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The French Revolution 
 in San Domingo 
 
 BY 
 
 T. LOTHROP STODDARD 
 
 A.M., PH.D. (hARV.) 
 
 BOSTON AND NEW YORK 
 HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
 
 1914 
 

 ,5 @f 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY T. LOTHROP STODDARD 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 Published November tqt4 
 
 NOV 23 1914 
 
 )CI.A388551 
 
TO MY MOTHER 
 
 
 \' k ') 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The world-wide struggle between the primary races 
 of mankind — the "conflict of color," as it has been hap- 
 pily termed — bids fair to be the fundamental problem 
 of the twentieth century, and great communities like the 
 United States of America, the South African Confedera- 
 tion, and Australasia regard the "color question" as 
 perhaps the gravest problem of the future. To our age, 
 therefore, the French Revolution in San Domingo — the 
 first great shock between the ideals of white supremacy 
 and race equality, which erased the finest of European 
 colonies from the map of the white world and initiated 
 that most noted attempt at negro self-government, the 
 black republic of Haiti — cannot but be of peculiar 
 interest. 
 
 Strangely enough, the real story of this tremendous 
 racial and social cataclysm has never been told, and it is 
 to fill this gap in the history of modern times that this 
 book has been written. For, be it noted, in this field, the 
 race question, important though it be, is not the sole 
 noteworthy element. San Domingo in 1789 was the most 
 striking example of French colonial genius, and the struggle 
 of the colony's formative ideals with the new political, 
 economic, and social conceptions of the French Revolution 
 is of great importance to the history of European coloni- 
 zation. The attempt to apply the Revolutionary ideals to 
 an environment so radically different from that of France 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 yields a most valuable side-light to the study of the 
 French Revolution itself, while the attempt made under 
 the Consulate to restore French authority and economic 
 prosperity to San Domingo is one of the most illuminating 
 episodes in the career of the master-figure of the age — 
 Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 
 The keynote to the history of the French Revolution 
 in San Domingo is a great tragedy, — the tragedy of the 
 annihilation of the white population. The period opens 
 in 1789 with a resident white population of nearly 40,000 
 souls, at the very pinnacle of material prosperity and pos- 
 sessed of a complex social organization, jealously guard- 
 ing its supremacy and race identity in face of a large caste 
 of half-breeds whose only bond of interest with their 
 white superiors was a common exploitation of some 
 half -million negro slaves. The period closes sixteen years 
 later with the complete annihilation of the last remnants 
 of the white population, the subordination of the mulatto 
 caste to the negroes, and the destruction of the island's 
 economic prosperity. 
 
 In this grim tragedy the chief figure is that of the black 
 leader Toussaint Louverture. Unfortunately it seems 
 improbable that the mists enveloping his personality will 
 ever be cleared away. Extremely little first-class material 
 exists, and practically everything written about him is 
 of such doubtful value that his figure seems destined to 
 remain forever shrouded in the haze of legend and tra- 
 dition. 
 
 Excluding my five opening chapters of an introductory 
 nature, describing the condition of San Domingo in 1789, 
 the body of the work falls under two main heads. The 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 first of these is the downfall of white supremacy, brought 
 about by internal dissensions, by the revolt of the mu- 
 lattoes and negroes, and by the vigorous determina- 
 tion of Revolutionary France to destroy the colonial 
 ideals of slavery and the color line. This culminates in the 
 general collapse of white authority in the year 1793. The 
 second main heading of the book is the progress of black 
 supremacy, personified in the career of Toussaint Louver- 
 ture. After seven years of constant struggle this suprem- 
 acy becomes absolute; the English invaders are expelled, 
 the mulattoes crushed, the Spanish portion of the island 
 overrun, and French authority reduced to a vain shadow. 
 By the year 1800, Toussaint Louverture is absolute master 
 of San Domingo. But his power is short-lived. France is 
 now under the First Consul Bonaparte, and the peace 
 with England in 1801 frees his hands for the restoration 
 of San Domingo to France. Under the shock of Leclerc's 
 expedition Toussaint's power collapses, and though the 
 complete conquest of San Domingo is delayed by yellow 
 fever and Napoleon's restoration of slavery, the French 
 triumph is averted only by the renewal of the struggle 
 between France and England in 1803. The English war is, 
 however, fatal to the French cause. Within a year the 
 island is completely lost, and shortly afterward the last 
 French colonists are exterminated by the negro leader 
 Dessalines. White San Domingo has become only a 
 memory, and the black State of Haiti makes its appear- 
 ance in the world's history. 
 
 Of the source-materials for the present work, by far the 
 ' richest collections are those preserved in the French ar- 
 chives, a full description of which may be found in the 
 
x PREFACE 
 
 appended bibliography. It is almost certain that no archi- 
 val material remains in San Domingo itself. Toussaint's 
 papers were captured by the French in 1802, and but 
 few documents can have survived the century of civil 
 strife which sums up Haiti's turbulent history. The printed 
 material on San Domingo is extensive. From the earliest 
 times the island attracted attention, the first writers on 
 San Domingo being learned ecclesiastics. As early as 1733 
 the Jesuit Charlevoix published a four-volume history of 
 the island, based upon still earlier unpublished writings. 
 After the Seven Years' War (1763), San Domingo was by 
 far the most important French colony, and the lively 
 interest displayed by French thought on political and 
 economic questions resulted in a considerable number of 
 writings concerning the island. This growing literature 
 was soon swelled by the humanitarian antislavery agi- 
 tation which began to be noticeable after 1770. The out- 
 break of the French Revolution saw a flood of books, 
 pamphlets, and brochures of every description and shade 
 of opinion upon colonial questions in general and San 
 Domingo in particular, and the intensity of output 
 continues till the year 1793, when it sharply declines ow- 
 ing to the repressive influence of the Terror. The revived 
 interest in colonial affairs under Bonaparte and the 
 prospects of a restoration of white authority in San Do- 
 mingo called forth a large number of writings from exiled 
 colonists, while Leclerc's expedition resulted in several 
 accounts by officers and civilians. The years following 
 the Bourbon restoration in 1814 saw a series of writings 
 by exiled colonists similar to that following the establish- 
 ment of the Consulate in 1799, noted above; for France 
 
PREFACE xi 
 
 had not renounced her claims on San Domingo and many 
 persons hoped that the Bourbons would follow Napoleon's 
 example after the Peace of Amiens, now that the general 
 pacification of 1815 had again given the French fleets 
 the freedom of the sea. When this hope was seen to be 
 a vain one, however, interest in San Domingo died away. 
 The few writings on the island during the years preceding 
 the final abolition of slavery in the French colonies in 
 1848 are of little value. Of late years the subject has been 
 touched upon by modern writers on the Old Regime and 
 on Napoleon, while some twenty -five years ago an Ameri- 
 can writer (Mills) wrote a scholarly treatise directly on the 
 first two years of the French Revolution in San Domingo, 
 though he did not utilize any of the unpublished archival 
 material. Critical notices upon all the important books 
 in this field may be found in the appended bibliography. 
 In closing I desire to express my profound appreciation 
 to all those who have so kindly assisted me in my work; 
 especially, to Professor A. C. Coolidge, of Harvard Uni- 
 versity, the inspirer of the present volume; to Professors 
 R. M. Johnston and R. B. Merriman, of Harvard Univer- 
 sity, for their suggestions on certain parts of the book; 
 and to Messrs. Waldo G. Leland and Abel Doysie, of the 
 Carnegie Bureau for Historical Research, for their assist- 
 ance in my French archival researches. I desire also to 
 express my appreciation of the privileges extended me 
 by the Library of Harvard University, which so greatly 
 facilitated my examination of printed material. 
 
 T. Lothrop Stoddard. 
 
 Boston, June 20, 1914. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY ... 1 
 
 Approach to San Domingo. Area. Spanish Conquest. The 
 Buccaneers. Their Impress on San Domingo. 
 
 II. NATURAL FEATURES, POPULATION, AND GOV- 
 ERNMENT 6 
 
 Contrast of French and Spanish San Domingo. French San 
 Domingo : — The North, — The West, -*■ The South. Popula- 
 tion. Climate. Government. Confusion of Powers. Charac- 
 ter. The Judiciary. Economic Situation of San Domingo. 
 Trade with France. The "Pacte Coloniale." Its Results. 
 
 III. THE WHITES 19 
 
 Complex Structure of the White Population. Europeans and 
 Creoles. Sterility. The Official Caste. The Nobility. The 
 Clergy. Irreligion. The Middle Class. The "Petits Blancs." 
 The Creoles. Wealth and Luxury. Consequences. Town Life. 
 Country Life. The "Legend" of San Domingo. 
 
 IV. THE MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE . . 37 
 
 The "Free People of Color." Mulattoes and Free Negroes. 
 Concubinage. Increase of Mulattoes. The Color Line. Its 
 Necessity. The "Law of Reversion." Abhorrence of Misce- 
 genation. Punishment of Renegades. Indelibility of Color. 
 Status of the Mulattoes. The Mulatto Character. 
 
 V. THE SLAVES . . 50 
 
 Slavery. The Slave Population. Its Sterility. Slave Im- 
 ports. The Slave Trade. Preponderance of Foreign-Born 
 Negroes. Variety of Types. The African Negro. The Creole 
 Negro. General Character. Religion. Condition. Work. 
 Discipline. Legal Status. Actual Status. "Marronage." The 
 Maroon Negroes. Negro Revolts. Macandal. 
 
 VI. THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 68 
 
 States-General. Discontent in San Domingo. The Idea 
 of Colonial Representation. Beginning of the Movement. In 
 
xiv CONTENTS 
 
 France, — in San Domingo. Propaganda in France. The 
 Authorities in San Domingo. Colonial Opposition to Repre- 
 sentation. Fear of the States-General, — and of the Anti- 
 Slavery Movement in France. Election of Deputies to the 
 States-General. The Government Falls into Impotence. 
 Colonial Propaganda in the French Elections. The "Club 
 Massiac." The Struggle in the States-General. Fatal Results 
 of Colonial Representation. Possibility that San Domingo 
 might have Escaped the Revolution. 
 
 VII. FIRST STAGE OF THE COLONIAL STRUGGLE IN 
 FRANCE 82 
 
 Rapid Progress of the Revolution. Alarm of the Colonists. 
 Plan of a Colonial Assembly. The Mulatto Agitation in 
 France. The Colonial Committee. Its Report, — and De- 
 cree of March 8, 1790. The "Instructions" of March 28. 
 "Article 4." 
 
 VIII. THE FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO. . 90 
 
 Latent Unrest at San Domingo. Effect of the "14th of 
 July." The Poor Whites enter Politics. Flight of Barbe- 
 Marbois. The Provincial Assemblies, — they call a Colonial 
 Assembly. Mulatto Unrest. Negro Unrest. White Reprisals. 
 Results. The Mulatto Rising of March, 1790. Effects. Pos- 
 sibility of a Government-Planter-Mulatto Alliance, — which 
 is not Realized. 
 
 IX. THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC . . . .100 
 
 Character of the Colonial Assembly. It draws up a Consti- 
 tution. Its Nature. Tension between Government and Assem- 
 bly. Peynier'a Referendum. Beginning of Hostilities. The 
 Chevalier Mauduit. The "Pompons Blancs." The Mutiny of 
 the Leopard. Mauduit's coup d'Hat. Vincent's Expedition. 
 The Fall of Saint-Marc. The Assembly leaves for France. The 
 "Treaty of Leogane." Unsettled State of the Colony, — the 
 West, — the South, — the North. Lack of Union against the 
 Revolution. Oge's Rebellion. Its Meaning. Its Results. It 
 fails to heal White Disunion. Overthrow of Royalism in the 
 West. Realignment of Parties. 
 
 X. THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 115 
 
 Relative Security of the Colonial System till 1790. Attitude 
 of French Conservatives, — and of the Colonists. Its Effect 
 
CONTENTS xv 
 
 on the National Assembly. The Tide Changes with 1791. 
 Report of the Grand Committee. The Great Debate on the 
 Colonies. The Rewbell Amendment. It becomes the Decree of 
 May 15, 1791. Its Results. Its Arrival in San Domingo. Its 
 Reception. The new Colonial Assembly. 
 
 XI. THE NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH . 128 
 
 Its Outbreak. Premonitory Symptoms since 1789. White 
 Disregard. First Negro Successes. Causes of White Inactiv- 
 ity: — Mental Shock, — Disaffection within Le Cap. Bravery 
 of the Country Whites. Terrible Nature of the Struggle. Negro 
 Leaders and Tactics. Primary Cause of the Insurrection. Con- 
 tributory Responsibility of the French Radicals, — of the 
 Royalists, — of the Colonists. 
 
 XII. THE MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST. 142 
 
 The Mulattoes resolve to Strike. The Royalists of the West. 
 The Alliance of Royalists and Mulattoes. The Confederation 
 of La-Croix-des-Bouquets. The Concordat of September. Its 
 real Significance. Renewal of the Troubles. Arrival of the 
 Decree of September 24, 1791. Its Effects. The Burning of 
 Port-au-Prince. Race War in the West, — and South. 
 
 XIII. THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS . . .153 
 
 Character of the Commission, — and of the Commissioners. 
 Their Arrival at San Domingo. Their Negotiations with the 
 Negro Rebels. Their Failure. Its Results. Breach between 
 Commissioners and Assembly. The Commissioners and the 
 West. Saint-Leger in the West. He returns to France. Crisis 
 at Le Cap. The March Riots. Mirbeck sails for France. 
 Roume remains, — to combat a Royalist Reaction. 
 
 XIV. THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 * 166 
 
 Jacobin Hostility to the Decree of the 24th September. 
 
 Jacobin Power in the "Legislatif." Appeals from San Domingo. 
 The Jacobins prevent the Sending of Aid. Effect on San Do- 
 mingo. The Jacobin Assault on the Colonial System. The 
 Report of January 10, 1792. The Approach of Jacobin Victory. 
 The Law of April 4, 1792. Effect on San Domingo. The 
 "Council of Peace and Union." Policy of Roume. His Jour- 
 ney to the West. Blanchelande in the South. 
 
xvi CONTENTS 
 
 XV. THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS . . .181 
 
 Coercive Nature of the Law of the 4th of April. The 
 Second Civil Commission, and Commissioners, Polverel, Ail- 
 haud, Sonthonax. Opinions on their Character. Was there a 
 Jacobin Plot? The Commissioners' Instructions. Their Ar- 
 rival at San Domingo. Their First Measures. Effect of the 
 "Tenth of August" on San Domingo. The Royalist Conspir- 
 acy. The October Riots. 
 
 XVI. SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH . . .194 
 
 Arrival of Rochambeau. Plans against the Color Line. The 
 "Affaire Theron." Polverel's Voyage to the West. Sonthonax's 
 Rule at Le Cap. Remonstrances of Polverel. The December 
 Riots. Results. Increasing Difficulties. Foreign War. First 
 Moves toward Emancipation. 
 
 XVII. POLVEREL'S GOVERNMENT OF THE WEST . 206 
 
 Polverel at Saint-Marc, — and at Port-au-Prince. His Alli- 
 ance with the Town Whites. The Desertion of Ailhaud. 
 Polverel in the South. The Break-Up of Western Royalism on 
 the Color Line. Hyacinthe's Maroon Rising. The Revolt 
 of Port-au-Prince. Sonthonax in the West. Fall of Port-au- 
 Prince. Rigaud's Defeat. 
 
 XVIII. THE DESTRUCTION OF LE CAP . . . .215 
 Unrest at Le Cap. The Arrival of Galbaud. Alarm of the 
 
 Commissioners. They Return to Le Cap. The Revolt of the 
 Fleet. The Destruction of Le Cap. Attitude of the Commis- 
 sioners. 
 
 XIX. EMANCIPATION . .222 
 
 Exodus of the White Population, — and of the White Troops. 
 Advance of the Spaniards. State of Le Cap. Sonthonax's New 
 Policy. His Emancipation Proclamation. Its Extension to the 
 West and South. Its Effects. Sonthonax's Perilous Situation. 
 His Flight to the West. 
 
 XX. THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION . . . .231 
 
 White Desire for English Aid. The Grande Anse calls in the 
 English, — and receives a British Garrison. Surrender of the 
 Mole-Saint-Nicolas. Defection of the West. Hopeless Condi- 
 tion of the North. Attitude of the Commissioners. Defection 
 
CONTENTS xvli 
 
 of the Mulattoes. The Convention Decrees the Commissioners 
 in a State of Accusation. It is Disregarded. Anti-Colonial 
 Feeling in France. The Convention abolishes Slavery. Effect 
 on San Domingo. The Commissioners leave for France. 
 
 XXI. THE ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE . 246 
 
 His Early Life. His First Acts. Toussaint in Spanish Serv- 
 ice. He changes Sides. Campaign against the English (1794). 
 The Campaign of 1795. Rivalry of the Colored Castes. 
 Rigaud's Rule in the South. Toussaint's Policy in the West. 
 Rigaud's Policy in the North. The Mulatto Troubles at 
 Le Cap. The Rising of the 30th Ventose. Its Results. 
 
 XXII. THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS . . .258 
 The Third Civil Commission, — and Commissioners. Their 
 
 First Acts. Sonthonax's Policy. Its Results in the North, — 
 and South. Policy of Sonthonax and Toussaint. Toussaint 
 expels Sonthonax. His Fears of its Effect on France. His 
 Attitude. 
 
 XXIII. THE MISSION OF GENERAL HEDOUVELLE . 269 
 
 Reasons for his Mission. Toussaint's English Policy. He- 
 douville's Policy. His Clash with Toussaint over the English 
 Evacuation. The Expulsion of Hedouville. 
 
 XXIV. THE WAR BETWEEN THE CASTES . . .276 
 
 Toussaint's Difficulties. He gains over Roume. The Con- 
 ference between Toussaint and Rigaud. The War between the 
 Castes. The Siege of Jacmel. The Conquest of the South. The 
 "Bloody Assize" of Dessalines. The Ruin of the West. 
 
 XXV. THE TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE . 283 
 
 Toussaint's Projects against Santo Domingo. Opposition of 
 Roume. It is Broken. Bonaparte's Commission. The Resist- 
 ance of Santo Domingo. Its Conquest by Toussaint. Condi- 
 tion of French San Domingo. Toussaint's Reconstruction of 
 San Domingo. His Favor to the Whites. Moyse's Rebellion. 
 Toussaint's Constitution. 
 
 XXVI. THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE . . . .296 
 The Colonies at the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon's Constitu- 
 tional Changes. Conflicting Views on the Future Colonial 
 
xviii CONTENTS 
 
 Policy of France. First Abortive Expedition for San Domingo. 
 Further Tentative Measure?. The English Peace frees Napo- 
 leon's Hands. Leclerc's Instructions. 
 
 XXVII. THE COMING OF LECLERC 308 
 
 Leclerc's Arrival at San Domingo. Toussaint's Attitude. 
 His Position. Leclerc's Plan. Fall of Le Cap, — and Port-au- 
 Prince. Surrender of the South, — and of Santo Domingo. 
 Dessalines's Failure at Leogane. Leclerc's Negotiations with 
 Toussaint. Capture of Port-de-Paix. Leclerc's Campaign. 
 Toussaint's Defeat at Couleuvres. Dessalines's Defence of the 
 West. His Failure at Port-au-Prince. Humbert's Defeat at 
 Port-de-Paix. Capitulation of Maurepas. Siege of the Crete-a- 
 Pierrot. Effect of its Capture. Submission of the Black Gen- 
 erals. Necessity for Leclerc's Policy of Conciliation. 
 
 XXVIII. THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER . 326 
 
 Yellow Fever. Toussaint's Arrest. Its Effects. Toussaint's 
 End. The Disarmament. Napoleon's Reactionary Policy. 
 Leclerc's Alarm. The Reaction at Guadeloupe. Its Effect 
 on San Domingo. Loyalty of the Black Generals. Leclerc's 
 Despair. Ravages of the Fever. The Death of Leclerc. 
 
 XXIX. THE LAST PHASE 344 
 
 Defection of the Mulattoes. Their Attack on Le Cap. De- 
 fection of the Black Generals. Improvement under Rocham- 
 beau. Terrible Nature of the Struggle. The English War. The 
 Loss of San Domingo. The Extermination of the Whites. The 
 End of "San Domingo." 
 
 NOTES 351 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 393 
 
The French Revolution in 
 San Domingo 
 
The French Revolution in 
 San Domingo 
 
 i * 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY 
 
 The European voyager who, on a morning of early 
 1789, raised the eastern cape of the island of San Do- 
 mingo and sailed along its northern shore, had before 
 his eyes substantially the panorama of to-day: a wall 
 of high green hills, clothed with forests and backed by 
 glimpses of mountain-peaks far in the hazy distance. 
 No sign of man broke upon the lonely coast, for this was 
 the decayed and neglected colony of Spanish Santo 
 Domingo. 
 
 But when he had crossed the wide bay-mouth of Man- 
 cenille and again neared the land, the scene was changed 
 as by an enchanter's wand. There lay before him a noble 
 plain, teeming and throbbing with human life to its 
 very background of lofty mountains; a vast checkerboard 
 of bright green sugar-cane, upon which rose white columns 
 of tall chimneys and tree-embowered plantation mansions. 
 Where a mountain spur neared the sea, its slopes were 
 belted with coffee-plantations almost to its wooded crest. 
 When the sudden tropic night fell, the long coast sparkled 
 with lights, while ever and anon a sudden flame from some 
 
2 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 boiling-house stack lit up the countryside with its glare. 1 
 For this was the French portion of the island, — " La 
 Partie Frangaise de Saint-Domingue." 
 
 Sailing next morning past the guns of Fort Picolet, the 
 city of Cap Francais came into view nestling under the 
 craggy "Morne du Cap." 2 This, the Metropolis of San 
 Domingo, was a fine, stone-built town of twenty thousand 
 souls. Over a hundred ships lay at anchor or beside 
 its broad quays, while three thousand sailors swarmed 
 upon its water-front or made merry in its many taverns. 3 
 Into its warehouses poured ceaselessly the tribute of the 
 great North Plain, — the produce of nearly three thou- 
 sand plantations and the labor of two hundred thousand 
 slaves. 4 Here glowed most brightly the strange, hectic 
 life of those eighteenth-century West Indies; — those 
 island-factories, producing sugar and consuming slaves. 
 
 This magnificent colony, which supplied not only 
 France but the half of Europe, was not very large. As a 
 glance at the map will show, it was little more than two 
 long peninsulas to north and south, connected by a strip 
 of territory in places not more than twenty miles wide. 
 By far the greater portion of the island remained in the 
 possession of its original masters, the Spaniards. 
 
 Columbus, its discoverer, had named it Hispaniola, and 
 it had been the earliest centre of Spanish colonization. 
 But a brief period of brutal exploitation had exhausted 
 its mineral wealth and annihilated its numerous Indian 
 population. The discoveries of Mexico and Peru rapidly 
 drained away the restless conquistador es, and the island 
 sank almost into oblivion. The few colonists who remained 
 turned loose their cattle on the lonely land, and in time 
 
INTRODUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY 3 
 
 troops of swine rooted in its virgin forests and herds 
 of wild cattle grazed upon its silent plains. 5 
 
 It was early in the seventeenth century that bands of 
 interlopers began to settle upon those northern and west- 
 ern coasts which were to form the French portion of San 
 Domingo. 6 These people were by no means predominantly 
 French. The English were nearly as numerous, and there 
 were other minor elements. 7 They found the western end 
 of the island entirely deserted, for the Spaniards had al- 
 ways confined their settlements to the east, the regions of 
 mineral wealth. Many of these men ranged the woods 
 after the herds of wild cattle, whence their name "buc- 
 caneers"; 8 others settled upon the little island of Tor- 
 tuga, off the north coast, from which they sallied forth to 
 prey upon Spanish commerce. 9 
 
 For nearly forty years these nests of hunters and pirates 
 pursued a bloody and tumultuous history. Three times 
 the Spaniards descended upon Tortuga and laid it waste, 
 while throughout this period the French and English 
 elements strove for supremacy. The struggle was long and 
 doubtful. As late as 1657 an Englishman ruled Tortuga, 
 and not until 1663 were the French firmly established. 10 
 
 Henceforth these regions might be considered French; 
 but their early history had set upon them an indelible 
 stamp which was to differentiate San Domingo from all 
 the other colonies of France. Not French adventurers 
 alone, but men of other nations as well, had settled the 
 land and wrested it from the Spaniard; neither crown 
 nor chartered company had brought them thither, but 
 their own adventurous wills. Hence, the basic spirit of 
 this young society was Liberty : Liberty in all its phases, 
 
4 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 — political, legal, social, religious, moral, — the very 
 antithesis to that ordered despotism of the Grand Mo- 
 narque which ruled contemporary France. 11 
 
 Royal Governors now sat at Tortuga, men of ability 
 and natural force, — but they could do little to increase 
 the power of the Crown. The wild buccaneer spirit flamed 
 up at the least sign of encroachment; indeed, this very 
 temper was needed to protect the infant colony from its 
 foreign enemies. For the Spaniard continued to threaten 
 till the Peace of Ryswick, 12 while the English made con- 
 tinual descents up to the general peace of 1714. 13 Thus, 
 after nearly a century of existence, San Domingo still 
 essentially retained its lawless independence. 14 
 
 At the death of Louis XIV, San Domingo was, it is true, 
 no longer the pirate nest of an earlier time. The Governors 
 had done their best to attach their unruly subjects to the 
 land, had brought in wives, and had encouraged agricul- 
 tural immigrants. There were distinct beginnings of 
 farming and trade. 15 The long peace which prevailed 
 until almost the middle of the eighteenth century saw the 
 rapid growth of San Domingo in wealth and population. 16 
 
 But the old spirit lived on. All the West Indies received 
 unruly elements, but San Domingo seems to have been 
 particularly marked in this respect. A Governor of Mar- 
 tinique complains of the number of persons leaving that 
 island for San Domingo, "where they may give them- 
 selves up to hunting and disorder, and where licentious 
 liberty is complete." 17 The Governors needed all their 
 tact and coolness to prevent continual outbreaks. "In 
 a word, insolence and mutiny were everywhere." 18 
 Attempts to infringe upon commercial liberty were 
 
INTRODUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY 5 
 
 answered by serious rebellions in 1670 and 1723, and the 
 proposed chartered company regime had to be dropped. 
 And it was very evident that these risings were but symp^ 
 toms of the basic spirit of the colony. "These people 
 have risen not only against the Company but against the 
 King's authority," writes the Governor in 1723. "They 
 demand tax exemption, free trade with all nations, and 
 a republican liberty." 19 It is no mere academic inter- 
 est which thus emphasizes the origin and early spirit of 
 San Domingo. For, despite the marvellous economic 
 and social transformation of the later eighteenth century, 
 the old ideas lived on. In 1789, the colonists had not for- 
 gotten their early history. They claimed that San Do- 
 mingo had "given itself to the King of France" upon 
 certain conditions; 20 they considered the island no mere 
 subject colony, but a " Franco- American Province," bound 
 to France through the Crown: 21 a species of personal 
 union somewhat like that of France and Navarre. On the 
 day when the French people should destroy the Crown and 
 claim for itself the right to break conditions which the 
 Crown had always respected and which the colonists con- 
 sidered vital to their existence (the color line and slavery), 
 it is easy to realize the moral sanction given to projects 
 for resistance and rebellion. 
 
II 
 
 NATURAL FEATURES, POPULATION, AND 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 In 1789 French San Domingo was the gem of the West 
 Indies, and the spectacle of its marvellous prosperity was 
 perhaps enhanced by contrast with its Spanish neighbor. 
 A short journey away from the fierce energy of the west 
 coast across the border mountain wall brought one to a 
 land where it was always afternoon: the same soil and 
 a better climate had here produced only a deepening 
 lethargy. Santo Domingo, the capital, was a handsome, 
 picturesque old town, with many stately landmarks of 
 its early prosperity, but elsewhere all was decay and 
 solitude. 1 The total population was barely 125,000. These 
 were mostly ranchers and herdsmen, for there was almost 
 no agriculture and only some fourteen thousand slaves. 
 Of the free population about half were rated white, though 
 the color line seems to have been pretty loosely drawn. 2 
 
 French San Domingo was divided into three provinces, 
 ■ — the North, the West, and the South; this order corre- 
 sponding to date of settlement and relative importance. 
 The North Province was the oldest, richest, and most 
 densely populated. Its glory was the incomparable " Plaine 
 du Nord" : its chief city, Cap Francais (colloquially known 
 as "Le Cap"), was the metropolis of the colony. 3 The 
 North Province was shut off from the rest of the island 
 by a difficult mountain-chain running east and west, 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 7 
 
 which continued out into the sea as a high peninsula 
 tipped by the strong fortress of the M61e-Saint-Nicolas, 
 the "Gibraltar of the Antilles." Although the North was 
 so largely mountainous, the valleys were of great fer- 
 tility and the lower hill-slopes eminently suited to coffee- 
 planting. Only about the Mole was there a dry and sterile 
 region unfit for agriculture. 4 
 
 The West Province embraced the central portion of the 
 colony, and much of the southern part as well. A glance 
 at the map will show its extraordinary irregularity of 
 outline, pressed close to the sea as it was by the sinuous 
 mountain wall of the Spanish border. It must be noted 
 that much of the long southern peninsula, which was the 
 colony's most striking geographical feature, fell within 
 its jurisdiction. 
 
 Although nearly twice the size of the North, the West 
 Province was not soVwell favored by nature. The moun- 
 tain ranges to north and east cut off the rainfall, and 
 made its climate hot and unhealthful; precipitation came 
 mostly from violent thunderstorms which were often more 
 a damage than a benefit. Its prosperity in 1789 was largely 
 due to elaborate irrigation, which made possible the regu- 
 lar cultivation of its plains. These were three in number: 
 the wide, inland valley of the Artibonite in the upper por- 
 tion of the Province, the small but rich plain of Leogane at 
 the base of the southern peninsula, and the great plain 
 of Cul-de-Sac, in rear of the city of Port-au-Prince. 5 
 
 Port-au-Prince, although dating only from the middle 
 of the eighteenth century, was a thriving town of some 
 eight thousand inhabitants. The produce of the Cul-de- 
 Sac made it a busy port, while its selection as the colonial 
 
8 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 capital gave it added importance. Its appearance, how- 
 ever, was far inferior to that of Le Cap, for the preva- 
 lence of earthquakes made it a town of low wooden 
 houses, which European visitors slightingly compared 
 to a Tartar camp. 6 
 
 The South Province was in all respects the least im- 
 portant. Its small area was entirely confined to the long 
 southern peninsula, in reality little more than a mountain 
 ridge sloping precipitately to the sea. Still largely unde- 
 veloped, the South's rather primitive economic and social 
 conditions recalled the earlier times. It was, however, not 
 devoid of possibilities, for there were many fertile valleys, 
 and a real plain behind its busy little capital, Les Cayes. 7 
 One thing should be especially noted; — a narrow strip 
 of sea alone separated the South Province from the Eng- 
 lish island of Jamaica, and a close intercourse had always 
 existed in defiance of the laws against contraband trade. 8 
 In the storms of the Revolution this was to have imp cr- 
 tant consequences. 
 
 The population of San Domingo was divided into three 
 castes: the whites, the "free colored" (including both 
 mulattoes and negroes), and the slaves. It is impossible 
 to discover their numbers for the year 1789 with any 
 great accuracy. The last official census was taken in 1788, 
 and it seems to have been far from accurate. No official 
 returns for the slave population can be trusted, since the 
 planters made false reports to avoid the head-tax on their 
 human chattels. 
 
 The official returns for 1788 give slightly under 28,C00 
 whites, 22,000 free colored, and some 405,000 slaves. 9 
 For the year 1789 we have no official returns, but we do 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 9 
 
 possess two estimates from experts worthy of every con- 
 sideration. The Intendant Barb6-Marbois, an exceedingly 
 careful man whose official position ensured him accurate 
 information, estimates the whites at 35,500, the free 
 colored at 26,600, and the slaves at 400,000. 10 The deeply 
 learned Moreau de Saint-Mery gives as his figures, 39,000 
 whites, 27,500 free colored, and 452,000 slaves. 11 
 
 The climate of San Domingo was very bad, — possibly 
 the worst of the West Indies. Official correspondence 
 almost always mentions the writers' failing health, while 
 the history of military operations in the island is one long 
 tragedy of disease, from the decimation of the Anglo- 
 Spanish expeditions in the wars of Louis XIV down to the 
 final catastrophic annihilation of Napoleon's great army 
 in 1803. 
 
 The writers on San Domingo unite in a general con- 
 demnation. "In this climate," writes an intelligent trav- 
 eller about the year 1785, "the European must be al- 
 ways on his guard. The sun is a danger, the evening-cool 
 a menace, the rain not less fatal." 12 Good health could be 
 preserved only by abstemious living and the most careful 
 precautions. 13 Hilliard d'Auberteuil's is the only voice 
 raised in its favor, 14 but he is obviously making a polemi- 
 cal point, 15 — and his words called forth protests of amaze- 
 ment and indignation. "To-day," writes a colonist, "is 
 the 30th of January; it is four o'clock in the afternoon; 
 — and I am obliged to prop up Monsieur d'Auberteuil's 
 book because I am sweating such great drops. What has 
 caused this? — the climate or Monsieur d'Auberteuil's 
 assertions? We will let him settle the question." 16 
 
 The hot months from April to September were the most 
 
10 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 unhealthful; they were the time of malaria and yellow 
 fever. But the cooler rainy season was also scourged by 
 intestinal troubles. 17 The only healthful spots were the 
 barren island of Tortuga, and the dry and sterile district 
 of the Mole-Saint-Nicolas. 
 
 Although the storms of the Revolution were to prove 
 that the population of San Domingo had neither forgotten 
 its early history nor lost its turbulent character, the pro- 
 found transformations of the preceding half-century had 
 greatly altered the spirit of government. Increase in 
 wealth and closer connections with France had enabled 
 the Bourbon Monarchy to tighten its grip upon the island. 
 
 "The government of the colony vested ultimately in 
 the Minister of Marine, representing the King." 18 His 
 edicts were laws, and he appointed the high officials. 19 
 But Paris was distant a six-weeks voyage, and the local 
 heads of government were in practice the supreme au- 
 thority. "Heads," be it remarked; for the local power was 
 twofold, ■ — the Governor and the Intendant. No parallel 
 should be drawn with their fellows of contemporary 
 France, for the Governor of San Domingo was the 
 stronger factor. 20 
 
 Theoretically each was assigned a special sphere, with 
 a middle ground of joint activity. The Governor was the 
 titular representative of the Crown, the military chief, 
 and the medium of external relations. The Intendant, 
 whose office dated only from the beginning of the eigh- 
 teenth century, 21 headed the civil administration and the 
 judiciary. 22 
 
 But this division of powers remained largely a theory. 
 To begin with, the respective spheres had never been per- 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 11 
 
 manently delimited. "The powers of the Governors were 
 not fixed definitely by law, but were described in the com- 
 mission given to each appointee and varied from time to 
 time. To a Governor possessing a greater degree of the 
 King's confidence, especial power would be given." 23 
 That large range of duties in which joint action was pre- 
 scribed was another fruitful source of ambiguity. And, to 
 these inherent difficulties, there was added the personal 
 element. The Governor was always an old soldier or 
 sailor; the Intendant always a bureaucrat. To place 
 members of the "Noblesse d'Epee" and the "Noblesse 
 de Robe" upon a remote island with interlaced author- 
 ity was to court the usual result, — chronic rivalries 
 and usurpations, which extended down through every 
 grade of the administrations. 24 For each stood at the head 
 of a numerous official hierarchy which naturally espoused 
 the cause of its superior. 25 All eighteenth-century writers 
 are loud in their censure of the endless confusion and 
 scandal. "This hybrid civil and military administration 
 called a government," exclaims Hilliard d'Auberteuil in 
 1776, "has degenerated into a frightful mixture of tyranny 
 and anarchy." 26 
 
 In these struggles the Governor generally came off 
 victorious. He was not only master of the regular military 
 forces, but also head of the elaborate militia and gen- 
 darmerie system demanded by the island's strategic posi- 
 tion and immense slave population. 27 His local comman- 
 dants sometimes usurped both civil and judicial authority, 
 and governed their districts under virtual martial law. 28 
 But the Intendant always opposed an annoying obstruc- 
 tionism, continuously invoked the intervention of the 
 
12 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Minister of Marine, and courted the favor of certain 
 elements of the colonial population. 29 
 
 As might have been expected, such a regime had a 
 harsh and arbitrary character. 30 Its incumbents, however, 
 boldly defended its necessity. "Yes," writes a Governor 
 in 1761, "authority is in the hands of the military power: 
 but this is the natural consequence of the colony's origin 
 and present condition. Eight thousand whites capable of 
 bearing arms are dispersed along three hundred leagues of 
 coast. Nearly two hundred thousand blacks, their slaves 
 and potential enemies, are about them day and night. 
 Furthermore, these are men not bound to the land by ties 
 of birth, loyalty, and blood, but drawn by self-interest 
 frcm many regions." 31 
 
 Nevertheless, though arbitrary and severe, the Govern- 
 ment of San Domingo was by no means so black as 
 painted by the democratic theorists of the time. Such a 
 population, with arms in its hands and the backing of past 
 tradition, would not have submitted to a very grinding 
 tyranny. A native planter like Venault de Charmilly 
 describes the force of public opinion, favored as it was by 
 the internecine struggles of authority itself. 32 
 
 But though there might be a dispute as to this Govern- 
 ment's tyranny, there could be none whatever as to its 
 costliness. 33 Bad finance was the besetting sin of the Old 
 Regime, but nowhere was its disorder, wastefulness, and 
 graft seen to better advantage than at San Domingo. In 
 the year 1785 the Abbe Raynal had protested strongly 
 against an expenditure of three million livres. 34 The official 
 report of December, 1789, itemizes an expenditure of nearly 
 five millions. 35 Taking Barbe-Marbois's census figures, this 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT IS 
 
 would mean a yearly burden on the colonists of nearly 
 one hundred and forty livres per head. The wealth of 
 San Domingo, it is true, enabled it to carry the burden; 
 but taxation was keenly felt, especially the hated poll-tax 
 on slaves. 36 
 
 The mere presence of antiquated methods, red tape, 
 and the lack of a well-audited budget produced much leak- 
 age. 37 But there was a great deal of downright graft be- 
 sides. A conservative observer like the Baron de Wimpffen 
 speaks scornfully of the venality of the Governors, 38 and 
 official peculation seems to have been as brazen as it was 
 serious. 39 
 
 Nevertheless, with all its faults, the Government was 
 not without its good side. "Especially since the middle 
 of the eighteenth century it had done much to better the 
 economic situation of the island, had organized a, good 
 police, clarified justice, and improved taxation." 40 
 
 But all this had been done in the spirit of the contempo- 
 rary maxim, "Everything for the people, and nothing by 
 the people." The official world was a caste of Europeans, 
 in which the colonists had no part. 41 There was not even 
 the humblest form of municipal self-government, 42 and 
 the reforming era of Choiseul had given San Domingo 
 only a couple of chambers of commerce. 43 It was this 
 complete lack of political education which was to weigh 
 so heavily in the Revolution. 44 
 
 Until well past the middle of the eighteenth century, 
 San Domingo had possessed a native judiciary. If we 
 are to believe the colonists, it was endowed with every 
 virtue, 45 but the testimony of officials and travellers leaves 
 a different impression. In 1711, a royal officer is greatly 
 
14 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 scandalized at the procedure of a magistrate who pro- 
 nounced judgment between pipe-puffs, the while a dis- 
 trict attorney allowed litigants to curse one another at 
 pleasure. 46 And, although time seems to have lent more 
 dignity, the conduct of the legal class remained unedify- 
 ing. In 1750, a registrar, formerly the proprietor of a 
 gambling-house, installed a faro layout amid his official 
 records to while away his idle moments. 47 
 
 Nevertheless, though crude and unlearned in the law, 
 this colonial judiciary seems to have given cheap and 
 speedy justice in accordance with local conditions. 48 Not 
 so the trained European lawyers who replaced them. 
 Their procedure was as tedious at San Domingo as in the 
 Parliament de Paris, and their pedantic application of 
 French precedents to radically diverse cases was a con- 
 stant source of injustice and irritation. 49 "The erudition 
 of these gentlemen," exclaims Raynal, "has well taught 
 us that the Coutume de Paris and the Institutes of Jus- 
 tinian were drawn up under a latitude very remote from 
 that of San Domingo." 60 This impatience at the slowness 
 and pedantry of the courts caused executive encroach- 
 ment, and royal officers often usurped judicial functions, 
 especially as they were thus striking at henchmen of the 
 hated Intendant. 51 The cost of this latter-day justice 
 seems to have been very great. De Wimpffen states that 
 the Provincial Court at Jacmel had a budget of over four 
 hundred thousand livres a year. 52 
 
 In 1789, San Domingo " had attained a height of pros- 
 perity not surpassed in the history of European colonies. 
 The greatest part of its soil was covered by plantations 
 on a gigantic scale which supplied half Europe with 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 15 
 
 sugar, coffee, and cotton." 53 And the degree of this pros- 
 perity was increasing by leaps aDd bounds. Since 1786, 
 "the planters had doubled their products, and a large 
 amount of French capital had poured into the island for 
 investment — a hundred millions from Bordeaux alone. 
 The returns were already splendid and still greater were 
 expected." 54 
 
 San Domingo had undergone the economic transforma- 
 tion of the other islands. In the seventeenth century its 
 products had been tobacco, cocoa, and indigo. These 
 had been grown by many small proprietors of modest 
 fortune, with the aid of white indentured servants and a 
 few slaves. 55 
 
 But the coming of sugar changed all this. The produc- K 
 tion of sugar is as much an industrial as it is an agricul- 
 tural operation; it requires broad acres, a costly plant, and 
 large working capital. The small holders quickly vanished 
 before huge plantations worked by great gangs of slaves. 56 
 In 1789, the number of sugar-plantations was close upon 
 eight hundred. 57 
 
 However, sugar was by no means San Domingo's only 
 product. Its cultivation was necessarily restricted to the 
 plains and broader valleys, but French thrift had utilized 
 everything except the mountain crests. 58 It is true that 
 tobacco and cocoa had practically gone and that indigo 
 was fast going, but other staples had come to take their 
 place. First among these stood coffee, whose three thou- 
 sand plantations covered every mountainside; while the 
 cotton acreage was advancing year by year. The less 
 favored districts were given up to pasture which fed 
 some two hundred and fifty thousand cattle and swine. 59 
 
16 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Such a colony was patently the most precious over-seas 
 possession of France. The imports from her American col- 
 onies for the year 1789 totalled two hundred and eighteen 
 million livres, 60 fully three fourths of which came from 
 San Domingo. 61 Furthermore, of these imports France 
 reexported nearly two thirds, mostly after economic 
 transformations which supported many branches of her 
 industrial system. 62 In supplying the wants of the island, 
 both the industry and the agriculture of France were 
 interested. The fifty million livres of exports to San Do- 
 mingo included everything from foodstuffs to tobacco- 
 pipes; — "in a word, every object indispensable to civ- 
 ilized life." 63 Lastly, to all these profits there must be 
 added the rich returns from the slave trade, 64 and San 
 Domingo's predominant share in maintaining the fleet 
 of a thousand ships and fifteen thousand sailors trading 
 with the colonies. 65 
 
 The splendid position of San Domingo might seem to 
 have meant contented colonists; — in reality, they were 
 hot with discontent: though prosperous, they well knew 
 that they might have been more prosperous still. For they 
 saw themselves the victims of that tyrannous economic 
 system known as the "Pacte Coloniale." 66 
 
 Normand has well summarized the principles of this 
 system under five rules: (1) the colony must send its prod- 
 ucts only to the mother country; (2) the colony must buy 
 only from the mother country; (3) the colony must es- 
 tablish no manufactures; (4) the mother country agreed 
 to buy its tropical products only from the colony; (5) the 
 carrying-trade with the colony must be the monopoly of 
 the mother country's merchant marine. 67 
 
POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT 17 
 
 It is clear that only the fourth rule favored the colony; 
 — the others sacrificed it to the mother country in the 
 most ruthless fashion. Yet at the time, no principle was 
 more generally established than the "Pacte Coloniale" : 
 all nations held it to be the keystone of colonial policy, 
 and Colbert's dictum, " Colonies are founded by and for 
 the mother country," 68 was considered an axiom. Even 
 the intellect of a Chatham could contend that the colonies 
 should not be allowed to make a nail or a horse-shoe. " The 
 mother country saw in her colonists only a special kind 
 of subjects, predestined to receive her products at an ex- 
 cessively high price and to yield theirs at a value abnor- 
 mally lowered by the absolute lack of foreign markets and 
 consequent competition." 69 They were "in every re- 
 spect victims of monopoly." 70 
 
 But, although the system of France was no stricter than 
 her neighbors', it bore with especial hardship on her colo- 
 nies. The reason for this was that the French merchant 
 marine, although granted the monopoly of the carrying- 
 trade, was quite inadequate to the supplying of the colo- 
 nies. 71 Indeed, it showed no real desire to do so, and strove 
 to keep up famine prices by this artificial scarcity. 72 The 
 bitter gibes of De Wimpffen show the deep indignation 
 felt at this conduct. 73 
 
 And if the French colonies were kept short in normal 
 times, how was it during the long wars of the eighteenth 
 century, when the superior English fleets swept the French 
 flag from the sea? For, be it understood, this was no mere 
 question of annoyance or of loss, but a matter of down- 
 right life and death. Not one of these over-specialized 
 islands produced enough tropical foods to feed its negroes, 
 
18 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 while the whites lived almost entirely upon imported pro- 
 visions. 74 Were no grain-ships to enter their harbors, the 
 colonists would die like Midas in his treasure- chamber. As 
 a matter of fact, great numbers of slaves at San Domingo 
 died of hunger during the Seven Years' War. 75 
 
 Of course this preposterous state of things wrought its 
 own cure. Smuggling had always existed at San Domingo; 
 smuggling of the most flagrant character and with a back- 
 ing of public approval which made its suppression impos- 
 sible. A regular traffic existed with the English and Span- 
 ish islands, and with the North American continent. 78 
 Indeed, the Governors themselves openly permitted 
 trading in times of especial scarcity. 77 
 
 The growing enlightenment of the eighteenth century 
 had led the French Government to attempt to remedy the 
 situation, though in hesitating fashion. In 1767, Choiseul 
 established a port of entry for foreign trade at the M6le- 
 Saint-Nicolas, although legalizing only a small list of 
 the most necessary foodstuffs. 78 In 1784, further conces- 
 sions were made by the opening of the chief ports (Le Cap, 
 Port-au-Prince, and Les Cayes), and by an extension of 
 the legal list. 79 Finally, the Anglo-French commercial 
 treaty of 1786 and the Franco- American convention of 
 1787 broke a wide breach in the "Pacte Coloniale." 80 
 
 But, after all, the old system still existed in principle, 
 and in 1789 the measures taken were either too partial or 
 too recent to have produced much effect. In 1788, the 
 foreign imports were only 7,000,000 livres, the exports 
 only 3,700,000; 81 — not very much by comparison with 
 the French trade. At the outbreak of the Revolution 
 colonial discontent was bitter and unassuaged. 82 
 
Ill 
 
 THE WHITES 
 
 Though small in number, the white population of San 
 Domingo x was in structure extraordinarily complex. Its 
 lines of cleavage were both many and transverse. This 
 handful of Europeans formed in one sense the Microcosm 
 of contemporary France, since all French classes were 
 there represented; 2 yet in spirit the two societies were by 
 no means the same, for in San Domingo, class relations 
 had been much modified by a tropical environment. 
 
 To form a correct idea of this colonial society is by no 
 means easy. Its observers often differ in their impressions 
 and in their judgments. Still, the main lines seem to be 
 fairly clear. Differences of opinion arise usually on details; 
 on fundamentals, the bulk of both private and official tes- 
 timony is in agreement. 
 
 The most obvious line of demarcation was one of birth. 
 The antagonism between native- and foreign-born — 
 or, in the language of the time, between " Creoles " and 
 "Europeans" 3 — seems to have greatly impressed ob- 
 servers. "The first thing that strikes every traveller," 
 says De Wimpffen, "is that in spite of the conformity of 
 origin, color, and interests, the whites from Europe and 
 the white Creoles form two classes, which, by their mutual 
 pretensions, are so widely sundered that necessity alone 
 can bring them together. The former, with more breed- 
 ing, more politeness, and more knowledge of the world, 
 
20 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 affect over the latter a superiority which is far from con- 
 tributing to unite them." 4 The number of shady charac- 
 ters among the Europeans did not promote good feeling. 6 
 Hilliard d'Auberteuil is particularly severe in his criticism 
 of the European population and advocates radical re- 
 striction of immigration to protect the Creoles, whom he 
 regards as by far the sounder element. 6 Of late years, how- 
 ever, the quality of the new arrivals would seem to have 
 been improving. 7 
 
 Yet even within its own ranks, the European class suf- 
 fered from disunion: "This element, although generally 
 energetic, hardy, and enterprising, at bottom lacked cohe- 
 sion." 8 Environment and interest had succeeded in pro- 
 ducing only the most superficial "consciousness of kind." 
 The Abbe Raynal brings this out very well. "There is 
 here," he says, "no national consciousness; because each 
 one brings his own with him, — his Dative prejudices, 
 education and vices. At the same time, while all these 
 people retain their peculiar manners and customs, they 
 yet take on what I may call the 'habits of the colonies.' 
 This distinction is important, and should not be over- 
 looked. Ordinarily, we seek for the character of a people 
 in its national point of view; but, in San Domingo, there 
 is no real 'people,' — only a mass of individuals, with 
 common interests but isolated viewpoints. Even the 
 Creole is not always an American; he is a Gascon or 
 Provencal, if he has chanced to learn his father's dialect 
 or imbibe his principles." 9 
 
 Another point to be noted is that the white population 
 of San Domingo was predominantly foreign-born; cer- 
 tainly over one half, 10 possibly even three fourths, 11 were 
 
THE WHITES 21 
 
 of European birth. For this state of things there were 
 several reasons. In the first place, the presence of an im- 
 mense slave population had made a class of native white 
 laborers impossible; 12 the "poor whites" of 1789 were in 
 great part a vicious rabble of adventurers. 13 
 
 And even among those townsmen and planters who 
 composed the middle and upper strata of society, there 
 were few marriages and fewer children. The causes of 
 this sterility are not far to seek. To begin with, San Do- 
 mingo had always lacked white women. In the bucca- 
 neer days their number had been extremely small, and the 
 quality of those then sent from France had made these a 
 doubtful blessing. 14 Although the large white immigra- 
 tion of the later eighteenth century had brought about 
 more normal conditions, the numerical disparity of the 
 sexes was still very great. In 1789, there were 24,700 
 white males to 10,800 females. 15 Then, again, the climate 
 was very hard on the children of Europeans; "it took at 
 least two generations before the race could strike root in 
 this new land." 16 As among Anglo-Indians to-day, chil- 
 dren were sent to Europe to escape the climate as well as 
 to get an education. 17 Lastly, this was a population of 
 fortune-hunters, not settlers, and the return to France 
 was ever in men's minds. Absorbed in their affairs, with 
 few ties of sympathy or social life, and possessed of luxu- 
 rious or dissipated habits, 18 these men could have but little 
 inclination to married life and the rearing of families. 19 
 
 There was one element in this strange society which 
 occupied a decidedly anomalous position. This was the 
 official class. Although composed almost exclusively of 
 Europeans, it stood as much aloof from its compatriots 
 
22 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 as from the Creole population, — a veritable caste apart. 20 
 The officials "had all that cool assumption of superiority 
 and that disdain for those around them which so com- 
 monly mark the man of the metropolis when in the prov- 
 inces." 21 Naturally, they were disliked, — a fact of 
 importance for the Revolution. 
 
 The nobility had played a vital pioneer role in the other 
 French islands, 22 but this had not been true of buccaneer 
 San Domingo. However, from the first the Royal Gover- 
 nors had been men of birth, and the aristocratic element 
 had steadily grown in importance. 23 In 1789, the colony 
 possessed some of the oldest blood of France. 24 The no- 
 bility was one of the best elements of the island's popula- 
 tion. Very many were settled as resident planters, and 
 had become a genuine squirearchy. They officered the 
 militia and the marechaussee, 25 and were the stanchest 
 supporters of law and order. 26 The relations of this island 
 aristocracy with the French nobility were very close, and 
 were becoming closer through frequent intermarriage. 27 
 "Sire," said a San Domingo deputation to Louis XVI, 
 "your court has become' Creole by alliances." 28 From 
 these marriages there had grown up an intermediate class 
 of absentee nobles. These men owned great plantations 
 in San Domingo, but rarely visited their estates and were 
 in no way a blessing to the colony. They were, however, 
 to play an important part in the early days of the Revo- 
 lution. 29 
 
 The clergy of San Domingo were inferior to those of the 
 other French islands : 30 their character seems to have been 
 consistently bad from the first. " Most of the priests here 
 are as debauched as the rest of the inhabitants," says 
 
THE WHITES 23 
 
 an official memoir of 1681.. 31 A century later, things were 
 no better. "A succession of bad and ignorant priests," 
 says the Abbe Raynal in 1785, "has destroyed both re- 
 spect for the cloth and the practice of religion in almost 
 every parish of the colony. An atrocious greed has become 
 the habitual vice of most of the parish priests." 32 The 
 sacraments were turned into so many instruments of 
 extortion, while the churches were "falling into ruin." 33 
 The Baron de Wimpffen is even more severe. "The clergy 
 of San Domingo," he writes in 1790, "seem to have vol- 
 untarily renounced the advantages which a system of con- 
 duct procures them elsewhere. Tranquil in their parson- 
 age-houses, they spend in peace an income sufficiently 
 large to enable them to live comfortably. Mass is cele- 
 brated one way or another in churches where none go 
 to hear it — so that to avoid reproach of preaching in 
 the desert, they do not preach at all. . . . Meanwhile, 
 the conjectures, which public scandal delights to indulge 
 on the children with which the female mulatto of Mon- 
 sieur the Rector may have peopled the parsonage-house, 
 keep their course; and, as this increase of family is, for 
 His Reverence, as well as for the rest of the colonists, 
 a sensible increase of fortune, you may easily comprehend 
 that few will have the candor to suppose he is indebted 
 for them solely to the good-will of his parishioners." 34 
 His opinion of the monks is equally unfavorable. "I am 
 persuaded, sir," he writes, "that there are to be found 
 amongst them men of real merit: at the same time, truth 
 obliges me to avow they are not numerous; because the 
 superior clergy, who nominate to the vacant benefices, 
 have contracted the pernicious habit of sending none 
 
v/ 
 
 24 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 thither but such intriguing and suspicious characters as 
 they wish to be rid of. To speak my mind fully on the 
 subject, nothing, generally speaking, can be more irreg- 
 ular than the regular clergy of San Domingo." 35 
 
 With such pastors, it is not surprising that the flocks 
 lacked religious zeal. "It is incredible," writes the Gov- 
 ernor in 1743, "what indifference these people have for 
 spiritual things." 36 The sacraments were ignored, and 
 parents left their children unchristened or mockingly 
 baptized them in a punch-bowl. 37 The pious Father 
 Labat is greatly scandalized both at the appearance of the 
 churches and the temper of the people. He found the 
 main church of Le Cap in a state of positive dilapidation, 
 while the congregation " acted as if at a play-house. They 
 talked, laughed, and joked; especially those in the bal- 
 cony, who drowned out my voice, and mingled the name 
 of God with their discourse in a perfectly intolerable 
 fashion." 38 
 
 The middle class at San Domingo was made up entirely 
 of merchants and small shopkeepers. It was thus a 
 strictly town population — a true bourgeoisie. No rural 
 middle class could exist upon a countryside cut up into 
 large, self-sufficing economic units like the plantations. 
 The greater merchants, as the trusted factors of French 
 commercial houses, were men of standing, but the small- 
 fry contained many persons with a shady business past. 39 
 The middle class was almost exclusively European; the 
 Creoles disliked town life, and lived in the country. 40 
 
 The lower ranks of the white population of San Domingo 
 were known as the "petits blancs." 41 This term may be 
 best translated "poor whites," although it must be borne 
 
THE WHITES 25 
 
 in mind that these people were in many ways dissimilar 
 to the "white trash" of the Southern States, since the 
 town-dwelling element was a heterogeneous rabble of 
 foreign birth. 
 
 This absence of a normal white working-class was the 
 inevitable consequence of a slave population outnumbering 
 the whites tenfold. It might have been otherwise. In the 
 early days San Domingo had possessed a class of small 
 landholders and farm-laborers, 42 while the French Govern- 
 ment had made real efforts to build up a white popula- 
 tion by the system of indenture-men, or engages. 43 In 
 spite of their poor quality and bad treatment, these en- 
 gages had done fairly well, and it seems practically cer- 
 tain that if slavery had been excluded, San Domingo 
 would have become the home of an acclimated white 
 people. 44 But it was not to be. Slavery became the very 
 basis of society — and wrought its logical consequences. 
 
 Among the poor whites of 1789 there ran a strong line 
 of demarcation between those of the country and those 
 of the town. All that was sound in the poor white popu- 
 lation was to be found in the rural element. In the first 
 place, these men earned an honest living. On every large 
 plantation there was a small corps of whites, — overseers, 
 technical experts, and mechanics. 45 In all, these must have 
 numbered several thousands. 46 Then, the scattering 
 small truck-farmers and ranchmen were usually classed 
 as "poor whites" rather than "planters," while in the 
 less tropical region of the Mole were certain agricultural 
 colonies of Acadians and Germans. 47 
 
 The poor whites of the towns, however, were nothing 
 but a vicious rabble of adventurers, drawn to San Do- 
 
26 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 mlngo by the luxury and dissipation of urban life. They 
 were the scum of France, and of Europe as well, for very 
 many were foreigners. Italians and Maltese predominated 
 among the foreign element, 48 though there were repre- 
 sentatives of many nations. 49 Even in ordinary times this 
 mass of crooks and criminals needed careful police watch- 
 ing, 50 but with the revolution it became a downright peril. 
 For it promptly caught up the patter of Jacobinism, and 
 seized every chance of riot and plunder. 51 Furthermore, ' 
 the brutality of these men to the negroes and mulattoes 
 did much to envenom the race question. 52 
 
 The garrison troops and the sailors in the ports were 
 also not unimportant elements of white San Domingo. 
 The island was permanently assigned two royal infantry 
 regiments 53 and a strong detachment of artillery, in 
 all about three thousand men. 54 The number of sailors 
 of the royal navy and merchant marine in the ports of 
 San Domingo must have always averaged several thou- 
 sand. The presence of these men did much to determine 
 the character of the port towns. 55 
 
 But the native-born element of the pqpulation must 
 not be disregarded. The Creole whites differed in many 
 respects from those of European birth. In the first place, 
 they were a rural, landowning population : a large propor- 
 tion of the planters, with their dependents, were Creoles, 
 and most of the small farmers and ranchmen as well. 
 Both in mind and body the Creoles showed the influence 
 of their tropical environment. Physically they were tall 
 and slender, well-featured though pale, and with a proud 
 nonchalance of bearing. 56 In character they were gen- 
 erous, warm-hearted, and brave, with a lively intelligence 
 
THE WHITES 27 
 
 and an ardent imagination; at the same time they were 
 reckless, frivolous, passionate, and often cruel, while 
 their indolence usually hindered the development of their 
 talents. 57 
 
 The two main causes of the Creole's special nature were 
 climate and slavery. It was the burning climate of San 
 Domingo which gave him his mercurial temperament, — 
 his intense crises of reckless passion or feverish energy, 
 followed by reactions into languorous apathy. 58 But even 
 more important was the influence of African slavery. He 
 certainly owed most of his bad qualities to this evil in- 
 stitution, which seems to have degraded the master even 
 more than the slave. Vaissiere comments upon this very 
 well. "Lost as they were among their immense herds of 
 slaves, the colonists suffered two fatal consequences: 
 by contact with these primitive beings, they necessarily 
 absorbed much of these people's nature, defects, and vices ; 
 from a life spent almost wholly among inferiors, their own 
 characters naturally degenerated." 59 
 
 This fatal influence weighed upon the Creole from the 
 very moment of his birth. A royal officer laments those 
 Creole children "corrupted in the cradle by the negresses' 
 milk and vices." 60 And everything contributed to stimu- 
 late the Creole child's wilfulness and vanity. That slave 
 nurse, who dared give him no direct command; 61 those 
 slave playmates, "condemned to flatter his lightest 
 whim"; 62 those parents, proverbial for over-fond indul- 
 gence; 63 — all these combined to make of him a pam- 
 pered little tyrant, unable to endure the slightest oppo- 
 sition. 64 Most writers on San Domingo quote the classic 
 story of the Creole child who, told there was no egg, de- 
 
28 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 manded two. 65 Add a precocious knowledge, gained by- 
 constant observation of the indecencies and cruelties of 
 plantation life, 66 and the conduct of the future man when 
 exposed to the temptations of unrestrained authority is 
 easy to foresee. 67 
 
 Much of the evil might have been remedied by a sound 
 education. But to the Creole even this was denied. 
 "What, then," exclaims De Wimpffen, "is the inhabi- 
 tant of San Domingo? That which every man must be 
 who is born under a burning atmosphere, with a vicious 
 education and a feeble government. He is born neither 
 corrupt nor virtuous, neither citizen nor slave, but his 
 character will form itself the instant education and 
 government, in concert with nature, shall occupy them- 
 selves with the care of giving him morals. At present, 
 we ought to set the higher value upon his good qualities, 
 as his education has hitherto been calculated to give him 
 none but bad ones. 68 . . . To tell you what should be done 
 to ensure the children of San Domingo a good education, 
 would be to tell you precisely everything that is not done 
 at present." 69 
 
 Many children, it is true, were sent to France for their 
 education. But they there learned little to fit them for 
 a colonial existence, and generally returned fine ladies 
 and gentlemen to whom the monotony and loneliness 
 of plantation life were unendurable. 70 
 
 In the Creole women, the type characteristics came 
 out most strongly. Piquantly beautiful, their languorous 
 grace charmed all observers. Their love was passionate 
 in the extreme, their jealous hate often terrible in its con- 
 sequences. 71 An American woman, who saw them in the 
 
THE WHITES 29 
 
 days of their adversity, is favorably impressed. "The 
 Creole ladies," writes Miss Hassal in 1802, "have an air 
 of voluptuous languor, which renders them extremely 
 interesting. Their eyes, their teeth, and their hair are 
 remarkably beautiful, and they have acquired from the 
 habit of commanding their slaves an air of dignity which 
 adds to their charms. Almost too indolent to pronounce 
 their words, they speak with a drawling accent which is 
 very agreeable. But since they have been roused by the 
 pressure of misfortune, many have displayed talents and 
 found resources in the energy of their own minds, which 
 it would have been supposed impossible for them to 
 possess." 72 
 
 Even more than her brothers, the Creole girl suffered 
 from the blight of slavery and the lack of education. Too 
 often, she lived in the most complete indolence; passing 
 her days, like an Eastern odalisque, amid the chatter and 
 singing of her slave girls. 73 She had few friends, for social 
 life was confined to infrequent balls, to which she gave 
 herself with the greatest abandon. 74 
 
 In 1789, San Domingo rightfully enjoyed a widespread 
 reputation for wealth and luxury. Its prosperity really 
 dates from the long peace after 1714, but from then on 
 progress was rapid. 75 Increase in wealth, however, quickly 
 destroyed the simplicity of buccaneer days. 76 "At first," 
 says an official memoir of 1718 on the state of the North 
 Province, "the inhabitants of this quarter were adven- 
 turers, used to all kinds of labor; they walked barefoot 
 in the sun without a thought of danger, so hardened were 
 they by continual exposure. But since the late peace 77 
 has made as many fortunes as there are inhabitants, their 
 
30 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 manner of life is entirely changed. Instead of a bit of wild 
 boar and bananas, on which they used to make merry 
 after having had to hunt the beast in the woods, their 
 tables are now laden with well-served delicacies. The 
 best burgundy and champagne are not too dear for them, 
 — they must have them at any price. They no longer 
 dare go out before sundown for fear of the heat, and even 
 then only in a carriage with comfortable springs." 78 
 
 With such rapid progress in wealth, it is no surprise to 
 find that at the outbreak of the Revolution there were 
 many persons possessed of large fortunes. From three 
 plantations in San Domingo, Alexandre de Beauharnais 
 drew a revenue of forty thousand livres, 79 and many a 
 great planter had an income of over one hundred thousand 
 a year. 80 These figures, however, by no means represent 
 net cash values. The hardships of the "Pacte Coloni- 
 ale," 81 the scarcity of ready money, 82 and the universal 
 extravagance combined to devour these princely reve- 
 nues; and some of the greatest proprietors were deeply 
 in debt. 83 
 
 A prodigal luxury was, indeed, the most striking fea- 
 ture of life. " Everything at San Domingo," writes Moreau 
 de Saint-Mery, "takes on a character of opulence which 
 astonishes the European." 84 People dined "'a la Creole' 
 — that is to say, with profusion," 85 and their tables 
 were served by such numbers of waiting-men as cut off the 
 very air. 86 A numerous troop of domestics was the surest 
 way to show one's wealth and self-importance. 87 "That 
 crowd of slaves which hangs upon the master's lightest 
 word or sign," says Moreau de Saint-Mery, "lends him 
 an air of grandeur. It is beneath the dignity of a rich man 
 
THE WHITES 31 
 
 to have less than four times as many servants as he needs. 
 The women have an especial gift for surrounding them- 
 selves with a useless retinue." 88 
 
 However, about all this magnificence one peculiarity 
 must soon have struck the attentive observer, — its 
 "personal" character. These costly feasts were very 
 likely served between bare walls, while the guest, who 
 bore upon his person ten thousand livres in lace and 
 jewels, probably dwelt in a house unfurnished and un- 
 adorned. 89 But the trend of conversation would soon 
 give the key to the riddle, — the table-talk must have 
 inevitably turned upon the delights of Paris and the pros- 
 pect of approaching trips to France. 9 * 
 
 Except among the Creoles, few persons cared to pro- 
 long their stay beyond a lucky turn of fortune. "The 
 pleasures of San Domingo," exclaims a colonist, "are 
 easily counted. A blue sky, and no cold weather: I can 
 name no others." 91 
 
 The consequences of all this were obvious. "A man," 
 says Moreau de Saint-Mery, "regards himself as camp- 
 ing upon a property worth several millions. His air is 
 that of a life-tenant already old, his extravagance is in 
 servants and good-cheer, — and you would think him 
 to be living in an 'hotel garni."' 92 "In a San Domingan 
 town," says Raynal, "you never see a man seated by the 
 domestic hearth and talking with interest about his 
 borough, his parish, or the home of his fathers; you see 
 only inns and travellers. Everything will confirm my 
 statement. Enter these people's houses, — they are 
 neither comfortable nor adorned. 'We have no time' — 
 *it's too much trouble' — that is what they tell you." 93 
 
32 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 In fine: "All wish to be gone, every one is in a hurry; — 
 these people have the air of merchants at a fair." 94 
 
 With such a general passion for money-making in the 
 shortest possible time, a high code of business ethics 
 could not prevail, and it is no surprise to learn that many 
 of the fortunes made at San Domingo were amassed by 
 very shady practices. 95 
 
 Of course, in such a society, there was much high living. 
 Drunkenness had always been a common failing at San 
 Domingo. "There are many heads here, used up by 
 drink," writes a Governor in 1710, 96 and his words would 
 have equally well applied to 1789. Rum was cheap, — 
 and full advantage was taken of the fact. "The people 
 here," writes an Intendant, "drink this sort of liquor 
 (which is of uncommon strength) as naturally and as 
 copiously as we do wine." 97 The number of taverns was 
 very great. 98 Gambling was also common to all ranks 
 of society; 99 while the fame of the mulatto girls of Le 
 Cap had spread far and wide through the West Indies. 100 
 
 Such were the port towns of San Domingo, — crude, 
 but full of life. Those rich merchants and ladies, decked 
 in gay clothes and jewels ; those gangs of sailors on shore- 
 leave; those chattering crowds of negresses with their 
 vivid turbans; those mulatto courtesans, gorgeous in 
 towering headdresses and flaming scarves, — all these 
 must have made a brilliant picture of peculiar interest. 101 
 
 The life of the countryside, though it differed in many 
 respects from that of the towns, was in essence the same: 
 the same material crudity was there, the same intellec- 
 tual poverty and mental isolation. The planter's house, 
 though large and spacious, was generally bare and com- 
 
THE WHITES 33 
 
 fortless; it was always devoid of taste. 102 "Taste, sir," 
 exclaims De Wimpffen, "is still Creolian at San Domingo. 
 And unfortunately, the Creolian is not the right taste. 
 It smells too much of the Boucan." 103 Even the richest 
 plantations had about them an air of shiftless neglect. 
 In a journey through the West Province, De Wimpffen 
 is greatly surprised at its aspect. "What you will have 
 some difficulty, sir, to believe of a country so rich as 
 this," he writes, "is, that of the two kinds of plantations 
 which we passed, one showed us only the picture of in- 
 dolence in the last stage of wretchedness; and the other, 
 that of the negligence and disorder of poverty, contrasted 
 with the pretensions of opulence directed by the most 
 execrable taste. Thus, you would sometimes meet an 
 elegant carriage drawn by horses or mules of different 
 colors or sizes, with ropes for traces, covered with the 
 most filthy of housings, and driven by a postilion be- 
 daubed with gold — and barefoot." 104 
 
 The chief drawbacks to plantation life were monotony 
 and loneliness. The strict regimen imposed by the cli- 
 mate 105 and the unvarying cycle of tropic agriculture 106 
 made the planter's existence one of deadening routine. 
 Furthermore, he was practically cut off from the world. 
 His nearest neighbor was sometimes miles away, and he 
 lived as on an island, — alone with his family or mulatto 
 housekeeper, surrounded by a horde of negro slaves. 
 "The loneliness of the plantations" is a recurrent phrase 
 in letters from San Domingo. 107 
 
 And that distant neighbor? With him our planter was 
 probably upon the worst of terms. Isolation had ended 
 by giving both of them the hermit's abnormal craving to 
 
34 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 be alone, and "imperceptibly they had at last become 
 by nature what they had been at first merely through 
 necessity." 108 
 
 All observers note these unsocial and quarrelsome 
 tendencies among the planters. 109 "In the spot where 
 I reside," writes De Wimpffen, "the neighbors hardly 
 know one another. Pretensions, either ill-founded or 
 ridiculous; jealousies of each other's fortune, more ridic- 
 ulous still; disputes about boundaries . . . and finally 
 trespasses committed by the negroes or the cattle — 
 occasion such a misunderstanding, or such a coolness, 
 that all reciprocal communication is out of the question. 
 Consequently, as nothing is so savage as the recluse who 
 is not so by choice, you must not be surprised that each 
 owl rests in his hole, and that so little sociability reigns 
 among men who have few or no sociable qualities." u0 
 Indeed, the famous "Creole hospitality" of former days 
 was become little more than a memory. 111 
 
 Such was San Domingo: assuredly the place to find 
 fortune, but scarcely the choice for a home. And yet, 
 curiously enough, there has grown up the "legend" of 
 San Domingo. All the popular writers have painted this 
 lost colony of France as a cross between Paradise and 
 Eldorado. 112 
 
 This legend seems to have been first built up by the 
 "memories" of those refugees who, scattered through 
 France, North America, and the West Indies, filled two 
 continents with their lamentations. It was but natural 
 that these impoverished exiles should have looked back 
 with longing to their better days, and should have 
 promptly idealized their lost homes. It is interesting to 
 
THE WHITES 35 
 
 find the legend already well formed by the opening of the 
 nineteenth century. 113 
 
 And of course, human sentiment also favored. The 
 dramatic shock of this immense catastrophe, by which a 
 land at the very pinnacle of wealth and prosperity was 
 suddenly blotted out and as much lost to white civiliza- 
 tion as though sunk like Atlantis beneath the waves, lent 
 an aureole of mystery and poetic charm. 
 
 But the foundations of the legend had been laid long 
 before. The returning colonist had always loved to 
 dazzle the French public, and many a man had ruined 
 himself by a scale of living suited only to the purses of the 
 wealthiest planters. De Wimpffen overwhelms this fail- 
 ing with his scorn. "Do not," he writes, "suffer yourself 
 to be imposed on by the puerile and ridiculous pomp 
 which certain planters display in their transient residence 
 at Paris or in the maritime towns. I am in the secret 
 of these quacks. This coach in which His West Indian 
 Worship so awkwardly parades, that wardrobe of the 
 Marquis de Mascarille, these jewels which sparkle on his 
 tawny fingers, are the profit of many crops and the price 
 of no small number of his slaves. Yet a little while, and 
 hard necessity will send the clownish niggard back, 
 half-civilized and wholly stripped (like the daw in the 
 fable) of his borrowed plumes, to begin again with an 
 aching heart those labors which scarce produced in ten 
 years as much as he spent in ten months, with no other 
 advantage than having raised a laugh at his expense from 
 the chevaliers d'industrie who stripped him of his wealth, 
 and the prostitutes who shared with them in the spoils. 
 I never met a West Indian in France who did not enumer- 
 
36 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 ate to me, with more emphasis than accuracy, the charms 
 of a residence in San Domingo : since I have been here, I 
 have not found a single one who has not cursed both San 
 Domingo and the obstacles eternally reviving, which, 
 from one year to another, prolong his stay in this abode 
 of the damned." 114 
 
 De Wimpffen is, at times, a little hard on San Domingo. 
 The returned colonist was probably moved not merely by 
 vain-glorious pride, but also by the joyous intoxication 
 of the man just back from the wilds with plenty of money 
 in his pocket. Still, the result was the same; and the 
 "Creole" became to France what the "Nabob" was to 
 England, — the archetype of the wealthy man. 
 
IV 
 
 THE MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 
 
 Midway between the white and slave populations of 
 San Domingo stood a caste known as the "free people of 
 color." l Numbering some twenty-seven thousand, 2 and 
 possessing a considerable share of the island's wealth, it 
 was a factor of the utmost importance. 
 
 Although certain of these people were full-blooded 
 negroes, by far the greater number were mulattoes 3 of 
 various shades. 4 The mulattoes looked upon the free 
 negroes with unconcealed dislike, but this never caused 
 an open breach within the caste; the free black fully 
 shared the mulatto's contempt for the slave, and re- 
 fused to make common cause with his blood-brother. 
 For this reason the free negroes never played an inde- 
 pendent role, and the "free people of color" may be 
 treated as the caste of the mulattoes. 5 
 
 The scarcity of white women had made illicit relations 
 between the colonists and their negresses inevitable from 
 the first. The Government disapproved, but its efforts 
 availed little to check this concubinage, 6 and "scions of 
 the great names of France — a Vaudreuil, a Chateauneuf , 
 the last of the Boucicaults — might be seen passing their 
 lives between a negress and a bowl of rum." 7 The negro 
 women made no resistance. They lacked the European 
 ideal of chastity, 8 and they had strong reasons for wel- 
 coming their masters' favor. "The negresses," says an 
 
38 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 official memoir of 1722, "are proud of having children 
 by white men. Also, they cherish the hope that the 
 fathers will free them or buy their liberty." 9 
 
 Later on, when mulatto women had become sufficiently 
 numerous, the wealthier whites took them as their con- 
 cubines. So general became this custom that the census 
 of 1774 showed five thousand out of seven thousand free 
 colored women living as white men's mistresses, 10 while 
 mulattresses also formed the courtesan class of the port 
 towns. 11 Other influences besides that of sex contributed 
 to bring about this state of things: the planter or mer- 
 chant regarded his mulattress as a necessity, both to 
 manage his complex household and to warn him of plots 
 among his slaves. 12 
 
 Given such conditions, however, it can be no surprise 
 that mulattoes appeared early and increased rapidly in 
 numbers. The exact rate of this increase cannot, it is 
 true, be known, for the census counted only the free 
 mulattoes, not those who remained in slavery. But even 
 these partial figures are significant enough. The census 
 of 1681 shows 210 mulattoes in San Domingo. 13 By the 
 year 1700, the numbers of the free colored had risen to 
 some 500 individuals; and this figure progressively rose 
 to 1500 in 1715; 3000 in 1745; 6000 in 1770; 12,000 in 
 1780; and 27,000 in 1789. 14 Of course, in this series, al- 
 lowance must be made for free negroes. Also, of the 
 mulatto element many were the children of mulatto 
 parents. Still, from the habits of the mulattresses, it is 
 clear that a large proportion of their children must have 
 had white fathers. 
 
