mmmmmmi ■,!.'vl,'';i'iV';';'; ';''';■ ■ '■,'■';' ' i > ■ , - ' ' ■ '' .,•'.,' ' ,', ,.;'; "'-' TW ' Q f "^^^" .0 .G7C77 1 1^ ^o.^^ ''%. ^ '■-.--■-■••/"\ "o. ^oV' ^<^- a? %TON The Four Seas Company 1919 Copyright, ipip, by The Four Seas Company The Four 'Seas Press Boston., Mass., U. S. A. (g)Ci.A5 2 9 451 JUL 31 \m PREFACE The contents of this volume are the substance, and in some degree the arrangement of pieces, pubUshed originally in a county newspaper. The very flattering comments of personal friends who read them — some no doubt uttered to soothe my vanity — as well as the love and affection that I bear to this the mental child of my old age whose feeble life I desire to preserve, have combined to induce me to revise them, eliminate, add to, polish and collect them into this form. These considerations, with some, may not be a satisfac- tory answer to the question, "why this waste of time, labor and printer's paper — the last thing at this time regarded as a big item in the high cost of living — adding one more volume to the im- measurable mass of unsaleable books now piled up in the warehouses, shelves and cellars of pub- lishing houses awaiting a conflagration and insur- ance adjuster?" To these imaginary Missour- ians who insist on being shown, I will explain that the only available statistics on the subject that I have been able to gather prove that ninety- nine and one half per cent of all the subscribers 6 Preface and borrowers of that newspaper, never read a word of any of those papers ; but after glancing at the repulsive looking title — "Anglophobia" — would pass it up, thinking it was a discourse on some disreputable and unpalatable patent medi- cine, or something concerning mad dogs. Some of these people deserve another chance to add to their knowledge, hence this book. I have not a solitary doubt that this book will be a complete failure, financially, instructively or in the capacity to survive one edition ; but I trust my readers will not indulge in too much tearful sympathy for me on that account, for the num- ber and character of the failures in my life has rendered me somewhat callous to the pain and mortification that once accompanied them. It may be instructive to my friends and gratifying to enemies to mention a few of them : Among the earliest failures of my life was when at the age of 17 years, in the year 1862, I attempted with others to thrash "Uncle Sam," an effort that was not in the main a success, "but quite to the contrary," as was remarked by a passenger on a ship to a lady, when she asked him if he had breakfasted. The civil and criminal dockets of the courts in this and adjoining counties for the past forty- Preface 7 three years will disclose many failures to win verdicts that I knew my clients were entitled to. At first such adverse verdicts would distress and disappoint me more than they would my clients, even when the death penalty was included; but later in life I could listen to an adverse verdict with perfect immobility of countenance and with- out a quiver of an eye-lash, at the same time secretly blaspheming the jury and its verdict in a manner that was perfectly withering and un- christianlike. It was in the year 1878 that I undertook the spiritual instruction in a Sunday school of eight or nine boys, aged from 10 to 14 years ; my suc- cess in that undertaking was not good; in fact, not to put too fine a point on it, it was a dismal failure. My attention was painfully called to the fact of such a failure by being called upon some years later to assist in extricating one of those boys from a mine down in Mexico, whither he had been sent by the constituted authorities of that most unhappy country for helping to rob a train. A vivacious young lady suggested, when I told of that experience in her hearing, that I had exhibited my usual prescience by giving such instruction to those boys as would afterwards en- able me to make a fee out of them; which re- 8 Preface mark implied that I had given those youngsters practical instructions in regard to train robbing and how to commit other felonies. While it is a fact that I was perfectly innocent of any such purpose, forethought or instruction, the circumstances tended to justify her remark to that degree that I was wholly unprepared to make any answer to her accusation, and it was more than a week before I was able to formulate a suitable rejoinder to her repartee. A spark of satisfaction will remain to me re- gardless of the fate of this little book, and that is, that although it occupies but an infinitesimal space in the literary world it will be first to oc- cupy this particular field of literary exploitation. For more than sixty years I have been an omni- verous and reasonably intelligent reader, and with average memory, and I do not now recall any writer who has attempted to combat the pre- judices that some Americans have against the English government and people, and show the groundlessness of such dislike. An Englishman is, and ought to be too proud and independent to combat a prejudice that he knows to be ground- less — American writers seem to have regarded the subject as unimportant and not worth their serious thought. Preface 9 It has been asserted by quite a number of peo- ple that the whole theme of "Anglophobia" is merely a fad or hobby of my own, and that there is not in the United States such widespread anti- English or pro-German sentiment as I assume in this book ; and my experience and opportunity for observation are too limited as to number of per- sons talked to, and area of country investigated, to furnish a basis for such generalization. It is my belief, however, formed from an observation of more than fifty years, that there exists in the minds of a vast number of Americans of Anglo- Saxon descent, a deep seated hatred for Great Britain, the reason for which they are not able to state clearly. The contention however is not susceptible of proof one way or the other and so it is left for the individual reader to sound, or to listen to, the sentiment of the people in his own locality or elsewhere, and formulate his own opinion as to whether this essay is entirely use- less or is calculated to serve a laudable purpose. With an earnest and patriotic aim to serve such a purpose, I now launch this frail bark upon the uncertain sea of public opinion, with all its imperfections on its head, where lurking sub- marine critics are submerged, ready to discharge lo Preface a satirical torpedo at its feeble and frightened body, if found to be worth the ammunition. And now, O most respected and honored reader, to conciliate you and win your good will and forgiveness, I will tell you truthfully that this is my first, last and' only venture; and like Cid Hamet Benengeli when he completed his his- tory of the life and adventures of the redoubt- able Don Quixote, I will now give my pen an un- broken eternal rest : "Condemned at length to be forgotten quite With all the pages which 'twas thine to write." J. G. COOK Burnet, Texas. CONTENTS Chapter Page Introduction 15 The American's First Impressions . . 22 Choosing an Enemy 32 Blood's Thicker Than Water ... 50 Un preparedness vs. Readiness ... 59 It Might Have Been 69 Some Law-makers and Some Lawyers Affected 80 American Military Caste — Contraband — Embargo 90 Embargo, Propagandists, and American ESAUS lOI Civilization, and Plans of Paul Kruger 108 Original "Scrap of Paper" Treaty — Dogs of War Let Loose .... 116 Comparative Manhood — Kruger and a Mier Prisoner 124 Parallel Between the United States AND Great Britain in the Treat- ment of Mormons, Filipinos, and Boers 131 ANGLOPHOBIA CHAPTER I Introduction The foregoing caption is not intended as a conun- drumi; it is merely a question to be answered — unsatisfactorily it may be — in this and succeed- ing chapters. The word "Anglophobia" is de- fined by Webster to be "Dislike of England," and the term will be hereinafter applied to Americans of Anglo-Saxon blood who are affected in this way. It can be readily understood why many Irish-Americans and German-Americans dislike Great Britain, but it requires some thought and historic investigation to understand why Anglo- Saxon Americans should entertain hatred and vindictive dislike towards people of their own blood, traditions, and history. The only harm resulting heretofore from this feeling was to cause the two nationalities, who are essentially the same in all of those characteristics that make for the highest order of modern civilization, to 15 i6 Anglophobia become to a certain degree estranged; and to cause Americans to view the British Govern- ment with distrust and suspicion. The existence and extent of this feehng of Americans against them has caused many Enghshmen, who might have immigrated to the United States and be- come citizens and mingled with our people and have reinforced the ever decreasing proportion of Anglo-Saxon blood in our nation, to migrate to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, East India, and to other English-speaking colonies and dependencies of Great Britain; where they were welcomed and where they would not be wounded by expressions of dislike for their mother country. It is not easy to estimate the effect upon our country of losing that rein- forcement of Anglo-Saxon blood, and so increase the proportion of blood of the strange untempered people from Eastern Europe and Western Asia that have swarmed to our shores, and become citizens of our country. There can be no more auspicious or appropriate time to combat this prejudice against the English government than the present, and if possible to remove it by exhibiting its groundlessness. Few Anglophobists in America are able off hand to state the reason for their dislike, which proves Introduction 17 that the feeling is founded on prejudice created from misinformation or hearsay. The two nations are now for the first time in history acting together, waging a terrific war against a common enemy, defending and uphold- ing the principles of liberty and democracy which are the common heritage of both; through the wisest counsellors of both countries they are to- day (April 30, 191 7) consulting in regard to the best method of conducting the war and other matters vital to the success of their armies. Within a few short months American boys may be standing in the same line of battle with young Englishmen and charging, falling, and dying for the same great cause of human liberty and democracy; an Englishman may perhaps render first aid to an American, or a wounded British soldier may be carried from the battlefield by an American. There are innumerable kindnesses and help that can be rendered for each other by Isoldiers fighting for the same cause, and the ut- most good will, respect and confidence should ex- ist between soldiers of different nationalities who have to rely upon the courage and fidelity of each other in their deadly conflicts with the enemy. The world is now entering upon an era where- in the English-speaking nations of the Anglo- i8 - Anglophobia Saxon race, like the tribe of Issachar, will bend their backs to the white man's burdens, upholding the weak, taming the savage, restraining the tyrant, enforcing peace, justice and mercy among the nations of the earth, setting examples that will guide mankind to right and happiness. They must act together and in harmony to ac- complish the great work for the human family that lies out before them. There can exist to- day in the heart of a patriotic American no great- er or no more exalted desire than to see perfect harmony between the great nations that will soon be called upon to perform that labor of love for humanity. It is these and like considerations that have urged the author to undertake a task that seems to have been ignored by the persons most vitally interested, and that is, the effort to combat those prejudices by showing their ground- lessness. The personal and national pride of the English would prevent their condescending to combat prejudices that they regard as unjust and without cause. But the American peo- ple are vitally interested in forming and main- taining a fair and unprejudiced judgment of all the nations of the earth with whom they are at peace; more especially the nation with whom the American people are closely allied by blood. Introduction 19 language, laws and traditions, as they are with the English. It might have been reasonably ex- pected that among the many hundreds of gifted American writers who have flourished during the past one hundred or more years, some one of them in the interest of right and justice, and without compromising his love for and loyalty to his own country, would have undertaken to re- move or palliate such prejudices, as far as the facts of history would "permit. But no such writer has ever attempted to separate the Anglo- phobists into the different classes or groups as they exist, analyze and trace to their origin the prejudices they entertain. With no experience as an essayist or writer of books, it is with many doubts and misgivings that the author attempts the exploration of this new field of literary venture; but he is sustained with the hope that should this effort fail to ac- complish the purposes designed, it may at least direct public attention to the necessity or exped- iency of an effort to break down those prejudices and may induce some abler writer to make the effort. To forestall any impression that the author is biased in favor of English people or is prompted by a feeling of national loyalty to their govern- 20 Anglophobia ment, or that this is not a perfectly impartial dis- cussion of the subject in hand, it is nothing but right and proper to set down that while he is not an Anglophobist neither is he an "Anglo- maniac," defined by Webster to be one "who has a mania for what is English"; the symptoms of the mania being discernable by one affecting the broad "a," the use of the monocle, and a waste- ful and perfectly meaningless use of the word "What" at the end of a sentence, and who is most exquisitely portrayed by Leon Wilson in his "Ruggles of Red Gap." The ancestral head of his family in America emigrated to this country many decades before the Revolutionary war, whose descendants fought the British in that war and in the year 1812, and he is therefore quali- fied to discuss the subject from an impartial view point. The author has found difficulty in maintaining that impersonal attitude that is achieved by the practised and gifted writer, and in effacing him- self — keeping the ego in the background. Ordinarily the liberal space allowed to the Pre- face and Introduction ought to afford room enough to contain all the personal pronouns of the first person singular that are required to elucidate his subject. It is not any want of modesty in Introduction 21 the author that causes them to bob up fre- quently in other places in this book, but rather because of a want of adeptness in arranging the subject matter of his theme, so as to exclude the ego, and keep it penned up in its proper place. The kindly reader is therefore requested to ig- nore the presence of the personal pronoun where it obtrudes itself, out of its place, the same as you would a pert child attempting to lead in the con- versation of grown peoples. The genus Anglophobist is susceptible of be- ing divided into four separate and distinct species or classes, each having distinct cause for their antipathy, and traceable to want of information, misinformation, conditions no longer existing or misunderstood. The most numerous and most respectable of those having the most reasonable cause for their dislike will be the first in the order of discussion. CHAPTER II The American's First Impressions Commencing about the year 1790 and continu- ing to the year i860 — a period of seventy years — the young Americans in nearly every community in the United States, on the 4th day of each July, listened to the reading of the Declaration of In- dependence, wherein the wrongs and injuries done to this country by the British Government were set forth in clear and incisive language that every one could understand. On these oc- casions, generally at Fourth of July barbecues, the orator of the day, a member of Congress or some other influential and prominent citizen of the community, in eloquent and forcible language recited all the acts of oppression of the British Government towards the colonies that led up to the Revolutionary war ; and would dwell at length upon the right of the Colonists as English sub- jects to resist all forms of taxation imposed upon them without their consent and without repre- sentation in the legislative body levying the tax. These speakers would dwell upon the privation 22 The American's First Impressions 23 and suffering of the American soldiers ; the glo- rious victories of American arms by land and sea, etc. At no time during these long series of years at such 4th of July occasions, or elsewhere, did any person speak in behalf of England or offer any excuse or fact in mitigation of the alleged wrongs. Naturally the result of such patriotic appeals and arraignment of England from year to year through more than two generations of citi- zens was to implant in the minds of Americans a deep antipathy for the English people, without discrimination ; a feeling which was handed down from father to son and aggravated and intensified as these charges were made from year to year, especially during and after the war of 181 2. The acts of England which brought about this war were also included in the 4th of July orations; and people were told of Americans being forcibly taken from American ships by the commanders of English men-of-war and compelled to serve in the English navy. Another cause of the anti-English feeling, dur- ing the period mentioned, is the fact that previous to our Civil War England was the only great nation with which America had ever been at war, and the loss, suffering and privation to America of the two English wars stood alone without off- ^4 Anglophobia set or comparison with any other war. It is true that a naval war between France and the United States lasted from the beginning of 1799 to the close of 1800, but that war being altogether a naval warfare, did not seem to make much im- pression on the minds of Americans, or embitter them against the French nation; but it is true nevertheless that the conduct of France toward Americans and American sailors and shipping was far more severe and aggravating than the conduct of England that brought on the war of 18 1 2. These wars with France and Great Brit- ain will be discussed more at length further on. In respect to the Revolutionary War, Ameri- cans during all the period referred to seem not to have considered or known that a great ma- jority of the English people were bitterly opposed to the coercive measures of the government of Great Britain towards the colonies; that the finest intellects, the greatest and most eloquent statesmen that the English nation has ever pro- duced, put forth their mightiest efforts against the commencement and prosecution of the war; such men for instance as Burke, Charles James Fox, Dempster, Wilkes and others in the House of Commons; and in the House of Lords, Lord Camden, Marquis of Rockingham, and Earl of The American's First Impressions 25 Chatham and many other noblemen of transcen- dent genius. Lord Chatham was the elder Pitt, and many years Prime Minister under George the Second and one of the greatest statesmen that the world has ever produced. The English peo- ple of that day were situated like the great mass of the German people of today, that is, deceived by the government, exploited into the war by an autocratic tyrant aided by a class of men who believed in autocratic government. George III was a pure-blooded German, believed in auto- cracy and the divine right of kings, and during the period of his sanity endeavored to reestablish those ancient prerogatives of the crown, the at- tempted exercise of which caused Charles I to lose his head. Why should the acts and the mis- conduct of an obstinate German autocrat, together with a subservient majority in Parliament and vacillating Prime Minister (Lord North) be at- tributed to the great majority of