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 FROM 
 
 99 
 
 "The Poison Fountain. 
 
 FACTS THAT ARE STRANGER THAN FICTION. 
 
 The Question Answered as to who owns the Child, its own Father 
 and Mother, or their Neighbors. Tom, Dick and Harry. 
 
 A BLOW FOR THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE FAMILY, AS AGAINST THE 
 MONSTROUS USURPATIONS OF THE STATE. 
 
 By ZACH. MONTGOMERY, 
 
 Of (he California Bar. 
 
 READ FIRST AND CONDEMN AFTERWARDS. 
 
 Copies of this Pamphlet will be sent Postage paid to any part 
 
 of the United States for the following prices in advance, 
 
 either in Money filers, or C/t,rre>ie// by Registered 
 
 Letter addressed to J. J. Montgomery, 
 
 Oaklaiid, Col., Box %83: 
 
 1 Copy, 10 Cents ; 10 Copies, 90 Cra.; 100 Copies, $S: 500 Corres, $35 ; 
 
 1000 Copies, !$l>2.50. 
 
 Individuals or Associations desiring this Pamphlet for free distribution, will 
 
 he supplied for §50 per 1000 with cost of freight 
 
 or postage added. 
 
 OAKLAND, CAL. 
 
 187!). 
 
The Poison Fountain 
 
 AND ITS CRITICS. 
 
 The " Poison Fountain" complete, first published in 1878, neatly bound, 
 consisting of 201 pages, of wliieh this pamphlet embraces only the first part, 
 can be had at A. L. Bancroft and Co.'s, Michael Flood's, and such other book- 
 sellers as may apply for the book. The second part of this work consists, for 
 the most part, of discussions between the author and many of the ablest defenders 
 of the New England public school system. 
 
 The following are short extracts from a few of the very many complimen- 
 tary notices the "Poison Fountain" has received from eminent CATHOLIC, 
 Protestant, and non-religious sources : — 
 
 Rt. Rev. E. O'Connell, R. C. Bishop of Grass Valley, California, speaking 
 of " Poison Fountain," says: " I only wish that every American citizen inter- 
 ested for the welfare of his country, and all parents whom God has blessed with 
 children, would read it attentively. Your arguments in behalf of the rights of 
 parents to control the education of their children, are, in my opinion, unanswer- 
 able." 
 
 Ex-Governor Peter H. Burnett, R. C. , concluded a notice of the book by 
 saying, "It is one of the most conclusive arguments I have ever read upon any 
 disputed subject." 
 
 Dr. John LeConte, President of California State University (Protestant), 
 after reading " Poison Fountain," in a letter to the author, among other things, 
 says : " There can be no doubt that the gradual impairment and loss of parental 
 authority and influence is one of the most serious and momentous evils which 
 besets the American civilization. It tmdermines the, very foundations of the 
 family — the essential unit of society." 
 
 Dr. Joseph LeConte, one of the most eminent professors of the State Uni- 
 versity (Protestant), in writing to the author, says: " I fully concur with you in 
 vour view that any education which weakens the family tie, strikes at the very 
 foundation of society, and no amount of good in other directions can atone for 
 this greatest of all evils. I fully concur with you also in your opposition to com- 
 pulsory State Education. This certainly strikes at the integrity of the family, 
 for it makes children ' the wards of the State.' I fully believe, also, that pri- 
 vate schools, each parent choosing his own, furnish a better education, all things 
 considered, than any public school system." 
 
 Rev. Dr. W. H. Piatt (Protestant), of San Francisco, speaking of " Poison 
 Fountain," says: " Its array of facts and its irrefragible logic cannot fail to do 
 good." 
 
 Mr. A. Adams, of Los Angeles (Protestant), writing to the author, says: 
 "I am struck with the similarity of our views on the school question, and bid 
 you Godspeed in propagating your views as contained in the publication before 
 me. I see that you, a Catholic, and T, a Protestant, are united here." 
 
 Dr. Thomas W. Dawson, of Downey City (non-r jligionist), concludes a 
 letter to the author, as follows : " I honestly believe that your array of facts and 
 reasoning are simply unanswerable." 
 
PART FIRST. 
 
 THE POISON FOUNTAIN 
 
 OB, 
 
 ANTI-PARENTAL EDUCATION. 
 
 CHAPTEB I. 
 
 Tlie writer intends to offer no apology to the reading coram a- 
 aity for the publication of this book. As soon would he think 
 of apologizing to the slumbering inhabitants of a city in 
 flames, for attempting to disturb their rest by the vigorous 
 ringing of a fire-bell. Far better that they awake even in 
 anger, than to awake not at all. 
 
 If the reader will but follow us, even to the extent of a few 
 pages, wo promise to demonstrate, by incontestable facts and 
 figures drawn from sources which will not and cannot be im- 
 peached, that the calamity at which we are endeavoring to 
 alarm our countrymen, is far more wide spread and direful in 
 its consequences than any conflagration that ever devastated a 
 city. We promise to prove that our boasted New England 
 public school system, as now by law established throughout 
 the length and breadth of the American Eepublic, is a poison- 
 ous fountain, fraught with the seeds of human misery and 
 moral death. But, says the reader, how can that possibly be 
 true? Can it be denied that an educated people are more 
 moral and virtuous, more contented, happy and law-abiding 
 than an ignorant people, and if so, how can it be charged that 
 a system of education which almost entirely banishes illiter- 
 acy from the land, is fraught with so much evil to those who 
 are brought under its influence ? These are candid questions, 
 and they shall receive candid answers. It is very true that 
 ignorance is the mother of vice. It is also true that an 
 educated people, if properly educated, are more moral, virtu- 
 
2 The Poison Fountain, oit 
 
 oils, contented, happy and law-abiding than an ignorant 
 people. 
 
 Thus far, we think there can be no difference of opinion 
 between the most inveterate supporter of the New England 
 public school system and ourselves. 
 
 Now, keeping steadily in view this common standpoint, name- 
 ly, that a people properly educated are more moral, viitucus, 
 contented, happy and law-abiding than an ignorant people, 
 let us suppose that we somewhere find living, side by side, twc 
 communities, one of which is made up almost entirely of edu- 
 cated people, while the other is largely composed of illiterate 
 people; and let us further suppose that amongst those consid- 
 ered educated you find that in proportion to their population 
 they have six criminals to where the more illiterate community 
 have but one ; suppose that they have nearly two paupers to 
 where the more illiterate people have but one; suppose that 
 they have two insane to where the illiterates have only one; 
 suppose that their death list shows four suicides to where that 
 of the illiterates shows but one, and suppose that the same list 
 shows three deaths from the criminal indulgence of the brutal 
 passions, while that of the illiterates shows but two, what con- 
 clusion would you arrive at with reference to that kind of edu- 
 cation? 
 
 Adhering to the proposition with which we set out a moment 
 ago, namely, that a people -properly educated are more moral, 
 virtuous, contented, happy and law-abiding than an uneducated 
 people, would you not be forced to the conclusion that there 
 must be something wrong, terribly, radically wrong, in a system 
 of education so much more direful in its results than even 
 illiteracy itself? 
 
 But just here, perhaps, the reader will ask us, as he has a 
 right to ask, "what application has your supposed case to the 
 question under discussion ?" Just have a little patience, good 
 reader, and you shall see the application 
 
 For this educated community, let us take the native born 
 white population of the six New England States, to-wit : Massa- 
 chusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut and 
 Rhode Island, and for the unlettered community, we will take 
 the native born whites ot the six States of Virginia, Maryland, 
 Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina. It will 
 be observed that the States thus enumerated are either a part of 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 3 
 
 the original thirteen, or such as have been carved out there- 
 from. 
 
 Both of these communities started on their career of exis- 
 tence about the same time ; both were composed mainly of 
 people from the same part of Europe; people who spoke the 
 same language and had been accustomed to the same laws, 
 manners and usages; people who possessed the same Christian 
 religion, pretty much all of whom (outside of little Maryland) 
 were of the protestant faith, and took as their religious ■ guide 
 the same bible and even the same translation of that bible. 
 
 There was one important particular, however, in which these 
 two communities widely differed at the very start, as we shall 
 presently see. 
 
 "More than two hundred years ago the principle was incor- 
 ' 'porated into the legislation of Massachusetts, that the ivJiole 
 ' 'people must be educated to a certain degree at the public ex- 
 "pense, irrespective of any social distinctions." (A) 
 
 Again, "In Massachusetts, by statute, in 1647 each town con- 
 sisting of fifty householders was directed to maintain a 
 "school to teach their children to read and write, and every 
 "town of one hundred families was to maintain a grammar 
 "school to fit youth for the college. The common schools of 
 "Massachusetts have" been kept up to this day by direct tax 
 ' 'and individual subscription, and nowhere in a population of 
 "equal extent has common elementary education been more 
 "universally diffused." (1) 
 
 "The compulsory system of supporting common and gram- 
 ' 'mar schools in each town is sustained, to this day, in Massa- 
 chusetts, and enforced by indictment. (2) 
 
 At a very early day, after their settlement, a similar system 
 of education was adopted in all the other New England States, 
 from which fact the system seems to have taken the name of 
 "the New England system." Chancellor Kent says : "In New 
 "England it has been a steady and governing principle from 
 "the very foundation of the colonies, that it was the right and 
 "duty of the government to provide, by means of fair and just 
 
 Note A — See work entitled "The Daily Public School," published by J. B. Lippiucott in 
 18G6, p 121. See Kent's Commentaries, vol. 2, p 210. 
 
 (1) See 2d Kent, 210-211. 
 
 (2) Commonwealth vs. Inhabitants of Dedham, 16 Mass. U., p 111. 
 
4 The Poison Fountain, oe 
 
 "taxation, for the instruction of all the youth in the elements 
 "of learning." (1) 
 
 On the other hand, the six enumerated States, comprising 
 what we have agreed to call the unlettered community, steadily 
 resisted the New England system up to a very recent date. 
 
 Virginia, which occupies about the same relation to the 
 latter community that Massachusetts does to the former, 
 according to Lippincott's Gazetteer of the World, published 
 in 1856, had at that time "no general free school system, but 
 "made an appropriation for the instruction of the poor." (2) 
 
 Thus these two communities, the one icitli its New England 
 public school system and the other without it, traveled along, 
 side by side, for about two hundred years, until A. D. 1860, 
 when the eighth United States decennial census was taken, and 
 the following was the showing of these two communities, as 
 will appear by reference to the annexed table No. 1. We 
 find that at the date referred to, to-wit : 1860, Massachusetts 
 and her five New England sisters had 2,665,945 native born 
 white inhabitants, and out of these only 8, 543 adults who could 
 not read nor write, while Virginia, with her five sisters num- 
 bered 3,181,969 native born whites, of whom 262,802 adults 
 could neither read nor write. So that in the six New England 
 States the proportion of illiterate native whites was only one to 
 every 312, while Virginia and her five sisters counted one illit- 
 erate to every 12. But mark you! how stand the criminal 
 lists ? Massachusetts and her five sisters, out of her native 
 white population of a little more than two and a half millions, 
 had on the 1st of June, 1860, just 2,459 criminals in prison, 
 while Virginia and her five comparatively unlettered compan- 
 ions, with a native white population of over three millions, had 
 but 477 in prison. That is to say, those educated under the 
 New England system had one native born white criminal to 
 every 1,084 native white inhabitants, while those who had gen- 
 erally rejected that system had but one prisoner to every 6,670, 
 being a disproportion, according to the whole number of native 
 whites, ot more than six criminals in New England to one in 
 
 (1) See 2d Kent, 210. 
 
 (2) See Lippincott's "Gazetteer of the World,"~putliBhed in 1856, p 2049. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 5 
 
 the other community . (B). A glance at the same table will 
 show that the natives educated under the New England system 
 had one pauper to every 178, while those who had managed to 
 live without that luxury had but one pauper to every 345. 
 
 Of those who in one year had died by suicide, New England 
 had one to every 13,285 of the entire population, while Virginia 
 and her five sisters had but one suicide to every 56,584, and of 
 those who perished, the victims of their criminal lusts, New 
 England had one to every 84, 737, while her neighbors, that had 
 never enjoyed her educational advantages, had but one such 
 victim to every 128,729. We have not before us the list of 
 insane in the several States for 1860, so we borrow from the 
 report furnished by the Census Marshal of 1870, where it 
 appears that the New England system produced (of those born 
 and living in their native States respectively) one insane person 
 to every 800 native born inhabitants, while the rejection of that 
 system resulted in one iusane to 1,682 native inhabitants. 
 
 Note B — The proportion is ascertained by simply dividing the whole number of native 
 white inhabitants by the whole number of native white criminals. We omit the fractions in 
 both cases. Great care has been taken to avoid mistakes in these computations, but should 
 any inaeuracy be discovered, the author will take it as a favor to be informed of the fact, so 
 that it may be corrected in futuro editions. 
 
The Poison Fountain, or 
 
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 Native criminals 
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 1st 
 
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Anti-Parental Education. 
 
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10 
 
 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 TABLE 5—1870. 
 
 In 1870, the several States and Territories, of the United States, not counts 
 ing Mississippi, Texas and Utah, supported 183,198 public school teachers, 
 educated G, 228,060 public school pupils, at an expense of $64,030,073. (See 
 compendium of Ninth Census of the U.S., Page 488.) The following table 
 is compiled from the above source. 
 
 STATES. 
 
 Alabama 
 
 Arkansas. .,<.... 
 
 California 
 
 Connecticut 
 
 Delaware 
 
 Florida , 
 
 Georgia 
 
 Illinois 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Iowa 
 
 Kansas 
 
 Kentucky 
 
 Louisiana 
 
 Maine 
 
 Maryland 
 
 Massachusetts. . . 
 
 Michigan 
 
 MiDnesota 
 
 Mississippi 
 
 Missouri 
 
 Nebraska 
 
 Nevada 
 
 New Hampshire. 
 
 New Jersey 
 
 New York 
 
 North Carolina.. 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Oregon 
 
 Pennsylvania— . . 
 
 Ehode Island 
 
 South Carolina. . 
 
 Tennessee 
 
 Texas 
 
 Vermont 
 
 Virginia 
 
 West Virginia. .. 
 Wisconsin 
 
 • oo p a> a 
 
 : &<£ B B I 
 : 2 ~£-p 3 
 
 67,263 
 
 72,045 
 
 75,527 
 
 88,449 
 
 16,835 
 
 10,132 
 
 11,150 
 
 677,623 
 
 446,066 
 
 205,923 
 
 58,030 
 
 218,340 
 
 25,832 
 
 152,765 
 
 83,226 
 
 242,145 
 
 254,738 
 
 103,408 
 
 320,313 
 
 15,052 
 
 1,856 
 
 59,408 
 
 80,105 
 
 719,181 
 41,912 
 
 737,693 
 29,822 
 
 745,734 
 27,250 
 31,362 
 82,970 
 
 52,067 
 
 8,700 
 
 101,493 
 
 337.008 
 
 h3 
 V fciri o 
 
 o° ~ 2 £L 
 
 : cTo-p 
 
 ; o * o 
 
 • m%j ° 
 : e*B 
 
 ( 629,626 
 
 552,461 
 1,027,733 
 1,426,846 
 
 127,729 
 76,389 
 
 175,844 
 7,810,265 
 2,063,599 
 3,245,352 
 
 660,635 
 1,150,457 
 
 473,707 
 
 843,435 
 1,146,057 
 3,207,826 
 2,164,489 
 
 895,204 
 
 3,092,733 
 
 182,100 
 
 81,273 
 
 403,310 
 
 1,562,573 
 
 8,912,024 
 205,131 
 
 8,528,145 
 139,387 
 
 7,292,946 
 355,582 
 279,723 
 683,008 
 
 516,702 
 
 98,770 
 
 599,811 
 
 2,209,384 
 
 »d o 
 
 5 9 36 
 
 7 66 
 21 55 
 16 13 
 
 7 58 
 
 7 53 
 15 77 
 11 52 
 
 4 62 
 15 75 
 11 37 
 
 5 26 
 18 33 
 
 5 52 
 13 77 
 13 24 
 
 8 49 
 8 65 
 
 9 65 
 12 10 
 43 78 
 
 6 78 
 19 56 
 
 12 38 
 4 89 
 
 11 56 
 4 67 
 9 77 
 
 13 04 
 8 90 
 8 23 
 
 9 92 
 11 35 
 
 5 90 
 
 6 55 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 11 
 
 One very noticeable fact in this connection, as shown by the 
 sregoing tables, is that in the State of Massachusetts, which 
 lairns the honor of being the founder of the New England / 
 ystem of education, while she had by far the smallest propor- 
 .on of illiterate native born adults of any, even of the New 
 fogland States, had at the same time much the largest propor- I 
 on of native white criminals, she having one criminal to every ' 
 49 native white inhabitants. 
 
 The nearest approach to her was the showing made by the 
 tate of Connecticut, where there was one native white crimi- 
 al to every 845 native white inhabitants. 
 
 And now, good reader, if you will take the pains to turn to 
 le sixth column of figures in table three, which shows the 
 dative proportion of native born white criminals in every 
 tate in the Union in 1860, you will see that Massachusetts 
 ands solitary and alone in the grand and magnificent propor- 
 ons of her criminal list. California at that time came next 
 i her chosen model, having one native born white criminal to 
 rery 697 native whites, while Massachusetts had one to everv 
 19. J 
 
 California seems to have resolved, however, not to be sur- 
 ged in her crime list even by her great exemplar, for when 
 [e next decennial census reports were returned, to-wit : in 
 170, California made a showing of one native white criminal to 
 ery 512 native white inhabitants, thus carrying off the palm 
 hich ten years before had been awarded to the old State of 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 In view of the foregoing facts and figures, is it any wonder 
 at the Boston correspondent of the San Francisco Morning 
 ill tells us "that a large number of public school men have 
 j;ome to the conclusion that the public school system of that 
 nty is a failure?" (A). Or is it surprising that another of 
 Lr leading dailies, the Alta California, speaking editorially of 
 e same system as it exists in this State, calls it "our ana- 
 nda," and declares that if we are to "judge this system by its 
 ipparent fruits, we shall have to pronounce it not only a mel- 
 ancholy, but a most disastrous failure, and that it will be 
 die to look for the cause of the general rowdyism, idleness 
 
 ons ,4— See Morning Call of August 5th, 1877. 
 
12 The Poison Fountain, oe 
 
 • 'and viciousness of the rising generation anywhere but in the 
 "training which it has been receiving?" (0.) 
 
 Even after the civil war, which raged with such terrible fury 
 over the Southern and Southwestern States, during the years 
 from 1861 tD 1865, whereby thousands of millions of dollars 
 worth of property was destroyed, a servile race were emanci- 
 pated and the very foundations of the whole social and politi- 
 cal fabric upheaved and broken to atoms — even after all the 
 bad government which bad white men and bad black men had 
 succeeded in forcing upon the subjugated States — still, when 
 the census reports for 1870 were published, they showed that 
 neither their native white criminals nor paupers counted in the 
 proportion even of so much as one, to where those counted two, 
 who had been for two hundred years subjected to the ravages 
 of the New England public school system. (See table No. 2.) 
 
 And this precious system of education is the great boon for 
 which in 1870 the American people were paying to the tune of 
 $64,030,673, while at the same time they were grinding through 1 
 f this mill of moral death no less than 6,228,060 children. In 
 order to maintain this very same system, California alone 
 expended during the last fiscal year no less than $2,749,729 16, 
 as appears from the recently published biennial report of the 
 State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
 
 r- Indeed, so infatuated has our young State become with this 
 crime and pauper-breeding system of public instruction, that 
 she has made it a penal offense for the parent or guardian of 
 any child between the ages of 8 and 14 years to keep such 
 child from the nublic school, even for the sake of sending it to 
 a far better private school of his own choice, and at his own i 
 expense, unless he first seeks and obtains the gracious permis- 
 I sion of the School Directors so to do. 
 
 But lest the reader should be disposed to doubt the existence 
 of so tyrannical a statute, here it is as enacted by the California 
 Legislature on the 28th day of March, 1874 : 
 
 "Section 1. Every parent, guardian or other person in the 
 State of California, having control and charge of any child or 
 children between the ages of 8 and 14 years, shall be required 
 to send any such child or children to a public school for a 
 period of at least two-thirds of the time during which a public 
 
 Note C—Alta editorial, January 31st, 1872. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 13 
 
 school shall be taught in each city and county, or school dis- 
 trict, in each school year, commencing on the first day of July, 
 in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sev- 
 enty-four, at least twelve weeks of which shall be consecutive, 
 unless such child or children are excused from such attendance 
 by the Board of Education of the city, or city and county, or 
 of the Trustees of the school district in which such parents, 
 guardians or other persons reside, upon its being shown to their 
 satisfaction that his or her bodily or mental condition has been 
 swell as to prevent attendance at school, or application to study 
 for the period required, or that the parents or guardians are 
 extremely poor or sick, or that such child or children are 
 taught in a private school or at home in such branches as are 
 usually taught in the primary schools of this State, or have 
 already acquired a good knowledge of such branches; provided, 
 in case a public school shall not be taught for three months 
 during the year, within one mile by the nearest traveled road of 
 any person within the school district, he shall not be liable to 
 the provisions of this Act. 
 
 ' 'Section 3. In case any parent, guardian or other person 
 shall fail to comply with the provisions of this Act, said parent, 
 guardian or other person, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- 
 meanor, and shall be liable to a fine of not more than twenty 
 dollars; and for the second and each subsequent offense, the fine 
 shall hot be less than twenty dollars nor more than fifty dollars, 
 and the parent, guardian or other person so convicted, shall 
 pay all costs. Each such fine shall be paid to the Clerk of tho 
 proper Board of Education or of the District Trustees." >-*i 
 
 Thus it is that the votaries of this system have absolutely! 
 undertaken, by the most tyrannical legislation, to strip every 
 parent of the guardianship ol his children and to transfer their I 
 entire control to an irresponsible Board of School Trustees ; scf? 
 that if these School Directors choose to appoint a libertine or 
 a harlot as the tutor of your daughters, and at the same time 
 refuse their gracious permission for you to send them to a pri- i 
 vate school of your own choice, it is with fines or prison dungeons 
 that the law proposes to reward you, should you, in obedience 
 to the dictates of right reason and your own conscience, seek to 
 shield them from the contaminating touch of a vile teacher. 
 Is it any wonder that vice flourishes or that virtue perishes 
 under the influence of such a system ? 
 
14 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 WHEREIN THE NEW ENGLAND PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IS RADICALLY 
 
 WRONG. 
 
 Every standard writer on the subject of either law or morals, 
 proclaims with one voice that parents are bound by the natural 
 law to feed, clothe and educate their own children, Bouvier 
 says, ' 'The principal obligations which parents owe their chil- 
 ' 'dren are their maintenance, their protection and their educa- 
 tion." (1). Chancellor Kent says, "The duties of parents 
 ' 'to their children as being their natural guardians, consist in 
 "maintaining and educating them during the season of infancy 
 "and youth." (2) 
 
 Sir William Blackstone says, "The last duty of parents to 
 "their children is that of giving them an education suitable to 
 " their station in life ; a duty pointed out by reason and of far 
 "the greatest importance of any. For," continues that author, 
 ' 'as Puffendorf very well observes, 'it is not easy to imagine or 
 "allow, that a parent has conferred any considerable benefit 
 "upon his child by bringing him into the world, if he after- 
 "wards entirely neglects his culture and education, and suffers 
 ' 'him to grow up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to 
 "others and shameful to himself.'" (a). Dr. Wayland, in his 
 elements of moral science, says : ' ' The duty of parents is gen- 
 erally to educate or to bring up their children in such manner 
 "as they believe will be most for their future happiness, both 
 "temporal and eternal." (3) Again "he (the parent) is 
 "bound to inform himself of the peculiar habits, and reflect 
 ' 'upon the probable future situation of his child, and deliber- 
 ' 'ately to consider what sort of education will most conduce to 
 "his future happiness and usefulness," (4). Again, "The 
 "duties of a parent are established by God, and God requires 
 "us not to violate them." (5.) According to tho laws of 
 nature, says Wayland, "the teacher is only the agent, tho 
 parent is the principal." (6.) But, under the New England 
 
 (1) Bouvier's Institutes, vol. 2, p 118. 
 
 (2) 2d Kent, 19G. 
 
 (a) Cooley's Blackstone, vol. 1, p 449. 
 
 (3) Waylands' Elements of Moral Scionce, 314. 
 
 (4) Wayland's Moral Science, 316. 
 
 (5) Wayland 321. 
 (G) Wayland, 316. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 15 
 
 system, as by law established, the parent is not recognized as 
 the principal, nor is the teacher regarded as his agent. The 
 Legislature of California has gone so far towards elevating the 
 teacher above the parents, as to make it a penal offense for any 
 parent to even insult the teacher of a public school in the 
 presence of his pupils, no difference what the provocation may 
 be. 
 
 Section 654, of the Penal Code of this State, reads, "Every 
 parent, guardian or other person, * who upbraids, insults or 
 abuses any teacher of the public schools, in the presence or 
 hearing of a pupil thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
 
 If the teacher insults the parent, in the presence of his chil- 
 dren, there is no penalty to pay, or if the dirtiest loafer in the 
 land insults the teacher of a private school, without the least 
 cause or provocation, that is all right ; but woe be to the father 
 or mother, who has the temerity to breathe one offensive word 
 against the teacher of a public school, in the hearing of his 
 pupils, even should it be to chide him for his immoral conduct 
 towards the child of the offender. 
 
 In his biennial report for 1864, our State Superintendent of 
 Public Instruction — quoting from the judicial decisions of 
 some of the Eastern States, construing their public school 
 laws, which are, in all respects similar to our own — maintains 
 the proposition that "the child should be taught to consider his 
 "instructor, in many respects, superior to the parent in point of 
 "autlwrity," and "tliat the vulgar impression that parents have 
 "a legal right to dictate to teachers is entirely erroneous," and 
 further that "parents have no remedy as against (lie teazlier." (1) 
 In the State of Vermont, in 1874, a School Committee expelled 
 from a public school certain children because of their absence 
 from school on a religious holiday, although they had remained 
 absent in obedience to the commands of their parents; and 
 this, too, was after the school authorities had been appealed 
 to, in vain, for leave of absence. This action of the School 
 Committee was afterwards sustained by the Supreme Court of 
 the State, which based its decision, in part, at least, on the 
 ground that "no divine authority had, been quoted or asserted" to 
 sustain the right claimed by these parents. (2) 
 
 (1) See Superintendent Swett's Biennial Keport for 18G4, p 164-5-0. and Judicial De. 
 cisions there quoted. 
 
 (2) FerrttervB. Tvler. 48 Vt.. 444. 
 
16 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 Thus the law of nature and nature's God, which ordains that 
 it is both the right and duty of parents to educate their chil- 
 dren ' ' in such manner as they believe will be most for their future 
 "happiness," is utterly disregarded and set at naught by the 
 State, which ordains that it is neither the right nor the duty of 
 parents, but of the State, to say when, where, by whom and in 
 what manner our children shall be educated. 
 
 Now, it is always possible for either individuals or States to 
 disregard and to violate nature's laws, but it is not possible to 
 do so without suffering, sooner or later, a penalty, and a pen- 
 alty, too, corresponding in magnitude with the importance 
 of the law violated. Hence it is — and we assert it without the 
 fear of successful contradiction — that those communities, 
 which have so long and so glaringly violated nature's laws in 
 the matter of education, are now reaping so heavy and so 
 deadly a harvest of crime, pauperism, insanity and suicides. 
 
 Dr. Way land has well said ' 'that tho relaxation of parental 
 ' 'authority has always been found one of the surest indications 
 "of the decline of social order and the unfailing precursor of 
 "public turbulence and anarchy." (P). Now, under the 
 law, as we have already seen, parental authority is not merely 
 relaxed, but it is utterly set at defiance . What, we would ask, 
 does parental authority amount to, in the matter of educating 
 children, when a parent is not recognized as having any ' 'remedy, 
 as against the teacher" for the wrongs he may perpetrate against 
 his child, and when, as in California to-day, the parent, is in the 
 eye of the law, a criminal, who ventures to send his own child 
 to a school of his own choice, and at his own expense, without 
 first going with his hat under his arm to a board of petty offi- 
 cials, to beg their permission so to do ? 
 
 If parents, any longer, have the least vestige of authority 
 over the all-important matter of their own children's education, 
 which is not wholly subordinated to the private interests, 
 prejudices, and petty spites of any and every little conclave of 
 irresponsible upstarts who, by hook or by crook, can so manage 
 on election day as to have their names on the tickets of the win- 
 ning party, we should feel under many obligations if somebody 
 would inform us what that remaining parental authority is, 01 
 where it is to be found. 
 
 (P) Wayland's Elements of Moral Scienco, p 313. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 17 
 
 Is it not the almost unanimous cry, on the part of parents, 
 throughout the length and breadth of the land, that they can 
 neither command the respect nor obedience of their child- 
 ren ? and are not our Police Courts crowded, and our county 
 prisons and State penitentiaries being filled with beardless 
 boys, many of whom have had comfortable homes, and have 
 grown up in the society of respectable parents, but never under 
 their control ? 
 
 But, perhaps, we shall be asked why is it that neither politi- 
 cians nor the parents of children have thus far done any thing 
 towards furnishing a remedy for all these crying evils. 
 
 We answer, the reasons are numerous ; but the first and 
 most important reason we shall assign is ignorance : Ignorance 
 of the true and Heaven-ordained relations between parent and 
 child; ignorance of the reciprocal duties which they respec- 
 tively owe to each other; yes, and ignorance — total ignorance 
 — of the foregoing, terrible facts, so clearly revealed by the 
 United States census reports. 
 
 Let any one who doubts the general ignorance of our people^ 
 on this last subject, test the matter, by catechising the first ten 
 men he meets concerning the facts, shown by our published 
 tables. The truth is, that the advocates of this New England 
 system have been so long, so loud and so persistent in pro- 
 claiming to the world its supposed excellencies that nine-tenths 
 of the world have, without the least investigation, concluded 
 to accept it for all that its most enthusiastic admirers represent 
 it to be. Were it not for the wide-spread and almost total 
 ignorance on the part of parents, as regards the poisonous and 
 deadly fruits which they and their children, and society at 
 large, are daily reaping from this anti-parental system of edu- 
 cation, it could not survive a single month, in its present shape. 
 0, how true it is that Ignorance is the mother of vice! 
 
 Another reason why no remedy has been applied to this fear- 
 ful malady is a long-standing, deep-seated and constantly fo- 
 mented prejudice in favor of the public school system, which 
 makes the politicians afraid to attack the monster, lest they 
 hurt their popularity. 
 
 STILL ANOTHER DIFFICULTY, 
 Is a want of harmony among those who see and lament the 
 terrible evils which this system is bringing on the country, and 
 
13 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 who are willing to make any and every sacrifice to avert those 
 evils. One says, let us have the Bible in the schools, another 
 says no, I want no Bible in mine; a third says, let us divide 
 the school funds amongst all the different religious denomina- 
 tions in such a manner that each denomination shall, as a body, 
 have control of a portion of those funds corresponding with 
 the number of its members; while a fourth says, away with 
 such silly nonsense, we have far too much ecclesiasticism iu 
 the public schools already. But is there not, we ask, 
 
 A COMMON GROUND WHEREON EVERY FRIEND OP EDUCATIONAL 
 REFORM CAN STAND? 
 
 Most undoubtedly there is. Let us recognize, just as the law 
 of Nature recognizes, the right and the duty of all parents, 
 having the ability so to do, to educate their own children in 
 their own way and by the use of their own funds. 
 
 After all, it is not less the interest than the duty of parents, 
 when they can do so, to pay the cost of their own children's 
 education and not to allow the State to pay it for them, for be 
 it remembered that the cost and care of properly feeding, clothing 
 and educating the child, are hut the price which Nature demands of 
 parents for the incomparable treasure of the child's love, honor and 
 obedience, and just in proportion to the extent to which parents 
 neglect or refuse to pay this price, in precisely the same proportion 
 do they forfeit their right to this inestimable boon . 
 
 Let us suppose that the State should take upon itself to feed 
 and clothe, as well as to educate the child; does any one doubt 
 that a child thus fed, clothed and educated at the public ex- 
 pense would grow up almost wholly destitute of parental affec- 
 tion? And who is so stupidly blind as not to see that the educa- 
 tionoi the child, after all, is the great nourisher of its affections? 
 Bospect, love and veneration do not depend near so much on 
 either the source or the character of the food which enters the 
 stomach, as upon the source and character of that which is 
 taken into the mind and heart. 
 
 But in cases where parents have not sufficient worldly wealth 
 to give their children a good elementary education, let the 
 State aid them just exactly as it should aid them, when neces- 
 sary, with means to feed and clothe their children, rather than 
 let them either starve or go naked . But for the same reason 
 that the State would not feed the children of its more needy 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 1§ 
 
 citizens upon the most dainty and costly delicacies, nor clothe 
 them in the finest silks and satins, so neither should it educate 
 them in those liigher or merely ornamental sciences not neces- 
 sary for those avocations in which they are likely to engage in 
 sifter life. And when the State furnishes educational aid, let 
 it do so, always, in harmony with the principles of parental 
 guardianship over the child. Let the parent in such cases 
 select the school, and the State pay the teacher. Let this boon 
 be extended to all who need State aid, without regard to differ- 
 ences in politics or religion. , 
 
 Perhaps, though, we shall be told that so radical a change in 
 the public school system, as that suggested, would work the 
 destruction of the system itself. If that be so, then we would 
 ask whether it is better for us to destroy the system, or to let 
 the system destroy us ? — — 
 
 Again, it may, perhaps, be objected that even if every parent 
 in the land had the means and the privilege of educating his 
 own children in his own way, still there would always be found 
 some parents in every community who would neglect this most 
 sacred duty; and what ought to be done with such parents: 
 We answer, what ought to be done with those heartless 
 parents who, having the means at hand, either of their own, or 
 such as have been furnished by the State, to comfortably feed 
 and clothe their children, would, nevertheless, deliberately 
 leave them to die of starvation or perish with cold? In either 
 case such parents should be punished as criminals against the 
 laws both of God and society. But so long as the State under- 
 takes to force upon the children of any class of parents a sys- 
 tem of education, which they cannot accept without a viola- 
 tion of conscience and of Nature's laws, it is nothing less than 
 the most cruel tyranny on the part of the State to make such 
 a system compulsory. 
 
 Let every friend of educational reform unite in maintaining 
 these plain, just and most reasonable principles, and the day is not 
 distant when — with Heaven's blessing — we shall restore parental 
 authority, re-establish family government, and teach the rising 
 generation to love, honor and obey, not only their fathers and 
 mothers, but also the laws, both of God and their country . 
 
20 The Poison Fountain, ok 
 
 CHAPTEB III. 
 
 THE ANTI-PABENTAL SCHOOL SYSTEM DISSECTED AND ANALYZED. 
 
 Should we wish to ascertain the exact character and proper- 
 ties of the waters of our great Pacific ocean, we would not 
 undertake to analyze the whole ocean, for that would be an 
 endless task, but we would take up at most a few ounces of this 
 water, and after making a thorough analysis of it, we would 
 announce the result as indicating the properties and character 
 of the waters of the Pacific. So it is if we would make a care- 
 ful and reliable analysis of the essential principles and elements 
 which go to make up what is known as the Public School Sys- 
 tem. If we were to undertake to subject to an analytical test 
 the whole system with its entire paraphernalia of teachers, 
 pupils, parents, school directors, school teachers, school books, 
 school funds and school houses, as they exist throughout the 
 country, we should become amazed and bewildered at the 
 magnitude of our undertaking, and would probably abandon 
 the enterprise in despair. So let us take from this very large 
 mass of school material a small quantity of its essential ele- 
 ments, just enough to be handled with ease, and examined with 
 care, and we shall be the better able to see what is the char- 
 acter of the ingredients which go to make up the system. In 
 order that you, good reader, may not accuse us of unfairness 
 in our selection of the particular sample to be analyzed, we 
 will allow you to choose your own material. Then cast your 
 eyes around you among your friends and neighbors, and name 
 for us two of the very best, purest, most intelligent, highly 
 educated and reliable men of your acquaintance. Let them be 
 men of your own religion, and belonging to the same political 
 party as yourself. In a word, let them be two men to whom, 
 in preference to all others in the world, you would be willing 
 to entrust the guardianship of that beautiful little girl of yours, 
 should it please God to take you and her mother away from her 
 during her years of childhood. Now, these two friends of 
 yours, whom we shall call A. and B., we shall take it for 
 granted are the very best material to be found in that great 
 mass of voters who control by their votes the destinies, and 
 shape the character of the public school system, as it exists in 
 your city. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 21 
 
 Now, suppose these two model men and neighbors should 
 some day come to your house, and address you thus: Mr. 
 C, we are informed that you are the father of a bright, 
 beautiful and intelligent little girl, now about seven years old; 
 just the proper age to begin her education. We feel quite 
 anxious that she should be properly educated, and, to tell 
 you the plain truth, we are afraid that if we leave the matter 
 entirely with you, her education will be neglected. Now 
 here is what we propose to do. We propose that we — your 
 two best friends — together with yourself, shall all enter into 
 a written contract, binding ourselves during your daughter's 
 minority to contribute annually a certain percentage upon the 
 assessed value of our property, which shall constitute a fund 
 for the education of this, your little girl. But it must, at the 
 same time and in the same contract, be stipulated that it shall 
 at all times be in the power of a majority of us three to select 
 the teachers and the school-books for your child. Should you, 
 against the wishes and without the consent of a majority of us, 
 take your child away and send her to some other school, you 
 must agree to forfeit, — should we choose to exact it — not exceed- 
 ing twenty dollars for the first offense, and not less than twenty 
 dollars for each subsequent repetition thereof. You must also 
 agree and bind yourself in advance not to withhold your assess- 
 ment, even should you withdraw your child from the school of 
 our selection, because we should, in that event, need the money 
 for the education of other children. 
 
 Now tell us, good reader, could you ever consent, while living 
 and in the possession of your reasoning faculties, to entrust 
 such a power as this over your infant child — girl or boy — to any 
 two men in existence? Would you not spurn such a proposition 
 as the above with indignant scorn, come from what source it 
 might? We may here remark, in passing, that it surely could 
 not better the matter should these supposed friends and neigh- 
 bors, in consideration of this proposed outrageous betrayal of 
 your parental trust, even offer to perpetrate a similar wrong 
 against their own children by turning over to you, the insulted 
 father, a corresponding share in their parental authority. And 
 yet, good reader, this miniature picture which we have just 
 drawn of the public school system, presents that system in its 
 very best possible aspect; because we have represented you, the 
 father, as still allowed to retain in your own hands one-third of 
 
22 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 that parental jurisdiction and control which the God of na^.-o 
 requires you to exercise over your child, while the other two- 
 thirds are to be entrusted to two of the very best men in the whole 
 community. But under the public school system as it is by law 
 established, instead of retaining in your own hands even so 
 much as one-third of your parental authority, you retain only 
 an infinitesimal fraction thereof. Where there are, as in San 
 Francisco, tens of thousands of voters, each father divides his 
 parental authority into tens of thousands of equal fragments, 
 retaining but one of these fragments for himself, whilst the 
 great bulk of this authority, instead of being lodged, as in the 
 case above supposed, in two of the very best men to be found 
 in the city, is scattered around broadcast amongst tens of thou- 
 sands of people, good, bad and indifferent. It is gobbled up 
 and wielded by every rough and every rake who is allowed a 
 vote; and this is what they call our great American Free 
 School System. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 23 
 
 CHA.PTEK IV. 
 
 A VOICE FROM SAN QUENTIN — CALIFORNIA'S EDUCATED CONVICTS — 
 ALL THE YOUNGER CRIMINALS CAN READ AND WRITE — TWO MORE 
 PENITENTIARIES NECESSARY TO ACCOMMODATE MASSACHUSETTS' 
 PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS — CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS THE HIGH 
 ROAD TO THE PENITENTIARY — HOW THE ONE SERVES AS A PREPARA- 
 TORY DEPARTMENT FOR THE OTHER. 
 
 The following is from resident director's (Lieutenant Gover- 
 nor Johnston's) late biennial report, showing the condition of 
 the California State prison and State prisoners for the two 
 years ending June 30, 1877. This report, under the caption of 
 "Educational," says: 
 
 "Turnkey's Table, Number VII, showing the educational 
 abilities of the inmates of the prison, gives the number who 
 can read and write at nine hundred and eighty-five; read but 
 not write, at twenty-four; neither read nor write, at three hun- 
 dred and nine. If we consider the number of Chinese and 
 Indians in our prison who can neither read nor write, and 
 deduct them from the whole number so as to match our Whites 
 and Negroes against the same in other States, it will be found 
 that ours possess the advantage in a large degree. In fact 
 among the younger convicts they can all read and write." 
 
