RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR GREGOR ALEXINSKY RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR GREGOR ALEXINSKY Ex-Deputy to the Duma Translated by BERNARD MIALL NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 597-599 FIFTH AVENUE 2 ^ ^ J S (^1// rights reserved) f-n - <^ i V- ^-X:::^ r/ 3- ^ --si " Petrograd, 12 January. — At Lemberg the con- valescent Russian soldiers, blinded by vitriol, which was flung in their faces by the Germans, offer a pitiful spectacle. With bandaged features, they move in Indian file, holding on to a cord, and led by a guide " (Telegram published in the journal L Humanitc, January 13, 1915). TO THESE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS, AND TO OTHER VICTIMS OF THE WAR, WHICH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE DID NOT DESIRE, I RESPECTFULLY DEDICATE THE PRESENT VOLUME THE AUTHOR PREFACE The success obtained with the British public by my work on " Modern Russia," of which the second edition followed the first in the space of ten months, has inspired me with courage once more to address my readers in a book devoted to my country. The subject of this new book is " Russia and the Great War." But in writing it I wished not merely to write a book for the moment ex- clusively, of value only for to-day, and of no interest to-morrow. It is not the external and dramatic aspect of the great war waged by Russia and her Allies that interests me the most. On the contrary, my readers will find in my pages neither descriptions of battles nor tragic or picturesque narratives of the incidents of battle. My aim has been something quite different from this. I wish to inform my English readers con- cerning the principal phenomena of Russian life before the war, and to explain the relations be- tween these phenomena and the war itself. 8 PREFACE What were the events of international poli- tics which preceded the war, and what causes forced Russia to take part in it ? What was the internal situation of Russia on the eve of the war ? Can we say that the Russian people, or its Government, or both together, desired this war? How was the war received by society, and by the popular masses in Russia, and what was the attitude of the various nationalities and political parties of my country toward the world- war? Why did certain of the Russian "revo- lutionaries " and Socialists experience a strange dread of the victory of Russia, and even express a desire that she should meet with defeat? In what manner did the Governments of the countries at war with Russia seek to exploit, to their own profit, the hatred of the Russian revolutionaries for Tsarism ? Why does the Russian soldier fight better when opposed to the Austrians, Germans, and Turks, than he fought during the war with Japan? What prospects will lie open before Russia at the end of the war ? What may Europe expect from Russia, and Russia from Europe, after the demolition of the Prussian militarism which threatens both Russia and Europe ? Here are the numerous questions which I deal with in the present volume, and which I seek PREFACE 9 to answer. In my arguments and expositions I have sought always to remain objective and impartial, so far as that is possible in the phase of the human tragedy through which we are passing. Each of my assertions is based on facts and supported by documents. I do not wish to trouble the minds of my readers by clamorous indignation ; I prefer to convince their minds by an objective analysis. For, in the words of a Russian writer — Words and illusions perish ; facts remain. G. A. April 1915. CONTENTS PART I BEFORE THE WAR CHAPTER I PAGE I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War. The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The confidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist . . 19 CHAPTER II I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or de- fensive ? — II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Germany and England. The Anglo-Franco- Russian eniente and its political character . . -32 CHAPTER III I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League.— II, The Turco- German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- stantinople and the Dardanelles . . . -47 11 12 CONTENTS CHAPTER IV PAGE I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The commercial exchange between these two countries. The success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs \ Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. Why was not the Russo-German economic entente realized ? ....... 59 CHAPTER V I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic progress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. The policy of the Government. Recent success of the liberative movement. The poHtical strike and the popular demonstrations of July 1914 in Petersburg . . -74 CHAPTER VI I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan of 1914. Its strategical and military destination . . 82 CHAPTER VII I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the nineteenth century. — II. The military forces of Russia compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The Russian Navy . . . . . . -95 CHAPTER VIII I. Did Russia desire the war ? The two Russias, popular and governmental. The pacific tendencies of the Russian peasants and working-men. — II. Official Russia and its CONTENTS 13 PAGE attitude towards the Austro-German coalition. The poHtical, military, and ideological recoil of the Russian Government from the Austro-German expansion. — III. The war and the Revolution. The Russian reaction and the Prussian . 105 PART II IN THE BLOODY FRAY CHAPTER I I. The diplomatic documents and the political reality. The opinion of a little Chinese scholar and a great European scientist. — II. The international tension in July 191 4 and the question of responsibility. The Austro-German aggres- sion and the part played by Russia. Could Russia have anticipated the war ? . . . . . -123 CHAPTER II I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted with an unexpected war. — II. The session of the Duma. The agreement between the majority of the parties and representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote for the military credits . . . . '134 CHAPTER III I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures; the new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the war . . . . . . . .155 14 CONTENTS CHAPTER IV PAGE I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nation- alities of the Russian Empire before the international war. — II. The Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles become Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — IV. The Ukraine.— V. Finland.— VI. The position of the Jews. Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist problem in the Baltic Provinces . . . -179 CHAPTER V I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries and Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this dread. The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. Why is the propaganda resulting from this apprehension erroneous and harmful ? — II. The German, Austrian, and Turkish Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian revolutionaries. The noble reply of certain of these latter to the agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. Russian revolutionaries in the French Army . . 229 CHAPTER VI I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. The " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." — II. The rural communes and co-operative associations in the campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. — III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — IV. The Press in Russia during the war . . . 258 CHAPTER VII I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he fought against Japan. The " liberation idea " and the war . 277 CONTENTS 15 PART III AFTER THE WAR CHAPTER I PAGE I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. The possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Are they necessary to Russia ? . . . . 297 CHAPTER II I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and the destruction of Prussian Imperiahsm. — II. The defeat of Germany is to the advantage of the German revolu- tionaries and the Socialists of Germany and of all Europe ........ 