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THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF 
 ENGLAND WITH THE QUAD- 
 RUPLE ALLIANCE 1815-1830 
 
 by 
 
 Myrna Boyce 
 
 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the department of history of the Grad- 
 uate College of the State University of Iowa in partial fulfillment of the 
 requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 JUNE 1918 
 
THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF 
 ENGLAND WITH THE QUAD- 
 RUPLE ALLIANCE 1815-1830 
 
 by 
 
 Myrna Boyce 
 
 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the department of history of the Grad- 
 uate College of the State University of Iowa in partial fulfillment of the 
 requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 JUNE 1918 
 
^%- 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 England's Entrance into the Quadrxjple Alliance 5 
 The General Policy of Castlereagh and Canning 
 toward the Interpretation of the Quadruple 
 Alliance 13 
 
 III The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle . . .19 
 
 IV The Congress of Troppau 36 
 
 V The Congress at Laibach 45 
 
 VI The Congress of Verona 51 
 
 VII The Economic Basis of the English Diplomacy 
 
 IN THE Congress 61 
 
 VIII Summary 73 
 
 Bibliography 76 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 ENGLAND^S ENTRANCE INTO THE QUADRUPLE 
 ALLIANCE 1815-1830 
 
 With the overthrow of Napoleon the victors of France were 
 confronted with the task of reconstructing the map of Europe 
 and of restoring peace and order. For this purpose the Con- 
 gress of Vienna was assembled, and a year later the Quadruple 
 Alliance was formed, destined to become the most power- 
 ful concert of powers ever maintained in time of peace. A 
 discussion of the origin, character, purposes, and justification 
 of such a union arouses numerous questions that demand con- 
 sideration and solution. 
 
 Was this dominating alliance, this strong concert of England, 
 Austria, Russia, and Prussia, in the period from 1815 to 
 1830, necessary to the reconstruction of Europe following the 
 Napoleonic regime? Was it an acknowledgment of the failure 
 of the Congress of Vienna to establish order and the regard 
 of one nation for another's rights? Was this Alliance, then, 
 a logical outgrowth of the Vienna conferences, or was its need 
 foreseen in the dreary days of desolation, and its form gradually 
 evolved? Was it a great machine of repression or instrument 
 of war projected into time of peace? Did England see in such 
 an alliance a noble means of guiding aright an erring nation? 
 Was she actuated by selfish motives in casting aside the policy 
 of Pitt, the policy of non-interference, or was she forced to a 
 realization that what concerned Europe was of consequence 
 to England, that she could no longer be a self-sufficing na- 
 tional unit? For forty years following the Second Treaty of 
 Paris, the peace of Europe was steadfastly maintained with- 
 out a single encounter between any of the powers. Is this 
 a justification for the reactionary character of the alliance? 
 
 In order to answer these questions and to understand the 
 origin of the Alliance together with the work confronting it, 
 
 5 
 
6 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 the work left undone by the Congress of Vienna, its short- 
 comings or failures, should be passed in brief review. 
 
 In that assembly of crowned heads and dictating diplomat- 
 ists, powerful though the Czar Alexander and Prince Metter- 
 nich were, the responsibility of adjusting the infinite disputes 
 should necessarily have fallen to England, that mistress of the 
 seas who overwhelmed Napoleon's schemes for Africa and 
 Asia; it was English money subsidizing the armies of Austria 
 and Russia which enabled them to continue in the field; it 
 was England's army, finally, and England's general that con- 
 quered the European foe. Moreover, England, alone among the 
 powers against France, because of her geographical location 
 and her general foreign relations could have been a disinter- 
 ested force and an equitable judge in deciding upon conti- 
 nental readjustments. Furthermore, the English people, 
 among whom for the decade past there had been developing a 
 moral sense as a nation, a comprehension that out of the 
 French Revolution there had emerged certain rights of man, 
 expected and rightfully demanded that the settlement of Eu- 
 rope be made upon a higher basis than the principle of legiti- 
 macy, that it be founded upon a higher moral law. Lord 
 Castlereagh himself recognized this new attitude not only of 
 England but of Europe. In a letter written in May, 1814, to 
 Lord Bentinck he said, ''It is impossible not to perceive a 
 great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the prin- 
 ciples of freedom are in full operation. The danger is, that 
 the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely 
 to make the world better or happier."^ Lord Castlereagh, 
 then, was not oblivious to this change, but as a reactionary 
 failed to respond to the awakened era. And so in the Con- 
 gress, England was content to take an inferior part, to per- 
 mit Metternich, "that mind which never erred," to be the 
 dominating personality. 
 
 Surely there was in the Polish question a right to be up- 
 held and a principle of justice upon which to act. But in 
 this the opportunity for England to interfere was allowed to 
 pass by. 
 
 "Up to the period of the Congress of Vienna, no British 
 
 1 Castlereagh, Correspondence X, p. 18 (Castlereagh to Lord Wm. Bentinck). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 7 
 
 statesman had ever set his hand to an instrument, acknowledg- 
 ing as valid acts, the two partitions of Poland. Had the 
 British plenipotentiary founded his objections upon this prin- 
 ciple, had he positively refused to commit his Government to 
 any such acknowledgement, and had he insisted on the erec- 
 tion of an independent Polish state, he would have been ap- 
 plauded by the whole of Europe, whilst Austria and Prussia 
 would not only have not opposed it, but, on the contrary, 
 would have acquiesced in it with pleasure. ' ' ^ 
 
 "Backed by such powerful support, as well as by the voice 
 of public opinion throughout Europe, it is more than probable 
 that he (Castlereagh) might have been successful, but the mo- 
 ment when he gave up the principle, and told the emperor 
 that he was not indisposed to witness even with satisfaction 
 that his Imperial Majesty should receive a liberal and important 
 aggrandizement on his Polish frontier, and that it was to the 
 degree and the mode to which he alone objected, he threw away 
 the only weapon which he could successfully wield. ' ' ^ That 
 Lord Castlereagh was not taking this moral stand was felt 
 by the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cook. He ex- 
 horted his superior to fling aside the treaties and ''to declare 
 that nothing should induce Great Britain to acknowledge the 
 validity of those acts. ' ' * 
 
 Again England failed to appreciate an ideal for which she 
 had been fighting, the building up of British Empire. It is 
 true that in the Congress and in the Treaty of Paris, England 
 made important acquisitions, and certainly expanded very ma- 
 terially in her colonial possessions, keeping islands of no con- 
 sequence to the imperial ideal. It was merely acquisitions of 
 land regardless of its use to England. That not even Liver- 
 pool was alive to the colonial situation is clear from the fol- 
 lowing extract from a letter to Castlereagh: "We have Guada- 
 loupe and the Saintes in our hands, which have in fact been 
 conquered. We have no desire for any more colonies, but it 
 may not be amiss to consider them as fair pledges for the just 
 claims of our own subjects."^ 
 
 2 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p. 354. 
 
 3 Stapleton, George Canning and his Times, p. 354. 
 ilbid, p 356. 
 
 5 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 48, (Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 5, 1915). 
 
8 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 Then, too, in the Eastern question, concerning the unrest 
 of the Balkan states, England could without doubt have used 
 her influence to allay discord, indeed even to settle definitely 
 the position and rights of those states in Europe. Austria did 
 not dare broach the subject, nor did Russia question it. It 
 was England's part, a responsibility she should have taken 
 upon herself. 
 
 Again, in the question of the slave trade, the Congress of 
 Vienna failed to respond to the demands of the reform party 
 of England. Castlereagh appeared satisfied to receive a gen- 
 eral declaration of the powers against it. 
 
 Following the Congress of Vienna, treaties between the 
 powers were made with the idea of supporting the work of 
 Vienna. The Treaty of Chaumont was entered into in the 
 spring of 1815, and in the November following the second 
 treaty of Paris was concluded. It confirmed the work of the 
 Congress with its glaring defects. To the potentates of its 
 making, it was obvious enough that a means of enforcing the 
 terms and of maintaining the status of things as therein pro- 
 vided would be necessary. That instrument proved to be an 
 alliance. The Congress of Vienna, therefore, was directly re- 
 sponsible for a continued union of powers. 
 
 But even before the treaty, there had been expressed opinions 
 concerning concord of action for the maintenance of peace, 
 and the repression of revolutionary development.® As early as 
 1800 this note appeared in the Parliamentary Debates: 
 
 " . . . In order to render this security as complete as pos- 
 sible it seems necessary at the period of a general pacification 
 to form a treaty to which all the principal powers of Europe 
 should be partners, by which their respective rights and pos- 
 sessions, as they shall then have been established, shall be fixed 
 and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually 
 to protect and support each other against any attempt to in- 
 fringe them. It should reestablish a general and comprehen- 
 sive system of public law in Europe, provide as far as possible 
 for repressing future attempts to disturb general tranquility, 
 and, above all, for restraining any projects of aggrandize- 
 ment and the ambition similar to those which have produced all 
 
 6 Hansard, Debates, XXL, p. 182. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 9 
 
 the calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous war 
 of the French Revolution. ' ' ^ 
 
 Castlereagh in his desire and plan for an alliance to se- 
 cure the future peace of Europe showed himself magnanimous, 
 a statesman, having at heart the interests not only of England, 
 but also the welfare of the continent. He made the statement : 
 
 "It is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence 
 she has inspired to the account of peace, by exercising a con- 
 ciliatory influence between the Powers, rather than put her- 
 self at the head of any combination of Courts to keep others 
 in check. . . The immediate object to be kept in view is to 
 inspire the states of Europe, as long as we can, with a sense 
 of the dangers which they have sunnounted by their union, 
 of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance, to 
 make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect 
 security against the revolutionary embers more or less ex- 
 isting in every state of Europe. ' ' * 
 
 Before the definitive Treaty of Paris was signed, the sov- 
 ereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in person, became 
 parties to a solemn compact, the Holy Alliance, formulated in 
 ^September, 1815. To this document England never signed 
 her name, allied though she had been with these nations through 
 the Napoleonic Wars, and at the time of its promulgation uni- 
 ted with them in the occupation of France. It was declared 
 that the articles, "in consequence of the great events which 
 have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and 
 especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Provi- 
 dence to shower down upon those states which place their con- 
 fidence and hope in it alone (their majesties) acquired the 
 intimate conviction of the necessity of founding the conduct 
 to be observed by the powers in their reciprocal relations upon 
 the sublime truths which the Holy religion of our Savior 
 teaches. " ^ In this holy union it was further decreed, ' ' the 
 three contracting monarchs will remain united by the bonds 
 of a true and indissoluble fraternity and considering each other 
 as fellow country men, they will on all occasions and in all 
 places, lend each other aid and assistance and regarding them- 
 
 7 Hansard, Debates, XXL, p. 172. 
 
 8 Castlereagh, Correspondence XI, p. 105, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose, Dec. 28, 1815). 
 
 9 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, I p. 317. 
 
10 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 selves as fathers of families, they will lead them in the same 
 spirit of fraternity with which they are animated to protect 
 religion, peace, and justice. 
 
 "In consequence, the sole purpose in force shall be that of 
 doing each other reciprocal service. ' ' ^* 
 
 Why such an alliance should be formed to the exclusion of 
 England was perplexing and irritating to the English House 
 of Commons, chiefly to the Whigs. Why the three Powers 
 which had entered into a treaty with England, pledging all 
 the contracting parties to an identity of interest and object, 
 should have entered into a triple alliance, why its sole nego- 
 tiation and signing had taken place outside the usual medium 
 of diplomacy, and what its real purposes were, were problems 
 exciting the suspicion of England.^^ 
 
 Mr. Brougham in his attack in the House on the unusual 
 manner in which it had been drawn up, and on the character 
 of its terms, demanded from Lord Castlereagh the reason for 
 England's exclusion and the necessity of the Powers entering 
 the solemn pledge. Such a treaty, unheard of in history since 
 the crusades, an unthinkable product of modern Europe, gave 
 rise to unwarranted alarm, bitter jealousy, and prophecies of 
 despotism based upon false analogies. "When crowned heads 
 met," it was declared, "the result of their united councils was 
 not always favorable to the interests of humanity. ' ' ^^ The 
 war against Poland had been prefaced by a proclamation in 
 similar language to that which this treaty contained. Castle- 
 reagh in reply to the opposition stated that the sovereigns had 
 addressed a join letter to the Prince Regent inviting him into 
 the Holy Alliance, but although the latter approved highly of 
 its terms, he was unable to become a party, as the laws of 
 England did not permit such a procedure. 
 
 Two months after the formation of the Holy Alliance, the 
 Quadruple Alliance was formed. To this England became a 
 party. This compact, providing for the employment of means 
 to maintain the peace of Europe, binding the contracting par- 
 ties to aid each other against all attempts to disturb the es- 
 ablished succession, providing for meetings of the allies from 
 
 10 Hansard, Debates, 11, p. 354. 
 
 11 Ihid, 11, 359. 
 
 12 Ibid, 11, 359. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 11 
 
 time to time to arrange difficulties which might arise, and to 
 discuss and settle any differences occurring between any two 
 powers, has often been confused with the Holy Alliance.^^ 
 In reality in the minds of the statesmen of the period there 
 appears to have been no distinction. In the correspondence 
 /of Canning and Wellington and in the memoirs of Gentz, the 
 expressions "Holy Alliance" and "Quadruple Alliance" are 
 used synonymously. 
 
 Modem historians make much of the point that the Holy 
 Alliance was from its inception a dead letter,^* and maintain 
 that it was the Quadi'uple Alliance, or the Pentarchy (as it 
 was sometimes called after the admission of France to its 
 councils) which became an influence in European affairs. That 
 the congresses were called in accordance with the pro^dsions 
 of the Quadruple Alliance is unquestioned, but whether the 
 two alliances were ever considered by their authors as distinct 
 or unrelated raises a point. 
 
 Josceline Bagot, in his life of Canning, declares: "By^ the_ 
 treaty drawn up in November, the five Powers or the Pentarchy, 
 pledged themselves to act in concord for the maintenance of 
 the European peace. There is a clear distinction between this 
 committee and what is known as the Holy Alliance, although the 
 policy to be pursued has been generally known as that of the 
 Alliance only." Bagot, himself, however, has failed to main- 
 tain the distinction. He writes: "Whether the attitude of 
 Great Britain which finally disconcerted the Holy Alliance and 
 made for liberal government of Europe, "^^ whereas in the 
 following statement of Gentz^ he recognizes no distinction: 
 "Now, this truly sacred union, of which the Holy Alliance is 
 but an imperfect symbol, was never manifested in a more 
 reassuring manner than at the time of the conference at Aix- 
 la-Chapelle. " ^* Greville in his Memoirs makes the statement, 
 "While Lord Castlereagh was obliged to pretend to disapprove 
 of the Continental System of the Holy Alliance. . . ."^^ 
 In like manner, recognizing the alliances as one and the same 
 
 isHertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, 1, p. 372. 
 
 14 Hazen, Europe Since 1815, p. 16. 
 
 15 Bagot, George Canning and his Times, I, p. 118. 
 
 16 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 194. 
 
 17 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 107. 
 
12 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 thing, Wellington in 1824 wrote, ''Although, therefore, the 
 Holy Alliance, properly so called, would be applicable to trans- 
 actions with the Porte, the system of the Holy Alliance sup- 
 posed to be established by the treaties of Paris and Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, was never considered applicable to those transac- 
 tions. ' ' ^^ Canning, in response to a call for a conference on 
 the Greek and Turkish situation declared, "I will not be re- 
 plunged into what is vulgarly called the ''Holy Alliance." '^'^ 
 
 Whether the alliance which became the active force in Eu- 
 ropean affairs be called the Holy Alliance, the Moral Pentarchy, 
 or the Quadruple Alliance, England was a member for very 
 definite reasons. First, the doubtful tranquillity of Europe, c^ 
 England's long alliance with the Powers, and her temporary ^ 
 occupation of France, were powerful influences impelling her to 
 remain an ally against France. In the second place, she was 
 actuated by an active purpose. ''To carry into execution not 
 only the maintenance of the treaties of peace connected with 
 the settlement of Europe (just then concluded) but also for 
 the purpose of controlling the ambition and jealousies of the 
 great Allied Powers themselves in relation to each other. ' ' ^" 
 
 England, at the time of her entrance into the Alliance, may 
 have foreseen a divergence of opinion respecting the interpreta- 
 tion of the duties of the allies as provided in the treaty, and 
 may have anticipated the impossibility of acting in harmony 
 with her allies. And yet by the pressure of existing conditions, 
 she had of necessity to become a participant in European af- 
 fairs, not definitely changing her former policy of isolation 
 but temporarily suspending it. 
 
 18 Wellington, Correspondence, II, p. 360, (Wellington to Canning). 
 
 19 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 313. 
 
 20 Wellington, Correspondence, II, p. 402, (The King to Liverpool, Jan. 27, 1804). 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE GENERAL POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH AND 
 
 CANNING TOWARD THE INTERPRETATION 
 
 OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLL\NCE 
 
 Diplomatic transactions are always to a greater or less de- 
 gree veiled in obscurity; they are always in large part hidden 
 records of history, ciphers to which time and chance may fur- 
 nish the key. Features of greatest importance are purposely 
 omitted ; motives, fears, and prophecies in the recorded volumes 
 of diplomatic papers have no place, and in their stead, gen- 
 eralizations, summaries, and memorials fill the pages. The re- 
 sults of conferences, the conclusion of long and heated de- 
 bates, of differences tending either toward war or peace, ap- 
 pear; but the arguments pro and con upon courses of action 
 eventually determined, the significant conversations among dip- 
 lomatists carried on outside the regular conference hall, the 
 dinners at which intrigues are inaugurated, fathomed or ad- 
 justed — in diplomatic correspondence, all of these have no 
 recognition. They are the omitted chapters. The necessity 
 of an envoy sparing the feelings of a colleague or of hiding 
 the mistakes of a home minister imposes a silence which is 
 often misconstrued. Upon the construction placed upon these 
 incomplete records and the surmises and suspicions they arouse, 
 is based the public condemnation or justification of ministers 
 and nations. 
 
