■■Httlill IMfl ( H , I I IB ■ II IMliil ■HBflHel IB Hi BSflflSsfiM Saul Hi I I'll HI ra ■ ran mil H HI IIHH| > Hfl HB1BHB 1 91 111191 mil wmi ill ™1BIH1 Mill S^% y sense. It is not sufficient therefore for the exhibition of the phenomena of waking life, that there should merely exist some irregular sensible qualities, resembling FURTHER CONSIDERED. 103 those which may result from the action of the organs of sense and motion. Their ac- tion must be truly used ; there must be the true and unperceived mechanical action of the five organs of sense ; and there must be a mechanical, unperceived passing of the sentient principle, the self from place to place ; and this action of the or- gans, and this motion must be in rela- tion to those things which fulfil their whole definitions. And it is of no conse- quence what place, space, motion, and external things are when unperceived ; they are conditions necessary to a result — therefore the real action of the organs, and the true motion of an individual mind must create a change of self, in relation to objects which continue to exist as the exciting causes for certain sensations or perceptions in particular ; independant of, and distant from, the powers of sen- sation in general. The detection of such an action be- tween the organs of sense and the objects of nature, arises from the conscious use of the organs mixed with the powers of the 104 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS understanding; for a stream of conscious life, however many, and separate and independant causes may be necessary in order to supply it, yet would appear merely as the idea of self; such causes would properly and truly determine an individual self, and the consciousness of self as their single combined effect. But whatever conscious applications were made to any other existence, power, or quality in nature, as necessary regularly to introduce new ideas and sensations upon this conscious self, would prove, that such qualities, powers, and beings, were wholly unnecessary to the existence of, and therefore no part of self. The five organs of sense, and motion, are such means of application, and therefore, the use of them, and regular returns upon them, afford the criterion of the presence of other exterior and continuous objects than self; and is the only way in which the phrase " evidence of sense," can with propriety be used. Motion is thus a sort of sense ; for motion will ever appear from infancy upwards to be an action in rela- FURTHER CONSIDERED. 105 tion to that space which is outward; i. e. an existence not included in the perceiv- ing mind : the child will consider its arms and legs as part of self; but the place in which he moves, the capacity of na- ture which allows him to move, which he by consciousness knows is not always in him, but is always ready to return upon the use of his arms and legs, he rightly reasons or perceives is no part of himself, his mind, or conscious existence ; but yet must necessarily be always existing in order to be ever ready to respond to his motions, and to enable him to use his members without re- sistence.* I say, the infant perceives * Since writing this essay, I find that Mr. Destutt de Tracy has many ideas which I am happy un- consciously to have hit upon ; but his argument is more confined than mine ; — for whereas he consi- ders body to be known as a result of that sensation of mind called a judgment, from the comparison of the ideas of will, and resistance to will; so I enlarge the number of such sorts of judgments, by the comparison of many other ideas, which I think it is clear are made from the earliest infancy, and even perhaps by the foetus before birth. FO 106 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS this relation amidst his " ideas and sen- sations " though he cannot analyse or express it, any more than some others who are far removed from infancy. Therefore, it is the unperceived ac- tion or use of the organs of sense which relates to exterior and continually exist- ing objects, and is the means of deter- mining their qualities to the sentient principle ; and it is the consciousness of their use which forms an argument by which men justly infer such permanent existences, and renders valid the phrase, " perception by sense;' for the conscious Added to this, none of the notions are the result of any circumstance which proves the continuity, and independancy of existences, as well as their exteriority. The former quality must be blended with the other two, in order to the formation of REALITIES. Condillac and De Gerando fall into the same mistake ; none of these show any thing beyond the action of such accidental circumstances as deter- mine will and its sense of resistance — even in dreams. These authors contain therefore no efficient an- swer to Berkeley. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 107 use of the organs of sense is rightly to be considered as the effect of their unper- ceived mechanical action, and this action as in relation to the appropriate objects which affect them : Therefore when the mind is conscious of the use of the eyes, the hands, &c, and of regular replies to their use, — it knows that there are other external continuous existences than it- self present ; and thus the immediate action of the understanding uniting with the conscious use of the organs of sense, together form " the perception by sense," and that of a different " order" of beings from those of dreams and fren- zies. If the organs of sense (and motion) were not truly used, Berkeley's own theory would fall to the ground, because they are, according to him, " necessary for the spirit to work on by set rules and methods." But if the order could go on as in dreams, they could not be needed. " In the manner of dreams and fren- zies" therefore, there is no use for organs of sense, neither are they used. 108 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS There exists, indeed, some sensible ap- pearances upon the mind, as if the senses had been in use ; but in that state there is a deficiency of the ideas of the understanding, so that images of sense, appear together confusedly with- out order in the mind, which is not in a state to perceive that they can be but fancies. But in a waking and sane state of mind, the harmony of its ideas, their relations and conclusions, force them- selves upon it with a superior and con- vincing evidence ; which in ordinary life is not weakened by those sceptical suggestions, which a consideration of the strength of the delusion in dreams, prompts to the more curious enquirer. A scepticism only to be corrected by the reflection, that it is not justified by reason,, or by that comparison and rela- tion of our ideas, which of whatever difficulty in the performance, can but remain the only method in our power of finding truth, or of forming any propo- sition whatever. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 109 Section III. Remarks on Dr. ReioVs neglect of the consideration of the phenomena of dreams in notions of ex- tension, fyc. Now on the other hand to return to Dr. Reid, when he asks, " if extension, " figure, and motion, are ideas of sensa- " tion" (saying he gives up the material world, if the question be answered in the affirmative,) he forgets that in a vivid dream these ideas may take place as perfectly as when the mind is awake ; — he forgets that every percep- tion of sensible qualities whatever must be a species, of which sensation is the genus, and can only be the attribute of a sentient being. By an illusion arising from the association of ideas, he joined the notions of the sensations of the sensible primary qualities, (of our sense or consciousness of extension, figure, and motion,) with the idea of their con- tinually existing external causes, as ex- isting together outwardly. For although 110 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS he explains himself in some places as concerning external objects not to be like sensations ; — yet he still keeps the notion by saying, that perceptions, or conceptions are not sensations ; and that he knows the external nature of a primary qua- lity, as well as its inward sensation ; as for instance, in extension, where the sensa- tion of moving along a surface, is unlike " the hard cohesion of parts sticking to- gether." Now paints, hardness, and sticking, are three " ideas of sensa- tion" also, and can never explain the nature of the external* quality, any more than does the moving along a sur- face. Thus he considers extension, figure, motion, and solidity, to be qualities of bodies, which are not sensations; of whose real nature when unperceived, we have a distinct and clear conception : — Now, there are perceptions of sensible qualities ; and perceptions of their re- lations by reasoning, yet both ere but species of sensations. The perceptions of sense, neither immediately, nor me- FURTHER CONSIDERED. Ill diately as signs of conceived qualities, can ever tell us of their positive nature when unfelt, whether they be primary or secondary. The perceptions of reason, will tell us, that there must necessarily be exterior objects, and that these must be as various as the sensations they create. But this notion was certainly not that, under which Reid contemplated extension, figure, and motion; for he never hints at it. No ; he truly thought the senses could suggest the conception of the nature of the real essential pri- mary qualities of matter, without such conceptions becoming sensations, whilst the understanding was satisfied it was legitimate so to do, because " instinct" compelled the mind to such a conception, and resolved the notion into a " pri- mary law of human belief" which could not be disputed without disputing a first principle.* — Yet the material world, * Against such a doctrine as this, there are few perhaps who might not find a conclusive argument, derived from the experience that every quality what- ever (however considered in a waking state as be- 112 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS the universe need not be annihilated, although primary qualities {after the senses have taken notice of them) should be " ideas of sensation ;" as long as the whole " furniture of heaven and earth" (whatever that furniture may be unperceived,) fits out all its variety of causes and of unperceived objects, to coalesce with the organs of sense and with the powers of sensation in order to its production. Thus, what Dr. Reid calls common sense, and considers erroneously to be a sense or instinct, is no more than an ob- servation of the simplest relations of our ideas. — It is but a simple inference of the longing to external things,) equally appears in dreams. There will arise extension, figure, motion, hardness, and softness ; heat, and cold ; colour, and sound : Will, and the resistance to will, whether by the resistance of solidity, or the wills of other men. It is this observation which shews that no con- clusive evidence can arise from the arguments of M. de Condillac, and M. Destutt de Tracy, De Gerando, &c. for the reality of an independant, con- tinually existing universe. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 113 understanding, after the observation that the use of any organ of sense is needful to let new ideas into the mind, that the mind itself was not the object of those new ideas, and that necessarily a third object must be the occasion of them. There- fore, together with the perception of the coxscious sense, (which takes notice when it is affected,) there is the percep- tion of the understanding, which ob- serving that the sense not being affected by what is properly termed our mind, or the mere capacity for sensation in gene- ral, the things which are affecting it, must necessarily be some other beings, extraneous to both : but this inference which by habit immediately accompa- nies the conscious use of the senses, is knowledge rather than instinct. Now those beings which do not yield any signs of mind or capacities of sensa- tion, but exhibit upon our minds solid extension and other qualities in parti- cular, are termed material things ; — whilst such beings as yield the notion of their possessing life and understand- 114 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS ing, are termed immaterial things. As far as these conclusions go, philosophy or the scrutiny of the most rigid analy- sis will support " common sense," or the simple relations arising from our original impressions ; — but since added to these conclusions, ordinary understandings conceive by a very natural association of thought, that the ideas of sensible qua- lities after the organs of sense have com- bined with exterior objects to their for- mation, are the very external material objects themselves; it is the business of an analytical philosophy, which intends to shew the entire method of the gene- ration of our notions, to break up this association. For an association of ideas merely, will never prove the existence of objects. A notion the fallacy of which some philosophers seem not to be sufficiently aware of. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 115 Section IV. Dreams considered in connexion with the doctrine discussed in " the Essay on the relation of cause and effect;" viz. How the mind may form a judg- ment antecedently to trial of future effects from present appearances ? Upon the whole, therefore, although the appearances in dreams afford a ground for scepticism concerning the reality of external objects, yet this is only on account of the difficulty there is in answering the question, " By what " means we can know antecedently to " trial, how bodies shall fulfil the ex- " pectations raised by their appear- " ance." This question is agitated and answered as well as I found myself capable of doing, in the Essay on Cau- sation ; where it is discussed, " by what " means we can detect the presence " of like compound causes ?" for the objects in dreams and madness, appear the same in all present qualities, as real ones ; but they will not fulfil the ex- 116 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS pectation of the future qualities their appearance is calculated to create. The same difficulty presents itself in all with which we have to do ; for as truly similar objects would necessarily appear the same, so where there is an appearance of similarity, we always consider it as a guiding circumstance by which to form a judgment of the future. In a sane and waking state, we compare such a cir- cumstance with many others, of which when in a dream or frenzy we are in- capable.