 Although marriage between the races was never pro- 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 39 
 
 hibited by law, 15 the number of such unions was always 
 extremely small. Now and then a wealthy mulattress 
 did succeed in obtaining a white husband, but this was 
 an exceptional event. 16 Hilliard d'Auberteuil, writing in 
 1776, states that there were only three hundred such 
 cases in the colony. 17 For few white men there were bold 
 enough, or reckless enough, to cross the color line. 
 
 White San Domingo was obviously much divided 
 against itself, but there was something upon which it was 
 at one. Creole or European, poor white or planter, 
 smuggler or governor, — all remembered that they were 
 white; all were determined that the white race should 
 keep white and should rule San Domingo. 
 
 Yet, in numbers, the white stock was but a handful 
 scattered amid the masses of the black; and beside it 
 there stood a growing mixed caste, part of which was 
 white to the casual eye. 
 
 To safeguard the ideal which they held most at heart, 
 the colonists felt there was but one way, and they ran 
 a racial dead line, so straight and clear that there could 
 be no crossing. To this the Home Government made no 
 demur, for the Old Regime shared the colonial ideal to the 
 full and backed it with all the force of authority. 
 
 The color line is the key to the Revolution in San 
 Domingo. When the Men of 1789 questioned it, the 
 colonists warned them that no change would be tolerated. 
 When the conquerors of the Old Regime laid hands upon 
 this social fabric, white San Domingo rose in furious re- 
 bellion; and this small handful, though threatened with 
 annihilation by its race enemies at home, defied the whole 
 power of regenerated France. When they had been 
 
40 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 beaten in the horrible struggle that ensued, these men 
 refused to surrender, abjured France, and gave themselves 
 to the foreigner. In their grim devotion to an ideal, the 
 colonial whites passed the bounds of politics : the religious 
 fanaticism of the Vendee was no fiercer than the racial 
 fanaticism of San Domingo. 
 
 From the very earliest days the colonists had been 
 brought to realize one apparent fact, — the fact of that 
 greater assimilative power of the black blood later for- 
 mulated as the "Law of Reversion." Once let the black 
 principle enter a stock, and it seemed impossible ever to 
 breed it out again: the moment fresh infusions of pure 
 white blood ceased, the mulatto apparently began to 
 revert to the negro. The learned Jesuit Father Labat 
 notes this early in the eighteenth century, 18 and Moreau 
 de Saint-Mery writes to the same effect. 19 
 
 Elaborate scientific experiments were made by slave- 
 owners with an enquiring turn of mind, — and the law 
 apparently held good in the most extreme cases. 20 On 
 a plantation of one of the smaller French West Indies 
 there were married two mulattoes, neither of whose an- 
 cestry had suffered an infusion of black blood for six 
 generations. "These young people were of remarkable 
 beauty. Their hair was extremely blond, their features 
 retained no negroid trace, and their skin was so white 
 that they might have been taken for albinos, had it not 
 been for the supple vigor of their limbs and the unusual 
 brightness of their minds. Well — their children were 
 unmistakably colored, and their grandchildren of an 
 extremely dark shade. 21 
 
 "After an experiment such as this, a man might well 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 41 
 
 ask how many successive marriages with whites were 
 necessary to really destroy in a family all trace of negro 
 blood, and it is easy to understand why pure white fami- 
 lies always refused to marry with persons having the 
 smallest drop of the black. For, once permit this first 
 marriage, and it needed only a second to turn a white 
 family into mulattoes. And — from mulatto to negro, 
 the way was short; it needed only one or two steps of the 
 same kind. 22 
 
 "The instinctive horror of the European for mixed 
 marriages is thus easy to understand, and the reason be- 
 comes plain why, in San Domingo, law and custom 
 united to devise every possible means of preventing this 
 confounding of the bloods." 23 
 
 The feeling against miscegenation was present from 
 the earliest times, and it was shared by both the Govern- 
 ment and the Church. "I do not think," writes an In- 
 tendant in 1681, "that marriages of whites to mulat- 
 tresses, or of mulattoes to white women, would be good 
 for the colony. Indeed, by what I have already seen, I 
 am only too well convinced of the bad results of such mar- 
 riages, which have caused much scandal and disorder. 
 It is true that the debauchery of the Spaniards and Port- 
 uguese has brought them to alliances with such an im- 
 pure stock; but I can also say that their colonies are 
 abodes of abomination, vice, and filth, and that from 
 these unions there has sprung a people so wretched and 
 so weak that an hundred of our buccaneers can put to 
 rout a thousand of that canaille." 24 
 
 In his official report of 1722, the Superior of Missions 
 is perhaps even more emphatic. According to this high 
 
42 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 ecclesiastic the increasing numbers of mulattoes, illegit- 
 imate or not, is exposing the colonies "to the terrible 
 punishment of those famous cities of abomination, which 
 were destroyed by the fire of Heaven." To him, the 
 mingling of the races is "a criminal coupling of men and 
 women of different species, whence comes a fruit which 
 is one of Nature's monsters." 25 
 
 And the Home Government shared this attitude. In 
 certain of the French colonies 26 mixed marriages were 
 forbidden, and although they were never formally pro- 
 hibited in San Domingo, the disapproval of the royal 
 authority was made perfectly clear. A ministerial letter 
 of 1741 commends an Intendant who had prevented such 
 a union. "His Majesty's pleasure," it runs, "is not to 
 permit the mixing of the bloods; your prevention of the 
 marriage in question is therefore approved." 27 
 
 On the white renegade who married a woman with the 
 least trace of negro blood, law and opinion joined in 
 imposing a legal and social ostracism which made of him 
 a veritable outcast. He could hold no public office, no 
 position of trust or confidence. 28 His wife's wealth could 
 do but little to relieve his miserable condition. "Every- 
 thing around these men," says Hilliard d'Auberteuil, 
 "calls forth regret. Everything which consoles others 
 plunges them in sadness. Their life is one long agony." 29 
 The status of the white renegade is well defined by the 
 legal commentator Desalles. "The white who marries 
 a colored woman," he writes in 1786, "descends from his 
 rank of white, and becomes the equal of the freedman. 
 In equity, he ought to be put lower; for he who, through 
 weakness, is untrue to himself, is still more likely to be 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 43 
 
 untrue to the laws of human society." 30 Like the polit- 
 ical traitor, the white renegade suffered "corruption of 
 blood." His children followed the mother, and became 
 merely free mulattoes. 31 
 
 Nevertheless, these measures were largely of a pre- 
 ventive character. But, if mulattoes possessed of wealth 
 and almost imperceptible in color were not to slip across 
 the line, positive measures appeared to be called for. It was 
 therefore thought necessary to mark down the members 
 of this caste through all its generations. 32 This was possi- 
 ble through a careful system of birth and marriage rec- 
 ords, and every disputed case involved lengthy genealog- 
 ical researches. The elaborate care exercised to prevent a 
 mulatto from changing his legal identity is best shown by 
 the minute classification of his color. Moreau de Saint- 
 Mery enumerates over sixty recognized combinations. 33 
 
 On the necessity for this indelibility of color, the 
 Home Government was as strict as colonial opinion. 
 "The negroes," writes the Minister of Marine in 1766, 
 "were brought to the colonies as slaves, and slavery has 
 imprinted an indelible mark upon all their posterity 
 whether of mixed blood or otherwise. Consequently, 
 their descendants can never enter the white class. For, 
 once reputed whites, they could, like whites, lay claim to 
 every honor and office; — a state of things absolutely 
 contrary to the constitution of the colonies." 34 And a 
 ministerial letter of 1771 states that nothing can destroy 
 that difference "which Nature herself has created be- 
 tween white and black, and which policy has ever been 
 careful to uphold as a barrier which the mulattoes and 
 their posterity may never overcome." 35 
 
44 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 The color line was valued not only as the sole means of 
 preserving the purity of the white blood, but also as the 
 best moral restraint upon the slaves. "This law is hard," 
 says an official paper, "but it is both wise and neces- 
 sary in a land of fifteen slaves to one white. Between the 
 races we cannot dig too deep a gulf. Upon the negro we 
 cannot impress too much respect for those he serves. This 
 distinction, rigorously upheld even after enfranchisement, 
 is the surest way to maintain subordination; for the slave 
 must thus see that his color is ordained to servitude, and 
 that nothing can make him his master's equal. The 
 colonial authorities should be ever zealous in severely 
 enforcing both this distinction and this respect." 36 
 
 A planter expresses colonial opinion very well. "It 
 was by means of this unalterable superiority of the white 
 race," says Carteau, "that, until the Revolution, nearly 
 600,000 blacks, continually armed, 37 obeyed without a 
 murmur a handful of masters. Especially, as this superi- 
 ority was not purely ideal. The negroes themselves recog- 
 nized it by daily comparing the activity, energy, knowl- 
 edge, and initiative of the whites with the degree of those 
 same qualities in themselves and in the mulattoes." 38 
 
 On the eve of the Revolution, the growing pressure of 
 that section of French public opinion which favored the 
 mulattoes led the Home Government to waver slightly 
 in its attitude. In 1788, the Minister of Marine asked 
 the Governor whether it might not be feasible to forbid 
 research into the origin of persons whose appearance was 
 entirely white. But the Colonial Government answered 
 that this would be positively dangerous. "The colo- 
 nial prejudice toward mulatto families," came the reply, 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 45 
 
 "cannot be overcome. Any attempt to coerce public 
 opinion on this point would endanger the King's au- 
 thority." 39 In the light of what was so soon to follow, 
 this reads like a prophecy. 
 
 From the theory of the color line, the actual status of 
 the free mulattoes in 1789 can be easily imagined. The 
 discriminations against them were both many and severe. 
 They were forbidden to hold any public office or to en- 
 gage in the learned professions; they were declared in- 
 capable of acquiring a patent of nobility or of receiving 
 the higher decorations, such as the Cross of Saint-Louis; 
 they were hindered by sumptuary laws from adopting 
 European dress and habits; they were assigned special 
 places in theatres, inns, churches, and public convey- 
 ances 
 
 40 
 
 Many of these measures were of quite recent date, 
 for, as time passed, the mulatto status had become more 
 and more rigidly defined. This has been sometimes held 
 as the result of growing race feeling; but such a theory 
 mistakes the effect for the cause. In the early days, the 
 mulattoes had been too few to even dream of effecting 
 any change in their situation. But, with the course of 
 time, things had become different. The mulattoes had 
 grown very numerous; they were often wealthy and pos- 
 sessed of a European education; many of them appeared 
 white. Such persons devised every possible means to 
 escape from their present condition, and strove desper- 
 ately to evade the laws which bound them to their 
 caste. 41 It was this increasing pressure upon the color 
 line which called forth the sharper legislation of the 
 later eighteenth century. Of course feeling steadily rose 
 
46 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 on both sides, and race hatred was very intense in 
 1789. 
 
 There was one field, however, in which the mulattoes 
 had never been restrained, — the acquirement and hold- 
 ing of property. 42 How large a share in the wealth of the 
 colony was held by them is difficult to say. In 1789, the 
 mulatto leader Raymond claimed that his caste was pos- 
 sessed of one third the landed property and one fourth of 
 the slaves. 43 On the other hand, Gouy d'Arcy, one of San 
 Domingo's deputies to the States-General, writes that the 
 mulattoes owned one tenth of the land and fifty thousand 
 slaves. 44 Gouy d'Arcy 's statement is probably nearer 
 the truth, for he was then attempting to prove the gen- 
 erosity of the white planters in endowing their natural 
 children, whereas Raymond is trying to show the general 
 importance of his caste. 
 
 The bitter feeling between the races exposed the mulat- 
 toes to much ill-treatment. For this, the poor whites 
 were mainly responsible. The wealth which many of the 
 mulattoes possessed filled the needy adventurers of the 
 towns with envious fury, and spurred them on to insult 
 and injury. 46 In the latter part of the eighteenth century, 
 the authorities seem to have protected the mulattoes 
 against the grosser forms of outrage, 46 but there was a 
 wide field which existing law could not reach. 
 
 This persecution, however, had very serious conse- 
 quences. To the mulatto's general feeling of social op- 
 pression there was added a sharp sense of personal in- 
 jury, a burning thirst for vengeance, of ominous import 
 for the days to come. 47 This danger had not passed un- 
 noticed by attentive observers. At the very beginning of 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 47 
 
 the eighteenth century, a high ecclesiastic had predicted 
 that the mulattoes would become a future menace to the 
 colony. 48 "Be on your guard," says an official memoir of 
 somewhat later date; "these people are but waiting their 
 chance to take a terrible revenge." 49 The council of 
 Port-au-Prince is positively prophetic. "These are dan- 
 gerous people," says its memoir to the Home Govern- 
 ment. "In a time of trial or of revolution, they will be the 
 first to throw off a yoke which galls them the more that 
 they have become rich, have whites in their pay, and have 
 lost much of their respect for our kind." 50 With the first 
 signs of the coming storm, the thousands of mulattoes, 
 trained to arms in the militia and the marechaussee, were 
 to become a menace to be greatly feared. 51 
 
 The mulatto's character was not of a high order. How 
 much his failings were due to his nature, how much to his 
 environment, it is difficult to say. Undoubtedly, his posi- 
 tion under the Old Regime was both hard and degrading. 
 Nevertheless, many mulattoes were men of considerable 
 wealth, who had received a European education, and 
 who had lived for years in France, where they not only 
 suffered little social discrimination, but were greeted with 
 sympathy and consideration by an increasingly large 
 section of society. And yet, when the Revolution had 
 given them complete equality and when circumstances 
 had made them masters of much of the island, they 
 failed to rise to their opportunities. The mulatto caste 
 produced no man of striking talents or eminent ability. 
 There is no mulatto Toussaint Louverture. 
 
 The most detailed analysis of the mulatto character is 
 in Moreau de Saint-Mery. "The mulattoes," he says, 
 
48 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 "are well made and of a quick intelligence, but they 
 share to the full the negro's indolence and love of repose. 
 Experience has shown that these men would be capable 
 of succeeding in all the mechanical and liberal arts, were 
 it not that their great desire is to do nothing. The mu- 
 latto journeyman works when pressed by want, then 
 idles till the same thing happens again. Undoubtedly, 
 there are exceptions. We all know mulattoes who are 
 really industrious. But the ease with which these may 
 be counted proves the general rule. The mulatto loves 
 pleasure. It is his only master, but a despotic one. To 
 dance, ride, and sacrifice to voluptuous pleasure, — be- 
 hold his three passions. He equals the white Creole in 
 the first, he far surpasses him in the last." 52 
 
 The mulattoes always had the reputation of being gen- 
 erous and hospitable people, and the women were espe- 
 cially noted for kind-heartedness, and for extreme com- 
 passion towards poverty and suffering. But their moral 
 natures were weak. The mulatto women were very 
 vain, frightfully extravagant, and extremely licentious. 63 
 Their moral standing in the later eighteenth century has 
 been already noted, 54 and it seems to have been the same 
 from the earliest days. "Most of the mulattresses," says 
 a Governor in 1681, "are not only prostitutes themselves, 
 but the procuresses of others' prostitution." 65 
 
 From the controversial writings of the Revolution, it 
 might almost be thought that the mulattoes were, ipso 
 facto, freedmen. The reason for this is that both sides 
 were interested in diverting attention from the slaves of 
 mixed blood. The mulattoes wished to make out that 
 they had little in common with the slave class, while the 
 
MULATTOES AND THE COLOR LINE 49 
 
 colonists desired to prove a generous dislike of leaving 
 their own blood in servitude. 56 
 
 But a study of earlier writers and of official correspond- 
 ence proves that mulatto enfranchisement was by no 
 means a matter of course, and that the number of such 
 slaves was very large. 57 As careful a modern writer as 
 Roloff estimates them to have made up ten per cent of 
 the entire slave population, 58 — that is, a figure of from 
 forty to forty-five thousand. 
 
 This is a matter of some practical importance. Sur- 
 prise has sometimes been expressed that, in the struggle 
 between the mulattoes and the negroes which took place 
 after the collapse of white authority, the mulattoes 
 should have held out so long. This is far easier to ex- 
 plain if we consider that, as far as the mulattoes were con- 
 cerned, it was a war of colors, not of castes, and that all, 
 regardless of origin, had united against black domination. 
 
 The lack of union between the free negroes and their 
 slave brethren has been already noted. 59 This was not 
 the case with the mulattoes. The mulatto slave felt him- 
 self the superior of the free black. "There is not a negro 
 who dares buy a half-breed or quadroon," says Moreau 
 de Saint-Mery. "Should he do so, the slave would prefer 
 death to such a dishonor:" 60 — a striking testimony to 
 the prestige of white blood in colonial San Domingo. 
 
THE SLAVES 
 
 African slavery was the curse of San Domingo. From 
 the very beginning, this dark shadow lay athwart its 
 path, and perverted both its social and economic history. 
 Present even in buccaneer days, with the opening years 
 of the eighteenth century the evil institution became a 
 basic principle and wrought its most fatal consequences. 
 "Negroes, and food for the negroes; that is the one rule for 
 the Colonies." 1 This maxim sums up the eighteenth- 
 century ideal. 
 
 Under the regime of slavery, San Domingo prospered, 
 it is true; but only for the moment, and at the cost of its 
 whole social and economic future. Socially, it was a land 
 based upon brute force and a racial dead line. Economi- 
 cally, it became a field of feverish exploitation, whose end 
 must be complete exhaustion. Negro slavery touched 
 this young society, just quickening with lusty life, and 
 made it an abortion. 2 
 
 In 1789, the slave population of San Domingo was 
 enormous; — certainly 450,000, 3 very possibly half a 
 million. 4 And it had been increasing with ever-growing 
 rapidity. The census of 1681 gives the slave population 
 as but 2000, 5 and that of 1687 as only about 3400. 6 Later 
 census figures are unreliable, owing to fraudulent returns, 7 
 but we possess certain official memoirs drawn up for the 
 information of Ministers of Marine, which are probably 
 
THE SLAVES 51 
 
 near the truth. In one of these, the number of slaves by 
 the year 1701 is estimated at 20,000, 8 and another memoir 
 reckons 230,000 slaves by the year 1754. 9 
 
 But rapid as was this increase, it was due to immigra- 
 tion, not to births; the slave population of San Domingo 
 never reproduced itself, and always showed a tendency 
 to die out. The annual excess of deaths was fully two and 
 one half per cent, — over 11,000 persons, reckoning on 
 the conservative basis of 450,000. 10 When we consider 
 that by the year 1789, nearly a million negroes had been 
 introduced into San Domingo during the course of its 
 history, 11 this matter appears still more important. 
 
 The continual dying-out of the slave population in a 
 favorable climate excited much comment at the time, 
 and many reasons for it were given. In 1764, a Governor 
 attributes it to improper food, undue labor imposed upon 
 pregnant women, and a very high infant mortality. 12 The 
 general opinion seems to have been that the negroes were 
 worked too hard, 13 and Hilliard d'Auberteuil asserts that 
 this was often deliberately done, as many masters consid- 
 ered it cheaper to buy slaves than to breed them. 14 A 
 colonial writer lays much of the trouble to immorality 
 among the negroes, and to the ensuing ravages of vene- 
 real disease. 15 
 
 Modern .writers have advanced further reasons. Pey- 
 traud, perhaps the ablest student on the subject, thinks 
 that much stress should be laid on the great nervous 
 strain imposed by the sudden change from the careless 
 indolence of savage existence to a life of continuous 
 labor. 16 His contention seems to be sound. It was 
 apparently this more than anything else which killed off 
 
52 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the enslaved Indian population; if the negro, less ner- 
 vous and more robust, survived, it was only after a costly 
 process of natural selection. 
 
 Leroy-Beaulieu holds that, by some fundamental law 
 of nature, slavery hinders man's reproduction, as captiv- 
 ity does that of wild animals. 17 Certainly the sterility 
 of the slave population was not confined to San Domingo; 
 it was common to the other West India islands without 
 distinction of nationality. 18 Wallon pithily sums up the 
 matter. "Slavery," he says, "like Saturn, devours its 
 own children." 19 
 
 It is obvious that to cover an annual deficit of two and 
 one-half per cent, 20 and to provide a steady increase as 
 well, the yearly importation of negroes must have been 
 progressively large. The statistics, however, are both 
 insufficient and faulty, while no record was kept of the 
 smuggled negroes, whose number is put at fully three 
 thousand a year. 21 The official figure for 1764 is ten 
 thousand and that of 1766 is thirteen thousand. 22 An 
 official memoir on the state of French commerce in 1785 
 gives the number of negroes exported to San Domingo 
 from the West Coast of Africa as thirty-four thousand, 
 not including three or four thousand from Mozambique. 23 
 Another memoir estimates the importation of negroes for 
 the year 1787 at over forty thousand. 24 This is probably 
 the approximate figure for 1789. 
 
 These great importations were effected by means of 
 the slave trade. 25 At the outbreak of the Revolution, 
 this was a great and highly organized industry. 26 In 1787, 
 there were ninety -two ships exclusively employed in sup- 
 plying the French colonies with negroes, 27 and in 1788 the 
 
THE SLAVES 53 
 
 number had risen to one hundred and five. 28 The traffic 
 was enormously lucrative, and was considered as the 
 great source of prosperity by the French maritime 
 towns. 29 
 
 The slaves were obtained from a chain of "factories," 
 stretching from the Senegal clear around the Cape of 
 Good Hope to Mozambique. The Senegal region had 
 been the earliest slaving centre, but as time went on this 
 moved steadily down the coast. In 1789, the trade 
 centred on the Congo and Angola coasts, while the 
 Mozambique branch was a late development. 30 At every 
 stage of the traffic the slaves were exposed to great hard- 
 ships, and the crowded slave-ships often became veritable 
 death-traps. The horrors of the "middle passage" have 
 left an evil memory. The average death-rate during the 
 voyage was from seven to eight per cent. 31 
 
 One of the most important considerations for the his- 
 tory of the Revolution in San Domingo is the fact that 
 a majority of the negro population was African-born. 
 Hilliard d'Auberteuil writes that in 1775 the Africans 
 outnumbered the Creole negroes by ten thousand, 32 while 
 Moreau de Saint-Mery states that in 1789 this proportion 
 had increased to almost two thirds. 33 It is therefore es- 
 sential to know something of this majority, born, not 
 under the influence of white supremacy, but in African 
 savagery. 
 
 As might have been expected from the extent of the 
 slave coast, the negroes of San Domingo were of very 
 mixed origin. 34 The first slaves had naturally come from 
 the Senegal region. They were all of a relatively high 
 type. The pure negro races of this region (Bambara, 
 
54 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Mandingo, etc.) rank well up in the scale of negro eth- 
 nology, while much of this section of Africa is inhabited 
 by races which are not straight negroes at all. Such are 
 the Fulah, a copper-colored people of doubtful origin, and 
 the "Black Moors" and Joloffs, who have much Fulah, 
 Berber, and Arab blood. 
 
 As time went on, however, the new arrivals became 
 of a steadily lower type. The slaving centre gradually 
 shifted to the Guinea Coast, and the Guinea negro was a 
 being far inferior to the black of the Senegal. In 1789, the 
 slavers were bringing mostly Congo and Angola negroes, 
 many of these being among the lowest of the black race. 
 Such were the cannibal Mondongo, who sawed their teeth 
 into sharp points, while the Angola negroes smelled so 
 horribly that the air was "tainted for a quarter of an 
 hour after they had passed." 35 The negroes of Mozam- 
 bique seem to have been physically weak and to have stood 
 the climate badly. They began to come only on the eve 
 of the Revolution. 
 
 But despite diversity of origin, certain general traits 
 appear to have been common to all the various types. 
 Peytraud has ably summed up the opinions of writers 
 who have observed the negro in his African home. "The 
 negro," he writes, "is a grown-up child, living quite in 
 the present and the absolute slave of his passions. Thus 
 his conduct displays the most surprising contradictions. 
 He is trifling, inconsistent, gay; a great lover of pleasure, 
 and passionately fond of dancing, noisy jollification, and 
 striking attire. His natural indolence is unparalleled, — 
 force and cruelty alone can get out of him the hard labor 
 of which he is capable. This, together with an inordinate 
 
THE SLAVES 55 
 
 sensuality, an ineradicable tendency to thieving, and 
 absolute lack of foresight, a boundless superstition fav- 
 ored by a mediocre intelligence, and timidity in face 
 of imaginary terrors combined with great courage before 
 real danger, appear to be the causes of the negro's lack of 
 progress and of his easy reduction to slavery." 36 
 
 Turning now to those who observed the African in San 
 Domingo, we find the most careful analysis in Moreau 
 de Saint-Mery. "The Africans," he says, "usually re- 
 main indolent and lazy. They are quarrellers, boasters, 
 liars, and given to thievery. Always addicted to the most 
 absurd superstition, there is nothing more terrifying to 
 them." 37 
 
 The negroes born in the colony appear to have been 
 somewhat superior to those fresh from Africa. As to the 
 degree of this superiority there seems to have been a slight 
 difference of opinion. According to Moreau de Saint- 
 Mery, "The Creole negroes are both physically and 
 mentally above those just brought from Africa. Accus- 
 tomed from their birth to a civilized environment, their 
 minds are less dull than the Africans'. . . . Generally 
 speaking, their value exceeds that of the Africans by 
 about one fourth." 38 And he adds that house-servants 
 and artisans were nearly always Creole negroes, on ac- 
 count of their higher intelligence. Another colonial 
 writer is not so optimistic. "As regards the Creole 
 negroes," writes Ducceurjoly, "their up -bringing im- 
 proves them a little; but they always closely resemble 
 the original type." 39 
 
 One thing seems clear: the differences between native- 
 and foreign-born were so comparatively slight that ob- 
 
56 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 servations on the negro population as a whole will apply 
 to both classes. A correct estimate is, however, a matter 
 of difficulty. Opinions are very numerous, sometimes 
 irreconcilable, and frequently prejudiced. Even the most 
 conscientious observer could study only a limited num- 
 ber of individuals, whose environment must have varied 
 extremely between a good and a bad master, and whose 
 inconsistencies of conduct must have caused great per- 
 plexity. Add to these inherent difficulties the fact that 
 many years before the Revolution the question of slavery 
 had begun to inflame opinions and change observers into 
 partisans, and the obstacles to correct judgment can be 
 easily seen. 
 
 Partisan writings vary in the most extraordinary fash- 
 ion. Antislavery circles pictured the negro as a good type 
 of that "man in a state of nature," that "noble savage," 
 which was one of the favorite ideas of radical thought in 
 the later eighteenth century. 40 The most extreme ex- 
 ample of this is probably a certain three- volume romance 
 published in 1789, entitled "Le Negre comme il y a peu 
 de Blancs," which endowed the negro with all the virtues 
 of the legendary Golden Age. On the other hand, the 
 hotter defenders of slavery portrayed him as a depraved 
 species scarcely to be classed among mankind, 41 while one 
 writer roundly asserts that the negro is not a human being 
 at all, but a superior species of orang-outang. 42 
 
 The bulk of moderate opinion, however, follows fairly 
 closely the estimates previously quoted regarding the 
 African negro. 43 De Wimpffen probably best avoids ex- 
 tremes. "The negro," he says, "just like ourselves, is 
 good or bad, with all the different shades that modify the 
 
THE SLAVES 57 
 
 two extremes. His passions are those of uninformed na- 
 ture: he is libidinous without love, and gluttonous with- 
 out delicacy. . . . He is indolent because he has few of the 
 wants that labor is calculated to satisfy. He loves re- 
 pose, not for the sake of enjoying it as we do, nor for the 
 opportunity of finding in tranquillity the moral fruition 
 which a state of physical activity had deprived him of; 
 but for the sake of doing nothing. . . . Generally speak- 
 ing, the negroes are neither false nor perfidious; sometimes 
 you will find a knave among them, who was probably in 
 Africa a physician, sorcerer, or priest. Such a man is 
 extremely dangerous. . . . Whether it be that they have 
 false or confused ideas on the nature of 'meum' and 
 'tuum' I know not, — but so it is, that the greatest part 
 of the negroes are thieves. Like all men whose religion is 
 confined to a few superstitious practices, they have no 
 idea of a conventional morality. Whatever good qualities 
 the negro has, he derives from nature." 44 
 
 Those of the negroes who came from the Senegal coun- 
 try had a dim idea of Mohammedanism. 45 The great 
 majority, however, were adherents of that fetishism 
 which appears to be the native African religion, and 
 though they quickly acquired a veneer of Christianity, 
 the hold of this old religion never seems to have been 
 broken. 46 The cult of "Vaudoux" flourished in spite of 
 every effort to stamp it out, 47 and is powerful in Haiti 
 to-day. 48 The fact that the negroes possessed a religion 
 and a priesthood of their own was to be of the greatest 
 importance in the coming uprising against white rule. 
 
 The negro's happiness or misery depended entirely 
 upon the character of his master. This is proved by the 
 
58 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 amount of contradictory testimony from careful ob- 
 servers. We are given pictures of really happy life — and 
 glimpses of a perfectly intolerable existence. In general, 
 the good seems to have outweighed the bad. 49 The negro's 
 surroundings were, it is true, of the simplest character. 
 His "quarters" were primitive in the extreme, his crea- 
 ture comforts few. But then he had known nothing bet- 
 ter in his African home, and the climate required little in 
 the way of shelter or of clothing. 50 On Sundays and feast 
 days he was free from labor, and he was allowed to keep 
 the profits of his garden-patch and hen-yard. That these 
 earnings were not negligible is shown by the quality of 
 his holiday attire, which seems to have greatly struck 
 observers. 51 
 
 Yet, after all, the great central fact in the negro's life 
 was work. The house-servants and artisans seem to have 
 had a fairly easy time, 52 but the mass of the slave popu- 
 lation led a life of hard and unremitting toil. From dawn 
 to dark the field-gangs pursued their monotonous round 
 of labor, exposed to the burning tropic sun, spurred on 
 by the whips of the black "commanders" under the 
 overseer's eagle eye. 53 
 
 The fundamental principle of San Domingo's economic 
 life was forced labor. "The refractory slave could not 
 be discharged like the free workman — he must be co- 
 erced." 54 And it was evident that this coercion must be 
 severe: to extract continuous labor from such essentially 
 indolent beings as the negroes, an iron discipline was 
 necessary. "To manage those immense herds of men and 
 to keep them in order," says Vaissiere, "there was needed 
 a master with a hand of iron. This becomes doubly clear 
 
THE SLAVES 59 
 
 when we consider the enormous disproportion which 
 everywhere prevailed between blacks and whites. Here 
 were isolated plantations where two or three whites were 
 surrounded by two or three hundred slaves. The slightest 
 weakness might engender a revolt which could, never be 
 put down. Thus, this system of perpetual coercion was 
 not only the one way to extract from the negro continu- 
 ous labor, — it was also the sole means of repressing his 
 bent towards crime and of guarding against his plots." 55 
 
 All persons well acquainted with colonial conditions 
 affirmed this necessity. "I arrived at Martinique," 
 writes a Governor of that island to the Minister of 
 Marine, "filled with all the European prejudices against 
 harsh treatment of the negroes. But I have quickly be- 
 come convinced that there must be a discipline not only 
 severe, but severe in the extreme." 56 
 
 The great enforcer of this discipline was the lash. "The 
 whip," exclaims a French antislavery writer, "is the 
 symbol of labor in the Antilles." 57 And this was perfectly 
 true. Whipping was the chief recognized punishment, 
 though its variations extended all the way from a slight 
 correction to a virtual sentence of death. 68 At the same 
 time many other forms of punishment were inflicted in 
 practice, and cruel or depraved masters were guilty of 
 most horrible excesses. 59 
 
 In the very early days, the negro had no legal protec- 
 tion whatever. As regards the purchaser, the negro was 
 his "thing," and the master might "do as he would with 
 his own." The slave of the seventeenth-century Antilles 
 was thus the instrumentum vocale of the old Roman Law. 60 
 
 But this state of things ceased legally after 1685. In 
 
60 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 that year, Colbert promulgated the "Black Code," 61 
 which, though inspired more by economic than humani- 
 tarian motives, set distinct bounds to the master's 
 power. 62 The principles of the Black Code were reaffirmed 
 and slightly strengthened by the Edict of 1724, while the 
 Ordinance of 1786 reflects the progress of ideas by its 
 very sharp provisions against neglect and cruelty. 63 
 
 Such was the law; — in theory really humane on the 
 eve of the Revolution; the trouble was that it had never 
 become a fact. There is no doubt that the softening of 
 manners and the increasing enlightenment of self-in- 
 terest had combined steadily to better the lot of the 
 slave. 64 At the same time he enjoyed little real protection 
 against a cruel or ignorant master. 65 For, however much 
 authority and public opinion might reprobate these ex- 
 cesses, they simply did not dare to punish the guilty for 
 fear of the effect upon the slaves. 
 
 The Royal Government recognized this clearly. "If it 
 be necessary to repress abuses of unhumane masters," 
 writes the Minister of Marine to Governor Larnage in 
 1741, "see that you take great care to do nothing which 
 may impair their authority over the slaves, for this might 
 cause a breaking-down of the necessary bounds of de- 
 pendence and submission." 66 "It is only by leaving to 
 the masters an almost absolute power," read the instruc- 
 tions given a new Intendant in 1771, "that we can suc- 
 ceed in holding such vast numbers of men in that state 
 of submission necessitated by their preponderance over 
 the whites. If persons abuse their authority, repress them 
 covertly; — but never let the slaves think that their 
 masters can do them wrong." 67 
 
THE SLAVES 61 
 
 Edwards touches the fundamental difficulty. "In 
 countries where slavery is established," he writes, "the 
 leading principle on which government is supported is 
 fear; or a sense of that absolute, coercive necessity which, 
 leaving no choice of action, supersedes all question of 
 right. It is in vain to deny that such actually is, and 
 necessarily must be, the case in all countries where slavery 
 is allowed. Every endeavor, therefore, to extend posi- 
 tive rights to men in this state, as between one class of 
 people and another, is an attempt to reconcile inherent 
 contradictions, and to blend principles together which 
 admit not of combination. The great, and I am afraid 
 the only certain and permanent, security of the en- 
 slaved negroes, is the strong circumstance that the in- 
 terest of the master is blended with, and in truth alto- 
 gether dependent upon, the preservation, health, strength, 
 and activity of the slave." 68 
 
 In 1788, on the very eve of the Revolution, the illusory 
 character of slave protective legislation was strikingly 
 illustrated by the "Affaire Lejeune." Lejeune, a coffee- 
 planter, had suspected a poisoning conspiracy among his 
 slaves. To discover the guilty parties, he inflicted upon 
 several of his negroes a series of fiendish tortures. Some 
 of the terror-stricken blacks complained to the authori- 
 ties, an investigation followed, and Lejeune's guilt was 
 proved to the hilt. But this was only the beginning. 
 The case had become the talk of the colony, already 
 stirred as it was by news of the antislavery agitation in 
 France. Governor and Intendant were soon bombarded 
 with letters, petitions, and addresses, begging them to 
 suppress this dangerous scandal. "In a word," writes the 
 
62 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Intendant Barbe-Marbois to the Minister of Marine, "it 
 would appear that the safety of the colony depends upon 
 the acquittal of the Sieur Lejeune." 69 This was, indeed, 
 what actually occurred. The case was appealed to the 
 highest court of the island, which handed down a decree 
 of acquittal, — "thus affirming once again the solidarity 
 of all whites as against their slaves." 70 
 
 Bryan Edwards, as we have seen, states that the base 
 of slave societies is fear. 71 This is true, ■ — and true in its 
 broadest sense. For, if the slave feared the master, the 
 master also feared the slave. In the background of San 
 Domingan life, there lowered a dark shadow, of which 
 men thought much even when they spoke little. 
 
 And this was no veiled or distant peril; no year passed 
 in which it failed to give bloody proof of its imminent 
 presence. The mass of the slave population, indeed, 
 might bend or break beneath the yoke, but there was 
 always a minority of untamable spirits who burst their 
 bonds and sought an outlaw's freedom. In a mountain- 
 ous country like San Domingo this was easy, and soon 
 every tract of forest and jungle came to have its wild 
 denizens. 
 
 This state of outlawry was termed "marronage," and 
 the runaways themselves were known as "marrons," — 
 or, in English, "maroons." For like conditions were 
 common to all the West India islands; as Peytraud justly 
 remarks, "Marronage was the endemic social plague of 
 the Antilles." The greatest efforts were made to stamp 
 out this evil, but in spite of a well-organized rural gen- 
 darmerie, the maroon bands could never be exterminated. 
 The many wide tracts of tangled mountain, covered with 
 
THE SLAVES 63 
 
 impenetrable tropical forest, offered the fugitive negroes 
 an almost inaccessible retreat. This was especially true 
 of the high ranges along the Spanish border. Safe in 
 these wild solitudes and secured against hunger by a 
 spontaneous food-supply, the maroon bands would often 
 descend by night upon the plains and valleys to steal 
 cattle, sack plantations, and murder travellers. 72 A colo- 
 nist, writing in 1772, states that at that very moment the 
 mountain districts back of Port-au-Prince were "deso- 
 lated by their frequent incursions." 73 
 
 And, as time went on, the numbers of the maroons 
 steadily increased. During the year 1720 alone, over 
 one thousand negroes took to the woods, while in 1751 
 a high official estimated the refugees in the mountains 
 of the Spanish border at over three thousand. 74 Of course 
 great numbers were recaptured or killed by the marS- 
 chaussee, while many soon died from the accidents of a 
 wild life; but the stream of recruits never ceased, and, 
 as there were many women among the bands, a native 
 maroon population gradually came into existence. These 
 men, born out of slavery and inured to a savage life, 
 acquired a tribal consciousness which marked them off 
 as a peculiar people. On the eve of the Revolution, the 
 Colonial Government followed the example of the Eng- 
 lish in Jamaica and the Dutch in Surinam, 75 and recog- 
 nized the tribal existence of the maroons on the Spanish 
 border by a convention of the year 1784. 76 
 
 The maroon negroes are a not unimportant factor in 
 the struggles of the Revolution. They jealously main- 
 tained their identity, rendered important service to the 
 English and Spanish invaders, and fiercely resisted Tous- 
 
64 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 saint Louverture's efforts to subject them to his authority. 
 They welcomed Napoleon's army, and, together with the 
 free negroes of the Old Regime, they became the most 
 loyal allies of the French. 
 
 Even in the best of times, the maroons were a source 
 of trouble. The reason why colonial writers do not devote 
 more attention to the problem is because it was one of 
 those constant factors which had come to be taken as a 
 matter of course. Now and then, however, a significant 
 side-light is thrown upon the question. For instance, 
 when the first rumors reached France of the great negro 
 insurrection of August, 1791, a retired officer of the mar6~ 
 chaussee wrote an open letter to one of the daily papers, 
 warning against exaggeration. He thinks that the re- 
 ports then current may be based upon some acute access 
 of the chronic marronage, and he gives a sketch of his 
 own experiences which portrays a state of genuine gue- 
 rilla warfare. 77 Of course, as it turned out, rumor had 
 not belied the truth; yet this letter is none the less valu- 
 able evidence for conditions under the Old Regime. 
 
 And now and then these wild bands found a leader. 
 Then the annoyance became a peril; — it acquired the 
 consistency of a revolt. For the maroons kept in touch 
 with the enslaved negroes, and could always stir many to 
 trouble. 
 
 Slave revolts had taken place throughout the colony's 
 history. In 1679, a Spanish negro formed a conspiracy 
 "to massacre all the French." 78 Foiled in this purpose 
 he formed an entrenched camp among the mountains, 
 and was only put down after a regular campaign. 79 And 
 this, at a time when the slave population was only two 
 
THE SLAVES 65 
 
 thousand as against five thousand whites. In 1691, two 
 other black leaders were hunted down and executed for 
 having planned "to massacre all the whites in the dis- 
 trict of Port-de-Paix, 80 down to women and children at 
 the breast." 81 In 1704, the negroes about Le Cap con- 
 spired "to kill by night all the whites of that quarter." 82 
 It is true that the hand of Spain was thought to have 
 been in these troubles, but subsequent affairs of a per- 
 fectly spontaneous nature prove that foreign instigation 
 was at most only a contributing cause. In 1703, an able 
 leader arose who for seven years spread terror by the sack 
 of plantations and the rape of white women, while 
 scarcely was he killed than a successor appeared who 
 baffled the marichaussSe for twelve years. 83 These men, 
 it is true, do not seem to have entertained the idea of a 
 regular insurrection, and the steady increase of settle- 
 ment after 1714 must have discouraged the prospects of 
 a successful rising; nevertheless, the early decades of the 
 eighteenth century show quite a list of notorious out- 
 laws. 84 
 
 But about 1750 there appeared a man of real ideas and 
 powerful personality who was to become a veritable 
 menace to the colony. This man was the famous Macan- 
 dal. Macandal was an African, whether from the Senegal 
 or Guinea is uncertain. For more than six years he ab- 
 stained from active warfare against the whites while 
 strengthening his influence over the negroes. His power 
 was of a religious nature, for he announced that he was 
 the Black Messiah, sent to drive the whites from the 
 island. His magic powers gave him the authority of a 
 veritable Old Man of the Mountain, and the supersti- 
 
66 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tious negroes considered him a god. He had a clear idea 
 of race, and concerning it, gave utterance to the following 
 remarkable prophecy: One day, before a numerous as- 
 sembly, he exhibited a vase containing three handker- 
 chiefs colored yellow, white, and black, which he drew 
 out in turn. "Behold," said he, "the first people of San 
 Domingo — they were yellow. Behold the present inhabi- 
 tants — they are white. Behold those who shall one day 
 remain its masters " — and he drew forth the black 
 handkerchief. 8B 
 
 At last, about 1758, he thought the moment come 
 for his great stroke. His plan rested on the wholesale 
 use of poison. Poison had always been the chief slave 
 method of obtaining revenge. It assumed the most di- 
 verse forms: poisoning of the master, of his children, his 
 cattle, his slaves, — even self-inflicted poisoning, if the 
 party thought himself a chattel of value. 86 But Macandal 
 united poisoning to marronage for a definite end. Ac- 
 cording to an official memoir, the plot was woven with 
 consummate skill. On a certain day all the water of Le 
 Cap was to be poisoned, and, when the whites were in 
 convulsions, Macandal and his maroon bands were to 
 raise the waiting negroes of the "plaine" and extermi- 
 nate the colonists. Only by the merest chance was the 
 conspiracy discovered. The terror among the whites was 
 great, and Macandal was relentlessly hunted down and 
 executed. Yet even in death he left behind a legacy of 
 unrest, for he prophesied that he would one day return, 
 more terrible than before. This was believed by many 
 negroes, and the colony was never free from poisonings 
 and disturbances. 87 
 
THE SLAVES 67 
 
 The great negro insurrection of 1791 was thus only the 
 coming to pass of what had been awaiting the favor of 
 circumstance since the colony's beginning. Its possi- 
 bility had long been foreseen. "We have in the negroes 
 most dangerous enemies," writes a Governor in 1685. 
 A century later, 88 a royal officer exclaims, "A slave col- 
 ony is a town menaced by assault; we are walking on 
 barrels of powder." 89 His words were true; — and sparks 
 from the edicts of Revolutionary France were soon to 
 fall upon those powder-barrels. 
 
 Such was San Domingo: materially prosperous, but 
 socially diseased. In closing this sketch of the colony at 
 the outbreak of the Revolution, let us quote the farewell 
 of De Wimpffen: "Will you have, sir, my parting word 
 on this country? It is: the more I know the inhabitants, 
 the more I congratulate myself on quitting it. I came 
 hither with the 'noble' ambition of occupying myself 
 solely in acquiring a fortune; but destined to become a 
 'master,' and consequently to possess 'slaves,' I saw, 
 in the necessity of living with them, that of studying them 
 with attention, to know them, — and I depart with much 
 less esteem for the one and pity for the other. When a 
 person is what the greater part of the planters are, he is 
 made to have slaves; when he is what the greater part 
 of the slaves are, he is made to have a master! Tout le 
 monde est ici a sa place!" 90 
 
VI 
 
 THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION IN 
 SAN DOMINGO 
 
 On the 19th of November, 1787, Louis XVI promised 
 a calling of the States-General. The phrasing, it is true, 
 was vague, and the date set 1792, but now that the Not- 
 ables had failed to give relief * it was plain that the bank- 
 rupt Government of France could never stagger through 
 another four years. For the first time since the far-off 
 year 1614, the French people was about to assemble 
 legally before the throne; there to lay bare its grievances 
 and demand redress. 
 
 But redress of grievances was not the hope of France 
 alone; — it was shared by Frenchmen over-seas, and 
 nowhere more ardently than in the chief colony of the 
 empire. San Domingo, as we have seen, was filled with 
 discontent: discontent at the caste of arbitrary soldiers, 
 supercilious bureaucrats, and pedantic lawyers who came 
 from Europe to rule her with such arrogance and waste; 2 
 discontent at that colonial system which pinched and 
 mulcted her at every turn. 3 That a movement for eco- 
 nomic reform and some measure of colonial self-govern- 
 ment should speedily arise was inevitable. 
 
 The most obvious means of furthering these ends was 
 the sending of representatives to the coming States-Gen- 
 eral. True, no precedent existed for such a step. But 
 precedent could clearly play little part in the convocation 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 69 
 
 of a body which had not met for nearly two hundred 
 years, and San Domingo might claim that her rights were 
 as good as those of great European provinces such as 
 Franche-Comte and Lorraine which had also come under 
 the French Crown since the last States-General in 1614, 
 yet whose admission was certain not to be refused. Of 
 course, San Domingo was not a contiguous province but 
 a remote colony, and no nation had ever admitted colo- 
 nial representatives to its council board. But then the 
 States-General was no modern legislature like the Eng- 
 lish Parliament, but a mediaeval assembly for the stating 
 of grievances and with no direct power of enforcing re- 
 dress. Theoretically, there seemed no good reason for 
 denying the Frenchmen of San Domingo this opportunity 
 of laying their complaints before the King. 
 
 In the early months of 1788 such a movement began, 
 both in San Domingo itself and among that numerous 
 group of absentee nobles, planters, and merchants then 
 living in France. 4 On July 15, 1788, the French section 
 organized as a regular party styling itself the "Colonial 
 Committee." It was dominated by a group of great ab- 
 sentee nobles, and at Court it had powerful connections 
 and the patronage of the Duke of Orleans. Its adherents 
 numbered about a thousand persons, centring in Paris, 
 but also scattered through the provinces and the com- 
 mercial towns. Furthermore, the party had the good 
 luck to discover among its members a man of real ability 
 in the person of the Marquis de Gouy d'Arcy, whose 
 stirring pamphlets and clever political tactics were at 
 length to bring it success. 6 
 
 In San Domingo, the party showed equal activity. 
 
70 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Here also the movement was headed by a number of 
 wealthy planters of noble birth, seconded by some of 
 the rich merchants and lawyers, while the semi-official 
 Chamber of Commerce at Le Cap set itself up as the 
 steering-committee of the movement. 6 The fear of gov- 
 ernment interference restrained the Chamber from too 
 open a propaganda, but in the month of May it drew up 
 a manifesto claiming the rights of San Domingo to rep- 
 resentation in the States-General, and circulated among 
 its adherents a petition to the King. 7 Backed by three 
 thousand signatures, this petition was forwarded to the 
 Colonial Committee in Paris. 8 In rather flamboyant 
 language it set forth the signers' griefs and hopes. "Sire," 
 it reads, "you are about to call all France around you. 
 The clarion call is already sounding, and its note carries 
 across the sea. Our hearts are at your feet. We are 
 Frenchmen; we lament that the ocean hinders us from 
 being the first to reach the footsteps of your throne." 9 
 
 This address did much to stimulate the French Com- 
 mittee's propaganda. Within the next few weeks a num- 
 ber of pamphlets appeared, mostly from the clever pen 
 of Gouy d'Arcy; wires were industriously pulled at Ver- 
 sailles; and on September 4 a deputation styling them- 
 selves the "Commissioners of San Domingo" appeared 
 before the Minister of Marine, La Luzerne, and presented 
 their petition now swelled to four thousand signatures 
 by the adherents of the party in France. La Luzerne 
 avoided committing himself, but laid the petition before 
 the King, and Louis referred it to the Conseil d'Etat, 
 which advised against colonial representation on grounds 
 of inexpediency. 10 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 71 
 
 However, this check was far from discouraging the 
 Colonial Committee. Fresh pamphlets appeared to win 
 over French public opinion, 11 and the growing weakness 
 displayed by the King's Government emboldened the 
 party to more radical action. By this time whole prov- 
 inces, like Dauphine and Brittany, were acting at their 
 own will and pleasure in open defiance of the King's au- 
 thority, 12 and the lesson was not lost upon the partisans 
 of colonial representation. "The Government," says 
 Boissonnade, "was denying them access to the coming 
 States-General; they resolved to force it. The Govern- 
 ment was denying them the right of assembly; they in- 
 voked the right of nature." 13 They passed the word to 
 their comrades in San Domingo to elect deputies to the 
 States-General. 
 
 In San Domingo what was the strength of that royal 
 authority now to be put to this decisive test? The well- 
 meaning but irresolute Minister of Marine, La Luzerne, 
 had been the island's last Governor, 14 and his successor, 
 the Marquis du Chilleau, had not yet left France. Never- 
 theless, San Domingo was in good hands. For the last 
 four years the intendantship had been held by the Mar- 
 quis de Barbe-Marbois. A man of strong character and 
 great ability, he had effected striking financial and ad- 
 ministrative reforms, and was the acknowledged head of 
 the Government. 15 
 
 Under better conditions this man might have been a 
 tower of strength against the forces of disorder and revo- 
 lution. But here, as elsewhere, the wretched Govern- 
 ment of Louis XVI deserted its most faithful servants. 
 Faced by the rising storm, he demanded again and again 
 
72 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 of the Home Government what attitude he was to assume. 
 "We administrators," he writes, "can only wait upon 
 your orders." 16 But the Government had no orders to 
 give. In December, 1788, arrived the new Governor, Du 
 Chilleau; yet his instructions contained not a line of posi- 
 tive direction; they simply ventured a pious confidence 
 "in the prudence of the administrators." 17 
 
 To Barb6-Marbois this was all the more perplexing 
 since it was becoming evident that in spite of their noisy 
 propaganda the partisans of colonial representation were 
 only a minority : fully two thirds of the white population 
 were showing themselves either indifferent or positively 
 hostile. The poor whites had nothing to gain from the 
 aristocratic regime proposed by the Chamber's mani- 
 festo, the official caste was in violent opposition to claims 
 for self-government which would have deprived its mem- 
 bers of their berths; finally, a majority even of the 
 planters expressed lively apprehensions as to the results 
 of this agitation. 18 
 
 The dissent among the planters is most significant. 
 The reasons for official opposition are patent, but these 
 planters were fully alive to colonial abuses, and were 
 by nature just as susceptible as the adherents of rep- 
 resentation to prospects of power and reform. The 
 reason for their opposition was their fear of the coming 
 States-General's attitude toward slavery and the color 
 line. 
 
 The first note against slavery had been sounded a full 
 half -century before by Montesquieu in his "Esprit des 
 Lois," but ever since then the chorus had been swelling 
 in volume. All the leaders of later French thought had 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 73 
 
 written against this institution, 19 and in the preceding 
 year the movement (become international in scope) had 
 assumed a practical form truly alarming to the colonies. 
 In 1787, the English reformer Clarkson had founded in 
 London a society advocating the abolition of slavery. 
 It had spread like wildfire, and a propaganda had begun 
 which within a year reached Parliament and alarmed the 
 British colonies. 20 
 
 And almost immediately the movement jumped the 
 Channel, for in February, 1788, the brilliant young pam- 
 phleteer Brissot founded the famous society of the "Amis 
 des Noirs." 21 If the English propaganda had spread 
 fast, the French one spread infinitely faster. The mother 
 society in Paris quickly counted among its members 
 many of the great names of the Revolution: men al- 
 ready famous like Lafayette, Mirabeau, and Condorcet; 
 coming figures like Robespierre. Furthermore, it quickly 
 became much more radical than the English society. It 
 affiliated with the network of secret revolutionary or- 
 ganizations then springing up over France, embraced 
 abstract principles, and already formulated the "Rights 
 of Man." It appealed to the people and soon gained 
 many thousand adherents. By its organized network 
 of daughter societies, it anticipated the system of the 
 Jacobins. 22 
 
 If even the English propaganda had disquieted San 
 Domingo, 23 it is easy to imagine the alarm caused by the 
 progress of the French society and by the accompanying 
 flood of antislavery literature. "I well remember," says 
 Moreau de Saint-Mery, "the tremendous sensation at 
 Le Cap, when, in April and May, 1788, numbers of the 
 
74 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 'Mercure de France' arrived giving details and com- 
 ment on this question." 24 
 
 Now all this had given the colonists food for much 
 reflection. Judging by the paralysis of the French Gov- 
 ernment, radical thought was very likely to dominate 
 the coming States-General. And it was equally clear 
 that this radical thought was pronouncing against colo- 
 nial ideals in no uncertain fashion. Was it, then, wise to 
 affiliate with this assembly or raise colonial questions for 
 its consideration? To many men the correct line of con- 
 duct had already been marked out by the recent action 
 of their English colonial neighbors. The island of Jamaica 
 had been as much wrought up over the efforts of Clarkson 
 and his friends as San Domingo by the doings of the 
 "Amis des Noirs"; — indeed, even in San Domingan 
 opinion, the English island was at that moment consid- 
 ered the more menaced of the two. 25 Yet the Jamaicans 
 expressed no desire to send a handful of representatives 
 to be lost in the mass of the British Parliament; instead, 
 they had been more than contented to send agents for 
 the protection of their interests. 26 This struck the mass 
 of the San Domingo planters as the proper solution of 
 their own difficulty. To keep colonial questions as much 
 as possible out of the French public eye, and to ob- 
 tain reforms directly from the Crown through the quiet 
 efforts of their agents, appeared to these men the only 
 safe course to pursue. 27 
 
 This opposition to colonial representation was not lorfg 
 in assuming concrete form. Not only was there wide- 
 spread refusal to sign the petition circulated in May, 
 1788, 28 but a public protest was got up and presented to 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 75 
 
 Barbe-Marbois. 29 In his correspondence with the Min- 
 ister of Marine, the Intendant explains the feelings of 
 this opposition. "Admission to the States-General," he 
 writes, "would, in itself, be dear to all the colonists. . . . 
 But they feel how little likeness there is between colonial 
 conditions and those to be treated by the States-General, 
 and they think that the voices of a few colonial deputies 
 would be lost in those of six or seven hundred persons few 
 of whom could have any knowledge of colonial conditions 
 or interests." 30 
 
 Such was the conviction of both Government and ma- 
 jority; yet, as has often happened, they were unable to 
 defeat the plans of an aggressive minority which knew 
 what it wanted and strove to a definite end. By the close 
 of the year 1788 this minority had acquired a well-knit 
 organization, with provincial and even parochial com- 
 mittees working under the guidance of the Chamber at 
 Le Cap. 31 Accordingly, after various aggressive moves, 32 
 the Chamber in late December boldly defied the Govern- 
 ment, and convoked throughout the colony electoral 
 assemblies for the choice of deputies to the States-Gen- 
 eral. 33 The conservative majority protested, 34 but did 
 nothing, and its natural leader, the Intendant, dared not 
 move for lack of orders. These elections appear to have 
 been highly irregular, packed, and sometimes secret. 
 The planter opposition refused to vote, and of the poor 
 whites only party henchmen were admitted. The result 
 was the "election" of a solid delegation of thirty-seven 
 deputies, several of whom were residents of France. 35 At 
 the same time cahiers of grievances were drawn up stat- 
 ing the electors' wishes. These show clearly the party's 
 
76 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 aims, which were nothing less than the erection of the 
 planter caste into a privileged aristocracy which should 
 monopolize the public offices and rule San Domingo. 86 
 
 As the result of these elections the Government was 
 quite discredited, 37 and it soon fell into absolute impo- 
 tence through a quarrel of Governor and Intendant. The 
 important results of the hard winter of 1788-89 upon the 
 course of the French Revolution have been often noted, 
 and it is interesting to discover a direct effect upon the 
 history of San Domingo as well. The failure of the 
 French crops had caused a prohibition against the ex- 
 port of grain from France, and this threatened San Do- 
 mingo with famine. To avert this famine, Governor Du 
 Chilleau in March, 1789, threw open the ports to foreign 
 foodstuffs. The terms of his proclamation, however, ex- 
 ceeded the law, and Barbe-Marbois protested. For some 
 time the relations between the two had been growing less 
 cordial, and this action of the Intendant completed the 
 rupture. Du Chilleau, a weak man with a hot temper, 
 now fell under the influence of the radical planters, who, 
 in May, 1789, induced him to issue an entirely illegal 
 ordinance giving the island virtual freedom of trade. The 
 Intendant at once reported to the Home Government 
 this nullification of the "Pacte Coloniale," and the 
 Minister of Marine promptly annulled Du Chilleau's 
 acts and recalled him in disgrace. But the political con- 
 sequences of the quarrel were none the less serious. The 
 ministerial orders did not arrive until autumn, and be- 
 fore that time the news of the first great triumphs of the 
 French Revolution had reached San Domingo — to find 
 the island virtually without a government. 38 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 77 
 
 The year 1789 discovered France in the tumult of the 
 approaching elections to the States-General, and therein 
 the voice of the Colonial Committee was heard loudly 
 raised among the rest. That it aroused a certain amount 
 of interest is proved by the election of several of its sup- 
 porters and by some favorable cahiers. 39 Yet its rather 
 noisy propaganda also had a reflex effect which went far 
 to justify the fears of its colonial opponents. The "Amis 
 des Noirs " took up its efforts as a challenge, seeing in the 
 champions of the Colonial Committee the most bitter 
 opponents of those changes so deeply laid to heart. They 
 therefore declaimed loudly against the oppression of the 
 slaves and the iniquities of slavery, and they succeeded 
 in getting a better hearing than the Colonial Committee 
 itself. 40 The great mass of public opinion, however, re- 
 fused to declare for either party. 41 
 
 The efforts of the Colonial Committee had evoked yet 
 another current of opposition. Among the colonists liv- 
 ing in France there existed the same differences of opinion 
 as among the residents of San Domingo. From the first 
 there had been much lively dissent at the doings of the 
 Colonial Committee, and these dissenters were rapidly 
 drawing together into that definite organization later 
 known as the "Club Massiac." Several of their sympa- 
 thizers were elected to the States-General where they 
 were certain to oppose colonial representation, 42 and 
 in this attitude they were sure to be supported by the 
 deputies of the commercial towns, already alarmed as 
 these were at the Colonial Committee's strictures on 
 the "Pacte Coloniale." 43 
 
 Faced by such powerful opponents it is not surprising 
 
78 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 that the first efforts of the Committee to seat its dep- 
 uties were failures. The States-General opened on the 
 5th of May, and in mid-June the cause of the San Do- 
 mingo deputies looked more than doubtful. In this 
 impasse they were fortuitously saved by the Day of the 
 Tennis Court : 44 in that crisis Gouy d' Arcy saw his op- 
 portunity and led his fellows to the aid of the imperilled 
 Third Estate. The spectacle of this group of noblemen 
 appearing in the hour of peril to share their fortunes 
 roused a wave of grateful enthusiasm among the Com- 
 mons, who admitted the principle of colonial representa- 
 tion on the spot. 45 
 
 The Colonial Committee had thus won in principle, 
 but the extent of its victory still remained to be deter- 
 mined. In the first debates on the size of the San 
 Domingo delegation, it seemed as though its demand 
 for twenty seats would go through. But the pressure of 
 other business caused frequent adjournments, and this 
 delay was skilfully used by its opponents. Pamphlets 
 from influential members of the "Amis des Noirs" like 
 Brissot and Condorcet appeared to chill opinion; a pro- 
 test from the "Club Massiac" stabbed the Committee 
 from behind; worst of all, the able pen of Mirabeau 
 fought savagely against the San Domingans, and in the 
 debates his great voice thundered forth words which 
 must have caused a shudder among the colonial depu- 
 ties. 46 "Have not the best minds denied the very utility 
 of colonies?" he cried. "And, even admitting their util- 
 ity, is that any reason for a right to representation? 
 These people wish a representation in proportion to the 
 number of inhabitants. But have the negroes or the free 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 79 
 
 people of color taken part in the elections? The free 
 colored are landowners and taxpayers; — nevertheless, 
 they have had no vote. And as to the slaves — either they 
 are, or they are not, men. If they be men, let the colo- 
 nists free them, make them voters and eligible as depu- 
 ties; if they be not men, — have we counted into the 
 population of France the number of our horses and 
 mules?" 47 
 
 On July 7, it is true, the Assembly voted the admis- 
 sion of six deputies from San Domingo. But the gulf had 
 already opened beneath the colonists' feet. Before those 
 ominous words of Mirabeau, even the sanguine Gouy 
 d'Arcy must have remembered the despised warnings of 
 the "Club Massiac." In the words of Deschamps, "This 
 logic was far from pleasing to the colonists. It chilled the 
 enthusiasm of the 20th of June, and made them already 
 regret their action in having placed themselves under 
 the protection of the Assembly. The political rights of 
 the mulattoes and the abolition of slavery were, in this 
 very first hour, already looming over the horizon, evoked 
 by the mighty orator who had thus far guided the Revo- 
 lution. It was nothing less than a declaration of war, and 
 one all the more serious in that the very utility of colonies 
 had been questioned. From that moment the colonial 
 deputies felt that they must separate their cause from 
 the mother country's, must extricate their interests from 
 its principles, and must give blow for blow to those 
 'Amis des Noirs' of whom Mirabeau was but the spokes- 
 man." 48 
 
 In other words, the Colonial Committee was about to 
 try, too late, what wiser heads had attempted from the 
 
80 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 first — to keep San Domingo out of the Revolution. At 
 one time, this had not been an impossibility. If the great 
 planter aristocracy had held together and consistently 
 backed the Government, it could certainly have kept the 
 island peaceful. And with no news from San Domingo 
 to rouse public interest or excite discussion, it is more than 
 likely that in the coming tumult of great events, colonial 
 questions would have been either overlooked or hushed 
 up by a little clever manipulation. 49 As a matter of fact, 
 a policy very like this was actually carried out by the 
 colonists of Ile-de-France and Bourbon, 50 with the re- 
 sult that these islands escaped the woes of the French 
 West Indian colonies. Even persons close to the event 
 realized the Colonial Committee's fatal error. "To-day," 
 writes the essayist Beaulieu in 1802, "this thoughtless 
 step of the inhabitants of San Domingo is generally held 
 to have been the source of those ills which wrought their 
 ruin. If the inhabitants of San Domingo had never sent 
 deputies to the States-General, there would have been 
 no point of contact between them and that National 
 Assembly which was the heart of the Revolution, or, at 
 most, communication would have been both slow and 
 difficult." 51 
 
 But it was not to be. For more than a year the par- 
 tisans of colonial representation had trumpeted their 
 cause all over France, stirred San Domingo to discord 
 and confusion, and engaged in a furious duel with French 
 radical thought which had filled the land with a flood 
 of oratory and pamphlets. The French public was now 
 deeply interested both in San Domingo and in colo- 
 nial questions, and the presence of her deputies in the 
 
THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 81 
 
 National Assembly had "bound the fate of the colony 
 to that of the mother country, which was soon to impose 
 upon that colony laws against which she would strive in 
 vain." 52 
 
VII 
 
 FIRST STAGE OF THE COLONIAL STRUGGLE 
 IN FRANCE 
 
 In France, the Revolution moved forward with stun- 
 ning rapidity. The storming of the Bastille on the 14th 
 of July felled the Government of the King, the night of 
 the 4th of August destroyed the power of the French 
 nobility, and on August 20, the "Declaration of the 
 Rights of Man" committed the National Assembly to 
 principles which condemned the very bases of colonial 
 society. 
 
 The colonists in France were wild with terror. "The 
 colony," write the San Domingo deputies to their constit- 
 uents on August 12, "is in most imminent peril. People 
 here are trying to raise a revolt among our negroes, and 
 the danger is such as to cause us the most horrible alarm. 
 We see the danger, — and yet are forced to keep silence. 
 Gentlemen, these people are drunk with liberty. A so- 
 ciety of enthusiasts who style themselves the 'Friends of 
 the Blacks' is writing openly against us; it is watching 
 eagerly for the favorable moment to explode the mine 
 against slavery; and should we have the tactlessness to 
 but utter that word, its members might make it the oc- 
 casion to demand the enfranchisement of our negroes." l 
 
 Under the pressure of this growing peril, both Colonial 
 Committee and Club Massiac drew together. What was 
 done, was done, and no time must be wasted in useless 
 
FIRST STAGE OF COLONIAL STRUGGLE 83 
 
 recrimination: positive action was necessary. It was evi- 
 dent that the old Government was in its death-agony and 
 that the National Assembly would soon be supreme. 
 Before this should happen, the best plan seemed to be to 
 establish in San Domingo some new power which might 
 offer resistance to anti-colonial legislation, and, by means 
 of the still-existing royal prerogative, to "remove colo- 
 nial affairs from the control of the National Assembly to 
 that of some local body in which the slave interests would 
 be safe." 2 
 
 Accordingly, the two factions approached the Minister 
 of Marine with a request for royal authorization to con- 
 voke a Colonial Assembly. This request La Luzerne was 
 only too happy to grant, and on September 27, he de- 
 spatched to San Domingo orders quite to the liking of 
 his petitioners. These orders provided for an Assembly 
 having competence over internal affairs and elected 
 through a franchise so limited by property qualifications 
 as assured planter control. 3 Best of all, from the colo- 
 nists' standpoint, there was no recognition whatever of 
 the National Assembly: the future colonial body was to 
 be accountable only to the King. 4 
 
 The course of events quickly showed the colonists that 
 they had acted none too soon. It also convinced them 
 that fresh efforts on their part were necessary. For, on 
 October 5, the Paris mob marched on Versailles and 
 brought both King and National Assembly back with 
 them next day. From that moment it was plain that 
 neither King nor Assembly was a free agent, and that the 
 radical minority might at any time enforce its will 
 through pressure from the Paris mob. 
 
84 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Indeed, this fresh victory of the Revolution soon pro- 
 duced important developments in the colonial question. 
 In Paris there had long existed a community of wealthy 
 mulattoes, come thither to obtain a European education 
 or to escape the rigors of the color line. These men had 
 naturally excited the sympathetic interest of French 
 radical thought, and from the first, the "Amis des 
 Noirs" had eagerly planned how the mulattoes might 
 best derive advantage from the course of the Revolution. 6 
 Under the leadership of one of these white friends (an 
 advocate named De Joly), the Paris mulattoes had re- 
 cently organized themselves into the society of "Colons 
 Americains." The progress of the Revolution greatly 
 encouraged their prospects, and on October 22, the in- 
 fluence of the "Amis des Noirs" succeeded in getting the 
 mulattoes a hearing before the National Assembly. On 
 that day a delegation of the "Colons Americains" ap- 
 peared at the Assembly 's bar, and there demanded that 
 the mulattoes be allowed to enjoy all the privileges of 
 citizenship, not as a favor but as a natural right, and that 
 the Assembly admit into its body certain delegates rep- 
 resenting the interests of the mulatto caste. The President 
 replied amicably that "no part of the nation should ask 
 its rights from the Assembly in vain," and took the 
 " Colons Americains' " petition into consideration. B 
 
 The next few weeks saw a vigorous controversy, both 
 within and without the Assembly. The " Amis des Noirs " 
 did their best to insure their proteges' admission, and the 
 influential pen of the Abbe Gregoire did yeoman service. 
 But their opponents were also active, and all the powerful 
 influence of the commercial towns backed the colonists in 
 
FIRST STAGE OF COLONIAL STRUGGLE 85 
 
 their efforts to shelve a proposal so certain to destroy the 
 peace of the colonies. On December 3, the question came 
 before the House, and a great debate ended in the defeat 
 of the "Amis des Noirs." 7 
 
 The danger was over for the moment, but the colonists 
 saw what must speedily be done. No more such oratori- 
 cal battles must be fought in the hall of the National 
 Assembly, for in these contests, the "Amis des Noirs," 
 with their ringing appeals to Revolutionary principles 
 and their backing of sympathetic galleries, were certain 
 sooner or later to sweep the Assembly off its feet and to 
 gain some decisive victory. If such questions must come 
 up at all, the colonists felt it absolutely necessary to get 
 them off the floor of the House into the quiet of the com- 
 mittee room. 8 Accordingly, a colonial deputy 9 promptly 
 proposed the formation of a Committee on Colonies, to be 
 composed of colonial and commercial deputies in equal 
 proportions. 10 The "Amis des Noirs," however, were 
 fully alive to the importance of this move. It was quite 
 clear that, once a body so constituted was established, 
 every proposal affecting the colonies would be either 
 killed in committee or reported to the House in biased 
 form. They accordingly fought the proposal, and showed 
 their strength by compassing its defeat. 11 
 
 Then, for three months, colonial questions slumbered 
 as interest centred in constitution-making and the foreign 
 crisis over Nootka Sound. However, toward the end of 
 February, 1790, the Assembly was brought to reconsidera- 
 tion by the increasingly serious news from the colonies. 
 Violent scenes were taking place in San Domingo, 12 and 
 still more serious tidings came from Guadeloupe and 
 
86 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Martinique, where the negroes were already stirring at 
 the call of the Revolution. 13 
 
 It was clear that the House needed full information on 
 this complicated question, and to sift the accumulating 
 mass of evidence, the Assembly on March 2, 1790, ap- 
 pointed a Committee on Colonies. On this committee 
 only two colonial deputies found seats, but as the "Amis 
 des Noirs" were excluded while the other members were 
 moderate in tone, the colonists might feel that they 
 would be given a friendly hearing. 14 
 
 This committee reported on the 8th of March, when 
 its chairman, Barnave, laid before the House a draft 
 decree for the settlement of the troubles over-seas. His 
 recommendations were very pleasing to the colonists. In 
 his report, Barnave maintained that the late troubles 
 were caused by the arbitrary nature of the Royal Gov- 
 ernment, the extreme rigor of the "Pacte Coloniale," 
 and the machinations of "those enemies of the happiness 
 of France" who had made the colonists believe that the 
 carrying out of the national decrees involved the ruin of 
 their fortunes and the peril of their lives. This last was, 
 of course, a direct thrust at the "Amis des Noirs." To 
 remedy these evils, Barnave advised that the colonies 
 should be left to work out their own internal constitu- 
 tions, that the "Pacte" should be toned down, and that 
 the National Assembly should quiet the colonies' fears 
 regarding the safety of their social organization. 15 
 
 In the draft decree these ideas were embodied in no 
 uncertain fashion. Its preamble stated that "While the 
 National Assembly considers the colonies as part of the 
 French Empire, and while it desires to see them enjoy the 
 
FIRST STAGE OF COLONIAL STRUGGLE 87 
 
 fruits of the happy regeneration which has just taken 
 place, it has, notwithstanding, never intended to include 
 them as subject to the constitution decreed for the king- 
 dom or laws incompatible with their local circum- 
 stances." 16 The body of the decree authorized the vari- 
 ous colonies to make known their wishes through local 
 assemblies, and declared "criminal against the nation 
 whosoever should seek to foment risings against them." 17 
 
 This was a sweeping colonial victory, but the As- 
 sembly had become so thoroughly alarmed at the condi- 
 tion of the colonies that it received Barnave's proposals 
 with acclamation. Even Mirabeau's great voice was 
 drowned by the cries of "Aux voix! Aux voix!" and the 
 decree was voted almost unanimously. 18 
 
 The Decree of March 8, 1790, was a crushing blow for 
 the "Amis des Noirs." Nevertheless, they did not de- 
 spair, for they saw a chance of undoing the colonists' vic- 
 tory. The decree was general in form and needed a set of 
 instructions to explain its execution. These instructions 
 did not come before the House until the 23d of March, and 
 this gave time for the exertion of adverse pressure and for 
 the framing of "jokers" to nullify its purpose. The effect 
 of this two weeks' effort was very apparent when the 
 instructions came before the Assembly, which now showed 
 clearly that strain of moral cowardice and vacillation 
 which was to be so largely responsible for the ruin of 
 San Domingo. 
 
 The great struggle came over Article 4, which con- 
 cerned voting qualifications. After much preliminary 
 bickering, the article as proposed stated that "all per- 
 sons" twenty-five years of age, owners of real estate or 
 
88 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 taxpayers, should be held qualified voters. Now this 
 phrasing contained an ambiguity which might well be 
 interpreted into a complete nullification of the decree it 
 was supposed to explain. For, taken literally, Article 4 
 admitted to the franchise a very large number of mulat- 
 toes; — something which was clearly just such a revo- 
 lutionary change in colonial conditions as had been 
 expressly disclaimed by the decree. 
 
 And, in the debate which followed, this ambiguity was 
 brought sharply to the notice of the Assembly. The 
 Abbe Gregoire loudly hailed Article 4 as consecrating the 
 political equality of the mulattoes, and this assertion was 
 at once hotly denied by a colonial deputy. Now, if the 
 decree of March 8 meant anything at all, it meant the 
 retention of the existing colonial status quo : yet the As- 
 sembly simply could not bring itself to a specific contra- 
 diction of its vaunted principles, and finally shirked the 
 point by simply voting Article 4 as it stood — ambiguity 
 and all. 19 "Thus," says Mills, "the Assembly refused to 
 consider the question above all others needing settlement. 
 The decree literally interpreted would admit the free peo- 
 ple of color to the exercise of the suffrage; but the tradi- 
 tions and customary law of the island were against any 
 such concession. It is evident that the colonial deputies 
 did not intend that the colored people should be admitted 
 to full citizenship. The explanation of this evasive action 
 of the Assembly is probably to be found in its unwilling- 
 ness to do anything which might seem to be inconsistent 
 with its Declaration of Rights and other enunciations of 
 fundamental principles, while at the same time it was 
 felt that no hasty action should be taken in the settle- 
 
FIRST STAGE OF COLONIAL STRUGGLE 89 
 
 ment of a question affecting the commercial interests 
 of France." 20 
 
 Fraught with its ominous equivocation, this truly 
 Delphic utterance of the National Assembly went forth 
 to San Domingo. 
 
VIII 
 
 THE FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 The close of the year 1789 found San Domingo al- 
 ready the theatre of growing tumult and confusion. The 
 prestige of the Royal Government had suffered a heavy 
 blow from the January elections, and the breach between 
 Governor and Intendant had destroyed its power of 
 action. 1 Still, the public peace was not really disturbed 
 before the autumn. Impotent as was the Royal Govern- 
 ment for repression, its hold on the machinery of govern- 
 ment was still unbroken, and the opposition dared at- 
 tempt no open attack until the result of the struggle in 
 France should be known in the island. The Party of 
 Representation, therefore, contented itself with perpetu- 
 ating its political organization by the establishment of 
 Provincial Committees, against which the Government 
 took no action. 2 
 
 Early in September, however, this truce was broken 
 by the tidings of the 14th of July. At San Domingo, as in 
 France, the fall of the Bastille was the signal for an ex- 
 plosion: in the towns, at least, the tricolor cockade was 
 worn by all, and several persons who ventured to express 
 their disapproval were lynched by excited crowds. 3 
 
 But the popular nature of these disorders showed that 
 the movement was assuming a new phase. Hitherto, the 
 struggle had been confined to the upper classes of society, 
 and the January elections had shown how completely the 
 
FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 91 
 
 lower orders of the white population had been disre- 
 garded. 4 But the ensuing months had given ample time 
 for the Revolutionary leaven to work among the needy 
 proletariat of the towns, 5 whose latent jealousy of the 
 wealthy whites had been rapidly transformed into an 
 active desire to share in the Revolution. 6 That the poor 
 whites would have to be reckoned with in future politics 
 was soon conclusively shown. The cahier of grievances 
 drawn up in the January elections was published at this 
 moment, and its demands for the erection of the planter 
 caste into a ruling aristocracy aroused such a storm of 
 popular indignation at Le Cap that the Provincial Com- 
 mittee hastened to convoke all classes of the white popu- 
 lation to the election of a Provincial Assembly. 7 
 
 The committee was emboldened to this step by the 
 victory which it had just won over the Government. The 
 news of the 14th of July had been hailed by the opposi- 
 tion as the signal for its attack upon the royal authority. 
 Wherever its power extended it had disbanded the royal- 
 ist-officered militia and enrolled its supporters into com- 
 panies of National Guards, 8 and as soon as it had thus 
 acquired a military backing it had dealt a decisive blow. 
 Everybody agreed that the pillar of royal authority in 
 San Domingo was the Intendant, Barbe-Marbois, — 
 and him the opposition promptly decided to eliminate. 
 Accordingly, a corps of Le Cap volunteers marched over- 
 land on Port-au-Prince to arrest the Intendant. Barbe- 
 Marbois, knowing his probable fate if captured and de- 
 spairing of any effective resistance to this sudden coup, 
 took ship and left the island, accompanied by those other 
 officials known for the most zealous upholders of the 
 
92 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 royal prerogative. 9 At San Domingo, as in France, the 
 "emigration" had begun. 
 
