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OF THE 
 
 BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 BY 
 
 SAMUEL ' T Y L E R , 
 
 OF THE MARYLAND BAR. 
 
 It na^ht to be eternally resolved and settled that the understanding cannot de- 
 cide otherwise than by Induction, and by a legitimate form of it. 
 
 Bacon's Works, 3rd Vol., page 340, Am., Ed, 
 
 N'um fin^o? num mentior? cupio refelli: quid enim laboro, nisi ut Veritas in 
 omni qufestione expliceiur ? — Cicero, Tnsc. Disp. Lib. 3rd. page 105, Glas. Ki. 
 
 [SECOND EDITION ENLARGED.] 
 
 PRINTED BY D. SCHLEY & T. KALLER 
 
 FREDERICK CITY, MD. 
 1846: 
 
\\ft* 
 
 
 Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 
 1846, by SAMUEL TYLER, in the Clerk's Office, of 
 the District Court of the District of Maryland. 
 
/ y--/ 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
 To Dr. Grafton Tyler, Georgetown, D. C. . 
 
 Beloved Brother: — Our pleasures and 
 our interests have always been so identified, 
 that I cannot but desire that your name may 
 be associated with mine, in a work which 
 has amused so many of my leisure moments., 
 and made it necessary that I should look over 
 borne of the ancient Greek and Roman auth- 
 ors, where almost every page suggested to 
 me the time when we first read them over 
 together, and like our play-grounds, brought 
 back to my mind, the happy days of our 
 youth. To you then, whom of all men, God 
 has made nearest to me, in that we are the 
 only children of our parents ; and as the near- 
 ness of our relation has been so excellently 
 illustrated in your brotherly love, which has 
 contributed so much to my happiness through 
 our childhood, and our youth, and increases 
 as we walk up the hill of life together, I ded- 
 
4 DEDICATION. 
 
 icate these reflections of my leisure hours, 
 hoping that the doctrines set forth, may re- 
 ceive the sanction of a judgment, that is so 
 certain a measure of truth as yours. 
 Your brother, 
 
 SAMUEL TYLER. 
 
 Frederick, Md., March 16tft, 1844. 
 
PREF ACE 
 
 Believing with Bacon, that, "It ought to 
 be eternally resolved and settled, that the un- 
 derstanding cannot decide otherwise, than by 
 Induction, and by a legitimate form of it," 
 I have endeavoured in the following dis- 
 course, to do something towards settling the 
 great problem. The discourse therefore, lies 
 within the province of logic in the most com- 
 prehensive meaning of that term, as embrac- 
 ing the method of investigation, the grounds 
 of human belief, and the origin of all knowl- 
 edge. It is true, that in the first part of the 
 discourse, I have endeavoured, not only to 
 show the grand results of Induction as an or- 
 gan of Investigation, but also, to vindicate 
 the philosophy which it has built up from the 
 grave accusations that have been preferred 
 against it. But this is nothing more, than a 
 vindication of Induction from objections urged 
 against it, on account of the imputed conse- 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 quences to which it leads. The discourse 
 therefore, in all its parts, lies strictly within 
 the province of logic. 
 
 The whole empire of human thought has 
 been traversed in the discourse, revelation as 
 well as nature has been searched, and induc- 
 tion has been found every where, the true 
 method of Investigation. And so far from 
 its being the Organon of Infidelity and 
 Atheism, as has often been asserted, it is 
 found, that all the lines of investigation which 
 it lays open, whether in physics or psycholo- 
 gy, ultimately converge and point upwards, 
 to an inquiry that results by the strictest log- 
 ical necessity in the belief of a God. And 
 when the province of revelation is entered, 
 it is found, that the very truths which Induc- 
 tion has discovered in the province of nature, 
 are assumed as true, in its teachings; and. 
 that nothing is told in revelation which does 
 not consist with the inferences which Induc- 
 tion has established in the province of nature. 
 And on the other hand, whenever man has 
 cast aside Induction, and let go the thread of 
 experience as an inadequate c)ne. to the lab- 
 
TREFACE. 
 
 arynths of knowledge, aad attempted by an 
 a priori method of investigation and its cor- 
 responding doctrine of fore-knowledge, to 
 ascertain the truths whether of nature or rev- 
 elation, we find that nothing but ever-vary- 
 ing and ever-increasing error has been the re- 
 sult. It would seem therefore, to be a legit- 
 imate conclusion ; " that the understanding 
 cannot decide otherwise than by Induction." 
 In undertaking a task so foreign to my ha- 
 bitual pursuits, I have been influenced by a 
 love of truth, and a strong desire to vindicate 
 a Method of Investigation, which by its great 
 doctrine, that experience is the only light to 
 our path, and lamp to our feet in the pursuit 
 of knowledge, is pushing forward the front- 
 iers of science in every possible direction, 
 with such triumphant success. And when I 
 reflect, how far the task was beyond my abil- 
 ities, I rejoice to know, that all the errors 
 which I may have committed in the execu- 
 tion of it, will be corrected in the progress of 
 truth. Num flngo? num mentior? cupio re- 
 felli : quid enim laboro, nisi ut Veritas in om- 
 ni quaestione explicetur? 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PART THE FIRST 
 
 The Influence of the Baconian Phi- 
 losophy. — Some one nation always at the 
 head of the rest. England at the head of 
 modern civilization. In modern civilization 
 there have been three great revolutions : the 
 religious, the philosophical and the political. 
 The philosophical revolution originated in 
 England. Lord Bacon stands at the head of 
 this movement. The object of this revolu- 
 tion. Bacon's writings their publication 
 
 and their circulation. Royal Society of Lon- 
 don. The leading discoveries of the physi- 
 cal sciences made in England. These dis- 
 coveries enumerated, and the method of 
 their discovery pointed out. These discov- 
 eries objects of the most delightful contem- 
 plation. Contrast between -the physical dis- 
 
10 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 coveries of the ancients and the moderns as 
 objects of intellectual contemplation. Baco- 
 nian philosophy practical. The application 
 of its discoveries to the mechanic arts. The 
 benefits conferred on England by the Baco- 
 nian Philosophy. This philosophy not con- 
 fined to physical nature ; but embraces intel- 
 lectual and moral science. The opinion that 
 this philosophy leads to a mean standard of 
 beauty, refuted ; and the question examined 
 at large both by philosophical analysis and 
 historical fact. English literature examined, 
 and its distinguishing features pointed out. 
 The opinion that the Baconian philosophy 
 leads to materialism and atheism refuted. 
 The Baconian philosophy likely to form the 
 type of universal civilization. 
 
 PART THE SECOND.— CHAPTER I. 
 
 The Baconian Method of Investiga- 
 tion. — The Aristotelian logic. The reason- 
 ing process in its form, is the syllogism. All 
 reasoning proceeds by comparison. The 
 fundamental principle of the syllogism. Ba- 
 con did not design to teach a new mode of 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 11 
 
 reasoning, but a new mode of investigation. 
 The a priori method of investigation nothing 
 more than a misapplication of the Aristoteli- 
 an logic. The influence of the a priori meth- 
 od of investigation upon philosophy. Bacon 
 appears. His instauration of the sciences. 
 The Novum Organon, its object, the spirit of 
 its philosophy, and the nature of its method 
 of investigation. This method called Induc- 
 tion. It is the reverse of the syllogism. 
 Analysis and synthesis considered, and both 
 shown to be inductive processes. The appli- 
 cation of mathematics to the inductive scien- 
 ces considered. Induction carried on by 
 principles of evidence and not by principles 
 of logic. The nature of analogy considered. 
 The inductive process founded on analogy. 
 The great fundamental principle of philo- 
 sophical evidence developed ; and it is shown 
 to bear the same relation to induction that 
 the fundamental principle of logic does to 
 the syllogism. Whether Bacon discovered 
 the inductive process considered. 
 
 PART THE SECOND.— CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Theory of Mind assumed in the 
 
12 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Baconian method of Investigation : — 
 
 Only two theories of mind, the theory of 
 innate ideas, and the theory, that all our 
 knowledge is founded ultimately upon expe- 
 rience. The theory of innate ideas, is the 
 theory of mind assumed in the a priori meth- 
 od of investigation ; and the theory, that all 
 our knowledge is founded upon experience, 
 is that assumed in the Baconian method of 
 investigation. Plato the leading Philosopher 
 amongst the ancients, and Des Cartes amongst 
 the moderns, who maintained the theory of 
 innate ideas. Both these Philosophers main- 
 tained the a priori method of investigation. 
 Bacon's theory of mind, the same with that 
 of Locke and Reid. They all maintained 
 the theory that all our knowledge is founded 
 upon experience. Locke solved the funda- 
 mental problem of psychology ; and Reid de- 
 veloped the fundamental laws of thought. 
 The Baconian method of investigation the 
 psychological correlative of the theory of 
 mind that all our knowledge is founded ulti- 
 timately upon experience. The theory of 
 mind taught in the sacred scriptures. The 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. 13 
 
 philosophy of Kant examined. The Bacon- 
 ian method of investigation traced up to the 
 first impressions made upon the senses. 
 
 PART THE THIRD. 
 
 Natural Theology: its place amongst 
 the Sciences, and the nature of its 
 evidence : — Natural Theology a branch of 
 the inductive or Baconian philosophy. The 
 errors of Lord Brougham's discourse of Na- 
 tural Theology pointed out. The place of 
 Natural Theology amongst the sciences and 
 the nature of its evidence pointed out by 
 Bacon. 
 
 Hume's essay on a special Providence and 
 a future state considered. The error of the 
 essay shown to consist in confounding a mere 
 physical cause with an intelligent creator. 
 This error shown to lie at the foundation of 
 all atheistical arguments. The evidences of 
 Natural Theology traced up to the idea of 
 causation developed in consciousness. 
 
 PART THE FOURTH. 
 
 The connection between Philosophy 
 and Revelation: In the interpretation of 
 
14 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 scripture^ revelation must not be subordinated 
 to philosophy. The subordinating revelation 
 to philosophy is now^ and has always been 
 the chief source of theological error. The 
 influence of various systems of philosophy 
 on Christianity examined. The Baconian 
 Philosophy the only one consistent with Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Baconian Philosophy is emphatically 
 the philosophy of protestantism. Luther de- 
 nounced the Aristotelian logic, because it was 
 the foundation of the scholastic theology, the 
 frame-work which supported its superstruc- 
 ture^ and the cement which held together all 
 its parts. And Bacon denounced it, because 
 it was the foundation, and frame-work and 
 cement of the a priori philosophy. Protes- 
 tant Christianity and the Baconian philosophy 
 originate in the same fountain, and flow to- 
 gether in the same channels. And it is very 
 remarkable that just now, so much attention 
 is directed to the two great revolutions of 
 modern times — the religious revolution ef- 
 fected by Luther, and the philosophical revo- 
 lution effected by Bacon. Two more elabo- 
 rate histories of the reformation than any ev- 
 er submitted to the world, are now being 
 
;16 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 written, and are nearly completed,— the one 5 
 by D'Aubigne in Switzerland, and the other, 
 by Ranke in Germany. The first, as far as 
 completed, has been translated into English, 
 and published and read with the deepest in- 
 terest over all Great Britain, and has been 
 republished and read more extensively, in 
 this country, than almost any other book. 
 And from the high reputation of Ranke, and 
 the absorbing interest of the subject, his his- 
 tory will doubtless soon be translated into 
 english and circulated through all the multi- 
 plied channels of publication. And the most 
 animating interest in the great theme, will be 
 kept alive. And within a few years, Mont- 
 agu's edition of Bacon's complete works, 
 with translations of those written in latin, 
 which had engaged the attention of the edit- 
 or more than twenty years, has been publish- 
 ed in England, and is now republished in 
 this country ; and the popular publications of 
 England, and the great periodicals of both 
 that and this country, have been for a long 
 time teeming with commentaries and exposi- 
 tions of the Baconian philosophy. The 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. T? 
 
 mighty spirit of modern civilization appears 
 to be stirring up society anew, by rehearsing 
 the history of its triumphs, and proclaiming 
 again to the world, its great doctrines. It 
 seems to be gathering up its strength, for a 
 new onward movement. 
 
 Impelled, by the same influence which is 
 operating upon so many minds in the differ- 
 ent nations of Christendom, we have endea- 
 vored in this discourse, to exhibit a popular 
 and succint, but yet a more thoroughly de- 
 veloped exposition of the Baconian philoso- 
 phy than any which has appeared. 
 
 In the first part of this discourse, we have 
 set forth, as the leading truth, that the Bacon- 
 ian philosophy has for its primary object, the 
 investigation of the laws of the material 
 world, and the application of these laws, 
 through the instrumentality of the useful arts, 
 to the physical well-being of man. That this 
 philosophy does not think it beneath its dig- 
 nity, to solve the homely problems : "What 
 shall we eat, and what shall we drink, and 
 and wherewithall shall we be clothed ?" But 
 admitting, that philosophers like other peo- 
 
 2* 
 
18 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 pie, must feed their hunger and clothe their 
 nakedness, it teaches how to make with more 
 facility and in greater abundance, the food 
 and raiment necessary for our bodies, and 
 proclaims not in whispers, but in its very 
 loudest accents, that Franklin did not more 
 fully exemplify the true spirit of philosophy 
 when he brought down fire from heaven, than 
 Fulton did, when he yoked it to the car of 
 commerce. 
 
 And as England originated the great phi- 
 losophical movement of which we are speak- 
 ing, and stands at the head of modern civili- 
 zation, we have cited the chief discoveries in 
 the sciences made by the Anglo-Saxon race, 
 and then showed how these discoveries, by 
 their application to the useful arts, have ex- 
 tended the dominion of man over the empire 
 of nature, and in this way conferred on Eng- 
 land so much wealth and power. 
 
 After thus showing the connection of the 
 Baconian philosophy with the useful arts, and 
 how much it has through them, contributed 
 to the physical comforts of man, we next 
 show that this philosophy does not lead to a 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 selfish morality, as some have alleged; but 
 that in all its principles, and in all its aims, it 
 tends to produce a noble and disinterested 
 morality. The next question discussed, is 
 the bearing of this philosophy upon the arts of 
 beauty ; and it is shown by an analysis of its! 
 fundamental principles, that it maintains a, 
 most exalted ideal. And this fact is further 
 proved and illustrated, by spreading out in 
 microscopic view, the literature of England 
 with all its rich and various and masculine 
 beauties, which has grown up under the in- 
 fluence of the spirit of this philosophy. 
 
 We next defend this philosophy from the 
 charge of materialism and atheism with which 
 it is so often assailed, and show that this 
 charge has no foundation either in its princi- 
 ples or the influence which it has actually ex- 
 erted upon the opinions of men ; for that the 
 nation which has most assiduously cultivated 
 it, has also done more to advance the doc- 
 trines of natural theology, than any nation 
 known to history. 
 
 We conclude this part of the discourse, by 
 showing that the Baconian philosophy is not 
 
20 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 
 
 like the ancient philosophies, adapted to the 
 culture of one epoch and one people only; 
 but that like Christianity it js catholic in its 
 -spirit and equally suited to all times and to 
 every people, and that it is likely to extend 
 its blessings to all nations, and gather them 
 under its wings as a hen doth gathe^r her 
 chickens. I 
 
 In the second part of the discourse, we en- 
 ter upon the consideration of the Baconian 
 method of investigation. This part is divided 
 into two chapters. The first chapter treats 
 in the first place, of the Aristotelian Logic, 
 and shows that it analyzes the reasoning pro- 
 cess, and developes the form in which every 
 argument passes through the mind, and that 
 this form is the syllogism. It then shows, that 
 the truth of the conclusion of an argument is 
 always assumed in the premises, and is not in 
 reality a new truth : but merely a particular 
 instance of a general truth already known, 
 and stated in the premises. It is then shown 
 that the a priori method of investigation is 
 nothing more than a misapplication of the 
 Aristotelian logic as a method of investiga- 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 21 
 
 tion. The effect of this misapplication upon 
 ancient philosophy, is then shown, and the 
 peculiar errors produced by it, pointed out. 
 This effect is then traced down through the 
 middle ages of European history, and the 
 futility of the philosophy of that period is 
 signalized. 
 
 We next enter upon the consideration of 
 the method of investigation taught by Bacon 
 in the Novum .Organon, and show that it is 
 just the reverse of the syllogistic method of 
 Aristotle, which had been previously used. 
 it is shown that the Baconian method of in- 
 vestigation proceeds from particulars to uni- 
 versals, and that the syllogistic or a priori 
 method proceeds from universals to particu- 
 lars. And it is shown that the Baconian 
 method of investigation is not a process of 
 reasoning at all — is not carried on by rules 
 of logic : but is carried on by rules of evi- 
 dence. And that though the mathematics 
 are applied to the verification of the inferen- 
 ces of induction in the physical sciences, that 
 still this does not take those sciences out of 
 the paje of induction and put them within 
 
"%2 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the precincts of reasoning: the reasoning 
 process being in such application of the math- 
 ematics, a mere touch-stone to test the truth 
 of the inductive conclusions, and not to elicit 
 any new conclusion not already reached by 
 induction. Analysis and synthesis are also 
 considered ; and are shown to be in the sci- 
 ences of contingent truth, inductive process- 
 es and not processes of reasoning, and that 
 they are what Bacon called the ascending and 
 descending processes of induction. And as 
 we show that induction is carried on by means 
 of principles of evidence and not by princi- 
 ples of logic, we enter upon the considera- 
 tion of the nature of philosophical evidence ; 
 and show that all evidence may be divided 
 into analogy and identity ; and that the whole 
 inductive process, as long as that process is 
 founded on mere probability, no matter how 
 great is the probability, proceeds on analogi- 
 cal evidence. And we show that all the 
 great discoveries in physical science have 
 been made by the evidence of analogy. We 
 then distinguish between philosophical anal- 
 ogy, and rhetorical analogy ; and show that 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 23 
 
 the distinction is an important one, and that 
 for want of this distinction men have contin- 
 ually fallen into error. And finally we evolve 
 out of our analysis of the inductive process, 
 the great fundamental principle of philosoph- 
 ical evidence, which bears the same relation 
 to induction, that the Dictum de omni et nullo 
 of Aristotle, does to the syllogism. And thus 
 we have rendered induction just as systematic 
 as Aristotle did the syllogism. And surely 
 it is much more difficult to develop a princi- 
 ple which shall embrace in its application the 
 innumerable particular instances which occur 
 in every science or department of nature, 
 and show the connection between them and 
 the inductive inference properly inferrible 
 from them, than it is to develop a principle 
 which shall show the connection between the 
 premises and conclusion of an argument : 
 and therefore such a principle is so much the 
 more important. 
 
 Mr. Macaulay in his celebrated review of 
 Bacon's writings seemed to think that no 
 such principle as the one just mentioned could 
 be developed — that no precise rule can be 
 
24 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 given, marking the difference between instan= 
 ces from which a sound inductive inference 
 can be drawn, and instances from which such 
 an inference cannot be drawn. And with a 
 levity characterized more by the spirit of a 
 coquette, than of a philosopher-^ with strong- 
 words and weak arguments — he has attempt- 
 ed to ridicule by the reductio ad absurdum, 
 the value of Bacon's delineation of the in- 
 ductive process in the second book of the 
 Novum Organon, He amuses himself, and 
 as he supposed, his readers too, with a ludi- 
 crous caricature of the inductive ocess, in 
 showing that it is by it, that a man finds out 
 that he has been made sick by the mince pies 
 which he had -eaten. It would have been 
 quite as philosophical, to have attempted to 
 depreciate the inductive procesSj by showing 
 that it was by that process, that Hudibras ar- 
 rived at the conclusion that it was not neces- 
 sary to have more than one spur ; because he 
 had ascertained by actual experiment, that 
 one side of his horse could not move without 
 the other, and that therefore, if one spur 
 could make one side go, it would make the 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 25 
 
 other go too. Mr. Macaulay well knows that 
 ridicule is not argument. And doubtless he 
 would readily perceive, that the fact, that 
 Hudibras 
 
 " by geometric scale, 
 
 Could take the size of pots of ale ; 
 Resolve by signs and tangents, straight, 
 If bread or butter wanted weight," 
 
 does not detract from the dignity of New- 
 ton's Principia or prove that the rules of 
 geometry are useless. And yet he does not 
 perceive the folly of attacking by ridicule, 
 the development of induction which Bacon 
 has given in the second book of the Novum 
 Organon. But smitten with the ambition of 
 critical display, he sacrifices truth to rhetoric. 
 And in his attempts to reduce to absurdity, 
 the reasonings of others, he plunges into that 
 predicament himself. Flying upon the wings 
 of antithesis, and in his onward course show- 
 ing first one wing of the antithesis and then 
 the other, in order that his readers may ad- 
 mire their brilliancy and their contrast, and 
 more intent upon the grandeur of his flight 
 than the point to which he is moving, he is 
 3 
 
26 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 sometimes carried to the most preposterous 
 conclusions. And on the point which we are 
 now examining he goes the whole length of 
 declaring that grammar and logic and rhetoric 
 are useless studies. When it is a knowledge 
 of these very studies, which has strengthened 
 and plumed his own wings, and enabled him 
 to soar aloft so boldly and gracefully, that we 
 cannot but admire his flight, even when it is 
 beyond the regions of truth and common 
 sense. 
 
 But not content with ridiculing induction 
 by general remarks, Mr. Macaulay, as if to 
 signalize its absurdity, ridicules it in all its de- 
 tails, until his criticism rivals in the minute- 
 ness, of its anatomy, the celebrated curse 
 which Dr. Slop, at the request of Mr. Shan- 
 dy, read aloud, to the so great horror of my 
 uncle Toby. " We have heard (says he) 
 that an eminent judge of the last generation 
 was in the habit of jocosely propounding 
 after dinner a theory, that the cause of the 
 prevalence of Jacobinism was the practice of 
 bearing three names. He quoted on the one 
 side Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 Sheridan, John Home Tooke, John Philpot 
 Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald 
 Wolfe Tone : These were instantiae con- 
 venientes. He then proceeded to cite in- 
 stances absentiae in proxime : — William Pitt, 
 John Scott, William Wyndham, Samuel 
 Horsely, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke 
 He might have gone on to instances secundum 
 magis et minus. The practice of giving chil- 
 dren three names, is more common in Ameri- 
 ca than England. In England we have a 
 King and a House of Lords, but the Ameri- 
 cans are republicans. The rejectiones are ob- 
 vious. Burke and Theobald Wolfe Tone 
 were both Irishmen; therefore the being an 
 Irishman, is not the cause of Jacobinism. 
 Horsely and Home Tooke were both Clergy- 
 men; therefore the being a Clergyman, is not 
 the cause of Jacobinism. Fox and V/ynd- 
 ham were both educated at Oxford; and 
 therefore the being educated at Oxford, is 
 not the cause of Jacobinism. In this way our 
 inductive philosopher arrives at what Bacon 
 calls the vintage, and pronounces that the hav- 
 ing three names is the cause of Jacobinism." 
 
28 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 " Here is an induction corresponding with 
 Bacon's analysis, and ending in a monstrous 
 absurdity. In what, then does this induction 
 differ from the induction which leads us to 
 the conclusion that the presence of the sun 
 is the cause of our having more light by day 
 than night ! The difference evidently is not 
 in the kind of instances, but in the number of 
 instances; that is to say, the difference is not 
 in that part of the process for which Bacon 
 has given precise rules, but in a circumstance, 
 for which no precise rule can possibly be giv- 
 en." Now we join issue with Mr. Macaulay 
 and say that it is the kind of instances as well 
 as the number of instances which constitute 
 the difference between the two cases which 
 he puts. For if the instances of the three 
 names had been as numerous as the whole 
 Jacobin party, though it would have been a 
 marvellous coincidence, yet no man in his 
 senses w r ould have believed that the bearing 
 three names was the cause of the prevalence 
 of Jacobinism ; and simply because, the in- 
 stances are not of the kind from which an in- 
 ductive inference can be drawn : they being 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 the mere coincidence of chance, and not 
 kindred facts conjoined by a law of nature. 
 It is true that if every Jacobin had borne three 
 names, it might have been inferred that there 
 was some cause for such a conjunction of facts ; 
 that their parents, perhaps, from some com- 
 mon motive gave their children three names, 
 just as the old Puritans from a common motive, 
 gave their children whole verses of scripture 
 for names. But under no circumstances what- 
 ever could it be inferred that the bearing- 
 three names was the cause of the prevalence 
 of Jacobinism. The fact that the presence 
 of the sun is the cause of more light by day 
 than night is a fact in nature, and is support- 
 ed as every fact in nature always is, by innu- 
 merable analogies. But is the naming chil- 
 dren a fact in nature — a work of the Creator? 
 Is the bearing three names and the being a 
 Jacobin, a relation established by the Creator 
 of the universe ? Is there any analogy in na- 
 ture from which it can be inferred that the 
 one is the cause of the other? Certainly 
 none. It might as well be supposed that the 
 wearing pantaloons is the cause of one per- 
 
30 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 son's being a man, and the wearing petticoats, 
 the cause of another person's being a woman, 
 as that the bearing three names is the cause 
 of one's being a Jacobin. 
 
 This then is the difference between the two 
 kinds of instances, and " the circumstance for 
 which a precise rule can be given :' ? the one 
 is the constant connection between two facts 
 in nature, the other , the casual coincidence of 
 two facts totally irrelevant, and dependent on 
 the acts of man. Their difference is perceiv- 
 ed intuitively, and therefore cannot be made 
 plainer by illustration. Our remarks in the 
 discourse, on analogy, appear to us, to throw 
 light upon the subject. 
 
 Mr. M acaulay after exhausting his weapons 
 of ridicule, becomes very serious, and says 
 "that the difference between a sound and 
 unsound, or to use the Baconian phraseology, 
 between the interpretation of nature and the 
 anticipation of nature, does not lie in this — 
 that the interpreter of nature goes through 
 the process analzyed in the second book of 
 the Novum Organon and the anticipator 
 through a different process. They both per- 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 31 
 
 form the same process. But the anticipator 
 performs it foolishly or carelessly ; the inter- 
 preter performs it with patience, attention 
 and sagacity, and judgment. Now precepts 
 can do little towards making men patient and 
 attentive, and still less towards making them 
 sagacious and judicious." Now these sober 
 remarks of Mr. Macaulay are not entitled to 
 one tittle more respect as exhibitions of truth 
 than those which we have been examining. 
 Precepts of no use! Why ; are not precept 
 and example the only guide of man ? and is 
 not the whole force of example in its being 
 the expression of a precept? The mere 
 general precept which lies at the foundation 
 of the Baconian philosophy, that we should 
 scrutinize with caution the phenomena of na- 
 ture, before we draw our inferences, has rev- 
 olutionized philosophy ; and yet it is gravely 
 asserted, by one of the most brilliant writers, 
 and adroit critics of the age, that precepts 
 are useless in philosophical investigations, and 
 in every thing else. We readily admit, that 
 as long as induction is confined, to ascertain- 
 ing what article of diet has made a man sick, 
 
32 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 or whether one side of a horse can move 
 without the other, precepts are of very little 
 use. But then, it must be remembered, that 
 induction "resembles the tent which the 
 fairy Paribanou gave to Prince Ahmed. 
 Fold it, and it seemed a toy for the hand of 
 a lady. Spread it, and the armies of power- 
 ful Sultans might repose beneath its shade." 
 When it is the toy for the hand of a lady, we 
 may use it without the aid of precepts, but 
 when it is spread out so that the armies of 
 powerful sultans may repose beneath its shade, 
 we cannot manage it by our unaided strength. 
 Having thus, in the first chapter of the 
 second part of the discourse, considered the 
 Baconian method of investigation, in the sec- 
 ond chapter, we consider the theory of mind 
 assumed in that method. We show, there 
 never has been, and that there never can be, 
 more than two theories of mind : and these 
 two theories are the theory of innate ideas, 
 and the theory that all our knowledge is 
 founded ultimately in experience. We show 
 that the theory of innate ideas is the theory 
 assumed in the a priori method of investiga- 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 33 
 
 tion ; and that the theory that all our knowl- 
 edge is founded ultimately in experience, is 
 that assumed in the Baconian method of in- 
 vestigation. It is shown that Plato was the 
 leading philosopher amongst the ancients and 
 Des Cartes amongst the moderns, who main- 
 tained the theory of innate ideas ; and that 
 both these philosophers maintained the a pri- 
 ori method of investigation. It is next shown 
 that Bacon had a distinct view of the the- 
 ory of mind that all our knowledge is founded 
 ultimately in experience ; and that this is the 
 theory of mind which has been developed by 
 Locke and Reid. We show that Locke solv- 
 ed the great fundamental problem of this the- 
 ory of mind, and showed that all our knowl- 
 edge originates in sensation and conscious- 
 ness. And that Reid established this theorv 
 still more firmly by developing the great psy- 
 chological laws which lie at the foundation of 
 this theory, and which govern human belief 
 in the knowledge derived through these orig- 
 inal sources of information. He developed 
 the law which governs our belief in the tes- 
 timony of sensation, and the law which gov- 
 
34 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
 erns our belief in the testimony of concious- 
 ness. He also developed the law which gov- 
 erns oar belief in the testimony of memory, 
 and the law which governs our belief, that 
 the future will be like the past, and that like 
 causes will produce like effects. This last is 
 the fundamental law of induction. And 
 thus we trace up the Baconian method of in- 
 vestigation through the theory of mind which 
 it assumes in every step of knowledge until 
 we trace the process up to the very first im- 
 pressions made upon the senses, and we 
 show the psychological law for every act of 
 the mind in the process. We next examine 
 the philosophy of Kant, and show that his 
 doctrine of a priori conceptions of the rea- 
 son, has the same logical characteristics as the 
 doctrine of innate ideas; and that it assumes 
 the a priori method of investigation. We 
 have therefore in the two chapters of this 
 part of the discourse, exhibited an outline of 
 a complete system of logic in the largest sense 
 of the term ; and furnished in it a touch- 
 stone of philosophical criticism by which the 
 reasonings of all philosophies may be tested. 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 3«5 
 
 In the third part of the discourse, we ap- 
 ply the second part by way of philosophical 
 criticism, to Lord Brougham's Discourse of 
 Natural Theology, and Hume's Essay on a 
 special Providence and a future State. We 
 show that Lord Brougham in the very outset 
 commits a logical blunder, which vitiates much 
 of his subsequent reasonings. And that he 
 does not solve the problem which he has pro- 
 posed to himself; but that he always dodges 
 it, or passes it over, by a mere assertion. We 
 show that this results from his overlooking, 
 some of the logical and psychological princi- 
 ples which we have developed in the second 
 part of our discourse. We then show how 
 by an application of these principles, the 
 problem which Lord Brougham has proposed 
 to himself can be solved. We next show 
 that the great doctrine of Lord Brougham's 
 discourse, that Natural Theology is a branch 
 of the inductive or Baconian philosophy, and 
 is founded on the same sort of evidence as 
 that philosophy, had been distinctly advanced 
 by Bacon, and set forth with the most accu- 
 rate discrimination ;. and from the fact that 
 
36 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 Brougham comments in his discourse up- 
 on this portion of Bacon's writings, we are 
 at a loss to determine whether he could have 
 misunderstood Bacon, or whether he wished 
 to pervert Bacon's doctrine, in order that he 
 might have the credit of having first shown 
 the true place of Natural Theology amongst 
 the sciences. 
 
 After having examined Lord Brougham's 
 discourse, we proceed to examine Hume's 
 Essay on a Special Providence and a future 
 State ; and we show by an application of the 
 psychological and logical principles developed 
 by us in the second part of the discourse, 
 that the whole fallacy of Hume's doctrine 
 consists in his confounding an intelligent 
 Creator with a mere physical cause. And 
 we show that this is the clue by which the 
 sophistical labyrinths of his argument are to 
 be traced. As soon as the distinction between 
 an intelligent Creator and a mere physical 
 cause is applied to Hume's reasonings, his 
 whole argument point after point, falls to the 
 ground, as if touched by the wand of a talis- 
 man ; and we feel astonished that the essay 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 37 
 
 should, by the apparent strength of its for- 
 tresses, have so long kept off the attacks of 
 natural theologians ; and should at this day 
 be considered so formidable as to lead Lord 
 Brougham to remark that, "we may the rath- 
 er conclude that it is not very easily answer- 
 ed, because in fact it has rarely if ever been 
 encountered by writers on theological sub- 
 jects." And it is remarkable that no writer 
 on natural theology, as well as we can recol- 
 lect, has shown the importance in our rea- 
 sonings on natural theology, of the distinct- 
 ion between an intelligent Creator and a mere 
 physical cause, and yet it is the confounding 
 of so obvious a distinction that has caused the 
 chief difficulty on this subject. We have 
 shown that with this distinction there is no 
 difficulty whatever in maintaining on the prin- 
 ciples of the inductive philosophy, the truth 
 of natural theology ; but that without this 
 distinction, natural theology must fail. 
 
 In the fourth part of the discourse, the 
 connection between philosophy and revela- 
 tion, is examined. It is shown, that when 
 
 we interpret revelation according to the light 
 
 4 
 
38 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of reason, we in reality, interpret it accord- 
 ing to philosophy, as reason has no light, but 
 that of experience, and this is philosophy. 
 From this consideration, it is shown that the 
 proper way to interpret the scriptures, is by 
 a. sound interpretation exercised upon their 
 own proper teachings. It is also shown, that 
 the scriptures, on account of the fact, that 
 their author knew the future as well as the 
 present and the past, and has directed some 
 of his doctrines accordingly, cannot be inter- 
 pretted altogether as a mere human writing. 
 It is also shown, that the scriptures, are not 
 confined to the doctrines of revelation, but con- 
 tain much which lies within the province of 
 philosophy ; and as they do not teach philoso- 
 phy, but theology, they must follow philoso- 
 phy in all things upon which it can speak au- 
 thoritatively as belonging to its province. A 
 difference however, is pointed out in the ap- 
 plication of this rule, between physics and 
 psychology ; as the scriptures throw no light 
 over physical science, but throw much over 
 psychology. 
 
 From this view of the connection between 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 39 
 
 philosophy and revelation, it is shown that 
 the a priori method of interpreting the scrip- 
 tures, — of forcing one's philosophy upon its 
 teachings — is altogether erroneous. That we 
 should never subordinate revelation to philos- 
 ophy. And it is shown, that the neglect of 
 this great truth has been the chief source of 
 error in every age of Christianity. That at 
 the present day, the scriptures are continually 
 perverted by subordinating their teachings to 
 philosophy. This is shown to be the case, in 
 the recent work of Prof. Bush on the Resur- 
 rection; and to be the case, in the heterodox 
 theology of New England ; and also to be 
 the case, in the perversions of theology in 
 Germany and France. It is shown too, that 
 during the middle ages, the philosophy of 
 Aristotle exerted a pernicious influence over 
 Christianity by cramping its vital spirit within 
 its own dry and meagre forms. It is shown 
 also, that in the earliest ages of Christianity, 
 the scriptures were perverted by forcing upon 
 them the doctrines of the different systems of 
 philosophy which then prevailed. The Eb- 
 ionites, the Gnostics, and the Platonists, all 
 
40 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 perverted; the doctrines of revelation, by 
 forcing upon the scriptures in their interpre- 
 tation of them, the peculiar doctrines of their 
 respective philosophy. And thus, the a 
 priori method of interpretting scripture, is as 
 false, as the a priori method of interpretting 
 nature. 
 
 It is next shown, that there is however a 
 philosophy which is consistent with Christian- 
 ity in both its method of investigation and its 
 principles — a philosophy which bows down 
 in humility before Christianity, and acknowl- 
 edges its ignorance of the great truths which 
 it proclaims. This is shown to be the Baco- 
 nian or Inductive philosophy. The inductive 
 method of investigation is shown, to corres- 
 pond with the nature of Christianity. The 
 great truths of Christianity upon which sal- 
 vation depends, are shown to be, like the 
 truths of nature upon which natural life de- 
 pends, so plain, that "the way-faring man 
 though a fool need not err therein." The 
 great cardinal doctrine of justification by faith, 
 and also the doctrine of the paramount im- 
 portance of truth in the conversion of man, 
 
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 41 
 
 which holds so prominent a place in the sys- 
 tem of theology called evangelical, are shown 
 to stand under those psychological laws, 
 which the inductive philosophy has discover- 
 ed. And thus the evangelical theology and 
 the Baconian philosophy are shown to be 
 parts of one great system of thought. 
 
 We have then, in the first part of the dis- 
 course, shown the nature of the Baconian 
 philosophy ; in the second part, the Baconi- 
 an method of investigation, and the theory 
 of mind assumed in that method; in the 
 third part, we have shown, how by the appli- 
 cation of the logical and psychological princi- 
 ples developed in the second part, it may be 
 used as a touchstone of philosophical criti- 
 cism, and at the same time it is shown, that na- 
 tural theology is a branch of the inductive phi- 
 losophy; and in the fourth part, we have 
 shown the connection between philosophy 
 and revelation. And now, all that we ask of 
 the reader is, that he will not read one part 
 of the discourse, without reading the whole ; 
 as the discourse is arranged in a sort of logi- 
 cal perspective, so that every part casts light 
 4* 
 
42 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 upon the others, and it is impossible to see the 
 full import of either part without reading 
 them all. 
 
PART THE FIRST 
 
 INFLUENCE OF THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 In every age of the world, since the human 
 family has been so numerous as to be divided 
 into separate communities, some one nation 
 has exerted a predominant influence over the 
 rest. This appears to be the economy of civ- 
 ilization. The Grecian Republics, (for they 
 all were but one nation,) and Rome, in their 
 successive order in history, have, of all the 
 nations of antiquity, exerted the most import- 
 ant influence on the destinies of man. But, 
 in modern times a new order of civilization 
 has arisen; and for more than two centuries, 
 England has stood at the head of this new 
 order of things. Enthroned upon the riches 
 of a universal commerce, enlightened by the 
 knowledge of every science, armed with the 
 power, and accomplished with the embellish- 
 
44 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ments of every art — baptized into the spirit 
 of Christianity, she is influencing and control- 
 ling the destinies of the human race towards 
 a glorious consummation. 
 
 In the progress of this civilization, there 
 have been three great revolutions, the religi- 
 ous, the philosophical, and the political. After 
 the human mind had thrown off the coercive 
 authority of the Papal Church, the moral au- 
 thority of the ancient philosophers still re- 
 mained ; and what Luther did in the eman- 
 cipation of the mind from the first, Bacon did 
 in the emancipation of the mind from the last. 
 Luther burnt the Pope's bull in 1520, and Ba- 
 con published his Novum Organon in 1620. 
 The religious revolution, therefore, preceded 
 the philosophical, and both of these, the poli- 
 tical. Not, however, that these revolutions 
 did not move on simultaneously ; but, that in 
 their progress, they were in advance of each 
 other, in the order which we have indicated. 
 Though they grew together they differed in 
 maturity. Their crises were successive. Per- 
 haps, the divine wisdom is displayed in this 
 order of things — perhaps any other order is 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 impossible in the moral economy of the world : 
 it being necessary that the restraints upon 
 man, should be thrown off, not all at once, but 
 separately, as he advances in mental and mor- 
 al improvement These then, are the move- 
 ments, which Europe has made in civilization. 
 She has thrown off religious despotism, she 
 has thrown off philosophical despotism, she 
 has thrown off political despotism. And she 
 has advanced to this position, through many 
 a bloody agony. The treasures of the indus- 
 try of ages have been spent, the chivalry of 
 thousands of heroes, the studies by day and 
 by night of scholars and philosophers, the 
 genius of poets exhibiting in their composi- 
 tions those actions which ennoble the soul, the 
 patriotic and humane sentiments of orators 
 clothed in the thunders of impassioned dic- 
 tion — all these have been spent in purchasing 
 the civilization of modern Europe. It be- 
 comes then, an important inquiry to ascertain 
 the character of the philosophy of that peo- 
 ple, into whose keeping, so far as human a- 
 gency is concerned, the destinies of Europe 
 
46 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 appear, in the progress of history, to have 
 been confided by divine providence. 
 
 We will, therefore, pass over the religious 
 and political revolutions, and even the litera- 
 ture of modern times, and confine ourselves 
 entirely to the philosophical revolution which 
 originated in England, and which is -exerting 
 so important an influence over the destinies of 
 man, through the agency of that great people. 
 
 We propose then, to sketch the rise and pro- 
 gress of the most wonderful philosophical rev- 
 olution, and the most glorious in its results up- 
 on the pursuits and happiness of man, of any 
 within the whole history of the world. We 
 propose to give some account of the philoso- 
 phy of utility — the philosophy of lightning 
 rods, of steam engines, safety lamps, spinning 
 jennies and cotton jins — the philosophy which 
 has covered the barren hills and the sterile 
 rocks in verdure, and the deserts with fer- 
 tility — which has clothed the naked, fed ti*e 
 hungry, and healed the sick — the philosophy 
 of peace, which is converting the sword into 
 the pruning hook, and the spear into the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 ploughshare. This is the philosophy of which 
 we propose to give some account.. 
 
 It was Lord Bacon, who launched the hu- 
 man mind upon this new career of discovery. 
 He is the great reformer,- who stands at the 
 head of the . teachers of this philosophy. 
 Physical nature seemed perfectly impenetra- 
 ble to the acutest intellects of the ancients. 
 They could not get over even the threshold of 
 physical science. Indeed,.they cannot be said 
 to have had any natural philosophy at all ; so 
 absurd were all their doctrines about physical 
 nature. Neither did the philosophers of the 
 middle ages, with all their assiduity, succeed 
 in exploring this field of knowledge. And, 
 though the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, 
 Galileo and Tycho Brahe show that Provi- 
 dence was preparing the way for a new era in 
 physical science, and the discoveries of Roger 
 Bacon in the thirteenth century indicate the 
 same fact, yet it remained for Lord Bacon to 
 generalize the idea which philosophers were 
 begining to see obscurely and in single instan- 
 ces, and to reveal to the philosophical world, 
 what it had been prepared to comprehends — 
 
48 THE BACONIAN 1 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 That true philosophy must be connected with 
 the arts, that while it satisfies the highest facul- 
 ties of the speculative intellect it may be appli- 
 ed to the physical wants, and the general well-- 
 being of man. That living as we do in a 
 world where general and permanent laws ob- 
 tain, and under their dominion, it is the object 
 of natural philosophy to> ascertain these laws, 
 in order that we may not, in our endeavours 
 to promote our comforts, act against these 
 laws, and thus attempt impossibilities ; and 
 also, that " these laws are not only invincible 
 opponents, but irresistible auxiliaries. " Ba- 
 con wished to make every power of nature 
 work for man, the winds, the waters, gravity, 
 heat and all the mighty energies, which lie 
 like the fabled giants of old under the moun- 
 tains. These he wished to unloose from their 
 fetters, and bring as servants under the domin- 
 ion of man. Such are the grand conceptions 
 which Bacon proclaimed to the world. 
 
 Scarcely had Bacon published his writings 
 before they were republished upon the con- 
 tinent of Europe. The treatise De Augmen- 
 tis was republished in France in 1624, the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 year after its appearance in England; and it 
 was translated into French in 1632. Editions 
 were also published in Holland in 1645, 1652 
 and 1662. The Novum Organon was thrice 
 printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650 and 1660; 
 and men of every cast in the higher walks of 
 life'on the continent of Europe were conver- 
 sant with his writings. Gassendi, Des Cartes 
 Richelieu, Voiture, and at a later period Leib- 
 nitz, Boerhave and Puffendorf were loud in 
 his praise. Indeed, his fame spread beyond 
 the bounds of his own country, more rapid- 
 ly than that of any philosopher within the 
 whole history of letters. What an impulse, 
 then, must the philosophy of Bacon have 
 given directly and indirectly to the progress 
 of the human mind upon the continent of Eu- 
 rope ! for its advances there, have been made 
 by pursuing the Baconian method of investi- 
 gation. But let us see the progress of his 
 philosophy in England, and cite some exam- 
 ples of the leading discoveries which have 
 been made by the Anglo-Saxon race. 
 
 Not long after the death of Lord Bacon, in 
 
 1626, the Royal Society of London was es»- 
 5 
 
50 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPui. 
 
 tablished for the promotion of the science^ 
 and all England resounded with his praise. 
 The philosophers of England almost adored 
 his genius. They felt that he had a true En- 
 glish mind; That he was the father of En- 
 glish philosophy. That the English mind 
 had at last given to it a method of philosophi- 
 zing suited to its practical and common sense 
 turn. And, behold the results written upon 
 the glorious records of English philosophy ! 
 In every department of physical science, . 
 England has made the leading discoveries; 
 and other nations, though their scientific la- 
 bours have been so brilliant, have done little 
 more than extended her researches and veri- 
 fy her theories. In physiology, the two 
 greatest discoveries were made by philoso- 
 phers of the British isle. Harvey discover- 
 ed the circulation of the blood, and publish- 
 ed his treatise Exercitatio de motu cordis, as 
 early as 1628. He was the cotemporary and 
 intimate friend of Bacon. Sir Charles Bell 
 discovered that there are two distinct sets of. 
 nerves, those of sensation and those of mo- 
 tion. And it is worthy of remark that both 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 these great discoveries ; so important to medi- 
 cal science, were discovered by considera- 
 tions founded upon the evidence of final 
 causes. Harvey discovered the circulation 
 of the blood, by reflecting on the use of those 
 valves in the veins whose structure is such as 
 to prevent the reflux of the blood towards 
 the extremities. And Sir Charles Bell tells 
 us in a note to his Bridgewater treatise on 
 the hand, that the views taken of the nervous 
 system in the chapter of that work on " Sen- 
 sibility and Touch, V where the uses and en- 
 dowments of the different nerves are consi- 
 dered, guided him in his original experiments 
 by which he established the great doctrine, 
 that there are two sets of nerves prevading 
 the whole animal system. By observation 
 and experiment, he had ascertained that each 
 nerve of sense has a distinct endowment, so 
 that one nerve can never subserve the pur- 
 pose of another, the nerve of vision for ex- 
 ample, can never serve for hearing, nor that 
 of taste for smelling, and so forth. And he 
 further observed, that each of these nerves 
 arose from a distinct part of the brain. He 
 
0% THE BACOxMAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 therefore concluded; that for the brain at 
 least; different nerves have different functions 
 derived from the spots whence they originate. 
 It therefore occurred to him, that perhaps, 
 the two great nervous functions of the body, 
 sensation and motion, are performed by differ- 
 ent nerves having different functions. This 
 however did not appear to be the case, as far 
 as observation and experiment had been 
 made ; for on cutting the trunk of a nerve, a 
 limb was found to be deprived of both feeling 
 and motion. Still, such was the force of the 
 inductive principle which he had established 
 relative to the nerves of the head, that he con- 
 jectured that what appeared to be one nerve, 
 might in reality be a bundle of nerves tied 
 and packed together for convenience of dis- 
 tribution. And on further investigation, he 
 discovered, that these apparently single nerv- 
 es, did really run into the spinal marrow by 
 two roots, one originating in the anterior, the 
 other, in the posterior column. He then pro- 
 ceeded to experiment upon the important fact 
 thus discovered. He laid bare the spine of 
 an ass, and on irritating the anterior root, the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 53 
 
 muscles supplied by the nerve were convul- 
 sed, while a touch of the posterior root made 
 the animal wince, as from pain. 
 
 But though this was strong proof, that mo- 
 tion belonged to the anterior root, and sensa- 
 tion, to the posterior, still, it was not conclu- 
 sive ; as it could not be determined with cer- 
 tainty, whether the pain indicated by the ani- 
 mal when the nerve was irritated, did not re- 
 sult from wounding the raw surface. In pur- 
 suing his investigations., he observed, that the 
 nerve to which he had ascribed sensation, 
 throughout the whole course of the spine, 
 had a ganglion or bulge on its roots, and that 
 the nerve to which motion had been ascribed, 
 had none. This difference in structure, 
 which in itself is some evidence of difference 
 in function, became a salient point to a cer- 
 tain proof, that there is a difference in the 
 functions of the two sets of nerves. For 
 upon further investigation, he discovered a 
 nerve of the head which arose from two roots, 
 on one of which there was a ganglion, but 
 none on the other ; and that these nerves in- 
 stead of being bound together in one sheath 
 
54 THE B AC OMAN r,HI LOSOFIi-Y, 
 
 as is the case with the spinal nerves, run sep- 
 arate, and also instead of being covered with 
 much flesh, come to the very surface of the 
 face. Inferring therefore, with that sagacity 
 which can interpret every intelligible indica- 
 tion, that these nerves were specially design- 
 ed to give sensation and motion to the head, 
 he by a slight puncture of the root, ascertain- 
 ed that the n^rve with the ganglion on it, 
 was a nerve of sensation. And thus the 
 strongest proof was adduced, that the nerves 
 of the posterior column of the spine anala- 
 gous to this one in structure, were so in func- 
 tion, as had been supposed; for this nerve 
 being separate from any other, and lying at 
 the very surface, could be punctured without 
 wounding a raw surface, and still it exhibited 
 indications of a function analagous to that 
 which had been ascribed to those analagous 
 to it in structure. And thus the fact, that the 
 two great nervous functions of the body, sen- 
 sation and motion , are performed by two dif- 
 ferent sets of nerves having different endow- 
 ments, was discovered. 
 
 Modern medicine also may be said to 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 55 
 
 have arisen in England. Sydenham, who 
 had maturely studied Bacon's writings, laid 
 the foundation of the science of medicine 
 by pointing out, both by precept and ex- 
 ample, the true method of observing the 
 symptoms of disease, and of applying cura- 
 tive means according to the natural indica- 
 tions. Since his time, medicine has, by the 
 aid of its auxiliary sciences, made rapid 
 progress: but still his works are of much 
 value, even yet, on account of their profound 
 general views. And John Hunter may be 
 said to have originated the science of com- 
 parative anatomy and physiology, by bringing 
 experiment into the study of these branches 
 of knowledge, thereby showing how to lay 
 open the great mysteries of the human or- 
 ganization. Surgical and medical pathology, 
 which before his time were entirely conjec- 
 tural, assumed from his principles a more pos- 
 itive character. But to a disciple of Hunter, 
 belongs the most important as well as the 
 most extraordinary discovery ever made in 
 medicine. From the fact that small-pox, like 
 some few other diseases, cannot, as a general 
 
56 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fact, afflict the same subject but once, the 
 practice of inoculation had been introduced ; 
 as the inoculated disease, on account of the 
 healthful condition of the patient when the 
 virus is introduced into his system, and the 
 treatment to which he can be subjected by 
 way of preparation, was found less virulent 
 than the disease taken in the natural way^and 
 yet retained its power to protect from a se- 
 cond attack. Though this was true, still 
 thousands died of the inoculated disease ; and 
 many contracted the disease from the inocula- 
 ted patients; and thus was ever kept open 
 new sources of the dreadful malady. Yet so 
 awful was the natural disease, that inoculation 
 though so terrible an expedient, was justly 
 considered a valuable remedy. 
 
 In this state of medical science relative to 
 this awful disease, Dr. Jenner of England, 
 having when a youth, heard a country girl re- 
 mark, that she was not afraid of small-pox, 
 for she had had the cow-pox, caught at the 
 idea, and continued to enquire and reflect 
 about it, year after year, until he evolved the 
 important doctrine of vaccination. With that 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 57 
 
 inductive sagacity which seizes upon those 
 analogies between dissimilar things that are the 
 clues by which the labyrinths of nature's se- 
 crets are to be explored, he conceived the bold 
 idea of introducing the disease of a beast into 
 the human frame, as a means of preventing a 
 worse disease natural to man. From a careful 
 examination of facts suggested by the remark 
 of the country girl he had been led to believe, 
 that cow-pox, when taken by milk-maids from 
 the udders of cows, will prevent the small- 
 pox. He therefore conjectured that it might 
 advantageously supersede the inoculated small- 
 pox, as it was a perfectly harmless disease 
 even when taken in the natural way, and 
 would, he supposed frojn analogy to the 
 small-pox, be still milder when taken by 
 inoculation, and yet like inoculated small-pox,, 
 would retain its protecting power. Experi- 
 ment was therefore made. On the four- 
 teenth day of May 1796., be inoculated a boy 
 in the arm, with vaccine virus taken from a 
 pustule on the hand of a young woman who 
 had been infected by her master's cows. The 
 disease took effect. On the first of the sue- 
 
68 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ceeding July he inoculated the hoy with 
 small-pox virus, and as he had predicted, 
 without the least-effect. And thus was made 
 a discovery which has saved the lives of mil- 
 lions of the human race; and has rescued 
 youth and beauty from the loathsome em- 
 braces of a disease, which even when it 
 spares the life of its victim, leaves upon him 
 forever the indelible marks of its malignity. 
 We delight to record, such triumphs of sci- 
 ence over human woe ; and to listen to the 
 joy of the great discoverer in announcing his 
 success to the world. u While the vaccine 
 discovery (says Jenner) was progressive, the 
 joy I felt at the prospect before me, of being 
 the instrument destined to take away from 
 the world, one of its greatest calamities, blend- 
 ed with the hope of enjoying independence 
 and domestic peace and happiness, was often 
 so excessive, that in pursuing my favourite 
 subject among the meadows, I have some- 
 times found myself in a revery. It is pleas- 
 ant to me to recollect, that these reflections 
 always ended in devout acknowledgments to 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 59 
 
 that being from whom this and all other mer- 
 cies flow. " 
 
 In Chemistry too, the greatest discoveries 
 have been made in England. The laws of 
 chemical combination; which are of so much 
 practical as well as scientific utility, were dis- 
 covered by Dalton. But in showing what 
 England has done for Chemistry, we must 
 not give too much prominence even to this 
 grand discovery, though it extends over the 
 whole domain of chemical investigation, and 
 lies at the very foundation of the science. 
 For not only have other brilliant discoveries in 
 chemistry been made in England, but indeed, 
 modern chemistry may be said to have origi- 
 nated there, or rather in the British isle. In 
 1752 Dr. Black of Edinburg, in experiment- 
 ing with the alkalies and alkaline earths 
 discovered, that causticity (which had been 
 commonly believed to be acquired by lime 
 from the fire in the process of calcination, 
 which is then called quick-lime, and that all 
 other alkaline substances derived it from the 
 quick-lime, as they with the exception of mag- 
 nesia can only be rendered caustic by being., 
 
60 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 treated with it) is in reality owing to the loss 
 of an aeriform substance with which they had 
 been combined, and that they become mild 
 again by a re-union with that substance. 
 This aeriform substance or gass, which is 
 now called carbonic acid, Black called fixed 
 air, to denote that it is found fixed in bodies 
 as well as in a separate elastic state. He dis- 
 covered that this fixed air is separated from al- 
 kalies and alkaline earths by heat, or by acids 
 which have a greater affinity for them than 
 the fixed air has. He also discovered that 
 the very same elastic substance was produced 
 by the fermentation of vegetable bodies, also 
 by the combustion of charcoal, and that it 
 is also evolved in the breathing of animals. 
 
