fc-^-^ ^°^:r^%^- .^^^'^'X .''y^^> r • & - *' «^^'^X ^' *^fe- %/ -^S- -^-0^' .„.<^"' .-iJ^i". -^^^..x^* .-aife-. \,./ :'M!h\ %.^^ .-Ji L*^ ^.^^ %.^" - ^ SPEECH •' J. R. UNDE.RWOOD. UPON TFIX RESOLUTION PROPOSING TO CENSURE JOHN QUINCY ADAMS PRESENTING TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES A PETITION PKATJHS :*0R THK DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION. Lelivereil in' the House of Represent; tite :, on the 27th of January, 1845 WASHINGTON: 1842. \ i \ ^. SPEECH. 1 was born (said Mr. Unberwood) among slaveholders, was educated by one, have lived alt my life in their midst, and have been honored by them with many important offices — I am my- self a slaveholder. I therefore fall completely within the exception taken by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Adams) to all those situated as I am. I do not admit the validity of his challenge. So far as it respects myself, I shall overrule his objection, and sit as one of his judges. I perceive no reasons which incapacitate the representatives of the slave-holding States from judging, imp'irtially, all questions of contempt or of privilege which may arise; and I appre- hend that the gentleman's exception and challenge to nearly one-half of his constitutional triers may have some influence (although it ought not, and I hope will not) in creating feehngs of as- perity towards the accused. I have, from the commencement of this business, protested against its introduction. I have some experience, in relation to proceedings of this kind, in this House. I once saw a man brought to our bar, to be tried for a contempt in refusing to answer questions before a committee. The trial proceeded day after day. The accused (Whitney) was defended by able counsel. In the pro- gress of the trial we lost sight of the real culprit, and converted the procedure into a censorious investigation of the conduct of the members of this House. After many days of intense excite- ment, the House became satisfied that all efforts to punish the accused would prove inefTeclual ; and Whitney was dismissed, after we (I do not wish or intend to use harsh terms) had rendered ourselves, in public opinion, not very estimable for our proceedings. I have seen various attempts made to punish members for assaults and batteries committed in the presence of this body, interrupting its sittings, and bringing disgrace upon the country and its in- stitutions. I have witnessed, in these ineffectual efforts to inflict punishment, much angry feeling — the pouring out of abusive epithets, and the waste of much lime, which should have been other- wise employed. I witnessed a proceeding, very analogous to the present, against the same gentleman. An at- tempt was made to censure him, because he asked the Speaker whether petitions from free negroes or slaves could be received under the rules of the House; and intimated, if they could, that he had one to offer. After the gentleman had effectually "used up" his assailants — after their missiles had rebounded from the mighty shield of the ex-President, and inflicted ghastly wounds on those who sent them — when there was no charge left, upon which to base a censure, except that he had given "color to an idea," we got clear of the whole aflTair, in the best way we could, by laying it on the table, never to be taken up again. It happened that the petition referred to asked for the expulsion of the gentleman from Massachusetts ! I have known those engaged in duels to be arraigned, first, before a committee, and then before the House, upon a preamble and resolutions proposing expulsion and censure as suitable punish- ments. The action of this House on the report of the committee upon the case of Mr. Grates, commenced on the 21st day of April, and continued, almost without intermission, until the 10th day of May, when the whole subject, without coming to any conclusion, was laid on the table. In the mean time, scenes of vituperation and disorder, similar to those we have witnessed during the last three days, were constantly occurring, and suffusing the cheek of the patriot with the blush of shame or indignation. With these facts fresh in my recollection, I deemed it a duty to object to the introduction of the original resolution of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Gilmer) as soon as it was moved. I have been overruled. Those who introduced the subject are answerable for its consequences. The gentleman from Massachusetts, after I had obtained the floor, rose to a privileged question — if not a question of privilege — and made a point of order upon the consideration of the amendment offered by my colleague. The point of order turned, in the argument, upen the jurisdiction and au- thority of this House to punish the member from Massachusetts for the high crimes or base motives imputed to and charged against him. But the question was so presented by the record, that it be- came one, in the opinion of many members, of mere expediency, as to the //w/e when my colleague's resolutions should be considered, instead of a question involving the jurisdiction and powers of this House. The vote, therefore, which overruled the point of order, has not decided the question of jurisdiction or power. The whole case is now before us upon its merits, disencumbered from all technicality and special pleading; and we must, necessarily, decide upon the extent of our powers, the innocence or criminality of the accused, and the nature and extent of the punish- ment. T 1 .L T' • .