just, merciful, democratic Englishmen as their unpardonable sin? To bring the answer of that question nearer home, why should the entire present citizenship of the state of Texas be condemned for the rapacity, dishonesty and oppressive acts of the Carpet Bag Government, forced on the people after the close of the Civil War? History affords numerous 26 Anglophobia instances of governments and rulers acting con- trary to the wishes and interests of the majority of the people they govern ; but instances are rare where a large and intelligent class of people for a period of more than one hundred and forty years persistently condemns and denounces a whole nation of people, because of the action of a minority government of that nation many years ago against the wishes of the majority. The misinformation or lack of information ex- isting in the minds of many Americans in regard to the facts and conditions in England preceding and culminating in the Revolutionary War, exists also in respect to many things having a bearing upon, and resulting in the war of 1812. From 1793 to 1807 Great Britain had been — with an interval of one or two years of feverish peace — continuously at war with France; at first with the French Republic, and later with Em- peror Napoleon ; in the latter year Napoleon was supreme in continental Europe, all resistance to his autocratic power had ceased, England alone was fighting him single-handed with all of Europe at his back. Twice during the period mentioned there had been combinations of the fleets of three or four of the European powers under the leader- ship of France for the purpose of invading Eng- The American's First Impressions 27 land; on each occa'Sion the fleets were scattered by storms, whereby England was saved from in- vasion and subjugation. Danger to England from the combined powers of Europe was still eminent in 1807, her principal defense was her navy, thousands of her marines were deserting from the navy and obtaining employment as sailors on American merchant vessels. The laws of Great Britain prohibited a British subject from renouncing his allegiance to that government and becoming a citizen of another country, and she proceeded to impress or capture those runaway Englishmen wherever found on American vessels. The United States, long a part of Great Britain, recognized the existence of the law against ex- patriation, having but a short time before lived under that law, made no special objections to the reclaiming of deserters from the English navy, but objected to the insult to the flag in holding up and searching American ships; still she had no provisions for the return of those deserters in any other way. Great Britain contended that she was fighting alone for the freedom, liberty and democracy of the world, that her subjugation would be soon fol- lowed by the conquest of America ; Louisana Ter- ritory and Canada would be retaken by Napoleon, 28 Anglophobia whose autocratic power would be finally estab- lished upon the ruins of free government; that if the United States did not choose to aid Great Britain in her struggle for the liberty of human- ity from the oppression of a tyrant, she should at least cease to be a refuge and asylum for the deserters from the British navy, thereby aiding the enemy of democracy to deplete and weaken her marine forces ; that if such drain on the Eng- lish marine continued her warships would even- tually be tied to the docks, her means of self-de- fense gone, leaving her helpless at the feet of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose all absorbing pas- sions were lust for power and frenzied hate for England. It is now, has always been, and will always be, an open question as to how far the United States was to blame for the depredations on her com- merce and insult to her flag ; and whether she did not in a great measure, by her pacific policy, en- courage such acts, and contribute to the wrongs and injuries committed upon her, often given as a reason for her hatred for the English; and while such depredations were unjustifiable except for the very doubtful excuse furnished by ex- igencies of the British government, growing out of her wars with Napoleon, still as the same kind The American's First Impressions 29 of depredations were committed upon American commerce by France and for a longer period of time, there can be no reason for exonerating the French and condemning the EngUsh for the same character of conduct. In rehearsing those depredations of the French — one series of which culminated in the war of 1 799- 1800 — it is not intended to revive or excite ill-will or prejudice against that brave, patriotic, high-minded and self-sacrificing nation, for whom, in her tragic struggle for existence, the great heart of the American people now reaches out in sympathy, in admiration and affection ; but such references are made merely for the purpose of exhibiting to the Anglophobist the inconsist- ency of condemning the act of a man or nation whom he dislikes, while approving or passing over the same thing done by another. In the summer of 1794 a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and America tending powerfully to promote the political amity and commercial benefits of both countries. This gave great offense to France which in 1795 came un- der the government or misgovernment of the "Directory," one of the governing boards or bu- reaus that ruled France during the progress of her revolution. The treaty did not in any man- 30 Anglophobia ner discriminate against France or her commerce, but being at that time at war with Great Britain, she resented any comity or friendship between the United States and Great Britain. France seems to have felt that the aid which she had given to America during the Revolutionary war should be repaid by perpetual fealty to her ; that America should not have friendly relations with any power that was at enmity with France. Even before the treaty in 1793, French privateers had commenced war on American commerce by seiz- ing ships and cargoes on the high seas, assuming that the sense of obligation and gratitude for as- sistance in her struggle for independence would keep America from resenting such depredations. In the presidential contest in 1796, the French minister took a very active part to defeat Adams, the Federalist candidate — the political party responsible for the treaty with Great Brit- ain. Failing to accomplish his defeat, France quickened her aggressive warfare on American commerce, seizing, searching, and confiscating ships, even in American waters. In retaliation, the United States at the beginning of 1799 issued letters of marque and reprisal to American pri- vateers. After about two years of raiding on The American's First Impressions 31 French shipping, during which time about ninety ships were captured or destroyed by the United States cruisers and privateers, in 1800 the Direc- tory was abolished. Napoleon became first consul, and for a time there was peace. CHAPTER III. Choosing an Enemy When Thomas Jefferson was elected President in 1800, he brought into power a party bent on reversing all of the policies of the Federalists — the party that had been in power since the gov- ernment was inaugurated under the constitution — especially those that had tended to centralize power in the general government. The new party regarded a strong navy and standing army of any size as affording the Federal government a too ef- fectual means of acquiring and holding supreme power. In pursuance of this policy, President Jeffer- son and his party caused work to be suspend- ed on the new warships that had been provided for under the previous administration ; those that remained were dismantled, docked, left out of re- pair, with neither equipment of guns, ammunition or men. By the government's policy it invited every fourth rate power in the world to impose on its citizens and prey on its commerce on the high seas with impunity. It may well be doubted 32 Choosing an Enemy 33 that the British commanders would have gone to the extent of boarding American ships and arrest- ing deserters if the United States had been pro- vided with a fair-sized navy. The government by its poUcy said to American seamen: "Stay in port, don't venture beyond the three-mile limit at sea ; if you do, it will be at your own peril. Your welfare does not justify the risk of increasing Federal power, by building and equipping war- ships, and maintaining crews and marines to man them." What kind of treatment could the Unit- ed States expect that her citizens would receive from the other nations, when she exhibited such small concern for their welfare? Though such indifference to their protection did not justify Great Britain in her encroachments, still, when this and all other circumstances are weighed, such as the national peril to Great Britain made emin- ent by the attitude of nearly all European na- tions, the natural instinct of self-defense and self- preservation which no man-made law can restrict or circumscribe, many grounds can be found that will in some degree mitigate her offense. In view of international law as recognized in the year 1807, these acts of Great Britain in reclaim- ing the deserters from her navy, should not be regarded as justifying the hatred for the English 34 Anglophobia to continue for more than one hundred years. After all, they were not more offensive than the conduct of Captain Wilkes, commander of an American man-of-war, in over-hauling the Eng- lish steamer Trent and forcibly taking and re- moving Slidell and Mason, Confederate commis- sioners on their way to Europe as passengers on the Trent. It is one of the unaccountable and anomalous phases of human nature that so many Southern people — ex-confederate soldiers and their des- cendants — should entertain illwill and dislike for England, in the face of undisputed history that the most influential classes in England were known to sympathize with the South during the Civil War ; and that she came near going to war with the United States on account of the Slidell and Mason incident. Yet among the bitterest English