306 CHAPTER III I. Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian monarchies? — II. The intrigues of the Russian reaction- aries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these intrigues are to be disarmed . . . . -312 CHAPTER IV I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national question after the war. — III. The role of the French and English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? . 322 16 CONTENTS CHAPTER V PAGE I. Russia and England, Their economic relations. The neces- sity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — II. The intellectual relations between Russia and England. Con- cerning certain " deviations " of English sympathies . 343 PART I BEFORE THE WAR Russia and the Great War CHAPTER I I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War, The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The con- fidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist. I The war with little Japan marked a decisive moTnent in the contemporary history of the ex- ternal policy of the great Russian Empire. To be more precise, it constituted first a check and then a change in the direction of this policy. Before the war the Russian eagle had hovered in full liberty above the Asiatic Orient, continu- ally extending its wings over new territories, until at length the Pacific Ocean was attained. But the Rising Sun of the young Japanese Empire was to scorch its pinions. Its flight toward the Far East was suddenly arrested, and as early as 1906, at a secret meeting of the leaders of the Russian Government, one of these latter declared 19 20 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR that after the debacle occasioned by the Russo- Japanese War, the Empire of the Tsars must per- force renounce the old aggressive energy of its customary external policy, in order to " assume a more prudent and more conciliatory attitude." Thus there ensued a period of arrest in the march of Russia toward the Far East, and the Muscovite bear found himself at the parting of the ways, like the hero of a popular Russian legend. Which was the road to follow ? Should he continue to tread the ancient track? But the yellow sun of Japan was still visible on the Eastern horizon. Or would it be better to return toward the West? Behold the black eagle of Gennany, with its beak of steel, and always on the alert ! Doubtless the best and simplest policy would have been to remain at home, to seek no new adventures, whether to East or to West. But unhappily man does not always adhere to the best or the simplest solution. And the historical past had left Russia a heavy burden in the shape of an inheritance of military and diplomatic ties^, and alliances and counter-alliances, whose auto- matic action might well result in dragging Russia into an external conflict, or in forcing her to involve both friends and enemies in such a con- flict. " Moreover, there were forces in the interior of the country which would not willingly bow BEFORE THE WAR 21 to the necessity of modifying the tone of the State's external policy. There were several groups among the higher ranks of the aristocracy and the Army for whom the lesson of the Russo- Japanese War passed almost unperceived, and who were eager to take their revenge upon the field of battle — but on what field was a matter of in- difference. There were groups of capitalists, moreover, who would not be content with a patient and peaceable effort to regenerate the great home market, which was nevertheless capable of yield- ing them a greater revenue than all the Man- churias and Persias of the world together. They hankered after foreign markets, which were to be conquered by brute force. " The East China railway should have created new markets for us, and have connected Europe and the East by a trade route. The Russo- Japanese War destroyed these hopes. The railway has lost 700 versts of its best and most pro- ductive portion ; we have lost the port of Dalny (Talienwan), which was equipped to perfection. We cannot hope great things from the exporta- tion of our merchandise to Southern Manchuria, where the Japanese are the masters. Our trade with Mongolia is equally in a stagnant condi- tion. . . . Our position in the Far East being compromised as a result of the war, the eye naturally returns toward the West, and above all to the Near East. A series of Chambers of 22 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Commerce has been established— Anglo-Russian, Russo-Belgian, and so forth. At the same time companies have been formed for the exporta- tion of general merchandise, and especially for export to the Balkans. . . . But, notwithstand- ing the simultaneous efforts of the Government, and the commercial and industrial circles, the exportation of manufactured articles is increasing far too slowly. Our position in the Near East is weak. In the West there is nothing to hope for. ' Friendly ' Germany is pushing us toward Asia, but in Persia our affairs are in a bad way, and threaten to grow still worse in the future- thanks to the German competition. We have lost the market of the rich southern portion of Manchuria, and the market offered by its northern portion is poor and unstable. Foreign compe- tition is successfully driving us out of Mongolia. Hence the tendencies which are now apparent among us, which demand the employment of armed force, that we may retain possession of these markets ; so that we find ourselves on the eve of new colonial adventures. ... In a word, the historical phase which was passed through before the Revolution is about to be renewed." Such is the description of the political situa- tion of Russia in Eastern Asia after the Russo- Japanese War, in respect of the economical basis of that policy, as it appeared to a worthy BEFORE THE WAR 23 Russian economist whose book was published in 191 I .» But while a few small political and economic circles hoped for a continuation of the old orien- tation of the foreign politics of Russia— that is, the continuation of the march toward the Far East — there were others— and among them were many Liberals— who insisted that Russia should concentrate her attention and her energies on regions less remote, notably on Asia Minor, the shores of the Black Sea, and the Balkans. It must be admitted that this tendency is founded on interests and considerations of an important nature. Russia is one of the " granaries of the world." Her foreign trade consists above all in the exportation of cereals. " A glance at the statistics of our cereal exports will show that their centre of gravity since the year 1896 lies in the ports of the south. During the last twelve years the part played by the regions of the south, south-east, and south-west in the foreign trade of Russia has been still further enlarged. In 1909, 76 per cent, of all the wheat, 91 per cent, of all the barley, 53 per cent, of all the rye, and 83 per cent, of all the maize exported from Russia was exported from the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov." = ' See the great economic work of M, A. Finn-Yenotaevsky Sovremenno'ie Kliozidistvo Rossiyi ("The Modern Economy of Russia"), Petersburg, 191 1, pp. 408-12. ^ Ibid. pp. 425-6. 