 The importance of this discovery consists 
 in the fact that contrary to the universal be- 
 lief, it was thereby discovered that atmospher- 
 ic air is not the only permanently elastic body, 
 but that there are others which though trans- 
 parent and invisible like atmospheric air, yet 
 possess very different qualities, and are ca- 
 pable of loosing their elasticity by entering 
 into chemical combination with either solids 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 6T 
 
 or liquids, and of regaining their elastic state 
 on being separated from them. What a new 
 view of things, must the discovery thus made, 
 that the solid marble is nothing but dust 
 bound together by an invisible gas, have 
 given ! What a wide field of investigation 
 did this strange insight into nature, open be- 
 fore the philosopher ! 
 
 And Black made another discovery quite 
 as remarkable as this. About the year 1763, 
 from the fact ascertained hy him, that when 
 heat converts a solid into a liquid, as when 
 ice is reduced to water, by putting it into its 
 own weight of hot water, or a liquid is con- 
 verted into a vapour, the liquid or vapour re- 
 sulting is no hotter than the solid or liquid 
 from which they are produced, though in the 
 process a great amount of heat has actually 
 entered into the substances; and from the 
 fact, that when* the water freezes or the va- 
 pour condenses: am unexpected amount of 
 heat is given, out^, he: : drew the inference, that 
 the quantity of heat which; could not be indi- 
 cated by the thermometer, remained latent m 
 the body. For in converting water into ice ? , 
 
(32 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as much as one hundred and forty degrees of 
 heat are expended, and yet the water will be 
 as cold as the ice — the thermometer will 
 stand at thirty two (freezing point,) instead, 
 as might be expected, at one hundred and 
 seventy two. And thus was revealed the 
 mysterious doctrine of latent heat. 
 
 This discovery and that of fixed air are 
 auxiliary to the illustration of each other, and 
 are the basis, or at all events, the chief salient 
 points of modern chemistry. As it was now 
 ascertained that there are other permanently 
 elastic bodies besides atmospheric air, and 
 as it appeared to be a fundamental fact in 
 nature, chemical investigation necessarily 
 took the direction which it indicated, as the 
 way to important truths ; and a mere 
 talent for experiment might now proceed 
 with the most brilliant success in a path, 
 which none but the highest genius for induc- 
 tive research could have laid open to the in- 
 quirer. And such was the course of chem- 
 ical enquiry. All chemists at once entered 
 upon the field of pneumatic chemistry, 
 which Black had laid open. Dr. Priestly 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 63 
 
 in 1774 discovered oxygen gas, by exposing 
 red-lead in a close vessel, to the sun's rays 
 concentrated by a burning glass, when a per- 
 manently elastic aeriform body was evolved, 
 which had the property of greatly increasing 
 the intensity of flame. At a later period^ he 
 discovered the important fact that the absorp- 
 tion of this gas in the act of respiration gives 
 its red colour to the arterial blood ; and he 
 also found that when plants grow inclose ves- 
 sels, and restore the purity of the air in 
 which a candle has been burnt, or an animal 
 breathed, a fact which he had before discov- 
 ered, they do so by evolving this gas. He 
 also discovered nitrogen gas, about the same 
 time that Dr. Rutherford of Edinburgh did, 
 by the fact, that if air is exposed to sulphur 
 and iron filings, its bulk is diminished, and 
 the residue is lighter than common air and 
 unfit for respiration, which residue is ni- 
 trogen. And Watt and Cavendish who 
 had entered upon this new field of investi- 
 gation, discovered some of its most important 
 truths. The composition of water, the knowl- 
 edge of which is an element in so many chem- 
 
64 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ical reasonings as to make it one of the most 
 prolific of chemical discoveries, was discov- 
 ered by Watt and verified by Cavendish who 
 burnt oxygen and hydrogen in a dry glass ves- 
 sel, when a quantity of pure water was gen- 
 erated equal in weight to that of the gases 
 which had disappeared in the formation of 
 water, a proof incontestable, that the water 
 was formed of the two gases which had dis- 
 appeared. Cavendish showed also the first 
 example of weighing permanently elastic 
 bodies ; and thus gained an important con- 
 troul over these evanescent substances. He 
 also discovered that nitrous acid is composed 
 of the two gases deprived of latent heat, 
 which compose our atmosphere, oxygen and 
 nitrogen. 
 
 But it was the glory of another English- 
 man to make the most brilliant discoveries 
 which have yet adorned the history of chem- 
 istry. Sir H. Davy with an experimental 
 skill and a daring intrepidity which have 
 never been excelled, entered at this stage of 
 the science into the field of chemical inqui- 
 ry which his countrymen were exploring 
 
THE BACONIA.NT PHILOSOPHY, 65 
 
 with such extraordinary success. And as if 
 it were specially designed to be wielded by his 
 giant arm, in the noble conquests of science, 
 Volta had just invented the pile which bears 
 his name. Immediately after its invention, it 
 was sent to England, and Nicholson and Car- 
 lisle discovered that water could be decom- 
 posed by its action. They plunged two plati- 
 num wires connected with the opposite poles 
 of the battery, into the same cup of water, 
 without their touching each other, when hy- 
 drogen gas was disengaged at the negative 
 wire, and oxygen at the positive, each passing 
 off in bubbles, which when collected in sepa- 
 rate tubes were found to be pure, and in the 
 exact proportion of which water consists. 
 With this wonderful fact before him, Sir H. 
 Davy exposed other compound bodies, such 
 as acids and salts, to the action of the battery, 
 and all without exception were decomposed, 
 one of their elements appearing at one side 
 of the battery, and the other at the opposite 
 extremity. And he found that there was a 
 uniformity in these decompositions. That their 
 
 law was, that the acids and oxygen and all 
 6* 
 
66 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 bodies of a like kind are transferred to and ac- 
 cumulate around the positive pole, while hy- 
 drogen, metals, alkalies and such like bodies 
 are transferred to the negative pole ; and he 
 discovered that these transfers will take place 
 through considerable spaces, and that acids 
 would pass through vessels containing alkaline 
 solutions, and alkalies, through vessels filled 
 with liquids containing free acids, without the 
 least combination, and appear at their respec- 
 tive poles with their peculiar properties. Sir 
 H. Davy observing the analogy between these 
 phenomena and the attractions and repul- 
 sions effected by ordinary electricity, inferred 
 that chemical attraction is an electric force ; 
 and that the reason why any substance, as 
 water for instance, is decomposed, by a batte- 
 ry, is that one end of the wire has a greater 
 affinity on account of its intense electrical 
 condition, for oxygen and the other for hy- 
 drogen, than these elements have for each 
 other. Guided by this view of the nature 
 of chemical attraction, he inferred that any 
 compound substance whatever, might be de- 
 composed by a battery of sufficient power, by 
 
THE BACONIAN FHIL080FHY. 67 
 
 subverting the chemical affinity of its ele- 
 ments, in presenting to it, a wire of such in- 
 tense electrical condition as to attract its ele- 
 ments with more force, than they attract each 
 other. Directing his experiments according- 
 ly, he succeeded in decomposing the alkalies 
 and alkaline earths, showing that they are 
 composed of oxygen and an inflamable me- 
 tal, the oxygen accumulating at the positive 
 pole, and the metal at the negative, thus 
 bringing to light entirely new substances in 
 these inflamable metals, and rendering still 
 more probable by the decomposition, the cor- 
 rectness of his view of the nature of chemi- 
 cal attraction. 
 
 What a grand step was this from the sim- 
 ple discovery of Black, that an elastic fluid is 
 sometimes found fixed in a solid, as carbonic 
 ascid in limestone ! For here the lime which 
 Black considered an element and which had 
 revolved as an element at the points of other 
 batteries, is now shown to be composed of an 
 inflamable metal, and a gas which is one of 
 the elements of the very gas which Black 
 had discovered to be the ligature which binds 
 
68 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 limestone together. And thus the path of 
 inquiry which Black opened, had led to such 
 rich discoveries. 
 
 But the career of discovery does not end 
 here. The field of chemical research which 
 had been laid open by Black, had been so 
 successfully explored, that Sir Humphrey 
 Davy was enabled to lay the foundations of 
 agricultural chemistry, upon the truths which 
 had been discovered, and thereby elevate the 
 culture of the soil from the most empirical 
 drudgery, to a scientific art. 
 
 It had been ascertained that vegetables are 
 composed of the four simple gases, Carbon, 
 Hydrogen, Nitrogen, and Oxygen, which the 
 disciples of Black had discovered, and a mi- 
 nute quantity of inorganic matter. The 
 question then occurred, whence do plants 
 obtain these elements? And it is at once 
 seen that they must obtain them either from 
 the atmosphere or the earth ; or from both. 
 It had long been known that marine plants 
 reaching the enormous height of three hun- 
 dred and sixty feet, and which nourish thous- 
 ands of marine animals, grow upon the naked 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 69 
 
 rocks. But as the surfaces of these rocks 
 undergo no change, it was obvious that the 
 plants did not draw their nourishment through 
 their roots from them. They must then derive 
 it through their leaves from the sea-water, in 
 which they float, spread out in their enor- 
 mous ramifications, so that every part of the 
 plant is presented to the surface of the water. 
 This is made clear, by the fact that sea-water 
 is found by analysis to contain all the constit- 
 uents, carbonic acid, ammonia and the alkaline 
 and earthy phosphates and carbonates, re- 
 quired by these plants for their growth, and 
 which are found to be the constituents of 
 their ashes. It is therefore seen that these 
 plants may derive all their nourishment 
 through their leaves. But do terrestrial 
 plants derive all their nourishment through 
 their leaves? This cannot be so; because 
 the only medium from which these plants can 
 derive nourishment through their leaves and 
 bark, is the atmosphere; and it does not 
 contain, like sea- water, all the elements of 
 plants. Its constituents are oxygen, nitrogen 
 together with watery vapour, carbonic acid 
 
70 THE BACONIAN PHlLOSOPHf. 
 
 and ammonia. And these are not all the 
 constituents of plants — the inorganic matter 
 being wanting. Terrestrial plants, must 
 therefore derive some nourishment at least, 
 from the soil. For though the earth is a 
 magazine of organic matter as well as inor- 
 ganic, yet as plants are found to flourish up- 
 on soils where the quantity of carbon and ni- 
 trogen contained in them cannot have been 
 in the soil, as well as from many other facts, 
 the conclusion is irresistible, that terrestrial 
 plants derive their nourishment, from the 
 atmosphere as well as the soiL 
 
 Thus is opened the whole field of agricul- 
 tural chemistry. For it is obvious, that if 
 plants are composed of certain elements, some 
 of which are derived from the soil, and others 
 from the atmosphere, it is necessary that the 
 soil and the atmosphere should each contain 
 the elements proper to it, as food to the plants. 
 For otherwise, the plants must be as it were 
 starved to death. And as it is certain, that 
 the atmosphere has not changed since the 
 earliest period at which an accurate analysis 
 of it has been made, we may conclude, as we 
 
THE BACONIAJf PHILOSOPHY. 71 
 
 know how its equilibrium is kept up, that it 
 will always contain those elements of plants 
 which it is its province in the economy of na- 
 ture, to furnish to vegetation. But this is not 
 the case with the soil ; for by a succession of 
 crops, all the elements necessary for the 
 growth of plants may be removed from the 
 soil ; and then the plants cannot grow from 
 want of food. It is seen then how important 
 it is to know what elements of plants are 
 furnished by the soil, and what by the atmos- 
 phere. For otherwise,, we might, at a great 
 expenditure of labour and capital be endea- 
 vouring to furnish to the soil, the elements 
 which the plants derive from the atmosphere ; 
 whereas all that is necessary, is to furnish 
 those to the soil, which it gives to the plant. 
 And as chemistry informs us of the nature of 
 manures, what elements each kind contains, 
 we are enabled to put on the soil, the precise 
 kind it wants; and thus make an economical 
 expenditure of labour and capital, and also, 
 direct our means with certain success. By 
 such a course of reasoning did Sir H. Davy 
 lay the foundation of agricultural chemistry ; 
 
72 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 though some facts here exhibited have been 
 discovered since his time. 
 
 The first inductive generalization ever made 
 in electricity^ was made by Grey and Wheel- 
 er of England, who discovered that some sub- 
 stances are conductors and others non-conduc- 
 tors. And the great truth that the lightning 
 of Heaven is identical with electricity was 
 discovered by one speaking the English as 
 his vernacular language. Franklin, by the 
 beautifully simple apparatus of a kite having 
 a key attached to the low^r end of a hempen 
 cord ; and being insulated by means of a silken 
 thread; by which it was fastened to a post; 
 demonstrated that the electric fluid and light- 
 ning are identical. The kite was raised, 
 while a heavy cloud was passing over ; and 
 after some time; the loose fibres of the hemp- 
 en cord began to bristle. Franklin touched 
 the key with his knuckle ; and the electric 
 spark was received; and thereby the identity 
 of electricity and lightning was verified. 
 
 The fundamental truth of optics was also dis- 
 covered in England. Newton discovered that 
 a beam of. light; as emitted from the sun ; con- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 73 
 
 sists of seven rays of different colours pos- 
 sessing different degrees of refrangibility. 
 This great discovery was made by darkening 
 a room and boring a hole in the window- 
 shutter, and letting a convenient quantity of 
 the sun's light pass through a prism. The 
 light was so refracted by its passage through 
 the prism, as to exhibit all the different colours 
 on the wall, forming an image about fi.\e times 
 as long as it was broad; instead of forming a 
 circular image, according to the received laws 
 of refraction at that time, and of a white 
 colour, according to the nature of light as 
 then understood. In order to ascertain the 
 true causes of the elongation and colours of 
 the image, Newton then placed a board with 
 a small hole in it, behind the face of the 
 prism and close to it, so that he could trans- 
 mit through the hole any one of the colours, 
 and keep back all the rest. For example, he 
 first let the red light pass through and fall on 
 the wall. He then placed another board, with 
 a hole in it, near the wall where the red ray 
 fell, so as to let it pass through the hole in 
 
 the second board, and then he placed a prism 
 7 
 
74 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 behind this board, and let the red light pass 
 through it near the wall. He then turned 
 round the first prism so as to let all the 
 colours pass in succession through these two 
 holes, and he marked their places on the 
 wall, and he saw by their places, that the red 
 rays were less refracted by the second prism, 
 than the orange, the orange, less than the 
 yellow, and so on, all being less refracted 
 than the violet. From this experiment, 
 Newton drew the grand conclusion that light 
 is not homogeneous, but is composed of rays 
 of different colours and of different degrees 
 of refrangibility. 
 
 And the greatest of all human discoveries, 
 the universality of the law of gravity, the 
 foundation of physical astronomy, was diseov^ 
 ered in England. Copernicus had discover^- 
 ed the motion of the earth on its axis around 
 the sun ; Kepler, that this motion around the 
 sun, is in an elliptical orbit, with the sun in one 
 of its foci ; and that an imaginary line drawn 
 from the planet in its revolution, to the sun, 
 describes equal areas in equal times ; and that 
 the square of the time that the planet takes 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 75 
 
 in moving around the sun is equal to the cube 
 of its distance from that body. This is the 
 starting-point where the discoveries of the 
 English begin. It remained to inquire into 
 the causes of these general facts which had 
 been discovered by Copernicus and Kepler. 
 
 In the year 1666., Newton, while sitting 
 alone in his garden and reflecting upon the 
 nature of gravity which causes all bodies to 
 descend towards, the centre of the earth, con- 
 sidering that, this power suffers no sensible 
 diminution at the greatest distances from the 
 centre of the earth to which we can reach, 
 being as great on the summits of the highest 
 mountains a& at the -bottom of the deepest 
 mines, conjectured that perhaps it extended 
 further than was commonly supposed. He 
 therefore began to consider what would be 
 its effects if it extended to the moon. That 
 the motion of the moon was affected by this 
 power, he conceived to be beyond a doubt; 
 and further reflection led him to suppose that 
 this body might by this power be held in 
 its orbit around the earth. For, though 
 gravity suffered no sensible diminution at the 
 
76 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 comparatively small distances from the centre 
 of the earth to which we can go, yet he 
 thought it highly probable, that it was great- 
 ly diminished at the distance of the moon, 
 and that therefore it did not cause that body 
 to fall to the earth. And he inferred, that if 
 the moon be held in its orbit by the principle 
 of gravity that the planets also must be held 
 in their orbits by the same power ; and that 
 by comparing the periods of the different 
 planets with their distances from the sun, he 
 might ascertain in what proportion the power 
 by which they were held in their orbits de- 
 creased. By this process he arrived at the 
 conclusion that it decreased in the duplicate 
 proportion, or as the square of their distances 
 from the sun. In order then to test the truth 
 of the conclusion, that the law of the force 
 by which the planets are drawn to the sun 
 was that it decreased as the square of their 
 distances from that luminary, he endeavored 
 to ascertain if such a force emanating from 
 the earth and directed to the moon was suffi- 
 cient to retain her in her orbit. To do this, 
 it was necessary to compare the space through 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 77 
 
 which heavy bodies fall in a given time to a 
 given distance from the centre of the earth, 
 viz : to its surface, with the space through 
 which the moon, as it were, falls to the 
 earth in the same time, while revolving in a 
 circular orbit; for in all his reasonings, he 
 supposed the planets to move in orbits per- 
 fectly circular. At the time Newton made 
 this calculation, he adopted the common es- 
 timate of the diameter of the earth, as then 
 used by geographers and navigators, which 
 was erroneous. Therefore his conclusions 
 were erroneous also. Some years afterwards, 
 the discovery that a projectile would move in 
 an elliptical orbit, when acted upon by a force 
 varying in the inverse ratio of the square 
 of the distance, led Newton to demonstrate 
 that a planet acted upon by an attractive 
 force varying inversely as the' square of the 
 distance, will describe an elliptical orbit in 
 one of whose foci the attractive force resides. 
 But though Newton had thus established an 
 hypothesis which explained the elliptical or- 
 bits of the planets, and this hypothesis was 
 founded upon an induction of facts made by 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Kepler*; and demonstrated by the application 
 of 'mathematics by himself, yet an indis- 
 pensable condition of the induction had not 
 beenifujlfiled. He had not yet obtained any 
 evidence that a force varying inversely as the 
 square of the distance, did actually reside in 
 the ? sun and planets; because his calculations 
 for testing this, founded upon the comparison 
 of the space through which heavy bodies fall 
 in a second of time to a given distance from 
 the centre of the earth, with the space 
 through which= the. moon, as it were, falls to 
 the earth, in a second of time while revolving 
 in a circular orbit, assumed an erroneous es- 
 timate of the diameter of the earth, as we 
 have shown, and consequently did not test 
 what it was intended to verify : but showed 
 that the force which retains the moon in its 
 orbit as deducted from the force which causes 
 the fall of heavy bodies to the earth is, as one- 
 sixth greater than that which is actually in- 
 dicated in her circular orbit. But M. Picard 
 having in 1679 executed the measurement of 
 a degree of the meridian, Newton afterwards 
 deduced from it the true diameter of the 
 
THE BACO.MA.V PHILOSOPHT. 79 
 
 earth, and trying his former calculation, he 
 realized his expectations ; and found the force 
 of gravity which regulates the fall of bodies 
 at the earth's surface, when diminished as the 
 square of the distance of the moon from the 
 earth, to be nearly equal to the centrifugal force 
 of the moon as deduced from her observed dis- 
 tance and velocity ; and he thus fulfilled the 
 fundamental condition of the inductive meth- 
 od of investigation, of always ascribing a cause 
 known to exist, to explain an effect. By this 
 course of reasoning Newton connected the 
 physics, of the earth with the physics of the 
 heavens, and established the universality of 
 the law of gravitation. 
 
 What more delightful employment can the 
 speculative philosopher have than the con- 
 templation of the grand discoveries which we 
 have been considering ! To one who loves 
 truth for its own sake, and feels delight in 
 the mere contemplation of harmonious and 
 mutually dependent truths, the knowledge of 
 such great truths is of sufficient value to re- 
 pay him for the labour of discovery, even if 
 they did not admit of any practical applica- 
 
80 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion. To know what it is that paints the 
 beautiful colours of the rainbow, and covers 
 the hills and valleys in green, and gives the 
 delicate tints to the flowers which picture the 
 fields,; to know that the scathing lightnings 
 which rush with such tremendous fury from 
 the vast magazines of the heavens, is the 
 same with the spark rubbed from the cat's 
 back ; to know that the water which we drink 
 and which appears so simple, is composed of 
 two gases, one of which is more combustible 
 than gunpowder, and produces instant death 
 when inhaled, and the other is the supporter 
 of combustion, though the two united is the 
 chief agent by which we extinguish fire ; to 
 know that the planets of such vast magni- 
 tude, and moving with such velocity through 
 such boundless space are held in their 
 orbits by the same force which causes an 
 apple to. fall to the ground ; to know the times 
 of eclipses and the returns of comets dashing 
 with a velocity quicker than thought over mil- 
 lions of miles of space and returning with 
 unerring certainty to the goal whence they 
 set out : and all other wonders which natural 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 81 
 
 philosophy reveals, must forever, as mere 
 matters of intellectual contemplation, be con- 
 sidered as inestimable treasures. And the 
 mere process of investigation according to 
 the Baconian method, is one of the noblest 
 and most delightful employments. The phi- 
 losopher at almost every stage of his progress, 
 is meeting with hints of greater things still 
 undiscovered, which cheers the mind amidst 
 its toil, with the hope of making still further 
 progress ; and new fields of discovery are con- 
 tinually opening in prospect and the light of 
 his present discoveries throwing enough of 
 their rays across the darkness before him, to 
 reveal as much of other new truths as will 
 stimulate him to continued exertion for their 
 discovery : thus curiosity is ever kept alive, 
 and exhausted energies renovated in the la- 
 borious pursuits of knowledge. 
 
 How utterly insignificant as mere matters 
 of intellectual contemplation, is all the phys- 
 ical philosophy of the ancients in compari- 
 son with these magnificent discoveries in the 
 different sciences ! And what can form a more 
 striking contrast than the sublime argumenta- 
 
82 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion of Newton and the petty sophistry of the 
 philosophers of the middle age ! What are the 
 eloquent reveries of Plato and the ingenious 
 reasonings of Aristotle in comparison with the 
 mighty mensuration by which Newton begin- 
 ning with the dust on the balance measures 
 the earthy and rising in the sublime argument, 
 measures planet after planet and weighing 
 them, balances one against the other, and not 
 content with holding as it were, worlds in the 
 hollow of his hand, he measures and weighs 
 systems of worlds; and his mighty calculus 
 still not exhausted, he balances systems of 
 worlds against systems of worlds, and embra- 
 ces in .-his argument the infinitude of the uni- 
 verse, until the words of the sacred poet, 
 " he weighed the mountains in the scales and 
 the hills in a balance," intended to describe 
 the, omnipotence of the deity, fall short in 
 describing the power of one of his creatures. 
 The wisdom of the Academy and the Ly- 
 ceum have been overshadowed by the glory of 
 Cambridge, and Greece yields to England in 
 philosophical renown ! 
 
 We see then, that as a mere matter of in- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. OO 
 
 tellectual contemplation to satisfy the specu- 
 lative mind, the Baconian philosophy is pre- 
 eminently sublime. We will now show that 
 it is also eminently practical ; and in this par* 
 ticular, it differs from all the philosophies of 
 the ancients., who thought that the only use of 
 philosophy, was in its influence upon the 
 mind in elevating it above the concerns of 
 life, and thus purifying and preparing it for 
 the philosophical beatitude of their heaven, 
 into which none, but philosophers were to 
 enter ; and that the practical affairs of life be- 
 longed to those of common endowments who 
 are fated by destiny to be mere " hewers of 
 wood and drawers of water.' 5 But far differ- 
 ent is the spirit of the Baconian philosophy. 
 Humbling itself before Christianity, it ac- 
 knowledges it to be a revelation from heaven, 
 pointing out the same way to future bliss, for 
 the peasant and the philosopher, and that it 
 only , has the power "to deliver man from the 
 bondage of corruption into the glorious lib- 
 erty of the sons of God" ; and that though 
 philosophy enlarges and elevates the mind 
 and affords us unspeakable intellectual pleas- 
 
84 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ure, yet that its chief office is to promote the 
 general well-being of man in this life, by con- 
 necting the sciences with the arts, and arm- 
 ing them with a power which mere empiri- 
 cism can never attain. 
 
 It is then the great excellence of the Ba- 
 conian philosophy, that even those of its dis- 
 coveries which bave contributed most to the 
 satisfaction of the speculative intellect and 
 are apparently the most remote from every 
 thing like practical application to the comforts 
 of man, have frequently been applied to the 
 most useful purposes of life. The discovery 
 of the nature of light by Newton, at once 
 led him to attempt a practical application of 
 it ; and though nothing of importance result- 
 ed from his labours, yet Hall and afterwards 
 Dolland constructed achromatic telescopes, 
 which could never have been done, if the fact 
 of the different refrangibility of the different 
 rays of light had not been known ; and this 
 discovery, was thus applied to the arts in ac- 
 cordance with the utilitarian spirit of the Ba- 
 conian philosophy. Scarcely had Franklin 
 discovered the nature of lightning, before he 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 85 
 
 constructed an apparatus to protect our build- 
 ings on land and our ships on the sea from 
 the ravages of the electric fluid; And thus 
 by a discovery apparently so remote from all 
 practical utility he disarmed the spirit of the 
 storm of his thunders, and thereby showed 
 to the world that knowledge is power. But 
 the most fruitful practical applications have 
 been made of Chemistry. It has been appli- 
 ed to agriculture, to medicine, and to the 
 mechanical arts. By applying the principles 
 which we have exhibited, to the improve- 
 ment of agriculture, it has made the most 
 sterile waste so fertile, as to yield all the va- 
 rious fruits of the earth in the richest abun- 
 dance. Where not a blade of grass grew, 
 now the most abundant harvests gladden the 
 sight, as they spread out in ocean waves over 
 the fields where chemistry has shed its fertil- 
 izing dews. And by its magic power, chem- 
 istry has released the various medical agents 
 which lie embedded in the innumerable veg- 
 etable and mineral products of nature, and 
 handed them over to the healing art, to aid 
 
 the vital powers in throwing off* from the 
 8 
 
$6 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 body the many diseases which prey upon 
 man. And its application to the mechanic 
 arts, has bestowed the richest blessings upon 
 man. Sir H. Davy applied its principles in 
 the construction of the safety lamp ; by which 
 man is enabled to walk with comparative 
 safety in the bottoms of dark mines, with a 
 light, amidst a gas more explosive than gun- 
 powder, where, without this lamp, the miner 
 is frequently exposed to as much danger as 
 though he were walking in a magazine of 
 powder with a lighted torch ; and thus thous- 
 ands of lives and millions of money are saved 
 by this one application of science to art. 
 But the crowning invention of all, the one 
 which constitutes the chief glory of science 
 in its application to art, is the steam-engine. 
 A profound chemical knowledge applied by 
 the most exquisite mechanical skill, enabled 
 James Watt to bring the steam-engine, which 
 had been invented by Savery and Newco- 
 men, to a degree of perfection which renders 
 it the most valuable of all inventions of art. 
 It brings under the control of man, an agent 
 more potent than a hundred giants, swifter 
 
THE B AC ONI AN PHILOSOPHY. 87 
 
 than the Arabian horse, and capable of as- 
 suming more forms in mechanism, than a 
 Proteus, so as to apply itself to all kinds of 
 work. It can pull a hundred wagons as easily 
 as one — perform one kind of labour as easily 
 as another. It is on the ocean, it is on the 
 rivers, it is on the mountains, it is in the val- 
 leys, it is at the bottom of mines, it is in the 
 shops, it is every where at work. It propels 
 the ship, it rows the boat, it cuts, it pumps^ it 
 hammers, it cards, it spins, it weaves, it 
 washes, it cooks, it prints, and releases man 
 of nearly all bodily toil. This mighty agent 
 is revolutionizing the world — annihilating 
 time and space by its speed, and bringing the 
 most remote parts of the earth together. 
 And all this mighty power is gained hy a 
 scientific knowledge of the nature of the at- 
 mosphere which we breathe, and the water 
 which we drink, and applying this knowledge 
 to mechanism, so as to make these so familiar 
 objects work for man. 
 
 Here let us pause, and reflect upon the 
 benefits conferred on England by the Bacon- 
 ian philosophy. It has made her the great- 
 
85 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 est nation in the world. It has done more to 
 develop her wealthy than all the legislation of 
 all the statesmen who have adorned her his- 
 tory bj their financial skill. It has given her 
 hundreds of bushels of wheat, thousands of 
 yards of cloths, and bestowed innumerable 
 comforts, where without its instrumentality, 
 there would have been but one. It has en- 
 abled her to extend her commerce over the 
 whole earth, and bring into her treasury count- 
 less millions of wealth. And this commerce 
 is the source of her great power, both in war 
 and peace, and is the means by which she is 
 controling the destinies of the world. And 
 though her whole policy is to extend her com- 
 merce by cultivating the arts of peace, yet it 
 is true, that she sometimes (and we abhor 
 the wickedness of it) pushes her commerce 
 by the thunders of her cannon into regions 
 where ignorance forbids its entrance ; but the 
 people who are thus treated, will in time 
 learn, that it is equally for their benefit, with 
 that of England, that her trade is extended 
 to their shores, and they will feel that peace 
 is the true policy of the world, and that all 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHf. 89 
 
 men are mutually interested in each other's 
 welfare and should live like members of one 
 family. The commercial spirit of England 
 is also the power which pioneers the way for 
 the other great influences which she is exert- 
 ing upon the civilization of the world. Her 
 sciences, her arts and her literature are car- 
 ried on the wings of her commerce over the 
 whole earth. And the Christian religion is 
 soon found smoothing the thorny pillow of 
 the dying man, and pouring the balm of con- 
 solation over his drooping spirit, in every 
 clime where British commerce has placed her 
 foot. 
 
 But the Baconian philosophy is not confined 
 to physical nature, as has been often asserted. 
 It embraces all knowledge. Bacon express- 
 ly says that his method of investigation is in- 
 tended to be applied to all the sciences. 
 "Some may raise this question (says he) 
 rather than objection, whether we talk of 
 perfecting natural philosophy alone according 
 to our method, or the other sciences also, 
 such as logic, ethics, politics. We certainly 
 
 intend to comprehend them all. And as 
 
 8* 
 
$0 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 common logic, which regulates matters by 
 syllogisms, is applied not only to natural, but 
 also to every other science, so our inductive 
 method likewise comprehends them all." 
 And in his Advancement of Learning, where 
 he defines the boundaries of the different 
 sciences, he has devoted as much attention to 
 the intellectual and moral sciences as to the 
 physical. But it is nevertheless true, that his 
 labours were directed chiefly towards physi- 
 cal science, because, in this, there was the 
 greater necessity for exertion ; as it was prin- 
 cipally through ignorance of this part of 
 knowledge, that man was delayed in his 
 career of civilization. And many, from the 
 fact that Bacon has said so much about phys- 
 ical nature, misconceiving the scope and spirit 
 of his philosophy, have asserted that it is 
 confined to sense, and is utilitarian, in the 
 gross meaning of avarice, and that it necessa- 
 rily leads to a selfish moral philosophy. 
 
 It has happened to Bacon, as to other phi- 
 losophers, who have originated a new move- 
 ment of the human mind, that the errors of 
 many of his successors who claimed, and 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOrHT. 91 
 
 many who did not claim to be his disciples, 
 have been charged to his philosophy, as its 
 legitimate fruits. The doctrines of Hobbs, 
 and Hume, and Hartly, and others in Eng- 
 land, and of Condillac, and Helvetius, and 
 D'Holbach and the host of infidels and athe- 
 ists in France, have been again and again 
 proclaimed as the legitimate and necessary 
 deductions from the principles of the Bacon- 
 ian philosophy The doctrines of the phi- 
 losophers just mentioned, resulted from these 
 philosophers seizing upon some one only of 
 the great principles of the Baconian philoso- 
 phy, and carrying it out to the wildest ex- 
 tremes, without modifying it by the other 
 principles of the system, and are, therefore, 
 at most, nothing more than the errors which 
 necessarily result in the development of the 
 Baconian philosophy, and are not a part 
 of that philosophy, but merely the exuviae 
 thrown off from it as it passes through the 
 process of development. Cicero, in his De 
 Oratore, has remarked the very same thing 
 of Socrates which we are now remarking of 
 Bacon. " For, as they all," says he, " arose 
 
92 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from Socrates, whose discourses were so va- 
 rious, different, and universally diffused, that 
 each learned somewhat that was different 
 from the other; hence families, as it were, 
 of philosophers were propagated, widely dif- 
 fering among themselves and vastly uncon- 
 nected with, and unlike one another ; yet all 
 of them affected to be called, and thought 
 themselves the disciples of Socrates. For, 
 in the first place, Aristotle and Xenocrates 
 were the immediate scholars of Plato; the 
 one of which was the founder of the Peripa- 
 tetics, the other of the Academics. Then 
 from Antisthenes, who admired chiefly the 
 patience and abstemiousness of Socrates in 
 his discourses, arose first the Cynics and then 
 the Stoics. Next from Aristippus, who was 
 charmed with the sensual part of Socrates' 
 discourses, the sect of the Cyrenians flowed, 
 whose doctrines, he and his successors main- 
 tained without any disguise of sentiment. 
 There were also other sects of philosophers, 
 who generally professed themselves to be the 
 followers of Socrates." We see then, that 
 all the different sects of philosophers, who 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 93 
 
 succeeded Socrates, the morose and abstemi- 
 ous Stoic, and the gay and voluptuous Cyren- 
 ian, all claimed to be the true disciples of So- 
 crates, and that Cicero says that their errors 
 resulted from their seizing upon one princi- 
 ple only of the philosophy of Socrates, and 
 losing sight of the other principles. The 
 Stoics seized upon patience and abstemious- 
 ness, and the Cyrenians upon sensual enjoy- 
 ments, both of which, when modified by the 
 other, are correct principles, but when carri- 
 ed to extremes, each is wrong, and will lead 
 to false moral philosophy. Having thus indi- 
 cated the source of the error which we are 
 combating, we will now show that it is an error. 
 The position that the Baconian philosophy 
 leads to a selfish morality, is maintained by 
 many on the ground that the Baconian phi- 
 losophy admits but one source of ideas, viz : 
 sensation. The argument is, that within the 
 sphere of sensation, there is no idea of right 
 and wrong — that pleasure and pain are the 
 only ideas furnished by sensation to denote 
 the moral qualities of human actions, and 
 that we approve of some acts, because they 
 
94 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 give pleasure, and disapprove of others, be- 
 cause they give pain ; and that, therefore, 
 according to this theory of mind, utility is 
 virtue, and self-interest the ground of moral 
 obligation. But we shall show in the second 
 chapter of the second part of this discourse 
 that the Baconian philosophy admits two sour- 
 ces of ideas, viz : sensation and conscious- 
 ness : and therefore this argument falls to the 
 ground ; because the ideas of right and wrong 
 are developed in consciousness, and it is in 
 consciousness, that the Baconian philosophy 
 lays the foundation of morality, and not in 
 sensation. 
 
 According to the Baconian philosophy, we 
 must examine all the facts of man's moral 
 constitution, and establish the fundamental 
 truths of moral philosophy by psychological 
 observation. Rejecting all innate moral prin- 
 ciples or notions, it appeals to experience, to 
 both the light of nature and revelation. It 
 therefore leaves man perfectly free to exam- 
 ine all the facts of his moral constitution, and 
 to establish whatever system of morals, a 
 sound induction may warrant, whether the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 95 
 
 selfish or the disinterested system. When 
 then we look into the heart of man, we there 
 find certain instinctive affections, such as love, 
 hope, fear, anger, pity and many others which 
 are all certainly disinterested in their nature; 
 as they seek their respective objects, by natu- 
 ral impulse or sympathy, without the mind's 
 thinking of anything beyond, whether their 
 satisfaction or disappointment will be agreea- 
 ble or disagreeable. We also find in the 
 mind, the power to distinguish moral good 
 and evil. It is upon these attributes of our 
 spiritual nature, that the Baconian philosophy 
 founds morality. But let us inquire into these 
 facts further, and ascertain the relation in 
 which the affections stand, to the power in 
 the mind to distinguish good and evil, or in 
 other words, ascertain the connection between 
 the feelings and the intellect. 
 
 If a beautiful object be presented to the 
 mind either through sense, memory or ima- 
 gination, and occupies its attention exclusive- 
 ly, the emotion of love, is by a great psycho- 
 logical law, necessarily excited in the mind, 
 and will continue until the object is removed. 
 
96 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or forgotten, or some other object is present- 
 ed in its stead. For it is a law of our mental 
 constitution, that every emotion whether of 
 love or hatred is allied to some object of per- 
 ception or memory or imagination, and is de- 
 pendent upon it, as its antecedent or cause, 
 and the emotion can never be excited in the 
 mind except by its appropriate object being 
 in the view of the mind, and never can cease 
 to exist in the mind until the object is forgot- 
 ten or removed from its view. Just as the 
 mind sees so the heart feels. It is thus manifest 
 that considerations of self have no agency in 
 producing our emotions whether of love or 
 resentment, in the natural operations of the 
 mind, and consequently the great law of the 
 affections on which morality is based, is dis- 
 interested, — operates uninfluenced by consid- 
 erations of self. But this connection between 
 the perceptions and the affections shows that 
 the correctness of our moral philosophy will 
 depend upon the enlightenment of our intel- 
 lect and the purity of our affections. That 
 goodness is goodness is hard to be perceived 
 by the greatest minds, if the moral feelings 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 97 
 
 are corrupt. This is a truth written in blood 
 upon the pages of history. But whenever 
 the mind perceives goodness or moral beauty, 
 the heart is necessitated by the great law of 
 the affections just indicated, to feel the emo- 
 tion proper to it, of love, and when it sees 
 vice or moral ugliness, to feel the emotion 
 proper to it, of aversion, and this without any 
 consideration of self mingled in it. We see 
 then by this analytical induction, that the prin- 
 ciple of morality is disinterested; because 
 the Creator by the great law of the affections 
 has made it imperative on us to love virtue for 
 its own nature, having made it natural for the 
 mind to love virtue and hate vice by creating 
 the relations of love and hatred between 
 them. But as man is not under a law of ne- 
 cessity like mere brute matter and incapable 
 of change, the obliquity of his mind may 
 become such as to render him unable to see 
 the loveliness of virtue, which is the same as 
 not seeing virtue at all, for loveliness is its 
 very essence, just as the eye may be so dis- 
 eased, as in jaundice, as to render him unable 
 to see the real colours of objects, and the 
 
98 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sinfulness of his own heart will cast its hue 
 over virtue ; just as the jaundice of the eye 
 will cast its hue over the objects of vision, 
 and neither the loveliness of the one nor the 
 colours of the other can be perceived. The 
 truth is, the perception and the emotion con- 
 stitute the state the mind is in, when any 
 object is present in thought, and they cannot 
 be separated. They are not distinct acts of 
 the mind, but are elements which make up 
 the act of apprehension or spiritual discern- 
 ment. And it was from the fact, that Helve- 
 tius did not discern the truth, that perception 
 and emotion are both elements of spiritual 
 discernment, and dwelt too exclusively upon 
 the phenomena of emotion,, that he fell into 
 the error that all mental acts are nothing but 
 feeling — that to think and to judge are but 
 to feel ; and that Diderot in criticising this 
 obvious error of Helvetius fell into the oppo- 
 site one, and maintained in his essay on the 
 origin and nature of the beautiful, that the 
 perception of beauty by the mind is a matter 
 of reason alone, like the perception of the 
 truth that two and two make four. We see 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 99 
 
 then, that according to the phsychological 
 facts which the Baconian philosophy points 
 out as the foundation of morality, that its 
 principle is disinterested. Man does certain- 
 ly feel the moral Tightness of truth and 
 justice, without any view at the time to their 
 consequences, just as he feels an appetite for 
 food without any view to its utility upon the 
 animal economy — the one feeling terminates 
 on virtue for its own sake and the other on 
 food for its own sake. But God in his great 
 benevolence has so organized the system of 
 things, as to make that which is right, useful 
 in such a vast majority of instances, as to 
 induce us in cases where it is doubtful what 
 is right, to use the relative utilities of the acts 
 as the standard of their rightness, and it has 
 indeed induced some to maintain that utility 
 is the essence of right. 
 
 But some contend that the Baconian phi- 
 losophy leads to a selfish morality, in a differ- 
 ent mode from that which we have just ex- 
 amined. That it tends to corrupt the moral 
 feelings by infusing into them, the spirit of 
 selfishness, in directing so much inquiry into 
 
100 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the developement of the resources of physical 
 nature ; and thus making man to think con- 
 tinually about his physical comforts, and to 
 place too much value upon the riches of 
 this world. That the Baconian philosophy 
 has done more than all other philosophies 
 put together, to develop the resources of 
 physical nature, and thereby to multiply the 
 physical comforts of man, we have already 
 shown ; and so far from shunning this result, 
 or wishing to conceal it, it has been the main 
 purpose of this part of our discourse, to ex- 
 hibit the fact in all its amplitude, and to pro- 
 claim it as the chief glory of the philosophy 
 which we expound. If such a result makes 
 man selfish, then is the destitution of barbar- 
 ism, better fitted to produce a sound morality 
 than the wealth of civilization. Then is man, 
 clothed in skins, possessed of more generous 
 sympathies, than when clothed in the comfort- 
 able fabrics of cultivated art; and his heart 
 contracts to a narrower selfishness, when he 
 accumulates wealth by millions, than when he 
 saves it by mites. If these be true proposi- 
 tions, then, have we entirely misread human 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 101 
 
 history. The fallacy of these conclusions, 
 shows the falsity of the premises from which 
 they are deduced. And it is evident, that 
 the whole tendency of the Baconian philoso- 
 phy is to elevate the condition of man. It 
 enables him to supply his physical wants hy 
 a small portion of labour, and to devote his 
 consequent leisure to the cultivation of science 
 and art. And it dignifies and ennobles the 
 employments which are devoted to the promo- 
 tion of our physical comforts, by connecting 
 them with the sciences. Under its influence, 
 mechanics are no longer mere handicrafts- 
 men, but are men of science, possessed of en- 
 larged views of human advancement. Watt 
 and Fulton occupy the highest places amongst 
 the benefactors of mankind ; and are quite 
 as fit to join that divine assembly of spirits, 
 where Cicero in his De Senectute, rejoices 
 that he shall meet Cato, as either of those 
 sages of antiquity. 
 
 But let us throw aside all speculation, and 
 look to facts. Where is the nation that can 
 boast a literature pervaded by a loftier moral- 
 ity than England ? It is true that some of 
 9* 
 
 
102 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 her writers maintain the selfish system of 
 morals, and some the disinterested. But this 
 has been the case at every era of philosophi- 
 cal developement, in every nation of the civ- 
 ilized world. In morals, as in every thing 
 else, men often bewilder themselves in the 
 minuteness of analysis. Those who main- 
 tain the system of disinterested morals differ 
 as to the basis of morals. One class refer- 
 ring our moral ideas to a special faculty, 
 termed the moral sense, others to reason, and 
 others to both the reason and the sensibility. 
 And those also who maintain the selfish 
 system differ widely, as to the basis of their 
 principle. This is inseparable from the nature 
 of the subject, for it is not purely a philosoph- 
 ical subject : but derives more of its light 
 from revelation than from nature ; and there- 
 fore, in attempting to ascertain the philosoph- 
 ical foundation of moral obligation, we shall 
 often find our line too short to reach the 
 bottom. The difficulties are inherent in the 
 subject; and they have been more nearly 
 overcome by the English than any other 
 people. And not only is the literature which 
 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 103 
 
 has grown up under the influence of the Ba- 
 conian philosophy pervaded by a lofty moral- 
 ity, but the people who have drunk most co- 
 piously at its fountains, and whose mental 
 habits and moral principles have been formed 
 under its influence, are distinguished by their 
 disinterested benevolence. They dispense 
 millions annually in charities at home ; and 
 their benevolent societies are healing the sick, 
 clothing the naked, and feeding the hungry, 
 and instructing the ignorant in every clime 
 of the earth. 
 
 In examining this question, we must dis- 
 tinguish the commercial spirit of England, 
 from the spirit of philanthropy. While the 
 first toils by day and by night to accumulate 
 wealth, the latter toils by day and by night to 
 expend it in alleviating the sufferings of the af- 
 flicted of all nations, and kindreds and tongues. 
 How superficial and ignorant then, is the 
 opinion so often expressed, that the Baconian 
 philosophy leads to a selfish morality ! We 
 have shown the contrary, both by philosophi- 
 cal analysis and historical fact, which are the 
 
104 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 only two modes of proof of which the sub- 
 ject is susceptible. 
 
 The same class of thinkers who maintain 
 that the Baconian philosophy is purely sensu- 
 al a mere pander to our animal comforts, 
 maintain also, that it has no ideal, and is utter- 
 ly inconsistent with all the arts of beauty. 
 That its main object is to make money plenty 
 in men's pockets; and that the spirit and 
 style of its kindred poetry is exemplified in 
 the following couplet : 
 
 " A penny sav'd is two-pence clear,, 
 A pin a day Va groat a year." 
 
 Let us examine the truth of this charge. 
 The Baconian philosophy, as we shall show 
 in the second chapter of the second part of 
 this discourse recognises consciousness as fully 
 as it does sensation, as a source of ideas, 
 and consequently just as fully embraces with- 
 in its "scope, the world of mind with all its 
 subjective realities, as it does the world of 
 matter with all its objective realities. It takes 
 therefore in its view, all the phenomena of 
 the spiritual world, as well as of the material, 
 and all the adaptations between these differ- 
 
THK BACONIAX PHILOSOI'H V. 105 
 
 ent worlds, from which the sublime and beau- 
 tiful in art, can be educed. And it teaches a 
 grander and a nobler, because a truer style of 
 literature, than any philosophy which has 
 been the source of culture to any people 
 known in history. It takes nature for its 
 model — the archetype which God has made — 
 and repudiates all that is speculative in taste, 
 as it does all that is speculative in reasoning. 
 And the true theory , of taste, is to imitate na- 
 ture, not it is true, by a servile copy, but by 
 exalting her — by making her beauty more 
 beautiful, and her sublimity more sublime — 
 but still by letting the beauty and sublimity, 
 be the beauty and sublimity of nature, merely 
 exalted. For the human heart was formed 
 to suit the natural, and the natural was form- 
 ed to suit the human heart, to call forth all its 
 powers. Some things, by a great pathological 
 law are agreeable to the human heart, and 
 others, disagreeable. Some things naturally 
 excite the feelings of sublimity, and others the 
 feelings of beauty. These things are formed 
 respectively by the Creator for the very pur- 
 pose. It is an adaptation cf the external 
 
106 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 world ; to the spiritual constitution of man. 
 The province then, of the science of taste, 
 is to ascertain, what those things are, and 
 the distinguishing property which constitutes 
 them, in both the material and spirtual worlds, 
 which naturally, and of their own original 
 adaptation, excite the emotion of the beauti- 
 ful or the sublime, or any other emotion, 
 which it is the* object of art to call forth. For 
 some things will excite these emotions by 
 association, and not of their own nature ; 
 and consequently are not so well calculated 
 to produce these emotions, as the things from 
 which they have derived this power by asso- 
 ciation ; and in fact cannot excite these emo- 
 tions at all, in minds in which, they have not 
 been asssociated, with the things from which 
 they have derived this adventitious power. 
 Truth or conformity to nature, then, is the 
 great standard of taste. For there is a true in 
 taste, a true in morals, as well as a true in 
 matter ; and all of them are to be ascertained 
 by inductive observation, and not by specula- 
 tive conjecture. Surely then, the literature 
 which springs up as an offshoot of that phi- 
 
THE BACOMAN PHILOSOPHY. 107 
 
 losophy which directs all our observations to 
 nature, and admits no criterions whether in 
 science or art, but the natural, is most like- 
 ly to approach nearest to nature in its repre- 
 sentations of the sublime and the beautiful 
 and all that affects the human heart. And 
 did the speculations of the philosophers of 
 ancient times and of the middle age, ever 
 present such sublime and such beautiful visions 
 before the fancy, as the Baconian philosophy 
 has spread out in the vast perspective of mod- 
 ern discoveries ? The truth is, the views of 
 nature as presented in these discoveries have a 
 grace and a grandeur, a beauty and a sublimi- 
 ty far above all the visions of fancy that ever 
 lay in the enchanting walks of speculation or 
 poetry. Induction has in fact evolved higher 
 standards of sublimity and beauty, than ima- 
 gination ever bodied forth in its most raptur- 
 ous visions of the ideal. How then, can the 
 Baconian philosophy lead to a mean literature, 
 when it familiarizes the mind to the most sub- 
 lime and beautiful objects of contemplation ? 
 It must have the opposite effect. It must 
 give a loftier ideal to the orator and the poet 
 
108 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 than the mere speculative philosophies ever 
 furnished. And no writer has presented a 
 more exalted estimate of poetry, and deline- 
 ated its high behests with more accuracy than 
 Bacon himself. "The use of poesy (says he 
 in the Advancement of Learning) hath been 
 to give some shadow of satisfaction to the 
 mind of man in those points wherein the 
 nature of things doth deny it ; the world being 
 in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason 
 whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of 
 man a more ample greatness, a more exact 
 goodness, and a more absolute variety than 
 can be found in the nature of things. There- 
 fore, because the acts or events of true histo- 
 ry have not that magnitude which satisfieth 
 the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and 
 events greater and more heroical : because 
 true history propoundeth the successes and 
 issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits 
 of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns 
 them more just in retribution, and more ac- 
 cording to revealed providence : because true 
 history representeth actions and events more 
 ordinary and less interchanged, therefore 
 
Y'HR BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 109 
 
 poesy endueth them with more rareness and 
 more unexpected and alternative variations : 
 so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and 
 conferreth to magnanimity, morality and 
 delectation. And therefore it was ever- 
 thought to have some participation of divine- 
 ness, because it doth raise and erect the mind 
 by submitting .the shows of things to the de- 
 sires of the mind \ whereas reason doth buc- 
 kle and bow the mind unto the nature of 
 things." This admirable delineation of the 
 objects and nature of poetry, sounds doubt- 
 less, in the ears of those whose opinions we 
 are examining, more like the language of 
 Homer or Dante or Milton discanting on his 
 divine art, than like the language of the father 
 of the experimental philosophy. The truth is, 
 the mighty and various and finely-fashioned 
 mind of Bacon is as little understood by this 
 class of thinkers as the spirit and scope of 
 his philosophy. His mind was a mirror held 
 up to nature, which reflected it, in all its vast- 
 ness and all its minuteness, all its sublimity and 
 all its beauty : revealing as much from the spir- 
 itual world as from the material — from the 
 10 
 
110 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 dark abysses of the human heart, as from the 
 hidden depths of matter. 
 
 The chief ground, on which, the opinion 
 that the Baconian philosophy leads to a mean 
 literature, appears to rest, as far as any thing 
 definite can be gathered from the loose and 
 vague generality of the language in which it 
 is usually expressed, is that this philosophy 
 directs the mind so exclusively to considera- 
 tions of utility, that it renders it incapable of 
 appreciating the beautifuh This is a singu- 
 larly erroneous view of the matter. For it is 
 not immediate considerations of utility which 
 prompt the Baconian philosopher to his in- 
 quiries. But it is the love of truth — the de- 
 light of viewing new truths evolved in ever 
 varying forms of beauty from the multifarious 
 facts which beset the path of investigation — 
 the felt triumph of the march over the difficul- 
 ties of science, as the enquirer steps from alti- 
 tude to altitude on the before untrodden steeps 
 of investigation, until he reaches a summit, 
 from whence he can descry the goodly classi- 
 fications and the harmonies of principle evolv- 
 ing themselves from the chaos of facts which 
 
THE BACOx\IAN PHILOSOPHY. Ill 
 
 lie spread out in such boundless profusion 
 over the vast regions of the universe. These 
 are the considerations which prompt the Ba- 
 conian philosopher to his inquiries. And af- 
 ter he has discovered some new principle, 
 then it is, that in accordance with the spirit 
 of his philosophy, he enters upon considera- 
 tions of utility in its applications to the relief 
 of human wants. The Baconian philosophy, 
 though considerations of utility embrace so 
 much of its aim, and constitute so much of 
 its glory, does not reject the beautiful, but 
 embraces both it and the useful in perfect 
 harmony, within the universality of its doc- 
 trines. And though the physical sciences to 
 which this philosophy has directed so much 
 attention, are emphatically the sciences of 
 utility, still their study, as the opinion which 
 we are examining presupposes, does not ne- 
 cessarily lead the mind off from the study of 
 the beautiful, or blunt its relish for objects of 
 taste. The relation between the different 
 branches of knowledge is much more inti- 
 mate than this supposition assumes. Such is 
 this intimacy, that the physical science, which 
 
112 THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of all others, appears to the superficial obser- 
 ver, to be the most remote from any affinity 
 to the arts of beauty, has been applied to two 
 of these arts with the most felicitous success. 
 Sir Charles Bell has applied his discoveries 
 in the nervous system to the arts of painting 
 and sculpture. Having discovered that, be- 
 sides the two great systems of nerves of sen- 
 sation and motion, other nerves went to the 
 muscles and moved them, and that these 
 arose from a tract of the spine separate from 
 either of the two columns originating the 
 other nerves, and that they went chiefly to 
 those muscles which subserve the purposes of 
 respiration ; and that as the function of respi- 
 ration in man was not designed for the sole 
 purpose of vitalizing the blood in the lungs, 
 but also, for communicating the thoughts and 
 passions of his soul, he had the genius to per- 
 ceive, that the nerves regulating respiration, 
 must be the nerves of expression and emotion. 
 He therefore under the impluse of a most ex- 
 alted genius for the arts of beauty, developed 
 this grand idea, and wrote his celebrated 
 work, the " Philosophy of Expression, " and 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 113 
 
 in this way applied his discovery of the 
 nerves of respiration to teaching the painter 
 and the sculptor, a knowledge by which he 
 may imitate and understand and correctly 
 depict the evervarying play of human passion. 
 And thus a man who spent his life in dissect- 
 ing the bodies of his fellow men and of the in- 
 ferior animals, could pass out of this butcherly 
 employment, as those whose opinions we are 
 examining would esteem it, and teach us how 
 to breathe life and feeling into the canvass and 
 the marble. And Bell himself was one of 
 the finest painters of his day — was no less 
 skilful with the pencil of the painter, than 
 with the knife of the Surgeon. Though, af- 
 ter the battle of Waterloo, he went to the 
 scene of slaughter and spent days and nights 
 amidst the dead and dying, sleeping only one 
 hour and a half out of the twenty four, for the 
 purpose of perfecting himself in military surg- 
 ery, yet at a later period of his life, we find him 
 making a pilgrimage to Rome, to view in that 
 imperial city the noble remains of ancient art, 
 to enable him to put the finishing touch upon 
 
 his "Philosophy of Expression." See then! 
 10* 
 
11-1 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 how extraordinary and mysterious, is the con- 
 nection between utility and beauty, between 
 the anatomy of the nervous system and the 
 arts oi painting and sculpture. The same 
 discoveries are applied to the arts of utility 
 and to the arts of beauty, to medicine and to 
 painting and sculpture. 
 
