E 477 ^^ "~ 
 
 .675 
 
 .M45 
 
 Copy 1 FiN^Dijsras 
 
 COURT OF IIsTQUIRY, 
 
 REVIE\VS 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL 
 
 AND OF TlIK 
 
 GENERAL OF THE ARMY, 
 
 IX THE CASE OF 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL G. K. WARREN. 
 
 WASHIXGTO^^: 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
 
 1883. 
 
/ 
 
 / 
 
FiisTDiisras 
 
 COUKT OF INQUIKY, 
 
 REVIE^WS 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL 
 
 AND OF THE 
 
 GENERAL OF THE AMY, 
 
 IN THE CASE OF 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL G. K. WARREN, 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
 
 1"«83. 
 
 8002 1 
 
i 
 
 
 06 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The undersigned certifies that the papors which follow are true extracts from the 
 record of the Court of Inquiry in the cas« of Brevet Major-General G. K. Warren, U. 
 S. A., late commanding Fifth Army Corps. 
 
 LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
 
 Bvt. Lieut. Col. U. S. A., 
 
 Recorder of the Court. 
 Washington Barracks, 
 
 January 29, 18S3. 
 (2) 
 
4r « 
 
 o 
 
 FINDINGS OF THE COURT. 
 
 \v 
 
 REPORT AND OPINION OF THE WARREN COURT OF INQUIRY. 
 
 The court, after mature deliberatiou ou the evidence adduced, and in 
 accordance with the requirements of the order conv-ening it, submits 
 the IblUiwinft' as its report of the tacts and its opinion in the case of 
 Lieut. Col. G. K. Warren, United States Corps of Juigiueers, as regards 
 his conduct as Major-General United States Volunteers, commanding 
 the Fifth Army Corps at the battle of Five Forks, Va., April 1, 1805, 
 and as regards the o])erations of his command on that day and the day 
 previous, so fur as relates to his, Lieutenant-Colonel Waireu's, conduct, 
 or to the imputations and accusations against him. 
 
 REPORT. 
 
 The First Imputation is found in an extract from General Grant's 
 report, on page 1137 of the report of the Honorable Secretary of War 
 to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, as follows (see, also, 
 Record, page 48) : 
 
 "On tlie morning oftheSIst, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession 
 of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with 
 one division instead of his whole corp'^, wliich was attacked by the enemy in supeiior 
 force and driven back on the secoud division before it had time to form, and it in tnrn 
 forced back npou the tliird division ; when tbe enemy was checked. A division of the 
 Second Corps was iunuediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy 
 loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained." 
 
 The facts on this point appear from the evidence to be the following: 
 At 7.30 p. m., on March 30, 1805, General Meade, then commanding 
 
 the Army of the Potomac, telegraphed to Lieutenaut-General Grant as 
 
 follows : 
 
 IV.* 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
 
 7.30 p. m., Mar. 30, 1865. 
 Lt. Gen'l Grant: 
 
 I send dispatch jnst received from Warren ; line working badly. I think his sug- 
 gestion the best thing we can do nuder existing circumstances — that is, let Humphreys 
 relieve Griffin & let Warren move on to the White Oak road &l endeavor to turn 
 euemj's right — as I nnderstand Warren — Ayres is now between S. & W. Dabney's, 
 liable to be isolated he must either be supported or withdrawn ; by adopting the pro- 
 posed plan he will be supported by the whole of the 5th Corps. & they ought to over- 
 awe anv opposition the enemy can make, except from their entrenchments. 
 
 (Signed) ' GEO. G. MEADE, 
 
 Ma). Gen'l. 
 
 *The Roman numbers attached to this jind the other dispatches, herein quoted, are 
 the same that these dispatches bear in the four series of dispatches beginning at page 
 1239, where, attached to each, will be found the evidence of its receipt and correctness 
 as a copy. — L. L. L., Recorder. 
 
 3 
 
Tlie ioUmvinji- dispatdi acconi])anie<l the above, and is the first and 
 only intnnation before the couVt as to General Warren's reporting- favor- 
 ably to getting possession of the White Oak road : 
 
 (Kec'd here at 4.4*2 }». in. Glasier. ■) 
 [7.20. Glasier.] ' 4 i). ui., M'cH 30 
 
 Gen. Wkiih, Ch\f Staff : 
 
 Gknkuai. : GeiiM Ayrcs' advance now sees the White Oak road, near W. Uahney's, 
 lor I of ii mile. Then- is a ditticnlt swanin between the plank road and that jdaee. 
 
 I liave now a eontiunons intrenched line from my riyht across Griffin's front and 
 along the jthmk-road nearly down to Gravelly Run. If Gen'l Hnmi)liieys can take 
 charjfe of Griffin's front, abont oOO y'ds west of i)lank-road, with the return down it, I 
 can take my corps and block the White Oak road. 
 Resp'lv, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, M. G. 
 
 At 8.30 p. m. of the same day Lieatenant-General Grant telegraphed 
 to General Meade as follows : 
 
 VI. 
 
 8.35 p. m. 
 
 (U. S. Military Telegraph.) 
 
 By telegraph from Grant's Headquarters. 
 
 March 30, 1865. 
 To Gen. Mkade : 
 
 Yon may notify Parke and Wright that tliey need not assault in the morning. They 
 should, of course, watch tJieir frouts &. go in if the enemy striiis to attack on our left, 
 but tlie iflea of a general attack by them is suspended. I have pretty much nuide up 
 my mind on tlie course to j»ursne, &. will inform you in tlie morning what it is. 
 
 Hum]»hreys «fc Warren may simply make secure their present position & await fur- 
 ther orders. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lt. Geiil. 
 Since writing the above, your dispatch of 7.30* rec'd. It will just suit what I in- 
 tend to projiose, to let Huuiithreys relieve Griffin's div., & let that move farther to 
 the left. Warren should get himself slBong to-night. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lt. Gen'l. 
 
 At 8.45 p. ni, of the same day General Meade telegraphed to General 
 Grant as follows: 
 
 VII. 
 
 Hdqrs. a. p., 8.45 p. m., Mar. 30. 
 Lt. Gen'l Gkant: 
 
 I have sent orders to Humphreys to at once relieve Warren's troops holding the 
 Boydton plank road. I liave ilirected Warren to reinforce & strengthen Ayres, and to 
 hold his whole corps ready to move at daylight under- orders that will be sent him. 
 
 I have not given liim orders what to do, because I infer from your disjiatcli vou will 
 send Ihem to me. I have <liiected I'aik(^ tt Wrigt>t not to attack towards iiiorning, 
 •but to be prepared to assume a threatening attitude & actually attack if any o))por- 
 t unity )>res(!ufs itself or <uders are sent to them. lam at a loss to account for tlie delay 
 in transniissiou of my dispatch of 7.45. This delay will account for mv last dispatch. 
 (Sy<l-) GEO. G. MEADE, 
 
 il/«/. Gen'l. 
 
 Mr. Caldwell will report the receipt by Gen'l Grant of this dispatch. 
 
 G. G. MEADE. 
 Dispatch is a true co])v. 
 
 S. N. BENJAMIN. 
 
 A. A. Gtiieral. 
 
 •This refers to the first dispatch in this report, numbered IV, of the series of dis- 
 patches. — L. L. L., Recorder. 
 
Later in the day, General Grant, in answer to the foregoing, directed 
 in the following dispatch that if General Warren had not reached the 
 White Oak road he should not mov e up until further orders : 
 
 VIII. 
 
 (U. S. Military Telegraph. By telegraph from Gravelly Run.) 
 
 MCH. 30, 1865. 
 To Maj. Gen. Mkade : 
 
 Your orders to Warren are right. I do not expect to advance him in the morning. 
 I supposed, however, tliat he \v;i8 now up to the White Oak road. If he is not, I do not 
 want him to move up without further orders. 
 
 U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lt. Gen'l 
 
 At 9.40 the next morning General Warren sent the following telegram : 
 
 LXXXIV. 
 
 Nunan, O.-^f) a. m. 9.40 a. m., M'ch 31, 180.5. 
 
 Gen'l Wkbb, 
 
 Ch'f of Staff. ■ 
 I have just rec'd report from Gen. Ayres that the enemy have their ytickets still this 
 side of the White Oak road, so their communication is continuous along it. I have 
 sent out word to him to try and drive them oil", or develop with what force the road is 
 held by theiu. 
 Resp'ly, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, 
 
 Maj. GenH Vol's. 
 
 From the evidence in the record, it appears that the enemy had con- 
 centrated three brigades on the White Oak road, and as soon as General 
 Ayres moved out, in compliance witli the orders as reported in theibre- 
 going telegram, he was attacked on his front and left Hank, probably 
 about half-past 10, ami certainly before 11, o'clock in the morning, by 
 this whole force, numbering, according to the testimony, 4,01)0 to 5,000 
 men. 
 
 The position of the Fifth Corps at daylight on March 31st was as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 The First (Griftin's) Division was relieved about daybreak from the 
 breastworks west of the phink-road, near "Stroud's," by Miles's di- 
 vision of Humphreys's corps, and posted along and behind the east 
 branch of GraveHy Run, northwest from the Boydton phink road, its 
 rigiit extending up towards the left of General Humphreys's ])osition. 
 
 The Second (Ayres's) Division was in front of the Holliday house, 
 about GOO yards south of the White Oak road. 
 
 The Third (Crawford's) Division occupied tlie part of the works south 
 and east of the Boydton ])lank road nearest Gravelly Run. 
 
 At 7.35 a. m. of March 31, General Warren rei)()rted the positions 
 about to be taken up by the several divisions of his corps as follows: 
 
 LXXVII. 
 
 Nunan. 8.6 a. in. Hdqhs. 5tu A. C, 
 
 7.3.5 a. m.. M'ch 31. 
 Gen'l Webb, Ch'f Staff: 
 
 Gen'l Griffin's troops will be massed nenr Mrs. Butler's; Gen'l Ayres', near S. Dab- 
 nev's ; (Jen'l Crawford, about half way between. They are along a wood-road, run- 
 ning from near Mrs. Butler's to W. Dabney's, on the White Oak road. It is not pracri- 
 caltle now f..r wheels, and there is a very difficult branch of Gravelly Run tli:it runs 
 south fnmi the White Oak riilge, joining the main stream at the crossing of the plank 
 road, which will take a long time to make practicable for wagons. I have all the 
 pioneers I can spare at work on it. I will send yon a sketch. 
 Resp'ly, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, M. G. 
 
6 
 
 TLes^ positions, according- to this telegram, as shown in evidence, 
 were located by the " Photographic or one inch map," tlie one mainly 
 used in the Army of the Potomac. This map, and the sketches based 
 on it, used by tlie officers in command, were insntlicient and inac- 
 curate guides for that section, and ''the road he was to keep" took 
 General Ayres to the llolliday house, as given on the ]\Iichler and skel- 
 eton maps, a mile to the eastwaid of the position of " S. Dabney's." 
 
 At 7 o'clock tliat morning General Warren had issued the following 
 order : 
 
 LXXIV. 
 
 Headquartf.us 5tu Akmy Cokps, 
 
 M'ch :U) {'Mat), 18(55—7 a. m. 
 Bvt. Mnj. tJen. Crawfokd: 
 
 Witlulraw all your pickets soutli of those established by Geii. Ayres; then move 
 with yonr whole division out &, mass it by a house occupied by a colored man ; and 
 then replace Gen'l Ayres' pickets from lefr of Gen'l Huujphreys, up to a jioiut north 
 of the nej^roe hiuise. 
 
 Make your head'rs at that house. Leave the pioneers of two brigades to begin to 
 mak(! a bridge acioss the stream for the passage of artillery. 
 Major Cope will go with you & assist you iu carrying out this order. 
 By command of Maj. Gen. Warren : 
 
 FRED. T. LOCKE, 
 
 Bv't CoL, A. J. G. 
 
 By this order, the Third (Crawford's) Division Avas to be massed by a 
 house "occupied by a colored man," whicli was the Hollida^^ house; so 
 that when General Crawford moved out he found liiinself close ui)on Gen- 
 eral Ayres. General Ayres " borrowed" from him one brigade as asup- 
 j)ort. The other two brigades of the Third (Crawford's) Division were 
 to the right and in rear of Ayres's division. 
 
 The First (Griffin's) Division was stil! posted, as previously described, 
 along and beliind tlie east branch of Gravelly Run. 
 
 These were suUstaniially the positions of the three divisions of the 
 Fifth Cor[)s at the time the reconnaissance commenced. General War- 
 ren was at his lieadquarters on th ■, Quaker road, in telegraphic commu- 
 nication with General JMeade, until about 10 o'clo(;k in the morning. 
 About this hour General Ayres began his reconnaissance. After his 
 advance had proceeded about 3lH) yards, the enemy " rose up along the 
 White Oak road" and advanced to the attack, and with the result as 
 reported in the following dispatch: 
 
 LXXXVL 
 
 1 p. m., Melt. :n, 1H65. 
 Gen'l Wkbb, 
 
 67/'/ of Staff: 
 "Gen'l: Gen'l Ayres made an advance with a small force at 10 a. ni., which the 
 enemy drove back and followed up iu heavy force, compelling both Ayres and Craw- 
 ford to fall back on Griffin, and, of course, iu much confusion. Grifliu's troops held 
 the eucMuy at the run west of the plauk road. 
 
 Geu'l Miles' diviKiou afterwards attacked the enemy, and were forced back on my 
 right. My skiruiish line iu front of Grittiu, most of it, has advanced on the left. 
 
 I am going to send forward a brigade from my left, supported by all I can get of 
 Crawfiud and Ayres, ami attack, swinging on our right. 
 
 Arrangenu'uts are being made for this, aud it will take pliice about 1.4.'3p. m., if 
 the enemy does not attack sooner. 
 Resp'ly, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, 
 
 Maj. Genl. 
 
OPINION. 
 
 There seems to be no evidence that General Warren, on the morning; 
 of March 31, or at any otlier time, reported favorably to getting- pos- 
 session of the White Oak road except in his dispatch (V) of 4 p. m., 
 March 30, already referred to, and the movement suggested in that was 
 practically set aside by General Grant's di.spatch (VIII) of March 30, 
 heretofore quoted. General Warren's report,in his dispatch (LXXXI V) 
 of 9.40 a. in., March 31, quoted above, that he had given orders to drive 
 the enemy's pickets off the White Oak road or develop what force of 
 the enemy held it, could not be fairly construed as being able to take 
 possession of it. 
 
 With regard to that portion of the imputation contained in the state- 
 ment that General Warren was directed to take possession of the 
 White Oak road, the following dispatch from General Meade is the only 
 one that can bear that construction : 
 
 LXXXV. 
 
 U. S. M. T. 
 Nunau. Hdqurs. Armies U, S., 
 
 10.30 a. m., Mar. 31, 1865. 
 
 To Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren: 
 
 Your (lispatcli giving Ayres' position is received. Geu'l Meade directs that should 
 you determine by your reconuoissiince that you can get possession of & hohl the White 
 Oak road, you are lo do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operatious to-day. 
 
 ALEX. S. WEBB, 
 BvH M. a., O. ofS. 
 
 And the evidence before the court shows that this order was not re- 
 ceived by General Warren till after the fighting that resulted from the 
 attempted reconnaissance had begun. 
 
 It is in evidence by Ayres and Crawford's testimony that General 
 Warren had in his advance two divisions, though the testimony does 
 not clearly show how long before the attack of the enemy upon Ayres 
 the division of Crawford reached him. 
 
 Griffin's division was held in reserve along the branch of Gravelly 
 Run nearest to and northwest froni the Boydton plank road, and it 
 may have been so held to carry out the intentions of the following dis- 
 patch from General Meade's headquarters : 
 
 LXXIX. 
 
 Nun an. 8.32 a. ni. 
 
 U. S. M. T. 
 
 Hdqrs. a. of p., 8.25, Mar. 31, 1865. 
 To Maj. -Gen. Waruen: 
 
 There is tiring along Huni])hreys' front. The Maj. Gen'l com'd'g desires you be ready 
 to send your reserve, if it should be called for, to support Humphreys. 
 There will be no movement of troops to-day. 
 
 (S'd) A. S. WEBB, 
 
 Ji. M. G. 
 Rec. 8.40 a. ra.— G. K. W. 
 
 The court is further of the opinion that, considering the Fifth Corps 
 constituted the extreme left wing of the armies operating against Rich- 
 mond, and ihat the corps was in a delicate position and liable to be 
 attacked at any moment, of which liability General Warren had been 
 repeatedly warned, he should have been with his advanced divisions, 
 guiding and directing them, and that he should have started earlier to 
 
• 8 
 
 tlie front than he did and not have waited at the telegraph office to 
 keep in coinnui'>ication with General JMeade's headqnarters, unless be 
 had direct orders that morning so to do, which, however, does not appear 
 in the evidence. 
 
 SECOND IMPUTATION. 
 
 The Second Imputation is found in the following extract from General 
 Sheridan's report of May 15, 1865 (See Kecord, pages 2L and 48), as 
 follows : 
 
 "***** had General Warren moved ac'coiding to the expectations of the 
 Lieutenaut-General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape 
 of the enemy's infantry in front of the Dinwiddle Court House." 
 
 REPORT. 
 
 The position of the Fifth Corps, on the afternoon and night of March 
 31, is indicated by the following telegram : 
 
 LXXXVIII. 
 
 [March 31st, 1865]— 3.40 p. m. 
 Geu'I Wkius, 
 
 Ch'f of Staff: 
 Gen'l: We liuve driven the enemy, I think, into his works. The jjrisoners report 
 Geu'I Lee here to-day, and that their breastworks are full of men. 
 We have prisonei-s from a portion of Pickett's and Johnson's div'ns. 
 The enemy iire artillery nj) the White Oak road from their works nearly a mile to 
 our right of where we struck the road; at this point their rigUt retires to the rear. 
 I have just seen Gen'l Miles, who is close up, he says, to their works, which have 
 heavy abattis in their front. 
 Resp'lv, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, M. G. 
 
 The exposed situation of the Fifth Corps, which occupied the extreme 
 left of the lines about Petersburgh, was, on the afternoon and evening 
 of the 31st of March, an object of grave anxiety to Lieutenaut-General 
 Grant, as appears in his dispatch to General Meade, as follows: 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 Dabxey's Mills, March 31, 1865. 
 Major General Micadk: 
 
 The o])erators at my Headquarters have gone to the wrong jdace or are still back. 
 If at your Headquarters will you please have tiiem sent here to-night? I think War- 
 ren sliould be in^tructed to send well down the White Oak road and also southwest 
 from his left, to watch and see if there is an eueuiy iu either directiim. I would much 
 rather have Warren back on the plank road than to be attacked trout and rear where 
 he is. He should intrench front aud rear of his left at least, and be ready to make a 
 good light of it if he is attacked in the morning. We will make no offensive move 
 ourselves to-morrow. If rations were not got up to-day they should be iu the morn- 
 
 (Signed) U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Licu't. General. 
 (Signed) (iico. K. Lekt, 
 
 J. A. Ge)i'L 
 
 The following gives directions to General Warren to secure his posi- 
 tions: 
 
 LXXXIX. 
 
 Printed: (Headqiauters Army of the Potomac,) 
 
 M'ch 31, 4.30 iJ. m.,1865. 
 (Capt. Winslow.) 
 Maj. Gen. G. K. Wahren, 
 
 ComUVfi {tth Corpx : 
 Secure your position; protect as well as possible your left llank. Word has been 
 sent to Sheridan, & it is believed that Sheridan is pushing up. 
 
9 
 
 Humphreys will be ordered to push up & to couueot with your ri<:;ht. You might, 
 if you think it worth while, pusii a small force down the White Oak road &, try to 
 communicate with Sheridan ; but they must take care not to tire into his advance. 
 By order of Gen'l Meade: 
 
 ALEX. S. WEBB, 
 
 B. M. G., C. 0. S. 
 
 The tidings received later of the enemy's snccessful advance against 
 Major-Geiieral Sheridan, by which the hitter had been pushed back to 
 Diuwiddie Court House, must have deepened the impression, already 
 entertained, of Warren's exposed position, as manifested in the follow- 
 ing dispatch : 
 
 XCIV. • 
 
 U. S. M. T. 
 8 p. m., Nuuan. 
 
 H'dqu'rs. a. of p., March 31.s«, 18(55—7.30. 
 To Maj. Gen. Warren : 
 
 Despatch from Genl. Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie C. H. by strong 
 force of cavalry supiKuted by in'antry. This leaves your rear and that of the 2d Corps 
 on the lioydton phuik-road o])en, and will require great vigilance on your part. If 
 you have sent the brigade down the Boydton Plank it should not go farther than 
 Gravelly Run, as I don't think it Avill render anv service but to protect your rear. 
 (S'd) ■ GEO. G. MEADE. 
 
 # Alaj. Genl. 
 
 The brigade mentioned in the preceding dispatch was a force of three 
 regiments, under Colonel Pearson, wliich had previously been oidered 
 by General Warren, by way of the plank-road, to the succor of Gen- 
 eral Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court-House, in compliance with former 
 instructions from General Meade. 
 
 General Warren lunl previously, of his motion and after noticing that 
 the tiring in the direction of Slieridan was receding towards Dinwiddie 
 Conrt-Honse, sent l>ari left's brigade of Grittin's division on the Crump 
 road to the rear of the enemy who were menacing Sheridan at Din- 
 wi«ldie, with directions to attack. 
 
 Warren was afterwards notitied to be ready to withdraw to the Boyd- 
 ton plank-road, as follows: 
 
 XCVI. 
 
 Rec'd 8.40 p. m. 
 
 (Confidential.) 
 
 U. S. M. T., Hdqrs. a. of P., 
 
 8.30 jj. m., March 31s<, 1865. 
 Nunan, 8.3.5 p. m. 
 
 To Maj. Gen. Warren: 
 
 The probability is that we will have to contract our line to-night. You will be re- 
 quired to hold, if ])ossible, the ]5oydtou ))lank joad & to Gi'avelly Run. Humphreys 
 & Ord aloug the run ; be [trepared to do this ou short notice. 
 
 ALEX. S. WEBB, 
 
 Bvt. M. Genl. 
 
 Warren, on receipt of the above, suggested, in case the left of the 
 line was not threatened south of Gravelly liun and east of the i)lank 
 road, that he should be permitted to "move down and attack the 
 enemy at Diuwiddie on one side and Sheridan on the other"; and he 
 
10 
 
 sent t\l^ following disinitcli, in which he did not particuhirize the route 
 or the time, aud obv'iousiy intended to move with the whoU^- corps: 
 
 XCVII. 
 
 8.40JJ. »(., Wch M, '65. 
 Gen'l Wkkh, (7/'/ Staff: 
 
 Tlie line along thfi ])lank-roa(l is very strong. One division, with uiy artillery, I 
 think can hold it. If we are not threatened sonth of Gravelly Enn, east of the jdank- 
 road, Geu'l Hunii>hreys and my hatteries, I think, conld hold this secnrely and let nie 
 move down and attaek the enemy at Diuwiddie on one side and Sheridan on the other. 
 From Harthitt's i)osition they will have to make a consideralde detour to re-enforce 
 their troops at that jtoint from the north. 
 
 Unless Sheridan has heeu too badly handled I think we have a chance for an open 
 field light jJiat should he made use of. 
 Resply, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, M. 0. 
 
 He was ordered to draw back to tlie P>oydton ])hink-road, and to send 
 Griffin's division by that roa<l to Dinwi(hlie to report to (General Sheri- 
 dan; and haste was enjoined in sending the divi-sion, as follows: 
 
 XCVIII. 
 Rec. 9.17 p. m. (L.) — Nunau, 9.15 p. ra. 
 
 U. S. M. T., HDQUsfA. OF P., 
 
 9^?. m., Mar. 31, 1865. 
 To Maj. Gen. Wakken : 
 
 Yon Avill, hy the direction of the maj. gen'l comd'g, draw back at once to your posi- 
 tion within the Boydton plank road & send a division down to Dinwiddle C. H. to 
 report to Gen'l Sheridan. This division will go down the Boydton plunk road. Send 
 Griftiu's division. Gen'l Humphievs will hold to Mrs. Butler's. 
 