24 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Cereals are the principal article of Russia's foreign trade. The ports of the Black Sea are the chief outlets for the foreign export of Russian grain. From this you can judge the importance of the Eastern Question, the question of the Dardanelles, etc., for the whole of Russia, from the point of view of her economic interests. Add to these the problem of the commercial relations existing between Russia and Germany, which are connected by a highly developed com- mercial exchange, the nature of which I shall presently explain. Finally, consider the position of Germany and Russia on the Baltic, which is the second-* great route of the foreign trade of Russia, and which is really in the possession of the powerful German Navj, and you will readily perceive that the economic interests of Russia in the West are far greater than in the Far East, and that Russia cannot completely ignore what is passing in Asia Minor, in the Balkans, and on her western frontiers. II Certain Russian politicians were even of opinion that Russia ought resolutely to abandon the old direction of her military and diplomatic policy, which looked toward the Asiatic Orient, and that this policy should confine itself to Europe and the Balkans. This opinion was dis- puted by the supporters of the Asiatic policy. BEFORE THE WAR 25 One of these latter, Baron Rosen, who had been Russian Amhassador in Belgrade, Tokio, and Washington, and who was a colleague of M. Witte at the time of the negotiations with Japan which took place at Portsmouth, published, in 191 3, a very interesting confidential memoir dealing with this subject, of which the issue was withdrawn from circulation — it is said by order of the Government. I believe my readers will feel grateful to me for quoting the essential por- tion of this memoir.' " After the check occasioned by the last war," writes M. Rosen, " and the defeat of our entire policy 'in the Far East— a policy qualified as a mere adventure by people who did not realize the vast importance to Russia of her interests in those regions, a policy which deserved that epithet only because it was not in time supported by all the forces of the State— the idea seems firmly to have rooted itself in the mind of the public that Russia should once more seek the centre of her political interests in Europe." M. Rosen does not share this opinion. He does not believe that Russia has any historic mission in the Near East ; he does not consider the " Slav idea " to have any real basis ; he is not of opinion that it corresponds with the real ^ A detailed account of this memoir, with many quotations, was published in the French review Le Correspotidant, Septem- ber 19 1 3. 26 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR interests of Russia. So far the defence of the " Slav idea " has had none but neg^ative and harmful results for Russia. It dragged the coun- try into the war of 1877-8, which cleared the ground for the Revolution ; it was the cause of the estrangement between Germany and Russia in the time of Bismarck, and the dissolution of the alliance of " Three Emperors " which guaran- teed the western frontier of Russia. Finally, says M. Rosen, it " also pushed us to the conclusion of an alliance with France which has involved us in interests entirely foreign to Russia : namely, the French desire to be revenged for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and, of late years, the Anglo-German antagonism, which will be the ground on which the coming European war will be fought." For M. Rosen " the great Slav ideal " is merely the " verbal gymnastics of writers and orators of the Slavophile camp *' . . . devoid of any real foundation. " All undertakings inspired by this idea— as, for example, the Slav Bank, the exhibitions of Russian products, the Russian libraries in Slav countries, etc., either remain in the condition of mere projects, or drag themselves through a miserable existence. ... In the domain of material civilization, Russia has no need of the Slav world, nor the Slav world of Russia. In the Slav States of the Balkans our industry, which BEFORE THE WAR 27 has at its disposal a vast home market defended by extremely high protective tariffs, could only at a loss compete with the Austro-German indus- tries ; as for the Slavs of the south, their com- mercial relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, their neighbour, will always be more advantageous than their relations with distant Russia. " From the intellectual standpoint, the Slavs of the Balkans (and still more those of Austria), despite a somewhat factitious Germanophobia, evidently prefer — and this is very natural — to tap directly and at first hand the Western sources, and principally those of Germany. ... As for the sympathies of the Austrian Slavs, which we are told are irresistibly pro-Russian, it is only too obvious that their flirtations with us have one sole object, and that essentially a selfish one : it is, to flaunt before the Austrian Government the bogy of Pan-Slavism under Russian hege- mony, in order to obtain from it the desired con- cessions. . . . Our continual advances, in the press and in the speeches of certain amateur poli- ticians, toward the Austrian Slavs, have in the end impelled Austria to retort by very undesir- able and even dangerous advances to our own ' Mazeppists,' ' Ukrainophiles, and other ele- ments hostile to the Russian Empire, which enter- ' The supporters of the policy inaugurated by the famous Cossack hetman Mazeppa. 28 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR tain treiacherous dreams of the dismemberment of Russia." Baron Rosen pronounces in favour of an understanding with Austria. " The only cause of armed conflict with Austria that can be foreseen is precisely the opposition which we are offering to her Balkan policy. . . . This antagonism is the cause of a state of affairs very dangerous for us, thanks to which, every time any disturbance occurs in the Balkan Peninsula, arises the possibility that Austria will intervene as the Power chiefly interested by reason of her geographical position, and for us the possi- bility of a conflict with her, and therefore of a European conflagration." Russia, M. Rosen holds, ought to reconcile herself to the Austrian penetration of the Balkans. " Austria, like Germany, is passing through a period of growth. . . . The only possible outlet is indicated by her geographical position ; rejected by the Germanic Confederation, she has turned her eyes toward the Slav south. The movement of Austria toward the Slav south does not clash with the real interests of Russia. On the other hand, Austria will meet with complications which should sufficiently make her aware of the value of amicable relations with Russia." An alliance between Russia and Germany ap- peared to M. Rosen to be even more necessary. BEFORE THE WAR 29 Allied with France and England, Russia finds herself in a camp hostile to Germany. M. Rosen believes that the entire responsibility of this hostility falls, not upon Russia but upon Erance and England. " In the forefront of the causes of this reciprocal hostility we see the irreconcil- able antagonism between France and Germany, founded on the French idea of revenge for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. To this cause has been added, of late years, another, which is the Anglo -Germanic antagonism founded on com- mercial, industrial, and colonial competition, and rivalry in the matter of naval armaments. These two motives are absolutely alien to the vital interests of Russia." During the first twenty years which followed the war of 1870-71, France was so weak and Germany so powerful, that, " thanks to the enormous disproportion of the forces at their disposal, war was for one of the parties a super- fluity and for the other an impossibility." Such a situation M. Rosen regards as ideal, and he is greatly disturbed by the fact than an alliance with Russia has re-established the equilibrium of forces. It is true that during those twenty years Germany enjoyed a hegemony in Europe, and that to-day she wishes once more to achieve that hegemony. But this tendency of Germany toward hegemony is dangerous only to Western Europe, not to Russia, says M. Rosen, who finds 30 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it " absolutely impossible to comprehend " how the German domination in Europe can be opposed to the interests of Russia, which is rather an Asiatic Power. " By abandoning to Germany supremacy in the Western portion of Europe, and by dissociating herself completely from all rival- ries between European Powers based on interests purely European, Russia would assure herself of the security of her western frontier, and would have her hands free for the accomplishment of her mission in Asia." r To yield Europe to the Prussian Moloch and to take Asia in exchange — such, according to M. Rosen's opinion, is the supreme national duty of Russia. Such an alliance with Germany would be the more profitable to Russia in that it would enable Germany to undermine the naval supre- macy of England, and such a decrease of power is in the