 This flight of the Intendant had the desired effect. It 
 left unsupported the new Governor, Count de Peynier, 
 who had arrived less than a month before. Although 
 personally a brave soldier, PeyDier was advanced in 
 years, somewhat lacking in resolution, and too unac- 
 quainted with local affairs to venture a determined resist- 
 ance to the attacks of the opposition. 10 Accordingly, on 
 November 1, the new Provincial Assembly of the North 
 met at Le Cap without interference from the royal author- 
 ities. It was, of course, dominated by the opposition, 
 which had by this time adopted the party nickname of 
 "Patriots." The " Patriots " had now developed a direct- 
 ing group of reckless spirits, foremost among them being 
 a showy nobleman named Bacon de la Chevalerie, and 
 one Larchevesque Thibaud, an oratorical lawyer of the 
 Le Cap Bar. 11 These two men were to be the leading 
 spirits of the "Patriot" party down to its destruction 
 in 1793. 
 
 The new Assembly at once declared that the powers 
 of government for the Province of the North vested en- 
 tirely in the body of its deputies, and assumed control 
 over every branch of local administration in complete 
 disregard of the Governor's authority. 12 
 
 With such a party stronghold as the North Province, 
 the progress of the "Patriots" in the rest of the colony 
 was rapid. Early in January, 1790, an Assembly of the 
 West Province met at Port-au-Prince, under the very 
 eyes of Governor Peynier, and in mid-February an As- 
 sembly of the South met at Les Cayes. However, the 
 
FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 93 
 
 Governor's presence and the growing conservatism of the 
 West and South forced these two bodies to adopt a much 
 more modest attitude than had been the case with the 
 Assembly of the remote and self-sufficient North. 13 
 
 Some time in January, 1790, arrived that plan for a 
 Colonial Assembly which had been drawn up by the 
 Home Government at the request of the colonists in 
 France. Its details were not wholly pleasing to the "Pa- 
 triots " and were promptly modified, but its substance was 
 quite in accord with their wishes. Therefore, in the latter 
 part of February, the three provincial bodies convoked 
 a Colonial Assembly, to meet at the town of Saint-Marc 
 in the West Province on the 25th of March. 14 The tardy 
 arrival of its members delayed the opening of this Colo- 
 nial Assembly: 15 before that date, the colony had been 
 thrown into great alarm by a rising among the mulat- 
 toes. 
 
 The ferment of the Revolution had not failed to stir 
 the mulattoes of San Domingo. As early as January, 
 1789, some mulattoes of the West Province had as- 
 serted their claims to political rights in a memorial to the 
 royal authorities, and although at that moment they did 
 not dare publicly to avow their hopes, they were steadily 
 encouraged by the reports received from the mulatto 
 community in Paris. 16 However, as tidings concerning 
 the anti-colonial tendencies displayed by the Revolution- 
 ary party in France continued to reach the island, the 
 hopes of the mulattoes became tinged with fears for their 
 personal safety. The alarm of the white population over 
 the "Amis des Noirs" in 1788 has been already noted. 17 
 Later, this feeling had been submerged by the political 
 
94 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 crisis, although we have seen how profoundly fear for the 
 existing social order had influenced conservative colonial 
 opinion. 18 But when the "Declaration of the Rights of 
 Man " arrived in late September, a fresh quiver of alarm 
 ran through San Domingo. "To promulgate such les- 
 sons in the colonies as the declared sense of the Supreme 
 Government," observes Edwards, "was to subvert the 
 whole system of their establishments. Accordingly, a 
 general ferment prevailed among the French inhabitants 
 of San Domingo, from one end to the other." 19 
 
 And the fears of the colonists were not confined to pos- 
 sible action of the mulattoes: already alarm was felt at 
 the attitude of the slaves. "In this country," writes a 
 colonist at this moment, "we are in the greatest fear con- 
 cerning the negroes." 20 That this attitude was justified 
 is shown by the report of a royal officer in the district of 
 Fort Dauphin, dated so early as the 14th of October, 
 1789, and considered by the Governor to be of sufficient 
 importance for transmission to the Minister of Marine. 
 "Sir," it reads, "this word 'Liberty,' which is echoing so 
 loudly all the way from distant Europe to these parts, 
 and which is being everywhere repeated with such en- 
 thusiasm, is sowing a fatal seed, whose sprouting will be 
 terrible. In France, where its application endangers 
 despotism alone, we may hope for the best results. But 
 here, where everything opposes the entire liberty of all 
 classes, we should see only blood, carnage, and the cer- 
 tain destruction of one or other of those incompatible 
 races of men which inhabit this colony. So long as there 
 exists the opposition of white and black, so long it will 
 be impossible to establish, upon a basis of liberty, any 
 
FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 95 
 
 mutual support of existing society." 21 He reports much 
 unrest among the negroes of his district, and urges greater 
 activity of the marechaussee in searching negro "quar- 
 ters " for concealed weapons and in breaking up nocturnal 
 gatherings among the slaves. That the servile mass was 
 thus early responsive to the Revolution was also shown 
 by the negro risings in Guadeloupe and Martinique dur- 
 ing these same autumn months of 1789. 22 
 
 The news of the mulatto propaganda in France and the 
 great debate of December 3 awakened fresh alarm. "The 
 speech of M. de Joly and its favorable reception by the 
 National Assembly," writes Governor Peynier, "have 
 aroused an agitation and terror of acute intensity." 23 
 But if the news from France alarmed the whites, it so en- 
 couraged the mulattoes that they began to desert their 
 passive attitude, and in November, 1789, a number of 
 public addresses demanding political rights were drawn 
 up by them in various parts of the colony. At this bold 
 step, however, the growing alarm of the whites changed 
 to a wave of fury. The framers of the addresses were 
 lynched, and a widespread persecution of the mulattoes 
 followed these first excesses. 24 
 
 Yet there was more than fear behind the numerous 
 outrages to which the mulattoes were now subjected: it 
 was also the explosion of long-suppressed class hatred 
 which here stood revealed. If the poor whites envied the 
 richer members of their own color, they both envied and 
 hated the wealthy mulattoes. Even in the past, they had 
 never neglected an opportunity to vent their feelings, 
 although hitherto the royal authority had protected the 
 mulattoes against the more serious forms of outrage. 25 
 
96 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 But now the Royal Government was shorn of its power, 
 and those upper-class colonial whites who controlled the 
 "Patriot" party, alarmed as they were at the Revolu- 
 tionary peril and anxious for poor white support, were 
 not likely to embroil themselves to protect their race op- 
 ponents. By this time the local offices were becoming 
 filled with poor whites, and to the will and pleasure of 
 these new functionaries, the mulattoes were now de- 
 livered almost without reserve. 26 
 
 The result of all this was very serious. The mulattoes, 
 excited as they were at the news from France and intoxi- 
 cated by the principles of the Revolution, were thus at 
 the same time subjected to an oppression not only far 
 more severe than they had ever known, but also peculiarly 
 intolerable to their sense of justice. To the legal discrimi- 
 nations of the color line, backed by a unanimous official 
 and public conviction, they had hitherto bent as to the 
 inevitable. But this arbitrary tyranny of ignorant and 
 despised adventurers was insupportable. 27 The wild rage 
 which rankled in mulatto hearts was soon to wreak its 
 vengeance upon the entire white population. 
 
 However, the first results, though significant enough 
 in character, were quite inconsiderable in fact. During 
 the month of March a rising took place in the West Prov- 
 ince among the mulattoes of the Artibonite, an inland 
 tract of fertile plain where the numbers of the caste were 
 very considerable. But the insurgents displayed no ac- 
 tivity, aroused no support save a few mutterings in the 
 South, and were promptly dispersed by the vigorous 
 action of the local militia and marechaussee. 2 * 
 
 Insignificant as had been the rising, however, the les- 
 
FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 97 
 
 son was for the moment taken to heart. This is proved 
 by the great lenience shown the insurgents. Some of the 
 disturbances had taken place in territory controlled by 
 the "Patriots," others in the sphere still dominated by 
 the Government, but in both cases the rebels were 
 granted a general pardon. 29 This was the result of 
 new political developments of great potential impor- 
 tance. 
 
 Under the Old Regime, we have already seen that the 
 royal Government had been the chief protection of the 
 mulatto caste. 30 That the mulattoes fully realized this 
 had been shown by their recent conduct. From the first, 
 they had maintained a respectful attitude toward the 
 royal authorities and had refrained from any anti-Gov- 
 ernment demonstration. Naturally, this was highly 
 pleasing to the harassed King's officers, who soon came 
 to regard the mulattoes as potential allies in the struggle 
 against the Revolutionary party. 31 
 
 Still more significant was the waning hostility to the 
 Government now shown by the better element of the 
 "Patriot" party. These wealthy planters and merchants 
 were becoming more and more alarmed at the attitude of 
 the white lower classes. For the pretensions of the poor 
 whites were daily becoming more extreme. Composed 
 mostly of ignorant men of narrow intelligence, this class 
 was either too short-sighted to realize the results of 
 white disunion or too reckless to care about consequences. 
 Therefore the poor whites were now openly striving for 
 political supremacy, and furthermore they were making 
 no secret of their hostility to wealth and privilege. 32 In 
 the recent elections to the new Colonial Assembly they 
 
98 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 had in many cases taken possession of the polls and ex- 
 cluded upper-class voters by violence and intimidation. 33 
 All the events of the last few months were thus steadily 
 leading conservative "Patriots" to forget their feud with 
 the Government. Alarmed at the ambitions of the poor 
 whites, warned by their own representatives in France 
 to heal dissension before the Revolutionary peril, and 
 taught by the mulatto rising that a continuance of per- 
 secution would drive that class to utter desperation, these 
 men began to approach the Government and to reenf orce 
 that strong body of Royalist opinion which was already 
 preparing for armed defence. 
 
 Out of all this there might have sprung a triple alliance 
 between the Government, the united planters, and the 
 mulattoes which would very possibly have saved San 
 Domingo. Even the "Patriot" Assembly of the North 
 was at this moment showing a spirit of conciliation to the 
 mulattoes, and it is probable that the majority of this 
 caste would have been too much alive to the poor white 
 menace and the Revolutionary ferment among the 
 negroes not to have accepted concessions short of the 
 abolition of the color line, and to have joined its fellow 
 property-holders and slaveowners in the maintenance of 
 existing society. This was what actually took place in 
 Isle-de-France and Bourbon, with the result that these 
 islands were spared the horrors of race war and social 
 dissolution. 34 
 
 Unfortunately, this alliance never took place. The new 
 Colonial Assembly at once assumed a constitutional posi- 
 tion which re-formed party lines among the whites; while 
 the ambiguous March decrees of the National Assembly 
 
FIRST TROUBLES IN SAN DOMINGO 99 
 
 and the incitements of their French friends so roused the 
 mulattoes that they resolved to strike for the full attain- 
 ment of their hopes. 35 The gods had indeed decreed the 
 destruction of San Domingo. 
 
IX 
 
 THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 
 
 On April 15, 1790, the new Colonial Assembly met at 
 Saint-Marc, a port town of the West Province, some fifty 
 miles north of Port-au-Prince. As might have been ex- 
 pected from the unscrupulous activity displayed in the 
 elections, the "Patriots" were in a great majority; in- 
 deed, all the more violent leaders of this party were to be 
 found on the roll of assemblymen. The first act of the 
 new Assembly was to elect as its President Bacon de la 
 Chevalerie, the arch-radical of Le Cap, and its next steps 
 were equally significant. Rejecting the term "Colonial" 
 as beneath its dignity, the new body assumed the title of 
 "General Assembly," and inscribed upon its walls the 
 motto, " Saint-Domingue, la Loi et le Roi." l 
 
 From the first, it was clear that the General Assembly 
 considered itself the supreme authority in the island: as 
 Deschamps well puts the matter, "It sincerely believed 
 itself a miniature Constituent Assembly." 2 And un- 
 fortunately it at ODce imitated one of the most serious 
 errors of its French model. The National Decree of 
 March 8, 1790, had authorized each colony to formulate 
 its wishes regarding its future internal status. Accord- 
 ingly, the General Assembly, instead of busying itself 
 with practical measures of conciliation and reform, 
 plunged at once Hto the attractive but perilous task 
 of framing a constitution. History shows that there is 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 101 
 
 nothing which so destroys in a parliamentary body its 
 sense of what is real and practicable as its prolonged 
 absorption in the formulation of abstract constitutional 
 principles. This was especially true in the case of the 
 General Assembly, for it rapidly evolved a theory of 
 government which rendered a struggle with the royal 
 authority inevitable and which sharpened political divi- 
 sions among the colonial whites past all likelihood of 
 reconciliation. 
 
 The fruit of these labors was a decree, passed on the 
 28th of May, entitled " Constitutional Bases of the Gen- 
 eral Assembly." By this self-made charter, the Assembly 
 arrogated to itself supreme authority in the island and 
 transformed the royal officers into its servants: all ef- 
 fective control by the National Assembly was excluded, 
 and the connection of San Domingo to the mother coun- 
 try was entirely through the Crown. 3 
 
 In France, this colonial constitution was almost uni- 
 versally condemned as an attempt at independence, and 
 even in San Domingo itself many persons were convinced 
 of its secessionist character. 4 Nevertheless, these judg- 
 ments seem to have been unfounded. When we consider 
 the island's past history 5 and the nature of its govern- 
 ment, 6 there is certainly nothing novel in the insistence 
 upon the royal connection. The great charge aimed 
 against the Assembly of Saint-Marc is its refusal to recog- 
 nize the paramount authority of the National Assembly. 
 But this is just where its case is strongest. The power of 
 the French people, as distinct from that of the French 
 Crown, was something quite as revolutionary as any of 
 the clauses of the colonial constitution : indeed, it was to 
 
102 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 guard against just such assumptions of popular control 
 over the colonies that the King's Ministers, in the pre- 
 ceding September, had drawn up that plan of convoca- 
 tion which was the legal basis of the General Assembly's 
 existence. 7 We must here be more than usually on our 
 guard not to read the future into our judgments. At that 
 very moment, thousands of persons 8 were leaving France 
 because they refused to recognize that supreme power 
 lay with a popular assembly and not with the King, while 
 still larger numbers of Frenchmen were soon to dispute 
 the doctrine of popular sovereignty by passive resistance 
 or armed rebellion. 9 To stigmatize as treason the colo- 
 nists' refusal to accept this debated theory may have been 
 good Revolutionary politics, but is an historical absurdity. 
 Garran-Coulon, the compiler of the great official report 
 so often quoted in these pages, well expresses the convic- 
 tion of the men of the Revolution. According to him, 
 there were but two courses open to the General Assembly : 
 either entire acquiescence in the decrees of the National 
 Assembly with the admission that San Domingo was a 
 subject colony, or complete independence. 10 But this ar- 
 gument is fallacious. As Mills well observes, " Between 
 these two extremes was another course. The planters 
 recognized the sovereignty of the French King, but not 
 the supremacy of the French people. They claimed that 
 as a matter of expediency this view was the one best 
 suited to the interest of France and of San Domingo, and 
 that as a matter of history this had been the real relation 
 of the two." u Unfortunately, Revolutionary France was 
 already displaying that uncompromising refusal to tol- 
 erate the slightest objection to its imperious will which 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 103 
 
 was to cause the Vendee at home and the ruin of San 
 Domingo over-seas. 
 
 The real innovation made by the May Constitution 
 lay in its subjection of the local royal authorities. To 
 proclaim submission to the King, and then in the same 
 breath turn the King's officers into the Assembly's serv- 
 ants was a political hocus-pocus as contradictory in theory 
 as it was dangerous in practice. For thus, at the very 
 moment of its defiance to Revolutionary France, the 
 General Assembly declared war upon its one natural ally, 
 and embarked on a desperate strife of faction when the 
 greater struggle was already looming over the horizon. 
 
 The tension between Government and Assembly now 
 rapidly grew more acute. Up to this time Governor 
 Peynier, an irresolute man averse to conflict, had done 
 his best to keep on good terms with the Assembly, and 
 had overlooked many of its early provocations. 12 But now 
 the issue of resistance or submission was fairly joined, 
 and the Governor was the more encouraged to oppose the 
 Assembly's pretensions in that he felt himself supported 
 by a growing body of public opinion. Even before the 
 Assembly had met, we have seen that the conservative 
 wing of the "Patriots" had begun to break up, 13 and 
 since then the party's conduct had caused many fresh 
 desertions. This was especially the case in the former 
 "Patriot" stronghold of the North. The mere departure 
 of the "Patriot" leaders for the General Assembly had 
 weakened that party's hold upon the provincial body, 14 
 while the hostility shown by the General Assembly to the 
 existing commercial system had soon alarmed the great 
 merchant body of Le Cap. 15 The May Constitution now 
 
104 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 capped the climax, for, by its provisions, the Provincial 
 Assemblies were as much threatened as the Royal Gov- 
 ernment. This roused all the strong local feeling of the 
 North, which hereupon recalled its deputies from the 
 General Assembly and issued a manifesto which was a 
 virtual declaration of war. 16 Furthermore, the pressure 
 of common interests soon resulted in an understanding 
 with the Governor, and a species of alliance was formed 
 between the two against the General Assembly. 17 
 
 Nevertheless, Peynier, averse as ever to violent meas- 
 ures, attempted to turn the difficulty. The National 
 Decree of March 8 provided that in cases of Colonial 
 Assemblies chosen before its passage, elections might 
 be held to determine whether these assemblies should 
 continue or be replaced by new bodies. In mid-June, 
 therefore, Peynier took advantage of this to order a refer- 
 endum on the question, 18 although his official correspond- 
 ence shows him to have been doubtful of the result. 
 "The colony," he writes to La Luzerne, "is at this mo- 
 ment in the greatest agitation. Two parties divide it. The 
 one, entirely devoted to the General Assembly, demands 
 its continuation: the other seeks its dissolution. This 
 latter party is the more numerous, and contains the 
 most intelligent and responsible citizens; nevertheless, I 
 very much doubt whether it will be successful. For the 
 other party is made up of the discontented, the declaimers 
 against pretended despotism, and the mass of workingmen 
 and artisans, who are persuaded that their opponents are 
 composed solely of those persons wishing to maintain 
 abuses." 19 Peynier's fears were justified by the event. 
 In the elections the North came out strongly against 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 105 
 
 renewal, but elsewhere, save in a few Government strong- 
 holds, the poor whites voted solidly for the General As- 
 sembly. The "Patriots" won a clear victory, and on 
 July 13, Peynier reluctantly proclaimed the Assembly 
 renewed. 20 
 
 Flushed by this triumph, the General Assembly now 
 forgot all moderation and determined to coerce the Gov- 
 ernor by force. Accordingly, it at once seized the royal 
 arsenals within its jurisdiction, and on July 27, it de- 
 creed the disbanding of the regular troops, who were 
 invited to re-form as "paid National Guards of San 
 Domingo." 21 This was, of course, an open declaration 
 of war. 
 
 But the struggle had no sooner begun than it became 
 apparent that vigor and determination had passed from 
 the "Patriots" to the Government. This state of things 
 was largely due to the fact that the Government party 
 once more possessed a head. Since the flight of Barbe- 
 Marbois, almost a year before, 22 the conservative forces, 
 though growing in strength, had been quite destitute of 
 leadership. But early in June the Chevalier Mauduit had 
 arrived to take up his duties as colonel of the Royal 
 Infantry Regiment "Port-au-Prince," and in the short 
 space of two months he had become the acknowledged 
 leader of the conservatives. Mauduit had none of the 
 bureaucratic caution of the late Intendant. A man of 
 great courage, his love of action was spurred by his 
 hatred of the Revolution; for the Chevalier Mauduit was 
 an ardent Royalist. Only a short time before this he had 
 written, "I love my country passionately; — and I love 
 the blood of my kings as men knew how to love two hun- 
 
106 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 dred years ago." 23 Just previous to his departure for 
 San Domingo he had gone to Turin for a conference with 
 the Comte d'Artois, the leader of the emigres. 2 * Such was 
 the Chevalier Mauduit, to whom the irresolute Peynier 
 surrendered himself, now that decisive action had become 
 a necessity. 25 
 
 That Mauduit had already gained the affection of his 
 soldiers was proved by the failure of the General Assem- 
 bly to sap their loyalty. But the regiment "Port-au- 
 Prince" did not number over twelve hundred men, 26 
 — scarcely a sufficient force to meet the large bodies 
 of National Guards at the General Assembly's disposal. 
 Fortunately, however, Mauduit had found another in- 
 strument ready to his hand. Ever since the proscription 
 of Barbe-Marbois, the more determined Royalists of the 
 West Province had enrolled themselves into volunteer 
 companies known as the "Pompons Blancs," from a 
 white decoration worn in their chapeaux. 27 These or- 
 ganizations Mauduit now heavily recruited, and the 
 Government soon possessed a considerable force of 
 thoroughly reliable troops. 28 
 
 Events soon showed that Mauduit had acted none too 
 soon. In the campaign which he had planned against 
 Saint-Marc, he had intended to use the naval forces then 
 in San Domingan waters to blockade the town by sea. 
 But it now appeared that the sailors had been tampered 
 with, for the crew of the flagship Leopard mutinied and 
 sailed to Saint-Marc, where the vessel was greeted with 
 hysterical delight and rechristened Sauveur des Fran- 
 gais. 29 
 
 The Government leaders now realized that the under- 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 107 
 
 taking was even more serious than they had imagined, 
 and that before striking at the Assembly they must make 
 sure of their own ground. For a dangerous centre of dis- 
 affection existed in Port-au-Prince itself. The Committee 
 of the West Province had always remained in "Patriot" 
 hands, and the mutiny of the Leopard had so encour- 
 aged this body that it had now begun to assemble its 
 partisans for a rising in the very capital of the colony. 
 But Colonel Mauduit was just the man for the situation. 
 At two o'clock on the morning of July 30, he led a strong 
 force of regulars and Royalist volunteers 30 against the 
 headquarters of the Western Committee, stormed it after 
 a bloody skirmish, and stamped out all signs of disaf- 
 fection within the limits of the town. 31 
 
 The road was now clear for a direct stroke at Saint- 
 Marc, albeit the Government leaders realized that the 
 bloodshed already attendant upon the coup d'etat was 
 likely to produce a dangerous effect upon French public 
 opinion, becoming daily more hostile to the suppression 
 of disorder. In his report to La Luzerne, Peynier foresees 
 that people in France will be demanding*his head "for 
 having shed the blood of citizens." "Yet, sir," he con- 
 tinues, "I should have held myself a traitor had I not 
 put down those in rebellion. . . . You, sir, know by your 
 own experience how dangerous are such movements in a 
 country like this. . . . Had I not acted thus, the mutual 
 hostility was such that I feel sure one part of the town 
 would soon have been massacred by the other." 32 
 
 But this danger from France made it the more neces- 
 sary to finish the business quickly. Fortunately, the Gov- 
 ernment was assured of active aid from the north. 
 
108 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 In the person of the Baron de Cambefort, colonel of the 
 Royal Regiment "Le Cap," Mauduit had found a col- 
 league after his own heart, and this man's able efforts had 
 resulted in the formation of a compact little army which, 
 under the command of a zealous young officer named 
 Vincent, had already left Le Cap by sea to cooperate with 
 the main body of the Government troops. 33 
 
 The campaign was short, bloodless, and decisive. Mau- 
 duit moved rapidly on Saint-Marc from Port-au-Prince 
 while Vincent's army landed north of the town, thus tak- 
 ing it between two fires. The General Assembly had 
 issued a proclamation calling on the citizens to rise in its 
 defence, and this appeal roused widespread response, 
 especially in the South. But the South was far away, 
 Saint-Marc itself was full of disaffection, and the As- 
 sembly soon recognized that resistance was impossible. 34 
 
 In its perplexity the General Assembly took a daring 
 resolution. Thanks to the Leopard the sea remained 
 open, and the Assembly now resolved to go to France, 
 there to seek aid and protection from its quondam rival 
 the National Assembly. Accordingly, on the afternoon 
 of the 8th of August, the General Assembly — now 
 thinned by desertions to a mere rump of eighty-five mem- 
 bers — met in its old hall for the last time, and thence, 
 amid long lines of troops, marched to the shore and em- 
 barked on the Leopard. Next day the "Eighty-five," 
 accompanied by their most zealous followers, sailed for 
 France. 35 
 
 The General Assembly was gone, but its partisans 
 remained. At the very moment of its embarkation, an 
 army some two thousand strong was advancing from the 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 109 
 
 South to its aid, gathering numerous recruits on its 
 march through the inland parishes of the West. But the 
 departure of the General Assembly for France had obvi- 
 ously carried the matter before a higher tribunal, and 
 until the decision of the national body should be known, 
 neither party desired to prejudice its case by further 
 acts of aggression. Accordingly, negotiations were begun, 
 which on August 23 ended in the so-called "Treaty of 
 Leogane " : really a truce in which both parties promised 
 to abstain from hostilities until the arrival of the Na- 
 tional Assembly's decision. 36 
 
 It was obvious that the "Treaty of Leogane" settled 
 nothing: indeed, the course of the next few months merely 
 deepened the gulf between the parties. San Domingo was 
 now divided between three factions, the bounds of whose 
 authority coincided roughly with the provincial frontiers. 
 The West was pretty generally subject to Government 
 control, and Mauduit's vigorous measures, backed by 
 his regulars and Royalist " Pompons Blancs," effected 
 a species of counter-revolution. The old King's officers 
 were restored and all disaffection sternly repressed. But 
 there was nothing healing or constructive in these meas- 
 ures, and this blind reaction merely compressed the latent 
 discontent till some future moment of explosion. 37 
 
 In the South, the "Patriots" were absolute masters. 
 The General Assembly's appeal for aid had here been the 
 signal for a general rising, and the last royal officers had 
 been deposed or murdered. Now that the "Treaty of 
 Leogane" had given them undisturbed authority, the 
 "Patriot" leaders proceeded to organize the Southern 
 parishes into a regular confederation, with an executive 
 
110 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 council, a treasury, and an army. 88 This was of great 
 significance for the future. We have already noted the 
 peculiar nature of the South; its isolation, its backward 
 economic and social conditions, and the strong influence 
 exerted by the neighboring English island of Jamaica. 39 
 This traditional separatism was greatly enhanced by the 
 practical independence now enjoyed, which did much to 
 bring about the Confederation of the Grande Anse and 
 the appeal to the English, in 1793. 
 
 The North, we have seen, had zealously aided Governor 
 Peynier against the Assembly of Saint-Marc, but it was 
 perfectly obvious that this action had been dictated by 
 hatred of the common enemy and in no sense by submis- 
 sion to the royal authority. Therefore, as soon as the rea- 
 son for joint action had vanished, its alliance gave place 
 to watchful neutrality. Peynier, however, was too cau- 
 tious to make any attempt against the North, and the 
 relations of the two remained outwardly correct. The 
 Northern Assembly assumed full control over its province, 
 although here as elsewhere the other factions were repre- 
 sented by minorities ready to make trouble at the first 
 opportunity. 40 
 
 One thing was clear — the white colonists were en- 
 tirely forgetting the necessity of union in face of the 
 French Revolution. Indeed, the recent action of the de- 
 feated "Patriots" in appealing to the judgment of the 
 National Assembly had shown a complete disregard of all 
 the warnings from cooler heads on both sides of the At- 
 lantic. At the time of Mauduit's coup against the West- 
 ern Committee, De Wimpffen had ably voiced this body 
 of opinion. "I see," he writes, "but one way of saving 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 111 
 
 the colony: it is to bring about the Revolution by the 
 hands of those who are ineffectually employed to retard 
 its progress. They can no longer check; they may still 
 direct it. The bulk of the colonists, the merchants, the 
 different departments of the administration, have all an 
 equal interest to maintain order: let them speedily join 
 themselves to the Government, to baffle and counteract 
 the dark intrigues carried on by the disaffected to excite 
 an insurrection of the people of color and the negroes." 41 
 The truth of these words was soon made evident. 
 Failure to obtain political rights had infuriated the Paris 
 mulattoes; the excited declamations of their numerous 
 sympathizers convinced them that they were victims of 
 an intolerable injustice; and the very air of Revolutionary 
 Paris taught them the gospel of violent measures. Under 
 these circumstances it is not strange that one of their 
 number, a young man of ardent temperament named Oge, 
 presently became convinced that he was destined to lead 
 a successful rising of his caste. Accordingly he left for 
 England, whence, with the aid of Clarkson, he succeeded 
 in reaching San Domingo in the early part of October. 
 His presence in the island was kept a profound secret 
 until, on October 28, he raised the standard of revolt in 
 the mountainous district of the North Province near the 
 Spanish border. With a force of about three hundred men 
 he kept the field for several days, but was finally beaten 
 after a sharp engagement by the strong column of regulars 
 and militia sent against him from Le Cap. Oge and his 
 principal followers fled into Spanish territory, but were 
 soon surrendered to the French authorities under the 
 terms of the extradition treaty then in force. Nearly all 
 
112 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the insurgents were apprehended and punished in pro- 
 portion to their share in the movement. Oge and his lieu- 
 tenant Chavannes suffered the usual penalty inflicted 
 upon insurgent leaders, — that of being broken on the 
 wheel; a score of others were hanged, and a large num- 
 ber were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. 42 
 
 This second rising of the mulattoes was a very much 
 more serious affair than the abortive attempt of the pre- 
 ceding March. 43 Not only had the insurgents stood their 
 ground; their call to arms had awakened widespread 
 response throughout the colony. In the West large num- 
 bers of mulattoes had taken arms, and only the vigorous 
 action of Mauduit and the prompt collapse of the North- 
 ern rising had avoided serious consequences. 44 Still more 
 ominous was the fact that this rising had been the direct 
 result of incitement from France. 
 
 Its results were more serious still. The numerous exe- 
 cutions which followed the suppression of the revolt 
 roused a furious desire for vengeance among the mulat- 
 toes, aDd made any common action of the two castes 
 against future Revolutionary slave legislation impossi- 
 ble. 45 Lastly, the news of Oge's tragic death excited in 
 France such a wave of sympathy for the mulattoes and 
 hostility to the colonists as greatly furthered the passage 
 of the momentous National Decree of May 15, 1791. 46 
 
 But all this was lost upon the minds of excited partisans. 
 The one fact which appeared on the surface was that this 
 second mulatto effort had been repressed almost as 
 quickly and easily as the first, and a feeling of confidence 
 ensued which blinded the colonists to future dangers and 
 persuaded them that they might safely continue their 
 
THE ASSEMBLY OF SAINT-MARC 113 
 
 internal quarrels. In November, 1790, the decision of the 
 National Assembly on the troubles of Saint-Marc had 
 reached the island. The specious pleading of the fugi- 
 tive colonial legislature had been unable to gloze over the 
 manifest tendencies of its actions, and on October 12 the 
 National Assembly had issued a decree which completely 
 vindicated the Government, nullified all the acts of the 
 colonial legislature, and declared its dissolution. 47 But 
 the "Patriots" refused to submit to this decision, and the 
 island remained in its condition of unstable equilibrium 48 
 until a sudden shock from without destroyed the existing 
 balance of parties in the spring of 1791. 
 
 The disturbed conditions revealed by the reports on the 
 troubles of Saint-Marc had convinced the National As- 
 sembly that an increase of the military forces in San 
 Domingo had become a necessity, and in consequence of 
 this decision, on the 2d of March, 1791, a squadron ap- 
 peared in the harbor of Port-au-Prince with two regi- 
 ments of the line on board. But by this time the Revo- 
 lutionary spirit had thoroughly infected the French army. 
 Even on the voyage the troops had got quite out of hand, 
 and the appeals at once made to them by the oppressed 
 "Patriots" of the town roused the soldiers to furious 
 mutiny. In the preceding winter the breakdown of Gov- 
 ernor Peynier's health had caused his replacement by the 
 Vicomte de Blanchelande, but the new Governor was no 
 stronger than his predecessor and displayed in this crisis 
 a total lack of resolution. The result was inevitable. Left 
 without orders, the soldiers of the regiment "Port-au- 
 Prince " succumbed to their comrades' appeals to join in 
 overthrowing this counter-revolution, and on March 4, 
 
114 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Blanchelande fled, while Mauduit, who refused to desert 
 his post, was murdered by the mutineers. 49 A "Patriot" 
 revolution followed throughout the province. The Gov- 
 ernment officials were everywhere deposed, the "Pom- 
 pons Blancs" disarmed, and the Royalist regime com- 
 pletely overthrown throughout the West. 50 
 
 The "Patriots" were now supreme in both West and 
 South; but this naturally revived the alliance of their 
 opponents. Blanchelande and the leading members of the 
 Government party fled to Le Cap, where they were re- 
 ceived in most friendly fashion, and as the "Patriots" 
 did not feel strong enough to attempt the reduction of the 
 North, this new balance of parties continued 81 until, 
 early in July, all quarrels were forgotten in presence of 
 the National Decree of May 15, 1791. 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 
 
 The National Decrees of March, 1790, had really- 
 begged the question of the cokroies. 1 But the attitude of 
 the Assembly of Saint-Marc, the alarm caused by Article 
 4, and the pressure of conservative opinion in France, all 
 showed the National Assembly that any blow aimed at 
 the existing social order in the colonies would entail the 
 most serious consequences. Until the spring of 1791 the 
 National Assembly consistently refused to touch either 
 slavery or the color line. 
 
 The attitude of conservative Frenchmen on the colonial 
 question is well expressed by De Wimpffen in a letter 
 written at the very beginning of the Revolution. "My 
 sentiments, sir, with regard to the slavery of the blacks 
 are no secret to you," he writes a French correspondent 
 in March, 1789. "You are apprised, then, that I have 
 always agreed, and still agree with those writers who re- 
 probate so strongly the infamous traffic we maintain on 
 the coasts of Africa. But, while I do justice to the purity 
 of their motives, . . . our age is unfortunately too full of 
 political reformers; who are in a violent haste to pull 
 down an irregular edifice, without having either the 
 talents or the materials necessary to construct it again 
 upon a better plan. One simple argument shall suffice for 
 all. Your colonies, such as they are, cannot exist without 
 
116 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 slavery. This is a frightful truth, I confess; — but the 
 not recognizing it is more frightful still, and may produce 
 the most terrible consequences. You must, then, sanction 
 slavery or renounce your colonies: and as 30,000 whites 
 can control 460,000 negroes only by the force of opinion 
 (the sole guaranty of their existence), everything which 
 tends to weaken or destroy that opinion is a crime 
 against society." 2 
 
 And the attitude of the colonists themselves was now 
 explained to the National Legislature by no less a body 
 than the Provincial Assembly of the North. This body 
 had accepted the supremacy of the National Assembly 
 and had declared war upon the autonomists of Saint- 
 Marc: and yet, at the height of the crisis, in the very 
 moment when it was equipping Vincent's army for an 
 invasion of the West, it had drawn up an address to the 
 French Assembly which frankly stated how easily its 
 action might have been reversed. This address, dated 
 July 13, 1790, begins by a vigorous condemnation of the 
 Assembly of Saint-Marc. "But," it adds, "what has led 
 the General Assembly into such a rash and disloyal 
 course? Let us, who have proved our loyalty, tell you 
 with the frankness permitted a friend speaking truth. 
 Gentlemen, the reason is an unfortunate suspicion of the 
 National Assembly itself: you have the proof of this as- 
 sertion in the Decree of the 28th of May, 3 . . . and in the 
 precautions taken against the National Assembly." This 
 suspicion, declares the address, has been caused by the 
 agitation of the "Amis des Noirs" within and with- 
 out the National Assembly, by the favorable reception 
 granted by that body to the mulattoes, 4 by Article 4, and 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 117 
 
 by the strong negrophil sentiment displayed by so large 
 a section of French public opinion. 
 
 "Pardon our frankness, gentlemen," continues the 
 address. "Never was frankness more necessary. The 
 misfortune of the General Assembly is that it does not 
 believe that your Decree of March 28 safeguards the 
 colony, and that it distrusts your attitude. We think the 
 contrary, and we believe that you could never lay a snare 
 for your brothers. But, had we believed as the General 
 Assembly, our conduct might well have been different. 
 
 "This is no time for mincing matters. Gentlemen, San 
 Domingo will never sacrifice her indispensable prejudice 
 regarding the mulattoes. She will protect them; she will 
 ameliorate their lot: of this intention she is daily giving 
 proof, and time will doubtless afford more extensive op- 
 portunities. But of both time and means, she must be the 
 absolute mistress, the only judge. ... As to the negroes, 
 our self-interest is allied to their well-being; but the 
 colony will never suffer this sort of property, which it 
 holds by the law and which guarantees all other species, 
 to be called in question, now or at any future time. 
 
 "The greater part of the colonists have misinterpreted 
 your intentions. It is therefore of supreme importance 
 that you remove these doubts, because long delay in so 
 doing might engender the idea of secession from France. 
 Forestall, then, these dangers, by a new act of wisdom, 
 confidence, and justice. Gentlemen, we have every con- 
 fidence in you; — but who is to assure us of the future? 
 Place subsequent legislatures in the happy impossibility 
 of listening to the enemies of our well-being; grant the 
 colony, in advance, an unchangeable article of the French 
 
 
118 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Constitution, to the effect that no law concerning its 
 internal condition (notably as regards the status of the 
 different classes which compose it) can be decreed except 
 on the specific demand of the colony itself. Then the 
 colony is quiet forever. Then the doubters can no longer 
 doubt. Then the ill-intentioned will have no more ex- 
 cuse. Then, but then only, our ties will be unbreak- 
 able." 6 
 
 All this greatly influenced the National Assembly, and 
 its Decree of October 12, 1790, although concerned pri- 
 marily with the troubles of Saint-Marc, 6 also contained 
 a very important declaration of its general intentions 
 toward the colonies. "No laws upon the status of persons 
 shall be decreed for the colonies," reads a clause of this 
 act, "except upon the specific, formal demand of their 
 Assemblies." 7 Thus, at least in general terms, the Na- 
 tional Legislature promised to respect the social system 
 of the colonies. 
 
 But with the opening months of 1791 there came a turn 
 of the tide. The wave of Revolution was rising fast and 
 the King was now but waiting the moment for flight: that 
 the radical flood should once more threaten the conserva- 
 tive edifice of colonial society was inevitable. The "Amis 
 des Noirs" had never relaxed their efforts. Besides their 
 general appeals for loyalty to the fundamental principles 
 of the Revolution, they maintained that, by passing 
 Article 4 of the March Instructions, the Assembly had 
 actually decreed the political equality of the mulattoes, 
 and they insistently demanded that the Assembly, by 
 some unequivocal act, should confound those persons now 
 barring the mulattoes from political rights in defiance 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 119 
 
 of the national will. To all this the colonists made reply, 
 and a great controversy raged during the opening months 
 of 1791. In March, the learned Moreau de Saint-Mery 
 published his "Considerations"; the ablest exposition of 
 the colonial thesis in all the voluminous literature of the 
 time. He is especially emphatic in combatting the as- 
 sertions of the "Amis des Noirs" to the effect that the 
 National Assembly must legislate on the status of the 
 mulattoes, and he predicts that if the Assembly should 
 reverse its decision as expressed in the Decrees of March 8 
 and October 12, negro emancipation and the destruction 
 of the colonies must soon follow of themselves. "If the 
 National Assembly," he writes, "has the misfortune to leg- 
 islate on the mulatto status, all is over. The colonists will 
 believe themselves betrayed; the mulattoes, instigated 
 by their friends, will go to the last extremity. And then 
 the slaves, who possess the same friends and the same 
 means of action, will seek to attain the same results. The 
 colonies will soon be only a vast shambles: and France — ? 
 Yes ! The mulattoes themselves are but pawns in a larger 
 game. For, if our slaves once suspect that there is a 
 power other than their masters which holds the final dis- 
 position of their fate; if they once see that the mulattoes 
 have successfully invoked this power and by its aid have 
 become our equals; — then France must renounce all 
 hope of preserving her colonies." 8 
 
 However, as time passed, public opinion declared itself 
 more and more in favor of the "Amis des Noirs," and 
 early in April the news of Oge's execution caused a veri- 
 table storm of anti-colonial feeling. The terrible death 
 of the young enthusiast was just the sort of thing to rouse 
 
120 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 popular passion in that feverish time. Paris hailed Oge as 
 a martyr to liberty, enacted his death upon the stage, 
 and grew so hostile to the colonial whites that a planter 
 scarcely ventured to appear upon the streets. 9 
 
 All this quickly reacted upon the National Assembly, 
 and presently a Grand Committee was appointed, con- 
 sisting of the five Committees on the Constitution, 
 Marine, Colonies, Commerce, and Agriculture, for a thor- 
 ough consideration of the social system in the colonies. 
 On the 7th of May this Grand Committee reported to the 
 Assembly, 10 — but its recommendations were favorable 
 to colonial desires. It urged the Assembly, as an act of 
 both justice and necessity, "to fulfil toward the colonies 
 an engagement which you have already solemnly taken; 
 an engagement from which your loyalty forbids you to 
 escape; — that is to say, to decree and transform into a 
 constitutional provision your promise of last October. 11 
 One thing cannot be gainsaid: the convulsions which 
 now rend the colonies have been caused first and foremost 
 by the fears there roused at the moment of the Revolu- 
 tion as to your political intentions; fears which have been 
 ever since inflamed by the most culpable methods." The 
 report then went on to explain why these fears had not 
 been allayed by the Assembly's pronouncements in the 
 Decree of March 8, 1790: because, aside from Article 4 
 of the instructions, its enemies had at once asserted that 
 it was only temporary in its nature and that it might be 
 revoked any day at the Assembly's pleasure. Then came 
 the Decree of October 12, stating explicitly "the As- 
 sembly's firm resolution to establish as an article of the 
 French Constitution the principle that no laws concern- 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 121 
 
 ing the status of persons should be decreed for the colo- 
 nies except upon the precise and formal demand of their 
 Assemblies." 
 
 And that promise, asserted the report, it was high time 
 to fulfil. " Gentlemen, it is in vain that you are told that 
 what you have already decreed is sufficient. Without 
 doubt it ought to suffice, but as a matter of fact it does 
 not suffice at all." For, the report continued, the op- 
 ponents of the present colonial system were now asserting 
 that the promise of October 12, like the pronouncement 
 of March 8, was merely provisional and liable to instant 
 revocation. The colonists, therefore, should have their 
 fears finally allayed by a positive constitutional decree 
 which would settle the matter beyond possibility of 
 doubt. "If this be not done," the report ended, "you 
 will put all in jeopardy; — rich possessions, a fleet, an 
 army, and the good order and prosperity of islands which, 
 by a word, you can return to peace and happiness. Lastly, 
 you will drive the colonial deputies to despair of the safety 
 of their country. . . . We repeat, gentlemen: the circum- 
 stances are grave; they are imperious. The measure 
 which we propose has become a necessity; - — and above 
 all, a prompt necessity. Gentlemen, discuss if you will, 
 but do not adjourn: the fate of your colonies, of your com- 
 merce, consequently of your political future, are bound 
 up with your decision." 
 
 Nevertheless, the Assembly did adjourn after a lively 
 preliminary skirmish; but on May 11 the decisive battle 
 began. Never before had such a battle been fought on the 
 colonies. Day after day its greatest orators strove upon 
 the floor of the House, and yet neither side could carry 
 
122 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the victory. But at last, suddenly and unexpectedly, the 
 end came. 
 
 It was the evening of the 15th of May. For five days 
 the National Assembly had winced beneath the threats 
 and warnings of the commercial and colonial deputies; 
 for five days it had writhed under the appeals of the 
 "Amis des Noirs" and the taunts of the roaring galleries. 
 Of a sudden, in a momentary lull, the radical deputy 
 Rewbell sprang to his feet and offered the following 
 "amendment": "The National Assembly decrees that it 
 will never deliberate upon the political status of the peo- 
 ple of color who are not born of free father and mother with- 
 out the previous free and spontaneous desire of the colo- 
 nies; that the Colonial Assemblies actually existing shall 
 continue; but that the people of color born of free father 
 and mother shall be admitted to all the future parish and 
 Colonial Assemblies, if in other respects possessed of the 
 required qualifications." 
 
 The Rewbell "amendment" was really a substitute for 
 the Grand Committee's bill; but its clever phrasing and 
 the small number of persons covered by its provisions 
 made it just the sort of compromise which appealed to a 
 body smarting in its conscience and worn down by ex- 
 haustion into a sullen agony to have done. Therefore, in 
 spite of the desperate efforts of Barnave, Malouet, and 
 the colonial deputies, the Rewbell amendment, amid a 
 thunder of applause, passed the House and became the 
 famous National Decree of May 15, 1791. 12 
 
 The rout of the colonists was complete. The number 
 of mulattoes thus decreed political equality was, it is 
 true, very small : not over four hundred voters, according 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 123 
 
 to Governor Blanchelande. 13 And yet, given a conflict 
 of irreconcilable principles in a time of revolution, this 
 decree was just that symbolic act which, if accepted by 
 the beaten side, ensured the other's complete victory. But 
 it was soon clear that no thought of submission lay in 
 colonial hearts. On the very next day u the colonial 
 deputies solemnly withdrew from the House, 15 and pres- 
 ently the tidings from over-sea told the National As- 
 sembly that it was face to face with rebellion. 
 
 It was on the 30th of June that the news of this decree 
 arrived at Le Cap, together with reports of the official 
 explanation drawn up by the victorious party in the 
 National Assembly. 16 This latter document was an 
 uncompromising statement of Revolutionary principles 
 which but added fuel to the flames. Almost at the start 
 its language excited misgivings as to the permanence of 
 even the decree's concessions on slavery; for, while it 
 pointed out the Assembly's decision not to legislate on the 
 status of the "non-free," it condemned slavery in prin- 
 ciple, and stated that the Assembly condoned the un- 
 doubted evils of this institution only in consideration of 
 the fact that the persons involved were ignorant aliens 
 whose immediate emancipation would provoke great 
 evils, and whom the Assembly would therefore leave to 
 the ameliorating effect of time. How much any promise 
 of the National Assembly was worth in a matter which 
 violated its principles the colonists might decide from the 
 appended explanation of its recent action regarding the 
 mulattoes. For this document not only assumed that by 
 Article 4 of the March instructions the Assembly had 
 decreed the political equality of free-born persons; it also 
 
124 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 went on to say that the Assembly would have been 
 powerless to deprive any such persons of political equal- 
 ity: for, "the rights of citizens are anterior to society, of 
 which they form the necessary base. The Assembly has, 
 therefore, been able merely to discover and define them; 
 it finds itself in happy impotence to infringe them." 
 After a severe condemnation of the colonial deputies for 
 their bolting of the Assembly, the document closed as fol- 
 lows: "The National Assembly has granted all to the 
 colonies: all, except the sacrifice of the imprescriptible 
 rights of a class of citizens which nature and law render 
 an integral part of political society ; all, except the reversal 
 of the life-giving principles of the French Constitution." 
 
 At the news of this revolutionary decree, the excitable 
 population of San Domingo rose in a delirium of furious 
 resistance. Governor Blanchelande seems to have been 
 almost as much shocked as the rest, for his letter of July 3 
 to the Minister of Marine not only unsparingly condemns 
 the decree, but asserts his absolute refusal to enforce it. 
 
 "I would, sir," he writes, "that I were not obliged to 
 report to you the sensation made by this news and the 
 rapidity with which it is flying to all parts of the colony. 
 . . . Three powerful motives combine to excite the pres- 
 ent feeling: offended pride, fear for the colony's safety, 
 and indignation at a broken promise. Sir, do not force 
 me to repeat the threats which are upon every tongue; 
 threats each more violent than the one before. The most 
 loyal hearts are estranged, and a frightful civil war or the 
 loss of the colony to France may well result from the pres- 
 ent state of opinion. . . . 
 
 "The first part of the decree, concerning the slaves and 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 125 
 
 freedmen, does not reassure people even as to their prop- 
 erty; for it is regarded as a mere temporary disposition 
 which a subsequent decree will abrogate, just as this one 
 has annulled the promise of the 12th October. Wherefore, 
 there has occurred that greatest of all misfortunes: the 
 colonists' trust in the National Assembly is absolutely 
 destroyed. 
 
 "The same letters also announce that England is de- 
 spatching to West Indian waters a fleet of forty-five sail; 
 and my pen refuses to report the speeches, perhaps the 
 prayers, to which this circumstance gives birth. To-mor- 
 row the Provincial Assembly meets. I have had proof of 
 its patriotism; — but the National Assembly has already 
 seen its principles regarding the mulattoes from its ad- 
 dress of last July; 17 and these principles have not 
 changed. On the other hand, the mulattoes may take 
 action, and if they move, all is lost. Judge, then, sir, of 
 my position. It is not my province to criticize decrees; 
 my duty is to enforce them. And yet, sir, I am resolved 
 to spill my own blood rather than that of my fellow 
 citizens and brothers. I pray to Heaven that the retire- 
 ment of the colonial deputies from the National Assembly 
 and the remonstrances of commerce may bring about the 
 withdrawal of this fatal decree. . . . But, sir, if it be not 
 at least materially modified, I have every reason to fear 
 that it will prove the death-warrant of many thousands 
 of men, including those very persons who are the objects 
 of its solicitude." 18 
 
 These were Blanchelande's reflections after observing 
 public opinion at Le Cap; as news arrived from other 
 parts of the colony, his reports bespoke still deeper alarm. 
 
126 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 "This decree is regarded as murderous to the colony," he 
 writes the Minister of Marine on the 31st of July; "and 
 men's minds are growing more inflamed instead of calm- 
 ing down. Popular resentment shows itself in the most 
 violent speeches, the most extraordinary proposals, and 
 people here speak only of resistance to the injustice and 
 ingratitude of the representatives of the nation. Men 
 ceaselessly invoke those promises contained in the De- 
 crees of March 8 and October 12 never to legislate on the 
 status of persons; promises, be it said, not yet explicitly 
 revoked, and here regarded as sacred. But these promises 
 being broken by the utterance of the 15th of May, men 
 say they are thereby quite absolved from their allegiance. 
 In fine, sir, despair is growing from day to day, and coun- 
 sels only armed resistance to the execution of this law, 
 however large the forces which may be sent hither." 19 
 
 That the Governor had not exaggerated is abundantly 
 proved both by other official writings 20 and by the large 
 number of private letters still preserved in the Archives 
 Nationales. One of these letters, dated Le Cap, July 5, 
 notes such intense indignation that the writer fears a 
 universal explosion. "The colony is resolved on secession 
 if the mother country attempts to enforce this decree." 21 
 Still more alarming is a letter from Port-au-Prince. This 
 also predicts a war between the castes, for the whites will 
 never yield. " Do you think," exclaims the writer, " that 
 we will take the law from the grandson of one of our 
 slaves? 'No! Rather die than assent to this infamy!' — 
 that is the cry of all. If France sends troops for the exe- 
 cution of this decree, it is likely that we will decide to 
 abandon France." 22 "Desolation is stamped upon every 
 
THE DECREE OF MAY 15, 1791 127 
 
 face," reads a letter from Leogane. "All business has 
 ceased, and people busy themselves only with this af- 
 fair.' 23 Correspondence from the South Province is but 
 the echo of that from the North and West. "This decree 
 has electrified the whole colony," reads a letter from Les 
 Cayes, which closes with the gloomy prophecy that "the 
 colony is doomed." 24 
 
 The best rallying-point for future resistance was obvi- 
 ously a Colonial Assembly. Accordingly, the Provincial 
 Assembly of the North promptly issued election writs 
 throughout the colony, and on August 9 the new body 
 met at Leogane, a town of the West. Its members dis- 
 played great unanimity, but soon adjourned after a few 
 proceedings of a formal nature, fixing the regular session 
 for the 25th of August at Le Cap. It was felt that the 
 crisis demanded the presence of the Colonial Legislature 
 in the chief centre of population, especially since Blanche- 
 lande's friendly attitude left nothing to be feared from 
 the royal authority. 25 
 
 But before the appointed day the mulattoes of the 
 West were in general revolt, while the negroes of the 
 North had lighted a conflagration never to be put out. 
 
XI 
 
 THE NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 
 
 It was just before dawn on the 23d of August, 1791, 
 that, a stream of dishevelled fugitives waked Le Cap to 
 terror and affright, while over the great North Plain a 
 lurid glow bore ominous witness to their tidings. These 
 refugees reported that the negroes were burning the cane- 
 fields and plantations, and that they themselves were but 
 the survivors of a frightful massacre. 1 
 
 So absorbed had the colonists been of late in their prepa- 
 rations for resistance to the May Decree that this rising 
 seems to have taken them quite unawares. And yet for full 
 two years the colony had been vouchsafed a whole series 
 of premonitory symptoms which a more observant peo- 
 ple would have seriously laid to heart. 
 
 We have already had a glimpse of the alarm caused by 
 the conduct of the negroes as far back as the autumn of 
 1789, 2 and what was there quoted is by no means all the 
 evidence which even now remains. "The troubles in 
 France have reached here," writes Julien Raymond from 
 the South Province to his brother, the mulatto leader in 
 Paris; "the whites have taken the tricolor cockade. As 
 you may well imagine, this has not occurred without con- 
 siderable disturbance and bloodshed. The most terrible 
 thing about this business, however, is the attitude of the 
 negroes, who, hearing that the cockade means liberty and 
 equality, have wanted to rise themselves. In several 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 129 
 
 districts a considerable number of them have been exe- 
 cuted." 3 Several other letters from this period speak 
 of similar disturbances, and throughout the year 1790 
 sporadic mutinies occurred on plantations in varjeus parts 
 of the colony. 4 
 
 But early in July, 1791, that sullen wave of unrest 
 passed over the negro population which heralded the 
 great rising: it is plain that at this moment the negroes 
 throughout the colony knew that something was in the 
 wind. The disaffection seems to have been spread by the 
 great Vaudoux cult, 5 which accounts for the secrecy and 
 obscurity of the whole affair, whose details will probably 
 never be known. In the West the disturbances were 
 widespread and called for vigorous measures. " The ne- 
 groes are stirring in astonishing fashion," writes a colo- 
 nist from Port-au-Prince to the Club Massiac on the 18th 
 of July. "Regular armed rebellions have occurred at sev- 
 eral points hereabouts, . . . and at one place some twenty 
 miles from here they had to call out the whole neighbor- 
 hood and summon the marechaussee. At this place they 
 had to fire a volley and charge the rebels, who stood their 
 ground and did not surrender until their leaders had fallen. 
 A dozen of them have since been hanged." 6 
 
 Still more alarming signs appeared in the North. On 
 the 11th of August a rising occurred at Limbe, a parish 
 of the Plain. The local marechaussee stamped out the 
 trouble, but the testimony gathered from prisoners taken 
 during the next few days was of a very disquieting nature. 
 It appeared that three days after the Limbe rising a meet- 
 ing had taken place, at which negroes from most of the 
 parishes in the Plain had assembled, "to fix the day for 
 
130 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the outbreak of the insurrection decided upon long be- 
 fore." 7 
 
 But all these warnings were disregarded. The risings 
 were repressed with great severity, it is true, but these 
 very successes appear to have inspired a feeling of over- 
 confidence. 8 And yet this is not so singular as it appears 
 to us, who judge in the light of future events: sporadic 
 plantation mutinies could not have been supremely 
 alarming to men accustomed to maroon incursions 9 and 
 absorbed in the alarming prospect of rebellion against 
 France. Furthermore, any alliance between negroes and 
 mulattoes was thought unlikely in the extreme, for it was 
 held impossible that the slaves could so far forget the 
 hatred which they bore toward their hardest task- 
 masters. 10 In the words of Mirabeau, the colonists "slept 
 on the edge of Vesuvius." ll 
 
 Whatever may have been its antecedents, the rising 
 which took place over the North Plain on the night of 
 the 22d of August was well planned and systematically 
 executed. The insurgent leader in the vicinity of Le Cap 
 was one Boukman, said to have been high in the Vau- 
 doux cult; and reports, apparently legendary, tell of pre- 
 liminary ceremonies of a savage and bloody nature. 12 
 The scattered white population of the plantations could 
 offer no resistance. The men were at once killed, often 
 with every species of atrocity, while the unfortunate 
 white women were violated — frequently upon the very 
 bodies of their husbands, fathers, and brothers. 13 The 
 full horror of the situation was soon brought home to the 
 people of Le Cap itself. A reconnoitring party of Na- 
 tional Guards which ventured a little way out into the 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 131 
 
 Plain was suddenly overwhelmed in the half-light of dawn 
 by a horde of negroes whose ghastly standard was the 
 impaled body of a white child: only two or three of the 
 soldiers escaped to carry the dreadful tidings. 14 Within 
 a few days the whole of the great North Plain was to be 
 only a waste of blood and ashes. 15 
 
 On that very morning of the 23d a strong column of 
 regulars and militia entered the Plain, but it was soon 
 compelled to retreat before the swarming negro masses, 
 and thereafter for some time the whites of Le Cap at- 
 tempted no aggressive measures. This lack of initiative 
 was due to several causes. In the first place, the colo- 
 nists seem to have been literally paralyzed by the mag- 
 nitude of the catastrophe and by the peculiar horror of 
 the attendant circumstances. Carteau, an eye-witness 
 of these events, has left us a vivid description. "Picture 
 to yourself," he writes, "the whole horizon a wall of fire, 
 from which continually rose thick vortices of smoke, 
 whose huge black volumes could be likened only to those 
 frightful storm-clouds which roll onwards charged with 
 thunder and with lightnings. The rifts in these clouds 
 disclosed flames as great in volume which rose darting 
 and flashing to the very sky. Such was their voracity that 
 for nearly three weeks we could barely distinguish be- 
 tween day and night, for so long as the rebels found any- 
 thing to feed the flames, they never ceased to burn, re- 
 solved as they were to leave not a cane nor house behind. 
 The most striking feature of this terrible spectacle was a 
 rain of fire composed of burning cane-straw which whirled 
 thickly before the blast like flakes of snow, and which the 
 wind carried, now toward the harbor and shipping, now 
 
132 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 over the houses of the city, plunging us in the greatest 
 fear of its effects and wringing our hearts with an agony 
 of grief as it disclosed the full extent of our misfortunes." 16 
 
 Edwards, who arrived at Le Cap about a month after 
 the outbreak of the insurrection, corroborates Carteau's 
 testimony. "We arrived in the harbor of Le Cap," he 
 writes, "at evening of September 26, and the first sight 
 which arrested our attention as we approached was a 
 dreadful scene of devastation by fire. The noble plain 
 adjoining Le Cap was covered with ashes, and the sur- 
 rounding hills, as far as the eye could reach, everywhere 
 presented to us ruins still smoking, and houses and plan- 
 tations at that moment in flames. It was a sight more 
 terrible than the mind of any man unaccustomed to such 
 a scene can easily conceive." 17 Any one who has seen 
 a burned district in the tropics can appreciate the force 
 of this description. 18 
 
 But there were also very practical reasons for renounc- 
 ing all immediate thought of reducing the rebels of the 
 Plain. The resident white population of Le Cap was not 
 over four thousand, the regular troops did not exceed 
 twelve hundred, and of the three thousand sailors in the 
 port nearly a third were foreigners. 19 Even counting the 
 refugees, the total number of whites in Le Cap during 
 the first days of the insurrection could not have been 
 over ten thousand, and their confidence was not in- 
 creased by the fact that the city also contained not less 
 than fourteen hundred mulattoes and from ten to twelve 
 thousand negro slaves. 20 The loyalty of the mulattoes 
 was doubtful, while the negro population was certainly 
 ripe for revolt and massacre. 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 133 
 
 It would seem that for some days previous to the fateful 
 23d of August, the Government had scented trouble. On 
 the very evening before the rising, several suspected per- 
 sons had been arrested and brought before the Governor. 
 "From their admissions," writes Blanchelande to the 
 Minister of Marine, "I became convinced that some con- 
 spiracy was on foot against the town." 21 As the result 
 of his fears he quietly took strong precautions, which 
 probably averted a terrible disaster. 
 
 But the most alarming fact remains to be told. Among 
 the prisoners there had been several whites, and Blanche- 
 lande says that at the moment he "could not quite make 
 out whether the suspected plot was among the whites, 
 mulattoes, free negroes, or slaves." One thing, however, 
 seems clear: a certain section of that low rabble of crimi- 
 nals and aliens which had always given so much trouble 22 
 was of so desperate and depraved a character that it was 
 willing to see Le Cap go down in blood and fire, provided 
 it had a share in the plunder. Indeed, by the following 
 morning, Blanchelande considered the situation so criti- 
 cal that he placed an embargo on all vessels, "to serve as 
 a refuge in case of disaster," and ordered sorties into the 
 Plain to cease. "If the means at my disposal had al- 
 lowed," he continues, "I should not have contented my- 
 self with this mere defensive attitude; I should have im- 
 mediately marched against the negroes and reduced them. 
 But Le Cap contained within itself a number of dangerous 
 elements, of all colors. I discovered then — I am still daily 
 discovering — numerous plots which prove that the town 
 negroes are in league with those in arms on the Plain: 
 hence, we must be continually on our guard lest some 
 
134 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 spark within the town itself flame rapidly into a general 
 conflagration." 
 
 However, imminent danger to the city itself lessened 
 with every day. Le Cap, of course, had been an open town 
 with no fortifications on its landward side, but the heights 
 which lay between it and the Plain offered natural ad- 
 vantages for defence quickly strengthened into regular 
 fortified lines. 23 On September 13, Blanchelande was 
 able to write that he considered the city fairly safe from 
 attack, "although the whites almost without exception 
 are the prey of a discouragement whose intensity you can 
 hardly conceive; in addition to which it is undeniable that 
 this town contains a very large number of poor and dis- 
 affected whites, who would welcome disorder in the hope 
 of bettering their lot by plunder. This class has clearly 
 shown its evil intentions by its formal refusal to fight the 
 rebels." 24 
 
 Very different was the spirit displayed by the whites of 
 the country. In the Plain, it is true, the sudden rising 
 of its dense negro population had swept the unsuspecting 
 colonists off their feet; but elsewhere the whites flew to 
 arms with astonishing rapidity, and succeeded in stem- 
 ming the black torrent for the time. Before long every exit 
 from the Plain was barred by military posts, while along 
 the mountain-crests the labor of numerous slave corvees 
 rapidly erected fines of strong forts and block-houses, 
 called "cordons," which were successfully to bar all in- 
 surgent intercourse with the West down to the collapse 
 of white authority in 1793. The white women and chil- 
 dren were rapidly gathered into fortified "camps," where 
 they might be safe from chance raiding parties 26 . 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 135 
 
 Then began a struggle obscure in detail but horrible 
 in character. "To detail, " writes Edwards, "the vari- 
 ous conflicts, skirmishes, massacres, and other scenes of 
 slaughter which this exterminating war produced, were 
 to offer a disgusting and frightful picture; a combination 
 of horrors wherein we should behold cruelties unexam- 
 pled in the annals of mankind; human blood poured 
 forth in torrents, the earth blackened with ashes, the 
 air tainted with pestilence. It is computed that, within 
 two months after the revolt first began, upwards of two 
 thousand whites had been massacred; that one hundred 
 and eighty sugar-plantations and about nine hundred 
 coffee, cotton, and indigo settlements had been destroyed 
 (the buildings thereon being consumed by fire); and 
 twelve hundred families reduced from opulence to abject 
 destitution. Of the insurgents, it was reckoned that up- 
 wards of ten thousand had perished by the sword or fam- 
 ine, and some hundreds by the hand of the executioner 
 — many of these on the wheel." 26 And he thereupon 
 gives a vivid picture of such an execution held beneath 
 the very windows of his lodging. 27 
 
 A British army officer who visited Le Cap in the early 
 autumn of 1791 has left a striking account of its condi- 
 tion. "The city," he writes, "presents a terrible spectacle; 
 surrounded by ditches and palisades, the streets blocked 
 by barricades, and the squares occupied by scaffolds on 
 which captured negroes are tortured, — the whole form- 
 ing a depressing picture of devastation and carnage." 28 
 
 The aspect of the country was more dreadful still. The 
 Great Plain was a silent waste of blackened ruin infested 
 by bands of prowling savages, 29 while farther inland the 
 
136 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 debatable hill country was studded with white and 
 negro "camps," both of which must have been veritable 
 dens of horror. The negro stockades were garnished, in 
 the African fashion, with the skulls of prisoners killed 
 after unspeakable tortures, while the tree - lined roads 
 leading to the white "camps" were festooned with the 
 bodies of hanged rebels. 30 
 
 However, as the months passed it became evident 
 that the insurgents were slowly gaining ground. By the 
 month of October, it is true, expeditions issued from Le 
 Cap; but in these sallies the rabble took no part, and the 
 bourgeois National Guards, though brave and willing, 
 died like flies before the climate and could not long keep 
 the field. The brunt of the fighting fell upon the regulars, 
 whose numbers were, however, soon terribly reduced. 31 
 Even the country whites suffered greatly from tropical 
 campaigning, and this continual drain upon their small 
 number was of course irreparable. How the country 
 whites wasted away is well shown by a letter from the 
 inland parish of Le Borgne. The district was quiet for the 
 moment, as the negroes had drawn off to resist a sortie 
 from Le Cap; "but sickness continues its war, and our 
 privations make of us an easy prey. Of the ten members 
 of our local committee, only three are able to be about, 
 and this is but typical of the rest. One of our most vital 
 posts kills every week some five or six of our men." 32 
 
 The way in which the hill country was gradually lost 
 is well described by the official diary of the Parish of Le 
 Trou. It begins with that general arming of the whites 
 and establishment of camps to guard exposed points 
 which occurred during the last days of August. Till mid- 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 137 
 
 September the parish was outwardly peaceful, though 
 a lengthening list of negro emissaries caught and shot 
 among the slave ateliers is daily recorded. On September 
 16, however, a stream of fugitives announced the capture 
 of the neighboring parish of Saint-Suzanne by the terri- 
 ble mulatto leader Candy. Now that Le Trou had be- 
 come a frontier parish things rapidly grew worse, and 
 a week later the mulatto companies of militia murdered 
 their white officers and went over to Candy. Then fol- 
 lows a gallant two months' struggle against the inevitable. 
 Every night plantations are sacked and the slaves carried 
 over to the enemy: sometimes a whole canton is thus 
 devastated. Finally, on November 16, the whites evac- 
 uate their posts and retire towards the sea. Only the 
 priest remains behind, and Candy promptly occupies the 
 country. 33 
 
 The first leaders of the negro rising were Boukman 34 
 and one Jeannot. But Boukman was killed by the whites 
 at the very start, and Jeannot was not only a monster of 
 cruelty, but such an insufferable tyrant that he was soon 
 done away with by his own followers. These first leaders 
 were replaced by two others named Jean-Frangois and 
 Biassou, of whom the former was ultimately to become 
 the acknowledged insurgent head. Of course the rebel 
 organization was at this time very crude, and these men 
 were only the two most prominent members of a whole 
 group of guerilla chiefs. 35 Rather alongside this negro 
 organization were the mulatto bands of Candy; for, 
 throughout the Plain, the mulattoes had risen at the 
 same moment as the slaves. 
 
 The negroes naturally adopted guerilla tactics, and 
 
138 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 never faced the whites in the open except when possessed 
 of overwhelming numbers. Such a negro attack is de- 
 scribed by the anonymous but well-informed author 
 of the "Desastres de Saint-Domingue." "Their enter- 
 prises," he writes, "have about them something truly 
 terrifying by the very manner of execution. The negroes 
 never mass in the open: a thousand blacks will never 
 await in line of battle the charge of a hundred whites. 
 They first advance with a frightful clamor, preceded by 
 a great number of women and children singing and yell- 
 ing in chorus. When they have arrived just out of gun- 
 shot from the whites, the most profound silence suddenly 
 falls, and the negroes now dispose themselves in such a 
 manner that they appear six times as numerous as they 
 are in reality. The man of faint heart, already daunted 
 by the apparent multitude of his enemies, is still further 
 shaken by their noiseless posturings and grimaces. All 
 this time the ominous silence continues; the only sounds 
 coming from the magicians, who now begin to dance and 
 sing with the contortions of demoniacs. These men are 
 working their incantations [' Wanga '] to assure the suc- 
 cess of the coming attack, and they often advance within 
 musket-shot, confident that the bullets cannot touch 
 them and desirous of proving to the other negroes the 
 power of their magic charms. The attack now takes 
 place with cries and howlings which, notwithstanding, 
 should not shake the courageous man." 36 
 
 Both existing evidence and the trend of events com- 
 bine to show that the great negro uprising of August, 
 1791, was but the natural action of the Revolution upon 
 highly inflammable material. 37 This is the opinion of 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 139 
 
 Garran-Coulon 38 and of the Colonial Committee in the 
 National Assembly; 39 both of them contemporary ver- 
 dicts rendered after the careful examination of an enor- 
 mous mass of evidence. Yet naturally there were a num- 
 ber of contributing factors to the great disaster which the 
 prevalent suspicion of the Revolutionary period raised 
 to the rank of primary causes. 
 
 Many conservative writers charged the outbreak to 
 the deliberate plottings of the "Amis des Noirs." 40 Now 
 there seems to be no doubt that the writings and speeches 
 of the French radicals did have a considerable effect upon 
 the negroes. In spite of all the colonists' efforts, a good 
 deal of incendiary literature found its way into the island: 
 a very violent open letter of the Abbe Gregoire to the 
 negroes was certainly known to them, and Carteau states 
 that on several occasions he saw Revolutionary pam- 
 phlets in the hands of slaves. 41 The conduct of persons 
 newly arrived from France must also have had a very 
 exciting effect. Blanchelande writes that when the mu- 
 tinous soldiers landed at Port-au-Prince in March, 1791, n 
 "they gave the fraternal embrace to all the negroes and 
 mulattoes whom they met, telling them that the National 
 Assembly had declared them free and the equals of the 
 whites"; 43 while a colonist writes that some of the 
 Western disturbances of July, 1791, were due "to the 
 civism of the sailors who were constantly about." 44 
 Nevertheless, it is quite certain that no accredited emis- 
 sary of the French radicals was ever captured among the 
 rebels, and the Colonial Committee states that its in- 
 vestigation had discovered no incriminating evidence of 
 actual complicity on the part of the French society. 45 
 
140 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Perhaps the most telling indirect evidence in the radi- 
 cal's favor, however, is the fact that the insurgents rose 
 to the cry of "God and the King," assumed Royalist 
 insignia, spared the clergy, and were shown benevolent 
 neutrality by the Spaniards. The later events of the 
 Vendee formed too striking a superficial analogy not to 
 be seized upon by many Revolutionary writers, who make 
 the charge that the Royalists incited the negroes t<5 re- 
 volt in the hope of frightening the colonists back to the 
 Old Regime. 46 But as bitter a hater of Royalism as 
 Garran-Coulon absolves them of the charge and holds 
 that the negroes' adoption of the outward signs of the 
 Old Regime was merely the imitation of the only in- 
 signia of authority then known to them. 47 The clergy, 
 whom the negroes regarded with superstitious reverence, 
 did generally remain unmolested among the rebels, and 
 it is certain that some of them actively aided the ne- 
 groes; 48 but these were probably zealots whom the reli- 
 gious schism then existing in France had roused to ex- 
 treme fanaticism. As to the Spaniards, it is certain that 
 they refused to give the aid called for by treaty obliga- 
 tions, and that the frontier officials winked at an exten- 
 sive contraband traffic with the negro rebels. 49 But the 
 Spanish attitude is sufficiently explained by horror at 
 the French Revolution, rage at the French attitude over 
 Nootka Sound, and the corrupt character of Spanish 
 officialdom. 
 
 The colonists themselves were indirectly much to 
 blame. It was their factional quarrels which did so much 
 to make the negroes' opportunity, while the flood of 
 rash political discussion carried on among the whites in 
 
NEGRO INSURRECTION IN THE NORTH 141 
 
 season and out of season must have given their slaves 
 much food for reflection. As far back as July, 1790, De 
 Wimpffen is greatly alarmed at the imprudence of the 
 colonists. "I see with pain, sir," he writes, "that the 
 Revolutionary vertigo has already made such progress 
 amongst the inhabitants that even at table, surrounded 
 by mulattoes and negroes, they indulge themselves in 
 the most imprudent discussions on liberty, etc. Very 
 soon the slaves of the neighboring plantations, connected 
 with those of the town, will carry home the discourses 
 they have heard, and comment upon them in their own 
 way. 'If these whites are free only to-day/ they will say, 
 ' What were they then yesterday ? — Slaves like ourselves ' ; 
 and God preserve me from being a witness of the con- 
 sequences of this mode of reasoning! To discuss the 
 'Rights of Man' before such people; — what is it but to 
 teach them that power dwells with strength, and strength 
 with numbers!" 50 
 
 To resume the thread of events: the North Plain 
 was the prey of a slave revolt which was blockading Le 
 Cap and eating into the mountain parishes; the West and 
 South were aflame with a mulatto insurrection which had 
 just laid Port-au-Prince in ashes; 61 when, on the 26th of 
 November, three Civil Commissioners landed at Le Cap, 
 charged by the National Assembly to quiet the troubles 
 of San Domingo. 
 
XII 
 
 THE MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 
 
 If the news of the May Decree had roused the whites 
 of San Domingo to furious resistance, it had as inevitably 
 inspired the mulattoes to revolt. Although technically 
 the Decree of May 15 had granted equality to only a 
 small number of the caste, the mulattoes realized as well 
 as did the whites that once this decree went into effect 
 their cause was morally won. As soon, therefore, as the 
 whites proclaimed their determination to resist the de- 
 cree, the mulattoes resolved to strike, assured as they 
 were of French approval at this blow against professed 
 rebels. By early August they had begun to assemble in 
 various parts of the West, especially in their stronghold 
 of the Artibonite, though so quietly that the preoccupied 
 whites seem to have given the matter little attention. 1 
 
 Both the state of mind and future plans of the mulat- 
 toes are well shown by a letter from Leogane, dated the 
 27th of August, addressed to the mulatto leader Ray- 
 mond at Paris. It is especially significant because the 
 writer is evidently still ignorant of the negro insurrection 
 which had broken out four days previously in the North. 
 "On all sides," writes this mulatto, "the whites are say- 
 ing that the Decree of May 15 will never be executed, and 
 that they would sooner lose the island than see it go into 
 effect. Nevertheless, they are so weakened by their own 
 dissensions that I for my part am convinced that our 
 
MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 143 
 
 class, which is almost as numerous as the whites, could 
 if properly led execute all the National Decrees on our 
 own account. So many of our young men are coming 
 forward . . . that I am quite sure we can put three thou- 
 sand men in line; and I flatter myself that these three 
 thousand, led by a man like the late Monsieur Mauduit, 
 would prove a torrent that Lucifer himself could not 
 resist." 2 
 
 The closing lines of this letter foreshadowed the next 
 step of the mulattoes. Ever since the overthrow of the 
 Government at Port - au - Prince in March, 1791, 3 the 
 Western Royalists had been a minority suffering from 
 increasing oppression. The mutinous soldiery which had 
 expelled Blanchelande and murdered Mauduit had re- 
 mained in the capital, had fraternized with the mob, and 
 had set up a turbulent democracy whose leading spirit 
 was one Praloto, a Maltese by birth and a thorough 
 scoundrel by character. 4 The town merchants dared 
 make no resistance to this government, but the coun- 
 try gentlemen had soon banded together and had estab- 
 lished a centre of opposition at the neighboring town 
 of La-Croix-des-Bouquets, the chief inland centre of 
 the Plain of Cul-de-Sac. 5 
 
 These men the mulattoes now approached with offers 
 of an alliance against their common enemies. And to 
 these Royalist gentlemen the offer must have greatly 
 appealed. Many of them had commanded the mulattoes 
 for years in the militia or the marechaussee, understood 
 the mulatto character, and felt that they would be able 
 to guide a movement which would undoubtedly be full 
 of peril to themselves if left to ignorant colored leaders. 
 