< • My colleague's preamble, in substance, affirms that a proposition to dissolve the Lnion is a- high breach of privilege, and a contempt ofi'ered to this House." Now, sir, I propose to examine the truth of these positions. Fortunately for me, my views and opinions have been heretofore expressed, in a speech de- livered in this Hall, when Mr. Ghavks and the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wist) were pro- ceeiled against for the parts thev acted in the fatal duel. I shall now do little more than repeat the main grounds of the argument, leaving members to examine the entire reasoning then advanced^ by looking into the Journal of Debates, if it be their pleasure to take so much trouble. By the Constitution, members of Congress are secured in certain privileges. By a well settled rule of interpretation, the enumeration of certain rights in any instrument, excludes those not ex- pressed ; and, therefore, nothing can "be claimed as a constitutional privilege which is not ex- pressly inserted. These are the words of the Constitution : " They (members of Congress) shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their sitiendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to or returning from the same; and for any speech or debate, in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. Exemption from arrest and irresponsibility for any speech or debate, in either House, except to the House which may be offended thereby, are the two privileges expressed. Why did those whu framed the Constitution omit to provide in that instrument for other cases of privilege, known to the law of Parliament, as acted on and enforced by the Houses of Lords and of Commons in Eng- land 1 Were the sages who framed our Constitution ignorant of the almost unbounded claims of the members of Parliament " to privilege 1" No, sir; they understood the subject well, and •with a full knowledge of the extravagant pretensions of the members of the British Legislature,, the patriots of the ifcvolution secured, in the Constitution, but two privileges to members of Con- gress. It has, therefore, always appeared very clear, to ray judgment, that the extension of the UreSS. IL lias, lUCltl.'ii, a.,yy>'j^ ^f^f "-- ---j , -- --j J— a > ... , , doctrine of "privilege," beyond the letter of the Constitution, is a palpable violation of that instru- ment. Hence, wherever it has been proposed to punish a member for an assault or battery, or murder, upon the ground of " breach of privilege," I have invariably denounced the proce- dure, 'l admit that disorderly conduct, on the part of members disturbing the deliberations of the House or its committee.*, or in any manner obstructing the business of legislation, is punishable. There is an express warrant in the Constitution for punishing such conduct; for it is provided in the fourth section of the first article, that "each House may determine the rule of its proceed- ings, punish a member for disorderiy behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." To proceed against a member for "disorderly behavior," is one thing— to charge him with a breach of privilege, or a " high breach of privilege," is another thing, totally different. I doubt whether either House can, constitutionally, erect itself into a judicial tribunal— assume cogni- yance of cases where the admitted privileges of its members have been violated — pronounce sentence againstthe offender, and then put it in execution, through the instrumentality of the Sergeant-at- Arms. Suppose I am arrested for debt, after the adjournment of Congress, on my way home; or suppose I am held to bail in an action of slander, founded upon words spoken in debate upon this floor, and incarcerated for failing to give it ; can the House of Representatives, at its next session, assume jurisdiction, and undertake to punish those who may have violated my privileges, or am I ]('ft to resort to the judicial tribunals for redress 1 But for certain precedents, I should not hesitate to decide that the only remedy, in such cases, must be applied by the judiciary. If the House, whose inenib.-r is imprisoned in violation of the Constitution, is not in session at the time, then, if judicial remedy be discarded, the member must remain in jail until the next meeting of Congress. When Congress convenes, can either House issue its writ of habeas corpus with a view to his release ? Can either House issue its "capias" against the offender, the breaker of privilege, and bring him up to answer, criminally, for his offence, or civilly, to the aggrieved member ] Can the House of Representatives, in such cases, punish by censure, fine, imprisonment, or hanging, the man viho violates the privileges of a member ] Can either House treat the subject as a civil suit, and Tender a judgment for damages to compensate ttie injury 1 If either House has criminal jurisdic- tion and may, constitutionally, intiict punishment, has it not civil jurisdiction likewi.