^1^ P3-? _i Dnrvri I 11 014 647 093 2 Cons^vation Resources Lig-Free® Type I Ph 8.S, Buffered ^ ^^f, SPEECH 7 S4 PV 1 OF HON. JAS. A. SEDDON, OF YIRGINIA, OK THS PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF AUGUST 6, 1850, CON- CERNING TEXAS AND NEW MEXICO. DWL.VV1IRK9 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TUESDAY, AUGUST IS, 1850. WASHINGTON: raarrn at the congre«sio>i&i, oi.obe OFf iob. 1850. 738Q8 FEDERAL USURPATIONS On the President's Message of August 6, 1850, concerning Texas and New Mexico. The House having resolved itself into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and taken up for con- aideration the Civil and Diplomatic Appropriation Bill — Mr. SEDDON obtained the floor. He said: Mr. Chairman: I propose to examine the posi- tion assumed by the Executive in his recent mes- sage touching the relations of the United States and Texas. I wish to do so freely and fearlessly; but, at the same time, with candor and with all proper respect to the Chief Magistrate of the Union. In some of the less important principles to which I shall have occasion to refer in the course of my remarks, I cordially concur, and I take pleasure in bestowing on them the feeble tribute of my commendation. I recognize, too, a seeming spirit of conciliation, and an urgency for the amicable adjustment of this vexed controversy, which, as the dictate of wisdom, moderation, and patriotism, would be worthy of all praise. But most unfortunately, the position of menace as- sumed towards Texas, and the high assumption of power to coerce her, are in fatal conflict with such overtures to harmony, and entirely counteract their healing tendencies. There are certain principles of the message, Mr. Chairman, which I regard as utterly subversive of the true relations existing between this Govern- ment and the States — usurpative in behalf of the Executive of essential powers of his coordinate departments, and in their proposed operation on the citizen, most oppressive and tyrannical. I should fail of a solemn duty to myself and my con- stituents, if, notwithstanding great disinclination to obtrude on the House at this late period of the session, I did not endeavor to establish my opinions. The message declares that the proposed ac- tion of Texas for the establishment of her ju- risdiction over territory recognized by her con- stitution as within her rightful limits, will be regarded as a combination for the obstruction of the laws of the United States too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial pro- ceedings, or the power vesiedin the narshala; and as such, will be supprrssed by the militia and by the military and naval forces of the Union, under order of the ExecuMve. I wi^h to state this posi- tion of the mwsagc fairly; and aa my time will not allow me to quote the passages which contain it, I challenge dissent from any friend of the Adminis- tration present. There is no contradiction, and the position is universally conceded. This posi- tion involves the direct assertion, that this Govern- ment possesses the power to coerce the people of a State acting under its authority, and that such power is vested in and must be exercised by the Executive. I wholly deny this power, as belong- ing to any or all of the departments of this Gov- ernment. Whence is such power derived .' When and how has it been conferred ? Nominally, sir, we yet concede the existence of a Federal Consti- tution — a chart of the powers pertaining to this Government. To it, I must, therefore, of necessi- ty, appeal; and yet, in attempting to develop the principles on which it rests, I am painfully con- scious that, so far as any influence is to be exerted on the minds of the fixed majority here, I had as well waste words on the marble columns of this Hall. So rapid have been the encroachments of this Government, so overgrown in its majesty, that any efl'^ort to question its authority, and test its assumptions, by the Constitution , i^ looked upon here as disloyalty and disunion, and is met either by the courtier-like smile of derision, or the surly rebuke of conscious power. I fear it were as vain to expect, in an assembly of sneeringskeptics, rev- erence to the authority of Holy Writ, as to hope for deference to the Constitution from Representa- tives professedly acting under its sanctions and sworn to maintain its provisions. By that instrument, which should be, however it assuredly is not, sacred fVom perversion and in- fraction, the powers reposed in this Government are conferred by specific grants, and all powers not granted are expressly reserved to the States and the people. Where, then, is the grant, ex- press or implied, of the power to this Govern- ment to coerce a State ? I challenge its production with confidence. There is none — none whatever, either by veto, by judicial process, or by force. Nor was this omission by accidentor inadvertence, but, as the history of the Convention shows, by design. There were in that body able and iniluential men, zealous to obtain such grant of authority; and at- tempts were msde and reiterated, in'a variety of forms and at diflTcrent stages of its deliberations, to have such power conferred, but without succeas. A brief synopsis of ihe various proposilions for | this purpose, I quote from a letter of that revered i statesman of the South, John C. Calhoun, whose inappreciable loss in this crisis of our affairs yet | fills wiih mourning the hearts of our people: J "The first project of a constitution Kubmiltcd to the con- j veniion, (Governor R^indolph'd,) cmbriic<-d a propcition lo ^j grant power 'to negative all laws contrary, in the opinion ii 'oftJic National Li-gii-lature, to the articles of the Union, or ] 'any treaty subsi.^tine under the authority of the Union, and !j ' to call forth the force of Ihe Union against any member ol ! 'the Union failing to fulfill his duty under the articles there 'of.' Tlie next project submitted, (Charles I'inckney's) j contained a'similar provision. It proposed ' that the legis- | 'Jtlureof Ihe United Suites; should have the powerto revise | ' the laws of the several Slates ihit may be supposed to in- < fringe the powers exclusively delegated by thii Uonslitu- 1 'tion to Congress, rtnd to negative and annul such as do.' The next was submitted by Mr. Patterson of New Jersey, and provided, " If any State, or body of men In any State ' shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such 'acts or treaties, [of tlie Union,] the Federal Evecntive 'shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the Confed- ' erated Stales, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to 'enforce or compel obedience to such acts or observance ' of such tieaties.' General Hamilton's next succeeded. Which declared 'all laws of the particular Slates contrary ' to the Constitution or laws of the United States, to he ut- ' terly void ; and the better to prevent such laws being ' passed, the Governor or President of each State shall be ' ' appointed by the General Government, and have a nega- I ' live on the laws of the State.' " At a subsequent period, a proposition was moved and referred lo a committee, to provide ' U)at the jurisdiction of ' the Supreme Court shall exleiid to all controversies between 'the United States and any individual State.' And at atlill later period, it was moved to grant power ' to negative all | ' laws passed by the several States interfering, in tne opin- j ' ion of the legislature, with the general harmony and inter- > 'est of the Union, provided that two-thirds of the n. embers ' of each House assent to the same.' Which, after an inef- fectual elTorl to commit, was withdrawn. " * * These proposilions were all moved and failed. ' ■ ■ Sufficient to prove conclusively, that the Convention which framed the Constitution, was opposed lo granting the power to Ihe General Government in any form, Ihiough any of its dejinrtmenti', lo coerce or control a Slate, though proposed in all conceivable modes, and sustained by the most talenteil and influential members." Further on, in controverting the idea that such power as claimed by many is conferred by the pro- visions of tbe Constitution as adopted, Mr. Cal- houn adds: " I have already stated that a distinct proposition was made to confer this very power in controversiy on the Su- preme 0«urt, which failed. • • • « This, of it.