 The Turnkey's Table Number III shows that the number of 
 Chinamen in the State prison is 197. Now if we deduct this 
 197 from the entire number of convicts who can neither read 
 nor write, it leaves just 112 who can neither read nor write 
 against 985 who can both read and write. Then again, from 
 this 112 there remain still to be deducted the Indians, whose 
 number is not given in the turnkey's table. But the most 
 startling revelation contained in the above extract is found in 
 the concluding sentence, which says, "in fact among the younger 
 convicts they can all read and write." 
 
 Now of the younger convicts, as appears from the turnkey's 
 table (No. 6) there are some 253 but twenty-one years old, or 
 under, while there are 831 under thirty years old. But while 
 our young State is making such rapid strides in the way of 
 forcing her boys first into her anti-parental schools and then 
 into her penitentiaries, her great exemplar Massachusetts, it 
 would seem, is not neglectful of her laurels. The regular | 
 Boston correspondent of the San Francisco Marning Call, • 
 
24 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 under date of November 16, 1877, says : ' ' Tiie rapid progress of 
 "knowledge -peculiar to tiie educational system of this State has led 
 " to the erection of two more State prisoris, one of which for 
 "women was successfully opened a few days ago, the number 
 " of wicked females who knocked for admission being forty- 
 "four. Present indications point toward the rapid filling up 
 ."of this new institution in a few months." 1 
 
 We are constantly told, by the friends and admirers of our 
 anti-parental educational system, that it is much better for the 
 State to expend money for schools and school-houses than for 
 jails and penitentiaries. Now taking the foregoing figures as a 
 basis of calculation, it would be a very interesting process, and 
 would doubtless lead to most important results if some admirer 
 of our present educational system, who is a good calculator, 
 would make an estimate in dollars and cents of the amount of 
 money saved to the State of California per annum by that kind 
 of education which is sustained at a cost of more than two and 
 a half millions of dollars a year, and which sends to the State 
 prison its hundreds of beardless boys, while total illiteracy — 
 which we all lament as a great evil — sends not so much as one 
 solitary boy to that popular institution. 
 *s^ Should anybody, in making such an estimate, find the profits 
 exceedingly small in proportion to the investment, let him not 
 convert that fact into an argument against education itself, but 
 only against this anti-parental system of education ; ^ a system 
 which, being conceived in crime, brought forth in ., crime and 
 nurtured in crime, must, of necessity, propagate crime. Hoping 
 that some one better versed in figures than ourselves will solve 
 for us the above problem, we shall now proceed to show how it 
 
 U IS THAT OUR EDUCATED BOYS FIND THEIR WAY TO THE PENITENTIARY. 
 
 Here, we will suppose, is an honest, industrious, hard-working 
 laboring man, who has a family, consisting of himself, his wife, 
 and half a dozen children, half girls and half boys. To put 
 the case in as favorable an aspect as possible, we will suppose 
 that he is in moderately good circumstances, being out of debt 
 and the owner of a comfortable homestead, but is compelled to 
 rely solely on his own labor and that of his wife for means 
 wherewith to feed and clothe his family. All his children are 
 of an age to attend school, and all are attending the public 
 schools, as the law directs. In the first place, heavy and fre- 
 
 i\) See Call of November 25, 1877. 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 25 
 
 quent drafts are made on the father's scanty and hard-earned 
 esources, in order to supply these children with all the required 
 books and stationery. These six children, too, must each and 
 all be dressed, not according to the means of their parents, but 
 according to the rules of the school and the demands of 
 fashion, and inasmuch as the more wealthy and aristocratic 
 Classes prescribe the law of fashion, they mast dress as well as 
 the children of the man who counts his wealth by the million. 
 If they do not so dress, they will have to encounter not only 
 the contemptuous sneers of fellow-pupils and classmates, but, 
 perhaps, the displeasure of teachers, if not expulsion from 
 school. The father would reason and, perhaps, remonstrate 
 with the teacher on the subject of these rigid and extravagant 
 rules of dress, but then he remembers that the law has said, 
 that the teacher of a public school is not the agent of the 
 parent, nor answerable to him for his conduct toward the pupil. 
 He also remembers that the law makes it criminal for a parent 
 to insult a teacher, while the teacher may insult the parent with 
 impunity; and for these reasons he does not care to risk an al- 
 tercation with the teacher on the subject of the boys' dress; it 
 would be too unequal a contest. So, in order to meet these 
 growing demands for books, stationery and clothing for their 
 children, these poor parents are compelled to work harder, 
 dress lighter and feed more scantily than is compatible with 
 either health or comfort. The father rises earlier in the morn- 
 ing than formerly, works later at night, and goes with worn-out, 
 ragged, or patched-up clothes, in order that his eldest boy may 
 get anew suit, so as to make as respectable an appearance as any 
 lad at the Lincoln School. 
 
 The mother, too, in worn-out and tattered apparel, plies her 
 washboard with unwonted vigor in order to get money to pay 
 the dressmaker for fitting, cutting and making Lizzie's nice new 
 dress, for the teacher says she must not come to school looking 
 like an old washerwoman's girl. The daughter, too* is learning 
 to play upon the piano, and of course it will not do for her to 
 lend a helping hand towards washing either clothes or dishes, 
 for the teacher says it will spoil the shape of her fingers and im- 
 pair the delicacy of her sense of touch. Thus both father and 
 mother work harder than slaves, and dress coarser than beggars, 
 in order that their children may enjoy the great advantages of 
 our glorious free school system of education. 
 
26 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 In the meantime these children are sitting in the same 
 classes, studying the same books, wearing the same costly fab- 
 rics, participating in the same amusements, contracting tho 
 same habits, imbibing the same love of ease, and the same aver- 
 sion to manual labor, and the same contempt for manual labor- 
 ers, as do their far more wealthy and aristocratic schoolfellows. 
 
 Leaving out of sight the five younger children, we shall now 
 give our undivided attention to the eldest son of this poor la- 
 borer. 
 
 After years of study he at length completes his course at the 
 Lincoln High School, acquitting himself with great honor, 
 amidst the cordial congratulations of professors and school di- 
 rectors, and eliciting the vociferous applause of the admiring 
 multitude. "We may imagine we see his poor old father crouch- 
 ing on the outskirts of the crowd, feasting his eyes upon an oc- 
 casional glimpse of his boy, but not daring to approach him be- 
 cause he has no clothes fit to be seen on such an occasion; 
 doubtless that father is picturing to himself a brilliant future 
 for his boy. He is, perhaps, looking forward to the time when 
 he shall be a governor, a senator, or possibly President of the 
 United States. Very likely, too, he fancies that in his declin- 
 ing years he shall be able to look to his son for that assistance 
 and support which his own exhausted means may then refuse to 
 afford him. But alasl how baseless are all these castles in the 
 air. The day after quitting school the young man finds himself 
 for once thrown on his own unaided resources. His father says 
 to him: "Well, my boy, I have been a long time struggling 
 with poverty and want in order that you might become edu- 
 cated. You see that both your mother and I are in rags, and 
 that handsome suit which you now wear is yet to be paid for. 
 You now have a fortune in your education, and hereafter you 
 must learn to shift for yourself and, if possible, lend a helping 
 hand from time to time to the support of your younger broth- 
 ers and sisters. 
 
 Thus situated, the young man probably for the first time in 
 his whole life, asks himself seriously the question, what busi- 
 ness is he going to follow? A more appropriate question 
 would be, what business can he follow ? There he stands in 
 the midst of a great bustling city, without a cent of money at 
 his command; without friends, without occupation, and without 
 the necessary qualifications for any earthly employment within 
 
Anti-^akental Education. 27 
 
 his reach. Probably his first effort will be to find a position as 
 clerk in some bank or other business establishment; but he 
 soon learns that these positions are all filled by the sons of 
 wealthy or influential parents. Occasionally he meets a former 
 schoolmate, discharging the duties of some coveted place, but 
 on inquiry, he learns that he has obtained his position at the 
 instance of a wealthy father or an influential friend. Failing 
 in everything else, he at length seeks for copying as a means of 
 earning bread. He gets hold of a city directory and makes a 
 list of the names and locations of all the law offices in the city. 
 He then goes from office to office in quest of the only work he 
 really knows how to do. But everywhere he is forestalled; 
 everywhere he is doomed to disappointment. On every hand 
 he meets young men and boys similarly situated, and making 
 similar fruitless efforts to raise a few dimes with which to stave 
 off starvation. Already the boy has spent weeks in an earnest 
 but vain endeavor to find work as a copyist. In the meantime 
 he has been living partly on his old father, and partly on what 
 he could pick up at the free-lunch tables. Seeing the son's ex- 
 treme embarrassment, the father perhaps suggests to him that 
 inasmuch as he has been disappointed in everything else, he 
 had better come and help him lay down those cobble-stones on 
 Battery street, where he can at least earn money enough to buy 
 victuals and clothes. But, alas! his hands are wholly unused 
 to toil, and what is infinitely worse, he has been, as we before 
 said, so trained up as to despise both manual labor and manual 
 laborers. He would be ashamed for one of his school compan- 
 ions to even meet him walking the street in company with his own 
 father, because of the old man's horn-like palms, and his laborer's 
 dress, so that even if he knew how to work, still in view of the 
 fact that it was only the other day that he finished his educa- 
 tional course with so much eclat and amidst such a shower of 
 bouquets as rained around him from the fair hands of San Fran- 
 cisco's wealth and beauty, is it to be expected that he is now 
 going to heave cobble-stones on a public street here under the 
 very shadow of his alma mater; to be twitted and jeered at by 
 those who envied him the literary honors with which he came 
 loaded from the Lincoln school? No, no; that is utterly impos- 
 sible; propose anything but that. Yet, says he, something 
 must be done, and that soon; I must have clothes, and I must 
 have bread; the world owes me a living, and I intend to have it. 
 
28 The Poison Fountain, or 
 
 Thus saying, lie turns his back upon his humble and destitute 
 home, and betakes himself again to perambulating the streets, 
 ready for any desperate turn in events that promises him 
 money. 
 
 Let the reader pause here, and ask himself the question, what 
 is there to save this youth from becoming a pest to society, a 
 disgrace to his old father and mother, and finally a convicted 
 felon, doomed to serve the State -within penitentiary walls ? 
 Perhaps it will be claimed that the bare recollection . of his; 
 newly acquired literary honors and the fear of losing the esteem i 
 of those who, the other day, so vociferously applauded his 
 youthful oratory and threw at his feet such a profusion of flowers, 
 ought of itself to be sufficient to shield him from temptation's 
 harm. But unfortunately, those withered flowers will not serve 
 for food, nor can he make clothes either of approving smiles or 
 shouts of applause. But can it be possible, you say, that one 
 so young, so intelligent and so well educated has no respect for 
 the law ? Why, sir, if you talk to him about respecting the 
 law, he will laugh you to scorn. Who is it that respects the 
 law, he will say, except just so far as the law subserves his pur- 
 poses ? Have we not laws against bribery ? and yet do not even 
 our law-makers, on election days, send out their dirty minions 
 with money in their pockets with which to buy their way into 
 the very halls of legislation ? Are not seats in the United States 
 Senate sometimes bought with gold ? And does not the Presi- 
 dent of the United States himself at this very moment hold his 
 high office by virtue of a false and forged certificate of election ? 
 Then why prate to me about the sanctity of the law, when the 
 very men who make the laws trample them unceremoniously un- 
 der their feet whenever it suits their purposes. But, you will 
 say, if this youth has no regard for human laws, surely he can- 
 not be wholly indifferent to the laws of God. Be not so fast, 
 my dear sir. Have you forgotten that the boy was educated in 
 our public schools, where it is a criminal offense, punishable by 
 a forfeiture of all interest in the public school moneys, to even 
 mention the subject of religion in the hearing of a pupil. And do 
 you know that there is no such prohibition against inculcating 
 the horrible doctrines of atheism in these schools? That many 
 of our public school teachers aro avowed atheists, who believe 
 neither in God nor Devil; neither in Hell nor Heaven, and that 
 our young hero is a firm believer in these dismal and diabolical 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 29 
 
 doctrines? Very true, you say; I knew very well that no re- 
 ligion was allowed to be taught in the public schools, but then 
 why did not his father and mother teach him religion at home ? 
 
 We first answer the question by asking another, and it is 
 this : How do you know that his parents themselves had any 
 well denned notions of religion? Or in fact any religion at all ? 
 If they had firmly believed in the teachings even of that natural 
 religion which an almighty hand has written in indelible char- 
 acters on every human heart, they surely would never have con- 
 sented to surrender to the public at large the right to select the 
 teachers, and in all essential particulars to shape the mental 
 and moral as well as the physical destines of their child. 
 
 But suppose that his parents were in every other particular 
 real models of perfection, both in their professions and in 
 their practices of religion, was it to be expected that he, their 
 son, would accept religious instruction from them ? Are not 
 they illiterate, and is not he educated? And shall wisdom take 
 lessons from ignorance? Has he not learned to despise them 
 both for their poverty and their simplicity? Can it be doubted 
 that even the sacrifices which they made in his behalf; that the 
 very patches with which they mended their old garments, in 
 order that he might be handsomely dressed; that the very toils 
 and hardships which have wrinkled their brows, soiled their 
 features, and imparted the bony touch to their palms in order 
 that he might learn to lead a life of ease, and freedom from 
 manual labor, are, on his part, requited with coldness and 
 contempt? And after learning to despise his parents, is it 
 at all likely that he would profit either by their religious in- 
 struction or their praiseworthy example? No, no, their religion, 
 just like their toilsome lives, and their old clothes, may be 
 good enough for them, but to an educated young man like him- 
 self it is only a bundle of cumbersome and useless rubbish, 
 and he will have none of it. 
 
 Then, since our young hero has learned to respect neither the 
 laws of man, nor the laws of God, and will neither be directed 
 by the good counsels, nor influenced by the exemplary lives of 
 his own father and mother; where, let it be asked, shall we look 
 for the controlling power that is to shape his future destinies? 
 Just follow him, as he hurries along yonder busy street, and 
 you shall see. Already he is in company with half a dozen of 
 his late school-mates, each of whom has a tale of woe and dis- 
 
30 The Poison Fountain, oft 
 
 appointment to tell, quite like his own. Now, for the first time 
 since leaving school, each and all of these boys find themselves 
 in congenial society. They feel that the world cares nothing 
 for them, and they care nothing for the world. They all have 
 empty stomachs and seedy clothes, and there is not money 
 enough in the crowd to purchase even one night's lodging, at 
 the meanest lodging-house in the city. 
 
 One of the party suggests that, having failed in everything 
 else, he has an idea of making an effort to get a position as 
 dish-washer in some hotel, or failing in that also, he might seek 
 employment as stable-boy, to clean out the stalls of some livery 
 stable. The majority of his companions, however, frown down 
 the proposition with contemptuous indignation, and our hero 
 threatens never hereafter to speak to the low-bred rascal, should 
 he ever again be guilty of advancing a proposition so far beneath 
 the dignity of an educated gentleman. In order, however, to 
 put at rest the question as to the feasibility of finding even that 
 kind of employment, one little fellow, the smallest in the- 
 crowd, puts in a word to assure his companions that there is 
 not enough in the last suggestion to be worth quarreling about. 
 He says he has been, for the past three days and a good part 
 of the nights, hunting from house to house, both in public ho- 
 tels and private dwellings, for any kind of light work, such als 
 boys could do, and everywhere he has found the field already 
 occupied, most always by Chinamen; whereupon they all agree 
 that they could not if they would, and would not if they could, 
 enter into successful competition with Chinamen, for the honor 
 of discharging the menial duties of kitchen servants. 
 
 At this particular juncture one of the party suggests that his 
 old widowed aunt has $500 in gold twenties, buried under her 
 barn floor; and that he knows just where to find the cash. They 
 can get this money and nobody but themselves need be any the 
 wiser for it. He says she has plenty without that, and she is 
 such a stingy old hag that it would be serving her just right 
 for them to go and relieve her of that five hundred. We do 
 not propose to follow this little band of young hoodlums far- 
 ther, for the present, but if any friend of our present public 
 school system can discover any motive which will deter from 
 crime and preserve from the penitentiary any one of the hun- 
 dreds upon hundreds of our city's youths, whose education and 
 situation in life differ in no essential particular from that of 
 
Anti-Parental Education. 31 
 
 the boys just above described, he will, by pointing out such 
 motive unquestionably confer a great and lasting benefit both 
 on the rising generation and on society at large. From the 
 fate of this eldest boy of our poor laborer we shall leave the 
 reader to guess the "doom which awaits his younger brothers 
 and sisters. 
 
 PETITION. 
 
 TO THE HONORABLE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 We, the undersigned, citizens and voters of the State of California, without 
 regard to political or religious differences, respectfully petition your honorable 
 bodies to pass a law for the taking of the sense of the voters of this State, at the 
 next general election, touching the propriety of so amending Article IX of our 
 State Constitution, as to make it substantially conform to the following proposi- 
 tions; such vote when so taken to have no other legal effect than to indicate the 
 deliberate judgment of the people, and thus serve as a guide for future action in 
 the premises : — 
 
 PBOPOSITIONS. 
 
 Parents are bound, by the law of Nature (each according to his ability), to 
 properly feed, clothe, and educate their own children, and unwilling parents shall 
 be compelled, by appropriate legislation, to discharge these duties. 
 
 II. 
 
 It is a public duty to assist, at public expense, in furnishing the necessary 
 means wherewith to properly feed, clothe, and educate children whose parents 
 are unable to so feed, clothe, and educate them. 
 
 III. 
 
 No citizen of this State shall ever be taxed for the feeding, clothing, or edu- 
 cating of children — not his own — whose parents are amply able to feed, clothe, 
 and educate them. 
 
 IV. 
 
 All such parents as are neither mentally nor morally unfit to have the custody 
 of children are entitled, and in duty bound, to select for the education of their 
 own children schools wherein they believe that neither the teachers, the associa- 
 tions, nor the kind of instruction given will seriously endanger either their health, 
 their lives, or their morals, but will best promote their temporal and eternal 
 welfare. 
 
 Neither the State, nor any municipal or other government organized under 
 Us authority, shall ever force upon the child of any parent — not legally adjudged 
 mentally or morally unfit to discharge the duties of the parental office — any par- 
 ticular teacher, book, or system of religious or non-religious instruction against 
 the conscientious objections of such parent. 
 
32 The Poison Fountain. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Tuition, when at public expense, shall embrace a good common English and 
 business education, added to such a thorough training in one or more of the me- 
 chanic arts, or the manufacturing, domestic, or productive industries, as will best 
 prepare youth for the practical business of self-support, but shall not extend to 
 the merely ornameDtal or more abstruse arts, or sciences, except in a limited class 
 of cases (to be provided for by law) as a reward for exalted merit, when coupled 
 With a high order of talent and a special aptitude for such arts or sciences. 
 
 VII. 
 
 The whole business of educating and training the young shall, like other pro- 
 fessions, be open to private enterprise and free competition; provided that the 
 State shall establish and maintain such necessary educational institutions as pri- 
 vate enterprise shall fail to establish and maintain; and every parent or guardian 
 entitled to have his or her child or ward educated at the public expense, shall se- 
 lect for such pui'pose his own school, and the teacher or principal of such school 
 shall be paid periodically for teaching such pupil a compensation, the maximum 
 of which shall be fixed by law, which compensation shall be proportionate to the 
 progress made by the pupil during such period of tuition in the legally appointed 
 secular branches. Said progress to be ascertained by examiners duly elected or 
 appointed in such manner as may be provided by law; but no religious tuition 
 which may be given in any such school shall be at public expense or subject to 
 the supervision of said examiners. 
 
 How Intelligent Citizens of all Classes Regard the Above Peopositions. 
 
 The friends and opponents of the foregoing propositions held a meeting in 
 the city of Oakland on the evening of October 6, 1879, for the purpose of consid- 
 ering their merits. In referring to that meeting and its action touching said 
 propositions, a leading Oakland daily, the Evening Tribune, in its issue of October 
 10th, among other things says: " A large audience gathered last Monday evening, 
 at the old Congregational Church building, to hear the Hon. Zach. Montgomery 
 discuss the demerits of the Public School System of the United States. It was 
 generally expected and hoped that the Rev. Horatio Stebbins, D. D., of San Fran- 
 cisco, would be present and take issue with the views advanced by Mr. Mont- 
 gomery, but the reverend gentleman did not put in an appearance. Pred. M. 
 Campbell, State Superintendent-elect, at the request of Mr. Montgomery, pre- 
 sided. ... In support of the two principal opinions, namely, the pernicious 
 influence of our present system of public instruction, and the right and duty of 
 the parent to select and control the education of the child , as well as clothe and 
 feed it, he advanced seven propositions, which, if carried out practically, he be- 
 lieved would prove vastly superior to the present system. He was frequently 
 plied with questions, put by persons in the audience, to which he responded with 
 nlacrity. A vote waa taken on the several propositions advanced by Mr. Mont- 
 gomery, to ascertain the sense of the audience in regard to the subject, and in- 
 variably the result showed that the speaker was sustained by a majority of his 
 hearers." 
 

"Reader, preserve this Pamphlet, and when certain stupid or 
 mendacious newspaper editors shall in the future, as in the past, 
 falsely charge its Author with seeking a division of the Publie 
 School Fund on a sectarian basis, turn to this record and put to 
 blush the ignorant or unprincipled falsifier. 
 
 Question. 
 
 What are some of the things^ to be accomplished by the adop- 
 tion of the Parental system of educatidn as herein proposed, in 
 place of the Anti-Parental system now prevailing 1 ? 
 
 Answer. 
 
 /. Under the system proposed, teachers will become amenable 
 to parents, instead of to politicians for the care which they take 
 of the health, the lives, the morals and the manners, as well as the 
 mental training of their pupils. ^ 
 
 ~* 
 
 II. Teachers will receive a eompensqjUon according to the 
 
 pyrogress of their pupils, and not according to their own skill in 
 repeating the answers, which a paid prompter has prepared, in 
 response to purchased questions. 
 
 III. Children, as a rule, will hecome more affectionate, 
 respectful and obedient to parents, xohile young, and more patri- 
 otic and law-abiding when old. 
 
 IV. Children will receive a far better and mare practical 
 education than under the present system at one-tenth the cost to 
 the pmblic. 
 
 V. The number of criminals, patters, and insane persons 
 will be vastly diminished, and so will be the amount of taxes paid 
 
 for the support of Policemen, Jails, Penitentiaries, Almshouses, 
 and Lunatic Asylums. 
 
 P D 9.-7. 
 
 » -« 
 
onfirmation of Hon. John J. Parker to be an 
 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
 of the United States 
 
 HEARING 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
 
 UNITED STATES, SENATE 
 
 SEVENTY-FIRST CONGRESS 
 
 SECOND SESSION 
 
 ON THE 
 
 CONFIRMATION OF HON. JOHN J. PARKER TO BE AN 
 
 ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
 
 OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 APRIL 5, 1930 
 
 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 107150 WASHINGTON : 1930 
 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
 
 GEORGE W. NORMS, Nebraska, Chairman 
 
 WILLIAM E. BORAH, Idaho. 
 CHARLES S. DENEEN, Illinois. 
 FREDERICK H. GILLETT, Massachusetts 
 ARTHUR R. ROBINSON, Indiana. 
 JOHN J. BLAINE, Wisconsin. 
 FREDERICK STEIWER, Oregon. 
 CHARLES W. WATERMAN, Colorado. 
 DANIEL O. HASTINGS, Delaware. 
 FELIX HEBERT, Rhode Island. 
 
 John R. Robertson, Clerk 
 William L; Ievin, Assistant Clerk 
 II 
 
 LEE S. OVERMAN, North Carolina. 
 HENRY F. ASHURST, Arizona. 
 THOMAS J. WALSH, Montana. 
 THADDEUS H. CARAWAY, Arkansas. 
 WILLIAM H. KING, Utah. 
 HUBERT D. STEPHENS, Mississippi. 
 C. C. DILL, Washington. 
 
 U&RAftY OP CONGRESS 
 
 ! RECEIVED 
 
 | APR 1 < 1 
 
 DOCUMENTS DIVISION 
 

 CONTENTS 
 
 Statement of — Page 
 
 Fish,H.E 70 
 
 Green, William 23 
 
 Johnson, Mercer G 79 
 
 Townsend, E. C 61 
 
 White, Walter 74 
 
 in 
 
CONFIRMATION OF HON. JOHN J. PAEKEK, TO BE AN 
 ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1930 
 
 United States Senate, 
 
 Subcommittee cf the 
 Committee on the Judiciary, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in 
 room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Lee S. Overman (chairman) 
 presiding. 
 
 Present: Senators Overman (chairman), Hebert, and Borah. 
 Senator Overman. The committee will come to order. This is a 
 subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee to hear anything 
 that might be said for or against the confirmation of Judge Parker. 
 Anyone who wants to be heard may be heard. 
 
 I received some letters this morning, which I will ask to be read in 
 the record. 
 
 The first is a letter from Judge Parker, dated April 1, 1930. 
 (The letter in question is as follows :) 
 
 United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 
 
 Fourth Judicial Circuit, 
 Charlotte, N. C, April 1, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Mr. Overman: I am in receipt of your kind letter of March 31, for 
 which I thank you very much indeed. 
 
 In answer to your question as to the extent of my practice before going on the 
 bench, I beg to advise that I practiced in Monroe in partnership with Judge 
 Stack from 1910 to 1922, our firm being Stack & Parker and later Stack, Parker 
 & Craig. We did a large general practice, but did not represent any public 
 service corporations. I do not want to appear to boast of our practice, but I 
 suppose that we had as large a practice as any firm of lawyers located in a rural 
 section in the State. Toward the latter part of the period I was employed in 
 important cases at various parts of the State, and spent much time away from 
 home in the trial of cases. I practiced in the State and Federal courts, including 
 the Supreme Courts of North and South Carolina, the circuit court of appeals of 
 this circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States. An examination of the 
 reports of the Supreme Court of North Carolina will show that hardly a court 
 passed that I did not argue a number of cases before that court. 
 
 In 1922, Judge Stack was elected to the State superior court bench, and I 
 decided to move to Charlotte so as to have a wider field for practice, and here 
 became head of the firm of Parker, Stewart, McRae & Bobbitt, in association 
 with Messrs. Plummer Stewart, John A. McRae, and William H. Bobbitt. Here 
 again, I was not retained by public service corporations, but did a wide general 
 practice. During this period I was appointed special assistant to the Attorney 
 General to prosecute certain war fraud cases and prosecuted the lumber fraud 
 case in Washington. You doubtless recall when I was there engaged in this duty, 
 and Judge Peyton Gordon, who was district attorney, Justice Jennings Bailey, 
 who presided, or Mr. Charles A. Douglass, Mr. T. C. Bradley or Mr. Hugh 
 
2 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 O'Bear, who appeared for the defense, or Mr. Justice Stone, who was Attorney 
 General, can tell you something about how I handled the case. 
 
 Among the important cases in which I have appeared, I would mention first 
 the Par Clearance case in the Supreme Court of the United States (262 U. S. 649), 
 in which I represented some 300 State banks against the Federal Reserve Bank of 
 Richmond. Opposed to me in the case were Mr. John W. Davis and Mr. Henry 
 W. Anderson. The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of North 
 Carolina in this case. I appeared for the Bank of Union in Bank of Union v. 
 Heath et al. (187 N. C. 18), in which certain bequests of the late B. D. Heath 
 were subjected to liability for the debts of the beneficiaries. The questions of 
 law involved were intricate and important and the amount involved was large. 
 Bank v. Redwine (171 N. C. 559) involved important questions of lien and regis- 
 tration. Horton v. S. A. L. Ry. Co. (175 N. C. 472) involved important questions 
 under the Federal employers' liability act. Williams v. Philadelphia Life Insur- 
 ance Co. (105 S. C. 305, 112; S. C. 100) involved questions of insurance law, as 
 did Gunter v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co. (130 S. C. 1), State v. Plyler (153 
 N. C. 630); State v. Gray (162 N. C. 608, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 71); and State v. 
 Thomas (184 N. C. 757), were murder cases involving important legal principles. 
 McNinch v. American Trust Co. (183 N. C. 33) involved the doctrine of con- 
 structive trusts. Wood v. Vanstory (171 Fed. 375), I argued alone in the circuit 
 court of appeals before I had been at the bar 12 months. 
 
 The above are but a few of the cases which I argued in appellate courts, and 
 many of the most important cases in which I appeared did not reach the appellate 
 courts. Thus the McCall will case, involving property worth around $100,000, 
 was twice tried by me in Sumter County, S. C., each trial lasting about three 
 weeks. Lamborn & Co. v. Snyder Grocery Co. was a case lasting nearly three 
 weeks in the Federal court in Charlotte. I represented one of the defendants 
 in the celebrated prosecution of the Bailey Bros. Tobacco Co. which consumed 
 more than two weeks in the Federal court at Greensboro. You will recall, also, 
 that I was leading counsel for Doctor Peacock in the celebrated murder trial at 
 Lexington. 
 
 While the practice of a lawyer in North Carolina is necessarily somewhat 
 limited in range, I beg to call attention to the fact that on the circuit court of 
 appeals I have dealt with cases of the greatest magnitude and from the widest 
 range of subjects. During the four and one-half years I have been on that 
 court, I have written 184 opinions, 34 of which, however, appear as per curiam 
 opinions. One hundred and fifty are published under my name. I inclose a list 
 of some of these which seem to me to be important. 
 
 Thanking j^ou for writing me, and with kindest personal regards, I am 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 John J. Parker. 
 
 Senator Overman. The next letter I have here is one from the 
 Governor of North Carolina, dated April 4, 1930, and signed O. Max 
 Gardner, governor. 
 
 (The letter referred to is as follows:) 
 
 State or North Carolina, 
 
 Governor's Office, 
 Raleigh, April 4, 1980. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Senator Overman: Judge Parker and I, as you know, do not sub- 
 scribe to the same political faith. He is a Republican and I am a Democrat. 
 Yet as governor of North Carolina and as a citizen of the State, and also as one 
 who has the most implicit faith in his character as a man of integrity and ability 
 as a judge, I do have a tremendous interest in the controversy that is now being 
 waged over his fitness to serve on the Supreme Bench of the United States. 
 It will not, I trust, therefore, appear presumptuous if I venture, for such con- 
 sideration as you and your committee may think it worth, my own opinion of 
 the qualifications of this distinguished North Carolinian for this high place. 
 
 I have known Judge Parker since we were in college together at the Univer- 
 sity of North Carolina and I unhesitatingly say, and you are authorized to 
 quote me as saying, that I have never known any man who possessed a higher 
 or a finer sense of righteousness and justice than Judge Parker. I have absolute 
 confidence in the integrity and essential soundness of his intellectual processes, 
 and I can not believe for an instant that he would be unfair, either to the most 
 
CONFIRMATION OP JOHN J. PARKER 3 
 
 powerful or the most humble citizen of this country. His whole outlook and 
 philosophy as a man and as a judge could not, in my opinion, be more accurately 
 epitomized than by the inscription over the entrance of the chapel at the Uni- 
 versity of North Carolina: 
 
 "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justice and love mercy and walk 
 humbly with thy God." 
 
 In my opinion Judge Parker enjoys the confidence and esteem of an over- 
 whelming majority of the people of this State, irrespective of party affiliations. 
 They respect him as a man, admire him as a judge, and that he would some day 
 be elevated to the Supreme Bench had become a sort of general hope and expect- 
 ancy. This was amply attested by the practically universal enthusiasm and ap- 
 proval with which the news of his appointment by President Hoover was received. 
 
 There is not, in my judgment, as I have already suggested, the slightest basis 
 in reality, for the fear expressed by one group of our citizens that he would not, 
 as a judge of the Supreme Court, be absolutely fair and impartial in any case or 
 controversy which might arise. I have never known any man whose concern for 
 the upholding and protection of what we know in a democracy as human rights, 
 as distinguished from property rights, excelled Judge Parker's. 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 O. Max Gardner. 
 
 Senator Overman. I have also a letter here from a former law 
 partner of Judge Parker's, which I will ask to have included in the 
 record, without reading, together with several others. 
 
 (The letters referred to are as follows:) 
 
 Stewart, McRae, & Bobbitt, 
 
 Attorneys at Law, 
 Charlotte, N. C, April 4, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Senator Overman: I am inclosing to you herein a clipping from one 
 of the Charlotte papers under date of April 3, 1930. I thought that you would 
 be interested in reading it. It appears from this article that an effort is being 
 made by the national organization to whip into line local organizations. I 
 unqualifiedly say to you that the laboring people of North Carolina, those who 
 belong to unions and those who do not belong, are practically unanimous in their 
 support of Judge Parker. They have absolute confidence in his fairness and 
 impartiality as well as his ability. All classes and conditions of people in North 
 Carolina, regardless of party affiliations, are most enthusiastically, and I might 
 say passionately, anxious to see Judge Parker on the Supreme Court. Our 
 people know him. 
 
 Personally, I feel that it is a serious matter when a judge is to be opposed on 
 the ground that he wrote an opinion which he honestly believed to be in con- 
 formity to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. I read the 
 opinion immediately after it was rendered and I am also familiar with the Hich- 
 man opinion. I can not see how the Parker opinion could be different from what 
 it is without overruling the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 I am not impressed with this protest against his confirmation. I have myself 
 been properly classed as strongly in sympathy with the laboring people and their 
 organizations, except communism, all these years; but I must confess that I 
 am somewhat impatient with the protests which have been made. 
 
 If the Senators could only know Judge Parker as I know him there would not 
 be a single opposition vote, and I make this statement knowing whereof I speak. 
 
 With my very best wishes, I beg to remain, 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 Pltjmmer Stewart. 
 
 [The Charlotte fN. C) News, Thursday, April 3] 
 
 Labor Chiefs Break Over Confirmation of Judge Parker 
 
 report wilson, state leader, yields stand repudiation of indorsement 
 
 of judge parker for seat on supreme court bench 
 
 Reports of a serious break between executive officers of the North Carolina 
 Federation of Labor over the fight of the American Federation of Labor on con- 
 firmation of Judge John J. Parker, of Charlotte, to the United States Supreme 
 
4 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Court were supported to-day by reports from Washington, that T. A. Wilson, 
 president of the State organization, officially repudiated his indorsement of the 
 jurist. 
 
 The Washington report combined with reports emanating within the past 
 few days from Raleigh, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem showed Secretary 
 Marcus Sauls, of the State Federation, sent to Senator Overman a telegram 
 declaring in substance that North Carolina organized labor would not support 
 Judge Parker. That action, rumored for several days, was confirmed by a report 
 received to-day from Greensboro and disclosed the break among the federation's 
 executive heads. Almost simultaneously a report came from Washington that 
 President Green, of the American Federation, received from President Wilson 
 an explanation of his (Wilson's) first message and a declaration that the State 
 Federation is in full accord with the American Federation, this second message 
 being a definite repudiation of the first one and constituting a complete reversal 
 of position. 
 
 President Wilson's action, according to reports emanating from Raleigh, was 
 forced by President Green, who held over the former's head a club in the form of a 
 threat to compel his resignation. The whole tangled situation, embarrassing 
 both to President Wilson and to other leaders of organized labor in this State, 
 was discussed in detail Sunday at a large gathering of labor leaders, held in 
 Raleigh. Mr. Wilson, who is a member of the North Carolina commission 
 charged with administration of the workmen's compensation law, admitted at 
 that meeting, according to several available reports, that President Green had 
 sent to him a vigorously worded reprimand for indorsing Judge Parker before 
 making an investigation of his record. Until the American Federation presented 
 its protest to Senator Overman's subcommittee in Washington, North Carolina 
 labor regarded Judge Parker as a jurist who opposed within legal limitations the 
 use of injunctions in labor disputes, it was learned. 
 
 The rank and file of North Carolina labor, so far as is indicated by available 
 reports, is standing by the American Federation but is not taking any particularly 
 aggressive action. Privately, many of the State's labor leaders have the highest 
 regard for Judge Parker and are hopeful that he will be confirmed though there 
 is an absolute lack of comment by any of the State's recognized labor leaders 
 regarding this situation. Even President Wilson and Secretary Sauls have said 
 nothing for publication, though Mr. Wilson did make public about two weeks 
 ago in Raleigh his telegram to President Green, in which Judge Parker was in- 
 dorsed. The text of President Wilson's second message was made public in 
 Washington by President Green. The text of Secretary Saul's message, support- 
 ing the American Federation's president and countering the State Federation's 
 president, also was given out for publication in Washington. The report seems 
 to be generally current throughout organized labor centers of this State that labor 
 is not expecting to prevent the Senate's confirmation of Judge Parker but does 
 expect to impress upon him the view of organized labor in bitter opposition to the 
 use of injunctions, instead of conciliation and arbitration, in labor disputes. 
 
 [Charlotte News, April 3, 1930] 
 
 CAROLINA LABOR PROTESTING ON PARKER CHOICE UNION ORGANIZATIONS IN 
 
 FOUR CITIES OF STATE REPORTED TO HAVE VOICED OBJECTIONS 
 
 Washington, April 3. — (A. P.) — Protests from labor organizations in four 
 North Carolina cities against confirmation of Judge John J. Parker, of North 
 Carolina, as associate justice of the Supreme Court, were received to-day by the 
 Senate Judiciary Committee. 
 
 The protests were /from the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, at Charlotte; 
 the Central Labor Union of Winston-Salem; the Central Labor Union of Salisbury, 
 and from the Union of Raleigh. 
 
 A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, headed by Senator Overman, 
 Democrat, North Carolina, will give a hearing on Saturday to representatives of 
 organized labor who are protesting Judge Parker's confirmation because of his 
 decisions in labor cases as a member of the Federal circuit court of appeals. 
 
 Pending the hearing there is no indication of the line-up in the Senate on th 
 Parker nomination although his friends are confident of the votes for confirmation. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 5 
 
 LOCAL RAIL BROTHERHOOD DENIES MAKING PROTEST ON JUDGE PARKER 
 
 W. L. Smith, official representative of the local Brotherhood of Railway 
 Trainmen, to-day denied a report that the local order had protested confirma- 
 tion of Judge John J. Parker as associate justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
 "We have nothing against the judge," he said. " But we have taken no official 
 action on the matter either for or against." 
 
 In other labor groups of the city, it was explained by spokesmen to-day that 
 local organizations were finding themselves embarrassed over the complex situ- 
 ation. 
 
 Not only has the judge taken no action locally against labor groups or their 
 welfare, according to these leaders, but actually he represented labor in the car 
 strike troubles of Charlotte a few years ago while he was a lawyer of Monroe. 
 
 However, State organizations are unable at present to take a stand against 
 officials of the American Federation of Labor, the officials said. The breach 
 between controlling officials of the American Federation of Labor and local 
 officials who personally favor the confirmation of the judge is being rapidly 
 whipped together by superior authorities, officers indicated. 
 
 Brevard, N. C, April 4, 1970. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dea.r Senator: I am inclosing you an editorial written by Hon. James 
 F. Barrett, the editor of the Brevard News, on Judge Parker. 
 
 As you know, Mr. Barrett is ex-president of the North Carolina Federation of 
 Labor and has always taken an active interest in all matters affecting the work- 
 ingman and has advocated the cause of the laborer ably and successfully. 
 
 During the World War Mr. Barrett was a member of the speakers' bureau of 
 the Department of Laboi and in the performance of his duties went over a large 
 part of the United States and made very valuable investigations for the Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 There is no man who is closer to labor and who has better knowledge as to the 
 friends and foes of labor, and his judgment has proven itself correct in the past 
 and I think that he is correct in the case of Judge Parker. 
 
 While the Transylvania Bar Association is a small organization, still, yet, 
 man for man, I consider it the equal of any similar organization in the United 
 States, and we unanimously indorse Judge Parker, and I sent a telegram to 
 President Hoover indorsing Parker. 
 
 You know that I am one of the militant Democrats of North Carolina, but 
 still, yet, I know Judge Parker well and have observed him in his activities as a 
 member of the board of trustees of the university, and he is as fine and upstanding 
 man as I know and is a Christian gentleman in its fullest meaning, and the 
 indorsement of Mr. Barrett and myself and of our bar association was entirely 
 unsolicited, and is as yet unknown to Judge Parker. 
 
 And may I now at this time, and as chairman of the Democratic Executive 
 Committee of Transylvania County put in a request that you make arrangements 
 to come to Transylvania County during the coming campaign, for us mountain 
 folks love you and want you to come up and advise us. 
 
 With every good wish, I am, 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 W. E. Breese. 
 
