IC « . C.C? . • <:-.-c< ^ar ^y- -^ ' < «. ic «tr <<-. c . '' V^'uv*^ Vyj^^v mmmu ''m ;!yu*^W; ww^^^^^*u !?^!!fsSMr;wJ^ ^W" ^V\^VggVW"^ yyi^^W^^ :vi^«sj^i«^« n rk\ -iUi^yJi M-f'WKRyM^v . A A M i^^lOH A TREATISE MORAL EYIDENCE, ILLUSTRATED BY NUMEROUS EXAMPLES BOTH OP GENERAL PEIMCIPLES AND OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS, BY EDWARD ARTHUR SMEDLEY, M.A. LATE CHAPLAIN OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMiSRIDGE, 'Hvioxov yv(afxr\v o-Tijaas KaQvirtpQ^v dpicTTriv. — PythAG. CAMBRIDGE : PUBLISHED BY J. DEIGHTON; LONDON: GEORGE BELL. 1850 CAMBRIDGE; PHINTED BY METCALFE AND PALMER, TRINITY-STRKET. PREFACE. When a builder intends to build a house, his first object is to secure a good foundation. If, after the work has proceeded, flaws and defects appear in the superstructure, they may, doubt- less, be soon remedied or removed. But if the foundation is unsound, and yet the house is built, the difficulty of remedying the evil be- comes proportionably great. Nothing will serve but the pulling down of all the materials, and a recommencement of the work from the be- ginning. So it is with principles. The mind of man recognises certain foundations, and on them builds a superstructure. But if his fundamen- tal elements are bad, or if in his mental pro- gress he admits any thing that is insufficient, then, before he can return to a healthy state of mind, he must pull down all that rests upon an inadequate support. Though the task a2 IV PREFACE. be painful and laborious, ' and though he be compelled to descend to the very foundation, still the thing must be done. This paramount necessity then being admitted, it will clearly be of proportionable importance, that we fully understand the proper use of the means by which we are to arrive at the pos- session of our elements, or, in other words, to obtain those truths which we so highly prize. Since right conduct implies a due reception of truth, if we are able to appreciate that which shews such truth, i,e. evidence, we have thus at least a power which is necessary to the dis- charge of our duty. We are like men who, being about to enter into battle, are at all events trained in handling and applying their weapons. We are as artists, sculptors, say, or painters, who, having good materials and suit- able instruments, well know the art of using them. It cannot be doubted that the Creator, in- tending men to imbue their minds with certain abstract principles of action, designed also that in the daily intercourse of life, as circumstances required, they should develop those principles PREFACE, V by a practical application. On a given occasion truths are presented to the mind, of which being convinced, and understanding the rela- tions founded on these truths, as well as armed with its abstract principles, it is thus prepared for action. In the following pages it is at- tempted to give specimens of the establishment of abstract principles, and in some degree to explain the manner of their application. Since, however, much that is adduced is exhibited principally in the way of example, it will pro- bably in itself appear meagre and insufficient. Accordingly, for fuller information the Reader is referred to writers who treat professedly upon subjects which are here but incidentally introduced. Nevertheless, what is given may, we trust, be useful as far as it reaches; and it will at all events furnish illustration of the exercise of that great faculty by which man is distinguished, viz. the judicial faculty of appre- ciating truth. A great question, as is well known, has arisen among ' moralists in regard to what is termed the moral sense, said to be naturally inherent in man. I am not ignorant, therefore, that VI PREFACE. objections may be urged against principles as- serted in this treatise. If it appears that it has neither been attempted to answer such ob- jections, nor indeed at all times to prove as- sertions, it is not necessarily because I am insensible of difficulties which may occur, or of solutions that may be oifered, or of proofs that may be required: but it has seemed de- sirable to compress the materials which lay at hand into as short a space as possible, and to exhibit a succinct view of the whole subject proposed. It may, however, be proper to introduce a few prefatory remarks, which will perhaps tend to smoothe difficulties, and which, being pre- sented in this place, will not interfere with the thread of the main argument. In the notion of a moral sense it is implied that men have a natural perception of right and wrong, together with a natural recognition of the former and rejection of the latter; and that they thus approve or disapprove of actions. Against this it is objected: When a child is born into the world, he is totally ignorant of all relations and objects contemplated in the PREFACE. Vll ideas of virtue and vice. What notions can an infant have