 (S'd.) . ■ A. S. WEBB, 
 
 Bvt. M. G., C. 0. S. 
 CI. 
 
 U. S. M. T. 
 
 Nuuau, 9.45. 
 
 Hdqrs. a. of Potomac, Mar. 31.s/, '65— 9.20p*m. 
 To Maj. Gen. Warken : 
 
 The division to be sent to Sheridan will start at once. You are to be held free to 
 act within the Boydton plank road. (Jen'l Humphries (sic) will hold to the road and 
 the return. 
 
 (S'd) ALEX. S. WEBB, 
 
 Rec'd 9.30 ]). m.— (J. K. W. 
 
 And the following to General Meade; 
 
 XXXVI. 
 
 B. M. (}., C. of S. 
 
 I Telegram.] 
 
 Dabnky's, 10.15 7>. »)., March 3l8/, 1865. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Mkade: 
 
 Let Warren move in the way yon propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. 
 Let (Jrittin go in as he was (irst directed. 
 
 LT. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lt. Gen'l. 
 
 General Sheridan was notified by the dispatch, as seen below, that 
 liarth'tt's brigade was at Crum])'s house (he was really at G. Boisseau's, 
 near by, and liad jtrobably received his recall to his division on the 
 Wliite Oak road); that Griffin's division had been ordered down the 
 
11 
 
 Boydton plauk road to join him, and that Warren wonld attack at day- 
 light, with two divisions, by the Crump road: 
 
 CLXXVIII. 
 
 By staff officer. 
 
 Printed : (Headquauters Army ok tuk Potomac) 
 
 Ajnil 1»< — 6 p. ni. — 1865. 
 
 [iSToTE BY THE liECORDER. — The correct date is between 10.15 and 
 10.45 p. m. March 'SUt, 1805.] 
 
 Maj. Gen'l Sheridan: 
 
 Gen'l Meade has directed all the spare aiuVtulauces he can get hold of i^ go down to 
 Dimviddie. 
 
 Bartleti's brigade is at Cruuip's house, on Gravelly Rnn. Griffiu, with three bri- 
 gades, is ordered down Boydton plauk to attack in rear of force menacing yon. Gen'l 
 Grant is requested to authorize the sending of Warren's two other divisions down the 
 dirt-road past Crump's to hold & cover that road &. to attack at daylight. 
 
 ALEX.'S. WEBB, 
 B. M. G.. C. 0. S. 
 
 [Note by the Recorder. — On the back of the dispatch is written 
 the following:] 
 
 E. Ap'l 1st, 18(i5. 
 
 P. S. — Grifftn will join you by the plank-road and Warren will attack with two 
 divisions. * 
 
 A true copy of the original dispatch now in the War Records Office, Washington 
 City, except the date in brackets, which has been attested as the correct date liy Gen- 
 eral Webb himself and inserted by the Recorder. The body of the dispatch and the 
 postscript are written in pencil, but the date of the dispatch and the date of the post- 
 script are written in ink, and in a different handwriting from the rest of the disjiatch. 
 With reference to the hour of its receipt, see testimony on pages 75, 76, and 77 of this 
 record. 
 
 LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
 Bvt. Lt. Colonel, U. S. A., Becorder. 
 
 The above dispatch should I)e dated between 10.15 p. m., March 31st, and 10.45 p. 
 m., ou March 31st, 1865. 
 
 ALEX. S. WEBB, 
 New York Crrv, FeVy24, 1881. Bet. Maj. Gen'l, U. S. A. 
 
 General Meade sent a dis])atch at 10.15 x>. ra., received by Warren at 
 10.50, directing him (General Warren), for the tirst time, to move two 
 divisions by the road Bartlett was on, and to strike the enemy in rear; 
 explaining that, should the enemy turn on him, his line of retreat would 
 be by J. M. Brooke's and K. Boisseau's to the ])lank road. General 
 Meade urged him to be very prompt in this movement in order to get the 
 forks of the road at J. M. Brooke's before the enemy, so as to open to 
 R. Boisseau's, 
 
 CIV. 
 
 Rec'd 10.50 p. m. L. Nunan, 10.48. 
 
 U. S. M. T. Hdqrs. a. of P., 
 
 10.15 ^j. m., March 'Mst, 1865. 
 To Maj. (ien. Warren: 
 
 Send Griffin promptly, as ordered, by the B8y<lton P. R., but move the balance of 
 your conunand by the road Bartlett is on. and strike the enemy in rear, who is be- 
 tween him and Dinwiddie. Gen'l Sheiiilan reported his last position as north of Din- 
 widdle Court-House, near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cro>s-roads at that 
 point. Should the enemy turn on yon, your line of retreat will be by J. M. Brooks' & 
 R. Boiseau's, on Boydton plank road. See one-inch maps. Yon must be very prompt 
 in this movement, «& get the forks of the road at J. M. Brooks' before the enemy, so as 
 
12 
 
 to open tS K. Boisean's. The I'lieiny will jirobably retire toward the Five Forks, that 
 bein<i; the direction of their main attack this day. Don't encinnber yourself with auy- 
 tliing that will impede your projrress or prevent your moving in any direction across 
 the country. Let me know when Griffin starts & when you start. 
 
 GEO. G. MEADE, 
 
 Maj. Gen'l. 
 Acknowledge receipt. 
 
 liejrardiiig the foregoiu.Q'; as General Warren liad already been in- 
 formed by a stafi'-ofticer, Colonel Coi)e, that Bartlett at (r. Boisseau's 
 had tlie enemy on liis front along tbe south bank of the branch of 
 Gravelly Rnii near Crunii)'s, it was impossible by any promptitude of 
 movement to obey liis instructions, as the enemy already occupied the 
 objective f)oint named by General Meade. 
 
 By dispatch XCVill (before quoted), received by General Warren at 
 9.17 p. ni., he was first <lirected to send Griffin's division to join Sheri- 
 dan by the Boydton plank-road. As one of the brioades (Bartlett's) 
 of this division was already at G. Boisseau's, by reason of the delay in 
 getting Bartlett back, Ayres's and Crawford's divisions were ordered to 
 move back first to the plank-road, ami Griffin to follow, as soon as 
 Bartlett rejoined him, and proceed to Diuwiddie. 
 
 C. 
 
 [General Orders No. — , ] 
 
 Headquaiitkrs .5th Army Corps, 
 
 Alarch 'AUf, IHH.^— 9.35 p. m. 
 
 I. General Ayres will imtnediately withdraw bis division back to where it waa 
 massed yestenl.ty near the Hoydton jilank road. 
 
 II. Gen'l Crawfoid will follow Gen'l Ayres and mass his troops behind theeutrench- 
 ment« near Mrs. Butler's. 
 
 III. Gen'l (iritiHn will immediately withdraw Gen'l Bartlett to his present position, 
 then move liack to the plank road and down it to Dinwiddle Court-House, and report 
 to G<'n'l Sheridan. 
 
 IV. C:ii)t. HoriJ], with the escort, ^\ill remain where (tcu'I Griffin's Head-Quarters 
 now iire till d.iybreak A then cou\e back to the j)bink road, bringing in all stragglers. 
 
 V. Division commanders, in executing this movement, which is ordered by G-^n'l 
 Meade to see that none of their pickets, or any portion of their trooi)s are left i)ehind. 
 
 VI. Gen'l Ayres and (ien. Crawford will have their troojjs under .irms at daybreak, 
 and the chief of artillery will have all the batteries in readiness to move. 
 
 Bv command of Maj. Gen. Warren. 
 • («'d) ■ FRED. T. LOCKE, 
 
 Brt. Col., J. A. G. 
 
 Shortly afterwards, from an examination ordered for the purpose, it 
 WHS rei)orted by a staff officer that the bridge on the i)lank-road over 
 Gravelly Kun was much broken, and that the stream was not Ibrdable 
 for infantry. 
 
 Finally, in consequence of the confusion it was supposed would be 
 created i)y changing the order of the divisions, it was determined by 
 Warren to send Ayres instead of Griffin to Uinwiddic. 
 
 CV. 
 
 Hkaoqrs. 5th Army Corps, 
 Tli'tA:?!, 1^(55-10.55 p. m. 
 General Mkadk : 
 
 I issued my orders on Gen'l Webb's first dcsiiatch to fall back, which made the di- 
 visions retire in the order of Ayres. C rawford, and Griffin, whicli was the order they 
 conhl most rapidly move. I cannot change them to-night withont iirodncing confu- 
 sion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now send (xcn. Ayres to Gen. 
 
13 
 
 Sheridan, and take Gen'l GritHu & Geu'l Crawford to move against the enemy, as this 
 last despatch directs I shoukl. I cannot accomplish the apparent objects of the or- 
 ders I have received. 
 Resp'ly, 
 
 G. K. WARREN, 
 
 Maj. Gen'l, Com'd'g. 
 2.12 a. m. Nunan ; Line down. 
 
 A trne copy of the manifold original in General Warren's file. The word "Other- 
 wise" has been, aj»parently, prefixed, in pencil, to the words "I cannot accomplish," 
 &c., after the (lispatch was writt<-n, and it does not appear in the copy astound in the 
 file from the Adjiitant-Generars Office ; an<l in tbe latter there is no punctuation in 
 the last sentence between the words "I will now send General Ayres" and the close 
 of the dis|)atch. 
 
 A copy of this dispatch is found in General Webb's file of copies of dispatches rec'd 
 at and sent from Gen'l Meade's headnuarters. 
 
 LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
 Bvt. Lt. Vol., U. S. A., 
 
 Recorder. 
 
 It was reported about 2 a. m., April 1, that the bridge over Gravelly 
 Ran was finished, and that Ayres was crossing it. 
 
 A dispatch from General Meades of 11,45 p. m., March 31, received 
 by Warren at 1 a. ni. of April 1, the late reception of which was ac- 
 counted for by a derangement of the telegrai)hic line, stated that Sher- 
 idan could not maintain liimself at Dinvviddie without re-enforcements, 
 and suggested, to avoid the delay caused by the necessity of re])airing 
 the bridge, that the re-enforcements should be sent by the Quaker road. 
 
 CXI. 
 
 Hdqr. a. p.— 11.45 p. m., Mar. 31. 
 
 Rec'd 1 a. m., April 1.— G. K. W. 
 Maj. Gen'l Wahken : 
 
 A dispatch, partially ti'ansmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly 
 Run is (festroycd, and time will be recjnired 1o rebuikl it. If this is the case, would 
 uot time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker road ? Time is of the utmost 
 importance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without re-euforce- 
 raents, &, yours are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get the 
 troops to him as soon as possible. If necessary send troops by both roads &, give up 
 the rear attack. 
 
 GEO. G. MEADE. 
 
 Maj. GenH. 
 
 If Shei'idan is not re-enforced & compelled to fall back, he will retire by the 
 Vaughn* road. 
 
 G. G. M. 
 
 A true copy of the original dispatch, written by General Meade and retained in 
 General Warren's file. 
 
 Ill the corr(si)onding copies, as found in the file from the Adjutant-General's Office, 
 and in Gen'l Wt4tb's file of (lisjjatcht^sat Gen'l Meade's headquarters, and in that from 
 the office for the 2»'iblicafion of tlie Rebellion Records, the words "in time" occur 
 immediately after the words '• if Sheridan is not re-enforced," and in the file from the 
 first office, what appears as a postscript in the original is in the main body of the dis- 
 patch. 
 
 LOOMIS L. LANGDON, 
 Bvt. Lt. Colonel, U. S. A. 
 
 Warren replies to the last suggestion by the following dispatch : 
 
 CXII. 
 
 Hdqurs. 5x11 a. C, 1.20 a. m., Apr. 1. 
 Gen'l Meade : 
 
 I think we will have an infautiy bridge over Gravelly Run sooner than I could send 
 troops around by the Quaker road. 
 
 * Vauffhan. 
 
14 
 
 But if rliiul auy ftilme, I will send that way. I have sent Beuyard* 2 hours ago 
 with what he thought necessary to make it practicable in one hour, and I trust to 
 that. 
 
 I am sending to Gen'l Sheridan my most available force. 
 Kesp'lv, 
 
 G. K. WAREEN, 
 
 Mtij. GenU. 
 
 After seudiiio- Ayres to report to Sheridan, Warren waited until 
 somt' time between 5 and (J a. m. before in >v\ng tbe other two divisions 
 by tlie ( 'rninp road to make the rear attaclc. 
 
 Warren finally received tlie following from General Sheridan: 
 
 CXlV. 
 
 Kec. 4.50 a. ni., April Ist.— G. K. VV. 
 
 (Printed:) Hkadquarters Middlr Military Division, 
 
 iJinwiddie C. JS.,i April I, 186.=>. 
 Maj. Gen'l Warrkx, 
 
 Com'd'f/ rjth A. C: 
 I am holding in front of Dinwiildie C. H., on the road leailing to Five Forks, for 
 three-<iuartera iif a inile, with Gen'l Caster's division. The enemy are in his imme- 
 diate front, lying so as to cover ihe road jnst this side of A. Adams's lionse, which 
 leads out across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand yon have a division at J.f 
 Bois^eau's; if so, yon are in the rear ot the enemy's line, and almost on his tiank. I 
 will hold nn here. Possibly they niav attack Custer at dayiinlit; if so, have this di- 
 vision attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyway, & I will make 
 an etil'urt to get the road this sidti of Adams's house, & if 1 do, you can capture the 
 whole of them. 
 
 Auy force moving down the road I nm holding, or on the White Oak road, will be 
 in tli(! enemy's rear, & in all ])robability get any force that may escai)e you bj' » 
 fltiulc attack. Do not i'ear my leaving here; if the enemy remain, I shall tight at day- 
 light. 
 
 P. II. SHERIDAN, 
 
 Maj. (ienl. 
 
 And about daybreak Warren left his headquai-ters at the Wilson 
 house, near the plank-road, for the White Oak road, where he put in 
 motion (riiftin's and Crawi'ord's divisions across the country to the line 
 of tiie Criiinp road; the head of the column starting between 5 and 
 o'clock. Giiftin went first, in column of route, and the rear brigade of 
 Crawford, in line of battle, to resist any adverse movement of the enemy 
 intren(;hed along the Claiborne road. 
 
 The <listance from the White Oak road, where the Fifth Corps was 
 posted on the evening and night of the.'ilst of March, to Dinwiildie 
 Court-IIouse, was about i\h, miles, and although General Ayres did not 
 reach that i)lace, but was turned off, his division marched an equivalent 
 distance. 
 
 The distance from the position of Griflin and Crawfoid on the White 
 Oak road to J. M. Brooke's, the point on the direct road from Dinwiddle 
 Court-House to Five Folks that General Warren was ordered, during 
 the night of the 31st of March, at the hour of the receipt of General 
 Meade's order of lO.lo p. m., to attain with two divisions, was about 4^ 
 miles. 
 
 * Benyaurd. . 
 
 \'.i a. m., according to testimony on pages 53. 54, and .56 of the printed recoilff 
 t Lieuteuant-General Sheridan testified that he was in error in saying "J. Boisseau's 
 
 house"; that he "should have said Dr. G. Boisseau's:"' and that "at the tune he 
 
 wrote" this dispatch his " iniiiression was there was a divisicm of the 5th C<n|is at Dr. 
 
 G. Boisseau's." See sworn statement, on page 53, and answer to question by court, 
 
 page 56 of this record. 
 
 L. L. L., Recorder. ^ 
 
15 
 
 It appears from the evidence that there had beeu heavy rains on two 
 or three days prior to the night of March 31 and April 1, and the 
 roads were very inn(hly and the streams were fnll. The condition of the 
 roads is shown by the foPowing- telegrams : 
 
 XIV. 
 
 [Telegram.) 
 
 Gravelly Run, March 'Mst, Irtli;')— 7.40 a. in. 
 Maj. Gen'l Meade, 
 
 Comd'fj J. /'. : 
 Owinj^ to the lieavy niiu this morning the troops will remain substantially as they 
 now are, but the 5th Corps should to-day draw three days' more ratiins. 
 
 U. S. GKANT, 
 
 Lt. (reii'L 
 XVIII. 
 
 10.28 a. m. — Mixer. Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
 
 10.23 a. «(.., 3Iarrh M, 1865. 
 Maj. Gen. Webb, 
 
 Jt Gen. Grant's Hdqrs. 
 Geul. Grant's dispatch to Geu. Meade as to sparing no exertion in the execution of 
 orders to get rations Ibrward to Warren is received. The Chief Quartermaster has 
 given such iustriictious, and to take the i-atious on pack mules if the train cau't be 
 got up. 
 
 (Signed) GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 A. A. G. 
 CXCIl. 
 
 (Cipher.) 
 
 Da bnry's Mills, -Ji^H/ 1, 1805. 
 
 10.30 a. m. 
 Lincoln, A., I'reitideni, 
 
 CUtj Point : 
 In my dispatch this morning I made a mistake iu saying Ch-d lost nothing iu the at- 
 tack made on him this a. m. His casualties were about 30 killed and wounded. He 
 reported no casualties lu Turner's Div., which led me into the error. Tlie (jnicksands 
 of this section exceed anything I have ever seen. Roads have to l)ecorduroid (sic) in 
 front of teams and artillery as they advance. We were 50 hours moving (500 teams 5 
 miles, with 1,2!)0 men to help them. Tlirough the woods where it is perfectly dry for 
 infantry, horses will go througli so deep as to scarcely be able to extricate themselves. 
 I have nothing special to report at this time. 
 
 (S'gVl) U. S. GRANT, 
 
 Lieut. General. 
 Official : 
 
 Geo. K. Leet, 
 
 A. A. G. 
 
 General Ayres's colnnm reached J. M. Brooke's after some delay, 
 caused' by having passed the Brooke's road abont a mile, a little after 
 daybreak. He was turned back and off the plank road and directed to 
 that point by a staff oihcer of General Sheridan. 
 
 The head of the column, under command of General AVarren, reached 
 J. Boisseau's about 7 a. ni. of the 1st of April, 
 
 The enemy began to withdraw their infantry from Dinwiddie, iu the 
 direction of Five Forks, about 2 a. m. April 1. 
 
 Warren, iu dispatch X(JV, of March 31, 8.20 p. m. (see the series of 
 dispatches in Eecord), asked, "Does Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie ?" To 
 which no reply was made, so far as the dispatches and the evidence in 
 the record show. Also, in dispatch CXI, received by Warren at 1 a. m. 
 April 1, General Meade said, "Sheridan cannot maintain himself at 
 Dinwiddie without reinforcements, and yours are the only ones that can 
 be sent." 
 
16 
 
 Geiu^al WaiTeii claims to have delayed action in moving the two 
 divisions to make the tiank and rear attack by the Cramp road, until 
 he would hear either that Sheridan still held Dinwlddie or that Ayres 
 had joined him. 
 
 It was not until 4.50 a. m., April 1, that he received Sheridan's dis- 
 patch CXIV, above quoted, stating in its closing ])aragra{)li, " Do not 
 fear my leaving here; if the enemy remain 1 shall light at daylight." 
 
 optnto:n^. 
 
 It is sujiposed that 'Hhe expectations of the lieutenant-general," re- 
 ferred to in the imputation, are those expressed in his dispatch to Gen- 
 eral Sheridan of 10.45 p. m. of March 31, 18G5, as follows: 
 
 CLXXIX. 
 
 Dabxey's Mills, 
 March 31, 1865—10.45 p. m. 
 Major (jleueral Shkkidan: 
 
 The atli Corps liiis been ordered to your support. Two Divisious will go by J. Bois- 
 seau's and one <lown the Boydtou road. In addition to this I have sent *McKenzie'8 
 cavalry, which will reach you by tin; t Vaughn road. All these forces, except the 
 cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-uight. 
 
 You will assunu! coniniand of the whole force sent to operate with you and use it 
 to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so 
 gallantly to-dav. 
 
 IT. S. GKANT, 
 
 Lieutenant GentraJ, 
 
 In which he says, "All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach 
 yon by 12 to-night." If this suj)position be correct, the court is of 
 opinion, consideiing the condition of the roads and surronmling coun- 
 try over part of which the trooi)s had to march, the darkness of the 
 night, the distance to be travekMl, and the hour at which the order for 
 the march reached (ieneial Wan en, 10.50 j). m., that it was not i)racti- 
 cable tor the Fifth Cori)s to have reached General Sheridan at 12 o'clock 
 on the night of March 31. 
 
 Not h withstanding that dispositions suitable for the contingency of 
 Sheridan's falling back from Diiiwiddie might well have occupied and 
 ])eri)lex<'d General Warren's mind during the nigiit, the court is of the 
 opinion that he should have moved the two divisions by the Crump road 
 in obedience to the orders and expectations of his commander, upon 
 whom alone rested the responsibility of the consequences. 
 
 It a]»p' ars from the dispatches and General Warren's testimony, that 
 neither Generals Mea«l, Siieridan, or Warien exjuessed an intention of 
 having tliis column attack befoie daylight. 
 
 The court is further of the oi»inion that General Warren should have 
 started with two divisions, as diivcted by General Meade's dispatch 
 (CIV, heretofore quoted), as early after its receipt, at 10.50 j). m., as he 
 could be assured of the prospect of Ayres's departure down the IJoyd- 
 ton plank-road, and should liave advanced on the Crumj) road as far 
 as directed in tiiat dispatch, or as far as might be practicable or neces- 
 sary to fulfill General Meade's intention; whereas tiie evidence shows 
 that he did not start until between five and six (d'clock on the morning 
 of the 1st of April, and did not reach J. Boisseau's with the head of the 
 column till about seven o'clock in the morning. 
 
 ^Mackenzie, tVaiighan. 
 
17 
 
 The dispatches show that Generals Meade and Warren anticipated a 
 withdraAval during the night of the enemy's forces fronting General 
 Sheridan, which was rendered higldy probable from the known position 
 in their rear of a portion of tlie Fiftli Corps (Bartlett's brigade) at G. 
 Boisseau's, and the event justified the anticijiation. 
 
 THIRD IMPUTATION. 
 
 The Third Imputation is found in an extract from General Sheridan's 
 report of May 16, 1865 (see Record, pages 21 and 48), as follows: 
 
 "* * * * * * * General Waireu did not exort himself to get np his corps 
 us rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he 
 wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed." 
 
 On the afternoon of April 1, the Fifth Corps was massed as follows : 
 Crawford's and Griffin's divisions at the forks of the Crump road and 
 the main road from Dinwiddie Court- House to Five Forks, and A^res's 
 division on the Brooke's road about one-fourth of a mile east from the 
 Ibrks of that road and the road to Five Forks. 
 
 The distance from the position of Griffin and Crawford to the place of 
 formation of the Fifth Corps, near Gravelly Run church, was about 2^ 
 miles, and the length of the corps when spread out in column of route 
 would be about 2f miles. The last tile of the column required as much 
 time to reach the place of formation as it would have taken to march 
 about 5 miles. 
 
 General Warren received his orders near Gravelly Eun Church to 
 move up his corps at 1 p. m., and it took some time to communicate 
 those orders to the divisions and for the movement to begin. 
 
 The route to the place of formation was along a narrow road, very 
 muddy and slippery, somewhat encumbered with wagons and led horses 
 of the cavalry corjis, and the men were fatigued. The testimony of 
 brigade and division commanders is to the eflect that the corps in line 
 of march was well closed up, and that no unnecessary delay Avas in- 
 curred. 
 
 The corps reached its destination, and was formed ready to advance 
 against the enemy about 4 p. m. 
 