 But let us illustrate this point a little fur- 
 ther. Geometricians have discovered what 
 is the curve of the greatest resistance or so- 
 lidity, and have thus established a fact of the 
 greatest utility in architecture. Michael An- 
 gelo in forming the model of the dome of St. 
 Peter's at Rome, gave it that oval or curve 
 which appeared to his judgment as an artist, 
 to be the most beautiful as drawn on the giv- 
 en breadth and height. And such is the ex- 
 quisite beauty of the dome that it fills every 
 beholder with admiration. It is said, that 
 the distinguished geometrician M. de la Hire 
 being at Rome, was so struck by the elegance 
 of this structure, that he determined to in- 
 quire into the rationale of its impression on 
 the mind ; and on examining the geometrical 
 properties of the curve of its outline, he found 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 115 
 
 that it was that of the greatest resistance or 
 solidity. And thus it is ascertained, that in 
 this instance, what is the most solid or useful 
 in art is also the most beautiful. And what 
 an extraordinary proof does it furnish of the 
 sublimity of the genius of Michael Angelo for 
 the beautiful in art, that in his attempts to 
 sketch the oval outline of the greatest beauty 
 for the dome, he should by the mere exercise 
 of his judgement as an artist, have hit upon 
 the exact curve with mathematical precision. 
 For the identity of the curve of the greatest 
 beauty with that of the greatest utility could 
 never have been ascertained, except by some 
 sublime genius in the felicity of his judg- 
 ment, ascertaining the first, as it were, by an 
 inspired intuition, and then the geometrician, 
 by the unerring calculus of his science, dis- 
 covering that what the artist has thus con- 
 ceived to be the most beautiful oval outline, is 
 the exact mathematical curve of the great- 
 est resistance. And this, upon the doctrine 
 of probabilities, amounts almost to a demon- 
 stration, that the curves of utility and beauty 
 are the same. 
 
3 16 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But the fact, that utility and beauty are of 
 a very kindred nature, or rather, that the 
 first is often an important ingredient of the 
 last, does not need further illustration. For 
 so frequently are they found conjoined both 
 in art and nature, that some philosophers, 
 though very erroneously, have been led to 
 insist, that utility is the essence of beauty — 
 that beauty consists in the fitness of things or 
 the adaptation of parts ; just as some philoso- 
 phers have been led by a like partial view, 
 to insist that utility is the essence of moral 
 good, from the frequency of the union of 
 the expedient and the right in the moral 
 economy of the world. 
 
 We can now, from the altitude to which 
 our analysis has carried us take a wide sur- 
 vey of the topic which we are discussing, 
 and see by the light of science, how ignorant 
 and grovelling is that view of the Baconian 
 philosophy, which sees in its vast range noth- 
 ing but a sordid utility, while, that utility 
 which is consistent with all that is noble in 
 morality and sublime and beautiful in art, is 
 the doctrine which it teaches from the first 
 
THE DACOMAN PHILOSOPHY. 117 
 
 aphorism in the Novum Organon, to the end 
 of its last lesson. 
 
 But it is useless to dwell longer upon phil- 
 osophical analysis, when we have historical 
 proof that the Baconian philosophy is consist- 
 ent with the arts of beauty, in the noble pro- 
 ductions of English literature ; for the liter- 
 ature of every nation partakes of the nature 
 of its philosophy, as the very charge which 
 we are considering assumes. Where then is 
 there a nobler literature, than that which has 
 been cultivated in the same soil and by the 
 same people, with the Baconian philosophy ? 
 Shakspeare, who was the cotemporary and 
 friend of Bacon, and whose productions are 
 so signally marked with the common rsense 
 which, arising in the Baconian philosophy, 
 pervades the whole of English civilization, 
 stands at the head of the dramatic writers of 
 the world. As though he had borrowed the 
 magic wand of nature herself, he creates all 
 beings with the same ease that she does, and 
 .fixes them in their appropriate employments, 
 and plans and executes their different offices, 
 with an exactitude which shows that every 
 
118 THE BACONIAN' PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 act proceeds, from its natural motive, and 
 every destiny from a plan of coincidents in 
 exact conformity to the dispensations of Prov- 
 idence. The most dreadful passions are 
 managed with as easy a conformity to nature, 
 as the most gentle. Murder, with its ferocity 
 and its relenting, its determination and its hes- 
 itancy, before it reddens its hands in blood, 
 and its remorse, and its imaginative agony, 
 after it has done the dark deed, is dramatized 
 with as much perfection as if the poet had 
 seen with his eye the naked heart of the mur- 
 derer throbbing in guilt. And with equal 
 ease, true love is presented in all its artless- 
 ness, whispering its affection in words as soft 
 and simple and sweet, as the attic bee ever 
 distilled upon the lips of a Grecian shepherd- 
 ess; or else, sitting silent, under the restrain- 
 ing diffidence of a pure heart, " until conceal- 
 ment, like a worm in the bud, feeds upon her 
 damask cheek. 5 ' — And jealousy, that monster 
 of suspicion, to whom, " trifles light as air, 
 are confirmation strong as proofs of holy 
 writ, " is presented in all his odiousness. 
 And avarice standing by his bond, and humor 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 119 
 
 holding both his sides, and every human pas- 
 sion are presented in ideal perfection. The 
 dark, and awful, and mysterious abyss of the 
 human heart is completely fathomed and the 
 poet sees by the light of Christianity, how, 
 fearfully and wonderfully it is made, and 
 paints it, as with a pencil dipped in inspira- 
 tion. And though Greece had her Homer, 
 England has her Milton ; and never since 
 the angels' harps, which hailed the morn of 
 the creation, has a nobler been strung than 
 his. The angels sang the joys of life, Milton 
 the woes of death. And did a deeper melo- 
 dy, and fuller of the dirgelike sounds of woe, 
 ever flow from the versification of poetry ? 
 Was the great epic of eternal death in all its 
 horrors, ever before made a reality to the 
 living ? Catching the sublime pathos of the 
 old poets of Judea, and the fire and finish 
 and copiousness of Greece, and transforming 
 and subordinating all to the type of his own 
 mighty genius, he has made a poem worthy 
 of the great theme of the fall of man. The 
 contrast between paradisaical innocence and 
 happiness and infernal wickedness and mise- 
 
120 THE BACO.V1AN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ry is presented in terrific reality. Such is 
 the grace and beauty and loveliness of the 
 first woman as she appears to the creative 
 fancy of the poet, that he represents Satan, 
 though with a bosom filled with the malice of 
 hell, and intent upon the destruction of man, 
 merely because man was innocent and happy. 
 as captivated for a moment by her charms as 
 he beheld her alone, amidst the rich shrubbery 
 of Eden, enchanting the scene of bliss she 
 moved in. But this exquisite sympathy of 
 the poet for true loveliness, does not, for one 
 moment, lead his judgement astray, so as to 
 make him soften the character of Satan. For 
 the unconquerable malignity and insatiable 
 hate of the arch fiend, is depicted in all its 
 dreadful deformity ; and the horrors of hell 
 are seen amidst the " darkness visible,' 7 in 
 such horrifying import as to show that ei there. 
 hope never comes, that comes to all." The 
 poet is always master of himself; is never 
 overpowered by the sublimity, nor enchained 
 by the beauty of his conceptions : but with 
 the self-possession of a great artist, he sets 
 forth every thing in its proper position, and 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 121 
 
 in its proper character, and in language so ex- 
 pressive and so suited to every topic, as to 
 place him perhaps at the very head of the 
 great masters of diction. And Butler, in his 
 Hudibras, has given to the world, the great 
 epic of ridicule. With a fancy alive to the 
 ludicrous, he has caught its minutest shades in 
 every action of life, and presented them in an 
 epic poem ; and thereby the majestic epic be- 
 comes ludicrous. The conceptions of the 
 poem are ludicrous, the language is ludicrous, 
 and even the very rhymes. The poet, it is 
 true, shoots keen shafts at his fellow-men, but 
 they are dipped in the unction of good-na- 
 ture, and not in the venom of malice. Such 
 a poem furnishes entertainment to one of the 
 most important faculties of the human soul, 
 the sense of the ludicrous — which ministers 
 so much to the smiles of home, the gaieties 
 of companionship, and by its goodly influ- 
 ences so often sweetens the sourness of our 
 feelings amidst the annoyances and the ills of 
 life, and opens the heart to the frailties of hu- 
 man kind, and makes us sympathize with the 
 
 whole race, rich and poor, learned and ignor- 
 11 
 
122 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ant, as we see their extravagances through 
 the amiable medium of a laughing heart — -'■ 
 and is therefore worthy of a place amongst 
 the great works of art. And Robert Burns, 
 with his harp tuned, now to merry, and now 
 to sorrowful music, is heard amidst the choir 
 of English poetry, reviving by his natural 
 strains, the youthful freshness of human feel- 
 ing, and keeping in harmony, those delicately 
 tuned chords of the heart, which in the trials 
 of life are so apt to loose the sweetness of their 
 primitive melody. But, we will not particu- 
 larize further ; for the English muse has sung 
 of every theme in original strains ; and has al- 
 so proved the beauty, and strength, and co- 
 piousness and flexibility of the English lan- 
 guage by translating into it the master-pieces 
 of antiquity, and showed that the streams are 
 almost as pure in these channels, as in their 
 Grecian and Roman fountains, 
 
 The prose literature of England also, is 
 rich in its abundance of matter and excellence 
 of style and the wide range of its topics. 
 Her historians are superior to any of modern 
 times, and perhaps equal to those of ancient 
 
THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 123 
 
 Her orators, as suited to the sphere of modern 
 civilization, are equal to any, in any period of 
 human history. In profound views of human 
 nature, in far insight into the policy of legis- 
 lation, and in all the knowledge of statesman- 
 ship, English oratory is far before that of an- 
 tiquity. And in the mere art, English orato- 
 ry is not easily surpassed. In the choice of 
 those topics, both local and general, which 
 lead the intellect and the heart captive ; and 
 in the easy and shining fluency of narrative, 
 the sparkling ripples of wit, the bold, and 
 headlong and dashing cataracts of declama- 
 tion, and the full and swelling, and sweeping 
 and overwhelming tide of argument, and the 
 lightning's flash of suddenly provoked invec- 
 tive which illuminates the whole flood of 
 speech, and falls mercilessly upon its victim, 
 it may well compare with that of any nation 
 ancient or modern. In criticism also, wheth- 
 er exegetical or purely rhetorical, English 
 literature is highly distinguished. And as a 
 specimen of historical criticism, there is noth- 
 ing so ingenious, so original, so masterly, so 
 triumphant and so to be marvelled at, as Pa- 
 
124 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ley's " Horae Paulinae, " It is a wonder of 
 ingenuity — a miracle of logical acumen. 
 Facts in the epistles of Paul, which separately 
 send forth a mere glimmer of light, and which 
 are apparently so unconnected as never to be 
 at all associated in thought, by even careful 
 readers, are selected and brought together in 
 logical order, and the feeble lights of each are 
 so concentrated upon the fact sought after, 
 and the fact is so illuminated in every point, 
 that you can no more doubt of its truth, 
 than you can of the reality of day, when the 
 sun ascends the meridian. In prose fiction 
 too, what literature can compare with the 
 English ? Where else, can so unique a group 
 of such masterly productions of their kind be 
 found, as the Pilgrim's Progress of Bunyan, 
 the Robinson Crusoe of De Foe, the Gulliv- 
 er's Travels of Swift, and the Tristram Shan- 
 dy of Sterne ? And how many thousands of 
 all cultivated nations, have been charmed by 
 the magic writings of Walter Scott ! The 
 young and the old, the learned and the ignor- 
 ant, the wicked and the pious, have all been 
 carried along on the enchanting tide of his 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 125 
 
 narrative as it flowed from its exhaustless 
 fountain, through the ever-varying scenes of 
 an epitomized world, and all have been equal- 
 ly delighted with the wonderful exhibition. 
 Such then, is the literature, laden with so 
 many masculine beauties, which has been cul- 
 tivated in the same soil and by the same peo- 
 ple, with the Baconian philosophy. How 
 erroneous then is the opinion, that the Bacon- 
 ian philosophy has no ideal, but is confined 
 to sense, and leads to a mean literature. 
 
 While answering the charge just consider- 
 ed, we have admitted that the literature of 
 every nation or epoch partakes of the nature 
 of the philosophy of that nation or epoch; 
 because it is a well-established historical fact, 
 and is in truth, nothing more than the exhi- 
 bition, by a people, of the same bent of mind 
 in literature and philosophy. The common 
 sense of the Baconian philosophy is manifest- 
 ed throughout every department of English 
 literature. The characters in Shakspeare's 
 plays are not mere personified qualities like 
 the persons in an allegory : but are real men 
 
 and women, such as we meet with in the 
 11* 
 
126 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 world ; actuated by the same diversity of mo- 
 tives and seeing the same objects. The 
 particular passion sought to be delineated is 
 individualized in some person, and the excel- 
 lence of the delineation consists in the har- 
 mony between the passion though exhibited 
 in all its ideal exaltation, and the character in 
 which it is set forth. For example, murder, 
 and avarice, and jealousy and humor are not 
 exhibited each in some metaphysical creature, 
 which has no other passion than the one ex- 
 emplified, but in real characters, which can 
 sympathize with the circumstances of real life, 
 and are at times under the influence of all 
 the other passions of man, as different sit- 
 uations call them forth. Murder is exhib- 
 ited in Macbeth, avarice in Shylock, jealousy 
 in Othello and humour in Falstaff, who are 
 all men full of the common sympathies of 
 humanity. This is the greatest triumph of 
 the dramatic art, to invest the ideal with hu- 
 manity. It is true that Shakspeare also cre- 
 ated such characters as Calaban ; but this 
 was merely a wayward freak of his genius. 
 And the same characteristic is exhibited in the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 127 
 
 writings of Milton. His fiends and angels 
 are not metaphysical abstractions ; but are 
 men exalted into superhuman greatness. 
 Though Satan does not appear " less than 
 archangel ruined," still he appears like a 
 wicked man of superhuman powers. And 
 the angels appear such as we may imagine 
 good men may become in a world where all 
 their powers are exalted. This likening of 
 spirits to men, we are well aware has been 
 censured by some critics as a great impro- 
 priety, and the Mephistophiles of Goethe, 
 which is a metaphysical incarnation of sin, 
 has been reckoned a finer delineation of the 
 spirit of wickedness than the Satan of Mil- 
 ton. But this criticism, we apprehend, is 
 founded in a misconception of the nature of 
 the poetic art, whose province it is to seize 
 upon practical criterions, and not upon spec- 
 ulative — to deal with realities, and such 
 things as can be made so much like realities, 
 as to awaken the common sympathies of the 
 human heart, and not with metaphysical ab^- 
 stractions — to be like Shakspeare, and no,t 
 like Goethe, like Robert Burns, and not like 
 
128 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Coleridge. But be this as it may, Milton 
 has certainly taken a common sense view, and 
 not a metaphysical one, of his great theme, 
 and thereby showed the national trait of his 
 mind. And Butler has taken a common 
 sense view of human nature in his great 
 poem. Hudibras, with all his ludicrous fa- 
 naticism and solemn folly, is still a man ; and 
 so of every other character. And as to the 
 poetry of Burns, it expresses more of natu- 
 ral feeling, such feeling as all men have, than 
 that of any poet known to history. But it is 
 useless to dwell upon this topic; for all the 
 late writers upon the history of literature on 
 the continent of Europe, have made special 
 reference to the fact that English literature is 
 pervaded by a vein of common sense. The 
 English have even examined the evidences 
 of Christianity according to the principles of 
 the inductive method, or of common sense. 
 Butler in his analogy, has drawn conclusions 
 as to the truth of Christianity from the anal- 
 ogy which exists between it and the course 
 of Providence as exhibited in nature; which 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 129 
 
 •is as strictly an inductive process, as any used 
 in the investigations of natural philosophy. 
 
 But there is a still graver charge brought 
 against the Baconian philosophy. It is said 
 to lead to materialism and atheism. DeMa- 
 istre, in his commentary on the philosophy 
 of Bacon, says : " Every line of Bacon con- 
 ducts to materialism : but in no part has he 
 shown himself a more skilful sophist, a more 
 refined, profound and dangerous hypocrite, 
 than in what he has written on the soul." 
 And Schlegel, in his history of literature, 
 says : " The philosophy of sensation which 
 was unconsciously bequeathed to the world by 
 Bacon, and reduced to the shape of a regu- 
 lar system by Locke, first displayed in France, 
 the true immorality and destructiveness of 
 which it is the parent, and assumed the ap- 
 pearance of a perfect sect of atheism." In 
 the second chapter of the second part of this 
 discourse, it will be shown, that the Baconian 
 philosophy recognises the testimony of con- 
 sciousness, as fully as it does that of sensa- 
 tion. If this be so, how can that philosophy 
 lead to materialism ? Consciousness tells us 
 
130 THE BACONIAN PKIL030PHY 
 
 that the soul is not material ; for we are cer- 
 tainly conscious that its attributes are not those 
 of matter. Sensation informs us of the ma- 
 terial world; consciousness of the spiritual 
 world ; and we have no right; according to 
 any, rule of evidence or logic ; to predicate in 
 the way of philosophical affirmation; any idea 
 derived from the material world; of the ob- 
 jects of the spiritual world ; because the 
 ideas of the qualities or attributes of spirit; 
 we get from consciousness; and we cannot pre- 
 dicate of spirit; any quality but what is ascer- 
 tained by consciousness; and neither can we 
 predicate of matter; any quality but what is 
 ascertained by sensation. We have no evi- 
 dence therefore; that the soul is material ; 
 because the knowledge of its nature is de- 
 rived from a source; from which not one idea 
 appertaining to matter is derived. The Ba- 
 conian philosophy; therefore; admits the same 
 amount of evidence in favour of the immate- 
 riality of the soul; that the a priori philosophy 
 does; and therefore rests upon the same 
 foundation in this particular. 
 
 And so far from the Baconian philosophy 
 
T1TE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 131 
 
 being atheistical, Bacon has defined the boun- 
 daries, and pointed out the nature of the ev- 
 idence upon which natural theology rests 
 upon the principles of his philosophy, with 
 admirable precision, as will be shown in the 
 third part of this discourse. And no nation 
 has cultivated natural theology with such as- 
 siduity and success, as the English. The 
 more the Baconian philosophy has been culti- 
 vated, the more has natural theology advanc- 
 ed. It is in fact the boast of this philos- 
 ophy, that it has revived the study of natural 
 theology, after it had been abandoned and 
 scouted by the philosophers of the continent 
 of Europe, as an unprofitable study. "It 
 gave a particular pleasure to Sir Isaac New- 
 ton," (says Maclaurin in his account of the 
 writings of Newton,) "to see that his philo- 
 sophy had contributed to promote an atten- 
 tion to final causes, as I have heard him 
 observe, after Des Cartes and others had en- 
 deavoured to banish them." And where is 
 the great work of Paley ? the two first chap- 
 ters of which approach as near to the certain- 
 ty of mathematical demonstration, as it is pos- 
 
132 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sible for moral reasonings to do. The eviden- 
 ces of natural theology pass through the achro- 
 matic mind of the author, without being dis- 
 coloured by prejudice or passion, and paint 
 upon his pages, their doctrines with all the 
 life and precision of daguerreotype. And 
 yet there never was a mind more thoroughly 
 imbued by the philosophy of sensation, as 
 Schlegel xalls it than Paley's. And the 
 Bridgewater treatises have brought all the 
 discoveries of the Baconian philosophy to 
 prove and illustrate natural theology. And 
 Bishop Butler even in his day, considered 
 natural theology as so well established in 
 English philosophy, that he assumed its truth 
 as the foundation of his great work on the 
 analogy between natural and revealed reli- 
 gion. So we see that in English philosophy, 
 revelation, natural theology and physical sci- 
 ence, are united in perfect harmony, pro- 
 claiming with one voice that there is a God. 
 Such then is the character of the Baconian 
 or English philosophy : it embraces every 
 thing that is sublime in speculation, useful in 
 practice, lofty in morality, beautiful in art, and; 
 reverential in religion. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 133 
 
 We now feel ourselves free to declare, that 
 Bacon has done more to advance the progress 
 of the human mind than any uninspired man 
 known to history. There are no writings in 
 the whole of literature, which take so pro- 
 found a view of human nature, and point out 
 so exalted a destiny for man, as his. With a 
 philosophical forecast unparalleled in the 
 world, he has given anticipations of some of 
 the greatest discoveries of modern science. 
 Even the law of gravity is conjectured, and 
 its application to the explication of the tides 
 of the ocean is distinctly stated. And his 
 philosophy possesses within itself the princi- 
 ple of perpetual progress ; for, it is not like 
 the ancient philosophies, confined to specula- 
 tive principles, from which an explanation of 
 all things is to be deduced, and as these prin- 
 ciples are in time found to be incapable of ex- 
 plaining the phenomena of nature, the an- 
 cient philosophies all sink into skepticism and 
 become extinct, but it is commensurate with 
 the phenomena of the universe, as it deals 
 with phenomena, and deduces its principles 
 
 from them, and not them from its principles, 
 12 
 
134 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is therefore, not like the ancient philoso- 
 phies, a means of culture and progress for one 
 people or epoch only, exhausting itself upon 
 that people or epoch, but it is the means of 
 culture and progress for all the nations and 
 periods of the world. The nations which 
 have been most under its influence have risen 
 superior to all the rest of the human family, 
 and have advanced progressively, and their 
 speed is daily accelerated, to a degree of in- 
 tellectual developement,and moral superiority, 
 and political power, which seem to indicate 
 that it is destined to form the type of the 
 civilization of a greater part, if not of all the 
 human race. And that this progress is like- 
 ly to be perpetual, is also indicated by the 
 fact, that England, the nation which has most 
 assiduously cultivated this philosophy stands 
 at the head of modern civilization, and is not 
 only the great progressive and regenerative 
 nation of modern times, but is also eminently 
 conservative, possessing in happy combination 
 the element of both progress and stability. 
 She never loses sight of ancient landmarks in 
 her progressive movements. How often, for 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 135 
 
 example, has she thrown her conservative in- 
 fluence over the troubled waters of European 
 politics, even when the commotion received 
 its first impulse from the influence of her own 
 principles of government! Scarcely has a 
 quarter of a century elapsed, since she exer- 
 ted all her power to rescue Christendom 
 from political and moral ruin, brought about 
 by a revolution with which at first she sympa- 
 thized strongly. And it seems, at this dis- 
 tance of time from the event, that if it had 
 not been for her, all Europe would have ret- 
 rograded in civilization. During the aw- 
 ful storm of the French revolution, when al- 
 most every government of Europe lay a 
 wreck upon the tremendous tossings of the 
 political waters, a gleam of hope still broke 
 across the scene, as the wise men of the earth 
 turned towards England and saw, that freigh- 
 ted with the best interests of humanity, se- 
 cure in her strength, she was riding out the 
 storm. 
 
 We have, therefore, strong reason to hope 
 that the Baconian philosophy sanctified by the 
 spirit of Christianity, will pour its sanative 
 
136 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 floods over all the earth, and bring back all 
 nations from the delirious wanderings of the 
 a priori philosophy, to walk in the plain and 
 sober paths of common sense. 
 
PART THE SECOND, 
 
 CHAPTER FIRST. 
 
 THE BACONIAN METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 The object of this chapter is to exhibit the 
 Method of Investigation taught by Bacon in 
 the Novum Organon, As the best mode of 
 doing this, we will first sketch an outline of 
 the Logic taught by Aristotle in his Organon, 
 and show its nature and its province, and then 
 sketch an outline of the Method of Investiga- 
 tion taught by Bacon in his Novum Organon, 
 and show its nature and its province, and 
 compare the two, and point out their differ- 
 ences. Let us then commence with an anal- 
 ysis of the reasoning process, as it is of this, 
 that the Organon of Aristotle treats. 
 
 We frequently observe in the best writers 
 upon science, a vagueness and contradiction 
 of expression in regard to the reasoning pro- 
 cess, that evince the greatest looseness of 
 12* 
 
138 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 opinion in regard to its nature. We frequent- 
 ly meet with such expressions as " the in- 
 ductive process of reasoning/' u the true 
 method of reasoning, which Bacon taught/' 
 "the erroneous method of syllogistic reasoning 
 which Aristotle invented/' and many other 
 such expressions, which clearly indicate that 
 the writers suppose, that there is more than 
 one mode of reasoning. Nothing can be more 
 erroneous than such a supposition. No matter 
 what be the subject upon which the mind is 
 employed, whether in the spiritual or mate- 
 rial world — whether in metaphysics, ethics, 
 politics, mathematics, or in the different bran- 
 ches of natural philosophy, the reasoning 
 process is always the same. The process is 
 always from the known, or that which is as- 
 sumed as known, to the unknown ; and is al- 
 ways reducible to a syllogism. The syllogism 
 is in fact the process of reasoning ; for though 
 every argument does not pass through the 
 mind in the strict logical form of the syllo- 
 gism, yet in every instance of reasoning, all 
 the parts of a syllogism are contemplated by 
 the mind. Some seem to entertain the notion, 
 
THE BACONIAN rillLOSOrHY. 139 
 
 that the syllogism is a peculiar kind of rea- 
 soning — that it is not the natural process of 
 the mind in reasoning, but is an artificial mode 
 invented by Aristotle. Let us test this notion, 
 by analyzing an argument presented in its 
 common form. u The world exhibits marks 
 of design, it therefore has an intelligent au- 
 thor." Now the process which takes place 
 in the mind, in forming this argument, is the 
 syllogism ; as will be seen, if we attempt to 
 refute the argument. Suppose we deny the 
 truth of the argument, we must do it upon 
 one of two grounds. Either upon the ground, 
 that the world does not exhibit marks of de- 
 sign, or upon the ground, that even if does, 
 still it may not have an intelligent author. An 
 objection upon either of these grounds is a full 
 denial of the argument. What does this 
 prove ? Why, that the argument rests upon 
 two assumptions. First, upon the assumption, 
 that whatever exhibits marks of design has 
 an intelligent author, and, secondly, that the 
 world exhibits marks of design. The two 
 assumptions are evidently the premises from 
 which the conclusion is deduced ; for if either 
 
140 
 
 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of them be false, the conclusion must be false, 
 and if both of them be true, the conclusion 
 must be true. As then both of these assump- 
 tions are absolutely essential to the truth of 
 the conclusion, the mind must have contem- 
 plated them in coming to the conclusion ; for 
 otherwise it would not be warranted in form- 
 ing any such conclusion. Indeed, it is im- 
 possible to form such a conclusion, without 
 considering both of these assumptions ; for 
 they are the evidence upon which it rests. 
 
 Now let us look back over what we have 
 been doing, and we shall see that, in devel- 
 oping the argument, we have formed it into a 
 complete syllogism. As developed, it is 
 thus : " Whatever exhibits marks of design 
 has an intelligent author. The world exhib- 
 its marks of design. Therefore, it has an in- 
 telligent author." This is a complete syl- 
 logism. The first sentence is the major 
 premiss; the second, the minor; and the 
 third, is the conclusion. The minor premiss 
 was expressed in the argument as we first 
 stated it ; but the major was not. When we 
 denied the truth of the argument, we found, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 141 
 
 4:hat in order to sustain it, we must adduce 
 other evidence than was expressed 3 and the 
 other evidence is the major premiss of the 
 syllogism. The mind then, must have con- 
 templated this major premiss ; else, it came 
 to the conclusion upon insufficient evidence. 
 In fact, the major premiss is implied in the 
 minor; as it must always be : and therefore, 
 the mind must of necessity have contemplated 
 it. The argument as we first stated it, is the 
 form in which we generally speak or write 
 our arguments ; for we never express all the 
 evidence which passes before the mind in 
 argumentation, but use expressions which 
 imply the truth of what is considered evident. 
 When, therefore, we wish to analyze and de- 
 lineate the process which takes place in rea- 
 soning, we must consider every step of the 
 argument — take hold of the attenuated clew, 
 and pass along all the most winding and intri- 
 cate passages of the mental labyrinth, and 
 find out what is not usually expressed. If 
 we do this with any argument whatever, and 
 add to it all that is understood, it will then be 
 a syllogism, or series of syllogisms. The 
 
142 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 very argument by which we have endeavour- 
 ed to establish the point under consideration, 
 may be formed into a series of syllogisms, by 
 merely supplying what is understood. 
 
 As we have established the point, that 
 every argument, when stated in full and in 
 logical order, is a syllogism, or a series of 
 syllogisms, we will next ascertain what are 
 the acts of the mind, which take place m the 
 syllogism, as we shall thus ascertain what are 
 the acts of the mind which take place in rea- 
 soning. 
 
 The fundamental principles of the syllo- 
 gism are ; first, if two terms agree with one 
 and the same third term, they agree with 
 each other; secondly, if one term agrees and 
 another disagrees with one and the same 
 third term, these two disagree with each 
 other. On the former of these principles, 
 rests the validity of affirmative conclusions:; 
 on the latter, of negative. In the argument 
 above, to prove that the world has an intelli- 
 gent author, we found out a third term, with 
 which both the subject and predicate of 
 the proposition agree, which third term is, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 143 i 
 
 m . whatever exhibits marks of design." Be- 
 cause if both the subject and the predicate of 
 the proposition agree with this third term, 
 they agree with each other. We see, then, 
 that in every affirmative syllogism there are 
 three agreements. The major and minor 
 terms agree with the middle term, and they 
 therefore agree with each other. And that 
 in every negative syllogism, there are two 
 disagreements. Either the major or minor 
 term agrees with the middle term, and the 
 other disagrees with it, and they therefore 
 disagree with each other. Now, how are 
 agreements and disagreements ascertained ? 
 Why, by comparison. The acts of the mind, 
 therefore, which take place in the syllogism^ 
 are a comparison of two terms, with a third, 
 and if they agree with it, then an inference 
 that they agree with each other; and if 
 either of them agrees, and the other disa- 
 grees with the third term, then an inference 
 that they disagree with each other. All 
 reasoning, therefore, proceeds by compari- 
 son. We have exhibited this point, because 
 we frequently meet with expressions, in the 
 
144 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 best writers upon logic and metaphysics, and : 
 also in the writings of all classes of authors, 
 which imply that all reasoning is not by com- 
 parison : and also because we have seen some 
 able writers running to the opposite extreme, 
 and confounding the simple act of compari- 
 son with the reasoning process, which as we 
 have shown, consists of several acts of com- 
 parison, and an inference from them. 
 
 We will now for the purpose of enquiring 
 more minutely into the nature of the reason- 
 ing process, take a syllogism to pieces, and 
 examine its I parts, so as to ascertain their 
 nature and their mutual relations to each 
 other. 
 
 The syllogism is composed of three pro- 
 positions, two of which are the premises, and 
 the other is the conclusion. For example, 
 in the syllogism which we have been using 
 all along, the proposition, " Whatever has 
 marks of design has an intelligent author/' 
 is the major premiss; the proposition, "The 
 world, exhibits marks of design," is the minor 
 premiss ; and the proposition, " The world, 
 therefore, has an intelligent author," is the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 145 
 
 conclusion. It is upon the mutual relations 
 existing between these propositions; and upon 
 the mutual relations existing between their 
 respective parts, that all the rules of Logic are 
 founded. It is intuitively manifest, that both 
 the minor premiss and the conclusion, are 
 embraced in the major premiss, as parts of a 
 whole. If the major and minor propositions 
 be granted, the conclusion must necessarily 
 follow, indeed the truth of the conclusion is 
 assumed in them. When, therefore, we as- 
 sert the truth of the major and minor prem- 
 ises, we virtually assert the truth of the con- 
 clusion also. We see, then, that in every 
 argument, the conclusion is contained or as- 
 sumed in the premises, and that the conclu- 
 sion is not a different truth from the premises, 
 but is one of the truths contained or assum- 
 ed in the major premiss, which is nothing 
 more than a general truth, of which the con- 
 clusion is a particular instance. When, there- 
 fore, we draw a conclusion, we do not, strictly 
 speaking, ascertain a new truth, but merely 
 develop in a particular instance, a general 
 
 truth known to us before. The great general 
 13 
 
145 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 principle which governs these mutual rela- 
 tions existing between the premises and con- 
 clusion, is the fundamental principle of Logic, 
 and is called in scholastic language the Ci Dic- 
 tum de omni et nullo" of Aristotle. It is 
 this : " Whatever may be predicated (affirm- 
 ed or denied) universally of any class, may 
 be predicated (affirmed or denied) in like 
 manner of any thing comprehended in that 
 class." The application of this principle to 
 the major premiss, as comprehending the 
 minor and the conclusion, is obvious : for if 
 it can be affirmed universally of the class of 
 things exhibiting marks of design, that they 
 have an intelligent author, it can necessarily 
 be affirmed so of the world, if it be one of 
 the things comprehended in that class. This 
 maxim may be called the formula of demon- 
 stration, a general argument, of which every 
 other is a particular instance. And the man 
 who violates it in argumentation, is to the eye 
 of enlightened reason guilty of as gross an 
 absurdity as he who attempts to raise himself 
 aver a fence by the straps of his boots. 
 We have now given an outline of the Logic 
 
THE BACONIAN 1 PHILOSOPHY. 147 
 
 taught by Aristotle in his Organon : and will 
 next introduce to our readers the Method of 
 Investigation taught by Bacon in his Novum 
 Organon. 
 
 From the expressions quoted at the begin- 
 ning of our analysis of the reasoning process, 
 and from many such that are found in the best 
 writers of every class, one might suppose 
 that Lord Bacon had taught a new mode of 
 reasoning : and that his Novum Organon was 
 designed to supersede altogether the Organ- 
 on of Aristotle. This is an entire misconcep- 
 tion of the whole subject. The design of the 
 Novum Organon was not to teach a new 
 mode of reasoning ; but to teach a new method 
 of investigation. The Novum Organon has, 
 therefore a very different province from that 
 of the Organon of Aristotle. The ^province 
 of the latter is to analyze the process of the 
 mind which takes place in reasoning ; and to 
 furnish a model to which sound reasoning 
 may be reduced and by which the correct- 
 ness of every argument may be tested, in its 
 conformity to the model; and to furnish rules 
 relative to the whole matter, as we may have 
 shown. 
 
148 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 But the Logic of Aristotle was supposed 
 by its author and the other Greek philoso- 
 phers to be an instrument of much more im- 
 portance in the investigation of truth, than it 
 really is, and was therefore applied to the in- 
 vestigation of the sciences, and is called the 
 a priori Method of Investigation, and it is as 
 a method of investigation, that the Novum 
 Organon is designed to supersede the Organ- 
 on of Aristotle, as we will now proceed to 
 show. 
 
 The Greeks were an astute and exceedingly 
 disputatious people, inordinately fond of dia- 
 lectical disquisitions ; and it was in this spirit, 
 that the Greek philosophers conceived that 
 the reasoning process was the chief process 
 in the investigation of the sciences, or in other 
 words that, the a priori, was the true method 
 of investigation. And it was at a period in 
 the history of Greece when her philosophers 
 were wholly given up to abstract studies, that 
 Aristotle's Organon had its origin ; and it may 
 be considered as a systematical developement 
 of the method of investigation pursued by 
 the Greek philosophers, who carried the a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 149 
 
 priori Method of Investigation which had 
 proved so successful in mathematical inquiries 
 to which it is adapted; into physical and meta- 
 physical inquiries, supposing that as in the 
 mathematics, so in physics and metaphysics, 
 every thing can be reasoned out from a few 
 simple notions or principles. And in accord- 
 ance with this opinion the Greek philoso- 
 phers were always endeavouring to find out 
 these simple principles in nature, which they 
 supposed would be productive of such rich 
 results in science. In psychology, we find 
 some maintaining the doctrine of innate gene- 
 ral ideas or principles from which not only 
 all metaphysical but all physical truths also 
 were to be reasoned out ; and in physics, we 
 find one making water, another, the infinitude 
 of things, a third, air, and at last Aristotle, 
 making form and privation combined with 
 matter, the principles of all things: and though 
 Aristotle did not maintain that these simple 
 notions or principles were an innate knowledge 
 of the mind, yet he seemed to think that they 
 might be recognised affirmatively at the first 
 
 glace of contemplation of an instance furnish- 
 13* 
 
150 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ed through sensation, and that therefore, the 
 chief process in the acquisition of truth, is in 
 deducing conclusions from principles, and not 
 in ascertaining principles. And these miser- 
 able abstractions were the clews by which the 
 labyrinths of nature's secret places were to 
 be passed through, and the truths of physics 
 and metaphysics ascertained by reasoning 
 from them. This misapplication of Logic as 
 a method of investigation could not but lead 
 to error. For Logic does not guaranty the 
 truth of the premises of an argument, unless 
 they are conclusions from previous arguments, 
 but always proceeds upon the hypothetical 
 truth of the premises. It merely guarantys 
 the truth of the conclusion, as an inference 
 from the premises ; its province as we have 
 shown, being to deduce conclusions from ad- 
 mitted premises. Its tendency, therefore, is 
 to make us overlook the truth of the premises; 
 as it furnishes no rule in regard to their truth, 
 but merely in regard to the truth of the con- 
 clusion as an inference from them. And this 
 is the very evil which it produced. 
 
 This misapplication of Logic as a method 
 
THE BACONIAN PHI LOSO-FI'.Y, 151 
 
 of investigation, led inevitably to the most 
 absurd theories in physical science imagina- 
 ble. As an example, we will cite Aristotle's 
 argument in proof of the immutability and 
 incorruptibility of the heavens, as it is. exhib- 
 ited by Galileo. 
 
 " 1st. Mutation is either generation or 
 corruption." 
 
 " 2d. Generation and corruption only hap- 
 pen between contraries." 
 
 " 3d. The motion of contraries is contra- 
 ry." 
 
 " 4th. The celestial motions are circular.'* 
 
 u 5th. Circular motions have no contra- 
 ries." 
 
 u A. Because there can be but three sim- 
 ple motions." 
 
 a 1st. To a centre." 
 " 2d. Round a centre." 
 "3d. From a centre." 
 
 " B. Of three things, only one can be 
 contrary to one." 
 
 " G. But a motion to a centre is manifestly 
 the contrary to a motion from a centre." 
 
 "D. Therefore, a motion round a centre 
 
152 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (i. e. circular motion,) remains without a 
 contrary." 
 
 " 6th. Therefore, celestial motions have 
 no contraries ; therefore, among celes- 
 tial things there are no contraries ; there- 
 fore, the heavens are eternal, immutable, 
 incorruptible, and so forth." 
 Such is a striking example of both the 
 method and the results of the ancient mode 
 of philosophizing. In it are exhibited a total 
 disregard of facts and phenomena and a pom- 
 pous and conceited affectation of system, 
 which admirably illustrates the intellectual 
 pride and vanity of the Greek philosophers, 
 who paid no regard to their premises, as facts 
 founded in nature ; but vainly hoped to rear 
 up a system of natural philosophy correspond- 
 ing with the indications of nature, merely by 
 deducing conclusions from assumed premises 
 not ascertained by observing nature, but pure- 
 ly the fictions of their own imaginations. 
 And to just as gross absurdities were the 
 Greek philosophers led in mental philosophy, 
 by their disregard of facts and phenomena, 
 as they were in physical. We will cite as an 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 153 
 
 example, the doctrine of sensation, or the 
 mode in which the mind perceives objects as 
 taught in the Peripatetic school. A kind of 
 images, or sensible species as they were call- 
 ed, were supposed to come off from all ob- 
 jects and to pass to our different organs of 
 sense, and were by them admitted to the 
 nerves, and through them conveyed to the 
 brain, where they were impressed as the en- 
 graving of a seal on wax, and were then re- 
 fined into intellectual species, after the mind 
 fully apprehended them. We might cite 
 many other examples of like absurdity : but 
 our object is merely to illustrate the point un- 
 der consideration. 
 
 The Logic and philosophy of Aristotle ob- 
 tained the greatest favor at Rome under the 
 Caesars. At an early period however, in the 
 Christain world, Plato had displaced Aristotle, 
 and his continued the most generally receiv- 
 ed philosophy until the close of the fifth cen- 
 tury, when the influence of Aristotle began 
 to prevail again, and though it declined a lit- 
 tle during the sixth century, at the close of 
 the seventh, it was every where triumphant 
 
154 THE BACONIAxN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 throughout the civilized portions of Europe, 
 Asia and Africa. Christians, Jews and Ma- 
 hometans bowed before his authority. Com- 
 mentaries, paraphrases, summaries and disser- 
 tations on his works were composed without 
 number in both Arabic and Latin. His works 
 were appealed to in all disputes as infallible au- 
 thority : and none dared dissent from the 
 a Great Master, " During this period, the 
 study of nature was still more neglected than 
 it had been by the Greeks. Mere .abstrac- 
 tions, figments of the mind, usurped the 
 place of even the few facts contained in the 
 Greek philosophy. Men's minds were in a 
 continual ferment about occult qualities and 
 essences— about proportion, degree, infinity, 
 formality, and innumerable other abstractions ; 
 and such was the height to which controver- 
 sy ran about these chimeras of the mind, that 
 it often resulted in bloodshed, and well-nigh 
 convulsed kingdoms. Every one seemed to 
 think that, " the chief end of man, is to con- 
 tradict his neighbour, and to wrangle with 
 him forever. " The different parties had their 
 rival chiefs decked out in all the titles of phi- 
 
TtJE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 155 
 
 losophical heraldry, such as " the invincible, " 
 " the most profound," u the angelical," " the 
 irrefragible doctor, " to lead them on to the 
 wordy war. And now the most absurd no- 
 tions were worked up into systems of phi- 
 losophy. As the great master Aristotle had 
 taught, as we have shown, that a uniform 
 circular motion was the only motion consis- 
 tent with the perfection of the heavenly me- 
 chanism, this notion was worked up into a 
 most unwieldy and complicated theory of as- 
 tronomy^ exhibiting the sun, moon and plan- 
 ets revolving in circles, whose centres were 
 carried round in other circles, and these again 
 in others, and so on without end— " cycle 
 upon epicycle, orb on orb," throughout the in- 
 finitude of space. But a still more absurd 
 astronomical theory was gravely presented to 
 the world in the sixth century by Cosmas 
 Indopleustes, who maintained, says Maclau- 
 rin in his account of Sir Isaac Newton's phi- 
 losophical discoveries, that " the earth was 
 not globular but an immense plane of a great- 
 er length that breadth,environed by an unpass- 
 able ocean. He placed a huge mountain to- 
 
158 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 wards the north, around which the sun and 
 stars performed their diurnal revolutions ; and 
 from the conical shape which he ascribed to 
 it, with the oblique motion of the sun, he ac- 
 counted for the inequality of the days and the 
 variation of the seasons. The vault of Heav- 
 en leaned upon the earth extended beyond 
 the ocean, being likewise supported by two 
 vast columns: beneath the arch, angels con- 
 ducted the stars in their various motions. 
 Above it were the celestial waters, and above 
 all he placed the supreme heavens." Such 
 then was the state of knowledge produced by 
 implicitly obeying authority, and following the 
 ancient method of philosophizing, of endeav- 
 ouring to deduce systems of philosophy from 
 a few imaginary principles — of misapplying 
 Logic as a method of investigation. 
 
 It was during this state of knowledge, 
 though light had begun to break in upon the 
 darkness, that Lord Bacon was born. While 
 yet a student at Trinity College, Cambridge, 
 he discerned the vagueness and inutility of 
 the existing state of knowledge ; and as he 
 advanced in age, he saw the more clearly 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 15? 
 
 the utter worthlessness of all the reigning 
 speculations of the day ; for, there being no 
 connection whatever between them and the 
 arts, they did not minister at all to the com^ 
 forts of man, or arm him with any power o- 
 ver nature. As this great genius meditated 
 upon the immense growth of pernicious error 
 which had sprung up in every province of 
 knowledge, he plainly saw, that it was in a 
 great measure the product of the extensive 
 influence which Aristotle possessed in the 
 schools, diverting the minds of men from the 
 study of nature to the study of his doctrines ; 
 and that the authority of Aristotle must be 
 overthrown, before man could be brought 
 back into the true paths of science. For 
 although the discoveries of Copernicus, Kep- 
 ler and Galileo had in some degree broken 
 the magic spell of the enchanter of Sta- 
 gira, it remained for a genius of a loftier tone 
 to show its delusion and folly by pointing out 
 its nature ; and to rouse up the minds of men 
 from slavish obedience to authority, by pour- 
 ing into them the quickening influences of his 
 own free spirit. All this Bacon designed to. 
 
L58 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 accomplish by his Installation of the Scien- 
 ces ; and to lead men back into the true paths 
 of science, from which they had so long wan- 
 dered. 
 
 The Installation of the Sciences, was de- 
 signed by Bacon to consist of six parts : but 
 as he wrote but little of the third, fourth, fifth 
 and sixth parts, we will say nothing of them. 
 The first part is the Advancement of Learn- 
 ing in which he sketches out all the depart 
 ments of knowledge and defines their limits ; 
 and shows the degree of cultivation in each. 
 In concluding this part of his great work, he 
 says, u thus have I made, as it were, a small 
 globe of the intellectual world as truly and 
 faithfully as I could discover, with a note and 
 description of those parts, which seem to me 
 not constantly occupate or well converted by 
 the labour of man. " 
 
 The second part of the Instauration of the 
 Sciences, is the Novum Organon, which it is 
 our object now to illustrate. As, in the Ad- 
 vancement of Learnings Bacon sketched a map 
 of the sciences, in the Novum Organon, he de- 
 velops the method by which they are to be 
 
THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 159 
 
 investigated. He here proclaims the great 
 truth, and develops it, that the knowledge of 
 the philosopher does not differ in kind but 
 only in degree, from that of the peasant — that 
 the whole of philosophy is founded on obser- 
 vation, and is nothing more than a classifica- 
 tion of facts and phenomena presented in na- 
 ture, rising first, from particulars, to classifi- 
 cations of the lowest degree of comprehension, 
 and then from these, to those of a higher de- 
 gree, and so on, until we arrive at classifi- 
 cations of the 'highest degree comprehend- 
 ing all the subordinate classifications. And 
 that these classifications are the only true 
 general conceptions ; as they are the only 
 ones which have any thing corresponding 
 to them in nature ; and that the ideas or 
 forms of Plato, and the empirical general 
 conceptions of Aristotle have nocounterparts 
 in nature, but are the mere fictions of their 
 own imaginations, and therefore are not a 
 proper foundation of science. In a word, he 
 declared that all philosophy is written in the 
 book of nature, the material and spiritual 
 worlds. He set forth this great truth in the 
 
160 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 very first proposition of the Novum Organon: 
 "Manas the servant and interpreter of nature, 
 does and understands as much as his obser- 
 vations on the order of nature, either with re- 
 gard to things or the mind, permit him, and 
 neither knows, nor is capable of more." The 
 spirit of this philosophy is humility. It teach- 
 es that in order to become philosophers truly 
 so called, men must cast off that intellectual 
 pride which vainly strives to find out the se- 
 crets of nature by mere reasoning, and be- 
 come as children, reading in humility the 
 simplest lessons in the book oi nature. " The 
 access to the kingdom of man which is found- 
 ed on the sciences, ?5 says Bacon, ".resembles 
 that to the kingdom of Heaven, where no 
 admission is conceded except to children. " 
 Noble and sagacious comparison ! With 
 what philosophic forecast does it portray the 
 spirit of true philosophy ! For as those who 
 recognise the doctrine of humility in divine 
 truth, have planted, upon the strongest for- 
 tresses of paganism, the white banner of Chris- 
 tianity, with the lonely star of Bethlehem 
 shedding its mild teams from its ample folds 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 161 
 
 as it waves over the worshippers of the true 
 God, so those who recognise it in human 
 truth, have pushed their conquests into every 
 province of nature, and even scaled the very 
 Heavens, and planted the standard of the Ba- 
 conian philosophy upon the remotest star, de- 
 monstrating by their success that the hum- 
 bling precept, "become as little children," 
 is as true in philosophy as in religion. It is 
 obedience to this precept which confers on 
 man all his power over nature — gives him 
 access to the kingdom founded on the scien- 
 ces. 
 
 The method of investigation, according to 
 this view of philosophy, proposed by Bacon 
 in his Novum Organon, he calls Induction, 
 which means iC a bringing in ;" because it 
 proposes to bring into philosophical investi- 
 gations facts diligently sought out in nature, 
 and after carefully examining them in all pos- 
 sible lights, to educe some general principle 
 from them which they clearly indicate. The 
 developement of this method, by showing its 
 nature and efficiency, and exposing the sour- 
 ces of error in philosophical investigations and 
 14* 
 
162 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 laying down precepts for conducting them 
 right, so as to enable the humble and sincere 
 inquirer to guard against error, constitute the 
 Novum Organon. Such then is the remedy 
 which Bacon proposed for rectifying the evils 
 of the ancient philosophy ; and for enabling 
 man to establish a true practical philosophy 
 that would extend his empire over all the do- 
 minions of nature. He sketched a chart to 
 guide the humble voyager on the vast ocean 
 of knowledge ; and erected beacons to warn 
 him where his barque might be stranded. 
 
 It is evident from this view of the subject 
 that the Novum Organon, was not designed 
 to teach a new mode of reasoning; and thus 
 to supersede the Organon of Aristotle in its 
 legitimate province of analyzing the process of 
 reasoning, and exhibiting rules for conducting 
 it aright : but merely to supersede it as an in- 
 strument of investigation in the sciences, to 
 which it had been misapplied both by its au- 
 thor and his followers, especially those of mod*- 
 ern times. The Novum Organon is not in 
 fact a treatise on lo^ic at all : but rather a 
 treatise on evidence ; for it treats more partic- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSCFHY, 163 
 
 ularly of premises, than of conclusions ; and 
 the premises are the evidence, which prove 
 the conclusion of an argument ; for when we 
 set out with a conclusion which is then called 
 a proposition, the evidence which we adduce 
 to prove it w T ould constitute the premises, if 
 we set out with the premises, in order to de- 
 duce the conclusion from them. Lord Bacon, 
 after surveying the whole of ancient philoso- 
 phy, saw that it was not sustained by legiti- 
 mate evidence-— that the premises (so to 
 speak) of the arguments were either plainly 
 false, or mere assumptions not proved ; and 
 he proposed in his Novum Organon, that 
 men should examine facts and phenomena 
 (the only legitimate evidence,) before they 
 form theories^ — interpret nature and have leg- 
 itimate premises, before they deduce conclu- 
 sions. He did not design to show that their 
 conclusions w r ere not logically deduced from 
 their premises, or that the syllogistic rules 
 laid down by Aristotle for conducting this 
 process were eroneous. 
 