«e, and may it not settle the entire controversy between the parties 1 I put these questions, and require answers. 'J hose who altemi>l to answer will, I apprehend, find much difiiculty in placing the power of this 31ouse upon such foundations as to justify its exercise, in the least degree. It is perfectly obvi- ous that, to tolerate such power, is to convert the two Houses of Congress, so far as the privi- leges of members arc concerned, into bodies clothed with legislative, judicial, and executive func- tions, wnhout limit or restraint. And these "high" powers are to be exercised by men compos- ing the two Houses, in behalf of themselves. Thus they, in effect, become judges in their ow.n cause. All this is at war with the essence of our institutions; and, but for some precedents to be found in our past history, it would \>e difficult for a republican to comprehend how it was possibie that either House of Congress should so far fdsrget the principles of justice, and of the Constitu- tion as to assume the powere of legislator, judge, juryman, and executioner, for the benefit of its member?. There is no excuse for it, but the inconsiderate and blind imitation of the example of the British Houses of Parliament. The formation of the Constitution, and the limitations therein pre- scribed to the extent of privilege, at once abolished the authority of British' precedents; and it should be a source of lasting regret, with every republican, that either Hous« of Congress should, at anytime, have gone so far as to invade the province of the judiciary, by attempting to inflict pun- ishment upon the citizen for a breach of "privilege." The case of Anderson, charged with violating the privileges of members, by offering a bribe, and of the editor of the Aurora, summoned to ap- pear before the Senate to answer for an offensive pubhcation, are the unfortunate precedents to which I refer, and vfhich I do, mo.^t sincerely, hope may never be followed hereafter. Why, sir, it" these cases are to be followed, I might move the House to send for Webb, of the Courier and En- quirer, and Bennett, of the Herald, and have the question settled between them, whether W^ebb did charge the Kentucky delegation, one and all, with bribery, at the rate of $100,000 per vote, for the repeal of the bankrupt act; or whether Bennett, as Webb charge.«, lied outright in making the statement. If Bennett propagated the calumnious falsehood, without autliority, he is legally guilty of slander, and might be punished. Where would such a doctrine as this lead us, and where would it end 1 Although the Constitution expressly excepts cases of "treason, felony, and breaches of the peace," from the operation of "privilege," yet the opinions now advanced, and heretofore prac- tised upon, vindicate the propriety of taking hold of a member and proceeding to try him for any of these ollenccs, upon the ground that it is matter of " privilege" either to the accused or to his fellow members. It cannot be the "privilege" of the accused under the Constitution, for that instrument declares, in such cases, he shall have no "privilege." How is it matter of "privi- lege" to my fellow members, that I am guilty of "treason, felony, or a breach of the peacel" It is impossible that my guilt, which deprives me of " privilsge," and subjects me to arrest, should confer upon them privileges not specified or enumerated in the Constitution. For "treason, fel- ony, or breach of the peace," I am, at all times, liable to arrest and trial before the judicial tri- bunals. Shall this House detain me from the civil magistrate, until my guilt is here pronounced by censure or expulsion, and then hand me over, with my case prejudged and prejudiced by the decision ? What authority have you to withhold any of your members from the sherifl'or mar- shal who has a warrant to arrest for treason or felony ] If you can keep him a day or an hour, and put the ofTiccr and his process at defiance, what prevents you from refusing to surrender the accused meml^r altogether? If you can detain him until you have tried him, may you not after trial, especially should you find him guiltless, detain him months and years ^ And, should you thus proceed, what becomes of the constitutional provision which allows immediate arrest in cases ot treason and felony 1 It is clear that you violate the Constitution, should you refuse for a moment to obey the process of the eivil magistrate. If no warrant is taken out tor the apprehension of the accused, does that give you authority to proceed 1 Certainly not. Your jurisdiction is perfect, or you have it not to any extent. If you have juri.sdiction.at all, and you commence the trial of a member, you should proceed to the termination of it. Now, it is very clear that you have no right to resist the process of the civil magistrate, and would be bouml by the Constitution, in the midst of such a trial as we are now conducting against the gentleman from Massachusetts, to sur- render the accused, or to allow his arrest ? Your liability to be thus