haters today many are to be found in the Southern states. The depredation on American commerce by Great Britain was one of the proximate causes of the war in 1812. In 1803 war again broke out between France and England and it was not long before each nation, England by her orders in council, and Napoleon by his decrees, estab- lished paper blockades of all the ports of each Choosing an Enemy 35 other, which included every port on the Mediter- ranean Sea, European ports on the Atlantic Ocean and Baltic Sea, and sea-ports of Great Britain. Napoleon by his decrees ordered his cruisers and privateers to capture and confiscate the ships of any neutral nation that had stopped at an English port, or had goods of English manufacture in their cargoes. England by her orders in council made practically the same res- trictions with reference to neutral trade with France and her allies. The United States being the only neutral nation having any commerce v/hatever was thus caught between the upper and nether millstones. Those orders and decrees were not directed specially against the United States, but tlie practical effect amounted to a de- claration of war by both nations against Ameri a. From the year 1806, when these orders and de- crees v/ere first made, to the fall of Napoleon in 1814, which also included the full period of the war in 181 2, marked the weakest, most humiliat- ing, and m.ost disgraceful period of American histor)^ Having done everything possible to weaken the hands of the general government, hav- ing dismantled the navy, reduced the regular army to a force of 6,000 men, having cut down the annual revenue to barely sufficient to support 36 Anglophobia the government on a peace basis, the government was suddently confronted with the dire necessity of having, and exercising for the defense of the country, the very powers of the Federal govern- ment that had been destroyed by the Jefferson ad- ministration. The only measure of redress or reprisal left to the United States, and for the pro- tection of her shipping, was to place an embargo on the shipment of any kind of freight whatever from the United States to any country in the world, and prohibit the exit of any American owned ships. This embargo produced such a storm of protest from the people as not only to demoralize the government but seriously threaten the Union itself. New England objected be- cause it ruined her commerce and left her ships to decay at the docks, her maritime population without employment. The Middle and Southern states complained because they were deprived by the embargo of a foreign market for their agri- cultural products. Discontent and dissatisfaction and resentment towards the government increased; a plan was formed in New England, at the instigation of the Federalists, to nullify the embargo and resist the enforcement of the law, which would necessarily cause secession and result in a union or com- Choosing an Enemy 37 mercial alliance with England. John Quincy Adams, Senator from Massachusetts, who had left the Federalist party, came to Washington to counsel the President and warn him of the temper and trend of affairs in New England. At the beginning of 1809, Congress substituted for the embargo the Non-Intercourse Act which permitted commerce with all nations except France and England and their allies, and as there was little or no commerce between the United States and the other neutral nations the Act served no purpose, except by lifting the embargo to turn loose American ships to engage in the old and respectable crime of smuggling. Finding that the smuggling, which took the place of open trade with France and England, cut off the revenue derived by the government from the tar- iff. Congress after eighteen months' trial repealed the Non-Intercourse act, and the United States fell back once more upon negotiations with the two countries to repeal their several orders and decrees. England refused to revoke her orders prohibiting neutrals from trading with France; Napoleon agreed to revoke his decrees prohibit- ing neutral trading with England and notified President Jefferson that he had in fact done so. This influenced many hundreds of ships with 38 Anglophobia valuable cargoes consisting principally of goods of English manufacture to be sent to France and to the ports of her allies. As soon, however, as they entered those ports they were seized and confiscated with their cargoes, the wily Em- peror claiming that his decrees were still in force. The loss to the American owners from such de- ceitful artifices amounted to quite ten million dol- lars in one season. For more than two years longer matters continued to grow worse, with a growing certainty that war was inevitable either with England or France. The United States was too weak to fight both, or either one of them singly, for that matter. She was ih the attitude of a trembling scared boy placed by his compan- ions in a ring with two husky bullies, his retreat cut off, and compelled to fight one of the bullies, with an absolute certainty of getting a licking whichever one he picked on. The author is re- counting a sad and actual experience of his boy- hood days, which enables him to describe accu- rately the sensations and travails of soul of Presi- dent Madison and Congress for the next two years or more. Without a navy, without an army, without armament, munitions, money, revenue or credit, the United States strove man- fully to keep out of war. She tried the Non-In- Choosing an Enemy 39 tercourse act again on both nations, but it would not work. Meantime she was trying in all good faith and sincerity to decide which one of the two nations was the safest for her to fight. Hered- itary dislike for England and love for France finally decided the question, and while it was ad- mitted that Napoleon had done far more to in- jure America than England had, on June i8, 1812, war was declared against Great Britain. True to the bad luck that seemed to have dogged the administrations of Jefferson and Madison in their foreign relations, the President soon learned that on the day before Congress declared war, England had revoked her orders in Council which had given such offense to the United States; and about the same time it was learned that a few weeks previously a French fleet had been sent to sea for the purpose of capturing or des- troying all American ships and sweeping her com- merce from the high seas. But it was too late to recall the declaration of war; America had turned loose her little navy of seven frigates and a few small brigs on British commerce and on her innumerable men-of-war. Congress had author- ized the President to increase the army from six to twenty-five thousand men, and to call for fifty thousand volunteers, but it absolutely refused to 40 Anglophobia levy any taxes or otherwise provide means to carry on the war. The financial centers of the country were the commercial cities on the Atlantic coasts, but the government adopted the fatuous policy of put- ting another embargo on all the shipping in all of those cities; this produced a perfect furore among the moneyed men of the nation, and when the government endeavored to float a loan with these financiers to raise money to prosecute the war it was incontinently turned down, its agents snubbed with the suggestion that they could not aid a government that had a habit of ruining their trade by its embargoes. Recruiting for the regular army and the volun- teer contingent progressed slowly : men could not serve without pay and find themselves. With no money or credit, war munitions insufficient in quantity and quality, with but little field artillery, the enemy rapidly assembling on the Canadian frontier, sea ports being blockaded by hostile squadrons, dissension among the people opposed to the war and dissatisfied with the government, negotiating with the enemy for the purpose of placing themselves once more under British rule, surely the outlook for the young nation was bleak and disheartening. The progress of events Choosing an Enemy 41 brought no improvement. Some of the New England states refused to allow their militia to serve beyond the limits of the respective states, whereupon it was necessary for the government to withdraw the regular troops from the stations on the New England coast, thereby exposing the whole coast to occupation by the British. The battles on land resulted in ignominious de- feat of the Americans. Three efforts to invade Canada failed and the Americans were driven back with heavy losses. General Hull surren- dered Detroit with 2,500 Americans to a British force numbering about one half of the American troops under his command. General Ross with four thousand men captured the city of Washington, and all the public build- ings were burned to the ground. 