 Lord Castlereagh in the period before the Congress of Vien- 
 na, like most European ministers in that era of revolutionary 
 ideas and excesses, was so strongly conservative as to be re- 
 actionary; and although his attitude follo\ving 1818 became 
 more liberal, and his policy, one of non-acquiesence in the 
 policy of restriction supported by his allies, he was condemned 
 by his contemporaries and has been blamed by historians since, 
 for his adherence to the system of repression. To Englishmen 
 
 13 
 
14 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 dissatisfied with the outcome of Vienna, and alarmed by the 
 assumptions of the Holy Alliance and by the coalition of the 
 four great Powers in time of peace, it was self evident that 
 Castlereagh upheld the entire continental policy. His former 
 actions confirmed them in the opinion, and the courtesy with 
 which he spoke of the allies in public seemed further proof 
 of his agreement with the Powers. It is with difficulty that 
 a man can again secure confidence when his past acts have once 
 condemned him. So it was with Castlereagh. Until recently, 
 the blame of the English support of the Quadruple Alliance 
 has fallen upon him, and the glory of disconcerting that council 
 has redounded to Canning alone. 
 
 That Castlereagh pursued the policy which he truly felt to 
 be of advantage to England is more credible today, as we 
 view in retrospect the period from 1814 to 1822, the time during 
 which, as foreign minister, he practically dictated foreign poli- 
 cy. His policy of repression as indicated in a note in Decem- 
 ber 1815, is but the expression of a natural fear. 
 
 In regard to the liberal movement in Prussia, he said that 
 he felt great anxiety and that it was impossible to foretell to 
 what end the new ideas of government and revolutionary ten- 
 dencies there prevalent would be carried.^ His distrust of the 
 revolutionary principles was often voiced in his letters to Eng- 
 lish representatives abroad. He saw new constitutions launched 
 in France, Spain, Holland, and Sicily, and was of the con- 
 servative opinion that such attempts at republican government 
 should not be encouraged, and that it was the duty of England 
 to retard rather than to accelerate the new principles.^ Al- 
 though fearing the results of sudden revolutionary outbursts, 
 and proclaiming it to be "true wisdom to keep down the 
 petty contentions of ordinary times, and to stand together in 
 support of the established principles of social order, "^ Castle- 
 reagh did not necessarily approve of England's entering into 
 congresses with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to which all in- 
 ternal affairs of the smaller countries were to be subjected. 
 Against such a policy of interference he wrote: 
 
 " It is not my wish to encourage, on the part of this country, 
 
 1 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 106, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose). 
 2Ihid, X, p. 15, (Castlereagh to Bentinck, May 7, 1814). 
 3 ibid, p. 105, (Castlereagh to Mr. Rose). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 15 
 
 an unnecessary interference in the ordinary affairs of the 
 Continent. The interposition of Great Britain will always 
 be most authoritative in proportion as it is not compromised 
 by being unduly mixed in the daily concerns of these states. ' ' * 
 
 Castlereagh 's concurrence in the Quadruple Alliance can- 
 not be taken as absolute approval of the Metternich system. 
 At its inception he could see an advantage in giving England 
 some voice in the European conferences. Would not her in- 
 terests have suffered without any representative to present her 
 views? The divergence of opinion which showed itself in 1815 
 became wider with the calling of each congress. At Aix-la- 
 Chapelle, Castlereagh opposed the prevailing sentiment; at 
 Troppeau and at Laibach, he objected to the presence of Eng- 
 lish representatives, lest he be accused of acquiescing in the 
 European policy. The instructions he drew up for the Con- 
 gress of Vienna were to the effect that England must not 
 join in the policy of the Quadruple Alliance.^ The break with 
 the Alliance, then, was not to take place with the death of 
 Castlereagh. It should not be construed purely as the new 
 policy of a new minister. 
 
 Metternich 's esteem for Castlereagh has been employed by 
 critics of the latter to show that he must have been in the con- 
 fidence of Metternich and that he approved of the Prince's 
 policy of interference. Metternich had met Castlereagh in 1814 
 at Basel and there he "had laid the foundations of a good feel- 
 ing."* It has been supposed that there had been some under- 
 standing between them previous to the congress of Verona, for 
 otherwise he would not have expressed the hope that Castle- 
 reagh would be the English representative, and have written, 
 ' ' I awaited him here as my second self. ' ' ^ 
 
 Although the correspondence would not support the state- 
 ment that Castlereagh upheld the method of what is known 
 as the Metternich system, and although Castlereagh 's communi- 
 cations to the House of Commons do not sustain the alliance 
 in the broader powers it assumed, opponents have, nevertheless, 
 suspected him of secret agreement with Metternich. Greville 
 in his Memoirs claims that, "While Castlereagh was obliged to 
 
 ilbid, p. 107. 
 
 5 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 143. 
 
 6 Ibid, p. 144. 
 
 7 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 591. 
 
I 
 16 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 pretend to disapprove of the continental Alliance, he secretly 
 gave to Metternich every assurance of his private concurrence, 
 and it was not till long after Canning's accession that Metter- 
 nich could be persuaded of his sincerity in opposing their views, 
 always fancying that he was obliged to act a part as his prede- 
 cessors had done to keep the House of Commons quiet. ' ' ^ This 
 secret agreement, if such existed, is the closed chapter in Castle- 
 reagh's relations with Metternich and the Quadruple Alliance. 
 It is not to be found in the diplomatic correspondence of Castle- 
 reagh himself or in the correspondence of Metternich that is 
 available. The question, therefore, as to the duplicity of Castle- 
 reagh in his relations to Parliament, and the question as to his 
 part in the disruption of the Alliance are unanswered, and his 
 condemnation or praise will rest with his adherents or op- 
 ponents. 
 
 With the diplomatic correspondence as evidence, it must hon- 
 estly be acknowledged by the supporters of either Castlereagh 
 or Canning that neither countenanced the Quadruple Alliance 
 in its more fully developed policies. But to Canning must be 
 accredited greater rigor, more effective opposition in contro- 
 verting the tendencies of the other Powers. Castlereagh 's stand 
 was one of non-agreement with their policies. It was negative. 
 Canning's objections, on the other hand, his declarations of the 
 policy of England, were the course of active resistance. 
 
 In the settlement of Vienna, Canning had no part, nor was 
 it concluded on principles upon which he approved. ' ' But from 
 the time when they were signed to the end of his life, he al- 
 ways held the provisions were to be accepted as inviolable by 
 England. ' ' ^ The Alliance, the means decided upon to maintain 
 the peace. Canning recognized. It was the extent of its power 
 to which he took exception. 
 
 Canning was not a lover of revolution. On the contrary, he 
 passed "nearly thirty years of his life fighting for old institu- 
 tions, ' ' ^° in the House of Commons, but he could not, as he 
 himself states, "shut my eyes to the real state of things."" 
 
 The glory of England, its prestige on the continent and 
 throughout the whole world, were ever before Canning in his 
 
 8 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 107. 
 
 9 Stapleton, Canning, p. 352. 
 
 lO/&id, p. 380-381, (Canning to H. WeUesley, Sept. 16, 1823). 
 11 Ibid. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 17 
 
 relations with Europe. His policy was apparently more sel- 
 fish, than that of Castlereagh. ''England has not only to main- 
 tain herself on the basis of her own solid foundation and settled 
 constitution, firm, unshaken, a spectress interested in the con- 
 test only by her sympathies, not a partisan on either side, but 
 for the sake of both, a model and ultimately perhaps an um- 
 pire. ' ' ^^ 
 
 His hope for a greater England appeared in numerous 
 speeches and lettere. At Plymouth in 1823, he outlined the 
 policy he intended to pursue, and made the statement, "For 
 Europe he would be desirous, now and then, to read England. ' '^* 
 
 It was not to the Alliance that Canning objected but to the 
 Congresses. "No more Congresses, thank God," he exclaimed 
 shortly before taking office. He was of the opinion that the 
 allies had no right to demand aid for interference in the na- 
 tional affairs of a state, but that it was England's place to 
 check aggression and to maintain the balance of power in Eu- 
 rope.^^ To Metternich, Canning's policy was unintelligible. 
 Why, he wondered, did not Canning withdraw altogether from 
 the Alliance, since he opposed its methods? In 1823 he wrote, 
 "When, then, does Canning want? Whose part will he take? 
 What is he about? For after all, a man must have some object 
 or end in view. I really begin to lose the very small portion of 
 respect I had (not without difficulty, God forgive me) attained 
 for the man. " ^^ 
 
 It is not surprising that Metternich was unable to determine 
 Canning's intentions, when the many instances of misunder- 
 standing between them are recalled. Even to the members of 
 his own foreign service Canning's motives were not clear. David 
 Montague Erskine, the minister to the United States in 1809 
 failed to understand his purposes. The American minister to 
 England during the same period, was likewise misled by his 
 statements. Henry Adams declares that Canning's policies do 
 not admit of understanding, and in speaking of his policy to- 
 ward American embargo, he states, "Yet motives were enigmas 
 too obscure for search, and the motives of Canning in this in- 
 stance were more perplexing than usual." ^'^ 
 
 12 Ibid, p. 368, Canning's speech, August 30, 1822, at Liverpool. 
 
 13 Ibid, p. 364, Canning to Sir Charles Bagot. 
 
 15 Ibid., p. 376, (Stapleton to Canning), (Canning to Wellesley). 
 
 16 Metternich, Autobiography, IV, p. 8-9. 
 
 17 Adams, History of the United States, V, p. 54. 
 
18 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 To the continental Powers to whom the responsibility of a 
 minister to a Parliament was beyond comprehension, the refusal 
 of Canning to act in concord could only be construed as the 
 policy of the minister alone. The contention that the demands 
 of Parliament were being fulfilled by Canning's position or that 
 acquiesence in the policy desired by the Powers would meet with 
 the disapproval of the House of Commons, was looked upon 
 by Metternich as a mere excuse. He believed that its opinions, 
 if adverse, might be overruled. Until 1823 he labored under the 
 delusion that the English foreign ministers secretly agreed to 
 measures which officially they denied, and that their real policies 
 were not represented by their language in Parliament. "It is 
 as essential a part of the national council," Canning wrote to 
 Henry WeUesley, ''and woe to the ministers who should under- 
 take to conduct the affairs of this country upon the principle of 
 settling the course of its foreign policy with a Grand Alliance, 
 and should rely upon carrying their decisions itito effect by 
 throwing a little dust in the eyes of the House of Commons. ' ' ^^ 
 Canning repeatedly insisted that the English ministers abroad 
 should make it clear to the allies that when differences arose in 
 the foreign relations, they must not be viewed as a "feint to 
 avoid conflict mth public opinion. ' ' ^^ His policy, Canning 
 wished it understood, was one of conviction and not one to meet 
 the parliamentary exigencies of the time.^° Metternich 's in- 
 ability to influence Canning or to shake him from a determined 
 policy led him to write that England had entered upon a false 
 and dangerous liberalism, and that Canning was certainly "a 
 very awkward opponent." 
 
 With this lack of sympathy between Canning and Metter- 
 nich, with a misunderstanding of the part that the English 
 Parliament exercised in foreign relations, the congresses after 
 Castlereagh seemed doomed to failure. The policy of Castle- 
 reagh to refuse assent to the usurped power of the congresses, 
 and to hold aloof in solitary opposition to the wish of the com- 
 bined allies will doubtless be seen to foreshadow the breach of 
 England with the Quadruple Alliance, a breach which culmin- 
 ated under Canning. 
 
 18 Stapleton, Canning, p. 378, (Canning to H. Wellesley). 
 
 19 Bagot, Canning, Vol. II, p. 221, (Canning to Chas. Bagot). 
 
 20 Ibid, p. 118. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 
 
 The allied Powers, as a means of executing the work of the 
 congress of Vienna and the Quadruple Alliance, agreed to unite 
 from time to time in congress, "to arrange together any mat- 
 ters of general interest which might arise and to settle and dis- 
 cuss any differences which might occur between any two 
 Powers. " ^ It was further stipulated that there should be no 
 discussion of the affairs of any Power without the represen- 
 tation of that country in the deliberation. In accordance with 
 this general agreement, the sixth article of the Quadruple Alli- 
 ance pro\dded more specifically for the assembly of the sove- 
 reigns. The purposes were stated, and the objects of the con- 
 ferences were declared to be the "greatest common interest and 
 the consideration of measures which would be the most bene- 
 ficial to the peace and prosperity of the world. " ^ In Metter- 
 nich's opinion the terms imposed a duty ux)on the Powers which 
 they were under obligation to perform : ' ' The five courts which 
 were assembled at Aix," he wrote, "are not only invited there, 
 but by the treaty of November 20, 1815, they are bound to 
 come." ^ 
 
 Accordingly, in the fall of 1818, the sovereigns of Russia, 
 Austria, and Prussia, together with the Austrian diplomatists, 
 Metternich, Vincent, and Gentz; the Russian, Capo d'Istria, 
 Nesselrode and Lieven; the Prussian, Hardenberg, Humboldt, 
 and Bemstoff; the English, "Wellington and Castlereagh; and 
 the French, Richelieu, Rayneval, and Mounier, met for their 
 first congress. Preliminary to the meeting, petitions to the Eng- 
 lish representatives requesting the consideration of certain meas- 
 ures, expressions of opinion regarding the meeting, together 
 with statements of the results expected from the congress, and 
 
 1 Greville, Memovra, II, p. 67. 
 
 2 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 773. 
 
 3 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 164. 
 
 19 
 
20 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 the arranging of private interviews and meetings previous to 
 the congress, were among the important preparations. They 
 are of significance in reflecting the attitude which prevailed at 
 the meeting, that of good will or reserved suspicion, and in por- 
 tending points of disagreement, should wide discussion be per- 
 mitted. 
 
 The opening of the congress to the consideration of new ques- 
 tions was looked upon by both England and Austria as dan- 
 gerous.* Metternich and Castlereagh in the early part of Sep- 
 tember concurred in the opinion that it would be unwise to 
 permit miscellaneous discussion; to the discussion of Spanish 
 affairs they were particularly opposed. France and Russia, 
 on the other hand, seem to have been agreed as to the necessity 
 of bringing the Spanish question before the Congress. The 
 Emperor having heard the request of the Spanish charge d'- 
 affaires at St. Petersburg for the admission of a Spanish minis- 
 ter to the conference, referred the matter to France. France 
 approved, and the attitude of these two Powers was made known 
 to Castlereagh in August through private conversation with the 
 Due de Richelieu and Pozzo di Borgo. Richelieu considered it 
 necessary for the conference to take some step for mediation 
 between Spain and her colonies. He proposed sending a mem- 
 ber of a younger branch of the Spanish dynasty to be King of 
 Buenos Ayres. Pozzo di Borgo was of the opinion that the 
 Spanish king should be admitted to Aix-la-Chapelle as "the 
 only mode of settling all Spanish questions. ' ' ^ 
 
 Against these proposals Castlereagh protested. His chief ar- 
 guments were that if the King of Spain were admitted his min- 
 isters also would have to attend, that inconveniences would pro- 
 bably result and the whole work of the conference would be 
 rendered impracticable; and that the other European nations 
 though submitting to the dominion of the four Powers would 
 resent the admittance of Spain to the councils.^ The fear of 
 the introduction of Spanish affairs appears to have been para- 
 mount in the minds of the English. "I cannot conceive," 
 wrote Mr. Cook to Castlereagh, ''that you would go further in 
 mediation with Spain than good offices and possible guarantees, 
 
 4 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 675, (Castlereagh to Metternich). 
 
 5 Ibid, XII, p. 675, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 
 
 6 Ibid, p. 665, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 21 
 
 . . . . a mediation by arms is out of the question. ' ' '^ The 
 Emperor of Russia, although he did not protest before the con- 
 gress against wide discussion, was anxious to avoid embarrass- 
 ing questions ; he suggested that the meeting should be brief as 
 his early return to Russia was necessary.^ 
 
 The situation was viewed as precarious. In August, Castle- 
 reagh while in Paris heard it both rumored and openly stated 
 that the meeting had been postponed until later in the fall, in 
 order to give time for summoning the King of Spain.^ Metter- 
 nich, in the same month, learned that the approaching congress 
 was looked upon by the Diet of Frankfurt with suspicion, and 
 that "intriguers" were planning to carry measures to Aix-la- 
 Chapelle ' ' to internipt the progress of affairs. ' ' ^* Castlereagh 
 received communication from the government suggesting the in- 
 expediency of the Powers entering upon transatlantic and col- 
 onial questions, ^^ but later received a long petition from Mr. 
 James Stephens,* suggesting African and colonial conditions 
 which should have consideration in the congress. Reasons were 
 given against the restoration of Haiti to France, both with re- 
 gard to the welfare of Haiti and to the advantage of England. 
 The demand for consideration of the abolition of slaves was 
 made, and a statement of two important measures which should 
 be put before the congress; first, whether France might not be 
 reasonably invited to declare herself in regard to her views on 
 St. Domingo, on account of their connections with the abolition 
 of the slave trade and the peace of the Indies; second, whether 
 if she meditate new expeditions the influence of Great Britain 
 and other powers at the congress might not be properly em- 
 ployed to induce her to desist from that purpose.^^ Not only 
 was there a demand for the discussion of the slave situation in 
 this particular case, but also a sentiment on the part of the 
 
 7 Ibid. 
 
 S Ibid, XII, p. 678, (Wellington to Earl Bathurst). 
 