 [The Brevard News, Wednesday, April 2, 1930] 
 OPPOSITION TO PARKER FOR SUPREME COURT 
 
 Intense surprise was registered in America, more especially in North Carolina, 
 when the American Federation of Labor announced opposition to the confirma- 
 tion of Hon. John J. Parker as a member of the United States Supreme Court. 
 This opposition is based upon a decision rendered by Judge Parker in a case 
 where the owners of coal mines had an agreement with their workers that they 
 should not join the miners' union so long as they remained in the employ of that 
 mine. This is known as the yellow-dog contract, and is one of the most obnoxious 
 conditions that labor must contend with. Senator Borah, progressive, says that 
 Judge Parker's decision in the case was in keeping with precedent, and had 
 
6 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKEPv 
 
 he decided otherwise, his decision would have been reversed by the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 President Green and the executive council of the American Federation of 
 Labor are to be commended for their eternal vigilance, their alert watchfulness, 
 in behalf of the toiling millions of America. In no other industry are the workers 
 so completely at the mercy of unscrupulous employers as found in the coal 
 mining industry, and it can also be said that in no other industry are there so 
 many unscrupulous employers as found among the coal-mine owners and their 
 representatives. Every advantage of the industry lies with the employer, be- 
 cause of the very nature of that industry. The owners own all the land about 
 the mines, and can patrol the premises and police the men with hired thugs who 
 parade as officers of the law. 
 
 The workers themselves are, most of the time, down in the bowels of the earth, 
 shut away from the association of their fellows even as they are shut out from the 
 sunlight and pure air. The miners have but little opportunity to speak for 
 themselves, or to take any part in the negotiations with law-makers, or even with 
 their own kindred organizations. So it is absolutely necessary that these men 
 have representatives to speak for them. Many of them are foreigners, and know 
 nothing of the contents of the contract which they sign with the company. Their 
 signature to the yellow-dog contract is a surrender of their rights as men and as 
 citizens, hence the contempt which an American citizen has for this form of 
 enslavement in a free country. 
 
 Notwithstanding all these things, we believe that the American Federation of 
 Labor is objecting to the confirmation of one of the whitest, finest, biggest- 
 hearted, fairest men ever elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 We believe that Judge John J. Parker would cheerfully have rendered an adverse 
 decision in that case had it been possible for him to have done so without having 
 his decision reversed because of its conflict with precedent and the established 
 rule. Judge Parker's great heart has throbbed in sympathetic unison with the 
 mass of mill workers about him, men and women who have called him friend, 
 and have never called in vain. In 1920 John Parker replied to organized labor's 
 questionnaire in a perfectly frank manner, a reply which marked his sympathetic 
 interest in the problems facing labor. He was given the biggest vote ever re- 
 ceived, up to that time, by a republican candidate for governor in North Carolina. 
 The bulk of this big vote was cast by labor. Had the American Federation of 
 Labor known Judge Parker as labor in North Carolina knows him, we believe 
 this protest would not have been made. 
 
 Judge Parker will be confirmed along toward the last of the week, or the first 
 of the next week. He will take his seat among those who constitute the Nation's 
 highest tribunal. He will go along as though this protest had never been made, 
 rendering decisions fairly, impartially, according to the light of the law and the 
 promptings of his great, pure heart. The years will roll by, and Mr. Justice 
 Parker will grow riper in years and richer in wisdom, and one day the news will 
 be flashed back to the Old North State that her beloved son has been elevated to 
 the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Wilmington, N. C, April S, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Senator: I am very glad to see that you are chairman of the sub- 
 committee of the Judiciary Committee, to which has been committed the con- 
 sideration of the confirmation of Judge John J. Parker, because I know that you 
 will give both sides a fair and adequate hearing. 
 
 It is utterly impossible for me to understand the real ground of opposition to 
 Judge Parker, and as you and I have been friends for many years, I desire to 
 make one or two comments on the matter; and, of course, Judge Parker knows 
 nothing of my purpose or act. 
 
 When I was holding court in Monroe in 1914 or 1915 — I have forgotten exactly 
 which — Parker appeared before me in many cases, and I was impressed with his 
 sound sense and general ability, and since he has been elevated to the circuit 
 bench I have appeared before him in several cases, and have, of course, read many 
 cases which he has decided and with which I had no connection, and I have been 
 deeply impressed with the great advance which he has made in legal knowledge, 
 so much so that I regard him as one of the very best judges before whom I have 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN ,T. PARKER 7 
 
 ever appeared. Indeed, I think when one considers his youth, the possibilities of 
 development and usefulness on his part are unlimited. 
 
 In this connection, I want to say that his decisions have always appeared to 
 me as being not only well reasoned and supported by plentiful references, but are 
 sustained by reason and sound judgment, and, even though the press informs us 
 that he is opposed by the American Federation of Labor, the Negroes and the 
 Communists, I have myself seen no public statement of any reasonable ground 
 for such opposition. Of course, Judge Parker sustained an injunction against 
 the miners and that seems to be the ground of Mr. Green's opposition, but has 
 anyone shown that his opinion was not founded upon law and sustained by au- 
 thority and common sense? If the decision of the court had been all that is now 
 said by radicals, more or less, why didn't they appeal it to the Supreme Court 
 and get it reversed? 
 
 As you know, I am a conservative, but I do strongly advocate rational develop- 
 ment and all possible improvement by reasonable means, but do not approve 
 Marxian theories, and I do not approve the attempt on the part of any organized 
 section of people, by whatever name known, Labor or Ku Klux, trying to dictate 
 appointments, confirmations, or anything else committed by the Constitution 
 and laws to public officers. 
 
 I hope you will be able to report favorably on Judge Parker's confirmation, 
 and I am sure no one will regret it, but I confess I did regret seeing that you and 
 Senator Simmons felt it to be your duty to vote against the confirmation of the 
 Chief Justice. 
 
 Sincerely your friend, 
 
 Geo. Rountree. 
 
 Greensboro, N. C, April 5, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Sir: I am a Democrat, and usually do not believe in one of my political 
 faith dabbling in a Republican pie scramble, but it seems to me that there is 
 probably involved in the John J. Parker appointment and opposition thereto, 
 something that justifies a good citizen making an exception. 
 
 I was the first president of the North Carolina State Federation of Labor, and 
 did more organizing and promotion work than has probably been done by any 
 other single individual, and to this day most of the local unions in this city, 
 Charlotte, and Salisbury and other places are the ones I organized without any 
 salary from the American Federation of Labor nearly 30 years ago; therefore, I 
 think the facts would indicate my loyalty to the principles of trade-unionism. 
 
 I am convinced that the objections to Parker's confirmation are foolish and 
 rather far-fetched. 
 
 While not intimately acquainted with Parker, I have known him and his 
 family, their antecedents and connections and contacts for more than 40 years, 
 and I know it would be impossible for him to be rabidly radical, or perniciously 
 reactionary. He is by nature and training, associations and habits, mildly 
 progressive, reasonably progressive, and entirely trustworthy and honest. 
 
 I am not a job holder nor an applicant for favors at the hands of the American 
 Federation of Labor nor of the Government, nor anyone else, and as a man whose 
 service proves his earnestness in the cause of organized labor, and the principles 
 of collective bargaining, I refuse to echo objections I do not understand, or assume 
 to mouth talismanic slogans that do not mean anything, and I, therefore, urge 
 the confirmation of Mr. Parker. 
 
 Mr. Parker is such a man that the fundamental and basic principles of our 
 Government will be safe in the hands of, and at whose hands the principle of 
 "equal rights to all and special privileges to none," will not suffer. 
 
 You may use this at your discretion, and your support of this confirmation 
 will be regarded as a further indication of your own statesmanship, and cause 
 your friends pleasure. 
 Sincerelv yours, 
 
 W. M. Tye. 
 
5 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PAEKER 
 
 Greenville, N. C, April 7, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senator. 
 North Carolina negroes are proud of the State's recognition and are militant 
 in their support of Judge Parker, who is a reminder of men like Augustus S. 
 Merrimon. The negro did not suffer with L. Q. C. Lamar on the supreme 
 bench. Unshackle the liberal-minded South and confirm him. 
 
 C. M. Eppes. 
 
 April 6, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senator, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Senator Overman : This letter is to substantiate my statement made 
 to you in Washington yesterday that I had talked to numbers of the laboring 
 people in North Carolina in regard to Judge John J. Parker being elevated to 
 the Supreme Court bench and all are in line for him to be confirmed as such. 
 He is eminently fitted and able and no one I have talked with blames him for 
 the now famous "yellow-dog" contract, and they are of the opinion that he 
 rendered his decision in that case according to the law. While none believe in 
 contracts of this nature, they are not placing any blame on him whatever for its 
 existence. Assuring you that it was a pleasure and an honor to be presented to 
 you and thanking you for your keen interest in this important matter. I beg 
 to remain, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 S. B. Winslow, 
 122 North McDowell Street, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 5, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate: 
 Urge Judge Parker's confirmation. He is fair upright and able. 
 
 J. Crawford Biggs. 
 
 Washington, D. C, March 14,- 1930. 
 The Hon. Herbert Hoover, 
 
 President of the United States, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Mr. President: The death recently of Justice Sanford left a vacancy 
 on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States which every citizen, 
 particularly every lawyer, should want to see filled with the appointment of one 
 best fitted to meet the requirements of the office and, knowing how eager Your 
 Excellency is to find that particular man, I feel it my duty to address you con- 
 cerning one whose name has been mentioned for the position. I do this un- 
 solicited. 
 
 Several years ago, John L. Phillips, Charles S. Shotweli and others were placed 
 on trial under the Federal Conspiracy Statute and were specifically charged 
 with defrauding the United States of large sums of money in connection with the 
 so-called lumber frauds. This prosecution was instituted through the activities 
 of certain members of Congress and a special fund appropriated for the purpose 
 of preparation and trial. John J. Parker, at that time a member of the Bar of 
 North Carolina, practicing in Charlotte, was made a Special Assistant Attorney 
 General of the United States and the lumber fraud case assigned to his care. 
 It was the writer's privilege to represent one of the principal defendants and to 
 be actively engaged in the trial during all of the three months and more that 
 the case was on hearing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 
 During all of this time I had an opportunity to study the quality of Parker's 
 mind and to observe his demeanor during those days of stress and strain. It was 
 a particularly trying ordeal. Placed in a courtroom in a foreign jurisdiction 
 with the public gaze and the eyes of Congress upon him, the mettle of this man 
 was tested in a way to show his true caliber. 
 
 As I told the then Attorney General, now Associate Justice Stone, in an 
 active career of more than 15 years at the bar, I never knew a case to be more 
 thoroughly prepared, more studiously arranged for trial or more ably presented 
 to the court on the law and to the jury on the facts than was the lumber fraud case 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKE It 9 
 
 by Mr. Parker. He withstood every attack against him, showed great judgment 
 and fairness, and won my admiration and respect both as a lawyer and a man. 
 
 I have not the pleasure of a close personal acquaintance with Judge Parker, 
 having seen him hut once since the above-mentioned case terminated, and that 
 shortly after he was appointed to the circuit court, and I am not writing this 
 letter for him but for you, Mr. President, in order that you might know what one 
 learned of his adversary at law in a long trial of an important case and no better 
 point of observation could be obtained. 
 
 There may be many others who might have equal qualities and attainments 
 and be as well fitted to sit in the seat of Justice Sanford, but I am confident 
 none would bring a higher degree of those qualities which I regard as requisite, 
 namely, superior ability as a lawyer, sterling and unquestioned integrity as a 
 man, an exalted sense of honor, fairness, duty and obligation, coupled with 
 that rare quality, judicial poise and temperament. 
 
 I trust that I have not transgressed upon your time in writing this long letter, 
 and I trust it may aid in your consideration of the appointee. 
 
 Assuring you of my deep respect and high regard, I am, my dear Mr. President, 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Thomas C. Bradley. 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 4, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Building, Washington, D. C: 
 I am an engineer on the Seaboard Air Line Railway, North Carolina Division, 
 member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and I would like to have 
 the appointment of Judge John J. Parker confirmed. 
 
 A. R. Vattghan. 
 
 Monroe, N. C, March 29, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Mr. Overman: In regard to press reports with reference to protest 
 against the seating of Judge John J. Parker to the high office for which he has 
 been selected, that of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. This protest filed 
 by the American Federation of Labor. 
 
 I have known Judge Parker from boyhood and he has been my neighbor and 
 friend. I feel that the President has acted very wisely in appointing Judge 
 Parker a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 I hope that you will use your best efforts to have Judge Parker's appointment 
 confirmed. I have been a Democrat all my life and have been connected with 
 Labor through the Train Service Organizations for many years, and I have 
 always found Judge Parker fair to both labor and capital. 
 Yours trulv, 
 
 W. E. Cason. 
 
 Answer to Charge That Judge Parker Advocated Denial of Rights 
 
 to Colored People 
 
 In saying that the constitutional amendment of North Carolina had been 
 accepted in good faith there was no approval of denying the equal protection of 
 the laws to the colored people or of denying them ari% rights under the Constitution 
 of the United States. Section 4 of Article VI of the constitution of North Carolina 
 prescribed as a qualification for registration for voting that the voter should be 
 able to read and write any section of the constitution in the English language. 
 It was provided, however, that no person who was entitled to vote on January 1, 
 1867, or the lineal descendant of such person should be denied the right to register 
 and vote by reason of failure to possess the educational qualification provided 
 he registered prior to December 1, 1908. After the latter date the educational 
 qualification applied alike to all persons, and many white persons have been 
 denied the right to vote in North Carolina because of failure to comply with it. In 
 this respect there is a difference between the suffrage provision of the North 
 Carolina constitution and others which have been criticized. In 1920 the period 
 within which an exception was made in favor of registering those who had voted or 
 
10 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 whose ancestors had voted prior to 1867 had long since elapsed, and the educa- 
 tional qualification was being applied to all persons alike. 
 
 In the Greensboro speech it was not proposed to deny the colored people any 
 rights under the law or to discriminate against them in any way. After the 
 adoption of the suffrage amendment they had not attempted to participate in the 
 political life of the State and no attempt had been made to organize them for 
 political purposes. They were going along quietly attending to their own business. 
 They were apparently following the advice of some of their leaders who counseled 
 them to let politics alone. Nevertheless, in almost every campaign the Republi- 
 can Party had been denounced as intending to put them in power in North 
 Carolina and restore the evils of the reconstruction period. In 1920 certain 
 adversaries of the party raised the same false issue and sought to stir up racial 
 prejudice by charging that the Republicans intended to organize the negroes 
 and turn the State over to them. The Greensboro speech was merely an answer 
 to this attempt to inject the race issue into politics. It called attention to the 
 fact that the colored people were not trying to, enter politics in North Carolina, 
 that the Republican Party of the State was not trying to organize them or 
 restore them to power in the State, and deplored the attempt to stir up racial 
 prejudice and hatred against them. 
 
 That the above is unquestionably correct appears from the letter filed with the 
 committee by the Society for the Advancement of Colored People, wherein it is 
 said: 
 
 "In 1920 Judge Parker was the Republican candidate for governor of North 
 Carolina. A discussion arose as to whether or not the Republican Party would 
 seek to organize negro voters. * * * Judge Parker is quoted by the Greens- 
 boro (N. C.) Daily News, of April 19, 1920, as saying in his speech of acceptance 
 of the gubernatorial nomination before the Republican State convention: 'The 
 Republican Party in North Carolina has accepted the amendment in the spirit 
 in which it was passed and the negro has so accepted it. I have attended every 
 State convention since 1908 and I have never seen a negro delegate in any con- 
 vention that I attended. The negro as a class does not desire to enter politics. 
 The Republican Party of North Carolina does not desire him to dp so. We 
 recognize the fact that he has not yet reached the stage in his development when 
 he can share the burdens and responsibilities of government. This being true, 
 and every intelligent man in North Carolina knows that it is true, the attempt 
 of certain petty Democratic politicians to inject the race issue into every cam- 
 paign is most reprehensible. I say it deliberately, there is no more dangerous or 
 contemptible enemy of the State than men who for personal or political advan- 
 tage will attempt to kindle the flame of racial prejudice or hatred.'" 
 
 It is no praise of a judge to say that he will give to every man his rights under 
 the law; for it is his duty to do that. But as showing that Judge Parker has 
 not in the administration of his office denied to the colored people their rights 
 guaranteed by the Constitution, attention might be called to the fact that he 
 presided in the circuit court of appeals of the fourth circuit in the recent case of 
 City of Richmond v. Deans, in which, in accordance with a prior decision of the 
 supreme court a residential segregation ordinance based on race was held viola- 
 tive of the provisions of the Constitution. That he has the confidence and re- 
 spect of the colored people who know him is shown by the letter of President 
 Shepard, of the North Carolina College for Negroes, written to Senator Overman 
 and filed with the committee. 
 
 David H. Blair. 
 
 Statement by Mary G. Kii*reth, President, Woman Patriot Publishing 
 Co., 8 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D. C. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to record myself in favor of Judge Parker's 
 confirmation. I am not an employer, or laborer, or lawyer. 
 
 I am merely one of what Senator Borah called the third party to this issue — 
 the public — and make this appeal for Judge Parker's confirmation only on behalf 
 of the principle of equality before the law. 
 
 Now, as I understand it, the whole purpose of this hearing is to go behind 
 the decisions of Judge Parker. Yet Judge Parker's decisions are in exact agree- 
 ment with those of the United States Supreme Court and other courts. 
 
 It is reassuring that this committee has now decided to examine the im- 
 mensely important decisions of Judge Parker. 
 
 They can bear the closest scrutiny. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER H 
 
 The identical legal nature of union and nonunion contracts between em- 
 ployers and employees is so clearly set forth in the Hitchman decision of the 
 United States Supreme Court, that I asked permission to file this statement 
 simply to bring out points in the Hitchman decision, particularly in the dis- 
 senting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandies, that I have not heard presented before 
 your committee. 
 
 Any attempt of a group to nullify a general law in its own behalf, to exempt 
 itself from laws upholding the inviolability of contracts, would land our com- 
 mercial nation in chaos, with a privileged proletarian class in the saddle. Ever 
 since the days of Thomas Jefferson this country has rejected the class legislation 
 theory that "some men are born with saddles on their backs and other are 
 equipped by Government with boots and spurs to ride them." 
 
 As Jefferson also said, "An equal application of law to every condition of man 
 is fundamental." Without equal justice under the law — equal security for all 
 legal contracts, of rich and poor, employer and employee, union or non-union — 
 there is no permanent security for any contract. 
 
 If there is any one principle upon which every justice then on the Supreme 
 Court agreed in the Hitchman case, it is this: 
 
 UNION LABOR CONTRACTS AND SO-CALLED "YELLOW-DOG" CONTRACTS ARE EQUAL 
 
 RIGHTS 
 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in the case (Hitchman Coal & 
 C. Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 270-272, October Term, 1917) upheld the type of 
 contract which is bitterly denounced as the "yellow-dog" contract by certain 
 labor leaders, as absolutely the same sort of contract, in a legal sense, as the union 
 labor "closed-shop" contract and governed by the same legal rights and principles. 
 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis held: 
 
 "It is urged that a union agreement curtails the liberty of the operator. Every 
 agreement curtails the liberty of those who enter into it. The test of legality 
 is not whether an agreement curtails liberty, but whether the parties have agreed 
 upon something which the law prohibits or declares otherwise to be inconsistent 
 with the public welfare. 
 
 "The operator, by the union agreement, binds himself (1) to employ only 
 members of the union; (2) to negotiate with union officers instead of with em- 
 ployees individually the scale of wages and the hours of work; (3) to treat with the 
 duly constituted representatives of the union to settle disputes concerning the 
 discharge of men and other controversies arising out of the employment. These 
 are the chief features of 'unionizing' by which the employer's liberty is curtailed. 
 Each of them is legal. To obtain any of them or all of them men may lawfully 
 strive and even strike. And, if the unions may lawfully strike to obtain each of 
 the things for which the agreement provides, why may it not strike or use 
 equivalent economic pressure to secure an agreement to provide them? 
 
 "It is also urged that defendants are seeking to 'coerce' plaintiff to 'unionize' 
 its mine. But coercion, in a legal sense, is not exerted when a union merely 
 endeavors to induce employees to join a union with the intention thereafter to 
 order a strike unless the employer consents to unionize his shop. Such pressure 
 is not coercion in a legal sense. The employer is free either to accept the agree- 
 ment or the disadvantage. Indeed, the plaintiff's whole case is rested upon 
 agreements secured under similar pressure of economic necessity or disadvantage. 
 
 "If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a closed union . 
 shop, it is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless the appli- 
 cant will consent to a closed nonunion shop. The employer may sign the union 
 agreement for fear that labor may not be otherwise obtainable; the workman 
 may sign the individual agreement for fear that employment may not be other- 
 wise obtainable. But such fear does not imply coercion in a legal sense. 
 
 "In other words, an employer, in order to effectuate the closing of his shop to 
 union labor, may exact an agreement to that effect from his employees. The 
 agreement itself being a lawful one the employer may withhold from the men 
 an economic need — employment — until they assent to make it. Likewise an 
 agreement closing a shop to nonunion labor being lawful, the union may with- 
 hold from an employer an economic need — labor — until he assents to make it. 
 In a legal sense an agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is volun- 
 tarily entered into; and as the agreement is in itself legal no reason appears why 
 the general rule that a legal end may be pursued by legal means should not be 
 applied." 
 
12 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKER 
 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented from the opinion of the court in that case, not 
 on the ground that a so-called "yellow-dog" contract is illegal but on the ground 
 that a union contract was as good at law as a "yellow-dog" contract — neither 
 better nor worse "in a legal sense" — and on the ground that in the opinion of 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis "there was no attempt' to induce employees to violate their 
 contracts" (in that case). Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clark concurred 
 in this dissenting opinion. On the technical questions as to the nature of the 
 contracts involved in that particular case and as to whether or not the union in 
 that case had used illegal methods to induce violation of those particular con- 
 tracts, the dissenting opinion disagreed with the court. But it did not disagree 
 with, but rather insisted upon, the principle that union-labor contracts and so- 
 called " yellow-dog" contracts are the same thing in a legal sense. 
 
 The opinion of the court in the same case, delivered by Mr. Justice Pitney, 
 likewise held as to what are called "yellow-dog" contracts: . 
 
 "This court repeatedly has held that the employer is as free to make non- 
 membership in a union a condition of emploj^ment as the working man is free 
 to join a union, and that this is a part of the constitutional rights of personal 
 liberty and private property, not to be taken away even bj r legislation, unless 
 through some proper exercise of the paramount police power. (See Adair v. 
 United States, 208 U. S. 161, 174; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14.) " (Hitch- 
 man Coal & C. Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 251.) 
 
 Thus in the Hitchman case every justice on the Supreme Court agreed as to 
 the legality of a contract "to make nonmembership in a union a condition of 
 employment" (the so-called "yellow-dog" contract) and also that an injunction 
 might properly be granted to restrain violation of such a contract, even by 
 "peaceable" intimidation, if "contrived for the purpose of inflicting damage" 
 as the court elsewhere held, or to "induce employees to violate their contracts" 
 as Mr. Justice Brandeis put it, in declaring that in his opinion no such attempt 
 had been made in the Hitchman case. 
 
 Judge Parker, in the case of the United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket 
 Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. (18 Fed. (2d) 839, Cir. Court of Appeals, 4th 
 Circuit, 1927), was governed logically and legally by the principles stated by the 
 Supreme Court in the Hitchman Coal & C. Co. case 10 years before. 
 
 Neither labor leaders nor lawyers have ever pointed out, "in a legal sense" 
 how it is possible to hold a so-called "yellow-dog" contract illegal, without at 
 the same time holding a union labor contract illegal. Both, in a legal sense, as 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis so clearly points out, are equal rights, which must legally 
 stand or fall together. Calling the one a bad name and the other a good thing 
 can not alter their character at all. 
 
 And if Judge Parker had refused to uphold a "yellow-dog" contract, then 
 indeed would the labor unions, no less than all employers and all lawyers, have 
 reasons to object to his elevation to the Supreme Court. For, to hold the so- ' 
 called "yellow-dog" contract illegal, any judge on any court would be compelled 
 to hold a union-labor contract illegal, on the same terms and for the same reasons, 
 in a legal sense. 
 
 The argument that a union "closed-shop" agreement is an excellent thing in 
 itself, and that a shop closed against union labor is wrong in itself, has nothing to 
 do with the question "in a legal sense" where, as Mr. Justice Brandeis so lucidly 
 shows, they are exacthy the same type of legal contracts. 
 
 Many manufacturers, including the National Association of Manufacturers, 
 have frequently indorsed the "open shop," and condemned the "closed shop" 
 whether closed for or against union labor, as industrially undesirable. But that 
 likewise has nothing to do with he naked legal question of the constitutional 
 rights of employers and employees to make union or nonunion "closed-shop" 
 contracts. That, in the language of the Supreme Cdurt, in the Hichman case, is 
 a part of the "rights of personal liberty and private property" that can not be 
 taken away "even by legislation." 
 
 Much less can it be taken away by abusive epithets and organized special 
 pleading for labor-union monoply of the "closed-shop" type of contract. 
 
 The American people in their Constitution reserved to themselves in their 
 several States the right to decide many economic, social, and moral issues, which, 
 like political questions, can not properly be decided by the Supreme Court, as 
 they are not within its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court itself has repeatedly 
 pointed out the strict limitations of it's jurisdiction, ever since it refused to advise 
 President George Washington in a matter not before the court. Were it to 
 become a general court of review, passing upon all economic, social, and moral 
 controversies, it would lose its character and respect, which it has maintained 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 13 
 
 since Marshall's day, as a court of law, which has declined to pass upon "political 
 questions" for more than a century. 
 
 Judge Parker's confirmation would restore to the people that confidence in the 
 Supreme Court which many organized groups have attempted to take away — 
 confidence in its justice under the law without respect to political or industrial 
 controversies. Rejection of Judge Parker would be a defeat for equal justice 
 under the law and a victory of outside organized emotion and class partisanship 
 over the legal knowledge of the United States Senate. 
 
 Mary G. Vilbreth. 
 
 [From the Charlotte Observer] 
 THE CONTESTED NOMINATION AND THE FACTS 
 
 The American Federation of Labor is opposing Judge John J. Parker's appoint- 
 ment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground 
 that he places property rights above human rights, and basis its charge on a deci- 
 sion of the circuit court of appeals written by him. 
 
 Our Government is one of laws and not of men. If Judge Parker decided that 
 case or any other case contrary to law it would be some evidence of his unfitness 
 for the office. If he decided it in accordance with the law, then the American 
 Federation of Labor's criticism should be directed at the law and not at the judge. 
 If the law is wrong, the way to get it righted is through act of Congress. It 
 will be a sorry day for America when our judges are appointed for their leanings 
 toward or prejudices against any group, or when a judge is to be damned for 
 following the law because it does not suit some group for him to do so. Integrity 
 of character and knowledge of law rather than interpretative viewpoint concerning 
 any one question should be the determinative factor in the appointment and 
 confirmation of all members of the bench. 
 
 The decision of which labor complains is that in the Red Jacket case. An 
 analysis of the case clearly shows that Judge Parker and the other members of 
 the circuit court of appeals, when they rendered their decision, were deciding no 
 new points, but were following decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 previously rendered on similar points. 
 
 The controversy in the Red Jacket case, reported in 18 Fed. (2d) 839, was not 
 between employer and employees, but between the employers and an outside 
 labor union which was attempting to interfere with their business. The complain 
 labor union which was attempting to interfere with their business. The complain- 
 ants in that case were operators of mines in West Virginia. They were operating 
 on the nonunion basis and their employees had entered into contracts not to 
 join a union while continuing in their employment. These employees were not 
 members of the United Mine Workers of America; but that organization decided 
 to bring them into the union. It thereupon declared a strike in the nonunion 
 West Virginia field and sent numbers of armed men into that field to induce the 
 nonunion workers to join the union and go on a strike. These armed men engaged 
 in a pitched battle with State officers, and martial law was declared. The 
 United States district judge in southern West Virginia granted an injunction 
 restraining the United Mine Workers and their officials from interfering with the 
 employees of complianants or from inducing them to violate their contracts by 
 joining the union and going on a strike. 
 
 On appeal to the circuit court of appeals the injunction granted was attacked 
 chiefly on the ground that a conspiracj' to prevent the mining of coal was not a 
 conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce. The Supreme Court had 
 decided the question directly to the contrary of this contention in the Second 
 Coronado case (268 U. S. 295, U. S. v. Brims 272 U. S. 549) and the Stone Cutters' 
 case (274 U. S. 37). The injunction was criticized in that it forbade peaceful 
 persuasion as well as forcible interference with and intimidation of employees; 
 but the duty to enjoin such persuasion had been expressly laid down by the Su- 
 preme Court in the case of Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell (245 U. S. 229). In 
 other words, the court in the Red Jacket case declared no new law but merely 
 applied the law as it had previously been declared by the Supreme Court. The 
 United Mine Workers petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case, but it 
 refused to do so, which, in view of the nature of the questions involved, not only 
 amounted to an approval of the decision but an indication that the principles 
 followed had been settled by prior decisions of the court. 
 
 107150—30 2 
 
14 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 This decision did not involve the right or wrong of contract between the 
 employer and its employees; and did not recognize the contract in any way 
 except that in which the Supreme Court had previously said in the Hitchman 
 case that it must be recognized. It did not strike at the right of labor to organize, 
 but, on the contrary, expressly upheld the right to organize and the right of the 
 union, even in the face of the contracts referred to, to extend its membership in 
 all lawful and proper ways. But it did hold that when the union turned aside 
 from its normal and legitimate objects and purposes and engaged in an actual 
 combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, it was accountable therefore in 
 the same manner as any other organization. 
 
 Carolina Mortgage Co., 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 8, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 My Dear Senator Overman: On my trips over the State recently I find a 
 uniform sentiment in favor of the confirmation of the appointment of Judge 
 Parker to the Supreme Court. Without an exception this is true, regardless of 
 political affiliations. Personally, I desire to register my position as follows: 
 
 I was reared in an adjoining home to Judge Parker, in Monroe, N. C. I have 
 known him from infancy. In his entire career nothing derogatory to his honesty, 
 ability, or moral integrity can be rightfully charged. He is a Christian gentle- 
 man, and as for his legal knowledge and judicial poise and fairness, statements to 
 the contrary could only fall flat because of their barrenness of truth. 
 With my best wishes, 
 Cordially yours, 
 
 David A. Houston. 
 
 Eugene, Oreg., April 7, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 Honorable Sir: I am a Republican, having a Maryland and Virginia ancestry, 
 and my father was a soldier in the United States Army for four solid years during 
 the Civil War; but, notwithstanding that I am a Republican, I actually believe 
 that the South really is a part of the United States and should bi fully recognized. 
 I have had 27 years' active practice at law. 
 
 It affords me the greatest pleasure to have read all of the decisions of Judge 
 John Johnston Parker since he was appointed to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
 for the Fourth Circuit. I think that it will be an honor to the United States for 
 the Senate to confirm Judge Parker's nomination for the Supreme Bench of the 
 United States; and I further believe that he is and shall be a judge equal to 
 Joseph Story, John Marshall, or Roger Brooke Taney. Judge Parker's knowl- 
 edge of the law is profoundly sound and his statements of the law are very excep- 
 tionally clear. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 H. E. Slattery. 
 
 Richmond, Va., April 9, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Sir: In view of the attack on the independence of the judiciary, as 
 evidenced by the opposition to Judge John J. Parker's confirmation as a Justice 
 of the Supreme Court, I transmit to you herewith a resolution unanimously 
 adopted by the bar of the city of Richmond, Va., the seat of the Circuit Court of 
 Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, of which court Judge Parker is a member. 
 
 Three hundred and eighteen members of the bar were present, an unprec- 
 edented attendance. 
 Respectfully, 
 
 Leon M. Nelson, 
 President Bar Association of the City of Richmond, Va. 
 
 "Resolved, That the bar of the city of Richmond (the seat of the Circuit Court 
 of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit) do hereby indorse the nomination of the 
 Hon. John J. Parker for the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
 the United States." 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J". PARKER 15 
 
 The foregoing resolution was unanimously adopted at a meeting of the bar 
 held in the city of Richmond on the 8th day of April, 1930, 318 members being 
 present. 
 
 John B. Duval, 
 Secretary Bar Association. 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 8, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Senator: I have followed the objections raised to the confirmation of 
 Judge John J. Parker as Supreme Court judge rather carefully. 
 
 It is my opinion that these charges are not well founded. In his court decisions 
 he has followed recognized precedents and endeavored to do the right as he saw 
 it. It is my impression that the people of North Carolina who believe in fair 
 play desire to see Judge Parker confirmed. 
 
 I have known Judge Parker not so intimately, but have watched his career 
 for many years, and believe he can be trusted, and that he will uphold the high 
 standards maintained by the great court to which he has been selected as a 
 member. 
 
 It is an honor to the State to furnish a member of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, and I believe if you insist on his confirmation that your friends, 
 and the people of North Carolina will believe that you have done right in the 
 premises. 
 
 With kindest personal regards, and best wishes always, I am, 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 R. A. DOUGHTON, 
 
 Chairman State Highway Commission. 
 
 Monroe, N. C, April 7, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Senator: I see in the press where a few leaders in organized labor 
 are fighting John J. Parker, trying to keep him from being confirmed Associate 
 Justice of the Supreme Court. 
 
 I have been a member of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen for 22 years, 
 and if you will pardon the length of this letter I wish to tell you about John J. 
 Parker and will appreciate it if you will read this letter before the honorable 
 committee appointed to investigate his record. 
 
 I was raised with John J. Parker, have known him from birth, attended school 
 with him, and will say as a labor voter there isn't a more sincere honorable 
 Christian man in the United States. All the money in the United States Treasury 
 couldn't buy him. He is competent, capable, and a scholar. There isn't a 
 more fitted man in the United States for this high honor given him by President 
 Hoover. 
 
 If the rank and file in labor fraternities in North Carolina could vote for 
 John J. Parker to be confirmed, 90 per cent would vote in his favor. 
 
 Our little city is a railroad division point for the Seaboard Air Line Railway 
 Co. where several different labor crafts have unions, and I don't believe I would 
 sav wrong when I say he would get a vote of 100 per cent. 
 
 I have never agreed with John Parker in politics, but the Republican Party 
 should feel highly honored in having such a man as he is in their party. He is 
 an able jurist and will always be a student. John Parker always remembers 
 his friends whether in overalls or in the highest executive of the largest corpora- 
 tions. 
 
 I can not conceive the idea of labor leaders fighting a man as honest as John 
 J. Parker is. 
 
 Wish I was financially able to come to Washington and look you gentlemen in 
 the eyes, also the labor leaders fighting him, and tell you about this capable 
 self-made man. 
 
 I sincerely hope you and the other two honorable Senators will unanimously 
 indorse him, and every honorable Senator in the Senate will vote for him to be 
 confirmed. 
 
 In years to come these honorable Senators will smile with pride because of 
 their voting for him to be confirmed and the honorable President, Mr. Herbert 
 
16 COXFIEMATIOX OF JOHX J. PAKKEE 
 
 Hoover, will feel proud of this appointment because he will prove to be one 
 of the greatest associate judges of the Supreme Court that ever lived. 
 
 I am writing you this letter, Mr. Overman, without the knowledge of a living 
 soul, but I was anxious to try and tell you the truth about one of the fairest, 
 squarest-minded men that ever lived, and I want you and the other members 
 of the committee to know that John J. Parker has the indorsement of the rank 
 and file of members of labor organizations in North Carolina where he was born 
 and reared. 
 
 With highest personal regards, cordially 3'ours, 
 
 John Dunham Bundy. 
 
 Rocky Mount, N. C, April 7, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Senator: My acquaintance with and knowledge of Judge John J. 
 Parker justifies me in the opinion that opposition to his confirmation is without 
 reasonable foundation or excuse. 
 
 Added to his brilliant intellectual gifts are scholarly learning, judicial temper 
 and a very high conception of the judicial duties and office. 
 
 He is incapable of deliberate or intentional injustice to any cause or person, 
 and labor will receive at his hands the same scrupulous care and regard that 
 will be given by him to life, liberty, and property. 
 
 The opinions for which he is unjustly criticized, are in every case based upon 
 decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. To have flown in their 
 face or refused to have been controlled by them would have been unpardonable 
 egotism and flagrant insubordination. 
 
 I am writing this without Judge Parker's solicitation or knowledge, and for 
 the simple reason that I think he is entitled to have the lawyers of the State, 
 who know him, avouch his fitness for the high office to which he has been 
 appointed. 
 
 It is needless for me to add that I belong to the opposite political party from 
 Judge Parker. 
 
 With very kind regards, I am, 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 F. S. Spruill. 
 
 Charleston, S. C, April 12, 1980. 
 Hon. L. S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 
 I see by papers that confirmation of Judge Parker is opposed. As a practicing 
 attorney in the fourth circuit I wish to testify to his high character, his legal 
 learning and his fine judicial temperament. It is the duty of a judge to decide 
 the law upon the facts, not to make law, and all of Judge Parker's decisions have 
 been in accordance with the law. The opposition should quarrel with the law, 
 not with Judge Parker. 
 
 Arthur R. Young. 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 11, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Senator: To the North Carolinians who know Judge John J. 
 Parker the charge preferred by President William Green, A. F. A., of "bias in 
 favor of powerful corporations and against the masses of the people," on the 
 part of Judge Parker is utterly without justification and at variance with his 
 public record in this State. v 
 
 In 1916 when Judge Parker was the Republican nominee for attorney general 
 of North Carolina he devoted his campaign speeches largely to a discussion of 
 railroad freight rates and strongly opposed the lease by the State of the Yadkin 
 Valley Railroad from Greensboro to Sanford. His argument on this question 
 gave him a State reputation and contributed in no small way to his nomination 
 for governor in 1920. 
 
 As the gubernatorial candidate for governor in 1920 Judge Parker, although 
 probably the youngest man ever nominated by either party for that office in 
 this State, not only lifted the campaign to a new, high, clean level but he stood 
 forth as the embodiment of progress. During that campaign he was invited to 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 17 
 
 speak before the student body of the .State university and he and his Democratic 
 opponent both spoke from the same platform in Raleigh on the subject of good 
 roads before a large audience, and the road plan outlined by Judge Parker was 
 largely embodied in the legislation enacted in 1921 which has resulted in placing 
 this State in the forefront with its improved highways. Furthermore, an exami- 
 nation of Judge Parker's speeches in the 1920 campaign show that he was a 
 pioneer advocate of woman suffrage, and insisted on better schools with increased 
 pay for teachers, and improved labor conditions, including workingmen's com- 
 pensation and in the important matter of taxation he strongly insisted that land 
 was overburdened and that corporate properties were not bearing their share. 
 In fact, his position on this question gained him the support of many so-called 
 progressive, and gave him the unprecedented Republican vote of 230,000 for 
 governor. 
 
 Recently I have visited several cities in eastern North Caroli7ia, and without a 
 single exception and without regard to political affiliations the people of this 
 State are inexpressibly proud of the appointment of Judge Parker and are unani- 
 mous in desiring his confirmation. 
 
 With great respect and best wishes, I remain, 
 Yours sincerely, 
 
 Willis G. Briggs. 
 
 Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills Co., 
 
 Spray, N. C, April 11, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Senator Overman: I hope before this that our distinguished fellow 
 citizen, Hon. John J. Parker, will have been confirmed for the Supreme Court 
 bench. I am afraid that many of us have not realized the amount of opposition 
 (on the surface at least) that is being generated against him or we would have 
 acted sooner. 
 
 I want to express my genuine gratification at his selection by the President 
 and to urge his speedy confirmation. I think it is not only an honor to North 
 Carolina for him to receive the appointment but that, because of his wonderful 
 ability and sense of fairness, he will be a credit to the Supreme Court. 
 With kind regards, I am, very truly yours, 
 
 Luther H. Hodges. 
 
 Winston-Salem, N. C, April 11, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 My Dear Senator: I am interested in the appointment of Judge John J. 
 Parker to the Supreme Court. I have known Judge Parker for 20 years, and 
 can testify to his splendid qualifications as a lawyer and to his splendid record 
 as a circuit court judge. 
 
 Judge Parker is a man of high character and is honored and respected by all 
 who know him. He has a great capacity for work, and in my opinion would take 
 rank as one of the great justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 Yours truly, 
 
 G. H. Hastings. 
 
 Commercial National Bank, 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 10, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 » Senate Judiciary Committee, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 My Dear Senator Overman: I have been watching with much interest the 
 hearings of the Judiciary Committee with reference to the nomination of Mr. 
 John J. Parker as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court to 
 succeed Mr. Justice Edward Terry Sanford, deceased. 
 