^elf, might to overrule the assumption of the power by constnic- tion, unless sustained by the most conclusive arguments. But when it Is artdeii, Uiat this proposition was moved (20tli . August) subserjuent to the period of adopting the provisions i vesting the court with its present powers, (18th July,) anrl | Ihat an effoit was made at a still later period (2-2d August) to invest Congrrss with a negative on all Slate laws, the argument against the powers would seem too conclusive to be overiuled by construction." , This, Mr. Chairman, should be conclusive. A power not granted, but denied, can surely not be justly claimed to this Government. But theconclu- Bion may be fortified by consideration of the nature and organization of our Federal and State systems. The governments in both certainly possess only delegated powers, and are subject to express limit- ations and reservations. As was Justly said on yesterday by my able and discriminating friend from South Carolina, (Mr. Woodward,] our an- cestors were irreconcilably opposed lo unlimited government in every form, whether its arbitrary powers were reposed in a Monarch or a body of Representatives. Our parent country boasted a limited monarchy indeed, but its Farliamentclaimed to be supreme; and from its claim to exercise such mpremaey, sprarg o«r Revolution Where un- limited power was lodged, there, it was seen, sover- eignty must reside; and with our revolutionary sires it was a fundamental principle, that sover- eignty rightfully belonged to the people alone of every independent State. Hence the great cardi- nal conception of American institutions, that law emanating from the true sovereigns, the people, should reign paramount, not merely over the citi- zens governed, but over the governments them- selves. That such governments should be dis- tinctly, and by organic law, what elsewhere they were merely in the speculations of philosophers or the dreams of visionaries, mere agencies, or trusts, created by express grants, and with strict limita- tions of powers. This grand idea ruled in the for- mation alike of the Federal and State governments. Limitations against the governments of bath kinds, and for the preservation of the rights reset ved to the people of the respective States, were provided by specific grants of power and by prohibitions. Limit- ations against the encroachments of each on the powers of the other were attempted by the partition between them of the attributes generally conceded to free governments in such manner as to afford each, as far as practicable, means of self protection. And finally, limitations within the governments, whether Stale or Federal, were sought, by partition in the exercise of the powers granted each, between its coordinate departments — legislative, executive, and judicial. But of what avail all these careful arrangements for the limitation of the agencies of government thus created to protect the rights re- served to the principal — the people — unless io them resided the ultimate power of revision, cor- rection, and repeal.' The existence of limitations and reservations, not merely between the Stale and Federal Governments, and their departments re- spectively, but against them all in favor of the people of the respective Slates, implies, of neces- sity, a superior over them, with power to regulate and enforce. Else such limitations and reserva- tions would be unsusceptible of preservation and enforcement, and might with impunily be pros- trated or usurped. Such power, as thus shewn to be absolutely necessary for the conservation and perfection of the system, so is it inevitably in- volved and established in the original power of creation, and the continuing sovereignty admitted by the whole system to abide in the people. Every law implies a superior to declare it, a sanction to enforce il, and a power to apply that sanction; and the higher the law and the more important its maintenance, the greater the necessity of such power lo regulate and execute it. This train o.*" reasoning conclusively places the power and duty I of enforcing the restrictions and reservations of j our constitutional systems in the body where they ; emanated, and of course lodges there the right of I ultimate judgment as to their due exercise and maintenance by the respective governments or agencies intrusted with them. Thut body is un- deniably Ihe peopU of each State in convention as- ; sembled, for the historic fact is beyond controversy, I that the Federal, no less than the State Govern- } ments, was adopted by the people of each State, acting separately and independently. Such para- mount prerogative of supervision, correction, and repteal, in the last resort, is then possessed by the people of each Slate acting for itself in convention. They constitute the only ultimate sovereign under Otti* system. TTie Stale, then, in this its sovereigr capacity, instead of being; liable to the coercion of the Ffckral Government, has, as to itaelf and within its limits, supremacy over and power to supervise or abrogate it. Nor does this imply any control or right of judgment by one State over the others united in compact with it. Equal com- petency of control within its limits is allowed to each; and in case of difference of judgment and inability to accord, as to the proper action of the common government, there should be first a call of a convention of the States under the provisions of the Constitution, to settle its interpretation. If to the decisions of such convention, a State can- not submit, she must exercise her highest right of secession, and hold her sister States as the other nations of the world — " Enemies in war: in peace friends." Having established, I trust, that no supremacy and no right of coercion pertains to the Federal Government over the States, in their highest ca- pacity, I proceed to consider whether it can justly elaim such high p^vv-ers over the Stale govern- ments. From the citations already made from the proceedings of the Convention, it seems that such supremacy ai.d power were sought to be estab- lished over the State governments as well as the States, and in neither instance were accorded. Not endowed with such power by specific grant, whence does the Federal agency derive its asserted superiority over the State governments ? Neither the source whence it emanates, the mode in which its powers are conferred, the nature and extent of those powers, nor the manner of their exercise, and the obligations imposed thereby on the citi- zen, entitles it to arrogate such superior preten- sions. The Federal and the State governments, as we have seen, derive their powers from pre- cisely the same source — the people of each inde- pendent State in convention assembled. The mode of conferring powers on the Federal Gov- ernment is by specific grant, with express reser- vation of powers not bestowed. The mode of conferring powers on the State governments is, generally, by giving to them the great mass of governmental powers, with limited exceptions by special prohibitions. The advantage here in the mode of bestowal, if of any validity, is clearly in favor of the State governments. The nature and extent of the powers conferred on the res- pective governments, indeed, vary in accordance with the different ends to be accomplished by them; the few more general and external pow- ers, in which all the States are jointly interested, being principally conferred on the Federal agent, while the great mass of civil and municipal powers are retained to the State governments. : Hence if some of the powers conferred on the Federal Government appear more grand and im- posing in their nature, more than compensation ; is afforded, in relatively weighing the powers of the State governments, by their greater number and their more important and intimate relation to the interests and pursuits of the citizen. The manner in which the powers of both governments j are exercised, and the nature of the obligation imposed on the citizen, are the same. Both act i, directly and compulsorily, ordinarily by law and '' through the regular administration of justice on' the citizen, and each may enforce its legitimate powers by adequate sanctions, and, if necessary, m in the last resort by the infliction of the pains ' and penalties of