 9. Ibid, p. 665, (Wellington to Castlereagh). 
 
 10 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 128. 
 
 11 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 473. 
 
 * Mr. Stephens, a native of the West Indies, was sent to England at an early age 
 to pursue the profession of the law. By means of a matrimonial alliance with the 
 family of Mr. Wilberforce, he obtained a seat in Parliament, which he resigned on 
 being appointed master in Chancery. 
 
 12 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XI, p. 234, (Mr. Jas. Stephens to Castlereagh). 
 
22 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 English people for a declaration of the Powers against the 
 slave trade. 
 
 With these conditions confronting them at the opening of the 
 congress, it was but natural that the confidence of one nation 
 toward another should be strained. Castlereagh wrote: 
 
 "I do not expect much good from Mettemich's negotiation 
 at Paris, and should not wish myself mixed in it. The less a 
 British minister dabbles in Monsieur's politics, the better. 
 Charles * will be of considerable use to me in keeping Metter- 
 nich steady and apprising me of what he is about. ' ' ^^ 
 
 By the Prime Minister little trust was placed in Emperor 
 Alexander. Liverpool, in his correspondence with Castlereagh 
 wrote : 
 
 "I think you will find no difficulty in keeping the Emperor 
 of Russia from coming in November; this visit might certainly 
 lead to intrigues. " ^* 
 
 By the time of the meeting, many of the suspicions and fears 
 which the statesmen had harboured through the year 1817 and 
 the summer of 1818 had disappeared. The sinister fear that 
 the Emperor had contemplated an alliance with the Bourbons 
 of France, Spain, and Italy, the belief on the part of Russia 
 that there were secret negotiations between Great Britain and 
 Austria, had in the main given way to a spirit of extreme cau- 
 tion.^^ After the first few days of the congress, Castlereagh, 
 knowing well the anxiety of Liverpool concerning the feeling 
 prevailing there, sent this message: ''You will probably wish 
 to know my real opinion upon the sincerity of all that is passing 
 around me. My opinion has always been that, whether sincere 
 or not we ought to meet it as if it was ; . . . . but my belief 
 is that the Emperor of Russia is, in the main, in earnest in 
 what he says. ' ' ^® Castlereagh was persuaded that the Em- 
 peror was, though desiring sway, intending to pursue a peace 
 policy and to maintain his connection with the allies.^^ 
 
 England did not enter this conference with the hope of ac- 
 complishing a great work; on the contrary, it was her purpose 
 
 * Charles Stewart, minister to Austria. 
 
 IS Ibid, XI, p. 1, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 
 
 14: Ibid, p. 2, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 
 
 15 Metternich, Autobiography, Gentz Memoir, III, p. 191-2. 
 
 16 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 47, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 
 n Ibid, p. 48. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 23 
 
 only to prevent innovations and to support the alliance with- 
 out giving to it a new aspect. An English official stated that 
 he did not expect much from Aix-la-Chapelle "except the ad- 
 mission of France to the confederacy and the withdrawing of 
 the troops from her frontier. ' ' ^® Fear of discussion of the 
 work done in congress by the new Parliament which would con- 
 vene in the winter, was the primary motive forcing England 
 to take a conservative stand, to avoid secret protocols and to 
 reject new treaties. 
 
 The time and place for the first congress was made known 
 through regular diplomatic channels. The intentions appear 
 to have been to assemble early in September, but owing to the 
 rise of the question concerning the admission of the Spanish 
 King, the meeting was deferred several weeks. No definite date 
 for the formal opening appears. There was apparently an un- 
 derstanding that all should be present by the first of October. 
 Wellington upon his arrival on September the twenty-seventh 
 found the King of Prussia already there. Castlereagh and Rich- 
 elieu had also arrived, and the Emperor of Russia was ex- 
 pected the next day.^* As in the congress of Vienna, the real 
 work took place in private interviews, and for the most part 
 the results were not written down. At the official conferences 
 themselves no minutes were kept, and the documents which were 
 to form the official reports were preserved in the form of 
 protocols. 
 
 The first work before the Powers, that for which they had 
 assembled, was the substitution of a permanent policy toward 
 France in place of the temporary measures that had been adop- 
 ted in the Treaty of Paris. The Treaty contained an article 
 providing that at the end of three years, the four allies to- 
 gether with the King of France were to meet for the purpose of 
 deciding whether the army of occupation should be withdrawn 
 from France or whether the condition of that state was such 
 as to necessitate its maintenance for a further period of five 
 years. The three important questions to be settled were, there- 
 fore, the evacuation of France, the pecuniary settlement, and 
 the position of the French King in the European councils. 
 
 i&Ibid, XI, p. 472, (Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh). 
 
 19 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 718, (Wellington to Gen. 
 Count, Wocongon ) . 
 
24 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 That the troops would be withdrawn, and that some terms for 
 a financial settlement would be made, and also that the King 
 would be admitted, was generally understood. The point was 
 to what extent the work would be carried. 
 
 By October fifth, the work of the French settlement had so 
 far progressed that it was certain evacuation would take place. 
 Wellington began immediately the plan of withdrawal. Shipping 
 of stores, transportation of the English troops, mapping out of 
 routes by which the different armies were to depart for their 
 respective countries, all were supei-vised by Wellington.^* A 
 grand review of the troops before the sovereigns was planned, 
 and necessary arrangements for the reception and entertain- 
 ment of royalty were delegated to him. These military con- 
 cerns occupied most of his time, and with the exception of very 
 detailed work on the state of the finances, he had little part in 
 the remaining business of the congress. 
 
 On the first of October, Wellington reported to the ministers 
 upon the financial arrangements. He declared that the French 
 government was prepared by loans arranged with the bankers, 
 Hope, Baring and Company to meet its obligations.^^ Calcula- 
 tions had been made for the French by Monsieur Mounier, 
 whose accounts later had been reviewed by Alexander Baring. 
 Mr. Baring reported the method of calculation to be correct. 
 The sum of ten millions of francs he considered fair as discount 
 to France. A further allowance of thirty sous upon the price 
 of the rentes to be given for the hundred million francs would 
 be two million francs. The total debt amounted to two hun- 
 dred and eighty millions. Allowing ten million for discount 
 and two million for rentes, the amount of two hundred and 
 sixty-eight millions, it was estimated would be the amount due 
 the allies. It was proposed that this sum should be met in 
 nine equal payments, "to be made the sixth of each month 
 from January to September." The final statement was as 
 follows : 
 
 20 Ibid, XII, p. 725. 
 
 21 Ibid, XII, p. 720, (Wellington to the ministers of the congress). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 25 
 
 ''170,000,000 frs. by the French Treas. in drafts upon the 
 two Houses. 
 98,000,000 frs. by the two Houses for the purchase of 
 Rentes for 100 millions less the reduction of 
 30 sous. 
 
 268,000,000 frs. "22 
 
 England had in 1815 postponed her right to receive pay- 
 ment until the second, third, fourth, and fifth years. As she 
 had at this time demanded no compensation in interest, Well- 
 ington held that she would demand none now. In the whole 
 transaction. Great Britain, being the largest creditor, had more 
 voice in the settlement than did her allies. The question of the 
 cost to France of the maintenance of the army of occupation 
 and the diminution of th,e indemnity in consequence of ex- 
 penditures for the army having been greater than had been es- 
 timated in 1815, complicated the settlement. The French minis- 
 ters held that the allies ought to bear this cost. They claimed 
 that according to the military convention of 1815, it was in- 
 cumbent upon France to pay no more than one hundred and 
 fifty millions of francs annually for the support of the army. 
 This amount she had exceeded in the three years by thirty- 
 eight thousand francs and consequently the demand was made 
 that this amount be deducted from her debt.^^ 
 
 Wellington in his observations upon the demand admitted 
 that it had not been anticipated in 1815 that it would be neces- 
 sary for France to go beyond one hundred fifty millions. "If 
 the allies had agreed to take this excess of expense upon them- 
 selves, then the diminution of the army effected in April 1817, 
 tended and all subsequent diminutions would have tended, to 
 pecuniary benefit and relief of the allies themselves, and not 
 of France, which is quite contrary to sense, reason, and fact. "^^ 
 This demand Wellington was unwilling to grant, but that France 
 had a claim for interest for sums paid previous to the fifth 
 year 1820, he admitted. 
 
 In his memorandum, checking the accounts, and the claims 
 
 22 Ibid, p. 724-5. 
 
 23 Ibid, XII, pp. 726-9. 
 iilbid, p. 729. 
 
26 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 brought forth by France, Wellington was of inestimable value 
 to England. His liberality toward France facilitated greatly a 
 peaceable agreement. He was willing to allow France fifteen 
 million francs as indemnity, basing this amount upon : 
 
 ''8 mill. frs. discount not due until 1819-1820. 
 4 mill. frs. int. for sums paid by France on account of 
 
 3 mill, for the solde in 1817-1818, due in 1820. 
 3 mill. frs. for the solde of November 1818." 
 
 The terms of final settlement as drawn up in the protocol of 
 the ninth of October were based largely upon the two reports of 
 Baring and Wellington. The agreement provided for the pay- 
 ment of two hundred sixty-five million francs, of which sum 
 one hundred million was payable by ** inscriptions of rentes," 
 bearing interest from the second of September, 1818. The one 
 hundred sixty-five million remaining was to be paid in nine 
 monthly installments commencing on the sixth of the following 
 January, by bills on the bankers Hope, Baring and Company. 
 Castlereagh objected to the confidence thus placed in the bank- 
 ing houses. There appeared greater risk, he thought, in placing 
 so great an amount of public money in private firms. The only 
 safe-guard was their personal security, for according to the ar- 
 rangement the allies did not even have the security of the 
 French government.^^ 
 
 So great was the fear of Prussia of danger resulting from 
 a falling of French rentes that her ministers demanded for 
 themselves security from Baring and Company. To allay dis- 
 trust, the demand had to be complied with. This caution on 
 the part of Prussia seems justifiable, for within a few weeks 
 of the settlement the public credit in France was severely 
 shaken. Cash in the banks fell from one hundred seventeen 
 million to thirty-seven million; the rente fell from seventy-six 
 to seventy-one.^* The great remittances abroad had taken the 
 specie from the country. This, although merely a temporary 
 crisis, made it necessary for the allies to alter the terms of 
 the settlement. After the close of the congress, several of the 
 ministers, therefore, went to Paris and there agreed, to keep 
 
 25/&id, XII, p. 828. 
 20 Ibid, XII, p. 763. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 27 
 
 on deposit the inscriptions for the one hundred millions and 
 to postpone the payment until the first of June 1820.^'' 
 
 The pecuniary settlement with France, though the most ted- 
 ious business before the congress, was not considered the most 
 difficult to handle. The difficulty of determining the method of 
 inviting the King of France to participate in future congresses 
 demanded more delicate treatment on the part of the allies. 
 To a supplementary article of the Alliance recognizing France 
 as an ally and openly declaring the Alliance no longer quad- 
 ruple but quintuple, England would not consent. There was 
 danger, the English thought, in giving a new character to the 
 Alliance, and in risking the resentment of nations that were 
 excluded.^^ Lord Bathurst wrote, ''I should like it better if 
 the invitation was given to any meetings which might take place, 
 than say that the King was invited to become a part of the 
 engagements to meet under the sixth article. ' ' ^^ Toward the 
 new treaty, England felt even greater anxiety. ''We have 
 been made very nervous," Liverpool wrote, "even by the pos- 
 sibility of a new treaty to which France might be a party. ' ' ^* 
 The recognition of France as an ally, therefore, was not made 
 by treaty, but by one of the protocols of the congress, a con- 
 vention entered into by the plenipotentiaries of the four courts. 
 In the third article, it was announced, that "France associated 
 with the other powers by the restoration of the legitimate and 
 constitutional monarchy, is engaged to concur from now on for 
 the maintenance and establishment of a system which has given 
 peace to Europe and which alone can assure the duration of 
 it."^^ 
 
 Closely allied with this question was the determination of 
 a method by which meetings in the future should be announced. 
 Bathurst informed Castlereagh of the necessity of bearing con- 
 stantly in mind the doubtful reception of an innovation by 
 the English Parliament. "We were all more or less impressed 
 
 27 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, p. 20. 
 
 (Annex E) Arrangement definitely, pour regler le mode et les 6poques de 
 c' asquittement des demiers 100,000,000 de V indemnity Pficuniaire a 
 foumir par la France. 
 
 28 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 63, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 
 
 29 Ibid, p. 55, (Lord Bathurst to Castlereagh). 
 SO Ibid, XII, p. 63, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 
 31 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, p. 15. 
 
28 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 with the apprehension of great inconvenience arising from a 
 decision being now publicly announced of continued meetings 
 at fixed points. ' ' ^^ The whole cabinet was of the opinion that 
 the time of the next meeting should be decided and announced, 
 but that an announcement and statement of the same general 
 purpose of such deliberation by circular letter should be avoided. 
 Canning was the most emphatic of the cabinet members in de- 
 nouncing a call by circular letter. There existed, he believed, 
 no basis for such a proceeding. The ninth article of the Treaty, 
 he construed as applicable only to a meeting called for the pur- 
 pose of "watching the internal state of France as far as it may 
 endanger the public tranquillity. ' ' ^^ England won her point 
 and in the protocol of November 15, it was announced that the 
 powers which had concurred in the Act judged it necessary to 
 establish definite assemblies. Let there be, it provided, "assem- 
 blies among the august sovereigns themselves, or among their 
 ministers and respective plenipotentiaries .... the time 
 and place of their meetings will be each time previously ar- 
 ranged by means of diplomatic communications. ' ' ^* 
 
 Besides acting in accordance with the principles of the Eng- 
 lish cabinet, Castlereagh in the congress had to represent the 
 English people in urging abolition of the slave trade. A pro- 
 position had been made in the preceding February relating to 
 the slavery question, and had been presented to the several 
 ministers of the various countries. But previous to the meeting 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle, no answer had been received.^^ At this 
 time, to press the matter further, Castlereagh proposed mea- 
 sures. Two particular propositions were submitted. 
 
 The first provided for addressing a direct appeal on the part 
 of the five Courts to the King of Portugal, founded upon the 
 Declaration made in His Majesty's name by his Plenipotentiary 
 at Vienna, and urging His Majesty to give effect to that declara- 
 tion at the period fixed by Spain for final abolition, viz., on 
 the 20th of May, 1820. 
 
 32 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 55, (Bathurst to Castlereagh — Protocole 
 de la conference entre les Plenipotentiaries des Cous d'Austriche, de France de la 
 Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russia — Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 Novembre, 1818). 
 
 sslbid, XII, p. 56. 
 
 34 British and Foreign State Papers, (Protocole de la Conference entre les 
 Plenipotentiaires des Cours, d'Austriche, de France, de la Grand Bretagne, de 
 Prusse, et de Russe, Aix-la-Chapelle, le 15 Novembre, 1818). 
 
 35 Ibid, VIII, p. 299, VI, p. 26. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 29 
 
 The second suggested that the Powers there represented should 
 accept the principle of a qualified right of mutual visit, as 
 adopted by the courts of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal 
 and the Netherlands, and should apply the same to the case of 
 their respective flags, as circumstances might point out.^" The 
 votes on these points were unfavorable, and a request for ob- 
 jections on the part of the different countries to the right of 
 visit was complied with. Russia though approving of the prin- 
 ciple of abolition, was reluctant to yield to the proposed measure. 
 She looked forward to the final abolition on the part of Portugal, 
 and in accordance with the visionary and idealistic dreams of 
 the Emperor, formulated a plan for the creation of new institu- 
 tions, to control the right of visit and execute the laws against 
 piracy and other breaches of abolition.^^ ''The Russian Mem- 
 oir," Castlereagh reported, "seems expressly to withhold, or 
 rather to delay its adherence, until there is reason to presume 
 that a general concurrence is attainable; but surely in all such 
 cases the most certain mode of obtaining a general concurrence, 
 is to augment the ranks of the concurring parties. ' ' ^® Austria 
 also preferred to await universal abolition. 
 
 France, unlike Russia, agreed with England that the right of 
 visit as outlined in the English memorandum was no infrac- 
 tion of the law of nations. She approved the principle of lim- 
 iting ' ' exercise of this power to the immediate purpose for which 
 it is granted," and the confining of the work to the African 
 coasts. The objections were that, should she enter into such a 
 measure, it might be looked upon as a concession for the evacua- 
 tion of France; and further, that she could not approve of 
 the principle of subjecting French property to the jurisdic- 
 tion of authority other than her own tribunals. 
 
 Prussia feared the abuse of the right of search and foresaw 
 the possibility of molesting commerce in the open seas. Eng- 
 land's purpose consequently failed for the time being. Why 
 the Powers postponed the passage of such a measure until the 
 slave trade should have been universally abolished, Castlereagh 
 attempted to answer as follows: 
 
 "Perhaps it is because no instance can be quoted that any 
 
 sejbid, VI, p. 57. 
 