* In the forming of our judg- ments upon this head, there is displayed every variety of intellect, through every gradation, from that of an almost total absence of it, to the wisest determina- tions, resulting from the soundest under- standings. But it is equally left for the idiotcy which is deficient in ideas, and that kind of philosophy which purposely sets them aside, to conceive the sensible qua- lities of things to be other than " signs of those secret powers' which may be * See Essay on Cause and Effect. FURTHER CONSIDERED, 117 capable of exhibiting their further qua- lities, provided they appear to have been formed by such methods, as must necessarily determine objects similar to those, which have been heretofore so formed. The only notion which can create a scepticism upon this head when applied to the objects of our waking ideas, is the impossibility of knowing by ex- perience, whether the exterior causes of our ideas are so completely independant of our minds, that they will continue when these fail ; i. e. whether they are capable of the qualities of such com- plete exteriority and continuity of exist- ence, that there be no common bond of unperceived union in their respective essences. And if, indeed, the causes for specific sensations in particular, were necessarily mixed up with those which determined all sensations in general, in any one indi- vidual, the universe would be dissolved in the dissolution of such individual, 118 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS which is inconceivable; although I hardly dare say we can perfectly demon- strate the contrary. In that case something would bear that relation to our waking and sound state of mind, which the brain does to a sleeping or insane one. Still we can- not in the least apprehend it ; and we are forced upon a dilemma, something analagous to what the mind frames in order to judge of the cause for the ro- tation of the seasons ; either, we say, " The sun moves round the earth, or, the earth round the sun;" the mind chooses to believe in the latter member of this dilemma, and never doubts after. So, the universe is contained in the existence of a single mind, or there are many minds, and many ob- jects which form the universe, and which have means to exhibit their existences on each other.* The latter * I find this idea is coincident with one of Priest- ley's, but I was not aware of his treatise until after the writing of this. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 119 member of this dilemma, the philoso- pher chooses equally with the peasant, and never for one moment conceives, that on his death, an universal blank and non-existence will succeed. Mr. Hume, who perceived that Bishop Berkeley's doctrine led to so monstrous a conclusion, owned however that it did so ; and although he embraced it, yet he freely confessed that he never acted as if he believed it, " for that the spe- culations of the closet were forgotten in the world, and that he behaved as if he thought things were truly external to him." This confession adds no strength to their doctrine, and may well embolden one who pretends not to their learning or genius, to shew where was the omis- sion unknown to themselves in the course of their reasoning. But, however this subtle part of the question may be answered, it does not, in any degree, lessen the demon- strative conclusions of the foregoing ar- guments, namely, 120 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS 1st. That things must continually exist in order to be ready constantly to appear. 2ndly, That the causes for particular kinds of sensations, must be external to the causes for its general essence or power. 3rdly, That what is termed the mind is a continually existing essence, capa- city, or power in general. 4thly, That what is deemed in the mind, is any particular state of sensa- tion at any given period. 5thly, That the causes of things not in any given state of the mind, and yet capable of exhibiting certain qualities upon it, are out of it, whether fitted to create ideas of sensible qualities, or any other ideas. Gthly, That consideration is the appro- priate method to regain the ideas of memory, &c. but 7thly, That the organs of sense are the instruments by which to regain the ideas of sensible qualities. FURTHER CONSIDERED. 121 8thly, That of all those things which are out of any particular state of mind, those which regularly exhibit sensible qualities upon the use of the organs of sense prove themselves continually exist- ing, by such exhibitions. 9thly, That in dreams, &c. there are no such regular returns upon the organs of sense; therefore, though the proxi- mate causes of sensible qualities exhi- bit their effects, yet there is wanting the proof of the continual existence of such causes, by which means they are discovered to be illusions, or objects, different from those for which their names were formed. lOthly, That the independancy which the causes of the objects of sense have of the capacity to general sensation, is proved by their affecting changes of qualities, of which the mind has no conscience. — But I shall finish this long discussion by remarking that this, and similar essays are not intended to prove, that there is but one method which God and Nature could employ, to arrive at G 122 PHENOMENA OF DREAMS, &C. the same ends ; but rather to analyse the complex operations of our minds, with such care and nicety, as may show what possibly consistent method has been used in the generation of our belief of external nature ; and afterwards to exa- mine if reason will support the notions, which have been formed concerning it. I shall therefore now proceed to draw that inference from the whole doctrine, which was originally the foundation of the observations in this treatise; and which although so long deferred, must at length claim that share of our notice its importance demands. 123 CHAPTER V. ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. The action of cause to be considered as external to mind. — Remark on the vague and popular use of the word Cause. — Sensible qualities not the causes of other sensible qualities. — Two kinds of neces- sary connexion. I resume the subject therefore by call- ing upon the reader's attention to ob- serve, that objects, when contemplated singly as the efficient causes of nature, are to be considered in their outward unperceived state, and as yet uncon- joined with each other. 2. That although numbers of objects may be needful towards any result, yet in a popular way, each may be called g 2 124 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS the cause of an event, when each is ab- solutely necessary in order to that result. Philosophy does not get rid of an incom- plete manner of thinking on this sub- ject, and thus talks of cause and effect following each other, &c. &c. ; whereas it is the union of all the objects absolutely necessary to any given end, which forms a new object, whose new qualities are the effects, ox properties of those objects when uncombined ; and which must be syn- chronous with the existence of the newly- formed object; and only subsequent to the existence of the previous objects, when in their uncombined state. — But the entire union of the objects, is always considered, and is the proximate cause of any event ; and therefore is one with it. Now all the exterior and uncombined objects, whose junction is necessary to an event, may be considered as one grand compound object ; and may, un- der that idea, be termed and spoken of in the singular number : and when con- templated previously to their union may also be considered to be prior in the WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 125 order of time, as the cause of a future object.* In all our reasonings, the word cause is rendered ambiguous, by applying it equally to a part of what is necessary to an end, as well as to the whole of what is necessary ; and to existing objects united to that end, as well as disunited to it; a fruitful source of much unsound reasoning in some of the best authors. 3. The ideas and sensations of the sensible qualities of things, can never be the causes of other sensible qualities of things.-^ It is not the sensible qualities of fire which burn, of bread which nourish ; it is not the idea or conception of the cohesion of parts which cause the sensation of hardness; — it is a certain number of amassed, unknown, external qualities, which determine to the senses different qualities as conjoined effects — " The sensation of hardness is not a " natural sign of an external quality of * This I do presently, in speaking of identity. f See Essay VI. 126 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS " firm cohesion of parts unlike a sensa- " tion."* — It is a sign only of another coexistent effect with itself determined from the same unknown, external object. This impossibility of sensible qualities, being the productive principle of sen- sible qualities, lies at the root of all Mr. Hume's controversy concerning the man- ner of causation ;| for he, observing that such ideas could only follow one another, resolved causation into the observation of * See Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, c. 5, sec. 5, " Let a man press his hand against the table," &c. f It is this view of things which explains the reason of all the difficulty, inconsistency, irresolu- tion, and unsatisfactory discussions upon cause, laws of nature, &c. in the writings of Stewart, Reid, and others — Even Mr. Prevost, who clearly per- ceives Stewart's ambiguity in assigning the same meaning to the word cause, as to other antecedents, fails to perceive wherein lies the true nature of power ; wherein consists that manner of action be- tween objects, by which there arises " the producing principle" of other objects. See Stewart's Philoso- phy of the Human Mind, c. 4, sec. 1, to p. 333. Note O, to ditto, vol. 2, Appendix to ditto, art. 2. Reid's Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 24. WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 127 the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities. But objects, when spoken of and considered as causes, should always be considered as those masses of unknown qualities in nature, exterior to the organs of sense, whose determination of sensible qualities to the senses forms one class of their effects; whereas philosophers, (with the excep- tion of Berkeley,) and mankind in general, look upon the masses of sensi- ble qualities after determination to the senses as the causes, the antecedents, the productive principles of other masses of sensible qualities, which are their effects or subsequents ; a notion naturally arising from the powerful style of the associations in the mind, and which our Maker has ordained for practical purposes ; — but monstrous when held as an abstract truth in analytical science. In a loose and popular way, men un- doubtedly conceive the sensible qualities of a loaf of bread for instance, which are determined to the eye and the touch, (through intimate association,) 128 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS as existing outwardly, along with the natural substance or particles of bread ; and consider, that that whole will nou- rish them ; but this notion is very dif- ferent from conceiving that whiteness and solidity will nourish ; they never do thus think ; they never consider the sensible qualities alone as the true causes of nourishment ; and if allowed to think and explain themselves upon the sub- ject, would show that they supposed the same mass which outwardly determined by its action on the eye a particular colour, and to the touch a certain con- sistency, would, on meeting with the sto- mach, satisfy hunger :— In short, concomi- tant, or " successive sensible qualities," are considered by all men when they come to analyse their notions, (and ought to be so held by philosophers,) as concomitant or successive effects, arising from the different actions of an ex- ternal independant object, meeting either at the same time, or successively, with different instruments of sense with which it unites. — Thus, the antecedency and subsequency WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 129 of certain respective aggregates of sensible qualities, must necessarily be invariable in like circumstances ; for they are successive and similar effects, from successive and similar causes, instead of the succession itself forming essential cause and effect. Whiteness, consistency, and nourishment, are as many invariable and successive effects, arising from an unknown object, exterior to the instru- ments of sense, and independant of mind ; which, formed after a certain fashion, and meeting successively with the eye, the touch, and the stomach, determines its successive sensible qua- lities. # Thus it is in like manner through- out all nature ; — and such a view of the subject would cure the error, which has of late crept into the works of sci- ence ; namely, the considering con- joined or successive effects from a com- mon cause, as possessing the nature of the connection of cause and effect. " When things are found together, an * See Locke. g5 130 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS " ultimate law of nature is * supposed "to be found/' and an enquiry after cause as a productive principle, proves an ignorance of that new and improved light which the labours of Mr. Hume, Dr. Browne, and others, have thrown upon the doctrine of causation. Whereas, causes, or objects, previous to their union with the instruments of sense and the powers of sensation, from whose junction are created the very sensible qualities themselves, must be exterior to, and independant of both ; whilst the regular successions of sensible qualities, are in their turn entirely dependant upon the regular successions of such junctions. 4. The necessary connection therefore of cause and effect, arises from the obli- gation, that like qualities should arise from the junction, separation, admix- ture, &c. of like aggregates of external qualities. But the necessary connec- tion of invariable antecedency and subse- * See Lawrence's Lectures, from p. 80 to 84. WHEN ACTING AS CAUSES. 