interrupted in your proceedings and defeated in your jurisdiction, proves that you have no right in the beginning to commence the trial. Gentlemen may contend that the efTect of my doctrine is, that however base a member may be, or however atrocious the crimes he may have committed, he woald be allowed to retain his seat as a fit associate of the members of this House. My opinions and doctrines lead to no such result. On the contrary, if there be among us a traitor or a felon, any one member of this House may be- come his accuser, appeal to the civil magistrate, take out a warrant, have him arrested, and tuns him over to the judiciary. If found guilty, the gallows or penitentian' would relieve us from his contaminating presence. If acquitted, I doubt very much whether this House ought to readjudi- cate the case, with a view to censure, or to expel, or to inlhct any other punishment. The spirit of that constitutional provision which declares that no person shall, for the "same offence, be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb," and the plea of autrefois acquit, should be respected here as well as in the courts of the judiciary. There is great impropriety in either House running ahead of the judiciary in affixing a stigma, by censure or expulsion, upon anv one of its members accused of crime. We all know how easy it is to excite clamor and prejudice, and thereby to prevent a fair and impartial trial. Shall the Houses of Congress so far forget their own dignitv, and the principles of justice, as to initiate proceedings which may eventuate in the sacrifice of innocent lives ? Suppose I commit homicide, my defence before a jury of my peers is, that I did it iu self-defence. It is impossible to say what influence my expulsion from this Hall might have upon the minds of my triers. It is certain, that so far as it operated, it would be most pernicious, and might cost me my life. I have not looked into the proceedings of the Senate in the case of Senator Smith, but I should be very reluctant to follow the precedent, if it assumes the right to run ahead of the judicial tribunals. [Here Mr. Adams was understood to say, that the case of Smith and the proceedings of the 6 Senate established no such principle. He said that Smith had been indicted by a grand jury as- an accomplice of Burr, which indictment had been dismissed after Burr's discharge ; that Burr •was acquitted upon a special verdict, which did not relieve his character from moral guilt.] I am glad to hear the fact slated, said Mr. Unuekwoou, by the gentleman from Massachu- setts. It presents the case of Smith in a new light to my mind. It is the case of an acquittal upon technical grounds by the judicial tribunal, leaving the moral guilt of the accused as the foun- dation of tlie proceedings against him by his fellow members. I am happy to lewn that the Senate did not take up the case of Smith until the courts of law were done with it. It seems to me that the entire doctrine of the advocates of '• privilege" i.-^ radically erroneous; and no part of the doctrine is more objectionable, in my estimation, than that which assumes the power to inquire into the moral character and conduct of a member on this floor, and to hold him responsible to his fellow members. The decalogue denounces Sabbath breaking and covetous- ness. Shall my fellow members try me for these sins, or any other ] Suppose they do try and expel me, and my constituents should think proper to send rne back again, will my re-election purify my character and make me a fit associate for those who had a few months before expelled me? After my re-election, shall I retain a seat, or nmst I submit to a second expulsion, and so on without end ? You have nothing to do with my moral character and conduct. For these I am responsible to my constituents, and if I am not so vile, in their estimation, as to be rejected by them, it is your duty to transact their business with me. A business association will no more contaminate your morals or your persons, than a professional association between lawyer and client, physician and patient, will communicate crime and disease to him who is employed to defend or to heal. Sir, the age is becoming "righteous overmuch." We are squeamishly sensitive on the subject of legislative purity, or affect to be so. I am afraid, sir, that the Impartial Judge will say to us,"ye strain at gnats and swallow camels." If a member in his motives and his actions does not come up exactly to the moral standard which the majority of this House may be disposed to erect, will it not be better to leave him to his constituents, rather than undertake to stretch him by our chastisements'! Where is your constitutional warrant to make a code of morals, and then to establish an inquisitorial court to ascertain who violates your code, and how to punish the of- fender ! In my opinion, we are transcending the Constitution, and trampling upon the rights of members and the rights of the people, in making the attempt. I object, then, to the want of power in this House to try the gentleman from Massachusetts. I object fur another reason. If the House has the power to try and to punish the member