uc An Estimate of Tonnage Available for the Transport of Trans-Atlantic Army Cargo From August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919 * By DONALD SCOTT Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics Washington, D, C. 1918 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 Glass LL (! ..j 3 2. o Book , h \ . *i\\ (L An Estimate of Tonnage Available for the Transport of Trans-Atlantic Army Cargo From August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919 41 \ By DONALD SCOTT Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics Washington, D. C. 1918 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 Acknowledgment should be made particularly to Mr. S. Marshall Evans, of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, for his careful estimates of ship production ; to the Shipping Section, General Staff, for very complete information as to the performance of Army ships and for valuable assistance in the preparation of material; and to the Divi- sion of Planning and Statistics of the United States Shipping Board for their accurate records of our Merchant Fleet. Thanks are also due to the Bureau of Operations of the Navy Department; to the Embarkation Service and to the Office of Military Railways of the War Department; and to the Shipping Control Committee for their generous cooperation. SUMMARY. In the following pages is presented an estimate of the ftmnage available for carrying Army cargo overseas from August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. The result is here given in concise form: Forces maintained overseas. i >ead- weight tons of ship- ping avail- able on first of month. August, 1918 1,924,000 January, 1919 3, 915, 000 July, 1919 8,015.00*1 December, 1919 12,063, 000 i-hori tons of Army cargo lifted. 507.000 1,081,100 2. 415. 000 3.040,000 At 50 pounds per man per day=| shuri ton per month. 796. 000 1,411,000 3,220,000 4,473,000 At 2^ pounds per man per day=n.42 short ton per month 1,421,000 2,574,000 5.750,000 7,238,000 The outstanding feature in this estimate is the large and rapid increase which is about to take place in the size of the Army fleet. We are at a turning point in ship production. There is need, there- fore, for a thorough survey to see if adequate provision has been made for the many factors which go to make up so complex a program. Certain factors stand out beyond others as possible obstacles to successful achievement unless careful plans lor overcoming them are made well in advance. Some of these are being studied now; others are not. It is recommended that special attention be given to the following subjects: (1) To study and redetermine the shipbuilding program and in so doing to standardize the types of vessels and of all their structural members and equipment. (2) To take steps to insure the necessary supply of steel. (3) To the manufacture of all items of mechanical and other equipment in sufficient quantities and for delivery when needed. Delays in shipbuilding must not occur for lack of boilers, turbines, or such important nautical instruments as chronometers. (4) To increase the supply of skilled labor at the shipyards. (5) To study the best way of meeting the demand for trained sea- men and officers to man our new vessels. (6) To anticipate and provide remedial measures against the probable congestion of railroad transportation next winter. 78030—18 2 (5) (7) To sec that the loading, repair, and bunker facilities of our home ports will he adequate for the great demand to be made upon them. (8) To study in particular our French ports; to determine and provide now for any necessary new construction and to work out the best method of coordination between the service of discharge at these ports and our service of embarkation here. (9) The Army should be asked to lay down a definite program, based on the shipping now available, and to take such steps as may be necessary to see that all supplies will be produced in sufficient quantities. (10) The Navy also should be requested to determine its program for the convoy of our increased fleet and to inform the Shipping Board of the armaments needed on our new vessels. PART I ESTIMATED TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT OP TRANSATLANTIC ARMY CARGO, AUGUST 1, 1918, TO DECEMBER 31, 1919 (7) PART I. ESTIMATED TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT OF TRANS-ATLANTIC ARMY CARGO, AUGUST 1, 1918, TO DECEM- BER 31, 1919. This estimate of shipping available for carrying Army cargo over- seas from August 1 , 1918, to December 31 , 1919, is founded on records of ship production at yards now in operation and on records of the performance of our shipping, both Army and merchant, which have been kept for some time. The latter have given us the actual 'turn- around, cargoes carried, time under repair, and other essential data for each boat, and from them Ave are able to predict the service which can be rendered by our new fleet with a degree of accuracy which would not otherwise be possible. While detailed discussion of the basis for this estimate is reserved for later pages, a brief statement may be made here. The total American-controlled