131 quency of successive aggregates of sensi- ble qualities, arises from the necessity there is, that there should be invariable sequences of effects, when one common cause (or exterior object) mixes suc- cessively with different organs of sense, or various parts of the human frame, &c. Of this obvious and important distinc- tion, between these two kinds of neces- sary connection, the authors alluded to take no notice. But I must now advert to an observa- tion of another description, it being not only necessary for the sake of clearness, but also immediately relevant in this place, where we are speaking of the different notions we form of objects ; i. e. when we consider them as masses of unknown, exterior qualities. I allude to the proper definition and use of the word idea — upon which the whole of the foregoing treatise has an influence;* and the understanding of * M. de Condillac most justly observes, " that " there is a great difficulty in finding a fit place for 132 ON THE NATURE OF OBJECTS, &C. which will greatly facilitate the compre- hension of the mystery intended to be unfolded to whoever has sufficient zeal, curiosity, and patience, to undertake a second perusal of these pages. " important definitions — If they are entered upon " too early, it is before their analysis proves their " propriety — If too late, the just views they may " include, are wanted in vain for their purpose." — This is precisely the case in which I find myself with respect to the definition of the word idea. 133 CHAPTER VI. OX THE USE OF THE WORD IDEA IN THIS TREATISE, AND CURSORY OB- SERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE AND PROPER USE IN GENERAL, &C. Section I. The word idea is used as signifying a distinct class of sensations ; as a sign in relation to continuous existences not present to the mind ; — Berkeley's ambiguous use of the word. — Objects in the mind compounded of sensations, {by means of the or- gans of sense,) and Ideas the result of their re- lations per xeivedby the understanding. — Evidence for the existence of the different parts of the same object unequal. — Objects of memory how com- pounded. — The continuous existence of an indivi- dual mind, or self, an inference from the relations which exist between the idea of remembered exist- ence, and the sensation of present existence. — The idea of existence in general, how found as an ab- straction from each sensation in particular, I use the word idea, as signifying a distinct class of sensations, being the result of that reasoning or observation which shows 134 ON THE USE OF that under certain conditions, there must needs be an existence when we cannot perceive it. In such is included the evidence for memory of the past ; of such is compounded expectation of the future. Thus we have an idea of continual, un- perceived, independant existence ; — but only have a consciousness or sensation of dependant, interrupted, and perceived existence ; whenever I have used it in any other sense, it is in a popular man- ner signifying notion or object of thought, &c. Berkeley used the word idea ambigu- ously, for the perception of combined sensible qualities called an object; and for a result of reasoning which yielded him an idea that there must be causes for his perceptions ; which causes he con- sidered the actions of a spirit. Thus the word idea has been indiscriminately used both by him and others, for the conscious- ness of the sensible qualities, which arise from the use of the organs of sense, in relation to external beings, and for the conclusions of the understanding, after THE WORD IDEA. 135 surveying the various relations and cir- cumstances, attendant on these sensible qualities. Now objects in our conscious apprehensions are compounded of each of these kinds of ideas; or rather of sensations of sensible qualities, and sensa- tions of ideas. — They are not only blue or red, sweet or sour, hard or soft, beau- tiful or ugly, warm or cold, loud or low ; but the ideas of their causes are included in their names as conti?iually existing, and that even when the organs of sense are shut. Had I not been fearful of interrupting the main and important object of this Essay, by diverting, and perhaps en- grossing the reader's attention in enter- ing on the scholastic and unsettled dis- pute concerning the meaning of the word idea, I should have followed the sug- gestions of a strict philosophy, by more fully developing the notion, that all con- sciousnesses whatever ought to be ranked under the one generic term, sensation; and that these should be divided into the sensations of 'present sensible qualities ; 136 ON THE USE OF sensations of the ideas of memory, sensa- tions of the ideas of imagination, sensations of the ideas of reason, §c. Thus simple sensation has many vari- eties of kinds. When it refers to no other existence than itself, it should be considered as sensation properly and im- mediately. In this sense we have the sensation of an idea; but then idea refers to an existence always considered independant of sensation ; which idea is only its sign, representative, image, or whatever name it may please philosophy to term it. Therefore our sensations in- clude the notion of existences, which have existed, may exist, will exist, must needs exist, but whose qualities are not presently determined upon the mind.* * A strict Idealist who really will not admit the knowledge of any thing but his own sensations, and thus refuses to believe in insentient qualities, ought, if consistent, to reject memory of the past and expectation of the future, and to admit nothing but each sensation as it rises as an existence ; for the existences (i. e. the sensations) which are past, and to come, are as much and entirely exterior to, and independant of, present sensations, as any insen- THE WORD IDEA. 137 Objects of memory are compounded of the fainter sensations of sensible qua- lities, mixed with the idea that the causes of the original impressions are removed ; (the which idea is the re- sult either of observation or reasoning ;) these again are united with the per- ception of the lapse of time, or of our own continuous existence going on be- tween the original moment of the im- pressions, and the existence of the pre- sent faint sensible qualities. Therefore the objects of memory are, masses of sensible qualities plus the idea of past time, plus the idea of having been caused by causes now removed. And thus the idea of tim e is not itself a mere sensible quality ; for although the present moment be but a sensation of tient existence whatever can be of sensation in general. Both may be known by receiving the evidence arising from the comparison of ideas, but they must stand or fall together. — I insert this note in consequence of a late conversation with a modern Idealist, who carries the notion so far as to assert, that there is no evidence for any existing sensations but his own. 138 ON THE USE OF immediate existence ; yet the past mo- ment is only remembered in the present ; and the memory of it is its idea, and not the very sensation itself: and this me- mory o£ past existence, and this sensation of present existence, includes in their union a corollary, which is the result of a relation that exists between the idea of remem- bered existence, and the sensation of present existence ; namely, that there "must needs be" a continued capacity in nature, fitted to unite memory to sense, and fitted to continue existence, which itself is neither memory nor sense ; for each particular memory, and each particular sense passes away — but the powers of memory and sensation in ge- neral continue to exist, of which each particular memory and sense arises as a change, and " a change could not begin of itself."* — " Thus the notion of time * It is this primeval truth, " That no quality can begin its own existence/' which is the key to every difficulty that concerns the sources of our belief or knowledge. M. de Condillac's system, (which I have read THE WORD IDEA. 139 is an idea the result of reasoning ; but time itself is a capacity in nature fitted to the continuance of any existence." Again, ideas of imagination are faint images of sensible qualities unmixed with any notions concerning time ; whose causes are considered as at present removed from their operation on the senses ; and variously compounded by the influence of fancy, or rendered more or less viva- cious by its power. Thus the objects of memory and imagination differ as to the nature of their component parts, and not since writing these papers,) notwithstanding its extreme beauty of conception, and close reasoning in general, falls in my judgment very early to the ground ; for he supposes the statue " to generate the idea of self by the perception of the succession of faint and strong scents only." This is a most important oversight — Self is always considered as a continuity, and is generated by the sense of continuous life, and the idea of its continued object which is the subject matter of all the changes. — So well was M. de Condillac aware that this notion was necessary to prove exteriority, that he shifts his ground in the chapter upon touch. 140 ON THE USE OF merely as to the comparatively higher vivacity of those of imagination: — A puerile notion, on which however Mr. Hume has reared the whole fallacy of his system with respect to that belief by which expectation of similar future ef- fects arises upon the presence of similar causes. — He argues, that because what are called real things yield vivacious images, therefore the mind considers all vivacious images as real ; and thus be- lieves in those future qualities of things, which are associated in a lively manner by memory with present impressions. Berkeley has also this fallacy in an- swering the objection made to his doc- trine when his adversary advances, that mere ideas cannot be real things, namely, " That the superior order and vivacity " of some ideas above others make the " whole distinction between what the vul- " gar deem real, or illusory objects" Now vivacity being one of the qua- lities usually accompanying the objects which impress the sense, it must neces- sarily belong to such, as a component THE WORD IDEA. 141 part of their whole effects, and there- fore, other things being equal which influence the judgment, vivacity of sen- sible qualities, will as one of their effects be ever referred to such objects ; and the remainder of their qualities will be expected to be fulfilled in con- sequence. Belief, therefore, (in this case,) and expectation in consequence, arises, 1st. From the necessity that like effects should have like causes ; and 2ndly, From the probability that such should be conjoined with such apparent causes as those with which nature usually unites them ; and therefore will fulfil the remainder of the definitions, which the complex exterior objects bear: and this trust in the regularity of nature in forming her compound objects alike, is on account of regularity itself being an effect which must have its equal cause. So little is merely a vivacity of image trusted to in a sane and waking state of mind, as indicative of the real pre- sence of the exterior objects which in- fluence the sense, that the mind, in 142 ON THE USE OF many cases, perceiving surrounding cir- cumstances differ, justly doubts upon this matter. Then thirdly, the ideas which are the result of reasoning testify, as mere signs, the existences of things, which are not sensations. Now objects in the mind are aggre- gates of the sensations of sensible qua- lities, and of the sensations of the ideas of memory, reason, imagination, ex- pectation, &c. variously compounded : And hence there arises a reason why the evidence of the certain existence of different parts of the same object must necessarily be unequal. For the sensible qualities have an immediate incontrovertible evi- dence, from the consciousness of their immediate presence. — They are felt — and the feelings are themselves the very existences. — But the evidence from me- mory, and reason, can never rise higher than memory and reason are capable of testifying. These sensible qualities equally exist in an hallucination of mind, as in its THE WORD IDEA. 143 sane state, and however incongruous they appear they do and must exist; but if a conclusion be drawn amiss in reasoning, if the memory be treacherous, or the judgment erroneous, then in such cases, these false ideas being mixed up and associated even with the most clear and orderly set of sensible qua- lities, would render the evidence for the existence of such an object, (or aggregate of various qualities,) ambiguous and unequal. Thus it cannot be denied but that the whole objects present to our consciousness, contain parts of unequal evidence as to their existence; some of which some- times failing, yield a just ground of scepticism ; — a scepticism, which how- ever, should never rise higher nor ex- tend further than the irregularity of na- ture justifies ; for as is the effect, so is the cause — the balance of regularity, and irregularity, we hold in our hands ; these are effects, and their causes must hitherto have been equal to them, and unless some interference is observed, or supposed possible, should reason- 144 ON THE USE OF ably beget in the mind a proportional reliance for the future. But if in any instance whatever, there had been hi- therto perfect regularity, yet it would not thence follow there were an equal demonstration for the future ; and that because we are ignorant of the cause for the regularity ; and cases might be supposed in future to occur, where a difference would be absolutely neces- sary in the apparent course of nature, or providence to take place. We have very strong evidence which goes to prove that single varieties, to otherwise universal experience, have taken place with respect to both kinds. That is, there have been single exceptions to uni- versal experience, which seem to have had no precise end in view, nor to have contributed to any end whatever; and THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN OTHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE USE OF, AS MEANS TO AN END, AND WHERE MOST MATERIAL EVENTS HAVE ENSUED IN CONSEQUENCE. The former kind, when well attested, THE WORD IDEA. 145 men seem not to find any difficulty in believing ; — of the latter they are in- finitely more incredulous and jealous in receiving the testimony. — Indeed, it must be allowed that a marvel- lous event becomes a very different object of attention when it presents itself to our notice, not merely as singular of its kind, and one whose causes are not obvi- ous, but, also as one which by its manner of 'production, forces the mind upon the inference, that as the apparently imme- diate cause is inadequate, therefore cer- tain other alledged causes both adequate and necessary are the true ones.* In each of these cases there are true miracles; i. e. marvellous events, singular exceptions to nature's course ; but the latter only affords what ought to be termed mira- culous evidence to a doctrine ; or in other words a similarity in the course of nature, ivith respect to the necessity and action of efficient cause, but a variety from its ap- parent regularity, in order to be used as a means towards a specific end. * See further, the Essay on Miracles. H 146 ON THE USE OF This difference between the singu- larity of an event and its intention; be- tween an insulated and surprising fact, and the object to be gained by it, is not shown (that I know of) by writers on this head. That there are such facts without any doctrine being in question, which are attested and reasonably be- lieved in (and that " with full assurance of faith,") at once dissolves the whole fabric of Hume's argument on the matter; and that whether a doctrine be true or false, — whether there be reli- gious miracles or not : because he points his force against the absurdity of ad- mitting evidence which testifies to the occurrence of an event, different/to??