 But if Bacon did design to teach a new 
 mode of reasoning, he has signally failed of 
 
164 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his purpose ; for we have shown that the 
 syllogism is the process which must take 
 place in all correct reasoning; and we will 
 now proceed to show that Induction is a very 
 different process, and not a process of reason- 
 ing at all. What is Induction ? It may be 
 defined, a process of investigation and of 
 collecting facts and phenomena, either with 
 or without a view, to establish some general 
 principle already suggested to the mind. It 
 is manifest that the mere investigation and 
 collection of facts and phenomena without a 
 view to establish some general principle al- 
 ready suggested to the mind, is not a reason- 
 ing process. It therefore, only remains to 
 examine the other, the investigation and col- 
 lection of facts and phenomena with a view 
 to establish some general principle already 
 suggested to the mind. In this last case, the 
 investigation and collection of facts and phe- 
 nomena, is conducted on the supposition or 
 presumption of the existence of a general 
 principle or law ; and is directed with a view 
 to establish it, by the examination of a suffi- 
 cient number of facts and phenomena. For 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 165 
 
 example : — A naturalist, after seeing for the 
 first time, a duck or any other water-fowl, 
 might be led to infer that all water-fowl have 
 web-feet; and might therefore proceed to 
 search for other water-fowl, until he found the 
 goose, the pelican, the swan, &,c. ; and would 
 then be convinced of the truth of the gene- 
 ral principle, that all water-fowl have web- 
 feet. Now, this is certainly not a process of 
 reasoning; for it/is conducted upon the sup- 
 position or presumption merely, of the exis- 
 tence of the law or general principle, and not 
 upon the absolute certainty of its existence ; 
 rfor it would then not .be investigation, but 
 demonstration or reasoning from known pre- 
 mises, to something taken for granted in those 
 premises, as we have shown reasoning always 
 to be. The inductive process is not governed 
 by .principles of logic, but by principles of 
 evidence. For instance : — In the example 
 above, the naturalist supposed from the fact, 
 that one water-fowl, the duck, has web-feet, 
 that all water-fowl have web-feet. Now, 
 this is evidently a mere supposition from tes- 
 timony not sufficient to convince the natura- 
 
166 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 list; he therefore searches for other water- 
 fowl (other testimony) and finds the goose, 
 the pelican, the swan, &,., and is convinced 
 by this accumulated testimony of the general 
 principle that all water-fowl have web-feet. 
 The mental determination is effected by tes- 
 timony, and not by rules of logic. The con- 
 clusion is not implied in the very conception 
 of the premises, as is always the case in rea- 
 soning ; but it is warranted by the probabili- 
 ties founded in the analogies of nature and 
 in the constitution of the human mind. The 
 inference is founded upon material relations, 
 and not upon logical. The conclusion is 
 probable ; but not necessarily certain, as is 
 always the case in logic ; for logic never 
 proves with any but the highest degree of 
 certainty, the inference being never deduced 
 from probabilities, but necessitated by the 
 very laws of thought. The relation between 
 the premises of an argument and the conclu- 
 sion, is that of reason and consequent ; and 
 the material relations of the objects express- 
 ed by the terms have nothing to do with the 
 inference of the one from the others ; for in 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 167 
 
 reasoning^ the inference is effected; vi termini 
 et rationisy and not vi materiae. And reason- 
 ing always proceeds from a class to a parti- 
 cular; or from a class of greater comprehen- 
 sion; to one of less ; and every class is estab- 
 lished by induction : to make a class then; a 
 prerequisite of induction; as we must do, if 
 we make induction; reasoning; would be ab- 
 surd ; for every induction would then be the 
 result of some previous induction; in infinit- 
 um ; and it would make our highest abstrac- 
 tions or generalisations; the first in order of 
 time in the acquisition of knowledge; which 
 is a psychological doctrine that is repudiated 
 by the whole Baconian philosophy ; as will 
 be seen in the next chapter. 
 
 It is manifest, we think, from this analysis, 
 that induction is the reverse of the syllogism. 
 Induction proceeds from particulars to a class 
 of low degree; and from several classes of a 
 low degree to those of a higher; until we ar- 
 rive at those of the highest degree. On the 
 contrary; syllogism proceeds from classes of 
 the highest degree to those of a lower, and 
 from those of the lowest degree to particulars. 
 
168 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The two together constitute one complete 
 system of precesses by which knowlehge is 
 acquired and perfected. For very often we 
 cannot be satisfied that we have arrived at a 
 correct inductive conclusion or statement of 
 a law of nature, until we make such conclu- 
 sion or law a ground of argument, and show 
 by strict reasoning that the phenomena ob- 
 served are consequences of it. For exam- 
 ple : in reasoning from the law of gravity, 
 we discover, by the application of the gene- 
 ral laws of dynamics, that all the planets must 
 attract each other, and therefore draw each 
 other out of the orbits in which they would 
 have moved, if acted upon by the sun only ; 
 and thus circumstances are discovered by 
 which our general conclusion is strengthened, 
 and which could not have been discovered 
 otherwise, as it required some such conclu- 
 sion which could only be obtained by strict 
 reasoning, to direct attention to such minute 
 inquiries ; and a correct theory is thus ob- 
 tained. This use of reasoning in inductive 
 inquiries will be more particularly explained 
 
THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 169 
 
 in the sequel, when we speak of the appli- 
 cation of mathematics to physical inquiries. 
 
 In further illustration of the nature of in- 
 duction, we will now inquire into the nature 
 of the methods of Analysis and Synthesis. 
 
 We frequently see Analysis called the induc- 
 tive process, and Synthesis called the hypo- 
 thetical process, the process of the ancients. 
 This is very erroneous. Synthesis is just as 
 much of an inductive process as analysis ; and 
 is, in fact, more extensively used by the Ba- 
 conian philosophers than analysis. Analysis 
 and synthesis are terms derived from the an- 
 cient Greek geometricians ; and are of quite a 
 different nature in the mathematics from what 
 they are in the other sciences. In mathemat- 
 ics synthesis is just the reverse of analysis ; 
 but it is not so in. the sciences of contingent 
 truth. In these, analysis is the process of in- 
 vestigation by observation and experiment; 
 and synthesis is the process of explaining 
 other phenomena^ by means of the general 
 fact or law ascertained by analysis. Synthe- 
 sis is just as much of a process of investiga- 
 tion as analysis; and is more frequently used 
 
170 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 
 
 as such. For we are frequently led to an in- 
 ference analytically, without our induction of 
 facts being sufficiently extensive to satisfy us ; 
 we therefore bring to our aid synthetically 
 facts which we had not before examined. 
 At the time we are explaining facts syntheti- 
 cally we are establishing the inference which 
 we derived analytically; because if the infe- 
 rence will explain the facts; the facts will, .of 
 course,, support the inference. Analysis and 
 synthesis are, therefore, both processes of in- 
 duction ; for by both of them we enlarge the 
 number of our facts. Indeed, most of the dis- 
 coveries in the inductive philosophy have 
 been made chiefly by synthesis. The phe- 
 nomenon of the rainbow was explained by it. 
 Sir Isaac Newton, by experiment with the 
 prysmatic spectrum, discovered that light is 
 composed of seven rays, of different colours, 
 and of different degrees of refrangibility. By 
 this fact, thus analytically established, he ex- 
 plained the phenomenon of the rainbow syn- 
 thetically ; and the phenomenon thus explain- 
 ed, establishes the fact that light is composed 
 of seven rays of different colours and differ- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 171 
 
 ent degrees of refrangibility. The phenom- 
 enon of the rainbow could never have been 
 explained analytically. We might have look- 
 ed at it forever, and would still be unable to 
 explain its cause from mere observation, no 
 matter how minute. The science of astrono- 
 my has been reared chiefly by synthesis. 
 Newton, from an examination of the phenom- 
 ena of motion on the earth, inferred the prin- 
 ciple of gravity, and by the principle of 
 gravity thus analytically ascertained, he ex- 
 plained synthetically the phenomena of the 
 whole solar system. It .would have been 
 impossible ever to have explained these phe- 
 nomena by analysis. In the preface to his 
 Principia, Newton says : "All the difficulty 
 of philosophy seems to consist in this : from 
 the phenomena of motions, to investigate the 
 forces of nature, and then from these forces 
 to demonstrate the other phenomena-; and to 
 this end the general propositions <in the first 
 and second books are directed. In the third 
 book, we give an-example of this, in explana- 
 tion of the system of the world; for, by the 
 propositions, mathematically demonstrated, in 
 
172 THE BACOXIAX PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the first book ; we then derive from the celes- 
 tial phenomena the forces of gravity, with 
 which bodies tend to the sun and the several 
 planets. Then, from these forces, by other 
 propositions, which are also mathematical, 
 we deduce the motions of the planets, the 
 comets, the moon, and the sea. ?? Now, this 
 is an outline of the method of investigation 
 pursued in the Principia, given by Newton 
 himself; and we see that synthesis is much 
 more extensively used than analysis. Anal- 
 ysis was employed in the first step of the in- 
 vestigation — u from the phenomena of mo- 
 tions to investigate the forces of nature. * : 
 The demonstration of the other phenomena 
 from these forces is by synthesis, and consti- 
 tutes the great portion of the immortal work. 
 The copy of the Principia which we have be- 
 fore us was edited by that distinguished 
 mathematician Roger Cotes. In his preface 
 to the work, in speaking of those who profess 
 experimental philosophy^ he says : "They 
 therefore proceed in a twofold method, syn- 
 thetical and analytical. From select phenom- 
 ena they deduce, by analysis, the forces of 
 nature, and the more simple laws of forces ; 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. J 73 
 
 and from thence, by synthesis, show the con- 
 stitution of the rest. This is that incompara- 
 bly best way of philosophising which our re- 
 nowned author most justly embraced before 
 the rest, and thought alone worthy to be cul- 
 tivated and adorned by his excellent labours. 
 Of this he has given us a most illustrious ex- 
 ample, by the explication of the system of the 
 world? most happily deduced from the theo- 
 ry of gravity," We might adduce innumer- 
 able other examples : indeed, we might bring 
 forward the whole of science in illustration of 
 our position, but we have sufficiently exem- 
 plified it; for, after showing that the greatest 
 monument of which the inductive philosophy 
 can boast was reared chiefly by synthesis— 
 that much the largest induction of facts was 
 made by this process, it is unnecessary to 
 dwell longer on examples. Perhaps it may 
 be objected to this last example that we are 
 confounding, by citing it, the distinction 
 which we have made between synthesis and 
 analysis in the mathematics and the sciences 
 of contingent truth. A little reflection will 
 
 remove this objection. 
 15* 
 
174 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The application of mathematics to the sci- 
 ences of contingent truth, does not take them 
 out of the pale of induction; because the 
 whole object of such application is to explain 
 the phenomena, by comparing the results of 
 the demonstrations from the assumed data 
 with observed facts, and thereby ascertaining 
 from the agreement or disagreement of the 
 results of the demonstrations with observed 
 facts, whether the data or principle inferred 
 by analysis,, upon which the demonstrations 
 are based, be true or false. An appeal must 
 be made to experience, in every particular 
 instance of the application of mathematics to 
 natural philosophy, to see whether the results 
 of the demonstration correspond with observ- 
 ed phenomena, no matter how well establish- 
 ed the general principles of the particular 
 science may be considered ; for it is in this 
 way only that mathematics gives certainty to 
 theories in natural philosophy, or in other 
 words, strengthens our inductive conclusions ; 
 because until we ascertain that such phenom- 
 ena do exist as the demonstrations show to 
 be necessary consequences of the assumed 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 175 
 
 principle, we cannot be sure of the truth of 
 the principle. For example ; when demon- 
 stration showed that if the principle of grav- 
 ity be true, there must exist certain i nequali- 
 ties and deviations in the motions of the 
 planets, produced by their mutual action upon 
 each other, drawing each other out of the 
 orbits they would have moved in if acted 
 upon only by the sun, we could not be cer- 
 tain of the truth of the principle of gravity 
 until we ascertained that these phenomena 
 did really exist ; and then the principle would 
 explain the phenomena, and the phenomena 
 support the principle, Both the analytical 
 and synthetical processes of induction then., 
 are aided by the application of mathematics. 
 Though, in testing the truth of the conclusion 
 or principle arrived at by the analytical pro- 
 cess of induction by applying mathematics to 
 it, you must assume the truth of the conclu- 
 sion or principle, and then deduce from it, 
 the phenomena from which the conclusion 
 has been inferred. And thus it is apparent, 
 that the analytical process is aided by the ap- 
 plicaton of mathematics, in the very same way 
 
176 'WHE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 that the synthetical process is : for in apply- 
 ing the mathematics to aid the synthetical 
 process, you must assume the truth of the 
 conclusion or principle arrived at by analysis, 
 and deduce from it, the phenomena which 
 you are seeking to explain by that conclusion 
 or principle, and in this way prove the ana- 
 lytical conclusion by these phenomena thus 
 synthetically explained, and show that they 
 belong to the same class with those from 
 which the analytical conclusion was inferred, 
 And both processes will thus result, in prov- 
 ing the general principle inferred in the ana- 
 lytical process. This application of mathe^ 
 matics in aid of the inductive process is spok- 
 en of by Bacon in the ninety six aphorism of 
 the second book of the Novum Organon, 
 where he says (C that mathematics ought rath- 
 er to terminate natural philosophy than to 
 generate or create it. •" 
 
 Let it not, then, be said that analysis is the 
 inductive process, and synthesis the ancient. 
 They are not processes of reasoning; for 
 they both are conducted on the supposition 
 or presumption merely of the existence of a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 177 
 
 law or general principle, and are directed 
 with a view to establish it, by the examina- 
 tion of a sufficient number of facts: and not 
 on the absolute certainty of the existence of 
 the law or principle, which is the case in rea- 
 soning. They are the processes by which we 
 acquire all our knowledge of philosophy ; and 
 the two together constitute what is meant by 
 induction in its largest sense. For example : 
 something suggests a general principle or 
 law; we then try whether it is sustained by 
 other facts, or, which is the same thing, whe- 
 ther it will explain other phenomena of the 
 same kind. The first step is analytical, the last 
 synthetical; and the whole is induction : and 
 the whole series of inductions by which the 
 sciences have been reared, were of this na- 
 ture — conclusions from a few instances prov- 
 ed by trial upon many ; and while we have 
 been explaining the nature of analysis and 
 •synthesis, we have been explaining the na- 
 ture of induction. This view of induction is 
 taken by Bacon himself in the 103 aphorism 
 of the first book of the Novum Organon. 
 Speaking of the mere examination of partic- 
 
178 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ulars, he says, " comparatively insignificant 
 results are to be expected from thence, whilst 
 the more important are to be derived from the 
 new light of axioms, deduced by certain 
 method and rule from the above particulars, 
 and pointing out and defining new particulars 
 in their turn. Our road is not along a plain, 
 but rises and falls-, ascending to axioms, and 
 descending to effects. " it is obvious, that 
 the terms ascending and descending describe 
 what are now called the analytical and syn- 
 thetical processes ; and it would perhaps be 
 better, if the terms analysis and synthesis were 
 banished from the sciences of contingent truth, 
 and the terms ascending induction, and de- 
 scending induction substituted for them, in 
 accordance with the phraseology of Bacon ; 
 because there is not the same difference be- 
 tween the terms analysis and synthesis in the 
 sciences of contingent truth, that there is be- 
 tween them in the mathematics, and the re- 
 tention of them is therefore calculated to mis- 
 lead. As methods of instruction in what is 
 already known, they are the reverse of each 
 other; and so they would be .as methods of 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 179 
 
 investigation in all the branches of natural 
 philosophy to which mathematics can be ap- 
 plied,, if all the phenomena were known, and 
 the mathematics were perfect, so as to render 
 these branches of natural philosophy as much 
 a matter of strict reasoning as geometry. 
 
 As we have shown that induction is carried 
 on ; by principles of evidence and not by 
 principles of logic, we will offer some reflec- 
 tions upon philosophical evidence; and de- 
 velop induction further than Bacon did, and 
 give it a more systematic form. 
 
 We frequently see Analogy spoken of in 
 the best writers as a fallacious sort of evi- 
 dence, that ought not to be admitted into the 
 inductive philosophy. This is very errone- 
 ous ; for analogy is true inductive evidence. 
 What we mean by inductive evidence, is evi- 
 dence founded in the constitution of nature — 
 real evidence, as opposed to mere hypothesis. 
 And what we mean by evidence, is whatever 
 is clothed by nature with the power of pro- 
 ducing conviction in our minds, when it is 
 fully apprehended, even in spite of ourselves. 
 As to the first point, that analogy has a real 
 
180 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 foundation in nature, no one can object ; for 
 we can trace it every where. And as to the 
 other point, whether it is clothed by nature 
 with power to produce conviction in our 
 minds solid enough to be the foundation of 
 sound inductive inferences, we think there 
 will be as little objection, after diligent inqui- 
 ry into the matter. The conviction produced 
 by analogy between facts or phenomena, has 
 the very same foundation that the conviction 
 of the existence of the most familiar object 
 has. They are both founded in our mental 
 constitution, on what is called by metaphy- 
 sicians, fundamental laws of belief. If we 
 see an object we cannot but believe in its 
 existence: so if we perceive an analogy be- 
 tween phenomena, we cannot but believe 
 that they are produced by a similar or com- 
 mon cause. But why the conviction is pro- 
 duced in either case, is not known to us, and 
 never can be in this state of existence. It is 
 beyond the boundaries of philosophy. Hav- 
 ing laid this foundation, .we will now proceed 
 to show the importance of analogical evi- 
 dence, and also to exhibit its nature, and: 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 181 
 
 finally, to indicate the general principle by 
 which our estimate of its force is to be regu- 
 lated. 
 
 There is no science whatever in which an- 
 alogical evidence is not of great importance. 
 In medicine, a remedy is frequently sugges- 
 ted in one disease, from its having been effi- 
 cacious in an analogous disease. In anatomy 
 also, it is of much importance. One of the 
 noblest monuments of human reason is the 
 osteology of Baron Couvier; and this has 
 been reared almost exclusively upon analogy. 
 In moral science also, it has its monuments. 
 The ablest defence of Christianity that has 
 ever been submitted to the world, is founded 
 altogether upon analogy. We mean the work 
 of Bishop Butler — a work that has done more 
 to make plain the ways of providence in the 
 moral economy of the world, than almost any 
 other human production. This work alone 
 is sufficient to entitle analogy to the character 
 of admissible evidence in philosophy ; for if 
 it be admissible in one science, it must be ad- 
 missible in all, as it must have the same rela- 
 tive strength in all. But we will not confine 
 16 
 
182 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ourselves to general propositions : but will 
 select instances in which analogical evidence 
 has been the foundation of discoveries in na- 
 tural philosophy, as the best mode of enforc- 
 ing our views. 
 
 The conjecture of Newton that the dia- 
 mond is a combustible body, which has been 
 always thought to evince such marvellous sa- 
 gacity, was founded upon the analogy of its 
 effects upon light, to those of other combus- 
 tible substances. Kepler having ascertained 
 the orbit of Mars about the sun to be an el- 
 lipse, having the sun in one of its foci, the 
 same law was immediately extended by anal- 
 ogy to all the planets ; and was found in time 
 to hold good in the case of each : and when 
 Jupiter's disc and satellites were afterwards 
 discovered by Galileo, the same law was im- 
 mediately extended by analogy, to this mini- 
 ature system, and found to hold good : and the 
 law was thus found to depend on the nature 
 of planetary motion. All of which has since 
 been mathematically demonstrated by New- 
 ton. Here, then, are conclusions from anal- 
 ogy in reference to the most difficult subjects., 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. ]83 
 
 demonstrated to be correct by the most rigid 
 application of mathematics ; and the conjec- 
 ture of Newton about the nature of the dia- 
 mond, has been proved to be correct by mod- 
 ern chemistry. But perhaps the most beau- 
 tiful instance of the use of analogical evi- 
 dence, within the whole range of natural sci- 
 ence, is to be found in the theory of dew by 
 Dr. Wells. It is selected by Sir J. W. F. 
 Herschel, "as one of the most beautiful spe- 
 cimens of inductive experimental inquiry. " 
 And as be has selected it as an example of 
 inductive search without regard to the kind of 
 evidence on which it rests, we will select it 
 as an example of inductive search, conducted 
 upon analogical evidence, and will give it in 
 the words of Herschel : "Let us now exem- 
 plify this inductive search for a cause, by one 
 general example : suppose dew were the 
 phenomenon proposed, whose cause we would 
 know. In the first place, we must separate 
 dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and 
 limit the application of the term to what is 
 really meant, which is, the spontaneous ap- 
 pearance of moisture on substances exposed 
 
1'84 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in the open air^ when no rain or visible wet 
 is falling. JNfow here we have analogous 
 phenomena in the moisture which bedews a 
 cold metal or stone, when we breathe upon 
 it.; that which appears on a glass of water 
 fresh from the well in warm weather ; that 
 which appears on the inside of windows, 
 when sudden rain or hail chills the external 
 air ; that which runs down our walls, when, 
 after a long frost, a warm moist thaw comes 
 on : all these instances agree in one point, the 
 coldness of the object dewed, in comparison 
 with the air in contact with it. But in the 
 case of the night dew, is this a real cause ? 
 is it a fact that the object dewed, is colder 
 than the air ? Certainly not, one would at 
 first be inclined to say; for what is to make 
 it so ? But the analogies are cogent and u- 
 nanimous ; and therefore we are not to dis- 
 card their indications ; and besides, the ex- 
 periment is easy : we have only to lay a ther- 
 mometer in contact with the dewed substance, 
 and hang one a little distance above it, out of 
 reach of its influence. The experiment has 
 therefore been made ; the question has been 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 185 
 
 asked, and the answer has invariably been in 
 the affirmative. Whenever an object contracts 
 dew ; it is colder than the air, &,a" We 
 here se^e inferences founded on analogy 5 prov- 
 ed by actual experiment. If the example 
 had been written with a view to the object for 
 which we have selected it, the language could 
 not have been more expressive of our doc- 
 trine — could not point out the analogies more 
 distinctly. This fact gives great force to it, 
 as an illustration of the use of analogical evi- 
 dence in philosophical inquiries. But why 
 need we dwell on minor examples, when in 
 fact, it was analogical evidence which led 
 Newton to break through the fetters of the 
 dogma, of the ancients, that the celestial phe- 
 nomena are in their nature and laws different 
 from the terrestrial, and to connect the phy- 
 sics of the earth with that of the heavens, 
 and to identify their laws. He discovered an 
 analogy between the motions of a bomb shot 
 from a cannon and the motions of the moon, 
 and was thus led to infer that their motions 
 were produced by the same cause, and regu- 
 lated by the same laws ; and from the anal- 
 16* 
 
186 ' THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ogy between the earth and the other planets, 
 he concluded that the motions of their satel- 
 lites were produced by the same cause that 
 those of the moon were ; and, finally, the ana- 
 logy between the motions of the earth and of 
 the other planets around the sun, and the mo- 
 tions of the moon around the earth, led him 
 to infer that their motions were produced by 
 the same cause; and the application of geom- 
 etry, enabled him to verify these inferences. 
 Thus we see, then, that it was by an induc- 
 tion founded upon analogies, that the law of 
 gravity was established. 
 
 It is very important, then, as these exam- 
 ples show., to have a number of analogous in- 
 stances, which class themselves with the one 
 under consideration : because the explanation 
 of one of them will be apt to lead to that of 
 all the others. We may also perceive analo- 
 gies between different sciences, and trace 
 them until they terminate in some common 
 phenomenon, more general than that which 
 is the subject of either of them, and thus ar- 
 rive at their common cause. This has been 
 the case with electricity, magnetism and gal- 
 
THE BACONIAN FH&LOSOPHT. 
 
 187 
 
 vanism, for they have been discovered to be 
 the same, or rather, the two last are particu- 
 lar instances of the first, by examining their 
 analogies; and it is very probable from the 
 strong analogies existing between the phe- 
 nomena of light and sound; that they will at 
 last be discovered to originate in a common 
 cause, vibratory motion. 
 
 But we need not dwell longer on particu- 
 lar examples; for the truth is, all the evidence 
 on which the inductive process is conducted., 
 may be divided into analogy and identity, 
 though of course, subordinate divisions may 
 be made of these. For example : a child 
 that has been burnt by the flame of a candle, 
 will expect the same effect from the same 
 cause — to be burnt by the same candle. This 
 expectation is founded upon identity of evi- 
 dence. But when the child expects the same 
 effect, from a similar cause, as for instance, 
 to be burnt by the flame of another candle 
 (though this may almost be called the same 
 cause,) or by the flame of wood, or gas, 
 or by every flame, the expectation is founded 
 upon analogy. Whenever the inference is 
 
188 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from same to same, it is founded upon identi- 
 ty ; and whenever it is from like to like, how- 
 ever great the likeness, it is founded upon ana- 
 logy. We see then, that Induction beginning 
 with the simplest classifications is founded up- 
 on analogy. As long as the- subject of inves- 
 tigation is merely probable, no matter how 
 great the probability, the process is founded 
 upon analogy. For example : — in the case of 
 the theory of dew, which we cited, the whole 
 process was founded upon analogy, until it 
 was ascertained by experiment with the ther- 
 mometer, that cold was the cause. And so 
 in every other science, we must proceed upon 
 analogous instances,, until we arrive at a com- 
 mon cause : and it has been done in every 
 science from astronomy to chemistry. By 
 analogy, the philosopher can push his enqui- 
 ries to the utmost verge of reasonable sup- 
 position. For example: we can with great 
 probability infer that those stars, which have 
 disappeared from the firmament, have been 
 consumed by fire, from the analogy of the 
 appearances exhibited by them to a great con- 
 flagration. The stars at first appeared of a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 189 
 
 dazzling white, then of a reddish yellow, and 
 lastly of an ashy paleness until their light ex- 
 pired. "As to those stars " says La Place 
 u which suddenly shine forth with a vivid 
 light, and then immediately disappear, it is 
 extremely probable, that great conflagrations 
 produced by extraordinary causes take place 
 on their surface. This conjecture is con- 
 firmed by their change of colour, which is 
 analogous to that presented to us on the earth, 
 by those bodies, which are set on fire, and 
 then gradually extinguished. " The analo- 
 gies, are the harmony of the universe — the 
 real music of the spheres. 
 
 Philosophical analogy is frequently con- 
 founded by logicians as well as by the gener- 
 al writer, with rhetorical analogy : but they 
 are* quite different. Philosophical analogy 
 consists in any resemblance between phenom- 
 ena, less than identity ; as in all the examples 
 which we have given. But analogy in rhe- 
 toric is a mere fanciful resemblance discover- 
 ed by the imagination ; and is used for mere 
 illustration or ornament. For example : 
 u the angry ocean, the howling winds. ' ? 
 
190 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Here, the stormy state of the ocean is liken- 
 ed to the anger of man ; and the noise of the 
 winds, to the howling of a beast. Now man 
 is naturally angry ; but the ocean is only met- 
 aphorically so ; and the beast naturally howls, 
 but the winds, only metaphorically. The 
 first is founded in nature, the latter, in fancy. 
 So in Shakspeare's beautiful description of 
 concealed love — 
 
 "She never told her love, 
 But let concealment, like a worm in the bud, 
 Feed on her damask .cheek. 5 ' 
 
 That the worm feeds on the bad, is a fact 
 in nature, that concealed love feeds on the 
 cheek, is a fact in fancy. So in Bacon, — 
 "But if it (the mind of man) work upon 
 itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it 
 is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs 
 of learning admirable for the fineness of 
 thread and work, but of no substance or 
 profit." That the spider makes a web is a 
 fact founded in nature ; that the mind of 
 man makes one is a fact in fancy. In these 
 examples, it is easy to discern, that the analo- 
 gy is purely rhetorical, and is used merely for 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY". 191 
 
 illustration and ornament. But there are in- 
 numerable instances in the best writers where 
 rhetorical analogy is used as the foundation 
 of inductive inference, thus confounding it 
 with philosophical analogy. For example 
 Dr. Johnson in one of his reported conver- 
 sations, talking of the want of memory, said, 
 u No sir, it is not true : in general every per- 
 son has an equal capacity for reminiscence, 
 and for one thing as well as another; other- 
 wise it would be like a person complain- 
 ing that he could hold silver in his hand, but 
 could not hold copper." It is very obvious 
 that this is not an argument, as was supposed 
 by the great talker. There is no philosophi- 
 cal analogy between the capacities of the 
 mind and those of the hand — between the 
 power of reminiscence, and the power to 
 hold silver. The two instances cannot be 
 brought under the same general principle or 
 major proposition ; there being no analogy 
 between them on which an inductive infers 
 ence, can be founded — and consequently, no 
 argumentative conclusion can be drawn from 
 the one to the other. The mind and the phy- 
 
192 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sical powers belong to two different classes of 
 being. Could the inductive philosopher ever 
 draw the inference that he could remember 
 one thing as well as another, from the fact 
 that he could hold in his hand, copper as 
 well as silver ? What analogy is there be- 
 tween the two powers ? Certainly, none, but 
 such as rhetoric may employ by way of illus- 
 tration and ornament. On another occasion, 
 the same individual used the following re- 
 mark, u No, Sir,. people are not born with 
 genius for particular employments or studies ; 
 for it would be Mke saying, that a man could 
 see a great w T ay east, but could not west." 
 This example is just like the other, and its 
 fallacy may be more clearly seen, by putting 
 the last part of the sentence, first. Thus : 
 U A man can see just as well east as he can 
 west, therefore he has as much genius for one 
 study as another." Here the conclusion does 
 not follow from the premises; because there 
 is no analogy between the capacity of the 
 mind and the power of the eyes, upon which 
 the inductive inference can be founded, which 
 constitutes the major premiss viz: " every 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 193 
 
 being that can see as well east, as it can west, 
 has as much capacity for one study as anoth- 
 er." Then, the minor premiss would be, 
 " A man can see as well east as he can west ; " 
 and then the conclusion would follow, "There- 
 fore, he has as much capacity for one study 
 as another." It really appears like trifling, 
 to expose such gross fallacies. But from the 
 fact that the greatest minds are deluded by 
 them, it is necessary to analyze them, and ex- 
 hibit the nature of the error on which they 
 are founded. But the most extraordinary 
 instance of the confounding rhetorical ana- 
 logy with philosophical analogy occurs in 
 Bacon's Advancement of Learning and in the 
 De Augmentis ; and it shows how very de- 
 lusive are such fanciful analogies. Bacon 
 has absolutely based a department of philoso- 
 phy upon them : or at least every instance 
 which he has cited as an example of the sub- 
 ject matter of this department of philosophy, 
 is tainted with the error which we are expos- 
 ing. He tells us there are some principles 
 which are not peculiar to one science, but are 
 
 common to several ; and the department of 
 17 
 
194 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy which embraces these principles^ 
 he calls Philosophia Prima, primitive or sum- 
 mary philosophy. We will cite only one ex- 
 ample : An infectious disease is more likely 
 to be communicated while it is in progress, 
 than when it has reached its height. This 
 he says is a principle in medicine; and that 
 it is also a principle in morals; for that the 
 example of very abandoned men injures pub- 
 lic morality less than the example of men 
 whose good qualities have not all been extin- 
 guished by vice. The resemblance here is 
 purely fanciful, too obviously so, to need 
 illustration after what has been said about the 
 examples above. The most remarkable fact 
 about this error of Bacon, is, that at the very 
 time he cited these examples of his Prima 
 Philosophia, he had in his mind the distinction 
 which we are exhibiting, though he certain- 
 ly could not have had a very distinct appre- 
 hension of it. For he makes this remark in 
 regard to the examples : " Neither are these 
 only similitudes, as men of narrow observa- 
 tion may conceive them to be, but the same 
 footsteps of nature treading or printing upon 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 195 
 
 several subjects or matters," They most un- 
 doubtedly are " only similitudes" and not 
 analogies upon which inductive inferences 
 can be based. And what is still more re- 
 markable, in the fifty-fifth aphorism of the 
 -first book of the Novum Organoid he has 
 mentioned as a source of error, the tendency 
 in some minds, to u compare even the most 
 delicate and general resemblances; " and that 
 such minds, " readily fall into excess, by 
 catching at shadows of resemblance." These 
 facts in relation to Bacon show the delusive 
 nature of these fanciful analogies, and that 
 though we may have a general notion of them 
 still we may be deceived in particular instan- 
 ces of even the most marked character. 
 
 One of the most beautiful illustrations of 
 the difference between philosophical and rhe- 
 torical analogy is given by Mr. Burke in his 
 letters on a regicide peace: "I am not of 
 the mind of those speculators, who seem as- 
 sured that all Sates have the same periods of 
 infancy, manhood and decrepitude that are 
 found in individuals. Parallels of this sort 
 rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or 
 
196 
 
 THE .BACONIAN. PHILOSOPHY 
 
 adorn, than to supply analogies from which 
 to reason. Individuals are physical beings — 
 commonwealths are not physical but moral 
 essences." And the same distinction is well 
 expressed by Darwin in the preface to his 
 Zoonomia : "The great creator of all things 
 has infinitely diversified the works of his 
 hands, but has at the same time stamped a 
 certain similitude on the features of nature, 
 that demonstrates to us, that they are one 
 family of one parent. On this similitude is 
 founded all rational analogy ; which so long 
 as it is concerned in comparing the essential 
 properties of bodies, leads us to many and 
 important discoveries : but when with licen- 
 tious activity it links together objects other- 
 wise discordant, by some fanciful similitude, 
 it may indeed collect ornaments for wit and 
 poetry, but philosophy and truth recoil from 
 its combinations.' 5 On rhetorical analogy, is 
 founded most of the beautiful flowers of 
 speech, which under the magic influence of 
 genius, spring up on the most sterile subjects 
 to beautify and adorn them : but it never can 
 be made the foundation of inductive inference. 
 
THE BACONIAN rillLOSOPHY. 197 
 
 It is from the nature of rhetorical analogy, 
 that men have, in a great measure, formed 
 their opinions of the force of analogical evi- 
 dence in philosophy. It is highly important 
 therefore, to distinguish between them. 
 
 Some have confined analogy to the resem- 
 blance of relations, both in philosophy and 
 rhetoric. But this is unphilosophical and 
 exceedingly inconvenient in practice ; multi- 
 plying distinctions which cannot be kept up, 
 by even the greatest degree of caution. In 
 philosophy, every rational resemblance less 
 than identity, is analogy ; and so in rhetor- 
 ic, every fanciful resemblance is analogy. In 
 rhetoric, however, the analogy is always be- 
 tween individuals of different species, and 
 never between individuals of the same class. 
 And it may here be remarked, that it is with 
 rhetorical analogies, and not with philosophi- 
 cal, that wit is conversant: wit belongs to 
 rhetoric, and not to logic. 
 
 From the analysis which we have made 
 of the evidence on which induction is found- 
 ed, the great fundamental principle of philo- 
 sophical evidence is easily evolved. It k 
 
198 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this : that in proportion as the analogy between 
 instances is stronger, our inferences from 
 one to the other are made with more and more 
 confidence ; and in proportion as it is weaker, 
 they are made with less and less confidence. 
 For example : an inference from one indi- 
 vidual to another of the same class, is made 
 with more confidence, than an inference from 
 one species to another. The inferences of 
 the anatomy of the human frame, for instance, 
 are made with far more certainty from the 
 analogies furnished in the dissection of a 
 man, than from those furnished in the dissec- 
 tion of any other animal. This principle 
 bears the same relation to induction, that the 
 Dictum de omni et nullo of Aristotle does to 
 the Syllogism. The dictum of Aristotle 
 points out the connection between the prem- 
 ises and the conclusion of the syllogism, and 
 this points out the connection between the 
 particular instances and the inductive infer- 
 ence. And this principle is commensurate 
 with the whole range of philosophical evi- 
 dence, and embraces all the classes of pre- 
 rogative instances set forth by Bacon in the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 199 
 
 second book of the Novum Organoid and 
 connects them with the inductive inferences 
 to be drawn from them. In its affirmative 
 application it embraces the comparison of in- 
 stances and in its negative application the re- 
 jection of natures. It is also of a very prac- 
 tical character ; as it is applicable to the most 
 general as well as to the most particular 
 cases. And in its negative application, it 
 checks the natural proneness of the human 
 mind to make hasty inductions. We will call 
 this principle, the Dictum secundum magis et 
 minus. 
 
 We have now presented to our readers a 
 general view of logic and the method of in- 
 vestigation, and defined the limits of their 
 respective provinces. 
 
 It has often been disputed whether Aristo- 
 tle understood the inductive process. He 
 certainly did know that there was such a pro- 
 cess ; for he frequently mentions it in his 
 writings. But it is no less certain, that he 
 had no idea of its scope and its great import- 
 ance in philosophical investigations : but 
 thought it of little importance in comparison 
 
200 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with the Syllogism, as he supposed that na- 
 tural philosophy could be discovered by rea- 
 soning from a few general principles, and that 
 therefore, the reasoning process was every 
 thing in philosophical inquiries, and induction 
 confined to very narrow limits ; though, at the 
 same time, it must be admitted, that he had 
 some notion of the necessity of resorting to 
 nature for something like principles ; for as 
 an observer and collector of facts and phe- 
 nomena he greatly surpassed all the philoso- 
 phers of his time. " For in common logic, 
 (says Bacon) almost our whole labour is spent 
 upon the syllogism. The logicians appear 
 scarcely to have thought seriously of induc- 
 tion, passing it over with some slight notice, 
 and hurrying on to the formulae of dispute. 
 But we reject the syllogistic demonstration, as 
 being too confused, and letting nature escape 
 from our hands. For, although nobody can 
 doubt that those things which agree with the 
 middle term agree with each other, (which is 
 a sort of mathematical certainty) neverthe- 
 less, there is this source of error, namely, 
 that a syllogism consists of propositions, pro- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 201 
 
 positions of words, and words are but the 
 tokens and signs of things. If, therefore, the 
 notions of the mind, (which are as it were the 
 soul of words, and the basis of this whole 
 structure and fabric) are badly and hastily ab- 
 stracted from things, and vague, or not suffi- 
 ciently defined, and limited, or, in short, faul- 
 ty (as they may be) in many other respects, 
 the whole falls to the ground. We reject, 
 therefore, the syllogism, and that not only as 
 regards first principles, (to which even the 
 logicians do not apply it,) but also In in- 
 termediate propositions, which the syllogism 
 certainly manages in some way or other to 
 bring out and produce, but then they are bar- 
 ren of effects, unfit for practice, and clearly 
 unsuited to the active branch of the sciences. 
 Although, we would leave therefore to the 
 syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded 
 demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popu- 
 lar and speculative arts, (for here we make 
 no alteration,) yet, in every thing relating to 
 the nature of things, we make use of induc- 
 tion, both for our major and minor proposi- 
 tions. For we consider induction to be that 
 
202 THE BA'CONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 form of demonstration which assists the sen- 
 ses, closes in upon nature, and presses on, and, 
 as it were, mixes itself with action. 
 
 Hence also the order of demonstration is 
 naturally reversed. For at present the mat- 
 ter is so managed, that from the senses and 
 particular objects they immediately fly to the 
 greatest generalities as the axes round which 
 their disputes may revolve ; all the rest is de- 
 duced from them intermediately, by a short 
 way we allow, but an. abrupt one, and impas- 
 sable to nature, though easy and w T ell suited 
 to dispute. But, by our method, axioms are 
 raised up in gradual succession, so that we 
 only at last arrive at generalities. And that 
 which is most generalized, is not merely no- 
 tional, but well defined, and really acknowl- 
 edged by nature as well known to her, and 
 cleaving to t<he very pith of things. 
 
 By far our greatest work, however, lies in 
 the form of induction and the judgment aris- 
 ing from it. For the form of which the logi- 
 cians speak, which proceeds by bare enumer- 
 ation, is puerile, and its conclusions precari- 
 ous, is exposed to danger from one contrarv 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 203' 
 
 example, only considers what is habitual, and 
 leads not to any final result. 
 
 The sciences, on the contrary, require a 
 form of induction capable of explaining and 
 separating experiments, and coming to a cer- 
 tain conclusion by a proper series of rejections 
 and exclusions. J; Not wit!) standing this ex- 
 plicit avowal by Bacon,, that 1 he logicians had 
 some, though a very inadequate notion of in- 
 duction, many have contended that Bacon 
 claimed to be, and that he really was the dis- 
 coverer of the inductive process. But the 
 tact that Bacon was not the first to remark 
 upon the inductive process, does not de- 
 tract in the slightest degree Srom his merit as 
 a philosopher — no more than the fact, that ' 
 Copernicus and Kepler had hinted that the 
 planets were held in their orbits by attraction, 
 detracts from the immortal discoveries of 
 Newton. For though Bacon did not discov- 
 er the inductive process, yet lie was the first 
 to develop its nature as a method of investi- 
 gation, to show its tra.o eenijgnt importance, 
 and to lay down rules for contracting it aright. 
 What other men saw through a glass darkly, 
 
204 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 he saw clearly and confidently. It was he 
 who poured the tide of fire over the fields of 
 knowledge, and withered and consumed the 
 poisonous growth, with which they were 
 overrun, and prepared them for the rich har- 
 vests which have since been cultivated by the 
 illustrious labourers who have followed his 
 directions. When he was born, the temple 
 of false philosophy still stood firm and the 
 priests who ministered at its altars thought it 
 eternal. He was brought up in the false 
 creed, and soon learned all its mysteries : but 
 his gigantic Anglo-saxon mind could not 
 be dwarfed so as to wear the fetters cf the 
 schools. He saw the folly of the miserable 
 * pedantry which was mistaken for profound 
 knowledge; and in the full strength of his 
 convictions, he determined to overthrow the 
 false systems amongst which men had been 
 so long bewildered, and to free the human 
 mind from the bondage of prejudice and can- 
 onized authority. With this view he wrote 
 the Novum Organon; and let the splendid 
 discoveries of modern science attest his suc- 
 
 cess 
 
PART THE SECOND, 
 
 CHAPTER SECOND. 
 
 THE THEORY OF MIND ASSUMED IN THE BA- 
 CONIAN METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 
 
 <c We must guide our steps by a clue, (says 
 Bacon, ) and the whole path , from the very first 
 perceptions of our senses, must be secured 
 by a determined method. " We will endea- 
 vor to fulfil the doctrine set forth in this pro- 
 position ; and therefore, will continue in this 
 chapter to develop the Baconian Method of 
 Investigation, until we trace it up to the first 
 impressions made upon the senses. In order 
 to do this, it will be necessary to inquire into 
 the psychology or theory of mind assumed in 
 the Baconian Method of Investigation, and 
 which the influence of that method upon Eng- 
 lish philosophy has caused to be developed by 
 Locke and Reid. 
 
 As the best mode of effecting this object, we 
 
 will first show the points of contact between 
 
 18 
 
206 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 psychology and logic, and between psycholo- 
 gy and the method of investigation ; and then 
 exhibit an outline of the two great systems of 
 psychology, which have divided the opinions 
 of philosophers, and show their correlative 
 methods of investigation, by developing the 
 points of affiliation and doctrinal identity be- 
 tween them. 
 
 The Creator of all things has established 
 an order, an antecedence and sequence, in the 
 phenomena of the universe of both matter 
 and mind. The object of philosophy is to 
 discover this order, by observing the pheno- 
 mena, tracing their relations, and ascertain- 
 ing the laws which govern them, for the pur- 
 pose of building upon such discoveries, cer- 
 tain practical rules or arts for increasing the 
 power of man. In the world of matter, we 
 investigate the relations of material substan- 
 ces, and their actions either of a mechanical 
 or chemical nature upon each other ; and 
 found upon these relations the mechanical and 
 chemical arts, by which the physical powers 
 of man are so much augmented in his know- 
 ing how to bring bodies into such circum- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 207 
 
 stances as will give rise to their peculiar ac- 
 tions. So in the world of mind, we investi- 
 gate the relations of its phenomena, their an- 
 tecedence and sequence in the order of time, 
 their relations to the world of matter, and 
 their antecedence and sequence in the logical 
 order, an order peculiar to the world of mind, 
 and which has no existence in the world of 
 matter. 
 
 The phenomena of mind may, for the con- 
 venience of this investigation, be divided into 
 two classes,* namely, those which relate to 
 the intelligence — to perception, consciousness, 
 memory, induction and reasoning : and those 
 which relate to the sensibility — to love, joy .> 
 hope, fear, anger, and all the other emotions; 
 and upon the relations of the phenomena of 
 both of these classes are founded certain prac- 
 tical rules or arts. On the first, are founded 
 logic and the method of investigation; and 
 on the latter, are founded, aesthetics and the 
 fine arts. It is with the first class, those 
 
 'Note. — We are well aware that the phenomena of the will constitute a 
 distinet class, but the division which we have made is sufficiently accural* 
 for our purpose. 
 
208 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which relate to the intelligence, that we have 
 to deal in the investigation which we are pur- 
 suing ; as it is amidst them that the connex- 
 ion between psychology and logic, and be- 
 tween psychology and the method of inves- 
 tigation is to be discovered. Psychology by , 
 analyzing the phenomena of reasoning, ex- 
 hibits the fundamental laws of thought, which 
 govern the mental acts in every demonstra- 
 tion : and logic exhibits the illative rules by 
 which the conclusion is evolved out of the 
 premises. This then is the point of contact 
 between psychology and logic, the boundary 
 where the one ends, and the other begins. 
 Psychology also exhibits, by analyzing the 
 phenomena of induction, the fundamental law 
 • of thought which governs the mental deter- 
 mination in every act of belief that the future 
 will be like the past, or that like causes will 
 produce like effects: and the method of in- 
 vestigation exhibits the inductive rules or re- 
 gulative principles by which the general con- 
 clusion is inferred from the particular instan- 
 ces. And this is the point of contact between 
 psychology and the method of investigation. 
 
THE EACOxNIAN PHILOSOPHY. 209 
 
 It is at these points of contact, that psycholo- 
 gy supplies the deficiencies of logic and of the 
 method of investigation — gives light where 
 they give none ; for logic and the method of 
 investigation pre-suppose psychology, and de- 
 pend upon it for their whole strength. 
 
 But psychology penetrates still further into 
 the mysteries of human thought, and as rea- 
 soning and induction assume the truth of the 
 facts attested by sensation, consciousness 
 and memory, it also analyzes their phenome- 
 na, and evolves the fundamental laws of be- 
 lief which govern all our knowledge derived 
 from these sources respectively, and thus as- 
 certains the very elements of human knowl- 
 edge, which admit of no explanation, which 
 borrow no light from any thing antecedent, 
 but are self-luminous; and in this way sup- 
 plies every thing which is assumed as true in 
 logic and the method of investigation. With 
 these preliminary remarks, indicating in a 
 general way the connexion between psychol- 
 ogy and logic, and between psychology and 
 the method of investigation, we will now pro- 
 ceed to exhibit the two great opposite sys- 
 
210 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 
 
 terns of psychology and the correlative meth- 
 ods of investigation. 
 
 The great problem which lies at the thresh- 
 old of every inquiry into the phenomena of 
 the human mind, and gives to every system of 
 psychology its distinctive feature, in the point 
 of view in which we are considering the sub- 
 ject (its connexion with logic and the meth- 
 od of investigation,) is, what is the origin of 
 our ideas, "those simple notions into which 
 our thoughts may be analyzed, and which may 
 be considered as the principles or elements of 
 human knowledge ?" There never have been, 
 and never can be, more than two theories in 
 regard to the solution of this problem. One 
 is the theory of innate ideas, or primitive 
 cognitions which are not the product of the 
 mind's own activity, but are its original fur- 
 niture ; the other, the theory, that all our ideas 
 are founded ultimately in experience, and 
 are acquired through sensation and conscious- 
 ness. These two opposite psychological the- 
 ories are the correlatives of the two opposite 
 methods of investigation, the a priori method, 
 ( which we have shown in the last chapter, to 
 
the Baconian ruiLosorur. 211 
 
 be nothing more than an application of the 
 Aristotelian logic out of its proper sphere,) 
 which makes all absolute verity to depend 
 upon certain innate principles, or elements of 
 knowledge, from which the mind starts and 
 reasons out all science as legitimate deductions 
 from them, in which the series of logical de- 
 ductions will correspond with the series of 
 facts subsisting in nature; and the inductive 
 or Baconian method, which bases all knowl- 
 edge upon experience, and considers princi- 
 ples as mere generalized facts obtained by 
 the observation of particular phenomena. We 
 will first treat ot the theory of innate ideas 
 and then show that it is the psychological 
 correlative of the a priori method of investi- 
 gation. 
 
 The theory of innate ideas has gppeared 
 under different phases ; and more distinctly in 
 the writings of Plato amongst the ancients, 
 and Des Cartes amongst the moderns, than 
 the writings of any other philosophers. Pla- 
 to representing one phasis of this theory, and 
 Des Cartes, the other. Plato held that there 
 are in the soul certain innate ideas which 
 
212 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 form the basis of our conceptions and consti- 
 tute the principles of our knowledge ; and that 
 these innate ideas were in the soul in a prior 
 state of existence^ and are now suggested to 
 the mind ; by individual objects presented to 
 the senses. That the process of acquiring 
 knowledge is mere suggested reminiscence; 
 and the reminiscence is in proportion as the 
 mind becomes acquainted with individual ob- 
 jects. For example : in the dialogue entitled 
 "Phaedon/ 5 he asks, "Is it upon seeing equal 
 trees equal stones and several other things 
 of that kind ; that we form the idea of equality ; 
 which is neither the trees nor the stones, but 
 something abstracted from all these objects ?" 
 And he answers the question thus : " Before 
 we begin to see, feel, or use any of our senses, 
 we must have had the knowledge of this in- 
 tellectual equality ; else we could not be ca- 
 pable of comparing it with the sensible ob- 
 jects, and perceive that they have all a ten- 
 dency towards it, but fall short of its perfec- 
 tion." 
 
 " That is a necessary consequence from the 
 premises." 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 213 
 
 " But is it not certain that immediately after 
 our birth, we saw, we heard and made use 
 of other senses?" 
 
 " Very true." 
 
 a Then it follows that before that time, we 
 had the knowledge of that equality ?" 
 
 u Without doubt." 
 
 " And of course, we were possessed of it 
 before we were born V) 
 
 " I think so." 
 
 ci If we possessed it before we were born, 
 then we knew things before we were born, and 
 immediately after birth ; knew not only what 
 is great, what is small, what is equal, but all 
 other things of that nature." 
 
 " For what we now advance of equality, is 
 equally applicable to goodness, justice, sanc- 
 tity, and in a word to all other things that have 
 a real existence ; so that we must of necessi- 
 ty have known all these things before we came 
 into this world." 
 
 It is manifest from this extract ; that Plato 
 maintained that all our abstract notions are in 
 the mind when we come into this world and 
 are of course, first in the order of acquisition ; 
 
214 
 
 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY". 
 
 and that it is by the light of these notions, or 
 ideas as he called them, that we comprehend 
 what we observe in this world — that it is by 
 the abstract innate idea of equality, that we 
 judge of the instances of equality exhibited 
 in experience ; by the abstract innate idea 
 of goodness, that we judge of the instances 
 of goodness, and so of every other innate 
 idea. Thus maintaining that man has in his 
 mind, an innate standard of truth, with which 
 he can compare every thing, and test its ver- 
 ity. 
 
 We will now exhibit the other phasis of 
 this theory, as taught by Des Cartes. He 
 held that the idea of the infinite, and all other 
 ideas which are particularizations of it, are 
 not acquired ideas, but are innate in the mind, 
 having been communicated to it, or interwo- 
 ven into its very being by the Creator, to be 
 the foundation of all its acquired knowledge, 
 and the guide of its future reasonings. Though 
 he did not maintain that these ideas were 
 always present in the mind : " When I say" 
 (says he) " that an idea is born in us, or that 
 it is naturally imprinted on our souls, I do 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 215 
 
 not mean that it is always present in thought, 
 for this would be contrary to fact ; but only 
 that we have in ourselves the faculty of pro- 
 ducing it." 
 
 It is evident that these doctrines of Plato 
 and Des Cartes are substantially the same, 
 and exhibit only different phases of the the- 
 ory of innate ideas. 
 
 We will now show that the theory of 
 innate ideas is the psychological correlative 
 of the a priori method of investigation, and 
 is the psychology assumed in that method ; 
 and that both Plato and Des Cartes actually 
 adopted and used that method. Thus prov- 
 ing the proposition, both by philosophical 
 analysis and historical fact. 
 
 The least reflection will discover that the 
 a priori method of investigation is the psy- 
 chological correlative of the theory of innate 
 ideas. For if all the principles or elements 
 of our knowledge are an original furniture of 
 the mind, and the most comprehensive princi- 
 ples stand first in the order of time in the mind, 
 are those first developed to the intelligence, 
 (as the theory of innate ideas teaches) — 
 
216 THE BACONIAN rHILSDSOPHY. 
 
 then the only method by which the mind can 
 extend the sphere of its knowledge and build 
 up this knowledge into science, is to combine 
 these principles and deduce from them con- 
 clusions corresponding to the real particulars 
 subsisting in nature; and the chronological 
 and logical order of our knowledge is the 
 same. And it is also clear that the a priori 
 method of investigation assumes the theory 
 of innate ideas or principles ; because if there 
 are no innate principles, or if, in other words, 
 a reason could be given for every truth, no 
 process of deduction (and the a priori method 
 of investigation is the process of deduction 
 or reasoning, as we have shown in the last 
 chapter) could ever have a beginning; for to 
 make reasoning the process of discovering 
 first principles, would be to go on to infinity ; 
 because, in every argument or process of rea- 
 soning, something must be assumed as true, 
 from which our reasonings set out, and on 
 which they ultimately depend. Where then, 
 is the first starting-point to be had, if it be 
 not innate ? It must be innate, or else it is 
 furnished by induction : and if it is furnished 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 217 
 
 by induction, the a priori method of investi- 
 gation can have no existence : but is in reali- 
 ty, what it was in the hands of Aristotle, 
 (who did not believe in innate principles, 
 but, that they are ascertained by induction,*) 
 nothing more than reasoning from principles 
 formed from a hasty or imperfect induction. 
 It is evident then that the a priori method of 
 investigation assumes the theory of innate 
 ideas or principles — requires them for its 
 starting-points; and thus is developed the 
 point of affiliation and doctrinal identity be- 
 tween them. 
 
 It is thus manifest from philosophical ana- 
 
 *\ote. — It may perhaps be enquired, why it is, that Aristotle, who main- 
 tained the theory of mind enunciated in the principle nihil intellectu. quod non 
 prius in sensu, yet maintained the a priori method of investigation. It is clear, 
 that Aristotle, is either inconsistent with himself, or that he meant by this doc- 
 trine, merely that sensation must precede all knowledge. But there are doctrines 
 setforth in his writings upon the point under consideration, which it is diffi- 
 cult to reconcile, and which show that his opinions were not very definite. 
 It is certain however, that he did not, like Plato, maintain that there are cer- 
 tain innate ideas in the mind, independent of the mind's activity, but seems to 
 have maintained the doctrine ascribed to him on the 149 — 50 pages of this dis- 
 course, which to a great extent is an a priori theory much like that of Kant, 
 and consequently, so far as it is an a priori theory, is consistent with his method 
 of investigation. But let it be borne in mind, that our object in this part of 
 our discourse, is not to show, that all who maintain the a priori method of in- 
 vestigation, also maintain the doctrine of innate ideas, but to show, that, that 
 method necessarily assumes this false doctrine for its basis, and is therefore fal- 
 lacious itself. 
 