of chastity, covetousness, cruelty] To which, as regards practical purposes, is it not a sufficient reply to say, These consider- ations do not shew that God, judging of the actions of man, may not accuse him as having conducted himself in a manner contrary to the sense of justice, i. e. the law of nature written in his heart] And though, from not having enjoyed the advantages of proper mental cul- ture, whole bodies and classes of men may have recognised principles altogether wrong; yet this does not appear to shake the convic- tion that there is such a thing as a sense of justice to which the Creator may refer as in- tended to dwell in our hearts. In regard to the wild boy whom Paley mentions,* the ques- tion seems to be, not whether when first caught he would feel a disapprobation of wickedness, but whether when duly trained and instructed an appeal might not be made to his conscience. So with respect to an infant, not whether at his birth he discriminates, but whether as he * Paley's Moral Philosophy, Bk. i. chap. 4. Vlll ^ PREFACE, grows up, being properly * disciplined, he does not acknowledge moral distinctions. It is very possible indeed that there may be a latent moral sense in the human mind which time and cul- ture develop. If a seed lies buried in the earth, and in process of time, under the influ- ence of the sun and rain, becomes at last a plant, what is the explanation of the pheno- menon? In a child just born there are no traces of reason, no proofs of intelligence to distinguish him from a puppy.* Yet who would assert that reason is not naturally in- herent in man] But whether the intellectual and moral powers be or be not latent in the infant, may perhaps seem rather a question of curious speculation than of real utility: and the time at which the moral sense is exhibited may be thought indifferent to our argument, provided that at length it does indeed appear; that, anterior to such appearance, there is no call for it, no responsibility respecting it; and that when exhibited, God can with propriety refer to it as shewing His will. * See Reid's Essays. PREFACE. IX It is admitted that God has endowed man with certain higher faculties, which elevate him above the brutes. Suppose now that when he is placed in a state of society, and made ac- quainted with various truths in which he is more or less concerned, the necessities of his condition, together with the exercise of these higher faculties and the operation of any spiri- tual influences received from God, produce a result, i. e. a peculiar tone of mind. Suppose that at all times and in all places he, as it were instinctively, acknowledges veracity, jus- tice, regard to common good, as principles which ought to regulate human conduct. Does it not therefore follow that God, having in- tended these necessities of society, having in- structed the mind to which He originally gave its powers, has now at least imposed a law for the observance of which He may justly hold man responsible? What if savage nations do recognise principles which we abominate? If the wild man caught in the woods be totally unfit for our state of society % If God, for the furtherance of wise purposes, has given one species of trial to one person or nation, another h X PREFACE. to another? We at least are not exempt from our own responsibilities. Christianity is revealed to some nations, is not revealed to others. Some men are born where religion in its purest form prevails. Others, though nominally Christians, are brought up in ignorance and bigotry; per- secute, and are. persecuted. Even in England, in our own day, some enjoy the highest ad- vantages of leisure, civilization, education, in- tellect; others, sunk in poverty, are therefore naturally deprived of high mental cultivation. Still the Judge is just, and every one is answer- able according to his powers and opportunities. Nevertheless, under all circumstances, how ready is the human heart to admit appeals to certain primary principles, if those appeals are well and wisely made. However untruly, un- justly, cruelly a man may be acting, yet he will hardly with barefaced callousness avow that he is untrue, unjust, cruel; that it is his will and pleasure so to be : but he will en- deavour to palliate his enormities, to reconcile, sophistically it is true, still to reconcile his proceedings with what he admits to be the law given for his obedience, or, " with necessity, the PREFACE. XI tyrant's plea," will excuse " his devilish deeds." Nevertheless he has a plea, however poor; and this in reality implies a law and a sense of responsibility. But as an objection to the notion of a moral sense, it is further urged, that, under given circumstances, the minds of men of even high culture will diifer as to the line of action pro- per to be pursued. One man's mind will dic- tate to him one course, another man's another. This diversity then seems to