treason. One advantage not' perhaps, sufficing to give any superiority State governments, but certainly strongly repug- nant to the conception of subordination on their part, is possessed by them in being constituenta to some of the most important branches of the Federal Government. The Legislatures of the States elect the Senators. The States, under the regulation of State legislation, either by separate districts or by general ticket, send the Representa- tives to this body; and, in a compound ratio of their representatives in both bodies, constitute the constituency which elect your President. Judging by these or any other tests you caa suggest, must it not be concluded that there is certainly no superiority on the part of the Fed- eral Government — no subordination on the part of the State governments? They are, in fact, coordinate agencies of the same common sover- eign — of equal dignity, and equally within its appropriate sphere embodying the highest law of the land. The Federal Constitution, from its concurrent adoption by all the States, operates over a larger sphere, and embodies a solemQ compact by which the powers of each are with- in the province of its legitimate functions, blend- ed and engaged for the attainment of its ends. In its obligation and operation on the citizen of each State, however, its authority, sanction, and mode of enforcing them, are precisely the same. To illustrate this, consider the obliga- tion and relation of a citizen of any State — Vir- ginia, for instance — to each Government. He is bound to obey, maintain, and execute the Consti- tution, and laws in conformity therewith, of the United States. And why.' Because of its adop- tion as their government within its sphere, by the people of Virginia in convention assembled. He is bound to like obedience and support to the State constitution, and laws within its province, because so likewise has the same sovereign or- dered. The Constitution of the United States, and the laws in pursuance thereof, operate upon him directly and compulsorily. So likewise precisely do those of his State. Each, in subordination only to the ultimate sovereign — the people of his State — is within its rightful sphere the supreme law to him, and must be so recognized and obeyed under the sanctions of all adequate penalties, even those of treason. Neither is superior. But in case of conflict Here Mr. DUER interrupted Mr. S., and in- quired if that clause in the Constitution of the United States, which declares "That the Con- ' scitution, and laws of the United States made ' in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the ' authority of the United States, shall be the su- '. prcme law of the land; and the judges of every ' State shall be bound thereby, anything in the 'Constitution or laws ,of any State not .v ithatand- ' ing," did not impart to the Federal Government supremacy ■ Mr. SEDDON. The gentleman's citation af- fords an answer to his inquiry. That clause shows the Federal Government to be snpieme within its righifttl sphere — no further. The Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties in conformity therewith, are certainly the supreme law of the land, and from the very nature of the Constitution must have been equally so, thoti^h not declared. But what advantage have they in this respect over the Constitution, and laws in pur- 1 suance thereof, of a State? In Virginia, for in- j stance, are not her Constitution, and the laws in i| pursuance thereof, within their sphere, just as Ij much the supreme law, equally as operative on |] the citizen, as are the Consutution and laws of the United States. If the force of the State may be invoked by the Federal Government to enforce its i Constitution, treaties and laws, may not likewise : all the forces of the Union be called for by the State, to enforce her Constitution and laws within her limits? This Government, and all its depart- ' ments or officers in their relations to Virgmia, or when within her limits, are as much bound to respect and obey her Constitution and laws, as the Government and officers of Virginia are to re- spect and obey as supreme within their sphere the Constitution and laws of the United States. In either case, the supremacy is dependent on the constitutionality of the laws, or of the construction placed on the Constitution. Here Mr. DUER again interposed, and inquired whether, in case of conflict in laws between the State and Federal Governments, the adjudication of the Supreme Court must not be conclusive as to the question of constitutionality? Mr. SEDDON resumed. The gentleman with his characterisiicsagacity and acuteness,must perceive that the solution of his questions is afforded by the inquiry, in whom rests the right of ultimate judgment as to the powers of the respective gov- ernments, and the conformity of their proceedings thereto. I deny wholly the power of such ulti- mate judgment to the Supreme Court. It has not even the power of primarily determining the ex- tent of the powers of this Government, much less of settling finally the constitutionality of its meas- ures. To establish this, many arguments might be adduced. I content myself with one or two as conclusive: In the first place, the judicial powers vested in it are specific grants, involving limita- tions and restrictions; and if entitled to construe finally its own powers, who are to enforce such restrictions, and of what avail are they? Expe- rience has shown, that as no men are infallible, the Supreme Court may mistake or transcend its just powers. To it, then, no less than to the other de- partments of the Government, must exist the su- perior for supervision and restraint, the necessity and existence of which I trust I have heretofore satisfactorily established. But, further; there is no grant of the power to the Supreme Court in the Constitution of such final arbitrament, nor, indeed, expressly of any power to decide on ques- tions of constitutionality. Its whole function is confined to expounding and applying what is law ' to cases in law and equity between litigant parties. Its faculty of determining on the constitutionality of any particular law thus comin? under its con- sideration, is not conferred by, nor dependent upon any grant of power to it specially, but results from and is inseparably incident to its character as a court. This faculty pertains not to it alone, but belongs equally to every court, from the highest to tlielowest, whetherin ourowii or a foreign country, having jurisdiction over cases involving the obli- gations of our laws. Under our system, the or- ganic law of constitutions is supreme, and in any case for the determination of what is law, it nmy be necessary to expound the meaning of the Con- stitution, and the conformity of any iiUeged law thereto. A power thus shared by every court, from a justice's up, in application to laws coming before it in the last resort, can surely with no va- lidity be adduced, as conferring the extraordinary and conclusive right of judgment as to the powers of our respective governments. No, sir; the Fed- eral and State governments being coordinate and equal in their respective spheres, entitled to enact laws of the highest obligation on the citizen, each is necessarily entitled to judge, in the first instance, of the extent of its powers, and to maintain its judgment. This faculty is possessed by the State in like manner and upon the same grounds as by the Federal Government. But in case of conflict in these laws or claims of power, must there be collision? Certainly not; for war between the State and Federal governmente was certainly never contemplated, and cannot be tol- erated. What, then, is the resort? I have argued to little purpose, if the answer be not prompt and decisive: to the common principal of these coordi- nate agencies — to the common and only sovereign, who created and is entitled to supervise or abrogate both or either, the people of the Stale in convention assembled. Their decision must be final and con- clusive; and by virtue of his sacred duty of alle- giance, forever settles, as to the citizen of the State, his relations and his obligations to the conflicting agencies. About the obligation of the citizen to deference and submission to this award of the sovereign, if against the State govern- ment, I apprehend there is