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THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 BY 
 
 COLONEL ROBERT R. McCORMICK 
 
 M 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 HARCOURT, BRACE AND HOWE 
 
 1920 
 

 Copyright, 1920, by 
 Robert R. McCormick 
 
 OCT 27 \i2d 
 ©CI,A601102 
 
TO OUR DEAD 
 
FOEEWORD 
 
 In the early days of my service, while on duty 
 with the General Staff of the A. E. F., I expected 
 to publish my observations upon the development 
 and conduct of that army ; but when the war came 
 to a sudden and unexpected end, after a campaign 
 in which I had no part, I abandoned the idea. 
 
 Now, however, more than a year has passed 
 since the armistice. The great army has gone 
 back into civil life. The Regular Army is rap- 
 idly returning to its bureaucracy. Congress ap- 
 pears farther from adopting a military policy 
 than at any period in the last decade. The Na- 
 tional Guard Association wants to smash the 
 Regular Army; and the pacifists, as though en- 
 couraged by the forest of white crosses they have 
 caused to be planted in Europe, work for that day 
 when they may see even more American dead than 
 there now are in France, even as the harvest ex- 
 ceeds the sowing. 
 
vi FOREWORD 
 
 I have, therefore, again changed my mind, and 
 have recorded here my observations and conclu- 
 sions as a modest contribution to popular com- 
 prehension of our effort, its difficulties, its limi- 
 tations and its achievements, so that another gen- 
 eration as untrained, unorganized and unarmed 
 as we were may not have to face an enemy under 
 the fearful handicaps we suffered. 
 
 Robert R. McCoemick. 
 
 November 1919. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Foreword v 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I The Background of the Army ... 1 
 
 II The Inspired Ambassador 29 
 
 III Early Days of the A. E. F 39 
 
 IV The Great Division 58 
 
 V Germany's Last Offensive 91 
 
 VI A Few Technical Points 112 
 
 VII The Pursuit from the Marne . . . 145 
 
 VIII The American Offensives 155 
 
 IX Some Elements of National Defense . 195 
 
 X New Weapons and Their Use . . . 207 
 
 XI The General Staff 231 
 
 XII The Crime of Silence 244 
 
 XIII The Only Solution 253 
 
THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE BACKGKOUND OF THE ARMY 
 
 In January of 1917 Germany decided to risk 
 war with us because she thought that we were 
 more formidable to her success as a neutral than 
 we would be as an enemy. 
 
 As a neutral we kept her from making the 
 maximum use of her submarines ; as an enemy we 
 could only try to. If her submarines were suc- 
 cessful, she had nothing to fear from our mil- 
 itary power; if unsuccessful, as after months of 
 effort on her part and anxiety on ours they turned 
 out to be, she still felt no apprehension of dan- 
 ger from our land forces. 
 
 She had watched the efforts made in America 
 for a more powerful army; she had seen Presi- 
 dent Wilson tentatively adopt the idea and had 
 seen him abandon it ; she had observed a secretary 
 
 of war (Garrison) who was committed to it jetti- 
 
 1 
 
^ THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 soned and replaced by a pacifist (Baker) who car- 
 ried Ohio for Mr. Wilson's reelection in 1916, on 
 the watchword ^*He kept ns out of war!*' 
 
 She had just witnessed a demonstration of our 
 military impotence in the mobilization of all our 
 armed forces on the Rio Grande to resist the pro- 
 jected Mexican invasion. 
 
 Any German who fought against us in 1918 
 and who reads the German secret service reports 
 on our 1916 farce must believe that we had been 
 deliberately fooling the observers. 
 
 Germany also knew that the Military Affairs 
 Committee of the House of Representatives was 
 controlled by a clique that would — as it did — ^put 
 every obstacle in the way of military improve- 
 ment. She knew that never in our history had we 
 organized an army fit to take the field in less than 
 two years. She knew, and in this particular she 
 was entirely right, that we did not have and 
 could not manufacture arms for an army of de- 
 cisive size during the months she expected to 
 employ in winning the war on land. 
 
 Germany knew, likewise, that the only organ- 
 ized forces in America, the Regular Army and the 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 3 
 
 National Guard, were antagonistic. The ancient 
 quarrel between them and the new elements of 
 friction which would arise in the development of 
 the new mobilization could be expected to militate 
 against our efforts in the field. 
 
 Since this domestic military antagonism has 
 continued throughout the war and is now one of 
 the chief obstacles to a safe military policy, it is 
 desirable to outline its history, which began long 
 before that of the nation, in an effort to find a 
 solution that will bring harmony and efficiency 
 into our army councils. 
 
 Antagonism on the part of the people toward a 
 regular army comes to us from English history. 
 After Cromwell overthrew King Charles I. and 
 Parliament, he ruled for a quarter of a century, 
 a military despot crushing all opposition with the 
 sword. Upon the Restoration, Parliament re- 
 sisted all the efforts of Charles II. to establish a 
 new regular army; this resistance was only partly 
 successful. 
 
 James II. increased the military forces of his 
 brother; used them to suppress the insurrection 
 under Monmouth, and followed the military vie- 
 
4 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 tory at Sedgemoor with a bloody persecution that 
 is still remembered with horror. 
 
 To overthrow James II., William III. had to 
 bring with him from Holland a mercenary force 
 of Dutch and Swedes, whose unpopularity is pre- 
 served to us by the meaning attached to the word 
 '^blackguard'' — the name (Black Guard) of one 
 of his household regiments. 
 
 The vicissitudes of the mother country were not 
 felt acutely in the colonies, but the refugees of all 
 parties that crossed to America brought with 
 them their political opinions and their grievances, 
 and among these we find a fixed hostility towards 
 *'the regulars." 
 
 Frontier life in the new country made it neces- 
 sary for men to acquire skill in arms and reintro- 
 duced the condition of armed freeman, of which 
 increasing civilization had deprived the old coun- 
 try. To defend themselves against the Indians, 
 the colonials had to organize military forces. 
 
 In the French and Indian wars, British regular 
 troops were sent to America and colonial militia 
 were enrolled by the several colonies, particularly 
 in New England. The regulars and colonials 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY B 
 
 were never congenial allies; ill feeling existed 
 on both sides. The resentment of the colo- 
 nials was accentuated by a regulation which 
 made the most junior officer of the King's army- 
 senior to every officer in the colonial forces. It 
 was because of this regulation that Colonel 
 George Washington retired from active military 
 duty until he returned to fight against his former 
 associates. 
 
 One may properly speculate upon how far this 
 regulation was responsible for the Revolution. 
 Merchants were vexed at taxation, lawyers were 
 indignant at the continuous violation of natural 
 rights, legislators resented unjustified and arro- 
 gant interference with their powers. But what 
 could all these have done if the colonial soldiers 
 had not been willing to fight their recent com- 
 rades? 
 
 It is interesting to note that the shadow of this 
 regulation, strangely incorporated into our serv- 
 ice, is today one of the causes of hostility be- 
 tween officers of the American regular army and 
 officers of the other corps. 
 
 The American Revolutionary war was a conflict 
 
6 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 between the regular army of England and the 
 colonial militia of the French and Indian wars, 
 although the British were reinforced by German 
 mercenaries, and the Americans by French regu- 
 lars and by German, Polish and French officers, 
 who entered the American service as soldiers of 
 fortune. 
 
 Necessities of space prevent any extended dis- 
 cussion of this war, but two important features 
 challenge our attention : First, the regular troops 
 generally outfought the militia; and, second, the 
 militia generals, risen in a field of free competi- 
 tion, generally outmaneuvered the generals who 
 came into authority by the routine of the British 
 regular army. 
 
 Also, it is a significant coincidence of this war 
 that the American admiral, the greatest naval 
 man America ever produced, came into the navy 
 from the merchant service. 
 
 After the formation of our nation, President 
 Washington endeavored to formulate a national 
 military policy. He had observed the breakdown 
 of the British regulars and he had seen the fal- 
 lacy of the untrained militia. 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY T 
 
 Recognizing that officers must be chosen for 
 ability and activity rather than for length of 
 service, he had mortally offended his old friend, 
 General Knox, at the time of the expected war 
 with France, by not appointing him one of the 
 lieutenant generals because of advanced age. 
 Had Washington installed a permanent military 
 policy for the United States we should have 
 avoided many of our subsequent defeats and 
 heavy losses of life. 
 
 Unfortunately, after Washington the leader- 
 ship of the nation was taken by a word man 
 (Thomas Jefferson) who never had entered a 
 battle and never intended to, and who, in playing 
 fast and loose with our military system, exercised 
 the same freedom that characterizes all slackers 
 and pacifists. He made of the army a constab- 
 ulary to garrison objectionable army posts, and he 
 fastened upon it a character which has limited its 
 efficiency to the present day. 
 
 In 1812 there was no regular force adequate to 
 conduct a war. There was no such militia as cap- 
 tured Louisburg and Havana and defended 
 Bunker Hill. As a consequence, Detroit, Buf- 
 
8 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 falo and Washington were captured and burned, 
 while New Orleans was saved to the nation only 
 through the genius of Andrew Jackson. 
 
 The battle of New Orleans was one of those 
 rare fights where undisciplined troops have van- 
 quished regulars. The reason for this is that they 
 were led by a man whose talents approached 
 genius, while the British regular troops were com- 
 manded by a man who, notwithstanding twenty 
 years' campaigning under England's greatest 
 living general, could not learn the principles of 
 war. A wrong lesson is likely to be learned from 
 this battle — namely, that raw troops are equal to 
 veterans. The correct lesson is that a general 
 promoted according to the routine of a regular 
 army threw away the advantage he held in com- 
 manding a trained army. 
 
 Thirty-four years after the battle of New Or- 
 leans the United States fought a war with Mexico 
 which had a character all its own among American 
 wars, in that it was a war brought on by our Gov- 
 ernment, and not a war in which the people as a 
 whole were vitally interested. 
 
 By order of President James K. Polk, the regu- 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARIMY 9 
 
 lar army was concentrated on the Mexican fron- 
 tier in January of 1846. It moved upon Mexico in 
 September, forced Mexico into war, attacked and 
 invariably defeated the Mexican armies. It was 
 a war of conquest, like the European wars of the 
 previous century, and, like them, was conducted, 
 for the greater part, by a professional army. As 
 a military and political venture it was completely 
 successful. 
 
 But it entailed political consequences not at all 
 to the fancy of its creators. One of the success- 
 ful generals, Zachary Taylor, was elected Presi- 
 dent of the United States, and the other, Winfield 
 Scott, became a constant candidate, endeavoring 
 to attract popular support by a display of mili- 
 tary pomp. Whatever popularity might have ac- 
 crued to the regular army from its successful con- 
 duct of the war, it was dissipated by the attempts 
 of its most successful leader to capitalize in the 
 political arena its achievements on the field of 
 battle. 
 
 Largely in consequence of this the army was 
 again reduced to the status of a constabulary and 
 posted along the Indian frontier west of Kansas 
 
10 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 and in the territory newly acquired from Mexico. 
 Its officers had the benefit of an able primary edu- 
 cation at West Point academy, but after gradua- 
 tion were left to shift for themselves for any fur- 
 ther learning. 
 
 Many volumes of military history have been 
 written about our Civil war; but little emphasis 
 has been laid upon the extraordinary political 
 conditions at the time the war began. Early his- 
 torians assumed that their readers were fully in- 
 formed of these facts. Military critics have 
 merely ignored them. No military lessons can be 
 drawn, however, without recognizing the compel- 
 ling political considerations. 
 
 During the years immediately preceding seces- 
 sion, the national government of the United 
 States was in the hands of the future secession- 
 ists. The leader of rebellion in 1861, Jefferson 
 Davis, was in 1857 the Secretary of War of the 
 United States. The President of the United 
 States in 1861, Abraham Lincoln, belonged to a 
 party which was in the minority in 1860. 
 
 The military revolution attempted by the South 
 in April, 1861, was preceded by a political revo- 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 11 
 
 Intion in 1860. War was declared, in effect, by 
 the southern states by their resolutions of seces- 
 sion before Lincoln became president and while 
 the administration was unwilling to oppose or in- 
 terfere with armed rebellion. 
 
 In its inception the war for the preservation 
 of the Union was, therefore, exactly opposite in 
 character to the war for conquest in the southwest 
 in 1846. 
 
 In the earlier combat the Government of the 
 nation used its existing military force to over- 
 come a weak neighbor. In the present case, the 
 Government of the nation had to use such ele- 
 ments of the nation as would support it to over- 
 come the rebellious sections. 
 
 The new administration had no knowledge of 
 military affairs; it did not know the officers of 
 the army, and, in the early days, when many distin- 
 guished officers were violating their oaths of loy- 
 alty, it did not even know which ones it could 
 trust. 
 
 Where the reg-ular army moved into Mexico in 
 1846 in mere obedience to orders, without any con- 
 viction of right and with no stronger incentive 
 
12 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 than professional ambition, the Union army of 
 1861 was composed entirely of men inspired by 
 the most lofty convictions, but with little, if any, 
 feeling of a legal obligation to fight. 
 
 If the army of 1846 may be compared to the 
 armies of Richelieu and Louis XIV., the army of 
 1861 was like the original army of Cromwell, and, 
 like the Cromwellian army, its officers were chosen 
 for the force of their moral leadership and not 
 from any conception of the military skill needed 
 to lead men into battle. 
 
 The Union troops were raised by states, and 
 commissions up to the rank of colonel were is- 
 sued by governors. Generals at the beginning 
 were appointed largely upon the recommendation 
 of loyal congressmen. 
 
 Armies were thrown into action within a few 
 weeks of the original assembly of the men and, 
 naturally, disasters resulted. 
 
 The antagonism which had characterized the 
 cooperation between the British regulars and the 
 colonials reappeared between the American regu- 
 lars and the American volunteers. There was a 
 great deal of fault on both sides. Without train- 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY IS 
 
 ing or experience, no civilian, howsoever able, is 
 ready to perform the duties of a high ranking 
 officer. Inevitably, therefore, civilians appointed 
 to high rank at the beginning of the war failed in 
 the field. On the other hand, many civilians de- 
 veloped into excellent generals. 
 
 Mere training and experience, however, will 
 not fit a dull man for high command; and many 
 regular officers, who were given their appoint- 
 ments for no better reason than that they had 
 received preliminary education at West Point, 
 failed as dismally as the amateurs. 
 
 If it justly may be charged against the volun- 
 teers that they caused generals to be made who 
 were without the requisite training, it also may 
 be charged against the regulars that they caused 
 generals to be retained after they had proven 
 their unfitness. 
 
 The most glaring example of this sort was that 
 of General Sherman, who removed the brilliant 
 and capable Logan and replaced him with the de- 
 feated and discredited Howard. This mistake of 
 Sherman ^s was fully recognized by Grant, but 
 the injury had been done. 
 
14 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Logan, as vindictive as he was brilliant, for 
 years afterwards was the leader in the Senate of 
 the '' volunteer*' faction against the ** regulars'' 
 and contributed much to perpetuate the feud be- 
 tween the services. 
 
 Stripped of hostility and prejudice, it is not 
 difficult to assign the regular army to its proper 
 place in the preservation of the Union, to point 
 out its limitations, and to show where the volun- 
 teer system did help decisively in the victory. 
 
 The regular army was the national reservoir 
 of military knowledge. All volunteers had to go 
 to it to learn the elements of military conduct. 
 The regular army furnished an indispensable 
 framework around which the conquering armies 
 were built. It furnished most of the successful 
 officers of high rank, and the greatest soldiers 
 produced by the war had, at some period of their 
 lives, served in it. 
 
 It did not, however, as an organization per 5e, 
 produce the victorious commander nor his prin- 
 cipal lieutenants. 
 
 It is customary to look upon General Ulysses 
 S. Grant as an officer of the regular army. The 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 15 
 
 regular army claims him from the volunteers. 
 Yet he entered the war in spite of the regular 
 army; and the regular army today would fight 
 bitterly against permitting another officer to rise 
 to power as he rose. 
 
 Grant was graduated from the West Point 
 Military Academy and served for several years 
 before the Mexican campaign as an officer of in- 
 fantry. In that campaign he displayed excep- 
 tional brilliancy, a brilliancy which ought to have 
 received instant recognition but did not. It is 
 a congenital fault of our regular army to fail to 
 recognize exceptional conduct. Shortly after the 
 Mexican war he resigned from the army. Rumor 
 says that intemperance was the cause. There is 
 no evidence to indicate that the regular army 
 made any effort to save for itself the hero of San 
 Cosme church and the future savior of the Union. 
 
 With the outbreak of the Civil war Grant 
 sought employment from General George B. Mc- 
 Clellan, commander-in-chief of the Union forces, 
 and a regular army man. He got no answers to 
 his letters, nor did he obtain so much as an inter- 
 view. 
 
16 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 He went to work in the office of the Adjutant 
 General of the state of Illinois, and was appointed 
 colonel of an Illinois regiment by Governor 
 Yates of Illinois. He was afterwards ap- 
 pointed brigadier general by President Lincoln 
 at the unanimous request of the Illinois congress- 
 men. Thus, the volunteer service supplied that 
 which the regular service denied — opportunity to 
 genius. 
 
 Placed by accident in a locality which did not 
 interest those in authority, he marched from vic- 
 tory to victory while the regular army generals 
 were adding defeat to defeat. After each victory 
 his command was taken away from him, and he 
 was left unemployed until the failure of his suc- 
 cessor compelled the reemployment of the genius. 
 
 Eventually, he brought to the Union arms the 
 most complete triumph in the history of war ; and 
 today military writers who rave over the 
 marches, even the failures, of lesser men are busy 
 trying to explain away the victories of a leader 
 whose rise was so unorthodox. 
 
 If there was a Grant, a Napoleon, or a Marl- 
 borough in the recent world war, he was not 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 17 
 
 allowed to rise. The regular army system of sup- 
 pressing brilliant men who might surpass all 
 their seniors was sufficiently in vogue in all the 
 belligerent countries from 1914 to 1918. 
 
 The close of the Civil war left us with a splen- 
 did organization, and with a realization of the 
 necessity of allowing native ability free play, as 
 well as of the value of military training. 
 
 No adequate military legislation resulted, how- 
 ever, and the regular army went back to chasing 
 Indians. 
 
 The nation in 1865 felt supremely strong in the 
 possession of a million trained soldiers, thousands 
 of trained officers, and generals of the highest 
 order. This feeling lasted long after the soldiers 
 had passed military age. A few of the volunteer 
 regiments maintained their organization, but with 
 a character in which the social and political fea- 
 tures gained ground at the expense of the mili- 
 tary. 
 
 After the Civil war military drill was taught in 
 schools and colleges ; but this decreased every year 
 and passed out of existence about the time of the 
 outbreak of the war with Spain. 
 
18 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The Spamsh war again bears a character en- 
 tirely different from all our other wars. It was 
 a spontaneous crusade to end Spanish misrule in 
 Cuba and was brought about by the insistence of 
 public opinion. 
 
 Neither the administration of President Cleve- 
 land, which left office in the Spring of 1897, nor 
 that of President McKinley, which succeeded, de- 
 sired or anticipated such a conflict. The regular 
 army was small, unorganized, ill-equipped, and 
 commanded by men whom advanced age had de- 
 prived of their once not insignificant military 
 powers. 
 
 Enthusiasm for the war with Spain was intense. 
 Volunteers offered themselves much faster than 
 the military authorities could prepare to accept 
 them, and a form of organization was adopted 
 similar to that of the Union army in the Civil war. 
 President McKinley took advantage of the oppor- 
 tunity to conciliate the southern states by ap- 
 pointing to high command old men who in their 
 youth had been prominent in the armies of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 Events, however, took all initiative out of the 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 19 
 
 hands of the Government. Admiral Sampson 
 blockaded the fleet of Admiral Cervera in the 
 harbor of Santiago, Cuba, and demanded military 
 forces to drive it to sea. Hardly had the army, 
 comprised almost entirely of regular troops, suc- 
 ceeded in this, when yellow fever threatened it 
 with extinction. From this it was rescued by the 
 forcefulness of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, who, 
 overcoming the inertia of regular channels, com- 
 pelled the removal of the expedition to Long 
 Island. 
 
 Meantime, Admiral Dewey's victory of May, 
 1898, in Manila Bay had led to complications both 
 with native insurrectionary forces and with Ger- 
 many which made necessary the sending of an 
 expedition across the Pacific. This expedition, 
 made up nearly altogether of volunteers from the 
 western states, armed with old-fashioned rifles, 
 was successful in capturing the city of Manila 
 from the Spaniards, and, later, in defeating a 
 native army which attacked the Americans. 
 
 The vast majority of the volunteers in the Span- 
 ish war were never engaged, but were concen- 
 trated in training camps without adequate equip- 
 
20 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 ment or organization where they suffered the 
 ravages of disease. 
 
 Five officers developed ''.onspicnons abilities in 
 these struggles — ^Wood, Eoosevelt, Bell, Funston 
 and Pershing — three of them volunteers and two 
 captains in the regular army. 
 
 Although successful in every campaign, it was 
 recognized that the American army was grossly 
 inefficient. 
 
 From the close of the Spanish-Philippine war, 
 therefore, dates the improvement in our military 
 services which contributed to Americans being 
 able, at the decisive moment, to put into the field 
 enough battle-worthy troops to turn the defeat 
 of the allies into victory; and this in spite of a 
 weak administration at Washington. This im- 
 provement was the achievement of the soldiers 
 themselves, the secretaries of war, and the vol- 
 unteer spirit of our militia. No other statesmen, 
 except President Eoosevelt, himself a soldier, 
 ever helped. 
 
 In the regular army the leadership was as- 
 sumed by men who had won high rank in Cuba 
 and the Philippines. They gathered about them, 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 21 
 
 in important staff positions, officers of demon- 
 strated fitness, althougli they could not advance 
 them over slothful and stupid ones because of the 
 seniority law. For the first time in our history, 
 however, the framework of a general staff was 
 formed. A war college was established in Wash- 
 ington for the study of military problems ; schools 
 were opened for instruction in the technical de- 
 tails of army duties, ranging from horseshoeing 
 and baking to artillery practice and logistics. 
 Real progress was made in acquiring technique, 
 and with it came a corresponding rise in morale. 
 These steps were not taken without opposition. 
 The army figures largely in the expenditures of 
 government. The beneficiaries were long accus- 
 tomed to their profit. To improve the old army 
 meant to disturb many of these powerful and 
 greedy recipients of congressional appropriations. 
 Progress also disturbed the lazy and the incom- 
 petent among the officers. These like certain ad- 
 mirals of the present day struck hands with the 
 profiteers and furnished '^expert testimony '^ 
 against all reforms. Improvement became harder 
 
9.9. THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 and harder and practically stopped after Roose- 
 velt left the White House. 
 
 In the meanwhile the National Guard was pro- 
 ceeding no less sincerely in its more modest 
 sphere. 
 
 When the regiments of volunteers were reor- 
 ganized after the Spanish war only men of mili- 
 tary bent remained. A strong desire for better- 
 ment existed, but the state governments furnished 
 little financial and no educational help. Troops 
 commissioned by the states, with commendable 
 inconsistency, appealed to the national govern- 
 ment for aid. The government, by acts of Con- 
 gress, thereupon began to furnish uniforms, rifles 
 and instructors, and, in return, has kept a certain 
 check upon the numbers and efficiency of state 
 troops. 
 
 Unfortunately, the relations between the Na- 
 tional Guard and the Regular Army again as- 
 sumed the character of their ancient grudge. The 
 soldierly element did not rise in the National 
 Guard Association. The National Guard gen- 
 erals were, for the most part, politicians, and 
 politicians who belittled the knowledge and pur- 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 23 
 
 poses of professional soldiers to conceal their 
 own ignorance, an example which, it is worth 
 noting, was followed in 1918 by certain regulars 
 who were unable to grasp the modern tactics of 
 their French instructors, and who sought to hide 
 their incapacity with a similar abuse of learning. 
 
 The Regular Army, for its part, did its work 
 grudgingly because it objected to the recognition 
 of any military organization except its own. In 
 spite of all obstacles, many National Guard offi- 
 cers and organizations absorbed much of the 
 knowledge the regulars had to teach, and with 
 this knowledge attained a degree of discipline and 
 organization hitherto unknown in militia troops 
 in time of peace. 
 
 The Philippine insurrection and the Boxer out- 
 break in China in 1900 kept the army before the 
 public eye for a short while. Domestic problems 
 became acute, and military affairs were left to 
 army officers, national guardsmen, and the War 
 Department, and by all of these they were at- 
 tended to with a devotion for which the nation 
 may well feel a deep and lasting gratitude. 
 
 Neither the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria 
 
24 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 in 1904-5, nor the Italian-Turkish war in 1910, 
 nor the wars in the Balkans in 1911-13, 
 created much stir in America. It was not until 
 the great war broke out in Europe in 1914 that the 
 public agitated itself about military affairs, and 
 then, unfortunately, to little purpose. There was 
 an element in the nation, inconsiderable in num- 
 bers but strong in organization, in platform speak- 
 ers, in writers and in financial backing which, com- 
 posed of men who determined that under no cir- 
 cumstances would they ever fight for their coun- 
 try, devoted itself to preventing the men that 
 would fight from being given a fair chance for 
 their lives and for victory. The pacifists were 
 against any plan for national defense and, of 
 course, against whatever plan at the moment 
 seemed likely to receive congressional sanction. 
 
 This opposition would have been swept aside, 
 however, but that the Regular Army and the Na- 
 tional Guard failed to agree upon a method for 
 increasing the military efficiency of the nation. 
 
 In 1911 a federal appropriation had been pro- 
 vided which furnished funds for such units of the 
 National Guard as measured up to standards es- 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 25 
 
 tablished by the Regular Army. The measure 
 which carried this appropriation designated the 
 National Guard as the second line of defense of 
 the Union, to be mobilized before volunteers 
 should be called for. 
 
 In 1915 the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Gar- 
 rison, introduced a bill creating an army to be 
 known as the *' Continental Army,'' to be organ- 
 ized among civilians under the direction of the 
 Regular Army, with junior officers from the Re- 
 serve Corps. The new army was to take prece- 
 dence over the National Guard. This measure was 
 vigorously opposed by the National Guard and 
 was never pushed to passage. Its only effect was 
 to revive and increase the animosity between the 
 regular and non-regular services. 
 
 In 1915 Major General Leonard Wood, then 
 commanding the eastern department, with head- 
 quarters in New York, organized a volunteer 
 training camp at Piatt sburg, N. Y. The plan met 
 with instantaneous and enthusiastic success. 
 Camps were established in other parts of the 
 country, and in the following year an appropria- 
 
26 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 tion was obtained from Congress to defray the 
 expenses of the student-officers. 
 
 Colleges also renewed their interest in military 
 drill, and, acting under the National Guard act, 
 organized various units for the training of the 
 students. 
 
 The greatest advance toward national prepar- 
 edness, however, came about, not through the ef- 
 forts of any American, but through the initiative 
 of President Carranza of Mexico. 
 
 If Jena made the German army great, and if 
 Sedan did the same for the French, the mobiliza- 
 tion of 1916 made the Ajnerican army of 1918 pos- 
 sible. Up to June, 1916, our administration had 
 refused to take any military steps in contempla- 
 tion of our difficult relations with Mexico. Early 
 in that month General Funston's secret service in- 
 tercepted a Mexican order to raid the states of 
 New Mexico and Arizona and to invade Texas in 
 force, capture San Antonio, and, in conjunction 
 with the Mexican population, reannex the south- 
 western states of our country to Mexico. Panic 
 ensued in Washington, and the entire National 
 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE ARMY 27 
 
 Guard was ordered to muster immediately and 
 proceed to the Mexican border. 
 
 Unless it was in 1898, never before was dis- 
 played such utter lack of organization and mili- 
 tary preparedness. German and Mexican secret 
 service operatives might well have reported to 
 their superiors that America was as incapable 
 of military action as China. 
 
 The demonstration was not only sufficient, how- 
 ever, to deter the Mexicans from proceeding in 
 their plans, but it had other far-reaching effects. 
 It startled the people and the administration into 
 a realization of our actual weakness. It showed 
 up the manifold deficiencies of our administration, 
 and, thanks to General Funston and the system of 
 training he installed among all the troops in his 
 command, it formed the cadres which saved us 
 in 1918; for in the flotsam and jetsam of this 
 wretched affair were the formations which were 
 to furnish storm troops in the hour of need. 
 
 It is a strange fact, however, that when it found 
 itself at war with Germany the Eegular army did 
 not want to use the organized forces of the Na- 
 tional Guard it had done so much to prepare. 
 
fS THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Rather, it would begin with hordes of untrained 
 men. It asserted with great obstinacy that the 
 only function of National Guard troops was to 
 guard munition factories and railroad bridges 
 and, taking advantage of a panic over German 
 plots, got them safely out of the way and out of 
 training and doing such work as Clausewitz, a 
 German general staff officer of a century ago, as- 
 signed to the Landsturm. 
 
 The National Guard, for its part, organized in 
 different states in units of battalions, regiments 
 and brigades — there were even two divisions — 
 wanted to enter the national service intact. 
 
 The mobilization of 1916 improved the feeling 
 between the two services, but did not heal the 
 breach. Unhappily, after two years of bloody 
 war, it remains open. 
 
CHAPTER n 
 
 THE INSPIRED AMBASSADOB 
 
 For some months after the declaration of war 
 on April 6, 1917, the German calculations ap- 
 peared correct. America had entered the war 
 without any idea of how she was to wage it. The 
 nation was not unanimously for the war. The ad- 
 ministration let weeks pass without any effort to 
 get ready for the stupendous consequences of the 
 course it had adopted. 
 
 Among those who had been clamoring for war, 
 a great number argued that its conduct would 
 merely require our sending the fleet to tighten 
 the blockade, putting an embargo on all exports 
 which might reach Germany through neutral 
 channels, and financing the allied nations in arms 
 against her. Others demanded that a volunteer 
 army should be sent to France and suggested as 
 its commander Colonel Roosevelt, the only man in 
 sight who could raise such a force. Recruits were 
 insufficient to fill either the Regular army or the 
 
 29 
 
30 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 National Guard. The enthusiasm which brought 
 on and characterized the war with Spain was lack- 
 ing. America had considered victory for the 
 allies as practically certain after the battle of 
 the Marne, and war was declared in this belief. 
 
 Then, after our declaration of war, Germany 
 won the great victory of the Spring of 1917. The 
 British and French had hoped to win a decisive 
 battle by a joint offensive. Hindenburg maneu- 
 vered from before the British attack, and inflicted 
 a frightful repulse upon General Nivelle, who had 
 replaced the cautious and successful Joffre. At 
 the same time it began to appear that the Rus- 
 sian revolution, hailed with delight, if not actually 
 fomented, by the allies, was taking an unexpected 
 turn and that the Russian pressure in the east 
 would be withdrawn. From the threshold of vic- 
 tory the allies felt themselves on the brink of de- 
 feat. France decided that American assistance 
 had become imperative and sent Field Marshal 
 Joffre, victor of the Marne, to get it. 
 
 Of all the strangers who ever came to our 
 shore Joffre exercised the greatest influence 
 over our people and upon our destiny. He cap- 
 
THE INSPIRED AMBASSADOR 31 
 
 tured public opinion at once, and the people im- 
 posed his recommendations upon Congress, Presi- 
 dent, and army alike. His appearance was so 
 venerable, his manner so simple, his statements of 
 facts so devoid of artifice and revealing condi- 
 tions so appalling that the nation was stirred to 
 its soul. 
 
 He told us that France was on the verge of col- 
 lapse. A force of troops must be sent immedi- 
 ately to restore the shattered national morale. 
 After these must follow an army of gigantic size. 
 He assured us that our volunteer system, then 
 under consideration, never could provide the num- 
 ber of troops needed in this war; nor could our 
 army, employing the tactics taught in our drill 
 regulations, exist in the face of the war-trained 
 German army, equipped with arms the Americans 
 had never even seen. France would furnish 
 everything she had in equipment, in designs for 
 arms, and in instruction. He gave to our ord- 
 nance department the secret plans of the famous 
 .75 field piece. 
 
 At first the American authorities attempted to 
 impose a censorship upon his utterances. The 
 
aa THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 text of his first public speech was edited by his 
 American military aide, who eliminated his opin- 
 ions upon American military organizations. 
 Hearers who understood French supplied the 
 missing fragments of his speech to the press, and 
 the field marshal constantly repeated them in his 
 private conversations. 
 
 Suddenly the nation realized that it had entered 
 a fight which threatened its very existence. 
 
 From that moment the American people formed 
 a cohesion of purpose such as never had existed 
 in our national life and which lasted throughout 
 the war. The administration and Congress 
 marched with public opinion. 
 
 The pacifists, the anti-Americans, those who 
 had fought national preparedness in Congress, 
 were for the moment overwhelmed. The Draft act, 
 one of the great milestones in our national evolu- 
 tion, and one that future historians will class with 
 the drawing up of the Constitution and the preser- 
 vation of the Union, was passed. Every young 
 American was made liable to fight for his country, 
 and, therefore, every parent became interested in 
 
THE INSPIRED AMBASSADOR 33 
 
 seeing him properly trained, properly equipped 
 and properly led. 
 
 There remained to decide the status of the Regu- 
 lar army and the National Guard. The former 
 wished to disband the latter. The latter wished 
 to enter service under the terms of legislation 
 then in force. A compromise was reached. The 
 National Guard, in its existing organization, 
 was mustered into the federal service, but its 
 officers were reduced to the status of reserve offi- 
 cers. This provision was not acceptable to the 
 National Guard, but was strongly championed by 
 the Training Camps association, an organization 
 of men who had been training for reserve com- 
 missions under the direction of the Regular army. 
 
 With the splendid achievements of the national 
 guardsmen ever fresh in mind, it is pleasant to 
 look back on the unselfish patriotism which im- 
 bued them. They offered themselves for war; 
 they fought to go to war; they gave up long- 
 standing privileges to go to war ; and they allowed 
 themselves to be placed under the control of the 
 Regular army, which they did not believe would 
 give them even fair treatment. When the War 
 
34 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Department later announced that National Guard 
 cavalry was not to be sent to Europe, regiments 
 of this arm voluntarily transferred into the artil- 
 lery, although the artillery service at that time 
 was believed to require such technique that only 
 men of long training could officer it. 
 
 The National Guard had been accused of too 
 much politics. Under pressure it showed its ca- 
 pacity for perfect military sacrifice. 
 