fleet has been determined each month by adding a careful estimate of new construction and of vessels otherwise acquired and subtracting losses from war and marine risk. This total has then been distributed to non-Army employments covering our trade requirements and other essential services, such as Belgian Relief. Allowance has been made for various delays in the delivery of the new boats. The balance remaining after these requirements have been met represents the total tonnage available for Army service. The cargo the Army boats will carry is based on records of actual performance. The different types of ships have been reduced to their cargo-carrying equivalents, and full allowance has been made for troop and animal ships. Allowances have been made also for in- creased repairs to the new vessels, winter delays, small cargo carriage of the vessels of 5,000 dead-weight tons or under and other limiting factors. (9) 7NO30— 18 3 10 It is believed that a conservative estimate has been made and that the shipping available for the Army is quite as likely to exceed these figures as to fall below them. In Table I is given an estimate of the dead-weight tons of shipping available each month for the transport of trans-Atlantic Army cargo, together with the number of short tons which can be lifted. For pur- poses of comparison only, the forces overseas which this cargo will maintain are chosen on two bases: First, that of 50 pounds per man per day, which from all figures now obtainable sooms a probable maximum requirement; and second, that of 28 pounds per man per day, the figures used by Brig. Gen. H. S. Johnson, Director of Pur- chases and Supplies, in his report of July 27, 1918. The absence of any carefully worked-out data on this important relation has been striking. The volume of cargo lifted does not always increase uniformly with the increase in shipping. In some months more vessels will be homeward bound than outward bound, in the winter the new vessels built on the Great Lakes are ice bound, and the performance of the whole fleet is delayed by stormy weather. Table I. — Estimated dead-weight tons of shipping available Jar trans-Atlantic Army cargo, short tons of cargo, and number of animals this fill lift and over-seas force it will ihiiJnla'm, Aug. 1, 1918, to Dec. SI, 1919 (fan/.r,.. exciudfid). January February . . March April May June July August September . October November . December.. January February.. . . March April May June July August September . . . October November... December December 31 . 19 is Dead- weight tons of shipping on first of month. n 769,000 a 846, 000 a 950, 000 a 1,182,000 a 1,420,000 a 1,561,000 a 1,718,000 1,924,000 2,116,000 2,520,000 2,881,000 3,370,000 3, 915, 000 4,458,000 5,003,000 5, 554, 000 6, 156, 000 6, 855, 000 8,015,000 8,827,000 9,653,000 10,500,000 11,303,000 12,063,000 12,842,000 Short tons Number of of cargo lifted. « 122,000 a 228, 000 n 289, 000 a 373,000 a 450,000 a 125,01)0 a 536, 000 597, 000 SOfi , 000 850,000 979,000 1,140,00(1 1,081,000 1,380,000 1,434,000 1,663,000 2,087,000 2,259,000 2,415,000 2, 879, 000 2,925,000 3,202,000 3, 355, 000 3,040,000 animals lifted, 20,000 20,000 20,000 23, 100 21,100 22,200 10,000 10,000 12, 600 10,000 10,000 0,700 ( >verseas force main- tained— At 50 At 28 pounds per | pounds per man per man per day= -i short tons per month. 796, 000 1,075,000 1,133,000 1,305,000 1,520,000 1,441,000 I. 840, ooo 1,912,000 2,227,000 2,783,008 3,012,000 3,220,000 3,839,000 3,900,000 4.269,000 4,473,000 1,053,000 day=0.42 short tons per month. 1,421.000 1.919,000 2,024,000 2,093,000 2,714,000 2,574,000 3,286,000 3,414,000 3,960,000 4; 969, 000 5,379,000 5, 750, 000 6,855,000 6,969,000 7. '124, 000 7,988,000 7,23s, 000 a Actual. 11 ESTIMATE OP AVAILABLE SHIPPING, LIFTED CARGO, AND OVERSEAS FORCE MAINTAINED. July 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. (Tankers excluded.) Available Shipping represents total deadweight tons available for trans- Atlantic Army cargo on first of each month. Lifted Cargo represents short tons of cargo above will lift in each preceding month. Overseas Force represents number of men which this cargo will maintain on basis of 50 pounds per man per day, all construction material included. This equals three- fourths short ton per man p"er month. Thousands Tans 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 0,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 9,000 2,000 1,000 CHART I. A Vj y V J 4 fz ■y J* p - >* o ^ ■iflrfi i* **: ..^. V v ' ' ' I ' I.I I I Jan Ear May. July Sept Nov Jan Mar Hay JtOy Sept' lTor Jan 1918 1919 12 The outstanding feature in this estimate is the large and rapid increase in the size of our Army fleet which is about to take place. The Army fleet will be doubled by December 1 and nearly three times its present size by March 1 . In two months new ships will be available for this service at the rate of 400,000 tons a month, and by the first of the year at the rate of 550,000 tons a month. After June 1. 