'^'y' <'^^yy %/^^^V V^^'.o^ .«b^^^. li^ - 1 • < .- %. t; -^^d* ^i^- ^-^ -^^ "^ •:(^^: ■^*^ ^.v 1^ ■• o %A « ♦ ' AO^ l^^-f/ y^c^''^ A^ %i* • • • 'bV^ .0 v', ^ <&" .•4 o v^\*'- ^'-. "-n..^ <<*'^^ 9- 'sm^ff'* ^^y t"^^^^^ ^^^ 'M^^- ^o> •"''yam. v4''% i^K*' /"^x '"-^^^^-j^^^^ "-^^^'./^x. '•f^ ^^i^^'\. ^•^^^;i>'l%% ^^.^;^^\ ^*' ^ .4 , %.^^ SPEECHES ^ OF JOHSf C. CAlHOUSf. DELIVERED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1811 TO THE PRESENT TIME. N E W - y R K : HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF-STREET. 18 4 3. Entered, according to Act of Congress, m the year 1843, by Harper & Brothers, In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New- York. ADVERTISEMENT. It may not be inappropriate to set forth, briefly, the considerations which have induced the pubUshers to ofFer this volume to the pubHc. ^ The speeches which it contains afford the principal— it might almost be said, the only— means of knowing the political opinions of a citizen who, for a long suc- cession of years, has occupied a conspicuous place before the people j who, as a high officer of the government at one time, and as a statesman and legislator both before and since that time, has taken a leading part in all the great political questions that have agitated the country; who has long pos- sessed an almost paramount influence in one part of the Union, and been looked upon, in fact, as the chief representative of political opinion in thai portion; and who, finally, has now retired from direct participation in the councils of the country, only to occupy the station of a candidate for the highest office in the gift of the people. The political doctrines of such 2 man cannot but afford interesting matter for attention and study ; and it ij believed that both friends and opponents of the distinguished person referrec to will gladly avail themselves of this opportunity to make themselves ac- quainted with his views and principles. The publishers have only to add, that in collecting the materials for the succeeding pages, they have resorted to the most authentic sources. ^ H. & B. New-York, June, 1843. CONTENTS. Page I. Delivered in the House of Representatives, December 19, 1811, in the De- bate on the Second Resolution reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations 9 II. Onslow in Reply to Patrick Henry — No. 1 14 " " " No. 2 22 III. Mr. Calhoun's Address, stating his Opinion of the RelatLQa_which the, "^Slates. and General Government bear to each other . . '. . 27 IV. MrrCalhoun's Letter to General Hamilton on the Subject of State Inter- position 43 V. Speech against the Force Bill 67 - VI. Speech on his Resolutions, and Reply to Mr. Webster, February 26, 1833 98 -^ VII. Speech on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites from the Bank of the United States, January 13, 1834 122 -^-VIII. Speech on Mr. Webster's Proposition to Recharter the United States Bank, March 26, 1834 138 IX. Speech delivered in the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1834, on the Bill to Repeal the Force Act 154 X. A Report on the Extent of Executive Patronage, February 9, 1835 . . 168 XI. A Report on that Portion of the President's Message which related to the Adoption of efficient Measures to prevent the Circulation of incendiary Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4, 1836 .189 XII. Speech on the Abolition Petitions, March 9, 1836 197 XIII. Speech on the Bill to prohibit Deputy Postmasters from receiving and transmitting through the Mail certain Papers therein mentioned, April 12, 1836 210 XIV. Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, February, 1837 . 222 XV. Speech on the Public Deposites, May 28, 1836 226 XVI. Speech on the Bill for the Admission of Michigan, Januar>' 2, 1837 . . 243 XVII. On the same Subject, January 5, 1837 249 --XVIII. Speech on the Bill authorizing an Issue of Treasury Notes, September 19, 1837 259 - - XIX. Speech on his Amendment to Separate the Government from the Banks, October 3, 1837 275 XX. Speech on the Sub-treasury Bill, February 15, 1838 .... 290 XXI. Speech in Reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 10, 1838 . 309 XXII. Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster on4;he Sub-treasury Bill, March 22, 1838 32 XXIII. Speech on the Bill to Prevent the Interference of certain Federal Officers in Elections, February 22, 1839 352 XXIV. Speech on the Report of Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the As- sumption of the Debts of the States by the Federal Government, Febru- ary 5, 1840 363 XXV. Speech on his Resolutions in reference to the Case of the Enterprise, March 13, 1840 378 XXVI. Speech on the Bankrupt Bdl, June 2, 1840 390 XXVIl. Speech on the Prospective Pre-emption Bill, January 12, 1841 . 403 XXVIII. Speech on the Bill to Distribute the Proceeds of the Public Lands, Janu- ary 23, 1841 417 XXIX. Speech in Reply to the Speeches of Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, on Mr. y Crittenden's Amendment to the Pre-emption Bill, January 30, 1841 . 429-^ XXX. Speech on the Case of M'Leod, June 11, 1841 442 XXXI. Speech on the Distribution Bill, August 24, 1841 447 XXXII. Speech on the Treasury Note Bill, January 25, 1842 .... 462 XXXIII. Speech in Support of the Veto Power, February 28, 1842 .... 477 XXXIV. Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in Relation to the Revenues and Expen- ditures of the Government, March 16, 1842 439 XXXV. Speech on the Loan Bill, April 12, 1842 509 -t'-XXXVI. Speech on the Passage of the Tariff Bill, August 5, 1842 . . . .518 XXXVII. Speech on the Treaty of Washington, August, 1842 532 XXXVIII. Speech on the Oregon Bill, January 24, 1843 544 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. I. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 19, 1811, IN THE DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FOR- EIGN RELATIONS. Mr. Speaker — I understood the opinion of the Committee of Foreign Rela- tions differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that the committee recom- mended the measures now before the house as a preparation for war ; and such, in fact, was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member except that gentleman. I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but consider it the eflect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed, the report could mean nothing but war or empty menace. I hope no member is in favour of the lat- ter. A bullying, menacing system has everything to condemn and nothing to recommend it — in expense it almost rivals war. It excites contempt abroad and destroys confidence at home. Menaces are serious things, which ought to be resorted to with as much caution and seriousness as war itself; and should, if not successful, be invariably followed by war. It was not the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) that made this a war question. The resolve contemplates an additional regular force ; a measure confessedly improper but as a preparation for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event. Sir, I am not insensible to the weighty importance of this question, for the first time sub- mitted to this house, to r^ompel a redress of our long list of complaints against one of the belligerants. According to my mode of thinking, the more serious the question, my conviction to support it must be the stronger and more unal- terable. War, in. our country, ought never to be resorted to but when it is clearly justifiable and necessary ; so much so as not to require the aid of logic to convince our understanding, nor the ardour of eloquence to inflame our pas- sions. There are many reasons why this country should never resort to it but for causes the most urgent and necessary. It is sufiicient that, under a govern- ment like ours, none but such will justify it in the eyes of the people ; and were I not satisfied that such is the present case, I certainly would be no advocate of the proposition now before the house. Sir, I might prove the war, should it follow, to be justifiable, by the express admission of the gentleman from Virginia ; and necessary, by facts undoubted and universally admitted, such as he did not attempt to controvert. The ex- tent, duration, and character of the injuries received ; the failure of those peace- ful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, are my proofs that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen — depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to reg- ulate our trade with other nations 1 negotiation, resorted to again and again, till it became hopeless, and the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and in the vain expectation of returning justice ? The evil still continued to grow, so that each succeeding year exceeded in enormity the preceding. The ques- tion, even in the opinion and admission of our opponents, is reduced to this sin- B 10 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. gle point : Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and mar- itime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens employed in exercising them ? These rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of re- dress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, unless we consider the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission as the best remedy. It is for the house to decide which of the alternatives ought to be embraced. I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority than the voice of any man. It is not in the power of speech to infuse the sense of independence and honour. To resist wrong is the instinct of nature ; a gen- erous nature, that disdains tame submission. This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gen- tleman from Virginia. He dared not to deny his country's wrongs, or vindi- cate the conduct of her enemy. But one part only of his argument had any, the most remote relation to this point. He would not say that we had not a good cause for war, but insisted that it was our duty to define that cause. If he means that this house ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other, to specify any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all others, he prescribes a course which neither good sense nor the usage of nations war- rants. ^Vhen we contend, let us contend for all our rights — the doubtful and the certain, the unimportant and essential. It is as easy to contend, or even more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the contest, secure all that our wisdom, and valour, and the fortune of war will permit. This is the dictate of common sense, and such, also, is the usage of nations. The sin- gle instance alluded to, the endeavour of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define the object of the war against France, will not support the gentleman from Vir- ginia in his position. That was an extraordinary war for an extraordinary pur- pose, and was not governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest or for redress of injury, but to impose a government on France which she refused to receive — an object so detestable that an avowal dare not be made. I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the proposition is estab- lished. I cannot but advert, however, to the complaint of the gentleman from "V irginia when he was first up on this question. He said he found himself re- duced to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the question before the affirmative was established. Let me tell that gentleman that there is no hard- ship in his case. It is not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I to affirm that the house is now in session, would it be reasonable to ask for proof? He who would deny its truth, on him would be the proof of so extra- ordinary a negative. How, then, could the gentleman, after his admissions, and ■with the facts before him and the nation, complain? The causes are such as to warrant, or, rather, to make it indispensable in any nation not absolutely de- l)endant to defend its rights by arms. Let him, then, show the reasons why we ought not so to defend ourselves. On him, then, is the burden of proof. This ho has attempted. He has endeavoured to support his negative. Before I pro- ceed to answer him particularly, let me call the attention of the house to one circumstance, that almost the whole of his arguments consisted of an enumer- ation of evils always incident to war, however just and necessary ; and that, if they have any force, it is calculated to produce unqualified submission to every species of insult and injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments of that description, and if 1 should allude to them, it will be only incidentally, and not for the jnirpose of serious refutation. The first argument which I shall notice is the unprepared state of the coun- try. Whatever weight this argument might have in a question of immediate war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country is unpre- pared, let us prepare as soon as possible. Let the gentleman subm'it his plan, and if a reasonable one, I doubt not it will be supported by the house. But, sir, let us admit the fact with the whole force of the argument ; I ask, whose is SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 11 the fault 1 Who has been a member for many years past, and has seen the defenceless state of his country, even near home, under his own eyes, without a sinde endeavour to remedy so serious an evil ? Let him not say " I have acted in a minority." It is no less the duty of the minority than a majority to endeavour to defend the country. For that purpose principally we are sent here, and not for that of opposition. We are next told of the expenses of the war, and that the people will not pay taxes. Why not? Is it a want of means ? What, with 1,000,000 tons of shipping ; a commerce of $100,000,000 annually ; manufactures yielding a yearly product of $150,000,000, and agriculture thrice that amount; shall we, with such great resources, be told that the country wants ability to raise and support 10,000 or 15,000 additional regulars? No : it has the ability, that is admitted ; but will it not have the disposition ? Is not our course just and ne- cessary ? Shall we, then, utter this libel on the people ? Where will proof be found of a fact so disgraceful ? It is said, in the history of the country twelve or fifteen years ago. The case is not parallel. The ability of the country is greatly increased since. The whiskey tax was unpopular. But, as well as my memory serves me, the objection was not so much to the tax or its amount as the mode of collectnig it. The people were startled by the host of officers, and their love of liberty shocked with the multiplicity of regulations. We, in the spirit of imitation, copied from the most oppressive part of the European laws on the subject of taxes, and imposed on a young and virtuous people the se- vere provisions made necessary by corruption and the long practice of evasion. If taxes should become necessary, I do not hesitate to say the people will pay cheerfully. It is for their government and their cause, and it would be their interest and duty to pay. But it may be, and I believe was said, that the peo- ple will not pay taxes, because the rights violated are not worth defending, or that the defence will cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my solemn protest against this low and " calculating avarice" entering this hall of legisla- tion. It'is only fit for shops and counting-houses, and ought not to disgrace the seat of power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches sovereign pow- er, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is a com- promising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but under the shield of honour. There is, sir, one principle necessary to make us a great people — to produce, not the form, but real spirit of union, and that is to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he is backed by the government — that its arm is his arm. He then will rejoice in its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. This is the way which has led nations to greatness. Sir, I am not versed in this calculating policy, and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars and cents the value of national independence. I cannot measure in shillings and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of our impressed seamen ; nor even the value of our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under the orders in council and the British system of blockade. In thus expressing myself, I do not intend to condemn any prudent estimate of the means of a country before it enters on a war. That is wisdom, the other folly. The gentleman from Virginia has not failed to touch on the calamity of war, that fruitful source of declamation, by which humanity is made the advocate of sub- mission. If he desires to repress the gallant ardour of our countrymen by such topics, let me inform him that true courage regards only the cause ; that it is just and necessary, and that it contemns the sufferings and dangers of war. If he really wishes well to the cause of humanity, let his eloquence be addressed to the British ministry, and not the American Congress. Tell them that, if they persist in such daring insult and outrages to a neutral nation, however in- clined to peace, it will be bound by honour and safety to resist ; that their pa- 12 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. tience and endurance, however great, will be exhausted ; that the calamity of war will ensue, and that they, and not we, in the opinion of the Avorld, will be answerable for all its devastation and raiser}^ Let a regard to the interest of humanity stay the hand of injustice, and my life on it, the gentleman Avill not find it dillicuit to dissuade iiis coimtrymen from rushing into the bloody scenes of war. We are next told of the danger of war. We are ready to acknowledge its hazard and misfortune, but I cannot think that we have any extraordinary dan- ger to apprehend, at least none to warrant an acquiescence in the injuries we have received. On the contrary, I believe no war would be less dangerous to internal peace or the safety of the country. But we are told of the black pop- ulation of the Southern States. As far as the gentleman from Virginia speaks of his own personal knowledge, I shall not question the correctness of his statement. I only regret that such is the state of apprehension in his part of the country. Of the southern section, I too have some personal knowledge, and can say that in South Carolina no such fears, in any part, are felt. But, sir, admit the gentleman's statement : will a war with Great Britain increase the danger ? VV'ill the country be less able to suppress insurrections ? Had we anything to fear from that quarter — which. I do not believe — in my opinion, the period of the greatest safety is during a war, unless, indeed, the enemy should make a lodgment in the country. It is in war .that the countrj' would be most on iis guard, our militia the best prepared, and the standing army the greatest. Even in our Revolution, no attempts were made at insurrection by that portion of our pop- ulation ; and, however the gentleman may alarm himself with the disorganizing eilects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks have felt much of their baneful influence. I dare say more than one half of them never heard of the French Revolution. But as great as he regards the danger from our slaves, the gentleman's fears end not there — the standing army is not less terrible to liim. Sir, I think a regidar force, raised for a period of actual hostilities, cannot properly be called a standing army. There is a just distinction between such a force and one raised as a permanent peace establishment. Whatever would be the composi- tion of the latter, I hope the former will consist of some of the best materials of the country. The ardent patriotism of our young men, and the liberal bounty in land proposed to be given, will impel them to join their country's stand- ard, and to fight her battles. They will not forget the citizen in the soldier, and, in obeying their officers, learn to contemn their government and Con- stitution. In our officers and soldiers we will find patriotism no less pure and ardent than in the private citizen ; but if they should be as depraved as has been represented, what have we to fear from 25,000 or 30,000 regulars ? Where will be the boasted militia of the gentleman ? Can 1,000,000 of militia be ovorpowfred by 30,000 regulars ? If so, how can we rely on them against a foe invading our country? Sir, I have no such contemptuous idea of our militia : their untaught bravery is sufficient to crush all foreign and internal at- tempts on their country's liberties. But we have not yet come to the end of the chapter of dangers. The gen- tleman's imagination, so fruitful on this subject, conceives that our Constitution is not caiculat«'d for war, and that it cannot stand its rude shock. Can that be 80 ? If so, we must then depend upon the commiseration or contempt of other nations for our existence. The Constitution, then, it seems, has failed in an essential object : " to provide for the common defence." -No, says the gentle- man, it is competent to a defensive, but not an offensive war. It is not neces- sary for me to expose the fallacy of this argument. Why make the distinction in this case f Will he pretend to say that this is an oilonsive war— a war of conquest ? Yes, the gentleman has ventured to make this assertion, and for reasons- no less extraordinary than the assertion itself. He says, our rights are SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 13 violated on the ocean, and that these violations affect our shipping and commer- cial rights, to which the Canadas have no relation. The doctrine of retaUation has been much abused of late, by an unreasonable extension of its meaning. We have now to witness a new abuse : the gentleman from Virginia has limited it down to a point. By his rule, if you receive a blow on the breast, you dare not return it on the head ; you are obliged to measure atid return it on the pre- cise point on which it was received. If you do not proceed with this mathe- matical accuracy, it ceases to be selT-defence — it becomes an improvoked attack. In speaking of Canada, the gentleman from Virginia introduced the name of Montgomery with much feeling and interest. Sir, there is danger in that name to the gentleman's argument. It is sacred to heroism ! it is indignant of sub- mission ! It calls our memory back to the time of onr Revolution — to the Con- gress of 1774 and 1775. Suppose a member of that day had rose and urged all the arguments which we have heard on this occasion — had told that Con- gress your contest is about the right of laying a tax — that the attempt on Cana- da had nothing to do with it — that the war would be expensive — that danger and devastation would overspread our country — and that the power of Great Britain was irresistible. With what sentiment, think you, would such doctrines have been then received ? Happy for us, they had no force at that period of our country's glory. Had such been acted on, this hall would never have witnessed a great people convened to deliberate for the general good ; a mighty empire, with prouder prospects than any nation the sun ever shone on, would not have risen in the West. No ! we would have been base, subjected colonies, gov- erned by that imperious rod which Britain holds over her distant provinces. The gentleman attributes the preparation for war to everything but its true cause. He endeavoured to find it in the probable rise in the price of hemp. He represents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge our coun- try into war for such interested and base motives. I will not reason this point. I see the cause of their ardour, not in such unworthy motives, but in their known patriotism and disinterestedness. No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to the Southern States. He says that the Non-importation Act has reduced cotton to nothing, Avhich has produced a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of our planta- tions is worth but little, but not for the cause assigned by the gentleman. The people of that section do not reason as he does ; they do not attribute it to the efforts of their government to maintain the peace and independence of their country : they see in the low price of their produce the hand of foreign injustice ; they know well, Avithout the market of the Continent, the deep and steady cur- rent of our supply will glut that of Great Britain. They are not prepared for the colonial state, to which again that power is endeavouring to reduce us.. The manly spirit of that section will not submit to be regulated by any foreiga power. The love of France and the hatred of England have also been assigned as the cause of the present measure. France has not done us justice, says the gentleman from Virginia, and how can we, without partiality, resist the aggres- sions of England ? I know, sir, we have still cause of complaint against France, but it is of a different character from that against England. She professes now to respect our rights ; and there cannot be a reasonable doubt but that the most objectionable parts of her decrees, as far as they respect us, are repealed. We have already formally acknowledged this to be a fact. But I protest against the principle from which his conclusion is drawn. It is a novel doctrine, and nowhere avowed out of this house, that you cannot select your antagonist without being guilty of partiality. Sir, when two invade your rights, you may resist both, or either, at your pleasure. The selection is regu- lated by prudence, and not by right. The stale imputation of partiality for France is better calculated for the columns of a newspaper than for the walls of this house. 14 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. The trentleman from Yir-inia is at a loss to account for what he calls our hatred to En"land. He asks, how can we hate the country of Locke of New- ton HauMMlcn, and Chatham ; a country having the same language and customs with our:,.-ive3, and descended from a common ancestry ? Sir, the laws of hu- man allections are steadv and uniform. If we have so much to attach us to that countn-, powerful indeed must be the cause which has overpowered it. Yes there is a causo strong enough; not that occidt, courtly affection, which he has -supposed lO be entertained for France, but continued and unprovoked insult and injun' : a cause so manifest that he had to exert much ingenuity to overlook it. But the gentleman, m his eager admiration of England, has not been sulHciently guarded in his argument. Has he reflected on the cause of that admiration ? Has he examined the reasons for our high regard for her Chat- ham? It is his ardent patriotism — his heroic courage, which could not brook the least insult or injury offered to his country, but thought that her interest and her honour ought to be vindicated, be the hazard and expense what they might. 1 hoiH}, when we are called on to admire, we shall also be asked to imitate. I hope the gentleman does not wish a monopoly of those great virtues for Englaiid. The balance of power has also been introduced as an argument for submis- sion. England is said to be a barrier against the military despotism of France. There is, sir, one great error in our legislation ; we are ready, it would seem from this argument, to watch over the interests of foreign nations, while we grossly neglect our own immediate concerns. This argument, drawn from the balance of° power, is well calculated for the British Parliament, but is not at all suited to the American Congress. Tell the former that they have to coii- tend with a mighty power, and if they persist in insult and injmy to the Ameri- can people, they will compel them to throw their weight into the scale of their enemy. Paint the danger to them, and if they will desist from injiuing us, I answer for it, we will not disturb the balance of power. But it is absurd for us to talk about it, while they, by their conduct, smile with contempt at what they regard as our simple, good-natured vanity. If, however, in the contest, it should be found that they imderrate us, which I hope and believe, and that we can affect the balance of power, it will not be difficult for us to obtain such terras as our rights demand. I, sir, will -now conclude, by adverting to an argument of the gentleman used in debate on a preceding day. He asked, why not declare war immediately 1 The answer is obvious — because we are not yet prepared. But, says the gen- tleman, such language as is held here will provoke Great Britain to commence hostilities. I have no such fears. She knows well that such a course would imite all parties here — a thing which, above all others, she most dreads. Be- sides, such has been our past conduct, that she will still calculate on our pa- tience and submission till war is actually commenced. II. ONSLOW IN REPLY TO PATRICK HENRY. No. 1. If rumour may be credited, I may be proud in having you as an antagonist [Mr. A., the President of the United States] ; and if I were actuated by a senti- ment of vanity, much of my reply would be devoted to tracing the strong, but, perhaps, accidental analogy between the style of your numbers and some of our public documents. But truth, and not the gratification of vanity, is my ob- ject ; and though the pride of victory would be swelled in proportion to the high SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 15 Standing of an opponent, I shall, without stopping to inquire into the question of authorship, proceed directly to the point at issue. If you have failed in your argument, you have, at least, succeeded in giving the question a new and interesting aspect. You have abandoned the rules and usages of the Senate, as the source of the Vice-president's authority as the presiding officer of the Senate. You contend that the disputed right is derived directly from the Constitution, and that the Vice-president's authority is wholly independent of the will of the Senate, which can neither give nor take it away. It is not my wish to misstate your arguments in the slightest degree, and, to avoid the possibility of misrepresentation, you shall speak for yourself. Spurn- ing the authority of the Senate, you scornfully observe, " With the easy assu- rance of a man stating a conceded postulate, he (Onslow) says, ' After z\\, the power of the Vice-president must depend upon the rules and usages of the Sen- ate :' a postulate not only false in its principle, but which, if true, would not sustain the cause to whose aid it is invoked. Unless the Constitution of the United States was subjected to some military construction, the power of the Vice-president, in presiding over the Senate, rests on deeper, holier founda- tions than any rules or usages which that body may adopt. What says the Constitution ? ' The Vice-president of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided.' ' The Sen- ate shall choose their own officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of Presi- dent of the United States.' — (Const. U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 3.) It is here made the duty of the Vice-president to preside over the Senate, under the sole re- striction of having no vote except in a given case ; the right of the Senate to choose their president is confined to two contingencies ; his powers, after be- ing so chosen, are identical with those of the president set over them by the Constitution, and any abridgment of those powers by the Senate would be a pal- pable infraction of that Constitution. Now, sir, what is the inVport of the terra ' to preside,' in relation to a deliberative assembly ? Can any sophistry devise a plausible definition of it, which would exclude the power of preserving or- der ? In appointing an officer to preside over the Senate, the people surely in- tended not to erect an empty pageant, but to accomplish some useful object : and when, in another part of the Constitution, they authorize each house ' to determine the rules of its proceedings,' they do not authorize it to adopt rules depriving any office created by the Constitution of powers belonging, ex vi ter- mini, to that office. If the plainest or most profound man in the commimity Avere asked what powers he supposed to be inherent in the presiding officer of either house of Congress, he would instantly enumerate, first, the power of preserving order in its deliberations ; next, that of collecting the sense of its members on any question submitted to their decision ; and, thirdly, that of au- thenticating, by his signature, their legislative acts. I have before said, and I regret that I am obliged to repeat a truism, that ' the right to call to order is a necessary consequence of the power of preserving order ;' and that, ' unless a deliberative body, acting within the sphere of its competence, expressly restrict this power and this right, no restriction on them can then be supposed.' In di- vesting the president set over them by the people, of any power which he had received, either expressly or impliedly, from the people, the Senate, instead of ' acting withiri the sphere of their competence,' would act usurpingly and un- constitutionally — they would nullify the connexion which the people had es- tabUshed between themselves and their president; they would reduce them- selves to the monstrous spectacle of a body without a head, and their president to the equally monstrous spectacle of a head without a body ; and their violent act, while it would be disobeyed as illegal, would be contemned as ridiculous. But, in truth, the Senate have never thus forgotten their allegiance to the Con- stitution." IQ SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. There can be no mistake as to the source or the nature of the power, ac • cordiiur to your conception. You tell us plainly that it rests " on a deeper, holier Lundation ' than the rules of the Senate— that it is " inherent in the Vice- president and that, as presiding officer, he possesses it ex vi termini ; that an attempt to divest, and, of course, to modify the power 'by the Senate, would be to act' usurpingly and unconstitutionally," and that " such violent act would be disobeyed as iflegal, and contemned as ridiculous." _ These are, at least, lofty grounds, and if they can be maintained, there is an end of the controversy. It would be absurd to go farther. An inquiry into the ndes and usages of the Senate, after such grounds are occupied, becomes ri- diculous, and much more so an inquiry into those of the houses of Parliament : for surely, if it is beyond the power of the Senate to give or withhold the right, it must stand on an elevation far above parliamentary rules or usages ; and I was therefore not a little surprised to find that, after so bold an assertion, more than four fifths of your long and elaborate essay was devoted to a learned and critical inquiry into these very rules and usages. There can be but one expla- nation of so strange an inconsistency, but that a very satisfactory one. You lack confidence in your own position ; and well might you : for, surely, power so despotic and dangerous, so inconsistent with the first principles of liberty, and every sound view of the Constitution, was never attempted to be establish- ed on arguments so imbecile and absurd, to which no intellect, however badly organized, could yield assent, unless associated with feelings leaning strongly lo°the side of power. That such are your feelings, no one who reads your es- say can doubt. None of your sympathies are on the Democratic side of our in- stitutions. If a question can be made as to where power is lodged, it requires but little sagacity to perceive that you will be found on the side which will place it in the fewest and least responsible hands. You perceive perfection only in the political arrangement, which, with simplicity and energy, gives pow- er to a single will. It is not, then, at all surprising, that you should seize on that portion of the Constitution which appoints the Vice-president to be Presi- dent of the Senate ; and that you should quote it at large, and dwell on it at length, as the source of high and uncontrollable power in that officer ; while you have but slightly and casually adverted to another section in the same article, which clothes the Senate with the power " of determining the rules of their pro- ceedings, punishing its members for disorderly conduct, and, with the concur- rence of two thirds, of expelUng a member." — (See Art. 1, Sec. 5.) Had your predilections for the unity and irresponsibility of power been less strong, you could not have failed to see that the point of view in which you have thought proper to place the question made it one of relative power between the Senate and its presiding officer. You place the Vice-president on one side and the Sen- ate on the other ; and the more you augment the constitutional power of the for- mer as the presiding officer, just in the same proportion you diminish the pow- er of the latter. What is gained to the one is lost to the other ; and in this com- petition of power you were bound to present fully and fairly both sides. This you have not done, and, consequently, you have fallen not only into gross, but dangerous errors. You set out by asserting that the very object of the appoint- ment of the Vice-president as President of the Senate was to preserve order, and that he has all the powers, ex vi termini, necessary to the attainment of the end for which he was appointed. Having gained this point, you make your next step, that the right of enforcing order involves that of calling to order, and that again involves the very power in question, which the Vice-president de- clined to exercise. You then draw two corollaries : that the power held by the Vice-president being derived direct from the Constitution, is held independ- ently of the Senate, and is, consequently, beyond their control or participation ; and that, as the Vice-president alone possesses it, he, and he alone, is respon- sible for order and decorum. Such is your summary logic, which you accom- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 17 pany with so much abuse of Mr. Calhoun for not calling the power, which you have as you suppose, clearly proven that he possesses by the Constitution, into active energy, by correcting and controlling, at his sole will and pleasure, the licentious and impertinent debates of the Senators. , ^ , ^ a Let us now turn the same mode of reasoning on the side of the Senate, and you will perceive that it applies with infinite more force, though you have not thought it deserving of notice. . . The Constitution has vested the Senate with the right of determining the rules of its proceedings, and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, which may extend even to expulsion. The great object of givmg the power to estab- lish rules is to preserve order. The only effectual means of preserving order is to prescribe by rules what shall be a violation of order, and to enforce the same by adequate punishment. The Senate alone has these powers by the Constitution : consequently, the Senate alone has the right of enforcing order ; and, consequently, whatever right the Vice-president possesses over order, must be derived from the Senate ; and, therefore, he can exercise no power in adopting rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated to him by the Senate,°and only to the extent, both in manner and matter, to which the power has been delegated. The particular power in question not havmg been dele- aated, cannot be exercised by the Vice-president, and, consequently, he is not responsible. Do you not perceive the irresistible force with which your own mode of reasoning applies to the substantial constitutional powers of the Senate, and how partial and absurd your arguments in favour of the inferred constitu- tional power of its presiding officer must appear in contrast with it J As absurd as it now appears, it shall be, if possible, intinitely more so before I have closed this part of the investigation. -u • j f With the same predilection, your assumptions are all on the side ot uncon- trolled and unlimited power. Without proof, or even an attempt at it, you as- sume that the power in controversy is inherent in the Vice-president, and that he possesses it ex vi termini, as presiding officer of the Senate. Now 1, who have certainly as much right to assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any such power ; and what may, perhaps, startle a mind organized like yours, 1 af- firm that, as a presiding officer, he has no inherent power whatever, unless that of doin^"i ix^...".--.K- ^1 not onlv attacked the decision of Mr. Calhoun, but you have impugned his mo- lives \vith licentious severity. The corrupt are the most disposed to attribute corruption, and your unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C.'s motives speak as little in favour of your heart as your arguments do of your head. For- tunately for the Vice-president, his general character for virtue and patriotism shields'him from the imputation of such gross abuse of power, from such impure motives as you attribute to him. He could not decide differently from what he did without being at war with the principles which have ever governed him. It is well known to all acquainted with him, publically or privately, that the maxim which he holds in the highest veneration, and which he regards as the founda- tion of our whole system of government, is, that power should be controlled by the body over which it is exercised, and that, without such responsibility, all delegated power would speedily become corrupt. Whether he is wrong in giv- ing too high an estimate to this favourite maxim is immaterial. It is, and long hal been, his, and could not fail in having great influence in the decision which you have so seriously assaulted. Had his principles been like yours, as illus- trated in your essay, it is possible he might have taken a different view of the subject ; but, as he has decided in conformity to principles long fixed in his mind, there is something malignant in the extreme to attribute his decision to motives of personal enmity. You not only attack Mr. C.'s motives for this de- cision, but also his motive for the constitution of the Committee of Foreign Re- lations. You think it a crime in him that the venerable and patriotic Alacon should be placed at the head of the committee. I will neither defend him nor the other members of the committee. They need no defence ; but I cannot but remark, that the election of Mr. Macon president pro tern, of the Senate is a singular comment on your malignant attack on the Vice-president. It would have been impossible that you should steer clear of the cant of your party, and we accordingly have a profusion of vague charges about Mr. Cal- houn's ambition. The lowest and most mercenary hireling can easily coin such charges ; and while they deal in the general, without a single specification, it is utterly impossible to meet or refute them ; but, fortunately, they go for no- thing with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, on the part of those who make them, they evince an envious, morbid mind, which, having no real ground of attack, indulges in vague, unmeaning abuse. It is highly honourable to Mr. C. that, in the midst of so much political enmity, his personal and public char- acter stands free from all but one specific charge — which is, that he has incli- ned, in his present station, too much against his own poioer, and too muck in favour of the inestimable right of the freedom of debate. That he has been indefatiga- ble in the discharge of his duty ; that he has been courteous to the members, and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. Not a moment was he absent from his post during a long and laborious session, and often remained in the chair, without leaving it, from eight to twelve hours. He has, however, com- mitted one unpardonable sin which blots out all. He did not stop Mr. Ran- dolph. This is the head and front of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph ? Is he or his manners a stranger in our national councils ? For more than a quarter of a century he has been a member of Congress, and during the whole time his character has remained unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, se- vere, and eccentric ; not unfrequently wandering from the question, but often uttering wisdom worthy of a Bacon, and wit that would not discredit a Sheri- dan, every speaker had freely indulged him in his peculiar manner, and that •without responsibility or censure ; and none more freely than the present Sec- retary of State, while he presided in the House of Representatives. He is elected, with a knowledge of all this, by the ancient and renowned common- wealth of Virginia, and takes his seat in the Senate. An immediate outcry is made against the Vice-president for permitting him, who has been so long per- inoiiga m no respecxs were iiis a,uacKs oil ims aamimsiraiioii ireer man wnat they had been on those of Mr. Jeflerson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe. Who can doubt, if Mr. Calhoun had yielded to this clamour, that the whole current would have turned, and that he would then have been more severely denounced for what would have been called his tyranny and usurpation, than he has been for refusing to interfere with the freedom of debate ? His author- ity would have been denied, and properly denied : the fact that Mr. R. had been permitted by all other presiding officers, for so long a time, to speak without re- straint, would have been dwelt on ; and the injustice done to the senator, and the insult offered to the state that sent him, would have been painted in the most lively colours. These considerations, we are satisfied, had no weight ■with the Vice-president. Those who know him know that no man is more re- gardless of consequences in the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on him is personal, in order to shake his political standing, and prostrate his char- acter, is clearly evinced by every circumstance ; and with this object, that he would have been assaulted, act as he might, is most certain. It is for the American people to determine whether this conspiracy against a public servant, whose only fault is that he has chosen the side of liberty rather than that of pow- er, and whose highest crime consists in a reverential regard for the freedom of debate, shall succeed. Onslow. / MR. CALHOUN S ADDRESS, STATING HIS OPINION OF THE RELATION WHICH THE STATES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT BEAR TO EACH OTHER. The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small imped- iment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labours of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political rev- olution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were imbodied and ably sus- tained : on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legislature ; and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other states. These resolutions and this report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief-justice M'Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail. As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this refer- ence to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately con- nected with this deeply-important subject ; but as there are many who may not have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however clear they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines which I conceive they embrace. from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character al- ready described ; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions ; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, " to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and lib- erties appertaining to them." This right of interposition, thus solemnly assert- ed by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may — State-right, veto, nullifi- cation, or by any other name — I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions. I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionarj'. Could I believjD such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom- mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo- site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great in- struments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity ; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and, so far from anar- chical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is in- compatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, con- sidered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said to give to the General Govermnent the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make " its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;" and that, " in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.'^ Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher author- * ity be adduced. / That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken dilferent views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with me ; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious ex- amination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I must fliink that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential at- tribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states, and who attribute to the Gen- eral Govermnent a ri^ht utterly incompatible with what all acknowledo-e to be its limited and restricted character : an error originating principally, as I must stitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions. It has been well' said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the object of a constitution is to restr.ain the government, as that of laws is to restrain individuals. The remark is correct; nor is it less true where the government is vested in a majority than where it is in a single or a few individuals — in a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the maxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and contined to subjects in which every portion of the community have similar interests ; but it is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right, and therefore absolute and unlimited. By nature every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments, whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority ; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will ; and such I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests. That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible to doubt. They are to be fouud in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small or homogeneous, and they constitute everywhere the great difficulty of forming and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in fact, what mainly renders a constitution indispensable ; to overlook which, in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suf- frage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing inter- ests which renders it the most difficult work of man. Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was fonnerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional pro- vision is that each should be represented in the government, as a separate es- tate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England the Constitution has assumed ex- pressly this form, while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was effected under different, but not much less efficacious forms. The perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the constitutions of these renowned states all their celebrity, which secured their liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and sep- arate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear, to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation of liberty than the right of suffi-age itself. They, in fact, have a common object, to effect which the one is as necessary as the other to secure responsibility : that is, that those xoho make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on whom the laivs in reality operate — the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. If, without the right of suffi-age, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the stronger. Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We empt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry, and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision than where the distinct in- terests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into con- flict, and more dangerous, when in that state, than those of any other descrip- tion : so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not formed, in an extensive territory, separate and independent communities, or sub- jected the tchole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country. So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One Gener- al Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all the states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being, from their local and peculiar character, such that they could not be subject to the will of a majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injus- tice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subject- ed, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all the states are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphat- ically American, without example or parallel. To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and those of the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere independent ; each perfectly adapted to its respective objects ; the states acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests ; acting jointly through one General Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitu- tion, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To pre- serve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty depends. Ilow is this to be effected? The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization, where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by dis- tinct but coimected governments ; but it is, in reality, an old question under a new form, long shice perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar in- terests have been separately represented in any government ; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be preserved — the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free — to give to each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments the interests it par- ticularly represents : a principle which all of our Constitutions recognise in the distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to main- fundamental distribution of powers between the General and State Governments. So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to con- solidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right all powers of government ; for it is not possible to distinguish, practically, between a govern- ment having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but con- nected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has already been shown. These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible ; and I am at a loss to un- derstand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institu- tions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact that in every free state there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain the contrariety of opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract considera- tion of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the danger is much less from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a na- ture may be abused by a state, but when I reflect that the states unanimously called the General Government into existence with all its powers, which they freely delegated on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety, and prosperity required it ; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollection of common suflering and common triumph in the great and splendid achievement of their independence ; and that the strongest feelings of our nature, and among them the love of national power and distinc- tion, are on the side of the Union, it does seem to me that the fear which would strip the states of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependant corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peace- able protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship when they created the General Government, is unnatural and un- reasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system cannot be trusted to preserve it, who can 1 So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free state in which this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting inter- ests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government and a state come into conflict, we have a higher remedy : the power which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all its authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The states themselves may be appealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, form a power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a state acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may com- pel the government, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its infraction to the parties who created it ; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal proj- ect of giving to the General Government the sole and final right of interpret- ment the creature of its will instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its* creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority which imposed it, and from which the government itself derives its existence. That such would be the result, were the right in question vested in the le- gislative or executive branch of the government, is conceded by all. No one has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the rio^ht, or deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences which I have stated would necessarily follow ; but its advocates have been rec- onciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that there is one department of the General Government which, from its peculiar organization, affords an independ- ent tribunal through which the government may exercise the high authority which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all. I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the judiciary department. I am fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it to the fullest extent in its constitutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible for me to be- lieve that it was ever intended by the Constitution that it should exercise the power in question, or that it is competent to do so ; and, if it were, that it would be a safe depositary of the power. Its powers are judicial, and not political, and are expressly confined by the Constitution " to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority ;" and which I have high authority in asserting excludes political questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the process of the court.* Nor is its incompetency less clear than its want of con- stitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance. The tariff itself is a strong case in point ; and the reason applies equally to all others ichcre Congress per- verts a potcer from an object intended to one not intended, the most insidious and dangerous of all the infractions ; and which may he extended to all of its powers, more esprcialhj to the taxing and appropriating. But, supposing it competent to take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objec- tion still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in question. It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to pro- tect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their re- sponsible agents — a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the in- terests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former. In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the government, throno-h all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents ; and that the jiowcr which realhj controls, vltimatehj, all the movcmrnts, is not in the agents, but those icho elect or appoint them. To under- stand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in any supposable case, we must raise our view from the. mere agents to this high controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compoimd- ed of the majority of the states, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the states, estimated in federal numbers. These, united, constitute the real and final power which impels and directs the movements of the Gen- eral Government. The majority of the states elect the majority of the Senate ; of the people of the states, that of the House of Representatives ; the two uni- ♦ I rofer to the authority of Chief-justice Marshall, in the case of Jonathan Robbins. I have not been able to refer to the speech, and speak from memory. the President, really exercise all the powers of the government, with the excep- tion of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a ma- jority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this uni- ted majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legisla- tive or executive representative ; and to confide the power to the judiciary to determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated and what reserv- ed, would be, in reality, to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways ; and, of course, to subject (against the fundamental principle of our system and all sound political reason- ing) the reserved powers of the states, with all the local and peculiar interests they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not Jinally to re- sist, the will of a dominant majority. But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this point would have been long since settled forever by the State of Virginia. The report of her Legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says : " It has been objected" (to the right of a state to interpose for the pro- tection of her reserved rights) " that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the Constitution could never draw within the control of the judicial department ; secondly, that, if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally author- itative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the par- ties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judi- cial department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the grant of the Constitution, and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the par- ties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by an- other — by the judiciarj^, as well as by the executive or legislative." Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected that, if one of the party has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other ; and that, consequently, in cases of contested powers between a state and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts, and that, of course, it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption that the General Government is a party to the constitutional compact. The states, as has been shown, formed the compact, acting as sovereign and independent communities. The General Government is but its creature ; and though, in reality, a government, with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government, wnthin the orbit of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact be- tween sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and object, of the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which all are jointly concerned, but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power E facts and the clearest conclusions ; while to acknowledge its truth is to de- stroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case sup- posed. For, if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of gov- ernment, the final cognizance of a question of contested power »vould be in the states, and not in the General Government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in all similar cases o[ a contest between one or more of the principals and a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are the plain dictates of both reason and analogy. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cognizance, as against the principals much less to use force against them to maintain their construction of their powers. Such a right would be monstrous, and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases. That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the states and the General Government, we have the authority not only of reason and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jef- ferson, at a late period of his Ufc, after long experience and mature reflection, says, " With respect to our State and Federal Governments, I do not think their relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former are suljordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate de- partments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask. If the two de- partments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to decide between them ? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ; but, if it can neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the states must be called to ascribe the doubtfid power to that department which they may think best." It is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode of making them, has, by a simple contrivance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes efiectually the necessity, and even the pretext for force : a power to which none can fairly object ; with which the interests of all are safe ; which can definitive- ly close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and efiectual, and, at the same time, consistent with what are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations ; but, if not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government ; a constitutional or absolute one ; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states or on the unrestrained will of a majority ; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it never Lc fonrottcn that, uhc.rc the majority rules without restriction, the minority is tfte subject ; and that, if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclu- sive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, between the sovereign and subject, under such a government, no constitution, or, at least, nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument. How the states are to exercise this high power of interposition, which con- stitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot he deleUUIl v^ciiuima ciinj. i.iil^^^ ^^^^..^ j — ^ the government for some time after it went into operation ; these states having, in the first instance, declined to ratify. Nor had the act of any individual the least influence in subjecting him to the control of the General Government, ex- cept as it mif^ht influence the ratification of the Constitution by his own state. Whether subject to its control or not, depended wholly on the act of the state. His dissent had not the least weight against the assent of his state, nor his as- sent against its dissent. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that the act of ratification bound the state as a community, as is expressly declared in the ! article of the Constitution above quoted, and not the citizens of the state as in- dividuals : the latter being bound through their state, and in consequence of the ratification of the former. Another, and a highly important consequence, as it regards the subject under investigation, follows with equal certainty : that, on a question whether a particular power exercised by the General Government be granted by the Constitution, it belongs to the state as a member of the Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitively, as far as her citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she contracted ; and if, in her opinion, the act exercising the power be unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which declaration ivould be obligatory on her citizens. In coming to this conclusion, it may be proper to remark, to prevent misrepresentation, that I do not claim for a state the right to abrogate an act of the General Gov- ernment. It is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act. Such an act is of itself void and of no effect. What I claim is, the right of the state, as far as its citizens are concerned, to declare the extent of the obligation, and that such declaration is binding on thc?n — a right, when limited to its citizens, flowing directly from the relation of the state to the General Government on the one side, and its citizens on the other, as already explained, and resting on the most plain and solid reasons. Passing over, what of itself might be considered conclusive, the obvious prin- ciple, that it belongs to the authority which imposed the obligation to declare its extent, as far as those are concerned on whom the obligation is placed, I shall present a single argmnent, which of itself is decisive. I have already shown that there is no immediate connexion between the citizens of a state and the General Government, and that the relation between them is through the state. I have also shown that, whatever obligations were imposed on the cit- izens, were imposed by the act of the state ratifying the Constitution. A sim- ilar act by the same authority, made with equal solemnity, declaring the extent of the obligation, must, as far as they are concerned, be of equal authority. I speak, of course, on the supposition that the right has not been transferred, as it will hereafter be shown that it has not. A citizen would have no more right to question the one than he would have the other declaration. They rest on the same authority ; and as he was bound by the declaration of his state as- senting to the Constitution, whether he assented or dissented, so would he be equally bound by a declaration declaring the extent of that assent, whether op- posed to, or in favour of, such declaration. In this conclusion I am supported by analog)--. The case of a treaty between sovereigns is strictly analogous. There, as in this case, the state contracts for the citizen or subject ; there, as in this, the obligation is imposed by the state, and is independent of his will ; and there, as in this, the declaration of the state, determining the extent of the obligation contracted, is obligatory on him, as much so as the treaty itself. Having now, I trust, established the very important point, that the declara- tion of a state, as to the extent of the power granted, is obligatory on its citi- zens, I shall next proceed to consider the effects of such declarations in refer- ence to the General Government : a question which necessarily involves the consideration of the relation between it and the states. It has been shown that the people of the states, acting as disthict and independent communities, are the of its departments, is, in fact, the agent of the states, constituted to execute their joint will, as expressed in the Constitution. In usinff the term agent, I do not intend to derogate in any degree from its character as a government. It is as truly and properly a government as are the state governments themselves. I have applied it simply because it strictly belongs to the relation between the General Government and the states, as, in fact, it does also to that between a state and its own government. Indeed, ac- cording to our theory, governments are in their nature but trusts, and thosfe ap- pointed to administer them trustees or agents to execute the trust powers. The sovereignty resides elsewhere — in the people, not in the government ; and with us, the people mean the people of the several states originally formed into thirteen distinct and independent communities, and now into twenty-four. Po- litically speaking, in reference to our own system, there are no other people. The General Government, as well as those of the states, is but the organ of their power: the latter, that of their respective states, through which are exer- cised separately that portion of power not delegated by the Constitution, and in the exercise of which each state has a local and peculiar interest ; the former, the joint organ of all the states confederated into one general comm.unity, arid through which they jointly and concurringly exercise the delegated powers, in which all have a common interest. Thus viewed, the Constitution of the Uni- ted States, with the government it created, is truly and strictly the Constitution of each state, as much so as its own particular Constitution and government, ratified by the same authority, in the same mode, and having, as far as its citi- zens are concerned, its powers and obligations from the same source, differing only in the aspect, under which I am considering the subject, in the plighted faith of the state to its co-states, and of which, as far as its citizens are con- sidered, the state, in the last resort, is the exclusive judge. Such, then, is the relation between the state and General Government, in whatever light we may consider the Constitution, whether as a compact be- tween the states, or of the nature of the legislative enactment by the joint and concurring authority of the states in their high sovereignty. In whatever light it may be viewed, I hold it as necessarily resulting, that, in the case of a power disputed between them, the government, as the agent, has no right to enforce its construction against the construction of the state as one of the sovereign parties to the Constitution, any more than the state government would have against the people of the state in their sovereign capacity, the relation being the same between them. That such would be the case between agent and principal in the ordinary transactions of life, no one will doubt, nor will it be possible to assign a. reason why it is not as applicable to the case of gov- ernment as to that of individuals. The principle, in fact, springs from the re- latio7i itself, and is applicable to it in all its forms and characters. It may, how- ever, be proper to notice a distinction between the case of a single principal and his agent, and that of several principals and their joint agent, which might otherwise cause some confusion. In both cases, as between the agent and a principal, the construction of the principal, whether he be a single principal or one of several, is equally conclusive ; but, in the latter case, both the principal and the agent bear relation to the other principals, which must be taken into the estimate, in order to understand fully all the results which may grow out of the contest for power between them. Though the construction of the principal is conclusive against the joint agent, as between them, such is not the case be- tween him and his associates. They both have an equal right of construction, and it would be the duty of the agent to bring the subject before the principal to be adjusted, according to the terms of the instrument of association, and of the principal to submit to such adjustment. In such cases the contract itself to it The General Uovernmeni is a cuae ui juuu agoii.._y — .^ic jwx... agoi.i, kji the twentv-four sovereign states. It would be its duty, according to the prin- ciples established in such cases, instead of attempting to enforce Us construc- tion of its powers against that of the states, to bring the subject before the states themselves, in the only form which, according to the provision of the Constitu- tion it can' be— by a proposition to amend, in the manner prescribed in the in- strument, to be acted on by them in the only mode they can, by expressly grant- ing or withholding the contested power. Against this conclusion there can be rafsed but one objection, that the states have surrendered or transferred the right in question. If such be the fact, there ought to be no difficulty in estab- lishintT it. The grant of the powers delegated is contained in a written instru- ment.'drawn up with great care, and adopted with the utmost deliberation. It provides that the powers not granted are reserved to the states and the people. If it be surrendered, let the grant be shown, and the controversy will be ter- minated ; and, surely, it ought to be shown, plainly and clearly shown, before the states are asked to admit what, if true, would not only divest them of a right tvhich, under all its forms, belongs to the principal over his agent, unless surren- dered, but which cannot be surrendered without in effect, and for all practical purposes, reversing the relation between them ; putting the agent in the place of the principal, and the principal in that of the agent ; and which would de- grade the states from the high and sovereign condition which they have ever held, under every form of their existence, to be mere subordinate and dependant corporations of the government of its own creation. But, instead of showing any such grant, not a provision can be found in the Constitution authorizing the General Government to exercise any control ivhatever over a state by force, by veto, by judicial process, or in any other form— a most iinportant omission, de- signed, and not accidental, and, as will be shown in the course of these remarks, omitted by the dictates of the profoundest wisdom. The journal and proceedings of the Convention which formed the Constitu- tion afford abundant proof that there was in the body a powerful party, distin- guished for talents and influence, intent on obtaining for the General Govern- ment a grant of the very power in question, and that they attempted to eflect this object in all possible ways, but, fortunately, without success. The first project of a Constitution submitted to the Convention (Governor Randolph's) embraced a proposition to grant power " to negative all laws contrary, in the opin- ion of the National Legislature, to the articles of the Union, or any treaty sub- sisting under the authority of the Union ; and to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfil his duty under the articles thereof." The next project submitted (Charles Pinckney's) contained a simi- lar provision. It proposed, "that the Legislature of the United States should have the power to revise the laws of the several states that may be supposed to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress, and to negative and annil! such as do." The next was submitted by Mr. Pat- erson, of New-Jersey, which provided, "if any state, or body of men in any state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties" (of the Union), " the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the pow- ers of the confederated states, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to en- force, or compel the obedience to such acts, or observance of such treaties." General Hamilton's next succeeded, which declared " all laws of the particu- lar states contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States, to be ut- terly void ; and, the better to prevent such laws being passed, the governor or president of each state shall be appointed by the General Government, and shall have a negative on the laws about to be passed in the state of which he is governor or president." At a subsequent period, a proposition was moved and referred to a committee trOVersKis Ut/iwecii iiio uiiii-t;u kjiaics anu. any iiiuiviuuai otaoc , aiiu, ai, a suil later period, it was moved to grant power " to negative all laws passed by the several states interfering, in the opinion of the Legislature, with the general harmony and interest of the Union, provided that two thirds of the members of each house assent to the same," which, after an ineffectual attempt to commit, was withdrawn. I do not deem it necessary to trace through the journals of the Convention the fate of these various propositions. It is sufficient that they were moved and failed, to prove conclusively, in a manner never to be reversed, that the Convention which framed the Constitution was opposed to granting the power to the General Government in any form, through any of its departments, legis- lative, executive, or judicial, to coerce or control a state, though proposed in all conceivable modes, and sustained by the most talented and influential members of the body. This, one would suppose, ought to settle forever the question of the surrender or transfer of the power under consideration ; and such, in fact, would be the case, were the opinion of a large portion of the community not bi- ased, as, in fact, it is, by interest. A majority have almost always a direct in- terest in enlarging the power of the government, and the interested adhere to power with a pertinacity which bids defiance to truth, though sustained by evi- dence as conclusive as mathematical demonstration ; and, accordingly, the ad- vocates of the powers of the General Government, notwithstanding the impreg- nable strength of the proof to the contrary, have boldly claimed, on construc- tion, a power, the grant of which was so perseveringly sought and so sternly resisted by the Convention. They rest the claim on the provisions in the Constitution which declare " that this Constitution, and the laws made in pur- suance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land," and that " the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitu- tion, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." I do not propose to go into a minute examination of these provisions. They have been so frequently and so ably investigated, and it has been so clearly shown that they do not warrant the assumption of the power claimed for the government, that I do not deem it necessary. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a few detached remarks. I have already stated that a distinct proposition was made to confer the very power in controversy on the Supreme Court, which failed ; which of itself ought to overrule the assumption of the power by construction, unless sustained by the most conclusive argimients ; but when it is added that this proposition was moved (20th August) subsequent to the period of adopting the provisions, above cited, vesting the court with its present powers (18th July), and that an effort was made, at a still later period (23d August), to invest Congress with a negative on all state laws which, in its opinion, might interfere with the gen- eral interest and harmony of the Union, the argimient would seem too conclu- sive against the powers of the court to be overruled by construction, however strong. Passing by, however, this, and also the objection that the terms cases in law and equity are technical, embracing only questions between parties amenable to the process of the court, and, of course, excluding questions between the states and the General Government — an argument which has never been answered — there remains another objection perfectly conclusive. The construction which would confer on the Supreme Court the power in question, rests on the ground that the Constitution has conferred on that tribu- nal the high and important right of deciding on the constitutionality aflaws. That it possesses this power I do not deny, but I do utterly that it is conferred by the Constitution, either by the provisions above cited, or any other. It is a G by the Supreme Court exclusively or peculiarly, it not only belongs to every court of the country, high or low, civil or criminal, but to all foreign courts, be- fore which a case may be brought involving the construction of a law which may conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. The reason is plain. Where there are two sets of rules prescribed in reference to the same subject, one by a higher and the other by an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal called in to decide on the case must unavoidably determine, should they convict, which is the law ; and that necessity compels it to decide that the rule prescribed by the inferior power, if in its opinion inconsistent with that of the higher, is void, be it a conflict between the Constitution and a law, or between a charter and the by-laws of a corporation, or any other higher and inferior authority. The principle and source of authority are the same in all such cases. Being derived from neces- sity, it is restricted within its limits, and cannot pass an inch beyond the nar- row confines of deciding in a case before the court, and, of course, between par- ties amenable to its process, excluding thereby political questions, which of the two is, in reality, the law, the act of Congress or the Constitution, when on their face they are inconsistent ; and yet, from this resulting limited power, de- rived from necessity, and held in common with every court in the world which, by possibility, may take cognizance of a case involving the interpretation of our Constitution and laws, it is attempted to confer on the Supreme Court a power Avhich would work a thorough and radical change in our system, and which, moreover, was positively refused by the Convention. The opinion that the General Government has the right to enforce its con- struction of its powers against a state, in any mode whatever, is, in truth, found- ed on a fundamental misconception of our system. At the bottom of this, and, in fact, almost every other misconception as to the relation between the states and the General Government, lurks the radical error, that the latter is a national, and not, as in reality it is, a confederated government ; and that it derives its powers from a higher source than the states. There are thousands influenced by these impressions without being conscious of it, and who, while they believe themselves to be opposed to consolidation, have infused into their conception of our Constitution almost all the ingredients which enter into that form of government. The striking difTerence between the present government and that imder the old confederation (I speak of governments as distinct from constitu- tions) has mainly contributed to this dangerous impression. But, however dis- similar their governments, the present Constitution is as far removed from coh' solidalion, and is as strictly and as imrely a confederation, as the one which it su- perseded. Like the old confederation, it was formed and ratified by state authority. The only diflerence in this particular is, that one was ratified by the people of the states, and the other by the state governments ; one forming strictly a union of the state governments, the other of the states themselves ; one, of the agents ex- ercising the powers of sovereignty, and the other, of the sovereigns themselves ; but both were unions of })olitical bodies, as distinct from a union of the people individually. They are, indeed, both confederations, but the present in a higher and purer sense than that which it succeeded, just as the act of a sovereign is higher and more perfect than that of his agent ; and it was, doubtless, in ref- erence to this diUcrencc that the preamble of the Constitution, and the address of the Convention laying the Constitution before Congress, speak of consolida- ting and perfecting the Union ; yet this diflerence, which, while it elevated the General Government in relation to the state governments, placed it more imme- diately in the relation of the creature and agent of the states themselves, by a natural misconception, has been the principal cause of the impression so preva- lent of the inferiority of the states to the General Government, and of the con- sequent right of the latter to coerce the former. Raised from below to the same themselves. I have now, I trust, conclusively shown that a state has a right, in her sov- ereign capacity, in convention, to declare an unconstitutional act of Congress to be null and void, and that such declarations would be obligatory on her citizens, as highly so as the Constitution itself, and conclusive against the General Gov- ernment, which would have no right to enforce its construction of its powers ' against that of the state. ! I next propose to consider the practical effect of the exercise of this high and important right— -which, as the great conservative principle of our system, is known under the various names of nullification, interposition, and state veto — in reference to its operation viewed under different aspects : nullification, as de- claring null an unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as the state is concerned ; interposition, as throwing the shield of protection between the citizens of a state and the encroachments of the Government ; and veto, as arresting or inhibiting its unauthorized acts within the limits of the state. The practical effect, if the right was fully recognised, would be plain and simple, and has already, in a great measure, been anticipated. If the state has a right, there must, of necessity, be a corresponding obligation on the part of the General Government to acquiesce in its exercise ; and, of course, it would be its duty to abandon the power, at least as far as the state is concerned, to compromise the difSculty, or apply to the states themselves, according to the form prescribed in the Constitution, to obtain the power by a grant. If granted, acquiescence, then, would be a duty on the part of the state ; and, in that event, the contest would terminate in converting a doubtful constructive power into one positively granted ; but, should it not be granted, no alternative would remain for the General Government but a compromise or its permanent abandonment. In either event, the controversy would be closed and the Constitution fixed : a re- suh of the utmost importance to the steady operation of the government and the stability of the system., and which can never be attained, under its present opera- tion, without the recognition of the right, as experience has shown. From the adoption of the Constitution, we have had but one continued agita- tion of constitutional questions embracing some of the most important powers exercised by the government ; and yet, in spite of all the ability and force of argument displayed in the various discussions, backed by the high authority claimed for the Supreme Court to adjust such controversies, not a single con- stitutional question, of a political character, which has ever been agitated during this long period, has been settled in the public opinion, except that of the un- constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Law ; and, what is remarkable, that was settled against the decision of the Supreme Court. ^ The tendency is to in- crease, and not diminish, this conflict for power. New questions are yearly added without diminishing the old ; while the contest becomes more obstinate as the list increases, and, what is highly ominous, more sectional. It is im- possible that the government can last under this increasing diversity of opinion, find growing uncertainty as to its power in relation to the most important sub- jects of legislation ; and equally so, that this dangerous state can terminate without a power somewhere to compel, in effect, the government to abandon doubtful constructive powers, or to convert them into positive grants by an amendment of the Constitution ; in a word, to substitute the positive grants of the parties themselves for the constructive powers interpolated by the agents. Nothing short of this, in a system constructed as ours is, with a double set of agents, one for local and the other for general purposes, can ever terminate the conflict for power, or give uniformity and stability to its action. Such would be the practical and happy operation were the ri^ht recognised ; but the case is far otherwise ; and as the right is not only denied, but violently opposed, the General Government, so far from acquiescing in its exercise, and abandoning the power, as it ought, may endeaA-our, by all the means within its command to enforce its construction against that of the state. It is under this aspect of the question that I now propose to consider the practical effect of the exercise of the ri^ht, with the view to determine which of the two, the state or the General Government, must prevail in the conflict ; which compels nae to revert to some of the grounds already established. I have already shown that the declaration of nullification would be obligatory on the citizens of the state, as much so, in fact, as its declaration ratifying the Constitution, resting, as it does, on the same Ijasis. It would to them be the hio^hest possible evidence that the power contested was not granted, and, of course, that the act of the General Government was unconstitutional. They Avould be bound, in all the relation.s. of life, private and political, to respect and obey it ; and, when called upon as jurymen, to render their verdict according- ly, or, as judges, to pronounce judgment in conformity to it. The right of jury trial is secured by the Constitution (thanks to the jealous spirit of liberty, doubly secured and fortified) ; and, with this inestimable right — inestimable, not only as an essential portion of the judicial tribunals of the country, but infinitely more so, considered as a popular, and still more, a local representation, in that department of the government which, without it, would be the farthest removed from the control of the people, and a fit instrument to sap the foundation of the system — with, I repeat, this inestimable right, it would be impossible for the Gen- eral Government, within the limits of the state, to execute, legally, the act nulli- fied, or any other passed with a view to enforce it ; while, on the other hand, the state would be able to enforce, legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification. Sustained by its court and juries, it would calmly and quietly, but successfully, meet every effort of the General Government to enforce its claim of power. The result would be inevitable. Before the judicial tribunal of the country, the state must prevail, miless, indeed, jury trial could be eluded by the refinement of the court, or by some other device ; which, however, guarded as it is by the ramparts of the Constitution, would, I hold, be impossible. The attempt to elude, should it be made, would its.elf be iraconstitutional ; and, in turn, would be annulled by the sovereign voice of the state. Nor would the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, under the judiciary act, avail the General Government.. If taken, it would but end in a new trial, and that in another verdict against the government ; but whether it may be taken, would be optional with the state. The court itself has decided that a copy of the record is requisite to review a judgment of a state court, and, if necessary, the state would take the precaution to prevent, by proper enactments, any means of obtaining a copy. But if ob- tained, what would it avail against the execution of the penal enactments of the state, intended to enforce the declaration of nullification ? The judgment of the state court would be pronounced and executed before the possibility of a reversal, and executed, too, without responsibility incurred by any one. Beaten before the courts, the General Government Avould be compelled to abandon its unconstitutional pretensions, or resort to force : a resort, the diffi- culty (I was about to say, the impossibility) of which would very soon fully manifest itself, should folly or madness ever make the attempt. In considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact that the General Government has no right to resort to force against a state — to coerce a sovereign member of the Union — which, I trust, I have established beyond all possible doubt. Let it, however, be determined to use force, and the difficulty Avould be insurmountable, unless, indeed, it be also determined to set aside the Constitution, and to subvert the system to its foundations. Against whom would it be applied ? Congress has, it is true, the right to call forth the militia " to execute the laws and suppress insurrection ;" but there would be no law resisted, unless, indeed, it be called resistance for the juries to refuse to find, and the courts to render judgment, in conformity to the force to reduce ; not a sword unsheathed ; not anbayonet raised ; none, absolute- ly none, on whom force could be used, except it be on the unarmed citizens en- gaged peaceably and quietly in their daily occupations. No one would be guilty of treason (" levying war against the United States, adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"), or any other crime made penal by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. To suppose that force could be called in, implies, indeed, a great mistake, both as to the nature of our government and that of the controversy. It would be a legal and constitutional contest — a conflict of moral, and not physical force — a trial of constitutional, not military power, to be decided before the judicial tribunals of the country, and not on the field of battle. In such contest, there would be no object for force, but those peaceful tribunals — nothing on which it could be employed, but in putting down courts and juries, and preventing *the execution of judicial process. Leave these untouched, and all the militia that could be called forth, backed by a regular force of ten times the number of our small, but gallant and patriotic army, could have not the slightest effect on the result of the controversy ; but subvert these by an armed body, and you subvert the very foundation of this our free, constitutional, and legal system of govern- ment, and rear in its place a military despotism. Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is proposed, with the view, I suppose, of disembarrassing the operation, as much as possible, of the troublesome inter- ference of courts and juries, to change the scene of coercion from land to water ; as if the government could have one particle more right to coerce a state by water than by laud ; but, unless I am greatly deceived, the difficulty on that element will not be much less than on the other. The jury trial, at least the local jury trial (the trial by the vicinage), may, indeed, be evaded there, but in its place other, and not much less formidable, obstacles must be encoun- tered. There can be but two modes of coercion resorted to by water — blockade and abolition of the ports of entry of the state, accompanied by penal enactments, authorizing seizures for entering the waters of the state. If the former be at- tempted, there will be other parties besides the General Government and the state. Blockade is a belligerent right ; it presupposes a state of war, and, unless there be war (war in due form, as prescribed by the Constitution), the order for blockade would not be respected by other nations or their subjects. Their vessels would proceed directly for the blockaded port, with certain pros- pects of gain ; if seized under the order of blockade, through the claim of in- demnity against the General Government; and, if not, by a profitable market, without the exaction of duties. The other mode, the abolition of the ports of entry of the state, would also have its difficulties. The Constitution provides that " no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another ; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another :" provisions too clear to be eluded even by the force of construction. There wall be another difficulty. If seizures be made in port, or within the distance assigned by the laws of nations as the limits of a state, the trial must be in the state, with all the embarrassments of its courts and juries ; while beyond the ports and the distance to which I have referred, it would be difficult to point out any principle by which a foreign vessel, at least, could be seized, except as an incident to the right of blockade, and, of course, with all the difficulties belonging to that mode of coercion. But there yet remains another, and, I doubt not, insuperable barrier, to be found in the judicial tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of introdu- cing force, whether by land or water. Though I cannot concur in the opinion of those who regard the Supreme Court as the mediator appointed by the Con- SlltUUOn DeUVeen me Siaies aim mv vjcuciai viruvcjuiiiem , aim luuugii 1 isatUiOi. doubt there is a natural bias on its part towards the powers of the latter, yet I must greatly lower my -opinion of that high and important tribunal for intelli- gence, justice, and attachment to the Constitution, and particularly of that pure and upright magistrate who has so long, and with such distinguished honour to himself and the Union, presided over its deliberations, with all the weight that' belongs to an intellect of the first order, united with the most spotless integrity. to believe, for a moment, that an attempt so plainly and manifestly unconstitu-i tional as a resort to force woidd be in such a contest, could be sustained by the sanction of its authority. In whatever form force may be used, it must present questions for legal adjudication. If in the shape of blockade, the vessels seized | under it must be condemned, and thus woidd be presented the question of prize! or no prize, and, with it, the legality of the blockade ; if in that of a repeal of the acts establishing ports of entries in the state, the legality of the seizure must be determined, and that would bring up the question of the constitutional- ity of giving a preference to the ports of one state over those of another ; and so, if we pass from water to land, we wall find every attempt there to substitute force for lav/ must, in like manner, come under the review of the courts of the Union ; and the unconstitutionality v/ould be so glaring, that the executive and legislative departments, in their attempt to coerce, should either make an attempt so lawless and desperate, would be without the support of the judicial depart- ment. I will not pursue the question farther, as I hold it perfectly clear that, so long as a state retains its federal relations ; so long, in a word, as it continues a member of the Union, the contest between it and the General Go'VernmenJ; must be before the courts and juries ; and every attempt, in whatever form^ ■whether by land or water, to substitute force as the arbiter in their place, must fail. The unconstitutionality of the attempt would be so open, and palpable, that it would be impossible to sustain it. There is, indeed, one view, and one only, of the contest in which fi:)rce could be employed ; but that view, as between the parties, would supersede the Con- stitution itself: that nullification is secession, and would, consequently, place the state, as to the others, in the relation of a foreign state. Such, clearly, would be the effect of secession : but it is equally clear that it would place the state beyond the pale of all her federal relations, and, thereby, all control on the part of the other states over her. She would stand to them simply in the rela- tion of a foreign state, divested of all federal connexion, and having none other between them but those belonging to the laws of nations. Standing thus to- wards one another, force might, indeed, be employed against a state, but it must be a belligerent force, preceded by a declaration of war, and earned on with all its formalities. Such would be the certain eflect of secession ; and if nullification be secession — if it be but a difl!erent name for the same thing — such, too, must be its effect ; which presents the highly important question. Are they, in fact, the same ? on the decision of which depends the question whether it be a peaceable and constitutional remedy, that may be exercised without termi- nating the federal relations of the state or not. I am aware that there is a considerable and respectable portion of our state, with a very large portion of the Union, constituting, in fact, a great majority, who are of the opinion that they are the same thing, differing only in name, and who, under that impression, denounce it as the most dangerous of all doc- trines ; and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless, indeed, I am greatly deceived, not only perfectly distinguishable, but totally dissimilar in their nature, their object, and effect ; and that, so far from deserving the de- nunciation, so properly belonging to the act with which it is confounded, it is, in truth, the highest and most precious of all the rights of the states, and es- sential to preserve that very Union, for the supposed effect of destroying which it is so bitterly anathematized. First, they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. One has reference to the parties themselves, and the other to their agents. Secession is a withdrawal from the Union : a separation from partners, and, as far as depends on the member withdrawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It presupposes an association : a union of several states or individuals for a common object. Wherever these exist, secession may ; and where they do not, it cannot. Nullification, on the contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent : the one granting a power to be executed, the other, appointed by him with authority to execute it ; and is simply a declaration on the part of the principal, made in due form, that un act of the agent transcending his power is null and void. It is a right belong- ing exclusively to the relation between principal and agent, to be found ivher- ever it exists, and in all its forms, between several, or an association of princi- pals, and their joint agents, as well as between a single principal and his agent. The difference in their object is no less striking than in their nature. The object of secession is to free the withdrawing member from the obligation of the association or union, and is applicable to cases where the object of the association or union has failed, either by an abuse of power on the part of its members, or other causes. Its direct and iminediate object, as it concerns the with, drawino- member, is the dissolution of the association or union, as far as it is con- cerned. On the contrary, the object of nullification is to confine the agent with- in the limits of his powers, by arresting his acts transcending them, iiot with the view of destroying the delegated or trust power, but to preserve it, by compelling the agent to fulfil the object for v:hich the agency or trust was created ; and is ap. plicable only to cases where the trust or delegated powers are transcended on the ])art of the agent. Without the power of secession, an association or union, formed for the common good of all the members, might prove ruinous to some, by the abuse of power on the part of the others ; and without nullification the agent might, under colour of construction, assume a power never intended to be delegated, or to convert those delegated to objects never intended to be com- prehended in the trust, to the ruin of the principal, or, in case of a joint agency, to the ruin of some of the principals. Each has, thus, its appropriate object, but objects in their nature very dissimilar ; so much so, that, in case of an asso- ciation or union, where the povvers are delegated to be executed by an agent, the abuse of power, on the part of the agent, to the injury of one or more of the members, would not justify secession on their part. The rightful remedy in that case would be nullification. There w^ould be neither right nor pretext to secede : not right, because secession is applicable only to the acts of the mem- bers of the association or union, and not to the act of the agent ; nor pretext, because there is another, and equally efiicient remedy, short of the dissolution of the association or union, which can only be justified by necessity. Nullifi- cation may, indeed, be succeeded by secession. In the case stated, should the other members undertake to grant the power nullified, and should the nature of the power be such as to defeat the object of the association or union, at least as far as the member nullifying is concerned, it would then become an abuse of power on the part of the principals, and thus present a case where secession would apply ; but in no other could it be justified, except it be for a failure of the association or union to effect the object for which it was created, independ- ent of any abuse of power. It now remains to show that their effect is as dissimilar as their nature or object. Nullification leaves the members of the association or union in the condi- tion it found them — subject to all its burdens, and entitled to all its advantages, comprehending the member, nullifying as well as the others — its object being, not to destroy, but to preserve, as has been stated. It simply arrests the act of the agent, as far as the principal is concerned, leaving in every other respect the operation of the joint concern as before ; secession, on the contrary, destroys, as far as the withdrawing member is concerned, the association or union, and restores him to the relation he occupied towards the other members before the existence of the association or union. He loses the benefit, but is released from the burden and control, and can no longer be dealt with, by his former as- sociates, as one of its members. Such are clearly the differences between them — differences so marked, that, instead of being identical, as supposed, they form a contrast in all the aspects in which they can be regarded. The application of these remarks to the polit- ical association or Union of these twenty-four states and the General Govern- ment, their joint agent, is too obvious, after what has been already said, to re- quire any additional illustration, and I will dismiss this part of the subject with a single additional remark. There are many who acknowledge the right of a state to secede, but deny its right to nullify ; and yet, it seems impossible to admit the one without ad- mitting the other. They both presuppose the same structure of the govern- ment, that it is a Union of the states, as forming political communities, the same right on the part of the states, as members of the Union, to determine for their citizens the extent of the powers delegated and those reserved, and, of course, to decide whether the Constitution has or has not been violated. The simple difference, then, between those who admit secession and deny nullifica- tion, and those who admit both, is, that one acknowledges that the declara- tion of a state pronouncing that the Constitution has been violated, and is, there- fore, null and void, would be obligatory on her citizens, and would arrest all the acts of the government within the limits of the state ; while they deny that a similar declaration, made by the same authority, and in the same manner, that an act of the government has transcended its powers, and that it is, therefore, null and void, would have any obligation ; while the other acknowledges the obligation in both cases. The one admits that the declaration of a state assent- ing to the Constitution bound her citizens, and that her declaration can unbind them ; but denies that a similar declaration, as to the extent she has, in fact, bound them, has any obligatory force on them ; Avhile the other gives equal force to the declaration in the several cases. The one denies the obligation, where the object is to jrreserve the Union in the only way it can he, by confining^ the government, formed to execute the trust powers, strictly within their limits, and to the objects for which they were delegated, though they give full force where the object is to destroy the Union itself; while the other, in giving^ equal weight to both, prefers the one because it preserves, and rejects the other be- cause it destroys ; and yet the former is the Union, and the latter the disunion ■party ! And all this strange distinction originates, as far as I can judge, in attributing to nullification what belongs exclusively to secession. The" diffi- culty as to the former, it seems, is, that a state cannot be in and out of the Union at the same time. This is, indeed, true, if applied to secession— the throwing off the authority of the Union itself To nullify the Constitution, if I may be pardoned the sole- cism, would, indeed, be tantamount to disunion ; and, as applied to such an act, it would be true that a state could not be in and out of the Union at the same time ; but the act would be secession. But to apply it to nullification, properly understood, the object of which, in- stead of resisting or diminishing the powers of the Union, is to preserve them as they are, neither increased nor diminished, and thereby the Union itself (for the Union may be as effectually destroyed by increasing as by diminish- ing its powers— by consolidation, as by disunion itself), would be, I would say, had I not great respect for many who do thus apply it, egregious trifling with a grave and deeply-important constitutional subject. I might here finish the task which your request imposed, having, I trust, de* her reserved powers against the encroachments of the General Government ; and 1 may add that the right is, in its nature, peaceable, consistent with the federal relations of the state, and perfectly efficient, whether contested before the courts, or attempted to be resisted by force. But there is another aspect of the subject not yet touched, without adverting to which, it is impossible to un- derstand the full eflects of nullification, or the real character of our political in- stitutions : I allude to the power which the states, as a confederated body, have acquired directly over each other, and on which I will now proceed to make some remarks, though, I fear, at the hazard of fatiguing you. Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution, no power could be ex- ercised over any state by any other, or all of the states, without its own con- sent ; and we, accordingly, find that the old confederation and the present Con- stitution were both submitted for ratification to each of the states, and that each ratified for itself, and was bound only in consequence of its own partic- ular ratification, as has been already stated. The present Constitution has made, in this particular, a most important modification in their condition. I allude to the provision which gives validity to amendments of the Constitution when ratified by three fourths of the states — a provision which has not attracted as much attention as its importance deserves. Without it, no change could have been made in the Constitution, unless with the unanimous consent of all the states, in like manner as it was adopted. This provision, then, contains a high- ly-important concession by each to all of the states, of a portion of the original and inherent right of self-government, possessed previously by each separately, in favour of their general confederated powers, giving thereby increased energy to the states in their united capacity, and weakening them in the same degree in their separate. Its object was to facilitate and strengthen the action of the amending, or (to speak a little more appropriately, as it regards the point under consideration) the repairing power. It was foreseen that experience would, probably, disclose errors in the Constitution itself ; that time would make great changes in the condition of the country, which would require corresponding changes in the Constitution ; that the irregular and conflicting movements of the bodies composing so complex a system might cause derangements requiring correction ; and that, to require the unanimous consent of all the states to meet these various contingencies, would be placing the whole too much under the control of the parts : to remedy which, this great additional power was given to the amending or repairing power — this vis medicatrix of the system. To understand correctly the nature of this concession, we must not confound it with the delegated powers conferred on the General Government, and to be exercised by it as the joint agent of the states. They are essentially different. The former is, in fact, but a modification of the original sovereign power re- siding in the people of the several states — of the creating or Constitution-making power itself, intended, as stated, to facilitate and strengthen its action, and not change its character. Though modified, it is not delegated. It still resides in the states, and is still to be exercised by them, and not by the government. I propose next to consider this important modification of the sovereign pow- ers of the states, in connexion with the right of nullification. It is acknowledged on all sides that the duration and stability of our system depend on maintaining the equilihriiun between the states and the General Government — the reserved and delegated powers. We know that the Conven- tion which formed the Constitution, and the various state conventions which adopted it, as far as we are informed of their proceedmgs, felt the deepest soli- citude on this point. They saw and felt there would be an incessant conflict between them, which would menace the existence of the system itself, unless properly guarded. The contest between the states and General Government —the reserved and delegated rights — will, in truth, be a conflict between ths H great predominant interests of the Union on one side, controlling and directing the movements of the government, and seeking to enlarge the delegated pow- ers, and thereby advance their power and prosperity ; and, on the other, the minor interests rallying on the reserved powers, as the only means of protect- ing themselves against the encroachment and oppression of the other. In such a contest, wdthoiU the most effectual check, the stronger will absorb the weak- er interests ; while, on the other hand, without an adequate provision of some description or other, the efforts of the Aveaker to guard against the encroach- ments and oppression of the stronger might permanently derange the system. On the side of the reserved powers, no check more effectual can be found or desired than nullification, or the right of arresting, within the limits of a state, the exercise, by the General Government, of any powers but the delegated— a ritdit which, if the states be true to themselves and faithful to the Constitution, Avfll ever prove, on the side of the reserved powers, an effectual protection to both. Nor is the check on the side of the delegated less perfect. Though less strong, it is ample to guard against encroachments ; and is as strong as the na- ture of the system would bear, as will appear in the sequal. It is to be found in the amending power. Without the modification which it contains of the rights of self-government on the part of the states, as already explained, the consent of each state would have been requisite to any additional grant of power, or other amendment of the Constitution. While, then, nullification would ena- ble a state to arrest the exercise of a power not delegated, the right of self-gov- ernment, if unmodified, would enable her to prevent the grant of a power not delegated ; and thus her conception of what power ought to be granted would be as conclusive against the co-states, as her construction of the powers grant- ed is against the General Government. In that case, the danger would be on the side of the states or reserved powers. The amending power, in effect, prevents this danger. In virtue of the provisions which it contains, the re- sistance of a state to a power cannot finally prevail, unless she be sustain- ed by one fourth of the co-states ; and in the same degree that her resistance is weakened, the power of the General Government, or the side of the delega- ted powers, is strengthened. It is true that the right of a state to arrest an un- constitutional act is of itself complete against the government ; but it is equally so that the controversy may, in effect, be terminated against her by a grant of the contested powers by three fourths of the states. It is thus by this simple, and, apparently, incidental contrivance, that the right of a state to nullify an uncon- stitutional act, so essential to the protection of the reserved rights, but which, unchecked, might too much debilitate the government, is counterpoised : not by weakening the energy of a state in her direct resistance to the encroach- ment of the government, or by giving to the latter a direct control over the states, as proposed in the Convention, but in a manner infinitely more safe, and, if I may be permuted so to express myself, scientific, by strengthening the amending or repairing power — the power of correcting all abuses or derange- ments, by whatever cause, or from whatever quarter. To sum all in a few words. The General Government has the right, in the first instance, of construing its own powers, which, if final and conclusive, as is supposed by many, would have placed the reserved powers at the mercy of the delegated, and thus destroy the equilibrium of the system. Against that, a state has the right of nullification. This right, on the part of the stale, if not counterpoised, might tend too strongly to weaken the General Government and derange the system. To correct this, the amending or repairing power is strengthened. The former cannot be made too strong if the latter be propor- tionably so. The increase of the latter is, in effect, the decrease of the former. Give to a majority of the states the right of amendment, and the arresting power, on the part of the state, would, in fact, be annulled. The amending power and hands. The same majority that controlled the one would the other, and the power arrested, as not granted, would be immediately restored in the shape of a grant. This modification of the right of self-government, on the part of the states, is, in fact, the pivot of the system. By shifting its position as the preponderance is on the one side or the other, or, to drop the simile, by increasing or diminish- ing the energy of the repairing power, effected by diminishing or increasing the number of states necessary to amend the Constitution, the equilibrium be- tween the reserved and the delegated rights may be preserved or destroyed at pleasure. I am aware it is objected that, according to this view, one fourth of the states may, in reality, change the Constitution, and thus take away powers which have been imanimously granted by all the states. The objection is more specious than solid. The right of a state is not to resume delegated powers, but to prevent the reserved from being assumed by the government. It is, how- ever, certain the right may be abused, and, thereby, powers be resumed which were, in fact, delegated ; and it is also true, if sustained by one fourth of the co- states, such resumption may be successfully and permanently made by the state. This is the danger, and the utmost extent of the danger from the side of the reserved powers. It would, I acknowledge, be desirable to avoid or lessen it ; but neither can be effected without increasing a greater and opposing danger. If the right be denied to the state to defend her reserved powers, for fear she might resume the delegated, that denial would, in effect, yield to the General Government the power, under the colour of construction, to assume at pleasure all the reserved powers. It is, in fact, a question between the danger of the states resuming the delegated powers on one side, and the General Government assuming the reserved on the other. Passing over the far greater probability of the latter than the former, which I endeavoured to illustrate in the address of last summer, I shall confine my remarks to the striking difference between them, viewed in connexion with the genius and theory of our government. The right of a state originally to complete self-government is a fundamental principle in our system, in virtue of which the grant of power required the con- sent of all the stales, while to withhold power the dissent of a single state toas suf- ficient. It is true, that this original and absolute power of self-government has been modified by the Constitution, as already stated, so that three fourths of the states may now grant power ; and, consequently, it requires more than one fourth to withhold. The boundary between the reserved and the delegated powers marks the limits of the Union. The states are united to the extent of the latter, and separated beyond that limit. It is, then, clear that it was not intended that the states should be more united than the will of one fourth of them, or, rather, one more than a fourth, would permit. It is worthy of remark, that it was pro- posed in the Convention to increase the confederative power, as it may be call- ed, by vesting two thirds of the states with the right of amendment, so as to require more than a third, instead of a fourth, to withhold power. The propo- sition was rejected, and three fourths unanimously adopted. It is, then, more i hostile to the nature and genius of our system to assume powers not delegated, than to resume those that are ; and less hostile that a state, sustained hy one fourth of her co-states, should j^f event the exercise of power really intended to be granted, than that the General Government should assume the exercise of powers not in- tended to he delegated. In the latter case, the usurpation of power would be against the fundamental principle of our system, the original right of the states ' to self-government ; while in the former, if it be usurpation at all, it would be, if so bold an expression may be used, a usurpation in the spirit of the Consti- tution itself — the spirit ordaining that the utmost extent of our Union should be limited by the will of any number of states exceeding a fourth, and that most interest, with so vast a territory, to be filled, in a short time, with almost count- less millions — a country of which the parts will equal empires, a union more intimate than that ordained in the Constitution, and so intimate, of course, that it might be permanently hostile to the feelings of more than a fourth of the states, instead of strengthening, would have exposed the system to certain destruction. There is a deep and profound philosophy, which he who best knows our nature will the most highly appreciate, that would make the intensity of the Union, if I mav so express myself, inversely to the extent of territory and the population of a countrv, and the diversity of its interests, geographical and political ; and which would hold in deeper dread the assumption of reserved rights by the agent appointed to execute the delegated, than the resumption of the delegated by the authority which granted the powers and ordained the agent to adminis- ter them. There appears, indeed, to be a great and prevailing principle that tends to place the delegated power in opposition to the delegating — the created to the creating power — reaching far beyond man and his works, up to the uni- versal source of all power. The earliest pages of Sacred History record the re- bellion of the archangels against the high authority of Heaven itself, and ancient mythology, the Avar of the Titans against Jupiter, which, according to its nar- rative, menaced the universe with destruction. This all-pervading principle is at work in our system — the created warring against the creating power; and unless the government be bolted and chained down with links of adamant by the hand of the states which created it, the creature will usurp the place of the creator, and universal political idolatry overspread the land. If the views presented be correct, it follows that, on the interposition of a state in favour of the reserved rights, it would be the duty of the General Gov- ernment to abandon the contested power, or to apply to the states themselves, the source of all political authority, for the power, in one of the two modes pre- scribed in the Constitution. If the case be a simple one, embracing a single power, and that in its nature easily adjusted, the more ready and appropriate mode would be an amendment in the ordinary form, on a proposition of two thirds of both houses of Congress, to be ratified by three fourths of the states ; but, on the contrary, should the derangement of the system be great, embracing many points difficult to adjust, the states ought to be convened in a general Con- vention, the most august of all assemblies, representing the united sovereignty of the confederated states, and having power and authority to correct every er- ror, and to repair every dilapidation or injury, whether caused by time or acci- dent, or the conflicting movements of the bodies which compose the system. With institutions every way so fortunate, possessed of means so well calculated to prevent disorders, and so admirable to correct them when they cannot be pre- vented, he who would prescribe for our political disease disunion on the one side, or coercion of a state in the assertion of its rights on the other, loould de- serve, and will receive, the execrations of this and all future generations. I have now finished what I had to say on the subject of this communication, in its immediate connexion with the Constitution. In the discussion, I have advanced nothing but on the authority of the Constitution itself, or that of re- corded and unqucstionalile facts connected with the history of its origin and formation ; and have made no deduction but such as rested on principles which I believe to be unquestionable ; but it would be idle to expect, in the present state of the pul)lic mind, a favourable reception of the conclusions to which I have been carried. There are too many misconceptions to encounter, too many prej- udices to combat, and, above all, too great a weight of interest to resist. I do not propose to investigate these great impediments to the reception of the truth, though it would l)e an interesting subject of inquiry to trace them to their cause, and to measure the force of their impeding power; but there is one among them of so marked a character, and wiiich operates so extensively, that I can- will be calculated to throw much light on what has already been said. Of all the impediments opposed to a just conception of the nature of our po- litical system, the impression that the right of a state to arrest an unconstitu- tional act of the General Government is inconsistent with the great and funda- mental principle of all free states — that a majority has the right to govern — is the greatest. Thus regarded, nullification is, without farther reflection, denounced as the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as, in truth, it would be, were the objection as well-founded as, in fact, it is destitute of all foundation, as I shall now proceed to show. Those who make the objection seem to suppose that the right of a majority to govern is a principle too simple to admit of any distinction ; and yet, if I do not mistake, it is susceptible of the most important distinction — entering deeply into the construction of our system, and, I may add, into that of all free states in proportion to the perfection of their institutions, and is essential to the very ex- istence of liberty. When, then, it is said that a majority has the right to govern, there are two modes of estimating the majority, to either of which the expression is applica- ble. The one, in which the whole community is regarded in the aggregate, and the majority is estimated in reference to the entire mass. This may be called the majority of the whole, or the absolute majority. The other, in which it is regarded in reference to its different political interests, whether composed of different classes, of different communities, formed into one general confeder- ated community, and in which the majority is estimated, not in reference to the •whole, but to each class or community of which it is composed, the assent of each taken separately, and the concurrence of all constituting the majority. A majority thus estimated may be called the concurring majority. When it is objected to nullification, that it is opposed to the principle that a majority ought to govern, he who makes the objection must mean the absolute, as distinguished from the concurring. It is only in the sense of the former the objection can be applied. In that of the concurring, it would be absurd, as the concurring assent of all the parts (with us, all the states) is of the very essence of such majority. Again, it is manifest, that in the sense it would be good against nullification, it would be equally so against the Constitution itself; for, in whatever light that instrument may be regarded, it is clearly not the work of the absolute, but of the concurring majority. It was formed and ratified by the concurring assent of all the states, and not by the majority of the whole ta- ken in the aggregate, as has been already stated. Thus, the acknowledged right of each state in reference to the Constitution, is unquestionably the same right which nvdlification attributes to each in reference to the unconslitiitional acts of the government ; and, if the latter be opposed to the right of a majority to govern, the former is equally so. I go farther. The objection might, with equal truth, be applied to all free states that have ever existed : I mean states deserving the name, and excluding, of course, those which, after a factious and anarchical existence of a few years, have sunk under the yoke of tyranny or f the dominion of some foreign power. There is not, with this exception, a sin- ' gle free state whose institutions were not based on the principle of the con- curring majority : not one in which the community was not regarded in refer- ence to its different political interests, and which did not, in some form or other, take the assent of each in the operation of the government. In support of this assertion, I might begin with our own government and go back to that of Sparta, and show conclusively that there is not one on the list Avhose institutions were not organized on the principle of the concurring ma- jority, and in the operation of which the sense of each great interest was not separately consulted. The various devices which have been contrived for this purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would be a curious and highly im- nent. The principle of the concurring majority has sometimes been incorporated in the reguhir and ordinary operation of the government, each interest having a distinct organization, and a combination of the whole forming the government ; but still requiring the consent of each, within its proper sphere, to give validity to the measures of government. Of this modification the British and Spartan govenunents are by far the most memorable and perfect examples. In others, the right of acting — of making and executing the laws — was vested in one in- terest, and the right of arresting or nullifying in another. Of this description, the Roman government is much the most striking instance. In others, the right o( originating or introducing projects of laws was in one, and of enacting them in another : as at Athens before its government degenerated, where the Senate proposed, and the General Assembly of the people enacted, laws. These devices were all resorted to with the intention of consulting the separ- ate interests of which the several communities were composed, and against all of which the objection to nullification, that it is opposed to the will of a ma- jority, could be raised with equal force — as strongly, and I may say much more so, against the unlimited, unqualified, and uncontrollable veto of a single tribune out of ten at Rome on all laws and the execution of laws, as against the same right of a sovereign state (one of the twenty-four tribunes of this Union), limit- ed, as the right is, to the unconstitutional acts of the General Government, and liable, as in effect it is, to be controlled by three fourths of the co-states ; and yet the Roman Republic, and the other states to which I have referred, are the renowned among free states, whose examples have difl'used the spirit of liberty over the world, and which, if struck from the list, would leave behind but little to be admired or imitated. There, indeed, would remain one class deserving from us particular notice, as ours belongs to it — I mean confederacies ; but, as a class, heretofore far less distinguished for power and prosperity than those already alluded to ; though I trust, with the improvements we have made, des- tined to be placed at the very head of the illustrious list of states which have blessed the world with examples of well-regulated liberty ; and which stand as so many oases in the midst of the desert of oppression and despotism, which occupies so vast a space in the chart of governments. That such will be the great and glorious destiny of our system, I feel assured, provided we do not permit our government to degenerate into the worst of all possible forms, a con- solidated government, swayed by the will of an absolute majority. But to pro- ceed. Viewing a confederated community as composed of as many distinct politi- cal interests as there are states, and as requiring the consent of each to its meas- ures, no government can be conceived in which the sense of the whole com- munity can be more perfectly taken, and all its interests be more fully represent- ed and protected. But, with this great advantage, united with the means of the most just and perfect local administration through the agency of the states, and combined with the capacity of embracing within its limits the greatest ex- tent of territory and variety of interests, it is liable to one almost fatal objection, the tardiness and feebleness of its movements — a defect difficult to be reme- died, and when not, so great as to render a form of government, in olher re- spects so admirable, almost worthless. To overcome this difficulty was the great desideratum in political science, and the most difficult problem'within its circle. To us belongs the glory of its solution, if, indeed, our experiment (for such it must yet be called) shall prove that we have overcome it, as I sincerely believe and hope it will, on account of our own, as well as the liberty and happi- ness of our race. Our first experiment in government was on the old form of a simple confed- eracy, unmodified, and extending the principle of the concmring majority alike for the first time in a confederation, the absolute with the concurring majority ; and thus uniting the justice of the one with the energy of the other. The new government was reared on the foundation of the old, strengthened, but not changed. It stands on the same solid basis of the concurring majority, perfected by the sanction of the people of the states directly given, and not in- directly through the state governments, as their representatives, as in the old confederation. With that difference, the authority which made the two Consti- tutions — which granted their powers, and ordained and organized their respect- ive governments to execute them — is the same. But, in passing from the Con- stitution to the government (the law-making and the law-administering powers), the difference between the two becomes radical and essential. There, in the present, the concurring majority is dropped, and the absolute substituted. In determining, then, what powers ought to be granted, and how the government appointed for their execution ought to be organized, the separate and concur- ring voice of the states was required — the union being regarded, for this pur- pose, in reference to its various and distinct interests ; but in the execution of these powers (delegated only because all the states had a common interest in their exercise), the union is no longer regarded in reference to its parts, but as forming, to the extent of its delegated powers, one great community, to be gov- erned by a common will, just as the states are in reference to their separate in- terests, and by a government organized on principles similar to theirs. By this simple but fortunate arrangement, we have ingrafted the absolute on the con- curring majority, thereby giving to the administration of the powers of the gov- ernment, where they were required, all the energy and promptness belonging to the former, while we have retained in the power granting and organizing authority (if I may so express myself) the principle of the concurring majori- ty, and with it that justice, moderation, and full and perfect representation of all the interests of the community which belong exclusively to it. Such is the solidity and beauty of our admirable system, but which, it is per- fectly obvious, can only be preserved by maintaining the ascendency of the CONSTITUTION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER THE LAW-MAKING THE CONCURRING OVER THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. Nor is it Icss clear that this can only be ef- fected by the right of a state to annul the unconstitutional acts of the govern- jnent — a right confounded with the idea of a minority governing a majority, but which, so far from being the case, is indispensable to prevent the more ener- getic but imperfect majority which controls the movements of the government, from usurping the place of that more perfect and just majority which formed the Consthution and ordained government to execute its powers. Nor need we apprehend that this check, as powerful as it is, will prove ex- cessive. The distinction between the Constitution and the law making pow- ers, so strongly marked in our institutions, may yet be considered as a new and untried experiment. It can scarcely be said to have existed at all before our system oi government. We have yet much to learn as to its practical opera- tion ; and, among other things, if I do not mistake, we are far from realizing the many and great difficulties of holding the latter subordinate to the former, and without which, it is obvious, the entire scheme of constitutional govern- ment, at least in our sense, must prove abortive. Short as has been our expe- rience, some of these, of a very formidable character, have begun to disclose themselves, particularly between the Constitution and the government of the Union. The two powers there represent very different interests : the one, that of all the states taken separately ; and the other, that of a majority of the states as forming a confederated community. Each acting under the impulse of these respective and very different interests, must necessarily strongly tend to come into collision, and, in the conflict, the advantage will be found almost marks will be sufficient to illustrate these positions. The Constitution, while it grants powers to the government, at the same time im- poses restrictions on its action, with the intention of confining it within a limited ranofe of powers, and of the means of executing them. The object.of the powers is to protect the rights and promote the interests of all ; and of the restrictions, to pre- vent the majority, or the dominant interests of the government, from perverting powers intended for the common good into the means of oppressing the minor inter- ests of the community. Thus circumstanced, the dominant interest in possession of the powers of the government, and the minor interest on whom they are exer- cised, must regard these restrictions in a very different light : the latter, as a protection, and the former, as a restraint, and, of course, accompanied with all the impatient feelings with which restrictions on cupidity and ambition are ever regarded by those unruly passions. Under their influence, the Constitu- tion will be viewed by the majority, not as the source of their authority, as it should be, but as shackles on their power. To them it will have no value as the means of protection. As a majority they require none. Their number and strength, and not the Constitution, are their protection ; and, of course, if I may so speak, their instinct will be to weaken and destroy the restrictions, in order to enlarge the powers. He must have a very imperfect knowledge of the hu- man heart who does not see, in this state of things, an incessant conflict between the government or the law-making power and the Constitution-making power. Nor is it less certain that, in the contest, the advantage will be exclusively with the former. The law-making poAver is organized and in constant action, having the con- trol of the honours and emoluments of the country, and armed with the power to punish and reward ; the other, on the contrary, is unorganized, lying dormant in the great inert mass of the community, till called into action on extraordinary occasions and at distant intervals ; and then bestowing no honours, exercising no patronage, having neither the faculty to reward nor to punish, but endowed simply with the attribute to grant powers and ordain the authority to execute them. The result is inevitable. With so strong an instinct on the part of the government to throw off the restrictions of the Constitution and to enlarge its powers, and with such powerful faculties to gratify this instinctive impidse, the law-making must necessarily encroach on the Constitution-making power, un- less restrained by the most efficient check — at least as strong as that for which we contend. It is worthy of remark, that, all other circumstances being equal, the more dissimUar the interests represented by the two, the more powerful will be this tendency to encroach ; and it is from this, among other causes, that it is so much stronger between the government and the Constitution-making powers of the Union, where the interests are so very dissimilar, than between the two in the several states. That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the danger which I have described, we have conclusive proof in the provision to which I have so fre- quently alluded — I mean that which provides for amendments to the Constitu- tion. I have already remarked on that portion of this provision which, with the view of strengthening the confederated power, conceded to three fourths of the states a right to amend, which otherwise could only have been exercised by the unanimous consent of all. It is remarkable, that, while this provision thus strengthened the amending power as it regards the states, it imposed imped- iments on it as far as the government was concerned. The power of acting, as a general rule, is invested in the majority of Congress ; but, instead of per- mitting a majority to propose amendments, the provision requires for that pur- pose two thirds of both houses, clearly with a view of interposing a barrier against this strong instinctive appetite of the government for the acquisition of the passage to the direct acquisition, had the wide door of construction been left open to its indirect ; and hence, in the same spirit in which two thirds of both houses were required to propose amendments, the Convention that framed the Constitution rejected the many propositions which were moved in the body with the intention of divesting the states of the right of interposing, and, there- by, of the only effectual means of preventing the enlargement of the powers of the government by construction. It is thus that the Constitution-making power has fortified itself against the law-making ; and that so effectually, that, however strong the disposition and capacit}^ of the latter to encroach, the means of resistance on the part of the former are not less powerful. If, indeed, encroachments have been made, the fault is not in the system, but in the inattention and neglect of those whose in- terest and duty it was to interpose the ample means of protection afforded by the Constitution. To sum up in few words,- in conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire philosophy of government, in reference to the subject of this communication. Two powers are necessary to the existence and preservation of free states : a power on the part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing their authority, by compelling them to be faithful to their constituents, and which is efiected through the right of suffrage ; and a power to compel the parts of society TO BE just to one ANOTHER, BY COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT THE INTER- EST OF EACH OTHER, which cau only be effected, whatever may be the device for the purpose, by requiring the concurring assent of all the great and distinct interests of the community to the measures of the government. This result is the sum-total of all the contrivances adopted by free states to preserve their liberty, by preventing the conflicts between the several classes or parts of the community. Both powers are indispensable. The one as much so as the other. The rulers are not more disposed to encroach on the ruled than the dif- ferent interests of the community on one another ; nor would they more cer- tainly convert their power from the just and legitimate objects for which gov. ernments are instituted into an instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents, than would the stronger interests theirs, at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to con- sult them in the measures of the government, by taking their separate and con- curring assent. The same cause operates in both cases. The constitution of our nature, which would impel the rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevented, would in like manner, and with equal force, impel the stronger to oppress the weaker interest. To vest the right of government in the absolute majority, would be, in fact, but to imbody the will op the stronger interest in THE operations OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NOT THE WILL OF THE WHOLE community, and TO LEAVE THE OTHERS UNPROTECTED, A PREY TO ITS AMBI- TION AND CUPIDITY, just as would be the case between rulers and ruled, if the right to govern was vested exclusively in the hands of the former. They would both be, in reality, absolute and despotic governments : the one as much so as the other. They would both become mere instruments of cupidity and ambition in the hands of those who wielded them. No one doubts that such would be the case were the government placed under the control of irresponsible lulers ; but, un- fortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not seen with equal clearness that it must as necessarily be so when controlled by an absolute majority ; and yet, the former is not more certain than the latter. To this we may attribute the mistake so often and so fatally repeated, that to expel a despot is to estab- lish LIBERTY — a mistake to which we may trace the failure of many noble and generous efforts in favour of liberty. The error consists in considering communities as formed of interests strictly identical throughout, instead of be- I ing composeu, as mvy m i^a.i,.^j "*-, "- — j , i • individuals. The interests of no two persons are the same, regardea m refer- ence to each other, though they may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the conuimnity. It is this diversity which the several portions of the community bear to each other, in reference to the whole, that renders the principle of the concurring majority necessary to preserve liberty. Place the power in the hands of the absolute majority, and the strongest of these would certainly per- vert the o-overnment from the object for which it was instituted, the equal pro- tection of the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself at the expense of the rest of the community. Against this abuse of power no remedy can be devised but that of the concurring majority. Neither the right of suffrage nor public opinion can possibly check it. They, in fact, but tend to aggravate the disease. It seems really surprising that truths so obvious should be so imper- fectly understood. There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in our intellect- ual powers on political subjects when directed to large masses. We readily see why a single individual, as a ruler, would, if not prevented, oppress the rest of the community ; but are at a loss to understand why seven millions would, if not also prevented, oppress six millions, as if the relative numbers on either 'side could in the least degree vary the principle. In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experience of ages, compre- hending alffree governments preceding ours, and ours as far as it has progress- ed. tIic practical operation of ours has been substantially on the principle of the absolute majority. We have acted, with some exceptions, as if the Gen- eral Government had the right to interpret its own powers, without limitation or check. : and though many circumstances have favoured us, and greatly impeded the natural progress of events, under such an operation of the system, yet we already see, in whatever direction we turn our eyes, the growing symptoms of disorder and decay — the growth of faction, cupidity, and corruption ; and the decay of patriotism, integrity, and disinterestedness. In the midst of youth, we see the flushed cheek, and the short and feverish breath, that mark the approach of the fatal hour ; and come it will, unless there be a speedy and radical change — a return to the great conservative principle which brought the Republican party into authority, but which, with the possession of power and prosperity, it has long ceased to remember. I have now finished the task which your request imposed. If I have been so fortunate as to add to your fund a single new illustration of this great con- servative principle of our government, or to furnish an additional argument cal- culated to sustain the state in her noble and patriotic struggle to revive and maintain it, and in which you have acted a part long to be remembered by the friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated for the time occupied in so long a commimication. I believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice, of imion, liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ordinary party strug- gles of the day sink into perfect insignificance ; and that it will be so regarded by the most distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt. With great and sincere regard, ^ I am yours, &c., &c., John C. Calhoun. His Excellency James Hamilton, Jun., Governor of South Carolina. V. SPEECH AGAINST THE FORCE BILL. Mr. President — I know not which is most objectionable, the provision of I the bill, or the temper in which its adoption has been urged. If the extraordi- ' nary powers with which the bill proposes to clothe the executive, to the utter I prostration of the Constitution and the rights of the states, be calculated to im- press our minds with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country ; the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exago-er- ate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy, is seized on with a view to°ex- ' cite hostility against her, but too plainly indicates the deep decay of that broth- erly feeling which once existed between these states, and to which we are indebted for our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of which alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to advert to all these mis- representations, but there are some so well calculated to mislead the mind as to the real character of the controversy, and hold up the state in a light so odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed. Among them, one of the most prominent is the false statement that the ob- ject of South Carolina is to exempt herself from her share of the public burdens, while she participates in the advantages of the government. If the charge were true — if the state were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy motives, mother as I consider her, I would not stand up on this floor to vindi- cate her conduct. Among her faults, and faults I will not deny she has, no one has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices — avarice. Her conduct, on all occasions, has been marked with the very opposite quality. From the commencement of the Revolution — from its first breaking out at Bos- ton till this hour, no state has been more profuse of its blood in the cause of the country, nor has any contributed so largely to the common treasury in proportion to wealth and population. She has in that proportion contributed more to the exports of the Union, on the exchange of which with the rest of the world the greater portion of the public burden has been levied, than any other state. No ; the controversy is not such as has been stated ; the state does not seek to participate in the advantages of the government without contributing her full share to the public treasury. Her object is far different. A deep con- stitutional question lies at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at issue is. Has the government a right to impose burdens on the capital and indus- try of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to benefit another 1 and I must be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so strong a disposition to misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrep- resentations are calculated to make, I will dwell on the point under consider- ation for a (ew moments longer. The Federal Government has, by an express provision of the Constitution, the right to lay duties on imports. The state has never denied or resisted this right, nor even thought of so doing. The government has, however, not been contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has gone a step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but for protection. This the state considers as an unconstitutional exercise of power — highly injurious and oppressive to her and the other staple states, and has, accordingly, met it with the most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at this time, into the argument as to the unconstitutionality of the protective system. It is not ne- cessary. It is sufficient that the power is nowhere granted ; and that, from the journals of the Convention which formed the Constitution, it would seem that it was refused. In support of the journals, I might cite the statement of Luther Martin, which has already been relerred to, to sno\y tnat tne i^onvention, so far from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left to the state the right to impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the sev- eral states to protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress has assumed, without any warrant from the Constitution, the right of exercising this most important power, and has so exercised it as to impose a ruinous bur- den on the labour and capital of the state, by which her resources arc exhaust- ' ed the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed — the means of education contracted — and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected. We have been sneeringly told that she is a small state ; that her population does not much ex- ceed half a million of souls ; and that more than one half are not of the Euro- pean race. The facts are so. I know she never can be a great state^ and that the only distinction to which she can aspire must be based on the mora! and intellectual acquirements of her sons. To the development of these much of her attention has been directed ; but this restrictive system, which has so un- justly exacted the proceeds of her labour, to be bestowed on other sections, has so impaired the resources of the state, that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry Dp the means of education, and with it deprive her of the only source through which she can aspire to distinction. There is another misstatement, as to the nature of the controversy, so fre- quently made in debate, and so well calculated to mislead, that I feel bound to notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the Constitution and laws of the United States ; and to rebut this supposed claim, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Rives) has gravely quoted the Constitution, to prove that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme laws of the land — as if the state claimed the right to act contrary to this provision of the Constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous : her object is not to resist laws made in pursuance of the Constitxition, but those made ■without its authority, and which encroach on her reserved powers. She claims not even the right of judging of the delegatea powers ; but of those that are re- served, and to resist the former, when they encroach upon the latter. I will pause to illustrate this important point. All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers, and that the powers reserved are reserved to the states respectively. The powers, then, of the system are divided between the general and the state government ; and the point immediately under consideration is, whether a state has any right to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the encroachments of the General Government. Without going deeply into this point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature and origin of the government, there is a simple view of the subject which I consider as conclu- sive. The very idea of a divided power implies the right on the part of the state for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical Avhen applied to power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in the separation of the parts. But in this sense it is not applicable to power. What, then, is meant by a division of power ? I cannot conceive of a division, without giWng an equal right to each to judge of the extent of the power allotted to each. Such right I hold to be essential to the existence of a division ; and that, to give to either party the conclusive right of jndging, not only of the share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other, is to annul the division, and would confer the whole power on the party vested with such right. But it is contended that the Constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court the right of judging between the states and the General Government. Those who make this objection overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the Constitution. By turning to the 10th amended article, it will be seen that the reservation of power to the states is not only against the powers delegated to Congress, but against the United States themselves ; and extends, of course, as tide provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, or prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. This presents the inquiry, What powers are delegated to the United States ? They may be classed under four divisions : first, those that are delegated by the states to each other, by virtue of which the Constitution may be altered or amended by three fourths of the states, when, without which, it would have re- quired the unanimous vote of all ; next, the powers conferred on Congress ; then those on the President ; and, finally, those on the judicial department — all of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the Constitution which or- ganize the respective departments. The reservation of powers to the states is, as I have said, against the whole, and is as full against the judicial as it is against the executive and legislative departments of the government. It cannot be claimed for the one without claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact, annulling this important provision of the Constitution. Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the subject, it has beea urged that this power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by that portion of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority. I believe the assertion to be utterly destitute of any foundation. It obviously is the intention of the Constitution simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the law- making and treaty-making powers ; and to vest it with the right of applying the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, to the cases which might arise under them ; and not to make it the judge of the Constitution, the laws, and the trea- ties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws to the facts of the case, and deciding upon such application, constitutes, in truth, the judicial pow- er. The distinction between such power, and that of judging of the laws, will be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknowledged power of the court in reference to treaties or compacts between sovereigns. It is per- fectly established, that the courts have no right to judge of the violation of treaties ; and that, in reference to them, their power is limited to the right of judging simply of the violation of rights under them ; and that the right of judging of infractions belongs exclusively to the parties themselves, and not to the courts : of which we have an example in the French treaty, which was de- clared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its violation by the gov- ernment of France. Without such declaration, had a French citizen sued a citizen of this country under the treaty, the court could have taken no cogni- zance of its infraction ; nor, after such a declaration, would it have heard any argument or proof going to show that the treaty had not been violated. The declaration of itself is conclusive on the court. But it will be asked how the court obtained the powers to pronounce a law or treaty unconstitution- al, when they come in conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it possesses the right, but I can by no means concede that it was derived from the Constitution. It had its origin in the necessity of the case. Where there are two or more rules established, one from a higher, the other from a lower authority, which may come into conflict in applying them to a particular case, the judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favour of the superior against the inferior. It is from this necessity, and this alone, that the power which is now set up to overrule the rights of the slates against an express provision of the Constitutiori was derived. It had no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source, will be manifest from the fact that it is a power which, so far from being con- I ferred exclusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to every court — inferior and superior — state and general — and even to foreign courts. But the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) relies on the journals of the Convention to prove that it was the intention of that body to confer on the Su- preme i^ouri iiie ngui "i uc(,i General Government. I will not follow him through the journals, as I do not deem that to be necessary to refute his argument. It is sufficient for this pur- pose to state, that Mr. Rutledge reported a resolution, providing expressly that the United States and the states might be parties before the Supreme Court. If this proposition had been adopted, I would ask the senator whether this very controversy between the United States and South Carolina might not have been brou<^ht before the court ? I would also ask him whether it can be brought be- I fore the court as the Constitution now stands ? If he answers the former in the affirmative, and the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his elabo- rate art^ument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the report of Mr. Rutledge Avas not, in substance, adopted as he contended ; and that the journals, so far from supporting, are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to maintain. I might push the argument much farther against the power of the court, but I do not deem it necessary, at least in this stage of the discussion. If the views which have already been presented be correct, and I do not see how they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the reserved powers were reserved equally against every department of the government, and as strongly against the judicial as against the other departments, and, of course, were left under the exclusive will of the states. There still remains another misrepresentation of the conduct of the state which has been made with the view of exciting odium. I allude to the charge, that South Carolina supported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible for the protective system. To determine the truth of this charge, it becomes necessary to ascertain the real character of that law — whether it was a tariff for revenue or for protection — which presents the inquiry, What was the corvdi- tion of the country at that period ? The late war with Great Britain had just terminated, which, with the restrictive system that preceded it, had diverted a large amount of capital and industry from commerce to manufactures, particu- larly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was a debt, at the same time, of one hundred and thirty millions of dollars hanging over the country, and the heavy war duties were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the ques- tion was presented, to what point the duties ought to be reduced. That ques- tion involved another — at what time the debt ought to be paid ; which was a question of policy involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected with the then condition of the country. Among the most prominent arguments in favour of an early discharge of the debt was, that the high duties which it would require to effect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the circumstances to which I have adverted. This view of the subject had a decided influence in determining in favour of an early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was, accordingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars, with the provision to apply the surplus which might remain in the treasury as a contingent appro- priation to that fund ; and the duties were graduated to meet this increased expenditure. It was thus that, the policy and justice of protecting the large amount of capital and industry which had heen diverted by the measures of the government into new channels, as I have stated, was combined with the fiscal action of the government, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of the debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers which would have fol- lowed a sudden and great reduction. Still, revenue was the main object, and protection but the incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by the Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures, and it proposed a heavy reduction on the then existing rate of duties. But what of itself, with- out other evidence, was decisive as to the character of the bill, is the fact that it fixed a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the protected articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles only : woollen and cotton objects of protection, were subject to a permanent duty of only 20 per cent. Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a protection of not more than 9 per cent, as fixed by the act, and of but fifteen as reported in the bill. These rates were all below the average duties as fixed in the act, including the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I have entered into some calculation, in order to ascertain the average rate of duties under the act. There is some uncertainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than thirty per cent, ad valorem : showing an excess of the average duties above that imposed on the protected articles enumerated of more than 10 per cent., and thus clearly establishing the character of the measure — that it was for revenue, and not protection. Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our experience, I perceive but two errors in the act : the one in reference to iron, and the other the mini- mum duty on coarse cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as re- ported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still farther reduced in its passage through Congress. The duty, at first, was fixed at seventy-five cents thehundred weight ; but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced, by a sort of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five cents. This injustice was severely felt in Pennsylvania, the state, above all others, most productive of iron ; and was the principal cause of that great reaction which has since thrown her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy. The other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty was as much too hio^h as that on iron was too low. It introduced, besides, the obnoxious minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended ; and to that extent, I am constrained, in candour, to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise nothing, the protective principle was recognised by the act of 1816. How this was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my ob- servation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject — the question of the currency, then so urgent, and with which, as chairman of the committee, I was particularly charged. With these exceptions, I again repeat, I see nothing in the bill to condemn ; yet it is on the ground that the members from the state voted for the bill, that the attempt is now made to hold up Carolina as responsible for the whole system of protection which has since followed, though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was there ever greater injustice 1 And how is it to be accounted for, but as forming a part of that systematic misrepresentation and calumny which has been directed for so many years, without interruption, against that gallant and generous state ? And why has she thus been assailed ] Merely because she abstained from taking any part in the Presidential canvass — believing that it had degenerated into a mere system of imposition on the people — controlled, almost exclusively, by those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of the government, and that without regard to principle or policy. Standing apart from what she considered a contest in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by both parties with a fury altogether unparalleled; but which, pursuing the course which she believed liberty and duty required, she has met with a firmness equal to the fierceness of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped. With a view of inflicting a wound on the state through me, I have been held up as the author of the protective system, and one of its most strenuous advo- cates. It is with pain that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject as that now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves the lib- erty of the country. I now regret that, under the sense of injustice which the remarks of a senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins) excited for the moment^ I hastily gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which has^ been made in reference to my course in 1816 : not that there will be any difliculty 1 ClUV^i in repelling tne cnarge, dui oecuu&t; i icci a ucc^ cussion, in any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of so little importance as the consistency or inconsistency of myself, or any other indi- vidual, particularly in connexion with an event so long since passed. But for this hasty pledge, I would have remained silent, as to my own course, on this occasion, and would have borne with patience and calmness this, with the many other misrepresentations with which I have been so incessantly assailed for so many years. The charge that I was the author of the protective system has no other foundation but that I, in common with the almost entire South, gave my support to the tarifi'of 1816. It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may rest my defence, without taking any other, on the ground that it was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection, which I have established beyond the power of controversy. But my speech on the occasion has been brought in judgment against me by the senator from Pennsylvania. I have since cast my eyes over the speech ; and I will surprise, I have no doubt, the senator, by telling him that, with the exception of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract nothing I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged, in refer- ence to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which is due to the occasion : taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was delivered, and bearing in mind that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection ; for reducing, and not raising the revenue. But, before I explain the then con- dition of the country, from which my main arguments in favour of the measure •were drawn, it is nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a fact in connexion with my speech, that is necessary to explain what I have call- ed hasty and unguarded expressions. My speech was an imprompiu ; and, as such, I apologized to the house, as appears from the speech as printed, for of- fering my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected on the sub- ject. It was delivered at the request of a friend, when I had not previously the least intention of addressing the house. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham, then and now, as I am proud to say, a personal and political friend — a man of talents and integrity — with a clear head, and firm and patriotic heart : then among the leading members of the house : in the palmy state of his political glory, though now for a moment depressed — depressed, did I say ? no ! it is his state which is depressed — Pennsylvania, and not Samuel D. Ingham ! Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under circumstances which, instead of depressing, ought to have elevated him in her estimation. He came to me, when sitting at my desk writing, and said that the house was falling into some confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I knew how difficult it was to rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced during the late war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it desers-ed, he requested me to say something to prevent the confusion. I replied that I was at a loss what to say ; that I had been busily engaged on the currency, which was then in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been pla- ced particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the committee on that subject. He repeated his request, and the speech which the senator fram Penn- sylvania has complimented so highly was the result. I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice, to be borne in mind by those who would hold me accountable, not only for the general scope of the speech, but for every word and sentence which it contains ? But, in asking this question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech. All I ask is, that I may be judged by the rules which, in justice, belong to the case. Let it be recollected that the bill was a revenue bill, and, of course, that it was constitu- tional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the measure is constitutional, all arguments calculated to show its beneficial operation may be legitimately pressed into service, without taking into consideration whether the subject to for instance, a question were beiore tnis body to lay a duty on iiibies, and a motion were made to reduce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free, who could doubt that the argument in favour of the motion, that the increased circulation of the Bible would be in favour of the morality and religion of the country, would be strictly proper 1 Or who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or morals of the country under the charge of the Federal Government? Again: suppose the question to be to raise the duty on silk, or any other article of luxury, and that it should be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly consumed by the rich and extravagant, could it be fairly inferred that, in the opinion of the speaker. Congress had a right to pass sumptuary laws ? I only ask that these plain rules may be applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn almost entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred on the country in time war, and which no one could doubt. The country had recently passed through such a state. The world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which no one could tell how soon again might return. Bonaparte had but recently been overthrown ; the whole southern part of this Continent was in a state of revolution, and was threatened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it occurred, must almost necessarily have involved this country in a most dangerous conflict. It was under these circumstances that I delivered the speech, in which I urged the house that, in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a state of war as well as peace, and that its provisions ought to be fixed on the compound views of the two periods — making some sacrifice in peace, in order that less might be made in war. Was this principle false ? and, in urging it, did I commit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and which has for its object the enriching of one portion of the country at the expense of the other ? The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure is proposed, the first thing is to ascertain its constitutionality ; and, that being ascertained, the next is its expediency ; wliich last opens the whole field of argument for and against. Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or unwise : so in a bill to raise imposts. It must first be ascertained that the bill is based on the prin- ciples of revenue, and that the money raised is necessary for the wants of the country. These being ascertained, every argument, direct and indirect, may be fairly offered, which may go to show that, under all the circumstances, the provisions of the bill are proper or improper. Had this plain and simple rule been adhered to, we should never have heard of the complaint of Carolina. Her objection is not against the improper modification of a bill acknowledged to be for revenue, but that, under the name of imposts, a power essentially differ- ent from the taxing power is exercised — partaking much more of the character of a penalty than a tax. Nothing is more common than that things closely re- sembling in appearance should widely and essentially differ in their character. Arsenic, for instance, resembles flour, yet one is a deadly poison, and the other that which constitutes the staff of life. So duties imposed, whether for reve- nue or protection, may be called imposts ; though nominally and apparently the same, yet they differ essentially in their real character. I shall now return to my speech on the tarifl'of 1816. To determine what my opinions really were on the subject of protection at that time, it will be proper to advert to my sentiments before and after that period. My sentiments preceding 1816, on this subject, are matter of record. I came into Congress, in 1812, a devoted friend and supporter of the then administration ; yet one of my first efforts was to brave the administration, by opposing its favourite meas- ure, the restrictive system — embargo, non-intercourse, and all — and that upoa the priaciple of free trade. The system remained in fashion for a time ; but, after the overthrow of Bonaparte, I reported a bill i'rom the Committee on For- K cign rielaiions,to repeal me wnuie s^sieui ui le&uii-uvc muaouics. w ime me bill was iiiider consideration, a worthy man, then a member of the house (Mr. M'Kim, of Baltimore), moved to except the non-importation act, which he sup- ported on the (ground of encouragement to manufactures. I resisted the motion on the verv (grounds on which Mr. M'Kim supported it. I maintained that the manufacturers were then receiving too much protection, and warned its friends that the witlidrawal of the protection which the war and the high duties then afforded would cause great embarrassment ; and that the true policy, in the mean time, was to admit foreign goods as freely as possible, in order to dimin- ish the anticipated embarrassment on the return of peace ; intimating, at the same time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a view of affording a moder- ate and permanent protection.* Such was my conduct before 1816. Shortly after that period I left Congress, and had no opportunity of making known my sentiments in reference to the pro- tective system, which shortly after began to be agitated. But I have the most conclusive evidence that I considered the arrangement of the revenue, in 1816, as growing out of the necessity of the case, and due to the consideration of jus- tice ; but that, even at that early period, I was not without my fears that even that arrangement would lead to abuse and future difficulties. I regret that I have been compelled to dwell so long on myself; but trust that, whatever cen- sure may be incurred, will not be directed against me, but against those who have drawn my conduct into the controversy ; and who may hope, by assailing my motives, to wound the cause with which I am proud to be identified. I may add, that all the Southern States voted with South Carolina in support of the bill : not that they had any interest in manufactures, but on the ground that they had supported the war, and, of course, felt a corresponding obligation to sustain those establishments which had grown up under the encouragement it had incidentally afforded ; while most of the New-England members were op- posed to the measure principally, as I believe, on opposite principles. I have now, I trust, satisfactorily repelled the charge against the state, and myself personally, in reference to the tariff of 1816. Whatever support the state has given the bill, originated in the most disinterested motives. There was not within the limits of the state, so far as my memory serves me, a single cotton or woUen establishment. Her whole dependance was on agri- culture, and the cultivation of two great staples, rice and cotton. Her obvious policy was to keep open the market of the world unchecked and unrestricted : to buy cheap, and to sell high ; but from a feeling of kindness, combined with a sense of justice, she added her support to the bill. We had been told by the agents of the manufacturers that the protection which the measure afforded would be sufficient ; to which we the more readily conceded, as it was consid- ered a final adjustment of the question. Let us now turn our eyes forward, and see what has been the conduct of the parties to this arrangement. Have Carolina and the South disturbed this ad- justment ? No : they have never raised their voice in a single instance against it, even though this measure, moderate, comparatively, as it is, was felt with no inconsiderable pressure on their interests. Was this example imitated on the opposite side ? Far otherwise. Scarcely had the president signed his name, before application was made for an increase of duties, which was repeat- ed, with demands continually growing, till the passage of the act of 1828. What course now, I would ask, did it become Carolina to pursue in reference to these demands ? Instead of acquiescing in them, because she had acted generously in adjusting the tariff of 1816, she saw, in her generosity on that occasion, ad- ditional motives for that firm and decided resistance which she has since made against the system of protection. She accordingly commenced a systematic opposition to all farther encroachments, which continued from 1818 till 1828 : * See Mr. C.'s Speech in the National Intelligencer, April, 1814. her Legislature. Ihese all proved insumcient to stem the current oi encroach- ment ; but, notwithstanding the heavy pressure on her industry, she never de- spaired of relief till the passage of the act of 1828 — that bill of abominations — engendered by avarice and political intrigue. Its adoption opened the eyes of the state, and gave a new character to the controversy. Till then, the ques- tion had been, whether the protective system was constitutional and expedient ; but, after that, she no longer considered the question whether the right of regu- lating the industry of the states was a reserved or delegated power, but what right a state possesses to defend her reserved powers against the encroach- ments of the Federal Government : a question on the decision of which the value of all the reserved powers depends. The passage of the act of 1828, with all its objectionable features, and under the odious circumstances under which it was adopted, almost, if not entirely, closed the door of hope through the Gen- eral Government. It afforded conclusive evidence that no reasonable prospect of relief from Congress could be entertained ; yet, the near approach of the pe- riod of the payment of the public debt, and the elevation of General Jackson to the presidency, still afforded a ray of hope — not so strong, however, as to pre- vent the state from turning her eyes for final relief to her reserved powers. Under these circumstances commenced that inquiry into the nature and extent of the reserved powers of a state, and the means which they afford of resist- ance against the encroachments of the General Government, which has been pursued with so much zeal and energy, and, I may add, intelligence. Never was there a political discussion carried on with greater activity, and which appealed more directly to the intelligence of a community. Throughout the whole, no address has been made to the low and vulgar passions ; but, on the contrary, the discussion has turned upon the higher principles of political econ- omy, connected with the operations of the tariff system, calculated to show its real bearing on the interests of the state, and on the structure of our political system ; and to show the true character of the relations between the state and the General Government, and the means which the states possess of defending those powers which they reserved in forming the Federal Government. In this great canvass, men of the most commanding talents and acquirements have engaged with the greatest ardour ; and the people have been addressed through every channel — by essays in the public press, and by speeches in their public assemblies — until they have become thoroughly instructed on the nature of the oppression, and on the rights which they possess, under the Constitution, to throw it off. If gentlemen suppose that the stand taken by the people of Carolina rests on passion and delusion, they are wholly mistaken. The case is far otherwise. No community, from the legislator to the ploughman, were ever better instruct- ed in their rights ; and the resistance on which the state has resolved is the result of mature reflection, accompanied with a deep conviction that their rights have been violated, and that the means of redress which they have adopted are consistent with the principles of the Constitution. But while this active canvass was carried on, which looked to the reserved powers as the final means of redress if all others failed, the state at the same time cherished a hope, as I have already stated, that the election of General Jackson to the presidency would prevent the necessity of a resort to extrem- ities. He was identified with the interests of the staple states ; and, having the same interest, it was believed that his great popularity — a popularity of the strongest character, as it rested on military services — would enable him, as they hoped, gradually to bring down the system of protection, without shock or inju- ry to any interest. Under these views, the canvass in favour of General Jack- son's election to the presidency was carried on with great zeal, in conjunction with that active inquiry into the reserved powers of the states on which final whom ihey were thus striving to elevate to the highest seat of power would prove so utterly false to all their hopes. Man is, indeed, ignorant of the future ; nor was there ever a stronger illustration of the observation than is afforded by the result of that election ! The very event on which they had buiU their Lopes has been turned against them, and the very individual to whom they looked as a deliverer, and whom, under that impression, they strove for so many years to elevate to power, is now the most powerful instrument in the hands of his and their bitterest opponents to put down them and their cause ! Scarcely had he been elected, when it became apparent, from the organiza- tion of his cabinet, and other indications, that all their hopes of relief through him were blasted. The admission of a single hidividual into the cabinet, under the circumstances which accompanied that admission, threw all into confusion. The mischievous influence over the President, through which this individual was admitted into the cabinet, soon became apparent. Instead of turning his eyes forward to the period of the payment of the public debt, which was then near at hand, and to the present dangerous political crisis, which was inevita- ble unless averted by a timely and wise system of measures, the attention of the President was absorbed by mere party arrangements, and circumstances too disreputable to be mentioned here, except by the most distant allusion. Here I must pause for a moment to repel a charge which has been so often made, and which even the President has reiterated in his proclamation— the charge that I have been actuated, in the part which I have taken, by feelings of disappointed ambition. I again repeat, that I deeply regret the necessity of noticing myself in so important a discussion ; and that nothing can induce me to advert to my own course but the conviction that it is due to the cause, at whick a blow is aimed through me. It is only in this view that I notice it. It illy became the chief magistrate to make this charge. The course which the state took, and which led to the present controversy between her and the General Government, was taken as far back as 1828— in the very midst of that severe canvass which placed him in power— and in that very canvass Carolina openly avowed and zealously maintained those very principles which he, the chief magistrate, now officially pronounces to be treason and rebellion. That was the period at which he ought to have spoken. Having remained silent then, and having, under his approval, impUed by that silence, received the support and the vote of the state, I, if a sense of decorum did not prevent it, might recriminate with the double charge of deception and ingratitude. My object, however, is not to assail the President, but to defend myself against a most unfounded charge. The time alone at which the course upon which this charge of disappointed am- bition is founded, will of itself repel it, in the eye of every unprejudiced and honest man. The doctrine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties, I openly avowed and maintained immediately after the act of 1828, that " bill of abominations," as it has been so often and properly termed. Was I at that period disappointed in any views of ambition which I might be supposed to en- tertain ? I was Vice-president of the United States, elected by an overwhelm- ing majority. I was a candidate for re-election on the ticket with General Jackson himself, with a certain prospect of a triumphant success of that tick- et, and with a fair j)rospect of the highest office to which an American citizen can aspire. What was my course under these prospects ? Did I look to my own advancement, or to an honest and faithful discharge of my duty ? Let facts speak for themselves. When the bill to which I have referred came from the other house to the Senate, the almost universal impression was, that its fate would depend upon my casting vote. It was known that, as the bill then stood, the Senate was nearly equally divided ; and as it was a combined measure, ori- ginating with the politicijans and manufacturers, and intended as much to bear upon the Presidential election as to protect manufactures, it was believed that, order to defeat General Jackson's election, as well as my own. The friends of General Jackson were alarmed, and I was earnestly entreated to leave the chair in order to avoid the responsibility, under the plausible argument that, if the Senate should be equally divided, the bill would be lost without the aid of my casting vote. The reply to this entreaty was, that no consideration person- al to myself could induce me to take such a course ; that I considered the measure as of the most dangerous character, and calculated to produce the most fearful crisis ; that the payment of the public debt was just at hand ; and that the great increase of revenue which it would pour into the treasury would acceler- ate the approach of that period, and that the country would be placed in the most trying of situations — with an immense revenue without the means of ab- sorption upon any legitimate or constitutional object of appropriation, and would be compelled to submit to all the corrupting consequences of a large surplus, or to make a sudden reduction of the rates of duties, which would prove ruinous to the very interests which were then forcing the passage of the bill. Under these views I determined to remain in the chair, and if the bill came to me, to give my casting vote against it, and in doing so, to give my reasons at large ; but at the same time I informed my friends that 1 would retire from the ticket, so that the election of General Jackson might not be embarrassed by any act of mine. Sir, I was amazed at the folly and mfatuation of that period. So completely absorbed was Congress in the game of ambition and avarice, from the double impulse of the manufacturers and politicians, that none but a few appeared to anticipate the present crisis, at which now all are alarmed, but which is the in- evitable result of what was then done. As to myself, I clearly foresaw what tas since followed. The road of ambition lay open before me — I had but to follow the corrupt tendency of the times — but I chose to tread the rugged path of duty. It was thus that the reasonable hope of relief through the election of Gen- eral Jackson was blasted ; but still one other hope remained, that the final dis- charge of the public debt — an event near at hand — would remove our burden. That event would leave in the treasury a large surplus : a surplus that could not be expended under the most extravagant schemes of appropriation, having the least colour of decency or constitutionality. That event at last arrived. At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that the public debt, for all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the small surplus remaining being nearly covered by the money in the treasury and the bonds for duties, which had already accrued ; but with the arrival of this event our last hope was doom- ed to be disappointed. After a long session of many months, and the most ear- nest effort on the part of South Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain relief, all that could be effected was a small reduction in the amount of the du- ties ; but a reduction of such a character, that, while it diminished the amount of burden, distributed that burden more unequally than even the obnoxious act of 1828 : reversing the principle adopted by the bill of 1816, of laying higher duties on the unprotected than the protected articles, by repealing almost en- tirely the duties laid upon the former, and imposing the burden almost entirely i on the latter. It was thus that, instead of relief — instead of an equal distribu- tion of the burdens and benefits of the government, on the payment of the debt, as had been fondly anticipated — the duties were so arranged as to be, in fact, bounties on one side and taxation on the other : thus placing the two great sec- tions of the country in direct conflict in reference to its fiscal action, and there- , by letting in that flood of political corruption which threatens to sweep away '• our Constitution and our liberty. This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by the adminis- tration, through its proper organ, the secretary of the treasury, and by the op- position, to be a permanent adjustment; and it was thus that all hope of relief through the action of the General Government terminated, and the crisis so long apprehended at length arrived, at which the state was compelled to choose be- tween absolute acquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to her reserved powers — powers of which she alone was the rightful judge, and •which only, in this momentous juncture, can save her. She determined on the latter. The consent of two thirds of her Legislature was necessary for the call of a convention, which was considered the only legitimate organ through which the people, in their sovereignty, could speak. After an arduous struggle, the State Rights party succeeded : more than two thirds of both branches of the Legisla- ture favourable to a convention were elected ; a convention was called — the ordinance adopted. The convention was succeeded by a meeting of the Legis- lature, when the laws to carry the ordinance into execution were enacted : all of which have been communicated by the President, have been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their labour. Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as to the na- ture of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of the movement of the state in reference to it, I will next proceed to notice some objections connected with the ordinance and the proceedings under it. The first and most prominent of these is directed against what is called the test oath, which an effort has been made to render odious. So far from de- serving the denunciation which has been levelled against it, I view this provis- ion of the ordinance as but the natural result of the doctrines entertained by the state, and the position which she occupies. The people of that state be- lieve that the Union is a union of states, and not of individuals ; that it was formed by the states, and that the citizens of the several states were bound to it through the acts of their several states ; that each state ratified the Constitution for itself, and that it was only by such ratification of a state that any obligation was imposed upon the citizens : thus believing, it is the opinion of the people of Carolina that it belongs to the state which has imposed the obligation to de- clare, in the last resort, the extent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are concerned ; and this upon the plain principles which exist in all analogous cases of compact between sovereign bodies. On this principle, the people of the state, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention, precisely as they adopted their own and the federal Constitution, haved eclared by the ordi- nance, that the acts of Congress which imposed duties under the authority to lay imposts, are acts, not for revenue, as intended by the Constitution, but for protection, and therefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the people of the state themselves, acting as a sovereign community, is as obliga- tory on the citizens of the state as any portion of the Constitution. In pre- scribing, then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was done than to pre- scribe an oath to obey the Constitution. It is, in fact, but a particular oath of allegiance, and in every respect similar to that which is prescribed under the Constitution of the United States, to be administered to all the officers of the State and Federal Governments ; and is no more deserving the harsh and bit- ter epithets which have been heaped upon it than that, or any similar oath. It ought to be borne in mind, that, according to the opinion which prevails in Caro- lina, the right of resistance to the unconstitutional laws of Congress belongs to the state, and not to her individual citizens ; and that, though the latter may, in a mere question of meum and tuum, resist, through the courts, an unconstitu- tional encroachment upon their rights, yet the final stand against usurpation rests not with them, but with the state of which they are members ; and such act of resistance by a state binds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen. But there appears to be a general misapprehension as to the extent to which the state has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweeping every officer by a general proscription of the minority, as has been represented in de- VeQ. 1 lie Siaie Iias, m lai^i, a,ui,t;u Willi iiits yieciteai, uciiuciiitroo, aii i;ni;uiiisia.ii- ces considered, towards citizens who differed from the majority ; and, in that spirit, has directed the oath to be administered only in cases of some official act directed to be performed in which obedience to the ordinance is involved. It has been farther objected that the state has acted precipitately. What ! precipitately ! after making a strenuous resistance for twelve years — by discus- sion here and in the other house of Congress — by essays in all forms — by res- olutions, remonstrances, and protests on the part of her Legislature — and, final- ly, by attempting an appeal to the judicial power of the United States ? I say attempting, for they have been prevented from bringing the question fairly be- fore the court, and that by an act of that very majority in Congress who now upbraid them for not making that appeal ; of that majority who, on a motion of one of the members in the other house from South Carolina, refused to give to the act of 1828 its true title — that it was a protective, and not a revenue act. The state has never, it is true, relied upon that tribunal, the Supreme Court, to vindicate its reserved rights ; yet they have always considered it as an auxili- ary means of defence, of which they would gladly have availed themselves to test the constitutionality of protection, had they not been deprived of the means of doing so by the act of the majority. Notwithstanding this long delay of more than ten years, under this continued encroachment of the government, we now hear it on all sides, by friends and foes, gravely pronounced that the state has acted precipitately — that her conduct has been rash ! That such should be the language of an interested majority, who, by means of this unconstitutional and oppressive system, are annually extorting millions from the South to be bestowed upon other sections, is not at all sur- prising. Whatever impedes the course of avarice and ambition will ever be de- nounced as rash and precipitate ; and had South Carolina delayed her resist- ance fifty instead of twelve years, she would have heard from the same quarter the same language ; but it is really surprising that those who are suffering in common with herself, and who have complained equally loud of their grievan- ces, who have pronounced the very acts which she has asserted within her limits to be oppressive, unconstitutional, and ruinous, after so long a struggle — a struggle longer than that which preceded the separation of these states from the mother-country — longer than the period of the Trojan war — should now com- plain of precipitancy ! No, it is not Carolina which has acted precipitately ; but her sister states, who have suffered in common with her, have acted tardily. Had they acted as she has done, had they performed their duty with equal en- ergy and promptness, our situation this day would be very different from what we now find it. Delays are said to be dangerous ; and never was the maxim more true than in the present case, a case of monopoly. It is the very nature of monopolies to grow. If we take from one side a large portion of the pro- ceeds of its labour and give it to the other, the side from which we take must constantly decay, and that to which we give must prosper and increase. Such is the action of the protective system. It exacts from the South a large portion of the proceeds of its industry, which it bestows upon the other sections, in the shape of bounties to manufactures, and appropriations in a thousand forms ; pensions, improvement of rivers and harbours, roads and canals, and in every shape that wit or ingenuity can devise. Can we, then, be surprised that the principle of monopoly grows, when it is so amply remunerated at the expense . of those who support it ? And this is the real reason of the fact which we wit- ness, that all acts for protection pass with small minorities, but soon come to be sustained by great and overwhelming majorities. Those who seek the monop- oly endeavour to obtain it in the most exclusive shape ; and they take care, accordingly, to associate only a sufficient number of interests barely to pass it through the two houses of Congress, on the plain principle that the greater the greater is the advantage to the monopolists. Acting in this spirit, we have often seen with what exact precision they count : adding wool to woollens, as- sociating lead and iron, feeling their way, until a bare majority is obtained, when the bill passes, connecting just as many interests as are sufficient to ensure its success, and no more. In a short time, however, we have invariably found that this h(i?i becomes a decided majority, under the certain operation which compels individuals to desert the pursuits which the monopoly has rendered unprofitable, that they may participate in those pursuits which it has rendered profitable. It is against this dangerous and growing disease which South Car- olina has acted : a disease whose cancerous action would soon have spread to every part of the system, if not arrested. There is another powerful reason why the action of the state could not have been safely delayed. The public debt, as I have already stated, for all practi- cal purposes, has already been paid ; and, under the existing duties, a large annual surplus of many millions must come into the treasury. It is impossi- ble to look at this state of things without seeing the most mischievous conse- quences ; and, among others, if not speedily corrected, it would interpose pow- erful and almost insuperable obstacles to throwing off the burden under which the South has been so long labouring. The disposition of the surplus would become a subject of violent and corrupt struggle, and could not fail to rear up new and powerful interests in support of the existing system, not only in those sections which have been heretofore benefited by it, but even in the South itself. I cannot but trace to the anticipation of this state of the treasury the sudden and extraordinary movements which took place at the last session in the Vir- ginia Legislature, in which the whole South is vitally interested.* It is im- possible for any rational man to believe that that state could seriously have thought of effecting the scheme to which I allude by her own resources, with- out powerful aid from the General Government. It is next objected, that the enforcing acts have legislated the United States out of South Carolina. I have already replied to this objection on another oc- casion, and will now but repeat what I then said : that they have been legisla- ted out only to the extent that they had no right to enter. The Constitution has admitted the jurisdiction of theUnited States within the limits of the sev- eral states only so far as the delegated powers authorize ; beyond that they are intruders, and may rightfully be expelled ; and that they have been efficiently expelled by the legislation of the state through her civil process, as has been acknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of the truth of the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have contended. The very point at issue between the two parties there is, whether nullifica- tion is a peaceable and an efficient remedy against an imconstitutional act of the General Government, and which may be asserted as such through the state tri- bunals. Both parties agree that the acts against which it is directed are un- constitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only as to the means by which our citizens may be protected against the acknowledged encroachments on their rights. This being the point at issue between the parties, and the very object of the majority being an efficient protection of the citizens through the state tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance of course received the most decisive character. AVe were not children, to act by halves. Yet for acting thus efficiently the state is denounced, and this bill reported, to overrule, by military force, the civil tribunals and civil process of the state ! Sir, I consider this bill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor in its support, as the most triumphant acknowledgment that nullification is peaceful and efficient, and so deeply intrenched in the principles of our system, * Having for their object the emancipation and colonization of slaves. the su})remacy of military lorce in lieu of the supremacy oi the laws. In fact, the advocates of this bill refute their own argument. They tell us that the or- dinance is unconstitutional ; that they infract the Constitution of South Carolina, although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was adopted by the very authority which adopted the Constitution itself. They also tell us that the Su- preme Court is the appointed arbiter of all controversies between a state and the General Government. Why, then, do they not leave this controversy to that tribunal 1 Why do they not confide to them the abrogation of the ordi- nance, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the assertion of that suprema- cy which they claim for the laws of Congress ? The state stands pledged to resist no process of the court. Why, then, confer on the President the exten- sive and unlimited powers provided in this bill ? Why authorize him to use military force to arrest the civil process of the state ? But one answer can be given : That, in a contest between the state and the General Government, if the resistance be limited on both sides to the civil process, the state, by its in- herent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will prove too powerful in such a controversy, and must triumph over the Federal Government, sustain- ed by its delegated and limited authority ; and in this answer we have an ac- knowledgment of the truth of those great principles for which the state has so firmly and nobly contended. Having made these remarks, the great question is now presented. Has Con- gress the right to pass this bill 1 which I will next proceed to consider. The decision of this question involves the inquiry into the provisions of the bill. What are they ? It puts at the disposal of the President the army and navy, and the entire militia of the country ; it enables him, at his pleasure, to subject every man in the United States, not exempt from militia duty, to martial law ; to call him from his ordinary occupation to the field, and under the penalty of fine and imprisonment, inflicted by a court martial, to imbrue his hand in his brothers' blood. There is no limitation on the power of the sword, and that over the purse is equally without restraint ; for, among the extraordinary fea- tures of the bill, it contains no appropriation, which, under existing circumstan- ces, is tantamount to an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its authority, incur any expenditure, and pledge the national faith to meet it. He may create a new national debt, at the very moment of the termination of the former — a debt of millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labour of that section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights this bill prostrates ! Thus exhibiting the extraordinary spectacle, that the very section of the coun- try which is urging tliis measure, and carrying the sword of devastation against us, are, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid by those whose rights are violated ; while those who violate them are to receive the benefits, in the shape of bounties and expenditures. And for what purpose is the unlimited control of the purse and of the sword thus placed at the disposition of the executive 1 To make war against one of the free and sovereign members of this confederation, which the bill proposes to deal with, not as a state, but as a collection of banditti or outlaws. Thus ex- hibiting the impious spectacle of this government, the creature of the states, making war against the power to which it owes its existence. The bill violates the Constitution, plainly and palpably, in many of its pro- visions, by authorizing the President, at his pleasure, to place the different ports of this Union on an unequal footing, contrary to that provision of the Con- stitution which declares that no preference shall be given to one port over another. It also violates the Constitution by authorizing him, at his discretion, to impose cash duties on one port, while credit is allowed in others ; by enabling the President to regulate commerce, a power vested in Congress alone ;. and by drawing within the jurisdiction of the United States courts powers aever in- L tended to be conferred on them. As great as these objections are, they become insignificant in the provisions of a bill which, by a single blow— by treating the states as a mere lawless mass of individuals — prostrates all the barriers of the Constitution. I will pass over the minor considerations, and proceed directly to the trreat point. This bill proceeds on the ground that the entire sovereignty of this'country belongs to the American people, as forming one great community, and re<^ards the states as mere fractions or counties, and not as an integral part of the Union : having no more right to resist the encroachments of the govern- ment than a county has to resist the authority of a state ; and treating such re- sistance as the lawless acts of so many individuals, without possessing sover- eif^ntv or political rights. It has been said that the bill declares v/ar against South Carolina. No. It decrees a massacre of her citizens ! War has some- thing ennobling about it, and, with all its horrors, brings into action the highest qualities, intellectual and moral. It was, perhaps, in the order of Providence that it should be permitted for that very purpose. But this bill declares no war, except, indeed, it be that which savages wage— a war, not against the commu- nity, but the citizens of whom that community is composed. But I regard it as worse than savage warfare — as an attempt to take away life under the colour of law, wdthout the trial by jury, or any other safeguard which the Constitution has thrown around the life of the citizen ! It authorizes the President, or even his deputies, when they may suppose the law to be violated, without the interven- tion of a court or jury, to kill without mercy or discrimination ! It has been said by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) to be a meas- ure of peace ! Yes, such peace as the wolf gives to the lamb — the kite to the dove ! Such peace as Russia gives to Poland, or death to its victim ! A peace, by extinguishing the political existence of the state, by awing her into an aban- donment of the exercise of every power which constitutes her a sovereign com- munity. It is to South Carolina a question of self-preservation ; and I proclaim it, that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to enforce it, it will be resisted, at every hazard — even that of death itself. Death is not the greatest calamity : there are others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among them may be placed the loss of liberty and honour. There are thousands of her brave sons who, if need be, are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives in defence of the state, and the great principles of constitutional liberty for which she is contending. God forbid that this should become necessary ! It never can be, unless this government is resolved to bring the question to extremity, when her gallant sons will stand prepared to perform the last duty — to die nobly. I go on the ground that this Constitution was made by the states ; that it is a federal union of the states, in which the several states still retain their sover- eignty. If these views be correct, I have not characterized the bill too strongly, which presents the question whether they be or be not. I will not enter into the discussion of that question now. I will rest it, for the present, on what I have said on the introduction of the resolutions now on the table, under a hope that another opportunity will be afforded for more ample discussion. I will, for the present, confine my remarks to the objections which have been raised to the views which I presented when I introduced them. The authority of Luther Martin has been adduced by the senator from Delaware, to prove that the citi- zens of a state, acting under the authority of a state, are liable to be punished as traitors by this government. As eminent as Mr. Martin was as a lawyer, and as high as his authority may be considered on a legal point, I cannot ac- cept it in determining the point at issue. The attitude which he occupied, if taken into view, would lessen, if not destroy, the weight of his authority. He had been violently opposed in Convention to the Constitution, and the very let- ter from which the senator has quoted was intended to dissuade Maryland from its adoption. With this view, it was to be expected that every consideration calculated to effect that object should be urged ; that real objections should be exaggerated ; and that those having no loundation, except mere plausible deduc- tions, should be presented. It is to this spirit that I attribute the opinion of Mr. Martin in reference to the point under consideration. But if his authority be good on one point, it must be admitted to be equally so on another. If his opinion be sufficient to prove that a citizen of the state may be punished as a traitor when acting under allegiance to the state, it is also sufficient to show I that no authority was intended to be given in the Constitution for the protection i of manufactures by the General Government, and that the provision in the Con- ' stitution permitting a state to lay an impost duty, with the consent of Congress, was intended to reserve the right of protection to the states themselves, and that each state should protect its own industry. Assuming his opinion to be of equal authority on both points, how embarrassing would be the attitude ia I which it would place the senator from Delaware, and those with whom he is acting — that of using the sword and the bayonet to enforce the execution of an. unconstitutional act of Congress. I must express my surprise that the slightest authority in favour oi power should be received as the most conclusive evidence, while that M-hich is, at least, equally strong in favour of right and liberty, is wholly overlooked or rejected. Notwithstanding all that has been said, I must say that neither the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any other who has spoken on therisame side, has directly and fairly met the great questions at issue : Is this a federal union ? a union of states, as distinct from that of individuals ? Is the sovereignty in the several states, or in the American people in the aggregate ? The very language which we are compelled to use, when speaking of our political institutions, af- fords proof conclusive as to its real character. The terras union, federal, uni- ted, all imply a combination oi sovereignties, a confederation of states. They are never applied to an association of individuals. Who ever heard of the Uni- ted State of New- York, of Massachusetts, or of Virginia ? Who ever heard the term federal or union applied to the aggregation of individuals into one community 1 Nor is the other point less clear — that the sovereignty is in the several states, and that our system is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers, under a constitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty between the states severally and the United States. In spite of all that has been said, I maintain that sovereignty is in its nature indivisible. It is the supreme power in a state, and we might just as well speak of half a square, or half of a trian- gle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to confound the exercise of sovereign powers with sovereingty itself, or the delegation of such powers with a surrender of them. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by as many agents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with such limitations as he may impose ; but to surrender any portion of his sovereignty to another is to annihilate the whole. The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clay- ton) calls this metaphysical reasoning, which, he says, he cannot comprehend. If by metaphysics he means that scholastic refinement which makes distinc- tions without difference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt than I do ; but if, on the contrary, he means the power of analysis and combination — that power which reduces the most complex idea into its elements, which traces causes to their first principle, and, by the power oi generalization and combi- nation, unites the whole in one harmonious system — then, so far from deserv- ing contempt, it is the highest attribute of the human mind. It is the power which raises man above the brute — which distinguishes his faculties from mere sagacity, which he holds in common with inferior animals. It is this power which has raised the astronomer from being a mere gazer at the stars to the liigh intellectual eminence of a Newton or Laplace, and astronomy itself from a mere observation of insulated facts into that noble science which displays to our admiration the system of the universe. And shall this high power of the mind, which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which con- trol the material world, be forever prohibited, under a senseless cry of metaphyg. ics, from beinn- applied to the high purpose of political science and legislation ? I hold them to be subject to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a subject for the application of the highest intellectual power. Denunciation may, indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer into these first principles, as it did upon Galileo and Bacon when they first unfolded the great discoveries which . have immortalized their names ; but the time will come when truth will pre- vail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics and legislation will be considered as much a science as astronomy and chemistry. In connexion with this part of the subject, I understood the senator from Vir- ginia (Mr. Rives) to say that sovereignty was divided, and that a portion re- mained with the states severally, and that the residue was vested in the Union, By Union, I suppose the senator meant the United States. If such be his meaning — if he intended to affirm that the sovereignty Avas in the twenty-four states, in whatever light he may view them, our opinions will not disagree ; but, according to my conception, the whole sovereignty is in the several states, \vhile the exercise of sovereign powers is divided — a part being exercised under com- pact, through this General Government, and the residue through the separate state governments. But if the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) means to as- sert thatihe twenty-four states form but one community, with a single sovereign power as to the objects of the Union, it will be but the revival of the old ques- tion, of whether the Union is a union between states, as distinct communities, or a mere aggregate of the American peaple, as a mass of individuals ; and in this light his opinions would lead directly to consolidation. But to return to the bill. It is said that the bill ought to pass, because the law must be enforced. The law must be enforced. The imperial edict must be executed. It is under such sophistry, couched in general terms, without looking to the limitations which must ever exist in the practical exercise of power, that the most cruel and despotic acts ever have been covered. It was such sophistry as this that cast Daniel into the lion's den, and the three Inno- cents into the fiery furnace. Under the same sophistry the bloody edicts of Nero and Caligula were executed. The law must be enforced. Yes, the act imposing the " tea-tax must be executed." This was the very argument which impelled Lord North and his administration in that mad career which forever separated us from the British crown. Under a similar sophistry, " that religion must be protected," how many massacres have been perpetrated T and how many martyrs have been tied to the stake 1 What ! acting on this vague abstraction, are you prepared to enforce a law without considering whether it be just or un- just, constitutional or unconstitutional ? Will you collect money when it is ac- knowledged that it is not wanted ? He who cams the money, who digs it from ihe earth with the sweat of his brow, has a just title to it against the universe. No one has a right to touch it without his consent except his government, and it only to the extent of its legitimate wants ; to take more is robbery, and you propose by this bill to enforce robbery by murder. Yes : to this result you must come, by this miserable sophistry, this vague abstraction of enforcing the law, without a regard to the fact whether the law be just or unjust, constitution- al or unconstitutional. In the same spirit, we arc told that the Union must be preserved, without re- gard to the means. And how is it proposed to preserve the Union ? By force ! Does any man in his senses believe that this beautiful structure — this harmonious aggregate of states, produced by the joint consent of all — can be preserved by force ? Its very introduction will be certain destruction of this Federal Union. No, no. You cannot keep the states united in their consti- tutional and federal bonds by force. Force may, indeed, hold the parts togeth- er, but such union would be the bond between master and slave : a union of exaction on one side, and of unqualified obedience on the other. That obedience Lmon! les, exaction on tlie side oi tne master; tor this very bill is intend- ed to collect what can be no longer called taxes — the voluntary contribution of a free people — but tribute — tribute to be collected under the mouths of the can- non ! Your custom-house is already transferred to a garrison, and that garri- son with its batteries turned, not against the enemy of your country, but on sub- jects (I will not say citizens), on whom you propose to levy contributions. Has reason fled from our borders ? Have we ceased to reflect ? It is madness to suppose that the Union can be preserved by force. I tell you plainly, that the bill, should it pass, cannot be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon your statute-book, a reproach to the year, and a disgrace to the American Senate. I repeat that it will not be executed : it will rouse the dormant spirit of the people, and open their eyes to the approach of despotism. The country has sunk into avarice and political corruption, from which nothing can arouse it but some measure, on the part of the government, of folly and madness, such as that now under consideration. Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power and liberty ; and I will tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that, as strong as may be the love of power on their side, the love of liberty is still stronger on ours. History furnishes many instances of similar struggles where the love of liberty has prevailed against power under every disadvantage, and among them few more striking than that of our own Revolution ; where, as strong as was the pa- rent country, and feeble as were the colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty, and the blessing of God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are, indeed, many and striking analogies between that and the present controversy : they both originated substantially in the same cause, with this difference, that, in the present case, the power of taxation is converted into that of regulating industry ; in that, the power of regulating industry, by the regulation of com- merce, was attempted to be converted into the power of taxation. Were I to trace the analogy farther, we should find that the perversion of the taxing pow- er, in one case, has given precisely the same control to the Northern section over the industry of the Southern section of the Union, which the power to reg- ulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of the colonies ; and that the very articles in which the colonies were permitted to have a free trade, and those in Avhich the mother-country had a monopoly, are almost identically the same as those in which the Southern States are permitted to have a free trade by the act of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the same act, secured a monopoly : the only difference is in the means. In the former, the colonies were permitted to have a free trade with all countries south of Cape Finisterre, a cape in the northern part of Spain ; while north of that the trade of the colonies was prohibited, except through the mother-country, by means of her commercial regulations. If we compare the products of the coun- try north and south of Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with the list of the protected and unprotected articles contained in the act of last year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very arguments resorted to at the commencement of the American Revolution, and the measures adopt- ed, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to enforce the law), are almost identically the same. But to return from this digression to the consideration of the bill. Whatever diflference of opinion may exist upon other points, there is one on which I should suppose there can be none : that this bill rests on principles which, if carried out, will ride over state sovereignties, and that it will be idle for any of its ad- vocates hereafter to talk of state rights. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) says that he is the advocate of state rights ; but he must permit me to tell him that, although he may differ in premises from the other gentlemen with whom he acts on this occasion, yet in supporting this bill he obliterates every vestige Ul UlOUlHyHUIl UC-l of '98, his example will be more pernicious than that of the most open and bit- ter opponents of the rights of the states. I will also add, what I am compelled to say, that 1 must consider him (Mr. Rives) as less consistent than our old oppoiients, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their premises, while his premises ought to have led him to opposite conclusions. The gentleman , has told us that the new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have ' brought state rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls new-fangled are but the doctrines of '98 ; and that it is he (Mr. Rives), and others with him, who, professing these doctrines, have degraded them by ex- plaining away their meaning and efficacy. He (Mr. R.)has disclaimed, in be- half of Virginia, the authorship of nullification. I will not dispute that point, j If Virginia chooses to throw away one of her brightest ornaments, she must not hereafter complain that it has become the property of another. But while I have, as a representative of Carolina, no right to complain of the disavowal of the senator from Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. R.) has done his na- tive state great injustice by declaring on this floor that, when she gravely re- solved, in '98, that, " in cases of deliberate and dangerous infractions of the Con- stitution, the states, as parties to the compact, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them," she meant no more than to ordain the right to protest and to remonstrate. To sup- pose that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which she afterward sustain- ed by so able and elaborate an argument, she meant no more than to assert what no one had ever denied, would be to suppose that the state had been guilty of the most egregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an occasion. In reviewing the ground over which I have passed, it will be apparent that the question in controversy involves that most deeply important of all political questions, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government : a question, on the decision of which depend, as I solemnly believe, the liberty of the peo- ple, their happiness, and the place which we are destined to hold in the moral and intellectual scale of nations. Never was there a controversy in which more important consequences were involved : not excepting that between Per- sia and Greece, decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis ; which gave ascendency to the genius of Europe over that of Asia ; and which, in its consequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a portion of the world even to this day. There is often close analogies between events ap- parently very remote, which are strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great contest between Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic polity and civilization, the very question between the federal and consolidated form of gov- ernment was involved. The Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with some exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have been based on the principle of consolidation, which considers the whole community as but a unit, and consolidates its powers in a central point. The opposite principle has prevailed in Europe — Greece, throughout all her states, was based on a federal system. All were united in one common, but loose bond, and the gov- ernments of the several states partook, for the most part, of a complex organi- zation, whiclt distributed political power among diflerent members of the com- munity. The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy ; and, if we turn to the Teutonic race, our great ancestors — the race which occupies the first place in power, civilization, and science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest part of Europe — we shall find that their governments were based on the federal organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a recent and able writer on the British Constitution (Mr. Palgrave), from whose writings I introduce the follow- ing extract : " In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was effected. nosts ana armies, lea on oy pruices, magistrates, ana cnieitains ; each ot whom was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine in- dependence in proportion as he and his compeers became united urtder the su- premacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the state, first as a milita- ry commander, and afterward as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political con- nexion, each member of the state continued to retain a considerable portion of the rights of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be consid- ered as a federation : it is not a unit, of which the smaller bodies politic there- in contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baron- ies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom ; all, in a certain de- gree, strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not al- ways strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in effect ; and he^ce it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very vill be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I con- sider the present — ^a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labour, productions, and institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to free- men. Should we be able to maintain in their full vigour our reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be our portion ; but if we yield, and permit the stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the government, then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I represent, is cast on the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the fact; for, though we participate in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor do I repine that the diity, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved powers, against apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To dis- charge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and in- tellectual ; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become dis- tinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny — if we yield to the steady encroachment of N f al.mitv ind most debasing corruption wiu uvcrbpit-^^a .x.c power, the severest calannt> and mo ^ . ^. ^^ ^^^ faithful to Ld. Every Somheru man, true^ h ^n -s^^ ^^;^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ the duties -»-^P-:;t"of thfs g v^^«^ -^^ ^^ ^'^^^^^^'^ '^^ ^'"'^ X°"r tvT^SthemSv'es, by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen Asylum. VI. ... CALHOUN'S SPEECH ON HIS -SOLUTIONS AND KEPLY TO MK. WEB- ''*' STER, FEBRUARY 26, lUSd. The following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Calho.n, came up for consider- ^"-'Th"'^! \rl That the people of the several states composing these United ''Resolved, inai tiie peupic i^ ,-, .• „^i „nmnart to which the people ot ''Resolved, 1 hat tne peopie ui creatine a General Govern- .ional compact, in !-i;-^i^^ll;:::Z:ti^i^Zt^^i. delegated to that ment to carry into efiect the objects loijn ^^^ers to be exercised jointly, government, for that purpose, ^f^^^^^f"^^^P,"jSiduary mass of powers, lo reserving, at the same time, each sja^ ^^^^f ' td hat" ^^enever the General be exercised by its own ^^P^^^^.^g^J™" , 'i^oTdele^a^ by the compact, its Government assumes the exercise «f P« ^^^^;*^^/^ the said government is acts are unauthorized, void and of ^^ ei^eci jndihn^ tti^e ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ the mode aad measure of redress. ^-^.^^^ States, taken « Resolved, That the assertions that the peop e oi principle collectively as mdividuals are now, --e^hav^ - - ^^^^^^^^ V ^^^ P^^ of the social compact, and, as such, are "O"^^"^ ^ ^ j political exist- or that they have ever been so united, ^/^ ^ny one s age o t p ^^ ence; that the people of the several ^f^^f^^^.^JP^'^^ egiance of their citi- niembers thereof, retained their ^^'^'^'^fl^JZrml^^^^^^ they have parted zens has been transferred to the ^^^neral Govern^^^^^^^^^^^^ with the right of punishing treason through ^^ ^^^P^^^^^^^^^^ ,U, extent of and that they have not the "§1^* of judging m the ast resort ^^^ ^,^^^^^ powers reserA^ed, and, of consequence « ^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ,,,d plain historical foundation in truth, but are contrary to the ^«f ^^^'^^^^.^cise of power on facts, and the clearest deductions ot ^^'^^^^ ^ J^f Jl^' " ^en^^^^ deriving author^ the liart of the General ^^vernment, or any of its dep^^^ ity from such erroneous assumptions, "^^^^^ f^^^'^;^^^^ of the states-to Just tend directly and inevitably '^^^^fjll^^^ro^Aihrnns a consolida- destroy the federal character of the U^^o"' an^H^o ^^^^ ^^_ ted aovernment, without constitutional check or Umimion, cessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself. S'clut^rstti.. When the Wnwith^h^^^^^^^^^ iciiuum^cu. the bill in strong language, but not stronger than the rules .which govern parlia- mentary proceedings permit ; nor stronger than the dfcafacter of the bill, and its bearing on the state which it is my honour to represent, justified. I am at a loss to understand what motive governed the senator in giving a personal char- acter to his remarks. IF he intended anything unkind — (here Mr. Webster. said, audibly, Certainly not ; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I in- I tended, if such had been his motives) — but still I must be permitted to ask. If he I intended nothing unkind, what was the object of the senator ? Was his motive to strengthen a cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a per- sonal direction ? If such was his motive, his experience as a debater ought to have taught him that it was one of those weak devices which seldom fail to react on those who resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity by attacking one who had A'oluntarily, and from a sense of duty — from a deep conviction that liberty and the Constitution were at stake-T-7liaji4^gQ,tihed him- self with an unpopular question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity would have impelled him in an opposite direction. Among the possible motives which might have influenced him, there is another to the imputation of which he is exposed, but which, certainly, I will not attribute to him — that his motive was to propitiate in a certain high quarter — a quarter in which he must know that no oflering could be more acceptable than the immolation of the character of him who now addresses you. But whatever may have been the motive of the senator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I never had any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the halls of legislation, and if I now had, T certainly would not indulge them on so solemn a question :. a question which, in the opinion of the senator from MassachHsett&>. 9|^x pressed in debate, involves the union'of, these states, and in mine, the liberty and the CTonstTtiifion of the country. Before, however, I conclude the prefatory observations, I must allude to the remark which the senator made at the termination of the argmnent of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. P^indexter). I understood the senator to say that, if I chose to put at issue his character for consistency, he stood pre- pared to vindicate his course. I assure the senator that I have no idea of call- ing in question his consistency, or that of any other member of this body. It is a subject in which I feel no concern ; but if I am to understand the remark of the senator as intended indirectly as a challenge to put in issue the consist- ency of my course as compared to his own, I have to say that, though I do not accept of his challenge, yet, if he should think proper to make a trial of charac- ter on that or any other point connected with our public conduct, and will select a suitable occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as compared with his, or that of any other member of this body, for consistency of conduct, purity of motive, and devoted attachment to the country and its institutions. Having made these remarks, which have been forced -upon me, I shall now proceed directly to the subject before the Senate ; and in order that it may, with all its bearings, be fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I in- troduced the resolutions. They were introduced in connexion with the bill which has passed this house, and is now pending before the other. That bill was couched in general terras, without naming South Carolina or any other state, though it was understood, and avowed by the committee, as intended to act directly on her. Believing that the government had no right to use force in the controversy, and that the attempt to introduce it rested upon principles utterly subversive of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the states, I drew up the resolutions, and intro- duced theni expressly with the view to test those principles, with a desire that they should be discussed and voted on before the bill came up for consideration. The majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on the table, and the bill taken up for discussion. Under this arrangement, which it was under- stood orio-inated with the committee that reported the bill, I, of course, ccmcln- ded that Its members would proceed in the discussion, and explain the princi- ples and the necessity for the bill, before the other senators would enter into the discussion, and particularly those from South Carolina ; understanding, how- erer that by the arrangement of the committee, it was allotted to the senator from Tennessee to close the discussion on the bill, I waited to the last moment^ in expectation of hearing from the senator from Massachusetts. He is a mem- ber of the committee. But not hearing from him, I rose to speak to the bill, and as soon as I had concluded, the senator from Massachusetts arose — I will nol say to reply to me, and certainly not to discuss the bill, but the resolutions ■which had been laid on the table, as I have stated. I do not state these facts in the way of complaint, but in order to explain my own course. The senator having directed his argument against my resolutions, I felt myself compelled to seize the first opportunity to call them up from the table, and to assign a day for their discussion, in the hope not only that the Senate would hear me in their vindication, but would also afford me an opportunity of taking the sense of this body on the great principles on which they are based. The senator from Massachusetts, in his argument against the resolutions, directed his attack almost exclusively against the first, on the ground, I suppose, that it was the basis of the other two, and that, unless the first could be demol- ished, the others would follow of course. In this he was right. As plain and as simple as the facts contained in the first are, they cannot be admitted to be true without admitting the doctrines for which I, and the state I represent, con- tend. He (Mr. W.) commenced his attack with a verbal criticism on the res- olution, in the course of which he objected strongly to two words, " constitu- tional," and " accede." To the former on the ground that the word^ as used (constitutional compact), was obscure — that it conveyed no definite meaning — and that the Constitution was a noun-substantive, and not an adjective. I re- gret that I have exposed myself to the criticism of the senator. I certainly did not intend to use any expression of a doubtful sense, and if I have done so, the senator must attribute it to the poverty of my language, and not to design. I trust, however, that the senator will excuse me, when he comes to hear my apology. In matters of criticism, authority is of the highest importance, and I have an authority of so high a character, in this case, for using the expression which he considers so obscure and so unconstitutional, as will justify me even in his eyes. • It is no less than the authority of the senator himself— given on a solemn occasion (the discussion on Mr. Foote's resolution), and doubtless with great deliberation, after having duly weighed the force of the expression. (Here Mr. C. read from Mr. Webster's speech in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the Senate of the United States, delivered January 26, 1830, as follows :) " The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it — in the hands of their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do I complain of the peculiar eflfect which the magnitude of that population has had in the dis- tribution of power imder the Federal Government. We know, sir, that the xeprcsentation of the states in the other house is not equal. We know that great advantage, in that respect, is enjoyed by the slaveholding states ; and we know, too, that the intended equivalent for that advantage, that is to_ say^ the imposition of direct taxes in the same ratio, has become merely nominal : the habit of the government being almost invariably to collect its revenues from other sources, and in other modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain^ nor would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation. It is the original bargain — the compact— let it stand ; let the advantage of it be fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propo- sitions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is, and for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusa- tions, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfound- STiTUTioNAL COMPACT, and to extend the power of the government over the internal laws and domestic condition of the states." It will be seen, by this extract, that the senator not only uses the phrase *' constitutional compact," v/hich he now so much condemns, but, what is still more important, he calls the Constitution itself a compact — a bargain ; which contains important admissions, having a direct and powerful bearing on the main issue involved in the discussion, as will appear in the course of his re- marks. But, as strong as his objection is to the word " constitutional," it is still stronger to the word " accede," which, he thinks, has been introduced into the resolution with some deep design, as I suppose, to entrap the Senate into an admission of the doctrine of state rights. Here, again, I must shelter myself under authority. But I suspect that the senator, by a sort of instinct (for our instincts often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience, which would account for his aversion for the word, that this authority was no less fhan Thomas Jefferson himself, the great apostle of the doctrines of state rights. The word was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky Resolu- tion, as well as the substance of the resolution itself. But I trust that I may neutralize whatever aversion the authorship of this word may have excited ia the mind of the senator, by the introduction of another authority — that of Wash- ington himself, who, in his speech, to Congress, speaking of the admission of North Carolina into the Union, uses this very term, which was repeated by the Senate in their reply. Yet, in order to narrow the ground between the sena- tor and myself as much as possible, I will accommodate myself to his strange antipathy against the two unfortunate words, by striking them out of the reso- lution, and substituting in their place those very words which the senator him- self has designated as constitutional phrases. In the place of that abhorred ad- jective " constitutional," I will insert the very noun-substantive " constitution ;" and in the place of the word *' accede," I will insert the word " ratify," which lie designates as the proper term to be used. Let us now see how the resolution stands, and how it will read after these amendments. Here Mr. C. said the resolution, as introduced, reads : Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is a bond, is a union heluoeen the stales ratifying the same. As proposed to be amended : Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States are united as parties to a compact, under the title of the Constitution of the Uni- ted States, which the people of each state ratified as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a Union hetween the states ratifying the same. Where, sir, I ask, is that plain case of revolution ? Where that hiatus, as wide as the globe, between the premises and conclusion, which the senator pro- claimed would be apparent if the resolution was reduced into constitutional lan- guage ? For my part, with my poor powers of conception, I cannot perceive the slightest difference between the resolution as first introduced, and as it is proposed to be amended in conformity to the views of the senator. And, in- stead of that hiatus between premises and conclusion, which seems to startle the imagination of the senator, I can perceive nothing but a continuous and sol- id surface, sufficient to sustain the magnificent superstructure of state rights. Indeed, it seems to rae that the senator's vision is distorted by the medium through which he views everything connected with the subject ; and that the same distortion wliich has presented to his imagination this hiatus, as wide as the globe, where not even a hssiire exists, also presented that beaiitnul and clas- sical image of a strong man struggling in a bog without the power of extricating himself, and incapable of being aided by any friendly hand, Avhile, instead of struggling in a bog, he stands on the everlasting rock of truth. Having now noticed the criticism of the senator, I shall proceed to meet and repel the main assault on the resolution. He directed his attack against the strong point, the very horn of the citadel of state rights. The senator clearly [ perceived that, if the Constitution be a compact, it was impossible to deny the assertions contained in the resolutions, or to resist the consequences which I ! had drawn from them, and, accordingly, directed his whole fire against that point ; but, after so vast an expenditme of ammunition, not the slightest impression, so far as I can perceive, has been made. But, to drop the simile, after a careful i examination of the notes which I took of what the senator said, I am now at a ' loss to know whether, in the opinion of the senator, our Constitution is a com- pact or not, though the almost entire argument of the senator was directed to that point. At one time he would seem to deny directly and positively that it was a compact, while at another he would appear, in language not less strong, to admit that it was. 1 have collated all that the senator has said upon this point ; and, that what I have stated may not appear exaggerated, I will read his remarks in juxtapo- sition. He said that " The Constitution means a government, not a compact. Not a constitution- al compact, but a government. If compact, it rests on plighted faith, and the mode of redress would be to declare the whole void. States may secede if a league or compact." 1 thank the senator for these admissions, which I intend to use hereafter. (Here Mr. C. proceeded to read from his notes.) " The states agreed that each should participate in the sovereignty of the other." Certainly, a very correct conception of the Constitution ; but when did they make that agreement but by the Constitution, and how could they agree but by compact ? " The system, not a compact between states in their sovereig-n capacity, but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating indi- Tidual relations between itself and the citizens." This the senator lays down as a leading fundamental principle to sustain his doctrine, and, I must say, by a strange confusion and uncertainty of language ; not, certainly, to be explained by any want of command of the most appropriate words on his part. " It does not call itself a compact, but a constitution. The Constitution rests on compact, but it is no longer a compact." I would ask, To what compact does the senator refer, as that on which the Constitution rests ? Before the adoption of the present Constitution, the states had formed but one compact, and that was the old confederation ; and, certain- ly, the gentleman does not intend to assert that the present Constitution rests upon that. What, then, is his mc-ining ? What can it be, but that the Con- ] stitution itself is a compact ? and how will his language read, when fairly in- terpreted, but that the Constitution was a compact, but is no longer a compact ? It had, by some means or another, changed its nature, or become defunct. He next states that " A man is almost untrue to his country who calls the Constitution a com- pact." I fear the senator, in calling it a compact, a bargain, has called down this heavy denunciation on his own head. He finally states that " It is founded on compact, but not a compact results from it." To what are we to attribute the strange confusion of words 1 The senator guage. No man knows better the precise import of the words he uses. The difficulty is not in him, but in his subject. He who undertakes to prove that this Constitution is not a compact, undertakes a task which, be his strength ever so oreat, must oppress him by its weight. Taking the whole of the argument of the senator together, I would say that it is his impression that the Constitu- tion is not a compact, and will now proceed to consider the reason which he has assigned for this opinion. He thinks there is an incompatibility between constitution and compact. To prove this, he adduces the words " ordain and establish," contained in the pre- amble of the Constitution. I confess I am not capable of perceiving in what manner these words are incompatible with the idea that the Constitution is a compact. The senator will admit that a single state may ordain a constitution ; and where is the difficulty, where the incompatibility of two states concurring in ordaining and establishing a constitution 1 As between the states themselves, the instrument would be a compact ; but in reference to the government, and those on whom it operates, it would be ordained and established — ordained and established by the joint authority of two, instead of the single authority of one. The next argument which the senator advances to show that the language of the Constitution is irreconcilable with the idea of its being a compact, is ta- ken from that portion of the instrument which imposes prohibitions on the au- thority of the states. He said that the language used in imposing the prohibi- tions is the language of a superior to an inferior ; and that, therefore, it was not the language of a compact, which implies the equality of the parties. As a proof, the senator cited the several provisions of the Constitution which provide that no state shall enter into treaties of alliance and confederation, lay imposts, &c., without the assent of Congress. If he had turned to the articles of the old confederation, which he acknowledges to have been a compact, he would have found that those very prohibitory articles of the Constitution were borrow- ed from that instrument ; that the language which he now considers as imply- ing superiority was taken verbatim from it. If he had extended his researches still farther, he would have found that itas the habitual language used in treat- ies, whenever a stipulation is made against the performance of any act. Among many instances which I could cite if it were necessary, I refer the senator to the celebrated treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay with Great Britain in 1793, and in which the very language used in the Constitution is employed. To prove that the Constitution is not a compact, the senator next observes that it stipulates nothing, and asks, with an air of triumph, Where are the evi- dences of the stipulations between the states ? I must express my surprise at this interrogatory, coming from so intelligent a source. Has the senator never seen the ratification of the Constitution by the several states ? Did he not cite them on this very occasion ? Do they contain no evidence of this stipulation on the part of the states ? Nor is the assertion less strange that the Constitu- tion contains no stipulation. So far from regarding it in the light in which the senator regards it, I consider the whole instrument but a mass of stipulation : what is that but a stipulation to which the senator refers when he states, in the course of his argument, that each state had agreed to participate in the sover- eignty of the others 1 But the principal argument on which the senator relied to show that the Constitution is not a compact, rests on the provision in that instrument which declares that " this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under their authority, are the supreme laws of the land." He asked, with marked emphasis. Can a compact be the supreme law of the land ? I ask, in return, whether treaties are not compacts, and Avhether treaties, as well as the Constitution, are not declared to be the supreme law of the land ? His argument, in fact, as conclusively proves that treaties are not compacts as it does that this Constitution is not a compact. 1 might rest this point on this decisive answer ; but, as I desire to leave not a shadow of doubt on this impor- tant point, I shall folloW the gentleman in the course of his reasoning. He defines a constitution to be a fundamental law, which organizes the gov- ernment, and points out the mode of its action. I will not object to the defini- tion, though, in my opinion, a more appropriate one, or, at least, one better adapted to American ideas, could be given. My objection is not to the defini- tion, but to the attempt to prove that the fundamental laws of a state cannot be a compact, as the senator seems to suppose. I hold the very reveyse to be the case ; and that, according to the most approved writers on the subject of gov- ernment, these very fundamental laws which are now stated not only not to be compacts, but inconsistent with the very idea of compacts, are held invariably to be compacts ; and, in that character, as distinguished from the ordinary laws of the country. I will cite a single authority, which is full and explicit on this point, from a writer of the highest repute. Burlamaqui says, vol. ii., part 1, chap, i., sec. 35, 36, 37, 38 : " It entirely de- pends upon a free people to invest the sovereigns whom they place over their heads with an authority either absolute, or limited by certain laws. These regulations, by which the supreme authority is kept within bounds, are called the fundamental laws of the state." " The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the decrees by which the entire body of the nation detemiine the form of govern- ment, and the manner of succeeding to the crown, but are likewise covenants between the people and the person on whom they confer the sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme authority is lim- ited." " These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the basis, as it were, and foundation of the state on which the structure of the government is raised, and because the people look upon these regulations as their principal strength and support." " The name of laws, however, has been given to these regalatioms in an im- proper and figurative sense, for, properly speaking, they are real covenants. But as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they have the force of laws themselves." The same, vol. ii., part 2, ch. i., sec. 19 and 23, in part. " The whole body of the nation, in whom the supreme power originally resides, may regulate the government by a fundamental law in such manner as to commit the exercise of the difl'erent parts of the supreme power to different persons or bodies, who may act independently of each other in regard to the rights committed to them, but still subordinate to the laws from which those rights are derived." " And these fundamental laws are real covenants, or what the civilians call pacta conventa, between the diflferent orders of the Republic, by which they stipulate that each shall have a particular part of the sovereignty, and that this shall establish the form of government. It is evident that, by these means, each of the contracting parties acquires a right not only of exercising the power granted to it, but also of jyeserving that original right." A reference to the Constitution of Great Britain, with which wc are- better acquainted than with that of any other European government, will show that it is a compact. Magna Cliarta may certainly be reckoned among the funda- mental laws of that kingdom. Now, although it did not assume, originally, the form of a compact, yet, before the breaking up of the meeting of the barons which imposed it on King John, it was reduced into the form of a covenant, and duly signed by Robert Fitzwalter and others, on the one part, and the king on the other. But we have a more decisive proof that the Constitution of England is a com- pact in the resolution of the Lords and Commons in 1688, which declared that kingdom, by breaking the original contract between the king and people, and having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, violated the fun- damental law, and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, hath abdicated the government, and that the throne is thereby become vacant." But why should I refer to writers upon the subject of government, or inquire into the constitution of foreign states, when there are such decisive proofs that our Constitution is a compact ? On this point the senator is estopped. I bor- row from the gentleman, and thank him for the word. His adopted state, which he so ably represents on this floor, and his native state, the states of Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, both declared, in their ratification of the Constitution, that it was a compact. The ratification of Massachusetts is in the following words (here Mr. C. read) : " In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788. " The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered the Con- stitution of the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Conven- tion of Delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by a resolution of the General Court of said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day of October last past, and acknowledgnig, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the people of the United States, in the course of his providence, an opportunity deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of lib- erty to themselves and of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitu- tion for the United States of America." The ratification of New-Hampshire is taken from that of Massachusetts, and almost in the same words. But proof, if possible, still more decisive, may be found in the celebrated resolutions of Virginia on the alien and sedition law, in 1798, and the responses of Massachusetts and the other states. Those resolutions expressly assert that the Constitution is a compact between the states, in the following language (here Mr. C. read from the resolutions of Virginia as follows) : ■ " That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS RESULTING FROM THE COMPACT, TO WHICH THE STATES ARE PARTIES, AS LIMITED BY THE PLAIN SENSE AND IN- TENTION OF THE INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING THAT COMPACT AS NO FARTHER VALID THAN THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE GRANTS ENUMERATED IN THAT COM- PACT ; AND THAT, IN CASE OF A DELIBERATE, PALPABLE, AND DANGEROUS EX- ERCISE OF OTHER POWERS NOT GRANTED BY THE SAID COMPACT, THE STATES WHO ARE PARTIES THERETO HAVE THE RIGHT, AND ARE IN DUTY BOUND, TO INTERPOSE FOR ARRESTING THE PROGRESS OF THE EVIL, AND FOR MAINTAINING WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS THE AUTHORITIES, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES APPERTAINING TO THEM. " That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government to en- large its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter, which de- fines them ; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases (which, having been copied from the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of confederation, were the less liable to be misconstrued), so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration which necessity explains, and limits the general phrases, and so as to consolidate THE STATES, BY DEGREES, INTO ONE SOVEREIGNTY, THE OBVIOUS TENDENCY o AND INEVITABLE RESULT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT REPUBLICAN SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES INTO AN ABSOLUTE, OR, AT BEST, A MIXED MONARCHY." They were sent to the several states. We have the reply of Delaware, New-York, Connecticut, New-Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, not one of which contradicts this important assertion on the part of Virginia ; and, by their silence, they all acquiesce in its truth. The case is still stronger against Massachusetts, which expressly recognises the fact that the Constitu- tion is a compact. In her answer she says (here Mr. C. read from the answer of INIassachusetts as follows) : " But they deem it their duty solemnly to declare that, while they hold sacred the principle, that consent of the people is the only pure source of just and legitimate power, they cannot admit the right of the state Legislatures to denounce the administration of that government, to which the people them- selves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively committed their national concerns. That, although a liberal and enlightened vigilance among the people is always to be cherished, yet an unreasonable jealousy of the men of their choice, and a recurrence to measures of extremity upon groundless or trivial pretexts, have a strong tendency to destroy all rational liberty at home, and to deprive the Uni- ted States of the most essential advantages in their relations abroad. That this Legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the judicial courts of the United States." " That the people, in that solemn compact, which is declared to be the supreme law of the land, have not constituted the state Legislatures the judges of the acts or measures of the Federal Government, but have confided to them the power of proposing such amendments of the Constitution as shall appear to them neces- sary to the interests, or conformable to the wishes, of the people whom they represent." Now, I ask the senator himself— I put it to his candour to say, if South Car- olina be estopped on the subject of the protective system because Mr. Burke and Mr. Smith proposed a moderate duty on hemp, or some other article, I know not what, nor do I care, with a view of encouraging its production, of which motion, I venture to say, not one individual in a hundred in the state ever heard, whether he and Massachusetts, after this clear, full, and solemn recognition that the Constitution is a compact, both on his part and that of his state, be not forever estopped on this important point ? There remains one more of the senator's arguments to prove that the Con- stitution is not a compact, to be considered. He says it is not a compact, be- cause it is a government ; which he defines to be an organized body, possessed of the will and power to execute its purposes by its own proper authority ; and which, he says, bears not the slightest resemblance to a compact. But I would ask the senator, Who ever considered a government, when spoken of as the agent to execute the powers of the Constitution, as distinct from the Constitu- tion itself, as a compact ? In that light it would be a perfect absurdity. It is true that, in general and loose language, it is often said that the government is a compact, meaning the Constitution which created it, and vested it with authority to execute the powers contained in the instrument ; but when the distinction is drawn between the Constitution and the government, as the senator has done, it would be as ridic- ulous to call the government a compact as to call an individual, appointed to execute provisions of the contract, a contract ; and not less so to suppose that there could be the slightest resemblance between them. In connexion with this point the senator, to prove that the Constitution is not a compact, asserts that it is wholly independent of the state, and pointedly declares that the states Constitution that three fourths of the states have a right to alter, change, or amend, or even to abolish it, staring him in the face. I have examined all of the arguments of the senator intended to prove that the Constitution is not a compact ; and I trust I have shown, by the clearest demonstration, that his arguments are perfectly inconclusive, and that his as- sertion is against the clearest and most solemn evidence — evidence of record, and of such a character that it ought to close his lips forever. I turn now to consider the other, and, apparently, contradictory aspect in which the senator presented this part of the subject : I mean that one in which he states that the government is founded in compact, but is no longer a com- pact. I have already remarked, that no other interpretation could be given to this assertion, except that the Constitution was once a compact, but is no long- er so. There is a vagueness and indistinctness in this part of the senator's argument, which left me altogether uncertain as to its real meaning. If he meant, as I presume he did, that the compact is an executed, and not an execu- tory one — that its object was to create a government, and to invest it with proper authority — and that, having executed this office, it had performed its functions, and, with it, had ceased to exist, then we have the extraordinary avowal that the Constitution is a dead letter — that it has ceased to have any binding etlect, or any practical influence or operation. It had, indeed, often been charged that the Constitution had become a dead letter ; that it was continually violated, and had lost all its control over the government ; but no one had ever before been bold enough to advance a theory on the avowed basis that it was an executed, and, therefore, an extinct instru- ment. I will not seriously attempt to refute an argument which to me appears so extravagant. I had thought that the Constitution was to endiure forever; and that, so far from its being an executed contract, it contained great trust powers for the benefit of those who created it, and all future generations, which never could be finally executed during the existence of the world, if our gov- ernment should so long endure. I will now return to the first resolution, to see how the issue stands between the senator from Massachusetts and myself. It contains three propositions. First, that the Constitution is a compact ; second, that it was formed by the states, constituting distinct communities ; and, lastly, that it is a subsisting and binding compact between the states. How do these three propositions now stand ? The first, I trust, has been satisfactorily established ; the second, the senator- has admitted, faintly, indeed, but still he has admitted it to be true. This admission is something. It is so much gained by discussion. Three years ago even this was a contested point. But I cannot say that I thank hira for the admission : we owe it to the force of truth. The fact that these states were declared to be free and independent states at the time of their independ- ence ; that they were acknowledged to be so by Great Britain in the treaty which terminated the war of the Revolution, and secured their independence ; that they were recognised in the same character in the old articles of the con- federation ; and, finally, that the present Constitution was formed by a conven- [ tion of the several states, afterward submitted to them for their ratification, and was ratified by them separately, each for itself, and each, by its own act, bind- I ing its citizens, formed a body of facts too clear to be denied and too strong to be resisted. , It now remains to consider the third and last proposition contauied in the resolution — that it is a binding and a subsisting compact between the states. The senator was not explicit on this point. I understood him, however, as as- serting that, though formed by the states, the Constitution was not binding be- tween the states as distinct communities, but between the American people in the aggregate, who, in consequence of the adoption of the Constitution, accord- inw to tlie opinion ot tlie senator, oecaiue one peupiu, at leasi, lu lue baluiii ui the delei/ated powers. This would, indeed, be a great change. All ackuowl- edo-e that previous to the adoption of the Constitution, the states consthuted distinct and independent communities, in full possession of their sovereignty ; and surely, if the adoption of the Constitution was intended to effect the great and important change in their condition which the theory of the senator sup- poses, some evidence of it ought to be found in the instrument itself. It pro- fesses to be a careful and full enumeration of all the powers wliich the states delegated, and of every modification of their political condition. The senator said ttiat he looked to the Constitution in order to ascertain its real character; and, surely, he ought to look to the same instrument in order to ascertain what chan^^es were, in fact, made in the political condition of the states and the coun- try. But with the exception of " we, the people of the United States," in the preamble, he has not pointed out a single indication in the Constitution of the great change which he conceives has been effected in this respect. Now, sir, I intend to prove that the only argument on which the gentleman relies on this point must utterly fail him. I do not intend to go into a critical examination of the expression of the preamble to which I have referred. I do not deem it necessary ; but were it, it might be easily shown that it is at least as applicable to my view of the Constitution as to that of the senator ; and that the whole of his argument on this point rests on the ambiguity of the terra thir- teen United States ; which may mean certain territorial limits, comprehending within them the whole of the states and territories of the Union. In this sense the people of the United States may mean all the people living within these limits, without reference to the states or territories in which they may reside, or oi which they may be citizens, and it is in this sense only that the expres- sion gives the least countenance to the argument of the senator. But it may also mean the states united, which inversion alone, without farther explanation, removes the ambiguity to which I have referred. The expression, in this sense, obviously means no more than to speak of the people of the sev- eral states in their united and confederated capacity ; and, if it were requisite, it might be shown that it is only in this sense that the expression is used in the Constitution. But it is not necessary. A single argument will forever settle this point. Whatever may be the true meaning of this expression, it is not ap- plicable to the condition of the states as they exist under the Constitution, but as it was under the old confederation, before its adoption. The Constitution had not yet been adopted, and the states, in ordaining it, could only speak of themselves in the condition in which they then existed, and not in that in which they would exist under the Constitution. So that, if the argument of the sena- tor proves anything, it proves, not, as he supposes, that the Constitution forms the American people into an aggregate mass of individuals, but that such was their political condition before its adoption, under the old confederation, direct- ly contrary to his argument in the previous part of this discussion. But 1 intend not to leave this important point, the last refuge of those who advocate consolidation, even on this conclusive argument. I have shown that the Constitution affords not the least evidence of the mighty change of the po-r litical condition of the states and the country, which the senator supposed it effected ; and 1 intend now, by the most decisive proof, drawn from the consti- tutional instrument itself, to show that no such change was intended, and that the people of the states are united under it as states and not as individuals. On this point there is a very important part of the Constitution entirely and strange- ly overlooked by the senator in this debate, as it is expressed in the first reso» lution, which furnishes the conclusive evidence, not only that the Constitution is a compact, but a subsisting compact, binding between the states. I allude to the seventh article, which provides that " the ratification of the convention of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between mean a volume — compacts, not laws, bind between the states ; and it here binds, not between individuals, but between the states : the states ratifying, implyino-, as strong as language can make it, that the Constitution is what I have assert- ed it to be — a compact, ratified by the states, and a subsisting compact, binding the states ratifying it. But, sir, I will not leave this point, all-important in establishing the true the- ' ory of our government, on this argument alone, as demonstrative and conclusive as I hold it to be. Another, not much less powerful, but of a different charac- ter, may be drawn from the tenth amended article, which provides that " the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." The article of ratification which I have just cited informs us that the Constitu- ' tion, which delegates powers, was ratified by the states, and is binding between them. This informs us to whom the powers are delegated, a most important fact in determining the point immediately at issue between the senator and my- self. According to his views, the Constitution created a union between indi- viduals, if the solecism may be allowed, and that it formed, at least to the ex- tent of the powers delegated, one people, and not a Federal Union of the states, as I contend ; or, to express the same idea differently, that the delegation of powers was to the American people in the aggregate (for it is only by such delegation that they could be made into one people), and not to the United States, directly contrary to the article just cited, which declares that the pow- ers are delegated to the United States. And here it is worthy of notice that the senator cannot shelter himself under the ambiguous phrase " to the people of the United States," under which he would certainly have taken refuge, had the Constitution so expressed it ; but, fortunately for the cause of truth and for the great principles of constitutional liberty for which I am contending, " peo- ple" is omitted : thus making the delegation of power clear and unequivocal to the United States, as distinct political communities, and conclusively proving that all the powers delegated are reciprocally delegated by the states to each other, as distinct political communities. So much for the delegated powers. Now, as all admit, and as it is express- ly provided for in the Constitution, the reserved powers are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people : none will pretend that, as far as they are concerned, we are one people, though the argument to prove it, however ab- surd, would be far more plausible than that which goes to show that we are one people to the extent of the delegated powers. This reservation " to the people" might, in the hands of subtle and trained logicians, be a peg to hang a doubt upon ; and had the expression " to the people" been connected, as fortu- nately it is not, with the delegated instead of the reserved powers, we should not have heard of this in the present discussion, I have now established, I hope, beyond the power of controversy, every alle- gation contained in the first resolution — that the Constitution is a compact formed by the people of the several states, as distinct political communities, subsisting and binding between the states in the same character ; which brings me to the consideration of the consequences which may be fairly deduced in reference to the character of our political system from these established facts. The first, and most important, is, that they conclusively establish that ours is a federal system : a system of states arranged in a Federal Union, and each re- taining its distinct existence and sovereignty. Ours has every attribute which belongs to a federative system. It is founded on compact ; it is formed by sovereign communities ; and is binding between them in their sovereign capaci- ty. I might appeal, in confirmation of this assertion, to all elementary writers on the subject of government, but will content myself with citing one only: Burlamaqui, quoted with approbation by Judge Tucker, in his Commentary on er's Ulackslone as follows) : Extracts from Blackstone's Commentaries. " Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a people formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those who justly claim independence from any civil power they were formerly subject to, have the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of equal right and liberty with respect to all other states, whether great or small. No regard is to be had in this matter to names, whether the body politic be called a kingdom, an em- pire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic, or free town. If it can exercise justly all the essential parts of civil power within itself, independently of any other person or body politic, and no other hath any right to rescind or annul its acts, it has the civil supremacy, how small soever its territory may be, or the number of its people, and has all the rights of an independent state. " This independence of states, and there being distinct political bodies from each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies whatsoever, about exercising jointly any parts of the supreme powers, such as those of peace and war, in league offensive and defensive. Two states, notwithstanding such treaties, are separate bodies, and independent. " These are, then, only deemed politically united when some one person or council is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers for both, and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any person or coun- cil is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for both, they are then one state : such is the State of England and Scotland, since the act of union made at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereby the two kingdoms were incorporated into one, all parts of the supreme power of both kingdoms being thenceforward united, and vested in the three estates of the realm of Great Britain ; by which entire coalition, though both kingdoms retain their ancient laws and usages in many respects, they are as effectually united and incorpo- rated as the several petty kingdoms which composed the heptarchy were before that period. " But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one person or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding controversies between different states, or their subjects, while each within itself exercises other parts of the supreme power, independently of all the others — in this case they are called systems of states, which Burlamaqui defines to be an assemblage of perfect governments, strictly united by some common bond, so that they seem to make but a single body with respect to those affairs which interest them in common, though each preserves its sovereignty, full and entire, independently of all others. And in this case, he adds, the confederate states engage to each other only to exercise with common consent certain parts of the sovereignty, especially that which relates to their mutual defence against foreign enemies. But each of the confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks proper those parts of the sovereignty which are not mentioned in the treaty of union, as parts that ought to be exercised in common. And of this nature is the American confederacy, in which each state has resigned the exercise of certain parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed before (except in com- mon with the other states included in the confederacy), reserving to themselves all their former powers, which are not delegated to the United States by the common bond of union. " A visible distinction, and not less important than obvious, occurs to our ob- servation in comparing these different kinds of union. The kingdoms of Eng- land and Scotland are united into one kingdom ; and the two contracting states, by such an incorporate unioa, are, in the opinion of Judge Blackstone, totally annihilated, without any power of revival ; and a third arises from their con- tion, are vested, from vvnence ne expresses a aouot wneiaer any inirmge- ments of the fundamental and essential conditions of the union would of itself dissolve the union of those kingdoms ; though he readily admits that, in the case of a federate alliance, such an infringement would certainly rescind the compact between the confederated states. In the United States of America, on the contrary, each state retains its own antecedent form of government ; its own laws, subject to the alteration and control of its own Legislature only ; its own executive officers and council of state ; its own courts of judicature, its own judges, its own magistrates, civil ofhcers, and officers of the militia ; and, in short, its own civil state, or body politic, in every respect whatsoever. And by the express declaration of the 12th article of the amendments to the Consti- tution, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. In Great Britain, a new civil state is created by the annihilation of two antecedent civil states; in the American States, a general /ec^eraZ council and administration is provided for the joint exercise of such of their several powers as can be more conveniently exercised in that mode than any other, leaving their civil stale unaltered ; and all the other powers, which the states antecedently possessed, to be exercised by them respectively, as if no union or connexion were established between them. " The ancient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a similar plan : each of those little states had its distinct possessions, territories, and boundaries ; each had its Serrate or Assembly, its magistrates and judges ; and every state sent deputies to the general convention, and had equal weight in all determinations. And most of the neighbouring states which, moved by fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate themselves. " These confederacies, by which several states are united together by a per- petual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance, that each particular people choose to remain their own masters, and yet are not strong enough to make head against a common enemy. The purport of such an agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some part of the sovereignty there specified without the general consent of each other. For the leagues to which these systems of states owe their rise seem distinguished from others (so frequent among different states) chiefly by this consideration, that, in the latter, each confederate people determine themselves, by their own judgment, to certain mutual performances, yet so that in all other respects they design not in the least to make the exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence these performances proceed, dependant on the consent of their allies, or to retrench anything from their full and unlimited power of governing their own states. Thus we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part, as their aim, only some particular advantage of the states thus transacting — their interests happen- ing at present to fall in with each other — but do not produce any lasting union as to the chief management of affairs. Such was the treaty of alliance between America and France in the year 1778, by which, among other articles, it was agreed that neither of the two parties should conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained, and whereby they mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until the independ- ence of the United States should be formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties which should terminate the war. Whereas, in these confederacies, of which we are now speaking, the contrary is observable, they being estab- lished with this design, that the several states shall forever liidi their safety one with another, and, in order to their mutual defence, shall engage themselves not to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power, otherwise than by a common agreement and approbation. Such were the stipulations, among others, con- tained in the articles of confederation and perpetual union between the Ameri- can oiai«:>, uy wmwu. ii. »> a.o i^gi-^v.^^ — -- — ^-.^, ~^^ ^w„«,.- of the United States in Congress assembled, send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any king, prince, or state ; nor keep up any vessels of war, or body of forces, in time of peace ; nor engage in any war, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless actually invaded ; nor grant com- missions to any ships of war, or letters of marque and reprisal, except after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, with several others ; yet each state respectively retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde- pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not expressly dele- gated to the United States in Congress assembled. The promises made in these two cases here compared run very differently ; in the former, thus : ' I will join you in this particular war as a confederate, and the manner of our attacking the enemy shall be concerted by our common advice ; nor will we desist from war till the particular end thereof, the establishment of the inde- pendence of the United States, be obtained.' In the latter, thus : ' None of us who have entered into this alliance will make use of our right as to the affairs of war and peace, except by the general consent of the whole confederacy.' We observed before that these unions submit only some certain parts of the sovereignty to mutual direction ; for it seems hardly possible that the affairs of different states should have so close a connexion, as that all and each of them should look on it as their interest to have no part of the chief government ex- ercised without the general concurrence. The most convenient method, there- fore, seems to be, that the particular stated reserve to themselves all those branches of the supreme authority, the management of which can have little or no influence in the affairs of the rest." Mr. Calhoun proceeded : If we compare our present system with the old confederation, which all acknowledge to have heen federal in its character, we shall find that it possesses all the attributes which belong to that form of government as fully and com- pletely as that did. In fact, in this particular, there is but a single difference, and that not essential, as regards the point immediately under consideration, though very important in other respects. The confederation was the act of the state governments, and formed a union of governments. The present Consti- tution is the act of the states themselves, or, which is the same thing, of the people of the several states, and forms a union of them as sovereign communi- ties. The states, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, were as separate and distinct political bodies as the governments which represent them, and there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent them from uniting under a compact, in a federal union, without being blended in one mass, any more than uniting the governments themselves, in like manner, without merging them in a single government. To illustrate what I have stated by reference to ordinary trans- actions, the confederation was a contract between agents — the present Consti- tution between the principals themselves ; or, to take a more analogous case, one is a league made by ambassadors ; the other, a league made by sovereigns — the latter no more tending to unite the parties into a single sovereignty than the former. The only difference is in the solemnity of the act and the force of the obligation. There, indeed, results a most important t' fference, under our theory of govern- ment, as to the nature and character of the act itself, whether executed by the states themselves, or by their governments ; but a result, as I have already stated, not at all affecting the question under consideration, but which will throw much light on a subject in relation to which I must think the senator from Massachusetts has formed very confused conceptions. The senator dwelt much on the point that the present system is a constitu- tion and a government, in contradistinction to the old confederation, with a view senator that our present system is a constitution and a government ; and that the former, the old confederation, was not a constitution or government ; not, however, for the reason which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and the latter not, but from the difference of the origin from which the two com- pacts are derived. According to our American conception, the people alone can form constitutions or governments, and not their agents. It is this differ- ence, and this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old confederation been the act of the people of the several states, and not of their governments, that instrument, imperfect as it is, would have been a constitution, and the agency which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is the true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not that in wliich the senator seems to be bewildered. There is another point on which this difference throws important light, and which has been frequently referred to in debate on this and former occasions. I refer to the expression in the preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of <' forming a more perfect union," and in the letter of General Washington, lay- ing the draught of the Convention before the old Congress, in which he speaks of " consolidating the Union ;" both of which I conceive to refer simply to the fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union between the states themselves, and not a union like that which had existed between the govern- ments of the states. We will now proceed to consider some of the conclusions which necessarily follow from the facts and positions already established. They enable us to de- cide a question of vital importance under our system : Where does sovereignty reside ? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours is a federal sys- tem, as I conceive I conclusively have, that fact of itself determines the ques- tion which I have proposed. It is of the very essence of such a system, that the sovereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole ; or, to use the language of Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system, and the whole the mul- tiple ; and not the whole the units and the parts the fractions. Ours, then, is a government of twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact, for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a common government as their joint agent, and not a union of the twenty-four sovereignties into one, which, according to the language of the Virginia Resolutions, already cited, would form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise that the senator from Virginia should avow himself the advocate of these very resolutions, when he distinctly maintains the idea of a union of the states in one sovereignty, which is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of a consol- idated government. Another consequence is equally clear, that, whatever modification was made in the condition of the states under the present Constitution, were modifications extending only to the exercise of their powers by compact, and not to the sover- eignty itself, and are such as sovereigns are competent to make : it being a con- ceded point, that it is competent to them to stipulate to exercise their powers in a particular manner, or to abstain altogether from their exercise, or to dele- gate them to agents, witb'sut in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The plain state of the facts, ^s regards our government, is, that these states have agreed by compact to exercise their sovereign powers jointly, as already stated ; and that, for this purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign ca- pacity, thereby making" it the constitution of each state, in nowise distinguish- ed from their own separate constitution, but in the superadded obligation of com- pact — of faith mutually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have stip- ulated, among other things, that it may be amended by three fourths of the states : that is, they have conceded to each other by compact the right to add new pow- ers or to subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the states, without re- P quirinff, as otherwise would be the case, the consent of all ; a modincation no more inconsistent, as has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I allude furnishes strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I contend, in the states severally : as the amendments are eftected, not by any one three fourths, but by any three fourths of the states, indicating that the sovereignty is in each of the states. If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the allegiance of the people is to their several states, and that treason consists in resistance to the joint authority of the states united, not, as has been absurdly contended, in resistance to the government of the United States, which, by the provision of the Constitution, has only the right of punishing. These conclusions have all a most important bearing on that monstrous and despotic bill which, to the disgrace of the Senate and the age, has passed this body. I have still a right thus to speak without violating the rules of order, as it is not yet a law. These conclusions show that the states can violate no law ; that they neither are, nor in the nature of things can be, under the domin- ion of the law ; that the worst that can be imputed to them is a violation of compact, for which they, and not their citizens, are responsible ; and that, t_p undertake to punish a state by law, or to hold the citizens responsible for the acts of the state, which they are on their allegiance bound to obey, and liable to be punished as traitors for disobeying, is a cruelty unheard of among civilized nations, and destructive of every principle upon which our government is found- ed. It is, in short, a ruthless and complete revolution of our entire system. I was desirous to present these views fully before the passage of this long- to-be-laniented bill, but as I was prevented -by the majority, as I have stated at the commencement of my remarks, I trust that it is not yet too late. Having now said what I intended in relation to my first resolution, both in reply to the senator from Massachusetts, and in vindication of its correctness, I will now proceed to consider the conclusions drawn from it in the second res- olution — that the General Government is not the exclusive and final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the states, as parties to the compact, have a right to judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the com- pact, and of the mode and measure of redress. It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body, to premise that our system comprehends two distinct governments — the General and State Gov- ernments, which, properly considered, form but one. The former representing the joint authority of the states in their confederate capacity, and the latter that of each state separately. I have premised this fact simply with a view of pre- senting distinctly the answer to the argument offered by the senator from Mas- sachusetts to prove that the General Government has a final and exclusive right to judge, not only of its delegated powers, but also of those reserved to the states. That gentleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a government, which he defines to be an organized body, endowed with both will, and power, and authority in propria v/gore to execute its purpose, has a right inherently to judge of its powers. It is not my intention to comment upon the definition of the senator, though it would not be difiicult to show that his ideas of government are not very American. My object is to deal with the conclu- sion, and not the definition. Admit, then, that the government has the right of judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then, will he withhold, upon his own principle, the right of judging from the state governments, which he has attributed to the General Government ? If it belongs to one, on his prin- ciple it belongs to both ; and if to both, when they differ, the veto, so abhorred by the senator, is the necessary result : as neither, if the right be possessed by both, can control the other. The senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order to sustain his main position, he fell back on that clause of the ConstUution which provides that i-iiio »^uiioi,ii,uiiuii, aiiu tiit^ lavvo mauvj ill |»uisua,m;e iiitjieui, siiaii ue me Su- preme law of the land." This is admitted : no one has ever denied that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are of paramount authority. But it is equally undenia- ble that laws not made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority, but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null and void ; which pre- . sents the question, Who are to judge whether the laws be or be not pursuant I to the Constitution ? and thus the difficulty, instead of being taken away, is re- moved but one step farther back. This the senator also felt, and has attempted to overcome the difficulity by setting up, on the part of Congress and the judi- ciary, the final and exclusive right of judging, both for the Federal Government ( and the fetates, as to the extent of their powers. That I may do full justice to the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own words. He states : " That there is a supreme law, composed of the Constitution, the laws pass- ed in pursuance of it, and the treaties ; but in cases coming before Congress, not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be subjects of ju- dicial discussion, Congress must interpret the Constitution so often as it has oc- casion to pass laws ; and in cases capable of assuming a judicial shape, the Su- preme Court must be the final interpreter." Now, passing over this vague and loose phraseology, I would ask the sena- tor upon what principle can he concede this extensive power to the legislative and judicial departments, and v/ithhold it entirely from the executive 1 If one has the right, it cannot be withheld from the other. I would also ask him on what principle, if the departments of the General Government are to possess the right of judging, finally and conclusively, of their respective powers, on what principle can the same right be withheld from the State Governments, which, as well as the General Government, properly considered, are but departments of the same general system, and form together, properly speaking, but one gov- ernment. This was a favourite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose wisdom I have a respect, increasing with my experience, and whom I have frequently heard say that most of the misconceptions and errors in relation to our system origi- nated in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system. I would far- ther tell the senator, that, if this right be withheld from the State Governments ; if this restraining influence, by which the General Government is coerced to its proper sphere, be withdrawn, then that department of the government from which he has withheld the right of judging of its own powers (the executive) will, so far from being excluded, become the sok interpreter of the powers of the o-ov- ernment. It is the armed interpreter, with powers to execute its own construc- tion, and without the aid of which the construction of the other departments will be impotent. But I contend that the states have a far clearer right to the sole construction of their powers than any of the departments of the Federal Government can have ; this power is expressly reserved, as I have stated on another occasion, not only against the several departments of the General Government, but against the United States themselves. I will not repeat the arguments which I then offered on this point, and which remain unanswered, but I must be permitted to offer strong additional proof of the views then taken, and wliich, if I am not mistaken, are conclusive on this point. It is drawn from the ratification of the Constitution by Virginia, and is in the following words (Mr. C. then read as follows) : " We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, hav- ing fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most mature dehberation hath enabled us, to decide thereon, do, in the name and in behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Coustitu- tion, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed hy them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will ; that, therefore no rifht of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified bv the Congress, by the Sena-te or House of Representatives, act- ing in any capacity, by the President or any departmen»t or officer of the United States except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes ; and that, among other essential rights, the liberty of con- science and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified by any authority of the United States. With these impressions, with a solemn appeal to the Searcher of all hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union in danuer bv a delay, with the hope of obtaining amendments previous to the ratification— we, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people of Vir^icicii^ vvcia do uusuuic as ii was lixuiu , uui, OO- scure as it is, he has said enough to enable us to perceive the process by which he has reached so extraordinary a position ; and we may safely affirm, that his arguments are not less extraordinary than the conclusion at which he arrives. His first proposition, which, however, he has not ventured to lay down express- ly, is, that Congress has an unlimited control over the deposites, and that it may dispose of them in whatever manner it may please, in order to promote the general welfare and convenience of the people. He next asserts that Con- gress has parted with this power under the sixteenth section, which directs the deposites to be made in the Bank of the United States, and then concludes with affirming that it has invested the Secretary of the Treasury with it, for reasons which I am unable to understand. It cannot be necessary, before so enlightened a body, that I should undertake to refute an argument so utterly untrue in premises and conclusion — to show that Congress never possessed the power which the secretary claim_s for it — - that it is a power, from its very nature, incapable of such enlargement, being limited solely to the safe keeping of the publi'e funds ; that if it existed, it would be susceptible of the most dangerous abuses ; that Congress might make the wildest and most dangerous association the ^depository of the public funds ; might place them in the hands of the fanatics and the madmen of the North, who are waging war against the domestic institutions of the South, under the plea of promoting the general welfare. But admitting that Congress possessed the power which the secretary attributes to it, by what process of reasoning caii he show that it has parted with this unlimited power, simply by directing the public money^^oVbe deposited in the Bank of the United States ? or, if it has -j'^arted with the power, by what extraordinary process has it been transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury by those few and simple words, "unless he shall other\V%; direct ?" In support of this extraordinary argument, the secre- tary has otfered not a single illustration, nor a single remark bearing the sem- blance of reason, bv^^one, which I shall now proceed to notice. He asserts, and asserts truly, that the Bank charter is a contract between the government, or, rather, the people of the United States and the Bank, and then assumes that it constitutes him a common agent or trustee, to superintend the execution of the stipulations contained in that portion of the contract compre- hended in the sixteenth section. Let us now, taking these assumptions to be true, ascertain what those stipulations are, the superintendence of the execution of which, as he affirms, are jointly confided by the parties to the secretary. The government stipulated, on its part, that the public money should be deposi- ted in the Bank of the United States — a great and valuable privilege, on which the successful operation of the institution mainly depends. The Bank, on its part, stipulated that the funds should be safely kept, that the duties imposed in relation to them should be faithfully discharged, and that for this, with other privileges, it would pay to the government the sum of one million five hundred thousand dollars. These are the stipulations, the execution of which, accord- ing to the secretary's assumption, he has been appointed, as joint agent or trus- tee, to superintend, and from which he would assume the extraordinary power which he claims over the deposites, to dispose of them in such manner as he may think the public interest or the convenience of the people may require. Is it not obvious that the whole extent of power conferred upon him, admitting his assumption to be true, is to withhold the deposites in case that the Bank should violate its stipulations in relation to them, on one side, and on the other, to prevent the government from withholding the deposites, so long as the Bank faithfully performed its part of the contract ? This is the full extent of his pow- er. According to his own showing, not a particle more can be added. But there is another aspect in which the position in which the secretary has pla- ced himself may be viewed. It offers for consideration not only a question of the extent of his power, but a question as to the nature and extent of duty which has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he has descri- bed there has been confided to him a trust of the most sacred character, ac- companied by duties of the most solemn obligation. He stands, by the mutual confidence of the parties, vested with the high judicial power to determine on the infraction or observance of a contract in which government and a large and respectable portion of the citizens are deeply interested ; and, in the execution of this hiffh power, he is bound, by honour and conscience, so to act as to pro- tect each of the parties in the full enjoyment of their respective portion of ben- efit in the contract, so long as they faithfully observe it. How has the secre- tary performed these solemn duties, which, according to his representation, have been imposed upon him ? Has he protected the Bank against the aggres- sion of the government, or the government against the unfaithful conduct of the Bank in relation to the deposites ? Or has he, forgetting his sacred obligations, disregarded the interests of both : on one side, divesting the Bank of the de- posites, and on the other, defeating the government in the intended security of the public funds, by seizing an them as the property of the executive, to be dis- posed at pleasure to favourite and partisan banks ? But I shall relieve the secretary from this awkward and disreputable posi- tion in which his own arguments have placed him. He is not the mutual trus- tee, as he has represented, of the government and the Bank, but simply the agent of the former, vested, under the contract, with power to withhold the de- posites, with a view, as has been stated, to their additional security — to their safe keeping ; and if he had but for a moment reflected on th^fact that he was directed to report his reasons to Congress only, and not alsfiJ tq the Bank, for withholding the deposites, he could scarcely have failed tC|<^ceive that he was simply the agent of one of the parties, and not, as he supposes, a joint agent of both. The secretary having established, as he supposes, his right to dispose of the deposites as, in his opinion, the general interest and convenience of the people might require, proceeds to claim and exercise power with a boldness commensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has assumed. He commences with a claim to determine, in his official character, that the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional: a monopoly, baneful to the welfare of the community. Having determined this point, he comes to the conclusion that the charter of the Bank ought not to be renewed, and then assumes that it will not be renewed. Having reached this point, he then determines that it is his duty to remove the deposites. No one can object that Mr. Taney, as a citizen, in his individual character, should entertain an opinion as to the uncon- stitutionality of the Bank ; but that he, acting in his official character, and per- forming official acts under the charter of the Bank, should undertake to deter- mine that the institution was unconstitutional, and that those who granted the charter, and bestowed upon him his power to act imder it, had violated the Constitution, is an assumption of power of a nature which I will not undertake to characterize, as I wish not to be personal. But he is not content with the power simply to determine on the unconstitu- tionality of the Bank. He goes far beyond : he claims to be the organ of the voice of the people. In this high character, he pronounces that the question of the renewal of the Bank charter was put at issue at the last presidential ejec- tion, and that the people had determined that it should not be renewed. I do not, said Mr. Calhoun, intend to enter into the argument whether, in point of fact, the renewal of the charter was put at issue at the last election. That point was ably and fully discussed by the honourable senators from Kentucky (xMr. Clay) and New-Jersey (Mr. Southard), who conclusively proved that no such question was involved in the issue ; and if it were, the issue comprehend- ed so many others, that it was impossible to conjecture on which the election Secretary of the Treasury constitutes himself the organ of the people of the Uni- ted States. He has the reputation of being an able lawyer, and can he be ig- norant that, so long as the Constitution of the United States exists, the only or- gans of the people of these states, as far as the action of the General Govern- ment is concerned, are the several departments, legislative, executive, and judi- cial, which, acting within the respective limits assigned by the Constitution, have a right to pronounce authoritatively the voice of the people ? A claim on the part of the executive to interpret, as the secretary has done, the voice of the people through any other channel, is to shake the foundation of our system. Has the secretary forgotten that the last step to absolute power is this very as- sumption which he has claimed for that department ? I am thus brought, said Mr. C.jto allude to the extraordinary manifesto read by the President to the cabinet, ajid which is so intimately connected with the point immediately under consideration. That document, though apparently addressed to the cabinet, was clearly and manifestly intended as an appeal to the people of the United States, and opens a new and direct organ of couimimication between the Presi- dent and them unknown to the Constitution ar\d the laws. There are but two channels known to either through which the president can communicate with the people — by messages to the two houses of Congress, as expressly provided |F for in the Constitution, or by proclamation, setting forth the interpretations ""'^which he places upon a law it has become his official duty to execute. Going beyond, is one among the alarming signs of the times which portend the over- throw of the Constitution and the approach of despotic power. :/ The secretary, having determined that the Bank was unconstitutional, and f that the people had pronounced against the recharter, concludes that Congress ■^' had nothing, to do.>with the subject. With a provident foresight, he perceives the didlculty aa4y^barrassment into which the currency of the country would be thrown ori-"Afe termination of the Bank charter ; to prevent which, he pro- ceeds deliberately, with a parental care, to supply a new currency, " equal to or better" than that which Congress had supplied. With this view, he determines on an immediate removal of the deposites ; he puts them in certain state insti- tutions, intending to organize them, after the fashion of the empire state, into a great safety-fund system, but which, unfortunately, undoubtedly for the project- ors, if not for the country, the limited power of the state banks did not permit him to effect. But a substitute was found by associating them in certain arti- cles of agreement, and appointing an inspector-general of all this league of banks ! and all this without law or appropriation ! Is it not amazing that it never occurred to the secretary that the subject of currency belonged exclusively to Congress, and that to assume to regulate it was a plain usurpation of the pow- ers of that department of the government 1 Having thus assumed the power officially to determine on the constitutional- ity of the Bank ; having erected himself into an organ of the people's voice, and settled the question of the regulation of the currency, he next proceeds to as- sume the judicial powers over the Bank. He declares that the Bank has trans- cended its powers, and has, therefore, forfeited its charter, for which he indicts on the institution the severe and exemplary punishment of withholding the de- posites ; and all this in the face of an express provision investing the court with power touching the infraction of the charter, directing in what manner the trial should be commenced and conducted, and securing expressly to the Bank the sacred right of trial by jury in finding the facts. All this passed for nothing in the eyes of the secretary, who was too deeply engrossed in providing for the common welfare to regard either Congress, the Court, or the Constitution. The secretary next proceeds to supervise the general operations of the Bank, pro- nouncing, with authority, that at one time it has discounted too freely, and at an- other too sparingly, without reflecting that all the control which the government can rightfully exercise over the operations of the institution is througti the tive directors who represent the government in this respect. Directors ! Mr. Cal- houn exclaimed, did I say ? (alluding to the present). No, spies is their prop- er designation. , . , t • i i i_ I cannot said Mr. C, proceed with the remarks which 1 intended on the re- mainder of the secretary's reasons : I have not patience to dwell on assump- tions of power so bold, so lawless, and so unconsthutional ; they deserve not the name of argument, and I cannot waste time in treating them as such. There are, hov/ever, two which I cannot pass over, not because they are more extraordinary or audacious than the others, but for another quality, Avhich 1 choose not to designate. The secretary alleges that the Bank has interfered with the politics of the countrj-. If this be true, it certainly is a most heinous offence. The-Bank is a great public trust, possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great power and influence, which it could not pervert from the object intended to that of influencing the politics of the country without being guilty of a great politi- cal crime. In making thesfhretQarks, I do not intend to give any countenance to the truth of the charge 'alleged by the secretary, nor to deny to the officers of the Bank the right which bel«Migs to them, in common with every chizen, free- ly to form political principles, and act on them in their private capacity, with- out permitting them to influence their official condu<;t. But it is straaage it did^ not occur to the secretary, while he was accusing and punishing the Ba^k on the charge of interfering in the politics of the country, that the government also was a great trust, vested with powers still more extensive, auil innnei measurably greater than that of the Bank, given to enable it to dischar-i , i jeet for which h was created ; and that it has no more right to pervert .- uov.-- er and influence into the means of controlling the politics of the coram \ than the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to him that the fourth :uiditor of tli. tr.asu- ry (an officer in his own department), the man who has nKutevso proiinncnt a figure in this transaction, was daily and hourly meddlin^.iu ']p6litics. and that he is one of the principal political managers of the adminTstration 1 ( ".in he be ignorant that the whole power of the government has been-'p^rrfetfed into a great political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling the country ? Can he be ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the government is to reward politicaf friends and punish political enemies ? and that, acting on this princi- ple, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and competent officers for opin- ion's sake only, and filled their places with devoted partisans ? Can he be ig- norant that the real offence of the Bank is not that it has intermeddled in poli- tics, but because it toouhl not intermeddle on the side of power ? There is no- thing more dignified than reproof from the lips of innocence, or punishment from, the hands of justice ; but change the picture — let the guilty reprove and the criminal punish, and what more odious, more hateful, can be presented to the imagination ? The secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the Bank had been waste- ful of the public funds. That it has spent some thirty, forty, or fifty thousand dollars — I do not remember the exact amount (trifles have no weight in the determination of so great a question) — in circulating essays and speeches in de- fence of the institution, of which sum, one fifth part — some seven thousand dol- lars — belonged to the government. AVell, sir, if the Bank has really irasted this amount of the public money, it is a grave charge. It has not a right to waste a single cent ; but I must say, in defence of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by the executive, it would have been unfaithful to its trust, both to 'he stockholders and to the public, had it not resorted to ever}' proper means in its power to de- fend its conduct, and, among others, the free circulation of able and judicious publications. But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the pu.iic funds to the lull CAlClit \^IICH.