from Massachusetts, what punishment should it inflict ! If he be guilty of treason or subornation of perjury, it is worse than "bathos" to reprimand him only. If the charges are true, expulsion is too mild a punishment. Fine and imprisonment are inilnitely too mild. If the ex-President be a traitor, hanging is the proper punishment. [Here Mr. Marshall again denied, in the most emphatic manner, ai he had done the day be- fore, that there was any such charge inai'e against Mr. Ahams.] I know, said Mr. Undehwoou, that -my colleague's preamble and resolutions do not, in so many words, charge the overt act of treason ; but his preamble, in substance, aflirms, that a proposition to dissolve the Union necessarily implies the destruction of the Constitution and the overthrow of the Republic, "involving necessarily, in its execution and its consequences, the destruction of our country and the crime of high treason." The gentleman from Massachusetts has presented such a profiosition, not as his own, but for the petitioners. My colleague's first resolution calls this act an " indignity " to the House, and an " insult " to the people of the United States ; and his second resolution declares, among other things, that the "wound which he (the accused) has permitted TO be aimed, through his insirumentality, at the Constitution and existence of his country, might well bs held to merit expulsion from the national councils." Now, put this and that together, and what does it mean 1 Sir, in the list resolution, the gentleman from Massachusetts is charged ^vith conduct — or "instrumentality" — which inflicts a "wound" or aims a blow at the Constitu- tion and existence of the country, by presenting the proposition of others; and in the preamble we are told what is to be implied by a "proposition" to dissolve the organic laws^in other words, to dissolve the Union. No inference can be drawn from all this, unless it be that the gentleman from Massachusetts is in heart and soul a traitor, and the willing tool, in the hands of traitors, to " overtlirow the American Republic." These imputations are cloaked in sonorous words and well-turned periods,which do not go directly to their object, but circumambulate with caution, and do the thing as effectually in the end as if they had been reduced to a single pointed sentence, de- claring that John Q. Adams gave aid and countenance to a traitorous movement. My colleague's resolutions do not breathe ajivord — no, not a letter — al)out the declaration or motion of the gentleman from Massachusetts, which accompanied the presentation of the petition. The motion which he made, to have the petition referred to a select committee, with instructions to report an answer, showing the reasons why the prayer ouglit not to be granted, is not hinted at, either in my col- league's resolutions, or in the oriijinal resolution of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Gilmer.) The gentleman from Massachusetts, by that motion, discountenanced and condemned the petition at the moment he presented it; and yet, sir, this important fact is suppressed or not noticed in- the resolutions proposing to censure him I This proceeding is at war with other constitutional principles, v^hich ought ever to be held sa- cred. The Constitution declares that no ex post facto law shall be passed, and that cruel and un~ u6Mc/ punishments shall not be inflicted. These prohibitions were intended to prevent Congress from making, by subsequent legislation, that action a crime, which was not denounced as such by the laws in force at the time of its performance -, and to secure notice, beforehand, of the nature and extent of punishment which should be inflicted for conduct made criminal by law. All pun- ishment is "cruel and unusual" which is imposed by retroactive legislation. Now, sir, what are* wc doing ] We are engaged in an attempt to punish the gentleman from Massachusetts for an ■ action not made criminal by any former law ; and we are invoked to inflict a punishment which neither he, nor any one else, was ever notified should be the consequence of his conduct. I am thoroughly convinced that we have tin privllfges, as members, which cannot be better pro- tected by the judiciary than by Congress itself. It is high time that the nation should look to the abuses which grow out of the attempt to exercise the jurisdiction now attempted, and to examine the extravagant and latitudinous pretensions of the advocates of congressional "privilege." The question of "privilege" is entirely distinct from the power expressly granted in the Constitution to punish and expel members for disorderly behavior. It is the imperative duly of each House by Its rules to prescribe punishments for every species of disorder, and to define, vvitJi precision, those offences for which a member shall be expelled. I have heretofore called the attention of this House to the importance of doing this, but I have in vain urged thq necessity of action. Until the House adopts some code defining offences, and prescribing punishments, and the mode of trial, we shall be agitated and troubled by abortive efforts to punish, which, instead of preserving our dig- nity, are themselves the causes of increased disorder, and tend to bring upon this body a weight of public odium which must eventually sink it. The attempt to try Mr. Graves and the seconds in the fatal duel, cost the nation more than $40,000. How many days we shall spend depleting the public purse at the rate of more than $2,000 per day, in the trial of the ex-President, time must determine. The loss of money is nothing compared with the loss of reputation.