144 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 It was, of course, evident that the mulattoes would insist 
 upon the May Decree, but the doings of the National 
 Assembly did not greatly trouble men who regarded it as 
 a nest of traitors soon to be snuffed out by the Counter- 
 Revolution. "Before three months," a member of the 
 Club Massiac had written to his fellows in San Domingo, 
 — " before three months, I say, your slaves will rise, 
 your plantations will be sacked, and your houses will 
 be burned. There is but one way of safety. Pin on the 
 white cockade, and rest assured that France will soon 
 come to your aid; for by that time fifty thousand Ger- 
 mans will have thrown out of the windows this legisla- 
 tive canaille" 6 
 
 The leader of the Western Royalists was one Hanus 
 de Jumecourt, a wealthy planter and a man of great 
 energy. His efforts soon brought his associates to accept 
 the offer of the mulattoes of the Artibonite, and in the 
 last days of August the two parties signed a formal alli- 
 ance known as the " Confederation of La-Croix-des-Bou- 
 quets.'* This compact was eagerly signed by the mulat- 
 toes throughout the province, while the signatures of the 
 country whites of all classes were obtained either will- 
 ingly or by violence. The news of the negro insurrection 
 in the North seems to have been very efficacious to this 
 end. 7 
 
 The news of this confederation greatly alarmed the 
 democrats of Port-au-Prince, who determined that sharp 
 action must at once be taken. Accordingly, on Sep- 
 tember 2, a disorderly column of regulars, National 
 Guards, and ruffians, loosely organized under the name 
 of "Flibustiers," marched on La-Croix-des-Bouquets. 
 
MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 145 
 
 The expedition, however, quickly ended in disaster. The 
 Confederates laid an ambush into which the column un- 
 suspectingly marched, the rabble fled at the first volley, 
 and the regulars, after a good fight, were cut to pieces. 8 
 The temporary disorganization which ensued among the 
 democrats of Port-au-Prince was cleverly taken advan- 
 tage of by the merchant classes, who were so exasperated 
 at their own position and so terrified for the future by the 
 news from the North that they were willing to make al- 
 most any agreement with a party headed by such reliable 
 persons as De Jumecourt and his associates. Accordingly 
 a conservative deputation was sent to negotiate with the 
 Confederates, and on the 11th of the month the confer- 
 ence resulted in the so-called "Concordat of September." 
 By this document the whites of Port-au-Prince agreed 
 not to oppose the National Decree of the 15th May, and 
 promised to admit mulattoes to the franchise under the 
 terms of the famous Article 4. 9 
 
 The Concordat of September was couched in fair 
 words, but it seems unlikely that either party took it 
 very seriously. De Jumecourt and his aristocratic asso- 
 ciates appear to have been really willing to see its exe- 
 cution, for they realized that with the restoration of abso- 
 lute government all the clauses anent mulatto political 
 equality would become so much waste paper, since there 
 could be neither franchise nor assemblies under the Old 
 Regime. Their hopes and plans are revealed in a letter 
 written by the Royalist commandant at Saint-Marc on 
 the 21st of September: "You have three classes of brig- 
 ands to fight. First, the white brigands, who are the most 
 to be feared. Leave them to be destroyed by the mulat- 
 
146 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 toes, if you do not care to destroy them yourself. Next, 
 with the aid of the mulattoes, you will reduce the rebel 
 negroes. After that, you will gradually restore the old 
 laws, and by that time you will be able to suppress the 
 refractory element among the mulattoes themselves." 10 
 The other white signatories of the Concordat, whose 
 adhesion had been obtained "under persuasion of torch 
 and poniard," as the Colonial Assembly put it, 11 were 
 well aware that this same Assembly would never assent 
 to the Concordat's provisions. 
 
 Neither did the more intelligent mulattoes believe that 
 the gulf of race hatred could be bridged by a sheet of 
 parchment. Upon the arrival of that decisive National 
 Decree of April 4, 1792, which was finally to ordain full 
 mulatto equality, a leader of the caste wrote to Ray- 
 mond: "You cannot imagine the sensation which this 
 beneficent decree has made among the whites; for, al- 
 though those of them allied with us had carried out the 
 Concordat, it is certain that they had never taken it seri- 
 ously. They rightly counted upon the fact that the Gen- 
 eral Assembly would never pronounce in our favor." 12 
 In spite of all this, however, the mulattoes had good 
 practical reasons for desiring an outward reconciliation. 
 Besides the fact that the Concordat was a moral victory, 
 there were so many wealthy slaveowners among the West- 
 ern mulattoes that the negro uprising in the North and 
 the agitation then going on among the negroes of the 
 West had excited almost as much alarm among them 
 as among the whites themselves. These mulattoes were 
 only too anxious to preserve order in the West until 
 the arrival of the forces then expected to be sent 
 
MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 147 
 
 from France to overawe colonial defiance of the mother 
 country. 
 
 The West, however, was not to be long preserved from 
 new disorders. The Concordat and the Royalist reaction 
 effected by the Confederates in the country parishes of 
 the West 13 had alarmed both racial and political feeling 
 at Le Cap. The Colonial Assembly denounced the Con- 
 cordat and its authors in no uncertain terms ; and Blanche- 
 lande, who had drawn away from the extreme Royalists 
 during his residence in the North, wrote a severe letter 
 to the Confederates, pointing out the impossibility of his 
 executing the May Decree until after its official arrival 
 in the colony, 14 and ordering them forthwith to disperse. 15 
 
 The above action of Governor and Assembly was prob- 
 ably only what the Confederates had expected; but what 
 now occurred at Port-au-Prince was quite a different 
 matter. By the mass of the town population the Con- 
 cordat had been received with fury, while among the 
 democratic leaders the news of the Counter-Revolution 
 effected throughout the West had aroused lively fears 
 for their personal safety. "The popular leaders here," 
 reads a letter of mid-October, "have so much to fear from 
 a return of the Old Regime that they prefer to expose the 
 colony to possible ruin rather than yield." 16 Accordingly 
 the democratic leaders denounced the merchant negotia- 
 tors of the Concordat as traitors, regained their old as- 
 cendancy, and broke off relations with the Confederates. 
 De Jumecourt, however, acted with great energy. He at 
 once blockaded Port-au-Prince with an army of several 
 thousand mulattoes, and as the town was not provisioned 
 for a siege it was soon forced to submit and sign the "Con- 
 
148 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 cordat of October" on the 23d of that month. In this 
 second treaty not only were all the provisions of the Sep- 
 tember Concordat reaffirmed; the city also agreed to 
 admit fifteen hundred mulatto troops as part of its gar- 
 rison. 17 
 
 Such was the condition of the West when, only a few 
 days later, the news of the National Decree of September 
 24 upset the calculations of both parties, and rendered a 
 new crisis inevitable. 
 
 We have already seen under what peculiar conditions 
 the Rewbell amendment had passed the National As- 
 sembly and become the Decree of May 15, 1791. 18 But, 
 as usual, no sooner had a definite stand been taken on 
 the thorny question of the colonies than an increasingly 
 large number of moderate deputies began to repent of 
 their action. The defiant secession of the colonial depu- 
 ties was a very ominous portent, while the Assembly was 
 immediately deluged with addresses and appeals which 
 soon produced a marked effect. Also, the colonists and 
 their commercial allies still had one chance of repairing 
 their defeat. Until the decree had been officially sent to 
 Blanchelande for execution the matter was not irrepa- 
 rable; and this delay the changed temper of the House 
 enabled them to accomplish. 19 
 
 The feelings of the wavering majority may be imagined 
 when in mid-August there arrived the news that San 
 Domingo and its Governor were in open rebellion. The 
 worst predictions of the colonial deputies were thus ful- 
 filled, and an intense revulsion of sentiment took place 
 which emboldened the colonists to strike for the reversal 
 of the hated decree. To detail the parliamentary struggle 
 
MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 149 
 
 which followed would be but the tedious repetition of 
 what had gone before: suffice it to say that after a final 
 grand debate the National Assembly, then on the very 
 verge of dissolution, passed the Decree of September 24, 
 1791, which granted all the demands of the colonists. 
 By its terms the status of both the mulattoes and the 
 slaves was left to the discretion of the colonial assemblies 
 whose decisions were to be ratified solely by the King, 
 the National Assembly having no voice in the matter. 
 Lastly, in order to take this question out of politics, the 
 decree was declared an unalterable article of the French 
 Constitution. 20 
 
 It was in the first days of November that the news of 
 this final volte-face of the Constituent Assembly reached 
 San Domingo. The effect was tremendous. The con- 
 fidence of the mulattoes in the French nation was as 
 much shattered by the Decree of the 24th September as 
 the faith of the whites had been by that of the 15th May. 
 The mulattoes now felt that their only chance lay in vio- 
 lent measures, especially as the whites had been so en- 
 couraged that they were now breathing vengeance rather 
 than conciliation. With the full tide of race hatred thus 
 unloosed on both sides, a general explosion in the West 
 was inevitable. 21 
 
 The natural theatre for the new crisis was Port-au- 
 Prince. As soon as the news of the September Decree had 
 arrived, the mulattoes demanded that the inhabitants 
 should signify their continued adhesion to the Concordat 
 — which had of course been nullified by this reversal of 
 the Decree of the 15th May. In the city itself feeling was 
 at the boiling point, for the mass of the inhabitants (who 
 
150 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 of course loathed the Concordat) had been greatly ex- 
 cited by the new decree, and had been roused to fury by 
 the insolent conduct of the mulatto soldiery quartered 
 in the town. It is not strange, therefore, that, when on 
 November 21 the question of reaffirmation was put to 
 the vote, the polling ended in a riot followed by a pitched 
 battle. After several hours' fierce fighting the mulatto 
 troops were driven from the town: before sunrise the 
 greater part of Port-au-Prince lay in ashes. The cause 
 of the terrible conflagration has always remained obscure. 
 From several conflicting versions, it would seem that the 
 retreating Confederates set fire to the outskirts of the 
 town while at about the same moment the white rab- 
 ble, bent on plunder and vengeance, fired the business 
 quarter. At any rate, the shops and houses of the mer- 
 chant classes were thoroughly sacked by the mob, several 
 wealthy whites were murdered, and a large number of 
 unarmed mulattoes were massacred. 22 
 
 The consequences of all this were terrible. Hitherto, 
 as we have seen, the policy of De Jumecourt had kept 
 the Western troubles within the bounds of politics. But 
 the struggle which now began was predominantly one of 
 race. It is true that De Jumecourt and his aristocratic 
 associates nominally continued to head the Confeder- 
 ates, but they could do little to restrain the passions 
 of their mulatto allies. The country whites were every- 
 where subjected to plunder and outrage, and the slightest 
 resistance was followed by torture and massacre. The 
 spirit of the mulattoes is well shown by the following 
 frantic letter of Augustin Rigaud, brother of the mulatto 
 leader soon to become so prominent: "The Parish of 
 
MULATTO INSURRECTION IN THE WEST 151 
 
 Acquin has just accepted our terms, but no reliance can 
 be placed upon such perverse men. Watch them! Leave 
 town! Take to the bush! At the least sign, kill, sack, 
 burn! No terms except the Articles of La-Croix-des- 
 Bouquets. I ride to vengeance. If I do not die on this 
 expedition, I shall soon return. Rise, I say; and we will 
 conquer these brigands who wish to massacre and enslave 
 our party. Vengeance! Vengeance! I embrace you all. 
 My last word is to wreak vengeance on these barbarians. 
 Fly to the succor of our murdered brothers. Vive la 
 liberte! Vive l'egalite! Vive l'amour!" 23 
 
 The horror of the race war in the West now almost sur- 
 passed that of the North. The mulatto Confederates, 
 in hideous token of their Royalist sentiments, fashioned 
 white cockades from the ears of their dead enemies. 24 
 The atrocities perpetrated upon the white women and 
 children are past belief. "The mulattoes," writes the 
 Colonial Assembly to its Paris commissioners, "rip open 
 pregnant women, and then before death force the hus- 
 bands to eat of this horrible fruit. Other infants are 
 thrown to the hogs." 25 
 
 The condition of Port-au-Prince was also terrible. The 
 demagogue Praloto and a bodyguard of desperadoes, 
 mostly foreigners like himself, had established a verita- 
 ble reign of terror. A merchant captain who sailed for 
 France on the 29th of December pictures vividly the 
 state of the town; strictly blockaded by the Confeder- 
 ates, "the inhabitants living on salt meat and putrid 
 water, yet resolved to be buried beneath the ashes of 
 their town rather than yield to the mulattoes." The mob 
 was daily forcing the jails and lynching mulatto prisoners 
 
152 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 there confined. 26 Edwards records a horrible atrocity 
 committed upon a mulatto leader captured in a skirmish. 
 He was paraded through the town nailed to a cart, then 
 broken on the wheel, and cast still living into the fire. 27 
 
 And by this time the South was also aflame. This 
 remote province seems to have been little affected until 
 the great explosion in the West at the end of Novem- 
 ber; but from then on its troubles rapidly grew acute. 
 The mulattoes rose en masse and drove the bulk of the 
 white population into Les Cayes; but at the mountain- 
 ous extremity of the peninsula, the region known as the 
 "Grande Anse," the whites killed or expelled the mulat- 
 toes. The negroes of this remote quarter seem to have 
 been entirely unaffected by the Revolutionary ideas, and 
 to have entertained only their natural hatred toward the 
 mulattoes. Taking advantage of this, the whites armed 
 their slaves, and at the head of their ateliers began the 
 reconquest of the South. 28 
 
 Such was the state of San Domingo at the beginning 
 of the year 1792. 
 
XIII 
 
 THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 
 
 As early as November, 1790, the National Assembly 
 had entertained the thought of sending a commission to 
 San Domingo to investigate and to appease the troubles 
 which there prevailed. But no such commission was actu- 
 ally formed until the summer of 1791, and even then its 
 departure for the island was delayed till October by the 
 struggle for the repeal of the Decree of the 15th May. 1 
 This delay, however, had an important bearing upon the 
 commission's subsequent action. Chosen at the time of 
 the May Decree, its members were what might be termed 
 moderate radicals; that is to say, they were opposed to 
 the immediate destruction of slavery, but favored mu- 
 latto equality. Now had come the Decree of the 24th 
 September. It should have been plain that a change in 
 personnel had thereby become a necessity: as a matter of 
 fact, nothing of the sort took place, and there followed the 
 anomalous spectacle of a commission sent to support 
 principles which it had been created to overthrow. Thus 
 handicapped from the start, its success might be deemed 
 most problematical. 2 
 
 And neither its instructions nor its membership bright- 
 ened its prospects. The directions of the National As- 
 sembly were vague; the powers conferred so general that 
 conflict with the existing island authorities was almost 
 a certainty. 3 As to the three "Civil Commissioners," 
 
154 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Mirbeck, Roume, and Saint-Leger, they were all devoid 
 of past distinction or future capacity. Mirbeck was a 
 person of rather unedifying habits who proved a non- 
 entity; Saint-Leger soon gained a venal reputation; 
 Roume alone showed forth an honest and upright nature, 
 albeit one marred by dogmatism and weakness. 
 
 On the 29th of November, 1791, the Commissioners 
 landed at Le Cap, stunned with horror at the awful con- 
 ditions which there prevailed, no tidings of the negro in- 
 surrection having reached France at the moment of their 
 departure for San Domingo. 4 They were well received by 
 both Governor and Assembly, 5 made a fairly good im- 
 pression, 6 and wrote home their thorough approval of the 
 various measures taken for the stemming of the insur- 
 rection. 7 
 
 But this era of good feeling was not of long duration. 
 The Commissioners were so depressed by the condition 
 of the colony that they yearned for an occasion to exer- 
 cise their role of peacemakers, — and it was not long 
 before an apparently golden opportunity presented itself. 
 Immediately upon their arrival the Commissioners had 
 issued a proclamation announcing the speedy arrival of 
 large military forces for the restoration of order. 8 This, 
 together with the imposing ceremonies of their installa- 
 tion, had been duly reported to the rebel negroes, and 
 produced a considerable effect. In their devastated terri- 
 tories the insurgents were by this time suffering great 
 privations, and many of them despaired of the future. 
 In consequence of all this, on the 10th of December 
 a rebel flag of truce appeared before Le Cap, bear- 
 ing from the negro chiefs Jean-Francois and Biassou a 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 155 
 
 letter to the new Commissioners expressing a desire for 
 peace. 9 
 
 A gracious answer from the Commissioners brought 
 forth a most astonishing reply: in return for liberty 
 granted to themselves and their principal followers, the 
 insurgent leaders promised nothing less than to force the 
 main body of the negroes back into obedience. "By 
 simply commanding each one of us to return to his own 
 place, as stated in your proclamation," reads this letter, 
 "you are ordering that which is impossible and perilous 
 at the same time. One hundred thousand men are in 
 arms. We are dependent upon the general will; — and 
 what a general will! That of a multitude of negroes from 
 the coast, 10 who for the most part do not know two words 
 of French yet who have been warriors in their own coun- 
 try." If peace is to be restored, the letter goes on, the 
 Commissioners must grant liberty to the several hun- 
 dred chiefs whom the writer shall name. Thereupon, with 
 all the natural leaders of the negroes working to this end, 
 the thing can probably be done; although the writers do 
 not deny that it will be dangerous. "For false principles 
 will make the slaves very obstinate; they will say that 
 they have been betrayed, and the result may be fatal, 
 no matter what precautions are taken." Still, con- 
 cludes the letter, if the King's troops will occupy the 
 open country, the writers think they can hunt down 
 those obstinate negroes "who, refusing obedience, will 
 infect the woods." n 
 
 The Commissioners were naturally overjoyed at this 
 offer, and on December 21 they had a personal interview 
 with Jean-Frangois a short distance out in the Plain. 
 
156 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Herein the negro leader expressed the greatest desire for 
 peace and agreed to send envoys to negotiate the terms 
 of a general pacification. 12 
 
 But at this point the Commissioners were surprised to 
 encounter the vigorous disapprobation of the colonists. 
 This attitude is well set forth in a letter written by a 
 prominent planter to Moreau de Saint-Mery: "Did you 
 ever hear anything more audacious than Jean-Francois' 
 demands? These wretches not only ask to escape the 
 punishment they so richly deserve; they want to be re- 
 warded as well. But, would not the granting of such 
 terms be a premium put upon the subsequent rebellion of 
 those excluded from the first, yet desirous of obtaining the 
 reward of murder and brigandage? Then, again, how can 
 we allow at large persons known to have incited their 
 fellows to insurrection; men ever destined to be a terror 
 from their present authority strengthened by future 
 impunity? How can we thus suffer among us those who 
 have murdered and ruined their masters? Can such 
 crimes be pardoned?" 13 
 
 This feeling was plainly shared by the Colonial As- 
 sembly, for when the insurgent envoys appeared at its 
 bar, they were received with haughty severity and were 
 offered little beyond vague promises. Furthermore, the 
 Assembly took pains to emphasize the fact that by the 
 National Decree of the 24th September the status of 
 persons had been left entirely in its hands, and spoke of 
 the Civil Commissioners as mere "intercessors/* The 
 result of this was soon apparent. The Civil Commis- 
 sioners' prestige with the negroes was destroyed, and the 
 rebels broke off negotiations. 14 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 157 
 
 Whether the offers of the negro leaders were either 
 sincere or even practicable, it is impossible to say. 
 Blanchelande seems to have been somewhat sceptical, 15 
 and it must not be forgotten that Jean-Frangois and 
 Biassou were at this time merely the leaders of the two 
 largest bands of the Plain. Nevertheless, the colonists' 
 attitude certainly appears unwise: Jean-Frangois' letter 
 of March 12 has the ring of sincerity, and a few hundred 
 liberties would seem a small price to pay for even a slight 
 chance of quelling the insurrection, whatever the ulti- 
 mate risks of such a course. The intransigeance of the 
 colonists undoubtedly arose from the long months during 
 which they had seen their homes destroyed and their 
 families devoted to every species of outrage and torture. 
 Their wild thirst for vengeance may be imagined when, 
 as late as February, 1792, the very Civil Commissioners 
 wrote the following lines to the Minister of Marine after 
 detailing some peculiarly horrible atrocities of the negro 
 and mulatto insurgents: "Their crimes are so atrocious 
 that it is impossible to pardon them; and even if we did 
 so they would not believe it. . . . It will be necessary to 
 exterminate very many of these wretches, both free and 
 slave, before San Domingo can be pacified." 16 As the 
 Colonial Assembly itself expressed it, "We could not 
 bring ourselves to treat with men armed against every 
 law; with incendiaries still covered with the blood of our 
 constituents." 17 
 
 However, the consequences of this rupture were seri- 
 ous. The rebels answered by a fresh burst of activity, 
 not only before Le Cap, but against the military lines 
 along the inland mountains as well. The Eastern Cordon 
 
158 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 was broken through and the Plain of Fort Dauphin 
 sacked and fired: in the peninsula of the Mole occurred 
 a revolt of both negroes and mulattoes, which took in 
 rear the vital Cordon de l'Ouest and culminated in the 
 storming of a large " camp" and the massacre of its hun- 
 dreds of helpless refugees. On the 25th of January, 
 Blanchelande wrote in the most pessimistic vein: "The 
 state of the colony grows worse every day. If powerful 
 succors do not speedily arrive, I shall regard it as abso- 
 lutely doomed." 18 
 
 The failure of these negotiations also marked the begin- 
 ning of the breach between the Civil Commissioners and 
 the Colonial Assembly. The Commissioners, at least, 
 had been certain of success; 19 and they were furious at 
 the Assembly both for causing their failure and for mini- 
 mizing their powers. 20 They immediately informed the 
 Colonial Legislature that their authority was practically 
 unlimited, and began a quarrel which by late February 
 culminated in a virtual ultimatum. After stigmatizing 
 as "lese nation" the appointment of a committee to in- 
 vestigate their powers, the Commissioners went on as 
 follows: "Understand, then, and never forget, that the 
 nation and the King have commissioned us to bring peace 
 and order to San Domingo; and that to this end our 
 powers have no limits except the terrible responsibility 
 which they entail. Our authority is a veritable dicta- 
 torship." 21 
 
 This quarrel with the Colonial Assembly had the 
 further effect of altering the Commissioners' attitude 
 toward the mulatto insurgents of the West. We have 
 already seen the dreadful condition to which that prov- 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 159 
 
 ince had been reduced by the opening days of 1792; — 
 the capital terrorized by an irresponsible mob and closely 
 invested by several thousand equally irresponsible in- 
 surgents. 22 The spirit which animated these besiegers is 
 well shown by the appeal from the mulatto leaders be- 
 fore Port-au-Prince to their brethren of the Artibonite. 
 "Hasten, dear friends," reads this letter, "to the siege 
 of Port-au-Prince; and there plunge your bloody arms, 
 avengers of treason and perfidy, in the breasts of these 
 European monsters. Too long have we been the sport of 
 their wiles and passions; too long have we groaned be- 
 neath their yoke of iron. Come, then, and destroy our 
 tyrants; bury them beneath our former shame; and pluck 
 up by the roots this upas tree of Prejudice." 23 
 
 Shortly after their arrival at Le Cap the Commissioners 
 had received deputations from both parties to this des- 
 perate struggle, though at the moment they were so ab- 
 sorbed in their negotiations with the negro rebels that 
 they had done little beyoDd sending stern addresses to 
 both sides. 24 But the horrible reports which continued 
 to arrive from both West and South so worked on the 
 Commissioners that, despite their quarrel with the As- 
 sembly, they determined that one of their number must 
 go to Port-au-Prince to see what could be done. Accord- 
 ingly, on the 29th of January, 1792, Saint-Leger landed 
 at the besieged capital. 
 
 Saint-Leger's first impressions were apparently horror 
 at conditions in the town and terror at the state of the 
 province. For in addition to the awful struggle going on 
 between the whites and the mulattoes, symptoms were 
 now appearing among the negro population which be- 
 
160 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tokened downright social dissolution. In the high moun- 
 tains south of Port-au-Prince a Spanish half-breed had 
 founded a genuine religious sect. Calling himself, with 
 extraordinary inconsistency, "Romaine the Prophetess," 
 inspired by the Virgin, his fanatic bands were spreading 
 terror and desolation throughout the hill country. 25 
 
 All this convinced Saint-Leger that the warring factions 
 must compose their differences at any price; but his tact- 
 less efforts to accomplish this reconciliation merely drew 
 upon him the suspicions of the white population. These 
 suspicions the violent demagogues of Port-au-Prince took 
 no pains to conceal: on the other hand, the Confederate 
 emissaries cleverly profited from these misunderstand- 
 ings by showing him the greatest deference. The upshot 
 of the matter was that the vain and irascible Saint-Leger 
 left Port-au-Prince in a rage, and established himself 
 among the mulattoes at La-Croix-des-Bouquets. His 
 favor was further assured the Confederates by the alac- 
 rity with which they obeyed his orders to disperse the 
 bands of "Romaine the Prophetess." The breach be- 
 tween Saint-Leger and the whites of Port-au-Prince was 
 soon complete. 26 
 
 Saint-Leger still hoped to accomplish great things, but 
 he was soon reduced to utter despair by the general ex- 
 plosion which now took place in the Artibonite. The 
 incendiary appeals from La-Croix-des-Bouquets 27 had 
 done their work only too well, for in mid-February the 
 mulattoes of the Artibonite suddenly rose and massacred 
 many of the white inhabitants. The refugees, however, 
 soon found an able leader in an adventurer named Borel, 
 and a war of extermination then began which virtually 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 161 
 
 dissolved the Confederation of La-Croix-des-Bouquets; 
 the mass of the country whites preferring the most des- 
 perate struggle in the open field to further association with 
 the treacherous mulattoes. Lastly, this break-up of the 
 Confederation encouraged the whites of Port-au-Prince 
 to a bold stroke. A strong column swept triumphantly 
 out over the Cul-de-Sac and occupied La-Croix-des-Bou- 
 quets itself. But at this the mulattoes summoned the 
 slave population to revolt, attacked the whites, and on 
 March 31, after a terrible battle in which two thou- 
 sand of the half-armed negroes are said to have fallen, 
 forced their enemies to retire once more to Port-au- 
 Prince. However, this general rising of the negroes had 
 completed the disorganization of the province, which 
 sank for the moment into utter anarchy. Overwhelmed 
 with terror and despair, Saint-Leger took refuge on a 
 warship off the coast and sailed on the 9th of April 
 for France. 28 
 
 When the despairing Saint-Leger dropped the Western 
 mountains below the horizon he did not know that his 
 colleague Mirbeck was already far on the homeward voy- 
 age in an almost similar frame of mind. The Commis- 
 sioners' claim to a dictatorship 29 had infuriated the 
 Colonial Assembly to such a degree that its radical wing 
 had determined to rid the island of their presence. But 
 forcible deportation of the nation's representatives was 
 no easy task: the Governor and his troops would certainly 
 protect the Commissioners from any such attempt. It 
 was therefore necessary to find allies outside the As- 
 sembly. Allies, however, were to be had — for a price. 
 Up to this moment Blanchelande's orders and Cambe- 
 
162 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 fort's regulars had kept fair order at Le Cap. But this 
 had been increasingly annoying to the mob of the town. 
 The sack of Port-au-Prince and the plundering democ- 
 racy there established had whetted the appetites of the 
 proletarians of Le Cap, who hated the Governor as much 
 as the Assembly did the Commissioners. It is therefore 
 not strange to find that an alliance between mob and 
 radical Assemblymen was soon established. 
 
 How great was the alarm among conservative citizens 
 is shown by a letter of this period. "Our ills," it reads, 
 "grow steadily worse, with no signs of betterment for 
 the future. All those whose means permit are leaving 
 this unhappy colony, — with the result that the canaille 
 continues to gain in power. Honest men will soon no 
 longer dare show themselves. Things have come to such 
 a pass that at any moment we fear they will cut our 
 throats." 30 
 
 The conspirators were, however, greatly aided by 
 the growing unpopularity of the Commissioners with all 
 classes of the white population. Saint-Leger's favor to 
 the mulattoes of the West was rousing race-feeling to a 
 high pitch, while the attempts of Mirbeck and Roume 
 to induce the Assembly to grant political rights to the 
 mulattoes completed the general exasperation. "Behold 
 us," writes an Assemblyman to a friend in the West, 
 "irrevocably embroiled with the Civil Commissioners. 
 Their negrophil principles, their partiality for the mulat- 
 toes, their pretensions to be the sovereign repositories of 
 all authority, are absolutely unmasked. Their influence 
 can be but fatal to this unhappy country." 31 
 
 The crisis came on the 26th of March. All night long 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 163 
 
 the conspirators had plied the rabble with drink in the 
 low taverns of the water-front, and about sunrise a curs- 
 ing, shrieking mob poured toward the Governor's man- 
 sion, yelling "To arms, citizens! Rid yourselves of your 
 enemies! Were this Port-au-Prince it would already have 
 been done!" 32 
 
 Faced by this sudden peril Blanchelande showed the 
 same weakness as in the Western crisis of the year before, 33 
 and was made prisoner after a half-hearted resistance. 
 Carrying the unhappy Governor in its midst, the mob 
 next invaded the Colonial Assembly and for many hours 
 held the trembling legislators in its grasp. After a really 
 brave stand, the conservative members were forced to 
 vote Blanchelande's embarkation: as to the Civil Com- 
 missioners, voices from the galleries yelled that the easiest 
 way would be to drown them. 
 
 All this time, however, the respectable elements had 
 been gathering under the vigorous appeals of Cambe- 
 fort, who finally ventured to call out his regulars. The 
 mob, too, was steadily thinning, as the drunken ruffians 
 tired of the business and went home to sleep off their 
 debauch. Accordingly, about two o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of the 27th of March, Blanchelande was rescued, and 
 the Assembly promptly reversed its embarkation de- 
 cree. Within a few hours order was restored. 34 
 
 The coup had failed, it is true, but there was every 
 prospect that another might be tried in the near future. 
 The Civil Commissioners had come very near assassina- 
 tion and felt their position to be a hopeless one. Accord- 
 ingly, on March 30, Mirbeck embarked for France, 
 Roume agreeing to follow three days later. 35 
 
164 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 As a matter of fact, Roume did not sail, but remained 
 for many months in San Domingo. The very day after 
 his colleague's departure he had a conference with some 
 conservative members of the Assembly, from which he 
 came away convinced that Le Cap was menaced by 
 a Royalist counter-revolution. And from the evidence 
 which remains it would seem that he was right. There 
 had always been a Royalist minority among the popu- 
 lation of the North, while Colonel Cambefort and his 
 officers had shown themselves partisans of the Old Re- 
 gime on many occasions — notably by their zealous 
 cooperation with Mauduit in the Western troubles of 
 the year before. 36 These Northern Royalists had been 
 encouraged by the triumphant reaction at Martinique 
 and were infuriated by the violence of the new National 
 Assembly which had met at Paris in the preceding Octo- 
 ber. 37 Furthermore, they had succeeded in converting 
 to their views an ever larger portion of conservative 
 opinion. All moderate men were disgusted at the ex- 
 cesses of the town mobs, and in addition were so alarmed 
 at the hostility of the new National Assembly that they 
 were becoming more and more willing to forget their 
 liberal ideas in a longing for the strong arm of military 
 authority. At this moment, then, it seems clear that all 
 classes except the rabble were ready to join the Royalists 
 in their plans for an alliance with the Western Confeder- 
 ates and the reestablishment of the Old Regime through- 
 out San Domingo. 
 
 This, however, Roume resolved at all costs to prevent, 
 and he felt that his presence might keep the wavering 
 Blanchelande from going over to the movement. In this, 
 
THE FIRST CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 165 
 
 by rather clever temporizing, he actually succeeded; and 
 Le Cap remained in uneasy disquietude until in mid- 
 May it was stricken by the tidings of the National Law 
 of April 4, 1792. 38 
 
XIV 
 
 THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 
 
 On the very day after the passage of the Decree of 
 September 24, 1791, occurred an event which boded ill 
 for its future: Barnave and others prominent in its pas- 
 sage were formally expelled from the Jacobin Club. 
 "The Society," it was said, "could preserve upon its 
 membership-roll only true friends of the Constitution 
 and of Humanity." This action was invested with still 
 greater future significance from the fact that the ex- 
 pulsions had been moved by Polverel, one of the men who 
 within a year were to be sent as dictators to San Domingo. 
 Furthermore, this was but the last of a series of steps 
 already taken by the Club in avowed hostility to the 
 colonial system. On June 10, Danton had obtained the 
 expulsion of Gouy d'Arcy for "forfaiture nationale," and 
 the Club had striven as desperately as the "Amis des 
 Noirs" to compass the September Decree's defeat. 1 
 
 And yet it was this Society which had already set out 
 to capture the coming Legislative Assembly, and which 
 within the year was to be the real Sovereign of France. 
 That its unscrupulous election methods had been a suc- 
 cess was shown when the new "Legislatif " met on Octo- 
 ber 1,1791. Instead of the Jacobin handful in the late 
 Constituent Assembly, 136 "Legislatif" deputies were 
 on the books of the Club, while the whole Assembly was 
 distinctly more radical in tone. The pronounced conserva- 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 167 
 
 tives had taken little part in the recent elections. Many 
 had by this time emigrated; still larger numbers had been 
 kept from voting by conscientious scruples or Jacobin 
 violence. Lastly, the Constituante's self-denying ordi- 
 nance made the Legislatif a body of entirely new men, and 
 the inexperienced mass of moderate deputies had small 
 chance of acquiring the capacity for organized resist- 
 ance to the disciplined driving-power of the great Club 
 backed by the Paris mob. 
 
 The Legislatif had not been long in session when tid- 
 ings of the great negro rising in San Domingo began to 
 arrive in France; tidings coupled with frantic appeals for 
 aid which grew in intensity and volume. Blanchelande's 
 initial report on the situation estimated six thousand 
 regular troops, fifteen thousand stand of arms, and an 
 immense materiel of war as the absolute minimum re- 
 quired to save San Domingo from destruction. 2 And these 
 colonial appeals were vigorously endorsed by the Civil 
 Commissioners recently sent from France. Their very 
 first letter emphasized the need of large and speedy suc- 
 cors, 3 and their recommendations grew more insistent 
 with every despatch sont home. When on February 20, 
 1792, the Colonial Assembly drew up an appeal for 
 twenty thousand troops, 4 the Commissioners appended 
 their earnest endorsement. "Twenty thousand men," 
 it reads, — "this figure, we certify, is but the absolute 
 necessity." 5 
 
 But against these appeals the Jacobins and the "Amis 
 des Noirs" 6 set themselves like flint, and in fact suc- 
 ceeded in preventing the despatch of any real aid to San 
 Domingo. They first denied the existence of the insur- 
 
168 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 rection, declaring it a ruse to assure a RoyaKst asylum 
 over -seas; then, when forced to admit the fact, they 
 branded it as the work of emigres. "The massacres," 
 cried Brissot triumphantly, " began on the 24st of Au* 
 gust; — just at the moment when the news had^arrived 
 of the King's flight to Varennes. Evidently they were 
 organized by the Counter - Revolutionists/' 7 Month 
 after month frantic letters and petitions poured by hun- 
 dreds into the Hall of Assembly, and these not only from 
 over -seas, but also from thousands of Frenchmen re- 
 duced to ruin and trembling for the lives of kindred in 
 San Domingo. 8 These appeals, coupled with the horrors 
 contained in every report from the island, might well 
 have moved hearts of stone; — but not the hearts of the 
 Jacobin opposition. Time after time a grim tragi-comedy 
 was enacted on the floor of the Assembly. Some fresh 
 batch of reports and petitions on San Domingo would 
 move moderate members to propose the sending of aid. 
 Instantly the Jacobins would be upon their feet with a 
 wealth of fine phrases, patriotic suspicions, and a whole 
 armory of nullifying amendments and motions to ad- 
 journ; — the whole backed by gallery threats to the 
 moderate proponents. And in the end, nothing would 
 be done. 9 
 
 The effect of all this upon the wretched inhabitants of 
 San Domingo may be conceived. On the 25th of January, 
 Blanchelande writes that the news of this continual 
 obstruction in the National Assembly "is reducing the 
 people to absolute despair." 10 The Minister of Marine, 
 Bertrand de Molleville, did what he could, but this was 
 little enough. So late as the 20th of February, the Civil 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 169 
 
 Commissioners wrote that up to that moment only 
 eleven hundred soldiers had arrived; while Commissioners, 
 Governor, and Colonial Assembly all joined in asserting 
 that such poor driblets were useless, since the men had 
 to be at once scattered among the most exposed points 
 where, unacclimated and crushed by excessive service, 
 they quickly, melted away. 11 
 
 Of this opposition to the relief of San Domingo it 
 is difficult to speak with moderation. For not even on 
 grounds of fanaticism can the Jacobin policy be palliated; 
 their attitude was largely due to a mere factious desire 
 to discredit the existing Government. The Jacobins had 
 vowed the destruction of the moderate "Feuillant" Min- 
 istry of the day, and they realized the excellent political 
 capital to be made out of the troubles in San Domingo. 
 Besides their ability to "point with alarm" to the Feuil- 
 lants' inability to restore order, the Jacobins had been 
 quick to realize the fact that these colonial disasters 
 were producing much discontent at home. The price of 
 sugar and coffee was going up every day, and complaints 
 were rising from every French breakfast table. The one 
 thing that can be said for the Jacobin opposition is that 
 it possessed the virtue of consistency: it fought the rescue 
 of suffering Avignon as stoutly as the salvation of mar- 
 tyred San Domingo, and richly earned the bitter gibe 
 of Pitt that these Frenchmen preferred their coffee "au 
 caramel." 
 
 But the programme of the Club was by no means a 
 wholly negative one: the hateful September Decree was 
 also the logical object of consistent Jacobin attack. The 
 story of the long six months' struggle which preceded 
 
170 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 complete Jacobin success is vividly narrated in the cor- 
 respondence of those commissioners sent to France by the 
 Colonial Assembly in the early autumn of 1791. 12 
 
 The Jacobin attack was both direct and indirect in 
 character. We have seen that the September Decree had 
 been made an article of the French Constitution of 1791, 
 and that it had been declared irrepealable except upon 
 the express desire of the colonies themselves. But his- 
 tory teaches nothing more certain than the impossibility 
 of forbidding any action of the sovereign power for all 
 future time. This anomaly was promptly insisted on by 
 the Jacobin orators, and besides declaring the September 
 Decree illegal, as contravening fundamental principles 
 and the imprescriptible rights of citizens, they urged the 
 Legislatif to vindicate its honor by repudiating this at- 
 tempt to trammel its sovereignty. 
 
 The news of the Concordat made in September be- 
 tween the whites and mulattoes of the West Province 
 gave the Jacobins an opportunity for indirect attack. 
 Ignoring the fact that the September Decree had speci- 
 fied only requests from Colonial Legislatures, the Jaco- 
 bins now asserted that by making the Concordat the 
 colony had expressed its desire for a change, and they 
 urged the National Assembly to ratify this instrument 
 and make it the law for all San Domingo. 13 Of course it 
 was quite evident that any such action would completely 
 nullify the September Decree. 
 
 The upshot of all this was that the whole question was 
 referred to the Committee on Colonies. This body was 
 by no means as friendly to the colonial whites as its pre- 
 decessor of the Constituante; 14 nevertheless, on January 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 171 
 
 11, 1792, it rendered a report which affirmed the consti- 
 tutionality of the September Decree and advised against 
 either ratifying the Concordat or extending its provisions 
 to the whole of San Domingo. 15 
 
 This blow checked the Jacobins — but only for a time. 
 For as the winter waned so did the Feuillant Ministry, 
 and every day revealed more clearly the coming Jacobin 
 ascendancy over France. By mid - February the grand 
 assault on the colonial system began. The letters of the 
 San Domingo commissioners tell of desperate efforts to 
 stem the tide, but their tone is one of ever deepening 
 despair. "There is no use denying the fact," they write 
 on the 14th of February, "the Legislatif will never grant 
 us aid until it has annulled the constitutional law of the 
 24th September. . . . The most influential members of 
 this Assembly are indeed of the opinion that the law is 
 not even constitutional, and any day may see our safe- 
 guard destroyed." 16 
 
 In their final campaign the Jacobins were greatly aided 
 by the growing irritation among even conservative 
 French circles at the steady refusal of the colonial whites 
 to accept the mulattoes as their political equals. The very 
 commercial classes were now estranged from their former 
 allies, since the French merchants had no desire to be 
 ruined for the upholding of the color line. What ap- 
 peared to colonists a vital principle seemed to Frenchmen 
 a foolish prejudice, and the whites of San Domingo were 
 more and more regarded as a stiff-necked generation in 
 great part responsible for the woes which overwhelmed 
 them. It was perfectly clear that the mulattoes were as 
 much opposed as the whites themselves to negro eman- 
 
172 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 cipation; consequently, if the whites would frankly and 
 fully accept the mulattoes as their equals, it was certain 
 that the freedmen would join whole-heartedly in the 
 suppression of the rebel slaves. 
 
 Another idea widely held among Frenchmen at this 
 moment contributed to favor the Jacobin campaign. 
 The opponents of the colonial system had long asserted 
 that when the Constituante passed the September De- 
 cree it was with the tacit understanding that the Colo- 
 nial Assembly would itself grant the mulattoes political 
 rights. This claim appears to have been entirely without 
 foundation; nevertheless, the feeling grew in France that 
 the Colonial Assembly was bound to adopt some such 
 line of action, at least on grounds of policy and humanity. 
 The Civil Commissioners had made no secret of such con- 
 victions, and their efforts to this effect had done much 
 to rouse the island whites against them. In their " ulti- 
 matum" of February 19, 17 they had said, "Representa- 
 tives of the colony of San Domingo and its unfortunate 
 inhabitants, remember that the mother country is watch- 
 ing you, and that she will demand a reckoning for the 
 precious time which you are losing in vain debates. 
 Hasten, then, to repair your errors by busying yourselves 
 with that internal status which cries so loudly for a 
 remedy." 18 
 
 The colonists were well aware of the increasing peril; 
 nevertheless, they grimly refused to abandon their posi- 
 tion. Their attitude is well set forth in a memorial written 
 at this moment by the Assemblyman De Pons. 19 He 
 contends that the mulattoes' claim for political rights is 
 only the first step in their deeper determination to obtain 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 173 
 
 social equality and the mixing of the bloods by inter- 
 marriage. And, asserts De Pons, once grant political 
 equality and all the rest will follow in time: the mulat- 
 toes will soon outvote the whites, establish mulatto politi- 
 cal supremacy, and then by coercive legislation force the 
 whites either to admit social equality or leave the island. 20 
 
 De Pons's claim that the mulattoes were certain to 
 obtain political supremacy if given the vote is strikingly 
 echoed by the mulatto leader Raymond. Writing to his 
 brethren at San Domingo, in censure of their support of 
 the Old Regime and dislike of popular assemblies, he 
 urges that such bodies are the surest instruments of vic- 
 tory, since the mulattoes would soon outvote the whites 
 and thereafter dominate the island. 21 
 
 Given such irreconcilable ambitions inflamed by so 
 much bloodshed and race hatred, it is not strange that 
 the colonial whites grimly resolved to keep San Domingo 
 a "white man's country" or to be buried in its ruins. 
 
 However, deserted as the colonists now were by even 
 conservative French opinion, the Jacobin triumph was 
 only a question of time : when the Feuillant Ministry went 
 down on March 10, 1792, the prompt overthrow of the 
 colonial system became a certainty. In fact, on the 24th 
 of March, the House passed that drastic project of the 
 Jacobin Gensonne which the terrorized King's signature 
 transformed into the National Law of April 4, 1792. 22 
 
 This law absolutely nullified the Constitutional Decree 
 of September, 1791, and pressed the Act of May 15 to 
 its logical conclusion. 23 
 
 "The National Assembly," reads its preamble, "ac- 
 knowledges and declares that the people of color and free 
 
174 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 negroes in the colonies ought to enjoy equality of politi- 
 cal rights with the whites; in consequence whereof it 
 decrees as follows : — 
 
 "1. Immediately after the publication of the present 
 decree, the inhabitants of each of the French colonies of 
 the Windward and Leeward Islands shall proceed to the 
 reelection of Colonial and Parochial Assemblies, after 
 the mode prescribed by the Decree of March 8, 1790, 
 and the Instructions of March 28. 
 
 "2. The people of color and free negroes shall be ad- 
 mitted to vote in all the primary and electoral assemblies, 
 and shall be eligible to the legislature and to all places of 
 trust, provided they possess the qualifications prescribed 
 in Article 4 of the aforesaid instructions. 
 
 "3. Three Civil Commissioners shall be named for the 
 colony of San Domingo ... to see this decree enforced." 
 
 That the Jacobins were determined to have no half- 
 measures was plain from the articles which followed : the 
 Commissioners thus decreed for the new law's enforce- 
 ment were given the powers of dictators and the backing 
 of an army to compel entire obedience to the Legislatif 's 
 will. 24 The white colonists were given the curt warning 
 to bend or be broken. 
 
 By the whites of San Domingo, indeed, the Law of 
 April 4, 1792, was regarded as a virtual sentence of death. 
 "With the most profound sadness," write its commis- 
 sioners to the Colonial Assembly, "we must inform you 
 that on the 24th of this month M. Gensonne's draft de- 
 cree was adopted almost unanimously. Both deputies 
 and public galleries were at such a pitch of frenzy that it 
 would have been highly dangerous for any one to have 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 175 
 
 manifested a contrary opinion, so that the minority offered 
 no opposition. The Minister of Marine is deeply afflicted 
 by this decision, and sees therein the certain ruin not 
 only of San Domingo, but of the Windward Islands 25 
 as well." 26 However, Bertrand de Molleville's opinion 
 was a matter of small importance, for within a few days 
 he was replaced by the Jacobin Lacoste. 
 
 "You may announce unreservedly that it is all over 
 with San Domingo," writes a returned colonist from 
 Bordeaux. "One of three things will follow: the whites 
 will exterminate the whole mulatto caste; the mulattoes 
 will destroy the whites; or the negroes will profit by these 
 dissensions to annihilate both the whites and the mu- 
 lattoes. But in any case, San Domingo should be erased; 
 from the maps of France." 27 
 
 When the tidings reached the island, the white popu- 
 lation of San Domingo was crushed as by a thunderbolt. 
 "On May 11, ' writes the Colonial Assembly to its com- 
 missioners, "the news arrived, — the news of the final 
 ruin of this unhappy country. Desolation is upon every 
 face; rage and despair may occasion something terri- 
 ble." 28 Its letter upon the law's official arrival is a veri- 
 table cry of agonized despair. "What!" it reads, "after 
 having been slaughtered, burned, ruined by these mon- 
 sters, we must now take them to our hearts like beloved 
 brothers? We are, then, to be forced by bayonets to 
 sign our death-warrant? This is the climax of horror, 
 tyranny, and despair!" 29 
 
 Very significant was the attitude of Governor Blanche- 
 lande. He flatly refused to give the new Minister of 
 Marine his opinion on the Law of the 4th of April, saying 
 
176 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 that he knew himself suspect to many members of the 
 National Assembly and that, in consequence, unpalata- 
 ble remarks might be used against him. 30 Henceforth 
 his letters are quite unreliable on the race question. They 
 are obviously written for effect. 
 
 The joy of the mulattoes was, of course, as great as 
 the colonists' despair. Raymond's letter to his friends in 
 San Domingo is a paean of victory, 31 and their letters to 
 him are equally jubilant. "Behold, then," writes his 
 brother Francois, "the decree which finally settles our 
 political status, so long disputed by abominable prejudice. 
 Good God! how this country is convulsed. Just imagine: 
 there are still some parts where people hope to see this 
 decree treated like that of the 15th May! But this time 
 they will have to obey the law." 32 
 
 The Civil Commissioner Roume was as delighted as the 
 mulattoes themselves and took no pains to conceal the 
 dislike he had always felt for the Decree of the 24th Sep- 
 tember. " I cannot bring myself to speak of petty details," 
 he writes the new Minister of Marine, "when discuss- 
 ing an event which restores to its pristine dignity one of 
 the three great families of the human race and enriches 
 France with an intermediate species in which are crossed 
 and blended two of these ancient families. Oh, that the 
 September Decree had never been ! " 33 
 
 It is plain that the Law of the 4th of April was as ab- 
 horrent to the white colonists as the Decree of the 15th 
 May, yet its arrival was followed by nothing except low 
 cries of despair. For there was a world of difference be- 
 tween their situation in the two periods. A year before 
 the whites had been masters of the whole island; now they 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 177 
 
 were crowded into a few port towns or prostrate beneath 
 the knives of the mulattoes of the West. Lastly, they 
 could hope for no foreign aid, since at the moment there 
 was no sign of an English war. To offer armed resistance 
 to the coming army of Jacobin France was clearly to 
 court immediate destruction. Therefore the white leaders 
 resolved to bow for the moment in the faint hope of a 
 better time to come, and the Colonial Assembly formally 
 counselled submission to the national will. 34 "We are so 
 dispersed," writes this body to its commissioners, "that 
 there is nothing left but submission." 35 Hopeless as 
 was the situation, however, it seems that this surrender 
 of the Assembly alone prevented a supreme outburst of 
 despair, for Roume writes that the absence of resistance 
 was wholly due to the conduct of the Assembly. "It is 
 certain," he adds, "that if the Colonial Assembly had 
 shown the least insubordination to this law, we should 
 have seen flowing torrents of blood." 36 
 
 By mid-June, Commissioner Roume was assured that 
 the whites of Le Cap were too crushed in spirit to make 
 any immediate trouble. He therefore felt free to turn his 
 undivided attention to the West. That province had not 
 long remained in the anarchy consequent upon the mu- 
 latto appeal to the slave population and the battle of 
 La-Croix-des-Bouquets. 37 For to all parties it had been 
 perfectly clear that the explosion of the West had left the 
 vital military cordon along the Western mountains quite 
 in the air; and it was absolutely certain that once the 
 black tide of the Northern rebellion burst through that 
 mountain wall and flowed over the seething negro popu- 
 lation of the West, all was over. 38 And no one was more 
 
178 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 conscious of this fact than the commandant of the West- 
 ern Cordon, De Fontanges. This officer, by his high 
 character and unimpeachable Royalism, succeeded in 
 bringing together the white and mulatto planters of the 
 Artibonite, and on April 19 he mediated the so-called 
 "Treaty of Saint-Marc," 39 — really a revival of the Con- 
 federation of La-Croix-des-Bouquets. This was quickly 
 joined by the other country parishes of the West, and 
 early in May an executive body called the "Council of 
 Peace and Union " met at Saint-Marc for the settlement 
 of the province. Its efforts were successful. The Cordon 
 de l'Ouest was once more made secure, and the slave 
 disturbances suppressed. 40 
 
 Nevertheless, these events had been viewed by Roume 
 with very mixed emotions. For the "Council of Peace 
 and Union " was as Royalist a body as the old Confedera- 
 tion had been, and the Bourbon Lilies were flying over 
 many a camp of the West. 41 Roume, therefore, set him- 
 self to win the mulattoes for the Revolution. To this end 
 he now came out squarely in favor of political equality. 42 
 On May 9 he wrote warmly to the new League, praising 
 their "holy union," which if generally adopted would 
 "save San Domingo." He offered the League his "most 
 fraternal greetings," and assured its members that France 
 would soon grant their wishes, "reducing to nothing the 
 work of the Colonial Assembly." 43 
 
 The Law of the 4th of April made Roume certain of 
 success. He now determined to go in person to the West 
 to break the alliance between the mulattoes and the Old 
 Regime; and on this journey he was accompanied by 
 Blanchelande, who desired to profit by mulatto satis- 
 
THE LAW OF APRIL 4, 1792 179 
 
 faction to raise troops among them for use against the 
 negro rebels of the North. Accordingly the two landed 
 at Saint-Marc on the 20th of June, where Roume was 
 greatly edified at observing whites and mulattoes "sit- 
 ting together like good brothers." u It is true that the 
 Confederates soon gave them to understand that no aid 
 would be granted against the Northern rebels until they 
 had helped capture Port-au-Prince; but as neither Roume 
 nor Blanchelande had any love for that turbulent de- 
 mocracy, they immediately accepted the terms of the 
 League. Roume, therefore, journeyed overland to the 
 besieging mulatto army, while Blanchelande with the 
 warships which had brought them from Le Cap sailed 
 to blockade Port-au-Prince by sea. The position of the 
 town was now hopeless, and on July 10, Port-au-Prince 
 sullenly surrendered. It was sharply dealt with. The 
 mutinous soldiery which for more than a year had ter- 
 rorized the town was embarked for France, the most 
 prominent mob leaders were expelled the country, and 
 the arch-demagogue Praloto was murdered. Held down 
 by a strong mulatto garrison, Port-au-Prince seemed 
 unlikely to give further trouble. 45 
 
 However, notwithstanding this triumph, the Western 
 mulattoes still seemed quite indisposed to follow Blanche- 
 lande against the negroes of the North. They now 
 demanded that before receiving the promised aid the 
 Governor should help their brethren in the South. The 
 mulattoes of that province were, indeed, in need of as- 
 sistance, for the hard-fighting planters of the Southern 
 mountains and their black followers had by this time 
 pretty well mastered the whole country. These Southern 
 
180 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 whites had already formed that "Confederation of the 
 Grande Anse " soon to play such an important r61e, and 
 had absolutely refused to obey the Law of the 4th of 
 April. 
 
 Blanchelande visited the South, it is true, but in a 
 vacillating mood that foreboded failure. He had no 
 heart to enforce the new law; he probably realized that 
 he had been duped by the League; and yet his platonic 
 counsels of submission and his release of mulatto pris- 
 oners infuriated the Southern whites against him. Re- 
 solved to do something to justify his presence, he at- 
 tempted to clear the high mountains of their bands of 
 half-maroon negroes, but the local whites gave little aid 
 and the expedition ended in a bad disaster. Discouraged 
 and discredited he sailed back to Le Cap, not only with- 
 out mulatto recruits, but deprived of the few soldiers 
 who had followed him to the West. 46 Roume, meanwhile, 
 remained at Port-au-Prince trying to convert the mulat- 
 toes from Royalism to the Revolution, although subse- 
 quent events proved that his efforts were crowned with 
 very mediocre success. 
 
 Such was the state of San Domingo when, on Sep- 
 I tember 18, the Jacobin Commissioners and six thousand 
 
 ! troops sailed into the harbor of Le Cap, to enforce 
 throughout the island compliance with the Law of April 
 4, 1792. 
 
XV 
 
 THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 
 
 That the new Jacobin rulers of France were determined 
 that their enactments should be no idle statements of 
 principle is shown by a glance at the Law of April 4, 1792; 
 if the preamble and first two articles laid down the doc- 
 trine of mulatto equality, the next eight were concerned 
 with measures for its strict enforcement. The closing 
 paragraph alone contained concessions to the colonists, 
 for by this final clause slavery was still maintained and 
 slave legislation left to the Colonial Assemblies. 1 
 
 The cardinal idea in these coercive measures was the 
 sending of new Civil Commissioners to direct the law's 
 enforcement, and the powers granted these Commis- 
 sioners, especially as amplified by the supplementary 
 decree passed on the 15th of June, 2 created nothing short 
 of a dictatorship. With such plenary powers, the new 
 Commission's future action depended entirely upon the 
 character of its members. And nothing shows more 
 clearly Jacobin intransigeance toward the feelings of the 
 colonists than the selection of persons which now took 
 place. Indeed, the first idea of the Jacobin' party was 
 actually to appoint, as one of the trio, Raymond, the 
 leader of the Paris mulattoes; and although moderate 
 opposition finally defeated this project, the terrified 
 letters of the colonial delegates 3 and the regretful com- 
 ments of Garran-Coulon 4 show how near it came to sue- 
 
182 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 cess. The defeat of this proposal undoubtedly spared 
 much bloodshed in San Domingo, for the state of mind 
 there prevailing was such 5 that if the whites had learned 
 that the chief mulatto leader was to have been one of 
 their future dictators, it is almost certain that they would 
 have risen in some supreme convulsion of despair. 
 
 But even though no mulatto was appointed, the choice 
 of persons finally selected did little to quiet the alarm of 
 white San Domingo. 6 Polverel, Sonthonax, and Ailhaud, 
 the new Civil Commissioners, were all Jacobins, and the 
 first two had already shown their sentiments toward the 
 colonists in no uncertain fashion. It was Polverel who in 
 the Jacobin Club had moved the expulsion of Barnave 
 and the other supporters of the distasteful decree of 
 September 24, 1791. Yet Polverel was by far the best 
 of the three. His Jacobinism, though fanatical, was sin- 
 cere, his personal honesty was never questioned, and 
 ripening years had brought some insight and reflection 
 in their train. To Polverel is due the fact that the suc- 
 ceeding pages of San Domingan history were not even 
 more lurid than the terrible reality. Ailhaud was a mere 
 cipher who played no part in coming events. 
 
 In the sinister figure of Sonthonax, however, all the 
 worst traits of the Jacobin type stood revealed. An ob- 
 scure country lawyer from the Savoyard border, 7 the 
 Revolution had been his opportunity, and from the first 
 he had identified himself with that extreme wing of the 
 Jacobin party then known as the "Enrages," and later 
 still more famous as the nucleus of the "Mountain." 
 A mere mouther of phrases, corrupt in both public and 
 private life, his one real talent lay in a certain sly ability 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 183 
 
 to trim with the times which was to bring him safe through 
 the storms of the Revolution. In that dreadful company 
 of Jacobin Proconsuls, history should rank Sonthonax 
 beside Carrier of Nantes and Joseph Lebon of Arras. 
 
 If such a man can be said to have real convictions, his 
 ideas on colonial questions may be gathered from a 
 signed article published in one of the ultra-radical sheets 
 about a year before. "The ownership of land both at 
 San Domingo and the other colonies," reads this article, 
 "belongs in reality to the negroes. It is they who have 
 earned it with the sweat of their brows, and only by 
 usurpation do others now enjoy the fruits." 8 The new 
 Minister of Marine, member of the Jacobin Ministry 
 though he was, remonstrated strongly against Son- 
 thonax's appointment as Commissioner to San Domingo; 
 but his objections were overruled. 9 
 
 The personnel of the new Commission was naturally 
 very pleasing to the mulatto colony at Paris. In his 
 jubilant letter of the 18th of June to his friends in San 
 Domingo, Raymond remarks, "As to the new Commis- 
 sioners, you may rely on the purity of their principles 
 and on their resolution to enforce the law." 10 
 
 The feelings of the white colonists in France are shown 
 by the following remarkable letter to the Colonial As- 
 sembly from one of its commissioners. 
 
 "I send you, gentlemen," he writes, "a decree of the 
 National Assembly which will give you the key to the 
 operations by which its Commissioners are to bring about 
 the general enfranchisement of the negroes. Do not 
 doubt these words, gentlemen; I know whereof I speak; 
 and I swear upon my honor that my words are true. The 
 
184 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 plot is already hatched within the National Assembly, 
 and will be carried out the moment the Commissioners 
 have attained complete authority. The plan is to en- 
 franchise all the negroes in all the French colonies; then, 
 with these first freedmen, to bring about enfranchisement 
 in all the foreign colonies; and thus to carry revolt and 
 independence throughout the New World, — a thing 
 which, according to its authors, will give them supremacy 
 over all the Powers of Europe. And this atrocious plan 
 producing such torrents of blood will certainly be exe- 
 cuted if you do not join haste to resolution, concord to 
 preparation, and to your resistance the courage of de- 
 spair. Gentlemen, beat off these tigers athirst for blood; 
 crush in these wretches' hearts their barbarous projects; 
 and thereby earn the love of your countrymen and the 
 blessings of an entire world saved by your courage from 
 the atrocious convulsions which these madmen have in 
 store. 
 
 "If you are sufficiently united to follow my counsel, I 
 guarantee the salvation of San Domingo. But, in any 
 case, let no one cherish the hope of mercy from these men, 
 let no one be deluded by their sly tricks of policy; the 
 negroes alone find room in their affections, and all the 
 whites without distinction, all the mulattoes as well, are 
 doomed; all alike are dangerous to their projects, all 
 alike will be sacrificed as soon as these men shall have 
 disposed of the officers, gotten rid of the troops of the 
 line, and become at last the undisputed masters." " 
 
 The closing lines of this letter are a remarkable proph- 
 ecy, for they accurately foreshadow those progressive 
 steps which culminated in Sonthonax's emancipation 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS »■ 
 
 proclamation of August, 1793. It is, indeed, far from im- 
 possible that some such scheme was actually entertained 
 by the extreme Jacobin leaders, for it is quite in line with 
 their avowed programme for the universal triumph of 
 the French Revolution and the regeneration of the world. 
 And, if such a plan did in fact exist, Sonthonax must have 
 been privy to it, since he was the friend and candidate 
 of the "Enrages." Such schemes were certainly widely 
 believed in at the time, and this letter is only one of a 
 number of similar predictions uttered during the summer 
 and autumn of 1792. 12 But of such a plan no actual trace 
 apparently remains, and Polverel at least must certainly 
 be exonerated from any intention of so far exceeding his 
 instructions. 
 
 These instructions were the logical sequence of the law 
 of April 4 and the Decree of the 15th June. After sketch- 
 ing the terrible condition of San Domingo, the instruc- 
 tions point out the difference between the situation of the 
 first and second Civil Commissioners. The first Com- 
 missioners, read the instructions, had to execute the Law 
 of the 24th September, "which placed the fate of the 
 colored citizens at the will of the Colonial Assembly"; the 
 second Commissioners are "being sent to execute the 
 Law of the 4th of April which pronounces equality of 
 political rights." The first Commissioners "had to con- 
 ciliate the rigor of the Law with the counsels and plead- 
 ings of Equity"; the second Commissioners are "going 
 forth strong in a new Law which permits neither the one 
 party to demand nor the other to temporize or refuse." 
 The first Commissioners were without soldiers; the sec- 
 ond Commissioners will come to San Domingo with six 
 
A FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 thousand troops, which should suffice "to stifle the very 
 murmurs of dissent." The new Commissioners are to use 
 every persuasion, yet armed resistance is more than 
 likely. In that case they are to use most vigorous meas- 
 ures, and "disobedience shall be regarded as high trea- 
 son." In the elections which will follow the dissolution 
 of the existing Assemblies, the Commissioners are to 
 take the greatest care that the Law is strictly enforced, 
 and shall see to it that mulattoes and free negroes are 
 everywhere not only voters but candidates as well. 
 Lastly, the Commissioners are directed to prosecute a 
 most rigorous investigation to discover the authors of the 
 late troubles, who are to be sent prisoners to France. 13 
 
 Armed with these instructions the second Civil Com- 
 missioners sailed in late July for San Domingo accom- 
 panied by six thousand men; two thousand of them 
 troops of the line to give consistency and discipline, the 
 other four thousand National Guards carefully chosen 
 for the soundness of their principles. The temper of these 
 new Commissioners was well shown even on the voyage. 
 Their first report is characterized by the Revolutionary 
 attitude of suspicion, — suspicion that officials in the 
 French ports have given them slow ships to delay their 
 arrival at San Domingo; suspicion that many officers are 
 seeking to debauch the soldiers' principles; lastly, grave 
 suspicion of General Desparbes, the commander of the 
 troops. 14 Desparbes's instructions had enjoined sub- 
 ordination to the Commissioners in matters of policy, but 
 had specifically given him full control over the technical 
 handling of the troops. But the Commissioners promptly 
 began to trespass upon this province, and the very day 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 187 
 
 of their arrival at Le Cap saw an open breach. The Com- 
 missioners sent Desparbes directions on how to land his 
 troops, at which Desparbes, with the proverbial short 
 temper of an old soldier, swore roundly, sent the Com- 
 mission word to mind their business, and expressed his 
 opinion of meddlesome civilians before his assembled 
 staff. The Commissioners' report to the Minister of 
 Marine expresses grave doubts as to the "civism" of the 
 general. 15 
 
 Uncertainty as to their reception had led the Com- 
 missioners to send on a fast ship which brought back 
 letters from the various high officials at Le Cap while 
 the fleet was still at sea. And the contents of these de- 
 spatches should have given the Commissioners much food 
 for reflection. There was first of all a report from Blanche- 
 lande giving a detailed statement of conditions in the 
 island. He reported less than fifteen hundred regular 
 troops fit for duty, and placed the numbers of the North- 
 ern rebels at sixty thousand, albeit scattered in many 
 bands. The Ordonnateur, 16 in his report, urged that, as 
 there was no formal opposition to the new law, the Com- 
 missioners should postpone their reconstructive measures 
 until the suppression of the negro revolt; adding that he 
 thought it might really be put down if the colonists were 
 not further alienated and if the new troops were used 
 at once before the climate had enfeebled their strength. 
 Both the Governor and the commander of the naval 
 station wrote special memoirs on, the dangers of the 
 political situation, stating that the soldiers and sailors 
 shared the colonists' repugnance to the Law of the 4th 
 of April, and that unless the Commissioners acted tact- 
 
188 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 fully and avoided allying themselves to any of the exist- 
 ing parties, a terrible explosion was almost inevitable. 17 
 How the Commissioners acted upon these advices was 
 soon to be seen. 
 
 It was on the 18th of September, 1792, that the fleet 
 dropped anchor in the harbor of Le Cap. The Com- 
 missioners were impressively received by both Governor 
 and Assembly, though the speech of President Daugy 
 showed the deep alarm felt as to their intentions. " Gen- 
 tlemen," he cried, "we are in your hands as a jar of clay, 
 which you may break at will. This is, then, perhaps the 
 last moment vouchsafed us to warn you of a vital truth 
 ill understood by your predecessors. This truth, already 
 recognized by the Constituent Assembly in its closing 
 moments, is that there can be no agriculture at San Do- 
 mingo without slavery; that five hundred thousand sav- 
 ages cannot be brought as slaves from the coast of Africa 
 to enter this country as French citizens; lastly, that their 
 existence here as free citizens would be physically incom- 
 patible with the coexistence of our European brethren." 18 
 
 To this address both Polverel and Sonthonax replied 
 in terms designed to quiet all fears regarding the aboli- 
 tion of slavery. Polverel's speech was undoubtedly sin- 
 cere, 19 but the words of Sonthonax, when contrasted with 
 the arguments so soon to be addressed to the National 
 Convention, are a revelation of his consummate hypoc- 
 risy. "We declare," he cried dramatically, "in the pres- 
 ence of the Supreme Being, in the name of the mother 
 country, before the people and amid its present repre- 
 sentatives, that from this time forth we recognize but 
 two classes of men at San Domingo — the free, without 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 189 
 
 distinction of color, and the slaves. We declare that to 
 the Colonial Assemblies alone belong the right to pro- 
 nounce upon the fate of the slaves. We declare that 
 slavery is necessary to the cultivation and prosperity of 
 the colonies; that it is neither in the principles nor the 
 will of the National Assembly of France to touch these 
 prerogatives of the colonists; and that if the Assembly 
 should ever be so far misled as to provoke their abolition, 
 we swear to oppose such action with all our power. Such 
 are our principles. Such are those given us by the Na- 
 tional Assembly and the King. We will die, if need be, 
 that they may triumph!" 20 
 
 That the Commissioners were generally satisfied with 
 their reception is clear from their first despatch to the 
 Minister of Marine. "Every one," it reads, "seems dis- 
 posed to obey the Law of the 4th of April. Neverthe- 
 less, prejudice is not yet destroyed. Time will do the 
 business, — but we will not neglect measures for its 
 acceleration." 21 
 
 The Commissioners' first act was highly significant. 
 Ever since the March riots 22 the white rabble of Le Cap 
 had been kept down by the strong hand of Colonel 
 Cambefort, and their feelings toward the royal authori- 
 ties after six months of this military rule may be imagined. 
 To the Commissioners, however, this was highly pleasing, 
 for they thus perceived an unlooked-for chance to divide 
 the white inhabitants. Accordingly they at once showed 
 marked favor to the poor whites, who were soon enrolled 
 in a popular club 23 quite on the Jacobin model. The 
 fraternal greetings of Polverel and the mob oratory of 
 Sonthonax were delightful to men smarting under the 
 
190 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 aristocratic aloofness and military severity of the old 
 Government; and as the Commissioners momentarily 
 refrained from pressing "Citizens of the 4th of April" 24 
 upon its membership, the relations of club and Com- 
 missioners were of the best. 25 
 
 Having broken the ranks of the colonial whites, the 
 Commissioners now began aggressive measures against 
 the existing authorities. Governor Blanchelande, whose 
 weakness and half-measures had had the usual result of 
 arousing the dislike of all parties, was quickly shipped 
 off, "suspect," to France, where the unfortunate man 
 perished on the guillotine in April, 1793. 26 Roume had 
 hastened up from the West and had offered the new Com- 
 missioners the benefit of his experience, but they soon 
 showed him he was not wanted, and he hastily embarked 
 for France. 27 On October 12, the Commissioners took the 
 still bolder step of dissolving the Colonial Assembly; but 
 instead of ordering elections for a new body, as pre- 
 scribed in their instructions, they set up a "Commission 
 Intermediate," a species of advisory council composed 
 of six whites, five mulattoes, and one free negro. 
 
 However, the effect of this act upon public opinion was 
 obscured by the political crisis now caused by the latest 
 news from France. For at this moment came tidings of 
 the momentous "Tenth of August": the storming of the 
 Tuileries, the practical deposition of the King, and the 
 call for the Convention. The news roused the Royalists 
 to fury and spread terror among all moderate men. For 
 it was only too clear that the "Tenth of August" was 
 a matter of vital concern to San Domingo, — what the 
 Jacobins and the mob of Paris had done yesterday, that 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 191 
 
 the Jacobins and the mob of Le Cap would surely do 
 to-morrow. That the recent measures of the Commis- 
 sioners had roused political passions is shown by the 
 letter of one of their partisans from the distant Cordon 
 de l'Ouest. "The principal inhabitants of this parish," 
 it reads, "are extremely envious of the lot of Martinique, 23 
 and are doing their best to foment a civil war from which 
 they expect the happiest results after the destruction of 
 the brigands. 29 What I have expected is coming to pass: 
 the more energetically your love for the common weal 
 is manifest at Le Cap, the more your watchfulness un- 
 masks the perfidy of bad Frenchmen, — the more these 
 strive to form a party in the parishes. You can have no 
 idea of the tricks they play to seduce the troops of the 
 cordon. 'Monsieur Cambefort is a god, Monsieur Des- 
 parbes is a booby, and the Civil Commissioners are 
 rascals'; — such are their opinions." 30 
 
 If this was the state of a country parish, it is easy to 
 imagine the condition of Le Cap. The Royalists, realiz- 
 ing that it was their last chance to imitate Martinique, 
 began to concert measures for getting rid of the Com- 
 missioners. And for such a stroke they were assured the 
 backing of most of the regular troops. Cambefort's 
 ability had kept the old regiment "Le Cap" absolutely 
 Royalist in feeling, and it was clear that the "Le Cap" 
 veterans did not stand alone. Some time before the Com- 
 missioners' arrival there had landed two battalions of 
 the Irish regiments "Dillon" and "Walsh"; and these, 
 like most of the foreign troops in French service, had 
 remained loyal to the King. Lastly, Desparbes had 
 grown so furious at the Commissioners' conduct that he 
 
192 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 listened receptively to the proposals now made against 
 them. 
 
 The crisis was prematurely evoked by a trivial inci- 
 dent. On the morning of the 17th of October, Le Cap 
 was placarded with libels representing the officers of 
 these Royalist regiments hanged in chains. An Irish 
 officer of "Walsh" lost his temper at the sight, began 
 tearing down the placards, and told an angry group of 
 clubmen that "he thanked God he was no Frenchman." 
 As he was about to be lynched a number of his soldiers 
 arrived, and a free fight followed. Both sides now took 
 action. The Royalists demanded the dissolution of the 
 club, the club demanded the embarkation of Cambefort 
 and the Royalist officers. Finally, before dawn of the 
 18th October, the mob seized the arsenal, and there- 
 upon, by Cambefort's advice, Desparbes ordered out the 
 troops. The regiment "Le Cap" and the Irish battalions 
 responded with a will, but the four thousand French Na- 
 tional Guards declared for the Commissioners. One of 
 their officers has left us a vivid picture of how he ha- 
 rangued a battalion, asking the soldiers if they were going 
 to shoot their brothers "to satisfy the barbarous humor 
 of a handful of aristocrats who wished only the destruc- 
 tion of the human race." 31 
 
 It is probable that the discipline of the regulars would 
 have given them the victory; but Desparbes, an old 
 man of seventy-three, could not face the terrible struggle 
 which would certainly follow a Royalist attack. He re- 
 fused to give the necessary orders, and the affair ended 
 in a fiasco. The Commissioners hereupon took vigorous 
 measures; Desparbes, Cambefort, and the chief Royalist 
 
THE SECOND CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 193 
 
 officers were sent prisoners to France, while most of the 
 junior officers of "Le Cap" and the Irish battalions threw 
 up their commissions and left the country. 32 The Royal- 
 ist party in the North had ceased to exist, and the Com- 
 missioners were freed of their most dangerous enemy. 
 
XVI 
 
 SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 
 
 It was less than a week after the Royalist plot that a 
 squadron entered the harbor of Le Cap with General 
 Rochambeau x and two thousand men on board. Having 
 been repulsed from Royalist Martinique, Rochambeau 
 received a fine reception at Le Cap and was appointed 
 Governor-General in place of Desparbes. The* stanch 
 Revolutionary sentiments of these new troops still fur- 
 ther encouraged the Commissioners, who now proceeded 
 to further measures for the strict enforcement of the 
 Law of the 4th of April. 
 
 A month's residence in the island had already con- 
 vinced the Commissioners that much must be done if this 
 law were to become a reality. Their tactics had divided 
 the colonists on political questions, it is true, but they 
 had made no progress in rallying any white support for 
 measures against the color line. "Strange, indeed," they 
 write the Convention on October 25, "is the error pre- 
 vailing in Europe that there has ever been a single 
 colonial white who has shown himself the true friend 
 of the colored citizens. The famous Confederation of 
 La-Croix-des-Bouquets, the Union of Saint-Marc, the 
 cajolery of the military officers, have all been so much 
 Counter-Re volutionary speculation." 2 
 
 However, the Commissioners' conduct in these last 
 days of October bore witness to their zealous employment 
 
SONTHON AX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 195 
 
 of those "measures for the destruction of the ruling prej- 
 udice" promised in their first letter to the Minister of 
 Marine. 3 The colored members of the "Commission 
 Intermediaire" were but the first of a lengthening list 
 of official appointees from the ranks of the "Citizens of 
 the 4th of April." And how white disrespect to these new 
 appointees would be treated was soon made plain by the 
 striking case of the Sieur Theron. 
 
 The Sieur Theron was captain-general of a parish in 
 the region of Fort Dauphin, and held a brilliant record 
 for bravery and military skill. The captain-general of the 
 adjoining parish was none other than the mulatto leader 
 Candy who had gained so sinister a reputation in the 
 rising of the Plain. Candy had later quarrelled with the 
 negro chiefs, had made his peace with the authorities, 
 and was now high in the Commissioners' favor. It ap- 
 pears that Theron did not show much respect to the 
 mulatto officers sent through his district with Candy's of- 
 ficial reports, in consequence of which Candy made some 
 personal remarks about the Sieur Theron. When the 
 white leader heard of this he lost his temper and wrote 
 Candy the following letter: "If the National Assembly 
 has granted you the political rights you now enjoy, we 
 on our part know how to bear it. Of this, you yourself 
 are the best proof; our conduct in your case should con- 
 vince you that we know how to sacrifice to time and cir- 
 cumstance. But the whole nation has not the power to 
 tear from our hearts the feeling of superiority toward you 
 which we have always held and ever shall hold while 
 there remain at San Domingo those negro slaves from 
 which you spring. This is a fact you now overlook, — 
 
196 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 and which it is good some one should teach you. Sir, you 
 make a great mistake if you think that any of us will 
 ever live in friendly familiarity with you and yours. 
 'Good-day'; 'Good-bye'; politeness, but exceeding re- 
 serve; that, sir, is all you can ask of us, — and the law 
 itself can force us to nothing more, because the law can- 
 not command the feelings of the heart. If this same law 
 subjects us to your orders, we will obey you with resig- 
 nation, but also with a certain dignity which will still 
 maintain us at a great distance from you." The letter 
 closed by explicitly stating that as this was a private 
 affair the writer trusted Candy would not stir public feel- 
 ing by showing these words to others, but would keep the 
 quarrel a personal one. 
 
