{ 4 o **-■ ^ * ^ii»Js^„« -ay . V V'^' v-^' V-o^ o5 °^ '.'*^^^-' ^" V^ ^^0^ '^'oV^' /-^i^'. '-^^o^ oV^^^»^'- ^.<'^ sPr, O .J o V ^^-n^. ^ -..-"(r^* ^ o * o > ^^0^ • ''bV^ A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY JOHN PAUL JONES FROM THE ORIGINAL BUST BY HOUDON IN THE POSSESSION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ACADEMY OF FINE ARTS PHILADELPHIA A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY BY JOHN R. SPEARS ILLUSTRATED CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS NEW YORK :: :: 1908 \ S1^ lUBRARYofCONciHESS, Two Copies Kecbivrf'J FEB 1 li^08 CLASS /^ XAi;. Wu. 'COPV a. Copyright 1908 by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Published February, 1908 PREFACE In preparing this volume the writer has been animated by a desire to tell, in one convenient volume, that might be sold at a moderate price, the whole story of our navy — to describe all the important naval battles, and to show how the nation has been affected at certain times by the work of its naval ships, and at other times by the want of such a force. All battles that have had any influence upon the wars in which the nation has been engaged, or upon the evolution of ships of war, or upon the character of our naval men, or of the nation, have been deemed important herein. Any con- sideration of the facts shows that our sailors were animated, in most of their battles, by the knowledge that they were fighting for the very life of the nation, and it is therefore not too much to say that a description of such a fight must be a hero story, however told. Frankly, it was in the be- lief that every history of our navy claims attention first of all as a hero story that this one was written. But while most of the space has been devoted to the battles, especial consideration has been given to the facts and conditions that have, from time to time, created public opinion in favor of, or against, the employment of a navy. In this point of view the building of the frigates early in the War of the Revolution, and the utter collapse of the young navy before the end of that war, have a new interest. Of still greater interest is the story of the navy building in the vi PREFACE days when we paid tribute to African princes, and, while singing " Hail, ye heroes, heaven-born band," hesitated to send our warships to sea for the protection of our mer- chantmen lest the swarming pirates be thereby made "more acrimonious than ever"! Still another story of the kind is that of the efforts to use "peaceable coercion" to compel the warring nations of Europe to treat us justly. The facts in that matter should be of particular interest to all who honestly believe that a strong navy incites a nation to go to war. For during a period of eleven years before the War of 1812 the American people strove with all their might to get on without a navy — with the result that they suffered every indignity, with enormous and even incalculable losses of property, and then were compelled to fight at last. That the influence of the American people has always been exerted for the pro- motion of peace is a statement that need not be supported by evidence, and that this influence has been effective in proportion to the strength of our navy is one of the propo- sitions which it is hoped has been made good in this volume. The work of our navy in the evolution of warships, though a matter of mechanics, is by no means devoid of popular interest. Thus the battle of the Constitution and the Guerriere, though it has been called elsewhere a mere naval duel, wrought a mighty change in the frigates of the world at the same time that it saved the American people from disasters that should never be forgotten. The battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac was of similar interest, for, in addition to its influence upon the war for the preserva- tion of the Union, it led to the evolution of the modern battleship. And as for the battleship, there are some who believe that it has been worth its cost aside from its politi- cal influence — as shall appear. Finally, a consideration of the effect of our naval battles upon character is a matter that brings us back again to PREFACE vii the hero stories, and makes such stories worth the teUing. It is worth while, is it not, to recall that John Paul Jones said while on a sinking ship, "I have not yet begun to fight," and that Commodore Perry, when going out to the battle of Lake Erie, said, "To windward or to leeward, they shall fight to-day" ? Though their names are nowhere recorded, we are not likely to forget the work of the men who, during the Civil War, deliberately met death in the "davids" at Charleston. The story of the cable-cutters of the War with Spain is inspiring far inland from the lit- toral. Indeed, this volume might very well have been dedicated to all who face the enemy — every enemy — with the spirit of the fighting men of our navy. J. R. S. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Organizing the First Navy .... 1 II. The First Battle of Lake ChampluVIn 8 III. With the Ranger and the Bonhomme Richard 13 IV. At the End of the War 26 V. The African Pirates and the French Spoliations 34 VI. Battles of the War with France . . 44 VII. Origin of the War of 1812 .... 53 VIII. Learning the Art of Naval Warfare 74 IX. The Decisive Battle of the War of 1812 80 X. Victories that were Timely .... 88 XI. Loss OF THE Chesapeake and the Argus 101 XII. On the Great Lakes 110 XIII. Minor Battles of the War .... 125 XIV. The Loss of the Essex 136 XV. On Lake Champlain 144 XVI. Development of Ships and Guns in the Old Navy 155 XVII. In the Beginning of the Civil War . . 164 ix X CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE XVIII. At Cape Hatteras and Port Royal . 175 XIX. The Monitor and the Merrimac . . 182 XX. On the Upper Mississippi 196 XXI. Farragut at New Orleans .... 205 XXII. Privateers and Cruisers 217 XXIII. The Mississippi Opened — Evolution of the Torpedo 234 XXIV. Farkagut at Mobile Bay 243 XXV. Building the White Squadron . . . 253 XXVI. Beginning the War with Spain . . . 265 XXVII. The Battle of Manila 274 XXVIII. On to Santiago 280 XXIX. Battle of Santiago 290 XXX. Ten Years of Naval Development . 301 ILLUSTRATIONS John Paul Jones Frontispiece From the original bust by Houdon in the possession of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia. FACING PAGF, Scene of Arnold's battle, October 11, 1776, and of Macdonough's victory, September 11, 1814 ... 10 / The Constitution escaping from a British squadron off the Capes of the Chesapeake, July, 1812 80 z' The fight between the Constitution and the Guerriere. . 84 /■ Captain Is.^ac Hull 102 From an engraving, at the Navy Department, Washington, of the painting by Stuart. Oliver H. Perry 118 -' From a Portrait after John Wesley Jarvis in the Redwood Library at Newport, R. I. Commodore Thomas Macdonough 146 ^ From a painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the Century Club, New York. Reproduced by permission of the owner, Rodney Macdonough, Esq. The fight between the Monitor and Merrimac .... 190 . Deck view of Monitor and crew 194 Commodore Worden and the oflBcers of the Monitor . 194 Mississippi River type of gunboat: The Cairo . . 200 •' Blockade runner Teaser 200 xi xii ILLUSTRATIONS FACING PAGE Admiral D. G. Farragut 206' Farragut's fleet passing Forts Jackson and St. Philip . 214 The battleship Oregon under way 260 The evolution of the six-inch gun 263 Diagrams showing the position of the keel and bow of the battleship Maine after the explosion .... 268 Aj>miral George Dewey 276 The new 20,000-ton type of battleship 302 A torpedo-boat destroyer under way 306 The submarine Shark 306 The Fulton 306 Holland type of submarine boat, using her gasoline engine as propelling power. A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY CHAPTER I ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY The destruction of the British war schooner Gaspe by a band of patriots under the lead of Captain Abraham Whip- ple, near Providence, R. I., before daylight in the morn- ing of June 10, 1772, was the first stroke afloat for Ameri- can liberty. The Gaspe, acting as a revenue cutter, had been destroying the commerce of the colony. The capture of the British war schooner Margaretta, off Machias, Me., on June 12, 1775, by patriots under Jeremiah O'Brien (they had been inspired by the story of Lexington), was the next, and it led to the destruction of Falmouth (now called Portland), Me., on October 18, 1775. In the meantime the Rhode Island Assembly, moved, perhaps, by the men who had been connected with the Gaspe affair, had unanimously declared "that the building and equipping of an American fleet as soon as possible" would "greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the liberty " of the colonies. When this resolution came before the Congress of the Colonies, then in session at Philadelphia, although Washington had already been authorized to borrow armed ships from Massachusetts to capture supplies from the British transports, it was ridi- culed as "the maddest idea in the world," and it was 2 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY with difficulty that "its friends procured the considera- tion of the question to be left open a little while." (John Adams ) On October 13, however; the navy builders got these resolutions adopted: "That a swift-sailing vessel, to carry ten carriage guns, and a proportionable number of swivels, with eighty men, be fitted, with all possible despatch, for a cruise of three months, and that the commander be instructed to cruise eastward for intercepting such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies. "That a committee of three be appointed ... to fit out the vessel. "That another vessel be fitted out for the same purpose." On October 30 the subject of a navy came up again. It was agreed that the second ship already ordered should carry fourteen guns, and then two more ships were ordered, one of which was to carry twenty guns and the other "not exceeding thirty-six." The committee provided for in the resolutions of the 13th included Deane, Langdon and Gadsden. To these were now added Hopkins, Hewes, R. H. Lee and John Adams. Then, on November 1, " a letter from General Washington by express, with an account of the burning of Falmouth, was read." Vice-Admiral Graves had thought to frighten the colonists into sub- mission by burning Falmouth, but the Congress imme- diately ordered copies of Washington's letter sent to all the colonies, and then adopted resolutions saying that it had been the deliberate intent of the British to disperse "at a late season of the year hundreds of helpless women and children, with a savage hope that those may perish under the approaching rigor of the season who may chance to escape destruction from fire and sword." And it was then declared that "these colonies . . . have determined to prevent as much as possible a repetition thereof, and ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 3 to procure some reparation for the same, by fitting out armed vessels and ships of force." To this end the sum of $100,000 was immediately (November 2) appropriated. Thereafter the Congress proceeded rapidly with the work of providing "an American fleet." On November 25 and 28 " Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies' were considered and adopted, and in this title the Congress used for the first time the term " Navy of the United Colonies." A remarkably large space in these rules is given to the provision of food, and to the care of the sick and wounded and to the property rights of the blue-jackets. And it was not for nothing that those grave legislators were concerned to provide that "a proportion of canvas for pudding bags, after the rate of one ell for every sixteen men" should be served out at proper intervals. In the meantime Washington had fitted out the Massa- chusetts cruiser Lee, Captain John Manly, on October 5. She carried '^ a flag with a white ground, a tree in the middle, the motto ' Appeal to Heaven ! ' " She was the first vessel to sail under the central authority, but her commission and that of Manly were signed by Washington, not by Con- gress. Moreover, she was not the property of the United Colonies. Her cruise proved exceedingly fortunate, for she captured the large transport Nancy, that had been loaded with material for the British army at Boston, and on her return to port "such universal joy ran through the whole camp as if each one grasped victory in his own hands." The joy spread to the hall of the Congress. The mes- senger sent by Washington to carry the news arrived at Philadelphia at a moment when the Congress was in secret session, considering how to secure the supplies needed to keep Washington's army together. When he knocked at the hall door the delegates ordered him to wait, but he was 4 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY insistent and they let him in. They listened with breath- less interest while he told his story, and then John Adams arose and said with the solemnity of a prophet: "We must succeed — Providence is with us — we must succeed!" The delegates were at last awakened to an appreciation of what Ruskin first called sea power, and they resolved: "That a committee be appointed to devise ways and means for furnishing these colonies with a naval arma- ment, and report with all convenient speed." The committee appointed for this purpose (it was the second naval committee of the Congress) included Bart- lett, Samuel Adams, Hopkins, Deane, Lewis, Crane, Rob- ert Morris, Read, Paca, R. H. Lee, Hewes and Gadsden. They made haste, as directed, and in two days (on De- cember 13, 1775) reported: "That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight guns, three of twenty-four guns, making in the whole thir- teen, can be fitted for the sea probably by the last of March next (1776). "That the cost of these ships, so fitted, will not be more than 66,666f dollars each, on the average. " That the materials for fitting them may all be furnished in these colonies except the articles of canvas and gun powder." The Congress was advised to "direct the most speedy means of importing" the two articles needed — 7,500 pieces of canvas and 100 barrels of powder — and it was thereupon resolved "That a committee be appointed with full powers to carry this advice into execution with all possible expe- dition. " This, the third, naval committee included Bartlett, Han- cock, Hopkins, Deane, Lewis, Crane, Robert Morris, Read, Chase, R. H. Lee, Hewes, Gadsden, and Houston. Chase, of Maryland, who had led in the ridicule of the ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 5 idea of "an American fleet," was now on a committee to aid in the fitting out of ships built for war purposes. On December 16 the sum of $500,000 was voted to pay for these warships. In the meantime the original naval committee (on which Deane was first named), appointed to fit out four armed ships, had selected four merchantmen from among those laid up in the Delaware, as follows: Two ships (large vessels rigged with three masts on which yards were crossed), one of which was named the Alfred, after Alfred the Great, and the other the Colum- bus, after the great explorer; two brigs, one of which was called the Andrew Doria, after one of the heroes of the battle of Lepanto, and the other the Cabot, after Se- bastian Cabot, the explorer who had sailed under the British flag. The two ships were rated as 24-gun frigates, but the Alfred carried thirty guns at that time, and the Columbus twenty-eight. The main deck battery on each was probably composed chiefly of 9-pounders, but there is some reason for supposing that a few 12-pounders were procured. (Force, IV, 964). On poop and forecastle they carried 6-pounders. European frigates of that day usu- ally carried 12-pounders on the main deck with 9-pounders on poop and forecastle. The Doria carried sixteen and the Cabot fourteen 4-pounders. On December 19, these vessels being "nearly ready to sail," the Congress borrowed four tons of powder and 400 muskets of the Pennsylvania committee of safety. And now that they were fitted out the Congress, on Decem- ber 22, 1775, formally organized the first "American fleet" by ordering that commissions be granted to the fol- lowing officers who had been selected by the committee: Esek Hopkins, Esq., Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; Dudley Saltonstall, Captain of the Alfred; Abraham Whip- ple, Captain of the Columbus; Nicholas Biddle, Captain 6 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY of the Andrew Doria; John Burroughs Hopkins, Captain of the Cabot. Thirteen lieutenants were also appointed, the first of whom was John Paul Jones. In addition to the vessels thus far named the naval com- mittee had purchased an 8-gun schooner — the Fly — used as a despatch boat, and they had secured and commissioned at Baltimore two other vessels, the sloop Hornet, of ten guns, and the schooner Wasp, of eight. Thus the first naval committee appointed had procured eight armed vessels for the use of the United Colonies. These were not all the armed vessels in the service; on November 16 the Congress had ordered " that two swift- sailing vessels be provided for packets." Robert Morris was directed to secure them, with Lynch and Franklin to aid him. By this committee two swift brigs were fitted out. One was named the Lexington and Captain John Barry, an Irish-American, noted in the annals of the navy, was appointed to command her. The other was named the Rep'isal and Captain Lambert Wickes was her master. Barry and Wickes were commissioned on December 7, 1775, but their brigs were reserved for other uses when the first "American fleet" was organized. From first to last the salt-water navy of the Revolution included forty-seven vessels — ships, brigs, schooners and sloops. The first navy ships, properly so-called, were the thirteen frigates ordered on December 13, 1775. These ships were armed with 12-pounders, at best, on the gun deck, and with 9-pounders, 6-pounders or smaller yet, on poop and forecastle. In 1777 a frigate was built at Am- sterdam and called the Indien. She carried thirty 36- pounders and fourteen 9-pounders and was therefore a most formidable vessel of her class for that day. The Alliayice, built at Salisbury, Mass., during that year, was perhaps the best frigate built at home during the war. She carried at first twenty-six 12-pounders and ten smaller ORGANIZING THE FIRST NAVY 7 guns. Later she carried twenty-eight 18-pounders and twelve 9-pounders. In this year, moreover, two other frigates of thirty-two guns, one of twenty-eight, a sloop- of-war of twenty guns and two of eighteen were built. In 1778 only one vessel, a sloop-of-war, was added to the navy. It was in this year that the French loaned a squadron to John Paul Jones. Finally, in 1782, a line-of- battle ship named America was built at Portsmouth, N. H. That was the end of the building, but several prizes cap- tured from the British were taken into the service. Of the ships thus provided, the frigate Randolph, the sloop Ranger and the converted merchantman Bonhomme Richard did the work of most interest to this history, but there was one fight on fresh water that had a great influ- ence on the course of the war. Of the work of the squadron organized under Esek Hopkins it need only be said that it went to the Bahamas, captured some stores and came back. Then it was dis- banded and the vessels were sent hunting British mer- chantmen with more or less success, but they did nothing of vital importance in the war. CHAPTER II THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN As the reader remembers, an American army invaded Canada in September, 1775, and during the subsequent wmter they held Governor Guy Carleton cooped up in Quebec. The arrival of a British fleet with an army of 13,357 men (including many Hessians) drove the Ameri- cans back. They reached Crown Point on July 3. The British, with Governor Carleton in command, followed, for "the design was," says the "Remembrancer," that this army and that of General Howe, then in New York, "should join about Albany and thereby cut off all com- munication between the northern and southern colonies." But when Carleton reached St. John's, a post standing at the foot of ship navigation of the lake, he found there was no road on either side of the lake, and that the lake route of travel was held by the Americans because General Arnold had taken and armed such vessels as he had found afloat there the year before. It was therefore necessary tor the British to construct a fleet suflSciently powerful to sweep the lake. The work of building the warships was assigned to Cap- tarn Charles Douglass, R.N., and the fact that he was able to set afloat a full-rigged ship carrying eighteen 12-pound- ers after only twenty-eight days of labor, indicates that the tacihti^ were satisfactory. The ship was named Meo;- ible. Two schooners, a huge scow called a radeau, an- other large scow that was called a gondola and was pro- pelled by sails, at least twenty gunboats and four long THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 9 boats from the fleet were also provided and armed for the occasion. To meet the powerfid British fleet Arnold was able to muster a sloop, two little schooners, eight gondolas and four galleys. One of the galleys (the Congress) was chosen by Arnold for his flagship because it was on the whole the most efiicient vessel he had. This galley was built on "the Philadelphia model" — it was about fifty feet long on the keel by thirteen wide and four and one-half deep. It could bring into action at best an 18-pounder,a 12 and two 6-pourtders. In short, the British ships engaged in the first day's battle could throw 546 pounds of shot to the Ameri- can's 265. They probably had two inches of wood in their walls to one inch in the American. For crews they had 697 picked ofiicers and men from the British fleet, beside an unstated but large number of trained artillerymen from the army (Pausch's "Journal," p. 84), and "a large de- tachment of savages under Major [Thomas] Carleton." [Lieutenant Hadden's ' Journal,' p. 19]. Moreover, there were twenty-four transports in the British fleet from which supplies of men and ammunition could be drawn. To man his flotilla Arnold needed 936 men, but he had only 700, and these were made up for the most part of landsmen, the "refuse of the army." These details seem necessary in connection with this, the first squadron battle fought by Americans, in order to set forth the disparity between the two sides, for by any just comparison the British were three times as powerful as the Americans. In spite of this disparity, Arnold sailed down the lake to get as near the enemy as possible, and with a clear per- ception of what the enemy must do he took a position be- hind Valcour Island. Having square sails the British were sure to come with a fair (north) wind. Because the water was shoal at the north end of his channel Arnold was 10 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY well assured that they would pass his island and then beat up to attack him, and in such a narrow channel they could not bring their full force to attack him in line. On October 11, 1776, the wind served and the enemy came snoring along with a full press of canvas and all eyes searching the eastern shores where Arnold was supposed to be in hiding. So they passed well alee of Valcour be- fore they saw the American flotilla. At the first alarm the ship and schooners tacked around to beat slowly up into the narrow channel, but the gun- boats cut close around the south end of the island. For the moment these gunboats were unsupported by the larger vessels, and Arnold with his four galleys and the schooner Royal Savage made a dash at them. The fight- ing began at eleven o'clock. The Royal Savage was driven ashore on Valcour Island and Arnold was compelled to re- turn to his original position where "at half -past twelve, the engagement became general and very warm. Some of the enemy's ships and all their gondolas beat and rowed up within musket shot