* What has the gentleman from Massachusetts done to insult or contemn this House, for which he should be punished ] He did nothing more than I have vpitnessed here a thousand times with- out the least excitement. He offered a petition and moved its reference to a select committee, with instructions to report against the prayer of the petitioners. That is ail he did. He used no indecorous language. He said nothing abu.sive of* any one. He violated no rule of order. For what, then, is he to be tried? Why, sir, for nothing ; unless it be the motives and feelings under which he acted in presenting the petition. I ask, sir, in sober earnestness, if his triers arfe not arrogating to themselves the •powers of Almighty God, in undertaking to judge his motives and feelings, and to find guilt in these, when his conduct is not criminall In ordinary prosecutions we inter the turpitude of motive and feeling from the criminality of action ; but in this case, the action being innocent, being nothing more than the presentation of a petition, we try the motive in order to establish the guilt of the accused. And how do we get at his motives'? Why, sir, it is done by identifying him with the petitioners. My colleague's resolutions and preamble intimate, pretty clearly, that the petitioners invite us to commit treason and perjury, for which they are morally guilty ; and their guilt attaches to the gentleman from Massachusetts, because he became their instrument in presenting the petition. Huch is the process of reasoning by which to fix a guilty or base motive upon the gentleman from Massachusetts; and this is persisted in, notwith- standing the gentleman's declaration, constituting a part of the res gesto, that he wished the com- mittee instructed to report against it ! My colleague is a lawyer. Does he consider himself iden- tified with his clients, and responsible for all the untruths, false statements, and perjuries, which may have been perpetrated in the bills and answers, declarations and pleas, which he, for them, may have presented to court in the course of his practice 1 God forbid that I should be held re- sponsible, either in this world or the next, for the actions or motives of those whom it has been my fortune to represent in the judicial tribunals of the country. I know it is a vulgar prejudice to identify client and lawyer, and to denounce both ; but I have never known the good sense of any people appealed to in vain. Temporary excitements, fanned by demagogues, may lead them astray for a while ; but, in the end, they distinguish between the client and the attorney, and per- ceive and discountenance the injustice of attaching the guilt of the one to the character of the other. Does not a similar distinction exist between the representative and the constituent 1 May not the representative offer to the legislative body any and every petition which the constituent places in his hands, without thereby identifying himself in motive, feeling, and action, with the constituent] May he not present the petition when he is directly opposed to every motive and feeling which actuates the petitioner? Su[)pose the petition from Haverhill had been placed in my hands" with a request that I should present it ; suppose I had stated to the House that I had such a petition ; that it was the first of the kind I ever heard of; that I was not sure but the petitioners owere guilty of crime in preparing such a paper ; and that, under such circumstances, not knowing * Thp trial nf Mr. Adams, to the exclusion of all oth"r business, commenced on the 25lh of January, and terminate 1 on the 7lh of February, v^hen the whole proceedings were laiil on the tatile without deciding a single point. The ex penses of the House, during the time thus wasted, exceeded g2G,000. 8 well what to do, I had determined to present it to the House, and ask its reference to a select com- mittee, with instructions to inquire and report what measures ought to be taken ; would any man dare rise and charge me, under such circumstances, with treasonable motives, or as aiding and abetting those who invite members of Congress to commit perjury ? And yet, sir, the supposed case is less favorable than the actual case before us ; for, in the supposed case, I have left the com- mittee at liberty to foster and sustain the petition ; whereas, the gentleman from Massachusetts, by his instructions, took away all discretion, except as to the number and nature of the reasons to be assigned against the prayer of the petition. Sir, it does seem to me that the attempt to punish the gentleman from Massachusetts, under the facts of the case, is a direct assault upon the liberty of speech, and the liberty of the representative in the