^^\JL UJ Kixv^ v:»v^\_.ivyv(j,i^ , i *\VU1U. aoiv Al 11^, l/llt> xn^ a,\_l VJl Llic llliail- cial department of the government, is not under as high and solemn obligation to take care of the moneyed interest of the public as the Bank itself. I would ask him to answer me a few simple questions : IIow has he performed this duty in relation to the interest which the public holds in the Bank ? Has he been less wasteful than he has charged the Bank to have been I Has he not wast- ed thousands where the Bank, even according to his own statement, has hun- dreds ? Has he not, by withdrawing the deposites and placing them in the state banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly affected the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in which the government, as a stockholder, is a loser to the amount of one fifth of the diminution ? a sum which I will venture to predict will many fold exceed the entire amount which the Bank has expended in its defence. But this is a small, a very small proportion of the public loss, in consequence of the course which the executive has pur- sued in relation to the Bank, and which has reduced the value of the shares from 130 to 108 (a senator near me says much more. It may be; I am not particular in such things), and on which the public sustains a corresponding loss on its share of the stock, amounting to seven millions of dollars — a sum more than two hundred fold greater than the waste which he has charged upon the Bank. Other administrations may exceed this in talents, patriotism, and honesty, but, certainly, in audacity, in effrontery, it stands without a parallel ! The secretary has brought forward many and grievous charges against the Bank. I willnot condescend to notice them — it is the conduct of the secreta- ry, and not that of the Bank, which is immediately under examination, and he has no right to drag the conduct of the Bank into the issue, beyond its opera- tions in regard to the deposites. To that extent I am prepared to examine his allegations again^la^t, but beyond that he has no right — no, not the least — to ar- raign the conductfof the Bank ; and I, for one, will not, by noticing his charges beyond that point, sanction his authority to call its conduct in question. But let the point in issue be determined, and I, as far as my voice extends, will give to those who desirent the means of the freest and most unlimited inquiry into its conduct. I am no partisan of the Bank — I am connected with it in no way, by moneyed or political ties. I might say, with truth, that the Bank owes as much to me as to any other individual iu the country ; and I might even add that, had it not been for my efforts, it woxi)4'iiot have been chartered. Standing in this relation to the institution, a high"^nse of delicacy, a regard to independ- ence and character, has restrained me from any connexion with the institution whatever, except some trifling accommodations in the way of ordinary business, which were not of the slightest importance either to the Bank or myself. But while I shall not condescend to notice the charges of the secretary against the Bank beyond the extent which I have stated, a sense of duty to the institution, and regard to the part which I took in its creation, compels me to notice two allegations against it which have fallen from another quarter. It is said that the Bank had no agency, or at least efficient agency, in the restoration of specie payment in 1817, and that it had failed to furnish the country with a uniform and sound currency, as had been promised at its creation. Both of these allegations I pronounce to be Avithout just foundation. To enter into a minute examination of them would carry me too far from the subject, and I must content myself with saying that, having been on the political stage, without in- terruption, from that day to this — having been an attentive observer of the ques- tion of the currency throughout the whole period — that the Bank has been an indispensable agent in the restoration of specie payments ; that without it the restoration could not have been effected short of the utter prostration of all the moneyed institutions of the country, and an entire depreciation of bank paper ; and that it has not only restored specie payment, but has given a currency far more uniform between the extremes of the country than was anticipated, or even .,1. R dreamed of, at the time of its creation. I will say for myself, that I did not be- lieve, at that time, that the exchange between the Atlantic and the West would be brouo-ht lower than two and a half per cent. — the estimated expense then, including insurance and loss of time, of transporting specie between the two points. How much it was below the anticipated point I need not state : the whole commercial world knows that it was not a fourth part at the time of the removal of the deposites. But to return from this digression. Though I will not notice the charges of the secretary for the reasons already stated, I will take the liberty of propound- ino- to those who support them on this floor a few plain questions. If there be in banking institutions an inherent tendency so strong to abuse and corrup- tion as they contend — if, in consequence of this tendency, the Bank of the Uni- ted States be guilty of the enormous charges and corruptions alleged, notwith- standing its responsibility to the government and our control over it, v/hat is to be expected from an irresponsible league of banks, as called by the senator from Kentucky (M. Clay), over which we have no legal control? If our power of renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States — if our right to vacate the charter by scire facias, in case of misconduct— if the influence vi^iich the appointment of five government directors gives us — and, finally, if the power which we have of appointing committees to examine into its condition, are not sufficient to hold the institution in check ; if, in spite of all these, it has, from the innate corruption of such institutions, been guilty of the enormous abuses and crimes charged against it, what may we not expect from the asso<;iated banks, the favourites of the treasury, over the renewal of whose charter the government has no power, against which it can issue no scire facias, in whose direction it has not a single individual, and into whose conduct Congress can appoint no committee to look ? With these checks all withdrawn, wh^ will be the con- dition of the public funds ? ^ I, said Mr. Calhoun, stated in the outset of my remarks, that, as broad as was the power which the secretary had assumed in relation to the deposites, there was a portion of the transaction of a highly important^ character, to which he has not alluded, and in relation to which he has not even attempted a justifi- cation. I will now proceed to make good this assertion to the letter. There is a material diflerence between withholding money from going into the Bank, and ivithdrawing it after it ha§ been placed there. The former is authorized in the manner which 1 have stated, uMer the sixteenth section, which directs, as has been frequently stated, that the public money shall be deposited in the Bank, unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury. But neither that sec- tion, nor any portion of the act incorporating the Bank, nor, in truth, any other act, gives the secretary any authority of himself to withdraw public money de- posited in the Bank. There is, I repeat, a material difl"erence between with- holding public money from deposite and withdrawing it. When paid into the place designated by law as the deposite of the public money, it passes to the credit of the treasurer, and then is in the treasury of the United States, where it is placed under the protection of the Constitution itself, and from which, by an express provision of the Constitution, it can only be withdrawn by an appro- priation made by law. So careful were the framers of the act of 1816 to leave nothing to implication, that express authority is given to the Secretary of the Treasury, in the fifteenth section, to transfer the deposites from one place to an- other, for the convenience of disbursements ; but which, by a strange perversion, is now attempted to be so construed as to confer on the secretary the power to withdraw the money from the deposite, and loan it to favourite state banks — I express myself too favourably, I should say give (they pay no interest) — with a view to sustain their credits or enlarge their profits — a power not only far be- yond the secretary, but which Congress itself could not exercise without a fla- grant breach of the Constitution. But it is said, in answer to these views. that money paid m deposite into the Bank, as directed by law, is not in the treasury. I will not stop, said Mr. C, to reply to such an objection. If it be not in the treasury, where is the treasury ? If it be not money in the treasury, where is the money annually reported to be in the treasury ? where the eight or nine millions which, by the annual report of the secretary, are said to be now in the treasury ? Are we to understand that none of this money is, in truth in the , treasury ? that it is floating about at large, subject to be disposed of, to be given I away, at the will of the executive, to favourites and partisans ? So it would seem ; for it appears, by a correspondence between the treasurer and the cash- ier of the Bank, derived through the Bank (the secretary not deemino- it worth while to give the slightest information of the transaction, as if a matter of course), that he has drawn out two millions and a quarter of the public money / without c^ppropriation, and distributed it at pleasure among his favourites ! But it jis attempted to vindicate the conduct of the secretary on the ground of precederii I will not stop to notice whether the cases cited are in point, nor will I avail myself of the great and striking advantage that I might have on the question of precedent : this case stands alone and distinct from all others. There is none similar to it in magnitude and importance. I waive all that : I place myself on higher grounds— I stand on the immovable principle that, on a ques- tion of law and constitution, in a deliberative assembly, there is no room no place for precedents. To admit them would be to make the violation of to-day the law and Constitution of to-morrow ; and to substitute in the place of the writ- ten and sacred will of the people and the Legislature, the infraction of those char, ged with the execution of the laio. Such, in my opinion, is the relative force of law and constitution on one side, as compared with precedents on the other. Viewed in a different light, not in reference to the law or Constitution, but to the conduct of the officer, I am disposed to give rather more weight to prece- dents, when the question relates to an excuse or apology for the officer, in case of infraction. If the infraction be a trivial one, in a case not calculated to ex- cite attention, an offi„cer might fairly excuse himself on the ground of precedent ; but in one like this, of the utmost magnitude, involving the highest interests and most important principles, where the attention of the officer must be aroused to a most carefiil examination, he cannot avail himself of the plea of precedent to excuse his conduct. It is a case where false precedents are to be corrected, and not followed. An officer ought to be ashamed, in such a case, to attempt to vin- dicate his conduct on a charge of violating law or Constitution by pleading pre- cedent. The principle in such case is obvious. If the secretary's right to withdraw public money from the treasury be clear, he has no need of precedent to vindicate him. If not, he ought not, in a case of so much magnitude, to have acted. I have not (said Mr. Calhoun) touched a question, which has had so promi- nent a part in the debate, whether the withholding of the deposites was the act of the secretary or the President. Under my view of the subject, the question is not of the slightest importance. It is equally unauthorized and illegal, whether done by President or secretary ; but^ as the question has been agitated, and as my views do not entirely correspond on this point with those advocating the side which I do, I deem it due to frankness to express my sentiments. I have no doubt that the President removed the former secretary, and placed the present in his place, expressly with a view to the removal of the deposites. I am equally clear, under all the circumstances of the case, that the President's conduct is wholly indefensible ; and, among other objections, I fear he had in view, in the removal, an object eminently dangerous and unconstitutional — to give an advantage to his veto never intended by the Constitution — a power in- tended as a shield to protect the executive against the encroachment of the legislative department — to maintain the present state of things against dangerous or hasty innovation, but which, I fear, is, in this case, intends*^ ■ « a sword to defend the usurpation of the executive. I say I fear ; for, ahhough the circmn- stance of this case leads to a just apprehension that such is the intention, I will not permit myself to assert that such is the fact — that so lawless and unconsti- tutional an object is contemplated by the President, till his act shall compel me to believe to the contrary. But while I thus severely condemn the conduct of the President in removing the former secretary and appointing the present, I must say that, in my opinion, it is a case of the abuse, and not of the usurpation of power. The President has the right of removal from office^ The power of xemoval. wherever it exists, does, from necessity, involve the power of general supervision ; nor can I doubt that it might be constitutionally exercised in ref- erence to the deposites. Reverse the present case : suppose the late secreta- ly, instead of being against, had been in favour of the removal, and that the President, instead of for, had been against it, deeming the removal not only in- expedient, but, under the circumstances, illegal ; would any man doubt thaty imder such circumstances, he had a right to remove his secretary, if it were the only means of preventing the removal of the deposites ? Nay, would it not be his indispensable duty to have removed him ? and had he not, would not he have been universally, and justly, held responsible ? 1 have now (said Mr. C.) ofl'ered all the remarks I intended in reference to the deposite question ; and, on reviewing the whole ground, I must say, that the secretary, in removing the deposites, has clearly transcended his power ; that he has violated the contract between the Bank and the United States ; that, iri so doing, he has deeply injured that large and respectable portion of our citi- zens who have been invited, on the faith of the government, to invest their property in the institution ; while, at the same time, he has deeply injured the public in its character of stockholder ; and, finally, that he has ir.flicted a deep -wound on the public faith. To this last I attribute the present embarrassment in the currency, which has so injuriously affected all the great interests of the country. The credit of the country is an important ponion of the currency of the country — credit in every shape, public and private — ©redit,- not only in the shape of paper, but that of faith and confidence between man and man — through the agency of which, in all its fonns, the great and mighty exchanges of this commercial countr}', at home and abroad, are, in a great measure, effected. To inflict a wound anywhere, particularly on the public faith, is to embarrass all the channels of currency and exchange ; and it is to this, and not to the with- drawing the few millions of dollars from circulation, that I attribute the present moneyed embarrassment. Did I believe the contrary — if I thought that any great and permanent distress would of itself resxilt from winding up, in a regular and legal manner, the present or any other Bank of the United States, I would deem it an evidence of the dangerous power of the institution, and, to that extent, an argument against its existence ; but, as it is, I regard the present embarrass- ment, not as an argument against the Bank, but an argument against the law- less and wanton exercise of power on the part of the executive — an embarrass- ment which is likely to continue if the deposites be not restored. The banks ■which have received them, at the expense of the public faith, and in violation of law, will never be permitted to enjoy their spoils in quiet. No one who re- gards the subject in the light in which I do, can ever give his sanction to any law intended to protect or carry through the present illegal arrangement ; on the contrary, all such must feel bound to wage perpetual war against a usurpa- tion of power so fiagrant as that which controls the present deposites of the public money. If I stand alone (said Mr. Calhoun), I, at least, will continue to maintain the contest so long as I remain in public life. As important (said Mr. Calhoun) as I consider the question of the deposites, in all its bearings, public and private, it is one on the surface, a mere pretext to another, and one greatly more important, which lies beneath, and which must be taken into consideration, to understand correctly all the circumstances auenuing this extraorainary transaction. It is lelt and acknowjeugeu on all sides that there is another and a deeper question, which has excited the pro- found sensation and alarm which pervade the country. If we are to believe what we hear from the advocates of the administration, we would suppose at one time that the real question was Bank or no Bank ; at another, that the question was between the United States Bank and the state banks ; and, finally, that it was a struggle on the part of the administration to guard and defend the rights of the states against the encroachments of the Gen- eral Government. The administration the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! What shall I call it ? audacity or hypocrisy ? The au- thors of the proclamation the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! The authors of the war message against a member of this confederacy — the au- thors of the " bloody bill" the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! This a struggle for state rights ? No, sir : state rights are no more. The .struggle is over for the present. The bill of the last session, which vested in the government the right of judging of the extent of its powers, finally and conclusively, and gave it the right of enforcing its judgments by the sword, de- stroyed all distinction between delegated and reserved rights, concentrated in the government the entire power of the system, and prostrated the states, as poor and helpless corporations, at the foot of this sovereignty. Nor is it more true that the real question is Bank or no Bank. Taking the deposite question in the broadest sense ; suppose, as it is contended by the friends of the administration, that it involves the question of the renewal of the charter, and, consequently, the existence of the Bank itself, still the banking sys- tem would stand almost untouched and unimpaired. Four hundred banks would still remain scattered over this wide Republic, and on the ruins of the United States Bank many would rise to be added to the present list. Under this aspect of the subject, the only possible question that could be presented for consideration would be, whether the banking system was more safe, more beneficial, or more constitutional, with or without the United States Bank. If, said Mr. Calhoun, this was a question of Bank or no Bank — if it involved the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question — one of the first magnitude, and, with my present impression, long entertained and daily increasing, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I would be found un- der the banner of the system. I have great doubts, if doubts they may be call- ed, as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica- tions : I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty in our country', where the system ex- ists in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the great question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored and the most important of any in the whole range of political economy — the banking in- stitution has, if not the greatest, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I would not shun the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully of- fering my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but, as it is, I must content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out. What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country ? I answer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the gov- ernment: a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the Bank, but which, Congress or the President, should have the power to create a Bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the country. This is the real question. Let us not deceive ourselves : this league, this association of banks, created by the executiv'e, bound together by its influence, united in common articles of as- sociation, vivified and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, and having their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasu- ry, into the common currency of the country', is, to all intents and purposes, a Bank of the United States — the executive Bank of the United States, as distin- guished from that of Congress. However it might fail to perforin satisfactorily the useful functions of the Bank of the United States as incorporated by law, it would outstrip it — far outstrip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects. Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country, and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system of menaces and promises will be established : of menace to the banks in pos- session of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to execu- tive views ; and of promise of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, hon- our, or honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would com- mence, unequalled in the annals of our country. I fear they have already com- menced ; I fear the means which have been put in the hands of the minions of power by the removal of the deposites, and placing them in the vaults of de- pendant banks, have extended their cupidity to the public lands, particularly in the Southwest, and that to this we must attribute the recent phenomena in that quarter — immense and valuable tracts of land sold at short notice ; sales fraudu- lently postponed to aid the speculators, with which, if I am not misinformed, a name not unknown to this body has performed a prominent part. But I leave this to my vigilant and able friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), at the head of the Committee on Public Lands, who, I doubt not, will see justice done to the public. As to stock-jobbing, this new arrangement will open a field which Rothschild himself may envy. It has been found hard work — very hard, no doubt — by the jobbers in stock, who have been engaged in attempts to raise or depress the price of United States Bank stock ; but no work will be more easy than to raise or depress the price of the stock of the selected banks,, at the pleasure of the executive. Nothing more will be required than to give or withhold deposites ; to draw, or abstain from drawing warrants ; to pamper them at one time, and starve them at another. Those who would be in the se- cret, and who would know when to buy and when to sell, would have the means of realizing, by dealing in the stocks, whatever fortune they might please. So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States incorpo- rated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been created by the will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States. To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther : you must divorce the government and the banking system. You must refuse all connexion with banks. You must neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by re- ceiving them in your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right to create a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money, is money in efliect ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti- tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound by a high obligation to adopt the most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have recogni- sed as money, to give it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of giving those quali- ties is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uniformity to the value of bank-notes, so long as you receive them in your dues, and treat them as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is no other alternative : I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are boimd to incor- poraie a oanK as luts uuiy saie aim erncient means oi giving stability ^nd uni- formity to the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the present illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to in- troduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching bank-notes in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and stability to the ourrency, and saving the country from corruption and ruin. Viewing the question, in its true light, as a struggle on the part of the execu- tive to seize on the power of Congress, and to unite in the President the power of the sword and the purse, the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) said, truly, and, let me add, philosophically, that we are in the midst of a revolution. Yes, the very existence of free governments rests on the proper distribution and or- ganization of power ; and to destroy this distribution, and thereby concentrate power in any one of the departments, is to effect a revolution ; but, while I agree with the senator that we are in the midst of a revolution, I cannot atrree with him as to the time at which it commenced, or the point to which it has progressed. Looking to the distribution of the powers of the General Govern- ment — into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments — and confinino- his views to the encroachment of the executive upon t-he legislative, he dates the commencement of the revolution but sixty days previous to the meeting of the present Congress. I, said Mr. Calhoun, take a wider range, and date it from an earlier period. Besides the distribution among the departments of the General Government, there belongs to our system another, and a far more im- portant division or distribution of power — that between the states and the Gen- eral Government, the reserved and delegated rights, the maintenance of which is still more essential to the preservation of our institutions. Taking this wide review of our political system, the revolution in the midst of which we are, be- gan, not, as supposed by the senator from Kentucky, shortly before the com- mencement of the present session, but many years ago, with the commence- ment of the restrictive system, and terminated its first stage with the passage of the force bill of the last session, which absorbed all the rights and sovereign- ty of the states, and consolidated them in this government. While this pro- cess was going on, of absorbing the reserved powers of the states on the part of the General Government, another commenced, of concentrating in the execu- tive the powers of the other two, the legislative and judicial departments of the government, which constitutes the second stage of the revolution, in which we have advanced almost to the termination. The senator from Kentucky, in connexion with this part of his argument, read a striking passage from one of the most pleasing and instructive writers in any lan- guage (Plutarch), giving the description of Caesar forcing himself, sword in hand, into the treasury of the Roman Commonwealth. We are at the same stao-e of our political revolution, and the analogy between the two cases is complete, va- ried only by the character of the actors and the circumstances of the times. That was a case of an intrepid and bold warrior, as an open plunderer, seiz- ing forcibly the treasury of the country, which, in that Republic, as well as ours, was confided to the custody of the legislative department of the govern- ment. The actors in our case are of a different character : artful and cunning politicians, and not fearless warriors. They have entered the treasury, not sword in hand, as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, under the silence of midnight. The motive and object are the same, varied only by character and circumstances. " With money I will get men, and with men money," was the maxim of the Roman plunderer. With money we will get partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money, is the maxim of our pub- lic pilferers. With men and money, Caesar struck down Roman liberty at the fatal battle of Pharsalia, never to rise again ; from which disastrous hour, all the powers of the Roman Republic were consolidated in the person of Cajsar, and ■i perpetuated in his line. "With money and corrupt partisans, a great efTort is now making to choke and stifle the voice of American liberty, through all its con- stitutional and legal organs ; by pensioning the press ; by overawing the other departments ; and, finally, by setting up a new organ, composed of office-holders and partisans, under the name of a national convention, which, counterfeiting the voice of the people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the succession ; when the deed shall have been done — -the revolution completed — and all the powers of our Republic, in like manner, consolidated in the executive in time, and perpetuated by his dictation. The senator from Kentucky (Mr. C.) anticipates with confidence that the small party who were denounced at the last session as traitors and disuuionists will be found, on this trying occasion, standing in the front rank, and manfully resisting the advance of despotic power. I, said Mr. Calhoun, heard the an- ticipation with pleasure, not on account of the compliment which it implied, bul the evidence which it affords that the cloud which has been so industriously thrown over the character and motive of that small, but patriotic party, begins to be dissipated. The senator hazarded nothing in the prediction. That party is the determined, the fixed, and sworn enemy to usurpation, come from \vha& quarter and under what form it may — whether from the executive upon the other departments of this government, or from this government on the sovereignty and rights of the states. The resolution and fortitude with which it maintained its position at the last session, under so many difliculties and dangers, in defence of the states against the encroachments of the General Government, furnished evidence not to be mistaken, that that party, in the present momentous struggle, would be found arrayed in defence of the rights of Congress against the en- croachments of the President. And let me tell the senator from Kentucky, said Mr. C, that, if the present struggle against executive usurpation be successful, it will be owing to the success with which we, the nullifiers — I am not afraid of the word — maintained the rights of the states against the encroachment of the General Govemment at the last session. A very few words will place this point beyond controversy. To the inter- position of the State of South Carolina we are indebted for the adjustment of the tariff question ; without it, all the influence of the senator from Kentucky over the manufacturing interest, great as it deservedly is, would have been wholly incompetent, if he had even thought proper to exert it, to adjust the question. The attempt would have prostrated him, and those who acted with him, and not the system. It was the separate action of the state that gave him the place to stand ujxin, created the necessity for the adjustment, and disposed the minds of all to compromise. Now, I put the solemn question to all who hear me. If the tariff had not then been adjusted — if it was now an open ques- tion — what hope of successful resistance against the usurpations of the executive, on the part of this or any other branch of the government, could be entertained ? Let it not be said that this is the result of accident — of an unforeseen contin- gency. It was clearly perceived, and openly stated, that no successful resist- ance could be made to the corruption and encroachments of the executive while the tariff question remained open — while it separated the North from the South, and wasted the energy of the honest and patriotic portions of the community against each other, the joint effort of which is indispensably necessary to expei those from authority who are converting the entire powers of government into a corrupt electioneering machine ; and that, without separate state interposition, the adjustment was impossible. The truth of this position rests not upon the accidental state of thing's, but on a profound principle growing out of the nature of government and party struggles in a free state. History and reflection teach us that, when great interests come into conflict, and the passions and the preju- dices of men are roused, such struggles can never be composed by the influ- ence of any individuals, however great ; and if there be not somewhere in the system some high constitutional power to arrest their progress, ana compel the parties to adjust the difference, they go on till the state falls by corruption or violence. I will, said Mr. C, venture to add to these remarks another, in connexion with the point under consideration, not less true. We are not only indebted to the cause which I have stated for our present strength in this body against the pres- ent usurpation of the executive, but if the adjustment of the tariff had stood alone, as it outrht to have done, without the odious bill which accompanied it — if those who led in the compromise had joined the State Rights party in their resistance to that unconstitutional measure, and thrown the responsibility on its real authors, the administration, their party would have been so prostrated throughout the en- tire South, and their power, in consequence, so reduced, that they would not have dared to attempt the present measure ; or, if they had, they would have been broke and defeated. Were I, said Mr. C, to select the case best calculated to illustrate the ne- cessity of resisting usurpation at the very commencement, and to prove how difficult it is to resist it in any subsequent stage if not met at first, I would se- lect this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present usurpation of power on the part of the executive 1 What the motive, the temptation, which has induced them to seize on the deposites ? What but the large surplus revenue ? the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of the government ? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas- ury, when not needed ? I answer, the protective system — that system which graduated duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but in refer- ence to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which poured millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands, and even the extravagance of the government — taken — unlawfully taken, from the pockets of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are entitled to what they make against all the world, except the government ; and against it, except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this sacred prin- ciple. Congress frst removed the deposites into the public treasury from the pockets of those who made it, where they were rightfully placed by all laws, human and divine. The executive, in his turn, following the example, has taken them from that deposite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan banks. The means used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution gives to Congress the power to lay duties with a view to revenue. This power, without regarding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a great trust power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended, that of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of another ; and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public treasury, as I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example of Congress. By the magic construction of a few simple words — " unless otherwise order- ed" — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited power — to give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like manner, pervert- ed this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry, of drawing the money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on favourite and partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr. C, would to God I could reverse the whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the coritroversy by returning the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citizens, by the sweat of whose brows it was made, and to whom only it rightfully belongs. But, as this cannot be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to return it to the public treasury, where it was ordered to be deposited by an act of the Legis- lature. S There is another aspect, said Mr. C, in which this subject may be viewed. We all remember how early the question of the surplus revenue began to agi- tate the country. At a very early period, a senator from New-Jersey (Mr. Dickerson) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing it among the states. The first message of the President recommended a similar project, which was followed up by a movement on the part of the Legislature of New- York, and, I believe, some of the other states. The public attention was aroused — the scheme scrutinized — its gross unconstitutionality and injustice, and its dangerous tendency — its tendency to absorb the power and existence of the states, were clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too deep to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What have we now in lieu of it ? What is the present scheme but a distribution of the surplus revenue ? A distribution at the sole will and pleasure of the executive — a distribution to favourite banks, and through them, in the shape of discounts and loans, to corrupt partisans, as the means of increasing political influence ? We have, said Mr. C, arrived at a fearful crisis. Things cannot long re- main as they are. It behooves all who love their country — who have afl'ection for their ofl'spring, or who have any stake in our institutions, to pause and re- flect. Confidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government. Alien- ation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of things inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions must follow ; and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will be thrown over the cause of liberty and the future prospects of our country. VIII. SPEECH ON MR. WEBSTER S PROPOSITION TO RECHARTER THE UNITED ST.-VTES BANK, MARCH 26, 1834. The question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster to introduce into tne Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years, the Bank of the United States, with modifications : I rise, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an early opportunity to express my opinion on the measure proposed by the senator from iMassachu- setts, and the questions immediately connected with it, under the impression that, on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of every class in the community, there should be an early declaration of their sentiments by the members of tlus body, so that all might know what to expect, and on what to calculate. I shall vote for the motion of the senator, not because I approve of the meas- ure he proposes, but because I consider it due in courtesy to grant leave, un- less there be strong reasons to the contrary, which is not the case in this in- stance ; but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me add, to do ample justice to his motives for introducing the bill, I cannot approve of the measure he proposes. In every view which 1 have been able to take, it is ob- jectionable. Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object. It is left perfectly open to conjecture whether a renewal of the charter is intend- ed, or a mere continuance, with the view of affording the Bank time to wind up its afi'airs ; and what increases the uncertainty is, if we compare the provisions of the proposed bill with the one or the other of these objects, it is equally un- suited to either. If a renewal of the charter be intended, six years is too short ; if a continuance, too long. I, however, state this as a minor objection. There is another of far more decisive character : it settles nothing ; it leaves every- thing unfixed ; it perpetuates the present struggle, which so injuriously agitates the country — a struggle of bank against bank — of one set of opinions against another ; and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armistice, to the year 1842 : a period that covers two presidential terms, and, by inevitable con- sequence, running, for two successive presidential elections, the politics of the country into the Bank question, and the Bank question into politics, with the mutual corruption which must be engendered ; keeping, during the whole peri- od, the currency of the country, which the public interest requires should have the utmost stability, in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation. But why should I pursue the objections to the plan proposed by the senator ? He himself acknowledged the measure to be defective, and that he would pre- fer one of a more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the best measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed necessity — under the im- pression that something must be done — something prompt and immediate, to re- lieve the existing distress which overspreads the land. I concur with him in relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive ; that it fell upon us sudden- ly, and in the midst of prosperity almost unexampled ; that it is daily consign- ing hundreds to poverty and misery ; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ; taking employment and bread from the labourer ; and working a fearful change in the relative condition of the money dealers on one side, and the man of busi- ness on the other — raising the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it is whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom. While I thus agree with the senator as to the distress, I am also sensible that there are great pub- lic emergencies in which no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the wisest are obliged to resort to expedients : to palliate and to temporize, in order to gain time with a view to apply a more effectual remedy. But there are also emergencies of precisely the opposite character : when the best and most per- manent is the only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but to distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or defeat all relief ; and such, viewed in all its relations and bearing, I consider the present ; and that the senator from Massachusetts has not also so considered it, I attribute to the fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject under consideration, he has given an undue prominence to that which has by far the least relative im- portance — I mean those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank question, as viewed by the senator, it would be a matter of but little importance whether the renewal should be for six years or for a longer period ; and a pref- erence might very properly be given to one or the other, as it might be suppo- sed most likely to succeed ; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting the period of six years, he has taken that which will be much less likely to succeed than one of a reasonable and proper duration. But had he turned his view to the other and more prominent question involved ; had he regarded the question as a question of currency, and that the great point was to give it uniformity, per- manency, and safety ; that, in effecting these essential objects, the Bank is a mere subordinate agent, to be vised or not to be used, and to be modified, as to its duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the higher question of the currency, I cannot think that he would ever have proposed the measure which he has brought forward, which leaves, as I have already said, everything connected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation. All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring to be touched with the utmost caution ; but in order that it may be seen as well as felt why it is so delicate, why slight touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and convulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause. If we take | the aggregate property of a community, that which forms the currency consti- i tutes, in value, a very small proportion of the whole. What this proportion is in our country and other commercial and trading communities, is somewhat un- certain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to twenty-five or thirty, though I presume that is not far from the truth ; and yet this small proportion of the property of the community regulates the value of all the rest, and forms the me- dium of circulation by which all its exchanges are effected ; bearing, in this re- spect a striking similarity, considering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood in the human or animal system. If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the circulation, we shall find one of the most important to be, that, as the circulation is decreased or in- creased the rest of the property will, all other circumstances remaining the same be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same proportion. To illustrate : If a community should have an aggregate amount of property of thir- ty-one millions of dollars, of which one million constitutes its currency ; and that one million should be reduced one tegth part, that is to say, one hundred thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be reduced in like manner one tenth part, that is, three millions of dollars. And here a very important fact dis- closes itself, which explains why the currency should be touched with such delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential qualities ; I mean that a small absolute reduction of the currency makes a great absolute reduction of the value of the entire property of the community, as we see in the case pro- posed ; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dollars in the currency re- duces the aggregate value of property three millions of dollars — a sum thirty times greater than the reduction of the currency. From this results an impor- tant consideration. If we suppose the entire currency to be in the hands of one portion of the community, and the property in the hands of the other portion, the former, by having the currency under their exclusive control, might control the value of all the property in the community, and possess themselves of it at their pleasure. Take the case already selected, and suppose that those who hold the currency diminish it one half by abstracting that amount from circula- tion : the effect of which would be to reduce the circulation to five hundred thousand dollars ; the value of property would also be reduced one half, that is, fifteen millions of dollars. Let the process be reversed, and the money abstract- ed gradually restored to circulation, and the value of the property would again be increased to thirty millions. It must be obvious that, by alternating these processes, and purchasing at the point of the greatest depression, when the cir- culation is the least, and selling at the point of the greatest elevation, when it is the fullest, the supposed moneyed class, who could at pleasure increase or di- minish the circulation, by abstracting or restoring it, might also at pleasure con- trol the entire property of the country. Let it be ever borne in mind, that the exchangeable value of the circulating medium, compared with the property and the business of the community, remains fixed, and can never be diminished or increased by increasing or dilninishing its quantity ; while, on the contrary, the exchangeable value of the property, compared to the cj^rency, must increase or decrease with every addition or diminution of the latter^ It results, from this, that there is a dangerous antagonist relation between those who hold or com- mand the currency and the rest of the community ; "tut, fortunately for the coun- try, the holders of property and of the currency are so blended as not to consti- tute separate classes. Yet it is worthy of remark — it deserves strongly to at- tract the attention of those who have charge of the public affairs — that under the operation of the banking system, and that peculiar description of property ex- isting in the shape of credit or stock, public and private, which so strikingly dis- tinguishes modern society from all that preceded it, there is a strong tendency to create a separate moneyed interest, accompanied with all the dangers which must necessarily result from such interest, and which deserves to be most care- fully watched and restricted. I do not stand here the partisan of any particular class in society — the rich or the poor, the property holder or the money holder ; and, in making these re- marks, I am not actuated by the slightest feeling of opposition to the latter. My object is simply to point out important relations that exist between them, re- suiting irom me laws wnicn govern tne currency, in order that the necessity for a uniform, stable, and safe currency, to guard against dangerous control of one class over another, may be clearly seen. I stand in my place simply as a senator from South Carolina, to represent her on this floor, and to advance the common interest of these states as far as we have the constitutional power, and as far as it can be done consistently with equity and justice to the parts. I am the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any political party. I am neither of the opposition nor of the administration. If I act with the former in any instance, it is because I approve of the course on the particular occasion ; and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose the administration — if I desire to see power change hands— it is because I dis- approve of the general course of those in authority — because they have depart- ed from the principles on which they came into 'office — because, instead of usint? the immense power and patronage put in their hands to secure the liberty of the country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into party in- struments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will it be, a syste- matic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem right, I shall cheer- fully support ; and I only desire that they shall aflbrd me more frequent occa- sions for support, and fewer for opposition, than they have heretofore done. With these impressions, and entertaining a deep conviction that an unfixed, unstable, and fluctuating currency is to be ranked among the most fruitful sour- ces of evil, whether viewed politically, or in reference to the business transac- tions of the country, I cannot give my consent to any measure that does not place the currency on a solid foundation. If I thought this determination would delay the relief so necessary to mitigate the present calamity, it would be to me a subject of the deepest regret. I feel that sympathy which I trust I ought, for the suflering of so many of my fellow-citizens, who see their hopes daily with- ered. I, however, console myself with the reflection that delay will not be the result, but, on the contrary, relief will be hastened by the view which I take of the subject. I hold it impossible that anything can be effected, regard- ing the subject as a mere bank question. Viewed in that light, the opinion of this house, and of the other branch of Congress, is probably definitively made up. In the Senate, it is known that we have three parties,' whose views, con- sidering it as a bank question, appear to be irreconcilable. All hope, then, of relief, must centre in taking a more elevated view, and in considering it, in its true light, as a subject of currency. Thus regarded, I shall be surprised if, on full investigation, there will not appear a remarkable coincidence of opinion, even between those whose views, on a slight inspection, would seem to be con- tradictory. Let us, then, proceed to the investigation of the subject under the aspect which I have proposed. What, then, is the currency of the United States? What its present state and condition ? These are the questions which I propose now to consider, with a view of ascertaining what is the disease, what the remedy, and what the means of applying it, that may be necessary to restore our currency to a sound condition. The legal currency of this country — that in which alone debts can be dis- charged according to law — are certain gold, silver, and copper coins authorized by Congress under an express provision of the Constitution. Such is the law. What, now, are the facts ? That the currency consists almost exclusively of bank-notes, gold having entirely disappeared, and silver, in a great measure, expelled by banks instituted by twenty-five distinct and independent powers, and iiotes issued under the authority of the direction of those institutions. They are, in point of fact, the mint of the United States, They coin the actual money (for such we must call bank-notes), and regulate its issue, and, conse- quently, its value. If we inquire as to their number, the amount of their issue, and other circumstances calculated to show their actual condition, we shall find ■■ that, so rapid has been their increase, and so various their changes, that no ac- curate information can be had. According to the latest and best that I have been able to obtain, they number at least four hundred and fifty, with a capital of not less than one hundred and forty-five millions of dollars, with an issue ex- ceedino' seventy millions ; and the whole of this immense fabric standing on a metallic currency of less than fifteen millions of dollars, of which the greater part is held by the Bank of the United States. If we compare the notes in circulation with the metallic currency in their vaults, we shall find the propor- tion about six to one ; and if we compare the latter with the demands that may be made upon the banks, we shall find that the proportion is about one to elev- en. If we examine the tendency of the system at this moment, we shall find that it is on the increase — rapidly on the increase. There is now pending a project of a ten million bank before the Legislature of New- York ; but recently one of five millions was established in Kentucky ; within a short period one of a large capital was established in Tennessee, besides others in agitation in several of the other states (here Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, said that one of eleven millions had just been established in that state). This increase is not accidental. It may be laid down as a law, that, where two currencies are permitted to circulate in any country, one of a cheap and the other of a dear material, the former necessarily tends to grow upon the lat- ter, and will ultimately expel it from circulation, unless its tendency to increase be restrained by a powerful and efficient check. Experience tests the truth of this remark, as the history of the banking system clearly illustrates. The sen- ator from Massachusetts truly said that the Bank of England was derived from that of Amsterdam, as ours, in turn, are from that of England. Throughout its progress, the truth of what I have stated to be a law of the system is strongly evinced. The Bank of Amsterdam was merely a bank of deposite — a storehouse for the safe-keeping of the bullion and precious metals brought into that com- mercial metropolis, through all the channels of its widely-extended trade. It was placed under the custody of the city authorities ; and on the deposite, a cer- tificate was issued as evidence of the fact, which was transferable, so as to en- title the holder to demand the return. An important fact was soon disclosed — that a large portion of the deposites might be withdrawn, and that the residue would be sulficient to meet the returning certificates ; or, what is the same in eflfect, that certificates might be issued without making a deposite. This sug- gested the idea of a bank of discount as well as deposite. The fact thus dis- closed fell too much in with the genius of the system to be lost, and, accord- ingly, when transplanted to England, it suggested the idea of a bank of discount and of deposite ; the very essence of which form of banking, that on which their profit depends, consists in issuing a greater amount of notes than it has specie in its vaults. But the system is regularly progressing, under the impulse of the laws that govern it, from its present form to a mere paper machine — a machine for fabricating and issuing notes, not convertible into specie. Already has it once reached this condition, both in England and the United States, and from which it has been forced back, in both, to a redemption of its notes with great difficulty. The natural tendency of the system is accelerated in our country by pecu- liar causes, which have greatly increased its progress. There are two power- ful causes in operation. The one resulting from that rivalry which must ever take place in states situated, as ours are, under one General Government, and having a free and open commercial intercourse. The introduction of the bank- ing system in one state necessarily, on this principle, introduces it into all the others, of which we have seen a striking illustration on the part of Virginia and some of the other Southern States, which entertained, on principle, strong aversion to the system ; yet they were compelled, after a long and stubborn re- sistance, to yield their objections, or permit their circulation to be furnished by The same cause which thus compels one state to imitate the example of an- other in introducing the system from self-defence, will compel the other states, in like manner, and from the same cause, to enlarge and give increased activity to the banking operation, whenever any one of the states sets the example of so doino- on its part ; and thus, by mutual action and reaction, the whole sys- tem is rapidly accelerated to the final destiny which I have assigned. This is strikingly exemplified in the rapid progress of the system since its first introduction into our country. At the adoption of our Constitution, forty- five years ago, there were but three banks in the United States, the amount of whose capital I do not now recollect, but it was very small. In this short space, they have increased to four hundred and fifty, with a capital of one hun- dred and forty-five millions, as has already been stated : an increase exceeding nearly a hundred fold the increase of our wealth aiid population, as great as they have been. But it is not in numbers only that they have increased : there has, in the same time, been a rapid advance in the proportion which their notes in circu- lation bear to the specie in their vaults. Some twenty or thirty years ago, it was not considered safe for the issues to exceed the specie by more than two and a half or three for one ; but now, taking the whole, and including the Bank of the United States with the state banks, the proportion is about six to one ; and excluding that Bank, it would very greatly exceed that proportion. This increase of paper in proportion to metal results from a cause which deserves much more notice than it has heretofore attracted. It originates mainly in the number of the banks. I will proceed to illustrate it. The senator from New-York (Mr. Wright), in assigning his reasons for be- lieving the Bank of the United States to be more dangerous than those of the states, said that one bank was more dangerous than many. That in some re- spects may be true ; but in one, and that a most important one, it is strikingly the opposite — I mean in the tendency of the system to increase. Where there is but one bank, the tendency to increase is not near so strong as where there are many, as illustrated in England, where the system has advanced much less rapidly, in proportion to the wealth and population of the kingdom, than in the United States. But where there is no limitation as to their number, the in- crease will be inevitable, so long as banking continues to be among the most certain, eligible, and profitable employments of capital, as now is the case. With these inducements, there must be constant application for new banks, whenever there is the least prospect of profitable employment — banks to be founded mainly on nominal and fictitious capital, and adding but little additional capital to that already in existence — and with our just and natural aversion to monopoly, it is difficult, on principles of equality and justice, to resist such ap- plication. The admission of a new bank tends to diminish the profits of the old, and, between the aversion of the old to reduce their income and the desire of the new to acquire profits, the result is an enlargement of discounts, effected by a mutual spirit of forbearance ; an indisposition on the part of each to oppress the other ; and, finally, the creation of a common feeling to stigmatize and oppose those, whether banks or individuals, who demand specie in payment of their notes. This community of feeling, which ultimately identifies the whole as a peculiar and distinct interest in the community, increases, and becomes more and more intense, just in proportion as banks multiply ; as they become, if I may use the expression, too populous, when, from the pressure of increasing num- bers, there results a corresponding increase of issues, in proportion to their means, which explains the present extraordinary disproportion between specie and notes in those states where banks have been most multiplied ; equal, in some, to sixteen to one. There results from this state of things some pohtical considerations, which demand the profound attention of all who value the liberty and peace of the country. While the banking system rests on a solid foundation, there will be, on their part, but little depcndance on the government, and but little means by which the government can influence them, and as little disposition on the part of the banks to be connected with the government ; but in the progress of the system, when their number is greatly multiplied, and their issues, in proportion to their means, are correspondingly increased, the condition of the banks becomes more and more critical. Every adverse event in the commercial world, or political movement that disturbs the existing state of things, agitates and endangers them. They become timid and anxious for their safety, and necessarily court those in power, in order to secure their protection. Property is, in its nature, timid, and seeks protection, and nothing is more gratifying to government than to become a protector. A union is the result ; and when that union takes place — when the government, in fact, becomes the bank direction, regulating its favours and ac- commodation — the downfall of liberty is at hand. Are there no indications that we are not far removed from this state of things ? Do we not behold in those events which have so deeply agitated us within the last few months, and which have interrupted all the business transactions of this community, a strong ten- dency to this union on the part of a department of this government, and a por- tion of the banking system ? Has not this union been, in fact, consummated in the largest and most commercial of the states ? What is the safety-fund system of New-York but a union between the banks and the state, and a consummation by law of that community of feeling in the banking system which I have at- tempted to illustrate, the object of which is to extend their discounts, and to ob tain which, the interior banks of that state have actually put themselves under the immediate protection of the government ? The effects have been striking. Already have they become substantially mere paper machines, several having not more than from one to two cents in specie to the dollar, when compared with their circulation ; and, taking the aggregate, their average condition will be foimd to be but little better. I care not, said Mr. C, whether the present commissioners are partisans of the present state administration or not, or w^hether the assertion of the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), that the government of the state has not interfered in the control of these institutions, be correct. Whether it has taken place or not, interference is inevitable. In such state of weakness, a feeling of dependance is unavoidable, and the control of the government over the action of the banks, whenever that control shall be- come necessary to subserve the ambition or the avarice of those in power, is certain. Such is the strong tendency of our banks to terminate their career in the pa- per system — in an open suspension of specie payment. Whenever that event occurs, the progress of convulsion and revolution will be rapid. The currency will become local, and each state will have a powerful interest to depreciate its currency more rapidly than its neighbour, as moans, at the same time, of ex- empting itself from the taxes of the government, and drawing the commerce of the country to its ports. This was strongly exemplified after the suspension of specie payment during the late war, when the depreciation made the most rapid progress, till checked by the establishment of the present Bank of the Uni- ted States, and when the foreign trade of the country was as rapidly conver- ging to the point of the greatest depreciation, with a view of exemption from du- ties, by paying in the debased currency of the place. What, then, is the disease which afflicts the system ? what the remedy ? and what the means of applying it ? These are the questions which I shall next proceed to consider. What I have already stated points out the disease. It consists in a great and growing disproportion between the metallic and paper circulation of the country, effected through the instrumentality of the banks : a disproportion daily and hourly increasing, under the impulse of most powerful causes, which are rapidly accelerating the country to that state of convulsion ana revoimion wiucii i nave inaicaiea. i ne remedy is to arrest its tuture proo-- ress, and to diminish the existing disproportion — to increase the metals and to diminish the paper — advancing till the currency shall be restored to a sound, safe, and settled condition. On these two points all must be agreed. There is no man of any party, capable of reflecting, and who will take the pains to in- form himself, but must agree that our currency is in a dangerous condition, and that the danger is increasing ; nor is there any one who can doubt that the only safe and effectual remedy is to diminish this disproportion to which I have re- ferred. Here the extremes unite : the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), and the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who stands here as the able and strenuous advocate of the banking system, are on this point united, and must move from it in the same direction : though it may be the design of the one to go through, and of the other to halt after a moderate advance. There is another point on which all must be agreed — that the remedy must be gradual — the change from the present to another and sounder condition, slow and cautious. The necessity for this results from that highly delicate nature of currency which I have already illustrated. Any sudden and great chant^e from our present to even a sounder condition would agitate and convulse socie- ty to the centre. On another point there can be but little disagreement. What- ever may be the different theoretical opinions of the members of the Senate as to the extent to which the reformation of the currency should be carried, even those who think it may be carried practically and safely to the restoration of a metallic currency, to the entire exclusion of paper, must agree that the restora- tion ought not to be carried farther than a cautious and slow experience shall prove that it can be done, consistently with the prosperity of the country, in the existing fiscal and commercial condition of the world. To go beyond the point to which experience shall show it is proper to go, would be to sacrifice the pub- lic interest merely to a favourite conception. There may be ultimately a disa- greement of opinion where that point is, but, since all must be agreed to move forward in the same direction and at the same pace, let us set out in the spirit of harmony and peace, though we intend to stop at different points. It may be that, enlightened by experience, those who intended to stop at the nearest point may be disposed to advance farther, and that those who intended the farthest, may halt on this side, so that finally all may agree to terminate the journey to- gether. Th^ brings us to the question of how shall so salutary a change be effected ? What the means, and the mode of application ? A great and difficult question, on which some diversity of opinion may be expected. No one can be more sensible than I am of the responsibility that must be in- curred in proposing measures on questions of so much magnitude, and which, in so distracted a state, must affect seriously great and influential interests. But this is no time to shun responsibihty. The danger is great and menacing, and delay hazardous, if not ruinous. While, however, I would not shun, I have not sought the responsibility. I have waited for others ; and, had any one pro- posed an adequate remedy, I would have remained silent. And here, said Mr. Calhoun, let me express the deep regret which I feel that the administration, with all that weight of authority which belongs to its power and immense pat- ronage, had not, instead of the deposite question, which has caused such agita- tion and distress, taken up the great subject of the currency ; examined it grave- ly and deliberately in all its bearings ; pointed out its diseased condition ;' des- ignated the remedy, and proposed some safe, gradual, and effectual means of applying it. Had that course been pursued, my zealous and hearty co-opera- tion would not have been wanting. Permit me, also, to express a similar re- gret that the administration, having failed in this great point of duty, the oppo- sition, with all its weight and talents, headed on this question by the distinguish- ed and able senator from Massachusetts, who is so capable of comprehending T or iIjCjK/hi:'-^ this subject in all its bearings, had not brought forward, under its auspices, some permanent system of measures, based upon a deliberate and mature investiga- tion into the cause of the existing disease, and calculated to remedy the disor- dered state of the currency. What might have been brought forward by them ■with such fair prospects of success, has been thrown on more incompetent hands, unaided by patronage or influence, save only that power which truth clearly developed, and honestly and zealously advanced, may be supposed to possess, and on which I must wholly rely. But to return to the subject. Whatever diversity of sentiment there may be as to the means, on one point all must be agreed : nothing effectual can be done, no check interposed to restore or arrest the progress of the system, by the ac- tion of the states. The reasons already assigned to prove that banking by one state compels all others to bank, and that the excess of banking in one in like manner compels all others to like excess, equally demonstrate that it is impossi- ble for the states, acting separately, to interpose any means to prevent the catas- trophe which certainly awaits the system, and perhaps the government itself, un- less the great and growing danger to which I refer be timely and effectually arrested. There is no power anywhere but in this government — the joint agent of all the states, and through which a concert of action can be effected adequate to this great task. The responsibility is upon us, and upon us alone. The means, if means there be, must be applied by our hands, or not applied at all — a consideration, in so great an emergency, and in the presence of such imminent danger, calculated, I should suppose, to arouse even the least patriotic. What means do we possess, and how can they be applied ? If the entire banking system was under the immediate control of the Gener- al Government, there would be no difficulty in devising a safe and effectual remedy to restore the equilibrium, so desirable, between the specie and the pa- per which compose our currency. But the fact is otherwise. With the ex- ception of the Bank of the United States, all the other banks owe their origin to the authority of the several states, and are under their immediate control, which presents the great difficulty experienced in devising the proper means of effecting the remedy Avhich all feel to be so desirable. Among the means which have been suggested, a senator from Virginia, not now a member of this body (Mr. Rives), proposed to apply the taxing power to suppress the circulation of small notes, with a view of diminishing the- paper and increasing the specie circulation. The remedy would be simple and effect- ive, but is liable to great objection. The taxing power is odious under any circumstances ; it would be doubly so when called into exercise with an over- flowing treasury ; and still more so, with the necessity of organizing an expen- sive body of officers to collect a single tax, and that of an inconsiderable amount. But there is another, and of itself a decisive objection. It would be unconstitutional — palpably and dangerously so. All political powers, as I sta- led on another occasion, are trust powers, and limited in their exercise by the subject and object of the grant. The tax power was granted to raise revenue for the sole purpose of supplying the necessary means of carrj'ing on the oper- ations of the government. To pervert this power from the object thus intend- ed by the Constitution, to that of suppressing the circulation of bank-notes, would be to convert it from a revenue into a penal power — a power in its nature and object essentially different from that intended to be granted in the Consti- tution ; and a power which in its full extension, if once admitted, would be suf- ficient of itself to give an entire control to this government over the property and the pursuits of the community, and thus concentrate and consolidate in it the entire power of the system. Rejecting, then, the taxing power, there remains two obvious and direct means in possession of the government, which may be brought into action to effect the object intended, but neither of which, either separately or jointly, is m sumcieni emcacy, aowever inaispensaoie mey may oe as a pan ot an etti- cient system of measures, to correct the present, or repress the growing disor- ders of the currency ; I mean that provision in the Constitution which empow- ers Congress to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and the power of prohibiting anything but the legal currency to be received, either in whole or in part, in the dues of the government. The mere power of coining , and regulating the value of coins, of itself, and unsustained by any other meas- 1 ure, can exercise but a limited control over the actual currency of the country, and is inadequate to check excess or correct disorder, as is demonstrated by the present diseased state of the currency. Congress has had, from the beginninor, iaws upon the statute-books to regulate the value of coins ; and at an early pe- riod of the government the mint was erected, and has been in active operation ever since ; and yet, of the immense amount which has been coined, a small res- idue only remains in the country, the great body having been expelled under the banking system. To give efficiency to this power, then, some other must be combined with it. The most immediate and obvious is that which has been suggested — of excluding all but specie in the receipts of the government. This measure would be eflectual to a certain extent ; but with a declining income, which must take place under the operation of the act of the last session, to ad- just the tariff, and which must greatly reduce the revenue (a point of the ut- most importance to the reformation and regeneration of our institutions), the effi- cacy of the measure must be correspondingly diminished. From the nature of things, it cannot greatly exceed the average of the government deposites, which I hope will, before many years, be reduced to the smallest possible amount, so as to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the shameful and dangerous state of things which now exists, and which has been caused by the vast amount of the surplus revenue. But there is, in 7mj opinion, a strong ob- jection against resorting to this measure, resulting from the fact that an exclu- sive receipt of specie in the treasury would, to give it efficacy, and to prevent extensive speculation and fraud, require an entire disconnexion on the part of the government with the banking system in all its forms, and a resort to the strong box as the means of preserving and guarding its funds — a means, if prac- ticable, in the present state of things liable to the objection of being far less safe, economical, and efficient than the present. What, then, Mr. Calhoun inquired, what other means do we possess, of suffi- cient efficacy, in combination with those to which I have referred, to arrest its progress, and correct the disordered state of the currency ? This is the deeply- important question, and here some division of opinion must be expected, how- ever united we may be, as I trust we are thus far, on all other points. I intend to meet this question explicitly and directly, without reservation or concealment. After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none : I can conjecture no means of extricating the country from the present danger, and to arrest its far- ther increase, but a Bank — the agency of which, in some form, or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought into the present dis- tressed state of currency by banks, and must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word, use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may be necessary to restore a safe and stable currency — just as we apply snow to a frozen limb in order to restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to sup- press the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a part of their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution — a greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of the communi- ty, than would the conquest of the country by a savage enemy. What, then, must be done ? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually grow up un- nBum der, and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect, the beantifiil process which we ' sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic body gradually superseded by the healing process of nature. How is this to be effected 1 How is a bank to be used as the means of cor- rectintr the excess of the banking system ? and Avhat bank is to be selected as the af^ent to eifect this salutary change ? I know, said ]Mr. C, that a diversity of opmion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those who ao-ree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree on the necessity of usin""- some bank as the means of effecting the object intended : one prefer- ring a simple recharter of the existing Bank, another the charter of a new Bank of the United States ; a third, a new Bank ingrafted upon the old ; and a fourth, the use of the state banks as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C, to leave all these as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared with each other, calmly and dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling ; and that to be selected which, on the Avhole, shall appear to be best, the most safe, the most efficient, the most prompt in application, and the least liable to consthutional objections. It would, however, be wanting in candour on my part not to de- clare that my impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the case, to combine the greatest advantages, and to be liable to the fewest objections ; but this im- pression is not so firmly fixed as to be inconsistent Avith a calm review of the whole ground, or to prevent my yielding to the convictron of reason, should the result of such review prove that any other is preferable. Among its pecrdiar recommendations may be ranked the consideration that, while it would afford the means of a prompt and effectual application for mitigating and finally removing the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open to the whole community a fair opportunity of participation in the advantages of the institution, be they what they may. Let us, then, suppose (in order to illustrate, and not to indicate a preference) that the present Bank be selected as the agfent to effect the intended object. What provisions will be necessary ? I will suggest those that have occurred to me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflections of those much more familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of course, are more competent to form a correct judgment of their practical effect. Let, then, the Bank charter be renewed for twelve years after the expiration of the present term, with such modifications and limitations as may be judged proper ; and that after that period it shall issue no notes imder ten dollars — that government shall not receive in its dues any sum less tban ten dollars, except in the legal coins of the United States ; that it shall not receive in its dues the notes of any bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dollars ; and that the United States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposite, the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in the dues of the govern- ment, nor the notes of any bank which may receive the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable by the government. At the expiration of s-ix years from the commencement of the renewed charter, let the Bank be prohibited from is- suing any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum imder that amount be re- ceived in dues of the government, except in specie ; and let the value of gold be raised at least equal to that of silver, to take effect immediately ,- so that the country may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding bank-notes. It is unnecessary for me to state, that at present the standard value of gold is less than that of silver ; the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold entire- ly from circulation, and to deprive us of a coin so well calcvdated for the circulation of a country so great in extent, and having so vast an intercourse, commercial, social, and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an addition- al recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late, become an impor- lina, and Georgia — to the industry of which the measure proposed would give a strong impulse, and which, in turn, would greatly increase the quantity pro- duced. Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members of this body far more competent to judge of their practical operation than myself; and I as my object is simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of others ' who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present enter into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of determining whether they are fully adequate to effect the object in view or not. There are, doubtless, others of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to the ex- perienced, which I would freely embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and most efficient. And it may be hoped, that if, on experience, it should be found that neither these provisions, nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed, the co-operation of the states may be afforded, at least to the extent of suppressing the circula- tion of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under their authority. I omitted, in the proper place, to state my reason for suggesting twelve years as the term for the renewal of the charter of the Bank. It appears to me that it is long enough to permit the agitation and distraction which now disturbs the country to subside, while it is sufficiently short to enable us to avail ourselves of the full benefit of the light of experience, which may be expected to be de- rived from the operation of the system under its new provisions. But there is another reason which appears to me to be entitled to great weight. The char- ter of the Bank of England has recently been renewed for the term of ten years, with very important changes, calculated to furnish much experience upon the nature of banking operations and currency. It is highly desirable, if the Bank charter should be renewed, or a new bank created, that we should have the full benefit of that experience before the expiration of the term, which would be effected by fixing the period I have designated. But as my object in selecting the recharter of the Bank of the United States was simply to enable me to present the suggestions I have made in the clearest form, and not advocate the recharter, I shall omit to indicate many limitations and provisions, which seem to me to be important to be considered, when the question of its perma- nent renewal is presented, should it ever be. Among others, I entirely concur in the suggestion of the senator from Georgia, of fixing the rate of interest at five per cent. — a suggestion of importance, and to which but one objection can, in my opinion, be presented — I mean the opposing interest of existing state in- stitutions, all of which discount at higher rates, and which may defeat any measure of which it constitutes a part. In addition, I will simply say that I, for one, shall feel disposed to adopt such provisions as are best calculated to secure the government from any supposed influence on the part of the Bank, or the Bank from any improper interference on the part of the government, or which may be necessary to protect the rights or interests of the states. Having now stated the measure necessary to apply the remedy, I am thus brought to the question, Can the measure succeed ? which brings up the inqui- ry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the several parties which now compose the Senate, and on which I shall next proceed to make a few remarks. First, then, can the State Rights party give it their support ? that party of which I am proud of being a member, and for which I entertain so strong an attachment — the stronger because we are few among many. In proposing this question, I am not ignorant of their long-standing constitutional objection to the Bank, on the ground that this was intended to be, as it is usually expressed, a hard-money government, whose circulating medium was intended to consist of mmaam^^^m^^mmmmmmimmmm the precious metals, and for which object the power of coining money, and regulating the value thereof, was expressly conferred by the Constitution. I know how long and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under how many difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my intention to attempt to change an opinion so firmly fixed ; but I may be permitted to make a few observations, in order to present Avhat appears to me to be the true question in reference to this constitutional point, in order that we may fully comprehend the circumstances under which we are placed in reference to it. 1 With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in conferring the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof, the Constitution in- 1 tended to limit the power strictly to coining money and regulating its value, or whether it intended to confer a more general power over the currency ; nor do I in- j tend to inquire whether the word coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be extended to other substances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the medium of the general circulation of the world. I pass these points. Whatever opinion there may be entertained in reference to them, we must all agree, as a fixed principle in our system of thinking on constitutional questions, that the power under consideration, like other powers, is a trust power ; and that, like all such powers, it must be so exercised as to effect the object of the trust as far as it may be practicable. Nor can we disagree that the object of the power was to secure to these states a safe, uniform, and stable currency. The nature of the power, the terms used to convey it, the history of the times, the necessi- ty, with the creation of a common government, of having a common and uniform circulating medium, and the power conferred to punnish those vyho, by coun- terfeiting, may attempt to debase and degrade the coins of the country, all pro- claim this to be the object. It is not my purpose to inquire whether, admitting this to be the object, Con- gress is not bound to use all the means in its power to give this safety, this sta- bility, this unifonnity to the currency, for which the power was conferred ; nor to inquire whether the states are not bound to abstain from acts, on their part, in- consistent with them ; nor to inquire whether the right of banking, on the part of a state, does not directly, and by immediate consequence, injuriously afiect the currency — whether the effect of banking is not to expel the specie currency, which, according to the assumption that this is a hard-money government, it was the object of the Constitution to furnish, in conferring the power to coin money ; or whether the effect of banking does not necessarily tend to diminish the value of a specie currency as certainly as clipping or reducing its weight would ; and whether it has not, in fact, since its introduction, reduced the val- ue of the coins one half. Nor do I intend to inquire whether Congress is not bound to abstain from all acts, on its part, calculated to affect injuriously the specie circulation, and whether the receiving anything but specie, in its dues. must not necessarily so affect it by diminishing the quantity in circulation, and depreciating the value of what remains. All these questions I leave open. I decide none of them. There is one, however, that I will decide. If Congress has a right to receive anything else than specie in its dues, they have the right to regulate its value ; and have a right, of course, to adopt all necessary and ' proper means, in the language of the Constitution, to effect the object. It mat- ters not what they receive, tobacco, or anything else, this right must attach to it. I do not assert the right of receiving, but I do hold it to be incontroverti- ble, that, if Congress were to order the dues of the government to be paid, for in- stance, in tobacco, they would have the right, nay, more, they would be bound to use all necessary and proper means to give it a uniform and stable value — ' inspections, appraisement, designation of qualities, and whatever else would be necessary to that object. So, on the same principle, if they receive bank-notes, they are equally bound to use all means necessary and proper, according to the peculiar nature of the subject, to give them unifornuty, stability, and safety. would, it is conceded, make them money, as far as the government may be concerned, and, by a necessary consequence, would make them, to a great ex- tent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive provisions in the Constitution which declare that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," which cannot be, unless that in which they are paid should also have, as nearly as practicable, a uniform value throughout the country. To effect this, if bank-notes are received, the bank- ing power is necessary and proper within the meaning of the Constitution ; and, consequently, if the government has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues, the power becomes constitutional. Here lies, said Mr. Calhoun, the real con- stitutional question : Has the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not ? The question is not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has been commonly argued ; though even in that view there would be as great a constitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other branch of the government, which should unite any association of state banks into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability to the cur- rency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act of so associa- ting or uniting them into one, by whatever name called, or by whatever depart- ment performed, would be, in fact, an act of incorporation. But, said Mr. Calhoun, my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the con- stitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitutional or not. It is, I repeat, to show where the difficulty lies : a difficulty which I have felt from the time I first came into the public service. I found then, as now, the currency of the country consisting almost entirely of bank-notes- I found the government intimately connected with the system : receiving bank-notes in its dues, and paying them away, under its appropriations, as cash. The fact was beyond my control ; it existed long before my time, and without my agency ; and I was compelled to act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the many questions which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on many of which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay less regard to the precedent than I do, acting here, in my representative and de- liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt from the beginning the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by the senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act, and which he so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Louisiana. The constitu- tionality of that act was doubted by many at the time, and, among others, by its author himself; yet he would be considered a madman who, coming into polit- ical life at this late period, would now seriously take up the question of the constitutionality of the purchase, and, coming to the conclusion that it was un- constitutional, should propose to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two flourishing states and a growing territory : nor would it be an act of much less madness thus to treat the question of the currency, and undertake to suppress at once the system of bank circulation which has been growing up from the beginning of the government, which has penetrated into and connected itself with every department of our political system, on the ground that the Constitu- tion intended a specie circulation ; or who would treat the constitutional ques- tion as one to be taken up de novo, and decided upon elementary principles, without reference to the imperious state of facts. But in raising the question whether my friends of the State Rights party can consistently vote for the measure which I have suggested, I rest not its decision on the ground that their constitutional opinion in reference to the Bank is errone- ous. I assume their opinion to be correct — I place the argument, not on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality, but on wholly different ground. I lay it down, as an incontrovertible principle, that, admitting an act to be unconstitu- tional, but of such a nature that it cannot be reversed at once, or at least without involving gross injustice to the community, we may, under such circumstances^ vote for its temporary continuance, for undoing gradually, as the only practica- ble mode of terminating it, consistently with the strictest constitutional objects. The act of the last session, adjusting the tariff, furnishes an apt illustration. All of us believed that measure to be unconstitutional and oppressive, yet we voted for it without supposing that we violated the Constitution in so doing, although it allowed upward of eight years for the termination of the system, on the ground that to reverse it at once would spread desolation and ruin over a large portion of the country. I ask the principle in that case to be applied to this. It is equally as impossible to terminate suddenly the present system of paper currency, without spreading a desolation still wider and deeper over the face of the country. If it can be reversed at all — if we can ever return to a metallic currency, it must be by gradually undoing what we hare done, and to tolerate the system while the process is going on. Thus, the measure which I have suggested proposes, for the period of twelve years, to be follow- ed up by a similar process, as far as a slow and cautious experience shall prove we may go consistently with the public interest, even to its entire reversal, if experience shall prove we may go so far, which, however, I, for one, do not anticipate ; but the effort, if it should be honestly commenced and pursued, would present a case every way parallel to the instance of the tariff to which I have already referred. I go farther, and ask the question, Can you, consistently with your obligation to the Constitution, refuse to vote for a measure, if intended, in good faith, to effect the object already stated ? Would not a refusal to vote for the only means of terminating it consistently with justice, and without involving the horror of revolution, amount in fact, and in all its practical consequences, to a vote to perpetuate a state of things which all must acknowledge to be emi- nently unconstitutional, and highly dangerous to the liberty of the country ? But I know that it will be objected that the Constitution ought to be amended, and the power conferred in express terms. I feel the full force of the objection. I hold the position to be sound, that, when a constitutional question has been agitated involving the powers of the government, which experience shall prove cannot be settled by reason, as is the case of the Bank question, those who claim the power ought to abandon it, or obtain an express grant by an amend- ment of the Constitution ; and yet, even with this impression, I would, at the present time, feel much, if not insuperable objection, to vote for an amendment, till an effort shall be fairly made, in order to ascertain to what extent the power might be dispensed with, as I have proposed. I hold it a sound principle, that no more power should be conferred upon the General Government than is indispensable ; and if experience should prove that the power of banking is indispensable, in the actual condition of the currency of this country and of the world generally, I should even then think that, what- ever power ought to be given, should be given with such restrictions and limita- tions as would limit it to the smallest amount necessary, and guard it with the utmost care against abuse. As it is, without farther experience, we are at a loss to determine how little or how much would be required to correct a dis- ease which must, if not corrected, end in convulsions and revolution. I con- sider the whole subject of banking and credit as undergoing at this time, throughout the civilized world, a progressive change, of which I think I per- ceive many indications. Among the changes in progression, it appears to me there is a strong tendency in the banking system to resolve itself into two parts — one becoming a bank of circulation and exchange, for the purpose of regulating and equalizing the circulating medium, and the other assuming more the character of private banking ; of which separation there are indica- tions in the tendency of the English system, particularly perceptible in the late modification of the charter of the Bank of England. In the mean time, it would be wise in us to avail ourselves of the experience of the next few years befora seems to me, it would be advisable to pm'sue, would be the same, whether the power be expressly conferred or not. I next address myself to the members of the opposition, who principally r^ep- resent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the country, where the banking system has been the farthest extended, and where a larger portion of the property exists in the shape of credit than in any. other section, and to whom a sound and stable currency is most necessary, and the opposite most dangerous. You have no constitutional objection : to you it is a mere question of expediency. Viewed in this light, can you vote for the measure suggested ? A measure designed to arrest the approach of events which, I have demonstra- ted, must, if not arrested, create convulsions and revolutions ; and to correct a disease which must, if not corrected, subject the currency to continued ao-ita- tions and fluctuations ; and, in order to give that permanence, stability, and uni- formity, which is so essential to your safety and prosperity. To efiect this may require some diminution of the profits of banking, some temporary sacri- fice of interest ; but if such should be the fact, it will be compensated more than a hundred fold by increased security and durable prosperity. If the sys- tem must advance in the present course without a check, and if explosion must follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater — should the system quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will ingulf your institutions and your prosperity. Can the friends of the administration vote for this measure ? If I understand their views, as expressed by the senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Ben- ton), and the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), and other distinguished members of the party, and the views of the President as expressed in reported conversations, I see not how they can reject it. They profess to be the advo- cates of a metallic currency. I propose to restore it by the most effectual measures that can be devised ; gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience may show that it can be done consistently with a due regard to the public interest. Farther no one can desire to go. If the means I propose are not the best and most effectual, let better and more effectual be devised. If the process which I propose be too slow or too fast, let it be accelerated or retarded. Permit me to add to these views what, it appears to me, those whom I address ought to feel with deep and solemn obligation of duty. They are the advocates and the supporters of the administration. It is now conceded, almost universally, that a rash and precipitate act of the executive, to speak in the mildest terms, has plunged this country into deep and almost universal distress. You are the supporters of that measure — you personally incur the responsibility by that support. How are its consequences to terminate ? Do you see the end ? Can things remain as they are, with the currency and the treasury of the country under the ex- clusive control of the executive ? And by what scheme, what device, do you propose to extricate the country and the Constitution from their pres'ent dan- gers ? I have now said what I intended. I have pointed out, without reserve, what I beheve in my conscience to be for the public interest. May what I have said be received as favourably as is the sincerity with which it has been uttered. In conclusion, I have but to add, that, if what I have said shall in any degree con- tribute to the adjustment of this question, which I believe cannot be left open without imminent danger, I shall rejoice ; but if not, I shall at least have the consolation of having discharged my duty. U mmams^m IX. SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 9, 1834, ON • THE BILL TO REPEAL THE FORCE ACT. I HAVE, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a deep conviction that the act which it proposes to repeal is, in its tendency, subversive of our political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country j which I trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate, should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and favourable hear- ing. In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my intention to avail my- self of the objections to the details of the act, as repugnant as many of them are to the principles of our government. In illustration of the truth of this assertion, I might select that provision which vests in the Pres- ident, in certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force of the country, civil, military, and naval, with the implied power of pledging the public faith for whatever expenditure he may choose to incur in its application. And, to prove how dangerous it is to vest such extraordi- nary powers in the executive, I might avail myself of the experience which we have had in the last few months of the aspiring character of that de- partment of the government, and which has furnished conclusive evidence of the danger of vesting in it even a very limited discretion. It is not for me to judge of the propriety of the course which the members of this body may think proper to pursue in reference to the question under con- sideration ; but I must say that I am at a loss to understand how any one, who regards as I do the acts to which I have referred, as palpable usur- pations of power, and as indicating on the part of the executive a danger- ous spirit of aggrandizement, can vote against the bill under considera- tion, and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President the extraor- dinary and dangerous power in question. But it may be said that the provision of the act which confers this pow- er will expire, by its own limitation, at the termination of the present session. It is true it will then cease to be law ; but it is no less true that the precedent, unless the act be expunged from the statute-book, will live forever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be quoted as an au- thority to confer on the chief magistrate similar, or even more dangerous powers, if more dangerous can be devised. We live in an eventful period> and, among other things, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons on the danger of precedents. To thein immediately we owe the act which has caused the present calamitous and dangerous condition of the coun- try ; which has been defended almost solely on the ground of precedents — precedents almost unnoticed at the time ; but had they not existed, or had they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of the country would this day be far different from what it is. With this knowl- edge of the facts, we must see that a bad precedent is as dangerous as the bad measure itself; and in some respects more so, as it may give rise to acts far worse than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In this view of the subject, to refuse to vote against the repeal of the act, and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or more dangerous powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as to vote for an act to vest per- manently in the President the power in question. But I pass over this and other objections to the details not much less formidable. I take a higher stand against the act : I object to the princi- ple in which it originated, putting the details aside, on the ground, as I in their tendency, to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunate- ly, we are not left to conjecture or inference as to what these principles are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere, in the debates of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests — the assumption on which only it could be supported — was, that this government had the final and conclusive right, in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its powers ; and that, to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the means of the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against individ- uals, but against the states themselves, and all acting under their author- ity, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity. If farther evidence be required as to the nature and character of the act, it will be found in the history of the events in which it took its ori- gin. It originated, as we all know, in a controversy between this govern- ment and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which in- volved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not intend to give the history of this controversy ; it is sufficient for my pur- pose to say that the state, in maintenance of what she believed to be her unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground : she placed herself on her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this confederacy, and made her opposition to the encroachment on her rights through a conven- tion of the people, the only organ by which, according to our conception, the sovereign will of a state can be immediately and directly pronounced. This government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the state, as- sumed the right to trample upon the authority of the convention, and to look beyond the state to the individuals who compose it : not as form- ing a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals, without political character or authority ; and thus asserted in the strongest manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of over- looking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the state itself, and of recognising, in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no other authority whatever in the system but its own. Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act, which assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and character of our political institutions'? It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question, to renew the debate of the last session. But, in declining to renew that discussion, I wish to be directly understood that I do so exclusively on the ground that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently ad- vanced ; and not on the ground that there is the least abatement of con- fidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertain- ed ; and, without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this dis- cussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate tkem against whatever assaults maybe made upon them, come from what quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last session on the elementary principles of our government, which were then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest and most common-sense view of our political institutions, regarding them merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order to ascertain the parts of which they are composed, and the relations which they bear to each other. Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with the number and complexity of the parts — with the division, classification, ^^^■■IHHHiHiHiB^^lHHHMHai ar.Q organizaiion wiucu peivuuc cvci^ pan ui mc o^oicm. ±t i.>, m luti, a system of governments ; and these, in turn, are a system of departments — a system in which government bears the same relation to government, in reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to each particular government. As each government is made up of the le- gislative, executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so the system is made up of this government, and the state governments, in like manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which consti- tute the respective governments are divided and organized into depart- ments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers are classed into two distinct divisions : the one containing powers local and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the states require to be exercised by each state through a separate government ; the other containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which can be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common govern- ment. The former of these divisions constitutes what, in our system, are known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each state through its own separate government. The latter are known as the delegated powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the several states. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legisla- tive, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect, constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, and is without example in ancient or modern times ; and may be regarded as the fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting its great conservative principle. If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division between the power of the people and that of the government — between that inherent, primitive, creative power which resides exclusively in the people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power or trust conferred upon the government to effect the object of their cre- ation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important dicision. The people, instead of being united in one general community, are divided into twenty-four states, each forming a distinct sovereign com- munity, and in which, separately, the whole power of the system ulti- mately resides. If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known un- der the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is an- nounced, and by which governments are formed and organized. If we trace historically the exertion of this power in the formation of the gov- ernments constituting our system, we shall find that, originally, on the separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each state for itself, through its own convention, formed separate constitu- tions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the regulation of which the states had a common interest. But this confed- eracy, proving incompetent for its object, was superseded by the present Constitution, which essentially changed the character of the system. If we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of the adoption of original constitutions of the several states, we shall find them precisely the same. In both, each state adopted the Constitution through its own convention, by its separate act, each for itself, and is only bound in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the adoption of any other state. The only point in which they can be dis- tinguished is the mutual compact, in which each state stipulated with the stitution is, in fact, the Constitution of each state. In Virginia, for in stance, it is the Constitution of Virginia ; and so, too, this government, and the laws which it enacts, are, within the limits of the state, the gov- ernment and the laws of the state. It is, in fact, the Constitution and o-ov- ernment of the whole, because it is the Constitution and government of each part ; and not the Constitution and government of the parts because ' it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts, and ends with ' the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the Avhole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each state has two distinct Constitutions and governments — a separate Consti- tution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in which each has a peculiar interest j and a general one to regulate the inter- ' ests common to all, and binding by a common compact the whole into one community, in which the separate and independent existence of each state as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of being fused into a common mass. ' Such is our system : such are its parts, and such their relation to each other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted any that is essential which I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the whole, we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by which all are blended into one, than we are by the number and complex, ity of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect, ancient or mod- ern, to be compared with it ; and can compare it to nothing but that sub- lime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to which it bears in many particulars so striking a resemblance. In this sys- tem, this government, as we have seen, constitutes a part — a prominent, but a subordinate part, with defined, limited, and restricted powers. I now repeat the question. Is the act which assumes for this government the right to interpret, in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to enforce its interpretation against all other authority, consistent with our institutions % To state the question is to answer it. We mio-ht with equal propriety ask whether a government of unlimited poAver is consist- ent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I say unlimited, for I would hold his understanding in low estimation who can make, practical- ly, any distinction between a government of unlimited powers, and one which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it pleases ; who does not see that, to divide power, and to give one of the parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the right "? It would be no less absurd, than for one in private life to divide his property with another, and vest in that other the absolute and uncon- ditional right to determine the extent of his share ; which would be, in fact, to give him the whole. Nor could I think much more highly of the understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right, on the part of this government, of determining the extent of its powers, ne- cessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers ; and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at that fundamental distribution of power which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable con- sequence, destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitu- tional laws, making the latter to the full as obligatory as the former ; of Avhich we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repeal- ed was before the Senate. It is well known that the power in controver- sy between this government and the State of South Carolina had been pronounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of the . Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body ; and yet IbS SPEECHES VF JOHN C. CALHOUN. there were instances, however extraordinary it may appear, of members of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconsti- tutional, and that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the power which the act assumed for this government, and illustrates, in the strongest manner imaginable, the truth of what I have advanced. But to proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to its powers, not only de- stroys, as I have stated, all distinction between constitutional and uncon- stitutional acts, but merges in this government the very existence of the separate governments of the states, by reducing them from that independ- ent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the system, to mere subordinate and dependant bodies, holding their power and existence at the mercy of this government. It stops not here — it an- nihilates the states themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling upon the authority of a Convention of the people of the states, the only organ through which the sovereignty of the states can exert itself, and to look beyond the states to the individuals who compose them, and to treat them as entirely destitute of all political character or power, is, in fact, to annihilate the states, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their powers, to this government. If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that once beautiful system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts blended into one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change ! All have disappeared — gone — absorbed — concentrated and consolidated in this government, which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the sys- tem, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic majority. Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused so complete a revolution — which has entirely subverted our political sys- tem, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place one in every respect so different — must not, in its consequences, prove fa- tal to the liberty and the happiness of these states ] Can it be necessary for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise, or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country 1 Need I show that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country of such vast extent, that should at once possess sufficient power to hold the whole together, without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty 1 There never existed an example before of a free community spreading over such an extent of territory ; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers, at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be. Yet this difficult problem was solved — successfully solved, by the wise and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No : it was above un- aided human wisdom — above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances, co-operating and leading the way to its formation ; directed by that kind Providence which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favour. To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insu- perable obstacle which it presents, required that peculiar division, distribu- tion, and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably distinguish our system, and which serve as so many breakwaters to ar- rest the angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition, and which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse, would be re- sistless. Of this partition and breaking up of power into separate parts, the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated of the states are organized, as the great and primary departments of the system. It is this important division which mainly gives that expansive character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capacity of beino- spread over the vast extent of our country without exposing us on the one side to the danger of disunion, or on the other to the loss of lib- erty. Without this happy device, the people of these states, after having achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve them- selves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their united wisdom and valour in the war of the Revolution, or have submitted quietly to the yoke of despotic power as the only alternative. In the place of this hdmirably-coritrived system, the act proposed to be repealed has erected one gl-eat consolidated government. Can it be ne- cessary for me to show what must be the inevitable consequences '? Need I prove that all consolidated governments— governments in which a sin- gle power predominates (for such is their essence) — are necessarily despot- ic, whether that po-wer be wielded by the will of one man, or that of an absolute and unchecked majority ] Need I demonstrate that it is, on the contrary, the very essence of liberty that the power should be so divided, distributed, and. organized, that one interest may check the other, so as to prevent the excessive action of the separate interests of the communi- ty against each other ; on the principle that organized power can only be checked by orgattized power V The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the ti'm-e of the formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and foretold what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers of. the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted, fore- told, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we have expe- rienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of the consolida- tinor tendency of the government ; and unless that tendency be arrested .■ — unless we reverse our steps, all that has been foretold will certainly befall us^^even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath — military des- potism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced that remarkable -decay of public virtue ; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviendy ; that decline of patriotism ; that increase of faction ; that tendency to an- archy ; and, finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one man which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should there be anyone seeing and acknowledging all these morbid and dangerous symptoms, but should doubt whether the disease is to be traced to the cause which I have assigned, I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed/? There is no event — no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physi- cal — without an adequate cause. I would ask him, Does he attribute it to the people 1 to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-gov- ernment % If the true cause may be traced to them, very inelancholy would be our situation ; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such be the fact, that out people are, indeed, incapable of self-government, I know of no people upon earth with whom we rhight not desire to change condition. When the day comes when this people shall be compelled to surrender self-government, a people so spirited and so long accustomed to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or countfy ; and, until compelled by irresistible evidence, so- fearful a cause cannot be ad- mitted. Can it be attributed to the nature of out system of government 1 Shall "We pronounce it radically defective^ and incapable of effecting the ol^ects be, in fact, not much less calamitous than if attributable to the people. To what other system could we resort 1 To a confederation 1 That has already- been tried, and has proved utterly inadequate. To consolidation 1 Rea- son and experience (as far as we have had experience) proclaim it to be the worst passible form. But if the cause be not in the people or the system, to what can it be attributed but to some misapprehension of the nature and character of our inst " "ions, and consequent misdirection of their powers or functions 1 And u , to what other misapprehension or misdirection, but that which directed our system towards consolidation, and consummated its movement in that direction in the act proposed to be repealed 1 That such is the fact — that this is the true explanation of all the symptoms of decay and corruption which I have enumerated — is, in reality, our only consolation ; furnishes the only hope that can be ra- tionally entertained of extricating- ourselves from our present calamity, and of averting the still greater that are impending. I know that there are those who take a different, but, in my opinion, a very superficial view of the cause of our difficulties. They attribute it exclusively to those who are in power, and see in the misconduct of Gen- eral Jackson the cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my full share of responsibility in elevating him to power, and there once existed between us friendly relations, personal and political, and I would rejoice had he so continued to conduct himself as to advance the interests of the country, and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have effected much good. He came into office under circumstances, and had a weight of popularity which placed much in his power, for good or for evil ; but either from a want of a just comprehension of the duties attached to the situation in which he is placed, or an indisposition to discharge them, or the improper influence and control of those who, unfortunately for the country and for himself, have acquired, through flattery and subserviency, an ascendency over him, he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and realized the predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs. How happened it that he who has proved himself so illy qualified to fill the high station that he occupies, was elected by the people 1 If it be attrib- uted to a misapprehension of his qualifications, or to an undue gratitude for distinguished military services, which at times leads astray the most intelligent and virtuous people in the selection of rulers — how shall we explain his re-election, after he had actually proved himself so incompe- tent ; after he had violated every pledge which he had made previous to election ; after he had disregarded the principles on which he had permit- ted his friends and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the domestic inter- course and relations of society 1 Shall we say that the feelings of grat- itude for military services outweighed all this 1 or that the people, with all this experience, were incapable of forming a correct opinion of his con- duct or character, or of understanding the tendency of the measures of his administration 1 To assert this would be neither more nor less than to assert that they have neither the intelligence nor the virtue for self- government ; as the very criterion by which their capacity in that respect is tested, is their ability duly to appreciate the character and conduct of public rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures ; and to ad- mit their incapacity in that respect would, in fact, bring- us back to the people as the cause. To understand truly how the distinguished individual now at the head of the nation was elevated to this exalted station, in despite of his ac- gk.liUWlCU" cu. ucicoia III otv^iai n;ouc\^io, aiiu liu»v lie iiao iciaiiit^u ills power among an intelligent and patriotic people, notwithstanding all the objections to his administration that have been stated, we must elevate our views from the individual, and his qualifications and conduct, to the working of the system itself, by which only we can come to a knowledge of the true cause of our present condition ; how we have arrived at it, and by what means we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and diffi- culties. I do not deem it r ':essary, in taking this view, to go back and trace the operation of our ^ jvernment from the commencement, or to point out the departure from its true principles from the beginning, with the evils thence resulting, however interesting and instructive the inves- tigation might be. I might show that from the first, beginning with the formation of the Constitution, there were two parties in the Convention : one in favour of a national, or, what is the same thing, a consolidated government, and the other in favour of the confederative principle ; how the latter, from being in the minority at first, gradually, and after a long struggle, gained the ascendency ; and how the fortunate result of that as- cendency terminated in the establishment of that beautiful, complex, fed- erative system of government which I have attempted to explain. I might show that the struggle between the two parties did not termi- nate with the adoption of the Constitution ; that after it went into opera- tion the national party gained the ascendency in the counsels of the na- tion ; and that the result of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the government in the direction which their principles led, and from which it never afterward recovered. I am far from attributing this to any sin- ister design. The party were not less distinguished for patriotism than for ability, and no doubt honestly intended to give the system a fair trial ; but they would have been more than men, if their attachment to a favour- ite plan had not biased their feelings and judgment. I (said Mr. C.) avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both of the great parties which divided the country in its early history. They were both eminently honest and patriotic, and the preference which each gave to its respective views resulted from a zealous attachment to the public interest. At that early period, before there was any experience as to the operation of the system, it is not surprising that one should believe that the danger was a tendency to anarchy, while the other believed it to be towards despotism, and that these different theoretical views should hon- estly have a decided influence on their public conduct. I pass over the intermediate events : the reaction against the national, or, as it was then called, federal party — the elevation of Mr. Jefferson in consequence of that reaction in 1801 — and the gradual departure (from the influence of power) of the Republican party from the principles which brought them into office. I come down at once to the year eighteen hun- dred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff was for the first time adopt- ed ; when the power to impose duties, granted for the purpose of raising revenue, was converted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and organizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and placing them under the influence of this government ; and when the principles of con- solidation gained an entire ascendency in both houses of Congress. Its first fruit was to give a sectional action to the government, and, of course, a sectional character to political parties — arraying the non-exporting states against the exporting, and the Northern against the Southern section. It is my wish to speak of the events to which I feel myself compelled to refer, in illustration of the practical operation of that consolidating tendency of the government, which was consummated by the act pro- posed to be repealed, and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils, X with the greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it is to speak of recent political events, and of the actors concerned in them ; and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid so painful a duty, if I did not believe that truth and public interest ret[uire it. Without a full under- standing of the events of this period, from '24 down to the present time, it is impossible that we can have a just knowledge of the cause of our present condition, or a clear perception of the means of remedying it. To avoid all personal feeling, I shall endeavour to recede, in imagination, a century from the present time, and from that distant position regard the events to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry by which an earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may be supposed to be ac- tuated. I feel I may be justified in speaking with the less reserve of these events, as the great question which, during the greater part of the period, so deeply agitated the country (the protective tariff), may now be consid- ered as terminated in the adjustment of the last winter, never to be re- agitated, as I trust ; and, of course, may be spoken of with the freedom of a past event. But to proceed with the narrative : the presidential contest, which was terminated the next year, placed the executive department under the con- trol of the same interest that controlled the legislative, so that all depart- ments of this government were united in favour of that great interest. The successful termination of the election in favour of the individual then elevated to the chief magistracy, and for whom 1 then and now entertain kind feelings, may be attributed in part, no doubt, to the predominance of the tariff interest, and may be considered as the first instance of the nredominance of that interest in a presidential contest. Let us pause at this point (it is an important one), in order to survey the state of public affairs at that juncture. In casting our eyes over the scene, we find the country divided into two great hostile and sectional parties — placed in conflict on a question, believed to be on both sides of vital importance, in reference to their respective interests ; and, on the side of the weaker party, believed, in addition, to involve a constitutional question of the greatest magnitude, and having a direct and important bearing on the duration of the liberty and Constitution of the country. In this conflict, we find both houses of Congress, with the chief magistrate, and, of course, the government itself, on the side of the dominant interest, and identified with it in principles and feelings. In this state of things, a great and solemn question. What ought to be done 1 was forced on the decision of the minority. Shall we acquiesce, or shall we oppose 1 and if oppose, howl To acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property and industry of an entire section of the country to an unlimited and indef- inite exaction ; as it was openly avowed that the protective system could only be perfected by being carried to the point of prohibition on all ar- ticles of which a sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the country. To submit under such circumstances would have been, accord- ing to our view of the subject, a gross dereliction both of interest and duty. It was impossible. But how could the majority be successfully opposed, possessed, as they were, of every department of the government ? How, in this state of things, could the minority effect a change in their favour through the ordinary operations of the government ? They could effect no favourable change in this or the other house — the majority in both but too faithfully represented what their constituents believed to be the interest of their section, to whom only, and not to us, they were re- sponsible. The only branch of the government, then, on which the mi- nority could act, and through which they could hope to effect a favourable change, was the executive. The President is elected by a majority of election, in proportion to their number and the unity of their voice. Here was all our hope, and to this point all our efforts to effect a change were necessarily directed 5 but even here our power of acting with effect was limited to a narrow circle. It would have been hopeless to present a can- didate openly and fully identified with our own interest. Defeat would have been the certain result, had his acknowledged qualifications for intelli- ' gence, experience, and patriotism been ever so great. We were thus I forced by inevitable consequence — neither to be avoided nor resisted — to abandon the contest, or to select a candidate who, at best, was but a choice of evils ; one whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on the subject which divided the two sections. However great the hazard, or the objections to such a selection for such an office, it must be char- ged, not to us, but to that action of the system which compelled us to make the choice— compelling us by that consolidating tendency which, had drawn under the control of this government the local and reserved powers belonging to the states separately ; the exercise of which had ne- cessarily given that direction to its action, that created and placed in con- flict the two great sectional, political parties. But it was not sufficient that the opinion of our candidate should not be fully in coincidence with our own. That alone could not be sufficient to ensure his success. It was necessary that he should have great per- sonal popularity, distinct from political 5 to be, in a word, a successful military chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and the least affected by political considerations ; and this was another fruit — a necessary fruit of consolidation. To these recommendations others must be added, in order to conciliate the feelings of the minority — that he should be identified, for instance, with them in interest, possess the same prop- erty, and pursue the same industry. These qualifications, all of which were made indispensable by the juncture, pointed clearly to one man, and but one, General Jackson. There was, however, another circumstance which gave him great prominence and strength, and which greatly con- tributed to recommend him as the opposing candidate. He had been de- feated in the presidential contest before the House of Representatives (though returned with the highest vote) under circumstances which were supposed to involve a disregard of the public voice. I do not deem it necessary to enter into an inquiry as to the principles which controlled the election, or as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many con- siderations doubtless governed, and, among others, the feelings of prom- inent individuals in reference to the candidates, and their opinion of their respective qualifications, besides the one to which I have alluded — that of giving to the dominant interest that control over the executive which they had over the legislative department. These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed distinctly to Gen- eral Jackson. He was selected as the candidate of the minority, and the canvass entered into with all that zeal which belonged to the mao-nitude of the stake, united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic pur- pose. The leading objects were to effect a great political reform, and to arrest, if possible, what we believed to be a dangerous, and felt to be an oppressive action of the government. It is true that the qualifications of the individual, thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many im- portant particulars, defective ; that he lacked experience, extensive polit- ical information, and a command of temper ; but it was believed that his firmness of purpose, and his natural sagacity, by calling to his aid the ex- perience, the talents, and patriotism of those who supported his claims, would compensate for these defects. I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this interesting and animated canvass ; but there is one circumstance attending it so strikino- so full of instruction, and so illustrative of the point under con- siderat'ion that I cannot pass it in silence. The canvass soon ran into the great and absorbing question of the day, as all ordinary diseases run into the prevailing one. Those in power sought to avail themselves of the popularity of the system with which they were identified. I speak it not in censure. It was natural, perhaps unavoidable, as connected with the morbid action of the government. That portion of our allies iden- tified with the same interest were in like manner, and from the same motive and cause, forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same interest. The result of these causes, combined with a monopolizing spirit of the protect- ive system, was the tariff of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight : that disastrous measure, which has brought so many calamities upon us, and put in peril the Union and liberty of the country. It poured millions into the treasury, beyond even the most extravagant wants of the government ; and which, on the payment of the public debt, caused that hazardous junc- ture, resuhing from a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has spread such deep corruption in every direction. This disastrous event opened our eyes (I mean myself, and those imme- diately connected with me) as to the full extent of the danger and op- pression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to effect the reform intended through the election of General Jackson. With these disclosures, it became necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more certain measure of protection. We turned to the Constitution to find this remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its pro- visions, in order to ascertain fully'the nature and character of our polit- ical system. We found a certain and effectual remedy in that great fun- damental division of the powers of the system between this government and its independent co-departments : the separate government of the states to be called into action to arrest the unconstitutional acts of this government, by the interposition of the state — the paramount source from which both governments derive their power. But in relying on this as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the presidential canvass J we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the necessary reform, and thereby supersede the necessity for calling into action the sovereign authority of the state, which we were anxious to avoid. With these views, the two were pushed with equal zeal at the same time ; which double operation commenced in the fall of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, but a few months after the passage of the Tar- iff Act of that year 5 and at the meeting of the Legislature of the State, at the same period, a paper, known as the South Carolina Exposition, was reported to that body, containing a full development, as well on the con- stitutional point, as the operation of the protective system, preparatory to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the state necessary in order to protecther rights and interests, and to stay a course of policy which we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of liberty and the Constitution. This movement on the part of the state places beyond all controversy the true character of the motives which .—«-« »»»«»»«H«U.IW»tHJIlWWtlH erable decrease of revenue, under the act of March 2d, ItiSS, known as the Compromise Law, with other preceding acts, in consequence of the payment of the public debt, which would very considerably affect the comparison, if the year 1834, instead of 1833, had been selected ; and they have to express their regret that the want of full and accurate materials for the former year prevents them from furnishing a statement which, while it would show the de- crease, would also show how little the final discharge of the public debt has contributed to diminish either the public expenditure or the patronage of the executive : facts of no small moment, as connected with the subject of inquiry. The deep interest which the enlightened and patriotic took in that great event was not to indulge in the idle boast that the country was free from debt, but that it would, as they believed, be necessarily followed by the substantial bless- ing of reducing the public burdens, and, with it, the patronage of the govern- ment ; and thus, while it relieved industry, it would, at the same time, strength- en liberty against power. Thus far, these anticipations have been but very im- perfectly, if at all, realized. As great as has been the reduction of the revenue, it is still as great as it was when the debt exceeded more than $100,000,000; and, what is more to the point, what conclusively shows how much easier it is to discharge a public debt than to obtain the corresponding benefits, a proportion- ate diminution of the public expenditure, is the fact, that now, when we are free from all debt, the pubhc expenditure is as great as it was when the debt was most burdensome to the country. The only difference is, that then the money went to the public creditors, but now goes into the pockets of those who live on the government, with great addition to the patronage and influence of the ex- ecutive, but without diminution of burden to the people. Your committee will next proceed to inquire what has been the effects of this great, growing, and excessive patronage on our political condition and prospects : a question of the utmost importance in deciding on the expediency of its reduction. Has it tended to strengthen our political institutions, and to give a stronger assurance of perpetuating them, and, with them, the blessings of liberty to our posterity 1 Has it purified the public and political morals of our country, and strengthened the feeUng of patriotism ? Or, on the other hand, has it tended to sap the foundation of our institutions ; to throw a cloud of un- certainty over the future ; to degrade and corrupt the public morals ; and to substitute devotion and subserviency to power, in the place of that disinterested and noble attachment to principles and country, which are essential to the pres- ervation of free institutions 1 These are the questions to be decided ; and it is with profound regret that yoUr committee are constrained, however painful, to say that the decision admits of little doubt. They are compelled to admit the fact, that there never has been a period, from the foundation of the government, when there were such general apprehensions and doubts as to the permanency and success of our political institutions ; when the prospect of perpetuating them, and, with them, our liberty, appeared so uncertain ; when pubhc and po- litical morals were more depressed ; when attachment to country and principles were more feeble, and devotion to party and power stronger : for the truth of all which they appeal to the observation and reflections of the experienced and enlightened of all parties. If we turn our eyes to the government, we shall find that, with this increase of patronage, the entire character and structure of the government itself is undergoing a great and fearful change, which, if not arrest- ed, must, at no distant period, concentrate all its power in a single department. Your committee are aware that, in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours, a strong executive is necessary ; and, among other reasons, in order to sustain the government, by its influence, against the local feelings and interests which it must, in the execution of its duties, necessarily encoun- ter ; and it was doubtless with this view mainly that the framers of the Consti- tution vested the executive powers in a single individual, and clothed him with ■SI'EiXljt^XlCiO ihe almost entire patronage of the government. As long as the patronage of the executive is so moderate as to compel him to identify his administration with the public interest, and to hold his patronage subordinate to the principles and measures necessary to promote the common good, the executive power may be said to act within the sphere assigned to it by the Constitution, and may be considered as essential to the steady and equal operation of the government ; but when it becomes so strong as. to be capable of sustaining itself by its influ- ence alone, unconnected with any system of measures or policy, it is the cer- tain indication of the near approach of irresponsible and despotic power. When it attains that point, it will be difficult to find anywhere in our system a power sufficient to restrain its progress to despotism. The very causes which render a strong executive necessary, the great extent of country and diversity of inter- ests, will form great and almost insuperable impediments to any effectual re- sistance. Each section, as has been shown, will have its own party and its own favourites, entertaining views of principles and policy so different as to render a united effort against executive power almost impossible, while their separate and disjointed efforts must prove impotent against a power far stronger than either, taken separately ; nor can the aid of the states be successfully in- voked to arrest the progress to despotism. So far from weakening, they will add strength to executive patronage. A majority of the states, instead of oppo- sing, will be usually found acting in concert with the Federal Government, and, of course, will increase the influence of the executive : so that, to ascertain his patronage, the sum-total of the patronage of all the states, acting in conjunction with the federal executive, must be added to his. The two, as things now stand, constitute a joint force, difficult to be resisted. Against a danger so formidable, which threatens, if not arrested, and that speedily, to subvert the Constitution, there can be but one effectual remedy : a prompt and decided reduction of executive patronage ; the practicability and means of effecting which, your committee will next proceed to consider. The first, most simple, and usually the most certain mode of reducing patron, age, is to reduce the public income, the prolific source from which it almost ex- clusively flows. Experience has shown that it is next to impossible to reduce the public expenditure with an overflowing treasury ; and not much less difficult to reduce patronage without a reduction of expenditure ; or, in other words, that the most simple and eff'ectual mode of retrenching the superfluous expenditure of the government, of introducing a spirit of frugality and economy in the admin- istration of public afi'airs, of correcting the corruption and abuses of the government, and, finally, of arresting the progress of power, is to leave tht;"ioney in the pock- ets of those who made it, where all laws, human and divine, place it, and from which it cannot be removed by government itself, except for its necessary and indispensable wants, without violation of its highest trust and the most sacred principles of justice. Yet, as manifest as is this truth, such is our peculiar (it may be said extraordinary) situation, that this simple and obvious remedy to excessive patronage, the reduction of the revenue, can be applied only to a very limited extent. But before they proceed to the question of reducing the revenue, your com- mittee propose to show what will be its probable amount in future, as the laws now stand, to what limits the public expendituia may be reduced consistently with the just wants of government, and, finally, what, with such reduction, will be the probable annual surplus to the year 1842, when the highest duties will be reduced to 20 per cent, under the act of March 2, 1833 ; and when, as the act provides, the revenue is to be reduced to a sum necessary to an economical administration of the government. According to the statement from the Treasury Department, the receipts of the year 1834, from all sources, amounted to $22,584,365 ; of which, customs yield- ed $16,105,372; land, $5,020,940; the residue being made uo of bank divi- dends and incidental items ; and the question now for consideration is, What will be the probable annual receipts from all sources during the next seven years, if the income, as has just been stated, is to be reduced to the economical wants of the government ? a question which, from its nature, can only be an- swered by probable estimates and conjectures, and which, in this case, is the more difficult to be answered from a defect of data in reference to the customs, the principal source of revenue. The changes in the rates of duties have been so great latterly, and the period so recent since the laws, as they now stand, commenced operation, that it is impracticable to resort to those average results deduced from long periods, by which only the temporary changes and fluctu- ations of commerce can be detected, and its habitual current ascertained and subjected to calculation. The act of the 2d of March, 1833, which made the last change, and on the provisions of which the estimates of the income from the customs for the period in question must be based, commenced its operation on the first of January, 1834, and we, of course, have the result of but a single year. From a statement furnished by the treasury department, it seems that the domestic exports of that year amounted, in round numbers, to eighty mill- ions of dollars, and the imports, given in round numbers (as all the subsequent statements are), to $125,500,000; of which $23,000,000 were reshipped, leaving $102,500,000 for the consumption and use of the country, of which $55,000,000 were of articles free of duty, and $47,000,000 of those liable to du- ties; that the gross receipts amounted to $ 15,572,448, and the nett to $14,222,448, leaving $1,350,000 as the expense of collection ; that the reduction of one tenth of the duties above 20 per cent, ad valorem every two years, according to the pro\^sions of the act of 2d of March, 1833, amounted to $850,000. As scanty as are these data, it is believed that it may be safely anticipated that the average annual income of the period in question will be equal, at least, to the income of the last year. Instead of entering into all the details through which your committee have come to this conclusion, which would swell this re- port to an unwieldy size, they will content themselves with simply giving the results of the causes which, as far as can be foreseen, may either increase or diminish the receipts of the customs for the next seven years as compared with the past year, accompanied by a statement of their probable effects in the aggregate. It will, however, be previously necessary to inquire whether the receipts from the customs during the last year in fact equalled the amount which the commercial transactions of the year, under ordinary circumstances, ought to have produced, ^i is not possible, in such an inquiry, to overlook the very un- usual importation of the precious metals during the year, which, accordino- to the statements from the treasury department, amounted to $16,572,582, consti- tuting, to that amount, a part of the articles imported in the year free of duty. The reshipment for the same period amounted to $1,676,208, leaving in the country, of the amount imported, $14,896,374 : a sum greatly exceeding our an- nual consumption, which, in addition to the supplies from our own rain's, prob- ably falls short of $2,000,000. The excess was doubtless caused by the pecu- liar condition of the country, in reference to its currency, during the year ; and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been imported in goods of various descriptions for the usual supply of the country instead of gold and silver. Sub- tracting, then, the two millions from this sum, and the balance from the amount of the articles free of duty, which, as stated, is $55,000,000, it would reduce the annual consumption of goods free of duty, including the precious metals, to $42,103,626 ; and assuming that the proportion between goods free of duty, and those liable to duty, to be as that sum is to $47,000,000 ; and, also, that the excess of the supply c,' gold and silver imported during the year would, un- der ordinary circumstances, have returned in that proportion between the dutied and the free articles, it would add to the former $7,133,313, and, of course, in- Z ori!» o2iijn\j c i^« tributed, in no small degree, the disease which now threatens so seriously the body politic. That a just conception may be formed of this extraordinary' in- crease, they have annexed a table of expenditures from the year 1823 to 1833, deducting the payment on account of the public debt, by which it appears that, in this short period of ten years, the expenditure has risen from 89,784,000 to 822,713,000, being an increase in the latter over the former of almost $3,000,000 beyond the whole expenditure of the government in 1823, exclu- ding, as stated, the public debt ; and this, too, during a period of profound peace, when not an event had occurred calculated to warrant any unusual expenditure. Of this enormous increase the greater part occurred in the last three years, in which time the expenditure has risen nearly $9,000,000, which may well ac- count for the present dangerous symptoms. Your committee have not time to give that minute attention to the expendi- tures necessary to determine what particular items can or ought to be retrenched ; nor do they deem it important, at present, to enter into so laborious an inquiry, even if time did not prevent. It is sufficient for their purpose to as«ume that the expenditures of 1823 were, at the time, considered ample to meet all the just wants of the government ; and that, so far from being a period distinguished by parsimony, the then administration were thought by many to be iinreasonably profuse, and were, accordingly, the object of systematic attacks on account of their supposed extravagance. Assuming, then, the expenditure of $9,784,000 to have been ample at that period, the question which presents itself is. What ought it to be at present, taking into consideration the necessity of increased expenditures in consequence of increased population ? They have already shown that the government cannot bear a permanent in- crease of expenditure in proportion to the growth of the population, which may be estimated at about three per cent., without an increase of patronage which must, in its progress, inevitably prove fatal to the institutions and liberty of the country. On this principle, the expenditure, instead of increasing nearly thir- teen millions in ten years, as it has, ought to have increased much less than three, a.id ought not, in the opinion of your committee, to have exceeded two millions at the farthest. Assuming that sum as a liberal allowance, and adding it to the expenditure of 1823, we shall have the sum of $11,784,000, beyond which the present expenditure ought not to have passed, including the pensions ; and, excluding them, $10,012,412, instead of $22,713,000, the sum actually expended. But it is believed that this sum will very considerably exceed, on the basis assumed, what ought to be the average annual expenditure for the next seven years. Of the items which compose the present expenditure, that for pensions constituted, last year, the sum of $3,341,877. Considering the advanced age of the pensioners, there ought to be, according to the anrAiity tables, a decrease by deaths of fourteen per cent, annually, which, in seven years, would diminish the expenditure on pensions from the sum above mentioned to $1,040,802 annu- ally, giving an annual average deduction of $328,725, and would reduce the expenditure on pensions for the ensuing seven years to an average sum of $2,048,000. Add this sum to $10,012,412, the sum beyond which the present expenditure ought not to extend, excluding the pensions, and we shall have $12,060,412, as what the annual average expenditure for the next seven years ought to be. Take this from the sum of $21,239,911, Avhich, as has been shown, will be the probable average aimual means of the government for the same period, and it would leave $9,170,499 ; or, in round numbers, for the facility of calculation, nine millions, as the average surplus means during the period at the disposition of the government, on the supposition that the expenditures will be reduced to the economical wants of the government. Having shown what will be the probable surplus revenue should the expen- .,.t^.^.>rfTr»CTrnTrnM^UMmMMW.M cr£jj:.v^neiO \jr jxjtin \j, K^ALttiuviMn diture be reduced to its proper limits, the committee propose next to consider whether, under existing circumstances, the revenue can be reduced. The two great sources of revenue are lands and customs. The others (not including the postoffice, which is a particular fund) are of small amount. Af- ter a careful investigation, your committee are of opinion that the act of 3d of ilarch, 183.3, has reduced the duties on imports, with some exceptions, as far as is practicable, under existing circumstances, consistently with the intent and spirit of the act. The act provides, among other things, that after the 31st day of December, 1 833, in all cases where the duties shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem, one tenth part of such excess shall be reduced, and, in like manner, one tenth, part every two years, till the 3Ist of December, 1839 ; and that, on the 31st of December, 1841, one half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted ; and on the 30th of June, 1842, the residue. It also provides that, till the 30th of June, 1842, the duties imposed by the then existing law shall remain un- changed, except as provided in the sixth section. Your comnuttee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the circumstan- ces under which it passed inv^olves anything in the nature of a pledge or con- tract, which would forbid any alterations of its provissions. It is sufficient for their purpose to state the fact, that the act is the result of a compromise between great sectional interests, brought into conflict under circumstances which threat- ened the peace and safety of the country ; and that it continues to be the only ground on which the adjustment of the controversy can stand. Under these circumstances, to disregard the provisions of the act would be to open a contro- versy which your committee hope is closed forever : a controversy which, if renewed, would do more to increase the power and influence of the executive than any other event that could occur. With the impression, then, that the provisions of the act cannot be disturbed without endangering the peace of the country, and adding greatly, by its consequences, to executive patronage, your committee have limited their inquiries to the reduction of the duties on such ar- ticles as, by the provisions of the act, are subject to be reduced ; and, after a careful investigation, they are of the opinion that all the reductions which caa be effected, consistently with the spirit of the compromise, are inconsiderable ; and that, to make those that might be made, would require too much time and investigation to permit it to be done at this session, as will appear by a reference to the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, herewith annexed; but, in order that the subject may be taken up with full information at the next session, they have instructed their chairman to submit a resolution for the consideration of the Senate, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report, at the commence- ment of the next session, what duties under twenty per cent, ad valorem may, with a due regard to the manufacturing interests of the country, be repealed or reduced, with an estimate of the probable amount of the reduction. In turning from the customs to the public lands, your committee find that the difficulty of reducing the revenue from that source is not less considerable than that from the customs. They fully agree in that liberal policy in relation to the public lands that regards them as the means of settlement, as well as a source of revenue ; and that they should be disposed of, accordingly, in the manner best calculated to diff"use a flourishing and happy population over the vast regions placed under our dominion ; a policy, the wisdo'n of which is best illustrated by the wonderful success with which it has been accomplished. It is an es- sential maxim of this noble and generous policy, that the price of the public lands should be fixed so low as to be accessible to the great mass of the citi- zens, and, at the same time, so high as not to subject them to the monopoly of the great capitalists of the country. Your committee are of opinion that this happy medium is attained by the present price ; and, judging from many indica- tions of late, that no considerable reduction can be made in the price without 192 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. making them the prey of hungry and voracious speculators and monopolists, to the great injury of the honest and industrious portion of the community, as well as to the portion of the country where the lands may be situated. Be this, however, as it may, it is at least certain that the immediate effect of reduction would be to increase rather than diminish the revenue from lands, and, of course, to augment instead of reducing the public income. To this may be added another, and, under ordinary circumstances, conclusive objection against the reduction. The reduction of the price of public lands, while it would act, in effect, as a bounty to the purchasers from the government, by enabling them to acquire more land for the same sum of money, would act, at the same time, as a tax upon the entire body of landholders, who constitute the great mass of our population — a tax on them immeasurably greater than the bounty to the purchasers. The government of the United States is, in fact, the great land-dealer of the country, and, as such, has the power, by raising or reducing the price of its lands, to reduce or raise, in a greater or less degree, the value of lands everywhere, and, of course, to affect in the same degree the property of the landholders throughout the Union. To what extent any given reduction of the price of pub- lic lands would affect the price of lands generally, would be difficult, if not im- possible, to ascertain. It would be greater or less, according to the circumstan- ces. The price of land in the adjacent portion of the country, or that from which emigration principally flowed, would be reduced nearly in the same pro- portion with that of the public lands ; that is, if the price of public lands be re- duced one half, lands adjacent, or lying in the emigrating portion of the countrj-, would generally fall one half, while the more remote would be less affected, in proportion to distance and the absence of emigration. But it may be safely as- sumed, taking the whole country, that the actual fall in the value of lands gen- erally, in the hands of the holders, would greatly exceed the actual reduction of the price of public lands. To illustrate : if the price of the latter be reduced one half, which at present would be sixty-two and one half cents per acre, lands generally throughout the country would be reduced in value per acre much more than that sum ; and if the far greater quantity held by the whole body of land proprietors, compared to the quantity sold by the government, be taken into the estimate, some idea may be formed how great the aggregate loss of the pro- prietors generally would be, on any reduction of price, compared with the ag- gregate gain of the purchasers. As great, however, as it must be, none who know the public spirit and enlightened patriotism of that great and respectable portion of our citizens can doubt their cheerful acquiescence in the sacrifice, should the public interest, or the fundamental maxim which ought to govern in the disposition of the public lands, require it ; but, otherwise, it would be a plain and palpable sacrifice of one, and that the largest portion of the community, to the other, without a corresponding benefit. In presenting this view, it is not the intention of your committee to offer any opinion on the propriety of a grad- uated reduction, as a measure of general policy, in the price of such public lands as have remained long in the market unsold, and of which there is no imme- diate prospect of making sale at the present price, because of their inferior qual- ity. Their case is very distinguishable from that of the great body of the pub- lic lands ; but the immediate effects of such reduction would obviously be to raise instead of reduce the revenue, and would, of course, increase instead of diminish the difficulty under consideration. Having now shown that no other reduction of the revenue can be effected, uifider existing circumstances, than the progressive reduction already provided for by the act of March 2d, 1833, in either of the great sources of our public income, with the exception already stated, your committee will next proceed to inquire whether executive patronage can be reduced by reducing the expendi- tures of the government. The result of their investigation on this point is, that, for reasons which will hereafter be offered, a reduction of expenditure, under existing circumstances, would tend to increase instead of reducing executive patronage. But if it were otherwise, it would be found utterly impracticable, for reasons already assigned, to reduce the expenditure much below the income. Experience has abundant- ly proved that, so long as there is a large surplus in the treasury, the interests in favour of its expenditure will ever be stronger than that opposed to it ; and that no prudential consideration, arising from the necessity of accumulating funds to meet future wants, or the hazard of enlarging executive patronage, or the danger of corrupting the political and public morals of the country by use- less and profuse expenditure, or any other whatever, is sufficient to resist the temptation to expend. If one unworthy object of appropriation is defeated, an- other, with no greater claims on the public bounty or justice, will ever stand ready to urge its claims, till the frugal and patriotic are wearied out with inces- sant and useless efforts to guard the treasury. But were it practicable, with an overflowing treasury, to bring the expenditures within proper limits, such is the present condition of things, that to reduce expenditure would, as has been stated, increase the patronage of the executive, and that to an extent so great that no object of expenditure can be suggested, having a plausible claim on the justice or boiuity of the public, which would tend half so much to increase his patronage as leaving the public money unexpended, to accumulate as surplus revenue in the deposite banks. To realize the truth of this remark, it must be borne in mind that the depos- ites are under the exclusive control of the executive ; that they are deposited in banks selected by him ; that they have the free use of them without com- pensation to the public, and they may be continued or dismissed as depositories of the public funds, at the pleasure of the executive. With these facts before us, the result must be obvious. To accumulate a per- manent surplus revenue in the banks is, in fact, but to add so much additional bank capital — capital, in this case, exclusively under executive control, without check or limitation ; and, with its increasing amount, daily giving to him a greater control over the deposite banks, and, through them, over the banking institutions of the country generally : thus adding the deep and wide-spread influence of the banks to the already almost overwhelming patronage of the executive. As the expenditure cannot be reduced, the next inquiry is, whether some ob- ject of general utility, in which every portion of the country has an interest, may not be selected as a fixed and permanent object on which to expend the sur- plus revenue. Your committee admit that, if such an object of expenditure could be selected, under a well-regulated system of disbursements established by law, much of the patronage incident to the present loose and unregulated disbursements might be curtailed ; but they are at a loss to find such an object. Internal improvement approaches the nearest; but there is opposed to it, with the object in view, in- superable objections. To pass by the formidable difficulty, the long-establish- ed diversity of opinion as to its constitutionality, which divides the two great sections of the country, experience has shown that there is no expenditure so little susceptible of being regulated by law ; none calculated to excite deeper competition, or to enlist a greater number in its favour, in proportion to the amount expended ; and, of course, calculated to add more to executive patron- age. To these an additional objection of a recent origin may be added. Your committee allude, to the executive veto, as applied to internal improvements, the effect of which has been to increase very considerably his power and patronage in reference to this branch of expendituie. The executive, in his veto mes- sage, assumes the ground that internal improvements may or may not be con- stitutional, according to the nature of each particular object ; the distinction to 184 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN be determined by him in the exercise of his constitutional function of giving or withholding his approval to acts of Congress ; the practical effect of which is to draw within his control the power and influence which appertain, not only to the administration, but also to the enactment of the law ; and, of course, to in- crease in the same degree his influence and patronage in reference to internal improvements. In making these remarks, the object of your committee is not to call in ques- tion the motive of the executive, or his right to draw what distinction he may think just and right in the exercise of his veto power, or the correctness of the distinctions in reference to the particular subject under consideration ; but sim- ply to exhibit the full extent of the objections to selecting it as the subject on which to expend the surplus revenue — objections, in their nature, incapable of being wholly removed even by an amendment of the Constitution, were an amendment practicable. But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, under existing circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is. What is to be done with the sur- plus 1 which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next eight years, the sum of $9,000,000 beyond the just wants of the government : a surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means of reducing the patronage of the executive must prove ineffectual. Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difficulty of finding any sat- isfactory solution of this question ; but, believing that the very existen«;e of our institutions, and, with them, the liberty of the country, may depend on the suc- cess of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole gTound, and the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be necessary to explain their views. Amid all the difiiculties of our situation, there is one consolation — that the danger from executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue, must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left undisturbed by its provisions, the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which, at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The difiiculty, in the intermediate time, is, that the revenue cannot be brought down to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, without great danger, raised to the rev- enue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficulty to be overcome ? It might seem that the simple and natural means would be to vest the surplus in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use ; but the difficul- ty in such a course will, on examination, be found insuperable. At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if not insurmountable difiiculties. No one would think of investing the surplus in bank stock, against which there are so many, and such decisive reasons, that it is not deemed necessary to state them ; nor would the objections be less deci- sive against vesting in the stock of the states, which would create the danger- ous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock, per- fectly safe, was selected, there would still remain another that could not be sur- mounted. There cannot be found a stock with an interest in its favour suffi- ciently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus reve- nue, will ever be found in favour of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject, that, were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use, there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in fa- vour of some local or favourite scheme of expenditure, and that in favour of the ariiii^jyjacja \jr jutin o. V/Ajjnuuii. stock. Nor can it be less obrious that, in point of fact, the former would prove far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever so great, would be absorbed by appropriations instead of being vested in the stock, and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion ; which brings us back to the original inquiry, How is the surplus to be disposed of un- til the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the govern- ment ? After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected ; and that is an amendment of the Constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the surplus revenue among the states till the year 1843, when, as has been shown, the income and expenditure will be equalized. Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis- tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a surplus for the purpose o( perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ; and yet what would be, when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply-dis- ordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition : just as some potent medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis- tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease that threatens the most dangerous consequences ; and which holds out hope, not only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations will suffice to illustrate. It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the surplus would be to place the interests of the states, on all questions of expen- diture, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would ne- cessarily increase the sum to 'be distributed among the states. The effect of this would be to convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this government ; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its fiscal action, to the honest simplicity of former days. It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its conse- quent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the use- ful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence if the pro- cess were too long continued ; but in the present irregular and excessive ac- tion of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful altera- tive medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character. Aa 186 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. But it may be objected, that, though the distribution might reduce all useless expenditure, it would, at the same time, give additional power to the interest in favour of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency ; and, if the dano-er from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal; but it is confidently believed that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is as- sumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the streno-th of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, safely proposed. It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the states, an appetite in its favour which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a permanent measure. It may, indeed, tend to excite such an appetite, short as is the period proposed for its operation ; but it is obvious that this danger is far more than countervailed by the fact, that the proposed amendment to the Con- stitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach of legislative construction, and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its adoption as a permanent measure, as it cannot be conceived that three fourths of the states will ever assent to an amendment of the Constitution to authorize a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraor- dinary condition of the country like the present. Giving, however, to these, and other objections which may be urged, all the force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered, the question is not whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but whether any other less objectionable can be devised ; or, rather, whether there is any other which promises the least prospect of relief that can be applied. Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is op- posed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free states perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in fact, be said with truth, that all, or nearly all, diseases which afflict free govern- ments, may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expendi- ture ; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, and subservient corps — a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain it in every measure, whether right or wrong, and which, if the cause of the dis- ease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than the people. What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is not for your committee to say ; but when they reflect on the present symptoms, on the almost unboimded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single will ; the surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less than seven years — a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear — and when they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, that of all the states acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith ap- plied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one proposed, not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power to arrest the disease, and to restore the body politic to a sound condition ; and they have, accordingly, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution that the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year, till the 1st of January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the states and territories, including the District of Columbia ; and, for that purpose, the sum to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory, and two for the Dis- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 187 trict of Columbia ; and that there shall be allotted to each state a number of shares equal to its representation in both houses, and to the territories, inclu- ding the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to each share $30,405 ; which, multiplied by the number of senators and repre- sentatives of any state, would show the sum to which it would be entitled. The reason for selecting the ratio of distribution proposed in the amendment is too obvious to require much illustration. It is that which indicates the rela- tive political weight assigned by the Constitution to the members of the confed- eracy respectively, and, it is believed, approaches as nearly to equality as any other that can be selected. It may be objected that some states, under the distribution, may receive more, and others less than their actual contribution to the treasury, under the existing system of revenue. The truth of the objec- tion may be acknowledged, but it must also be acknowledged that the inequali- ty is at least as great under the present system of disbursement, and would be as great under any other disposition of the surphis that can be adopted. But as effectual as the distribution must be, if adopted, to retrench improper expenditure, and reduce correspondingly the patronage of the government, yet other means must be added to bring it within safe limits, and to prevent the re- currence hereafter of the danger which now threatens the institutions and the liberty of the country ; and, with this view, your committee have reported a bill to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of certain officers therein named, passed 13th May, 1820; to make it the duty of the President to lay before Congress, on the first of January next, and on the first of January every four years thereafter, the names of all defaulting officers and agents charged with the collection and disbursement of the public money, whose commissions shall be vacated from and after the date of such message ; and also to make it his duty, in all cases of nomination to fill vacancies occa- sioned by removal from office, to assign the reason for which said officer may have been removed. The provisions of this bill are the same as those contained in bill No. 2, re- ported to the Senate on the 4th of May, 1826, by a select committee appointed to " inquire into the expediency of reducing the patronage of the government of the United States," and which was accompanied by an explanatory report, to which your committee would refer the Senate ; and, in order to facilitate the reference, they have instructed their chairman to move to reprint the report for their use. But the great and alarming strides which patronage has made in the short period that has intervened since the date of the report, has demonstrated the necessity of imposing other limitations on the discretionary powers of the ex- ecutive, particularly in reference to the General Postoffice and the public funds, on which important subject the executive has an almost unlimited discretion as things now are. In a government like ours, liable to dangers so imminent from the excess and abuse of patronage, it would seem extraordinary that a department of such vast powers, with an annual income and expenditure so great, and with a host of persons in its service, extending and ramifying itself to the remotest point, and into every neighbourhood of the Union, and having a control over the cor- respondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost un- limited control of the executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is sufficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the community, and to control to a great extent public opinion. To guard against this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on executive patronage, acting through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an entire reorganization of the department is required ; but their labour, in refer- 188- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ence to this subject, has been superseded by the Comrnittee on the Postoffice, which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more mi- nutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their recommendation. But, as expensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the executive through the postoffice department, it is not much less so in reference to the public funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system spread from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the utmost West, consist- ing of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the ex- ecutive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favour, or to be withdrawn at his pleasure, it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calcu- lated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and in- fluence ; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud. The first and most decisive step against this danger is that already proposed, of distributing the surplus revenue among the states, which will prevent its growing accumulation in the banks, and, with it, the corresponding increase of executive power and influence over the banking system. In addition, your committee have reported a bill to charge the deposite banks at the rate of per cent, per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the average monthly deposites ; to prohibit transfers, except for the purpose of dis- bursements ; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure to the government an equivalent for the use of the public funds, to prevent the abuses and influence incident to transfer-warrants, and to place the deposite banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the executive. In addition to these measures, there are, doubtless, many others connected with the customs — Indian affairs, public lands, army, navy, and other branches of the administration — into which, it is feared, there have crept many abuses, which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of per- sons employed, and, with them, the executive patronage ; but to reform which would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the adminis- tration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong conviction that they \vill greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability, retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and thereby reduce the patronage of the executive to those safe and economical limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and final completion, this great work of reform. The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and dangerous, and, if it be permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party question. Every lover of his country and of its institutions, be his party what it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attend- ant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its farther progress, if not timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the danger originated, but how it is to be arrested ; not the cause, but the remedy ; not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to be rescued. SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 189 XI. A REPORT ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH RE- LATED TO THE ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT THE CIRCULATION OF INCENDIARY ABOLITION PETITIONS THROUGH THE MAIL, FEBRUARY 4, 1836. The Select Committee to vjhom was referred that portion of the President's Mes- sage tohich relates to the attempts to circulate, through the mail, inflammatory appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report : The committee fully concur with the President as to the character and ten- dency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he ex- presses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and SO repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which these unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth does not arrest them, the non-slaveholding states will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the Presi- dent as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of ar- resting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he recommends — that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe pen- alty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrain- ed to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law ; that it Avould be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Consti- tution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the domestic institutions of the slaveholding states, and, with them, their peace and security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the evil and the necessity of its suppression, it would hare been the cause of deep regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right of Congress, Avould deprive the slaveholding states of any portion of the protec- tion which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afford- ed, according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infrin- ging on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of the states on the other. The committee, with these preliminary reniarks, will now proceed to estab- lish the positions Avhich they have assumed, beginning with the first — that the passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to in- quire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to establish postoflices and postroads, or from the trust of " preserving the relation created by the Constitution between the states," as supposed by the President. However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be by which it may be at- tempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they must fall short of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the period when the Constitution was adopted, forever closed the door by which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press — a provision which inter- poses, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure rec- 190 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ommended by the President. That the true meaning of this provision may be fully comprehended, as bearing on the point under consideration, it will be ne- cessary to recur briefly to the history of the adoption of the Constitution. It is well known that great opposition was made to the adoption of the Con- stitution. It was acknowledged on all sides, at the time, that the old confeder- ation, from its weakness, had failed, and that something must be done to save the country from anarchy and convulsion ; yet, so high was the spirit of liberty — so jealous were our ancestors of that day of power, that the utmost efforts were necessary, under all the then existing pressure, to obtain the assent of the states to the ratification of the Constitution. Among the many objections to its adoption, none were more successfully urged than the absence in the instrument of those general provisions which experience had shown to be necessary to guard the outworks of liberty : such as the freedom of the press and of speech, the rights of conscience, of trial by jury, and others of like character. It was the belief of those jealous and watchful guardians of liberty, who viewed the adoption of the Constitution with so much apprehension, that all these sacred barriers, without some positive provision to protect them, would, by the power of construction, be undermined and prostrated. So strong was this apprehen- sion, that it was impossible to obtain a ratification of the instmment in many of the states without accompanying it with the recommendation to incorporate in the Constitution various articles, as amendments, intended to remove this defect, and guard against the danger apprehended, by placing these important rights beyond the possible encroachment of Congress. One of the most important of these is that which stands at the head of the list of amended articles, and which, among other things, as has been stated, prohibits the passage of any law abridg- ing the freedom of the press, and which left that important barrier against pow- er under the exclusive authority and control of the states. That it was the object of this provision to place the freedom of the press be- yond the possible interference of Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for the first time. It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison, in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799, against the alien and sedition law, and which conclusively settled the principle that Congress has no right, in any form or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of the press.* The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the se- dition act, but was the leading cause of the great political revolution which, in 1801, brought the Republican party, with Mr. Jefterson at its head, into power. With these remarks, the committee will turn to the sedition act, in order to show the identity in principle between it and the act which the message recom- mends to be passed, as far as it relates to the freedom of the press. Among its other provisions, it inflicted punishment on all persons who should publish any false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government, with intent to defame the same, or bring it into contempt or disrepute. Assuming this pro- vision to be unconstitutional, as abridging the freedom of the press, which no one now doubts, it will not be difficult to show that if, instead of inflicting pun- ishment for publishing, the act had inflicted punishment for circulating through the mail for the same offence, it would have been equally unconstitutional. The one would have abridged the freedom of the press as effectually as the other. The object of publishing is circulation ; and to prohibit circulation is, in efl'ect, to prohibit publication. They both have a common object — the communication of sentiments and opinions to the public ; and the prohibition of one may as effectually suppress such communication as the prohibition of the other ; and, of * The article is in the following words : " Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer- i cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably * to assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances." SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 191 course, would as effectually interfere with the freedom of the press, and be equally unconstitutional. But, to understand more fully the extent of the control which the right of prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post- office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided "that no stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a road parallel to it, shall carry letters." The same provision extends to packets, boats, or other vessels, on navigable waters. Like provision may be extended to newspapers and pamphlets ; which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press on all subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It would, in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties. The mandate of the government alone would be sufficient to close the door against circulation through the mail ; and thus, at its sole will and pleasure, might intercept all communica- tion between the press and the people, while it would require the intervention of courts and juries to enforce the provisions of a sedition law, which experi- ence has shown are not always passive and willing instruments in the hands of government, where the freedom of the press is concerned. From these remarks, it must be apparent that, to prohibit publication on one side, and circulation through the mail on the other, of any paper, on account of its religious, moral, or political character, rests on the same principle ; and that each is equally an abridgment of the freedom of the press, and a violation of the Constitution. It would, indeed, have been but a poor triumph for the cause of liberty, in the great contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on principles that would have left Congress free to suppress the circulation through the mail of the very publications which that odious act was intended to pro- hibit. The authors of that memorable achievement would have had but slen- der claims on the gratitude of posterity, if their victory over the encroachment of power had been left so imperfect. It will, after what has been said, require but few remarks to show that the same principle which applied to the sedition law woidd apply equally to a law punishing, by Congress, such incendiary publications as are referred to in the message, and, of course, to the passage of a law prohibiting their transmission through the mail. The principle on which the sedition act was condemned as unconstitutional was a general one, and not limited in its application to that act. It withdraws from Congress all right of interference with the press, in any form or shape whatever ; and the sedition law was put down as unconstitutional, not because it prohibited publications against the government, but because it inter- fered at all with the press. The prohibition of any publication on the ground of its being immoral, irreligious, or intended to excite rebellion or insurrection, would have been equally unconstitutional ; and, from parity of reason, the sup- pression of their circulation through the mail would be no less so. But, as conclusive as these reasons are against the right, there are others not less so, derived from the powers reserved to the states, which the committee will next proceed to consider. The message, as has been stated, recommends that Congress should pass a law to punish the transmission through the mail of incendiary publications in- tended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. It of course assumes for Congress a right to determine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insur- rection. The question, then, is. Has Congress such a right 1 A question of vital importance to the slaveholding states, as will appear in the course of the discussion. ]92 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. After examining this question with due deliberation, in all its bearings, the committee are of opinion, not only that Congress has not the right, but to admit it would be fatal to the states. Nothing is more clear than that the admission of the ri"-ht, on the part of Congress, to determine what papers are incendiary, and, as such, to prohibit their circulation through the mail, necessarily involves the ri"-ht to determine what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation. Nor is it less certain that, to admit such a right, would be virtually to clothe Congress with the power to abolish slavery, by giving it the means of breaking down all the barriers which the slaveholding states have erected for the pro- tection of their lives and property. It would give Congress, without regard to the prohibition laws of the states, the authority to open the gates to the flood of incendiary publications which are ready to break into those states, and to punish all who dare resist as criminals. Fortunately, Congress has no such right. The internal peace and security of the states are under the protection of the states themselves, to the entire exclusion of all authority and control on the part of Congress. It belongs to them, and not to Congress, to determine what is, or is not, calculated to disturb their peace and security ; and, of course, in the case under consideration, it belongs to the slaveholding states to deter- mine what is incendiary and intended to incite to insurrection, and to adopt such defensive measures as may be necessary for their security, with unUmited means of carrying them into effect, except such as may be expressly inhibited to the states by the Constitution. To establish the truth of this position, so es- sential to the safety of those states, it would seem sufficient to appeal to their constant exercise of this right at all times, without restriction or question, both before and since the adoption of the Constitution. But, on a point of so much importance, which may involve the safetj', if not the existence itself, of an en- tire section of the Union, it will be proper to trace it to its origin, in order to place it on a more immovable foundation. That the states which form our Federal Union are sovereign and independent communities, bound together by a constitutional compact, and are possessed of all the powers belonging to distinct and separate states, excepting such as are delegated to be exercised by the General Government, is assumed as unques- tionable. The compact itself expressly provides that all powers not delegated are reserved to the states and the people. To ascertain, then, whether the power in question is delegated or reserved, it is only necessary to ascertain ■whether it is to be found among the enumerated powers or not. If it be not among them, it belongs, of course, to the reseri'ed powers. On turning to the Constitution, it will be seen that, while the power of defending the country against external danger is found among the enumerated, the instrument is whol- ly silent as to the power of defending the internal peace and security of the states, and, of course, reserves to the states this important power, as it stood before the adoption of the Constitution, with no other limitation, as has been stated, except such as are expressly prescribed by the instrument itself. From what has been stated, it may be inferred that the right of a state to defend it- self against internal dangers is a part of the great, primary, and inherent right of self-defence, which, by the laws of nature, belongs to all communities ; and so jealous were the states of this essential right, without which their independ- ence could not be preserved, that it is expressly provided by the Constitution,* that the General Government shall not assist a state, even in case of domestic violence, except on the application of the authorities of the state itself: thus ex- cluding, by a necessary consequence, its interference in all other cases. Having now shown that it belongs to the slaveholding states, whose institu- tions are in danger, and not to Congress, as is supposed by the message, to de- termine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insurrection among * See 4th article, 4th eection, of the Constitution. SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 193 the slaves, it remains to inquire, in the next place, what are the corresponding duties of the General Government, and the other states, from within whose lim- its and jurisdiction their institutions are attacked : a subject intimately connect- ed with that with which the committee are immediately charged, and which, at the present juncture, ought to be fully understood by all the parties. The committee will begin with the first. It mav not be entirely useless to premise that rights and duties are recipro- cal — the existence of a right always implying a corresponding duty. If, con- sequently, the right to protect her internal peace and security belongs to a state, the General Government is bound to respect the measures adopted by her for that purpose, and to co-operate in their execution, as far as its delegated pow- ers may admit, or the measure may require. Thus, in the present case, the slaveholding states having the unquestionable right to pass all such laws as may be necessary to maintain the existing relation between master and slave in those states, their right, of course, to prohibit the circulation of any publication or any intercourse calculated to disturb or destroy that relation, is incontrovertible. In the execution of the measures which may be adopted by the states for this pur- pose, the powers of Congress over the mail, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations and between the states, may require co-operation on the part of the General Government ; and it is bound, in conformity to the principle estab- lished, to respect the laws of the state in their exercise, and so to modify its acts as not only not to violate those of the states, but, as far as practicable, to co-operate in their execution. The practice of the government has been in conformity to these views. By the act of the 28th of February, 1803, entitled "An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain states," where, by the laws of those states, their importation is prohibited, masters or captains of ships or vessels are forbidden, under severe penalty, " to import or bring, or cause to be imported or brought, any negro or mulatto, or person of colour, not being a native or citizen, or registered seaman of the United States, or seamen, natives of countries be- yond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place which shall be situated in any state which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the admission or im- portation of such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour." This provision speaks for itself, and requires no illustration. It is a case in point, and fully embraces the principle laid down. To the same effect is the act of the 25th of February, 1799, respecting quarantine and health laws, which, as belonging to the internal police of the states, stand on the same ground. The act, among other things, " directs the collectors and all other revenue officers, the masters and crews of the revenue cutters, and the military officers in command on the station, to co-operate faithfully in the execution of the quarantine and other re- strictions which the health laws of the state may establish." The principles embraced by these acts, in relation to the commercial inter- course of the country, are equally applicable to the intercourse by mail. There may, indeed, be more difficulty in co-operating with the states in the latter than in the former, but that cannot possibly affect the principle. Regarding it, then, as established both by reason and precedents, the committee, in conformity with it, have prepared a bill, and directed their chairman to report the same to the Senate, prohibiting, under the penalty of fine and dismission from office, any deputy postmaster in any state, territory, or district, from knowingly receiving and putting into the mail any letter, packet, pamphlet, paper, or pictorial repre- sentation, directed to any postoffice or person in a state, territory, or district, by the laws of which the circulation of the same is forbidden ; and also prohibit- ing, under a like penalty, any deputy postmaster in said state, territory, or dis- trict, from knowingly delivering the same, except to such persons as may be authorized to receive them by the civil authority of said state, territory, or dis- trict, Bb 194 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJN. It remains next to inquire into the duty of the states, from within whose lim- its and jurisdiction the internal peace and security of the slaveholding states are endangered. . ■ ■ % In order to comprehend more fully the nature and extent of their duty, it will be necessary to make a few remarks on the relations which exist between the states of our Federal Union, with the rights and obligations reciprocally result- ing from such relations. It has already been stated that the states which compose our Federal Union are sovereio'n and independent communities, united by a constitutional compact. Amono- its members the laws of nations are in full force and obligation, except as altered or modified by the compact ; and, of course, the states possess, with that exception, all the rights, and are subject to all the duties which separate and distinct communities possess, or to which they are subject. Among these are comprehended the obligation which all states are under to prevent their citi- zens from disturbing the peace or endangering the security of other states ; and, in case of being disturbed or endangered, the right of the latter to demand of the former to adopt such measures as will prevent their recurrence ; and, if re- fused or neglected, to resort to such measures as its protection may require. This right remains, of course, in force among the states of this Union, with such limitations as are imposed expressly by the Constitution. Within their limits, the rights of the slaveholding states are as full to demand of the states within whose limits and jurisdiction their peace is assailed, to adopt the meas- ures necessary to prevent the same, and, if refused or neglected, to resort to means to protect themselves, as if they were separate and independent commu- nities. Those states, on the other hand, are not only under all the obligations which independent communities would be to adopt such measures, but also under the obligation which the Constitution superadds, rendered more sacred, if possible, by the fact that, while the Union imposes restrictions on the right of the slave- holding states to defend themselves, it afibrds the medium through which their peace and security are assailed. It is not the intention of the committee to in- quire what those restrictions are, and what are the means which, under the Constitution, are left to the slaveholding states to protect themselves. The pe- riod has not yet come, and they trust never will, when it may be necessary to decide those questions ; but come it must, unless the states whose duty it is to suppress the danger shall see in time its magnitude, and the obligations which they are under to adopt speedy and effectual measures to arrest its farther prog- ress. That the full force of this obligation may be understood by all parties, the committee propose, in conclusion, to touch briefly on the movements of the Abolitionists, with the view of showing the dangerous consequences to which they must lead if not arrested. Their professed object is the emancipation of slaves in the Southern States, which they propose to accomplish through the agency of organized societies, spread throughout the non-slavcholding states, and a powerful press, directed mainly to excite in the other states hatred and abhorrence against the institu- tions and citizens of the slaveholding states, by addresses, lectures, and picto- rial representations, abounding in false and exaggerated statements. If the magnitude of the mischief affords, in any degree, the measure by which to judge of the criminality of a project, few have ever been devised to be com- pared with the present, whether the end be regarded, or the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. The blindness of fanaticism is proverbial. With more zeal than understanding, it constantly misconceives the nature of the object at which it aims, and towards which it rushes with headlong violence, regardless of the means by which it is to be effected. Never was its charac- ter more fully exemplified than in the present instance. Setting out with the abstract principle that slavery is an evil, the fanatical zealots come at once to SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 195 the conclusion that it is their duty to abolish it, regardless of all the disasters which must follow. Never was conclusion more false or dangerous. Admit- ting their assumption, there are innumerable things which, regarded in the ab- stract, are evils, but which it would be madness to attempt to abolish. Thus regarded, government itself is an evil, with most of its institutions intended to protect life and property, comprehending the civil as well as the criminal and military code, which are tolerated only because to abolish them would be to increase instead of diminishing the evil. The reason is equally applicable to the case under consideration : to illustrate which, a few remarks on slavery, as it actually exists in the Southern States, will be necessary. He who regards slavery in those states simply under the relation of master and slave, as important as that relation is, viewed merely as a question of prop- erty to the slaveholding section of the Union, has a very imperfect conception of the institution, and the impossibility of abolishing it without disasters unex- ampled in the history of the world. To understand its nature and importance fully, it must be borne in m.ind that slavery, as it exists in the Southern States (including under the Southern all the slaveholding States), involves not only the relation of master and slave, but also the social and political relations of two races, of nearly equal numbers, from different quarters of the globe, and the most opposite of all others in every particular that distinguishes one race of men from another. Emancipation would destroy these relations — would divest the masters of their property, and subvert the relation, social and political, that has existed between the races from almost the first settlement of the Southern States. It is not the intention of the committee to dwell on the pecuniary aspect of this vital subject : the vast amount of property involved, equal, at least, to $950,000,000, the ruin of families and individuals', the impoverishment and prostration of an entire section of the Union, and the fatal blow that would be given to the productions of the great agricultural staples, on which the com- merce, the navigation, the manufactures, and the revenue of the country almost entirely depend. As great as these disasters woidd be, they are nothing com- pared to what must follow the subversion of the existing relation between the two races, to which the committee will confine their remarks. Under this relation the two races have long lived in peace and prosperity, and, if not disturbed, would long continue so to live. While the European race has rapidly increased in wealth and numbers, and, at the same time, has main- tained an equality, at least morally and intellectually, with their brethren of the non-slaveholding states, the African race has multiplied with not less rapidity, accompanied by great improvement, physically and intellectually, and a degree of comfort w'hich the labouring class in few other countries enjoy, and con- fessedly greatly superior to what the free people of the same race possess in the non-slaveholding states. It may, indeed, be safely asserted, that there is no example in history in which a savage people, such as their ancestors were when brought into the country, have ever advanced in the same period so rap- idly in numbers and improvement. To destroy the existing relations, would be to destroy this prosperity, and to place the two races in a state of conflict, which must end in the expulsion or extirpation of one or the other. No other can be substituted compatible with their peace or security. The difficulty is in the diversity of the races. So strongly drawn is the line between the two in consequence, and so strengthen- ed by the force of habit and education, that it is impossible for them to exist to- gether in the same community, where their numbers are so nearly equal as in the slaveholding states, under any other relation than that which now exists. Social and political equality between them is impossible. No power on earth can overcome the difficulty. The causes lie too deep in the principles of our nature to be siu:mounted. But, without such equality, to change the present 196 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrPf. condition of the African race, were it possible, would be but to change the form of slavery. It would make them the slaves of the community instead of the slaves of individuals, with less responsibility and interest in their welfare on the part of the connnunity than is felt by their present masters ; while it would destroy the security and independence of the European race, if the African should be per- mitted to continue in their changed condition within the limits of those states. They would look to the other states for support and protection, and woidd be- come, virtually, their allies and dependants ; and would thus place in the hands of those states the most effectual instrument to destroy the influence and con- trol the destiny of the rest of the Union. It is against this relation between the two races that the blind and criminal zeal of the Abolitionists is directed — a relation that now preserves in quiet and security more than 6,500,000 of human beings, and which cannot be destroyed ■without destroying the peace and prosperity of nearly half the states of the Union, and involving their entire population in a deadly conflict, that must ter- minate either in the expulsion or extirpation of those who are the object of the misguided and false humanity of those who claim to be their friends. He must be blind indeed who does not perceive that the subversion of a re- lation which must be followed with such disastrous consequences, can only be effected by convulsions that would devastate the country, burst asunder the bonds of the Union, and ingulf in a sea of blood the institutions of the country. It is madness to suppose that the slaveholding states would quietly submit to be sacrificed. Every consideration — interest, duty, and humanity ; the love of country, the sense of wrong, hatred of oppressors, and treacherous and faithless confederates, and, finally, despair — would impel them to the most daring and desperate resistance in defence of property, family, country, liberty, and exist- ence. But wicked and cruel as is the end aimed at, it is fully equalled by the criminality of the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. These, as has been stated, consist in organized societies and a powerful press, directed mainly with a view to excite the bitterest animosity and hatred of the people of the non-slaveholding states against the citizens and institutions of the slave- holding states. It is easy to see to what disastrous results such means must tend. Passing over the more obvious effects, their tendency to excite to insur- rection and servile war, with all its horrors, and the necessity which such ten- dency must impose on the slaveholding states to resort to the most rigid disci- pline and severe police, to the great injury of the present condition of the slaves, there remains another threatening, incalculable mischief to the country. The inevitable tendency of the means to which the Abolitionists have resort- ed to efiect their object must, if persisted' in, end in comjiletely alienating the two great sections of the Union. The incessant action of hundreds of societies, and a vast printing establishment, throwing out daily thousands of artful and in- flammatory publications, must make, in time, a deep impression on the section of the Union where they freely circulate, and are mainly designed to hare ef- fect. The well-informed and thoughtful may hold them in contempt, but the young, the inexperienced, the ignorant, and thoughtless will receive the poison. In process of time, when the number of proselytes is sufficiently multiplied, the artful and profligate, who are ever on the watch to seize on any means, how- ever wicked and dangerous, will unite with the fanatics, and make their move- ments the basis of a powerful political party, that will seek advancement by difl'using, as widely as possible, hatred against the slaveholding states. But, as hatred begets hatred, and animosity animosity, these feelings would become reciprocal, till every vestige of attachment woifld cease to exist between the two sections ; when the Union and the Constitution, the oflspring of mutual af- fection and confidence, would forever perish. Such is the danger to which the movements of the Abolitionists expose the SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 197 country. If the force of the obligation is in proportion to the magnitude of tire dano-er, stronger cannot be imposed than is at present on the states within whose limits the danger originates, to arrest its farther progress — a duty they owe, not only to the states whose institutions are assailed, but to the Union and Constitution, as has been shown, and, it may be added, to themselves. The sober and considerate portions of citizens of the non-slaveholding states, who have a deep stake in the existing institutions of the country, would have little forecast not to see that the assaults which are now directed against the institu- tions of the Southern States may be very easily directed against those which uphold their own property and security. A very slight modification of the ar- guments used against the institutions which sustain the property and security of the South would make them equally effectual against the institutions of the North, including banking, in which so vast an amount of its property and capi- tal is invested. It would be well for those interested to reflect whether there now exists, or ever has existed, a wealthy and civilized community in which one portion did not live on the labour of another ; and whether the form in which slavery exists in the South is not but one modification of this universal condition ; and, finally, whether any other, under all the circumstances of the case, is more defensible, or stands on stronger ground of necessity. It is time to look these questions in the face. Let those who are interested remember that labour is the only source of wealth, and how small a portion of it, in all old and civilized countries, even the best governed, is left to those by whose labour wealth is created. Let them also reflect how little volition or agency the operatives in any country have in the question of its distribution — as little, with a few exceptions, as the African of the slaveholding states has in the distri- biition of the proceeds of his labour. Nor is it the less oppressive, that in the one case it is eff*ected by the stern and powerful will of the government, and iu the other by the more feeble and flexible will of a master. If one be an evil, so is the other. The only difference is the amount and mode of the exaction and distribution, and the agency by which they are effected. XII. SPEECH ON THE ABOLITION PETITIONS, MARCH 9, 1836. The question of receiving the petitions from Pennsylvania for the abo- lition of slavery in the District of Columbia being under consideration, Mr. Calhouu rose and said: If we may judge from what has been said, the mind of the Senate is fully made up on the subject of these petitions. With the exception of the two senators from V^ermont, all who have spoken have avowed their conviction, not only that they contain nothing requiring the action of the Senate, but that the petitions are highly mis- chievous, as tending to agitate and distract the country, and to endanger the Union itself. With these concessions, I may fairly ask, Why should these petitions be received 1 Why receive when we have made up our mind not to act ] Why idly waste our time and lower our dignity in the useless ceremony of receiving to reject, as is proposed, should the peti- tions be received] Why, finally, receive what all acknowledge to be highly dangerous and mischievous 1 But one reason has, or can be as- signed — that not to receive would be a violation of the right of petition, and, of course, that we are bound to receive, however objectionable and dangerous the petitions may be. If such be the fact, there is an end to the question. As great as would be the advantage to the