indicate not the sure law of the Creator, but some fantastic and supple rule unworthy of His unchangeable cha- racter, and on which dependence cannot be placed. To which it seems open to the advocates of a moral sense to make some such reply as the following. It is of course supposed that the mind of a person called upon to act is honest, otherwise the objection at once vanishes. For if he pro- ceeds in opposition to what is really the dictate of his conscience, and knowingly does what he is sensible is wrong, it does not follow that the will of God is not clearly revealed to him,, but Xll PREFACE. it simply appears that he is determined to fol- low the bent of his own will. Though he may make a pretence of conscience, yet the case is really not in point; nor can his alleged dif- ference from the judgment of another man. placed in similar circumstances, be counted of any weight at all. But admit that a man's conscience honestly leads him to one course of conduct, while that of another, of apparently similar education, placed in a similar position, points to another. The question, however, oc- curs ; Be the outward appearance of things what it may, still are the consciences of each duly purified and enlightened'? The Deity in- deed. Who ever contemplates the full brilliancy of truth, clearly perceives the conduct proper to be adopted by a particular man, under given circumstances. But if two men, on the same occasion, sincerely differ ; might not further re- flection, a fuller examination of principles, a deeper probing of their own hearts, lead to unity ] But after all how difficult is it to shew that two persons, under the same given circum- stances, really do come to different conclusions. For though certain apparent circumstances may PREFACE. Xlll be the same, still others which (imperceptibly perhaps) qualify the views of each, are entirely different. For instance, suppose the whole ex- perience of one man's life has led him to attach peculiar importance to one set of notions, that of the other man to another set, and thus, in a given case, they clash; then in reality one judges upon the following evidence, i. e. the circumstances of the given case, together with all other matters bearing upon it, which his experience has supplied in the course of many years. Similarly the other. Hence, as they arrive at results built upon different founda- tions, they may very possibly and naturally differ. Who shall say that the Deity, making due allowances, may not approve of the con- clusions to which both of these persons in their respective positions have come, though such conclusions be directly opposed to each other'? Who shall say that the objects contemplated by the Divine Mind were not the discipline and moral trial of the men, while the course of action adopted or the thing done has (irre- spectively of such discipline and trial) been a matter of secondary importance, or of no im- XIV . PREFACE. portance at all] Thus wHen God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, the thing enjoined was not the object: the intention was to try Abraham's faith. Again, cases of conscience often occur, which are in truth of the most perplexing kind, and where much weighty ar- gument may be adduced on both sides. Now though the pretence of difficulties where they do not exist, as a mere subterfuge and evasion, cannot be too strongly reprobated; still it is easy to perceive, that in really difficult cases the most enlightened of mankind may honestly arrive at different conclusions. On such occa- sions a wise man, duly estimating the position, would naturally shrink from delivering his judg- ment, unless imperatively required. In the va- rious business of life, however, there are these urgent calls, designed doubtless to serve the purposes of moral trial and discipline; and all that we can do is to act honestly to the best of our ability, committing the issue to God. The objections which have been mentioned seem at least mitigated by these answers But a mass of positive evidence may be ad- duced by those who assert the existence of a PREFACE. XV moral sense. Let us see what Bishop Butler alleges on this point. " That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But, additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought : and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disap- prove others as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral, approving and disapproving faculty, is certain, from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in each other. It appears in our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters; from the many written systems of morals, which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined that XVI , PREFACE. all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical; from our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a dis- tinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it; from