interests of Russia — so Baron Rosen believes. Russia's confidence in Erance and England rests " on fragile bases," he says, and " the confi- dence of Germany is incommensurably more precious to us." Commenting upon the ideas expressed in M. Rosen's memoir, of which we have given a detailed summary, a French review remarked that these ideas revealed " an atavistic German- ism," and that " if it had amused HerrBethmann- Holweg to give his advice to the Russian BEFORE THE WAR 31 Ambassador in Berlin, this is the advice he would have given." Let us now analyse the actual international position of Russia before the war, so that we may judge whether the Germanophile counsels of Baron Rosen did really constitute good advice, and whether they corresponded with the true interests of the country. CHAPTER II I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or defensive ? II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Ger- many and England. The Anglo- Franco-Russian entente and its political character. I Despite the lamentations of the supporters of her " Asiatic orientation," the recoil of Russia from the Far East and her " return " to the West was an accomplished fact. This fact confronted the Russian State, with the complex problem of its attitude toward the other European States, and its position in the famous " Concert " of Great Powers. To a very appreciable extent this position was no doubt determined by the recent history of Russia's foreign policy, which has been charaicterized by the Franco -Russian Alliance and the Anglo -Franco-Russian entente. The Franco-Russian Alliance is of a double character — financial and politico-military. Doubt- less the economic and financial element was pre- ponderant at the birth of this strange union of the republican democracy of France and the BEFORE THE WAR 33 monarchical autocracy of Russia. Yet we cannot deny the importance of the political and military considerations which have pushed France into the arms of Tsarism. These considerations have made themselves felt more especially of late years. After Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, after the ruin of almost her entire navy, and the heavy losses in men and material suffered by the army, the military power of Russia was gravely compromised. Germany immediately profited by this breach of equilibrium, consoli- dating her international position, both economic and political. One may say, without exaggera- tion, that the great misfortunes suffered by Russia during the war of 1904-5 brought prosperity to Germany. In the first place, Germany succeeded in ex- ploiting the very embarrassing situation of her eastern neighbour in the year i 904, by securing from Russia a Customs Treaty highly profitable to German trade and industry. At the same time Germany was redoubling her efforts to increase her military forces, and this increase became most rapid immediately upon the enfeeblement of the Russian army at the close of the war. In the year 1905 the German Empire took a gigantic stride in this direction ; for in that year the Reichstag voted a Military Law which increased the armed forces of the Kaiser, not merely from the numerical point of view, but also from that 3 34 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of the technical material of war. During the seven years that followed the efforts of Germany in the direction of preparing for war became continually more and more intensive, and France was left far behind in the matter of military expenditure. During these seven years Germany expended £300,000,000 on her military forces, while France spent only £236,000,000. This repre- sents a surplus of £64,000,000 for the period of seven years, or more than £9,000,000 annu- ally. The use which Prussian militarism has made of its supremacy is well known. By exploiting the weakness of Russia the Kaiser's Government has on several occasions, since the year 1904, systematically provoked France. The culminating point of this provocation was the famous coup d'Agadlr of 191 1, when the Kaiser threw into the scales of a diplomatic con- versation the weight of a warship, and, by means of this cunning stroke of blackmail, obtained, without a shot being fired, a consider- able portion of the French possessions in the Congo. In speaking thus of the systematic provoca- tion practised by Germany, I do not in the least intend to represent France as an inoffensive white lamb devoured by a ferocious wolf. Modern France is a country like other capitalist nations— an armed nation, a nation with a colonial BEFORE THE WAR 35 policy, etc. But in the social and economic structure of France there are characteristics which render her more pacific and, if I may so express myself, more defensive than aggressive Germany. France is a country of great financiers on the one hand, and of small hoarders on the other. It is a country of large and small investors. But the investor, the stock-holder, is the most pacific type of the modern bourgeois ; which is easily comprehensible, for in case of armed conflict the investor is the worst sufferer, by reason of the fall of securities of all descriptions. The pre- dominance of the investor in the bourgeois society of France explains the fact that in spite of the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by the Germans — in spite of "the wound in her side which France," to quote M. Viviani, " has for half a century silently endured " — the idea of a war against Germany was not really attractive to the French mind. The Germans were perfectly well aware of this fact. In 1909 the well-known German professor and patriot, Herr Delbriick, published an article ' in which he demonstrated that it was beyond a doubt that the majority of the French people did not desire war with Germany, and that the idea of la revanche had lost a great measure of its power. France is the banker of Europe, says Professor Delbriick, and a European war might result in the stoppage of the payments ^ Preussische Jahrbiic/ier, January 1909, vol. 134. 36 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR of interest on her loans, which would be a terrible blow to the nation. The majority of the bourgeois democrats of France were not only opposed to an aggressive policy towards Germany, but were even inclined to entertain the idea of a Franco -German entente. This pacific tendency was supported also by the Socialist workers of France, who did their utmost to avert the melancholy possibility of an armed conflict between their country and Germany, and who, as a class, offered the life of that noble tribune of the French people, Jean Jaures, as a tragic proof of their sincere devotion to the propaganda of peace. Finally, it is easy to realize that a republican State is in general far less adapted to an offensive and warlike policy than an absolute or semi- absolute monarchy. At all events, M. Marcel Sembat, a notable Socialist, and a member of the Ministry of National Defence, asserts in cate- gorical fashion, in a volume published by him shortly before the war, and which created a con- siderable sensation, that there is an almost natural opposition between the republican ideal and offensive warfare. " The militarist republic, the Nationalist re- public, the warlike republic — we have here not a doctrine but a blunder," he writes. » ' Marcel Sembat, Faites un Roi, sinon ^aites la Paix, Paris, 1914. BEFORE THE WAR 37 This is not to say that a democratic repubhc is incapable of defending itself— the experience of the First Republic revealed its defensive capa- cities — but the bureaucratic and democratic system is undoubtedly less adapted to a policy of aggres- sion and international brigandage than an auto- cratic and absolutist system. And this is merely another argument in favour of democracy. The perpetual peril of an armed conflict with Germany forced France to seek the surest pos- sible of guarantees against this peril. Many politicians saw such a guarantee in a Franco- German entente. The conferences of Members of Parliament held at Basle and Berne were the praiseworthy achievement of these men. But these very conferences proved that although in France the majority of the true democrats sin- cerely desired peace and an understanding with