2,000 Americans defending the city, scurried away at the first con- tact with the British with a loss of one man killed. The fall and abdication of Napoleon on April 4, 18 14, and his banishment to Elba, released from service in Europe the large armies of British veterans that had been thoroughly trained and seasoned for warfare in the sanguinary wars of Napoleon. The naval forces that had been em- ployed by Napoleon against England were now her allies, and she was therefore able to turn 42 Anglophobia her entire strength, navy and land forces, to the war against the United States. Her navy sub- divided into squadrons blockaded the main ports of America, and began a series of raids and in- cursions on coast towns and adjacent country. Her land forces were placed along the Canadian frontiers in strength sufficient to repel American invasions, as well as to raid American territory. Her mode of warfare was confined to raids and incursions at widely separated and isolated points ; keeping the American army scattered and grad- ually exhausting its energy, making forced marches from point to point to meet and repel these numerous incursions, extending for more than one thousand miles along the Canadian bor- der, and four or five thousand miles of coast line extending from Maine to the mouth of the Mis- sissippi River, it was impossible for the United States to furnish adequate protection to the vast extended border and coast line, and the inhabit- ants of the harried districts complained bitterly at what they regarded as the neglect of their gov- ernment to protect them. In parts of New Eng- land the feeling assumed a rebellious tone ; seces- sion was openly threatened by the Federalists, who were strongly pro-British. The Legislature of Massachusetts called a convention of New Choosing an Enemy 43 England States and New York, which met in secret session and agreed on proceedings looking to a union with Great Britain. The island of Nantucket declared neutrality and placed itself under British protection. While the American land forces were victorious in several battles along the Canadian border, these victories did not counterbalance the losses they had suffered from British victories, and accomplished nothing except to hearten the Americans and restore confidence in their fight- ing abilities. The American navy achieved bril- liant victories in Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, and were generally victorious in the fights be- tween a single American ship with a British man- of-war, but these victories did nothing towards breaking the British blockade or bringing the war any nearer to an end. The outlook for America in December, 1814, was recognized by both nations to be bleak and discouraging. No progress to end the war would ever be made until the United States finally fell to pieces by the sheer dissatisfaction of her own people; forming small republics, each making its own peace, as New England was then about to do. It was at this crisis that the Government of Great Britain displayed a mag- 44 Anglophobia nanimity, kindness and consideration towards the United States that could not be expected of her under all the circumstances or even required by the customs and usages of nations at war. The declaration of war by the United States on the i8th of June, 1812, was without justification. In the language of a reliable and distinguished American historian, "the cause of the war at the very eve of its outbreak had been taken away," and again, "The risk of the war was not worse than its deep impolicy," and *Tt was a foolhardy and reckless risk the Congress was taking" in declaring war, and further "The grounds of the war were singularly uncertain." Another dis- tinguished American historian has written : "The declaration of war by America seemed an act of sheer madness." Instead of waiting for the vanquished nation to sue for peace as was the custom, and at a time when America was practically helpless and hope- less to bring to a successful issue the war that she had started. Great Britain held out to her enemy the olive branch of peace. The offer was promptly and gladly accepted by the United States, resulting on December 24, 18 14, in the Ghent treaty of peace that has lasted to this day. The generosity and broadmindedness of Great Choosing an Enemy 45 Britain were never displayed to a greater degree than in waiving all claim for indemnity either in money or in territorial concessions. The custom and usages of nations has always recognized the right of a victorious nation to exact and receive such an indemnity from her vanquished enemy, to reimburse her for costs, expenses and losses in- cident to a war. Even those who are biased in favor of America are bound to admit that Great Britain was justly and fairly entitled to indemnity for losses occasioned by that war. At a time when she was straining every nerve, employing every resource in her desperate struggle for the benefit of mankind against the scourge of Eu- rope, single handed and alone, staggering under the weight of debts and privations of more than twenty years of almost constant warfare, she needed and deserved at least the sympathy, if not the active aid, of every English-speaking people. Instead, our government, by what was claimed by the people of New England to be an inexcus- able accident prompted by hereditary dislike for England, precipitated an unnecessary war and added to the burdens and distress of the English people, who felt that their nation had been struck in the back by those who "were indeed of their own tribes and families." At the opening of hos- 46 Anglophobia tilities the United States was the aggressor, her navy began the destruction of British ships and her land forces invaded Canada before Great Britain could prepare to meet her new enemy. During the progress of that war hundreds of British warships and merchant craft were des- troyed, thousands of British seamen and marines at sea, and British soldiers on land, lost their lives. The war had cost Great Britain millions of dollars. Never before or since has a conquering nation shown to her vanquished enemy such liberality in the face of such uncalled for provocations and injuries. Even in later periods of the world's history indemnities have been exacted against the unsuccessful nation, even when no war had ac- tually taken place. Germany in recent years an- nexed the city and seaport of Kiao Chau in China and the inlet of Sausah as a coaling station dur- ing the year 1897, as indemnity for the murder of two German missionaries ; and from France she exacted about one billion dollars besides the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine as indemnity for losses and outlay resulting from the Franco- Prussian war. The United States received from Mexico a cession of a vast territory at the close of the Mexican war, and while it was ostensibly Choosing an Enemy 47 sold to the United States for twenty-five million dollars, the value of the territory was far in ex- cess of that sum, which excess constituted a princely indemnity. So in the cession of the Phil- lipines, Porto Rico, and other islands to the Unit- ed States by Spain at the close of the Spanish- American war, the actual value of the territory ceded was many times more than the twenty mil- lions paid to Spain for it, which excess consti- tuted a large indemnity. England therefore could, in good faith, and in accordance with the universal usages of nations, have demanded in- demnity from the United States, and could have easily enforced it. New England was ready and anxious like over-ripe fruit to drop into her hand, and the United States was without power to coerce her back into the union. The secession of New England and her retention by Great Britain as indemnity, would in the course of time have resulted in the dissolution of the union, or, at least, would have arrested national development, and delayed, if not prevented, the fulfillment of the grand destiny of the American people that is now unfolding itself to the enraptured vision of the world. Uninfluenced by any feeling of malice or re- venge growing out of the war. Great Britain re- 48 Anglophobia nounced her right and power to dismember the United States by demanding territorial indemnity or by affiliating the New England states. It is deplorable that the public speakers and writers in America, especially writers of our school histories and boards that select them, should have always regarded it as unpatriotic to mention the blunders and mistakes of our ances- tors, carefully omitting the mention of any his- torical incident, however true, or material that would be calculated to moderate our national conceit or cause disagreeable emotions in the minds of young Americans; they have con- sistently refused to suggest in behalf of other people that have been at war with us any candid and favorable circumstances. The unhappy re- sult of this partial and unfair teaching and his- tory can never be more aptly exemplified than in the United States yielding to the national and hereditary dislike emplanted and cultivated in the mind of the American people against England by American writers and speakers, and declar- ing war against her instead of France — a war that cost the United States thousands of lives and millions of dollars; a war that accom- plished nothing except to increase the dislike of Choosing an Enemy 49 the two English-speaking peoples for each other. If the war had been declared against France it would have been merely a naval warfare, with every advantage to the United States, and would have ceased upon the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte. CHAPTER IV. Blood is Thicker Than Water Ordinarily a proper and unbiased consideration of the facts of history which exhibit the good will and kind feeling of the people of England for America during the past century should overcome the dislike and prejudice in the minds of Americans against Great Britain caused by the teaching of American orators and historians described in the preceding chapters; but with many, the first impressions on this subject have become unchangeable opinions in hearing the same thing repeated so often, and never disputed by any one. Many elderly Americans of pure English descent can be found who declare their dislike for England and admit that they do not know the particular reasons for such dislike, ex- cept as they have heard in early life the spread- eagle speeches of those Fourth of July orators. They admit that they have always disliked Eng- land; but also declare their respect (and as to some individuals their real affection) for the Eng- lish people that have settled in America. 