 In four weeks from the arrival of Marshal 
 Joffre, Congress by legislation had provided 
 for the expansion of the Regular army, for 
 the enrollment of the National Guard, and for a 
 national army to be composed entirely of drafted 
 men. The draft was also to fill up vacancies in the 
 Regular army and National Guard and furnish 
 replacements for casualties. Four kinds of officers 
 were provided: Officers of the Regular army, 
 officers of the National Guard, officers of the Re- 
 serve Corps, and officers of the National army. 
 This last class might be composed of civilians be- 
 yond the age limitations for reserve officers or of 
 regular officers promoted for the emergency to 
 higher rank. 
 
THE INSPIRED AMBASSADOR 35 
 
 Much credit is due to studious officers of the 
 Regular army in drafting these bills, and also 
 severe blame for two inexcusable provisions: 
 (1) that where two officers are of the same grade, 
 if one holds a lower commission in the Regular 
 army he shall be deemed senior, even though his 
 commission in the higher grade is the more re- 
 cent (a survival of the rule in the French and 
 Indian wars which made all officers of the British 
 army superior to colonial officers) ; (2) that offi- 
 cers of the National Guard, Reserve Corps, and 
 National Army could be deprived of their com- 
 missions for incompetence, upon fhe recommenda- 
 tion of a board of officers, while officers of the 
 Regular army were exempt from this ruling. The 
 distinction was this: incompetent officers of the 
 temporary services could be discharged, but in- 
 competent officers of the Regular army could not ! 
 
 The Draft act will pass into history as the out- 
 standing legislative achievement of the war. Fol- 
 lowing a long dominance in our national life of a 
 faction of weak national feeling and of centrifugal 
 propaganda, the Draft act asserted the supremacy 
 of the nation over all its citizens to an extent that 
 
36 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 even our federalist and unionist ancestors had not 
 attempted. 
 
 But if the Draft act was the most important 
 feature of the struggle, surely the officers' train- 
 ing camps were the most romantic. 
 
 Fifty thousand of the best youths of the nation 
 assembled at the selected places to undergo hard 
 training, severe and competitive examination, and 
 then the rigors of war. At this time there was no 
 draft act to evade, there were no rain-proof jobs 
 on the horizon in Washington. The only hope of 
 reward was a commission as a junior line officer, 
 the most burdensome, as it is the most perilous, 
 position in the army. 
 
 The men of this first camp will ever occupy a 
 pedestal that no other group of officers can reach. 
 
 Eegular and National Guard officers, when they 
 entered military service, faced no such certitude 
 of hardship and danger. 
 
 In the conduct of these schools the Eegular 
 army rendered its greatest service in the war. 
 
 While the shortness of the course did not permit 
 much military instruction, nor, in fact, were our 
 Regular officers fully equipped to instruct in mod- 
 
THE INSPIRED AMBASSADOR 57 
 
 em war, they did impress upon their pupils 
 their own unsurpassed sense of duty, of self- 
 immolation, of rendering and exacting obedience. 
 They taught the rigors of army life and demon- 
 strated in camp the heart-breaking fatigue which 
 it is the lot of every soldier to endure. 
 
 The camps were tests rather than courses of 
 instruction. The graduates were not trained offi- 
 cers, but they were capable of becoming officers 
 of the highest type. Early in the war some of 
 them were sent to the front in regular divisions 
 and given responsibilities that in normal times 
 would not come upon officers of ten years ' experi- 
 ence. A percentage failed, and under the iron 
 rules which preservation of an unbroken front 
 made indispensable these were relieved. The 
 majority, however, served with great honor, and, 
 it must be said, received too little recognition in 
 comparison with their superior officers, whose 
 rapid rise was largely due to their young sub- 
 ordinates. 
 
 Field Marshal Joffre's mission had borne fruit. 
 America provided for a great army. In June it 
 dispatched the First Division with Greneral 
 
38 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Persliing and his staff to encourage our allies 
 while the gigantic army was being raised. 
 
 In July the National Guard was called into the 
 federal service, and in September the draft went 
 into effect. All the well considered calculations 
 of the Kaiser ^s government had crashed to the 
 ground. 
 
CHAPTEE III 
 
 EAKLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 
 
 I WAS mustered into the federal service in May, 
 1917, and reported to General Pershing in Paris 
 in July. 
 
 The wisdom of General Joffre's request for an 
 American force to appear immediately in France 
 was manifest at once. The morale of the French 
 nation was at the breaking point. There even was 
 a number of people whose despondency was so 
 great that they resented the entry of America into 
 the war because it would delay peace — a peace of 
 defeat. 
 
 The French censorship, in the interest of the 
 commanding general, of course, had prevented any 
 mention of the French defeat of April. The 
 official announcement was, in the words of the 
 first Napoleon, *^as false as an official dispatch." 
 The German communiques had been suppressed 
 by the allies. 
 
 In consequence, France was the prey of exag- 
 
 39 
 
40 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 gerated rumors. The actual French losses in the 
 April offensive were in the neighborhood of 
 100,000, but rumor estimated them anywhere from 
 double that number to 500,000. 
 
 In defeat, the French always suspect treachery. 
 The existence of censorship, of course, accentu- 
 ated the suspicion, which, moreover, was not with- 
 out foundation. Treachery existed in high places, 
 and the censorship was used to protect it. 
 
 We now know how Bolo Pasha was caught in 
 America, and, upon evidence produced from 
 America, was condemned and shot. We know that 
 M. Malvy was tried and exiled, and M. Caillaux 
 was convicted of serious charges. 
 
 Of course, the American staff obtained this in- 
 formation in advance of the general public. It 
 knew of the murder of Ahnareyda on the day fol- 
 lowing the crime. The story is not generally 
 known and will bear telling here. 
 
 Almareyda, an opium fiend and a man of suspi- 
 cious life, but at the same time a confidant of high 
 officials in the French republic, was arrested and 
 almost immediately afterwards found dead in his 
 cell. The prison doctors issued a certificate that 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 41 
 
 he had died from an overdose of morphine, self- 
 administered. Under French law the authorities 
 retained jurisdiction over the body until it was 
 placed in the grave. 
 
 As soon as this was accomplished the nearest 
 relative, who thereupon obtained the right of con- 
 trol over the corpse, had it dug up and demon- 
 strated to witnesses from marks on the neck and 
 from an examination of the lungs that death haa 
 come from strangulation. 
 
 A so-called investigation was held and it was 
 declared that Almareyda, in a fit of despondency, 
 had hanged himself with his suspenders, and that 
 the prison authorities had lied about the manner 
 of his death to save themselves from the charge 
 of carelessness. This story was in itself ren- 
 dered doubly ridiculous by the fact that the sus- 
 penders could hardly have supported the weight 
 of the man and by the second fact that the highest 
 support to which this peculiar hangman's noose 
 could be attached was the head of the prison bed, 
 some two and a half feet above the floor. The 
 public was asked to believe that Almareyda hung 
 himself lying down! 
 
42 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Publication of the crime, of course, was per- 
 mitted only in versions sanctioned by the authori- 
 ties. The story, as told here, is the one which 
 came into the Intelligence Department of our Gen- 
 eral Staff. It was generally believed that Alma- 
 reyda had been murdered to prevent his betray- 
 ing important accomplices. The names of those 
 prominent officials were mentioned, but I do not 
 recollect whether their names were placed in the 
 records of our General Staff. 
 
 About the same time Mati Hara, a woman of 
 the half -world, was executed ; and it was believed 
 that she was induced not to betray her accom- 
 plices by promises that her life would be spared 
 at the last moment, and that the death volley was 
 fired before she understood the deception prac- 
 ticed upon her. 
 
 A movement was seriously projected to call a 
 joint meeting of the Senate and Chamber of 
 Deputies at Versailles. (When the Senate and 
 Chamber meet in joint session at Versailles they 
 automatically become a joint constitutional con- 
 vention and parliament with unlimited powers.) 
 The overthrow of the government and the re- 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 4S 
 
 moval of President Poineare were contemplated. 
 
 The object of the proposed convention was en- 
 tirely patriotic; but it was gradually abandoned 
 as the Eussian revolution developed into a reign 
 of terror and a surrender to Germany. The posi- 
 tion of the French government, however, gradu- 
 ally became impossible and it was finally over- 
 thrown by the terrific attacks of Georges Clemen- 
 ceau. Publication of these attacks was absolutely 
 forbidden by the censorship. French officials 
 never mentioned them; yet they were known in 
 Paris among American newspaper men, who 
 brought the news to our General Staff. 
 
 The staff, of course, came into possession of a 
 large part of the secret history of the war. It 
 learned the nature of the dual alliance between 
 France and Russia; the terms of the military 
 compact between France and England, under 
 which England guaranteed an army to fight on 
 the continent against Germany, France, in return, 
 opening up to England the broad studies of her 
 war college, studies which went far beyond any- 
 thing dreamed of outside of the continent of Eu- 
 rope, and even more profound than those of the 
 
44 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 German general staff. The staff learned how, for 
 some years before the war, Belgium had been 
 irresolute, unable to make up her mind whether 
 to join the alliance against Germany or to stand 
 neutral. This vacillation, preventing the forma- 
 tion of a plan to use French and British troops 
 for the defense of the Belgian frontier, is respon- 
 sible for Germany ^s easy conquest of the little 
 country and the successful turning of the French 
 left flank at Charleroi. 
 
 We learned that before the beginning of hos- 
 tilities Germany had asked Italy merely to mobil- 
 ize troops on the French border and, in payment 
 for such slight service, offered territory both on 
 the French mainland and in Morocco. Italy re- 
 fused to comply, saying that action on her part 
 was not required under the terms of the Triple 
 Alliance. On the other hand, she notified France 
 of her intention to remain neutral, thus permit- 
 ting France to concentrate against Germany the 
 troops which, in the scheme for a general Euro- 
 pean war, had been assigned to the Italian fron- 
 tier. 
 
 The general staff obtained the details of the 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 45 
 
 various secret treaties between the allies, publica- 
 tion of which during the peace conference caused 
 such public commotion. The first treaty between 
 England, Prance and Eussia for the partition of 
 Turkey gave Persia, Palestine and Alexandretta 
 to England, Syria to France, and Armenia and 
 Constantinople to Eussia. It is likely that Bul- 
 garia, learning of the disposition of Constanti- 
 nople, which she coveted, was influenced thereby 
 to join the Central powers. 
 
 In order to draw Italy into the Entente, this 
 treaty had to be modified ; and it had to be altered 
 again to secure the support of Greece. All this 
 information was forwarded by our general staff to 
 Washington in the summer of 1917, and was avail- 
 able to our State Department throughout our par- 
 ticipation in the war. 
 
 All the allied governments had military mis- 
 sions in Eussia, exerting various kinds of in- 
 fluence upon that government. From them we 
 learned of the fast waning morale of the Eussian 
 troops ; how the demagogue Kerensky was letting 
 the nation rapidly drift into anarchy, and how the 
 soldier Korniloff was striving desperately to pre- 
 
46 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 serve discipline which would enable the army to 
 stand before the Germans and prevent them from 
 massing against the western front before the 
 American army could be prepared. 
 
 The reports of all the allied missions came into 
 our hands. It is gratifying to note that those of 
 the American attache were the clearest and the 
 most prophetic. 
 
 Each of the allied missions urged its govern- 
 ment to exert every pressure for the support of 
 Korniloff, our only hope in the military situation. 
 
 Unfortunately, the allied governments were 
 controlled by word men. They supported their 
 fellow word man, Kerensky, and the Eussian front 
 collapsed. 
 
 One of the first acts of the United States upon 
 entering the war was to place embargoes on ex- 
 ports to countries trading with Germany. The 
 British blockade had not been entirely effective in 
 keeping American materials of various kinds from 
 reaching Germany, and had been practically pow- 
 erless in preventing Germany's neighbors from 
 trading with her. The Scandinavian countries 
 were absolutely dependent upon imports from the 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 47 
 
 United States. They were now compelled to stop 
 shipments of home products to Germany under 
 penalty of an embargo on the necessities of life. 
 
 The same methods of coercion were directed 
 against Switzerland, but with most unexpected 
 and, as we look back upon the occasion, ludicrous 
 results. Switzerland replied that unless the allies 
 furnished her with necessary foodstuffs she would 
 open her frontier to the German army. At that 
 time the allies were on the defensive, waiting for 
 the American army, and the lengthening of the 
 battle line was to be avoided at all costs. Our 
 diplomats were compelled, therefore, to climb 
 down as gracefully as they could, and food was 
 brought across the submarine zone in bottoms 
 sorely needed to carry troops and military sup- 
 plies, and, as the Swiss would not even send their 
 own railroad engines and cars to transport it from 
 the ports to their frontier, the overworked French 
 railroad equipment was taxed for this purpose. 
 
 The French General Staff showed great loyalty 
 to ours in furnishing us with copies of deciphered 
 messages from the German wireless station in 
 Spain informing the submarine commanders of 
 
48 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 tHe location and course of our convoys. This was 
 a real act of friendship, as the French staff was 
 so anxious to keep secret the fact that it could 
 decode the German dispatches that it had never 
 given any decoded information to its other allies 
 or even to its own navy. 
 
 The one piece of information our allies did not 
 offer us was the number of allied divisions that 
 were engaged or in reserve on all fronts. We ob- 
 ,tained this information, but I consider the method 
 by which it was done a military secret. 
 
 At this time the Catholic party in Germany 
 made secret proposals of peace, and shortly after- 
 ward a public effort toward that end emanated 
 from the Vatican. The German proposal was con- 
 veyed by Herr Erzberger to Switzerland, and by 
 him to French secret agents. The French Gen- 
 eral Staff passed the word on to us. I do not 
 know whether its terms were made public in 
 America. They were as follows: 
 
 Belgium was to be evacuated and compensated 
 for damages. Invaded France was to be evacu- 
 ated, but not compensated for damages. Alsace 
 and Lorraine (German since 1870) were to be re- 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. R 49 
 
 turned to France, and Germany recompensed by- 
 territory (not specified) in some other part of the 
 world. German colonies were to be restored. The 
 Austrian-Italian boundary and the eastern boun- 
 daries were to be determined at a peace confer- 
 ence. 
 
 The officers assembled at General Pershing's 
 headquarters were men who had distinguished 
 themselves by long, continuous and arduous stud- 
 ies at the schools which the army had formed. 
 They had bought the military books of the re- 
 nowned German military authorities, most of 
 which had been translated into English by British 
 officers. Officers conversant with the German lan- 
 guage studied the originals, and other books which 
 had not yet been translated. Thus they acquired 
 a knowledge that had not been known to previous 
 generations of American officers ; for if Napoleon 
 exhausted the principles of strategy and tac- 
 tics. Von Moltke and his school standardized ad- 
 ministrative machinery and the staff system neces- 
 sary to the conduct of large armies. 
 
 My feeling on first meeting the staff was one of 
 national pride ; but later, when I learned how these 
 
50 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 men had equipped themselves for the task, I real- 
 ized that while the nation should rejoice at having 
 such men ready in her hour of need, she had no 
 right to congratulate herself upon their achieve- 
 ments. 
 
 In European countries a great part of the ef- 
 forts of government has been devoted to the 
 efficiency of the army. In America the "Substan- 
 tial efforts toward miUtary efficiency originated 
 within tFe army and were carried on by the offi- 
 cers without aid or encouragement from the 
 nation. 
 
 There was something professorial about these 
 staff officers with General Pershing. Their lives 
 had been devoted to study and they had had little 
 opportunity to practice their theories. Accus- 
 tomed to command small units, they were inex- 
 perienced in the dispatch of business, because the 
 army frowns severely on minor mistakes of ad- 
 ministration and offers little reward for positive 
 accomplishment. This explains the friction that 
 arose everywhere between army officers and busi- 
 ness men drafted into the army. The soldiers 
 failed to keep pace with the rapidity of adminis- 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 61 
 
 tration to wMch the business men had been edu- 
 cated in the school of commercial competition. 
 
 The work to which this General Statf addressed 
 itself was the greatest that ever confronted any 
 similar body of men. It had to equip the army 
 with weapons and ammunition, and, as the event 
 turned out, it had to produce more than half of 
 all the other supplies. It had to study not only 
 the developments which had come in this war but 
 also the phenomena of European warfare, which 
 are very different from those with which Ameri- 
 can soldiers had become familiar. 
 
 All our wars had been fought in sparsely in- 
 habited territories, with little artificial shelter 
 against the weather, and with few and bad roads. 
 The billeting of large numbers of troops in the 
 Civil war would have been impossible for lack of 
 houses; and the principle of billeting had never 
 been accepted in America. In France, the mul- 
 titude of villages furnished cover for all soldiers 
 not on the firing line; the dividing of organiza- 
 tions into proper numbers for shelter in the vari- 
 ous towns and their reassembly for the march had 
 to be learned by the Americans. 
 
52 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Ever since tlie time of the Romans, roads in 
 France have been built with an eye to military use. 
 The capacity of these roads to carry troops and 
 their supplies had been studied for centuries. Bat- 
 tlefields have been fought over time and again, 
 and have furnished encyclopedias of military in- 
 formation for European soldiers; and most of 
 this was unknown to us. 
 
 The difference in the weather, the absence of 
 severe cold, the presence everywhere of water, 
 the defensible character of the masonry build- 
 ings, even the shape of the ground, the color of 
 the landscape and the refractions of light — 
 these were alien to our experience. All this had 
 to be learned while ports of debarkation, supply 
 depots and railroads were built. Finally, the 
 personal relationship between our forces and 
 those of our allies had to be built up, and misun- 
 derstandings and European jealousies overcome. 
 
 The French and British governments were in- 
 tensely jealous of each other. A veritable contest 
 arose between them for the control of their new, 
 great and unmeasured ally. In the early years of 
 the war American ambassadors had been clay in 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 53 
 
 the hands of European diplomats. They expected 
 American generals to be the same. They did not 
 doubt that the American command would be con- 
 trolled — the question which agitated their minds 
 was, by whom would it be controlled? The Eng- 
 lish held the great advantage of a common lan- 
 guage and their instinctive ability in the selection 
 of men for international conferences. They also 
 held control of the sea, and owned the shipping 
 upon which the American army must cross. 
 
 Against this, in the first instance, the French 
 could only oppose the fact that the war was in 
 France and that all transportation had to be on 
 French roads and railroads. 
 
 With some abruptness the French high com- 
 mand placed the American sector as far as pos- 
 sible from the seacoast, and separated the Amer- 
 icans by hundreds of miles of French troops from 
 the English. 
 
 Early in the war, the Americans would have 
 preferred to train with the English and to go into 
 line with and beside the English. \This, however, 
 the French obstinately forbade. They were un- 
 willing to contemplate the two English speaking 
 
64 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 nations so closely allied. They were, perhaps, also 
 unwilling to give the American army a too easy 
 line of retreat to the seacoast in the event of a 
 lost battle. That their last decision was well 
 taken will never be questioned by any American 
 soldier who was in the active army after March 
 21st, 1918, when it looked as if a German success 
 would pen the American troops against the Alps 
 and when the British army, falling back on the 
 sea, left in the allied line an almost fatal gap. 
 
 The first premise was probably a false one. 
 The American army was incapable of any side 
 agreements among allies. I cannot but remember, 
 though, that in the early days of our sojourn in 
 France the British army exercised an influence 
 upon our own quite incommensurate with its mili- 
 tary skill. Later, however, our ablest officers per- 
 ceived that the French General Staff possessed 
 vast stores of military lore unknown to the other 
 allies, and, lacking which, war against Germany 
 must have spelled catastrophe. 
 
 Our General Staff was earnest, capable and suc- 
 cessful. It would have benefited from an earnest 
 perusal of '^Pinafore," but probably to no greater 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A. E. F. 56 
 
 extent than any other body of men possessed of 
 almost unlimited authority. It soon impressed 
 upon the allies the fact that our army was cast in 
 a mold entirely different from that of our dip- 
 lomats or our idle rich. Said an English colonel 
 to me : * ^ I did not know that there were such men 
 in America. My conception of Americans has 
 been of men trying to make enough money for 
 their wives to spend and of women trying to spend 
 all the money their husbands could make. There 
 are no such people in Europe as you are bringing 
 over. By mere force of character you must dom- 
 inate the world." 
 
 Of course, this Englishman had seen the ex- 
 tremes of our nation. The nation is much sounder 
 than its specimens abroad generally appear to 
 Europeans — and the best elements of our nation 
 were found in our army. The staff, however, 
 furnished amusement for the allies in one purely 
 American way. 
 
 The General Staff, among other things, is the 
 legislature of the organization whicK" it controls. 
 Our G.H.Q. (General Headquarters) was a regu- 
 lar American legislature, and produced, in spite 
 
56 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of its many and complicated duties, an amazing 
 mass of regulations governing the individual, just 
 like legislatures at home. Later, when the army 
 went overseas, we had a number of staff legisla- 
 tures legislating their heads off. 
 
 The American uniform was designed by the 
 worst tailor in the world in conjunction with the 
 worst soldier; so our dress regulations became 
 subject to many changes. Tastes varied among 
 the army corps, divisions and brigades; and so 
 did the anatomy of the commanding officers. From 
 these diverse viewpoints came codes of laws as 
 diverse as the statutes of our several states. 
 It is a military principle that a lower authority 
 cannot repeal the restriction imposed by any 
 higher authority ; but he may add to it or legislate 
 upon subjects not covered by the higher command. 
 Hence, an officer dressed in the height of fashion 
 in one sector might find himself under arrest in 
 another for wearing or failing to wear a pair of 
 spurs, for the length of his overcoat, or for carry- 
 ing a cane. 
 
 To the French, who do not interfere with man- 
 kind's idiosyncrasies, who devote their energy to 
 
EARLY DAYS OF THE A, E. F. 67 
 
 achieving a higher degree of professional skill 
 than any other army has attained, this Yankee 
 legalism was a source of much amusement. Many 
 officers preserve to this day the celebrated order 
 that ** American soldiers are not to be seen with 
 notoriously immoral women,'' issued because mili- 
 tary police from rural districts, unacquainted with 
 Parisian fashions and metropolitan cosmetics, re- 
 vealed an embarrassing lack of discrimination in 
 enforcing a rule that * ' soldiers should not associ- 
 ate with immoral women." 
 
 The French also were more amused than com- 
 plimented when the American troops in Paris 
 were given as a distinctive badge a white fleur-de- 
 lys on the left shoulder 1 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE GREAT DIVISION 
 
 Upon the arrival of the 1st artillery brigade 
 in France I was transferred to this organization 
 at my request, my own regiment having been 
 made into artillery. 
 
 My previous military service had been in the 
 National Guard cavalry. I was, therefore, a 
 stranger both to the men and the work of the 
 regular field artillery. The first impression these 
 made upon me has not faded, but has grown stead- 
 ily both from intimate acquaintance with them and 
 from the reflections following the close of the war. 
 
 The United States field artillery is the most 
 admirable organization with which I have ever 
 come in contact. During the years immediately 
 preceding our entry into the war it prepared itself 
 to play a threefold role: It had to keep in con- 
 stant readiness to engage the numerically su- 
 perior artillery of Mexico; it endeavored to con- 
 stitute itself a sample of the field artillery we 
 
 58 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 59 
 
 should require in a great war; and it had to pre- 
 pare for the stupendous expansion which a great 
 war would demand. 
 
 That it would have performed the first of these 
 duties successfully, if called upon, none will ever 
 question. To chronicle its success in the others 
 always will be the pleasant duty of every Ameri- 
 can military historian. 
 
 Although too small in its totality to execute an 
 artillery maneuver, and never allowed to concen- 
 trate for practice purposes, it had worked out the 
 role of artillery in modern war as fully as foreign 
 artilleries had done before 1914 with every facility 
 at their disposal. 
 
 I believe its use of field guns before the war was 
 second only to the French. Also, it fully foresaw 
 the value of curved fire, which the Germans ex- 
 celled in and which the French had neglected, 
 and it had asked to be supplied with powerful 
 howitzers. It followed the European war more 
 closely than did the other arms of our service and 
 endeavored to keep its equipment abreast of war 
 developments. Its form of organization was en- 
 tirely adequate, and, once free from the incubus 
 
60 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of the ordnance department, it provided itself 
 from foreign arsenals with the most effective 
 weapons. 
 
 It is unnecessary to record here how the course 
 of the war surprised the officers of all armies. 
 The early plans of operations of all general staffs 
 failed because their conceptions of the roles of 
 artillery and infantry proved to be erroneous. 
 
 Each of the three years following 1914 brought 
 innovations in war materiel, technique and tac- 
 tics. Our allies loyally offered to instruct our 
 inexperienced army in all the lessons they had 
 learned at heavy cost. In the United States ar- 
 tillery, or, to bring this statement within the prov- 
 ince of my own knowledge, in the 1st brigade of 
 the United States field artillery, which was the 
 model and the training school for all later forma- 
 tions, this instruction was accepted with the open- 
 mindedness that characterizes the well-trained 
 and self-reliant professional. 
 
 The French instructors were selected from 
 among their best technicians, assisted by a naval 
 officer who had introduced methods adapted 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 61 
 
 from ocean navigation into the domain of field 
 artillery. 
 
 The American officers were, or course, thor- 
 onghly up to date in all matters relating to 
 draught and mobility and the care of horses. They 
 also were so familiar with their own guns that 
 learning the materiel of the French pieces was not 
 more difficult than for a thoroughly skilled auto- 
 mobile mechanic to familiarize himself with the 
 characteristics of a new car, although among the 
 higher ranking officers exceptions to this must be 
 made. They rapidly mastered a number of im- 
 proved methods of directing fire, as developed 
 by the exigencies and the opportunities of war, 
 these only involving improvements on thoroughly 
 understood mathematical principles. 
 
 Even before our training period was half 
 elapsed, the need of an expanding army began to 
 draw heavily on the existing organizations; but 
 so efficient were these that, although the practice 
 cont ^ued throughout the war, the 1st artillery 
 brigade was able to meet the demands upon it for 
 officers to instruct or command new units, and, at 
 
62 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 the same time, to comply with every request for 
 military service in the field. 
 
 In October the 1st division was ordered to the 
 front. The reason given was, to furnish fur- 
 ther instruction ; but the real reason, it is believed, 
 was to inform the allied world that American 
 troops were in action. The division did not enter 
 the line as a unit, but each infantry battalion was 
 attached to and put under the command of a 
 French regiment, each battalion of artillery being 
 made a part of a French groupment. Junior 
 French officers directed each of the companies, or 
 batteries, and non-commissioned instructors 
 abounded. Much useful knowledge was acquired 
 in this way, but the most important and costly 
 lesson — not to betray their presence to the enemy 
 — ^was one which our troops never thoroughly 
 learned. 
 
 German observers saw strange auto trucks on 
 the roads. They saw khaki-clad men around the 
 artillery observation posts and in the trenches. 
 To ascertain the significance of this novelty, they 
 made a small trench raid on November 3rd, and 
 killed and captured a handful of our infantry. 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 63 
 
 On our return to tlie rear we learned of the 
 great Italian disaster of October 24th at Capo- 
 retto. I felt keenly at that time that this was a 
 disgrace to America. We had been in the war six 
 months, with ample warning beforehand, and yet 
 we were not able to put into the field at the vital 
 spot the insignificant number of troops that would 
 have saved the day. 
 
 The Italians had shown their ability to fight on 
 even terms with the Austrians. It was eight small 
 German divisions, acting like the edge of a knife, 
 that cut the hole through the Italian line. If we 
 could have been able to put 100,000 American 
 troops at that point the disaster would have been 
 averted. 
 
 Even after the debacle America was powerless 
 to help. English and French troops, worn with the 
 hard fighting of the summer, were rushed to stop 
 the rout; but American troops were unavailable. 
 Our system of training was not at fault; we had 
 to raise a great army for 1918, and to do this we 
 had to break up our entire regular army and even 
 distribute the officers of our National Guard 
 
64 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 among the raw troops. Our shameful unprepar- 
 edness was responsible. 
 
 The division then returned to the rest area 
 to await its equipment and to resume its train- 
 ing. All Regular officers were promoted one 
 grade; some were sent back to America; still 
 others became instructors in France ; a few went 
 on staff duty. The lower grades were filled with 
 reserve officers, graduates of the artillery schools 
 in France. There was a shake-up in the higher 
 command, the division commander and one bri- 
 gade commander being relieved. Supplies were 
 short; clothing could not be kept up; the meat 
 ration had to be obtained from the Canadians; 
 pay day was irregular; the mails were dilatory; 
 forage was lacking, and the horses suffered. Ar- 
 tillery drivers bought oats out of their own scant 
 funds to feed the government horses that the gov- 
 ernment did not provide for. 
 
 At this time the General Staff College was or- 
 ganized at Langres with French and English in- 
 structors. Reserve and National Guard officers 
 were assigned there, as well as Regulars; but 
 the regulations provided that the desirable ap- 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 65 
 
 pointments from the school, the chiefs of staff and 
 operations officers, could only be given to Regn- 
 lar officers ; and the years of service required for 
 the different appointments limited the field of 
 competition for the most important posts. 
 
 On January 6th, 1918, the division was sur- 
 prised at receiving orders to proceed to the front. 
 It was still short of much essential equip- 
 ment, and the artillery had never been supplied 
 with the telephone equipment needed to train its 
 telephone details. The new battery commanders 
 were away at school, leaving these important com- 
 mands to officers who had been commissioned only 
 a few months previously. 
 
 The reason for ordering the 1st division to the 
 front at this time has never been given. I do 
 not believe that it was planned by General Per- 
 shing. At least, I know his plan a few weeks 
 before had been not to put the division into line 
 before spring. 
 
 It may be that considerations of French morale 
 prompted it, or it is possible that the beginning 
 of the Senate investigation into the conduct of the 
 
66 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 war brought irresistible pressure from Wasb- 
 ington. 
 
 After a reconnaissance, insufficient because of 
 lack of automobiles and time, tlie division marched 
 from the Gondrecourt area to the St. Mihiel front. 
 
 Here, for the first time, we held a continued 
 sector — the American sector. We went in, first, 
 as battalions under French colonels, then as regi- 
 ments under French brigadiers ; and, finally, as a 
 division under our own officers. To each Ameri- 
 can unit was attached an experienced French of- 
 ficer, very much as Regular officers were formerly 
 attached to the militia as inspector-instructors. 
 Experienced non-commissioned officers were pres- 
 ent to help the men. Staff officers and technical 
 experts were provided. In short, everything was 
 done that could be done to obtain assistance and 
 instruction from the experienced troops who had 
 fought for four years. 
 
 Strangely enough, all the American officers did 
 not take kindly to this wonderful ajid necessary 
 assistance. Some announced that their education 
 was complete; others that the French methods 
 were bad. A few complained of the individual 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 67 
 
 officers attached to them. On the other hand, 
 most of the officers accepted the instruction with 
 enthusiasm, or, at least, in good grace. They 
 were eager to add whatever they could to their 
 store of military information. They were keen 
 to learn the French methods, even if they were 
 not at first convinced of their excellence. 
 
 As I look back on the early days of our partic- 
 ipation in the war and consider my friends who 
 failed or who succeeded, I cannot recall one ex- 
 ception to this statement: That all the failures, 
 who were sent to the rear or to America bitter, 
 disappointed men, belonged to the class which dis- 
 dained the military advice of the French, while all 
 the successful officers, ranging from those who ad- 
 vanced only a grade or two in promotion, or may- 
 be received only a simple decoration, up to those 
 who rose to the command of corps and of armies, 
 belonged to the class which eagerly absorbed the 
 grim lessons of war as learned by the French. 
 
 This was inevitable. No man's education ever 
 is completed. No man has fully mastered any 
 profession. The men who turned from French in- 
 struction, from the experience gained in four years 
 
68 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of war, were men whose intellects were numbed 
 by complacent egotism; or who were too lazy to 
 exert themselves in further study; or were men 
 who, like Napoleon III. and his marshals, either 
 thought that the mere possession of military rank 
 in itself constituted military education or were 
 afraid to enter into military discussions through 
 fear of betraying an ignorance of which they were 
 fully aware or at least suspected. 
 
 There had been too much talk of '^American 
 methods.'* Any methods we had were the result 
 of experience in the Civil war, the Spanish war 
 and the Philippine war, none of which formed any 
 accurate criterion of what the great European 
 war was like. None of the armies, not even the 
 German, which had made the most dispassionate 
 study of the lessons of Manchuria and the Bal- 
 kans, had anticipated what the tactics of this war 
 would be. The views entertained by our army 
 were exceedingly good when compared with those 
 of the other armies in the days when all were 
 equally inexperienced. They were crass and inef- 
 fective when compared to the tactics developed in 
 four years of actual fighting. Unfortunately, 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 69 
 
 high ranking officers were not easily removed, and 
 too often they had to prove their incompetency 
 by costly and unsuccessful battle before they were 
 removed. 
 
 To a new division sector warfare is exceedingly 
 trying, and to a division which, like ours, only 
 received an important part of its necessary equip- 
 ment after arriving at the front, and was not 
 practiced in the use of it, the trial was particu- 
 larly hard. Until a soldier becomes familiar with 
 the sounds of war every little burst of artillery 
 fire, every flurry of machine guns, suggests an 
 attack. Any indication, or no indication at all, is 
 sufficient to cause the sounding of a gas alarm. 
 Officers of all ranks are uncertain of themselves 
 and of their subordinates. This is a trying phase 
 that every division must go through, and it is the 
 more disagreeable and serious, if the division 
 entering the line has not been given adequate 
 training. 
 
 Looking across the perspective of more than two 
 years, I realize what a wonderful school for the 
 division the Toul sector was. Under our able 
 French instructors we began with the sim- 
 
70 THE ARxMY OF 1918 
 
 plest operations of the separate arms, and 
 worked progressively forward to trench raids of 
 considerable magnitude, raids which were, in 
 effect, small attacks. 
 
 The Germans did all they could to assist our 
 training. Their efforts were never beyond our 
 powers not only to resist but to understand. If 
 we destroyed a German battery, they destroyed 
 an American battery. If our patrols captured a 
 German listening post, the Germans retaliated. 
 They kept even step with our growing experience, 
 and firmly established our morale by an unsuc- 
 cessful trench raid of large size on March 1st, a 
 good six weeks after our entry into line. 
 