* the course of experience ; out of the order of the apparent train of cause and effect, and which he terms the course of nature. Whereas men very well know that nature, whatever her apparent course may be, still keeps them (( at a great " distance from all her secrets ;" from the knowledge of the precisely efficient cause acting in any particular case, and there- THE WORD IDEA. 147 fore, that there is nothing contrary to her real course, (by means of some secret efficient cause) that singular varieties should take place ; and for this reason they conceive that evidence ought to be admitted on the subject. The examina- tion, reception, or rejection of evidence on it, tries the intellects of men much in the same way as other things do, but their hearts still more when it concerns the subject of religion. It thence follows that a regularity with respect to certain events in one country, does not prove there must be the same regularity in another. Nor does that which is a regular appearance at one age of the world, prove the same must exist in all ages of the world. Nor do the usual actions of God's pro- vidence which are most wise in order to our reliance on his modes of opera- tion, prove that he will never alter his action, if he should intend to convince us in any case of his immediate pre- sence. But to return to the more im- mediate object of this chapter, it follows ii 2 148 ON THE USE OF from the reasoning adduced in it, that both Mr. Hume and Dr. Reid are wrong in their notions arising from the observation " that the real table can suffer " no alteration, as we recede further from " it, although it appears to diminish"* Mr. Hume hence argues, that we can- not see a real table, but the image or idea of a table only; and that thus " we can have no absolute communication " by the senses with external objects" And Dr. Reid answers, " that we " have such communication, because a real " table would by the laws of optics, thus " diminish upon the sight" Now the truth is, that no real table is formed, no image of a table is formed, unless the whole united mass of the unknown objects in nature exterior to, and in- dependant of the instruments of sense, (not yet worthy of the name of " table,") unite with the mechanical action of these, and by their means with the sentient principle, in order to create in * See Reid " on the Intellectual Powers/' for Hume's objection, and Reid's answer. THE WORD IDEA. 149 such an union that object which alone can properly be termed " table." Yet after experience, ^Ae outward ob- jects, the CONTINUALLY EXISTING parts of the whole causes necessary to the creation of a table, must be named by the name by which the whole is named ; for there is no other name whereby they can be called, nor any other ideas by which the memory of them can be introduced into the mind, save by the appearance of " the faint images of those sensible qualities" which their presence originally created.* *See page 137. 150 CHAPTER VII. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE CON- TAINED IN THE PRECEDING ESSAY TO THE EVIDENCE OF OUR BELIEF IN SEVERAL OPINIONS. Section I. The foundation of our belief in God. Assuming I have proved to the satis- faction of the reader, the existence of ' ' body " and of the " external universe/' it remains to point out a few inferences from the doctrine, of sufficient import- ance to justify a further intrusion upon the patience of the reader ; and which have always equally interested the minds of the learned and the unlearned. These principally relate, — 1 . To the existence of Deity. 2. To our own identity ; and the na- ture of body and mind. BELIEF IN GOD. 151 3. To that intimation which the mind receives of outward objects not yet sup- posed to exist, but with respect to which all ideas of delusion are rejected, such as prophecies, instincts, &c. 4. To the comprehension of the na- ture of the unperceived causes of our sensations. 1. As to the existence of God, let it be remembered that all our belief con- cerning every proposition, is the result of what we conceive to be the consistent relations of ideas present in the mind. Now I have shown, that these relations force our minds to believe in continuous existences unperceived. It is upon similar premises that we build the foundation of our belief in Deity. For after some contemplation upon the phe- nomena of nature, we conclude, that in order to account for the facts we per- ceive, " there must needs be " one con- tinuous existence, one uninterrupted essentially existing cause, one intelli- gent being, " ever ready to appear" as the renovating power for all the depend- 152 BELIEF IN GOD. ant effects, all the secondary causes beneath our view. To devout minds, this notion becomes familiar and clear ; and being mixed with the sensible im- pressions of goodness, wisdom, and power, begets those habitual sentiments of fear, trust, and love, which it is reasonable to perceive and to enjoy. Our constantly familiar friend, whose presence we speak of, and whose qua- lities we love and admire, affords us no further proof for his existence and his qualities, than the reasoning adduced in this book : — He must needs be another being than ourselves, having qualities which are not our own, but his, that are sufficient to engage our sympathy, or the relations of our thoughts would be rendered inconsistent with each other. Section II. The knowledge of our own independant existence — how gained* Again, the idea of our own independ- ant existence is generated by observing, that the compound mass we term self IDENTITY. 153 can exist when we do not observe it; and we have thus the idea of our own existence, in that it needs must continue to exist when unperceived, as well as during the sensation of it when perceived. Besides, on this subject, as every other, it is to the causes for the constant effects, (the objects whose union shall bear out similar results,) to which there is a tacit reference as the true and continued existences in nature : — ■ Now the causes for the general powers of sensation cannot be the same as those for any particular sensation, and so must be independant of each ;* and indeed each sensation is always felt as an effect, as " beginning to be ;" therefore what we allude to as self, is a continued ex- isting capacity in nature, (unknown, unperceived,) fitted to revive when sus- pended in sleep, or otherwise, and to keep up during the periods of watchful- ness the powers of life and consciousness, especially those which determine the union of memory with sense. For as sen- * See p. 83, 84, " It is such a perception," &c. H 5 154 IDENTITY. sation is interrupted, and is an effect ; the original cause must be uninterrupted ; and such an uninterrupted cause as is equal to keep up the life of the body, or mass deemed our own body, and to unite it under that form with the powers of me- mory and sense : Identity, therefore, has nothing to do with sameness of parti- cles, but only has relation to those powers in nature (flowing from that con- tinuous Being the God of Nature,) which are capable of giving birth to that con- stant effect, the sense of continuous exist- ence ; which sense, when analysed, is the union of the ideas of memory, with the impressions of present sense. Should it be objected that the causes for such an union might be interrupted ; then as these would " begin their existences" and would only be effects, the mind would go backwards till it reposed in some un- interrupted cause, and would consider such, and such only, as an independant capacity in nature, fitted to excite the union of memory with present sense, and as the complicate being self; which BODY AND MIND. 155 when conscious, could take notice of its existence, and when unconscious, (as in sound sleep) could exist independantly of its own observation. Section III. Observations on the essential difference between body and mind. Hence also may be seen all the essen- tial difference between body and mind ; — Body is the continually exciting cause, for the exhibition of the perception of extension and solidity on the mind in par- ticular; and mind is the capacity or cause, for sensation in general. And these two must be different in "then proportions among themselves," (in their unperceived state,) as well as in their "positive values" in their perceived state.* Now whether these causes or capacities can exist separate from each other, is the question which is always asked, and still remains unanswered in * See p. 38. 156 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN philosophy. Abstractedly there seems no hindrance for such separate exist- ence. Practically, sensation in general is never known, but in company with that which excites the sensation of extension in particular, and which seems so much a part of the whole causes necessary for sensation in general, that under the form and action of the brain, it only seems capable of being elicited. Still we know not whether in many other beings, sensations may not go on with- out brain, and whether, where ideas have once been generated through its means, some other causes in nature may not be equal to keeping them up — ana- logous to the power there is in this state of being, by which we recollect the images of colours, and sounds ; of be- ings, or virtues, &c. &c. without the use of those organs of sense, which were at first necessary to the formation of such notions. It is here Mr. Lawrence is illogical, for he assigns a "false cause," an unproved cause as the foundation for BODY AND MIND. 157 sentiency, when he ascribes it as the quality of the living nerve only ; for we do not know by any experience we have, that all and only, what we mean by nerve, will elicit sentiency.* We can- not produce it by any means in our power ; it has been begun and is con- tinued, without our having had any part in the consultation which took place when God said, " Let us make man in our image after our likeness." I confess I think the farther we extend our views into the regions of metaphysics, the more possible and probable does the resurrection from the dead appear ; or at least an existence analogous to it. For it is evident, more is wanted for the ca- pacity for sensation in general, than that exterior cause which is necessary for the exhibition of extension in particular ; which extension in many varieties ap- pears insentient. Various effects must have proportional causes, and therefore * See Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, b. 4, c. 6, s. 17. 158 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN there must be some extraneous reason for sentiency, beyond what is absolutely necessary for mere insentient extension ; — Yet it has been said, extension seems to form a part at least of that combina- tion of powers which elicits sentiency. Now if the causes for sentiency, minus the brain, find in the great womb of na- ture, any other cause equal to the brain, a finer body, an ethereal stimulus, or any thing which may help to unite me- mory with sense, then the difficulty at- tending the notion of the resurrection vanishes. It would appear therefore equally in- conclusive for man to argue against the possibility of a future life on account of the dispersion of the particles of the present gross body by death, as for the worm to suppose it could not again live because its outside crust wholly pe- rishes : — He might resist every notion (however prompted by his instinct or his wishes,) of an existence beyond the range of his present experience, beyond the extent of the leaf on which he is BODY AND MIND. 159 born to die; yet the time would equally arrive, when as a winged insect he would roam through boundless space in comparison of the circumscribed spot to which his former existence was con- fined, and chase the brilliant image of himself, through a live-long summer's day, amidst the sweets of a thousand flowers. Man in his present state, feels occa- casional aspirations towards another, prompted by the craving want of some unknown unimaginable good, of which he has no intimation but from the con- sciousness of an unsatisfied capacity : — Let him not then too easily reject the belief that this capacity has a corres- ponding object, that his nature is ca- pable of a nobler modification, a higher flight in more exalted regions than this, and enlarged as to every power of ac- tion, thought, and enjoyment. 160 INSTINCTS AND Section IV. Cursory observations on instincts and prophetic vision. Instincts # give notions of real beings, if the objects to which they point fulfil their whole qualities. It is consistent with the previous doctrine, that instinct be an action of the brain excited inde- pendant of impression, in the first in- stance from external objects, but after- wards capable of being kept up by their means. For as the brain is the expo- nent of the soul, so any of its actions whatever, being either the effect of an impression from an outward object, or brought about by any other cause ade- quate to a given action, would equally give rise to the idea of the corresponding object; as in dreams, &c. But in dreams the objects do not fulfil the whole qua- * As for instance, the instincts of birds give them notions of the materials requisite for making 1 their nest previously to a first formation. PROPHETIC VISION. 161 lities expected of them, from the first impressions made upon the mind : in instincts it is otherwise — for after the first impressions begin to fade, the images can be renewed by the acquaint- ance made with those external objects, which are not only capable of fulfilling the first expectation formed of them, but also of affording a regular and con- stant reply to the demands of the organs of sense. In like manner, prophecy is also true prophecy, if a lively action of the brain, does through any cause whatever which produces it, testify the future existence of such things as do really happen after- wards, in such fulness, and order, and perfection as renders it improbable that the coincidence of the prophecy and the events which arrive, could take place by chance. The probable evidence be- fore the accomplishment of a prophecy that it will be accomplished, must arise from a number of collateral circum- stances, which, after accomplishment, 162 NATURE OF have much to do in rendering it of inte- rest, veracity, and importance. Section V. On the knowledge of the nature of unperceived objects. With respect to the nature of unper- ceived objects I shall take notice, that we can form some ideas of their natures by subtracting from them equally that which is common to all, viz. the action of the instruments of sense and the mind. For although it be true that nothing can be like any sensation, but a sensation ; yet it does not follow, but that there may be qualities connected with our sensations, and arising out of them, which we perceive have not sensation for their essence, and so may belong to insentient natures. Now it is - by- separating the idea of sensation in gene- ral from the ideas of particular sensa- tions,* that we gain the notion of exist- * See the short essay, That sensible qualities cannot be causes. UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. '163 ence which need not necessarily be sentient;* for as the capacity for sensa- tion in general, or mind, cannot be contained in any one sensation in par- ticular, so it cannot in all ; and therefore in like manner, as there is one eye, but many colours and figures, so there must be one capacity, but many sensations — one continually existing power, of which these are but the changes. f Again, as variety does not depend upon sensation as its essence, so we per- ceive that variety may take place among any supposed existences whatever; and not only so, but that the quality itself of variety when unperceived, will be like perceived variety, in as far as it is variety; and that such a quality must necessarily exist amidst that set of won- derful objects which is neither contained * See the note page 42 of the essay on cause and effect, and pp. 42, 83, 84, 182 of this essay. f It is supposed here that the reader has acqui- esced in the Doctrine of the foregoing Essay, " That qualities cannot begin their own existence," and that the union of qualities or objects is neces- sary to form new existences. 