 19 
 
218 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lysis of the theory of innate ideas, and of the 
 a priori method of investigation, that they 
 are psychological correlatives. We will next 
 show, that they are correlatives in the history 
 of philosophy also — that they are historically, 
 as well as philosophically related — that Plato 
 and Des Cartes adopted and used the a priori 
 method of investigation, as well as maintain- 
 ed the doctrine of innate ideas. 
 
 In the Phaedon, the same treatise from 
 which we extracted the remarks relative to in- 
 nate ideas, and the one in which Plato gives, 
 though in an incidental way, his peculiar psy- 
 chology, we have also a delineation of Plato's 
 method of investigation ; though this is given 
 in an incidental way too ; for in investigating 
 the subject of the treatise, the immortality of 
 the soul, he had to use both his psychologi- 
 cal theory and his method of investigation. 
 
 " Have seeing and hearing, " says Plato, 
 "any thing of truth in them, and is their tes- 
 timony faithful ? Or are the poets in the 
 right in saying that we neither see nor hear 
 things truly ? For if these two senses of 
 seeing and hearing are not trustworthy, the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. . 219 
 
 others which are much weaker, will be far 
 less such. Is it not by reasoning that the 
 soul embraces truth ? And does it not reason 
 better than before, when it is not encumber- 
 ed by seeing and hearing, pain or pleasure ? 
 When, shut up within itself, it bids adieu to 
 the body, and entertains as little correspon- 
 dence with it as possible ; and pursues the 
 knowledge of things without touching them. 
 Now the simplest and purest way of examin- 
 ing things, is to pursue every particular 
 thought alone, without offering to support 
 our meditations by seeing or hearing, or 
 backing our reason by any other corporeal 
 sense ; by employing the naked thougfit with- 
 out any mixture, and so endeavouring to trace 
 the pure and general essence of things with- 
 out the ministry of the eyes or ears : the 
 soul being, if I may so speak, entirely disen- 
 gaged from the whole mass of the body, 
 which only encumbers the soul, and cramps 
 it in the quest of wisdom and truth, as often 
 as it is admitted to the least correspondence 
 with it. If the essence of things be ever 
 known, must it not be known in the manner 
 
220 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 above mentioned ?" Plato exhibits his meth- 
 od of investigation still more clearly in the 
 following remarks extracted from the same 
 treatise : — u After I had wearied myself in 
 examining all things, I thought it my duty to 
 be cautious of avoiding w T hat happens to those 
 who contemplate an eclipse of the sun ; for 
 they lose the sight by it, unless they be care- 
 ful to view its reflections in water or some 
 other medium. A thought much like to that 
 came into my head, and I feared I should lose 
 the eyes of my' mind, if I viewed objects 
 with the eyes of my body, or employed any 
 of my senses in endeavoring to know them. 
 I thought I should have recourse to reason, 
 and contemplate the truth of all things as re- 
 flected from it. It is possible the simile I use 
 in explaining myself is not very just : for I 
 cannot affirm that he who beholds things in 
 the glass of reason, sees them more by reflec- 
 tion and similitude than he who beholds them 
 in their operations. However, the way I fol- 
 lowed, was this ; from that time forward I 
 grounded all upon the reason that seemed 
 the best, and took all for truth, that I found 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 221 
 
 conformable to it, whether in effects or causes ; 
 and what was not conformable I rejected, as 
 being false. " 
 
 In these extracts we see that Plato held 
 that u it is by reasoning that the soul em- 
 braces truth, " and that the mind has the 
 light of all truth within itself, and all the 
 material within itself, upon which to exert 
 the reasoning process ; and that it does not 
 stand in need of the ministry of the senses 
 to gain any information — in a word, that all 
 philosophy is built up by reasoning from or 
 upon innate ideas; for that all the phenomena 
 in nature are but copies of these innate ideas, 
 and are known to the mind, only by compar- 
 ing them with these innate ideas and observ- 
 ing their resemblance to them as their types 
 and models. 
 
 That the a priori method of investigation 
 was c that used by Des Cartes also, is clearly 
 manifested in his writings. He founded all 
 knowledge upon a logical basis — upon de- 
 monstration ; and considered that the object 
 of philosophy is to deduce by reasoning from 
 
 first causes, rules for the conduct of life and 
 19* 
 
222 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 for the various arts. " It is clear/ 5 says he, 
 " that we shall follow the best method in phi- 
 losophy if from our knowledge of the deity 
 himself, we endeavour to deduce an explica- 
 tion of all his works ; that so we may ac- 
 quire' the most perfect kind of science, which 
 is that of effects from their causes." In ac- 
 cordance with this view of the method of in- 
 vestigation to be used in physical science, is 
 his theory of the mind; for he maintains that 
 the idea of God, which he makes the start- 
 ing-point in natural philosophy, is innate in 
 the mind. - Thus basing natural philosophy 
 in psychology, and making it necessary to es- 
 tablish the foundation of psychological truths 
 before certainty can be attained in physical 
 truth. In order then to establish the founda- 
 tion of 'psychological truth, he makes doubt 
 the foundation of certainty and the starting- 
 point in, human knowledge. "It is not to- 
 day," says he, " for the first time that I have 
 perceived in myself that, from my earliest 
 years, 1 have received a great many false 
 opinions as true, and that what I have built 
 upon principles so badly ascertained, can be 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 223 
 
 only very doubtful and uncertain. And ac- 
 cordingly, I have decidedly judged that I 
 must sincerely undertake some time in my 
 life to rid myself of all the opinions I had be- 
 fore taken upon trust, and begin altogether 
 anew from the foundation, if I would estab- 
 lish any thing firm and constant in science. 55 
 Rejecting then, the knowledge of every 
 thing, and plunging into absolute skepticism, 
 he sets about to prove his own existence, as 
 the first problem in knowledge ; and does it 
 by this argument: — "I think, therefore I 
 exist. 55 Satisfied, that by this argument and 
 the application of the principle contained in 
 it, he had proved the reality of every thing 
 revealed in consciousness — the reality of his 
 own existence, his own thoughts, passions, 
 &c, his next difficulty was to pass out of the 
 sphere of consciousness, and prove the reality 
 of things external to himself. In ofder to do 
 this, he must find some fact revealed in con- 
 sciousness, (whose phenomena he .had proved 
 to be worthy of credit) as the starting-point 
 of the argument. This fact is the idea of a 
 supremely perfect being, which he finds in 
 
224 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 his mind. He concluded, that as the mind 
 of man is finite, it could not have produc- 
 ed by its own activity, this idea of the infi- 
 nite i but that this idea must have some real 
 object corresponding to it — which object is 
 God — or in other words, that the idea of the 
 absolute and infinite must have, from their 
 very nature, a real object subsisting in time, 
 corresponding to it. " If we carefully exam- 
 ine/' says he, " whether existence belongs to 
 a being supremely powerful, and what sort of 
 existence, we shall find ourselves able clearly 
 and distinctly to know, first, at least, possible 
 existence agrees with him, as well as with all 
 other things of which we have in ourselves 
 any distinct idea, even those which are com- 
 posed of fictions of our own mind : and next, 
 because, we cannot think existence is possi- 
 ble, without knowing at the same time — 
 keeping in mind his infinite power — that he 
 can exist by his own force, we conclude that 
 he really exists, and that he has been from all 
 eternity ; for it is very evident from the light 
 of nature, that that which exists by its own 
 force, exists always ; and thus we shall know 
 
THE BACONIAN P1IIL0S0PIIV. 225 
 
 that necessary existence is contained in the 
 idea of a supremely powerful being, not by a 
 fiction of the understanding, but because it 
 belongs to the true and immutable nature of 
 such a being to exist ; and it will be easy for 
 us to know that it is impossible for this su- 
 premely powerful being not to have in him- 
 self all other perfections that are contained 
 in the idea of God, in such sort, that, of their 
 own proper nature and without any fiction of 
 the understanding, they are always joined 
 together and exist in God." By this ar- 
 gument Des Cartes satisfied himself, that the 
 existence of a God is proved from the exis- 
 tence of the idea of such a being in the mind, 
 and that thus the existence of an external re- 
 ality is proved — that the boundary of con- 
 sciousness is passed, and two orders of ideas 
 are established : viz : himself, and the extern- 
 al reality ; the proof of himself, resting upon 
 his methodical doubt, "I think, therefore I ex- 
 ist," and the proof of the existence of the ex- 
 ternal reality, resting upon an idea corres- 
 ponding to it in his mind. Returning again 
 into consciousness, he finds there, the idea of 
 
226 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thought, and the idea of extension, under 
 one or the other of which, he maintained, 
 are embraced all other ideas ; and as these 
 ideas are radically distinct, he concluded that 
 the substances of which they are respectively 
 the attributes are distinct also. The world, 
 then, is composed of two classes of beings, 
 spirit and matter, they being the substances of 
 which thought and extension are the essen- 
 tial attributes. But the question occurs to 
 him, how does he know the reality of matter ? 
 And he solved it thus : Because he has a 
 natural impulse to believe in the objects of 
 his sensations, and God, whose existence he 
 has proved, being perfect in his nature, has 
 guarantied the truth ot their testimony. 
 Here then, is the starting-point in natural 
 philosophy — God and matter. And as mat- 
 ter and motion are, to his apprehension, the 
 only phenomena in the physical world, in ac- 
 cordance with his doctrine just now proved, 
 that the most perfect kind of science is that 
 of effects deduced from their causes, he says, 
 " give me matter and motion and I will ex- 
 plain the universe :" and he accordingly ex- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 
 
 plains all material phenomena by the applica- 
 tion of mechanics based upon geometry, ma- 
 king God the prime mover of the universe, 
 and the cause of all material phenomena. 
 
 In this analysis of the Cartesian philoso- 
 phy, in which we have endeavored to present 
 the fundamental conceptions of that philoso- 
 phy in their true relations and logical order, 
 without any reference to the order in which 
 they stand in the writings of Des Cartes, it is 
 evident that the method is a priori — that it 
 begins with an argument at all its salient 
 points — that psychology is made the founda- 
 tion of every truth, and that the very first 
 truth in this is established by an argument. 
 
 And what a miserable tissue of sophistry 
 is the whole pretended argument; resting, 
 as it and every other a priori argument must, 
 upon mere assumptions mistaken for innate 
 ideas or principles. The theory of innate 
 ideas and the a priori method of investiga- 
 tion are correlative systems of error. Each 
 is necessary to support the other. And they 
 have been the great fountains from which 
 have flowed copious streams of error into 
 
228 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 every department of human knowledge. For 
 psychology is the foundation of all human 
 knowledge — is the centre around which every 
 science revolves — is the light in which all 
 other sciences are seen ; and in proportion as 
 this light is true or false, is the correctness of 
 all our opinions upon the great subjects of 
 human thought. 
 
 Having now established the point, both by 
 philosophical analysis and historical fact, that 
 the theory of innate ideas and the a priori 
 method of investigation have a logical affinity 
 and a doctrinal identity, and are consequent- 
 ly psychological correlatives, we will next 
 treat of the psychological theory, that all our 
 ideas are founded in experience and are ac- 
 quired through sensation and consciousness, 
 and show 7 that it is the psychological correla- 
 tive of the Baconian method of investigation; 
 and in doing this, we shall trace that method 
 to the first impressions made upon the senses, 
 and evolve the principles which govern every 
 step of the process. 
 
 The most profound and comprehensive re- 
 mark ever uttered by man in the whole his- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 229 
 
 tory of philosophy, is the first aphorism of 
 the Novum Organon — " Man as the servant 
 and interpreter of nature, does and under- 
 stands as much as his observations on the or- 
 der of nature, either with regard to things or 
 the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor 
 is capable of more. ?? This proposition 
 throws more light over the mysteries of na- 
 ture than every thing that had been written 
 before. It proclaims the true system of both 
 mental and natural philosophy, and defines 
 the limits and the modes of both the knowl- 
 edge and the power of man. All the rest of 
 the Novum Organon does nothing more than 
 develop the great truth contained in this pro- 
 position. In order to exhibit its full import, 
 we will divide it into the two propositions 
 asserting two kindred but distinct truths, of 
 which it is composed. It speaks of man as 
 the interpreter of nature, and also as the ser- 
 vant of nature. Let us keep these two truths 
 separate ; and consider the proposition, first 
 leaving out what is said of man, as the servant 
 of nature ; and then leaving out what is said 
 
 of him, as the interpreter of nature. Man, as 
 20 
 
230 
 
 THE BACOXIA.N PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the interpreter of nature, understands as much 
 as his observations on the order of nature, ei- 
 ther with regard to things or the mind, per- 
 mit him, and does not know more. . Here, 
 it is declared, that the philosopher is a mere 
 interpreter of nature, and that his knowledge 
 is acquired by the observation of the order of 
 nature, of both things and the mind, and that 
 he does not know more. This proposition 
 then, while it proclaims that both natural and 
 mental philosophy are confined to the obser- 
 vation of the order of nature, the antece- 
 dence and sequence of its phenomena, just 
 as distinctly proclaims the theory of mind, 
 that all our knowledge is founded on experi- 
 ence — that we understand as much as our ob- 
 servations on the order of nature, either with 
 regard to things or the mind, permit, but do 
 not know more. But this exposition does 
 not exhaust the fullness of the proposition ; 
 for it speaks of man as the servant as well as 
 the interpreter of nature, and thus points out 
 the mode and the limit of his power as well 
 as the mode and limit of his knowledge. The 
 mode of his power consists in acting as the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 231 
 
 servant and not as the master of nature, and 
 the mode of his knowledge consists in his 
 interpreting and not anticipating nature. 
 
 And here is at once shown the connexion 
 between science and art, and the nature of 
 both of them. Science consists in finding 
 out the laws of nature ; and art, or the pow- 
 er of man, consists in obeying these laws — 
 in serving nature. Here then is evolved, 
 out of the first sentence of the Novum Or- 
 ganon, the psychology or theory of mind as- 
 sumed in the Baconian method of investiga- 
 tion, and which the whole scope and drift of 
 that method make manifest ; that all our 
 knowledge is founded in experience. And 
 thus is at once exhibited the point of affiliation 
 and doctrinal identity between the Baconian 
 method of investigation and its correlative 
 system of psychology. 
 
 But we are not left to infer the psychology 
 ol Bscon merely from what he has tacitly as- 
 sumed; for though the chief object of his writ- 
 ings was to give directions in physical inquir- 
 ies, and to divert the minds of men from me- 
 taphysical speculations about the essence, the 
 
232 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 eternal reasons and primary causes of things^ 
 and thus, to prevent them from admitting ob- 
 jections against plain experience, founded 
 upon metaphysical notions — as Aristotle and 
 the ancient philosophers had done, according 
 to whose opinions physical science is the ap- 
 plication of metaphysical notions to the ex- 
 planation of the general phenomena of the 
 universe — yet in his Advancement of Learn- 
 ing, he has given a clear view of his theory 
 of mind, and shows that he had a distinct ap- 
 prehension of the great outline of the psychol- 
 ogy which has since been developed by Locke 
 and Reid- "The knowledge of man," says 
 he, "is as the waters, some descending from 
 above, and some springing from beneath ; 
 the one informed by the light of nature, the 
 other inspired by divine revelation. The 
 light of nature consisteth in the notions of 
 the mind, and the reports of the senses. So 
 then according to these two differing illu- 
 minations or originals, knowledge is first of 
 all divided into divinity and philosophy." Ba- 
 con is here speaking of the origin of all hu- 
 man knowledge. He says one kind is deriv- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 233 
 
 ed from revelation, and the other from the 
 light of nature ; and that the "light of nature 
 consists of the notions of the mind* and the 
 reports of the senses." By the notions of the 
 mind, the whole scope of his writings, their 
 very drift and aim, shows that he means 
 those notions or ideas which are developed 
 in consciousness, and not innate ideas ; and 
 it is plain, that by the reports of the senses, 
 he means the ideas acquired through sensa- 
 tion : though we do not assert that Bacon had 
 apprehended with scientific accuracy these 
 two different sources of knowledge, but 
 merely that he had a general knowledge of 
 them. It is manifest then, that though Bacon 
 laid great stress upon the knowledge derived 
 through the senses, he did not think that sen- 
 sation is the only source of knowledge,as some 
 of the philosophers of the continent of Eu- 
 rope have ignorantly alleged, but that like 
 Locke and Reid he admitted consciousness to 
 be a distinct and equally important source of 
 knowledge. 
 
 We will now proceed to show that the 
 system of psychology, maintained by Bacon, 
 
234 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is identical with that of Locke and Reid, indi- 
 cating as we proceed the points of affiliation 
 and doctrinal identity between their system 
 and the Baconian method of investigation, 
 and thus demonstrate that their system is as- 
 sumed in that method. 
 
 In developing the doctrines of Locke and 
 Reid, we shall not so much follow in their 
 tracks, as pursue the train of our own 
 thoughts : neither shall we stop short at the 
 limits to which they have developed their 
 doctrines, but will give to them more scien- 
 tific completeness than they possess as devel- 
 oped by themselves, by filling up, with logical 
 concatenations, the chasms which lie between 
 the doctrines and their correlative method of 
 investigation, and by modifying any doctrine 
 which they have expressed with too much 
 latitude or expressed imperfectly, so as to 
 make them harmonize in a system. 
 
 It was the signal glory of Locke to estab- 
 lish the true theory of the origin of our ideas ; 
 and thus to solve the problem which lies at 
 the very threshold of psychology. The the- 
 ory of innate ideas which we have already ex- 
 
the baconja:* philosophy, 235 
 
 hibited, had prevailed generally throughout 
 the whole history of philosophy. This theo- 
 ry Locke overthrew, just as Bacon had done 
 its correlative method of investigation, and 
 showed how all our ideas originate.* In com- 
 mencing his strictures upon the theory of in- 
 nate ideas he says : a It is an established o- 
 pinion amongst some men, that there are in 
 the understanding certain innate principles, 
 some primary notions, momu ew^, characters, as 
 it were stamped upon the mind of man, which 
 the soul receives in its very first being, and 
 brings into the world w T ith it. ;? He then se- 
 
 *Note. — We do not mean that Locke has shown correctly in every instance, 
 how our notions have originated ; but that he has shown, that they are all acquir- 
 ed through experience and are not an original furniture of the mind. Can any 
 one doubt, for example, how the notions of colours and sounds are acquired, 
 when they consider that persons who have not the senses of sight and hearing 
 cannot by any means whatever acquire these notions ? They must see at once 
 that these notions are acquired through the senses of sight and hearing. Locke 
 has shown that all other notions of the external world are acquired in a similar 
 way ; though his explanation of some instances may be erroneous. Neither 
 does it detract from the truth of Locke's indication of the sources of these 
 notions, that he has not chosen the most appropriate terms to express them, 
 viz : sensation and reflection. The last is the term which has been mostly con- 
 sidered erroneous. Consciousness has been, and we concur in the opinion, 
 considered as indicating more exactly the source of one class of our ideas. 
 But this precision, though important in scientific accuracy, does not detract 
 from the truth of the solution which Locke has given of the problem of the 
 origin of our ideas. It is a pitiful criticism upon a" great philosophical discovery, 
 to dwell upon a mere inaccuracy in definition ; though certainly, the inaccu- 
 racy ought to be pointed out. 
 
236 THE BACONIAN' PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ilects the following propositions as "having 
 the most allowed title to innate " principles, 
 namely :— " Whatsoever is, is; and It is impos- 
 sible for the same thing to be, and not to be. " 
 He then argues that these principles are not 
 so much as known to the greater part of man- 
 kind, and are therefore not innate. " For, 
 first, it is evident, that all children and idiots 
 have not the least apprehension or thought 
 of them ; and the want of that is enough to 
 destroy that universal assent, which must 
 needs be the necessary concomitant of all in- 
 nate truths : it seeming to me near a contra- 
 diction to say, that there are truths imprinted 
 on the soul which it perceives or under- 
 stands not ; imprinting, if it signify anything, 
 being nothing else, but the making certain 
 truths to be perceived. For to imprint any- 
 thing on the mind, without the mind's per- 
 ceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If, 
 therefore, children and idiots have souls, 
 have minds,with those impressions upon them, 
 they must unavoidably perceive them, and 
 necessarily know and assent to these truths ; 
 which, since they do not, it is evident that 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 237 
 
 there are no such impressions. No proposi- 
 tion can be said to be in the mind, which it 
 never yet knew, which it was never yet con- 
 scious of. " To the argument which had 
 been frequently used by the advocates of the 
 doctrine of innate ideas, that men know these 
 innate principles, as soon as they come to the 
 use of reason, he replies : "But how can 
 those men think the use of reason necessary, 
 to discover principles that are supposed in- 
 nate, when reason, (if we may believe them,) 
 is nothing else but the faculty of deducing 
 unknown truths from principles or proposi- 
 tions that are already known ! We may as 
 well think the use of reason necessary to make 
 our eyes discover visible objeets, as that 
 there should be need of reason, or the exer- 
 cise thereof, to make the understanding see 
 what is originally engraven on it, and cannot 
 be in the understanding before it is perceived 
 by it. " After showing that the fact that 
 those propositions are assented to, as soon as 
 proposed and understood, does not prove 
 them innate, and after deducing a variety of 
 other arguments against the doctrine of in- 
 
238 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nate ideas or principles, he says : " I say next 
 that these two general propositions are not 
 the truths that first possess the minds of child- 
 ren ; nor are antecedent to all acquired and 
 adventitious notions ; which if they were in- 
 nate, they must needs be. The child certain- 
 ly knows, that the nurse that feeds it, is nei- 
 ther the cat it plays with, nor the blackamoor 
 it is afraid of; that the wormseed or mustard 
 it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for ; 
 this it is certainly and undoubtedly assur- 
 ed of : but will any one say, it is by virtue of 
 this principle, that it is impossible for the 
 same thing to be, and not to be, that it so 
 firmly assents to these and other parts of its 
 knowledge ? Or that the child has any no- 
 tion or apprehension of that proposition, at 
 an age, wherein yet it is plain, it knows a 
 great many other truths?" By this train of 
 reasoning, Locke has" utterly overthrown the 
 theory of innate ideas. This he does in the 
 first book of his work on the human under- 
 standing. And in the second book, he shows 
 the true theory of the origin of ideas or of 
 human knowledge. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 "Let us," says he, "then suppose the mind 
 to be as we say white paper, void of all char- 
 acters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be 
 furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast 
 store which the busy and boundless fancy of 
 man has painted on it with almost endless va- 
 riety ? Whence has it all the materials of 
 reason and knowledge ? To this I answer, in 
 one word, from experience; in that all our 
 knowledge is founded, and from that it ultima- 
 tely derives itself. Our observation employed 
 either about external sensible objects, or about 
 the internal operations of our minds, perceiv- 
 ed and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
 supplies our understandings with all the mate- 
 rials of thinking. These two are the fountains 
 of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we 
 have or can naturally have, do spring." Such 
 is Locke's theory of the origin of human 
 knowledge — it is all founded on experience. 
 
 It has often been urged as an objection to 
 this theory of Locke, that there are certain 
 fundamental ideas which are necessarily as- 
 sumed in the very conception of other ideas, 
 which if derived from experience, could not 
 
240 THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have come into the mind, before the ideas in 
 the very conception of which they are assum- 
 ed ; and that consequently, these fundamen- 
 tal ideas, are a priori conceptions of the rea- 
 son. Nothing can be more erroneous than 
 this objection. It is founded upon an entire 
 misconception of the whole process, by which 
 knowledge is acquired. It assumes, that the 
 mind acquires one idea at a time ; whereas 
 this is impossible. When an object is pre- 
 sented to the senses, for example, we not 
 only get an idea of the object, but we also 
 get an idea of existence and unity and other 
 ideas. e * Existence and unity (says Locke,) 
 are two ideas, that are suggested to the un- 
 derstanding, by every object without and 
 every idea within." Now, according to the 
 reasoning of the objection which we are con- 
 sidering ; the ideas of existence and unity, are 
 a priori conceptions. But if it be asked, whe- 
 ther the mind has the ideas of existence and 
 unity before it has the idea of the object which 
 suggests them, and which cannot be appre- 
 hended without assuming them, it surely can- 
 not be answered in the affirmative. If then, it 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 241 
 
 cannot be answered in the affirmative these 
 ideas are not innate, and it is sheer trifling, 
 to call them a priori conceptions, by way 
 of distinguishing them from ideas acquir- 
 ed by experience. Because these ideas are 
 after experience, and are ideas accompanying 
 the idea of the object which has suggested 
 them in experience. The ideas are tied to- 
 gether. They are related to each other, and 
 cannot be conceived except under their rela- 
 tions. And moreover, the ideas are not all 
 brought out in equal distinctness in the first 
 spontaneous action of the mind : but are af- 
 terwards evolved by reflection. The mind 
 does not acquire one idea at a time, any- 
 more than the eyes see one object at a time. 
 Nothing is ever perceived by itself, but must 
 be perceived in its relations to its concomi- 
 tant ideas. It is only by abstraction, after 
 ideas are acquired, that we can isolate them 
 in conception. But in acquiring them, they 
 are always acquired under relations — are al- 
 ways conceived in connection with others. 
 And when, we analyze the idea of an object, 
 
 it is found that the idea is not formed at once. 
 21 
 
242 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Impressions corresponding with every part 
 of the object^ are made upon the mind, and 
 the whole are combined into an idea of the 
 object. What is called perception,, is a com- 
 pound process — a sort of analytico-synthet- 
 ical process; and the result is multiplicity in 
 unity. Aristotle seems to have had some 
 apprehension of this truth ; for as well as we 
 recollect^, he somewhere calls perception an 
 obscure synthesis. And let any one reflect 
 for a moment on the operation of his mind, 
 and he will at once see, that in the process of 
 perceiving an object, the ideas of existence 
 and unity do not come first into the mind : 
 and yet in analyzing the idea of the object, 
 we see that these ideas are necessarily as- 
 sumed in it. The reasoning relative to these 
 ideas, will hold good against all those which 
 are called a priori conceptions, because the a 
 priori character is ascribed to all of them on 
 account of the fact that they are necessarily 
 assumed in other ideas, before which they 
 could not have come into the mind, if they 
 be acquired by experience. We will there- 
 fore, proceed to show the real origin of the 
 chief of those which are so called. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 243 
 
 The ideas of time, space and cause are the 
 chief of those which have been said to have 
 an a priori origin. Now, we think it is clear 
 that the first and the last are acquired through 
 the impressions made in consciousness from 
 the mind's own states and acts, and that the 
 other is acquired by external perception. By 
 contemplating the operation of our own fac- 
 ulties, and noting the succession of thoughts, 
 the idea of time is suggested by the lapse in- 
 tervening between the thoughts, as well as 
 between our mental states at the beginning and 
 the end of the process. The interval seen 
 between objects certainly gives us the idea of 
 space. And that things exist in space, is a 
 matter of direct perception ; and space is 
 perceived to be as much of a reality, as the 
 things which exist in it. To deny that space 
 is a reality, and to say, that " It is a thing 
 which being nothing in itself, exists only that 
 other things may exist in it, ?; is nonsense. 
 So, by contemplating the operation of the at- 
 tention and the will in controuling our men- 
 tal operations, we acquire the idea of men- 
 tal power. By considering the effort by 
 
244 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 which we put our limbs in motion we acquire 
 the idea of mechanical force ; and by reflect- 
 ing on the changes which are produced by 
 both the mental power in the current of 
 thought, and by mechanical force in matter, 
 the abstract conception of cause is suggested 
 to us. By the idea ol cause thus acquired 
 from the surest source of experience, our 
 own consciousness, we invariably assign a 
 cause for the changes which take place in the 
 material world. And by the experience of 
 our own intentions as capable of being carri- 
 ed into execution, by mechanical contrivan- 
 ces, we come at the conception of final cause 
 or design as manifested in the machinery of 
 every part of creation. Such then appears 
 to be the origin of these fundamental ideas. 
 They are all founded in experience. 
 
 Another objection to Locke's theory is that 
 necessary and universal truths cannot be foun- 
 ded in experience. The most prominent of 
 these truths, on account of its great import- 
 ance in our philosophical reasonings, is the 
 proposition : — " Every thing which begins to 
 exist, must have a cause." Now, this truth 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 245 
 
 is certainly not innate knowledge. For all the 
 ideas, Ct existence/ 5 " beginning/ 5 iC cause/' 
 &,c, embraced in it, are derived from expe- 
 rience ; and the proposition merely express- 
 es a relation between them and affirms it to 
 be a necessary one. To say then, that we 
 have knowledge of the relations between 
 things of which we have no ideas at all, as 
 we must do, if we say that we have innate 
 knowledge of the proposition in question, 
 and yet that the ideas embraced in it are ac- 
 quired by experience, is nonsense. The fact 
 that the relation is a necessary one, does not 
 prove that it is not derived from experience. 
 The idea of necessity as well as the idea of 
 contingency belongs to the province of expe- 
 rience. The relations between physical things 
 are contingent — there is no necessary relation 
 between any particular cause and effect, any 
 two physical facts, as far as we know ; and 
 therefore experience does not justify us in 
 saying that there is any such necessary rela- 
 tion : and the philosophy of experience does 
 not teach any such doctrine. Physical phi- 
 losophy does not inquire into causation, but 
 21* 
 
246 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 into constant succession — not into efficient 
 causes, but into the laws which regulate the 
 succession of phenomena. Here then every 
 thing is contingent. But the proposition, 
 which we are examining,belongs to a different 
 department of thought. It belongs to meta- 
 physics and not to physics. It is not, let it be 
 observed, a general proposition embracing by 
 way of generalization, all the particular in- 
 stances of relation between physical causes 
 and effects ; and affirming that each particu- 
 lar effect is necessarily produced by the par- 
 ticular fact which precedes it. It is higher 
 up in the inquiry into the constitution of na- 
 ture. It is at a point, where physics cease 
 to answer our interrogatories. It is at a step, 
 where other ideas besides those furnished by 
 matter, must intervene to resolve the * prob- 
 lems. Ideas furnished from the psychologi- 
 cal world, the idea of cause evolved in con- 
 sciousness, must come to our aid in the inqui- 
 ry ; for physical nature cannot be explained 
 without the intervention of these ideas. And 
 thus we are lifted up above physics, but still 
 we are on the basis of experience within the 
 
THE BACOMAN philosophy. 247 
 
 province of metaphysics. We have gotten 
 from experience in the physical world, the 
 idea that things begin to exist, and from ex- 
 perience in the psychological world, the idea 
 of cause; and we merely affirm the relation 
 which experience tells us must exist between 
 them. The necessity of the relation is forced 
 upon us, by the contradictions, absurdities 
 and impossibilities to which the contrary doc- 
 trine would lead. The relation is not neces- 
 sary in the same manner, that the three 
 angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
 angles. This conclusion is necessitated by 
 the very laws of thought, upon the percep- 
 tion of the relations involved in the proposi- 
 tion, the two sides of the equation being 
 identical truths expressed in different forms, 
 the same quantity being stated in the form 
 of a triangle and also in the form of two 
 right angles. We do not therefore, let it be 
 observed, in sustaining our doctrine, fall into 
 the error of Condillac that, <c All propositions 
 in other sciences are of the nature of equa- 
 tions in mathematics;" for propositions in 
 the physical and psychological sciences ex- 
 
24S THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 press real relations, while in the mathematics, 
 they express logical relations. Though, of 
 course, propositions can be formed relative 
 to physical and psychological subject mat- 
 ters, which merely express logical rela- 
 tions, but then like all other logical proposi- 
 tions, the relations embraced in them being 
 logical and not real, they are governed by the 
 rules of logic, and not by the laws of nature ; 
 and such propositions are of the nature of 
 equations in mathematics. But the relation 
 of the predicate and subject of the proposi- 
 tion which we have been considering, is ne- 
 cessary from the nature of the relation be- 
 tween a beginning of existence and causation, 
 as disclosed in experience ; and not from a 
 logical necessity, as in mathematical equa- 
 tions and other purely logical propositions. 
 The view which we have here taken of 
 necessary truths, is sometimes opposed by ad- 
 ducing the proposition, a That the fact, that 
 every effect within our experience has had a 
 cause, is no adequate ground of assurance 
 that every effect must have a cause. " Now, 
 this is an incongruous proposition, the first 
 
THE BACONIAN mil OSOP11Y. 249 
 
 branch of it lying in physics, and the other 
 in metaphysics, according to the distinctions 
 just now made. The causes and effects in 
 the first branch are evidently physical causes 
 and effects, while in the latter, efficient cau- 
 ses and their effects are evidently intended, 
 as the word must implies the idea of necessi- 
 ty, which, as we have shown, is not applica- 
 ble to the relation between physical causes 
 and effects, but only to metaphysical causes 
 and their effects. Physical causes are noth- 
 ing, as far as we know, but antecedent phe- 
 nomena without any efficiency ; and to say 
 that from these we can not infer that every 
 effect must have an efficient cause is a tru- 
 ism : but nevertheless, it has no sort of bear- 
 ing upon the doctrine which it is designed to 
 refute viz : That our knowledge of necessary 
 truths is founded upon experience. Because 
 this doctrine does not teach, that from the 
 mere observation of the antecedence and se- 
 quence of phenomena in the physical world 
 we can arrive at a general law 7 of efficient 
 causation : but merely, at a general law regu- 
 lating the successions of phenomena. Effi- 
 
250 THE BACOMAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cient causation lies, as we have shown, within 
 metaphysics, and the experience on which it 
 is founded, is based in consciousness, whence 
 we get the idea of power or cause. Within 
 the sphere of efficient causation, we can say, 
 that every effect must have a cause ; or in oth- 
 er words, that every effect must originate in a 
 cause ; or still further, must spring from an in- 
 telligent creator, eternal in himself. For in 
 tracing up our various trains of thought about 
 causation suggested in experience, we are 
 compelled to come to this conclusion. The 
 relation is clearly seen to be a necessary one, 
 and that the word must implying necessity 
 can be predicated of it. So, we are back a- 
 gain with a sure footing upon the doctrine, 
 that the idea of necessity is one which be- 
 longs to the province ol experience. 
 
 The necessary character of mathematical 
 truths has been urged as an objection to 
 their being founded in experience Now, it 
 is obvious, that all true propositions about a 
 subject matter which is necessarily such as it 
 is, must benecessarily true ; because its qual- 
 ities are necessarily such as they are, and the 
 
TKS BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 251 
 
 propositions merely predicate of the subject 
 matter one or more of these qualities. This 
 is clearly the case in mathematics. Quantity 
 and number, for example, are necessarily 
 such as they are; and of course, any propo- 
 sitions expressing their properties must be 
 necessary truths. The mind by applying it- 
 self to the consideration of their subject mat- 
 ters, discovers these properties, — which is ex- 
 perience — and then expresses the result of 
 that experience in axioms. We have an in- 
 tellectual experience of the necessary proper- 
 ties and relations of quantity and number as 
 realized in special cases. The axioms of ge- 
 ometry all relate to space, time, force, num- 
 ber and other magnitudes. Now, all the ax- 
 ioms, which predicate equality of either of 
 these subject matters, as for instance, the one 
 which declares, that magnitudes are equal, 
 which fill the same space, are obviously found- 
 ed in experience. For what but experience 
 can assure us of the sameness of these sub- 
 ject matters, on which the truth of these ax- 
 ioms depends. The axiom, which declares 
 that " things equal to the same thing, are e- 
 
252 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 qual to one another M which is a general 
 proposition of which all others expressing e- 
 quality are but examples, is nothing more than 
 the ordinary process of measurement gene- 
 ralized, and embodied in words. And the 
 propositions which relate particularly to space, 
 such as " that two straight lines cannot en- 
 close a space " and " that lines which cut one 
 another cannot both be parallel to the same 
 third line " are all founded on experience. 
 It is impossible for us to exemplify either of 
 them in thought, without recurring to cases 
 in actual experience, which shows that in 
 these they originate. They all involve induc- 
 tion — a consideration of particular cases and 
 an inductive generalization. The truth of 
 the propositions is forced upon us by cases in 
 daily experience. And the mind forms gen- 
 eral conceptions out of these particular cases ; 
 and these particular cases are realized in the 
 general conceptions. So then, it is seen that 
 the axioms of mathematics, though they are 
 necessary truths, are all founded on expe- 
 rience : and so therefore must be all the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 253 
 
 most remote conclusions resulting from their 
 combination. 
 
 As to the objection resulting from the uni- 
 versality of the propositions, this is founded 
 upon an entire misapprehension of the doc- 
 trine of experience ; and would go to show 
 that induction itself, the great organon of ex- 
 perience, is not founded upon experience ; 
 for the great office of induction is to ascertain 
 general or universal truths. The doctrine of 
 experience, is not that we have actual expe- 
 rience of every inference found in our knowl- 
 edge, but merely that all knowledge is actual 
 experience, or conclusions from actual expe- 
 rience, the general or universal conclusions 
 which reach beyond actual experience, being 
 justified by the constitution of our nature, 
 which constrains us to ascribe like effects to 
 like causes, upon the basis of analogy, which 
 we have shown, in treating of induction, is 
 the process by which all philosophy is built 
 up. We certainly in the inductive process 
 are led to believe the cases in which we have 
 no actual experience, from those in which we 
 
 have. The inference of universalitv there- 
 22 
 
254 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fore is, in the strictest sense, founded on ex^ 
 perience. For it is the force of the cases in 
 which we have experience, such as their num- 
 ber and the strength of their analogies, which 
 justifies us in drawing a universal conclusion 
 embracing cases in which we can have no ac- 
 tual experience without being omniscient — 
 without the past, the present and the future 
 being all alike within our immediate cognition. 
 A priori knowledge belongs to God only. 
 
 The truth is, there is not an idea within the 
 whole range of philosophy, that is not found- 
 ed ultimately on experience. In the third 
 part of this discourse, it will be shown that 
 even the idea of a God is founded upon it. 
 That upon the doctrine of experience, natural 
 theology is impregnable ; and that Hume in 
 his celebrated atheistic argument entirely per- 
 verted this doctrine, by confining experience 
 within the sphere of sensation, to what we 
 perceive by the senses, instead of extending 
 it also, to its still more appropriate sphere of 
 consciousness. Consciousness is its most, in- 
 disputable province ; for no skeptic has yet 
 appeared who was fool enough to deny the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 255 
 
 testimony of consciousness. Consciousness 
 is therefore emphatically the province of ex- 
 perience. And it was because Hume in his 
 argument, covertly excluded consciousness 
 from the province of experience, that he could 
 not discover that the origin of the idea of cause 
 which originates in consciousness, is with- 
 in that province ; and that he succeeded in 
 throwing a suspicion upon the great doctrine 
 of experience, which Atlas-like sustains the 
 whole superstructure of the Baconian philos- 
 ophy, and which by its potent organon of in- 
 duction, has explored so many of Nature's 
 dominions, and is still advancing in its con- 
 quests, with such rapid progress and such 
 brilliant victories, as to make us almost antici- 
 pate, that at some future day in the history 
 of man, nature will have told her last secret 
 under the torture of this mighty engine of 
 investigation. 
 
 Here we have arrived at the point of affil- 
 iation and doctrinal identity, between the 
 psychology of Locke, and the method of in- 
 vestigation of Bacon, namely, that all our 
 knowledge is founded on experience. This is 
 
256 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the theory of mind with all its correlative doc- 
 trines, that is assumed in the Baconian meth- 
 od of investigation. This theory of mind 
 teaches that we begin with the knowledge of 
 particulars and proceed to the knowledge of 
 generals, as is taught throughout Locke's 
 writings; and that nothing but particulars 
 producing particular effects has any real ex- 
 istence ; and that generals are nothing more 
 than the conceptions of the mind formed from 
 the contemplation of particulars, and are not 
 real archetypal existences as Plato thought, 
 by which the natures of particulars are com- 
 prehended. 
 
 Though Locke had, as we have shown, 
 solved the great fundamental problem of psy- 
 chology, and thus laid the foundation of men- 
 tal philosophy, yet he had assumed in that so- 
 lution a most erroneous theory in regard to 
 the manner in which the mind perceives both 
 external objects and itself. He assumed the 
 ideal theory, that ideas or images of things 
 in the mind, and not things themselves are 
 the only objects of thought, which had pre- 
 vailed universally from the earliest history of 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 257 
 
 philosophy. Bishop Berkeley, after the time 
 of Locke, showed that this doctrine led ir- 
 resistibly to the denial of the existence of the 
 material world ; because if we perceive noth- 
 ing but ideas, there is no ground for infer- 
 ring that any material world exists ; as there 
 is nothing in ideas to indicate such a fact. 
 But Berkeley held that the mind does per- 
 ceive itself immediately, and therefore con- 
 cluded that the spiritual world has a real ex- 
 istence. Hume, who was instigated by a 
 passion to overthrow all belief, philosophical 
 as well as religious, in order that he might 
 engulph all knowledge in absolute skepticism, 
 had the acumen to pierce through the incon- 
 sistency of Berkeley's doctrines in regard to 
 the spiritual world, and his doctrines in re- 
 gard to the material world, and showed that 
 Berkeley had no more right to hold that the 
 mind perceived itself immediately, than he 
 had to hold that it perceived the material 
 world immediately ; and as Hume held the 
 ideal theory to be true, he turned the argu- 
 ments which Berkeley had used against the 
 
 existence of the material world, against the 
 22* ' 6 
 
258 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 existence of the spiritual, and showed that a 
 denial of its existence is also a legitimate de- 
 duction from the ideal theory. So that a 
 Christian Bishop and an infidel philosopher 
 had, by their joint labours, shown that a doc- 
 trine in which they both believed, and which 
 had prevailed universally in the philosophi- 
 cal world for several thousand years, proved 
 beyond a doubt that the universe of both 
 matter and mind is all an illusion ; and that 
 nothing exists but certain ideas governed by 
 laws of constant succession. 
 
 Thus had skepticsim, by attacking English 
 philosophy on a point where it had inadvert- 
 ently based itself upon error, utterly over- 
 thrown it. But in the order of Providence, 
 a champion for the truth appeared in Reid, 
 who, imbued with the true spirit of English 
 philosophy, had the sagacity to perceive that 
 the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume, are a 
 reductio ad absurdum of the ideal theory, and 
 at once set about to examine it; for up to this 
 time, he had believed in its truth. He show- 
 ed that when applied to the sense of sight, 
 there is something plausible in the theory, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 259 
 
 that the mind perceives the images of things 
 and not things themselves, but that when ap- 
 plied to the other senses, it is perfectly ab- 
 surd. " As to objects of sight, ?? says he, 
 " 1 understand what is meant by an image of 
 the figure in the brain : but how shall we 
 conceive an image of their colour, where there 
 is absolute darkness ? — And as to all other ob- 
 jects of sense, except figure and colour, I am 
 unable to conceive what is meant by an image 
 of them. Let any man say what he means 
 by an image of heat and cold, an image of 
 hardness or softness, and an image of sound 
 or smell, or taste. The word image, when 
 applied to these objects of sense has absolute- 
 ly no meaning. " By this and many other 
 modes of reasoning, Reid showed beyond a 
 doubt, that this theory is a mere hypothesis 
 feigned in a vain endeavour to fathom the mys- 
 tery of the union between body and soul, be- 
 tween mind and matter. Yet he did not at- 
 tempt to substitute for it any theory of his 
 own, of the manner in which the mind per- 
 ceives external things ; as he considered this 
 beyond the sphere of philosophy, " How a 
 
260 THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 
 
 sensation, " says he, " should instantly make 
 us conceive and believe the existence of an 
 external thing altogether unlike to it, I do not 
 pretend to know; and when I say that the 
 one suggests the other, I mean not to explain 
 the manner of their connexion, but to express 
 a fact, which every one may be conscious of; 
 namely, that by a law of our nature, such a 
 conception and belief constantly and immedi- 
 ately follow the sensation. " Though Reid 
 did not attempt to show the manner in which 
 the mind perceives external objects, for this 
 is impossible ; yet he has solved the second 
 great problem in psychology as Locke has 
 solved the first. This second problem is, upon 
 what does our knowledge of the existence of 
 the material and spiritual worlds rest ? How 
 do I know these are not illusions, as Hume and 
 Berkeley have taught ? We have shown how 
 Des Cartes has answered these questions—that 
 he based their solutions upon argument — upon 
 demonstration : which is the basis upon which 
 the theory of innate ideas must forever found 
 it; as that theory knows no belief independ- 
 ent of or anterior to demonstration. And 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 261 
 
 though Hume (for we will now take leave 
 of Berkeley) adopted the theory of Locke, 
 that all our knowledge is founded ultimately 
 upon experience, yet he agreed with Des 
 Cartes, that all belief is founded upon demon- 
 stration, and thus formed an inconsistent mon- 
 grel creed, which is the hallucination of the 
 skeptic, who seeing in his own mind contra- 
 dictory opinions, concludes that this is the 
 character of truth. Reid, therefore, taking 
 as the foundation of his inquiry, the truth of 
 Locke's doctrine* (though it must be admit- 
 ted that Reid does not always appear to com- 
 
 *Note. In consequence of the skeptical conclusions which Hume deduced 
 from the ideal theory, Reid was led to overlook in a great measure the impor- 
 tance of the service rendered by Locke to mental philosophy, because Locke 
 had assumed that theory in „his explanation of mental phenomena. He over- 
 looked the fact that the great aim of Locke was to solve the problem of the 
 origin of human knowledge, and that in the solution of this problem, he had, 
 more by inadvertence, than by deliberate consideration, assumed the ideal the- 
 ory, and that his solution is correct whether the ideal theory be true or not. 
 In fact all that Keid has himself done, proves that Locke's theory of the origin 
 of human knowledge is true. For, while Reid is refuting the ideal theory, he 
 incidentally establishes the fact that there are no innate ideas or notions, but 
 that they are acquired by experience — suggested by sensation and conscious- 
 ness. It is true that he says frequently in his writings that there are other 
 ideas than those of sensation and reflection : but then, we must observe what 
 he means by this. He does not lay it down as an abstract proposition, hut con- 
 fines its meaning to the ideal theory, and thus limits the meaning of the propo 
 sition. He is refuting the ideal theory, and uses this proposition as a touch- 
 stone to refute that theory. For example, he says, "The conception of a 
 mind, is neither an idea of sensation nor of reflection ; for it is neither like cny 
 
262 TKE 'BACONIAN 'PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 prehend fully his relation to Locke in the de- 
 velopment of English psychology,) that all 
 our knowledge is founded ultimately in ex- 
 perience, by a most profound and accurate 
 analysis of mental phenomena, proved that 
 there is in the mind, an element of belief in- 
 dependent of demonstration, and evolved the 
 
 of our sensations, nor like anything we are conscious of." Now, in this sen- 
 tence, when it is taken in connexion with Reid's argument, properly, the first 
 proposition — "The conception of a mind is neither «m idea of sensation nor of 
 reflection, " is the conclusion ; and the last proposition — " For it is neither like 
 any of our sensations nor like anything we are conscious of" is the proof of 
 the premises from which the first is deduced. His object is to refute the theo- 
 ry that our ideas are mere images of something in sensation or consciousness; 
 and in order to do this, he shows that the idea of mind is not an image of any- 
 thing either in sensation or consciousness : but that it is a notion which is sug- 
 gested to us by our sensations, just as the idea of hardness isnotlike that quality 
 in matter, yet it is suggested to us by feeling a body which possesses that quality. 
 But still it is evident, that Reid supposed that he himself had solved the 
 great problem in psychology — that he supposed the problem, whether the mind 
 perceives tilings or the images of things, is a greater problem than that of the or- 
 igin of our ideas, and he has accordingly subordinated this last, to the other, 
 and classed Locke and Des Cartes, as belonging to the same school of 
 mental philosophy. And even Dugald Stewart, with all his systematic and 
 critical cast of mind, did not discern the precise relation which Reid held to 
 Locke in the development of mental philosophy : but thought that Reid had 
 originated a new mental philosophy. And this view of the subject, has led 
 Stewart to express in his writings, opinions of Locke somewhat contradictory ; 
 thus showing that his mind was rather confused on the subject. All these er- 
 rors of Stewart resulted from his not viewing psychology from logic, as we 
 have done. By looking- at it from logic, it is at once discovered, that whai w 
 tlie origin of human knowledge, in the fundamental problem, and that the solu- 
 tion of this problem is the first step in psychology, and that all philosophers 
 must be classed under one or the other of the two solutions which have been 
 given of it, and not under the solutions of a minor problem, such as whether 
 the mind perceives images or things themselves. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 263' 
 
 great fundamental laws of human belief; and 
 thus laid open to the eye of philosophy what 
 it had so long sighed after, and toiled for 
 through so many thousand years — the solid 
 foundations of absolute verity, and raised up 
 English philosophy from the abyss into which 
 Hume had so coldly and stealthily piloted her. 
 As Locke had shown that the elements of 
 knowledge are not innate, and that neither 
 are they acquired by reasoning, but through 
 sensation and consciousness, Reid, true to 
 these principles of him whom God in his 
 providence had made his forerunner and mas- 
 ter, though as we have already said, he did 
 not seem to comprehend the fact, strove, and 
 successfully, to discover the psychological 
 laws which govern human belief in regard to 
 the knowledge acquired through these origi- 
 nal sources. The"* law of belief which gov- 
 erns the knowledge acquired through sensa- 
 tion, he showed to be, that such is the consti- 
 tution of human nature, that man cannot but 
 believe in the reality of whatever is clearly at- 
 tested by the senses. And he showed that 
 the law of belief relative to the phenomena 
 
264 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of consciousness, is, that such is the constitu- 
 tion of human nature, that man cannot but be- 
 lieve in the reality of whatever is clearly at- 
 tested by consciousness. He showed these to 
 be ultimate facts in psychology, incapable of 
 resolution into simpler elements. That hu- 
 man intelligence cannot penetrate deeper into 
 the mysteries of faith. That here man finds 
 laws of imperative command to believe, and 
 that man cannot but believe. These laws are 
 constituent elements of the mind. The mind 
 must be annihilated before these laws can 
 cease to operate ; for the sane mind obeys by 
 necessity. Disobedience is impossible except 
 in insanity, and even then disobedience is only 
 partial. Another fundamental law of belief 
 Reid showed to be, that man is so constituted 
 that he cannot but believe in whatever he dis- 
 tinctly remembers. This law is auxiliary to the 
 others ; for without this law, the other two 
 would be nearly useless. But the great fun- 
 damental law of belief, upon whose broad 
 ioundations, all science immediately rests, the 
 law of inductive belief, which is the only 
 guide to our knowledge in the darkness of 
 
THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 265 
 
 the future, the law by which the mind infers 
 the future from the past — that like causes will 
 produce like effects — still remained undiscov- 
 ered ; and the dauntless skepticism of Hume 
 stood in the very vestibule of the temple of 
 philosophy, boldly declaring that man cannot 
 know any thing but what he has actually seen 
 or been conscious of; and that even this 
 knowledge must be verified by reasoning, as 
 all certainty rests upon demonstration. Reid 
 therefore showed by a most rigid analysis of 
 mental phenomena, that man is so constituted 
 that he cannot but believe that like causes will 
 produce like effects; and that the future will be 
 like the past : and thus discovered the great 
 fundamental law of belief which governs the 
 mental determination in the inductive pro- 
 cess ; and thereby connected the whole men- 
 tal theory of Locke and himself with the 
 Baconian method of investigation; for this 
 is the point of contact between psychology 
 and the method of investigation, as we show- 
 ed in the beginning of this chapter. Reid 
 has therefore solved the second great problem 
 
 in psvchology; and showed that, the Bacon- 
 23 
 
266 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ian method of investigation which maintains 
 that induction, and not reasoning, is the par- 
 amount process in the acquisition of knowl- 
 edge, and that perception, and consciousness, 
 and induction, and not reasoning, are the ul- 
 timate foundations of verity, has assumed a 
 correct theory of the human mind. 
 
 According to English psychology then, the 
 mind of man is developed from without in- 
 wards — sensation being exerted before con- 
 sciousness, consciousness before induction,and 
 induction before reasoning. As Reid showed 
 that in the various exertions of thought there 
 is not in the mind, any object distinct from 
 the mind itself, but that what philosophers 
 had called ideas or images of things in the 
 mind, are nothing but the thoughts or acts 
 of the mind, the doctrine of English psychol- 
 ogy that all our knowledge is founded ulti- 
 mately upon experience, means that the pow- 
 ers of the mind are dormant until awakened 
 into consciousness by some impression made 
 upon the senses, and that as soon as this 
 is done, the knowledge of two facts is ac- 
 quired at once, that of the existence of the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 267 
 
 object of sensation, and of the person's own 
 existence as a sentient being ; and thus two 
 orders of ideas or notions are established, 
 the mind, and that which is not the mind ; and 
 that the original elements of all our knowl- 
 edge are suggested to the mind by some such 
 occasions — that certain impressions on our or- 
 gans of sense are necessary to suggest to the 
 mind a knowledge of external things^ and to 
 awaken it to a consciousness of its own exis- 
 tence, and to give rise to the exercise of its 
 various faculties ; and that after consciousness 
 is thus awakened, it becomes a source of 
 ideas or notions distinct from those of sensa- 
 tion — that the ideas of eolours, sounds, hard- 
 ness, extension, and all the qualities and 
 modes of matter are received through the 
 senses ; and that the ideas of memory, voli- 
 tion, imagination, anger, love and all the acts 
 and affections of mind are suggested in con- 
 sciousness ; and that it is from the materials 
 thus furnished in the way of experience, that 
 the mind by combining, abstracting, general- 
 izing, and so forth, builds up all knowledge. 
 This mere historical order of the develop- 
 
268 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ment of the mind shows that particulars are 
 known before generals ; and that consequent- 
 ly, perception is exercised before induction, 
 and induction, before reasoning ; because per- 
 ception informs us of particulars, induction 
 of generals, and reasoning sets out from gen- 
 erals, and is therefore dependent on induc- 
 tion for the truth of its premises ; and con- 
 sequently there cannot be an a priori method 
 of investigation. 
 
