^..^^ iV '" "^V^^ "^MIM^^^. ^^^rS^ oV'^^^P^"'" «>*^<-^ '^0^ ^oV" ^0 v-^ „ -' °- y\.i^.\ /•^;:>o /.>;^.\ / o <« o , \ %^ - *^^ O >v_ .... Ao, ^ ^ .' .^ ,* ^ *>.1 •' ^0- '^, ' 'i MARSHAL GROUCHY'S OWN AC- COUNT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO CiROrC'llilY MARSHAL GROUCHY'S OWN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO ^, rv..j'v^ T^-.-i-s^-'Ssi C%Aj Printed for private distribution only from originals in the collections of W. K. Bixby 7 WILLIAM K. BIXBY ST. LOUIS, MO. MCMXV Two hundred copies of this edition were printed, of which this is number • 5 THE TORCH PRESS CEDAR RAPIDS IOWA CONCERNING THE RESPONSIBIL- ITY FOR THE LOSS OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO The following is an explanatory excerpt from a letter to Mr. Bixby from the dealer through whom Marschal Grouchy's MS. ac- count of the Battle of Waterloo was obtained: "When I purchased the manuscript now in your possession I was assured that it was an article written by Grouchy, sent to a magazine editor, but for some reason never published. My research of yesterday leads me to believe that, instead of being an unpublished article, it is the original manuscript of the very account on which centers the entire literature concern- ing who lost the Battle of Waterloo. . . The manuscript would thus prove to be far more valuable than I had at first supposed, as the central document in an historical contro- versy extending over half a century concern- ing the greatest historical event of that cen- tury." [ 5 ] ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO By Marshal Grouchy a corner of the curtain covering the causes for the loss of the battle of water- loo lifted — the impossibility on account of its position for the army corps under the orders of marshal grouchy to take part in this battle The four days' campaign which ended the military career of Napoleon opened on the 15th day of June, 18 15. The French army, 1 10,000 men strong, crossed the Sambre at Charleroy and engaged with a body of 20,000 Prussians which had taken position behind that city in order to retard the Emperor's ad- vance. Some troops of the enemy which oc- cupied Charleroy having retired toward Brux- elles by Quatra Bras, Marshal Ney was de- spatched by this route with 40,000 men. Im- [ 6] THE ABOVE INDORSEMENT APPEARS ON THE BACK OF THE GROUCHY MS. mediately after the passage of the Sambre, the Emperor having with him Marshal Grouchy and the rest of the army, making 70,000 men, moved toward Fleurus, and on the i6th of June attacked the main Prussian army, which he had hoped to surprise while encamped, but which he found drawn up in the plains behind that city. Although judged to be about 100,- 000 strong, it was defeated after offering a stubborn resistance. Toward ten o'clock in the evening Marshal Blucher, profiting by the obscurity of the night, effected his retreat, pre- sumably in the direction of Namur and Wavre where, as was afterwards learned, lay the army of General Biilow, who was not able to arrive in time to take part in the battle of the i6th. (I say presumably, for cannons and prisoners were taken on both of these routes.) Up to half -past twelve at noon on the 17th of June the Emperor — who until then had ordered no movement of the army — was wait- ing a report from Marshal Ney; as soon as he received it, he ordered Marshal Grouchy to take his place at the head of the corps of in- fantry under Generals Vendame and Gerard, and of the cavalry under Generals Pajol and [ 7] Excelmans, forming a total of some thirty thousand men, and to follow the Prussian army; this in spite of the fact that he had been informed that it had fifteen hours' start of the army sent to pursue it, having effected its re- treat the evening before at ten o'clock, and the few light cavalry troops which had followed it had not been able to retard its movement. Napoleon, marching to the left with his guard and the other troops that had fought at Fleurus, went to join Marshal Ney, who on the 1 6th had defeated the advance guard of the Duke of Wellington near Quatra Bras. He then found himself facing the entire Eng- lish and Belgian army. Marshal Ney on the 1 6th would have destroyed the advance guard which he had been fighting, if, at the moment when the engagement was at its height, he had not been deprived of the regiments of the Count d'Erlon, nearly 20,000 strong. These troops spent the day in lazily covering the dis- tance between Fleurus and Quatra Bras; they did not fire a single gun, and were of no use to the army fighting at Fleurus, where they did not even arrive! The only orders given by the Emperor to [ 8 ] Marshal Grouchy after he was sent off on the 17th, and the day of the battle of Waterloo on the 1 8th, are those enclosed in a letter of the Marshal, Duke of Dalmatie (Major-general Soult), written on the field of the battle of Waterloo the i8th at one o'clock in the after- noon and delivered at four o'clock to Marshal Grouchy, then fighting with the Prussians, whose rear guard he had captured at eleven o'clock in the morning, one league from Wavre. After having been overthrown it was rallied in that city by the army of Marshal Blucher, who, since the evening before had taken its position on the heights behind the Dyle. Toward one o'clock Marshal Grouchy ordered General Vendame to take by main force the bridge over the Dyle. This attack not succeeding, he directed General Gerard and the cavalry of General f ajol to take the mill of Bielge and the village of Limellette, in order to effect there the passage of the river, while General Vendame kept up the combat in Wavre, and while a false attack was being carried on at the expense of that city. Such was the state of affairs on the arrival of the officers bringing the dispatch from the [ 9 ] Duke of Dalmatie, the tenor of which is here given : The 1 8th, one o'clock, P. M. To Marshal Grouchy: Monsieur le Marechale, you wrote this morning at six o'clock to the Emperor that you would march upon Sarra Valain; then your project was to go to Corbaix and to Wavre. This