164 NATURE OF in the uniform capacity called mind, or the uniform action of the organs of sense, and which therefore we justly consider as forming an universe inde- pendant of both. Thus the ocean must be vast, in compa- rison of a drop of water, when both are unperceived. Time, in union with the powers of sensation, may be measured by a succession of ideas in the fancy ; but time in nature, and unperceived, measures, and is not measured by, the succession of events, whether sensations or not; as the revolution of seasons ; the birth and fall of empires ; the change of har- mony to chaos, or of chaos to harmony. — Again, subtract the organs of sense, from the most minute divisions of mat- ter, and they are only little in compa- rison with what is large ; and the ques- tion concerning the infinite divisibility of matter, resolves itself into the impos- sibility of the imagination conceiving and not conceiving of a thing at the same time — -for the conditions of the problem are, that something is to be imagined UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 165 too small for the imagination to con- ceive ; and to imagine it under the forms of an extension, which extension is not conceivable when unperceived either by the senses, or the imagination ; whereas we know not what extension unperceived is, although I am willing to concede a mite cannot be the same as the globe, not only with respect to that condition of being which, when exhibited upon the eye or touch, yields the notion of extension, but which, when subjected to calculation, manifests that in its un- known state, it must be liable to that variety, which when perceived, is called size or figure, and becomes altered in its dimensions : still when that unknown being matter is in its unperceived state subject to that condition or state called divisibility, when fancy has done its ut- most, and attempted a conception of inconceivable subdivisions, perhaps such a portion of matter is a world, and is an unknown quantity of " something," (as Hume calls it) supporting the means of life to millions of beings under no man- 166 NATURE OF ner of relation either to our senses or minds. It is here that it would be proper to show more fully and distinctly than has yet been done, what is the error of Bishop Berkeley's doctrine, concerning the knowledge we have of external ob- jects, and to call upon that which has been laid down in these pages, to point out where the fallacy lies in his reason- ing, which at once is considered as unanswerable, and nevertheless at vari- ance with the common experience of life.* But it is impossible to place his curious system in a proper light, or ren- der the argument against it apparent, without some extracts from his Essay on the Principles of Human Knowledge. I would rather do this in a detached manner, than introduce it here, and then take the opportunity of showing a little more at length than would now be convenient, the manner in which the * Mr. Hume calls it a doctrine which equally fails to enforce conviction, or to suggest an answer to its fallacy. UNPERCEIVED OBJECTS. 167 foregoing doctrine enables me distinctly to point out, how obvious an answer presents itself to those points of his doc- trine, which from a lapse in the reason- ing fail to produce conviction ; and how truly consistent, and philosophical, and accordant with experience, is the rest of his matter, however much it may vary from commonly received notions. I shall therefore throw these paragraphs, with the observations annexed to them, in a short and distinct essay ; and shall conclude, for the present, this subtle, complicated, and, I fear, fatiguing sub- ject, with a concise summary of the doctrine. 168 CHAPTER VIII. RECAPITULATION. The perception of independant, external, and con- tinued existences, the result of an exercise of the reasoning powers, or a mixture of the ideas of the understanding, with those of sense. — Exter- nal objects unknown as to the qualities which are capable of affecting the senses. — Known as com- pounds of simple sensations, mixed with ideas of reason or conceptions of the understanding . — Re- ply to an objection concerning extension. — There exists, however, one set of exterior qualities, which resemble such as are inward; these are variety — independancy — existence — continued ex- istence — identity, SfC- Exteriorly extended ob- jects, cannot be like the idea of extension. — An appeal to the phenomena of the diorama as an evidence for the truth of these 7iotions. The ideas of this treatise do unintentionally coincide with some mysteries of religion. — Conclusion. The perception of external, continually existing, independant objects, is an RECAPITULATION. 169 affair of the understanding ; it is a men- tal vision; the result of some notions previously in the mind, being mixed with each sensation as it arises, and thus enabling it to refer the sensations to certain reasonable causes, without resting merely in the contemplation of the sensations themselves ; by which it comes to pass, that names stand for these compound mixtures ; and that the organs of sense are the instruments which immediately detect the presence of those things which are external to, and independant both of the organs of sense and the mind. I consider the chief proposition, thus used as a mean of quick and constant reasoning, applicable to, and immediately associated with, certain exhibited sen- sations, to be that which comprehends the relation of cause and effect. By these means, there is the reference of similar effects to similar causes, and of differences of effects, to proportional differ- ences in causes. That class of ideas which Dr. Reid 170 RECAPITULATION. terms instinctive, and Mr. D. Stewart considers as composed of simple ideas not formed by the senses, but generated upon certain jit occasions for their pro- duction, I consider to be the conclu- sions of a latent reasoning;* as the mere results and corollaries, included in the relation of those ideas and sensa- tions already existing in the mind, and which were previously formed by the senses. The idea is very soon learned, that it is a contradiction to suppose things to begin of themselves ; for this idea is occasioned by the impression, (the ob- servation,) that the beginning of every thing is but a change of that which is already in existence, and so is not the same idea, (the same quality,) as the beginning of being, which is independant of previous being and its changes. The two ideas are therefore contrary to each other ; and the meanest understanding- perceives them to be so, as easily as it * Since writing the above, I find M. Destutt de Tracy of my opinion. RECAPITULATION. 171 perceives that white is not black, &c. Changes therefore require beings already in existence, of which they are the affections or qualities ; and children, peasants, and brutes know and perceive these relations, though they cannot analyse them.* The mind therefore taking notice of changes, refers them to objects of which they are the qualities. Thus a very young and ignorant per- son will soon perceive, that the various sensations of which he is conscious, are mere changes in relation to some other objects in existence. Such an one on hearing himself speak, or sing, will not consider the sensation of sound apart from its cause, or the object of which it is a change, and on hearing another voice than his own, will refer such variety in the effect, to a proportional variety in the cause ; for here his consciousness tells him, that the sound is not formed by the * M. D. de Tracy considers children as capable of perceiving a relation between two ideas, as of their original perception. i 2 172 RECAPITULATION. same means which formed the first sound, yet it appears in many respects a similar effect ; therefore, he concludes that in as many respects there are simi- lar causes, i. e. similar objects of which there has been sound as a change : and in some respects the effects are diverse, therefore, the causes are equally diverse ; i.e. are uttered by another be- ing than himself, thus concluding another being like himself to be present. The same method regards the perception of every sense, and the objects in relation to it ; and I consider primary qua- lities of matter, in this respect, to be upon the same footing as those which are secondary : Objects are therefore, be- ings like ourselves, plus or minus the differ- ences ; in as much as they are the propor- tional causes of the sensations which they create. Thus we can but virtually touch causes, and that is by reasoning. And as the knowledge of external nature is but an inference from reason, either from the relation of cause and effect, analogies, probabilities, &c. so its abso- RECAPITULATION. 173 lute independancy of each mind, can have no further certainty than such in- ference, however strong it may be, can afford. Indeed, in one point of view, such complete independancy as should suppose the annihilation of any one es- sence in nature would appear impos- sible ; one change is independant of another change, a man may die, and his child continue to live; but I con- ceive the frame of nature so completely one whole, and all its changes but such constituent parts of it, that either, on the one hand, it must be wholly impos- sible for a true annihilation to take place of the essential and permanent existence of any part ; or on the other, that if it were possible, the whole must be destroyed together. Now, although the reference of like effect to like cause be absolute demon- stration, yet it may be, that in some instances, we consider effect partially ; referring some like effects not only to like causes, but to compound objects with which they are usually associated ; 174 RECAPITULATION. and which objects will exhibit other effects, for which there may not be suf- ficient proof or likelihood; also the very comparison of what is like, to like, supposes an ability to perfect compa- risons, a subject on which we frequently make mistakes. Independant existence is then, however, a conclusion of rea- soning; an idea in the understanding in relation to the perception of the ne- cessity there should be like cause for like effect, and proportional causes for proportional effects. Again, as to the continuation of the existence of independant objects, the original causes and capacities for every thing must be concluded as uninter- rupted, as long as effects are renewed at intervals ; it being a contradiction that such effects should begin their own exist- ences. Therefore, the perception of the continued existence of objects is also in relation to the knowledge of causation, and is an idea gained by the under- standing by reference from reason. Out- ward existence, is the perception of a con- RECAPITULATION. 175 tinued independant existence in relation to motion, from our own minds taken as a centre whence we set out ; the which mo- tion is a sort of sense, whose sensible quality merely, could not immediately yield the notion of unperceived ex- teriority, unless mixed with the powers of the understanding, which refer its sensible quality to an unperceived cause, in the way that has been described to be the case both with respect to itself, and to the other senses ; by which means they are considered to interact with those things known by consci- ousness not to be minds. For motion is when unperceived a capacity or qua- lity of being, in relation to those vari- ous objects which are proved to be con- tinually existing by their regular reply to its action.* And when motion is considered in relation to empty space merely, it is also perceived to be in relation to a mode of existence, proved by the same * See this Essay, p. 83, 84, and from p. 102 to 107 ; " It is not sufficient therefore ;" also Essay VI. 176 RECAPITULATION. process of the understanding to be continually existing. For as the ex- teriority of space, or distance between objects, replies regularly to the sense and use of motion, so must it be re- garded as a common quality to all objects, having its own unperceived essence. Al- though, therefore, the instruments of sense, and motion, can only after their action form sensible qualities, " ideas of sensation," yet their use immediately gives notice of outward, insentient, and unperceived existences ; — because the understanding being supposed correct in the notion that such " must needs exist" in the manner explained at large in this treatise, informs the mind that it is with these continuous unperceived existences, that the organs of sense and motion themselves also as unperceived existences interact in order to the per- ception of their sensible qualities when the whole union touches the sentient capa- city.* But it is motion, as first in order, and first in proof, which is impowered to detect the outwardness of ob- * See pp. 54, 55, &c. RECAPITULATION. 177 jects :* because those things which return upon the application of motion to the sense of touch, are by that necessity of motion in order to apprehend their tangibility justly defined as distant from * It is here I differ with several French authors whose works I have met with since writing this treatise, with M. Destutt de Tracy, Condillac, de Gerando, &c. The sense of the resistence of solidity to the sense of voluntary motion, no more proves the ex- teriority, independancy , and continuity of objects, than the reply of colour to the use of the eye. The will is no more self, than is the eye, or the hand. The five organs of sense in their conscious use, afford by the phenomena which take place in consequence, an equal proof of these attributes belonging to those constituent parts of the whole causes of our sensations, which are by conscious- ness known not to be contained in the mere pos- session of the mind itself, and in the motions of the five instruments of sense. For these latter can exist and act without certain given ideas, there- fore the REMAINING NECESSARY PARTS of the whole cause of such ideas, are independant and separate from them. Such also regularly reply to irregular applications, in relation to them, there- fore, continue in their existence. This is the argu- ment, and it applies, equally to each of the five i 5 178 RECAPITULATION. the mind which apprehends them,* for every distinct quality may be named as we please according to its variety of appearance. But it is these distant con- tinuous existences, which exhibit their qualities, one quality, that by the ear is perceived as sound ; another, by the palate as taste ; a third, by the nostrils, as smell ; a fourth and fifth, by the eye, as figure and colour. Nevertheless these distant independant beings in re- lation to motion, are wholly unknown as to their imperceived qualities, which yet we immediately perceive must exist by means of the sensible qualities they excite, and which are associated with the ideas of their causes. It is not, therefore, colour only, but all sensible qualities whatever, which are carried out by an act organs of sense, as much as to the sense of touch. The touch would not prove this point, without a mixture of reasoning : and which reasoning would be sufficient to draw the same result from the phe- nomena of the other senses. See Destutt de Tracy Ideologic, p. 114, duod. * See p. 57, &c. of this Essay. RECAPITULATION. 