Germany, public opinion in the latter country was not so pacific, and the attitude of the German members in respect of their French colleagues was somewhat reserved. This explains why the French democracy could not risk a radical change of foreign policy, or withdraw its diplomatic and military contract with Russia. This contract, in spite of all its weak and obscure points, reptresented, for France, a certain guarantee in the event of German aggression. Even those Frenchmen who were opposed on principle to the alliance with Russia were obliged to accept 38 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR it in practice, at all events pending the realiza- tion of a Franco -German entente. This contra- diction between the theoretical negation of the Russian alliance and its practical acceptation is mentioned, we shall find, in the same work of M. Sembat's of which we have spoken. "Russia? Russia is of no use to us," writes M. Sembat, "and we are no manner of use to Russia, save to supply her with money. The three weeks of mobilization and the counter- attack of Austro -Hungary, favoured by the Polish revolt, forbid us to count on her at the beginning of the war." ' But a few pages farther on M. Sembat says : " The Russian alliance has incontestably amelio- rated, to the profit of France . . . the ratio of the [French and German] military forces."- So, with considerable reserve, and almost against its will, the French democracy was obliged to accept, for the time being, the con- tinuation of the policy of the Franco - Russian alliance, as a feeble yet necessary guarantee against a German invasion. II The German peril also gave rise to the Anglo- French alliance, the basis of which was laid down by the Convention concluded in 1904— that is, at ' Marcel Sembat, Faites im Roi, sinon faites la Faix, Paris, 1914. ^ Ibid. BEFORE THE WAR 39 a time when the Russian forces were absorbed by the conflict with Japan, so that Germany had her hands free on her eastern frontier. The de- fensive character of the Anglo-French aUiance is, I consider, beyond all doubt. It was defensive at its birth, and it was still defensive several months before the outbreak of the war, as we cannot fail to see from the correspondence between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, in November 191 2, " If either Government," wrote Sir Edward Grey, " has serious reasons for fearing an un- provoked attack on the part of a third Power, or any other event which should jeopardize the general peace, that Government should immedi- ately consult with the other, to determine whether they should not take concerted action in order to prevent aggression and to maintain peace." In reply to this letter, M. Cambon wrote : " I am authorized to declare to you that in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reason to apprehend either the aggression of a third Power or any event threatening to the general peace, that Government would imme- diately consult with the other as to whether the two Governments should take concerted action with a view to preventing aggression or pre- serving peace." ' » See the Livre Jamie of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 19 14. 40 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR It follows from these documents, which re- mained secret until the declaration of war, and were published by M. Viviani only during the session of the French Parliament of the 4th of August, 19 1 4, that the Anglo-French alliance was formed by the two contracting Powers, not with a view to " hemming in Germany," as the latter believed (perhaps quite sincerely), but in order to obtain a mutual guarantee against Kaiserism. For England such a guarantee was even more necessary than for France, because Germany regarded England as her principal rival. " Our future is on the sea," declared Wilhelm II at Stettin in his speech of the 23rd September, i 890. Hence his preoccupation concerning the augmen- tation of the German Navy. A French writer who has taken it upon himself to comment upon the thoughts expressed by the German Emperor on this subject states that " in considering the Emperor Wilhelm's ideas relating to the navy one must distinguish between two points of view : one commercial, the other military. In the first place, the Emperor has a very clear conception of the great part which sea power plays in the com- mercial and industrial developiment of a people. It is by sea that one sets forth to conquer the markets of the world ; hence the necessity of a great mercantile marine, and the importance of the old Hansa Towns, Bremen, Hamburg, BEFORE THE WAR 41 Liibeck, and Stettin, and the capital part played by the great steamship companies. But secondly, those various parts of the globe in which the German Empire gains a footing by means of its trade are vulnerable points. ... Its fresh triumphs, its pacific conquests, excite jealousy, create inevitable rivalry, and necessarily provoke conflicts. . . . Only one arm will enable a country to triumph in struggles of this nature— namely, a powerful battle-fleet." ' But both forms of German expansion by sea — commercial expansion and naval and military expansion— result in placing her in competition with England. From the commercial point of view this competition may be expressed in the following figures : Exports. In 1907. In 1913. Germany ... ^345,000,000 ... ^505,000,000 England ... ^435,000,000 ... ^535,000,000 France ... ;j^225, 000,000 ... ^275,000,000 United States... ^405,000,000 ... ;!^525,ooo,ooo Although England still maintains her supre- macy in absolute figures, the German exports are increasing much more rapidly relatively speaking. It is true that the German exports are artificially stimulated by means of premiums paid by the State to the exporters. Be that as it may, the prevailing idea of the German Govern- ment is to ensure that German capitalism shall ^ Jules Arren, Guillaunie II, Ce qu'il dit, ce quHl pense, Paris, 1 9 II, pp. 159-60. 42 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR have its "place in the sun," But where is this place to be found ? Germany can do no other than wrest it away from her neighbours. This was done in 191 1, when a large slice of the French Congo was obtained for nothing. But much more might be obtained from England. The attempt must be made. But first of all England's naval supremacy must be wrested from her. And here Germany sets herself feverishly to build battleships and cruisers. England is forced to note this move and reply to it, and the Anglo- German commercial rivalry becomes a military rivalry. And, as I have already stated in my book " Modern Russia," " this rivalry appears to be the axis of European world-politics." The present war has absolutely confirmed this idea. The Germans themselves say that England is their principal adversary. In 1908 the German patriot Professor Delbriick wrote that the lesser questions of international politics are not solved in and by themselves, but in respect of greater antagonisms, and that the Austro- Serbian disputes must be adjudged, in the long run, in the light of the Anglo-German an- tagonism. And now, since the declaration of war, another well - known German publicist, Maximilian Harden, writes in Zukanft (Octo- ber 17, 19 1 4) that the annexation of Belgium by Germany is necessary so that she may crush England. " Is it not there [in Belgium] that BEFORE THE WAR 43 all German hearts to-day are longing, impetu- ously, and in a spirit at times too insulting, for a victory over England ? " England is even more bitterly hated by the German Jingoes than is Russia. In December, 19 14, a Social-Demo- cratic ( ! ) German journal admitted, with un- heard-of cynicism : " The conflict with Tsarism is popular, but what was the meaning of the ancient battle-cry ? Never that we were to make war with the purely ideological and political object of defeating Tsarism. . . . Our political enemy is our economic enemy— England." Herr Lenard, Professor of Physics in the Uni- versity of Heidelberg, delivers himself as follows, in a pamphlet published some two or three months after the declaration of war : — " Away with all considerations relating to what is termed English culture. The principal nest, the chief academy of all hypocrisy on the banks of the Thames, must be demolished to its foun- dations, if we would obtain a favourable result." Even the German poets expend their lyrical fire in hatred of England. The most popular of the modern poets in Germany is Ernst Lissauer. Why? Because he wrote the " Song of Hatred of England." Our hatred we will ne'er abate, Who know the one and only hate : We love as one, we hate as one. We have one foe, and one alone- England ! 