Author . ^1f*0^ Title Imprint. 16 — 4737?-9 e^O / 56th Congress, I SENATE. j Docltvient M Session. \ \ No. 148. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. Jaxuary 30, 1899.— Read and laid on table. J.\NU.\RY 31, 1901. — Injunction of secrecy removed. In the Senate of the United States, February 5, 1901. Ordered, That there he printed for the use of the Senate three thousand copies of the instructions and all accompanying papers of the President to the commissioners who negotiated the treaty with Spain at Paris. Attest: Charles G. Bennett, Secretary. To the Senate of the United States: In answer to the resolution of the Senate of January 6, 1899, request- ing- the President, so far as in his judginent not inconsistent with the public interest, to connnunicate to the Senate ''all instructions given by him to the commissioners for negotiating- the pending treaty with Spain, and all correspondence between the P^xecutive or the Depart- ment of State with such commissioners, and all reports made by them to him or to the Department." I transmit herewith a report from the Secretarv of State, together with the papers called for by the said resolution, so far as it is, in my judgment, not inconsistent with the public interest to communicate them. The papers transmitted inchide "all instructions given by" me "to the commissioners for negotiating the pending treat}' with Spain." J William McKinlet. Executive Mansion, Washington^ Jan uary 30, 1899. To the President: The undersigned, Secretary of State, to whom vou referred a reso- lution adopted in the Senate^ of the United States on the 6th instant, reading as follows: Resolved, That the President of the United States, so far as in his judgment not inconsistent with the public interest, be requested to communicate to the Senate all \. instructions given by him to the commissioners for negotiating the pending treaty I with Spain, and all correspondence between the Executive or the Department of State with such commissioners, and all reports made by them to him or to the Department — has the honor to lay l)efore the President, with a view to their trans- mission to the Senate in answer to the foregoing resolution, should the President deem it expedient to so do, copies of the original instruc- tions given to the American peace commissioners before their depar- ture, together with copies of the reports and instructions exchanged by telegraph with the conmiissioners in the course of the negotiation. E7Z^ 2 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. exceptino- only certain matters of collateral import which, in the opin- ion of the undersigned, it would be inconsistent with the public interest to communicate, but which, however, in no wise affected the negotia- tion as between the United States and Spain, The undersigned believes that the telegraphic correspondence so sub- mitted contains all that is necessary to a full understanding of the peace negotiations, and therefore does not su])mit the more detailed reports received by mail after the cal)led suuunari(\s and inquiries had been received and acted upon, inasmuch as th(\v fully appear in all essential particulars in the protocols and accompanying papers already laid be- fore the Senate with the treaty of peac^ signed December 10, 1898. Respectfully submitted. John Hay. Departmi<:nt of State, Wa-sJihigtori^ J<(/ia<(i'y 30, 1899. List of Papers. 1. September It), 1898. Instructions of the President to tlie United States peace conmiissioners. lA. August 26. Instructions to the Evacuation Connnissioners of Puerto Rico. IB. August 26. Instructions to the Evacuation ('onunissioners of Cuba. IC. July 18. War Department, General Order, No. 101. 2. September 28. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 3. September 28. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 4. September 28. Mr. Day to the President. 5. September 28. The President to Mr. Day. 6. September 29. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 7. September 30. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 8. September 30. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 9. October 1. Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 10. (No. 1). Octobers. Mr. Day to I\ I r. Hay. (Telegram.) 11. (No. 2). October 4. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 12. October 4. President of France to the President. 13. October 5. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ] 14. October 6. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 15. (No. 3). October?. Mr. Day to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 16. (No. 4). October 7. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 17. October 7. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 17A. October 7. The President to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 17B. (No. 5). Mr. Day to the President. (Telegram.) 18. (No. 6). October 8. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 19. OctoI)er8. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 20. (No. 7). October 8. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 21. October 8. Mr. Hav to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 22. (No. 8). October 9. ' IMr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) (No. 9). October 12. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. October 13. Mr. Hay to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) October 14. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) [No. 10). October 17. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 'No. 11). October 17. Mr. Day to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) (No. 12). October 19. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 29. October 19. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) 30. (No. 13). October 22. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 31. (No. 14). October 22. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 32. October 23. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 33. October 24. Mr. Hay to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 34. (No. 15). October 25. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 35. October 25. Mr. Hav to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 36. (No. 16). October 25. The Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 37. October 26. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 38. (No. 17). October 27. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 39. (No. 17A). October 27. Mr Day to Mr. Adee for the President. 40. (No. 18). October 27. Mr. Da v to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 41. October 27. ]\Ir. Hay to Mr. Ihiy. 42. October 28. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 42A. October 28. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram; personal.) 43. (No. 19). October 29. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. 44. October 30. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 45. October 30. jNIr. Frve to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 46. November 1. Mr. Hay to Mr. Frye. (Telegram.) 47. November 1. Mr. Hay to :Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 48. November 3. Mr. Day to .Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 49. November 3. J\lr. Hay to i\Ir. Day. 50. November 4. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 51. November 5. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 52. (No. 20) . November 5. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 53. (No. 21). November 9. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 54. (No. 22). November 10. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 55. (No. 23). November 11. Peace Commissioners to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 56. November 13. :\Ir. Hay to "Sir. Day. (Telegram.) 57. Novend)er 15. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 58. (No. 24). November 15. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 59. November 15. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 60. November 16. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 61. (No. 25). November 18' Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 62. November 18. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 63. November 18. jNIr. HaV to Mr. Dav. (Telegram. ) 64. November 19. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 65. (No. 26). November 21. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 66.' November 22. Mr. Day to Mr. Adee for President. (Telegram.) 67. November 22. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. 68. (No. 26 A). November 23. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 69. (No. 27). November 25. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 70." (No. 28). November 25. Mr. Davis to Mr. Hav. 70A. (No. 29). November 25. Mr. Gray to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 71. November 25. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 71 A. November 27. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 72. November 29. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day." (Telegram.) 73. (No.31). Novend)er29. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 73A. November 29. The President to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 73B. November 29. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram. ) 74. (No. 32). November 29. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 75. (No. 33). November 30. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 76. (No. 35). December 1. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay (Telegram.) 77. December 1. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 78. December 1. Mr. Hav to INlr. Dav. (Telegram. ) 79. (No. 36) . December 3'. Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 80. December 3. Mr. Hav to Mr. Dav. (Telegram.) 81. (No. 37). Decembers! Mr. Dav to Mr. Hay. (Telegram.) 82. December 8. Mr. Hay to ]Mr. Day. (Telegram.) 83. December 10. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hav. (Telegram.) 84. December 10. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay." (Telegram.) 85. December 16. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSIONERS. By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of which is herewith inclosed, it was agreed that the United States and Spain would each appoint not more than live commissioners to treat of peace, and that the commissioners so appointed should meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty should be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two lountries. 4 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. For the purpose of carrjing into effect this stipulation I have appointed j^ou as commissioners on the part of the United States to meet and confer with commissioners on the part of Spain. As an essential preliminarv to the agreement to appoint commis- sioners to treat of peace this Government re(iuired of that of Spain the unqualified concession of the foUowino- precise demands: 1. The relinquishment of all claim of sovereigntv over and title to Cuba. 2. The cession to the Ignited States of Porto Kico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies. 3. The cession of an island in the Ladrones, to l)e selected by the United States. 4. The immediate evacuation l)v Spain of Cuba. Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies. 5. The occupation t)y the United States of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. These demands were conceded by Spain, and their concession was, as you will perceive, solemnly recorded in the protocol of the 12th of August. By article 1 of that instrument Spain agreed to '' relinquish all claim of sov'ereignty over and title to Cuba." By article 2 she agnM>d to "cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Si)anish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.'' By article 8 it was declared that the United States would "occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace Mhich shall determine the control. dis]M)sition, and government of the Pliilij)pines." P)V aiticle 4 i)rovisi()n was made for the immediate evacuation of Cul)a. Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, as follows: Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porte Ricn, aud other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in "the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protoi'ol, appoint commissioners, and the connnissioners'so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this proto- col, meet at Habana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of ('ul)a and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Govern- ment will, within ten clays after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other com- missioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this jirotocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Kico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Kico and other islands now under Spanish sover- eignty in the West Indies. The conmiissioners referred to in the foregoing article have been appointed, and they are now in session at Habana and San Juan, respectively. A copy of their instructions is herewith inclosed. By these instructions you will observe that the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other Spanish islands in th(^ West Indies is treated as a military operation, and will, when carried into effect, leave the evac- uated places in the military occupation of the United States. The pur- poses of the United States during such occupation are set forth in General Orders, No. 101, of the War Department, of Julv 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the President on capitidation of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cid)aand in the eastern part of the prov- PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. O ince of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States. A copy of this order is hereto annexed for your information. As the evacuation of Cuba and the other Spanish islands in the West Indies by the Spanish military forces devolves upon the United States the duty of taking possession of and holding and preserving all the immovable property therein previously belonging to the Government of Spain, the evacuation commissioners of the United States are instructed to arrange for the taking into possession and to take into possession for the United States all public buildings and grounds, forts, fortifica- tions, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed prop- erty previously belonging to Spain, and to arrange for the care and safe-keeping of such property under the authority and control of the United States. Small arms and accouterments, batteries and field artillery, supply and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedi- menta of the Spanish army in Cuba and other Spanish islands in the West Indies are to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable time; but the armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed batteries, being in the nature of immovable fixtures, are not to be allowed to be taken, but are, in connection with such forts, fortifications, and bat- teries, to be taken over into the possession of the United States. The instructions of the evacuation commissioners also contain appropriate clauses in regard to the custody and preservation by the United States of state papers, public records, and other papers and documents nec- essary or convenient for the government of the islands, as well as all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the title to property. It will be proper to confirm these transactions by appropriate clauses in the treaty of peace. Similar clauses will be inserted in respect to the islands ceded to the United States in the Ladrones. This Government has selected the island of Guam, and you are instructed to embody in the treaty of peace a proper stipulation of cession. A rumor has reached us from various quarters to the effect that the Spanish peace commissioners will be instructed to claim compensa- tion for the public property of the Spanish Government in Cuba as well as in territories agreed to be ceded to the United States. This rumor is not credited, but it is proper to make a few observations upon it. No such claim on the part of the Spanish Goverimient is to be entertained in respect to any territory which Spain either cedes to the United States, or as to which she relinquishes her sovereignty and title. The cession of territory or the relinquishment of sovereignty over and title to it is universally understood to carr}^ with it the pub- lic property of the government by which the cession or relinquish- ment is made. Any claim therefore on the part of Spain, such as that above suggested, would be inconsistent with the express agreements embodied in the protocol. In the correspondence leading up to the signature of that instru- ment you will observe that this Government waived for the time being the requirement of a pecuniary indemnity from Spain. This conces- sion was made in the hope that Spain would thereby be enabled prompth" to accept our terms. But if the Spanish commissioners should, contrarj" to our just expectations, put forward and insist upon 6 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. a claim for compensation for public property, .you are instructed to put forward as a counterclaim a demand for an indemnity for the cost of the war. By article 6 of the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the com- manders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was given by the Government of the United States inuiiediately after the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary orders having previously been prepared. But before notice could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States in the Philippines they captured and took possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs, which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol. In view of what has taken place it is necessar^^ now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. Before giving you specific instructions on this subject it is my desire to present cer- tain general considerations. It is my wish that throughout the negotiations intrusted to the com- mission the purpose and spii-lt with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. AVe had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert the struggle and in the final arbitrament of force this country was impelled solely by the inirpose of relieving grievous wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured. It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settle- ment as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world shoukl not under any illusion of the hour be dinuued by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened Republic. Our aim in the adjustment of peace should l>e directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territorv that the Spanish flag should remain on this PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 7 side of the sea. This lesson of events jind of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands l)elonoino- to Spain in this hemisphere. The Philippines stand upon a diHerent basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any orio-iiuil thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obliyations which we can not disi-(>o-ard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing- unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsi- bilities which we must meet and discharge as liecomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the b(>ginning the Ruler of Nations has plainlv written the high eoumiand and pledge of civilization. Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the connucrcial oppor- tunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking- only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding prin- ciples the present interests of our country and the proper measure ofits duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, and humane purpose which Avas invoked as our justification in accept- ing the war. In view of what has })een stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island ot Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the Tnited States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging- to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and connnerce, together with other i-ights of protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of anv territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States. We are informed that numerous persons are now held as prisoners by the Spanish Government for political acts performed in Cuba, Porto Rico, or other Spanish islands in the West Indies, as well as in the Philippines. You are instructed to demand the release of these prisoners so far as their acts have connection with matters involved in the settlement between the United States and Spain. It will be desirable to insert in any treaty of peace which you may conclude a stipulation for the revival of the provisions of our former treaties with Spain, so far as they may be applica))le to present conditions. I have directed Gen. Wesley Merritt, the late commander at Manila, to report to the Commission at Paris, where he will arrive October 2, 8 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. with such information as he may possess, and it is understood he will carr}^ with him, for the use of the Commission, the views of Admiral Dewey. To the views of these distinguished officers 1 invite the most careful consideration of the Commission. It is desired that your negotiations shall be conducted with all possible expedition in order that the treaty of peace, if you should succeed in making one, may be submitted to the Senate early in the ensuing ses- sion. Should you at any time in the course of your negotiations desire further instructions, you will ask for them without delay. William McKinley. Executive Mansion, Wasfungton^ Septeniher 16, 1898. August 27. 189S. Rear- Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, U. S. N. , Commissioner on the Part of the United States to Bupei'intend the Evacuation of Porto Pico. Sir: I inclose herewith, for your information, copies of two letters of instruction issued bj^ the President, on the 26th instant, to the com- missioners on the part of the United States to superintend the evacua- tion of Porto Rico. Respectfully, 3-ours, J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. [Enclosure.] To Major-General Brooke, Rear-Admiral Schley, Brigadier-General Gordon, Commissioners on the Part of the United States to Supenntend the Evacuation of Porto Rico: By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of which is hereto annexed, the Governments of the United States and Spain agreed upon and defined the conditions on which they would enter upon negotiations for the establishment of peace between the two countries. Among the conditions thus agreed upon is the following: "Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." In order to give this stipulation effect it is agreed by Article IV of the protocol that Spain will, among other things, "immediately evacuate * * * Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies;" and to this end each Government engages within ten days after the signing of the protocol, to appoint commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of the pro- tocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, "for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." The President has appointed you commissioners on the part of the United States to meet commissioners on the part of Spain at San Juan, for the purpose of arrang- ing and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, excluding Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands, for the evacuation of which other commissioners have been appointed. You are therefore directed to proceed to San Juan at as early a day as practicable, in order that you may meet the commissioners on the part of Spain at the place and within the time designated. Your functions relate solely to "the evacuation" of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, with the exception above stated. The evacuation referred to is a military operation, and will, when carried into effect, leave the evacuated places in the military occupation, of the United States. Any questions not properly connected with this operation, such as may be involved in the PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. B' formal relinquiyhnient of sovereignty and title or cession of territory by Spain, are not within your powers, but must remain to be dealt with l)y the commissioners who are to meet at Paris under Article V of the protocol, for the jjurpose of negotiating and concluding a treaty of peace. The purposes and policy of this Government during the period of nulitary occupa- tion will not form a subject of negotiation between yourselves and the Spanish com- missioners, but they are set forth in General Order No. 101 of the War Department of July 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the President on the capitulation of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern })art of the province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States. A copy of this order is hereto annexed for your information and guidance. Your duties embiace both the arranging and the carrying out of the details of the evacuation. It will therefore be your duty to sui)ervise the execution of the details of the evacuation as well as to agree ujion them. By the terms of the protocol I'ortcj Rico is to l)e ceded by Spain to the United States. As such cession of the island will necessarily carry with it all the immovable property therein heretofore belonging to the Government of Spain, you will there- fore arrange for and take into possession for the United States all public buildings and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed property heretofore belonging to Spain, and will arrange for the care and safe- keeping of the same as the property of the United States. The small arms and accouterments, l)atteries of field artillery, supi)ly and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Porto Rico you will permit to be removed, if desired, by the representatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable time. The armament of forts, fortifica- tions, and fixed batteries, being in the nature of immovable fixtures, will not be per- mitted to be taken, but will, in connection with said forts, fortifications, and batteries, be taken over by you into the possession of the United States. It will be your duty to see that all state papers, public records, and other papers and documeiits necessary or convenient for the government of the island, and records pertaining specially to the history of the island, be taken into your custody and pre- served as the pro]>erty of the United States. You will also provide that all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient fcjr securing to individuals the titles to property shall also be saved and preserved. In taking over public property into the possession of the United States, you will have brief descrijjtions and full inventories made, and transmit the same to the Secre- tary of War, duly verified. You are authorized to allow such persons as may so desire, to depart from the islands in a peaceful and regular manner with their personal possessions. It will be your duty to confer with the general commanding the military forces in Porto Rico, from time to time, with reference to the details of the evacuation, and to arrange through the commancling general that the United States shall be pre{)ared to take possession of each city, town, place, or port, with a suitable garrison as fast as the Spanish forces evacuate the same. In like manner you will arrange, in connection with the connnanding-general, to- take charge of the custom-houses and other public buildings as the same are severally delivered over to the representatives of the United States. If in the course of your proceedings you desire further instructions on any particu- lar questions that may arise, you will submit without delay your request for such instructions. It is desired that your duties as conunissioners shall be performed with all possible expedition. Wi\r. McKixLEY. Executive Mansion, August 26, 1S9S. By the President : [great seal of united states.] J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary of State. [Confidential.] To Major-General Brooke, Rear- Admiral Schley, Brigadier-General Gordon, Cummissionerx on the part of the United States to superintend the evacuation of Porto Rico: In addition to the matters contained in your formal instructions herewith sub- mitted, your attention is hereby called to certain other matters relating not so much to the immediate evacuation by Spain of the islands as to the future control and gov- 10 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. ernment of the same by the United States, to which it is desired that you will pay such attention as opportunity may afford. You will bear in mind that Porto Rico and the other islands mentioned, except Cuba, are to become territory of the United States. Therefore all things done by you in the discharge of your commission should be done with a view to the future welfare of the islands and tlie improvement of the state and condition of their peo])le as dependencies of the United States. So far as it may come within the scope of your duties endeavor to arrange those matters within your jurisdiction so as to facilitate the speedy reestablishment of trade, commerce, business, and other peaceful pursuits of the inhabitants. You will need to become informed as to the police arrangements of each city and town and to be prepared to advise and assist the general in command of the island in the adoption and application of means to continue good order and the administra- tion of the local laws and ordinances after the departure of the Spanish forces. Where it can be done prudently, confer with the leading citizens of Porto Rico in an unofficial manner and endeavor to ascertain their sentiments of loyalty to the United States and their views as to such measures as they may deem necessary or important for the future welfare and good government of the island. In carrying out the details of the evacuation you will, so far as applicable and as will not conflict with your personal instructions, observe the principles contained in the instruction for government of armies of the United States in the field (G. O., 100). William McKinley. .Executive Mansion, Washington, Anguat 26, 1S98. By the President: [great seal of united states.] J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary of State. General Orders, ) War Department, >- Adjutant-General's Office, No. 101. ) W((s/i;,i(/fo7i, Jitly IS, 1898. The following, received from the President of the United States, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned: Executive Mansion, Washington, Juhj 13, 1898. To the Secretary of War. Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation. The first effect of the military occupation-of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of (Xiba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its supi^ort and protection. Our occu- pation should be as free from severity as possible. Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent, and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordi- nary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 11 j)ractice is, so I'iir as possible, to be adhered to on tlie i)resent occasion. Tlie judjies and the other officials connected with the administration of jnstice may, if they accept the snpreniacy of the United States, continues to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the snjx'rvision of the American com- mander in chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be preserved. The freedom of the peoi)le to i)ursue their accustomed occupations will beal)ridgelies and other movable })roperty of such government, may be seized by the military occu- pant and converte(l to his own use. The real property of the state he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revemies thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All pul)lic means of transporta- tion, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways and boats belonging to the state may l)e appropriated to his use, but unless in case of military necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and l^uildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all schoolhouses, are, so far as possible, to be i>rotectet.sfonrr on the Part of the Ignited States to Siqyerlntend the Evacuation of Cuba. Sir: 1 inclose herewith for j'our information copies of two letters of instruction issued bv the President on the 26th instant to the commis- 12 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. sioners on the part of the United States to superintend the evacuation of Cuba. Respectfully 3"ours, J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. [Enclosure.] To Major-General Wade, Rear-Admiral Sampson, Major-General Butler, Commissioners on the Part of the United States to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba: By a protocol signed at Washington August 12, 1898, a copy of which is hereto annexed, the Governments of the United States and Spain agreed upon and defined the conditions on which they would enter upon negotiations for the establishment of peace between the two countries. Among the conditions agreed upon is the following: "Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Guba." In order to give effect to this and other stipulations of the protocol, it is agreed by Article IV that Spain will, among other things, immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government agrees, within ten days after the signing of the protocol, to appoint commissioners, who shall, within thirty Vlays after the signing of the protocol, meet at Habana, "for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands," while other commis- sioners are to meet at San Juan, Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the "evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies." The President has appointed you commissioners on the part of the United States to meet commissioners on the part of Spain at Habana, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands. You are therefore directed to proceed to Habana at as early a day as practicable, in orrler that you may meet the commissioners on the part of Spain at the place and within the time designated. The evacuation referred to is a military operation and will when carried into effect leave the evacuated places in the military occupation of the United States. The purposes and policy of this Government during the period of military occupa- tion will not form the subject of negotiations between yourselves and the Spanish commissioners; but they are set forth in General Orders No. 101 of the War Depart- ment of July 18, 1898, which was issued by direction of the President on the capit- ulation of the Spanish forces at Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the Province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States. A copy of this order is hereto annexed for your information and guidance. Your duties embrace both the arranging and carrying out of the details of the evacuation. It will therefore be your duty to supervise the execution of the details of the evacuation as well as to agree upon them. The evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands by the Spanish military forces will devolve upon the United States the duty of taking possession, holding, and preserving all the immovable property therein heretofore belonging to the Gov- ernment of Spain. You will therefore arrange for and take into possession for the United States all ])ublic buildings and grounds, forts, fortifications, arsenals, depots, docks, wharves, piers, and other fixed property heretofore belonging to Spain, and will arrange for the care and safe-keeping of the same under the authority and con- trol of the United States. The small arms and accouterments, batteries of field artillery, supply and baggage wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta of the Spanish army in Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands you will permit to be removed, if desired, by the represen- tatives of Spain, provided such removal shall be effected within a reasonable time. The armament of forts, fortifications, and fixed liatteries, loeing in the nature of immovable fixtures, will not be permitted to be taken, but will, in connection with said forts, fortifications, and batteries, be taken over by you into the possession of the United States. It will be your duty to see that all state papers, public records, and other papers and documents necessary or convenient for the goverftment of the islands and records pertaining specially to their history be taken into your custody and preserved PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 