of us." The schooner Carleton anchored there, and with springs on her cable trained her broadside on Arnold's galley. The shot fired point-blank struck home at every broadside, while the Indians that were with the British took post in the woods at each end of the American line, where they poured in a galling fire. At his first view of the enemy Arnold had seen that he could not win against such odds, but, aiming the guns on the Congress, with his own hands he fought as one who sees victory within his grasp. The schooner Carleton was silenced and the boats that were held in reserve towed her out of range. The Maria came up to take her place and was in turn driven off. Last of all came the Inflexible, a ship fit to sweep the lake, but, as Hessian Pausch says, " the Inflexible took her place only to retreat as the others had done." One galley, the Philadelphia, was now in- SCENE OI" ARNOLD'S BATTLE, OCTOBER 11, 1776. AND OF MACDONOUGH'S VICTORY, SEPTEMBER 11, ISU. THE FIRST BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 11 jured so that, as Pausch says, she " began to careen over on one side, but in spite of this [she] continued her fire." ("Journal," p. 83.) "They continued a very hot fire with round and grape- shot until five o'clock," wrote Arnold, "when they thought proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards and continue the fire until dark." To this Lieutenant Had- den, of the Royal Artillery adds in his "Journal": "It was found that the boats' advantage was not to come nearer than about 700 yards, as whenever they approached nearer they were greatly annoyed by grapeshot." In fact, one British boat that was driven by its Hessian commander, Lieutenant Dufais, to a closer range, was blown up. "The cannon of the Rebels were well served," says Pausch, "for, as I saw afterwards, our ships were pretty well mended and patched up with boards and stop- pers." In numbers and in concentration of gun power the British had three times the force of the Americans, but Arnold, with his scanty crews, fought them to a standstill. He had fought to delay the enemy, and he had succeeded, but he could not hope for victory over such a force, and that night when the usual fog spread over the lake, he slipped through the British line and pulled away toward Ticonderoga, sinking two of the gondolas as he went be- cause they were beyond saving, and making such repairs as he could to the others. The British followed, and on the 13th they overhauled the remnant of the American flotilla near Split Rock Point. The ship and the two schooners were in the lead with the radeau and the big sailing gondola within range. The gunboats were not far behind, but they were more modest this time, as Hadden says. At least two of them came into the fight, however. Arnold was to meet seven of the best of the British fleet, although the ship alone, or even the radeau, was now far 12 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY more than a match for his shattered flotilla. Moreover, at the first broadside of the enemy, the galley Washington was so badly cut up that she had to surrender. But to surrender in time of battle was not in the heart of Benedict Arnold. In spite of overwhelming odds — un- daunted by the fire of the whole British fleet that was soon concentrated on his galley — Arnold fought them off for four hours. And even then, when the enemy had closed in around him so that escape was impossible; when a third of his crew had been shot down and his galley was a wreck barely able to float, he would not surrender. Directing the gondola captains who had stood by him to beach their vessels, he covered them as best he could as they made for the shore, and then, after driving his galley upon the rocks, he kept his guns working until all were set on fire. He remained on board his own vessel until the flames were climbing the rigging "lest the enemy should get possession and strike his flag, which was kept flying to the last." The American flotilla was destroyed, but the sacrifice was not in vain. No fight like that was ever made in vain. It was our battle of Bunker Hill afloat. Carleton sailed on until he came in view of Ticonderoga, but there he stopped. He had come intending to attack the American works at that point, but as Dodsley's "Annual Register" (London) says in reporting the affair, he had seen "the countenance of the enemy," and this with "other cogent reasons prevented this design from taking place." By fighting on against overwhelming odds — by fighting blindly until the last gasp — the American flotilla turned back the invader, and thus made straight the way that led to the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. CHAPTER III WITH THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD With his name at the head of the register of lieutenants, John Paul Jones was made executive officer of the Alfred and he sailed with her to the Bahamas. Of his work after her return, and while in command of two other warships, nothing need be said here because, while it was well done, it had no influence on the war that is worth mention. On June 14, 1777, by resolution of the Congress, Jones was ordered to take command of the sloop-of-war Ranger, then building at Portsmouth, N. H., and take her to Europe. A coincidence that no biographer has failed to mention is found in the fact that on the same day the Congress adopted the Stars and Stripes, " a new constella- tion," as the flag of the United States. Hastening to Portsmouth, Jones hoisted on the Ranger the new flag and he claimed that she was the first ship so honored. Then with scanty, and in the matter of sails, unfit materials, he fitted her out, armed her with eighteen 6-pounders, "all three diameters of the bore too short," and on November 1, 1777, he sailed for France bearing despatches to the American envoys in Paris, and the news of the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, which was to induce the French Government to acknowledge the inde- pendence of the United States. In France, where he arrived on December 2, Jones strove to get command of a small squadron with which to cruise on the British coasts, "to surprise their defenceless places; and thereby divert their attention, and draw it from our 13 14 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY coasts." Being unable to secure a squadron, he fitted out the Ranger for the work he had proposed. In her he re- ceived, February 14, 1778, the first foreign salute ever given to the new flag. Then, on April 10, he sailed from Brest for the British coasts. Arriving off Whitehaven at mid- night on the 22d Jones landed, fired one ship in the harbor and frightened the wits out of half of the United Kingdom. He then sailed to the Isle of St. Mary, where he landed a force of men and surrounded the house of the Earl of Sel- kirk. It was the avowed object of this landing to carry away the earl, "and to have detained him until, through his means, a general and fair exchange of prisoners, as well in Europe as in America, had been effected." Finding that the earl was not at home " some officers," says Jones, observed that "in America no delicacy was shown by the English who took away all sorts of moveable property, setting fire not only to towns and to the houses of the rich, but not even sparing the wretched hamlets and milch cows of the poor and helpless at the approach of an inclement winter." Remembering these facts of British outrage the officers urged Jones to carry away at least the silverware of the earl, and he permitted them to do so, although he did not fully approve the act. The plate carried away was worth about £500. When it was sold as good prize in France Jones bought it with his own money, and at an expense of £1000 all told, re- turned it to the earl. The earl, to show how much he ap- preciated this sacrifice, wrote to Jones saying: "I have mentioned it to many people of fashion." It appears that the earl never mentioned the return of the plate to any of the British naval historians; at any rate not one of them mentions the fact that it was returned. Sailing north, Jones met the British sloop-of-war Drake, Captain G. Burden, off Belfast Lough. It is a curious fact, illustrative of the naval conditions THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 15 prevailing during the Revolution that, while waiting for the Drake to come within range, the executive officer of the Ranger was telling the men before the mast that "being American citizens, fighting for liberty, the voice of the peo- ple should be taken before the captain's orders should be obeyed." "The people" were on the point of rising in open mutiny, and Jones's life was in real danger, when the approach of a boat from the Drake, that had come out for a look at the Ranger, showed that a battle was at hand, no matter what the "vote" might decide, and "the people" concluded to fight under Jones. Reaching off shore until there was plenty of room on deep water for a battle the Ranger wore around on the port bow of the Drake and opened the battle with a broad- side. Squaring away, the Drake replied and thereafter, for an hour and four minutes, the two ships drove along, firing as rapidly as the two crews could handle their guns. It was as fair a fight as is known to history, for, while the Drake had twenty guns (6-pounders, like the Ranger's), and was manned by 151 regularly enlisted men besides an unstated number of volunteers, where the Ranger carried only 123 (or possibly 126), the Americans had been taught to shoot — they were good New England Yankees. The Ranger remained almost unharmed, while the Drake lost three yards, her masts were all wounded and her hull was "very much galled." And just as the sun was sinking be- hind the Irish hills her captain fell mortally wounded. The first lieutenant also having been mortally hurt, her crew called for quarter. The Ranger lost three killed and five wounded and the Drake about forty-two killed and wounded. Small as were these two vessels the capture of the Drake made a great stir throughout Europe, because at that time no officer on the Continent thought it possible to win in a sea fight with the British where the forces were 16 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY equal. Unhappily, however, Jones's success created envy and jealousy as well as admiration. When the French minister of marine would have put him in command of a squadron the opposition of French officers prevented his doing so, and Jones was kept waiting for months for the fulfilment of promises that never could be fulfilled. On February 4, 1779, Jones was ordered to an old East Indianman lying at L'Orient. She was rotten and slow but she would float and carry guns, and he began to fit her out. As built, this ship was fitted to carry guns on her main deck with a few more on poop and forecastle. To increase her gun power Jones cut six new ports, on each side, on a deck below the main. He thought to instal there twelve 18-pounders but he could obtain only con- demned guns, and he, therefore, mounted three of the best of them on each side. On the main deck he mounted twenty-eight "indifferent 12-pounders," or fourteen on a side. Four 9-pounders were mounted on the poop and as many on the forecastle. Wlien fitted out this ship, which Jones renamed the Bonhomme Richard, carried twenty-one guns on each side. A crew was procured " from among the English prisoners, and by enlisting raw French peasants as volunteers. Captain Jones had not more than thirty Americans among the crew" when he hoisted the flag. A number of other vessels were then ordered to join her and form a squadron. The American frigate Alliance had come to Europe under a Frenchman named Pierre Landais, a man who, after having been driven from the French navy for cause, went to America and obtained a com- mission by fraud. The Alliance, carrying thirty-six guns, was ordered to join Jones. The other ships of the squad- ron were the French frigate Pallas, of thirty-two 8-pound- ers, the brig Vengence, of twelve 3-pounders, and the cutter CerJ of eighteen similar guns. The five, considered as a THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 17 war squadron, compared very well with the Bonhomme Richard, considered as a warship. To add to his troubles Jones was compelled to sign an agreement that "made of the squadron a confederacy rather than a military unit. . . . Every subordinate cap- tain had ground for questioning his particular orders." (Mahan). "There was neither secrecy nor subordination," as Jones wrote, but his "reputation being at stake," he "put all to the hazard." Then came one stroke of good luck. The British made an exchange of prisoners by which 199 American seamen were released, and of these Jones shipped more than 100. Every man of them was needed in the work that followed. He also secured Lieut. Richard Dale, who had escaped from the British prison by walk- ing out dressed in a British uniform obtained by stealth. The squadron sailed from Groix Roads, outside of L'Orient, on August 14, 1779. On the 23d of the follow- ing month, while the Bonhomme Richard, the Alliance, the Pallas and the Vengence were off Flamborough Head, on the east coast of England, to which point Jones had come to cut off the Newcastle coal trade, the British Baltic fleet, laden with ship stores, appeared, coming with a fair breeze from the north. At that the Vengence was ordered out of danger, Landais, with the Alliance, fled, and John Paul Jones, together with the Pallas, stood up to meet the fleet. The most interesting battle of the Revolution — the most remarkable ship duel known to the annals of the sea — was at hand. The British fleet was in charge of the line- of-battle ship Serapis and the sloop-of-war Countess of Scarborough. Allen ("Battles of the British Navy," vol. I, p. 288) says that the battery of the Serapis "consisted of twenty long 18-pounders on the lower deck, twenty-two long 12-pounders on the main deck, and two long 18 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY 6-pounders on the forecastle." As Allen deliberately mis- represents the forces of British ships in describing British battles it is certain that the Serapis carried no smaller battery than that here given. She could therefore fire a broadside of at least 318 pounds of shot. As the Serapis tacked out in front of the merchantmen the Pallas went off in search of the Countess of Scar- borough, leaving the Bonhomme Richard to fight it out with the liner. The wind was light and the Richard was slow. The whole afternoon was passed in drifting to- gether. At 7 o'clock, after nightfall, Jones turned to the westward off the weather (it was the port bow) of the Serapis and only a pistol shot away. At that, Captain Richard Pearson, commanding the Serapis, hailed twice, and Jones replied to the second hail with a broadside. Jones had secured an excellent position for a cannon fight but, unhappily, this first broadside did the Richard more harm than it did the Serapis. Two of the con- demned 18-pounders on the lower deck burst, killing nearly every member of their crews and badly demoraliz- ing all the sailors on that deck. A few more shot were fired from the one 18-pounder that remained mounted, but in a few minutes it had to be abandoned on account of the flinching of the men. The Richard had gone into battle firing a broadside of 258 pounds, but she was now reduced to 204 against the 318 of the Serapis. Worse yet, when Jones thought to head across the bows of the Serapis, where he might rake her from end to end, he failed be- cause the Serapis was able to sail better. In fact she was then getting into a position to cross the bows of the Rich- ard, and to prevent that Jones brought the bow of the Richard toward the wind and threw her sails aback to send her astern, parallel with the enemy. By this movement the two ships were placed side by side and no more than sixty feet apart. It was a position THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 19 where the preponderance of gun power on the Serapis would have its greatest effect. The 12-pounders of the Richard were well handled, but the shot from the 18- pounders on the Serapis were a half heavier, and they simply cut the Richard's rotten old timbers into dust. Jones had been thinking of trying to cross the stern of the Serapis to rake her, but the effect of the broadsides showed him that his only hope lay in getting alongside and boarding. He therefore filled away his sails and headed for the enemy's waist, only to fail once more be- cause the Richard was so sluggish that she merely bumped into the stern of the Serapis. As the two vessels then lay (bow to stern), no shot was fired on either side because no gun could be brought to bear. For a time, too, not a voice was heard on either side. As he was looking for boarders to come. Captain Pearson called his men aft to repel the Americans, but when none came to be repelled he began to think they had given up the fight altogether — a natural thought, for he had seen the work of his own guns — and he shouted : "Has your ship struck?'* The fight had lasted for nearly an hour. In that time Jones had twice failed in efforts to gain a position that would be decisive. The battery of the Richard had been reduced not only by the loss of the 18-pounders but by a number of 12-pounders that had been dismounted. Nor was that the worst, for, as the Richard had rolled to the long swell of the sea; several shot had penetrated below the water-line. She was already wounded beyond hope and sinking, but John Paul Jones replied: "I have not yet begun to fight!" Jones found it impossible to board the Serapis in the position in which the ships lay, because his men would have to run out on the bowsprit and drop in a thin line down on the quarterdeck of the Serapis, where the British 20 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY stood in a well-ordered mass to receive them. So he backed his sails once more and drifted clear to look for another opening. To prevent the Richard crossing her stern, the Serapis now backed her sails and began to drift astern, turning stern first away to the north. On seeing this, Jones immediately filled his sails, intending to lay the Richard across the bows of the Serapis in a position like the cross-mark on the letter T, where he could use his guns to rake her while she could not bring a gun to bear. It was his last hope, perhaps, and it succeeded in an unexpected way. The bowsprit of the Serapis was brought in "over the poop by the mizzen-mast," and then "Captain Jones with his own hands made fast to the mizzen-mast of the Bonhomme Richard the ropes that hung from the enemy's bowsprit." The time to begin the fight had come. As the two ships now drifted with the wind, the stern of the Serapis swung in against the bow of the Richard, bringing the two ships together with their starboard sides rubbing each other. In some places the ports were oppo- site each other, and in others the ports lay opposite the blank side of the enemy. In the matter of gun power the Serapis now had a great advantage because her starboard battery was entirely fresh, while that of the Richard had been greatly weakened by the previous firing. Crossing over, the men of the Serapis fired the guns and blew their ports open. "A novelty was now presented to many witnesses but few admirers," as Lieutenant Dale said. Neither crew could load their guns without poking the ends of their long-handled rammers through the ports of the enemy, and in a spirit of fair play this was allowed on both sides. While the play was fair it was so unequal that in a short time all the guns on the Richard's broadside except the two on the poop were put out of action. She had only THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 21 two 9-pounders against the entire broadside of the British hner. In a brief time the side of the Richard from the mainmast aft was entirely cut away save for a timber here and there between the muzzles of the British guns. But for these the upper deck of the Richard would have fallen on the lower. The shot that worked such havoc on her fighting side cut away the further side also until there was a clean sweep across her deck and the shot fired thereafter from some of the guns of the Serapis flew clear of all and fell into the water beyond. In the meantime the water had come in through the shot holes below the water-line until it was five feet deep in the hold, and burning wads from the guns of the Serapis set the Richard on fire in a number of places, including one close to the magazine. Jones in his place on the quarter-deck was cheering on his men and using his two guns to clear the enemy's deck of men, but down below despair seized upon all. The surgeon first lost his nerve. The water rose until he found the operating table, on which he placed the wounded, floating from under his hands with the motion of the ship, and running on deck he begged Jones to sur- render before they were all drowned. But Jones replied: "What, Doctor? Would you have me surrender to a drop of water? Here, help me get this gun over to the other side." The doctor ran below, and Jones, with some of his men, brought one of the 9-pounders from the off to the fighting side of the deck, so that he had three with which to fight on. Then the Alliance came along, ostensibly to join in the attack on the Serapis; but Landais, taking advantage of the smoke and confusion of battle, and of the fact that his gunners were under decks, where they could not see what they were doing, fired two broadsides into the Rich- ard. At the first broadside the crew of the Richard cried out to tell the Alliance that they were attacking friends, 22 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 'NAVY and as soon as possible signal lights were set on that side of the ship. But when the second broadside was fired from her the Richard's crew began to cry that the British had taken the Alliance. At that the gunner of the Rich- ard, crazed by fear, ran aft to haul down her flag, and on finding that it had been shot away he began to bawl for quarter, Jones instantly hurled a pistol at the gunner, hitting him in the head, fracturing his skull and knocking him down a hatch. That ended the appeal for quarter, but Captain Pearson had heard the cry, and he shouted to ask Jones if quarter was demanded. He got no satis- factory reply, and concluding that the Richard's crew were in a bad way, he ordered his men to board her. They started with a shout, but as they came to the rail, Jones leaped from the quarter-deck and with a pike in hand met them. And on seeing him "they imagined he had, as they said, a large corps " in reserve. So they fled. As Carlyle said of certain Austrian officers who once fled from the presence of Frederick the Great, they were over- awed by the divinity that hedges about the person of such a sea king. One sees from the British portraits of Jones how these sailors thought he looked. On returning to his 9-pounders, Jones found that the supply of cartridges had ceased to come. Dale was sent below to learn the trouble. He found enough. At a glance he saw that the water was swelling to the hatches in the lower hold, that flames near the magazine might cause an explosion at any moment, and that the master- at-arms, frightened into supposing that the ship was sink- ing, had liberated the 300 prisoners that had been taken from prizes. These men were now swarming up the hatch. Instead of quailing. Dale shouted that the Serapis was sinking and that the only hope of life was in keeping the Richard afloat. Then he sent part of the prisoners to the pumps, where they worked in relays until they fell THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 23 exhausted, while others were put to fighting the flames near the magazine. But now the end was at hand. With his 9-pounders and with the aid of musketry Jones succeeded in clearing the men off the upper deck of the Serapis. A man in the maintop of the Richard (one account says it was Midship- man Nathaniel Fanning), took a bucket full of hand- grenades — small shells — out on the mainyard of the Richard, where it extended above the deck