44 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR In this connection a German critic, speaking of the lyric poetry to which the present war has given birth, has written : " It is worthy of remark that the warHke poetry of Germany knows nothing of national hatred of France and Russia. France and Russia are adversaries, while Eng- land is the enemy.'' The aggressive and threatening attitude of Germany during the last few years has pushed England and France alike toward an understand- ing with Russia. But my English readers are well aware that the idea of this understanding was much debated, and even opposed, by the demo- cratic elements in England, which were shocked by the concubinage of their free country with the despotism of the Tsars. In Russia, too, the understanding with England has not everywhere been welcomed. The Conservatives and the parties of the Right in particular pronounced themselves resolutely as against the entente. Remember, for instance, the sentiments ex- pressed in respect of England by the Russian reactionaries during the visit of the French Premier to Petersburg, in the summer of 19 12. Prince Meschersky, the editor of the ultra-Con- servative Grazhdanin, wrote that " close friend- ship between Russia and Germany is a more advantageous and lasting blessing for France than dependence on ever capricious, ever selfish, and ever insincere England." And the organ of BEFORE THE WAR 45 the " Black Bands," Zemschina, spoke as follows : " In short, England wants to egg us on, and to weaken Germany through us, though we may have to undergo another war like that of 1 8 1 2 as a result. But Heaven preserve us from the privilege ! It is time for us to give up playing the part of the saviours of Europe, and especi- ally of England." And M. Menshikov declared, in the Novoe Vremya : " I do not see the advan- tage to the French and ourselves to be obtained by averting war between England and Germany. On the contrary, such a war could only be bene- ficial both to France and to ourselves. With the present preponderance of England's Navy and the difficulty of a large descent on her shores, such a war is likely to end in the destruction of the whole German and half the English Navy. Neither France nor Russia would have much reason to grieve on that account." And another journal— an organ of the " True Russians," the Russkoe Znamia, was even more candid in its expressions : " Every misfortune suffered by England, every weakening of her power, only causes joy to Russia ( ! ?) and to pull her chest- nuts out of the fire for her is unworthy of the Russian people." ' ' I quote from Darkest J??issm (the issue for the 21st of August, 191 2). As for the antipathy of the Russian reactionaries for France, it is so well known that I need not enlarge upon it here. 46 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR The Russian Liberals, on the contrary, favoured an entente with England. Generally speaking, the idea of an Anglo -Franco -Russian alliance is supported in Russia by the Liberal and Democratic bourgeoisie, while the Right opposes to this the ideal of a " Holy Alliance " of the three monarchies— the Romanoff, Hapsburg and Hohenzollern. But, happily, perhaps, for the progress and the democracy of Europe, this alliance could not be realized, and the Austro- German alliance, which has caused so much misery to humanity, was not transformed into the Austro-Russo-German alliance, which would have caused even more, and would hav^e been far more dangerous to Europe. CHAPTER III I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League. — II. The Turco- German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Con- stantinople and the Dardanelles. I The tragic and awful symphony of the world- war, now being executed by the formidable orchestra of millions of rifles and thousands of cannon, had for its prelude the Balkan War, or rather the two wars in the Balkans. The economic causes of the first Balkan War are well known. The Christian nations of the Balkans, whose development toward the north and west was cut short by the proximity of the great European Powers, had only one object : to procure outlets on the south and south-east of the Balkan Peninsula, through provinces occu- pied by the Turks. Among the democratic elements of the Balkan States there were those who proposed to solve the problem, not by the sanguinary means of a war against Turkey, but by the creation of a " Republican Federation of 48 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the peoples of the Balkans and the Near East/' which would have comprised Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey, both European and Asiatic. Two consecutive conferences convoked by all the Socialist parties of the Balkans declared themseWes of this opinion. But this noble dream, whose realization would have assured the Balkan States against a war among themselves on the one hand and the aggression of Austria or Russia on the other, was not realized, because of the egoism of the Governments of the Balkan States and the brutal and erroneous policy of the Young Turks. The manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey and the Balkan States, published at the end of the year 1 9 1 2, gives the following description of this policy : — "If we emphasize the grave responsibility of the Balkan States in the . . . war, as well as in the past, when they hindered the internal trans- formation of Turkey — if we accuse European diplomacy, which has never desired serious re- forms in Turkey, of duplicity — we do not in any way wish to belittle the responsibility of the Turkish Governments. We denounce them to the civilized world, to the people of the Empire, and particularly to the Mohammedan masses, without whose help they would not have been able to uphold their domination. We reproach the Turkish regime with the complete absence of real BEFORE THE WAR 49 liberty and equality for the nations— an absolute lack of security and of any guarantee of the life or the rights and property of the citizens— the non- existence of justice and of a well -organized and impartial administration. It has upheld a system of the most harassing taxation. It has turned a deaf ear to all demands of reform that might benefit Mohammedan and other peasants and workers. It has supported only its feudal sub- jects or nomadic tribes armed against the de- fenceless agriculturists. By their proverbial inertia the Turkish Governments have done nothing but provoke and maintain poverty, ignor- ance, emigration and brigandage, and massacres without number in Anatolia and Rumelia— in a word, anarchy, which serves to-day as a pretext for intervention and for war. " The hope that the new regime would put an end to the past by inaugurating a new policy has been disappointed. The successive ' Young Turk ' Governments have not only continued the errors of the past ; they have used the authority and the prestige of an apparent parliamentary system in order to apply a policy of denationali- zation and oppression, together with an exces- sive bureaucratic centralization, which has ignored the rights of nationalities and the demands of the working classes. The members of the new regime have in some respects even outdone those of the old, which had raised the systematic 4 50 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR assassination of political opponents to the height of a governmental policy." ' There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Governments of four Balkan States desired, and were able, profiting by the crimes and errors of the Turkish Government, to form a military league against the latter and to declare war upon it. Neither is it surprising that the Russian Government lent its aid to the enterprise, per- ceiving in it an efficacious means of sapping the power of Turkey and opposing to Austria the coalized forces of the Balkan League. But if Russia assisted in the creation of the Balkan League and the first Balkan War, Austria in her turn contributed toward the dissolution of this League, and to the declaration of the second Balkan War, by pushing Bulgaria into a conflict with Greece and Serbia, which enabled Turkey to recapture Adrianople, and in some degree to recoup herself for her losses. The rapid disso- lution of the Balkan League was a piece of very successful policy on the part of Austria, who thenceforward no longer had to face a coalitic of four Balkan States, but was able profitab;^ to exploit the disagreements created between' Bulgaria and her recent allies. ' S,ee the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Socialists of Turkey and the Balkans. To the Working People of the Balkans and Asia Minor. To the Labour International. To Public Opinion." 