13 for the future use of such goverunient as nia\' he estahhshed thereiu. You will also provide that all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to property shall also l^e saved and preserved. In taking over public property into the possession of the United States you will have brief descriptions and full inventories made and transmit the same to the Sec- retary of War, duly verified. You are authorized to allow such persons as may (so) desire to depart from the islands in a ix'aceful and regular manner with their personal possessions. It will be your duty to confer with the general commanding the military forces in Cuba and the afr}nher 30, 1S98. Minister for foreign atiair.s oav(> joint entertainment yesterday to the two commissions; passed oft' ver}' ag-reeably. Meet for business to-morrow. Commissioners will be presented to the President of France on Tuesday. Can 3'ou send word of gnu^ting to him to be delivered at our presentation^ Day. The Preslderd to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Washington, Septeuiher 30, 1S98. Answering your telegram of to-day, I request you to deliver to President of the Republic, on the occasion of your presentation, the following message in my name: His Excellency Felix Faure, President of the French Republic, Paris: On this occasion, when the commissioners of the United States and Spain are about to assemble in the capital of France to negotiate peace, and when the representatives of this Government are receiving the hospitality and good will of the Republic, I beg to tender to you a most friendly personal greeting and the assurances of my grateful appreciation of your kind courtesies to the American commissioners. William McKinley, President of the United States. M/\ Dinj to the President. [Telegram.] Paris, Oetoher i, IHDR. At our iirst meeting to-day the Spanish Commissioners by instruc- tion of their Government ])resented as })reliminarv to any discussion of a treaty a written communication basing on Aiiich^ VI of the pro- tocol a demand that the American commission join them in declaring that the status quo in the Philppine Islands existing at the time of the signing of the protocol must be immediately restored by the con- tracting party that may have altered it or have consented or failed to prevent its alteration to the prejudice of the other. Spanish commu- nication represents that status quo has been altered and continues to be altered to prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it descrit)es as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops, and demands that commissioners jointly declare that American authorities in Phili})})ine Islands nmst at once proceed completely to restore status quo in terri- tories they occupy and refrain from preventing restoration thereof by Spain in territory not occupied by United States. Spanish commis- sioners ask for an answer on Monday next. We propose to reply that these demands having been presented to the Government of the United States were answered by notes of the Department of State to French embassy of September 5 and 16, and that any further demands as to 16 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. military operations in the Philippine Islands must be addressed to Government at Washington and consequently that we can not joiujin the proposed declarations. We await instructions. Day. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] To Secretary of State: Our answer submitted to Spanish commissioners declining to join in declarations as to restoration status quo in Philippine Islands on grounds stated in our telegram October 1st well received by them. We then submitted articles of the treaty covering Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands in West Indies and Guam, as provided in protocol. They asked until Friday to consider them. Adjourned to Friday afternoon. Hear Merritt to-morrow. Day. Mr. Day to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] No. 2. J Paris, Octoher J^, 1898— m. 51 j)- m. The opinions of Admiral Dewe3% in the possession of the Commis- sion, seem to favor retention of Luzon alone, but appear to have been given in answer to question as to which island in Philippine Islands the United States should retain. If this assumption is correct, will you, if it is deemed advisa])le, as certain by telegraph through proper channel, and telegraph us whether Admiral has formed an opinion, and if so what (it) is on the question whether it would be better for United States to retain Luzon, and perhaps one or two small adjacent islands, or the whole group. Day. The President of France to the President. [Telegram.] Paris, Octoher ^, 1898. I have had great pleasure in receiving the American Plenipoten- tiaries of the Spanish-American Peace Commission. During the audi- ence Mr. Day read me the telegram which yow had the kindness to send me. I am much touched at the sentiment which Your Excellency has had the goodness to express in respect to me, and I thank you verj" much. I hope that the American Commissioners will have a pleasant memory of their sta}' in Paris, and I will do my best to make it agreeable. I sincerely trust that the peaceful work of the commission will come to a happy conclusion. Felix Faure. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 17 .Vr. Ildij to Mr. Ddij. [Telegram. J Department op State, Wdx/i/iK/foti. October 5, 1898. (Sent 12.45 p. iii.) The President on the i;^)th Augu.st I'cqiiested Dewey's opinion on relative desirableness of the several islands, to which he made l)rief reply ))y cable which you have seen. Later the President asked him to communicate to Merritt his views on general question of Philip- pines. His report in your hands is in response to })oth questions. Hay. Mr. Hay to Jlr. Day. [Telegram.] Department of State, Wa^h!))r/to)). Ortoh-r 6, J89S. (Sent 4 p. m.) The following telegram has been received here from the chairman of the American commissioners in (\iV)a: Havana, October 5, J898. Joint session of commissions de-veloped irreconcilable differences, Spanish com- mission under instructions from their Government holding, first, that Spanish sov- ereignty will remain paramount in Cuba until Spain, in treaty about being negoti- ated in Paris, has relinquisheil the same and treaty has been concluded, ratified, and proclaimed. Second. When Spain has relinquished sovereignty in the manner just stated, then so much of fourth article as provides for immediate evacuation becomes effective; that this evacuation is solely a military operation. Third. That dates originally given hy them under which evacuation is to be com- l)leted, April 1, next year, are l)y them adhered to. Fourth. That rule of capture does not apply to territory now occupied ]>y Spanish troops; that they are therefore permitted to take with them not only alf movable property, but also all guns and their mountings from fortifications, and fixed bat- teries as well as machinery from navy-yards and arsenals — in fact, everything of material of war which can l)e moved. We ha\'e dissented from all of these proposi- tions, holding, first, that under terms of protocol relinquishment of sovereignty is a condition prei-edent to negotiations for peace at Paris. Second. That, under protocol, article fourth became effective on its date, August 12; that the term ''to evacuate" is not restricted in its nieaning as used in the protocol to a military evacuation, and that to immediately evacuate means to at once abandon possession of by withdrawing from the country not only the military but also the (iovernment authority of Sj^ain. Third. That we insist upon Deceml)er 1, next, as date for concluding evacuation by Spanish troops. Fourth. That under Spanish law all movable things constructed or destined for the permanent use or service of immoval)le property become innnovable property; that fortifications and fixed batteries are innnovable property; that, therefore, guns and their mountings and other things intended for pennanent use or service of such fortifications are necessarily fixtures, and hence inmiovaljle property, and likewise machinery and other like fixtures in navy-yard or arsenal. Spanish conunission all made point that surrender of sovereignty at various points at various times would cause confusion in matter of tariff and in collecting internal (?) and other duties. We replied we had considered that subject and were prepared to assume responsi- bility for proper collections when our troops occupy island. Spanish commission has appealed to Madrid for instructions upon points stated. We submit foregoing differences for your actinn and further instructions. Spanish S. Doc. 148 2 18 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. commission have heretofore assured us that within period b\' them stated they will proceed as rapiiUy wdth the eiidjarkation of their troops as circumstances and facili- ties will permit, and they stated to-day that up to this time they are promised 27 ships, most of them on the way. Wadk, ( 'li(iiriii(iii. To this the President made the followiiio- reply: Wade, Hahaiia: Your messafie of ()ctol)er ."i givinjr the differences between the S])anish commis- sioners and yourselves is received. Their claims are wholly inadmissible, and yours are in strict accordance with the ]irotocol and the instructions hi'retofore jriven, and must be adhered to. Wii i.iA.M M(Ki.\j,i-:v. Hay. Mr. Ihnj in Mr. l/s statements from (leiieral (rreeiie. Suro'eoii Bourns, Major Boll. Admiral Dewcv. Colonel Jewett, personal opin- ions of Belgian Consul Andre at Manila, and correspondence of our military officers with Aoiiinaldo. Needless to sunnnarize the state- ment of Greene, who is in Washinoton. Bourns several years in the Philippine Islands, and opinion nuich relied on by Merritt. Thinks if a few ambitious insurtj-ent chieftains coidd be disp(>;ed of. masses of nati\es could l>e manaoed by the Ignited States. Considers natives incapable of self-oovernment because of lack of o-ood exam})les, lack of union in Luzon and throuohout archipelaoo. und existence of race, tribal, and religious tliflerences. Natives united aoainst Spain. Strong feeling against monastic orders, but notagaiiist church itself. Natives in Luzon are Catholics and well disposed t-konsi-. No relioious tolerance in the islands. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of priests in Luzon. The United States raig-ht have conflicts with the church, but not with the people. Answering- questions of Senator Davis, Merritt said sevei'al million dollars fell into American hands on capitulation of Manila. Spanish authorities extorted -i^2,U0O,U0O from ])ank in March and never repaid it. Probably spent this money or carried it away before the capitula- tion. Friars are mostly imported Spaniards. Native priests are popu- lar, and pro])a])ly in sympathy with insuro-ents. Filipinos treated prisoners well, but did not feed them well: this was unnecessary. The natixes he has seen in Manila, capal)le of assisting- the United States in governing-, could be num})ered on his lingers, but the munber mig-ht increase. So far they had had no training. The islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao dependent more or less strategically and commercially on Luzon. This (is) his under- standing, but he did not give much attention to the subject and his opinion not \aluable. ]Manila the distributing center. Had not given consideration to the place at which S])ain would set up her power if we took Luzon. Spain might go\-ern othei- islands if she did not con- tinue abuses, (ieneral Merritt thinks that if L'nited States attempted to take possession of Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his inmiediate followers would resist it, but his forces are divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If the islands were divided, rilibustering- expeditions might go from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to (juestions of Senator Frye, Merritt said insurg-ents would nuirder Spaniards and pri(\sts in Luzon and destroy their prop- erty if the United States withdrew. United States undei- moral obli- gation to stay there. He did not know whether the effect of setting- up a govei'nment by the United States in Luzon would be to produce revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their g-overn- uient. Some of the revolutionary leaders in Luzon might try to stir up rebellion in the other islands, but it would be difficult for them to tit out expeditions without our knowledge. There would be danger between the United States and Spain, as there is between Germany and France over Alsace-Lorraine — Spain would want to recover what she had lost. Would not say that the United States should taki; all or none. Thought United States could not abandon Luzon. It would simplify things if United States took whole group, but whether it is not a larger undertaking- than we choose to have on our hands is a (|uestion in his mind, and if there was a way of compromising it by holding on to Luzon and such other contig-uous islands as we desire, thinks it would be wise to do it. Would have no confidence in Spanish guarantees. Answering- questions of Mr. Gray. Merritt said consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph made it doubtful whether United States Avould be morally justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war, as if we had attacked Barcelona, but pres- ent conditions in Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents not in worse condition by our coming, Spaniards hardly aide to defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 21 trenches, they might maintain themselves ^vith the help of a navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a r(\spon- sibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be sentimental. He thought it would l)e an advantage if the United States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He) thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap lal)or in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a day. according to skill. United States might hold Luzon alone, but it would rec|uire larger force to protect Luzon if other powers held other islands, though it would require a larg-er force to protect all the islands than to protect Luzon. Thought we could manage the religious question, but it would ])e unwise to let Protestant missionaries go there except as educatoi's, and that not inuuediately. Answering questions of Mr. Reid. Merritt said he considered cap- ture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was over- estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his principal fol- lowers, if allowed to do so. Spanish guaranties worthless unless enforced by bayonet. To take Luzon alone would expose us to Spain's efforts to recover what she had lost. If disorders broke out in other islands either through Spanish misgovernment or through attempt to sell to other countries, the effect upon our possessions in Luzon would l^e disasti'ous. Prosperity of Manila has arisen partly from its being the capital and entrepot of the group. If we took Luzon alone and powerful European countries got other islands the trade would be deflected from Manila. A strong power holding Cebu or Iloilo wT)uld develop it at expense of Manila. Manila would become less valuable, but even in this case he thinks revenues would be sufficient to pay all expense of administration, including army and navy. Revenue of whole group would be more than adequate for government. Native forces might be used for military purposes if recruited about a nucleus of a regiment or two of our own troops. Natives glad to serve in army and could undoubtedly l)e depended on. A military government, fol- lowing the English examples of utilizing natives as far as possible, would be best for the present. Answering Judge Day. Merritt said he had no knowledge of how natives outside Luzon would act toward United States. Thinks Luzon would be self-sustaining, except in case of foreign interference, but even then would be self-supporting. Answering Senator Gray. Merritt said he thought the natural advantages would cause commerce to fiow through its accustomed channels. It would be better for the other islands and Luzon to be in the possession of a highly civilized power than to remain in their present condition. The capitulation of ^Manila on file in the War Department was made a part of General Merritt's statement. Thursdav, 10 a. m. Day. 22 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. J//'. Day to Ml'. Ihiy. [Telegram.] No- ^-J I'ARis. October 7, 1898. (Received 1.05 p. m.) Telegram coiieernino- difficulties of commissioners at Habana received. Our coiDinissioners seem to have made mistake in discussing or answer- ing anv question as to Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty over and title to CJuba. Their duties relate solelv to that practical niilitary operation of immediate evacuation. It seems to us they should have said this, instead of accepting an issue as to the time Vhen Spanish sovereignty will be relinquished. Not of vital importance when Spain formally relinquishes her sovereignty, or whether she ever formally relinquishes it, if we are in possession. This was specitic purpose o"f article 4 of protocol. We meet Spanish commissioners this afternoon and shall go forward with articles as to ('u})a, Porto Kico, and Guam without mentioning (|uestions fx'fore commissioners at Habana. Day. J//', lliiii io Mr. Ddij. [Telegram.] Depaktment of State. AVii^^JiiiKltoiu Oitohr 7, 1898. Your No. 4 received and is satisfactory to the President. It was not to have you open the question which you have properly regarded as closed, but to have you assist if possible in the carrvingout of the terms settled by the protocol, to wit: The immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands of the West Indies. The evacuation commissioners have not so far as we are advised discussed the relin((uishment of title and sovereigntv in Cuba and Porto Rico on part of Spain; that was settled by the protocol. Thev have discussed only the details of evacuation. Your proposal to go forward without mentioning questions before commissioners at Habana is approved bv the President. Hay. Tlw Pr,s!iting central islands — Panay, Negros, Cebu. Bojol. Leyte. Samar. and Mas))ate — more uncouth, less hospitable, and more averse to association with outsiders. Peculiar class in Panay of Chinese half-castes, who are traders and middlemen. Negros has few persons of importance: not favorite place of residence, but richest island for production of sugar: has no harbor. Iloilo on Panaj' being its entrepot. The island of Palawan almost worthless. The inhabitants of Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao are Mussulmans: have no distinctive name: have successfully resisted repeated efi'ortsof Spain to sul)due them: not hostile to other foreigners. Spaniards PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 25 hold in the island of Sulu, only town of Sulu. which is often raided, and in Mindanao only several posts on the coast. No oiw con- trols interior. Manila has 400. <)(>(• inhabitants, inchidino- C.ojmk) Chinese, (i.OOO Spaniards. 