 It is in evidence that General Warren remained near Gravelly Run 
 Church, directing the formation, explaining thfe mode of attack to the 
 division and brigade commanders, with sketches prepared for the pur- 
 pose. 
 
 General Warren also repeatedly sent out staff officers to the division 
 commanders in order to expedite the march. 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 The conrt is of the oi)inion that there was no unnecessary delay in 
 this march of the Fifth Cori)s, and that General Warren took the usual 
 methods of a corps commander to prevent delay. 
 
 The question regarding General Warren's manner appears to be too 
 intangible and tlie evidence on it too contradictory for the court to de- 
 cide, separate from the context, that he appeared to wish " the sun to go 
 down before dispositions for the attack would l>e completed;" but his 
 actions, as shown by the evi«lence, do not appear to have corresponded 
 with such wish, if ever he entertained it. 
 8002 2 
 
18 
 
 FOURTH IMPUTATION. 
 
 The Fourth Imputation is fouud in an extract from General Sheri- 
 dan's report of May 10, 1865 (see Record, pp. 22 and 48), as follows : 
 
 "Durin<f tliis attack I again became dissatisfied with Geueral Warren. During the 
 engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy tire, and 
 simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren 
 did not exert himself to inspire." 
 
 When the Fifth Corps moved up to the attack, General Sheridan said 
 to General Ayres, "I will ride with you." General Warren was on the 
 left of Crawford's division, between Crawford and Ayres. 
 
 When General Ayres's command struck the White Oak road it re- 
 ceived a fire in flank from the enemy's '•'return" nearly at right angles 
 to the road. Tie changed front immediately at right angles and faced 
 the "return," his right receiving a fire from Munford's Confederate 
 division of dismounted cavalry distributed along the edge of the woods 
 to the north of the White Oak road. There w^as some confusion, which 
 was immediately checked by the exertions of General Sheridan, Gen- 
 eral Ayres, and other officers. 
 
 The evidence shows that General Warren was observant of Ayres, 
 because he sent orders to Winthrop's reserve brigade to form on the 
 left of Ayres's new line. 
 
 This necessary change of front of Ayres increased the interval be- 
 tween him and Crawford on his right; the latter was marching without 
 change of direction until, as he expressed it, he would clear the right 
 of Ayres, when he was also to change front to the left. 
 
 At this moment, Warren, who saw that Crawford, with Griffin follow- 
 ing, was disajipearing in the woods to the north of the White Oak road, 
 sent a staff officer to Griffin to come as quickly as he could to sustain 
 Ayres; went himself to the left brigade of Crawford, and caused a line 
 to be marked out facing to the Avest, directing the brigade commander 
 to form on it; then went into the woods and gave orders to the right 
 brigade of Crawford to form on the same line. When he returned to 
 the open ground the brigade he had directed to change front had dis- 
 appeared, as appears by the evidence, in consequence of orders given 
 by an officer of General Sheridan's staffi General Warren sent repeated 
 orders by staft'-oificers to both GrifQn and (Crawford to change direction, 
 and went himself to both, and finally by these means corrected, as far 
 as was possible under the circumstances, the divergence of these two 
 divisions. 
 
 It appears from evidence that these two divisions were operating in 
 the woods and over a difficult country, and received a fire in their front 
 from the dismounted cavalry of Munford, posted in the woods to the 
 north of the White Oak road, which led to the belief, for some time, 
 that the enemy had a line of battle in front; and this may furnish one 
 reason why it was so difficult at first to change their direction to the 
 proi)er one. 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 General Warren's attention api)ears to have been drawn, almost im- 
 mediately after Ayres received the fiank fire froin the " return" and hig 
 consequent change of front, to the probability of Crawford with Griffin 
 
19 
 
 diverging too much from and being separated from Ayres, and by con- 
 tinuous exertions of himself and staff substantially remedied matters; 
 and the court thinks that this was for him the essential point to be at- 
 tended to, which also exacted his whole efforts to accomplish. 
 
 C. C. AUGUR, 
 Brigadier- General, U. 8. A., 
 
 President of Court. 
 LOOMIS L. Langdon, 
 Brevet Lieutenant- Golonelj U. 8. A., Recorder. 
 
 There being no further business before the court, it adjourned smedlte. 
 
 C. C. AUGUR, 
 Brigadier- General, U. 8. A., 
 
 President of Court. 
 LOOMIS L. Langdon, , 
 
 Brevet Lieutenant- Colonel, U. 8. A., Recorder. 
 
 [Action of the President of the United States on the foregoing proceedings.] 
 
 War Department, 
 
 November 21, 1882, 
 The foregoing proceedings and report having been laid before the 
 President, he directs that the findings and opinion of the court of in- 
 quiry be published. 
 
 ROBERT T. LINC0L:N^, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
REI^OPITS 
 
 OF TUB 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL AND 
 GENERAL OF THE ARMY 
 
 IN THK MATTMR OF THIC 
 
 W^ARREN COURT OF INQUIRY. 
 
 Official copy : 
 
 ADJUTA^fT-GKNEU/JLL'S OFFICE, 
 
 Jnnnary T), 188:5. 
 
 R. C. DRUM, 
 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 21 
 
REPORTS 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL AND GENERAL OF THE ARMY 
 
 EEPOBT OF THE JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL. 
 
 War Department, 
 Bureau of Military Justice, 
 
 Washington, July 11, 1882. 
 Hon. Egbert T. Lincoln, 
 
 Secretary of War : 
 Sir : The record of the proceedings of the court of inquiry appointed 
 (by the President, December 9, 1879) on the application of Lieut. Col. 
 G. K. Warren, Corps of Engineers (late major-general of volunteers), 
 for the purpose of inquiring into Colonel Warren's conduct as major-gen- 
 eral commanding the Fifth Corps at the battle of Five Forks, Virginia, 
 on April 1, 18C5, and into the operations of his command on that day, 
 and the day previous, as far as they relate to Colonel Warren's conduct 
 or to imputations and accusations against him, is herewith submitted 
 with the following report : 
 
 On the 18th of November, 1879, Colonel Warren addressed the Secre- 
 tary of War asking attention to his application for a court of inquiry, 
 giving in brief his reasons for asking for the court as follows: 
 
 Early iu the morning of April-1, 1865, the Fifth Army Corps was detached from the 
 left wing of the Army of the Potomac, under Major-General Meade, where it had pre- 
 viously been, and, joining with the command of Major-General Sheridan, fought with 
 him the battle of Five Forks, where we won a victory remarkable for its completeness. 
 After the close of the battle, while at the head of my army corps, directed by me 
 through the continuance of the battle, and led by me in the tinal assault, in which 
 latter my horse was fatally shot, with several thousand prisoners, twelve battle stand- 
 ards, and a battery of artillery in our hands, with no armed foe in sight, I received, 
 about 7 p. m., a written order from General Sheridan relieving me, and directing me 
 to report in person to Lieutenant-General Grant. 
 
 This order came without any assigned reason, nor had there been any real discord- 
 ance between us. Surprised, I sought General Sheridan and asked him what it meant ; 
 to which his only reply was, "Obey the order ! " I proceeded at once to General Grant, 
 ten miles distant. * * * jj© told me he had given General Sheridan the authority 
 to relieve me if he thought necessary, but gave no reason for its use on this occasion. 
 
 Incorporated with this letter were various letters and extracts from 
 General Sheridan's report, and from newspapers, showing that oh the 
 9th of Ai)ril, 1865, General Warren addressed General Grant's chief of 
 staft', requesting "a full investigation of the matter as soon as the exi- 
 gencies of the service will admit," with a reply from General Grant dated 
 May 6, 1865, saying: "It is impossible at this time to give the court and 
 witnesses necessary for the investigation." Also a letter addressed by 
 General Warren to the Secretary of War, dated May 1, 1866, requesting 
 the appointment of a court of inquiry upon the matters referred to. The 
 extracts from General Sheridan's report and the newspaper extract re- 
 
 23 
 
24 
 
 ferred tt) comment severely upon the conduct of General Warren in the 
 operations preceding and in the battle of Five Forks. 
 
 General Warren says, in substance, that the incumbency of General 
 Grant as President has prevented tlie grant of his request for a court 
 of inquiry, and the revival of a new and unwarranted allegation of his 
 unfitness to command, made to apjdy to his actions at the battle of Five 
 Forks, appeared in the New York Herald of July 28, 1878; and he con- 
 cludes by saying: 
 
 It is not too late to correct the gross injustice under which I have suffered so long. 
 The needful witnesses of the facts still live. Common justice to my public record as 
 a soldier, and my rights under the Articles of War, demand, it seems to me, that my 
 request for a court of inquiry, respectfully made at the earliest moment after the event, 
 and urged for action on every available occasion heretofore, a« well as now, should 
 be granted. 
 
 The injustice thus complained of by General Warren is contained in 
 so much of the report of General Sheridan, dated May 10, 1865, as re- 
 lates to his operations in the vicinity of Five Forks, March 31, 1805, and 
 his battle there April 1, 1805, as w ell as in so much of the report of Gen- 
 eral Grant as relates to the oi)erations of the armies in front of Peters- 
 burg March 31, 1805. General Sheridan, in his report referred to, speak- 
 ing of his command of 9,000 cavalry, said: 
 
 With this force I moved out on the 29th of March, in conjunction with the armies 
 operating against Richmond, and in the subsequent operations I was under the im- 
 mediate orders of the Lieutenant-Geueral commauding. * * * Next morniug, 
 March M, General Merritt advanced toward the Five Forks with the first division and 
 meeting with considerable opposition. * » » The advance of the first division got 
 possession of the Five Forks, but in the mean time the Fifth \imy Corps, which had 
 advanced toward White Oak road from the Vaughan road, was attacked and driven 
 back, and withdrawing from that point this force of the enemy marched rapidly from 
 the front of the Fifth Corps to the Five Forks, driving in our cavalry advance, and 
 moving down on roads west of Chamberlin's Cret-k attacked General Smith's brigade 
 but were unable to fojce his position. 
 
 In General Grant's report, referred to, it is stated in this connection: 
 
 On the morning of the Slst General Warren reported favorably to getting posses- 
 sion of the White Oak road and was directed to do so. To accomplish this he moved 
 with one division instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in 
 .superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and 
 it in turn forced back upon the third division when the enemy was checkeil. 
 
 After describing his spirited engagement with the enemy during the 
 31st of March, and having been forced to retire from the vicinity of Five 
 Forks south to Dinwiddie Court-House, by the superior force of the 
 >enemy's cavalry and infantry, General Sheridan continues in his report: 
 
 During the night of the 31st of March, my headquarters were at Dinwiddie Conrt- 
 House, and the Lieuteuant-General notified me that ihe Fifth Corps would rei)ort to 
 me, and should reach me by midnight. 
 
 The corps did not so report, and General Sheriaan continues:* 
 
 Had General Warren moved, according to the expectations of ihe Lieuienant-Gencral, there 
 would appear to hare been hut little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of 
 JDimciddie ('onrf- House. Ayres' division (Fifth Corps) moved down the Boydton plank- 
 road during the night, and in the morning moved west via R. Boisneau's house, strik- 
 ing the Five Forks road about two and a half miles north of Dinwiddie Court-House. 
 General Warren, with Grithn's and Crawford's divisions, moved down the road by 
 Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks near J. Boisseau's house, between seven 
 and eight o"(;Iock on tlie morning of the 1st of April. Meantime I moved my cavalry 
 force, at daylight, against the enemy's lines in my front, which gave way rapidly, 
 moving ofl' by tlie right flank and crossing Chamberlin's Creek. This hasty movement 
 was accelerated by tlie discovery that two divisions of the Fifth Corps were in their 
 
 In the original report there are no sentences in italics. 
 
25 
 
 rear and that oue division was luovino towards their left and rear. The following 
 w^ere the iustrnctions sent to General Warren : 
 
 "Cavalry Headquarters, Dinwiddik Court-House, 
 
 ^^Jpril I, 1865 — 3 a. m. 
 "I am holding in front of Diuwiddie Conrt-Hoiise, on the road leading to Five 
 Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are 
 in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road, just this side of A. Adams' house, 
 which leads out across Chamberlin's bed or run. I understand you have a division 
 at J. Boisseau's ; if so, yon are in rear of tlie enemy's line and almost on his flank. I 
 Avill hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight ; if so, attack instantly 
 and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the 
 road this side of Adams' house, and if I do, you can capture tlie whole of them. Any 
 force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the 
 enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape yon by a left flank 
 attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains I shall fight at daylight. 
 
 "P. H. SHERIDAN, 
 
 " Major-General. 
 "Major-General Warrex, 
 
 " Commanding Fifth Army Corps." 
 
 As they fell back the enemy were rapidly followed by General Merritt's two divisions. 
 * * * I then determined that I would drive the enemy with the cavalry to the 
 Five Forks, press them inside of their works, and make a feint to turn their right 
 flank, and meanwhile qnietly move up with the Fifth Corps with a view to attack 
 their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and drive westward those who 
 might escape, thus isolating them from the army at Petersburg. Happily this con- 
 ception was successfully executed. 
 
 About this time General Mackenzie's division of cavalry, from the Army of the James, 
 reported to me, and consisted of about 1,000 effectiA'e men. I directed General War- 
 ren to hold fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to Hie 
 front when required ; and General Mackenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwid- 
 dle Court-House until further orders. Meantime General Merritt's command contin- 
 ued to press the enemy, and by impetuous charges drove them from two lines of 
 temporary works, General Custer guiding his advance on the Widow Gilliams' house 
 and General Devin on the main Five Forks road. * * * About 2 o'clock the enemy 
 was behind his works, on the White Oak road, and his skirmish line drawn in. I 
 then ordered up the Fifth Corps on the nuiin road, and sent Brevet Major Gillespie, of 
 the Engineers, to turn the head of the column oft' on the Gravelly Run Church road, 
 and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to and at a jtoiut but a short dis- 
 tance from the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divis- 
 ions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in reserve, 
 in columns of regiments, opposite the center. I then directed General Merritt to dem- 
 onstrate as though he was attemi)ting to turn the enemy's riglit flank, and notified 
 him that the Fifth Corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the 
 cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth Corps became eng;iged, 
 and that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then rode over where 
 the Fifth Corps was going into position and found them coming up very slowly. I 
 was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low and we had 
 to tight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to 
 have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had 
 fallen during the day. In thifi connection IwiUsa;/ thai General ll^arren did not exert him- 
 self to get up his corph, us rapidhj as he mi<iht have done, and his manner gare me the impres- 
 sion that he wished the sun to go doivn before dispositions for the attack could be completed. 
 As soon as the corps was in position I ordered an advance in the following forma- 
 tion : Ayres' division on the left, in double line; Crawford's division on the right, in 
 double lines ; and Grifhn's division in the reserve, behind Crawford ; and the White 
 Oak road was reached without opposition. While General Warren was getting into 
 position, I learned that the left of the Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac, on 
 my right, had been swung around from the direction of its lino of battle until it fronted 
 on the Boydton road, aTid parallel to it, which afforded an opportunity to the enemy 
 to march down the White Oak road and attack me in right and rear. General Mac- 
 kenzie was therefore sent up the Crump road with directions to gain the White Oak 
 road if possible, but to attack at all hazards any enemy fonml, and if successful, then 
 march down that road and join me. General Mackenzie executed tliis with courage 
 and skill, attacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak road iiud driving it to- 
 wards Petersburg. He then countermarched and then joined me on the White Oak 
 road just as the Fifth Corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing 
 round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the Ford road at the cross- 
 ing of Hatcher's Run. The Fifth Corps, on reaching the Wliite Oak road, made a left 
 
26 
 
 wheel arfd hurst, on the enemy's flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, 
 orders having heen given that if the enemy was routed there should be no halt to re- 
 form broken lines. As stated before, the firing of the Fifth Corps was the signal to 
 General Merritt to assault, which was promptly responded to, and the works of the 
 enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The enemy 
 were driven from their strong lint* of works and completely routed, the Fifth Corps 
 doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing 
 on to the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and, 
 riding into their broken ranks, so demoralized them that they made no serious stand 
 after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000 
 prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward and were pursued 
 until long after dark by Merritt's and Mackenzie's cavalry, for a distance of six miles. 
 During this attack I again becavie dismtinjied tdth General Warreii. During the engage- 
 vicnt portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy Jire, and simply from want 
 of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Wanen did not exert himself to inspire. 
 I therefore relieved him from the command of the Fifth Corps, authority for this action having 
 been sent tome (Record, pp. 18, 22). 
 
 General Warren asserted that — 
 
 Whatever there is in the report of Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sheridan 
 reflecting any dishonor upon me, and whatever statements there may be in the rej»ort 
 in support of such reflections, or against my efficiency as commander of the Fifth 
 Corps, and any statement or inference that I was relieved till after the battle was 
 ended and the victory complete, and whatever else may be stated hereafter, before 
 this court, dishonorable to rae, during the days upon which my conduct is to be in- 
 vestigated, I deny, and it is my design to disprove (p. 29). 
 
 General Warren also complains of the statement in the extract from 
 the report of General Grant, above quoted, and desires that the same 
 be investigated (Record, p. 48). 
 
 The extract from General Grant's report alluded to is, for convenience, 
 again quoted, as follows : 
 
 . On the morning of the 31st General Warren reported favorably to getting possession 
 of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this he moved with 
 one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior 
 force and driven back on the second (livision before it had time to form, and it in turn 
 forced back on the third division, wlitui tlie enemy was checked. 
 
 The extracts from the rei)ort of General Sheridan, complained of by 
 General Warren, and which he desires investigated, are indicated by 
 underscoring in the report of General Sheridan, above quoted, but for 
 . convenience are here grouped as follows : 
 
 (1.) Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant 
 General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the 
 enemy's infantry in front of Dinwifldie Court-House. 
 
 (2.) *■ * * General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly 
 as he might have done, and his n)anner gave me the impression that he wished the 
 sun to go down befoi-e dispositions for the attack could be completed. 
 
 (3.) * * * During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. 
 During the engagenunit portions of his lino gave way when not exposed to a heavy 
 fire, and simply for want of couiidenco on the part of the troops, which General War- 
 ren did not exert himself to inspire. 1 therefore relieved him from the command of 
 the Fifth Corps, authority for this action having been sent to me before the battle, 
 unsolicited. 
 
 As to the imputation contained in General Grant's report, the court 
 reports substantially the following facts and opinion : 
 
 On the afternoon of the 30th of March, 1865, General Warren sug- 
 gested to General Meade — 
 
 If General IInm])hrey8 can take charge of Griffin's front, about 500 yards west of 
 plank-road, with the return down to it, I can take my corps and block the White Oak 
 road. 
 
 This suggestion was approved by Generals Meade and Grant, Gen 
 eral Grant remarking: 
 
 It will just suit what I intended to propose, to let Humphreys relieve Griffin's di- 
 vision, and let that move farther to the left. Warren should get himself strong to- 
 night. 
 
27 
 
 Genera] Grant was tlien intormed by General Meade tliat orders had 
 been sent — 
 
 To Hnmplirevs to at once relieve Warren's troops holding the Boydton plank-road. 
 I have directed Warren to re-enforce and strengthen Ayres, and to hold his whole corps 
 ready to move at daylight, under orders that would be sent him. I have not given 
 him orders what to do, because I infer from yonr dispatch you will send them to me. 
 
 General Grant replied : 
 
 Your orders to Warren are right. I do not expect to advance him in the morning. 
 I supposed, however, he was now up to the White Oak road. If he is not, I do not 
 want him to move up without further orders. 
 
 Next morning, the 31st of March, General Warren's assistant adjutant- 
 general, at 7 a. m., dispatched General Crawford (one of his division 
 commanders): 
 
 Withdraw all your pickets south of those established by General Ayres, then move 
 with your whole division out and mass it by a house occupied by a colored man, and 
 then replace General Ayres' pickets from left of General Humphreys's up to a point 
 north of the negro house. Make your headquarters at that house. 
 
 Thirty-five minutes afterx^ ards he dispatched General Meade's chief 
 of staff the following- positions occupied bv the three divisions of his 
 Fifth Corps: 
 
 General Griffin's troops will be massed near Mrs. Butler's; General Ayres near S. 
 Dabney's; General Crawford about half way between. They are along a wood road 
 running from near Mrs. Butler's to W. Dabney's, on the White Oak road. 
 
 About an hour afterwards General Meade's chief of staff dispatched 
 General Warren: 
 
 There is firing along Humphreys' front. The Major-General commanding desires 
 you be ready to send your reserve, if it should be called for, to support Humphreys. 
 
 An hour and fifteen minutes afterwards General Warren dispatched 
 General Meade's chief of staff: 
 
 I have just received report from General Ayres that the enemy have their pickets 
 still this side of the W^hite Oak road, so their communication is continuous along it. 
 I have sent out Avord to him to try and drive them oft' or develop with what force the 
 road is held by them. 
 
 At 10.30 General Meade's chief of staff dispatched Warren: 
 
 Your dispatch giving Ayres' position is received. General Meade directs that should 
 you determine by your reconnoissance that you can get possession of and hold the 
 White Oak road, you are to do so, notwithstandiug the orders to suspend operations 
 to-day. 
 
 Thus stood the position of the Fifth Corps when the reconnoissance 
 commenced. General W^arren was at his headquarters on the Quaker 
 road, in telegraphic communication with General Meade, until about 
 10 a. m. About this time General Ayres began his reconnoissance. 
 After his advance had proceeded about 300 yards, the enemy " rose up 
 along the White Oak road" and advanced to the attack with the result 
 described in the following dispatch from Genneral Warren to General 
 Meade's chief of staff": 
 
 General Ayres made an advance with a small force at 10 a. m., which the enemy 
 drove back and followed up in heavv force, compelling both Ayres and Crawford to 
 fall back on Griffin, and of course in much confusion. Griffin's troops held the enemy 
 at the run west of the plank road. 
 
 In the opinion of the court there is nothing to show that General 
 Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak 
 road, on the morning of the 31st of March, or at any other time ; but 
 the court is of the opinion that, considering the Fifth Corps constituted 
 the extreme left wing of the armies operating against Kichmond, and 
 that the corps was in a delicate position and liable to be attacked at 
 
28 
 
 any moment, oi which liability he had been repeatedly warned, he 
 should have been with his advanced divisions guiding and directing 
 them; and that he should have started earlier to the front than he did, 
 and not have waited at the telegraph otiice to keep in coumuinication 
 with General ^leade's heaihpiarters, unless lie had direct orders that 
 morning so to do, whi(;h, however, does not ap[)ear in the evidence. 
 On the second imputation, nanu^ly: 
 
 Had (icneral Wunon moved accoidinji to the expectations of the Lieutenaut-Geu- 
 eral, there would appear ti> have l)een hut little chanee for the escape of the enemy's 
 infantry in front of Dinwiddle Court-Honse, 
 
 the court reports substantially as follows: 
 
 At 3.40 p. m. March 31st, General Warren reported that he drove the 
 enemy into his works near the White Oak road (after his repulse as set 
 forth above). Fifty minutes afterwards, 4.30 p. m.. General Meade's 
 chief of staff dispatched General Warren: 
 
 Secnre yonr position j protect, as well as possible, your left tiauk. Word has been 
 sent to Sheridan and it is l)elieved Sheridan is pushing up. * * * Yon nught, if 
 yon think it worth while, push a small force down the White Oak road and try to com- 
 municate with Sheridan ; but they must take care not to fire into his advance. 
 
 At 7.30 p. m. General Meade dispatched General Warren: 
 
 Despatch from Oeneral Sheridan says he was forced back to Diuwiddie C. H. by 
 strong force of cavalry supported by infantry. This leaves your rear, and that 
 of the 2d corps on the Bo5'dton plank road open, and will require great vigilance 
 on your part. If you have seut the brigade down the Boydton plank, it should not 
 go farther than Gravelly Kun, as I don't think it will render any service but to pro- 
 tect your rear. 
 