1919, over 800,000 tons a month will be added. The magnitude of these figures will be better understood if we realize that by next July the Army service alone will include a tonnage greater than the total German merchant marine in June, 1014 Six months later it will be more than one and two-thirds times as large. The whole of this fleet, greater than that which served the needs of Germany to all quarters of the globe, will be concentrated between France and the United Stales. The Army cargo which our ports here will have to load and our ports in France discharge will by December be double the loadings of July, treble by April, and in August next will be five times as great. We are clearly at a turning point in ship production, and the great increase about to occur demands that our horizon be scanned anew to discover what limitations, if any, may stand in the way of the production and utilization of so rapidly growing a fleet : for if such imitations exist, nothing but the most immediate and efficient action can prevent a breakdown which will proportionately reduce our military effort. Earnest consideration is being given to many of these obstacles and to adecpiate plans for overcoming them, but in other instances there is no convincing evidence that such is the case. There are here indicated only the more important factors which may stand in the way of successful achievement, but it must not be forgotten that in so complex a program no detail can be overlooked. ARMY SUPPLIES. The Army will undoubtedly wish to make a survey of the produc- tion of all supplies, since the tonnage which is now indicated as available for the transport of Army cargo is larger than the figures hitherto used and a change in the rate of production of supplies is often a matter of months. SHIPBUILDING. Recent investigations show that the most serious study will be called for to see that the amount of steel required for this great ton- nage is forthcoming without unnecessary interference with other industries Production must be stimulated and the supply directed with care and precision into the channels where it is most needed. 13 Provision must be made for the prompt supply of all mechanical and other equipment in order thai no delay may occur in their installation. Boilers, turbines, gears, winches, anchor chains, even oars for lifeboats if not timed to meet the needs of our prog-ram, may prove the one weak link in the chain. Chronometers and Other nautical instruments of delicate adjustment are not less essential. With shipbuilding planned on so large and rapidly increasing a scale, no time will be given for the accumulation of reserves. Struc- tural materials and all equipment must press closely on the heels of production, calling for prompt and continuous delivery. Are we sure that this great number of parts will be ready to meet the schedule laid down { Standardization should be carried to the highest degree possible. Reductions in the number of steel sections, of angles and channels, of shapes, of machinery and other equipment, of the types of vessels even, can be carried much further than has yet been attempted. This would permit a freer diversion of supplies to the point of greatest need, and might reduce by one-half the enormous stocks which must now be carried. These are now estimated at 1,000,000 tons of steel. Delays in transportation may prove a serious limitation. Have we looked forward to the railroad congestion which in greater or less degree seems inevitable in the winter months, when our whole Army program will be going at top speed ? In that event, relief may have to be found by temporarily eliminating the carriage of some non- essentails. If so, we should begin now to determine what these non- essentails are and to adjust these industries in advance to such a possible curtailment in transportation. The competent inspection of newly built boats to discover and correct faults requires the provision of many skilled engineers. In our present haste to place boats in service the thoroughness of this inspection has steadily declined. More time and attention should be given to this, as it is one of the causes of the abnormal delays for repairs which our new boats now undergo. Recently several of our new boats have broken down after sailing on their initial voyages and have been compelled to return to port. Labor difficulties must be anticipated and the proper machinery for their prevention or adjustment carefully worked out, The sup- ply of skilled labor for the shipyards must be increased. There is need of more calkers, chippers, holders on and bolters up. It was the opinion of one shipyard manager that he could increase his pro- duction 20 per cent with two more good ship fitters. The training schools established at the yards should be extended. In particular the size and type of vessels being built should be carefully studied. Vessels of 5,000 tons or under are uneconomical for long hauls, owing to their relatively greater fuel consumption. Their 78030—18 4 14 coal hunkers leave too little room for cargo. The new Ferris type of wooden ships of 3,500 dead-weight tons, for instance, will have an estimated coal consumption of 34 tons per day, whereas a 7,500 ton steel vessel will consume only from 27 to 30 tons. In our trans-Atlantic service, where