 The position which the division occupied was 
 ideal for a school, provided the enemy wished 
 to treat it as such. Our line lay in a low, slightly 
 rolling country, dominated by Mont Sec, a steep, 
 high mountain held by the enemy. To keep out 
 of sight of his watchful observers, troops had to 
 lie close in their trenches, dugouts or camou- 
 flaged battery positions. Troops in the woods, 
 which abounded, were allowed freer action ; but the 
 mountain looked down on the tops of the forest, 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 71 
 
 and the German observers conM recognize cut- 
 tings for batteries when indiscreetly made; and 
 they easily located habitations and kitchens if 
 smoke was allowed to rise during the day. The 
 enemy also had complete control of the air, and 
 he flew at will over our lines for observation, pho- 
 itographic purposes and offensive sorties. This 
 control of the air also allowed him to maintain his 
 balloons close to the front lines and at a maximum 
 height. 
 
 Thus, American indiscretions invariably were 
 punished. Trenches, reserve positions and bat- 
 teries which were revealed by the least care- 
 lessness received chastisement. Sometimes this 
 came in the form of harassing fire, or fire for 
 destruction, or, in the event of a trench raid by 
 either side, the enemy artillery would fire upon 
 every American position known to it. Thick 
 heads and dull, which had failed to learn the teach- 
 ing at school, had the lessons of war pounded into 
 them by the German schoolmasters, whose motto 
 was: **He who will not heed must feel." Su- 
 perior officers were enabled to judge of the intel- 
 ligence and force of their subordinates by measure 
 
72 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of the losses they sustained. Performing exactly 
 similar work and facing identical problems, some 
 units were almost wiped out; others suffered the 
 minimum of loss. 
 
 The Germans also taught artillery tactics to 
 our higher command. 
 
 It may be said here that while the French in 
 1918 excelled in the technique of artillery, in the 
 location of the enemy, and in the accuracy of fire, 
 the Germans retained a superiority of tactical 
 skill. In the placing and moving of guns they 
 maintained this superiority over the allies to the 
 (end. 
 
 The artillery brigade entered the Toul sector 
 well instructed by the French, but also retaining 
 a great many of its preconceived ideas. Conse- 
 quently, it was roughly handled in the early days ; 
 but with characteristic American celerity it 
 discarded its notions and adopted the methods of 
 the enemy where and when they had proved su- 
 perior. 
 
 During all this time there was a constant flow 
 of junior officers through the organizations. 
 Those who had received training at the front were 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 73 
 
 ordered to other organizations, their places being 
 taken by new arrivals from America and from the 
 artillery schools. This system increased the diffi- 
 culty of conducting the division, but it was neces- 
 sary in the greater interest of preparing the army 
 for its future role. 
 
 Service at the front also was a great test of 
 personal fitness. Steps to dispose of incompetent 
 officers holding permanent commissions in the 
 regular army differed from the system employed 
 in getting rid of inefficient reserve or national 
 guard officers. Officers of the regular army could 
 be relieved by their superiors, deprived of their 
 temporary rank, and returned to the United 
 States with their permanent rank by order of the 
 commander-in-chief. They could not be dis* 
 missed. All other officers could be ordered by 
 their regimental commanders before a board of 
 inquiry and, upon an adverse finding approved by 
 higher authority, deprived of their commissions. 
 
 It was my unpleasant duty to sit on one of these 
 boards during my entire service at the front. This 
 board adopted two standards, a higher standard 
 of efficiency being required for provisional officers 
 
74 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 in the regular service, whose commissions would 
 become permanent with the lapse of time, than for 
 the temporary officers. For the latter a degree of 
 competence to perform the duties of their rank 
 in warfare was selected in the beginning; but, 
 later, when it was seen that the number of avail- 
 able officers was less than the requirements of the 
 army, the judgment of the board was tempered by 
 the possibility of finding better material to re- 
 place the man under a charge of incompetence. 
 
 It was a singularly oppressive duty to bring a 
 recommendation for dismissal, so disastrous to the 
 feelings of young men who had offered their lives 
 to their country; but, in the face of a thoroughly 
 trained and experienced enemy, the retention of 
 other than efficient officers would have been a be- 
 trayal of our private soldiers and of our cause. 
 The criticism has been made that the testimony of 
 officers superior to members of the boards was 
 admitted, and that this testimony exercised undue 
 influence on such boards. In my experience, such 
 charges are unsustained. I remember that the 
 testimony of our forceful brigade commander was, 
 upon occasion, held insufficient, and that by a 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 75 
 
 board on whicli his adjutant sat as a member ; on 
 another occasion, a defendant arrested by order 
 of the commander-in-chief, through whose initia- 
 tive the proceedings were brought, was found com- 
 petent to hold his commission. 
 
 In the earlier sittings of these boards the only 
 recommendation the boards were allowed to make 
 was whether or not the commission of the officer 
 in question should be vacated. Later this rule 
 was modified, and the boards could recommend 
 the transfer of an officer to some other duty. 
 
 In the rush of the training camps it was not 
 only natural that commissions should be issued to 
 men incapable of holding them but that they 
 should be issued in a branch of the service for 
 which the officers were not qualified. In the artil- 
 lery, for instance, a certain proficiency in mathe- 
 matics is indispensable ; and no degree of leader- 
 ship will enable a man to figure his firing data, or 
 to regulate the firing of a battery from a flank. On 
 the other hand, an artillery officer does not need 
 the same excellent degree of physique required of 
 an infantryman. A man can be a very useful junior 
 officer on the staif without possessing in any de- 
 
76 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 gree tlie qualities of leadership. Indeed, within 
 the same arm of the service different qualities 
 could be recognized. I recall one man who failed 
 as a telephone officer but who became the chief of 
 operations of a brigade and actually improved 
 upon the firing methods of the French artillery. 
 Another artillery officer, who had failed to shine 
 elsewhere, acquired distinction while operating in 
 liaison with the infantry; and he was not one of 
 those who forgot his mission to lead an infantry 
 platoon in assault. 
 
 It certainly was not true in the division that 
 permanent officers in the Regular army were 
 held to a lower standard than those of the re- 
 serve. From one regiment, two colonels, a lieu- 
 tenant-colonel and a major were ordered to the 
 rear. It is a fact, however, that gross incompe- 
 tence received no severer treatment than depriva- 
 tion of temporary rank. The Eegular army still 
 contains officers whose utter incapacity was dem- 
 onstrated on the battlefield, and the dangerous 
 rule of seniority is raising them to positions where 
 they can do more damage in our next war. 
 
 The Regnilar officers were scrupulous about 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION T7 
 
 maintaining for their subordinates from the Re- 
 serve corps all honors rightfully earned. I re- 
 member an instance where a first lieutenant of 
 the Reserve corps had come into command of a 
 battery and exercised great ability. The corps 
 staff, perceiving that there was a captaincy vacant 
 in the regiment, assigned to it a regular captain, 
 an artilleryman by profession and a graduate of 
 West Point. The colonel of the regiment, himself 
 a professional artilleryman and an academy grad- 
 uate, refused to supersede the reserve lieutenant 
 and assigned the new captain as second in com- 
 mand of another battery. 
 
 It seemed to me then, and it seems to me now, 
 that the Germans should have adopted a policy 
 of smashing each American division as it ap- 
 peared in line. This would not have been diffi- 
 cult. It is simple to destroy one division by mass- 
 ing against it sufficient materiel and men. When 
 the unit is raw, the operation becomes elementary. 
 If the Germans, therefore, had smashed the 1st 
 division, and then the 2nd and 26th and 42nd, the 
 original American divisions that went to France, 
 it not only would have kept these future assault 
 
78 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 divisions from ever maturing but it would have 
 broken up the entire scheme of instruction which 
 made our participation so decisive in the summer 
 of 1918. 
 
 We should have had to delay putting our 
 divisions into line until we had a sufficient number 
 to prevent concentration against any one of them. 
 This would have meant delay, and delay is one 
 of the great dangers of war. I never have learned 
 what reason, if any, guided the German high com- 
 mand. Perhaps it was devoted to the principle 
 of major maneuvers and was against all other 
 considerations. Perhaps it feared to stir up the 
 American people as early in the war the English 
 people had been stirred. At all events the Ger- 
 mans did not interfere with our raw divisions, and 
 this enabled them to perform a threefold mission 
 which led to the German undoing before the fol- 
 lowing winter. 
 
 This triple achievement was : The green Amer- 
 ican divisions in line relieved the worn and thor- 
 oughly experienced French divisions and allowed 
 them to rest; they gained the experience of war- 
 fare, which can come only from actual fighting, 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 79 
 
 without heavy losses, and they constantly wore 
 down the trained and tired troops opposed to 
 them. 
 
 One general tribute may be paid to our senior 
 officers. They were full of fight. 
 
 Said one commander: **I don't want to hear 
 any talk of German atrocities. These complaints 
 have made the Germans think the allies are afraid 
 of them. When we hear the Germans complain of 
 us I will feel that their morale is breaking.*' 
 
 It had been the custom for both sides, the Ger- 
 mans and the allies, to take as much rest as pos- 
 sible in what were known as quiet sectors. The 
 Americans made these quiet sectors active. Un- 
 prepared to enter any large maneuvers, the Amer- 
 ican infantry, nevertheless, constantly harassed 
 its opponents by patrols, trench raids and con- 
 tinuous sniping, and the artillery fired day and 
 night on every possible target. Undoubtedly, the 
 American troops lost more heavily than their op- 
 ponents, but they had a large reservoir of rein- 
 forcements to draw upon, and their enemy had 
 not. Our individual energy and nervous force 
 was unweakened ; that of the enemy was far spent 
 
80 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 from four years of war. Finally, we had every- 
 thing to learn from these operations, wliile we 
 could teach our opponents nothing. 
 
 A great principle of warfare, announced by 
 Napoleon and taught by Marshal Foch, is the 
 wearing do^vn of the opponent while holding out 
 a reserve for the final blow. The green American 
 divisions did the wearing down; they released 
 trained reserves for the final blow, and, at the 
 same time, transformed themselves into assault 
 troops of a high order. 
 
 On the day the division repulsed the German 
 raid on Remieres Wood, in the Toul sector, it 
 received orders foretelling the expected German 
 offensive. 
 
 During the winter the Soviet government 
 of Russia made peace with Germany, and Rou- 
 mania was compelled to follow suit. The Ger- 
 mans, therefore, were able to reinforce their 
 western armies, retaining at the rear a number 
 of troops for rehearsing the forthcoming battle. 
 The German plan of operations was Imown. It 
 was to follow the method employed in their recent 
 success at Riga against the Russians, and was a, 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 81 
 
 further development of the offensive used by 
 Brusiloff against the Austrians in 1916; and, be- 
 fore that, by the Germans and Austrians on May 
 1st, 1915, at the Dunajec. The plan of attack con- 
 templated a secret assembling of artillery and 
 infantry, a short and brutal artillery preparation, 
 in which the use of yperite gas formed an impor- 
 tant function, and then an attack, not in lines, as 
 had been used before, but by detached groups 
 which were to infiltrate (slip between) the de- 
 fensive units and fire upon them from the flanks, 
 while further groups of Germans rushed them 
 from the front. 
 
 The method of defense adopted by the allies 
 was the occupation of a series of defensive lines 
 by the front line divisions. Each unit of infan- 
 try and artillery was to defend its position to the 
 last man, without hope of reinforcement, in the 
 expectation that twenty-four hours would elapse 
 before the German attack could overwhelm the 
 last line of defense of the sector troops, which 
 would allow sufficient time for reserves held at 
 strategic points along the line to form behind the 
 breach. 
 
82 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Authorities better informed than I will have 
 to tell the world what was the matter with the 
 allied command in the Spring of 1918. Possibly 
 there was dissension among the allied command- 
 ers-in-chief; otherwise, how explain the supine 
 sitting on the defensive and waiting for the blow 
 to fall, tactics which every work on war has de- 
 nounced as foredoomed to disaster? The excuse 
 cannot be offered that the allies were waiting for 
 the arrival of the American army. A large army 
 was in the making in America, and the greater 
 part of it had been ready for transportation to 
 Europe for several months; but the transporta- 
 tion, while available, had not been forthcoming, 
 as events subsequently disclosed clearly proved 
 and explained. 
 
 The Germans attacked the 5th British army on 
 March 21st, and quickly broke through on an 
 extended front. The disaster galvanized the allies' 
 into life. The gap was closed as brilliantly and 
 as skillfully as it had been opened. 
 
 The French 1st army was moved from Alsace 
 to Picardy, and the 1st division, known in the 
 army as the American division, was taken along. 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 83 
 
 An immediate counter-attack was projected, and 
 while stopping for a few days behind the new 
 front the division received instruction and prac- 
 tice in the assault. For reasons unknown to me 
 the plan for the attack was given up. Probably 
 the troops necessary to this operation were more 
 urgently needed as reinforcements in Flanders 
 or in front of Amiens. 
 
 The 1st division entered the line in Picardy 
 while the German forward pressure was still in 
 force. It entered a battlefield fairly covered with 
 artillery on both sides, artillery which continued 
 a duel for more than a month before the American 
 and French artillery obtained the mastery. All 
 kinds of guns, from trench mortars with a range 
 of a few hundred yards to long naval guns firing 
 twenty kilometers into the enemy's back areas, 
 were constantly in action. All day the opposing 
 artilleries fired to destroy each other, or upon 
 targets which revealed themselves to the battery 
 observers or to the balloons. All night they fired 
 on roads, paths and stream crossings, to impede 
 the advance of supplies, ammunition and rein- 
 forcements; day and night they poured their 
 
84 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 shells -upon trenches, villages and woods, to roh 
 the enemy of sleep, shatter his nerves, and kill 
 him. The country behind the lines was made more 
 deadly from artillery fire than the front lines, 
 which were spared to avoid the accidents of short 
 firing into their own infantry. The infantry, how- 
 ever, indulged in continuous fighting with ma- 
 chine gun, rifle and grenade. All night long was 
 conducted a partisan warfare. 
 
 *^No Man's Land must be American," was the 
 order of the commanding general, and our infan- 
 try made it so. Enemy patrols were attacked 
 wherever found, irrespective of numbers in either 
 party. If the enemy remained in his trenches, 
 he was sought out there. During the early days 
 of the battle the Germans on our left unleashed 
 an attack which made considerable progress for 
 a while, and eventually some of our long-range 
 guns were brought into action; but so concen- 
 trated were we on our own problem that hardly 
 a man today remembers the episode. 
 
 We had learned much in the Toul sector, but 
 were still lacking in that knowledge which saves 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 85 
 
 life. We lost three men to one lost by the French 
 divisions on either side of us. 
 
 A splendid aviation squadron to assist our 
 heavy artillery in counter-battery was furnished 
 by the French, and little by little our artillery su- 
 periority, grew and the German batteries were 
 destroyed or withdrawfi. One battalion of Ameri- 
 can 155s was credited with the destruction of ten 
 German batteries. It lost no guns from enemy 
 hits, but two were blown up and several were 
 worn out from continuous firing. The American 
 batteries were heavily manned. It was possible 
 to have two shifts of gunners, working twelve 
 hours each, and still replace exhausted men with 
 fresh groups from the horse lines. For the offi- 
 cers, however, there was no rest, and the excessive 
 fatigue revealed the greater combatant value of 
 young men. Officers around forty years of age — 
 and there were a number of gallant spirits of that 
 age who had sought commissions as junior lieu- 
 tenants — wore down under the strain, while boys 
 in their early twenties, whose military value had 
 appeared much less in the training period, on the 
 march, and in the early days of action, became 
 
86 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 red-eyed and pale, it is true, but evinced no dim- 
 inution of vitality. 
 
 Early in May, German resistance was so far 
 weakened that the French undertook the offen- 
 sive. 
 
 The German line had stopped and was holding 
 a series of naturally strong points. The policy 
 of the allied high command was to take all of 
 these points so as to leave the enemy no points 
 of departure for new attacks, and, likewise, no 
 bases of defense for our future offensive. 
 
 Grivesnes was stormed by the French, our 
 artillery participating. Soon afterwards it was. 
 confided to the senior officers that a great allied 
 offensive was to start at the end of May to drive 
 the Germans from their positions so dangerously 
 near to Paris and too close to Amiens. The gen- 
 eral plan was for three divisions to attack along 
 the line we held and advance eastwardly; and 
 three days later twenty divisions were to move 
 north from the front at Lassigny. Later, the plan 
 was changed to an attack by three divisions only; 
 but when the assault was finally made the 1st 
 division infantry made it alone. 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 87 
 
 The attack was of the kind, carefully prepared 
 and suddenly executed, which had been introduced 
 by the French at Verdun in the previous summer. 
 Great quantities of artillery were brought up to 
 reinforce that of our division. Batteries of trench 
 mortars were installed to destroy all life above 
 ground in the village of Cantigny ; guns of 220 mm. 
 caliber were to demolish all the cellars ; two bat- 
 teries of 380 mm. guns (approximately eleven 
 inches diameter) were to break into a tunnel 
 known to exist in the old chateau, and a hundred 
 75s were to put the rolling barrage before our 
 infantry. French tanks were to lead in the as- 
 sault and French flame throwers were to destroy 
 any defenders who insisted on fighting to the last 
 from underground shelters. 
 
 The plan of battle was approved by the French 
 army corps under which we served, and the artil- 
 lery plan was formulated by officers specially de- 
 tailed for this purpose. The scheme was an edu- 
 cation in itself, and the method of putting it into 
 execution was a novelty to the American officers. 
 We had been brought up under the system where- 
 by orders were issued by a superior authority and 
 
88 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 were carried out by subordinates, without ques- 
 tion or comment. Rather than speak back to a 
 superior officer, our batteries had more than 
 once fired at targets designated by the higher com- 
 mand, but which were known to the battery and 
 battalion commanders to be behind their range. 
 
 For the assault on Cantigny the artillery field 
 officers were assembled and written instructions 
 were issued to each. The plan was explained and 
 a general discussion invited. 
 
 The American officers sat silent while certain 
 French commanders made such comments as ap- 
 peared to them reasonable. Comments and criti- 
 cisms alike were received amiably. Some criti- 
 cisms were waved aside ; but others, which showed 
 that the staff had been mistaken in its plan, 
 brought amendments, thus encouraging some of 
 the American officers to make observations upon 
 matters particularly within their own knowledge. 
 These were taken under consideration. Where 
 batteries were given missions upon targets for 
 which they had no observation, telephonic com- 
 munication with observation posts overlooking 
 these targets was provided. The meeting broke 
 
THE GREAT DIVISION 89 
 
 up with every officer thoroughly understanding 
 the work before him and sharing the general con- 
 fidence in the plans, so fully explained and bound 
 to succeed. 
 
 The assault took place exactly as scheduled. 
 Every objective was taken. Every counter-attack 
 was beaten off. The smallness of the losses proved 
 at once the skill of the planners of the battle and 
 the state of efficiency at which the 1st division 
 had now arrived. 
 
 The moral effect of the Cantigny battle was in- 
 finitely greater than its tactical importance. Since 
 early spring the Germans had been winning all 
 along the line. Now, on the morrow of another 
 great German victory, when the only hope of the 
 allies lay in American reinforcements, American 
 troops proved that they could throw back the 
 enemy in formal battle. 
 
 The success of the 1st division on May 28th was 
 repeated by the 2nd division on June 6th at 
 Chateau Thierry. The American quality was 
 proved; only numbers were necessary to assure 
 the victory. 
 
 From Cantigny the 1st division was to go ta 
 
90 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 greater victories at Soissons and at St. Mihiel, 
 and to carry the greater part of the burden of the 
 second phase of the Argonne. It was to furnish 
 one army commander, two corps commanders, 
 seven division commanders, a commander of army 
 corps artillery, and too many brigadiers, regi- 
 mental commanders and important staff officers 
 to catalogue. Thirty-two thousand of its officers 
 and men were killed and wounded. Of those un- 
 touched by enemy shot, so many were promoted to 
 command in other organizations as to leave but 
 a leaven to inspire the replacements of officers and 
 men. 
 
 So great a thing is an American division when 
 thoroughly trained and disciplined. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 Germany's last offensive 
 
 Before taking up the larger operations of 
 American troops, which were now arriving in 
 France in great numbers, it is necessary to review 
 the course of the war throughout that year. 
 
 The year 1917 closed with Germany once more 
 successful on all fronts. In the east Eussia 
 had gone bolshevik and made peace, a peace which 
 Eoumania was compelled to follow. Italy, badly 
 routed, had reestablished her lines only with the 
 help of two hundred thousand French and English 
 troops. On the western front the Germans had 
 repulsed both the French and English offensives. 
 The French attack was stopped, with heavy losses 
 to Nivelle, within forty-eight hours. The British 
 offensive proceeded through the month of August, 
 but gradually lost its momentum, and it wore 
 down the British army, not yet sufficiently devel- 
 oped to conduct a major operation. Captured 
 
 German documents attested to the bravery of 
 
 91 
 
92 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Haig's troops, dwelt upon the inaccuracy of Ms 
 artillery, and exposed the unskillfulness of the 
 British commanders. 
 
 At the end of the year several small actions 
 conveyed important military lessons to those who 
 might be conversant with the facts. At Verdun 
 and at Malmaison the French, striking for limited 
 objectives, made attacks whose brilliancy demon- 
 strated that at last France had competent com- 
 manders, who had discovered how to co-ordinate 
 the operations of troops of the different arms 
 equipped with modem weapons. They formulated 
 the principle that *Hhe artillery conquers the 
 ground, the infantry occupies it.*' The German 
 defenders, both infantry and artillery, were anni- 
 hilated by overwhelming attacks of French artil- 
 lery, secretly concentrated. The French infantry 
 mopped up what was left, organized the occupied 
 ground, and held it against counter-attacks. 
 
 The British assault on Cambrai in November 
 was an experiment with a new weapon, and it 
 succeeded beyond all expectations. A large num- 
 ber of tanks and a supporting force of infantry, 
 which events proved to be inadequate, were 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 93 
 
 launched in an early morning surprise attack with 
 little artillery preparation. They easily broke the 
 German line and penetrated a number of kilo- 
 meters, but the troops were insufficient to exploit 
 this startling success. When stopped, they occu- 
 pied a new line in the form of a small salient. 
 The German general. Von der Marwitz, imme- 
 diately concentrated his reserves and counter-at- 
 tacked. Without tanks and massed artillery, his 
 success, nevertheless, was complete. The English 
 were driven back in confusion, and the line was 
 only restored by the arrival of hastily summoned 
 French troops, who made one of those long 
 marches that no other allied troops, because of 
 incomplete training and their inexperienced staffs, 
 have been able to perform. 
 
 A valuable lesson should have been drawn from 
 this battle by any soldiers informed of its details. 
 Unfortunately, the military censorship had thor- 
 oughly absorbed the conviction that it must pub- 
 licly announce all actions as victories. This time 
 it also misinformed its allies. American head- 
 quarters cabled Washington that Cambrai was a 
 moral and material victory. I happened to be at 
 
94 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Britisli headquarters the day of the German suc- 
 cess at Cambrai, and I told our staff what 
 actually happened. The official British account, 
 however, was accepted. 
 
 If Cambrai had been recognized for what it was 
 — a British defeat, and nearly a British disaster — 
 enough pressure might have been brought to bear 
 to obtain the shipping necessary to transport our 
 army to the western front before the disaster of 
 March, 1918. 
 
 Only in the southeast did the year 1917 end 
 more favorably to the allied cause. More success- 
 ful in diplomacy than in battle, the entente brought 
 Greece, whose government was pro-German, into 
 the war on its side. It should be borne in mind 
 that after Germany had defeated and was over- 
 running Serbia, the allies invaded northern 
 Greece to prevent the Germans from making a 
 connection with that country and using Greek 
 ports as submarine bases. Under the protection 
 of the invading armies a revolution was staged by 
 that wiliest of statesmen, Venizelos. King Con- 
 stantine, brother-in-law of the German Kaiser, 
 was compelled to abdicate, and his son, Prince 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 95 
 
 Alexander, was placed on the throne. A republic 
 probably would have been established but for the 
 opposition of English royalists, who were not 
 anxious to see a monarchy destroyed to make 
 room for a republic. 
 
 In December, 1917, the British defeated the 
 Turkish army in Palestine. 
 
 The incoming year, therefore, saw the French 
 and English standing opposite the Germans, and 
 subsidiary armies facing each other in Italy and 
 Greece. Everybody knew that the Spring and 
 Summer would witness a tremendous, if not a de- 
 cisive, campaign on the western front. Germany 
 had available the army which defeated Eussia and 
 was preparing to bring it across Europe by rail. 
 The allies had the American army, its prelimi- 
 nary organization and training in America ac- 
 complished, to bring across the Atlantic, to equip 
 it with modern weapons, and give it final instruc- 
 tion at the rear and in the trenches. Here was re- 
 produced on a grand scale the oft repeated situa- 
 tion of two hostile armies in contact and awaiting 
 the arrival of reinforcements which would decide 
 the fate of the battle. 
 
96 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 German troops now marched to the guns while 
 American troops were left fuming in America. 
 
 The 1st American division was moved to France 
 between June and September, 1917, and was fol- 
 lowed, in order, by the 26th and 42nd. The 2nd 
 division assembled in France during the winter, 
 and the 41st crossed the ocean early in January. 
 This rate of progress was more in keeping with 
 America's pre-war unpreparedness than with the 
 glorious rising of the nation which followed Field 
 Marshal Joffre's embassy. 
 
 The fault was not principally American. True, 
 our newly constituted shipping board did not 
 function well. Eesisting the demands of the mili- 
 tary authorities, it devoted a large percentage of 
 its shipping to commerce. This conduct was more 
 reprehensible than injurious, however, because the 
 tonnage at its disposal was small. Troops could 
 not be moved in quantity except in British bot- 
 toms, which, from the beginning of our overseas 
 movements, our general staff in Europe had been 
 negotiating unsuccessfully to obtain. The British 
 held back. 
 
 M. Painleve, the former French War Minister, 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 97 
 
 tells us that high officers of the British army 
 thought they could win the war before American 
 troops arrived, and with characteristic sporting 
 instinct wished to carry off the victory without 
 assistance. The war, however, had made over- 
 whelming demands on British shipping. Merchant 
 ships had been used as breakwaters ; great num- 
 bers had been sunk by submarines; many had 
 been commandeered to carry munitions, war sup- 
 plies and troops to England, to her allied coun- 
 tries and to her columns of conquest in Asia and 
 Africa. Only a small percentage of her total was 
 left to maintain her foreign trade and capture 
 that of Germany. 
 
 It is the traditional policy of England, while 
 engaged in European wars, to lend only such help 
 on the continent as may be necessary to secure the 
 victory, and to bend the rest of her efforts to ex- 
 tending the British empire throughout the world. 
 
 With the British army in France so confident 
 of success, it was unreasonable to expect England 
 to deprive herself of shipping to bring into France 
 an army which would detract from British im- 
 portance at the peace table. 
 
98 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Thus January and February and the first three 
 weeks of March went by with only one hundred 
 and fifty thousand American combatant troops in 
 France, and no movement on foot to accelerate 
 their transportation. Less excusable was the 
 situation on the actual battlef ront. 
 
 Every general officer in each allied army was 
 sufficiently read in the history of warfare to 
 comprehend the disadvantage under which two 
 or more armies under separate commanders 
 labor when they face enemy forces operating 
 under a single commander. Even officers who 
 had not studied military history hardly could 
 have failed to see how the united German com- 
 mand for four years had resisted and defeated 
 greatly superior numbers of allies, divided as they 
 were into separate armies under generals inde- 
 pendent of each other. Yet so shortsighted in real 
 patriotism, which ought to look only for the ulti- 
 mate success of their country, and so absorbed in 
 personal glorification, were the men responsible 
 for the military control of the war that, rather 
 than become subordinate one to another, they in- 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 99 
 
 sisted upon maintaining a military relation 
 doomed to defeat. 
 
 Looking back on the days of March, 1918, it is 
 strange to recall how confident we were of throw- 
 ing hack the inevitable German attack. We knew 
 that the Germans were training armies back of 
 their lines for the decisive assault; we knew in 
 general the tactics they proposed to employ. We 
 knew that the Germans had successfully broken 
 the Eussian, Serbian and Italian fronts, and we 
 had learned of their new mustard gas through 
 bitter experience. Yet, each army on the west- 
 ern front felt that the Germans could not break 
 through it! 
 
 What happened on March 21st is known. In 
 spite of air patrols, of trench raids, and of 
 allied spies, the Germans succeeded in marching 
 a great army through a territory inhabited by a 
 French population hostile and eager to furnish in- 
 formation to their countrymen, and completely 
 surprised the British 5th army. 
 
 They were well informed of the location of the 
 British organized defenses and batteries. Before 
 the assault these were overwhelmed by yperite 
 
100 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 gas, the effects of which continued long- after the 
 bombardment had ceased, allowing the German 
 artillery to turn its full force to the protection of 
 the attacking troops. 
 
 The British defeat was complete. The way was 
 open to Amiens. The Germans did what the allies 
 had failed to do under more favorable circum- 
 stances — they completely broke the trench system 
 and annihilated the defending army. One British 
 general, believing all was lost, maneuvered his 
 troops as though to protect the broken right flank 
 of the British army, apparently forgetting there 
 was a gap in the common front that must be closed 
 to avert an allied disaster. In momentary panic, 
 he acted as if his only thought was to enable the 
 British army to get back safely to the seacoast. 
 
 Then, with victory in Germany's hands, the 
 French army performed a maneuver as extraordi- 
 nary in its way as the German attack, and closed 
 around the hole in the line. Nearby troops 
 marched to the battlefield with unprecedented 
 speed, more remote troops moved in camions, and 
 an entire army crossed France by rail from 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 101 
 
 Lorraine. Of this army the American 1st division 
 formed a part. 
 
 It seems to me that the result of the battle of 
 March 21st was the inevitable consequence of a 
 situation which allowed an army, organized and 
 trained through the years, to devote its entire at- 
 tention to an army built up during the war. I 
 have no doubt the same thing would have hap- 
 pened to the American army, in the same position. 
 Only the French could meet the Germans on even 
 terms, and this because they had organized for 
 war as long and as carefully as their traditional 
 foe. 
 
 The desperate situation galvanized the torpid 
 allied governments into action. An allied com- 
 mander-in-chief was named. After March 21st 
 there could be no doubt in what army the supreme 
 command should lie. It was given to General 
 Foch and his French staff. 
 
 Foch received the appointment because of the 
 high opinion Clemenceau entertained for him. In 
 many circles Joffre would have been the most 
 welcome leader. Joffre, however, had a certain 
 military opposition and he was much feared by 
 
102 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 the French politicians because of his popularity. 
 
 I do not feel that the personality of Foch made 
 much difference. What was needed was any one 
 of a half dozen French generals educated in the 
 French schools of high command, who had prac- 
 ticed during the years of peace the maneuvering 
 of large bodies of men by rail and by road, and 
 who had risen in the French army with a freedom 
 of promotion for merit which did not exist in the 
 English armies. If France did not produce any 
 great general in this war, she did furnish a num- 
 ber of masters of technique and she certainly 
 promoted officers who demonstrated unusual 
 ability. 
 
 With the German drive stopped by the French 
 just short of Amiens, and again in April at Kem- 
 mel Hill, the allied position was almost hopeless. 
 A few more concentrations, a few more drives, 
 and Germany must be victorious. The only hope 
 of salvation was to get American help before Ger- 
 many could strike again. 
 
 Commercial considerations being forgotten, 
 shipping was produced as if by magic. A new 
 and serious question, however, had presented 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 103 
 
 itself. Should the half-trained and imperfectly 
 armed American troops be transported across the 
 ocean in the face of a not improbable German vic- 
 tory, of which they could only be the spoils? If 
 Germany should win before Summer, the Ameri- 
 can troops would not be in condition to assist in 
 the allied defense; they would fall into the Ger- 
 man hands as hostages, and they would not be 
 available to defend the American seacoast from 
 the attack of the victor. 
 
 I have an idea that many readers will scorn a 
 suggestion implying so despicable a motive. Let 
 them study the conduct of the allies during the 
 war; the ratio between English troops in France 
 and in England and the failure to support Russia 
 in 1915. 
 
 America sent her troops. She did much more. 
 She sent them as the allies needed them, and not 
 as the ambitions of their generals dictated or as 
 their own welfare required. Divisions were 
 broken up and the infantry sent without its ar- 
 tillery. They were sent, not to enter quiet sectors 
 for instruction in modem warfare, but to reinforce 
 tired, hard-pressed troops on an active front. A 
 
104 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 large part of them were put under generals and 
 colonels of an army which had just been com- 
 pletely defeated. 
 
 The troops which went into action with the 
 British were not raw troops. They were, for the 
 most part, national guardsmen, many of whose 
 officers had given their leisure time to military 
 study. They had received preliminary training 
 in the Mexican mobilization and had now been 
 drilling for nearly a year. They had been prac- 
 ticed in marching formations, had received small 
 arms and bayonet training, and had been taught 
 infantry tactics so far as these had developed up 
 to the Summer of 1917. They had not studied the 
 use of the modern infantry weapons of assault, 
 the trench mortars or infantry cannon. They had 
 not learned the use of cover, which only comes 
 from service at the front, and which can be taught 
 with smaller losses in sector warfare. They were 
 totally uninformed as to the methods of attack 
 developed and perfected by the French at the end 
 of 1917 and they were not accompanied by their 
 own artillery, which should have been trained 
 with them until they had reached the perfect un- 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 105 
 
 der standing essential to tlie support of infantry 
 if it is to be saved heavy losses in assault. 
 
 So much higher, therefore, is their glory, that 
 without flinching they faced the strain of battle 
 which the French higher command only required 
 of the 1st division after three months of sector 
 training, of the 2nd after five months, and of the 
 26th and 42nd after six. 
 
 After March 21st American divisions debarked 
 in France in the f ollomng sequence : 32nd, 3rd, 5th 
 complete, and the 28th, 77th, 4th, 27th, 30th, 35th 
 and 33d without artillery. 
 
 On May 27th the Germans broke the Franco- 
 British Chemin des Dames line and marched into 
 the Chateau Thierry salient, to be stopped on June 
 4th by another army, hastily collected by General 
 Foch, of which the American 2nd division occupied 
 the key position on the direct road to Paris, while 
 the machine gun battalion of the 3rd division went 
 into action on the south bank of the Marne. 
 
 American troops were now called upon in num- 
 bers. The 3rd, 4th and 28th divisions were moved 
 from British fronts to the Chateau-Thierry 
 salient. The 26th was brought from Toul and put 
 
106 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 into the front line, and the 42nd was taken from 
 reserve at Baccarat and put into line near Reims. 
 The 77th, 82nd, 35th and 32nd divisions were 
 training, relieving divisions already trained, and 
 wearing down the Germans in the qniet sectors. 
 