of the Serapis, and reaching a convenient point for the purpose began to throw the grenades down an open hatch to the next deck. In a moment one of the shells exploded on a pile of cart- ridges that had been placed there for the use of the gun- ners, a pile that extended from the mainmast well aft. "The effect was tremendous. More than twenty of the enemy were blown to pieces, and many stood with only the collars of their shirts upon their bodies." (Dale.) It was about 9 o'clock when this explosion occurred. The flames set the ship on fire in a dozen places and dis- heartened captain and crew alike. They fought, how- ever, until 10 o'clock, when the Alliance came back once more. This time Landais did not dare to attack the Richard openly, but according to his own statement, made next day, he loaded his guns with grape shot, "which I knew would scatter," and then fired a broadside into the stem of the Serapis and the bow of the Richard. On receiving this broadside. Captain Pearson, as he says in his report, "found it in vain, and, in short, impracticable, from the situation we were in, to stand out any longer, with the least prospect of success. I therefore struck (our mainmast at the same time went by the board)." ("An- nual Register," vol. XXII, p. 311.) Lieutenant Dale at once boarded the Serapis, followed (Converse, p. 193) by acting-Lieutenant John Mayrant and a number of men. Captain Pearson and a British 24 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY lieutenant were escorted to the Richard, and then the firing from the Serapis was stopped. John Paul Jones with his rotten old Indiaman had beaten a British liner just off the stocks. The spectacle there afforded was the most remarkable known to the annals of the sea, for, as Buell has pointed out with em- phasis, while the Bonhomme Richard was steadily sink- ing — was destroyed beyond hope — as Jones stood on her deck he could yet command, and did command, the ship that had shot her to pieces. And this spectacle was seen in the moonlight by 1,500 people who gathered on Flamborough Head to witness the fight. At 9 o'clock in the forenoon of the next day the last boat left the side of the Richard. Her masts and sails were in good order and her flag was left flying from her mizzen truck. Thereafter the people on the other ships watched her in silence as she rolled and pitched heavily over the long waves, sinking steadily as they gazed, until at 10 o'clock her bow dipped under a wave, failed to rise with the next, and then down she sank, and the last that was seen of the Bonhomme Richard was her flag, the Stars and Stripes, trailing out, triumphant, from her mizzen truck. In the course of a speech which the British Minister of Colonial Affairs made before Parliament, as reported in the "Annual Register," 1778, on pages 46 and 47, he said: "If America should grow into a separate empire it must of course cause such a revolution in the political system of the world that a bare apprehension of the unknown consequences which might proceed from so untried a state of public affairs would be sufficient to stagger the resolution of our most determined enemies." To this a member of Parliament added that "the contest now was not whether America should be dependent on the British THE RANGER AND THE BONHOMME RICHARD 25 legislature, but whether Great Britain or America should be independent. Both could not exist in that state to- gether. For such were the sources of wealth and power in that vast Continent . . . that this small island would be so cramped in its peculiar resources that it must in a few years sink to nothing, and perhaps be reduced to that most degrading and calamitous of all possible situations, the becoming of a vassal to our own rebellious colonies if they were once permitted to establish their independence and their power," It was in those words that the fear of the "American Peril" first found expression, and in those words may be seen the condition of mind created by the appearance of American ships of war upon the coasts of an enemy. Of the subsequent career of John Paul Jones it need only be said here that he was all but overwhelmed with praise at Paris. The king gave him a sword, and, with the consent of the Congress, the Grand Cross of the Order of Military Merit. He arrived in America once more in February, 1781. Instigated by his personal enemies (and John Paul Jones was a man whom we may "love for the enemies he has made"), the Congress investigated his career. Instead of censuring him, however, the Congress, on April 14, 1781, tendered him a vote of thanks "for the zeal, prudence and intrepidity with which he has sup- ported the American flag; for his bold and successful enterprises to redeem from captivity the citizens of the States . . . and in general for the good conduct and eminent services by which he has added lustre to his character and to the American arms." He was then placed at the head of the navy. In 1787 the Congress voted him a gold medal. No other naval officer of the Revolution was thus honored. CHAPTER IV AT THE END OF THE WAR Although brief space can be given to the other cap- tains of the Revolution because their work on the whole had no decisive influence on the war, some account must be given of Nicholas Biddle and John Barry. Riddle's first command was the Pennsylvania galley Franklin. From her he was promoted to the Doria, as noted, and his good work in her as a commerce destroyer led to his transfer to the Randolph, one of the 32-gun frigates that the Congress was building. She proved to be an unlucky ship. Sailors left her in the Delaware to ship on privateers. She was dismasted soon after leaving port in February, 1777, and then British renegades in her crew tried to carry her to Halifax. Finally, at 8 o'clock at night, on March 7, 1778, she was found in the West Indies under the guns of the British liner Yarmouth, rated as a sixty-four but carrying seventy guns. (Charnock, vol. Ill, p. 167.) Biddle had waited for her. It is said that he had often talked with John Paul Jones of the results that would fol- low if "by exceedingly desperate fighting one of our ships" should "conquer one of theirs of markedly supe- rior force"; he had hoped that he might be the captain upon whom Fortune was thus to confer the honor of fight- ing such a battle; he had always been ready for the chance, and now the hour was at hand. As the liner, with her men at quarters, ranged along the weather side of the Randolph and hailed her, one of the Randolph's lieutenants shouted: 26 AT THE END OF THE WAR 27 "This is the Randolph." At the same moment he flung the Stars and Stripes to the breeze and then Biddle fired a broadside into the enemy. Because of the thickness of her timbers, the size and number of her guns — her main deck guns were 24-pounders, while the Randolph's best were 12-pounders — and the number of her crew, the Yarmouth was of more than four times the force of the Randolph, but Biddle began the battle. He was soon shot down — a bullet pierced his thigh — ^yet, seated in a chair at the forward end of the quarterdeck, he cheered on his men, who fired three broadsides to the British one until it was seen that neither speed of firing nor accuracy of aim could win in such a contest. At that Biddle ordered the helm down, and he was lufiing up in order to grapple the enemy and fight it out on her deck by boarding — 315 men against 500 — when fire reached the magazine beneath his feet and blew the Randolph out of water. So near was the Randolph at this moment that splintered pieces of her wrecked hull fell upon the deck of the Yar- mouth, and with them was an American ensign, rolled up ready for hoisting in case the one then flying should be shot away. It fell on the Yarmouth's forecastle, unsinged. The Yarmouth passed on with her carpenters and riggers busy. She had lost five men killed and twelve wounded. Four days later she happened to sail over the ground of the brief battle when she found four men afloat on a piece of the Randolph — the sole survivors out of her crew of 315. "Nick Biddle — poor, brave Nick — was the kind of naval captain that the god of battles makes." Captain John Barry was the first officer sailing under the "union" flag to capture an enemy's warship. The "union" flag was made of thirteen stripes with the British union in the upper left hand corner. He left port in the Lexington, one of the two ships Morris was to provide, and on April 7, 1776, captured the British sloop Edward, 28 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY a tender of the frigate Liverpool. Barry was then pro- moted to the frigate Efpngham, but she was destroyed in the Delaware and for a time he helped "Mad" Anthony Wayne raid the British foragers who came from Phila- delphia while Washington's army was at Valley Forge. Finally he was sent to the frigate Raleigh and he sailed from Boston on September 25, 1778. The next day he fell in with the 50-gun ship Experiment and the frigate Unicorn, of the enemy's navy, and for nearly two days gave them the race of a lifetime. Then the wind failed and after a blood-stirring fight he ran his ship ashore on the coast of Maine and abandoned her. Barry was one of the men who would not surrender. While in command of the frigate Alliance in May, 1781, he captured two British brigs that had the temerity to attack him, and then, while on his way to Havana, in 1782, fought the last naval battle of the war by attacking the frigate Sibyl, one of a British squadron which he encountered. Of course, with the other ships to help her, the Sibyl was able to escape, but the affair is worth mention if only to show the enter- prise of this fighting Irishman. The most important proposition that was brought to the attention of the Congress in connection with the navy was that made by Silas Deane. On November 1, 1778, Deane, who had been one of the American envoys in France, submitted certain "proposals for equipping such a fleet as will be sufficient to defend the coasts and com- merce of the United States against any force which Great Britain will be able to send to America." (Wharton, vol. II, p. 824.) In these proposals Deane pointed out that in order to obtain a foreign loan (for which negotiations were then in hand), it was necessary to set "on foot a naval force," because, "without a naval force sufficient to protect in some degree our commerce as it revives, it will be very AT THE END OF THE WAR 29 difficult if not impossible to pay either the principal or the interest of the money we may borrow." To this end Mr. Deane proposed that the Congress build twenty large ships "of a new construction, carrying forty-two to forty- eight cannon, being equal to sixty-four and even seventy- four line-of-battle ships." That was the first public state- ment of what has since been the American idea of a war- ship. For here were to be built twenty ships on the frigate model, carrying from thirty to thirty-six guns of the heaviest calibre on one deck, with the remaining guns of a somewhat lighter calibre on the quarter-deck and forecastle. The size of the timbers, the thickness of the planks and the spread of sails on these frigates were to be equal to what could be found on the 74-gun liners. The last feature of the Revolution, and perhaps the most important, is the work of the privateers. On December 25, 1775, the Congress provided for commissions to be issued to privateers "which the good people of these col- onies" wished to fit out in pursuit of the merchantmen of Great Britain. Franklin and a few others of the time realized that privateering was merely legalized piracy, but the people of the country as a whole were in a state of civilization (as, indeed, were the people of Europe), where the use of privateers seemed not only permissible but praiseworthy. The growth of the fleet thus set afloat was prodigious. A volume issued by the Librarian of Congress shows that the Continental Congress bonded 1,699 privateers during this war. They varied in force from the fishing smack Wasp, having no cannon and a crew of but nine men, to the Deane, of Connecticut, carrying thirty guns and a crew of 210 men. Forty-five of these privateers were ships of twenty guns and a hundred men or better. The list con- tains many duplicates, of course, but on the other hand 30 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY there were not a few privateers afloat early in the war that were not bonded by the Congress. In estimating the total American privateer force of the whole war Hale says (Winsor's "History of America," vol. VI, p. 587): "Between the beginning and end of the war the Salem vessels alone numbered nearly 150. The Massa- chusetts Archives give a list of 365 as commissioned and belonging in Boston." The total number of Massachusetts privateers is estimated at "more than 600." In the course of the war, according to Hale, "Massachusetts alone sent 60,000 men" afloat as privateers — an estimate probably too high. Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Connecti- cut probably sent 20,000 more. After these came the fleets of the Delaware and the Chesapeake and other more southern waters. It is, therefore, certain that more than a thousand differ- ent privateers, manned with nearly 80,000 men, sailed from the American ports to hunt for British merchantmen. The most liberal estimate of the number of vessels cap- tured is found in the "American Antiquarian Society Proceedings," dated October, 1888, p. 394. There Hale says : " It will also appear that more than 3,000 prizes from the British merchant marine were captured by the Ameri- can navy and privateersmen." That "this loss crippled very severely the mercantile prosperity of England" is be- yond question. There is another side of the matter, however, now to be examined. First, such damage as was done by privateers might have been done at less expense by well-fitted naval ships. Then, at the time that it was recorded "that the American armed ships" had captured all told 773 of the British merchantmen and had sent into port 559 of them, the British armed ships had taken and sent into port 904 American ships of all kinds. Many of the privateers carried crews and armaments so small that even armed AT THE END OF THE WAR 31 merchantmen took some of them, and only in rare cases was an American privateer able to beat off an English man-o'-war of anywhere near its own force. When we come to set the 904 ships captured from us against the 559 we captured from the British the much-lauded work of the privateers is seen in its proper light. The ship owners in their greed for "easy money" went mad. "Ships that were deemed worth £1000 twelve months ago now sell for £3000," wrote Robert Morris in December, 1776, and this increase in price was wholly due to the insistent demand for privateers. The builders of two of the frigates the Congress had laid down in Rhode Island stole Government materials and used them in build- ing privateers. The demoralization of the ship owners spread to the sailors. Wages rose to $30 and $40, and finally to $60 a month, on the privateers. At the same time the prospect of shares in fat prizes was held out to them. The Congress paid only $8 a month and the shares of naval prizes were less. The consequences of this con- dition of affairs were far-reaching. The naval oflBcers were unable to man their ships. The spirit of the occa- sion led many men to enlist in the naval ships, draw their advance pay, and then "jump the bounty" and ship in a privateer. The demoralization spread to the army. "Many of the Continental troops now in our service pant for the expiration of their enlistments in order that they may partake of the spoils of the West Indies," wrote Ben- jamin Rush. "At a moderate estimate there are now not less than 10,000 men belonging to New England on board privateers. New England and the Continent can- not spare them." The number of men in the army, including militia called out for a service of a few weeks, was at best 90,000. With the exception of a few brief intervals, the number of men 32 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY afloat in the privateers was as great as the number serving in the army, and at some times the number afloat was far greater. The largest number of men employed in the British navy at any time was 87,000. We sent afloat in privateers almost as many men as the British navy em- ployed on all stations, ineluding the East Indies. The number of men in our privateers was at all times at least twice as great as the number of British sailors kept on the American station. These facts are most important. For if our privateer forces could have been properly concentrated and handled on battleships they would have swept the enemy from the American coast and then from the Seven Seas. Greed blinded patriotism and statesmanship. There is no in- stance on record where such a splendid power was wasted as was the sea power of the United States in the War of the Revolution. The consideration of these facts is not wholly academic; their bearing on modem naval policy is obvious. They demonstrate the importance of build- ing the most powerful ships possible. Even that is not all to be said of the evil of that priva- teering. The stories of the successes of the few were told and retold as time passed, while the losses of the many were forgotten. Our histories took up and emphasized the tales. The work of the privateers was, therefore, lauded higher and higher from year to year, and the stories of the victories of the untrained militia (which were, in fact, very few indeed) were added. So the people came to believe not only that poorly armed privateers, aided by untrained militia, had won our liberties, but they became well assured that such forces were adequate to defend the nation from every kind of aggression. They literally believed that the interest of our merchants in legalized piracy would prove sufficient to protect the grow- ing high-seas commerce of the nation in all parts of the AT THE END OF THE WAR 33 world. And when to this faith was added the hatred of a standing army that had had so large a part in developing the revolutionary spirit, the mass of the people concluded that the maintenance of a navy would be a menace to American liberty. When the War of the Revolution ended we had left as a nucleus of a navy our best frigate, the Alliance. To preserve the liberties of the young republic from the threat- ening dangers of a standing navy this frigate was ordered sold on June 3, 1785, as a merchantman. The vote in favor of the sale was 18 to 4. She was eventually thrown back into the hands of the Government and then was set ashore on Pellet's Island, in the Delaware, where she gradually sank in the mud. And there her bones lie to this day. While the Alliance was allowed to lie there rotting, a gang of pirates on the north coast of Africa captured and enslaved a number of American seamen. We owe much to those African pirates, for while we paid them more than two million of dollars in tribute money to hire them to let our merchantmen trade in the Mediterranean Sea in peace, they compelled our legislators at last to build and maintain naval ships, and thus made it possible not only to fight suc- cessfully a second war for liberty, but what was of equal benefit, to escape from the dominion of a detestable national ideal and from a national reputation the memory of which is still humiliating. CHAPTER V THE AFRICAN PIRATES AND THE FRENCH SPOLIATIONS Any consideration of the history of the period just after the Revolution shows that the nation was Uke a young robin just from the nest — it was blatant, and for safety depended not at all on beak or claws. Nature provides the young robin with a speckled breast for its concealment, and nature had provided "the broad Atlantic" to protect the fledgling republic. How far the protective coloring serves the bird is known to all naturalists; the extent of the protection afforded the nation by "the broad Atlantic" shall now be set forth. On July 25, 1785, the schooner Maria, Captain Isaac Stephenson, of Boston, was captured by Algerine pirates off Cape St. Vincent, and five days later the ship Dauphin, Captain Richard O'Brien, of Philadelphia, was taken by the same pirates at a point fifty leagues west of Lisbon. These vessels, with their crews, numbering twenty-one all told, were carried to Algiers, where the crews were en- slaved and the property appropriated. Fully to appreciate this assault upon American com- merce it should be recalled that for many years thereto- fore the rulers of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, though tributary to the Sultan of Turkey, were yet so far independent that they made war on whom, and when, they pleased. Their armed ships cruised through the Mediterranean and as far as the Azores and the English 34 AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 35 Channel in search of the merchant ships of the nations that had not made treaties with them. The naval power of these little countries was insignifi- cant. Algiers, the most powerful, had nine ships ranging in force from sixteen to thirty-two guns each, with fifty gunboats carrying a 12-pounder each, for harbor defence. Yet every maritime nation of Europe had suffered from the depredations of these pirates, and the leading nations had purchased peace with them at an expense so great that the account seems incredible. Indeed, the whole story of the Barbary pirates, as told in the documents to be found in the "Foreign Relations" volumes of the "American State Papers," is now well-nigh unbelievable. Thus Great Britain is said to have paid an annual tribute of $280,000. France paid $100,000 a year with " presents " every ten years. Spain, by a cash payment estimated at a sum above $3,000,000, obtained a treaty of peace with no annual tribute. The reason for paying these enormous sums is remark- able. In the state of civilization then prevailing in Eu- rope each nation preferred to buy a peace for itself rather than to wipe out the pirates, because, when a peace was purchased, the pirates were left free to prey on the com- merce of competing nations that had not made such a peace. The pirates were urgently encouraged to raid the ships of other nations. The most civilized nations of Europe held and openly avowed the theory that the best way to promote their own mercantile interests was found in de- stroying the commerce of competing nations. And that theory was practiced, if not openly avowed, as late as our Civil War, as shall appear. After our War of the Revolution came to an end, and our merchants attempted to trade in the Mediterranean, the Algiers agent of the British Government called the attention of the Corsairs to the fact that the ships under the new flag were good prize. 