1912. BEFORE THE WAR 51 II Another factor greatly making for the success of the Austro -German policy was the enormous and exclusive influence of Germany in Turkey. The stages by which this influence was evolved are well known. The point of departure was the year 1895, when all Europe was thrilled by the massacres of the Armenians in Turkey, and when the Government of Wilhelm II, alone among the Governments of Europe, took the part of Turkey, and the German Emperor came forward for the first time as the supporter of the old Turkish regime. This service was well paid by Turkey, who made several important concessions to Ger- man capital. The same story was repeated in 1905, in con- nection with the Macedonian question, when Germany refused to take part in a naval demon- stration against Turkey, which was designed to put pressure on the Sultan's Government in order to force it to put into effect the reforms promised to Macedonia. Jean Jaures wrote at the time that the German Emperor wished to spare the Sultan, firstly, because he wished Germany's assistance to Turkey to be paid for by various privileges afforded to German capital, and secondly, because the Sultan was one of the representatives of the monarchical idea and of absolute power in 52 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Europe.' The quays of Constantinople, exploited by German concessionaires, the railways of Turkey in Asia, built and exploited by German capital, together with other concessions and com- mercial or undustrial undertakings — ^such was the payment in kind which the Germans received at the price of the innocent and unavenged blood of Armenia and Macedonia. The concession to build the Bagdad Railway marked the climax of German influence in Turkey, for it opened wide the door for German emigration into Asia Minor. The activities of Marshal Von der Goltz Pasha marked the climax of her political and military penetration of Turkey. The abolition of the Old Turk regime and the beginning of the Young Turk era, which made practically no change in the internal life of Turkey, left its foreign policy also unchanged : German influence continued to be predominant. The dispatch of a military Mission, with General Liman von Sanders at its head, secured the Turkish Army as a docile weapon in German hands. Germany regarded Turkey as her " private game-preserve," and on the 1 6th of January, 1 9 1 3, tTie German Ambassador in Con- stantinople, Baron von Wagenheim, publicly de- livered a speech threatening Russia, in which he said : " Germany will never allow Russia to exert pressure on Turkey. Neither now nor in the ' See his article in LHumanitc, November 27, 1905. BEFORE THE WAR 53 future shall we permit any one to lay hands on Anatolia." ' As for the Germans themselves, they have laid their hands, not only on Anatolia but on many other Turkish provinces. Posing as the champion of Turkish indepen- dence, Germany in reality deprived the country of any independence whatever. And when the hour struck Germany cast Turkey to the flames without even asking her consent or what was her will. For it is a well-established fact that the German mercenaries in the service of the Turkish Government began hostilities against the non- fortified towns of Russia without even warning the Turkish Government, which found itself confronted by the accomplished fact, and had not sufficient courage to refuse to follow down the path by which the German officers were dragging it. Ill Before effecting the penetration of the Balkans, Germany pushed Austria thither. This is already an old story. Having excluded Austria from the Kederation of the Germanic States, having closed all outlets toward the north, the Prussian monarchy pointed out the way to the south, toward Salonica and other ports of the Balkans. ' There was a question of reforms in Armenia. The speech was delivered by Herr von Wagenheim at the German Teuton ia Club, in Constantinople. / 54 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT V/AR According to the ideas of the German Imperial- ists, the march of Austria toward the south, and her penetration of the Balkans, was to be the prelude to the complete and final triumph of German domination over the Balkan Peninsula. But in her penetration of the Balkans Austria encountered the resistance of the Slav States in general, and of the Serbs in particular. The legitimate nature of this resistance was not denied even by certain elements of Austrian society. For instance, the Social-Democratic party (German) in Austria, in its manifesto of the i 8th of October, 191 2, accusing both Italy and Russia of "pre- paring for war," at the same time declared : — " Austria-Hungary, placed between Russia and Italy, is guilty in a high degree. This Empire, incapable of relieving its people, suffering the most terrible want during the rise in the price of bread, powerless to stop civil war among its own peoples, governing Hungary with the brutal violence of a Tisza and a Lucacs, burdening Croatian Slavonia with the dictatorship of Cuvaj, failing in Bosnia and Herzegovina to redeem the promise made thirty-four years ago to emancipate the Christian peasants from Turkish feudal serfdom—this Empire now poses, as if it had not enough to do in its own country, as judge and arbitrator over the distant Balkan States. " The Austrian people have only one interest in the Balkans : the peaceful exchange of BEFORE THE WAR 55 merchandise with the Balkan peoples. Our manufacturers wish to sell their products in Serbia and Bulgaria. In exchange we want from the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry their cattle and their cereals. The fact that this exchange of products has been made onerous, and has for many years been obstructed, is due to no fault of the Serbians or the Bulgarians. It is the fault of the agrarian party of Austria-Hungary. In order to raise the price of cattle throughout Austria-Hungary by avoiding foreign competi- tion, the rich agrarians caused our frontiers to be closed to Serbian and Bulgarian cattle. If we do not buy cattle in the agricultural countries of the Balkans, these countries will naturally eliminate our products from their markets. This is the obstacle to our commerce in the Balkans. But to remove this obstacle it is not necessary to send our soldiers to the frontier. The barrier will fall if we break the power of the agrarian party in Austria-Hungary, and if we pull down the custom-houses. " We do not want war against Serbia, we want war against the famine policy of our agrarians. That is the Balkan policy we need. . . . Neither do we want to spill the blood of our soldiers in order to prop up the rotten feudalism of Turkey, and assure it of the subserviency of the Slav populations. And little Serbia, which has no more inhabitants than the city of Vienna, will / 56 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR certainly not become a danger to Austria by taking a few miserable villages ! . . . Austria - Hungary has committed enough crimes against the poor southern Slav populations. Only by military dictatorship will she be able to govern the Slavs of the south, who are under her domination. By her economic and agrarian policy she has reduced the peasants of Serbia to despair. She would even drive the vSlavs of the south into