250 Eno-lish, 250 to 800 (Jernians, 8oo P>ritish Indians, a sprinkiino- of other foreig-nors, 50,000 Spanish half-castes, and rest native Tag'alos. Luzon has about 1,250,000 inhabitants. Whole group has aV)out 5,000,000 natives, who have been subjected b}^ Spaniards and are Catholics; about 1.000.000 other natives. There are four orders of monks — Austins or Augustinos, Dominicans, Kecoletos, Franciscan. The Jesuits, whose work is exclusively educa- tional, are moral and populai". The head of church is arch]>ishop, but each ordcM' has a head called the pi'ovincial, who is practically independent. The secular clergy, who are natives, claim orders not entitled to hold the incumbencies through which they control land. It seems orders originally took lX)ssession, which was afterwards confirmed by royal decrees, but have no title deeds. There is a system of land registration in islands, very recent and little used. You present proofs and eventually get certificate of title from chief of the treasury. Monks understood not to have attempted registration. They rent land, usually for three years, then raise rent so as to capitalize tenant's labor. This caused opposition and a demand for production of title deeds. Monks hold about 3 per cent cultivated lands in Luzon. Perhaps not more than six estates in group held by foreigners. Three thousand acres large estate. Friars mostly lead loose lives, get up socities called Cofradia of women, whom they make servants and have at beck and call. This is notorious and not concealed b}^ monks; examples given. Priests can not appear in court, but words received as truth. Civil and military government merely servant of orders, who dictate appointment and deposition governors and control them even in matters of life and death. Had Ceneral Blanco removed because not blood- thirsty. Climate Philippine Islands good. No prevalent fevers as in Cuba. Light fevers, but no malaria. Best and most advanced island is Luzon. Most insurrections there because people most advanced. Insurrections caused by oppressions of monks, who hare people sent from place to place for personal causes. Cienerally have them ))an- ished by governor-general to Mindanao, fludicial administration Philippine Islands wholly untrustworthy. Judges appointed from Spain. Persecution and corruption I'ife. Important cause of native discontent is exaction [of] compulsory labor fifteen days each year. Labor commutable in money. False returns, number of laborers, and corresponding- exactions of mone}'. Another cause is civil guard. Spanish officers, native men. System good, but abused. Men steal and extort from natives. Officers com- pel natives |to] furnish supplies and persecute if refused. Another cause is poll tax for cedula [personal civil certificate], which every individual over eighteen years must pay for and carry. Coal in Cebu merely lignite, requires mixing. Coal in Luzon l)etter quality, but not safe to use alone. Natives unfit for self-govenunent. Ideas too undeveloped. Would submit to just civilized government. Separation Luzon from rest group would now create scarcity labor outside Manila, but natives of other islands startled liy freedom of Luzon would want (to) come there and Luzon would be cultivated and 26 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. make pro.sperous colony. Half of island not now cultivatetl and mostly virgin soil. Sugar shipped to Hongkong and Shanghai. Hemp chiefly to America. Luzon has best soil for tobacco, cofl'ee, and all island products except cane sugar. If Spaniards retain other islands it should be on the following con- ditions: Expulsion and exclusion of monastic orders, permission to natives to go and couie freely, regulation of commerce by treaty, free trade between islands, and abolition of export duties. Problem of g'overnment not complicated by taking group, but special privileges necessary for the people Mindanao. Philippine Islands natives not troubled about religion. Native priests would not opposi^ the liiited States or resent coming of Protestant missionaries. (lovermnent pay them salaries probably averaging live hundred Mexican dollars yearly. Loss of this would not make trouble; mosth' have means (of) their own. In Philippine Islands budget 1896, church got nearly ^7,600.000 in gold. Pensions and allowances to persons outside Manila, such as to descendants of Columbus. Maintenance consu- lates far P^ast consumed nearly HOO.OOO. Highways and pul)lic works nothing. Priests exact ai)Out l.OOO, (»(»<» yearly for marriages, sale indulgences, etc, and indirectly a tax of about 24: cents on everyone in parish. The (lovernment levies taxes from $5 to '^'250 on all busi- ness, runs lottery, licenses cock fighting, imposes stamp tax. C'orrupt exaction in the settlement of estate. Cock lighting should be tol- erated. Native life dull, amusement necessary. Spanish promises of reform W(mld not be fulfilled. Would be interpreted broadly. Broke agreement with Aguinaldo. If monks left, natives would claim land; orders would claim it collectively as corporation. Harljor in north of Luzon, called Apurri, 32)3 miles from Hongkong, could be made very good. Subig Bay. commercially objectionable l)ecause land about it is hilly and rises abruptly from sea, l)ut this is an advantage for national defense. Minuoro Island thinly populated; its development always opposed by Spaniards. Fine hard wood there. To take Luzon and leave other islands to Spain unconditionally would tend to produce revolutions. To take Luzon, require free ingress and egress, create interisland free trade, and forbid Spain to alienate other islands, would be almost same as taking the whole and confer favor on Europe. To take all wouki square itself. Expenses would be greater, but income also. Enough soldiers to protect group could be recruited in islands. Exclusive of ^Mindanao, thinks alienation of other islands by Spain should be prevented to keep out Germany, the great trade rival of Great Britain to-day and of United States in next gen<>ration. Sundav, t) afternoon. Day. J/r. Day to Mr. Ihiy. [Telegram.] No. i>.] Paris, (hUibcr 12. 1898. Joint commission met 3^esterday. We presented paper rejecting Spanish articles as to Cuba and Porto Rico. Spanish commissioners then tiled under the rules a memorandum giving reasons in support of their position on Cuban debt and now insist upon relinquishment and PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 27 transfer of .sovereignty to United States wliieh is to aceept it without any express obligation to transfer it to the Cuban people. On Cul)an debt we shall insist upon our original position. A niajoritv favor ad- herence to words of Article I of protocol as to relincjuishment of sov- ereignty over Cuba. Senator Cxray in favor of accepting sovereignty unconditionally in view of our already expressed declaration of trust in regard to same, and that we may thereby avoid future compli- cations with Cubans, claiming sovereignty while we are in process of pacifying island and restoring order in accordance with our own ideas. We desire instructions on this point. We shall, unless other- wise instructed, insist upon disposition of matters in first and second articles of the protocol before taking up Article 111. We meet again on Fridav. Wednesdav. Day. J//'. Ray to Mr. Ihiy. [Telegrain.] Depart:mext of State. Washington, Odoh^r 13, 189S. The President sees no reason for departing from instructions already given, but many reasons for adhering strictly to terms of protocol con- cerning Cuba. We must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolu tion of Congress. The commission will use its own best judgment as to pressing to definite conclusions. Thursdav. 3 afternoon. Hav. J//'. IL/y to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Department of State. Washington, Octoher U. 1898. The Secretary of the Navy has just received the following telegram from Admiral Dewey, which is communicated for your mformation: It is important that the dii^popition of the PhiUppme Islands should be dei-ided as soon as possilile, and a strong government established. Spanish authority ha.« been completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of JManila. Strongly probal)le that island.* to the south will fall into same state soon. Distressing reports have been received of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authoi-ities in other parts of tiiese islands. The natives ajjpear nnalile to govern. Dewey. Hay. 2L Day to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] No. lO.j Paris. Oetohcr i;\ 1898. Joint conference this afternoon. Spanish commissioners stated that (they) were ready to withdraw articles previously presented b}' them on Cuba and Porto Rico and substitute for them others more nearly in conformity with language of the protocol. The American conmiis- 28 PAPERS KELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. sioners, availing themselves of this opportunity, immediately presented a paper previously prepared by them, in which they stated that, while accepting- all responsibilities for the protection of persons and property which might legallv and justly attach to the United States during the occupation of Cuba, they nmst again and finally decline to assume l)ur- den of the so-called Cuban debt either for the United States or ( Jub*. and offered to substitute for articles previously presented by them articles embodying precise language of the first and second articles of the protocol as to Cuba. Porto Rico, and Guam. Spanish com- missioners desired opportunity to consider proposal, and conference adjourned till Wednesday afternoon. Monday evening, 8.30. Day. Mr. Day to Mr. llay. [Telegram.] No. 11.1 Paris, Octohn- 17, 1S98. Spanish commissioners at conference to-day brought to our notice telegram from their Government, stating that.it had information that Iowa and Oregon and reinforcement of troops are going to Manila; also that Tagalo rebels have in their possession a large number of Spanish prisoners, civil as well as military. The Spanish conmiis- sioners made no protest, but merely asked us to communicate reports to our Government and represent that such things tend to create a state of public feeling which might embarrass the negotiations. We answered that, in absence of information or instructions on the subject which properly belonged to two Governments, we would com municate reports to our Govermiient. We made this promise more readily in view of Admiral Dewey's telegram. We feel importance of preserving, so far as possible, condition of things existing at the time of signing protocol. Spanish commissioners said their Government hoped Spanish pris- oners referred to might be liberated or turned over to American authorities. We venture to suggest that it might be advisable for our Govern- ment to do anything it properly can to prevent change of status quo in Philippine Islands, or development there of disorders which may seem to warrant active measures b}" Spain or other governments. Might not our Government, in reply to representations which it has received oi- probably will receive from Spanish Government, oli'er to take more active and positive measures than heretofore for preserva- tion of order and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands^ Mondav, 8.30, evening. Day. Mr. Day t<> Mr. llay. [Telegram.] No. 12.] Paris, Ovtoler 19. 1898. The conference which was to have taken place to day postponed till Fridav on request of Spanish commissioners. Day. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 29 J//'. Ihdj to Mr. Dai/. [Tek'gniin.] DErARTMENT OE StATE, W(iHhi)i(/fo)i, October 19, 1898. TIk^ t'ollowiiiin- tcleo-ram has been received to-dav bv Seei'etary of War: M \N-ii..\, (><1nh,r 19. Adji'taxt-Gexekai., ]V(i.-iani this morning- we stated intention to stand strictly on articles of the protocol. We have since read translation of the written memorandum, in which Spaniards make a point that we are iinwillinu- to assume in tr(>aty any responsibility for the protection of life and property durinj:;' our occupation of Cuha. or to engage to give aid and guidance to Cut)a as promised in our note of 8()th of July. I nder the circumstances we deem it important, while refusing to assume Cuban debt, to express readiness to incorporate in treaty properly guarded stipulations, acknowledging and assuming any legal responsibility to which we are by our own declarations and course of conduct com- mitted. We meet Spaniards Motulay '2 p. m. and desire instructions Sundav. 1.80 a. m. Day. Mr. //>/// io Mr. Ihnj. [Telegram.] Department of State. ^(/s/u'nf/foft. Ortoher '24. 1SD8. Your numbers thirteen and fourteen received. Your position as to Cuban (U'bt and your proposed procedure in accordance with engage- ments of note of Julv 30th are fuUv approved. Hay. Mr. Il Mr. Hay. [Tek-gnim.J No. 15. 1 Paris, (Hohrr 2o. 1H98. At conference yesterday we aguin informed Spanish commissioners that United States would not subdivide so-called Culian del)t. Span- ish commissioners then intimated they were willing to meet American commissioners as to relincfuishment of sovereignty over Ciiba if some responsibility for such debt was acknowledged. We insisted upon our position and finally asked whether they would refuse to sign any arti- cles unless such acknowledgment was made. To this question the Spanish commissioners asked time for reply, and we adjourned till 4 o'clock p. m. on Wednesday. Would you approve an article in treaty wdiich should pro\ide that the Tnited States, while not contract- ing any independent lia])ility of its own, would use its good othces with any people or government possessing so\ereignty in Cuba for acknowl- edgment of any debts incurred by Spain for existing internal improve- ments of a pacific character in the islands; a mixed commission to be appointed to ascertain whether any such debts exist, and if so, their amount. This would necessarily be a precedent for Porto Rico, (niam, and Philippine Islands. Commissioners may feel inclined to make this concession on strength of precedents and statements of publicists as to passing of local debts or debts incurred specially for l)enefits of trans- ferred territory. We hope for rt^ply before meeting again. Tuesdav, 5.15 afternoon. Day, Mr. Iliiy to Mr. Ihiy. [Telegram.] Department of State. Ocfoher 25, 1898. Answering your No. 15, the President directs me to say that under no circumstances will the Government of the United States assume any part of what is known as the Cuban debt, which is fully described in the memorandum of the American commissioners marked ** E " received this morning, nor would the United States engage to use its good offices to induce any government hereafter to be established in Cuba to assume such debt. It is not believed that there are any debts outstanding- incurred by Spain for existing improvements of a pacific character. It should l)e made clear what is meant l)y such improvements and what is included. The President regards it "as most desirable that in the present negotiations you should adhere strictly to the terms of the protocol. If this proves impossilde. you will ascertain as definitely as you can the exact meaning of their suggestions as to local Cuban debt and the evidences thereof and re|)oi't to the President with vour reconunendations. Hay. 32 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. l*r((Ci- ( '))llllll!xx!(Hlcfs to J//'. //{(//. [Telegram.] No. 16. j Paris, Ocfohe?' ^5, 1S9S. Ditferenoe.s of opinion aiiioiig I'omnii.s.sioner.s concerning Philippine Lslands are set forth in .statements transmitted herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost imme- diately. Day. (1) Information j^ained by conmiission in Paris leads to conyiction that it would be na\al. political, and connuercial mistake to diyide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this efl'ect. As instructions proyide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not con- sider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain goy- erned and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest saye to proceed ^w\th the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession. The Ladrones and Carolines were also goy- erned from the same capital ))y the same goyernor-general. National boundaries ought to follow natural diyisions, ))ut there is no natural [)lace for dividing Philippine Islands. There is hardly a single island in the group from which you can not shoot across to one or more of the others — scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent. Military and nayal witnesses agree that it would be pi'actically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part — some say easier, all say safer. Agi-ee, too, that ample and trustworthy military force could be raised among natives, needing only United States otticers and a siuall nucleus of United States troops; also that islands could be relieved from oppressive Spanish taxation and yet furnish sutticient revenue for the Avhole cost (of) administration and defense. Great dangers must result from division. Other islands, seeing benefits from our government of Luzon, are sure to revolt and to be aided and encouraged by natives of Luzon, thus repeating in more aggravated form our troubles with Spain about Cuba. Visayas already in revolt. Division would thus insure lawlessness and turbulence within gunshot of our shores with no prospect of relief unless in Spam'sh sale of islands to unfriendly commercial rivals, which would prol)ably happen if we hold the most important. Luzon, and release the others. Generally expected now that this would be attempted the moment we released them. If such sale or transfer is to be made at all would be less dangerous to our interests if done by us rather than by Spain. If we do not want the islands ourselves, ))etter to control their disposition; that is, to hold the option on them rather than to aljandon it. Could then at least try to protect our- selves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers. Com- mercially, division of archipelago Avould not only needlessly establish dangerovis rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 33 Present prosperity of Mcinilu depends on Its being- natural center of import and export trade for the whole oronp. Large part of its busi- ness derived from Iloilo, Cebu, and other points in south. To yield these to unfriendly rivals would be to provide Ijeforehand for diversion of business from our own possessions. Moral oljligation not to return Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved them applies also to the rest of the archipelago, since Spanish power there is now broken and can not be restored without our consent. We believe public opinion in Europe, including- that of Kome, expects us to retain whole of the Philippine Islands, and would prefer that to anj'^ other solution save the impossible one of the restoration of Span- ish powder over all the islands. If a division should be insisted upon, the only one that seems to us admissi])le w^ould be by a line from the straits of San Bernardino south of ]VIas)xite and north of Panay to the northeast corner of Borneo, leaving to the United States all to the westward, including Luzon, Mindoro, and Palauan. This would con- trol the China Sea and give excellent ports of call along the whole line from Borneo to Hongkong; but it would throw" away the Visayas, including- the best sugar, hemp, and tobacco islands. These contri- bute a large part of Manila's trade and are inhabited generally by a people nearly as easy to manage as those in Luzon. We are convinced that much injustice has been done inhabitants in published accounts of their character. Even the Mohammedans of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, if left enjoyment of religious liberty and given freedom from oppressive taxation, would be found less intractable in opinion of the experts than under the rule of Spain, while the others would be comparatively easy to control and glad to welcome strong and just rule of United States. CusHMAx K. Davis, William P. Frye, Whitelaw Reid. {'2) I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing- in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaki^n, we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing w^ith the insurgents. Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We can not leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources, either to form a government or to battle against a foe which, (although) unequal to us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This is par- ticularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only experience can determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It may prove expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the other side of the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds. Accepting Luzon, strategic advantage, as shown by high naval authority, may require cession of that part of the group lying north and west of a line drawn through St. Bernardino Strait south of Luzon to St. Bernardino Islet, and thence by the Naranjos Islands and certain S. Doc. 148 3 34 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. courses and distances to Tambisaii Islands on the nortlieast coast of Borneo, conveying to the United States Luzon, Mindoro. Palawan, and various other islands, thus controlling the entrance to China Sea with additional harbors and ports of call. The objection that other islands will be acquired b}' European powers without regard to our interests can be obviated by treaty stipulation for nonalienation without the consent of the United States. There should be also stipulations for absolute freedom of the trade and intercourse among all the islands of the group. This gives us practically control of the situation with a base for the navy and commerce in the east (and^ responsibility for the people to whom we owe obligation and those must likely to become fit for self-government. It affords an opportunity for lessening the burden of colonial government, with room for further expansion if desired. It does not leave us open to the imputation of following agreement to negotiate with demand for whole subject-matter of dis- cussion ourselves. William K. Day. (3) The undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entan- gling alliances against which Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly increased military establishment; immense sums for fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous complica- tions with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area for homes for American citi- zens; climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of Amer- ican youth; new and disturbing questions introduced into our politics; church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity — injury. The undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to insur- gents is paramount to our own manifest interests. Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured C'adiz ancl Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at the conclusion of war. On the contrary, interests and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial adminis- tration or government of subject people in American system. So iiuich from standpoint of interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of victory that becomes the advanced civiliza- tion we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgai- greed for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and delib- erate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. Third article of the protocol leaves everything concerning the control of the Philippine Islands to negotiation between the parties. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 35 It is absurd now to say that we will not nt'uotiato })ut will appro- priate the whole subject-niatter of neo-otiation. ' At the very least let us adhere to the President's instructions and if conditions require the keeping- of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfill- ment of high public and moral obligations, and that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest, the President among other things eloquently savs: It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as s(;rupulou8 and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds my con- science and governs my action. Geoege Gray. Wednesday, 12.30, night. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Department of State, Wa>;G to the treaty with SPAIN. the oommis.sioners may deem wise and best in the matter of the debts for internal improvements and public works of a paeitic char- acter in the Philippines will receive his favorable consideration. Nor does he desire the commission to disregard well-established precedents or make any conditions which will not be worthy of ourselves and merit the approval of the best judoment of mankind. If it should be the opinion of the commissioners that there should be paid a reason- able sum of mone}' to cover peace improvements, which are fairly chargeable to us under established precedents, he will give cheerful concurrence. The money payment, if any is determined upon, should rest solely upon the considerations suggested in your message of Sunday night. He desires that you may read this to the commission with vour message to him. Hay. Mr. Day to M,\ Adee. [Telegram.] United States Peace Coiminiission, Far/.s. Xonmher 3, 189S—10 a. i„. (For the Pres^itlent. — Special.) After a careful examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Phili])pine Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and status quo restored as far as practi- cable. We can require cession of Philippine Islands onlv as indemnity for losses and expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands, the ])roken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors. Have written fully. Thursdav, 11. 3U morning. Day. Mr. Hay to Mr. JJay. [Telegram.] Department of State. Wa.s/ii'>i(/ton. Xovemher 3^ 1898. The President has received your dispatch of this date and awaits your letter. ^leantime, however, the question may be ultimately determined. He assumes you have not yielded the claim by right of conquest. In fact, the destruction of the Spanish fleet on ]\Iay 1 was the conquest of ]\Ianila. the capital of the Philippines. The President has confidence that the commission will be able to make a treaty on just and honorable grounds: a failure to do so would be greatly to be regretted. Hay. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 41 J//'. Day to 2fr. Ade^. [Telegram.] Paris, November J^, 1898— 2. W. (For the President— Special.) Telegram of November 3 from the Secretary of State received. "We have not yielded the claim by a right of conquest. Telegram to you on that subject was on the afternoon of discussion with Spanish com- missioners. We shall not foreclose important matters without advis- ing you. We are doing all in our power to secure treaty in accord- ance with your views. In the opinion of a majority of the commis- sion we shall not promote this end by putting forward the claim that Manila was taken by conquest on May 1. Subsequent military oper- ations and capitulation, no les.-< than miitual acceptance of protocol, preclude making demand upon that ground. Our opinion as to in- effectiveness of capitulation after protocol has alreadv been stated. Day. I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial conc[uest of the Phil- ippine Islands, such as indemnity or as conditions of peace imposed by our general military success and in view of our future security and general welfare, commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected terri- torial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow and untenable under protocol. Friday. 3.30 afternoon. CusHJViAN K. Davis. J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Department of State, Washingto)}. JS^cu'einber 5, 1898. Yours of November 4. special, and that of Senator Davis received. The President has no purpose to question the commission'.s judgment as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim. He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented, and the grounds upon which vou will rest it. he contiidently leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a treaty shall be effected in terms which wiU not only satisfy the present generation but. what is more important, be justilied in the judgment of posterity. The argument which shall result in such a consummation he confides to the commission. He appreciates the difficulties and embarrassments, and realizes the delicate work Tiefore you. but that the commissioners will be able to conclude a treaty of peace satisfactorily to the country, justified by humanity and by prece dent, is the belief of the President and vour countrvmen generallv. Hay. 42 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. J//'. J>a>i to Jlr. Jhnj. [Telegram.] No. 20.] Paris, Nm^emhrd, 1898. Spanish oommissioner.s, in paper presented yesterday, maintain that demand for whole Philippine Islands violates protocol, which by its terms contemplated only provisional occupation Manila and did not impair Spanish sovereig-nty over grou]). They cite circular French minister for foreign atl'airs of Augnist last announcing to French ambassadors in Europe the signature of protocol ana saying our demand Philippine Islands was for provisional occupation of ]Manila by the American forces; also clause of capitulation 5lanila providing for return of arms to Spanish forces on evacuation of city. They also invoke our argument that Spain is now precludt^d from bringing for- ward Cu])an del)t ])ecause she faiUnl to mention it during negotiation of protocol. They ([uote interviews between the President and Cam- bon to show th;it former did not intend to demand cession group, but agreed that Philippine Islands question should be subject of negotia- tion at Paris and particularly his declaration that clause in protocol did not decide anything against either (lovernment; also refer to answer in Spanish note of August 7 to demand as to Phili])pine Ishuids as showing their (iovcM'nment's understtuiding thereof, and argue that United States ])y omitting to deny admitted correctness of that under- standing. They further maintain that nothing has occurred since sign- ing of protocol to justify Tnited States in iMdarging demands. As to our proposal to assume debts for ])acitic impi'ovements, they say archipehigo burdened with debt 4U(>,UOU.()(iO pesetas, or ^»t.(lOO.OO(», secured by moi'tgages on revenues Manila custom-house, vesting in third parties of \arious nationalities rights which do not belong to Spain. They declare and say that they hope there will be no necessity to repeat that Spain can not and ought not. since respect for others forbids it, to agree in any treaty to anything implying impairment or suppression or even disregard of private rights of others against the will of their legitimate and special proprietors. They say there are besides unsecured cok)nial debts. These likewise forl)id acceptance of American proposal which involves revision of legitimate acts of internal sovereignty, the debt having been lawfully contracted. Any inquiry whether proceeds were judiciously invested is inadmissible on grounds of national self-respect or as affecting obligation of del)t. Spanish paper then discusses armistice; maintains ineffectiveness capitulation of Manila, and holds acts of military administration unlaw- ful, such as taking public funds, collecting reveiuies. and controlling courts and police; and specilically complains of alleged release on Sep- tember 21 of 13 prisoners in jail forconmion crimes, which it describes as an unheard of act. On points of law they cite article 140 of our instructions to armies in held, Halleck's International Law, and Field's Code, and sa}' that, according to authorities and the protocol, treaty of peace should provide for immediate delivery of Manila to Spain, immediate release of garrison, return to Spanish (iovernment of alt funds and public propert}^ taken by American army since its occupation of place, and all taxes collected, and indenmitication of Spain for damages occasioned by detentions Spanish troops resulting in spread of Tagalo insurrection and involving ill-treatment of Spanish prisoners. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 43 In conclusion, Spanish commissioners invite American commission- ers to present a proposition in accordance with articles 3 and (3 of the protocol, and covering- obligations of United States growing out of acts of war committed after signing of protocol, in seizing Manila and doing of things in excess of rights under article 3. We have word of Freiich minister for foreign affairs that statement in his circular was oversight and will immediately be corrected. We are preparing reply to Spanish paper to be presented at next joint meeting on Tuesday afternoon. Saturdav, 6 afternoon. Day. Jlr. Day to Jlr. Ilay. [Telegram.] No. 21. J Paris, Noveniber 9, 1898. In order to finish copying answer to Spanish paper on the Philippine Islands, we asked postponement of meeting yesterday from 2 to 4 o'clock p. m. Spanish commissioners replied that they had engagement later in the afternoon, and suggested postponement till 2 to-day. We met accordingly this afternoon and presented answer. We repel Spanish assumption that we base our demands as to Philippine Islands on concessions in the protocol, as in the case of Cuba and Porto Rico, but we maintain that by third article we reserved and secured full and absolute right to make demands in future, and that our present demands are justified by and are included in the terms of the protocol. We also deny that provisions of the protocol can be qualified or limited by anything in Spanish notes prior to its signature. We show by review of the negotiations and of interviews at Executive Mansion that protocol was made only because Spanish response of August 7 was unacceptable. We quote to same effect from French Yellow Book telegram of Mr. Cambon transmitting draft of protocol and saying United States had decided to state precisely (preciser) therein the terms on which negoti- ations for peace would be undertaken. We quote in full note of Secre- tary of State to Cambon, of August 10. and show that our interpretation is justified by written correspondence, conversations at Executive Mansion, and" terms of protocol. We go over this ground at length. We express surprise at apparent renewal of Cuban debt question so soon after it was waived. We quote their language as to not wishing to have to refer to this again, and as to not permitting any discussion of certain phases of the question, characterizing this as language unusual in diplomacy unless to convey a deliberate ultimatum. We then inquire again as to final intentions of Spanish commissioners upon this subject. We call attention to admitted fact that considerable part of proceeds Cuban loans was expended in prosecuting war against United States, and inquire if they mean to be understood as refusing to permit any consideration of this expenditure. We then take up question of capitulation of Manila, and maintain that our powers as occupant under the protocol are the same iii all respects as to government and administration as under capitulation. In closing, we refer to another aspect of capture of Manila; noting that Spanish commissioners complain of it as occurring a few hours 44 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. after signature of protocol, we ask if just and impartial mind might not consider why not captured before — namely, through humane desire to save city and Spanish residents from dreaded vengeance of insurgents, and suggest that men to whom that humane delay was due, General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, were entitled to better treat- ment than their insinuation of needless slaughter and conscious violation of protocol. Our answer covered 50 tj'pewritten pages. Spanish commission- ers asked till Saturday to study it, and reserved right to ask, if neces- sary, for more time. At this, the next meeting, we may need to outline definite and linal propositions on whole question of Philippine Islands, including possible cash payments. Wednesdav evening, 9.30. Day. Mr. Bay to Mr. Hay. fTelegram.! No. 22.] ' Paris, November 10, 1898. We have information Philippines debt as follows: Prior to insur- rection, August, 1(S!»6, colony paid its way by local taxes and moderate tariff. After war began captain-general instructed to draw from prosperous local banks, such as deposit bank, local savings bank, and Banco Hispano-Filipino. He also obtained advances from friars. Expenses increasing, colonial minister empowered to draw on funds raised for expenses Cuban war, which he did to the extent of 7,660,403yVV pesos, or dollars. Expenses still increasing Govern- ment was authorized by law of Cortes, tenth June, 1897, published Madrid Gazette 29th June, to grant general guarantee of nation for operations of credit which would be necessary for Philip])ine Islands in consequence of disturbances there. Then royal decree 28th June, 1897, authorized colonial minister to issue four hundred thousand hypothecated ])onds of Philippine Islands treasury, at six per cent, redeemable at par in forty years, Avith special guarantee of Philippine Islands revenues and general guarantee of Spanish nation. The issue consists of one series of two hundred tifty thousand bonds of five hundred pesetas each, and another of one hundred and fifty thousand bonds of one hundred pesos each; first series reserved for issue in Spain, two hundred thousand immediately placed, and fifty thousand kept back by minister for the colonies and placed later on, also in Spain; second series intended for ^Manila, part to reiml)urse advances and rest to be placed there. This loan produced 38,570,494:3Vcr pesos net. Madrid Gazette, 20th October, 1898, shows that of this sum 19, 891,800x^0 were used for war in Philippine Islands; 7,660,-103yVo reimbursed to Cuban treasury, and 10,938.477x1 o advanced to same, leaving balance 13th June, 1898, to credit of Philippine Islands treas- urv of 79,813xW pesos. Nothing in Gazette or other official document shows an}^ part of this loan applied to purelv local purposes or objects of utilitv. It is said that not 5 per cent of Philippine Islands ])onds have been placed outside of Spain and colonies, and of fifteen million intended for Manila between ten and eleven million actually }:>laced there and rest returned to Spain and placed easily, chieffy in Barcelona. You may expect very shortly a telegram embodying views of American commissioners on Philippine Islands question. Day. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 45 Peace commissioner's to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] No. 23 -Special.] Paris, November 11, 1898. Our commissioners desire definite instructions as to Pliilippine Islands as soon as practicable. The following- statements embody indi- vidual expression of their views upon the subject. Moore. (1) Holding- the view that the Philippine Islands group is likely to prove a burden rather than a benefit to the United States, I would minimize our holdings there to the lowest point consistent with our o))ligations. This view I undertook to express in m}' telegram of October 25, Our advantage is a naval and commercial base in the East. More than this we should not seek. Our obligations seem to require us to take Luzon and islands so near as to be essential thereto. Assuming that the President and Cabinet have determined to take whole group, then I believe we will be justified in paying lump sum, sav fifteen mil- lions, recognizing- that we are dealing with a bankrupt people; that Spain loses her colonies, the revenues of which are charged with out- standing debts, and parts with a considerable portion of her revenue- producing domain. I would assume no part of the so-called Cuban and Philippine Islands bonded debt. Rather than fail to secure treaty of peace I think demand for whole group might be so modified as to let Spain keep Mindanao and Sulu group without conditions, paying same sum as above indicated. These islands with money payment would be a substantial concession. In that alternative we might secure one of the Caroline group as naval station and at the same time safe-guard our interests and people there. Day. (2) Favor taking the entire group and paj'ing ten million dollars in gold, a fair estimate of debt properly chargeable to the Philippine Islands. If necessary to secure treaty, and I believe it is, I would take Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, also Ponape of the Carolines, paying from five to ten millions of dollars. I would require: First, free interchange of products of the islands for consumption there, also that products of other islands in group intended for export from Manila be admitted free with distribution of goods imported into ^Manila to other islands without additional duties. Second, the right of entry into such ports of the Philippine Islands as are not ceded, upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise in relation to port and customs charges, while Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territories in their Pacific Islands ceded to the United States. Third, charges against American vessels for entry into peninsular ports of Spain no higher than imposed on Spanish vessels in American ports. Fourth, in all ports of these islands remaining- under Spanish rule our citizens shall have all questions at issue tried before an American consul or other duly qualified American officer. Fifth, all persons held by Spain for political acts performed in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Ponape, Guam, or the Philippine Islands to be immedi- atel}^ released. Sixth, absolute freedom of religion in the Philippine Islands, Ladrones, and Caroline Islands. Seventh, United States shall have the rioht to land cables on anv of these islands and the tolls for 46 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. messages on our tnuis-Paeitic euldes or iiiterisland lines shall l)e regu- lated by the Government of the Tnited States. Eighth. United States shall have the right to extend its submarine cables from Puerto Kieo, via the Canaries, to the coast of Africa or Spain and thence to any Spanish Mediterranean island. Apply so many of these articles as may be necessarv if the entire Philippine Islands group is taken. Fkye. (3) The undersigned begs to say that, while adhering to the views expressed in his telegram of the '2ikh October, he is of the opinion that it is immensely important to the country that we should not separate without the conclusion of a treaty of peace. A renewal of the state of active war, even if Spain's resistance })e continued feeble or none at all, would compel us to seize with the strong hand all of hei- colonial possessions. This is not a role that is desirable for the United States to assume. We have achieved all and more than we went to war to accomplish, and Spain has conceded it in a protocol. The same i)ro- tocol left the fate of the Philii)pine Islands to be determined 1)V a treaty to be thereafter concluded between the two countries. ^ The stipulation was not that it should be determined as the United States should dictate, but by a treaty between the parties. This necessarily leaves it open to a negotiation which must result in an agreement which implies a quasi freedom of consent by Spain as w^ell as by the United States. If that consent can not b(> obtained we are relegated to the state of active war which the armistice suspended, and the sword will again be drawn and the concpiest completed. Though Spain makes no physical resistance, she will state her case to the world as having consented to do all that she promised to do in the protocol, but that she could not su))scribe to terms which she had no right to expect. It would, in the opinion of the undersigned, be most unfortunate if the United States should feel compelled to abandon the high position taken at the l)eginning of the war and. instead of crowning their tri- umphs by setting an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory, act the part of a ruthless concpieror. Believing that the result of a failure to ol)tain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be dt»precated as inconsistent with the traditions and civilization of the United States. I would be willing to take the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and 1 would, to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe. 1 mean that I would prefer the latter alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all. George Gray, (4) Our duty not to return to Spain any territory in which we have broken down her rule has been enforced in our instructions from the outset. Furthermore, the right of a nation which has been successful in a war forced upon it to exact an indemnitv afterwards for the cost of the war is recognized. Adding pensions and other proper items to this cost as already tabulated, we have a total of between two hundred and fifty and three hundred millions. Spain is without money or the means of procuring it, and can therefore pay us in nothing' but terri- PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 47 tory. She has so far given us onh' FuerloJlioo. How far does that go towards repaj'ing our outlay iu cash, to say nothing of the derange- ment of business and loss of life^ For a standard of valuation we may perhaps refer to the live considerable purchases of territor}^ we have made within a century and the others we have considered. We paid twelve millions for Louisiana; live million for Florida; fifteen million for territor}- acquired from ]Mexico under the treaty of Guada- loupe, including New Mexico, Colorado (and) California; ten million for territory acquired in like manner by the (jadsden purchase; and seven million two hundred thousand for Alaska. We once offered seven mil- lion and a half for St. Thomas and St. Johns, and later could have had that whole group for five million. For Cuba we once talked of paying one hundred million, and at another time a hundred and twenty-five mil- lion. Taking this last as coming nearest to fixing a standard of value in the present case, we may reckon that Puerto Rico, farther from us, less important to the protection of our coasts, and only one-twelfth size, though with nearly one-half as much population, could not b}" any possil)ility be regarded as indemnity for more than fort}" or lift}' million of our just claim. Even if Cuba were added in its present devastated and depopulated condition, the present valuation of the two would not repay the outlay forced upon us by the war; but we have all along refused to take Cuba. What else has Spain with which to repay us except the archipelago, which lies at our mercy with its cap- ital in our possession? Its area is just about two and a half times that of Cuba, but instead of being near our coasts it is halfway around the globe from us. Some of our people think it worthless to us, and prob- ably few that it could be valued so high as the remaining two hundred or two hundred and fifty million of our cash outlay; but it is an asset of some sort — whether to develop or to dispose of — and we ought now to retain the power to do either as the Government and the people on fuller knowledge may determine. Are at the end of six weeks of fruitless negotiation (one-half longer than it took France and Germany to agree upon their first treat}' of peace after their last war) this suggests to me now the desirableness of our calling time on the Spanish commissioners, and giving notice that we must either make some progress or close the protocol. At the same time, in our own interest, we must shrink from renewing the war, even in name, over our prostrate foe, and must take into consideration the great desirableness of securing a definite and permanent treaty of peace To do this I would be willing to make some concessions from our just dues if sure they could not be misinterpreted and used as a pretext for greater delays and further unreasonable demands. 1 would be willing, as one proposition, under such conditions and only as a certain means of speedily securing a treaty, to leave Spain Mindanao and the Sulu group in the southern part of the Philippine Islands — that is to say, the Mohanunedan pai-t of the archipelago, being about one-third of it — and take instead all the Carolines and the Ladrones, while making stringent requirements as to the freedom of religion as well as forbidding Spanish restrictions on trade with the rest of the Philippine Islands. I would not compromise our position on the Cuban debt by doing anything to recognize that of the Philip- pine Islands, it being apparent that it was used to prosecute the war against insurgents, partly iu the Philippine Islands and partly in Cuba; but rather than lose a treaty and resume hostilities I would, 48 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY AVITH SPAIN. as another propo.sition, be willino- to take the Carolines in addition to all the Philippine Islands, and in return for the Carolines and for past pacilic expenditures in them and in the Philippine Islands I would be willing to give a lump sum of from twelve to fifteen million dollars, providing ultimately for this sum out of the revenues of the islands; and, finally, as a last concession from this second proposition. I would not sacritice the treaty for the sake of retaining Mindanao and the Sulu group. WlIITELAW ReID. (5) It is my opinion that the existing situation reiiuires that the United States present without much delay an ultimatum insisting upon the signature of a treaty for the cession b\' Spain of the entire Philip- pine Islands archipelago, Puerto Rico, and Guam and the relinquish- ment of sovereignty over Cuba. I am also of the opinion that we should pay no money to Spain on account of her debt or on any other account whatsoever, and that we should so declare in an ultimatum, if necessary. It now appears that Spain has paid nothing for any })acitic improvements in the Philippine Islands. They have all been paid for by the proceeds of local taxation of the islands. I believe that one of the purposes of Spain in protracting these negotiations is to entangle the United States with some of the European powers. The Spanish commissioners have reoccupied their iirst position, that the United States shall assume or be bound for the so-called colonial debt, and it is plain that so long as her connnissioners thus contend the negotia- tion stands just as it did at its beginning. I do not believe we shall ever get a treatv except as a result of such an unyielding ultimatum. Friday morning, 29th. C. K. Davis. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.l Washington, Novemher 13., 1898. A treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States if it can be had without the sacrifice of plain duty. The President would regret deeply the resumption of hostilities against a prostrate foe. We are clearh" entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely I can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico, which we have and which is wholly inadequate. Does Spain propose to pa}' in mone v the cost of the war and the claims of our citizens, and make full guar- anties to the people of the Philippines, and grant to us concessions of naval and telegraph stations in the islands, and privileges to our com- merce the same as enjoyed by herself rather than surrender the archi- pelago? From the standpoint of indemnit}' both the archipelagoes are insufficient to pay our war expenses, but aside from this do we not owe an obligation to the people of the Philippines which will not per- PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 49 mit US to return them to the .sovereignitv of Spain i Could we justify ourselves in such a course, or could we permit their ])arter to some other power f Willing or not, we have the responsihility of duty which we can not escape. You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Counnissioners Frye and Reid. you can offer more. The President can not believe any division of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indenuiity for the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised, l»ut the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out. You have the largest liberty to lead up to these instructions, but unreasonable delav should be avoided. Hay. JL: Day to J//-. Adee. [Telegram.] Paris, November 15, 1898. (For the President. — Special. ) Your final instruction on Philippine Islands received. We are for- mulating- proposals for treaty in accord therewith. Spaniards asked and we granted adjournment to Wednesday. They say have not received copies from Madrid, which are needing. It is probable that Spanish commissioners will not sign treatv. but this is only surmise. Spanish sources are filling European press with charges of violation of protocol and understanding at Washington in claim now made for Philippine Islands. You have no doubt seen our counter statement sent out by Associated Press. If we break, I think pretty full synopsis of correspondence and negotiations leading to protocol should appear in American, also in friendly press on this side. We shall pursue this course unless you disapprove. Tuesdav morning, 2.30. Day. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram. J Special.] Department of State, Washington^ November 15, 1898. The President earnestl}' hopes there may be no break, but approves the suggestion made in j'our special of this date. Tuesday afternoon. Hay. S. Doc. 148 4 50 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. Mr. Moorr to J/r. Jl((i/. [Telegram.] No. 24. Special.] Paris, Aoreiuhcr 7J, 1898. Unless otherwise iiistnuted. the Anieriean eoininissionei-s propose to present to the .'^junish eoiniuissioners, perhaps at the joint ineetin^- to-morrow, the following proposition as enil)odying tinal position of our Government in the present negotiations: The proi)osal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archijielago of the Phili])pine Islands, l»ut the American commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should 1)6 agreed to, the sum of twenty million dollars, to be pairisoners now held by Spain for political offenses in connection with the insurrection of Cuba and Philippine Islands; the acquisition of the island of Kusaie or Ualan ^ in the Carolines for a naval and telegraph station; and of cable-landing rights at other places in Spanish jurisdiction; and the revival (of) certain treaties heretofore in force between the United States and Spain. Tiiesdaj'^ evening, 6.20. Moore. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Special.] Department of State, W(uhington. November 16. 1898. Your No. 24 received. The course proposed is approved. Hay. ' Kusaie and Ualan are different names for the same island. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 51 Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] I No. 25.] Paris, November 18, 1898. Spanish commissioners yesterda}" presented long- paper in which they reply to our last memorandum. Discuss provisions of protocol relating- to Philippine Islands, and support by argument their recent proposals thereon. The^^ declare that our memorandum al)()unds in grave errors of fact and strange doctrines of law, and deny that they have withdrawn their provisional acceptance of our articles on Cuba, Porto Rico, and Guam; that acceptance, however, was conditional upon agreement on whole treaty and was given for compensation which might be obtained in other articles for sacrifice of Spain as to debts, but only subsequent development in negotiations is the demand for cession of the Philippine Islands, Spanish commissioners would there- fore have been justified in insisting on claims as to transmission of colonial obligations and debts, but have confined themselves to con- tradicting affirmations to which they could not assent. They quote royal decrees and the text of bonds to disprove that greatest part of the Cuban debt was contracted in the eli'ort first to conquer Cuban insurgents and then to oppose the United States, as well as to show that colonial revenues were primary security for debt. They maintain legal right of Spain so to contract the debt and the legal validity of the debt so contracted, and cite our demands that Spain suppress rebellion and maintain order in Cul>a as a proof of our recognition of her sovereignty in the premises and the legitimacy of its exercise for that purpose ; but in concluding this part of the paper they sa}^ the duty of defending the bondholders does not belong to Spain; that it is sufficient for her to defend the legitimacy of her action, her perfect right to create the debt and the mortgage by which it was secured, and her strict right not to pay interest or principal except upon proof of insufficiency of mortgaged revenues. The respon- sibility of failing propei'ly to apply revenues will rest on those Avho control them, and not upon Spain, who has not the means to compel the performance of the duty, Spain neither will nor can do anything to impair the rights of bondholders, who can without great eftort demonstrate [the] justice of their cause. Spanish commissioners then discuss Article III of the protocol and contend that it should be read in light of prior negotiations. They quote telegram of August 1 to CamTjon saving that three [sic — our ^] demand seemed to lack precision; that Spanish Government supposed there was no question in regard to Spain's permanent sovereignty over archipelago and that occupation of Manila, its harbor and ba}^, by the United States would last only during the time necessary for two countries to agree on administrative reforms, The}^ then refer to Cambon's interview with the President of August 3 and to dispatch of Spanish minister for foreign afi'airs of August 7, and say that never till now has the United States consented to give concrete form to the idea involved in the phrase "''control, disposition, and govern- ment" of the Philippine Islands. If the United States meant that joint commission should determine the sovereignty' of the group b}^ agreeing or disagreeing to its cession to the United States, why did it not say so? 52 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. American c-oininis.sionors say that word "coiitror* must 1h' construed in the sense of authority or command, because that is its l)roadest mean- ing? in Enjj-lish, hut fail to notice that the protocol was also written and sitrned in French, and that the French word "controle"' means only investigation or inspection. The word *' disposition. '■ while it conveys the Idea of alienation in private law. usually means in French distribution according- to a certain and determined ordei-. The word •'government" may mean the right of adniinisttMing or exercising sovereiti-nty. but may also signify manner of governing or form which may be" given to government. The words therefore do not possess a clear and precise meaning, incapable of doul)t or aml)iguity. and yet it was the Ignited States, not Spain, that insisted upon retaining them and refused to explain them. Vattel. Volume III. page 1!>7, declares that dout)ts nmst be resolved against him who gives the law in the treaty, since it is his fault not to have expressed himself with more clearness. The party \\ho dictates conditions should not ha allowed to convert vague or ambiguous term> into bonds to tic u}) the more feeble contracting party. In the American note of July 3o it was said that if the terms oH'ered by the United States were accepted in their entirety connnissioners • would be appointed to settle the details of treaty of peace, etc. Could unexpressed (hMuand for cession of inunense territory . with a population of 9,000.000 inhabitants, have been considered as a detail of the treaty ( Spanish commissioners here review at some length interviews of Cam- bon with the President and compare versions thereof, and contend that by the note of Spanish Minister for Foreign Atlairs of August 7 Crovernment reserved a j>ri(>ri\\.^ sovereignty over rhilii)piiie Islands, and that Article III of the protocol can in law bind it only witii this reservation, which was never withdrawn. They say that the only objection made in our note of August 10 to Spanish note of August 7 was that the latter was not entirely explicit, owing to various trans- formations which it had undergone. This, they maintain, could not have referred to paragraph on "Philippine Islands, since it ('xplicitly reserved a jrriorl Spanish sovereignty over the islands. The Paris conference is therefore authorized to determine only their internal regime. Spanish commissioners then proceed to support their last proposals as to what should be done regarding Philippine Islands in the treaty of peace. They disclaim intention to assert that General Merritt and Admiral Dewev had knowledge of protocol when they took Manila on August 18. but refer to the Admiral's message to the governor of Manila of May 1 threatening to destroy city if all vessels, torpedo boats, and warships under the Spanish Hag were not immediately sur- rendered, and say they })resume this message will have no place in the chapter of history in which are recorded the services rendered to the cause of humanity of which there is so much ostentation in these days. Thev also refer "to circumstances in connection with delay in taking Manila; that the number of insurgents about the city increased because of postponement of it, and complains of statement in American memo- randum that the captain-general tied before the surrender. They maintain that our occupation of ^lanila pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace was intended and agreed upon merely by way of a guar- anty,"^ and that protocol makes no connection between future occupa- tion of the place and the payment of a war indemnity. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 53 They observe that the American commissioners do not in their memorandum argue that suspension of hostilities did not go into effect immediately, but that they endeavor to invalidate the Spanish claim as dilatory. They state that this claim was made twenty-three days after capitulation and inquire what law or practice forfeits such a claim unless presented before the twenty' -three days reckoned from the act giving rise to it. Even if the claim had not been then pre- sented, the Spanish commissioners might present it now, since thej- are empowered to ask for a faithful execution of the protocol. They quote from Wharton's International Law Digest that compacts be- tween enemies should be specially adhered to as of immediate interest and duty, not onh" to the parties but to all mankind. The}' combat the argument that occupation of Manila under the protocol is same as or equivalent to a military occupation by conquest. They contend that (occupation i) by force of a territory which sur- renders through an act of war has a special name, which is "capitula- tion," and that to call by this name the occupation under the protocol in order to bring it within the terms of the illegal capitulation of Manila after the protocol was signed is an error never heretofore officially or scientitically made. They contend that occupation as a guaranty conveys no greater right than to maintain a military force in that territory till the performance of the principal obligation, and that the occupying party has therefore usually taken care even to stipulate for the taking of provisions for his forces. The occupa- tion under the protocol can not be considered as a military one. since it was not effected ])y force not as the result of a belligerent operation. jNIoreover. it was after August 16, when the American commanders heard of the protocol, that they began to take possession by military force of the machinery of government, of the pulilic moneys, revenues, and imposts. Spanish commissioners say they might here bring the paper to a close did they not desire to tind some way in harmony with senti- ments of humanity and patriotism of both commissioners to remove obstacles to peace: this can be done only through the bona tides of both parties; the commissioners are equally divided. The United States does not go further than to claim that under the protocol it has right to ask for the sovereignty over Philippine Islands. It does not claim the right to order the cession to be made. Shall the negotiations then be broken off' and hostilities renewed^ Can not the good faith of the parties suggest some means of averting these terrible consequences i' The commissioners might agree to leave the question of sovereignty over Philippine Islands for direct negotiations between the two Gov- ernments, and continue meanwhile the discussions of all other points to be embodied in the treaty. This method is, however, attended with the danger of the Governments failing to agree. The Spanish com- missioners think it more sensible and more sure for the two commis- sions to agree to propose to their Governments an arbitrator or a tri- bunal of arbitration to determine the true sense in which Articles III and VI of the protocol should be taken. If there is any controversy between nations which men of goodwill should endeavor to settle by justice and equity it is that of a differ- ence as to the interpretation of a treaty. Sovereigns may refuse to submit to judgment of a third party that which affects their honor or even their amour propro. but in the modern and Christian world it is 54 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. inooiu'civable they should prefer covering earth with corpses and del- uging- it with human blood to submitting their own opinions on a mat- ter so exposed to tallil)ility as the sense which a party to a treaty may desire to give it. The United States, say the Spanish commissioners, have to their glory taken among civilized peoples the initiative in appealing to the humane, rational, and Christian method of ai'bitra- tion, rather than intiict bloody war. The senate of Massachusetts in 1835 approved the proposal for creation of an international court to settle all ditferences between countries. In 1851 Committee on For- - eign Relations reconnuended insertion of arbitration clause in treaties, and the Senate approved a report in 1853. In 1873 the Senate again, and in 1874 l)oth Houses of Congress, i"eaf- tirmed this humanitarian aspiration; and tinally. in 1888. not satistied with havinu' marked out a line of conduct so laudable, both Houses of Congress adopted joint resolution i-ecjuesting the President to use his influence to induce governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States to submit questions that might arise between them in future to arbitration. The Spanish counuissioners declare the^ hope that the case before the Paris conference will not lead the United States, by departing from such glorious precedents, to wish to settle the difticulty by the last means which among national and free beings is sadly inevitable, although it may never ))e lawful, in the absence of other means moi'e humane and tending to preserve unalterable peace among men. Our conmiissioners propose to reply to this and reaflirm their pri>- vious position, and to make, unless otherwise instructed, the proj)osal conveyed to you in my special of November 15, and give the Spanish commissioners a week in which definitely and finally to accept it. MOOKK. J//'. Ihnj to Mr. D'l'j. [Telegram.] Washington, Novemher 18, 1898. Dewey telegraphs entire island of Panay in possession of insnrgents, except Iloilo, which is defended by 8(>o Spanish troops. Foreign citi- zens beg for American protection. Island of Negros has declared independence, and desires American protectorate. Fridav, 2 afternoon. Hay. J//'. JJay to J/r. Adee. [Telegram.] Paris, Xovemhcr 18, 1898. (Special. — For the President. ) Secretary- Moore has just sent telegram advising of Spani.sh reply received yesterday, translation finished this morning: also advi.-^edour intended course, which I hope you will approve. As to negotiations preceding protocol, there are sharp diflerences in some respects between PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 55 Camboivs reports, as quoted by Spanish commission, and my uu'morandu of same conversations, which, you remember, were made shortly after each interview, submitted to you, corrected, and transcribed in tvpe- written form, which I have with me. You can read in connection with this [the] correspondence leading- to protocol, pamphlet publica- tion. Cop}'' in the Department of State if you have not one at hand. After delivery [of] our note [ofj July 30, to Duke de Almodovar. Cambon came to White House Auoust 3. They quote from his report: I availed myself of this declaration to recjuest the President to have the kindness to state as precisely as possible his intentions in regard to the Philipjnne Islands. On this point I told him the answer of the Madrid Government was clrawn up in such a way as to admit of all demands on the part of the United States and consequently of all kinds of apprehensions on the part of Spain in regard to her sovereignty. !Mr. McKinley answered: "I do not want any misunderstanding to remain upon this sub- ject, and neither of the two countries shall be the ones to l)e called upon to decide what are the permanent advantages we shall ask for in the archipelago and finally those to decide the intervention [controle], disposition, and government of tht- Philippine Island," and he added: "The Government of Madrid can rest assured that up to the present nothing against Spain has been settled a priori in my own miml, as I myself consider that nothing is decided against the United States." M}' memorandum shows on same date. August 3: Ambassador reported Spanish Government had received American answer; that it would be regarded by Spain as very severe, etc. French amba.ssador said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that United States intended to take the Philippine Islands group. That Government appreciated that reforms were necessary in the government; that American privileges be granted in the islands; but that Spanish suzerainty should not lie interfered with was a matter that Spanish minister would insist upon. President answered that e negotiated; and that he, the President, could not make any change in the teims heretofore submitted. The ambassatlor called attention to the wording of the note of July .30 as to pos.«ession of the city, bay, and harbor of IManila to l)e retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them afterwards. President said that must depend upon the terms of the treaty. Ambassador inquired whether the United States had iirejudged the matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein l)y the United States." President said case has not been jirejudge*! as far as concerns this Government or the Spanish Government. Whole matter would be left to the commissioners for negotiation to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime the United States would insist upon holding ^Manila, as laid down in the note. Its disposition thereafter, as already said, would depend upon the terms of the treaty. Spanish commissioners then take up C'limboirs report [of] interview of July 30 and our note of tlmt date presented to him for transmission to Spain. Spanish commi.ssioners state Cambon"s report as follows: The demands formulated in Article III, I (Cambon) said to the President, are apt to endanger in Madrid the success of this preliminary negotiation, especially if the word " jiossession" is retained in conjunction with control and government of the Philippine Islands, as it seems to put in doubt from this moment the sovereignty of Spain over that colony. You will notic-e tlie President of the Republic told me that his deniands in article first and second admitted of no discussion. " I ( the President) leave it to the negotiators to decide the question of the Philippine Islands." Seeing that the President of the Republic was firm in not changing the terms of Article III, I made such an urgent appeal to his generosity as to secure his order to use the word " dispo.sition " instead of ' " posses.siou, " as the former does not prejudge the result of negotiations and has not the comprehensive meaning which belongs to the other word. My notes show that at that time, July 30 — The President said that as to the Philippine Islands the note expressed the purpose of this Government, and their final disi)osition would depend upon the treatv to be negotiated by the commissioners and ratifietl bv the interested Governments. Am- 5G PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. bassador read the paragraph ooneerniog the Philippine Islands and characterized it as harsh. "Thetie are very hartl terms." Siiid the ambiissador. to which the President inquireil in what jiarticular. The ambassador sugirested, in reg-ard to the PhiHppine Islands, that it might be the acquiring by the Uniteil States of all of them, to which the President replied that that would l>e determined by the treaty. The amba.>*.e concevletl by Spain. Ambassador addeil particularly that the won.1 "possession" translated in Spanish in such wise as to be regardeil as an expression of a severe, threatening nature, and sug- gested a change in that word. He suggestert or meaning. The word "disposition" l^ing suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that that word, not changing the meaning, might lie substitutetl for the word "possession." Indeed, the word "disposition" was the broader one of the two and would clearly include " posset^sion. " Accordingly the note was so changeil without other changes, and was handed to French amiwssi\dor to be com- municated to Spanish Government. These report.