36 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY "By , we must put a check to these people, they are ruining our commerce here," said the British consul at Tunis, on hearing that American ships had entered the Mediterranean. ("Life of General Eaton," p. 105.) "America has three powerful enemies in Algiers, viz.: French and Spanish and the most inveterate is the Eng- lish," wrote Captain O'Brien after his capture. These quotations are made to show the ways of com- merce, and more especially to show that the Americans knew very well the disposition of the European govern- ments in such matters. Ministers to conclude treaties with the Barbary powers were appointed on May 12, 1784, and on March 12, 1785, it was determined to send agents directly to the pirate cities. The expense then provided for was S80,000. A treaty, ratified by the Congress on July 18, 1787, was secured with Morocco at a cost of about $9,500, but before the American agents had reached Algiers the ships men- tioned had been taken, and the Dey demanded a ransom of $59,496 for the captives as a preliminary step in the ne- gotiation of a treaty. At that the Congress balked. Then, to cause the pirate chief to reduce his price, our Government broke off all negotiations, and even refused to repay the money which a charitable resident of Algiers had advanced to keep the captives from actual hunger. In due time the plague carried off six of the unfortunates and one was ransomed by his relatives. There the mat- ter rested until a constitution was adopted and Washington was elected President. On May 14, 1790, a petition from the enslaved Amer- icans was presented to the House of Representatives, which referred it to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. Mr. JefPerson reported that "it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute and ransom." Congress, "counting their interest more than their honor" (as Jefferson had AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 37 said in speaking of European tribute-paying), preferred "tribute and ransom." On February 22, 1792, the Sen- ate resolved that it would ratify a treaty, if one could be made, paying $100,000 for peace with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, $40,000 for the ransom of the captives and an annual tribute of $24,000 a year to Algiers. In the meantime a new emperor having ascended the throne in Morocco his favor was purchased at an expense of $25,000, which was counted a fine bargain. Negotiations were now opened with Algiers, but the European agents living there at once made active oppo- sition. They had learned through some traitor at Phila- delphia what Congress, in secret session, had agreed to pay, and when they told the Dey about the sums voted he readily acceded to their request to raise his demands to a larger sum. And then, lest the American agents, on arriving, should meet the Dey's new demands, the British agent, Mr. Charles Logic, planned a new raid on American commerce. The Portuguese (they had refused to make peace with the pirates), for the sake of protecting ships trading to their ports, had been affording convoy to such American merchantmen as had ventured into the waters near Gib- raltar since 1786. The protection thus afforded had served to keep the Algerine corsairs within the Mediter- ranean. Consul Logic arranged a truce between Algiers and Portugal, under which the Dey had permission to send his corsairs to cruise for American ships on the At- lantic. During October and November, 1793, eleven American merchantmen were taken and the number of enslaved Americans was raised to 115. " It is needless for me, who have suffered much, to touch on the distress of these unfortunate men," said Captain Richard O'Brien, in reporting the arrival of the new cap- tives. " I have known my country — nine years' captivity — by her cruelty." 38 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY Stung by this reproach.. Colonel David Humphreys, American Minister to Portugal, wrote to the Secretary of State, underscoring some of his words: "// we are to have a commerce we must have a naval force (to a certain ex- tent) to defend it." With all his indignation the Colonel felt obliged to say, "to a certain extent." Good politician that he was, he knew that if he were to advocate an efficient navy he would arouse instant opposition at home. The Colonel's appeal had some effect. The whole cor- respondence was submitted to Congress (the student of history can find it in the "American State Papers," vol. I), and after it had been considered in secret session for two days Congress "Resolved, That a naval force . . . ought to be pro- vided for the protection of the commerce of the United States against Algerine cruisers." This resolution prevailed in the House by a vote of 43 to 41, and it should be noted that James Madison, who was to be the President in a most critical period of the coming century, was of those who voted in the negative. Out of this resolution grew a law providing for four 44-gun frigates and two 36-gun frigates. The law was approved on March 27, 1794. While the carpenters stretched the keels of the new warships the negotiations with the pirates were continued to a successful issue. The exact cost of this treaty was never made public, but in a report of the Secretary of the Treasury, dated January 4, 1797, the total expense of ransoming the prisoners and buying a treaty is placed at $992,463.25. In this sum is included the cost of a fine frigate which was given to the pirates as a part of the inducement to preserve the peace. Whatever conscientious scruples the people had about building a navy for their own defence they had none about supplying the pirates with the best possible AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 39 means of making further aggressions. That, however, is not all the expense. The treaty provided for an annual tribute of "12,000 sequins in maritime stores" to be de- livered in Algiers. The cost of the stores given for the first two years under this agreement, including the freight from the United States to Algiers, amounted to $144,- 246.63. Blackmail to the extent of $34,500 had been paid already to Morocco, and peace was yet to be pur- chased of Tunis and Tripoli. The American people had preferred "tribute and ran- som" to "war," chiefly because they supposed that course would be the cheaper. But "tribute and ransom" had cost not less than $1,171,209.88, down to January 4, 1797, and, to paraphrase John Paul Jones, they might well have said "we have not yet begun to pay blackmail." And yet they had been told ("Naval Affairs," vol. I, p. 20), that the cost of the six frigates which would have saved their honor would be but $1,141,160, armed and equipped for service. The worst feature of this story, however, is yet to be considered, for, in thus choosing to pay tribute rather than fight, the American people made public proclamation of their ideal of national life — they thus announced that they would save money at a sacrifice of honor. How the reputation which we thus began to acquire was after- wards cultivated, during the period just before the War of 1812, is a story to be told further on. In the meantime Washington had gone on with the work of navy building as rapidly as possible. Joshua Humphreys, a notable shipbuilder of Philadelphia, had taken up Deane's idea of "a new construction," and he was now employed to elaborate it in the models of the new ships. Taking the Constitution, which was laid down at Boston, as the type of the 44-gun frigates, it is seen that she had a gun-deck that was 174 feet 10.5 inches long, and 40 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY on this she carried thirty long 24-pounders, and that, too, although Congress had contemplated 18-pounders and' 9-pounders only. That gun-deck was longer than the gun- deck on any line-of-battle ship of less than seventy-four guns in the world at that time (see Charnock), and there were some 74's with shorter gun-decks. The battery was that commonly used on the main deck of the ordinary 74-gun ship. As the Constitution was designed to carry twenty guns of smaller size (12-pounders at first) on her upper deck, it was believed that she could not only over- power any frigate in the world, but that she would be able to give a good account of herself in an engagement with the smaller liners. Next to gun-power the designers placed speed. "It is expected that the commanders will have it in their power to engage or not," wrote Humphreys. This expectation was not realized— the ships were not especially speedy— but it is notable that to thickness of walls not a thought was given. They depended on gun-power, not thick walls, for protection. Before the ships could be completed the treaty with Algiers was ratified— March 2, 1796. Congress had pro- vided that the work on the ships should be suspended as soon as peace with blackmail was secure. Washington was then President. He saw and said that a navy might "prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other option." He therefore urged the completion of the Constitution, the United States and the Constellation, which were already well under way. Few people now read the "Annals of Congress," and that is a pity, for they are most instructive, however de- pressing to American vanity. The discussions over the completion of these frigates ran on almost interminably. AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 41 During the time of these discussions, a French privateer looted an English merchantman within sight of Charles- ton, S. C, and the story was promptly told in Congress. In the West Indies 1-gun picaroons under the French flag and even rowboats without guns captured and looted merchantmen under the American flag. More than three hundred American ships were looted in one year, by privateers and pirates fitted out from French ports, and a West India governor boasted that he and his people were growing rich on the spoils. And yet Congressmen — especially members of the House — talked and haggled. Thus Gabriel Christie said he would much rather the three frigates were " burnt than manned." John Page asserted that "commercial retalia- tion" would serve better than frigates in bringing France to do us justice. Another pointed to China as a nation that enjoyed a profitable commerce in spite of the fact that it had neither merchantmen nor warships. He was sure that China was thus far an example to the United States. The name of this statesman is not given in the "Annals," but Albert Gallatin, who was Secretary of the Treasury under Jefferson, approved and defended the unnamed. ("Annals of Congress," February, 1797, p. 2129.) John Swan wick, in discussing the use of frigates as convoys of merchantmen bound to the West Indies opposed the measure on the ground that "when the privateers and cruisers in those seas learnt that we had frigates out they would become more acrimonious than ever." It was in those days that "Hail Columbia" was written. People sang "Hail ye heroes, heaven-born band," while their representatives, with their approval, voted against using the frigates as convoys lest such use make the privateers "more acrimonious than ever." However, the aggressions at last forced the nation to 42 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY fight. John Adams had become President meantime, and he had an adequate faith in guns afloat. Congress not only consented to complete the frigates, but on April 20, 1798, the sum of $950,000 was voted for the purchase and equipment of an additional naval force. Thereafter those who saw that submission did but add to the aggressions and spoliations, and that a nation rcust compel respect before it can hope for peace — those members of Congress who saw this, and advocated the use of a navy, moved on rapidly. By the act of April 30, 1798, the Navy Department was established. On May 4 the President was authorized to procure cannon and build foundries and armories. At the same time the sum of $80,000 was voted for galleys to be used as porcu- pine quills. Jefferson was then Vice-President and the bill originated in the Senate. Jefferson's ideas of war were plagiarized from the sfhingurinoe. In June the President was authorized to accept, if offered by private citizens, six frigates and six sloops-of- war, and pay for them with Government bonds. On July 7 the old treaties, nominally yet in force, were abrogated. On the 1 1th a marine corps of 881 officers and men was provided for, and, on the 16th, a law was signed that not only authorized the President to complete the three frigates that had been contemplated when first the Alge- rine aggressions roused the nation to resistance, but it permitted the building of three more frigates of " not less than thirty-two guns." In the meantime, by the Act of May, 1798, the President was authorized "to instruct and direct the commanders of the armed vessels of the United States to seize, take and bring in" any "armed vessel found hovering on the coast of the United States for the purpose of committing depredations"; and this was supplemented by the Act of July 9 which authorized the naval ships to " subdue, seize AFRICAN PIRATES AND FRENCH SPOLIATIONS 43 and take any armed French vessel which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere on the high seas." In some respects this was the most important naval act ever passed by Congress. For it became a law at the beginning of the work of the new navy, and it declared that if we were to compel an enemy to do us justice we must not depend on harbor defence galleys, but must send ships fit to keep the sea in search of the enemy in his own waters. The new American navy— three frigates and twelve converted merchantmen — was ordered forth to fight for the honor of the flag. For thirteen years the American people, "counting their interest more than their honor," had preferred "tribute and ransom" to "war." In the hope of peace they had submitted to every outrage upon the life and the liberty as well as the property of their citizens. They had believed that submission would soften the hearts of their oppressors, but they had seen the num- ber of outrages steadily increase instead of diminish. Now like hunted beasts driven to a corner they had turned and shown their teeth. CHAPTER VI BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE The sloop-of-war Delaware, Captain S. Decatur, Sr., had the luck to make the first stroke of the war. She fell in with a French privateer near the coast. As her papers showed, the privateer had captured a number of American vessels. She was sent in and bought for service in the navy under the name of Retaliation. On February 9, 1799, the Constellation, Captain Thomas Truxton, was cruising at a point five leagues to the north and east of Nevis Island, in the West Indies. At noon a sail was seen in the southeast, and Truxton squared away before the northeast trades to head her off. The stranger— it was the French frigate Insurgent, Captain Barreaut — at first made no effort to escape, but while awaiting the coming of the Coristellation she had the misfortune to lose her maintopmast. She then tried to reach a nearby port, but the Constellation overhauled her, and then she came to the wind on the port tack with her guns out. Swinging down under easy sail the Constellation came to the wind on the weather quarter of the enemy. Captain Barreaut then hailed several times, but Truxton made no reply until he was in a position where every gun would bear, and then he answered with a broadside. It was the first opportunity that a frigate of the new navy had had to shoot for the honor of the flag, and every gun was aimed to strike home in the hull. The broadside showed the French captain that he was no match for the Yankee 44 BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 45 in gun fire, yet undismayed, he shouted "Stand by to board!" and put his helm down to bring the Insurgent to the side of the Constellation, only to find that the loss of his topmast was against him. The attempt to luff, in fact, gave the Constellation opportunity to reach ahead, cross the Insurgent's bows and rake her fore and aft. This done, the Constellation reached on until well on the star- board bow of the enemy, where she maintained her posi- tion for nearly an hour, firing with the greatest advantage and receiving in return but a partial broadside at any round from the French guns. Then she crossed the In- surgent's bows once more, raked her, and worked aft along the port side again. It was a most vigorous conflict, for both crews were ani- mated by a sense of national injury. The Frenchmen felt that they were fighting for human freedom against all the world, and that the American people ought to have sided with them in the conflict, especially as the treaty of alliance of 1778 had guaranteed to the French king "the present possessions of the crown of France in America." The Americans, on the other hand, had in mind the loot- ings of American ships by the French privateers and pirates from the French ports together with the outrages that had been perpetrated upon crews during the loot- ings. But while each was filled with animosity the results of the fire differed greatly. On the Constellation a shot cut through the foretopmast and it was in immediate danger of falling from the pressure of the sail, when Midshipman David Porter climbed the rigging and cut away the yards, relieving the pressure. It was a narrow escape from serious injury, but the fact that a shot from a main-deck gun should have flown that high showed that the French- men were not aiming their guns. On the Constellation the gunners were aiming at the Insurgent' s hull, and within an hour after the first broadside every gun in 46 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY the Frenchman's main deck broadside was put out of action. On seeing how the enemy's fire had decreased, Truxton wore down across the Insurgent's stern to rake her for the third time, and at that, at 4:30 o'clock — after a fight of an hour and a quarter — the French flag was hauled down. The Insurgent was much inferior in force, but it was the superior gunnery, not the superior battery, of the Con- stellation that won the fight, as is shown by the fact that the Insurgent lost twenty-nine killed and forty-one wounded, while the Constellation lost by the enemy's fire but one killed and two wounded. One story of this affair portrays graphically the char- acter of the officers of the young navy. When the Insur- gent had surrendered. Lieutenant John Rodgers, Midship- man David Porter and eleven seamen were sent to take charge of her. They found that the Frenchmen had thrown overboard all the handcuffs and shackles com- monly used to secure prisoners, and had also disposed of gratings used to cover the hatches when prisoners were to be confined in the lower hold. It was plainly seen, there- fore, that they contemplated rising on their captors if opportunity offered. Accordingly, Rogers began to trans- fer the Frenchmen to the Constellation as rapidly as possi- ble, although in the meantime a gale had come on and the sea was getting rough. Moreover, the wrecked condition of the tophamper of the ships interfered with their naviga- tion. As a result of these conditions there were yet 173 prisoners on board the Insurgent when night came on, and a little later the ships lost sight of each other in the gloom. Lieutenant Rodgers with one young midshipman (Porter was eighteen years old), and eleven men were obliged not only to guard 173 prisoners but to handle a badly wrecked ship in a West India gale, with the rocks of Nevis Island alee. Nevertheless John Rodgers, David BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 47 Porter and the eleven unnamed bluejackets were equal to the occasion. One determined man, well armed, was placed at each hatch with orders to shoot any prisoner making any attempt to escape. The others cleared away the wreckage and handled the ship. Though they were for three nights and two days without sleep or rest, they brought her into St. Kitts. An opportunity to make more than one good fight sel- dom comes to a naval captain, but Truxton was the excep- tion. Having returned to the United States to secure a new crew (Congress refused to allow crews to be enlisted for more than one year), the Constellation was fitted with a new battery because the first one was too heavy. She received 18-pounders on her main deck, and the ten long 12's on the quarter-deck were replaced with ten 24- pounder carronades, a short gun using a large shot and a small (about one-third the usual) charge of powder. Ac- cording to Cooper, this was the first use of carronades in the American navy. Being of light weight they could be fired rapidly, and later they became very popular, although they were utterly absurd, as was proved in the next war. Thus armed, the Constellation returned to the West Indies, and at 7 o'clock a. m., on February 1, 1800, while cruising five leagues west of Bassaterre Roads, Guada- loupe, a sail was seen off to to south'ard. On running down for a look it was seen that the stranger was a frigate carrying at least four more guns than the Constellation. Truxton had left a station to which he had been regularly assigned, and in leaving it he was giving the French pri- vateers opportunity to get away in search of American merchantmen. Nevertheless, on seeing that the enemy was somewhat superior in force, he could not resist the temptation to continue the chase. Accordingly through- out that day, the night following and all the next day the Constellation stretched every sail, and, finally, as the next 48 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY night came on, a growing breeze carried her well down on the enemy's weather quarter. With that the battle lan- terns were lighted and word was sent to the guns' crews that they were not to fire a shot until orders were given by the captain. Truxton then climbed on the rail of his ship to hail the enemy. He was answered by a round of shot from her quarter-deck before he had said a word. At that Truxton climbed down again and once more ordered his gunners not to fire until he told them to do so, adding that when the word did come they were "not to throw away a single charge of powder and shot, but to take good aim, and to fire directly into the hull of the enemy." In perfect silence thereafter, save as the water splashed under her bows, the Constellation reached ahead with her sails flashing white in reflecting the fire of the enemy's guns until a position was reached to "enable us to return effectually his salute," as Truxton said. Then the whole broadside was fired. It was a little past 8 o'clock when the Constellation's broadside was fired. With both crews loading and firing as swiftly as possible both ships reached away, side by side, through the gloom, until 1 o'clock the next morning. At that hour the Frenchman's guns were silenced. Her flag had been lowered twice, meantime, but as the act was not seen on the Constellation, the fire was continued, and the Frenchmen returned each time to their guns out of sheer despair. But in the moment of final victory, when Truxton would have gone alongside to take possession of his prize, word was brought him that every shroud and stay supporting the mainmast had been shot away and that the mast must soon fall if it were not secured imme- diately. Truxton and his men had been so intent on shooting the enemy to pieces that they had failed to ob- serve how their ship had been cut up — a most commenda- ble error, if any error is ever to be commended. BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 49 Truxton at once called all hands on deck to save the mast by means of preventer stays, but before one could be put in place the roll of the sea threw the spar over the rail. In the meantime the enemy was drifting away, so that she now escaped altogether. Midshipman Jarvis and several men were in the top at the time it fell, and all but one man were lost. Jarvis had been warned by an old sailor, but he refused to leave his post, saying: "If the mast goes we must go with it!" Some time later it was learned that the French ship was the frigate Vengence, Captain Pitot. Her main-deck battery was like that of the Constellation. Above she carried sixteen long 12-pounders and eight short 42's. The Vengence went to Cura9ao to repair damages. A man named Howe, who was a prisoner on the Vengence at the time of the action, reported that 186 round shot from the Constellation had pierced her hull, and that she was also somewhat cut up in the rigging. Out of her crew that, with some passengers who helped at the guns, numbered under 400, she lost 160 in killed and wounded. The Constellation lost twenty-five killed, including those who died of their wounds, and fourteen wounded. No other officer had anything like as good an opportu- nity as Truxton, nevertheless there were a number of minor actions that are memorable because of their bearing upon the results of the war. For instance, two schooners were built at Baltimore that were the first light cruisers of the new navy. To a sailor's eye there never was a more beautiful class of naval ships than the old-time schooners, and their crews lived literally in touch with the sea — with their ears down to "the unfathomable dialogue of the ever-moaning brine." Each of these schooners was armed with twelve long 6-pounders. One was named the Enterprise and the other the Experiment. 