 English psychology, then, has discovered 
 the origin of human knowledge, and the fun- 
 damental laws of belief, which govern the 
 two original sources of this knowledge, sen- 
 sation and consciousness, and also the funda- 
 mental law of belief which governs the in- 
 ductive inference of a general conclusion 
 from particular instances exhibited in sensa- 
 tion and consciousness, and shown that these 
 fundamental laws of belief are elements of 
 the mind itself; and consequently ultimate 
 facts in psychology ; and thus, by strict analy- 
 sis of phenomena, laid open the whole men- 
 tal process of acquiring knowledge, and es- 
 tablished the basis of absolute verity. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 269 
 
 We have then in accordance with the propo- 
 sition of Bacon quoted at the beginning of this 
 chapter, a sure foundation to tread on through 
 the whole path of investigation, from the very 
 first perceptions of the senses, to the highest 
 generalizations of induction — having the fun- 
 damental laws of belief developed by Reid, 
 to stand on safely and confidently in admit- 
 ting the information of the senses, the infor- 
 mation of consciousness, the information of 
 memory and the conclusions of inductive in- 
 ference. 
 
 But let us return for a moment to the 
 ground over which we have passed, and see 
 whether we cannot throw more light on the 
 theory of mind that all our knowledge is 
 founded on experience ; or rather, let us look 
 at that theory in another light. 
 
 Lord Bacon, as we have already shown, 
 teaches that the knowledge of man is deriv- 
 ed from two sources, the light of nature, and 
 divine revelation : a The knowledge of man 
 is as the waters, some descending Irom above, 
 and some springing from beneath ; the one 
 
 informed by the light of nature, the other 
 23* 
 
270 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 inspired by divine revelation." As we have 
 examined psychology in the light of nature, 
 we will now inquire whether any further 
 light is thrown upon it by divine revelation. 
 
 It is distinctly taught in the book of Gene- 
 sis^ that man originally received the truth by 
 immediate revelation from God ; and that he 
 conversed with superior intelligences, mes- 
 sengers from Heaven ; and thus, by a super- 
 natural tuition, was instructed in knowledge 
 which he could not have acquired by his un- 
 aided intellect. Now, if such communica- 
 tions of knowledge were necessary to the ed- 
 ucation of man, in the earliest period of his 
 history, when he had just drawn his intellectu- 
 al life from its first source, and possessed all 
 the mental activity, which it may be conjec- 
 tured he received when his intellectual en- 
 dowments were first bestowed upon him by 
 the hands of the Creator, is it not manifest, 
 that the knowledge of man is not innate in its 
 elements in the mind, and is not a mere de- 
 velopment of human reason? For, at the 
 creation of man his physical necessities, as 
 well as his mental enjoyments, required more 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 271 
 
 than at any time since, that knowledge should 
 be innate in his mind. But we find that man 
 was treated as an ignorant being, as in his in- 
 fancy, and was instructed by superior intelli- 
 gences. And this same supernatural instruc- 
 tion in some form was continued by prophets 
 and inspired men, until it was completed in 
 the gospel of Jesus. 
 
 Has not God, then, treated man on the as- 
 sumption that knowledge is not a mere de- 
 velopment of human reason exercised upon 
 elements or primordial ideas innate in the 
 mind? It may, perhaps, be argued that it 
 requires time to develop knowledge from 
 these primordial notions, and that therefore 
 man was necessarily instructed in the earliest 
 period of his history. But we judge that 
 this has no force. Because the faculties of 
 the first man were created mature, and his 
 mental eye, undimmed by sin, w r e may con- 
 jecture, possessed an extraordinary degree of 
 intuition, seeing with the greatest clearness 
 whatever can be the object of intellectual per- 
 ception ; and therefore tie could have develop- 
 ed his innate ideas into sufficient knowledge, 
 
272 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 if this had been the mode of acquiring knowl- 
 edge, which the Creator had established for 
 him. But even if the first man had received 
 his knowledge by an instantaneous endow- 
 ment, it would not have impugned our theory ; 
 because his intellectual faculties and his physi- 
 cal nature were created mature, and not left 
 to the slow process of natural growth, and 
 therefore such an endowment would have 
 been merely in keeping with the extraordina- 
 ry dealings of the Creator, above the course 
 of nature. But it is certain that the first man 
 and all his posterity were treated as beings 
 incapable of acquiring sufficient knowledge 
 without supernatural instruction ; and the fact 
 that their faculties were mature and yet their 
 knowledge deficient, forcibly corroborates our 
 position. 
 
 But the gospel makes our conclusion still 
 more clear. The apostle Paul says : " 1 had 
 not known sin, but by the law ; for I had not 
 known lust, except the law had said thou 
 shalt not covet." What is this but asserting 
 that there is nothing in the reason of man 
 which could have taught him sin? The law 
 
THE BACONIAN PI1II.OSOPH V. 27o 
 
 was a schoolmaster, to bring man to the gos- 
 pel ; and the gospel has revealed still more 
 clearly the truth to man. 
 
 So far from the most essential knowledge 
 being innate in man, it has been necessary in 
 all periods of the world down to the present 
 time, that man should be instructed by others 
 of superior knowledge: and thus in modern 
 times, a general providence is performing for 
 man what God did in the earlier periods of 
 the world by direct instrumentality. No na- 
 tion has ever risen from barbarism in the scale 
 of civilization by its unaided efforts. All have 
 borrowed learning from those which have 
 preceded them. Every development of hu- 
 manity has given its light to those which have 
 succeeded it. The Greeks did all which phi- 
 losophy, or the unaided reason of man, can 
 do towards the solution of the mysteries of 
 humanity. But after all their intellectual 
 achievements, it has been declared by divine 
 revelation, " that man by wisdom knew not 
 God ; " and that their philosophy was wisdom 
 falsely so called. But who can tell how much 
 of Greek philosophy was a traditionary re- 
 
274 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 flection of divine revelations ? To deny, that 
 much of it was, would be to run counter to 
 the whole current of history, and to falsify 
 the best established inductions of philosophy. 
 All the philosophy of every period of the 
 world has been enlightened by divine revela- 
 tions ; and by a strange reflex action, the 
 light thrown back from philosophy upon rev- 
 elation, often enables man to see the truths of 
 revelation the more clearly. Philosophy be- 
 comes a mirror, in which we can see the im- 
 age of revelation, reflected by its own light, 
 in brighter lustre often, than when we look 
 at it immediately: but still it is the light of 
 revelation all the while revealing the truth to 
 us. In order to apply to individual man, 
 what is here said of nations, it is merely ne- 
 cessary to reflect, that what is developed in 
 nations, is also developed in the individual 
 man : as a nation is but an aggregate of indi- 
 viduals. 
 
 We think, that our theory is further con- 
 firmed by the fact that the same sort of er- 
 rors are manifest in the theology of nations 
 which adopt the theory of innate ideas, as in 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 275 
 
 their philosophy. Those nations which adopt 
 this theory, and that all philosophy is nothing 
 more than a development of human reason, 
 have fallen into error by making revelation 
 subordinate to philosophy — having modified 
 the doctrines of revelation by the teachings 
 of reason. Whereas, those nations which 
 have adopted the opposite doctrine, that all 
 knowledge is acquired by experience, either 
 from the light of nature, or the light of reve- 
 lation, have submitted to the teachings of 
 both these lights — have become the mere in- 
 terpreters of both nature and revelation — 
 have admitted that the mind has no innate 
 intellectual conceptions, or innate moral prin- 
 ciples, by which to try the truth of the doc- 
 trines of revelation : but have admitted as the 
 truth whatever a fair interpretation shows to 
 be the doctrines revealed. The English, who 
 adopt the doctrine, that all knowledge is 
 founded in experience, have the largest mass 
 of orthodox theology — theology conforming 
 to a strict interpretation of the scriptures — of 
 any nation in Christendom, while the Ger- 
 mans and French, who maintain, to a great 
 
276 TIIK B A CD!f!n A 3 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 extent, under some modification or other, the 
 theory of innate ideas, and exalt the ability 
 of human reason, have reasoned away the ob- 
 vious and philological meaning of the scrip- 
 tures, in explaining their doctrines by certain 
 abstract intellectual conceptions; and thus sub- 
 stituted a philosophical theology in the place 
 of divine revelation, thereby declaring them- 
 selves wise above what is written ; as will be 
 shown in the fourth part of this discourse. 
 
 We have purposely deferred until now, the 
 examination of a system of philosophy, which 
 is doing more directly and indirectly, than any 
 other system, to prevent the spread of the 
 doctrines of Locke and Reid. We allude to 
 the philosophy of Kant. The empirical skep- 
 ticism of Hume, which had been so entirely 
 refuted by Reid, is reproduced under a dog- 
 matic form, in this philosophy. The writings 
 of Reid are directed against the skepticism 
 which attacks the very primary laws of 
 thought, in the empirical form in which 
 Hume presented it. When therefore, it is 
 presented by Kant in the dogmatic form of 
 the transcendental philosophy, it is no easy 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 27? 
 
 matter to detect the fallacy. Hume by an in- 
 genious sophistry, and a perversion of the 
 doctrine of Locke, that all our knowledge is 
 founded on experience, attempted to make it 
 appear in his essay on a special providence 
 and a future state, that this doctrine leads to 
 atheism, by endeavoring to show, that many 
 truths which are necessary to sustain the doc- 
 trines of natural theology, and a future state, 
 have no valid existence^ at all ; as they can 
 not be found in experience, the only source 
 of knowledge. Amongst the most important 
 of these truths, is that of causation. He 
 maintained that we have no real idea of cause, 
 that it is a mere figment of the mind ; as it 
 has no prototype in experience — nothing real 
 to communicate such an idea to the mind. 
 
 With this potent doctrine of skepticism, 
 Hume entered upon the field of human 
 knowledge, and maintained that all reasoning 
 concerning matters of fact is founded upon 
 the relation of cause and effect, and as there 
 is in reality no such relation, there is there- 
 fore, no evidence to assure us of any matters 
 
 of fact lying beyond our senses. Kant capti- 
 24 
 
278 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 vated by the ingenious sophistry of Hume, 
 was awakened ; as he himself says, from the 
 dogmatic slumber in which he had been re- 
 posing. Unable to pierce through the fallacy 
 of Hume, and discover that the idea of cause,, 
 as we have already shown, and will again 
 more fully show in the third part of this dis- 
 course, where Hume's doctrine is particular- 
 ly examined, is founded in experience, is de- 
 rived from the consciousness of power in our- 
 selves ; and not from the external world at 
 all, from the succession of events in the phy- 
 sical world, as Hume supposed it must be, if 
 founded in experience : for he covertly as- 
 sumes in his essay, that the doctrine of ex- 
 perience confines the origin of our knowledge 
 to the senses. Kant regarded this argument 
 of Hume as a reductio ad absurdum of the 
 doctrine, that all our knowledge is founded 
 on experience. He therefore concluded, as 
 he could not get rid of the idea of cause, that 
 it must be a necessary truth — a truth not de- 
 rived from experience, but arising with it — a 
 truth written as it were on the mind, but re- 
 quiring contact with the external world to 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 279 
 
 make it legible. And agreeing with the 
 skeptical conclusion of Hume, that there is 
 nothing in the external world corresponding 
 with it, he maintained that it is a purely sub- 
 jective idea. 
 
 Here then, is the starting-point of Kant : — ■ 
 There are truths w T hich we do not derive from 
 experience, which come neither from sensa- 
 tion, nor from consciousness, which can be 
 neither proved nor disbelieved. " 1 first en- 
 quired (says he) whether the objection of 
 Hume might not be universal, and soon found, 
 that the idea of the connection between cause 
 and effect is far from being the only one by 
 which the understanding, a priori, thinks of 
 the union of things ; but rather, that meta- 
 phyics are entirely made up of such concep- 
 tions. I endeavoured to ascertain their num- 
 ber, and when guided by a single principle, I 
 had succeeded in the attempt, I proceeded to 
 inquire into the objective validity of these 
 ideas ; for I was now more than ever convin- 
 ced that they w T ere not drawn from experi- 
 ence, as Hume had supposed, but that they 
 came from the pure understanding. " Though 
 
280 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Kant did not maintain, as this quotation shows., 
 the theory of innate ideas, which was refuted 
 by Locke, yet he maintained one of like im- 
 port, and of the same logical consequences. 
 He maintained that there is an a priori as well 
 as an a posteriori element in our knowledge ; 
 and that in fact the a posteriori element can 
 not become knowledge strictly so called, until 
 it is combined with the a priori element — that 
 it cannot be cognized before this combination. 
 
 In order to bring out this doctrine of Kant, 
 more distinctly, we will endeavour to present 
 his view of the processes by which the mind 
 builds up knowledge. 
 
 When we look at an object, there are cer- 
 tain impressions made upon the mind corres- 
 ponding with all the various parts of the ob- 
 ject, and these impressions produce intui- 
 tions; and the idea of the object is not form- 
 ed until these intuitions are combined by the 
 mind into unity in consciousness. In this 
 way ideas are formed out of intuitions. Ideas 
 are then formed into judgments, by the un- 
 derstanding, recalling the notion of unity, and 
 thereby combining them. Intuitions are thus, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 281 
 
 the matter of ideas, and ideas are the matter of, 
 judgements. The next and the highest step 
 in knowledge, is to bring judgements to unity, 
 which is done by reasoning— by combining 
 the judgements under the forms of the reason, 
 or according to the laws of thought. 
 
 But there are certain a priori conceptions 
 of the reason, which belong to the same class 
 with the idea of cause, that constitute the con- 
 ditions on which all these operations depend, 
 and without which, these operations are im- 
 possible. All intuitions are^ for example, re- 
 duced to unity under the a priori conceptions 
 of time and space. All ideas are reduced 
 to unity under the a priori conceptions of 
 quantity, quality, relation or modality, call- 
 ed after the manner of Aristotle, the cate- 
 gories. And lastly, the unity of judgements 
 is produced under the a priori conception, 
 either of substance, the absolute totality 
 of phenomena, or of a supreme being which 
 contains all others. All these fundamental 
 notions are called the forms of reason, and 
 reason with respect to them, is called pure 
 
 reason. They are a priori conceptions of the 
 
 .24* 
 
282 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 reason itself, produced by its own spontanie- 
 ty, or existing in its spontaniety, and are not 
 furnished by experience. 
 
 Every act of knowledge therefore, is de- 
 pendent on the a priori conceptions of the 
 reason. Without them, there can be neither 
 ideas, judgements nor reasoning. These a 
 priori conceptions are inherent in the mind ; 
 and without them, the mind could have no 
 knowledge. They are the conditions, as well 
 as the measure by which knowledge is tested. 
 It is manifest then, that the logical relations of 
 these a priori conceptions of the reason, are 
 precisely the same with those of innate ideas, 
 and have exactly the same function in the 
 method of investigation. And accordingly, 
 Kant maintained an a priori method of inves- 
 tigation, just as Plato and Des Cartes with 
 their innate ideas, and Aristotle with his em- 
 pirical general conceptions, did. He main- 
 tained that the great work in building up 
 philosophy, consists in establishing the great- 
 est possible unity of judgements; and that 
 this is done by reasoning. He maintained, 
 that there are three general forms of reason- 
 ing, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 283 
 
 disjunctive ; and that each of these forms of 
 reasoning are dependent for its validity upon 
 a priori conceptions of the reason, which give 
 unity to the judgements embraced in the pro- 
 cesses. What he means by categorical reas- 
 oning is when the conclusion is embraced in 
 the very conception of the premises; and is 
 what we have exhibited as the reasoning pro- 
 cess. But what he calls hypothetical reason- 
 ing^ is what we have exhibited as induction, 
 and is not reasoning at all, as we have shown. 
 We will pass over disjunctive reasoning, as of 
 no use in our inquiry ; as we have shown al- 
 ready, that there is but one process of reason- 
 ing, and consequently our doctrine excludes 
 this form of reasoning, as distinct from cata- 
 gorical reasoning which we have shown to be 
 the process of reasoning. 
 
 Let us then, dwell upon what Kant calls 
 hypothetical reasoning ; as this is the one, of 
 his three forms of reasoning, to which we 
 wish to direct especial attention ! This form 
 of reasoning is what we mean by induction, 
 as has been said before. Now Kant main- 
 tained that experience cannot furnish the fun- 
 
284 
 
 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 damental notion upon which the validity of 
 hypothetical reasoning or induction, depends, 
 viz : the notion of the absolute totality of phe- 
 nomena. That the all of the conclusion is 
 not embraced in the some of the premises ; 
 for however large the number of facts observ- 
 ed, the number is limited and represents noth- 
 ing absolute ; and that consequently, the rea- 
 son must furnish, the a priori conception of 
 the absolute totality of phenomena, which 
 gives validity to the process. As we have 
 already examined at large the nature of the 
 inductive process, and shown that it is not a 
 reasoning process at all as this theory of Kant 
 assumes, but that it is radically distinct from 
 the reasoning process, what is there said 
 shows the futility of this doctrine. And we 
 have shown that it is by a fundamental law of 
 thought, that we draw the inductive inference 
 of the all in the conclusion, from the some in 
 the premises, or more properly, instances; 
 and that it is upon the quantum of evidence 
 (the number of particulars and the strength 
 of their analogies,) that the validity of the in- 
 ductive inference depends ; and that from the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 2S5 
 
 constitution of our nature, we confide in the 
 truth of the universal inference, just as we 
 do in the validity of what we see or are con- 
 scious of. The validity therefore, of the in- 
 ductive conclusion, does not depend upon any 
 a priori conception of the absolute totality 
 of phenomena. And if it did, it would be 
 equally valid, whether many or few par- 
 ticulars are examined ; and thus the nature 
 of induction as a process founded upon evi- 
 dence — upon the number of particulars ob- 
 served, — would be denied, and it be made a 
 logical process deriving its validity from a lo- 
 gical basis, contrary to the intrinsic nature of 
 the whole process.* 
 
 This theory of Kant also leads to skepti- 
 cism, as we have before said. He maintains, 
 as the quotation made above shows, that these 
 a priori conceptions of the reason have no 
 objective reality, nothing corresponding to 
 them, in nature , and that consequently, what 
 are called laws of nature, are nothing but the 
 
 *Note. Notwithstanding the utter incompatibility of the Kantian doctrine 
 of a priori conceptions, with the inductive method of investigation, repudia- 
 ting as it does the theory of mind upon which this method rests, Professor 
 Whewcll of Cambridge, England, in his philosophical writings has attempted 
 .to combine theru into a system. 
 
286 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 laws of our minds, imposed as it were upon 
 nature : the phenomena of nature necessarily 
 passing before the mind's comprehension in 
 the order which these regulative principles of 
 the thoughts called a priori conceptions, give 
 to them. His philosophy therefore, as set 
 forth in his chief work, " The Critique of 
 Pure Reason" leads to Atheism just as inevi- 
 tably as Hume's, from the negative pole of 
 which it sprung. And so sensible was Kant 
 of. this consequence, that in his " Critique of 
 Practical Reason" he endeavored to base nat- 
 ural theology in the moral part of our nature, 
 overlooking the fact, that as all the ideas must 
 still be furnished by the reason, he was still en- 
 tangled in the toils of his peculiar logical theory. 
 This a priori element of the Kantian phi- 
 losophy pervades in some shape or other, the 
 whole of the German philosophy, filling it 
 with all the error which we have shown must 
 result from the doctrine of innate ideas ; and 
 in the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel con- 
 summating its fullest developement, by going 
 the extravagant length of making the absolute 
 which is perceived by a sort of intuition, em- 
 brace the whole of existence and knowledge 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 287 
 
 And as this a priori elements in its connection 
 with logic, the same as the doctrine of innate 
 ideas, we have sometimes in this discourse 
 used language relative to the German philos- 
 ophy which perhaps requires this explanation ; 
 for otherwise it might perhaps be thought, 
 that we intended to teach, that the doctrine 
 of innate ideas in the form taught by Plato 
 and Des Cartes pervaded the German philos- 
 ophy. All that we mean by such expressions, 
 and we use them for convenience, in our ex- 
 tensive generalizations, is that the doctrine of 
 innate ideas and that of a priori conceptions 
 of the reason, are logically the same. They 
 both equally put knowledge upon an a priori 
 basis, and are both therefore psychological 
 correlatives of the a priori method of investi- 
 gation, though, the doctrine of innate ideas 
 is more strictly so : logically they are the 
 same doctrine, differing only in form and de- 
 gree. And in accordance with this view of 
 their logical identity, we sometimes speak of 
 all a priori systems as transcendental; because 
 they all equally maintain that there are in the 
 mind, a priori conceptions which transcend 
 the sphere of phenomena ; and are neither 
 
288 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 circumscribed by experience, nor derived 
 from it, by the activity of the mind exercised 
 upon its phenomena. 
 
 We have now, in the two chapters of the 
 second part of this discourse, exhibited an 
 outline of the method of investigation, the 
 processes, the starting-points and the founda- 
 tions, of the English or inductive philosophy, 
 and contrasted them with those of the a priori 
 system of philosophy, in order that men may 
 see, from the contrast, how solid are the foun- 
 dations of the philosophy which has formed 
 the opinions and mental habits of the Anglo- 
 Saxon race; and also that men may have 
 a touchstone of philosophical criticism, by 
 which to test the reigning speculations of the 
 day. For such is the increasing taste, in both 
 this country and England, for the transcen- 
 dental speculations of the German and French 
 philosophers, that unless something is done, 
 to check its progress, our old English philos- 
 phy will be cut loose from its strong anchor 
 of common sense ; and be driven off from its 
 ancient moorings, to be dashed and tossed by 
 every wind of speculation, upon the bound- 
 less ocean of skepticism. 
 
PART THE THIRD. 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 ITS PLACE AMONGST THE SCIENCES; AND ITS EVIDENCES 
 
 The second part of this discourse, not only 
 teaches the true method of investigation, but 
 it also may be employed as a touchstone of 
 philosophical criticism, to direct and enlight- 
 en the judgement in philosophy, just as rhet- 
 oric is a touchstone of literary criticism, to 
 direct and refine the taste in literature. We 
 will therefore, in this third part of the dis- 
 course apply the logical and psychological 
 principles developed in the second part, 
 by way of philosophical criticism, to Lord 
 Brougham's Discourse of Natural Theology, 
 and Hume's Essay on a Special Providence 
 and a Future State, in order to show how the 
 errors of both these productions may be de- 
 tected by the application of these principles ; 
 and also make it manifest, that Natural The- 
 ology is a branch of the Baconian or inductive 
 25 
 
290 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy, and is supported by every prin- 
 ciple of that philosophy, both logical and 
 psychological : and thus, while we show the 
 importance of the second part of this dis- 
 course as a touchstone of philosophical criti- 
 cism, at the same time put to rest the ig- 
 norant assertion which we noticed in the 
 first part of this discourse, that the Baconian 
 philosophy leads to atheism. 
 
 With a view then to these objects, let us 
 enquire what is the proper place of Natural 
 Theology amongst the sciences, and what is 
 the nature of the evidence upon which it 
 rests ! 
 
 Natural theology is a branch of the induc- 
 tive philosophy, and is founded upon the 
 same sort of evidence, as that upon which 
 natural philosophy and metaphysics are bas- 
 ed. Lord Brougham in his " Discourse of 
 Natural Theology," enunciates this proposi- 
 tion; and the whole design of his work is 
 to establish it ; but he has in the very out-set, 
 most strangely assumed a false notion in re- 
 gard to the nature of the evidences on which 
 natural, theology rests ; and then endeavors 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 291 
 
 by a laboured analysis, to show, that the evi- 
 dences on which natural philosophy and met- 
 aphysics are based, are of the same character. 
 He assumes that all the evidences upon which 
 natural theology rests are deductive ; and then 
 endeavors to show, that all the evidences 
 are deductive also, on which natural philos- 
 ophy and metaphysics repose. Nothing can 
 be more erroneous than these notions ; and 
 more flimsy sophistry was never employed 
 to sustain error, than the noble author has 
 pressed into his service. A false notion in 
 logic which runs through the whole discourse, 
 led him into these errors. This false notion 
 in logic, is the confounding the fundamen- 
 tal laws of belief with reasoning ; and con- 
 founding reasoning with simple compari- 
 son. Indeed, the author's logical doctrines 
 go the full length of rejecting altogether per- 
 ception and consciousness,and substituting the 
 process of reasoning in their stead. On pa- 
 ges 18 — 21, he remarks : " The careless 
 inquirer into physical truth would certainly 
 think he had seized on a sound principle of 
 classification, if he should divide the objects 
 
292 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 with which philosophy, natural and mental, 
 is conversant, into two classes — those objects 
 of which we know the existence by our sen- 
 ses, or our consciousness ; that is external ob- 
 jects which we see, touch, taste, and smell, 
 internal ideas which we conceive or remem- 
 ber, or emotions which we feel — and those 
 objects of which we only know the existence 
 by a process of reasoning, founded upon 
 something originally presented by the senses or 
 by consciousness.^ The author then goes on, 
 with a tissue of the most egregious sophistry, 
 to refute the truth of this classification ; and 
 after citing a great many instances of truths, 
 which are generally supposed to be ascertain- 
 ed by perception and consciousness, and not 
 by reasoning, he asks : a But can we say 
 that there is no process of reasoning even in 
 the simplest case which we have supposed 
 our reasoner to put — the existence of the 
 three kingdoms, of nature, of the heavenly 
 bodies, of the mind ? It is certain that there 
 is in every one of these cases a process of 
 reasoning," Now, is it not making wild 
 work with mental philosophy, to assert that 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 293 
 
 the existence of external objects, and even 
 the existence of the mind is ascertained by 
 processes of reasoning ? Why ! what can 
 the author mean by reasoning ? Let him an- 
 swer for himself ! On page 20, in arguing 
 this very point, he says : " The very idea of 
 diversity implies reasoning, for it is the re- 
 sult of a comparison. " Here, he evidently 
 confounds reasoning with simple comparison ; 
 as will appear by throwing the argument into 
 a syllogism ; because the major premiss will 
 be — "Whatever is the result of a comparison, 
 implies reasoning ;" w r hich is virtually as- 
 serting that comparing is reasoning. Where- 
 as, reasoning is a comparing of two terms 
 with a third term, and drawing a conclusion 
 from the comparison, that the two terms agree 
 with each other, from the fact that they agree 
 with the same third term, or that they disa- 
 gree with each other, from the fact that one of 
 them agrees, and the other disagrees with the 
 same third term.* So then, in every act of 
 
 *Note. As it would embarrass us by the number of notes, to notice every 
 application of the logical and psychological principles in this criticism, we will 
 merely direct attention to this instance, and leave the other instances to the 
 reader's own observation. See pages 143-4. 
 
 25* 
 
294 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 reasoning there are three acts ol comparison, 
 two simple and one inferential ; and therefore 
 to say that simple comparison is reasoning, 
 is grossly erroneous. Now, what is the pro- 
 cess of reasoning, by which the existence of 
 such an object of sense as a tree, is ascertain- 
 ed ? We should like to see the argument in 
 the form of a syllogism. But the notion that 
 the existence of the mind is ascertained by 
 reasoning and not by consciousness, is the 
 grossest absurdity in the whole discourse. 
 Reasoning is the deducing something un- 
 known, from something known. Now, what 
 is it, from which the existence of the mind is 
 deduced, which was known before the exis- 
 tence of the mind was known ? What is the 
 major premiss of such a conclusion ? And if 
 every object of sense and of consciousness is 
 ascertained by reasoning, is deduced from 
 something previously known — how did we 
 acquire the knowledge from which it is de- 
 duced ? Let this question be put in infini- 
 tum; and what answer can be given to it, on 
 Lord Brougham's theory ? There must be a 
 beginning some where ; and this rebuts the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 295 
 
 presumption that all our knowledge is ascer- 
 tained by reasoning. The truth is Lord 
 Brougham's discourse is replete with logical 
 blunders ; and he contradicts himself over and 
 over again, and evinces the greatest looseness 
 and confusion of opinion in regard to the gen- 
 eral doctrines of logic. For example : — on 
 page 39, he says ; "The consciousness of exis- 
 tence, the perpetual sense that we are think- 
 ing, and that we are performing the operation 
 quite independently of all material objects, 
 proves to us the existence of a being dif- 
 ferent from our bodies, with a degree of ev- 
 idence higher than any we can have for the 
 existence of those bodies themselves, or of 
 any other part of the material world. " 
 How can this sentence be reconciled with the 
 doctrine before advanced, that the existence 
 of our mind is ascertained by reasoning ? Is 
 it not emphatically asserted here, that its ex- 
 istence is ascertained by consciousness, u The 
 perpetual sense that we are thinking ? " And 
 on page 41, in discoursing of the faculties of 
 the mind, he says — " Among the most re- 
 markable of these, is the power of reasoning, 
 
S96 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or first comparing ideas and drawing conclu- 
 sions from the comparison, and then compar- 
 ing together these conclusions or judge- 
 ments." Is not this definition of reasoning, 
 altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis 
 that all comparison is reasoning? which is 
 assumed as the basis of all the logical doc- 
 trines advanced in the first section of the dis- 
 course ; though we are sure it was assumed 
 inadvertently: yet without this assumption, 
 the doctrines have not even the semblance of 
 plausibility, and even with it they are alto- 
 gether untenable ; because it would then be 
 necessary to assume, that in every act of per- 
 ception and consciousness, there is compari- 
 son ; which is preposterous. There are many 
 other logical errors in the discourse, such as 
 confounding induction with reasoning : but 
 our limits will not permit us to make quota- 
 tions in proof of this point. 
 
 We think that it is now apparent, that 
 Lord Brougham was in error when he assum- 
 ed that all the evidences of natural theology 
 are deductive ; for they are evidently of both 
 kinds — some intuitive and some deductive, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 297 
 
 just as in all other inductive sciences. In 
 other words, some of its evidences rest upon 
 perception and consciousness and some upon 
 reasoning. It is impossible to distinguish 
 what items of evidence or knowledge are as- 
 certained by perception and consciousness, 
 and what by reasoning, in every instance ; 
 yet it is easy to draw a line of difference be- 
 tween them by general definition; for every 
 one knows that they differ widely from each 
 other. It is therefore impossible, and we do 
 not think that it is desirable, (for it is the 
 case of every other inductive science) to 
 show what amount of the evidence of natu- 
 ral theology, is founded upon perception and 
 consciousness, and what amount upon reason- 
 ing. All that is requisite (if it be requisite 
 at all to consider its evidences in this divis- 
 ion) is to show in a general way that some 
 of its evidences are founded upon the one, 
 and some upon the other ; and this is so easily 
 done, and we conceive it to be of so little 
 importance,, that we will not make a particu- 
 lar topic of it ; but will merely ask the rea- 
 der to bear the matter in mind as he passes 
 over the sequel of this part of our discourse. 
 
29S THE 'BACONIAN" PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Let us return to the proposition with which 
 we set out, that natural theology is a branch 
 of the inductive philosophy ; and is founded 
 upon the same sort of evidence, as that upon 
 which natural philosophy and metaphysics are 
 based ; which it is the object of this part of 
 our discourse to establish, and which it was 
 also the object of Lord Brougham's discourse 
 to establish. The same error which per- 
 vades the first section, which is the portion 
 of the discourse that we have been consider- 
 ing, runs through all the other sections ; and 
 superadded to this, there is in the second and 
 third sections a continual dodging of the 
 chief difficulty which the discourse was de- 
 signed to remove — the difficulty of " explain- 
 ing" as the author says on page 10, u the na- 
 ture of the evidence upon which it (natural 
 theology) rests — of showing that it is a sci- 
 ence the truths of which are discovered by 
 induction, like the truths of natural and moral 
 philosophy — that it is a branch of science par- 
 taking of the nature of each of those great 
 divisions of human knowledge, and not merely 
 closely allied to them both." All this will appear 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 299 
 
 as we proceed. We will therefore endeavor 
 to establish the proposition with which we set 
 out; by meeting the difficulties, which our 
 author shunned ; and will at the same time, 
 show how he has shunned them, and thus 
 point out the defects in his discourse, while 
 we supply them; or by pointing out in what 
 they consist, show how they may be supplied. 
 Natural theology branches off into two 
 paths of inquiry concurrently, or rather iden- 
 tically with natural philosophy and metaphys- 
 ics; for in inquiring into the structure and 
 relations of the physical and spiritual worlds, 
 which are respectively, the objects of natural 
 philosophy and metaphysics, the evidences of 
 their origin and destiny which are the ob- 
 jects of natural theology, are necessarily, re- 
 vealed to us, and forced upon our attention. 
 In our inquiries into the physical and spirit- 
 ual worlds, we cannot but observe the eviden- 
 ces of design displayed in them : in other 
 words, when we are studying natural philos- 
 ophy and metaphysics, the evidences of nat- 
 ural theology lie in our path at every step — 
 we behold the footsteps of. God imprinted, 
 
300 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 on every part of these domains of inquiry, 
 " The same induction of facts, " says Lord 
 Brougham, u which leads to a knowledge of 
 the structure of the eye and its functions in 
 the animal economy, leads us to the knowl- 
 edge of its adaptation to the properties of 
 light. It is a truth in physics, in the strictest 
 sense of the word, that vision is performed 
 by the eye refracting light, and making it 
 converge to a focus on the retina ; and that 
 the peculiar combination of its lenses, and the 
 different materials they are composed of, cor- 
 rect the indistinctness which would otherwise 
 arise from the different refrangibility of light : 
 in other words, make the eye an achromatic 
 instrument. But if this is not also a truth in 
 natural theology, it is a position from which, 
 by the shortest possible process of reasoning, 
 we arrive at a theological truth — namely, that 
 the instrument so successfully performing a 
 given service by means of this curious struc- 
 ture, must have been formed with a knowl- 
 edge of the properties of light." We have 
 made this quotation both for the purpose of 
 illustrating our position, and at the same time 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 301 
 
 pointing out the defect, which runs through 
 the whole discourse, of dodging the real dif- 
 ficulty, as is done in this quotation ; for this 
 may be taken as a favourable sample of the 
 instances in which the author explains the 
 mental transition from the apprehension of a 
 truth in natural philosophy, to the apprehen- 
 sion of a truth in natural theology. In no 
 instance, has he explained it more accurately ; 
 for in many instances, he leaps the chasm 
 which separates the truths of the two scien- 
 ces, or bridges it over with a mere asser- 
 tion ; and thus passes by the very point to be 
 proved. For example: he concludes the 
 very paragraph, which we are now consider- 
 ing, thus : — " These things are truths in both 
 physics and theology ; they are truths taught 
 by the self-same process of investigation, and 
 resting upon the self-same kind of evidence. 5 ' 
 This conclusion is preceded by no analysis 
 indicating its truth : but merely by statemen ts 
 of facts in natural philosophy relative to the 
 laws of light and their adaptation to the struc- 
 ture of the eye. So again, on page 51, after 
 
 citing many examples of design in the psycho- 
 
 28 
 
302 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 logical world, when he comes to prove that 
 the theological doctrine inferrible from the 
 examples, rests upon the same sort of ev- 
 idence, as that upon which intellectual and 
 natural science rests, he passes over the very 
 point to be proved by this assertion : — " The 
 kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, 
 that by which we conduct all the investiga- 
 tions of intellectual and natural science. " But 
 to return from this exposition, to the quota- 
 tion above. The proposition^ " that the eye 
 is an achromatic instrument," is certainly not 
 a truth in natural theology ; though it is evi- 
 dence which proves a truth in natural theol- 
 gy — that it was made by an intelligent agent. 
 For it is one thing to inquire into the uses of 
 an object, and another to inquire into its ori- 
 gin — whether it was manufactured or not? 
 One thing, to enquire into the structure of a 
 watch, and another to inquire whether it was 
 manufactured or produced spontaneously — 
 to inquire into the use of a thing, and wheth- 
 er it was designed and fabricated for that use. 
 But is the proposition " that the eye is an 
 achromatic instrument, a position from which 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 303 
 
 by the shortest possible process of reasoning, 
 we arrive at a theological truth ?" May we 
 not arrive at the doctrine, that the eye was 
 made by an intelligent agent, simultaneously 
 with the discovery that the eye is an achro- 
 matic instrument ? Is not evidence of both 
 truths revealed at the same time ? Or are 
 not both truths, different convictions produc- 
 ed by the same evidence, owing to different 
 views of it? For example: — in inquiring 
 into the functions of the eye on mechanical 
 principles, with a view to ascertain what 
 mechanical design it evinces, the only evi- 
 dence of design, would be its round form, 
 which makes it move more easily in the sock- 
 et, so as to enable us to look about more read- 
 ily ; and the eye lids, which serve as a pro- 
 tection, and for the purpose of shutting up the 
 eye, to prevent us from seeing when we de- 
 sire to sleep. And these would be all the 
 evidences of design, which optics would afford 
 one acquainted with mechanics and anatomy, 
 but ignorant of the laws of light. And thus 
 stood the evidences of natural theology af- 
 forded by optics, until Sir Isaac Newton dis- 
 
304 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 covered the different refrangibility of the dif- 
 ferent rays of light. This discovery in natu- 
 ral science, now enabled us to discover the 
 design of the other peculiar conformation of 
 the eye — that its lenses refract light and make 
 it converge to a focus, and paint an image 
 on the retina. Here, then, as optics progress 
 other evidences of design are revealed ; and 
 natural theology keeps pace with optics. Still 
 our knowledge of optics is imperfect. Mr. 
 Dolland discovers another law of nature — 
 the dispersive powers of different substances; 
 and this enables us to ascertain that the pecu- 
 liar materials which the lenses of the eye are 
 composed of, correct the indistinctness of vi- 
 sion, that would otherwise be produced by the 
 different refrangibility of the different rays 
 of light : and thus another adaptation of 
 means to an end, is discovered ; and the ev- 
 idences of natural theology evinced by the 
 human eye are complete. The science of 
 optics is now investigated in reference to 
 compartative anatomy ; and it is here discov- 
 ered, that the conformation of the eye is va- 
 ried to suit, the different necessities of each 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 305 
 
 animal. If the animal prowl by night, the 
 conformation of the eye is such as to enable 
 him to see in the dark : if he be amphibious, 
 his eye is formed so as to suit the vision to 
 the mediums of both air and water , if he 
 be acquatic, his eye is constructed wholly 
 with reference to the adaptation of light to 
 water ; and this change of conformation to 
 diversity of circumstances, is seen through- 
 out the whole science of comparative anato- 
 my. In this investigation, it is perfectly ob- 
 vious, that the truths of natural theology were 
 revealed to us simultaneously with the truths 
 in optics ; for the truths of optics are the ev- 
 idences of the truths of natural theology. 
 In fact, the very idea of contrivance involves 
 the idea of a contriver ; and it may be doubt- 
 ed, whether in the acquisition of knowledge, 
 the idea of a contriver or agent, is not first in 
 chronological order ; it certainly is, if either 
 be prior. It is also obvious, that the pro- 
 cess of investigation is the same in optics and 
 natural theology ; for truths in both sciences 
 were discovered in the same investigation ; 
 
 just as anatomical truths, and the truth of the 
 
 26* 
 
306 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 different refrangibility of the rajs of light, 
 and the truth of the refractive powers of dif- 
 ferent substances, and of the dispersive pow- 
 ers of substances, also, might have been dis- 
 covered in the same process of investigation. 
 All these various truths belonging to differ- 
 ent sciences, may be discovered by the self- 
 same inductive process; just as in an analysis 
 of any complex phenomenon, truths belong- 
 ing to different sciences are always discover- 
 ed, in the resolution of such a phenomenon 
 into its several causes. The process of in- 
 vestigation in natural theology, is just as ob- 
 viously inductive, as that in physical science. 
 For example — one instance of adaptation of 
 means to ends, is discovered, and another, 
 and another, until the observer is forced by 
 the laws of his mind, to believe, that so many 
 contrivances adjusted so nicely for bringing 
 about certain ends, must have been fabricated 
 for the purpose, by some agent of knowledge 
 competent to the task. 
 
 It is manifest, then, that the evidence of 
 natural theology is of precisely the same 
 character, as that on which natural philoso- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 307 
 
 phy rests ; and like all other evidence, pro- 
 duces conviction when contemplated, indepen- 
 dently of our volition. Its evidences cannot 
 be comprehended, without our being persua- 
 ded of its truths. That some have not been 
 persuaded of its truths, though they have un- 
 derstood the evidences, or perceived the de- 
 signs, does not result from the fact that the 
 evidences had no tendency to convince them ; 
 but because preconceived opinions overruled 
 or counteracted the force of these evidences : 
 so that their opinions do not result from any 
 inherent defect in the testimony any more 
 than the inefficiency of medicines in some 
 cases, does not result from the defect of the 
 medicines but from the condition of the pa- 
 tients. The instant we discover contrivance, 
 adaptation of means to ends, in any part of 
 creation, whether in the physical or spiritual 
 worlds, we are irresistibly led to infer an in- 
 telligent artificer. Who, for instance, can 
 read the Bridgewater Treatises, and contem- 
 plate the innumerable instances of contriv- 
 ance, adaptations of means to ends, order, 
 and harmony, there collected, and not be con- 
 
308 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 vinced that such innumerable arrangements 
 so conducive to purposes, and so certainly ac- 
 complishing them, and in many instances ac- 
 complishing them by such a number and vari- 
 ety of means changed to suit a change of cir- 
 cumstances, all working to accomplish partic- 
 ular purposes which are important in them- 
 selves, and yet, by the harmony of their ac- 
 tion accomplishing with unerring certainty, 
 and in some instances, at such long and regu- 
 lar intervals of time, the main purpose of 
 all the arrangements combined, must have 
 been made by design ; and that an agent ex- 
 ists capable of contriving the whole — of con- 
 ceiving the purposes, and adapting the means, 
 and adjusting them so nicely, for execut- 
 ing these purposes? A much more limited 
 induction of instances of any other class, 
 would convince any one, of any truth in phys- 
 ical science. The most cautious philosophers 
 are continually inferring physical causes from 
 a much more limited induction of facts. We 
 have, then, the same kind, if not the same 
 degree of evidence, and we will say the same 
 degree, for believing in the existence of an 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 309 
 
 intelligent first cause or agent, as we have for 
 believing in the existence of gravity or any 
 other physical cause. The evidence of the 
 one is just as obvious as that of the other — 
 shines with as bright a light from every part 
 of creation. Why, then, should it not strike 
 home upon the mind, as strong a conviction 
 of the peculiar doctrines which it teaches ? 
 Is it because we infer an invisible acent, from 
 sensible phenomena ? But may not this ques- 
 tion return upon him, who asks it, to know 
 whether we do not continually infer invisi- 
 ble physical causes from sensible phenom- 
 ena? Will it be said that the existence of 
 an intelligent artificer, cannot be proved by 
 contrivances, adaptations of means to ends, 
 order, and harmony, just as the existence 
 of a physical cause, can be proved by the 
 motions and changes around us ? It certainly 
 can; and the grounds, upon which the proofs 
 in both instances rest, will be pointed out in 
 the sequel, in treating of causation in connec- 
 tion with Hume's Essay. 
 
 We will not consider the branch of natural 
 theology, which runs identically with meta- 
 
310 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 physics, as the remarks upon the branch, 
 which we have considered, can be easily ap- 
 plied to that branch ; and the defects in Lord 
 Brougham's Discourse, are precisely the same 
 in both branches, and therefore need not be 
 pointed out in both. 
 
 As we have now examined the nature of 
 the evidence on which natural theology rests, 
 we will next endeavour to point out its exact 
 place among the sciences, and its precise rela- 
 tions to them. And this, we think, cannot 
 be done better, than by showing what Lord 
 Bacon has said on the subject ; especially too, 
 as we shall thereby vindicate the opinion of 
 this great man on this subject, from the idle 
 censures of blundering ignorance, or the wil- 
 ful perversions of envious detraction, endea- 
 vouring to cover over Lord Bacon's opinions, 
 in order that they may gain the credit of having 
 first discovered the proper place of natural 
 theology among the sciences ; when, in fact,all 
 that they have said truly on the subject, was 
 said in a general way by Bacon, and whenever 
 they have refused to follow this illustrious 
 guide, they have gone astray from the truth. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 311 
 
 Lord Bacon, in his Advancement of Learn- 
 ing, after speaking of history and poetry, 
 says : — u The knowledge of man is as the wa- 
 ters, some descending from above, and some 
 springing from beneath ; the one informed by 
 the light of nature, the other inspired by di- 
 vine revelation. So then according to these 
 two differing illuminations or originals, knowl- 
 edge is first of all fc divided into divinity and 
 philosophy. ^ 
 
 " In philosophy, the contemplations of man 
 do either penetrate unto God, — or are cir- 
 cumferred to nature, — or are reflected or re- 
 verted upon himself. Out of which several 
 inquiries, there do arise three knowledges, di- 
 vine philosophy, natural philosophy, and hu- 
 man philosophy or humanity. " — page 131, 
 Basil Montagu's edition. 
 
 " And as concerning divine philosophy or 
 natural theology, it is that knowledge or ru- 
 diment of knowledge concerning God, which 
 may be obtained by the contemplation of his 
 creatures; which knowledge may be truly 
 termed divine, in respect of the object, and na- 
 tural, in respect of the light. — For as all works 
 
312 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 do show forth the power and skill of the work- 
 man; so it is of the works of God, which do 
 show the omnipotency and wisdom of the 
 maker. Wherefore by the contemplation of 
 nature^ to induce and enforce the acknowl- 
 edgement of God, and to demonstrate his 
 power providence and goodness, is an excel- 
 lent argument, and hath been excellently han- 
 dled by divers."— Pages 135-6. 
 
 " Natural science or theory (natural phi- 
 losophy,) is divided into physique and meta- 
 physique : wherein I desire, it may be conceiv- 
 ed that I use the word metaphysique in a dif- 
 fering sense from that, that is received : and 
 in like manner, I doubt not it will easily ap- 
 pear to men of judgment, that in this and 
 other particulars wheresoever my conception 
 and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I 
 am studious to keep ancient terms. To re- 
 turn, therefore, to the use and acceptation of 
 the term metaphysique as I now understand 
 the word. It appeareth likewise, that natural 
 theology, which heretofore hath been handled 
 confusedly with metaphysique, I have enclos- 
 ed and bounded by itself. It is, therefore, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 313 
 
 now a question, what is left remaining for 
 metaphysique ; wherein I may without pre- 
 judice preserve thus much of the ancient of 
 antiquity, that physique should contemplate 
 that which is inherent in matter, and there- 
 fore transitory; and metaphysique should 
 handle that which supposes further in nature 
 a reason, understanding and platform — the 
 one part which is physique, inquireth and 
 handleth the material and efficient causes; 
 and the other which is metaphysique handleth 
 the formal and final causes." Pages 141-2. 
 
 " For metaphysique, we have assigned unto 
 it, the inquiry of formal and final causes. v 
 page 144. Lord Bacon then proceeds to in- 
 quire into formal causes, by which he means 
 causes of a higher degree than metaphysical 
 causes,in his meaning of this latter term, and 
 then proceeds to the second part of metaphy- 
 sique. 
 
 "The second part of metaphysique, is the 
 inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to 
 report not as omitted, but as misplaced ; and 
 yet it it were but a fault in order, I would not 
 
 speak of it ; for order is matter of illustra- 
 
 27 
 
314 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 tion, but pertaineth not to the substance of 
 sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a 
 deficience or at least a great improficience in 
 the sciences themselves. For the handling of 
 final causes, mixed with the rest in physical 
 enquiries, hath intercepted the severe and 
 diligent inquiry of all real and physical 
 causes, and given men occasion to stay upon 
 these satisfactory and specious causes, to the 
 great arrest and prejudice of further discov- 
 ery. Not because those final causes are not 
 true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept 
 within their own province ; but because 
 their excursions into the limits of physical 
 causes, has bred a vastness and solitude in 
 that track. For otherwise keeping their pre- 
 cincts and borders, men are extremely de- 
 ceived, if they think there is an enmity or re- 
 pugnancy at all between them. For the 
 cause rendered that the hairs about the eye- 
 lids are for a safeguard of the sight, doth not 
 impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is 
 incident to orifices of moisture; and so of 
 the rest : both causes being true and compat- 
 ible, the one declaring an intention, the other 
 a consequence only." Pages 148-150. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 316 
 
 It will be seen by these extracts, that Ba- 
 con first divides knowledge into divinity, 
 (revelation) and philosophy. He then pro- 
 ceeds to consider philosophy; and divides it 
 into three parts, divine philosophy or natural 
 theology, natural philosophy, and human philo- 
 sophy. As the first in order, he then treats of 
 natural theology, and says with great sagaci- 
 ty, that it u may be truly termed divine in 
 respect of the object, and natural in respect 
 of the light ;" that is, the subject of which 
 it treats, is divine, but the evidence on which 
 it rests is natural, or founded on the constitu- 
 tion of nature ; the very doctrine which Lord 
 Brougham's whole treatise was designed to 
 establish. He next proceeds to the consider- 
 ation of natural philosophy, and divides it 
 into physique and metaphysique ; and de- 
 fines the province of physique to be the in- 
 quiry into physical causes ; and after treating 
 of this branch of natural philosophy at some 
 length, he proceeds to the other branch, 
 which he calls metaphysique; and we be- 
 speak the particular attention of our readers 
 to this branch of Bacon's division of natural 
 
316 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy, asking them to bear constantly in 
 mind, the sense in which he uses the term, 
 as a part of natural philosophy, and not ac- 
 cording to its present acceptation, the science 
 which treats of mind. 
 
 Bacon defines metaphysique, to be that part 
 of natural philosophy which inquires into for- 
 mal and final causes, ^fter treating of formal 
 causes, by which he means causes of a higher 
 degree than physical causes, in his sense of 
 this latter term, he proceeds to consider final 
 causes. The term final causes, he uses in its 
 common acceptation, the designs manifested 
 in creation, " that the hairs about the eye-lids 
 are for a safe-guard of the sight ; that the 
 firmness of hides is for the armor of the body 
 against the extremities of heat or cold, de- 
 claring an intention and not a consequence 
 only. 55 He then, in order to do away the 
 evils which had resulted to philosophy, from 
 considering final causes confusedly with phy- 
 sical causes, " for the handling of final caus- 
 es mixed with the rest in physical inqui- 
 ries, had intercepted the severe and diligent 
 inquiry of all real and physical causes, " has 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 317 
 
 divided natural philosophy into two parts, 
 physique and metaphysique, in order to sep- 
 arate the two kinds of causes, and to prevent 
 final causes from being considered to the ex- 
 clusion of physical causes. However useless 
 such a division may be at this advanced stage 
 of science, it was necessary at the time Bacon 
 wrote ; for the consideration of final causes, 
 had led men from the consideration of physical 
 causes — "had given them occasion to stay 
 upon these satisfactory and specious causes, 
 to the great arrest and prejudice of further 
 discovery. ;? " To say" says Bacon, Ci that the 
 hairs of the eye-lids are for a quick-set and 
 a fence about the sight ; or that the firmness 
 of the skins and hides of living creatures is 
 to defend them from the extremities of heat 
 or cold, is welljnquired and collected in met- 
 aphysique : but in physique they are imperti- 
 nent. Not because those final causes are not 
 true and worthy to be inquired, being kept 
 within their own province (metaphysique) ; 
 but because their excursions into the limits of 
 physical causes hath bred a vastness and sol- 
 itude in that track." Bacon therefore, con- 
 27* 
 
318 THE BACONIAN FHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sidered final causes as a part of the evidence 
 on which natural philosophy rests ; and very 
 wisely too ; for some great discoveries in nat- 
 ural philosophy have been made by the light 
 of final causes. For example : — the discov- 
 ery of the circulation of the blood was acer- 
 tained by the consideration of final causes ; 
 as also were the two setts of nerves. And in- 
 deed without the evidence of final causes, little 
 progress would have been made in anatomy, 
 for it is by considering the supposed functions 
 of the different parts of the human system,that 
 its exact anatomy is ascertained ; as is evinc- 
 ed by the minute and useful anatomical re- 
 searches, the supposed functions of the liver, 
 the colon and other intestines are leading to, 
 in the structure of these organs ; while at the 
 same time, the structure of these organs is 
 aiding in ascertaining their functions ; and all 
 these again, conducting to a knowledge of 
 correct pathology. And we find that Locke 
 has used an argument founded upon fin- 
 al causes (the uses of the faculties) against 
 the doctrine of innate ideas, thus making 
 final causes evidence in intellectual philoso- 
 
THE BACONIAN THILOSOFUY. 319 
 
 phy. (C For any one will easily grant," says 
 he, " that it would be impertinent to suppose 
 the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to 
 whom God has given sight and a power to re- 
 ceive them by the eyes from external objects : 
 and no less unreasonable would itbe to attribute 
 several truths to the impressions of nature 
 and innate characters, when we may observe 
 in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and 
 certain knowledge of them., as if they were 
 originally imprinted on the mind." 
 