the arms of Russian Tsarism, were she to shed Serbian blood at this junc- ture in order to uphold the Turkish suzerainty over a Serbian peasantry ; were she to pre- vent the Serbian peasants, whose products she will not accept, from finding access to other markets. Precisely because we are the enemies of Russian Tsarism, whose expansion represents the greatest danger to European civilization, we ask Austria-Hungary not to take the aggressive by opposing the interests of the southern Slavs." I Unhappily the Austro - Hungarian agrarians were stronger than the pacifist elements of their country. Directly the Balkan League was dis- solved the Austrian Government began to seek a pretext to strangle Serbia, and to clear a road to the ports in the south and south-west of the Balkan Peninsula, across the political and mili- ^ See the English edition of the " Manifesto of the Social- Democratic Party of Austria," October 191 2. BEFORE THE WAR 57 tary ruin of the Serb State. Such a plan was bound to involve Austria-Hungary in a conflict w^ith Russia, above all as Germany desired that conflict even more than did Austria herself. As we shall presently see, Russia's policy toward the xA.ustro -German alliance was in no manner provocative. On the contrary, it was a rather weak and amiable policy. But Russia, despite her weakness and the sympathies of her ruling classes for their German colleagues, could not remain completely impassive before Austria's attempt to strangle Serbia. The German patriot and professor Herr Delbriick wrote in 1909 that " Italy and Russia could not permit the continual penetration by Austria of the Balkan Peninsula," and the Serbian people " could not remain tranquil while enclosed on two sides by Austro- Hungary and, having no outlet to the sea, it saw before it the inevitable prospect of fail- ing into a complete dependence upon that Power." I To realize plainly what might be the result to Russia of the German and Austrian domination of the Balkans, we must once more remember that the greater part of Russia's exports of grain passes by way of the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. On this export trade depends, not only the agricultural economy of Russia but also the Budget of the State. If Turkish rule on ^ See Preussische Jahrbiicher^ January, 1909, vol. 134. 58 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR the banks of the Bosphorus is not always agree- able to Russia, a German and Austrian domina- tion of a military character would be extremely dangerous to her, and not to Russia alone, but to Italy, France, and England. As for Russia herself, her economic and political situation on the shores of the Black Sea might become abso- lutely insupportable and untenable, in the event of the Balkans and Constantinople being con- quered by Germany and Austria. The Baltic is already closed by a powerful German fleet. If the Black Sea were closed also Russia would find herself in a cul-de-sac and would become the economic and political vassal of the Austro- German bloc. CHAPTER IV I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The commercial exchange between these two countries. The success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. Why was not the Russo-German economic entente realized ? I In addition to the general political questions which divide Germany and Russia, there are also certain special problems which result in the oppo- sition of the two nations. The economic relations between Russia and Germany were markedly intensive and well de- veloped before the war. To characterize these, it will suffice to say that according to the date communicated to the First Russian Export Con- gress (which met at Kiev in the early part of 1914), 50 per cent, of the total Russian imports come from Germany. Germany and Russia, therefore mutually satisfy the half of their several economic needs and their demands on external markets. In 1901 Germany imported from Russia 1 8 7' 6 million roubles worth of merchan- 59 60 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR dise, while Russia took from Germany goods to the value of 216-9 million roubles. In the same year England imported from Russia goods to the value of 1 45' 5 million roubles, and exported to Russia goods to the value of 127-1 million roubles. In 1909 the German goods imported into Russia amounted to 363-3 million roubles, and the Russian export to Germany 387-1 millions, while for England the corresponding figures were 127-9 ^^^ 228*9 million roubles. As for the other European countries, their com- mercial exchange with Russia is of little value compared with the German trade.' But the most important factor in this problem is the qualitative aspect of the commercial rela- tions between Germany and Russia. Many Russian economists assert that, thanks to the fiscal and commercial policy of Germany, Russia is economically dependent on the former country. This opinion is expressed, not only by those economists who support the interests of the great capitalists but also by the democratic and inde- pendent economists, whose view -point is that of the great masses of the people. For instance, one of the most notable students of Russian economics, M. Oganovsky, a representative of the " populist " (narodnik) movement, states that the world does not contain any great independent ' The figures are cited from the Annual of the journal Aefc^ for the year 191 2, BEFORE THE WAR 61 Power which could possibly find itself in the position of the colony of another Power, and that Russia alone constitutes an exception to this rule. I " Russia was gradually becoming more and more of a German colony— in this sense notably, that the Russian people were becoming an object of exploitation by the upper classes of the German people. In 1904, profiting by our embarrassing situation, the German Government managed, at the moment of concluding the Customs Treaty with Russia, to assure itself of immense advan- tages, which cost our agricultural producers over a thousand million roubles. The extremely high customs duties which were imposed on Russian agricultural products imported into Germany by the treaty of 1904 protected the German Junkers from the competition of the Russian wheat - growers, and forced the latter to lower the price of their products in order to sell them in the German market. As for the compensation re- ceived by Russia in the form of the increase of the customs duties on the products of German industry, this compensation, according to the report of the Russian Council of State, ' could not be otherwise than burdensome to the rural economy, which consumed foreign articles (such as agricultural machinery, etc.), as well as to ' "One of the Causes of the War," an article in the Yejeme- statchny Journal, Petrograd, October 1914. 62 RUSSIA AND THE GREAT WAR Russian industry, which needs articles of foreign production for its technical equipment.' " ' We may judge how far the commercial treaty of 1904 facilitated the economic conquest of Russia by Germany by the following fact : Ger- many exported to Russia, an agricultural country par excellence, not only industrial products but a large quantity of corn. In 1902 Germany ex- ported to Russia only 106,000 cwt. of rye; in 1905 (a year after the conclusion of the Customs Treaty of 1904) the amount had risen to 603,000 cwt., and in 191 1 to 2,105,000 cwt. " During the last few years the importation of German rye has attained figures more or less re- markable, and it is said that the principal cause of this phenomenon is the fiscal policy of Germany during the last twenty years." ^ During the period 1907- 11 the quantity of rye imported from Germany into Russia amounted to some I 5 per cent, of the total exports of rye from Russia to foreign countries. During the same period Germany exported to Russia more than 16 per cent, of her total export of rye. And here I must remark that the success of German competition was facilitated, not only by the mistaken Customs Treaty but also by the ' Cited from the article by M. Finn-Yenotaevsky, " The Causes of the World War," in the review SovrenierDiy Mir^ Petro- grad, October 1914. ^ M. L. Litochenko, "German Rye in the Russian Market," an article in the review Viestnik F