50 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY In March, 1800, the Enterprise, under Lieutenant-Com- mandant John Shaw, while in the Mona passage fell in with a Spanish brig armed with eighteen 9-pounders — a vessel of double her force. The Spaniard opened fire. The Enterprise had already shown superiority in speed — it would have been easy for her to escape from the brig — but Shaw preferred to fight, and at the end of twenty minutes the brig made sail for a far country, to which the Enterprise let her go because Spain and the United States were not at war. In the course of the next eight months the Enterprise was in five different conflicts, none of which need be described here because all the vessels of the enemy were of inferior force and merely served to give the Amer- ican crew a little target practice. Then while cruising in the lee of St. Kitts she fell in with the French brig Flam- beau, carrying twelve 9-pounders and a crew of 110, where the Ejiterprise was armed with 6's and had but 83 men on board. The Frenchman had the windward position, also, but Shaw drove the Enterprise alongside to leeward and opened fire. The two hulls were only twelve yards or so apart — no more than the width of a narrow street — but the French- men on the Flambeau, like those on the other French ships already described, had never learned to aim their guns, and at the end of twenty minutes they tacked around and fled for their lives. This, too, proved in vain. Shaw tacked in pursuit, and although he stopped to pick up six men who accidentally fell into the sea from the Flambeau, he soon overhauled her and then her flag came down. She had lost forty killed and wounded out of 110. The En- terprise lost tfen all told. The Experiment had fewer opportunities, but on Janu- ary 1, 1800, under Lieutenant-Commandant Maley, she made one good fight. With a number of merchantmen she was lying becalmed in the Bight of'Leogane. To the BATTLES OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE 51 people on shore the h"ttle fleet seemed to offer a most pleasing opportunity for plunder. The natives there had often taken American merchantmen with rowboats only, therefore ten barges manned by from thirty-five to forty men each, went afloat. No more determined band of pirates was ever seen in the West Indies than these. Twice they were driven away by the broadside of the Experiment, but on each occasion they landed their dead and wounded, took on fresh men and came agam. When they came the third time they were divided into three flotillas of three boats each, which made a dash at the Experiment from three different directions at once. In the barges were 270 pirates against a crew of seventy men on the schooner; it was the last and most desperate assault of all, but flesh and blood could not stand up against the fire of the Yankee crew, and the attack failed. The conflict from first to last was seven hours long. The Experiment had two men wounded. Two or three of the pirate barges were sunk with all hands. On September 13 of this year the Experiment, under Lieutenant Charles Stewart, fell in with an 18-gun brig and a 14-gun schooner belonging to the enemy. Stewart's seamanship w^as to give him lasting fame in the navy. On this occasion he manoeuvred the Experiment in a way that separated the two French vessels, and then he swooped down and took the schooner. After placing Midshipman David Porter in command of the prize, Stewart went in pursuit of the big brig, but the French captain had seen enough of the whirlwind tactics of the flying "Yankee," and he set studding sails and so escaped. Since much was said in Congress about the enormous expense of fighting for our rights, here is the reckoning: Our cruisers captured eighty-three ships, carjying 46fi guns and 3,150 men. Other ships were sunk and driven 52 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY ashore. Several flotillas of picaroons were destroyed. A great number of American merchantmen that had been captured by the enemy were retaken. The pirates and piratical cruisers were driven from the sea; the spoliation of American commerce by the French was brought to an end. In all this time the French took just one armed American ship — Le Croyable — and she was lost because her com- mander (Lieutenant William Bainbridge) showed too eager gallantry in chasing strange sails, for he got under the guns of two French frigates. To use the only argu- ment that will appeal to those who count a loss of "values" on the stock market as a matter of more importance than a loss of national honor, it was worth while to employ the navy, because by what it captured and by what it actually protected it paid for itself several times over. Yet this financial return was the smallest of the results achieved. For all efforts of the United States to make a lasting treaty failed until after the work of the American cruisers — especially the Constellation — had been described in the French papers. Then — on March 30, 1800 — Napoleon, First Consul, graciously received the American envoys. By good fighting the navy saved the nation from war. CHAPTER VII ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 In every adequate account of the War of 1812 two statements of fact stand forth prominently: The British aggressions leading to that war grew out of that fear of the "American peril" which first found ex- pression in the Parliament during the Revolution. Our lack of a navy led, as Washington had foreseen, to "such violation of the rights of the neutral party" as at last made war inevitable.^ In connection with what was said in Parliament about the "American Peril," it is to be noted that as soon as the Revolution was ended the American ship owner made strenuous attacks upon those "peculiar resources" the expected "cramping" of which had filled the British Member of Parliament with fear. He began, that is to say, an effort to wrest the supremacy of the seas from the British merchantman, and the extent of his success aston- ishes the student of history to this day. The registered ships of the United States in 1789 had a tonnage of 123,- 893. Twelve years later, in 1801, the tonnage had in- creased, in spite of French spoliations (the French pirates had captured 300 ships in a single year), and in spite of violent British opposition meantime, to 632,907. This ^In his eighth Annual Address Washington said: "To secure re- spect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violation of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other option." 53 54 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY increase was due to the one fact that the American ships and the American crews were the best afloat. While the " American peril " was thus sweeping the Seven Seas the British war upon Napoleon was begun on April 29, 1803. The British navy was supreme. The French merchant ships were unable to leave port. The trade be- tween the French colonies and France was stopped be- cause, under French law, this trade was confined to French ships. In this emergency Napoleon opened the trade of the colonies to all " neutrals," and the one neutral worth consideration was the United States. Through the aid of American ships French colonial produce found a ready market, and even supplanted that of the British colonies. This trade still further increased the profits of the American ship owner at the very time when French privateers and the few French warships that were able to leave port were increasing the perils and decreasing the profits of the British ship merchant. The British merchants and the British colonists appealed to their Government for help, and to that appeal was added one from the British navy. The most interesting British book printed at that period ("War in Disguise," by James Stephens), sets forth the motive of the British naval officer in this matter in a way that is frank and sat- isfactory. For it draws (pp. 125-127) a picture of a British Admiral growing old and full of honors in the service of his country, who was yet unable "to wrest [from the enemy] the means of comfortably sustaining those honors," because, so long as American ships were allowed to do the work from which the war excluded French ships, he must " look out in vain for any subject of safe and uncontested capture." That is to say, while the right of neutrals to the freedom of the sea was con- ceded the British naval officer would not be able to capt- ure any prizes. ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 55 The times were barbarous, and ten years of war pre- viously waged for the suppression of repubUcan institu- tions on the Continent had intensified the barbarism of England. The British Government promptly found a way to provide the aging admirals with subjects of safe capture, and at the same time strike the "American peril" a staggering blow. British sailors, for time out of mind, had sung "Not a sail but by permission spreads"; the theory that British naval supremacy gave the British Government the full right, as a belligerent, to dictate to all neutrals the terms on which their ships might sail the seas was little doubted in England. In accordance with this theory it had been declared that neutrals should not enter a trade, in time of war, from which they were excluded in time of peace. Thus, American ships having been ex- cluded by French law from the trade between France and her colonies in time of peace, it was declared by the Brit- ish that such ships should not enter the trade in war time when France was willing to relax her laws. As a " special concession" the British agreed that the American ship might carry goods from the French colonies to the United States and after landing the cargo there, and paying all American duties there on it, it might be reloaded and car- ried to a French port. To this British regulation of American carrying trade the American Government submitted, but the superiority of American ships and sailors was so great that American shipping yet competed successfully with the British for the European trade. Thereat the British prize court assumed the right to dictate the terms on which the colonial prod- uce should be landed in the United States — to declare, for instance, that if the American Government allowed the exporter any rebate on the tariff paid when landing the goods, that rebate should warrant condemning the ship. Subjects of "safe capture" for the benefit of aging Brit- 56 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY ish admirals were now provided in abundance; for Ameri- can ships covered the seas, and the British rules were en- forced without adequate previous notice. The British method of carrying on their search for sub- jects of safe capture is also memorable, for British frigates literally blockaded American ports. Captain Basil Hall, R. N., who, in the spring of 1806, was a midshipman on the frigate Leander, described the blockade as his ship maintained it at Sandy Hook ("Fragments of Voyages and Travels"): "Every morning at daybreak we set about arresting the progress of all the vessels we saw, firing off guns to the right and left to make every ship heave to ... I have frequently known a dozen, and sometimes a couple dozen, ships losing their fair wind, their tide, and worse than all, their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day, before our search was completed." Any informality in the papers, or any chance expression in the private letters (which were all .read), exciting the slightest suspicion that French property was on board led to the seizure of the ship, and she was at once sent to Halifax for trial before a court that was financially inter- ested in the condemnation of prizes. So runs the beginning of the story of the British attacks upon American ships and shipowners. Because the War of 1812 was fought for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" with "trade" placed ahead of human rights, the sufferings of the shipowners have been described thus far ahead of "sailors' rights." The sailors shall now be considered. From the days of Cromwell the British naval captains, when in want of men had sent gangs of sailors ashore, or to the decks of British merchantmen, where they took by force any man found fit for the service. The system seems now utterly inhuman, but in the state of civilization prevailing at the beginning of the nineteenth century it ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 57 was commonly practised. After the end of the War of the Revolution the British naval oflScer found in the practice of impressment a safe and satisfactory way for expressing his contempt and hatred for republican in- stitutions, and incidentally, a way of crippling, more or less, the "American peril." Boarding American ships ostensibly in search of the British subjects often to be found in American crews, the British press gangs jeeringly car- ried off the best men on board, knowing them, usually, to be American citizens. Captain A. T. Mahan, whose work on the " War of 1812 " is the latest, says the British made "no crude claim" to any "right" to impress American native-born citizens. It is true that they never wrote a public document in which such a claim was made directly, but the extent of the claim of the British may fairly be inferred from their practice. For impressment of American citizens was carried on, with the full knowledge of the British Government, for nearly thirty years. Nor is that all. While they did not openly assert the justice of their practice they insisted that no Brit- ish citizen who had become a naturalized American should be exempt. Worse yet, they insisted, after a time, that no American citizen should be exempt from impressment unless he had with him, at the time he was seized, a paper called a "protection," signed and sealed by customs officials of the United States, certifying that he was Ameri- can born. That is to say, the British claimed the right to impress all Americans who through the perils and mis- haps of the sea might lose their "protections." The American Government submitted to this claim of the British. No sooner were "protections" provided for, however, than the British repudiated them on the plea that all American customs officials were in the habit of issuing the papers to British citizens for the sake of the fees exacted; 58 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY incidentally it was declared that the whole list of American customs oificials were professional perjurers. The im- pressing of American seamen went on merrily and, when impressed, the American was compelled to serve without pay unless he condoned the crime by "voluntarily" en- listing. To escape from his bondage the American sailor was obliged to secure evidence of his birth that would be satisfactory to the British Admiralty, and this evidence had to be transmitted through the American Secretary of State to London. Moreover, when the impressed American had the good luck to run away from the ship on which he was held he was proclaimed a "deserter," and the claim that he was a deserter was enforced with broadsides. In one case where Americans, admitted to be Americans, were retaken after "desertion" they were flogged with 500 blows each from the boatswain's cat^a punishment little short of death by torture. In following the custom of impressing American sea- men the British officers often boarded American ships at sea and took away so many men that the ships were left dangerously short-handed. In fact some ships thus robbed failed to reach port. The impressment of their crews amounted to murder. Impressment often amounted to murder, too, when some sturdy American, asserting his rights, refused to do duty. For some of those patriots were shipped off to serve on the coasts of Africa and India, where they died of fevers. Others were tortured under the lash. Others were chained in the bilge-water of the lower hold and fed on even less and worse food than was served to the underfed crew. While it is true that in a few cases Americans succeeded in securing evidence of their nativity that satisfied the Admiralty the release came only after two or three years of service without pay; and it is not to be forgotten that ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 59 not one British officer was ever so much as reprimanded for enslaving these men who were admitted to be Americans. Finally, the fact that the British stubbornly refused, when making the treaty of peace after the war, to consider any concession in the matter of impressing Americans, seems to have some bearing on the character of the "Claim" — whether "crude" or not — which they had made theretofore. The actual number of American sailors impressed is, of course, a matter of no moment in a discussion of the right of the practice. But since the number affected the issue it may be noted that, in replying to the request of Congress for information in the matter, Mr. Madison reported, under date of March 5, 1806, that papers filed in his office showed that 2,273 had been impressed since the beginning of the war between England and Napoleon. It was admitted in Parliament after the fighting began that more than 3,000 Americans were in the navy. Of course that was but a fraction of the number actually impressed, for the friends and relatives of foremast hands were usually too poor or ignorant to make an appeal to the American Secretary of State. It is estimated that, first and last, as many as 20,000 Americans were thus enslaved. The nearest approach to an adequate apology for the practice that one could find in British literature, until recent years, is the assertion that Great Britain was fight- ing the Great Oppressor of the World ; it was a war for Human Liberty; that she was in straits where she could man her ships only by impressment; that Americans were so much like Englishmen in speech and appearance that mistakes were really unavoidable. Captain Mahan, in his "War of 1812" (Scribner's Magazine, January, 1904), supports that British view, as proclaimed at the period of the war. He says: "It maybe said that Great Britain could have desisted. She could not." The London Spec- 60 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY tutor, however (December 23, 1905), in reviewing the work of this American naval captain, says emphatically, if un- kindly: "While we agree [with Mahan] that many of the meas- ures we took were forced upon us by that necessity which knows no law, impressment from foreign ships was not one of them." It is seen now that the British sailors left their ships not because they lacked patriotism but because of the con- ditions in the British service that created the bloody mutinies of 1797. Starvation, ill-treatment not easily de- scribed and scant wages drove British seamen to serve under a flag they despised (they called it in derision the "gridiron" flag). For under that flag they received good pay and ample food. The concern which the Congress of the Revolution had shown in connection with the pud- ding bags was bearing fruit. By raising the pay and giv- ing a satisfactory ration the British could have filled their ships. The Earl of Galloway, in the House of Lords, on May 13, 1813, in referring to "the propensity of our seamen to desert," said that this "propensity" might be "obviated by an increase of petty officers, and by more liberal remuneration." (Annual Reg.) No one in the House disputed his assertion. Impressment was preferred through parsimony chiefly; it would have cost some money to give the seamen enough to eat, with fair pay. This is not to scold the British for what they did. Ever since the days when danger taught primitive man to walk erect the evolution of the race has been the result of suc- cessful conflicts with aggressive and domineering enemies. The British then taught the Americans a needed lesson — if only we might fully understand and remember it. We now come to the attitude of the American people while subject to these outrages and aggressions. When ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 61 the war upon Napoleon began, Thomas Jefferson was President of the United States. He had seen in the work of President Adams an effective method of ending such troubles. He had also read a report to the House of Rep- resentatives, written by Secretary of the Navy Stoddert, under date of January 12, 1801, which said: "When the United States own twelve ships of seventy- four guns, and double the number of strong frigates . . . confidence may be indulged that we may then avoid those wars in which we have no interest, and without submit- ting to be plundered." The experience of the American people ever since the Declaration of Independence had demonstrated that what- ever the merits of other methods of dealing with the spoil- ers might possibly be, it was certain that good fighting would serve. But Mr. Jefferson, on taking office, had a new scheme in mind, and to help him carry it out he called to his cabinet James Madison and Albert Gallatin, the two men who had, as members of the House, most effec- tively opposed the building of a navy. Jefferson, in his "Virginia Notes" (p. 258), had said that "the sea is the field on which we should meet an European enemy," and he even suggested a fleet of eighteen ships-of-the-line and twelve frigates as a force adequate to American needs. His new policy was never set forth in public documents, but it was very fully de- scribed in private letters. Thus in a letter to Thomas Paine he said: "Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the' energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. We believe we can enforce these principles as to ourselves by peaceable means." To a celebrated Pennsylvania peacemaker, Dr. Logan, 62 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY he explained how he was to use peaceable means to compel the compliance of foreign nations. He said: " Our commerce is so valuable to them that they will be glad to purchase it, when the only price we ask is to do us justice. I believe that we have in our own hands the means of peaceable coercion; and that the moment they see our Government so united as that we can make use of it, they will for their own interest be disposed to do us justice." In the year that Jefferson was inaugurated the exports of the United States amounted to $94,115,925, while the imports reached the sum of $111,363,511. Jefferson be- lieved that the profits of the foreign peoples on this trade — particularly the profits of the manufacturers who pro- duced our imports — were so great that we had only to withdraw our trade from an aggressing nation to compel it to do us justice. An appeal to trade "interest" — bluntly, an appeal to greed — was Jefferson's means of "peaceable coercion." It was a policy particularly pleasing to those American Congressmen who had voted to pay blackmail — an annual tribute to the African pirates rather than build a navy. Mr. Jefferson intended to coerce, but never with guns afloat. "That a navy caused more ills than it prevented or corrected was one of the deepest convictions that under- lay the policy of Mr. Jefferson" after he became President. "Sound principles," said he, "will not justify our taxing the industries of our fellow-citizens to accumulate treasures for wars to happen we know not when." (Quoted by H. Adams, "History of the United States," vol. I, p. 222.) To avoid, as far as possible, taxing the industry of his fellow citizens for the support of a navy Jefferson laid up five of the frigates-in-ordinary at Washington. The work on six ships-of-the-line, which Congress had authorized, was suspended. Mr. Adams had expended $3,448,716 on ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 63 the navy in 1800. In 1802 Mr. Jefferson expended but $915,562. To reduce naval expenditures still further he proposed in his message, dated December 15, 1802, "to add to our navy-yard here a dock within which our present vessels may be laid up dry and under cover from the sun." "Beautiful and appropriate drawings of the dock and its locks" were laid before Congress, and nothing but the size of the estimated cost prevented Congress adopting the plan of laying up our navy "dry and under cover from the sun" at a time when British frigates were plundering American ships and impressing native-bom American sea- men in American waters at Sandy Hook. This is not to doubt Mr. Jefferson's sincerity of purpose. He intended to promote peace and the financial growth of the country. First of all he intended to pay the public debt, and in this he succeeded astonishingly well. In 1801 the debt amounted to $83,038,051. Just before the War of 1812 it had been reduced, under the Jeffersonian policy, which Madison continued, to $45,209,738. What with the blockading of New York and the im- pressment of American seamen, the country was aroused to a pitch where Jefferson saw a wished-for opportunity to bring into use his one sure weapon — "peaceable coer- cion " — for compelling the oppressor to do us justice. He accordingly instructed Congress to pass the non-inter- course bill that became a law April 18, 1806. The im- portation of beer, millinery goods, playing cards and some other things of British manufacture was absolutely pro- hibited "from and after the 15th day of November next." So confident was Mr. Jefferson in the success of "peace- able coercion" that he wrote: "We begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole Gulf Stream as our waters, in which hostilities are to be frowned on at present, and prohibited" later. "We shall never permit another privateer to cruise within it," he added. 