Abolitionists if we are bound to receive, if it would be a violation of the right of petition 193 SPEECHES OF JOH\ C. CALHOl'N'. not to receive, we must acquiesce. On the other hand, if it shall be sliown, not only that we are not bound to receive, but that to receive, on the ground on which it has been placed, would sacrifice the constitutional rights of this body, would yield to the Abolitionists all they could hope at this time, and would surrender all the outworks by which the slave- holding states can defend their rights and property hers, then a unani- mous rejection of these petitions ought of right to follow. The decision, then, of the question now before the Senate is reduced to the single point. Are we bound to receive these petitions'? Or, to vary the form of the question, Would it be a violation of the right of petition not to receive them 1 When the ground was first taken that it would be a violation, I could scarcely persuade myself that those who took it were in earnest, so con- trary was it to all my conceptions of the rights of this body and the provisions of the Constitution ; but finding it so earnestly maintained, I have since carefully investigated the subject, and the result has been a confirmation of my first impression, and a conviction that the claim of right is without shadow of foundation. The question, I must say, has not been fairly met. Those opposed to the side which we support have discussed the question as if we denied the right of petition, when they could not but know that the true issue is not as to the existence of the . right, which is acknowledged by all, but its extent and limits, which not one of our opponents has so much as attempted to ascertain. What they have declined doing I undertake to perform. There must be some point, all will agree, where the right of petition ends, and that of this body begins. Where is that point 1 I have exam- ined this question carefu]lj\ and I assert boldly, without the least fear of refutation, that, stretched to the utmost, the right cannot be extended be- yond the presentation of a petition, at which point the rights of this body commence. When a petition is presented, it is before the Senate. It must then be acted on. Some disposition must be made of it before the Senate can proceed to the consideration of any other subject. This no one will deny. With the action of the Senate its rights commence : rights secured by an express provision of the Constitution, which vests each house with the right of regulating its own proceedings, that is, to deter- mine by fixed rules the order and form of its action. To extend the ri^ht of petition beyond presentation, is clearly to extend it beyond that point Avhere the action of the Senate commences, and, as such, is a manifest violation of its constitutional rights. Here, then, we have the limits be- tween the right of petition and the right of the Senate to regulate its proceedings clearly fixed, and so perfectly defined as not to admit of mis- take, and, I would add, of controversy, had it not been questioned in this discussion. If what I have asserted required confirmation, ample might be found in our rules, which imbody the deliberate sense of the Senate on this point, from the commencement of the government to this day. Among them, the Senate has prescribed that of its proceedings on the presentation of petitions. It is contained in the 24.th Rule, which I ask the secretary to read, with Mr. JefTerson's remarks in reference to it. " Before any petition or memorial addressed to the Senate shall be re- ceived and read at the table, whether the same shall be introduced by the President or a member, a brief statement of the contents of the petition or memorial shall verbally be made by the introducer." — Rule 24. Mr. Jefferson's remarks : " Regularly a motion for receiving it must be made and seconded, and a question put whether it shall he received ; but a cry from the house of ' Receive,' or even a silence, dispenses with the for- mality of the question." SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 199 Here we have a confirmation of all I have asserted. It clearly proves that, when a petition is presented, the action of the Senate commences. The first act is to receive the petition. Received by whom ] Not the secretary, but the Senate. And how can it be received by the Senate but on a motion to receive, and a vote of a m.ajority of the body 1 And Mr. Jeiierson, accordingly, tells us that, regularly, such a motion must be made and seconded. On this question, then, the right of the Senate begins, and its right is as perfect and full to receive or reject, as it is to adopt or reject any other question, in any subsequent stage of its pro- ceedings. When I add that this rule was adopted as far back as the 19th of April, 1789, at the first session of the Senate, and that it has been re- tained, without alteration, in all the subsequent changes and modifications of the rules, we have the strongest evidence of the deliberate sense of this body in reference to the point under consideration. I feel that I might here terminate the discussion. I have shown con- clusively that the right of petition cannot possibly be extended beyond presentation. At that point it is met by the rights of the Senate ; and it follows, as a necessary consequence, that, so far from being bound to re- ceive these petitions, so far would a rejection be from violating the right of petition, we are left perfectly free to reject or to receive at pleasure, and that we cannot be deprived of it without violating the rights of this body, secured by the Constitution. But, on a question of such magnitude, I feel it to be a duty to remove every difficulty ; and, that not a shadow of doubt may remain, I shall next proceed to reply to the objections our opponents have made to the grounds I have taken. At the head of these it has been urged, again and again, that petitioners have a right to be heard, and that not to receive petitions is to refuse a hearing. It is to be regretted that, throughout this discussion, those opposed to us have dealt in such vague generalities, and ventured assertions with so little attention to facts. Why have they not informed us, in the present instance, what is meant by the right to be heard, and how that right is violated by a refusal to receive 1 Had they thought proper to give us this information, it would, at least, have greatly facilitated my reply ; but as it is, I am constrained to inquire into the different senses in which the assertion may be taken, and then to show that in not one o( them is the right of petition in the slightest de- gree infringed by a refusal to receive. What, then, is meant by the assertion that these petitioners have a right to be heard? Is it meant that they have a right to appear in the Senate chamber in person to present their petition and to be heard in its defence I If this be the meaning, the dullest apprehension must see that the ques- tion on receiving has not the slightest bearing on such right. If they have the right to be heard personally at our bar, it is not the 24'th rule of our proceedings, but the 19th which violates that right. That rule ex- pressly provides that a motion to admit any person whatever within the doors of the Senate to present a petition shall be out of order, and, of course, excludes the petitioners from being heard in person. But it may be meant that petitioners have a right to have their petitions presented to the Senate and read in their hearing. If this be the meaning, the right has been enjoyed in the present instance to the fullest extent. The peti- tion was presented by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) in the usual mode, by giving a statement of its contents, and on my call was read by the secretary at his table. But one more sense can be attached to the assertion. It may be ineant that the petitioners have a right to have their petitions discussed by the Senate. If this be intended, I will venture to say that there never was an 200 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. assertion more directly in the teeth of facts than that which has been so frequently made in the course of this discussion, that, to refuse to receive the petition, is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners. Has not this ques- tion been before us for months'? Has not the petition been discussed day after day, fully and freely, in all its bearings 1 And how, with these facts before us, with the debates still ringing in our ears, any senator caa rise in his place, and gravely pronounce that to refuse to receive this pe- tition is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners, to refuse discussion in the broadest sense, is past my comprehension. Our opponents, as if in their eagerness to circumscribe the rights of the Senate, and to enlarge those of the Abolitionists (for such must be the effect of their course), have closed their senses against facts passing before their eyes ; and have en- tirely overlooked the nature of the question now before the Senate, and which they have been so long discussing. The question on receiving the petition not only admits discussion, but admits it in the most ample manner ; more so, in fact, than any other, except the final question on the rejection of the prayer of the petition, or some tantamount question. Whatever may go to show that the petition is or is not deserving the action of this body, may be freely urged for or against it, as has been done on the present occasion. In this respect there is a striking difierence between it and many of the subsequent ques- tions which may be raised after reception, and particularly the one made by the senator from Tennessee (Mr, Grundy), who now is so strenuous an advocate in favour of the right of the petitioners to be heard. He spoke with apparent complacency of his course as it respects another of these petitions. And what was that course ] He who is now so eager for discussion to give a hearing, moved to lay the petition on the table, a motion which cuts off all discussion. But it may be asked, If the question on receiving petitions admits of so wide a scope for discussion, why not receive this petition, and discuss it at some subsequent stage 1 Why not receive, in order to reject its prayer, as proposed by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), instead of rejecting the petition itself on the question of receiving, as we propose 1 What is the difference between the two 1 I do not intend at this stage to compare, or, rather, to contrast the two courses, for they admit of no comparison. My object at present is to establish, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that we are not bouiid to re- ceive these petitions ; and when that is accomplished, I will then show the disastrous consequences which must follow the reception of the peti- tion, be the after disposition what it may. In the mean time, it is suffi- cient to remark, that it is only on the question of receiving that oppo- sition can be made to the peiition itself. On all others the opposition is to its prayer. On the decision, then, of the question of receiving depends the important question of jurisdiction. To receive is to take jurisdic- tion ; to give an implied pledge to investigate and decide on the prayer, and to give the petition a place in our archives, and become responsible for its safe keeping ; and who votes for receiving this petition on the ground on which its reception is placed, votes that Congress is bound to take jurisdiction of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in the states ; gives an implied pledge to take the subject under considera- tion, and orders the petition to be placed among the public records for safe keeping. But to proceed in reply to the objections of our opponents. It is next urged that precedents are against the side we support. I meet this ob- jection with a direct denial. From the beginning of the government to the commencement of this session, there is not a single precedent that SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 201 justifies the receiving of these petitions on the ground on which their re- ception is urged. The real state of the case is, that we are not following, but making precedents. For the first time has the principle been assumed that we are bound to receive petitions ; that we have no discretion, but must take jurisdiction over them, however absurd, frivolous, mischievous, or foreign from the purpose for which the government was created. Re- ceive these petitions, and you will create a precedent which will hereaf- ter establish this monstrous principle. As yet there are none. The case relied on by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) is in no respect analoo-ous. No question, in that case, was made on the reception of the petition. The petition slipped in without taking a vote, as is daily done where the attention of the Senate is not particularly called to the subject. The question on which the discussion took place was on the reference, and not on the reception, as in this case ; but what is decisive against the precedent, and which I regret the senator (Mr. Grundy) did not state, so that it might accompany his remarks, is the fact that the petition was not for abolishing slavery. The subject was the African slave-trade ; and the petition simply prayed that Congress would inquire whether they might not adopt some measure of interdiction prior to 1808, when, by the Con- stitution, they would be authorized to suppress that trade. I ask the sec- retary to read the prayer of the petition: "But we find it indispensably incumbent on us, as a religious body, as- suredly believing that both the true temporal interests of nations and eternal well-being of individuals depend on doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly before God, the creator, preserver, and benefactor of men, thus to attempt to excite your attention to the affecting subject (slave-trade), earnestly desiring that the infinite Father of Spirits may so enrich our minds with his love and truth, and so influence your under- standing by that pure wisdom which is full of mercy and good fruits, as th-at a sincere and an impartial inquiry may take place, whether it be not an essential part of the duty of your exalted station to exert upright en- deavours, to the full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction to public righteousness, which the influence of artifice of particular per- sons, governed by the narrow, mistaken views of self-interest, has occa- sioned ; and whether, notwithstanding such seeming impediments, it be not really within your power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if ad- hered to, we cannot doubt abolition must produce the abolition of the slave-trade." Now, I ask the senator, Where is the analogy between this and the pres- ent petition, the reception of which he so strenuously urges \ He is a lawyer of long experience and of distinguished reputation, and I put the question to him. On what possible principle can a case so perfectly dis- similar justify the vote he intends to give on the present occasion! On what possible ground can the vote of Mr. Madison, to refer that petition, on which he has so much relied, justify him in receiving this X Does he not perceive, in his own example, the danger of forming precedents 1 If he may call to his aid the authority of Mr. Madison, in a case so dissim- ilar, to justify the reception of this petition, and thereby extend the juris- diction of Congress over the question of emancipation, to what purpose, hereafter, may not the example of his course on the present occasion be perverted % It is not my design to censure Mr. Madison's course, but I cannot re- frain from expressing my regret that his name is not found associated, on that occasion, with the sagacious and firm representatives from the South — Smith, Tucker, and Burke of South Carolina, James Jackson of Geor- gia, and many others, who, at that early period, foresaw the danger, Cc and met it as it ought ever to be met by those who regard the peace and security of the slaveholding states. Had he added the weight of his tal- ents and authority to theirs, a more healthy tone of sentiment than that which now, unfortunately, exists, would this day have been the conse- quence. Another case has been cited to justify the vote for reception. I refer to the petition from the Quakers in 1805, which the senator from Pennsyl- vania (Mr. Buchanan) relies on to sustain him in receiving the present pe- tition. What I have said in reply to the precedent cited by the senator from Tennessee applies equally to this. Like that, the petition prayed legislation, not on abolition of slavery, but the African slave-trade, oyer which subject Congress then in a few years would have full jurisdiction by the Constitution, and might well have their attention called to it in ad- vance. But, though their objects were the same, the manner in which the petitions were met was very dissimilar. Instead of being permitted to be received silently, like the former, this petition was met at the threshold. The question of receiving Avas made, as on the present oc- casion, and its rejection sustained by a strong Southern vote, as the jour-- iial will show. The secretary will read the journal : " Mr. Logan presented a petition, signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on be- half of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, in Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race. On the question, ' Shall this petition be received V it passed in the affirmative — yeas 19, nays 9." Among those to receive the petition there were but four from the slaveholding states, and this on a single petition praying for legislation on a subject over which Congress in so short a time would have full author- ity. What an example to us on the present occasion ! Can any man doubt, from the vote, if the Southern s^iators on that occasion had been placed in our present situation— that, had it been their lot, as it is ours, to meet that torrent of petitions which is now poured in on Congress, not from peaceable Quakers, but ferocious incendiaries — not to suppress the African slave-trade, but to abolish slavery, they would with united voice have rejected the petition with scorn and indignation! Can any one who knew him doubt that one of the senators from the South (the gallant Sum- ter), who, on that occasion, voted for receiving the petition, would have been among the first to vindicate the interests of those whom he rep- resented, had the question at that day been what it is on the present oc- casion ? W^e are next told that, instead of looking to the Constitution in order to ascertain what are the limits to the right of petition, we must push that instrument aside, and go back to Magna Charta and the Declaration of Rights for its origin and limitation. We live in strange times. It seems there are Christians now more orthodox than the Bible, and politicians whose standard is higher than the Constitution ; but I object not to tracing the right to these ancient and venerated sources; I hold in high estima- tion the institutions of our English ancestors. They grew up gradually, through many generations, by the incessant and untiring efforts of an in- telligent and brave people struggling for centuries against the power of the crown. To them we are indebted for nearly all that has been gained for liberty in modern times, excepting what we have added. But may I not ask how it has happened that our opponents, in going back to these sacred instruments, have not thought proper to cite their provisions, or to show in what manner our refusal to receive these petitions can violate ^mmm the right of petition as secured by them 1 I feel under no obligation to supply the omission — to cite what they have omitted to cite, or to prove, from the instruments themselves, that to be no violation of them which they have not proved to be a violation. It is unnecessary. The practice of Parliament is sufficient for my purpose. It proves conclusively that it is no violation of the right, as secured by those instruments, to refuse to receive petitions. To establish what this practice is, I ask the secretary to read from Hatsel, a Avork of the highest authority, the several para- graphs which are marked with a pencil, commencing at page 760, under the head of Petitions on Matter of Supply : " On the 9th of April, 1694, a petition was tendered to the house re- lating to the bill for granting to their majesties several duties upon the tonnage of ships ; and the question being put that the petition be re- ceived, it passed in the negative." " On the 28th of April, 1698, a petition was offered to the house against the bill for laying a duty upon inland pit coal ; and the question being put that the petition be received, it passed in the negative. See, also, the 29th and 30th of June, 1698, petitions relating to the duties upon Scotch linens, and upon whale fins imported. — Vid. 20th of April, 1698." " On the 5th of January, 1703, a petition of the maltsters of Nottingham being offered against the bill for continuing the duties on malt, and the question being put that the petition be brotight up, it passed in the nega- tive." " On the 21st of December, 1706, Resolved, That this house will receive no petition for any sum of money relating to public service but Avhat is recommended from the crown. Upon the 11th of June, 1713, this is de- clared to be a standing order of the house." " On the 29th of March, 1707, Resolved, That the house will not pro- ceed on any petition, motion, or bill for granting^ any money, or for re- leasing or compounding any money owing to tlie crown, but in a com- mittee of the whole house ; and this is declared to be a standing order. See, also, the 29th of November, 1710." " On the 23d of April, 1713, Resolved, That the house wall receive no petition for compounding debts to the crown, upon any branch of the rev- enue, without a certificate from the proper officer annexed, stating the debt, what prosecutions have been made for the recovery thereof, and what the petitioner and his security are able to pay." "On the 25th of March, 1715, this is declared to be a standing order. See the 2d of March, 1735, and the 9th of January, 1752, the proceedings upon petitions of this sort." " On the 8th of March, 1732, a petition being offered against a bill de- pending for securing the trade of the sugar colonies, it was refused to be brought up. A motion was then made that a committee be appointed to search precedents in relation to the receiving or not receiving petitions against the imposing of duties ; and the question being put, it passed in the negative." Nothing can be more conclusive. Not only are petitions rejected, but resolutions are passed refusing to receive entire classes of petitions, and that, too, on the subject of imposing taxes — a subject, above all others, in relation to which we would suppose the right ought to be held most sa- cred, and this within a few years after the Declaration of Rights. With these facts before us, what are we to think of the assertion of the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), who pronounced in his place, in the bold- est and most unqualified manner, that there was no deliberative body which did not act on the principle that it was bound to receive petitions 1 That a member of his long experience and caution should venture to make an assertion so unfounded, is one among the many proofs of tiie carelessness, both as to facts and argument, with which this important subject has been examined and discussed on that side. But it is not necessary to cross the Atlantic, or to go back to remote periods, to find precedents for the rejection of petitions. This body, on a memorable occasion, and after full deliberation, a short time since reject- ed a petition; and among those who voted for the rejection will be found the names (of course I exclude my own) of the most able and experienced members of the Senate. I refer to the case of resolutions in the nature of a remonstrance from the citizens of York, Pennsylvania, approving the act of the President in removing the deposites. I ask the secretary to read the journals on the occasion : " The Vice-president communicated a preamble and a series of resolu- tions adopted at a meeting of the citizens of York county, Pennsylvania, approving the act of the executive removing the public money from the Bank of the United States, and opposed to the renewal of the charter of said bank ; which having been read, Mr. Clay objected to the reception. And on the question, ' Shall they be received V it was determined in the negative — yeas 20, nays 24-. " On motion of Mr. Preston, the yeas and nays being desired by one fifth of the senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are, " Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, M'Kean, Mangum, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright. " Those who voted in the negative, are, " Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, Leigh, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rob- bins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Webster." In citing this case il^is not my intention to call in question the con- sistency of any member on this floor : it would be unworthy of the occa- sion. I doubt not the vote then given was given from a full conviction of its correctness, as it will doubtless be in the present case, on whatever side it may be found. My object is to show that the principle for which I contend, so far from being opposed, is sustained by precedents, here and elsewhere, ancient and modern. In following as I have those opposed to me, to Magna Charta and the Declaration of Rights for the origin and the limits of the right of petition, I am not disposed, with them, to set aside the Constitution. I assent to the position they assume, that the right of petition existed before the Constitution, and that it is not derived from it ; but while I look beyond that instrument for the right, I hold the Constitution, on a question as to its extent and limits, to be the highest authority. The first amended ar- ticle of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall pass no law to prevent the people from peaceably assembling and petitioning for a re- dress of grievances, was clearly intended to prescribe the limits within which the right might be exercised. It is not pretended that to refuse to receive petitions touches in the slightest degree on thgse limits. To suppose that the framers of the Constitution — no, not the framers, but those jealous patriots who were not satisfied with that instrument as it came from the hands of the framers, and who proposed this very provision to guard what they considered a sacred right, performed their task so bunglingly as to omit any essential guard, would be to do great injustice to the memory of those stern and sagacious men ; and yet this is what the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) has ventured to assert. He said that no provision was added to guard against the rejection of petitions, HIilliillfliiliilHHIBlHIUHHiHi because the obligation to receive was considered so clear that it was deemed unnecessary ; when he ought to have known that, according to the standing practice at that time, Parliament was in the constant habit, as has been shown, of refusing to receive petitions — a practice which could not have been unknown to the authors of the amendment ; and from which it may be fairly inferred that, in omitting to provide that petitions should be received, it was not intended to comprehend their reception in the right of petition. I have now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that we are not bound to receive these petitions, and that if we should reject them we would not in the slightest degree infringe the right of petition. It is now time to look to the rights of this body, and to see whether, if we should receive them, when it is acknowledged that the only reason for receiving is that we are bound to do so, we would not establish a principle which would trench deeply on the rights of the Senate. I have already shown that, where the action of the Senate commences, there also its rights to determine how and when it shall act also commences. I have also shown that the action of the Senate necessarily begins on the presentation of a petition ; that the petition is then before the body ; that the Senate can- not proceed to other business without making some disposition of it ; and that, by the 24jth rule, the first action after presentation is on a question to receive the petition. To extend the right of petition to the question bn receiving is to expunge this rule — to abolish this unquestionable right of the Senate, and that for the benefit, in this case, of the Abolitionists. Their gain would be at the loss of this body. I have not expressed my- self too strongly. Give the right of petition the extent contended for, decide that we are bound under the Constitution to receive these in- cendiary petitions, and the very motion before the Senate would be out of order. If the Constitution makes it our duty to receive, we would have no discretion left to reject, as the motion presupposes. Our rules of proceeding must accord with the Constitution. Thus, in the case of Revenue bills, which, by the Constitution, must originate in the other house, it would be out of order to introduce them here, and it has, accordingly, been so decided. For like reason, if we are bound to receive petitions, the present motion would be out of order ; and, if such be your opinion, it is your duty, as the presiding officer, to call me to order, and to arrest all farther discussion on the question of reception. Let us now turn our eyes for a moment to the nature of the right which, I fear, we are about to abandon, with the view to ascertain what must be the consequence if we should surrender it. Of all the rights belonging to a deliberative body, I know of none more universal, or indispensable to a proper performance of its functions, than the right to determine at its discretion what it shall receive, over what it shall extend its jurisdiction, and to what it shall direct its deliberation and action. It is the first and universal law of all such bodies, and extends not only to petitions, but to reports, to bills, and resolutions, varied only in the two latter in the form of the question. It may be compared to the function in the animal economy, with which all living creatures are en- dowed, of selecting through the instinct of taste what to receive or reject, and on which the preservation of their existence depends. Deprive them of this function, and the poisonous as well as the wholesome would be indifl^erently received into their system. So with deliberative bodies : deprive them of the essential and primary right to determine at their pleasure what to receive or reject, and they would become the passive receptacle, indifferently, of all that is frivolous, absurd, unconstitutional, immoral, and impious, as well as what may properly demand their de- liberation and action. Establish this monstrous, this impious principle (as it would prove to be in practice), and what must be the consequence 1 To what would we commit ourselves 1 If a petition should be presented praying the abolition of the Constitution (which we are bound by our oaths to protect), according to this abominable doctrine it must be re- ceived. So if it prayed the abolition of the Decalogue, or of the Bible itself. I go farther. If the abolition societies should be converted into a body of Atheists, and should ask the passage of a law denj'ing the ex- istence o( the Almighty Being above us, the Creator of all, accordino- to this blasphemous doctrine we would be bound to receive the petition ; to take jurisdiction of it. I ask the senators from Tennessee and Pennsyl- vania (Mr. Grundy and Mr. Buchanan), Would they vote to receive such a petition 1 I wait not an answer. They would instantly reject it with loathing. What, then, becomes of the unlimited, unqualified, and universal obligation to receive petitions, which they so strenuously maintain, and to which they are prepared to sacrifice the constitutional rights of this body 1 I shall now descend from these hypothetical cases to the particular question before the Senate. What, then, must be the consequences of receiving this petition, on the principle that we are bound to receive it, and all similar petitions whenever presented'? I have considered this question calmly in all its bearings, and do not hesitate to pronounce that to receive would be to yield to the Abolitionists all that the most sanguine could for the present hope, and to abandon all the outworks upon which we of the South rely for our defence against their attacks here. No one can believe that the fanatics, who have flooded this and the other house with their petitions, entertain the slightest hope that Con- gress would pass a law at this time to abolish slavery in this District. In- fatuated as they are, they must see that public opinion at the North is not yet prepared for so decisive a step, and that seriously to attempt it now would be fatal to their cause. What, then, do they hopel What but that Congress should take jurisdiction of the subject of abolishing slavery — should throw open to the Abolitionists the halls of legislation, and en- able them to establish a permanent position within their walls, from v/hich hereafter to carry on their operations against the institutions of the slave- holding states % If we receive this petition, all these advantages will be realized to them to the fullest extent. Permanent jurisdiction would be assumed over the subject of slavery not only in this District, but in the states themselves, whenever the Abolitionists might choose to ask Con- gress, by sending their petitions here, for the abolition of slavery in the states. We would be bound to receive such petitions, and, by receiving, Avould be fairly pledged to deliberate and decide on them. Having suc- ceeded in this point, a most favourable position would be gained. The centre of operations would be transferred from Nassau Hall to the Halls of Congress. To this common centre the incendiary publications of the Abolitionists would flow, in the form of petitions, to be received and pre- served among the public records. Here the subject of abolition would be agitated session after session, and from hence the assaults on the prop- erty and institutions of the people of the slaveholding states would be dis- seminated, in the guise of speeches, over the whole Union. Snch would be the advantages yielded to the Abolitionists. In propor- tion to their gain would be our loss. What would be yielded to them would be taken from us. Our true position — that which is indispensable to our defence here — is, that Congress has no legitimate jurisdiction over the subject of slavery either here or elsewhere. The reception of this petition surrenders this commanding position ; yields the question of ju- !■■ risaiction, so important to tne cause ot abolition, and so injurious to us j compels us to sit in silence to witness the assaults on our character and institutions, or to engage in an endless contest in their defence. Such a contest is beyond mortal endurance. We must, in the end, be humbled, degraded, broken down, and worn out. The senators from the slaveholding states, who, most unfortunatelj^, have committed themselves to vote for receiving these incendiary peti- tions, tell us, that whenever the attempt shall be made to abolish slavery, they will join with us to repel it. I doubt not the sincerity of their dec- laration. We all have a common interest, and they cannot betray ours without betraying, at the same time, their own. But I announce to them that they are now called on to redeem their pledge. The attempt is now making. The work is going on daily and hourly. The war is wao-ed, not only in the most dangerous manner, but in the only manner it'can be Avaged. Do they expect that the Abolitionists will resort to arms, and commence a crusade to liberate our slaves by force \ Is this what they mean when they speak of the attempt to abolish slavery % If so, let me tell our friends of the South who differ from me, that the war which the Abolitionists wage against us is of a very different character, and far more effective. It is a war of religious and political fanaticism, mingled, on the part of the leaders, with ambition and the love of notoriety, and waged, not against our lives, but our character. The object is to humble °and debase us in our own estimation, and that of the world in general ; to blast our reputation, while they overthrow our domestic institutions. This is the mode in which they are attempting abolition with such ample means and untiring industry ; and now is the time for all who are opposed to them to meet the attack. How can it be successfully met % This is the im- portant question. There is but one way: we must meet the enemy on the frontier — on the question of receiving ; we must secure that important pass — it is our Thermopylae. The power of resistance, by a universal law of nature, is on the exterior. Break through the shell— penetrate the crust, and there is no resistance within. In the present contest, the question on receiving constitutes our frontier. It is the first, the exterior question, that covers and protects all the others. Let it be penetrated by receiving this petitioH, and not a point of resistance can be found within, as far as this government is concerned. If we cannot maintain ourselves there, we cannot on any interior position. Of all the questions that can be raised, there is not one on which we can rally on ground more tenable for ourselves, or more untenable for our opponents, not excepting the ultimate question of abolition in the states. For our right to reject this petition is as clear and unquestionable as that Congress has no right to abolish slavery in the states. Such is the importance of taking our stand immovably on the question now before us. Such are the advantages that we of the South would sacrifice, and the Abolitionists would gain, were we to surrender that im- portant position by receiving this petition. What motives have we for making so great a sacrifice % What advantages can we hope to gain that would justify us 1 We are told of the great advantages of a strong majority. I acknowl- edge it in a good cause, and on sound principles. I feel, in the present instance, how much our cause would be strengthened by a strong and de- cided majority for the rejection of these incendiary petitions. If anything we could do here could arrest the progress of the Abolitionists, it would be such a rejection. But, as advantageous as would be a strong majority on sound principles, it is in the same degree dangerous when on tlie op- posite — when it rests on improper concessions and the surrender of prin- ciples, whicn would be the case at present. Such a majority must, in this instance, be purchased by concessions to the Abolitionists, and a surrender, on our part, that would demolish all our outworks, give up all our strong positions, and open all the passes to the free admission of our enemies. It is only on this condition that we can hope to obtain such a majority — a majoritj- which must be gathered together from all sides, and entertain- ing every variety of opinion. To rally such a majority, the senator from Pennsylvania has fallen on the device to receive this petition, and imme- diately reject it, without consideration or reflection. To my mind, the movement looks like a trick — a mere piece of artifice to juggle and de- ceive. I intend no disrespect to the senator. I doubt not his intention is good, and believe his feelings are with us ; but I must say that the course he has intimated is, in my opinion, the worst possible for the slave- holding states. It surrenders all to Abolitionists, and gives nothing in turn that would be of the least advantage to us. Let the majority for the course he indicates be ever so strong, can the senator hope that it will make any impression on the Abolitionists 1 Can he even hope to maintain his position of rejecting their petitions Avithout consideration or deliber- ation on their merits 1 Does he not see that, in assuming jurisdiction by receiving their petitions, he gives an implied pledge to inquire, to delib- erate, and decide on them 1 Experience will teach him that we must either refuse to receive, or go through. I entirely concur with the sen- ator from Vermont (Mr. Prentiss) on that point. There is no middle ground that is tenable, and, least cf ill, that proposed to be occupied by the senator from Per" ylvania, and those who act with him. In the mean time, the courr^j ::i: proposes is calculated to lull the people of the slave- holding states into a false security, under the delusive impression which it is calculated to make, that there is more strength here against the Abo- litionists than really does exist. But we are told that the right of petition is popular in the North, and that to make an issue, however true, which might bring it in question, tvould weaken our friends here, and strengthen the Abolitionists. I have no doubt of the kind feelings of our brethren from the North on this floor; but I clearly see that, while we have their feelings in our favour, their constituents, right or wrong, will have their votes, however we may be affected. But I assure our friends that we would not do anything willingly which would weaken them at home; and if we could be assured that, by yielding to their wishes the right of receiving petitions, they would be able to arrest permanently the progress of the Abolitionists, we then might be induced to yield ; but nothing short of the certainty of permanent security can induce us to yield an inch. If to maintain our rights must increase the Abolitionists, be it so. I would at no period make the least sacrifice of principle for any temporary advantage, and much less at the present. If there must be an issue, now is our time. We never can be more united or better prepared for the struggle ; and I, for one, would much rather meet the danger now than to turn it over to those who are to come after us. But, putting these views aside, it does seem to me, taking a general view of the subject, that the course intimated by the senator from Penn- sylvania is radically wrong, and must end in disappointment. The at- tempt to unite all must, as it usually does, terminate in division and dis- traction. It will divide the South on the question of receiving, and the North on that of rejecting, with a mutual weakening of both. I already see indications of division among Northern gentlemen on this floor, even in this stage of the question. A division among them would give a great impulse to the cause of abolition. Whatever position the parties may JMiiiiiiiMMiliiiiBnnmTMininTimiii \\\m ■■m take, in the event of such division, one or the other would be considered more or less favourable to the abolition cause, which could not fail to run it into the political struggles of the two great parties of the North. With these views, I hold that the only possible hope of arresting the progress of the Abolitionists in that quarter is to keep the two great parties there united against them, which would be impossible if they divide here. The course intimated by the senator from Pennsylvania will effect a division here, and, instead of uniting the North, and thereby arresting the progress of the Abolitionists, as he anticipates, will end in division and distraction, and in giving thereby a more powerful impulse to their cause. I must say, before I close my remarks in this connexion, that the members from the North, it seems to me, are not duly sensible of the deep interest which ihey have in this question, not only as affecting the Union, but as it relates immediately and directly to their particular section. As great as may be our interests, theirs are not less. If the tidecontinues to roll on its turbid waves of folly and fanaticism, it must, in the end, prostrate in the North all the institutions that uphold their peace and prosperity, and ultimately overwhelm all that is eminent, morally and intellectually. I have now concluded what I intended to say on the question immedi- ately before the Senate. If I have spoken earnestly, it is because I feel the subject to be one of the deepest interest. We are about to take the first step ; that must control all our subsequent movements. If it should be such as I fear it will, if we receive this petition, and thereby establish the principle that we are obliged to receive all such petitions ; if we shall determine to take permanent jurisdiction over the subject of abolition, whenever and in whatever ^ "nner the Abolitionists may ask, either here or in the states, I fear that the consequen-ctyn will be ultimately disastrous. Such a course would destroy the confidence -. - the people of the slave- holding states in this government. We love and cherish the Union : we remember with the kindest feelings our common origin, with pride our common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common greatness and glory that seem to await us; but origin, achievements, and anticipation of coming greatness are to us as nothing compared to this question. It is to us a vital question. It involves not only our liberty, but, what is greater (if to freemen anything can be), existence itself. The relation which now exists between the two races in the slaveholding states has existed for two centuries. It has grown with our growth, and strength- ened with our strength. It has entered into and modified all our institu- tions, civil and political. None other can be substituted. We will not, cannot permit it to be destroyed. If we were base enough to do so, we would be traitors to our section, to ourselves, our families, and to poster- ity. It is our anxious desire to protect and preserve this relation by the joint action of this government and the confederated states of the Union ; but if, instead of closing the door — if, instead of denying all jurisdiction and all interference in this question, the doors of Congress are to be thrown open ; and if we are to be exposed here, in the heart of the Union, to an endless attack on our rights, our character, and our institutions; if the other states are to stand and look on without attempting to suppress these attacks, originating Avithin their borders ; and, finally, if this is to be our fixed and permanent condition as members of this confederacy, we will then be compelled to turn our eyes on ourselves. Come what will, should it cost every drop of blood and every cent of property, we must defend ourselves ; and if compelled, we would stand justified by all laws, human and divine. If I feel alarm, it is not for ourselves, but the Union and the institu- tions of the country, to which I have ever been devotedly attached, how- D D ever calumniated and slandered. Few have made greater sacrifices to maintain them, and none is more anxious to perpetuate them to the latest generation ; but they can and ought to be perpetuated only on the con- dition that they fulfil the great objects for which they were created — the liberty and protection of these states. As for ourselves, I feel no apprehension. I know to the fullest extent the niairnitude of the danger that surrounds us, I am not disposed to under- estimat^e it. My colleague has painted it truly. But, as great as is the danger, we have nothing to fear if true to ourselves. We have many and great resources ', a numerous, intelligent, and brave population ; great and valuable staples ; ample fiscal means ; unity of feeling and interest, and an entire exemption from those dangers originating in a conflict between labour and capital, which at this time threatens so much danger to con- stitutional governments. To these may be added, that we would act un- der an imperious necessity. There would be to us but one alternative — to triumph or perish as a people. We would stand alone, compelled to defend life, character, and institutions. A necessity so stern and impe- rious would develop to the full all the great qualities of our nature, men- tal and moral, requisite for defence — intelligence, fortitude, courage, and patriotism ; and these, with our ample means, and our admirable mate- rials for the construction of durable free states, would ensure security, liberty, and renown. With these impressions, I ask neither sympathy nor compassion for the slaveholding states. We can take care of ourselves. It is not we, but the Union which is in danger. It is that which demands our care — demands that the agitation of this question shall cease here — that you shall refuse to receive these petitions, and decline all jurisdiction over the subject of abolition in every form and shape. It is only on these terms that the Union can be safe. We cannot remain here in an endless struggle in defence of our character, our property, and institutions. I shall now, in conclusion, make a single remark as to the course I shall feel myself compelled to pursue, should the Senate, by receiving this pe- tition, determine to entertain jurisdiction over the question of abolition. Thinking as I do, I can perform no act that would countenance so dan- gerous an assumption ; and, as a participation in the subsequent proceed- ings on this petition, should it unfortunately be received, might be so construed, in that event I shall feel myself constrained to decline such participation, and to leave the responsibility wholly on those who may assume it. XIII. SPEECH ON THE BILL TO PROHIBIT DEPUTY POSTMASTERS FROM RECEIV- ING AND TRANSMITTING THROUGH THE MAIL CERTAIN PAPERS THERE- IN MENTIONED, APRIL 12, 1836. I AM aware, said Mr. Calhoun, how offensive it is to speak of one's self; but as the senator from Georgia on my right (Mr. King) has thought proper to im- pute to me improper motives, I feel myself compelled, in self-defence, to state the reasons which have governed my course in reference to the subject now under consideration. The senator is greatly mistaken in supposing that I was governed by hostility to General Jackson. So far is that from being the fact, that I came here at the commencement of the session with fixed and settled principles on the subject under discussion, and which, in pursuing the course that the senator condemns, I have but attempted to carry into effect. m....w,.«»„«u,uuu,.,_ As soon as the subject of abolition began to agitate the South last summer, in consequence of the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, I saw at once that it would force itself on the notice of Congress at the present session, and that it involved questions of great delicacy and difficulty. I im- mediately turned my attention, in consequence, to the subject, and, after due re- flection, arrived at the conclusion that Congress could exercise no direct power over it ; and that, if it acted at all, the only mode in which it could act, consist- ently with the Constitution and the rights and safety of the slaveholding states, would be in the manner proposed by this bill. I also saw that there was no inconsiderable danger in the excited state of the feelings of the South ; that the power, however dangerous and unconstitutional, might be thoughtlessly yielded to Congress, knowing full well how apt the weak and timid are, in a state of excitement and alarm, to seek temporary protection in any quarter, re- gardless of after-consequences, and how ready the artful and designing ever are to seize on such occasions to extend and perpetuate their power. With these impressions I arrived here at the beginning of the session. The President's message was not calculated to remove my apprehensions. He as- sumed for Congress direct power over the subject, and that on the broadest, most unqualified, and dangerous principles. Knowing the influence of his name, by reason of his great patronage and the rigid discipline of party, with a large portion of the country, who have scarcely any other standard of Constitution, politics, and morals, I saw the full extent of the danger of having these danger- ous principles reduced to practice, and I determined at once to use CA'ery effort to prevent it. The senator from Georgia will, of course, understand that I do not include him in this subservient portion of his party. So far from it, I have always considered him as one of the most independent. It has been our for- tune to concur in opinion in relation to most of the important measures which have been agitated since he became a member of this body, two years ago, at the commencement of the session during which the deposite question was agi- tated. On that important question, if I mistake not, the senator and myself con- curred in opinion, at least as to its inexpediency, and the dangerous consequen- ces to which it would probably lead. If my memory serves me, we also agreed in opinion on the connected subject of the currency, which Avas then incident- ally discussed. We agreed, too, on the question of raising the value of gold to its present standard, and in opposition to the bill for the distribution of the proceeds of public land, introduced by the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay). In recurring to the events of that interesting session, I can remember but one important subject on which we disagreed, and that was the President's protest. Passing to the next, I find the same concurrence of opinion on most of the im- portant subjects of the session. We agreed on the question of executive pat- ronage, on the propriety of amending the Constitution for a temporary distribu- tion of the surplus revenue, on the subject of regulating the deposites, and in support of the bill for restricting the power of the executive in making removals from office. We also agreed in the propriety of establishing branch mints in the South and West — a subject not a little contested at the time. Even at the present session we have not been so unfortunate as to disagree entirely. We have, it is true, on the question of receiving abolition petitions, which I regret, as I must consider their reception, on the principle on which they were received, as a surrender of the whole ground to the Abolitionists, as far as this government is concerned. It is also true that we disagreed, in part, in ref- erence to the present subject. The senator has divided, in relation to it, be- tween myself and General Jackson. He has given his speech in support of his message, and announced his intention of giving his vote in favour of my bill. I certainly have no right to complain of this division. I had rather have his vote than his speech. The one will stand forever on the records of the Senate (unless expunged) in favour of the bill, and the important principles on which it rests, while the other is destined, at no distant day, to oblivion. I now put to the senator from Georgia two short questions. In the numerous and important instances in which we have agreed, I must haA-e been either righi or wrono-. If rif^ht, how could he be so uncharitable as to attribute my course to the low and unworthy motive of inveterate hostility to General Jackson ? But if wrong, in what condition does his charge against me place himself, who has concurred with me in all these measures ? (Here Mr. King disclaimed the imputation of improper motives to Mr. C.) I am glad to hear the gentle- man's disclaimer, said Mr. C., but I certainly understood him as asserting that, such was my hostility to General Jackson, that his support of a measure was sufficient to ensure my opposition ; and this he imdertook to illustrate by an anecdote borrowed from O'Connell and the pig, which, I must tell the senator, was much better suited to the character of the Irish mob to which it was ori- ginally addressed, than to the dignity of the Senate, where he has repeated it. But to return from this long digression. I saw, as I have remarked, that there was reason to apprehend that the principles embraced in the message might be reduced to practice— principles which I believe to be dangerous to the^ South, and subversive of the liberty of the press. The report fully states what those principles are, but it may not be useless to refer to them briefly on the present occasion. The message assumed for Congress the right of determining what publica- tions are incendiary and calculated to excite the slaves to insurrection, and to prohibit the transmission of such publications through the mail ; and, of course, it also assumes the right of deciding what are not incendiary, and of enforcing the transmission of such through the mail. But the senator from Georgia de- nies this inference, and treats it as a monstrous absurdity. I had (said Mr. C.) considered it so nearly intuitive, that I had not supposed it necessary in the re- port to add anything in illustration of its truth ; but as it has been contested by the senator, I will add, in illustration, a single remark. The senator will not deny that the right of determining what papers are in- cendiaiy, and of preventing their circulation, implies that Congress has jurisdic- tion over the subject ; that is, of discriminating as to what papers ought or ought not to be transmitted by the mail. Nor will he deny that Congress has a right, when acting within its acknowledged jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of its acts ; and yet the admission of these unquestionable truths admits the con- sequence asserted by the report, and so sneered at by the senator. But, lest he should controvert so plain a deduction, to cut the matter short, I shall propound a plain question to him. He believes that Congress has the right to say what papers are incendiary, and to prohibit their circulation. Now, I ask him, if he does not also believe that it has the right to enforce the circulation of such as it may determine not to be incendiary, even against a law of Georgia that might prohibit their circulation? If the senator should answer in the affirmative, I then would prove by his admission the truth of the inference for which I con- tend, and which he has pronounced to be so absurd : but if he should answer in the negative, and deny that Congress can enforce the circulation againt the law of the "state, I must tell him he would place himself in the neighbourhood of nullification. He would, in fact, go beyond. The denial would assume the xieht of nullifying what the senator himself must, with his views, consider a constitutional act, when nullification only assumes the right of a state to nullify an unconstitutional act. But the principle of the message goes still farther. It assumes for Congress jurisdiction over the liberty of the press. The framers of the Constitution (or, rather, those jealous patriots who refused to consent to its adoption without amendments to guard against the abuse of power) have, by the first amended article, provided that Congress shall pass no law abridging the liberty of the mmammmmmmt^^ press, with the view of placing the press beyond the control of congressional legislation. But this cautious foresight would prove in vain, if we should con- cede to Congress the power which the President assumes of discriminating, in reference to character, what publications shall not be transmitted by the mail. It would place in the hands of the General Government an instrument more potent to control the freedom of the press than the sedition law itself, as is fully established in the report. Thus regarding the message, the question which presented itself on its first perusal was, How to prevent powers so dangerous and unconstitutional from being carried into practice 1 To permit the portion of the message relating to the subject under consideration to take its regular course, and be referred to the Committee on Postoffices and Post-roads, would, I saw, be the most certain way to defeat what I had in view. I could not doubt, from the composition of the committee, that the report would coincide with the message, and that it would be drawn up with all that tact, ingenuity, and address, for which the chairman of the committee and the head of the postoffice department are not a little distinguished. With this impression, I could not but apprehend that the authority of the President, backed by such a report, would go far to rivet in the public mind the dangerous principles which it was my design to defeat, and which could only be effected by referring the portion of the message in question to a select committee, by which the subject might be thoroughly investigated, and the result presented in a report. With this view I moved the committee, and the bill and report which the senator has attacked so violently are the result. These are the reasons which governed me in the course I took, and not the base and unworthy motive of hostility to General Jackson. I appeal with con- fidence to my life to prove that neither hostility nor attachment to any man or any party can influence me in the discharge of my public duties ; but were I capable of being influenced by such motives, I must tell the senator from Geor- gia, that I have not such regard for the opinion of General Jackson as to permit his course to influence me in the slightest degree, either for or against any measure. Having now assigned the motives which governed me, it is with satisfaction I add that I have a fair prospect of success. So entirely are the principles of the message abandoned, that not a friend of the President has ventured, and I hazard nothing in saying, will venture, to assert them practically, whatever they may venture to do in argument. They well know now that, since the subject has been investigated, a bill to carry into effect the recommendation of the mes- sage would receive no support even from the ranks of the administration, de- voted as they are to their chieftain. The senator from Georgia made other objections to the report besides those which I have thus incidentally noticed, to which I do not deem it necessary to reply. I am content with his vote, and cheerfully leave the report and his speech to abide their fate, with a brief notice of a single objection. The senator charges me with what he considers a strange and unaccountable contradiction. He says that the freedom of the press and the right of petition are both secured by the same article of the Constitution, and both stand on the same principle ; yet I, who decidedly opposed the receiving of abolition peti- tions, now as decidedly support the liberty of the press. To make out the con- tradiction, he assumes that the Constitution places the right of petitioners to have their petitions received and the liberty of the press on the same ground. I do not deem it necessary to show that in this he is entirely mistaken, and that my course on both occasions is perfectly consistent. I take the senator at his word, and put to him a question for his decision. If, in opposing the receiv- ing of the abolition petitions, and advocating the freedom of the press, I have involved myself in a palpable contradiction, how can he escape a similar charge, when his course was the reverse of mine on both occasions ? Does he not see that, if mine be contradictory, as he supposes, his loo must necessarily be so ? But the senator forgets his own argument, of which I must remind him, in order to reUeve him from the awkward dilemma in which he has placed himself in his eatxerness to fix on me the charge of contradiction. He seems not to recol- lect that, in his speech on receiving the abolition petitions, he was compelled to abandon the Constitution, and to place the right, not on that instrument, as he would now have us believe, but expressly on the ground that the right existed anterior to the Constitution, and that we must look for its limits, not to the Con- stitution, but to the Magna Charta and the Declaration of Rights. Having now concluded what I intended to say in reply to the senator from Georgia, I now turn to the objections of the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Davis), which were directed, not against the report, but the bill itself. The senator confined his objections to the principles of the bill, which he pronoun- ces dangerous and unconstitutional. It is my wish to meet his objections fully, fairly, and directly. For this purpose, it will be necessary to have an accurate and clear conception of the principles of the bill, as it is impossible, without it, to estimate correctly the force either of the objections or the reply. I am thus constrained to restate what the principles are, at the hazard of being considered somewhat tedious. The first and leading principle is, that the subject of slavery is under the sole and exclusive control of the states where the institution exists. It belongs to them to determine what may endanger its existence, and when and how it may be defended. In the exercise of this right, they may prohibit the intro- duction or circulation of any paper or publication which may, in their opinion, disturb or endanger the institution. Thus far all are agreed. To this extent no one has questioned the right of the states ; not even the senator from Mas- sachusetts, in his numerous objections to the bill. The next and remaining principle of the bill is intimately connected with the preceding, and, in fact, springs directly from it. It assumes that it is the duty of the General Government, in the exercise of its delegated rights, to respect the laws which the slaveholding states may pass in protection of its institutions ; or, to express it differently, it is its duty to pass such laws as may be necessa- ry to make it obligatory on its officers and agents to abstain from violating the laws of the states, and to co-operate, as far as it may consistently be done, irj their execution. It is against this principle that the objections of the senator from Massachusetts have been directed, and to which I now proceed to reply. His first objection is, that the principle is new ; by which I understand him to mean, that it never has, heretofore, been acted on by the government. The objection presents two questions : Is it true in point of fact ? and if so, what weight or force properly belongs to it ? If I am not greatly mistaken, it will be found wanting in both particulars ; and that, so far from being new, it has been frequently acted on ; and that if it were new, the fact would have little or no force. If our government had been in operation for centuries, and had been exposed to the various changes and trials to which political institutions, in a long-pro- tracted existence, are exposed in the vecissitudes of events, the objection, under such circumstances, that a principle has never been acted upon, if not decisive, would be exceedingly strong ; but when made in reference to our government, which has been in operation for less than half a century, and which is so com- plex and novel in its structure, it is very feeble. We all know that new prin- ciples are daily developing themselves under our system, with the changing condition of the country, and, doubtless, will long continue so to do in the new and trying scenes through which we are destined to pass. It may, I admit, be good reason even with us for caution — for thorough and careful investigation, if a principle proposed to be acted upon be new ; for I have long since been BiHiiliiiiiiiaHHIiiiiHilliHHHyH^ n-augiu uy eAptjiiKiiue, uiu.i wxiaievbr is umneu IS 10 oe receiveu witu caution m politics, however plausible. But to go farther in this early stage of our politi- C9l existence, would be to deprive ourselves of means that might be indispensa- ble to meet future dangers and ditficulties. But I take higher grounds in reply to the objection. I deny its truth in point of fact, and assert that the principle is not new. The report refers to two in- stances in which it has been acted on, and to which, for the present, I shall con- jfine myself: one in reference to the quarantine laws of the states, and the oth- er more directly connected with the subject of this bill. I propose to make a few remarks in reference to both : beginning with the former, with the view of showing that the principle in both cases is strictly analogous, or, rather, identi- cal with the present. The health of the state, like that of the subject of slavery, belongs exclusively to the states. It is reserved, and not delegated ; and, of course, each state has a right to judge for itself what may endanger the health of its citizens, what measures are necessary to prevent it, and when and how such measures are to be carried into effect. Among the causes which may endanger the health of a state, is the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases through the medi- um of commerce. The vessel returning with a rich cargo, in exchan"-e for the products of a state, may also come freighted with the seeds of disease and death. To guard against this danger, the states at a very early period adopted quaran- tine or health laws. These laws, it is obvious, must necessarily interfere with the power of Congress to regulate commerce — a power as expressly given as that to regulate the mail, and, as far as the present question is concerned, every way analogous ; and acting, accordingly, on the principles of this bill. Congress, as far back as the year '96, passed an act making it the duty of its civil and mil- itary officers to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the states, and to co-operate in their execution. This act was modified and repealed by that of '99, which has since remained unchanged on the statute-book. But the other precedent referred to in the report is still more direct and im- portant. That case, like the present, involved the right of the slaveholding states to adopt such measures as they may think proper to prevent their domes- tic institutions from being disturbed or endangered. They may be endangered, not only by introducing and circulating inflammatory publications calculated to excite insurrection, but also by the introduction of free people of colour from abroad, who may come as emissaries, or with opinions and sentiments hostile to the peace and security of those states. The right of a state to pass laws to prevent danger from publications is not more clear than the right to pass those which may be necessary to guard against this danger. The act of 1803, to which the report refers as a precedent, recognises this right to the fullest ex- tent. It was intended to sustain the laws of the states against the introduction of free people of colour from the West India Islands. The senator from Mas- sachusetts, in his remarks upon this precedent, supposes the law to have been passed under the power given to Congress by the Constitution to suppress the slave-trade. I have turned to the journals in order to ascertain the facts, and find that the senator is entirely mistaken. The law was passed on a memorial of the citizens of Wilmington, North Carolina, and originated in the following facts : '^ After the successful rebellion of the slaves of St. Domingo, and the expul- sion of the French power, the government of the other French West India Islands, in order to guard against the danger from the example of St. Domingo,, adopted rigid measures to expel and send out their free blacks. In 1803, a brig, having on board five persons of that description who were driven from Guada- loupe, arrived at Wilmington. The alarm which this caused gave birth to the memorial, and the memorial to the act. 1 learn from the journals, that the subject was fully investigated and discuss- cd in both houses, and that it passed by a very large majority. The first sec- tion of the bill prevents the introduction of any negro, mulatto, or mustee, into any state, by the laws of which they are prevented from being introduced, ex- cept persons of the description from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, or register- ed seamen, or natives of the United States. The second section prohibits the entry of vessels having such persons on board, and subjects the vessels to sei- zure and forfeiture for landing, or attempting to land them contrary to the laws of the states ; and the third and last section makes it the duty of the officers of the General Government to co-operate with the states in the execution of their laws against their introduction. 1 consider this precedent to be one of vast im- portance to the slaveholding states. It not only recognises the right of those states to pass such laws as they may deem necessary to protect themselves against the slave population, and the duty of the General Government to respect those laws, but also the very important right, that the states have the authority to exclude the introduction of such persons as may be dangerous to their insti- tutions : a principle of great extent and importance, and applicable, to other states as well as slaveholding, and to other persons as well as blacks, and which may hereafter occupy a prominent place in the history of our legislation. Having now, I trust, fully and successfully replied to the first objection of the senator from Massachusetts, by showing that it is not true in fact, and if it were, that it would have had little or no force, I shall now proceed to reply to the second objection, which assumes that the principles for which I contend would, if admitted, transfer the power over the mail from the General Govern- ment to the states. If the objection be well founded, it must prove fatal to the bill. The power over the mail is, beyond all doubt, a delegated power ; and whatever would di- vest the government of this power, and transfer it to the states, would certainly be a violation of the Constitution. But would the principle, if acted on, transfer the power ? If admitted to its full extent, its only effect would be to make it the duty of Congress, in the exercise of its power over the mail, to abstain from violating the laws of the state in protection of their slave property, and to co-operate, where it could with propriety, in their execution. Its utmost effect "would then be a modification, and not a transfer or destruction of the power ; and surely the senator will not contend that to modify a right amounts either to its transfer or annihilation. He cannot forget that all rights are subject to modifications, and all, from the highest to the lowest, are held under one uni- versal condition — that their possessors should so use them as not to injure oth- ers. Nor can he contend that the power of the General Government over the mail is without modification or limitation. He himself admits that it is subject to a very important modification, when he concedes that the government cannot discriminate in reference to the character of the publications to be transmitted by the mail, without violating the first amended article of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from passing laws abridging the liberty of the press. Other modifications of the right might be shown to exist, not less clear, nor of much less importance. It might be easily shown, for instance, that the power over the mail is limited to the transmission of intelligence, and that Congress cannot, consistently with the nature and the object of the power, extend it to the ordinary objects of transportation without a manifest violation of the Constitution, and the assumption of a principle which would give the government control over the general transportation of the country, both by land and water. But if it be subject to these modifications, without either annihilating or transferring the power, why should the modification for which I contend, and which I shall show hereafter to rest upon unquestionable principles, have such effect ? That it would not, in fact, might be shown, if other proof were necessary, by a refer- ence to the practical operation of the principle in the two instances already re- ferred to. In both, the principle which I contend for in relation to the mail has long been in operation in reference to commerce, witnout the transfer ot the power of Congress to regulate commerce to the states, which the senator contends would be its effect if applied to the mail. So far otherwise, so little has it affected the power of Congress to regulate the commerce of the countr}', that few persons, comparatively, are aware that the principle has been recog- nised and acted on by the General Government. I come next (said .Mr. Calhoun) to what the senator seemed to rely upon as his main objection. He stated that the principles asserted in the report were contradicted by the bUl, and that the latter undertakes to do indirectly what the former asserts that the General Government cannot do at all. Admit (said Mr. C.) the objection to be true in fact, and what does it prove, but that the author of the report is a bad logician, and that there is error some- where, but without proving that it is in the bill, and that it ought, therefore, to be rejected, as the senator contends. If there be error, it may be in the report instead of the bill, and till the senator can fix it on the latter, he cannot avail himself of the objection. But does the contradiction which he alleges exist ! Let us turti to the principles asserted in the report, and compare them with those of the bill, in order to determine this point. What, then, are the principles which the report maintains ? It asserts that Congress has no right to determine what papers are incendiar}-, and calculated to excite insurrection, and, as such, to prohibit their circulation, but, on the con- trary, that it belongs to the states to determine on the character and tendency of such publications, and to adopt such measures as they may think proper to prevent their introduction or circulation. Does the bill deny any of these prin- ciples ? Does it not assume them all ? Is it not drawn up on the supposition that the General Government have none of the powers denied by the report, and that the states possess all for which it contends ? How, then, can it be said that the bill contradicts the report ! But the difficulty, it seems, is, that the General Government would do through the states, under the pro^"isions of the bill, what the report denies that it can do directly ; and this, according to the senator from Georgia, is so manifest and palpable a contradiction, that he can find no explanation for my conduct but an inveterate hostility to General Jack- son, which he is pleased to attribute to me. I have, I trust, successfully repelled already the imputation, and it now re- mains to show that the gross and palpable errors which the senator perceives exist only in his own imagination, and that, instead of the cause he supposes, it orit^inates, on his part, in a dangerous and fundamental misconception of the na- ture of our political system — particularly of the relation between the states and the General Government. "Were the states the agents of the General Govern- ment, as the objection clearly presupposes, then what he says would be true, and the government, in recognising the law of the states, would adopt the acts of its agents. But the fact is far otherwise. The General Governjneut and the governments of the states are distinct and independent departments in our complex political system. The states, in passing laws in protection of their domestic institutions, act in a sphere as independent as the General Govern- ment passing laws in regulation of the mail ; and the latter, in abstaining from %-iolatinor the laws of the states, as pro\'ided for in the bill, so far from making the states its agents, but recognises the right of the states, and performs on its part a conesponding duty. Rights and duties are in their nature reciprocal. The existence of one presupposes that of the other, and the performance of the duty, so far from denying the right, distinctly recognises its existence. The senator, for example, next to me (Judge White) has the unquestionable right to the occupation of his chair, and I am, of course, in duty bound to abstain from violating that right ; but would it not be absurd to say, that in performing that duty by abstaining from violating his right, I assume the right of occupa- tion ? Again : suppose the verv quiet and peaceable senator from Maine (Six. Ee Shepley), who is his next neighbour on the other side, should undertake to oust the senator from Tennessee, would it not be a strange doctrine to contend that, if I were to co-operate with the senator from Tennessee in maintaining pos- session of his chair, it would be an assumption on my part of a right to the chair ? And yet this is the identical principle which the senator from Georgia assumed, in charging a manifest and palpable contradiction between the bill and the report. But to proceed with the objections of the senator from Massachusetts. He asserts, and asserts truly, that rights and duties are reciprocal ; and that, if it be the duty of the General Government to respect the laws of the state, it is in like manner the duty of the states to respect those of the General Government. The practice of both have been in conformity to the principle. I have already cited instances of the General Government respecting the laws of the states, and many might be shown of the states respecting those of the General Govern- ment. But the senator from Massachusetts affirms that the laws of the General Gov- ernment regulating the mail, and those of the government of the states, prohibit- ing the introduction and circulation of incendiary publications, may come into conflict, and that, in such event, the latter must yield to the former ; and he rests this assertion on the ground that the power of the General Government is ex- pressly delegated by the Constitution. I regard the argument as wholly incon- clusive. Why should the mere fact that a power is expressly delegated give it paramount control over the reserved powers ? What possible superiority can the mere fact of delegation give, uidess, indeed, it be supposed to render the right more clear, and, of course, less questionable ? Now I deny that it has, in this instance, any such superiority. Though the power of the General Govern- ment over the mail is delegated, it is not more clear and unquestionable than the rights of the states over the subject of slavery — a right which neither has, nor can be denied. In fact, I might take higher grounds, if higher grounds were possible, by showing that the rights of the states are as expressly reserved as those of the General Government are delegated ; for, in order to place the reserved rights beyond controversy, the tenth amended article of the Constitu- tion expressly provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people ; and, as the subject of slavery is acknowledged by all not to be delegated, it may be fairly considered as expressly reserved under this provision of the Constitution. But, while I deny his conclusion, I agree with the senator that the laws of the states and General Government may come into conflict, and that, if they do, one or the other must yield ; the question is. Which ought to yield ? The ques- tion is one of great importance. It involves the whole merit of the controversy, and I must entreat the Senate to give me an attentive hearing while I state my views in relation to it. In order to determine satisfactorily which ought to yield, it becomes neces- sary to have a clear and full understanding of the point of difliculty ; and for this purpose it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks. Properly considered, the reserved and delegated powers can never come into conflict. The fact that a power is delegated is conclusive that it is not re- served ; and that it is not delegated, that it is reserved, unless, indeed, it be pro- hibited to the states. There is but a single exception : the case of powers of such nature that they be exercised concurringly by the state and General Gov- ernment — such as the power of laying taxes, which, though delegated, may also be exercised by the states. In illustration of the truth of the position I have laid down, I might refer to the case now under consideration. Regarded in the abstract, there is not the slightest conflict between the power delegated by the Constitution to the General Government to establish postofiices and post- roads, and that reserved to the states over the subject of slavery. How, then, g_|||_|_»»|»«||||»^^ can there be conflict ? It occurs, not between the powers themselves, but the laws respectively passed to carry them into eflect. The laws of the state, pro- hibiting the introduction or circulation of incendiary publications, may come in conflict with the laws of the General Government in relation to the mail ; and the question to be determined is. Which, in the event, ought to give way ? I will not pretend to enter into a full and systematic investigation of this high- ly important question, which involves, as I have said, the merits of the whole controversy. I do not deem it necessary. I propose to lay down a single principle, which I hold to be not only unquestionable, but decisive of the ques- tion as far as the present controversy is concerned. My position is, that, in de- ciding which ought to yield, regard must be had to the nature and magnitude of the powers to which the laws respectively relate. The low must yield to the high ; the convenient to the necessary ; mere accommodation to safety and security. This is the universal principle which governs in all analogous cases, both in our social and political relations. Wherever the means of enjoying or securing rights come into conflict (rights themselves never can), this universal and fundamental principle is the one which, by the consent of mankind, gov- erns in all such cases. Apply it to the case under consideration, and need I ask which ought to yield ? Will any rational being say that the laws of eleven states of this Union, which are necessary to their peace, security, and very ex- istence, ought to yield to the laws of the General Government regulating the postoffice, which, at best, is a mere accommodation and convenience, and this, when this government was formed by the states mainly with a view to secure more perfectly their peace and safety ? But one answer can be given. All must feel that it would be improper for the laws of the states, in such case, to yield to those of the General Government, and, of course, that the latter ought to yield to the former. When I say ought, I do not mean on the principle of concession. I take higher grounds. I mean under the obligation of the Consti- tution itself. That instrument does not leave this important question to be de- cided by mere inference. It contains an express provision which is decisive of the question. I refer to the provision which invests Congress with the pow- er of passing laws to carry into effect the granted powers, and which express- ly restricts its power to laws necessary and proper to carry into ellect the dele- gated powers. We here have the limitation on the power of passing laws. They must be necessary and proper. I pass the term necessary with the sin- gle remark, that, whatever may be its true and accurate meaning, it clearly in- dicates that this important power was granted with the intention of being spa- ringly used by the framers of the Constitution. I come to the term proper ; and I boldly assert, if it has any meaning at all — if it can be said of any law whatever that it is not proper, and that, as such. Congress has no constitution- al right to pass it, surely it may be said of that which would abrogate, in fact, the laws of nearly half of the states of the Union, and which are conceded to be necessary for their peace and safety. If it be proper for Congress to pass such a law, what law could possibly be improper ? We have heard much, of late, of state rights. All parties profess to respect them, as essential to the preservation of our liberty. I do not except the members of the old Federal party — that honest, high-minded, patriotic party, though mistaken as to the principles and tendency of the government. But what, let me ask, would be the value of state rights, if the laws of Congress, in such cases, ought not to yield to the states ? If they must be considered paramount, whenever they come into conflict with those of the states, without regard to their safety, what possible value can be attached to the rights of the states, and how perfectly un- meaning their reserved powers ? Surrender the principle, and there is not one of the reserved powers which may not be annulled by Congress under the pre- text of passing laws to carry into effect the delegated powers. The senator from Massachusetts next objects, that, if the principles of the biU be admitted, they may be extended to morals and religion. I do not feel bound to admit or deny the truth of this assertion ; but if the senator will show me a case in which a state has passed laws under its unquestionable reserved powers, in protection of its morality or religion, I would hold it to be the duty of the General Government to respect the laws of the states, in conformity to the prin- ciples which I maintain. His next objection is, that the bill is a manifest violation of the liberty of the press. He has not thought proper to specify w^herein the violation consists. Does he mean to say that the laws of the states prohibiting the introduction and circulation of papers calculated to excite insurrection, are in violation of the liberty of the press ? Does he mean that the slaveholding states have no right to pass such laws ? I cannot suppose such to be his meaning ; for I understood him, throughout his remarks, to admit the right of the states — a right which they have always exercised, without restriction or limitation, before and since the adoption of the Constitution, without ever having been questioned. But if this be not his meaning, he must mean that this bill, in making it the duty of the officers and agents of the government to respect the laws of the states, violates the liberty of the press, and thus involves the old misconception that the states are the agents of this government, which pervades the whole argument of the senator, and to which I have already replied. The senator next objects that the bill makes it penal on deputy postmasters to receive the papers and publications which it embraces. I must say, that my friend from IMassachusetts (for such I consider him, though we differ in politics) has not expressed himself with his usual accuracy on the present occasion. If he will turn to the provisions of the bill, he will find that the penahy attaches only in cases of knowingly receiving and delivering out the papers and publi- cations in question. All the consequences which the senator drew from the view which he took of the bill of course fall, and relieves me from the necessity of showingthat the deputy postmasters will not be compelled to resort to the espionage into letters and packages, in order to exonerate themselves from the penalty of the bill, which he supposed. The last objection of the senator is, that, under the provision of the bill, every- thing touching on the subject of slavery will be prohibited from passing through the mail. I again must repeat, that the senator has not expressed himself with sufBcient accuracy. The provisions of the bill are limited to the transmission of such papers in reference to slavery as are prohibited by the laws of the slave- holding states — that is, by eleven states of the Union — leaving the circulation through the mail without restriction or qualification as to all other papers, and wholly so as to the remaining thirteen states. But the senator seems to think that even this restriction, as limited as it is, w-ould be a very great inconveni- ence. It may, indeed, prove so to the lawless Abolitionists, who, without regard to the obligations of the Constitution, are attempting to scatter their firebrands throughout the Union. But is their convenience the only thing to be taken into the estimate ? Are the peace, security, and safety of the slaveholding states nothing ? or are these to be sacrificed for the accommodation of the Abolition- ists ? I have now replied directly, fully, and, I trust, successfully to the objections to the bill, and shall close what I intended to say by a few general and brief remarks. We have arrived at a new and important point in reference to the abolition question. It is no longer in the hands of quiet and peaceful, but I cannot add, harmless Quakers. It is now under the control of ferocious zealots, blinded by fanaticism, and, in pursuit of their object, regardless of the obligations of religion or morality. They are organized throughout every section of the non-slave- holdintr states ; they have the disposition of almost unlimited funds, and are in possession of a powerful press, which, for the first time, is enlisted in the cause marngmiMMaiamMa^mBmBum of abolition, and turned against tlie domestic institutions, a"nd the peace and se- curity of tlie South. To guard against the danger in this new and more men- acing form, tlie slaveholding states will be compelled to revise their laws against the introduction and circulation of publications calculated to disturb their peace and endanger their security, and to render them far more full and efficient than they have heretofore been. In this new state of things, the proba- ble conflict between the laws which those states may think proper to adopt, and those of the General Government regulating the mail, becomes far more impor- tant than in any former state of the controversy ; and Congress is now called upon to say what part it will take in reference to this deeply-interesting sub- ject. We of the slaveholding states ask nothing of the government but that it should abstain from violating laws passed within our acknowledged constitu- tional competency, and conceded to be essential to our peace and security. I am anxious to see how this question will be decided. I am desirous that my constituents should know what they have to expect, either from this govern- ment or from the non-slaveholding states. Much that I have said and done during the session has been with the view of affording them correct information on this point, in order that they might know to what extent they might rely upon others, and how far they must depend on themselves. Thus far (I say it with regret) our just hopes have not been realized. The Legislatures of the South, backed by the voice of their constituents, expressed through innumerable meetings, have called upon the non-slaveholding states to repress the movements made within the jurisdiction of those states against their peace and security. Not a step has been taken ; not a law has been passed, or even proposed ; and I venture to assert that none will be : not but what there is a favourable disposition towards us in the North, but I clearly see the state of political parties there presents insuperable impediments to any legislation on the subject. I rest my opinion on the fact that the non-slaveholding states, from the elements of their population, are, and will continue to be, divided and distracted by parties of nearly equal strength ; and that each will always be ready to seize on every movement of the other which may give them the superiority, without much regard to consequences as affecting their own states, and much less re- mote and distant sections. Nor have w-e been less disappointed as to the proceedings of Congress. Be- lieving that the General Government has no right or authority over the subject of slavery, we had just grounds to hope Congress would refuse all jurisdiction in reference to it, in whatever form it might be presented. The very opposite course has been pursued. Abolition petitions have not only been received in both houses, but received on the most obnoxious and dangerous of all grounds— that we are hound to receive them; that is, to take jurisdiction of the question of slavery whenever the Abolitionists may think proper to petition for its abolition, either here or in the states. Thus far, then, we of the slaveholding states have been grievously disappoint- ed. One question still remains to be decided — that presented by this bill. To refuse to pass this bill would be virtually to co-operate with the Abolitionists — would be to make the officers and agents of the postoffice department in efTect their agents and abettors in the circulation of their incendiary publications in violation of the laws of the states. It is your unquestionable duty, as I have demonstrably proved, to abstain from their violation ; and, by refusing or neglect- ing to discharge that duty, you would clearly enlist in the existing controversy, on the side of the Abolitionists, against the Southern States. Should such be your decision by refusing to pass this bill, I shall say to the people of the South, look to yourselves — you have nothing to hope from others. But I must tell the Senate, be your decision what it may, the South will never abandon the principles of this bill. If you refuse co-operation with our laws, and conflict should ensue between your and our law, the Southern States will never yield to the superiority of yours. We have a remedy in our hands, which, in such event, we shall not fail to apply. We have high authority for asserting, that in such cases " state interposition is the rightful remedy" — a doctrine first an- nounced by Jefferson — adopted by the patriotic and Republican State of Ken- tucky, by a solemn resolution in '98, and finally carried out into successful prac- tice on a recent occasion, ever to be remembered by the gallant state which I, in part, have the honour to represent. In this well-tested and efficient remedy, sustained by the principles developed in the report, and asserted in this bill, the slaveholding states have an ample protection. Let it be fixed — let it be riveted in every Southern mind, that the laws of the slaveholding states for the protec- tion of their domestic institutions are paramount to the laws of the General Government in regulation of commerce and the mail, and that the latter must yield to the former in the event of conflict ; and that,, if the government should refuse to yield, the states have a right to interpose, and we are safe. With these principles, nothing but concert would be wanting to bid defiance to the movements of the Abolitionists, whether at home or abroad ; and to place our domestic institutions, and, with them, our security and peace, under our own pro- tection, and beyond the reach of danger. XIV. SPEECH ON THE RECEPTION OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY, 1837. If the time of the Senate permitted, I should feel it to be my duty to call for the reading of the mass of petitions on the table, in order that we might know what language they hold towards the slaveholding states and their institutions; but as it will not, I have selected indiscriminately from the pile, two: one from those in manuscript, and the other from the printed ; and, without knowing their contents, will call for ttte reading of them, so that we may judge, by them, of the character of the whole. (Here the secretary, on the call of Mr. Calhoun, read the two petitions.) Such, resumed Mr. C, is the language held towards us and ours; the peculiar institutions of the South, that on the maintenance of which the very existence of the slaveholding states depends, is pronounced to be sinful and odious, in the sight of God and man ; and this with a systematic design of rendering us hateful in the eyes of the world, with a view to a general crusade against us and our institutions. This, too, in the legis- lative halls of the Union ; created by these confederated states for the better protection of their peace, their safety, and their respective insti- tutions ; and yet we, the representatives of twelve of these sovereign states against whom this deadly war is waged, are expected to sit here in silence, hearing ourselves and cAir constituents day after day denounced, without uttering a word ; if we but open our lips, the charge of agitation is re- sounded on all sides, and we are held up as seeking to aggravate the evil which we resist. Every reflecting mind must see in all this a state of things deeply and dangerously diseased. I do not belong, said Mr. C, to the school w^hich holds that aggression is to be met by concession. Mine is the opposite creed, which teaches that encroachments must be met at the beginning, and that those who act on the opposite principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in particular, I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we concede an inch, concession would follow concession — compromise would follow compromise, until our ranks would be so broken that effectual resistance would be impossible. We must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a V ....,,-.>.>,^»^,>««««^«»»i«.T,»,n^..Miiou...m.»»wimwn sent to receive,these insulting petitions, and the next demand will be that they be referred to a committee, in order that they may be deliberated and acted upon. At the last session, we were modestly asked to receive them simply to lay them on the table, without any view of ulterior action. I then told the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who strongly urged that course in the Senate, that it was a position that could not be maintained ; as the argument in favour of acting on the petitions, if we were bound to receive, could not be resisted. I then said that the next step would be to refer the petition to a committee, and I already see in- dications that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will be followed by another, and we would thus proceed, step by step, to the final consum- mation of the object of these petitions. We are now told that the most effectual mode of arresting the progress of abolition is to reason it down 5 and with this view, it is urged that the petitions ought to be referred to a committee. That is the very ground which was taken at the last session in the other house ; but, instead of arresting its progress, it has since ad- vanced more rapidly than ever. The most unquestionable right may be rendered doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and that would be the case in the present instance. The subject is beyond the jurisdiction of Congress — they have no right to touch it in any shape or form, or to make it the subject of deliberation or discussion. In opposition to this view, it is urged that Congress is bound by the Constitution to receive petitions in every case and on every subject, whether within its constitutional competency or not. I hold the doctrine to be absurd, and do solemnly believe that it would be as easy to prove that it has the right to abolish slavery, as that it is bound to receive peti- tions for that purpose. The very existence of the rule that requires a question to be put on the reception of petitions, is conclusive to show that there isAp such obligation. It has been a standing rule from the commencem0t of the goveriyjpent, and clearly shows the sense of those who formed the Constitution on this point. The question on the recep- tion would be absurd, if, as is contended, we are bound to receive ; but I do not intend to argue the question ; I discussed it fully at the last ses- sion, and the arguments then advanced neither have nor can be answered. As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion of the North ; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work upward till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly con- flict. This is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a discussion with one of the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine of the proclamation and the force bill — that this government had a right, in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce it at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly maintained by that senator — would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of Aboli- tionism ; I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assump- tion of unlimited power on the part of the government, and that such would be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the Union. The consequence would be inevitable — a large portion of the Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would believe it to be an obligation of conscience to abolish it, if they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its continuance, and that his doctrine would necessarily lead to the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted that it would commence, as it has, with this fanatical portion of society ; and that they would begin their operation on the ignorant, the weak, the young, and the thoughtless, and would gradually extend upward til] they became strong enough to obtain political control, when he, and others holding the highest stations in society, would, however reluctant, be compelled to yield to their doctrine, or be driven into obscurity. But four years have since elapsed, and all this is already in a course of regu- lar fulfilment. Standing at the point of time at which we have now arrived, it will not be more difficult to trace the course of future events now than it was then. Those who imagine that the spirit now abroad in the North will die away of itself without a shock or convulsion, have formed a very inadequate conception of its real character ; it will continue to rise and spread, un- less prompt and efficient measures to stay its progress be adopted. Al- ready it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a con- siderable extent, of the press j those great instruments by which the mind of the rising generation will be formed. However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding states are at present, in the course of a few years thej^ will be succeeded by those who will have been taught to hate the people and institutions of nearly one half of this Union, with a hatred more deadlj- than one hostile nation ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must become, finally, two people. It is impossible, under the deadly hatred which must spring up between the two great sections, if the present causes are permitted to operate unchecked, that we should continue under the same political sys- tem. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder, as power- ful as are the links which hold it together. Abolition and the Union can- not coexist. As the friend of the Union, I openly proclaim it, and the sooner it is known the better. The former may now be controlled, but in a short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the course of events. We of the South will not, cannot surrender our institutions. To maintain the existing relations betweeik the two races Bhabiting that section of the Union is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both. It cannot be subverted without drenching the country in blood, and extir- pating one or the other of the races. Be it good or bad, it has grown up with our society and institutions, and is so interwoven with them that to destroy it would be to destroy us as a people. But let me not be under- stood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations be- tween the two races, in the slaveholding states, is an evil : far otherwise ', I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be, to both, and "will continue to prove so, if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually. It came among us in a low, degraded, and savage condition, and, in the course of a few generations, it has grown up under the fostering care of our institutions, as reviled as they have been, to its present comparative civilized condition. This, with the rapid increase of numbers, is conclu- sive proof of the general happiness of the race, in spite of all the exag- gerated tales to the contrary. In the mean time, the white or European race has not degenerated. It has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where sla- very does not exist. It is odious to make comparison ; but I appeal to all sides whether the South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism, courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our na- ture. I ask whether we have not contributed our full share of talents and political wisdom in forming and sustaining this political fabric j and aaammttMmmmaMiiiaMaaaiBiai whether we have not constantly inclined most strongly to the side of lib- erty, and been the first to see, and first to resist, the encroachments of power. In one thing only are we inferior — the arts of gain; we acknowl- edo-e that we are less wealthy than the Northern section of this Union, but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of this government, which has extracted much from, and spent little among us. Had it been the reverse — if the exaction had been from the other section, and the expenditure with •us this point of superiority would not be against us now, as it was not at the formation of this government. But I take higher ground. I hold that, in the present state of civiliza- tion where two races of different origin, and distinguished by colour, and other physical diflerences, as well as intellectual, are brought to- gether, the relation now existing in the slaveholding states between the two is, instead of an evil, a good — a positive good. I feel myself called upon to speak freely upon the subject, where the honour and interests of those I represent are involved. I hold, then, that there never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labour of the other. Broad and general as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history. This is not the proper occasion, but, if it were, it would not be difficult to trace the va- rious devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been so unequally divided, and to show by what means so small a share has been allotted to those by whose labour it was produced, and so large a share given to the non-producing class. The devices are almost innu- merable, from th'^ brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might well chal- lenge a comparison between them and the more direct, simple, and patri- archal mode by which the labour o*" the African race is among us com- manded by the European. I may say, with truth, that in few countries so much is left to the share of the labourer, and so little exacted from him, or where there is more kind attention to him in sickness or infirmi- ties of ao-e. Compare his condition with the tenants of the poor-houses in the most civilized portions of Europe — look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, un- der the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poor- house. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the question: I turn to the political ; and here I fearlessly assert, that the existing relation between the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the fact. There is, and*alvvays has been, in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization, a conflict between labour and capital. The condition of society in the South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this con- flict ; and which explains why it is that the political condition of the slaveholding states has been so much more stable and quiet than those of the North. The advantages of the former, in this respect, will become more and more manifest, if left undisturbed by interference from without, as the country advances in wealth and numbers. We have, in fact, but just entered that condition of society where the strength and durability of our political institutions are to be tested ; and I venture nothing in pre- dicting that the experience of the next generation will fully test how vastly more favourable our condition of society is to that of other sec- tions for free and stable institutions, provided we are not disturbed by the interference of others, or shall have sufficient intelligence and spirit to resist promptly and successfully such interference. It rests with our- F F selves to meet and repel them. I look not for aid to this government, of to the other states ; not but there are kind feelings towards us on the part of the o-reat body of the non-slaveholding states ; but, as kind as their feelino-s may be, we may rest assured that no political party in those states'^vill risk their ascendency for our safety. If we do not defend our- selves none will defend us ; if we yield, we will be more and more pressed as we'recede; and, if we submit, we will be trampled under foot. Be assured that emancipation itself would not satisfy these fanatics : that gained, the next step would be to raise the negroes to a social and polit- ical equality with the whites ; and, that being effected, we would soon find the present condition of the two races reversed. They, and their Northern allies, would be the masters, and we the slaves ; the condition of the white race in the British West India Islands, as bad as it is, would be hap- piness to ours ; there the mother-country is interested in sustaining the supremacy of the European race. It is true that the authority of the former master is destroyed, but the African will there still be a slave, not to individuals, but to the community — forced to labour, not by the au- thority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of the civil magistrate. Surrounded, as the slaveholding states are, with such imminent perils, I rejoice to think that our means of defence are ample, if we shall prove to have the intelligence and spirit to see and apply them before it is too late. All we want is concert, to lay aside all party differences, and unite with zeal and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security without re- sortino- to secession or disunion. I speak with full knowledge and a thor- ough examination of the subject, and, for one, see my way clearly. One thincr alarms me — the eager pursuit of gain which overspreads the land, and which absorbs every faculty of the mind and every feeling of the heart. Of all passions, avarice is the most blind and compromising — the last to see, and the first to yield to danger. I dare not hope that anything I can say will arouse the South to a due sense of danger ; I fear it is be- yond the power of mortal voice to awaken it in time from the fatal secu- rity into which it has fallen. XV. SPEECH ON THE PUBLIC DEPOSITES, MAY 28, 1836. The Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the bill to regtriate the deposites of the pubUc money. After some words from Mr. Wright in explanation, Mr. Calhoun said : This bill, which the senator from New-York proposes to strike out in order to sub- stitute his amendment, is no stranger to this body. It was reported at the last session by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, and passed the Sen- ate after a full and deliberate investigation, by a mixed vote of all parties, of twenty to twelve. As strong as is this presumptive evidence in its favour, I would, notwithstanding, readily surrender the bill and adopt the amendment of the senator from New-York, if I did not sincerely believe that it is liable to strong and decisive objections. I seek no lead on this important subject ; my sole aim is to aid in applying a remedy to what I honestly believe to be a deep and dangerous disease of the body politic : and I stand prepared to co-operate with any one, be he of what party he may, who may propose a remedy, provi- ded it shall promise to be safe and efficient. I, in particular, am desirous of co- LaaMBm„m^M»m.»„.ww«.,^-»iu»uuu»»,. operating with the senator from New-York, not only because I desire the aid of his distinguished talents, but, still more, of his decisive influence with the powerful party of which he is so distinguished a member, and which now, for good or evil, holds the destiny of the country in its hands. It was in this spirit that I examined the amendment proposed by the senator ; and I regret to say, after a full investigation, I cannot acquiesce in it, as I feel a deep conviction that it will be neither safe nor efficient. So far from being substantially the same as the bill, as stated by the senator, I cannot but regard it as essentially different, both as to objects and means. The objects of the bill are, first, to se- cure the public interest as far as it is connected with the deposites ; and, next, to protect the banks in which they are made against the inflaence and control of the executive branch of this government, with the view both to their and the public interest. Compared with the bill, in respect to both, the proposed amendment will be found to favour the banks against the people, and the exec- utive against the banks. I do not desire the Senate to form their opinion on my authority. I wish them to examine for themselves ; and, in order to aid them in the examination, I shall now proceed to state, and briefly illustrate, the several points of diff"erence between the bill and the proposed amendment, ta- king them in the order in which they stand in the bill. The first section of the bill provides that the banks shall pay at the rate of two per cent, per annum on the deposites for the use of the public money. This provision is entirely omitted in the amendment, which proposes to give to the banks the use of the money without interest. That the banks ought to pay something for the use of the public money, all must agree, whatever diver- sity of opinion there may be as to the amount. According to the last return of the treasury department, there was, on the first of this month, $45,000,000 of public money in the thirty-six depository banks, which they are at liberty to use as their own for discount or business, till drawn out for disbursements, au event that may not happen for years. In a word, this vast amount is so much additional banking capital, giving the same, or nearly the same, profit to those institutions as their permanent chartered capital, without rendering any other service to the public than paying away, from time to time, the portion that might be required for the service of the government. Assuming that the banks real- ize a profit of six per cent, on these deposites (it cannot be estimated at less), it would give, on the present amount, nearly three millions of dollars per annum, and on the probable average public deposites of the year, upward of two mill- ions of dollars ; which enormous profit is derived from the public by compara- tively few individuals, without any return or charge, except the inconsiderable service of paying out the draughts of the treasury when presented. But it is due to the senator to acknowledge that his amendment is predicated on the suppo- sition that some disposition must be made of the surplus revenue, which would leave in the banks a sum not greater than would be requisite to meet the cur- rent expenditure : a supposition which necessarily must affect, very materially affect, the decision of the question of the amount of compensation the banks ought to make to the public for the use of its funds ; but, let the disposition be what it may, the omission in the amendment of any compensation whatever is, in my opinion, wholly indefensible. The next point of difference relates to transfer warrants. The bill prohibits the use of transfer warrants, except with a view to disbursement, while the amendment leaves them, without regulation, under the sole control of the treas- ury department. To understand the importance of this difference, it must be borne in mind that the transfer warrants are the lever by which the whole bank- ing operations of the country may be controlled through the deposites. By them the public money may be transferred from one bank to another, or from one state or section of the country to another state or section ; and thus one bank may be elevated and another depressed, and a redundant currency created in one state or section, and a deficient in another; and, through such redundancy or deii- ciency, all the moneyed engagements and business transactions of the whole community may be made dependant on the will of one man. With the present enormous surplus, it is difficult to assign limits to the extent of this power. The secretar}% or the irresponsible agent unknown to the laws, who, rumour says, has the direction of this immense power (we are permitted to have no certain information), may raise and depress stocks and property of all descriptions at his pleasure, by withdrawing from one place and transferring to another, to the unlimited gain of those who are in the secret, and certain ruin of those who are not. vSuch a field of speculation has never before been opened in any country ; a field so great, that the Rothschilds themselves might be tempted to enter it ■with their immense funds. Nor is the control which it would give over the pol- itics of the country much less unlimited. To the same extent that it may be used to affect the interests and the fortunes of individuals, to the like extent it may be employed as an instrument of political influence and control. I do not intend to assert that it has or will be so employed ; it is not essential at pres- ent to inquire how it has or will be used. It is sufficient for my purpose to show, as I trust I have satisfactorily, that it may be so employed. To guard against the abuse of so dangerous a power, the provision was inserted in the bill to prohibit the use of transfer warrants, except, as stated, for the purpose of disbursement ; the omission of which provision in the amendment is a fatal ob- jection to it of itself, were there no other. But it is far from standing alone ; the next point of difference will be found to be not less striking and fatal. The professed object of both the bill and the amendment is to place the safe- keeping of the public moneys under the regulation and control of law, instead of being left, as it now is, at the discretion of the executive. However strange it may seem, the fact is, nevertheless, so, that the amendment entirely fails to effect the object which it is its professed object to accomj^lish. In order that it may be distinctly seen that what I state is the case, it will be necessary to view^ the provisions of the bill and the amendment in reference to the deposite separately, as they relate to the banks in which the public funds are now de- posited, and those which may hereafter be selected to receive them. The bill commences with the former, Avhich it adopts as banks of deposite^ and prescribes the regulations and conditions on the observance of which they shall continue such ; while, at the same time, it places them beyond the con- trol and influence of the executive department, by placing them under the pro- tection of law so long as they continue faithfully to perform their duty as fiscal agents of the government. It next authorizes the Secretary of the Treasurj- to select, under certain circumstances, additional banks of deposite, as the exigen- cy of the public service may requir?, on which it imposes like regulations and conditions, and places, in like manner, under the protection of law. In all this the amendment pursues a very different course. It l>egins with authorizing the secretary to select the banks of deposite, and limits the regulations and condi- tions it imposes on such banks ; leaving, by an express provision, the present banks wholly under the control of the treasury or the executive department, as they now are, without prescribing any time for the selection of other banks of deposite, or making it the duty of the secretary so to do. Tlie consequence is obvious. The secretary may continue the present banks as long as he pleases ; and so long as he may choose to continue them, the provisions of the amend- ment, so far as relates to the deposites, will be a dead letter ; and the banks, of course, instead of being under the control of the law, will be contrary, as I have said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment — subject exclusive- ly to his will. The senator has attempted to explain this difference, but, I must say, veiy un- satisfactorily. He said that the bill prohibited the selection of other banks ; and, as he deemed others to be necessary, at certain important points, in con- .=^.«.»»,«»««»r-^,.».TI»»»„«U..»UUU...».M»l»WWtWtf sequence of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision authorizing the selection of other banks. The senator has not stated the provisions of the bill accurately ; so far from not authorizing, it expressly authorizes the selec- tion of other banks where there are now none ; but I presume he intended to limit his remarks to places where there are no existing banks of deposite. Thus limited, the fact is as he states ^ but it by no means explains the extraor- dinary omission (for such I must consider it) of not extending the regulations to the existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected. If the public service requires additional banks at New-York and other important points, in consequence of the vast suras deposited there (as I readily agree it does), if no disposition is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason for enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the secretary to select other banks at those points ; but it is impossible for me to comprehend how it proves that the regulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be ex- clusively limited to such newly-selected banks. Nor do I see why the senator has not observed the same rule, in this case, as that which he adopted in i-efer- ence to the compensation the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money. He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground that his amendment proposed to dispose of all the surplus money, leaving in the possession of the banks a sum barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation. On the same principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the selection of additional banks where there are now banks of deposite, as they would be ample if the surplus was disposed of. In this I understood the senator himself to concur. But it is not only in the important point of extending the regulations to the existing banks of deposite that the bill and the amendment difler. There is a stri- king dilference between them in reference to the authority of Congress over the banks of deposite embraced both in the bill and the amendment. The latter, fol- lowing the provision in the charter of the late Bank of the United States, authorizes the secretary to withdraw the public deposites, and to discontinue the use of any one of the banks whenever, in his opinion, such bank shall have violated the conditions on which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe in its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report the fact to Congress. We know, from experience, how slight is the check which this restriction im- poses. It not onl);- requires the concurrence of both houses of Congress to overrule the act of the secretary, where his power may be improperly exerci- sed, but the act of Congress itself, intended to control such exercise of power, may be overruled by the veto of the President, at whose will the secretary holds his place ; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under the con- trol of the executive department of the government. To obviate this, the bill vests the secretary with the power simply of withdrawing the deposites and suspending the use of the bank as a place of deposite ; and provides that, if Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposites shall be returned to the bank after the termination of the next session of Congress. The next point of dilTerence is of far less importance, and is only mentioned as tending to illustrate the different character of the bill and the amendment. The former provides that the banks of deposite shall perform the duties of commis- sioners of loans without compensation, in like manner as was the duty of the late Bank of the United States and its branches, under its charter. Among these duties is that of paying the pensioners — a very heavy branch of disburse- ment, and attended with considerable expense, and which will be saved to the government under the bill, but will be lost if the amendment should prevail. Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to the security of the deposites. With so large an amount of public money in their vaults, it is im- portant that the banks should always be provided with ample means to meet their engagements. Wuh tliis view, the bill provides that the specie in the SFEECHtS Ut JUrtIS C. UAL,HUUW. vaults of the several banks, and the aggregate of the balance in their favour with other specie-paying banks, shall be equal to one fifth of the entire amount of their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and private deposites — a sum, as is believed, sufficient to keep them in a sound, solvent condition. The amendment, on the contrarj^, provides that the banks shall keep in their own vaults, or the vaults of other banks, specie equal to one fourth of its notes and bills in circulation, and the* balance of its accounts with other banks payable on demand. I regret that the senator has thought proper to change the phraseologv, and to use terras less clear and explicit than those in the bill. 1 am not certain that I comprehend the exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks ? In a general sense, all depos- ites are considered as specie ; but I cannot suppose that to be the meaning in this instance, as it would render the provision in a great measure inoperative. I presume the amendment means special deposites in gold and silver in other banks, placed there for safe keeping, or to be drawn on, and not to be used by the bank in which it is deposited. Taking that to be the meaning, what is there to prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimating the means of the several banks of deposite ? Take two of them, one having S 100,000 in specie in its vaults, and the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank, ■which, in addition, has, besides, another $100,000 of its own ; what is there to prevent the latter from returning, under the amendment, 8200,000 of specie in its vaults, while the former would return 8100,000 in its own vaults, and an- other in the vaults of the other bank, making, in the aggregate, between them, 8400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both would be but 8300,000 ? But this is not the only difference between the bill and amendment, in this particular, deserving of notice. The object of the provision is to compel the banks of deposite to have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities, so that the government should have sufficient assurance that the public moneys in their vaults would be forthcoming when demanded. With this view, the bill provides that the available means of the bank shall never be less than one fifth of its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposites, public and pri- vate ; while the amendment entirely omits the private deposites, and includes only the balance of its deposites with other banks. This omission is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the greater jwrtion of the liabilities of the deposite banks must, with the present large surplus, result from their deposites, as every one who is familiar with banking operations will readily perceive. I have now presented to the Senate the several points of difference which I deem material between the bill and the amendment, with such remarks as to enable them to form their own opinion in reference to the difference, so that they may decide hov/ far the assertion is true with which I set out, that, wherever they differ, the amendment favours the banks against the interests of the public, and the executive against the banks. The senator, acting on the supposition that there would be a permanent surplus beyond the expenditures of the government, which neither justice nor regard to the public interest woidd permit to remain in the banks, has extended the provis- ions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as to comprehend a plan to with- draw the surplus from the banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the sinking fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every quarter, the probable receipts and expenditures of the quarter ; and if, in their opinion, the receipts, with the money in the treasury', should exceed the estimated expenditure by a certain sum, say 85,000,000, the excess should be vested in state stocks ; and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient amount of the stocks should be sold to make up the deficit. We have thus presented for consideration the important subject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anxiously and universally asked, What shall be done with the surplus? Shall it be ex- — ..«.»»r...^„».^^..^„,x^„.trrTn.,»Tmil»»»«M»IWHMllWUUWMHMMIWTm pended by the government, or remain where it is, or be disposed of as proposed by the senator ? or, if not, what other disposition shall be made of it ? questions, the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire circle of our policy, and on the decision of which the future destiny of the country may depend. But before we enter on the discussion of this important question, it will be proper to ascertain what will be the probable available means of the year, in order that some conception may be formed of the probable surplus which jnay remain, by comparing it with the appropriations that may be authorized. According to the late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, there was de- posited in the several banks a little upward of S3.3,000,000 at the termination o( the first quarter of the year, not including the sum of about S 3,000,000 de- posited by the disbursing agents of the government. The same report stated the receipts of the quarter at about $11,000,000, of which lands and customs yielded nearly an equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters an equal amount, it would give, for the entire receipts o( the year, $44,000,000. I agree with the senator, that this sum is too large. The customs will prob- ably average an amount throughout the year corresponding with the receipts of the first quarter, but there probably will be a considerable falling off in the receipts from the public lands. Assuming $7,000,000 as the probable amount, which I presume will be ample, the receipts of the year, subtract- ing that sura from 544,000,000, will be $37,000,000 ; and subtracting from that S 11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter, would leave $26,000,000 as the probable receipts of the last three quarters. Add to this sum 833,000,000, the amount in the treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives 859,000.000. To this add the amount of stock in the United States Bank, which, at the market price, is worth at least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000, which I consider as the least amount at which the probable available means of the year can be fairly estimated. It will, probably, very considerably exceed this amount. The range may be put down at between $66,000,000 and 873,000,000, which may be considered as the two extremes between which the means of the year may vibrate. But, in order to be safe, I have assumed the least of the two. The first question which I propose to consider is, Shall this sum be expend- ed by the government in the course of the year ? A sura nearly equal to the entire debt of the war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence of these states were established ; raore than five tiraes greater than the expen- diture of the government at the commencement of the present administration, — deducting the payments on account of the public debt — and more than four tiraes greater than the average annual expenditure of the present administration, making the same deduction, extravagant as its expenditure has been. The very magnitude of the sura decides the question against expenditure. It may be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended. There are not objects on which to expend it ; for proof of which I appeal to the appropriations already made and contemplated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which, as liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised „«T^,,w— ^wm,_mrpxT.r.Tnor.nemtWHmi»HIilWllMllJ«UU«»BBMIHHHM Whatever may be the diversity of opinion on other points, there is not an in- telligent individual of any party, who regards his reputation, that will venture to deny that the liberty of the country is at this time more insecure and unstable than it ever has been. We all know that there is in every portion of the Union, and with every party, a deep feehng that our political institutions are undergoing a great and hazardous change. Nor is the feeling much less strong, that the vast increase of patronage and influence of the government is the cause of the great and fearful change which is so extensively affecting the character of our people and institutions. The effect of increasing the expenditures at this time, so as to absorb the surplus, would be to double the number of those who live, or expect to live, by the government, and in the same degree augment its patron- age and influence, and accelerate that downward course which, if not arrested, must speedily terminate in the overthrow of our free institutions. These views I hold to be decisive against the wild attempt to absorb the im- mense means of the government by the expenditures of the year. In fact, with the exception of a few individuals, all seem to regard the scheme either as im- practicable or unsafe ; but there are others, who, while they condemn the at- tempt of disposing of the surplus by immediate expenditures, believe it can be safely and expediently expended in a period of four or five years, on what they choose to call the defences of the country. In order to determine how far this opinion may be correct, it will be neces- sary first to ascertain what will be the available means of the next four or five years ; by comparing which with what ought to be the expenditure, we may determine whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In makino- the calculation, I will take the term of five years, including the present, and which will, of course, include 1840, after the termination of which, the duties above twenty per cent, are to go off', by the provisions of the Compromise Act, in eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the economical and just wants of the government. The available means of the present year, as I have already shown, will equal at least $66,000,000. That of the next succeeding four years (including 1840) may be assumed to be twenty-one millions annually. The reason for this as- sumption may be seen in the report of the select committee at the last session, which I have reviewed, and in the correctness of which I feel increased con- fidence. The amount may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the esti- mate in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur. Assumino", then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the next four years, it will give an aggregate of $84,000,000, which, added to the available means of this year, will give $150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the govern- ment for the period assumed. Divide this sum by five, the number of years, and it will give $30,000,000 as the average annual available means of the period. The next question for consideration is. Will it be expedient to raise the dis- bursement during the period to an average expenditure of $30,000,000 annual- ly ? The first, and strong objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the deposite banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, beginning with a surplus of upward of thirty millions at the commencement of next year, and decreasing at the rate of eight or nine millions a year till the terminati-on of the period. But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly. It would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to keep up the disburse- ments at so high a rate. I ask. On what shall this money be expended 1 Shall it be expended by an increase of the militar}^ establishment ? by an enlarge- ment of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the navy, far beyond what is proposed for the present year ? Have those who advocate the scheme reflected to what extent this enlargement must be :Camed to absorb so great a sura 1 Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure upon Indian treaties Gg and Indian wars, and with profuse expenditure in every other branch of service, the aggregate amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000, and that of disbursements will not, probably, equal that sum. To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the army, the navy, the fortifications, and the like, be carried, in order to absorb that sum, especially with a declining expenditure in several branches of the service, particularly in the pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a million of dol- lars ? But, in order to take a full view of the folly and danger of the scheme, it will be necessary to extend our view beyond 1842, in order to form some opinion of what will be the income of the government when the tariff shall be so reduced, under the Compromise Act, that no duty shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem. I know that any estimate made at this time cannot be con- sidered much more than conjectural ; but still, it would be imprudent to adopt a system of expenditure now, without taking into consideration the probable state of the revenue a few years hence. After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the impression that the income from the imposts, after the period in question, will not exceed $10,000,000. It will probably fall below, rather than rise above, that sum. I assume, as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign articles will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know that the capacity of the coun- try to consume depends upon the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of its commerce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not be safe to assume any considerable increase in any article except cotton. To what ex- tent the production and consumption of this great staple, which puts in motion so vast an amount of the industry and commerce of the world, may be increas- ed between now and 1842, is difficult to conjecture ; but I deem it unsafe to suppose that it can be so increased as to extend the capacity of the country to consume beyond the limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable articles, the latter, ac- cording to the existing proportion between the two descriptions, would amount in value to something less than $70,000,000. According to the Compromise Act, no duty, after the period in question, can exceed twenty per cent., and the rates would range from that down to five or six per cent. Taking fifteen per cent, as the average, which would be, probably, full high, and allowing for the ex- penses of collection, the nett income would be something less than $1 0,000,000. The income from public lands is still more conjectural than that from cus- toms. There are so many, and such various causes in operation affecting this source of the public income, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a con- jectural estimate as to its amount, beyond the current year. But, in the midst of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely assumed, that the purchases during the last year, and thus far this, greatly exceed the steady, progressive demand for public lands, from increased population, and the consequent emigration to the new states and territories. Much of the purchases have been, unquestion- ably, made upon speculation, with a view to resales, and must, of course, come into market hereafter in competition with the lands of the government, and to that extent must reduce the income from their sales. Estimating even the de- mand for public lands from what it was previous to the recent large sales, and taking into estimate the increased population and wealth of the country, I do not consider it safe to assume more than $5,000,000 annually from this branch of the revenue, which, added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts between fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842. I now ask whether it would be prudent to raise the public expenditures to the sum of $30,000,000 annually during the intermediate period, with the prospect that they must be suddenly reduced to half that amount ? Who does not see the tierce conflict which must follow between those who may be interest- ed in keeping up the expenditures, and those who have an equal interest against ^ -^..^.„x^,».— r.,^,^»„^..^„»,.T,i.j..»»umimn»utimfHMll»uuMWBBMUIIIII an increase of the duties as the means of keeping them up ? I appeal to the senators from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest in low du- ties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and extravagant, and which, if adopted, might again renew the tariff, so recently thrown off by such hazard- ous and strenuous efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remem- ber what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly unparalleled, Congress then raised the duties to a rate so enormous as to average one half the value of the imports, when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when, of course, there would be no objects on which the immense income from such extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally expended. It is ama- zing that there was such blindness then as not to see what has since follow- ed — the sudden discharge of the debt, and an overflowing treasury, without the means of absorbing the surplus ; the violent conflict resulting from such a state of things ; and the vast increase of the power and patronage of the government, with all its corrupting consequences. We are now about, I fear, to commit an error of a different character : to raise the expenditure far beyond all example, in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue, which must, with equal cer- tainty, bring on another conflict, not much less dangerous, in which the strug- gle will not be to find objects to absorb an overflowing treasury, but to devise means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and legitimate wants of the country. It is easy to foresee that, if we are thus blindly to go on in the management of our aflairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent concussion which must follow from such folly cannot but end in a catastrophe that will ingulf our political institutions. With such decided objections to the dangerous and extravagant scheme of absorbing the surplus by disbursements, I proceed to the next question, Shall the public money remain where it now is ? Shall the present extraordinary state of things, without example or parallel, continue, of a government, calling itself free, extracting from the people millions beyond what it can expend, and placing that vast sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations, selected at the sole will of the executive, and continued during his pleasure, to be used as their own from the time it is collected till it is disbursed ? To this question there must burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and its insti- tutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice, and oppression, an indig- nant no. And here let me express the pleasure I feel that the senator from New-York, in moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme, has placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the present unheard-of and dangerous state of things ; and I add, as a simple act of justice, that the tone and temper of his remarks in support of his amendment were characterized by a courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shall endeavour to imitate. But I fear, notwithstanding this favourable indication in so influential a quarter, the very magnitude of the evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetu- ate it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its favovu-, that I greatly fear that all the eflbrts of the wise and patriotic to arrest it will prove unavailing. At the head of these stand the depository banks themselves, with their numerous stockholders and officers ; with their $40,000,000 of capital, and an equal amount of public deposites, associated into one great combination ex- tending over the whole Union, under the influence and control of the treasury department. The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply interest- ed in the continuance of the present state of things, is opposed to any change. To this powerful combination must be added the numerous and influential body who are dependant on banks to meet their engagements, and who, whatever may be their political opinions, must be alarmed at any change which may limit their discounts and accommodation. Then come the stock-jobbers, a growing and formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks, and who behold in the present state of things the most favourable opportunity of carrying on their dangerous and corrupting pursuits. With the control which the Secretary of the Treasury has over the banks of deposite, through transfer warrants, with the power of withdrawing the deposites at pleasure, he may, whenever he chooses, raise or depress the stock of any bank, and, if disposed to use this tremendous power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of the initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the secret. To the stock-jobbers must be added speculators of every hue and form ; and, in particu- lar, the speculators in public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are rapidly divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our ancestors in the public domain, by giving in exchange what may, in the end, prove to be broken credit and worthless rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty poli- ticians, who wield this mighty combination of interests for political purposes. I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in this discussion ; and, that I may not even seem to do so, I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fear- ful, and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the present state of things places in the hands of those who have control of the government, and which, if it be not wielded to overthrow our insthutions and destroy all responsibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and not to their want of means. Such is the power and influence interested to continue the public money where it is now deposited. To these there are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patri- otic of every party, who behold in the continuance of the present state of things almost certain convulsion and overthrow of our liberty. There would be found on the same side the great mass of the industrious and labouring portion of the community, whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their knowl- edge, were it not that what is improperly taken from them is successfully used as the means of deceiving and controUinfj them. If such were not the case — if those who work could see how those who profit are enriched at their ex- pense — the present state of things would not be endured for a moment ; but as it is, I fear that, from misconception, and consequent want of union and co- operation, things may continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a remedy. I trust, however, that such will not be the fact ; that the people will be roused from their false security ; and that Congress will refuse to adjourn till an efficient remedy is applied. In this hope, I recur to the inquiry, What shall that remedy be ? Shall we adopt the measure recommended by the senator from New- York, which, as has been stated, proposes to authorize the commis- sioners of the sinking fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter, and, if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to vest the surplus in the purchase of state stocks; but, if there shall be a deficiency, to sell so much of the stock previously purchased as would make up the difference ? I regret that the senator has not furnished a statement of facts sufficiently full to enable us to form an opinion of what will be the practical operation of his scheme. He has omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount of stocks issued by the several states : a fact indispensable in order to ascertain how the price of the stocks would be aflected by the application of the surplus to their purchase. All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind, must know that the price of stocks rises proportionably with the amount of the sum applied to their purchase. I have already shown that the probable surplus at the end of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appropriations, will be between thirty and thirty-five millions ; and before we can decide un- derstandingly whether this great sum can with propriety be applied as the sen- ator proposes, we should know whether the amount of state stocks be sufficient to absorb it, without raising their price extravagantly high. The setiator should also have informed us, not only as to the amount of the stock, but how it is distributed among the states, in order to enable us to deter- mine whether his scheme would operate equally between them. In the ab- "'"^'""~" sence of correct information on both of these points, we are compelled to use such as we may possess, however defective and uncertain, in order to make up our mind on his amendment. We all know, then, that while several of the states have no stocks, and rnany a very inconsiderable amount, three of the large states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New- York) have a very large amount, not less in the aggregate, if I am cor- rectly informed, than thirty-five or forty millions. What amount is held by the rest of the states is uncertain, but I suppose that it may be safely assumed that, taking the whole, it is less than that held by those states. With these facts, it cannot be doubted that the application of the surplus, as proposed to be ap- plied by the senator, would be exceedingly unequal among the states, and that the advantage of the application would mainly accrue to these states. To most of these objections, the senator, while he does not deny that the application of the surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that the states issuing them will not derive any benefit from the advance, and, consequently, have no interest in the question of the application of the surplus to their purchase. If by states he means the government of the states, the view of the senator may be correct. They may, as he says, have but little interest in the market value of their stocks, as it must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that be high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and comprehend the people of the state as well as the government, the argument entirely fails. The senator will not deny that the holders have a deep interest in the application of so large a sura as the present surplus in the purchase of their stocks. He will not deny that such application must greatly advance the price ; and, of course, in determining whether the states having stocks will be benefited by applying the surplus as he proposes, we must first ascertain who are the hold- ers. Where do they reside ? Are they foreigners residing abroad ? If so, would it be wise to apply the public money so as to advance the interests of foreigners, to whom the states are under no obligation but honestly to pay to them the debts which they have contracted ? But if not held by foreigners, are they held by citizens of such states ? If such be the fact, will the senator deny that those states will be deeply interested in the application of the surplus, as proposed in his amendment, when the effects of such application must be, as is conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the stocks, and, conse- quently, to increase the wealth of their citizens ? Let us suppose that, instead of purchasing the stocks of the states in which his constituents are interested, the senator's amendment had proposed to apply the present enormous surplus to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which the constituents of the Southern senators are interested, would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slave- holding states would have a deep interest in the question ? It will not be de- nied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly advanced, and the wealth of their citizens proportionably increased. Precisely the same eff*ect would re- sult from the application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the citi- zens of the states which have issued large amounts of stock. The principle is the same in both cases. But there is another view of the subject which demands most serious consid- eration. Assuming, what will not be questioned, that the application of the sur- plus, as proposed by the amendment, will be very unequal among the states, some having little or none, and others a large amount of stocks, the result would necessarily be to create, in effect, the relation of debtor and creditor between the states. The states Avhose stocks might be purchased by the commission- ers would become the debtors of the government ; and as the government would. in fact, be but the agent between them and the other states, the latter would, in reality, be their creditors. This relation between them could not fail to be pro- ductive of important political consequences, which would infiuence all the op- erations of the government. It would, in particular, have a powerful bearing upon the presidential election ; the debtor and creditor states each striving to give such a result to the elections as might be favourable to their respective in- terests ; the one to exact, and the other to exempt themselves from the pay- ment of the debt. Supposing the three great states to which I have referred, whose united influence would have so decided a control, to be the principal debtor states, as would, in all probability, be the fact, it is easy to see that the result would be, finally, the release of the debt, and, consequently, a correspond- ent loss to the creditor, and gain to the debtor states. But there is another view of the subject still more deserving, if possible, of attention than either of those which have been presented. It is impossible not to see, after what has been said, that the power proposed to be conferred by the amendment of the senator, of applying the surplus in buying and selling the stocks of the states, is one of great extent, and calculated to have powerful in- fluence, not only on a large body of the most wealthy and influential citizens of the states which have issued stocks, but on the states themselves. The next question is. In whom is the exercise of this power to be vested ? "Where shall we find individuals sufficiently detached from the politics of the day, and whose virtue, patriotism, disinterestedness, and firmness can raise them so far above political and sinister motives as to exercise powers so high and influen- tial exclusively for the public good, without any view to personal or political aggrandizement ? Who has the amendment selected as standing aloof from pol- itics, and possessing these high qualifications ? Who are the present commis- sioners of the sinking fund, to whom this high and responsible trust is to be confided ? At the head stands the Vice-president of the United States, with whom the Chief-justice of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secre- tary of the Treasurj% and the Attorney-general, are associated ; all party men, deeply interested in the maintenance of power in the present hands, and having the strongest motives to apply the vast power which the amendment would con- fer upon them, should it become a law, to party purposes. I do not say it would be so applied ; but I must ask. Would it be prudent, would it be wise, would it be seemly, to vest such great and dangerous powers in those who have so strong a motive to abuse it, and who, if they should have elevation and virtue enough to resist the temptation, would still be suspected of having used the power for sinister and corrupt purposes ? I am persuaded, in drawing the amendment, that the senator from New- York has, without due reflection on the impropriety of vesting the power where he proposes, inadvertently inserted the provision which he has, and that, on review, he will concur with me, that, should his amendment be adopted, the power ought to be vested in others, less expo- sed to temptation, and, consequently, less exposed to suspicion. I have now stated the leading objections to the several modes of disposing of the surplus revenue which I proposed to consider ; and the question again recurs, What shall be done with the surplus ? The Senate is not uninformed of my opinion on this important subject. Foreseeing that there would be a large sur- plus, and the mischievous consequences that must follow, I moved, during the last session, for a select committee, which, among other measures, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution as to authorize the temporary distribu- tion of the surplus among the states ; but so many doubted whether there would be a surplus at the time, that it rendered all prospect of carr}dng the resolution hopeless. My opinion still remains unchanged, that the measure then proposed was the best ; but so rapid has been the accumulation of the surplus, even be- yond my calculation, and so pressing the danger, that what would have been then an efficient remedy, would now be too tardy to meet the danger, and, of course, another remedy must be devised, more speedy in its action. After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate attention, I have come to the conclusion that there is no other so safe, so efficient, and so free from ob- jections as the one I have proposed, of depositing the surplus that may remain ■-"^— "— -^— -" — ""^'"""'^■■■■■■M— ^^^^^— ^■«^»l^"^»^"^i— ^I^M^^^gm at tlie termination of the year, in the treasury of the several states, in the man- ner provided for in the amendment. But the senator from New- York objects to the measure, that it would, in effect, amount to a distribution, on the ground, as he conceives, that the states would never refund. He does not doubt but that they would, if called on to refund by the government ; but he says that Con- gress will, in fact, never make the call. He rests this conclusion on the sup- position that there would be a majority of the states opposed to it. He admits, in case the revenue should become deficient, that the Southern or staple states would prefer to refund their quota rather than to raise the imposts to meet the deficit ; but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the manufacturing states, which would prefer to increase the imposts to refunding their quota, on the ground that the increase of the duties would promote the interests of manu- factures, I cannot agree with the senator that those states would assume a po- sition so entirely untenable as to refuse to refund a deposite which their faith would be plighted to return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to lay a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would, consequently, throw the whole burden of the tax on the other states. But, be this as it may, I can tell the senator that, if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he may rest assured that the other states would most miquestionably resist the in- crease of the imposts ; so that the government would have to take its choice, either to go without the money, or call on the states to refund the deposites. But I so far agree with the senator as to believe that Congress would be very reluctant to make the call ; that it would not make it till, from the wants of the treasury, it should become absolutely necessary ; and that, in order to avoid such necessity, it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public ex- penditures as the preferable alternative. I see in this, however, much good in- stead of evil. The government has long since departed from habits of econo- my, and fallen into a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance in its disburse- ments, rarely equalled by any free state, and which threatens the most disas- trous consequences. But I am happy to think that the ground on which the objection of the sena- tor stands may be removed, without materially impairing the provisions of the bill. It will require but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giving to the deposites all the advantages, without the objections, which he proposes by his plan. It will be easy to provide that the states shall authorize the proper officers to give negotiable certificates of deposite, which shall not bear interest till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid. Such certificates would be, in fact, state stocks, every way similar to that in which the senator proposes to vest the surplus, but with this striking superiority : that, instead of being partial, and limited to a few states, they would be fairly and justly appor- tioned among the several states. They would have another striking advantage over his. They would create among all the members of the confederacy, recip- rocally, the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their relative weight in the Union ; which, in effect, would leave them in their present relation, and would, of course, avoid the danger that would result from his plan, which, as has been shown, would necessarily make a part of the states debtors to the rest, with all the dangers resulting from such relation. The next objection of the senator is to the ratio of distribution proposed in the bill among the states, which he pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitution- al. He insists that the true principle would be to distribute the surplus among the states in proportion to the representa^tion of the House of Representatives, without including the senators, as is proposed in the bill, for which he relies on the lact, that, by the Constitution, representation and taxation are to be appor- tioned in the same manner among the states. The Senate will see that the effect of adopting the ratio supported by the senator would be to favour the large states, while that in the bill will be more favourable to the small. The state I in part represent occupies a neutral position between the two. She cannot be considered either a large or a small state, forming, as she does, one twenty-fourth part of the Union ; and, of course, it is the same to her which- ever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer the one contained in my amendment, on the o-round that it represents the relative weight of the states in the govern- ment. It is the weight assigned to them in the choice of the President and Vice-president in the electoral college, and, of course, in the administration of the laws. It is also that assigned to them in the making of the laws by the ac- tion of the two houses, and corresponds very nearly to their weight in the ju- dicial department of the government, the judges being nominated by the Presi- dent and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, I was influenced, in selecting the ratio, by the belief that it was a wise and magnanimous course, in case of doubt, to faVour the weaker members of the confederacy. The larger can al- ways take care of themselves ; and, to avoid jealousy and improper feelings, ought to act liberally towards the weaker members of the confederacy. To which may be added, that I am of the impression that, even on fhe principle as- sumed by the senator, that the distribution of the surplus ought to be apportion- ed on the ratio with direct taxation (which maybe well doubted), the ratio which I support would conform in practice more nearly to the principle than that which he supports. It is a fact not generally known, that representation in the other house, and direct taxes, should they be laid, woidd be very far from being equal, although the Constitution provides that they should be. The inequality would result from the mode of apportioning the representatives. Instead of apportion- ing them among the states, as near as may be, as directed by the Constitution, an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which, in its effects, gives to the large states a greater number, and to the small a less than that to which they are entitled. I would refer those who may desire to understand how this ine- quality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the apportionment bill un- der the last census. So great is this inequality, that, were a direct tax to be laid, New- York, for instance, would have at least three members more than her apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I have proposed would, I admit, produce as great an inequality in favour of some of the small states, particularly the old, whose population is nearly stationar}^ ; but among the new and growing members of the confederacy, which constitute the greater portion of the small states, it would not give them a larger share of the deposites than what they would be entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objec- tion of the senator to the ratio of distribution, like his objection to the condition on which the bill proposes to make it, is a matter of small comparative conse- quence. I am prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one or the other may be more acceptable to the Senate. It now remains to compare the disposition of the surplus proposed in the bill with the others I have discussed ; and, unless I am greatly deceived, it pos- sesses great advantages over them. Compared with the scheme of expending the surplus, its advantage is, that it would avoid the extravagance and waste which must result from suddenly more than quadrupling the expenditures, with- out a corresponding organization in the disbursing department of the govern- ment to enforce economy and responsibiUty. It would also avoid the diversion of so large a portion of the industr\^ of the country from its present useful direc- tion to unproductive olijects, with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity of the country, as has been shown, while it would, at the same time, avoid the increase of the patronage and influence of the government, with all their corruption and danger to the liberty and institutions of the country. But its advantages would not be limited simply to avoiding the evil of extravagant and useless disburse- ments. It would confer posuive benefits, by enabling the states to discharge their debts, and complete a system of internal improvements, by railroads and canals, which woidd not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the confederacy, but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely our resources and prosperity I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of the surplus which is proposed in the bill with the dangerous, and, I must say, wicked scheme of leai'ino- the public funds where they are, in the banks of deposite, to be loaned out by those institutions to speculators and partisans, without authority or con- trol of law. Compared with the plan proposed by the senator from New-York, it is suffi- cient, to prove its superiority, to say that, while it avoids all of the objections to which his is liable, it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with others peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent is, that it provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-seated disease which now af- flicts the body politic, and which threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be speedily and effectually arrested. All who have reflected on the nature of our complex system of government, and the dangers to which it is exposed, have seen that it is susceptible, from its structure, to two dangers of opposite character, one threatening consolidation, and the other anarchy and dissolution. From the beginning of the government, we find a difference of opinion among the wise and patriotic to which the gov- ernment was most exposed : one part believing that the danger was that the government would absorb the reserved powers of the states, and terminate in consolidation, while the other were equally confident that the states would ab- sorb the powers of the government, and the system end in anarchy and disso- lution. It was this diversity of opinion which gave birth to the two great, hon- est, and patriotic parties which so long divided the community, and to the many political conflicts which so long agitated the country. Time has decided the controversy. We are no longer left to doubt that the danger is on the side of this government, and that, if not arrested, the system must terminate in an entire absorption of the powers of the states. Looking back, with the light which experience has furnished, we now clearly see that both of the parties took a false view of the operation of the system. It was admitted by both that there would be a conflict for power between the gov- ernment and the states, arising from a disposition on the part of those who, for the time being, exercised the powers of the government and the states, to en- large their respective powers at the expense of each other, and which would induce each to watch the other with incessant vigilance. Had such proved to be the fact, I readily concede that the result would have been the opposite to what has occurred, and the Republican, and not the Federal party, would have been mistaken as to the tendency of the system. But so far from this jealousy, experience has shown that, in the operation of the system, a majority of the states have acted in concert with the government at all times, except upon the eve of a political revolution, when one party was about to go out, to make room for the other to come in ; and we now clearly see that this has not been the result of accident, but that the habitual operation must necessarily be so. " The mis- conception resulted from overlooking the fact, that the government is but an agent of the states, and that the dominant majority of the Union, which elect and control a majority of the State Legislatures, would elect also those who would control this government, whether that majority rested on sectional inter- ests, on patronage and influence, or whatever basis it might, and that they would use the power both of the General and State Governments jointly, for aggran- dizement and the perpetuation of their power. Regarded in this light, it is not at all surprising that the tendency of the system is such as it has proved itself to be, and which any intelligent observer now sees must necessarily terminate in a central, absolute, irresponsible, and despotic power. It is this fatal ten- dency that the measure proposed in the bill is calculated to counteract, and which, I believe, would prove effective if now applied. It would place the states in the relation in which it was universally believed they would stand to this government at the time of its formation, and make them those jealous and H H OirijLd\^ncju vigilant guardians of its action on all measures touching the disbursements and expenditures of the government, which it was confidently believed they would be • which would arrest the fatal tendency to the concentration of ihe entire power of the system in this government, if any power on earth can. But it is objected that the remedy would be too powerful, and would produce an opposite and equally dangerous tendency. I coincide that such would be the danger, if permanently applied ; and, under that impression, and believing that the present excess of revenue would not continue longer, I have limited the measure to the duration of the Compromise Act. Thus limited, it will act sufficiently long, I trust, to eradicate the present disease, without superinducing one of an opposite character. But the plan proposed is supported by its justice, as well as these high con- siderations of political expediency. The surplus money in the treasury is not ours. It properly belongs to those who made it, and from whom it has been unjustly taken. I hold it an unquestionable principle, that the government has no right to take a cent from the people beyond what is necessary to meet its legitimate and constitutional wants. To take more intentionally would be rob- bery ; and, if the government has not incurred the guilt in the present case, its exemption can only be found in its folly — the folly of not seeing and guarding against a-vast excess of revenue, which the most ordinary understanding ought to have foreseen and prevented. If it were in our power — if we could ascertain from whom the vast amount now in the treasury was improperly taken, justice would demand that it should be returned to its lawful owners. But, as that is impossible, the measure next best, as approaching nearest to restitution, is that which is proposed, to deposite it in the treasuries of the several states, which will place it under the disposition of the immediate representatives of the peo- ple, to be used by them as they may think fit till the wants of the government may require its return. But it is objected that such a disposition would be a bribe to the people. A bribe to the people ! to return it to those to whom it justly belongs, and from whose pockets it should never have been taken. A bribe ! to place it in the char<^e of those who are the immediate representatives of those from whom we derive our authority, and who may employ it so much more usefully than we can. But what is to be done ? If not returned to the people, it must go some- how ; and is there no danger of bribing those to whom it may go ? If we dis- burse it, is there no danger of bribing the thousands of agents, contractors, and jobbers, through whose hands it must pass, and in whose pockets, and those of their associates, so large a part would be deposited 1 If, to avoid this, we leave it where it is, in the banks, is there no danger of bribing the banks in who&e custody it is, with their various dependants, and the numerous swarms of specu- lators which hover about them in hopes of participating in the spoil 1 Is there no danger of bribing the political managers, who, through the deposites, have the control of these banks, and, by them, of their dependants, and the hungry and vo- racious hosts of speculators who have overspread and are devouring the land ? Yes, literally devouring the land. Finally, if it should be vested as proposed by the senator from New- York, is there no danger of bribing the holders of state stocks, and, through them, the states which have issued them ? Are the agents, the jobbers, and contractors ; are the directors and stockholders of the banks ; are the speculators and stock-jobbers ; are the political managers and holders of state securities, the only honest portion of the community ? Are they alone incapable of being bribed ? And are the people the least honest, and most liable to be bribed? Is this the creed of those now in power? of ■those who profess to be the friends of the people, and to place implicit confi- ■ dence in their virtue and patriotism ? I have now (said Mr. Culhouu) stated what, in my opinion, ought to be done -•with the surplus. Another question still remains : not what shall, but what will be done with the surplus ? With a few remarks on this question, I shall conclude what I intended to say. There was a time, in the better days of the Republic, when to show what ought to be done was to ensure the adoption of the measure. Those days have passed away, I fear, forever. A power has risen up in the government greater than the people themselves, consisting of many, and various, and powerful in- terests, combined into one mass, and held together by the cohesive power of the vast surplus in the banks. This mighty combination will be opposed to any change ; and it is to be feared that, such is its influence, no measure to which it is opposed can become a law, however expedient and necessary, and that the public money will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as the public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed, seems fast ap- proaching, when no law can pass, nor any honour be conferred, from the chief magistrate to the tide-waiter, without the assent of this powerful and interested combination, which is steadily becoming the government itself, to the utter sub- version of the authority of the people. Nay, I fear we are in the midst of it ; and I look with anxiety to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are or not. If nothing should be done — if the money which justly belongs to the people be left where it is, with the many and overwhelming objections to it — the fact will prove that a great and radical change has been effected ; that the govern- ment is subverted ; that tlie authority of the people is suppressed by a union of the banks and executive — a union a hundred times more dangerous than that of Church and State, against which the Constitution has so jealously guarded. It would be the announcement of a state of things from which, it is to be feared, there can be no recovery — a state of boundless corruption, and the lowest and basest subserviency. It seems to be the order of Providence that, with the exception of these, a people may recover from any other evil. Piracy, robbery, and violence of every description may, as history proves, be followed by vir- tue, patriotism, and national greatness ; but where is the example to be found of a degenerate, corrupt, and subservient people, who have ever recovered their virtue and patriotism ! Their doom has ever been the lowest state of wretch- edness and misery : scorned, trodden down, and obliterated forever from the list of nations. May Heaven grant that such may never be our doom ! XVI. SPEECH ON THE BILL FOR THE ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN, JANUARY 2, 1837. • Mr. Grundy moved that the previous orders of the day be postponed, for the purpose of considering the bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union. Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the motion ; the documents accompanying the bill had but this morning been laid upon the tables, and no time had heen allowed for even reading them over. Mr. Grundy insisted on his motion. Of one point he was fully satis- fied, that Michigan had a right to be received into the Union ; on this, he presumed, there would be but little difference of opinion, the chief diffi- culty having respect to the mode in which it was to be done. There seemed more difference of opinion, and he presumed there would be more debate, touching the preamble than concerning the bill itself; but he could not consent to postpone the subject. Congress were daily pass- ing laws, the effect of which pressed immediately upon the people of Michigan, and concerning which they were entitled to have a voice and 244 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJIT. a vote upon this floor ; and, therefore, the bill for their admission ought to receive the immediate action of the Senate. As to the documents, they were not numerous. The gentleman from South Carolina might readily run his eye over them, and he would perceive that the facts of the case were easily understood. Indeed, there was but one of any con- sequence respecting which there was any controversy. When the Senate adjourned on Thursday, many senators had been prepared, and were de- sirous to speak, although the documents were not then printed. It was the great principles involved in the case which would form the subjects of discussion, and they could as well be discussed now. He thought the Senate had better proceed. One fact in the case was very certain : there had been more votes for the members to the last convention than for the first. How many more was a matter of little comparative consequence. The great question for the Senate to consider was this ; What is the will of Michigan on the subject of entering the Union I If this could be decided, it was of less consequence whether the bill should or should not expressly state that the last convention, and the as- sent by it given, formed the ground of the admission of the state. Mr. Calhoun here inquired whether the chairman of the committee was to be understood as being now ready to abandon the preamble 1 If the Judiciary Committee were agreed to do this, he thought all difficulty would be at an end. Mr. Grundy replied, that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he had no authority to reply to the inquiry, but, as an individual^ he consid- ered the preamble as of little consequence, and he should vote for the bill whether it were in or out. Michigan ought, undoubtedly^, to be ad- mitted, and all the consequences would result, v/hether the preamble were retained or not. He had received no authority from the committee to consent that it should be stricken out. For himself^ he was settled in the belief that Congress possessed full power to prescribe the boundaries of a territory, and that, when that territory passed into a state, the right re- mained still the same. Congress had already established the boundary of Ohio, and that settled the question. He never had perceived the necessity of inserting in the admission bill the section which made the assent of Mich- igan to the boundaries fixed for her by Congress a prerequisite to her admission, because the disputed boundary line was fixed by another bill j and, whether the preamble to this bill should be retained or not, Michigan could not pass the line, so that the preamble was really of very little consequence. Mr. Calhoun said that, in inquiring of the honourable chairman whether he intended to abandon the preamble of the bill, his question had had re- spect, not to any pledge respecting boundaries, but to the recognition of the second convention and of its doings. He watited to know whether the chairman was ready to abandon that principle. He had examined the subject a good deal, and his own mind was fully made up that Michigan could not be admitted on the ground of that second convention j but the Senate might set aside the whole of what had been done, and receive Michigan as she stood at the commencement of the last session, Mr. Grundy observed, that if the gentleman's mind was fully made up, then there could be no necessity of postponing the subject. The gentle- man has fully satisfied himself, and now (said Mr. G.) let us see if he can satisfy us. His argument, it seems, has been fully matured, and we are now ready to listen to it. Though I consider that there is no virtue in the preamble, and that the effect of the bill will be the same whether it is stricken out or retained, yet I am not ready to say that I shall vote to strike it out. I am ready to hear what can be said both for and against it. The question was now put on the motion of Mr. Grundy to postpone the previous orders, and carried, 22 to 16. So the orders were postponed, and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which having been again r€ad at the clerk's table, as follows : Ji Bill to admk the State of Michigan into the Union upon an equal footing with the, original States. Whereas, ia pursuance of the act of Congress of June the fifteenth, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, "An act to establish the northern boundary of the State of Ohio, and to provide for the admission of the State o£ Michigan into the Union, upon the conditions therein expressed," a convention of delegates, elected by the people of the said State of Michigan, for the sole purpose of giving their assent to the boundaries of the said State of Michigan as described, declared, and established in and by the said act, did, on the fifteenth of December, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, assent to the provisions of said act: therefore, Be it enacted, <§-c.. That the State of Michigan shall be one, and is here- by declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on. an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever. Sec. 2. <^nd be it fait her enacted. That the Secretary of the Treasury, in carrying into efl'ect the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the act of the twenty-third of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, " An act to regulate the deposites of the public money," shall consider the State o[ Michigan as being one of the United States, Mr. Calhouii then rose, and addressed the Senate as follows : I have bestowed on this subject all the attention that was in my power, and, although actuated by a most anxious desire for the admission of Michigan into the Union, I find it impossible to give my assent to this bill. I am satisfied the Judiciary Committee has not bestowed upon the subject all that attention which its magnitude requires, and I can explain it on no other supposition why they should place the admission on the grounds they have. One o[ the committee, the senator from Ohio on my left (Mr. Morris), has pronounced the grounds as dangerous and revolu- tionary ; he might have gone farther, and, with truth, pronounced them utterly repugnant to the principles of the Constitution, I have not ventured this assertion, as strong as it is, without due reflec- tion, and weighing the full force of the terms I have used, and do not fear, with an impartial hearing, to establish its truth beyond the power of controversy. To understand fully the objection to this bill, it is necessary that we should have a correct conception of the facts. They are few, and may be briefly told. Some time previous to the last session of Congress, the Territory of Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized the people to meet in con- vention for the purpose of forming a state government. They met, accord- ingly, and agreed upon a constitution, which they forthwith transmitted to Congress. It was fully discussed in this chamber, and, objectionable as the instrument was, an act was finally passed, which accepted the con- stitution, and declared Michigan to be a state and admitted into the Union, on the single condition that she should, by a convention of the people, assent to the boundaries prescribed by the act. Soon after our adjournment, the Legislature of the State of Michigan (for she had been raised by our assent to the dignity of a state) called a convention of the people of the state, in conformity to the act, which met, at the time orjir-i^nr-c appointed, at Ann Arbour, After full discussion, the convention ivith- held its assent and formally transmitted the result to the President of the United States. This is the first part of the story. I will now give the sequel. Since then, during the last month, a self-constituted assembly met, professedly as a convention of the people of the state, but without the authority of the state. This unauthorized and lawless assemblage assumed the high function of giving the assent of the State of Michigan to the condition of admission, as prescribed in the act of Congress. They communicated their assent to the executive of the United States, and he to the Senate. The Senate referred his message to the Committee on the Judiciary, and that committee reported this bill for the admission of the state. Such are the facts, out of which grows the important question, Had this self-constituted assembly the authority to assent for the state 1 Had they the authority to do what is implied in giving assent to the condition of admission] That assent introduces the state into the Union, and pledges it, in the most solemn manner, to the constitutional compact which binds these states in one confederated body ; imposes on her all its obligations, and confers on her all its benefits. Had this irregular, self-constitued as- semblage, the authority to perform these high and solemn acts of sov- ereignty in the name of the State of Michigan '{ She could only come in as a state, and none could act or speak for her without her express au- thority ; and to assume the authority without her sanction is nothing short of treason against the state. Again : the assent to the conditions prescribed by Congress implies an authority in those who gave it to supersede, in part, the Constitution of the State of Michigan ; for her Constitution fixes the boundaries of the state as part of that instrument, which the condition of admission en- tirely alters, and, to that extent, the assent would supersede the Consti- tution ; and thus the question is presented, whether this self-constituted assembly, styling itself a convention, had the authority to do an act which necessarily implies the right to supersede, in part, the Constitution. But farther : the State of Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized a convention of the people, in order to determine whether the condition of admission should be assented to or not. The convention met, and, after mature deliberation, it dissented from the condition of admission ; and thus, again, the question is presented, whether this self-called, self-consti- tuted assemblage, this caucus — for it is entitled to no higher name — had the authority to annul the dissent of the state, solemnly given by a con- vention of the people, regularly convoked under the express authority of the constituted authorities of the state 1 If all or any of these questions be answered in the negative — if the self- created assemblage of December had no authority to speak in the name of the State of Michigan — if none to supersede any portion of her Con- stitution — if none to annul her dissent from the condition of admission, reg- ularly given by a convention of the people of the state, convoked by the authority of the state — to introduce her on its authority would be not only revolutionary and dangerous, but utterly repugnant to the principles of our Constitution. The question, then, submitted to the Senate is. Had that assemblage the authority to perform these high and solemn acts 1 The chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary holds that this self- constituted assemblage had the authority; and what is his reason'? Why, truly, because a greater number of votes were given for those who con- stituted that assemblage than for those who constituted the convention of the people of the state, convened under its constituted authorities. This argument resolves itself into two questions — the first of fact, and ■ ■■■■■■ rmi»*i the second of principle. I shall not discuss the first. It is not necessary to do so. But, if it were, it would be easy to show that never was so important a fact so loosely testified. There is not one particle of official evidence before us. We have nothing but the private letters of individ- uals, who do not know even the numbers that voted on either occasion j they know nothing of the qualifications of voters, nor how their votes were received, nor by whom counted. Now, none knows better than the honourable chairman himself, that such testimony as is submitted to us to establish a fact of this moment, would not be received in the lowest magistrate's court in the land. But I waive this. I come to the question of the principle involved ; and what is it \ The argument is, that a greater number of persons voted for the last convention than for the first, and, therefore, the acts of the last of right abrogated those of the first j in other words, ihat mere numbers, without regard to the forms of law or the principles of the Constitution, give authority. The authority of numbers, according to this argument, sets aside the authority of law and the Constitution. Need I show that such a principle goes to the entire overthrow of our constitutional government, and would subvert all social order % It is the identical principle which prompted the late revolutionary and anarchical movement in Maryland, and which has done more to shake confidence in our system of government than any event since the adoption of our Con- stitution, but which, happily, has been frowned down by the patriotism and intelligence of the people of that state. What was the ground of this insurrectionary measure, but that the government of Maryland did not represent the voice of the numerical majority of the people of Maryland, and that the authority of law and the Constitution was nothing against that of numbers \ Here we find on this floor, and from the head of the Judiciary Committee, the same principle re- vived, and, if possible, in a worse form ; for, in Maryland, the anarchists assumed that they were sustained by the numerical majority of the people of the state in their revolutionary movements ; but the utmost the chair- man can pretend to have is a mere plurality. The largest number of votes claimed for the self-created assemblage is 8000 j and no man will undertake to say that this constitutes anything like a majority of the voters of Michigan ; and he claims the high authority which he does for it, not because it is a majority of the people of Michigan, but because it is a greater number than voted for the authorized convention of the peo- ple that refused to agree to the condition of admission. It may be shown, by his own witness, that a majority of the voters of Michigan greatly ex- ceed 8000. Mr. Williams, the president of the self-created assemblage, stated that the population of that state amounted to nearly 200,000 per- sons. If so, there cannot be less than from 20,000 to 30,000 voters, con- sidering how nearly universal the right of sufirage is under its Constitu- tion ; and it thus appears that this irregular, self-constituted meeting did not represent the vote of one third of the state; and yet, on a mere prin- ciple of plurality, we are to supersede the Constitution of Michigan, and annul the act of a convention of the people, regularly convened under the authority of the government of the state. But, says the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), this assembly was not self-constituted. It met under the authority of an act of Con- gress; and that act had no reference to the state, but only to the people ; and that the assemblage in December was just such a meeting as that act contemplated. It is not my intention to discuss the question whether the honourable senator has given the true interpretation of the act, but, if it were, I could very easily show his interpretation to be erroneous ; for, if such had been the intention o{ Congress, the act surely would have spe jjijQ :irCjrjKjni:jj cified the time when the convention was to be held, who were to be the manao-ers who the voters, and would not have left it to individuals who might° choose to assume the authority to determine all these important points. I might also readily show that the word " convention" of the people as use'd in law or the Constitution, always means a meeting of the people' reo-ularly convened by the constituted authority of the state, in their hio-h sovereio-n capacity, and that it never means such an assemblage as the one in question. But I waive this ; I take higher ground. If the act be indeed, such as the senator says it is, then I maintain that it is utterly opposed to the fundamental principles of our Federal Union. Congress has no rio-ht Avhatever to call a convention in a state. It can call but one convention, and that is a convention of the United States to amend the Federal Constitution ; nor can it call that, except authorized by two thirds of the states. Ours is a Federal Republic — a union of states. Michigan is a state ; a state in the course of admission, and differing only from the other states in her federal relations. She is declared to be a state, in the most solemn manner, by your own act. She can come into the Union only as a state, and by her voluntary assent, given by the people of the state in convention, called by the constituted authority of the state. To admit the State of Michigan on the authority of a self-created meeting, or one called by the direct°authority of Congress, passing by the authorities of the state, would be the most monstrous proceeding under our Constitution that can be con- ceived ; the most repugnant to its principles, and dangerous in its conse- quences. It would establish a direct relation between the individual citi- zens of a state and the General Government, in utter subversion of the federal character of our system. The relation of the citizens to this government is through the states exclusively. They are subject to its authority and laws only because the state has assented they should be. If she dissents, their assent is nothing ; on the other hand, if she assents, their dissent is nothing. It is through the state, then, and through the state alone, that the United States government can have any connexion with the people of a state ; and does not, then, the senator from Pennsyl- vania see, that if Congress can authorize a convention of the people in the State of Michigan without the authority of the state, it matters not what is the object,'^ it may, in like manner, authorize conventions in any other state for whatever purpose it may think proper 1 Michigan is as much a sovereign state as any other, differing only, as I have said, as to her federal relations. If we give our sanction to the assemblage of December, on the principle laid down by the senator from Pennsylvania, then we establish the doctrine that Congress has power to call at pleasure conventions within the states. Is there a senator on this floor who will assent to such a doctrine 1 Is there one, especially, who represents the smaller states of this Union, or the weaker section 1 Ad- mit the power, and every vestige of state rights would be destroyed. Our system would be subverted, and, instead of a confederacy of free and sovereign states, we should have all power concentrated here, and this would become the most odious despotism. He, indeed, must be blind, who does not see that such a power would give the Federal Government a complete control of all the states. I call upon senators now to arrest a doctrine so dangerous. Let it be remembered that, under our system, bad precedents live forever; good ones only perish. We may not feei all the evil consequences at once, but this precedent, once set, will surely be received, and will become the instrument of infinite evil. It will be asked, What shall be done 1 Will you refuse to admit Michi- gan into the Union I I answer, No : I desire to admit her ; and if the seii- ators from Indiana and Ohio will agree, I am ready now to admit her as she stood at the beginning of last session, without giving sanction to the unauthorized assemblage of December. But if that does not meet their wishes, there is still another by which she may be admitted. "We are told two thirds of the Legislature and peo- ple of Michigan are in favour of accepting the conditions of the act of last session. If that be the fact, then all that is necessary is, that the Legislature should call another convention. All difficulty will thus be re- moved, and there will be still abundant time for her admission at this ses- sion. And shall we, for the sake of gaining a few months, give our as- sent to a bill fraught with principles so monstrous as this 1 We have been told that, unless she is admitted immediately, it will be too late for her to receive her proportion of the surplus revenue under the deposite bill. I trust that on so great a question a difficulty like this will have no weight. Give her at once her full share. I am ready to do so at once, without waiting her admission. I was mortified to hear on so grave a question such motives assigned for her admission, contrary to the law and Constitution. Such considerations ought not to be present- ed when we are settling great constitutional principles. I trust that we shall pass by all such frivolous motives on this occasion, and take ground on the great and fundamental principle that an informal, irregular, self-con- stituted assembly, a mere caucus, has no authority to speak for a sovereign state in any case whatever ; to supersede its Constitution, or to reverse its dissent, deliberately given by a convention of the people of the state, reg- ularly convened under its constituted authority. XVII. ON THE SAME SUBJECT, JANUARY 5, 1837. Mr. Grundy, chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, having moved that the bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union be now read a third time, Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate in opposition to the bill. I have (said Mr. C.) been connected with this government more than half its existence, in various capacities, and during that long period I have looked on its action with attention, and have endeavoured to make my- self acquainted with the principles and character of our political institu- tions; and I can truly say, that within that time no measure has received the sanction of Congress which has appeared to me more unconstitutional and dangerous than the present. It assails our political system in its weakest point, and where, at this time, it most requires defence. The great and leading objections to the bill rest mainly on the ground that Michigan is a state. They have been felt by its friends to have so much weight, that its advocates have been compelled to deny the fact, as the only way of meeting the objections. Here, then, is the main point at issue between the friends and the opponents of the bill. It turns on a fact, and that fact presents the question. Is 3Iichigan a state ? If (said Mr. C.) there ever was a party committed on a fact — if there ever was one estopped from denying it — that party is the present majority in the Senate, and that fact that Michigan is a state. It is the very party who urged through this body, at the last session, a bill for the admission of the State of Michigan, which accepted her Constitution, and declared, in the most explicit and strongest terms, that she was a state. I will not take up the time of the Senate by reading this solemn declaration. It has 1 1 250 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. frequently been read during- this debate, and is familiar to all who hear me, and has not been questioned or denied. But it has been said there is a condition annexed to the declaration, with which she must comply- before she can become a state. There is, indeed, a condition ; but it has been shown by my colleague and others, from the plain wording of the act, that the condition is not attached to the acceptance of the Constitu- tion, nor the declaration that she is a state, but simply to h.e^ admission into the Union. I will not repeat the argument, but, in order to place the subject beyond controversy, I shall recall to memory the history of the last session, as connected with the admission of ^Michigan. The facts need but be referred to, in order to revive their recollection. There were two points proposed to be effected by the friends of the bill at the last session. The first was to settle the controversy, as to bound- ary, between Michigan and Ohio, and it was that object alone which im- posed the condition that Michigan should assent to the boundary pre- scribed by the act as the condition of her admission. But there was an- other object to be accomplished. Two respectable gentlemen, who had been elected by the state as senators, were then waiting to take their seats on this floor ; and the other object of the bill was to provide for their taking their seats as senators on the admission of the state, and for this purpose it was necessary to make the positive and unconditional dec- laration that Michigan was a state, as a state only could choose senators, by an express provision of the Constitution ; and hence, the admission was made conditional, and the declaration that she was a state was made ab- solute, in order to effect both objects. To show that I am correct, I will ask the secretary to read the third section of the bill. [The section was read, accordingly, as follows: " Sect. 3. ^nd he it farther e?iacted, That, as a compliance with the fundamental condition of admission contained in the last preceding sec- tion of this act, the boundaries of the said State of Michigan, as in that section described, declared, and established, shall receive the assent of a convention of delegates elected by the people of said state, for the sole purpose of giving the assent herein required ; and as soon as the assent herein required shall be given, the President of the United States shall announce the same by proclamation ; and thereupon, and without any faN ther proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said state into the Union, as one of the United States of America, on an equal foot- ing with the original states in every respect whatever, shall be considered as complete, and the senators and representatives who have been elected by the said state as its representative in the Congress of the United States, shall be entitled to take their seats in the Senate and House of Repre- sentatives respectively, without farther delay."] Mr. Calhoun then asked. Does not every senator see the two objects — the one to settle the boundary, and the other to admit her senators to a seat in this body ; and that the section is so worded as to effect both, in the manner I have stated 1 If this needed confirmation, it would find it in the debate on the passage of the bill, when the ground was openly- taken by the present majority, that Michigan had a right to form her con- stitution, under the ordinance of 1787, without our consent, and that she was of right, and in fact, a state, beyond our control. I will (said Mr. C.) explain my own views on this point, in order that the consistency of my course at the last and present session may be clearly seen. My opinion was, and still is, that the movement of the people of Michi- gan in forming for themselves a state constitution, without waiting for the assent of Congress, was revolutionary, as it threw oif the authority of the United States over the territory ; and that we were left at liberty to treat the proceedings as revolutionary, and to remand her to her territorial condition, or to waive the irregularity, and to recognise what was done as rightfully done, as our authority alone was concerned. My impression was, that the former was the proper course ; but I also thought that the act remanding her back should contain our assent in the usual manner for her to form a constitution, and thus to leave her free to become a state. This, however, was overruled. The opposite opinion prevailed, that she had a perfect right to do what she had done, and that she was, as I have stated, a state both in fact and right, and that we had no control over her; and our act, accordingly, recognised her as a state from the time she had adopted her Constitution, and admitted her into the Union on the condition of her assenting to the prescribed boundaries. Having thus solemnly recognised her as a state, we cannot now undo what was then done. There were, in fact, many irregularities in the pro- ceedings, all of which were urged in vain against its passage ; but the presidential election was then pending, and the vote of Michigan was con- sidered of sufficient weight to overrule all objections and correct all ir- regularities. They were all, accordingly, overruled, and we cannot now go back. Such was the course, and such the acts of the majority at the last session. A few short months have since passed. Other objects are now to be effected, and all is forgotten as completely as if they had never ex- isted. The very senators who then forced the act through, on the ground that Michigan was a state, have wheeled completely round, to serve the present purpose, and taken directly the opposite ground! We live in strange and inconsistent times. Opinions are taken up and laid down, as suits the occasion, without hesitation, or the slightest regard to principles or consistency. It indicates an unsound state of the public mind, preg- nant with future disasters. I turn to the position now assumed by the majority to suit the present occasion ; and, if I mistake not, it will be found as false in fact, and as er- roneous in principle, as it is inconsistent with that maintained at the last session. They now take the ground that Michigan is not a state, and cannot, in fact, be a state till she is admitted into the Union ; and this on the broad principle that a territory cannot become a state till admitted. Such is the position distinctly taken by several of the friends of this bill, and implied in the arguments of nearly all who have spoken in its favour. In fact, its advocates had no choice. As untenable as it is, they were forced on this desperate position. They had no other which they could occupy. I have shown that it is directly in the face of the law of the last ses- sion, and that it denies the recorded acts of those who now maintain the position. I now go farther, and assert that it is in direct opposition to plain and unquestionable matter of fact. There is no fact more certain than that Michigan is a state. She is in the full exercise of sovereign authority, with a Legislature and a chief magistrate. She passes laws, she executes them, she regulates titles, and even takes away life — all on her own authority. Ours has entirely ceased over her, and yet there are those who can deny, with all these facts before them, that she is a state. They might as well deny the existence of this hall ! We have long since as- sumed unlimited control over the Constitution, to twist and turn, and deny it, as it suited our purpose ; and it would seem that we are presumptu- ously attempting to assume like supremacy over facts themselves, as if their existence or non-existence depended on our volition. I speak freely. The occasion demands that the truth should be boldly uttered. )ib)i SPEECHES OF JOHiN U. UALHOUW. But those who may not regard their own recorded acts, nor the plain facts of the case, may possibly feel the awkward condition in which comincr events may shortly place them. The admission of Michigan is not the onlj?