50 Blood is Thicker Than Water 51 There is some excuse for and consideration to be shown for this class of anti-English Ameri- cans; custom and environment over which they have no control conspired to embitter them against Great Britain. I confess that until I was forty-five years old, I had the same intense pre- judice against the Old Country. I recall listen- ing to one of those spread-eagle orators when I was a boy. How he lambasted the English and twisted the tail of the English lion, and made the American eagle scream! He stamped and foamed and roared, turned red in the face and shook his fist in the direction he supposed Eng- land to be. He personally defied the entire Brit- ish empire and dared it individually and collec- tively just to put one foot on American soil as an invader. The orator was a heavy-set, squatty little man, but to boyish admiring eyes he loomed up like a giant. The boys who listened to that speech were worked up into a perfect frenzy of patriotism and hatred for England. For myself, I felt that I had been mistreated by Providence in not being permitted to be born in time to be a Revolutionary soldier, and feared that there v/ould not be another war with England in my Ufetime. These chapters are especially dedicated to this 52 Anglophobia class of English-hating Americans and their des- cendants, because I know from my own exper- ience how they came to feel that way. The other groups of Anglophobists, describe • hereafter, are far beyond the reach of argument or reason ; they are perfectly incorrigible, and as to them this discussion does no good, except to counteract the effect of their statements and in- fluence. We can all remember how the heart of the American people warmed towards the English when we heard how the British jackies and marines on British ships in Hong Kong harbor cheered and hurrahed for the Americans as Dewey's fleet steamed out for Manila under or- ders to "capture the Spanish fleet or destroy it." We all regarded the incident as showing how the English people would side in the war then start- ing, and that it showed that "blood is thicker than water." Within one week after war was declared against Spain, Great Britain declared her neutrality, which was quickly followed by all other European powers excepting Germany. There is no longer any doubt that at that time Germany had already or intended to form an alliance with Spain and join the war against the United States. This was proven, in a measure, Blood is Thicker Than Water 53 by the conduct of Admiral Deiterich, commanding a German fleet at Manila Bay. Immediately af- ter the destruction of the Spanish fleet, Com- modore Dewey laid siege to the city of Manila. On the arrival of the German fleet, after the bat- tle. Admiral Deiterich anchored his flagship be- tween Dewey's fleet and the City of Manila. The rules of naval warfare prohibited neutral ves- sels from placing themselves between a belliger- ent fleet and a city it was besieging. The Ger- man admiral ignored this rule, but was ordered by Dewey to remove his vessel. Deiterich leis- urely and with apparent reluctance complied with the order. The next morning he returned to the same place. Dewey again ordered him to "get out and stay out," adding that if he "wanted to fight he would get it," and began to clear for action. The German retired and soon left the bay. It has since developed that a secret treaty between Spain and Germany provided for a transfer of the Philippine Islands to Germany in the event of war between Spain and the United States, because Spain felt that she would be un- able to hold them in case of such a war. The presence of the German fleet was to take posses- sion of those islands, and Deiterich's action was a feeler to see how far he could go, and also to 54 Anglophobia communicate with the Spanish authorities in Manila. The excellent markmanship of the American gunners jfiring at the Spanish fleet a few days previously no doubt is one good reason why the German admiral hesitated to accept Dewey's invitation to fight. Before he received instructions from the Kaiser, Great Britain quiet- ly gave Germany to understand that she, Great Britain, was prepared to enter the war as an ally of the United States in the event that Germany formed a war alliance with Spain. Only since the beginning of the European war has it been possible for Americans to realize the awful and sickening possibilities to the United States that would have quickly developed if Germany had allied with Spain in the Spanish war. Great Britain remaining neutral. We all realized at the time, with national terror, how helpless the eighty millions of the people of the United States were for warfare on land ; a m.ere handful of regulars and a volunteer army of men without training, equipment, experienced officers, provisions, transportation or modern armament, with 4,000 miles or more of coast line vulnerable to the enemy. For naval warfare we had a fourth-class fleet, and that divided, nearly one- half at Manila, 12,000 miles away from the other Blood is Thicker Than Water 55 half; the coast Hne and sea-board cities were practically without defense. The present war has taught us something about German preparedness for war during the past forty odd years. As far back as forty-seven years ago they were able to place 325,000 men on the French frontier within eighteen days after the declaration of war by France, well equipped, well provisioned, trained and officered, and with- in a few weeks were able to crush the French army; and within five days after the declaration of the present war by Germany she had 500,000 well trained soldiers on the march toward the frontier of Luxemburg and Belgium supplied with the latest improved armament. In the year of 1898 she was well prepared for war, as in 1914. She had the second greatest navy in the world. The United States navy at that time was classed as the fourth. Almost the entire mer- chant marine of Germany was subsidized and therefore subject to be used by the Germans as transports, or to be converted into cruisers in the event of a war. The Spanish navy after destruc- tion of eleven vessels at Manila comprised six ships under the command of Admiral Cervera, and about that many more under the command of Admiral Carama. Our North Atlantic fleet 56 Anglophobia was divided into two squadrons, one under the command of Admiral Schley guarding the coast of New England, the other, under Admiral Sampson, scouting the South Atlantic coasts of the United States. We can all remember the panic of the Ameri- can people near the coasts on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico when it was learned that the Spanish squadron, under Cervera, had left the Azores Islands and sailed westerly towards the United States; there was no wireles-s telegraphy in those days, and there was no way to ascertain what part of the long coast-line from the Rio Grande, by way of Key West to the north-east corner of Maine, the Spanish would strike. With three times as many warships as the American Atlantic fleet numbered; with more than one hundred and fifty transports at their command; the ability of Germany to mobilize in a short time her army and navy; the total un- preparedness of the United States; her Atlantic fleet divided into two squadrons ; widely separat- ed; it is not difficult to summarize the disasters to our country in a coalition of Germany and Spain, and continued neutrality of Great Britain, and it goes without saying that they could have easily landed a large army at almost any point on Blood is Thicker Than Water 57 the Gulf or Atlantic coast that suited their pur- pose. Once landed and intrenched on a line se- lected by the trained military genius of German officers ;supportedby developed artillery and rapid firing guns; defended by infantry of that stub- born, suljen courage that makes the German sol- diers apparently indifferent to danger or death; armed with the newest and most destructive pat- terns of rifles: the ability of the United States army, composed of untrained volunteers, to drive the enemy out of the country would be scarcely possible. The usual tactics of American troops at that period, as well as that of the British, two years later in the Boer war, was to charge the enemy whenever he was encountered, and with but little knowledge or examination of the ground over which the charge was made. This method worked successfully at San Juan Hill in Cuba, though at a loss to the Americans in killed and wounded of about sixteen hundred men in less than four hours of fighting; the Spanish loss was about fifteen hundred in that battle. The reck- less courage of the American troops ; the strange want of care in the commanding officers in as- certaining the nature of the ground and obstacles and dangers the troops were encountering in that 58 Anglophobia charge, are best shown in liie following extract from the official report of General Shafter on that engagement : "After completing their formation under a destructive fire and advancing a short dis- tance, both divisions found a wide bottom in which had been placed barbed-wire entangle- ments, and beyond which the enemy was strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position," etc. And there you have the American tactics of 1898. Charging like mad bulls as soon as they could see the enemy or learn his position; with- out knowledge or care of barbed-wire entangle- ments or exposure to the enemy's fire; no clear- ing or opening up a way by artillery fire or fore- thought; what would such reckless tactics mean to American untrained volunteer troops charg- ing a German army entrenched and prepared as heretofore indicated? It would mean to them suicide, slaughter, butchery ; it would mean wind- rows and heaps of American dead and wounded soldiers. CHAPTER V. Unpreparedness Versus Readiness To illustrate further and emphasize the danger to the United States of the threatened coalition of Germany and Spain in the Spanish war of 1898, it may be proper to cite additional facts show- ing the unpreparedness of our government. On February 15th, about two months before the de- claration of war, the battleship Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor ; both nations realized then that war was inevitable. The government of the United States, recognizing its utter want of prep- aration and desiring to postpone actual hostilities until some preparation could be made, instructed the minister to Spain, General Stewart L. Wood- ford, to use every effort to keep Spain quiet un- til the middle of April. The following is an extract from an authentic statement made by General Woodford, written soon after the war: 'The weeks drifted by and February 15th, 1898, came, when our battleship was blown up in the harbor of Havana. Through departments other than the State Department, I 59 6o Anglophobia received telegraphic