179 of the mind, and considered as propor- tionally distant from the mind, as is the quantity of motion required to attain them in their tangible form, and as im- mediately coalescing, and inhering in and with those independant objects.* Infants very soon perceive motion to be in respect to existences, which are not included in the idea of themselves; and which they also very soon con- ceive to continue to exist unperceived, as they are " ever ready to appear" upon the caprice of their action ; that is to say, the influence of thought or conception of ideas, is soon mixed with simple sensa- tion, forming thereby those complex beings called outward objects ; (I may say, those perplexing beings, at once ideas of the mind and existences inde- pendant of it ! ) Now the understand- ing perceiving that independant con- tinued existences, are not the same be- ings as those which are included in our * See Essay 4th, on the union of colour and ex- tension. 180 RECAPITULATION. own sentient natures ; that they are not merely sound, colour, &c. places them beyond, (that is, considers them as existing under a capacity of being in- dependant of) every source of our own sensibility ; viz. out of the limit of the definition of our bodies and minds ; asso- ciating with the ideas of their distances their whole sensible qualities. I now repeat this reasoning is also appli- cable to the primary as well as the secon- dary qualities. For what are " parts in cohesion or extension,"* when separated from that external independant exist- ence which the understanding allots to the unperceived unknown causes of these ideas in the mind, and from their rela- tion to motion, (which when unper- ceived is also unknown as to its nature,) but " ideas of sensation" exhibitions of colour and of touch, &c. Nor will it be a reasonable objection to say, (as Dr. Reid does) " an idea cannot be extended and solid," for the proposi- * See Reid's Inquiry. RECAPITULATION. 181 tion concerning the perception of external qualities, intends to assert, that the idea of extension as a sensation independant of its cause is not an extended or solid idea, any more than the idea of a colour is a coloured idea ; or of a sound a noisy idea. For although the qualites are under- stood to be created by their exterior causes, yet these qualities are but effects ; — a certain " idea of sensation " is not coloured, it is colour — does not emit a sound, it is sound — does not ex- hibit extension, it is extension, and so of the rest. They are all simple sensations, created by causes which the understand- ing concludes to be external and inde- pendant of self; and are in relation to motion and the five senses, for the ex- hibition of their appropriate effects, and having corresponding proportions among themselves. Parts, therefore, are unknown powers, save that they exist in relation to motion, to touch, and other affections, the which when un- perceived are still also unknown powers, save in their existences, their mutual rela- 182 RECAPITULATION. tions, and their proportional varieties. For there exists one set of exterior qualities, which we may know of, as re- sembling such as are inward* They are the same as those, which affect the sen- sations, and which the understanding- can apply to every kind of existence, sentient or insentient. Such is that of variety ; we perceive variety amidst our sensations ; but other existences might also be various ; and being so, we in- timately and immediately know what va- riety means. The same of independancy ; one sensation may be independant of another, so may any other existence, and we know what quality it is we speak of, when we predicate independ- ancy of unperceived existences. Existence is upon the same footing also ; existence of a sensation is in the very exhibition and conscious feeling of a quality. But the idea of existence in general is the very being of any qua- lity whatever, as barely contrary to non-existence. t This idea of existence * Seep. 162. f See p. 42, 162, 163, Essay VI. RECAPITULATION. 183 is gained by comparing the conscious- ness of successive sensations with the idea* of non-existence; which idea is also generated by the means of their successive disappearance. Thus, the idea of existence is a more general idea than that of the idea of sensation, for as each sensation in particular successive- ly ceases to exist, so they all must ; and as they do not begin their own existences, so they are but changes of something which is neither any one 9 nor yet the whole of our sensations : therefore, sensation is not necessarily existent, but existence is something which is not included in any conscious- ness, and is the general quality of which sensation is the accident, or exponent ; instead of sensation being a mere sy- nonymy with existence, as I have heard contended. Therefore an unperceived quality may exist unfelt, and in that quality of exist- tence, can be conceived of when un- * See p. 50, concerning negative ideas. 184 RECAPITULATION. perceived, as similar to perceived exist- ence : Also in a more popular and practical way, we judge that another mind might not perceive our sensations, nor we the sensations belonging to another, yet that both would equally exist in relation to each unperceivedly. Continued existence is likewise subject to a similar observation, and signifies that no interval of time, interrupts the existence of a particular quality ; such an affection may belong to unperceived as to perceived existences. Identity, or the continued sameness of a quality, may be predicated of an unperceived quality, and there may be other affections liable to similar rea- soning, which at present do not occur to my mind, unless it be the relation of cause and effect, which may equally exist among insentient as sentient na- tures. The reason why these unper- ceived qualities, may resemble those which are perceived, and not any of the primary or secondary qualities of bodies (relating to the five organs of RECAPITULATION. 185 sense) be resembling in their perceived and unperceived state, is because the external qualities which are in relation to the senses and mind, require their aid to modify them ; and that which is altered cannot be the same as when exist- ing previous to alteration. Unperceived, unconscious, extended parts, (whatever parts unperceived may be,) cannot be like the idea of extension. But among sensations themselves, after their determination upon the mind, there may exist relations which the senses have nothing to do with, have 7iot altered, and which may be applicable to any existence whatever : — Putting all these things together; the colouring of a scene in nature or art, is in relation to real or supposed motion — and motion is con- ceived in relation to existences inde- pendant of self; therefore colouring will always be seen as though it were outward, and therefore conceived of as thus by the imagination. The organs of sense convey sentient existences in- ternally to the inmost recesses of the 186 RECAPITULATION. soul : the understanding reacts upon them, and places all things without it in similar proportions. If this proposition were not capable of proof by abstract reasoning, the exhibition of the Diorama now before the public (of a scene of natural size from nature, and another from art,) would be enough to prove that colouring is placed in proportion to the position of things among themselves ; and such positions are as the capacities of distance, and the powers of motion in relation to us, as well as among themselves : The scene, independant of the under- standing, is a scene of mental sensation ; for when the mind is for a moment deluded, (of which I speak from expe- rience, knowing that this extraordinary fac-simile of nature and art has the power of effecting a complete delusion,) and forgets the place in which it is — the relation of place being forgotten, the scenes are conceived of as real ; i. e. the colouring is symptomatic as a quality of beings, which will fulfil the remain- der of the qualities belonging to their RECAPITULATION. 187 definitions upon trial, and thus be equal to their whole definitions. But when we recollect where we are, the mind perceives these thoughts to be illusory, and the colouring is not then conceived to be a quality of such objects as will fulfil their whole definitions. I shall conclude with saying, that as we never can experience the fulfilment of that part of the definition of external objects, viz. their existence after our own ceases ; so although it be an inference of high probability, yet it is short of strict de- monstration. We can indeed by refer- ring like effects to like causes, and pro- portional effects to proportional causes, demonstrate thus far ; but we never experience this further complete inde- pendancy of outward object as an effect. All we can do is to refer compound si- milar and various effects, to compound similar and various causes ; which occa- sions an inference that such causes are like ourselves, plus or minus the vari- eties, and we finding ourselves inde- pendant of them, are led to conclude 188 RECAPITULATION. they will in like manner be independant of us. This statement of the matter imme- diately touches upon the difficulty there is in the detection of like compound objects being present to us. However, the reasoning on the point is nearly de- monstrative, and practically is entirely so — for when we get at objects like ourselves, which must exist as causes of the effects we experience, nothing is perceived capable of making such a difference, as should prevent them from existing independant of us were we no more — yet things are real, if even this last test of independancy remain without proof; for they are real which fulfil the definitions for which their names were first formed. The being true to expectations formed of their qua- lities, is the very criterion of reality ; and even upon the supposition of a total independancy being out of contempla- tion, still all existing things would be in relation to our senses, and to motion ; and be independant of our thoughts and RECAPITULATION. 189 actions. Nor let it be thought that in- fants, peasants, and brutes, do not reason ; all of these are capable of per- ceiving certain relations, included in the impressions made -upon them, and of drawing them as occasion requires into practical results.* With respect to the nature of God, (in which all men are so much and justly interested) his essential existence, his continued existence is demonstrated, by the abstract argument used in this treatise. Whatever variety and changes of beings there are, all changes must finally be pushed back to that essence who began not, and in whom all de- pendant beings originally resided, and were put forth as out goings of him- self in all those varieties of attitudes which his wisdom and benevolence thought fit. And I shall not shrink from saying,, that such thoughts as these, do unin- tentionally render the mysteries of re- * M. de Tracy says, " Un enfant apperc.oit un rapport cerume il appercoit un couleur." 190 RECAPITULATION. ligion easier to the comprehension than otherwise they would appear ; for shall we limit the capacities and attributes of Divinity, in his unknown, unperceived state, by our meagre perceptions ? May he not to every world that hath come forth from him, offer a protection, and an in- terference, in proportion to, and in re- lation to its wants ? May not some confined manifestations, of the uni- versal essence, be sent to different worlds adapted to their capacity for moral improvement, to the motives which may act upon them, and the uses which result from such a mani- festation of his presence, in the way either of action or passion ? Again shall all things swarm with life, and the principle which divides animate from inanimate nature be still undiscovered, and yet no emanation from the essen- tial deity, brood over the face of the deep, or breathe into man the breath of life ? or finally, shall God be either limited, or divisible, by senses that cannot detect his presence, although RECAPITULATION. 191 known by the understanding that he " needs must exist," and be in all times and places " ready to appear" to his creation, as the continually existing cause for its support, its life, its hope, its confidence, and its joy ! ESSAYS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE DOCTRINES CONTAINED IN THE PRECEDING ONE, AND IN AN ESSAY ON THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. K PART II. ESSAYS CONTAINING INQUIRIES RELATIVE TO THE BERKELEIAN THEORY; THE COMPARISON OF MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL INDUCTION ; THE UNION OF COLOUR AND EXTENSION; THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES ; THE NATURE OF A FINAL CAUSE AND OF MIND; THE REASON OF SINGLE AND ERECT VISION. 195 ESSAY I. consideration of the erroneous reasoning contained in bishop Berkeley's principles of human knowledge. Section I. " When several ideas," says Bishop Berkeley (section 1st,) " (imprinted on " the senses) are observed to accom- " pany each other, they come to be " marked by one name ; and so to be " reputed as one thing, thus a certain " colour, taste, smell, figure, and con- " sistence, are accounted one distinct " thing, signified by the name of apple; " other collection of ideas form a stone, " a tree, a book, &c." (Section 3rd, p. 25,) " For what are objects but the " things we perceive by sense ? and k 2. 