neither dissent nor controversy. Nor is it less clear in case the de- cision be against the Federal Government, if the indisputable fact be borne in mind, that the only obligation of the citizen of the State to that Gov- ernment proceeds from its like adoption by the people of his State in convention assembled. Com- plexity and uncertainty can only be induced on this point, by confounding the relations of solemn compact which exists by the Constitution between the States as sovereignties, with the obligations imposed under it on the citizens of any State. The action of the State in its highest sovereign ca- pacity, must be conclusive as against the agency created by it, and on the allegiance of its citizens; but if deemed by the other States violative of the compact with them creating the Federal Govern- ment, they, each having for itself equal right of judgment, may determine such act cause of com- plaint, or even war. But in such case, the State resorting to her highest reserved right of secession will be out of the Union, and if conflict ensue, it must be not that of rebellion or insurrection to the Government of the United States, with liability to the penalties of treason to the citizen, but of war between equal sovereigns. For, as every other reason concurs to establish the justice of this con- clusion, so likcwi.se does the unhappy relation in which, on any other construction, the citizens must stand to the two governments, confirm it. A di- vided allegiance would be to them an extreme of cruelty and oppression, which our ancestors could never have contemplated to impose. It is cori- ceded the United St.-ites Government is supreme in it8spherc,und may punish for treason. So equally, that the State government is supreme in its sphere, and may enforce the same penalty. In case of conflict, the wisest and best, solicitous only for the di.scharge of duty, must be traitors to one or the other, and he subiecteri to the impulalior and penalty of this greatest of crimes. No, sir; alle- giance can only be rightfully due to one sovereign — the State in its highest capacity; and its award absolves the citizen from all olhet obligations, and claims his entire duty. In establishing the sovereignty of the States and the total want of power in the Federal Govern- ment to coerce them, I have been betrayed, Mr. Chairman, into a more abstract discussion and at greater length than I had anticipated. Yet, con- sidering tne extraordinary doctrines that have been avowed in this message, and the ideas elsewhere inculcated of late from high sources of the divided allegiance of the citizens of the States and of their superior obligations to the Federal Government, 1 can scarcely regret it. 1 trust it may induce, in the South especially, recurrence to fundamental principles, and the proud conviction, that the alle- giance of the citizen is due, where his instinct, his sympathies, and best affections would direct it, to his State alone. This right of coercion towards a State has been heretofore claimed by this Government. It con- stituted the pernicious heresy of that high Federal paper, the proclamation of General Jackson, which has since been so generally reprobated, es- pecially in the South. But in essential particulars, the pretensions of this message far exceed even the assumptions of that proclamation. In the first place, as was adverted to by the able gentle- man from Georgia, [Mr. Stephens,] General Jackson pretended not to assume under the laws relied on by Mr. Fillmore, then as now in full force, the power to call out the militia and employ the naval and military forces to coerce South Car- olina. He did not deem them applicable or suffi- cient for such purpose, and he accordingly appealed to the legislative department for additional laws. Congress, then as now, prompt to assert the pre- tensions of the Government and strengthen the hand of power, passed the notorious Force bill, which was reported by no less a personage than Mr. Webster himself, who must then at least have concurred in the necessity of such additional en- actments. But Jackson was not bold enough for Mr. Fillmore and his Secretary. They aver that tliey can, unaided by further law, step in where he feared to tread. A distinction yet more material exists in the dif- ferent character of the questions, in which the two Executives propo.sed to intervene with force against a State. That with South Carolina was in the execution of laws, operating directly on the citi- zens in reference to private rights, and was admitted to come within the general purview of a power to lay and impose duties, imposts, &c., and to be be- yond the ordinary functions of State action. This with Texas, is a political question, not afiecting pri- vate rights or citizens individually, but a matter of jurisdiction and boundary, in which the Stale as a unit — an independent sovereign, is only concerned; and which it is by the message distinctly admitted, ; comes within the scope of her regular State action. In the controversy with South Carolina, there was difficulty and perplexity induced by the nature of the laws sought to be arrested. It was insisted, with much plausibility at least, that as the laws, being those of revenue, must by the Constitution I be uniform, and confessedly came wiilim the terms ' of granted power, insomuch that their unconsti- i tutionality must be maintained on iin- ground of the intention to protect, involved in,but not avowed by them, they could not be arrested by the State without subverting the revenue system for all the other States as well as herself, and without travel- ing entirely beyond her competency and the scope of her admitted powers. Hence it was insisted the compulsory operation of the laws of the Uni- ted States might be enforced against the citizens of South Carolina, without conflict with her power as a State or community, and her laws suspending them, treated as a mere nullity. In candor, I must say such considerations did not change my con- victions, although I admitted the embarrassment m which they plunged the question of the right to coerce. They seemed to change it from the right to coerce a State, merely into a right to enforce the law against individual citizens. But my opinion was, that the State was in the last resort the right- ful judge of the unconstiiutionalily of any laws; and being, in the language of the Virginia resolu- tions of '98. entitled and " in duty bound, in case ' of deliberate and dangerous infractions of the Con- ' stitution, to interpose to arrest the progress of the 'evil, and to maintain within her limits the author- 'ities, rights, and liberties appertaining to her," acted entirely within her competency in deter- mining the mode and measure of redress. In the present case, such specious pretences can- not be asserted , and no such embarrassment can ex- ist. The question is directly with a State-:— a politi- cal question, relative to boundary and jurisdiction, which are admitted to come within her compe- tency. It is no matter of mere private right, nor are individuals directly concerned in relation to it. The compulsory action of the United States is di- rected not against the private citizen, but against the civil posse, or the militia of Texas. The State, as a political community, is coerced, and her citizens, arrayed under the aegis of her authority and protection, are deliberately shot down. This transcends any foriner assumption of Federal power, and claimed, as it is, for the Executive alone, how revolting and monstrous does it ap- pear! This claim, Mr. Chairman, of the Federal Gov- ernment to judge and enforce its own powers, must inevitably change the whole character of our Government from that of a confederated republic of States, to a consolidated government of one people. If the States, the creators and grantors of the limited powers delegated, are not permitted to judge and defend the rights reserved to ihem, while unlimited power of construction and coer- sion are conceded to the mere creature and agent, who can fail to predict the speedy accumulation of all coveted powers in the hands of the latter? Practically it must become a government of un- limited powers, a despotism, converting the States into mere dependencies and municipalities. The mere letter of the Constitution will be a barrier as frail as a gossamer web. It behooves, then, all the States to maintain, in full validity and extent, the power of defending their reserved right.