 The German advances had stopped, forming a 
 series of salients projecting into our lines. 
 
 From the days of short fronts and short range 
 weapons, salients have been well recognized weak 
 points for the reason that the adversary could 
 concentrate a heavy fire upon them from several 
 directions and confuse the defenders by simul- 
 taneous attacks on the different fronts. In the 
 early part of this war, although ranges had in- 
 creased enormously, the lengths of fronts had in- 
 creased in even greater proportion, and many 
 salients were created and held with impunity be- 
 cause they were so much greater in extent than 
 the range of the artillery used in the early period 
 of the war that it was impossible to concentrate 
 fire upon them. It seemed as though the old prin- 
 ciple of tactics no longer held. 
 
 However, by the Spring of 1918 the French had 
 armed themselves with a great number of mobile 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 107 
 
 guns ranging nearly 20,000 meters. With these 
 they surrounded the Cantigny and Chateau- 
 Thierry salients. The divisional artillery fired to 
 its extreme range. From there on the 155 longs 
 took up the mission. A small semicircle which the 
 longs could not reach was attacked with special 
 cannon of still greater range and with aerial bom- 
 bardments. Nowhere in the salients was there 
 safety or rest for the Germans. Advancing to the 
 front line or returning to rest, they were compelled 
 to pass mile after mile over roads subject to artil- 
 lery fire. 
 
 The effect of this artillery fire must not be for- 
 gotten in casting up the reasons for the German 
 collapse. 
 
 On June 7th the Germans attempted another 
 grand attack on the line Montdidier-Noyon, 
 and here they met their first complete check. The 
 French had notice of the plan and adopted a spe- 
 cial form of tactics to defeat it. Strong points 
 were skillfully concealed and held in force. Ger- 
 man troops passing between them, according to 
 their new tactics of infiltration, were caught under 
 the concentrated artillery fire of the defense. 
 
108 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Wlien the weight of the Geiinan attack forced 
 back the garrisons at the strong points, these re- 
 tired in good order upon a line of supporting 
 troops, drawn up beyond the range of the German 
 barrage, and fully prepared for battle. The at- 
 tack was stopped, and the 10th army, under Gen- 
 eral Mangin, advancing from billets in the region 
 of Beauvais, counter-attacked on the German 
 right flank and drove it back in disorder. 
 
 This was the first big allied success and it was 
 made possible by the valor of the French troops, 
 the tactical skill of their leaders, and the presence 
 of ^ve hundred thousand American troops, which 
 released an equal number of French veterans 
 from the quiet sectors to thicken their defensive 
 organization. 
 
 With the entrance into line of the American 
 army in force the hour for German victory had 
 passed. 
 
 Disturbed by rumors from the Fatherland, and 
 hurried by the rapid development of the Ameri- 
 cans, the German staff began to falter. The 
 preparations for the attack around Reims were 
 not well concealed. Field Marshal Foch was 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 109 
 
 fully informed of them and massed his defensive 
 troops. Not only Americans, but English and 
 even Italians, were brought to the battlefield. 
 Even the exact hour of the assault was learned, 
 and the French defensive bombardment was 
 started one hour before the German fire. Sur- 
 prised with munitions for the artillery prepara- 
 tion piled beside the guns, with columns of troops 
 advancing into position along heavily shelled 
 roads, it was too late to stop the attack. 
 
 General Gouraud withdrew his troops from the 
 front into three defensive lines. He ordered that 
 the first line, when hard pressed, should fall back 
 on the second, and the third line troops should 
 act for counter-attack, or for defense of the last 
 position, as developments of the battle might 
 dictate. 
 
 In the first line only groups of machine gunners 
 and signalers were left. They were to notify the 
 command of the start of the German assault and 
 keep the defensive artillery informed of its prog- 
 ress, so that the heavy barrage could be kept con- 
 stantly on the advancing Germans. 
 
 From Chateau-Thierry to Verdun this attack 
 
110 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 stopped either at the advance or at the inter- 
 mediate line, excepting just west of Eeims, where 
 the German column thrust back its opposition and 
 continued to progress towards Epernay. Nowhere 
 did Americans give way. The 42nd and 3rd di- 
 visions particularly distinguished themselves. 
 
 Not many troops on either side were available 
 for maneuver, but on the allied side there re- 
 mained at the disposition of Marshal Foch the 
 best troops in the war, the 1st and 2nd American 
 divisions and the French Moroccans. These three 
 divisions were formed into a special corps under 
 General Berdoulat, and, assisted by a mass of 
 little, fast French tanks, debouched from the for- 
 est of Villers-Cotterets at daylight on July 18th. 
 By nightfall they had driven seven kilometers into 
 the enemy's line. Without reinforcement or re- 
 lief, they attacked again the next day, and on the 
 20th captured Berzy-le-Sec, cutting the road from 
 Soissons to Chateau-Thierry. 
 
 The German advance on Epernay, made in the 
 hope of capturing Reims and flattening out the 
 salient, had to be abandoned, and their resources 
 devoted to stopping the great counter-attack 
 
GERMANY'S LAST OFFENSIVE 111 
 
 wHcli threatened to capture their whole army. 
 Scotch and French troops relieved the Americans 
 and the Moroccans, but German reinforcements 
 in equal numbers had been rushed to the scene 
 and the allied advance was stopped. 
 
CHAPTEE VI 
 
 A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 
 
 Shoetly after the battle of Cantigny I was pro- 
 moted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in my 
 old regiment, now the 122nd field artillery, and 
 upon its arrival in France was assigned to it at 
 the request of the regimental commander. Nei- 
 ther in the regular army nor in any foreign serv- 
 ice have I seen a body of men reach a greater 
 state of efficiency before they had undergone the 
 experience of battle. The regiment was in a splen- 
 did state of administration, of discipline and of 
 morale. The officers, who had come from the cav- 
 alry more than a year before, had studied their 
 new technique to good eifect. 
 
 Upon the order of the commanding officer I 
 prepared a course of instruction, drawn from 
 eight months' experience at the front, which was 
 to supplement the instruction in fire adjustment 
 given by the school. 
 
 I insert these instructions, written in the midst 
 
 112 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 113 
 
 of war, primarily for the purpose of illustration. 
 In later chapters I will refer to untrained divisions 
 and green divisions. Our inexperienced troops 
 were ignorant of many military accomplishments 
 not touched upon in this simple course. The points 
 I sought to cover were essentials in which most 
 of the officers who had come to the 1st division 
 from America and from training schools in France 
 had either not been taught or had totally failed to 
 comprehend. 
 
 The immense blockades on the roads during the 
 Argonne fighting were primarily due to ignorance 
 of road discipline. The hunger of which so many 
 con^plained was due to their ignorance of the con- 
 servation and use of food. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS FOR TROOPS ABOUT TO ENTER 
 THE LINE 
 
 Upon leaving the training camp and entering upon 
 active duty, it is necessary for junior officers to appre- 
 ciate the immensely greater responsibilities which they 
 incur. In a regimental camp, the commanding officer 
 or, in all events, the field officers between them, can 
 personally supervise everything and can personally 
 direct and correct whenever necessary. On the other 
 hand, when deployed in action, when spread out on the 
 
114 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 march and even when billeted in towns, this immediate 
 supervision becomes impossible. Enforc&ment of orders 
 and discipline devolves upon the junior officers unmded. 
 
 The senior officers can only issue orders and inspect 
 to see if they are properly carried out and if not, to 
 proceed against the officer mho has failed to carry themn 
 out. 
 
 CHAPTER I. The Maxch.— The rules for con- 
 ducting a march are the following: 
 
 (1) All vehicles must be securely and neatly packed. 
 
 (2) When moving, all vehicles must be kept at all 
 times at the extreme right of the paved road, in 
 order to allow traffic freely to pass the column. 
 When halted, the vehicles will be pulled clear off 
 the road, whenever possible. 
 
 (3) They must be formed in groups. Generally, ten 
 vehicles form a group and the distance between 
 groups is fifty meters, to form a pocket in which 
 faster vehicles may enter when meeting traffic, 
 or while passing the train. A red disc is placed 
 
 ^ on the rear end of the rear wagon of each group. 
 
 (4) Trains will never, under any circumstances, be 
 stopped in towns. 
 
 The foregoing rules are elementary, but because of 
 their simplicity are frequently neglected. Their ob- 
 servance is absolutely obligatory and must be enforced, 
 if necessary, by severe disciplinary measures against 
 negligent officers. The next two rule? are not easily ob- 
 served. They are: 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 116 
 
 (5) Never allow the road to become blocked. 
 
 (6) Never lose the way. 
 
 Most frequent causes for blocking of traffic are becom- 
 ing mired and driving off the paved road. These faults 
 can be minimized with well trained drivers, but there is, 
 on narrow or bad roads, a constant opportunity for the 
 initiative of the commanding officer. For instance, 
 when coming to a steep hill, or to a soft length of road 
 that threatens to stall the train, attach additional horses 
 to each vehicle before it enters the bad spot. It is 
 easier to pull a moving vehicle through a muddy hole or 
 up a steep slope than to start one once stalled. In the 
 case of a sharp turn in a narrow road, it is desirable to 
 unhitch the lead horses ; sometimes all except the wheel- 
 ers may be removed. Time taken in these little opera- 
 tions is inconsequential compared with the long delays 
 due to stalling of a gun or park wagon. 
 
 On the march to Cantigny two wagons getting off a 
 bad piece of road delayed a regiment of artillery eight 
 hours. 
 
 Whenever a train becomes blocked for any reason, it is 
 the duty of a superior commander to investigate the con- 
 duct of the officer immediately in charge, to ascertain 
 not only whether he was guilty of negligence but whether 
 he exercised all the initiative and energy which might 
 be expected and required of him. 
 
 The final injunction (6) is the most important, the 
 most frequently violated, and the one whose violation 
 is the most fatal in its consequences. 
 
116 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The rale is absolute. 
 
 An officer travelling must never lose his way. 
 
 An officer who violates this injunction must be con- 
 sidered prima facie guilty of a very serious offense, re- 
 quiring the strongest kind of evidence to overcome his 
 presumption of guilt. 
 
 It is not necessary to be lost. Sometimes a road is 
 easy to follow and, therefore, invites carelessness. Other 
 times a way may appear so difficult as to invite dis- 
 couragement. The consequences of a mistake may be 
 so serious, in a military way, that mistakes must be 
 made serious for the offender. It will be remembered 
 that many battles have been lost because an organization, 
 or even a messenger, violated this simple rule. 
 
 Precautions to be taken include a careful study of 
 the map, a careful reading of all signboards along the 
 road, and, when doubt exists, an interrogation of inhabi- 
 tants and scouting along different forks of a doubtful 
 crossroad. 
 
 A train once committed to a wrong road may be com- 
 pelled to a long detour ; may run to a blind end ; may 
 have to be left out of an operation entirely. It is, there- 
 fore, indispensable that a train shall have competent 
 scouts pushed sufficiently far in advance to establish 
 the correct direction before the column reaches the 
 crossroad. 
 
 Each battery will have a machine gun mounted on a 
 wagon for use against airplane attack. The machine 
 gun detail will be charged with keeping a sharp look- 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 117 
 
 out for hostile airplanes. Whenever a hostile airplane 
 is reported within the vicinity of the column, the column 
 will be withdrawn under trees, if possible, otherwise 
 halted on the road until the airplane has passed. All 
 mounted men will dismount when at a halt. On the 
 march, drivers will be required to walk about half 
 the time. 
 
 Officers should be taught to locate the North Star 
 by the Big and Little Dippers and by Cassiopeia. They 
 should accustom themselves to follow the course of 
 the sun by day and of the stars at night. They should 
 also memorize the general course of the rivers of the 
 neighborhood. Watches, compasses, and maps are es- 
 sential to scientific warfare, but one should be prepared 
 to get along without them if necessary. 
 
 CHAPTER IT. Occupying Positions.— Occupying 
 battery positions divides under four heads. The first 
 is in the case of the relief of a sector. In this case 
 a battery generally takes up the position of the battery 
 it relieves. Ample time is furnished for reconnaissance 
 of roads. The relief is made at night in order to avoid 
 observation by the enemy, and if traffic on the road 
 permits it is desirable to separate the guns by an in- 
 terval of five minutes' march to allow each gun to un- 
 limber and the horses to move away before the next gun 
 arrives in position. This plan will minimize confusion 
 in case fire comes on the battery during the relief, or 
 in case of fire along the road of approach. It is the 
 duty of the outgoing battery to turn over to the incom- 
 
118 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 ing battery all information, of whatever nature, per- 
 taining to its battery position. An officer of the out- 
 going battery remains with the incoming battery for a 
 day or two; the incoming battery commander should 
 avail himself to the fullest extent of the information 
 of the outgoiQg officer. Pride or a false fear of appear- 
 ing ignorant cannot be tolerated. 
 
 The second case of occupying a battery position is as 
 a reinforcing battery. In this instance, a number of the 
 available battery positions will have been noted by the 
 staff, and there will be offered to each groupment, or 
 group, either a certain number of alternative battery 
 positions from which to select, or the locations for bat- 
 teries will be indicated by coordinates. Sometimes no 
 opportunity for reconnaissance can be given the battery 
 officers. Hence, absolute familiarity with the map is 
 essential. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that with the immense quan- 
 tity of artillery used in this war, individual batteries 
 must be located according to a general plan, the needs 
 of the individual battery giving way to the greater 
 needs of the whole. At the same time, group and bat- 
 tery officers have much better opportunity for deter- 
 mining the very best location for a battery within a 
 limited area and much greater interest in so doing than 
 has the staff. Therefore, when a battery commander 
 finds a position which he thinks will allow him to per- 
 form all his missions, will not interfere with any other 
 battery, and will afford him greater protection than the 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 119 
 
 one allotted him, he should report this fact to his imme- 
 diate superior. Every battery and group commander 
 studies the ground in his area with great care so as to 
 endeavor to get absolutely the best location and ar- 
 rangement of his guns. The Plan Director is a map 
 of extraordinary exactness, but it must be remembered 
 that the contours are separated by five meters and cannot 
 portray the small accidents of the ground which fur- 
 nish the best defilade both from view and from fire. 
 
 The third case is that of an advance. The conditions 
 are much the same as in reinforcing; the batteries are 
 moved according to a plan of operations. The difference 
 is that the accidents of battle may disarrange the plan 
 and call upon the immediate commander to display 
 initiative and originality. 
 
 The fourth case is of batteries going to fill a gap in 
 the line, as at Montdidier and Chateau-Thierry. This 
 condition more nearly approximates the methods set 
 down in our drill regulations than any of the others. 
 It may be pointed out that in this situation the enemy's 
 infantry has preceded his artillery and that, as less 
 counter-battery is to be feared, less attention need be 
 paid to defilade and more to the selection of positions 
 which facilitate the quick opening of fire. 
 
 CHAPTER III. Emplacements.— Work on battery 
 emplacements should be begun, when possible, be- 
 fore the arrival of the battery, and to this end the bat- 
 tery and group commanders should endeavor to send 
 forward working parties to get some sort of protection 
 
120 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 before the battery arrives. Work on the emplacement 
 must continue as long as the battery occupies the posi- 
 tion. Men should be encouraged to take pride in their 
 skill in constructing battery positions and not to feel 
 disappointed when their well-built position must be 
 evacuated. 
 
 It is a simple matter to make a protection against 
 shrapnel and shell fragments, even of large caliber 
 shells. When a gun crew is so protected that it cannot 
 be put out of action except by a direct hit by shell, 
 there is little chance of it failing to perform its duty 
 in battle, even if under fire. With time, tunnels to 
 shelter gun crews can be driven to a sufficient depth to 
 render them proof against counter-battery fire. 
 
 The method and order of construction of battery posi- 
 tions are laid down in general orders. It is well to call 
 the attention of battery commanders to the fact that the 
 battery commander's command posts should be at least 
 100 meters to one flank of the guns. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. Defilade.— This is the most dif- 
 ficult part of the artillery and, next to correct shooting, 
 the most important. It includes the selection of a posi- 
 tion, the artificial improvement of this position, and 
 the abstention from doing things which will reveal the 
 position to an enemy on the ground or in the air. 
 
 An ideal position for 75s would be along a road of 
 irregular tracing not carried on the map; in some 
 broken ground in which the wheels, trail and gun crew 
 can be located in a depression where the natural sur- 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 121 
 
 face of the ground reaches up to the muzzle and forward 
 rises a mask which does not interfere with the minimum 
 range required for the tactical use of the guns ; for the 
 howitzers a position along a similar road but behind a 
 hill, the higher the better, with a slope of 30 degrees, 
 or behind a steep bank, or in a cut or ravine. 
 
 The 75s, because of their small size and flash, can be 
 very effectively concealed among bushes, hedges or 
 orchards. The howitzers are not as easily concealed, and 
 because of their high angle of fire may be placed in 
 woods or behind hills where the field pieces could not 
 operate. In any battery area a number of sites will 
 be found, each possessing various advantages and 
 disadvantages. It is a part of the function of an 
 artilleryman to balance the advantages and select the 
 most suitable. 
 
 Battery officers should take every opportunity to 
 study the conformation of ground and to pick out likely 
 battery positions. It is only by perfect familiarity with 
 ground conformation that officers in battle can rapidly 
 select the best available position. They should beware 
 of small woods carried on the plan director. If their 
 presence in such a wood becomes known, their cover 
 becomes a target, a point which can be used by the 
 enemy to measure ranges and deflections and an object 
 of good visibility for airplane observation. 
 
 The batteiy position selected, the problem of artificial 
 concealment [camouflage] presents itself. This is the 
 subject of vital importance. One of the greatest mis- 
 
122 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 takes an artillery officer unfamiliar with the subject can 
 make is to minimize it through egotism. A study of 
 enemy counter-battery fire upon any groupment will 
 reveal the fact that one or two batteries receive most 
 of the punishment. This is due to bad camouflage and 
 bad defilade discipline in the batteries concerned. 
 
 Any battery commander can learn the principles of 
 camouflage, and by availing himself of talent in his 
 organization can obtain a great degree of invisibility. 
 The principle of camouflage is to have the ground upon 
 which the battery rests reveal to aerial observation or 
 photography little or no change. 
 
 First, the four pieces should not be placed at regular 
 intervals or in line; second, no shadows should be 
 thrown; camouflage nets should be sloped so that early 
 morning sun and the late evening sun will not cast 
 shadows. Existing shadows should not be suppressed; 
 for instance, if a battery is located in a quarry the 
 camouflage should not cover the side of the quarry. Re- 
 flection of light is to be avoided ; camouflage should not 
 be stretched tight and flat. Black holes should not ap- 
 pear, for which reason curtains must extend over em- 
 brasures and back of the emplacements and over ammuni- 
 tion shelters. It is found desirable to have the bottom 
 of the camouflage net about two feet from the ground. 
 Where foliage must be cut to permit the firing of bat- 
 teries, this must be done with careful study ; the cutting 
 must be (1) reduced to the absolute minimum; (2) not 
 nearer to the ground than the requirements of minimum 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 123 
 
 range demand, and (3) not regular in shape. Batteries 
 in woods and hedges will be greatly helped in their con- 
 cealment by use of freshly cut branches set on end, 
 either in the ground or in wire netting above the pieces. 
 
 The camouflage erected, the battery conunander can- 
 not dismiss the subject. Camouflage has the habit of 
 falling into disarray, like the clothing of a schoolboy, 
 and in order to look natural needs to be readjusted to 
 meet the different conditions of light, like the com- 
 plexion of a mature beauty. If one of the officers shows 
 an aptitude for the subject, he may be designated, in 
 addition to his other duties, as camouflage officer ; other- 
 wise this duty must be confided to a suitable non- 
 commissioned officer. The camouflage officer, or non- 
 commissioned officer, must be constantly wandering 
 around the position looking for faults and for oppor- 
 tunities of improving the camouflage. No greater 
 evidence of military proficiency can be given by a 
 battery officer than by keeping his battery in condition 
 of good defilade. 
 
 The battery commander must determine the avenues 
 of circulation. If the battery is on a road, the kitchen 
 must be put down the road in one direction and the 
 latrine in the other direction. Under no circumstances 
 must men leave the road except to perform duty. If 
 one or more paths are absolutely unavoidable, they 
 should be wound irregularly around trees and bushes 
 or along the border separating two different crops in a 
 field. Cutting of comers must be forbidden under severe 
 
124. THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 penalty. It is desirable to fence the permitted paths 
 with barbed wire, and, until this is done, to station path 
 sentries with orders and to compel every one, even senior 
 officers, to obey them. 
 
 The necessity of keeping out of sight must be thor- 
 oughly explained to the men, and discipline must be 
 used whenever necessary to enforce this rule. Men in 
 the open must take cover immediately upon a hostile 
 airplane being reported. It is to be borne in mind that 
 it is much easier to keep men out of the open than to 
 get them in from the open in time to prevent their 
 being seen. While batteries are generally defiladed from 
 enemy view, lengths of roads leading to them are always 
 in enemy view. Circulation along these roads may re- 
 veal to the experienced enemy the locations of batteries 
 themselves invisible. The battalion commander, there- 
 fore, must control such circulation. 
 
 Smoke is a frequent means of betraying locations. 
 In clear, windless weather, smoke columns can be inter- 
 sected from enemy 0. P 's. and their location determined 
 to a yard. An example of the penalty of poor smoke 
 discipline was that of a battery kitchen in a large forest 
 of tall trees which received a volley of forty shells per- 
 fectly aimed. 
 
 Even the best defiladed battery will be located by 
 intersection of its flashes or by sound ranging, if it fires 
 alone. A sufficient volume of fire will confuse both the 
 flash spotting and sound ranging sections of the enemy. 
 Thus, in general action, batteries are not apt to reveal 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 1^5 
 
 their presence, and the chances of bein^ located by flash 
 spotting and sound ranging may be minimized in regis- 
 tration by having several different batteries fire at the 
 same, or approximately the same, moment; during fire 
 for destruction, by having several destructions carried 
 on at the same time. In registration, this is best accom- 
 panied by cooperation between battalion commanders; 
 and in fires for destruction, must be regulated by the 
 chief of the divisional artillery. 
 
 The enemy may be further confused by the use of 
 roving guns. Individual guns, platoons or even batteries, 
 in the case of the light artillery, are taken out of their 
 regular position, moved under the cover of darkness and 
 fired for a day, or a part of a day, from a temporary 
 position, moving out again that night. 
 
 As a protection against enemy fire for destruction, 
 the practice of separating the platoons by a hundred 
 yards or more is coming more and more into use. In 
 batteries of 155s, the separation of a battery into two 
 platoons for firing is done more than half the time 
 when standing on the defensive. Intervals between guns 
 are also greatly increased, sometimes to as much as 
 100 meters. 
 
 The movement toward the dispersion even of the 
 component units of batteries has been accentuated by 
 the use of yperite (mustard gas). While the gas mask 
 and oiled clothing give temporary protection against 
 this gas, it is impossible for men to remain on the ground 
 upon which any considerable number of yperite shells 
 
U6 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 have fallen. The dividing of batteries renders the dis- 
 abling of an entire battery less probable, or, in any 
 event, demands a double expenditure of enemy shells. 
 
 The battery command post also should be located far 
 enough from the battery to be out of the yperite fumes. 
 Alternate battery positions must be located and oriented, 
 to which the pieces must be withdrawn as soon as the 
 gas bombardment upon the position has ended. The 
 pieces must be thoroughly disinfected, the clothing of 
 men exposed to the yperite fumes changed, the men 
 bathed in soap and water, and the clothing hung to let 
 the yperite evaporate into a location where the fumes 
 can do no damage. 
 
 Finally, in order to confuse the enemy, Quaker bat- 
 teries will be made. These should not be too visible or 
 they will not fool the enemy. If false flashes are ob- 
 tainable from the storage park, they can be fired from 
 these dummy positions. If they are not available, the 
 unused packages of powder from the 155s can be fired 
 by means of Bickford fuses. 
 
 CHAPTER V. Artillery Observation. — Upon com- 
 ing into position, observation should be organized in 
 the first instance by battalion. The batteries of 75s 
 find observation posts where they can observe their bar- 
 rage. The battalion observation post is located where 
 it can get the best view of the battalion sector. The 
 battery observation posts will report directly to the 
 batteries observation of fire and barrage. All other 
 information is reported to battalion headquarters. Ob- 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 127 
 
 servation posts of the 155s, not being concerned with 
 the baiTage, seek longer views. They will become 
 valuable to regulate barrage if the enemy crosses our 
 first line, and should be used to study the ground where 
 such barrage would be put down. Their occupants 
 should be ready to control the fire of the 75s on such 
 barrage, if called upon to do so. 
 
 Where an 0. P. has a special mission, as in the case 
 of a battery observation post of 75s, one man will watch 
 this field, while another performs general observation. 
 
 The number of the personnel occupying observation 
 posts will vary according to the cover obtainable. It is 
 desirable to have it not less than three nor more than 
 six. Where an 0. P. is in a position exposed to enemy 
 view, details are changed every night and remain in 
 the observation post for 24 hours. 
 
 Strict discipline must be used, if necessary, to prevent 
 men from disclosing their persons or in any way be- 
 traying the 0. P. to the enemy. A disclosure not only 
 endangers the personnel but may lead to the destruction 
 of the 0. P. at the moment observation is most needed. 
 
 It is highly desirable to have the observation posts 
 interconnected by telephone, as will be pointed out 
 in the chapter on Telephone. In the absence of such 
 line, the battalion observation posts can readily com- 
 municate with each other through the battalion switch- 
 board and the lines connecting battalion command posts. 
 
 Upon occupying an observation post, the officer in 
 charge will immediately select an object in enemy ter- 
 
128 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 ritory about the middle of his field of vision, and which 
 is accurately represented upon the map. This will be 
 the zero line of his observatoiy. The instruments will 
 be oriented with the zero of the lower limb laid on this 
 point. The lower limb will be securely clamped. Ob- 
 servations from the observatory will thereafter be read 
 on the mill scale: so many mills right or left (of Mont 
 Sec steeple or Canti^y graveyard). It will be the 
 duty of the personnel in charge of the observatory to see 
 that the lower limb of the instrument is never moved, 
 and to caution senior officers, who alone have the right 
 to enter observation posts, as a further protection against 
 a loss of the zero line. Stakes will be driven along this 
 line which can be seen in thick weather and identified 
 at night by means of luminous watch faces. If the ob- 
 servatory is occupied in thick weather, observation 
 must be made according to the points of the compass 
 until the weather clears. 
 
 As rapidly as possible the officer of the observation 
 post will prepare a panoramic sketch and a visibility 
 map of the field of view from his observatory. Each 
 O. P. will be given the coordinates of the other 0. P's. 
 in the battalion. Each observer will visit all the 0. P 's. 
 as opportunity offers, and will communicate directly 
 with them when he sees something of interest which he 
 thinks may be invisible from their observatories. 
 
 All matters of sufficient interest are to be reported 
 immediately to battalion command posts, from which 
 they will be relayed to the higher commands. 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 1^9 
 
 A diary will be kept in each 0. P., divided into 24 
 parts, corresponding to the hours of the day, and aU 
 events of whatever kind not worthy of immediate re- 
 port will be written down in this diary. This will 
 include the fall of enemy shells and an impression as 
 to their origin. If enemy shells pass directly over the 
 observation post, this should be reported by telephone. 
 The point of fall then being determined, a line is estab- 
 lished within which the enemy battery lies. All 
 occurrences deemed of interest to the battery will be 
 reported immediately. Among these will be firing of 
 any kind, with the observer's best impression as to the 
 direction from which it comes; all activity, flashes, all 
 smoke, all unusual noises within the enemy lines, any 
 suspicious movements within our own lines, and partic- 
 ularly any signals from our infantry. 
 
 These will all be reported by reference to the zero 
 line and to objects on the ground. 
 
 In case of enemy attack, the observers will report its 
 progress and call for fire on vulnerable targets. If the 
 attack advances far enough, the observers will have an 
 opportunity for individual distinction. A few deter- 
 mined men in a concealed dugout may delay many times 
 their number for an appreciable time. 
 
 Observers of different batteries, battalions and regi- 
 ments will at need register the fire of any battery in 
 the brigade. Where none of the observation posts is 
 suitable to fire on any particular objective, use of the 
 ground telegraphic sets of the infantry may be made. 
 
130 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The observer, accompanied by the operator, finds a 
 location where he can view the objective. If the dis- 
 tance permits, the messages are sent direct to the 
 antennas of its battalion; if not, they are sent to the 
 infantry command post, which relays them by telephone. 
 
 As rapidly as possible the regimental observation 
 officer coordinates the observation posts of the regiment, 
 and the brigade observation officer coordinates all those 
 within the brigade. Upon occasion, O. P's. of different 
 battalions, or even of different regiments, may be con- 
 nected to regimental and brigade centrals, though this 
 practice must be limited owing to the amount of traffic 
 over brigade and regimental lines. 
 
 Because no two divisional sectors are alike, it is im- 
 possible to fix hard and fast rules for the conduct of 
 observation. The efficiency of the observation system 
 will depend on the skill and energy of the officers con- 
 cerned. 
 
 It is to be borne in mind that while all the^observation 
 posts of the brigade are to be considered one system, the 
 initiative of battalion commanders and observation of- 
 ficers must not be dulled. 
 
 The brigade has the use not only of the divisional 
 artillery observation posts but is in communication with 
 the infantry observation officer and corps observation 
 officers. Frequently an uncertain report as to the loca- 
 tion of an enemy position, or activity in the enemy line, 
 from one observation system can be corroborated from 
 one of the other sources. 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 131 
 
 Regimental and brigade headquarters will install addi- 
 tional observation stations, or move existing stations 
 of battalions and even of batteries, when this will re- 
 sult in reducing the extent of the invisible areas. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. Artillery Telephones. — The scheme 
 of artillery telephone consists of branching lines 
 from brigade to regiments, regiments to battalions, 
 battalions to batteries, and batteries to battery observa- 
 tion posts. Regimental headquarters are connected 
 together, as are adjoining battalions and battery com- 
 mand posts; in addition, the units of 75s are connected 
 with corresponding units of infantry. 
 
 With every telephone operator there will always be 
 an orderly to be sent for any person desired on the 
 telephone ; in time of unusual activity, there will be two 
 orderlies. 
 
 Telephone liaison will always be reinforced by visual 
 signalling and by mounted or foot messengers. It is 
 essential that all men of the liaison detail shall be 
 familiar with all roads and paths between battery posi- 
 tions and battalion, battalion and regiment, and regi- 
 ment and brigade. 
 
 The many diversions of attention, the many calls for 
 men, the constant assignment of men to different duties, 
 creates an erosion which wears away these organizations 
 established at the beginning of a campaign. It is the 
 constant, and perhaps the most important, duty of a 
 battalion commander to see that these are continually 
 renewed and that the organization will never find 
 
132 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 itself surprised by the cutting of the telephone liaison. 
 
 Operation of telephones at the front requires a degree 
 of rapidity, skill and accuracy far in excess of that re- 
 quired commercially. A few seconds lost by a delay, 
 or a mistake, may cost many lives. 
 
 When two or more calls come at the same time, the 
 first preference should be given to an observation post, 
 second preference to the line of the senior command, 
 third preference to a junior command, and fourth to 
 a collateral line. This may be varied, according to the 
 intelligence of the operator, when especially important 
 news is expected from some source. All telephones will 
 be tested every half hour in each direction. Operators 
 will never call an officer to the telephone to speak to 
 an officer of inferior rank. Officers below the rank of 
 battery commander or adjutant will not ask an oper- 
 ator to get a party on the line, but will be given con- 
 nection with the switchboard and personally ask for 
 the desired party. 
 
 Lines are used only for official communication. Ter- 
 rible things have happened because a telephone wire was 
 being used for sociable conversation. The locations of 
 friendly positions are never mentioned over the tele- 
 phone, nor is any other information that might be use- 
 ful to the enemy. 
 
 As the relative location of observation posts, battery 
 and command posts vary indefinitely, so an indefinite 
 number of opportunities exists to increase the telephonic 
 liaison beyond that contemplated by the regulations. 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 133 
 
 For instance, two observation posts or batteries of sepa- 
 rate units may be located so close together that a short 
 length of wire may connect them. A battery of one 
 battalion may find itself so close to the command post 
 of another that an intercommunication wire can be 
 made at a minimum of labor and material. 
 
 All officers interested in observation should seek 
 opportunities to increase the amount of telephone 
 liaison without an undue expenditure of wire. In this 
 fashion, telephone liaison offers an opportunity for ini- 
 tiative similar to that of selection and camouflage of 
 battery positions. 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. Maps and Records in Command 
 Post. — Each command post will keep the following 
 records pertaining to its sector : 
 
 Maps showing the location of the command posts, 
 battery positions, observation posts, telephonic and 
 visual liaison; these last two, approximately exact. 
 Threads are pinned to the map at the locations of 
 the 0. P^s. Mill scales are made with a zero cor- 
 responding to the zero at the 0. P. Thus reports 
 from the 0. P. are rapidly located on the map. 
 Where any two 0. P's. report the same subject, it 
 can be located by intersections, visibility maps of 
 the observation posts, fields of fire and dead spaces 
 of the batteries. 
 
 A graphic representation of the normal and even- 
 tual missions of the batteries, such as barrages, 
 counter-preparations, interdiction fires, counter-bat- 
 
134 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 tery, and also the normal and the eventual zones. 
 
 This information will also be kept in the form of 
 written orders. When any orders, in any form, have 
 been superseded by others, the old orders will be de- 
 stroyed to prevent possible confusion. 
 
 A list of ammunition, rations, horses, wagons, harness, 
 etc., will also be kept at command posts. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. Combat.— Offensive combat being 
 at the will of the higher command, is precised in orders. 
 Attacks, general or limited, are accompanied by a plan 
 of artillery made in the army, corps, or division head- 
 quarters. The duty of the subordinate commanders is 
 to give full effect to the plan of the higher command. 
 Firing data are prepared in the batteries and checked 
 in the battalions. Regimental and battalion commanders 
 assure themselves that all orders have been read and 
 comprehended by those intrusted with carrying them 
 out. They assure themselves of the efficiency of their 
 communications, and they follow the plan of action step 
 by step, superintending its execution by their subor- 
 dinates. 
 