 And an hour afterwards (8.30 p. m.) General Meade's chief of staff 
 dispatched General Warren: 
 
 The pntbability is that we will have to contract our line to-night. Von will be re- 
 <}uired to hold, if possible, the Boydton plank road and to Gravelly Run. Humphreys 
 -and Ord along the run. Be prepared to do this on short notice. 
 
 Ten minutes afterwards, 8.40 p. m., General Warren replied to thiwS, 
 saying : 
 
 The line along the i»lank road is very strong. One division with my artillery, I 
 think can hold it. If we are not threatened south of Gravelly Run, east of the plank 
 road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, and let 
 me move down and attack the enemy at Diuwiddie on oue side, and Sheridan on the 
 other. From Bartlett's position they will have to make a considerable detour to re- 
 inforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless Sheridan has been too badly 
 handled, I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made nse of. 
 
 At y and 0.20 p. m. General Meade's chief of staff' dispatched General 
 Warren : 
 
 You will, by the direction of the nujjor-general commanding, draw back at once to 
 yonr position within the Boydton plank road, and send a division down to Diuwiddie 
 C. H. to report to General Sheridan. This division will go dt)wn the Boydton plank 
 road. Send GriHin's division. * * » 'j'lje division to be sent to Sheridan will 
 start at once. You are to be held free to act within the Boydton plank road. 
 
 General Warren then issued orders to carry out these instructions 
 and to re-post his remaining divisions, and in this connection, at 10.55 
 p. m., dispatched General Meade : 
 
 I issued my orders on General Webb's first dispatch to fall back, which made the 
 divisions retire in the order of Ayres, Crawford, and Gritliin, which was the order they 
 could most rai)idiy move. I cannot change them to-night without i)roducing confu- 
 sion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now send General Ayres to 
 General Sheridan, and take General Griffin and General Crawford to move against 
 the enemy, as this last dispatch directs I should. I cannot accomi>lish the apparent 
 objects of the orders I have received. 
 
29 
 At 10.15 p. ID. General Meade dispatclied General Warreu : 
 
 Send Griffin proiiijitly, as ordered, by the Uoydtou jjlank road, but move the balance/ 
 of your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear, who is be- 
 tween him and Dinwiddie. General Sheridan re[)orted his last i)osition as north of 
 Dinwiddle Court-House, near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads at that 
 point. Should the enemy turn on yoii, your line of retreat will be l)y .1. M. Brook's 
 .andE. Boisseau's, on Boydton plank roatl. See one-inch maps. Vou must be very 
 prompt in this uiovtuient, and get the forks of the road at J. M. Brook's before the 
 enemy, so as to open to R. Boisseau's. The enemy will probably retire toward the Five 
 Forks, that being the direction of their main attack this day. Don't encumber yourself 
 with anything that will impede your progress or prevent your moving in .any direc- 
 tion across the country. Let me know when Griffin starts, and when you start. 
 
 Simultaneously with this last dispatch, General Grant dispatched. 
 General Meade : 
 
 Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. 
 Let Griffin go in as he was first directed. 
 
 Between 10.15 and 10.45 General Meade's chief ol' staff dispatched 
 General Sheridan (Kecord, p. 1315): 
 
 Bartletfs brigade is at Crump's house on Gravelly Run. Griffin, with three brig- 
 ades, is ordered down Boydton plank road to attack in rear of force menacing you. 
 General Grant is requested to authorize the sending of Warren's two other divisions 
 down the dirt road, past Crump's, to hold and cover that road and to attack at day- 
 light. 
 
 P. 8. — Griffin will join you Ity the plank road and Warren will attack with- two 
 divisions. 
 
 At 10.45 p. ni. General (rrant dispatched General Sheridan: 
 
 The Fifth Corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. 
 Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent McKen- 
 zie's cavalry which will reach you by the Vaughan road. All these forces except the 
 cavalry should reach you by 12 to-night. You will assume command of the whole 
 force sent to operate with you, and use it to the best of your ability to destroy the 
 force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day. 
 
 About this time General Warren discovered that the bridge over 
 Gravelly Euii, on the route of the Fifth Corps to re-enforce General Sher- 
 idan, was broken down and the stream was not fordable for infantry. 
 General Warren informed General Meade of this fact by telegraph, but 
 the line was not in order and the message was not fully sent. 
 
 At 11.45 p. m. General Meade dispatched General Warren: 
 
 A dispatch, partially ti-ansmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly 
 Run is destroyed, and time will be required to rebuild it. If this is the case, would 
 not time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker road ? Time is of the utmost 
 importance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without re-enforcemeuts, 
 and yours are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get the troops 
 to him as soon as possible. If necessary, send troops by both roads and give up the 
 rear attack. 
 
 To which he replied at l.liO a. m. April 1. 
 
 I think we will have an infantry bridge over Gravelly Run sooner than I could send 
 troops around by the Quaker road. But if I find any failure I will send that way. I 
 have sent Beuyaurd, two hours ago, with what he thought necessary to make it prac- 
 ticable in one hour, and I trust to that. I am sending to General Sheridan my most 
 available force. 
 
 At 3 a. m. April 1, General Sheridan dispatched General Warren : 
 
 I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court-House, on the road leading to Five Forks, 
 for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his im- 
 mediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adam's house, which leads 
 out across Chambeilin's bed or run. I understand youhave adivision at J. Boisseau's; 
 if so, you are in the rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his tiank. I will hold on 
 here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, have this division attack 
 instantlv and in full force. Attack at davliglit anyway, and I will make an effort to 
 
30 
 
 get the road this side of Adam's house, aud, if I do, you can capture the whole of them. 
 Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in 
 the enemy's rear, and in all probability got any force that may escape you by a flank 
 attack. Do not fear my leaviug here. If the enemy remain I shall light at daylight. 
 
 This dispatch was received by General Warren an honr and a half 
 afterwards, namely, at 4.50 a. ni. After sending- Ayres to report to 
 Sheridan, Warren waited nntil some time between 5 and a. m., April 
 1, before moving the other two divisions by the Crnmp road to make 
 the rear attack. The distance from the White Oak road, where the 
 Fifth Corps was posted on the night of the 31st of March, to Dinwiddle 
 Court-House was abont CA miles. The distance from the position of 
 Griffin aud Crawford on "the White Oak road, to J. M. Brook's, the 
 point on the direct road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks 
 (that General Warren was ordered, during the night of jMarch 31, at 
 the hour of the receipt of General Meade's order of 10.15 p. m. to attain 
 with two divisions) was about 4.J miles. There had beeu heavy rains 
 two days prior to March 31, and the roads were very muddy and the 
 streams were full. 
 
 The head of the column under General Warren reached J. Boisseau's 
 about 7 a. m. of the 1st of April. The enemy began to withdraw their 
 infantry from Diuwiddie in the direction of Five Forks about 2 a. m., 
 April 1, and the court is of the opinion that the coudition of the roads, 
 the darkness of the night, and the hour at which the order for the 
 march reached General Warren, 10.50 p. m., that it was not ])racticable 
 for the Fifth Corps to have reached General Sheridan at 12 o'clock on 
 the night of March 31, which were "the expectations of the Lieutenant- 
 General" in the premises, but, notwithstanding dispositious suitable 
 for the contingency of Sheridan's falling back from Diuwiddie might 
 well have occui)ied aud perplexed General Warren's mind during the 
 night, the court is of the opinion that he should have moved the two 
 divisions by the Crumj) road in obedience to the orders aud expectations 
 of his commander, upon whom alone rested the responsibility of the con- 
 sequences. The court is further of opinion that General Warren should 
 have started with two divisions, as directed by General Meade's dis- 
 l)atch, as early after its receipt, at 10.50 p. lu., as he couhl be assured 
 of the prospect of Ayres's departure down the Boydtou ])lank road, aud 
 should have advanced on the Crump road as far as directed in that dis- 
 patch, or as far as might be practicable or necessary to fultill General 
 Meade's intentions ; whereas the evideuce shows that he did not start 
 until between 5 and G o'clock on the moruing of the 1st of April, and 
 did not reach J. Boisseau's with the head of his column till about 7 
 o'clock in the morning. The dispatches show that Generals Meade and 
 Warren anticipated a withdrawal during the night of the enemy's forces 
 fronting General Sheridan, which was rendered highly probable from 
 the known position in their rear of a portion of the Fifth Corps, Bart- 
 lett's brigade, at G. Boisseau's; and the event justified the anticipa- 
 tion. 
 
 On the third imputation, namely : 
 
 General Warren did notexert himself to get up bis corps as rapidly as he might have 
 done, aud his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down be- 
 fore dispositions for the attack could be completed. 
 
 The court reports that the distance from the position of Griflfln and 
 Crawford (at the forks of the Crump road) to the place designated for 
 the formation of the Fifth Corps at Gravelly Run Church was about 2^ 
 miles, aud the length of the corps, when spread out in column, would 
 be about 2-^ miles, the last tile of the column requiring as much time 
 
ol 
 
 to reach tbe place of formation as it would have taken to mnrch about 
 5 miles ; that at 1 p. m. General Warren received his orders, near Gravelly 
 Eun Church, to move up his corps, and it took some time to communi- 
 cate those orders to the divisions and for the movement to begin, and 
 the cori)s reached the i)lace of formation and was ready to advance 
 against the enemy about 4 p. m.; that the route to the i)Iace of forma- 
 tion was along a narrow road, very muddy and slippery, somewhat en- 
 cumbered with wagons and led horses of the cavalry corps, and the men 
 were fatigued; that the cori)s in line was well closed up, and no unnec- 
 essary delay was incurred, and that General Warren remained near 
 Gravelly Run Church directing the formation, explaining the mode of 
 attack to the division and brigade commanders, with sketches prepared 
 for the purpose; and that General Warren also repeatedly sent out staff- 
 officers to the division commanders in order to expedite the march. 
 
 The court is of the opinion that there was no unnecessary delay iu 
 this march of the Fifth Corps, and that General Warren took the usual 
 methods of a corps commander to i^revent delay; that the question re- 
 garding General Warren's manner appears to be too intangible and the 
 evidence on it too contradictory for the court to decide, separate from 
 the context, that he appeared to wish "the sun to go down before dispo- 
 sitions for the attack would be completed," bnt his actions, as shown by 
 the evidence, do not appear to correspond witli such wish, if ever he 
 entertained it. 
 
 On the fourth imputation, namely : 
 
 During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the 
 engagement portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy tire, and 
 simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which (jjeneral Warren did 
 net exert himself to inspire. 
 
 The court reports, when the Fifth Corps moved up to the attack and 
 when General Ayres reached the White Oak road he received a fire in 
 flank from the enemy's " return ", nearly at right angles to the road. He 
 changed front immediately at right angles and faced the "return", his 
 right receiving afire from Mumford's Confederate division of dismounted 
 cavalry distributed along the edge of the woods to the north of the White 
 Oak road. There was some confusion, which was immediately checked 
 by the exertions of General Sheridan, General Ayres, and other officers, 
 but that General Warren was observant of Ayres, because he sent orders 
 to Winthrop's reserve brigade to form on the left of Ayres's new line. 
 That this necessary change of front of Ayres increased the interval 
 between bim and Crawford on his right, the latter marching without 
 change of direction until he would clear the right of Ayres, when he was 
 also to change front to the left. At this moment Warren, who saw that 
 Crawford, with Griffin following, was disappearing in the woods to the 
 north of the White Oak road and away from the positions assigned them 
 in the attack, sent staff-otfi(;ers and went himself to botli Griffin and Craw- 
 ford to have them change direction, connectedly with A.yres's change 
 of front and to rectify as far as possible the break in the 1 ine. The court 
 further report that Crawford's and Griffin's divisions m ere operating in 
 the woods and over a difficult country, and received a tire in their front 
 from the dismounted cavalry of Mumford posted in the woods to the 
 north of the White Oak road, which led to the belief for some time that 
 the enemy had a line of battle in front, and this may furnish one reason 
 why it was so difficult at first to change their direction to the proper 
 one. The court is, therefore, of the opinion that Warren's attention ap- 
 pears to have been drawn almost immediately after Ayres received the 
 flank fire from the "return", and his consequent change of front to the 
 
32 
 
 probability of Crawford, with Griffin, diverging too much aud being sep- 
 arated from xVyres, aud by continuous exertions of himself and staif sub- 
 stantially remedied matters, aud the court thinks that this was for him 
 the essential point to be attended to, which exacted his whole eflbrts to 
 accom])lish. 
 
 The foregoing is the substance and effect of the report and opinions 
 of the court on the im])utations referred to. It will be observed that 
 the court finds negligence on the part of General Warren in the con- 
 duct and handling of his corps in the affair with the enemy near the 
 White Oak road on the 31st of ]March, aud disobedience to orders in 
 failing to cooperate with General Sh(ni<lan's forces near Dinwiddle on 
 the night of the 31st of March and morning of the 1st of April ; but 
 acquits him of blame in the imputed tardiness in marching his corps 
 for formation for the attack on the eneuiy's works at. Five Forks, and 
 in the mismanagement of his corps during that attack. 
 
 The evidence is exceedingly voluminous. The entire record com- 
 prises 5,320 written i)ages of legal cap. In print there are .1,550 pages of 
 closely printed matter. 
 
 In support of the im])utations contained in his report against Gen- 
 eral Warren, General Sheridan submitted a statement under oath, in 
 which he said (Record, p. 51) : 
 
 During tlie 31st of March, in y cavalry bad Ijeen driven buck from Five Forks to 
 within a short distance of Dinwiddie Court-House, and about the time of the final 
 attack of the enemy that evening I sent Captain Sheridan, of my stati', to General 
 Grant to report the condition of affairs. On his way to (Jeneral Grant's headquarters, 
 I believe Captain Sheridan stopped at (Jeneral Meade's to ask that some one be sent 
 with him as a guide to General (^rant's headquarters, as he did not know where they 
 were located. While Captain Sheridan was waiting for this guide, General Meade 
 questioned him as to the situation around Dinwiddie Court-House, and had the po- 
 sition of my lines pointed out to him, on his maps, by Captain Sheriaan. 
 
 (xeneral Sheridan liere quotes the dispatches passing between Gen- 
 erals Meade and Grant, Generals Meade and Warren, Generals Grant 
 and Sheridan, aud Generals Sheridan and Warren, which are quoted 
 in the report of the court, relative to the sending of the. Fifth Corps to 
 support General Sheridan at Dinwiddie, and after showing that these 
 orders were imperative that Warren should go at once to the relief of 
 Sheri<lan, states that he did not reach hiui according to the exi)ectations 
 of the Lieutenant-General, and that two divisions of the Fifth Corps 
 <lid not move in compliance with the orders until after daylight the next 
 morning. General Sheridan continues (Kecord, jip. 53 and 54): 
 
 I began to move against the eneraj' at daylight, and then discovered his infantry 
 line, retiring from my front. The two divisions of the Fifth Corps that General 
 Grant had informed me would move by .J. Boisseau's did not come on that road the 
 previous night, nor did they appear on the enemy's rear at dayliglit as requested in 
 uiy ;{ a. m. dis|»ateh. As a matter of fact tht\y were Just about tlien breaking from 
 the bivouac in which General Warren had placed them the night before, and fi'om 
 ■which they had not moved. The enemy remained in my front during the night. 
 Ayres says he saw him hastily moving off after his arrival, and the reports of Gen- 
 erals Merritt, Hayes, and others confirm this. In addition, however, I submit the 
 following . ' * * captured dispatch of (ieneral Lee, svjiich shows that Pickett's 
 infantry was to withdraw at 4 a. m Aj>ril 1 * ' * : 
 
 "•J «)"ci.()tK a. m., April 1, 1865. 
 " To (ieneral Hkai.: 
 
 "GE.^teRAL: (ieneral Lee wishes you to withdraw your command to this side of the 
 creek when (Jeneral Pickett's infantry is witiidrawu at 4 a. ni. You will bivouac on 
 this side. 
 
 " L. TIEKNAN BKIEN, 
 
 "• Anxiiifani Adinlant-aeiicrul." 
 
33 
 
 I would, in this connection, refer the court to the official report of General Pickett of 
 this battle, in which he states that he fell back from mj^ front at daylifi^ht, April 1, to 
 Five Forks, "pressed by the enemy." As the enemy fell back he was followed by 
 Merritt's two divisions, and I at this time determined to drive liini to Five Forks, 
 still hoping that Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come at J. Boisseaii's in time 
 to effect some resnlts * * *. I was considerably disappointed that we had thus far 
 attained no other result than obliji,ing the retirement of the enemy, but feeling con- 
 fident that he would not give up the Five Forks without a struggle, I pressed him 
 back to that point with the cavalry. The 10.0.5 dispatch of the .Slst, from General 
 Grant, had informed me that all the support he had ordered, consisting of the whole 
 of the Fifth Corps and Mackenzie's cavahy, should reach me, with the exception of 
 the cavalry, by 12 o'clock that night. The order to Warren to move, and the exigen- 
 cies which Geuerals Grant and Meade considered that the situation demanded, were 
 of such a nature that they did not admit of anything but prompt and resolute com- 
 pliance, and I felt that there were no circumstances in existence during the night 
 which sliould have prevented the movement of these two divisions in ob dience to the 
 order, and not enough to justify the delay at the bridge by the other division, as the 
 creek could have b€%i forded. I do not i-emember at what time General Warren re- 
 ported to me, but his official repor]^ says about 11 a. m., April 1, and I have no reason 
 to doubt its correctness. 
 
 General Sheridan here quotes from his report relative to his direction 
 to General Warren to hold fast at J. Boissean's and to rest and refresh 
 his men while the cavalry pressed the enemy into his works at Five 
 Forks. This having been accomplished, General Sheridan continues : 
 
 I then ordered xip the Fifth Corps ou the main road, and sent Brevet-Major Gillespie, 
 of the Engineers, to turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Run Church road, 
 and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to and at a ])oint but a short dis- 
 tance from the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two di- 
 visions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in 
 reserve in columns of regiments opposite the center. I directed General Merritt 
 to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right Hank, and 
 notified Inm that the Fifth Corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered 
 that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth Corps be- 
 came engaged, and that that would be determined by the volleys of musketry. I then 
 rode over to where the Fifth Corps was going into position, and found it coming up 
 very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, 
 ,and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been 
 shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave 
 men who had fallen during the day. At 1 o'clock p. m. General Warren says, in his 
 official report, he received my order to move his corps from the point where it was 
 massed at J. Boissean's house, and shortly thereafter he reported to me. I think he 
 was correct as to the time. I explained to him the state of affairs, and what my plana 
 were. I tnen directed General Merritt, who commanded the cavalry, to make a dem- 
 onstration as though attempting to turn the enemy's right, and ordered that the cav- 
 alry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth Corps l>ecame engaged. I 
 had then received the authority from General Grant to relieve General Warren. This 
 authority was verbal and was brought by General Babcock. It authorized me to 
 relieve him in case I thought it for the best interests of the service. I cannot now 
 recall the exact wording of the message. It was, however, left to my judgment. I 
 rode over to where the Fifth Corps was to go into position, and found it slowly com- 
 ing up. The distance from J. Boissean's house to Gravelly Run Church is two miles, and 
 the formation of the corps near the latter place was accomplished about 4 p. m. Three 
 hours had elapsed from the time the order was given General Warren, and this rime had 
 been consumed in transmitting the order and in marching two miles and forming the 
 corps. Only a few minutes could have been lost in transmitting the order from Gen- 
 eral Warren to his divisions, they being massed as before stated. While the corps 
 was arriving and forming, I was anxious that it shoukl come up rapidly, expressing 
 to General Warren my fears that the cavalry would expend its ammunition before 
 the attack oould be made, and I also feared that part of General Lee's force defend- 
 ing Petersburg and strongly intrenched at the crossing of the Claiborne road, about 
 three miles away, might move down the White Oak road, and by attacking, or even 
 threatening my flank, prevent me from accomplishing my design on Five Forks; and 
 I did not know then, nor do I know now, of any especial effort General Warr'en made 
 to bring up his corps, nor did I see any indications of solicitude for the active execu- 
 tion of his orders in order that the combined movement might produce the success 
 intended, although I was with him the principal portion of the afternoon until the 
 battle commenced. His corps had been divested of all impedimenta. It even had 
 no artillery, and although the ground was muddy from recent rains, it consumed threa 
 
 8002 3 
 
34 
 
 Lours of valuable time in niarcbiiifj two miles ami formiug in line of battle, with 
 whicli I was dissatisfied. My directions to General Warren for the formation were, to 
 place two divisions in the iront line and hold one division in reserve in rear of his cen- 
 ter (he says the right, in his ofiicial report, in which I have since discovered he was 
 correct). I knew that the leit flank of the enemy was turned to the rear so as to 
 make a right angle with the White Oak road. I did not know the extent of that 
 reverse flank, nor its strength, but it was the oljjective point of the attack that was 
 made by the Fifth Corps, and when it was carried the remaining portion of the 
 enemy's works wotild be taken in roar. I presumed that an extent of front of two 
 divisions was enough to cover the works of the enemy, and supposing that I would 
 meet with a ]>retty obstinate resistance, 1 put one division in rear as a reserve, and 
 for the purixise of turning the extreme left of the enemy's line after the two front 
 divisions and Merritt's cavalry had become hotly engaged. This was the plan of bat- 
 tle usually followed in most ot the engagements I fought during the war; precipita- 
 ting a turning column close in on the enemy's flank, when ascertained, and after I 
 had engaged his whole front ; and GrifHn had been instructed to this effect by myself 
 in person. The front of the corps was lying obliquely to the White Oak road, and 
 when that road was reached the corps was to swing around to tl^^, left perpendicular 
 to the White Oak road, and keep closed to the left. Ayres obeyed this order, and the 
 movement brought him directly on the enemy's flank, and in front of his works, which 
 were thrown to the rear, and which were about 100 yards in length. Crawford's 
 division, on reaching the White Oak road, did not wheel to the left as ordered ; in 
 fact it deflected to the right, and continued to move from the objective point, making 
 its co-operation at the desired uu)ment extremely uncertain, and rendering disaster 
 possible. It went so far to the right, breaking the line of battle, that his left finally 
 came out near C. Young's house, on the Ford road, where he first encountered the 
 enemy in any considerable force, who was then retreating from his works, having 
 "by this movement broken the line of battle, and completely isohited his division, 
 and also jtrevented Mackenzie's cavalry from occupying the position which it had 
 been directed to gain on the Ford road near where it crossed Hatcher's Run It wil[ 
 thus be seen that the diversion of Crawford destroyed the plan I had in my mind on 
 making the attack, and the gap left by him was taken advantage of by the enemy, 
 and he succeeded in throwing the right of Ayres' division into confusion, which I 
 believe would have resulted in disaster but for the exertions of General Ayres and 
 the officers of his command. I do not recollect that General Warren was present 
 anywhere near the line on this occasion, or of any etlorts he made to bring Crawford's 
 division into the position contemplated by the orders, and I did not know then, nor 
 do I know now, of any directions which he gave at this portion of the line with a 
 view to remedying the disorder here. I wish to direct the attention of the court to 
 the fact that the place called Five Forks was not the essential point in this battle; 
 but the angle made by the enemy refusing his left flank was the essential and object- 
 ive point, and that the point called Five Forks had no more real significance than 
 any other portion of the enemy's line fronting on the W'hite Oak road. The angle, 
 and that portion of the enemy's works which were perpendicular to the White Oak 
 road, was the point on his line on which I had directed the attack of the Fifth Corps, 
 and General Crawford did not conform to the instructions in moving towards the 
 Ford road in an oblique line, instead of wheeling to the left and keeping closed on 
 Ayres. His exposed left flank, only, encountered the enemy, which would not have 
 been the case had he wheeled to the left. It was not contemplated that he should 
 gain the Ford road by that wide detour, isolating his division from the rest of the 
 Fifth Corps, General Mackenzie having i»reviously received orders to go to that road 
 and capture any force fleeing down it. Crawford's movement displaced Mackenzie, 
 however, and the latter was crowded over towards Hatcher's Run. Crawford's divis- 
 ion captured some artillery and a number of prisoners on the Ford road, the order 
 for which was originally given by one of my staff officers. Col. George A. Forsyth, to Col. 
 West Funk, of the One hundred and twenty-first Pennsylvania Regiment, who was in 
 command of two regiments. 
 