-;; but as to the States of the South, possessed of a great minority interest, their prosperity, safety, perhaps their very existence, is staked upon it. The dom- inant majority is, and must be, with the northern and free States. Unscrupulous and lustful of pow- er, as a majority ever is, we of the South have, at this time, the gravest reasons to apprehend ite direst encroachments. The malign spirit of abo- titionism is spreading with a rapidity and an in- tensity that cannot be too vividly realized, instil- ling its pernicious persunsives from the cradle of infancy to the death-bed of age — engrossing with its fell misrepresentations all the avenues to the northern mind — working through the school-mas- ter, the pulpit, and the press — invoking to its aid alike the generous sympathies and invidious feel- ings of the masses — it has rooted, almost univer- sally, in the convictions of the northern people a sentiment of the abhorrent nature and exceeding sinfulness of the institutions of the South. This sentiment receives aliment and vigor from delusive conceptions of popular liberty, even among the natives of the North. It is with still more avidity embraced and acted upon by the hundreds of thousands of foreign emigrants who annually pour into the North, wholly uninformed of the nature of our institutions, and possessed only by the crudest notions of universal liberty and equality. Under all these concurring and increasing influen- ces, it is hardly strange that this anti-slavery senti- ment should have changed from a latent to an active operative principle. From private conclaves it has passed into popular assemblages. It has controlled elections, and been embraced by parties, ; until it has found admission and established as- \ cendency in the legislative bodies of the North. Disregarding all relations of union and fraternity j which should subsist between the States, and ; overleaping all the restraints of duty and constitu- tional obligation, it has embodied itself in acts of hostile or invidious legislation in many, and among them the most influential States of the North. Having accomplished its work in the I State governments of the northern section, it has intruded its baneful presence in the Halls of Fed- eral Legislation. The dominant majority here acknowledge its influence, and in one form or another, crouch submissive to its mandates. Even in that most guarded repository under this Gov- ernment of the rights of the States, the Senate, it has obtruded in imposing power, and for the ac- | complishment of its ruthless ends, has openly proclaimed a law of higher obligation than the Constitution and the sanctions of a solemn oath. Under the specious pretence of freeaoilism, in the last and present Congress, it has been engaged I by shifting devices, but with unchanging con- i sistency of purpose, in plundering the South of all rights in the late magnificent acquisition of I our common Government, and devoting the whole to its grand end of anti-slavery propagandism. Sir, all the safeguards of the Constitution — all the bar- riers of the South for protection and defence ^nder this Government, have beenorarc disregard- ed and trampled. down. The principle prevails with most — is acknowledged by many, that the ^ majority in Congress, judging and executing its powers, must rule and shall be submitted to. The only reliance for security and refuge left, is in the jurisdiction and reserved powers of the States. They yet receive partial acknowledgment and some semblance of respect. Every consideration of safety, prosperity, and power, in the present and the future, enjoins on the slaveholding States to assert and maintain in their full latitude and vigor, all the functions of the State governments — all the reserved power.s and inalienable sovereignty of the States. To rely on their partial representation in j the Federal Legislature for protection against the |i : steady encroachments of a sectional majority, were to rest on a broken reed. It were scarce less ■ mockery, than would have been a recommendation to our fathers of the Revolution to rely on their ! representation in Parliament, when the astute Eng- j lish lawyer made the notable discovery, that all the American colonies held of the Crown by the tenure of the manor of Earl Greenwich, and that consequently the member from that place was the representative of all America! In unhappy Ire- land, the worst governed and most oppressed, per- haps, of christian nations, we have the practical example how much such minority representation ! avails. She is an integral part of the British em- ; pire, and has her proportion of representatives in I Parliament. Yet, since her union, even more than I when a mere dependency, have her toiling millions groaned in the extremest misery, and on the verge of starvation, under the rapacity and misrule of the English majority. No, sir; every separate community — every great minority interest, to be secure, must be able and willing to protect itself. The last sheet-anchor of our hopes and safety, is I in the States, whose rights must he maintained at every hazard. If the pretensions of this message ; pass into rightful precedent, to rule the future ac- i tion of this Government, what security or defence for admitted powers remain to the States? When- j ever a controversy with any one of them is alleged ; to exist, or, il may be, is trumped up for sinis- ter purposes by the Executive of the Union, is he to use the whole power of the Union to main- tain the claim, as construed by himself, and to crush the State that resists ? Plausible pretences I for such controversy are never wanting to the ra- pacity of power. They may be found in clauses of the Constitution, such as the obligation to guar- anty to each Stale a republican form of government, and many others. It may, in the progress of abo- litionism, be alleged by the Executive, as asserted by inany here, that slaveholding governments are not republican. By the action of the Government I now contemplated here, an example will be set of purchasing, with the common funds of the Union, the territory claimed by one of the slaveholding States, to convert it into free soil. Where will this end .' May not next slaves be purchased to make further free soil .' And if necessary to find pre- 1 tences of controversy, may they not be readily I found in casual disturbances, incited perhaps for I the design of invoking Federal jurisdiction? Ac- cording to the late John Q.. Adams, Federal au- thority would not then be wanting. The whole pretension of coercion of States must be repelled, else there is no real safety. But, Mr. Chairman, my waning hour compels me to forbear from further illustration on this point, and to proceed to the consideration of the pretences asserted in the message for this extra- ordinary claim of power. They seem to me untenable, and in direct conflict with otherpositions of the same message. The first position in the case presented by the President for' his justifica- tion is, that Texas can have no juri.