64 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY It has been asserted that the non-intercourse law was "vindictive retaUation." John Randolph, who, although the greatest of American blatherskites, saw some things clearly, said it was "a dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence." Jefferson's "dose of chicken broth" was mixed to cure all ills. A week after it was signed the frigate Leander was still at Sandy Hook firing off guns to the right and left as before. In the course of the day, while firing on a coaster, the shot killed the coaster's master. For this murder the captain of the Leander was recalled — and sent to a more comfortable station. As an official reply to Jefferson's effort at "peaceable coercion," the British proclaimed a paper blockade of the coast of Europe from Brest to the Elbe, though it should be said that the measure was decided on while yet non-intercourse was under discussion in Congress. The coast thus "blockaded" contained the ports most fre- quented by American shipping, but if forces had been stationed to make an actual blockade the United States would have had no cause of complaint. The injury done American shipping was found in the confiscation of ships for the violation of a blockade that did not exist. The position then assumed by the American Government in regard to paper blockades has now no firmer supporter than the British nation, and British writers on international law admit that in the matter of the obligations of neutrals the United States "represented by far the most advanced existing opinions." But no American protest then availed. This adoption of the scheme of paper blockades (May 16, 1806) led Napoleon to issue his "Berlin Decree" (No- vember 21, 1806). Of the general attitude of Napoleon toward the United States it need only be said here that it was imperious and insulting, and that he did what he could ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 65 to rob the people that were counting their interest more than their honor. It was at one time suggested in Con- gress that the United States should declare war against both England and France, and that ought to have been done. The Berlin Decree stated the undisputable fact that the blockade declared by the British was designed to destroy all neutral commerce for the benefit of British shipping and commerce. From this Napoleon argued that who- ever had any part in British commerce was but aiding the nefarious British plan. He therefore decreed that the British Islands were in a state of blockade; all intercourse with these islands was prohibited; all merchandise com- ing from them was declared good prize; it was ordered that no ship coming from the British Islands should be allowed to enter any continental port. The American people were now literally between the devil and the deep sea, if that expression may be allowed, and that, too, when they had not yet learned that " when you clinch with the devil you must use your claws." Yet worse was to come. Two American commissioners had been negotiating a treaty with the British when the Berlin Decree was issued. The treaty was all ready for signa- tures when a copy of the decree reached London. There- upon the British negotiators declared they would not sign the treaty " unless our Government should engage to sup- port its rights against the measures of France" ("Foreign Relations," vol. Ill, p. 147). They demanded that the United States declare war on France as the price of the treaty, and it was a treaty that ignored impressment. The treaty was eventually forwarded to Washington, where it was laid aside. Manifestly the refusal to buy her playing cards and beer had not yet peaceably coerced Great Britain to any extent. The refusal to make a definite treaty was followed by 66 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY an Order in Council, dated January 7, 1807, forbidding to neutrals all participation in the continental coasting trade as far south and east as Italy. An American ship that found a poor market in one port was confiscated if she attempted to go to another. Then came the attack on the frigate Chesapeake. In shipping a crew at Norfolk for a voyage to Europe, early in 1807, four of the men secured were claimed by British naval officers as deserters from the British ships that were at that time lying in the Chesapeake Bay for the purpose of examining all shipping, as the Leopard had done at Sandy Hook. That the four had fled from British ships is undisputed. They were the kind of deserters al- ready mentioned — impressed American seamen seeking liberty. Three of them were known on all hands to be Americans born; it is possible that the fourth was British born. The three were also negroes, a fact of interest in connection with the oft-repeated British assertion that it was impossible to tell an American from an Englishman, and that the British made "no crude claim to impress American-born citizens." This case was not singular, either, for red Indians were impressed as native-born Englishmen ! When a demand for the "deserters" was refused the vice-admiral commanding the station ordered his ships to take them from the Chesapeake by force whenever they should find her at sea. The Chesapeake sailed early on June 22, 1807, and when well off shore she found the British frigate Leopard awaiting her. The Leopard demanded the four men. Captain James Barron, commanding the Chesapeake, re- fused, but did not at once order his men to quarters. When he did send them there he told them to go quietly, so that the British should not learn what they were doing. The gun-deck was lumbered up with all sorts of baggage ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 67 and stores. The guns were not in order. Many of the guns had been suppUed with rammers too large for the bore. There were no matches for firing the guns. The bHght of "peaceable coercion" was over the whole ship and her crew. While Barron fumbled, the British opened fire — at 4:30 o'clock — and continued it for fifteen minutes, when Barron hauled down the flag. The four " deserters " were then carried to Halifax, where they were convicted of the crime of deserting. The three Americans known to be Americans received 500 lashes; the one who may have been British-born was hanged. The Chesapeake had three men killed and eighteen wounded. She was somewhat, but not much, cut up by the Leopard's safe target practice. President Jefferson at once issued a proclamation order- ing all British ships from American waters and forbidding them to enter again. A similar measure of "vindictive retaliation" was issued by the Mayor of Norfolk, who forbade his people to hold any communication with the British ships (by the way, the ships ignored the President's proclamation), and when the British senior captain threatened to take supplies by force, all the mounted militia of the region were called out. Jefferson, bending to the blast of "popular clamor," talked much of war and summoned an extra session of Congress. Then, on December 18, in a message that is, perhaps, the most remarkable document in the American archives, he recommended that full revenge be taken for the intolerable outrage upon the honor of the nation — by laying an embargo on all American shipping! At one stroke all British profit on American commerce — the very last cent — was to be cut off. Now he would demonstrate that our "commerce is so valuable to them that they will be glad to purchase it when the only price we ask is to do us justice." Following this a bill was introduced to authorize the 68 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY President to sink "blocks" — worthless ship hulls — in a line across the Hudson to prevent British insults to New York. It was also proposed to stretch a chain across the Narrows for the same purpose. The building of some gunboats — rowboats fit to carry one 24-pounder each — was authorized ostensibly as an extreme war measure, but really because it was well known to Jefferson that such boats were worthless for any war purpose. But more sorrowful than these bills were the arguments used to resist those who called for war. "Had not Den- mark a navy?" asked Representative Fisk. "What be- came of it ? It fell . . . and that will be the fate of our navy, if we erect one." Burwell called attention to the fact that England's naval "resources were infinitely be- yond those of our infant country." John Randolph said that the navy had been "for years a moth on the public purse." The mere sight of a member of the marine corps made his gorge rise, and as for resisting the British by means of the navy, " a straight- jacket and depletion" were the only remedies for one wild enough to suggest it. Smilie, who had not always opposed a naval force, said that "prudence required a temperate course." It was even asserted that members of the House ought to be moderate in their choice of words lest the British Minister of Foreign Affairs be offended to a point where "he would put forth his strength and make us feel it." With few exceptions the members of Congress diligently cultivated the fears — the cowardice of the nation. In all that weary period there was but one gleam of light. "Sir!" said Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, with his lip curling in scorn, "if I can help it the old women of this country shall not be frightened by the talk of war any longer. I have been a close observer of what has been done and said by the majority of this House, and I am convinced that no insult, however gross, could force ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 69 this majority into the declaration of war. To use a strong but common expression, it could not be kicked into such a declaration." The Embargo Act became a law on December 22, 1807. The nation was then young, and the American people were developing their national ideals. It was at this critical period that Congress "counted their interest more than their honor." It is asserted by the apologist for the British aggressions that "the British Government at once disowned" the as- sault upon the Chesapeake. The assertion is a half truth. On August 3 Minister Canning wrote to Monroe saying that " His Majesty neither does nor has at any time main- tained the pretension of a right to search ships of war in the national service of any State for deserters." He thereby asserted that the men taken from the Chesapeake were deserters, at least. He had previously asked Monroe if the "deserters" were Americans or British, and had main- tained that their nationality was a matter of importance. He did recall Vice-Admiral Berkeley, but a better com- mand was soon given him. More than that the British positively refused to do, unless Jefferson would first with- draw his proclamation depriving British ships of the right of using American ports. The real attitude of the British Government on this matter is seen in the editorials of the Government news- papers. In them there was no whine about "imminence of national peril" and England's death struggle for the liberty of the world. Said the Morning Post: "A war of a very few months, without creating to us the expense of a single additional ship, would be sufiicient to convince her [America] of her folly by a necessary chastise- ment of her insolence and audacity. " This was the real attitude of the British, and it was only when it was seen, in 1811, that the American people would fight at last, that a 70 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY full disavowal of the Chesapeake affair was made by a return of the "deserters" to the deck of the assaulted ship. While the American Congress talked about embargo and the impossibility of meeting Great Britain upon the high seas the British Government, by Orders in Council dated November 11, 1807, extended the paper blockade through- out the world. Every port from which British ships were excluded by Napoleon, even in the colonies, was declared "blockaded" to neutral ships. While the apologist for the British speaks of this as a " measure of just and neces- sary retaliation" for the Berlin Decree, the order itself shows that it was not either a matter of retaliation or for keeping West India products out of the realms of Napoleon. For it was expressly provided in the order that American ships might continue to trade to the forbidden ports if they would first call at an English port, land their cargoes, pay certain specified duties, procure a permit called a license, and then reship and get away on their voyage. The British sailor had been singing " No sail but by permission spreads." The British Government now said "no trade except through Great Britain." And that is to say that when it was seen that the Ameri- can ships were able to carry on trade, in spite of all the ills imposed theretofore by British jealousy, this last Order in Council was devised to compel the triumphant "Yankee" shipowner to give up a share of his profits. In fact the membcEs of the British Government in time openly avowed that the object was a mere grab, a trick of commerce for which war gave opportunity, and not a war measure at all. In a debate in Parliament, March 3, 1812, Spencer Percival frankly declared : "The object of the Orders in Council was not to destroy the trade of the Continent, but to force the Continent to trade with us." ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1812 71 Lord Erskine, being of the opposition, said of the Orders as a matter of "retaliation": "It is, indeed, quite astonishing to hear the word *re- taUation' twisted and perverted in a manner equally re- pugnant to grammar and common sense, . . . It is a new application of the term, that if A strike me, I may retaliate by striking B. I cannot, my Lords, conceive of any- thing more preposterous." Unbelievable as it now seems, it was at the moment when the British were making this last stroke for levying tribute on American commerce that the American Con- gress passed the embargo act. During the ensuing year — 1807 and 1808 — the embargo was so rigorously enforced that American ships disappeared entirely from the ports of Europe. The time for which President Jefferson had looked — the time when the British merchant and manufacturer should be wholly deprived of the profits on the American trade — had come. England was now to become glad to buy back that, trade, especially as the only price we asked was that she do us justice! But when the "peaceable co- ercionists" looked eagerly for offers to "dicker" for this trade, they saw nothing but looks of contempt. And the British contempt was shared by every other people in Europe. The French Minister to the United States, in a letter dated September 4, 1807, spoke feelingly of "the sentiments of fear and servile deference with which the inhabitants of the American Union are penetrated." He added that the Americans were "a people that conceives no idea of glory, of grandeur, of justice . . . and that is disposed to suffer every kind of humiliation provided it can satisfy its sordid avarice." (Quoted by Henry Adams, "History of the United States," vol. IV, p. 149.) But while the work of "peaceable coercion" was thus leading the American Nation to a depth of degradation 72 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY not now quite comprehensible, the people — they whom Lincoln trusted — were slowly coming to an understanding of the conditions that prevailed. In spite of the misin- formation of party newspapers, and of the speeches in, and the acts of, Congress deliberately made with the in- tention of deceiving, the truth became known. Once the facts were fully known the people decided for themselves what course to pursue; and they made the decision with- out counting their interest. For the attitude of the people in ignoring "interest" at the last we may thank the British naval officers, for it was the impressment of American citizens that led to it. Wives and children and aged parents of impressed Americans were found in every port. Congressmen ignored them, but their neighbors, and the people of the countryside round about, could not and would not. What the honest indignation of the "jingoes" in Congress could not ac- complish, the tears of woman did do. And those tears still reach the heart of every patriot. The whisperings of voters who had for years cowerttJ.._ Diagrams Showing in the Heavy Lines the Position of the Keel and Bow of the " IVIame ' after the Explosion. SKETCH SHOWWIS VERTICAL KEEL BROKEN AND FLM KEEL PLATES BENT, IN PRESENT POSITION AT POltVt MARKED I Aon projection of injuries. redrawn from _,. drawing made bv chief gunners* ^ hate: a.ousson.u.S.N^Coliver). Sketch Showing Broken Keel at Point Marked I A in the Above Plan. (Both drawings reproduced from the Official Report.) 269 270 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY An examination of the locality is sufficient, in connection with the evidence made public, to convince any candid in- vestigator that such a mine as that could have been placed and exploded only with the aid of the Spanish officials of some rank. In fact, if the deed had been committed by any other persons than Spaniards of rank the detailed story would have been told long ago. Great as was the impression made upon the American people by this slaughter it should be noted that it did not cause the war. Preparations for the inevitable conflict — - a conflict made inevitable by conditions in Cuba — were already well in hand long before the Maine went to Ha- vana. On January 11 the commanders of the various squadrons were ordered to retain in the service any men whose terms of enlistment might be expiring. The South American squadron was ordered north from Montevideo. Vessels en route to foreign parts were intercepted and ordered home. Lieutenant G. L. Dyer, naval attache at Madrid, had been gathering all possible information about the Spanish navy. Commodore George Dewey was se- lected for the command of the Asiatic squadron (October 21, 1897), and he had been diligent in securing information about the Spanish fleet at Manila. The Secretary of the Navy had exliausted his powers in preparing his ships for service and especially in securing adequate supplies. Of course the destruction of the Maine somewhat has- tened matters. A full supply of ammunition for Dewey's fleet was forwarded to Honolulu, where the Baltimore took it and then steamed away to Hongkong. There she arrived, happily, in time for an overhauling in the dry- dock. The battleship Oregon was started on her long journey from San Francisco to Key West on March 19. In the meantime (March 9) Congress appropriated $50,000,000 for the "national defence" and $25,000,000 was added later to this sum. Efforts were then made to BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 271 buy warships and we secured one that we were able to get into actual service — the New Orleans, formerly the Amazonas, of Brazil. A few others were secured, but not in time to be of service worth mention. We learned that when war was actually at hand we had to depend on what we had provided in advance for such an emergency. We secured some merchantmen — ninety-seven in all. "Some American owners displayed far more greed than patriotism," says Secretary Long, and in "two instances there was rank extortion. ' ' Of these ships we made shoddy warships, in some cases, and in others colliers and despatch boats. One ship was fitted as a hospital and another as a floating machine shop. Thus, before the actual need came, the Department was able to report "ready." The country ought to remember Secretary Long, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and the many naval officers who did this work. In laying out the work of the navy an attack upon the ports of Spain was considered and abandoned because of the unfriendly attitude of European Powers and because, too, the end could be accomplished perhaps better by making the fight on the coast of Cuba where the Spanish navy would be operating 3,000 miles from home. The American ships were therefore assembled, as far as possible, at Key West. All would have gathered there but for the disgraceful cowardice of people of political influence in the coast cities. So many of these demanded protection that a coastguard squadron which included one of the swiftest of our cruisers had to be detailed for patrol duty along shore. In addition a stronger squadron was lo- cated in the Chesapeake. However, a sufiicient but most heterogeneous fleet was found at Key West when the day of war came. There was the Indiana with armor eighteen inches thick, and gunboats like the Nashville with no armor at all. There was the New York with her 4-inch 272 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY broadside guns and a speed of twenty knots and the moni- tors with 12-inch guns and a speed of from six to eight knots. We had built a navy for "coast defence" and when the time to use it came we found that we had to seek the enemy on his own coasts, and do it with armored ships having a coal-bunker capacity of from 236 to 410 tons only. Still, as said, the navy was ready when on April 9 Consul General Lee left Havana. On the 11th the Presi- dent sent a message to Congress, setting forth the situa- tion. On the 18th Congress resolved that "the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free," and directed the President to use our entire land and naval forces to make them free. The vote in the House was 310 to 6. This act was signed by the President on April 20. The Spanish Minister left Washington that night. The next day Minister Woodford left Madrid, and then at sunrise on April 22, 1898, the American fleet steamed away from Key West, under Rear-Admiral Sampson, who had been promoted for the work in hand. It was bound for the coast of Cuba, where a blockade was to be established from Cardenas to Bahia Honda on the north coast, and at Cien- fuegos on the south coast. The whole island was not blockaded because (according to Secretary Long) the navy did not have enough ships to do more than was done. Torpedo boats and lighthouse tenders were necessarily utilized in order to make the blockade effective. As the fleet steamed away a merchantman was seen approaching from the west loaded with lumber. A little later this vessel displayed her flag and as it was spread to the breeze a lookout on the New York reported that it was Spanish. The Nashville, Captain W. Maynard, was ordered in chase. Turning out of her place in line she headed for the ship and then gunner Patrick Malia, at 7:02 o'clock, fired the first shot of the war by sending a BEGINNING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 273 shot across her bows. She was the inappropriately named merchantman Buenaventura, of