 The daily activity of the artillery is determined in 
 the division and corps, and is laid out in orders issued 
 every evening for the following 24 hours. These orders 
 specify : 
 
 1. Destructions. 
 
 2. Interdictions and harassing fire. 
 
 3. Concentrations. 
 
 The higher command determines the objectives to be 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 135 
 
 fired upon and divides them among the regiments in 
 whose sector they lie. The regiments divide their tar- 
 gets between their battalions; the battalions between 
 the batteries. The actual conduct of fire reposes in the 
 battery commander. The major's supervision is merely 
 to assure himself of the captain's competency. In case 
 of incompetency, the remedy is a removal of the battery 
 commander, not taking over the battery commander's 
 duties by the major. 
 
 Defensive Combat. Fire called forth by activity of 
 the enemy is defensive in cause, although it may lead 
 to fire offensive in effect. The defensive fires are: 
 
 (1) Counter-Battery. — An enemy battery firing upon 
 our troops is, in turn, fired upon by our artillery. This 
 fire, as a rule, is ordered by the brigade commander 
 or commander of the heavy artillery ; but in the case of 
 enemy's batteries whose location is known, and which it 
 is desired to silence as often as they come into action and 
 as rapidly as possible, authority to open fire may be 
 given to the battalion or even the battery commander 
 upon receipt of information that this battery is firing. 
 
 (2) Reprisal Fire, — When friendly troops are being 
 fired upon by enemy batteries which for any reason 
 cannot be counter-batteried, our artillery fires upon 
 corresponding enemy troops. This fire is ordered by 
 the commander of the divisional artillery, generally at 
 the request of the organization under fire. Reprisal fire 
 may also accompany counter-battery fire. 
 
 (3) Offensive Counter-Preparation. — This is a plan 
 
136 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of fire upon enemy organizations, trenches, command 
 posts, batteries and assembly points. Its object is to 
 break up enemy organizations before they can launch 
 the assault. It is generally called by order of the com- 
 mander of the divisional artillery, upon information of 
 the assembling of hostile troops, heavy enemy bombard- 
 ments, or other reasons leading him to believe an enemy 
 attack is imminent. However, any commanding officer, 
 upon receiving what appears to him sufficient evidence 
 of a planned enemy attack, must not hesitate to put his 
 artillery into action in his normal enemy counter-attack 
 zone, or even, if he deems it justifiable, into one of his 
 eventual zones. He will, of course, immediately pass 
 the information on to his commanding officer. 
 
 (4) Barrage. — Artillery barrage is principally the 
 work of 75s and the principal duty of the 75s. The line 
 of barrage is laid down by the chief of the divisional 
 artillery, who may also call upon a part or all of the 
 155s to participate. Barrage is delivered at the request 
 of the infantry, either by telephone or signal ; upon the 
 request of the artillery liaison officer; or upon a call 
 from an airplane, balloon or observation post; or when 
 enemy bombardment or rifle fire leads any artillery 
 commander to believe that barrage of his organization 
 is called for. 
 
 In order to deliver defensive fire without unnecessary 
 delay, trail circulars will be marked at the points at 
 which the trail shall rest for each normal and special 
 barrage and counter-preparation. The weather cor- 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 137 
 
 rections for each principal target will be kept up to 
 the moment. The firing data for the different barrages 
 and counter-preparations will be prepared separately 
 for each gun and will be given to the chiefs of section. 
 The executive's command for this fire are the name 
 and number frequently repeated, as "Special barrage 
 No. 2" or ''Counter-Preparation No. 1.'' Each section 
 lays its piece and begins firing immediately. 
 
 When a secondary barrage has been planned, the line 
 of which runs across our territory and which is to be 
 used only in the event the enemy takes our first posi- 
 tions, the firing data will be prepared as in the normal 
 barrage, but it will be kept at the battery command 
 post, in a place where it can be easily reached but not 
 confused with other documents. It will be handed to 
 the chiefs of section only at the moment it is to be 
 put into effect. 
 
 Fire of opportunity is called for by an airplane, bal- 
 loon or terrestrial observer when he sees enemy troops 
 or transport within the zone of fire of our artillery. 
 
 The best results are obtained by personal understand- 
 ing between elements of command rather than upon 
 rigid orders which cannot cover all possible contingen- 
 cies. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. Closeup Defense.— Due to a variety 
 of reasons, among which may be mentioned the diffi- 
 culty of moving the great number of batteries used on 
 every front; the necessity of keeping horses far behind 
 the batteries; the practice of shelling heavily the rear 
 
138 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 areas, especially the roads ; the use of aviation which will 
 discover batteries retreating in the open, even when 
 defiladed from terrestrial view ; the efficiency of machine 
 gun fire upon large targets, such as gun sections, even at 
 long ranges ; the growth of counter-attack as a defensive 
 measure, and the greater means of resistance furnished 
 by emplaced batteries, barb wire entanglements and 
 machine guns — the closeup defense of batteries has 
 assumed a more important aspect than it held before 
 this war broke out. Therefore, defensive measures for 
 holding battery positions have been elaborated. The 
 battery commander will reconnoiter the ground and be- 
 gin his preparations for closeup defense as soon as he 
 occupies a battery position. The guns will easily sweep 
 all open territory in front of them. Attackers will have 
 to come up some defiladed space or around a flank. 
 Battery machine guns will be so placed as to sweep such 
 approaches, and ranges will be measured to all points 
 from which rifle and machine gun fire can be directed 
 on the batteries. Preparations will be made to move 
 the pieces as occasion may warrant; especially to fire 
 to the flank, where they may take a whole enemy wave in 
 enfilade. Wire entanglements will be built around the 
 battery; concealed pits will be dug for bombers; hand 
 grenades will be drawn and distributed among the pits. 
 Where several batteries are grouped together, the officer 
 who commands them all (major, colonel or brigadier 
 general) will coordinate the plan of defense. All the 
 machine guns will be placed according to a common plan. 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 139 
 
 A veritable machine gun barrage even may be possible. 
 
 The howitzers are less capable for use in closeup de- 
 fense than the 75s. For this reason the personnel has 
 been furnished with rifles. It is not improbable that 
 these guns will be firing on some target of great im- 
 portance, such as a river crossing. In this case, the de- 
 fense should endeavor to leave a sufficient gun crew 
 (four or five men per gun) to keep up this fire to the 
 last moment. 
 
 The skill and stubbornness of the closeup defense of 
 battery positions may decide the fate of a battle. It 
 may furnish an opportunity for the greatest individual 
 distinction. 
 
 CHAPTER X. The Food Question.— One of the 
 most vital elements of this war is food. In the first 
 place, there is a shortage of food all over the world. 
 In the second place, transportation is limited and ave- 
 nues of transportation are limited. A soldier who wastes 
 any food not only robs some other mouth but does his 
 share uselessly to congest our means of transportation. 
 The rule, therefore, must be rigidly established that 
 every soldier, officer or man must consume all the food 
 he takes. The cook must be instructed not to prepare 
 any large surplus of cooked food each meal. He must 
 be rigidly compelled to serve all leftover food at the 
 next meal. He should be encouraged to prepare soup, 
 which will use up his bones and furnish valuable heat 
 in the winter and liquid in a palatable form, water be- 
 ing frequently unpalatable at the front. 
 
140 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Conclusion. — Less difficulty has been experienced 
 in teaching officers the technique of artillery than in 
 getting them to carry out the necessary works — to en- 
 force the many rules of conduct which the making of 
 war demands. An artillery officer is not a mere com- 
 puter of figures or instrument man. He is primarily a 
 commander. He must be ceaselessly vigilant to enforce 
 compliance of all warlike regulations. 
 
 In the foregoing I imagine that army haters 
 will find considerable ^'Prussianism'' in the con- 
 stant reference to * ^ Discipline ' ' and *' Enforce- 
 ment of Orders.'' Between the soldier and the 
 pacifist, political or otherwise, there lies a chasm 
 nnbridgable becanse the former thinks, instructs 
 and regulates in contemplation of daily peril and 
 mortal combat, while the latter lives, breathes and 
 has his being in exquisite comfort and perfect 
 safety, determined never to risk life or limb or 
 time for his country. The soldier imposes hard 
 rules upon himself and his subordinates that his 
 country may live. The pacifist preaches luxury 
 of mind and body that he may profit at the expense 
 of his fellow men. The civilian and the uniformed 
 soldier lean, naturally, to the easy preachings. 
 They do not comprehend the aw^ful penalties of 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 141 
 
 disregarding military rule. To them, for instance, 
 the rules of camouflage appear like the **Keep 
 off the grass*' signs in the park. They ignore 
 the fact that in the first the lives of men are at 
 stake, while in the second merely those of a few 
 blades of grass. To them absence without leave 
 is like playing *' hookey '* from school; desertion, 
 like quitting a job. They do not perceive that the 
 uninterrupted presence of men is necessary not 
 only to carry out the offensive moves of our com- 
 mand but to counteract the unexpected moves of 
 the enemy. 
 
 The civilian beneficiaries of our victory fail to 
 contemplate how terrible to them would have been 
 the consequences of defeat. They are prone to 
 take up all attacks on * 'military justice.'' They 
 do not understand the consequences of a lax ad- 
 ministration of military law. 
 
 Not many weeks ago a one-armed boy called 
 upon me to tell me that a disregard of my instruc- 
 tions to hide from enemy airplanes had cost him 
 his arm and had cost the lives of several of his 
 comrades. He told how the headquarters com- 
 pany, of which he was a member, had marched 
 
142 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 at night to the proximity of the front and sought 
 concealment in a woods. The next morning a 
 German airplane flew overhead. Everybody ran 
 out to gaze at the enemy. Almost immediately 
 the German artillery concentration fell upon the 
 woods. 
 
 In my last days at Cantigny I was suffering 
 severely from influenza and was unable to make 
 my daily inspection. Most of the old officers had 
 been evacuated from the same cause. On the day 
 preceding the assault, however, I proceeded with 
 assistance to inspect the observation posts — the 
 eyes of the artillery. There I found a newly ar- 
 rived lieutenant in charge, the men all exposed 
 to enemy fire and not wearing their gas masks. 
 A poet might say that any consequences of this 
 carelessness to them would be upon their own 
 heads, forgetting that men killed, for whatever 
 fault, are none the less dead — they are losses to 
 our army — ignoring the vital fact that whenever 
 the artillery observers are killed or wounded the 
 artillery is blind. In this case lack of training 
 was responsible, but if it had been weakness or 
 
A FEW TECHNICAL POINTS 143 
 
 a desire to be an easy boss, of course, no penalty 
 could be too severe for such offense. 
 
 Men cannot be allowed, because of their laziness 
 or carelessness, to jeopardize the lives of their 
 comrades. The sentinel asleep on duty is not an 
 heroic or a sentimental figure, even though it is 
 accepted as a presidential perquisite to pardon 
 him for the applause of the pacifists. The un- 
 dutiful soldier in a well trained organization is 
 as rare as a criminal in a church congregation. 
 It is as much an insult to the men who wore the 
 uniform to suggest that all enlisted men are po- 
 tential defendants in courts-martial as to say that 
 all citizens will probably come before our criminal 
 courts. 
 
 In all my service, and with several thousand 
 troops, I can remember every criminal case. Two 
 were for serious offenses against women. Two 
 were for theft. One, a false charge of assault 
 with a deadly weapon, which the judge advocate 
 directed to have dismissed. Summary court cases, 
 the police court cases of the army, were not much 
 more numerous, and the only serious penalty ever 
 inflicted in summary court was six months' con- 
 
144 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 finement and loss of rank to a sergeant of long 
 service who got himself and two young soldiers 
 drunk in barracks when he should have been 
 on duty. If others' experience was very different 
 from mine, it must be because they served with 
 worse troops and worse officers. 
 
CHAPTEE VII 
 
 THE PURSUIT FEOM THE MARNB 
 
 The defeat of the Germans in the second battle 
 of the Marne furnished the occasion for giving the 
 first American army corps command at the front. 
 The French had wished to incorporate all the 
 American divisions into French army corps, while 
 the American high command desired to build up 
 all- American organizations as fast as possible. On 
 the side of the French contention it was urged 
 that French losses in the war had greatly reduced 
 the number of combatant troops, while leaving her 
 general staffs, her army and her corps troops al- 
 most intact. France, therefore, had a superfluity 
 of corps commanders and corps staff officers who 
 were first trained in the French school of high 
 command, had benefited by the experience of four 
 years of war, and now held their present posi- 
 tions by demonstrated ability. No American, on 
 the other hand, could meet any of these require- 
 ments. Prior to our entry into the war no Ameri- 
 
 145 
 
146 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 can officer had ever comrQanded so large a unit 
 as a complete division. 
 
 However, there were a number of men qualified 
 to command divisions, because the duties of divi- 
 sion commanders and the maneuvers to be ordered 
 by them are only one step removed from those of 
 regimental and brigade commanders, with which 
 all studious officers of the regular army were con- 
 versant. A division, moreover, like a brigade, 
 regiment or battalion, is primarily an obeying 
 organization, carrying out orders laid down with 
 greater or less precision by a higher authority. 
 From commanding a division to commanding a 
 corps, however, there was a gap which any Ameri- 
 can officer would find great difficulty in crossing. 
 
 An army corps is a planning organization. It 
 has to work out the complicated arrangements 
 whereby a number of divisions move, relieve, or 
 reinforce each other, and at the same time receive 
 supplies and munitions; must place troops, sup- 
 plies and munitions in such places that they can be 
 readily used to meet unforeseen developments 
 of battle ; must determine how great a force should 
 be concentrated on each portion of the corps front. 
 
THE PURSUIT FROM THE MARNE 147 
 
 It must also order the very complicated disposal 
 of the great quantities of artillery of different 
 sizes and ranges, and make plans for the concen- 
 trations of fire to destroy the enemy's defense or 
 break his attack. 
 
 Since early spring a high ranking American 
 general and his staff had been attached to a 
 French army corps for instruction to acquire the 
 necessary technique to perform these duties. These 
 officers had been for some time bending every 
 effort to obtain command at the front. 
 
 While the issue of the German offensive re- 
 mained in doubt it was manifestly impossible to 
 risk a disaster by confiding a large sector of the 
 line to this inexperienced, insufficiently trained 
 and untried corps organization. With the de- 
 feat of the Germans, however, a new situation pre- 
 sented itself which rendered the formation of the 
 first American army corps at the front not only 
 possible but advisable. 
 
 All military text books require the vigorous 
 pursuit of a retreating enemy. Against inferior 
 troops vigorous pursuit has been crowned with 
 success in this war, but wherever the retreating 
 
148 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 troops have been of high order they have not only- 
 conducted their retreats safely but, owing to the 
 long range of modern cannon, aided by the deadly 
 effect of concealed machine guns and the defensive 
 strength of barbed wire entanglements, have in- 
 flicted disproportionate losses upon their pur- 
 suers. 
 
 In 1914 the French had been able to retreat from 
 the frontier as ordered and had attacked accord- 
 ing to plan. The Germans, in turn, withdrew from 
 the Mame, their rear guards checking the vigor- 
 ous French pursuit with heavy loss, retired in 
 order, and stopped at the Aisne. Now that an- 
 other pursuit from the Marne was necessary, the 
 French were neither anxious to conduct it them- 
 selves nor to command American troops in a pro- 
 ceeding which promised heavy losses with small 
 prospects of strategic success. On the other hand, 
 the Germans would be unable to take advantage of 
 any blunders which the American army corps staff 
 might make in conducting the pursuit. 
 
 On July 30th I received orders to return home 
 to command one of the new regiments being 
 formed to proceed to France in the winter. I took 
 
THE PURSUIT FROM THE MARNE 149 
 
 advantage of the travel order to visit our troops 
 in the pursuit from the Marne, stopping at each 
 headquarters on the way forward. This brought 
 me to our General Headquarters, to the staff of 
 the First army, the staff of the First corps and 
 to several division and brigade staffs. At each 
 stopping place I was impressed by the high char- 
 acter, the distinct force and the great native in- 
 telligence of the officers. I also missed the per- 
 fection of organization and easy running elasticity 
 that characterized the French staffs which had 
 been trained for years in the higher schools of war 
 and had received their post-graduate course dur- 
 ing four years at the front. The American com- 
 munications were defective and the higher com- 
 mands were not'by any means sufficiently informed 
 of the location of their front lines. Eoad condi- 
 tions back of the troops were far from satisfac- 
 tory. The rules of road discipline had not been 
 sufficiently taught to the trains which blocked 
 each other, not only at junctions but even on 
 straight stretches of wide turnpike. Military 
 police were few and inefficient. This was the 
 inevitable result of the short period of training. 
 
150 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The staff officers, who in normal times would have 
 regulated the moving of the trains, were so taxed 
 by their unaccustomed duties in this movement as 
 not to have any reserve time to manage the in- 
 dispensable service of the rear. 
 
 Eventually I came up to an artillery colonel of 
 long overseas service fuming with rage. He had 
 reported to a brigadier general from a regular 
 division recently arrived in Europe whose brigade 
 he was to support. The artilleryman had been 
 at the front several days supporting the infantry 
 of his own division and should have been notified 
 by a higher authority of the relief of the infantry. 
 The first information, however, was from his own 
 liaison officer, who telephoned that new infantry 
 were coming into the front line. After waiting 
 for some time for the new infantry brigade com- 
 mander to send for him he had finally located the 
 latter and after several hours * wait was still with- 
 out word from the infantry commander of his 
 plans or of the service he wished from the artil- 
 lery. 
 
 Let me say for the benefit of the uninitiated that 
 in any division the commander of the artillery 
 
THE PURSUIT FROM THE MARNE 151 
 
 brigade lives beside the division commander, re- 
 ceives his orders for artillery support, and advises 
 him upon the technical possibilities of the artillery 
 arm. In like manner the commander of each regi- 
 ment of field pieces sits in with the commander of 
 each infantry brigade, while the artillery battalion 
 commander is in close touch with the commanders 
 * of infantry regiments. The preliminary military 
 education of the infantry brigadier in this case 
 had not taught him how to avail himself of his 
 artillery support and his sojourn in France had 
 been too short for him to learn it before entering 
 the lines. Perhaps this fault might have been 
 remedied at division headquarters except for the 
 fact that the general commanding the artillery 
 brigade himself had only just landed in France 
 without any preliminary study or observation and 
 had been ordered to the front to replace a general 
 from the engineering corps who now, for the sec- 
 ond time, had been relieved from command of an 
 artillery brigade because of his inability to grasp 
 the duties and maneuvers of that arm. 
 In the summer of 1918 the lower ranks were 
 
152 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 very much farther along their road than were the 
 staffs and senior officers. 
 
 The public seems to be fairly well educated to 
 the necessity of training soldiers, but it has not 
 yet been impressed with the greater necessity of 
 training officers. It is easier to make a soldier 
 than to make a staff officer and to perfect a com- 
 pany organization than to perfect a general staff 
 or produce a general. 
 
 Instances of inefficiency or insufficient training 
 on the part of general officers in the pursuit from 
 the Marne aboimd. Time and again infantry were 
 ordered to attack without artillery assistance, al- 
 though the artillery was in position and ready 
 to fire. Formations were frequently used which, 
 while laid down in text books before the war, had 
 been proven obsolete in actual experience. A great 
 deal of greenness among the junior officers also 
 showed itself. Troops came under enemy fire 
 while still in column and bodies of soldiers crossed 
 the skyline and approached the Germans in full 
 view, when with a little maneuvering they might 
 have kept behind a crest or a woods and have 
 avoided detection. Efforts at concealment from 
 
THE PURSUIT FROM THE MARNE 153 
 
 airplane observation also left mncli to be desired. 
 On the other hand, both officers and men demon- 
 strated upon every occasion their willingness to 
 attack the enemy irrespective of loss. This qual- 
 ity is one which can be attained by the troops of 
 only a few nations and by them only after suffi- 
 cient training and an infusion of the proper dis- 
 cipline. It is a glory not only to the troops but to 
 the men who led them and to the higher officers 
 who inspired their training that they had acquired 
 in one year a power of self-immolation for which 
 military text books state two years is the irre- 
 ducible minimum. 
 
 The imperfection of training of our troops and 
 the incapacity of some of their commanding offi- 
 cers made our casualties unduly large. However, 
 they did not prevent a continuous and heavy pres- 
 sure on the German rear. If, as in 1914, the Ger- 
 mans withdrew successfully from position to posi- 
 tion and stopped upon the line they had chosen, 
 they were still further tired and so much nearer 
 the breakdown, and their losses, moreover, irre- 
 placeable. The American troops which survived 
 were the better for the ordeal. They learned many 
 
154 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 valuable lessons. They had increased confidence 
 in themselves, and those officers who themselves 
 were unable to keep up and absorb the lessons of 
 war were beginning to show their incapacity to 
 the higher command. 
 
 The soldiers covered themselves withi glory. 
 The sins of the pacifists filled many graves. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 
 
 The pursuit of the Germans after their repulse 
 at the Mame in July, 1918, ended one of the closing 
 chapters in the world war. Secure from defeat, 
 the allies began a long and systematic preparation 
 to win a victory. This plan they soon abandoned 
 to embark upon the successful and final campaign 
 in the fall of the year. 
 
 Congress, meanwhile, legislated to extend the 
 age provisions of the draft act in order to raise 
 another army of a million men. The general staff 
 in Washington instructed General Pershing to 
 send home officers experienced in combat to com- 
 mand new regiments and battalions. As I was 
 among the number ordered back, I visited general 
 headquarters in hopes of having the order re- 
 scinded so far as it applied to me. My old friends 
 in the intelligence department, while sympathizing 
 with my view, declared that the war would con- 
 tinue for two or three years. A high ranking 
 
 155 
 
156 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 artillery officer jokingly said I would miss the 
 summer campaign, but would return in time to 
 spend another winter in the trenches. 
 
 The commander-in-chief pleasantly but firmly 
 refused my request, saying that the important 
 movements were over for the year, and that the 
 essential work ahead was to bring another army of 
 a million Americans to France by March, 1919. 
 
 I intrude this personal experience merely to 
 show the opinion of our high command in August, 
 1918, as to the duration of the war. Since the 
 termination of hostilities I have learned from 
 those in authority that the British held the same 
 views. 
 
 It was on the 5th of August that I visited our 
 general staff. Three weeks later in Washington 
 I was told by a member of our diplomatic service 
 that the war would be over in a month or two. The 
 reasons for this diametrically opposite forecast 
 have never been made public. Undoubtedly, the 
 successful Franco-British offensives of August 
 8th and 21st had something to do with it. I 
 imagine that information obtained by our secret 
 service from the Central Powers also was partly 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 157 
 
 responsible. I surmise as an obvious fact that 
 our secret service agents were in touch with the 
 German revolutionaries, just as German secret 
 service operatives were in communication with 
 malcontents in allied countries. Our men may 
 have received information concerning the internal 
 condition of Germany which was not known even 
 to the German authorities. 
 
 At all events the decision to assume a vigorous 
 offensive at once was reached by the allies. The 
 return of officers to America to train the new army 
 was stopped. The flow of American reinforce- 
 ments to France continued in a steady stream, 
 although there was not sufficient food in sight to 
 feed them in the event of a repulse of the allied 
 offensive or a successful resumption of the Ger- 
 man submarine campaign. There were not even 
 arms enough to equip them. 
 
 From the end of March, Marshal Foch had com- 
 mand of all the allied forces. He had been con- 
 strained to act strictly on the defensive until July 
 18th, when the American and French attack near 
 Soissons relieved the German pressure on the west 
 side of the salient and compelled its evacuation. 
 
158 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 In the Franco-British attacks of August 8th 
 and 21st American infantry participated vigor- 
 ously; but their achievements are not the fuU 
 measure of American contribution to the victory. 
 
 We have seen, in a previous chapter, how the 
 American 1st army corps pounded the retreat- 
 ing Germans. If no immediate advantage from 
 this costly maneuver was visible, the harvest of 
 this American sowing was reaped in Picardy by 
 our French and British allies. Ludendorff in his 
 book tells how the divisions in reserve in Picardy 
 were shifted to resist and to stand behind the sec- 
 tor the Americans had punished so hard. Without 
 the heavy American attacks on the German rear 
 guard, from the Marne to the Vesle, with conse- 
 quent heavy American losses, the Franco-British 
 success of August 8th would not have been pos- 
 sible. 
 
 The initiative was again in Foch's hands and 
 it remained with him to the end of the war. He 
 now had a larger, better equipped and a less 
 fatigued army than Ludendorff. 
 
 A fundamental principle of war is to mass a 
 greater number of troops against a lesser num- 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 159 
 
 ber of troops and defeat the smaller number. The 
 principle has one drawback; namely, when the 
 greater number is successfully massed against the 
 smaller number, but fails to defeat that smaller 
 number, the attacker has exhausted and disor- 
 ganized a greater number of troops than has the 
 defender, and has created a situation where his 
 opponent has larger numbers of fresh, organized 
 troops than himself. He has created the oppor- 
 tunity for successful counter-attack. History 
 shows that when the defending general has taken 
 advantage of this situation, most disastrous re- 
 sults have attended the attacker. The successful 
 defensive-offensive battles of the world have been 
 the most decisive. 
 
 In the Spring the Germans threw superior num- 
 bers against the British and defeated them. They 
 were stopped by the arrival of French reinforce- 
 ments, whose great exertions, as well as numbers 
 engaged, however, were much less than those of 
 the attacking Grermans, because the French re- 
 inforcements simply moved by roads and, to a 
 great extent, in automobile trucks and trains, 
 while the German attackers, after concentrating 
 
160 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 with great effort, had advanced, fighting, through 
 ravines and across plowed fields. Ludendorff had 
 struck successfully twice more, and twice unsuc- 
 cessfully, before Foch unleashed his counter- 
 stroke on July 18th. 
 
 By August all the German troops were tired; 
 the British army had enjoyed comparative rest 
 since April, and the American army, crossing the 
 ocean in a steady flow, was fully effective as a re- 
 serve. The experienced troops already were be- 
 ing used in offensive action; the partly trained 
 troops were in line in quiet sectors, gaining ex- 
 perience, wearing down their tired adversaries, 
 and at the same time releasing veteran troops 
 for maneuver. The newest arrivals were in train- 
 ing camps, and the day they would be ready to 
 enter the line could be figured mathematically. 
 The English and French continued a vigorous of- 
 fensive in Picardy and Flanders, while the tired 
 American divisions of the Marne salient were re- 
 organized and prepared for further battle. 
 
 Upon this occasion the American authority was 
 extended. General Pershing in person took the 
 field as commander of the American 1st army, 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 161 
 
 under the command of General Petain as army 
 group commander. The St. Mihiel salient was 
 selected as the ground for the operation. 
 
 Some controversy has arisen as to who planned 
 the battle of St. Mihiel. Some say the plans were 
 drawn by the American 1st army staff and ac- 
 cepted without revision by General Petain. Others 
 say they were French plans and accepted in their 
 entirety by the Americans. Between these state- 
 ments there seems but little purpose in argument. 
 Indeed, the general plan of operation was obvious. 
 
 Of course, all the technique that was used in 
 the battle of St. Mihiel had been acquired by us 
 from the French. We had accepted their organiza- 
 tion of infantry regiments and had learned our 
 minor tactics under their instructors. Our ar- 
 tillery was entirely armed with French guns, the 
 power and limitations of which only the French 
 could know. All our tanks were made in France, 
 and the aviation was principally French and Eng- 
 lish. The organization of the artillery fire was, 
 for the most part, under French officers serving in 
 the American army as ^* chiefs of corps artillery." 
 Furthermore, the American 1st army still lacked 
 
162 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 a great deal of the equipment necessary to conduct 
 army operations, and this, with its personnel, was 
 lent by General Petain. 
 
 It is not by hiding the military shortcomings of 
 the American government behind the brilliant 
 achievements of American soldiers that we are 
 going to save future Americans from the handi- 
 caps under which we fought the war. Nor is it 
 fair to our fallen companions, nor to future gen- 
 erations, that we should claim credit for military 
 excellence that Congress and our executives had 
 put beyond our powers to attain. 
 
 The French had begun to organize the St. Mihiel 
 salient for an attack before the American 1st di- 
 vision occupied it in January, 1918. They sup- 
 plied all the materiel; and they furnished prac- 
 tically all the technical and tactical services. If 
 the American staff officers did write the orders for 
 the attack, they did it after having studied under 
 French commanders for fifteen months, and they 
 could not have done so when they arrived in 
 France. 
 
 America 's contribution to the battle was 500,000 
 men. Officers and men had learned in France 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 163 
 
 what American pacifists had forbidden them to 
 learn at home — how to maneuver in modern bat- 
 tle; and they were willing to suffer untold hard- 
 ships and advance unflinchingly against the 
 enemy. Americans glory is that American troops 
 went forward across muddy fields, at heart-break- 
 ing speed, carrying out well-prepared orders, and 
 by the very vigor of their assault paralyzing the 
 German defense. 
 
 For Ihe battle of St. Mihiel, which was the first 
 American offensive on a great scale, and yet not 
 one requiring the entire American strength in 
 France, General Pershing had assembled sub- 
 stantially all of his better trained divisions and 
 his three best organized army corps staffs. 
 
 Even while preparing for this battle he also 
 was preparing for a larger battle, since known as 
 the Battle of the Argonne. 
 
 The battle of the Argonne was projected by 
 Marshal Foch as a gigantic maneuver in which the 
 American 1st army to the east of the forest and 
 the French 4th army to the west were to advance 
 side by side, outflanking this formidable defense. 
 
 General Foch had wished to constitute two 
 
164 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Franco-American armies under French army 
 commanders. Doubtless, lie felt greater confi- 
 dence in his better trained, more experienced and 
 fully tried French army commanders than he did 
 in the American high command. He also was in- 
 fluenced by the fact that French armies possessed 
 all the technical equipment and transportation 
 necessary to the conduct of armies, while the 
 American armies did not. He may or may not 
 have been influenced by personal and national 
 considerations. Because of its enormous losses, 
 the French army had decreased in size, throwing 
 out of employment a number of generals and staff 
 ofiicers who were anxious to command American 
 troops. There was national advantage also in 
 having French generals commanding American 
 troops at the end of the war. 
 
 General Foch's plan would have been correct 
 if a long war had been in prospect. The end was 
 in sight, however, and it was essential for Ameri- 
 cans position at the peace table, and for American 
 safety after the peace, that the closing of hos- 
 tilities should leave an American army in the field 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 165 
 
 under command of generals experienced and 
 proven in battle. 
 
 General Pershing", therefore, was right in lead- 
 ing an all American army into the Argonne and in 
 borrowing such French equipment and such staff 
 and other officers as he needed. 
 
 It is not my purpose to cull from official and 
 unofficial accounts the progress of the forty days' 
 battle, but to point out circumstances which are 
 of value to our army and which have not received 
 sufficient recognition. 
 
 The American 1st army was not a well oiled 
 machine. It was lacking in many essential re- 
 spects : it was short of its own artillery, of trans- 
 port, of signal equipment, of aviation, of horses ; 
 and, as indicated before, many of its divisions 
 were not complete. It also was deplorably weak 
 in generals. 
 
 For his initial assault between the Argonne and 
 the Meuse General Pershing chose his least ex- 
 perienced divisions. Indeed, most of these units 
 were not divisions at all, because they did not 
 possess their divisional artillery. A division con- 
 sists of infantry, artillery and auxiliary troops, all 
 
166 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 of which should be trained to act together for the 
 common benefit. A division without artillery is 
 as incomplete as an infantry regiment without 
 machine guns. 
 
 It will be remembered that the exigencies of the 
 allies following the defeat of March 21st had in- 
 duced or compelled the Americans to send over in- 
 fantry without artillery. In consequence, these 
 infantry organizations were forced to fight 
 through the Argonne battle without their divi- 
 sional artillery, a handicap which cost them 
 severely in loss of life, but which their valor over- 
 came. These lost lives cannot be blamed upon any 
 section of the American army. Our allies are re- 
 sponsible to a certain degree, but, of course, the 
 chief blame rests upon those pacifists who pre- 
 vented us from being prepared to protect our 
 soldiers in this war. 
 
 Looking back with a perspective of more than 
 a year, it is safe to say that General Pershing was 
 absolutely right in engaging his less organized 
 and less trained troops, while holding his better 
 organized and trained troops in reserve, as 
 Napoleon was wont to employ his Imperial Guard. 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 167 
 
 The hardest part of an offensive, under conditions 
 of modern artillery preparation, is not the first 
 assault, but the more or less confused battle which 
 develops as the troops move forward. 
 
 It has been suggested by students of the battle 
 that if the best troops had been used in the initial 
 assault, the war might have been terminated that 
 week of September 26-October 2. Never were 
 troops more surprised than were the Germans on 
 the morning of the Argonne attack. Only five 
 divisions opposed the American advance, which 
 penetrated deeply from the first day and almost 
 broke through the line before German reserves 
 were brought up on the third day. It has been 
 argued that if the seasoned divisions, assisted by 
 their divisional artillery, had made the first attack 
 they certainly would have broken clear through 
 the German line and compelled a retirement which 
 would have given us Sedan before the week end. 
 If we could be sure that this is what would have 
 happened, we can agree that it would have been 
 better to engage the seasoned divisions ; but noth- 
 ing is certain in war, and least of all the moves 
 of your opponent. 
 
168 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 As the battle was fought German reserves and 
 American reinforcements simultaneously arrived 
 upon the scene, and there, in a series of bitter en- 
 gagements called the second phase of the battle, 
 the Aanericans constantly gained ground until 
 brought to a stand on October 14th. If the trained 
 divisions had been used, and if they had broken 
 the German line the first or second day, a general 
 German collapse might have resulted; yet, other 
 things might have happened. Driven by the im- 
 minence of their destruction, the Germans might 
 have massed a larger number of reserves, and our 
 trained assault divisions might have faced battle, 
 tired and farther from their bases than they were 
 when they entered the second phase as fresh 
 troops. If the American veterans had become ex- 
 hausted, they would have had to be relieved by 
 less experienced and less trained troops, and the 
 very reverse of a complete victory might have 
 taken place. 
 