 37 Ibid, pp. 67-69. 
 
 38 Ihid, p. 80. 
 
30 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 slave trader, under either the Russian, Prussian, or Austrian 
 flags has yet appeared on the coast of Africa, that these Powers, 
 from a sentiment of delicacy towards the States more directly 
 interested both in the local and maritime question, have felt 
 some reluctance to take a lead in giving the sanction to this 
 principle. ' ' ^® 
 
 In addition to the disagreement on the slavery situation, dis- 
 sent among the allies appeared in several other noteworthy in- 
 stances. An act of guarantee brought forth by the Emperor 
 Alexander and concurred in by the continental powers roused 
 serious opposition on the part of the English emissaries. The 
 act was concerned with a reciprocal safeguarding of possessions 
 of each of the countries which were parties to the agreement. 
 It proposed the establishment of the casus foederis "on a com- 
 mon basis, against any extension, whatever, by one of the parties, 
 of his present possessions." This guarantee was to apply to 
 European possessions. The proposal met with the hearty ap- 
 probation of Mettemich who saw in it an advantage to both 
 Austria and Prussia. Not so with the British Government, 
 Metternich wrote, "who will find it impossible to take a direct 
 and obligatory part in so extensive an act of guarantee." He 
 believed, however, the proposition should not be rejected because 
 of England's inability to accept it. His prophecy with regard 
 to England's position proved correct.** 
 
 Liverpool, alarmed by such a suggestion, and fearing that "it 
 would set the mind of Europe again afloat," urged the pre- 
 vention of the act. "We cannot on any account be parties to 
 any guarantee which may be maintained in it, . . . . we 
 cannot enter into any new engagements. ' ' The situation present- 
 ed a serious aspect to England, for the conclusion of this act 
 which would supersede the Quadruple Alliance would neces- 
 sitate her compliance with it, or her exclusion thereafter from 
 continental affairs.*^ The general desire among the continental 
 powers to hold England as an ally led to the rejection of the 
 plan. 
 
 Again, on another question England's objection carried 
 
 39 Ibid, VI, p. 80, (Memorandum of the British Government) . 
 4-0 Mettemich, Autobiography, III, p. 183. 
 
 41 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 830, (Liverpool to Castle- 
 reagh) . 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 31 
 
 weight. This concerned the Spanish situation, the question of 
 mediation between Spain and the colonies. Liverpool was anx- 
 ious that the point should not be urged by Spain, but as a pre- 
 caution sent word to Castlereagh to bear in mind the interests 
 of English commerce in his treatment of the matter. He men- 
 tioned the distinction which England should maintain between 
 the colonies of South America which had declared their indepen- 
 dence foiTnally and those which had not. With the colonies 
 that had not yet made such a declaration, mediation could be 
 permitted.^- Since none of the Powers were desirous of under- 
 taking the task of mediation an invitation was sent by the 
 French and Russian ministers to the Duke of Wellington asking 
 him to mediate. To him, the proposition seemed impracticable, 
 as he considered that the Powers had no right to interfere unless 
 requested by at least one of the parties implicated ; and still less 
 would they have such a right should Spain refuse the right of 
 intervention. He believed that little could be accomplished 
 without perfect agreement on the subject among the Powers. As 
 a consequence of his reply, no settlement of the Spanish trouble 
 was made.^^ 
 
 England had successfully resisted the demands made by the 
 allies in the congress for continued interferences in French 
 affairs. She prevented the formation of a new alliance. She 
 relegated the Spanish question to a position of unimportance. 
 She opposed the summoning of congresses by circular letter. 
 Work which it would seem should have found a place in the 
 conferences, remained untouched. ' ' There was discussed neither 
 the form of governments, nor the representative system, nor the 
 maintenance or modification of the privileges of the nobility 
 nor the liberty of the press, nor anything touching the interest 
 of religion."** 
 
 There was reserve and timidity in the introduction of new 
 questions on the part of all. The English cabinet in particular 
 expressed uneasiness during the whole course of the proceed- 
 ings. "You will be glad to find that there has not appeared 
 the slightest disposition to push the discussion here beyond the 
 line that had been chalked out by the circular from Paris, ' ' was 
 
 i2 Ibid, XII, p. 823, (Liverpool to Castlereagh). 
 
 43 Ibid, pp. 846-851. 
 
 44 Metternich, Autobiography, Gentz Memoir, III, p. 195. 
 
32 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 a message to Liverpool from Castlereagh.*^ Knowing well 
 that the foreign correspondence could be demanded in Parlia- 
 ment, both Castlereagh and the cabinet desired few papers to be 
 drawn up. The real debates on the questions considered at Aix- 
 la-Chapelle, they knew, would take place in the English Parlia- 
 ment. For this reason, such warning as "I think it. would be 
 the safest thing to separate without any declaration, as we know 
 how roughly these state papers are apt to be handled in Parlia- 
 ment, ' ' *® and ' ' the more general the declaration, the better, ' ' 
 were among the expressions of Castlereagh of the anxiety pre- 
 vailing in the Foreign Office. 
 
 One of the greatest difficulties that the English experienced 
 was the inability on the part of the allies to recognize the 
 subservience of the Department of Foreign Affairs to Parliament. 
 Liverpool, distressed by the Russian attempts to inveigle Castle- 
 reagh, urged him to convince the Russians that the foreign ser- 
 vice dared not be drawn into polities that would be at variance 
 with the spirit of the government.*^ During the whole pro- 
 cedure of the conferences, the ministers of Engiand in deciding 
 upon the measures confronting them, had constantly to bear in 
 mind the reception of their work at home. In the financial 
 settlement, the question raised in Castlereagh 's mind was "How 
 will such an arrangement be looked upon by the home govern- 
 ment?" In his objections he urged not so much his own wish 
 as the probable remonstrance of the home treasurer. ''I do not 
 believe that our Treasurer would trust so large a sum as four 
 million of our treasury bills for sale out of their hands, upon 
 any private security whatsoever," *® was the note sent to 
 Wellington. If the English diplomatists could have adopted 
 a motto for their mode of procedure at Aix-la-Chapelle, it would 
 certainly have been to this effect: Let us produce as few docu- 
 ments as possible for the perusal and criticism of our Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 So few were the important documents drawn up and the 
 protocols entered into that a brief summary of the significant 
 
 45 Castlereagh, Oorreapondence, XII, p. 54, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 
 
 46 Ibid, p. 760. 
 
 47 Ibid, XII, p. 63. 
 
 48 Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, XII, p. 760, (Castlereagh to Welling- 
 ton). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 33 
 
 ones may be given here. The protocol of October ninth between 
 France and Great Britain was the first essential agreement con- 
 tracted. It provided for the evacuation of France, for the 
 surrender of the fortresses, and for the payment of the French 
 indemnity. The next fundamental convention, one which was 
 of value for future work, was that of November fifteenth, signed 
 by the four Powers, its chief terms being the provisions for the 
 concurrence of the French King with the allies in future con- 
 gresses and for the method of convening the Powers. The pro- 
 tocol of November fourth, addressed to the Duke of Richelieu, 
 announced the satisfaction felt on the part of Europe with the 
 internal conditions of France and extended a formal invitation 
 to the King of France to participate in future meetings. The 
 two most noteworthy of the remaining agreements appear as 
 annexes to other protocols.*^ One is a note of the French King 
 in acknowledgement of the invitation; the other, a general 
 declaration of the five Courts, on the principles which are to 
 be upheld and which had been adhered to by the congresses. 
 All of these documents with the exception of the one concern- 
 ing financial settlement possess as their chief characteristic, very 
 general statements. It is probable that in their last draft the 
 English had the final word. The anxiety of Liverpool and 
 Bathurst must have been greatly relieved when they read the 
 declarations in which little was contained of "practical ques- 
 tion" and which were more discussions as "to words than 
 things. ' ' 
 
 The work of the congress was concluded, and its results, un- 
 foretold, were to be products of time. The real opinions of 
 the participants concerning the value of the union of the chief 
 European nations, in many instances, are probably, like the 
 documents themselves, sentiments and expressions for the public 
 to read. Castlereagh, guarded as he had necessarily been in 
 every utterance and in every written argument, distrustful 
 though he had been toward his allies, fearful though he had been 
 of condemnation at home, yet declared : 
 
 "It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the Euro- 
 pean Government, at once extinguishing the cobwebs with which 
 diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole bearing of 
 
 49 British and Foreign State Papers, VI, pp. 14-21. 
 
34 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 the system into its ture light, and giving to the counsels of 
 the great Powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a 
 single state. ' ' ^° 
 
 Approving, as this statement seems to, of the system of con- 
 gesses, it cannot be taken as proof of the desire to give any 
 great amount of power to the congress. Before subsequent con- 
 ferences were called, Castlereagh stated that with all respect 
 to the work of Aix-la-Chapelle, he would ' ' question the prudence 
 or in truth, the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its form and 
 provisions. ' ' ®^ 
 
 Gentz, in a memoir drawn up at Aix-la-Chapelle, affirmed that 
 in his opinion the policy of holding a congress was best suited 
 to European needs. As a conclusion to the meeting, his Memoir 
 was read extolling the conference in its lofty idealism, in the 
 harmony among its members, and in the delicacy with which 
 the work was handled. Two great benefits, he proclaimed, in 
 generalizations which would be inoffensive to a most exacting 
 critic, result from the congress. 
 
 "First, that of having entirely cleared the ground, removed 
 all doubts, and fully re-established the confidence of each of 
 the cabinets in the proceedings and principles of the others, 
 and in the stability of the general harmony. 
 
 "Secondly, that of having by confidential interviews, earnest 
 discussions, and the contact of intelligent minds, imbued the 
 sovereigns and their ministers with the necessity of maintain- 
 ing intact a system which, whatever its theoretical merits or de- 
 fects is at present the only one practicable — the anchor of sal- 
 vation for Europe. "^^ 
 
 Was the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle a success? The answer 
 must be in the affirmative if we consider its result in relation to 
 the purposes for which is was called, but in the light of the 
 work which it might have done, like the congress of Vienna, it 
 is found wanting. The slavery situation remained unsettled, 
 and the Spanish difficulties, both colonial and domestic, were 
 prolonged, to become considerations of a coming congress. 
 
 Its chief importance lay in the establishment of a precedent 
 for the reunion of sovereigns and ministers in accordance with 
 
 50 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 55, (Castlereagh to Liverpool). 
 
 51 Ibid, p. 312. 
 
 52 Mettemich, Autobiography, Gentz Memoir, III, p. 192. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 35 
 
 the Quadruple Alliance. Furthermore, the beginning of a 
 breach between England and her allies was forecast at this 
 early date, for all Powers began to realize though vaguely, per- 
 haps, that there existed in England a governmental power 
 which would ever be looked upon by the English as superior to 
 an international congress, a power to which all English policy 
 must be bent. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE CONGRESS OF TROPPAU 
 
 The period of 1820-1823 in the history of the Quadruple Alli- 
 ance was marked by three important assemblies of the allied 
 powers. It was the period of the Austrian congresses, as the 
 conferences were rightly designated. All were held in Aus- 
 trian territory; that of Troppau in Silesia in 1820; that of 
 Laibach in Carniola in 1821 ; that of Verona in Venetia in 1823. 
 For still another reason these congresses should be termed Aus- 
 trian. In the case of Troppau and Laibach, it was a question in 
 which Austria alone was vitally concerned, which led to their 
 assembly. Verona saw the completion of Austrian interference 
 in Italy. It was Austria that outlined the policy and saw to its 
 execution. It was the period of supremacy of the Austrian re- 
 actionary policy. 
 
 The first formal meeting of the Quadruple AUiance took 
 place at Troppau in November and December of 1820. Though 
 the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had been held in 1818, it was 
 specifically provided for by the treaty of Paris. That of Trop- 
 pau, on the contrary, was the first congress to be called in ac- 
 cordance with the genigral principles of the Quadruple Alliance, 
 the principles declaring for the maintenance of peace and tran- 
 quillity in Europe, and for the meetings of the sovereigns to 
 consider together threatening evils and means of promoting the 
 welfare of the European states. 
 
 In 1820 and 1821 such events transpired within a few months 
 as seemed to threaten the destruction of the old system. Revo- 
 lution broke out in Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont. 
 Prussia was on the verge of revolution. Military plots in prac- 
 tically every state added to the anxiety of the monarchs. IMet- 
 temich's theory seemed justified, that revolution was a con- 
 tagion and that so long as a germ remained alive every state 
 was in danger of contamination. With the spectacle of actual 
 
 36 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 37 
 
 revolution in progress, it was with little difficulty that Metter- 
 nich secured the approval of the Emperor of Russia and the 
 King of Prussia for a congress. 
 
 To England, the expediency of a congress for the very evi- 
 dent purpose of interfering with the internal affairs of a state 
 was doubtful. In September, 1820, Castlereagh in a despatch 
 to the British minister at Vienna wrote: 
 
 ''With all the respect and attachment which I feel for the 
 system of the Alliance, as regulated by the transaction of Aix- 
 la-Chapelle, I should much question the prudence, or, in truth, 
 the efficacy, of any formal exercise of its forms and provisions 
 on the present occasion when the danger springs from the in- 
 ternal convulsions of independent states, the policy of hazard- 
 ing such a step is much more questionable. ' ' ^ 
 
 Castlereagh was desirous that general questions should not 
 be admitted if a congress convened. It seemed to him that 
 Austria because of her proximity to the revolution in Italy 
 should act independently of the Alliance and propose the course 
 to be taken there.^ In reply to the memoir of the Austrian 
 minister calling for a conference to adopt a policy toward revo- 
 lutionary Naples, Castlereagh stated his objections. He would 
 not consent to the proposed hostile league of the five Powers 
 against Naples. 
 
 "If all are pledged not to recognize but with common con- 
 sent the order of things now subsisting, that force, if requisite 
 is to be employed for its overthrow, all are principles, not only 
 morally but de jure in the war, though all may not bear arms 
 in the execution of the common cause. Now this is a concert 
 which the British government cannot enter into. ' ' ^ 
 
 This declaration of Castlereagh is a definite statement of a 
 policy absolutely opposed to interference by the Alliance. It 
 was a policy formulated by Castlereagh and forcefully main- 
 tained and executed by his successor Canning. Against such 
 a league, Castlereagh urged six objections of which the first 
 and the last are particularly significant. It was a recognition of 
 that same higher power that had been a check at Aix-la-Chap- 
 elle. The first reason he stated for England's not entering into 
 
 1 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 312, (Castlereagh, to Lord Stewart). 
 
 2 Ibid, XII, p. 313. 
 
 3 Ibid, p. 313. 
 
38 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 such an agreement was that "it binds to engagements which 
 they could not be justified in taking without laying the whole 
 before Parliament, ' ' and as if to emphasize the influence of this 
 branch of government, the final summary of his objection de- 
 nounced the league as "most certainly to be disapproved by 
 our Parliament. ' ' * 
 
 The loss to English commerce was likewise reckoned with 
 in coming to the decision that the Powers ought not to inter- 
 fere. 
 
 In the course of the despatch, Castlereagh made it clear 
 that England's interference was out of the question, and that 
 in the name of the Alliance, intervention was opposed; but to 
 the propriety of Austria's interference, he would agree. "Aus- 
 tria must, at least as far as we are concerned, make the measure, 
 whatever it is, her own. ' ' ^ 
 
 From this attitude, Canning would have dissented, for he 
 stood for non-interference on the part not only of the Alliance, 
 but also on the part of any individual state in the internal af- 
 fairs of another state. 
 
 England had little interest in Italian affairs, and consequent- 
 ly any hostile action taken by Austria against the Italian king- 
 doms would affect her but slightly. A disinterested policy or 
 one little forceful was, therefore, possible. With Spain, how- 
 ever, her position was firmer. Russia and Austria had for 
 some time been watching the development of liberalism in Spain, 
 and had directed notes to England disclaiming the tendencies 
 there. They had insinuated that England was secretly giving 
 to the constitutionalists of Spain her approval, if not actual aid. 
 Russia had proposed intervention. The ultra-royalists in France 
 likewise feared the effects upon them of the overthrow of the 
 Bourbon power in Spain. In April, 1820, Wellington, appre- 
 hending the attitude of the European Powers, wrote to Castle- 
 reagh, opposing any interference in Spain. The king, he said, 
 had not called for assistance and it was doubtful whether it 
 would be possible for the Powers to intervene at that time, 
 pitted against each other as they appeared to be. But of this 
 he was convinced, "No foreign power ought to interfere." 
 
 ilbid, p. 314. 
 
 5 Ibid, XII, p. 356. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 39 
 
 * ' There is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreign- 
 ers can interfere with so little advantage as in those of Spain. 
 There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and 
 even despised."* 
 
 When the call for a congress came, therefore, England was 
 prepared to resist any attack upon Spain. Austria had men- 
 tioned particularly the Italian question as the significant one 
 to be considered, and Castlereagh was anxious that the Emper- 
 or of Russia should not attempt to introduce any new subject 
 of discussion. Russia, as England had feared, did propose 
 in the congress, intervention in Spain, but England vehement- 
 ly protested. The Spanish question was then dropped. 
 
 In September it was definitely arranged that the confer- 
 ences would begin on October 20. The greatest concern was felt 
 on the part of Metternich as to what England intended to do. 
 In his memoirs, September 17, he wrote, ''Will anyone come 
 from London? and who? Castlereagh is desired by many, but 
 he will not be able to come ; for this matter Wellington could be 
 nominated. Will he come or will they choose to send him ? " '^ 
 Neither Castlereagh nor Wellington was sent to represent Eng- 
 land. It was deemed sufficient to authorize Lord Stewart, the 
 British minister to Vienna, to attend the congress and to look 
 after English interests. 
 