 I have not followed personally the career of Mr. Justice Parker, but I happen 
 to know that his standing is of the very highest in the State of North Carolina, 
 from whence he comes. He has the reputation of dealing out even-handed jus- 
 tice, regardless of whether the litigants be rich or poor, which I understand to 
 be in accordance with the oath he will be required to take. Mr. Justice Parker 
 
18 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 not only has the ability and the integrity required but he possesses the neces- 
 sary judicial temperament to a remarkable degree. 
 
 I have been watching with interest the opposition to Mr. Justice Parker by 
 the labor people, but I do not believe it possible for the labor people to get a 
 man who would more quickly correct a mistake, if he should make one, than 
 Mr. Justice Parker. I believe that if confirmed as an Associate Justice he will 
 not only be an honor to his State but to the Nation, and I certainly hope that 
 the Judiciary Committee can see its way clear to recommend his confirmation, 
 and that action of the committee will be followed by quick confirmation by the 
 Senate. 
 
 With high considerations, 
 Yours truly, 
 
 Wade H. Cooper, President. 
 
 Raleigh, N. C, April 10, 1930. 
 Dear Senator Overman : Mr. Andrews, my two voting daughters, and myself 
 wish to add our indorsement to the many of those who believe that the judiciary 
 should stand for law and justice and not represent any class legislation. 
 
 We cheerfully indorse the nomination of Judge John J. Parker which is now 
 in your hands. 
 Sincerely, 
 
 Augusta Webb Ford Andrews. 
 
 Winston-Salem Teachers' College, 
 
 Winston-Salem, N. C, April 9, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C. 
 Honored Senator: I am venturing to address you this line to express the 
 hope that Judge Parker may be confirmed as Associate Justice of the United 
 States Supreme Court. I believe you will join me in the feeling that it may be 
 the opportunity for our good old State to have well-merited recognition. 
 
 As a colored man, I am free to say that, in my judgment, there is nothing in 
 Judge Parker's judicial record which would warrant opposition from my race, 
 and I do not feel that justice for the colored race as citizens would in any way 
 be threatened in the hands of Judge Parker. I hope, therefore, that your com- 
 mittee will decide to recommend his confirmation, and to follow the recommenda- 
 tion through the Senate in order that it may have the Senate's favorable action. 
 May I add, Senator, that probably you used to know me years ago when I was 
 associated with J. C. Price, as a member of the faculty of Livingstone College. 
 I remember how finely you and members of your family encouraged the work 
 of the college in those days. 
 I beg to remain, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 S. G. Atkins, President. 
 
 Winston-Salem, N. C, April 10, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Chairman Judiciary Committee, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Sir: I take great pleasure in writing this letter to you in support of the 
 nomination of the Hon. Judge John J. Parker, for Associate Justice of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, and I trust you will give your hearty support to 
 Judge Parker and to fight for his confirmation. Judge Parker is one of the finest 
 Christian gentlemen in this country to-day, one who is well qualified to serve 
 not only as Associate Justice but as Chief Justice as well. Judge Parker is not 
 against the colored race at all, and I don't believe that there is a single instance 
 in the life of Judge Parker, before or since he has been judge, where he has shown 
 in the trial of any case against a member of the colored race a bit of discrimina- 
 tion against the same, and as president of the North Carolina State Association 
 of Elks, I take great pleasure in indorsing the Hon. Judge John J. Parker, for the 
 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and I stand ready 
 to give any assistance I can in his behalf. 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 E. H. Copeland 
 
CONFIRM ATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 19 
 
 Greenville, N. C. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Dear Senator: I am sure you will not take seriously the opposition of our 
 good bishop. 
 
 In the contest waged by many of the negro opponents to the late Hon. Frank 
 Linney. The same excuse as to his attitude to the negro. North Carolina has 
 led all States in this Union caring for its negro citizenship. Our welfare work 
 headed by Lieutenant Oxly, backed by the State administration, our State schools, 
 and many men and women are encouraged to do their best for their people. 
 
 Now, then, when we see North Carolina Senators and our friends at home 
 speak up without prejudice for the recognition of the State, senseless opposition 
 from self-constituted leadership should cease. "The United States of New York " 
 should not keep North Carolina from taking her proper place when recognized. 
 Moton and Shepard can speak for our people. 
 
 I would, from gratitude to North Carolina leaders, favor Judge Stacey of our 
 own supreme court. 
 
 C. M. Epps. 
 
 Senator Overman. I have also a telegram from Mr. James F. 
 Barrett, dated Brevard, N. C, April 4, which will also be made a 
 part of the record. 
 
 (The telegram referred to is as follows:) 
 
 Brevard, N. C, April 4, 1930. 
 Hon. Lee S. Overman, 
 
 Chairman Judiciary Committee United States Senate. 
 As a citizen of North Carolina and former President of the North Carolina. 
 State Federation of Labor I intreat your committee to report favorably upon the 
 nomination of Hon. John J. Parker as Associate Justice of the United States 
 Supreme Court and trust that the Senate will confirm this nomination. I fully 
 understand the contempt that the great American Federation of Labor has for 
 what is known as the "yellow-dog" contract in the coal mines and admire Presi- 
 dent Green for his vigilance but knowing Judge Parker as I do I am confident 
 that he rendered the only possible decision in the case. Ten years ago when 
 Judge Parker was a candidate for Governor in this State he replied promptly 
 and fairly to organized labor's questionnaire and repsonded readily to every call 
 made upon him by the working masses. It is in fullest confidence that the 
 American Federation of Labor and the toiling millions will have in Judge Parker 
 on the Supreme Court Bench as fine a friend and stanch advocate as ever donned 
 the robe of that mighty office that I urge his confirmation. 
 
 James F. Barrett. 
 
 (Senator Overman submits the following statement of facts as 
 found by Judge McClintock in which the court of appeals delivered 
 its opinion.) 
 
 Memorandum of points decided by Circuit Judge Parker in International 
 Organization United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consolidated 
 Coal & Coke Co. (18 Fed. (2d), 839), circuit court of appeals, fourth circuit, 1927. 
 
 The opinion was written upon a consolidated appeal from a final decree of the 
 United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, George 
 McClintock judge. 
 
 The original action consisted of 12 suits brought by various coal-mine operators 
 in Virginia against the United Mine Workers, district and local unions of the or- 
 ganization in West Virginia, and various district and local officers. The com- 
 plainants numbered 316, constituting 12 cases, which were consolidated May 
 21, 1923, the ultimate printed record comprising 5,000 pages. 
 
 The actions at issue were instituted to restrain interference with the business 
 operations of the complainants by the union and its members on the ground that 
 the combination presented was a restraint of interstate commerce in violation 
 of the Sherman Act. The district judge found this to be a fact and entered a 
 final decree and an injunction. 
 
 The appeal was heard by Justices Waddill, Rose, and Parker and the opinion 
 written by Judge Parker. Judge Rose concurred in the affirmation of the decree 
 of the district court. "He expressed a desire, however, to examine the record 
 with a view of satisfying himself whether jurisdiction existed as to the defendants 
 
20 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Lewis, Green, and Murray. He died before the opinion could be submitted to 
 hirn. " 
 
 The chief points of Justice Parker's decision were as follows: 
 
 1. Held that the extent and general purpose of the United Mine Workers 
 did not, as was contended, make the organization as such a conspiracy in re- 
 straint of trade or an unlawful organization. On the contrary, the legitimacy of 
 the union in itself is fully vindicated and its right to lawfully carry out its legiti- 
 mate objects sympathetically stated and sustained. 
 
 2. Held that when turning aside from its legitimate objects and engaging in 
 an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade the union "is account- 
 able therefor in the same manner as any other organization." The evidence in 
 the case, which includes the continuous calling of strikes over a period of years 
 to close the mines of the nonunion operators, the expenditure of hundreds of 
 thousands of dollars and a campaign of violence and intimidation, demonstrates 
 the defendants "have engaged in an actual combination in restraint of trade in 
 a manner quite foreign to the normal and legitimate objects of the union." 
 
 3. The defendants contended that coal mining was not interstate commerce 
 and therefore a combination to prevent the operation of coal mines was not a 
 conspiracy to restrain such commerce. The court held that by the facts found 
 and in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
 the second Coronado case (259 U. S. 344) and United States v. Brims (47 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 169, 71 Law Ed.), the case clearly demonstrates a production of coal 
 within the mines of the plaintiffs amounting to 40,000,000 tons annually, 90 per 
 cent of which entered into intertsate commerce; and the clear intent and effect 
 of defendants conspiracy was to stop the shipment of such coal in interstate com- 
 merce. The defendants intended the necessary consequence of their conduct, 
 which was plainly a restraint of interstate commerce in violation of the Sheiman 
 Act under continuing decisions of the United States Supreme Court in labor 
 and nonlabor cases alike. 
 
 4. Defendants alleged a misjoinder of parties. Held there was a commo/i 
 interest among all plaintiffs in the subject-matter of litigation which justified 
 joinder of parties under the recognized equity practice. The case presents a 
 single controversy leveled against the individual business of the plaintiffs as a 
 class, because all were operating in a common territory. All the questions of law 
 and the evidence were the same in all cases. Complainants beng the object of 
 a joint attack could therefore justly seek the protection of the court in a single 
 action against a common defendant since all the issues presented were determin- 
 able in a single case. 
 
 5. Objection was made by defendants to the provision in the injunction 
 restraining them "from inciting, inducing, or persuading the employees of the 
 plaintiffs to break their contract of employment with the plaintiffs." The court 
 pointed out that this language is not as broad as that directed to the same pur- 
 pose and approved by the Supreme Court in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. 
 Mitchell (245 U. S. 229). The doctrine of enjoining interference with a contract 
 by means of peaceful persuasion was approved not only in the Hitchman case but 
 in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City General Trades Council (259 U. S. 184) 
 and United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (259 U. S. 344). 
 
 The union complained that the effect of this language in the decree was to 
 forbid defendants, for an indefinite time in the future, to lay before the nonunion 
 employees of plaintiffs "any lawful and proper argument in favor of union 
 membership." 
 
 "If we so understand the decree, we would not hesitate to modify it," said 
 Judge Parker. * * * "To make a speech or to circulate an argument under 
 ordinary circumstances, dwelling upon the advantages of union membership, is 
 one thing; to approach a company's employees who are working under a contract 
 not to join the union while remaining in the company's services, and induce them 
 in violation of the contract, to join the union and go on a strike for the purpose 
 of forcing the company to recognize the union, or of impairing its power of pro- 
 duction, is another and very different thing." 
 
 The court then quotes from the Hitchman case to make the point plain. Judge 
 Parker further quoted the Supreme Court in the Hitchman case to show that 
 "another fundamental error in defendant's position consists in the assumption 
 that all measures that may be resorted to are lawful if they are 'peaceful' — that 
 is, if they stop short of using violence or coercion through fear of it. In our opin- 
 ion, any violation of plaintiffs' legal rights contrived by the defendants for the 
 purpose of inflicting damage, or having that as its necessary effect, is as plainly 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 21 
 
 inhibited bv the law as if it involved a breach of peace." (Hitchman Coal & 
 Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 261.) 
 
 6. The court pointed out that the prohibition of section 20 of the Clayton Act 
 against enjoining peaceful persuasion applies only to a dispute "concerning terms 
 or conditions of employment, between an employer and employee, between em- 
 ployers and employees, or between employees or persons employed and persons 
 seeking employment." The pending case is between employers and persons, 
 neither ex-employees nor persons seeking employment. 
 
 7. A further paragraph of the decree was criticized by defendants because it 
 enjoined them from aiding or abetting persons who occupied, or held without 
 rights, houses belonging to the complainants. Judge Parker pointed out that 
 under the law of West Virginia, when the complainants' employees quit work 
 but refuse to surrender the houses of complainants occupied by them, "they be- 
 come trespassers on complainants' property." (Angel v. Black Sand Consolidated 
 Coal Co. 96 W. Va. 47.) That is, the decree forbids defendants to aid and abet 
 any trespasses on the complainants' property in furtherance of the design of the 
 conspiracy presented. 
 
 8. The defendants contended that some of the complainants were in "pari 
 delicto" with defendants, and therefore should be denied relief because they had 
 operated on a union basis during a number of years and also paid the "check- 
 off." But Judge Parker pointed out that the check-off is not in itself illegal and 
 therefore, by agreeing to pay it, none of the complainants could become con- 
 spirators. 
 
 Therefore, the decision, while not approving all the findings of fact made by 
 the district court, held the decree to be sustained by the evidence. It was there- 
 fore affirmed. 
 
 [Senator Overman also submitted the following memorandum:! 
 
 Memorandum on the Opinion of Circuit Judge John J. Parker in Inter- 
 national Organization, United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket 
 Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. (18 F. (2d) 839) 
 
 This and companion cases were suits brought by coal mining companies in 
 West Virginia to enjoin the United Mine Workers, who had declared a strike in an 
 attempt to unionize the field, from interfering with the companies' employees by 
 violence, threats, intimidation, picketing, and the like, or by procuring them to 
 breach their contracts with the plaintiffs. The trial court found that the de- 
 fendants were maliciously endeavoring to cause the employees of the plaintiffs 
 to violate their contracts of employment with the plaintiffs, and were, by force, 
 intimidation, and violence, endeavoring to compel the plaintiffs' employees to 
 cease work, and enjoined these acts. 
 
 On appeal to the circuit court of appeals, one question earnestly pressed was 
 that the defendants were not interfering with interstate commerce and, therefore, 
 the Federal courts had no jurisdiction. The circuit court of appeals held that 
 interstate commerce was involved, and based its decision on the Coronado case 
 (268 U. S. 295). 
 
 Another point urged by the Mine Workers in the circuit court of appeals was 
 that the injunction was too broad and went beyond injunction against force, 
 violence, and intimidation, and, in effect, enjoined interference with the plain- 
 tiffs' employees by means of peaceful persuasion. The opinion discloses that 
 plaintiffs' employees had entered into contracts that they would not join the union 
 while remaining* in the plaintiffs' service. In his opinion, Judge Parker says: 
 
 "What the decree forbids is this 'inciting, inducing, or persuading the employ- 
 ees of plaintiff to break their contracts of employment'; and what was said in 
 the Hitchman case with respect to this matter is conclusive of the point involved 
 here." 
 
 The case to which Judge Parker referred was the decision of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell. 
 (245 U. S. 229.) In that case the defendants had peaceably persuaded plaintiff's 
 employees to break contracts similar to those involved in the case dealt with by 
 Judge Parker. The court in its decision said: 
 
 "Another fundamental error in defendants' position consists in the assumption 
 that all measures that may be resorted to are lawful if they are ' peaceable ' — that 
 is, if they stop short of physical violence, or coercion through fear of it. In our 
 opinion, any violation of plaintiff's legal rights contrived by defendants for the 
 purpose of inflicting damage, or having that as its necessary effect, is as plainly 
 
22 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 inhibited by the law as if it involved a breach of the peace. A combination to 
 procure concerted breaches of contract by plaintiff's employees constitutes such a 
 violation, that is, a violation of the plaintiff's legal right." 
 
 It does not appear from Judge Parker's opinion that any question was raised by 
 counsel in the Red Jacket case as to the validity of the contracts between the 
 plaintiffs and their employees, by which the latter agreed not to join the union. 
 An examination of the briefs of counsel filed in this case, discloses no suggestion 
 or contention that the contract between the mining companies and their non- 
 union employees, prohibiting the latter from joining the union, was illegal or void 
 as against public policy or for any other reason. Counsel, as well as the circuit 
 judges, quite correctly considered the Hitchman case conclusive on that point, 
 for in its opinion (245 U. S. p. 250) the Supreme Court had declared : 
 
 "That the plaintiff was acting within its lawful rights in employing its men 
 only upon terms of continuing nonmembership in the United Mine Workers of 
 America is not open to question. * * * The same liberty which enables 
 men to form unions, and through the union to enter into agreements with em- 
 ployers willing to agree, entitle? other men to remain independent of the union 
 and other employers to agree with them to employ no man who owes any alle- 
 giance or obligation to the union. In the latter case, as in the former, the parties 
 are entitled to be protected by the law in the enjoyment of the benefits of any 
 lawful agreement they may make. This court repeatedly has held that the 
 employer is as free to make nonmembership in a union a condition of employ- 
 ment, as the working man is free to join the union, and that this is a part of the 
 constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property, not to be taken 
 away even by legislation, unless through some proper exercise of the paramount 
 police power." (Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161; Coopage v. Kansas, 
 236 U. S. 1.) 
 
 "Plaintiff, having in the exercise of its undoubted rights established a working 
 agreement between it and its employees, with the free assent of the latter, is 
 entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of the resulting status, as in any other 
 legal right. That the employment was 'at will,' and terminable by either 
 party at any time, is of no consequence. " 
 
 Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion in the Hitchman case, but his 
 dissent was not based on a suggestion that the contract between the employer 
 and its employees not to join the union was unenforceable or void. On the con- 
 trary, he said (p. 271) : 
 
 "In other words an employer, in order to effectuate the closing of his shop to 
 union labor, may exact an agreement to that effect from his employees. The 
 agreement itself being a lawful one, the employer may withhold from the men an 
 economic need — employment — until they assent to make it." 
 
 His dissent was based on the proposition, not that the contracts were unlawful, 
 but that the union men did not induce the plaintiff's employees to violate their 
 terms (p. 272). This contention was expressly rejected in the ruling opinion of 
 the court (p. 255). 
 
 Whatever reasons might have been advanced for assailing such contracts on 
 grounds of public policy, Judge Parker and his associate judges were constrained 
 by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hitchman case to disregard them. 
 No such point was made by counsel in the Red Jacket case who must have 
 regarded the right to make such contracts as settled in the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. 
 
 On the other question, as to whether any actionable wrong justifying an injunc- 
 tion was committed by the union men in attempting by peaceable means to 
 induce nonunion employees to violate their contracts of employment by joining 
 the union, Judge Parker again bases his decision on the Hitchman case where 
 substantially similar contracts were involved and the Supreme Court held that 
 peaceful efforts by the strikers to induce the company employees to agree to 
 join the union while remaining in plaintiffs' employ were properly enjoined. 
 
 There does not appear to be a point decided in the Red Jacket case on which 
 Judge Parker assumed to exercise any independent judgment or opinion. He and 
 his associates felt bound by the Supreme Court decisions. In holding the con- 
 tracts valid and that peaceable efforts to induce the nonunion men to break them 
 were properly enjoined, he merely quoted rulings to that effect in the Hitchman 
 case. Nowhere are pressed or indicated any personal views about any of these 
 questions. He had no freedom of judgment on any of them; he was bound by the 
 decisions of the Supreme Court, which he could not refuse to follow. The Hitch- 
 man case itself had originated in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Cir- 
 cuit before Judge Parker became a member of that court, the Circuit Court of 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 23 
 
 Appeals had denied an injunction, and its decision was reversed by the Supreme 
 Court in the Hitchman case. What would have been the fate of a decision by 
 Judge Parker in the Red Jacket case contrary to that which he rendered is indi- 
 cated by the fact that the United Mine Workers filed a petition for a writ of 
 certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, asking that court to 
 review Judge Parker's decision, and the petition for certiorari was denied (275 
 U. S. 536). 
 
 To refuse to confirm the nomination of Judge Parker for his decision in the 
 Red Jacket Coal Co. case will amount to refusing to confirm him because he 
 followed and^ gave binding effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. At least he considered the cited decisions of the Supreme Court 
 to be controlling in the Red Jacket case, and no one has yet pointed out any 
 ground on which the Hitchman case and the Red Jacket case may properly be 
 distinguished. 
 
 The question is not whether the Supreme Court was right or wrong in its con- 
 clusion. The question is whether Judge Parker was dealing with points which 
 had been settled by the Supreme Court which he was bound, under his oath of 
 office, to follow. He and his two associates put their decision upon the controlling 
 authority of the Hitchman case, as they were constrained to do, but even in this 
 they were careful not to go beyond the dictates of that decision. It was argued 
 that the decree in effect forbade any lawful or proper argument addressed to 
 plaintiffs' employees in favor of union membership. Answering this contention, 
 Judge Parker said: 
 
 "If we so understood the decree, we would not hesitate to modify it. As we 
 said in the Bittner case, there can be no doubt of the right of the defendants to 
 use all lawful propaganda to increase their membership. * * * What the 
 decree forbids is this 'inciting, inducing, or persuading the employees of plaintiff 
 to break their contracts of employment'; and what was said in the Hitchman case 
 with respect to this matter is conclusive of the point involved here." 
 
 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM GREEN, PRESIDENT AMERICAN FED- 
 ERATION OF LABOR 
 
 Senator Overman. Mr. Green, I have statement from you this 
 morning, which I intended to put in the record, but since you are 
 here, I suppose you want us to hear it? 
 
 Mr. Green. Gentlemen of the committee, I am pleased to come 
 this morning and present to you in the name and behalf of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Labor its opposition to the confirmation of Judge 
 Parker, as a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 I speak for the American Federation of Labor 
 
 Senator Overman. What position do you hold now, Mr. Green? 
 
 Mr. Green. I am president of the American Federation of Labor, 
 and as president of the American Federation of Labor I speak for 
 that federation, having been authorized to file our objection to the 
 confirmation of Judge Parker by the executive council of the Ameri- 
 can Federation. 
 
 Senator Overman. That means all the affiliated associations? 
 
 Mr. Green. All the affiliated associations affiliated with the 
 American Federation of Labor, and in addition, may I state, that 
 I have been authorized by the officers of the railroad organizations 
 affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, the Brotherhood 
 of Railway Trainmen, the Order of Railway Conductors, the Brother- 
 hood of Locomotive Engineers, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive 
 Firemen, to represent them and file their objection along with the 
 objection of the American Federation of Labor to the confirmation of 
 Judge Parker, so that I am appearing in behalf of the American 
 Federation of Labor and the transportation organizations of the 
 United States, all of us having arrived at one common decision upon 
 
24 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PAEKEE 
 
 this important matter of united opposition to the confirmation of 
 Judge Parker. 
 
 Now, first of all, may I submit to you the basis of our opposition? 
 It is embodied in an official communication which I transmitted to 
 all the honorable members of this committee this morning, except 
 perhaps Senator Hebert, because I was not advised that he was a 
 member of the committee. However, I would like you, Senator, to 
 accept this communication as addressed to you also. 
 
 The working people of the United States are deeply interested in 
 the appointment of members to the Supreme Court of the United 
 States. This interest is based very largely upon the fact that many 
 of the decisions of the Supreme Court very vitally affect the well- 
 being and happiness of millions of working men, their wives and their 
 families. This is particularly true when we consider the fact that as 
 a result of modern industrial expansion and growth many economic 
 problems are developed which enter into the consideration of numerous 
 legal questions which finally reach the Supreme Court for considera- 
 tion and decision. 
 
 Labor firmly believes that those who are appointed to serve as 
 members of the Supreme Court of the United States should possess a 
 knowledge and understanding of modern day economic questions, of 
 human relations in industry, and should possess a trained mind 
 sympathetic toward the hopes and aspirations of the masses of the 
 people. 
 
 The officers and members of the American Federation of Labor 
 and of these brotherhood organizations, to which I referred, are of 
 the opinion that Judge John J. Parker, recently appointed to be an 
 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, does not possess the requisite 
 qualifications to serve in such a responsible position. For that reason 
 the American Federation of Labor and those associated with it 
 formally and most vigorously protest the confirmation of the ap- 
 pointment of Judge Parker by the United States Senate to be a 
 member of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Our action in opposing the confirmation of the appointment of 
 Judge Parker is based upon a study of his qualifications, his life's 
 environment, his point of view regarding human relations in modern 
 industry, and his judicial attitude toward economic and industrial 
 problems which seriously affect the material and moral well-being of 
 working men and women as shown in the decision which he rendered 
 in the case of the United Mine Workers of America v. The Red Jacket 
 Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., and in the opinion in which he con- 
 curred as rendered in the Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal 
 Co. case. These opinions were rendered and concurred in by Judge 
 Parker as a member of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 In the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. case Judge Parker 
 wrote an opinion in which he affirmed and sustained an injunction 
 issued by Judge McClintic of the Federal District Court of West 
 Virginia, restraining the officers and members 'of the United Mine 
 Workers of America from soliciting men employed by the Red Jacket 
 Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., and numerous others, to exercise their 
 common, inherent, and legitimate right to join a trade union. The 
 effect of this injunction was to make criminals out of law-abiding, 
 honest, loyal American citizens if they requested, in the exercise of 
 peaceful and law-abiding methods, working men to join with them 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 25 
 
 in a labor organization which constituted an integral part of the 
 American Federation of Labor. 
 
 The late distinguished Senator Robert M. La Follette, who served 
 for so many years as an influential member of the United States 
 Senate, stated that Federal Judge McClintic, of West Virginia, who 
 issued the original injunction in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal 
 & Coke Co. case and whose action was approved and sustained by 
 Judge Parker, had shown himself to be a petty tyrant and an arrogant 
 despot. 
 
 That is the language of the late Senator La Follette. 
 
 It is alleged that the opinion of Judge Parker was based upon the 
 existence of what labor appropriately terms "yellow-dog" contracts. 
 These so-called contracts provide that the employees of the coal 
 company can not join a labor union while serving as employees of 
 the company. Judge Parker held that because these "yellow-dog" 
 contracts were in effect it was unlawful for representatives of organized 
 labor to unionize the workers who were parties to the "yellow-dog" 
 contracts, or to solicit them to join a trade union without the coal 
 company's consent. 
 
 The injunction issued by Judge McClintic and which Judge Parker 
 approved in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. case, was 
 most sweeping in its terms and comprehensive in its application. In 
 effect it reduced the workers employed by these numerous coal com- 
 panies represented in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. 
 case to a condition approximating industrial servitude. Trade union 
 representatives were denied the right to talk to them and to peace- 
 fully persuade them to join a trade union. They could not be asked 
 to join a union and in that way exercise the right of collective action 
 comparable to the exercise of the right to organize exercised by those 
 corporations which employed them. 
 
 The injunction issued by Judge McClintic and which was approved 
 and confirmed by Judge Parker is still in effect. It operates as the 
 law of the land in southern West Virginia. As a result we behold an 
 economic condition in the mining towns controlled by those corpora- 
 tions which sought and secured the injunction, shocking in the ex- 
 treme. The operation of the injunction has served to make serfs out 
 of the miners. Their condition is hopeless. Their wages are below a 
 subsistence level and their conditions of employment are un-American 
 and intolerable. The officers and members of organized labor would 
 help them through organization and cooperation, but they dare not 
 because if they did they would be punished for violating, not the law 
 of the land, but a judge-made law confirmed and approved by Judge 
 Parker. 
 
 It will be no doubt alleged by the friends of Judge Parker that his 
 decision was based upon a rule laid down by the Supreme Court of 
 the United States in the celegrated Hitchman case. The so-called 
 "yellow-dog" contract was first brought to public notice when this 
 decision in the celebrated Hitchman case was rendered by the Supreme 
 Court of the United States in 1917, 13 years ago. Since that time 
 many economic, industrial, and social changes have taken place. It 
 is fair to assume that the late Chief Justice Taft had arrived at the 
 conclusion that "yellow-dog" contracts were inequitable and that em- 
 
26 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 ployees subjecting themselves to the signing of such contracts did so 
 under duress and compulsion. 
 
 Senator Borah. You say it is fair to presume that. Did he ever 
 say anything to justify that presumption? 
 
 Mr. Green. I am going to quote what he said that we interpret 
 to mean that. 
 
 Senator Borah. In the Tri-City case? 
 
 Mr. Green. In the Tri-City case. 
 
 It is clearly evident from what Chief Justice Taft stated in the 
 Tri-City case that he recognized the fact that collective bargaining 
 on the part of trade unions was necessary to place an employee on a 
 plane of equality with an employer. In rendering his decision in the 
 Tri-City case he used the following language : 
 
 A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was de- 
 pendent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. 
 If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was never- 
 theless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. 
 Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with 
 their employer. 
 
 I construe that to mean that Justice Taft, when he rendered his 
 decision in the Tri-City case, believed that the time had arrived in 
 the development of modern industry and in the expansion and growth 
 of the Nation, that union among employees was essential, not only 
 necessary, but essential, in order that they might deal with powerful 
 corporations and powerful employers. 
 
 Senator Borah. I think he held that very clearly, but he said 
 also: 
 
 It is idle to talk of peaceful communication in such place and under such con- 
 ditions. The name "picket" indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with 
 peaceable persuasion. 
 
 Mr. Green. He was dealing with the picketing. 
 Senator Borah. Exactly. He says: 
 
 Persuasion or communication attempted under such conditions is anything 
 but peaceable and lawful. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, we can't see it quite that way. Of course, 
 Senator, we always claim the right to our opinion and concede to 
 everyone else the same, but we think this language is susceptible of 
 the interpretation we place upon it; that he had arrived at the con- 
 clusion, clear and distinct, that union was necessary in order for the 
 employees to deal fairly with the employers. 
 
 Senator Borah. I am not passing on the decision rendered by 
 Judge Parker, but what I was trying to satisfy myself concerning 
 was whether or not it was to be distinguished from the decision 
 rendered by Judge Taft. 
 
 Mr. Green. I hope that I may be able to bring that to you in a 
 clearer way before I am through. 
 
 Again I quote from a statement made by the late Chief Justice Taft 
 relative to injunctions as most illuminating and interesting in the 
 consideration of the fitness and qualifications of Judge Parker to 
 serve as a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 This is quoting from Judge Taft again. 
 
 Senator Overman. What case? 
 
CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 27 
 
 Mr. Green. This was in an article that he prepared for the Public 
 Ledger of Philadelphia. 
 
 The usefulness of the injunction in the coal strike should not mislead reac- 
 tionary employers into the belief that it is a panacea for labor troubles. It has 
 worked well in this case (referring to the coal case in 1919) because public opinion 
 has sanctioned its use by the courts at the instance of the Government in defense 
 of the lives of the whole people. But it was only justified by the great emergency, 
 and was only made necessary by the incredible sense of irresponsible power of the 
 strike leaders. Labor troubles are not to be permanently solved in any such way. 
 Government of the relations between capital and labor by injunction is a solecism. 
 It is an absurdity. Injunctions in labor troubles are merely the emergency brakes 
 for rare use and in case of sudden danger. Frequent application of them would 
 shake to pieces the whole machine. They should be availed of only when the 
 soviet policy of a selfish aggregation of men pushes society against the wall into 
 a desperate situation. 
 
 I think that language is very significant as coming from the late 
 Chief Justice Taft. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, that was written while he was in private 
 life. 
 
 Mr. Green. I am not sure, but it is taken from an article that he 
 wrote. 
 
 Senator Borah. That was written while he was in private life. 
 He afterwards wrote this tri-city decision. 
 
 Mr. Green. I presume he entertained the same view in private 
 life as when he was on the bench. 
 
 Senator Borah. I presume so; but yet he joined in the Tri-City 
 case. 
 
 Mr. Green. That would seem a little contradictory, then, 
 wouldn't it? 
 
 Senator Borah. It would seem to be so. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, you accept our point of view on it, and let the 
 other go. 
 
 The significant fact connected with the opinion of Judge Parker 
 rendered in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. case is 
 not so much that he followed the decision of the Supreme Court in 
 the Hitchman case, but that he has shown in the opinion he wrote 
 and through his judicial attitude that he is in entire sympathy and 
 accord with the legal and economic policy embodied in the injunction 
 issued by Judge McClintic. Believing that these conclusions are 
 correct, Labor is of the opinion that the appointment and confirmation 
 of Judge Parker means that another injunction judge will become a 
 member of the Supreme Court of the United States. As a result, 
 the power of reaction will be strengthened, and the broad minded, 
 humane, progressive influence so courageously and patriotically 
 exercised by the minority members of the highest judicial tribunal 
 in the land correspondingly weakened. 
 
 There is the kernel in the nut. 
 
 Labor has always held that the so-called "yellow-dog" contract 
 is socially and morally wrong and because it lacks mutuality and is 
 contrary to public policy it is legally indefensible. These "yellow- 
 dog" contracts are forced, secured under duress and compulsion. 
 There is no bargaining and there can be no equality in bargaining as 
 between employer and employee in the consummation of a "yellow- 
 dog" contract. Invariably the worker is given the alternative of 
 signing a "yellow-dog" contract in order to secure employment, or 
 
28 CONFIRMATION OP JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 refuse to do so and as a consequence remain idle suffering from want 
 and hunger. In most instances, because of economic pressure and 
 necessity, he is compelled to sign the "yellow-dog" contract in order 
 to secure employment. There is no freedom of action. The worker 
 is the victim. The power of the corporation is against him and 
 even though he smarts under a sense of injustice he reluctantly signs 
 the "yellow-dog" contract. Hunger and necessity very frequently 
 compel him to do so. Certainly no one can contend that a contract 
 forced under such circumstances is just or that it conforms to a sound 
 public policy. 
 
 The purpose of the employer in requiring employees to sign a 
 contract in which they agree as a condition of employment that they 
 will not join a union, is obvious. The employers know full well that, 
 as Judge Taft stated, the individual is helpless and because he is 
 helpless the corporation can exercise economic control over him. It 
 is to the financial interest of the corporation to keep him indivualistic 
 and economically unrelated to his fellow workers. Wages may be 
 fixed and conditions of employment prescribed in accordance with the 
 will and decision of the corporation. The "yellow-dog" contract is 
 the medium through which this purpose is accomplished. This is 
 unjust, and any member of the judiciary who lends himself to the 
 imposition of such an injustice through the submission of an opinion 
 which legalizes and perpetuates the "yellow-dog" contract is, in 
 the opinion of labor, unfit to serve as a member of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States. 
 
 Senator Overman. Mr. Green, I have some letters and editorials 
 in which it is said the protest of your order, the American Federation 
 of Labor, was rather against the Red Jacket contract than Judge 
 Parker. Judge Parker followed the Hitchman case, and you are 
 protesting against the law laid down in the Hitchman case and other 
 cases. It isn't so much against Judge Parker, as against this system, 
 that which has been announced by the Supreme Court. 
 
 Mr. Green. No, we don't want to be placed in that light. The 
 Hitchman decision — I will try to make it plain — was the Dred Scott 
 decision to labor. We hold that it is indefensible; that it is not in 
 accordance with sound public policy, as I have said. That is true, 
 but that is beside this situation. What I just stated in the pre- 
 ceeding paragraph was not so much that Judge Parker followed 
 the Hitchman decision as laid down by the Supreme Court, but 
 that he shows himself as in entire sympathy with that decision, 
 and that is our objection to Judge Parker. 
 
 We feel that it would be unwise, that it would not be in the interest 
 of the common welfare, and the common people, the great mass of 
 the people, to strengthen the reactionary side of the Supreme Court, 
 by adding another to that powerful influence. 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, that is what has been suggested to me; 
 that your order is very much opposed to the principle laid down by 
 the Supreme Court in this case. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, we are very strongly opposed to that. 
 
 Senator Overman. Your objection is to the policy rather than to 
 Judge Parker himself, but Judge Parker was bound by the facts as 
 found by Judge McClintic. Do you admit that that is so, that in 
 rendering his decision he was bound by the facts found by Judge 
 McClintic? 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 29 
 
 Mr. Green. I think I can show where he did not follow exactly the 
 Hitchman decision, and I am going to endeavor to show you the 
 position taken by some members of the judiciary, in cases where they 
 think they are bound to follow precedents. I want to quote from a 
 statement made by the late Justice Sanford, in the Bedford Cut 
 Stone case. He said: 
 
 I concur in this result upon the controlling authority of Duplex Co. v. Deering 
 (254 U. S. 443), etc., which, as applied to the ultimate question in this case, I am 
 unable to distinguish. 
 
 He concurred in it, but apparently reluctantly. 
 
 There is no such evidence found in the decision rendered by Justice 
 Parker in the Red Jacket case. 
 
 I want to touch upon what we call the fundamentals in the Yellow- 
 Dog Contract case just for a moment, in order to bring that to your 
 attention. 
 
 Senator Borah. May I ask a question before you start in? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Borah. Has the validity of the "yellow-dog" contract 
 standing alone ever been tested? 
 
 Mr. Green. There is a case now pending in the Supreme Court 
 of Wisconsin, I think, based upon the constitutionality of a statute 
 in Wisconsin recently enacted by the Wisconsin State Legislature, 
 which invalidates and makes illegal "yellow-dog" contracts in that 
 State. 
 
 Senator Borah. I have never been able to determine for myself 
 what consideration there was for a "yellow-dog" contract. I have 
 been at a loss to know why the attorneys who were fighting those 
 cases did not test the validity of it on the ground there was no con- 
 sideration for a man agreeing to remain out of the union. What 
 possible consideration can flow to a man for agreeing not to join a 
 union? What mutuality? 
 
 Mr. Green. I can not see any. 
 
 Senator Borah. The question is why wasn't that point tested? 
 Judge parker, taking the "yellow-dog" contract as valid, sustained the 
 injunction to the effect that union men could not ask nonunion men 
 to break their contract, but it seems to me the way to have reached 
 that question was to test the validity of the contract upon which they 
 were basing such an injunction. I am speaking without full investiga- 
 tion. 
 
 Mr. Green. That might have been the proper procedure, and that 
 point may have been raised in some of these cases. I have not gone 
 into that. It may have been raised. I am not sure. I think it 
 was raised in the Hitchman case. But we believe that the finding 
 of the court in the Hitchman case, was based upon a different set of 
 facts than was presented in the Red Jacket case, and that is the point 
 I want to bring to you later. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Is it your contention that Judge Parker deviated 
 from the decision in the Hitchman case? 
 
 Mr. Green. No. I don't contend that he deviated from that 
 decision, but the point I have made is this — there are two points I 
 am making in connection with that. First, that the "Red Jacket" 
 decision that he approved, and which he wrote, is based upon a 
 
 107150—30 3 
 
30 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 different set of facts. It is not entirely in accordance with the rule 
 laid down by the Supreme Court in the Hitchman case. k 
 
 Secondly, that an examination of the his opinion leads us to the 
 conclusion that he is in entire accord with the legal principle involved 
 in the "Yellow Dog" contracts. 
 
 Senator Borah. I wish you would develop that latter proposition, 
 because I am interested in it. 
 
 Senator Hebert. I was going to say, you will, of course, develop 
 that? 
 
 Mr. Green. I will try to. 
 
 Labor has always held that the so-called "Yellow Dog" contract 
 is socially and morally wrong and because it lacks mutuality and is 
 contrary to public policy it is legally indefensible. These "Yellow 
 Dog" contracts are forced, secured under duress and compulsion. 
 There is no bargaining and there can be no equality of a "Yellow Dog" 
 contract. Invariably the worker is given the alternative of signing 
 a "Yellow Dog" contract in order to secure employment, or refuse to 
 do so and as a consequence remain idle, suffering from want and 
 hunger. In most instances, because of economic pressure and neces- 
 sity, he is compelled to sign the "Yellow Dog" contract in order to 
 secure employment. There is no freedom of action. The worker is 
 the victim. The power of the corporation is against him and even 
 though he smarts under a sense of injustice he reluctantly signs the 
 "Yellow Dog" contract. Hunger and necessity very frequently 
 compel him to do so. Certainly no one can contend that a contract 
 forced under such circumstances is just or that it conforms to a sound 
 public policy. 
 
 The purpose of the employer in requiring employees to sign a con- 
 tract in which they agree as a condition of employment that they will 
 not join a union, is obvious. The employer knows full well that, as 
 Judge Taf t stated, the individual is helpless, and because he is helpless 
 the corporation can exercise economic control over him. It is to the 
 financial interest of the corporation to keep him individualistic and 
 economically unrelated to his fellow workers. Wages may be fixed 
 and conditions of employment prescribed in accordance with the will 
 and decision of the corporation. The "yellow-dog" contract is the 
 medium through which this purpose is accomplished. This is unjust, 
 and any member of the judiciary who lends himself to the imposition 
 of such an injustice through the submission of an opinion which legal- 
 izes and perpetuates the "yellow-dog" contract, is in the opinion of 
 labor, unfit to serve as a member of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States. 
 
 Senator Hebert. May I interrupt you right there? Do these 
 "yellow-dog" contracts contain provisions for a fixed compensation 
 or a minimum wage? 
 
 Mr. Green. The wages are not touched at all, Senator. It is 
 merely a blank form handed to the worker when he appears at the 
 window for employment, and that blank form prescribes that "while 
 I am in your employ, I will not join a union." 
 
 Senator Borah. That is perfectly clear to me, that there is utterly 
 no consideration for that kind of a contract. The consideration 
 running between the employer and the employee is the wages and the 
 service which he renders? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 31 
 
 Senator Borah. And when he appears at the window and is asked 
 to sign this contract, what possible consideration can there be for 
 giving up that right? 
 