 Tested by the possibility of unexpected success. 
 General Pershing *s judgment remains sound. 
 Tested by the possibility of mischance, it was 
 equally correct. What if the American and the 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 169 
 
 Frencli intelligence had been mistaken as to the 
 number of German troops in readiness for the 
 defense? What if the assault had met such a 
 devastating fire as shriveled up the army of Gen- 
 eral Nivelle in 1917 and destroyed the best assault 
 divisions of France? General Pershing's conduct 
 is justified by every analysis. His army marched 
 through to victory. Let it not be forgotten that 
 General Ludendorff's brilliant breaches of our 
 lines in March and May, in which he used his as- 
 sault troops to break the line, led him to disaster. 
 Of the great difficulties under which insuffi- 
 ciently trained and organized divisions labored 
 there is, unfortunately, no comprehensive and au- 
 thentic record. In all of them knowledge of mod- 
 ern battle conditions was wanting. They had re- 
 ceived their trench mortars and their infantry 
 cannons only a short time before and did not know 
 how to use them. Some regiments marched 
 through the whole campaign without taking these 
 indispensable weapons from their trains. They 
 were, in consequence, badly in need of materiel 
 with which to attack German machine gun nests at 
 close range. Not understanding their own arms, 
 
170 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 and still less imderstandiiig the artillery arm, 
 they called for 75s to accompany the infantry. 
 Unfortunately, they did not furnish the drivers 
 with sabers or sharpen the teeth of the horses — 
 the only way in which they could have expected 
 to hurt the enemy with 75s on the infantry firing 
 line. 
 
 The modern field piece is a long range weapon. 
 It ranges up to 11,000 meters and is most effective 
 between 7,000 and 2,500 meters. At a less range 
 than that, because of its flat trajectory, its diffi- 
 culty of concealment and of transportation, it is 
 no match for the machine gun, the infantry can- 
 non or the long range trench mortar. Even so, a 
 school of officers has been formed which desires to 
 return our artillery to the role it played in the 
 days of the Civil War, when artillery losses were 
 large and artillery results small. They have cited 
 in support of their contentions the use of the field 
 piece by the Germans in infantry waves. The 
 point is not at all well taken. The Germans lacked 
 tanks and had to seek fire power in the front line 
 by other means. For this they used an ample 
 number of trench mortars very superior to those 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 171 
 
 of tlie allies. They made special mounts on low 
 wheels for a small number of 77 m.m. guns to 
 serve certain special purposes. Finally, they did 
 engage some 77s at close range with very bad re- 
 sults. This maneuver was not a development of 
 the war but a remaining erroneous fragment of 
 their former artillery instruction. 
 
 A very good impression of what an under- 
 trained division suffered can be had by studying 
 the testimony before the Senate committee sup- 
 porting and contradicting the charges of Governor 
 Allen of Kansas, and from the history of the 35th 
 Division. 
 
 From the latter I extract a communication from 
 the chief of staff of the 1st army to the commander 
 of the division : 
 
 HEADQUARTERS, FIRST ARMY 
 
 AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 Office of the Chief of Staff 
 
 October 26, 1918. 
 
 From: Chief of Staff, 1st Army. 
 
 To : Commanding General, 35th Division. 
 
 Subject: Conclusion of an inspection of the con- 
 
172 THE ARMY OP 1918 
 
 duct of the 35t]i Division during attack in recent 
 operations. 
 
 1. The Army Commander directs me to transmit 
 to you the following conclusions of an inspection 
 of the conduct of the 35th Division during its at- 
 tack in our recent operations. He desires that 
 these conclusions be given the greatest weight in 
 the organization and training of your Division. 
 
 2. These conclusions have been deduced from 
 the testimony of several eye-witnesses and are 
 transmitted to you with the desire not only to 
 point out the causes for undesirable conditions 
 but also to give you a basis for the future train- 
 ing of the 35th Division. 
 
 Conclusions: 
 
 1st. That the 35th Division at the commence- 
 ment of operations, September 26th, was not a 
 well disciplined combat unit, and the many officers 
 with the Division were not well-trained leaders. 
 
 2nd. That the Division Staff was not efficient 
 or well organized. 
 
 3rd. That the changes in the Staff and Brigade 
 and Eegimental Commanders greatly handi- 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 173 
 
 capped the Division Commander in the proper 
 functioning of his Division. 
 
 4th. That after the attack started there was no 
 system of liaison. Even the runner failed to fol- 
 low the axis of liaison prescribed. 
 
 5th. That brigade and regimental commanders 
 failed to make use of the means of liaison at their 
 disposal and failed to keep in touch with their 
 higher commanders. 
 
 6th. That the failure of all commanders to keep 
 a headquarters established where communications 
 could be received was inexcusable. 
 
 7th. That the action of brigade and regimental 
 commanders in going far to the front and out of 
 all communication resulted in their having no 
 more effect on the action than so many company 
 or platoon commanders, and prevented the head- 
 quarters in rear from sending orders to units in 
 front. 
 
 8th. That if commanders had remained in their 
 headquarters or made provisions for messages 
 reaching them immediately, they would have been 
 able to have had a fair knowledge of conditions, 
 
174 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 and perhaps have straightened out the many diffi- 
 culties that arose. 
 
 9th. That the intermingling, confusion and 
 straggling which commenced shortly after H hour 
 showed poor discipline, lack of leadership, and 
 probably poor preparation. 
 
 10th. That it was a serious error for both the 
 Division Commander and the Chief of Staff to 
 leave their Headquarters at the same time. 
 
 11th. That the nve attacks which the Division 
 made followed each other so closely that there 
 was no opportunity after the evening of Septem- 
 ber 26th to reorganize and get the various units 
 in hand. 
 
 12th. That after September 27th the Division 
 was really one in name only, as maneuvering 
 power with intact units, except the Engineers, 
 ceased to exist. 
 
 13th. That the casualties among the officers 
 were undoubtedly responsible for a great deal of 
 the disorganization. 
 
 14th. That most of the straggling and confu- 
 sion was caused by men getting lost and not hav- 
 ing leaders, and not from any deliberate design 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 175 
 
 to go to the rear in order to avoid further fighting. 
 
 15th. That the fighting spirit and bravery of 
 officers and men were excellent. 
 
 16th. That the failure to have telephone and 
 wireless communication forward to include Regi- 
 ments, and the failure to use the proper code call 
 to Corps Headquarters, was due to the inefficiency 
 of Lt. Colonel George A. Wieczorek, Signal Corps, 
 then Division Signal Officer. 
 
 17th. That the Artillery Commander, Brig. 
 Gen. L. G. Berry, failed to cooperate with and 
 make full use of the Air Service until ordered 
 to do so. 
 
 H. A. DRUM, 
 Chief of Staff. 
 
 The criticism seems sweeping, the more so that 
 the division commander and brigade commanders 
 and a part of the colonels were officers of our regu- 
 lar army who would be supposed by the general 
 public to know the principles so confidently set 
 down by General Drum. The fact is that few, 
 if any, of our regular officers knew any of these 
 principles before they went to France, and, of 
 course, no other officers did. 
 
176 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 It must not be thought that disorganization in 
 the army was confined to National Guard troops. 
 An excellent article in the Field Artillery Journal 
 shows the complete disorganization of the 3rd 
 artillery brigade in the battle of July 15th. This 
 brigade was gallant, as were all American troops, 
 but its commanding officer and its colonels had 
 rendered themselves powerless to exert the slight- 
 est influence upon the course of the combat. 
 
 Indeed, officers of the 1st division will remem- 
 ber in their early training maneuvers a simulated 
 attack against an imaginary enemy which broke 
 down solely through the inability of officers of all 
 ranks to carry out the parts assigned to them by 
 their instructors. It is training and experience, 
 not inspiration and valor alone, which make pos- 
 sible success in modern warfare. 
 
 To the difficulties arising from lack of training 
 were added in many instances unskillful general- 
 ship. 
 
 It has long been the law in America that general 
 officers shall be appointed by the President, sub- 
 ject to the confirmation of the Senate. In the 
 emergency of a war for which he had refused to 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 177 
 
 prepare, the executive was unwilling to assume 
 this responsibility and called upon a number of 
 high ranking officers in the war college to recom- 
 mend a method for selecting general officers. This 
 board recommended that all officers not notori- 
 ously incompetent should be promoted in the order 
 of seniority in the regular service and that all 
 officers upon reaching the retiring age of 64 should 
 be retired from any service. 
 
 The ruling was made upon the assumption that 
 a soldier was senile at 64 but at the height of his 
 power at 63 years, 11 months and 30 days. The 
 rule also held that a regular army officer of every 
 branch was equally competent to command in any 
 other branch. An engineer might command artil- 
 lery, a cavalryman tanks, or an artilleryman avia- 
 tion, although, as turned out to be the case, he 
 might never have given ^Ye minutes' thought fo 
 these services before his assignment. It was also 
 the doctrine that a general officer needed no train- 
 ing and that failure to command successfully, 
 which led to his removal from one command, did 
 not incapacitate him for reassignment to a newer 
 
178 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 and less experienced organization, wMcli, there- 
 fore, needed a still abler commander. 
 
 The creation of generals by seniority was popu- 
 lar in the regular army because while under it 
 many inexcusable promotions were made, and 
 many ridiculous assignments, still every officer in 
 the service received more than enough promotion 
 to satisfy his natural ambition and every one was 
 saved the humiliation and even the danger of 
 humiliation of being overslaughed ; that is to say, 
 of having an officer junior to him in the service 
 promoted over his head. 
 
 The rule adopted was carried through syste- 
 matically and no consideration of the good of the 
 service or the lives of soldiers was allowed to in- 
 terfere with the course of promotion. Officers ap- 
 proaching the retiring age were assigned to duty 
 or given high commands or sent on to visit the 
 battle front as though to prepare them for active 
 service and then retired as the clock struck their 
 sixty-fourth birthday. Not only was the time 
 spent on their training wasted, but the experience 
 of their successors was delayed by so much, and 
 divisions whose commanders had just been retired 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 179 
 
 were sent overseas under generals they did not 
 know and who did not know them. 
 
 I believe that General Pershing was bitterly op- 
 posed to this rule. In the higher commands which 
 came under his personal supervision he made as- 
 signments without reference to seniority, but in a 
 great army where generals are numbered by the 
 hundreds the assignments and removals, or most 
 of them, had to be done by rule, and the rule was 
 that every general, from whatever branch of the 
 service, should be considered competent to com- 
 mand every other branch until he had proven his 
 incapacity beyond the reasonable doubt of staff 
 officers remote from the actual scene of hostilities. 
 
 Late in the war, when the qualifications of vari- 
 ous officers had been made plain, the removals of 
 generals became so common as to provoke much 
 comment and some resentment. Even if injustice 
 may have been shown toward a few individuals, 
 it was as nothing compared to the frightful in- 
 justice to the millions of soldiers whose lives had 
 been jeopardized, and many of them forfeited, 
 while a few generals were being given a **full 
 and fair'' try-out. 
 
180 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The re^lar army is not and is not intended to 
 be a self-governing organization. The very prin- 
 ciple of all military organization is subordination 
 to a higher authority. "Wherever soldiers of any 
 rank are allowed to select their leaders intolerable 
 harm is done. We learned from the Civil War and 
 other wars not to allow enlisted soldiers to select 
 their company officers. Our government, unfortu- 
 nately, did not understand that it should not allow 
 commissioned officers to select their generals. To 
 be sure, a strong policy aimed toward the appoint- 
 ment of the most competent soldiers to high com- 
 mand would have bred a great deal of ill-feeling 
 among the officers not so chosen, but any method 
 of selection would have been better than that of 
 pure seniority. On the basis of military educa- 
 tion, the chief engineer of any railroad would be 
 as competent to command a division as an army 
 engineer whose life had been spent building break- 
 waters and dredging rivers, while the head of any 
 manufacturing concern would have more natural 
 qualifications to command the aircraft organiza- 
 tion than any officer in the United States army. 
 
 The chief blame for this great evil must lie 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 181 
 
 where the Constitution puts it, on the eonunander- 
 in-chief of the United States army and upon his 
 secretary of war, rather than upon the unfortu- 
 nate committee of soldiers upon whom was loaded 
 the responsibility and who proved unable to resist 
 the impulses of ambition and the importunities of 
 life-long friends. 
 
 In the divisions that first came to France con- 
 siderable progress in weeding out incompetents 
 was made, more noticeably in the lower ranks 
 than among the general officers ; but in the newly 
 arrived divisions little of either was possible. Con- 
 sequently there resulted a great deal of mishan- 
 dling of troops at a time when skillful leadership 
 was more than ever essential. 
 
 As early as the second day of the Argonne the 
 removal of general officers began, and it continued 
 in increasing numbers until the end. 
 
 The failure to provide the army with the best 
 available generals caused two hardships to the 
 men : First, the hardship of serving under incom- 
 petents; second, after the removal of these, the 
 hardship of serving under new officers, frequently 
 assigned from strange organizations. 
 
18^ THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Among hundreds of stories concerning tlie ig- 
 norance of general officers throughout the war, I 
 give three, because I have proven their authen- 
 ticity : 
 
 A battery of artillery was skillfully camouflaged 
 at the edge of a muddy, much traveled road. Pass- 
 ing vehicles threw mud over the camouflage and 
 onto the guns, thus improving the camouflage. A 
 general officer, after complaining several times of 
 the dirty guns, ordered the road back of the bat- 
 tery position to be swept clean and kept so. For 
 the information of civilians, I will explain that a 
 German air photograph showing a traveled road 
 swept clean for a length of one hundred yards 
 would cause such attention to be directed to that 
 spot as would certainly discover the battery. This 
 general was not an incompetent; he was merely 
 new to warfare. Afterwards he attained high 
 rank in the army. 
 
 An infantry major, in advancing, left two of his 
 companies under cover, and went forward with 
 two. Experiencing stubborn resistance, he sent a 
 runner to bring up the two companies in support. 
 The runner met a general but recently arrived 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 183 
 
 from America and assigned to command a brigade. 
 
 ^^Here, where are you going?" shouted the gen- 
 eral. 
 
 ^*I am carrying an order to bring up the sup- 
 porting companies of the battalion, sir," replied 
 the runner. 
 
 *^Well, I will have you understand that nobody 
 in my brigade goes to the rear," answered the 
 general. *^You return to your company." 
 
 When the runner reached his battalion com- 
 mand post he reported to the major, who again 
 sent him back for the two companies, with orders 
 to hide behind a bush if he saw any general officers 
 coming along! 
 
 During the advance in the latter days of the 
 Argonne, an infantry battalion was ordered to 
 clear out a ravine, a mile and a quarter long, oc- 
 cupied by the Germans. Shortly before H hour 
 the division commander met a battery of artillery 
 changing position. He halted it and directed the 
 captain to unlimber and execute **a heavy bar- 
 rage" on the ravine for twenty minutes. 
 
 He then sent a message to the battalion com- 
 mander to delay his attack, as he had ordered a 
 
184 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 heavy artillery barrage on the ravine to precede 
 the assault. The major, who had already begun 
 his attack, anticipating a devastating flood of 
 shell, pulled his men back to await the artillery 
 fire. 
 
 The artilleryman, being in a position where he 
 could obtain no observation of the ravine, and 
 having no time to orient his position to obtain ac- 
 curate fire, merely assured himself that his range 
 was sufficient to clear the American troops and 
 fired for twenty minutes. The infantry major 
 did not even perceive the artillery fire, so wild 
 and thin it was; he lost three hours and a half 
 waiting for assistance which had never been pos- 
 sible. 
 
 To deliver supporting fire to an attack a bat- 
 tery of 75s should not be given a front of more 
 than 200 yards to sweep; and unless it has ob- 
 servation to regulate, it must have accurate maps 
 and orienting data. 
 
 This division commander, whose function it 
 was, among other things, to command three regi- 
 ments of artillery, did not know even the simplest 
 principles of artillery fire. But I do not blame 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 185 
 
 the general; he was an energetic and gallant offi- 
 cer. I do feel, though, that the army is to blame 
 for raising to the rank of major generals officers 
 who had not been instructed in the arms which 
 they were to employ. 
 
 The first phase of the Argonne consisted of the 
 initial assault of the greener divisions of the 
 army. This assault lost momentum as the divi- 
 sions became exhausted or disorganized. New di- 
 visions took their places as fast as they could be 
 moved over congested roads, and, German rein- 
 forcements arriving, there ensued a period of dis- 
 jointed attacks known as the second phase. 
 
 In this respect the battles of the Argonne re- 
 semble those of Verdun and the Somme with the 
 exception that now the allies were so greatly pre- 
 ponderant in numbers of men and munitions that 
 a battle of attrition was as certain to end in vic- 
 tory as in former cases it was bound to be inde- 
 cisive. For this reason the policy of continuing 
 the assault night and day with all the means at 
 hand deserved the highest military commendation. 
 
 The minor tactics employed, however, cannot 
 receive the same degree of praise. The second 
 
186 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 phase of the Argonne was strategically successful 
 in that it wore down the weakening enemy. Tac- 
 tically, it was a series of failures. Soldiers are 
 taught that a tactical victory consists of posses- 
 sion of the battlefield at the end of the action. 
 In the days of spears and shock tactics this was 
 clearly the case. Leaders sought security in the 
 superiority of the location of the ground upon 
 which they placed their troops and upon the rigid- 
 ity of their formation. Pushed off this ground, 
 the troops inevitably lost the regularity of their 
 order and were doubly defeated. 
 
 When firearms again brought extreme mobility 
 into warfare the advantage of holding a certain 
 piece of ground decreased to the vanishing point. 
 The English troops on King's Mountain were at a 
 disadvantage and their successive successful 
 charges against the Tennessee militia were totally 
 unavailing because these never stood before the 
 enemy, but kept shooting at him from all sides. 
 
 The introduction of artillery into mobile war- 
 fare gave to possession of the battlefield its old 
 importance. No matter how mobile the artillery, 
 once engaged it could not be withdrawn from be- 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 187 
 
 fore a vigorous attack. Placed practically in line 
 with its infantry, sometimes in front of it, it was 
 doomed to capture, if the infantry were driven 
 back. Conquest of the battlefield, therefore, meant 
 conquest of the enemy ^s artillery, and as an army, 
 no matter how mobile, without artillery cannot op- 
 pose an army with artillery, it meant victory. 
 
 The long range of modern artillery lent a new 
 aspect to warfare — ^what is termed the ** depth'' of 
 the battlefield. 
 
 Where Napoleon's cavalry could re-form in per- 
 fect security a few hundred yards distant from the 
 British squares at Waterloo, the modern soldier 
 is in range of the enemy at many miles. In mod- 
 ern defensive warfare artillery may be placed sev- 
 eral thousand meters behind the infantry line and 
 fire upon the enemy at varying distances in 
 front of the line, according to the range of the 
 guns. In a previous chapter it has been related 
 how General Gouraud planned his defensive battle 
 of Champagne in depth and withdrew his infantry 
 from position to position while firing upon the ad- 
 vancing Germans with cannon, machine guns and 
 rifles. So far had he extended this principle that 
 
188 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 some of his artillery could not reach the Germans 
 until they had advanced a considerable distance 
 inside the original French first line. 
 
 Under these conditions a tactical success can 
 only be gained by an advance which overruns and 
 captures the defensive artillery. Any advance 
 less than this is merely a march forward under 
 enemy fire which becomes more effective at every 
 step, while the protecting barrage of the offensive 
 artillery gives less support. When the assault is 
 stopped, if it is stopped short of the defensive ar- 
 tillery, the defensive artillery is moved back. 
 Under these circumstances the attacker must suf- 
 fer much more heavily than the defender. 
 
 Many mistakes were made in the Argonne in 
 ordering attacks which did not even contemplate 
 overrunning the enemy *s artillery, and these in 
 spite of the fact that the tactical principle above 
 enunciated had been acted upon by American 
 troops when on the defensive and should have 
 been thoroughly understood by all general and 
 staff ofiicers. 
 
 The appreciation of this principle is the line of 
 demarcation between the second and third periods 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 189 
 
 of the battle. For the decisive attack all available 
 artillery was mobilized on the front of the 5th 
 corps. Both the corps commander and the chief 
 of the corps artillery were skillful officers whose 
 experience dated back to the early days of the 
 1st division. All the artillery was organized to 
 fire according to one comprehensive plan. The 
 rolling barrage was planned to sweep 11,000 
 meters. The infantry was ordered to capture all 
 the enemy defenses, however deep. The assault 
 was a complete success. Everywhere the German 
 infantry was thrown back and finally the 2nd divi- 
 sion broke clear through and opened the road to 
 Sedan. 
 
 The Argonne will be known as Pershing's battle 
 and so brings up the personality of the com- 
 mander-in-chief. 
 
 One of the questions I am asked most frequently 
 is: What about Pershing? "What do you think 
 of Pershing! What was Pershing, anyhow? I 
 can add no details to the story of General Persh- 
 ing's early career. He is a graduate of West 
 Point. At the battle of Santiago, Cuba, he com- 
 manded a troop of cavalry. In the Philippines he 
 
190 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 attracted attention by his aggressiveness in a 
 campaign against one of tlie savage tribes. Pres- 
 ident Roosevelt, in his process of vitalizing the 
 Regular army and changing it from a constabulary 
 into a military force, promoted him from the rank 
 of captain to that of brigadier general. In 1916 
 he commanded the unsuccessful expedition to cap- 
 ture Francisco Villa. His conduct of this expedi- 
 tion received general commendation, it being thor- 
 oughly understood that the limitations put upon 
 him by the War Department made his success 
 impossible. "When he was ordered to Europe in 
 1917 as commander-in-chief he was generally 
 recognized as the proper man for the place, if 
 General Wood was to be passed over. 
 
 I met him for the first time in Paris, and my 
 acquaintanceship with him was only that of a 
 major on staff duty with his commanding general. 
 From the day I reported to duty I have seen him 
 five times. In August, 1917, he sent for me to 
 receive my report of Erzberger's secret peace 
 offer to the allies, of which I have spoken before. 
 The second time was when I asked permission to 
 leave staff duty for the line. And I saw him twice 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 191 
 
 during his inspections of the front, the last time 
 during a heavy German artillery fire. I mention 
 this because of the pusillanimous suggestion that 
 General Pershing absented himself from the firing 
 line. I saw him last when I asked to remain in 
 France.* 
 
 The demands upon General Pershing were 
 varied and difficult. For the first few months 
 after his arrival in Europe he was compelled to 
 appear at many places as tangible evidence of the 
 coming of the American army. He had to receive 
 receptions, eulogies and flatteries such as never 
 before were showered upon an American officer. 
 His friends wondered whether he could keep his 
 head after such ovations. He could and he did. 
 He was responsible for the organization that was 
 to receive, transport, feed, equip and munition 
 the huge army coming from America with nothing 
 but the clothes on its back. This task was suc- 
 cessfully accomplished. In March, 1918, he had 
 to make one of the gravest military decisions that 
 ever confronted a general. The allies were being 
 
 *I have met General Pershing twice since this chapter was 
 written. 
 
192 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 badly beaten. Within the next two months they 
 might be defeated and destroyed. Americans 
 reaching France could not be made effective fight- 
 ing forces in twice that time. 
 
 Should he bring them over and risk their cap- 
 ture or destruction by a victorious enemy before 
 they were capable of fighting, or should he leave 
 them safely in America, where they could protect 
 our shores against a triumphant foe I 
 
 People who see only that the Germans were 
 finally overcome can never realize how close the 
 Kaiser came to victory, and they never will ap- 
 preciate how momentous was the problem faced 
 by ijreneral Pershing. Another might have taken 
 the safer but the weaker course. 
 
 In September he was compelled to decide the 
 question of putting our newly arrived troops into 
 the offensive while unequipped and untrained. 
 
 Under other circumstances it would have been 
 criminal to put many of these formations into a 
 major battle. Only in the last extremity of defeat 
 or to secure a victory almost within grasp should 
 the newly arrived divisions have been allowed to 
 fight a trained and still organized enemy. The 
 
THE AMERICAN OFFENSIVES 19S 
 
 second condition existed, and General Pershing 
 showed irreproachable military judgment in 
 throwing every resource of his command, every 
 soldier, trained and untrained, into the fire. 
 
 The Battle pf the Argonne in a measure re- 
 sembles the Battle of the Wilderness. With the 
 superiority of force at our disposal only an iron 
 will to hammer away irrespective of loss was 
 necessary. But this quality was indispensable. 
 Our losses inevitably would be enormous and 
 our efforts not spectacular. Criticisms of the 
 Argonne we have had, and more will be forth- 
 coming, and very just ones; but there can be no 
 fair criticism of General Pershing for throwing 
 every available man into the attack that ended 
 the war. 
 
 We got only the armistice as a result, and 
 a peace. If the Germans could definitely have 
 stopped the allied advance before winter, how 
 much worse might be the plight of the world to- 
 day! 
 
 What heights General Pershing might have at- 
 tained as a strategist or a tactician had he been in 
 the war long enough to learn all that the Russian^ 
 
194 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 French and German generals knew, it is futile to 
 ask. No man can do more than meet an emerg- 
 ency. Pershing did this. For the numerous vexa- 
 tions, inconveniences, and even unnecessary hard- 
 ships which our troops underwent let us place 
 the blame where it belongs — on America's refusal 
 to prepare for war — and not hold responsible 
 men who did their best in a hurry and with the 
 few miserable tools they were given. 
 
 It may be remarked in closing that General Per- 
 shing is not an officer who rose according to regu- 
 lar army methods. While still a captain he was 
 picked out for high command. If all the other 
 American generals had been selected in the same 
 way our success would have been greater. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 SOME ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 
 
 The armistice found the army still vigorous and 
 its efficiency much increased by its experience in 
 the great battle. Men of real military power had 
 come to the front — and, not the least important, 
 were fully aware that they had not learned all 
 there was in the military art. Schools were im- 
 mediately formed to study the lessons of the cam- 
 paign and maneuvers were held to in&truct all 
 arms and all ranks in the evolutions which had 
 proven the most successful and the most econom- 
 ical of human life. The American army had ap- 
 proached — perhaps it had reached — the stage 
 where it could function without the assistance of 
 French officers. 
 
 Let it be our effort to continue the development 
 of our military from the point it attained in the 
 war and not let it drop back to a position where 
 it will need foreign arms and a yearns instruction 
 
 195 
 
196 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 by foreign officers, under the protection of a for- 
 eign navy, to get ready for the field. 
 
 We have demobilized. This was necessary. We 
 have, however, given up every form of organiza- 
 tion which we so painfully built up during the war 
 and which we will need to protect us in any strug- 
 gle which the rivalries of the world may force 
 upon us. Surely, an intelligent people will not 
 allow this condition of helplessness to continue. 
 
 Enough time has passed to cool any ill-will 
 which has sprung up from personal injustices, 
 themselves caused by the rotten military system 
 preceding our entry into the war. Let us consider 
 dispassionately how we can form a skeleton organ- 
 ization best adapted for rapid mobilization. 
 
 In retrospect it is not difficult to measure the 
 services of all factors that contributed to our 
 success. The Regular army, of course, played by 
 far the greater part. It was the reservoir from 
 which the fundamentals of our military instruc- 
 tion were drawn. It had already largely instructed 
 the National Guard in 1916. It continued this in- 
 struction the following year, furnishing the bulk 
 of the high ranking officers for that organization. 
 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 197 
 
 It also examined the fitness of the National Guard 
 officers and got rid of the not inconsiderable num- 
 ber of incompetents it contained. It furnished 
 instructors for the Officers ' Training Camps and it 
 furnished all the regimental commanders for the 
 National army. 
 
 The Eegular army also furnished the principal 
 officers of all the general staffs. In sincerity, in 
 patriotism, and in bravery on the battlefield its 
 members lived up to the high expectations of its 
 admirers. However, it had certain defects which 
 it was unable to remedy of itself and there was in 
 this war no higher authority capable of rendering 
 it this service. It could not control its group feel- 
 ing. The system of promotion put into effect by 
 it regarded too highly the career of the profes- 
 sional soldier and too little the success of the 
 war. The selection of generals merely in order of 
 seniority was a grave offense against the army. 
 The rapid promotion given to the younger officers 
 was not in itself detrimental to efficiency. These 
 officers shone in their new positions with great 
 brilliancy. 
 
 In dealing with the question of supplies at home, 
 
198 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 its failure was almost complete. The fault here, 
 however, does not rest upon the army officers as 
 much as upon the civilians in the War Depart- 
 ment, not only those who officiated during the war 
 but those who had failed to make a plan of co- 
 operation between the military and industry long 
 before. 
 
 The administration in Europe was, on the whole, 
 exceedingly good, such failures as were evinced 
 being due to the herculean tasks imposed and the 
 necessity of improvising organizations which had 
 never existed even on paper. 
 
 Little praise, however, can be given to the Reg- 
 ular service for its conduct of aeronautics either 
 in Europe or at home. It failed grossly to deliver 
 the necessary planes. It shone in no respect, and 
 it is to be noted that the famous fliers whose gal- 
 lantry relieved the monotony of unsuccess did not 
 come from the Regular service. It is proper to 
 add that one exception to this unfortunate recital 
 is Brigadier General William Mitchell, who, fre- 
 quently suppressed in Europe, is now the chief of 
 aeronautics, and who, it may be hoped, will rescue 
 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 199 
 
 that branch of the service from its unenviable 
 position. 
 
 In military education the Regular army ranks 
 high. Considering the paucity of opportunity for 
 study and the mistreatment it received at the 
 hands of two succeeding administrations, the mis- 
 erable conditions under which it was kept along 
 the Mexican frontier, its achievements in this line 
 are astounding. The average in intelligence and 
 character of its members is elevated, and men of 
 capacity for great command were shown to be 
 present, although their arrival in position was 
 delayed by the cabal of the senior officers to retain 
 active rank. 
 
 The training camps furnished a great majority 
 of the officers in the war. The course of instruc- 
 tion was made short by necessity, but it was effi- 
 cient, and the principle of requiring every man to 
 pass this test before receiving a commission is 
 surely one we must never abandon. It must not 
 be thought that all the officers who came from 
 these camps entered them from civil life. A very 
 large percentage entered from the ranks of the 
 army. This is, of course, the right principle, and 
 
200 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 would have been adopted from the beginning, if it 
 had been possible. It only becomes possible in 
 practice if every citizen has served in the ranks. 
 We would have been lost if we had tried to officer 
 our great armies in 1917 from the ranks of the 
 Eegular army and the National Guard. 
 
 I firmly believe that the National Guard should 
 be continued. It is highly desirable that there 
 should be other military organizations or another 
 military organization from that adimnistered by 
 the War Department. Everybody knows the 
 blanket effect which the War Department always 
 has put on all initiative. Let us by all means 
 have military organizations where men of military 
 talent can develop along free lines. The Eegular 
 army should compel the National Guard to main- 
 tain a certain standard, but should not prevent its 
 rising above that standard. 
 
 The National Guard comes out of the late war 
 with a marvelous record and a clean slate. De- 
 nounced for decades, not only by Regular army 
 officers but by slackers as well, as an organization 
 of tin. soldiers, it furnished the cadres which made 
 the success of 1918 possible. The troops which 
 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 201 
 
 the Eegular army, distracted by its manifold 
 duties, could not furnish, the National Guard sup- 
 plied. Their achievements, early recognized by 
 both our allies, are now acclaimed by the com- 
 mander-in-chief himself. The National Guard, 
 however, was only a cadre which was not complete 
 at the top nor at the bottom. It had to borrow 
 most of its general officers, and this always will be 
 so. The spare time which a civilian may give to 
 military training can hardly fit him to hold gen- 
 eral rank. Even a brilliant civilian is less fitted at 
 the outset than a Eegular chosen in order of sen- 
 iority. 
 
 The National Guard did not furnish its entire 
 quota of officers, needing replacements from the 
 training camps, to which it furnished many pupils, 
 and it also drew heavily upon the draft for its 
 effectiveness. At the end of the war it stood with 
 a long list of divisions and regiments only less 
 effective than the 1st and 2nd divisions. It is now 
 an organization in bebig, or, rather, a series of 
 organizations in being. These organizations have 
 developed among themselves, by experience under 
 fire and by elimination, men competent to hold 
 
202 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 very high command. It is entirely proper that 
 they should receive commissions in these com- 
 mands from their state governments and that 
 these commisions should be honored by the Fed- 
 eral government. We know from the experience 
 of this war that if any National Guard officers 
 prove incompetent to perform their duties, they 
 will easily be removed. 
 
 Eeserve officers should not be left in their pres- 
 ent unorganized condition. Calling them out from 
 time to time for a short period of instruction will 
 not bring the best results. They should be en- 
 cadred into regiments and organized in the sev- 
 eral departments ready to receive their allotment 
 of recruits or selected men in emergency. Nor 
 should any limitation be placed upon the rank to 
 which they may rise by suitable demonstration of 
 efficiency. The Reserve corps will never be of any 
 value to the Union if it is to be branded as an in- 
 ferior organization. The young Regular officer 
 who alluded to the U. S. R. on a Reserve officer's 
 collar as his *^ badge of shame '* showed bad taste, 
 but he phrased in Napoleonic language the regula- 
 tion which rendered our Reserve corps unpopular. 
 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE S03 
 
 Any idea that high command shall be confined 
 to officers of the Regular army is not only repug- 
 nant to American principles but also, as history 
 shows, productive of inefficient generalship, and 
 lastly will vitiate all attempts to obtain necessary 
 military legislation. 
 
 Superior advantages which come to the Eegular 
 army officers to fit themselves for high command 
 will result in bringing Regular army officers into 
 most of the important positions. From the point 
 of view of their own ambition they do not need 
 any such written or unwritten law. As a success- 
 ful general from the Regular army put it: *^If 
 after twenty years of study I am not a better 
 soldier than one of these new men, heaven knows, 
 I want to get out of his way.'' 
 
 The great success of the war was the draft. 
 In the permanent establishment of this service 
 lies our national security and the remedy of such 
 military iUs as developed in our war. If every 
 officer has to rise from the ranks, there can be no 
 feeling of officer favoritism. If every citizen 
 serves a period in the army, there will not be that 
 lack of understanding between manufacturer and 
 
g04 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 supply officer which acted so detrimentally. If 
 every member of Congress has served in the army, 
 there will be an end to the lamentable misconcep- 
 tion about the army and military affairs which 
 noW characterizes onr legislators. If every citizen 
 is always liable to the call to war, young pacifists 
 and old pacifists witli sons will not embark so 
 lightly on the fallacies that cost us so heavily in 
 wounded and dead. 
 
 To be sure, universal service will not eradicate 
 all faults or all mistakes, but it will end the great 
 faults under which we have served. 
 
 To provide our personnel, therefore, we should 
 have universal training to start every citizen on 
 the road to military efficiency and to give each 
 one an equal opportunity to become a commis- 
 sioned officer. The Eegular officers' corps chosen 
 from those who apply for commissions will be the 
 heart of our military system. The officers' reserve 
 corps and the National Guard shall be auxiliaries. 
 