 I'revious tothis, howcA^er, the enemy had been driven outof his entire line of works, 
 and Colonel Fui^k's capture was the result and not a part of the main attack » * ». 
 General Warren ha viiigdisapi)ointed me in the movement of his corps, and in its manage- 
 ment during the battle in the new emergency that had arisen, and by the new phase 
 that had been givenour situation about Kichniond by the battle just won, Ifeltthathe 
 was not the man to rely on, and I deemed it, after due deliberation, to be in the best 
 interests of tln^ service to relieve him, which I accordingly did, and I put the corps 
 under the command of General Griffin. 
 
 General Sheridan testifies further (Eecord, p, 105): 
 
 I did not relieve him for a punishment, I relieved him for other reasons. 
 
35 
 
 And at page 106 he says: 
 
 I tliiuk he (lidu't exert liimself sutficiently at that time to restore confuleuce; he 
 allowed, my Hue of battle to be broken; he "destroyed the tactics that I inteuded to 
 make in the battle, because I intended that colnuin, which was put behind Crawford 
 to be a close-turning column on the left of the enemy, so I could crush them in their 
 works. 
 
 During the formation of the Fifth Corps at Gravelly Rim Church pre- 
 paratory to the attack, General Sheridan testifies to having a conversa- 
 tion with General Warren. He says (Record, p. 114) : 
 
 We liad a conversation. In the first place he feeemed to be somewhat reluctautj 
 thought; and just before the battle he commenced talking in my presence, and there 
 were a good many othcers around (I don't know whether they heard him or not), 
 after the ])lan of the battle had been fixed, that Bobby Lee was always getting people 
 into ilitticulties — niejuiing General Lee of the Confederate army — that lie was getting 
 people into diflicultiw, and talked in rather a gloomy kind of a way. I recollect I 
 thought it was very strange that a man ^ould talk that way when he knew he had 
 to fight. I thought he ought to talk the other way and encourage those who were 
 about him and not depress me. It wtis then I made up my mind to accompany the 
 Fifth Cor}>s. I then accompanied the Fifth Corps generally : then, afterwards, I accom- 
 panied the Fifth Corps on account of the conditions. 
 
 As to the point of complaint made against General Warren during- the 
 battle, General Sheridan, at page 100, testifies that this was on account' 
 of— 
 
 The general confnsioTi, mismanagement, and risk that resulted from the bad man- 
 agement of his corps. * * * In the first place the troops were confused by the 
 fire of the enemy's pickets. There was great confusion and timidity on the part of 
 the men. In fact I began to have some doubts as to whether I was going to be success- 
 ful or not. Our skirmish line lay down and the fire of the enemy was very slight ; the 
 line became confused and connnenced firing straight in the air. The poor fellows had 
 been fighting behinil breastworks for a long period, and when they got out to attack 
 breastworks they seemed to have been a little timid. I began to get alarmed. I had 
 accompanied General Warren up to that period; then I rode out in front of the line of 
 battle and helped to remedy the confusion. While I was out in front of the line of 
 battle I saw General Warren in the rear a little distance, about where I left him 1 
 think. I succeeded, with General Ayres and other officers, in remedying this confusion, 
 and it seemed to me that if I had been General Warren I would not have allowed my 
 superior officer to ride out in front of tne liue of battle of my men in order to remedy 
 a seiious confusion without making some exertions myself of the same kind. * * «■ 
 My orders were very particular to have Crawford's division keep close to the right of 
 Ayres, so that I could rake the enemy's line along the White Oak road, after the re- 
 verse portion was captured, in rear. The battle was over, I considered, as soon as 
 we had captured that angle. The fiist thing I knew I saw Crawford obliquing, instead 
 of making the left wheel as I had expected ; and it was not a full left wheel, only a 
 partial one; he was obliquing to the right; he was going away from the objective 
 point, and was going in the direction of Hatcher's Run and leaving Ayres's flank ex- 
 posed entirely — his right flank. I think I sent for him or sent for Warren ; I kuow I 
 sent for Crawford and tried to get him back, and I sent, I think, to General Warren ; 
 I could not find him ; I don't know, but to the best of my recollection I sent several 
 times to try and repair this trouble. Griffin, I knew, had to follow Crawford, and it 
 seemed to me they were both marching towards Hatcher's Run, not towards the object- 
 ive point. I theii sent for them, as I say, and they did not come. About that time 
 there was not much left to fight the battle except Ayres's division, and they substan- 
 tially did fight the battie there, according to the best of my judgment. * * * Gen- 
 eral Warren was in command of the corps, with that responsibility on him. He was 
 responsible to me to hold his subordinates responsible. 
 
 General Warren's version of the events of the 31st of March antfi Ist 
 of April, 1805, which led to his being relieved from his commaiid,. as~ 
 gathered from his testimony before the court of inquiry, is substaHstiolly, 
 as follows: 
 
 Relative to the rout of the two divisions of his corps on the morning, 
 of the 31st, he says that Ayres was quite near the White Oak roaxl, Craw- 
 ford was half way between Ayres and the eastern branch of Graivelly Run;, 
 and Griffin was on the east side of that branch of the run. Crawford.'* 
 
3<; 
 
 and Griffin's divisions were especially massed. General Ayres's division 
 was disposed to meet the necessities of his position but don't know in 
 what that was, but was informed by dispatches from General Sheridan 
 that a considerable force of the enemy was on the White Oak road to 
 his left; that he received a dispatch informing him of firing in General 
 ] lumphreys' front and to be ready to sui)port him with his reserve if neces- 
 sary, to which he replied that "there was a good deal of firing going on in 
 our lines by the men firing off their guns to put in fresh loads"; that he 
 then "informed General Meade of his intention to develop the enemy's 
 force on the White Oak road," with reply that should he determine by his 
 reconnaissance "to get possession of the White Oak road to do so, not- 
 withstanding the orders to suspend operations"; that before the receipt 
 of this Inst disi)atch he was on his way to superintend the operations on 
 the White Oak road, but had previously given Ay^s orders to jmsh 
 forward his picket line and snpportJt with a brigade. At page 759 of 
 the Eecord, General Warren testified: 
 
 The idea of uiakiuf; thiK reconuaissance originated with nie and was approved by 
 General Meade. I think I had ordered it before — I reported to him what I had 
 done — before I received any approval from him, because his approval carries more 
 with it than what I ordered. He not ouly authorized me to make the reconnaissance, 
 which I did with a view to secure a good position for General Ayres if he was going 
 to be (|uiet duriug the day, but General Meade said if we could hold the road I could 
 take it, which had not been my intention. 
 
 On the way to join his corps he heard firing in advance, and at the 
 crossing of the branch met the two divisions of his cori)s in full retreat, 
 broken, and disorganized ; that he finally succeeded in driving back the 
 enemy into his iutrenchments, and that the intrenchments were full of 
 men ; that during the course of the afternoon he received a dispatch 
 telling him to guar<l his flank, that General Sheridan was pushing up, 
 and to send a small force down tbe White Oak road to open communi- 
 cation with him, but having heard the firing that evening in the direc- 
 tion of Dinwiddie, and knowing by its sound that the enemy was driving 
 Sheridan, he ordered Bartlett's brigade of Griffin's division to proceed 
 in the direction of the firing, and at 5.50 p. m. informed General Meade 
 that Sheridan's cavalry had been driven back to Dinwiddie Court-House. 
 Soon after he received a dispatch from General Meade to " let the force 
 ordered to move out the White Oak road move down the Boydton plank- 
 road as promptly as possible" ; that he sent General Pearson with this force 
 as directed; that at 8 p. m. he received a dispatch from General Meade 
 informing him that General Sheridan had been forced back to Dinwid- 
 die, and directing him to protect his rear and to exercise great vigilance, 
 and directing that the force sent down the Boydton road should proceed 
 no farther than Gravelly Run bridge; that at 8.20 p. m. he rei)lied, giving 
 the position of General Bartlett's brigade, and expressed the opinion that 
 the enemy could not remain between him and Dinwiddie if Sheridan 
 kept fighting, and he believed the enemy would be compelled to fall 
 back on Five Forks ; that he inquired, "Does General Sheridan still hold 
 Dinwiddie Court Housed' That hethen received a dispatch from General 
 Meade saying, " We must contract our lines," and that he would "be re- 
 quired to hold theBoydton plank-road to Gravelly Run"; to which he re- 
 plied, " The line along the plankroad is very strong," and asked to be per- 
 mitted to move down to Dinwiddie and attack theeneujy on one side and 
 Sheridan on the other; that at 9.17 p. m. he received a dispatch from 
 General Meade directing him to send Griffin's division to report to 
 Sheridan at Dinwiddie ; that he then sent Captain Wadsworth and Major 
 Benyaurd to examine the bridge at Gravelly Run, and they reported the 
 bridge broken down and the stream impassable ; that he then ordered 
 
37 
 
 a bridge to be immediately constructed, and it was reported the bridge 
 could be constructed in an hour, and he ordered Griffin's division to be 
 concentrated preparatory to starting as directed ; but Bartlett's brigade 
 having been detached and the division being the most scattered of his 
 divisions and the most inconvenient to start to Sheridan's sui)port, he 
 changed the order and directed Ayres's division to report to G eneral Sheri- 
 dan at Dinwiddie; that at 9.50 p. m. he received another order direct- 
 ing the division to be sent to Sheridan to start at once; that at 10 p. m. 
 he notified General Meade of the difficulty of starting Griffin at once 
 and the fact of the necessity of a bridge's being built over Gravelly Run, 
 the stream being too deep to ford for infantry; that at 10.15 p. m. he 
 received a dispatch from (jeneral Meade saying, "It is impossible for 
 Bartlett to join Griffin in time to move with any promptitude down the 
 Boydton plank," ^nd directing that another good brigade be sent to 
 join Griffin, in place of Bartlett, ayd at 10.15 he received another dis- 
 patch from General Meade directing him to send Griffin ])romptly, as 
 ordered, by the Boydton plank-road, and to move the balance of his 
 command by the road Bartlett was on, and strike the enemy in the rear, 
 who would then be between him and Dinwiddie: that General Sheri- 
 dan reported his last position as north of Dinwiddie Court-House, near 
 Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads at that point; that he 
 must be very prompt in this movement and get the forks of the road at 
 J. M. Brooks' before the enemy so as to open to R. Boisseau's ; that he 
 obeyed none of these orders, because he knew very well that the enemy 
 held the road to R. Boisseau's and the position he was ordered to as- 
 sume on the roads referred to ; thut be tliereupon, at 10.55 p. m., dis- 
 patched General Meade, saying: 
 
 I isisned my orders, ou General Webb's tirst dispatch, to fall back, which made the 
 divisions retire in the order of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin, which was the order they 
 could most rapidly move. 1 cannot change them to-night without producing con- 
 fusion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now send General Ayres 
 to General Sheridan, and take General Griffin and General Crawford to move against 
 the enemy, as this last dispatch directs I should, [otherwise] I cannot accomplish the 
 apparent objects of the orders I have received. 
 
 That he thereupon sent orders to his division commanders to carry 
 out these orders; that at 12.40 a. in., April 1, he received a dispatch 
 from General Humphreys saying he was ordered to resume his position 
 of the morning, to which he immediately replied that he had been 
 ordered to attack the enemy confronting Sheridan, saying: 
 
 I think the enemy that drove Sheridan to-day must withdraw to-night. I have a 
 brigade on the road north from -/. Boisseau's. 
 
 That at 1 a. ra., April 1, he received a dispatch from Crcneral Meade 
 (of 11.45 p. m., March 31), saying: 
 
 A dispatch, partially transmitted, is received, indicating the bridge over Gravelly 
 Run is destroyed, and "time will be required to rebuild it. If this be the case, would not 
 time be gained by sending the tmops by the Quaker road '? Time is.of the utmost im- 
 portance. Sheridan cannot niaintaiu himself at Dinwiddie without reinforcements, 
 and yours are the only ones that can be sent. Use every exertion to get the troo})s to 
 hira as soon as possible. If necessary, send troops by both roads and give up the rear 
 attack. 
 
 To which he replied, at 1.20 a. m., April 1 : 
 
 I think we will have an infantry bridge over (Jravclly Run sooner than I could 
 send troops around by the Quaker road. But, if I find any failure, I will send that 
 way. I have sent Benyaurd, two hours ago, with what he thought necessary to make 
 it practicable in one hour, and I trust to that. 1 aui sending to General Sheridan my 
 most available force. 
 
38 
 lu <!bimectioii with this he testified : 
 
 About that tiuii^ Iliad asci-rtuiuod that Griffin and Crawford wcic in bivouac wliore 
 I had left thiMu at the (dost^ of the d;iy, March :5l, and that (General Ayres was on his 
 way, probably, still toward rhe crossing of (iravelly Kun, by the plank-road, and had 
 reason to believe that the bridgi! would very soon be completed, alllioKfih I had no 
 kuowltiUif i/tt of its (ictual condUioii — that /.y, of the hruhjt at GmveUii /i'm?*.* I knew that 
 ]?artlett's brigade was probably on its way back to join Griffin's division, and that the 
 enemy was in force south of the run — ^.just south of Crump's, where Bartletthad been. 
 General Humphreys, at that time, was waiting to hear from me to make his change 
 back to the Boydtou plank-road. 
 
 And as General Meade's dispatch indicated — 
 
 That lie was ignoraut of the po.sition of the enemy between the (Jrump crossing of 
 Gravelly Riiu and R. Boisseau's and J. M. Brooks', ou the Five Fork's road; he wa 
 ignorant of the fact that the enemy occupied this place between that and Crnntp's; 
 
 And having- sent Ayres to reinforce Sheridan, he — 
 
 Did not think it advisable, under the circumstances, to attempt to make the rear at 
 tack until he was sure Sheridan had beea reinforced, but to leave the infixntry of- 
 Griffiu and Crawford where they were until we could get further light on that subject. 
 
 And he says : 
 
 Having decided what was best to do, I thought it best to let them remain where 
 they were until we could get more positive information about how to proceed. 
 
 And— 
 
 To trust to Ayres to reinforce Sheridan, and to keep those two divisions where they 
 •were until we could learn what was best to do with them. 
 
 At 2.05 a. m., April 1, he sent the following dispatch to General Meade 
 
 The bridge over Gravelly Run Captain Benyaurd reports now practicable for infantry 
 and General Ayres' division advancing across it toward Uinwiddie Court-House. I 
 have given General Ayres orders to report to General Sheridan. 
 
 General Warren testified (Record, p. 736): 
 
 Another great source of uncertainty to me about how to act at this time Avas the dis- 
 jointed manner in which my dispatches went to General Meade and General Meade's 
 would come to nic. * * * For instance, here is a dispatch that I received at 1 a. m., 
 for the iirst time, saying that (ieneral Meade has received knowledge that the bridge 
 was broken at Gravelly Run, and which immediately changes all his plans. There 
 were other points of information in my possession on the way to him which might also 
 further modify his ordei's, so that I was in a measure left in an independent position. 
 I was continnally in possession of facts which my superior did not know: that gave 
 me reasons for action. I did not feel responsible, for instance, for making a movement 
 «u the 8n])i)osition that 1 could get to J. M. Brookes's without a tight, which order (ien- 
 eral Meade had given to uie, l»ecause I knew I could not. It was a conditional order 
 to do a certain thing under a certain suiiposition ; and I would, of course, have to 
 consider when I knew the conditions were different : Was I still to carry out the 
 order literally or to wait until he receives knowledge of the different state of things ? 
 That was one reason which compelled me to let things wait as they were until better 
 light reached me and reached the other parties. That dispatch itself was one of them. 
 The others can all be shown in the same way. 
 
 He received information at 4.50 a. ni., April 1, that Ayres had coni- 
 municated with Sheridan, and at the same time received a disi)atcli from 
 General Sheridan, saying: 
 
 I am holding in front of Dinwiddle Ccmrt-House, ou the road heading to Five Forks 
 for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy arc in his im 
 mediate front, lying so as to cover the road, just this side of A. Adams' house, which 
 leads out across Chamberlin's 1ml or rim. I understand you have? a division at J. 
 Boissi'au's; if so, yoii are in the rcKrot' the enemy's line and almost on his Hank. I will 
 hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, have this division 
 attack in.stantly and in full force. Attack at daylight any way, and I will make an 
 effort to get the road this side of Adams' house, and if I do you can capture the wlude 
 of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road 
 will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you 
 by a Hank attack. Do not fear my leaving here ; if the enemy remain I shall fight at 
 daylight. 
 
 * Not in italics in the original. It is so printed here for convenience of reference. 
 
39 
 General Warren testified (Record, p. 739) : 
 
 Of course, that order put an entirely diftereiit face ou affairs from what General 
 Meade's ha'i. It showed me that General Sheridan felt confident he could maintain 
 Ilia position, and, therefore, that reinforceraeuts for him were not necessary, and I could 
 move directly toward Dinwiddie Court-House, with Grithn and Ayres and Crawford, 
 just as 1 had sugiicsted the evcniujj; before, and as I had been ordered to do under dif- 
 ferent circumstances during the night. 
 
 Upon receipt of General Sheridan's dispatch be proceeded to the White 
 Oak road and witbdre\\' the two remaining' divisions of his corps (Craw- 
 ford's and (h'iffin's), and began to march in a regnLar pace across the 
 country over the route lie was ordered to travel the previous night, and 
 says : 
 
 I rode ahead to join General Griftin at the forks, on the road where Crump's road 
 joins the one running from Dinwiddie Court-House to Five Forks. There I met Gen- 
 eral Griffin in person. 1 didn't see General Sheridan. General Gritifln told me that 
 Sheridan had left word for all troops to halt that reached that point ; that he would 
 send word when he wanted us; that he joined General Griffin about 8 a. m., and 
 about an hour afterwards received the following: "General Meade directs that in 
 the movements following your junction with General Sheridan you will be under his 
 orders and report to him. Please send a report of progress." 
 
 To which he replied, 9.30 a. m. : 
 
 I reached the crossing of the Gravelly Run early this morning, and met General 
 Sheridan there. We are massed at that point by his direction. I did not meet Gen- 
 eral Sheridan personally ; General Griffin leading the column saw him. If we remain 
 in this vicinity we can get rations by the Boydton plank-road. We were unable, ex- 
 cept in part, to replenish yesterday, as ordered. The enemy did not follow with a 
 single man when we left the White Oak road this morning. 
 
 About 11 a. m. he went to see General Sheridan, and says: 
 
 I found him on the west side of the road that leads up to Five Forks, on the south" 
 west side of it, a few steps off from the road. I found his headquarters, I might say- 
 As I apjiroached the place, I think he had been lying down on a blanket, and he rose 
 up. I spoke to him, half reclining or may be sitting upon the blanket. » * * jje 
 showed no impatience. I met him as I usually meet men. without anything particular 
 to remark. He made no remarks at all bout delay ; do not lemember seeing "Tony" 
 Forsyth (a member of General Sheridan's staff). * * .* I felt, notwithstanding that 
 I had gone without sleep all night — I felt a good deal elated that such a night as we 
 had had had turned out so well; that everything had turned out so successfully, so I 
 made the remark to General Sheridan that we had had rather a held day of it since 
 yesterday morning. He said to me, "Do you call that a held day?" I saw by the 
 tone of his remark that he was not very well jileased with what I said, so I in a meas- 
 ure apologized for it by saying that perhaps it was a little ironical, and I referred to 
 the fact that we had been directed to cease oj>erations and have a quiet time of it, but 
 the aispositions General Lee had made had given us about as lively a time as I had 
 had in my experience. That was the only allusion I recollect making to that subject, 
 and we ceased conversation. 
 
 A scout then came np, and after conversing together for a brief period — 
 
 General Sheridan got on his horse and rode away towards Five Forks. I remained 
 at this point, and at 12 m. received the following dispatch: " General Meade desires me 
 to say that he has directed Lieutenant Parker, chief ordnance officer of the army, to 
 instruct your division ordnance officers to reijlenish the ammunition with the men, 
 so as to bring it up to the allowance prescribed, and then to send his empty wagons 
 to the rear for a fresh supi)ly. 
 
 And forty minutes afterwards he issued orders to his division com- 
 manders to procure ammunition and supplies for the men. At 1 p. m. 
 (twenty minutes afterwards) he received the order from General Sheridan 
 for the infantry to move up and turn them off on a road where he had 
 put an oflQcer to designate the spot. 
 
 General Warren testified (Record, p. 744) : 
 
 I immediately turned to General Bankhead, who was inspector-general of the corps 
 and an experienced soldier, and without taking time to write any order, I told him. 
 
40 
 
 veiballj>to go back as rapidly as lit; could and give the order tirst to General Crawford 
 to move out, then to General GriHin and to General Ayres to move in that order, and 
 that they must come as quickly as they could, because there was preparation to be 
 made to attack the enemy ; that is about the substance of it. General Bankhead set off 
 at a gallop ; he went off as fast as any man could go down that road, I think. After 
 doing that, it is my recollection I went up the road and saw (ieiujral Sheridan. I met 
 him somewhere between where 1 first met bim and the Five Forks, and I think it was 
 some disi auce up that 1 met him coming down, and we talked together as we rode along. 
 
 * * * He told me that the enemy was in line of battle along the White Oak road, 
 their left resting about where the road I was to turii off on crossed the White Oak road, 
 and that he wanted me to form my line .so that I should strike with the right center 
 on the angle of the works and let the left engage the front, and plaee one division 
 behind the right to support the attack on the angle where we thought the fight would 
 be the heaviest, and to so place the men oblitjue to the road as to bring this heaviest 
 force of mine on the angle of the works — giA'e it a direction who,se obliquity to the road 
 would correspond with that supposed position of the enemy in his works. We talked 
 that over until I understood it, I think, and he Avas convinced that I understood him. 
 
 * * * I decided to put General Crawford's division on the right of the road 
 to strike the angle first, and put (ieneral Griftin's ,livision behind that ; they were 
 the two heaviest divisi<ms. I placed the smaller division on the left of the road, which 
 was General Ayres', as I supposed from the position of the enemy as given to me that 
 General Crawford's center would tall right on the angle of their line, and that if he was^ 
 notable to carry it General Griftin would be right there to sustain him and to take 
 advantage of any success. General Ayres's being the weakest division, I left on the 
 left to engage the front and prevent the enemy there re-enforcing that angle. That 
 is about the substance of it. I had a conversation with General Sheridan about the 
 delay of the troops in moving up and forming. I probably talked with him several 
 times. I recollect a conversation, and the fact that he was very anxious to have them 
 up ; and the iiriucii)al reason given was that the cavalrymen he was afraid would get 
 out of ammunition; and 1 told him I thought they were coming up as fast as they 
 could come under the conditions, and that if he wanted me to move up with what I 
 had up, I would move any time he would signify and let the rest follow, but he said, 
 " No ; wait for them all to get up," and of course there was nothing to do but to wait 
 for them to come up. I sent staff officers occasionally to inform them, the command- 
 ing officers, that there was anxiety for them to be up as quickly as possible. I gave 
 them as uuich stirring up as I thought would do any good. I thought they nujved up- 
 as well as men could. They had been doing very severe work, and they had suffered 
 very great privations. I thought my place was right there at the head of the column. 
 I remained all through that nearly there, and 1 took special pains to not let anybody 
 stoj) on the road to find out where he had to go — kept them going so as not to let them 
 halt at the head of the column and cause thestoppageof those in rear. The intervals 
 of time I had, I spent in instructing my command(^rs as to what it was expected we- 
 would do. 1 thought the most important place was at the place where they were 
 forming, to prevent the delays I have spoken of. There were other reasons for my 
 being there; one of them was that the enemy might choose to make a denion.stration 
 to .see what we were doing there, and then that it would lie my ])lace to be there to- 
 meet him. I anticipated that as a possible contingency, and if the enemy attacked, I 
 would jirobably have been very much missed if I had not been there. 
 