movement is in accordance with his Maj- esty's orders, which were communicated to you. The Emperor, however, commanded me to tell you that you must keep maneuvring in our direction. It is your duty to see how we stand, in order to act accordingly and to join forces with us, so that you may always be ready to engage and crush whatever troops of the enemy may attempt to disturb our right wing. At this moment the battle on the Waterloo side is already won; the enemy's center is at Mont St. Jean; so do your best to join our right. (Signed) LE Duc DE DALMATIE. P. S. A letter which has just been inter- cepted brings the news that General Biilow is to attack our right flank. We think we see [ lo] his regiment on the heights of St. Lambert; so do not therefore lose an instant in coming and joining us and in crushing Biilow, whom you will take in flagrante delictu. (Signed) LE MARSHAL Due DE DALMATIE. As the Prussians were masters of the most practicable communication between Wavre and Waterloo, and as there was no direct route between Waterloo and the position near Wavre, where the troops under Marshal Grouchy's orders were fighting, they were obliged, in order to join the Emperor, to travel over near- ly five leagues and to cross a difficult wooded country, cut by ravines. The orders to join forces were sent at one o'clock, P. M., and did not arrive until four o'clock. Marshal Grouchy's troops, which had to force the passage of the river, were then fighting with an enemy superior in numbers and occupying a strong position, which it was necessary to capture. It was then physically impossible for them to arrive at Waterloo in time to change the fortune of the day, which was decided — as all those instructed in mil- itary affairs well knew — at the moment when [ " ] General Biilow's troops appeared on the flank of the French army: in other words, at the moment when Napoleon summoned Marshal Grouchy to him. In examining with some attention the letter of Marshal Due de Dalmatie, one is con- vinced, — I St. That Marshal Grouchy operated ac- cording to the Emperor's intentions in march- ing upon Wavre. 2nd. That Napoleon did not think of sum- moning this Marshal until one o'clock in the afternoon, at the very instant when the head of General Biilow's column showed itself on the Heights of St. Lambert, and consequently when it was much too late to paralyze the flank attack of the Prussians. Finally, it is well to remember what Eng- lish pride and Prussian boasting have taken great care to minimize — I mean the numer- ical superiority of the allies. It was so great that in spite of Marshal Blucher's losses at Fleurus, his army, united since the 17th with Billow's troops at Wavre, was triple the force under Marshal Grouchy's command sent to pursue him. The pursuit could not give great [ 12 ] results, because"!! was not ordered until fifteen hours after Blucher's retreat. He had the time to rally his army, to place it advantageously, and he did not expose himself or make a great display of genius in directing half of his army on Napoleon's flank, while with the other half he would retard for some time the march of Marshal Grouchy; would dispute with him the passage of the Dyle and (on account of the forces which he left before him and of their position) would have even chances of crush- ing his contingent. Only a blind and even culpable partiality (for such it is when an attempt is made to ob- scure the historic truth and to betray the sound opinion, which evidence of facts, experience of war, and military methods have necessarily in- culcated) could possibly claim, as did the ju- dicious author of the "Considerations sur I'Art de la Guerre," that Marshal Grouchy's troops remained on the i8th in stupid immobility and that on hearing the cannon on his left he ought to have disregarded the instructions which had been given him, to have abandoned the pursuit of Marshal Blucher, and to have gone to join Napoleon. [ 13 ] The writers of articles inserted in the differ- ent papers are equally mistaken when they de- clare that Marshal Grouchy was deluded by Marshal Blucher; that he took the troops left before him for the main Prussian army and that if he had followed a parallel march, con- trary to his orders, which were to pursue Mar- shal Blucher and to complete his defeat by at- tacking him wherever he happened to fall in with him, it would have saved Napoleon. Without doubt this assertion would have been justified, if on the evening of the 17th Napoleon had sent to Marshal Grouchy orders to join forces with him. Or even if on the 1 8th at daybreak these orders had come, then they might have been carried out, at a profit- able time, and probably the fate of the battle and the issue of the campaign would have been different; but in truth, given as they were, on the 1 8th at one o'clock in the afternoon to troops who could not receive them until many hours after, who had the passage of a river to effect, and nearly five hours of marching in order to get there, and given only when the head of the Prussian column was in sight, it became illusive; for it was obviously impos- [ 14] -^ "^J i^'^ ^:!' ' Jy^ ! fi^^WV , .' ' :'>' ! *m^f^ fl^S __ii^ bfc sible that the cooperation of Marshal Grouchy could have taken place, and that he prevented the honors of the victory from falling into the hands of the French army, which did not cease to reap a harvest of them at the field of Water- loo, until the moment of the flank attack of the Prussians. N. B. The original of the orders of the Marshal Duke of Dalmatie and all the official documents relating to this campaign are in the hands of a public officer at Paris and will be published some day. Not being supported by substantial evidence the history of this cam- paign and of the causes of this disaster would be only a sort of declaration bearing the colors of the party to which its writer now belongs. [ 15 ] H ZOfo 79 .^" .r%. H ^ .*"' 4 .<^Bn^ . ■ay o * ^icsisJ^• "^^x-v^ ■ay ^ *^^>ii>iP^* ^0 ^ " " AV ft^ " • "^ ~ <^' n^ ' " " " A." 'O Tli1i=»!^ N.MANCHESTER, l«o^ . /xV ,<■'•« '^ " "Ow A^