 The infuriated Candy, however, instead of seeking 
 satisfaction of Theron, promptly forwarded the letter to 
 Le Cap. The Commissioners felt that Theron had ex- 
 pressed only too well what all the white colonists were 
 thinking, and the captain-general's very prominence in- 
 creased their resolve to make an example of him. Ac- 
 cordingly, the Sieur Theron was summoned to Le Cap 
 for trial. Sonthonax opened the examination by asking 
 Theron why he had written Candy such an insulting and 
 provocative letter; to which the captain-general replied 
 that he had wished to abate the pride of Candy. To this 
 Polverel observed that the air of superiority in the letter 
 was a manifest violation of the Law of the 4th of April, 
 which had established equality between all citizens re- 
 gardless of color. Theron replied that he had expressly 
 wished to keep this matter between Candy and himself, 
 and that he could not see how he had violated the law, 
 
SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 197 
 
 "which commanded execution and resignation, — not 
 the feelings of the heart"; and that therefore he had con- 
 sidered himself free to choose his friends. But the Com- 
 missioners observed severely that this was not a case of 
 "feelings kept carefully within the heart, but an overt act 
 squarely against the law"; and to Theron's further objec- 
 tion that this act, though overt, concerned only Candy 
 and could never hinder the law's execution, the Commis- 
 sioners answered that by showing Candy his sentiments 
 Theron had increased race hostility and had been guilty 
 of sedition. Thus the trial proceeds for many pages, in 
 which it is instructive to note both the cold severity of 
 Polverel and Sonthonax's brutal invective. The verdict 
 was, of course, certain from the start: "Considering that 
 it is necessary to take severe measures to repress a preju- 
 dice whose annihilation can alone save the colony," the 
 Sieur Theron was degraded from his office and shipped 
 a prisoner to France to answer for his " incivism " before 
 the bar of the Convention. When we remember that this 
 same Candy had torn out the eyes of his wretched pris- 
 oners with a corkscrew and had been guilty of unspeak- 
 able outrages upon white women, it is easy to understand 
 the wild despair that settled down upon white San Do- 
 mingo. The Sieur Theron had been in error : Jacobin law 
 did "command the feelings of the heart." 4 
 
 The condemnation of the Sieur Theron was almost the 
 last joint act of the Civil Commissioners for many months 
 to come: on October 29, Polverel and the cipher Ailhaud 
 sailed for the West. The "Tenth of August" had so 
 intensified the Royalism of this province that the Com- 
 missioners had decided something must speedily be done, 
 
198 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 and the quiet then prevailing at Le Cap encouraged them 
 to think that the North would give little further trouble. 5 
 This momentary lull at Le Cap encouraged the ener- 
 getic Rochambeau to begin those operations against the 
 negro rebels which until then had been entirely forgotten 
 in face of the necessity for holding down the white popula- 
 tion of the city; but his successes were ephemeral, for ever 
 larger numbers of troops had to be held in Le Cap itself 
 to face the storm raised by the character of Sonthonax's 
 rule. 6 Relieved of his colleague's relative moderation, 
 Sonthonax, as sole dictator of the North, now displayed 
 to the full the reckless and arbitrary violence of his na- 
 ture. Every ship for France carried numerous suspects, 
 while a forced loan to cover his lavish expenditure struck 
 terror to the propertied classes. Most significant of all, 
 however, was the hostility of his former allies the poor 
 white clubmen. Their dreams of exploiting the aristo- 
 crats and monopolizing public office had proved but fond 
 illusion; they now saw themselves more and more dis- 
 carded for "Citizens of the 4th of April." Officials, 
 counsellors, intimates, mistresses, — all about Son- 
 thonax was now mulatto. The white proletarians of Le 
 Cap discovered that in the eyes of Sonthonax they too 
 were aristocrats — "Aristocrates de la Peau." 7 As the 
 poor whites took no pains to conceal their rage at this new 
 state of things, a series of violent quarrels with Sonthonax 
 ensued which ended in the closing of the club and the 
 deportation of its prominent agitators. Sonthonax, how- 
 ever, seems to have realized the growing difficulties of 
 his position, for he attempted to veil his most arbitrary 
 measures by making the suggestions come from his crea- 
 
SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 199 
 
 ture, the "Commission Intermediate." But this petty 
 ruse deceived no one, and popular hatred became merely 
 dashed with contempt. 8 
 
 His state of mind was probably not improved by his 
 colleague's remonstrances. These are particularly sharp 
 in Polverel's letter of the 14th December. 9 In this Son- 
 thonax is sharply censured both for his wholesale de- 
 portations and for his manner of bringing them about. 
 Sonthonax's method was to have the " Commission In- 
 termediate" draw up proscription lists of those who 
 had "lost the confidence of the People " ; whereupon Son- 
 thonax would yield to the voice of the "People's repre- 
 sentatives," declare the accused "suspect," and order 
 them deported to France for examination by the Con- 
 vention. This practice Polverel condemned as both il- 
 legal and impolitic. The West had cried that Sonthonax 
 was trying to hide behind his tool, and the Commis- 
 sioners' prestige was being ruined in consequence. Pol- 
 verel also condemned Sonthonax's closure of the club. 
 " This act is a manifest violation of the rights of man and 
 the citizen," reads the letter, "in addition to which, you 
 have remedied nothing; for by dissolving the club you 
 have not annihilated its members." He also expressed 
 indignation that Sonthonax should have taken general 
 measures without his assent, and announced that he had 
 forbidden in the West and South the execution of that 
 forced loan decreed by Sonthonax for the whole of San 
 Domingo. 
 
 Sonthonax's reply was characteristic. He complained 
 bitterly that his colleague should have listened to the 
 "voice of calumny," and justified his arbitrary measures 
 
200 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 on the broad ground of "necessity." As to the club, it 
 was a "nest of aristocrats"; in addition to which he 
 expressed astonishment that Polverel should "quote the 
 Rights of Man in a slave country." He had consulted the 
 "Commission Intermediate " "to have virtually the de- 
 sire of the colony by the mouths of its provisional repre- 
 sentatives"; and he closed by stating that "his heart was 
 torn" by Polverel's action. 10 In other words, Sonthonax 
 intended to persevere in the course he had laid down. 
 
 But before Polverel had even written his pre Lest a 
 fresh explosion had occurred at Le Cap. That Sonthonax 
 had scented trouble is plain, for during the month of 
 November he had recruited a large body of mulatto sol- 
 diers. It was further action in this same line which 
 brought on the explosion of the 2d of December. It will 
 be recalled that after the failure of the Royalist attempt 
 in late October, most of the officers of the old regiments 
 had thrown up their commissions and left the country. 
 Sonthonax now announced that in conformity with the 
 Law of the 4th of April a number of lapsed commissions 
 in the regiment "Le Cap" would be given to mulattoes. 
 But at this even the veterans of "Le Cap" forgot their 
 discipline and broke into open mutiny. On December 1, 
 Sonthonax sent the popular young general, Laveaux, to 
 recall them to their duty, but his appeals were fruitless. 
 A committee of the oldest soldiers met Laveaux at the 
 barrack gate and flatly refused to receive the mulatto 
 officers, while a great crowd encouraged their resistance 
 with cries of "Bravo, Regiment du Cap," and a thunder 
 of applause. 
 
 Next day the regiment was ordered to parade on the 
 
SONTHONAX'S rule in the NORTH 201 
 
 Champ de Mars. The command was obeyed, but when 
 the regulars arrived they found themselves confronted by 
 the new mulatto companies. Voices in the crowd cried 
 "Massacre,*' for the regiment was without cartridges. 
 At this moment a negro was seen moving toward the 
 mulatto lines with a bag over his shoulder, and was at 
 once seized by the crowd. General Laveaux rode up, 
 crying that the bag contained bread, and when ripped 
 open the bag was, indeed, found to contain bread on top, 
 but beneath was a mass of cartridges. Then came a gen- 
 eral explosion. The white mob and the mulattoes en- 
 gaged in a general melee which ended by the sudden re- 
 treat of the mulattoes from the town and their seizure 
 of the fortified lines at the entrance to the Plain. The 
 threat was unmistakable, and beneath the awful menace 
 of destruction by the wild rebel hordes the whites of 
 Le Cap bowed in trembling despair. Sonthonax himself 
 acted as the messenger of peace and returned to town at 
 the head of the triumphant mulattoes. 11 
 
 Le Cap now lay apparently crushed beneath the yoke 
 of Sonthonax and his mulatto battalions. The regiment 
 "Le Cap" and a great number of civilians were deported, 
 and for the next few months the white population lived 
 under a veritable reign of terror. Sonthonax presently 
 set up a miniature Revolutionary tribunal, the prisons 
 were jammed with suspects, and every ship carried 
 batches of deported persons for trial in France. 12 
 
 Sonthonax's state of mind during this period is well 
 shown by his letter of December 8 to the Minister of 
 Marine. After detailing his repressive measures conse- 
 quent on the rioting of the 2d of December, he says, "It 
 
202 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 is hard for Frenchmen to rule by terror; but one must so 
 rule here at San Domingo, where there are neither morals 
 nor patriotism, neither love of France nor respect for her 
 laws; where the ruling passions are egoism and pride; 
 where the chain of despotism has weighed for a century 
 on all classes of men from Governor to slave. I have 
 arrested the evil in its course. I have chastised; I have 
 struck down: all the factious are in fear before me. And 
 I shall continue to punish with the same severity who- 
 soever shall trouble the public peace, whosoever shall 
 dare deny the national will, — especially the holy law of 
 equality!" 13 
 
 And the violence of Sonthonax seemed but to increase 
 with time. Some three weeks later, in his report to the 
 Convention, he exclaims, "Herein the Convention may 
 see the efforts of pride to destroy the holy doctrine of 
 equality among free men; its members may convince 
 themselves that the French Revolution will triumph over 
 the league of kings before it succeeds in crushing infernal 
 prejudice at San Domingo. Oh ! that I might die a martyr 
 to that equality which it is my first duty to preach and 
 to defend. I shall never flinch before the rage of its 
 detractors." 14 
 
 Crushed as the white population appeared, however, 
 Sonthonax continually dreaded some supreme convulsion 
 of despair. His anxiety appears in a letter of January 11, 
 1793, to explain the sending of an unusually large batch 
 of suspects for trial in France. "At the time of our arrival 
 in San Domingo," he writes, "there existed two factions 
 — the Royalists and the Aristocrates de la Peau. The 
 former were crushed in October, but the latter are more 
 
SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 203 
 
 audacious than before. Everywhere, especially at Port- 
 au-Prince, they prate of independence." 15 The opening 
 weeks of the year 1793 brought ever deepening troubles 
 in their train. The sullen fury of the whites, the stub- 
 born Royalism of the West, 16 the melting away of the 
 French troops under bad management and disease, and 
 the total failure to accomplish anything against the 
 negro rebels, — all these combined to form a picture 
 of deepening gloom. Sonthonax's letter of February 8 
 confesses to utter exhaustion in both credit and supply. 17 
 
 But most ominous of all was that storm-cloud which 
 now peered over the horizon-line of the ocean. To say 
 nothing of the crisis with Spain, Revolutionary France 
 was fast drifting toward war with England; and Son- 
 thonax knew only too well that the infuriated whites 
 were dreaming of an English war. "The independents 
 and the Royalists breathe only the hope of foreign fleets," 
 he writes the Minister of Marine on February 18, 1793. 18 
 "However, France may count upon the Citizens of the 
 4th of April. She has no better friends, and they alone 
 would suffice to repel all the valets of all the tyrants with 
 islands in the Antilles." 19 
 
 As recently as the December riots, Sonthonax, to quiet 
 uneasiness at his rule, had affirmed with his usual exu- 
 berance of statement his conviction as to the necessity 
 of slavery. "Such are my principles, such my profession 
 of faith," he had cried, pointing to his maiden speech 
 before the Colonial Assembly; 20 "may the day on which 
 I change be the last of my life." 21 However, on the same 
 day that he had written the letter last quoted to the 
 Minister of Marine, he penned a report to the Conven- 
 
204 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tion the knowledge of which would have alarmed his 
 allies, the "Citizens of the 4th of April," almost as much 
 as the whites themselves. This letter begins with a con- 
 fession of complete failure against the rebel negroes, who, 
 "aided by the perfidious Spaniards, brave our cannon 
 and our troops. The worst of the matter is that among 
 these rebels are a large number of genuine irreconcilables ' 
 to the Republic. These follow blindly a number of des- 
 potic chiefs who are devoted Royalists. Stupid agents of 
 the furies of a sanguinary Court, these wretched negroes 
 fight only for their religion and for that King whom they 
 imagine themselves destined to restore upon his throne. 
 The thought of Liberty never enters their heads. Only 
 the chiefs have such ideas; and even they think less of 
 being free men than of themselves reigning over slaves. 
 It is, therefore, not at all the noble sentiment of Liberty 
 which inspires them ; they even speak of it as but an ac- 
 cessory thing." The real persons to blame, continues the 
 letter, are "the wretches who misled the Constituent 
 Assembly in its last moments; those who snatched from 
 it the fatal Decree of the 24th September"; thus giving 
 the Royalists the chance to tell the negroes that the 
 National Assembly had abandoned them to the tender 
 mercies of the Colonial Legislature and that their only 
 hope lay in the King. 
 
 Sonthonax now comes to the point. Of course, he con- 
 tinues, he and Laveaux will fight bravely on; but he can 
 no longer conceal "a conviction that the Convention 
 should hasten to legislate on the lot of the slaves, without 
 awaiting the demand of those Colonial Assemblies, which 
 will always entertain their ridiculous pretensions to rival 
 
SONTHONAX'S RULE IN THE NORTH 205 
 
 the Convention and which will probably never possess 
 sufficient enlightenment and wisdom to feel the neces- 
 sity for a new regime. Everything, then, demands that 
 the Convention should break the bonds which the Con- 
 stituante has laid upon the national sovereignty." 
 
 "I do not pretend," concludes Sonthonax, "to point 
 the exact moment for effecting an entire reform in the 
 colonial system. But if this be not promptly modified, 
 if the lot of the slaves be not ameliorated, it is impossible 
 to foresee the duration of the woes of San Domingo. Last 
 of all, such a decree will be only the natural sequence of 
 the Law of the 4th of April." 22 Thus did Sonthonax 
 foreshadow his future action, when, six months later, 
 without authority from home and despite Polverel's 
 opposition, he was to proclaim the freedom of all the 
 negroes in the North Province of San Domingo. 
 
 With Sonthonax action followed so quickly on the 
 heels of thought that had he continued to remain at Le 
 Cap it is more than likely his desire would not have waited 
 six months for its translation into fact. However, the 
 explosion which had just occurred at Port-au-Prince de- 
 termined him to yield to Polverel's entreaties, and early 
 in March he committed Le Cap to the trusty Laveaux 
 and sailed for the West. 
 
XVII 
 
 polverel's government of the west 
 
 It was on the 2d of November, 1792, that Polverel and 
 his shadowy colleague Ailhaud landed at the Confederate 
 stronghold of Saint-Marc. The Commissioners had hoped 
 that their presence "would awaken the patriotism of its 
 inhabitants, still too warmly attached to the Old Regime 
 and its agents"; * but they soon found that report had 
 not belied the Royalism of the West. Polverel's explana- 
 tion of the "Tenth of August" and the late troubles at 
 Le Cap "did not produce the effect we had expected"; 
 instead of applauding, the assembled crowd shouted, 
 "Vive le Roi!" Next day things grew still more serious. 
 An angry mob of both whites and mulattoes surrounded 
 the Commissioners' house and so alarmed them by its 
 threats that they hastily took refuge on shipboard. It is 
 true that they had brought a small body of troops under 
 the command of a reliable officer named Lasalle, but they 
 dared not use this slender force against the angry inhabit- 
 ants, and covering their humiliation by talk of "leniency 
 to the unenlightened," they sailed for Port-au-Prince. 2 
 
 Here their reception was very different. The favor 
 shown by the Commissioners to the poor whites of Le 
 Cap had aroused the greatest enthusiasm among the 
 democrats of Port-au-Prince, and the news of the "Tenth 
 of August " had excited as much rejoicing in the city as 
 fury in the Royalist hinterland. Polverel and Ailhaud 
 
POLVEREL IN THE WEST 207 
 
 were therefore given the warmest of welcomes, and the 
 tone of the reception speeches must have been delight- 
 ful indeed to persons still smarting from Saint-Marc 
 hospitality. 
 
 "This city, so grossly libelled by Monsieur Blanche- 
 lande and the former agents of despotic authority," the 
 Commissioners inform the Convention, "appears to us 
 full of a great number of patriots." 3 "Here is the state 
 of things in the West," they write Sonthonax on the same 
 day; "except Port-au-Prince, all is aristocrat. Monsieur 
 de Jumecourt holds in his hand all the planters and 
 ateliers of the Plain. 4 Up till now he has kept things in- 
 tact; but the slaves are armed, and at the first sign from 
 Monsieur de Jumecourt, or at the least move against him, 
 all would be on fire." 6 The Confederate leader, it is 
 true, received the Commissioners with formal respect, 
 but Polverel was not deceived by his attitude, and, de- 
 spairing for the moment of reconciling the mulattoes 
 to the Revolution, he leaned more and more upon the 
 whites of Port-au-Prince. This explains much of his 
 criticism at Sonthonax's closure of the Le Cap Club 
 and other anti- white measures. 6 In his protest already 
 quoted, Polverel says as much. "The only dependable 
 patriots," he assures Sonthonax, "are the whites of Port- 
 au-Prince and Jacmel. 7 Despite their resistance to the 
 Law of the 4th of April, all the whites here are 'patriotes 
 enrages.'" 8 
 
 That Polverel had not overstated the matter is shown 
 from a letter written by a member of the Port-au-Prince 
 Club to a brother clubman at Le Cap describing the wel- 
 come accorded Borel, the famous partisan fighter of the 
 
208 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Artibonite. 9 The writer was evidently a man of little 
 education, as the script is bad and the spelling worse. 
 Put into grammatical language, this letter runs as fol- 
 lows: "The clubs, my brother, the clubs may yet save 
 this unhappy country, covered with all possible crimes, 
 the victim of the greatest rascals and the most infernal 
 plots. ... At Borel's arrival the town was all lighted up, 
 — except a few houses of aristocrats. The sight was very 
 pretty, but I was hoping for something prettier still; — 
 that is to say, after the fashion of Le Cap, the entire an- 
 nihilation of the aristocrats, who, to the disgrace of good 
 citizens, dare inhabit the city of Port-au-Prince. I had 
 thought that only patriots had the right to breathe the 
 air of this town. Nothing of the sort: not a single de- 
 portation, not a single holy proscription; no change. The 
 public offices are still partly held by aristocrats, by 
 enemies of the Revolution; and Port-au-Prince, my dear 
 brother, reeks with aristocrats; incredible to you, of 
 course, but true." 10 It is certainly a strange irony that 
 Sonthonax at this very moment was showing the recipient 
 of this effusion, worthy of the Cordeliers Club, that the 
 San Domingo clubmen were also aristocrats: "Aristo- 
 crates de la Peau." 
 
 Thus for two months Polverel remained in Port-au- 
 Prince; closely allied to the town whites but daring no 
 move against the solid Royalism of the inland country. 
 In mid-January, however, tired of inaction, he resolved 
 to visit the South, — a resolve made doubly urgent by 
 the desertion of his colleague Ailhaud. The Commis- 
 sioners had been only a few days at Port-au-Prince when 
 Polverel had directed his colleague to take command of 
 
POLVEREL IN THE WEST 209 
 
 the South. Ailhaud, however, proved but a broken reed. 
 His weak nerves had entirely gone to pieces under the 
 horrors of San Domingo, and he was no sooner at sea 
 than he ordered his ship to sail forthwith to France. 11 
 
 The South was more than ever under white control, 
 and the policy of the Commissioners had stimulated the 
 Royalism of the hard-fighting planters of the "Grand 
 Anse " to a pitch which reduced Polverel to despair. In 
 a detailed report on the South by parishes he describes 
 one of these as "a sterile land where the seed of Revolu- 
 tion will not grow. It is the abode of a great number 
 of ci-devant nobles who are openly addressed by their 
 former titles, and since they and their creatures form 
 almost the whole population, they find few persons to 
 contradict their liking." The adjoining parish was also 
 full of these "hommes a parchemin." In Les Cayes 
 itself he had made some progress by founding a club 
 "which walks in the right line of patriotism, — hatred of 
 the Counter-Revolutionists, love for the Republic, submis- 
 sion to its laws and respect for its representatives. But 
 the great planters and the inhabitants of the Plain, 12 just 
 as in all the other parts of the colony, view with pain an 
 order of things which places them upon a level with their 
 fellow citizens." 13 
 
 However, before Polverel could accomplish much, he 
 was forced to leave Les Cayes by alarming tidings from 
 the West. During his absence Sonthonax's mulatto rule 
 at Le Cap had been doing Polverel's work, and the West- 
 ern Royalists were at last splitting along the color line. 
 For while there were a good many genuine Royalists 
 among the mulattoes, the race question so overshadowed 
 
210 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 politics with the bulk of the caste that Sonthonax's ultra- 
 radical measures were fast bringing the mulattoes to see 
 that they had more to gain from the Commissioners than 
 from their white Confederate allies. And, conversely, 
 Sonthonax's treatment of the Northern whites had roused 
 such terror throughout the colony that the whites of the 
 West felt they must sink every political difference before 
 a peril which menaced their very existence. 
 
 Accordingly, about the end of January, 1793, Borel, 
 who had become the^ acknowledged head of the whites of 
 Port-au-Prince, held a conference with De Jumecourt, the 
 Confederate leader, at which they agreed to forget the 
 past and to form a new Confederation including both 
 parties. Polverel was greatly disturbed at the news and 
 forbade any such action, but his unavailing protests were 
 presently supplemented by an unlooked-for diversion in 
 the shape of a negro rising in the West. 14 
 
 We have already noted the existence of that powerful 
 maroon community among the mountains of the Spanish 
 border, whose political individuality had been recognized 
 by the Royal Government some years before the Revolu- 
 tion. 16 This people had been powerfully recruited during 
 the late troubled years, and had not remained an idle spec- 
 tator of events. Its ravages had hit the mulattoes even 
 harder than the whites, since the maroons bore a special 
 hatred toward their old enemies of the marechaussee. 16 
 At this moment these people had become still more for- 
 midable through the adhesion of an able negro leader 
 named Hyacinthe, who succeeded in raising many of the 
 slaves and who carried his ravages to the outskirts of 
 Port-au-Prince itself. This negro rising had important 
 
POLVEREL IN THE WEST 211 
 
 political consequences. Hyacinthe had recently been in 
 Confederate service, and the town whites, fearing some 
 treachery on the part of De Jumecourt, drew away from 
 the white Royalists for the time. Furthermore, the race 
 feeling of the town mob was so aroused that they began 
 to maltreat mulattoes, and when General Lasalle under- 
 took to suppress these disorders the pent-up rage at Son- 
 thonax's conduct burst into flame. Lasalle was expelled 
 the city, and Port-au-Prince stood in open defiance of the 
 Civil Commissioners. 17 It was the report of these troubles 
 that induced Sonthonax to come to the West. 18 
 
 Sonthonax landed at Saint-Marc on the 9th of March, 
 and was received with rapture by the mulattoes who had 
 recently made themselves absolute masters of the town. 
 He at once saw that quick action was necessary before the 
 Western whites should cement their alliance once more. 
 His feelings toward them are shown by his letter to the 
 Minister of Marine. "The crimes of Port-au-Prince begin 
 again," he writes on March 10; "the town is forming an 
 alliance with the heads of the Royalist party. . . . The 
 negroes have risen, and the Plain of Cul-de-Sac lies in 
 ashes. Such, citizen, are the fruits of the stupid and 
 frantic pride of a handful of Europeans whom the Na- 
 tional Assembly and its representatives have treated 
 altogether too leniently." 19 
 
 That Sonthonax did not intend to display much leni- 
 ence in the future was plain from the manifesto drawn up 
 with his approval by his followers at Saint-Marc and 
 published throughout the West. "Hasten," it reads; 
 "hasten from all parts of the colony, regenerated citizens. 
 Surround the organs of the Law, and may our bodies fall 
 
212 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 a thousand times beneath the blows of our miserable 
 enemies rather than allow them to abate one jot the laws 
 of the Republic. Put forth all your strength; let our 
 enemies tremble with fear at sight of the ardor with 
 which we shall crush and annihilate that insolent faction 
 which centres at Port-au-Prince. Swear never to return 
 till the last of them are exterminated. No more peace, 
 friends, no more pardon; crush this foul vermin which 
 carries desolation to the most distant mountains. Re- 
 member that the foreign enemy make compromise with 
 domestic agitation impossible, and purify with death 
 this land still reeking with crimes." 20 
 
 The response to this appeal was so general that when 
 Polverel arrived from the South he found a considerable 
 force assembled for the march on Port-au-Prince. The 
 exclusively racial character of this new struggle is shown 
 by the fact that "there were not thirty whites in the 
 whole army." 21 The campaign which followed was short 
 and decisive. The mulattoes soon surrounded Port-au- 
 Prince from the landward side while the Commissioners 
 and their fleet blockaded it by sea. The inhabitants 
 knew that they could expect little mercy, but after nearly 
 two days' terrific bombardment by the fleet their forts 
 were silenced; to avert the general massacre which would 
 probably have followed an assault, Port-au-Prince sur- 
 rendered on April 13, 1793. Borel and several hundred 
 of the most determined whites cut their way through the 
 mulatto lines and escaped to the South. 22 
 
 The conquered city was treated with extreme severity. 
 The Commissioners' mulatto and negro troops plundered 
 and murdered almost at will; hundreds of the inhabit- 
 
POLVEREL IN THE WEST 213 
 
 ants were confined in the prisons or upon hulks in the 
 harbor, and great numbers were deported. A letter 
 written on the 24th of April and smuggled out of the town 
 by a friendly sailor 23 gives a vivid picture. "I have lost 
 hope," cries the writer to his brother in France; "I am 
 convinced that we are the destined victims of the most 
 execrable horrors that hell itself can invent. . . . Behold 
 our reward for all the sacrifices we have made for the 
 Revolution. We are good citizens; we flatter ourselves 
 that we are good Republicans: and we can speak only 
 by signs. Should we dare make a murmur, we are thrown 
 aboard ship like bags of dirty linen and sent to France 
 without a word to those left behind." 24 
 
 The West as well as the North now lay crushed be- 
 neath the heel of the Civil Commissioners and their mu- 
 latto soldiery. But the South still defied them and refused 
 obedience to the Law of the 4th of April This last centre 
 of resistance was now taken in hand. During the weeks 
 which followed the surrender of Port-au-Prince a consid- 
 erable army was formed for the conquest of the South 
 and the command entrusted to Andre Rigaud, a Southern 
 mulatto who had shown considerable ability in the vari- 
 ous struggles of the South and West. But the fighters of 
 the Grande Anse proved more formidable than before: 
 Rigaud's army was completely cut to pieces and hundreds 
 of mulattoes were left dead on the field. Rigaud's report 
 to the Commissioners shows how serious had been his 
 defeat and how momentous might well be its conse- 
 quences. "If the South be not conquered," he asserts, 
 "the whole colony will try the same course. In all the 
 parishes our enemies openly rejoice, — and you know 
 
214 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 very well what such rejoicing means. . . . Citizens, if you 
 want any peace you must deport half the white popula- 
 tion of San Domingo. The mask is off at last; it plays 
 the aristocrat to our face." 25 
 
 But many days before Rigaud wrote these lines the 
 Commissioners had hastened from Port-au-Prince to face 
 a new storm-cloud in the North, and it was plain that 
 action against the whites of the South would have to be 
 postponed. 
 
XVIII 
 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF LE CAP 
 
 When Sonthonax sailed for the West in the opening 
 days of March, 1793, Le Cap appeared so crushed in 
 spirit that he anticipated little resistance to the stern 
 rule of General Laveaux. And yet the very first report of 
 this trusted deputy must have stirred Sonthonax to fresh 
 disquietude. In his letter of March 7, Laveaux reported 
 quiet, it is true, but added that this was "thanks to the 
 watchfulness of the Commission Intermediate and to his 
 own military patrols." He also reported so much veiled 
 hostility and seditious language that a projected sally 
 against the rebel negroes had been indefinitely postponed. 1 
 
 And his subsequent letters were more ominous still. 
 The very next day arrived the tidings of the execution of 
 Louis XVI, which produced "commotion" suppressed 
 only by redoubled patrols, 2 while ten days later the news 
 of the English war caused him to ask Sonthonax for 
 further orders in case of extreme necessity. 3 Before 
 March was out the situation had grown so bad that 
 Laveaux wrote, "You must repress the disaffected; their 
 numbers grow with every day. Count on us, but do not 
 lose a single instant in your return. . . . We fear a violent 
 explosion." 4 
 
 Such was the state of Le Cap when on the 7th of May 
 a new Governor-General arrived from France. The out- 
 break of war with both England and Spain 5 placed dis- 
 
216 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 traded San Domingo in a highly perilous situation, and 
 made the presence of an able military head a matter of 
 prime necessity. Realizing this obvious fact, the Con- 
 vention despatched to San Domingo one Galbaud, an 
 officer free from political entanglements and with a pro- 
 fessional reputation of the best. His instructions were 
 the counterpart of those issued to Desparbes, — sub- 
 ordination to the Commissioners in political matters, but 
 a free hand in the technical handling of the troops. 6 
 
 Galbaud was a quiet, steady soldier who had always 
 kept out of politics and who asked nothing better than 
 absorption in his professional duties. But the excitable 
 population of Le Cap, goaded to despair by the long 
 months of Sonthonax's brutal rule, welcomed the new 
 Governor-General as a deliverer: when it discovered that 
 his wife was a San Domingo Creole it greeted Galbaud 
 as an avenger as well. Madame Galbaud has left a vivid 
 picture of her husband's triumphal progress through the 
 streets of the city and of the frantic enthusiasm which 
 met him on every side. 7 
 
 Galbaud's soldierly instincts were greatly shocked at 
 the terrible condition of Le Cap. He found everything in 
 the greatest dilapidation; the magazines empty, the sol- 
 diers destitute and mutinous for want of pay, the treasury 
 completely looted by Sonthonax and his corrupt asso- 
 ciates. Madame Galbaud relates her horror at the Com- 
 missioners' conduct in both North and West, and the 
 General himself seems to have shared her feelings. He 
 at once took measures to remedy the situation, quieted 
 the troops, and confirmed the inhabitants in their favor- 
 able opinion of his character. 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF LE CAP 217 
 
 At the news of Galbaud's arrival the Civil Commis- 
 sioners' jealous and despotic temper at once took alarm: 
 when they learned of the new Governor-General's meas- 
 ures and increasing popularity, fear gave place to fury. 
 Galbaud's letters expressed the utmost respect, it is true, 
 but it was clear that he intended to be master in his own 
 department and that he was not the type of man to be- 
 come their unresisting tool. The Commissioners resolved 
 to hasten back at once to deal with this dangerous rival. 
 Their state of mind may be gauged by a letter sent the 
 Commission Intermediate announcing their coming. 
 "Be of good heart, brave citizens," it reads, "soon the 
 colony shall be purged of this frightful lethargy which now 
 consumes it. Yet a few days and we shall appear once 
 more at Le Cap; and we are there resolved to display a 
 severity which our principles have too long restrained. 
 The agitators of all parties will soon be annihilated, and 
 a better order of things shall then succeed to this de- 
 structive chaos. Let not discouragement seize true Re- 
 publicans. Yet a little while and they shall triumph. 
 Let public functionaries tremble who have abused and 
 still abuse the power of place to mislead the people! 
 Their reign is almost over." 8 
 
 At Le Cap itself the Commissioners' partisans breathed 
 the same frantic menaces as their chiefs. Madame Gal- 
 baud relates how Dufay, one of Sonthonax's closest inti- 
 mates, "often made remarks to me like this: 'The white 
 population must disappear from the colony. The day of 
 vengeance is at hand. Many of these colonist princes 
 must be exterminated.' His tone," concludes Madame 
 Galbaud, "was one of frenzy." 9 
 
218 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 It was on the 10th of June that the Civil Commissioners 
 and their long column of mulatto soldiery entered Le Cap 
 amid the frantic applause of their partisans and the sul- 
 len silence of the whites. Even before their arrival they 
 seem to have made up their minds that Galbaud must at 
 all costs be disposed of, for their attitude toward him was 
 hostile in the extreme. Their plan of action was soon re- 
 vealed. After a short examination of his credentials they 
 pronounced these invalid, and after an angry altercation 
 they declared him deposed and ordered him to embark 
 for France. To all this, despite the prayers of the white 
 population, Galbaud submitted. He realized that with 
 men like these the only alternative to obedience was armed 
 rebellion, and he was too much the disciplined soldier to 
 seek a struggle with the civil authorities. 
 
 Unfortunately the Civil Commissioners began their 
 work of vengeance before Galbaud had put to sea. Never 
 before had Le Cap witnessed such deportations en masse, 
 and within a few days every ship of the departing squad- 
 ron was crowded with the condemned. Nevertheless, the 
 impending catastrophe might still have been averted had 
 it not been for the conduct of the Commissioners' mu- 
 latto soldiery. These men proceeded to treat the whites 
 of Le Cap as they had those of conquered Port-au-Prince, 
 and they made no distinction between the civilian popu- 
 lation and the sailors of the fleet. Seamen on shore leave 
 were insulted, and resistance was answered by murder. 
 This was too much. In the harbor of Le Cap were nearly 
 three thousand sailors, and the whole body now rose in a 
 furious cry for vengeance. The movement spread like 
 wildfire, the naval officers were swept off their feet, and 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF LE CAP 219 
 
 Galbaud himself yielded to the universal cry. On the even- 
 ing of the 19th of June, Galbaud was borne in triumph 
 through the fleet amid thunderous cheers of "Vive la 
 Republique! Vive Galbaud!" and summoned the sailors 
 to land for the overthrow of the tyrants. 
 
 About dawn on the 20th of June, Galbaud landed with 
 over two thousand sailors of the fleet. The regulars who 
 garrisoned the harbor forts went over without firing a 
 shot, but the French National Guards held firm for the 
 Commissioners. Then a terrible struggle began. Every 
 street, every house, was furiously defended by the Com- 
 missioners' white and mulatto troops. Furthermore, 
 these regular combatants were soon reenforced by the 
 whole civilian population: the whites rising for Galbaud, 
 the mulattoes and town negroes for the Commissioners. 
 At the end of the day, however, it was plain that the 
 discipline of the regulars and the wild courage of the 
 sailors were gaining the victory, and at dawn next day 
 Galbaud's columns pierced the main line of defence while 
 the Commissioners fled to the fortified lines at the 
 entrance to the Plain. 
 
 But the shouts of victory soon died in the terrible cry 
 of "The Brigands are in the town!" The dreadful news 
 was only too true. During the night the Commissioners, 
 knowing that they would be beaten on the morrow, had 
 offered plunder and liberty to the eager rebels of the 
 Plain, and dense masses of howling savages were now 
 pouring into the town. Against the pressure of these 
 black hordes Galbaud and his followers could do nothing, 
 and by nightfall they held only the harbor forts and the 
 water-front. But the fall of night made little difference in 
 
220 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the scene, for harbor and shipping lay bright as day in the 
 awful glare of the burning city : Le Cap was in flames, and 
 those of the white population not huddled along the quays 
 were dying amid their burning homes or under the tor- 
 ments of the savages. Next day fully fifteen thousand 
 more of the rebels poured into the city, and Galbaud, 
 recognizing that the case was hopeless, set sail for the 
 United States. Every ship that could keep the sea fol- 
 lowed his flag, and soon the great fleet with its ten thou- 
 sand despairing refugees on board had dropped the empty 
 harbor and blazing city below the horizon. Fortunately 
 the voyage was fair, and when this tragic armada cast 
 anchor in Chesapeake Bay the sufferings of the wretched 
 fugitives were over. Public and private benevolence vied 
 in the work of mercy, and even distant Massachusetts 
 supplemented the federal grant by special legislative 
 provision. 10 
 
 During all those scenes of horror which marked the 
 fall of Le Cap the Commissioners remained immovable, 
 and true to their promise allowed the rebel negroes the 
 absolute sacking of the town. They would neither stir 
 themselves nor allow any one else to do so. On the even- 
 ing of the 22d, General Lasalle had arrived from the West 
 with two hundred mulatto dragoons, and he had implored 
 the Commissioners to let him take command of the 
 French National Guards and the mulatto battalion to 
 fight the fire and stop the massacre. This request, how- 
 ever, the Commissioners absolutely refused, and only on 
 the evening of the 24th was Lasalle allowed to enter the 
 city with a single squad of his dragoons; "with whom," 
 he writes, "I marched amid flames and corpses." n The 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF LE CAP 221 
 
 Commissioners' responsibility for this awful disaster 
 seems to be complete. 
 
 The best picture of the catastrophe is that left us by 
 Carteau, at that moment on duty at a military post upon 
 the heights overlooking the Plain. "For four days and 
 nights," he writes, "we watched the fire consume this 
 rich and famous city, the glory of the French colonies. 
 . . . We were stupefied at sight of the immense clouds of 
 black smoke which rose by day; at night we were awed by 
 the flames which, striking the bold promontory that over- 
 hangs the town, lit up with reflected light the whole vast 
 immensity of the Plain. During the first two days we 
 did not know the meaning of this terrible spectacle. 
 Deep in our own thoughts, therefore, we whites, mulat- 
 toes, and free negroes who made up the post instinctively 
 ranged ourselves by colors, — each against the others, 
 each prepared to sell life dearly. In this uncertainty we 
 awaited impatiently the outcome of this tragic event; 
 although we whites, so long the butt of the Commis- 
 sioners' injustice and cruelty, had the keenest dread of 
 that which lay in store." 12 
 
XIX 
 
 EMANCIPATION 
 
 The destruction of Le Cap was interpreted by white 
 San Domingo as a virtual sentence of death : save within 
 the parishes controlled by the white Confederates of the 
 Grande Anse, all sought to quit the land accursed. Every 
 merchant ship from the ports of North and West bore 
 its sad freight of refugees; every Spanish outpost received 
 a stream of despairing fugitives. But there was something 
 still more serious. The Commissioners' deliberate sum- 
 mons to the savage hordes of the Plain had horrified the 
 regular troops almost as much as the civilian population, 
 and wherever their position allowed, these also resolved 
 to forswear allegiance to such authorities. The results 
 of all this were at once decisively apparent upon the 
 Spanish border. The Spaniards had begun hostilities as 
 far back as early May, but the small number of their 
 troops and the scanty population of Spanish Santo 
 Domingo 1 had confined their efforts to a few border 
 skirmishes. Now, however, things became very differ- 
 ent. The whole Cordon de 1'Est went over in a body, 
 while the Spaniards bestirred themselves to take the 
 Royalist negro chiefs into their pay and laid plans for 
 the complete conquest of the "Partie franchise de 
 Saint-Domingue . ' ' 
 
 The desperate state of the French colony is disclosed 
 by Sonthonax himself in his letters during the month of 
 
EMANCIPATION 223 
 
 July, 1793. A long report to the Convention, written 
 July 10, describes the general exodus of the white popu- 
 lation, the departure of the whole naval station, and the 
 desertion of a thousand regulars and French National 
 Guards to the Spaniards. "Such, citizens," he concludes, 
 "is the disastrous condition to which Galbaud has re- 
 duced us in the Province of the North. Without ships, 
 without money, with only a month's supply, — still we 
 do not yet despair of the safety of the patrie. We ask no 
 troops, no ships, no sailors; it is with the real inhabitants 
 of this country, the Africans, that we will yet save to 
 France the possession of San Domingo." 2 
 
 However, despite this characteristic flourish, Son- 
 thonax's reports grow more and more hopeless as he 
 describes the triumphant progress of the Spaniards and 
 their allies, black and white. "The slaves remaining in 
 the party of kings," he writes on July 30, "march in 
 company with a great number of white Smigres. After 
 every action we find these people among the dead. The 
 corsairs which infest our coast are armed and manned by 
 Frenchmen. Well may we say that morally, as well as 
 physically, all that is European becomes tainted and 
 rotten in this unhappy country." 3 
 
 When Sonthonax penned these lines he was once more 
 in sole command of the North, Polverel having hastened 
 back to the West. Accompanied by his mulatto troops 
 and the few hundred French National Guards who still 
 remained faithful to the Republic, Sonthonax lay on the 
 heights overlooking the ruined city, surrounded by 
 swarming thousands of negro savages. The terrible condi- 
 tion of Le Cap is described in a letter from an officer of 
 
224 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the French National Guards. Although the Americans 
 were bringing in enough supplies to keep them from 
 actual starvation, "all the whites are leaving for New 
 England 4 who can possibly get away. This country will 
 in future be little suited to Europeans, and will have no 
 lasting tranquillity. Battalions of negro slaves have been 
 formed and have been given their liberty. They will be 
 the future armed force of this country. Also, a general 
 emancipation and division of the land will soon take 
 place." 5 So appalled was the writer at the future and so 
 worn down by privation that he closes his letter with the 
 statement that he was about to throw up his lieutenant- 
 colonel's commission and sail for the United States with 
 the rest. 
 
 This French officer was a true prophet, for Sonthonax 
 had already taken the first steps of that momentous 
 action secretly advocated since February, 1793. "The 
 flames which devoured Le Cap," says Carteau, "marked 
 the triumph of the yellow caste; they were also the har- 
 bingers of black supremacy." 6 The same author tells of 
 a number of white refugees who, despairing of mercy 
 from the Commissioners, sought and found refuge with 
 the terrible mulatto Candy: "for," he adds, "this gen- 
 tleman, grown suspicious of the Commissioners' real aim, 
 had begun to look upon them with an evil eye." 7 
 
 Candy had, indeed, good cause for his disquietude. 
 On that very 21st of June, when the rebel negroes of the 
 Plain swarmed into Le Cap at the Commissioners' sum- 
 mons, there had appeared the following astounding 
 proclamation: "The will of the French Republic and its 
 representatives being to give liberty to all negro warriors 
 
EMANCIPATION 225' 
 
 who shall fight for the Republic under the Civil Commis- 
 sioners' orders, ... all slaves declared free by the Repub- 
 lic's delegates shall be the equals of all men, white or any 
 other color. They shall enjoy all the rights of French 
 citizens. Such is the mission which the National Conven- 
 tion and the Executive Council of the Republic have 
 given the Civil Commissioners." 8 Furthermore, on the 
 following day, another proclamation promised liberty to 
 individuals who, "wishing to become free, should enroll 
 themselves in the forces of the Republic." 9 
 
 After Polverel's departure, the attitude of Sonthonax 
 grew clearer with every day, and the mulattoes now un- 
 derwent the same painful disillusionment as the white 
 proletariat a few months before. The mulatto caste saw 
 itself thrust into the background, and the entourage of 
 Sonthonax grew steadily more and more negro. Lasalle 
 (now appointed Governor - General) saw astonishing 
 changes in his corps of officers. "I found myself," he 
 writes the French Government, "surrounded by epau- 
 lettes of all grades worn by slaves of the day before " ; and 
 he notes that one of these new citizens had been appointed 
 colonel and inspector-general of San Domingo. 10 
 
 Sonthonax's intentions are still more clearly shown by 
 his letter to the Convention written at the end of July. 
 " The time for shufflings and half-measures," he exclaims, 
 " is past. The slave-drivers and the kings must be put 
 on the same plane. Let them cease their tyranny; let 
 them quit their prey; better still, let them disappear 
 from the surface of the globe." u 
 
 Obviously, Sonthonax was resolved to wait no longer, 
 and on the 29th of August, 1793, he formally proclaimed 
 
226 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the freedom of the slave population throughout the North 
 Province of San Domingo, attempting at the same time 
 to justify his former inconsistencies of conduct. The 
 proclamation opened with a quotation from the " Rights 
 of Man." 
 
 "'All men' [it reads] 'are born and remain free and 
 equal.' Behold, citizens, the evangel of France! It is 
 high time that it was proclaimed in all parts of the Re- 
 public. Sent by the Nation as Civil Commissioners to 
 San Domingo, our mission there was to enforce the Law 
 of the 4th of April and to prepare gradually, without 
 dissension or convulsion, the enfranchisement of the 
 slaves. . . . 
 
 "At that time, citizens, we assert that slavery was 
 necessary, both for the continuance of labor and for the 
 preservation of the inhabitants. For San Domingo was 
 then in the power of a horde of ferocious tyrants, who 
 openly preached that the color of the skin should be the 
 sign both of power and of reprobation. The judges of 
 the unhappy Oge, the creatures and members of the in- 
 famous provost courts who filled the towns with gibbets 
 and torture-wheels to sacrifice the Africans and men 
 of color to their atrocious pretensions; — all these men of 
 blood yet peopled the colony. 
 
 "To-day things are changed, indeed. The slave-drivers 
 and cannibals are no more. Some have perished, victims 
 of their own impotent rage; others have sought safety in 
 flight and emigration. Those whites who yet remain are 
 the friends of the law and of French principles. . . . 
 
 "The French Republic wishes liberty and equality 
 among all men, regardless of color; the kings are happy 
 
EMANCIPATION 227 
 
 only in the midst of slaves. The Republic adopts you 
 among its children; the kings aspire to cover you with 
 chains or to destroy you utterly. The representatives 
 of this same Republic, to aid you, have unbound the 
 hands of the Civil Commissioners. A new order is about 
 to be born, and the ancient servitude shall disappear." 12 
 
 This proclamation, preceded by a "bonnet rouge" at 
 the end of a pike, was ordered solemnly read in every 
 commune of the North, while a delegation was sent to 
 France to implore the ratification of the Convention. 
 
 In his report to that body Sonthonax did not attempt 
 to deny that he had acted without orders, but based his 
 defence upon the broad ground of necessity. "The last 
 ships are gone," he writes; "we are without supplies, and 
 all would appear lost to men not resolved to hold out to 
 the last. Under such circumstances the only course was 
 to give a great example of justice. I have attained this 
 end by proclaiming the 'Rights of Man' in the Province 
 of the North." 13 His letter to Polverel was less positive 
 in tone, but stated that the writer was "at least sure 
 of having turned the results of a great disaster to the 
 profit of humanity/' 14 Polverel was, indeed, angry and 
 alarmed, but he realized that the step was irrevocable 
 and he presently proclaimed emancipation in the West 
 and South with certain minor qualifications. 15 
 
 If Sonthonax had expected that emancipation would 
 end his troubles, he was soon bitterly undeceived: the 
 proclamation did not rally the negroes to the Republic, 
 but did produce fresh social disorders. Jean-Francois and 
 Biassou, now formally commissioned in Spanish service 
 and steadily extending their authority over the lesser 
 
228 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 negro chiefs, replied in no uncertain fashion. "We can- 
 not," reads their letter, "conform to the national will, 
 seeing that since the beginning of the world we have 
 obeyed the will of a king. We have lost the King of France, 
 but we are dear to him of Spain, who constantly shows 
 us reward and assistance. Wherefore, we cannot recog- 
 nize you as Commissioners until you have enthroned a 
 king." 16 
 
 And not merely was Sonthonax unable to reconcile the 
 negroes in Spanish service; his own ranks suffered daily 
 depletion. At the fall of Le Cap many thousand negroes 
 had taken the tricolor, but as soon as there was nothing 
 more to plunder, these new converts quickly vanished 
 with their booty to take up their careless life among the 
 woods and mountains or to enroll themselves beneath the 
 banner of Spain. Indeed, the one prominent chief whom 
 Sonthonax had converted to the Republic, a certain 
 Macaya, presently changed sides and sent to Sonthonax 
 this astonishing profession of faith: "I am the subject 
 of three kings, — the King of the Congo, lord of all the 
 blacks; the King of France, who represents my father; the 
 King of Spain, who represents my mother. These three 
 kings are descended from those who, led by a star, went 
 to adore the Man-God. If I passed into the Republic's 
 service, I should perhaps be forced to make war on 
 my Jbrothers, the subjects of these three kings to whom 
 I have sworn fidelity." 17 
 
 The social consequences of emancipation were equally 
 disappointing. Up to this time, despite all the disturb- 
 ances of the last few years, some considerable districts 
 had continued under regular cultivation. But now the 
 
EMANCIPATION 229 
 
 negroes everywhere refused to work and broke into com- 
 plete insubordination. How serious was this state of 
 things may be seen by a letter from the island of Tortuga, 
 hitherto entirely exempt from serious disturbance. "De- 
 cidedly," it reads, "all is lost in this colony. Deprived 
 as we now are of our personal property, what becomes of 
 our lands? Nothing. The slaves, become suddenly free, 
 independent, our equals, or rather our superiors (for 
 to-day they give us the law), have been changed into so 
 many scoundrels armed with torch and knife to strike 
 their victims and burn everything at the slightest sign. 
 Like the Janissaries in Turkey, they have become the 
 terror even of those who have freed them and given them 
 arms. Little by little their aversion to work has strength- 
 ened. In vain has the attempt been made to keep them 
 on the land they tilled by making them co-owners and 
 giving them a fourth of the product. 18 Unsatisfied, in- 
 different to this benefit, idleness, indolence, debauchery, 
 theft, and evil-doing are for them the sovereign good, 
 the highest happiness, to which all else is sacrificed. In- 
 deed, they scarcely permit the planters, their former 
 masters, to live in their own houses or to enjoy what 
 little remains to them. Such, my dear Armand, are the 
 fatal results of the 29th of August, 1793. The insurrec- 
 tion of 1791 was partial, and was caused by the mulat- 
 t,oes for their own special benefit; to-day this insurrection 
 is general, and 400,000 individuals are being ceaselessly 
 told, 'You are all freemen.' The evil is past cure; the 
 colonies are lost to France; and I doubt whether French- 
 men can here find any more French property." 19 
 
 Our Tortuga planter's description of conditions at Le 
 
230 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Cap was hardly overestimated; the position of Sonthonax 
 had rapidly become such as to endanger his own person. 
 His mulatto troops could, of course, no longer be relied 
 on, while as supplies and money waned so did the sub- 
 ordination of the black soldiery. An attempt to restore 
 discipline ended in riotous mutiny, and the attitude of 
 the thousands of idle and destitute negroes became daily 
 more menacing. Carteau gives a vivid picture of this 
 critical time. "As I was walking to the Commissioner's 
 for my passport," he writes, "I saw a negro raise himself 
 among a group lying under the balcony of a government 
 storehouse and cry loudly to his comrades: 'That Son- 
 thonax! If some one would give me fifty portugaises 
 I would kill him within the hour.' I marvelled," adds 
 Carteau, "at the negro's audacity in speaking thus so 
 high." 20 When, in early October, this writer at last suc- 
 ceeded in leaving Le Cap, he draws a sad picture of the 
 broad harbor, quite empty now save for a scant half- 
 dozen American vessels scattered along the vast, de- 
 serted quays. 21 
 
 Small wonder that Sonthonax had himself departed 
 when, upon these local perils, came the evil tidings that 
 the English had landed in San Domingo, welcomed by 
 both the white and mulatto populations of South and 
 West. 
 
XX 
 
 THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 
 
 English aid against Revolutionary France had long 
 been the hope of many persons in San Domingo. As 
 far back as the outcry at the Decree of May 15, 1791, 
 the prevalence of such opinions had alarmed Governor 
 Blanchelande, 1 and this sentiment had been still further 
 strengthened by the negro insurrection and its conse- 
 quences. When in late September, 1791, Edwards ar- 
 rived at Le Cap with the warships and supplies lent by 
 the Governor of Jamaica, he relates that the assembled 
 inhabitants "directed all their attention toward us, and 
 we landed amidst a crowd of spectators who, with up- 
 lifted hands and streaming eyes, gave welcome to their 
 deliverers (for such they considered us), and acclama- 
 tions of 'Vivent les Anglois' resounded from every 
 quarter." 2 The English officers were splendidly re- 
 ceived, and Edwards specifies "a very strong disposition 
 in the white inhabitants of Le Cap to renounce their 
 allegiance to the mother country. The black cockade was 
 universally substituted in place of the tricolored, and very 
 earnest wishes were avowed in all companies, without 
 scruple or restraint, that "England would send an arma- 
 ment to conquer the island or rather to secure its volun- 
 tary surrender from its inhabitants." 3 And he adds that 
 he was so generally considered an accredited emissary 
 
232 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 of the British Government that his position became a 
 highly embarrassing one. 
 
 This pro-English feeling is well shown by a letter from 
 Le Cap written shortly after the outbreak of the negro 
 insurrection. "I am as good a Frenchman as there is in 
 this world," it reads, "and I am attached to the mother 
 country by ties of blood, affection, and gratitude. But 
 rather than see my fortune, honorably acquired, become 
 the prey of brigands egged on by another set of brigands 
 sitting in Paris, I prefer a thousand times to go over to 
 the English. . . . And every one else here thinks as I." * 
 
 If such had been the feeling in the North during the 
 autumn of 1791, the state of the traditionally pro-Eng- 
 lish South may be imagined two years later after a 
 twelvemonth of Sonthonax's rule in San Domingo. The 
 tragedy of Le Cap had not only loosed the last tie to 
 Jacobin France; it had also shown the South what would 
 follow if the next attempt of the savage mulatto partisan 
 Rigaud should end in victory. Accordingly, on Septem- 
 ber 3, 1793, the Confederates of the Grande Anse signed 
 a treaty with the Governor of Jamaica which formally 
 transferred their allegiance to the British Crown. "The 
 Inhabitants of San Domingo," runs the first article, 
 "being unable to appeal to their legitimate sovereign for 
 deliverance from the tyranny which oppresses them, in- 
 voke the protection of His Brittannic Majesty and bear 
 him their oath of fidelity; begging him to preserve the 
 colony, and to treat them as good and loyal subjects 
 until the general peace, when the French Government 
 and the Allied Powers shall definitely decide the question 
 of the sovereignty of San Domingo." The subsequent 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION £33 
 
 articles assured to the French inhabitants the full en- 
 joyment of their old laws and customs. 5 
 
 The Governor of Jamaica acted quickly. On the 19th 
 of September, a small English squadron dropped anchor 
 in the harbor of Jeremie, the stronghold of the Grande 
 Anse, situated at the extreme end of the long peninsula 
 of the South, and nine hundred British soldiers landed 
 amid salvos of artillery and shouts of "Long live King 
 George!" The neighboring parishes at once submitted; 
 only the eastern districts and the city of Les Cayes were 
 still held down by Rigaud and his mulatto soldiery. 
 
 And the defection of the South was but the prelude to 
 a still greater disaster. Upon the outermost tip of the 
 northern peninsula stood the great fortress of the M61e- 
 Saint-Nicolas, the key of the Windward Passage, pro- 
 verbially known as the Gibraltar of the Antilles. Its nat- 
 ural strength had long marked it out as the last refuge 
 in case of supreme disaster, and here were gathered the 
 reserve materiel and the only considerable body of white 
 troops, besides Laveaux's shattered battalions at Le 
 Cap, which still adhered to the Republic. This garrison 
 consisted of the Irish battalion "Dillon" and some five 
 hundred French National Guards, but its temper had 
 become increasingly doubtful, and the tactless conduct 
 of Sonthonax was now to bring on irreparable disaster. 
 
 On his way to the West after the destruction of Le 
 Cap, Polverel had visited the Mole and had sent an 
 alarming letter to Sonthonax urging decisive measures. 
 "If you do not hasten to change the spirit of this place," 
 he writes, "it will become one more dangerous nest of 
 Royalism, Anglicism, and love of Spain. ... If the gar- 
 
234 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 rison be not changed . . . and 'Dillon' replaced by a 
 strong garrison of free companies and new citizens, 6 all 
 is lost in this quarter. It must be totally regenerated." 7 
 
 Sonthonax had immediately begun to take steps in 
 this direction, but he had quickly discovered that the 
 defenders of the Mole absolutely refused to put them- 
 selves in his power. At this insubordination Sonthonax 
 had completely lost his temper and had issued a proc- 
 lamation declaring the whole garrison guilty of "lese- 
 nation" and "traltres a la Patrie." The result was in- 
 evitable. On the 22d of September a single ship appeared 
 off the Mole with a hundred British grenadiers aboard, 
 but at the mere sight of the English flag Major O'Farrel, 
 of the Irish battalion, came out with proposals of capit- 
 ulation, and the great fortress, with its two hundred 
 heavy guns, immense materiel, and entire garrison of 
 nearly a ^thousand men, surrendered without striking 
 a blow. The example of the Mole was followed by the 
 German colonists of Bombarde, and the whole peninsula 
 down to the walls of Port-de-Paix had soon thrown off 
 allegiance to the Republic. 8 
 
 These defections of the white districts to north and 
 south were serious enough, but what now began in the 
 West Province reduced the Commissioners to absolute 
 despair. The mulattoes had everywhere greeted Son- 
 thonax's negrophil policy with ill - concealed rage; his 
 emancipation proclamation had roused them to furious 
 mutiny. The mulattoes had always been as bitterly 
 opposed to emancipation as the whites themselves, and 
 at the present moment they were even harder hit, since 
 up to this time they had succeeded in keeping most of 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 235 
 
 their slaves in some sort of obedience. "These Citizens 
 of the 4th of April,'* writes Governor-General Lasalle to 
 the French Government, "whom you regard as the true 
 defenders of the colony and whose fortune consisted 
 largely in slaves ; how are they now to live? The proclama- 
 tion of the 29th of August has reduced them to the most 
 frightful misery." 9 
 
 Upon the angry mulattoes of the West the English 
 intervention worked almost as powerfully as upon the 
 whites themselves. It is true that the presence of Polverel 
 and a few mulatto leaders thoroughly committed to the 
 Republic kept Port-au-Prince quiet for the moment, and 
 that the iron hand of Rigaud continued to hold down Les 
 Cayes; but elsewhere all was seething disaffection. When, 
 about mid -October, a thousand more English troops 
 landed in the South, the mulatto stronghold of the Ar- 
 tibonite rose in open revolt and a new Confederation of 
 Saint-Marc called the English into the West. "So long 
 as the Civil Commissioners' proclamations assured our 
 future well-being," announced the mulatto Mayor of 
 Saint-Marc, "I obeyed them to the letter. But from the 
 moment that I realized they were preparing the thunder- 
 bolt now shattering everything around us, I took meas- 
 ures to save our fellow citizens and to preserve our prop- 
 erties." 10 The example of Saint-Marc was followed by 
 Leogane, and Port-au-Prince was thus hemmed in on 
 both sides by British territory. 
 
 In the North Province the situation was even more 
 hopeless. Laveaux with the wrecks of the European bat- 
 talions had retired to the stronghold of Port-de-Paix, and 
 behind the walls of this first centre of French coloniza- 
 
236 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tion he now lay watching the progress of the Spaniards 
 from the east and of the English from the M61e-Saint- 
 Nicolas. His terrible situation is shown by his report to 
 Sonthonax of mid-September. At that moment Laveaux 
 had but seven hundred men fit for duty, and these poor 
 remnants were wasting rapidly under the terrible con- 
 ditions which prevailed. "I cannot describe to you," 
 he writes, "the horrors of our hospitals. Never cleaned, 
 even the dying are unattended while the dead remain in 
 their beds sometimes two days. . . . Into these dens of 
 pestilence the soldier enters with horror, crying, 'Behold 
 my last abode.'" The food was execrable: a little bread, 
 fish so bad "that men shrink from it," and for drink 
 tafia-grog to which the soldiers laid much of their sick- 
 ness. " In fine, one sees walking spectres instead of French 
 soldiers." All the supplies having been burned at the 
 destruction of Le Cap, "the troops cannot march for 
 lack of shoes and will soon be absolutely naked." La- 
 veaux closes with a pathetic appeal for Sonthonax's 
 attention. 11 
 
 Laveaux's report on the general military situation at 
 the beginning of October was more hopeless still. Be- 
 sides the danger from foreign enemies, most of the negro 
 troops were showing a desire to replace him by one of 
 their own number. "We are in a country," he writes, 
 "where by the course of events the white man is detested. 
 The guilty have fled, it is true; but the hatred toward the 
 whites borne by the Africans is not in the least assuaged 
 thereby. Each day the whites are threatened. . . . And 
 who can force these new citizens to do their duty once 
 they have abjured it? Will they respect the handful of 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 237 
 
 white troops which yet remains?" Laveaux frankly 
 admits that he despairs of keeping order; all he can do is 
 to die at the head of the few soldiers that yet remain. 
 Since the fall of the Mole, he continues, the military situa- 
 tion has become quite untenable. Even a retreat over- 
 land into the West is most uncertain, for the attitude of 
 the negro troops is doubtful; if the English once pierce 
 the lines of Port-de-Paix, this attitude will become more 
 doubtful still. "For, after all the examples of their lack 
 of courage or good faith in fighting the brigand negroes, 
 what can you expect of them against the English?" 12 
 
 This crushing series of disasters lashed Sonthonax into 
 a delirium of fury. Weeping with rage, he dashed off 
 incoherent letters to Laveaux and Polverel, urging them 
 to make the whole coast a desert and then retire like 
 maroons into the mountains. But this ferocious counsel 
 Polverel refused to follow, and returned a severe answer 
 stating that such a policy would merely unite all men 
 against them. "Let us," concludes this letter, "indeed, 
 save the colony, liberty, and equality; but let us also 
 understand once for all why we are fighting, whom we are 
 fighting, and what shall be the means." 13 
 
 From insane rage Sonthonax now fell into abject de- 
 spair, and in late December he wrote to Polverel proposing 
 that one of them should leave San Domingo to carry a 
 report to the Convention; but his colleague adminis- 
 tered another severe rebuke, stigmatizing this plan as 
 desertion. 14 Soon after this the demoralized Sonthonax 
 rejoined his colleague at Port-au-Prince. 
 
 However, the opening months of 1794 brought no 
 comfort in their train: the North fell more and more into 
 
238 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 English and Spanish hands, while in the West the mu- 
 lattoes continued to abjure the Republic. The extent of 
 this defection is shown by the number of intercepted 
 letters still preserved in the Archives Nationales. 15 In 
 one of these the writer passionately urges his Republican 
 friend to follow his example. He, too, had fought in the 
 earlier mulatto insurrections, but he had since felt "the 
 humiliations which the Civil Commissioners have heaped 
 upon us by making us the servile instruments of their 
 sanguinary passions and their destructive projects." In- 
 deed, he was in complete despair when the coming of the 
 English opened the door of hope. 16 Another letter is still 
 stronger in tone. "Cease; yes, cease, sir," it reads, "to 
 work blindly for the general liberty of the slaves and to 
 further the perfidious aDd devastating intentions of the 
 Civil Commissioners. Join the party of honest men; 
 preserve your property from destruction and fire. Our 
 rights are safe-guarded by the word of a nation whose 
 established constitution is unmenaced by the fluctuations, 
 crises, and convulsions which cause the present weakness 
 of the French, and which reduce all their colonies to a 
 frightful fluidity." 17 
 
 During these months another blow had been struck at 
 the prestige of the Commissioners. The stream of de- 
 ported persons flowing constantly into France with alarm- 
 ing tales of outrage and tyranny had excited French public 
 opinion and roused the watchful jealousy of the Conven- 
 tion, which, in July, 1793, passed a decree of accusation 
 against its representatives in San Domingo. 18 "The late 
 disasters at Le Cap," writes a colonist at Nantes to a 
 friend in the island, "have been deeply felt in France. 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 239 
 
 Polverel and Sonthonax have been denounced to the 
 National Convention as the authors of the ruin of San 
 Domingo, and have been decreed in a state of accusation. 
 Thus we may hope that ere long the colony will be 
 purged of those two monsters." 19 The news had been 
 hailed with delight by the whole English party, which 
 scattered broadcast a violent manifesto summoning the 
 Republican districts to rid themselves of the tyrants 
 whom the Convention had just "broken like a glass of 
 beer." 20 But all regular communication between France 
 and San Domingo had ceased with the outbreak of the 
 English war, and the Commissioners, stigmatizing these 
 reports as libels, showed no signs of obeying the orders 
 of the Convention by a return to France. 
 
 The colonists, however, soon realized that the Conven- 
 tion's action toward its Commissioners was a purely 
 personal affair which betokened no change in sentiment 
 regarding the colonies. Indeed, Jacobin France, now full 
 in the throes of the Terror, breathed an ever-increasing 
 hatred of the "Aristocrates de la Peau" and greeted the 
 English intervention with a fresh burst of fury at this 
 new Vendee over-seas. How the returned colonist fared 
 at this moment is revealed by the experiences of Carteau 
 in the month of May, 1794. Scarcely had his ship cast 
 anchor in the harbor of Toulon when the young port 
 officer approached him with a menacing air. "'Well,' he 
 exclaimed loudly, 'at last they are free; those unhappy 
 slaves. After a century of abuse and torture it was high 
 time that they became your equals and enjoyed our pre- 
 cious liberty; for they are as much men as we ourselves.' 
 I was silent," comments Carteau; "it was no time to 
 
240 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 reply. The guillotines were 'en permanence' upon the 
 public squares." 21 
 
 And Carteau's further experiences show that the port 
 officer's words were but the echo of all those who then 
 dared express an opinion. "From Toulon to my journey's 
 end," he goes on, "in coach or barge, in public house or 
 private home, at cross-road or on city square, — every- 
 where I found the same prejudice, the same virulence 
 against the colonist. 'Prejudice'! that is too mild a 
 word. It was a furious hatred which prevailed: a hatred 
 of such intensity that our most terrible misfortunes did 
 not excite the slightest commiseration. To those prej- 
 udiced minds we appeared more guilty than the most 
 abandoned criminals, to whom are often vouchsafed 
 some dregs of pity. We colonists, . . . just escaped from 
 tempest and prison, destitute, ruined, impoverished, 
 often fated to beg our bread, found only coid hearts and 
 unfeeling souls. Ah! how many there were who, to all 
 this, added signs of detestation and of horror. I could 
 name a great number of persons, men and women, young 
 and old, who to my story of misfortune merely answered, 
 ' You have richly deserved it ! ' Our detractors had poi- 
 soned against us all classes of society : servants, peasants, 
 workmen, — the very day-laborers in the fields. These 
 simple people, impressed only by striking ideas, remem- 
 bered about us only those reports most sensational in 
 character. In their opinion we colonists were worse than 
 cannibals, and they really believed that we were accus- 
 tomed to mutilate, flay, and massacre our slaves. I was 
 actually introduced to many persons so touched by the 
 unhappy lot of the slaves that they had long since ceased 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 241 
 
 to take coffee; thinking that they swallowed only blood 
 and sweat in this sugared drink ! " 22 
 
 Such being the state of French opinion, it is not strange 
 that when Sonthonax's delegates reached France in early 
 1794, they received a warm welcome and found the Con- 
 vention disposed to set its seal upon the new order in San 
 Domingo. These three delegates, a white, a mulatto, and 
 a negro, had been sent as deputies to the Convention in 
 pursuance of national legislation which had already as- 
 similated the colonies as ordinary departments of the 
 French Republic. What followed their request for ad- 
 mission to seats in the Convention is well described by the 
 official record in the "Moniteur" 23 : — 
 
 "At the session of the 15th Pluviose, Year II [February 
 3, 1794], the chairman of the Committee on Decrees rose. 
 'Citizens, your Committee on Decrees has verified the 
 credentials of the deputies of San Domingo. It finds 
 them in order. I move that they be admitted to seats 
 in the Convention.' 
 
 "Camboulas. 'Since 1789, the aristocracy of birth and 
 the aristocracy of religion have been destroyed; but the 
 aristocracy of the skin still remains. However, it too is 
 at last doomed : a black man, a yellow man, are about to 
 sit amongst us in the name of the free citizens of San 
 Domingo.' [Applause.] 
 
 "The three deputies of San Domingo enter the hall. 
 The black features of Bellay and the yellow face of Mills 
 excite long and repeated applause. 
 
 "Lacroix (of Eure-et-Loire). 'The Assembly has long 
 desired to have in its midst some of those men of color 
 oppressed for so many years. To-day it possesses two. 
 
242 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 I demand that their introduction be marked by the 
 President's fraternal embrace.' 
 
 "The motion is carried amid loud applause. 
 
 "The three deputies of San Domingo advance and re- 
 ceive the President's fraternal kiss. The hall rings with 
 fresh applause." 24 
 
 Next day the negro deputy Bellay delivered a very 
 violent speech against the Counter-Revolutionary nature 
 of the white colonists, and ended by "imploring the Con- 
 vention to vouchsafe to the colonies full enjoyment of the 
 blessings of liberty and equality." What followed is strik- 
 ingly told by the official account in the "Moniteur": — 
 
 " Levasseur (of Sarthe). 'I demand that the Conven- 
 tion, yielding, not to a moment of enthusiasm, but to the 
 principles of justice, and faithful to the Declaration of 
 the Rights of Man, decree that from this moment slavery 
 is abolished throughout the territory of the Republic. 
 San Domingo is part of this territory; — nevertheless, 
 there are still slaves.' 
 
 "Lacroix (of Eure-et-Loire). 'When we drew up the 
 Constitution of the French people we did not direct our 
 gaze upon the unhappy negroes. Posterity will severely 
 censure us for that fact. Let us now repair this fault. 
 Let us proclaim the liberty of the negroes. . . . President, 
 do not suffer the Convention to dishonor itself by a dis- 
 cussion.' 
 
 "The Assembly rises by acclamation. 
 
 "The President pronounces the abolition of slavery 
 amid great applause and repeated cries of 'Vive la Re- 
 publique ! ' ' Vive la Convention ! ' ' Vive la Montagne ! ' 
 
 "The two deputies of color appear on the tribune; 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 243 
 
 they embrace. [Applause.] Lacroix conducts them to 
 the President, who gives them the fraternal kiss. [Ap- 
 plause.] 
 
 "Cambon. 'A citizeness of color, regularly present at 
 the Convention's sittings, has just felt so keen a joy at 
 seeing us grant liberty to all her brethren that she has 
 fainted. [Applause.] I demand that this fact be men- 
 tioned in the minutes, and that this citizeness be ad- 
 mitted to the sitting and receive at least this much rec- 
 ognition of her civic virtues.' 
 
 "The motion is carried. 
 
 "On the front bench of the amphitheatre, at the Presi- 
 dent's left, is seen this citizeness, drying her tears. [Ap- 
 plause.] 
 
 "After some discussion on the wording of the intended 
 decree, Lacroix gets the following resolution carried: 
 'The National Convention declares slavery abolished in 
 all the colonies. In consequence, it decrees that all men, 
 without distinction of color, domiciled in the said colo- 
 nies, are French citizens and enjoy all the rights assured 
 under the Constitution.'" 25 
 
 When it is remembered that at this moment San Do- 
 mingo was the only colony in which any official acts of 
 emancipation had taken place, the spirit of the Conven- 
 tion toward colonial questions in thus abolishing the 
 colonial system by a rising vote without discussion is 
 sufficiently plain. 
 
 The effect of all this upon San Domingo may be im- 
 agined. More and more the mulattoes of the West re- 
 nounced their allegiance to the Republic, and the Com- 
 missioners' position in Port-au-Prince (now renamed 
 
244 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 " Port Republicain ") grew worse with every day. Acts of 
 terror availed but little, and the Commissioners, grown 
 suspicious of the whole mulatto caste, leaned increasingly 
 upon the negro population. In early February, 1794, the 
 appearance of an English squadron off Port-au-Prince 
 spurred the Commissioners to fresh exertions, and black 
 battalions were recruited from the half-savage negroes 
 of the Plain and the wild insurgents of the mountains. 
 But this merely precipitated the crisis. Rigaud, the mu- 
 latto commandant of Les Cayes, wrote an ominous pro- 
 test warning the Commissioners that "the soldiers' order 
 and good- will for the service and defence of the country" 
 was waning at sight of the public revenues "entirely 
 given to African laborers who assuredly have not the 
 same needs as themselves." Rigaud asserted that the 
 negroes should serve the Republic without pay, and should 
 also support the mulatto soldiery "out of gratitude for 
 the debt they owe the former freedmen who now de- 
 fend them." 26 The mulattoes of Port-au-Prince did not 
 stop at words. On the night of the 17th of March the mu- 
 latto battalions suddenly rose, the Commissioners barely 
 escaped from the town, and returned only upon condi- 
 tions tantamount to an abdication. 27 
 
 Under such conditions the fall of Port-au-Prince was 
 plainly at hand, and toward the end of May the English 
 prepared to strike the decisive blow. The campaign was 
 well planned and skilfully executed. A column of whites 
 from the Grande Anse, about a thousand strong, under 
 the Baron de Montalembert, advanced northwards from 
 Leogane, another column of some twelve hundred white 
 and mulatto Confederates, under Hanus de Jumecourt, 
 
THE ENGLISH INTERVENTION 245 
 
 moved down from Saint-Marc, while on May 30, a 
 strong squadron appeared off Port-au-Prince with fifteen 
 hundred British troops on board. The city made but a 
 feeble resistance. It was soon demoralized by a heavy 
 bombardment from the English fleet, and when the chief 
 land fort had fallen before the assault of De Montalem- 
 bert's hard-fighting Southerners, the Commissioners and 
 the wreck of their troops sought safety with Rigaud. 
 Despite its misfortunes, Port-au-Prince was a rich prize. 
 The English captured one hundred and thirty pieces of. 
 heavy artillery and merchant shipping to the value of 
 four hundred thousand pounds. 28 
 
 But the sands of the Commissioners' rule were now run 
 out. Scarcely had they joined Rigaud when a fast-sailing 
 corvette appeared bearing the Convention's mandate to 
 arrest its refractory delegates and bring them to France 
 for trial under the decree of accusation passed almost a 
 year before. There could be no evading this imperious 
 summons, and on June 12, 1794, Sonthonax and Polverel 
 sailed for France, leaving Rigaud and his half-guerilla 
 soldiery to sustain the struggle against the English and 
 their partisans. In West and South the situation seemed, 
 indeed, hopeless, but in the North a man had appeared 
 in the ranks of the Republic who had already wrested 
 half their conquests from the Spaniards. This man was 
 Toussaint Louverture. 
 
XXI 
 
 THE ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 
 
 Francois-Dominique Toussaint ("Louverture") 
 was born about the year 1743 on a plantation of the North 
 Plain not far from the city of Le Cap. His father was 
 an African negro from Guinea; his mother, born in the 
 colony, was a negress of uncertain origin. One thing is 
 sure: Toussaint was a full-blooded negro with no trace 
 of white or mulatto blood. The origin of the name 
 "Louverture" is obscure. Toussaint at first served as 
 a stable-boy, but his intelligence was soon remarked by 
 the plantation manager, who made him his coachman, 
 and in the comparative leisure of this occupation Tous- 
 saint learned to read and write, albeit very imperfectly. 1 
 He seems to have gained a certain local reputation among 
 the negroes, and to have already displayed that power 
 over his racial brethren which was to be the keystone 
 of his later authority. 2 
 
 At the outbreak of the negro insurrection of August, 
 1791, Toussaint was nearly fifty years old. He took no 
 part in the rising until the late autumn, when he attached 
 himself to the bands of Jean-Francois and Biassou. His 
 ability was, however, recognized from the first, for he was 
 at once made a high officer and appears to have been one 
 of Jean-Francois's intimate counsellors in the December 
 peace negotiations with the first Civil Commissioners. 3 
 
 Upon the outbreak of war between Spain and the 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 247 
 
 French Republic in the spring of 1793, Toussaint nat- 
 urally entered Spanish service. His growing importance 
 is shown by the fact that he was already the leader of a 
 band of six hundred well-armed negroes devoted to his 
 orders, and also by the circumstance that he acted no 
 longer as a subordinate of Jean-Francois, but directly 
 under the Spanish general's orders as a semi-independent 
 commander. During the ensuing year Toussaint's prog- 
 ress was rapid. He induced many of the French regular 
 troops who had deserted to the Spaniards after the de- 
 struction of Le Cap 4 to officer his growing bands and 
 train them in the European fashion. Several brilliant 
 military feats increased his prestige to such an extent 
 that by the spring of 1794 he commanded four thousand 
 men, wholly devoted to his person and unquestionably 
 the best armed and disciplined black corps in the Spanish 
 army. 5 
 
 At this moment the cause of the Republic was at its 
 lowest ebb. In the North, Laveaux had retired with the 
 wrecks of the European troops for a last stand behind the 
 walls of Port-de-Paix; in the West, the English were pre- 
 paring their decisive stroke against distracted Port-au- 
 Prince. Yet this was the moment chosen by Toussaint 
 to enter the Republic's service. Strange as this may at 
 first appear, reflection shows that his decision was de- 
 termined by motives of sound policy. The progress of 
 the English had greatly alarmed Toussaint, for England 
 had entered San Domingo as the champion of the whites 
 and mulattoes : she was therefor pledged to the mainte- 
 nance of that slavery which the French Republic had just 
 abolished throughout its colonies. 6 His personal motives 
 
248 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 also strongly favored a change of side. In Spanish service 
 he could never hope to supplant Jean-Francois, now 
 become the trusted generalissimo of the black forces 
 entirely devoted to the Spanish cause, and loaded with 
 honors and dignities. On the other hand, the French 
 Republic had failed to gain over any important negro 
 leader, and in its desperate situation was sure to grant 
 Toussaint a position equivalent to that of Jean-Fran cois 
 himself. 7 
 
 Accordingly, in April, 1794, Laveaux was overjoyed 
 to receive an intimation that Toussaint was ready to 
 open negotiations, and the details were quickly settled to 
 their mutual satisfaction. In the execution of his project 
 Toussaint now showed to the full that extraordinary 
 duplicity which is the most striking trait in his character. 
 Up to the very hour of his desertion to the Republic he 
 maintained his attitude of complete devotion to the 
 Royalist cause : only a few days previous to his change of 
 side, the Spanish general, after observing the fervor of 
 his religious devotions, wrote, " In this whole world God 
 has never entered a soul more pure." 8 The Marquis of 
 Hermona's feelings may be imagined when on the 6th 
 of May, 1794, Toussaint suddenly massacred the Spanish 
 soldiers under his orders and led his four thousand negro 
 troops into Republican territory. Toussaint's first report 
 to Laveaux contained a fervent Republican profession 
 of faith. 9 This astounding defection completely disorgan- 
 ized the Spanish forces, which rapidly evacuated most 
 of their conquests in the North. 10 
 
 The news of Toussaint's conversion came as a ray of 
 hope to the despairing Civil Commissioners. Their de- 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 249 
 
 light is shown by the letter written Toussaint on the eve 
 of their departure for France. "You cannot imagine," 
 it reads, "our joy at such glad tidings. We had long be- 
 lieved those Africans allied with the Spaniards and Royal- 
 ists as lost to the Republic; but now that the brave Tous- 
 saint has come under its banner, now that he is finally 
 disabused of his errors, we hope to see all the Africans 
 of the North imitate his generous repentance and defend 
 their liberty by fighting for France. . . . Bless, citizen, 
 bless the National Assembly, which, by overthrowing the 
 thrones of kings, has founded the happiness of the human 
 race upon equality and liberty. Remember that the dis- 
 tinctions of color are no more: that a negro is as good 
 as a white man; a white as good as a black." n 
 
 The utter disorganization of the Spanish forces en- 
 abled Toussaint to attempt operations against the Eng- 
 lish in the West. The capture of Port-au-Prince had been 
 the high- water mark of English success. Scarcely had 
 they taken possession of the city when there appeared 
 amongst them the dread scourge which eight years later 
 was to destroy the great army of Napoleon. Yellow fever 
 broke out among the English regiments at Port-au-Prince 
 and within two months swept away nearly seven hundred 
 of the British soldiers. 12 In such circumstances it was 
 madness to expose the troops to active campaigning till 
 the sickness should abate with the autumn; therefore the 
 English failed to push their advantage, and gave time for 
 Rigaud to consolidate his rule in the South and for Tous- 
 saint to reorganize the North. 
 