 He further said that he could not Imagiue how General Sheridan 
 could have had the impression that he '■'■ wished the sun to go down before 
 the formation could be completed"; and he says he gave the following 
 instructions to his division commanders: 
 
 The line \Aill raoAe forward, as formed, till it reaches the White Oak road, when it 
 will swing around to the left, perpendicular to the White Oak road. General Merritt's 
 and General Custer's cavalry will charge the enemy's line as soon as the infantry get 
 engaged. The cavalry is on the left of the infantry except Mackenzie's division, which 
 is moving u]i the White Oak road from the right. 
 
 lie says he had a conversation with General Sheridan about the for- 
 mation of the corps for the attack, and says : 
 
 I understood that I was forming exactly as he wanted me (p. 741)). 
 And gave particular instructions — 
 
 That when we broke the enemy's line, got him started, we wei-e not to stop for auy- 
 tbing. 
 
41 
 
 • 
 Had 110 knowledge of the nature of the country, nor what was before 
 him, but recollects crossing the White Oak road and saw Mackenzie's 
 cavalry come in from the right along that road (p. 749): 
 
 The fire of the enemy first l)egau in onr front from the woods we were marching 
 towards, the woods jnst on the nortli of the White Oak road at the east of the " return " 
 — firing soutli from along the edge of the woods — we had a fire in front of us. Seeing 
 this skirmish fire coming, and not finding any line of battle on the White Oak road, I 
 thought it more probable that the line of 'battle was in the edge of the timber, so 
 everything moved right on towards it. We found the road in a different direction 
 from what 1 expected. 1 thought it— the road— was east and west, but it was south- 
 east and northwest, so that if we had been marching due north the right of our line 
 would have struck it first. As this lire was coming in our front, of course that was 
 the thing to march for. We went on until General Ayres caught a fire on his left after 
 he had crossed the White Oak road. Then he immediately made a change of front, 
 very promptly facing his nearest brigade by the left flank, filing it to the left so as to 
 face the fire that was then conung from his previous left. The other brigade on Ayres's 
 right changed front and came around on his right, I think at double-quick. ' The 
 brigade in reserve under General Winthrop, as soon as Ayres's division came under fire, 
 just a little north of Bass' house, halted. It is not proper for a reserve to go under 
 fire until it can be of some use; that halting was therefore proper. At this time, I 
 should think, a large portion of General Griffin's and General Crawford's commands 
 were nearly out of sight in the woods north of the White Oak road. * * * Seeing 
 that the fight for the angle of the works was going to come on Ayres instead of Craw- 
 ford, as we had planned it, I sent an ofiScer to Griffin to come in in that direction as 
 quickly as he could to sustaiuAyres. I then went to the left of Crawford's division, 
 Kellogg's brigade — Crawford himself was already in the woods — and I told Colonel 
 Kellogg to change the direction of his brigade by wheeling to the left, and establish a 
 new line of battle at right angles with his previous movement, and hold the pivot. 
 He did so. I saw his new line established by markers, then I passed into the woods 
 to the right myself, and communicated the order to the next brigade on the right. I 
 think I succeeded, perhaps, in doing that, but I did not find General Crawford. It was 
 an anxious time, as Ayres was alone by himself. I did not pursue that any further, 
 and I came back into the opening. I sent staff' officers after General Crawford to tell 
 him that he must make a wheel to the left at once and keep closeed in to the left of 
 the brigade that I had already established in the new direction. I was so long in the 
 woods that I think when I came out Kellogg's brigade was gone. I know now it was 
 Kellogg's brigade. I could not understand why it should have left there; it embar- 
 rassed me a good deal. 
 
 At page 792, General Warren testified that " Kellogg's brigade was a 
 fixed pivot, to hold my troops up to General Ayres, and I want to say 
 that the responsibility for the others getting away rested with the au- 
 thority thait moved that pivot." 
 
 So I remained there in the field, where everybody could find me and see me, not far 
 from where the left flank of Kellogg's brigade had been halted, and continued to send 
 officers to General Crawford and General Griffin until I think I had none left. And 
 while I was there, I think the first time. General Sheridan came to me. He seemed 
 to be much pleased. He said, "We flanked Ihem gloriously." Then the failure of the 
 other troops to api)ear on the ground made him anxious. He said Griffin and Craw- 
 ford were going too far oft' from the place where they ought to be, and that he had 
 sent several of his staff" officers after them. I told him I had sent every one of mine, 
 but I thought he need not be alarmed, because they were too good soldiers to go very 
 far away from the fire if there was no enemy in their front, and that he could rely upon 
 their not going too far, and all would be right. The interval that elapsed seemed 
 long. I remained there awhile because I kuew it was better I should be where I 
 could be found, to give directions, than it would be to be riding around where I might 
 not be wanted and so that no one could find me when I might be wanted. Then I 
 started myself, and I think I struck into the road that leads north from Bass's across 
 the White Oak road and into the woods, and I came out in that clearing at the north- 
 east corner of the Sydnor field. 
 
 After describing his movements and operations with Crawford's divis- 
 ion, and when there was no longer an enemy in sight, he continues : 
 
 I sent back General Bankhead for orders to General Sheridan, to learn what he wished, 
 and waited a little while. * * * General Bankhead came back to me au<l said that 
 my orders had been sent to me, and very soon afterwards they arrived, brought by 
 Colonel Forsyth, relieving me from duty, as follows: 
 
42 
 
 *' Majdf-Geiieial Warren, coinmaudis Fifth Araiy Corps, is rflicved from duty and 
 will report at once for orders to Lieutenant-General Grant, coujuiauding armiesof the 
 United States. 
 
 '•By command of Ma.jor-General Sheridan." 
 
 That very much astonished me, and I immediately rode back on the road and asked 
 General Sheridan what it meant. Tlie only answer I received from him was, "Obey 
 the order I " I think that was all ; I gctt no explanation. I then went to General Meade's 
 headquarters and there I staid. General Meade expressed no disMpproval of my oper- 
 ations of those two days. 
 
 Whether or uot " Geueral Warren reported favorably to getting pos- 
 session of the White Oak road and AAas directed to do so," is a qnes- 
 tiou of construction of thedispatches passing' between Generals Warren 
 and ]\[eade, and Generals ]Meade and Grant from 4 p. in., March 30, till 
 10.30 a. ni., Marcli 31, 1805. 
 
 That portion of General Grant's report \vhich says that " he (Warren) 
 moved with but one division, instead of his whole corps, which was at- 
 tacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second 
 division before it had time to form and in turn forced back upon the 
 third division, w hen the enemy was checked," is substantiated by the 
 testimony, and is conceded to be true. 
 
 In his dispatch of 4 p. m., March 30, it will be remembered General 
 W^arren said : . 
 
 If General Humphreys can take charge of Grittiu's front about 5U0 yards west of 
 plank road Avith the return down it, I can take my corps and block the White Oak 
 road. 
 
 The language of this dispatch may be construed, without doing vio- 
 lence to its terms, as reporting "favorably to getting possession of the 
 White Oak road," under certain conditions, if complied with. By Gen- 
 eral Meade's dispatch of 8.45 p. m. these conditions a])pear to have been 
 complied with, and by General Grant's dispatch of 8.30 p. m. the pro- 
 posed measure was approved by him, but later in the day General 
 Grant dispatched General Meade : 
 
 Your orders to Warren are right. I do not expect to advance him in the morning. I 
 supposed, however, that he was now up to the White Oak road. If he is not, I do 
 uot want him to move uj) without further orders. 
 
 It does not appear that Warren was notified of General Grant's orders 
 in this respect, or that General Meade specially forbade him to attempt 
 taking possession of the White Oak road, as previously suggested by 
 General Warren ; for, notwithstanding Grant's orders to Meade that 
 Warren was not " to move up without further orders," it will be found 
 that early on the morning of the 31st he changed the positions of the 
 divisions of his corps and reported the same to General Meade, and at 
 9.40 a. m. he informed General Meade, " I have sent out word to him 
 (Ayres) to try and drive them (the enemy) off the White Oak road or 
 develop with what force the road is held by them," with the result 
 above set forth. It is believed that the statements contained in Gen- 
 eral Grant's report complained of are justified by the facts. 
 
 The second imputation, namely: 
 
 Had General W^arren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-Gen- 
 eral tlnrc would have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in 
 front of Diuwiddie Court-House, 
 
 is involved in the following facts: 
 
 The Fifth Army Corps having rallied from the repidse described in 
 the extract from General Grant's report, and having by 3.40 ]>. m., with 
 the assistance of a division of the Second Cori)s, driven the small force 
 of the enemy behind his works near the White Oak road, and General 
 
rsiri 
 
 -]M ][ 
 
 Warren beariug- the sound of battle between Sheridan's forces and the 
 rebels, and hearing the firing receding in the direction of Diinviddie 
 Court-Honse, indicating that the rebels were driving or pressing Siieri- 
 dan, and having been cautioned by General Meade to protect his left 
 tlank, and to "i)ush a small force down the White Oak road (which 
 was on the prolongation of his left tlank) and try to coniinuuicate with 
 Sheridan," and to " take care not to fire into his advance," General 
 Meade erroneously believing that Sheridan was advancing against the 
 eneiuy and that he would unite with the left of the Fifth Corps by the 
 White Oak road, but General Warren, as above stated, knowing the 
 true situation, sent Bartlett's brigade, ot'Griftiu's division, of his corps, 
 down the Crunii) road to (i. Boisseau's, which was directly in the rear 
 of the enemy confronting Slieridan, the eneim''s cavalry being encain[)ed 
 directly in front of the pickets of this brigade. It was not till 7.30 p. ni., 
 it would seem, that General Meade having ascertained the true situation 
 from staff officers sent by General Sheridan to General Grant to inform 
 him of his situation in front of Dinwiddle Conrt-House and the result 
 of the operations leading thereto, dispatched General Warren : 
 
 Dispatch from General Sheridau says he was forced back to Dinwiddle Conrt-House 
 by a stronij force of cavalry, supported by infantry. This leaves your rear and that of 
 the Second Corps on the Boydton plank road open, and will require great vigilance on 
 your part, &c. 
 
 General Warren claims that he notified General Meade, in a dis- 
 patch of 5.50 p. m. of Sheridan's situation near Dinwiddle, as commu- 
 nicated to him by "an officer and a sergeant from General Sheridan, who 
 were cut off in an attack by the enemy and escaped," and saying : 
 
 I have just sent General Bartlett and my escort in that direction, but think they 
 canuot be in time. I hear cannonading that I think is from near Dinwiddle Court- 
 House. 
 
 Thisdispatch,ifsentasclaimed, didnot reach General Meade, who was 
 no more than one half orthree-quarters of an hour's ride distant, at most; 
 for if it had reached him it is reasonable to suppose it would be imme- 
 diately communicated to General Grant, containing, as it did, informa- 
 tion of vital importance to the operations then going on and in con- 
 templation by the armies in front of Petersburg. But the first dis- 
 patch from Meade to Grant touching Sheridan's situation near Dinwid- 
 dle i§ dated 7.40 j). m., and the information is given as coming from "Cap- 
 tain Sheridan, from Sheridan's cavalry," the officer sent by General 
 Sheri<lan at the close of the battle in front of Dinwiddle to report the 
 situatio)! to General Grant, and Meade, being apparently of the belief 
 that Warren was ignorant of the_situation of Sheridan, dispatched in 
 return the identical information contained in Warren's dispatch of 5.50 
 ]). m., which was communicated to him by Sheridan's staff' officer. At 
 8.30 p. m. General Meade dispatched Warren : 
 
 The probability is that we will have to contract our line to-night. You will be re- 
 quired to hold, if possible, the Boydton plank road, and to Gravelly Kuu, Hum- 
 phreys, and Ord, along the Run. Be prepared to do this on short notice. 
 
 To which he replied, at 8.40 p. m. : 
 
 The line along the plank road is very strong. One division with my artillery, I think, 
 can hold it. If we are not threatened south of (Jravelly Run, east of the plank road, 
 General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, and let me 
 move down and attack the' enemy at Dinwid<lie on one side and Sheridan on the 
 other. From Bartlett's position they will have to make a considerable detour to re- 
 inforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless Sheridan has been too budly 
 handled, I think we have a chance for an open tield tight that sliould be made use of. 
 
44 
 These Suggestions were not adopted, but at 9 p. m. he was iustructed 
 
 Draw back at once to your position within ilio Boydton plank road, and send a di- 
 vision down to Dinwiddle Court-Honse to ici»oit to General Sheridan. This division 
 will go down the Boydton plank road. Send fhithn's division. General Hnniphreys 
 will hold at Mrs. Butlers. 
 
 At 9.20 p. 111. he was instiueted : 
 
 The division to be sent to Sheridan will .start at once. You are to be held free to 
 act within the Boydton plank road. General Humphreys will hold to the road and to 
 the return. 
 
 Great expeditiou was eujoiued by (leueral (Irant in this uiovemeut, 
 and the situation deuiauded it. At JO.lo j). m. he was further in- 
 structed by General Meade : 
 
 Send Grittin })rompt]y, as ordered, by the Boydton plank road, but move the bal- 
 ance of your command by the road ]5artlett is on, and strike the enemy in rear, 
 who is between him and Dinwiddle. General Sheridan reported his last position as 
 north of Dinwiddle Court-House, near Dr. Smith's, the enemy holding the cross-roads 
 at that i)oint. Should the enemy turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. 
 Brooks' and 11. Boissean's, on Boydton jilank road. See one-inch maps. Yon must 
 be very prompt in this movement, and get the forks of the road at .1. M. Brooks' be- 
 fore tlie enemy, so as to open to U. Boisseau's. The enemy will probably retire to- 
 ward the Five Forks, that being the direction of their main attack this day. Don't 
 encumber yourself with anything that will impede your progress or prevent your mov- 
 ing in any direction across' the t'onntry. Let me know when Griffin starts and when 
 you start. 
 
 At 10.55 p. m. he replied to General ]\Ieade : 
 
 I issued my orders on General Webb's (Meade's chief of statf ) first dispatch to fall 
 back, which madethe divisions retire in theorder of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin, which 
 was the order they could most rapidly move. I cannot change them to-night with- 
 out producing confusion that will render all my operations nugatory. I will now 
 send General Ayres to General Sheridan, an<l take General (Trififiu and Gener.'>l Craw- 
 ford to move against the enemy, as this last dispatch directs 1 should. (Otherwise) 
 I cannot accomplish the apparent objects of the orders I have received.* 
 
 About this time it was claimed by (reneral Warren that the bridge 
 across Gravelly Eun on the Boydton plank road over which Ayres was 
 ordered to march to report to Sheridan, was broken down, and owing 
 to the swollen condition of the stream, caused by recent rains, was not 
 fordable for infantry, and a bridge must be coustructed. This report was 
 made to Warren by two officers of his staff, and he thereupon ordered 
 a bridge to be coustructed. About this time also the telegraph line be- 
 tween Warreu's and Meade's headquarters failed to work and messages 
 do not seem to have passed as they ought, but as the distance betfPeen 
 those headquarters does not appear to have exceeded three miles, the 
 dispatches could have been sent by mouuted messengers, during the 
 night, M'hicli would not require more than an hour at most for trans- 
 mission. Warren appears to have sent Meade a dispatch, res[)ecting 
 the bridge at Gravelly Eun. At 11.45 p. m. ]Meade dispatched Warren, 
 saying : 
 
 A dispatch, ])artially transmitted, is received, indicating tlie bridge over (Jravelly 
 Run is destroyed, and time will be reciuired to rebuild it. If this is the case would not 
 time be gained by sending the troops by the Quaker road. Time is of the utmost im- 
 portance. Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without re-enforcements, 
 and yours are the only mies that can be sent. Use every exertion to get the troops to 
 him as soon as possible. If necessary send troops by both roads and give up the rear 
 attack. 
 
 This dispatch General Warren says he received at 1 a. m., Ai)ril 1, 
 and twenty nnnutes alterwards he replied : 
 
 I think we will have an infantry bridge over Gravelly Run sooner than I could send 
 troops arotind by the Quaker road, but if I tiud any failure I will send that way. I 
 have sent Benyaurd two hours ago with what he thought necessary to make it prac- 
 ticable in one hour, and I trust to that. 
 
 *See Dispatches CV and CVIII, pp. 1284 and 1285. — L. L. L., Recorder. 
 
45 
 
 About 2 a. m., April 1, the bridge was reported completed, aud Ayres's 
 division crossing it on the way to join Sheridan at Dinwiddle. Ben- 
 yaurd, the engineer officer, who superintended the construction of this 
 bridge, testitits to the delay of Ayres's division in awaiting the comple- 
 tion of the bridge, although Ayres has no recollection of the bridge or 
 any delay having been caused thereby. General Sheridan and mem- 
 bers of his staff, who crossed this stream at the point where the bridge 
 was located, during the day and afterwards, testify that the stream was 
 fordable for infantry and deny the existence of a bridge. It is remark- 
 able that General Warren, in \'iew of the urgency of his orders and the 
 contiguity of his headquarters to the place where the bridge is said to 
 have been located, «Ud not repair in person and ascertain the exact 
 character of the stream as to fordability and the necessity of a bridge 
 to enable infantry to pass. 
 
 Between 10.15 and 10.45 p. m. Meade's chief of staff dispatched 
 Sheridan : 
 
 General Meade lias directed all the spare ainbiilauceslie cau get hold of to j>o down 
 to Dinwiddle. Bartlett's brigade is at Crnmp's house, on Gravelly Run. Griffin, with 
 three brigades, is ordered down Boydton plauk to attack in rear of force menacing 
 you. General Grant is requested to authorize the sending of Warren's two other 
 divisions down the dirt road, i^st Crump's, to hold and cover that road, aud to attack 
 at daylight. 
 
 And at 10.45 p. m. Grant dispatched Sheridan : 
 
 The Fifth Corps has beeu ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J . 
 Boisseau's aud one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent Macken- 
 zie's cavalry, which will reach yon by the Vaughan road. All these forces, except 
 the cavalry, should reach you by 12 to-uight. You will assume command of the whole 
 force sent to operate with you aud use it to the be&t of your ability to destroy the force 
 ■which your command has fought so gallantly to-day. 
 
 Shortly after the receipt of the dispatch directing him to send 
 Griffin's division to rei)ort to Sheridan at Dinwiddle at 9..>5 p. m. Gen- 
 eral Warren issued orders to his corps to withdraw, aud mass, and or- 
 dered Griffin to withdraw Bartlett's brigade for the purpose of accom- 
 panying him to join Sheridan. But as he had reason to substitute Ayres 
 for Griffin for this service he did not countermand the withdrawal of 
 Bartlett. The order of withdrawal reached Bartlett some time near 
 midnight, and he had barely reached the division before he immedi- 
 ately, with the division, retraced his steps to the very vicinity from 
 which he was withdrawn during the night. General Sheridan, having 
 been informed by his dispatches that there was a brigade of United 
 States troops near G. Boisseau's (it was actually at Crump's house, on 
 the Gravelly Run, which was a more available position for the purposes 
 of General Sheridan), and supposing that this force was increased to a 
 division, at 3 a. m., April 1, dispatched General Warren: 
 
 I am holding in front of Dinwidddie Court-House, on the road leading to Five 
 Forks, for three-quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemj^ are 
 in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams's house, 
 Avhich leads out across Chamberlin's Bed or Run. I understand you have a division 
 at J. (G.) Boisseau's ; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost on his flank. 
 I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, have this 
 division attack instantly and in full force. Attack at day light sinyway, aud I will 
 make an eflbrt to get the road this side of A. Adams's house, and if I do, you can cap- 
 ture the w^hole of them. Auy force moving down the road I am holding, or on the 
 White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that 
 may escape you by a flank attack. Uo not fear my leaving here ; if the enemy re- 
 main I shall tight at daylight. 
 
 This dispatch was received by Warren at 4.50 a. m., and a half an. 
 hour afterwards, or about daylight, he put the two divisions of his corps 
 
■ n^^ 46 
 
 (Crawford's and Griffin's) on the march across the country down the 
 Crump road to tlie point indicated by General Sberidan, reaching there 
 about 8 a. m., but lie was too late. The enemy in the early morning 
 withdrew most of their infantry from Sheridan's front, and had retired 
 past the point Warren was ordered to hold and intercept them. Had 
 he reached this point by V2 o'clock or even by 4 in the morning the 
 enemy's infantry would have been intercepted, captured, or destroyed, 
 and this is what is believed to have been the expectations of the lieu- 
 tenat-general referred to in Sheridan's report. 
 
 The court finds, it will be seen, that when Warren received Meade's 
 order of 10.15 p. m. to march the two divisions of his corps, and •' get 
 the forks of the road at J. M. IJrookes's, before the enemy, so as to open 
 to E. Eoisseau's" he knew that the objective point specified was then in 
 the possession of the enemy, and "it was," the court says, "impossible 
 by any promptitude of movement to obey liis instructions, as the enemy 
 already occupied the ojective jwint named by General Meade." If Gen- 
 eral W^arren believed this at the time why did he not so inform General 
 Meade. In all his dispatches to Meade tliat night he expresses a readi- 
 ness to obey the orders received, and in no case did he claiui that any 
 of his orders were impracticable to perform or carry out. He states 
 reasons for not carrying out his orders, when testifying before the court — 
 namely, darkness of the night, bad roads — and he says that his only ef- 
 forts were (lirecte<l to saving Sheridan by re-enforcing him at Dinwiddle, 
 and he did not consider anything about attacking the enemy in the 
 rear, and he says if Meade had been aware of the conditions he would 
 not have issued such orders. Still, upon receipt of Sheridan's order at 
 4.50 a. m., he experienced no difficulty in withdrawing and marching to 
 the point indicated at Crumi)'s ; and did not Ayres and Bartlett nuirch 
 during the darkness of the night, Ayres reaching within supporting dis- 
 tance of Sheridan at Diuwiddie by daylight in the morning ? It is be- 
 lieved that General Warren's failure to march during the night of March 
 31, as instructed, tended to defeat the expectations of the Lieu tenant- 
 General, and that General Sheridan was justified in remarking thereon, 
 in his report, as he was charged with the direction and command of all 
 the forces operating against the enemy between Dinwiddle Court-House 
 and Five Forks at the time, and every incident connected with that 
 service was a legitimate snbject for remark in his official report of oper- 
 ations. 
 