^, not dirtictilt of reconciliation, have k\-VAK: Again has it bei>n at the White House, in the pre.-^eni-e of Mr. McKinley and at his express re^piest. that I have conununicated to the .Secretary of State the note of August 7, in which your excellency declares that the Government of Spain accepts the condi- tions imix>seain the c^ession. conseijuently the immeeeteil the Spanish Ge nameest way to settle the matter wiis to put the terms in the shape of a definite protoi^ol. which the Pre.sia.e translated and put in cipher .several times," This note, (the) Spanish commissioners say. led them into error, and they ••nobly comply with the duty of so admitting." In fj-aming our answer we shall maintain our version is taken from the memoranda made by the then Secretary of State directly after the conversations, submitted to the President', by him revised* and then reduced to typewritten form: and likewise correspond with the rec- ollection of the interviews now entertained by the President of the United States and the then Secretary of State. I shall be obliged for any comment you mav see fit to make in reply thereto. Fridav. 1.3' » afternoon. Day. J// . I/rnj to Jfr. Day. ITelegiam.] Washincjtox. yn,'e„(h>r 19. 1898. The President approves your proposed action. His recollection of oral discussion preceding protocol coincides exactly with vours. Hay. J//-. Jja,/ f,. Jfr. H<'o- ^6.] Paris. Xn,'.nJj.,r 21. 1898. AA e presented this afternoon our proposal as telegraphed you in our No. '24t. We expressed ex|Dectation of American commissioners that final and definite answer be given not later than i^Sth instant. AI.^sion a communication sulmiitting for adoi)tion, in lieu of our final proposition of last Monday, any one of threc^ fol- lowing alternative propositions: First, reliiuiuishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Porto Rico and' other Antilles, the island of Guam, in the Ladrones, and the Philippine Islands archipelago, including Mindanac) and Sulu. to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of ^100,000,000 as compensation for her sovereignty over the archipelago and the works of public utility she has executed during her rule in all the islands of the East and West, the sovereignty over which she relin- quishes or cedes. Second, cession to the United States of the island of Kusaie. in the Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the]\Iari- anas while they remain under Spanish rule, and cession of Philippine PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITfl SPAIN. 59 Islands archipelago proper; thati.s, beginnino- on the north, the islands ot'Hatanes, Bal)uyanes. Luzon. Visayas, and all the others, following to the south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south of this sea the islands of Mindanao and Sulu, which have never formed a pait of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper. The United States, as compensation for said islands, for the right to land cables, and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands during her rule, will pay to Spain the sum of ^50*,0()U,00(i. Third, Spain relinquishes her so\ereignty ov(n- Cuba and gratuitously cedes to the United States the Philippine Islands Archipelago proper, besides Porto Rico, the other West Indies, and the island of (hiam. which she cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indem- nity to American citizens for injuries suffered since the 1)eginning of the last Cuban insurrection. The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal what are the debts and obligations of a colonial character which should pass with the island> the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and cedes. On these i)i"opositions the connnissioners hold the following views: Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid think we are connnitted to our final pi'oposition of last ^Monday: Commissioners Frye and Grav favor sub- mitting a proposal to leave to Spain Mindanao and Sulu group and take instead l^alan or Strong Island in the Carolines, paying only §20,000,000. Mr. Day would favor this if it were an original propo- sition. He believes that Mindanao and the Sulu group can be readily separated from the other islands, and that, with their population, they are likely to be a source of trou])le and expense and are not desiral)le for us. He thinks Ualan or Strong Island would be very valuable to us, and he would prefer it. He also thinks that this concession would pro])ably bring a treaty, and that it may be that our present ultimatum will; ])ut. as already stated, he thinks our oidy consistent course now is to stand by that ultimatum. Commissioner Gray prefers, above all. acceptance of third proposition. Our commissioners desire to answer president of Spanish commission to-morrow. Fridav afternoon, 4.3<». MOOKE. Jfr. I),ir!s to J//'. Uiijj. [Telegram.] No. 28.] Paris, Kovemher 25, 1898. I desire to add to my \'iews. as stated in Mr. Moore's telegram, that I think the propositions there stated are an afterthought contrived to protract and embarrass the negotiations after Si)ain had received our deliberate ultimatum, which has been given out as such to our peo])le and to the world. The United States, having so taken its position, ought not to recede. I think that Spain will accept our ultimatum if we Hnnly insist u]x^n it. Fridav afternoon, 5. C. K. Davis. 60 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. Mr. Gray to Mr. Ilay. [Telegram.] No. 29.] Nov. 2.5, 1898. Our having submitted an ultimatum does not in my opinion preclude us from adopting a course that will prove more advantag(^ous to our country, Mv reasons for accepting third proposition in the letter of the president of the Spanish commission are, briefly, that in paying twenty millions we do not prevent the raising hereafter of the ques- tion of the liabilit}' of the sovereign of the relinquished and ceded ter- ritory for some part of the so-called colonial debts. When raised we must either flatly refuse to consider it and take the consequences, or must arbitrate. We have nothing to fear from ar))itration. ])ut have much to gain in moral prestige and maintenance of our i)reeminence in recognizing the obligations of international law. Bx-^adopting this course we pay nothing to Spain, and settle instead of postpone the question of liability and cm-vy the principle of arbitration with us into the new century. George Gray. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Tek-frram.] Washington, Noventhcr '25. 1898. (Sent 12 midnight.) The President has considered the three proposals of the president of the Spanish commission submitted to you. He flnds no reason for departing from his last instruction and your proposal thereunder. His instructions are that 3'ou adhere to 3'our last proposal and decline those of the Spanish commission. He repeats his instruction of November 13, by which you are author- ized, in case of cession of an island in Carolines and other concessions mentioned by Messrs. Frye and Reid, to ofler additional compensation. If negotiations in regard to Philippines are successful, you will com- municate to the President what amount is required for Strong Island, and he will instruct vou. Hay. 3fr. Bay tn Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] Paris, November 27, 1898. Paris Herald to-dav publishes telegram from Washington saying we have increased our demand to include Sulu group. This incorrect report tends to create impression that we are increasing our claims after ultimatum. Sunday night, 12. Day. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 61 Mr. Day to 2fr. JLn/. [Tek'gnmi,] No. 31. 1 Paris, NoMuher 29, 1898. Spanish coininissioncrs at t()-(la\''8 conference presented a definite and final acceptance of our last proposition. Next meetino- on Wednes- day, at which time we will present articles on other matters. They expressed a desire to reach a conclusion promptly. We hope to make good progress from this time. Monday afternoon, 8.15. Day. The I-fesidciit to j\Ir. Day. [Telegram.] Exp:cutive Mansion, WanJiiiH/ton., November 1i9^ 1898. Message just received. Tlie commissioners have my profound thanks. AViLLIAM McKlNLEY. J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Washington, Novemher 29, 1898. f In reviving conventional arrangements do not lose sight of copy right agreement. Hay. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Washington, Novemher 29, 1898. The President wishes to know the opinion of the commission as to inserting in treaty provisions on the subject of citizenship of inhabi- tants of Philippines which will prevent extension of that right to Mongolians and others not actually subjects of Spain; also whether you consider it advisable to provide, if possible, for recognition of existence of uncivilized native tribes in same manner as in Alaska treaty, perhaps leaving to Congress to deal with status of inhabitants by legislative act. Hay. 62 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN, Ml'. Moore to Mr. Hay. [Telegriim.] No. 82. J Pakis, Noreiither 29, 1898. The American commissioners propose to offer Spain, for cession of Kusaie and concession of cable-landint^ rights in other Spanish terri- tor3% the sum of a million dollars. Tuesda}' afternoon, 12.30, Moore. Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. [Tcletfram.] No. 33.] Pahis, Mmmther 30, 1898. Joint Connnission to-day discussed draft of treaty. We proposed to apply to the Philippine Islands provisions agreed on by the com- missioner's for the evacuation of Porto Kico. Spanish commissioners raised the (jiiestion as to whether any agreement was reached as to heavy ordnance in fortilications and as to war materials, and expressed a desire for retention of such ordnance and materials in the Philippine Islands and also in Porto Kico, if not agreed on by commissioners. Can you cable us evacuation agreement as to Porto Kico^ We tendered admission of Spanish ships and merchandise in Philip- pine Islands on same terms as our own for a period of ten years. Spanish commissioners propose extension of this privilege to their ships and merchandise in Porto Rico for same period and in Cuba during oui" occupation. On this proposal. Messrs. Day and Gray express the view that if Spanish conunissioners will agree to cede Kusaie for amount proposed, grant religious freedom in Carolines, and promptly sign treaty as tendeivd by us, they would concede extension of privileges granted to Spanish ships and merchandise in Philippine Islands to Poito Kico for rive years and Cuba during our occupation, but not to exceed live years. In such case they consider it a not imreasonable concession to ancient habitudes and to Spanish commerce prosti'ated by war. It is not clear to them that such a concession in a ti-eaty acquiring territory would open the favored-nation door. For precedents for such action on the ])art of the United States see sixth article of the treaty with Spain for the annexation of Florida in 1S19, and seventh article of the treaty for cession of Louisiana in 1803. Mr. Davis states that he is opposed on principle to granting to Spain as to Porto Rico and Cuba the conunercial and shipping prixileges which she requests. He thinks it should not be a subject of these negotiations, but that it should be dealt with b}' Congress. Does not believe that these concessions are necessary to secure a treaty. Thinks favored- nation clause would entitle certain other nations to same privileges we grant to Spain. Mr Frye declares he is most emphaticalh' opposed to this propo- sition. Kusaie, even without any mone}' pavment, would in nis opinion be no compensation for this privilege. Mr. Reid objects to commission's taking initiative on a subject (in) no way covered b\- our instructions, especially as proposed action would endanger the future PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 63 extension of present long-stimdino- ])oli('y of Government to Porto Rico and Cuba. lie thinks no step of such oravity should be proposed here without action of President, if not also of CongTess. Commissioners desire instructions on this subject. Next joint meetinii' to-morrow l^ p. m. We ha\'e agreed to mutual release of prisoners and letui'u to their country by i)arty releasing- them. Wednesday, 8.80 evening. Moore. Mr. Hay to Mr. Day. [Teloffram.] Washington, December i, 1898. Your No. 83 received. It was held by us in Porto Rico that the armament of forts, fortifi- cations, and fixed batteries were to be included in the surrender and taken over into the possession of the United States. The Spanish army was to take with it small arms and accouterments, batteries of field artillery of 9 centimeters caliber, supply and bag-gage wagons, ambulances, and other impedimenta. The President thinks it undesirable to include in treaty any prefer- ential privileges to Spain in Cu])a or Porto Rico; and if such privi- leges tendered l)y you in Philippines are accepted, care should be taken to avoid possil)le em})ari'assments to legislation by Congress, or demands bv other governments under favored-nation clause. Hay. Mr. Bay to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] No. 35.] Paris, December 1, 1898. At this time (Thursday, 8.30 p. m.) we have received no answer to our telegram asking for instruction as to Spanish rights in ports of Cuba and Porto Rico, and concerning Kusaie. It is important to have same to-morrow. Thursday evening, 9. Day Mr. Hay to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] Executive Mansion, Washington, December 1, 1898. Reply sent before receipt of \o\xv 35. Hay. 64 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. J//-. Day to J//'. Hay. [Telegram.] No. 36.] Paris, Deceiuhrr 3. 1898. We iiro unanimously of opinion that unless we are invested M'ith discretion to allow for a limited period, not exceeding- live years. Span- ish vessels comino- lad(ni only with productions of Spanish growth and manufacture directly from the ports of Spain or of her colonies to enter ports of Cuba and Porto Rico without paying- other or higher duties on cargoes or tonnage than are paid ])y the L'nited States ves- sels, it may be impracticable tool)tain anything not contained in our ultimatum and therefore necessarily forming sul)iect of mutual con- cession, such as Kusaie. and religious freedom in Carolines, the release of political prisoner.^, cable-landing rights, and revival of treaties in force between the two countries l)efore the war. The privilege above mentioned isditi'erent from and nmch more restricted than that referred to in our telegram of 30th ultimo, and is in conformity with precedents cited in that telegram from Florida and Louisiana treaties. Early answer desirable. Saturdav afternoon, 3. Day. J//-. Jlay to J//'. Day. [Telegram.] December 3. 1898 (midnight). The President is still of opinion that preferential privileges to Spain in Porto Rico and Cu])a are not desirable. He would even prefer that treaty should be made on basis of idtimatum rather than risk the em- barrassments which might result from such concessions. Hay. J//'. Day to Jfr. Hay. [Telegram.] No. 37.] Paris, Decemler 8, 1898. At the session to-day we agreed upon all the al•ticle.>^ of the treaty so far as an agreement could be reached. They refused to sell Kusaie. Will send you a summary to-morrow as soon as the treaty is engrossed. We meet to sign in duplicate; think we can sign on Saturday of this week. Thursdav afternoon. o.:^0. Day. J//'. Hay to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Department of State, Washington., Dece)nher 5, 1898. Your No. 37 received. The President sends to all of 3'ou his most cordial thanks and congratulations. Permit me to add ni}' own. John Hat. PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. 65 Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] Paris, December 10, 1898. Treaty as agreed on will coii.sist of preamble and seventeen articles, as follows: First. Kelinf|uisjiinent of sovcreignt}" over Cul>a and the assumption l)v the United States of an}' oblitration under international law for the protection of life and property durino- occupation. Second. Cession of Puerto Rico and the other islands and Guam. Third. Cession of Philippine Islands Archipelao-o and the pa^-nient of twenty millions within three months after the exchange of ratifica- tions. Fourth. Admission of Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine Islands for ten years on the same terms as American ships and mer- cliandise. I'^ifth. P^vacuation of Philippine Islands by Spain; inunediate return (»r Spanish soldiers at Manila by the United States to Spain; disposi- tion of war material and armaments in Philippine Islands and Guam. Sixth. General release and return of prisoners, military and political. Seventh. Mutual relinquishment of claims arising since the begin- ning of the insurrection in Cuba and before the exchange of ratifica- tions, the United States to adjudicate and settle claims of its own citizens. Eighth. Transfer of public property, archives, records. Ninth. Citizenship in relinquished and ceded territories. Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, may, within a j'ear, elect to retain Spanish nationality. Civil rights and political status of native inhab itants of ceded territories to be determined by Congress. Tenth. Protection of all persons in their religion. Eleventh. .Jurisdiction of courts. Twelfth. Preservation of pending judicial proceedings. Thirteenth. Protection of copyrights and patents in ceded and relin- (luished territories. Fourteenth. Appointment of consuls by Spain in such territories. Fifteenth. Each countr}^ to accord to merchant vessels of other same treatment as to its own in respect of port charges. Sixteenth, Any obligations assumed by the United States as to Cuba limited to time of occupation, but the United States will at the end of occupancv advise any government established in Cuba to assume same obligations. Seventeenth. The exchange of ratitications at Washington within six months after signature of treaty. Treaty expected to be signed this afternoon. Moore. Mr. Day Uj 2Ir. Day. [Telegram.] Paris, December 10, 1898. Treatv signed at 8.50 this evening. Day. S. Doc. 148 5 66 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY WITH SPAIN. J/r. Moore to Mr. Hay. [Telegram.] Paris, December 16., 1898. Peace Commission sails by the St. Louis from Southampton Satur- day, and desires on arrival at New York to go immediately by the Pennsylvania road, by special train, if necessary, to \Vashinott)n. The commission hopes to present the treat}' to the President December 24. MOOKE. O LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 013 902 171 A