 This English inaction was most fortunate for the Re- 
 public, since the first attempts of Toussaint and Rigaud 
 
250 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 showed how strong was the British hold on the West. 
 Toussaint's attack on Saint-Marc in September was a 
 failure, while in December Rigaud's bold attempt on 
 Port-au-Prince ended in a bad disaster, his two thousand 
 mulatto soldiers being terribly cut up. Still, the year 1794 
 ended well for the Republic. Toussaint had cleared the 
 North of the Spaniards and had driven the English from 
 their footholds on the Cordon de l'Ouest, while Rigaud 
 repaired his defeat before Port-au-Prince by capturing 
 the important town of Leogane. Furthermore, the rapid- 
 ity with which Toussaint was building up his army pres- 
 aged fresh successes in the coming year. 13 
 
 The campaign of 1795 was almost exclusively devoted 
 to the struggle with the English. The Spaniards re- 
 mained strictly on the defensive, and it was quite evident 
 that nothing more was to be feared from them, since 
 peace negotiations had already opened between Spain 
 and the French Republic. The British Government had 
 done little to sustain its cause in San Domingo. Less than 
 two thousand troops arrived during the winter of 1794-95, 
 and when the unhealthy season began in the spring, dis- 
 ease again thinned the ranks of the British soldiery. 
 Still, the English position was very formidable. The whole 
 West Province was dotted with strong forts, and the 
 black and mulatto regiments recruited among the native 
 population fought stubbornly in their defence. 
 
 In September, 1795, arrived the momentous news of 
 the signing of the Peace of Bale, by which Spain ceded 
 her portion of San Domingo to France, though retaining 
 possession till the Republic should be in a position to 
 defend its new territory from attack. But England had 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 251 
 
 at last resolved to make a great effort to conquer San 
 Domingo, and with the healthier days of late October, 
 General Howe and seven thousand troops fresh from 
 home landed at the Mole-Saint-Nicolas. Two years be- 
 fore, this fine army would have absolutely assured the 
 conquest of San Domingo: now it was too late. Rigaud 
 showed his strength by beating off the formidable Eng- 
 lish attack on Leogane, while Toussaint weathered the 
 storm with slight losses of exposed territory. In a few 
 months the English army had wasted to a shadow, and 
 by early 1796 it was plain that the invaders would make 
 no further efforts of a vital nature. 14 
 
 It was well for the Republican cause that the English 
 peril was thus virtually past, for in these same spring 
 months of 1796 there arose the first storm-clouds of that 
 great convulsion which was to rend San Domingo for the 
 next four years. With the general collapse that followed 
 the destruction of Le Cap in June, 1793, white supremacy 
 was ended, and short of an English conquest or some 
 future supreme effort from France, was ended forever. 
 But what San Domingo was to be had not yet been de- 
 cided. The South, under the iron rule of Rigaud, was 
 obviously mulatto; 15 the West was for the moment in 
 foreign hands; in the North the policy of Sonthonax had 
 already resulted in black supremacy. Up till now the 
 struggle against the foreigner had obscured the racial 
 issue, but before the year 1795 was out the stage had been 
 set for the coming struggle between the colored castes. 
 On the one side stood the mulattoes both free and slave, 16 
 joined by the free negroes of the Old Regime and loosely 
 allied to the wild maroon elements; on the other lay the 
 

 252 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 mass of the negro population, — vastly superior in num- 
 ber but only half-conscious of itself and lacking intelli- 
 gence and organization. Would the mulattoes be able 
 to rivet their domination over the black population as the 
 whites had done before them? That was the question. 
 
 Ambitious as were the projects of the mulatto caste, 
 they were already realized in many parishes of the South 
 and West. The sphere of Rigaud's authority now formed 
 a genuine mulatto state in which white and black were 
 alike subject to a domination more severe than that of 
 the Old Regime. The country was systematically ex- 
 ploited by the mulatto caste and the negro population 
 once more reduced to slavery. The character of this 
 mulatto rule is described in the report of an old officer of 
 the marechaussee, sent out by the French Government in 
 early 1794 to investigate conditions in the South. "Ever 
 since the Civil Commissioners got rid of the whites," 
 reports this agent to the Minister of Marine, "the 
 mulattoes have monopolized the public posts. All of- 
 fices, both civil and military, are now in their power. 
 . . . Only the vain appearance of a free government re- 
 mains. The municipalities are a farce, — all power is 
 lodged with the mulatto commandants. . . . The few 
 white troops that remain are perishing of misery and 
 want, while the remnant of the white inhabitants still 
 loyal to the Republic are more wretched than the Africans 
 in slavery days. The Africans themselves are not con- 
 tent, and everywhere complain of their great misery." 
 The worst of the matter was that this mulatto rule was 
 not only despotic but factious and inefficient as well. 
 The commandants were generally ignorant, "and so 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 253 
 
 jealous that they never stop accusing each other. Mont- 
 brun says that Beauvais is a traitor, Beauvais says the 
 same of Montbrun, while Rigaud accuses them both." 17 
 The great obstacle to mulatto dominion was obviously 
 the rising power of Toussaint Louverture. Hitherto, the 
 black general had been but a distant figure to the mu- 
 lattoes of the South, since the English occupation of 
 the West Province had completely cut communications. 
 But by late 1795 the English sphere was so shrunken that 
 relations had been resumed. And Toussaint's first act 
 showed the Southern mulattoes both his dangerous in- 
 tentions and his superiority to their leader Rigaud. The 
 Peace of Bale had been a great thing for Toussaint Lou- 
 verture: his one dangerous negro rival, Jean-Francois, 
 had retired to Spain, while most of the disbanded black 
 soldiery had taken service in Toussaint's army. This 
 powerful accession of strength now led the black leader 
 to venture a further step in the consolidation of his 
 authority over all the negroes of San Domingo. In the 
 Western mountains were certain negro bands which had 
 remained nominally loyal to the Republic. However, 
 while aiding Rigaud in his struggle against the English, 
 the commanders of these negro bands had always refused 
 to admit his authority and had thus drawn down the 
 hatred of the vengeful mulatto. Toussaint realized the 
 situation and resolved to turn it to his own profit. He 
 first gained over the least powerful of these independ- 
 ent commanders, an ambitious negro named Laplume, 
 and then offered Rigaud his assistance in crushing the 
 two chief leaders. Rigaud accepted with joy, and under 
 Toussaint's orders Laplume betrayed his colleagues to 
 
254 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the mulatto, who put them to an atrocious death in the 
 dungeons of Les Cayes. But Rigaud's delight was much 
 abated when he learned that Laplume had led the as- 
 sembled bands over to Toussaint's army, and realized 
 too late that his thirst for vengeance had been satisfied 
 only at the cost of consolidating Toussaint's power over 
 the negroes of the West. 18 
 
 But the enraged Rigaud spied the joint in Toussaint's 
 armor: the journey of the clever mulatto intriguer Pin- 
 chinat to Le Cap in early 1796 revealed Rigaud's deter- 
 mination to rouse the mulattoes of the North to decisive 
 action. And Pinchinat found the ground well prepared, 
 for conditions at Le Cap were already so tense that an 
 explosion would have probably occurred even without 
 his incitations. 
 
 When Laveaux had withdrawn the European troops 
 to Port-de-Paix in the autumn of 1793, he had left Le 
 Cap in charge of a mulatto officer named Villatte. The 
 wild negroes of the Plain had soon left the ruined town, 
 Villatte had before long established his supremacy, and 
 Le Cap presently became the rallying-point for all the 
 mulattoes of the North. Things had gone well enough for 
 the caste till the close of 1795, when Laveaux took ad- 
 vantage of the improved military situation to return from 
 Port-de-Paix to Le Cap. Completely dependent upon 
 Toussaint and his negro regiments for operations against 
 the English, and already falling under the sway of the 
 black leader's personality, Laveaux was indignant at the 
 nature of Villatte's rule. Tactless attempts to subordi- 
 nate the mulatto commander to his authority quickly 
 led to trouble. The critical state of affairs at Le Cap 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE %55 
 
 is shown by Laveaux's correspondence with the French 
 Government. 
 
 "There are here," he writes on January 14, 1796, 
 "many evil persons who work for independence; who cry 
 that the colony has no need of France." And he cites a 
 list of mulatto and free negro agitators with Villatte at 
 their head. "An abominable jealousy exists here among 
 the citizens of color," he continues, " against the whites 
 and negroes. The colored citizens are furious that one of 
 their number does not govern San Domingo. They say 
 to us openly, 'This is our country, not yours. Why do 
 you give us white men to govern our country? ' They are 
 abominably jealous of me, and wish Villatte as Governor. 
 
 "The citizens of color are in despair at seeing Tous- 
 saint Louverture, a negro, become brigadier - general. 
 . . . Yes, citizen, I must admit the fact: all the colored 
 citizens and old free negroes are the enemies of emancipa- 
 tion and of equality. They cannot even conceive that a 
 former negro slave can be the equal of a white man, a 
 mulatto, or an old free negro." He concludes with a long 
 account of the predatory rule of Villatte and his follow- 
 ers, "who have ceaselessly crushed the other inhabitants. 
 My efforts have roused the fury of these men, who wish 
 to continue that old life of 1793-94, when the strongest 
 hand seized all"; and he ends by describing a number of 
 partial riots and mutinies. 19 
 
 If such was the state of affairs before Pinchinat's 
 arrival, it is not strange that the presence of this clever 
 intriguer quickly brought on more serious trouble. At 
 the end of January the arrest of one of Villatte's fol- 
 lowers for official peculation caused a general riot in which 
 
256 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Laveaux was insulted and his authority openly flouted. 
 His report to the Minister of Marine shows his growing 
 indignation. "Citizen mulatto," he writes, "is resolved 
 to govern this country. He cannot bring himself to be 
 the equal of a black, and he wishes to be more than a 
 white. Crime is nothing to him: when one of his kind is 
 the guilty party, all is excusable . Villatte is quite per- 
 suaded that he is going to be Governor, and in this mad 
 idea all his partisans support him." Laveaux attributes 
 the late riots to Pinchinat, the agent of Rigaud, "whose 
 pride and ambition are such that he dreams of becoming 
 Dictator of the colony. The mulatto citizens wish to 
 rule, wish to have every office, wish to embezzle every- 
 thing: they recognize no laws the moment these hinder 
 their passions and their pride." 20 
 
 Villatte and Pinchinat were, indeed, determined on 
 decisive action. The crisis came with the 30th Ventose 
 (20th of March). About sunrise the mulattoes of Le Cap 
 rose en masse, dragged Laveaux with jeers and insults 
 through the streets, and cast him into prison. But the 
 conspirators now found that by their factious antics they 
 had merely played another's game. From his strong- 
 holds on the Cordon de l'Ouest, Toussaint Louverture 
 had watched all that passed at Le Cap. Up to the very 
 moment of the crisis he had made no sign, but that his 
 plans had been carefully laid was soon apparent. The 
 fortified heights above the town were held by the black 
 general, Michel, who now refused obedience to Villatte, 
 curtly ordered the release of Laveaux, and announced 
 that Toussaint was coming with ten thousand men, de- 
 termined "to sacrifice everything that lived in Le Cap" 
 
ADVENT OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 257 
 
 should any attempt be made on the life of Laveaux. 21 
 After some bluster the terrified mulattoes released their 
 prisoner: a few days later Toussaint entered Le Cap with 
 a large army, while Villatte and his partisans retreated 
 into the country. 22 
 
 The affair of the 30th Vent6se was a crushing blow 
 to the mulattoes of the North and a great triumph for 
 Toussaint Louverture. The keen-sighted negro had well 
 judged his man, for the impetuous Laveaux was so over- 
 whelmed with enthusiastic gratitude that he virtually 
 surrendered himself into his deliverer's hands. Publicly 
 acclaiming Toussaint as "that black Spartacus pro- 
 phesied by Raynal, whose destiny is to avenge the out- 
 rages upon his race,"' he made Toussaint Lieutenant- 
 Governor of San Domingo and promised to do nothing 
 without his advice and counsel. Toussaint reciprocated 
 in the same vein. "After God, Laveaux," he cried; and 
 with rather grotesque inconsistency this elderly negro, 
 generally known as "le vieux Toussaint," addressed the 
 youthful French general as "Bon Papa." 23 All this 
 enormously increased Toussaint's prestige among the 
 negroes, and correspondingly weakened white authority. 
 "This," declares Lacroix, "was the death-blow to French 
 authority in San Domingo. It is from this moment that 
 we must date the end of white prestige and the beginning 
 of black rule." 24 
 
 Such was the state of affairs when on May 11, 1796, a 
 third Civil Commission arrived at Le Cap, sent by the 
 new Government of the Directoire to restore French 
 authority over distracted San Domingo. 
 
XXII 
 
 THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 
 
 In France the Terror was long past, 1 and the new Gov- 
 ernment of the Directoire 2 assured a relatively moderate 
 regime. In the general survey which followed its acces- 
 sion to power, the Directoire's attention had been nat- 
 urally attracted to San Domingo, and in the early 
 spring of 1796 it had resolved to attempt a restoration of 
 French authority. To this end a body of five Commis- 
 sioners had been despatched to the island with a con- 
 siderable naval squadron and three thousand troops 
 which succeeded in outwitting the English cruisers. 
 
 The personnel of this new expedition was most inter- 
 esting. The troops were commanded by General Ro- 
 chambeau, seconded by General Desfourneaux, both of 
 whom had served in the island. And three of the Civil 
 Commissioners were equally familiar with San Domingo 
 politics. The Chairman of the Commission was none 
 other than Sonthpnax, acquitted of the charges laid 
 against his previous stewardship after a long and farcical 
 trial. Purged of his extreme Jacobinism, Sonthonax was 
 now a good "Thermidorien" and high in the Directoire's 
 favor. The mulatto Raymond was also upon the board, 
 having thus obtained the post of which he had been 
 baulked in 1792. Another member of the Commission 
 was Roume, though he had been ordered to Spanish 
 Santo Dolhingo, to prepare that colony for the coming 
 
THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 259 
 
 transfer of national authority. 3 The other two Commis- 
 sioners were Leblanc, an ex-Terrorist, and Giraud, a 
 neurotic nonentity of the type of former Commissioner 
 Ailhaud. 
 w The four Commissioners, Sonthonax, Roume, Leblanc, 
 and Giraud, were well received at Le Cap. The return 
 of Sonthonax, the "Liberator of San Domingo," excited 
 the enthusiasm of the negro population; the appointment 
 of the colored leader Raymond pleased the mulatto ele- 
 ment: the landing of three thousand white troops over- 
 awed the disaffected. The Commissioners' first report 
 describes their triumphal progress between cheering 
 crowds and double ranks of negro soldiery. 4 They were, 
 however, confronted by a difficult situation. Toussaint 
 Louverture's black regiments held down Le Cap, it is 
 true, but Villatte and his army still lay near by, while the 
 town population was overwhelmingly in his favor. In 
 this delicate situation the Commissioners acted with con- 
 siderable tact. They induced Villatte to appear before 
 them and then sent him to France for further examina- 
 tion; but they managed the affair without undue vio- 
 lence, and as Villatte was not personally beloved, they 
 succeeded in reconciling the mulatto element to their 
 action. 5 
 
 The Commissioners were evidently uneasy at the com- 
 plete authority exercised by Toussaint and his lieutenants 
 over the negro population. This feeling shows in their 
 early letters and is strikingly displayed in a long memoir 
 to the Directoire drawn up in the early autumn. "To 
 speak of laws to the negroes," write the Commissioners, 
 "is to burden them with things too metaphysical for 
 
260 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 their understanding. To these people, the man is every- 
 thing: at his voice they are quite carried away, and his 
 name is to them what the fatherland is to genuine free- 
 men. The regime which we found established upon our 
 arrival at San Domingo was exactly similar to the feudal 
 system of the eighth century. Law and liberty were but 
 idle names: the cultivators and the soldiers passively 
 obeyed their military chiefs, and fought for them alone 
 while crying, 'Long live the Republic.'" 6 
 
 Given such conditions, it was plain that Toussaint 
 Louverture and his fellows would have to be tactfully 
 handled; but it should have been equally clear that the 
 interests of France required that he should not be al- 
 lowed to make himself absolute, and that the only possi- 
 ble counterbalance lay in a judicious support of the mu- 
 lattoes. Unfortunately for France it was not long before 
 the new Commission followed Laveaux's example in 
 favoring the power of Toussaint Louverture. The cause 
 of this fatal policy was Sonthonax's overweening ambi- 
 tion. Time had, indeed, changed the stripe of his politi- 
 cal coat, but not his insatiable thirst for power, and he 
 soon conceived the idea of dominating his colleagues 
 through an alliance with Toussaint Louverture. Son- 
 thonax's previous experience with negro chiefs had not 
 increased his respect for their mental ability, and he had 
 no conception of the extraordinary cunning and duplicity 
 of the man whom he proposed to use as his instrument to 
 power. The acclamations of the negroes had intoxicated 
 the "Liberator," while his remembrance of past insults 
 in the West and South prejudiced him against the mulat- 
 toes. Accordingly, aided by his fellow Terrorist Leblanc, 
 
THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 261 
 
 he soon dominated the weak Raymond and the con- 
 temptible Giraud, and quickly showed Toussaint favors 
 of no uncertain character. 7 
 
 However, Sonthonax's policy quickly produced dis- 
 turbing results. General Rochambeau protested against 
 the new military powers granted the black leader, and 
 Sonthonax promptly used his old methods by formally 
 deporting him to France. 8 The mulattoes of the North 
 showed their feelings in more disagreeable fashion : they 
 incited the negroes to murder the whites by spreading 
 reports that the Commissioners were come to restore 
 slavery. In the district of Port-de-Paix nearly all the 
 remaining whites of that quarter were barbarously mas- 
 sacred in a negro rising of late September. How serious 
 was the situation is shown by a letter from one of the 
 French officials sent out with the Commissioners. "If 
 the Directoire does not promptly send imposing forces," 
 he writes, "the colony is lost forever. The disturbances 
 have become general and the Europeans are everywhere 
 being massacred. The cantons of Port-de-Paix are com- 
 pletely devastated, and outside of the town itself not 
 a white man remains alive. The national authority is 
 flouted; we are at the mercy of the negroes, whom La- 
 veaux has wholly demoralized, . . . and by the time you 
 receive this letter we may have all been massacred." 9 
 
 Equally pessimistic was the report of General Des- 
 fourneaux, the commander of the French troops, to the 
 Minister of War. " I have some great truths to tell you, 
 citizen," he writes on the 15th of October, "and as man 
 to man, as a soldier who loves his country, I ought not to 
 leave you ignorant of the greatness of our ills, the deep- 
 
262 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 ness of our wounds. . . . San Domingo can be saved to 
 France only by Republican bayonets. Our moral in- 
 fluence here has become absolutely nil. Anarchy has 
 brought confusion, pride has engendered schemes of 
 independence: all the colors are mutually to blame. . . . 
 The one remedy is an overwhelming force of at least 
 twenty thousand men who, acting in a body, shall sweep 
 from the surface of this island the enemies of the Re- 
 public." 10 
 
 That the Civil Commissioners obtained scant respect 
 from the negro generals is shown by their own correspond- 
 ence. In their memoir of October 9 they relate a flagrant 
 instance of disobedience on the part of the black general, 
 Michel, adding, "Our position has compelled us to over- 
 look this act of insubordination, as on so many other oc- 
 casions. These generals leave their posts and disobey our 
 orders. They oppress and plunder the cultivators, who 
 dare not complain. The Commission feels that it would 
 compromise its authority if it tried to make an example 
 of any one." u 
 
 In the South, the results of Sonthonax's policy were 
 more serious still. Rigaud, furious at the favor shown 
 Toussaint Louverture, absolutely refused obedience to 
 the black leader. And he appeared fully able to sustain 
 his defiant attitude. His virtual reenslavement of the 
 negro population had restored prosperity to the South, 
 and his full warehouses procured him all needed supplies 
 from the numerous American vessels which entered the 
 Southern harbors. His army consisted of several thou- 
 sand well-armed mulatto troops and a considerable num- 
 ber of black regiments under mulatto officers. 12 Further- 
 
THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 263 
 
 more it was impossible to send an expedition against him. 
 The English still occupied most of the intervening West, 
 while their maroon allies of the Eastern mountains made 
 any flank march via Spanish territory impracticable. 
 
 What he could not effect by force of arms, however, 
 Sonthonax determined to accomplish by indirection. 
 Accordingly, he sent a sub-commission, headed by his 
 henchman General Kerverseau, to "investigate condi- 
 tions in the South." 13 No sooner had this commission 
 arrived, however, than it showed its true purpose in no 
 uncertain fashion. Rigaud's report to the French Gov- 
 ernment details the doings of Sonthonax's pupils. "The 
 delegates had scarcely landed at Tiburon," he writes, 
 "when they began to sow dissension among the troops. 
 'Why,' they asked the negro subalterns, 'are you not 
 commanders like the mulattoes?' and to the soldiers, 
 'Why are you not advanced in grade? Join the whites, 
 then, to exterminate these people and have their places.' 
 On their journey to Les Cayes many idle and vagabond 
 negroes came to them, complaining of the punishments 
 inflicted by the inspectors of labor. To these people the 
 delegates replied, ' We are come hither to end the tyranny J 
 of the mulattoes. Tell your comrades that they are free j 
 and that no one can force them to labor.' " 14 From other 
 accounts of the delegates' conduct this picture appears 
 substantially correct. 15 The Civil Commissioners com- 
 plain to the Directoire that the Southern troubles were 
 caused by their delegates' efforts "to insure the equal 
 happiness of all citizens; from having wished to destroy 
 a new aristocracy." 16 
 
 It could not be expected that the mulattoes would 
 
264 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 long tolerate such efforts to destroy their supremacy. Ac- 
 cordingly, Rigaud soon left Les Cayes, ostensibly to direct 
 some military operations against the English, and in his 
 opportune absence agents rode through the Plain incit- 
 ing the negroes to rise against the delegates "who had 
 brought chains to reenslave them," and telling the igno- 
 rant cultivators "that since the mulattoes and the ne- 
 groes were the true inhabitants and owners of the colony, 
 everything belonged to them, while the whites should be 
 driven out or exterminated." 17 The ruse worked as suc- 
 cessfully with the Southern negroes as with their brethren 
 of Port-de-Paix. On the 10th Fructidor (27th of August), 
 a general rising took place, the few remaining white 
 inhabitants were exterminated, and the delegates were 
 dragged ignominiously to prison. It is true that Rigaud 
 soon reappeared and released the delegates, but they 
 were so obviously under duress that the Civil Commis- 
 sioners promptly recalled them to Le Cap. Sonthonax 
 was furious but helpless, and Rigaud remained absolute 
 master of the South. 18 Sonthonax frankly confessed his 
 utter failure when eight months later he wrote the Minis- 
 ter of Marine, "The South is quiet, but Rigaud is ever 
 rebellious to authority. Since the massacres he has gov- 
 erned those parts like a Nabob : that is to say, his will 
 is law. The military power is all; the civil authority 
 nothing." 19 
 
 Meanwhile, at Le Cap, Sonthonax had been steadily 
 clearing his path. Giraud was easily bullied into a nervous 
 collapse and left voluntarily for France. Leblanc was of 
 sterner stuff, but he presently died, — not without sus- 
 picions of poison. As for the mulatto Raymond, he 
 
THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 265 
 
 showed himself too much of a coward to be dangerous, 
 and as he was obviously a useful figurehead for future 
 moves against his caste, both Sonthonax and Toussaint 
 agreed that it was best to let him remain. 
 
 Save for the distant Roume at Spanish Santo Domingo, 
 the only prominent European still left in the island was 
 General Laveaux — and him Sonthonax now disposed of 
 by a clever trick. The French Constitution of the Year 
 III had declared San Domingo an integral part of France, 
 and had assigned the island a number of seats in the na- 
 tional legislative bodies. Sonthonax determined to have 
 Laveaux elected deputy for ^an Domingo and thus re- 
 move him from the scene. In this plan Toussaint Louver- 
 ture heartily agreed. Laveaux was altogether too popular 
 with the negro generals for Toussaint's liking, and his 
 stanch Republican ideals might cause trouble on some 
 future occasion. Accordingly an election was held, and as 
 General Michel threatened to burn Le Cap if the result 
 was unfavorable, it is not surprising that Laveaux was 
 "elected" by an overwhelming majority. 20 
 
 How close were the relations between Sonthonax and 
 Toussaint at this moment is shown by a letter from the 
 black leader to the Directoire. It opens characteristically 
 by a great deal of fulsome flattery, and after the usual 
 invocation of Heaven's blessing upon San Domingo, it 
 expresses the greatest admiration for Sonthonax and 
 Raymond. "The people are attached to the former as the 
 founder of their liberty, and love the latter for the vir- / 
 tues which so honor him." Another phrase of this letter 
 could not have been wholly pleasing to its recipients. 
 "So long as the people are governed by men as wise as 
 
266 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 those who have thus far guided its destinies," Toussaint 
 informs the Directoire, "France will always find the peo- 
 ple obedient " ; and adds significantly, " I assure you of the 
 truth of this, Citizen Directors; — I being its chief." 21 
 
 Sonthonax had thus rid himself of the last annoying 
 European presence. Unfortunately, although his own 
 road was clear, he now made the unpleasant discovery 
 that he himself stood in the path of Toussaint Louver- 
 ture. The black leader had been as willing as Sonthonax 
 to see the principal Europeans removed from the island, 
 but now that this was done, the presence of the ambi- 
 tious Commissioner was both unnecessary and dangerous. 
 It is therefore not surprising that Sonthonax himself was 
 presently "elected" deputy from San Domingo. Son- 
 thonax did not at all relish this promotion and attempted 
 to gain support among the black generals, but Toussaint's 
 eagle eye was upon him and these plottings merely has- 
 tened the denouement. On August 20, 1797, Toussaint 
 suddenly appeared at Le Cap with several thousand men 
 and urged Sonthonax to take up his legislative duties in 
 France. There was no denying this pressing invitation. 
 The greatest politeness was observed on both sides, but 
 the furious Sonthonax was none the less escorted on 
 shipboard next day. The craven Raymond alone re- 
 mained as Toussaint's passive instrument. 22 
 
 The last white authority in French San Domingo had 
 thus disappeared, but Toussaint was by no means easy 
 for the future. He well knew that his expulsion of Son- 
 thonax was a virtual act of rebellion which the Directoire 
 would bitterly resent. And this was not all. France was 
 no longer the France of the Terror. Robespierre lay a 
 
THE THIRD CIVIL COMMISSIONERS 267 
 
 full four years in his grave, and meanwhile the conserva- 
 tive tide had been sweeping steadily on. Colonists were 
 no longer hunted down as "Aristocrates de la Peau"; 
 instead, they were given a respectful hearing on colonial 
 questions, and in the National Legislature itself voices had 
 been raised for the restoration of the old colonial system. 
 
 Toussaint's alarm showed in his measures. A special 
 envoy was sent to the Directoire to explain his recent 
 action, and in a long memoir on the late events Tous- 
 saint made the extraordinary assertion that Sonthonax 
 had proposed secession from France and their establish- 
 ment as joint sovereigns of San Domingo. 23 From Son- 
 thonax this brought forth the following caustic reply: 
 "As to the charge of fomenting independence, I have but 
 two words to say: Toussaint speaks only Creole, hardly 
 understands French, and is perfectly incapable of uttering 
 the language with which he is credited. 24 Up to this time 
 no one has ever accused me of stupidity; nevertheless, 
 this ridiculous conversation makes me a schoolboy under 
 the ferule, stammering absurdities and brought to order 
 by his pedagogue." After asking the Directoire to search 
 his whole career for one word which might support Tous- 
 saint's assertions, Sonthonax concludes, "Certes, if any 
 one should be suspected of independence it is he whose 
 whole political life has been one long revolt against 
 France. Toussaint has fooled two kings; he may well end 
 by betraying the Republic." 25 
 
 The attitude of Toussaint Louverture was certainly 
 not one of submission. His letter to the Directoire of 
 September, 1797, opens with the usual flattering phrases, 
 and "takes this occasion to renew the assurance of my 
 
268 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 inviolable attachment for France"; but goes on in the 
 following strain: "It is to this sentiment, so deeply 
 graven upon my heart, that France owes the preserva- 
 tion of San Domingo. By this time all would have been 
 over if, forgetting the benefits received by the negroes 
 from its immortal decree, I myself had set the example 
 of ingratitude. Independence would have been pro- 
 claimed, and instead of submissive and grateful children, 
 France would have found us only rebels." 26 
 
 Still more menacing was Toussaint's warning to the Di- 
 rectoire not to heed the growing demand for the sending 
 of an army to restore San Domingo to French authority. 
 After assuring the Directoire that he knew its wisdom 
 and virtue would never permit it to listen to such pro- 
 jects, Toussaint continues, "You will permit only Re- 
 publican Frenchmen to come to San Domingo. These 
 we will receive fraternally; but we will ever repel those 
 rash enough to dare tamper with the rights guaranteed us 
 by the Constitution. How would the negroes regard the 
 arrival of a European French army if they knew that 
 their enemies had brought about its arrival in this 
 country for the carrying out of liberticidal projects? . . . 
 Citizen Directors, I swear to you that I will die before I 
 will see snatched from my hands that sword, those arms, 
 which France has confided to me for the defence of her 
 rights, for the rights of humanity, and for the triumph of 
 liberty and equality!" 27 
 
 Small wonder that early in 1798 the alarmed Direc- 
 toire, its hands still tied by the English war, sent the able 
 General Hedouville to repeat his conciliatory triumphs in 
 the Vendee by a diplomatic pacification of San Domingo. 
 
XXIII 
 
 THE MISSION OF GENERAL HEDOUVILLE 
 
 The sending of General Hedouville to San Domingo 
 proved the Directoire's fear of Toussaint Louverture. 
 For Hedouville was one of the Directoire's ablest serv- 
 ants. A man of keen insight and strong personality, 
 his considerable military ability was outshone by his 
 remarkable diplomatic talents. His recent exploits in the 
 pacification of the Vendee had marked him out as one of 
 the strong men of the Republic. The Directoire's action 
 thus showed both soundness of judgment and sense of 
 reality. Matters had gone so far in San Domingo that 
 only the Machiavellian dilemma remained. "Crush or 
 conciliate"; — that was the sole alternative: and since 
 Toussaint Louverture could be crushed only by a large 
 army which could not be sent until the close of the Eng- 
 lish war, conciliation was the one policy which for the 
 present stood any chance of success. Toussaint himself 
 had warned the Directors that half-measures would be 
 fatal. 1 But a man of strong personality and diplomatic 
 ability might dominate the black leader; or, at least, 
 hold the balance between the colored castes till an Eng- 
 lish peace should give France the choice of other means. 
 
 It was toward the end of March, 1798, that Hedouville 
 landed at Spanish Santo Domingo to take counsel of 
 Roume and the other French officials there before begin- 
 ning his hazardous undertaking. But the tidings which 
 
270 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 met him in the Spanish capital must have greatly in- 
 creased his disquietude. Toussaint's apprehensions re- 
 garding the possible action of the Directoire had been 
 translating themselves into most vigorous measures. It 
 was perfectly clear that any decisive action against the 
 rival mulatto power in the South must be preceded by the 
 expulsion of the English from the island. Accordingly, 
 no sooner had the departure of Sonthonax freed his hands 
 for the moment than Toussaint began formidable prep- 
 arations against the foreign enemy. The English were 
 in evil case. The failure of General Howe's great effort 
 in the autumn of 1795 had convinced the British Gov- 
 ernment that the conquest of San Domingo was impos- 
 sible, and for the last two years the English had been hang- 
 ing on by mere inertia and by the preoccupation of their 
 opponents. Even so, they had steadily lost ground, and 
 they now possessed only a strip of the west coast and the 
 two isolated strongholds of the Grande Anse in the South 
 and the Mole-Saint-Nicolas in the North. 
 
 As soon as Toussaint began his preparations, therefore, 
 the English commander realized that the days of British 
 rule in San Domingo were numbered; but since this con- 
 tingency had been long foreseen, he hoped to balance 
 British territorial loss by commercial gains and by politi- 
 cal damage to France. For the English fully realized the 
 conflicting aims of the Republic and of Toussaint Lou- 
 verture. Could they but play upon this fact to obtain 
 Toussaint's friendship, they might hope to deprive the 
 French Republic of that island which they could not hold 
 themselves, and also, by commercial privileges, partially 
 to recoup their enormous losses. Accordingly, when 
 
MISSION OF GENERAL HEDOUVILLE 271 
 
 Toussaint and his army appeared in the West, he was 
 met by courteous envoys who flattered his pride with 
 their attentions and fed his ambition by their hints and 
 proposals. The campaign became one of notes and con- 
 ferences. 2 
 
 All this convinced Hedouville that no time was to be 
 lost, and on April 21 he arrived at Le Cap. His first acts 
 were well calculated to restore French prestige : his cold 
 reception of Raymond emphasized the Directoire's dis- 
 pleasure at the expulsion of Sonthonax, its agent, while 
 a summons to both Toussaint and Rigaud to appear 
 before him at Le Cap announced the primacy of the 
 Republic's special representative. 3 Both Toussaint and 
 Rigaud obeyed the summons, though the conference 
 which followed was of a purely formal nature. Hedou- 
 ville realized that the expulsion of the English was as \ 
 desirable for the Republic as for Toussaint himself, and ] 
 determined to postpone all questions of internal policy 
 until this end had been attained. 
 
 But Hedouville was unable long to maintain this reso- 
 lution. As representative of the French Republic he was 
 forced to hold a certain supervisory attitude over the 
 English negotiations on penalty of losing all his prestige 
 and appearing as the passive instrument of Toussaint's 
 will. But the course of these negotiations was fast as- 
 suming a character which called for the active inter- 
 ference of the Republic's representative. On the 2d of 
 May, the English general signed an agreement with 
 Toussaint for the evacuation of Port-au-Prince and all 
 the other posts in the West. In this same document 
 Toussaint agreed to grant full amnesty to all the English 
 
272 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 partisans — a clause absolutely contravening the French 
 laws regarding traitors and emigres. And to this first 
 difficulty, the English general soon added another blow 
 at Hedouville's position : he presently offered to surrender 
 the Mole to the French representative, then acceded to 
 Toussaint's protest and delivered the fortress to the 
 black leader. The circumstances of this surrender were 
 striking in the extreme and emphasized yet more strongly 
 the flouting of Hedouville's authority. Toussaint, re- 
 ceived with regal honors, again agreed to amnesty the 
 English partisans in defiance of Hedouville's express pro- 
 hibition, and signed a secret agreement giving the Eng- 
 lish extensive rights of trade. 4 Lacroix asserts that the 
 English had hoped for much more than this. "I myself 
 and the other staff officers as well," he writes, "saw in the 
 archives captured at Port-au-Prince the secret proposals 
 which were the cause of those public demonstrations. 5 
 These proposals were to the effect that Toussaint Lou- 
 verture should declare himself King of Haiti, and Mait- 
 land 6 assured him that England would at once recognize 
 him as such if at the moment of assuming the crown 
 he signed a commercial treaty by which England should 
 have the exclusive right of exporting the island's colonial 
 products and of importing manufactured articles. The 
 King of Haiti would then be assured the constant pres- 
 ence of an English squadron to protect him against 
 France." 7 
 
 But Toussaint Louverture took no such action. The 
 mulatto power was still unbroken; his own authority over 
 the black generals was far from secure; lastly, since the 
 Peace of Campo Formio, 8 England was left alone against 
 
MISSION OF GENERAL HEDOUVILLE 273 
 
 France, and for months past had been openly menaced 
 with a French invasion headed by the rising genius 
 of General Bonaparte. Toussaint continued to proclaim 
 his loyalty to the Republic. 
 
 Nevertheless, his defiance of the Republic's laws ren- 
 dered a struggle with its San Domingo representative in- 
 evitable. Hedouville had recognized this fact and was 
 already making his preparations. The obvious counter- 
 poise to Toussaint's power was the mulatto caste, and 
 a journey of Rigaud to Le Cap revealed Hedouville's 
 intentions for the future. Of this journey Toussaint was 
 well aware, yet he made no move to prevent the inter- 
 view. His intentions for this reserved attitude are shown 
 by the following statements made to a white colonist 
 then high in his service. "I have from a Creole worthy 
 of every confidence, now a resident of Paris," writes 
 Lacroix, "that one day he was talking with Toussaint 
 Louverture when some negro officers came in great alarm 
 to inform him that Rigaud had passed through Port- 
 au-Prince en route for Le Cap. 'Let Monsieur Rigaud 
 go get his instructions from the agent of the Directoire,' 
 answered Toussaint. 'Do not be alarmed. Go.' The 
 officers obeyed, and my informant started also. 'No,' 
 said Toussaint to him, 'stay. You are never too much 
 with me'; and he continued the following monologue in a 
 far-away voice: 'I might have him stopped; — but God 
 keep me from it. I need Monsieur Rigaud — he is violent 
 — he suits me to make war with — that war which is 
 necessary to me. The mulatto caste is higher than mine; 
 if I did away with Monsieur Rigaud, they might perhaps 
 find a better man. I know Monsieur Rigaud. He is vio- 
 
274 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 lent. He lets his horse go when he gallops. He shows his 
 arm when he strikes. I gallop, too, but I curb; and when I 
 strike, men feel but do not see. Monsieur Rigaud knows 
 how' to make insurrections only by blood and massacre; 
 I also know how to move the people. He trembles, does 
 Monsieur Rigaud, when he sees the people he has excited 
 in fury. I do not suffer fury; when I appear all must be 
 quiet again.'" 9 
 
 The mulattoes' hour had not yet struck, but Hedou- 
 ville's time was^come: the man who had dared measure 
 himself against Toussaint Louverture could not be tol- 
 erated in San Domingo. Suddenly the North Plain, the 
 very streets of Le Cap, swarmed with emissaries crying 
 that Hedouville had come to restore slavery. The French 
 general protested loudly, but found his words so much 
 idle wind against the credulity of the negroes, "who, 
 however much they may be maltreated by their chiefs, 
 look upon their word as oracles." 10 Soon the dull roar of 
 insurrection swept across the Plain, the negroes "being 
 quickened by their erotic dances, especially by one around 
 a bull's skull lighted inside." On the night of October 20, 
 a vast horde of negroes appeared before the outskirts of 
 Le Cap, and when the garrison learned that Toussaint 
 was in their midst it refused to offer resistance. Hedou- 
 ville saw that the game was up. Collecting the few hun- 
 dred European troops in the town, and followed by about 
 a thousand whites, mulattoes, and free negroes who espe- 
 cially feared Toussaint's vengeance, he set sail for France. 
 His parting shot was a proclamation solemnly warning 
 the inhabitants of the island against Toussaint's plans 
 of independence, and orders to Rigaud not to obey the 
 
MISSION OF GENERAL HEDOUVILLE 275 
 
 black leader's commands. The pacifier of the Vendee 
 had lost his laurels in San Domingo. 
 
 Hedouville's reflections upon the situation are most 
 interesting. "The facts I have related," he writes the 
 Directoire, "show that all Toussaint's protestations of 
 attachment to the Republic were false; that his sole aim 
 has been to preserve that arbitrary authority usurped be- 
 fore my arrival in the colony; and that even before that 
 time he had been secretly negotiating with Maitland for 
 the evacuation of the English posts on conditions that 
 assured the return of the emigres, free trade with the Eng- 
 lish and Americans, and his de facto Independence n ; — 
 covering his ingratitude, meanwhile, by oaths of fidelity. 
 
 "But, presently, Toussaint Louverture will deceive all 
 those enemies of ours whose tool he may at this time 
 appear, and in the end he will oppress and cover with 
 humiliation those whites whom he fears as much as he 
 hates; yes, even those among them who are especially 
 bound to him and who have encouraged him in his meas- 
 ures. . . . Toussaint Louverture now receives the Emigres 
 with open arms : yet at the same time he never ceases to 
 fill the cultivators with suspicion against all white men, 
 to the end that these may never succeed in destroying his 
 despotism. He is heaping up great wealth by the sale 
 of colonial products to the English and Americans, and 
 to-day San Domingo is practically lost to France. If the 
 Directoire cannot take the very strong necessary meas- 
 ures, the sole hope of checking Toussaint Louverture 
 even for the moment lies in sedulously fostering the hate 
 which exists between the mulattoes and negrpes, and by 
 opposing Rigaud to Toussaint Louverture." 12 
 
XXIV 
 
 THE WAR BETWEEN THE CASTES 
 
 If Toussaint had feared the anger of the Directoire 
 after Sonthonax's removal, he was still more alarmed at 
 the possible consequences of his expulsion of Hedouville. 
 For Hedouville was one of the strong men of the French 
 Republic and would certainly throw all his influence 
 in favor of vigorous action. Furthermore, the French 
 agent's parting orders had been a heavy blow to Tous- 
 saint Louverture. They had legalized the future resist- 
 ance of Rigaud and had shifted the Republic's moral 
 sanction to the side of the mulattoes. Lastly, there was 
 a distinct possibility that the Directoire would decide to 
 back Rigaud with French troops. 
 
 All this made it necessary to strike the decisive blow 
 against the mulattoes. And yet, for the moment, Tous- 
 saint still held his hand. The cause of this restraint bears 
 witness to the political sagacity of this extraordinary 
 man. Toussaint was now quite alone in French San 
 Domingo, for by this time Raymond had gone the way 
 of his colleagues. With the approach of the decisive 
 struggle between the negro and the mulatto castes even 
 the subservient Raymond could not be trusted to act 
 against his race; wherefore the usual " election " had called 
 the mulatto Commissioner to a seat in the French Legis- 
 lature as a deputy for San Domingo. But French au- 
 thority was still represented by Roume, — for the last 
 
THE WAR BETWEEN THE CASTES 277 
 
 two years Civil Commissioner in Spanish Santo Domingo. 
 During these two years, however, Toussaint had care- 
 fully studied this man and had by now quite taken his 
 measure. Roume was no Sonthonax to change his opin- 
 ions with the times. He still remained the humanitarian 
 enthusiast of 1792, and his ideals had been neither shat- 
 tered by the Terror nor shelved after Thermidor. Tous- 
 saint felt certain that by personal contact his own strong 
 personality could win the doctrinaire enthusiast to his 
 support and thereby regain that moral sanction of the 
 Republic's name lost since his rupture with Hedouville. 
 
 Accordingly he besought Roume to come to French 
 San Domingo as arbiter between himself and Rigaud, 
 and once Roume had accepted this proposal Toussaint 
 quickly gained complete ascendancy over the French- 
 man's weaker personality. How complete was Tous- 
 saint's triumph is revealed by Roume's letters to the 
 Minister of Marine. "Every opinion that I have held 
 hitherto," he writes from Port-au-Prince on the 11th of 
 February, 1799, "is quite beneath the actual merit of this 
 great man. We understand each other perfectly and do 
 not differ on a single point. . . . Toussaint Louverture and 
 the other black generals are truly the saviors of San Do- 
 mingo and the benefactors of France." Roume was quite 
 out of sympathy with the mulattoes and with Hedou- 
 ville's policy of their support. Toussaint, asserted Roume, 
 had the devotion of nine tenths of the population; Ri- 
 gaud that of only one tenth. Hedouville's idea of support- 
 ing this minority seemed to Roume "un-Republican and 
 Machiavellian. I, on the contrary," he contends, "see 
 the guarantee of San Domingo's loyalty in the happiness 
 
278 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 of its inhabitants and the constitutional organization 
 of the country." He begs the Directoire to grant Tous- 
 saint and his partisans a full pardon for all past acts, 
 especially those connected with the expulsion of Hedou- 
 ville. "If this be done," he continues, "I guarantee that 
 the negro army will be gradually reduced, and that the 
 newly landed European will soon be unable to perceive 
 any difference between the departments of France and of 
 San Domingo." He ends with a warm defence of Tous- 
 saint's reception of the emigres. According to Roume an 
 era of universal fraternity was breaking over San Do- 
 mingo ; all the colors had forgotten their former discords 
 and were looking upon one another as brothers. 1 Un- 
 fortunately Roume saw with the eye of faith rather than 
 of fact: the unhappy island was about to be convulsed 
 by a death-struggle which for sheer horror would exceed 
 anything that had gone before. 2 
 
 Roume 's first act was to call a conference between 
 Toussaint and Rigaud for the settlement of their dis- 
 putes. The mulatto leader must have attended with 
 great reluctance, since Roume's letter of invitation de- 
 scribed his black rival as "a virtuous man," a "philoso- 
 pher," and "a good citizen devoted to France." 3 Still, 
 nothing was to be gained by refusal, and the meeting soon 
 took place at Port-au-Prince. Here, however, Rigaud 
 found that his surmises were correct. At this time his 
 sphere embraced not merely the South, but also the 
 southern districts of the West Province to the walls of 
 Leogane. Yet in the settlement proposed by Roume the 
 mulatto leader was required to give up nearly all these 
 Western districts to the authority of Toussaint Louver- 
 
THE WAR BETWEEN THE CASTES 279 
 
 ture. As this would have meant Rigaud's virtual impris- 
 onment within the remote peninsula of the South, it is 
 not surprising that the mulatto leader left in a rage and 
 broke off the negotiations. This was just what Toussaint 
 had wanted, for the flouted mediator was greatly incensed 
 at Rigaud's conduct and clove yet tighter to the side 
 of Toussaint Louverture. 
 
 The decisive struggle was now plainly at hand, and 
 Toussaint began his preparations. Troops assembled at 
 Port-au-Prince while the black leader started on a flying 
 trip to secure the doubtful quarters of the West and 
 North. Before his departure he warned the mulatto pop- 
 ulation of Port-au-Prince against the consequences of 
 rebellion. Ordering them to assemble in the main church 
 of the town, he denounced from the pulpit a vast mulatto 
 conspiracy against his life and closed with these ominous 
 words: "General Rigaud refuses to obey me because I 
 am black. Mulattoes, I see to the bottom of your souls. 
 You are ready to rise against me. But, in leaving Port- 
 Republicain for Le Cap, I leave my eye and my arm: 
 my eye to watch, my arm to strike." 4 
 
 Toward the end of April, Toussaint formally de- 
 nounced Rigaud as a traitor, and when the mulatto leader 
 quoted Hedouville's instructions, Roume also proclaimed 
 him guilty of treason and rebellion against France. 
 Nevertheless, although Toussaint soon gathered an army 
 of ten thousand men at Port-au-Prince, the campaign 
 began with a serious reverse. In early June the command- 
 ant of Leogane, a free negro of the Old Regime, went over 
 to his caste and betrayed this bulwark of Port-au-Prince 
 to Rigaud. Moreover, this was the signal for further 
 
280 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 trouble. The mulatto stronghold of the Artibonite rose 
 in arms, while in the North a general mulatto insurrec- 
 tion broke out aided by several black leaders converted 
 by Hedouville's diplomacy to hostility to Toussaint Lou- 
 verture. Even General Michel, the black commander of 
 Le Cap, was involved in the movement. 
 
 If Rigaud had acted promptly, there is no telling what 
 might have happened: unfortunately for the mulatto 
 cause his measures lacked promptness while Toussaint's 
 moves were the springs of an infuriated tiger. Gathering 
 his picked troops and most trusted generals, Toussaint 
 fell like a thunderbolt upon the Artibonite, then dashed 
 straight for Le Cap, while his terrible lieutenant Des- 
 salines raced for the other rebel centre at the Mole-Saint- 
 Nicolas. The punishment of the North was frightful. 
 The mulattoes and free negroes were butchered en masse; 
 the survivors were broken by torture and by conscription 
 into black regiments where life was made one long agony. 
 Toussaint characteristically announced the close of the 
 massacres by a sermon to the surviving mulattoes of Le 
 Cap on the Christian duty of pardoning one's enemies. 5 
 
 The way was now clear for the attack on the South. 
 Rigaud's mulatto soldiery opposed a furious resistance 
 and even his black regiments fought stoutly against their 
 brethren of the North, but by the turn of the year, after 
 three months' desperate fighting, Toussaint's superior 
 numbers had driven Rigaud into the peninsula of the 
 South. However, this was only the beginning. The nar- 
 row neck connecting Rigaud's territory with the main- 
 land was covered by the fortress of Jacmel, a place of 
 great strength held by the flower of Rigaud's mulatto 
 
THE WAR BETWEEN THE CASTES 
 
 soldiery under his best lieutenant, Petion. Until Jacmel 
 had fallen, Toussaint dare not plunge into the mountain- 
 ous fastnesses of the South, so for three months the ter- 
 rible Dessalines broke his teeth against the bastions of 
 Jacmel while Toussaint held off the relieving columns of 
 Rigaud. At last, on the night of March 11, 1800, Petion 
 abandoned the ruined town and cut his way through the 
 black lines. The gate was down at last, and Toussaint's 
 army poured on to the conquest of the South. 
 
 Then began a struggle whose horrors have probably 
 never been surpassed. Neither side dreamed of quarter, 
 and the only prisoners taken were those reserved for tor- 
 ture. So ferocious was the racial hatred of the combat- 
 ants that men often tore one another to pieces with their 
 teeth. 6 But the end was now only a question of time. On 
 July 5, Rigaud's army was crushed at Acquin and the 
 shattered remnants took refuge in Les Cayes. The town 
 was strong and Rigaud still breathed defiance, but the 
 efforts of Roume and a French officer named Vincent 
 finally persuaded him to avoid the further shedding of 
 blood. On the last day of July, Rigaud and his principal 
 officers took ship for the Danish island of Saint Thomas, 
 while his mulatto corps d'elite, some seven hundred 
 strong, retired to Cuba rather than obey the orders of 
 a black. 7 
 
 It was on August 1, 1800, that Toussaint Louverture 
 made his triumphal entry into Les Cayes. After a solemn 
 Te Deum for his victory, Toussaint mounted the pulpit 
 according to his wont and promised a general pardon. 
 But this was only a ruse. Toussaint knew that the mu- 
 lattoes were his irreconcilable enemies, and he had no 
 
FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 mind to see himself stabbed in the back at the height of 
 some future struggle with France. He therefore appointed 
 the sinister Dessalines Governor of the South with gen- 
 eral orders 8 for the "pacification" of the country. And 
 Dessalines did not disappoint his master. Backed by- 
 overwhelming masses of negro troops, this ferocious 
 brute born in the wilds of the Congo traversed in turn 
 the districts of the South. Not by sudden massacre, but 
 slowly and methodically, the mulatto population was 
 weeded out. Men, women, and children were systemati- 
 cally done to death, generally after excruciating tortures 
 chief among which was Dessalines's own special inven- 
 tion, — a form of impalement christened "The Bayonet." 
 The number of persons who perished in this atrocious 
 proscription is usually estimated at ten thousand. 9 Tous- 
 saint's comment was characteristic. Reproached with 
 Dessalines's cruelty he answered, "I told him to prune 
 the tree, not to uproot it." 10 
 
 Eighteen hundred was, indeed, an evil year for San 
 Domingo: to the depopulation of the South was added 
 the economic ruin of the West. For during those same 
 autumn months which witnessed Dessalines's grim prog- 
 ress through the South, the rains fell upon the island as 
 they had never fallen within the memory of man. The 
 raging mountain torrents soon overwhelmed the great 
 irrigation dams of the Artibonite and Cul-de-Sac, al- 
 ready neglected for the past ten years, and since there 
 was no French capital to repair the loss the prosperity 
 of the semi-arid West 11 vanished forever. 12 The curse 
 of Heaven seemed to have fallen upon the unhappy 
 country. 
 
XXV 
 
 THE TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 
 
 So far back as December, 1799, when his columns had 
 barely appeared before Jacmel, Toussaint Louverture had 
 begun to prepare for the next step in his ambitious career. 
 In that month he had demanded of Roume authorization 
 to occupy Spanish Santo Domingo. We have seen that 
 by the Treaty of Bale, in 1795, Spain had ceded her por- 
 tion of the island to the French Republic, but it must also 
 be remembered that by the express desire of France she 
 had agreed to retain possession until an English peace 
 should enable the Republic to occupy the country. The 
 Directoire's intentions were precise on this point, and 
 Roume's instructions had been explicit in their prohi- 
 bition of any amalgamation with the French portion. 
 Hitherto Roume had appeared the blind instrument of 
 Toussaint's ambition, but as a matter of fact his attitude 
 had come more from the strength of his convictions than 
 from moral cowardice or subservience. Therefore, when 
 Toussaint demanded of Roume something clearly for- 
 bidden by the explicit will of France, he was chagrined 
 to receive an uncompromising refusal. 1 
 
 For the moment Toussaint could not afford to break 
 with the French representative. The resistance of Jacmel 
 revealed the power of Rigaud and the slightest reverse 
 might still have been fatal. But as soon as the fall of 
 Jacmel had made his eventual triumph a certainty, Tous- 
 
284 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 saint showed the French agent what it meant to thwart 
 his will. The old tragi-comedy already played upon Son- 
 thonax and Hedouville was now enacted for the benefit 
 of Roume. Toussaint's brutal nephew Moyse, already 
 noted for his hatred of the white race, roused the wild 
 negroes of the hinterland, descended upon Le Cap, and 
 subjected the helpless Roume to insults and menaces. 
 After a fortnight of this maltreatment, Toussaint ap- 
 peared and rescued the frightened man, but let him know 
 at the same time that further obstinacy might be fatal 
 to the whole white population of the colony. So terrified 
 was Roume by all this that on April 27, 1800, he granted 
 the required authorization. 
 
 It was no mere lust of conquest which spurred Tous- 
 saint to these extreme measures. In the preceding au- 
 tumn the 18th Brumaire 2 had made General Bonaparte 
 master of France, and Toussaint's European agents 3 
 assured him that the young dictator would draw the 
 reins of French authority far tighter than had the 
 weak and discredited Directoire. A struggle with France 
 had become more than ever an ultimate certainty, and 
 in that struggle Toussaint could not afford to leave his 
 whole flank open to attack. 
 
 How well Toussaint had judged the necessity for haste 
 was quickly shown. An entire week before Roume's 
 capitulation, a French Commission had landed at Santo 
 Domingo with letters and proclamations from Bona- 
 parte. 4 The proclamation, it is true, was of a reassuring 
 nature, and the letters confirmed Toussaint in his existing 
 rank and dignities, but despite Bonaparte's evident de- 
 sire to avoid a rupture for the moment there was much 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 285 
 
 to rouse the black leader's alarm. The Commissioners 
 were authorized to mediate a truce between Toussaint 
 and Rigaud, and the French Government's 1 determina- 
 tion to maintain the separation of Spanish Santo Do- 
 mingo was explicitly stated. 5 The personnel of this new 
 Commission was also significant. Its members were 
 Vincent, a white officer with long experience in San 
 Domingo, who, though friendly to Toussaint, had never 
 swerved in loyalty to France; the mulatto Raymond; and 
 one General Michel, 6 an expert well able to discern the 
 true military situation. 
 
 Toussaint's action, however, showed that he was re- 
 solved on no half -measures. The Commissioners' prestige 
 was promptly destroyed by their rough arrest by Moyse 
 and their appearance as prisoners at Le Cap. Of course, 
 Toussaint at once released them and disavowed his 
 nephew's action, but he expressed great indignation at 
 the proposed truce with Rigaud, neglected to publish 
 Bonaparte's conciliatory proclamation, and shipped the 
 intractable General Michel back to France. 
 
 However, Toussaint well knew that it was an ill thing 
 to juggle with the new First Consul. He had received 
 Bonaparte's commands and he had defied them: only 
 decisive action remained. Nevertheless, Toussaint's first 
 attempt on Santo Domingo ended in disaster. Rigaud's 
 still unbroken power in the South made the sending of an 
 army over the Eastern mountains as yet impossible, but 
 early in May Toussaint despatched a white officer with 
 a detachment of black soldiers by sea to take formal 
 possession of the Spanish capital. No sooner had these 
 emissaries landed, however, than the French agent and 
 
286 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 the Spanish Governor united in refusing to disobey the 
 orders of their respective Governments. And this was 
 not all. The population of Santo Domingo showed 
 greater hostility than the authorities. In the Spanish 
 colony negroes were few, 7 and if the whites abhorred 
 black rule, it is easy to imagine the feelings of the mulatto 
 majority toward the adversary of Rigaud. At sight of 
 Toussaint's black soldiers the population rose in fury, 
 and only an escort of Spanish troops to the border saved 
 them from massacre. Furthermore, the news of this 
 unexpected event had important results in French San 
 Domingo : Roume was encouraged to revoke his authori- 
 zation, and in July he wrote the Spanish Governor that 
 no occupation would take place. 
 
 But these were mere idle words. In August the South 
 lay at Toussaint's feet and by the late autumn Des- 
 salines's proscription had crushed the mulatto caste once 
 for all. 8 As soon as Toussaint's army was thus released 
 for foreign service, the black leader struck quick and 
 hard. Roume (once more left to the brutalities of Moyse) 
 was dragged off to the Western mountains, while the pro- 
 tests of Vincent were answered by veiled imprisonment. 
 The cowardly Raymond, once more Toussaint's passive 
 tool, was contemptuously disregarded. Early in Janu- 
 ary, 1801, two strong armies crossed the border. The 
 northern column under Moyse overran the back coun- 
 try, while the main body under Toussaint himself struck 
 straight for Santo Domingo. Against these overwhelming 
 forces the slender Spanish garrison could do nothing; the 
 population was too cowed by the recent horrors of the 
 South to offer any resistance; and on the 28th of January, 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE it 
 
 1801, Toussaint Louverture made his triumphal entry 
 into the Spanish capital. Within a month he was abso- 
 lute master of the whole country. 
 
 Toussaint's settlement of the conquered territory again 
 showed his political sagacity. The land was strongly held 
 by four thousand black soldiers, it is true, but these were 
 picked troops kept under iron discipline, while their com- 
 mander was not a negro, but the mulatto Clervaux. The 
 abolition of customs lines was a great economic boon to 
 the Spanish colony, and this material prosperity aided 
 in quieting hostility, albeit San Domingo's welcome to 
 Napoleon's army in 1802 showed that Toussaint had 
 not succeeded in really reconciling the population to his 
 rule. 9 
 
 Toussaint Louverture was at last master of all San 
 Domingo. And yet he faced the future with the gravest 
 disquietude. His success had been gained only at the 
 price of virtual rebellion against France and defiance of 
 the terrible First Consul. The moment an English peace 
 should free Bonaparte's hands, Toussaint knew that he 
 was marked for destruction, while ten years of race war 
 and social dissolution had so worn San Domingo down 
 that only superhuman exertions could make her ready for 
 the blow which lay in store. Up to this moment Tous- 
 saint had been absorbed in a series of struggles which had 
 precluded any reconstructive measures, and his power, 
 though no longer threatened by domestic enemies, thus 
 rested on most insecure foundations. 
 
 The terrible condition of San Domingo during these 
 years is well shown by the series of secret reports drawn 
 up for the French Government by various trusted agents 
 
d FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 and officials. How matters stood at the time of Hedou- 
 ville's expulsion in the autumn of 1798 may be gathered 
 from the report of General Becker, one of the high officers 
 on Hedouville's staff. Becker did not have a high opinion 
 of Toussaint's army and thought it could offer little re- 
 sistance to a powerful European force, since it was "with- 
 out regular discipline or instruction. The number of 
 officers is past counting, especially in the higher grades. 
 Naturally vainglorious, these good fellows believe that 
 once they put on epaulettes they are forthwith com- 
 manders: in reality the best of them are hardly equal to 
 poor European officers, while the rest are of a stupidity 
 such as I have never seen anywhere else. As to the few 
 white officers, instead of being a useful leaven, they are 
 the corrupters of the colony. They flatter the negro and 
 mulatto chiefs, compare them to the greatest heroes, laud 
 their military talents, hail them as the fathers and saviors 
 of the colony, and assert that the government of San Do- 
 mingo really belongs to them." He estimates the black 
 army at about twenty thousand men, though the district 
 generals varied their corps at pleasure. "These com- 
 mandants," he continues, "are in reality so many little 
 monarchs in their respective quarters. They monopolize 
 all the powers of government and obey the higher au- 
 thorities only when it suits them. In a word, they are 
 so many despots, more or less insupportable as they are 
 more or less evil." The civil administration was in com- 
 plete anarchy; the generals requisitioned at pleasure, and 
 the officials were mere spoilsmen. The courts were a farce, 
 and justice was always bought and sold. Becker's vital 
 statistics are the most depressing feature of his entire 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 289 
 
 report. He asserts that the whites had diminished by 
 over two thirds, the mulattoes by one fourth, and that of 
 the vast negro population fully a third had perished. 10 
 
 If such had been the state of San Domingo at the close 
 of 1798, its condition could certainly not have been 
 improved by that frightful struggle between the castes 
 which had brought ruin and massacre to every province. 
 Assuredly the picture presented by confidential reports 
 of that later period fully bears out this hypothesis. Only 
 a month before Toussaint's invasion of Santo Domingo, 
 Chanlatte, the French agent, wrote the following lines 
 to Bonaparte: "The Colony of San Domingo is in the 
 most deplorable state. 11 A civil war between North and 
 South has swept away an immense number of cultivators, 
 and although this war is now over, new troubles have 
 arisen which daily sacrifice fresh victims in all parts of the 
 country. Anarchy in every sense of the word is tearing 
 this unfortunate colony." 12 
 
 What these new troubles were of which Chanlatte 
 speaks is described by the reports of persons in the 
 French portion of the island. In the autumn of 1800 the 
 Minister of Marine presented to the Consuls a long report 
 on San Domingo, compiled from interrogations of re- 
 turned government agents and from the written reports 
 of others still in the island. "According to these," writes 
 the Minister, "the greatest discord reigns between Tous- 
 saint Louverture and the different generals under his 
 orders. General Moyse is on very bad terms with his 
 uncle; he has even shown a desire to supplant him. Des- 
 salines apparently enjoys Toussaint Louverture's chief 
 confidence, but may shortly form a new party different 
 
290 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 from that of Moyse. In such an event, Maurepas, in- 
 clined to revolt like the others, would be ready to join 
 Dessalines. Christophe is excessively discontented with 
 Toussaint Louverture, and the white inhabitants would 
 be for him. . . . The rivalries of Generals Moyse and 
 Dessalines presage new storms for the colony. Tous- 
 saint holds them only by hopes of higher command and 
 greater wealth." 13 
 
 Still more alarming was the report of a French official 
 who had left Le Cap in mid-September. He reported 
 that since Roume's arrest Toussaint had set no bounds 
 to his assumptions of sovereignty, the white officials 
 being completely ignored. Toussaint was buying im- 
 mense quantities of arms and ammunition from the Eng- 
 lish and Americans, paying for them with the state rev- 
 enues. He estimated that thirty thousand muskets had 
 been already imported. Before his departure for France 
 the writer had protested to Moyse, whose answer had 
 been a threat to have the Frenchman shot. The white 
 officials were terrorized and dared not write home, since 
 even official correspondence was systematically violated. 
 New officials coming out from France were being thrown 
 into prison. "There is no law left in San Domingo," as- 
 serts this writer. "The will of General Toussaint and the 
 other generals' arbitrary whims are the basis for all that 
 is done. The commandants are all negroes and have 
 complete authority, while the civil service and judiciary 
 are only an empty farce." He, too, reports grave dissen- 
 sions among the negro generals. At the moment of his 
 departure in mid-September, "Toussaint dared not go 
 to Le Cap for fear of General Moyse. . . . Moyse, more 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 291 
 
 sanguinary but less crafty than Toussaint, has already 
 lifted the mask; he says that he no longer recognizes the 
 laws of France and that the colony ought to legislate for 
 itself. Toussaint, hypocritical, sly, playing the religious 
 devotee, orders crimes and protects the abuses and di- 
 lapidations of his creatures, whom he disavows according 
 to circumstances and on whom he throws the odium of 
 his Machiavellian conduct. Dessalines, a ferocious and 
 barbarous Congo, swears he will drink the blood of the 
 whites. ... In fine, throughout the North I have seen 
 terror and desolation. The towns are deserted and men 
 are fleeing a country in which they can no longer 
 exist." 14 
 
 Such were the difficulties confronting Toussaint Lou- 
 verture in the autumn of 1800. That only two years 
 later he should have built up the powerful machine which 
 faced Napoleon's army is the greatest triumph of this 
 extraordinary man. For Toussaint held the key to the 
 situation. He knew the natural wealth of San Domingo; 
 he knew how his race could endure forced labor; lastly, 
 he knew that could he but wring sufficient wealth from 
 these two factors, he might hold the loyalty of his greedy 
 generals and buy the products of the civilized world. To 
 this end he now turned the whole power of his ferocious 
 energy — and succeeded in marvellous fashion. Ten 
 years of war's natural selection had already assembled the 
 strong men of the negro race in the ranks of his army, 
 and this army showed no repugnance to execute its 
 leader's will upon the mass of the black population. The 
 whole country was soon scoured by Toussaint's flying 
 columns, and the negroes were herded from their vaga- 
 
292 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 bond life in the woods and mountains back to work such 
 as they had never known under the Old Regime. Free 
 men by law, in fact the negro cultivators found them- 
 selves once more slaves: slaves of the State, — and of a 
 military State at that. The colony was divided into regu- 
 lar districts, each under its general, with two captain- 
 generals, — Moyse for the North, Dessalines for the 
 South and West. Dessalines showed himself particularly 
 successful in his stewardship. He patrolled his province 
 like a King of Dahomey, surrounded by a corps of exe- 
 cutioners, and shirkers and rebels were publicly buried 
 alive or sawn between two planks to encourage the zeal of 
 the ateliers. Yet the results of this regime were extraor- 
 dinary. Ever since the abolition of slavery in 1793, the 
 refusal of the negroes to work had reduced the produce 
 of San Domingo to insignificant proportions. Now, the 
 old prosperity returned with a bound, and despite the 
 tremendous largess bestowed upon the black generals, 
 the treasury and state warehouses were filled to over- 
 flowing. 15 
 
 Still more noteworthy was Toussaint's friendly atti- 
 tude toward the whites. The chief cause of his rupture 
 with Hedouville in 1798 had been his welcome of the 
 emigres in contravention to the laws of the Republic, 16 
 and ever since then he had shown increasing favor to the 
 returned colonists. Several motives combined to influ- 
 ence Toussaint in favor of this policy. First of all, he 
 realized that he needed the whites' superior intelligence 
 in his plans for reconstructing the shattered edifice of 
 San Domingan society, and he also knew that in this 
 work his white subordinates would be thoroughly trust- 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 293 
 
 worthy, both through lack of sympathy for the negroes 
 and from fear of their vengeance should he be over- 
 thrown. Again, he realized that nothing would so raise 
 his prestige among the blacks as the sight of their former 
 masters in his service. Lastly, in case of war with France, 
 the whites would be most valuable hostages. For all 
 these reasons, then, the white colonists were invited to 
 return, and all who consented to do homage to the 
 black ruler were assured of his most gracious favor. 
 Their estates were restored and stocked with negroes 
 who were compelled to labor as zealously as their fellows 
 upon the state domains or the private plantations of the 
 black generals. Toussaint himself set up a genuine Court, 
 where amid regal splendors the native force of his com- 
 pelling personality obtained the respect of all around 
 him. 17 
 
 Most of the black generals were so sated with power 
 and plunder that they asked for nothing better than 
 the continuance of this reign of plenty. But there was a 
 minority whom thirst for power or race hatred alienated 
 from Toussaint and his regime. The leader of this mi- 
 nority was Toussaint's nephew Moyse. We have seen 
 how strained relations between the two had been in the 
 autumn of 1800, and as time passed this tension had in- 
 creased. Toussaint's iron rule necessarily provoked great 
 discontent among the negro population, and Moyse pres- 
 ently came out as the champion of the exploited masses 
 of his race and the denouncer of Toussaint's pro-white 
 policy. "Whatever my old uncle may do," said Moyse, 
 "I will not be the hangman of my own color. He urges 
 me on in the name of the interests of France, but I 
 
294 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 notice that these same interests are always those of the 
 whites; — and I shall never love the whites till they have 
 given me back the eye that they put out in battle." 18 
 
 With such sentiments it is not surprising that Moyse's 
 stewardship of the North was not so pleasing to Tous- 
 saint as that of Dessalines in the West. Matters were 
 finally brought to a head by an insurrection of the Plain 
 and the massacre of several hundred whites. But Tous- 
 saint acted with his usual rapidity. Before his terrible 
 presence the rising died away and Moyse fell helpless into 
 his power. Toussaint never cared to deal a second blow. 
 Moyse was summarily shot, Toussaint's prestige was 
 restored by spectacular executions, and the last overt 
 opposition to his authority was thoroughly stamped 
 out. 19 Only in the inaccessible fastnesses of the Eastern 
 and Southern mountains the savage maroon bands still 
 defied his power. Everywhere else the last murmurs had 
 died away. 
 
 The time was now come for the formal consecration of 
 Toussaint's supremacy. In the late summer of 1801 a 
 miniature convention of ten persons met at Port-au- 
 Prince and soon drew up a new constitution for San Do- 
 mingo. By it Toussaint Louverture was appointed Gov- 
 ernor for life with power to name his successor, and the 
 tie with France was reduced to a mere empty acknowl- 
 edgment of the sovereignty of the Republic. Vincent 
 protested against this virtual declaration of independ- 
 ence, but was sharply bidden to take the document to 
 France for "approval." As, however, Toussaint had at 
 once declared the new constitution in full operation, it 
 was plain that this was only a hollow mockery. 20 
 
TRIUMPH OF TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 295 
 
 But the sands of Toussaint's rule were running low. 
 Before Vincent had reached France the Preliminaries of 
 Amiens 21 had assured an English peace; and the ban had 
 not been ten weeks lifted from the sea when a great 
 armada sailed for San Domingo bearing twenty thousand 
 veterans from the armies of Italy and the Rhine with 
 Bonaparte's answer to the black who had dared defy 
 his will. 
 
XXVI 
 
 THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 
 
 When the coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire * gave the 
 sovereignty of France into Napoleon's iron grasp, the 
 French colonial empire had ceased to exist. San Domingo, 
 greatest of them all, was lost to the white race and was 
 at the moment the prey of warring negroes and mulat- 
 toes. Guadeloupe had been preserved to the Republic 
 by the brutal energy of the Jacobin Victor Hugues, who 
 from 1794 to 1798 had wrung out of the negro population 
 the necessary sinews of war by a regime of state slavery 
 much like that adopted by Toussaint Louverture; but 
 Hugues's recall in 1798 had been followed by civil broils 
 which were fast reducing Guadeloupe to anarchy. Cay- 
 enne, too, still flew the tri-colored flag, but its remote 
 insignificance alone preserved it from attack. Those 
 remote islands of the Indian Ocean, Isle-de-France and 
 Bourbon, were in open rebellion against the Republic 
 and had maintained the old colonial system in complete 
 defiance of the national will. All the other colonies, 
 Martinique included, had been for years in English 
 hands. 2 
 
 Previous to the 18th Brumaire, Napoleon appears to 
 have been too much absorbed in his plans against Egypt 
 and India to have paid much attention to the West In- 
 dian colonies, 3 but no sooner had he grasped the reins 
 of supreme authority than his devouring energy assailed 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 297 
 
 a problem which cried so loudly for solution. The first 
 result of his deliberations was a decisive preliminary step 
 that cleared the ground for all subsequent action. The 
 Directoire Constitution of the Year III (1795) had main- 
 tained the Jacobin ideal of colonial assimilation. All the 
 French dependencies had been declared integral parts of 
 the Republic, and no difference whatever had been made 
 between the departments of the European mainland and 
 the "departments" over-seas. But all this had remained 
 pure theory. The colonies in English hands and the 
 rebellious islands of the Indian Ocean had simply main- 
 tained the old slave regime; the negro and mulatto dicta- 
 tors who ruled San Domingo did as they pleased; lastly, 
 in Guadeloupe and Cayenne, the only colonies where 
 white Republican officials actually ruled, the tricolor 
 had been kept flying only by a crushing exploitation of 
 the new black citizens which violated every principle of 
 "Liberty and Equality." 
 