^diction in New Mexico, because beyond her rightful limits, and in the po.ssfssion of the United States. This involves necessarily the determination by the President, in the fir.st instance, of the rightful boundaries of Texas and New Mexico, and of the character and extent of the possession of the United States. Yet, I understand nim to concede that for the deternai- 9 nation of these boundaries, legal adjudication, or | the concurrent assent of the United States and Texas, is requisite. As there certainly are, and, as I I hold, constiiulionally can l)e created no courts I of competent jurisdiction to decide the question, that alternative may be dismissed from consider- ] ation. The competency of Texas to act in this de- ! termination of boundaries is admitted to be equal ; with that of the United States — her assent being equally requisite. He declares, too, until this joint settlement be had, no government. State or Territo- j rial, can be ri,a;htfully established for Nev/ Mexico. This also affirms the equal competency and the necessity of the assent of Texas in this matter of boundary. The President likewise expressly ad- 1 mits, that the determination of these boundaries, so far as the assent of the United States is requir- ed, belongs not to the Executive, but to Con- gress. How, then, can he, in the first instance, either in due deference to the equal competency of Texas, or to the power lodged in Congress, alone undertake to determine the rightful boun- daries of New Mexico, and to maintain them with the sword r Is the distinction sought to . be made, that he only determines possession and means to maintain that? But whence derives : he authority at his mere discretion to fix the limits or determine the character of the posses- sion held of that Territory.' The possession of i that part of the Territory east of the Rio Grande as a right or even adverse possession is denied by Texas to be in the United States, and is claimed to be in herself. It is a most material point in her claim, and if established in her favor, would dispense with her other impregnable proofs of title, and determine the whole question m her behalf. Pos- session is a most material element of title — indeed, in defect of a better in another, is perfect title. Every lawyer knows the steps of title are — pos- session, right of possession, the right of proprietor- ship. Here two leading points of title — possession and right of possession, are determined by the Executive discretion alone, in despite of the admis- sion that the sole right to determine title for one party , the United States, is in Congress, and , for the other, with equal competency of action, in Texas. If the assent of Texas be necessary, is not such assent as essential to deteimine possession and the character of that possession, as any other element of title .' If the sole power of determining title for the United States be in Congress, is not its action indispensable as well to determine pos- session and its extent and character as to any other point of title.' Sir, this assumption of the Executive to determine possession, its character and extent, in consistency with other principles correctly avowed in his message, in effect for-, ever settles this whole question of title against Texas, unless she will accept such terms as may be dictated her by the United States. Possession alone gives usufruct — sufficiently long continued is indefeasible title. It is therefore in the United States equivalent to absolute enjoyment of the ^hole — with certainty of ultimate perfection to her title, unless an agreement for the settlement of boundaries is had with Texas. Now in this state of things, of what benefit to Texas to admit the necessity of her assent? If she does not assent to such terms as may be proposed her by the United States, she is excluded altogether. Sup- pose a proffer made her on terms satisfactory to the rapacity of free-soilism, now dominant in this Congress. She refuses. She thereby only excludes herself from the pittance that may be offered, for though her assent is requisite, until it be given the United States engrosses all, and holds by force. This is indeed a shallow device to make your own terms or engross the whole. But, sir, it is asked. Is not the possession un- doubtedly in the United States? and is not the President bound to maintain it? Most assuredly not. There are troops of the United States there, but so there are in every State of the Union, espe- cially in those having frontiers neighboring on a foreign Power or exposed to Indian depredations. These troops can establish no civil jurisdiction. They are, as they are bound to be in time of peace, subordinate to the civil power. Texas is one of the States of the Union, and the possession of the General Government of any territory claimed by her, is naturally and persumptively her possession. Even more clearly is such the natural conclusion from the mere military occupation by the troops of the common Government. But, sir, we are not left to presumption here. We know that before the war with Mexico, Texas claimed this territory. Her claim by the compact of annexation is certainly recognized by the United States as running above 36° 30' north latitude. That compact retained to the United States the power of adjusting her bound- aries by treaty with other nations. But in the negotiations of Mr. Donelson, the obligation on the part of the United States to assert this claim and obtain it, if fairly practicable, by treaty, 1 was certainly imposed. That effort was zeal- ; ously made by Mr. Polk's Administration, and ' the instructions given to our minister distinctly pointed to, and urged the establishment of the right 1 of Texas to the territory east of the Rio Grande. Failing negotiation, the war was declared and fought, on the ground that Texas extended to the Rio"Grande,and that consequently Americati blood had been shed on American soil. No distinction was then attempted between the lower and upoer Rio Grande, as certainly none was made by this Government. By that war, this Government, in all its departments, was irrevocably committed be- fore the civilized world to the right of Texas to the Rio Grande; else was the war one of rapine and robbery, and the honor and justice of the Union irretrievably forfeited. When this terri- tory was invaded and occupied during the war, it was done confessedly in maintenance of the right of Texas, and in her behalf. The competency of the President, as commander-in-chief, flagrante i belU), to determine and declare the purposes of any .1 military expedition, and the quo animo with which I a country is invaded and held, can hardly be con- troverted. During the whole war, in his messages, and in a letter to the Governor of Texas in refer- ence to the possession of this very territory, his 1 convictions as to the clear right of Texas and the auxiliary character of its military occupancy, were explicitly stated. And after the war, Mr. Polk's Administration gave positive orders to the military commanders in occupancy to facilitate and aid 1 whatever efforts Texas might make to establish civil jurisdiction over it. Congress all this time I not merely acquiesced, but, so far as action was I taken at all, conformed to and sustained the vieyre .1 of the Administration. General Taylor's Admin- 10 istration modified the orders given to the com- manders, but only to the extent that they should take no part any way, in case of an effort by Texas | to organize the territory. They were not to in- i terfere against Texas, but so to arrange their i troops as to avoid conflict witii her authorities. , There may be reasons to apprehend that at a later ; day General Taylor's Administration had conclu- ded to proceed a step further, and discourage all such attempts at organization by Texas. Certainly ; there is no official committal by him to an adver- ' 3ary holding, and the use of force to maintain it. The undivided responsibility of that position is , on the present Executive. Before this Congress, I while individuals may have asserted the existence 1 of a controversy about the title of Texas to the \ Rio Grande, I affirm, with confidence, such con- I troversy was never recognized by this Govern- j ment in any of its departments; and except for I the stress rested upon it by distinguished Senators j who wished to make it an element to promote the passage of a system of obnoxious measures, it is very doubtful whether it would have ever been gravely insisted on. Certainly the first official sanction given to it is now by President Fillmore; and he originates, decides, and threatens to main- ' tain with force, an adverse holding of the whole | against Texas. In this he distinctly rebukes both his predecessors — Mr. Polk, who ordered the troops of the United States to aid Texas, and Gen- eral Taylor, who enjoined neutrality on them. If there be competency in the Executive to determine even primarily the possession of this territory, and j the nature and extent of its possession, surely ! during and after the war it pertained to Mr. Polk; | and his determination that the possession of the } United States was in subordination and aid of: Texas was conclusive. At least the decision of General Taylor not to hold adversely might be held binding on his successor; but Mr. Fillmore not merely claims the power to the Executive to [ determine the possession, but tohimself peculiarly, i; He makes no account of the action and decisions j of previous