 Metternich found his strongest ally in the Emperor Alexan- 
 der. ''The Emperor Alexander has become much wiser than 
 he was in 1813." After several private interviews, Metternich 
 recorded in his diary, November 10, "The friendliness of the 
 Russian Emperor for me continues. It is a return to the 
 year 1813. If he had been in the year 1815 as he was in the 
 year 1813, there would have been no 1820."* The Russian 
 policy because of the opposing views of the ministers and the 
 Emperor was to Metternich an interesting object of observation, 
 Nesselrode he could manage. "Nesselrode is morally dead; 
 it is just as if he were not there at all." Capo d'Istria, how- 
 ever, at one time the most influential advisor of the Emperor 
 opposed the principles and policies of Metternich. He was 
 England's strongest friend in the congress and Metternich 's 
 
 6 Wellin^on, Supplementary Despatches, I, pp. 116-117. 
 
 7 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 393. 
 SIbid, III, p. 402. 
 
40 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 most powerful opponent.^ Mettemich wrote he was a "small, 
 mean, intellect," but one which must be made to turn even 
 against his will. It was only after weeks of persuasion 
 that Mettemich forced the Emperor to cease depending upon 
 his minister's opinions. The effect was to prolong the con- 
 gress; November 27th, Mettemich recorded his progress in the 
 congress : 
 
 "We are gradually attaining results. They are unhappily 
 not successful to the degree I had wished ; with Capo d 'Istria it 
 is even difficult to carry out a plain benefit. Capo d 'Istria is 
 not a bad man, but honestly speaking he is a complete and 
 thorough fool; a perfect miracle of wrong headedness." 
 
 Insignificant though England appeared in the congress, and 
 strong as the unanimity seemed to be between the Emperors of 
 Russia and Austria from being natural allies, England could 
 still find in Austria a check against Russia, and in France 
 likewise an ally against Russia. In the matter of Russian in- 
 terference in the Greek revolution, it was early seen in the 
 congress that Austria would view with suspicion and jealousy 
 any move on the part of Russia in the southeast. Austria had 
 been apprised of England's support in this matter previous 
 to the meeting. With France, England had found a bond of 
 sympathy, because of French fear that Russia would demand the 
 entrance of a Russian army into Spain. 
 
 As a result of the unofficial alliance, because it fostered 
 strong tendencies ready to become active forces upon provoca- 
 tion, neither the Spanish situation nor the Greek revolution 
 dared be acted upon in the congress. The revolution of Naples, 
 therefore, remained the only subject open to consideration. 
 
 The congress opened with a statement by Austria of the con- 
 ditions in Naples, and the urgent necessity of the allies to per- 
 form their duty in restoring peace. It was unnecessaiy for 
 England's representative to raise any objections, for both ob- 
 jections and passive approval had been given to Austria in 
 September preceding. Castlereagh had notified Lord Stewart 
 that according to a strict interpretation of the Alliance the 
 revolution in Naples did not come under its surveillance. "It 
 is, nevertheless, an event of such great importance in itself 
 
 9 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 350. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 41 
 
 and of such probable moral influence upon the social and pol- 
 itical system of Europe, that, in the fortunate intimacy of 
 counsel which prevails between the five principal Powers of 
 Europe, it necessarily occupies their most anxious attention. ' ' ^^ 
 This statement might be construed as an acceptance of the 
 principle of interference by the Powers, but since it is con- 
 tradictory to the opinions Castlereagh frequently expressed 
 opposing the principle of intervention by the alliance, it is 
 probable he meant to say that it was only natural that the 
 Neapolitan revolution, an event of far-reaching effects, should 
 be a subject of serious deliberation on the part of the Powers. 
 It does not necessarily carry with it the idea that they were 
 to interfere. 
 
 England expected that Austria would interfere, but if force 
 should be employed, she demanded that Austria satisfy the 
 allies that she was aiming at no aggrandizement or supremacy in 
 Italy, but that she was merely acting in self-defense. The stand 
 for interference by the Powers having been taken, England 
 no longer had ony voice in the congress. During the rest of 
 the session there was no attempt made by England to oppose 
 the course decided upon. It seemed to be the attitude that 
 what was of no direct concern to England should be allowed to 
 go on as it might. Castlereagh 's policy does not appear as 
 straightforward as it might, and leaves a basis for opponents 
 to suspect him of duplicity in the affair. Mettemich was cer- 
 tainly led to understand that Austrian interference in Italy 
 would be tolerated, but that intervention by the Powers would 
 be opposed in principle. But it was equally clear to Metter- 
 nich that if the Powers did undertake to interfere, two courses 
 were open to the English: one of withdrawing from the con- 
 gress, and the other of resisting the Powers by amis. The sec- 
 ond alternative would not be resorted to. Either Austria or 
 the Powers, therefore, were free to act as they saw fit without 
 fear of England. 
 
 Very few documents were drawTi up by the congress, but 
 the few which were formulated show in the general sentiment 
 expressed the absolute dictatorship of Metternich. He himself 
 boastfully declared, ''In all the documents sent forth the 
 
 10 Ibid, XII, p. 315, (Castlereagh to Lord Stewart). 
 
42 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 thoughts are mine; but the drawing up is by Capo d'Istria." 
 In loftiness of pui'pose, the objects proclaimed from Troppau 
 are only secondary to the noble expressions of the Holy Alli- 
 ance. The first declaration to the King of Sicily by the three 
 kings was dated November 20th. Prefaced by several para- 
 graphs dealing with the duty imposed upon the allies of restor- 
 ing peace, the invitation to the King to join with them at Lai- 
 bach was issued. 
 
 Had it not been for the strong appeal of France that a 
 reconciliation of the King of Naples with his subjects be under- 
 taken by the allies, before recourse to arms was attempted, the 
 meeting with King Ferdinand would most probably not have 
 been proposed, and the congress of Laibach would have been 
 rendered unnecessary. Although England and France did not 
 sign the declarations dr^wn up at the congress, or join with 
 the three sovereigns in issuing the invitation to Naples, the 
 King of France on December third sent a message to Naples, 
 expressing his approval of the action taken by the congress, 
 urging his attendance at Laibach, and regretting that he him- 
 self was unable to be present.^^ 
 
 A second document of significance did not appear until De- 
 cember eighth. It was this, the circular to the Austrian, 
 Prussian, and Russian ministers at the court of London which 
 led to the attack in the English Parliament on the foreign policy 
 of Liverpool and Castlereagh. This circular is a statement 
 of the policy adopted at Troppau. The sovereigns declared 
 their intentions of repressing rebellion that opposed legitimate 
 governments. Upon this principle, which they recognized as 
 not a new one, but as one founded upon the principles laid down 
 in the treaties of 1814 and 1815, they based the right of inter- 
 vention. The inference was made that the courts of London and 
 Paris would approve the proceeding.^^ 
 
 The opposition to the policy outlined in the circular, and 
 to Castlereagh 's apparent approval of it, was led in the Eng- 
 lish Parliament by Lord Holland and Earl Grey. The only 
 evidence presented by Liverpool in defense of this attitude and 
 as proof of his disapproval of the course taken, was his circu- 
 
 12 British and Forei^ State Papers, VIII, pp. 1147-1170. 
 IS Ibid, pp. 1149-51. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 43 
 
 lar letter from the foreign office to the British ministers at 
 the foreign courts, dated January 19, 1821. Why England had 
 not protested earlier against the principles of despotism laid 
 down at Troppau was a question to which the English ministers 
 failed to make a strong reply. The statement that the events 
 of Troppau had been known in the latter part of December 
 was a weak apology, for the policy prevailing at Troppau had 
 been discussed in European papers long before this time, and 
 England was certainly aware of the course that was being 
 adopted at the congi-ess.^* 
 
 Both Liverpool and Castlereagh attempted to justify the 
 allies somewhat by declaring before Parliament that the revo- 
 lution in Naples was not a popular one, but that it had been 
 the work of a military clique. In restoring the monarchy, 
 therefore, the Powers were acting in accordance with the wishes 
 of the populace. The English ministers preferred to look upon 
 the interference in Naples as an exception, and not to admit it 
 as the accepted policy of the Alliance. The general principles 
 set forth by the sovereigns they strongly disclaimed. Liverpool 
 declared, "Never did Russia, Austria, and Prussia do a more 
 ill advised act, than when they put forth the declaration. ' ' ^^ 
 
 In answer to the question, why England had not remonstra- 
 ted against the work of the allies. Earl Liverpool without doubt 
 touched the keynote of the policy England had adopted : ' ' The 
 country must not put itself into the situation of having made a 
 vain remonstrance, which it has not the courage or the means 
 to enforce." ^"^ 
 
 From this it would appear that the policy taken with regard 
 to the conduct of the congress was based upon economic interest. 
 The problems of whether England desired to maintain her 
 neutrality with Naples, or whether she approved of restoring 
 legitimate rule, or whether she resented the interference of the 
 allies, all had to be answered not upon theories, sentiment, or 
 precedent, but upon the basis of the advantages or disadvan- 
 tages to her. Russia and Austria, it was known, had immense 
 armies that could be put into the field upon a few weeks notice. 
 A vehement remonstrance by England supported by arms would 
 
 14 Hansard, Debates, V, p. 1061. 
 
 15 Ibid, p. 1065. 
 
 16 Ibid. 
 
44 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 have been necessary to make their opposition effective, and 
 this was deemed inexpedient. There was nothing for England 
 to gain. 
 
 Having issued the invitation to the King and the circular to 
 the foreign courts, the congress stood ready for adjournment. 
 Instead, it was decided to await the answer of the King of 
 Naples. This prolonged the meeting until the end of Decem- 
 ber. Metternich on December 11th wrote, "The King of Naples 
 may come or he may stay away; measures must be taken to 
 suit both cases." The waiting was wearisome. Troppau was 
 little accommodated to the entertainment of royalty, and the 
 inclemency of the weather added to the disagreeableness of the 
 surroundings. December 21st, Metternich recorded, "Still no 
 news from Naples." At last on December 24th, the courier 
 arrived bearing the news that the King would go to Laibach. 
 "I start tomorrow morning, my Emperor; the next morning, 
 the Emperor Alexander," on the 27th Metternich wrote.^^ 
 
 Would England be present at Laibach? Metternich hoped 
 she would join the allies there. "France and England have 
 been asked to take part in the step, and it is to be expected 
 that they will not refuse their consent, since the principle on 
 which the invitation rests is in perfect harmony with the agree- 
 ments formerly concluded by them. ' ' ^^ 
 
 17 Wellington, Autobiography, III, pp. 406, 409. 
 i8/&td, p. 446. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE CONGRESS AT LAIBACH 
 
 When it was decided at Troppau that the congress should 
 be continued, it was very wisely agreed to adjourn to Laibach, 
 a city better suited to accommodate the members. Situated 
 in southern Austrian territory, it was not an undesirable win- 
 ering place. A winter resort it proved to be to the sovereigns 
 and ministers of the congress, for with little to do but await 
 developments in Naples, there was opportunity and leisure to 
 enjoy the sunshine and soft winds, Italian in nature. 
 
 The members began to assemble January fourth. Metter- 
 nich, ever ready to seize the advantage of preliminary conver- 
 sations and an opportunity of observing tendencies, was the first 
 to arrive. A few days later, the Emperors of Austria and 
 Russia, and the King of Naples were present. Their first meet- 
 ing on January sixth Metternich dubbed the "Festival of the 
 Three Kings." 
 
 England's policy opposing the principle of interference in 
 the name of the Alliance had not been changed, and consequent- 
 ly Metternich 's hopes that England might send representa- 
 tives to participate at Laibach were not realized. The Honor- 
 able Robert Gordon was present, but since he was not officially 
 accredited to the congress, did not attend the conferences. How- 
 ever, toward the end of February, Austria was disposed to look 
 with comparative complacence upon England's stand, and went 
 so far as to invite the unofficial English representative into pri- 
 vate conferences.^ 
 
 France, after armed intervention was determined upon, re- 
 fused to countenance the conferences. Any determined oppo- 
 sition on her "part would have aroused the indignation of Russia 
 and Austria, both of which would have seen in such action, the 
 old revolutionary spirit attempting to assert itself. Therefore, 
 
 1 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 372. 
 
 45 
 
46 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES , 
 
 to preserve her friendly relations with the European Powers, 
 France had recourse only to silent disapproval and eventual 
 withdrawal. 
 
 The work of the congress commenced with a call upon King 
 Ferdinand to declare his opinions concerning the revolution. 
 As was expected, he implored the sovereigns to restore the old 
 monarch and to establish the power of kingship as it had been 
 previous to the events of 1820. Under the direction of the 
 Powers, he framed a letter, January 20th, to his son, the Prince 
 Regent of Sicily, informing him of the action of the congress. 
 
 "I have found them irrevocably determined not to admit the 
 state of things which had resulted from these events or which 
 could result from them, to regard it as incompatible with the 
 tranquillity of my realm, as well as with the security of neigh- 
 boring states, and to combat it by force of arms, in the case 
 where forces of persuasion could not effect an immediate ces- 
 sation of them. ' ' ^ 
 
 The declaration of the allies themselves to Naples was trans- 
 mitted by two circulars, dated January 19th, to the ministers 
 of the three Powers residing at Naples. The conditions calling 
 forth intervention were reviewed, and the general principles, so 
 often proclaimed as the bases of their action, were again set 
 forth.^ The policy upon which the allies had agreed, was also 
 declared. When the news reached Naples, the French charge d' 
 affaires there addressed a note on February 9th, declaring that 
 France would act in compliance with the instructions sent to 
 the ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.* 
 
 The decision upon Sicilian affairs made at Laibach was made 
 known to the Austrian people by a declaration issued by the 
 Austrian government, February 13. Again the events in Naples 
 necessitating action by the allies were developed in minute de- 
 tail, and the marching of troops into the Italian province was 
 announced to be a measure of greatest need. 
 
 The congress in consequence, the report stated, had ordered 
 troops to cross the Po, and if the conflict proved more severe 
 than anticipated, the Russian Emperor stood prepared to join 
 his forces with those of Austria.^ 
 
 2 British and Foreign State Papers, VIII, pp. 116-23. ^(^ti, - ^ 
 
 ZIbid, VIII, pp. 1165-1172. 
 
 ilbid, p. 1172. 
 
 ^ Ibid, Vi p. 1175, (Declaration of Austrian Government to Vienna). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 47 
 
 Neither the Austrian government nor the English felt content 
 with this decree. The possible union of the great military power 
 of Russia with that of Austria appeared to England to fore- 
 bode grave dangers. There was no assurance that a compro- 
 mise had not been effected by Russia whereby aid would be 
 given Austria in Italy provided Austria in turn would give 
 her consent to any Russian aggression in the East. To the Aus- 
 trian government in Vienna and to the Austrian people, the 
 mere proposal of a Russian army crossing Austrian territory 
 was obnoxious. Capo d'Istria had opposed the declaration, 
 but his influence had ceased to be of any consequence.*^ 
 
 February 6, the Austrian army numbering 60,000 men 
 crossed into Italy. A proclamation dated February 27, and 
 signed by Baron Frimont, General of the Austrian forces, was 
 proclaimed to the Neapolitans, urging them to rally to the 
 support of the King. The offensive was taken by the army on 
 March fourth. Little resistance was offered and the army with- 
 ing less than two weeks had entered Naples.'^ 
 
 On February 28th, the congress, having previously provided 
 for another conference for September, 1822, dissolved. The 
 King of Naples and the Italian princes accompanying him, left 
 Laibach early in March, but the Austrian and Russian sover- 
 eigns and diplomatists remained until late in May. From the 
 adjournment in February, the formal sessions of the congress 
 gave way to informal meetings, and the work accomplished after 
 that date was in the nature of private interviews and agree- 
 ments. 
 
 Had it not been for the revolution in Piedmont, any arrange- 
 ments entered into after February would have been treated best 
 as unrelated to the Quadruple Alliance. But the interference of 
 the Powers in the Sardinian kingdom, as a furtherance of the 
 policy adopted toward Naples, must necessarily be associated 
 with the work of the allies at Laibach. News of the insurrec- 
 tion was received March 15th, and straightway an agreement 
 was consummated between Austria and Russia by which 80,000 
 men were to march from Austria into Italy, and 90,000 Russians 
 were to cross the Austrian borders.^ 
 
 6 Metternich, Autobiography, III, p. 480. 
 
 7 Ibid, pp. 5190-5220. 
 
 8 Ibid, III, p. 490. 
 
48 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 If England could have understood Metternich's motives, as 
 he recorded them, in demanding the mobilization of the Rus- 
 sian army on the Austrian frontier, all suspicion of a secret 
 compact between the Powers would have been dissipated. In 
 reply to a letter condeming Austria's power in recognizing her 
 inefficiency to cope with the revolutions of Italy and her ap- 
 parent pleasure in receiving Russian aid, Mettemich showed 
 the artful cunning of diplomacy. 
 
 ''I had to think of destroying Russian Liberalism, and prov- 
 ing to Europe that henceforth the Radicals will have to deal 
 with the two powers possessing most freedom of action. 
 
 "All the promises, all the speeches of the Emperor of Russia 
 would have been valueless; but his setting in motion some hun- 
 dred thousand men, their effective march, the expenditure on 
 them of ten millions, these are facts. The command to halt is 
 another fact not less important ; and a hundred twenty thousand 
 men placed in the Russian provinces nearest to our frontiers, 
 with orders to march at the first request of Austria, is certainly 
 a third fact, which will prevent these disturbers from counting 
 so rapidly on the Emperor Alexander in the future."® 
 
 From Laibach, the Italian rebellions were quelled; the reac- 
 tionary principles were supreme. Metternich tried to persuade 
 himself that the Greek situation would settle itself, and a, 
 compact with respect to Greece was signed by the Emperors 
 of Russia and Austria whereby it was agreed that, 
 
 *'As it (Greece) has remained up to this time estranged from 
 all the affairs of Europe, we do not feel called upon to inter- 
 fere in its affairs. ' ' ^^ The Spanish question here as at Troppau 
 was left untouched. 
 