Bilboa, bound from Pascagoula to Rotterdam. She was condemned as a good prize and eventually became a coal barge on the American coast. CHAPTER XXVII THE BATTLE OF MANILA It was a fortunate thing for the United States that when the first gun of the War with Spain was fired off Key West, on April 22, 1898, no formal declaration of war had been made on either side. For while Admiral Sampson was directing the capture of the Buenaventura the cruiser Baltimore was just steaming into Hong Kong after her long run from Honolulu with ammunition for Dewey, and she was short of coal and needed cleaning in the drydock. Until war had been officially declared the British at Hong Kong were under no obligations as neutrals, and the Balti- more was free to get everything she needed. Immediately on arrival she was docked and at the end of forty-eight hours she came forth ready. It was then — on April 24 — that the Spanish officially proclaimed that war existed and British neutrality was announced. At the same time Dewey received an order from Washington which said: "Proceed at once to the Philippines. Commence oper- ations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy." International law allowed Dewey a day of grace in port for such further preparation as was needed, and on the 25th he sailed away with the bands on the British ships playing the "Star Spangled Banner" and the British crews cheering. The captain of the Immortalite shouted as the ships passed out: "You will surely win." 274 THE BATTLE OF MANILA 275 Commodore Dewey's fleet consisted of the Olympia (flagship), Captain C. V. Gridley; the Baltimore, Captain N. M. Dyer; the Raleigh, Captain J. B. Coghlan; the Boston (one of the first ships built for the White Squadron), Captain F. Wildes; the Concord, Captain A. Walker, and the Petrel, Captain E. P. Wood. The revenue cutter McCulloch, Captain D. B. Hodgson, R.M., was assigned to the fleet as a despatch boat, and two transports had been purchased and loaded with supplies sufficient to last the fleet six months. The fighting ships mounted all told fifty three guns, 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch rifles. Of small guns — 6-pounders and smaller — there were eighty- four. Four of the ships were classed as cruisers and three as gunboats. The Spanish fleet at Manila included two cruisers, eleven gunboats and twenty-five "mosquito" gunboats, but Admiral Montojo, commanding, could place in the battle-line no more than eleven of the largest of the vessels, and they together mounted only forty-four guns, of which the smallest was of 3.5 inches and the largest 6.2 inches calibre. More than half of the main battery guns were 4.7-inch calibre. Of smafl guns the Spaniards mounted eighty-one. It is manifest that afloat the Spanish force was vastly inferior. But Admiral Montojo had placed his fleet at the Cavite arsenal, located on Cavite Bay, an indentation on the south side of Manila Bay, and this bay was guarded by two 6.2-inch guns and three 6.3-inch guns placed in forts of which the one on Sangley Point was a modern casemate. Moreover, Manila city was guarded by four 9.5-inch guns and four 5.5-inch besides fifteen old- style rifles of 6.3-inch calibre. On islands at the entrance of the bay were seventeen rifles of modern build and vary- ing in size from 4.7-inches to 7 inches in calibre. To reach the Spanish fleet at Cavite it was necessary that Dewey should pass within easy range of nearly all 276 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY of the guns at the entrance of the bay, where they were located well for a plunging fire; and when within the bay he would have to fight, as he knew very well, not only the Spanish fleet but the Spanish forts both at Cavite and Manila city. On leaving Hong Kong the American fleet made Mirs Bay a rendezvous until the 27th when they sailed and at dawn on the 30th they arrived within sight of Luzon, the island on which Manila stands. That day was passed in searching the coast for the Spanish fleet as far as Subig Bay, for the coast affords a number of nautical-ambush lo- calities, but nothing was found, and at midnight the Olympia led the way past the forts guarding the entrance to Manila Bay. Flames from a smokestack revealed the fleet to the sentinels on shore, but only one shot was fired from the forts. The dawn of Sunday, May 1, 1898, found the American fleet lying about seven miles west from Manila city and perhaps as far northwest from the Cavite forts where the Spanish ships were at anchor. The crews had passed the night at their guns. A haze on the water was so thick that the Spanish ships could not be seen, but as soon as it was light enough for navigation the fleet, with the Olympia in the lead, was headed in toward Manila and then around in a curve to pass within range of the Spanish fleet. At 5:15 o'clock a gun, mounted at Manila, opened fire, and as the signal "Fire as convenient" was flying on the Olympia, the captain of the Concord sent two shells at the Manila fort. Thereafter the fleet steamed on, with the gunners grinning like prize fighters, until the Olympia was 5,600 yards from the Spanish ships, which could then be seen anchored across Cavite Bay. Then Dewey turned to Captain Gridley and said quietly: "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." The 8-inch guns in the forward turret were discharged From a photograph, copyright igoj, />y Ctinetlinst. ADMIRAL GEORr.E DEWEV. THE BATTLE OF MANILA 277 immediately. It was then exactly 5:35 o'clock. The speed of the fleet was now reduced and with their port batteries working vigorously the ships passed in front of the Spanish fleet and the forts. Two submarine mines were exploded in front of the Ohjmpia at a distance of a thousand yards or so, but because the distance from the flagship was so great they only gave confidence to the American commanders. The fire of the Spanish had been rapid but as little harmful as the explosion of the torpedoes, and when Dewey drew out of range to westward he turned inshore and came back so as to pass much closer to the enemy. It had been manifest to the Spaniards from the first that their fire was ineffective, and when the American ships turned back Admiral Montojo slipped the cable of his flagship, the Reina Christina, and steamed out to reduce the range. Here, if ever, was uncircumspect gallantry, for the guns of the whole American fleet were at once concen- trated on the venturesome Spaniard, and she was riddled from stem to stern. Her sides were beaten in, her men were swept away from their guns and she was set afire in so many places that flames burst up from every hatch, while puffs of steam followed, showing that steam con- nections had been cut. In haste she was turned back toward the shelter of the harbor forts, and then an 8-inch shell from the Olympia raked her from aft forward, the whole length of her gun deck. As she arrived within the bay her crew were seen leaping overboard from both sides, while boats came hurriedly from the other ships to rescue those who could not swim. Of 493 men on board when she began the battle only seventy escaped unhurt. While his flagship was destroyed Admiral Montojo was yet unbeaten. Crossing to the Isla de Cuba, as Perry crossed from the Lawrence to the Niagara, during the batde of Lake Erie, Montojo spread his flag once more and fought on. 278 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY In the meantime two torpedo boats made a dash at the American fleet, but the small-gun men picked them up and within a few minutes sank one of them and drove the other, crippled, to the beach, where it was found after- wards broken and bloody. Three times the American ships circled in front of the enemy, and then at 7:35, "being erroneously informed that the 5-inch battery was short of ammunition" (Long), Dewey ordered the fleet out of action. When out of range all hands were sent to breakfast. At 10:45, when the men had been well rested (some of them stretched out on deck and had a comforting sleep), the fleet once more went in search of the Spaniards. The Spanish flagship was now under water, while all the other ships except one were well within Cavite Bay, where they had either been set on fire, or were sinking, because the seacocks had been opened. The Antonio de JJlloa was still in the fight. Her captain nailed her flag to the mast and fought until she sank with her guns sissing hot as the water reached them. The American gunners then gave special attention to the Spanish forts. The little Petrel, by going into Cavite Bay, where she could take the enemy in the rear and at short range, was named the " Baby Battleship" by the en- thusiastic sailors of the other ships. The fire proved so hot that the garrisons were unable to endure it. At 12:20 o'clock the white flag was displayed and the Petrel sig- nalled "The enemy has surrendered." Three of the Spanish ships were sunk by the fire of the American ships and eight were set on fire and scut- tled by their own crews after it was seen that there was no hope. In the forts and ships together there were 381 men killed. In the American fleet seven men were wounded somewhat and none were killed. No shot from the forts hit any ship. Though several shot from the THE BATTLE OF MANILA 279 Spanish ships struck home, no damage of moment was inflicted. Of the results of the battle it must be said first that the destruction of the Spanish ships ended the Spanish power on the Pacific. American commerce was thereafter as free as before the war began. A Spanish fleet was ordered from home waters toward the Philippines; it was probably only a threat, but even if it was really bound for a contest with Dewey, it never got beyond the Suez Canal. It left the Spanish coast without ships and the prospect of an American raid across the Atlantic turned it back. The thoroughness with which Dewey did his work, it should be said, was a notice to the unfriendly Powers of Europe that American sailors could and would fight just as well as they had fought in the Civil War and the War of 1812, and that notice, we may suppose, confirmed the new-born British faith in Tattnall's celebrated expression, " Blood is thicker than water." The desire to be on friend- ly terms with a first-class fighting man is entirely natural. It was seen at last, that in defending American rights it had been necessary to fight a battle in far waters — in a part of the world where the much-vaunted strategic value of "the broad Atlantic" was of no avail. Finally, though the lesson has not been well learned yet, the victory, gained by the gun-fire of unarmored ships, confirmed the words of Farragut when he said that "the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from our own guns." CHAPTER XXVIII ON TO SANTIAGO On the approach of war Spain divided her home fleet into two squadrons, one of which was ordered first to the Canaries, to which the Americans were expected to send a squadron, and then to the Cape de Verdes. This squadron was composed of the Maria Teresa, the Vizcaya, the Oquendo, and the Cristobal Colon, with the torpedo destroyers Furor, Terror and Pluton. The Teresa, Viz- caya and Oquendo carried armor that was twelve inches thick, with a three-inch incHned deck within the belt, and each was armed with two 11-inch guns in turrets and ten 5.5-inch guns in broadside, besides smaller guns. They were credited with a speed of twenty knots. The Colon had the same speed as the others. Her armor belt was six inches thick, and she was supposed to be armed with two 10-inch, ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns, but her largest guns had never been mounted. As the torpedo destroyers were also formidable and able to cross the sea, this squadron engaged the serious attention of the Wash- ington strategists from the first, and when, on April 29, it left the Cape de Verdes with destination unknown, the "Navy Department floundered in a sea of ignorance." (Long.) Because some of the things done thereafter during this campaign became the subject of a heated controversy that raged throughout the country, creating settled prejudices and bringing unmerited reproach upon many naval offi- cers of superior ability and personal character, it seems 280 ON TO SANTIAGO 281 necessary to say here that every material statement to be found herein has been gathered from the "Record of Pro- ceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear- Admiral Winfield S. Schley" (a court held in 1901, at Schley's request), from Schley's "Forty-five Years Under the Flag," and from the official reports in the " Appendix to the Re- port of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation for 1898." No campaign was ever before described as that of Santi- ago was, and all interested can rest assured that when all prejudices have been lost the historians of the future will do exact justice to everyone who was engaged in the work. The members of the court were: Admiral George Dewey, Rear-Admiral A. E. K. Benham and Rear-Admiral F. M. Ramsey, with Captain S. C, Lemly Judge Advocate General, From the immense mass of material thus pro- vided have been gathered the following facts: Admiral Cervera, commanding the Spanish squadron from the Cape de Verdes, appeared off Martinique on May 11, the day when Sampson, with a heterogeneous squadron, was bombarding San Juan, Porto Rico, whither he had gone in search of the Spaniards. The news of the arrival of the Spanish was held up by the French for thirty- six hours. When Washington heard the news Sampson was ordered back to Key West. The Flying Squadron, (that in the Chesapeake) was ordered south, and scouts were sent to patrol certain channels through which Cer- vera would have to go if he were to make a run to Havana. All but the smallest of the blockaders off Cienfuegos were ordered away. The Department knew that Cervera would need coal, and that his machinery would need overhauling. There were only four Spanish ports in the West Indies where he could be accommodated— Havana, Cienfuegos and Santi- ago, Cuba, and San Juan, Porto Rico. No effort was made to keep unbroken watch off either Santiago or San 282 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY Juan until after it was rumored that Cervera was in San- tiago. From Martinique Cervera went to Cura9oa to coal. When he was about to leave Cura9oa on May 15 the fact was telegraphed promptly to Washington and then to Sampson, who was on his way to Key West from San Juan. Sampson placed his ships in the Bahama Channel, where they could intercept Cervera if a dash for Havana were made by way of the east end of Cuba, and after putting Captain R. D. Evans in charge, he continued on, under his orders from Washington, to Key West, where he arrived May 18. The Flying Squadron was already there. Samp- son chose to guard the north shore of Cuba, and sent Commodore Schley, commanding the Flying Squadron, to Cienfuegos. The order said "Proceed with despatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos." It had been learned, on au- thority supposed to be trustworthy, that Cervera had sup- plies for Havana, and it was believed that he would try to reach Cienfuegos, from whence a railroad led to Havana. A scout was now sent to San Juan, but none to Santiago. "Early on the morning of the 19th" (Schley's "Forty- five Years Under the Flag," p. 262) another order, sent to Schley from Sampson, said: "You should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay." In obedience to this order the " Flying Squadron, consist- ing of the Brooklyn!, Massachusetts, Texas and Scorpion, sailed from Key West between 7 and 8 a. m.. May 19, for Cienfuegos via the Yucatan Channel. ... At day- light on the 22d position was taken off Cienfuegos, near the entrance, and the port was thus blockaded." (Schley, pp. 263, 265.) The route had been covered in a little less than three days. The loiva. Captain R. D. Evans, fol- lowed, leaving Key West on the 20th, going by way of the blockading station off Havana (a longer route), and arrived after two days and two hours. ON TO SANTIAGO 283 A converted yacht, which Schley met on the way, sent word, saying "No news of the Spaniards." When forty miles from Cienfuegos "a number of guns were heard, apparently with the cadence of a salute." (Schley.) Schley, therefore, thought that Cervera might be arriving at Cienfuegos at that moment. When the blockade had been established off Cienfuegos smoke as from steamers was seen within the harbor. Officers on Schley's ships saw lights on shore that were supposed to be signals, on the nights of May 22 and 23. Schley saw them on the 23d. Captain Evans received, before leaving Key West, a memorandum regarding such signals, which were to be made by insurgents in Cuba who wished to communicate with the American ships. Schley testified ("Proceedings," pp. 1348-1349) that he did not receive this memorandum until it was brought by a de- spatch boat on the 23d. No effort was made to investigate the signal lights that night. On the 24th Captain McCalla, of the Marhlehead, arrived and asked if such signals had been seen, and said he had arranged for them. He was sent to investigate, and near 4 o'clock of the same day re- ported that the insurgents said Cervera was not in Cien- fuegos. By the despatch boat that arrived on the 23d Schley had received from Sampson a letter containing a copy of a letter from the Department, dated May 20, as follows: "The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago might very well be correct, so the Department strongly advises that you send word to Schley to proceed off Santiago with whole command." Sampson's letter (dated May 21) said : "Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him." Schley was satisfied, at 4 o'clock p. m. on the 24th, that 284 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. He reported this to the Department, and said he would "move eastward to-mor- row." At 7:45 o'clock that night (24th) he moved east- ward, having notified the ships to rendezvous at a point twenty-five miles south of Santiago. The collier Merrimac, carrying 4,500 tons of coal, went with Schley. Next day the sea was rough for the small craft. The Eagle (a con- verted yacht) took a solid sea over her bow and filled her forward compartment. Schley then slowed down the squadron to a speed that the Eagle could make. On the 26th, after the Eagle had been pumped out, she was ordered to Jamaica. At 5:30 p. m. that afternoon Schley stopped at a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago. At midnight on May 20 Captain W. C. Wise, command- ing the scout Yale, then at Cape Haytien, received a de- spatch from Washington, saying ("Proceedings," p. 212): "The Spanish squadron arrived on the 19th at Santiago. Proceed off that port. Get in touch with the enemy." It was also said that Schley had been ordered to Santiago "with all possible despatch." On the way to Santiago the Yale fell in with the scout St. Paul, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, and took her along. Neither of these ships saw anything of the Spaniards. The scout Harvard, Captain C. S. Colton, joined them. She saw nothing. The cruiser Minneapolis, Captain T. F. Jewell, arrived on the 23d. She saw nothing. The Spaniards were all far inside at this time. The Minne- apolis was sent on the 24th ("Proceedings," p. 350) to report to Schley off Cienfuegos, but not finding him there she returned to Santiago, arriving on the 26th. She saw nothing of the Flying Squadron while on the way. When Schley arrived at a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago his smoke was seen by the cruiser Minneapolis, and the scouts Yale and *S^. Paul, and all three joined him. ON TO SANTIAGO 285 Captain Sigsbee was called to the Brooklyn, where he reported' "I have seen absolutely nothmg of the Spanish fleet." He also reported that he had captured "very close to the Morro, off Santiago,'' the British ship Res- tormel, loaded with 2,400 tons of coal. The Restormel had left Cardiff after the war began, she had been sent to San Juan, Porto Rico, for orders, she had been sent thence to Curajoa, where she had arrived two days after Cervera sailed, and she had then been ordered to Santiago. The captains of all three of the scouting vessels have testi- fied that they all believed, when they joined Schley, that Cervera was in Santiago, as the Department's despatch had said. Captain Sigsbee put a Cuban pilot on the Brooklyn, and he told Schley that ships as large as Cervera's could not enter Santiago except under circumstances extraordinarily favorable. The log of the Brooklyn for the 26th shows that the weather was "cloudy and pleasant," and that the "breeze" varied from "light" to "moderate" and back to "gentle." Before leaving Cienfuegos, Schley had written the De- partment that he should not be able to remain off Santiago " on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so we will proceed to the vicinity of Nicholas Mole where the water is smooth." At 7:45 o'clock p. m., on the 26th, two hours and fifteen minutes after reaching a point twenty-two miles south of Santiago, Schley signalled to his squadron: "Destination Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed nine knots." The Merrimac's machinery was out of order, but the Yale took her in tow. The fleet steamed westward eighteen miles, stopped at 11:15 p. m. and then drifted until 3 : 40 in the afternoon of the next day. May 27. WTiile thus drifting, at 9:30 o'clock in the forenoon of May 27 286 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY the scout Harvard joined the squadron and dehvered to Schley the following despatch, which had been addressed to the Harvard at St. Nicholas Mole: "Proceed at once and inform Schley as follows: All Department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The Department looks to you to ascertain the fact, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action." To this Schley replied ("Proceedings," p. 1827): Received dispatch of May 26th delivered by Harvard off Santi- ago de Cuba. Merrimac's engine is disabled and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leav- ing Key West. Brooklyn is the only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of the squadron. Not pos- sible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer, owing to south- west winds. Harvard just reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti. Minne- apolis has only coal enough to reach Key West, and same of Yale, which will tow Merrimac. It is to be regretted that department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West, via Yucatan passage, for coal. . . . Will leave St. Paid here. Will require 9500 tons of coal at Key West. The Court of Inquiry, in its report, unanimously wrote as follows under the sub-title of "Facts": The coal supply of the flying squadron at noon on May 27 was sufficient to have enabled them to steam at 10 knots per hour — the Brooklyn for 11| days, the Iowa for TJ days, the Massachusetts for 10 days, the Texas for 6| days, the Marblehead for 3J days, the Vixen for llj days, or to have remained on blockade duty off San- tiago de Cuba — the Brooklyn for 26 days, the Iowa for 16 days, the Massachusetts for 20 days, the Texas for 10 days, the Marblehead ON TO SANTIAGO 287 for 5 days, the Vixen for 23 days, and then steam to Gonaives, Haiti, or to Cape Cruz, Cuba, to coal. At that date the Flying Squadron was accompanied by the collier Merrimac, containing 4,350 tons of coal. The amount of coal required to completely fill the coal bunkers of all the vessels of the Flying Squadron on this same date was 2,750 tons. The conditions of wind, sea and weather from noon on May 26 to June 1 were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off Santiago de Cuba. Having sent the despatch quoted above, Schley, at 3:45 p. M. on the 27th, went on toward Key West, twenty- three miles, and then stopped again and drifted. While drifting at this time the Texas went alongside the collier and remained filling her bunkers all night. While she was there, at 10:45 that night, Schley signalled her: "The more coal you take on in this smooth weather the less you will have to take on in Haiti." After drifting until 1 p. m. on the 28th, Schley returned toward Santiago, and at 6 o'clock that night took a posi- tion seven miles south of the entrance of the harbor. " Commodore Schley made no effort to ascertain whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago; he left said harbor entirely unguarded from 6 p. m. of May 26 to 5 p. M. of May 27, and guarded only by the scout St. Paul from 5 p. m. on May 27 until 6 p. m. May 28." ("Facts," unanimously found by Court of Inquiry.) Schley, in his "Forty-five Years under the Flag," says (p. 278): "The move to the westward at 9:50 p. m. on the night of May 26th was made with the purpose in view of blocking the passage to the westward to bar any effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan passage." On May 29 the Colon, of Cervera's squadron, was seen at anchor 1,200 yards within the entrance to the harbor. She had been there since the 24th, as her log shows. 