Presidents. I The next position of the President in the case presented by him is, that the treaty of Guadalupe Hidnlgp applies to and is in force as law in New Mexico, and that the Constitution requires him to execute it, and enforce its guarantees of liberty, property, and religion to the Mexicans residents j there. He gives no force or validity to any other {• Iowa or government, either civil or military, exist- , ing there, but disclaiming the authority to estab- lisn such in himself or the people there, rests his obligation on the. Constitution and treaty alone. This involves a claim on the phrt of the Executive both to interpret and enforce a treaty. The start- ling character of such an assumption has been ex- ': posed and enforced with such ability by the gen- tleman from Georgia, [Mr. Stephens,] that I , merely refer to it. It certainly confounds the dis- : tinctions between the judicial and executive de- ^ Sarlments, and engrosses the powers of both in ,, Ir. Fillmore. In many, perhaps most cases of|; treaties, the obligiition of providing for their en- h forccment by low rests on the legislative 'iepart- | ment, and the principle, extended to such, would make the President dispense with Congress as readily us he r">ropiiMea to ilifregard the Judiciary. Rut. riHsoningon the Presdcnt'd premi.^'es, how will the treaty or \U guaranteea be violated or en- dangered by the extension of the jurisdiction of ; Texas over New Mexico? To maintain them, ; why must Texas be excluded by force? Tha j treaty makes no special allusion, nor imposes any ' peculiar obligations in relation to New Mexico, it merely draws a line of demarcation between the whole territory ceded the United States and Mex- ico, and the guarantees to liberty, property, and religion, apply alike to the Mexicans residing in any part, whether on the Lower Rio Grande, in New Mexico, or California. Texas, as one of the States of the Union, is fully bound to respect and enforce the treaty. The extension of her I jurisdiction, by bestowing the protection of a re- i publican end State government, and insuring the j aids of judicial process, and the regular adminis- tration of justice, might indeed facilitate the execu- I tion of the treaty, and the enforcement of its guar- ! antees. But unless the laws and judicial proceed- ' ings of Texas militate against liberty, property, land religion, how can her jurisdiction conflict with j the treaty and its guarantees ? To pretend so is I reproach and insult to Texas, as gratuitous taa un- I founded. But if the possession of Texas be incon- ' sistent with the treaty, in what position does the President place himself? Her jurisdiction has been extended, and actually exists, over large portions I of territory on the Lower Rio Grande, not in her \ possession before the war, and equally with New I Mexico embraced in the terms of the treaty. His I obligation to execute its guarantees are the same I there as in New Mexico. Will he employ the I militia and military force of the Union to oust her there? On his grounds he will be under solemn obligation so to do, and he must wage war to dis- possess her. Again: If her jurisdiction be inconsistent with the treaty, what mockery to profess that her assent is necessary to the settlement of boundaries, and that her claim may be allowed by Congress or by legal adjudication. The treaty is binding on both Congress and Texas, and if its guarantees preclude the admission of her jurisdiction, she must in any event be excluded, and the President, under his sense of obligation to execute it as the supreme law, must take care that she be forever debarred. But further: If the jurisdiction of Texas, a State of the Union, be inconsistent with the treaty, how does it stand with California? All the territory, the best part of which has been engrossed by that so-called State, is equally embraced by the treaty and its guarantees. The Mexicans there are equally to be secured in liberty, property and reli- gion; yet tiic jurisdiction of that pretended State, formed by hordes of adventurers from every clime, of every race, complexion, and language, certainly without authority, and, as I think, by palpable usurpation, is established and recognized. Surely the jurisdiction of Texas, a Stale in the Union, cannot be more inconsistent with the treaty than that of California, an usurper, not even admitted aa a State, whose first acts, from authentic informa- tion, have been to abolish peonage, an established right among the Mexicans, and to lay impositions, felt by them as most oppressive and exacting. There might, indeed, be just pretence that her ju- risdiction afforded no adequate guarantees of lib- erty, property, and religion, to the resident Mexi- cans. But her authority is ncknowledged, and the sanction of Congress ifcommended to be eiven to it by her admission, while the jurisdiction of II Texas is to be resisted with the sword, as subver- sive of the treaty and in conflict with the liberty, property, and religion of the Mexicans. In such preposterous inconsistencies is the President in- volved. In this connection I had intended, Mr. Chair- man, to expose the sophistry and special pleading used by the Secretary of State to palliate the pro- ceedings of the officers and people of New Mex- ico, in their late unauthorized proceedings to form a constitution and government. I do not under- stand him to justify them, for I am happy to see he pronounces their proposed government a nul- lity. My time, however, will not allow, and I necessity, and, as I shall have to show presently, in aid of the courts and marshals of the Union. Where the combinations arose in a State possess- ing all the machinery provided for the maintenance of law and order, and became, notwithstanding all such restraining influences, too powerful for the ordinary means of judicial repression, there might be reason and justice in supposing they could only be put down by the strong arm of force. Besides, the courts of Territories are not strictly courts of the United States; and being intended in aid of them, the law could only properly extend to States where such courts existed. These would seem sufficient reasons for the restriction; but whether proceed to the only further position assumed by ^ so or not, the restriction is explicit, and cannot be the President to sustain his proposed course. It is, that by the acts of February 28, 1795, and March 3, 1807, he is empowered to employ in the E resent case the militia and military forces of the 'nion. I deny this wholly. In the first place, the authority to call out and employ the militia is by the law of 1795, limited expressly to the case of obstructions to the execution of the laws of the United States in a State. It has no application to any Territories whatever, much lees to one with- out organization or civil government, as New Mex- ico. The language of the law in the only section applicable, is: " Whenever the laws of the United ' States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof 'obstructed, in any State, by combinations too ' powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course 'of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested ' in the marshals by this act, it shall be lawful for ' the President to call forth the militia of swc/i State, * or of any other Slate or States, as may be neces- ' sary to suppress such combinations and to cause ' the laws to be duly executed," &c. The law of 1807 only authorizes the President, " in all cases of insurrection or obstruction to tlse ' laws, either of the United States, or of any indi- ' vidual State or Territory, when it is lawful for the ' President to call forth the militia for the purpose ' of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing ' the laws to be duly executed, to employ for the * same purposes such part of the land or naval ' force of the United States as shall be judged ne- ' cessary, having first observed all the prerequisites ' of the law in that respect." This law clearly confers only the power to use the military force in aid of the militia, when oy existing laics they can be employed. It enlarges the force tiiat may be used, not the cases in which it may be applied. It can, therefore, not extend the operation of the law of 1795 to cases not covered by it. It is true, this law of 