 The stand which England had taken at Troppau was main- 
 tained at Laibach. At Troppau it was clearly shown that if 
 interference were admitted, she would not become a party to 
 the agreement, and at Laibach England let it be known that 
 though she might dissent from the policy of the allies, remon- 
 strance would not be made in the form of an ultimatum. Castle- 
 reagh was determined that upon the Italian question, England 
 should not take the field. England was apparently little con- 
 
 9 Ibid, III, p. 529. 
 
 10 Ibid, p. 523. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 49 
 
 cemed with the events at Laibach, and made no arrangement 
 for the rapid communication of information as in the preced- 
 ing congresses. February 7, Castlereagh wrote, "We are yet 
 without any intelligence from Laibach of the course of measure 
 intended to be pursued. ' ' ^^ 
 
 Upon the question with whom England felt herself most 
 strongly in accord, the views of the men of the period strangely 
 differ. Since France opposed the course taken in the con- 
 gresses, the natural supposition would be that France and 
 England were in sympathy. Metternich, however, declared 
 "France and England, far from being on good terms, com- 
 pletely distrust each other. England is entirely with us."^^ 
 
 Others than Mettemich were likewise of the opinion that 
 England and Austria were agreed, and that as a matter of fact, 
 England had, preceding the time of actual interference, taken 
 more hostile measures against Naples, than had been adopted 
 by the Congress. The presence of the British fleet at Naples 
 was looked upon by them and by the opposition in Parliament 
 as a breach of neutrality. Castlereagh affirmed that the pur- 
 pose of the fleet was the defence of British citizens. With these 
 conflicting statements the motive of the action must be left un- 
 decided. 
 
 In January, Castlereagh declared that Mettemich should not 
 have made the Italian revolution in Naples a European ques- 
 tion, and in April before Parliament he stated, ' ' The illustrious 
 monarchs have been ill-advised in adopting principles which 
 were not consistent with sound policy. ' ' ^^ Castlereagh dared 
 go thus far in his replies to Parliament, but to have explained 
 the real situation of England would have been impossible. No 
 English minister would have had the courage to expose the 
 weakness of British influence abroad, and to explain that war was 
 her only effective recourse. Then to have explained further that 
 intervention was tolerated because it was against England's 
 economic interest to oppose by arms, would have degraded Brit- 
 ish policy before the world. 
 
 With the conclusion of the conferences at Laibach, Castle- 
 reagh 's policy of the part England should take in the meetings 
 
 11 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 364. 
 
 12 Ibid, XII, p. 364. 
 
 13 Ibid., p. 341. 
 
50 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 of the allies came to an end. At Aix-la-Chapelle the position of 
 England had been one of force and prominence. On significant 
 points her remonstrance had been effective. At Troppau and 
 Laibach her disapproval of interference by the Powers was 
 passed by unheeded. Castlereagh may have looked with less 
 disfavor upon the proceedings than his public utterances and 
 official correspondence indicated, but, nevertheless, in the fact 
 that he had registered the remonstrance in his public acts is 
 to be found the real importance of his attitude. The recog- 
 nition that England must not interfere within a state, and that 
 the economic interest of the nation forebade England's engaging 
 in war to uphold a remonstrance upon a situation of little con- 
 sequence to her, were Castlereagh 's chief contributions to Eng- 
 land's foreign policy. In his policy, therefore, were laid the 
 foundations of the inevitable disruption of a system governing 
 Europe by congresses. When the point had been reached where 
 accredited ministers would not be sent by England to the con- 
 ferences a wide breach was effected; when action was taken 
 based upon principles abhorrent to the English nature, the 
 breach was widened, and when at last, English economic in- 
 terests would be unfavorably affected by a congress, the allies 
 and England would be found in opposing camps. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE CONGRESS OF VERONA 
 
 In the few years between 1815 and 1822 there were without 
 doubt more attempts made to unite the powers of Europe under 
 treaties, alliances, and combinations for a common purpose than 
 in any other correspondingly short period of peace. The Con- 
 gress of Vienna, the Treaty of Paris, the Holy Alliance, and the 
 Quadruple Alliance, the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Laibach, 
 and Troppau, all suggested a union of the Powers, and a com- 
 bination of federated interests. 
 
 And yet, the summer preceding the conferences of Vienna 
 and Verona found the European Powers widely separated in 
 policies. The general alliance alone tended to unite the great 
 nations. There was no federative system. Having settled the 
 French situation, the Alliance was shorn of its only common 
 purpose. The foreign relations of Europe were at this period 
 in a state of transition. Attention had been turned from the 
 French power, and statesmen were necessarily influenced by 
 probable future developments rather than by present con- 
 ditions. 
 
 In this period of uncertainty, in which no Power could feel 
 that it had the unequivocal support of an ally, intervention 
 within the internal affairs of a state was admitted. It called 
 forth denunciation on the part of Great Britain but did not 
 provoke resistance. No federative policy had been combined 
 and no demand of its assistance was made which the British 
 Parliament would have been bound in the right of an existing 
 treaty. Great Britain consequently, though vigilant in her 
 watch of European affairs, refrained from interfering so far as 
 her interests did not suffer. It was undoubtedly her policy to 
 unite with no Power until the event or situation calling forth the 
 federated interests of states should have developed. 
 
 "Russia has long looked to the dismemberment of Turkey as 
 
 51 
 
52 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 affording the opportunity of her own most valuable aggrandize- 
 ment. Austria is eager to obtain possession of the Slavonian 
 provinces bordering her own territories, and adjacent to Italy, 
 her favorite object. France, connected with the Mediterranean 
 and desirous of acquiring the advantage of commerce, looks with 
 hope and expectation at the independence of Greece; and Great 
 Britain interested generally in the protection of commerce, 
 and specially in the maintenance of her own maritime impor- 
 tance, must regard with anxious apprehension, every power 
 which seeks to obtain a preponderance in a country so favor- 
 ably situated for maritime purposes. Here, there is a country 
 which Russia seeks to magnify in her already vast domain, and 
 where Austria, France, and Great Britain have each a direct 
 and urgent interest in restraining and moderating her en- 
 croachments. " ^ 
 
 Perhaps this was to be the basis of a new federative policy. 
 In 1822, it was still uncertain and the failure to agree in the 
 Congress is traceable largely to the failure of diplomatists to 
 foresee who the common enemy was to be; the danger from 
 Russia being, however, the most zealously guarded. 
 
 In the spring preceding the Congress of Verona, Mettemich 
 and the Marquis of Londonderry at a meeting in Germany 
 discussed the Russian situation as related to the Greek revolu- 
 tion and the Greek war with Turkey. They agreed that in 
 the congress the Powers must not only refuse the intervention 
 in the name of the Alliance, but must deny Russia the right 
 of interference. It was definitely understood that the attention 
 of Russia must be turned from the Southeast.^ 
 
 Great Britain was alive to the approaching storm in Europe, 
 and before the Congi-ess had sounded Metternich on Austria's 
 attitude toward Russia, and likewise through the Duke of Well- 
 ington 's conferences with Monsieur de Villele, the French foreign 
 minister, had attempted to determine the course France would 
 adopt toward the Spanish revolution. Here Wellington agreed 
 that the Spanish revolution was not a subject for the Congress 
 as it was purely a French problem.^ 
 
 1 Quarterly Review (1828), XXXVIII, p. 177. 
 
 2 Wellington, Despatches, I, pp. 288-294, (Wellington to Canning in Paris, Sept. 
 21, 1822). 
 
 sibid, I, p. 292. 
 Chateaubriand, Congress de Tyrone 1, Chapter XX. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 53 
 
 From these two instances it may be seen that the Congress 
 could not be a union of federated allies; the factions were 
 doomed to be of greater importance than the combined Powers. 
 Out of this discussion no two Powers were to be found whose 
 interests were united on the various questions, such as the 
 Turkish, the Spanish, the slave trade; there would have been 
 formed the foundation of federative policies. 
 
 The Congress of Verona, held in the fall of 1822, was not 
 only the last of the series of Italian congresses, but whalt 
 is of greater significance, the last union of the Powers in ac- 
 cordance with the principles of the Quadruple Alliance. 
 
 The instructions to Wellington to hold England aloof from 
 interference within the internal affairs of any nation were 
 first sent by Castlereagh in May, 1822.* The revolution in 
 Spain was recognized as an evil tendency to be steadfastly 
 watched by the allies; yet the opinion was advanced that there 
 was no ground for believing Europe to be endangered by it. 
 It was hoped that England and the allied countries in confer- 
 ence would agree on the subject and realize that the purpose of 
 the Alliance was not interference. With respect to Spain, 
 Castlereagh wrote in the instructions, "There seems nothing to 
 add to or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solici- 
 tude for the safety of the Royal Family, observance of our en- 
 gagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any in- 
 terference in the internal affairs of that country must be con- 
 sidered as forming the basis of his Majesty's policy." ^ 
 
 In the Turkish question (the war between Greeks and Turks) 
 Great Britain was instructed to be no party to intervention. 
 Between Turkey and Russia the instruction declared it to be 
 Great Britain's policy to insist upon the observance of treaties 
 and to oppose any breach between the countries. On the sub- 
 ject of the American colonies, England could join in no declara- 
 tion affirming the rights of Spain. The purport of the instruc- 
 tions was non-interference on the part of the Alliance. This 
 policy was retained and enforced by Canning. The credit, 
 however, of declaring the principle is here seen to belong to 
 Castlereagh. 
 
 4 British anc Foreign State Papers, X, p. 74. 
 
 5 WeUington, Despatches, IV, p. 286, (Draft of Memorandum of Instruction for 
 the Duke of WeUington). 
 
54 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 After his conservation with Villele in Paris, Wellington ap- 
 plied to the new foreign minister, Canning, for any further 
 instructions he might have. The reply gives due credit to the 
 policy outlined by the Marquis of Londonderry. 
 
 ''On the affairs of Spain, whether European or American, I 
 have nothing to communicate to your Grace which can in any 
 degree vary the tenor of the sentiments expressed in the heads 
 of instruction of which your Grace is already in possession, or 
 of the conduct which your Grace is therein directed to ob- 
 serve. ' ' * 
 
 Since the time of the instructions drafted by Londonderry, 
 such occurrences had taken place in the diplomatic intercourse 
 with the Powers as to suggest that without question, a deter- 
 mined project of interference was afoot, and that at the Con- 
 gress of Verona measures for action would be taken. Canning, 
 therefore, reasserted the English position in a note to Welling- 
 ton saying, ''I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and 
 peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come 
 what may, his majesty will not be a party. "'^ 
 
 From time to time suggestions and semi-instructions appear 
 in the communication from the British foreign office to Well- 
 ington. They are not significant of any change in policy and 
 so may be passed without comment. But because of the ques- 
 tion often raised as to whether Austria would have been per- 
 mitted to interfere in Italian affairs, had Canning then have 
 been directing the English policy, a reference in his letter to 
 Wellington is noteworthy, in which he refers to the question of 
 Austria withdrawing her troops, one of the questions for 
 discussion at the conferences of Verona. He shows no disap- 
 proval of the Austrian occupation of the Italian territory. 
 ''Should it appear your Grace's conviction, that the con- 
 tinuance of an Austrian garrison in Piedmont is still abso- 
 lutely necesvsary, your Grace has only to keep yourself within 
 the lines of your original instructions, and preserve an abso- 
 lute silence in any discussion of Italian affairs. ' ' ^ 
 
 The work before the Congress of Verona in which Great 
 Britain was to take the part of the unyielding opponent to the 
 
 e Ibid, I, p. 301, (Canning to Wellington). 
 
 7 Ibid, p. 304. 
 
 8 Ibid, II, p. 308, (Canning to Wellington). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 55 
 
 continental powers, was concerned chiefly with three questions: 
 the Spanish situation, the abolition of the slave trade, and the 
 policy to be adopted toward the Spanish American colonies. Of 
 these, the Spanish question became the leading problem, and the 
 one upon which the Alliance split into three parts. Early in 
 the session, Wellington wrote to Canning, "It is obvious that 
 the contest of Verona will fall principally upon me. Prince 
 Mettemich and Count Bernstorif will remain behind and leave 
 to the French ministers and to me to fight the whole battle."® 
 
 As had been anticipated from the conversation between Well- 
 ington and Villele, France brought forward the possibility of 
 war with Spain. The army of observation maintained by France 
 on the Spanish border, was objected to by Spain, French min- 
 isters stated. But the protection of the French border demand- 
 ed that it be retained there, was the French contention. The 
 revolution in Spain was declared to be a menace to France and 
 might necessitate war at any time. 
 
 In view of this situation, Montmorency, the French plenipo- 
 tentiary read a paper ^° before the Congress in which he repre- 
 sented the situation as a purely French one. He desired, how- 
 ever, the support of the Alliance in case of war and made three 
 demands of the allies. First, what their attitude would be 
 toward the situation, whether they would follow France in re- 
 calling their ministers ; second, what moral aid they would give ; 
 and third, what material aid they would guarantee.^^ Alexander, 
 having surrendered his aggressive policy in the East, was anx- 
 ious to employ his army in the West. It would tend to avert pop- 
 ular disfavor at home with his policy toward Turkey. His 150,- 
 000 troops were ready to march and it was his purpose to find 
 use for them. At Vienna, therefore, before going to Verona, he 
 had shown his readiness to march them into Piedmont through 
 Germany, there to await developments in Spain, and to assist 
 France if necessary.^^ 
 
 Mettemich posing as a great friend to Alexander, in a half- 
 hearted manner upheld the Russian offer in public meetings, 
 
 9 Ibid, II, p. 348, (Wellin^on to Canning). 
 
 10 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, I, p. 48. 
 
 11 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 4, (Memorandum of the Duke of 
 Wellington ) . 
 
 12 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 457, (Wellington to Canning). 
 
56 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 but secretly advised France to oppose it." Wellington, the 
 first of the ministers to reply to the French overtures, declared 
 that Great Britain disapproved of any intervention or declara- 
 tion by the allies against Spain, and that she looked with almost 
 equal disfavor upon any rupture between France and Spain. 
 Wellington reviewed the British line of conduct since April, 
 1820, showing that it had been the policy of the government 
 to avail itself of every opportunity of recommending to the alllies 
 that they abstain from interference in Spain. England, Well- 
 ington stated, would decline to engage in any measure on the 
 hypothetical case as presented by Montmorency.^* Before taking 
 any action, is would be necessary for Great Bntain to have 
 knowledge of all the circumstances which had occurred between 
 the two countries.^^ The three continental Powers in their sep- 
 arate replies to the French paper were agreed that they would 
 act as ''France should, in respect to their ministers in Spain, 
 and would give to France every countenance and assistance she 
 should require ! the cause for such assistance, and the period and 
 the mode of giving it, being reserved to be specified in a 
 treaty."^*' 
 
 It was decided that despatches be written to the respective 
 ministers of Madrid, in which the courts were to make known 
 their wishes and intentions to Spain. Having failed to pre- 
 vent the Congress from taking action on the Spanish question, 
 and of course refusing to send a similar despatch to the British 
 envoy at Madrid, Wellington recommended that the Powers 
 confine themselves solely to the external quarrel between France 
 and Spain, and that they suggest nothing with regard to the 
 internal situation and that they do no menace.^^ Great Brit- 
 ain then offered to mediate between France and Spain if France 
 approved. ^^ To France, however, Great Britain appeared an 
 interested party, one not only in sympathy with the constitu- 
 tionalists of Spain, but directly opposed to a strong Bourbon 
 
 1^ Ibid, p. 460. 
 
 14 British and Foreign State Pai)ers, X, p. 4, (Canning to Wellington). 
 >» Ibid, p. 8. 
 Wellingrton, Despatches, I, p. 506. 
 
 16 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 9, (Memorandum of the Duke of 
 Wellington) . 
 
 17 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 520, (Wellington to Canning). 
 
 18 British Foreign and State Papers, X, p. 12, (Canning to Wellington). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 57 
 
 monarch in Spain, lest he be a source of strength to the French 
 Bourbons. England had concluded treaties with Spain which 
 aroused naturally enough the suspicions of France. Chateau- 
 briand remarks that he learned from good authority that Eng- 
 land had already given 2,000,000 to Spain to obtain what she 
 wished, and that she had promised 4,000,000 more.^^ 
 
 In the offer of mediation sent to Spain, Great Britain declared 
 her willingness to mediate provided Spain redress the griev- 
 ances between them.-^ From this it would appear that Great 
 Britain was acting not solely in the capacity of champion of 
 liberty and non-intervention, but that her own interests were 
 the basis of her policy. 
 
 Again throughout the pages of the diplomacy of this period 
 there are continually allusions to a war between France and 
 England, if France invaded Spain. Should that occur, the 
 opinion prevalent was that it would mean a continental war, a 
 certain war with Russia^, a necessary one with Austria, who 
 would be forced to give France the assistance she promised at 
 Verona. ^^ In this condition the Spanish situation closed, with 
 the allies in three groups: Great Britain absolutely opposed to 
 war whether by the Alliance or by France ; France claiming it 
 to be her war; Russia and Austria believing it to be concerned 
 with the Alliance. 
 
 The Spanish American situation was given little discussion 
 in this Congress. The internal conditions in Spain were too 
 entirely disrupted to authorize a discussion of returning the 
 lost colonies to the king. Wellington made known to the allies 
 that Great Britain would admit of no general discussion of the 
 colonies, but that they must be considered in three groups, and 
 that three distinctions must be maintained: 
 
 "1 The territories within which the contest still 
 subsists. 
 2 The territories in which the struggle may be said 
 to be over, and the possession become complete 
 on the part of the local government. 
 