 We see then, that Bacon makes final causes 
 evidence in natural philosophy, that part of it 
 embraced in the division which he calls meta- 
 physique. Now natural theology also, rests 
 entirely upon the evidence of final causes, the 
 contrivances and adaptations of means to ends 
 manifested in creation; and therefore Lord 
 Bacon has with great sagacity, distinguished 
 the use of final causes as evidence in natural 
 philosophy, by bounding natural theology to 
 itself. " Natural theology," says Bacon, 
 "which heretofore hath been handled con- 
 fusedly with metaphysique (his sense of the 
 term) I have bounded by itself. " Before Ba- 
 
320 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 con's time, men had, in handling final causes 
 considered them as evidence in both natural 
 philosophy and natural theology in one and 
 the same treatise ; thus confounding the two 
 sciences together, and retarding the progress 
 of both. At one moment they would in the 
 same inquiry,consider the theological doctrine 
 based upon final causes, and at the next mo- 
 ment, consider the philosophical doctrine 
 based upon them ; to the utter confusion of 
 all connected thought and definite inquiry. 
 Bacon then, considers final causes in two 
 points of view — first as evidence in natural 
 theology ; and secondly, as evidence in natural 
 philosophy. We believe that every writer 
 on natural theology, has overlooked the fact 
 that Bacon, has made this twofold division of 
 the enquiry into final causes. This oversight 
 has arisen from the fact, that Bacon does not 
 use the term final causes, when he speaks of 
 natural theology ; and also from the fact, that 
 he uses the term metaphysique in a different 
 sense from its present acceptation. And all 
 writers who have quoted the concluding re- 
 marks on metaphysique, " not because those 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 321 
 
 final causes are not true and worthy to be in- 
 quired,being kept within their own province/' 
 have supposed that Bacon meant, natural 
 theology, by u their own province ;" where- 
 as the whole tenor of the argument shows, 
 that he means, that part of natural philoso- 
 phy, which he calls metaphysique. He is 
 showing that final causes have not been kept 
 within the province of metaphysique \ but 
 have been considered confusedly with physi- 
 cal causes — " that their excursions into the 
 limits of physical causes, hath bred a vastness 
 and solitude in that track. For otherwise, 
 keeping their precincts and borders (meta- 
 physique) men are extremely deceived, if 
 they think, there is an enmity or repugnancy 
 at all between them ; " that is between phys- 
 ical causes and final causes, both as evidence 
 in natural philosophy : and this is the more 
 obvious, as Bacon never applies the term final 
 causes to the contrivances of nature, when 
 considered as evidence in natural theology, 
 but only when considered as evidence in na- 
 tural philosophy ; thus affording evidence of 
 the maturity and precision of his reflections 
 
322 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 upon this point. Let any one read Bacon's 
 writings with this view of his doctrines in re- 
 gard to final causes, and the occasional re- 
 marks which appear to disparage the inquiry 
 into final causes., can be easily reconciled with 
 the doctrines so deliberately expressed in the 
 Advancement of Learning, 
 
 It is manifest that Lord Bacon considered 
 natural theology a branch of the inductive 
 philosophy, based upon the same sort of evi- 
 dence, as that upon which natural philosophy 
 and metaphysics rest, " it being natural in 
 respect of the light, though divine in respect 
 of the object." He makes it a branch of phi- 
 losophy because its evidence is founded in na- 
 ture ; not a branch of divinity, its evidence 
 being derived from revelation. " The knowl- 
 edge of man " says he, u is as the waters, 
 some descending from above, and some spring- 
 ing from beneath ; the one is informed by the 
 light of nature, the other inspired by divine 
 revelation. So according to these two differ- 
 ent illuminations or originals (different sorts 
 of evidence) knowledge is first of all, divid- 
 ed into divinity and philosophy." Now, has 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 323 
 
 not Bacon defined the place of natural theol- 
 ogy among the sciences, and pointed out its 
 relations to them, with at least as much pre- 
 cision as Lord Brougham ? Why, then, does 
 Lord Brougham write his whole discourse, as 
 though he claimed the merit of assigning to 
 natural theology, its true place among the 
 sciences. It is true, that one section of the 
 discourse, is taken up with the consideration 
 of what Bacon had said upon the subject ; 
 but after quoting detached remarks of Bacon 
 upon final causes, which were not spoken in 
 reference to natural theology at all ; and ex- 
 pressing many misapprehensions of Bacon's 
 meaning, he concludes, that on the whole, 
 " when rightly examined, then, the authority 
 of Lord Bacon appears not to oppose the 
 doctrine which we are seeking to illustrate." 
 " Appears not to oppose ! " So then all that 
 the noble author could see, in the elaborate 
 care and extreme precision, with which Ba- 
 con has defined the boundaries of natural the- 
 ology, and indicated the nature of the evi- 
 dence on which it rests (for he has been 
 a3 careful about natural theology, in this 
 
324 THE BACCWIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 respect ; as about any other science), is that 
 he appears not to oppose the science of 
 natural theology. Is this ignorance? oris 
 it wilful perversion, desiring to establish 
 his own claim to the merit of discovering the 
 place which natural theology holds among 
 the sciences? This Olympic Jupiter of British 
 criticism, has no right to complain of the se- 
 verity of our strictures; for he has been for 
 the last twenty years continually hurling his 
 bolts, without the least mercy, upon authors 
 in every department of literature, and while 
 we have pointed out the errors which more 
 than disfigure his discourse, we here gladly 
 acknowledge, that it throws the light of much 
 learning, upon the subject of natural theolo- 
 gy, and contains some specimens of fine writ- 
 ing, that entitle its author to stand in the 
 very first rank of the great masters of diction. 
 As we have shown, that natural theology is 
 a branch of the inductive philosophy^ and is 
 based upon the same sort of evidence, as that 
 upon which natural philosophy and metaphy- 
 sics repose, we will next proceed to combat 
 the objections which have been urged against 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 325 
 
 it, and to point out the chief source of the er- 
 ror of the objections ; and in doing this, to 
 extend our inquiry still further into the evi- 
 dences of natural theology, until we trace 
 them up to the very origin of the main idea 
 on which the whole science rests. 
 
 Many philosophers, and amongst them, 
 Des Cartes and Leibnitz, men of immense ge- 
 nius, and of vast attainments in every de- 
 partment of knowledge, have decried final 
 causes, as unworthy to be admitted within the 
 circle of legitimate philosophical evidence. 
 La Place, too, one of the most illustrious 
 names of modern times, has rejected final 
 causes from philosophy. " Let us run over/' 
 says he, " the history of the progress of the 
 human mind and its errors : we shall perpet- 
 ually see final causes pushed away to the 
 bounds of knowledge. The causes which 
 Newton removed to the limits of the solar 
 system, were long ago employed in explain- 
 ing meteors. They are therefore, in the 
 eyes of the philosopher, nothing more than 
 the expression of the ignorance in which 
 
 we are, of most real causes.'' But so far as 
 28 
 
326 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 authority goes, it is decidedly favourable to 
 the evidences of final causes. To say noth- 
 ing of the many distinguished writers of the 
 present day, we can point to the father of in- 
 ductive philosophy, to Copernicus, to Kep- 
 ler, and to the great genius of the human 
 race, the man who had drunk as deep into 
 the fountains of true philosophy, as any one 
 who ever lived, as having borne their testimo- 
 ny in their favour. After Newton had pas- 
 sed on, in his sublime career, from planet to 
 planet, and from system to system, until he 
 had stepped from the golden ladder of geom- 
 etry, upon the remotest star ; when he looked 
 down and saw how far he was above the high- 
 est point to, which any other philosopher had 
 ever climbed, if he had excluded final causes 
 from his philosophy, he would have supposed 
 himself upon the very summit of science, 
 and would have exclaimed, u there is no God ; 
 for if there were, here would be his dwelling 
 place ! " and this atheistic declaration would 
 have been the conclusion of the immortal Prin- 
 cipia. But in the spirit of true philosophy, 
 Newton directed his eye still upwards, and 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 327 
 
 by the light of final causes, saw the heights 
 of inductive science towering still far above 
 him, and stretching on to the throne of an 
 intelligent Creator : and then, with the same 
 confidence in which he had written the 
 other great truths of nature, he penned his 
 '" General Scholium, " declaring there is a 
 God, and made it, the sublime conclusion of 
 his immortal labours. 
 
 We think, that much, if not all the error 
 relative to natural theology, has originated in 
 the use of the term, " final causes. " The 
 use of this term has led to great confusion of 
 ideas in regard to causation, and has also led 
 men to confound an intelligent Creator, with 
 a mere physical cause — to thrust a mere 
 mechanical cause into the place of God. 
 Hume in his " Essay on a particular Provi- 
 dence and a Future State, " from the begin- 
 ning to the end of his argument, confounds 
 an intelligent Creator, with a mere physical 
 cause : as soon as this is perceived, the fal- 
 lacy of his whole argument becomes mani- 
 fest. This argument of Hume, is the great 
 bulwark of atheism ; u and we may the rather 
 
328 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conclude/' says Lord Brougham, "that it is 
 not very easily answered, because, in fact, it 
 has rarely, if ever, been encountered by wri- 
 ters on theological subjects." We will, there- 
 fore expose what appears to be the chief er- 
 ror of this argument ; as we believe that the 
 same error lies at the bottom of all objections 
 to natural theology. , 
 
 The Collocutor (who speaks Hume's sen- 
 timents ) says — " you then, who are my ac- 
 cusers have acknowledged, that the chief, or 
 sole argument for a divine existence ( which I 
 never questioned,) is derived from the order 
 of nature ; where there appear such marks 
 of intelligence and design, that you think it 
 extravagant to assign for its cause, either 
 chance, or the blind and unguided force of 
 matter. You allow that this is an argu- 
 ment drawn from effects to cause. When 
 we infer any particular cause from an effect, 
 Ave must proportion the one to the other, and 
 can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause 
 any qualities but what are sufficient to produce 
 the effect. The same rule holds, whether 
 the cause assigned,be brute unconscious mat- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 329 
 
 ter or rational intelligent being. If the cause 
 be known only by the effect, we ought not 
 to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are 
 precisely requisite to produce the effect — 
 nor can we by any rules of just reasoning re- 
 turn back from the cause, and infer other ef- 
 fects from it, beyond those, by which alone, 
 it is know to us. No one merely from the 
 sight of one of Zeuxis 5 pictures could know, 
 that he was also a statuary or an architect, 
 was an artist no less skilful in stone and mar- 
 ble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the 
 Gods to be the authors of the existence or 
 order of the universe ; it follows that they 
 possess that precise degree of power, intelli- 
 gence, and benevolence, which appears in 
 their workmanship ; but nothing farther can 
 be proved, except we call in the assistance 
 of exaggeration and flattery, to supply the de- 
 fects of argument and reasoning." 
 
 We perceive that in this argument, God is 
 expressly and designedly likened to, and con- 
 founded with any physical cause, and that 
 the one is reasoned from to the other ; and 
 
 the whole argument throughout all its parts 
 
 28* 
 
330 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is conducted upon the supposition that there 
 is no difference; " whether the cause assign- 
 ed 3 be brute unsconscious matter or rational 
 intelligent being f* and all the doctrine ad- 
 vanced by Hume, can be sustained upon this 
 supposition only. But is it not obvious to the 
 plainest understanding, that there is a wide 
 difference between a mere physical cause, 
 and an intelligent Creator ? What is a physi- 
 cal cause ? It is an event or fact, which con- 
 stantly precedes another in nature. For ex- 
 ample : heat always precedes ignition in a 
 body ; and when we meet with a burnt stick, 
 we therefore assign heat as the cause of the ig- 
 nition. What we mean then, by causation in 
 the physical world, is nothing more, so far as 
 our knowledge extends, than the constant 
 conjunction or succession of two events or facts. 
 We do not know, whether the cause, or ante- 
 cedent fact, does contain an operative princi- 
 ple which produces the effect or sequent fact, 
 or not ; for we can readily conceive that this 
 conjunction or succession might have been oth- 
 erwise—that fire might freeze,instead of burn : 
 at least such a supposition involves no contra- 
 
THE BACONIAN -PHILOSOPHf. 331 
 
 diction in thought, and therefore appears to be 
 within the limits of possibility. And in in- 
 ferring a cause from an effect, we must not in- 
 fer one more than adequate to produce the ef- 
 fect. And in the progress of science, caus- 
 es are continually being resolved into other 
 causes, and these again, into causes still 
 more remote ; and causes thus become effects, 
 or in truth, their real character is thus as- 
 certained to be nothing more than facts 
 standing in constant conjunction or succession 
 with other facts in the order of nature, as A 
 stands before B, in the alphabet, and that it 
 might have been otherwise. Such, then, is 
 a physical cause ; and that it is such, Hume 
 is one of the most strenuous advocates; 
 and then of course, it must be to such an idea 
 of a physical cause, that he likens the Crea- 
 tor throughout his argument. 
 
 Now, to clothe the Creator with the attri- 
 butes of a physical cause; and to limit his 
 operations to the mere works which he has 
 already made, as we limit a cause, to its 
 known effects, is most preposterous. There 
 is no analogical or deductive relation be- 
 
332 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tween them, upon which either an inference 
 or an argument from the one to the other, 
 can be based. Hume has entirely miscon- 
 ceived the argument for the existence of a 
 Divine being. It is not based upon the doc- 
 trine of cause and effect as exhibited in the 
 physical world, at all, (which will be more 
 clearly shown in the sequel, when we treat 
 of the origin of the idea of causation,) but 
 is based upon the contrivances indicative of 
 design, which appear in every part of the 
 universe, to which the term, " final causes, " 
 has been very improperly applied, thus ex- 
 tending the idea of causation, to a case in 
 which it does not apply in its ordinary signif- 
 ication. We can never infer the existence of 
 an intelligent being or agent, from the mere 
 antecedence and sequence of facts or phe- 
 nomena, however constant it may be ; for 
 there is nothing in this, that evinces intelli- 
 gence. The mere fact that fire burns, or that 
 cold freezes, can not give us the least ground 
 for inferring the existence of an intelligent 
 agent. But it is by observing the contrivan- 
 ces, the adaptations of means to ends, by 
 which certain results are brought about, dis- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 333 
 
 played in the universe, that leads us to infer 
 the existence of an intelligent agent, who 
 designed and fabricated them. And why do 
 we draw this inference ? Because contri- 
 vances, and adaptations of means to ends are 
 marks of intelligence. But how do we know 
 that they are marks of intelligence? By ob- 
 serving the works of men. But how do we 
 know that the works of men evince intelli- 
 gence ? By a knowledge derived from con- 
 sciousness of the' exercise of intelligence by 
 ourselves in conceiving designs, and executing 
 them by contrivances and adaptations of 
 means to ends. We therefore, arrive at the 
 knowledge of the Creator, (his existence be- 
 ing implied in such knowledge,) in the same 
 manner, that we arrive at the knowledge of 
 men — by comparing his works with our own. 
 If we see a watch for the first time, w r e know 
 that it was made by an intelligent being, 
 though we never saw one fabricated. So if 
 we see an animal with all its admirable con- 
 trivances, we know that it must be the work 
 of an intelligent being also ; because both e- 
 qually evince design and intelligence ; and 
 
334 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 experience, as well as an original principle of 
 our minds compel us to ascribe both to a sim- 
 ilar cause or agent, as thej both have the ap- 
 pearance of a manufactured article. This is 
 an act of ordinary induction of two facts un- 
 der one class or principle. We look at the 
 facts or phenomena in one point of view 
 only — that of design ; and this is the point 
 we generalize. The difference in the facts, 
 whether in the excellence of workmanship, 
 in the material, or in the particular objects of 
 the contrivances, cannot affect the justness 
 of the classification; for this difference has 
 nothing to do logically, with the point gener- 
 alized. This is a well established inductive 
 principle, upon which we are continually act- 
 ing in the ordinary affairs of life, as well as 
 in philosophical pursuits. We have thus by 
 the strictest induction brought God and man 
 under one class — that of intelligent beings or 
 agents ; and of course we can reason from the 
 one to the other, to the full extent of that 
 classification : and we will show in the sequel, 
 that on this ground the evidences of natural 
 theology are impregnable. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 335 
 
 " We can never return back," says Hume, 
 " from a cause and infer other effects from 
 it, than those by which it is already known 
 to us." This, we apprehend, cannot be 
 said of man as an intelligent agent. Could 
 we not justly argue or infer that the artificer 
 could make another watch, or that Zeuxis 
 could paint another picture ? It is impossi- 
 ble for us to think otherwise. The very same 
 reasons will compel us to infer that God or 
 the intelligent agent, who made the animal, 
 could make another. If it be denied that 
 Hume's argument goes to this extent, (though 
 we assert that it does,) yet, it cannot be 
 denied, that it goes to the extent of deny- 
 ing, that God can make any thing the least 
 variant from what he has already made. 
 Which, according to the induction we have 
 made of God and man, under one class — that 
 of intelligent agents — is virtually asserting, 
 that because a man has made an axe, we have 
 no right to infer, that he could make a hat- 
 chet 5 or that because he has made a boot, 
 we have no right to infer that he could 
 make a shoe; or that because he has made 
 
336 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 a watch or a steam engine, that he could make 
 a syringe or the very most simple utensil ; 
 for if an intelligent agent be like a physi- 
 cal cause, he must be confined to his known 
 works ; and we have no more right to infer 
 smaller effects from a cause, than those which 
 it is known to produce, than w 7 e have to infer 
 larger. It is true, we would not be justified in 
 inferring, that Zeuxis was a statuary, from the 
 fact that he was a painter ; neither would we 
 be-justified in inferring that he was not a statua- 
 ry ; for, from the nature of mind, we know that 
 he might be, and a poet and a mathematician 
 also ; for it is the nature of mind to- perform 
 various operations, as the various works of 
 of man attest. We have proved God to be 
 mind, or an intelligent being, and of course 
 he must possess various powers ; for a mind 
 or intelligent being with capacity to do one 
 work only is incomprehensible ; or at least 
 contrary to experience and the analogies of 
 nature. And does not the universe indi- 
 cate the most various powers in its artifi- 
 cer ? A perfect acquaintance with all science 
 is evinced in its adaptations of means to ends, 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 337 
 
 its laws, and its order. It is evident there- 
 fore, that it is unphilosophical, and indeed 
 absurd, to limit the powers of God to what 
 he has done, as we limit a cause to its known 
 effect. Such a notion is contrary to all the anal- 
 ogies of mind as exhibited by men ; and it is 
 from observing the minds of men as manifest- 
 ed in their acts, and ultimately our own minds, 
 (as we have shown,) that we infer the nature 
 of God ; and not from the consideration of 
 physical causes ; to which God bears no anal- 
 ogy whatever, and from the contemplation of 
 which alone, it would be impossible ever to 
 infer the existence of such a being. 
 
 But if we push out Hume's argument 
 a little further than he has done, (and we 
 have a right to do it,) its erroneousness can 
 be more clearly exhibited. If we must infer 
 that God can do no more than he has already 
 done, we have no right to infer, that the sun 
 will rise to-morrow, or that the world will 
 continue another moment, or that the seasons 
 will follow each other as they have done, or 
 that the existence of any thing can be con- 
 tinued another instant; because we must 
 29 
 
 : 
 
338 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 limit the cause to those effects, " by which 
 alone it is known to us. " In reference to 
 this point, Hume says: — "In works of hu- 
 man art and contrivance, it is allowable to 
 advance from the effect to the cause, and re- 
 turning back from the cause, to form new in- 
 ferences concerning the effect, and examine 
 the alterations, which it has probably under- 
 gone, or may undergo. But what is the foun- 
 dation of this method of reasoning ? Plainly 
 this ; that man is a being whom we know by 
 experience, whose notions and designs we 
 are acquainted with, and whose projects and 
 inclinations have a certain connection and co- 
 herence, according to the laws, which nature 
 has established for the government of such a 
 creature. w Well ! cannot the same be said of 
 God ? Hume answers, no ! " The Deity is 
 known to us, only by his productions, and is 
 ai single being in the universe not compre- 
 hended under any species or genus from 
 whose known attributes, we can by analogy 
 infer any attribute or quality in him." We 
 have shown, that we have a right to draw the 
 very same inferences in regard to the power 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 339 
 
 of God, to repeat and vary his operations, 
 that we draw in regard to man ; because we 
 brought them under the same classification — 
 the same " species or genus, " and can there- 
 fore infer by analogy the attributes and qual- 
 ities of God from the experienced attributes 
 or qualities of man. We have as much right 
 to infer, that God can create other worlds, as 
 we have to infer that man can make another 
 watch or other machine. The very constitu- 
 tion of our minds, upon the comprehension of 
 the evidence, necessitates such an inference in 
 both instances. We cannot believe otherwise 
 if we wished to do so ; for the very notion 
 that God is an intelligent being forces such 
 a conviction upon us. But does not Hume, 
 when he admits that man can repeat and vary 
 his operations, virtually admit that God can 
 do so ? For it must be through the power 
 of God upholding him, that man is enabled 
 to do it; and this proposition Hume does not 
 deny. Hume's argument goes the full length 
 of destroying everything like inductive in- 
 ference ; and confines our knowledge to 
 what is now present to our senses and con- 
 
340 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sciousness and memory. If this narrow cir- 
 cle embraced all legitimate knowledge, all our 
 hopes would be blasted, by the most wither- 
 ing skepticism. 
 
 From this train of reasoning, Hume, though 
 he admits that there is a God, concludes, that 
 we have noright to attribute, either omni- 
 science or omnipotence to him • or suppose 
 that he has either the power or inclination to 
 continue our existence in a future state ; lor 
 w r e must limit his powers to what he has 
 done. This we think is sufficiently answer- 
 ed by the single reflection, and the trains of 
 thought to which it necessarily conducts : 
 that when we look out upon the universe, 
 and see the wonderful adaptation of every 
 thing to the place which it occupies, and of 
 all to each other, and observe such a chain of 
 connexion binding all together as one whole, 
 we cannot but believe, that the whole is the 
 product of one mind ; and in the chain of 
 causation we cannot stop short of one ulti- 
 mate cause, and this the direct agency of an 
 intelligent being, no matter how boundless be 
 the range of our thoughts.: and therefore we 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 341 
 
 are necessitated to ascribe creation to one 
 creator with wisdom and power commensurate 
 with the universe — and this is omniscience 
 and omnipotence. 
 
 It is obvious, that the great error of Hume's 
 argument consists in confounding the Crea- 
 tor with a mere physical cause; and apply- 
 ing the doctrines of mere causation, to the 
 creative operations of an intelligent agent. 
 The same error is apparent in the quotation 
 from La Place, where he says final causes are 
 perpetually " pushed away to the boundaries 
 of science." And the same error is the 
 source of most if not all, of the false doc- 
 trine relative to natural theology. 
 
 As Hume's argument relative to a particu- 
 lar providence and a future state, is intimately 
 connected with his doctrine of cause and ef- 
 fect; and as the portion of his doctrine of 
 cause and effect, which relates to the origin 
 of the idea of causation or power, is radical- 
 ly erroneous, we will examine this portion of 
 his doctrine and expose its errors. 
 
 " All reasoning concerning matters of fact," 
 
 says Hume, " seems to be founded on the re~ 
 29* 
 
342 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lation of cause and effect. By reason of this 
 relation alone, we can go beyond the evidence 
 of our memory and senses. If we would 
 satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the 
 nature of that evidence, which assures us of 
 matters of fact, we must inquire how w r e ar- 
 rive at the knowledge of cause and effect. 
 The knowledge of this relation is attained by 
 experience, and not by reasoning a priori.— 
 The principle which determines us to form a 
 conclusion from the past to the future, is cus- 
 tom or habit. And it is certain, that we here 
 advance a very intelligent proposition at least, 
 if not a true one, when we assert, that after 
 the constant conjunction of two objects, heat 
 and flame, for instance, weight and solidity, 
 we are determined by custom alone, to ex- 
 pect the one from the appearance of the other. 
 All inferences, therefore, from experience, 
 are effects of custom, not of reasoning. " 
 
 We will commence with Hume's last pro- 
 position; and deny, that it is custom or 
 habit, which determines us to draw conclu- 
 sions from the past to the future, or to infer 
 cause from effect. On the contrary, we main^ 
 
THE BACONIAN TIIILOSOPHY. 343 
 
 tain, that it is an original principle of the mind, 
 which is exercised from earliest infancy ; 
 though the exercise of it, like that of every 
 other principle of the mind, is directed by 
 experience. This principle is a fundamental 
 law of the mind, like the principles by which 
 we believe in our own existence, and in the 
 existence of external objects. It determines 
 us to believe that the future will be like the 
 past, and that similar causes will produce 
 similar effects. The inference is not intuitive, 
 neither is it demonstrative, but we are com- 
 pelled to draw it, by an original principle of 
 the mind, called the fundamental law of in- 
 ductive belief. This principle has been de- 
 veloped, since the essay of Hume, by Dr. 
 Reid ; as we have shown in the second part 
 of this discourse. We will here quote Hume 
 against himself; and show that he has ad- 
 mitted this very principle in some of his rea- 
 sonings. In a preceding chapter, where he 
 argues that the inference from effect to cause, 
 is not an argument, he says : " When a child 
 has felt the sensation of pain from touching the 
 flame of a candle, he will be careful not to 
 
344 THE BACONIAN .'PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 'touch any candle ; but will expect a similar 
 effect, from a cause which is similar in its sen- 
 sible qualities and appearances. If I be right, 
 I pretend not to have made any great discov- 
 ery. And if Ibe wrong, I must acknowledge 
 myself to be indeed, a very backward scholar ; 
 since I cannot now discover an argument, 
 which it seems was perfectly familiar to me, 
 long before I was out of my cradle." Hume, 
 here says, that a child will infer that any can- 
 dle will burn, because the one which it touch- 
 ed, did so. Now this inference surely can- 
 not be from custom or habit ; for it would be a 
 strange sort of custom or habit, that is acquired 
 by a child in a moment. As we do not know- 
 how old Hume was before he left his cradle, 
 we cannot determine, whether there is any 
 contradiction in his saying, that he was per- 
 fectly familiar with what he calls custom or 
 habit, long before he was out of his cradle, 
 and shall leave this point to be determined by 
 his nurse. We do not care whether Hume 
 calls the thing custom or habit or by any other 
 name, so that he admits that the child brings 
 it into the world with it, and exercises it from 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 345 
 
 earliest infancy, as he does admit, if he means 
 anything in this last quotation. In illustration 
 of his doctrine of custom or habit, he makes 
 a supposition of a person of the strongest 
 faculties of reason and reflection, brought sud- 
 denly into the world ; and says that such a 
 person, " would immediately observe a con- 
 tinual succession of objects, and one event 
 follow another; but would not be able to 
 discover any thing further. Such person 
 without more experience could never employ 
 his conjecture or reasoning concerning any 
 matter of fact, or be assured of any thing 
 beyond his senses or memory." Here Hume 
 says, that a person of the strongest faculties 
 of reason and reflection could only from ex- 
 perience do what a child, he admits, does at 
 once, and what he was perfectly familiar with 
 long before he was out of his cradle. In 
 another place, speaking of the operation, by 
 which we infer like causes from like effects, 
 he says, it is not " trusted to the fallacious 
 deductions of our reason. It is more con- 
 formable to the ordinary wisdom of nature, 
 to secure so necessary an act of the mind by 
 
346 THE SAC ON I AN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 some instinct or mechanical contrivance, which 
 may be infallible in its operations, may dis- 
 cover itself at the first appearance of life and 
 thought, &,c." What he here calls " natu- 
 ral instinct, which discovers itself at the first 
 appearance of life and thought, " he before 
 calls custom or habit., In the first of the two 
 last quotations, he obviously makes his per- 
 son to suit his argument, and then tries to 
 prove his argument by his person ; which is 
 reasoning in a circle. The fact is, he contra- 
 dicts himself, so often, on this point, that his 
 writings remind us of a wheat field, with a 
 good deal of rye in it. At first, we cannot 
 distinguish whether it is a field of wheat or 
 a field of rye ; but on a nearer view and a 
 closer examination, we discover, that there is 
 more wheat than rye, and therefore conclude, 
 that it was intended for a field of wheat. 
 
 The manner in which Hume has fallen into 
 these contradictions, is this : he first argues 
 that the inference from the past to the future, 
 or from effect to cause is founded on experi- 
 ence, and adduces such arguments to prove 
 it, as will make this point strongest when 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 347 
 
 taken alone. And in the second place, he 
 contends, that it is not reasoning a priori, or 
 a reasoning process at all ; and adduces such; 
 arguments, as will make this point strongest 
 when taken alone, losing sight of the argu- 
 ments on the other point; and thus when the 
 arguments on both points are brought into 
 juxta-position, as we have brought them, they 
 are found in conflict and destroy each other, 
 and leave the truth in undisturbed security. 
 
 In the recapitulation at the end of the essay, 
 on necessary connection between cause and 
 effect. Hume says, "Every idea is copied 
 from some preceding impression or sentiment ; 
 and when we cannot find any impression, we 
 may be certain that there is no idea. In all 
 single instances of the operation of bodies, or 
 minds, there is nothing that produces any im- 
 pression, nor consequently can suggest any 
 idea of power or necessary connection. But 
 when uniform instances appear, and the same 
 object is always followed by the same event, 
 we then begin to entertain the notion of cause 
 and connection. We then feel a new senti- 
 ment or impression, to wit, a customary con- 
 
348 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nection in the thought or imagination, be- 
 tween one object and its usual attendant ; and 
 this sentiment is the original of that idea, 
 which we seek for. For as this idea arises 
 from a number of similar instances and not 
 from any single instance ; it must arise from 
 that circumstance, in which the number of in- 
 stances differ from every individual instance. 
 But this customary connection, or transition 
 of the imagination, is the only circumstance, 
 in which they differ. In every other particu- 
 lar they are alike. " 
 
 The sentiment of customary connection, is 
 certainly not very intelligible ; and surely the 
 idea of power is not a copy of it, according 
 to Hume's own theory ; because according to 
 his theory, the idea differs from its impres- 
 sion or sentiment in vivacity only. They are, 
 says he, in his essay on the origin of ideas, 
 " distinguished by their different degrees of 
 force and vivacity. ." Now the impression or 
 sentiment of connection is different in kind 
 from the idea of power; does not come un- 
 der the same class. The idea of power 
 must according to Hume's own theory, be a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 349 
 
 copy of the impression or sentiment of power, 
 just as the idea of heat is a copy of the im- 
 pression of heat, or the idea of a tree is a 
 copy of the impression of a tree, or the idea 
 of any act of the mind is a copy of the sen- 
 timent of that act. They must be of the 
 same kind, and " distinguished by their dif- 
 ferent degrees of force and vivacity." Hume 
 means by impression or sentiment the effect 
 produced on the mind when the object is 
 present to the senses, or an emotion or other 
 mere mental act, as love or hatred, is actually 
 taking place; and by idea, the notion of this 
 impression or sentiment of the object or emo- 
 tion when recalled by the memory. In 
 another place, he says " that the idea of 
 power can never be derived from the con- 
 templation of bodies in single instances of 
 their operation ; because no bodies ever 
 discover any power, which can be the ori- 
 ginal of this idea ; ?; and he might have ad- 
 ded, that a number of instances do not dis- 
 cover any power either, which can be the 
 original of this idea. The only difference in 
 
 the effect upon the mind, produced by a sin- 
 30 
 
350 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 gle instance and a number of them, is in de- 
 gree of certainty. For example : the appli- 
 cation of heat to metal would give the im- 
 pression that heat can fuse metal, and a num- 
 ber of instances of its application could only 
 add certainty to our conviction : but could 
 never suggest the idea, that heat can trans- 
 mute metal into wood, or change the original 
 impression into an idea entirely different from 
 it. It is evident, then, that the idea of pow- 
 er or cause is not derived from the contem- 
 plation of a number of instances of conjunc- 
 tion between the same facts or events, as 
 Hume contends. But here the question sug- 
 gests itself: how can this doctrine of custom- 
 ary connection, be reconciled with the decla- 
 ration that the child will get the idea that any 
 candle will burn, from the fact that one did 
 so ? The child must certainly from the one 
 instance, have derived the idea that the can- 
 dle had the power to burn, or which is the 
 same thing, was the cause of the pain, and 
 that any other candle would produce the same 
 effect. Here, then, let us pause and look 
 back, with a feeling of melancholy pity, at 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 351 
 
 the laborious and toilsome efforts, of a great 
 genius striving to overturn the foundations of 
 all our religious- hopes, ending at last in such 
 gross contradictions and absurdities as would 
 almost disgrace a child ! 
 
 It is evident from the foregoing considera- 
 tions, that the idea of power or cause, is not 
 derived originally from custom or habit in 
 contemplating many instances of the conjunc- 
 tion or succession of the same phenomena in 
 the physical world. On the contrary, we 
 maintain that it is not derived from the con- 
 templation of the phenomena of the physical 
 world at all — the conjunction or succession of 
 the same events,, either in many or single in- 
 stances ; for it seems very clear that we could 
 never derive the idea of power from merely 
 contemplating the constant succession of two 
 events or phenomena : but that it is derived 
 from mental phenomena — from the conscious- 
 ness of power in ourselves, to act or produce 
 effects, or even make exertion ; and that we 
 transfer this idea of power or causation to 
 what we call causes in the physical world. 
 Suppose we had been from infancy shut np 
 
352 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in a dark cave, with our body and limbs 
 encrusted in plaster so that we could nei- 
 ther see motion in external bodies, nor be 
 capable of producing it in ourselves, and 
 therefore could have no idea of it whatever : 
 still we would have a complete idea of power 
 or force derived from consciousness in our- 
 selves of a will, an endeavor, an exertion, 
 and a consequent fatigue and exhaustion. If, 
 then, we were put into a state of insensibility 
 by an opiate, and then removed into the light, 
 where we could see inanimate things in mo- 
 tion, such as a stone rolling, we would have 
 no idea that power or force was the cause of 
 the motion ; but if we were now freed from 
 the plaster, and discovered that by the will, 
 the endeavor, the exertion of which we 
 were before conscious, we could move our 
 limbs, and by their instrumentality, other bo- 
 dies, we would begin to ascribe all the mo- 
 tions in the physical world, which were be- 
 fore inexplicable, to some hidden force ; and 
 thus transfer an idea derived exclusively from 
 consciousness, to phenomena in the physical 
 world. This is the history of the chronolo- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 353 
 
 gical order, in which every mind acquires 
 its knowledge of causation in the physical 
 world. And this is not a single instance, an 
 anomaly, in mental phenomena ; for the poet 
 is continually transferring ideas derived from 
 consciousness to material things, in his per- 
 sonifications. IVo one will pretend, that there 
 is, in the physical world, any thing but motion, 
 that can suggest the idea of force to us ; and 
 it is very certain, that this can do it, only by 
 association in the manner which we have 
 developed ; for there is nothing in motion 
 that can suggest the idea of force to us a 
 priori. There is no analogy or perceptible 
 relation between them ; and force produces 
 equilibrium as well as motion. It may per- 
 haps be asked, how does a child get the idea 
 that a candle has the power to burn, just from 
 a single instance ? By association in the man- 
 ner we have shown ; for power is, if not the 
 very first, certainly among the first things we 
 are conscious of, in the acquisition of knowl- 
 edge ; for, on no other hypothesis, can any 
 rational explication of psychological phenom- 
 ena be given. Hume thus argues against 
 30* 
 
354 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 this doctrine : " The influence of the will 
 over the bodily organs, is a fact, which like 
 all natural events, can be known only by ex- 
 perience, and can never be foreseen from any 
 apparent energy or power in the cause which 
 connects it with the effect, and renders the 
 one an infallible consequence of the other. 
 The motion of our bodily organs follows upon 
 the command of the will. Of this we are 
 every moment conscious. But the means by 
 which this is effected ; the energy by which 
 the will performs so extraordinary an opera- 
 tion, of this we are so far from being im- 
 mediately conscious, that it must forever es- 
 cape our most diligent inquiry." We cer- 
 tainly agree with Hume, that " the influence 
 of the will cannot be foreseen from any appa- 
 rent energy or power in the cause ; " because, 
 this w r ould be to look at the operations of the 
 mind with the eyes. Here Hume confounds 
 consciousness with perception ; and applies 
 language to the former, which has been form- 
 ed to express the operations of the latter, 
 and has no meaning, when applied to the 
 former. But is he not all the while proving 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 3*55 
 
 by his own argument, that we are conscious of 
 power over our bodily organs ? And does not 
 this give us the idea of power ? No, says he, 
 because " we are not conscious of the means 
 by which it is effected." But, no one pre- 
 tends to such knowledge; for it involves the 
 nature of the union between soul and body, 
 between spirit and matter ; and if this is 
 an objection to one instance of knowledge 
 derived through consciousness, it is an objec- 
 tion to all our knowledge derived through 
 that source; for in no instance are we con- 
 scious of the modus operandi of mind. We 
 are conscious of thinking, and of controlling 
 the current of our thoughts ; but of the 
 means by which the operation is effected, or 
 of the manner in which the brain is the or- 
 gan of the mind, we are utterly ignorant : 
 but will any man in his senses, pretend that we 
 have no idea of thought, or of mind ? Such 
 a notion would not be skepticism but consum- 
 mate nonsense. We might just as well deny 
 that we have any idea of perception, because 
 we do not know the means of its operation ; 
 and thus shut up all sources of knowledge at 
 
355 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY* 
 
 once ; for we have no more knowledge of the 
 manner in which the mind communicates with 
 the external world, than we have how it 
 exercises power over our bodily organs. 
 Throughout the whole of these objections, 
 Hume seems to think that we cannot have 
 an idea of any thing but what we can see and 
 handle — that the only real ideas are those de- 
 rived through the senses; for the language he 
 applies to consciousness, has no meaning ex- 
 cept upon this supposition. 
 
 It will now appear how the doctrine of 
 cause and effect is connected with the eviden- 
 ces of natural theology. If the idea of pow- 
 er or cause is not derived from consciousness 
 of power in ourselves, then the idea of the 
 final cause or power is not derived ultimately 
 from reflecting upon our own minds, and God 
 cannot therefore, be classed under the same 
 genus or species with man, so that we can 
 reason from the one to the other ; and then 
 all the evidences of natural theology must 
 rest ultimately upon the doctrine of customa- 
 ry conjunction. Upon this foundation the 
 evidences of natural theology must fail ; be- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 357 
 
 cause we know of but one instance of con- 
 junction between such a cause and effect, — ■ 
 the present creation ; and the doctrine of cus- 
 tomary conjunction, is that no one instance 
 can suggest the idea of power, but that it re- 
 quires many instances to do it. Hume, 
 throughout his argument on a particular prov- 
 idence and a future state, covertly assumes 
 this position, though he does not push it out 
 to its ultimate conclusions, for it would go the 
 full length of denying the existence of any 
 God at all, which he seems to have avoided 
 merely for the purpose of thereby better sus- 
 taining the skeptic character of never assert- 
 ing any thing positively; for it is evident 
 from his writings, that he foresaw this con- 
 clusion as resulting from his principles of ev- 
 idence in regard to cause and effect. His 
 doctrine is, that cause and effect are nothing 
 more than the constant conjunction or succes- 
 sion of two facts or phenomena; and that 
 the antecedent fact does not produce or ex- 
 ercise any power over the sequent fact, and 
 that in reality, there is no causation in such 
 cases, but that it is the mere association of 
 
358 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 ideas arising from the constant conjunction of 
 the facts that leads us to imagine that there Is 
 an operating principle or power in the ante- 
 cedent fact. We see by this mere statement, 
 that ii God be like a physical cause, he must 
 according to Hume's doctrine be merely ima- 
 ginary, even if there were as many instances 
 of conjunction between such a cause and its 
 effect, as between any other cause and effect. 
 This doctrine then leads to atheism ; and does 
 not stop short at a God of limited powers, as 
 Hume has done in his essay on a Particular 
 Providence and a Future State. But will it 
 make any material change in the theological 
 doctrine, if we consider the cause or antece- 
 dent fact as containing an operative principle 
 which produces the effect or sequent fact ? If 
 we liken God to a blind agency in matter, such 
 as this doctrine of cause and effect teaches, 
 we cannot upon any principle of sound induc- 
 tion, consider him any thing else than a mere 
 vis format iva, operative through the universe, 
 which is the doctrine of pantheism. " God, w 
 says Michelet, a pantheist, "is the eternal 
 movement of the universal principle constant- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 359 
 
 \y manifesting itself in individual existences, 
 and which has no true objective existence, but 
 in these individuals which pass away again 
 into the infinite. " To this notion of God, 
 must the doctrine, that a physical cause con- 
 tains an operative principle, lead, if we make 
 causes the foundation of our inferences in re- 
 gard to God. We see, then, that upon nei- 
 ther doctrine of cause and effect, can God be 
 likened to a physical cause ; for the first leads 
 to atheism, and the other to pantheism, which 
 is in fact atheism too. But if we lay causa- 
 tion in consciousness, the evidences of natu- 
 ral theology are impregnable ; because then, 
 instead of being driven to the necessity of 
 confounding God with a mere physical cause, 
 (bringing them under the same class,) and 
 reasoning from one to the other, we bring 
 God under the same class, (that of intelligent 
 agents,) with man, and reason from an intelli- 
 gent agent to an intelligent agent. Because 
 in this view of causation, we resolve every 
 mechanical cause ultimately into the direct 
 agency of an intelligent being ; for the only 
 instance of direct causation of which we have 
 
360 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 any knowledge, is that of the exercise of 
 force by ourselves and by other men, over 
 matter. And this would perhaps be account- 
 ing for every instance of causation in the uni- 
 verse ; for so very large a portion of the phe- 
 nomena of the universe have already been 
 traced up to the exertion of mechanical force, 
 as to lead philosophers to believe, that me- 
 chanical force is the only cause capable of 
 acting on material beings, and that, of course, 
 all other causes, when better understood, 
 will be ascertained to be nothing more than 
 the exercise of mechanical force. With 
 this view then, of causation, and basing the 
 evidences of natural theology on the contriv- 
 ances, adaptations of means to ends, the or- 
 der and harmony of the universe, we have 
 throughout the whole inquiry, — never losing- 
 sight of it for a moment — the idea that God 
 is a personal intelligent being, distinct from 
 his creatures, both animate and inanimate, in 
 his essence, and acts, and consciousness ; and 
 not a mere cause, of which the universe is 
 the phenomena. On this foundation, natu- 
 ral theology teaches the notion of such a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 361 
 
 God as we can address as " Our father who 
 art in heaven. " 
 
 The argument of Hume, which we have 
 been considering, is certainly subtle and in- 
 genious in the extreme, but he views things too 
 much through the little pin-hole of his skep- 
 tical creed, to let in upon his mind, light from 
 all parts of his subject; and in presenting his 
 partial views to others, he gives them such 
 bold relief, by the bright coloring of his ad- 
 mirable rhetoric, as to cast the other parts of 
 his subject, completely into the shade. In 
 his philosophical writings, therefore, we never 
 see a complete picture ; yet what we do see^ 
 exhibits the touches of a master ; for howev- 
 er imperfect the picture may be as a likeness, 
 it has nothing of the daubing of the preten- 
 der. 
 
 If what we have gleaned, from this field of 
 evidence which has been harvested home by 
 the masterminds of the past and present cen- 
 tury, shall contribute anything to the truths of 
 natural theology, we will rejoice ; for it were 
 better that the sun were smitten from the 
 
 firmament, and all creation covered in dark- 
 31 
 
362 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ness ; so that we could not read one word in 
 the great book of nature ; than that a false 
 and impious philosophy should tear out the 
 sacred chapter of final causes. What ! God 
 write a book in defence of atheism. It must 
 be so, if nature tells nothing of him. Must 
 creation cease to declare the glory of him who 
 spread out the heavens, and will roll them up 
 as a scroll ? The desolate soul of the misan- 
 thrope atheist ; may answer "yes j" but New- 
 ton has given the response of the Baconian 
 philosopher. 
 

 PART THE FOURTH. 
 
 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY 
 AND REVELATION. 
 
 In the third part of this discourse, we have 
 shown, that Natural Theology is a branch of 
 Philosophy. We propose now to inquire, 
 what connection there is between Philosophy 
 and Revelation. 
 
 In order to attain a precise understanding 
 of this question, it is important, to inquire 
 first into the connection between reason and 
 revelation. First then, what is the connec- 
 tion between reason and revelation ? 
 
 The first problem which presents itself in 
 the investigation of the connection between 
 reason and revelation, is what is meant by 
 reason ? We shall endeavour to show, that 
 whatever idea men may intend to convey by 
 it in such a connection, they do in reality 
 mean by it philosophy. If this be so, then 
 
364 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this inquiry will resolve itself into the inves- 
 tigation of the connection between Philoso- 
 phy and Revelation, which is the subject that 
 this part of our discourse is intended to un- 
 fold. 
 
 In the second chapter of the second part 
 of this discourse, we have endeavoured to 
 show with Locke, that there are no innate 
 ideas, nor a priori conceptions, by which the 
 mind judges of truth, but that all our knowl- 
 edge is acquired by experience ; and that what 
 we call principles are nothing but generalized 
 facts ; and that whether these facts or princi- 
 ples have been generalized by ourselves or 
 by others, they are equally acquired by ex- 
 perience in our meaning of the term. 
 
 If then the mind has no innate, or a priori 
 knowledge, but acquires all through experi- 
 ence, we must mean by reason, either the 
 bare faculty of reason, or else the knowl- 
 edge acquired by that faculty : for upon this 
 theory of mental philosophy, it can have no 
 other meaning. If then we mean by it, the 
 bare faculty of reason, the inquiry resolves it- 
 self into this: What is the use of reason in inter- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 365 
 
 preiing revelation? and if we mean by it, the 
 knowledge acquired by that faculty, the in- 
 quiry resolves itself into this: What is the 
 connection between our knowledge of nature 
 and revelation. And whether we use the 
 word in the one meaning or the other, it 
 amounts to the same thing, in the connection 
 in which we are considering it. For the real 
 inquiry is, what light does our reason throw 
 upon revelation ? If our reason has no light, 
 but what it has acquired by experience, then 
 this light is the light of nature, which is phi- 
 losophy ; and it is by this light, that it must 
 judge of the truths of revelation, if it judge 
 of them by any other light, than that of 
 revelation itself. There are then, accord- 
 ing to this analysis, only two lights to guide 
 the mind in the investigation of knowledge, 
 the light of nature and the light of revelation. 
 And our inquiry obviously resolves itself into 
 the question, what assistance does the light 
 of nature afford us in examining the truths 
 of revelation ? Or, what is the connection be- 
 tween philosophy and revelation? And this 
 
 is the question which we propose to examine. 
 31* 
 
366 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 " The knowledge of man (says Bacon) is 
 as the waters, some descending from above, 
 and some springing from beneath ; the one 
 informed by the light of nature, the other in- 
 spired by divine revelation. So then, accord- 
 ing to these two differing illuminations or ori- 
 ginals, knowledge is first of all divided into 
 divinity, and philosophy. ;? As then, nature 
 and revelation are the only sources of knowl- 
 edge, what assistance does the light of nature 
 or philosophy give us in interpreting divinity 
 or revelation ? This question Bacon himself 
 has properly answered. "But on the other 
 side (says he) out of the contemplation of nat- 
 ure or ground of human knowledge, to induce 
 any verity or persuasion concerning the points 
 of faith, is in my judgment not safe. Dafidei 
 qua fidei sunt. We ought not attempt to 
 draw down or submit the mysteries of God, 
 to our reason ; but contrariwise, to raise and 
 advance our reason to the divine truth. 
 Wherefore we conclude that theology, which 
 in our idiom we call divinity, is grounded on- 
 ly upon the word and oracle of God, and not 
 upon the light of nature. " Such is the doc- 
 
THE BACONIAN FHILOS0PH*. 367 
 
 trine of the Baconian Philosophy, that theol- 
 ogy is grounded only upon the word and ora- 
 cle of God, and not upon the light of nature. 
 We must look to the light of nature for phil- 
 osophy, but to revelation, for theology. And 
 as the mind has no innate knowledge, if we 
 interpret revelation by any other light than 
 its own, we interpret it by the light of philo- 
 sophy, whether we call it interpretation ac- 
 cording to reason, or not. For we have 
 shown, that what we call reason, is philoso- 
 phy ; and not a light put into the mind by the 
 Creator, at or before our birth, and therefore 
 a divine standard of truth, called by the a 
 priori philosopher, the reason, by which, rev- 
 elation as well as nature, is to be tested as to 
 the truth of its doctrines. 
 
 But let us not, in this inquiry, overlook the 
 distinction between reason, as meaning phi- 
 losophy, and as meaning the hare faculty of 
 reason; and thereby mistake what we say 
 about it as meaning philosophy, as being said 
 about it as meaning the bare faculty of rea- 
 son. For it would be nonsense, to say that 
 reason in this latter sense, is of no use in in- 
 
3bb THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 vestigating the doctrines of revelation. " The 
 use of reason (faculty of reason) in religion, 
 ( says Bacon ) is of two sorts : the former, in the 
 conception and apprehension of the mysteries 
 of God, to us revealed ; the other in inferring 
 and deriving of doctrine and direction there- 
 upon. The former extendeth to the myste- 
 ries themselves ; but how ? by way of illus- 
 tration, and not by way of argument; the 
 latter consisteth indeed of probation and ar- 
 gument. In the former we see God vouch- 
 safed to descend to our capacity in the ex- 
 pressing of his mysteries in sort as may be 
 unto us ; and doth graft his revelations and 
 holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, 
 and applieth his inspirations to open our under- 
 standing, as the form of the key, to the ward 
 of the lock ; for the latter, there is allowed 
 us a use of reason and argument, secondary 
 and respective although, not original and ab- 
 solute. For after the articles and principles 
 of religion are placed and exempted from ex- 
 amination of reason, it is then permitted unto 
 us to make derivations and inferences from 
 and according to analogy of them } for our bet- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 369 
 
 ter direction. In nature this holdeth not; 
 for both the principles are examined by induc- 
 tion, though not by a medium or syllogism ; 
 and besides, those principles or first positions 
 have no discordance with that reason which 
 draweth down and deduceth the inferior po- 
 sitions. Such therefore is the secondary rea- 
 son which hath place in divinity, which is 
 grounded upon the placets of God." Bacon 
 here shows that reason enables us to apprehend 
 the mysteries of God, such as the doctrine of 
 the atonement, or the resurrection, not by 
 way of argument or proof, but by way of il- 
 lustration ; lor God doth graft these mysteries, 
 as well as his holy doctrine, love your enemies, 
 and other such doctrines, upon the notions of 
 our reason, and applieth his inspirations to 
 open our understanding as the form of the 
 key to the ward of the lock, in order that we 
 may fully understand them. But we will 
 show in the sequel, that much of what we, 
 in considering at this day the connection be- 
 tween philosophy and revelation, are apt to 
 call the notions of reason, and probably of 
 what Bacon in the passage quoted, has called 
 
370 THE EACO.VIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the notions of reason, is not derived exclusive- 
 ly from the light of nature, but also from rev- 
 elation. Because our first parents were taught 
 by revelation, at the very moment of their 
 creation, or rather, as soon as their internal 
 consciousness was awakened into knowledge. 
 The light of nature had no sooner fallen on 
 their minds, than God spoke to them and in- 
 structed them in all knowledge proper for 
 them. And the mode of instruction by reve- 
 lation was continued through prophets and 
 inspired men till the completion of that mode 
 of instruction in Christianity. So that the 
 light of nature and the light of revelation are so 
 mixed up in our knowledge, that the teachings 
 of each cannot be separated, and the latter 
 had become so corrupted before Christianity 
 was promulgated, that we are apt in the ardour 
 of investigation, to call all our knowledge 
 anterior to Christianity, the notions of our 
 reason. So that, in strictness, the bare facul- 
 ty of reason is not now, and never has been, 
 employed in examining revelation, but is em- 
 ployed with a knowledge already furnished 
 from both nature and prior revelations. But 
 
THE BACONIAN PIIILOSOPH l'i 371 
 
 this use of prior knowledge is not by way of 
 proof of the doctrines of revelation at this 
 day, but merely by way of comprehending 
 them ; because every portion .of our prior 
 knowledge has lost its authority as revelation, 
 from the fact, that the revealed cannot be dis- 
 tinguished from the natural, and therefore 
 cannot be made a test in examining what is 
 known to be revelation. Bacon also shows 
 that reason is of use in inferring and deriving 
 doctrine and direction from revelation, and 
 that this consisteth indeed in probation and 
 argument : but still, that this use of reason 
 and argument is secondary, not original and 
 absolute ; for, that all our inferences and deri- 
 vations must be made according to the analogy 
 of the articles and principles of religion, or 
 as the Apostle expresseth it, by " comparing 
 spiritual things with spiritual ;" and not as in 
 nature, where principles themselves are ascer- 
 tained by induction. 
 
 We do not, therefore, in revelation ascer- 
 tain first-principles, such as love your neigh- 
 bour as yourself, or the ten commandments, 
 by induction in the wide domain of reason or 
 
372 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy, and then try the scriptures by 
 these principles ; nor do we look out into the 
 domain of philosophy for still higher and 
 more absolute truths, as the transcendental 
 philosophers do, and deduce from them the 
 great doctrines of revelation, according to 
 certain fancies about the unity of truth. But 
 we get all our knowledge of the truths of re- 
 velation from a sound interpretation of the 
 scriptures. " For the obtaining the informa- 
 tion (says Bacon) itresteth upon the true and 
 sound interpretation of the scriptures, which 
 are the fountains of the waters of life." Be- 
 cause the fundamental doctrines taught in re- 
 velation are the generalizations, if we may so 
 speak, of a wider experience than that which 
 lies within the province of philosophy. They 
 embrace eternity, with all the facts in that 
 boundless field of experience. It is only 
 then by a mind which has swept over that 
 vast field of vision, that the truths which be- 
 long to it can be generalized. A finite mind 
 cannot do so ; and of course it must receive 
 such truths from the mind that can ; or rather, 
 must receive them from the mind whose man- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 373 
 
 ner of knowing is different from man's manner 
 of knowing — who knows intuitively, what man 
 knows inductively; and to whom all truths 
 are objects of intellectual perception. And 
 this is the reason that induction has a secon- 
 dary office in ascertaining the truths of reve- 
 lation : these truthsjbelong to a wider field of 
 experience than that in which induction can 
 be used by man. 
 