 Warren claimed that the troops which he had " sent to the relief of 
 Sheridan were withdrawn by the express direction of General (4rant". 
 This claim is founded upon Grant's order to Meade to send Griffin's di- 
 vision to Sheridan at Diuwiddie, which necessitated the withdrawal of 
 Bartlett's brigade from Crump's; but as Warren afterwards substi- 
 tuted Ayres's division for this service he might have countermanded the 
 order for the withdrawal of Bartlett from his position near ('rumi)'s,^ 
 which was a good one to hold either for the protection of the rear of 
 his own corps, or to menace the enemy confronting Sheridan, or to in- 
 tercept or harass the retreat of the enemy from Sheridan's front. War- 
 ren further claiuied " that the rear attack was originally suggested by" 
 him "at a time when its execution was comparatively easy, and Avas 
 not permitted by General Grant until the situation had been essentially 
 changed by General Grant's own orders." This claim is founded on the 
 refusal of Grant to approve Warren's suggestion, in his dispatch to 
 Meade, that he be permitted to go down and attack the enemy on the 
 one side while Sheridan attacked on the other, Grant ordering instead 
 that Warren send one of his divisions to report to Sheridan at Dinwid- 
 
47 
 
 die, and march bis otbcr two division, and attack the enemy in the 
 rear, by the Crump road. This is what General Warren understands 
 as an essential change of the situation, essentially paralyziug his efforts 
 for the night! He also claims ''that the movement on the rear of the 
 enemy was suspended by General Meade." In this he refers to Meade's 
 dispatch in which the delay at the crossing was referred to, and urging 
 that Sheridan should be re enforced at Dinwiddie by sending troops by 
 other roads, and if this was necessary, to give uj) the rear attack ; but 
 as he did not send any troops by other roads, as suggested in this dis- 
 patch, it cannot be understood that the order for the rear attack was 
 suspended. Warren further says : 
 
 That the expectatious of Lientenant-Ge.iieral Graut, as to the time when Warreu 
 could complete his moveuieuts on the nij^ht of the 3 1st of March, were based on a mis- 
 apprehension of the true situation. 
 
 In this he refers to Grant's dispatch to Sheridan, in which he said 
 that Warren should join hiui by V2 o'clock that night, when, in fact, the 
 broken bridge and unfordable stream prevented the division's marching 
 by the Boydton plank road at an earlier hour than 1 o'clock next morn- 
 ing; and the additional fact that the enemy occupied the route the 
 other two divisions were ordered to march, and this Avas ascertained 
 by Bartlett's brigade, which found itself in the presence of the enemj^ 
 at Crumj)'s. But the plain meaning of the order to Warren was not 
 that he should go down to Dinwiddie to Sheridan, but that he should 
 press the enemy in the rear, confronting Sheridan, cut off their retreat, 
 and capture or destroy them in the morning, in conjunction with Sher- 
 idan's command. 
 
 The third imputation is involved in the following facts : 
 General VVarren having decided not t^ march his corps on the night 
 of the 31st, so as to place his two divisions in the rear of the enemy, and 
 so to crush and destroy him, and the enemy having retired from Sheri- 
 dan's front unmolested or threatened in the rear by any force, but pur- 
 sued and pressed in their withdrawal by Sheridan's cavalry, when the 
 advance division (Griffin's), about 8 a. m., reached a position iu the 
 vicinity indicated by Sheridan's dispatch to Warren of 3 a. m., General 
 Sheridan, who happened to be passing that point in pursuit of the en- 
 emy, meeting General GriflSn, directed him to halt at that point until 
 further orders. General Sheridan then passed on, and when General 
 Warren came up he was informed of Sheridan's wishes. Griffin's and 
 Crawford's divisions were then massed at the forks of the Crump road 
 and the main road from Dinwiddie Court-House to Five Forks. Ayres's 
 division, which went down the Boydton plank road during the night 
 and early morning, was directed to march to the same vicinity and there 
 also await further orders. In the mean time General Sheridan, with 
 his cavalry, continued to drive and ])ress the enemy in the direction of 
 Five Forks, and about 12 m., or a little after, forced him behind his 
 works along the White Oak road at Five Forks. General Warren re- 
 mained with his troops until about 11 a. m., when he decided to pro- 
 ceed and find General Sheridan in the direction of Five Forks. The 
 enemy having been driven behind his works, General Sheridan decided 
 to attack him there with his cavalry along the entire front of the works 
 on the White Oak road, and with the Fifth Corps on their left flank, 
 where the enemy relused his line of works on that road; and with this 
 view, sent an officer of his staff "to select ground which would hold 
 Warren's corps close under the right flank of Devin's (cavalry) com- 
 mand and beyond the observation of the enemy." The ground was se- 
 lected "in the vicinity of Gravelly Run church— a little south of it." 
 
48 
 
 General Sheridan ordered that the ground selected should be shown to 
 General Warren, which was accordingly done. General Warren was 
 then directed to niarcli up the Fifth Corps from the position in which 
 it was halted in the morning and form it, for the attack at the point 
 selected, near the church. General Warren communicated this order to 
 an officer of his staff about 1 o'clock p. m., and directed him to commu- 
 nicate the order to the division commanders. 
 
 The distance from the ]iosition of Griffin and Crawford to the place 
 of formation near Gravell}^ Knn church was about 2^ miles and the 
 length of the corps when in cohimu en route would be about 2-| miles. 
 Tlie last file of the column required as much time to reach thei^lace of 
 formation as it woukl have taken to march about five miles. " The route 
 to the place of formatiou was along a narrow road, very muddy and slip- 
 pery and somewhat encumbered with wagons and led horses of the 
 cavalry cori)s" is testified to by some, but the weight of testimony is 
 decidedly that the road was simply narrow and muddy and Avasnot en- 
 cumbered with wagons and led horses. It is not probable that wagons 
 to any number had at that time reached such an advanced i)ositiou with 
 an eneni}' directly in front and a battle just to be fought. The cavalry 
 officers are unanimous that none of their le<l horses were on this road, 
 but were in the rear of the dismounted men in front of the rebel works 
 on the White Oak road. 
 
 The corps reached its destination and w^as formed ready to advance 
 against the enemy about 4 p. m. or perhaps a little later. From the 
 time the order to form the corps was communicated to Warren, at the 
 church, about one o'clock, till the formation of the corps was completed, 
 about i p. m., he remained personally present at the church and made 
 no personal exertion to bring up the corps. He was quite collected, 
 imperturbable, passive, and ai)parently indifferent during this time, 
 while General Sheridan seemed anxious and impatient, and repeatedly 
 gave orders to hurry up the infantry. In this connection General Sheri- 
 dan testified: (Kecord, p. 9o.) 
 
 I complaiued that they (the infantry) were slow in coming up ; and luy directions 
 to the calvary had been to hold the enemy in the works. My object was to surprise 
 them, if possible, by the Fifth Corps ; hold them in the works by a vigorous fire in front 
 and tlireateuing the right flank. I was afraid they (my cavalry) would exhaust their 
 ammunition, and I knew it was an important point, and I was pretty anxious about 
 commencing that battle. I didn't have much time to fight it in, and didn't know ex- 
 actly how long it was going to take, and I knew the enemy held the White Oak road 
 about three miles to my right and rear; and I had all that anxiety on my mind, and 
 I expressed a good deal of that anxiety to General Warren during the time the troops 
 were coming up. 
 
 And respecting General Warren's manner, General Sheridan testified : 
 
 We had a conversation. In the first place, beseemed to- be somewhat reluctant, I 
 thought; and just liefore the battle he commenced talking in my presence, and there 
 were a good many officers around ( I don't know whether they heard him or not), after 
 the plan of the battle had been fixed, that "Bobby Lee" was always getting people 
 into difficulties and talked in rather a gloomy kind of way. I recollect I thought it 
 was very strange that a man would talk that way Avhen he knew he had to fight. I 
 thought he ought to talk the other way and encourage those who were about him and 
 not depress me. It was then I made up my mind to accompany the Fifth Corps. I 
 then accompanied the Fifth Corps generally ; then afterwards I accompanied Ayres's 
 division on account of the conditi(ms. 
 
 Warren denies that he used such language as this, but says that dur- 
 ing the course of the afternoon he said things to Sheridan which were 
 not kindly received. He said, in a conversation with General Sheridan : 
 
 I made the remark to General Sheridan that we had had rather a field day of it 
 since yesterday morning. Ho said to me, "Do you call that a field day?" I saw by 
 
49 
 
 the tone of his remark that lie was not very well pleased with what I had said ; so I 
 ill a ineasure apologized for it by saying that perhaps it was a little ironical, and I re- 
 fered to the fact that we had been directed tc cease operations and have a quiet time 
 of it, but the dispositions General Lee had made had given us about as lively a time 
 as I hiid had in my experience. 
 
 General Chamberlin testifies (p. 236) : 
 
 That those who do not know General Warren's temperament might think him to be 
 negative when he was deeply intent. (General Warren's temperament is such that he 
 instead of showing excitement generally shows an intense concentration in what I 
 call important movements, and those who do not know him might take it to be apathy 
 Avhen it was deep concentrated thought and puri»ose. And it would not be unnat- 
 ural that a stranger looking at General Warren and not seeing indications of excite- 
 ment and resolution on his face might judge him to be apathetic when in fact that 
 conclusion might be far from the truth. 
 
 And General Chamberlin says he saw no indication of indifference 
 on the part of General Warren on that occasion. 
 
 It is evident that General Sheridan was seriously impressed by the 
 behavior of General Warren in not making some personal exertion to 
 hurry up the marching of his corps to the place of formation for the at- 
 tack, and his apathy, or apparent apathy, in this respect led, no doubt, 
 to the inference that he "wished the sun might go down before the dis- 
 positions for the attack could be completed," and although "Warren 
 remained near Gravelly Eun Church directing the formation, exidain- 
 ing the mode of attack to the division and brigade commanders, with 
 sketches prepared for the purpose," yet Sheridan with his staff was 
 also present and engaged in doing the same labor, and Warren, being- 
 well known to his brigade and division commanders, would have done 
 far more to expedite the movement if he had ridden back with his staft 
 and personally urged forward the divisions. It is believed that the 
 Fifth Corps In this instance, numbering about 10,000 effective men, 
 should have marched up to the place of formation within two hours, at 
 most, from the time the order was given at 1 o'clock, ond that the for- 
 mation should, at all events, have been effected at a much earlier hour 
 than 4 o'clock. 
 
 The fourth imputation grew out of the following facts : 
 
 The Fifth Corps having been formed for attack, as above described, 
 the following plan of battle was communicated to its commanding offi- 
 cers by General Warren, accompanied with a diagram showing the 
 position of the enemy's works along the White oak road : 
 
 The line will move forward, as formed, until it reaches the White Oak road, when 
 it Avill swing round to the left, perpendicular to the White Oak road. General Mer- 
 ritt's and General Custar's cavalry will charge the enemy's line as soon as the infantry 
 get engaged. The cavalry is o\\ the left of the infantry, exce^Jt Mackenzie's, which 
 is moving up the White Oak road from the right. 
 
 Previous to this (p. 1168) — 
 
 General Sheridan called [the commanders present] around him in the road. His plan 
 was very short; he drew his saber in the dust, and says : "There is the White Oak 
 road ; the enemy are entrenched behind that; they have refused their left somewhere 
 near an old church ; whether it is within their lines, or not, I do not know." He said, 
 "I will attack their entire front. I will deploy my cavalry dismounted, and engage 
 their entire front, and with the strong arm I will strike this salient, and wheel on ta 
 their left and rear." 
 
 The corps was formed with its front nearly parallel with the White 
 Oak road, obliquing slightly to the left, and probably a mile, or there- 
 abouts, to the left front of the point where the enemy refused their in- 
 trenchraents along the White Oak road. Ayres's division was on the 
 8002 4 
 
50 
 
 left of the formation, Orawfuid's on the riglit, with Griffin's division in 
 rear of Crawford. General Warren says : 
 
 The diagraiii showed that the enemy was in line of battle with his left flank jnst 
 coverins the .junction of the Gravelly Run Church road and White Oak road, and the 
 instructions and diafirani indicated that (General Crawford would strike that anjrle. 
 Now if they strike that angle they will swing around, of course ; but if they do not 
 strike anything tliey move ou uutilsomething is struck" (Record, p. 778). 
 
 That is, his understanding of the order of battle would lead to the 
 following result : Ayres's division according to this diagram — which was 
 made by Geueial Warren himself, although he had not been over the 
 ground nor had he seen it — being formed ou one side of the Gravelly Run 
 Church road and Crawfoi'd and Griffin on the other, and this road cut- 
 ting the White Oak road at its junction with the angle or return of the 
 enemy's works. Ay res, advancing in this order, would strike the front 
 of the enemy's works, and Crawford the angle, and General Warren 
 says he is positive he so informed Crawford. 
 
 In this view of the programme of attack General Warr&u must have 
 totally misunderstood his instructions from General Sheridan, who defi- 
 nitely fixed the position of the enemy's lines along the White Oak 
 road, the actual length of the intrenched line perpendicular to that 
 road forming the angle not being fully ascertained but sufficiently so 
 to guide the attack. If it had been Sheridan's understanding that 
 Ayres would strike the front of the works he would have, it is pre- 
 sumed, ordered the Cavalry Corps, which was aligned on the front of 
 the works, to attack simultaneously with tbe Fifth Corps, but the orders 
 that were given, as testified to by all and conceded before the court, 
 were that the Fifth Corps would first attack at the angle or "return", 
 and the cavalry, which covered the entire front, would then assault the 
 enemy's works in front, the fire of the Fifth Corps to be the signal for 
 the attack by the cavalry. This is further strengthened from the fears 
 expressed by Sheridan to Ayres and others that the infantry attacking 
 the "return" were firing into the cavalry attacking the front of the works. 
 And it was not intended that the cavalry should be overlapped by the 
 infantry on that side. Arguing, however, in su])port of his view,Geu- 
 <^ral Warren says : 
 
 It would seem to be the intention of General 8heridan's counsel, judging from his 
 line of examination of certain witnesses, to insist that General Sheridan intended tbe 
 Filth Corps to strike the White Oak road to the right of the angle, then wheel to the 
 left and move along the road until thej' struck the works. 
 
 And he criticises this plan as follows : 
 
 Most assuredly it was never his (Sheridan's) intention to expose the tlank of an en- 
 tire corps as he did to the lire of that ''return." Flanking an enemy means getting 
 your frojt ou the enemy's llauk, not your flank in front of the enemy's earthworks. 
 
 It is not believed this would have been done under ordinary conditions 
 in an open country in sight of the enemy, but the evidence shows that 
 the formation of the Fifth Corps for the attack was made entirely 
 out of sight of the enemy, and in marching forward to the White Oak read 
 the corps was masked and hidden from the enemy, at the "return," by 
 dense growths of timber, and the attack at the " return" wasacomj^lete 
 surpjise. lndee<l, the enemy was not only on this flank, but was in front 
 also, and when the change of direction was made facing the "return" 
 he was also in the rear. But General Warren's views of the order of 
 attack as testified to before the court do not exactly harmonize with 
 his carefully-prepared instructions to his commanders at Gravelly Kun 
 church. Tlu?re the order was, to swing around upon reaching the White 
 
51 
 
 Oak road absolutely; here the swinging aroimd was to be conditional — 
 that is, not to swing around " until something is struck." 
 
 In moving forward to the attack, General Sheridan accompanied 
 Ayres's division, and when this division reached the White Oak road 
 it received a tire in the flank, from the enemy in the woods, in front of 
 the "return", when it immediately changed front and faced the "return". 
 General Sheridan testifies: 
 
 Q. Am I correct iu niulerstaudiiig your testimony and your statement now to the 
 the effect that the point of complaint that you make against General Warren as to 
 the battle — the actual battle of Five Forks — was that Crawford and Griffin got too 
 far to the right, and that he didn't do anything towards getting them back or con- 
 trolling their movements/ — A. The general confusion, mismanagement, and risk that 
 revsnlted from the bad management of bis corps. 
 
 Q. That is rather vague. I would like yon to specify what the had management 
 was. — A. In the tirst i»lace, the troops were confused by the tire of the enemy's pickets . 
 There was great confusion and timidity on the part of the men; in fact, I began to 
 have some doubts as to whether I was going to be successful or not. Our skirmish 
 line lay down and the tire of the enemy was very slight; the line became confused and 
 commenced tiring straight in the air. The poor fellows had been lighting behind 
 breastworks for a long x)eriod, and when they got out to attack breastworks they 
 seemed to have been a little timid. I began to get alarmed. I had accompanied Gen- 
 eral Warren up to that period ; then I rode out iu front of the line of battle and helped 
 to lemedy the confusion. While I was out in front of the line of Itattle I saw General 
 Warren in the rear a little distance, about where I left him, I think. I succeeded, with 
 (leneral Ayres and other officers, iu remedying this confusion, and it seemed to me that 
 if I had been (ieueral Warren I would not have allowed my superior officer to ride 
 out in front of the line of battle of my men in order to remedy a serious confusion 
 wiihout making some exertion myself of the same kind. 
 
 While the testimonj^ is conflicting as to the extent of this confusion 
 in Ayres's division at this critical period of the attack, Ayres saying that 
 it was no more than occurred by his rapid change of front and the double- 
 quick niarch of the troops to the front, and a rebel general testified that 
 it was no more than might have been expected under the circumstances 
 from any other troo[»s similarly situated, yet it may be stated as beijig 
 undeniably true that General Sheridan deemed the confusion of a serious 
 character, for he actually sent an ofticer of his staff to General Merritt, 
 commanding tbe calvary corps, to suspend the attack of the calvary for 
 the reason that the infantry was nor coining up to its work, and Gen- 
 eral Merritt so* testified, (p. 840), General Sheridan testified, and the 
 court reports, tliat General Warren was observant of the confusion in 
 Ayres's division, but he made no personal exertion to remedy this confu- 
 sion. General Sheridan testified : 
 
 There are certain conditions that I always adhered to during the war, iu reference 
 to the commanding officers of troo]>s — and that was in reference to their taking risk — 
 that I never wanted them to put themselves in danger except if confusion existed 
 among their troops which might result in defeating those troops ; then I held that the 
 commanding officer should go out there and take his chances the same as the men. 
 
 I think that this is quite a reasonable rule in such cases, and the rule 
 by which the conduct of commanding officers should be determined; is 
 not severe nor exacting too much irom them ; and that General Sheridan 
 had a light to expect some personal exertion on the part of General 
 Warren towards remedying the confusion. 
 
 Another im|)utation, not adverted to in any of the official reports of 
 the battle of Five Forks, appeared in the testimony in (;onnection with 
 the attack of the Fifth Cordis at the "return" or left flank of the enemy's 
 works. Continuing General Sheridan's testimony from his testimony 
 last above quoted, he said : 
 
 Q, Do you recollect what my question was — to specify all the points that you made 
 against General Warren as to his conduct during the whole battle — have you done 
 it? — A. No, sir. 
 
52 
 
 Q. Go of! then, please, aud tinisb it. — A. My orders were very i>articular to have 
 Crawford's divisiou keep close ou the right of Ayres, so that I could take th* eueniy's 
 liu'e along the White Oak road, after the reverse portion was captured in the rear. 
 The' battle wasover, I cousidered, assbon as we had captured that angle. The first 
 thiu"^ I knew I saw Crawford obli([uing instead of making the left wheel as I had ex- 
 pected : and it was not a full left wheel, only a partial one; he was obliquing to the 
 ri"-ht : he was going away from the objective point and was going in the direction of 
 Hatcher's Ixunlmd leaving Ayres's tlank exposed entirely — his right flauk. I think I 
 sent for him or sei t for Warren; I know I sent for Crawford and tried to get him back, 
 and I sent. 1 think, to General Warren. I could not tind him. I don't know, but to the 
 best of mv recollection I sent several times to try aud repair this trouble. Grilfin, I 
 knew, had to follow Crawford, and it seemed to me they were both marching toward 
 Hatcher's Run, not towards the objective point. I then sent for them, as I say, and 
 thev did not come. About that time there was not much left to fight that battle ex- 
 cept Ayres's division , and they substantially did tight the battle there accordingto the 
 best of my judgment. . , , , ^ ^- -^ • • i, 
 
 Q. Now, then, as far as I understand your answer to my question, it principally 
 sino-les out General Crawford or General Gritifin. Where do you claim that Warren's 
 fautt was in relation to that point?— A. General Warren was in command of the 
 corps with that responsibility on him. He was responsible to me to hold his subor- 
 dinates responsible. , . ^ . . • • • , ^■ 
 
 Q. And what do you claim was Warren's sin of omission or commission in relation 
 to 'ii:'t "oing off to the right ?— A. If there was anybody iu the wide world that 
 should have made an ettbrt to prevent that, General Warren was the man. 
 
 Q. Undoubtedly. Now, do you know whether he made any effort or not ?— A. I 
 don't know ; I did not realize any. 
 
 « ' * * * • 
 
 Q. Then you don't hold him or claim him responsible for Crawford and Griffin's going 
 away but for his not getting them back— is that it?— A. I hold him responsible for 
 their (Toino away. I hold him responsible for the whole condition of things. 
 
 Q. You Think that is a fair judgment on your part of the conduct of a subordinate ; 
 a fair manner of h(dding your subordinate to his otbcial responsibility — is that it? — 
 A. I will say yes, as a direct answer, and now I will make my explanation: In the 
 first place Ihave stated in my narrative that I was governed by the conditions that 
 I was placed iu at the battle of Five Forks. There was no time to swap j^ck-knives. 
 I had to meet this new emergency at once. The new emergency was that I had my 
 back to the enemy as soon as I had gained the battle of Five Forks, and that was 
 not 
 I could 
 
 ren who Iml' disappointed me. And if thaf condition had not existed I probably 
 would not have relieved General Warren. I hate to punish a man as much as any- 
 body in the world. I did not relieve him to punish him. I relieved him in order to 
 meet the new emergency (pp. lOO-'l). 
 
 After describing the change of front of Ayres, as above set forth 
 General Warren testified : 
 
 At this time, I should think, a large portion of Griffin's and General Crawford's com- 
 mands were nearly outof sight iu the woodsnorthof the WhiteOak road. * * * Seeing 
 that the fight for the angle of the works was going to come on Ayres instead of Crawford, 
 as we had^planned it, I sent an officer to (Jriffiu to come in, in that direction, as qnickly 
 as he could to sustain Ayres. I then weutto the left of Crawford's division, Kellogg's 
 brigade— Crawf(nd himself was already in the woods— aud I told Colonel Kellogg to 
 chano-e the direction of his brigade by wheeling to the left and establish a new line 
 of battle at right angles with his previous movement and hold the pivot. He did so ; 
 I saw his new line established by markers. Then I passed into the woods to the right, 
 myself, and communicated the order to the next brigade on the right— I think I suc- 
 ceeded', ]»erhaps, iu doing that, but I did not find (Jeneral Crawford. It was an anxious 
 time as Ayres was alone by himself. I did not pursue that any further, and I came 
 back into the oiiening. I sent staff officers after Crawford to tell him that he must 
 make a whfcl to the left at once and keep closed in to the left of the brigade that I 
 had already established in t he new direction. I was so long in the woods that I think 
 when I came out Kellogg's brigade was gone. » * * l could not understand why 
 it should have left there; it embarrassed me a good deal; so I renudued there in the 
 field where everybody could find me and see me, not far from where the left flank of 
 Kellogg's brigade had been halted, and continued to send olticers to General Crawford 
 and General Griffin until, I think, I had none left. 
 
 General Sheridan being with Ayres's division, which was then about to 
 assault the enemy's "return" or left flank, atid seeing tbat Griffin's and 
 
53 
 
 Crawfosd's divisions were marching away from the point of attack, sent 
 several members of his staff to bring them back, saying they are going 
 entirely ont of the battle and " mining the whole thing." General Ayres 
 at this point testified as follows: 
 
 Q. General Griffin commanded one of your [the] divisions of the Fiftli Corps ?— A. Yes. 
 
 Q. He is dead ? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. He has been dead since 1867, I think? — A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. You said that before General Chamberlin's brigade came to you, General Griffin 
 ■came over to you and had a conversation ? — A. Yes. 
 
 Q. I would like to know what that conversation was? — A. One of my staff officers 
 had gone over to General Griffin, I think. He came riding through the woods very 
 rapidly, and he says : "Ayres, what is up, what is up?" Isaid: "There is nothing new, 
 Griffin ; Crawford has taken his division away and left me to light alone. The same 
 ■old story." That was just after I had changed front and was preparing to advance ou 
 that angU^ — before I had carried the angle. « 
 
 Q, What did Griffin do? — A. He immediately disappeared in the woods — went di- 
 rectly back into the woods. I suppose the result was the briuging of his division in, 
 because it came not long after ; General Chamberlin's brigade came first. 
 