196 on Berkeley's principles ' what do we perceive but our own " ideas or sensations ? for, (section 5th,) :i light and colours, heat and cold, ex- " tension and figure, in a word, the " things we see and feel, what are they " but so many sensations, notions, ideas, i( impressions on the sense? and is it ' possible to separate even in thought " any of these from perception." Sec. 9, p. 27. " Some make a distinc- " tion between primary and secondary " qualities ; but extension, figure, and ; ' motion, are only ideas existing in the ' ( mind . And an idea can be like nothing " but an idea, for neither these nor their " archetypes, can exist in an unper- " ceiving substance." (Section 15th.) " It is impossible, therefore, that any " colour or extension at all, or sensible " quality whatever, should exist in an " unthinking subject without the mind, " or indeed, that there should be any " such thing as an outward object." Thus far Bishop Berkeley, on objects being only ideas, or sensations of sen- sible qualities, and these ideas as com- OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 197 prehending the primary as well as se- condary qualities, Many, I conceive* will think, from what I have said in the foregoing pages, that there is no mate- rial difference between my doctrine, and his. But a careful investigation of both, will show there is a very consi- derable one. For although, I agree with him, I st. That nothing can be like a sensation, or idea, or perception, but a sensation, idea, and perception; 2ndly. That the primary qualities, after the impressions they make on the senses, are sensations, or ideas, or perceptions ; as well as the secondary ones. Yet I do not agree with him, in stating, that objects are nothing but what we per- ceive by sense, or that a complete enumeration is made of all the ideas which constitute an apple, a stone, a tree, or a book ; in the summing up of their sensible qualities. For I have made it clear, I trust, by the foregoing argument, that an object perceived by the mind is a compound being, consisting of a certain collection of sensible qua- 198 on Berkeley's principles lities, " mixed with an idea the result of reasoning" of such qualities being formed by a " continually existing out- ward and independant set of as various and appropriate causes ;" therefore th^t there must be " an outward object," existing as a cause to excite the inward feeling. The logical error, therefore, of Bishop Berkeley on this part of the subject, is an incomplete definition; for no definition is good which does not take notice of all the ideas, under the term ; and in every object of sense which the mind perceives, the know- ledge of its genus, as a general effect arising from a general cause independant of mind, is mixed with the sensations or ideas resulting from its special qualities affecting the same. The notion of this genus is omitted in Dr. Berkeley's definition of an object, by the limiting words but and only. 2. Bishop Berkeley is guilty of an ambiguity, when he speaks " of ideas being imprinted on the senses" " of OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 199 our perceiving" (by sense) "our own ideas and sensations,' for he appears to speak of the " senses on which ob- jects are imprinted, " as if he intended by them those five organs of sense, viz. the eye, the ear, &c. vulgarly called the senses, but which, in truth, have no sense or feeling in themselves as inde- pendant of mind ; but are mechanical instruments ; which as powers modify exterior existences, ere they reach the sentient capacity ; the which capacity as a general power or feeling becomes modified thereby; for undoubtedly, the senses as organs cannot perceive what the senses as organs are required to form.* ■ When he speaks of " ideas being im- printed on the senses," the phrase con- tains the very doctrine he is controvert- ing. The ideas of colours cannot be im- printed on the eye ; nor those of sound on the ear ; nor those of extension on * Dr. Reid on visible figure, &c. is guilty of a like error. 200 on Berkeley's principles the touch ; for there are no such ideas, until after the eye, as an instrument, has been affected by some sorts of out- ward objects, fitted to convey to the sentient principle, a sensation of colour, and so of the rest. Therefore the ob- jects perceived by the organs of sense cannot be our ideas, and sensations. Indeed, he does not take notice that he uses the notion of perception (which is that upon which the whole argument depends) in two different methods, or meanings. For the term perception, when applied to those objects for whose observation the organs of sense are required, and by which certain qualities are determined upon the per- ceiving mind, is used as the notice the mind takes of the presence of certain qualities in consequence of the conscious use of the organs of sense, the use and action of which must, therefore, be in relation to some objects which are not the mind ; but when applied to the " ideas and sensations of sensible qua- lites," perception is only used as the OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 201 mental consciousness of those quali- ties, leaving out the conscious use of the organs of sense, and the ideas of the outward objects which must neces- sarily have acted on them. Nor is this reasoning I am using, the mere turning of an expression, for in this sentence " what are objects but the things we perceive by sense ?" and " what do we perceive but our ideas and sen- sations ?" there is an offence against one of the plainest and most useful of logi- cal rules ; for the argument if placed in a regular syllogism, will be seen to contain a middle term of two different and particular significations from which, therefore, nothing can be concluded. Let the question be, " Are objects, ideas and sensations only?" and the middle term, " The things we perceive " — be united with the predicate for the major proposition, and then be altered to — " the things we perceive by se?ise.' : when joined to the subject, for the minor ; it will be seen that an incon- k5 202 on Berkeley's principles elusive syllogism is thence formed. — For if the major proposition stands, "Our ideas and sensations, are the only things we 'perceive,'" and the minor, " Ob- jects are the things we perceive by sense," the conclusion, viz. " Therefore objects are only our ideas and sensations," does not logically follow, because the middle term would then consist of " two different parts, or kinds, of the same universal idea," i.e. the idea of perception in general; " and this will never serve to show whether the subject and predicate agree, or dis- agree."* For in the general conscious per- ception of sensible qualities, are included the knowledge that the organs of sense are used, as mechanical instruments acted upon by cer- tain causes, and the ideas of these~causes . And this conscious use of the mechanical action of the five senses in relation to other beings than the mind, is a very different part, or kind of the universal idea of per- ception, from the mental consciousness of PARTICULAR SENSIBLE QUALITIEStfft/z/ ,' * Watts's Logic. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 203 which is also another part, or kind of the general notion of perception ; which general notion includes every species of consciousness whatever. The conscious- ness whether the organs of sense be used or not, in perceiving objects, is the great criterion of a sane, or insane state of mind, of its waking or sleeping con- dition ; the consciousness that the organs of sense are used, makes all the difference between objects of sense, or objects of memory, reason, or imagina- tion. By the quick and practical use of the senses subsequent to infancy, the asso- ciations of ideas, resulting from reason and experience, are so interwoven and so immediate with the consciousness of their use, that they ought always to be consi- dered as forming a component part of the whole ideas which lie under the terms, the objects of sense. The objects of sense, therefore, (under the conscious use of the organs of sense,) are known, (ac- cording to the reasoning used in the foregoing chapters of this essay,) to be the continued, exterior, and independant exist- 204 on Berkeley's principles ences of external nature, exciting ideas, and determining sensations in the mind of a sentient being ; but not only to be ideas and sensations. In the sentence already commented on, and which contains the sum of Dr. Berkeley's doctrine — the word object, as well as the phrase " perception by sense" is of ambiguous application; — for in his use of the word object, he begs the question ; meaning thereby a collection of sensible qualities, formed by the senses and apprehended by the mind ; whereas the adversary means by that word, a set of qualities exterior to the mind, and to which the organs of sense are in relation as mechanical instru- ments, and of which they take notice as those permanent existences, which the understanding is aware must needs continue when unperceived, ere they are transformed by their action into other beings. Objects before the notice of the senses, are not the same things as after their acquaintance with them. All men mean by objects the things which OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 205 exist previously to their mixture with the action of the organs of sense, and Which FROM POWERFUL ASSOCIATION, they conceive to exist under the forms of their sensible qualities; — therefore by feigning the contrary notion there can arise no convincing argument. To go on, however, with the argu- ment, (by which I would show that ob- jects of sense are not only the ideas of their sensible qualities,) I observe that reason discovering these objects to be in their relation to each other, as va- rious as the impressions they convey; also perceives them to be in one respect like Xh.e ideas they create ; i.e. in the same proportions and bearings to each other, outwardly as they are inwardly. Therefore among the observations we have of " our ideas and sensations" of sensible qualities, we do perceive some- thing else than these mere " ideas or sensations ;" for we perceive by reason, that those things which must needs be present in order as causes to affect the sense, may on account of their variety, 206 on Berkeley's principles their similar distinctness, and proportions, be named, (when considered as existing exterior to the instruments of sense,) by the names they bear when inwardly taken notice of. Now I consider the observation of this latter circumstance as containing a full answer to all the puzzling contra- dictions of Bishop Berkeley's theory; for although, in a popular manner, men consider things are outwardly the coun- terpart of what they perceive inwardly ; yet this is not the whole reason of the difference they make amidst things : for the soul does truly in a sense perceive outward things, as they are when exist- ing outwardly, for after reason shews that the qualities of things, in a state of perception, cannot be like them out of a state of perception, yet being conscious that sensation is only a simple act, (a power, a quality,) it perceives by the un- derstanding thatthe varieties of things are in relation to each other outwardly in the same proportion as are the inward sensa- tions . Thus hard and soft,bitter and sweet, OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 207 heat and cold, round and square,are there- fore perceived not only to be sensations, but to be certain unknown qualities of objects independant of the mind in re- lation to each other, and in that state " to continue to exist, ready to appear to the senses when called for." Popularly, the sensations these excite, are associated with the notions of the outward objects, and all their varieties. But when philosophy breaks up this association, she should not take away more than what this na- tural junction of thought has created; Bishop Berkeley does not merely sepa- rate what is mixed, but would destroy the whole compound together. This observation, in my opinion, contains a demonstration against the Berkelean theory, and restores nature entirely to her rights again. " Equals taken from equals the remainders are equal.'" Take sensation, simple sensation, the power or capacity of feeling merely, from exten- sion, from colour, from sound, and from taste; from heat and cold; from electri- city or attraction ; from fire, air, water, .208 on Berkeley's principles or earth ; from the 'perception of life, or the idea of death ; from motion or rest. Is there nothing left ? Every thing is left that has any variety or difference in it. " What are objects" (says Bishop Berkeley) " but the ideas perceived by sense ?" They are beings perceived by reason, to be continually, independantly, outwardly existing, of the same propor- tions as are the inward sensations of which they are the effects. Had Bishop Berkeley allowed of the force of a most finished piece of reasoning he uses in respect to the proof of the existence of other minds than our own, in behalf also of objects that are not minds, he had not set before the public, some para- doxes, unhappily considered as unan- swerable. In (sect. 195), he says, " From " what has been said, it is plain that " we cannot know the existence of other " spirits otherwise than by their opera- " tions, or the ideas by them excited in "us. I perceive several motions, " changes, and combinations of ideas, " that inform me there are certain par- OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 209 " ticular agents like myself, which ac- " company them and concur in their " production. Hence the knowledge I " have of other spirits is not immediate " as is the knowledge of my ideas, but " depending on the intervention of ideas, " by me referred to agents or spirits " distinct from myself, as effects or con- " comitant signs." Now my argument (however ill I may have executed it) intends the whole way to show " that our knowledge of other objects" (of any kind) is not im- mediate as is the knowledge of our ideas," but depends " on the intervention of our ideas," by us referred to " agents or spirits," (to unknown proportionate causes distinct from ourselves,) and that the several " motions, changes, and combina- " tions of ideas, which we perceive, in- " form us that there are certain parti- " cular agents like ourselves" (always like ourselves as continuing to exist, and in other qualities, plus or minus ourselves) " which accompany them, and concur " in their production." 