 Bonaparte, however, soon showed that he was re- 
 solved to end this empty farce: his Constitution of the 
 Year VIII (1800) abjured the Revolutionary principle 
 of assimilation and declared that the colonies should 
 be henceforth governed by special laws in conformity 
 to their peculiar geographical and social situation. This 
 was a return to the theory of the Old Regime and freed 
 Napoleon's hands for all contingencies. 4 
 
 The basis of future action was thus laid down, but 
 little else could be done for the moment. The iron gir- 
 dle of the English blockade kept the shattered and dis- 
 organized French navy strictly in port, and whatever .. 
 Napoleon might wring from his weak sea-power must 
 
298 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 be devoted to his imprisoned Egyptian army. Still, the 
 First Consul determined to be ready for prompt action at 
 the first favorable moment, and to make up his mind 
 what this action should be he now sought to obtain all 
 possible information on the state of the colonies. The 
 opening months of the year 1800 saw a flood of letters 
 and memoirs from all the principal actors in colonial 
 affairs and from many exiled colonists as well. As re- 
 gards San Domingo these advices were most diverse 
 in character. According to Hedouville, Sonthonax, and 
 most others, Toussaint Louverture was the great obstacle 
 to the restoration of French authority, and Rigaud was 
 the only bulwark against the establishment of San Do- 
 mingo's de facto independence under English protection; 6 
 yet a minority held that Toussaint should be supported 
 as the one man capable of restoring peace and order to 
 the distracted island. 6 Most of the exiled colonists ad- 
 vised sending new officials to restore French authority; 
 but while some urged their backing by a small army, 7 
 others maintained that such half -measures would merely 
 drive the negroes to rebellion and open independence. 
 Forfait, the new Minister of Marine, told Napoleon that 
 a strong expedition could restore San Domingo to France, 
 but that until an English peace made such an expedition 
 possible, Toussaint must be most tactfully handled. He 
 advised sending a commission to reassure Toussaint and 
 stop the horrible struggle between the castes, and he 
 warned Napoleon of the dangerous alarm already roused 
 among the negroes of San Domingo, who saw in the re- 
 actionary colonial principle proclaimed by the new con- 
 stitution the first step toward the restoration of slavery. 8 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 299 
 
 It was in consequence of Forfait's representations that 
 Napoleon despatched that Commission which received 
 such cavalier treatment at the hands of Moyse and Tous- 
 saint Louverture. 9 
 
 Despite Forfait's advice, however, Napoleon seems to 
 have been sceptical as to the results of these efforts, for 
 at the very moment of the Commissioners' departure he 
 ordered the preparation of a strong squadron at Brest 
 and the concentration of some five thousand soldiers for 
 San Domingo. That even at this early date Napoleon 
 was inclined to vigorous measures is shown both by the 
 choice of its commander and the tone of his instructions. 
 The ideas held by General Sahuguet, the destined leader 
 of this expedition, were certainly not those of conciliation. 
 " Toussaint Louverture and Rigaud, whom an abuse of 
 words makes 'friends of the Republic,'" he writes the 
 First Consul, "are really both of them enemies of France. 
 It is not as the ally of one or the other that I should go to 
 San Domingo. Whichever faction questions the European 
 general's authority should be exterminated. Otherwise 
 all will be lost." 10 And Sahuguet's instructions were 
 quite in this spirit. He was directed to end the war be- 
 tween the castes, and as soon as possible to banish both 
 Toussaint and Rigaud from the island. 11 
 
 But Sahuguet's armament was destined never to reach 
 San Domingo. The preparations were slow and faulty, 
 the English blockade was alert and vigilant, and in May 
 Napoleon left Paris for the campaign of Marengo. Not 
 till the beginning of June did a violent storm scatter the 
 English blockading fleet, and no sooner had the San Do- 
 mingan squadron gained the open sea than it was forced 
 
300 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 to put back in distress. For ten years of the Revolution 
 had ruined the French navy. The ill-found ships of the 
 San Domingo squadron could scarcely keep the boisterous 
 sea, the supplies were mostly spoiled, and disease was 
 raging among the troops. To attempt the conquest of 
 San Domingo with such an armament was clearly mad- 
 ness, and the expedition collapsed. 12 
 
 Shortly after Napoleon's return from the triumph of 
 Marengo, he began to receive news from the West Indies. 
 This news was of the most contradictory character. His 
 Commissioners reported their bad reception by Moyse, 
 Toussaint's designs on Spanish Santo Domingo, and his 
 refusal to publish Bonaparte's conciliatory proclama- 
 tion. 13 Nevertheless, Vincent maintained that Tous- 
 saint was the one man who could save San Domingo 
 from anarchy, and advised the French Government to 
 send none but persons known for sympathizers of the 
 negroes and of Toussaint's rule. Roume wrote still more 
 strongly. He asserted that the black leader was devoted 
 to France and that his recent conduct had been caused 
 solely by his fear of a new slave regime. To bind him 
 firmly to France all European agents should be recalled 
 and Toussaint left supreme till the peace with England. 
 On the other hand, the French agents in Spanish Santo 
 Domingo gave exactly the opposite advice. They as- 
 serted that Toussaint was fast working toward inde- 
 pendence, and that Roume and Vincent were writing 
 under duress. 14 "All the bonds of intimacy with the 
 mother country are dissolved," wrote Chanlatte from 
 Spanish Santo Domingo. "Attachment to the French 
 Republic has become a crime or an object of derision. 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 301 
 
 The very name of the national authority is flouted and 
 outraged. ... I cannot too often repeat that time presses 
 and that the situation is grave: if independence strikes 
 its roots too deep, the means of reestablishing the love of 
 France will become more and more costly and difficult." 15 
 
 Chanlatte's sentiments were echoed by General Hedou- 
 ville, then in the United States. "Since the victory over 
 Rigaud," he wrote Napoleon in the late autumn, "the 
 spirit of independence has greatly increased in San Do- 
 mingo." As one of his proofs Hedouville quoted the fol- 
 lowing incendiary speech of Dessalines to his troops: "The 
 war which you have just finished is a little war, but you 
 have two bigger ones still to fight: one against the Span- 
 iards, who do not want to give up their land and who 
 have insulted your brave general-in-chief; another against 
 France, who will try to make you slaves again as soon as 
 she is freed from her enemies. And these two wars we 
 will be able to sustain." This speech, adds Hedouville, ) 
 was no idle boast, for from the port of New York alone i 
 twenty-five thousand muskets, sixteen pieces of artillery, 
 and an immense amount of war materiel had already 
 started for San Domingo. 16 
 
 From all these reports, however, one fact was certain, 
 — the authority of France was destroyed. Small wonder, 
 therefore, that Napoleon began fresh preparations for an 
 expedition to San Domingo, especially as in August he 
 had opened negotiations with England. But the hopes 
 of peace soon died away, Napoleon was forced to con- 
 centrate his attention upon the imprisoned Army of 
 Egypt once more, and all thoughts of a San Domingo 
 squadron had to be again postponed. 17 
 
302 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Yet just as decisive action had thus become impossible, 
 the news from San Domingo grew worse. In October 
 arrived the tidings of Rigaud's flight and Toussaint's 
 complete triumph over the mulattoes: 18 Napoleon now 
 realized that he would be fortunate if he succeeded in 
 keeping even Spanish Santo Domingo from Toussaint's 
 grasp. In this unpleasant situation the Minister of Ma- 
 rine again urged Napoleon to try conciliation by means 
 of another Commission. "The expedition to San Do- 
 mingo," writes Forfait, "is at present a diplomatic mis- 
 sion. Your object is to stop bloodshed and to obtain 
 peace without a violent convulsion. The men whom you 
 send thither must act with tact, prudence, and dissimu- 
 lation toward the negroes. An officer just returned from 
 San Domingo portrays the condition of the whites in the 
 most alarming colors. They are in a state of absolute 
 oppression, ceaselessly threatened with ill-usage which 
 is but too often actually inflicted upon them. The ne- 
 groes have not disarmed since the submission of the South ; 
 on the contrary, they remain on a full war footing and 
 daily increase their military preparations. They make 
 no secret of their intention to conquer the Spanish part 
 of the island and later on to fight France. They look with 
 the gravest suspicion upon the whites, and our unfor- 
 tunate brothers expect to become the victims of. their 
 tyrants at the first intimation that an army is on the 
 way. All this should lead you to flatter Toussaint Lou- 
 verture, conciliate the other chiefs, and tactfully retain 
 your prestige while awaiting the favor of circumstances." 19 
 
 Sceptical as was Napoleon over the efficacy of fresh 
 conciliation, he agreed to Forf ait's proposals; but before 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 303 
 
 the new Commission had sailed there arrived the news of 
 the outrages upon Roume and the conquest of Spanish 
 Santo Domingo. 20 All that the Commission was to have 
 averted had now taken place, and Napoleon counter- 
 manded its departure in order not to expose the dignity 
 of France to further humiliations. But the need for Com- 
 missions was almost over: already Napoleon had begun 
 those negotiations which were to culminate in the Pre- 
 liminaries of Amiens. On October 1, 1801, Napoleon's 
 hands were at last free to deal as he saw fit with San 
 Domingo. 21 
 
 What Bonaparte had in mind was perfectly clear, 
 for soon every dockyard from Flushing to Toulon rang 
 with preparations, while twenty thousand veteran troops 
 stood ready to go on board. 22 At the head of this formi- 
 dable armament was Napoleon's brother-in-law, General 
 Leclerc. His instructions bear impressive testimony to 
 the First Consul's care for San Domingo, while their 
 nature shows how far France had travelled since the 
 18th Brumaire. 
 
 Napoleon divided the conquest of San Domingo into 
 three periods. In the first, lasting from fifteen to twenty 
 days, Leclerc should occupy the coast towns and organize 
 his forces. In the second, a quick converging movement 
 from several points should smash organized resistance. 
 In the third, mobile flying columns should hunt down the 
 scattered negro bands among the woods and mountains. 
 Thereupon the colony should be reconstructed on lines 
 analogous to those of the Old Regime, though chattel 
 slavery was not to be restored. This programme Na- 
 poleon tersely sums up in the following words : — 
 
 -\ 
 
304 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 "Never will the French Nation give chains to men 
 whom it has once recognized as free. Therefore all the 
 blacks shall live at San Domingo as those in Guadeloupe 
 to-day. 23 
 
 "Your conduct will vary with the three periods above- 
 mentioned. 
 
 "In the first period you will disarm only the rebel 
 blacks. In the third you will disarm all. 
 
 "In the first period you will not be exacting: you will 
 treat with Toussaint, you will promise him everything he 
 asks, — in order that you may get possession of the prin- 
 cipal points and establish yourself in the country. 
 
 "As soon as you have done this, you will become more 
 exacting. You will order him to reply categorically to 
 your proclamation and to my letter. You will charge him 
 to come to Le Cap. 
 
 "In your interviews with Moyse, Dessalines, and Tous- 
 saint 's other generals, you will treat them well. 
 
 "Gain over Christophe, Clervaux, Maurepas, and all 
 the other black leaders favorable to the whites. In the 
 first period, confirm them in their rank and office. In the 
 last period, send them all to France, with their rank if 
 they have behaved well. 
 
 "All Toussaint's principal agents, white or colored, 
 should in the first period be indiscriminately loaded with 
 attentions and confirmed in their posts : in the last period, 
 all sent to France; — with their rank if they have be- 
 haved well during the second; prisoners if they have 
 acted ill. 
 
 "All blacks in office should during the first period be 
 flattered, well treated, but undermined in authority and 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 305 
 
 power. Toussaint, Moyse, and Dessalines should be well 
 treated during the first period; sent to France at the last, 
 in arrest or with their rank according to their conduct. 
 
 "Raymond has lost the Government's confidence; at 
 the beginning of the second period you will seize him and 
 send him to France as a criminal. 
 
 "If the first period last fifteen days, all is well; if 
 longer, you will have been fooled. 
 
 "Toussaint shall not be held to have submitted until 
 he shall have come to Le Cap or Port-au-Prince in the 
 midst of the French army, to swear fidelity to the Re- 
 public. On that very day, without scandal or injury but 
 with honor and consideration, he must be put on board 
 a frigate and sent to France. At the same time, if pos- 
 sible, arrest Moyse and Dessalines: if impossible, hunt 
 them down; and then send to France all the white par- 
 tisans of Toussaint, all the blacks in office suspected of 
 disaffection. Declare Moyse and Dessalines traitors and 
 enemies of the French people. Start the troops and give 
 them no rest till you have their heads and have scattered 
 and disarmed their partisans. 
 
 "If after the first fifteen or twenty days it has been 
 impossible to get Toussaint, proclaim that within a speci- 
 fied time he shall be declared a traitor, and after that 
 period begin a war to the death. 
 
 "A few thousand negroes wandering in the mountains 
 should not prevent the Captain-General from regarding 
 the second period as ended and from promptly beginning 
 the third. Then has come the moment to assure the 
 colony to France forever. And, on that same day, at 
 every point of the colony, you will arrest all suspects in 
 
306 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 office whatever their color, and at the same moment 
 embark all the black generals no matter what their con- 
 duct, patriotism, or past services; — giving them, how- 
 ever, their rank, and assuring them of good treatment 
 in France. 
 
 "All the whites who have served under Toussaint, and 
 covered themselves with crimes in the tragic scenes of 
 San Domingo, shall be sent directly to Guiana. 
 
 "All the blacks who have behaved well, but whose rank 
 forbids them to remain longer in the island, shall be sent 
 to Brest. 
 
 "All the blacks or mulattoes who have acted badly, 
 whatever their rank, shall be sent to the Mediterranean 
 and landed at Corsica. 
 
 " If Toussaint, Dessalines, or Moyse is taken in arms, 
 they shall be passed before a court-martial and shot as 
 rebels within twenty -four hours. 
 
 "No matter what happens, we think that during the 
 third period you should disarm all the negroes, whatever 
 their party, and set them to work. 
 
 "All those who have signed the Constitution 24 should 
 in the third period be sent to France; some as prisoners, 
 others at liberty as having been constrained. 
 
 "White women who have prostituted themselves to 
 negroes, 25 whatever their rank, shall be sent to Europe. 
 
 "You will take the regimental flags from the National 
 Guard, give out new ones, and reorganize it. You will 
 reorganize the gendarmerie. Suffer no black above the 
 rank of captain to remain in the island. . . . 
 
 "The Captain-General shall allow no temporizing 
 with the principles of these instructions; and any person 
 
THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE 307 
 
 talking about the rights of those blacks who have shed 
 so much white blood shall under some pretext or other 
 be sent to France, whatever his rank or services." 26 
 
 Armed with these instructions, General Leclerc and the 
 main squadron under Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse sailed 
 from Brest on the 14th of December, 1801, for San Do- 
 mingo. 
 
XXVII 
 
 THE COMING OF LECLERC 
 
 On the 29th of January, 1802, the Brest fleet under 
 Villaret-Joyeuse and the Rochefort squadron of Admiral 
 Latouche-Treville lay off Cape Samana, the eastern ex- 
 tremity of the island of San Domingo. There was no 
 sign of the Toulon-Cadiz division with its forty-five hun- 
 dred troops, neither had any news arrived of the Havre- 
 Flushing squadron with its twenty -five hundred men. 
 General Leclerc thus found himself off San Domingo with 
 barely twelve thousand soldiers. But his troops were vet- 
 erans, and the lexicon of Napoleonic generals did not con- 
 tain the word "delay." Leclerc therefore resolved to strike 
 at once. A small squadron was told off to rouse Spanish 
 Santo Domingo, while the bulk of the fleet sailed on 
 west. 1 
 
 During those hours of final preparation, the French 
 fleet had been scrutinized by no less a person than Tous- 
 saint Louverture. As the black leader looked down upon 
 the great armada from the high cliffs of Cape Samana, 
 a moment of discouragement seems to have seized him. 
 " We must perish," he cried to his staff. "All France is 
 coming to San Domingo. She has been deceived; she 
 comes to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." 2 
 Toussaint seems to have underestimated the magnitude 
 of Napoleon's preparations and to have expected a much 
 smaller armament. His first attitude was therefore 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 309 
 
 marked by some uncertainty and by a desire to gain time, 
 though it is plain that thoughts of submission were never 
 seriously entertained. 
 
 Toussaint's position was, indeed, a strong one. He 
 possessed an army of fully twenty thousand regular 
 troops, the pick of the whole negro population, hardened 
 by years of war, well armed and fairly disciplined. This 
 army was divided into three grand divisions. The North 
 was held by five thousand men under Christophe. The 
 main corps was at Le Cap, while a considerable divi- 
 sion, under the able Maurepas, lay at Port-de-Paix to 
 watch the doubtful districts about the Mole-Saint-Nicolas. 
 The West and South were more strongly garrisoned, for 
 the remaining mulattoes were, of course, unreconciled, the 
 maroon tribes were as yet unconquered, and even the 
 ordinary negro population of those provinces had never 
 fallen so completely under Toussaint's influence as had 
 their brethren of the North. All this was well known to 
 Toussaint, who had placed these regions under the terri- 
 ble Dessalines with eleven thousand soldiers. The third 
 military division — four thousand strong — garrisoned 
 Spanish Santo Domingo. It was commanded by the mu- 
 latto Clervaux, seconded by Toussaint's brother, Paul 
 Louverture. It must also be noted that nearly the whole 
 negro population of the French part was armed and could 
 furnish many thousands of guerilla fighters to supple- 
 ment Toussaint's twenty thousand regular troops. Al- 
 together, the problem facing Leclerc and his twelve 
 thousand French soldiers was by no means an easy one. 3 
 
 However, the French general acted with the greatest 
 boldness. General Rochambeau, with two thousand sol- 
 
310 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 diers, was ordered to capture Fort Dauphin, the most 
 eastern point of French San Domingo; General Boudet 
 and thirty-five hundred men sailed on to seize Port-au- 
 Prince; Leclerc himself with his remaining five thousand 
 troops made for Le Cap. 
 
 It was on February 3 that Leclerc appeared off the 
 harbor and demanded the submission of the town. What 
 followed was most significant. At sight of the French 
 fleet the large mulatto and free negro population broke 
 into extravagant rejoicings, while the mayor of Le Cap, 
 himself a free negro of the Old Regime, implored Chris- 
 tophe to offer no resistance. Christophe seems to have 
 been confused by these demonstrations, and it is possible 
 that Leclerc might have been able to enter the harbor by 
 a sudden coup de main. Unfortunately a storm now blew 
 up which compelled the French fleet to stand offshore, 
 and this gave Christophe time to regain his resolution and 
 to follow Toussaint's orders. These orders were to burn 
 the town and retreat to the mountains: accordingly, 
 when the French fleet reappeared toward evening of 
 February 5, Le Cap was in flames. Leclerc, however, 
 acted with great promptness, saved part of the city from 
 destruction, and sent out flying columns which preserved 
 the Plain. 4 Furthermore, these troops soon encountered 
 the outposts of Rochambeau, who on February 4 had 
 carried Fort Dauphin by a brilliant coup de main. By 
 February 6 the whole of the Plaine du Nord was in 
 French hands. 
 
 And on the same day as Lerclerc's capture of Le Cap, 
 Port-au-Prince had fallen almost without a blow. Gen- 
 eral Boudet had appeared on February 4 and had re- 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 311 
 
 ceived the same refusal to surrender, but next day he had 
 landed a strong force which advanced boldly on Fort Bizo- 
 ton, the key to the town. This rash move had been 
 crowned with success. At sight of the advancing French 
 infantry the mulatto commandant of Fort Bizoton cried, 
 "Vive la France," and led his whole battalion over to 
 the invaders. At this defection the garrison of Port-au- 
 Prince had left in such a panic that they neglected to 
 destroy the town, though they dragged away several 
 hundred wretched whites to glut their future vengeance. 
 This striking French success was undoubtedly due to 
 the absence of Dessalines, at that moment enjoying the 
 pleasures of his gorgeous palace at Saint-Marc. 5 
 
 And further triumphs awaited General Boudet. On 
 the very night after the capture of Port-au-Prince a black 
 officer arrived from Laplume, the commander of the 
 South, offering to submit with all his troops. This was 
 the same Laplume who, in 1795, had brought his bands 
 over to Toussaint Louverture, but like most of the West- 
 ern negroes he showed little personal attachment to the 
 great black of the North Laplume kept his word to 
 Boudet, for on February 7 his soldiers quietly took the 
 oath of allegiance to France. Even his officers showed 
 no signs of discontent. 6 
 
 Moreover, these successes in the French part of the 
 island were surpassed by those in Spanish Santo Do- 
 mingo. On February 2 the small squadron detailed for 
 this duty appeared off the Spanish capital. The city of 
 Santo Domingo was commanded by Paul Louverture, 
 who refused the French summons to surrender. But at 
 sight of the French squadron the inhabitants showed 
 
312 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 their hatred of Toussaint's rule by a furious rising. It is 
 true that Paul Louverture's black soldiers finally quieted 
 the town, but the whole back country was ablaze behind 
 him, and when his superior officer, the mulatto Clervaux, 
 submitted at Saint Yago, Paul Louverture himself sur- 
 rendered. Of the four thousand black troops in Spanish 
 Santo Domingo not a man rejoined Toussaint in the 
 west. 7 
 
 Thus, within a week, Toussaint was reeling under Le- 
 clerc's stunning blows, and outside of the North his power 
 had shown scant vitality. So far the results had exceeded 
 Napoleon's expectations. Not even the savage courage 
 of Dessalines had prevented the defection of the West 
 coast. As soon as he learned of the events at Port-au- 
 Prince, Dessalines had rushed from Saint-Marc, picked 
 up the retreating garrison and struck for Leogane to pre- 
 vent the defection of the South. But Boudet was too 
 quick for him. Hardly had Dessalines arrived at Leo- 
 gane when a strong French column appeared, and on 
 February 11 the black general was forced to beat a hasty 
 retreat after burning the town. A body of two thou- 
 sand irregulars left behind in the mountains back of Leo- 
 gane was quickly smashed by the French, whose com- 
 munications with Laplume were firmly established. 8 
 
 Meanwhile Leclerc had restored order at Le Cap, and 
 as several days were needed to complete his military 
 preparations, he resolved to try negotiations with Tous- 
 saint Louverture. But all his startling reverses had in 
 no way altered Toussaint's determination, and Leclerc 
 soon realized that his adversary was merely seeking to 
 gain time. On the 17th of February, when his prepara- 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 313 
 
 tions were completed, the French general issued a proc- 
 lamation putting Toussaint and Christophe beyond the 
 pale of the law and declaring all their armed adherents 
 guilty of rebellion. 9 
 
 Leclerc can certainly not be charged with having 
 wasted time in these negotiations. The armistice was 
 only local, and besides the fighting in the West a fresh 
 blow had been struck in the North. On February 10, 
 General Humbert and twelve hundred men had landed 
 at Port-de-Paix, the strongest point on the North coast. 
 Port-de-Paix was held by the able black general, Mau- 
 repas, and two thousand regular troops, but a brilliant 
 action of the French land and naval forces took the town 
 by a coup de main. Nevertheless, Maurepas was far from 
 beaten. Port-de-Paix is girt in by rugged hills on which 
 the negroes lay strongly entrenched, while the fanatical 
 hatred of the whites held by the population soon gave 
 Maurepas the backing of many thousand savage irregu- 
 lars, undisciplined but well armed and full of courage. 
 It is therefore not surprising that when General Humbert 
 attempted to follow up his victory the French troops 
 suffered a bloody check and would have been forced 
 to reembark but for the guns of the fleet. 10 
 
 But Leclerc was now ready to strike his decisive blow. 
 On the 14th of February, the Toulon-Cadiz squadron had 
 arrived with its precious reinforcements, and the French 
 commander now had some nine thousand* men free for 
 offensive operations, not counting a strong corps of mu- 
 lattoes and free negroes eager for revenge. Therefore the 
 ink of his proclamation was hardly dry when Leclerc's 
 columns started across the Plain to storm the long moun- 
 
314 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tain wall behind which lay Toussaint Louverture. The 
 French plan was a bold one. Rochambeau was to move 
 from Fort Dauphin and clear the mountains along the 
 Spanish border, while Leclerc and the main body should 
 strike for the Cordon de l'Ouest and roll Toussaint down 
 into the Western plains, where he should be crushed by 
 Boudet's advance from Port-au-Prince. 
 
 The week which followed saw a truly Napoleonic cam- 
 paign. From Fort Dauphin Rochambeau hurled himself 
 like a thunderbolt upon the Eastern mountains, and in 
 three days he lay over the Spanish border with Tous- 
 saint's right wing broken to pieces. Leclerc, meanwhile, 
 was mastering the Western mountains, with more labor 
 but with equal success. That old "Cordon de l'Ouest, " 
 which had for two years held back the tide of negro insur- 
 rection, was no easy prey : its rugged heights and tangled 
 valleys were held by the flower of Toussaint's soldiery, 
 while thousands of wild guerillas swarmed upon every 
 mountain-side. But the veterans of Italy and the Rhine 
 would not be denied, and their tremendous elan car- 
 ried all before them. On the second night Leclerc lay at 
 Plaisance, halfway through the mountains. "Our three 
 divisions," he writes the Minister of Marine, "have 
 everywhere forced back the enemy with the greatest 
 impetuosity. You should see this country to form any 
 idea of the difficulties we encounter at every step. I have 
 seen nothing in the Alps to compare with them." n 
 
 Torrential rains held up the French columns during the 
 20th of February, but next day began that final advance 
 which on February 23 culminated in the storming of 
 Toussaint's main position at the Gorge of Couleuvres. 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 315 
 
 This natural fortress had been greatly strengthened by 
 entrenchments and abattis of felled trees, and was held 
 by three thousand of Toussaint's choicest troops sup- 
 ported by several thousand guerillas. Yet in a few hours 
 all was over: Toussaint had retreated southward leaving 
 a thousand men dead on the field, and the French right 
 slept that night at the Western seaport of Gonaives. 12 
 
 The Cordon de l'Ouest was won — yet the blow was 
 not decisive. Leclerc had expected that Toussaint's re- 
 treat would have led him straight into the arms of the 
 French columns from Port-au-Prince; but no such col- 
 umns appeared, and Toussaint retired safely to his fast- 
 nesses in those mountains of the Spanish border over- 
 looking his base of supplies, the inland valley of the 
 Artibonite. The black leader had been saved from the 
 trap by Dessalines's able defence of the West. Although 
 checked at Leogane on the 11th of February, Dessalines 
 had continued to menace Port-au-Prince, and General 
 Boudet had been obliged to take such elaborate precau- 
 tions to protect his lines that only on February 21 had 
 he dared begin his northward advance. And even then 
 his progress had been slow and difficult. The road from 
 Port-au-Prince to Saint-Marc led through a narrow belt 
 of broken country lying between the sea and the high 
 mountains enclosing the valley of the Artibonite. These 
 natural advantages were skilfully used by Dessalines. 
 His army was of good quality and superior in numbers, 
 and it offered such a stubborn resistance that the French 
 advance had to be continually cleared by artillery. Not 
 until February 25, two days after Toussaint's defeat at 
 the Gorge of Couleuvres, did Boudet enter Saint-Marc. 
 
316 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 And the capture of Saint - Marc meant nothing. The 
 town was a heap of ruins, for Dessalines had fired it 
 at the last moment, leaving only the mangled bodies of 
 several hundred white prisoners as his savage greeting to 
 the French; a wide tract of country still lay between 
 Saint-Marc and the Northern mountains: most ominous 
 of all, the black army had disappeared, though its where- 
 abouts were only too well shown by the letter from Tous- 
 saint to Dessalines which now fell into Boudet's hands. 
 "Nothing is hopeless, Citizen General," read this de- 
 spatch, "if you can but deprive the invaders of there- 
 sources of Port Republicain. 13 Try to burn that place by 
 every means of force or guile; it is of wood, and a few 
 faithful spies could do the business. Can you not find in 
 your army men devoted enough to undertake this service? 
 Ah, my dear General ! what a misfortune that there was 
 a traitor in that town and that our orders were not 
 executed! Watch for the moment when the garrison is 
 weakened by expeditions into the plains, and then try to 
 surprise and capture that town behind them. Do not 
 forget that while we are awaiting that rainy season which 
 should rid us of our enemies, our sole resources are de- 
 struction and fire. Remember that the land bathed by our 
 sweat must not furnish the slightest sustenance to our 
 enemies. Ambush the roads, throw dead men and horses 
 into the springs. Destroy all, burn all; so that those who 
 come here to force us back into slavery may have ever 
 before their eyes the image of that hell which they 
 deserve." u 
 
 This letter, coupled with the ominous disappearance 
 of Dessalines, was quite enough for Boudet, who re- 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 317 
 
 treated hastily on Port-au-Prince. The town was de- 
 fended by only six hundred troops under General La- 
 croix, 15 and it might have gone hard with this slender 
 garrison but for a diversion of a most unexpected char- 
 acter. We have often noted those formidable maroon 
 tribes of the Spanish border who had so successfully 
 maintained their independence under the Old Regime. 
 Grown still more powerful during the troubled years of 
 the Revolution, these maroons had proved as much of 
 a thorn to Toussaint Louverture as to the former Gov- 
 ernors of the French Crown, and though he had suc- 
 ceeded in expelling them from the mountains about the 
 Artibonite he had failed against their chief stronghold in 
 the great woods to the southeast about Lake Henriquillo. 
 No sooner had the French arrived at Port-au-Prince than 
 the maroons prepared to take revenge upon their hated 
 enemy, and at the very moment when Dessalines was 
 doubling back upon Port-au-Prince, two strong maroon 
 bands appeared before the town to offer General Lacroix 
 their services. Informed by these valuable allies of Des- 
 salines's approach, Lacroix put them to skilful use. 
 Weak as was the garrison, he marched boldly upon Des- 
 salines's advance guard of a thousand men, set a maroon 
 ambush, and destroyed it at a blow. When on the night 
 of February 26, Dessalines arrived before Port-au-Prince 
 he dared not attack, and soon retreated before the ap- 
 proach of Boudet's returning columns. 16 
 
 Meanwhile, Leclerc had not been inactive. Although 
 Toussaint and his regulars had been driven into the West, 
 the mountainous regions in French hands still swarmed 
 with guerillas, and much hard work was needed to clear 
 
318 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 these rugged districts of their presence. Furthermore, 
 the news from Port-de-Paix called for instant action. 
 On the same day that Leclerc had begun his advance 
 against Toussaint Louverture, a strong squadron carry- 
 ing fifteen hundred men had left Le Cap to reenforce 
 Humbert at Port-de-Paix, while other ships had sailed 
 to raise the M61e-Saint-Nicolas. This latter expedition 
 had been a brilliant success: at sight of the French ships 
 the Mole had welcomed them as deliverers, and the whole 
 region had soon thrown off Toussaint's hated yoke. 17 
 But what happened at Port-de-Paix was very different. 
 The reinforcements landed on the evening of February 
 19, and that same night Humbert attacked, hoping to 
 take the negroes by surprise. But Maurepas was on the 
 alert and the French were repulsed with heavier losses 
 than before. A German battalion which headed the as- 
 sault was completely cut to pieces, and Humbert was 
 forced to resume his defensive attitude. 
 
 However, Leclerc's occupation of the Cordon de l'Ouest 
 completely changed the situation. If Toussaint had 
 escaped, Maurepas at least was cut off, and his only 
 refuge vanished with the revolt of the Mole-Saint-Nicolas. 
 Leclerc resolved to crush the black general at once, and 
 on February 25 he despatched a strong column to take 
 Port-de-Paix in rear. But Maurepas cleverly avoided 
 annihilation. The news of Toussaint's defeat at Cou- 
 leuvres had shown Maurepas his hopeless position, and 
 he had at once approached Humbert with offers of sur- 
 render. The defeated French general, ignorant of Le- 
 clerc's success, granted Maurepas very favorable terms, 
 and Leclerc was, of course, forced to ratify this capitula- 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 319 
 
 tion. The black general and his officers retained their 
 rank and were taken into French service, together with 
 the two thousand troops under their orders. The eight 
 thousand irregulars were dismissed to their homes. Le- 
 clerc was much chagrined at the moment, but afterwards 
 congratulated himself on this event, for Maurepas served 
 him well, while the black soldiers as usual passively fol- 
 lowed their chiefs. 18 
 
 The submission of Maurepas opened the way for the 
 final attack on Toussaint's main position in the moun- 
 tains about the Artibonite. On March 2, Leclerc ordered 
 a general converging movement, and after a fortnight's 
 confused fighting the French columns met under the walls 
 of the Cr6te-a-Pierrot. Dessalines had especially dis- 
 tinguished himself in this preliminary campaign, and 
 when at last forced to quit the West he left a ghastly 
 trophy of eight hundred white corpses, largely those of 
 women and children, most barbarously massacred. The 
 Crete-a-Pierrot, a fortress of enormous strength, com- 
 pletely blocked the entrance to the valley of the Artibo- 
 nite. It had been the chief inland stronghold of the Eng- 
 lish, and Toussaint had still further fortified it until it 
 was almost impregnable. Held by twelve hundred picked 
 troops, the Crete - a - Pierrot was a most formidable 
 obstacle. 
 
 Nevertheless, Leclerc knew that it must be taken — 
 and taken in short order as well. For Toussaint was mak- 
 ing desperate efforts to raise the siege. Slipping through 
 the French lines, he burst into the North, and at his 
 presence the negroes rose in furious insurrection. The 
 whole Plaine du Nord was ablaze, Le Cap was closely 
 
320 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 beset, and Leclerc's communications were completely 
 severed. The French position became most critical. Four 
 desperate assaults broke in vain against the bastions of 
 the Crete-a-Pierrot and merely cost the besiegers fifteen 
 hundred men and some of their best officers. But Leclerc 
 was not to be shaken off. With incredible energy, double 
 lines of circumvallation were drawn about the besieged 
 fortress, and Dessalines's ferocious night attacks from the 
 neighboring mountains were repulsed, the while a terrible 
 three days' bombardment wore the defenders down. At 
 last, on the night of the 24th of March, the garrison 
 threw itself upon the French lines and after losing half 
 its strength cut its way through. 19 
 
 The capture of the Crete-a-Pierrot had cost the French 
 two thousand men, but the moral effect was tremendous. 
 "Now," writes the chief -of -staff to the Minister of War, 
 "we have nothing more to do but to clear the colony of 
 brigand bands which dare not face our soldiers and war 
 only by pillage, massacre, and arson. I hope my next 
 despatch will report their entire annihilation." 20 This 
 letter appears unduly optimistic; nevertheless, every- 
 thing announced the speedy collapse of organized resist- 
 ance. Leclerc acted with his usual energy. General La- 
 croix was ordered to overrun the Artibonite while the 
 Captain-General himself turned back to subdue the re- 
 bellious North. This was not accomplished without much 
 hard fighting, for Toussaint again appeared in person to 
 animate resistance, but in a week Leclerc cleared the 
 Plaine du Nord and on April 2, entered Le Cap. The 
 very next day the long-delayed Havre-Flushing squadron 
 arrived, and its twenty -five hundred fresh troops placed 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 321 
 
 Leclerc in position to deal the final blows at the insur- 
 rection. 21 
 
 But the very arrival of reenforcements made these 
 blows apparently superfluous. The fall of the Cr6te-a- 
 Pierrot had greatly shaken the negroes, and the coming 
 of these new troops completed their demoralization. In a 
 few days Leclerc received emissaries from Christophe offer- 
 ing to submit on promise of pardon and reception into 
 the French service, and when the Captain-General had 
 agreed to these conditions Christophe carried his twelve 
 hundred regular troops over to the French. To the black 
 cause this defection was a crushing blow. On May 1, 
 Dessalines and Toussaint Louverture capitulated on 
 similar terms, and shortly afterward they made their 
 formal submission at Le Cap. Dessalines followed Chris- 
 tophe's example by entering the French service; Tous- 
 saint retired to private life on his estates near Gonaives. 22 
 
 General Lacroix has left an interesting account of these 
 events. "Some days before Dessalines's arrival," he 
 writes, "Toussaint Louverture had come to greet Leclerc. 
 His presence aroused great excitement at Le Cap. The 
 inhabitants of that town, like those of the. country 
 through which he passed, showed him every outward 
 sign of the most profound respect. He arrived followed 
 by three or four hundred horse-guards, who during his 
 entire interview with Leclerc remained in the courtyard 
 drawn up in battle array with bared sabres." 23 Tous- 
 saint's conduct was certainly not marked by humility: 
 he responded coldly to Leclerc's warm greeting and 
 maintained an attitude of proud sadness, as if already 
 repenting of his resolution. 24 
 
322 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Lacroix's impressions of Dessalines's submission are 
 most striking. "On arriving at Le Cap," he writes, "I 
 had occasion for most serious reflections. I saw several 
 of our general officers pass by in full uniform ; — the 
 inhabitants paid them not the least sign of deference. 
 All at once I heard a murmur, — it was General Des- 
 salines! He was coming to salute Leclerc. The whole 
 population rushed forward and prostrated themselves be- 
 fore him. I was more saddened than angered at the sight. 
 These sombre and painful thoughts followed me to head- 
 quarters. In Leclerc's antechamber I found Dessalines. 
 My horror of the man kept me at a distance; but he 
 asked who I was, came over to me, and without looking 
 at me said in a raucous voice, 'I am General Dessalines. 
 In unfortunate times I have heard much of you.' 28 His 
 bearing and his manners were savage; I was surprised 
 at his words, which announced more assurance than 
 remorse. This barbarian must have felt himself strong 
 indeed, to have dared adopt this attitude. I could hardly 
 be polite, for the image of the massacres of Verettes and 
 Petite Riviere rose before my eyes at sight of the man 
 who had ordered those scenes of horror." 2fi 
 
 This defiant attitude of the black generals is the best 
 proof of the necessity for Leclerc's policy of conciliation. 
 Napoleon, it will be remembered, had ordered him to 
 deport Toussaint and the other negro leaders, and then 
 proceed at once to the disarmament of the whole popu- 
 lation; instead of which, Leclerc had allowed the black 
 generals to remain in the island and attempted nothing 
 beyond a slight reduction of the negro regiments. But 
 in this matter the Captain-General had no choice. Or- 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 323 
 
 ganized resistance was, indeed, at an end, but the effort 
 had cost him half his army. Those terrible drives across 
 mountain and jungle had crushed even the veterans of 
 Italy and the Rhine, and on April 1, Leclerc wrote the 
 First Consul that he had but seven thousand European 
 troops with the colors and five thousand in hospital. As 
 up to that moment fully seventeen thousand men had 
 reached San Domingo, another five thousand French 
 soldiers were dead. 27 By that time Leclerc had seven 
 thousand "colonial troops" in his pay, partly made up of 
 mulatto and free negro corps which could be relied upon 
 with reasonable certainty, but in still greater measure 
 composed of the black regiments brought over by Cler- 
 vaux, Maurepas, and Laplume. The very ease with which 
 these troops had deserted Toussaint showed their blind 
 devotion to their chiefs and made it almost certain that 
 any violence offered these generals would entail the de- 
 fection of their men. Leclerc's financial position was 
 also bad, for Napoleon apparently thought that a rich 
 island like San Domingo should pay the costs of cam- 
 paigning in European fashion, whereas no supplies could 
 be obtained except from the English and Americans, who 
 would take nothing but hard money in payment. Also, 
 the commissary department had broken down and sup- 
 plies from France were either defective or worthless. 
 Again, the reinforcements announced for San Domingo 
 were no longer choice troops, but raw material, for now 
 that the great blow had been struck, Napoleon was evi- 
 dently not minded to consume his veterans in policing 
 the island through the dreaded rainy season now at 
 hand. Lastly, Leclerc had learned that the English nego- 
 
324 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tiations were going ill. All this made it sheer madness to 
 reject the black generals' proffered terms and force them 
 to a guerilla war to the death. 28 
 
 Leclerc's position is well shown by the following letter 
 to the Minister of Marine, written just before Toussaint's 
 offer of submission. "Toussaint still holds the moun- 
 tains," writes Leclerc. "He has under his orders some 
 four thousand regular troops and a great number of 
 armed cultivators. I cannot finish this war unless I can 
 both conquer and effectively hold the mountains of North 
 and West, and while I am attacking these regions I must 
 continue to occupy those already held, where the culti- 
 vators are beginning to stir again. To finish the conquest 
 of San Domingo I need twenty-five thousand men. At 
 this moment I have eleven thousand European troops 
 and seven thousand colonials, 29 in whom I place far from 
 implicit confidence. While I am successful they will stay 
 by me, but a few reverses might serve to double the 
 strength of my enemies. I cannot take those severe meas- 
 ures which can alone assure San Domingo to France until 
 I have twenty-five thousand Europeans with the colors." 30 
 
 Thus the black generals remained and Toussaint lay 
 in haughty aloofness upon his estates near Gonaives, 
 albeit his captured archives convinced Leclerc of the 
 black leader's treason to France. "Out of the multitude 
 of letters in my hands which show Toussaint Louver- 
 ture's firm intention of independence," writes the Cap- 
 tain-General to Bonaparte, "I send you these few. They 
 are all anterior to our arrival at Le Cap, and clearly prove 
 that had I allowed myself to be duped by his absurd pro- 
 testations I should have been an imbecile." 31 
 
THE COMING OF LECLERC 325 
 
 The negroes were thus subdued, not broken. Still, all 
 organized resistance was over, and with no necessity for 
 further active campaigning Leclerc hoped to nurse his 
 army through the unhealthy months and build it up for 
 decisive action in the autumn. Never was hope more 
 cruelly deceived. Within a fortnight after Toussaint's 
 submission the French army became aware that in its 
 midst there stood a foe against which skill and courage 
 were in vain. 
 
XXVIII 
 
 THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 
 
 It was about mid-May that yellow fever broke out at 
 Le Cap and Port-au-Prince. During the hot months of 
 summer the disease nearly always appeared at San Do- 
 mingo, and we have seen how severely it had scourged the 
 English invaders in 1794. Nevertheless, up to this mo- 
 ment it had never been greatly feared. Serious as had been 
 the losses of the French forces in San Domingo during the 
 Revolution, they had been caused mainly by malarial 
 fevers and intestinal disorders aggravated by wretched 
 sanitation. The best proof of how slight a toll yellow 
 fever had hitherto exacted is the fact that until this 
 moment not a single high officer or important civilian 
 had fallen a victim to the disease. 1 
 
 But the horror which now smote the doomed army was 
 unparalleled in the whole history of the West Indies. 
 Before the first week of June was out, three thousand men 
 were dead, while the losses among officers and high civilians 
 were proportionately greater than those of the rank and 
 file. The crowded cantonments of Le Cap and Port- 
 au-Prince became vast charnel-houses, and every night 
 long rows of corpses were laid in the barrack-yards wait- 
 ing for the death-carts to carry them to the lime-pits 
 without the town. The fleet was as hard hit as the army, 
 and the sailors died by hundreds and by thousands. 2 
 
 These first ravages of the yellow fever are vividly de- 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 327 
 
 scribed in the Captain-General's melancholy despatches. 
 "If the First Consul wishes to have an army at San 
 Domingo in October," writes Leclerc to the Minister 
 of Marine on the 11th of June, "he must send it from 
 France, for the ravages of this disease are simply inde- 
 scribable. Our losses in officers and civil functionaries are 
 out of all proportion to those of the troops. Not a day 
 passes but I lose some whom I bitterly regret. My helpers 
 are dying and leaving me to bear alone a burden already 
 insupportable." 3 This was but too true, for Leclerc him- 
 self was a sick man. Almost upon arrival he had been at- 
 tacked by malarial fever, and only his iron will enabled 
 him to surmount the crises of the disease. In this same 
 letter he asserts that he cannot last long and begs for his 
 recall. This desire must have rapidly increased, for a 
 month later things had grown worse. "This disease con- 
 tinues its ravages over the whole colony," writes Leclerc 
 to the Minister of Marine on the 17th Messidor (6th of 
 July). "Prairial cost me three thousand men; Messidor 
 will probably cost me more still. At present I lose one 
 hundred and sixty men a day."' 4 
 
 This terrible visitation had not long continued before 
 a change became apparent in the attitude of Toussaint 
 Louverture. His conduct had been suspicious from the 
 first, for, though ostensibly retired to private life, his 
 two thousand chosen life-guards had all renounced mili- 
 tary service and had settled about their general; — 
 technically peaceful cultivators, patently the possible 
 focus of a new insurrection. Toussaint watched the 
 fever's ravages with ill-disguised glee. Soon even generals 
 like Christophe and Dessalines were warning Leclerc 
 
328 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 of his intentions, and presently intercepted letters trans- 
 formed suspicion into practical certainty. 5 
 
 What followed is well told by Leclerc. " My position 
 grows worse from day to day," he writes Napoleon on the 
 6th of June. "Disease takes my men. Toussaint Lou- 
 verture is playing false — just as I expected. However, I 
 have gained from his submission what I had intended — 
 the winning over of Dessalines and Christophe with their 
 troops. I have just ordered his arrest, and I think I can 
 count on Dessalines (whose spirit I have mastered) to 
 hunt him down if he escapes. At the same time, do not be 
 astonished if I fail. For the last two weeks this man has 
 been very suspicious: not that* I have given him cause, 
 but the fact is, he regrets his former power, and these 
 regrets have engendered the idea of re - forming his 
 party." 6 
 
 However, Leclerc's plans had been well laid, and a 
 clever ruse lured Toussaint within the French lines, 
 where he was at once arrested and embarked for France. 7 
 Leclerc's reflections on the event are contained in the 
 following letter, written on the 11th of June to the Min- 
 ister of Marine: "In one of my last despatches I told you 
 of the pardon granted General Toussaint. This ambi- 
 tious man, however, from that very moment never ceased 
 to conspire in secret. He surrendered only because Gen- 
 erals Christophe and Dessalines told him that they saw 
 he had deceived them and that they were resolved no 
 longer to make war upon us. But no sooner had he seen 
 himself thus abandoned than he sought to organize a 
 great insurrection among the cultivators. The reports 
 which came to me even from Dessalines on Toussaint's 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 329 
 
 conduct since his submission left no doubt on this point. 
 I intercepted letters written to his agent at Le Cap which 
 proved that he was trying to regain his former influence. 
 Under such circumstances I could not allow him time 
 to carry out his criminal projects. I ordered his arrest. 
 The thing was not easy, but it is done. I am now send- 
 ing to France with all his family this man so dangerous 
 to San Domingo. Citizen Minister, the Government 
 must put him in some fortress in the centre of France, so 
 that by no possibility can he escape and return to San 
 Domingo, where he has the power of a religious leader. 
 For if, three years from now, this man were to reappear 
 at San Domingo, he might well destroy everything that 
 France had done." 8 And on the same day Leclerc wrote 
 Napoleon, "Toussaint Louverture must not be at liberty. 
 Imprison him far within the Republic, that he may never 
 see San Domingo again." 9 The fear of ToussaLit's 
 escape seemed to haunt Leclerc, for a month later he 
 wrote the Minister of Marine, "You cannot keep Tous- 
 saint at too great a distance from the sea nor in a place 
 too sure. The man has fanaticised this country to such 
 a degree that his appearance would set everything once 
 more aflame." 10 
 
 However, no general outbreak followed Toussaint's 
 deportation. Leclerc 's strong precautions worked well, 
 and the few partial risings were at once stamped out. The 
 black generals were not wholly averse to their late master's 
 downfall, and the colonial troops obeyed orders. 11 After 
 Leclerc's vigorous despatches, Toussaint's fate was easy 
 to foresee. Upon his arrival in France he was sent to Fort 
 de Joux, a post in the heart of the Jura near the Swiss 
 
330 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 frontier. The winter chill of this bleak region was fatal 
 to the aged negro, who presently developed consumption 
 and died on April 7, 1803. 12 Thus the great black van- 
 ished from the scene. Judged by white standards Tous- 
 saint is in many ways a sinister and repulsive figure; yet 
 he should be measured, not with Europeans, but with 
 the great men of his own race — with the Zulu Chaka 
 and with Macandal. 
 
 Toussaint's arrest had caused no overt rebellion, it is 
 true, but Leclerc knew that the negro population was 
 greatly excited and that the slightest shock to his moral 
 prestige might produce a general explosion which would 
 sweep away the poor remnants of his dying army. He 
 also realized that the materials for such an explosion 
 would be always ready to hand while the negro popula- 
 tion kept possession of the arms served out by Toussaint 
 Louverture. Hence, although he well knew the desperate 
 risks involved, Leclerc resolved upon the general dis- 
 armament of the negroes. This was to be primarily 
 effected by the black generals and their troops, and was 
 to be done by provinces — Laplume in the South, Des- 
 salines in the West, Christophe and Maurepas in the 
 North. Since the North Province was the danger-point, 
 Leclerc ordered it left alone until the disarmament of the 
 other provinces was complete. 
 
 The work began about the third week of June. In the 
 South all went smoothly, and Laplume soon reported that 
 within his jurisdiction nothing more was to be feared. 
 In the West there was considerable trouble, but Des- 
 salines showed the same ferocious pleasure in carrying 
 out Leclerc's orders that he had in executing Toussaint's 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 331 
 
 commands, and broke resistance with barbarous cruelty. 
 Leclerc's report of July 6 is full of confidence. "The 
 black generals," he writes, "now see clearly that I am 
 destroying their influence in this country. Nevertheless, 
 they dare not rebel: (1) because they detest each other 
 and know that I should use them for their mutual de- 
 struction; (2) because the negroes are not brave and have 
 been terrified by the war I have waged upon them; (3) 
 because they fear to measure themselves against the man 
 who has broken their chiefs. Under these circumstances 
 I march with rapid strides toward my goal. The South 
 and West are about disarmed; the North will be taken 
 in hand next week. The gendarmerie is being organized, 
 and as soon as the gendarmerie is in working order and the 
 disarmament is complete I shall strike the final blows. 
 If I succeed, as now seems probable, San Domingo will 
 be truly restored to the Republic." 13 
 
 The North, it is true, proved no easy task. Trouble had 
 begun at the mere news of the disarmament of the South 
 and West, and the first active measures provoked serious 
 risings in several quarters. Leclerc's difficulties in han- 
 dling the situation are revealed by his correspondence. 
 "Another of these insurrections has broken out at Port- 
 de-Paix," he writes the Minister of Marine on the 22d of 
 July. "It is impossible to send the European troops — 
 they drop on the road. Of colonial troops I have but few; 
 I have been obliged to dismiss many, since I dare not 
 keep them in great number." 14 Still, these risings were 
 only sporadic, Christophe and Maurepas acted loyally, 
 and Leclerc did not doubt his ultimate success. 
 
 But at this very moment there arrived news from 
 
332 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 France and Guadeloupe which plunged the Captain- 
 General into absolute despair. In Leclerc's instructions 
 Napoleon had expressed his firm resolve not to restore 
 slavery, and had specified the status of Guadeloupe as 
 the future basis for San Domingo. 15 But in the ensuing 
 months the First Consul's attitude had changed. De- 
 cres, the new Minister of Marine, was a strong believer 
 in the restoration of the old colonial system, and his 
 arguments, backed by the appeals of French commerce 
 and the planter exiles, slowly converted Bonaparte. The 
 results of this conversion were soon apparent. On May 
 20, the French Government announced that no change 
 would take place in the social status of the colonies re- 
 stored by England; that slavery and the color line should 
 there remain unaltered. And the Home Government soon 
 took a still more serious step. In early June the slave- 
 trade was formally restored for all the French colonies, 
 and it was specifically stated that these new arrivals from 
 Africa were to be genuine chattel slaves even in islands 
 whose present black inhabitants then enjoyed personal 
 freedom. A few weeks later further legislation deprived 
 the mulattoes of their equal rights, restored the color 
 line, and prohibited mixed marriages. 16 About mid-July, 
 just after the disarmament of the North had begun, 
 Leclerc received an authorization to restore slavery in 
 San Domingo whenever he saw fit. 
 
 This startling proof of Napoleon's new policy filled 
 Leclerc with terror. Already the negroes were restive 
 under the reports of the pro-slavery agitation in France 
 and the intemperate language of returning planters, 
 while at this very moment the news of the reestablished 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 333 
 
 slave-trade sent a wave of sullen fury over the whole 
 colony. To restore slavery while the French army was 
 wasting to a shadow was sheer madness, and Leclerc 
 hastily penned letters beseeching against any such action. 
 " Do not think of establishing slavery here for some time," 
 he wrote the Minister of Marine on the 24th of July; " I 
 believe I can so fix things that my successor will have 
 nothing to do except execute the Government's orders. 
 But after my numberless proclamations assuring the 
 negroes their liberty, I cannot so stultify myself." 17 
 
 Whether Leclerc's tact and prestige would have 
 blinded the negroes to Napoleon's ultimate intentions is 
 impossible to say, for in the last days of July the news 
 from Guadeloupe made further denial impossible. At 
 the beginning of April, Napoleon had sent a certain Gen- 
 eral Richepanse and four thousand men to reduce that 
 island to obedience. The troubles following the recall of 
 Victor Hugues in 1799 had broken French authority in the 
 island and had ended in mulatto supremacy. This regime 
 Napoleon resolved to destroy, and Richepanse 's instruc- 
 tions were even more vigorous than Leclerc's had been. 
 Sweeping as were these directions, however, they had 
 been carried out to the letter. Guadeloupe was so much 
 smaller than San Domingo that the young and vigorous 
 General Richepanse had succeeded in effecting its com- 
 plete subjection after a few weeks' sharp campaign, and 
 the Napoleonic " third period " had thereafter been put 
 in force at once. The whole population was winnowed 
 like wheat, and three thousand persons were deported. 
 Napoleon's idea proved a sound one, for the loss of all 
 its natural leaders broke the spirit of the colored popula- 
 
334 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 tion, and Guadeloupe gave no further trouble. The en- 
 tire subjection of the island was so perfectly clear that 
 when Richepanse received Bonaparte's permission to re- 
 store slavery he hastened to carry it into effect, and in 
 mid- July the old colonial system was formally restored. 18 
 
 But the reckless and short - sighted Richepanse had 
 given no thought to San Domingo. The news from Guade- 
 loupe quickly reached the greater island — and suspicion 
 became certainty. The effect was terrible. The fanatic 
 North burst into flame, and most of the West followed its 
 example. Even the black soldiers began to desert their 
 generals and go over to the insurgents. The yellow fever 
 continued to rage, and Leclerc's reinforcements vanished 
 almost as quickly as they came. The army of San Do- 
 mingo entered upon its death-agony. 
 
 "My position is in no way bettered," writes Leclerc on 
 August 6 to the Minister of Marine; "the rebellion grows, 
 the disease continues. It will last till the 1st Vendemiaire 
 [23d September]. All the negroes here are convinced by 
 the news from France, by the reestablishment of the 
 Trade, and by General Richepanse's restoration of slav- 
 ery at Guadeloupe, that we are about to reduce them to 
 servitude. I can no longer obtain disarmament except 
 after long and obstinate resistance. These men will not 
 surrender. I must confess it: at the very moment of 
 success, those political circumstances above mentioned 
 have almost destroyed my work. You must no longer 
 count upon the moral force I used to have here; it is de- 
 stroyed. Those measures taken elsewhere have infuriated 
 men's minds. I can reduce the negroes only by force — 
 and for this I must have an army and money." 19 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 335 
 
 The most alarming thing about this new insurrection 
 was that it came from below. The black generals had 
 been little affected by the news from Guadeloupe. Le- 
 clerc had profited by Toussaint's example, and the negro 
 leaders, sure of their personal safety and loaded with 
 wealth and power, gave no signs of changing sides. Only 
 one black general, Charles Belair, joined the Western 
 insurgents, 20 and his fate merely proved Leclerc's hold 
 upon his fellows, for Dessalines hunted him down, shot 
 him offhand and massacred his soldiers. But if the black 
 generals stood by the French, their lesser officers did not, 
 and it was these hundreds of unknown chiefs who now 
 led over the colonial troops and roused the cultivators to 
 rebellion. " To have been rid of Toussaint is not enough," 
 writes Leclerc on August 25; "there are two thousand 
 more leaders to get rid of as well." 21 
 
 Leclerc's desperate situation is best shown by his report 
 of August 6 to Bonaparte: — 
 
 "My position grows trying and may well become 
 worse. Here it is: disease had made such frightful rav- 
 ages among my troops that when I wished to disarm the 
 negroes an insurrection broke out. . . . Our first attacks 
 drove the insurgents, but they scattered into other can- 
 tons. In the present insurrection there is a veritable 
 fanaticism. These men may be killed, but will not sur- 
 render. They laugh at death; — and it is the same with 
 the women. I begged you, Citizen Consul, to do nothing 
 to make these people fear for their liberty till the mo- 
 ment when I should be prepared. Suddenly there came 
 the law authorizing the Trade, and on top of that General 
 Richepanse has just decreed the restoration of slavery in 
 
336 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Guadeloupe. With this state of things, Citizen Consul, 
 the moral force I had here acquired is destroyed. I can 
 do nothing more by persuasion; I can only use force, — 
 and force I have none. 
 
 "At present, Citizen Consul, now that your colonial 
 plans are perfectly well known, if you wish to preserve 
 San Domingo send a new army, — and especially send 
 money. I declare positively that if you abandon us to 
 ourselves as you have so far done, this colony is lost; — 
 and, once lost, you will never get it back again. 
 
 "My letter may surprise you, Citizen Consul, after 
 what I had before written you, but was there ever a 
 general obliged to calculate on the death of four fifths 
 of his army and the uselessness of the rest through 
 lack of money, as I have to do in a country where 
 nothing can be bought save for hard cash and where 
 a little money would have allayed much discontent? 
 Ought I, under these circumstances, to have expected 
 the law on the slave-trade and the decrees of General 
 Richepanse? 
 
 "I have explained my position with a soldier's frank- 
 ness. In bitter sorrow, I see all that I have so far done 
 on the verge of annihilation. Citizen Consul, if you could 
 but have seen the difficulties of all sorts that I had con- 
 quered and the results I had obtained, you would tremble 
 with me at sight of my position to-day. Nevertheless, 
 unpleasant as it is, I still hope to succeed. I am mak- 
 ing terrible examples; and since terror alone remains, 
 terror I employ. 
 
 "But all the planters and merchants arriving from 
 France speak of nothing but slaves. It seems as though 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 337 
 
 there was a general conspiracy to prevent San Domingo's 
 restoration to the Republic." 
 
 Leclerc ends with an appeal for money: "Sacrifice six 
 million francs at this time, Citizen Consul, that you may 
 not have to spend sixty millions in the spring." 22 
 
 August passed, September came; — and the fever still 
 raged on. The colonists all assured Leclerc that with the 
 autumn equinox the disease would rapidly abate and 
 that a fortnight later it would have entirely disappeared. 
 However, on the 13th of September, with the equinox 
 only a week away, there were no signs of a change. The 
 reinforcements which now arrived (mostly North Eu- 
 ropeans) stood the climate very badly: these masses of 
 Germans, Dutchmen, Belgians, and Poles, died even 
 faster than the French. 
 
 " The moment troops arrive," writes Leclerc, " I have 
 to throw them into the field to repress that general insur- 
 rection discussed in my last despatches. For the first 
 few days these troops act with vigor and gain successes; 
 — then the disease smites them, and all my reenforce- 
 ments are annihilated. People assure me of a certain 
 change of season by the 15th Vendemiaire [7th October], 
 but I greatly fear that by that time I shall have no 
 soldiers. 
 
 "I can give you no exact idea of my position: each day 
 it grows worse, and what will most retard the colony's 
 prosperity is the fact that when the disease ceases I 
 shall have no men for aggressive action. If on the 15th 
 Vendemiaire I have four thousand Europeans fit to 
 march, even counting those now on the sea, I shall be 
 glad, indeed. All my corps commanders save two are 
 
338 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 dead, and I have no fit persons to replace them. To give 
 you an idea of my losses, know that the 7th of the Line 
 came here 1395 strong: to-day there are 83 half -sick men 
 with the colors and 107 in hospital; the rest are dead. 
 The 11th Light Infantry landed here 1900 strong: to-day 
 it has 163 fit for duty and 200 in hospital. The 71st of the 
 Line, originally 1000 strong, has 17 men with the colors 
 and 133 in hospital. And it is the same with the rest of the 
 army. Thus, form your own idea of my position in a 
 country where civil war has raged for ten years and where 
 the rebels are convinced that we intend to reduce them 
 to slavery. 
 
 " Citizen Minister, if the French Government wishes 
 to preserve San Domingo it must, on the very day that 
 it receives this letter, order the departure of ten thou- 
 sand men. They will arrive in Nivdse [January, 1803], and 
 order will be entirely restored before the next hot season: 
 although, if this disease habitually lasts three months on 
 end at San Domingo, we must renounce this colony." 2S 
 
 Three days after this despatch a letter to Napoleon 
 announced the abandonment of much of the hinterland 
 and such loss of prestige that one or two of the black 
 generals were beginning to waver, albeit the majority 
 were still loyal. 
 
 "My position," writes Leclerc, " is desperate. . . . The 
 main cause of my present plight is the reestablishment 
 of slavery in Guadeloupe. As soon as this news arrived, 
 the insurrection, hitherto only partial, became general, 
 and since I was unable to face it everywhere, I have 
 been obliged to abandon many points. The arrival of 
 considerable reenforcements helped me over the first 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER S39 
 
 crisis, but was no lasting benefit, for after twelve days' 
 campaign these corps were annihilated and the insurrec- 
 tion made new progress through the lack of means to 
 crush it. In these last days the force and boldness of 
 the rebels are such that I have been obliged strictly to 
 cover Le Cap. . . . The negro troops are entirely untrust- 
 worthy. Recently a whole battalion killed its white offi- 
 cers and deserted — for this struggle is now strictly a 
 war of color. 
 
 "Here is the state of my black generals. Maurepas is 
 a dangerous rascal, but I dare not arrest him at this mo- 
 ment, since this would surely entail the defection of all 
 his troops. Christophe has so maltreated the negroes that 
 he is hated by them, and is therefore not to be feared. 
 Dessalines is at present the butcher of the negroes; it is 
 through him that I execute all my odious measures. I 
 shall keep him as long as I need him. He has already 
 begged me not to leave him at San Domingo when I re- 
 turn home. Laplume, Clervaux, and Paul Louverture 
 are three imbeciles whom I shall get rid of at will. Charles 
 Belair has been tried and shot. 
 
 " Next month I hope to have eight thousand men — 
 four thousand white troops, two thousand gendarmes, 
 two thousand negro soldiers. But these forces will not 
 suffice to hold the country, and the longer I put off its 
 submission the harder that submission will be. 
 
 " Yes, Citizen Consul, such is my position. I have not 
 exaggerated. Each day I have to rack my brains to know 
 how I may repair the ills of the day before. Not one con- 
 soling thought to efface or diminish the cruel impressions 
 of the present or the future. The preservation of San 
 
340 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 Domingb since the embarkation of Toussaint Louverture 
 is something more extraordinary than my landing and 
 my capture of that general. If I did not know how much 
 you have the success of this expedition at heart, I should 
 believe myself sacrificed. . . . 
 
 "Citizen Consul, I must have ten thousand men at 
 once. I must have them to assure you San Domingo. 
 The disease has put us far back, and the longer you 
 delay, the more men you will have to send to remedy 
 the situation." 
 
 The fever was raging worse than ever; it was killing 
 from 100 to 120 men per day. 24 The losses to date could 
 be estimated from the following figures: original expedi- 
 tion, 20,000; later reinforcements, 6500; marine artillery, 
 1500; total, 28,000. Of these Leclerc expected that next 
 month there would be 10,500 alive; but of these only 4500 
 fit for duty, while 1500 would be convalescent and 4500 
 in hospital. Also, 5000 sailors had died. "Thus," con- 
 tinues Leclerc, " the occupation of San Domingo has so 
 far cost us 29,000 men, — and as yet we are far from being 
 its masters." He ends by a detailed report on the serious 
 state of his own health and urges Napoleon to send out 
 his successor, for "the situation is such that San Do- 
 mingo should not be a moment without a head, — and 
 there is no one here to fill my place. Rochambeau, a 
 brave soldier and a good fighter, has not an ounce of 
 tact or policy. Furthermore, he has no moral charac- 
 ter and is easily led." 25 
 
 The longed-for 1st Vendemiaire came at last: that Re- 
 publican New Year's Day or autumn equinox which the 
 colonists had told Leclerc was the date for the abate- 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 341 
 
 ment of yellow fever. But this particular visitation 
 seemed as unparalleled in its duration as in its virulent 
 intensity, for the fever still raged on. The thin French 
 lines shrunk rapidly toward the coast and the black gen- 
 erals became more doubtful in their attitude. 
 
 "My position grows worse from day to day," writes 
 Leclerc to Napoleon on the 4th Vendemiaire, " and the 
 most terrible thing about the situation is that I cannot 
 tell you when or how it will improve. I thought that the 
 ravages of the disease would slacken with Vendemiaire. 
 I was mistaken; it has taken on new virulence. Fructidor 
 [September] has cost me more than four thousand dead, 
 and to-day people tell me that it may last till the end 
 of Brumaire [21st November]. If this be true and its 
 intensity continue, the colony is lost. 
 
 "Each day the insurgent forces increase, while mine 
 diminish by loss of whites and desertions of the blacks. 
 Dessalines, who up to this time has not thought of re- 
 bellion, thinks so to-day. A month ago he was destroying 
 captured arms; to-day he no longer destroys them, and 
 he no longer maltreats the negroes as he did then. He 
 is a scoundrel. I know him; but I dare not arrest him: 
 I should alarm all the negroes who are still with me. 
 Christophe inspires more confidence. Maurepas is a 
 rascal, but I cannot yet order his arrest. 
 
 " Never was general in a more dreadful situation. The 
 troops arrived a month ago no longer exist. Each day 
 the rebels attack, and the firing can be heard in Le Cap. 
 I cannot take the offensive, — it crushes my troops; and 
 even should I attack, I could not follow up the victories 
 I might gain. I repeat what I have said before: San Do- 
 
342 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 mingo is lost to France if by the end of Nivose [January 
 20, 1803] I do not receive ten thousand men in a body. 
 The partial reinforcements you send me might feed the 
 army in ordinary times, but they can never reconquer 
 San Domingo." 26 
 
 Next day the Captain-General wrote in still more em- 
 phatic terms: "You will never subdue San Domingo 
 without an army of twelve thousand acclimated troops 
 besides the gendarmerie; — and you will not have this 
 army until you have sent seventy thousand men to San 
 Domingo." 27 
 
 When the 15th Vendemiaire (7th October) had passed 
 with no sign of the usual cessation of the fever, Leclerc 
 wrote the following despairing letter: "Here is my opin- 
 ion on this country. We must destroy all the mountain 
 negroes, men and women, sparing only children under 
 twelve years of age. We must destroy half the negroes 
 of the plains, and not allow in the colony a single man 
 who has worn an epaulette. Without these measures the 
 colony will never be at peace, and every year, especially 
 deadly ones like this, you will have a civil war on your 
 hands which will jeopardize the future." Leclerc then 
 sketches out what must be done. Let Napoleon send 
 twelve thousand men at once, six hundred men per 
 month through the next hot season, then another fifteen 
 thousand the following autumn, and the thing will be 
 done by the spring of 1804. 28 
 
 This letter was Leclerc 's last will and testament. He 
 had written it in the flush of a new malarial crisis which 
 prostrated him for some time, and scarcely had he shown 
 signs of recovery when the first symptoms of yellow fever 
 
THE COMING OF THE YELLOW FEVER 343 
 
 appeared. For eleven days his iron will battled with the 
 disease, but on the morning of the 2d of November the 
 French army learned that its general was dead. 29 JLe- 
 clerc has been much blamed for the French failure in 
 San Domingo, but when, in the light of all the attendant 
 circumstances, we picture the Captain-General dragging 
 himself from his bed in the flush of fever or the shiver of 
 ague-chill to pen his luminous despatches, we must agree 
 with Roloff that it is a wonder he did so well. 30 
 
XXIX 
 
 THE LAST PHASE 
 
 Leclerc's last days were tortured by new misfor- 
 tunes. On October 10, the mulatto general, Clervaux, 
 suddenly revolted and carried with him all his troops. 
 This spectacular desertion was another result of the reac- 
 tionary legislation in France and Richepanse's measures 
 in Guadeloupe. In July, Napoleon had formally rees- 
 tablished all the mulatto discriminations of the Old Re- 
 gime, 1 while at about the same time Richepanse had re- 
 stored the color line for Guadeloupe and its dependencies. 
 This enraged the mulattoes of San Domingo as much as 
 the restoration of slavery had infuriated the negroes, and 
 since caste feeling was much stronger among the colored 
 people than among the blacks, the m^atto leaders soon 
 initiated decisive action. 
 
 Their plans had been so quietly laid that this mulatto 
 defection took the French army by surprise and exposed 
 it to the danger of absolute destruction. Up to this time 
 the colored people had been the negroes' most savage 
 opponents, and Clervaux's mulatto troops had made up 
 the greater part of the garrison of Le Cap itself. For the 
 moment the city was defended by only a few hundred 
 French troops and the white National Guard numbering 
 one thousand infantry and two hundred horse. All this 
 was well known to Clervaux, and two days after his deser- 
 tion he made a bold attempt to storm Le Cap by a sudden 
 
THE LAST PHASE 345 
 
 assault. Backed by fully ten thousand negro rebels his 
 mulatto troops flung themselves upon the city lines, but 
 the whites defended themselves with superb courage and 
 forced the baffled Clervaux to draw off with great loss. 2 
 
 Le Cap was saved, but the mulatto revolt decided the 
 black generals' attitude. On the following day Christophe 
 joined Clervaux, the other black commanders in the 
 North quickly followed his example, and when the news 
 reached Dessalines he summoned the West to revolt 
 against white rule. 3 Leclerc's death greatly encouraged 
 the insurgents, and by mid-November the French held 
 onlyLe Cap and the Mole in the North, and the coast 
 towns of the West. However, the faithful Laplume still 
 kept the South intact, while Spanish Santo Domingo 
 vigorously rejected the idea of any cooperation with the 
 rebel negroes and mulattoes of the French colony. 4 
 
 Indeed, before the month of November was out, the 
 French cause began to improve. Napoleon had in no way 
 relaxed his determination for the conquest of San Do- 
 mingo, but the unprecedented ravages of the yellow fever 
 had completely upset his plans, while the disorganiza- 
 tion of the navy and colonial administration had greatly 
 hampered his efforts to remedy the situation. Neverthe- 
 less, by early autumn these efforts had begun to bear 
 fruit, and a new system of colonial depots in the French 
 ports enabled the First Consul to equip some ten thou- 
 sand fresh troops for service in San Domingo. 5 Further- 
 more, in the island itself the convalescents were beginning 
 to rejoin the colors, and since these men were immune 
 to yellow fever they formed a growing nucleus of ac- 
 climated troops. It is true that the disease continued into 
 
346 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 January and swept away many of Napoleon's reinforce- 
 ments, but the French army steadily gained in strength 
 and soon enabled the new Governor-General, Rocham- 
 beau, to take offensive measures. Fort Dauphin was re- 
 captured in December, Port-de-Paix in January, 1803, 
 and much of the hinterland in both North and West was 
 recovered. The chief set-back was in the South. The 
 mulatto element there had been greatly strengthened by 
 the return of all those exiled on the fall of Rigaud, and 
 in mid-January the colored population had made com- 
 mon cause with the disaffected negro element by a revolt 
 against the faithful Laplume. The black general still 
 held many of his people loyal to the French, but he 
 was slowly driven back on Les Cayes. Still, by the begin- 
 ning of March, Rochambeau had over eleven thousand 
 French troops with the colors, and as only four thousand 
 men lay in hospital it was plain that disease had done its 
 worst by the French army. 6 
 
 Frankly a war of race, the struggle which now ensued 
 acquired a most ferocious character. We have seen that 
 Leclerc's last despatch to Bonaparte had advised a war 
 of extermination, 7 and this opinion was generally shared 
 by both the army and the civilian population. " Almost 
 all the negroes in the gendarmerie have deserted bag and 
 baggage to the enemy," writes a white colonist to a lady 
 in France, "and the same thing is true of the black 
 troops. After such examples how can we trust those 
 negroes who appear to desire submission? So long as 
 there remains at San Domingo any considerable body of 
 negroes who for twelve years have made war, the colony 
 will never be reestablished. The negro who has been a 
 
THE LAST PHASE 347 
 
 soldier will never again become a cultivator; he prefers 
 death to work. He who has once worn an epaulette 
 holds it dearer than life; he will commit every crime to 
 retain it. If France wishes to regain San Domingo she 
 must send hither twenty-five thousand men in a body, 
 declare the negroes slaves, and destroy at least thirty 
 thousand negroes and negresses — the latter being more 
 cruel than the men. These measures are frightful, but 
 necessary. We must take them or renounce the colony. 
 Whoever says otherwise lies in his throat and deceives 
 France." 8 
 
 Rochambeau fully agreed with these sentiments, and 
 his ruthless energy was eminently suited to the task. 
 Through March and April, 1803, the rebels were steadily 
 rooted out of the open country and forced into the moun- 
 tains, even man-hunting dogs being imported from Cuba 
 to fill the gaps in the ranks of the French army. The 
 growing peril forced the insubordinate negro bands to 
 yield stricter allegiance to Dessalines, but even so 
 Rochambeau's ultimate triumph grew clearer with every 
 day. Napoleon was equipping fifteen thousand fresh 
 troops to maintain the army during the coming sum- 
 mer, and he had planned another fifteen thousand for the 
 decisive blow in the autumn. 9 But already a shadow lay 
 athwart the path of Rochambeau's success. During 
 these same months Napoleon's negotiations with Great 
 Britain grew more and more hopeless, and on May 12 
 the short and hollow Peace of Amiens gave place to a 
 new English war. 10 
 
 The English war sounded the death-knell of white San 
 Domingo. A year later the island would probably have 
 
348 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 been crushed; but as it was, the half -finished work was 
 soon entirely undone. In the last days of June a strict 
 blockade cut off San Domingo from the world . and 
 stopped the stream of men and money which fed the 
 French army. The English at once aided the rebels, the 
 flame of insurrection burst forth with new energy, and 
 the hinterland was lost once more. This was a fatal blow. 
 The English blockade stopped all intercommunication 
 by sea, and the scattered garrisons of the coast towns were 
 crushed in turn by Dessalines's overwhelming forces. 
 Early in October the fall of Les Cayes announced the 
 loss of the South; before the end of that month the evac- 
 uation of Port - au - Prince heralded the end of French 
 resistance in the West; and on November 10, 1803, 
 Rochambeau sailed out of the harbor of Le Cap to give 
 his sword to the waiting English admiral. On the 28th 
 of November, the evacuation of the Mole-Saint-Nicolas 
 gave the death-stroke to French San Domingo. 11 Na- 
 poleon's great effort had ended in complete disaster. Of 
 the fifty thousand soldiers sent thither during those short 
 two years, only a few thousand ever saw France again — 
 and these after years of English captivity; while the ten 
 thousand sailors dead of yellow fever were to be sorely 
 missed on the day of Trafalgar. 12 Only in Spanish Santo 
 Domingo was the French flag still kept flying by a tiny 
 corps of European troops. 13 
 
 And the destruction of French authority was but the 
 prelude to the complete extermination of the white race 
 in "la Partie francaise de Saint-Domingue." At the mo- 
 ment of the French evacuation Dessalines was the ac- 
 knowledged war-chief of all the black armies, but with 
 
THE LAST PHASE 349 
 
 the removal of external pressure his position became a 
 most critical one. In December, 1803, he formally pro- 
 claimed the island's independence, reviving the Indian 
 name of "Haiti" to mark the complete break with its 
 colonial past. The succeeding year saw a fierce struggle 
 with the other black and mulatto chiefs, but in the end 
 Dessalines triumphed over all his enemies, and in October, 
 1804, he set the seal upon his victory by crowning him- 
 self emperor. 14 
 
 The time was now ripe for the final blow. When the 
 French troops had left the country in November, 1803, 
 Dessalines had promised protection to all white civilians 
 who chose to remain, and shortly afterwards a proclama- 
 tion had invited all white exiles to return. The favorable 
 treatment accorded those who remained after the de- 
 parture of Rochambeau induced a considerable number 
 of colonial whites to return to San Domingo. But no 
 sooner was the black leader firmly seated on his imperial 
 throne than these unfortunates discovered their mistake 
 in trusting the word of Dessalines. Scarcely had the new 
 year begun when orders went forth to massacre the 
 white population, and on April 25, 1805, a ferocious proc- 
 lamation set the seal on this awful proscription and laid 
 down that doctrine of white exclusion ever since retained 
 as the cardinal point of Haitian policy. 15 
 
 The nature of these events is well shown by the letter 
 of a French officer secretly in Port-au-Prince at the time, 
 who himself escaped by a miracle to the lesser evil of an 
 English prison in Jamaica. " The murder of the whites in 
 detail," he writes, "began at Port-au-Prince in the first 
 days of January, but on the 17th and 18th March they 
 
350 FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO 
 
 were finished off en masse. All, without exception, have 
 been massacred, down to the very women and children. 
 Madame de Boynes was killed in a peculiarly horrible 
 manner. A young mulatto named Fifi Pariset ranged the 
 town like a madman searching the houses to kill the little 
 children. Many of the men and women were hewn down 
 by sappers, who hacked off their arms and smashed in 
 their chests. Some were poniarded, others mutilated, 
 others 'passed on the bayonet,' 16 others disembowelled 
 with knives or sabres, still others stuck like pigs. At 
 the beginning, a great number were drowned. The same 
 general massacre has taken place all over the colony, and 
 as I write you these lines I believe that there are not 
 twenty whites still alive — and these not for long." 17 
 
 This estimate was, indeed, scarcely exaggerated. The 
 white race had perished utterly out of the land, French 
 San Domingo had vanished forever, and the black State 
 of Haiti had begun its troubled history. 
 
 THE END 
 
NOTES 
 
NOTES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 1. Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Description de la Partie Francaise de 
 l'lsle Saint-Domingue " (2 vols.; Philadelphia, 1797), i, 295. 
 
 2. "Mome," the Creole word for "mountain." 
 
 8. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 295-509. An extraordinarily detailed 
 description. 
 
 4. Ibid., i, 103-06. 
 
 5. The standard work for the early period is that of the learned Jesuit 
 Charlevoix, "Histoire de l'lsle Espagnole ou de Saint-Domingue." 
 (Amsterdam, 1733, 4 vols.) 
 