coal must be carried for the round trip, this means that the 3,500-ton wooden vessel will have her cargo space so cut down that she will lift but about 45 per cent of her deadweight tonnage in Army cargo, whereas the average of all of our Army vessels at present is 68 per cent and the most efficient types run as high as 72.3 per cent. Our estimated production of these small vessels of 5,000 dead- weight tons or less from July 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919, is as follows : Steel vessels: From July 1, 1918, to Dec. 31, 1918 391,906 From Jan. 1, 1919, to Dec. 31 , 1919 1, 136, 728 Wooden vessels: From July 1, 1918, to Dec. 31, 1918 889,000 From Jan. 1, 1919, to Dec. 31, 1919 2, 326, 000 Total 4, 743, 634 Just what employment can be found for this great tonnage of small vessels does not seem to be known. To some extent, they will release larger vessels in our .coastwise and other short-haul service. A small number will be sent to France to carry coal from England for the Army. The limits of absorption in these directions will be soon reached and these vessels, unless the present program is changed, will have to engage in service which they are little fitted to perform. In our chart it has been assumed that the increase in these vessels up to January, 1919, could be effectively employed, but after that date it has been necessary to discount heavily the cargo-carrying ability of these small ships. A possible suggestion is the transformation of the 3,500-ton steel vessels to be built on the Great Lakes from coal burners, as at present planned, to oil burners. Oil can be carried in spaces in the ship which do not encroach on its cargo space and as on the average the Army is shipping measurement rather than weight cargo, these vessels could then carry their full cubic capacity. Our building program should be carefully reconsidered, not only as regards these small boats, but also in the light of the more definite information which will now be available as to our needs. On the latest outward voyage of the vessels now in Army service, the records give the following information as to the relative efficiency of ves- sels of different sizes and speeds: 15 Table II. Dead-weighl Ions. 12,000 and over. 11,000 I o 12,000., 10,000 to U.IKMI. 9,000 to 10,000.. 8,000 to 9,000.. 7,000 to 8,000.... (5,000 to 7,000.... 5,000 to 6,000.... 5,000 and under Number in service A verage speed. LI. 8 11.8 11.3 10.7 10.4 10.0 11.2 10.6 10.0 Per cent of total dead- weight lifted. 66.0 66. 1 6(5.3 69.4 72.3 64.6 61.3 59.7 55.0 Effective average turn- around, in days. 79.2 71.7 74.7 76.2 67.4 64.8 66.0 61.8 73.6 Long tons transporte d per dav per 10,000 dead- weight tons. 83 92 89 91 107 100 93 97 75 Are we producing the type of vessel most efficient in the carriage of Army cargo ? Have we sufficiently considered their adaptation to the limits of length, beam, and draft imposed by the French ports? What consideration has been given to the service these boats will be called upon to perform after the war is over and they are dispatched to the various ports of the world '( SHIP OPERATIONS. The problem of securing officers and crews in sufficient numbers and with the necessary training is one that must be solved well in advance of the demand. Here again .we meet labor problems that require careful handling It is estimated that it will take at least 50,000 men to man the additional vessels we can place in service before the end of 1919. Can we secure this number by a volunteer system and have we planned the necessary schools and instructors lor their training? It may be necessary to draft them and to have them trained and controlled by the Navy. Our new crews, as a whole, are reported to come from classes used to better and cleaner living conditions than the regular sailor. Problems of the fore- castle have already arisen from this difference. Patriotism, the adventurous spirit stimulated in times of war, and high wages are all calling men to the sea who may not remain once the war is over. How can we best insure the manning of our merchant marine when peace is restored ? A special problem is presented in the stokehold. The difficulty of securing and retaining competent men for this arduous work is well known. The installation of oil burners, instead of coal, would relieve this problem and should be carefully considered. ■ The Navy should be informed of the increased size of the transport fleets now contemplated and make adequate provision for convoys. Whatever additions to its own service may be needed will have to be determined promptly. If an extension of the arming of our cargo vessels is necessary, much time can be saved by seeing that the 16 armament is installed concurrently with the mechanical equipment. A careful program for this work should be mapped out to avoid delay in mounting gnus on vessels already completed. Tonnage engaged in lifting our essential imports must be allocated with great precision in order that even and dependable schedules may be maintained, with their attendant economies in the use of shipping. Without such schedules the careful adjustment of our industries to restrictions