 Let us undo at once our error of demobilization. 
 Officers of the Regular army holding temporary 
 commissions have had to vacate these temporary 
 commissions entirely. Why entirely? Obviously, 
 
ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE 205 
 
 a regular army of a few liiindred thousand men 
 cannot support an officers' corps necessary for as 
 many millions. But wliy should not an officer 
 serving in the capacity in the Eegular army which 
 the occasion demands still have a reserve rank or 
 a war rank to which he will rise immediately on 
 the outbreak of hostilities and without further 
 action on the part of the authorities. Surely an 
 officer who knows he will occupy a position of in- 
 creased authority in the event of war will work 
 to prepare for that position, will be familiar with 
 it, and, unlike so many of the generals at the be- 
 ginning of the late war, will not think as a major 
 or a captain. 
 
 This plan would also facilitate the recruiting 
 of an officers' reserve corps. Now an officer who 
 accepts a res^erve commission feels that he is 
 accepting a rank beyond which he cannot be pro- 
 moted and that if he is mobilized he will be con- 
 stantly overslaughed by an unlimited number of 
 Regular army officers who will be promoted not 
 by selection because of efficiency but by seniority 
 because of class feeling. The reserve officer 
 
206 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 should know just where he will be at the outbreak 
 of war and that, once the whole army is mobilized, 
 all officers will be on the same Ust — will rise, stand 
 still, or fall on their merits. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 NEW WEAPONS AND THEIB USB 
 
 Just as we should learn from our war experi- 
 ence how to provide an army to defend us in the 
 next great crisis, so must we find a true military 
 doctrine for the use of the army. 
 
 It is vital to resist the temptation to find in the 
 experiences of the war corroboration of precon- 
 ceived ideas. This will be especially hard among 
 the officers of the Regular army because they have 
 studied from pre-war text books and because a 
 minority of them have had actual experience in 
 combat. Just now too much stress is being laid 
 upon the value of * draining for open warfare," 
 and the emphasis on the importance of mobility 
 as contrasted with force. It would be absurd 
 to suggest that open warfare training should be 
 abandoned or to minimize in the least degree the 
 value of mobility. Furthermore, there is no 
 danger of such a mistake being made in America. 
 
 There is, however, a danger that men who have 
 
 207 
 
THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 not participated in heavy combat will fail to ap- 
 preciate that when troops, substantially equal in 
 numbers, equipment and discipline, meet, there 
 must result a grueling combat in which every re- 
 source of materiel and technique must be em- 
 ployed. 
 
 I am frankly afraid that those officers who have 
 not learned the intricate technique developed on 
 the west front will prevent its being taught in 
 American schools. Let us not forget that the 
 armies which clashed in 1914 were all led by gen- 
 erals educated up to the eyes in the school of 
 mobility. And let us not forget that a month of 
 inconclusive ^^open warfare^' ended with the op- 
 posing armies completely demobilized in the face 
 of each other. For years thereafter neither side 
 was able to use enough fokce to break the other's 
 lines. When finally the Germans found the means 
 to break our lines, these were in every case re- 
 stored and at less expenditure of energy than had 
 been used in breaking them. 
 
 The campaign of the fall of 1918 is no criterion 
 for a campaign between equals. The Germans 
 were inferior in men and in munitions. They were 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 209 
 
 deserted by their allies. The country behind them 
 was breaking into revolution. 
 
 In our teachings of mobility let us appreciate 
 that we move only to concentrate fokce. Let us be 
 prepared to exercise this fokce to the fullest effi- 
 ciency, and let us appreciate that ^'open warfare" 
 can only be used in advance guard actions and in 
 the pursuit. 
 
 When main bodies come into contact, methods 
 wrongly called those of ^'trench warfare'' must 
 be used, as was shown in the transition from the 
 second to the third period of the battle of the Ar- 
 gonne. 
 
 To attack successfully an enemy who is organ- 
 ized to defend himself it is necessary to concen- 
 trate a superiority of artillery which by carefully 
 regulated fire and well defined objects will neu- 
 tralize his barrage batteries and will put out of 
 service the greater part of his organized strong 
 points. The infantry concentrated in superior 
 numbers for the assault can, by use of its proper 
 weapons, overcome the defense of hostile infantry 
 and artillery which has been shattered by our ar- 
 tillery preparation, or it can attack with reason- 
 
210 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 able success enemy rear guards ; but for infantry 
 to attack an organized enemy, equipped with ma- 
 cbine guns and protected by wire and a barrage 
 and not greatly shaken by our preparatory fire, 
 has been proven suicidal by the experience of all 
 combatants in this war. The fact that tanks are 
 of great assistance in attack and that surprise is 
 still possible and of great value does not detract 
 from these established principles. 
 
 It is imperative that artillery be handled as 
 artillery and not as though it were trench mortars 
 or infantry cannon. Bringing artillery into the 
 assaulting line adds nothing to the attack, while it 
 deprives it of the invaluable support of guns 
 properly handled. 
 
 Artillery fire, to be effective, must be concen- 
 trated. The long range of modern guns permits 
 concentration not only to a point far beyond that 
 which heretofore was possible but to the point of 
 annihilation. To attain this irresistible use of 
 artillery perfect liaison between infantry and 
 artillery is essential. This liaison can be accom- 
 plished only in divisions trained and exercised in 
 the combined use of arms. 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 211 
 
 Due to the lack of divisional artillery and the 
 consequent lack of support to some infantry divi- 
 sions, and because of the ignorance of many gen- 
 eral officers in the use of artillery, there has grown 
 up a school of infantry officers who believe that 
 cannon should be attached to small infantry units 
 to move with them and fire on the restricted front 
 of the unit to which they are attached. This is an 
 error of the first magnitude. 
 
 The correct employment of artillery is simple 
 and self-evident, but it seems as much of a mystery 
 to some intelligent men as music or painting is to 
 others. 
 
 At the time of Francis I. the Chevalier Bayard 
 is quoted as advocating the concentration of artil- 
 lery fire; and a chronicle of the time of Joan of 
 Arc remarks the amazement of a lieutenant-gen- 
 eral that Joan knew by instinct how to concentrate 
 the fire of artillery as well as he could have done 
 it. Yet war after war has been fought and this 
 simple principle has been utterly ignored by men 
 of lifelong service in the army. 
 
 In justice to our army let it be recorded that 
 prior to the war neither the French nor the Ger- 
 
212 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 mans had thoroughly mastered the use of the 
 combined arms under modern conditions. The 
 technique of the first was, to be sure, nearly per- 
 fect in accuracy of aim and in concentration of 
 fire. They themselves admit, however, there was a 
 lack of cooperation between the artillery and the 
 infantry in the early stages of the war. The Ger- 
 mans understood both the concentration of 
 artillery fire and the use of the combined arms; 
 but they fell into the error of exaggerating the 
 value of moving the guns, and from this mistake 
 they never entirely recovered. Soldiers should 
 know that the moving of cannon is a defensive 
 operation and that the offensive operation of can- 
 non, within their range, lies in moving their fire. 
 
 Of course, the four developments of this war 
 which most profoundly have affected its present 
 and future conduct are : Airplanes, mustard gas, 
 tanks and automobile trucks. 
 
 Of these, airplanes have practically monopolized 
 public attention. It has even been suggested in 
 the American Congress that the next war will be 
 won in the air. This is a threefold misapprehen- 
 sion due to the natural appeal the airplane makes 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 213 
 
 to the imagination, to the propaganda carried on 
 by inefficient and dishonest aircraft production au- 
 thorities, and to its spectacular attacks on civil 
 populations, timid and easily panic stricken. 
 
 The airplane undoubtedly is effective in attack- 
 ing towns behind the lines. The German air raids 
 obtained results greatly incommensurate with any 
 material damage done. Bombing factory towns at 
 night robbed the workers of sleep, shook their 
 nerves, and detracted from their capacity to turn 
 out munitions. The effect of air raids in this 
 direction, however, shrinks to insignificance when 
 compared with General Scott's bombardment of 
 the civil population of Vera Cruz with heavy ar- 
 tillery in 1847. The Germans made a practice of 
 bombing factory cities as far as their means would 
 permit, but it cannot be said that all their efforts 
 had any appreciable effect upon the final outcome 
 of the war. 
 
 On the other hand, the allied blockade produced 
 a condition of near famine in Germany in 1918 
 and was largely instrumental in breaking down 
 Teutonic morale. This reached its lowest ebb in 
 the summer and fall of 1918, when the hard 
 
214 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 pressed army in the field had need of every pos- 
 sible support from home, but received discourage- 
 ment instead. The blockade, therefore, remains 
 supreme as the most eifective and the most cruel 
 weapon to use against the enemy ^s civil popula- 
 tion. 
 
 From the point of view of military attack air- 
 plane bombing is not effective. If the bomber flies 
 by night to avoid detection from the ground, he 
 has great difficulty in seeing the target. If he 
 comes low enough to see and hit the target, he 
 becomes visible and vulnerable. If an airplane 
 attacks back areas in daytime, it must fly so high 
 in rarefied atmosphere to avoid the anti-aircraft 
 guns that it is not able to carry a large quantity 
 of bombs, and it must launch these without pos- 
 sibility of aim. As a weapon of destruction the 
 airplane cannot compete with the artillery in 
 accuracy or in volume of fire. 
 
 The principle that **one gun on shore is worth 
 two guns at sea'' has remained true at every de- 
 velopment of the battleship, and the same probably 
 will be true of the airplane. Ground gives con- 
 cealment, protection, and the opportunity to use 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE ^15 
 
 the biggest gun. The ship and the airplane may 
 choose the time and range of attack, but these 
 will not offset the greater advantage of fighting 
 from the ground. 
 
 In attacking troops the airplane, armed with 
 machine guns, has proven more effective. It is 
 exaggeration to say that any value comes from 
 dashing at a battery in position or upon troops in 
 trenches, because these usually find protection. 
 But when the roads are congested by columns of 
 infantry leaded down with equipment, and by ar- 
 tillery and transport tired and not vigilant against 
 air attacks, airplanes with machine guns have in- 
 flicted considerable losses; and by scattering or- 
 ganizations and blocking roads have materially 
 delayed movements of troops. For this purpose, 
 therefore, airplanes will be used more extensively 
 in future. 
 
 On the other hand, it should not be forgotten 
 that the development of aviation advanced much 
 more rapidly than did the science of anti-aircraft 
 counter-offensive. Undoubtedly instruments will 
 be invented to improve the fire upon airplanes at 
 great heights, and gunners will be better trained 
 
216 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 to combat airplanes flying low to attack troops. 
 For the latter we have only to devise a simple 
 weapon and put it in the hands of experienced 
 wing shots. The red tape of the War Department 
 prevented the use of this simple expedient in Eu- 
 rope, although frequently advocated; and yet, in 
 several cases, infantrymen, relying only upon 
 their sense of an object moving in the air, and 
 using either the service rifle or the French auto- 
 matic rifle, succeeded in bringing down enemy 
 planes. 
 
 The great use of aviation, of course, will be to 
 obtain information. Airplanes now can fly many 
 hundreds of miles without alighting. They can, 
 therefore, patrol the enemy's rear for a distance 
 that it will take troops several days to cover, even 
 while marching at the most rapid speed. On clear 
 days they can easily detect all movements in force 
 on the railroads or roads, and on clear and espe- 
 cially on moonlit nights should gather a great deal 
 of information. The value of airplane reconnais- 
 sance in this war became the greater because of 
 the almost solid line between Switzerland and the 
 sea, which made the work of ground patrols and 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 217 
 
 spies much more difficult. Airplanes not only 
 acted as patrols but carried spies by night and 
 left them in enemy country to send back reports 
 by carrier pigeon, by contact with other spies, 
 and by returning in an airplane with which an 
 appointment had been made. 
 
 In this way airplanes make the problem of the 
 commander contemplating an attack much more 
 difficult. That they do not make it impossible has 
 been shown by the concentrations of troops and 
 surprise attacks which characterized the year 
 1918. Four instances will confirm this — ^in the 
 early spring of that year the British, with a large 
 preponderance in the air, were unable to learn of 
 the German concentration against their 5th army ; 
 on the 18th of July, the Grermans, with a superior- 
 ity in the air, were not aware of the concentration 
 of the Franco- American corps in the forest of 
 Villers-Cotterets ; in April, 1917, the information 
 which the Germans got of the proposed French 
 attack was obtained by a trench raid ; and on July 
 15th, 1918, the vital information which General 
 Gouraud received of the very hour that the Ger- 
 
«18 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 man general attack was to start was obtained by 
 an old-fashioned patrol of only four men. 
 
 I feel, however, that the intelligence depart- 
 ments of all armies signally failed to take full ad- 
 vantage of the possibilities of gaining informa- 
 tion by airplane. 
 
 In addition to its long range patrolling, the air- 
 plane is valuable in obtaining news of enemy 
 movements near the front during battle and the 
 movements of its own advancing troops. Making 
 photographs which reveal the positions of enemy 
 batteries, strong points and trenches is perhaps 
 the most important service of the airplane, since 
 it is impossible to break an enemy line without ac- 
 curately bombarding his defensive organization. 
 Having located the enemy's defenses, the airplane 
 also offers great service in regulating the fire of 
 the destroying artillery. 
 
 Great as the value of the airplane unquestion- 
 ably is for locating and directing fire upon enemy 
 organizations, it is not indispensable. Many ex- 
 pedients have been devised for detecting enemy 
 positions from the ground and for directing fire 
 upon them. 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE jei9 
 
 The American artillery became especially profi- 
 cient in this because it had to fight almost with- 
 out aviation through the greater part of the time 
 it was in the war. On the contrary, the British 
 were superior to their enemy in the air throughout 
 most of the struggle, but did not get the full benefit 
 of this superiority because their artillery never 
 reached the technical development which the 
 Americans learned from the French. It seems 
 well to point out that in the development of our 
 aviation to the utmost we should not neglect fully 
 to develop all the ground methods of countering 
 the enemy's aviation. 
 
 Airplanes and balloons again give commanding 
 officers the opportunity to make personal observa- 
 tions and to inspire the men with their presence. 
 
 It was Napoleon's constant endeavor to occupy 
 a position on the battlefield where he could view 
 all maneuvers and could direct tactical movements 
 in person. His corps and division commanders 
 personally commanded their compact masses and 
 inspired them by example of individual courage. 
 
 The increasing size of armies and of the range 
 and destruotiveness of weapons had led to such 
 
220 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 great extensions of fronts and such depths and 
 openness of formations, such necessity for con- 
 cealment from sight even before the great war as 
 to make individual observation by the commander 
 on the one hand and example on the other no 
 longer possible. Coincidentally, the development 
 of the telephone made possible the transmission 
 of orders over long distances. 
 
 These causes led to the exercise of command 
 from a conmaand post, selected because of its ac- 
 cessibility to lines of communication from all 
 points, and generally placed immediately in rear 
 of the center of the command. Here the com- 
 mander receives information from the front and 
 orders from the rear and from it regulates' the 
 movements of his troops. If he leaves his posi- 
 tion for the front, he can obtain only a small part 
 of the information necessary to form his judg- 
 ments and can inspire only an infinitesimal per- 
 centage of his men, while all efforts made in these 
 directions necessitate his turning over the com- 
 mand of his troops to his subordinate for a con- 
 siderable period of time, perhaps during the time 
 when his presence is most needed. 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 221 
 
 By using an airplane a division commander can 
 make frequent and rapid surveys of the condition 
 at his front, size up the situation at the vital spot 
 and intervene with a decisiveness which is not 
 possible when dependent upon varying and con- 
 flicting reports from subordinates. At the same 
 time by use of special insignia on the plane the 
 commander can make his presence known and 
 thereby encourage his troops. 
 
 It seems strange that this use of the airplane 
 was not adopted in the war. The reason probably 
 lies in the high average age of commanders dis- 
 posing of airplanes and to the hostility which the 
 great number of mediocre generals would feel 
 towards a" dashing individual who would thus dis- 
 tinguish himself. In all services brilliancy was 
 frowned upon by the oligarchies of old fogies 
 which retained their palsied influence throughout 
 the conflict. 
 
 Among the Germans, artillery commanders 
 were required to study the enemy's terrain by 
 aerial observation over his lines, but this was for- 
 bidden in the American army. Of course, the Ger- 
 mans were right and we were wrong. We also 
 
9.%% THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 were wrong in not allowing our artillery com- 
 manders a personal use of balloons. The balloon 
 is the proper station for an artillery group com- 
 mander when his group is in action. He will do 
 better work by the use of his own eyes than he 
 will by using reports of a balloon observer. Fur- 
 thermore, he can be held entirely responsible for 
 the conduct of his fire and cannot pass the blame 
 of failure to an officer in another branch of the 
 service. 
 
 It is hard to fix the blame for the failure to al- 
 low our artillery commanders personally to take 
 the air. Undoubtedly the higher officers of the 
 air service intrigued to keep officers of other serv- 
 ice from flying in order to magnify the branch of 
 the service over which they presided. The gen- 
 eral staff also discouraged the development of 
 initiative on the part of line officers. Perhaps 
 there was also a lack of insistence on the part of 
 the artillery officers to obtain personal use of the 
 balloons and airplanes. 
 
 It must become a part of our doctrine that in 
 the air, as it has always been on the ground, the 
 responsible commanders shall make their own re- 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 223 
 
 connaissances wherever possible and not delegate 
 this dangerous but indispensable work. 
 
 While fully comprehending the great value of 
 the air service, we must not forget that in the 
 actual battle poison gas and tanks are much more 
 effective. Aided by yperite gas, surprise was the 
 great factor in) the German victories of 1918. 
 Aided by tanks, surprise was the element of allied 
 success in the same year. 
 
 The enormous value of surprise, long recog- 
 nized in the literature of war, had been largely 
 counteracted on the western front by the strong 
 defensive organizations that demanded such a long 
 artillery preparation to destroy them as to inform 
 the enemy of the assailant's purpose. The great 
 offensive power of gas and tanks reintroduced the 
 opportunity for surprise. 
 
 The great difference between bullets or ex- 
 plosive shells on the one hand and gas on the 
 other is that the action of the former is in- 
 stantaneous, while the latter retains its deadly ef- 
 fect for varying periods. If the bullet or shell 
 fragment does not strike its intended target, it is 
 harmless. 
 
224 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The most effective of all gases used in tlie war 
 was yperite, which poisoned the neighborhood of 
 its release for hours and even days. Yperite, a 
 liquid of severe caustic properties, penetrates the 
 thickest clothing and inflicts terrible burns upon 
 the body. Evaporated, it becomes a deadly gas, 
 invisible and nearly odorless. Upon one occasion 
 a division marched in the rain through dripping 
 woods which previously had been subjected to 
 yperite. Nearly all of the men had to be taken to 
 the rear, writhing in agony. In many instances 
 men have been fatally gassed without even know- 
 ing they had been subject to its effects. Because 
 of its deadly efficiency gas has, further, a moral 
 effect. Troops become inured to high explosive 
 shell and rifle fire, but the longer they are ac- 
 quainted with the effects of gas, the more they 
 dread it. 
 
 The Germans, on March 21st, 1918, made the 
 fullest use of gas in their attack on the British. 
 First, batteries were silenced and, once splashed 
 with the liquid yperite, they could not be used 
 again for a long time. Next, the German guns 
 were turned upon strong points and the garrisons 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 225 
 
 were subjected to the effects of yperite gas. A 
 part of each garrison was put out of action by 
 bums and the remainder greatly weakened from 
 having to wear gas masks for several hours. 
 
 Having disposed of counter-batteries and of 
 known strong points, the whole German artillery 
 was able to fire the rolling barrage before its own 
 troops. It would not be wide of the truth to say 
 that the use of the yperite gas had increased three- 
 fold the efficiency of the German artillery. 
 
 American troops suffered the same disadvantage 
 from the lack of gas shells that they suffered from 
 the shortage of airplanes. Sentimentalists whose 
 activities undoubtedly were guided by German 
 agents delayed the manufacture of gas for use 
 against the Germans while fellow countrymen 
 were scalded and choked to death by this modern 
 and terribly effective weapon. 
 
 The tank, like every other weapon in this war 
 excepting gas, is an American invention, neglected 
 in its home country and developed abroad. The 
 tank, in principle, is the body of an armored car 
 superimposed upon the American farm tractor. 
 It is strange that those countries which en- 
 
226 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 deavored to be militarily efficient in times of peace 
 had not already hit upon the tank. They all de- 
 veloped the armored automobile and used it ex- 
 tensively along the roads during the war of move- 
 ment. When the front became stabilized, the 
 roads immediately in the rear became impassable 
 and the armored automobiles could not be used. 
 It has not yet been determined who first thought 
 of using the American endless belt tractor on the 
 battle field. 
 
 Originally, the tank's principal value was be- 
 lieved to lie in the facility with which it out barbed 
 wire. Prior to the development of the tank the 
 wire was cut by artillery fire, by long tubes filled 
 with high explosives and placed beneath the en- 
 tanglements, and by infantry under protection of 
 a barrage. All of these methods were effective 
 in trench raids, but not satisfactory in large move- 
 ments. At Cambrai the British tanks opened ave- 
 nues through the wire defenses in a manner that 
 revolutionized the principles of attack. Tanks 
 also proved of great value in attacking machine 
 guns, the tank's weapon and crew having an ad- 
 vantage over the infantry machine gun crew in 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE 227 
 
 the open or even in a pill box. The tank's weak- 
 ness lies in its absolute vulnerability to a direct 
 hit from a cannon. From this it seeks security 
 in surprise, in rapidity of movement, and, most of 
 all, by operating in misty weather. The mist which 
 makes the airplane powerless brings the tank into 
 its kingdom. Therefore, as the reconnaissance 
 airplane is the greatest assistance to the defense 
 and the tank is the greatest weapon in the assault, 
 misty weather will favor the attack more than 
 ever. A general lesson should be drawn from this 
 coincidence — in misty countries the offensive will 
 be more successful than in regions blest with a 
 clear climate. 
 
 Tanks constructed for that purpose also have 
 been used to carry field pieces across shell-torn 
 ground and to bring up water and munitions. 
 Large tanks have been used, especially by the 
 British, to carry infantry across open ground and 
 establish them in woods and other defiladed areas. 
 
 The tractor, which has been adopted for the 
 American artillery, is a tank in every respect 
 except that the drivers have no protection and 
 no weapon. If our ordnance department ever 
 
228 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 stops its policy of opposing improvement, protec- 
 tion will be given to the drivers v/hich will make 
 them immune from shrapnel fire and greatly in- 
 crease the mobility of our artillery. 
 
 The word 'Hank*' was adopted to make the Ger- 
 mans think that these new machines had no other 
 object than the carrying of water to the front. It 
 is unfortunate that the word was appropriated at 
 all. It ought to be expunged from our military 
 vocabulary and the word 'Hractor'' substituted. 
 We will develop the many uses to which the tractor 
 is adaptable in warfare much more freely than 
 if we hypnotize ourselves with the word *Hank," 
 which, in the public mind, and to a great extent 
 in the military mind, limits the tractor mechanism 
 to a definite style of machine. 
 
 If aviation has received too large a portion of 
 public attention, the automobile truck has been 
 practically neglected, and yet this machine saved 
 the war for the allies. 
 
 The French railroads were vastly inferior to 
 the German, and although the French had the ad- 
 vantage of fighting in their own country and using 
 their own railroad lines, while the Germans had to 
 
NEW WEAPONS AND THEIR USE ^9 
 
 fight in foreign countries and connect their rail- 
 road lines with the captured lines, rebuilding 
 temporarily many dynamited bridges, the latter 
 still gave their armies a service immeasurably 
 superior to the French railroad service. The 
 French were the first to fall back on the use of 
 automobile trucks, turned out by their factories 
 in great quantity and of splendid quality. 
 
 One of the considerations governing the Ger- 
 man attack on Verdun in 1916 was that the as- 
 sailants could easily renew their supplies by rail 
 while the French had only one railroad line to the 
 city, and this under long range shell fire. It was 
 a distinct military surprise to the Germans to find 
 the French were able to supply the army defend- 
 ing Verdun by an enormous and efficient system 
 of auto truck transportation. 
 
 When the Germans broke the British line in 
 March, 1918, the greater part of the French re- 
 serves were moved to the battle front in auto 
 trucks; and when the Germans broke the line on 
 the Chemin des Dames in May, the American 2nd 
 division was moved across France in auto trucks 
 from its position in support of the 1st and jarrived 
 
230 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 in time to block the road to Paris. One of Luden- 
 dorff ^s laments is that the German factories could 
 not turn out auto trucks in numbers necessary to 
 offset the allies' advantage. 
 
 The airplane in reconnaissance, the tank in as- 
 sault, and the auto truck in mobility have sadly in- 
 vaded the province of cavalry. One well may 
 wonder what lies before the beau sahreur. The 
 answer, perhaps, is found in the words of the 
 chagrined mechanic who, given a team of artillery 
 horses to drive, contemptuously referred to them 
 as * ^ hay burners. ' ' The fight is between the horse 
 and the machine and it will be determined by the 
 economic conditions of warfare. Where horse 
 feed is abundant and fuel scarce the cavalry horse, 
 the artillery horse and the army mule will remain. 
 Elsewhere, they will be driven out by the machine. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE GENERAL STAFF 
 
 The subject of the General Staff is one mention 
 of which, is the occasion for great controversy. 
 While its ihdispensability is acknowledged, its un- 
 popularity is great in every country. 
 
 One hundred years ago Clausewitz, when writ- 
 ing on war, could not restrain himself from mak- 
 ing contemptuous allusions to staff officers. The 
 French called their genera^ staff ;ofificers ^^en- 
 dentCj ' ' meaning * ^ dressed in lace. ' ' The English 
 viewpoint is shown by the scale of awards the 
 German officers were supposed to employ in re- 
 warding their sharpshooters for killing British 
 officers : * ' Ten marks for a captain, twenty marks 
 for a major, one hundred marks for a colonel, and 
 thirty days in jail for shooting a British staff 
 officer ! ' ' In our own army the general staff was 
 frequently referred to as the ** general stuff,'' and 
 when its officers went to the front they were some- 
 
 231 
 
232 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 times told that a star could now be put in the serv- 
 ice flag of their particular general staff. 
 
 This unpopularity of this minority of the army 
 with the majority, and the great unpopularity of 
 the Washington general staff with the members 
 of Congress, make the development of a proper 
 general staff system a difficult matter. At the 
 same time a general staff is essential to an efficient 
 army. 
 
 Every army has long been divided into three 
 fundamental sections called arms, or branches, of 
 the service. They are infantry, artillery, and 
 cavalry. To assist these in their work are sup- 
 plementary services called engineers and signal 
 troops, supply trains, hospital troops and a mili- 
 tary legal department. Each is separate and dis- 
 tinct, and its personnel devotes itself to its 
 particular branch of the service. 
 
 Management of the whole rests in the general 
 or generals. In the case of a small army, say one 
 regiment of infantry, one battery of artillery, one 
 troop of cavalry, with a handful of specialists in 
 other departments, one general can do this work 
 with such assistants as he can pick up from the 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 233 
 
 differ ent branches or from civil life. As armies 
 increase in size the complexity of their administra- 
 tion and command increases, and larger and more 
 thoroughly organized staffs become necessary. 
 
 While armies exist for use in the field they must, 
 in their nature, have an administration at a central 
 point ; this administration procures their weapons, 
 clothing and supplies. 
 
 In early days this was largely done by con- 
 tractors. The abuses and weaknesses of the con- 
 tractor system led to the development of bureaus. 
 The collapse everywhere of the bureau system 
 caused the duties of the bureaus to be turned over 
 to the General Staff ; that is, everywhere except in 
 America, where the bureau system persisted, in 
 spite of a long series of failures, up to this war, 
 where it once more left its hecatombs. 
 
 The principal bureaus of our War Department 
 are the Adjutant-General, whose duty is to issue 
 the order to the Commander; the Ordnance De- 
 partment, whose function is to procure arms and 
 fighting equipment; and the Quartermaster's De- 
 partment, whose province is to furnish clothing 
 and supplies. The spheres of the Ordnance and 
 
234 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 the Quartermaster's Departments have become 
 overlapped in an exceedingly ludicrous manner. 
 
 It is necessary to dwell for a moment on the 
 total failure of our bureaus in this war because 
 of the vigorous efforts now being put forth by 
 them and their political supporters in Washington 
 to preserve them so they may repeat in a future 
 conflict the horrors they achieved in this. 
 
 Our Ordnance and our Quartermaster's bureaus 
 really were worse than useless. Better for the 
 army had they never existed. Not only did they 
 do no good, but they stood resolutely in the path 
 of every effort toward accomplishment. 
 
 The Ordnance Department had not provided for 
 the war a single weapon of first class. Our 3-inch 
 field piece was badly sighted ; our howitzers were 
 of such feeble range that if brought into action 
 against modern artillery they would have ap- 
 peared like the jingalls of the Chinese against 
 the modern artillery of the Japanese in 1895. The 
 machine gun was invented by an American, but 
 the Ordnance Department refused to provide them 
 either in number or quality. When the American, 
 Colonel Lewis, invented a greatly improved ma- 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 235 
 
 chine gun and offered it to this country gratis, 
 criminal jealousy on the part of the Ordnance offi- 
 cers induced its refusal, and this refusal was con- 
 tinued long after the outbreak of the present war 
 and even after our entrance into it. Rather than 
 let American troops fight with a Lewis gun, our 
 envious Ordnance Department preferred they go 
 to battle unarmed. The confessed pretext for this 
 criminality was that the Ordnance Department 
 was developing a better gun. At the end of the 
 war an excellent weapon was produced, whether 
 better or worse than the Lewis is a matter of 
 opinion; but this gun was not available while 
 American lives were being sacrificed on the battle- 
 field. 
 
 No less criminal was the conduct of this depart- 
 ment in regard to artillery. When Joifre came to 
 America in the spring of 1917 he brought the com- 
 plete plans for the French 75, the great weapon 
 invented by the French in 1896, and which, at the 
 close of the war, was still the premier field piece. 
 Not only was this by far the best field piece in 
 existence, but the French, by long practice, had 
 developed methods of handling it which would 
 
236 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 require a long period of experimentation with 
 any new weapon to learn to imitate. These 
 plans were turned over to our Ordnance Depart- 
 ment just as we were about to enter the war with 
 practically no artillery, and such as we had of in- 
 ferior quality and nearly worn out. The Ordnance 
 Department spent a year trying for its oivn glory 
 to develop improvements on the *'75.'' Mean- 
 time, American divisions remained nmequipped. 
 Instruction was delayed. If, sometimes, our 
 barrages were misplaced, if the artillery did not 
 protect the infantry, if our shells fell in the ranks 
 of our own men, the chief blame lies at the door 
 of these murderous egoists. 
 
 If our Ordnance Department was vicious, our 
 Quartermaster's Department was ridiculous. 
 The Quartermaster's Department purchased 
 clothes for the army and also perpetrated the 
 design. The result attained by these sleek clerks 
 has offended the eye of Europe and America and 
 spoiled the temper of every American soldier. Our 
 infantry was dressed in riding breeches, and all 
 soldiers were given a legging cumbersome to put 
 on, fragile in construction, and unsightly in ap- 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 237 
 
 pearance. Our shoe was well shaped, having been 
 designed by a doctor, but of such flimsy construc- 
 tion that it could not survive a single day's hard 
 marching. To save some few cents per thousand, 
 all pockets were reduced to a minimum size, and 
 this for men who had to carry upon their person 
 not only such comforts as they wished but all their 
 necessities. The Quartermaster's Department, 
 besides, had evolved a system of transacting busi- 
 ness that would amaze a Chinese custom house 
 collector. Its end was not to transact business, 
 but, incident to the transaction of business, to per- 
 form a series of extraordinary acrobatics on 
 paper. 
 
 In consequence, the troops in Europe suffered 
 hardships until a purchasing department was 
 organized which was compelled to procure more 
 than half the supplies needed by the army. 
 
 Soldiers, lacking in military qualities, uncom- 
 fortable in the field, unsuccessful in the command 
 of men, unrespected by their fighting associates, 
 naturally drift into the swivel chairs of the bu- 
 reaus, there to find themselves the masters of 
 
238 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 the fighting; men, with the tragic and comic results 
 already outlined. 
 
 Stark necessity had driven the armies of Eu- 
 rope into better organization, but no such neces- 
 sity had knocked at the doors of our War Depart- 
 ment. Our bureaus had become allied with the 
 political machine. Business firms dealt with the 
 army through the Ordnance and Quartermaster's 
 Departments. Also, they lent aid at election 
 times. Officers and men dealt with the Adjutant 
 General, and political favors for people with in- 
 fluence could be negotiated through this office. 
 
 Elihu Boot, while Secretary of State, and 
 'Leonard Wood, while Chief of Staff, fought vigor- 
 ously to eradicate these evils, but their efforts 
 were only partially successful; and with the end 
 of the latter 's detail, politics increased its sway 
 over the military fate of the millions destined to 
 go forth to fight. 
 
 The theory upon which these administrative 
 duties should be turned over to the General Staff 
 is that the General Staff is composed of fighting 
 men, not of slackers and clerks. These fighting 
 men, being up to date in military developments, 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 239 
 
 will demand up-to-date equipment, and, themselves 
 subject to the hardships and dangers of war, will 
 be loath to subordinate military efficiency to 
 political expediency, a condition which has not 
 existed in the staff departments. 
 
 The General Staff, then, fundamentally an or- 
 ganization drawn from the fighting services, is 
 charged with the administration and equipment of 
 the army, in peace as well as in war, and with the 
 conduct of all affairs which involve more than 
 .one arm of the service. These include (1) obtain- 
 ing information about the enemy, (2) planning 
 movements of troops of different arms by rail or 
 by road or by water, (3) plans of battle for the 
 combined arms, (4) producing and delivering sup- 
 plies, and (5) training. 
 
 This, of course, makes the General Staff su- 
 perior to any of the arms of the service, and it has 
 led to constant usurpation of power, a usurpation 
 which has come the more easily because of another 
 consideration. 
 
 The promotion of able officers seems to become 
 more difficult as armies become more regularized. 
 More and more high rank goes to men who have 
 
240 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 passed the age of greater efficiency and have really- 
 entered upon or advanced far down life's decline. 
 This fanlt has been recognized without being cor- 
 rected. Rather than assault the obstacle boldly, 
 military practice has been to circumvent it by 
 vesting in young staff officers of lower rank pow- 
 ers which properly belong to the superior gen- 
 erals. 
 
 For example, a General Staff officer, acting in 
 the name of his commander, can give orders to 
 officers who far outrank him. The operations offi- 
 cer of a division, who may be a Lieutenant-Colonel 
 or a Major, may himself direct a Brigadier-Gren- 
 eral what to do ; and likewise, any one of the chiefs 
 of the General Staff sections of the great General 
 Staff may issue orders to Army Commanders. A 
 Brigadier General may designate in detail the 
 work to be performed by the troops under the di- 
 rect command of a Lieutenant-General. 
 