the like dis- tinction every one makes, between injury and mere harm, which Hobbes says is peculiar to mankind; and between injury and just punish- ment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is manifest, great part of common language, and of com- mon behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty ; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; whether considered as a per- ception of the understanding, or as a sentiment of the heart,* or, which seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty or practical discerning power within us ap- * We find this sentence printed "as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart." As Stewart however observes, there is surely a typographical error. PREFACE. XVll proves, and what it disapproves. For, as mueh as it has been disputed w^herein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public: it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that which the primary and funda- mental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon man- kind, namely justice, veracity, and regard to common good."* Is not this conclusive 1 Because controversies have been carried on in regard to the moral sense, Paley dismisses the question; and taking what he calls a surer road, proceeds to his maxim of expediency. This doctrine of expediency he applies, to the estab- lishment, for example, of such a principle as that of gratitude. Now certainly so high a prin- ciple is worthy of all the support by which it is * Butler. Dissertation '' Of the Nature of Virtue." XVlll , PREFACE. possible to maintain it; and therefore, as aux- iliary we may take what Paley gives ; still do we not needlessly surrender what altogether belongs to us, unless we directly and strongly assert this principle, as at once recognised by that faculty which recognises justice and benevolence 1 While touching upon this point, I will take the opportunity of adding, that in the succeeding pages, recourse has been had to any source which was open for the establishment of the principles asserted. Thus natural reason and Scripture, considerations of justice and expediency, other men's ideas as well as my own have been jointly applied. It has likewise frequently been my endeavour to support and illustrate my argu- ments by analogy. For (as says a learned writer*) from "the numerous similitudes and analogies which our Lord employed on all oc- casions to convey His supernatural truths to men, we may infer that this method of reason- ing is especially consecrated to the service of religion." In the kingdoms both of nature and of grace, the God of all truth is wonderfully * Tatham, Bainpton Lectures. PREFACE. XIX consistent in the mode of its dispensation ; and analogy is the intellectual instrument, by which in one no less than in the other, man is enabled to ascend from earth to heaven. From the curves and motions of projectiles, we have beheld the astronomer rising by a sublime analogy to those of the celestial bodies :" and thus in the moral world we naturally ascend from earthly things to heavenly. Let it be allowed then to establish and illustrate our truths in every pos- sible manner. Though " the rain descend, and the floods come, and the winds blow and beat upon a house," still as its foundations are stronger, the greater is its stability. Accord- ingly, the more firmly moral and religious prin- ciples are established in the human heart, the more probable is it that man will overcome the difliculties and temptations, to which, by the permission or decree of a wise Providence, he is perpetually exposed. k ERRATUM. Fage 179, line 6, erase the word 'instinctive/ CONTENTS. BOOK I. CONSIDERATIONS UPON MORAL EVIDENCE PREVIOUS TO THE RECOGNITION OF CHRISTIANITY. CHAPTER I. Page State of mind supposed to lead a man to inquiry. . 3 CHAPTER II. Intellectual and Moral Truth. . . ,8 CHAPTER III. Intellectual Truth. ..... , 11 CHAPTER IV. Various degrees of Evidence shewing that things have been, are, will be. . . . ,14 CHAPTER V. Difficulties of the Inquirer. . . ^ .29 CHAPTER VI. Answer to the Objections of the preceding Chapter. . 34 CHAPTER VII. Recognition of certain truths of Natural Religion. . 39 CHAPTER VIII. Of Moral Certainties. . . . .42 XXll . CONTENTS. CHAPTEH IX. Page A Future Judgment. Acknowledgment of the truth of Christianity. . . . . .49 BOOK II, CONSIDERATIONS UPON MORAL EVIDENCE IMMEDIATELY SUB- SEQUENT TO THE RECOGNITION OP CHRISTIANITY. CHAPTER I. State of mind of the Inquirer. Nature and extent of Responsibility. . . . . .61 CHAPTER II. Great responsibility in regard to the due admission of highly probable Evidence. . . .67 CHAPTER III. Man is ever a responsible judge, acting by authority. In matters involving great interests the responsi- bility is more strongly felt. . . .73 CHAPTER IV. Recapitulation of elements combined in the character of