 The proper mode, then, of interpreting the 
 scriptures, is not by making its doctrines 
 square with our reason, which is nothing 
 more than our philosophy, but by a sound in- 
 terpretation of their language by the rules of 
 grammar and logic ; and by collecting all the 
 passages on the same subject matter, and 
 from the induction of the whole, draw the 
 meaning of each ; and not from the meaning of 
 one which we may fancy to be a leading one, 
 to infer the meaning of all the rest, thus violat- 
 ing the fundamental principles of induction, 
 which in this secondary way holds good in in- 
 vestigations of this kind, as well as in nature. 
 In some cases, however, where the meaning 
 
 of a text is so obvious that no two opinions 
 32 
 
374 THE BACONIAN THILOSOrHY. 
 
 can be entertained about it, like what Bacon 
 calls u glaring instances " in nature, where 
 one single instance is so significant^ that you 
 can by it alone determine upon the nature of 
 the whole class, you may use it as a key to the 
 meaning of less obvious passages upon the 
 same subject matter. In a word, we must 
 make scripture the infallible rule of interpret- 
 ing scripture ; just as we make nature the in- 
 fallible rule of interpreting nature. Neither 
 must we interpret the scriptures altogether as 
 we would a mere human writing. For 
 though in most things they are like human 
 writings, yet they differ in some essential 
 particulars; as is well shown by the following 
 remarks of Bacon. " But the two latter 
 points known to God and unknown to men, 
 touching the secrets of the heart and the suc- 
 cessions of time, do make a just and sound 
 difference between the manner of the exposi- 
 tion of the scriptures and all other books. For 
 it is an excellent observation which hath been 
 made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ 
 to many of the questions which were pro- 
 pounded to him, how that they are impertinent 
 
THE BACONIAN PIIILOSOPHF. 375 
 
 to the state of the question demanded: the rea- 
 son whereof is, because not being like man, 
 which knows man's thoughts by his words, 
 but knowing man's thoughts immediately, 
 he never answered their words, but their 
 thoughts : much in the like manner it is with 
 the scriptures, which being written to the 
 thoughts of men, and to the succession of 
 ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contra- 
 diction, differing estates of the church, yea 
 and particularly of the elect, are not to be in- 
 terpreted only according to the latitude of 
 the proper sense of the place, and respec- 
 tively towards that present occasion where- 
 upon the words were uttered, or in precise 
 congruity or contexture with the words, be- 
 fore or after, or in contemplation of the prin- 
 cipal scope of the place ; but have in them- 
 selves not only totally or collectively, but dis- 
 tributively in clauses and words, infinite 
 springs and streams of doctrine to water the 
 church in every part. And therefore the lit- 
 eral sense is as it were the main stream or 
 river ; so the moral sense chiefly, and some- 
 times the allegorical or typical, are they 
 
376 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 whereof the church hath the most use : not 
 that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or 
 indulgent or light in allusions : but that I do 
 so much condemn that interpretation of scrip- 
 ture which is only after the manner as men 
 use to interpret a profane book." These sa- 
 gacious remarks of Bacon need no comment. 
 They point out with great precision, the dif- 
 ference to be observed in interpreting the 
 scriptures and a mere human writing — a dif- 
 ference founded upon the omniscience of the 
 Author of the scriptures. 
 
 It may perhaps be asked, whether philoso- 
 phy is of no use at all, in the interpretation 
 of the scriptures? as our remarks thus far, 
 may appear to lead to the conclusion that it is 
 not. We answer, yes ! For it must be borne 
 in mind, that the scriptures contain something 
 besides revelation, that though they brought 
 life and immortality to light, yet the greater 
 part of them are rehersals of historical facts 
 and citations of natural phenomena, and re- 
 marks upon the nature of man, all of which 
 lie within the province of philosophy. Of 
 course then, all natural phenomena, whether 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 377 
 
 physical or psych ological, are to be explain- 
 ed by philosophy, with the limitation as to 
 the psychological phenomena which will be 
 explained hereafter ; and not to be judged 
 according to the words of scripture, as these 
 convey the notions current amongst men at 
 the time the scriptures were written, and not 
 absolute truth, as do their teachings of reve- 
 lation proper. The Papal Church, for in- 
 stance, followed the letter of scripture, when 
 it condemned Galileo. But this was a matter 
 in which it ought to haye followed the light 
 of nature or philosophy. For the scriptures 
 do not teach philosophy, but theology. They 
 were intended to light up that dark abyss 
 which lies beyond the present state of exis- 
 tence- — to bring life and immortality to light. 
 This is the province of revelation, and over 
 it philosophy throws no light. For much of 
 what we now call philosophy, as we have al- 
 ready indicated, is in reality the light of rev- 
 elation, which has become so mixed up with 
 the light of nature in our knowledge, that 
 we cannot separate them, and it has therefore 
 
 lost all its authority as the light of revelation 
 32* 
 
378 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in interpreting the scriptures. Indeed, it is 
 doubtful whether all the theological notions 
 in the world are not fragments of revelations 
 more or less corrupted, made in the early 
 ages of human history. For it is certain that 
 the theology of our first parents, was a direct 
 revelation, and not inferences from the indica- 
 tions of nature. And this was also the case 
 with our second great progenitor, Noah. And 
 therefore it may be, that all the theology in 
 the world, in all the varying forms of mono- 
 theism, polytheism, and pantheism, is derived 
 more or less from these original divine reve- 
 lations, but kept alive in these corrupt forms 
 by the indications of nature, ever since they 
 were revealed. And as the light of nature, 
 with the assistance of all the fragments of 
 divine revelations which had been handed 
 down to them, was not sufficient to enable the 
 wisest philosophers before the Christian dis- 
 pensation, to form a correct idea of God ; 
 and as the light of nature has not been suffi- 
 cient to prevent the idea of God from being 
 entirely obliterated from the minds of some 
 tribes of men in the south of Africa, who 
 
THE BACONIAN rillLOSOPHV. 379 
 
 have for centuries been entirely removed from 
 the influence of the amount of revealed truth 
 which is always acting through the gene- 
 ral agencies of civilization, it may be doubt- 
 ed whether the light of nature in itself 
 is sufficient to originate in the human mind 
 the idea of God ; though they are, as we have 
 shown in the third part of this discourse, 
 abundantly sufficient to prove the existence 
 of a God, after the idea of God is once in the 
 mind,— is once grafted upon the notions of cau- 
 sation and contrivance developed in conscious- 
 ness ; and the mind is thereby enabled to per- 
 ceive and generalize the analogies pertaining 
 to the subject which are presented in the 
 psychological and physical worlds. And the 
 Creator has certainly not left the human race 
 to the teachings of the light of nature alone: 
 but has made revelation even of his own ex- 
 istence, a part of his educational economy. It 
 is true that the Apostle to the gentiles has said: 
 " For the invisible things of him from the 
 creation of the world ; are clearly seen, being 
 understood by the things that are made ; even 
 his eternal power and Godhead : so that they 
 
380 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are without excuse." But this, we appre- 
 hend, does not controvert our view. Because 
 the Apostle says this of men, who had the 
 idea of God, as he well knew, given them by 
 divine revelation, either immediately, or by 
 remote means. And what the Apostle says 
 further seems to confirm our view : " Because 
 that, when they knew God, they glorified 
 him not as God, neither were thankful, but 
 became vain in their imaginations, and their 
 foolish hearts were darkened/' &c. The 
 words, u when they knew God," evidently re- 
 fer to other knowledge than that derived from 
 nature — from " the things that are made. " 
 All then, the Apostle appears, to teach, was, 
 that even the light of nature was sufficient 
 to keep alive in the mind the idea of God, 
 which had been communicated by divine rev- 
 elation, if man had not apostatized, and there- 
 by suffered his mind to be darkened. And 
 a kindred thought is expressed in the elev- 
 enth chapter of Hebrews, " Through faith we 
 understand that the worlds were framed by 
 the word of God, so that things which are 
 seen, were not made of things which do ap- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 381 
 
 pear. 7 ' The meaning here is, that it is by faith, 
 by the teachings of revelation and not by the 
 light nature, that we know that all things are 
 made by God, and not developed out of capa- 
 bilities of nature by agencies which we can as- 
 certain by the light of nature; as philosophy 
 would seem to teach. So that there may be a 
 doubt,whether all the evidences of natural the- 
 ology are not seen by a light imparted at some 
 stage of man's history, by direct revelation. 
 
 And this does not detract from the proper 
 force of the evidences of natural theology. 
 For though we might not be able to read the 
 planetary system in the indications of the 
 heavens, as Newton did, still after he has 
 taught us, we can then see its evidences in all 
 their force, and they are just as incontroverti- 
 ble as if we had discovered them ourselves. 
 So in regard to the evidences of natural the- 
 ology, we might not be able to see these evi- 
 dences in nature, without an instructor, but 
 when once instructed, we may be able to 
 see them in all their fulness. And it is no 
 objection to the parallel, that we require a su- 
 pernatural instructor in the one case and only 
 
382 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 a human instructor in the other. For we ut- 
 terly repudiate the shallow sophism, that 
 " nothing can be made intrinsically evident to 
 reason, whose intrinsic truth transcends rea- 
 son ; or, what is the same thing, is not natur- ' 
 ally knowable by reason. " The intrinsic 
 truth or internal reasonableness of many of 
 the doctrines of revelation which are not natu- 
 rally knowable by reason, is now evident to the 
 mind enlightened by revelation. For exam- 
 ple, the precept "love your enemies," and 
 the other sublime instructions of the sermon 
 on the mount, were not naturally knowable by 
 reason : but we apprehend, their internal rea- 
 sonableness or intrinsic truth, is clearly discov- 
 ered by the Christian. Else, the doctrine of 
 spiritual discernment taught in the scriptures 
 is a cunningly devised fable. We admit there 
 are some mysteries in revelation, as for in- 
 stance, the trinity, whose internal reasonable- 
 ness is inevident to the mind of man : but none 
 of them contradict what is known. They are 
 merely above our knowledge ; and therefore 
 do not support the sophism which we repu- 
 diate. Therefore,, though the evidences of 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 383 
 
 natural theology may not be naturally discern- 
 ible, yet they may be seen by the light of re- 
 velation shed abroad on the mind, increasing 
 its spiritual discernment. 
 
 We see then how little the light of nature 
 or philosophy has to do with theology or the 
 teachings of revelation. Philosophy is noth- 
 ing but the result of the observation and ana- 
 lysis of phenomena, either in the physical or 
 psychological world: and our knowledge of 
 the infinite and the absolute, or in other words 
 our general conceptions, are nothing but in- 
 ductive inferences, and not the result, of di- 
 rect cognition, as is our knowledge of partic- 
 ulars. Every conclusion therefore, which 
 transcends the sphere of phenomena, is mere 
 conjecture. What light then, does philoso- 
 phy throw upon the doctrine of the trinity, 
 the incarnation, or of the origin of sin, or the 
 atonement, or even upon the immortality of 
 the soul? Where are the phenomena or an- 
 alogies in nature, from which these great doc- 
 trines are to be inductively inferred ? They 
 are without any but the very vaguest analo- 
 gies in nature, and certainly without any pro- 
 
384 TEE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 totype in existence. The little light which 
 philosophy amongst the ancients seemed to 
 throw even upon the immortality of the soul, 
 was perhaps but the faded light of ancient 
 revelation which had passed down comming- 
 led with the light of nature in human teach- 
 ings. This truth has often forced itself upon 
 us when reading the Phaedon of Plato. The 
 rambling speculations, the flimsy hypothetical 
 reasonings that prove nothing, the vulgar al- 
 lusions, which neither explain nor enforce 
 anything, but need to be explained them- 
 selves, all overwhelm us with the conviction, 
 that the writer is striving after something be- 
 yond the compass of the human faculties un- 
 aided by revelation. And even the analogies 
 of nature which are often employed in illus- 
 trating the doctrines of revelation, and de- 
 fending them from the cavils of infidelity, are 
 but a secondary knowledge. They have 
 been seen by the light of revelation, and not 
 by the light of nature. They do not lead to 
 the truths of revelation, but the light of reve- 
 lation leads to them, and enables us to see 
 them as the foot-prints of the God of revela- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 385 
 
 tion upon the domain of nature. It is by a 
 spiritual discernment, which the truths of re- 
 velation beget in the mind, that we perceive 
 them; just as we have already shown, is the 
 case with the evidences of natural theology. 
 We have said that all natural phenomena 
 whether physical or psychological, are to be 
 explained by philosophy, and not by the 
 words of scripture. But it is important to 
 observe, that there is a difference between 
 physical and psychological truths in the cer- 
 tainty with which they can be made to bear 
 upon the interpretation of scripture. There 
 is generally more certainty in our knowledge 
 of physical than of psychological truths. For 
 instance, we know with absolute certainty, 
 that the earth moves round the sun, and that 
 the bread and wine in the eucharist are bread 
 and wine ; and of course, scripture must be 
 interpreted accordingly ; for God never con- 
 tradicts in revelation, what he has said in na- 
 ture ; and it must be borne in mind that in 
 physics all reasoning must end in submission 
 to the senses. For the illusions of sense can 
 
 only be corrected bv evidence of the same 
 
 J 33 
 
386 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sort, where one sense is brought to testify 
 against another or the same sense against 
 itself. And Revelation throws no light over 
 physical truth, except as to the origin of the 
 world, and the order of its creation, and per- 
 haps also as to the time in which it was created, 
 and also, that things were created mature, the 
 vegetables bearing seed after their kinds, and 
 the animals, including man, bearing young 
 after their kinds : if these truths can proper- 
 ly be said to lie within the range of physics. 
 And therefore physical truth must be seen 
 exclusively by its own light, or the light of 
 philosophy. But this is not the case with psy- 
 chology. For over the moral branch of this 
 subject, though lying within the province of 
 philosophy, revelation throws much light. 
 For even though it should be maintained that 
 we are not enabled by the light of revelation 
 to discover any psychological truth, which is 
 not to some extent made known to us by the 
 light of nature, yet it must be admitted, that 
 we are enabled by it, to see the great truths 
 of the moral branch of psychology in much 
 greater distinctness. For example; the great 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 387 
 
 fundamental truth of our moral nature, that 
 which constitutes the basis of the moral branch 
 of psychology, that the heart of man is de- 
 ceitful above all things and desperately wick- 
 ed, and that man is bom in sin, is much more 
 manifest to our reason by the light of revela- 
 tion, than it is by the light of nature. Our 
 spiritual discernment is quickened and invig- 
 orated by the doctrines of revelation, through 
 the agency of the Spirit of God ; and we are 
 thus enabled to discern much more clearly, 
 the great truths which lie within the moral 
 branch of psychology. The remark of the 
 Apostle : u But the natural man receiveth not 
 the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are 
 foolishness unto him : neither can he know 
 them, because they are spiritually discerned, ^ 
 has much pertinence to the topics of which 
 we are treating, but was spoken more partic- 
 ularly of the great truths of the plan of sal- 
 vation through Jesus Christ, over which the 
 light of nature throws no light whatever. 
 Notwithstanding though, that the light of 
 revelation illumines the truths of the moral 
 branch of psychology, still after we have 
 
388 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 searched the scriptures about any doctrine 
 relative to man, it is legitimate, with the light 
 thus obtained to look into the nature of man 
 or psychology, and to the intellectual branch as 
 well as to the moral, for though revelation 
 throws no light over the purely intellectual 
 branch,yet it assumes the truths of that branch, 
 to see whether we can derive from thence any 
 evidence confirmatory of our interpretation, in 
 the adaptation of the doctrine to the nature 
 so discerned, or in the conformity of the doc- 
 trine to ascertained psychological laws. In- 
 deed the adaptation of the doctrines of rev- 
 elation to the nature of man in regenerating 
 it, and satisfying its most earnest cravings, 
 and its most perplexing doubts, is one of the 
 strongest evidences of its divine character ; 
 because it evinces a knowledge of man, on 
 the part of the teacher of such doctrines, far 
 more accurate than any man can by possibil- 
 ity possess ; for one of the most important of 
 these doctrines, is that man cannot possibty 
 know, such doctrines. In order to discover 
 this adaptation, we must understand, both 
 revelation and man • but in the enquiry, it 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 389 
 
 ought constantly to be borne in mind, that 
 revelation is the light, and man the subject to 
 be illumined, and not the reason of man the 
 light, and revelation the subject to be illumin- 
 ed. " For God doth graft his revelations 
 and holy doctrine upon the notions of our 
 reason, and applieth his inspirations to open 
 our understanding as the form of the key to 
 the ward of the lock." It is true however, 
 that the truths of scripture do nevertheless 
 appear more manifest after we have seen the 
 excellence of their application to our natures, 
 than before ; and thus more completely satis- 
 fy our skepticism. 
 
 With these views then, we should never 
 make revelation subordinate to philosophy* 
 For of any of the proper truths of revelation, 
 philosophy knows but little, and of many of 
 them nothing at all. And this truth cannot 
 be too much urged upon our attention. The 
 neglect of it, has been the great source of her- 
 esy in every age of Christianity. And that 
 it has lost none of its importance is made 
 manifest by many publications of the present 
 
 day, and by none more clearly than the recent 
 33* 
 
•390 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 work of Professor Bush on the resurrection. 
 The Professor has signally violated this fun- 
 damental principle of scriptural interpreta- 
 tion. He has made his argument from rea- 
 son, or the light of nature, the first step in 
 the investigation of the teachings of revela- 
 tion on the subject of the resurrection ; in- 
 stead of first examining revelation and ascer- 
 taining its doctrines from its own teachings 
 on a subject lying so emphatically within its 
 province, and then examining nature, to see 
 whether it said anything upon the subject. 
 And as might be expected by any one ac- 
 quainted with the fallacy of such a method 
 of interpretation, we see in the whole inves- 
 tigation, a constant effort to bring the truths 
 of revelation within the laws of nature, which 
 if successful, would at once destroy the super- 
 natural character of revelation and cast the 
 inquirer down upon the broad platform of 
 infidelity. In his very preface he says, "the 
 resurrection is effected by the operation of nat- 
 ural laws." And he more than intimates, that 
 the spiritual body is developed immediately 
 after death by galvanic agencies ; and declares 
 

 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 391 
 
 that ** the intimate connection between elec- 
 trical phenomena and light goes undoubtedly 
 to favor the idea that the spiritual body will 
 be essentially luminous." And thus the 
 great leviathan doctrine of the resurrection 
 which had been swimming about in the bound- 
 less ocean of metaphysical conjucture, for a 
 period long before the Sadducees disputed 
 about it, and had escaped the angling of the 
 most skilful philosophers, has been caught by 
 Professor Bush upon the cunning hook of 
 reason, with almost as much ease as a boy 
 catches a trout. But scriptural commentators 
 should know that the line of philosophy can- 
 not fathom the mysteries of revelation ; nor 
 its light illumine their darkness. Philosophy 
 stands by the dying man, feels his pulse ebb 
 and flow, sees the pallid hues gather over the 
 brow, sees the fire of the eye bedimmed, and 
 hears the last gasp of life ; and all then is 
 lost in shadows, clouds and darkness. True ! 
 philosophy may then cast a longing hope and 
 a probable conjecture into a future state, 
 which imagination can create. But is this 
 the sure inference of sound philosophy? Is 
 
392 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this such a light as can gild the dark clouds 
 which hang over the future, with a bow of 
 promise sufficiently bright to animate the hopes 
 of the dying man ? Let the dying infidel an- 
 swer the question ! For philosophy then, to 
 tell us in what body the soul is to rise, when it 
 does not tell us that it will rise at. all, is to 
 our minds, something like a double petitio 
 principiL 
 
 This a priori method of interpreting scrip- 
 ture — of forcing one's philosophy upon its 
 teachings, — has been the great source of the- 
 ological error in all ages of Christianity. At 
 the present day, we need but look to New- 
 England theology, where the attempt to 
 bring down the mysteries of revelation, to 
 the principles of reason, at first reduced 
 Christianity to Unitarianism, and has now 
 so completely frozen all life out of it, that as 
 a retreat from open infidelity this theology 
 has ascended the high walks of the transcen- 
 dental philosophy, to see whether it cannot 
 descry in its reveries something to bridge 
 over the yawning chasm which separates the 
 mysteries of revelation from the teachings of 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 393 
 
 philosophy. And in all countries, where the 
 a priori philosophy prevails, at the present 
 day, especially in Germany, it is corrupting 
 revelation by subordinating its teachings more 
 or less to its a priori conceptions, upon the 
 ground that Christianity is a system of accom- 
 modation undergoing a gradual development, 
 through the agency of philosophy, which from 
 its higher position in the scale of knowledge, 
 can hear more articulately the voice of God 
 than it is expressed in the exoteric teachings 
 of Christianity. This state of theology in 
 Germany has been produced by the philo- 
 sophical movement which begun in the a pri- 
 ori philosophy of Kant. Kant in his " Reli- 
 gion within the Limits of mere Reason," and 
 his disciple Fichte in his " Critique of all 
 Revelation," applied the principles of the pe- 
 culiar form of a priori philosophy which Kant 
 originated, to revelation, and subordinating it 
 to these principles, concluded that revelation 
 cannot possibly give us any information which 
 our natural reason and conscience might not 
 have obtained without it. And thus our rea- 
 son is made the test and measure of the doc- 
 
394 
 
 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 trines of revelation. And it was the same lo- 
 gical torch which Kant had lighted at the 
 altar of the a priori philosophy, that Schel- 
 ling and Hegel held in their hands as the 
 light to their path, when they descended into 
 those dark abysses of blasphemous nonsense, 
 from whence they brought up, as truths far 
 more profound than the teachings of revela- 
 tion, their monstrous pantheistic doctrines 
 which corrupting German theology, led it to 
 the very brink of the hell of errors. And 
 Cousin the Germanized French philosopher, 
 was guided by the impious light from the 
 same torch, when basing himself upon the 
 doctrine that the reason of man is imperson- 
 al, and therefore capable of seeing absolute 
 truth, he maintained as he openly does in his 
 Introduction to the History of Philosophy, 
 that revelation is to be developed and per- 
 fected by philosophy imparting to it some of 
 its own superior light. That, fi philosophy is 
 patient ; she knows what was the course of 
 events in former generations, and she is full 
 of confidence in the future ; happy in see- 
 ing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 395 
 
 Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, 
 to assist her in ascending to a yet loftier eleva- 
 tion." We do not so much wonder that pro- 
 fessed philosophers should thus place philo- 
 sophy above revelation — and that even those 
 who profess to believe in Christianity as a 
 divine revelation, should adopt as their canon 
 of interpretation, that we must admit nothing 
 which revelation contains, as truth, unless 
 we can find it in our own consciousness as an 
 innate idea, or a priori conception of the 
 pure reason. But Cousin who professes to 
 believe in Christianity^ is often driven by his 
 reasonings from this principle, into positions 
 so obviously infidel and pantheistic, that in 
 order to prevent himself from being consider- 
 ed an infidel, he frequently amidst the diffi- 
 culties of reconciling his religion with his 
 philosophy, cries out in his very loudest ac- 
 cents, that he is a Christian philosopher. 
 We can smile at the philosopher who thus 
 rolls his stone to the top of the hill, and is 
 then carried down by its weight back again 
 to the bottom. But very different are our 
 feelings, towards those rational theologians 
 
»5yO THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 who with lusty, though unavailing efforts are 
 striving to clamber up the lofty, but cloud- 
 capped summits of the transcendental philos- 
 phy, to see whether they cannot descry from 
 the lofty peaks, by the light of reason, the ob- 
 jects of that distant region, where only the 
 light of revelation penetrates, while the high- 
 er they ascend the thicker is the darkness ; 
 and who at last become so habituated to seeing 
 nothing on account of the darkness, that they 
 mistake the figments of their own imagina- 
 tions for the objects of that distant region. 
 And we know that some, who are so firmly 
 convinced by its external evidences, that 
 Christianity is a divine revelation, as to be 
 unable to throw off the belief, after becom- 
 ing captivated by the optimistical philosophy 
 of Cousin, and following it with enthusiasm, 
 in its vain endeavour to subordinate Christi- 
 anity to philosophy, have at last become so 
 well aware of its infidel tendencies, that in a 
 moment of despondency, they have precipi- 
 tated themselves down into the broad abyss 
 of Roman Catholic credulity, exclaiming as 
 as they fall, "that nothing can be made in- 
 

 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 397 
 
 trinsically evident to reason, whose intrinsic 
 truth transcends reason, or, what is the same 
 thing, is not naturally knowable by reason"! 
 and maddened by this sophism, strive to be- 
 lieve, that bread and wine are flesh and blood, 
 as taught by the infallible Church, which 
 sees not with its eyes, but with an inward 
 grace. 
 
 During the middle ages, the philosophy of 
 Aristotle exerted a most pernicious influence 
 over Christianity, Substituting its empty 
 forms, for the substance of christian doctrine, 
 it moulded the simple truths of the gospel 
 mixed with platonism culled from the fathers, 
 into a system of theological conundrums far 
 more fit, to sharpen the wits of polemics, than 
 to soften the hearts of sinners. Weaving its 
 subtle web through the entire scheme of scho- 
 lastic theology, and drawing its meshes tight- 
 est around the most vital truths, it crippled 
 Christianity in its holy power over the human 
 heart. And man left to wander in the zig- 
 zag mazes of a logical creed, was soon bewil- 
 dered in his reason; and thus prepared, to 
 
 believe every folly and to worship every su- 
 34 • 
 
398 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 perstition, which Aristotle sitting in the place 
 of Paul ; proclaimed in the name of Christ. 
 
 In the earliest ages of Christianity also, 
 the various sects of philosophers of that day, 
 the Judaizing sects who maintained a sensu- 
 ous philosophy of the lowest grade, as well 
 as those sects who maintained a speculative 
 idealistic system, resting upon an a priori 
 foundation, perverted Christiany, by making 
 its doctrines conform to their respective pre- 
 conceived philosophical notions. These in- 
 terpreters set out with these notions, and 
 searching through the scriptures for some- 
 thing to support them, seized upon individu- 
 al passages, and dissevering them from their 
 historical and logical context, made them 
 mean what suited their preconceived notions, 
 because the words taken by themselves were 
 capable of such signification. They could 
 not bring themselves to limit their specula- 
 tions by the definite facts of revelation. 
 The Platonists, for instance, instead of con- 
 ceiving God, as the scriptures represent him, 
 as a personal God who created all things from 
 nothing, and who upholds and controls all 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 399 
 
 things, and has a care for every individual as 
 well as the whole, brought into Christianity 
 the God of their speculative conceptions, 
 their 'o, from whence all existence eternally 
 flows by a necessity, under the guidance of 
 the reason. That Judaizing sect, the Ebion- 
 ites, also brought their carnal Jewish notions 
 into the interpretation of scripture; and made 
 the whole Christian scheme conform to them. 
 They considered the Messiah, according to 
 the Jewish representation of him, as a man 
 who had been chosen Messiah by a decree of 
 God's council, and furnished with the requi- 
 site divine powers, for the accomplishment of 
 his office. And though this sect maintained 
 a sensuous philosophy of the lowest grade^ 
 and not a speculative one, yet they made an 
 a priori application of it to the interpretation 
 of scripture ; and thus perverted scripture an 
 the same way that the idealistic philosophers 
 did. 
 
 But the most extravagant example of 
 perverting scripture by forcing upon it the 
 speculative opinions of a spurious a priori 
 philosophy, is that of the Gnostics. These 
 
400 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 speculators gave themselves up, in the inter- 
 pretation of scripture, to the most unbridled 
 license, despising the letter, idealizing every- 
 thing, and striving to look by the light of rea- 
 son beyond scripture and the natural world, 
 and dive into the mysteries of those things 
 which lie beyond the ken of man, and prop- 
 erly belong to the things which rest upon that 
 faith which reposes upon the authority of 
 God. This gnosticism, not even content with 
 the wide range of Platonic speculation, gave 
 itself up to still wilder fancies. They intro- 
 duced the notions of the oriental theosophy 
 into the interpretation of Christianity, and 
 made a theosophical Christianity. They found 
 in Christianity what they thought resem- 
 blances to their theosophical doctrines, and 
 seizing upon these resemblances, they forced 
 them according to their spurious method of 
 interpretation, into full harmony with their 
 preconceived notions. And thus while they 
 thought they were interpreting scripture, for 
 they were firm believers in Christianity, they 
 were in reality developing their own theoso- 
 phical notions. Christianity did not soar e- 
 
THE BACONIAN - PHILOSOPHY, 401 
 
 nough into supernatural regions for them. It 
 dwelt too much among men — was two prac- 
 tical. They wished to prove all things — to 
 comprehend the incomprehensible. " The 
 inquiries which chiefly occupied them/' says 
 Neander, "were these: How is the transi- 
 tion from infinite to finite ? How can man 
 imagine to himself the beginning oi creation? 
 How can he think of God as the original pro- 
 jector of a material world, so foreign to his 
 own nature ? Whence come those wide dif- 
 ferences of nature among men, from the man 
 of truly goodly disposition, down to those 
 who appear to be given up entirely to blind 
 desire, in whom no trace of the rational and 
 the moral creature can be found ?" 
 
 " Now it was exactly here, " continues 
 Neander, " that Christianity made religious 
 faith independent of speculation, and cut off 
 at once all that would lead to those specula- 
 tive cosmogonies by which the element of 
 pure religious faith was only troubled, and 
 the confusion between the ideas of God and 
 nature furthered, inasmuch as it (Christiani- 
 ty) directed the eye of the spirit beyond the 
 34* 
 
402 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 whole extent of the visible world, where in 
 the chain of cause and effect, one thing is 
 constantly unfolding itself out of another, to 
 an almighty work of creation performed by 
 God, by which worlds were produced, and 
 in virtue of which the visible did not spring 
 out of that which appears, Heb. xi. 3. Crea- 
 tion is received here as an incomprehensible 
 fact under the constraint of a faith that raises 
 itself above the position occupied by the un- 
 derstanding, which wishes constantly to de- 
 duce one thing from another, and to explain 
 every thing, while it denies everything that 
 is immediate. Gnosis would not acknowl- 
 edge any such limits to speculation : she 
 wished to explain and represent to the mind 
 how God is the fountain and the source of 
 all existence." And the Gnostics, in their 
 attempts to explain these problems, built up 
 the most fanciful system imaginable ; because 
 their speculations were not limited by facts 
 either in nature or revelation : but in the li- 
 centious spirit of an a priori philosophy, they 
 roamed at large over the boundless regions 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 403 
 
 of fancy, and filled Christianity with the doc- 
 trinal phantasmagora of their theosophy. 
 
 But Platonism holds the most prominent 
 place of any philosophy in the history of 
 Christian theology. For it has been from 
 the first ages of Christianity, and is even 
 now, proclaimed as the philosophy peculiarly 
 akin to Christianity. And some have de- 
 clared, and do still declare, that Platonism 
 was a forerunner of Christianity; and some 
 going still further, maintain that, there was 
 in Christ no other revelation, than such as 
 occurred in Plato. Now all this we conceive 
 to be most pernicious error — from the first pro- 
 position, that Platonism is akin to Christiani- 
 ty, to the legitimate deduction from it, that 
 there was in Christ no other revelation, than 
 such as occurred in Plato. The Platonic 
 philosophy with its a priori method and its 
 transcendental conceptions, never did, and 
 never can exercise wholesome influence upon 
 Christian doctrine. It dwells too much on em- 
 pyrean heights ever to affiliate with Christiani- 
 ty in its humble walk in the strait and narrow 
 way of life. It claims to have a mystic ladder 
 
404 
 
 'HE B AC OMAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 by which kcan ascend to the region of absolute 
 truth, and have a clear intellectual perception 
 of the real essence of things-— to have in fact, as 
 great an abundance of revelations, as the a- 
 postle Paul had, when he was caught up to 
 the third heaven. It professes to have a 
 knowledge which transcends the bounds of 
 those truths which are received from extern- 
 al impressions and internal suggestions — 
 in fact, to know after God's manner of 
 knowing. It thus, like every other a priori 
 philosophy, poisons knowledge at its very 
 source, by teaching that general truths are 
 objects of direct cognition, and that partic- 
 ulars are known by reasoning from these 
 general truths.* With these high assump- 
 tions, Platonism has made, and cannot but 
 make Christianity a system of doctrine to be 
 tested and explained by its own principles, 
 and to be moulded in accordance with its own 
 
 *Note. It should be continually borne in mind, that this is a purely logical 
 treatise ; and that it merely points out the inconsistency of Platonism with 
 Christianity on logical grounds. It might be easily shown, that the fundamental 
 moral doctrines of Plato, are also inconsistent with Christianity. The exem- 
 plar of moral character required by Platonism is just the reverse of that re- 
 quired by Christianity. The little child, is the heavenly pattern pointed out 
 by Christianity, while the Philosopher, is that pointed out by Platonism. The 
 spirit of Christianity is humility, that of Platonism is pride. 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 405 
 
 knowlege of absolute truth. When carried 
 to its ultimate deductions, it cannot but main- 
 tain that there was in Christ no other reve- 
 lation than such as occurred in Plato : be- 
 cause Plato knew absolute truth by direct 
 cognition — a by employing the naked thought 
 (says Plato) alone, without any mixture, and 
 so endeavoring to trace the pure and general 
 essence of things without the ministry of the 
 eyes or ears ; the soul being, if I may so 
 speak, entirely disengaged from the whole 
 mass of the body, which only encumbers the 
 soul and cramps it in the quest of wisdom 
 and truth, as often as it is admitted to any 
 the least correspondence with it." Accord- 
 ing to this doctrine, the reason of Plato was 
 equal to the divinity of Christ. What then 
 is to be done with the declaration of the 
 Apostle : — " For other foundations can no 
 man lay than is laid, which is Jesus Christ ?" 
 It is true, that at an early period of Chris- 
 tianity, Christian doctrine took a wider range 
 and more discursive flights in the theology of 
 the Platonic schools of Alexandria, than in 
 that of the cotemporary schools, where differ- 
 
406 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ent modes of thought prevailed; and in look- 
 ing back over that period of history, we are 
 apt to be captivated by the false show of Al- 
 exandrian theology. But we apprehend, that 
 it is at least doubtful, whether the impulse 
 which proceeded from the Alexandrian schools 
 had a tendency to advance sound scriptural 
 interpretation, and pure Christian doctrine. 
 For no fact in church history is more certain, 
 than that the fathers of the first centuries per- 
 verted Christian doctrine by calling into their 
 aid the platonic philosophy in the interpreta- 
 tion of scripture. And that many of them 
 believed and endeavoured to make others be- 
 lieve, that most if not all the mysteries of 
 their religion had been set forth in the writ- 
 ings of Plato. Chrysostom declaimed against 
 these efforts; and the unsophisticated Tertul- 
 lian declared that the seeds of heresies were 
 scattered in Plato's doctrine of ideas. And 
 it was Platonism culled from the writings of 
 the fathers, that furnished the schoolmen with 
 the extravagance of the matter of their the- 
 ology, as the logic of Aristotle did the subtle- 
 ty of its form. So that at every period of 
 

 THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 407 
 
 the progress of Christianity, Platonism has 
 been one of the chief sources of its corrup- 
 tion. 
 
 And it is manifest that the great Apostle 
 to the Gentiles, who was so eminently quali- 
 fied for his high mission, by his gentile as well 
 as Hebrew learning, did not think that the 
 Platonic philosophy was in any way kindred 
 to Christianity. For in his first epistle to the 
 Corinthians, he denounces the Greek philos- 
 ophy as foolishness, and takes great pains to 
 place Christianity in open hostility to it. 
 And throughout this whole epistle, he never 
 once attempts to elucidate any doctrine of 
 Christianity by the teachings of the Greek 
 philosophy, though the epistle was addressed 
 to Greeks. And yet, it is one of the most 
 striking features of the mode of instruction 
 used by Christ and his Apostles, to graft their 
 doctrines upon those notions of their hearers 
 which have any affinity whatever with the 
 doctrines which they taught. This we see 
 strikingly exemplified by the Apostle Paul 
 when he was writing to his own countrymen 
 the Jews, in the epistle to the Hebrews. In 
 
408 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the very opening of the epistle he shows that 
 Christianity is the continuation of the sys- 
 tem of instruction; which God had employed 
 towards their fathers, by the prophets. And 
 in the eleventh chapter, he shows at great 
 length, and with deep earnestness, that faith 
 was the vital principle of religion under the 
 old dispensation as well ss under the new : 
 thus showing that the great central doctrine 
 of Christianity, " the just shall live by faiihp 
 was also the central doctrine of the religion 
 of their fathers. But never once in all his 
 epistles to the Gentiles, though we find him 
 saying that certain of their poets had said 
 what he was then teaching, do we find him 
 saying that Greek philosophy, whether Pla- 
 tonism or any other form of it, taught simi- 
 lar doctrines with those of Christianity. But 
 on the contrary, his whole drift is to show 
 that this philosophy was antagonist to Chris- 
 tianity. And indeed; we do not recollect any 
 instance in all his writings, where the Apostle 
 ever attempts to liken the great doctrines of 
 revelation to any thing in the natural world — 
 to any doctrine of philosophy — except when 
 

 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 409 
 
 he speaks, in the fifteenth chapter of first Cor- 
 inthians, of the resurrection of the dead. 
 But even there, he does not attempt to prove 
 the doctrine of the resurrection, by analogies 
 from nature which he adduces ; but merely to 
 illustrate what he taught. For the analogies, 
 are not philosophical analogies from which 
 an inductive inference can be drawn as to 
 the truth of the great doctrine discussed, but 
 merely rhetorical analogies illustrative of his 
 meaning. And it is contrary to the funda- 
 mental idea proclaimed in Christianity as a 
 supernatural revelation, to prove its doctrines 
 by the light of nature — to search in the anal- 
 ogies of nature for a key to its mysteries. 
 For as the doctrines taught do not lie within 
 the range of experience — within the province 
 of nature — the mode of proof w T as by mira- 
 cle ; thereby bringing supernatural things, 
 though not within the province of nature, 
 yet within that of experience ; by making, 
 for instance, the supernatural fact of the res- 
 urrection a fact in experience, by the res- 
 urrection of Christ. And when Paul stood 
 
 upon Mars Hill, which overlooks the proud 
 35 
 
410 THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 
 
 city of Athens, prouder perhaps of her philos- 
 ophy, than any thing else, he did not eulo- 
 gize that philosophy, and say that it was kin- 
 dred to the great doctrines which he taught, 
 and thereby gain a favourable hearing ; but 
 proclaimed that he had come to declare unto 
 them the God whom they ignorantly worship- 
 ped. How differently does the Apostle act 
 from the fathers of the first centuries of the 
 Christian church, who were continually en- 
 deavouring to show that Platonism contained 
 almost all Christian doctrine. 
 
 With these facts forcing themselves upon 
 any but the most superficial student of the 
 scriptures, how can it be pretended, that 
 Platonism has any affinity with Christianity ? 
 For the Apostle does not except Platonism 
 from his censures of the Greek philosophy ; 
 as he undoubtedly would have done, if he 
 had not intended to include it in his denun- 
 ciations. And it can not be maintained that 
 the Apostle was not acquainted with the Pla- 
 tonic philosophy ; when he was familiar with 
 general Greek literature. 
 
 We have now, we submit, shown that PJa- 
 
THE BACOPJIAN PHILOSOPHY. 411 
 
 tonism, with every form of the a priori phi- 
 losophy^ is utterly at war in its very funda- 
 mental conceptions, in its whole view of the 
 capacity of the human mind, with the genius of 
 Christianity as a revelation from God lying 
 beyond the province of reason, and to be 
 found only in his word contained in the Holy 
 Scriptures. For every system of a priori 
 philosophy when carried out to its legitimate 
 deductions, must like Platonism, virtually sur- 
 persede revelation, in its assumption that man 
 by virtue of his natural union with the Di- 
 vinity, is able to apprehend intuitively all the 
 spiritual truths which concern him ; and thus 
 confound all distinction between the natural 
 and supernatural orders of things — between 
 philosophy and revelation. 
 
 We now propose to show, that there is a 
 philosophy which is consistent both in its 
 method of investigation, and its principles 
 with Christianity — a philosophy, which, hum- 
 bling itself before Christianity, acknowledges 
 it to be a revelation of a knowledge that lies 
 beyond and above its province. This is the 
 Inductive or Baconian philosophy. 
 
412 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 That there is a philosophy, or rather psy- 
 chology, which accords with Christianity — 
 is assumed in it — is very obvious. We say 
 psychology , because we have heretofore shown 
 that revelation throws no light upon physics — 
 teaches nothing in regard to them- — but is 
 confined to the spiritual part of nature — the 
 nature and destiny of man, which lies prop- 
 erly within the province of psychology. 
 There is, therefore, a psychology which is 
 in accordance with Christianty, and which is 
 assumed in it, because there must be a corres- 
 pondence between man and revelation. Man 
 must be such as revelation represents him to 
 be — else revelation is false. And revelation 
 must be adapted to man — must assume a cor- 
 rect view of his nature. The laws of his 
 mind, must be such as revelation assumes. 
 If his mind were like that of the beasts of 
 the field, for example, revelation would be 
 altogether unfitted to it. Because such is 
 the constitution of the mind (if we may use 
 the word in such an application,) of a beast, 
 that moral truth cannot operate upon it. 
 There are no notions in his mind, no percep- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 413 
 
 tions in his instincts, upon which the doc- 
 trines of revelation can be grafted, and the 
 inspirations of God applied as the ward of 
 the key to the form of the lock, to open his 
 understanding so as to comprehend them. 
 The process of enlightenment and regenera- 
 tion set forth in the scriptures would be unfit- 
 ted to such a nature ; because they could not 
 operate upon it — its very laws forbid it. For 
 how could moral truth, which is the great and 
 only instrument by which the spirit of God 
 operates upon the mind of man in bringing 
 it from a state of sin to one of holiness, oper- 
 ate upon the mind of a beast which has no 
 moral perceptions ? There would have 
 to be a new creation — the beast would have 
 to be changed, or rather created into a 
 man — would have to be endowed with all the 
 capabilities of an intellectual, moral being — 
 before the doctrines of revelation could oper- 
 ate upon it. But such is the nature of man 
 that the doctrines of revelation can operate 
 upon his mind ; because it was founded upon 
 a correct view of the laws of his mental con- 
 stitution — it assumes a correct theory of his 
 35* 
 
414 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mind. The theory of mind is a legitimate 
 object of philosophical inquiry — is a branch 
 of philosophy which we call psychology. 
 There must be then, according to this analy- 
 sis, a theory of mind, a psychology, assumed 
 in Christianity ; and this theory of mind 
 whether it be possible to ascertain it or not, 
 is just as true as Christianity itself, which as- 
 sumes its truth as its own foundation as a 
 scheme of salvation for man. 
 
 It is therefore legitimate, in the interpreta- 
 tion of scripture, as we have before shown 
 w T hen we had this topic in hand in another 
 part of this chapter, after we have carefully 
 examined the doctrines of revelation, to 
 search in psychology to see whether we can 
 find any thing there confirmatory of our con- 
 clusions, or anything which clearly forbibs 
 them. But it cannot be too constantly and too 
 carefully borne in mind, that we must not 
 iorce our psychology upon scripture. For 
 there is much danger of doing it, even when 
 we make the psychological inquiry the last 
 in the process of interpretation : but not the 
 hundreth part as much, as when we carry our 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 415 
 
 preconceived psychological notions into the 
 inquiry according to the a priori method ; 
 thus making the psychological inquiry the 
 first in the process of interpretation. For 
 let it not be supposed, that we imagine that 
 any one would in the interpretation of scrip- 
 ture, first look into psychology and then into 
 scripture ; for all that we mean, by making 
 the psychological inquiry the first in the order 
 of the investigation, is, that they will carry 
 their preconceived psychological notions into 
 the interpretation ; which is the same in effect, 
 as first examining into psychology for the 
 doctrine to be found in scripture. For so 
 clearly is it contrary to all sound canons of in- 
 terpretation, to force our preconceived notions 
 upon scripture, that we cannot even take the 
 abstract meaning of a word and force it upon 
 that word in a passage contrary to the import 
 of the context ; as is strikingly exemplified 
 in 1st. Cor. iv, 3, where v«g* (day) is used 
 in the metonymical sense of judgement, con- 
 trary to its universal signification. 
 
 What then, is the psychology j or theory of 
 mind assumed in Christianity ? We have in 
 
416 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the second chapter of the second part of this 
 discourse, shown, that it is the theory, that all 
 our knowledge is founded upon experience; 
 and is acquired through the light of nature, or 
 the light of revelation. This is the psychology 
 with all its doctrines which is assumed in 
 Christianity. We have in that chapter shown, 
 that the theory of mind, that all our knowl- 
 edge is founded on experience, is true ac- 
 cording to the light of nature or psychologi- 
 cal phenomena, and we have also there 
 shown, that it is assumed in Christianity as a 
 scheme of instruction. When, therefore, 
 there are more than one view of the genius 
 and cardinal doctrines of Christianity, deriv- 
 ed from different interpretations of scripture, 
 it will be legitimate according to the princi- 
 ple developed in this part of our discourse, 
 to enquire which view accords best with the 
 established principles of psychology. And 
 we think, that it will appear in the sequel, 
 that the evangelical theology will accord best 
 with these principles. 
 
 According to the theory of mind which we 
 maintain as the true one, revelation teaches a 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 417 
 
 knowledge which nature does not : and all 
 our knowledge is derived from one or the 
 other of these two sources. If this be so, 
 then of course we must look to the scriptures 
 which are the records of that revelation for 
 the doctrines which it teaches; just as we 
 look to nature for philosophy. And it is man- 
 ifest that such perversion of scripture could 
 never result from this method of interpreta- 
 tion, as from the a priori method which we 
 have shown to have been so great a source of 
 error. Because this method of interpreta- 
 tion is limited in all its speculations by the de- 
 finite facts of revelation, and does not pretend 
 to see beyond. And this inductive method 
 of interpretation corresponds with the nature 
 of Christianity. For Christianity is given to 
 us not in the form of a system demonstrated 
 in all its parts; but it is presented in facts and 
 doctrines which are to be generalized, and 
 the unity of its doctrines to be ascertained 
 and developed by an examination of all their 
 various representations and applications set 
 forth in the scriptures. This constitutes the 
 glory of Christianity. This makes it that 
 
4J8 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 practical, popular system adapted to the want3 
 of every grade of intelligence, just as the 
 light of nature, or rather its phenomena, are 
 adapted to every grade of intelligence, from 
 the peasant to the philosopher, from the child 
 to the man. If Christianity had been pro- 
 mulgated as a dogmatic system developed in 
 all its logical concatenations, the ignorant 
 could never have profited by its teachings, ex- 
 cept through the instructions of the learned. 
 And it would have been an esoteric ; priestly 
 system, known only to a priesthood whose 
 divine right it would have been to monopolize 
 the oracles of God ; and thus to hold the keys 
 of heaven. But it is presented in such a 
 form that every man can appropriate it to 
 himself in his own way — can understand its 
 doctrines set forth in a practical mode, in so 
 many various applications to the conduct of 
 individuals of every grade and character, and 
 condition. Its very form teaches the great 
 Protestant doctrine of private judgment. 
 
 For the first time then in the history of 
 man, the esoteric and the exoteric are united 
 are harmonized. The philosopher and the 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 419* 
 
 multitude have the same religious doctrines. 
 Faith and knowledge have become reconcil- 
 ed — knowledge has confessed its ignorance, 
 and admitted it must build upon faith as its 
 only sure foundation in theology as well as in. 
 philosophy. The Greek has renounced his 
 wisdom, and espoused the foolishness of the 
 Jew. And thus is realized, what appeared 
 to the ancients an impossibility, a religion 
 that unites all men with one another : " A 
 man must be very weak," says Celsus, "to 
 imagine that Greeks and Barbarians in Asia, 
 Europe and Lybia, can ever unite under one 
 religion." 
 
 How distinctly at every step in the forego- 
 ing analysis do we see that the psychological 
 doctrines which are developed in the induc- 
 tive philosophy, are those which harmonize 
 with the nature of Christianity, as a mode of 
 instruction to mankind. It is seen that Chris- 
 tianity makes faith occupy a position higher 
 than reasoning. That reasoning must set 
 out from faith, just as in nature we must 
 set out from simple belief. And the facts 
 which are the legitimate objects of faith 
 
420 THE BACO_\ T IAX PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 must be ascertained, by induction employ- 
 ed in the secondary way we have before 
 mentioned, in the examination of scripture 
 under the guide of the rules of gramma- 
 tical and logical interpretation. Neander, in 
 speaking of Apelles, an oriental theoso- 
 phist, who embraced Christianity, says : 
 "Appelles, finding no satisfactory conclusion 
 in his speculations upon the incomprehensi- 
 ble, took refuge in the faith which obeys an 
 inward necessity without being able to solve 
 every difficulty to itself, (difficulties which in 
 his case met him even in that which he could 
 not choose but to recognise,) he could do no 
 other, he said ; he felt himself obliged to be- 
 lieve in one eternal God, as the original cause 
 of all existence, but he could not scientifical- 
 ly prove how all existence was necessarily to 
 be traced back to the one original principle. 
 The church-teacher, Rhodon, to whom he 
 made these communications in confidence, 
 laughed at him as one who pretended to be a 
 teacher, but only believed what he taught; 
 and acknowledged that he could not prove it ; 
 but one is inclined to ask, whether the laugh- 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY*. 421 
 
 er in this case was wiser than the man whom 
 he laughed at, and whether Rhodon himself ; in 
 the strict sense of the word, could prove that 
 which Apelles avowed that he only believed?" 
 What Neander says of Apelles, " he took 
 refuge in the faith which obeys an inward 
 necessity, without being able to solve every 
 difficulty/' is the true psychological doctrine 
 developed by Reid, as is shown in the second 
 chapter of the second part of this discourse. 
 Here then is shown the doctrinal identity, 
 of the true psychological doctrine that we 
 believe by an inward necessity independent of 
 ratiocination, and the psychology which is 
 assumed in Christianity. And thus is shown 
 that the faith of Christianity is adapted to 
 the nature of man — is in conformity to the 
 laws of his mind. 
 
 But as faith is the great central doctrine of 
 Christianity, we will develop its psychologi- 
 cal foundation still further. It is a psycho- 
 logical fact, that the knowledge of every phil- 
 osophical truth increases the ability of the 
 mind to apprehend still more recondite truths. 
 
 The more philosophy we learn, the greater 
 36 
 
422 THE BACO.flAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is our ability to learn other truths; and the 
 knowledge of truth invigorates the mind — 
 quickens and enlightens the mental eye, gives 
 it a wider view and a deeper penetration. 
 And it is another psychological fact, as we 
 have shown in the first part of this discourse, 
 that there is an intimate connection between 
 the feelings and the intellect — that it is a 'aw 
 of our mental constitution, that every emo- 
 tion is allied to some object of perception, 
 or memory or imagination, and is dependent 
 upon it as its antecedent or cause ; and the 
 emotion can never be excited in the mind 
 except by its appropriate object being in the 
 view of the mind ; and can never cease to 
 exist in the mind until the object is forgotten 
 or removed from its view. We see then, 
 how it is that philosophical truth operates 
 upon the moral and aesthetical parts of our 
 nature, quickening and improving both the 
 sensibility to the moral and beautiful. We 
 will now r show that we have here developed 
 the psychological foundation of religious faith; 
 and that the doctrine that we are saved by 
 faith, is one adapted to the nature of mm, 
 
•;;ku BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 423 
 
 Through faith we are saved ; and that not 
 of ourselves. As it is the truth which is the 
 proper object of faith ; it is the truth which, 
 by the agency of the spirit of God, operates 
 upon man, enlightening his mind, and quick- 
 ening and purifying his moral sensibility, ac- 
 cording to the psychological laws above indi- 
 cated, by which truth operates upon our 
 moral and aesthetical nature. The truth is 
 given to us by God, and by an inward neces- 
 sity, we believe, when it is discerned by us. 
 True faith is accompanied with a spiritual 
 communion between the heart and the doc- 
 trine believed, according to the psychological 
 law of the connection between the feelings 
 and the intellect ; and hence there is generat- 
 ed in the heart a condition kindred to the 
 truth believed. The truth enters into the 
 spiritual life, and becomes its forming and fash- 
 ioning principle, by which the w T hole inward 
 man is changed according to the psychologi- 
 cal law, into conformity with it. By true 
 faith we enter into communion with divine 
 things ; and this is different from that faith 
 which rests merely upon authority, and clings 
 
424 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 only to outward things. This last is not a 
 belief in the truth by its own impression upon 
 the mind, but a belief in the authority ; and 
 is therefore a mere logical inference that 
 the doctrine to which the authority is given 
 is true. It is not a perception of the truth 
 by its own light. It is not spiritual discern- 
 ment — a perception of the truth accompani- 
 ed by its correspondent holy emotion. Be- 
 lieving the miracles of the gospel is nothing 
 in itself, the devils believe and tremble — but 
 the belief of its truths is every thing. 
 
 We see then, that according to psychologi- 
 cal laws, it is through faith, having truth for 
 its object, that we are changed from wicked- 
 ness to holiness — that the love of sin is turn- 
 ed into the love of holiness; and it is the 
 truth by the agency of the Spirit of God, 
 which changes us, and not we of ourselves. 
 Faith works by love ; because the truth which 
 produces faith, converts our hatred of holy 
 things into love of them ; and love becomes 
 the condition of faith — the impulse of the 
 soul generated or quickened into life by faith, 
 is love; and of course the heart then works 
 
THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
 425 
 
 by love. And thus is shown, according to 
 psychological laws, the nature of the doctrine 
 that faith works by love. 
 
 We see, then, by this analysis, how the 
 evangelical view of Christianity, which makes 
 faith and truth the great paramount matters 
 in the scheme of redemption, is explained 
 and supported by those psychological laws 
 which have been established by a rigid induc- 
 tion of phenomena ; and this is strong confir- 
 mation, that this is the correct view of Chris- 
 tianity. 
 
 It can now be seen, that the doctrine pro- 
 claimed in the very opening of the Analyti- 
 cal Introduction to this discourse, that the 
 Baconian philosophy is emphatically the philo- 
 sophy of protestantism, was no unmeaning 
 declaration. We have seen, that this philo- 
 sophy makes scripture, the infallible rule of 
 its own interpretation. And that repudiating 
 the notion that Christianity is an esoteric sys- 
 tem, and that any class of men have the keys 
 of heaven, it proclaims the great doctrine of 
 private judgement. And the very theory of 
 mind which this philosophy has established. 
 
426 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the psychological laws which it has devel- 
 oped, confirm the protestant view of Christi- 
 anity, that it is the truth, and not the sacra- 
 ments, which is the great means of converting 
 men. In a word, this philosophy takes the 
 same view of the mission of Christ as he 
 himself did, when he said to Pilate : " To this 
 end was I born, and for this cause came I into 
 the world, that I should bear witness unto the 
 truth." 
 
 And, when we look back and survey the 
 wide field of discussion over which we have 
 passed, and see how constantly, the inductive 
 method of investigation has led to truth in 
 every department of thought, we cannot but 
 believe, that it is the true method. While 
 on the other hand, when we see how univer- 
 sally, in all ages and in all regions of thought 
 — in revelation, as well as in nature — the a 
 priori method has led to error, it would 
 almost appear as though that method were 
 the very Organon of Satan, 
 
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