 Mr. Green. None whatever. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, has it been tested? 
 
 Senator Hebert. And that is not mentioned in this contract. 
 There is no consideration mentioned for his abstaining from joining 
 a union. That is not fixed in this agreement he signs? 
 
 Mr. Green. No; just simply that he will not join a union while in 
 the employ of this company. He surrenders his right, a legal right, 
 an inherent right. You can imagine a man going around, searching 
 for work. He is face to face with want, and many of them sign it 
 without knowing what it is, in order to get the work. 
 
 Senator Borah. He isn't the only man that is interested, and the 
 employer is not the only man interested. It is contrary to public 
 policy; the public is interested. 
 
 Mr. Green. That is the very point I want to show. It is a matter of 
 public interest. You go into southern West Virginia now and behold 
 the economic effect of this injunction that is in effect permanently as 
 the law of the land, and you can not go in and help them to raise 
 themselves out of their condition of industrial servitude without 
 violating this injunction. 
 
 Senator Borah. The entire community is interested in the condi- 
 tion of its working people. 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. And anything that militates against a reasonable 
 use of the powers they have to bring about reasonable compensation 
 is against public policy. 
 
 Mr. Green. W r e agree with you heartily. 
 
 Labor wishes its position regarding the exercise of the equity 
 power, the issuance of injunctions by courts of equity, to be thoroughly 
 and rightfully understood. We are not opposed to the exercise of the 
 equity power when it is necessary to protect physical tangible 
 property from irreparable injury when there is no remedy at law. 
 
 I want to make the position of labor clear on that point. 
 
 We believe that an examination of the origin and use of the equity 
 power will show that it was intended that it should be exercised 
 most carefully and resorted to only in extreme and urgent cases. 
 The broad and extended use of the powers of equity in human rela- 
 tions as between employers and employees has aroused keen resent- 
 ment and social hate in the hearts and minds of the masses of the 
 people. The workers of Great Britain, from which country we 
 inherited our system of law and equity, have never been harassed 
 or restrained in the exercise of the normal functions of trade-unions 
 through the issuance of such an injunction as was approved and 
 sustained by Judge Parker in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & 
 Coke Co. case. No such injunction could be issued or ever would 
 be issued against the workers of Great Britain. In the light of this 
 fact, why should the workers of America be subjected to such an 
 injustice? 
 
 While labor does not oppose the use of the injunction and a proper 
 exercise of the equity power for the protection of physical, tangible 
 property, it does resent the use of the writ of injunction for the 
 purpose of preventing working men and women from exercising 
 
32 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PAEKEE 
 
 their common, ordinary, and inherent right to join trade-unions for 
 mutual protection and helpfulness. 
 
 Senator Borah. And to persuade others to join. 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes; and to persuade others to join. Those are com- 
 mon rights we feel should not be restrained through the use of the 
 equity power. 
 
 Senator Borah. You do not contend that an injunction should not 
 be applied where there is physical injury, threatened physical injury 
 to life and to property? 
 
 Mr. Green. No, sir; we are in accord with that, as I have made 
 plain. 
 
 A further fact stands out prominently in the decision of Judge 
 Parker in the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. case, and 
 which labor regards as of very great importance. In the decision 
 rendered by Judge Parker the United Mine Workers were restrained 
 from extending financial assistance to the employees of the Red 
 Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., who occupied the houses of the 
 corporation in case said employees exercised the right to join the union. 
 
 They can't pay their house rent. 
 
 The United Mine Workers were forbidden to pay the rent of the 
 workers or to extend financial assistance in case they joined the union. 
 There has never been a more glaring example of a judicial disregard 
 of human rights and a corresponding regard of property rights as 
 transcendent over human rights than is shown in the judicial attitude 
 of Judge Parker as expressed in the written opinion he rendered in 
 the Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. case. 
 
 Regarding the policy pursued by many members of the judiciary 
 in the exercise of the equity power in labor controversies, may I quote 
 from a statement made by Senator Pepper, a former distinguished 
 Member of the United States Senate, in an address which he made at 
 a joint meeting of the Pennsylvania Bar Association on July 8, 1924: 
 
 In the Senate one quickly becomes aware of the existence throughout the 
 country of a sentiment on this subject which, if unchecked, may easily develop 
 into a revolutionary sentiment. I accordingly addressed a letter to every United 
 States district attorney asking him to secure from the clerk's office in his district 
 a copy of such injunction orders made by the United States court in his district 
 during the last two years. Courteous attention to my request has supplied me 
 with a most interesting mass of material. A study of these orders discloses an 
 evolution mildly comparable with the growth of the corporate mortgage. The 
 injunction orders have become more and more comprehensive and far-reaching 
 in their provisions until they culminate in the shopman's injunction order already 
 referred to. 
 
 He was referring to the order in the shopmen's strike. 
 
 Every thoughtful lawyer who has not already done so should read that order 
 and meditate upon its significance. In so doing he should have in mind that 
 during the shopmen's strike in 1922 nearly every one of the 261 class 1 railroads 
 and a number of short-line railroads applied for injunctions in the various Federal 
 courts. No applications were denied. In all nearly 300 were issued. 
 
 Naturally enough, during the past two decades there have been bitter protests 
 from the ranks of labor. To the striker it seems like tyranny to find such vast 
 power exercised, not by a jury of one's neighbors but by a single official who is 
 not elected but appointed, and that for life, and whose commission comes from a 
 distant and little-understood source. 
 
 Strong language ! 
 
 As a supplement to this letter of protest against the appointment 
 of Judge John J. Parker as a member of the Supreme Court of the 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKER 33 
 
 United States, I submit a short historical review of the United 
 Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke 
 Co. case and of the Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
 case herein referred to. There is incorporated in this review a copy 
 of the final decree entered in these cases as reported and directed 
 by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of which John J. Parker is 
 a member. 
 
 While we in no way question the integrity, the honor, of the 
 academic qualifications of Judge John J. Parker, we hold that he 
 has shown a judicial state of mind which betrays a judicial and 
 mental bias in favor of powerful corporations and against the masses 
 of the people. We feel that the Supreme Court of the United States, 
 exercising such tremendous powers as are conferred upon it by the 
 Constitution of the United States, should be composed of broad- 
 visioned men who have had a wide experience in human affairs and 
 who, because of such wide experience, are able to dissociate them- 
 selves from a provincial environment and to possess a comprehensive 
 understanding of human relations in industry, of social and economic 
 problems which have arisen out of the development of modern 
 industry and of economic life. We wish to see the greatest legal 
 tribunal in all the world humanized and liberalized. 
 
 For the reasons herein set forth, and for the further reason that 
 we are certain that Judge John J . Parker does not possess the qualifi- 
 cations, the fitness, training, and experience requisite to membership 
 on the Supreme Court of the United States, I herewith submit in the 
 name and in behalf of the Executive Council of the American Federa- 
 tion of Labor, the transportation brotherhoods, and of millions of 
 workers whom we have the honor to represent, our protest against 
 the appointment and confirmation of Judge John J. Parker as a 
 member of the the Supreme Court of the United States, and we appeal 
 to the members of the United States Senate to vote against his con- 
 firmation. 
 
 Now, may I supplement this statement by calling your atten- 
 tion 
 
 Senator Borah. Mr. Green, may I read a paragraph here that I 
 would like to have go in the record? I am reading from the decision 
 of Judge Parker: 
 
 With respect to the second paragraph complaint is made that it restrains 
 defendants "from inciting, inducing, or persuading the employees of the plaintiff 
 to break their contract of employment with the plaintiff." 
 
 As I see it, the gist of this case is that they issued an injunction 
 against union men trying to persuade nonunion men to break an 
 illegal contract. In other words, the "yellow dog" contract was the 
 contract which was involved, and they were using the injunction 
 against men exercising their power of persuasion to violate that con- 
 tract. That is the gist of this case, isn't it? 
 
 Air. Green. Yes, I think so: but this is an observation I wish to 
 make in connection with that matter. First of all, we do not feel that 
 he followed the decision in the Hitchman case, and that I am going to 
 bring to your attention in just a moment. Second, we do not believe 
 that the fact warranted the opinion delivered by Judge Parker. 
 Third, we hold that the "yellow-dog" contract is illegal. There is no 
 
34 COlSTFIRMATIOiSr OF JOHN J. PAEKEE 
 
 mutuality in it. It is secured under duress and compulsion, and there- 
 fore is contrary to sound public policy. 
 
 Here is the historical review to which I referred, of the United 
 Mine Workers of America v. The Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & 
 Coke Co., and of the Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. 
 I will not burden you by reading it. but will put it in the record, be- 
 cause I presume you will examine this. 
 
 Senator Overman. It may be made a part of the record. 
 
 (The opinions referred to are as follows:) 
 
 UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA V. RED JACKET CONSOLIDATED COAL & COKE 
 
 CO. (18 FED. (2D) 839.) 
 
 This case, with which were joined 11 other cases, arose out of the efforts of 
 the United Mine Workers of America to organize mine workers employed in the 
 West Virginia coal fields. There were 12 suits instituted by various owners 
 and operators of coal mines in West Virginia against the United Mine Workers 
 of America, the district and local unions of that organization in West Virginia 
 and a number of its international, district, and local union officers. The com- 
 plainants numbered 316 in all and embraced most of the nonunion coal com- 
 panies operating in the southern West Virginia field. The suits were instituted 
 to restrain interference with the complainants' business on the ground that the 
 interference complained of constituted a restraint of interstate trade and commerce 
 in violation of the Sherman Act. 
 
 The suit of the Red Jacket Coal Co. was instituted September 30, 1920. This 
 company operates in Mingo County, W. Va. A strike was declared against the 
 company about July 1, 1920, and a suit was instituted to enjoin the union and 
 its officers and members from interfering with the company's employees by 
 violence, picketing, etc., or by procuring them to breach their contracts of 
 employment. The suit of the Borderland Coal Co. was instituted September 
 26, 1921. This company also operated in Mingo County and it asked relief 
 not only for itself but also for 62 other companies operating in the same territory 
 and who were actually made parties to the suit on April 8, 1922. Practically 
 the same relief was sought as in the Red Jacket case. 
 
 On April 1, 1922, while the strike order of July 1, 1920, in Mingo County was 
 still in effect, the union called a nation-wide strike because of a failure to nego- 
 tiate a basic wage agreement with the union operators of the central competitive 
 field, comprising the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and western Pennsylvania. 
 The strike call was issued to nonunion as wed as to union members, and measures 
 were taken to make it effective throughout the nonunion fields of West Virginia, 
 as well as in the Kanawha and New River fields where the union had formerly 
 been recognized, but where operation had been commenced on a nonunion basis 
 under contracts between the operators and their employees. Nine suits were 
 instituted by the operators to enjoin the union, its officers and members from 
 interfering with their employees and the operation of their mines, and the same 
 relief was asked as in the Red Jacket and Borderland suits. In each of these 
 suits a number of companies operating in the same general neighborhood joined 
 as complainants and as stated, 62 companies joined as complainants in the 
 Borderland suit which had been instituted as a previous date. 
 
 Temporary injunctions were secured in all of these suits. In a number of them, 
 appeals were taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the 
 injunctive orders of the district court were modified. 
 
 The general strike of 1922 was settled by the Cleveland wage agreement in 
 August of that year, but the strike was continued against the nonunion operators 
 of West Virginia. Certain companies which had joined as complainants in some 
 of the bills, entered into wage agreements recognizing the union and withdrew as 
 complainants. On September 18, 1922, the Carbon Fuel Co. filed a suit against 
 the defendants in the other cases and the companies who had withdrawn from the 
 suit as complainants, asking the same relief as was asked in the other suits and 
 also that these companies be enjoined from paying to the United Mine Workers, 
 the "check off" provided for in their contract. A preliminary injunction was 
 granted, which, on appeal, was modified by this court. 
 
 For such modification orders see Keeney v. Borderland Coal Corporation (282 
 Fed. 269) ; Dwyer v. Alpha Pocahontas Coal Co. (282 Fed. 270) ; United Mine 
 Workers of America, v. Leevale Coal Co. (285 Fed. 32) ; and United Mine Workers 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 35 
 
 of America v. Carbon Fuel Co. (288 Fed. 1020). All of these decisions were 
 rendered before Judge Parker was appointed a member of the Circuit Court of 
 Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
 
 On May 21, 1923, the district court entered an order consolidating all 12 of the 
 cases and the defendants having already moved to dismiss for misjoinder of 
 parties plaintiff, objected to the consolidation and excepted to the order. The 
 district court on October 16, 1925, made an extended findings of fact and in each 
 case entered the same final decree, from which the defendants have appealed. 
 
 This district judge found that the defendants had conspired to restrain inter- 
 state trade and commerce in coal and that at the time these suits were instituted, 
 the United Mine Workers of America were attempting unlawfully and malici- 
 ously to induce and cause the employees of the plaintiffs to violate their contracts 
 of employment with the plaintiffs; to compel the employees of said plaintiffs, by 
 intimidation and violence to cease working for the plaintiffs and to become mem- 
 bers of the union; to compel the plaintiffs to recognize the union and to deal with 
 it and operate their mines under union conditions or to close down such mines. 
 The district judge further found that it was part of the policy of the union to 
 have its members hold possession of dwelling houses belonging to the companies 
 which were constructed and maintained by them for the use of their employees 
 as incidental to such employment and that the union was maintaining persons in 
 the wrongful occupation of such houses for the purpose of preventing the houses 
 being used by persons who were willing to work. 
 
 On these findings, a final decree was entered in each case and by this decree, the 
 defendants were restrained and enjoined: 
 
 "(1) From interfering with the employees of the plaintiffs or with men seeking 
 employment at their mines by menaces, threats, violence, or injury to them, 
 their persons, families, or property, or abusing them, or their families, or by 
 doing them violence in any way or manner whatsoever, or by doing any other act 
 or thing that will interfere with the right of such employees and those seeking 
 employment to work upon such terms as to them seem proper, unmolested, and 
 from in any manner injuring or destroying the properties of the plaintiffs, or 
 either of them, or from counseling or advising that these plaintiffs should in any 
 way or manner be injured in the conduct and management of their business and 
 in the enjoyment of their property and property rights. 
 
 "(2) From trespassing upon the properties of the plaintiffs, or either of them 
 or by themselves, or in cooperation with others, from inciting, inducing, or per- 
 suading the employees of the plaintiffs to break their contract of employment 
 with the plaintiffs. 
 
 "(3) From aiding or assisting any other person or persons to commit or 
 attempt to commit any of the acts herein enjoined. 
 
 " (4) From aiding or abetting any person or persons to occupy or hold without 
 right, any house or houses or other property of the plaintiffs, or any of them, by 
 sending money or other assistance to be used by such persons in furtherance of 
 such unlawful occupancy or holding." 
 
 The union filed 28 assignments of error and presented 5 principal contentions 
 for consideration: (1) The evidence did not establish a conspiracy in restraint 
 of trade; (2) there was misjoinder of parties plaintiff; (3) the injunctive decree is 
 too broad, forbidding persuasion, as well as violence and intimidation; (4) that 
 the courts should not have enjoined defendants from rendering assistance to 
 persons to enable them to occupy houses belonging to complainants and (5) that 
 those complainants who had had wage agreements with the union were not 
 entitled to relief. 
 
 From this resume of the facts in the case, it will be seen that the district court, 
 if sustained, had effectually blocked the United Mine Workers of America from 
 attempting to organize any mine workers in the entire State of West Virginia. 
 Upon appeal, the case was considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
 Fourth Circuit, consisting of Judges Waddill, Rose, and Parker. Judge Parker, 
 now named for appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered 
 the opinion of the court, which sustained in all essential respects, the decree of 
 the district court and by the terms of which decision, the United Mine Workers 
 of America were restrained from seeking to organize the mines throughout West 
 Virginia. 
 
 In rendering his decision, Judge Parker first took up the question of whether 
 the evidence established a conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade and com- 
 merce. 
 
 After examining, the evidence and citing with approval certain portions of the 
 decisions in the Duplex Printing Press and American Foundries cases, Judge 
 
36 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Parker stated that he had no hesitation in holding that the defendants were not 
 guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, merely because of the extent and 
 general purpose of their organization. He pointed out that in the coal industry, 
 the rate of wages is one of the largest factors in the cost of production and affected 
 not only competition in the immediate neighborhood but that with producers 
 throughout the same trade territory. Accordingly, the union, he said, was not 
 to be condemned because it sought to extend its membership throughout the 
 industry. He also pointed out that section 6 of the Clayton Act declared the 
 normal objects of labor unions to be legitimate and forbade their being held to be 
 combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade because they are organized or 
 because of the normal effect of such organization on interstate commerce. He 
 held: "It may be conceded that the purposes of the union, if realized, would 
 affect wages, hours of labor, and living conditions and that the power of its 
 organization would be used in furtherance of collective bargaining and that 
 these things would incidentally affect the production and price of coal sold in 
 interstate commerce. And it may be conceded further that by such an extension 
 of membership, the union would acquire a great measure of control over the 
 labor involved in coal production. But this does not mean that the organization 
 is unlawful." 
 
 "However," he went on to say, "when the union turned aside from its normal, 
 and legitimate objects and purposes and engaged in actual combination or con- 
 spiracy in restraint of trade, it was accountable therefore in the same manner as 
 any other organization." And it was his opinion that the evidence in this case 
 justified the conclusion that the United Mine Workers had engaged in an actual 
 combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in a manner quite foreign to 
 the normal and legitimate objects of the union. He sustained the findings of the 
 district judge that a combination or conspiracy existed among the defendants 
 without regard to participation by the central operators, to restrain and interfere 
 with the interstate business of complainants. The defendants, as officers of the 
 union, had combined and conspired to interfere with the production and shipment 
 of coal by the nonunion operators of West Virginia in order to force the unioniza- 
 tion of the West Virginia mines and to make effective the srtikes declared pursuant 
 to the policy of the union. There was no question in his mind but that the 
 strikes called by the union in West Virginia in 1920 and 1922 and the alleged 
 campaign of violence incident thereto, were merely the carrying out of the plan 
 and policy upon which the mine workers had been engaged for a number of 
 years. It was significant to him that efforts were made to organize nonunion 
 fields at a time when there was no general strike. He stressed the fact that 
 the national strike of 1922 was made applicable to the nonunion West Virginia 
 fields and that the efforts to organize were continued after the settlement by 
 virtue of the Cleveland wage agreement. All of these facts satisfied the district 
 judge that a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce was in effect and Judge 
 Parker in his opinion found that these findings were sustained by the evidence. 
 
 In determining the question as to whether or not coal mining constituted 
 interstate commerce, he dismissed as not being in point, decisions of the Supreme 
 Court in the first Coronado Case (259 U. S. 344), and that in the United Leather 
 Workers v. Herkert (265 U. S. 457). In the Leather Workers case, it was held 
 that the fact that trunks when manufactured were to be shipped or sold in 
 interstate commerce would not make their production a part thereof. The first 
 Coronado case held that a conspiracy directed against production of so small an 
 amount of coal (5,000 tons a week) could not be said to be a conspiracy to restrain 
 interstate commerce, even though the coal was intended, if produced, for shipment 
 in such commerce. The second Coronado case (268 U. S. 295) was referred to 
 and the ruling there was held applicable by Judge Parker to this case. 
 
 "The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate 
 commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production 
 is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when 
 the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown 
 to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate com- 
 merce or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of 
 the antitrust act." 
 
 Judge Parker felt that the case considered by him fell within the rule of the 
 second Coronado decision. It was shown by Judge Parker that the total pro- 
 duction of the mines of the complainants was in excess of 40,000,000 tons per 
 year, more than 90 per cent of which entered interstate commerce. Interference 
 with the production of these mines as contemplated by the defendants, would, he 
 
CONFIRMATION - OF JOHN J. PARKER 37 
 
 held, necessarily interfere with interstate commerce in coal to a substantial 
 degree. He further pointed out that the purpose of the defendants in interfering 
 with the production was to stop the shipments in interstate commerce. It was 
 only as the coal entered into interstate commerce that it became a factor in the 
 price and affected the defendants in their wage negotiations with the union 
 operators. A conspiracy, he held, was in violation of the statute where there 
 existed an intent to restrain interstate commerce and a scheme appropriate 
 for that purpose, even though it does not act directly upon the instrumentalities 
 of commerce and, he went on to say, where the necessary result of the things done 
 pursuant to or contemplated by the conspiracy is to restrain trade between 
 the States, the intent is presumed. The defendants must be held to have intended 
 the necessary and direct consequences of their acts and can not be heard to say the 
 contrary. 
 
 The second paragraph of decree restrained defendants "from inciting, inducing, 
 or persuading the employees of the plaintiff to break their contract of employ- 
 ment with the plaintiffs." 
 
 It was contended that the effect of this decree operating indefinitely in futuro, 
 was to restrain the defendants from attempting to extend their membership 
 among the complainants' employees who are under contract not to join the 
 union while remaining in complainants' services and to forbid the publishing 
 and circulating of lawful arguments and the making of lawful and proper speeches 
 advocating such union membership. The miners contended that the effect of 
 the decree is that, because complainants' employees have agreed to work on 
 the nonunion basis, they were forbidden, for an indefinite time in the future, 
 to lay before them, any lawful and proper argument in favor of union membership. 
 
 Judge Parker pointed out that while there be no boubt of the right of the 
 defendants to use all lawful propaganda to increase their membership, this right 
 must be exercised with due regard to the rights of complainants. "To make a 
 speech or to circulate an argument under ordinary circumstances dealing on 
 the advantages of union membership is one thing. To approach a company's 
 employees, working under contract not to join the union while remaining in 
 the company's service, and induce them, in violation of their contracts, to join 
 the union and go on a strike for the purpose of forcing the company to recognize 
 the union or of impairing its power of production, is another and very difficult 
 thing." He held that what was said in the Hitchman case with respect to this 
 matter was conclusive of the point involved here. 
 
 "But the facts render it plain that what the defendants were endeavoring 
 to do at the Hitchman mine and neighboring mines can not be treated as a bona 
 fide effort to enlarge the membership of the union. There is no evidence to 
 show, nor can it be inferred, that defendants intended or desired to have the 
 men at these mines join the union, unless they, could organize the mines. Without 
 this, the new members would be added to the number of men competing for 
 jobs in the organized districts, while nonunion men would take their places in 
 the Panhandle mines. Except as a means to the end of compelling the owners 
 of these mines to change their method of operation, the defendants were not 
 seeking to enlarge the union membership. * * * Another fundamental 
 error in defendant's position consists in the assumption that all measures that 
 may be resorted to are lawful if they are ' peaceable ' — that is, if they stop short 
 of physical violence, or coercion through fear of it. In our opinion, any violation 
 of plaintiff's legal rights contrived by defendants for the purpose of inflicting 
 damage, or having that as its necessary effect, is as plainly inhibited by the law 
 as if it involved a breach of the peace. A combination to procure concerted 
 breaches of contract by plaintiff's employees constitutes such a violation." 
 
 The inhibition of section 20 of the Clayton Act against enjoining peaceful 
 persuasion was held not to apply as this was not a case growing out of a dispute 
 concerning terms or conditions of employment, between an employer or employee, 
 between employers and employees, or between employees, or persons employed, 
 and persons seeking employment. This was a case, he held, growing out of a 
 dispute between employers and persons who were neither ex-employees nor seek- 
 ing employment and thus section 20 of the Clayton Act had no application. 
 
 Paragraph 4 of the decree was criticized because it violated section 20 of the 
 Clayton Act, but since Judge Parker held that section 20 did not apply, he saw 
 no other reason why paragraph 4 was not proper. Under the law of West 
 Virginia, when employees of complainants quit work and refused to surrender 
 the houses of compl xinants occupied by them, they became trespassers. The 
 effect of the fourth paragraph was held merely to be from aiding and abetting 
 in trespasses committed on complainant's property in furtherance of the design 
 
38 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 of the conspiracy and Judge Parker further stated that no more effective way 
 of shutting down the mine could be devised than to get the houses of the mine 
 villages in possession of persons who refused to work in the mines and withhold 
 possession of the houses from persons who are willing to work. 
 
 The "check-off" was held not to be of itself illegal. The basis of the con- 
 tention that those complainants who had formerly held agreements were not 
 entitled to relief was that they had operated on a union basis for a number of 
 years and paid the "check-off" to the union. However, Judge Parker held the 
 "check-off" not to be illegal and that such complainants by agreeing to the 
 "check-off" did not become parties to the conspiracy of the defendants. The 
 decree entered in the several cases by the district court was held to be sustained 
 by the evidence and was accordingly affirmed. 
 
 BITTNER V. WEST VIRGINIA-PITTSBURGH COAL CO. (15 FED. (2D) 652). 
 
 On May 11, 1925, a bill of complaint was filed by the West Virginia-Pittsburgh 
 Coal Co. against the officers of the United Mine Workers as such and individually. 
 Service was had upon Bittner and others. The bill set forth that the company's 
 mines were run on a nonunion basis and that each miner employed by the com 7 
 pany entered into a contract whereby it was agreed that the mines should be run 
 nonunion and that such employees should not join or become affiliated in any 
 way with any union of coal miners while in such employment. 
 
 The bill alleged that from 1917 until 1922, the mines were operated on a union 
 basis; that from January, 1922, they were operated on a nonunion basis and a 
 vigorous effort was made by the miners to organize the mines. Contempt pro- 
 ceedings were instituted under an injunction theretofore awarded against the 
 United Mine Workers of America as a result of which the interruption in the 
 use of the complainant's property was discontinued until about March 1, 1925. 
 
 The complaint further alleged that around March 1, 1925, the defendants 
 combined, conspired, and confederated together for the purpose of organizing the 
 nonunion mines in northern West Virginia and had induced, enticed, and per- 
 suaded a number of its employees to break their contracts of service and cease 
 working for the complainant and agree to joint the United Mine Workers of 
 America. It was alleged that the defendants knew that the mines had been 
 operated as nonunion from 1922 and that the employees were working under 
 contracts of service. 
 
 The case came on to be heard on the complainant's prayer for a preliminary 
 injunction and the defendant's motion to dismiss and thereafter on May 19, 
 1925, the court awarded the preliminary injunction containing seven paragraphs 
 as follows: 
 
 " (1) From interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees for 
 the purpose of unionizing plaintiff's mines without its consent, by representing 
 or causing to be represented to any of plaintiff's employees, or to any person who 
 might become an employee of plaintiff, that such person will suffer or is likely to 
 suffer some loss or trouble in continuing in or entering the employment of the 
 plaintiff, by reason of plaintiff not recognizing the union, or because plaintiff 
 runs a nonunion mine. 
 
 " (2) From interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees for 
 the purpose of unionizing the mines without the plaintiff's consent, and in aid of 
 such purpose knowingly and willfully bringing about the breaking by plaintiff's 
 employees of contracts of service known at the time to exist with plaintiff's present 
 and future employees. 
 
 " (3) From knowingly and willfully enticing plaintiff's employees, present or 
 future, to leave plaintiff's service on the ground that the plaintiff does not recog- 
 nize the United Mine Workers of America or runs a nonunion mine. 
 
 " (4) From interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees, so 
 as to knowingly and willfully bring about the breaking by plaintiff's employees, 
 present and future, of their contracts of service known to the defendants to exist, 
 and especially from knowingly and willfully enticing such employees, present or 
 future, to leave plaintiff's service without plaintiff's consent. 
 
 " (5) From trespassing on or entering upon the grounds and premises of plaintiff 
 or its mines for the purpose of interfering therewith or hindering or obstructing 
 its business, or with the purpose of compelling or inducing, by threats, intimida- 
 tion, violent or abusive language, or persuasion, any of plaintiff's employees to 
 refuse or fail to perform their duties as such. 
 
 " (6) From compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by 
 threats, intimidation, or abusive or violent language, any of plaintiff's employees 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 39 
 
 to leave its service, or fail or refuse to perform their duties as such employees, or 
 compelling or attempting to compel by like means any person desiring to seek 
 employment in plaintiff's mines and works from so accepting employment therein. 
 
 " (7) From picketing the streets, roads, or other avenues of approach to plain- 
 tiff's mines, for the purpose of enticing, entreating, persuading, or by any means 
 inducing plaintiff's employees to break their contracts of service known to them 
 at the time to exist; from approaching plaintiff's employees, present or future, at 
 their places of residence, or at any other place for the purpose of enticing, entreat- 
 ing, persuading, or by any means inducing said employees, to break their contracts 
 of service known to them at the time to exist; from advertising meetings or by 
 any means inducing plaintiff's employees to attend meetings at which attempts 
 shall be made, by entreaty, enticement, or persuasion, to induce plaintiff's 
 employees to break their contracts of service then known to them to exist; and 
 from doing the like for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff's mines." 
 
 On the same day, the defendants filed a written motion to dissolve the injunc- 
 tion, which was heard on June 1 and on June 2, the district court filed its opinion, 
 denying the motion to disslove and entered its decree, modifying the preliminary 
 injunction by omitting the seventh paragraph. 
 
 , Thereupon, the defendants appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
 Fourth Circuit, composed of Judges Waddill, Rose, and Parker. Judge Waddill 
 delivered the unanimous opinion of the court. 
 
 Four grounds were assigned by the defendants for reversing the decree of the 
 district court. First, the complaint was not entitled to the relief prayed for under 
 the doctrine of res adjudicata; second, that the court was without jurisdiction to 
 afford the relief sought; third, that the decree asked for was villotive of the 
 law, and, fourth, that the granting of the same would create a situation whereby 
 the United Mine Workers of America would be entirely denied the right of 
 having their side of the controversy heard. 
 
 To sustain the doctrine of res adjudicata, the defendant showed that on 
 December 2, 1913, the complainant procured an injunction against Bittner and 
 others seeking relief of the character herein sought, which injunction was modi- 
 fied on July 3, 1914, and on July 10, 1923, the injunction in its modified form was 
 made permanent and a contempt proceeding had been instituted by the com- 
 plainant seeking to secure the benefits of the injunction proceedings. 
 
 The contempt proceedings were dismissed and the original injunction as modi- 
 fied was attempted to be enforced. The temporary injunction of May 19, 1925, 
 was modified by the omission of the seventh paragraph which resulted, in effect, 
 in the reinstatement of the original injunction of December 2, 1913. 
 
 The circuit court of appeals held that the facts as to what occurred in refer- 
 ence to the original injunction had no material bearing in this case and that the 
 condition prevailing and what occurred after the effort to operate the complain- 
 ant's mines upon the original plan of nonunion mines should control. 
 
 In the present case, the injunction decree in the old suit was entered in 1913 
 and had reference to conditions existing then and the evidence was to prove the 
 then existing conditions. The decree in that case referred to and determined 
 the rights of the parties as of that time and held that the acts done at that time 
 were in violation of the then rights of the parties. Bittner is the only party to 
 the present suit who was a party to the 1913 suit and the defendants in this suit 
 who were officers of the United Mine Workers are not bound by the decree in 
 this suit. 
 
 The bill in this case charges that around March 1, 1925, the defendants con- 
 spired and confederated together for the purpose of unionizing all the nonunion 
 mines of northern West Virginia and in furtherance of that conspiracy, during 
 the month of April, 1925, entreated, enticed, and persuaded a great number of 
 complainant's employees to break their contracts of service, well knowing that 
 the mines were being operated on a nonunion basis and under contract with its 
 employees to that end. 
 
 The defendants were acquitted in the contempt proceedings instituted against 
 them for alleged violations of the injunction order of 1913. This in no way 
 affected complainant's right to the injunction prayed for, as the alleged con- 
 tempt related to the old case and not to this. 
 
 Answering the question of jurisdiction, it is held that the court was clothed 
 with full power, authority and jurisdiction, as well as of the subject matter as of 
 the parties to the litigation. The general purposes of the suit was to preserve 
 and protect to complainant its lawful right to use and enjoy its property. The 
 grievances are that the miners had set about and combined and confederated 
 among themselves and with others to forcibly unionize complainant's mines 
 
40 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 which would tend to destroy the value of the same, and make impossible the 
 profitable production of coal. The company also complained that its mines 
 were operated under written contracts with its employees on a nonunion basis 
 and that this method of operating its mines, and the rights and benefits accruing 
 to complainant under such contracts of employment was a most valuable property 
 right which enabled it to successfully conduct its business, and particularly to 
 maintain the number of employees necessary to carry on its business, and with- 
 out which it could not have done so, and to avoid strikes and such incidental 
 interruptions as would result in the practical destruction of its business and 
 property and its right to use and enjoy the same. Notwithstanding the fact 
 that the miners had knowledge of such contracts, they deliberately set about to 
 induce and secretly persuade the company's employees and workmen to break 
 their contracts by becoming members of the United Mine Workers and keeping 
 that fact secret from the knowledge of the complainants, until with such numbers 
 they could undermine and break up the complainant's business, all of which 
 actions and doings were against good conscience and fair dealings. 
 
 The right to maintain the suit was held to be clear. The miners, citizens of 
 the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio, were served with process in West Virginia, 
 which gave and conferred upon the complainant the right to maintain this, 
 litigation. 
 
 The case was held to be in its essential features a counterpart of the Hitchman 
 case. Here as there, the right of injunction was involved and considered, growing 
 out of efforts to unionize mines by peaceable and persuasive methods, fraud- 
 ulently and deceptively practiced, in utter disregard of its rights and interests 
 under the contractual relations with its employees, of which the defendants were 
 fully advised. # 
 
 Section 20 of the Clayton Act was held to have little or no application to this 
 case, in the light of the interpretation placed thereon in American Foundries v. 
 Tri-City Council (257 U. S. 184), where it was said: 
 
 "It has been determined by this court that the irreparable injury to property 
 or to a property right, in the first paragraph of section 20, includes injury to the 
 business of an employer, and that the second paragraph applies only in cases 
 growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, between 
 an employer and employee, or between employers and employees, or between 
 employees, or, between persons employed and persons seeking employment, and 
 not to such dispute between an employer and persons who are neither ex-employ- 
 ees nor seeking employment." 
 
 Where fraud and deception are openly charged in the methods adopted and 
 practices pursued to undermine and destroy the complainant's right, equity will 
 not fail to afford the fullest relief. 
 
 The circuit court of appeals stated that it appeared that the court below neither 
 violated any rule of equity, nor improperly exercised the discretion reposed in it, 
 and that the evidence entitled the complainant to injunctive relief, and that the 
 action taken, save as modified hereafter, was free from error. 
 
 The scope'of the injunction was criticized by the defendants who contended 
 that its effect was to forbid the publishing and circulating of lawful arguments 
 and the making of lawful speeches advocating membership in the union in the 
 neighborhood of the plaintiff's mines. The circuit court of appeals did not think 
 that this wag the proper construction of the order, which was an exact cop} 1, of 
 that which was approved by the United States Supreme Court in the Hitchman 
 case. But, in order that there might be no misunderstanding, the circuit court 
 ordered that the injunction as issued be modified by adding the following pro- 
 vision. 
 
 "Provided, That nothing herein confined shall be construed to forbid the 
 advocacy of union membership, in public speeches or by the publication or circu- 
 lation of arguments, when such speeches or arguments are free from threats and 
 other devices to intimidate, and from attempts to persuade the complainant's 
 employees or any of them to violate their contracts with it." 
 
 As modified, the decree of the district court was upheld. 
 
 Mr. Green. Here is a memorandum that I wish to submit concern- 
 ing the opinion of Circuit Judge John J. Parker in the case of the 
 United Mine Workers of America v. the Red Jacket Coal & Coke Co. 
 This is filed with you for the purpose of presenting to you our point of 
 view regarding the difference in the rule laid down in the Hitchman 
 case and the decision of Judge Parker. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 41 
 
 The personal, mental, and judicial attitude of Federal Circuit Judge 
 John J. Parker concerning the rights of the laboring man in contro- 
 versies with employers is clearly apparent from a reading of his opin- 
 ion in the case of United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Coal & Coke Co. 
 (18 Fed. Rep. (2d) 839) (1927); Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Cir- 
 cuit; especially when this case is compared or contrasted with the 
 earlier cases of Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., decided 
 by the same court and reported (15 Fed. Rep. (2d), 652) (1926); and 
 the case of Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell et al., decided by 
 the Supreme Court of the United States in 1917, and reported in 245 
 United States, 229. 
 
 As a preliminary it is to be observed that the Red Jacket Coal case 
 was heard and argued before the whole Circuit Court of Appeals for 
 the Fourth Circuit, consisting then of Circuit Judges Waddill, Rose, 
 and Parker. However, between the hearing of the case and the an- 
 nouncement of the decision and opinion, Judge Rose died. At the 
 end of the case it is stated that the late Judge Rose concurred in the 
 decision that the decree of the district court should be confirmed but 
 had expressed a desire to examine the record with a view of satisfying 
 himself whether jurisdiction existed as to certain defendants. "He 
 died before the opinion could be submitted to him." The opinion 
 in this case, therefore, is not the opinion of three of the circuit judges 
 but the opinion written by Judge Parker and concurred in by Judge 
 Waddill. It is to be noted, in this connection, that Judge Waddill 
 delivered the opinion of the same court in the Bittner case, supra, 
 which had been decided by all three of the circuit judges, namely, 
 Judges Waddill, Rose, and Parker. 
 
 The so-called Red Jacket Coal case was a consolidation of 12 cases. 
 Appeals were taken from decrees of the District Court for the Southern 
 District of West Virginia, wherein the United Mine Workers, and 
 certain of its officers, had been enjoined as»hereinafter set forth. 
 
 Among the statements of fact prefacing the opinion, it is stated 
 that : 
 
 Complainants operated their mines nonunion, that is, their employees are 
 notified that the company will not employ union men and accept employment with 
 that understanding, and, in the case of most of them, the employees have entered 
 into contracts that they will not join the union while remaining in the service of 
 the employer. 
 
 The contracts considered in the other two cases; namely, the Bittner 
 case and the Hitchman case, were similar. 
 
 In other words, by the terms of these alleged contracts laborers 
 employed in the mines entered employment under an alternative 
 contract, that is to say, they agreed that so long as they remained in 
 the employ of the operators they would not join the union, or, con- 
 versely stated, if they joined the union they would not remain in the 
 employ of the operators. 
 
 In the Red Jacket Coal case the bill sought to enjoin the union 
 and its officers, among other things, from interfering with the com- 
 pany's employees "by procuring them to breach their contracts wth 
 plaintiff in the manner enjoined in Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell. 
 
42 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN" J. PARKER 
 
 The district judge found, among other things, that defendants had 
 conspired to restrain interstate trade and commerce in coal and were 
 attempting — 
 
 (a) unlawfully, maliciously, and unreasonably to induce, incite, and cause 
 employees of the plaintiffs in said suits to violate their said contracts of em- 
 ployment with said plaintiffs. 
 
 (b) to compel said employees of said plaintiffs, by use of force, intimidation, 
 threats, violence, vile epithets, abusive language, and false and fraudulent 
 statements, to cease working for said plaintiffs and to become members of said 
 union. 
 
 Upon the pleadings and findings of fact by the district judge 
 injunctions were issued enjoining defendants, among other things, 
 
 (2) From * * * inciting, inducing, or persuading employees of the 
 plaintiff to break their contract of employment with the plaintiffs. 
 
 It is to be borne in mind that the alleged contracts do not prohibit 
 employees from leaving the employ of the plaintiffs, nor from join- 
 ing the union, but only from joining the union and continuing in 
 the employ of the plaintiffs. 
 
 Nowhere in the case does it appear (as it does appear in the 
 Bittner and Hitchman cases, supra) that the employees in the Red 
 Jacket Coal Co. secretly became members of the union and con- 
 tinued in the employ of the plaintiffs. 
 
 Senator Hebert. You are still quoting from the opinion now? 
 
 Mr. Green. No; I am reading our interpretation. 
 
 Senator Overman. You are reading the fact as to conspiracy, as 
 to force. Is that from McClintic's finding of fact? 
 
 Mr. Green. No, no. I am not quoting from McClintic's decision 
 at all. 
 
 Senator Borah. He is reading his own argument. 
 
 Mr. Green. That is my own argument. 
 
 In the Hitchman case* it was made plain that the workers were 
 joining a union, and that they were doing it secretly, and while belong- 
 ing to the union secretly they remained in the employ of the company, 
 and that was involved in the Hitchman decision. Another thing 
 was that the organizer who tried to organize these workers in the 
 Hitchman case, did so through deception, and that is not charged in 
 the Red Jacket case. 
 