^ point involved in the passage of this bill. A question will follow, which may be presented to the Senate in a very few days, as to the rio-ht of Mr. Norvell and Mr. Lyon, the two respectable gentlemen who have been elected senators by Michigan, to take their seats in this hall. The decision of this question will require a more sudden facing about than has been yet witnessed. It required seven- or. eight months for the majority to wheel about from the position maintained at the last session to that taken at this, but there may not be allowed them now as many days to wheel back to the old position. These gentlemen cannot be refused their seats after the admission of the state by those gentlemen who passed the act of the last session. It provides for the case. I now put it to the friends of this bill, and I ask them to weigh the question de- liberately — to bring it home to their bosom and conscience before they answer — Can a territory elect senators to Congress 1 The Constitution is express: states only can choose senators. Were not these gentlemen chosen long before the admission of Michigan ; before the Ann Arbour meeting, and while Michigan was, according to the doctrine:^ of the friends of this bill, a territory! Will they, in the face of the Constitu- tion, which they are sworn to support, admit as senators on this floor those who, by their own statement, were elected by a territory "? These questions may soon be presented for decision. The majoritj^, who are forcing this bill through, are already committed by the act of last session, and I leave theiji to reconcile as they can the ground they now take with the vote they must give when the question of their right to take their seats is presented for decision. A total disregard of all principle and consistency has so entangled this subject, that there is but one mode left of extricating ourselves without trampling the Constitution in the dust ; and that is, to return back to where we stood when the question was first presented; to acquiesce in the right of Michigan to form a constitution, and erect herself into a state, under the ordinance of 1787 ; and to repeal so much of the act of the last session as prescribed the condition on which she was to be admitted. This was the object of the amendment that I offered last evening, in order to relieve the Senate from its present dilemma. The amendment involved the merits of the whole case. It was too. late in the day for discussion, and I asked for indulgence till to-day, that I might have an opportunity of presenting my views. Under the iron rule of the present majority, the indulgence was refused, and the bill ordered to its third reading; and I have been thus compelled to address the Senate when it is too late to amend the bill, and after a majority have committed themselves both as to its principles and details. Of such proceedings I complain not. I, as one of the minority, ask no favours. All I ask is, that the Constitution be not violated. Hold it sacred, and I shall be the last to complain. I now return to the assumption that a territory cannot become a state till admitted into the Union, which is now relied on with so much con- fidence to prove that Michigan is not a state, I reverse the position. I assert the opposite, that a territory cannot be admitted till she becomes a state ; and in this I stand on the authority of the Constitution itself, which expressly limits the power of Congress to admitting new states into the Union. But, if the Constitution had been silent, he would indeed be ignorant of the character of our political system, who did not see that states, sovereign and independent communities, and not territories, can only be admitted. Ours is a union of states, a Federal Republic. States, ar tjEj^^riLjKi \jc uujiii \^» v/^xjxivune and not territories, form its component parts, bound together by a solemn leao-ue, in the form of a constitutional compact. In coming into the Union, the state pledges its faith to this sacred compact : an act which none but a sovereign and independent community is competent to per- form ; and, of course, a territory must first be raised to that condition be- fore she can take her stand among the confederated states of our Union. How can a territory pledge its faith to the Constitution 1 It has no will of its own. You give it all its powers, and you can at pleasure overrule all her actions. If she enters as a territory, the act is yours, not hers. Her consent is nothing without your authority and sanction. Can you, can Congress, become a party to the constitutional compact % How absurd. But I am told, if this be so — if a territory must become a state before it can be admitted — it would follow that she might refuse to enter the Union after she had acquired the right of acting for herself. Certainly she may. A state cannot be forced into the Union. She must come in by her own free assent^ given in her highest sovereign capacity through a convention of the people of the state. Such is the constitutional provision j and those who make the objection must overlook both the Constitution and the ele- mentary principles of our government, of which the right of self govern- ment is the first } the right of every people to form their own government, and to determine their political condition. This is the doctrine on which our fathers acted in our glorious Revolution, which has done more for the cause of liberty throughout the world than any event within the rec- ord of history, and on which the government has acted from the first, as regards all that portion of our extensive territory that lies beyond the limits of the original states. Read the ordinance of 1787, and the various acts for the admission of new states, and you will find the principle in- variably recognised and acted on, to the present unhappy instance, with- out any departure from it, except in the case of Missouri. The admis- sion of Michigan is destined, I fear, to mark a great change in the his- tory of the admission of new states ; a total departure from the old usage, and the noble principle of self-government on which that usage was found- ed. Everything, thus far, connected with her admission, has been irreg- ular and monstrous. I trust it is not ominous. Surrounded by lakes within her natural limits (which ought not to have been departed from), and possessed of fertile soil and genial climate, with every prospect of wealth, power, and influence, who but must regret that she should be ushered into the Union in a manner so irregular and unworthy of her fu- ture destiny 1 But I will waive these objections, constitutional and all. I will sup- pose, with the advocates of the bill, that a territory cannot become a state till admitted into the Union. Assuming all this, I ask them to explain to me how the mere act of admission can transmute a territory into a state. By Avhose authority would she be made a state \ By ours \ How can we make a state 1 We can form a territory ; we can admit states into the Union ; but I repeat the question, How can we make a state 1 I had sup- posed this government was the creature of the states, formed by their authority, and dependant on their will for its existence. Can the crea- ture form the creator \ If not by our authority, then by whose 1 Not by her own ; that would be absurd. The very act of admission makes her a member of the confederacy, with no other or greater power than is pos- sessed by all the others ; all of whom, united, cannot create a state. By what process, then, by what authority can a territory become a state, if not one before admitted! Who can explain 1 How full of difficulties, compared to the long-established, simple, and noble process which has prevailed to the present instant ! According to the old usage, the Gen- eral Government first withdraws its authority over a certain portion of its territory, as soon as it has a sutiicient population to constitute a state. They are thus left to themselves freely to form a constitution, and to ex- ercise the noble right of self-government. They then present their Con- stitution to Congress, and ask the privilege (for one it is of the highest character) to become a member of this glorious confederacy of states. The Constitution is examined, and, if Republican, as required by the Fed- eral Constitution, she is admitted, with no other condition except such as may be necessary to secure the authority of Congress over the public do- main within her limits. This is the old, the established form, instituted by our ancestors of the Revolution, who so well understood the great principles of liberty and self-government. How simple, how sublime ! What a contrast to the doctrines of the present day, and the precedent which, I fear, we are about to establish ! And shall we fear, so long as these sound principles are observed, that a state will reject this high priv- ilege — will refuse to enter this Union 1 No, she will rush into the em- brace of the Union so long as your institutions are worth preserving. When the advantages of the Union shall have become a matter of calcu- lation and doubt j when new states shall pause to determine whether the Union is a curse or a blessing, the question which now agitates us will cease to have any importance. Having now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that Michigan is a state, I come to the great point at issue — to the decision of which all that has been said is but preparatory — Had the self-created assembly which met at Ann Arbour the authority to speak in the name of the people of Michio-an ; to assent to the conditions contained in the act of the last ses- sion ; to supersede a portion of the Constitution of the state, and to over- rule the dissent of the convention of the people, regularly called by the constituted authorities of the state, to the condition of admission \ I shall not repeat what I said when I first addressed the Senate on this bill. We all, by this time, know the character of that assemblage ; that it met without the sanction of the authorities of the state ; and that it did not pretend to represent one third of the people. We all know that the state had regularly convened a convention of the people, expressly to take into consideration the condition on which it was proposed to admit her into the Union, and that the convention, after full deliberation, had declined to give its assent by a considerable majority. With a knowledge of all these facts, I put the question, Had the assembly a right to act for the state \ Was it a convention of the people of ]\Iichigan, in the true, legal, and constitutional sense of that term] Is there one within the limits of my voice that can lay his hand on his breast and honestly say it was 1 Is there one that does not feel that it was neither more nor less than a mere caucus — nothing but a party caucus — of which we have the strongest evidence in the perfect unanimity of those who assembled! Not a vote was (riven ajrainst admission. Can there be stronger proof that it was a meeting got up by party machinery, for party purpose ] But I go farther. It was not only a party caucus, for party purpose, hut a criminal meeting — a meeting to subvert the authority of the state, and to assume its sovereignty. I know not whether Michigan has yet passed laws to guard her sovereignty. It may be that she has not had time to enact laws for this purpose, which no community is long without ; but I do aver, if there be such an act, or if the common law be in force in the state, the actors in that meeting might be indicted, tried, and punished for the very act on which it is ?iow proposed to admit the state into the Umon. If such a meeting as this were to undertake to speak in the name of South Carolina, we would speedily teach its authors what they owed to the ■" — authority and dignity of the state. The act was not only in contempt of the authority of the State of Michigan, but a direct insult on this govern- ment. Here is a self-created meeting, convened for a criminal object, which has dared to present to this government an act of theirs, and to expect that we are to receive this irregular and criminal act as a ful- filment of the condition which we had prescribed for the admission of the state ! Yet I fear, forgetting our own dignity, and the rights o( Michi- gan, that we are about to recognise the validity of the act, and quietly to submit to the insult. The year 1S36 (said Mr. C.) is destined to mark the most remarkable change in our political institutions since the adoption of the Constitution. The events of the year have made a deeper innovation on the principles of the Constitution, and evinced a stronger tendency to revolution, than any which have occurred from its adoption to the present day. Sir (said Mr. C, addressing the Vice-president), duty compels me to speak of facts intimately connected with yourself. In deference to your feelings as presiding officer of the body, I shall speak of them with all possible re- serve, much more reserve than I should otherwise have done if you did not occupy that seat. Among the first of these events which I shall no- tice, is tfie caucus of Baltimore ; that, too, like the Ann Arbour caucus, has been dignified with the name of the convention of the people. This caucus was got up under the countenance and express authority of the President himself; and its edict, appointing you his successor, has been sustained, not only by the whole patronage and power of the government, but by his active personal influence and exertion. Through its instru- mentality he has succeeded in controlling the voice of the people, and, for the first time, the President has appointed his successor ; and thus the first great step of converting our government into a monarchy has been achieved. These are solemn and ominous facts. Xo one who has examined the result of the last election can doubt their truth. It is now certain that you are not the free and unbiased choice of the people of these United States. If left to your own popularity, without the active and direct influence of the President, and the power and patronage of the government, acting through a mock convention of the people, instead of the highest, you would, in all probability, have been the lowest of the candidates. During the same year, the state in which this ill-omened caucus con- vened, has been agitated by revolutionary movements of the most alarm- ing character. Assuming the dangerous doctrines that they were not bound to obey the injunctions of the Constitution, because it did not place the powers of the state in the hands of an unchecked numerical major- ity, the electors belonging to the party of the Baltimore caucus, who had been chosen to appoint the state senators, refused to perform the func- tions for which they had been elected, with the deliberate intention to subvert the government of the state, and reduce her to the territory con- dition, till a new government could be formed. And now we have before us a measure not less revolutionary, but of an opposite character. In the case of ^Maryland, those who undertook, without the authority of law or Constitution, to speak and act in the name of the people of the state, proposed to place her out of the Union by reducing her from a state to a territory ; but in this, those who, in like manner, undertook to act for Michigan, have assumed the authority to bring her into the Union without her consent, on the very condition which she had rejected by a convention of the people, convened under the authority of the state. If we shall sanction the authority of the Michigan caucus to force a state into the Union without its assent, why might we not here sanction a similar caucus in Maryland, if one had been called, to place the state out^ of the Union 1 These occurrences, which have distinguished the past year, mark" the commencement of no ordinary change in our political system. They an- nounce the ascendency of the caucus system over the regularly constituted au- thorities of the country. I have long anticipated this event. In early life my attention was attracted to the working of the caucus system. It was my fortune to spend five or six years of my youth in the northern por- tion of the Union, where, unfortunatelj^, the system has so long prevailed. Though young, I was old enough to take interest in public affairs, and to notice the working of this odious party machine ; and after-reflection, with the experience then acquired, has long satisfied me that, in the course of time, the edicts of the caucus would eventually supersede the authority of law and Constitution. We have at last arrived at the com- mencement of this great change, which is destined to go on till it has consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and constitutional authority, unless speedily and effectually resisted. The reason is obvi- ous : for obedience and disobedience to the edicts of the caucus, where the system is firmly established, are more certainly and effectually re- warded and punished than to the laws and Constitution. Disobedience to the former is sure to be followed by complete political disfranchise- ment. It deprives the unfortunate individual who falls under its ven- geance of all public honours and emoluments, and consigns him, if depend- ant on the government, to poverty and obscurity ; while he who bows down before its mandates, it matters not how monstrous, secures to him- self the honours of the state, becomes rich, and distinguished, and power- ful. Offices, jobs, and contracts flow on him and his connexions. But to obey the law and respect the Constitution, for the most part, brings little except the approbation of conscience — a reward, indeed, high and noble, and prized by the virtuous above all others, but, unfortunately, little valued by the mass of mankind. It is easy to see what must be the end, unless, indeed, an effective remedy be applied. Are we so blind as not to see this — why it is that the advocates of this bill, the friends of the system, are so tenacious on the point that Michigan should be admitted on the authority of the Ann Arbour caucus, and on no other 1 Do we not see why the amendment proposed by myself, to admit her by rescind- ing the condition imposed at the last session, should be so strenuously opposed 1 Why even the preamble would not be surrendered, though many of our friends were willing to vote for the bill on that slight con- cession, in their anxiety to admit the state 1 And here let me say that I listened with attention to the speech of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden). I know the clearness of his understanding and the soundness of his heart, and I am persuaded, in declaring that his objection to the bill was confined to the preamble, that he has not investigated the subject with the attention it deserves. I feel the objections to the preamble are not without some weight ; but the true and insuperable objections lie far deeper in the facts of the case, which would still exist were the preamble expunged. It is these which render it impossible to pass this bill without trampling under foot the rights of the states, and subverting the first principles of our government. It would require but a few steps more to effect a complete revolution, and the senator from North Carolina has taken the first. I will explain. If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the commence- ment of those profound changes in the character of a people which are working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface, look to the change of language : you will first notice it in the altered meaning of im- '—'"^ portant words, and which, as it indicates a change m the leelings and principles of the people, become, in turn, a powerful instrument in accel- erating the change, till an entire revolution is efTected. The remarks of the senator will illustrate what I have said. He told us that the terms " convention of the people" were of very uncertain meaning and difRcuh to be defined ; but that their true meaning was, any meeting of the people, in their individual and primary character, for political purposes. I know it is difficult to define complex terms, that is, to enumerate all the ideas that belong to them, and exclude all that do not ; but there is always, in the most complex, some prominent idea which marks the meaning of the term, and in relation to which there is usually no disagreement. Thus, ac- cording to the old meaning (and which I had still supposed was its legal and constitutional meaning), a convention of the people invariably implied a meeting oi the people, either by themselves, or by delegates expressly chosen for the purpose, in their high sovereign authority^ in expressed con- tradistinction to such assemblies of individuals in their private character, or having only derivative authority. It is, in a word, a meeting of the people in the majesty of their power — in that in which they may right- fully make or abolish constitutions, and put up or put down governments at their pleasure. Such was the august conception which formerly entered the mind of every American when the terms "convention of the people" were used. But now, according to the ideas of the dominant party, as we are told on the authority of the senator from North Carolina, it means any meeting of individuals for political purposes, and, of course, applies to the meeting at Ann Arbour,, or any other party caucus for party pur- poses, which the leaders choose to designate as a convention of the peo- ple. It is thus the highest authority known to our laws and Constitution is gradually sinking to the level of those meetings which regulate the operation of political parties, and through which the edicts of their lead- ers are announced and their authority enforced; or, rather, to speak more correctly, the latter are gradually rising to the authority of the former. When they come to be completely confounded ; when the dis- tinction between a caucus and the convention of the people shall be com- pletely obliterated, which the definition of the senator, and the acts of this body on this bill, would lead us to believe is not far distant, this fair political fabric of ours, erected by the wisdom and patriotism of our an- cestors, and once the gaze and admiration of the world, will topple to the ground in ruins. It has, perhaps, been too much my habit to look more to the future and less to the present than is wise ; but such is the constitution of my mind, that, when I see before me the indications of causes calculated to effect important changes in our political condition, I am led irresistibly to trace them to their sources, and follow them out in their consequences. Lan- guage has been held in this discussion which is clearly revolutionary in its character and tendency, and which warns us of the approach of the period when the struggle will be between the conservatives and the destruc- tives. I understood the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) as holding language countenancing the principle that the will of a mere nu- merical majority is paramount to the authority of law and Constitution. He did not, indeed, announce distinctly this principle, but it might fairly be inferred from what he said ; for he told us, the latter, where the Con- stitution gives the same weight to a smaller as to a greater number, might take the remedy into their own hand ; meaning, as I understood him, that a mere majority might, at their pleasure, subvert the Constitution and government of a state, which he seemed to think was the essence of De- mocracy. Our little state has a Constitution that couLd not stand a day Kk against such doctrines, and yet we glojry in it as the best in the Union, It is a Constitution which respects all the great interests of the statCj givino- to each a separate and distinct voice in the management of its po- liticaf affairs, by means of which the feebler interests are protected against the preponderance of the greater. We call our state a republic, a com- monwealth, not a democracy ; and let me tell the senator it is a far more popular government than if it had been based on the simple principle of the numerical majority. It takes more voices to put the machine of gov- ernment in motion than those that the senator would consider more pop- ular. It represents all the interests of the state, and is, in fact, the gov- ernment of the people, in the true sense of the term, and not of the mere majority, or the dominant interests. I am not familiar with the Constitution of Maryland, to which the sen- ator alluded, and cannot, therefore, speak of its structure with confidence ; but I believe it to be somewhat similar in its character to our own. That it is a government not without its excellence, we need no better proof than the fact that, though within the shadow of executive influence, it has nobly and successfully resisted all the seductions by which a corrupt and artful administration, with almost boundless patronage, has tempted to seduce her into its ranks- Looking, then, to the approaching struggle, I take my stand immova- bly. I am a conservative in its broadest arid fullest sense, and such / shall ever remain, unless, indeed, the government shall become so corrupt and disor- dered that nothing short of revolution can reform it. I solemnly believe that our political system is, in its purity, not only the best that ever was formed, but the best possible that can be devised for us. It is the only one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, and occupying so vast an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I can- not hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative ; and, because I am a conservative, I am a state rights man. I believe that in the rights of the states are to be found the only effectual means of check- ing the overaction of this government; to resist its tendency to concen- trate all power here, and to prevent a departure from the Constitution ; or, in case of one, to restore the government to its original simplicity and purity. State interposition, or, to express it more fully, the right of a state to interpose her sovereign voice, as one of the parties to our consti- tutional compact, against the encroachments of this government, is the only means of sufficient potency to effect all this ; and I am, therefore, its advocate. I rejoiced to hear the senators from North Carolina (Mr. Brown) and Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) do us the justice to distin- guish between nullification and the anarchical and revolutionary move ments in Maryland and Pennsylvania. I know they did not intend it as a compliment, but I regard it as the highest. They are right. Day and night are not more difllerent — more unlike in everything. They are unlike in their principles, their objects, and their consequences. I shall not stop to make good this assertion, as I might easily do. The occasion does not call for it. As a conservative and a state rights man, or, if you will have it, a nullifier, I have and shall resist all encroachments on the Constitution, Avhether it be the encroachment of this government on the states, or the opposite — the executive on Congress, or Congress on the executive. My creed is to hold both governments, and all the departments of each, to their proper sphere, and to maintain the author- ity of the laws and the Constitution against all revolutionary movements. I believe the means which our system furnishes to preserve itself are am- ple, if fairly understood and applied ; and I shall resort to them, however c&irrnpt and disordered the times, so long as there is hope of reforming IBBBBf the government. Ihe result is in the hands of the Disposer of ev^ents. -it is my part to do my duty. Yet, while I thus openly avow myself a conservative, God forbid I should ever deny the glorious, right of rebel- lion and revolution. Should corruption and oppression become intoler- able, and cannot otherwise be thrown off — if liberty must perish, or the government be overthrown, I would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt government, that could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen ; but I trust in God things will never come to that pass. I trust never to see such fearful times; for fearful, indeed, they would be, if they; should ever befall us. It is the last remedy, and not to be thought of till .common sense arid the voice of mankind would justify the resort. Before I resume my seat, I feel called on to make a few brief remarlis on a doctrine of fearful import, which has been broached in the course of this debate — :the right to repeal laws granting bank charters, and, of course, of railroadsj turnpikes, and joint-stock companies. It is a doc- trine of fearful import, and calculated to do infinite mischief. There are countless millions vested in such stocks, and it is a description of property of the rriost delicate character. To touch it is almost to destroy it. But, while I enter my protest against all such doctrines, I have been greatly alarmed with the thoughtless precipitancy (not to use a stronger phrase) with which the most extensive and dangerous privileges have been grant- ed of late. It can end in no good, and, I fear, may be the cause of con- vulsions hereafter. We already feel the effects on the currency, which no one competent of judging but must see is in an unsound condition. I must say (for truth compels me) I have ever distrusted the banking sys- tem, at least in its present form, both in this country and Great Britain. It will not stand the test of time; but I trust that all shocks or sudden revolutions may be avoided, and that it may gradually give way before some sounder and better-regulated system of credit, which the growing intelligence of the age may devise. That a better may be substituted I cannot doubt ; but of what it shall consist, and how it shall finally super- sede the present uncertain and fluctuating "currency, time alone can de- termine. AH I can see is, that the present must, one day or another, come to an end, or be greatly modified, if that, indeed, can save it frtom an entire overthrow. It has within itself the seeds of its own destruction. XVIIL SPEECH ON THE tilLL AUTHORIZING AN ISSUE OF TREASURY NOTES, SEPTEMBER 19, 1837. • Mr. President : An extraordinary course of events, vvith which all are 'too familiar to need recital, has separated, in fact, the government and the banks. What relation shall they bear hereafter ? Shall the banks again be used as fiscal agents of the government? Be the depositories of the public money? And, above all, shall their notes be considered and treated as money in the re- ceipts and expenditures of the government ? This is the great and leading question ; one of the first magnitude, and full of consequences. I have given ,it my most anxious and deliberate attention, and have come to the conclugion that we have reached the period when the interests both of the government, and the banks forbid a- reunion. I now propose to offer my reasons for this: conclusion. I shall do it with that perfect frankness due to the subject, to the- country, and the position I occupy. All I ask is, that I may be heard with a candour and fairness corresponding to the sincerity with which I shall deliver my sentiments. Those who support a reunion of the banks and the government have to overcome a preliminary difficulty. They are now separated by operation of law, and cannot be united while the present state of things continues, without repealing the law which has disjoined them. I ask, Who is willing to propose its repeal ? Is there any one who, during the suspension of specie payments, would advocate their employment as the fiscal agents of the government, who ■would make them the depositories of the public revenue, or who would receive and pay away their notes in the public dues ? If there be none, then it results that the separation must continue for the present, and that the reunion must be the work of time, and depending on the contingency of the resumption of specie payments. But suppose this difliculty to be removed, and that the banks were regularly redeeming their notes, from what party in this body can the proposition come, or by which can it be supported, for a reunion between them and the govern- ment ? Who, after what has happened, can advocate the reunion of the govern- ment with the league of state banks ? Can the opposition, who for years have been denouncing it as the most dangerous instrument of power, and efficient means of corrupting and controlling the government and country' ? Can thev, after the exact fulfilment of all their predictions of disastrous consequences from the connexion, now turn round and support that which they have so long and loudly condemned 1 We have heard much from the opposite side of untried experiments on the currency. I concur in the justice of the censure. Nothing can be more delicate than the currency. Nothing can require to be more delicately handled. It ought never to be tampered with, nor touched, im- til it becomes absolutely necessar}\ But, if untried experiments justly deserve censure, what condemnation would a repetition of an experiment that has failed deserve ? An experiment that has so signally failed, both in the opinion of sup- porters and opponents, as to call down the bitter denunciation of those who tried it. If to make the experiment was folly, the repetition would be madness. But if the opposition cannot support the measure, how can it be expected to receive support from the friends of the administration, in whose hands the ex- periment has so signally failed as to call down from them execrations deep and loud ? If, Mr. President, there be any one point fully established by experience and reason, I hold it to be the utter incompetency of the state banks to furnish, of themselves, a sound and stable currency. They may succeed in prosperous times, but the first adverse current necessarily throws them into utter confusion. Nor has any device been found to give them the requisite strength and stability but a great central and controlling bank, instituted under the authority of this government. I go farther : if we must continue our connexion with the banks — if we must receive and pay away their notes as money, we not only have the right to regulate, and give uniformity and stability to them, but we are bound to do so, and to use the most efficient means for that purpose. The Constitu- tion makes it our duty to lay and collect the taxes and duties uniformly through- out the Union ; to fulfil which, we are bound to give the highest possible equality of value throughout every part of the country, to whatever medium it may be collected in ; and if that be bank-notes, to adopt the most efiective means of ac- complishing it, which experience has shown to be a Bank of the United States. This has been long my opinion. I entertained it in 1816, and repeated it, in my place here on the deposite question, in 1834. The only alternative, then, is, disguise it as you may, between a disconnexion and a Bank of the tfnited States. This is the real issue to which all must come, and ought now to be openly and fairly met. But there are difficulties in the way of a National Bank, no less formidable BgMMBMMMMaana si-fjiiit^ncis ur jyjtiLy \^. ^^Ajunuuii. than a reconnexion with the state banks. It is utterly impracticable, at pres- ent, to establish one. There is reason to believe that a majority of the peo- ple of the United States are deliberately and unalterably opposed to it. At all events, there is a numerous, respectable, and powerful party — I refer to the old State Eights party — who are, and ever have been, from the beginning of the urovernment, opposed to the Bank, and whose opinions, thus long and firmly entertained, ought, at least, to be so much respected as to forbid the creation of one without an amendment of the Constitution. To this must be added the insuperable difficulty, that the executive branch of the government is openly opposed to it, and pledged to interpose his veto, on constitutional grounds, should a bill pass to incorporate one. For four years, at least, then, it will be imprac- ticable to charter a bank. What must be done in the mean time ? Shall the treasury be organized to perform the functions which have been recently dis- charged by the banks, or shall the state institutions be again employed until a bank can be created ? In the one case, we shall have the so much vilified and denounced sub-treasury, as it is called ; and in the other, difficulties insur- mountable would grow up against the establishment of a bank. Let the state institutions be once reinstated and reunited to the government as their fiscal agents, and they will be found the first and most strenuous opponents of a Na- tional Bank, by which they would be overshadowed and curtailed in their profits. I hold it certain, that in prosperous times, when the state banks are in full operation, it is impossible to establish a National Bank. Its creation, then, should the reunion with the state banks take place, will be postponed until some disaster similar to the present shall again befall the country. But it re- quires little of the spirit of prophecy to see that such anotlier disaster would be the death of the whole system. Already it has had two paralytic strokes — the third would prove fatal. But suppose these difficulties were overcome, I would still be opposed to the incorporation of a bank. So far from affiDrding the relief which many an- ticipate, it would be the most disastrous measure that could be adopted. As great as is the calamity under which the country is suffering, it is nothing to ^what would follow the creation of such an institution under existing circum- stances. In order to compel the state institutions to pay specie, the Bank must have a capital as great, or nearly as great, in proportion to the existing institu- tions, as the late Bank had, when established, to those of that day. This would give it an immense capital, not much less than one hundred millions of dollars, of which a large proportion, say twenty millions, must be specie. From what source is it to be derived ? From the state banks ? It would empty their vaults, and leave them in the most helpless condition. From abroad, and Eng- land in particular ? it would reproduce that revulsive current which has lately covered the country with desolation. The tide is still running to Europe, and if forced back by any artificial cause before the foreign debt is paid, cannot but be followed by the most disastrous consequences. But suppose this difficulty overcome, and the Bank re-established, I ask, What would be the effects under such circumstances 1 Where would it find room for business, commensurate with its extended capital, without crushing the state institutions, enfeebled by the withdrawal of their means, in order to create the instrument of their oppression ? A few of the more vigorous might survive, but the far greater portion, with their debtors, creditors, and stock- holders, would be involved in common ruin. The Bank would, indeed, give a specie currency, not by enabling the existing institutions to resume, but by de- stroying them and taking their place. Those who take a different view, and so fondly anticipate relief from a Na- tional Bank, are deceived by a supposed analogy between the present situation of the country and that of 1816, when the late Bank was chartered, after the war with Great Britain. I was an actor in that scene, and may be permitted 262 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. to speak in relation to it with some little authority. Between the two periods there is little or no analogy. They stand almost in contrast. In 1810, the government was a debtor to the banks ; now it is a creditor : a difference of the greatest importance, as far as the present question is concerned. The banks had over-issued, it is true, but their over-issues were to the government, a sol- vent and able debtor, whose credit, held by the banks in the shape of stock, was at par. It was their excessive issues to the government on its stock which mainly caused the suspension ; in proof of which, it is a remarkable fact, that the depreciation of bank paper, compared with gold and silver, was about equal to the proportion which the government stock held by the banks bore to their is- sues. It was this excess that hung on the market and depressed the value of their notes. The solution is easy. The banks took the government stock pay- able in twelve years, and issued their notes for the same, payable on demand^ in violation of the plainest principles of banking. It followed, of course, that when their notes were presented for payment, they had nothing but government stock to meet them. But its stock was at par, and all the banks had to do was to go into market with the stock they held and take up their notes ; and thus the excess which hung upon the market and depressed their value would have been withdrawn from circulation, and the residue would have risen to par, or nearly par, with gold and silver, when specie payments might be easily resumed. This they were imwilling to do. They were profiting every way : by drawing interest on the stock, by discounting on it as capital, and by its continued rise in the market. It became necessary to compel them to surrender these advan- tages. Two methods presented themselves : one a bankrupt law, and the oth- er a National Bank. I was opposed to the former then, as I am now. I re- garded it as a harsh, unconstitutional measure, opposed to the rights of the states. If they have not surrendered the rights to incorporate banks, its exer- cise cannot be controlled by the action of this government, which has no power but what is expressly granted, and no authority to control the states in the ex- ercise of their reserved powers. It remained to resort to a National Bank as the means of compulsion. It proved effectual. Specie payments were re- stored ; but even with this striking advantage, it was followed by great pressure in 1818, 1819, and 1820, as all who are old enough to remember that period must ! recollect. Such, in fact, must ever be the consequence of resumption, when forced, under the most favourable circumstances ; and such, accordingly, it pro- ved even in England, with all her resources, and with all the caution she used in restoring a specie circulation, after the long suspension of 1797. What, then, "would be its effects in the present condition of the country, when the govern- ment is a creditor instead of a debtor ; where there are so many newly-created banks without established credit ; vvhen the over-issues are so great ; and when so large a portion of the debtors are not in a condition to be coerced ? As great as is the tide of disaster which is passing over the land, it would be as nothing to what would follow, were a National Bank to be established as the means of coercing specie payments. I am bound to speak without reserve on this important point. My opinion, then, is, that if it should be determined to compel the restoration of specie pay- ments by the agency of banks, there is but one way — but to that I have insu- perable objections — I mean the adoption of the Pennsylvania Bank of the Uni- ted States as the fiscal agent of the government. It is already in operation, and sustained by great resources and powerful connexions, both at home and abroad. Through its agency specie payments might undoubtedly be restored, and that with far less disaster than through a newly-created bank, but not with- out severe pressure. I cannot, however, vote for such a measure ; I cannot agree to give a preference and such advantages to a bank of one of the members of this confederacy, over that of others — a bank dependant upon the will of a state, and subject to its influence and control. I cannot consent to coiifer such favours . on the stockholders, many of whom, if rumour is to be trusted, are foreign cap- itaUsts and without claim on the bounty of the government. But if all these, and many other objections, were overcome, there is still one which I cannot sur- mount. There has been, as we all know, a conflict between one of the departments / ' of the o-eriment; or some new device, it is only returning to the old mode of collecting and disburs- ing pubhc money, which, for thousands of jeaxs. has been the practice of all eidightened people tiU within the last century. In what maimer it is intended to reorganize the treasTiry by the bill reported, I do not know. I have been too much engaged to read it : and I can only say that, for one, I shall assent to no arrangement which provides for a treasury bank, or that can be perverted into one. If there can be any scheme more tatal than a reunion with the banks at this time, it would be such a project. Nor will I give mv assent to anv arrangement which shall add the least unnecessary patronage. I am the sworn (oe to patronage, and have done as much and suf- fered as much in resisting it as any one. Too many years have passed over me to change, at this late day, my course or principles. But I will say, that it IS impossible so to organize the treasury for the performance of its own functions as to oive to the executive a tenth part of the patronage it will lose by the pro- posed separation, which, when the bill for the reorganization comes up, I may have an opportunity to show. I have ventured this assertion after much reflec- tion, and with entire confidence in its correctness. But something more must be done besides the reorganization of the treasury. Under the resolution of 1816, bank-notes would again be received in the dues of the government, if the Bank should resume specie payments. The legal, as well as the actual connexion, must be severed. But I am opposed to all harsh or precipitate measures. No great process can be effected without a shock but through the agency of time. I, accordingly, propose to allow time for the final separation ; and with this view I have drawn up an amendment to this bill, which I shall offer at the proper time, to modify the resolution of 1816, by pro- viding that after the 1st of January next, three fourths of all sums due to the government may be received in the notes of specie-paying banks ; and that after the 1st of January next following, one half; and after the 1st of January next subsequent, one fourth; and after the 1st of January thereafter, nothing but the legal currency of the United States, or bills, notes, or paper issued under their authority, and which may by law be authorized to be received in their dues. If the time is not thought to be ample, I am perfectly disposed to extend it. The period is of little importance in my eyes, so that the object be effected. In addition to this, it seems to me that some measure of a remedial character, connected with the currency, ought to be adopted to ease off the pressure while the process is going through. It is desirable that the government should make as few and small demands on the specie market as possible during the time, so as to throw no impediment in the way of the resumption of specie payments. With this view, I am of the impression that the sum necessary for the present wants of the treasury should be raised by a paper, which should, at the same time, have the requisite qualities to enable it to perform the functions of a paper circulation. Under this impression, I object to the interest to be allowed on the treasury notes, which this bill authorizes to be issued, on the very opposite ground that the senator from 'Massachusetts bestows his approbation. He approves of interest, because it would throw them out of circulation, into the hands of capitalists, as a convenient and safe investment ; and I disapprove, because it will have that effect. I am disposed to ease off the process ; he, 1 would suppose, is very little solicitous on that point. But I go fartlier. I am of the impression, to make this great measure suc- cessful, and secure it against reaction, some stable and safe medium of circula- tion, to take the place of bank-notes in the fiscal operations of the government, ought to be issued. I intend to propose nothing. It would be impossible, with so great a weight of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support of the administration ; and if it were, it ought not to be attempted where so much must depend on the mode of execution. The best measure that could be devi- sed might fail, and impose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met with the hearty approbation of those who are to execute it. I intend, then, merely to throw out suggestions, in order to excite the reflection of others on a subject so delicate and of so much importance, acting on the principle that it is the duty of all, in so great a juncture, to present their views without reserve. y It is, then, my impression that, in the present condition of the world, a paper currency, in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable in financial and conunercial operations of civilized and extensive communities. In many respects it has a vast superiority over a metallic currency, especially in great and extended transactions, by its greater cheapness, lightness, and the facility of determining the amount. fhe great desideratum is, to ascertain what de- scription of paper has the requisite qualities of being free from fluctuation in value, and liability to abuse, in the greatest perfection. 1 have shown, I trust, that the bank-notes do not possess these requisites in a degree sufficiently hio-h for this purpose. I go farther. It appears to me, after bestowing the best re- flection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency. It is the form of credit proper in private transactions between man and man, but not for a stand- ard of value to pertorm exchanges generally, which constitutes the appropriate functions of money or currency. The measure of safety in the two cases are wholly different. A promissory note, or convertible paper, is considered safe so long as the drawer has ample means to meet his engagements, and, in pass- ing from hand to hand, regard is had only to his ability and willingness to pay. Very different is the case in currency. The aggregate value of the currency of a country necessarilybears a small proportion to the aggreo-ate value of its property. This proportion is not well ascertained, and is probably subject to considerable variation in different countries, and at different periods in the same country. It may be assumed conjecturally, in order to illustrate what I say, at one to thirty. Assuming this proportion to be correct, which probably is not very far from the truth, it follows, that in a sound condition of the country, where the currency is metallic, the aggregate value df the coin is not more than one in thirty of the aggregate value of the property. It also follows that an increase in the amount of the currency, by the addition of a paper circulation of no in- trinsic value, but increases the nominal value of the aggregate property of the country in the same proportion that the increase bears to the whole amount of currency; so that, if the currency be doubled, the nominal value of the property will also be doubled. Hence it is, that when the paper currency of a country is in the shape of promissory notes, there is a constant tendency to excess. We look for their safety to the ability of the drawer ; and so long as his means are ample to meet his engagements, there is no distrust, without reflecting that, con- sidered as currency, it cannot safely exceed one in thirty in value compared to property ; and the delusion is farther increased by the constant increase in value of property with the increase of the notes, in circulation, so as to main- tain the same relative proportion. It follows, that a government may safely contract a debt many times the amount of its aggi^gate circulation ; but if it were to attempt to put its promissory notes in circulation in amount equal to its- debts, an explosion in the currency would be inevitable. And hence, with other causes, the constant tendency to an excessive issue of bank-notes in pros- perous times, when so large a portion of the community are anxious to obtain accommodation, and who are disappointed when good negotiable paper is re- fused by the banks, not reflecting that it would not be safe to discount beyond the limits I have assigned for a safe circulation, however good the paper offered. On what, then, ought a paper currency to rest ? I would say on demand and supply simply, which regulates the value of everything else— the constant de- mand which the government has on the community for its necessary suppHes. A medium resting on this demand, which simply obligates the government to receive it in all of its dues, to the exclusion of everything else except gold and silver, and which shall be optional with those who have demands on government to receive or not, would, it seems to me, be as stable in its value as those metals^- themselves, and be as little liable to abuse as the power of coining. It would contain within itself a self-regulating power. It could only be issued to those who had claims on the government, and to those only with their consent, and, of course, only at or above par with gold and silver, which would be its ha- bitual state ; for, as far as the government was concerned, it would be equal, in every respect, to gold and silver, and superior in many, particularly in regu- lating the distant exchanges of the country. Should, however, a demand for gold and silver from abroad, or other accidental causes, depress it temporarily, as compared with the precious metals, it would then return to the treasury ; and as it could not be paid out during such depression, its gradual diminution in the market would soon restore it to an equality, when it would again flow out into the general circulation. Thus there would be a constant alternate flux and re- flux into and from the treasury, between it and the precious metals ; but if at any time a permanent depression in its value be possible, from any cause, the only efl'ect would be to operate as a reduction of taxes on the community, and the only sufferer would be the government itself. Against this, its own interest would be a sufficient guarantee. Nothing but experience can determine what amount and of what denomina- tions might be safely issued, but it may be safely assumed that the country would absorb an amount greatly exceeding its annual income. Much of its ex- changes, which amount to a vast sum, as well as its banking business, would revolve about it, and many millions would thus be kept in circulation beyond the demands of the government. It may throw some light on this subject to state, that North Carolina, just after the Revolution, issued a large amount of pa- per, which was made receivable in dues to her. It was also made a legal ten- der, but v/hich, of course, was not obligatory after the adoption of the Federal Constitution. A large amount, say between four and five hundred thousand dollars, remained in circulation after that period, and continued to circulate for more than twenty years at par with gold and silver during the whole time, with no other advantage than being received in the revenue of the state, which was much less than $100,000 per annum. I speak on the information of citizens of that state, on whom I can rely. But whatever may be the amount that can be circulated, I hold it clear, that to that amount it would be as stable in value as gold and silver itself, provided the government be bound to receive it exclusively with those metals in all its dues, and that it be left perfectly optional with those who have claims on the government to receive it or not. It will also be a necessary condition, that notes of too small a denomination should not be issued, so that the treasury shall have ample means to meet all demands, either in gold or silver, or the bills of the government, at the option of those who have claims on it. With these con- ditions, no farther variation could take place between it and gold and silver than that which would be caused by the action of commerce. An unusual de- mand from abroad for the metals would, of course, raise them a little in their relative value, and depress, relatively, the government bills in the same propor- tion, which would cause them to flow into the treasury, and gold and silver to flow out ; while, on the contrary, an increased demand for the bills in the do- mestic exchange v/ould have the reverse efl^ect, causing, as I have stated, an alternate flux and reflux into the treasury between the two, which would at all times keep their relative values either at or near par. No one can doubt that the fact of the government receiving and paying away bank-notes, in all its fiscal transactions, is one of the principal sources of their great circulation ; and it was mainly on that account that the notes of the late Bank of the United States so freely circiflated over the Union. I would ask, then, "Why should the government mingle its credit with that of private corporations ? No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank — more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix it up with the less perfect credit of those institutions ? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own transactions ? Why should it not be safe in its own hands, while it shall be consid- ered safe in the hands of 800 private institutions, scattered all over the country, and which have no other object but their own private profit, to increase which, they almost constantly extend their business to the most dangerous extremes ? And why should the community be compelled to give six per cent, discount for the gov- ernment credit blended with that of the banks, when the superior credit of the of£jtjf^nejO ur juni^i o. U/AiiHUUiN. government could be furnished separately, without discount, to the mutual ad- vantage of the government and the community ? Why, let me ask, should the government be exposed to such difficulties as the present, by mingling its credit with the banks, when it could be exempt from all such by using, by itself, its own safer credit ? It is time the community, which has so deep an interest in a sound and cheap currency, and the equality of the laws between one portion of the citizens and the country and another, should reflect seriously on these things, not for the purpose of oppressing any interest, but to correct gradually disorders of a dangerous character, which have insensibly, in the long course of years, without being perceived by any one, crept into the state. The ques- tion is not between credit and no credit, as some would have us believe, but in what form credit can best perform the functions of a sound and safe currency. On this important point I have freely thrown out my ideas, leaving it to this body and the public to determine what they are worth. Believing that there might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on the credit of the govern- ment exclusively, I was desirous that those who are responsible, and have the power, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of the temporary de- ficit of the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth instalment, intended to be deposited with the states, to use them as the means of affording a circulation for the present relief of the country and the banks, during the process of separ- ating them from the government ; and, if experience should justify it, of furnish- ing a permanent and safe circulation, which would greatly facilitate the opera- tions of the treasury, and afford, incidentally, much facility to the commercial operations of the country. But a different direction was given, and when the alternative was presented of a loan, or the withholding of the fourth instalment from the states, I did not hesitate to give a decided vote for withholding it. My aversion to a public debt is deep and durable. It is, in my opinion, pernicious, and is little short of a fraud on the public. I saw too much of it during the late war not to understand something of the nature and character of public loans. Never was a country more egregiously imposed on. Having now presented my views of the course and the measures which the permanent policy of the country, looking to its liberty and lasting prosperity, re- quires, I come finally to the question of relief. I have placed this last, not that I am devoid of sympathy for the country in the pecuniary distress which now pervades it. No one struggled earlier or longer to prevent it than myself; nor can any one more sensibly feel the wide-spread blight which has suddenly blasted the hopes of so many, and precipitated thousands from aflluence to pov- erty. The desolation has fallen mainly on the mercantile class — a class which I have ever held in the highest estimation. No country ever had a superior body of merchants, of higher honour, of more daring enterprise, or of greater skill and energy. The ruin of such a class is a heavy calamity, and I am so- licitous, among other things, to give such stability to our currency as to prevent the recurrence of a similar calamity hereafter. But it was first necessary, in the order of things, that we should determine what sound policy, looking to the future, demands to be done at the present juncture, before we consider the question of relief; which, as urgent as it may be, is subordinate, and must yield to the former. The patient lies under a dangerous disease, with a burning thirst and other symptoms, which distress him more than the vital organs which are attacked. The skilful physician first makes himself master of the nature of the disease, and then determines on the treatment necessary for the restoration of health. This done, he next alleviates the distressing symptoms as far as is consistent with the restoration of health, and no farther. Such shall be my course. As far as I possibly can, consistently with the views I entertain, and what I believe to be necessary to restore the body politic to health, I will do everything in my power to mitigate the present distress. Farther I cannot go. " After the best reflection, I am of opinion that the government can do but lit- M M iJ74 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. tie in the way of relief; and that it is a case which must be mainly left to the constitution of the patient, who, thank God, is young, vigorous, and robust, with a constitution sufficient to sustain and overcome the severest attack. I dread the doctor and his drugs much more than the disease itself. The distress of the country consists in its indebtedness, and can only be relieved by payment of its debts. To effect this, industry, frugality, economy, and time are neces- sary. J rely more on the growing crop — on the cotton, rice, and tobacco of the South, than on all the projects or devices of politicians. I am utterly opposed to all coercion by this government. But government may do something to re- lieve the distress. It is out of debt, and is one of the principal creditors both of the banks and of the merchants, and should set an example of liberal indul- gence. This I am willing to give freely. I am also prepared to vote freely the use of government credit in some safe form, to supply any deficit in the cir- culation, during the process of recovery, as far as its financial wants will per- mit.- I see not what more can be safely done. But my vision may be obtuse upon this subject. Those who differ from me, and who profess so much sym- pathy for the public, seem to think that much relief may be afforded. I hope they will present their views. I am anxious to hear their prescriptions, and I assure them, that whatever they may propose, if it shall promise relief, and be not inconsistent with the course which I deem absolutely necessary for the restoration of the country to perfect health, shall cheerfully receive my support. They may be more keensighted than I am as to the best means of relief, but cannot have a stronger disposition to afford it. We have, Mr. President, arrived at a remarkable era in our political history. The days of legislative and executive encroachments, of tariffs and surpluses, of bank and public debt, and extravagant expendhure, are past for the present. The government stands in a position disentangled Irom the past, and freer to choose its future course than it ever has been since its commencement. We are about to take a fresh start. I move off under the State Rights banner, and o-o in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the opportunity thoroughly to reform the government ; to bring it back to its original principles ; to retrench and economize, and rigidly to enforce accountability. I shall op- pose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt ; to create a National Bank ; to reunite the political and money powers (more dangerous than Church and State) in any form or shape ; to prevent the operation of the compromise, which is gradually removing the last vestige of the tariff system ; and, mainly, I shall use my best efforts to give an ascendency to the great conservative prin- ciple of state sovereignty, over the dangerous and despotic doctrine of consoli- dation. I rejoice to think that the executive department of the government is now so reduced in power and means, that it can no longer rely on its influence and patronage to secure a majority. Henceforward it can have no hope of sup- porting itself but on wisdom, moderation, patriotism, and devoted attachment to the Constitution, which, I trust, will make it, in its own defence, an ally in ef- fecting the reform which I deem indispensable to the salvation of the country and its institutions. I look, sir, with pride to the wise and noble bearing of the little State Rights party, of which it is my pride to be a member, throughout the eventful period through which the country has passed since 1824. Experience already bears testimony to their patriotism, firmness, and sagacity, and history will do it jus- tice. In that year, as I have stated, the tariff system triumphed in the councils of the nation. We saw its disastrous political bearings — foresaw its surpluses, and the extravagances to which it would lead — we rallied on the election of the late President to arrest it through the influence of the executive department of the government. In this we failed. We then fell back upon the rights and sovereignty of the states ; and by the action of a small, but gallant state, and through the potency of its interposition, we brought the system to the ground, sustained as it was by the opposition and the administration, and by the whole power and patronage of the government. The pernicious overflow of the treas- ury, of which it was the parent, could not be arrested at once. The surplus was seized on by the executive, and, by its control over the banks, became the fruitful source of executive influence and encroachment. Without hesitation, we joined our old opponents on the tariff' question, but under our own flag, and without mero-ing in their ranks, and made a gallant and successful war against the encroachments of the executive. That terminated, we part with our late allies in peace, and move forward, lag or onward who may, to secure the fruits of our long, but successful struggle, under the old Republican flag of '98, which, though tattered and torn, has never yet been lowered, and, with the blessing of God, never shall be with my consent. XIX. SPEECH ON HIS AMENDMENT TO SEPARATE THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE BANKS, OCTOBER 3, 1837. Mr. President : In reviewing this discussion, I have been struck with the fact, that the argument on the opposite side has been limited, almost exclu- sively, to the questions of relief and the currency. These are, undoubtedly, im- portant questions, and well deserving the deliberate consideration of the Sen- ate ; but there are other questions involved in this issue of a far more elevated character, which more imperiously demand our attention. The banks have ceased to be mere moneyed incorporations. They have become great political institutions, with vast influence over the welfare of the community ; so much so, that a highly distinguished senator (Mr. Clay) has declared, in his place, that the question of the disunion of the government and the banks involved in its consequences the disunion of the states themselves. With this declaration sounding in our ears, it is time to look into the origin of a system which has already acquired such mighty influence ; to inquire into the causes which have produced it, and whether they are still on the increase ; in what they will ter- minate, if left to themselves ; and, finally, whether the system is favourable to the permanency of our free institutions ; to the industry and business of the country ; and, above all, to the moral and intellectual development of the com- munity. I feel the vast importance and magnitude of these topics, as well as their great delicacy. I shall touch them with extreme reluctance, and only be- cause I believe them to belong to the occasion, and that it would be a derelic- tion of public duty to withhold any opinion, which I have deliberately formed, on the subject under discussion. The rise and progress of the banking system is one of the most remarkable and curious phenomena of modem times. Its origin is modern and humble, and gave no indication of the extraordinary growth and ijiifluence which it was destined to attain. It dates back to 1609, the year that the Bank of Amsterdam was established. Other banking institutions preceded it ; but they were insula- ted, and not immediately connected with the systems which have since sprung up, and which may be distinctly traced to that bank, which was a bank of deposite — a mere storehouse — established under the authority of that great commer- cial metropolis, for the purpose of safe-keeping the precious metals, and facili- tating the vast system of exchanges which then centred there. The whole sys- tem was the most simple and beautiful that can be imagined. The depositor, on delivering his bullion or coin in store, received a credit, estimated at the standard value on the books of the bank, and a certificate of deposite for the amount, which was transferable from hand to hand, and entitled the holder to 276 SPEECHES OF JOHJN U. i;Al.HULiN. ■withdraw the deposite on payment of a moderate fee for the expense and hazard of safe-keeping. These certificates became, in fact, the circulating medium of the community, performing, as it were, the hazard and drudgerj^ while the pre- cious metals, which tliey, in truth, represented, guilder for guilder, lay quietly in store, without being exposed to the wear and tear, or losses incidental to actual use. It was thus a paper currency was created, having all the solidity, safety. and uniformity of a metallic, with the facility belonging to that of paper. The whole arrangement was admirable, and worthy of the strong sense and down- right honesty of the people with whom it originated. '^Out of this, which may be called the first era of the system, grew the bank of deposite, discount, and circulation — a great and mighty change, destined to ef- fect a revolution in the condition of modem society. It is not difficult to explain how the one system should spring from the other, notwithstanding the striking dissimilarity in features and character between the offspring and the parents A vast sum, not less than three millions sterling, accumulated and remained habit- ually in deposite in the Bank of Amsterdam, the place of the returned certifi- cates being constantly supplied by new depositors. With so vast a standing deposite, it required but little reflection to perceive that a very large portion of it might be withdrawn, and that a suflicient amount would be still left to meet the returning certificates ; or, what would be the same in effect, that an equal amount of fictitious certificates might be issued beyond the sum actually depos- ited. Either process, if interest be charged on the deposites withdrawn, or the fictitious certificates issued, would be a near approach to a bank of discount. This once seen, it required but little reflection to perceive that the same pro- cess would be equally applicable to a capital placed in bank as stock ; and from that the transition was easy to issuing bank-notes payable on demand, on bills of exchange, or promissory notes, having but a short time to run. These, com- bined, constitute the elements of a bank of discount, deposite, and circulation. Modem ingenuity and dishonesty would not have been long in percei\dng and turning such advantages to account; but the faculties of the plain Belgian was either too blunt to perceive, or his honesty too stern to avail himself of them. To his honour, there is reason to believe, notwithstanding the temptation, the deposites were sacredly kept, and that for every certificate in circulation, there was a ccfrresponding amount in bullion or coin in store. It was reserved for another people, either more ingenious or less scrupulous, to make the change. The Bank of England was incorporated in iGOi, eighty-five years after that X of Amsterdam, and was the first bank of deposite, discount, and circulation. Its capital was £1,200,000, consisthig wholly of government stock, bearing an interest of eight per cent, per annum. Its notes were received in the dues of the government, and the public revenue was deposited in the bank. It was au- thorized to circulate exchequer bills, and make loans to government. Let us pause for a moment, and contemplate this complex and potent machine, under its various character and functions. As a bank of deposite, it was authorized to receive deposites, not simply for safe-keeping, to be returned when demanded by the depositor, but to be used and loaned out for the benefit of the institution, care being taken always to be provided with the means of returning an equal amount, when demanded. As a bank of discount and circulation, it issued its notes on the faith of it5 capital stock and deposites, or discounted bills of exchange and promissory notes back- ed by responsible endorsers, charging an interest something greater than was authorized by law to be charged on loans ; and thus allowing it, for the use of its credit, a higher rate of compensation than what individuals were authorized to receive for the use and hazard of money or capital loaned out. It will, per- haps, place this point in a clear light, if we should consider the transaction in its true character, not as a loan, but as a mere exchange of credit. In discount- ing, the bank takes, in the shape of a promissory note, the credit of an indi- »l'liJiV;Hi;JS UF JOHiM C. CALHOUN. ii77 vidual so good that another, equally responsible, endorses his note for nothing, and gives out its credit in the form of a bank-note. The transaction is obvious- ly a mere exchange of credit. If the drawer and endorser break, the loss is the Bank's ; but if the Bank breaks, the loss falls on the community ; and yet this transaction, so dissimilar, is confounded with a loan, and the bank per- mitted to charge, on a mere exchange of credit, in which the hazard of the breaking of the drawer and endorser is incurred by the Bank, and that of the Bank by the community, a higher sum than the legal rate of interest on a loan ; in which, besides the use of his capital, the hazard is all on the side of the lender. Turning from these to the advantages which it derived from its connexion with the government, we shall find them not less striking. Among the first of these in importance is the fact of its notes being received in the dues of the government, by which the credit of the government was added to that of the Bank, which added so greatly to the increase of its circulation. These, ao-ain when collected by the government, were placed in deposite in the Bank ; thus giving to it not only the profit resulting from their abstraction from circulation, from the time of collection till disbursement, but also that from the use of the public deposites in the interval. To complete the picture, the Bank, in its ca- pacity of lender to the government, in fact paid its own notes, which rested on the faith of the government stock, on which it was drawing eight per cent. ; so that, in truth, it but loaned to the government its own credit. Such were the extraordinary advantages conferred on this institution, and of which it had an exclusive monopoly ; and these are the causes which gave such an extraordinary impulse to its growth and influence, that it increased in a lit- tle more than a hundred years — from 1694, when the second era of the sys- tem commenced, with the establishment of the Bank of England, to 1797, when- it terminated — from jC1,200,000 to nearly £11,000,000, and this mainly by the addition to its capital through loans to the government above the profits of its annual dividends. Before entering on the third era of the system, I pause to make a few reflections on the second. I am struck, in casting my eyes over it, to find that, notwithstanding the great dissimilarity of features which the system had assumed in passing from a mere bank of deposite to that of deposite, discount, and circulation, the operation of the latter was confounded, throughout this long period, as it regards the effects on the currency, with the bank of deposite. Its notes were universally regard- ed as representing gold and silver, and as depending on that representation ex- clusively for their circulation ; as much so as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam. No one supposed that they could retain their credit for a moment after they ceased to be convertible into the metals on de- mand ; nor were they supposed to have the effect of increasing the aggregate amount of the currency ; nor, of course, of increasing prices. In a word, they were in the public mind as completely identified with the metallic currency as if every note in circulation had laid up in the vaults of the Bank an equal amount, pound for pound, into which all its paper could be converted the moment it was presented. All this was a great delusion. The issues of the Bank never did represent, from the first, the precious metals. Instead of the representatives, its notes were, in reality, the substitute for coin. Instead of being the mere drudges, performing all the out-door service, while the coins reposed at their ease in the vaults of the banks, free from wear and tear, and the hazard of loss or destruc- tion, as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam, they substituted, degraded, and banished the coins. Every note circulated became the substitute of so much coin, and dispensed with it in circulation, and thereby depreciated the value of the precious metals, and increased their consumption in the same proportion ; while it diminished in the same degree the supply, by 278 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtTrf. rendering mining less profitable. The system assumed gold and silver as the basis of its circulation ; and yet, by the laws of its nature, just as it increased its circulation, in the same degree the foundation on which the system stood was weakened. The consumption of the metals increased, and the supply di- minished. As the weight of the superstructure increased, just in the same pro- portion its foundation was undermined and weakened. Thus the germe of de- struction was implanted in the system at its birth ; has expanded with its growth, and must terminate, finally, in its dissolution, unless, indeed, it should, by some transition, entirely change its nature, and pass into some other and entirely dif- ferent organic form. The conflict between bank circulation and metallic (though not perceived in the first stage of the system, when they were supposed to be indissolubly connected) is mortal ; one or the other must perish in the struggle. Such is the decree of fate : it is irreversible. Near the close of the second era, the system passed the Atlantic, and took root in our country, where it found the soil still more fertile, and the climate more congenial than even in the parent country. The Bank of North America was established in 1781, with a capital of $400,000, and bearing all the fea- tures of its prototype, the Bank of England. In the short space of a little more than half a century, the system has expanded from one bank to about eight hun- dred, including branches (no one knows the exact number, so rapid the increase), and from a capital of less than half a million to about $300,000,000, without, apparently, exhausting or diminishing its capacity to increase. So accelerated has been its growth with us, from causes which I explained on a former occa- sion,* that already it has approached a point much nearer the limits beyond which the system, in its present form, cannot advance, than in England. During the year 1797, the Bank of England suspended specie payments : an event destined, by its consequences, to effect a revolution in public opinion in re- lation to the system, and to accelerate the period which must determine its fate. England was then engaged in that gigantic struggle which originated in the French Revolution, and her financial operations were on the most extended scale, followed by a corresponding increase in the action of the Bank, as her fiscal agent. It sunk under its over-action. Specie payments were suspended. Panic and dismay spread through the land — so deep and durable was the im- pression that the credit of the Bank depended exclusively on the punctuality of its payments. In the midst of the alarm, an act of Parliament was passed making the notes of the Bank a legal tender ; and, to the surprise of all, the institution proceeded on, apparently without any diminution of its credit. Its notes circulated freely as ever, and without any depreciation, for a time, compared with gold and silver ; and continued so to do for upward of twenty years, with an average diminution of about one per cent, per annum. This shock did much to dispel the delusion that bank-notes represented gold and silver, and that they circulated in conse- quence of such representation, but without entirely obliterating the old impres- sion which had taken such strong hold on the public mind. The credit of its notes during the suspension was generally attributed to the tender act, and the great and united resources of the Bank and the government. But an event followed of the same kind, under circumstances entirely differ- ent, which did more than any preceding to shed light on the true nature of the system, and to unfold its vast capacity to sustain itself without exterior aid. We finally became involved in the mighty struggle that had so long desolated Europe and enriched our country. War was declared against Great Britain in 1812, and in the short space of one year our feeble banking system sunk \m- der the increased fiscal action of government. I was then a member of the other house, and had taken my full share of responsibility in the measures which * See Speech ou Mr. Webster's motion to renew the charter of the United States Bank in 1834 bad led to that result. I shall never forget the sensation which the suspension, and the certain anticipation of the prostration of the currency of the country, as a consequence, excited in my mind. We could resort to no tender act ; we had no great central regulating power, like the Bank of England ; and the credit and resources of the government were comparatively small. Under such circum- stances, 1 looked forward to a sudden and great depreciation of bank-notes, and that they would fall speedily as low as the old continental money. Guess my surprise when I saw them sustain their credit, with scarcely any depreciation, for a time, from the shock. I distinctly recollect when I first asked myself the question, What was the cause ? and which directed my inquiry into the extraordi- nary phenomenon. 1 soon saw that the system contained within itself a self-sus- taining power ; that there was between the banks and the community, mutually, the relation of debtor and creditor, there being at all times something more due to the banks from the community than from the latter to the former. I saw, in this reciprocal relation of debts and credits, that the demand of the banks on the com- munity was greater than the amount of their notes in circulation could meet ; and that, consequently, so long as their debtors were solvent, and bound to pay at short periods, their notes could not fail to be at or near a par with gold and sil- ver. I also saw that, as their debtors were principally the merchants, they would take bank-notes to meet their bank debts, and that that which the mer- chant and the government, who are the great money-dealers, take, the rest of the community would also take. Seeing all this, I clearly perceived that self- sustaining principle which poised the system, self-balanced, like some celestial body, moving with scarcely a perceptible deviation from its path, from the con- cussion it had received. Shortly after the termination of the war, specie payments were coerced with us by the establishment of a National Bank, and a few years afterward, in Great Britain, by an act of Parliament. In both countries the restoration was follow- ed by wide-spread distress, as it always must be when effected by coercion ; for the simple reason that banks cannot pay unless their debtors first pay, and that to coerce the banks compels them to coerce their debtors before they have*^ the means to pay. Their failure must be the consequence ; and this involves the failure of the banks themselves, carrying with it universal distress. Hence I am opposed to all kinds of coercion, and am in favour of leaving the disease to time, with the action of public sentiment and the states, to which the banks are al'one responsible. But to proceed with ray narrative. Although specie payments were restored, and the system apparently placed where it was before the suspension, the great capacity it proved to possess of sustaining itself without specie payments, was not forgot by those who had its direction. The impression that it was indispen- sable to the circulation of bank-notes that they should represent the precious metals, was almost obliterated ; and the latter were regarded rather as restrictions ^- on the free and profUabte operation of the si/stem than as the means of Us security. Hence a feeling of opposition to gold and silver gradually grew up on the part of the banks, which created an esprit dii corps, followed by a moral resistance to specie payments, if I may so express myself, which in fact suspended, in a great degree, the conversion of their notes into the precious metals, long before the present suspension. With the growth of this feeling, banking business as- sumed a bolder character, and its profits were proportionably enlarged, and with it the tendency of the system to increase kept pace. The effect of this soon displayed itself in a striking manner, which was followed by very important con- sequences, which I shall next explain. It so happened that the charters of the Bank of England and the late Bank of the United States expired about the same time. As the period approached,, a feeling of hostility, growing out of the causes just explained, which had ex- cited a strong desire in the community, who could not participate in the profits SriiEiUrlrjO ur junii o« v/A^nuuiia of these two great monopolies, to throw off their restraint, began to disclose it- self ao-ainst both institutions. In Great Britain it terminated in breaking down the exclusive monopoly of the Bank of England, and narrowing greatly the spe- cie basis of the system, by making the notes of the Bank of England a legal tender in all cases, except between it and its creditors. A sudden and vast in- crease of the system, with a great diminution of the metallic basis in proportion to banking transactions, followed, which has shocked and weakened the stabil- ity of the system there. With us the result was different. The Bank fell un- der the hostility. All restraint on the system was removed, and banks shot up in every direction almost instantly, under the growing impulse which I have ex- plained, and which, with the causes I stated when I first addressed the Senate on this question, is the cause of the present catastrophe. With it commences the fourth era of the system, which we have just entered — an era of struggle, and conflict, and changes. The system can advance no farther in our country, without great and radical changes. It has come to a stand. The conflict between metallic and bank currency, which I have shown to be inherent in the system, has, in the course of time, and with the progress of events, become so deadly that they must separate, and one or the other fall. The degradation of the value of the metals, and their almost entire expulsion from their appropriate sphere as the medium of exchange and the standard of value, have gone so far, under the necessary operation of the system, that they are no longer sufficient to form the basis of the widely-extended system of bank- ing. From the first, the gra^atation of the system has been in one direction — to dispense with the use of the metals ; and hence the descent from a bank of de- posite to one of discount ; and hence, from being the representative, their notes have become the substitute for gold and silver ; and hence, finally, its present tendency to a mere paper engine, totally separated from the metals. One law has steadily governed the system throughout — the enlargement of its profits and influence ; and, as a consequence, as metallic currency became insufficient for circulation, it has become, in its progress, insufficient for the basis of banking operations ; so much so, that, if specie payments were restored, it would be but nominal, and the system would in a few years, on the first adverse current, sink down again into its present helpless condition. Nothing can prevent it but great and radical changes, which would diminish its profits and influence, so as effectually to arrest that strong and deep current which has carried so much of the wealth and capital of the community in that direction. Without that, the system, as now constituted, must fall ; unless, indeed, it can form an alliance ''' with the government, and through it establish its authority by law, and make its credit, unconnected with gold and silver, the medium of circulation. If the al- liance should take place, one of the first movements would be the establishment of a great central institution ; or, if that should prove impracticable, a combina- tion of a few selected and powerful state banks, which, sustained by the govern- ment, would crush or subject the weaker, to be followed by an amendment of the Constitution, or some other device, to limit their number and the amount of their capital hereafter. This done, the next step would be to confine and con- solidate the supremacy of the system over the currency of the country, which would be in its hands exclusively, and, through it, over the industry, business, and politics of the countiy ; all of which would be wielded to advance its prof- its and power. The system having now arrived at this point, the great and solemn duty de- volves on us to determine this day what relation this government shall hereafter bear to it. Shall we enter into an alliance with it, and become the sharers of its fortune and the instrument of its aggrandizement and supremacy ? This is the momentous question on which we must now decide. Before we decide, it behooves us to inquire whether the system is favourable to the permanency of our free Republican institutions, to the industry and business of the country, and. above all, to our moral and intellectual development, the great object for which we were placed here by the Author of our being. Can it be doubted what must be the effects of a system whose operations have been shown to be so unequal on free institutions, whose foundation rests on an equality of rights 1 Can that favour equality which gives to one portion of the citizens and the country such decidjsd-advantages over the other, as I have shown it does in my opening remarks ? \Can that be favourable to liberty which ct»n- centrates the money power, and pTfces it under the control of a few powerful and wealthy individuals ? It is the remark of a profound statesman, that the revenue is the state ; and, of course, those who control the revenue control the state ; and those who can control the money power can the revenue, and through it the state, with the property and industry of the country, in all its ramifica- tions. Let us pause for a moment, and reflect on the nature and extent of this tremendous power. The currency of a country is to the community what the blood is to the hu- man system. It constitutes a small part, but it circulates through every portion, and is indispensable to all the functions of life. The currency bears even a smaller proportion to the aggregate capital of the community than what the blood does to the solids in the human system. What that proportion is, has not been, and perhaps cannot be, accurately ascertained, as it is probably subject to con- siderable variations. It is, however, probably between twenty-five and thirty-five to one. I will assume it to be thirty to one. With this assumption, let us sup- pose a community whose aggregate capital is $31,000,000 ; its currency would be, by supposition, one million, and the residue of its capital thirty millions. This being assumed, if the currency be increased or decreased, the other portion of the capital remaining the same, according to the well-known laws of currency, property would rise or fall with the increase or decrease ; that is, if the cur- rency be increased to two millions, the aggregate value of property would rise to sixty millions ; and, if the currency be reduced to $500,000, it would be re- duced to fifteen millions. With this law so well established, place the money power in the hands of a single individual, or a combination of individuals, and they, by expanding or contracting the currency, may raise or sink prices at pleasure ; and by purchasing when at the greatest depression, and selling at the o-reatest elevation, may command the whole property and industry of the community, and control its fiscal operations. )The banking system concentrates and places this power in the hands of those who control it, and its force in- creases just in proportion as it dispenses with a metallic basis. Never was an eno-ine invented better calculated to place the destiny of the many in the hands of the few, or less favourable to that equality and independence which lies at the bottom of our free institutions. These views have a bearing not less decisive on the next inquiry — the effects of the system on the industry and wealth of the country. Whatever may have been its effects in this respect in its early stages, it is difficult to imagine any- thuig more mischievous on all of the pursuits of life than the frequent and sud- den expansions and contractions, to which it has now become so habitually sub- ject that it may be considered its ordinary condition. None but those in the secret know what to do. AU are pausing and looking out to ascertain whether an expansion or contraction is next to follow, and what will be its extent and duration ; and if, perchance, an error be committed — if it expands when a con- traction is expected, or the reverse — the most prudent may lose by the miscalcu- lation the fruits of a life of toil and care. The consequence is, to discourage industry, and to convert the whole community into stock-jobbers and speculators. The evil is constantly on the increase, and must continue to increase just as the banking system becomes more diseased, till it shall become utterly intolerable. But its most fatal eflfects originate in its bearing on the moral and intellectual development of the community. The great principle of demand and supply gov- N N »i^£.rii;rlrjO ur jwnn y^. »^Ajjrnjuii. ems the moral and intellectual world no less than the business and commercial. If a community be so constituted as to cause a demand for high mental at- tainments, or if its honours and rewards are allotted to pursuits that require their development, by creating a demand for intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, justice, firmness, courage, patriotism, and the like, they are sure to be produced. But if, on the contrary, they be allotted to pursuits that require inferior qualities, the higher are sure to decay and perish. I object to the banking system, be- cause it allots the honours and rewards of the community, in a very undue pro- portion, to a pursuit the least of all favourable to the development of the higher mental qualities, intellectual or moral, to the decay of the learned professions, and the more noble pursuits of sciene, literature, philosophy, and statesmanship, and the great and more useful pursuits of business and industry. With the vast increase of its profits and influence, it is gradually concentrating in itself most of the prizes of life — wealth, honour, and influence, to the great disparagement and degradation of all the liberal, and useful, and generous pursuits of society. The rising generation cannot but feel its deadening influence. The youths l-'who crowd our colleges, and behold the road to honour and distinction termina- ting in a banking-house, will feel the spirit of emulation decay within them, and will no longer be pressed forward by generous ardour to mount up the rugged steep of science as the road to honour and distinction, when, perhaps, the high- est point they could attain, in what was once the most honourable and influential v/ of all the learned professions, would be the place of attorney to a bank. Nearly four years since, on the question of the removal of the deposites, although I was opposed to the removal, and in favour of their restoration, be- cause I believed it to be illegal, yet, foreseeing what was coming, and not wishing there should be any mistake as to my opinion on the banking system, I stated here in my place what that opinion was. I declared that I had long entertained doubts, if doubts they might be called, which were daily increasing, that the system made the worst possible distribution of the wealth of the com- munity, and that it would ultimately be found hostile to the farther advancement of civilization and liberty. This declaration was not lightly made ; and I have now unfolded the grounds on which it rested, and which subsequent events and reflection have matured into a settled conviction. With all these consequences before us, shall we restore the broken connex- ion ? Shall we again unite the government with the system ? And what are the arguments opposed to these high and weighty objections? Instead of meet- ing them and denying their truth, or opposing others of equal weight, a rabble of objections (I can call them by no better name) are urged against the separa- tion : one currency for the government, and another for the people ; separation of the people from the government ; taking care of the government, and not the people ; and a whole fraternity of others of like character. When I first saw them advanced in the columns of a newspaper, I could not but smile, in thinking how admirably they were suited to an electioneering canvass. They have a certain plausibility about them, which makes them troublesome to an opponent simply because they are merely plausible, without containing one particle of reason. I little expected to meet them in discussion in this place ; but since they have been gravely introduced here, respect for the place and company ex- acts a passing notice, to which, of themselves, they are not at all entitled. I begin with that which is first pushed forward, and seems to be most relied on — one currency for the government and another for the people. Is it meant that the government must take in payment of its debts whatever the people take in payment of theirs? If so, it is a very broad proposition, and would lead to important consequences. The people now receive the notes of non-specie- paying banks. Is it meant that the government should also receive them? They receive in change all sorts of paper, issued by we know not whom. Mu^t the government also receive them ^ They receive the notes of banks issuing notes under five, ten, and twenty dollars. Is it intended that the gov- ernment shall also permanently receive them ? They receive bills of exchange. Shall government, too, receive them? If not, I ask the reason. Is it because they are not suitable for a sound, stable, and uniform currency? The reason is good ; but what becomes of the principle, that the government ought to take whatever the people take? But I go farther. It is the duty of government to receive nothing in its dues that it has not the right to render uniform and stable in its value. We are, by the Constitution, made the guardian of the.- money of the country. For this the right of coining and regulating the value of coins was given, and we have no right whatever to receive or treat anything as money, or the equivalent of money, the value of which we have no right to regulate. If this principle be true, and it cannot be controverted, I ask. What right has Congress to receive and treat the notes of the state banks as monev ?•' If the states have the right to incorporate banks, what right has Conoressto regulate them or their issues? Show me the power in the Constitution. If the right be admitted, what are its limitations, and how can the right of subject- ing them to a bankrupt law in that case be denied ? If one be admitted, the other follows as a consequence ; and yet those who are most indignant against the proposition of subjecting the state banks to a bankrupt law, are the most clamorous to receive their notes, not seeing that the one power involves the other. I am equally opposed to both, as unconstitutional and inexpedient. We are next told, to separate from the banks is to separate from the people. The banks, then, are the people, and the people the banks — united, identified, and in- separable ; and as the government belongs to the people, it follows, of course, according to this argument, it belongs also to the banks, and, of course, is bound to do their biddings. I feel on so grave a subject, and in so grave a body, an almost invincible repugnance in replying to such arguments ; and I shall hasten over the only remaining one of the fraternity which I shall condescend to notice with all possible despatch. They have no right of admission here, and, if I were disposed to jest on so solemn an occasion, I should say they ought to be driven from this chamber, under the 47th rule.* The next of these formidable objections to the separation from the banks is, that the government, in so doing, takes care of itself, and not of the people. Why, I had supposed that the gov- ernment belonged to the people ; that it was created by them for their own use, to promote their interest, and secure their peace and liberty ; that, in takinw care of itself, it takes the most effectual care of the people ; and in refusincr all em- barrassing, entangling, and dangerous alliances with corporations of any de- scription, it was but obeying the great law of self-preservation. But enough ; I cannot any longer waste words on such objections. I intend no disrespect to those who have urged them ; yet these, and arguments like these, are mainly relied on to countervail the many and formidable objections, drawn from the highest considerations that can influence the action of governments or individu- als, none of which have been refuted, and many not even denied. The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) urged an argument of a very different character, but which, in my opinion, he entirely failed to establish. He asserted that the ground assumed on this side was an entire abandonment of a great constitutional function conferred by the Constitution on Congress. To establish this, he laid down the proposition, that Congress was bound to take care of the money of the country. Agreed ; and with this view the Constitu- tion confers on us the right of coining and regulating the value of coins, in or--^- der to supply the country with money of proper standard and value ; and is it an abandonment of this right to take care, as this bill does, that it shall not be expelled from circulation, as far as the fiscal action of this government extends ? But having taken this unquestionable position, the senator passed (by what * It is the rule regulating the admission of persons in the lobby of the Senate. country to the right of establishing a currency, and then to the right of estab- lishino- a bank currency, as I understood him. On both of these points I leave him in the hands of the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who, in an able and constitutional argument, completely demolished, in my judgment, the position assumed by the senator from Massachusetts. I rejoice to hear such an argument from such a quarter. The return of the great State of Pennsyl- vania to the doctrines of rigid construction and state rights sheds a ray of light on the thick, darkness which has long surrounded us. But we are told that there is not gold and silver enough to fill the channels of circulation, and that prices would fall. Be it so. What is that, compared to the dangers which menace on the opposite side ? But are we so certain that there is not a sufficiency of the precious metals for the purpose of circulation ? Look at France, with her abundant supply, with her channels of circulation full to overflowing with coins, and her flourishing industry. It is true that our sup- ply is insufficient at present. How could it be otherwise ? The banking sys- tem has degraded and expelled the metals — driven them to foreign lands — closed the mines, and converted their products into costly vases, and splendid utensils and ornaments, administering to the pride and luxury of the opulent, in- stead of being employed as the standard of value, and the instrument of making exchanges, as they were manifestly intended mainly to be by an all-wise Provi- dence. Restore them to their proper functions, and they will return from their banishment ; the mines will again be opened, and the gorgeous splendour of wealth will a'gain reassume the more humble, but useful, form of coins. But, Mr. President, I am not driven to such alternatives. I am not the ene- my, but the friend of credit — not as the substitute, but the associate and the as- sistant of the metals. In that capacity, I hold credit to possess, in many re- spects, a vast superiority over the metals themselves. I object to it in the form which it has assumed in the banking system, for reasons that are neither light nor few, and that neither have nor can be answered. The question is not whether credit can be dispensed with, but what is its best possible form — the most stable, the least liable to abuse, and the most convenient and cheap. I threw out some ideas on this impoftant subject in my opening remarks. I have heard nothing to change my opinion. I believe that government credit, in the form I suggested, combines all the requisite qualities of a credit circulation in the highest degree, and also that government ought not to use any other credit but its own in its financial operations. When the senator from Massachusetts made his attack on my suggestions, I was disappointed. I expected argument, and he gave us denunciation. It is often easy to denounce, when it is hard to refute ; and when that senator gives denunciations instead of arguments, I con- clude that it is because the one is at his command, and the other not. We are told the form I suggested is but a repetition of the old Continental money — a ghost that is ever conjured up by all who wish to give the banks an exclusive monopoly of government credit. The assertion is not true : there is not the least analogy between them. The one was a promise to pay when there was no revenue, and the other a promise to receive in the dues of gov- ernment when there is an abundant revenue. , We are also told that there is no instance of a government paper that did not depreciate. In reply, I affirm that there is none, assuming the form I pro- pose, that ever did depreciate. Whenever a paper receivable in the dues of government had anything like a fair trial, it has succeeded. Instance the case of North Carolina, referred to in my opening remarks. The draughts of the treas- ury at this moment, with all their encumbrance, are nearly at par with gold and silver ; and 1 might add the instance alluded to by the distinguished sena- tor from Kentucky, in which he admits that, as soon as the excess of the issues of the Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky were reduced to the proper point, its had a fixed paper circulation, in the form of bank-notes, but which were incon- vertible, of upward of $120,000,000, estimated in the metallic ruble, and which had for years remained without fluctuation, having nothing to sustain it but that it was received in the dues of the government, and that, too, with a revenue of only about $90,000,000 annually. I speak on the authority of a respectable traveller. Other instances, no doubt, might be added, but it needs no such support. How can a paper depreciate which the government is botmd to re- ceive in all its payments, and while those to whom payments are to be made are under no obligation to receive it ? From its nature, it can only circulate •when at par with gold and silver ; and if it should depreciate, none could be in- jured but the government. But my colleague objects that it would partake of the increase and decrease of the revenue, and would be subject to greater expansions and contractions than bank-notes themselves. He assumes that government would increase the amount with the increase of the revenue, which is not probable, for the aid of its credit would be then less needed ; but if it did, what would be the effect ? On the decrease of the revenue, its bills would be returned to the treasury, from ■which, for the want of demand, they could not be reissued ; and the excess, instead of hanging on the circulation, as in the case of bank-notes, and expo- sing it to catastrophes like the present, would be gradually and silently with- drawn, without shock or injury to any one. It has another and striking advan- tage over bank circulation — in its superior cheapness, as well as greater stabili- ty and safety. UBank paper is cheap to those who make it, but dear, very dear, to those who use it-4fully as much so as gold and silver. It is the little cost of its manufacture, and the dear rates at which it is furnished to the communi- ty, which give the great profit to those who have a monopoly of the article. Some idea may be formed of the extent of the profit by the splendid palaces which we see under the name of banking-houses, and the vast fortunes which have been accumulated in this branch of business ; all of which must ultimate- ly be derived from the productive powers of the community, and, of course, adds so much to the cost of production. On the other hand, the credit of govern- ment, while it would greatly facilitate its financial operations, would cost no- thing, or next to nothing, both to it and the people, and, of course, would add nothing to the cost of production, which would give every branch of our indus- try, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, as far as its circulation might ex- tend, great advantages, both at home and abroad. But there remains another and great advantage. In the event of war, it would open almost unbounded resources to carry it on, without the necessity of resorting to what I am almost disposed to call a fraud — public loans. I have already show^n that the loans of the Bank of England to the government were very little more than loaning back to the government its own credit ; and this^- is more or less true of all loans, where the banking system prevails. It was pre-eminently so in our late war. The circulation of the government credit, in the shape of bills receivable exclusively with gold and silver in its dues, and the sales of public lands, would dispense with the necessity of loans, by in- creasing its bills with the increase of taxes. The increase of taxes, and, of course, of revenue and expenditures, would be followed by an increased de- mand for government bills, while the latter would furnish the means of paying the taxes, without increasing, in the same degree, the pressure on the commu- nity. This, with a judicious system of funding, at a low rate of interest, would go far to exempt the government from the necessity of contracting public loans in the event of war. I am not, Mr. President, ignorant, in making these suggestions (I wish them to be considered only in that light), to what violent opposition every measure of the kind must be exposed. Banks have been so long in the possession of gov- imuHUiUUtHmMuuwmtuuuiiuumiuniuanutiHniHitnmuuumH ernmeni creaii, mai mey very naiurauy cunciuue iiiey nave an exclusive rignt to it, and consider the withdrawal of it, even for the use of the government it- self, as a positive injury. It was my fortune to take a stand on the side of the government against the banks during the most trying period of the late war — the winter of 1814 and 1815 — and never in my life was I exposed to more cal- umny and abuse — no, not e^en on this occasion. It was my first lesson on the subject. I shall never forget it. I propose to give a very brief narrative of the scenes through which I then passed ; not with any feeling of egotism, for I trust I am incapable of that, but to illustrate the truth of much I have said, and to snatch from oblivion not an unimportant portion of our financial history. I see the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) and of Alabama (Mr. King), who were then members of the House of Representatives, in their places, and they can vouch for the correctness of my narrative, as far as the memory of transactions so long passed will serve. The finances of the country had, at that time, fallen into great confusion. Mr. Campbell had retired from the head of the treasury, and the late Mr. Dal- las had succeeded — a man of talents, bold and decisive, but inexperienced in the affairs of the department. His first measure to restore order, and to furnish the supplies to carry on the war, was to recommend a bank of $50,000,000, to be constituted almost exclusively of the new stocks which had been issued du- ring the war, to the exclusion of the old, which had been issued before. The proposed bank was authorized to make loans to the government, and was not bound to pay specie during the war, and for three years after its termination. It so happened that I did not arrive here till some time after the commence- ment of the session, having been detained by an attack of bilious fever. I had taken a prominent part in the declaration of the war, and had every motive and disposition to sustain the administration, and to vote every aid to carry on the war. Immediately after my arrival, I had a full conversation with Mr. Dallas, at his request. I entertained very kind feelings towards him, and assured him, after he had explained his plan, that I would give it my early and favourable attention. At that time I had reflected but little on the subject of banking. Many of my political friends expressed a desire that I should take a prominent part in favour of the proposed bank. Their extreme anxiety aroused my attention, and, being on no committee (they had been ap- pointed before my arrival), I took up the subject for a full investigation, with every disposition to give it my support. I had not proceeded far before I was struck with the extraordinary character of the project : a bank of $50,000,000, whose capital was to consist almost exclusively of government credit in the shape of stock, and not bound to pay its debts during the war, and for three years afterward, to furnish the government with loans to carry on the war ! I saw at once that the effect of the arrangement would be, that government would borrow back its own credit, and pay six per cent, per annum for what they had already paid eight or nine. It was impossible for me to give it my support under any pressure, however great. I felt the difficulty of my situation, not only in opposing the leading measure of the administration at such a crisis, but, what was far more responsible, to suggest one of my own, that would aflxjrd relief to the embarrassed treasury. I cast my eyes around, and soon saw that the government should use its own credit directly, without the intervention of a bank ; which I proposed to do in the form of treasury notes, to be issued in the operations of the government, and to be funded in the subscription to the stock of the bank. Treasury notes were, at that time, below par, even with bank paper. The opposition to them was so great on the part of the banks, that they refused to receive them on deposite, or payment, at par with their notes ; while the government, on its part, received and paid away notes of the banks at par with its own. Such was the influence of the banks, and to such degradation did the government, in its weakness, submit. All this influence I had to en- I hesitated not. I saw the path of duly clearly, and determined to tread it, as sharp and rugged as it was. When the bill came up, I moved my amendment, the main features of which were, that, instead of government stock already is- sued, the capital of the bank should consist of funded treasury notes ; and that, instead of a mere paper machine, it should be a specie-paying bank, so as to be an ally, instead of an opponent, in restoring the currency to a sound condition on the return of peace. These were, with me, indispensable conditions. I accompanied ray amendment with a short speech of fifteen or twenty minutes, and so overpowering was the force of truth, that, notwithstanding the influence of the administration, backed by the money power, and the Committee of Ways and Means, which was unanimous, with one exception, as I understood, my amendment prevailed by a large majority; but it, in turn, failed — the opposition, the adherents of the administration, and those who had constitutional scruples, combining against it. Then followed various, but unsuccessful, attempts to charter a bank. One was vetoed by the President, and another was lost by the casting vote of the speaker (Mr. Cheves). After a large portion of the session was thus unsuccessfully consumed, a caucus was called, in order to agree on some plan, to which I, and the few friends who still adhered to me after such hard service, were especially invited. We, of course, attended. The plan of compromise was unfolded, which approached much nearer to our views, but which was still objectionable in some features. I objected, and required far- ther concessions, which were refused, and was told the bill could be pass- ed without us ; at which I took up my hat and bade good-night. The bill was introduced in the Senate, and speedily passed that body. On the second read- ing, 1 rose and made a few remarks, in which I entreated the house to remem- ber that they were about to vote for the measure against their conviction, as had been frequently expressed ; and that, in so doing, they acted under a suppo- sed necessity, which had been created by those who expected to profit by the measure. I then reminded them of the danger of acting under such pressure ; and I said that they were so sensible of the truth of what I uttered, that, if peace should arrive before the passage of the bill, it would not receive the support of fifteen members. 1 concluded by saying that I would reserve what I intended to say on the question of the passage of the bill, when I would express my opinion at length, and appeal to the country. My objections, as yet, had not gone to the people, as nothing that I had said had been reported — such was my solicitude to defeat the bill without extending our divisions beyond the walls of the house, in the then critical condition of the country. My object was to ar- rest the measure, and not to weaken confidence in the administration. In making the supposition, I had not the slightest anticipation of peace. England had been making extensive preparations for the ensuing campaign, and had made a vigorous attack on New-Orleans, but had just been repelled ; but, by a most remarkable coincidence, an opportunity (as strange as it may seem) was afforded to test the truth of what I said. Late in the evening of the day I met Mr. Sturges, then a member of Congress from Connecticut. He said that he had some information which he could not withhold from me : that a treaty of peace had been made ; and that it had actually arrived in New-York, and would be here the next day, so that I would have an opportunity of test- ing the truth of my prediction. He added, that his brother, who had a mercan- tile house in New- York, had forwarded the information to him by express, and that he had forwarded the information to connected houses in Southern cities, with direction to purchase the great staples in that quarter, and that he wished me to consider the information as confidential. I thanked him for the intelli- gence, and promised to keep it to myself. The rumour, however, got out, and the next day an attempt was made to pass through the bill ; but the house was unwilling to act till it could ascertain whether a treaty had been made. It ar- t1lllHJW».»w».*