288 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY Others of the ships were seen near her. The four cruisers and two of the destroyers were in the harbor, the third destroyer having gone to San Juan. "No attempt was made by Commodore Schley on May 29 or 30 to capture or destroy these Spanish vessels." ("Facts.") On May 31 Schley went to the Massachusetts. He said to the captain : " Higginson, I am going in with you and the Iowa and pot the Colon with your big guns. I want to fire deliberately. Admiral Sampson will be here to- morrow morning and I wish to destroy the Colon." At 11:10 o'clock he set signals saying: "The Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa will go in after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at the Cristobal Colon with 8, 12, and 13-inch guns. Speed about ten knots." At 1 : 30 the three ships went to a range of something more than 7,000 yards (four land miles at least was the range), headed eastward across the harbor and fired at the Colon during the interval of from two to four minutes that she was visible from each ship. The shots fell short. The Colon and a battery on the hill replied. The Colon's shots fell short. One shot from the battery on the hill passed over the Massachusetts. In turning to cross back the ships used "a port helm" — they went out to sea still further. Captain Higginson suggested that the turn be made inshore — "with a starboard helm" — in order to reduce the range, but Schley " thought it would be better to go around with a port helm." ("Proceedings," p. 39.) Captain Higginson did not think the land batteries amount- ed to much. Before the Court of Inquiry Schley testi- fied ("Proceedings," p. 1,375) that he thought the guns were of 6 or 8-inch calibre." He also said: "Their shot did go beyond us. That being developed, I determined, of course, that there was no necessity to have risked — it would have been military folly to have risked — any of the battleships." ON TO SANTIAGO 289 In his report to the Department regarding this affair he said the " reconnoissance was intended principally to injure and destroy Colon." (See "Proceedings," p. 1,505, "I will stand by that.") In connection with these statements of fact it seems worth while to note here that the scout St. Louis (the big Atlantic liner of that name), Captain C. F. Goodrich, and the tug Wompatuck, Lieutenant C. W. Jungen, were off Santiago early in the morning of May 18, and steamed in until "within 1.3 miles of the castle." They were then about 2,600 yards from the hill forts. The St. Louis was armed with 6-pounders; the Wompatux;k had one 3-pounder. Using these guns these two unarmored ves- sels, with machinery high out of the water, silenced the batteries on the hills and then picked up and cut a cable. The Wompatujck was still closer in at one time. (See Append. Rep. Bu. Nav., p. 209.) CHAPTER XXIX BATTLE OF SANTIAGO After receiving Schley's telegram of May 27, saying he should go on to Key West in spite of orders, the De- partment ordered Sampson to Santiago, where he arrived on June 1. Schley had blockaded the port by cruising slowly to and fro "at an average distance of six or seven miles" ("Facts," in "Proceedings," p. 1,828), with two pickets two miles nearer shore at night. After Sampson arrived the fleet was divided into two squadrons, of which one, called the West Squadron, was under Commodore Schley, while the other, the East, was directly under Admiral Sampson, who also, of course, had supreme com- mand of both. The squadrons were arranged in a curve drawn around the harbor mouth with a radius that did not exceed six miles. At night the whole fleet closed in to a distance of two miles from the entrance. Then two battleships steamed in one mile and stopped there, after which one of them kept the entrance and the channel far beyond well illuminated with her search-lights, while the other kept her guns trained up the channel and the gunners stood with their fingers on the triggers, so to speak, ready to fire on any ship that might appear. Three auxiliaries were then sent in and placed in line across the harbor mouth at a distance of half a mile from land, while three steam launches were kept patrolling to and fro within a quarter of a mile of the beach. "The whole habit of mind of our Commander-in-chief was to be in close touch with the enemy," wrote Captain Chadwick, of the New York. 290 BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 291 At 3 o'clock on the morning of June 3 the coUier Merri- mac was sunk in the mouth of the harbor by Naval-Con- structor R. P. Hobson, in an effort to close the channel— a brave deed, but not successful. On June 10 the harbor of Guantanamo, forty miles east of Santiago, was occupied as a coaling and repair station for the fleet. The marines, under Colonel R. W. Huntington, had a warm time with the Spanish soldiers, but of course they held on. There was a lot of brave work done along shore during the month of June, but no description of it can be given here because it did not directly influence the result of the campaign. On June 14 an army of 16,000 men sailed from Tampa, Fla., and on the 22d they began to land at Daiquira, to the eastward of Santiago. As this army (it was under General Shafter) was sure to besiege Santiago, and thus, as Cap- tain-General Blanco pointed out at the time, bring starva- tion upon Cervera's squadron as well as upon the city, the Spanish authorities were- in a quandary as to what should be done with the ships. The ships certainly were not in an efficient state for battle, but to remain was to face destruction in any event, and on July 2 Cervera received definite orders to leave within twelve hours. At sunrise the next morning the American squadron lay in a semicircle off the port at a distance of from two to four miles. The armored line included the Indiana, the New York, the Oregon, the Iowa, the Texas and the Brook- lyn, in the order named, beginning at the east side of the harbor. The auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen lay closer in, the Gloucester to the east and the Vixen to the west side of the harbor entrance. It was a beautiful morning, but much like other morn- ings that had passed. The lookout on the flagship had seen nothing to indicate a change of purpose among the enemy in the harbor. In the meantime the admiral had made an engagement to visit the headquarters of the army 292 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY on that day, and at 8:50 o'clock the New York left the squadron and steamed east under three boilers of steam. Throughout the fleet the Sunday inspection was taken in hand at 9:30. While the men were lining up for this purpose a lookout on the Texas stood with his hand on signal halliards, to which were set signals that would announce the approach of the enemy, and on the Oregon and the Iowa sailors stood with fingers on the triggers of 6-pounders, ready to an- nounce the enemy's approach by firing a shot. It was in that fashion that watch was kept, and the keen lookouts were rewarded. At 9:31 the sharp bow of the Spanish flagship was seen coming from beliind Smith Cay, and at the first glance the lookouts began to bawl: "The fleet's coming out!" The signals were hoisted on the Texas and the guns were fired on the Oregon and the Iowa. With that the gongs on all the ships called all hands to quarters, and breaking ranks the men ran shout- ing for joy to gun-breech and stoke-hole. At the same instant the engineers on watch opened wide the throttles, and the American squadron began to close in for battle at close quarters, according to the plan that had been given to each captain in the squadron by Admiral Sampson — an order that said : " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his ships or force them to run ashore in the chan- nel." The fleet was too far out to intercept the Spaniards in the channel. As the Spaniards reached the mouth of the channel they turned westerly, with the Teresa in the lead. At this time, and before she had cleared the shoal, found just to the west of the mouth of the channel, she was head- ing directly at the Brooklyn, and the Brooklyn was head- ing in toward her. The Teresa opened fire with her for- ward turret gun at the Brooklyn and her broadside at the BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 293 other American ships, aiming especially at the Indiana. All the American ships were closing in with growing speed and all returned the fire with enthusiasm. The Spanish shot all flew wild at this time, but almost from the first round the Americans saw that they were striking home. But because they were using the old brown powder, a cloud of smoke soon arose around them, which made aiming difficult and navigation dangerous. As the Brooklyn steamed in Commodore Schley signalled " close in " and about the same time told his captain (Cook) to keep out of torpedo range of the Spaniards, Torpedo range at that time was about 1,000 yards. Before coming out the captain of the Teresa had de- termined to ram the Brooklyn, but as soon as he had cleared the shoal at the mouth of the channel he changed his mind and turned still further to the west in a de- termined effort to get away from the American fleet. This left the Vizcaya, the next Spanish ship in the line, heading directly at the Brooklyn. Schley had already thought that the Teresa would try to ram the Brooklyn, and had said to Cook, "Cook, look out; they are going to ram you." And now that the Vizcaya was seen clos- ing in on the Teresa's former course, both Schley and Cook thought of torpedoes, and Cook, under the general order he had received from Schley on that subject, ordered the Brooklyn's helm put hard aport and she turned away from the enemy, out to sea, and then to the west in a course parallel with that taken by the flying Spaniards. The Brooklyn was flying the signal "Follow the flag," as she turned away from the enemy. The Brooklyn made no effort to use either her torpedoes or her ram. "When the Brooklyn's helm was put hard aport, the Teresa was 1,400 yards to the eastward of north of the Brooklijn, the Vizcaya was to the eastward of the Teresa and the Colon to the eastward of the Vizcaya. 294 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY When the Brooklyn completed the turn and was heading to the westward the Vizcaya and the Colon were about 2,400 yards to the northward and westward of the Brooklyn. ("Facts," found by the Court, p. 1,829.) In the meantime the other ships of the fleet had been closing in and firing as rapidly as possible. Chief-Engineer Milligan of the Oregon had kept up steam so well that she was able to cross astern of the Iowa and plough up between the Iowa and the Texas in chase of the Spaniards as they fled to the westward. Both the Iowa and Texas were obscured by the smoke for a time, but as the Oregon drew in between them the Texas suddenly came into view so close aboard to port that a collision seemed impending. Captain Clark instantly turned to the starboard only to find himself almost on top of the Iowa. When the Brooklyn turned away from the Spaniards she ran in so close on the Texas ("so near that it took away our breath," wrote Captain Philip) that Captain Philip felt obliged to stop and then back his engines to keep out of the way. Captain Evans estimated that the Brooklyn crossed the bow of the Texas at a distance of 100 yards, while Lieutenant Heilner of the Texas esti- mated the distance at 150 yards. Schley explained that to have turned with a starboard helm instead of the port "would have carried us into a dangerous proximity to the torpedo attack, the broadside torpedo attack, of the enemy's vessels." ("Proceedings," p. 1,398.) In his autobiography he says that turning away from the enemy "was the proper military move . . . and saved the day beyond a doubt." When the Brooklyn was out of the way the three ships, that had been apparently so near in collision on account of her turn, were able to keep on closing in. As they drew near their fire became more deadly, and within fifteen minutes the Teresa was seen "wabbling like a BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 295 wounded bird." Smoke was pouring from ports and hatches. She was on fire as well as in danger of jinking and, turning from her course, she ran ashore about six miles west of the harbor. Seeing the Teresa was done for, the fleet concentrated their fire on the Oquendo, the last of the squadron, because she was nearest, and she, too, soon turned as the Teresa had done, leaving the Vizcaya and the Colon to continue the wild flight. The Vizcaya was already badly wounded, however, and the pounding of the Brooklyn, the Texas and the Oregon, which were well to westward of the other American ships, drove her to the rocks at Asseraderos, fifteen or sixteen miles from the harbor. The Colon, by steaming closer to the shore, had escaped the fire and was now doing everything possible to get away. The fighting was ended; it was now a case of speed alone. In the meantime the two destroyers, the Pluton and the Furor, had followed out astern of the Spanish cruisers. They found Wainwright, of the converted yacht Gloucester, waiting for them. Wainwright had cleared his little ship for action with the others and, steaming in, he had fired at the big Spaniards with his 6-pounder and 3-pounder battery. Then he thought of the destroyers, and slowing down, he headed in, while Engineer G. W. McElroy bottled up steam. Wainwright was from the Maine, and his day had come. The Spanish destroyers carried two 14-pounders, two 6-pounders and two 1 -pounders each, and there were two of them, but as soon as they appeared Wainwright drove the Gloucester into the mouth of the harbor under the fire of the land batteries as well as of the enemy's guns afloat to meet them "at short range." The Pluton was coming at full speed, but under Wain- wright's fire she first slowed down and then sought safety for her crew by a flight to the rocks alongshore; for she was sinking rapidly. The Furor turned as if with better 296 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY pluck to run at the Gloucester, but it was soon seen that she was turning merely because she was no longer under con- trol — she was in the death flurry — and when she had com- pleted one circle she began to go down stern first. Hasten- ing to the rescue Wainwright secured a dozen of her crew, and then, after an explosion somewhere in the bow, she went down speedily. When in doubt about the conduct of an American naval officer in battle let the reader ask what would John Paul Jones, or Nicholas Biddle, or William B. Gushing, or G. U. Morris, or David Glasgow Farragut, or Richard Wainwright have done under the circumstances. Their conduct needed no explanation — there is none to dispute that they have set the pace for all American naval offi- cers. Try all others by their standard. As the Colon fled the Brooklyn and the Oregon held on in chase with the slower Texas following astern of them. Milligan went into the Oregon's stoke-hole, where the men who shovelled coal were gasping for breath but keeping the fires blazing until a speed of perhaps eighteen knots was reached. It was then that the impatient younger officers on deck asked Captain Clark to let them try a shot. Clark consented, and Milligan, black with coal, came up on deck to thank the captain and say that his men were fainting below, but if they could hear a shot, now and then, they could live through and keep her going. The first shot fell short, but another passed over and fell ahead of the Colon. With that shot hope fled from the Spanish ship, and hauling down her flag she turned ashore, grounding at the mouth of the Tarquino River, forty-three miles from Santiago. The American squadron lost one man killed and one wounded. Both were on the Brooklyn. She was for twenty minutes under the fire of perhaps all the four Spanish ships, and yet lost no more. The Spanish squad- BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 297 ron lost at least 350 killed and 160 wounded, while seventy officers and 1,600 men were taken prisoners. Superior speed carried our ships within range and superior gunnery, not superior armor, protected our men and destroyed the enemy. As Farragut said, "The best protection against the enemy's fire is a well-directed fire from our own guns." Neither of the Spanish ships was saved, though at least two of them might have been by prompt effort, but the Spanish naval power was wiped out. The Spanish au- thorities did, indeed, start a small squadron eastward as a threat to Dewey at Manila, but it was not an effective squadron, and a threat of a Yankee squadron on the Span- ish coast stopped it. The destruction of Cervera's squad- ron decided the war. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out, that when the hulls of the wrecked Spanish ships had been examined it was found that out of more than 8,000 shots fired at them, only 123 struck home. To reach 123 hits the holes made by 6-pounders in the smokestacks were counted. It was to that degree of excellence that we trained our gunners before the War with Spain ! The New York, at the time the Spaniards appeared, was well on her way toward Siboney. On hearing the firing she was turned back at full speed, and she made such good headway that if by accident the Brooklyn and the Oregon had broken down she would have overhauled the Colon eventually. The Texas was also gaining on the Colon. The destruction of the Colon did not depend on any one ship of the fleet. At the time the Gloucester sank the destroyers, and even when the fleet opened fire, the New Ywk was nearer the Indiana than the Brooklyn was. ("Proceedings," p. 1,841.) It was claimed for Adnnral Sampson that because of the position of the New York during the heavy firing "the absolute command and the 298 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY fuH responsibility" were his — that a failure to destroy the fleet would have been charged to him. The Court of Claims, when the question of prize money came before it, decided that Sampson was in command at the battle. To complete the record the following is the Opinion of the Court of Inquiry : Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost despatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade of that port. He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by commimicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8.15 a.m. of that date. He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all despatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron. He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron. He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Depart- ment's order of May 25. He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago Harbor on May 29 and 30. He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31. By commencing the engagement on July 3 with the port battery and turning the Brooklyn around with port helm. Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the Texas and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision. Admiral Schley did injustice to Commander A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed be- tween them. Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise. His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading. BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 299 His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously. George Dewey, Admiral U. S. N., President, Sam. C. Lemly, Judge Advocate-General, Judge Advocate. After signing the above Admiral Dewey wrote the fol- lowing personal opinion: In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to Cienf uegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible de- spatch. Commodore Schley having in view the importance of ar- riving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers. The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective. Commodore Schley, in permitting the Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish squadron from her when she came out. The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about 22 miles south of Santiago was made with as much despatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit. The blockade of Santiago was effective. Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships. George Dewey, Admiral U.S.N. , President, Sam. C. Lemly, Judge Advocate-General, Judge Advocate. It is important to note that the question of who was senior officer at the battle of Santiago was not at any time before the Court of Inquiry. Testimony looking to a consideration of that question was rigorously excluded. Moreover, when counsel for Admiral Sampson appealed for protection for their client, or for permission to appear and defend his rights, the Court, with Admiral Dewey con- senting, refused to let them appear, and Dewey wrote to them saying that "Admiral Sampson is not an interested 300 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY party." ("Proceedings," p. 1,843.) When a letter was sent by the writer to Admiral Dewey asking why he had thus expressed an opinion against the claims of a man whom he had refused to hear, no answer was received. CHAPTER XXX TEN YEARS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT The battle of Santiago was decisive. Spain's navy as a weapon of offence was annihilated. That she had some ships left at home for coast defence, and that her home ports were on the far side of the broad Atlantic from her enemy was a matter of no importance in con- nection with the result of the war. Her forces in Cuba were hemmed in and were compelled to surrender. The navy had part in the occupation of Porto Rico and the Philippines, but of the work done there nothing need be said here. As a result of the war with Spain we found ourselves in possession of the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico. It has been determined that we shall retain the govern- ment of these islands until the people thereof are fully capable of governing themselves, and the chances are that as fast as they reach that state of enlightenment they will rejoice that they live under the flag that first gave them opportunity for development. These islands we must protect. For many years we have had the Monroe Doctrine to uphold. No foreign nation shall obtain con- trol of another foot of soil on either of the Americas. And in defence of this doctrine we are as likely to be obliged to send a squadron to protect Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil as to any other part of the continent. We are build- ing the Panama Canal and we shall have to defend that as well as the new-made republic of Panama. We have de- termined that our merchants shall not be shut out of such 301 302 A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY markets a.s China ami otln i similar powers afford hv unfair **spluTi\s of inihuMuv." In view of (ho ohhi:;n(ii>ns (hat wo havo assuniotl as a worUl Powc 1- (ho oUl-(inio talk about the advantjiges of our si(ua(ion \\'\{\\ an oooan (hviihnix us from (ho otlior V )yL O* ... iOvr C * ' ,0 ^*-^/>^^ ■' ^^ A 'O^ * • « 0- V .sJJoL'*^ c:^ 1^ .1 N. MANCHESTER INDIANA 46962 •^ LIB "^ 4^ o««.<;> (P *>^'- ^ ^^ ' *^li' % 4* »•••/!. CV -£L