information on February 1 8th that there was not on American ships or in the ordnance depots more than two rounds of powder per gun or per man. I was therefore told to exhaust the arts of peace until April 15th, the earliest date at which we could be any where near ready for war, and that in any event smoke- less powder for both navy and the army would be another impossibility. I did the best I could, but let me inform you that if it had not been for the unfaltering, unchanging and loyal friendship of England, and the attitude of her minister at Madrid, I might have failed to do the little I did do, because the representatives at Madrid of Con- tinental Europe were ready at any time to inter- fere with the plans of the United States if the British minister would only join them." At the time that war was declared, April 19, 1898, the standing army of the United States did not exceed 28,000 men of all arms. On April 23rd, President McKinley issued a call for 125,- 000 volunteers, and on May 25 he issued another call for 75,000 more, aggregating 200,000. The time necessary to recruit, concentrate, equip, train and get this volunteer army in fighting shape has been variously estimated at from three to six months. Assuming that it could all be Unpreparedness vs. Readiness 6i done in three months, the question still remains, would that be in time to check a German in- vasion of this country if it was attempted? This question can best be answered by again alluding to some of the incidents of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. As I have already stated, the Ger- man government was able to mobilize on the French frontier within eighteen days after the declaration of war 325,000 troops. Three days later the French had an army of 300,000 well trained and well equipped troops on that fron- tier. The French were prepared for the war. Their arsenals were full of ammunition. The army was well supplied with Chassepot guns, a rapid-firing weapon, and with a new weapon called the mitrailleuse, which could fire twenty- five bullets at a time; notwithstanding these ad- vantages and preparations, the French army never recovered from the disadvantage of being three days longer than the Germans in mobilizing. The strong drive of the German army broke through the French line, and within two months and three days after the declaration of war the German troops had surrounded and begun the siege of the city of Paris, after which the defeat and destruction of the remaining armies of France became a matter of mere detail. Twenty- ^2 Anglophobia seven years passed, leading up to the Spanish- American war. The speedy and complete suc- cess in the war with France, the billion dollar reward as indemnity and acquisition of Alsace and German Lorraine, the consolidation of all the German states, kingdoms and principalities into one mighty empire, evolved in the brain of the German rulers the dreams of world-wide dom- ination. That they were casting covetous looks at South American territory was evidenced by the ominous growl of the old war-dog Bismarck, when he de- nounced the Monroe Doctrine as the ''most ar- rogant piece of national impudence that was ever uttered." During this period the standing army and navy of the empire was gradually increased in size and efficiency; her war-chest filled with gold; arms and ammunition of the latest im- proved kind constantly on hand; her wonder- ful system of espionage and secret service, per- meating and exploring the territory of every na- tion or country in Europe and America, and por- tions of Asia and Africa, including that of her allies — learning the topography, military secrets and strength and preparedness of each, their revenues, warships, harbors, fortifications, and a thousand other details that might be useful in the Unpreparedness vs. Readiness 63 future domination, conquest or destruction of these countries or nationalities that the interest of the empire might require. And how about the United States during all those twenty-seven years? A great, big-hearted nation, open-mind- ed, with no military, naval or diplomatic secrets of her own, and not desiring to know those of other nations; unsuspicious, friendly and peace- ful, her people charitable and sympathetic, hand- ing out their countless thousands of dollars to re- lieve the stricken and distressed in every part of the world. Brave, high-minded America; her guns rusting, ammunition exhausted, every in- crease of her navy begrudged and opposed by a demagogue faction in Congress. What chance would she have had in a conflict with Germany with her standing army of near a half million of well-trained soldiers at the time of the Spanish war, with more than a million well-trained reserv- ists within military age who had already served their time of enlistment? I answer that question by asking another— what chance would that peaceful, big-hearted giant have as he walked abroad, a kindly smile lighting up his features, his hands in his pockets to hand out alms to the needy beggar, meeting a low-browed enemy with re- volvers strapped to his waist, murder in his heart, 64 Anglophobia quick to draw and of deadly aim, hunting his vic- tim? What really happened, and what might have re- sulted to the two countries if England had not quietly intimated to Germany, "hands off," will be developed hereafter. Having shown how well prepared Germany was for an invasion of the United States if she had entered the war as an ally of Spain in 1898, and how unprepared the United States was to resist such invasion, it is proper to investigate the motives and purposes, if any, of the German Government in entering into a coalition with Spain, and the reason, if any, why she would de- sire to prosecute a destructive war against a peaceful nation; a nation for which she had al- ways professed good-will and friendship; a na- tion with which so many thousands of her own people had affiliated as citizens. The great in- centive to such a course can be found in the bit- ter and cruel hatred excited in the minds of the governing classes of Germany against any na- tionality that opposed or in any manner inter- fered with her schemes or plans for dominating and Germanizing the world. A striking illustra- tion of such a disposition is found in the differ- ence in their treatment of the Grand Duchy of Unpreparedness vs. Readiness 65 Luxemburg and the kingdom of Belgium by the Teutonic rulers during the present European war. At the commencement of the war the friendship of Germany for the two countries was the same. The young Grand Duchess of Luxemburg strongly and vigorously protested against the vio- lation of the neutrality of her country by the pas- sage of German troops through it, but offered no resistance, and the lives, liberty and property of her people were not destroyed or materially im- paired by the Germany army. Belgium resisted the violation of her neutrality and the devasta- tion and ruin of her country and people followed. The German war policy of "f rightfulness" adopt- ed and pursued by her ostensibly to terrify and intimidate the Belgians and suppress resistance was in fact prompted by feelings of revenge and hatred engendered by the Belgian resistance. The hatred of Germany for England concentrat- ed and expressed in her national "Hymn of Hate" was not on account of losses in killed and wounded at, before and after the battle of the Marne, but because she was thwarted by Eng- land in her desire to establish naval bases on the North Sea and English Channel by the conquest of Belgium and North-eastern France; by check- ing the aspirations of Germany through her line 66 Anglophobia of railway to Bagdad, to control the trade of Per- sia, Afghanistan and eventually India ; and also by supporting and upholding the Monroe Doctrine of the United States ; as well as because of Eng- land's superior navy, commercial rivalry, etc. The vigorous colonial policy instigated by Bis- mark was his favorite scheme to promote world- wide domination of the empire; but this colonial policy came too late to accomplish that purpose; all of the desirable and available territory of the world for colonization had long been annexed by other European powers; the only territory that Germany would be able to annex was portions of East and West Africa, the territory of Kiau- Chau in China and a few islands in the Pacific Ocean. The vast fertile region in South Ameri- ca practically unoccupied — described in part by ex-President Roosevelt in his account of his re- cent explorations of South America — was denied to her by the hated Monroe doctrine. In the absence of that doctrine, how easy with Ger- many's perfection of statecraft and intrigue and wealth would it have been for her to interfere in, or manipulate the revolutions that were al- ways existing in these unhappy countries, to her own advantage; thereby either acquiring terri- tory or establishing such an influence as would Unpreparedness vs. Readiness 67 amount to actual ownership. How easy to have acquired control of the bankrupt French com- pany and built and controlled the Panama Canal, enabling her to extend her influence and power to the western republics of Chile, Peru, and Ecua- dor. How easy to acquire by purchase or con- quest Cuba and Porto Rico from the feeble and decaying Spanish government. It is impossible even for the dullest intellect not to perceive the vast and wonderful possibilities for expansion, territorial, political, financial and commercial, that would be offered to the German government by the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine. As well would it be impossible for even the strongest intellect to conceive or summarize all of these pos- sibilities and advantages ; the ordinary mind stag- gers at the attempt to grasp them. When Germany declined to proclaim her neu- trality in the Spanish-American war, it fore- shadowed conclusively that she would take a part in that war, as ally to one of the other belliger- ents. Everything goes to show that it is not the United States, but Spain, that she proposed to help. Outside of the proof furnished by the con- duct