which have been placed upon our supplies becomes impossible. ■ UNITED STATES PORTS. Our Army vessels now spend nearly as much time in home ports as in those in Fiance. For cargo vessels clearing in February, March, and April the average was 17 days in home ports and 21 days in French ports. Relief from congestion on this side of the water is being sought by the development of ports outside of New York, as well as of this port itself. In the two months of May and June, 43 per cent of the total Army cargo lifted was loaded at ports other than New York. The use of these out ports should be extended^ but it should be remembered that the Gulf ports entail a longer turn around and the facilities of the Atlantic ports should be developed to the utmost. Fresh study should be given to all port facilities in the light of these new figures and particularly to our repair facilities, in order that these may be supplied both with equipment and skilled labor to meet the burden which will fall upon them. England's exper- ience in the spring of 1917, when her failure to anticipate her repair needs crowded her ports with vessels, should be a timely warning. It is agreed that our new tonnage, built under great pressure at plants new to this industry and operated by crews of little experience, will be subject to an abnormally high percentage of repairs during the lirst vear or so of their life. By next spring it is estimated that there will be constantly under repair in United States ports some . r )(M),0()() tons of new shipping, and this will increase through the year. Adequate bunker facilities for the coaling of this fleet must be provided. Last winter lack of prompt fuel supplies seriously delayed many vessels. To avoid any possible congestion in the stormy winter weather, a sufficient reserve should be accumulated at all ports. FRENCH PORTS. Recent cables show that the port facilities in France have been receiving earnest consideration abroad, but for several reasons a somewhat extended discussion of this subject is here given. First, these new figures for 1919 as to cargo carriage are undoubtedly beyond any estimates now in the hands of those in France, and there is danger, therefore, that these ports may prove one of the more 17 serious limitations on our ability to move this large tonnage. Sec- ond, if a study of these new figures should indicate the need of con- structing additional berths, the shipment of material will have to be expedited to get construction started before winter. Third, this great transportation problem demands a close coordination in organization between those loading and dispatching Army vessels here and those in control of the ports in France. The difficulties of communication and other causes seem to have stood in the way of the interchange of the accurate and current information which is necessary if our effort on this side is to combine most effectively with that of our authorities in France. This report agrees with the estimates recently cabled from abroad that the capacity of these ports for the next few months will be greater than was at one time feared. There seem reasonable grounds* however, for believing that their limits, without new construction, are clearly indicated. It is possible that plans have been matured abroad providing for other developments than those now under way, and that the great demand which our new shipping will make has been anticipated. It seems more probable, however, that in France, as here, the new proportions soon to be assumed by our Army fleet will make it necessary to think in new terms. Observers bear enthusiastic testimony to the remarkable work so far accomplished by our engineers. In the face of extraordinary difficulties, inherent to the rapid creation of port facilities on a coast whose sandy, gently sloping littoral is by nature opposed to such development, they have adapted and extended existing facilities, constructed new docks, and by constan t struggle succeeded in keeping nearly abreast of a cargo discharge which rose to 498,000 short tons of trans-Atlantic cargo in June. The very stress laid upon these difficulties, which though sur- mounted have not been removed, raises grave doubts as to whether these ports can absorb the 1,081,000 tons we can send them in Janu- ary, 1919, or the 1,663,000 short tons which can be lifted in April. These doubts are not dispelled by any estimates now obtainable, and the following table shows that if these estimates are correct the great tonnage which we now find we shall be able to lift will be very con- siderably beyond the capacity of the ports to discharge. Table III gives the best estimates now available for the discharge capacity of the French ports. 78030—18 5 18 — ■ > ■' S3 £' u, cfl (h O S o*2 o c « .. „• .2 1/ D9 t; o a o -»j .1-1 o c <*- 4-U o to * o b cs-o S a T3 2 G «^ o-s ? o o +»© fcc-^ w„ SP . it a> *- 0.--H 0) v. a a oj 4> ^ O 0} +j a) <-> 03 £ > ."^ >2 © F-. a 5J ;- a +3 +- 1 <» pry ea as C3« O-C o o Ha "te rH ^ -S JS 03 to O ^ 3 i . Wf5 -r. ° =>, ►J ^ .