 At the hearing the appellants, United Mine Workers and its officers, 
 argued that the second paragraph of the injunction restrained the 
 defendants from persuading employees of the plaintiffs to break their 
 contract of employment with plaintiffs and urged that the decree be 
 modified in such manner as not to enjoin the appellants from advocat- 
 ing union membership by means of public speeches, or the publica- 
 tion or circulation of arguments free from threats, and so forth. In 
 denying such modification Judge Parker used the following language: 
 
 It is said, however, that the effect of the decree, which, of course, operates 
 indefinitely in futuro, is to restrain defendants from attempting to extend their 
 membership among the employees of complainants who are under contract not 
 to join the union while remaining in complainants' service, and to forbid the pub- 
 lishing and circulating of lawful arguments and the making of lawful and proper 
 speeches advocating such union membership. They say that the effect of the 
 decree, therefore, is that, because complainants' employees have agreed to work 
 on the nonunion basis, defendants are forbidden, for an indefinite time in the 
 future, to lay before them any lawful and proper argument in favor of union 
 membership. 
 
 If we so understood the decree, we would not hesitate to modify it. As we 
 said in the Bittner case, there can be no doubt of the right of defendants to use 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 43 
 
 all lawful propaganda to increase their membership. On the other hand, how- 
 ever, this right must be exercised with due regard to the rights of complainants. 
 To make a speech or to circulate an argument under ordinary circumstances 
 dwelling upon the advantages of union membership is one thing. To approach 
 a company's employees, working under a contract not to join the union while 
 remaining in the company's service, and induce them, in violation of their con- 
 tracts, to join the union and go on a strike for the purpose of forcing the company 
 to recognize the union or of impairing its power of production, is another and very 
 different thing. What the decree forbids is this "inciting, inducing, or persuading 
 the employees of plaintiff to break their contracts of employment"; and what was 
 said in the Hitchman case with respect to this matter is conclusive of the point 
 involved here. 
 
 Senator Borah. That contract is what j^ou call the " yellow-dog " 
 contract? 
 
 Mr. Green. The "yellow-dog" contract. 
 
 In other words, this opinion and decision can mean only one thing, 
 and that is, that so long as employees are working for an employer 
 under the alternative sort of alleged contract, hereinbefore described, 
 neither the union nor any of its officers has the right in any manner 
 whatsoever to attempt to persuade such employees to join the union. 
 
 Senator Hebert. That is your conclusion, but that is not exactly 
 what the judge said in his decision, however. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, that is the effect of it. 
 
 It is to be observed that Judge Parker attempts to rely upon the 
 Hitchman case, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, and upon the Bittner case, supra, previously decided by his 
 own court. 
 
 An examination of the Hitchman case shows that it arose prior 
 to the enactment of the Clayton Act; that it held that the United 
 Mine Workers of America was an unlawful combination in restraint 
 of trade, and so forth. 
 
 Thirteen years ago it was decided that that labor organization was 
 a conspiracy, an unlawful combination in restraint of trade. Since 
 that time the Clayton Act has been sustained, which wipes out that 
 doctrine of conspiracy as held in the Hitchman case. An examina- 
 tion of the Hitchman case shows that it arose prior to the enactment 
 of the Clayton Act, that it held that the United Mine Workers of 
 America were an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and so 
 forth, and sustained an injunction restraining the defendants from 
 inducing plaintiff's employees to break their contract of employment 
 with plaintiff. 
 
 Restraining what they held to be an unlawful combination. 
 
 It is to be observed, however, that in the Hitchman case the 
 facts differ. There, according to the findings of facts, the union or- 
 ganizer (p. 246) did not confine himself to mere persuasion but 
 resorted to deception and abuse. The deception consisted of induc- 
 ing the employees of the Hitchman Coal Co. to join the union secretly 
 and at the same time to remain in the employ of the Hitchman Coal 
 Co. until a sufficient number of employees should become members 
 of the union, without the knowledge of the employer, to successfully 
 bring about a strike. 
 
 No such charge was made in the Red Jacket case. There was no 
 charge that the United Mine Workers' officers were attempting to 
 use deception or fraud or to persuade the men to secretly join the 
 union and to remain in the employ of the coal company after they 
 had joined the union. There is the difference between the two cases. 
 
44 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKER 
 
 In the Bittner case, supra, opinion by Circuit Judge Waddill, the 
 same situation existed according to the findings of fact. In that case 
 the lower court had enjoined the defendants, among other things: 
 
 (2) From knowingly and wilfully bringing about the breaking by the plain- 
 tiff's employees of contracts of service known at the time to exist with plaintiffs 
 present or future employees. 
 
 (4) From knowingly and wilfully enticing such employees, present or future, 
 to leave plaintiff's service without plaintiff's consent. 
 
 (7) From by any means inducing plaintiff's employees to break their con- 
 tracts of service known to them at the time to exist; from approaching plaintiff's 
 employees, present or future, at their places of residence, or at any other place, 
 for the purpose of enticing, intreating, persuading, or by any other means inducing 
 said employees to break their contracts of service kn6wn to them at the time to 
 exist. 
 
 And so forth. Just think of it. 
 
 Senator Overman. That is the Bittner case you are reading from? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes. 
 
 In his opinion, in the Bittner case, Judge Waddill stated (p. 657) 
 that the case was in its essential features practically a counterpart of 
 the Hitchman case; notwithstanding which the injunction decree of 
 the district court, which was affirmed otherwise, was modified by the 
 following proviso (p. 659): 
 
 Provided: That nothing herein contained shall be construed to forbid the 
 advocacy of union membership in public speeches or by the publication of 
 circulars or arguments, when such speeches or arguments are free from threats 
 and other devices to intimidate, and from attempts to persuade complainant's 
 employees, or any of them, to violate their contracts with it. 
 
 That is quoted from the Bittner case. 
 
 From the foregoing it is perfectly apparent that Judge Parker in 
 his opinion and decision in the Red Jacket Coal case has gone far 
 beyond the doctrine laid down either by the Supreme Court of the 
 United States or by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth 
 Circuit; and that he has, in effect, practically stated the law to be 
 that it is unlawful, by any means whatsoever (even though there 
 be no element of violence, threat, fraud or deceit), to endeavor to 
 induce or persuade an employee to join a labor union if such employee 
 is working under an alternative agreement hereinbefore described 
 and generally known as a "yellow-dog" contract. 
 
 Senator Borah. Have you a copy of any " yellow-dog" contract? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes, we have some at our office, and I will be glad to 
 supply it for the benefit of the committee. 
 
 Senator Overman. I wish you would send one to the committee, 
 and we will put it in the record. 
 
 Mr. Green. I will be glad to. 
 
 (Copies of several "yellow-dog" contracts are as follows:) 
 
 THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF LILLYBROOK COAL CO., ONE OP THE PLAINTIFFg 
 IN THE RED JACKET INJUNCTION CASE 
 
 It is mutually agreed between Lilly brook Coal Co., and , here- 
 inafter for convenience referred to as the first and second party respectively, as 
 follows : 
 
 1. The first party hereby employs and the second party hereby agrees to work 
 for the first party in or around its coal mines upon the terms and conditions 
 herein stated, which employment may be terminated by either party hereto at will. 
 
 2. The mines of the first party are operated by nonunion labor and the first 
 party agrees that it will continue to so operate said mines so long as the second 
 party remains in its employ. 
 
CONFIRMATION OP JOHN J. PARKER 45 
 
 3. The second party accepts the above employment with the express under- 
 standing and agreement that he is not a member of the United Mine Workers of 
 America or other labor unions; that he will not agree to become a member of or 
 join the United Mine Workers of America or other labor union while he is in the 
 employ of the first party and if at any time while he is in the employ of the first 
 party he desires to become a member of the United Mine Workers of America 
 or other labor union he will immediately quit the employment of the first party. 
 And the second party further agrees that while he is in the employ of the first 
 party he will not make any effort to induce, persuade or otherwise procure the 
 other employees, present or future of the first party to agree to become a member 
 or members of the United Mine Workers of America or any other labor union or 
 to join the same. 
 
 Witness the following signatures. 
 
 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OF SUMMIT COAL CO., ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE 
 RED JACKET INJUNCTION CASE 
 
 I am not now a member of the United Mine Workers of America, the I. W. W., 
 or any other organization of mine workers and will not during this employment 
 join or affiliate with any such mine labor organization because I believe the 
 preservation of the right of individual contract free from interference or regulation 
 by others and payment in proportion to services rendered, to be to my interest, 
 to the best interest of the public and of all industry; and I enter this employment 
 with the understanding that the policy of the company is to operate a nonunion 
 mine and that it will not knowingly employ anyone belonging to such union or 
 organization and would not give me employment under any other condtions. 
 
 I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the mining laws of West Virginia 
 and the rules and regulations of this company. I have also been instructed in 
 the hazards of this occupation. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 I hereby apply to Boone County Coal Corporation for employment at its 
 mines situate on the Spruce Fork of Coal River in Logan and Boone Counties, 
 W. Va., upon the following terms: 
 
 (1) I understand that the company is operating "nonunion" and that it is to 
 continue to operate nonunion while I am in its employ. 
 
 (2) I am not now a member of the United Mine Workers of America, the 
 I. W. W., or any other organization of mine workers, and will not, while I am in 
 the employ of this company, join or affiliate with any such mine labor organiza- 
 tions. 
 
 (3) If at any time while in the employ of the company I want to become a 
 member of or affiliate with any such organization, I agree to withdraw from its 
 employment, after giving it three days' notice thereof, and to surrender to the 
 company the possession of any premises or property of the company which I may 
 be occupying or using. 
 
 (4) I will not make any effort while in the employ of the company or upon its 
 property, to unionize its employees or interfere in any way with their working 
 for the company. 
 
 (5) I agree to accept the scale of wages which the company is paying at this 
 time for similar work, which is satisfactory to me. 
 
 This memorandum, when accepted by the company, constitutes a contract of 
 employment between me and said company, made this day of , 
 
 192. _: 
 
 Witness : 
 Approved : 
 
 Boone County Coal Corporation 
 By 
 
 Mr. Green. I am submitting herewith for the consideration of the 
 committee a few samples of "yellow-dog" contracts which have 
 
 107150—30 4 
 
46 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 come into my possession. Particular attention is drawn to those 
 which have been imposed on the workers in the hosiery industry, 
 which justifies an assumption that a concerted effort is being made 
 to impose this so-called contract throughout the industry. Because 
 of the fact that many of such so-called contracts are verbal and much 
 more oppressive, it is not possible to furnish the committee with 
 copies of them. Then, too, many of such antiunion provisions are 
 contained in employment application blanks which necessarily remain 
 in the possession of the companies. For this reason it is not possible 
 to furnish the committee with samples of these. Particular attention 
 is directed to the contract drawn up by the Industrial Association of 
 San Francisco, which in effect makes that body a strike-breaking 
 agency. 
 
 No. 
 
 CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
 
 This agreement, made and entered into this day of , 192 — , by and 
 
 between the Industrial Association of San Francisco, the party of the first part, 
 
 hereafter called the association, and the party of the second part, 
 
 hereafter called the mechanic, 
 
 Witnesseth: This contract becomes effective when the mechanic is prepared to 
 begin a full day's work after his arrival in San Francisco. 
 
 (1) The mechanic hereby represents, warrants, and guarantees that he is a 
 skilled . 
 
 (2) The association hereby guarantees continuous employment (except as 
 
 hereinafter provided) to said mechanic as a skilled from and after the 
 
 date mechanic arrives in San Francisco and is prepared to begin a full day's 
 
 work to — ■ , 192 — (Sundays and legal holidays excepted), at a minimum 
 
 wage of -, it being understood that nothing herein contained shall prohibit 
 
 the mechanic from earning more than this amount. 
 
 (3) The mechanic hereby agrees to furnish the usual tools used in his craft. 
 
 (4) It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that each working day 
 except Saturdays shall consist of 8 hours, and that each week shall consist of 
 5}i days; it is also understood that this agreement contemplates a 44-hour week 
 (except as hereinafter provided as to overtime). Overtime is to be paid at the 
 rate of time and a half for the first four hours and thereafter double time shall 
 be paid. Sundays and holidays shall be double time. 
 
 (5) It is agreed that as part of this contract the association shall advance 
 
 transportation to the mechanic from to San Francisco, the cost of which, 
 
 to wit, $ , is to be deducted from the pay due to the mechanic and withheld 
 
 by his employer at the rate of $5 per week, commencing the second week of em- 
 ployment and continuing until the full amount of said transportation is paid. 
 In the event that the mechanic fully and faithfully performs the services herein 
 specified for the original period of this contract the association agrees to refund 
 and pay to the mechanic said sums so deducted and withheld from said pay upon 
 the expiration of said period. 
 
 (6) It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that the association 
 may terminate this agreement at any time by furnishing said mechanic transpor- 
 tation to . If this agreement is thus canceled by said association, the 
 
 transportatoin thus furnished or offered to be furnished shall be in lieu of any 
 further employment, and the mechanic thereupon agrees to release the associa- 
 tion from all claims and demands of every kind and nature whatsoever, the 
 payment of which to the mechanic will release and discharge the association from 
 any further liability under this contract. 
 
 (7) It is also understood and agreed that this contract may be terminated at 
 the option of the association because of the incompetency, intoxication, or 
 insubordination of the mechanic, or because of the refusal of the mechanic to 
 work when and where ordered, to do a full day's work, or because of absenting 
 himself without the permission of the association; it being understood that if 
 this contract is thus terminated said mechanic shall have no further claim against 
 said association for further employment or for the benefits of this contract or 
 otherwise. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. BAJEKEK 47 
 
 (8) The mechanic hereby agrees to work under American-plan conditions in 
 San Francisco or within a radius of 50 miles thereof until the date set forth in 
 paragraph 2 hereof, whenever and wherever he may be directed by the associa- 
 tion. 
 
 (9) Said mechanic agrees to take orders from and be entirely under the juris- 
 diction of the association, except such time as he may be assigned for employ- 
 ment by the association to an employer or person engaged in the photo-engraving 
 business in San Francisco or vicinity. 
 
 (10) In the event the mechanic shall be idle during the term of this agree- 
 ment because the association has not furnished him with workfor assigned him 
 for work, then said mechanic agrees to report daily during such time as he is not 
 furnished work by said association, at its office in the Alexander Building, 155 
 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, or other designated place, at the following 
 times, to wit, from 10 a. m. to 11a. m. and from 4 p. m. to 5 p. m. 
 
 (11) The mechanic hereby certifies that he has no physical defect which will 
 disqualify him for the duties pertaining to the work which this contract con- 
 templates. 
 
 (12) It is further agreed that no claim shall be made against the association 
 by the mechanic for compensation or damages, including workmen's compensa- 
 tion, for injury either to person or property occasioned while said mechanic is 
 employed or is working for any of the employers or persons to whom he may be 
 assigned by said association, the said employer or persons being considered the 
 immediate employer of the mechanic for the purpose of any such claim. 
 
 (13) It is expressly agreed that this contract may be extended (all other con- 
 ditions remaining in force as pertains to working conditions, rates of pay, etc.), 
 at the option of the association for a period of not to exceed six months from and 
 after the expiration of this agreement. 
 
 (14) This agreement is complete in itself and supersedes all prior negotaitions 
 and contracts, whether oral or written, it being expressly agreed between the 
 parties hereto that any such prior written or oral negotiations or contracts are 
 hereby set aside and canceled and that this contract contains all of the agree- 
 ments and the only covenants and agreements between said association and said 
 mechanic. 
 
 (15) No alterations or modifications of the terms or conditions of this agree- 
 ment shall be valid unless signed by the president or by the managing director 
 of said association; and no promises, whether oral or written, shall be binding 
 on said association unless the same are reduced to writing and signed by the 
 said president or said managing director of said association. 
 
 (16) The mechanic accepts service with full understanding that he is to work 
 under strike conditions. 
 
 The undersigned mechanic hereby acknowledges and certifies that he has read 
 and understands all of the terms of the within and foregoing contract. 
 
 In witness whereof the parties hereto have set their hands the day and year 
 first above written. 
 
 Industrial Association of San Francisco, 
 
 By . 
 
 Witness: 
 
 To the United States Gypsum Plaster Co. 
 
 I hereby apply for work with the United States Gypsun Plaster Co. and agree 
 
 to accept for my employment in such capacity a wage of cents per hour; 
 
 if by piece-work rate will be , the work, wages, and hours being subject 
 
 to revision on option of the company and it will be considered as acceptable 
 by me if I remain in the employ of the company hereafter. 
 
 I accept the company's right, at its option, to operate its plants and mines 
 such number of hours each shift as the requirements of business demand. 
 
 I reserve the right to leave the company 's employ at any time upon such 
 reasonable notice to the superintendent of my department that will afford him 
 time to fill my place. The company, may, at its option, dispense with my 
 service for any cause which the company may deem sufficient. 
 
 I agree during employment under this that I will work efficiently and diligently 
 and will not participate in any strike nor unit with employees in concerted action 
 to change hours, wages, or working conditions; I further declare that I am not 
 a, member of the I. W. W. or any other communistic or like organization, nor will 
 I join such while in the company's employ. 
 
 I agree to abide faithfully by all the rules of the company as posted on its 
 premises or outlined by the superintendent of my department. 
 
48 
 
 CONFIRMATION OP JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 The company agrees to pay the wages earned by me regularly semimonthly 
 and to enable me to maintain as far as possible a regular income by uninterrupted 
 operation. 
 
 When this application as indorsed is accepted by the company it shall become 
 a binding contract between myself and the company as long as I remain in the 
 company's employ. 
 
 Accepted day of , 1925. 
 
 Signed 
 
 Address . 
 
 APPLICATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AS OPERATOR 
 
 Age 
 
 Ful name 
 
 Permanent address (city and street) 
 
 Previous employers 
 [This information must cover a period of five years] 
 
 Employer's name 
 
 Address 
 
 Position 
 
 Occupied 
 
 Time 
 engaged 
 
 Reason 
 
 for 
 leaving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 References other than above, if any 
 
 Have you previously been employed as an operator in this city? 
 
 If so, when and by whom 
 
 What experience have you had on press and code work? 
 
 Do you use and own a typewriter? 
 
 State condition of health during the past five years 
 
 Are you afflicted with writer's cramp or telegrapher's paralysis? 
 
 Are you temperate? 
 
 Are you a member of any telegrapher's union? 
 
 If so, do you agree, in case you are given employment by the Postal Telegraph- 
 Cable Co. to resign your union membership, and also to refrain from joining any 
 Union during the continuance of such employment; and also render full and faith- 
 ful service at all times, to obey rules and instructions, refraining from all agitation 
 and interference with the company's business, and to work carefully and well 
 with every operator? 
 
 Do you wish to become a member of the Postal Telegraph Employees Associa- 
 tion? 
 
 (Date) . 
 
 (Signature) 
 (Address) _ 
 
 Note. — The applicant will please fill out and return this blank to. 
 
 Manager 
 
 EMPIRE HAT WORKS, CHICAGO, ILL. 
 
 The undersigned hereinafter referred to as employee, in accepting and/or 
 
 continuing in employment with hereinafter referred to as employer in 
 
 place of business at Chicago, Cook County, 111., and in considera- 
 tion of said employee being emplo3 r ed by said employer and in consideration that 
 this employer does and will continue to operate said place of business on the 
 nonunion basis, does so upon the understanding and agreement with said 
 employer as follows: 
 
 (1) That said employer is operating and will continue to operate upon the 
 nonunion basis and as nonunion. 
 
 (2) That said employer will not recognize nor have any dealing with any 
 labor union. 
 
CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 49 
 
 (3) That said employee is not a member of any labor union, that while em- 
 ployed by said employer he will not become a member of any labor union, and 
 will have no dealings, communications, or interviews with the officers, agents, 
 or members of any labor union in relation to membership by said employee in 
 such labor union, or in relation to said employee's said employment. 
 
 (4) That it is the intention and desire of said employer and employee that 
 the employment relation between them be kept entirely free from interference 
 or intervention in any respect by any labor union, its officers or agents. 
 
 Employee's name , 
 
 Address . 
 
 Employer's name , 
 
 Bv . 
 
 I am employed by and work for the Chipman Kintting Co., Easton, Pa., with 
 the express understanding that I am not a member of the American Federation of 
 Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers Union, or unions, et al., and will not become a 
 member while an employee of the Chipman Knitting Co.; that the Chipman 
 Knitting Co., is run nonunion and agrees with me that it will remain nonunion 
 while I am in its employ. If at any time I am employed by the Chipman Knitting 
 Co., I want to become connected with the American Federation of Full Fashioned 
 Hosiery Workers Union, or unions, et al., or any affiliated organization, I agree 
 to withdraw from the employ of the said company, and agree that while I am in 
 the employ of said company I will not make any efforts amongst its employees 
 to bring about the unionizing of that factory against the company's wish. I have 
 either read the above or heard the same read. 
 
 Approved by: 
 
 ARTCRAFT YELLOW DOG 
 
 I am employed by and work for the Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.), of 
 Philadelphia, Pa., with, the express understanding that I am not a member of the 
 American Federation of Full Fashioned Workers Union, Local No. 706, or any 
 of its affiliated branches, that it is my understanding that the Artcraft Silk Hosiery 
 Mills (Inc.), is a nonunion shop, and that it agrees with me that as long as I am 
 in its employ, it will remain a nonunion shop. 
 
 Should I desire at any time to become connected with any local branch or 
 affiliated organization connected with the American Federation of Full Fashioned 
 Hosiery Workers Union, it is distinctly understood that I am privileged to do so 
 but I hereby agree that before becoming connected with any such group, I will 
 tender my resignation to the Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.). 
 
 It is further understood and agreed that so long as I am employed by the 
 Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.), I will not make any effort amongst itself to 
 bring about the organization of this plant or plants against the wishes of your 
 company. 
 
 I have either read the same or heard the above read. 
 
 Witi 
 
 Indianapolis, Ind., August 18, 1927. 
 
 I am employed by, and work for, Real Silk Hosiery Mills, (Inc.), an Illinois 
 corporation, at its mill in the city of Indianapolis, Ind., with the express under- 
 standing that I am not a member of the American Federation of Full Fashioned 
 Hosiery Workers, of the Indianapolis local branch, or any of its affiliated bodies, 
 nor of any similar outside organization, and will not become so while an emplovee 
 of Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.). 
 
 I further understand and agree that the mill of Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.), 
 at Indianapolis, is run nonunion, and it agrees with me that such mill will run 
 nonunion while I am in its employ. 
 
 I further agree that I will not enter into any agreement, or advise any other 
 employee so to do, the purpose of which shall be to induce or procure the em- 
 ployees of Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.) or any of them, by concerted action, 
 to quit the service of said corporation in a body or at a given time, or in any 
 way to interfere with the business of said corporation or. hamper or obstruct it 
 in the manufacture and sale of its products. 
 
50 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PAEKEE 
 
 Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.), on its part agrees that it will provide means 
 to train me and its other employees; that it will not lockout its employees in a 
 body, nor refuse to employ competent men willing to abide by the terms of this 
 agreement, nor discharge men wholly without cause, or otherwise violate any 
 clause of this agreement. 
 
 If at any time while I am employed by Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.), I want 
 to become connected with the American Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery 
 Workers, the local Indianapolis branch, or any of its affiliated organizations, 
 I agree to withdraw from the employment of said company and I agree that while 
 I am in the employ of that company I will not make any efforts among its em- 
 ployees to bring about the unionization of its mill at Indianapolis against the 
 company's wishes. 
 
 I have either read the above, or heard the same read to me. 
 
 Real Silk Hosiery Mills (Inc.). 
 Witness: 
 
 Copy of yellow-dog contract which A. R. MacDonald attempted to install in 
 the Cambria Silk Hosiery Co.'s plant in Philadelphia. 
 
 INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT FORM 
 
 I am employed by and work for the of , with the express under- 
 standing that I am not a member of the American Federation of Full Fashioned 
 Hosiery Workers' Union, any affiliated organization, or any other union or 
 organization existing or hereafter constituted or created for a purpose of having 
 aims or purposes similar to the above named and will not become so while an 
 
 employee of the ; that the is run nonunion and agrees with me that 
 
 it will run nonunion while I am in its employ. If at any time I am employed by 
 
 the , I want to become connected with the American Federation of Full 
 
 Fashioned Hosiery Workers' Union or any organized labor body, I agree to 
 withdraw from the employment of said company, and agree that while I am in 
 the employ of that company I will not make any efforts amongst its employees 
 to bring about the unionizing of that factory against the company's wishes. I 
 have either read the above or heard the same read. 
 
 Witness : 
 
 Allied Manufacturers' League (Inc.), 
 
 New York, N. Y. 
 Gentlemen: The undersigned hereby subscribes to membership in the Allied 
 Manufacturers' League (Inc.), and approves the league's aims and purposes as 
 outlined below: 
 
 AIMS AND PURPOSES 
 
 To organize employers of labor and by collective action and expertly directed 
 effort to combat communism and radicalism and its inroads into American 
 industry. To eliminate by means and methods of proved legality and effective- 
 ness, the growing cancer of communism as it is present in our industrial body, 
 and by lawful and educational method, to actively discourage its being further 
 fostered. 
 
 To prevent radical or communistic interference, direct or otherwise, with the 
 relations that exist between employers and employee. 
 
 To eliminate the great economic losses that radicalism, unchecked and un- 
 hindered, eventually forces upon employers who are unorganized and unfamiliar 
 with the intricacies and effectiveness of the communistic method. 
 
 Membership shall entitle us to full participation in the activities of the league 
 as outlined below: 
 
 1. Consultation and statistical department. — We shall have the privilege of con- 
 sulting with the officers of the league as often as we deem necessary on all matter 
 pertaining to labor law, labor strife or strike, communism, radical labor move- 
 ments, etc., such consultations to include the league's assistance based on its 
 experience in the above fields. We shall have access to the league's statistical 
 files at all times. (This department maintains an adequate file of papers, books, 
 documents, letters, lists, etc., pertaining to all phases of the communist or radical 
 labor movement.) 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 51 
 
 2. Professional department. — It is understood that in case of strife or strike- 
 suspected, pending, or active, we shall have the right to consult this department 
 for advice or assistance. Such advice and assistance will include, when neces- 
 sary, the personal visit of an expert deputized by the league to cooperate with us 
 in properly handling the situation. It is understood that there shall be no charge 
 for the services of such an expert — but we do, however, agree to pay his actual 
 expenses while he is absent from his home office during such consultation. We 
 also understood that upon proper written request the league will assist us in 
 securing new employees. We agree to pay actual cost of such assistance. 
 
 We also understand that upon written request the league will assist us in 
 securing instructors to teach any employees the technique of our business. 
 
 3. Production department. — We understand that the league will assist us at 
 any time in securing facilities that will aid in our production requirements, at 
 prices subject to our acceptance — this to be affected through other members 
 of the league. We agree that inasmuch as there is no additional charge for 
 this service, the league shall not be held accountable for credits, juices, or any 
 other losses sustained by us in so placing our production. We also agree that 
 if the league appeal to us to assist another member whose production has been 
 hindered through strike or strife, we will use our best efforts in so far as we can, 
 without injury to ourselves, to assist the member. 
 
 4. Contract department. — We understand that we have the right to request 
 the league to install the individual contract system in our plant if we desire 
 such an installation. It is thoroughly understood that the installation of the 
 contract system is not obligatory to members of this league. 
 
 5. Current news and advisory department. — It is understood that this department 
 will assist us in the preparation of educational articles on communism for news- 
 papers, house organ or leaflets without cost to us. Such material is to be pre- 
 pared only upon our written request addressed to the league's home office. 
 We also understand that the league will supply us, at actual cost, with printed 
 matter on communism, properly prepared for distribution to employees, if we 
 request same. This department will also advise us through letters, bulletins, 
 etc., regarding current league activities and certain phases of the communistic 
 or radical movement. 
 
 6. Legislative department. — We pledge ourselves to assist the league's legisla- 
 tive department as far as it is within our power and judgment necessary, in 
 combating legislation that we believe detrimental to ourselves or our relations 
 with our employees. We also pledge ourselves to assist the league's legislative 
 department so far as our judgment dictates, in securing the enactment of such 
 laws as will prevent communists or radicals from successfully carrying on their 
 legislative program, and their local and national activities. 
 
 7. Federal department. — We agree to cooperate with the league in its efforts in 
 maintaining this department and its relations with the Federal Government. 
 
 Advisory board. — Allied Manufacturers' League (Inc.) as chartered by the 
 State of New York, provides for an advisory board comprised of not more than 
 15 members, including not more than 5 from any one industry. The advisory 
 board will meet quarterly or more often it if be considered necessary, and is em- 
 powered to offer suggestions regarding the policy of the league in its relations 
 with labor. A member of the league may at any time submit to the advisory 
 board for such action as is deemed necessary, ideas, suggestions, etc., pertaining 
 to the labor situation in his particular industry. 
 
 9. We agree that in so far as we accept recommendations of the league, such 
 recommendations shall be used only in a just and honorable manner as they 
 apply to our employees. We further agree that all information prepared exclu- 
 sively for and submitted to us by the league shall be regarded as for our particular 
 use, such information to be handled judiciously and in entire confidence except 
 as regards other members of the league. It is fully understood that our member- 
 ship in this league does not financially obligate or connect us in any way with 
 the league's financial responsibilities. 
 
 10. We agree to pay $ upon notification from the league of the accept- 
 ance of our application and to pay $ each month for a period of one year 
 
 thereafter, in advance. 
 
 11. This membership agreement shall continue from year to year unless we 
 notify the league in writing at least 60 days before the expiration of this agree- 
 ment of our desire to discontinue our membership. We also agree that the 
 league may cancel this agreement upon 30 days' written notice if the advisory 
 board shall decide that such cancellation be for the best interests of the league. 
 
52 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 12. In cases of dispute under the terms of this agreement, both parties bind 
 themselves to submit the same to an arbitration committee of three members of 
 the league and to abide by the conclusions of that committee. The league shall 
 select one member of this committee, the party in dispute shall select one member, 
 and the league and the party in dispute shall select the third member. 
 
 Allied Manufacturers' League (Inc.) 
 Make all checks payable to the Allied Manufacturers' League (Inc.). 
 
 Senator Overman. In this case there was a certiorari to get an 
 appeal from Parker's decision. The Supreme Court heard that and 
 refused to grant the appeal? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes; the Supreme Court refused to grant the applica- 
 tion for a writ. That is another reason why we should like to see the 
 Supreme Court liberalized. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Was that a divided opinion, the refusal of the 
 Supreme Court? Was it unanimous, or a divided opinion? 
 
 Mr. Green. I am not in a position to say whether that was a 
 divided opinion or not. 
 
 Now, I want to call your attention to this fact, in connection with 
 Judge Parker, that Judge Parker was a candidate for the Republican 
 nomination for governor in North Carolina in 1920. He was ap- 
 pointed and served as the special assistant to Attorney General 
 Harry M. Daugherty from 1923 to 1924. He served in that position 
 during that time. He was national committeeman for the Republi- 
 can Party in North Carolina in the year 1924. 
 
 There are some other matters in connection with this case that I 
 should like to call your attention to, but I think it is unnecessary. 
 I have here some citations of instances where State courts particu- 
 larly have refused to follow the ruling of the Supreme Court in the 
 Hitchman case. If you think it would serve the purpose of the com- 
 mittee to have it, I would be glad to go on. 
 
 Senator Overman. We will be glad to have it, if you desire it in 
 the record. 
 
 Senator Borah. Have you the 245 New York there? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes; that is included. You mean in the bakery and 
 restaurant case? 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Green. That is 260 
 
 Senator Borah. No; 245 New York. 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes; 245 New York. 
 
 There are a number of cases cited here. 
 
 In the decision of the Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine 
 Workers, 222 S. W. 1079 Ky. (1920), the ruling in the Hitchman 
 case was not followed. The company had sought and obtained an 
 injunction restraining various acts of the union for the purpose of 
 inducing or persuading any of its employees to break their con- 
 tracts of employment. The court of appeals reversed the decision 
 of the Circuit Court for Perry County and said : 
 
 Labor organizations have a status in this country the same as other associations. 
 Courts without exception have recognized the right of laboring men to associate 
 themselves together to better their conditions and to increase their wages by 
 lawful means. They can organize new lodges and solicit membership at any 
 time or place so long as they do not trespass upon the rights of another. 
 
 The general rule seems to be that organizers of labor unions may use any 
 peaceable means, not partaking of fraud, to induce persons to become members, 
 and equity will not enjoin such organizers or their associates, from attmpting 
 by proper argument to persuade others to join the union so long as they do not 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 53 
 
 resort to force or intimidation. If the union should induce employees of the 
 plaintiff to become members of its organizaton, and the plaintiff, as it has done in 
 the past, should discharge such employees because of their membership in the 
 union, and the plaintiff should thereby lose the service of the employee, the 
 proximate cause would not be the joining of the union by the employee, but the 
 discharge of the employee by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff could have no legal 
 redress of the defendant, even though all its employees should so join the union 
 and should in consequence suffer discharge by the plaintiff, and its business 
 should be closed. ' 
 
 In La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co. r. Electrical 
 Workers, 140 N. E. 899 Ohio (1923), individual contracts were for 
 employment at will and under which the employee agreed and prom- 
 ised that he would take no action at any time designed or tending 
 in any way to unionize the employees or to make its shop a closed 
 union shop or any of its jobs closed union jobs. The trial court, 
 while enjoining intimidation, threats, and violence, did not restrain 
 the strikers from peaceful picketing, nor from peacefully persuading 
 employees of the La France Co. to leave their work, nor from peace- 
 fully persuading applicants for work not to accept employment with 
 the company. The company appealed from the decision of the lower 
 court, but the court of appeals, as well as the State supreme court, 
 affirmed its decision. The State supreme court said: 
 
 Equality of justice demands that in any controversy the rights of all parties be 
 scrupulously maintained. The right of workmen to be employed, irrespective of 
 union membership, must be maintained; the right of the employer to conduct his 
 business without illegal interference must be upheld; and legal means employed 
 by strikers must not be curtailed. Among the latter are the right of peaceful 
 picketing, the peaceful persuasion of employees to terminate contracts at will, 
 and the peaceful persuasion of expectant employees not to accept work with the 
 employer in question. 
 
 Immediately thereafter the Court of Appeals for the Southern 
 District of Ohio, in the case of Shafer v. Pattern Makers, followed the 
 La France precedent. By the contract here the employees agreed 
 not only not to join a union during employment but promised to have 
 no dealings with union representatives with regard to joining a union 
 or regarding the conditions of his employment. 
 
 In Kilby Manufacturing Co. v. Molders, a court of appeals again 
 applied the doctrine of the La France case, in which contracts at will 
 were involved, to a situation involving term contracts, under which 
 nonunion employees had been hired to replace striking union molders. 
 The court granted a permanent injunction but restrained only intimi- 
 dation and violence, permitting peaceful methods of picketing for the 
 purpose of inducing employees to quit. 
 
 The controlling case in New York is Exchange Bakery & Restau- 
 rant v. Rifkin (245 N. Y. 260 (1927)). This case involved the attempts 
 of a union to organize waitresses who had signed individual nonunion 
 agreements. By its decision the court of appeals, the State's highest 
 court, denied an injunction, protecting the nonunion promises of the 
 waitresses, holding that the promises were merely promises and not 
 contracts, as they" were based on no consideration on the part of the 
 emploj^er. The court said: 
 
 The purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under which its mem- 
 bers do their work; to increase their wages; to assist them in other ways, may 
 justifv what would otherwise be a wrong. So would an effort to increase its 
 members and to unionize an entire trade or business. It may be as interested 
 in the wges of those not members, or in the conditions under which they work as 
 in its own members because of the influence of one upon the other. All engaged 
 
54 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 in a trade are affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the principle of 
 collective bargaining. Economic organization to-day is not based on the single 
 shop. Unions believe that wages may be increased, collective bargaining main- 
 tained only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory but generally. 
 That they may prevail it may call a strike and picket the premises of an employer 
 with an intent of inducing him to employ only union labor. And ic may adopc 
 either method separately. Picketing without a strike is no more unlawful than 
 a strike without picketing. Both are based upon a lawful purpose. Resulting 
 injury is incidental and must be endured. 
 
 The Interborough Rapid Transit cases (159 N. E. 863 N. Y. 1928 
 and 227 N. Y. S. Supplement 258 (1928)) have both denied injunctive 
 protection to nonunion contracts. In the first case, Interborough 
 Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, New York Court of Appeals said: 
 
 Though the plaintiff's employees are prohibited from joining that association or 
 union, the union may, despite the prohibition, attempt to recruit its membership 
 from those emploj r ees, at least where the prohibition is not part of a contract of 
 employment for a definite term. * * * They are under no obligation to the 
 plaintiff to inform it that some of the plaintiff's employees are joining the union, 
 so that the plaintiff may exercise its choice of retaining or disqharging the new 
 members. They are not under any obligation even to urge or compel their new 
 members to give their employer such information. 
 
 In the second case, Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, the 
 employment contract was for two years. The court found that this 
 alleged 2-year contract, though signed by the employee, contained 
 no promise by the company to employ for two years or for any 
 specified period, and that even if it had it would have been made 
 valueless because of the rules included in it relating to discharge. The 
 court said: 
 
 Unlimited and practically unhampered power to discharge employees is given 
 to the company. * * * The contract purports to bind the employee for 
 two years, while the employer is not in substance subject to a reciprocal obliga- 
 tion. Where, an employee abandons all right to leave the service of his employer, 
 whereas the employer reserves practically entire freedom to discharge him. 
 there is no compensating consideration. 
 
 The court held that the employment, therefore, was at will and 
 that since there was no promise to work there could be no inducing a 
 breach of a promise to work. 
 
 Senator Borah. Have you ever examined the trade disputes act 
 of England with regard to this particular subject? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. I saw a reference the other day to the effect that 
 the trade disputes act of England permitted such things as per- 
 suasion and inducement, by law? 
 
 Mr. Green. It does; it permits it. 
 
 Now, it has been said that the Supreme Court has never reversed 
 itself. 
 
 Senator Borah. It distinguishes. 
 
 Mr. Green. It distinguishes. I wish to submit for the record 
 and for your information an extract from the dissenting opinion of 
 Justice Brandeis, in Washington v. Dawson & Co. (264 U. S.) and 
 some other citations of cases where they have "distinguished" as you 
 have very modestly said, Senator, which we accept as the better 
 language. I would like to submit that for the benefit of the record: 
 
 If the court is of opinion that this act of Congress is in necessary conflict with 
 its recent opinions, those cases should be frankly overruled. The reasons for 
 doing so are persuasive. Our experience in attempting to apply the rule and 
 helpful discussions by friends of the court have made it clear that the rule declared 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 55 
 
 is legally unsound; that it disturbs legal principles long established; and that if 
 adhered to it will make a serious addition to the classes of cases which this court 
 is required to review. Experience and discussion have also made apparent how 
 unfortunate are the results economically and socially. It has, in part, frustrated 
 a promising attempt to alleviate some of the misery and remove some of the 
 injustice incident to the conduct of industry and commerce. These far-reaching 
 and unfortunate results have been forseen when the decision was rendered. If 
 it is adhered to, appropriate legislative provision, urgently needed, can not be 
 made until another amendment of the Constitution shall have been adopted. 
 For no Federal workmen's compensation law could satisfy the varying and 
 peculiar economic and social needs incident to the diversity of conditions in the 
 several States. 
 
 The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and 
 those which follow it. The decisions are recent ones. They have not been 
 acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested 
 interests have clustered. They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On 
 the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men, women, and children, and 
 the general welfare. Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is 
 not a universal, inexorable command. The instances in which the court has 
 disregarded its admonition are many. 
 
 See Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio* Rv. Co. (260 U. S. 653, 659), overruling 
 ex-parte Wisner (203 U. S. 449); Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (257 U. S. 
 529, 533), overruling Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co. (94 U. S. 535) and 
 Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt (202 U. S. 246); Boston Store 
 v. American Graphophone Co. (246 U. S. 8, 25) and Motion Picture Co. v. Uni- 
 versal Film Co. (243 U. S. 502, 518), overruling Henry v. Dick Co. (244 U. S. 1); 
 United States v. Nice (241 U. S. 591, 601), overruling matter of Heff (197 U. S. 
 488); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (158 U. S. 601), overruling Hylton 
 v. United States (3 Dall. 171); Roberts v. Lewis (153 U. S. 367, 379), overruling 
 Giles v. Little (104 U. S. 291); Brenham v. German American Bank (144 U. S. 
 173, 187), overruling Rogers v. Burlington (3 Wall. 654) and Mitchell v. Burlington 
 (4 Wall. 270); Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100, 118), overruling Pierce v. New 
 Hampshire (5 How. 504); Morgan v. United States (113 U. S. 476, 496) over- 
 ruling Texas v. White (7 Wall. 700); Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall. 457, 553), 
 overruling Hephburn v. Griswold (8 Wall. 603). 
 