discharge of what he regards official duty. In this view, the whole proceeding is an outrage upon the first principles of constitutional liberty. It is well known to all, who have served with the gentleman from Massachusetts as long as I have, that his doctrine on the "right of petition" is ultra in the extreme. I have thought, and still think, that he is in an error on the subject. Some years since, I made fruitless efforts to o''- tain the floor, with a view to deliver my sentiments and opinions on the subject of the right of petiti«n ; and especially the right of the people of the States to petition for the abohtion of slavery in the District of Columbia. Not getting an opportunity to make a speech here, I deemed it a duty to present my opinions, and the reasons in support of them, to my constituents; and did so, through the columns of the National Intelligencer. My letter may be found in that paper, under the date of 13th May, 1840. 'I endeavored to demonstrate that the "ri^hf of petition" was not unlimited; that it was not coextensive with the liberty of speech. I have heard the gentleman, from Massachusetts contend that the only limitation to the right of petition consisted in offensive, insulting terms. I have heard him admit that this House was not bound to receive petitions couched in oflensive, insulting language. If no such language justified their rejection, then his doctrine has always been, since I knew him, that Congress ought to receive and act upon the petitions which any portion of the people might think proper to send. Sir, in offeruig the petition front Haverh'll.the genlbman from Massachusetts has acted in conformity with principles which he has avowed for years. His practice on former occasions-has made a strong impression upon my mind, of the sincerity and pertinacity with which he adheres to what I regard an error. Surely members have not forgotten the elTorts heretofore made to censure the gentleman from Massachusetts for manifesting a willingness to present a petition fcr his own expulsion, coming from free negroes or slaves. The other day, he presented a petition for his own degradation as chairman of the Com- mittee on Foreign AlTairs. He once presented a petition from a man who asked of Congress the privilege of building a house, without showing what obstructions we^-e in his way, or how the ac- tion of Congress would relieve his embarrassments. With a knowledge of these facts, I was not surprised that the gentleman presented the Haverhill petition. Sir, he could lioi have refused, and preserve his consistency. And the cau.se for astonishment is not that he offered the petition, but it is that wf, to preserve our privileges, .should undertake to punish him for performing what he regards a conscientious duty ! I can perceive no foundation on which to chaige the accu.sed with offering an insult or contempt to the Hou.^e. The intention or motive is indispensible to con.stitute an insult or contempt ; and if you cannot reach the motive, and the action does not necessarily show the motive, then there is no foundation on which to presume an insult or contempt, and no one ought to suppose that either was offered, without proof. In our schoolboy days, we have all read the fal)le of the lamb and the wolf, who was insulted because the lamb crossed or drank in the stream below. I trust, sir, there is no't such deep-rooted hostility between the accused and any portion of the members of this House, that any pretext will be regarded sufficient to justify his immolation. The gentleman from Mas- sachusetts has been the most active member in presenting abolition petitions for many years. He may have created some personal dislike towards himself, by his course in that respect; but all must acknowledge, however offensive such petitions are to many of us, the gentleman has uniformly de- clared that" he offered them under a sense of duty, although he would not vote according to the wishes of the petitioners. For years past, Congress and the nation have been embroiled in the worst feelings m relation to the "right i>f petition," especially that cla.ss of petitions praying for the abolition of slavery in this District. The course pursued by this House has aggravated instead of allaying the evil. The proper remedy is, to take up the .s'ubject deliberately and calmly, and to define the " right of petition." Let us examine with a view to ascertain what constitutes the right; how to be exer- cised by the people ; and how its exercise should be treated by the deliberative a.ssembly addressed. Instead' of doing this, the remedy heretofore applied has been to arrest and prevent discussion. "When an offensive petition is presented, we either lay it, or the question of reception, upon the 'table without debate; and, in regard to the class of pel I'f' V '^0^ ^°-^^> v"^^/ .^•^'''*' - ^ov^ 1^ - « • ^^-^^^ ^-o^^-^^ - ^'% ^^ "-" °- //^ y.^^^X >..<^^ " .o^ ..^'** "^c > ■'•^- c°\c:^^ '^'o 1* -. * • o . -^o' ^ iW5^ >..s^^ /Jfev \..^^^ /MM^^ %.^^ o* Jtev \./ : ♦ A V -^^ ^^""^ /\-^iX ''^'^m:> /^-^X . e „ o " » vJ <^ ^^^ *^- 'N » . « • < ,,-&- . vOv!> ... 0' 'v-'^-^'V V"^^'*/ \1*"^''\**^ %/ -^ V - * • :,* ^*>.. - m ^^^\ '.