 19 Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, I, p. 86. 
 
 20 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 28. 
 
 21 Wellington, Despatches, II, pp. 31-33, (Memorandum from Canning to Well- 
 ington). 
 
58 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 3 The states in actual or in intended negotiation with 
 old Spain. "22 
 
 Chateaubriand, ignoring the distinctions made by Great Brit- 
 ain, proposed in the Congress to extend the principle of inter- 
 vention to the colonies and to help the king of Spain subdue 
 them. No conclusions were reached. In light of future events, 
 however, it may be fair to state that without declaring it, the 
 allies understood that should this situation become more urgent, 
 a congress could be assembled to deliberate upon Spanish Ameri- 
 can affairs. 
 
 At this Congress, as at Vienna and at Aix-la-Chapelle, the 
 British minister was instructed to urge the allied powers to take 
 active measures against the slave trade. Of the continental 
 powers, France was the one most actively engaged in maritime 
 pursuits, and so it was to France, England first put the ques- 
 tion of abolition of the slave traffic. In Paris, Wellington ap- 
 proached the French minister on this point. He was assured 
 that the "King and the French government were sincerely anx- 
 ious to put an end to this traffic, but that they could devise no 
 measures which could have that effect which they could hope to 
 prevail upon the chambers to adopt; that the measure so often 
 recommended to their attention by the British ambassador at 
 this court, that of attaching a peine infamante to the convic- 
 tion of this crime would be inefficient if passed into a law. ' ' ^^ 
 
 With this little encouragement to a solution of the evil prac- 
 tice, the British potentiary carried the subject into he Con- 
 gress. In the paper read before the assembly on the subject, 
 Wellington denounced France very openly, declaring that he had 
 positive proof that the great contraband trade was carried on 
 under the protection of the French flag.^* The reason being 
 that "France is the only one of the great maritime powers of 
 Europe whose government has not entered into the treaties which 
 have been completed with His British Majesty for giving to 
 certain of the ships of each of the contracting party, a limited 
 power of search and capture of ships engaged in this horrible 
 traffis. ' ' -' Wellington proposed that arrangement be made for 
 
 22 Ibid, I, p. 287, (Instructions to Wellington). 
 23 /bid, I, p. 295, (Wellington to Canning). 
 
 24 Chateaubriand, Congres de YSrone, I, p. 34. 
 
 25 British and Foreign State Papers, X, p. 96. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 59 
 
 executing the existing law against the trade, or that a conven- 
 tion be entered into by the Powers to prohibit the importation 
 of foreign produce from slave trading colonies. This latter 
 suggestions was denounced as striking particularly at Portugal. 
 Portugal, it was claimed, had no representative at the Con- 
 gress and had the right of having its case heard before such an 
 agreement should be made. 
 
 The suggestion of an executive council to punish offenders 
 was repulsive to the French. "This according to the nature of 
 governments is the judicial and legislative body that is called 
 upon to decide it. ' ' ^* Chateaubriand denied the charge that the 
 French flag covered this illicit trade. He stated, "To retire the 
 protection of the French flag from foreign individuals who make 
 use of the flag to cover commerce in slaves is entirely just, but 
 France has no need to prohibit that which it has never com- 
 mitted."" 
 
 The French people were suspicious of England's apparently 
 high moral purpose in urging the abolition. Chateaubriand says, 
 "One must admire here the Christlike spirit, the progress of 
 civilization, that has been made and continues increasing without 
 ceasing; but it is a singular thing that this perseverance of the 
 cabinet of Saint James has introduced in all the Congresses 
 in the midst of questions most vital and of present interest, this 
 question incidental and rambling, of the abolition of the trade 
 in blacks. The English had sold their whites as slaves in 
 America in a time as near ours as the time of Cromwell. The 
 secret of these contradictions is to be found in the private in- 
 terests and mercantile interests of England. This is necessary 
 to understand in order not to be a dupe of a philanthropy so 
 ardent and so lately evident. ' ' ^^ 
 
 Ardent as Great Britain appeared in behalf of the negro trade 
 she was unwilling to permit the alliance to declare the slave trade 
 piracy lest it give the Powers too much authority.^^ In the end 
 the Powers united in declaring the trade "abominable" and in 
 declaring themselves ready to agree to measures judged "ex- 
 
 26 Chateaubriand, Oongres de Yirone, I, p. 39. 
 
 27 Ihid, p. 36. 
 
 28 Ibid, I, p. 35. 
 
 29 WeUin^on, Despatches, I, p. 334, (Canning to Wellington). 
 
60 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 ecutable" in order to assure the total abolition. It was more of 
 a moral triumph than a practicable one.*° 
 
 This was the last important problem to be brought before 
 the Congress. The allies had failed to agree as a whole, and, 
 as factions, had been unable to have common interest through- 
 out. The congress closed with France heartily disliking Eng- 
 land, not only because of the Spanish situation, but because of 
 what she considered an absolutely selfish policy on the part of 
 Great Britain in the slave trade. England had united with 
 Austria in distrust of Russia, but Austria stood "with France 
 on the Spanish difficulties. No Power through these conferences 
 was able to find an ally with whom she could be federated 
 for a common purpose. 
 
 The strength of the Quadruple Alliance was broken at Verona. 
 The union failed to become a permanent federation. It may 
 have been that it was doomed to failure because of its wrong 
 foundation, a league of the strong against the weak, rather than 
 a union of the weak against some formidable power. The su- 
 perior power, the one which would menace continental Europe, 
 could not yet be clearly foreseen. 
 
 30 Chateaubriand, Congres de V drone, I, pp. 34-109. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF ENGLISH DIPLO- 
 MACY IN THE CONGRESS 
 
 The course of English diplomacy in the period of the Con- 
 gresses cannot be said to have been determined by any one fac- 
 tor, the social, the political, or the economic. Each had its 
 share in formulating the policy of the British ministers and rep- 
 resentatives abroad. The force of public opinion as a moral 
 force was certainly a direct impulse to the English diplomatists 
 to secure the abolition of the slave trade; the recognition of 
 responsibility to Parliament, the fear of entering into any re- 
 lations which might strengthen the opposition and threaten the 
 government at home, likewise had their effects, as political forces 
 upon the European relations. Though to no one force may 
 be attributed the sole motive power, yet it is possible for 
 one to appear predominant. The purpose of this chapter will 
 be to trace the economic force, as the predominant factor in 
 determining England's foreign relations with the Quadruple 
 Alliance. 
 
 The years immediately following the peace were in England 
 a period of universal distress. Trade and commerce were dis- 
 organized, agriculture and industry had not yet evolved through 
 the industrial and agricultural revolutions into the new sys- 
 tem. Millions were unemployed, and to this great mass seek- 
 ing a means of livelihood, there was added in 1815, 1816, and 
 1817, another million, the discharged soldiers and sailors. The 
 vast majority of England's working men were starving; even 
 the employed were unable to subsist on the low wages and were 
 forced to become recipients of ' ' poor relief. ' ' ^ 
 
 Under such conditions the work of the government was not 
 to provide primarily for the growth of England, nor to seek 
 prestige abroad; it was not to uphold principles of democracy 
 
 1 Cambridge, Modern History, X, p. 574. 
 
 61 
 
62 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 by the sword. This was the period in which home interests 
 had first to be dealt with. The first duty of Parliament was, 
 therefore, to establish the stability of the state. Peace had to 
 be maintained at home, riots and all uprisings of the masses 
 had to be quelled. The people had to be led gradually into new 
 fields of industry. The discontented were eager for a demon- 
 stration against capital and government, and must from the 
 state's point of view be given as little opportunity as possible 
 for opposition to the new policies. Parliament in its extreme 
 caution and timidity was opposed to intertangling foreign rela- 
 tions, such as might rouse the nation. In short, the interest with 
 which Parliament watched negotiations abroad was due princi- 
 pally to the economic condition at home. 
 
 To trace the influence of economic conditions upon each act 
 of the English ministers, or upon every subject considered in 
 the congresses would be a work impossible as well as imprac- 
 ticable. Such an influence must necessarily react on a move- 
 ment, a policy, a general situation, rather than upon mere oc- 
 currences, such as the admittance of the French King or his 
 representatives to the congresses ; it is with the former class that 
 an attempt will be made to relate economic influence. To this 
 belongs the part taken by England in the financial settlement 
 at Aix-la-Chapelle, the opposition to interference in Spain, the 
 stand of comparative indifference on the question of Naples and 
 Piedmont, the position of the slave trade, the definite policy of 
 non-interference in the Spanish American colonies, the policy 
 of non-intervention towards the Greek revolution in its early 
 stages. 
 
 The financial depression resulting from the wars led to the 
 cry for retrenchment by the Whigs. The immense national debt 
 which had steadily accumulated within a few years amounted 
 in 1815 to 861,000,000 pounds. In that year 74,000,000 pounds 
 was raised by taxation alone. Even with the war taxes and the 
 laying aside annually of a sinking fund of over £14,000,000,^ 
 "the capital of the debt rose by much more than the difference 
 between the amount of money borrowed and the amount ap- 
 plied to the liquidation of old liabilities. ' ' ^ With peace restored 
 and expenditures reduced, the people of all classes who had 
 
 2 Spencer Walpole, History of England, I, p. 29. 
 SWalpole, History of England, I, p. 29. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 63 
 
 been overwhelmed with war taxes for a quarter of a century, 
 hoped to obtain relief. The plan of depending upon the sinking 
 fund to liquidate the debt was doomed to failure, as "the 
 scheme, in fact, depended on the surplus income of the country 
 being equal to the whole amount of the sinking fund, and, as 
 the result proved, it rarely exceeded one-tenth of it. The plan, 
 in a heavily taxed community, with constituencies clamoring for 
 fiscal relief, was certain to fail. ' ' * 
 
 The financial situation in addition to the debt was further 
 embarrassed by the currency situation.^ With peace it was 
 hoped that the hoarding of money which had resulted from the 
 contraction of the currency and fall of prices would cease, and 
 that money would no longer leave the country. In 1817-18, 
 however, specie continued to be drawn from England in even 
 greater amounts than during the last two years of the war. 
 The deficient harvest of 1816 and the very ordinary one of 1817 
 necessitated the importation of foreign grain; exports and 
 imports fell off. Although France paid the expenses of the 
 army of occupation, even then, large sums of English money 
 were expended by the army. Subsidies paid by England to her 
 allies during the war gave way to the first years of peace to 
 loans. In 1816, France raised six million francs and again in 
 1817 made provision for thirty millions raised in loans. The 
 rates of exchange in these years began to be unfavorable to 
 England, and in one of the debates on the currency situation the 
 statement was made that: 
 
 ' ' If the committee would compare the dates of these loans with 
 the periods at which the rate of exchange began to be unfavorable 
 towards the country, it would be found to fall soon after the 
 conclusion of the first French loan. ' ' ® 
 
 As a result of this financial condition, secret treaties entered 
 into by England were viewed with suspicion, lest they require 
 money for their fulfillment. 
 
 All the great nations were creditors to England. Through the 
 great financial houses such as the Rothschilds and Baring, Eng- 
 land had a most efficient organization for floating the loans. Not 
 only the European countries but the Americas as well bor- 
 
 ilbid, I, p. 30. 
 
 5 Traill, Social England, VI, p. 89. 
 
 6 Annual Register, (1818), p. 66. 
 
64 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 rowed from England. ' ' Over ten millions were lent and lost in 
 South America between 1822-26."^ 
 
 Until 1823 resumption of specie payments had not been made. 
 In 1817-18, after long debates on the currency situation, Par- 
 liament fixed rates at which notes were to be converted at a 
 reduced premium until May of 1823, after which all notes were 
 to be redeemed in gold.^ In 1818 the statement was made official- 
 ly that cash payment would probably not be resumed at the ap- 
 pointed time, due not to any situation in the country itself but 
 to ''something in foreign relations." "What that something 
 was," the Earl of Lauderdale stated, in an opposition speech, 
 "he (the secretary of the Treasury) had not chosen to explain, 
 but this much appeared that this most important of all measures 
 no longer depended upon the decision of the British Parliament 
 but on what might be done by the government of France or of 
 any other foreign country. ' ' ^ 
 
 The foreign situation referred to was the approaching con- 
 gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which the status of France was to 
 be determined. If the armies of France were withdrawn. Par- 
 liament foresaw France would want a further loan, and at the 
 same time the government was concerned over the method which 
 would be adopted to pay the present debt. 
 
 In the congress of Aix, therefore, England drew up the con- 
 ditions of the financial settlement. Being the biggest creditor 
 not only of France but of the other Powers, England was left 
 to arrange the settlement with France. It was as the banking 
 houses of England would have demanded. Castlereagh, having 
 in mind the situation of the currency in England, was worried 
 during the congress as to whether the plan of payment to Hope, 
 Baring and Company, a private firm, would be acceptable to 
 the British Secretary. 
 
 In the congresses succeeding that of Aix-la-Chapelle, the 
 financial distress was ever a check in foreign relations. The 
 congresses were looked upon as a needless expense, and at a time 
 when the government was almost bankrupt, when taxes were 
 excessive, even this unimportant item was denounced as needless 
 extravagance. "The result of his ( Castlereagh 's) policy is this, 
 
 7 Cambridge, Modern History, X, p. 743. 
 
 8 Traill, Social England, VI, p. 89. 
 
 9 Annual Register, (1818), pp. 17-18. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 65 
 
 that we are mixed up in the affairs of the continent in a manner 
 we have never been before which entails upon us endless nego- 
 tiations and enormous expenses. ' ' ^° 
 
 The war, while incurring such expense upon England as to 
 almost bankrupt the nation, at the same time developed the 
 wealth of certain classes. Twenty years of war had destroyed 
 European commerce but had raised Great Britain to the posi- 
 tion of the greatest carrying power, the strongest commercial 
 nation of the world. Great commercial houses sprang up to 
 benefit from the new traffic suddenly thrown open to England. 
 Rights of the European nations on the seas were ignored; the 
 navigation acts of Spain limiting the trade with the Spanish 
 West Indies had little weight in checking the British merchant- 
 men. 
 
 During the same period in which European industry was in- 
 terrupted for lack of raw materials and was hampered by the 
 late introduction of modern machineiy, England was developing 
 into the greatest industrial nation of the world. England and 
 the Spanish American colonies became commercially supplemen- 
 tary, the one, the producer of the manufactured commodity, 
 the other, the producer of the raw material. Spain about 1808 
 relaxed for a few years her navigation acts in favor of Great 
 Britain, and from that moment, the colonies were lost to Spain 
 commercially. 
 
 The wealth, thus suddenly thrown to England in commerce 
 and industry through the exigencies of war, easily made, was 
 invested widely, often recklessly. Stock companies like the wild 
 cat banks in our history sprang into existence overnight. Mil- 
 lions of pounds were used for speculation in Spanish American 
 mines. Portugal, for years a strong ally, almost a dependency 
 of England, was infested with British capital. Even Greece, 
 not yet an independent nation, opened a new field for British 
 capital. 
 
 As a result of this economic condition at home, the relations 
 of England with foreign nations were naturally affected. With 
 wealth acquired, the capitalist desired social and political posi- 
 tion. He purchased a seat in Parliament and in that capacity 
 denounced or approved the foreign policy. Though during the 
 
 10 Greville, Memoirs, I, p. 55. 
 
66 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 period of the Congresses, the capitalist class was in a small mi- 
 nority, its influence can be traced in foreign relations. It acted 
 with the Tory party; it supported the landed interests, and its 
 interests were in turn supported by the Tories. 
 
 Such were the general conditions of England. The way in 
 which they react upon the foreign relations will be seen in the 
 policies adopted by the British ministers in dealing with the 
 most significant problems confronting the congresses. 
 
 In the intervention of Austria in Naples and Piedmont, Eng- 
 land would remonstrate, but not forcibly oppose. English capi- 
 tal was not invested in the Italian provinces to any considerable 
 amount. Trade with Italy would be little affected whether the 
 monarch were deposed or restored. 
 
 Austria was determined upon intervention. She could speak 
 with authority for, in addition to her own immense army, Rus- 
 sia's several hundred thousand troops would assist if necessary. 
 England financially was in no condition to oppose an aggres- 
 sive policy within a state in which she was little concerned. 
 Furthermore, there were military revolts in England at the 
 time, and the loyal troops could not be spared abroad. The only 
 efficient remonstrance would be by arms, and England was in 
 no condition to maintain such a stand. Her statesmen could 
 maintain such a principle, the principle of non-interference in 
 this case. The formulation of the principle, however, did not 
 necessarily mean that it would be maintained. 
 
 In addition to the lack of funds, and to the general opinion 
 that where England received no benefit, she should remain pas- 
 sive, the effects of the French Revolution upon the European 
 states, still clearly pictured in the English mind, tended to make 
 the government conservative. 
 
 Castlereagh shared the opinion of the Tories and of the 
 Whigs who had temporarily joined them, that there was danger 
 of revolution at home. He was not certain but that revolution 
 in any state threatened the status of other nations. Although 
 the government shared with the European powers this fear 
 of revolution, with England the question of economic inter- 
 est in cases of nation in revolution was first of all considered. 
 