 •Q. That is all you saw of that division ? — A. Yes. 
 
 Q. How many brigades were there that day of that division? — A. I don't know. 
 I just saw that one come in just after I had carried that angle. General Griffin said 
 two or three things before he went back. He said : " Yes, I have told General Warren 
 if he would let your division and mine go together in these cases these things would 
 Bot happen." 
 
 ^. In your opinion, could that communication have been maintained between 
 Crawford and yourself, when you moved into action there, with proper diligence ? — 
 A. It was natural for me to suppose when I changed my front to engage the enemy, 
 and was engaging a heavy force, as the musketry showed, it was natural to suppose 
 that General Crawford wculd bring his division around and come in on my right and 
 ■engage in the battle ; that was what I expected at the time. 
 
 General Grifiiu, in his report, in evidence, p. 1186, after-describing his 
 march to Gravelly Run Church and the formation of the Fifth Corps 
 for the attack, says : 
 
 Immediately after the order to advance against the enemy was given (who was 
 supposed to be intrenched at Five Forks), with instructions to the division that after 
 it had crossed the road it was to change direction to the left so as to strike the enemy 
 in Hank and rear. After advancing about a mile, and finding nothing in front save 
 a few cavalry vedettes, and there being heavy volleys of musketry to the left and rear, 
 the division was halted, and upon personal examination it was found that the enemy 
 was moving up the White Oak road. Immediately the division was faced by the left 
 flank, and marched some four or five hundred yards, when its direction as to the line 
 of battle was changed perpendicularly to the left, and moved down at a double quick 
 upon the enemy, who was visible some three-fourths of a mile distant, moving up the 
 White Oak road. 
 
 General Crawfoid testified: 
 
 Q. You were to keep closed on Ayres? — A. I never received anj- orders in that di- 
 Tection. I should have done that naturally. 
 
 Q. Did the original orders direct you to do that? — A. No, sir; only I would be on 
 Ayres's right. 
 
 Q. Did you get a diagram? — A. I did. I recollect it was given to me by General 
 Warren — a piece of manifold paper. 
 
 Q. You never supposed you were to keep close connection necessarily with General 
 Ayres's division ? — A. I did that without having received any orders about it ; that was 
 the spirit of the movement, and that I was to advance then with Ayres, and I was to 
 protect liis flank and meet any enemy that might come in upon his flank. 
 
 Q. When you first went into the woods, after crossing the White Oak road, had con- 
 nection been broken? — A. Just as we were getting into the woods an officer told me 
 there was no connection with Ayres — ^just after we crossed the White Oak road. 
 
 Q. You have related what you did, then? — A. Yes. 
 
 Q. But you never made the connection ? — A. I did not make the connection. 
 
 Q. Why not? — A. Because the enemy were firing. I could not move by the flank 
 to do it. I reported it to General Warren. I reported that there was no connection 
 l)etween me and Ayres, and asked for orders. 
 
 Q. What was to be inferred by that, that you could not make it? — A. That it had 
 
o4 
 
 # 
 
 becu broken and I should go on with the same luoveuieut that had been originally 
 intended. 
 
 Q. Did you not feel that it was your duty to make that connection at once at that 
 time under the spirit of the order? — A. It did not strike nie so. I had not broken the 
 connection. I reported it to my corps conimauder, who would see to it. I did not 
 know what had been done. I knew it had not been from any negligence upon my 
 l)art. I supposed that Ayres had gone to the left by order. 
 
 It would appear from tbis testimony that it was in the power of Gen- 
 eral Warren to have prevented the marehing" away of < 'rawford's and 
 Griilfin's divisions upon crossing the White Oak road, and the change 
 of front of Ayres. 
 
 The court reports in effect that a statt" officer of General Sheridan 
 interfered with and i^revented Warren from changing the front of 
 Crawford's division so as to march it in the direction of the angle of the 
 enemy's works in support of Ayres, who was then away back to the left 
 and rear, by ordering a brigade (Kellogg's) to march to the tiring to the 
 left, which Warren had placed in line in that direction, in order that 
 the other brigades of Crawford's division could be formed on the same 
 line, and that this i)revented Crawford's division from forming its lines 
 and marching in support of Ayres. 
 
 The staff officer of General Sheridan alluded to is Col. George A. 
 Forsyth, who, in obedience to General Sheridan's orders, rode ov^r 
 and get Crawford's and Griffin's divisions into the tight. Upon reach- 
 ing the left of Crawford's division he shouted to the nearest brigade 
 (Kellogg's), "Swing in to the left, here ; the fighting is here, to the left." 
 The brigade commander refused to be ordered by Colonel Forsyth, 
 whom he did not know, and some hot words passed between them. The 
 brigade commander, howev^er, upon reilection, decided to swing in the 
 direction of the contest, and thus became isolated from the remainder 
 of that division, which swept around by Hatcher's Run,i)assed in the 
 rear of the rebel works near by the run, and finally came out near the 
 right of the enemy's works (which by that time had been captured by 
 Ayres and Griffin), skirmishing and fighting with fleeing fragments of 
 the enemy escaping from the works. 
 
 During the afternoon of that day General Sheridan had orderbd Mac- 
 kenzie's division of cavalry, which General Grant had ordered to report 
 to him, to march, General Sheridan says — 
 
 Up the Crump road, with directions to gain the White Oak road if possible, but to 
 attack at all hazards any enemy found, and if successful then nuirch down that road 
 and join me. (Jeneral Mackeuzie executed this with courage and skill, attacking 
 a force of the enemy on the White Oak road and driving it towards Petersburg. He 
 then countermarched, and then joined nie on the White Oak road, just as the Fifth 
 Corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing around with the right of the 
 infaoitry and gain possession of the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's Run. 
 
 The divergence of Crawford's division not only endangered the safety 
 of the army, but it crowded Mackenzie out so that it was impossible to 
 carry out his orders. General Mackenzie testified : 
 
 After moving in this way a short time, I found that I was immediately on the right 
 of the infantry, and therefore diverted my course somewhat to the right to prevent 
 being involved with them. I moved on again, and again became myself involved 
 with them, and soon found myself on Hatcher's Run. 
 
 And so, he says, when he reached the Ford road crossing, the battle 
 was over, and he was prevented fiom performing the duty contem])lated, 
 of intercepting the retreating rebels, that duty having been partially 
 performed hy that portion of Crawford's division deflected from the real 
 point of attack. While it may be admitted that General Warren ac- 
 quitted himself bravely, leading scattered portions of his corps, mostly 
 
55 
 
 of Crawford's division, against fragments of the retreating enemy i^tbe 
 evidence on this point, however, being extremely conflicting, very respect- 
 able and reputable witnesses testifying that Warren was in the rear out 
 of the range of the action the entire afternoon), and Ayres, unassisted, 
 fortunately carried the "return"; still, if Ayres had been repulsed, the 
 consequences would have been disastrous to that army. It was so testi- 
 fied to by some, although, on one occasion, when the question was asked, 
 it was objected to by General Warren, and the objection was sustained. 
 It was just as competent to admit this testimony as it was to admit tes- 
 timony tending to show that although the divisions of the corps became 
 scattered and disconnected, yet General Warren behaved himself credit- 
 ably in pursuing and attacking fragmentary bodies of the enemy. In this 
 connection General Sheridan testified as follows: 
 
 It will be seen that if there wei'e plenty of the enemy up in the direction that Cieu- 
 eral Warren went that it would have been a bad thing- to attack them, any way. It 
 would have been an error from the direction that he advanced. Had he kept on the 
 right of Ayres, and they had both pushed on, and they had reached the Ford road, he 
 would have been in the rear of those who were facing liim, and fightiug him, as you 
 say, all day, and that is about the best way of taking works that I know of — taking 
 them in the rear. Now, then, suppose Ayres had beeu defeated, Crawford would have 
 been captured. The battle would have been lost. * * * In any case, if he had 
 obeyed his orders, or had not broken my line of battle, and it had gone on as it should 
 have gone on, we would have reached the P^'ord road long before the enemy got out of 
 the main works, and. if there was no holding the front, wo would have had them iu 
 the rear, but, if we had been defeated, then salt could not have saved the men who 
 went around on the Foi-d road, or in that direction. 
 
 The testimony of those who were questioned on the fact corroborates 
 this view of General Sheridan. « 
 
 The form of the inquiry appears to have beeu in the nature of a con- 
 test between General Warren as plaintiff, and Generals Grant and 
 Sheridan as defendaiits. Except as witness, General Grant did not 
 take any active part in the proceedings. General Sheridan, however, 
 ai)peared in jierson witli counsel to defend the wrongs and injuries com- 
 plained of by General Warren, and he is known throughout the pro- 
 ceedings as the "respondent." 
 
 In the nature of an offset to General Sheridan's imputations, GeiTeral 
 AVarren introduced a mass of testimony tending to show that the cavalry 
 under Sheridan was not seriously engaged with the enemy either on 
 the 31st of March or 1st of April, and that the cavalry corps took no 
 active part in the capture of the enemy's works at Five Forks, with the 
 view to falsify General Sheridan's official report in that respect. But 
 General Warren's efforts to establish this showing, with reference to 
 the operations of the 31st, were abandoned — his counsel conceding, but 
 not until the evidence failed him, that there was "no point to make 
 about the cavalry operations on that day." It would have been a grace- 
 ful act to have made the same concession about tlie operations on the 
 1st of April, and the part taken by that arm of the service in the capture 
 of the works at Five Forks. JSTothing can be more certain than that the 
 cavalry pressed the enemy from the early morning of April 1 until he 
 was driven behind his works at Five Forks at noon of that day, and 
 that in view of the conditions the co-operation of the cavalry was es- 
 sentially necessary to that victory, and that they went over the enemy's 
 works in front almost simultaneously with Ayres's division at the angle. 
 But, to return to the course of procedure before the court, it would seem 
 as though it was a private contest between the parties specified rather 
 than an examination with a view to the vindication of public justice. 
 And this brings me to the consideration of — 
 
 1st. What is the correct procedure before courts of inquiry! and, 
 
56 
 « 
 2(1. Is there any limitation as to the time in which a court of inquiry 
 may be demanded and ordered under the Articles of War ? 
 
 Hough, in his work on Military Courts, p. 138, speaking of the pro- 
 cedure before courts of inquiry, says : 
 
 Each party should examine their witnesses in the same order as at a court-martial, 
 those for the prosecution first and then those for the defence. 
 
 O'Brien, in his work on American Military Law p. 291, speaking on 
 the same subject, says : 
 
 The form of proceeding assimilates as closely as possible to that of a coiirt-martial' 
 and is identical with it so far as relates to tlie rules of evidence and the examina- 
 tion of witnesses. 
 
 And to the same effect is De Hart's Military Law, p. 332; Ives' Mili- 
 tary Law, pp. 272-3. 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that the procedure of courts of inquiry should 
 be similar to that of a court-martial — the witnesses for the prosecution 
 being called first and those for the defence afterwards. This course 
 was reversed, General Warren first calling witnesses to establish his 
 innocence of the imputations and General Sheridan then to establish 
 them. 
 
 These imputations involved, as will be seen, criminal neglects of duty, 
 if not more, on the part of General Warren. Such imputations before 
 courts of inquiry and courts-martial are investigated by the public in 
 tbe manner of criminal investigations. 
 
 It was therefore the duty of the recorder of the court to have prose- 
 cuted and tojiave assumed the burden of establishing the truth and 
 justice of the imputations made against General Warren, and then for 
 General Warren to disprove the case thus made against him. Instead 
 of this, the recorder was employed in cleri(;al duties connected with the 
 record, leaving the conduct of the case entirely in the hands of Generals 
 Sheridan and Warren and their counsel. It appears, however, that the 
 court so directed at the beginning, by establishing a special course of 
 procedure before it for the hearing of this case analagous to the pro- 
 cedure observed in ordinary litigation between i^rivate suitors. 
 
 The one hundred and fifteenth Article of Wor provides: 
 
 A court of inquiry to examine into the nature of any transaction of, or accusation 
 or imputation against, any officer or soldier may be ordered, &c. 
 
 There is no express limitation to the time this court of inquiry may 
 be ordered fixed by the Articles of War, but most of the military writers 
 agree that a court of inquiry is merely preliuiiuary to ulterior proceed- 
 ings by court-martial (Tyler's Military Law, ]>. 3-40; Adye's Treatise 
 on Courts-Martial, pp. 75-78; De Hart's Military Law, j). 280), and, 
 therefore, where the prosecution of an otfeuse before a court-martial is 
 barred by the one hundred and third Article of War, it would be a 
 work of supererogation to ajipoint a court of inquiry. 
 
 Attorney-General Gushing (in G Opinions, 239) seems to liold views 
 contraiy to the abo\'e. He says : 
 
 All Ihe oV)jections to the assumption that courts of incjuiry arc not included in the 
 limitation of the Articles of War ))roceed on tlie prctuiscs tiiat the only cud of a court 
 of in(|uiry is a court-marfial. Hut we have seen that a court of inquiry has other 
 functions, its great purpose being to collect information l»y wliicli to guide the dis- 
 cretion of him who orders it in regard to a matter of intiuiry. Tlie question upon 
 which that discretion is to be exercised nuiy be of ordering a court-martial, and it may 
 be of something else. In either case it is a regular means of iuforiuation which ought 
 to be left open to the Executive. For instance, a court of in(i(uiry is ordered on the 
 incidents of a battle or on tlu' events of a campaign. The results of the inquiry may 
 be the ordering of a court-martial ; or, it may be a change of the officers in command 
 
57 
 
 only, for deficiency either in strategic or tactical skill or in good fortune. A court of 
 inquiry may be called for the exculpation of an officer, and thus have the elfect of sav- 
 ing his honor in the eyes of the country as well as of the Executive, or it may be of 
 counteracting injurious impressions on the part of the Executive. It may happen 
 that questions shall arise as to an oftense alleged to have been committed by an officer 
 more than two years ago as to which he ought to be exculpated if innocent, or, if guilty, 
 dismissed by the President, though not liable to be tried by court-martial. In such a 
 ca«s6 a court of inquiry protects the officer and informs the conscience of the Executive. 
 A court of inquiry may be needed for the very purpose of ascertaining whether an al- 
 leged offence was or was not committed within two years, and so informing the mind 
 and guiding the discretion of the Executive on the very point of the legality of a court- 
 martial. In a word, courts of inquiry are not limited in the terms of the Articles of 
 War; it is well settled that they are not limited by construction in Great Britain; 
 the more general conclusion has been the same in this country, and that conclusion 
 seems to me consonant with the general principles of law, and especially convenient 
 in a constitutional government like the United States. 
 
 Until a recent date courts of inquiry in Great Britain existed under 
 the sole authority of the Crown. It is said : 
 
 For the King, being the supreme magistrate of the kingdom, and intrusted with the 
 whole executive power of the law, no court whatever can have any jurisdiction unless 
 it some way or other derive it from the Crown ; besides, as he is considered as the gen- 
 eralissimo or first in military command within the kingdom, and has the sole power 
 of raising and regulating fleets and armies, he must possess an indubitable right of 
 taking such methods as he may judge proper to examine into the conduct of his offi- 
 cers and soldiers. And further, as it is the prerogative of the Crown to dismiss officers 
 or soldiers or any other servants from its service without any form of trial, so far from 
 objecting to the power of appointing courts of inquiry being lodged within the King, 
 that wheneA'er His Majesty shall condescend to leave the examination of doubtful 
 cases to such a court, and take their opinion thereon previous to the dismission of the 
 suspected person or persons, or the bringing of them before a court-martial, where an 
 olfender risks being punished with more severity, it may be regarded iBither as a mark 
 of his clemency and certain indication of his love of justice and equity. (Adye's 
 Courts-Martial, pp. 73, 74.) 
 
 Such being the theory of courts of inquiry in Great Britain, of course 
 it cannot be supposed that they are there " limited by construction," in 
 view of the purposes for which they are created. 
 
 In all the cases mentioned by the Attorney-General the investigation 
 of the incidents of an unsuccessful campaign or the incompetency of 
 commanding officers would undoubtedly take place at the time, as it 
 would manifestly be folly to inquire into either such subjects when the 
 campaign and war terminated and there were no public reasons to in- 
 vestigate it ; and as the Executive cannot dismiss an officer in time of 
 I)eace, it follows that an inquiry into matters alleged to have been 
 committed more. than two years can mean nothing. Cessante ratione 
 leffis cessaf it ipsa lex. 
 
 There could therefore be no ulterior proceedings beyond the report of 
 this court of inquiry, although it has inculpated General Warren in 
 what is in fact criminal negligence and disobedience of orders. Ko good 
 results can follow from this inquiry. It certainly did not exonerate the 
 ^Sapplicant," and the "respondent" testified as follows: 
 
 That it was not my purpose to antagonize the Fifth Corps nor to make the officers 
 of the Fifth Corps nor the men of the Fifth Corps feel bad. They had won a great 
 victory and I wanted to say just as little about the incidents connected with the A'ic- 
 tory as I possibly could, at least those that might look bad to their friends or to the 
 public, and so I was influenced a great deal in praising the cori)s. There is not a com- 
 mander who ever commanded men who has not done the same thing. It is a pretty 
 painful thing to antagonize old soldiers. This is the most painful thing I ever had 
 in my life, going through this inquiry. I am not only antagonizing myself but will 
 antagoiiize officers before we get through. 
 
 I think it will be seen from the evidence that reasonable grounds ex- 
 isted justifying the statements contained in the reports of Generals Grant 
 
58 
 
 iiud Sheridan aflectiug- General Warren, and that the act of General 
 Sheridan in relieving General Warren from command as he did was the 
 exercise of a discretion with which he was clothed, and in so doing there 
 is nothing to show that he was actuated by other than patriotic and 
 iustifiable motives. 
 
 D. G. SWAIM, 
 Jn dge-A dvocate- Gen era I. 
 
REPORT OF THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY. 
 
 HeADQUARTEBS of IHE Aemy, 
 
 Washitujio)}, D. C, July 35, 1S82. 
 
 The opinion of the court of inquiry in various branches of the case 
 of GouverneurK. AYarren, lieutenant-colonel of engineers, brevet major- 
 general United States Army, and the elaborate review of the same by 
 Judge-Advocate-General SSwaim, having been submitted tome foi' con- 
 sideration, I have to state that my official action is in no sense jieces- 
 sary to give strength to the conclusions reached or effect to whatever 
 Executive action the case may call for. 
 
 The court of inquiry was ordered by President Hayes, on the urgent 
 and repeated request of General Warren, and although General War- 
 ren could not have been tried by a general court-martial because of the 
 prohibition as to time in the one hundred and third Article of W^ar, yet 
 the power and right of the President of the United States to order an 
 inquiry into ''the natureof any transactions of, or accusations or im])u- 
 tatious against, any ofiScer" is clearly given by the one hundred and 
 fifteenth Article of War without any limitation as to time or circum- 
 stance, and it is for the President of the United States alone to make 
 such application of the results of this inquiry as his judgment may ap- 
 prove. To aid him in this I venture to condense a few points in this 
 most elaborate record. 
 
 In the month of March, 1865, Abraham Lincoln was President ( f the 
 United States, and constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
 Navy. The United States were engaged in a Avar involving the exist- 
 ence of the government, and had vast armies in the field, one of which — 
 the Army of the Potonmc — under the immediate command of Major- 
 General Meade, was operating- south of tlie James River, near Peters- 
 burg, against the enemy's capital, and against his chief army com- 
 manded by General Lee. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac was organized into corps, divisions, and 
 brigades. The corps commanders were always appointed by the Presi- 
 dent, whilst the division and brigade commanders were usually desig- 
 nated by the commanding general. On the 31st of March, 1865, General 
 G. K. Warren commanded the Fifth Corps, composed of three divisions — 
 Griffin, Ayres, and Crawford — on the extreme left of the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 At that date there were other armies operating against the same 
 enemy, viz, the Army of the James and a corps of calvary under Gen- 
 eral Sheridan. Lieutenant General Grant commanded all the armies 
 of the United States, but was ])ersonally present with the Army of the 
 Potomac. He possessed the absolute coufidence of the President, and 
 was vested with every power necessary to success. About that date he 
 had sent General Sheridan to feel for and attack the extreme right flank 
 of the enemy's line at or near the Five Forks. He, General Sheridan, 
 March 30, encountered a force too large to overcome with cavalry alone 
 and called for re- enforcement. This was promptly ordered by Lieuten- 
 ant-General Grant, through General Meade, who ordered the nearest 
 corps — Fifth, General Warren's — which corps was ordered to report to^ 
 
 .59 
 
60 
 
 Oeueral Sheridan at or near Dinwiddle by daylight of April 1, and be 
 subject to bis orders. The court of inquiry does not state that the President 
 had deputed to General Grant his undoubted authority to appoint and 
 remove corps commanders, but this is inferred and unquestioned. Yet 
 it is clearly found that General Grant had deputed to General Sheri- 
 dan the right to remove General Warren and give the command of the 
 Fifth Corps, if he saw fit, to General Griflin, one of tHe division com- 
 mauders. 
 
 The court fin d that the Fifth Corps did not reach General Sheridan 
 4is early on the 1st of April, as he had reason to expect, or as it might 
 have done. 
 
 On that 1st day of April, under the immediate command of General 
 Sheridan, was fought the battle of Five Forks — one of infinite impor- 
 tance. The history of it is given in great detp.il in the proceedings of 
 this court, and the findings are that the tactical handling of the Fifth 
 ■Corps by General Warren was unskillful, and that though the general 
 result was a success and victory, yet the victory resulted in spite of the 
 misdirection of two of the three divisions of the Fifth Corps, for which 
 the corps commander was held responsible. 
 
 General Sheridan, then uijiug the authority vested In him, relieved 
 General Warren of his command, and devolved it on the next in rank, 
 General Griffin. He had full authority for so doing; was sustained at 
 the time by his immediate superior, Lieutenant-General Grant, and 
 his action was never questioned by the then President Lincoln, or his 
 immediate successor, Johnson. There the matter ought to have ended. 
 
 But General Warren appealed to the successive Presidents for a 
 court of inquiry, but did not succeed until 1881, when by President 
 Hayes he was granted the opportunity for a full hearing before an im- 
 partial court of inquiry, whose proceedings contain a complete history 
 of these important eveuts, and whose findings confirm substantially 
 what was otficially reported on the dates of the occurrences. 
 
 It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commander of 
 an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conduct for 
 managing his command. He is responsible for results, and liblds the 
 lives and rei)utations of every officer and soldier under his orders as 
 subordinate to the great end— victory. The most important events are 
 usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he cannot stop to ana- 
 lyze his reasons. He must act on the impidse, the conviction, of the 
 instant, and should be sustained in his conclusions, if not manifestly 
 unjust. The power to command men and give vehement impulse to 
 their joint action is something which cannot be defined by words, but 
 it is plain and manifest in battles, and whoever commands an army in 
 chief must choose his subordinates by reason of qualities which can 
 alone be tested in actual conflict. 
 
 No one has (piestioned the patriotism, integrity, and great intelli- 
 gence of General Warren. These are attested by a long record of most 
 excellent service, but in the clash of arms at and near Five Forks, 
 March 31 and April 1, 18G5, his personal activity fell short of the stand- 
 ard fixed by General Sheridan, on whom alone rested the great re- 
 sponsibility for that and succeeding days. 
 
 My conclusion is that General Sheridan was perfectly justified in his 
 action in this case, and he must be fully and entirely sustained if the 
 United States expects great victories by her armies in the future. 
 
 All the other branches settled by this court belong to the domain of 
 liistorv rather than of militarv inquiry. 
 
 w. T. sherma:^^, 
 
 Q General. 
 
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