 I want to make it clear, gentlemen of the committee, that in pre- 
 senting our opposition to the confirmation of Judge Parker we in no 
 way question his integrity. The man is a perfect stranger to me. I 
 never met him. Our opposition is based upon what we interpret to 
 be Ms judicial attitude toward these great modern-day economic 
 problems, the problems that arise out of human relations in industry, 
 and we feel that it is not in accord with the highest and best interest 
 of the masses of the people and of the perpetuation of our form of 
 government. 
 
 It has been said that labor in North Carolina was in favor of Judge 
 Parker, and that labor in North Carolina had supported him. I 
 recall the young man reading a statement from Mr. Barrett, who 
 stated that he spoke for labor. Mr. Barrett in no way speaks for 
 labor. As I understand it, he has been excommunicated from 
 membership in the organization, because of some violation of its rules. 
 Here is a telegram from Mr. Wilson, who is the president of the 
 North Carolina State Federation of Labor. I wired him some 
 time ago, asking him to supply me with information regarding Judge 
 Parker and his record, his judicial attitude and his decisions. He 
 filed a telegram with me stating that he knew him there only, that 
 so far as he knew there was nothing that he could take exception to. 
 Then later on I wired him and asked him if he was aware of his 
 decision in the Red Jacket case. He said no, and sent me this tele- 
 gram : 
 
 At the time of my first telegram neither I nor members of the North Carolina 
 Federation had discussed Parker with a knowledge of his decision in the Red 
 
56 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Jacket Coal case involving "yellow-dog" contracts. Since learning of his deci- 
 sion in this case, North Carolina labor is opposed to his nomination and in full 
 accord with the action of the American Federation of Labor in opposing the 
 confirmation of the appointment of Judge Parker as a member of the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 Senator Borah. Do you know anything in Judge Parker's career, 
 except his decisions, which would indicate his unfriendliness to labor? 
 
 Mr. Green. No; nothing. I know nothing of Judge Parker or his 
 record as a citizen or a man. I have been told by those who have 
 examined his records and decisions that there is nothing in his deci- 
 sions that stand out as stamping him as a man possessed of out- 
 standing legal ability, and we feel sure that he has lived in a narrow 
 environment, limited experience, and that he is not acquainted with 
 these modern-day economic problems, and in many of the decisions 
 of the Supreme Court these economic problems, arising out of human 
 relationships, and out of industry, must be considered and acted upon 
 fairly and justly. These decisions made by the Supreme Court, 
 many times, I think through a lack of understandinh, or through a 
 failure to have the facts properly presented, hang like a shadow over 
 the activities of labor in the exercise of our normal functions. This 
 Hitchman decision has served to reduce thousands and thousands of 
 miners in isolated mining sections to a condition of industrial servi- 
 tude. I can not believe that the learned members of the Surpeme 
 Court of the United States would render such a decision if they were 
 fully conscious of its consequences. The church can not help these 
 men. The chambers of commerce will not help these poor workers. 
 Fraternal organizations can only assist them along charitable lines. 
 There is nobody can help them economically except the great organ- 
 ized-labor movement. They become an open door to communism 
 because they are crushed. We dare not go in now, because, not that 
 a statute forbids us to go in, but because an order of the court in 
 futuro prevent us from going in to organize these people and help them. 
 
 Senator Overman. Isn't your remedj^ legislation? 
 
 Mr. Green. Perhaps so. 
 
 Senator Borah. You mean the " yellow-dog" contracts? 
 
 Senator Overman. No; I mean isn't the remedy there in legisla- 
 tion? 
 
 Mr. Green. I want to bring to your attention, after all, that these 
 decisions are usually made in accordance with the view of the court. 
 His training, his environment, his impressions on these decisions are 
 final, and I want to emphasize this fact again, that it is not so much, 
 although we contend that Judge Parker did not follow the rule in the 
 Hitchman case, but granting he did — it is not so much that he fol- 
 lowed the rule, it is that he showed himself, in the language he used, 
 as being in entire accord with the rule laid down in the Hitchman case, 
 and in common with other groups, we are fighting to add to the 
 strength and purpose and hand and mind and brain of men like Justice 
 Holmes, whom we love with all our hearts, and Justice Brandeis. 
 
 That is the position of labor frankly stated, and that is one of its 
 reasons, outstanding reason, why we are opposed to the confirmation 
 of Judge Parker. 
 
 We believe that reaction will be strengthened. The power of that 
 branch of the court seems to put property rights above human rights 
 solidified. 
 
CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER 57 
 
 Now, I am through, gentlemen, and I thank you for the oppor- 
 tunity of presenting our protest. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Mr. Green, you do not represent the United 
 Mine Workers? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes, sir. We represent 5,000,000 working men and 
 women associated with the American Federation of Labor, and, as I 
 stated, I speak for more than a half million workers in the four 
 brotherhoods not directly associated with us; that is, the locomotive 
 engineers, the locomotive firemen, the trainmen, and the Order of 
 Railway Conductors. 
 
 Senator Overman. Mr. Green, there is one matter I think it is 
 my duty to biing to your attention. I received a communication this 
 morning which was not read, but it was put in the record. That com- 
 munication said that you used some threat or some effort to threaten 
 Mr. Wilson to change his mind about Judge Parker. 
 
 Mr. Green. That is not true, Senator. I am not made that way. 
 
 Senator Overman. I thought it was my duty to bring it to your 
 attention. 
 
 Mr. Green. I will file with you a copy of all the correspondence 
 that passed between Mr. Wilson and myself, and I haven't seen him 
 to talk to him personally about the matter. I had communicated 
 with him from here, inquiring, as I said, about Judge Parker's quali- 
 fications, because both of them are North Carolinians, and I wished 
 to know. That statement is not true, and I wish to deny it most 
 vehemently. I never resort to such means or methods. 
 
 Senator Overman. I thought I ought to call it to your attention, 
 because it is in this letter that will appear in the record. 
 
 Mr. Green. I am glad you did, so that I can make the denial. Mr. 
 Wilson will tell you that also. I know you have received a number of 
 telegrams from labor people in North Carolina. 
 
 Senator Overman. Yes. Do you desire me to put in the record 
 those protests that came from throughout the country? 
 
 Mr. Green. No; I don't desire that. You can dispose of them as 
 you see fit. 
 
 Senator Overman. I thought I might put them in the record just 
 to indicate what they are, without reading them. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, if you wish to do that, all right. 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, it is just as you wish. 
 
 Mr. Green. It might be, in order to make the record complete, 
 they should be included. 
 
 Senator Overman. All right, Mr. Stenographer, put them in, just 
 indicating who they are from, where they are from, without stating 
 what they say. 
 
 (The committee has received communications from the following, 
 favoring Judge Parker's confirmation.) 
 
 Herbert M. Bierce, Winona, Minn. 
 
 C. A. Williams, sr., Charlotte, N. C. 
 
 A. B. Carter, president Carter Mills, Gastonia, N. C. 
 
 J. E. Allen, superintendent of schools, Warrenton, N. C. 
 
 F. D. Grist, commissioner of labor and printing, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 J. Vines Cobb, Pinetops, N. C. 
 
 C. F. Huneycutt, Greensboro, N. C. 
 
 F. C. Abbott, Charlotte, N. C. 
 
 Henry D. Williams, attorney at law, New York, N. -Y. 
 
 Jesse L. Armfield, High Point, N. C. 
 
58 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKEE 
 
 G. Willard Rich, attorney at law, New York, N. Y. 
 
 Irvine F. Belser, Columbia, S. C. 
 
 Dr. L. E. Ragsdale, Donelson, Tenn. 
 
 William I. Green, J. L. Boag, and W. E. Fish, Washington, D. C. 
 
 M. K. Tyson, executive national secretary; Association of Negro Tailors, 
 Burlington, N. C. 
 
 J. E. Shepart, president North Carolina College for Negroes, Durham, N. C. 
 
 W. E. Cason, general chairman Order Railway Conductors, Monroe, N. C. 
 
 Ernest W. Bradford, attorney at law, Washington, D. C. 
 
 James F. Barrett, former president North Carolina State Federation of Labor, 
 Brevard, N. C. 
 
 Hon. 0. Max Gardner, Governor of North Carolina, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 A. R. Vaughan, Engineers of the S. C. L., Brotherhood of Locomotive En- 
 gineers, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 Henry M. Rose, National News Service, Detroit, Mich. 
 
 Hon. Geo. Rountree, Wilmington, N. C. 
 
 W. E. Breese, Brevard, N. C. 
 
 (The committee has also received communications from the follow- 
 ing, protesting against the confirmation of Judge Parker.) 
 
 Central Labor Union, Building Trades Council, and Womens Union Labor 
 League, Ashevile, N. C. 
 
 Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen, Greensboro, N. C. 
 
 Rev. G. F. Cooper, Marion, Ohio. 
 
 Scott Williams, Parsons branch, National Association for the Advancement of 
 Colored People, Parsons, Kans. 
 
 Cape Fear Lodge Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen, Wilmington, N. C. 
 
 Miss Rosalie McClellan; teachers association, Memphis, Tenn. 
 
 C. P. Mulder, Salisbury Central Labor Union, Salisbury, N. C. 
 
 C. W. Moore, secretary No. 173, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 T. V. Griswold, secretary Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Charlotte, N. C. 
 
 Winston-Salem Central Labor Union, Winston-Salem, N. C. 
 
 International Association of Machinists, Washington, D. C. 
 
 J. E. Lee, chairman Baltimore A. M. E. preachers' meeting, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen of Nebraska, Omaha, Nebr. 
 
 United Wall Paper Craft of North America, York, Pa. 
 
 Journeymen Barbers International Union of America, Indianapolis, Ind. 
 
 A. F. Whitney, president Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Cleveland, Ohio. 
 
 Walter White, secretary National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
 People, New York, N. Y. 
 
 S. B. Winslow, Raleigh, N. C. 
 
 Miss Mary W. F. Speers, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Nazareth hosiery strikers, Easton, Pa. 
 
 A. J. Bradley, Troy, N. Y. 
 
 Percy Tetlow, president local union No. 2347, Putney, W. Va. 
 
 John L. Love, president Kansas City, Mo., branch of NAACP, Kansas City, 
 Mo. 
 
 Rev. John Haynes Holmes, New York City. 
 
 Johns Hopkins Liberal Club, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 J. Howard Tucker, local union 340, United Mine Workers of America, Ward, 
 W. Va. 
 
 J. E. Garrison, local union 4999, United Mine Workers of America, Javins 
 W. Va. 
 
 United Mine Workers of America, local No. 677, Hugheston, W. Va. 
 
 Civil Liberties, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Spencer Shop Federation, Salisbury, N. C. 
 
 Edward H. Butts, Huntington, W. Va. 
 
 Revolutionary Age, New York, N. Y. 
 
 H. H. Taylor, chairman Negro Republican Party, Warrenton, N. C. 
 
 Central Labor Union, Kansas City, Mo. 
 
 Nelson V. McMuller, Louisville, Ky. 
 
 George Sladovich, New Orleans, La. 
 
 Bricklayers Local Union, Greensboro Machinists, Carpenters Local Union, 
 Plasteiers and Cement Finishers, Central Labor Union, Brotherhood of Railway 
 Clerks, Marcus F. Sauls, secretary North Carolina Federation of Labor, all of 
 Greensboro, N. C. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 59 
 
 People's Legislative Service, Washington, D. C. 
 
 William H. Werth, Tazewell, Va. 
 
 R. T. McNulton, secretary Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Memphis, 
 Tenn. 
 
 James Maloney, president Glass Bottle Blowers Association, Philadelphia, 
 Pa. 
 
 E. P. Curtis, president Railway Conductors, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
 
 The following letter from Normn Thomas opposing confirmation, 
 is printed in full: 
 
 Socialist Party, 
 New York City, April 4, 1930. 
 Hon. George W. Norris, 
 
 Chairman Judiciary Committee, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Senator Norris: By formal action of the national executive com- 
 mittee of the Socialist Party, I, as chairman of the committee of the party on 
 public affairs, was instructed to communicate to your committee our opposition 
 to the confirmation of the nomination of Judge John J. Parker to the bench of the 
 United States Supreme Court and our reasons therefor. 
 
 Our specific reasons are those already made public by labor organizations and 
 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Assuming 
 that Judge Parker is of the same opinion in 1930 as he was when candidate for 
 governor of North Carolina in 1920, he believes in the exclusion of or nonpartici- 
 pation of negroes in politics. The facts in this case presented by the National 
 Association for the Advancement of Colored People are in themselves a reason 
 for keeping from the Supreme Court of the United States a man whose conception 
 of democracy is so partial that it would exclude members of a whole race. The 
 point of view Judge Parker expressed in 1920 can not but color his opinions as 
 judge on race questions, no matter how great his effort after impartiality. 
 
 It is equally certain that his decision as a judge in the Red Jacket injunction 
 case practically makes it impossible legally to organize workers who under stress 
 of hunger or misinformation have signed a yellow dog contract. It is impossible 
 to exaggerate the danger of such decisions to peaceful progress of labor organiza- 
 tions and the invitation that it gives to revolt and to violence. It may be that 
 Judge Parker felt that he was bound by precedent to make this decision. A 
 great judge fit for the bench at this critical time if he could not find a way around 
 precedent would have found a way to dissociate himself from apparent moral 
 approval of it. 
 
 Entirely aside from these specific criticisms we are profoundly concerned that a 
 judge should be elevated to the Supreme Court bench at this important juncture 
 who has shown no positive sense of the importance of the restatement of legal 
 principles in terms of human rights and needs, no judge worthy to sit with a 
 Holmes or a Brandeis. By the majority decisions in many cases involving labor 
 on the one hand a great public utilities and corporations on the other the Supreme 
 Court has virtually legislated a reactionary theory of property rights which it 
 has read into the Constitution. If these decisions stand it will be exceedingly 
 difficult to preach to our people the efficacy of political action as a means to 
 social change. The dead hand of precedent and the live hand of a judicial 
 oligarch will be upon us with such weight that no majority by peaceful means can 
 work its will. 
 
 For this situation a remedy must be found in limiting the powers of the court, 
 but in the meanwhile the nature and extent of those limitations will be de- 
 termined in part by the character of the court's decisions. These decisions, of 
 course, will be determined by the character of men appointed to the court. Ele- 
 vation to the Supreme Bench gives no man infallibility. It can not change the 
 background of his thinking or his approach to problems of law and life. Judge 
 Parker, so far as the record goes, shows none of those characteristics of greatness 
 as the expounder of law as a living thing which our times demand. He has, on 
 the other hand, in specific cases shown a prejudice or narrowness of view which 
 bode ill for the wisest exercise of the tremendous power which judges of the 
 Supreme Court have taken to themselves. 
 
 Therefore, we earnestly oppose his confirmation in the name of peaceful and 
 constructive progress by democratic methods. 
 Sincerely yours, 
 
 Norman Thomas. 
 
60 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Senator Hebert. Is it your understanding that the United Mine 
 Workers are also opposed to the confirmation of Judge Parker? 
 
 Mr. Green. I am glad you brought that to my attention. 
 
 Senator Hebert. They were most concerned in this case to which 
 you have made reference, and I wanted to make that clear on the 
 record. 
 
 Mr. Green. I wish here to read a telegram which I received from 
 the attorney representing the United Mine Workers in the Red 
 Jacket case. 
 
 Senator Overman. That is the gentleman I would like to see. 
 
 Mr. Green. Well, he isn't here, but his telegram is here. 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, there is a man here by the name of 
 Townsend. 
 
 Mr. Green. Oh, yes. Mr. Townsend is here, and he was asso- 
 ciated with Mr. Warrum. This is a telegram dated Indianapolis, 
 Ind., March 26. It reads: 
 
 Mr. Lewis has referred to me your two telegrams concerning Judge Parker. 
 Judge Parker wrote the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in the Red Jacket 
 case sustaining McClintic's drastic injunction based on the yellow-dog contract 
 of some 300 coal companies. This injunction and opinion which the Supreme 
 Court declined to review insulates some 50,000 nonunion coal miners from any 
 peaceable contact or persuasive approach by the miners' organization. Our 
 protest against this is of record in the hearings of the subcommittee of the Senate 
 Judiciary Committee on the injunction bill and Senate Interstate Commerce 
 Committee on the 1928 coal investigation. No attorney representing the mine 
 workers has ever said that this was the only opinion that could have been delivered 
 in the Red Jacket case. On the contrary we have always insisted that the 
 opinion was an outrage on the right of organized labor. 
 
 Henry Warrtjm. 
 
 I wired Mr. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, asking 
 him for information regarding Judge Parker, and the attitude of the 
 miners and so forth, and this is the reply. 
 
 Senator Overman. Does Lewis oppose the confirmation? Do you 
 understand him to say that? 
 
 Mr. Green. Yes; so far as I understand it, although I am not sure 
 but what somebody is here to speak for Mr. Lewis. I am speaking 
 for the American Federation of Labor, and the United Mine Workers 
 are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor as a part of the 
 great organized labor movement. 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, who is Mr. Lewis? 
 
 Mr. Green. The president of the United Mine Workers, an 
 affiliated organization. 
 
 Senator Overman. That is what I understood, but I gathered 
 from the telegram that you telegraphed him to ask if he was opposed 
 to this confirmation of Judge Parker. 
 
 Mr. Green. No; I telegraphed him for information regarding the 
 decisions of Judge Parker in this case. 
 
 Senator Overman. And this is the answer you read? 
 
 Mr. Green. That is the answer of Mr. Warrum, the attorney to 
 whom he referred the message of inquiry. 
 
 Senator Overman. Have you anything else? 
 
 Mr. Green. No. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 61 
 
 STATEMENT OF E. C. TOWNSEND, CHARLESTON, W. VA. 
 
 Senator Overman. Give your name, position, and residence. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. E. C. Townsend, attorney at law. I reside at 
 Charleston, W. Va. 
 
 Senator Overman. Do you hold any official position now? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir. I am the present State tax commis- 
 sioner of West Virginia. 
 
 Senator Overman. Did you appear in this so-called Red Jacket 
 case? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I did. 
 
 Senator Overman. Who did you appear for? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. The United Mine Workers of America. 
 
 Senator Overman. Did the question of the yellow-dog contract 
 come up directly in this case? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. You mean this yellow-dog contract, or what is 
 commonly understood as the yellow-dog contract? 
 
 Senator Overman. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I never so considered, Senator. I think the 
 major question involved in the Red Jacket case was a question of 
 jurisdiction. Of course, the question of the yellow-dog contract was 
 incidentally in the case. 
 
 Senator Borah. This injunction was based upon the yellow-dog 
 contract; the injunction purported to protect the yellow-dog contract. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. Wasn't the legality of the contract ever questioned, 
 or the validity of it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. You mean in this litigation? 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. Where? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. In the district court. That is — I don't know that 
 I understand just exactly what you mean. 
 
 Senator Borah. Did you raise the question that the "yellow-dog" 
 contract was illegal, contrary to public policy, or wanting in considera- 
 tion? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I always argued that question. 
 
 Senator Borah. Did you argue it to the court? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. Did you file a brief on it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. Have you a copy of that brief? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I can furnish it. 
 
 Senator Borah. I would be glad to have it. I can not find any- 
 where in this decision rendered by Judge Parker where the validity 
 of that contract was ever presented to the court. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Well, the validity of the contract was never pre- 
 sented to the court, except, as I say, in the arguments that were nu.de 
 in the district court, and in the circuit court of appeals. It was always 
 contended that the "yellow-dog" contract was contrary to public 
 policy, without mutuality, and could not be enforced. 
 
 Senator Borah. Was that raised in your brief in the circuit court 
 of appeals? 
 
 107150—30 5 
 
62 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That was argued; yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. In the printed brief? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes. 
 
 Senator Borah. Can you furnish us a copy of that brief? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes; I will be glad to do that. 
 
 Senator Borah. It appears from the decision that the court did 
 not pass directly upon the validity of the contract. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. The decision, as I understand it, said that the 
 question of the validity of that contract was settled in the Hitchman 
 case. 
 
 Senator Overman. Did you conclude that was so, before the court, 
 in your construction of the Hitchman case? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. In effect; yes. 
 
 Senator Overman. You thought the Hitchman case settled that 
 question, and therefore you did not press it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. We did not press it as strongly as we pressed 
 some other questions that were in the case. The major question in 
 that case was a question of jurisdiction. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, the court did not so consider it. Perhaps 
 I have read this decision too hurriedly. I have tried to go through 
 it with care, but I have been unable to find in this opinion any place 
 where the court passed upon the validity of the contract, or where it 
 declares that the validity of it had been determined by any other 
 court. The court did refer to the Hitchman case as sustaining its 
 injunction. For instance, let me call your attention here [to this. 
 The court here says: 
 
 With respect to the second paragraph, complaint is made that it restrains 
 defendant "from inciting, inducing or persuading employees of the plaintiff to 
 break their contract of employment with the plaintiff." 
 
 That, from my viewpoint, states the real vital proposition in the 
 case. The court was sustaining an injunction upon the contract, 
 which it seems to me ought to have been regarded as debatable, if not 
 void. 
 
 Now, it says : 
 
 The language certainly is not so broad as that of the decree approved by the 
 Supreme Court in the Hitchman coal case. 
 
 But, it doesn't say, so far as I can see — I may have overlooked it, 
 it doesn't say the Hitchman coal case was based upon the validity 
 of the contract. He does sustain the decree, the breadth of the decree, 
 and the far reaching import of the decree, by citing the Hitchman 
 case, but what has seemed to me, as a bystander, and an outsider, is 
 that the first and primary question would have been the validity of 
 that contract. You certainly can not base an injunction upon an 
 invalid contract, and if you could have broken the contract, the 
 injunction would have had to fall. The court may have ignored it, 
 but I do not find where the court passed upon the validity of that 
 contract at all. They took it for granted that it was valid. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Well, they based it upon the Hitchman case. 
 But I think the first and primary question in the Ked Jacket case was 
 a question of jurisdiction, because they could not have passed upon 
 the question of whether the contract was valid or invalid if they did 
 not have jurisdiction. 
 
 Senator Borah. What do you mean by jurisdiction? 
 
CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN J. PARKER. 63 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Jurisdiction to entertain the case, on the theory 
 of whether or not it was an interference with interstate commerce. 
 That question had to be decided in the affirmative before they could 
 pass on any other question. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, the court did pass on that. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That was the question upon which the United 
 Mine Workers mainly predicated their fight. 
 
 Senator Borah. Your contention was that the digging of coal was 
 not interstate commerce? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. The mere mining of coal was not interstate 
 commerce. 
 
 Senator Hebert. And that was sustained? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. No; not in that respect. If it had been, then the 
 circuit court of appeals could not have entertianed jurisdiction of the 
 case. 
 
 Senator Borah. The circuit court of appeals took the view that 
 the Supreme Court of the United States had decided that proposition 
 also, that while the actual mining of coal was not interstate commerce, 
 yet if it was mined and traveling in interstate commerce constantly — 
 and that was the purpose of 90 per cent of it, I think they said — they 
 held it was interstate commerce. But that was not, to me, or to my 
 mind, the question which disturbed most the court. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Well, it may not have been. 
 
 Senator Borah. They went into the question of sustaining the 
 injunction against permitting the union to persuade the men to 
 violate the yellow-dog contract. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is true. 
 
 Senator Borah. Do you know anything in the attitude of Judge 
 Parker which would indicate to you he is unfriendly to labor, other 
 than his decision in this case? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I do not. 
 
 Senator Borah. What in this decision do you point out as indi- 
 cating that he approved of this yellow-dog contract, and an injunction 
 of this breadth, and so forth? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I think Judge Parker felt in this case that he was 
 bound by the decision in the Hitchman case, so far as the yellow-dog 
 contract was concerned. 
 
 Senator Borah. Was that argued before the court? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That was argued. 
 
 Senator Overman. But I understand you and the attorneys with 
 you did not press that fact, because you believed the Hitchman case 
 settled that question. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. We believed the Hitchman case, in the main, 
 settled that question. We did argue that question in this way: The 
 jurisdiction in the Hitchman case 
 
 Senator Borah. I think the Hitchman case settled about every- 
 thing in the labor world. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I think you are right. 
 
 Senator Borah. I want to read something here from the Hitchman 
 case. On page 261 : 
 
 Respecting the sweep of the injunction, we differ somewhat from the result 
 reached by the district court, so far as it restrains, first, interfering or attempting 
 to interfere with plaintiff's employees for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff's 
 mine, without its consent, by representing or causing to be represented to any 
 
64 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 of plaintiff's employees or to any person who may become an employee of the 
 plaintiff, that such person will suffer, or is likely to suffer, some loss or trouble,, 
 by continuing in the employ of the plaintiff, or because the plaintiff runs a. 
 nonunion mine. 
 
 That is the first clause they sustained. 
 
 In other words, if a union man met a nonunion man and said, 
 "You are going to lose out in this proposition, and you can only win 
 out by joining the union, " he was within the purview of this injunction. 
 
 It makes union labor simply a painting on the wall. 
 
 Senator Overman. You are reading from the Hitchman case? 
 
 Senator Borah. I am reading from the Hitchman case. That is 
 what Mr. Green said was the Dred Scott decision on labor. 
 
 It continues: 
 
 Second, interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees for the 
 purpose of unionizing the mine without plaintiff's consent, and in aid of such 
 purpose, knowingly and lawfully bringing about the breaking, by plaintiff's 
 employees of contracts of service, known at the time to exist with plaintiff's 
 employees. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Do they discuss that yellow-dog contract there? 
 Senator Borah. They just took it for granted it is a valid contract,, 
 it seems. [Continues reading:] 
 
 Third, knowingly and wilfully inciting plaintiff's employees, present or futuie r 
 to leave plaintiff's service, on the ground that plaintiff does not recognize the 
 United Mine Workers of America, or runs a nonunion mine. 
 
 Fourth, interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees, so as 
 knowingly, and willfully to bring about a break of the plaintiff's employees 
 present and future contracts of service, known to the defendant to exist, and 
 especially from knowingly and willfully enticing such employees', present or 
 future, to leave the plaintiff's service without the plaintiff's consent. 
 
 This is the situation as I see it: They had what they called the 
 yellow-dog contract 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is the Hitchman case? 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes. The Supreme Court decided that a man, 
 under that contract, could not be talked to by anybody in order to 
 induce him to change his mind, and that you could not unionize the 
 mine without the mine owner's consent. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I do not think it is quite that broad. 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes; that is just how broad it is: 
 
 To leave the plaintiff's service without the plaintiff's consent. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes; under the contract. 
 
 Senator Borah. I had supposed that if there was anything on 
 earth that was well established, it was that a man could quit work 
 whenever he got ready. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. He can. He can under this contract. 
 
 I don't want you, Senator, or this committee, to get the idea that I 
 am defending this contract, because I am not. I have always con- . 
 demned it, and I condemn it now as against public policy, without 
 mutuality, and unfair to the employee in every respect. 
 
 I started to say a moment ago, if you will permit me — you asked a 
 question that I started to answer and did not conclude. 
 
 Senator Borah. Excuse me, please. Go ahead. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Jurisdiction in the Hitchman case was obtained 
 by the court upon the ground of diversity of citizenship. The con- 
 tract involved in that transaction was simply an oral contract. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 65 
 
 What the organizers of the United Mine Workers undertook to do in 
 that case was to organize the miners, while they were under that 
 contract not to join a union, and allow the miners to continue in the 
 employ of the compan}^. 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes. That is one proposition of it, but the 
 Supreme Court segregates the two propositions. It refers to the 
 fact that they were secretly getting miners to join the union, professing 
 not to be members of any union, and then it segregated and separated 
 from that the other proposition. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is true. I was discussing that proposition. 
 Continuing a little further; the plan in that case was that they were 
 to secretly join the union and continue in the employ of the company 
 until a sufficient number of them had joined, so that they, to use the 
 language that they used, could "crack off," at which time they would 
 all walk out in a body and close down the mines. 
 
 The district court and the Supreme Court of the United States 
 sustained the oral contract, as representatives of the miners' union 
 always contended, upon the ground of deceit and fraud that was 
 practiced in connection with that contract, and that is the position 
 we took in the later cases. But the later cases were distinguishable 
 from that case, because that case was decided upon the ground of 
 fraud and deceit, and if in good faith the representatives of a labor 
 organization asked a person who was under a contract of employment 
 to join a union, they had a right to do that. They had a right to ask 
 them to join a union, if it was in good faith and openly. 
 
 Senator Borah. Does the Supreme Court hold that? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is the very thing the Supreme Court did 
 not hold. 
 
 Senator Borah. Yes; I thought so. 
 
 Senator Overman. Mr. Townsend, in reading this Hitchman case, 
 I gather there was no conspiracy in that case, no force, whereas Judge 
 McClintic finds in his Red Jacket decision, that there was menace, 
 force, and disturbance of all kind. Is that so? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Well, that is true, in the Red Jacket, that there 
 was force involved, and not the mere question of the yellow-dog 
 contract. Of course, the yellow-dog contract was sustained. What 
 I mean to say is this, that I think the opinion rendered by Judge 
 Parker in the Red Jacket case, in so far as the yellow-dog contract 
 was concerned, was because he felt he was bound by the decision of 
 the Supreme Court in the Hitchman case. 
 
 Senator Overman. And you felt he was bound by it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Well, I didn't feel that way about it at that time, 
 and I am not going to say that I feel that way now, because I repre- 
 sented the defendant, but he felt that way about it, and he had a 
 right to feel that way. He was the judge in the case, and he had the 
 last guess about it. 
 
 Senator Overman. Why didn't you press the validity or non- 
 validity of this contract? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. We did. 
 
 Senator Overman. You said you did indirectly. You said you 
 didn't press it directly, because you were satisfied it was settled in 
 the Hitchman case. 
 
66 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I did feel it was, to a large extent, settled in the 
 Hitchman case, and I feel that way now, that to a large extent that 
 question was settled in the Hitchman case. 
 
 Senator Overman. And that is the reason you did not press that 
 point? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is the reason we did not press it as strongly 
 as we pressed some other questions upon the major issue involved in 
 that case, which was the question of jurisdiction. At the time the 
 Red Jacket case was instituted the decision of the Supreme Court of 
 the United States had been rendered in the Foundries case, and the 
 Supreme Court decision had also been rendered in what was known 
 as the Leather Workers' case. In those two cases we had reason to 
 believe that the mining of coal was in no way involved in interstate 
 commerce, and also the first decision in the Coronada case held speci- 
 fically and distinctly, and directly, that the mining of coal was not 
 interestate commerce. Between the time the Red Jacket case was 
 instututed and finally reached the United States Supreme Court, the 
 second decision in the Coronada case came from the Supreme Court 
 of the United States, in which that court held that when interfering 
 with the mining of coal, or if a labor organization interfered with the 
 mining of coal, with intent to prevent its shipment in interstate com- 
 merce, that then it came within the Sherman Act and the Clayton 
 Act, and the court had jurisdiction to entertain the case. That case 
 was followed by the Stone Cutters' case, and by the Brinns case, all 
 to the same effect. When this Red Jacket case finally reached the 
 Supreme Court- 
 
 Senator Borah. Do you mean the Red Jacket case went to the 
 Supreme Court? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I mean the Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Parker 
 had confronting him, on the one hand, on the question of jurisdic- 
 tion, the doctrine laid down in the Leather Workers case, and the 
 doctrine laid down in the first Coronada case, which would seem to 
 indicate that there was no question of Federal jurisdiction involved, 
 because the mining of coal was not interstate commerce. On the 
 other hand, he had confronting him the decision of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States in the second Coronada case, in the 
 Brinns case, and in the Stone Cutters' case, all of which tended to 
 show that there was a question of ' interstate commerce involved, 
 and in the Red Jacket case he, in my judgment, followed the weight 
 of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
 Senator Borah. On the question of jurisdiction? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes; and also followed the weight of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States on the question of "yellow dog" contracts. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Mr. Townsend, is this the language which' you 
 have in mind in the second Coronada case? I quote now: 
 
 When the intent of this unlawful preventing of the manufacture or pro- 
 duction is shown to be to restrain or control the supplj r entering and moving in 
 interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a 
 direct violation of the antitrust act ? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is it; yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Borah. I wish you would supply us with the briefs in 
 which the validity of this contract was argued. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I will supply you with those, Senator. I have a 
 bound volume of them. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 67 
 
 Senator Borah. Did Judge McClintic render a written opinion? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. No. He made a finding of fact. 
 
 Senator Overman. Were the facts found by him in writing, and 
 presented to Judge Parker? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Overman. They were? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Overman. I suppose they set them forth in this opinion? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is in the record. 
 
 Senator Overman. Then, he goes on and says there was a demon- 
 stration about some tenement houses owned by the company, and 
 an interference with the people who lived in those. Do vou remember 
 that? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir. The finding of fact of Judge McClintic 
 was to this effect in that respect; that the tenement houses that were 
 occupied by the miners at the time they went out on strike, when 
 they ceased to work for the coal company, that they became tres- 
 passers and were not entitled to occupy, nor were they entitled to 
 possession cf the house. 
 
 Senator Overman. That is under a West Virginia statute? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Under a West Virginia decision, a decision of the 
 Supreme Court of West Virginia, and that is what the Supreme 
 Court of West Virginia did decide; that the relationship of land- 
 lord and tenant did not apply to those houses, but the possession of 
 the house was merely incident to the employment in the mines. 
 
 Senator Overman. I read the decision in which they said there 
 were simply speeches or persuasions. There was more in this case 
 than simply speeches and persuasions, was there not? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. You mean in the Red Jacket? 
 
 Senator Overman. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Oh, yes; there was a great deal of violence and 
 intimidation. Nobody objects to the granting of an injunction in 
 connection with the destruction of property, or intimidation or vio- 
 lence. 
 
 Senator Overman. There was in this case, you say? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. There was, in connection with the contract of 
 employment. The miners' organization did not undertake to defend 
 intimidation and violence and destruction of property. It never has. 
 
 Senator Borah. Are you now an employee of the miners, at this 
 time? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. No, sir; I am not. I want to add to that, Senator, 
 by saying that I am in full sympathy with their efforts to rid them- 
 selves of the "yellow-dog" contract and the use of the injunction in 
 labor disputes, to the extent to which they have been used. I want 
 my opposition upon that question made entirely clear. But I want 
 to make this additional statement, if you will pardon me. I do not 
 think the decision of Judge Parker, in this case, according to my 
 idea of it, is sufficient to warrant his disapproval as a member of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Senator Borah. If you thought that Judge Parker believed, as an 
 economic proposition, in the "yellow-dog" contract, and believed in 
 that way to manage labor, leaving out now the question that he felt 
 constrained to follow a superior court; if you felt he had attained the 
 
68 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PAEKEB 
 
 view that that was a correct position and correct view of the situation, 
 now would you feel about it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Let me answer that by this statement: That if 
 this case affecting the question of the "yellow-dog" contract had been 
 before Judger Parker for the first time, and that had been the first 
 decision upon the question, and he had decided it like he did, I would 
 have then said that he should not be confirmed as a member of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, because his ideas of economics, 
 in so far as they relate to that question, were wrong. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, as he decided it in the lower court, it is alto- 
 gether probable that he would be of the same opinion upon the 
 Supreme Court bench. Having construed the decision of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States in the way he has, I would take it that if 
 this question would arise again, he would take it it was settled by his 
 court. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. He would probably feel it was settled by the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, yes; and I would not criticize 
 him for that, from my standpoint. If he felt it was settled, I think 
 he would have the right to follow precedent in that respect. I think 
 this whole question of the "yellow-dog" contract, so far as it affects 
 the Federal courts, is one for legislation, under its present status, and 
 not a court decision. 
 
 Senator Borah. I don't understand why the validity of a contract 
 is not always a judicial question. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. It is. 
 
 Senator Borah. If the "yellow dog" contract is invalid for the 
 reasons which have been stated, it is purely a judicial question. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. It has never been held to be invalid. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, I say, if it is invalid — or whether it is valid 
 or invalid for the reasons stated, it is purely a judicial question, 
 isn't it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, and as I construe the decision, that question 
 has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, assuming that the majority of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States has passed on it to that effect, and we 
 continue to put other members on the court holding to the same 
 opinion, it would be a pretty well settled proposition, wouldn't it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I think it is settled now. It can not be settled 
 any stronger than it has been settled in the Hitchman case. 
 
 Senator Hebert. If the contract has been held valid, then the only 
 way to do away with it is by legislation, isn't it? That is, if the 
 courts have held it valid. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. The subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee 
 drew a very excellent bill in connection with the use of injunctions in 
 labor disputes, which I understand is now pending before Congress, 
 and that bill I heartily indorse. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, just how far can legislation go on that kind 
 of a question until the courts contend it has impinged upon its func- 
 tions? That is also a very delicate question, as illustrated in Adair 
 and Coppage cases. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. It is. 
 
 Senator Borah. It may be so now that it is settled, that it would 
 be amenable alone to effective legislation, but originally it was a 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 69 
 
 judicial question which went before these people. They did not re- 
 ject it because it was not a judicial question. They assumed to pass 
 on it. 
 
 Mr. Townsend. They did pass on it in the Hitchman case. But 
 Judge Parker could not have passed on that question in the Red 
 Jacket case, except that court had jurisdiction to pass on it under 
 acts of Congress, the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act. That is 
 the only thing that gave Judge Parker jurisdiction to entertain the 
 case at all. 
 
 Senator Borah. Suppose Judge Parker had stricken out, or modi- 
 fied the decree, by striking out " persuading the employees of the 
 plaintiffs to break their contract. " That would not have been error, 
 would it? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Not if he had first decided he had jurisdiction to 
 entertain it. 
 
 Senator Borah. He decided he had jurisdiction, and then he took 
 up the question of the decree. If he had modified the decree to strike 
 out all reference to persuading them to break their contract, that 
 would have been within his jurisdiction, wouldn't it, notwithstanding 
 the Hitchman case? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. It would, yes, sir; unquestionably. Then the 
 question would have arisen whether or not it was in conflict with the 
 Hitchman case. We tried to get into the Supreme Court of the 
 United States with this Red Jacket case, and were unable to do so. 
 
 Senator Borah. Why did they decline jurisdiction? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. There was no reason given. We tried to review 
 it by writ of certiorari, and they denied it. 
 
 Senator Overman. In the certiorari did you bring up the question 
 of the "yellow-dog" contract? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. That is argued in the brief presented to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, in support of the petition for 
 certiorari. 
 
 Senator Overman. It is? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Overman. The validity of that contract? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. Yes, sir; and I would be glad to supply the 
 committee with a copy of these briefs. 
 
 Senator Overman. And yet they refused you? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. They refused to review the Red Jacket case. 
 Construed another way, everything, as I understand that case, 
 that was passed upon by Judge Parker, had been passed upon directly 
 or indirectly by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 Senator Borah. I think that is all I have. 
 
 Mr. Green. Senators, I should like to make this observation for 
 the benefit of the record, in order not to create any misunderstanding 
 that may have been caused by reason of the statement made by Mr. 
 Townsend. Mr. Townsend does not speak for anyone connected 
 with the American Federation of Labor. He does not speak for the 
 American Federation of Labor. He is not wdth us. He comes here 
 as an attorney, as I understand it, and as tax commissioner for 
 West Virginia. We are not in accord with the views he has expressed 
 just now. We do not agree with him. 
 
70 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Mr. Townsend. I do not claim to represent the American Fed- 
 eration of Labor. I am expressing my own individual views. 
 
 Senator Borah. I understood that. 
 
 Air. Townsend. And nobody else. 
 
 Senator Overman. Do you desire to say anything else, Mr. 
 Townsend? 
 
 Mr. Townsend. No, sir. 
 
 Senator Overman. There was a man by the name of Fish, who 
 came to my office this morning and he presented a paper which I did 
 not read. If he desires to appear and read it, he may. 
 
 STATEMENT OF H. E. FISH, EX-BUSINESS AGENT, HOISTING 
 ENGINEEKS, LOCAL NO. 77, OF WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 Mr. Fish. Mr. Chairman and honorable members of this com- 
 mittee, at the present time I represent the majority of that local 
 organization, by a bound contract, signed. 
 
 I am not a public speaker, and therefore I would much rather the 
 secretary would read this document that I have brought up here, 
 for the purpose of showing this committee of honorable men there 
 are worse conditions existing within the rank and file of the Inter- 
 national Union of Operating Engineers of the American Federation 
 of Labor than there was in the mines of West Virginia. 
 
 I thank you, gentlemen. If you care to read this 
 
 Senator Borah. Just let it be printed in the record. 
 
 Who do you represent, Mr. Fish? 
 
 Mr. Fish. 1 represent no organization. I represent myself and 
 the majority of the members of the local organization of Hoisting 
 Engineers. I was suspended a year ago to-morrow without hearing, 
 without notice of hearing, without trial of any description. 
 