210 on Berkeley's principles In order, however, to carry the argu- ment a little farther on these matters, let us examine with a greater nicety than we have yet done this proposition ; — " figure, extension, and motion are only " ideas in the perceiving mind," — and let us select one quality, say figure, for this examination, in order to sim- plify the analysis ; then the argument which applies to figure, will also apply to the other qualities. Let the question be ; Is figure an idea only in the perceiving mind ? Now un- doubtedly the sense, inward perception, or notion of figure, (or by whatever word shall be designated the conscious sensa- tion of a living being which it has, un- der the impression of figure,) can only be in a perceiving mind ; and nothing else can be like it but such another sensa- tion : but this sense of figure, is not what the word figure, only means when ap- plied to an object which affects either the sense of sight or touch. It is then a relative term — a sign of a compound notion, signifying a particular sensation OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 211 caused by a particular cause, which cause is not a sensation. Moreover, the word is also understood to be applicable to the proportion which that cause (or " outward continuous object " ) bears to the other out- ward beings surrounding it; (and this without supposing they are the least like our ideas ;) for let us consider a round figure, for instance, apart from our perception of it ; the line which bounds this solid substance outwardly, (whatever line and solid may be,) and parts it from the surrounding atmosphere, (whatever parting or atmosphere may be,) must still be a variety, or change, or difference, among these outward things, and this difference among outward unknown things, not like sensations, is outward, and is always meant in that sense by the word, which signifies, a certain state of continuous ex- istence, which is independant of mind. The word and notion are compound, and each stands for the cause and effect united, and not only for the effect. Philosophers, therefore, ought to be capable of per- ceiving that figure, extension, and mo- 212 on Berkeley's principles tion, &c. are not only ideas in the mind, but are capacities, qualities, beings in nature in relation to each other when exterior to mind. It is owing to our ideas being the counterparts of the proportions of those things, which our reason teaches us must be independant of mind, that Dr. Reid talks of an intuitive conception and knowledge of the nature of outward extension, &c. Whereas it is by ob- serving the relations of our ideas which are effects, whose causes must be equal to them, that we have a knowledge of that relation which the independant and permanent objects of the universe must needs bear to each other ; if instinct only guided us, there would be no more proof of the external world than of a dream, where there is an equal instinct in behalf of what is afterwards acknow- ledged to be non-existent. But the perceptions of the relations which our ideas and sensations bear to each other, and the results therein de- duced, put the proof of an external and OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 213 continually existant universe upon the same footing as the existence of the sensations themselves, and form a de- duction as demonstrable, and clear, and convincing* as any mathematical cer- tainty whatever. To go on, Bishop Berkeley however allows that there are causes for the sen- sations of sensible qualities ; independ- ant of the perceiving mind. But it is in descanting upon their nature that he is again guilty of as fallacious, and in- conclusive, and paradoxical reasoning as that which we have just examined ; for he uses the very argument of his adversary, (which he has been indus- triously endeavouring to destroy,) as an instrument to prove his own doctrine, and I shall now proceed to shew that he does so. Section II. (Section 25th and 26th.) " We per- " ceive," says Bishop Berkeley, " a " continual succession of ideas ; there 214 on Berkeley's principles " is therefore some cause of these ideas. " This cause cannot be any quality or " idea ; for an idea " (section 25th) " is an inert being, and cannot be the " cause of any thing. It must therefore " be a substance," (section 26th,) " and " as it has been shown there is no ma- " terial substance, it remains the cause " of our ideas, is an incorporeal, active " substance or spirit." (Section 27th.) " A spirit is one simple, undivided, " active being, which hath understand- * ing and will." (Section 28th.) " My " own will excites in my mind ideas at " pleasure, and by the same power they " are destroyed. This making and un- " making of ideas, very properly deno- *' minates the mind active." (Section 29th.) " But the ideas imprinted on " sense are not the creatures of my " will, there is therefore some other " will or spirit which produces them." (Section 30th.) " Now there are set " rules, or established methods, where- " by the mind we depend on excites in " us the ideas of sense, and these are OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 215 " called the Laws of Nature."* (Section 156th.) " By nature is meant the vi- " sible series of effects or sensations " imprinted on our mind." The con- clusion of the whole matter is, that there is nothing but two sets of ob- jects, viz. "spirits" and "ideas;" " spirits as causes, and ideas as their effects." Now it is plain we can know no more of activity, indivisibility, and simplicity, as applied to substance, called mind, than of inertness, divisibility, &c. applied to another sort of substance, called matter. These are still only ideas gained in the usual way, rejected when applied to objects of sense existing with- out the mind, but made use of by him, when applied to spirit, existing without the mind. " Motion" (Bishop Berkeley distinctly says) " is only an idea existing in the mind." If so, I ask, what does he know about activity, as absolutely ne- cessary to constitute a cause, and which * The remaining sections are taken up in an- swering objections, and are quite immaterial to the subject of these remarks. 216 on Berkeley's principles cause, he says, cannot be an idea? because ideas are " visibly zwactive." Also, what notion can he have of cause at all, if he knows of " nothing but ideas ;" and ideas are not causes, and what too are the rules and methods of the working of a spirit, which as rules and methods and laws of nature, cannot themselves be spirit or substance, yet are not allowed to be material beings ? And how can the will at pleasure, call upon an idea, when before it begins to call, it must know what it wishes to call, and so must have consciousness of the idea in question, which as an object asso- ciated with another idea, can and does truly act as a cause in order to introduce it. But /argue as we can distinguish between the capacity for sensation in general, and that for the exciting causes of extension and other qualities in par- ticular, so we have a right to name this mind, and that body, and that after all the talk of materialists, who say, " matter cannot act on mind/' (" they are discordant beings ; so all is OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 217 matter;") And the immaterialists who say the same things, (" and that all is mind," for the same reason;) it ap- pears perfectly easy that such causes and capacities, such collections of qua- lities should intermix, and produce those results, which take place under different forms of sensible objects ; and which in my opinion are combined by the junction of the qualities of matter, or unknown powers, or qualities in na- ture ; the senses, or instruments fitted to act along with these ; and the mind, or sentient principle and capacity. Na- ture in her whole works bears witness such is the case. — Also by keeping strictly in view, that the power of sensation is one and simple, ---and that subtracting it from all the objects with which we are acquainted, the remain- ing qualities will bear still to be con- sidered as worthy of holding the various names affixed to their appear- ances upon the sense, and reasoned on as before; — there will be cause and effect, extension and space ; time and L 218 on Berkeley's principles eternity ; variety of figure and colour ; heat and cold, merit and demerit; beauty and deformity, &c. &c. The proportions of all these beings among themselves, the external inde- pendant qualities in nature among themselves, corresponding to our per- ceptions, must be as various as they appear to the mind ; therefore, there is figure, extension, colour, and all qua- lities whatever. Nor is it necessary in order to support the idea of Deity, and his constant presence and providence, to have recourse to the ridiculous no- tion of his activity as a " spirit" upon our senses in order to change our ideas; for whilst the perception of sen- sible qualities immediately informs us of our own sensations* reason by the in- tervention of the ideas of their dif- ferent relations, equally discovers to us insentient existences, as well as that of our own, and other minds; whilst with respect to the being of God, his essential existence, his continued exist- * See p. 14, " Also the mind," &c. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 219 ence, is demonstrated, by the abstract argument used in this treatise. " What- " ever variety and changes of being " there are, all changes must finally be " pushed back to that essence, who be- " gan not to be, and in whom all de- " pendant beings originally resided, and " were first put forth as out- goings of " himself in all those varieties of atti- " tudes, wherewith his wisdom and " benevolence are able to fit out every " variety and gradation of creature."* * See p. 189. L2 220 ESSAY II. UPON THE NATURE OF THE FIVE OR- GANS OF SENSE, AND THEIR MANNER OF ACTION WITH REGARD TO EX- TERNAL PERCEPTION. I would here more fully consider a subject of great importance, upon which I have but briefly touched in the larger essay, " on external per- ception ;" namely, The nature of the Jive organs of sense, and the manner in which they are used, with regard to the con- veyance of the perception of external ob- jects to the mind. This subject appears to me but partially analysed by the au- thors to which I have there alluded. It is naturally complicated ; embraces a vast variety of particulars bearing ON THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 221 upon each other ; — Each of which in order to be examined aright, must, during the period of its examination, be equally considered as unproved, as well as others which might suffice as proofs, were they not also involved in the un- certainty of the point in question. When this is done, every object what- ever of supposed existence, independant of mental consciousness, is found to be upon an equal footing, and must neces- sarily be put aside, on account of being as yet unacknowledged. What then remains as given data ? Nothing but our sensations, mental con- sciousnesses, (simple or complex,) ar- bitrarily named, and their relations ; and this seems to leave so frightful a void ; the analysis of our knowledge into such materials seems so impossible ; and the being capable of arriving at any certain evidence for real things (as they are called,) by a synthesis formed of such, seems likewise so impossible, that the soul starts back with a wise alarm for fear of venturing too far, and 222 THE NATURE OF beyond the limits whence it may be able to retread its steps if such should be the case ; yet as I have attempted to question so much, I must in order to be consistent, push my inquiries still fur- ther. I must lead on to where this subject points, and endeavour to make that theory, which to my own mind is consistent and luminous, appear so to others. Now, that our living conscious sen- sations, that is, those consciousnesses which are sufficiently vivid to form strong impressions ; and long enough in duration to admit of being compared together ; with the results of their com- parisons as again forming a new class of sensations, (ideas of reason,) are the only, the original, and immediate ma- terials of our knowledge, is the chief feature of the philosophy I would pro- fess. And I do consider these mate- rials as sufficient for every useful opi- nion ; for the proof of every existence which others refer to " instincts," "pri- mary laws of belief" " ultimate facts" THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 223 " immediate knowledge by the senses," or other meatis, the which do truly leave the objects of which they testify wholly without any proof whatever ; for, " that we are incapable of thinking otherwise than we do" can itself be no reason that we think rightly. The same instincts, laws of belief, immediate knowledge by senses, do, in the course of every twenty-four hours, afford the same kinds of proof for the independant existence of objects which men admit to be non- existent without a doubt remaining on the subject; but when our conscious- nesses of sensation, and the results arising from the comparison of them are reposed in, as being the only ori- ginal materials of our knowledge, and as therefore containing the proofs of the existences, with which we are ac- quainted, then inasmuch as the ori- ginal sensations are the beings, the very beings themselves ; so the know- ledge of their existence is in and with themselves, as well as of the existences contained in their relations. The ideas of reason are thence upon 224 THE NATURE OF the same footing as to certainty, as are those of sensation, and are true demon- strations of existences. The reason, therefore, for believing in existence, independant of consciousness, must bear to be examined and substantiated upon this foundation; i. e. as being the re- sult of the comparison of our " ideas of sensation." The ideas of reason must be the corollaries included in the impressions of sense, from whatever source they may be supposed to arise ; they must be the conclusions of the judgment when the faculties are in a state to exert their power. For independant existences are, by the very terms, and supposition of the state- ment, unconscious ; and, therefore, must be known of as a result derived from the comparison and included in the re- lations of those which are conscious. In this inquiry all writers I have met with, (especially Bishop Berkeley, who professes idealism,) are to be blamed for an oversight, when they speak of the senses in such phrases as these, "objects imprinted on the senses" "the THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 225 perception of external objects by the senses ;" &c. without even considering that the whole question is begged by this use of the word sefises ; an object imprinted on the eye, for instance, must mean, (even in Bishop Berkeley's sense,) an object rendered conscious by the use of the eye ; but what is the use of the eye itself, other than a con- scious sensation, or action, supposed to involve the knowledge of an object, EXTERIOR tO, and INDEPENDANT of that mind, to which it serves as an in- strument of perception ? For unless the whole subject in question is granted, the consciousness of the use of the organs of sense, can but be con- sidered as some " sensations and ideas,"* which introduce into the mind, other " sensations and ideas." Yet Berkeley evidently considers the use of the or- gans of sense, as a circumstance dis- tinguished and different from " ideas and * " Sensations and ideas," is the phrase by which Berkeley always expresses the conscious perception of any sensible qualities whatever. L 5 226 THE XATURE OF sensations;" because he considers that ••' God by set rules and methods, called " the laws of nature, works upon and •• with the sensed, in order to create tc ideas of sensation, objects of sense " every moment.'" He thus makes an essential difference between the two powers in nature, without marking out any criterion of distinction by which the mind may recognize any such dif- ference between them : the senses, there- fore, in his notion of them, are as ne- cessary, to be acted upon " by these set rules and working* of a spirit," as they are in order to be worked upon by real extension, kc. in the language of the anti- idealists. What then, I again ask, are the so worked upon ? are they other set rides of the spirit I If so, one set of rules acts upon another set of rules, in order, for instance, to give us ideas of vision : but one set of rules would seem enough to give us such ideas. It appears, then, that the " senses" in relation to the actions of a spirit, must at any rate be something THE FIVE ORGANS OF SENSE. 227 extra to the consciousness of their use. They are something in Berkeley's sense by which the spirit we depend upon introduces " ideas in our minds," but they are not as yet sensations in a mind, for it is by them sensations and ideas are introduced into the mind. The consciousness of the use of the eye could not introduce light ; it must be the eye properly so called, whatever that organ when unperceived may be : therefore, the organs of sense are at least, even in Berkeley's sense, some objects — not themselves