^_< ~ o 0) si rO cS z OS CO A o s CD cS a) a 7. E X go is - to CM — eS v. 03 eS Si 03 rd — Ph c < E- 73 O ~ hr 05 39 6 5 03 s S3 r4 CO s- X *a S3 3h H ,0 d 03 -* 03 3 a Fl c 559555 3 c — it = c E-CH oo o so o 599595 C C C T OC: ic -f CN rr; Ci -r O CC' tf CO CC lO CN1 ■ CO i-H ^! Siooo o O C-l lO CO o -§•5 *f2 S • os a 8§ cm" t-T ■X — — -H sssg O 2 eo f |^ CO OO if c o e c = c — c c o • - = c * ic a t c *~K II * *** • ^i/ *• — 0*"^ *& & ?*£ >itf* * * j**» - 1 24 ESTIMATE OF OVERSEAS FORCE SHIPPING WILL MAINTAIN AND LIMITATION IMPOSED BY PORT DISCHARGE. August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. The overseas force has been based on 50 pounds of supplies per man per day, all construction material included. This equals three-fourths short ton per man per month. thousands Men CHART IV. 4,600 4,000 il 3,500 i 4 fj 3,000 J Y ^* 2,500 <*• 2,000 ^ « * 1,500 ^ y >^/ -5 jflP"* 1,000 / 500 Sept hot Jan Jbr May Jaly Sep* *°* Jan 1918 1919 PART II GAINS AND LOSSES IN TOTAL FLEET. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL FLEET. SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR ARMY SERVICE. (25) Total. July. August . September. October. November. ] December. ,917,211 13, 735, 268 14, 564, 936 15,416,785 16,226,547 17,059,169 928, 708 440, 677 175, 256 84,700 154, 075 74,000 943, 806 969, 526 930, 801 956, 841 1 , 002, 538 12,913,849 147. 004 177,602 85, 450 188,050 * 45, 700 454,411 181, 040 87, 250 230, 025 16, 800 463, 022 184, 474 89, 550 183, 755 10,000 471,631 477,459 187,910 190,854 91,250 92,700 196,050 231,525 10,000 ' 10,000 5, 374, 636 2, 686, 474 1,186,250 3, 154, 630 382, 428 72, ooo ! 26, 250 ! 31,181 l 110,681 j 114,138 117,677 121,039 124,219 127,593 1,744,, 542 60, 000 43, 143 4, 783 2,755 60, 000 46,600 4, 797 2, 741 60, 000 50, 142 4,808 2,727 60, 000 53, 504 4,821 2,714 60, 000 56, 683 4, 836 2,700 60,000 59, 944 . 4, 962 2,687 1,005,000 600, 292 89,100 50,150 , 735, 268 14, 564, 936 15, 416, 785 16, 226, 547 17,059,169 17, 934, 114 • Table V Estimated total dead-weight tonnage, exclusive of tanhers, under American control/rom July 1, 1918, to Dec. ■;/, 7979. wis 19111. July. tugual September, Ootobei \,>\,'l,lt. 1 , 269 I, 718, 119 2,077, 120 1,924,280 2, 2S7, 757 2, 115, III 7 2. 705. 066 2,520,216 ::. 07,x, 820 2. 880, 9X0 3,5X1, 198 3,370,368 4, 139,0-17 8,916,207 1,695, 1X7 1 158,347 5, 252, 590 5, 002 750 5.810.401 5 55;; 5g] 0.419. 131 0. 150. 291 7. 118,207 8,278,045 X. 015, 205 9, 089, 880 X. X27.0IO 9.910, 127 9. 053, 2X7 10. 702. 550 in 199, , in 1 1 568, 128 11,303, 2XX 1 ! in,: li,; 13, I", 178 12,842,338 wise Beel Added vessels 132,840 225,861 162,840 210,037 171. MO 117,299 184,840 873, 764 197,840 802, 378 21(1. xlo 557,849 223,840 550, HO 230. 840 557, 109 219, X40 503, X05 262,840 602, 730 202. X40 099 (170 202, 840 1.159,838 202. 8 10 811 836 202, X 10 X20, 217 202.8 10 | X 10, 123 202, XIII 202. XIII 202. 840 ,■1 80] 262, x in , ho 7H030— 18. (To face page 31.) i umulatlve Increase Table X. — Estimatl Grand total. Distribution: New vessels en route — Pacific-Atlantic Great Lakes-Atlantic. Unassigned Trans-Atlantic services. . . Other trade areas — Steamers Sailing vessels Navy July 1. 6, 764, 807 137, 945 Total. Balance available for Army Army distribution: Trans-Atlantic fleet English Channel and European coast- wise fleet Added vessels 96, 130 867, 529 2, 967, 887 562, 927 281, 130 4, 913, 548 1,851,259 1,718,419 132, 840 225, 861 Aug. 1. 6,880,911 96, 150 54, 660 Sept.l. 7, 091, 800 95, 517 56, 545 867, 529 2, 939, 835 564, 487 281, 130 4, 803, 791 2,077,120 1 , 924, 280 152, 840 210, 637 867, 529 2, 867, 282 566, 040 351, 130 4, 804, 043 2, 287, 757 2,115,917 171, 840 417, 299 78030—18. (To face page 31.) :n from war risk has been LnGre&sed mouth by month from the July figure above mentioned until a total increase of 50 per cent is nude in December and thereafter this figure is niaint aine 1. Table IX. — American-controlled tonnage pynk by enemy nriim, (tankers excluded) and available enemy submarines fdr tht perib'd Jan. 1, 1917, to July Si, 1'HS. Available enemy sub- marines :il end of peril d. American- controlled tonnagi sunk during peri d. Available enemy sub- marines al end of period. American- controlled tonnage sunk during period. Quarter ending- Mar. 31, 1917 [53 1.52 166 175 29, 550 92,338 61.254 42, 7S2 Quarter ending Mm. 31, 191S Tune 30, 1918 July, 101 S . 17S ' 161 June 30,1917 36,516 Sept. 30, 1917 Dec. 31, 1917. S9, 669 50,615 1 U end o May, 191 s. Possible other enemy action. — At some time Germany may deter- mine to sacrifice a portion of her navy in an attack upon the Atlantic transports. The opinion is held that a portion of her fleet could pos- sibly get through to the Atlantic, and before being destroyed could sink a large proportion of the tonnage then at sea. No allowance for such uncertain and indeterminate loss can be stated in figures, and no attempt has been made to include it in the above table. Marine risk. — This has been accurately determined for the purpose of insurance, and it is stated by the Insurance Division of the United States Shipping Board that for other than Army vessels the annual loss from marine risk will be about 2 per cent for ocean-going steam vessels and about 6 per cent for ocean-going sailing vessels. Vessels in Army service are subject to a greater risk, due to the danger of collision incident to their gatherings in convoys. Con- sidering the danger from such maneuvers at all times, and the added possibility of accident with less experienced crews on our new ships, an allowance of 5 per cent per annum has been made as the probable loss from this source. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL FLEET. In Table X the total American controlled fleet, as determined in Table V, has been distributed each month to the essential services which must be maintained and the balance remaining has been carried to the Army and represents the amount of tonnage which can be counted on that month to lift Army cargo. N"ew vessels en route. — Vessels built on the Pacific coast and on the Great Lakes must come to Atlantic ports before loading Army cargo, and these vessels are therefore shown as en route for this period, which is one month for Pacific coast boats and six weeks for Great Lakes boats. 32 The Great Lakes vessels, during the months from November to April, when the northern waterways are frozen, are held after delivery as en route and are not released until April, thus reaching Atlantic coast ports and becoming available for the Army in time. Trans-Atlantic services. — These include American controlled vessels which are in the following services: TABLE XI. Trans-Atlantic total 867, 529 United Kingdom 93, 669 ( 'hannel 3, 800 French 200, 725 French Government 24, 448 Italian 159, 790 Italian Government 97, 872 Mediterranean 33, 705 Dutch 11, 080 Swiss 83, 437 Swiss Government 17, 490 Belgian relief 100, 241 Cross channel and French coastwise 33, 077 Other, including Norway and Sweden, Greenland and Iceland, Persia, Portugal, and Spain 68, 195 Total 927, 529 Less Norwegian included above but later found not subject to our control 60, 000 This tonnage carries cargoes essential to European countries and represents an adjustment between their great needs for commodities and the amount of tonnage which we can spare. We are under no stipulated obligation to furnish any of this tonnage except that for Bel- gian relief and Switzerland, but it is certain that we must to a certain extent see that the associated Governments are supplied with essen- tials. There is no reason to suppose that their essential needs will decrease, and, on the other hand, the Army program before us will call for all our available tonnage for some time to come. These services have therefore been carried as a constant amount through the table. Other trade areas. —The tonnage assigned to these services is en- gaged in carrying our essential imports from abroad or in maintaining necessary coastwise traffic. The assignment of tonnage for these purposes during the year beginning January 1, 1919, is as follows: 33 Table XII. Trade area. Tonnage in service July 1, 1918. Trans-Pacific: American controlled Foreign cont rolled South American: West coast- American controlled Foreign controlled East coast- American controlled Foreign controlled Gulf . Caribbean, and West Indies: American controlled | <)2(>, 005 Foreign controlled 87, 581 Africa: American controlled , 55, 807 Foreign controlled ' 36, 955 Hawaiian and Philippine intei -island, American controlled 13,361 Atlantic coastwise, American controlled 250, 775 Pacific coastwise, American controlled 217,275 New F.ngland coal trade, American controlled 398, 537 553, 153 708,902 581,381 72, 509 155,240 229, 058 Total necessary tonnage. American- controlled dead- weight tons required in 1919. 550, 000 597,000 300,000 500,000 14,758 13,361 300,000 300,000 155,000 3,030,119 In estimating the above requirements the actual dead-weight ton- nage necessary to lift our essential imports for 1919 has been deter- mined from careful estimates of our trade requirements next year, based on: (a) Data obtained in determining our 1918 requirements; (b) Further studies of these trades by the Shipping Board in con- sultation with the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Army, the Navy, and other departments of the Government; (c) Trade hearings conducted by the War Industries Board and the War Trade Board. These requirements in long tons have been converted into the necessary dead-weight tons of shipping from records of actual turn- arounds, bunkers, and stowage. These records have been kept for some months. They have made it possible to estimate our tonnage requirements with a degree of accuracy which would not otherwise be possible. The total tonnage required for trade services, other than trans- Atlantic, as so determined, is taken as a constant from January 1, 1919. The present tonnage in these services is decreased evenly each month from July 1, 1918, to that date. Winter delays. — Allowance has been made for delays due to bad weather in winter. This is estimated at 5 per cent for November and 5 per cent for March, and 10 per cent each month for December, January, and Februar}^. Manifestly, good management will maintain 34 an even amount of tonnage in our trades wherever possible, and the delay of these months lias boon distributed over the year. It amounts to 3^ per cent per month, and will call for the addition of 101,004 dead-weight tons to offset it. making a total required tonnage for other trade areas on January 1 . 