1807 mentions Territories, but before force can be employed there, laws authorizing the employment of the militia in them must be found. This may, perhaps, be furnished in organized Ter- ritories in the bills establishing them, or in the acts of the territorial legislatures under them. It cannot be extorted from the law of 1795, which is alone relied on by the President; and certainly in the case of New Mexico, no authority can be adduced from any law organizing that Territory, or from any territorial legislation in pursuance of it. By ! the only law pretended to be applicable — that of [ 1795 — the power conferred can only be exercised in a Stale. Adequate reason for this restriction ji the regular administration of law may be found in the consideration that such high >' according to the President's own ai gotten rid of by construction. As a law against life and liberty, conferring extraordinary powers for the use of force on the Executive alone, every consideration and legal rule requires its strict con- struction. But to establish the restriction to States, its plain language and intendment are only needed and insisted on. Considering, then, the power to employ the militia and military force limited to cases in a State, the President is wholly unautho- rized to use either in New Mexico, unless upon the admission that it is part of Texas. Such ad- mission would be utterly subversive of the pre- tence of unlawful combination at all, and conclu- sive against every justification of his menaced coercion. A graver objection still exists, Mr. Chairman, to the construction given by the President to the acts of 1795 and of 1807, as authorizing him in the present case to employ f^orce. It has been exhib- ited and illustrated by the gentleman from Geor- gia, [Mr. Stephens,] with such fullness and abil- ity, that I am justified in adverting to it with more brevity than its importance would otherwise allow It is, that the whole law is only ancillary, in aid of the States, and upon their call in case of insur- rection, and in aid of the judicature and the mar- shals in the administration of the laws of the Uni- ted States in case of resistance or obstruction in a State " by combinations too powerful to be sup- pressed by the ordinary course of judicial pro- ceedings, or the powers vested in the marshals." The purpose of the law was only to bring the military in aid of the civil power. The President has totally misconceived the extent and nature of the powers conferred on him in undertaking to determine, first, the existence and extent of the application of a treaty; then to expound its obli- gations, and directly, under pretence of this law, to execute its provisions, as so interpreted, by force. Rights arising under this treaty, as under any other law, must be adjudicated, not by the President but by the courts. Judicial process in execution of them must be resorted to and en- forced by the marshals. He must see them duly carried out, and in this way fulfill his constitu- tional duty " to take care the laws be executed." Only when laws are so opposed, or the execu- tion so obstructed in any Slate, that they cannot be thus enforced, can the extraordinary power of these acts of 1795 and 1807 be invoked by him? Now, how, in the case of New Mexico, can it be pretended that such obstruction or resistance to exists, when, dmissions, there and extraordinary power was not intended to be ij is no civil government of lawful authority — no conferred except in cases of palpable and urgent i courts nor marshals of the United States within 12 it? Would It not be monstrous that citizens of Texas, actin? under her positive authority , siiould, Ij on the mere fiat of the President, be shot down for l! acts for which there is no penalty affixed by law, j and no courts authorized to fry them ? This con- ; struction of the President strikes at the very foun- | dation of civil liberty — that no man shall be '• de- L prived of life, liberty, or property, except by the I judgment of his peers and the law of the land." It arrogates in his single self judicial and execu- ] live powers, and makes him both judge and exe- | cutioner. In addition, the right to employ at dis- ; crelion the militia and military of the Union may ; involve unlimited expenditure. By this claim he ] at once commands the purse and the sword of the I Union. Such powers would be despotic. I And whence, Mr. President, come these extra- ordinary claims to concentrate powers in the Ex- ecutive? From a Whig President. Sir, if there' be u principle at the basis of the Whig organiza- tion, on which they claim their distinctive name, | time-honored in its association with the struggle i of liberty against prerogative, I thought it was j atern opposition to the encroachments of Execu- tive power, n with Mr. Fillmore's party, there be remembrance of past professions, or adherence | to fundamental principles, must not the force of i truth as to his present positions " unwhig him for life." What, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is the ex- planation of the strange pretensions, inconsisten- cies and errors of this message? Can any one doubt it is to be found in the fixed design to make or force a case for buying or robbing Texas of a large part of the territory belonging to her? Un- der her jurisdiction, that limited portion of our ac- quisitions from Mexico may be enjoyed by slave- holders, and the barriers of State authority, which is yet affected to be di.^putod, must exclude the ap- plication alike of the Wilmot proviso and of the safer jugglery which has been substituted for it. The lustful rapacity of freesoilism is roused and pledged to engross, by bullying or bribing, the territory, which else the jurisdiction of a slave- holding State must insure to southern institutions. Would such a controversy as this with Texas about territory, claimed so long and with so many recognitions by our Government of her right, ever have been made with any northern non-slaveholding State ? I appeal with confidence to the convictions of all who hear me, if a similar case of bound- ary had arisen wiih .Maine, or with Michigan, v/ould there have been even conirover.sy respect- ing it' The territory would have been yield- ed without delay or hesitancy to the State. As a portion of the State claiming it, it would have still swelled the power of the Union. No one would have dreamed of making war on a State, or paying her millions to secure to the United Stales the mere proprietary right in vacant wastes, which would hardly even return the costs of surveying and selling. Sir, the case is too plain. The driveling idiot might almost comprehend it. And will the South aid or acquiesce in such rapa- city and extortion? Aggression after aggression, «t first covertly, then openly, has been made on her rights — on the privileges of her States and peo- ple to equality and protection under the common government of the Union. They bave been yielded to with the vain hope of peace and harmony. Con- cessions have invariably been followed by demands more insolent and encroaching. The whole legis- lation of our common Government is sought to be directed in invidious discouragerpent and discrim- ination against our institutions ahd property; and to this aim it appears are likewise directed the po- tent agencies and influence of the Executive. To the progress of this great and growing danger, there must be arrest, else the institutions of the South, and with them all the momentous interests of security, prosperity, and progress, dependent on them, must ultimately succumb. At what point the South will turn and repel such dire wrongs, it is with her people to decide. My con- viction is, that dangers gather round her the more she " tarries by the way." If she wishes to pre- serve this Union by making it reconcilable with her safety and her honor, she cannot too soon and too emphatically manifest her resolve further to concede no right, and endure no wrong. She has elements of power, of production, of prosperity, which, in the keeping of a free and brave people, whether in or out of this Union, insure her respect, influence, and safety. '• Thr fault is not in our stars, But ia oumelves, that we are underlings." LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS :il,i:ir;ii I'.i. nMU I .|l •! \ 014 647 093 2 ^