 The General Staff becomes a kind of a superior 
 officers' corps, standing in relation to the line offi- 
 cers somewhat as line officers stand to non-com- 
 missioned officers. 
 
 It has been found necessary to put staff officers 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 241 
 
 through a course of instruction and to require 
 them to pass an examination. They are then as- 
 signed to the General StafP by an order of the 
 War Department, and are sent to duty with their 
 respective commands by order of the War De- 
 partment or the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, a 
 Division General may not select his staff officers. 
 If a difference arises between him and his staif he 
 has a personal appeal to his Corps Commander, 
 but the staff officer has an independent line of com- 
 munication to staff officers at Great Headquar- 
 ters, which dominates the Corps Commander. As 
 the detail of all administration is handled by the 
 •General Staff, the subordinate of the General 
 Staff is really closer to the fountain head of 
 authority than his commander. This is a fault and 
 a grave one, and one which must be remedied. 
 
 Staff officers do not personally engage in oper- 
 ations, whether maneuvers or combats. Informa- 
 tion of the actual working of the plans they formu- 
 late comes to them second-hand. Their perception 
 is limited by the ability of combat officers to ex- 
 plain and their own capacity to comprehend. 
 Therefore, anything like permanency in staff as- 
 
^42 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 sigmnent is certain to breed misconception in 
 high quarters and unskillful, badly drawn orders. 
 Another fault of the General Staff system is one 
 of morale. Before the days of the General Staff 
 the path to the rear was entirely too well beaten. 
 Many were they who left the combatant branches, 
 recognized as the services of honor, for the ad- 
 ministrative branches, which soldiers held in slight 
 esteem. With greater power and greater prestige 
 attached to the place of comfort and immunity 
 from danger on the General Staff, how shall we be 
 able to keep able and forceful men at the front, 
 where, after all, the enemy has to be met and over- 
 thrown? 
 
 Finally, that conception of the General Staff 
 which was developed in Germany, and which all 
 the Allied Staffs showed tendencies to emulate, 
 must be annihilated; namely, that in time of war 
 the General Staff becomes the government of the 
 country, an irresponsible government, and one 
 possessing powers of tyranny which it has taken 
 generations to drive out of our civil system. If 
 a military clique comes to possess complete power 
 to dictate who shall and who shall not enter the 
 
THE GENERAL STAFF 243 
 
 army, to decide where mobilized men shall serve, 
 to say what industries shall be commandeered for 
 military purposes, and shall be able to regulate the 
 right to travel, to conduct a military secret serv- 
 ice, to have the power of imprisonment, and be 
 permitted, as was proposed by President Wilson, 
 to gag the press, how great becomes the jeopardy 
 of our liberties ! 
 
 The solution of the General Staff problem is 
 virtually the solution of every other military prob- 
 lem — universal service of all young men while 
 they are young. With universal service will come 
 national and individual understanding of military 
 necessities and the limitation of military author- 
 ity. The nation will not, as its civil authorities 
 found it necessary to do in 1917, turn over the con- 
 duct of the war to men as unknown to the nation 
 as the nation is unknown to them, with knowledge 
 of war too little known to both. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE CKIME OF SILENCE 
 
 That censorship is unavoidably vicious is a 
 truth it has taken history to develop, and this was 
 understood before the war only by free peoples. 
 In Russia, as in oriental countries, censorship was 
 employed as one of the most efficient instruments 
 of tyranny. In Germany, also, truth and forward 
 movements were combated by a censorship which, 
 while it could not be made complete, was none the 
 less efficiently exercised. The long struggle for 
 freedom in England and her colonies is too well 
 known to require even a summary here. One hun- 
 dred and fifty years ago the conviction of our peo- 
 ple expressed itself in the constitutional provi- 
 sion for the freedom of the press. 
 
 The principle of the freedom of the press was 
 established in England contemporaneously with 
 the supremacy of parliament over the king. It 
 first came into relationship with the military ui 
 the Crimean war, when Mr. Russell, correspondent 
 
 244 
 
THE CRIME OF SILENCE 245 
 
 of the London Times, exposed the frightful dis- 
 organization of the British army in that campaign. 
 From that day to the great war it exercised a wide 
 influence upon military affairs. That its influence 
 has not been wholly beneficial is certain, but its 
 faults have been magnified and its benefits largely 
 forgotten. 
 
 The savage description of the Union rout at the 
 first battle of ^'Bull Eun'Vby Mr. Eussell of 
 Crimean fame, since dubbed *^Bull Run'' Russell, 
 was as unpopular among the American people as 
 it was in the army, but it was the greatest single 
 factor in awakening the north to its real military 
 shortcomings. The press also is to be credited in 
 large measure for the removal of McClellan and 
 Burnside and for the popularity of Grant, which, 
 if it did not alone enable him to rise to the rank 
 of commander-in-chief, upheld him during his 
 well-conceived and hard-fought campaign that 
 ended the rebellion. 
 
 Professional, even more than public, opinion 
 forgets benefits and exaggerates shortcomings. 
 Military men added their resentment to a just 
 criticism by a too free press of real faults in the 
 
246 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 military zone, and became unanimous in their op- 
 position to it. Chief among free people in their 
 opposition to the press were the French ofi&cers 
 who, smarting under th^r fully earned defeat in 
 1870, endeavored to conceal the faultiness of their 
 maneuvers under the camouflage that the news- 
 papers exposed their plans to the enemy. The 
 French, therefore, absolutely excluded newspaper 
 correspondents from their armies. 
 
 The English army also objected to journalistic 
 criticisms and to their professional hostility added 
 class antagonism, the officers being from the 
 aristocracy and *^ pressmen'' from the middle and 
 lower classes! Furthermore, the British army, 
 as an organization, was exceedingly hostile to the 
 ^* Liberal" government and determined to fight 
 the war without interference from it. 
 
 The allied armies on the western front organ- 
 ized press bureaus. These not only prevented the 
 publication of news valuable to the enemy but pre- 
 vented the allied peoples from getting informa- 
 tion, already possessed by the enemy, which would 
 tend to reflect upon the skill of the allied com- 
 manders. These commanders insisted upon the 
 
THE CRIME OF SILENCE 247 
 
 publication of false reports of military operations, 
 and as the press bureaus fell into the hands of 
 sycophantic individuals they gave great space to 
 grandiose letters and salutations between high 
 ranking officers that would more naturally have 
 emanated from the half savage leaders of the 
 middle ages than from the educated gentlemen 
 thus led from common sense by the exercise of an 
 arbitrary power which no authority, civil, relig- 
 ious or military, has ever been able to exercise 
 with moderation. 
 
 It was largely due to this antagonism to the 
 press that our allies were beaten nations when 
 we came into the war. 
 
 The French people had entirely lost confidence 
 in its government and in its army. It knew that 
 both had lied about the offensive of General 
 Nivelle in 1917. Public opinion was near collapse, 
 and even revolt, when America's unexpected entry 
 saved the situation. 
 
 The English, while not having suffered such 
 heavy losses, because of their smaller participa- 
 tion in the war on land, had yet suffered fright- 
 fully. The making of munitions was delayed be- 
 
248 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 cause their need had been concealed to protect the 
 reputations of incompetents in office. The raising 
 of necessary troops was postponed because a pub- 
 lic explanation of their need meant exposing a 
 lack of military success that would have 
 diminished the reputations of high ranking offi- 
 cers which were built on the reports of military 
 press agents. The weeding out of incompetents, 
 a practice indispensable in the making of a vic- 
 torious army, was prevented, as it was intended to 
 be prevented, by concealing the shortcomings of 
 officers who were to bring catastrophe later. 
 It was to a country where the military exercised 
 such dictatorship that our General Staff, unaccus- 
 tomed to arbitrary authority, came in 1917. The 
 officers were taught how the allied generals made 
 war without interference from civil governments, 
 and even without unpleasant criticism for such 
 errors, great or small, of mind or of heart, as 
 they should commit. In unfamiliar surroundings 
 and* subject to foreign and aristocratic influence, 
 they adopted a censorship which made them 
 despots for a while, but which now leaves them 
 practically strangers in their own land. 
 
THE CRIME OF SILENCE 249 
 
 In the rules for censors one finds very little re- 
 garding the publication of information valuable 
 to the enemy. That phase had been accepted as 
 axiomatic for a long time by our civil as well as 
 by our military population. But criticism of any 
 kind was forbidden; all mention of shortcomings 
 of whatever nature was prohibited ; any reference 
 to the achievements or valor of individuals, how- 
 soever insignificant, was not permitted. In ad- 
 dition, it was verbally explained to the censors 
 that nobody was to get *'any advertising.^^ 
 
 Whether this course was forced upon the Ameri- 
 can military authorities by the Washington ad- 
 ministration to prevent a future presidential can- 
 didate from rising in the expeditionary forces, or 
 was fathered by the high ranking officers to pre- 
 vent any Grant or Sheridan from appearing, I 
 have not learned. It is evident, however, that ft 
 succeeded in both directions. No man from the 
 expeditionary forces is considered for the presi- 
 dency ; and we do not know of an officer who served 
 overseas that demonstrated his ability to com- 
 mand an army without the assistance of French 
 staff officers. 
 
250 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 In its effect, our censorship was more severe 
 than that of the English or the French. The 
 French soldiers were allowed to write letters un- 
 hindered by censorship, and both the English and 
 French soldiers returned home periodically on 
 leaves of absence or furloughs, carrying by word 
 of mouth what the English were forbidden to put 
 on paper. Americans, of course, could not return 
 home for visits, and they were no more allowed 
 to write their opinions from leave areas than they 
 were when in the presence of the enemy. 
 
 No sooner had the censorship rules been put 
 into effect than they were regretted. General 
 Pershing and his staff were strongly opposed to 
 the War Department's method of selecting gen- 
 erals, and would have welcomed newspaper sup- 
 port to help them weed out the incompetents. 
 They regretted it more at the end of 1917, when the 
 little army in France was short of supplies and 
 short of food, and when a request was refused by 
 the War Department that newspaper correspond- 
 ents be allowed to cable home about the shortage 
 of supplies in order to stimulate production and 
 transportation. Later in the war, partly because 
 
THE CRIME OF SILENCE 251 
 
 of pressure coining from below, from journalists 
 and from home, the rigidity of the censorship 
 rules was relaxed; but to the end it remained a 
 blanket on initiative, a snuffer on brilliancy and 
 a camouflage for incompetents. 
 
 Censorship eventually became a disease in every 
 belligerent country — the more virulent, the more 
 effective. In America it merely held back supplies 
 and kept down ability. In England, besides that, 
 it delayed the raising of troops and maintained in- 
 competents in high command throughout the war. 
 In France it almost brought defeat during the 
 Spring of 1917. Had it not been removed by 
 Premier Clemenceau upon his ascent to power it 
 certainly would have brought about a collapse of 
 France in the spring of 1918, when the Germans, 
 in an irresistible flow, were apparently approach- 
 ing the city of Paris and when the falling of ^ ^ Big 
 Berthas'' in the streets gave the impression that 
 the Kaiser's guns were much closer than was the 
 case. 
 
 Censorship was a vigorous element in the wreck 
 of Eussia ; and censorship was largely responsible 
 for the breakdown of morale in Germany. Un- 
 
252 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 questionably it was proven by this war that the 
 evils of an absolutely unrestricted press are not 
 so dangerous to victory as a medieval censorship 
 which oppresses all armies and all the peoples be- 
 hind them. 
 
 In our forthcoming military legislation one of 
 the most thoroughly considered sections should be 
 that governing relations between press and army. 
 We must, of course, keep from the enemy all in- 
 formation of a military nature. Likewise, we 
 must put it beyond the temptation of any man to 
 indulge the stultifying, lying suppression that 
 characterized every army in the late war. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE ONLY SOLUTION 
 
 We have finished another war in which our 
 soldiers suffered unnecessary losses and hard- 
 ships because of our failure to prepare, while the 
 country at large has suffered almost nothing and 
 the congressmen and the president who failed to 
 prepare for the war have suffered not at all. 
 
 It is, therefore, difficult to establish a military 
 policy based on the lessons of the war. Congress 
 cannot be expected to understand the subject. Our 
 only hope lies in the formation of a sound doctrine 
 which will be accepted by the public and by its 
 representatives. 
 
 This is rendered difficult by the fact that few 
 Americans saw more than one phase of the fight- 
 ing in which an American army took part. The 
 American army, in turn, saw only a small part of 
 the war, and the greater part of the American 
 army was not engaged until the height of German 
 power had passed. 
 
 253 
 
254 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Our difficulty is increased by the fact that all 
 governments in the war have strained themselves 
 to falsify its every phase and to mislead public 
 opinion, supposedly in the interest of a national 
 morale, but really in that of the heads of the gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 It is necessary, therefore, in this work to out- 
 line the course of the war as it actually took place. 
 Space will not permit proof of the statements. 
 They are true, however, and controversy about 
 them can only result in establishing their accu- 
 racy. 
 
 Long before war started all the parties involved 
 contemplated the possibility of Germany's attack- 
 ing France through Belgium. Books had been 
 published about it in all European languages. The 
 French, English and Belgians were not surprised 
 by a *^ grave breach of international law.*' They 
 had held military conferences for some years in 
 contemplation of just such an action. Besides, in 
 similar situations, all the allies had done what 
 Germany did. 
 
 The conduct of the allied and of the German 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 25^ 
 
 armies alike was based on military, not on moral, 
 considerations. 
 
 In time of peace Frenchmen served three years 
 in the army, Germans only two ; therefore, France 
 had half again as large a percentage of her popu- 
 lation with the colors as did Grermany. The rela- 
 tive strength of the French army to the German 
 must therefore be stronger at the outset of the 
 war than after all available reserves on both sides 
 had been called to the colors. For this reason, 
 and for reasons of tactical theory, the French 
 'high command planned to fight a decisive battle 
 with Germany at the first possible moment, and 
 therefore moved to the attack immediately after 
 the declaration of war by the most direct line, 
 which was across the French-German frontier. 
 
 To Germany, also, a speedy decision was im- 
 perative, as the German plan was first to over- 
 whelm France and then to turn upon Kussia. The 
 German high command did not believe in the 
 efficacy of frontal assault. Therefore, it opposed 
 the French advance with troops entrenched in 
 previously prepared positions, and turned the 
 
256 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 French left flank by the great march through Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 The number of troops employed by the Germans 
 on the one hand, and by the French, English and 
 Belgians on the other, were not disproportionate. 
 
 What is known to the English as the battle of 
 Mons, and also widely known as the battle of 
 Charleroi, was a very great battle, extending from 
 the Alps to Belgium, in which the Germans won a 
 great victory all along the line. After this vic- 
 tory the Germans sent three of the army corps 
 from their right flank to East Prussia, and with 
 the remainder of the army pursued the defeated 
 allies. 
 
 On September 6th the French army, with its 
 English assistants, faced about and in the follow- 
 ing three days fought the battle of the Marne, 
 which prevented the loss of the war. It was not 
 a victory, however, that was at all decisive against 
 the Germans, who retired to the north of the River 
 Aisne, where they in turn repulsed all Anglo- 
 French attacks. 
 
 The next move in the campaign on the western 
 front was the attempt on the part of the allies to 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION ^57 
 
 turn the German right flank, which, being met by 
 German reinforcements, led to the well known 
 race to the sea. 
 
 The purpose of each army was to turn the flank 
 of its enemy and to destroy him. In this both 
 sides failed. Neither side intended a stabilization 
 of the front nor was either side content with the 
 line which actually became fixed. The allies would 
 have wished to hold at least Lille and Antwerp, 
 cutting the Germans from the Channel, while the 
 German desire would have been to reach the 
 French seacoast as far south as Abbeville. 
 
 From a tactical point of view, then, the war in 
 the west in 1914 was a deadlock. From a strategic 
 point of view, however, it was a great German 
 defeat, as Germany had planned to destroy France 
 in sixty days. 
 
 The lesson for us in this campaign is that the 
 French army, trained but untried by war, after 
 meeting a severe defeat, was able to retreat all 
 along the line, in some places more than a hundred 
 miles, face around, and win a battle upon which 
 their national existence depended; that the Ger- 
 mans could maneuver an army of equal size in 
 
^58 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 accordance with the military principles of encircle- 
 ment, brushing aside the mitrained Belgian army- 
 like chaff, win a great battle, pursue a brave and 
 skillful enemy into the heart of his country, then, 
 defeated in pitched battle, retire to a strong 
 position and check all pursuit; that England 
 could, upon a moment's notice, ship sixty thou- 
 sand men across the Channel, trained and 
 equipped for war, munition them, supply them, 
 and constantly reenforce them during months of 
 hard fighting. 
 
 Compare this with the two American armies at 
 Bull Run a half century before, where both 
 armies of untrained men ran away from each 
 other; with the war mth Spain when our men 
 died like flies in camps at home ; with the Mexican 
 fiasco of 1916, when for months our men could not 
 be moved a day's march from camp or even sup- 
 plied or armed in camp. 
 
 Warfare on an even greater scale was waged in 
 the east. Although the French had not tried to 
 fight on the defensive while waiting for Russia 
 to mobilize, still after the early French defeats 
 Russia made a great effort to relieve the pressure 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 259 
 
 on the western front by a hasty and half organized 
 invasion of East Prussia. This diversion was suc- 
 cessful in drawing three army corps from the 
 German army just before the battle of the Marne, 
 but was itself roughly handled. 
 
 The battle of Tannenburg, or the battles of the 
 Mazurian Lakes, as they are popularly called, 
 were not great battles, nor were the losses of the 
 Russians heavy in either men or armament. There 
 grew up in Germany, however, a need for a victory 
 to offset the disappointment of the campaign in 
 the west, and so the ^'victory'' of Hindenburg was 
 created large in fiction. 
 
 The great battle in 1914, the most nearly de- 
 cisive battle of the whole war, was the battle east 
 of Lemberg, in which the Eussian army totally 
 defeated and almost destroyed the Austrian army. 
 
 Thereafter, the Eussians attempted an invasion 
 of Germany through Silesia. This was defeated 
 by a combination of German and Austrian armies, 
 after which fighting on a large scale took place 
 backward and forward across East Prussia, Po- 
 land and Galicia, the Germans generally having 
 
260 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 the best of the Eussians, and the Eussians ahnost 
 invariably defeating the Austrians. 
 
 It is important to appreciate that in 1914 Eus- 
 sia was the most powerful and chivalrous of the 
 allies, as she not only fought her immediate oppo- 
 nents, but more than once lent aid to France and 
 England by launching attacks which drew German 
 troops from their fronts at times of great allied 
 distress. 
 
 The lessons to Americans from this campaign, 
 in addition to the readiness of all armies to ma- 
 neuver and the ability of all their higher com- 
 manders and staffs from the outset to perform 
 their duties, is the way Austria, having lost one 
 great army, was quickly able to produce another 
 from among her trained reserves. Surely, if any 
 one of the chief contending nations — France, Ger- 
 many, Eussia and Austria — had not been organ- 
 ized on the principles of universal service, that 
 country would have been overwhelmed in the first 
 year of war. 
 
 When winter brought an end to the fighting it 
 was seen that the opposing countries had been so 
 evenly matched that neither side had been able 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 261 
 
 to win the decisive victory wMcli had been sought 
 by all. Germany, as the leading advocate of quick 
 and decisive warfare, was, therefore, considered 
 the loser in the resulting deadlock. If France and 
 Russia had been able to stand off Germany on her 
 own terms in a war started upon her own initia- 
 tive, it was reasoned, the addition of England's 
 army in the making would surely prove decisive 
 in 1915. This argument proved faulty. 
 
 In 1915 England's army was not ready to func- 
 tion, while Russia's army had exhausted its am- 
 munition supplies. Russia was well prepared for 
 war in 1914 in trained men, in technical equip- 
 ment, in skillful generals, and in arsenals full of 
 ammunition, but back of the army there was not 
 an organized civilization which in the other coun- 
 tries, especially Germany and France, could make 
 up the wastage of war supplies. 
 
 In May, 1915, therefore, while the French with 
 the support of the half -trained British formations 
 stormed helplessly against the German line in a 
 number of heroic and useless battles that need 
 not be enumerated here, the Germans and Aus- 
 trians concentrated against the Russian army and 
 
262 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 broke the Eussian line again and again and pur- 
 sued the defeated but stubborn Russians beyond 
 the frontier of old Russia. Nothing in military 
 history is more glorious than the grim determina- 
 tion with which the old Russian army fought with 
 empty pieces against the overwhelming storm of 
 shot and shell poured on them by their enemies. 
 
 In that year Russian regiments contained a per- 
 centage of unarmed men who had to be clothed 
 and supplied and exposed to enemy fire but could 
 not be used until they had picked up rifles dropped 
 by stricken comrades. 
 
 I remember a conversation with General Brusi- 
 loff shortly before the German attack at the Duna- 
 jec river in May, 1915. I had been visiting his 
 front line in the Carpathians, and in particular 
 had witnessed an attack by Russian infantry on 
 Austrians holding the top of a low precipice. The 
 Russians had climbed a long steep slope and had 
 dug a shallow trench at the base of the cliff. From 
 this shelter they emerged several times in a vain 
 attempt to escalade the heights, being slaughtered 
 by machine gun and rifle fire. 
 
 I mentioned this incident to General Brusiloff 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 263 
 
 and suggested that while the Austrian position 
 was practically impregnable against infantry as- 
 sault, it was particularly vulnerable to artillery 
 attack in that it afforded no shelter from explod- 
 ing shells and could not be fortified without great 
 time and labor. The general dismissed the sug- 
 gestion somewhat impatiently. Said he: *^Men 
 and munitions may be used interchangeably. I 
 haven 't any munitions. I must use men. ' ^ 
 
 What a furore such a speech would arouse if 
 made by an American general! And yet our 
 policy is not very different. War can be waged 
 with the loss of a few well-trained men or of many 
 slightly trained men. Our Congress has deliber- 
 ately chosen the latter method throughout our 
 history. Three-fourths of the men killed in the 
 Argonne and elsewhere in France were killed by 
 Americans; only one-quarter were killed by the 
 Germans ! 
 
 In the same year (September-December, 1915)' 
 German, Austrian and Bulgarian troops, under 
 German command, destroyed Serbia and occupied 
 its territory. In this year, also, Italy joined the 
 alliance and from then on conducted against Aus- 
 
264? THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 tria a secondary war, not without effect on the 
 final outcome. 
 
 In 1916 the western front became the center of 
 importance for the first time since the battle of 
 the Marne. The English army, always increasing 
 and improving, and the French army, reaching 
 higher and higher development in its technique, 
 were preparing for a vast combined offensive. 
 
 In order to anticipate them the Germans at- 
 tacked Verdun in great force in February while 
 the plans for the Franco-British offensive were 
 still incomplete. 
 
 If the campaign of 1914 on the western front 
 was substantially a campaign between the German 
 and French armies, the battle of Verdun was 
 , fought entirely by Germans and Frenchmen. No 
 allied troops appeared on either side. The two 
 trained armies of the two military nations en- 
 gaged in the greatest battle of history and ended 
 in deadlock when the Franco-British attack on the 
 Somme forced the discontinuance of the German 
 assaults at Verdun. 
 
 It must be noted by all, in spite of any national 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 265 
 
 pride, that only when attacking the French have 
 the Germans been stopped. 
 
 They broke the Eussian line in the spring of 
 1915 (May-September), and the Serbian line that 
 fall (September-December). A handful of Ger- 
 man divisions cut the Italian defenses like a thun- 
 derbolt in the autumn of 1917, and the Germans 
 smashed through the British army in the spring 
 of 1917. American troops have resisted their on- 
 set, but under command of skilled and experi- 
 enced French generals. 
 
 The year 1916, which saw Eoumania overrun, 
 also saw a revival of the Eussian army, due to the 
 arrival of the French and English-made artillery 
 and ammunition and a brilliant Eussian offensive 
 under Brusiloff which until 1918 was considered 
 the best coordinated attack effected by allied 
 troops. 
 
 It was fear of this Eussian revival, as well as 
 of the increasing British army and the develop- 
 ment of French tactics and materiel which deter- 
 mined Germany to enter upon the unrestricted 
 submarine campaign which brought about her de- 
 feat. 
 
^66 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 The Eussian army, often victorious, more often 
 defeated, never lost its power of resistance nor its 
 promise of further aggression. It was at home 
 that Eussia collapsed. The Russian people, suf- 
 fering from the horrors of the war, broke into re- 
 bellion, which rapidly descended into anarchy, 
 and took Russia out of the war and of civilization. 
 
 The course of America's timely intervention 
 and the war in the main theater have been re- 
 counted elsewhere. Our help was the main factor 
 in the decision, but other important incidents must 
 not be ignored. 
 
 In June of 1918 the Austrians, this time without 
 the aid of German troops, attacked the Italian, 
 French and English forces along the Piave. The 
 Italians had been much strengthened in munitions 
 and equipment by their allies, their morale had 
 been built up and French officers had tactfully 
 imparted a considerable amount of military 
 knowledge. 
 
 The Austrian attack after some local successes 
 broke down. The morale •of the Austrian people 
 had suffered severely during the winter and in- 
 fected the army, which in October broke into a 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION ^67 
 
 wild and disastrous rout, taking Austria out of 
 the war. 
 
 In September the line of the Central Powers in 
 Macedonia was broken. Adopting the tactics 
 successfully employed Jby the Germans on the 
 Piave the year before, the French commander-in- 
 chief concentrated French troops and French ar- 
 tillery and with them broke a hole through the 
 Bulgarian line. The Serbian army, which was 
 not sufficiently trained to effect this complicated 
 maneuver, was especially well qualified for the 
 arduous pursuit, being familiar with the country, 
 hardy, and used to meager fare. 
 
 The Austro-German-Bulgarian- Turkish army 
 was never rallied. 
 
 Bulgaria sued for peace on September 26th 
 and Turkey followed on October 28th. 
 
 •The question has been raised as to the realness 
 of this battle. It has been suggested that Bul- 
 garia asked for an excuse to quit. Time will bring 
 out full information on that point. It need only 
 be observed here that the morale of a country at 
 war is as much a part of its fighting efficiency as 
 is its artillery. 
 
268 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 Staggered by the defection of her allies and the 
 defeat of her armies, Germany's morale collapsed 
 and she in turn fell into anarchy. The sailors of 
 the fleet refused to put to sea on October 21st. 
 Their revolt rapidly spread. The revolution 
 might have been checked if troops had been sent 
 from the front for this purpose, but no troops 
 could be spared from before the unceasing attacks 
 of the American army. 
 
 The revolution succeeded, and in consequence 
 the army at the front no longer could be supplied 
 and was compelled to accept any terms which the 
 allies saw fit to offer. 
 
 From this we must draw an additional lesson : 
 that a popular government at home is necessary 
 to support the bravest army at the front. 
 
 France suffered more than Germany; France 
 suffered more than Kussia. 
 
 From September, 1914, until August, 1918, the 
 life of the French republic hung by a thread. There 
 were murmurings; there were plots; but never 
 did the nation fail to support its marvelous mili- 
 tary machine. 
 
 In this war there were but two armies of the 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 269 
 
 first class, the French and the German. The 
 Eussian, American, English, Italian and other 
 armies trailed along after them; in which par- 
 ticular order does not matter. The French and 
 the Germans were about an equal match in the 
 field. It was the superiority of the French at 
 home, the result of popular institutions, that 
 achieved the victory. 
 
 Equal at the front and stronger at the rear, 
 France offers the complete model for national 
 defense. 
 
 German writers have dwelt at great length upon 
 the aid they were forced to render the Austrians, 
 aid both in troops and generalship. Sufficient 
 stress has not been given to the aid lent by France 
 to her allies. 
 
 During 1914 French generals practically com- 
 manded the British army. In the years following 
 the British withdrew from beneath French con- 
 trol and suffered heavily for their national ego- 
 tism. They accomplished no military successes 
 and, on the contrary, had to be rescued several 
 times by the French from predicaments into 
 which their inexperienced officers had led them. 
 
270 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 It was French generalship, in addition to French 
 and English materiel help, which reorganized the 
 Italian army along the Piave after its defeat at 
 Caporetto, and French staff officers as well as 
 French artillerymen organized the Italian army 
 for the campaign of 1918. 
 
 Our own army, of course, was formed on the 
 French model and briefly trained in the French 
 school. Its most brilliant successes were achieved 
 Tinder French generals and its most bitter failures 
 came when French advice was disregarded. 
 
 This fact must be accepted before a proper 
 military policy can be found. It is a dose which 
 will not be swallowed without effort. We admit 
 readily that the greatest schools of architecture, 
 of art, of acting, and of music are in Europe. Be- 
 fore the war no doctor denied that a medical edu- 
 cation was incomplete without a course in Berlin 
 or Vienna. We approached Europe more closely 
 in all these arts than we did in the art of war, and 
 yet we find individual and national difficulty in ad- 
 mitting our obvious military shortcomings. 
 
 Why is it? 
 
 It is because fighting is the primeval purpose 
 
 I 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 271 
 
 of the male. In modem times, when fighting be- 
 comes necessary only once in a lifetime instead of 
 every day, the urgency is no less great. The fact 
 that it is the male mission is as true as in the stone 
 age. 
 
 Women have entered all forms of industry, of 
 all the arts and the sciences. They play an in- 
 creasing part in government, so long a masculine 
 monopoly. From war only do they shrink. Here 
 men stand alone, the preservers, the admired of 
 women. Here they glory in their masculinity and 
 resent any suggestion that the males of another 
 race can excel them even in technique. 
 
 Of this our lawmakers are ever conscious. They 
 may not think that every man is a soldier but they 
 know that every man is a voter. Hence the bla- 
 tant oratory, the misleading question : * * How do 
 you account for the fact that our boys after three 
 months are better soldiers than the veterans of 
 Germany ?'' 
 
 The fact is they were not. * * Our boys ' ' did not 
 fight in this war. Regiments of soldiers of a year 
 or more training fought. Their efficiency varied 
 in direct ratio to the length of their training, ex- 
 
272 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 cept as modified by exceptionally capable or no- 
 toriously inefficient commanders. ''Our boys*' 
 never f ougbt well in any war. The civilian cannot 
 endure the battle. A complete metamorphosis 
 must take place to turn the civilian into the sol- 
 dier. Many times must a man overcome the fear 
 of death in his imagination before he can rise 
 triumphant over it on the battlefield. 
 
 It was *'our boys'' who broke on both sides at 
 Bull Eun. It was ''soldiers" that would not give 
 way on either side in the Wilderness. 
 
 The Great Division lost twenty-one prisoners 
 in a little trench raid in October of 1917 while still 
 untrained and but eleven more during all the great 
 battles that followed. 
 
 The steeled soul is not all in war. The efficient 
 private is a skilled workman, and each step up- 
 ward in a military hierarchy demands an increase 
 of knowledge in geometric progression. 
 
 Just as misleading as to say that our boys are 
 bom soldiers is it to suggest that our officers are 
 bom commanders. Practice is as necessary as 
 study to develop their abilities and to permit 
 selection for important posts. This our old army 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 273 
 
 did not permit, and in consequence our soldiers 
 were not led mth the same skill as those of the 
 French and the Germans. Indeed, the advantage 
 which the American regnlar officer held over the 
 National Guard officer in opportunity to become 
 proficient in the art of war was less than the ad- 
 vantage the French officer held over him. We 
 suffered as a consequence. 
 
 It is putting the case conservatively to state that 
 throughout the army the French of any grade 
 were the peers in military skill of the Americans 
 of the next higher grade. The French private 
 knew as much as the American, noncom; the 
 French noncom as the American company officer; 
 the French company officer as the American field 
 officer, and the French field officer as the American 
 general. 
 
 So excellent was French discipline that civilians 
 and thick-headed professional soldiers did not 
 recognize it. French troops on the march looked 
 like a mob as compared to Americans or English. 
 They were merely traveling in the easiest way 
 and could be formed in seconds. But American 
 or English raw troops allowed such latitude would 
 
274 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 have become a mob. So in battle. French soldiers 
 would be found wandering" all over, but they 
 were on substantial purpose bent and returned to 
 their commands. Well trained troops can do 
 things and be given liberties impossible to new 
 formations. 
 
 The French had no officer caste dispute. All 
 their officers were chosen from among the whole 
 people by examination, many of them from the 
 ranks ; they were then given a complete education 
 in the duties of company officers. 
 
 There was no room for doubt as to who was the 
 better man, officer or private. The private readily 
 rendered obedience ; the officer had no need to pro- 
 tect his authority by aloofness. 
 
 But the greatest superiority of all was the 
 superiority of the French civil government over 
 the American civil government. In none of the 
 crises of the war did the French civil government 
 fail; not when Von Kluck approached Paris in 
 1914 nor when the French army was bleeding to 
 death on the walls of Verdun, or when Nivelle's 
 offensive failed, or when the German wave almost 
 submerged the allies' defense in the Spring and 
 
THE ONLY SOLUTION 275 
 
 Summer of 1918. The French civil administration 
 understood war and the French people under- 
 stood war. 
 
 We scattered our energies into a myriad of 
 civilian pursuits — construction of unnecessary 
 training camps, tremendous building of docks and 
 warehouses. We had the surplus energy to spare 
 and we had a minor part to play. France had 
 neither, but she knew self defense as a nation and 
 threw her full strength upon the enemy. 
 
 It is a sophistry of ours to say that '*man for 
 man, ship for ship, our navy is the equal of any 
 in the world,'' as though a man or a ship means 
 anything in a naval battle. We also salve indeci- 
 sion with the statement that **our regular army 
 for its size is as good as any army in the world." 
 That is not true. Our small army was never 
 trained as an army. Our generals were never 
 exercised in the command of the full number of 
 our troops. No effort had ever been made to clean 
 out the incompetents among the generals as Joffre 
 cleaned out the incompetent generals two years 
 before the outbreak of war. 
 
276 THE ARMY OF 1918 
 
 There is only one way to have a good army and 
 that is to have every man a soldier. 
 
 Then each one will be exalted in the sense of his 
 manhood. 
 
 Each father will understand the demands upon 
 his son ; each manufacturer will know for what he 
 is building; each congressman will understand 
 about what he is legislating. The military man 
 will be judged by a comprehending public and 
 there will be no room for him to seek advancement 
 by playing upon the misapprehensions of a civil 
 constituency. 
 
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