of the commander of the German fleet at Manila Bay, and of her representative at Madrid disclosed by ex-Minister Woodford, her secret 68 Anglophobia hatred for the United States growing out of the bar to her ambition by reason of the Monroe Doc- trine, existing up to and evidenced by her secret intrigue with Mexico and Japan, was amply suf- ficient to show whose ally she proposed to be in that war. It cannot be said that at and before the commencement of that war she had not accurately sized up the situation and her certainty of being able to defeat the American army, as it then existed. It is not possible that she could be blind to all the advantages accruing to her by such an alliance, if Great Britain remained neutral. Any person making such an assertion, shows that he has been utterly oblivious of current and re- cent history exhibiting the singleness of purpose of the German government, its miraculous fore- sightedness, its supernatural intrigue, and espion- age, its diabolical ingenuity in preparing means, weapons and occasions for the destruction of human life; such a critic in his bhnd admiration for German "Kultur" shows that he has been in a state of somnabulism since August, 1914, a sleep- walker, passing through life perfectly and wilful- ly oblivious to events and happenings that even inanimate nature has responded to. CHAPTER VI. It Might Have Been An effort has been made in the preceding chap- ters to summarize the military conditions of this country as they existed at the beginning of the Spanish-American war in the spring of 1898, as well as the attitude of the German government to- ward that war, and her preparedness and absolute certainty of victory if she concluded to intervene in behalf of Spain — Great Britain remaining neu- tral — pointing out the strong inducements, rea- sons and motives urging her to form a coalition with Spain ; her desire and at one time her bona- fide intention to do so. This leads to a recital of the supposed or hypo- thetical conflict between Germany and the United States, and the invasion of the latter country by the armies of Germany and Spain, the defeat of the Americans and occupation of portions of the country ; and in the light of the fate of Belgium and North France since their occupation by the German army, to state in part the particular dis- asters, suffering and ruin to the people of our 69 70 Anglophobia country by such invasion and military occupation. The savage cruelty and barbarity attendant upon German conquest of a countiy in 191 4 would have attended such a conquest in 1898. What she did to the helpless people of Belgium^ and France, she was ready and anxious to do to the people of the United States in 1898 if she had the chance. The same conditions exciting the hatred, malice and revenge of the German rul- ing military caste existed at each period. For want of an opportunity to exhibit the fiendish blood-thirsty nature of a certain type of German officers and soldiers, m.ankind had no conception of it until it was exhibited in the tragedies that quickly followed the occupation of Belgium and Northern France. The type referred to is sepa- rate and distinct from the kindly, peaceable and industrious class of Germans who affiliate readily with the democracy of the countries to which they migrate and often become the trusted friends and neighbors of Americans. This type differs from the pure-blooded German physically, mentally, and morally. They are easily recognizable by their sullen, brutal faces, flat heads and cruel expression indicative of their Hunnish origin. They have no more humanity than the gorilla; they would shoot down their own fathers, mo- It Might Have Been 71 thers, children, or brothers, if ordered to do so by those in command of them. The Huns who con- quered the German tribes of Central and West- em Europe in the fifth century were not Ger- mans but Kalmucks, or Monguls from Central Asia. In the invasion they were led by Attila the Great, called the "Scourge of God" be- cause of the inhuman savage barbarities commit- ted by his followers. Although they settled in the conquered territory and mingled and inter- bred with the conquered German tribes the two races never amalgamated; the Mogul breed still reverts to type, although infused with the blood of other races. In many sections of Prussia the Hunnish type predominates. It is, and has al- ways been, the chief support of Kaiserism, and militarism, the willing and bloody tools of ty- rants; the Prussian instrumentality of "f rightful- ness." With officers of the same breed they are left to garrison the towns and villages of the ter- ritory overrun by the German troops, while the best and bravest of the army go to the front. It is this kind of armed and trained creatures of German ambition that would have been detailed to garrison the cities, towns and villages of the United States in 1898 if this country had been in- vaded. 72 Anglophobia It might not be improper at this point for the benefit of the Anglophobist of English descent to visualize as happening in America some of the horrible atrocities committed on the helpless people of Belgium and North France by those Prussian garrisons. Take the ordinary Ameri- can town or village, inhabited by refined and edu- cated people; raised in an atmosphere of free- dom and liberty, safe under the protection of law and officers from injury and imposition, the young men independent, self-respecting and brave, young ladies of the usual American beauty and culture ; the people all at peace, living in lux- urious homes, elegantly furnished; comforts and luxuries of life in abundance. Perhaps it is your condition, Mr. Anglophobist, and no doubt you have in mind the individuals just described, or people like them. You hear the dull roar of dis- tant cannonading; it comes nearer. You see bodies of American volunteer troops passing through retreating; then the dark grey uniforms of the Teuton soldiers who pass on leaving a gar- rison of demons to carry out the amiable will of the beloved Kaiser, which means inaugurating an orgy of crime, robbery, arson, and looting; old men and women ranged up against a stone wall and shot by a platoon of soldiers on some pre- It Might Have Been 73 tejct, houses blown up or burned after looting, young ladies dragged away, never to be heard of again; the highways crowded with frightened fugitives fleeing from the wrath of the invader; old men tottering along with the aged wife; little children, some of them mere babies, their parents dead or vanished, with pitiful little bundles of clothing, tired, hungry, thirsty, crying, sleeping and dying by the road-side. Man can think and write or speak of tragedies like those of Belgium five thousand miles off in an impersonal way, with sorrow, and sympathy for the unfortunate; but when it comes to thinking of such things hap- pening to our own people, our horror becomes unspeakable. The fate of one town such as I have described would have been that of five hundred or one thousand other American towns that would have been occupied by the German army if she had invaded the country as an ally of Spain. The atrocities mentioned are not merely imag- inary or manufactured for effect; each of them has occurred in Belgium and France, and hun- dreds of other kinds, times without number in scores of places, so brutal, fiendish and cruel as would move the recording Angel to throw down his pen in disgust at the horror of it. 74 Anglophobia Not the least of all the calamities to the Unit- ed States of such a German invasion would have been the terrible loss in killed and wounded to our army in battles with the German troops. I do not underestimate the courage of Americans, but without organization, training and proper equip- ment, such courage would not only be useless, but would in fact lend aid to their destruction. The wail of distress and cries for help coming from stricken towns and country writhing under the cruelty and oppressions of the Hunnish brutes would have aroused the American manhood to perfect frenzy ; and totally unfitted them for the training and preparation that would enable them to cope with the enemy; causing them to rush upon the enemy without organization, poorly armed, to be cut down like grass by a reaper, their bodies piled up like cord-wood before Ger- man trenches. The moral to be deduced from thus stressing the evils that threatened our country in 1898 is, that those calamities were averted by Great Brit- ain through her friendship for, and stand taken, in behalf of the United States, and which caused Germany to give up her purposes. There are thousands of middle-aged Americans who today owe their lives to England ; men who would have It Might Have Been 75 been slaughtered by the Germans in the war pre- vented by Great Britain. And it is a sad reflec- tion upon the gratitude they owed to England, that eighteen months afterwards when the Boer war broke out many mass meetings were held in many places in the United States for the pur- pose of expressing sympathy with the Boers and denouncing England, and thousands of Ameri- cans made their way to South Africa to enlist in the Boer army, many of whom would have died by German bullets a year and a half -before in America, but for the English. And it is a monu- ment to the magnanimity of the British that whenever they took any of these American prisoners, instead of sending them to prison camps they would offer to parole them and give them transportation back to America. Soon after the Boer war I was told by an in- telligent English physician that although England made no complaint of the actions of Americans in siding against her, nothing in the history of all her foreign relations had ever happened that hurt the great heart of the English people like that display of ingratitude by Americans. The destruction of life and property in the United States, just mentioned, and the suffering of the people, attendant upon a German invasion 76 Anglophobia in 1898, although far greater than described, are things that could all be effaced by the lapse of tim*\...V*-'>\.. V--',.^ % t >' 'oV /% V * <>•■■-'>■■