1919, of 3,131 ,123. Repairs.— The time spent in repairs other than those which can be made while the vessel is loading or unloading is included in our records of turnarounds and provided for in this factor. Navy. — The Navy has made a request for the addition of 10 colliers, totaling 50,000 dead-weight tons, and four other vessels, totaling 20,000 dead-weight tons, before September 1. and this additional amount of tonnage lias therefore been assigned to the Navy in August. SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR ARMY SERVICE. The actual dead-weight tonnage engaged in Army service July 1 has been taken as a base, and to this has been added the additional tonnage which will become available each month after provision for all other essential services. This Army fleet has then been divided into service between England and France to take care of Army coal requirements in France and trans-Atlantic service. The latter will consist of regular cargo ships, passenger ships of different types, and animal ships. In estimating the cargo which can be lifted on passenger and animal ships, they have been reduced to their actual dead-weight cargo carrying equiv- alent. Repairs on the present Army fleet are included in our turn-around figures. From February 26 to July .'il an average of 5.2 per cent of the total Army fleet was continously under repair in United States ports. This does not include those repairs which were made while vessels were loading and unloading. It represents approximately '■\\ days per round trip. It is the impression of men qualified by experience in such matters that new boats now coming forward will be subject during their first year or so to a very much greater delay from this source. Not only are these boats placed in service after being built at extra- ordinary speed by yards new to this work, but the inspection which they are given is less thorough than in normal times. Added to this will be the element of less skilled crews. An increase of time spent in repair to 2\ times the present delay has been made for these new boats, and their turn around proportionately lengthened. Winter delays. -In the winter months an allowance for delay due to stormy weather has been made, and the turn arounds during the months of November and March have been lengthened 5 per cent 35 and during December, January, and February 10 per cent for each month. As the Army is taking all the boats which it can get each month, it is impossible to distribute this delay over the whole year. as in the ease of trade vessels. Coal requirements. — In June 103,000 tons of coal were carried from England to France for the use of the Army by American controlled ships, totaling 132,000 dead-weight tons. The Army has estimated its maximum need of coal at 200,000 tons next spring. Shipping in this service has therefore been proportionately increased each month to April, 1919, and is thereafter carried as a constant. This coal will provide for the 268 additional locomotives each month now called for by Gen. Pershing. Troops to Siberia. -From information obtained from the Army this movement will be carried in Army vessels now on the Pacific which will continue to lift cargoes from the Philippines on their homeward voyage. No especial allowance has therefore been made for this service. Troop ships and animal ships. — From Army records of actual short tons of cargo carried by troop ships, it appears that these will carry about one-eighth as much as cargo vessels of the same dead-weight. Their turn around, however, is one-half that of cargo boats. Similar records show that animal ships will carry approximately 30 per cent less cargo than a cargo vessel of the same turn around. The cargo carriage of these vessels has been figured on this basis. Cargo carriage of Army fleet.— With the allowance above men- tioned, the trans-Atlantic Army cargo which can be lifted each month has been figured on the basis of existing records of stowage, bunkers, and turn arounds. The cargo vessels clearing in June carried 68 per cent of their dead-weight. From February to June, inclusive, they averaged 64.-1 per cent. An average of 661 per cent has been taken as the basis of this estimate. The effective average turn around for cargo boats clearing in April was 70 days. The average from February to April, inclusive, was 70.7 days. Seventy days has been taken as the average except for such boats as will use the port of Marseille, the turn around for which is estimated at 77 days. Small vessels. — Finally, an allowance has been made for the small vessels of 5,000 dead-weight tons or less. Up to January, 1011). it is assumed that our production of these can be absorbed in some reason- ably efficient employment. A discount of 15 per cent is made on the carrying capacity of these vessels coming forward after that date, as these ships, whether they go to the Army or indirectly release other boats for the Army, will undoubtedly have to engage 1 in longer hauls. o LIBRARY OF CONGRESS