 When Spain asked for the aid of the Alliance to restore to 
 her the revolting American colonies, England refused. "The 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 67 
 
 four allied powers and France had protested against the seizure 
 of Monte Video, but otherwise Spain had been left to herself. 
 Great Britain seemed to have more to gain than to lose by the 
 insurrection. The revolted colonies were open to her commerce 
 and by weakening Spain they had strengthened the maritime su- 
 premacy of Great Britain. Great Britain was willing to mediate 
 on condition that Spain would make reasonable concessions. ' ' ^^ 
 Spain was unwilling. 
 
 England had for centuries suffered under the Spanish trade 
 monopoly. If the colonies were reduced to Spanish authority, 
 England feared the reenforcement of the old colonial system. 
 Therefore, instead of upholding the principle of legitimacy, a 
 policy of the alliance, English diplomatists yielded to the in- 
 terests of their commercial classes. It was well known that 
 agents in the colonies had raised loans and engaged soldiers in 
 London, that regiments had left England to aid the insur- 
 gents, that ships with cargoes of military stores cleared from 
 Spanish American ports and that the mercantile interests favored 
 revolution.^^ 
 
 In the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Castlereagh showed a 
 comprehension of the English commercial interests in his state- 
 ment, ' ' This reference to intervention in the colonies at once re- 
 vives the whole colonial policy system, and even if it were 
 sufficient to satisfy our interested views, it would reduce the 
 colonies to that state of dependence upon the mother country to 
 which it is impossible to presuppose that any of them will in 
 the future submit. ' ' " The discussion in the Congresses of media- 
 tion between Spain and her colonies, England prevented. But 
 during these years British agents were attempting to negotiate 
 a favorable commercial treaty with Spain.^^ From 1820 until 
 the time of the independence of the colonies, the trade relations 
 between Spain and Great Britain played a conspicuous part in 
 the diplomatic relations. In a despatch of January 1820 to 
 Castlereagh, Sir Henry Wellesley states, 
 
 ''Your lordship will see by my despatches that the Duke of 
 San Fernando complains of the frequency of my representations 
 
 n Brodrick and Fotheringham, 1811-37, Political History of England, p. 190. 
 12 Cambridge, Modem History, X, pp. 213, 214. 
 
 14 Castlereagh, Correspondence, XII, p. 90. 
 
 15 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 641. 
 
68 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 upon commercial subjects. In other respects we are upon very 
 good terms. ' ' ^^ 
 
 Suspicious that an attempt would be made to reconquer the 
 colonies for Spain, after the invasion of Spain by France in 
 1822, Canning entered into negotiations with the United States 
 minister to London, Richard Rush, suggesting joint action against 
 the European Alliance extending its powers to the American 
 continent. The result was the Monroe Doctrine on the part of 
 the United States and the recognition of the independence of 
 the colonies a year later on the part of Great Britain. Canning 
 realizing the commercial advantage to Great Britain made the 
 remark, ' ' Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage 
 our matters sadly, she is English. ' ' ^^ 
 
 In urging the abolition of the slave trade, English represen- 
 tatives were actuated without doubt more by the popular cry 
 against slave traffic, and the demand for this social reform, than 
 by economic motives, but in the minds of the European states- 
 men, the proposals made at the various congresses for a gen- 
 eral abolition were viewed in the light of England's self in- 
 terest. 
 
 France being the country most concerned in the abolition ques- 
 tion, was the one England sought to win over to the cause. 
 Three modes were proposed by Canning: persuasion, coercion, 
 and interest. Of the means of coercion he mentioned the possi- 
 bility of having the Alliance declare it piracy, but was perfectly 
 confident France could not concede to British cruisers the right 
 of visit and capture of the French ships.^^ Nor was Canning 
 himself desirous that such a method should be put into prac- 
 tice, it was a suggestion rather than a desired result. 
 
 "As to letting the Holy Alliance declare it piracy, it would 
 be to give them an authority, which they might turn to worse 
 purposes. ' ' ^^ 
 
 A second mode of coercion, suggested by Canning, was that 
 of forbidding the importation of produce from the colonies of 
 states permitting the slave trade. He was also quite certain 
 that Europe would not accept. England, it is quite clear from 
 
 l* Stapleton, Canning, p. 421. 
 17 Wellington, Despatches, I, p. 325. 
 -i-SIhid, p. 334, (Canning to Wellington). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 69 
 
 the following note to Wilberforce, could not accede to such a 
 proposition : 
 
 "You are surprised that the Duke of Wellington has not 
 been instnicted to say that we will give up the trade with Brazil 
 (for that is, I am afraid, the amount of giving up the export, 
 of her sugar and cotton) if Austria, Russia, and Prussia will 
 prohibit her produce. In fair reasoning we have a right to be 
 surprised for we ought to be ready to make sacrifices when we 
 ask them and I am for making them; but who dares to promise 
 such a one as this, without full knowledge of the opinions of the 
 commercial part of the nation " ? 20 
 
 At Aix-la-Chapelle the plan of England met with counter 
 proposals to which England could not accede. The Russian plan, 
 for the establishment of an international board of control on 
 the West coast of Africa with an international fleet, commit 
 sioned to suppress the trade, met with no success, neither did 
 suggestions for the establishment of an international fleet in the 
 Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates. 
 
 ''The sea power of Russia was a dangerous, because an un- 
 known, quantity, the activities of the Czar's agents in Spain 
 and Italy had excited the suspicions of his ultimate aims, and 
 Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would have 
 involved the establishment of Russian warships on the Mediter- 
 ranean. ' ' ^^ 
 
 In the Congress of Verona, England again pressed the subject 
 of abolition. Here the failure to carry the measure was due. 
 Canning states, "partly from the nations seduously inculcated 
 by the powers having colonies that self-interest now mingles 
 with our humanity and that by our persevering efforts to bring 
 about the abolition in other countries, we are now seeking to 
 inflict upon the colonial possessions of our rivals a portion of 
 the evils which the partial abolition is alleged to have brought 
 upon our own. ' ' ^^ 
 
 England, instead of approaching the Congress upon this sub- 
 ject, had the alternative of negotiating separately with different 
 countries. This matter was, in fact, attempted in several cases, 
 but the practice of purchasing the recognition of this evil by the 
 
 20 Ibid., I, p. 475, (Canning to Wilberforce, Oct. 31, 1822). 
 
 21 Cambridge, Modern History, X. p. 20. 
 
 22 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 323. 
 
70 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 different countries entailed an expense upon the nation which 
 was openly criticised. In 1818 Great Britain agreed to pay 
 Spain 400,000 pounds, in consequence of Spain agreeing to 
 the abolition of the trade. At this date, the suffering of the 
 poor in England was intense, and the opinion was expressed in 
 Parliament that the 400,000 pounds might be more advantage- 
 ously disposed of in this country. It would furnish the means 
 of giving to 8000 individuals the sum of 50 pounds each.^^ 
 Seeking foreign channels for benevolent purposes was looked up- 
 on as false humanity. 
 
 Abolition through single treaties was therefore impractical, 
 and resort was had toward making it a general European ques- 
 tion. Owing to the pressure at home for the suppression of the 
 slave traffic, abolition was strongly advocated by England in 
 the congresses. But the commercial interests of England were 
 too much at variance with those of Prance to permit a final solu- 
 tion of the problem. 
 
 It was upon a situation of little importance itself, yet of 
 greatest concern to England that the British policy so diverged 
 from the European interests as to lead to the ultimate with- 
 drawal of England's representatives from the conferences of the 
 allied Powers. 
 
 With the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1820, Eng- 
 land could hope for a liberal commercial agreement. When, 
 therefore, at Verona, the Congress determined to intervene in 
 behalf of monarchy, England's interests and those of her allies 
 were in conflict. When neither side would yield the breach in 
 the Quadruple Alliance was completed. 
 
 When the Congress met, Metternich proposed a process verbal 
 specifying the cases in which the powers should intervene, but 
 the Duke flatly refused to subscribe. This was the end of the 
 Congress. The differences between the Alliance and Great 
 Britain were proclaimed to the world, and Canning wrote to 
 Frere soon after, ' ' The history of all I could tell in the words 
 or rather in the substitution of one word for another, for "alli- 
 ance ' ' read ' ' England ' ' and you have the clue to my policy. ' ' ^* 
 
 The French armies were marched into Spain and the absolute 
 monarchy was restored. England, though in the position of an 
 
 23 Annual Register, (1818), I, pp. 20-22. 
 
 24 Bagot, Canning, II, p. 120. 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 71 
 
 indifferent by-stander, kept close watch. Just as in the Austrian 
 intervention in Naples, the British warships appeared in the 
 Bay of Naples with secret orders, and so at this time, the British 
 fleet, always prepared, was stationed off the coast of Portugal 
 with the ostensible purpose of preserving Portugal from foreign 
 invasion and aggression. It was a country in which British in- 
 vestments were to be protected. 
 
 Of the important problems before the Congresses, there re- 
 mains the Greek situation. In the Greek revolution, Russia for 
 obvious reasons espoused the cause against Turkey. The Greeks 
 were unquestionably deserving of the sympathy and aid of 
 Europeans, which was denied them as a result of the action of 
 the Congresses. But British commerce in the Black Sea was 
 flourishing and commercial interests could permit of no inter- 
 vention which might weaken that trade, or make Russia domi- 
 nant in the Eastern waters. The apprehension of this danger 
 is expressed by Wellington in a note to Canning dated at Verona. 
 
 "I have explained to the Count (Nesselrode) that it was im- 
 possible for Great Britain to adopt or to attempt to enforce 
 upon the Porte the principle of making the Black Sea another 
 Baltic, or of the Bosphorus a Sound." ^^ The question united 
 Austria and Great Britain, Great Britain agreeing with Metter- 
 nich to let the revolution "bum itself out beyond the pale of 
 civilization. ' ' 
 
 Aside from the danger of Russian supremacy in the East, 
 there was another reason for England's reticence to succor the 
 Greek cause. 
 
 ' ' Should we be led by any false impulse of chivalrous benevo- 
 lence to participate in the struggle itself, we commit, and there- 
 by impair our authority; we abandon the position in which 
 we might hereafter do most good, and may bring the danger 
 of a foreign struggle home to our own shores, and to our own 
 institutions. ' ' ^® 
 
 As late then as 1822, liberal ideas were discountenanced in 
 England as forerunners of revolution. About five years later, 
 however, the British fleet again loomed up in the waters of a 
 country in revolt. English capital in Greece was in need of 
 protection. 
 
 25 Wellington, Correspondence, I, p. 523, (Wellington to Canning). 
 
 26 Stapleton, Oeorge Canning and his Times, p. 368. 
 
72 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 With the failure of England to agree with her allies at Verona, 
 England's representation in the councils of the Quadruple Alli- 
 ance was at an end. She had entered the Alliance and had 
 acceded to the government of Europe by congresses in the be- 
 lief that English interests would suffer without representatives 
 in the European councils to guard them. Emerging from the 
 war as the greatest European power, England had reason to 
 suppose she would dominate the Alliance as she had done the 
 Powers against Napoleon. After Aix-la-Chapelle, her influence 
 had passed, due largely to the new economic relations between 
 herself and the European states. Her armies were no longer 
 needed in Europe, her subsidies belonged to the war period. 
 After 1818 there was little need of English loans. No longer 
 did economic obligations necessitate a dependent attitude upon 
 Great Britain. With economic independence secured, the Powers 
 were at liberty to oppose British interests. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 SUMMARY 
 
 The Quadruple Alliance, though successful in maintaining 
 peace between the great European Powers, was never a strong 
 federation. It was essentially weak, and the power which it 
 wielded over all Europe was never recognized by the smaller 
 nations as legitimate. It was a dictatorship of the great Powers. 
 
 Within the Alliance itself, the wielders of this usurped power 
 failed to act in harmony through the congresses. And so from 
 without and within it was ever threatened with disruption. Dur- 
 ing the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle, the King of Sweden protest- 
 ed against the action of this league; later the German states 
 protested against the Carlbad Decrees, which they considered the 
 work of the Alliance, and again after Verona there was a re- 
 monstrance made by the King of Wiirtemberg. 
 
 From the time of the first congress to the breach at Verona, 
 i-t has been seen, the various Powers failed to agree or to act 
 together on a common basis. Austria was interested chiefly in 
 maintaining her supremacy in Italy and in supporting every- 
 where the old regime. France, up to the Congress of Verona 
 was chiefly concerned in reestablishing herself in the councils of 
 the Powers, and from that time was interested in carrying out a 
 national policy against Spain. Russia agreed with Austria that 
 liberal tendencies must be thwarted, and England, ostensibly the 
 champion of liberal movements and non-interference, opposed 
 or tacitly acquiesced, depending as her commercial interests were 
 involved. The Alliance from within, therefore, could only exist 
 as long as the varied interests did not conflict. Each of the 
 members found difficulty in supporting such an international 
 alliance, organized on broad principles capable of unlimited 
 expension. 
 
 With the defection of England at Verona, the congresses held 
 in accordance with the Alliance were discontinued, but the 
 
 73 
 
74 STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 Quadruple Alliance itself was not at that time dissolved. Though 
 its power in European politics was broken then, it existed in 
 theory until 1848. 
 
 After Verona, England's policy rapidly diverged from that 
 of the continent and she gradually developed her policy of iso- 
 lation or rather returned to it. Mettemich wrote that the 
 British government seemed to be devoting itself to a system 
 of complete isolation but that he did not believe such a po- 
 sition possible. Unquestionably, Canning's purpose after 
 Verona was to hold England aloof from the continent. ' ' Hence- 
 forward, England must be content to move steadily on in her 
 own orbit. ' ' ^ 
 
 Perhaps the chief purpose of the Alliance was the main- 
 tenance of peace in Europe, not only between the Powers but 
 within the individual states. In order to uphold the existing 
 order, the Alliance adopted a policy of repression and succeeded 
 in quelling liberal outbursts in Naples, Piedmont and Spain. In 
 other states it checked such movements. The right to interfere 
 was based upon the theory that if peace was to be maintained, 
 order must be upheld; consequently revolution whether local 
 or national must be thwarted as dangerous to the general peace. 
 England, the most liberal member of the Alliance, though dis- 
 approving of suppression in the name of the Powers, yet per- 
 mitted it, and through the period of the congresses held the 
 opinion that every European country was endangered by revo- 
 lutions in a neighboring state. 
 
 The primary purpose of the various uprisings of the period 
 was the desire for reform and liberty. This progress was sup- 
 pressed by the Alliance. But in spite of the power of the Alli- 
 ance and its apparent success in supporting the old regime, the 
 spirit of discontent smouldered for a few years and then burst 
 forth in the revolutions of 1820, 1830, and 1848. The Alliance 
 had succeeded in retarding for a time the social, political and 
 economical development of Europe, but failed to check the in- 
 evitable progress toward reform. 
 
 The Alliance cannot be condemned for its repressive mea- 
 sures when viewed in the light of a general peace. The results, 
 however, must be branded as a failure, for through reactionary 
 
 1 Wellington, Despatches, II, p. 207, (Mettemich to Wellington). 
 
ENGLAND AND THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 75 
 
 measures makiri'g reform impossible, it invited resistance, in the 
 form of revolution. 
 
 Considering the situation in a broader aspect, one should ask 
 himself whether the policy of the Quadruple Alliance was re- 
 actionary because dominated by the narrow conservatism of 
 Metternich, or whether after all in its policy it had not touched 
 upon a more fundamental principle, namely, that any inter- 
 national organization for the maintainence of peace either be- 
 tween states or within the individual states would not of neces- 
 Mty be reactionary. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 1. Despatches, Correspondence and Memorandum of the Field Marshal, 
 
 the Duke of Wellington, edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington. 
 8 Volumes. I, II, VI. 
 
 2. Supplementary Despatches of the Field Marshal, the Duke of Welling- 
 
 ton. 8 Volumes. X, XII. 
 . 3. Letters and Despatches of Viscount Castlereagh, edited by the Marquis 
 of Londonberry, 12 Volumes. IX-XII. 
 
 4. British Foreign and State Papers. VI, VII, VIII. 
 
 5. Hansard Debates. 
 
 Old Series— XXXL, XXXII. 
 New Series — V, VI. 
 
 6. Autobiography of Prince Metternich, edited by Prince Richard Met- 
 
 tenich. 5 Volumes. I-III. 
 
 7. Greville Memoirs. A Journal of the Reign of King George IV and 
 
 King WiUiam IV, and Queen Victoria, by the late Charles C. F. 
 GrevUle. 8 Volumes. I. 
 
 8. Augustus Granville Stapleton — George Canning and his Times. 
 
 9. Hertslet, Sir E., Map of Europe by Treaty, I, 
 
 10. Chateaubriand, Congres de Verone, I, II. 
 
 11, Quarterly Review, XXXVIII. 
 
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 1. Bagot, Josceline: George Canning and his Friends. 2 Volumes. 
 
 2. Maxwell, Sir Herbert: The Life of Wellington. 
 
 3. Cambridge Modern History, IX-X. 
 
 4. Phillips, W. Alison: Modern Europe 1815-1899. 
 
 5. Seignobos, C. A. : Political History of Europe since 1814. 
 
 6. Brodrick, G. C, and Fotheringham, F. K. : The Political History of 
 
 England 1801-1837. 
 
 7. Marriott, J. A. R. : England since Waterloo — in Oman, Political His- 
 
 tory. 
 
 8. Hazen, Charles Downer: Europe since 1815. 
 
 9. Martineau, Harriet: A History of the Thirty Years Peace. 1816- 
 
 1846. 4 Volumes. I. 
 
 10. Spencer Walpole: History of England from 1815, 6 Volimies, I. 
 
 11. Robinson, J. H. and Beard, C, A,: Modern Europe, Volume I, 
 
 12. Fyffe, C. C. : History of Modern Europe. 
 
 76 
 
6L0qi