 Senator Borah. Does this document have any relation to Judge 
 Parker? 
 
 Mr. Fish. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Borah. Do you know Judge Parker? 
 
 Mr. Fish. I do not. 
 
 Senator Hebert. Are you opposed to his confirmation? 
 
 Mr. Fish. No, sir; I am not. He was appointed by the President 
 of the United States of America, and that satisfies me he is all right. 
 
 Senator Overman. Really, this paper of yours is not anything 
 with regard to Parker's confirmation or against him. I judge it is 
 just an attack on some organization or something. 
 
 Mr. Fish. Within the rank and file of the American Federation 
 of Labor; yes, sir. I have affidavits to support it. I have copies 
 of injunctions. I have bills of complaint. 
 
 Senator Overman. We are not trying the American Federation 
 of Labor. We are trying Judge Parker as to whether he shall be 
 confirmed or not. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, suppose we have this printed in the rec'ord. 
 
 Senator Overman. All right, let it be printed. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 71 
 
 (The document presented by Mr. Fish is as follows :) 
 
 THE INDUSTRIAL SERVITUDE WHICH EXISTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
 OPERATING ENGINEERS AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 2, 1930. 
 To the United States Senate: 
 
 Gentlemen: William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, 
 has been accredited by the press with riling or intentions of filing with the Senate 
 Judiciary Committee a written objection to the confirmation of Judge Parker as 
 associate judge of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 The objections of labor, as represented by President Green, are based on 
 Judge Parker's record as a member of the United States Circuit Court of the 
 Fourth District, particularly the decision upholding the injunction of Judge Mc- 
 Clintic, of West Virginia, which prohibited mine workers from soliciting mines 
 who had been forced to sign the so-called "yellow-dog" contract to become 
 members of the Mineworkers Union. President Green claims this decision 
 shows Judge Parker placed property rights above and superior to human rights 
 and that he approved an injunction which virtually reduced the conditions of the 
 miners of West Virginia to a point approximating industrial servitude. It is also 
 stated that President Green will call on each Member of the Senate to refuse to 
 confirm the nomination of Judge Parker. 
 
 In view of the foregoing we wish to place the following facts before the Senate 
 Judiciary Subcommittee and the United States Senate in order that they may 
 judge for themselves the value of the testimony and opposition of the American 
 Federation of Labor's representatives. 
 
 The International Union of Operating Engineers composed of union operators 
 of power-driven machinery with headquarters located at 1003 K Street NW., 
 Washington, D. C, and with Arthur M. Huddle as general president, is affiliated 
 with the American Federation of Labor and as such is under the guiding hand of 
 President Green. 
 
 Shortly after assuming office nearly nine years ago, General President Huddle 
 instituted what he has since termed a policy of international supervision of local 
 unions which he places into effect in the following manner: 
 
 By first suspending all officers of the local union who do not signify their 
 willingness to comply with his demands. Then placing a man of his choice over 
 the local union with the title of international supervisor, who assumes full charge, 
 takes over all moneys, books, and personal property of said local union, and then 
 proceeds to illegally suspend all members who haven't become cowed enough to 
 submit without a protest. Said supervisor immediately places into effect the 
 following rules: 
 
 Any member who solicits employment from any employer for himself or any 
 other' member or accepts employment at his trade will be fined and suspended. 
 
 Employers must hire all members through office of supervisor. 
 
 Any member who talks to or enters the home of a suspended member will be 
 fined and suspended. 
 
 There will be no election of officers in this local union. 
 
 The supervisor has the power to assess each member any amount at any time 
 he may deem necessary. 
 
 The' supervisor has complete control of all funds of this local union. 
 
 The supervisor has the power to suspend any or all members who do not abide 
 bv his decisions. 
 
 * The supervisor's decisions supersede the constitution and by-laws of this 
 organization. 
 
 The supervisor is answerable to no one but the general president. All dues 
 must be paid six months or a year in advance to remain in good standing and 
 to obtain work. 
 
 All employers having in their employ a suspended member are ordered to 
 discharge him at once and upon failure to comply with said order a strike is called, 
 thereby forcing them to accede to the demands of the supervisor. 
 
 This method of intimidation has been consistently used even to the extent of 
 having several suspended members discharged from six or more positions thereby 
 instituting what could be legallv termed a black list since it is being done in 
 all principal cities of the United States and all for the purpose of impressing 
 upon the minds of the members that they must be subservient to the wishes of 
 the supervisor which in turn places them under the complete domination of 
 General President Huddle. 
 
72 CONFIRMATION" OF JOHN" J. PARKER 
 
 As an illustration of the extreme to which General President Huddle carries 
 his policy of blacklisting we reprint herewith a copy of a letter sent to Local No. 5 
 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron 
 Workers : 
 
 Headquarters International Association of Bridge, 
 
 Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., December 14, 1929. 
 Mr. L. L. Myers, 
 
 Alexandria, Va. 
 Dear Sir and Brother: I have been notified by Secretary-Treasurer Dave 
 Evans of the International Union of Operating Engineers that two of their 
 ex-members named Green and Fish, who have been suspended, are working at 
 iron work, and made application to join your local union, and the operating 
 engineers request that these members not be permitted to join your local union. 
 I understand President Morrin had this matter up with Brother Locker and 
 gave him instructions that these two men should not be permitted to member- 
 ship in your local union. Therefore his instructions should be complied with 
 by your local union, and if they are working on permits their permits should be 
 revoked. 
 
 Hoping you will let me hear from you regarding this matter and that these 
 instructions are being complied with, and with best wishes, I am, 
 Fraternally yours, 
 
 W. J. McCain, General Secretary. 
 
 ■ The general executive board of the International Union of Operating Engineers 
 is composed of the general officers, consisting of general president, five vice presi- 
 dents and the general secretary-treasurer. The five vice presidents are occupy- 
 ing positions as supervisors over local unions, subject to dismissal by the general 
 president. The general executive board has the power and authority to decide 
 all appeals from the decision of the general president and all other questions 
 which may arise between quadrennial conventions, in other words the adminis- 
 trative, legislative, and judiciary authority of the organization is vested in a 
 small group of seven men with the general president, by virtue of his usurpation 
 of power, dominating the entire board, hearing appeals from his own decisions 
 and passing judgment upon them, thereby subjecting the entire organization of 
 approximately 40,000 men to his whims or else the ultimate suspension. 
 
 From the foregoing paragraph you will readily perceive the waste of time and 
 money incurred by the members who appeal to the general executive board for 
 relief from the general president's persecution. 
 
 The thought may occur to you that if you were placed in a position similar to 
 the members of the engineers' union, you would promptly sever all connections 
 with the organization and work on open-shop work, but bear in mind organized 
 labor controls practically all building work, making it next to impossible to secure 
 employment unless you are a member in good standing and servile to the wishes 
 of a labor czar of General President Huddell's type. 
 
 The members realizing the utter impossibility of obtaining justice in their 
 organizations tried repeatedly to obtain an audience with President Green with 
 the faint hope of justice prevailing in the American Federation of Labor. 
 
 They were finally referred to Secretary Morrison who stated the American 
 Federation of Labor was familiar with conditions existing in the engineers' 
 union, but would do nothing for them because they granted general presidents 
 complete autonomy with the issuance of their charters. 
 
 When questioned about local autonomy as prescribed by labor constitutions 
 he declined to comment and advised the delegation to submit to General President 
 Huddell. 
 
 At present there are over 104 local unions suffering under enforced supervision 
 comprising a large majority of the entire membership of engineers and with 
 supervisors casting the vote of the entire membership of their separate local 
 union, it is impossible to remove general officers by a referendum vote, with the 
 result that they have perpetuated themselves in office with no redress on the part 
 of the rank and file. All of the foregoing acts were direct violations of the Inter- 
 national Union of Operating Engineers' constitution. 
 
 It is apparent to all persons familiar with conditions existing within the engi- 
 neers' organization that they are in a state of bondage or servitude far worse than 
 that attributed to the miners of West Virginia by President Green. 
 
 After enduring despotism until it became unbearable, the members of all prin- 
 cipal cities have applied to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for 
 relief. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PAEKER 73 
 
 Through their attorney, Samuel Untermeyer, they have sought an injunction 
 restraining General President Huddle from enforcing and retaining supervision, 
 his removal from office, and have also charged him with conspiracy and unlawful 
 disbursement of funds. 
 
 From authoritative sources we have learned that other international presi- 
 dents are eagerly waiting the outcome of this suit in order to inaugurate super- 
 vision in their respective organizations. 
 
 With men of that type casting the elective vote in the American Federation of 
 Labor conventions with power to elect or reject the reason is apparent to all why 
 President Green is objecting to Judge Parker's confirmation. 
 
 Since labor injunctions seldom do more than prohibit strikers from molesting 
 strike breakers and restricts picketing, labor leaders haven't much fear on that 
 score, but when they see a man appointed who has demonstrated that he has 
 courage enough to render a decision in a labor dispute according to the merits 
 of the case, the alarm is widespread, striking terror in the hearts of men of General 
 President Huddle's type, who see themselves exposed by future court actions 
 before a fair judge. 
 
 It is our suggestion to President Green that before he attacks the judicial state 
 of mind and qualifications of a renowned citizen appointed to the bench in the 
 highest court of our land by the President of the United States that he first wipe 
 out all stains of servitude existing within the American Federation of Labor 
 sponsored by his leaders and advisers. 
 
 We earnestly request the Judiciary Subcommittee to consider this letter while 
 hearing arguments of the representatives of the American Federation of Labor. 
 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 William I. Green. 
 Henry E. Fish. 
 Robert Ely. 
 
 The above signers of this document are former members of the International 
 Union of Operating Engineers, and all the facts contained in this document can 
 be proved, upon request. 
 
 STATEMENT OF ARTHUR M. HUDDLE, GENERAL PRESIDENT 
 INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 
 
 Mr. Huddle. Mr. Chairman, I am president of the International 
 Union of Operating Engineers, which this man (referring to Mr. 
 Fish) was turned out of, for violating all the laws of our International 
 Union. 
 
 He has gone into the courts of the city of Washington and the courts 
 have refused to hear his case. He now has the case in the courts of 
 the city of Washington, and Mr. Untermeyer has been retained as 
 as attorney for a group of bolsheviks like this man here, about four 
 or five hundred of them, that claim to be American citizens and loyal 
 to President Hoover. The courts have not sustained them anywhere. 
 
 If you print that in the record, you will only ball up your 
 record. They are only here in favor of Judge Parker because the 
 American Federation of Labor is opposed to it, and anj^thing the 
 American Federation of Labor is opposed to they are in favor of and 
 anything the American Federation of Labor is with they are against 
 it. That is the reason he is on the outside. 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, I said we wouldn't consider anything that 
 was fighting the American Federation of Labor. 
 
 Mr. Huddle. Well, that is all he is here for. 
 
 Senator Borah. Well, he has presented his petition, and he is 
 entitled to have it filed. 
 
74 COlSTFIBMATIOlSr OF JOHN J. PARKEE 
 
 STATEMENT OF WALTER WHITE, SECRETARY NATIONAL ASSO- 
 CIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 
 
 Mr. White. My name is Walter White, acting secretary for the 
 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, with 
 headquarters at 69 Fifth Avenue, New York City. 
 
 Gentlemen of the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the 
 Judiciary : 
 
 May I, on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement 
 of Colored People, present to the Subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on the Judiciary, to which has been referred for consideration 
 the nomination of the Hon. John J. Parker, of Charlotte, N. C, for 
 appointment to the United States Supreme Court, the reasons why 
 we respectfully urge that this nomination be not approved? 
 
 In 1920 Judge Parker was the Republican candidate for governor 
 of North Carolina. When he and his party were charged with plans 
 to organize the negro vote in support of Judge Parker's candidacy, 
 Judge Parker is reported by the Greensboro Daily News of April 19, 
 1920, as declaring in his speech of acceptance of the gubernatorial 
 nomination before the Republican State convention of that year: 
 
 The Republican party in North Carolina has accepted the amendment in the 
 spirit in which it was passed and the negro has so accepted it. I have attended 
 every State convention since 1908 and I have never seen a negro delegate in any 
 convention that I attended. The negro as a class does not desire to enter politics. 
 The Republican Party of North Carolina does not desire him do do so. We 
 recognize the fact that he has not yet reached that stage in his development 
 when he can share the burdens and responsibilities of government. This being 
 true, and every intelligent man in North Carolina knows that it is true, the 
 attempt of certain petty Democratic politicians to inject the race issue into every 
 campaign is most reprehensible. I say it deliberately there is no more dangerous 
 or contemptible enemy of the State than men who for personal or political advant- 
 age will attempt to kindle the flame of racial prejudice or hatred * * * the 
 participation of the negro in politics is a source of evil and danger to both races 
 and is not desired by the wise men in either race or by the Republican Party of 
 North Carolina. 
 
 On Wednesday, March 26, the National Association for the Ad- 
 vancement of Colored People telegraphed Judge Parker asldng him 
 if he had been correctly quoted by the Greensboro Daily News and 
 gave him opportunity to state whether or not the'' views which the 
 Greensboro Daily News attributed to him in 1920 were still held by 
 him in 1930. Inquiry of the telegraph company reveals that this 
 message was delivered to Judge Parker and signed for by K. Howard. 
 No reply has been received from Judge Parker and we feel that it is 
 safe to assume that he was correctly quoted by the Greensboro Daily 
 News and that his views have not changed within the past decade. 
 
 The amendment to which Judge Parker referred in the first sentence 
 of the foregoing statement is the one added to the constitution of 
 North Carolina in 1900 which provided, among other steps, for the 
 pajmient of a poll tax, for successful meeting of literacy tests by 
 voters, and for the inclusion of a grandfather clause in the State 
 constitution. The grandfather clause is the key to the admitted 
 purpose of these amendments — namely, to eliminate negroes from 
 participation as voters. The North Carolina grandfather clause 
 provided that one who could vote in North Carolina on January 1, 
 1867, or who was a lineal descendant of one who had such right to 
 vote prior to 1867, might have his name entered on the - permanent 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 75 
 
 register prior to December 1, 1908, and thereby become a voter for 
 life, though he had neither property nor literacy. 
 
 In the case of Guinn & Beal u. The United States (238 U. S. 347) 
 
 Senator Overman. Well, I will get a copy of the statute and put 
 that in the record. 
 
 Mr. White. Very well. 
 
 In the case of Guinn & Beal v. The United States (238 U. S. 347), 
 the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1915, declared such 
 grandfather clauses to be unconstitutional. Judge Parker's state- 
 ment as quoted, however, indicates clearly that the real purpose 
 back of the constitutional amendment of 1900 — namely, to dis- 
 franchise negroes, had his full approval. 
 
 The consequences of confirmation of the nomination as a Justice of 
 the United States Supreme Court of one who holds the views which 
 this statement of Judge Parker's indicates he holds may be seen, if 
 one considers what would have been Judge Parker's attitude had he 
 been sitting on the Supreme Court Bench when the case of Guinn & 
 Beal v. The United States was brought before that court for decision; 
 or what would be his attitude were he now confirmed and that issue 
 were brought before the court subsequent to his confirmation instead 
 of having been settled in 1915. It is a reasonable certainty that one 
 holding such views could not have approached this vitally important 
 question with that dispassionate, unprejudiced, and judicial frame of 
 mind which would enable him to render a decision in accordance with 
 the Federal Constitution. 
 
 Judge Parker as a lawA^er and as a judge of the Federal court could 
 not but have known that such a statement and such practices as were 
 advocated and approved by him in the foregoing statement were an 
 open, shameless flouting of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments 
 to the Federal Constitution. The National Association for the 
 Advancement of Colored People is convinced that no man who enter- 
 tains such ideas of utter disregard of integral parts of the Federal 
 Constitution is fitted to occupy a place on the bench of the United 
 States Supreme Court. Twelve million American negroes and all 
 white Americans who have a regard for law and order can not help 
 condemning an attitude which indicates a willingness to support some 
 laws and to disregard others when political expediency dictates. 
 
 May we emphasize that we have no personal animosity against or 
 personal knowledge of Judge Parker. Our opposition to him is based 
 upon the conviction that he does not possess the standards which 
 should be required of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
 If Judge Parker, for political advantage, can flout two amendments to 
 the Federal Constitution to pander to base race prejudice, we respect- 
 fully submit that he is not of the caliber which loyal, intelligent 
 Americans have the right to expect of Justices of the Nation's highest 
 court. 
 
 Attached is a memorandum of some of the important cases involv- 
 ing the enforcement of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments so 
 far as the citizenship rights of negroes are concerned which have been 
 presented to the United States Supreme Court within the past 15 
 years. With the economic, educational, political, and other progress 
 which the negro is making, and with the growing consciousness on the 
 part of intelligent Americans as to the importance of the settlement 
 
76 CONFIRMATION OP JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 of the race problem upon a basis of even-handed justice, it seems prob- 
 able that even more cases of similar nature and equal importance will- 
 be presented to the Supreme Court for decision in the near future. 
 Entertaining such views as he expressed in 1920 when he sought elec- 
 tion to the governorship of North Carolina, we are strongly convinced 
 that it would be improper to place such a man as Judge Parker upon 
 the bench of the United States Supreme Court. 
 
 We, therefore, respectfully urge upon your subcommittee that it 
 refuse a favorable report upon Judge Parker's nomination. We also 
 respectfully urge, through your subcommittee, that the Judiciary 
 Committee as a whole take the same action and that the Members of 
 the United States Senate vote against the confirmation of Judge 
 Parker. 
 
 Senator Overman. Do you know Doctor Moulton, the head of the 
 Tuskegee Institute, the most prominent colored man in the country? 
 
 Mr. White. I know him very well. 
 
 Senator Overman. Don't you think his sentiments are in line with 
 those expressed by Judge Parker? 
 
 Mr. White. In justice to Doctor Moulton, I don't think so. 
 
 Senator Overman. Hasn't he so stated, time and again? 
 
 Mr. White. No. Doctor Moulton's latest book, What the 
 Negro Thinks — I don't quote him directly — but he said in that 
 book that all thinking and intelligent negroes were asking for exactly 
 the same rights under the Constitution as given to any other citizen 
 of the country, and that the Negro would not be satisfied with any- 
 thing less than that. 
 
 Senator Overman. Do you know Dr. James E. Shepard? 
 
 Mr. White. I know Dr. James E. Shepard, although not as well as 
 I know Doctor Moulton. 
 
 Senator Overman. I desire to put in the record his letter to me. 
 
 (The letter referred to is as follows :) 
 
 North Carolina College for Negroes, 
 
 Durham, March 29, 1930. 
 Senator Lee S. Overman, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 Dear Senator Overman: I desire to add my personal word of indorsement 
 of Judge J. J. Parker. I think that no fairer or impartial lawyer could have been 
 selected then Judge Parker to fill the exalted position as Justice of the Supreme 
 Court. His attitude on all racial questions and all questions affecting the rights 
 of humanity, he has tried to be fair. 
 
 As a colored man and recognizing the fact that the Supreme Court of the 
 United States should always be composed of men who represent the highest 
 and best in thinking and in action, and that great questions affecting human 
 relations and interracial relations will often come before them, if I did not 
 believe Judge Parker was absolutely fair and impartial, I would not write this 
 letter in his behalf. 
 
 Judge Parker's selection honors the State and is a tribute to the worth and 
 ability of a man who has worked himself up by his own efforts to be considered 
 worthy to sit on the highest tribunal in American life. I hope that you are quite 
 well. 
 
 With sentiments of warm personal esteem and respect, I am, 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 J. E. Shepard, President. 
 
 Senator Borah. Who is Doctor Shepard? 
 
 Senator Overman. One of the leading colored men in North 
 Carolina. 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 7? 
 
 Mr. White. He is president of the North Carolina College for 
 Negroes at Durham, N. C. 
 
 Senator Borah. Who composes this association of which you are 
 secretary? 
 
 Mr. White. The National Association for the Advancement of 
 Colored People composed of white and colored people who are 
 interested in the securing and confirming to the negro rights under the 
 Constitution. 
 
 Senator Borah. Who are some of the prominent members? 
 
 Mr. White. Its national president, recently deceased, and presi- 
 dent since its inception, was Warfield Storey, eminent constitutional 
 lawyer, and former president of the American Bar Association. 
 Vice presidents, Rev. John Haynes Homes; Bishop John Hurst; 
 Arthur B. Spingarn, of New York; and Oswald Garrison Villard. 
 The treasurer is J. E. Spingarn. 
 
 The board of directors are: Mary White Ovington, New York; 
 Bishop John Hurst, Baltimore; Joseph Prince Loud, Boston; T. J. 
 Nutter, Charleston, W. Va. ; Jane Addams, Chicago; Clarence Dar- 
 row, Chicago; Hon. Harry E. Davis, Cleveland; Hon. Ira W. Hayne, 
 Detroit; F. B. Ransom, Indianapolis; Dr. J. A. Somerville, Los 
 Angeles; R. R. Church, Memphis; and George W. Crawford, New 
 Haven. 
 
 Senator Borah. That is enough. Did you have a meeting on this 
 subject? 
 
 Mr. White. Yes; our committee of administration. 
 
 Senator Borah. Who is the committee? 
 
 Mr. White. The committee is composed of J. E. Spingarn, the 
 treasurer; Arthur E. Spingarn, chairman of the national legal com- 
 mittee; Mary White Ovington, chairman of the board of directors; 
 W. E. B. Du Bois, editor of the Crisis; Isador Martin, of Philadelphia; 
 and myself. 
 
 Senator Borah. Was it unanimous? 
 
 Mr. White. It was unanimous. 
 
 Senator Overman. Were they all present? 
 
 Mr. White. They were present. 
 
 Senator Overman. Did 3^011 have anything before you except this 
 newspaper report? 
 
 Mr. White. As is our custom, we keep closely in touch with all 
 matters which may affect favorably or unfavorably the rights of 
 negroes, and we made an investigation, made an inquiry, and we 
 found a record of this statement as made by Judge Parker, and our 
 feeling is based upon the well-accepted fact that judges, like all other 
 human beings, even justices of the United States Supreme Court, 
 have their opinions colored by their social, economic, political, and 
 other views. That is our feeling. 
 
 Senator Borah. Do you know anything in the career of Judge 
 Parker to indicate that he is unfriendly to the negro? 
 
 Mr. White. Nothing except this statement here. 
 
 Senator Borah. Except that statement you have there? 
 
 Mr. White. This one statement. 
 
 Senator Borah. Do } r ou know of anything in his career that you 
 have heard of, where he has been in any way unjust? 
 
 107150—30 6 
 
78 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 Mr. White. Frankly, we never heard of him until he was nominated 
 by President Hoover. 
 
 Senator Borah. Has it been your business to look up his record 
 since then? 
 
 Mr. White. Yes, since then. 
 
 Senator Borah. In looking it up, have you ascertained anything 
 along that line? 
 
 Mr. White. Nothing, except the statement upon which we base 
 our objection. 
 
 Senator Overman. Do you know, Mr. White, that most of the 
 intelligent, educated, colored people vote in North Carolina? 
 
 Mr. White. Within recent years, that has been the movement. 
 
 Senator Overman. And they supported him loyally for governor. 
 Do you know that? 
 
 Mr. White. As to all of them voting, Senator Overman, I am 
 prepared to quote figures on that, but we do know that, for example,. 
 in certain cases, since the grandfather clause, the matter of exclusion 
 from the so-called white Democratic primaries, and so forth, in the 
 latter of which a case was carried from Texas to the Supreme Court 
 of the United States — and then also there has been since then the 
 question of the enabling act, giving the political parties the right to 
 set up their own qualifications for membership, has permeated and 
 has had a direct bearing upon the participation of negroes in the vote. 
 
 Senator Overman. I was speaking of North Carolina, where Judge 
 Parker ran for governor, and led his ticket and got 60,000 more votes 
 than any man ever got who ran for governor. He was supported, 
 loyally, was he not, but these colored men, who could vote and by 
 some who could not? 
 
 Mr. White. Some of them can vote in the larger cities of North 
 Carolina. 
 
 Senator Overman. The grandfather clause is out now. 
 
 Mr. White. Since 1915; yes. 
 
 Senator Overman. It no longer exists. 
 
 Mr. White. But it is still not a safe matter for negroes, even in 
 North Carolina, Senator Overman, to talk too much about voting in 
 the rural districts. 
 
 Senator Overman. Not if he can read and write. 
 
 Mr. White. Even some of those who can read and write. 
 
 Senator Overman. Can you cite any instance in North Carolina 
 where any of them have been refused the right to vote, where they 
 could read and write, and have the necessary qualifications a white 
 man has? 
 
 Mr. White. I haven't the figures with me, but I can search our 
 records and supply you with the information that is there. 
 
 Senator Overman. I don't think you can find much of that sort. 
 
 Mr. White. I might say this: I don't want, even in the slightest 
 degree, to be accused of being unfair, and I want to say that North 
 Carolina has made more rapid progress toward fair treatment of the 
 negro than any other Southern State. That is not flatten, Senator 
 Overman. 
 
 Senator Overman. I think that is true. What I meant to say is 
 that Judge Parker, after that speech, ran ahead of his ticket and got 
 60,000 more votes than any other candidate for governor ever 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 79 
 
 received, and he was supported loyally by all the leading colored 
 men of the State. He was bound to have been to get that vote. 
 
 Is there anything else, Mr. White? 
 
 Mr. White. There are one or two other members of our board 
 of directors that I would like to mention. I notice that Senator 
 Borah smiled when I mentioned the name of Clarence Darrow. 
 There are one or two other names on there I would like 
 
 Senator Borah. I didn't smile disapprovingly. 
 
 Mr. White. No, I know. Mr. Darrow and I have talked many 
 times about a case in which you and he were engaged many years 
 ago. 
 
 Senator Hebert. I suppose the question is whether you smiled 
 approvingly, Senator. 
 
 Mr. White. I just want to show you the type of men on our 
 board. Senator Arthur Capper, of Kansas, is a member of our board; 
 Lieut. Gov. Herbert H. Lehman, of New York; William English 
 Walling, and others of that caliber also are members of the board 
 of directors of the association. 
 
 Senator Borah. May I be permitted to smile again? 
 
 Mr. White. Yes; I have no objection whatever, Senator Borah. 
 
 STATEMENT OF MERCER G. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR PEOPLES 
 LEGISLATIVE SERVICE 
 
 Senator Johnson. Inasmuch as I have sent to every member of 
 the committee and all Senators a copy of this news release, which 
 I would like to go into the record, it will be just as satisfactory to 
 me if I may put it in the record without reading it. 
 
 Senator Overman. Very well. 
 
 (The statement in question is as follows :) 
 
 People's Legislative Service, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 JUDGE PARKER NOT THE RIGHT MAN 
 
 The nomination of Judge John J. Parker to fill the vacancy on the United 
 States Supreme Court ought not to be confirmed. His presence on the Supreme 
 Bench would not add to, but would detract from, the distinction of the great 
 court. It would increase rather than lessen the grounds of just criticism of the 
 court by that large body of Americans spiritually akin to Jefferson and Lincoln 
 who believe that human rights are superior to property rights. 
 
 Following hard upon the elevation of Chief Justice Hughes, the elevation of 
 Judge Parker to the Supreme Bench might well be the straw that breaks the 
 camel's back. From the liberal viewpoint, the Supreme Court is now loaded to 
 the limit with judicial representatives of things rather than human flesh and 
 blood. 
 
 To compare small things with large, it would be as great a blunder to put 
 Judge Parker on the Supreme Bench after his decision in the case of the United 
 Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co. et al. ( IS Fed. Rep. 2d 
 series, p. 839) as it would have been to put Chief Justice Taney on thai bench 
 after his decision in the Dred Scott case. In both instances tragic social blindness 
 sealed the eves of the judges. 
 
 According to Taney, the black man "had no rights which the white man was 
 bound to respect." According to Parker, the American worker has no rights 
 which the American employer is bound to respect. It is fair to say this in the 
 black shadow of his Red Jacket decision which lifts the "yellow-dog" contract 
 above the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the guaranties of 
 human rights in the Constitution and laws passed under it to secure those rights. 
 
 The Taney decision, elaborately argued and buttressed, so offended the 
 conscience of his generation that it hastened the appeal to arms which washed it 
 
80 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 away in a torrent of blood. Rightly understood, rightly related to the human 
 and political tragedy that has taken place in the coal fields of West Virginia 
 during the past decade, the Parker decision is as offensive to the conscience of 
 mankind as the Taney decision. Possibly more so, because less excusable in the 
 light of this larger and fairer day. Once it comes to be generally understood, 
 the aroused American conscience will make short shrift of this sociall}* shabby and 
 moralty shoddy decision, the worse for its specious reasoning in support of 
 intolerable industrial tyranny. 
 
 At the moment Judge Parker is conspicuous among those who have solemnly 
 blessed the "yellow-dog" contract. He may become known as the "'yellow- 
 dog' judge," whether on or off the Supreme Bench. His "yellow-dog" decision 
 is his only decision that has ever attracted attention (unless it be his decision to 
 give the Union Carbide Co. a clean bill of health when it was accused of violating 
 the Sherman Anti-Trust Act about the time he was going to the extreme of legal 
 imagination to nail the United Mine Workers to the cross for violating that act) . 
 
 What is a "yellow-dog" contract? It is a labor contract that almost literally 
 reduces the worker who signs it to the status of the proverbial yellow dog. It 
 reduces the free-born American worker to the condition of a Mexican peon. It 
 throws him back toward chattel slavery. It robs him of human rights which it 
 is a personal shame for him to part with, and a social crime for any American 
 citizen to take away from another,, even with the mean consent of a Federal 
 judge. Duress, in the shape of the power to starve the worker, is back of every 
 "yellow-dog" contract. It spells the doom of organized labor if firmly established 
 and made respectable. 
 
 Upholding the sacredness of such contracts, the notorious Judge George 
 McCIintick papered the mountains of southern West Virginia with injunctions of 
 .the most drastic character ever penned enjoining the officers and members of the 
 United Mine Workers and even its sympathizers from saying or doing anything 
 whatsoever that might in any conceivable manner interfere with these contracts. 
 "Reduced to their simple terms," declared a responsible New York newspaper 
 reporter who visited the coal fields, "they enjoin the person to whom they were 
 sent from doing everything but eat — if he could get the food — and sleep — if 
 he could find a place to put his head." If Judge McCIintick did not fully ac- 
 cept the view of the extremists among the nonunion coal operators that the 
 then great and important labor organization of our American miners was in itself 
 a criminal conspiracy he nevertheless lent his court to their deadly persecution 
 of its members as if he did. "Abandon hope ye who enter here," might well have 
 been written over the door of his court, so far as organized labor was concerned. 
 He became the driver of a judicial car of Juggernaut which crushed civil liberty 
 within the dead line drawn about the coal fields and along with it the homes and 
 the hopes of thousands of Americans whose ancestors, under the inspiration of 
 the Declaration of Independence, had fought for American freedom, Hand in 
 glove with the lawless nonunion operators and their army of ruthless imported 
 gunmen, he played an important part in building up an industrial autocracy in 
 West Virginia which Senator William S. Kenyon denounced as "vicious and un- 
 American" and "as contrary to the genius and spirit of our institutions." 
 
 In his testimony before the Senate investigating committee over which Senator 
 Kenyon presided, Samuel Untermyer expressed the belief that the United 
 States Steel Co. was the dominant antiunion factor in West Virginia, that the 
 bitter fight there was just another episode of its "crusade against organized 
 labor," and said he regarded the Steel Co. "as the greatest enemy to industrial 
 peace in the country." Men of the type of Judge McCIintick, armed with the 
 power of a Federal court, deserve to be classed among the greatest enemies of 
 industrial peace in the country. 
 
 In his opinion in the Red Jacket case (which with the others came up for 
 review from Judge McClintick's court), Judge Parker refers to Judge McCIintick 
 as "the learned district judge." That and nothing more. After reading 5,000 
 pages of the crushing tragedy that had transpired in West Virginia, there is 
 nothing whatever to indicate that he was the least disturbed by it or by Judge 
 McClintick's part in it. They saw eye to eye — through the same gimlet hole. 
 Judge Parker galloped with him to the death of organized labor in the coal fields 
 of southern West Virginia, without batting an eye or turning a hair. 
 
 When the Mine Workers Union stood with its back to the wall in West Virginia, 
 one of its valiant spokesmen used these words: "Regardless of terrorizing and 
 abusing, we will stand upon our policy and in keeping with law and orderly 
 procedure, we shall go on, knowing full well that in the end reason and right will 
 prevail." 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKER 81 
 
 Is the right answer to this high hope the elevation of Judge Parker to the 
 Supreme Court? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Then, in addition to that, I want to do what I can 
 to wipe out the somewhat technical character the discussion took on 
 after Mr. Townsend began to testify. 
 
 The thing that makes me opposed to his nomination is his apparent 
 inability to size up a human situation into the midst of which he is 
 thrown. When he decided the Red Jacket case there was available 
 two volumes of testimony taken by the Senate Committee on Edu- 
 cation and Labor, over which Senator Kenyon presided; and he had 
 immediately in his hand 5,000 pages, a part of which cited conditions 
 in West Virginia; which one, who like myself, went to West Virginia 
 in 1922 after nearly two years' service in the battle fields of France, 
 caused this veteran to say, "Conditions in West "Virginia seem to be 
 more hellish than those I left behind in France." 
 
 I can not give his name, but that is a part of his testimony before 
 the Kenyon committee. 
 
 Senator Borah. Judge Parker couldn't have taken that hearing 
 into consideration in the trial of a cause, could he? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Senator Borah, I notice that you, when this matter 
 came up, felt that the "yellow-dog" contract was vitally involved 
 and that you could not get away from it, nor could your mind keep 
 from jumping to the conclusion that the "yellow-dog" contract was 
 absolutely against sound public policy. 
 
 If Judge Parker is humanely fitted to go on the Supreme Court 
 Bench, why didn't that question come to him? Why didn't he him- 
 self face the desolation that was being wrought in West Virginia with 
 the "yellow-dog" contract as the point of departure. 
 
 In reading his decision in that case, the thing that appalls me is the 
 blindness of the judge in the face of the human conditions which can 
 not be left out of the atmosphere in which cases are decided in any 
 court, if they are decided justly, and especially those decided in the 
 Supreme Court. 
 
 I want to say that personally I feel about the "yellow-dog" con- 
 tract that it is, as they said about the Canadian border line discus- 
 sion — they didn't say 50-50, but I will say 50-50. It is 50-50 or 
 fight. 
 
 If the Supreme Court ever absolutely decides and gets away with 
 the decision that what labor justly calls the "yellow-dog" contract 
 is the law of the land, and that decision is not overthrown by statute, 
 so it will stay overthrown, we have a condition confronting us just as 
 we did after the Dred Scott decision. 
 
 Why didn't Judge Parker, when he faced that contract, which 
 forbid absolutely the American laborer to join a union, why couldn't 
 he say, just as the man in the street must be able to say that the thing 
 was a complete denial of those human rights possessed by every 
 individual. Suppose the "red-dog" contract had said 
 
 Senator Hebert. It was the "yellow dog" at first. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. I go back to the "yellow dog." I apologize to the 
 "red dog" profoundly. 
 
 Suppose the "yellow-dog" contract forbade a worker to join the 
 Episcopal Church, of which Judge Parker is a member, or the 
 Methodist Church, or the Roman Catholic, or any church? 
 
82 CONFIRMATION OF JOHN J. PARKER 
 
 It looks to me like a man would say, "You can't get away with 
 that." 
 
 Suppose it had forbidden a man to vote. In order not to be 
 starved to death in West Virginia during this time, suppose that 
 was the alternative, that. the man should sign away his right to vote. 
 Everybody would say that that was against public policy. 
 
 Suppose it forbid a man to marry, and there possibly were men 
 who signed the "yellow-dog" contract who would have signed them 
 if the "yellow-dog" contract had forbidden them to marry. 
 
 Senator Overman. The committee is inclined to believe what you 
 say, so if it believes this is an unconscionable contract, why argue it? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Because of the Eygptian darkness of the mind of 
 Judge Parker, when he confronted those conditions in West Virginia. 
 
 Senator Overman. He was not a resident of West Virginia. He 
 was a judge that came from another State. What did he know 
 about the conditions in the coal mines? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. If he was as ignorant as that, sir, in 1922, he was 
 incapable of ever learning enough to sit on the Supreme Court Bench, 
 because it was common knowledge throughout the United States. 
 Paper after paper sent their best men. John W. Owens, now editor 
 of the Baltimore Sun, was sent by the Sun into West Virginia, and 
 he came back, giving a fair account, but he said in order to give a fair 
 account of this situation, "it is perfectly plain to fair eyes, going in 
 from the outside, that the coal operators from West Virginia are the 
 guiltiest in this civil Avar, which exists there, since they were the 
 ones who by gross illegality started the conditions which afterwards 
 arose there." 
 
 Senator Borah. Mr. Johnson, I think so far as the contract is 
 concerned, perhaps there won't be very much discussion about that. 
 But, have you gone over the record in this case, from the beginning — 
 that is, the record in the case, through the volumes of evidence and 
 through the briefs in the case? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Not in this particular case. 
 
 Senator Borah. I was going to ask you a question, but if you have 
 not gone over that, I will refrain. 
 
 Senator Overman. Who did you say you represented, Mr. John- 
 son? You are the head of some organization? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Yes. I use that rather as descriptive. I will tell 
 you all you want to know about the People's Legislative Service, but 
 inasmuch as we do not formally pass any resolutions at all, but so 
 far as the attitude which I, as its director, take, it depends on whether 
 or not, on the whole, the director is representing good common sense, 
 from the standpoint of the liberal, progressive movement 
 
 Senator Overman. Have you an organization back of you? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. In coming here I am coining here quite 
 as legitimately as I do in all the work which I do and which has been 
 done in the name of the People's Legislative Service during the 
 past ycer. 
 
 Senate Oeverman. That is not the question I asked you. Who 
 is back of you? Some association must be back of you, if you are 
 head of the legislative service. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Do you want to know what the set-up is of the 
 organization at this moment? 
 
CONFIRMATION OF JOHN" J. PARKER 83 
 
 Senator Overman. I would like to know who you represent. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Well, I have the right to say I represent the People's 
 Legislative Service. That is an organization composed of people 
 throughout the United States who, on the whole, have gone along 
 with the elder Senator Robert La Follette, who inspired the organi- 
 zation about 1921. 
 
 Senator Overman. It is not a political organization? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. No. Well, I wouldn't want to say it was non- 
 political, because we get out voting records, in which we attempt to 
 see whether or not we think a man is sufficiently liberal enough and 
 progressive enough to be elected to the United States Senate" or the 
 House of Representatives. 
 
 Senator Overman. Are you paid any salary? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Am I paid a salary? 
 
 Senator Overman. Yes. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Overman. Who pays you, and what salary do you get? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. I get $5,000 a year, and it is paid by the People's 
 Legislative Service. 
 
 Senator Overman. You can not tell us who composes that Legis- 
 lative Service? You can not tell us some of the names? 
 
 Mr. Johnson. Well, I can tell you 
 
 Senator Overman. You speak of all the people of the United 
 States. We want to know w r ho composes it. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. I want to make it about as clear as I can, fairly, 
 that I am willing, so far as this hearing is concerned, to be put down 
 merely as Mercer G. Johnson, a citizen of Washington, D. C, who 
 spent some time in the coal fields of West Virginia when this matter 
 was at its height, who was a member of the Baltimore committee for 
 the relief of West Virginia miners, which raised between $24,000 and 
 $25,000 to relieve the intolerable conditions which had been brought 
 on in West Virginia through the tyranny of Judge McClintic in help- 
 ing the coal operators over and over again in acting illegally, and who 
 was so much interested 
 
 Senator Overman. We are going to adjourn very soon, now. 
 
 Mr. Johnson. I am willing to stop, sir, whenever you want me to, 
 but I would lkie to just finish this — who w r as enough interested, who 
 had enough intelligent interest in the industrial questions, especially 
 as it affects organized labor, and more particularly the miner, to 
 organize the public committee on coal, in New York, which attempted 
 to serve as a sounding board for the real facts of the case in 1922, and 
 who was well enough known to have District No. 29 of the United 
 Mine Workers invite him to West Virginia in 1922 to help them sus- 
 tain the morale of the striking miners. 
 
 Senator Overman. Does anybody else desire to be heard this 
 morning? We w T ant everybody w T ho desires to be heard, to be heard. 
 We do not w T ant to take advantage of anybody. 
 
 Apparently there is no one to be heard and we will adjourn now 
 subject to the call of the chairman. 
 
 (Whereupon, at 1.15 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned 
 subject to the call of the chairman.) 
 
 X 
 
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