 6. The standard works on the buccaneers are, besides Charlevoix: 
 Du Tertre (1667-71); Le Pers (MSS, Bibliotheque Nationale, 
 "Fr. 8992"); Labat (1742); Oexmelin (Dutch writer, 1674); 
 Archenholz (1804). 
 
 7. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 7. 
 
 8. From their manner of curing the beef and hides. 
 
 9. Vaissiere, "Saint-Domingue (1629-1789): La Societe et la Vie 
 Creole sous l'Ancien Regime" (Paris, 1909), 13; Levasseur, 
 "Histoire du Commerce de la France" (Paris, 1911), I, 284. 
 
 10. Vaissiere, 7-11. (He has cleared up this obscure period by his 
 original researches in the English "Calendar of State Papers.") 
 
 11. Ibid., 16-17. 
 
 12. Anno 1697. 
 
 13. The Peace of Utrecht. 
 
 14. Vaissiere, 25; Levasseur, I, 391-93. 
 
 15. Vaissiere, 18-24. 
 
 16. Levasseur, i, 484-85. 
 
 17. Peytraud, "L'Esclavage aux Antilles Frangaises avant 1789," 151. 
 
 18. Vaissiere, 55. 
 
 19. Ibid., 56. 
 
 20. Speech to the Tiers Etat by the San Domingo deputy Gouy dArcy, 
 at the taking of the Oath of the Tennis-Court, June 20, 1789; 
 "Requ&te Presentee aux Etats Generaux, le 8 Juin, 1789, par les 
 deputes de l'lsle de Saint-Domingue" (pamphlet); several other 
 instances to the same effect but with slightly different language. 
 
 21. Speech of the San Domingo deputy Cocherel in the National As- 
 sembly, November 26, 1789; "Memoire instructif adresse aux 
 Notables par les Commissaires de Saint-Domingue" (pamphlet. 
 
354 NOTES 
 
 anno 1787, pp. 5-7); "Opinion de Blin sur la proposition d'un 
 comite coloniale" (pamphlet, November, 1789); other language 
 to the same effect. 
 
 CHAPTER H 
 
 1. The standard authority on Spanish San Domingo is Moreau de 
 Saint-Mery, "Description de la Partie Espagnole de 1'Isle Saint- 
 Domingue." (1789.) 
 
 2. Roloff, "Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I" (Munich, 1899), 37. 
 
 3. For description, see ante, pp. 1-2. 
 
 4. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 103-06; Garran-Coulon, "Rapport sur 
 les Troubles de Saint-Domingue, fait au nom de la Commission 
 des Colonies, des Comit6s de Salut Public, de Legislation, et de la 
 Marine, reunis" (official publication; 4 vols.; Paris, Year VI- 
 1798), i, 33-34. 
 
 5. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 506; n, 6-13; Garran-Coulon, I, 35. 
 
 6. Moreau de Saint-Mery, u, 320-406; De Wimpffen, "A Voyage to 
 Saint-Domingo in the Years 1788, 1789 and 1790" (London, 1797; 
 trans.), 206-07. 
 
 7. Moreau de Saint-Mery, u, 532-35. 
 
 8. Garran-Coulon, i, 36. 
 
 9. Vaissiere, 153. (MSS. data in the Archives des Colonies.) 
 
 10. Sciout, "La Revolution a Saint-Domingue: Les Commissaires 
 Sonthonax et Polverel" (Revue des Questions Historiques, 
 
 October, 1898), 400. 
 
 11. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 106; n, 13; n, 533. 
 
 12. Girod-Chantrans, "Voyage d'un Suisse dans les differentes Colo- 
 nies de l'Amerique" (Neufchatel, 1785), 219. 
 
 13. Vaissiere, 279-80; Du Buisson, "Nouvelles Considerations sur 
 Saint-Domingue" (2 vols.; Paris, 1780), n, 9. 
 
 14. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, "Considerations sur 1'etat present de la 
 Colonie Franchise de Saint-Domingue" (2 vols.; Paris, 1776), 
 n, 19-24. 
 
 15. See bibliographical note on Hilliard d'Auberteuil. 
 
 16. Du Buisson, n, 8-9. 
 
 17. Vaissiere, 278-79. 
 
 18. Mills, "The Early Years of the French Revolution in San Do- 
 mingo" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Univ., 1889), 21. 
 
 19. Ibid., 22; Roloff, 6. 
 
 20. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 11-13. Raynal, "Essai sur 1' Administra- 
 tion de la Colonie de Saint-Domingue" (?: 1785), 145-46; Bois- 
 sonnade, "Saint-Domingue a la Veille de la Revolution et la 
 Question de la Representation Coloniale aux Etats Generaux" 
 (Paris, 1906), 7. 
 
NOTES 355 
 
 21. Vaissiere, 181. 
 
 22. Boissonnade, 6; Roloff, 6-7; Mills, 22. 
 
 23. Mills, 23; also, Roloff, 7. 
 
 24. Roloff, 7; Mills, 22-23; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 2-18; Raynal, 
 145-147. 
 
 25. Boissonnade, 6-7. 
 
 26. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, ir, 17. 
 
 27. Ibid., ii, 2-18; Raynal, 145-46; Roloff, 7. 
 
 28. Vaissiere, 108-14. 
 .29. Ibid., 131-52. 
 
 30. Deschamps, "Les Colonies pendant la Revolution: la Constitu- 
 ante et la Reforme Coloniale" (Paris, 1898), 11-13. 
 
 31. Vaissiere, 115. 
 
 32. Venault de Charmilly, " Lettre & Bryan Edwards " (London, 1797) , 
 pamphlet. 
 
 33. Deschamps, 8-10. 
 
 34. Raynal, 223. 
 
 35. Deschamps, 300 bis. (Appendix.) 
 
 36. De Wimpffen, 69-73. 
 
 37. Deschamps, 10-11. 
 
 38. De Wimpffen, 211-12. 
 
 39. Vaissiere, 89-92. 
 
 40. Boissonnade, 7. 
 
 41. Roloff, 9; Mills, 14; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, i, 35-36. 
 
 42. Boissonnade, 7. 
 
 43. For a full discussion of these proposed reforms, see Daubigny: 
 "Choiseul et la France d'Outremer apres 1763." (Paris, 1892.) 
 
 44. Mills, 25. 
 
 45. Carteau, "Soirees Bermudiennes " (Bordeaux, 1802), 25-26. 
 
 46. Vaissiere, 85. 
 
 47. Ibid., 86-87. 
 
 48. Raynal, 177. 
 
 49. Ibid., 171-72. 
 
 50. Ibid., 177. 
 
 51. Vaissiere, 112-14. 
 
 52. De Wimpffen, 78. 
 
 53. Mills, 9. 
 
 54. Ibid. 
 
 55. Leroy-Beaulieu, "De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes" 
 (4th ed.; Paris, 1891), 163-64. 
 
 56. Peytraud, 448-50; Leroy-Beaulieu, 164. 
 
 57. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 100. 
 
 58. Deschamps, 4. 
 
 59. Moreau de Saint-M&y, i, 100. 
 
 60. Deschamps, 5. (Official Report of August, 1791.) 
 
356 NOTES 
 
 61. The figures for San Domingo are doubtful. Leroy-Beaulieu's 
 193 millions (p. 167) is far too high. The nearest figure is probably 
 Mills's 176 millions (p. 11), though his authority is doubtful. 
 Even this figure seems slightly high from other evidence; see 
 Treille, 24-25; Boissonnade, 19. 
 
 62. Boissonnade, 19; Deschamps, 5-7; Mills, 12. 
 
 63. Boissonnade, 20. 
 
 64. Deschamps, 19-20; Boissonnade, 21. 
 
 65. Deschamps, 7; 19-20; Boissonnade, 21. 
 
 66. The best discussion is that of Normand, "Le Pacte Coloniale" 
 (Doctor's thesis, Faculte de Droit, Paris, 1900). See also treatment 
 in Leroy-Beaulieu. Both are based upon the leading economic 
 writers. 
 
 67. Normand, 23. 
 
 68. Deschamps, 21. 
 
 69. Peytraud, 452-53. 
 
 70. Normand, 49. 
 
 71. Deschamps, 21-22; Roloff, 5. 
 
 72. Peytraud, 76; Levasseur, 489. 
 
 73. De Wimpffen, 72-77; 85-87; 276-77. 
 
 74. Roloff, 5; Mills, 12. 
 
 75. Mills, 12. 
 
 76. Ibid., 12-13; Roloff, 5; Levasseur, 489. 
 
 77. Levasseur, 489. 
 
 78. Ibid., 489; Normand, 148. 
 
 79. Normand, 148-49; Mills, 13; Roloff, 5-6; Levasseur, 489. 
 
 80. Deschamps, 29-37. 
 
 81. Boissonnade, 24. 
 
 82. Ibid., 17. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 1. As already seen, not over forty thousand. This figure does not, 
 however, include the garrison troops nor the sailors of the royal 
 or merchant marine in the ports of the colony. These will be con- 
 sidered later. 
 
 2. Leroy-Beaulieu, 159. 
 
 S. Although loose usage has since obscured its true meaning, the 
 term "Creole" has to do, not with race, but with birthplace. 
 "Creole" means "one born in the colonies." In the eighteenth 
 century, this was perfectly clear. Whites were "Creole" or "Eu- 
 ropean"; negroes were "Creole" or "African." 
 
 4. De Wimpffen, 65. 
 
 5. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 33-35; 42-43; Moreau de Saint-Mery, 
 I, 9-11. 
 
NOTES 357 
 
 6. HilHard d'Auberteuil, n, 44-45 
 
 7. Du Buisson, n, 24. 
 
 8. Boissonnade, 31. 
 
 9. Raynal, 6. 
 
 10. Garran-Coulon, I, 16. 
 
 11. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 9. 
 
 12. Leroy-Beaulieu, 164. 
 
 13. This class will be discussed later. 
 
 14. Vaissiere, 78; De Wimpffen, 81-82. 
 
 15. Garran-Coulon, i, 16 (Barbe-Marbois's figures). 
 
 16. Vaissiere, 279; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 13; Raynal, 5. 
 
 17. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 42. 
 
 18. These social traits will be discussed later. 
 
 19. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 45. 
 
 20. Ibid., ii, 35-36; Roloff, 7. 
 
 21. Mills, 14. 
 
 22. Leroy-Beaulieu, 155-60; Peytraud, 12. 
 
 23. Boissonnade, 31-32. 
 
 24. Ibid. 
 
 25. The rural gendarmerie. 
 
 26. Vaissiere, 93-152 (an extremely full treatment of the subject). 
 
 27. Ibid., 354-55. 
 
 28. Mills, 27. 
 
 29. Vaissiere, 355-60. 
 
 30. For clergy of other islands, see Leroy-Beaulieu, 160; Peytraud, 
 12-13. 
 
 31. Vaissiere, 82. 
 
 32. Raynal, 236. 
 
 33. Ibid., 236-37. 
 
 34. De "Wimpffen, 280-81. 
 
 35. Ibid., 281. 
 
 36. Vaissiere, 80. 
 
 37. Ibid. (Like most of the quotations from this author, the above is 
 drawn from the official correspondence in the Archives des Colonies.) 
 
 38. Ibid., 81-82. 
 
 39. Boissonnade, 32-33; Peytraud, 13; 270-71; Leroy-Beaulieu, 160- 
 61; Mills, 14-15. 
 
 40. Mills, 15; Vaissiere, 104-06. 
 
 41. Literally "small whites." 
 
 42. See ante, p. 15. 
 
 43. Peytraud, 4; 13-25; 270; 445-49; 455-57; Leroy-Beaulieu, 161-64; 
 Vaissiere, 52; 154. 
 
 44. See Peytraud and Leroy-Beaulieu above; also the latter's remarks 
 on Cuba and Porto Rico before development of slavery there, 
 251-56; 269-70. 
 
358 NOTES 
 
 45. A large proportion of these were Creoles. 
 
 46. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 40-41; Roloff, 8. 
 
 47. See letter of Governor Blanchelande to the German Colony of 
 Bombarde, Archives Nationales, D-xxv, 46; Boissonnade, 31. 
 
 48. .Schoelcher, 5. (These play a not unimportant part in the Revolu- 
 
 tionary disturbances, especially the Maltese demagogue Praloto 
 at Port-au-Prince.) 
 
 49. I have noted in lists of prisoners, deported persons, etc., preserved 
 in the Archives Nationales, very many foreign names. Some are 
 even Slav. 
 
 50. Vaissiere, 338 (Police report of 1780, in Archives Coloniales). 
 
 51. Ibid., 229; "Desastres," 130-32; Deschamps, 18. 
 
 52. Vaissiere, 229; "Desastres," 129-30. 
 
 53. The regiments "Le Cap" and "Port-au-Prince." 
 
 54. Deschamps, 300 bis. (Appendix.) 
 
 55. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 8-9. 
 
 56. Ibid., 1, 12; Vaissiere, 301-02; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 45 ; Mills, 13. 
 
 57. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 12; 16-17; Vaissiere, 306; De Wimpffen, 
 65. 
 
 58. Vaissiere, 302-03; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 31. 
 
 59. Vaissiere, 303. 
 
 60. Ibid., 305. 
 
 61. Ibid., 306. 
 
 62. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 13. 
 
 63. Ibid., i, 12-13. 
 
 64. Ibid., I, 13; Vaissiere, 305-06. 
 
 65. Moreau de Saint-M£ry, i, 12 (note); Vaissiere, 306-07; and others. 
 
 66. Vaissiere, 303-06; De Wimpffen, 268. 
 
 67. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 15-16, Vaissiere, 305-06. 
 
 68. De Wimpffen, 264. 
 
 69. Ibid., 268. 
 
 70. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 13-15; Vaissiere, 308. 
 
 71. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 17-21; Vaissiere, 308-19; Hilliard 
 
 d'Auberteuil, n, 31-32. 
 
 72. MissHassal, "Secret History; or, the Horrors of San Domingo, in 
 a series of Letters, written by a Lady at Cape Frangois to Colonel 
 Burr, Late Vice-President of the United States. Principally during 
 theCommandof General Rochambeau" (Philadelphia,1808), 19-20. 
 
 73. Vaissiere, 313-18; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 20-21. 
 
 74. Vaissiere, 319-22; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 19-20. 
 
 75. Vaissiere, 61-62; also, see ante, p. 4. 
 
 76. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 7-8. 
 '77. The Peace of Utrecht, in 1714. 
 
 78. Vaissiere, 63. 
 
 79. Deschamps, 4. 
 
NOTES 359 
 
 80. Peytraud, 458. 
 
 81. See ante, pp. 16-18. 
 
 82. Vaissiere, 35-36; 68-69; Peytraud, 132-35. 
 
 83. Peytraud, 458-59. 
 
 84. Moreau de Saint-M&y, i, 11. 
 
 85. Ibid. 
 
 86. Vaissiere, 297. . 
 
 87. Ibid., 296. 
 
 88. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 11. 
 
 89. Vaissiere, 295. 
 
 90. Du Buisson, n, 2-3; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 11; Vaissiere, 300. 
 
 91. Du Buisson, ii, 4. 
 
 92. Moreau de Saint-M&y, I, 11. 
 
 93. Raynal, 25. 
 
 94. Ibid., 7. 
 
 95. Vaissiere, 64-67. 
 
 96. Ibid., 71. 
 
 97. Ibid., 72. 
 
 98. Ibid., 72-73. 
 
 99. Ibid., 73; 327; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 10. 
 
 100. Vaissiere, 334-37; Moreau de Saint-M&y, I, 92-97. 
 
 101. Vaissiere, 327-50. 
 
 102. Ibid., 287-95 (quoting several contemporary descriptions). 
 
 103. De Wimpffen, 103. 
 
 104. Ibid., 202. 
 
 105. Vaissiere, 279-80. 
 
 106. Ibid., 282-86 (cites instances of various types of plantation life, 
 from contempoaffigiaifcounts) . 
 
 107. Ibid., 280-82. ^\l 
 
 108. Ibid., 323. \> 
 
 109. Du Buisson, n, 4-5; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, i, 107; Vaissiere, 319-25. 
 
 110. De Wimpffen, 117-18. 
 
 111. Ibid., 118-19; Vaissiere, 323-24. 
 
 1 12. See the opening pages of Castonnet des Fosses, Dr. Magnac, and 
 articles in various periodicals. 
 
 113. See the effect produced by these accounts on Miss Hassal, in 1802 
 (p. 18) ; and on Captain Rainsford, &t about the same date (p. 104). 
 
 114. De Wimpffen, 315-16. \ 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 1. "Les Gens de Couleur Libres." This was not a euphemism, but 
 the legal definition. 
 
 2. See ante, pp. 8-9. 
 
 3. That is, of mixed white and negro blood. 
 
360 NOTES 
 
 4. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 90; HilHard d'Auberteuil, n, 87-88; 
 Roloff, 8. 
 
 5. This will be brought out by the course of events. 
 
 6. Peytraud, 196-207; Lebeau, 95-100; Vaissiere, 214-16. 
 
 7. Vaissiere, 216. 
 
 8. Peytraud, 195-96. 
 
 9. Ibid., 205. 
 
 10. Mills, 19. 
 
 11. Vaissiere, 334-37; Moreau de Saint-M6ry, i, 19-20; Lebeau, 93-94. 
 
 12. Vaissiere, 281-82. 
 
 13. Ibid., 21. 
 
 14. Moreau de Saint-M&y, i, 68-69. 
 
 15. Lebeau, 90-93; Vaissiere, 217. 
 
 16. Vaissiere, 76; 216-17; Peytraud, 197. 
 
 17. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 79. 
 
 18. Vaissiere, 221. 
 
 19. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 89. 
 
 20. Vaissiere, 219. 
 
 21. Ibid., 219-20. 
 
 22. Ibid., 220. 
 
 23. Ibid., 221. 
 
 24. Lebeau, 91-92. 
 
 25. Peytraud, 205. 
 
 26. In Louisiana and Bourbon: see Lebeau, 92. 
 
 27. Lebeau, 92-93. 
 
 28. Ibid., 19-21; Peytraud, 424. 
 
 29. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 79. 
 
 30. Lebeau, 94. 
 
 31. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 79. (This in accordance with the Roman 
 maxim, Partus sequitur ventrem.) 
 
 32. Lebeau, 3-4; Vaissiere, 221-22; Peytraud, 425. 
 
 33. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 71-89. 
 
 34. Peytraud, 422-23. 
 
 35. Lebeau, 4. 
 
 36. Lebeau, 9. 
 
 37. That is, with agricultural implements; especially with machetes. 
 
 38. Carteau, 60-61. 
 89. Vaissiere, 228. 
 
 40. Lebeau, 17-54; 92-94; Peytraud, 425-34; Vaissiere, 224-27; Mills, 
 16-19. 
 
 41. Vaissiere, 221-24; Peytraud, 423-25; Roloff, 8. 
 
 42. Lebeau, 111-15. 
 
 43. D6schamps, 18. 
 
 44. Gouy d'Arcy, "Idees Sommaires sur la Restoration de Saint- 
 Domingue" (Paris, 1792), 8. 
 
NOTES 361 
 
 45. "Desastres," 130-31. 
 
 46. Peytraud, 432-33; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 74. 
 
 47. "Desastres," 131-32; Schoelcher, 5-6. 
 
 48. Peytraud, 206. 
 
 49. Vaissiere, 229. 
 
 50. Ibid., 224. 
 
 51. Edwards, 2; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 91. 
 
 52. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 90. 
 
 53. Ibid., i, 92-97; Vaissiere, 334-37; Peytraud, 429-30. 
 
 54. See ante, p. 38. 
 
 55. Lebeau, 93-94. 
 
 56. Gouy d'Arcy, 8; Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 17; Ibid., "Considera- 
 tions," 6-8. 
 
 57. Peytraud, 401-21; Lebeau, 58-78; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, I, 20-21; 
 De Wimpffen, 14-15. 
 
 58. Roloff,9. 
 
 59. See ante, p. 37. 
 
 60. Quoted in Peytraud, 434. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 1. Deschamps, 16 (quoting an economic writer of the later eighteenth 
 century). 
 
 2. Peytraud, vii-vin; 32-34; 143-44; 435-45; Leroy-Beaulieu, 164- 
 65; 189-95; Deschamps, 15-16. 
 
 3. See ante, pp. 8-9. 
 
 4. Semi-official estimates of 1788-89 give 509,000. See Garran- 
 Coulon, I, 15. 
 
 5. Vaissiere, 164. 
 
 6. Peytraud, 137. 
 
 7. See ante, p. 8. 
 
 8. Peytraud, 138. 
 
 9. Ibid., 139. 
 
 10. Moreau de Saint-Mery and Bryan Edwards, both careful contempo- 
 rary writers, come independently to this conclusion. See Peytraud, 
 141; Leroy-Beaulieu, 194. 
 
 11. Mills, 20; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 63. 
 
 12. Peytraud, 140. 
 
 13. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 64; Peytraud, 213-38; Vaissiere, 165-69. 
 
 14. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, II, 64. 
 
 15. Du Buisson, n, 43-44. 
 
 16. Peytraud, 214-15; 237; 436-37. The fact was noted by colonial 
 writers, but without drawing any conclusions. See Du Buisson, 
 I, 72-73; Ducceurjoly, i, 19. 
 
 17. Leroy-Beaulieu, 195. 
 
362 NOTES 
 
 18. Leroy-Beaulieu, 194. 
 
 19. Peytraud, 142 (quoting Wallon). 
 
 20. The deficit of eleven thousand persons previously quoted is con- 
 servative. Roloff states that fifteen thousand were needed to fill 
 the gaps (pp. 8-9). 
 
 21. Peytraud, 135-36. 
 
 22. Vaissiere, 164. 
 
 23. Peytraud, 139. 
 
 24. Vaissiere, 164. The customs figures are: 1787, 31,000; 1788, 30,000. 
 These are obviously too low. See Peytraud, 139. 
 
 25. For a masterly account, see Peytraud, 36-142; also Vaissiere, 
 155-63. 
 
 26. Peytraud, 35-76. 
 
 27. Deschamps, 19. 
 
 28. Boissonnade, 21. 
 
 29. Treille, 26-30; Boissonnade, 21; D6schamps, 20. 
 
 30. Peytraud, 77-105. 
 
 31. Ibid., 106-28; Vaissiere, 156-63. 
 
 32. Hilliard d'Auberteuil, n, 68. 
 S3. Moreau de Saint-M6ry, i, 23. 
 
 34. The best account is in Peytraud, 87-90. For more detailed treat- 
 ment, see observations of Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 23-25, and of 
 his contemporary Bryan Edwards, on the same types in Jamaica. 
 They tally very closely. 
 
 85. Peytraud, 90 (quoting a contemporary account). 
 
 86. Ibid., 86. 
 
 87. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 35. 
 
 88. Ibid., i, 40. 
 
 89. Ducceurjoly, n, 22. 
 
 40. Vaissiere, 206. 
 
 41. Ibid., 206-08; Garran-Coulon, n, 198-203. 
 
 42. Garran-Coulon, n, 23-24. 
 
 43. See Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 43-62; De Wimpffen, 129-32; 
 Ducceurjoly, i, 18-22; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, i, 133-36; Du Buis- 
 son, i, 71-75. 
 
 44. De Wimpffen, 129-32. 
 
 45. Peytraud, 171. 
 
 46. Peytraud, 167-81; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 35-36; Vaissiere, 
 210-11. 
 
 47. Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 45-51; Vaissiere, 178-79; Peytraud, 224. 
 
 48. See Sir Spencer St. John, and Hesketh Pritchard's "Where Black 
 rules White." 
 
 49. Vaissiere, 176-206; Edwards, 5; Hilliard d'Auberteuil, I, 136. 
 
 50. Peytraud, 216-18; 226-32. 
 
 51. Vaissiere, 169-80; 196-205; Peytraud, 216-41; Edwards, 5. 
 
NOTES 363 
 
 52. Vaissiere, 168; Peytraud, 216; 90; Moreau de Saint-Mery, i, 40. 
 
 53. Peytraud, 214-16; 290-91; Vaissiere, 166-68. 
 
 54. Peytraud, 290. 
 
 55. Vaissiere, 180-81. 
 
 56. Peytraud, 193-94. 
 
 57. M. Schoelcher (quoted in Peytraud, 291). 
 
 58. Peytraud, 291-93; Vaissiere, 189-91. 
 
 59. Vaissiere, 193-94. 
 
 60. Peytraud, 144-45; Vaissiere, 182-83. 
 
 61. The manuscript text of the "Code Noir" in the Colonial Archives 
 is reproduced in full in Peytraud, 158-66. 
 
 62. Peytraud, 149-57; Vaissiere, 183. 
 
 63. Vaissiere, 185-86. 
 
 64. Ibid., 195-205; Peytraud, 243; Edwards, 14-15. 
 
 65. Vaissiere, 184-85. 
 
 66. Ibid., 181. 
 
 67. Ibid. 
 
 68. Edwards, 13-14. 
 
 69. Vaissiere, 188. 
 
 70. Ibid., 186-88 (entire account of the "Affaire Lejeune"). 
 
 71. See ante, p. 61. 
 
 72. Vaissiere, 234-35. 
 
 73. Du Buisson, I, 77. 
 
 74. Vaissiere, 235. 
 
 75. Peytraud, 344. 
 
 76. Garran-Coulon, i, 4. 
 
 77. "Lettre au 'Patriote frangais' par un ancien OfBcier creol," 
 October 31, 1791. 
 
 78. Charlevoix, in, 162. (He is strictly contemporary, for his book 
 appeared only a few years after this event.) 
 
 79. Ibid., in, 162-64; Levasseur, 392. ' 
 
 80. At that time the most populous quarter of the colony. 
 
 81. Vaissiere, 232 (official quotation); also see Charlevoix, rv, 10. 
 
 82. Vaissiere, 232-33 (official quotation). 
 
 83. "Lettre par unancien Officier creol" (op. cit.). 
 
 84. Vaissiere, 236; "Lettre" (op. cit). 
 
 85. Vaissiere, 237. 
 
 86. Ibid., 238-45; 249-53; Peytraud, 317-23; Moreau de Saint-Mery, 
 i,36. 
 
 87. Vaissiere, 236-38; 245-49; "Lettre par un ancien Officier creol " 
 (op. cit). 
 
 88. In the year 1783. 
 
 89. Vaissiere, 229-30. 
 
 90. De Wimpffen, 336. 
 
364 NOTES 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 1. The Notables had met in February and had been dissolved in 
 May, 1787. 
 
 2. See ante, pp. 10-15 and 21-22. 
 
 3. See ante, pp. 16 to 18. 
 
 4. Boissonnade, 43-46. 
 
 5. Ibid., 46-57. 
 
 6. Ibid., 61-67. 
 
 7. Ibid., 74-83. 
 
 8. Ibid., 90. 
 
 9. Ibid., 95. 
 
 10. Ibid., 98-113; Mills, 27-28. 
 
 11. Boissonnade, 113-125. 
 
 12. The meeting of Vizille had been held in July; the Assembly of 
 Romans in September. 
 
 13. Boissonnade, 125. 
 
 14. Ibid., 7-8. 
 
 15. Ibid., 10-11; Garran-Coulon, I, 42; Mills. 40. 
 
 16. Boissonnade, 126-27. 
 
 17. Ibid., 127-28. 
 
 18. Ibid., 69-71. 
 
 19. Notably Voltaire, Rousseau, Turgot. (See Zimmermann, 249- 
 50.) 
 
 20. Boissonnade, 37-38; Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 
 1-3. 
 
 21. A French translation of the name of Clarkson's society. 
 
 22. Deschamps, 50-52; Boissonnade, 38-40; Edwards, 19-20. 
 
 23. Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 16. 
 
 24. Ibid., 4. 
 
 25. Ibid., 4. 
 
 26. Boissonnade, 71; Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 3. 
 
 27. Boissonnade, 71; Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 16. 
 
 28. See ante, p. 70. 
 
 29. Boissonnade, 70-71. 
 
 30. Arch. Col., F. 16 (Letter of December 8, 1788). 
 
 31. Boissonnade, 138-43. 
 
 32. Ibid., 130-48. 
 
 33. Ibid., 149. 
 
 34. Venault de Charmilly, 48 (himself one of the protestants). 
 
 35. Boissonnade, 149-67; Mills, 28-29; Garran-Coulon, i, 46. 
 
 36. Boissonnade, 167-70; Mills, 29-30; Garran-Coulon, I, 47-48. 
 
 37. Boissonnade, 187-88. 
 
 38. Ibid., 192-95; Mills, 39-41. 
 
NOTES 365 
 
 39. Boissonnade, 198-202. 
 
 40. Ibid., 209-13. 
 
 41. Ibid., 202-08. 
 
 42. Ibid., 213. 
 
 43. Deschamps, 58-59. 
 
 44. The 20th of June, 1789. 
 
 45. Boissonnade, 214-33; Deschamps, 61-66; Mills, 30-31. 
 
 46. Boissonnade, 234-71; Mills, 31. 
 
 47. Deschamps, 69. 
 
 48. Ibid., 69-70. 
 
 49. Boissonnade, 5-6; 273-74; Vaissiere, 359-61. 
 
 50. Roloff, 22-23. 
 
 51. Quoted in Boissonnade, 274; and in Vaissiere, 360-61. 
 
 52. Vaissiere, 361. 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 1. "Lettre ecrite par MM. les Deputes de Saint-Domingue a Ieur 
 Constituans au Cap." (Pamphlet form; also mainly quoted in 
 Garran-Coulon, i, 116.) 
 
 2. Mills, 34. 
 
 3. Garran-Coulon, i, 57-59; Mills, 35; Deschamps, 90. 
 
 4. Mills, 35. 
 
 5. This whole topic is exhaustively treated in Brette, "Les Gens de 
 Couleur Libres et leurs Deputes en 1789"; in "La Revolution 
 Francaise," xxix, 326-45; 385-407 (1895); see also Boissonnade, 
 172; Edwards, 20. 
 
 6. Brette, 329-37; Mills, 35-36; Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considera- 
 tions," 8-9. 
 
 7. Brette, 385-86; Mills, 35-36; Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considera- 
 tions," 8-9. 
 
 8. Deschamps, 78-79. 
 
 9. De Curt, deputy for Guadeloupe. By this time the other French 
 colonies had been given representation in the National As- 
 sembly. 
 
 10. Deschamps, 76-77; Garran-Coulon, i, 60-62; Mills, 50. 
 
 11. Deschamps, 79-80. 
 
 12. Treated in the next chapter. 
 
 13. Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 17-29; Garran-Coulon, 
 i, 126. 
 
 14. Deschamps, 80-81; Garran-Coulon, I, 128. 
 
 15. Deschamps, 90-91. 
 
 16. The text of the decree may be found in Arch. Pari., xn, 73. 
 
 17. For different comments on the decree, see Mills, 54; Deschamps, 
 93; Edwards, 28-29. 
 
366 NOTES 
 
 18. Mills, 54; Deschamps, 92. 
 
 19. Deschamps, 99-100; Mills, 56. 
 
 20. Mills, 56. 
 
 CHAPTER Vni 
 
 1. See ante, pp. 75-76. 
 
 2. Mills, 41, 44; Garran-Coulon, I, 71-72. 
 
 3. Garran-Coulon, i, 73-74; "Desastres," 139-40; Mills, 41-42. 
 
 4. See ante, pp. 75-76. 
 
 5. See ante, pp. 25-26. 
 
 6. Mills, 41. 
 
 7. Garran-Coulon, I, 80-81; "Desastres," 140; Mills, 44. 
 
 8. Mills, 42. 
 
 9. Garran-Coulon, i, 75-78; Mills, 43; Schoelcher, 14-15; "D&- 
 astres," 141. 
 
 10. Mills, 41; 47. 
 
 11. "Desastres," 142-43; Garran-Coulon, I, 80-81; Mills, 48^*9. 
 
 12. Garran-Coulon, i, 80-88; Mills, 45-47; Schoelcher, 14-17; Dalmas, 
 38-40. 
 
 13. Garran-Coulon, i, 88-90; Mills, 45-47. 
 
 14. Garran-Coulon, I, 90-95; Mills, 52-53; Edwards, 25-26. 
 
 15. Mills, 58. 
 
 16. Boissonnade, 172-73; "Desastres," 144. 
 
 17. See ante, pp. 72-74. 
 
 18. Ibid. 
 
 19. Edwards, 21. 
 
 20. Mills, 42. 
 
 21. Letter of the local commandant of Maribaroux to the district com- 
 mandant of Fort Dauphin, October 14, 1789, Arch. Col., F-3, 194. 
 
 22. Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 17-29. 
 
 23. Letter to La Luzerne, February 12, 1790, Arch. Col., C-9, 164. 
 
 24. Mills, 47-48; Garran-Coulon, i, 109-14. 
 
 25. See ante, pp. 46-47. 
 
 26. Lacroix, I, 21, 22; "Desastres," 144; Gatereau, 22-28. 
 
 27. Lacroix, i, 22-23; "Desastres," 145. 
 
 28. "Desastres," 146; Edwards, 23. 
 
 29. Lacroix, I, 24; Edwards, 24. 
 
 30. See ante, p. 46. 
 
 31. Lacroix, i, 14-15. 
 
 32. Ibid., 24-25. 
 
 33. "Desastres," 145; Gatereau, 41-42. 
 
 34. Roloff, 22-23. 
 
 35. Lacroix, I, 25-28; Edwards, 65. 
 
NOTES 367 
 
 CHAPTEE IX 
 
 1. Garran-Coulon, i, 161-65; Mills, 58. 
 
 2. Deschamps, 175. 
 
 3. Garran-Coulon, i, 170-75; Mills, 61; Edwards, 32-36. 
 
 4. Garran-Coulon, i, 175-98; Dalmas, 45-47; Mills, 77-78; Edwards, 
 36. 
 
 5. See especially ante, pp. 2-5. 
 
 6. See ante, pp. 10-14. 
 
 7. See ante, p. 83. 
 
 8. That is, the &migr6s. 
 
 9. That is, the Clergy and the Vendeens. 
 
 10. Garran-Coulon, i, 181-82. 
 
 11. Mills, 78. 
 
 12. "Desastres," 148-50; Mills, 64-65. 
 
 13. See ante, pp. 97-98. 
 
 14. Mills, 58. 
 
 15. "Desastres," 146-48; Mills, 59; Garran-Coulon, i, 159-60. 
 
 16. Garran-Coulon, i, 182-87. 
 
 17. Mills, 62-65; Edwards, 37; Dalmas, 43-44; "Desastres," 152. 
 
 18. "Desastres," 151-52. 
 
 19. Letter of June 21, 1790, Arch. Col., C-9, 164. 
 
 20. Mills, 66-67; Garran-Coulon, i, 211-13. 
 
 21. Garran-Coulon, i, 243-51; "Desastres," 153; Mills, 70. 
 
 22. In September, 1789; see ante, p. 91. 
 
 23. Garran-Coulon, i, 222. 
 
 24. Ibid., i, 221-25; Mills, 68; Edwards, 31-32. 
 
 25. Edwards, 32. 
 
 26. Deschamps, 300 bis. (Appendix.) 
 
 27. Garran-Coulon, i, 78, 229. 
 
 28. Ibid., i, 225-29; "Desastres," 153. 
 
 29. Garran-Coulon, I, 251-55; Mills, 70-71; Edwards, 37-38. 
 
 30. That is, "Pompons Blancs." 
 
 31. The most detailed account is by Governor Peynier himself, in his 
 report of July 31 to the Minister of Marine, Arch. Col., C-9, 164; 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46. De Wimpffen, who was in Port-au-Prince 
 at the time, has left some interesting pages (333-40). See also 
 Garran-Coulon, I, 248-51; "Desastres," 154-55; Edwards, 39-40. 
 Both sides later drew up justificatory memorials to the National 
 Assembly; but these, together with other pamphlet literature, 
 have as usual been digested by Garran-Coulon (supra). 
 
 32. Report of July 31, quoted above. 
 
 33. Mills, 71-73; Garran-Coulon, I, 255-61; Edwards, 40. 
 
 34. Garran-Coulon, i, 262-69; "Desastres," 154-57; Mills, 72-73. 
 
368 NOTES 
 
 35. Mills, 73; Garran-Coulon, I, 269-72; "Desastres," 155-56. 
 
 36. Garran-Coulon, i, 272-80; Mills, 83; "Desastres," 156-57. 
 
 37. Deschamps, 179-80; Garran-Coulon, i, 313-18; Mills, 82-83. 
 
 38. Garran-Coulon, i, 272-80; 293-97; Mills, 83. 
 
 39. See ante, p. 8. 
 
 40. The best account of affairs in the North is in the reports of Moreau 
 de Saint-Mery's special correspondent at Le Cap — due allowance 
 being made for party bias, — Arch. Col., F-3, 195, 196. See also 
 Garran-Coulon, i, 300-07; "Desastres," 157-58; Dalmas, 67-68. 
 See also instructive letter of a "Patriot" inhabitant of the North 
 to a friend in Paris (printed as a pamphlet now apparently very 
 rare, Bib. Nat., LK-12, 296). 
 
 41. De Wimpffen, 334. 
 
 42. Garran-Coulon, n, 42-71; "Desastres," 160-65; Mills, 86-90; 
 Edwards, 44-55. 
 
 43. See ante, p. 96. 
 
 44. For the action of the Government in the West, see official cor- 
 respondence and Mauduit's report, Arch. Col., C-9, 164. The 
 treatment of this point in the various secondary works is mostly 
 doubtful conjecture. 
 
 45. Lacroix, i, 64-65. 
 
 46. See next chapter. 
 
 47. Garran-Coulon, i, 281-89; Mills, 74-77; Edwards, 56-58. 
 
 48. For this period, see official correspondence, Arch. Col., C-9, 164, 
 165; Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; also, the Moreau de Saint-Mery cor- 
 respondence above, Arch. Col., F-3, 196. This period is not treated 
 in any published work. 
 
 49. See Blanchelande's report, March 13, 1791, Arch. Col., C-9, 165; 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; other official and semi-official papers 
 summarized in Garran-Coulon, i, 332-43; see also "Desastres," 
 169-71; Mills, 91-93. 
 
 50. Garran-Coulon, i, 348-52; "Desastres," 172-73. 
 
 51. For this period, see Blanchelande's correspondence, Arch. Col., 
 C-9, 165; Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; Moreau de Saint-Mery corre- 
 spondence, Arch. Col., F-3, 196; also, Garran-Coulon, i, 348-62; 
 Mills, 93-94 (very summary treatment). 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 1. See ante, pp. 87-89. 
 
 2. De Wimpffen, 49-51. 
 
 3. That is, the General Assembly's "Constitutional Bases"; see 
 ante, pp. 101-03. 
 
 4. See ante, pp. 84-85. 
 
 5. "Adresse de l'Assemblee provinciale du Nord de Saint- 
 
NOTES 369 
 
 Domingue a l'Assemblee Nationale." (Le Cap, July 13, 1790; 
 official publication.) 
 6. See ante, pp. 105-108. 
 _ 7. Arch. Pari., xrx, 569. 
 
 8. Moreau de Saint-Mery, "Considerations," 47-48. 
 
 9. Edwards, 65-66; Dalmas, 109-10. 
 
 10. For text of this report, see Arch. Pari., xxv, 636 et seq. 
 
 11. See ante, p. 118. 
 
 12. The text of these debates, etc., may be found in Arch. Pari., xxv- 
 xxvi, under dates of the 7th, and the 11th to 15th May. For brief 
 accounts, see Deschamps, 219-28; Mills, 97-98. 
 
 13. Letter to Minister of Marine, July 16, 1791, Arch. Col., C-9, 165. 
 
 14. That is, on May 16. 
 
 15. Arch. Pari., xxvi, 122. 
 
 16. "Expose des motifs des Decrets des 13 et 15 Mai sur l'etat dea 
 Personnes dans les Colonies." 
 
 17. See ante, pp. 116-18. 
 
 18. Letter to the Minister of Marine, July 3, 1791, Arch. Col., C-9, 
 165. 
 
 19. Letter of July 31, Arch. Col., C-9, 165. 
 
 20. See especially, letter of the Procureur of the Conseil Superieure 
 du Cap, and addresses of the North Provincial Assembly to the 
 National Assembly and to the King, Arch. Nat., AD-vii, 16. 
 Others quoted in Garran-Coulon, n, 111-20. 
 
 21. Letter from Le Cap to Havre, July 5, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 78. 
 
 22. Letter to a relative at Bordeaux, July 10, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 78. 
 
 23. Letter to Havre, July 12, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 78. 
 
 24. Ibid. 
 
 25. Garran-Coulon, n, 183-93; Edwards, 70-71; "Desastres," 178-79. 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 1. Letter of Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, September 2, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; also see good account in Edwards, 72. 
 
 2. See ante, pp. 94-95. 
 
 3. Letter of October 1, 1789, Garran-Coulon, n, 195. 
 
 4. Garran-Coulon, n, 195-96. 
 
 5. Castonnet des Fosses, 81-82. 
 
 6. Garran-Coulon, n, 207-08 (another similar letter quoted). 
 
 7. Ibid., ii, 211-12 (quoting the words of one of the prisoners). 
 
 8. Garran-Coulon, n, 210-11; Lacroix, i, 88-89. 
 
 9. See ante, pp. 62-67. 
 
 10. "Desastres," 183; Edwards, 88. 
 
 11. Garron-Coulon, n, 210. 
 
 12. Castonnet des Fosses, 82-83; Schoelcher, 30-31. 
 
370 NOTES 
 
 13. Edwards, 73-75; "Desastres," 183-89; Sciout, 413-14; Castonnet 
 des Fosses, 83-84. History curiously repeats itself. At least one 
 similar outrage occurred during the late negro rising in Cuba 
 (province of Oriente), in the spring of 1912. 
 
 14. Edwards, 74-75; Sciout, 413. 
 
 15. Garran-Coulon, n, 213-14; Edwards, 78-79. 
 
 16. Carteau, 87-88. 
 
 17. Edwards, vii. 
 
 18. I have here specially in mind the region of Martinique devastated 
 by that great eruption of Mont Pelee on May 8, 1902, which de- 
 stroyed the city of Saint-Pierre. The contrast between the utter 
 desolation of the lava-scorched fire-zone and the luxuriant vege- 
 tation of the surrounding hills was extraordinary in the extreme. 
 
 19. Moreau de Saint-Mery, I, 491-92. 
 
 20. Ibid. 
 
 21. Letter of September 2, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46. 
 
 22. See ante, pp. 25-26. 
 
 23. Garran-Coulon, n, 217-18; Edwards, 77-78. 
 
 24. Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, September 13, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 46. 
 
 25 Blanchelande's correspondence through September and Octo- 
 ber, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; Edwards, 78; Lacroix, i, 105-06; 
 Sciout, 413. 
 
 26. Edwards, 82-83. 
 
 27. It must be remembered that Edwards was an eye-witness of these 
 early months of the insurrection, and is therefore high authority. 
 
 28. Letter of a British officer, dated September 24, 1791, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 79; see also numerous letters of colonists, merchant cap- 
 tains, etc., preserved in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 78, 79, 87. 
 
 29. Letter of the Colonial Assembly to its commissioners at Paris, 
 November 12, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 30. Lacroix, i, 106-07; Sciout, 413-16. 
 
 31. Blanchelande's correspondence; especially letter of November 16, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; the best account of these expeditions is 
 found in a series of letters from a militia officer to a friend in 
 Le Cap, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87. 
 
 32. Private letter from Le Borgne, November 9, 1791, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 79. 
 
 33. "Tableau des Evenemens qui ont eu lieu dans la Paroisse du Trou 
 depuis la Revolte des Negres," Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 78. 
 
 34. See ante, p. 130. 
 
 35. Garran-Coulon, n, 258-60. 
 
 36. "Desastres," 192. 
 
 37. Remember the chronic marronage and revolts under the Old 
 Regime; see ante, pp. 62-67. 
 
NOTES 371 
 
 38. Garran-Coulon, n, 194-96; 209-12; 264-66. 
 
 39. Arch. Pari., xxxvii, 222 et seq. (report of January 11, 1792). 
 
 40. This is the thesis of Edwards, 87-93; and Governor Blanchelande 
 suspected them at the time: see especially his letter of September 
 2, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; see also Moreau de Saint-Mery 
 correspondence, Arch. Col., F-3, 197. 
 
 41. Carteau, 75-76. 
 
 42. See ante, pp. 113-114. 
 
 43. Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, March 13, 1790, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 46. 
 
 44. Garran-Coulon, n, 208. 
 
 45. Report of January 11, 1792, quoted supra. 
 
 46. "Desastres," 190-95; Carteau, 71-85; Lacroix, I, 101-11. 
 
 47. Garran-Coulon, n, 209-10; 264-66. 
 
 48. Ibid., ii, 258; "Desastres," 194-95; Lacroix, i, 108-11. 
 
 49. See Blanchelande's correspondence, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; 
 Moreau de Saint-Mery correspondence, Arch. Col., F-3, 197; also 
 very interesting private letter of November 22, 1791, from Le 
 Cap, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87; see also Garran-Coulon, n, 237-88; 
 Lacroix, i, 104; Dalmas, 151-53. 
 
 50. De Wimpffen, 335-36; to the same effect, see Carteau, 74-75. 
 
 51. See next chapter. 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 1. Garran-Coulon, n, 125-38; "Desastres," 180-81; Edwards, 71-72. 
 
 2. Letter of one Labuissonniere to J. Raymond, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 114. 
 
 3. See ante, pp. 113-14. 
 
 4. Garran-Coulon, I, 348-58. 
 
 5. Ibid., ii, 139-41. 
 
 6. Garran-Coulon, n, 104. 
 
 7. Ibid., n, 142-43. 
 
 8. Ibid., n, 142-43; Lacroix, i, 116. 
 
 9. Garran-Coulon, n, 144-46; Edwards, 84-85; "Desastres," 201- 
 02. 
 
 10. Letter of M. de Coigne, September 21, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 46. 
 
 11. The Colonial Assembly to its commissioners at Paris, October 2, 
 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62; see also sceptical opinion of Civil 
 Commissioner Roume in his comment to the National Assembly 
 on the real value of this and subsequent Concordats: note, dated 
 April 20, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2. 
 
 12. Letter of Labadie to J. Raymond, the mulatto leader at Paris, 
 July 9, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 114. 
 
372 NOTES 
 
 13. The popular municipalities were everywhere suppressed, and 
 power restored to the old King's officers, who, of course, were 
 De Jumecourt's followers. See Blanchelande's correspondence, 
 especially letter of October 22, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; 
 General Assembly's letter to its commissioners, October 16, 1791, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62; also, an interesting letter from their Port- 
 au-Prince business correspondent to Dacosta Freres of Nantes, 
 November 8, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79. 
 
 14. It must be remembered that no decree went into effect until after 
 the arrival of the formal document: this the mere news always 
 preceded. 
 
 15. See correspondence between Blanchelande and De Jumecourt, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46. 
 
 16. Letter of a merchant in Port-au-Prince to a merchant in Nantes, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87. 
 
 17. Garran-Coulon, n, 146-58. 
 
 18. See ante, pp. 121-22. 
 
 19. Garran-Coulon, n, 269-80; for numerous addresses still preserved, 
 see Arch. Nat., AD-vii, 16. 
 
 20. For various comments on the decree, see Deschamps, 232-239; 
 Edwards, 95-96; Garran-Coulon, n: 280-81. 
 
 21. Edwards, 96-97. 
 
 22. See letter of Blanchelande, December 17, D-xxv, 46; very inter- 
 esting letter from a major of National Guards to a relative in 
 France, December 17, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87; another private 
 letter of December 17, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79; various pieces 
 of ex parte testimony summarized in Garran-Coulon, n, 157-76. 
 
 23. Lacroix, i, 194; Schoelcher, 63. 
 
 24. Letter of the Colonial Assembly to its commissioners, January 
 28, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62; Sciout, 420; "Desastres," 
 212. 
 
 25. Letter of January 28, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. These hide- 
 ous practices seem to have been frequently perpetrated by the 
 mulattoes in all parts of the colony. For a similar and perhaps 
 even more horrible instance, see the case of the Sejourne family, 
 Edwards, 98; "Desastres," 212; for similar instances in the South, 
 see letter of a merchant of Les Cayes to a relative at Nantes, 
 January 10, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87; deposition of a merchant 
 captain from Les Cayes, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79. For similar 
 atrocities of the mulatto leader Candy in the North, see letter of 
 the Colonial Assembly, October 6, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62; other 
 atrocities, taken from the Arch. Nat., in Sciout, 415-21. 
 
 " 26. Deposition sent to the Minister of Marine, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 87. 
 27. Edwards, 98. 
 
NOTES 373 
 
 28. See files of Blanchelande's correspondence, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 46; of the Colonial Assembly's correspondence with its commis- 
 sioners, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62; also several good private letters, 
 depositions of merchant captains, etc., Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79, 87. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 1. Garran-Coulon, n, 74-81; also several documents on this point in 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 87. 
 
 2. Garran-Coulon, n, 302-03. 
 
 3. Ibid., 303-04. 
 
 4. The Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, November 29, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. The Colonial Assembly to its commissioners at Paris, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 62. 
 
 7. The Civil Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, December 
 23, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 8. Quite without foundation. 
 
 9. Letter of Jean-Frangois and Biassou to the Civil Commissioners, 
 December 9, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. This and subsequent letters 
 from the negro leaders are evidently written by mulattoes or by 
 white priests, the negro leaders being illiterate. 
 
 10. That is, from Africa. 
 
 11. Letter of Jean - Frangois and Biassou to the Commissioners, 
 December 12, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 12. Letter of the Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, Dec. 23, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 13. Letter of December 29, Arch. Col., F-3, 197. See also similar 
 letter of an Assemblyman to the Commissioners, December 15, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1; and similar language in the Colonial 
 Assembly's justificatory memoir to the National Assembly, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 47. 
 
 14. Besides the original documents quoted above, see Garran-Coulon, 
 ii, 303-21 ; Lacroix, i, 147-57. Neither mentions the extraordinary 
 offer made on December 12 by the negro leaders to reduce their 
 followers to slavery in return for personal liberty, although this 
 would seem to be the vital point in the whole affair. Lacroix was 
 undoubtedly ignorant of this letter's existence. Garran-Coulon 
 must have known of it, but suppressed it. This is one of his numer- 
 ous "sins of omission," against which one must be continually on 
 one's guard. 
 
 15. Letter to the Minister of Marine, January 25, 1792, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 46. 
 
 16. Letter of February 20, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
374 NOTES 
 
 17. Memoir quoted above, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 47. 
 
 18. Letter to the Minister of Marine, January 25, 1792, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 46, for events above narrated, see correspondence of 
 Blanchelande, the Civil Commissioners and the Colonial As- 
 sembly; also Garran-Coulon, n, 323-28. 
 
 19. Letter to the Minister of Marine, December 23, 1791, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 1. 
 
 20. Mirbeck's report to the National Assembly, May 26, 1792, Arch. 
 Pari., xliv, 139 et seq. ; also reflections by Roume, April, 1792, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 21. Mirbeck's report, supra. 
 
 22. See ante, pp. 151, 152. 
 
 23. Letter of January, 1792, Garran-Coulon, n, 427-28. 
 
 24. Correspondence of the Commissioners with the Confederates and 
 with Port-au-Prince, in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1-2; see also Garran- 
 Coulon, ii, 455-70. 
 
 25. Saint-Leger's correspondence with his colleagues and with the 
 Minister of Marine, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1-2; also, Garran-Coulon, 
 ii, 470-72; 487-92. 
 
 26. Saint-Leger's correspondence above, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1-2; 
 Garran-Coulon, n, 472-506. 
 
 27. See ante, p. 159. 
 
 28. Saint-Leger's correspondence with his colleagues and with the 
 Minister of Marine, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2; also, letter of the Colo- 
 nial Assembly to its commissioners, April 21, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 62; see also Garran-Coulon, ii, 509-15. 
 
 29. See ante, p. 158. 
 
 30. Letter of a private person from Le Cap, spring of 1792, Arch. Col., 
 F-3, 197. 
 
 31. Letter dated March 7, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 83. 
 
 32. Mirbeck's report, supra. 
 
 33. That is, the military mutiny at Port-au-Prince, March 4, 1791; 
 see ante, p. 113. 
 
 34. Blanchelande's letter to the Minister of Marine, April 1, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 46; also his letter of April 21, ibid. ; the Commis- 
 sioners' report to the Minister of Marine, April 2, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 2; Mirbeck's report, supra. 
 
 35. Mirbeck's report, supra; Roume to the Minister of Marine, April 
 2, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2. 
 
 36. See ante, pp. 107-08. 
 
 37. That is, the " Legislatif ." 
 
 38. Roume's correspondence with the Minister of Marine, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 2; Garran-Coulon, n, 406-18. 
 
NOTES 375 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 1. Deschamps, 239-40. 
 
 2. Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, September 2, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 46. 
 
 3. The Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, November 29, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 4. The Colonial Assembly to the National Assembly, February 20, 
 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 5. The Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, February 20, 1792, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1. 
 
 6. The "Amis des Noirs" were by that time almost synonymous 
 with the Jacobins; the two societies were being rapidly purged of 
 moderate members in the manner already related of the Jacobins. 
 
 7. Speech of December 3, 1791, Arch. Pari., xxxv, 536. 
 
 8. See almost any volume of the Arch. Pari, after xxxin. A large 
 number of petitions, etc., preserved in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79. 
 
 9. For particularly flagrant instances, see session of December 3, 
 Arch. Pari., xxxv, 535 et seq. ; session of February 10, 1792, Arch. 
 Pari., xxxviii, 354 et seq. 
 
 10. Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, January 25, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 46. 
 
 11. See files of correspondence in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 1, 46 and 62, 
 respectively. 
 
 12. The entire correspondence on both sides is preserved in Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 62. As it was strictly confidential in character, it 
 is very valuable. I have already made much use of it in the previ- 
 ous chapters on affairs in San Domingo for late 1791 and early 
 1792. 
 
 13. For this point, see Arch. Pari., xxxv-xxxvi, especially debates 
 of early December. 
 
 14. See especially letter of the Colonial Assembly's commissioners, 
 February 26, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 15. Arch. Pari., xxxvii, 222 et seq. 
 
 16. Letter to the Colonial Assembly, February 14, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 62. 
 
 17. See ante, p. 158. 
 
 18. Mirbeck's report to the National Assembly, Arch. Pari., xliv, 
 139 et seq. 
 
 19. "La Question politique des Affranchis," Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 113. 
 
 20. See also interesting letter by another Assemblyman, January 31, 
 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 83. 
 
 21. J. Raymond to friends in San Domingo, June 18, 1792, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 13. 
 
376 NOTES 
 
 22. For debates, see Arch. Pari., xl, under dates 21st to 28th March, 
 1792; see also Garran-Coulon's account, he himself being one of 
 the principal advocates of the measure, in, 4-25. 
 
 23. Text of the decree in Arch. Pari., xl, 577 et seq. 
 
 24. These articles will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 25. That is, Guadeloupe and Martinique. 
 
 26. Letter of March 26, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 27. Letter of one Barillon to a friend in Paris, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 79. 
 
 28. Letter of May 13, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 29. Letter of June 7, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 30. Blanchelande to the Minister of Marine, May 18, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 46. 
 
 31. Letter of June 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 13. 
 
 32. Letter to J. Raymond at Paris, Aquin, July 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 114. 
 
 33. Roume to the Minister of Marine, June 9, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2. 
 
 34. On this point, see Garran-Coulon, in, 36-44; "Desastres," 228-29. 
 
 35. The Assembly to its Paris commissioners, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
 36. Roume to the Minister of Marine, June 9, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2. 
 
 37. That is, in late March, 1792; see ante, pp. 160-61. 
 
 38. See correspondence of Blanchelande, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; and 
 of the Colonial Assembly to its commissioners, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 62 (months of April and May). 
 
 39. This document still exists in duplicate in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 111. 
 
 40. Garran-Coulon, in, 71-78. 
 
 41. Lacroix, i, 182-83. 
 
 42. It must be remembered that news of the new law did not reach 
 Le Cap until the 11th of May. 
 
 43. Roume to the Council of Peace and Union, May 9, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 2. (Note that this was written only two days before the 
 decisive news from France.) See also letter to the Parish of 
 Le Borgne, May 8, Arch. Col., F-3, 197. 
 
 44. Roume to the Minister of Marine, July 11, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 2. 
 
 45. See Roume's and Blanchelande's correspondence, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 2 and 46; also, Garran-Coulon, in, 78-98; Lacroix, 1,181-93. 
 
 46. See Blanchelande's correspondence, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46; 
 Garran-Coulon, n, 571-609; in, 101-16; Lacroix, i, 193-97; good 
 short account of the military operations in Poyen, 17-19. 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 1. See text of the law in Arch. Pari., xl, 577 et seq. 
 
 2. Text in Arch. Pari., xlv, 235 et seq. 
 
 3. See correspondence with the Colonial Assembly for April, May, 
 and June, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 62. 
 
NOTES 377 
 
 4. Garran-Coulon, in, 128-29 (himself very prominent in all these 
 events). 
 
 5. See ante, pp. 173-77. 
 
 6. See letter of the Colonial Commissioners, April 24, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 62. 
 
 7. He was born in the Bugey. 
 
 8. In Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 11. 
 
 9. Garran-Coulon, in, 131. 
 
 10. Letter of June 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 13. 
 
 11. Letter of Cougnac-Mion to the Colonial Assembly, July 20, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 11. 
 
 12. See especially, Polverel to the Minister of Marine, January, 1793, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 11. 
 
 13. "Memoire du Roy pour servir d'Instruction aux Sieurs Polverel, 
 Sonthonax et Ailhaud, Commissaires Civils preposes a l'execution 
 de la Loi du 4 Avril a Saint-Domingue," 17 June, 1792, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 4. 
 
 14. The Civil Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, September 
 30, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 15. Letter of September 30, supra. For these and subsequent differ- 
 ences between the Civil Commissioners and Desparbes, see Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 4 and 47. 
 
 16. The new title given to the head of the civil administration, cor- 
 responding to the Intendant of the Old Regime. 
 
 17. These documents are all in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 18. See Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. Extracts of all the speeches on this 
 occasion are quoted in Garran-Coulon, in, and in Sciout. 
 
 19. See supra. 
 
 20. Ibid. 
 
 21. The Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, September 30, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 22. See ante, pp. 162-63. 
 
 23. " Les Amis de la Constitution " ; later " Les Amis de la Convention." 
 
 24. The sarcastic nickname given by the colonial whites to the 
 mulattoes and free negroes decreed equality by the new law. 
 
 25. See various papers in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 26. Papers of trial of Blanchelande in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 46-47. 
 
 27. Garran-Coulon, in, 139-40. 
 
 28. At Martinique, it will be remembered, the Old Regime had been 
 restored for the past two years. 
 
 29. The name commonly given the negro insurgents. 
 
 30. Letter to the Civil Commissioners, Plaisance, October 14, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 80. 
 
 31. Memoir of Adjutant-General Lacombe, Aff. Etr, "F.D.," "Amer- 
 ique," 14. 
 
378 NOTES 
 
 32. Documents on this affair in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4, 47, 56. Son- 
 thonax's report to the Convention, October 25 (Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 4), is an extraordinary garbling of the facts, and is quite 
 worthless. Lacombe's memoir {supra) is better, but is couched in 
 the same vein and should be used with great caution. Garran- 
 Coulon's Account (in, 176-94) is partisan and unreliable. This is 
 true of his entire treatment of the second Civil Commissioners, 
 with whom he was closely involved. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 1. The son of the French general so famous in the American War 
 of Independence. 
 
 2. Letter of October 25, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 3. See ante, p. 189. 
 
 4. All the papers of this case are preserved in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 4. 
 
 5. For Polverel's journey and its consequences, see next chapter. 
 
 6. Good summary of these military operations in Poyen, 23. 
 
 7. This striking expression is first used by Sonthonax in his letter 
 to the Convention of January 11, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 Thereafter he uses it constantly to describe the white population 
 of San Domingo. 
 
 8. The minutes of the "Commission Intermediate" are partly pre- 
 served in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 63, 64. 
 
 9. Polverel to Sonthonax, Port-au-Prince, December 14, 1792, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. 
 
 10. Sonthonax to Polverel, December 23, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. 
 
 11. For these troubles, see Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5, 11, 14, 50. The num- 
 ber of documents is very large; summary in Sciout, 432-35; Gar- 
 ran-Coulon, ra, 227-37. 
 
 12. A good picture of conditions is found in "D6sastres," 253-54; 
 269. 
 
 13. Sonthonax to the Minister of Marine, December 8, Arch. Col., 
 C-9, 166. 
 
 14. Sonthonax to the Convention, December 31, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 15. Ibid., January 11, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 16. See next chapter. 
 
 17. Sonthonax to the Convention, February 9, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 18. France had declared war on England February 1, but of course 
 Sonthonax was not yet aware of the fact. 
 
 19. Letter of February 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 20. See ante, pp. 188-89. 
 
 21. Speech of December 2, 1791, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 22. Sonthonax to the Convention, February 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv. 5. 
 
NOTES 379 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 1. Polverel and Ailhaud to the Convention, November 14, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 11. 
 
 2. Besides the official report above quoted, see Garran-Coulon, in, 
 250-57. 
 
 S. Letter of November 14, supra. 
 
 4. That is, the Plain of Cul-de-Sac, in rear of Port-au-Prince. 
 
 5. Polverel and Ailhaud to Sonthonax, November 14, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 12. 
 
 6. See ante, pp. 198-200. 
 
 7. A port town farther to the south, where similar conditions pre- 
 vailed. 
 
 8. Polverel to Sonthonax, December 14, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12; see 
 also detailed memoir of General Lasalle to the Convention, Feb- 
 ruary 16, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 50. 
 
 9. See ante, pp. 160-61. 
 
 10. Letter dated November 30, 1792, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 80. 
 
 11. The Convention severely reprimanded Ailhaud and tried him for 
 desertion, but finally contemptuously dismissed him. Documents 
 of trial, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. 
 
 12. That is, the plain back of Les Cayes. 
 
 13. Polverel to the Minister of Marine, January 22, 1793, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 11. 
 
 14. Garran-Coulon, in, 295-99. 
 
 15. See ante, p. 63. 
 
 16. Composed mainly of mulattoes with white officers. 
 
 17. See memoir of Adjutant-General Lacombe, Aff. Etr., "F.D.," 
 "Amerique," 14; Garran-Coulon, in, 299-315. 
 
 18. See ante, p. 205. 
 
 19. Sonthonax to the Minister of Marine, March 10, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 5. 
 
 20. Garran-Coulon, in, 320. 
 
 21. Sonthonax to the Convention, June 18, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 22. For this whole affair, see the Commissioners' correspondence and 
 other papers, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5; also large numbers of docu- 
 ments in Arch. Nat., D-xxv 15; with due precaution, see ac- 
 count in Garran-Coulon, in, 317-59. i 
 
 23. The mails were by this time so systematically violated that only 
 letters by private hands give real information. 
 
 24. Letter from Port-au-Prince dated April 24, 1793, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 80. 
 
 25. Rigaud to the Civil Commissioners, June 24, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 16. 
 
380 NOTES 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 1. Laveaux to Sonthonax, March 7, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. 
 
 2. Ibid., March 9, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. 
 
 3. Ibid., March 18, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. 
 
 4. Ibid., March 29, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. 
 
 5. France had declared war on England February 1, and on Spain 
 March 7, 1793. 
 
 6. "Memoire en forme d'Instructions donnees par le Conseil Exe- 
 cutif Provisoire," Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 47. 
 
 7. Deposition of Madame Galbaud, July 18, 1794 (30th Messidor, 
 An II). Her evidence is all the more valuable since it was given 
 as a prisoner of the Committee of Public Safety. Galbaud's own 
 official account, together with his correspondence, is preserved in 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 47, 48. 
 
 8. The Commissioners to the Commission Intermediate, May 29, 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 9. Madame Galbaud's deposition, supra. 
 
 10. The documentary material on the destruction of Le Cap is enor- 
 mous. The accounts of Galbaud and other officers are in Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 47, 48; the Commissioners' correspondence is in 
 D-xxv, 5, 6; their official relation (practically worthless) in D-xxv, 
 6; a large dossier of documents in D-xxv, 19. Lastly, an enormous 
 collection of letters, etc., from refugees and other persons is in 
 D-xxv, 79-84. The best printed account is in Sciout, 445-49 (based 
 on the above material); a good short account is in Poyen, 31-33. 
 Garran-Coulon's treatment(m, 423-84) is meretricious special 
 pleading and absolutely unreliable. 
 
 11. Lasalle to the Conseil Executif (report), Aff. Etr.,"F.D.," "Amer- 
 ique," 14. 
 
 12. Carteau, 4-5. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 1. See ante, p. 6. 
 
 2. Sonthonax to the Convention, July 10, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 3. Ibid., July 30, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 4. "Pour la Nouvelle Angleterre." This was a general term applied 
 to the whole coast of the United States. 
 
 5. Letter to a friend in France, July 24, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 80. 
 
 6. Carteau, 5. 
 
 7. Ibid., 232. 
 
 8. This last statement is wholly untrue. Text of this proclamation 
 preserved in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5; printed in Sciout, 448, and in 
 Garran-Coulon, iv, 39. 
 
NOTES 381 
 
 9. Text printed in Garran-Coulon, iv, 40. 
 
 10. Report to the Conseil Executif, Aff. Etr., "F.D.," "Amerique," 
 14. 
 
 11. Sonthonax to the Convention, July 30, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 12. Most of the text is printed in Garran-Coulon, iv, 59-64. 
 
 13. Sonthonax to the Convention, September 9, 1793, Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 5. 
 
 14. Sonthonax to Polverel, September 3, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 15. See Polverel's correspondence with Sonthonax, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 5; and with his agent Delpech in the South, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. 
 Good summary of this point in Sciout, 453. 
 
 16. Lacroix, i, 252. 
 
 17. Ibid., i, 253. 
 
 18. One of the regulations made by the Civil Commissioners. 
 
 19. Letter from Tortuga to a relative in France, early 1794, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 30. Much information as to the effect of enfranchise- 
 ment and the working of labor regulations is found in the great 
 collection of documents by parishes in Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 28-30; 
 printed accounts in Carteau, 238-40; Lacroix, I, 251-62. 
 
 20. Carteau, 239-40. 
 
 21. Ibid., 242. 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 1. See ante, pp. 124-26. 
 
 2. Edwards, vii. 
 
 3. Ibid., ix-x. 
 
 4. Letter to l'Archevesque Thibault at Paris, September 5, 1791; 
 Garran-Coulon, in, 16-17. 
 
 5. Text printed in Garran-Coulon, iv, 128-32; also in Edwards: 
 summarized in Sciout, 458-59. The entire history of the English 
 intervention is treated in Edwards with a considerable amount of 
 local detail. It is summarized in Rainsford. The French side, up 
 to 1795, is given in detail by Garran-Coulon, iv, though his ac- 
 count must be read with the usual caution. The main facts are 
 accurately summarized in Poyen, 36 et seq. 
 
 6. That is, mulatto and negro troops. 
 
 7. Polverel to Sonthonax, August 26, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 5. 
 
 8. It must be remembered that these districts contained the largest 
 rural white population of the colony. For details, see Garran- 
 Coulon, rv, 136-48. 
 
 9. Lasalle to the Conseil Executif, September 5, Aff. Etr., "F.D.," 
 "Amerique," 14. 
 
 10. Quoted in Lacroix, i, 278. 
 
 11. Laveaux to Sonthonax, "Memoire sur l'etat des troupes europe- 
 
382 NOTES 
 
 ennes," September 10, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. See similar reports 
 by General Lasalle to the Conseil Executif, September 5, Aff. 
 Etr., " F.D.," "Amerique," 14; and to the Minister of War, Arch. 
 Guerre, i, "St. D.," a, Correspondance. 
 
 12. Laveaux to Sonthonax, October 4, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 19. 
 
 13. Polverel to Sonthonax, December 1, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. Son- 
 thonax was at this time in the hinterland of the West trying to 
 prevent new defections. 
 
 14. Polverel to Sonthonax, January 22, 1794, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 12. 
 
 15. Note that since these are all intercepted letters they form but a 
 fraction of a much more numerous correspondence between the 
 mulattoes of the English and the Republican districts. 
 
 16. Letter of the early spring of 1794, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 38. 
 
 17. Letter dated Leogane, March 15, 1794, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 38. 
 
 18. Arch. Pari., lxtx, 39. 
 
 19. Letter dated October 24, 1793, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 38. 
 
 20. Text printed in Garran-Coulon, iv, 167-69. 
 
 21. Carteau, xxi. 
 
 22. Carteau, xxii-xxv. 
 
 23. The Archives Parlementaires do not yet go beyond August, 1793. 
 For further proceedings of the National Legislatures, see reports 
 in the "Moniteur Officiel." Most of the important debates, 
 reports, etc., were printed in pamphlet form, and are preserved 
 in the "Collection Camus," Arch. Nat., AD-xvui C. 
 
 24. "Moniteur Officiel," seance du 15 Pluvi6se, An II. 
 
 25. Ibid., seance du 16 Pluvi6se, An II. 
 
 26. Rigaud to Polverel, February 26, 1794, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 28. 
 
 27. For these troubles, see Garran-Coulon, iv, 195-235; summary in 
 Castonnet des Fosses, 144-48. 
 
 28. For French accounts, see Poyen, 38-39; Castonnet des Fosses, 
 148-50; for the English side, see Edwards, supra. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 1. Toussaint's handwriting remained always crude. The autograph 
 memorials to Napoleon during his captivity are barely legible. 
 
 2. Most of what has been written on Toussaint's early life is legend or 
 invention. The analysis and discussion of this material pertains 
 to a biography and is not germane to a general work like this. The 
 essential facts regarding Toussaint's early days are best presented 
 in Castonnet des Fosses, 157; see also Poyen, 41-42. 
 
 3. Garran-Coulon, n, 313. 
 
 4. See ante, p. 222. 
 
 5. Poyen, 43-47. 
 
 6. February 4, 1794. 
 
NOTES 383 
 
 7. Lacroix, i, 299-300; Castonnet des Fosses, 158-59; Poyen, 47. 
 
 8. Lacroix, i, 301. 
 
 9. Toussaint Louverture to Laveaux, May 18, 1794, Bib. Nat., 
 Dept. des MSS., "Fonds Fr.," 12102; quoted in full by Schoelcher, 
 98-100. He has quoted all the essential parts of this correspond- 
 ence under the heading, "Papiers de Saint-Domingue," and I 
 shall cite him when quoting from this correspondence. 
 
 10. Schoelcher, 102-09; Poyen, 48-50; Castonnet des Fosses, 160; 
 Lacroix, I, 302. 
 
 11. The Commissioners to Toussaint Louverture, June, 1794, Arch. 
 Nat., D-xxv, 23. 
 
 12. Rainsford, 193. 
 
 13. Poyen, 50-54; Schoelcher, 107-17; Castonnet des Fosses, 160-62. 
 
 14. Poyen, 54-57; Schoelcher, 140-54; Castonnet des Fosses, 163-64. 
 
 15. Save the districts of the Grande Anse, in Anglo-colonial hands. 
 
 16. See ante, pp. 48-49. 
 
 17. Cardon's report to the Minister of Marine, Paris, January, 1795 
 (Nivdse, An III), Arch. Col., F-3, 199. 
 
 18. Castonnet des Fosses, 164-65; Schoelcher, 135-39. 
 
 19. Laveaux to the Committee of Public Safety, January 14, 1796 
 (24th Niv6se, An IV), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 50. 
 
 20. Laveaux to the Minister of Marine, February 2, 1796 (13th 
 Pluvi6se, An IV), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 50. 
 
 21. Ibid., June 14, 1796 (26th Prairial, An IV), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 
 50. 
 
 22. For these events, see Laveaux's correspondence with the Minister 
 of Marine, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 50; also his correspondence with 
 Toussaint Louverture and other documents quoted in extenso by 
 Schoelcher, 155-66. 
 
 23. Schoelcher, 172; 181-84; Lacroix, i, 309. 
 
 24. Lacroix, i, 309. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 1. Robespierre had fallen on the 9th Thermidor, An II (July 27, 
 1794). 
 
 2. Took office November 3, 1795. 
 
 3. Spain had ceded her colony of Santo Domingo to France by the 
 Treaty of Bale, but had agreed to administer the colony until a 
 peace between France and England should enable the Republic 
 to assume effective control. For Roume's instructions, see Aff. 
 Etr., "F.D.," "Espagne," 50. 
 
 4. The Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, May 16, 1796 
 (27th Floreal, An IV), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 45. 
 
 5. See the Commissioners' correspondence, D-xxv, 45; Laveaux's 
 
384 NOTES 
 
 correspondence, Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 50; also documents quoted 
 in Schoelcher, 167-68. 
 
 6. Memoir to the Directoire, October 9, 1796 (18th Vendemiaire, 
 An V), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 45. 
 
 7. The minutes of the Commission unfortunately no longer exist. 
 Our chief source for its internal history is the long memoir of 
 Raymond to the Minister of Marine, of September, 1797. For the 
 later period it is unreliable, being influenced by Toussaint, but 
 for this early period comparative analysis with other correspond- 
 ence and events shows it to be largely correct. See Arch. Nat., 
 AF-in, 210. 
 
 8. For Sonthonax's justification of his conduct herein, see letter to 
 the Minister of Marine, July 23 (5th Thermidor), Arch. Nat., 
 D-xxv, 45. 
 
 9. Letter of one Vergniaud to Lesage (of Eure-et-Loire), member 
 of the National legislature, October 18, 1796 (27th Vendemiaire, 
 An V), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 83. 
 
 10. Letter of October 15, 1796 (24th Vendemiaire, An V), Arch. 
 Guerre, i, "St.D.," a, Correspondance. 
 
 11. Memoir to the Directoire, October 9, 1796 (18th Vendemiaire, 
 An V), Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 45. 
 
 12. Castonnet des Fosses, 175. 
 
 13. Sonthonax and Leblanc terrorized Giraud and outvoted Ray- 
 mond's veto. 
 
 14. Rigaud to the Corps Legislatif, October 21, 1796 (30th Vende- 
 miaire, An V), Arch. Nat., AF-m, 208. 
 
 15. Castonnet des Fosses, 175-78; Lacroix, I, 319-20. 
 
 16. Memoir to the Directoire, supra. 
 
 17. Ibid. 
 
 18. For these events, see the Civil Commissioners' correspondence. 
 Arch. Nat., D-xxv, 45; also the very full correspondence of Ri- 
 gaud, both directly with the French Government, Arch. Nat., 
 AF-in, 208-09, and indirectly through the French Minister to 
 the United States via the American ships trading at Les Cayes, 
 Aff. Etr., "F.D.," "Amerique," 14. 
 
 19. The Civil Commissioners to the Minister of Marine, May 27, 1797 
 (8th Prairial, An V), AF-in, 209. 
 
 20. See Raymond's report to the Minister of Marine, September 10, 
 1797; also Castonnet des Fosses, 173-75. 
 
 21. Toussaint Louverture to the Directoire, February 1, 1797 (13th 
 Pluviose, An V), Arch. Nat., AF-m, 209. Two points should be 
 noted regarding Toussaint's correspondence. In the first place, he 
 himself spoke and wrote only Creole French, — a dialect so cor- 
 rupt as to be often quite unintelligible to a European Frenchman. 
 Therefore all Toussaint's letters are translations by educated 
 
NOTES 385 
 
 secretaries. The style of his letters is also very peculiar. The lan- 
 guage is so verbose as to be hard to quote briefly. There is always 
 much fulsome flattery and obscure language. Only occasionally 
 does some significant phrase like the one just quoted reveal the 
 iron hand in the velvet glove. 
 
 22. Besides Raymond's account, see Lacroix, i, 320-27; Poyen, 63-64. 
 
 23. Report to the Directoire, September 4, 1797 (18th Fructidor, 
 An V), Arch. Nat., AF-m, 210. 
 
 24. Toussaint's report (supra) is in the form of long dialogues, written 
 as if word for word with the supposed conversations reported. 
 
 25. Sonthonax to the Directoire, January 27, 1798 (8th Pluvi6se, 
 An VI), Arch. Nat., AF-in, 210. 
 
 26. Toussaint Louverture to the Directoire, September, 1797, Arch. 
 Nat., AF-m, 210. 
 
 27. Toussaint Louverture to the Directoire, October 5, 1797 (14th 
 Brumaire, An VI), Arch. Nat., AF-m, 210. 
 
 CHAPTER XXni 
 
 1. See ante, pp. 267-68. 
 
 2. Lacroix, i, 337-38. 
 
 3. For this and subsequent events, see Hedouville's correspondence 
 with the Directoire, Arch. Nat., AF-m, 210. The main facts are 
 fairly well treated in Lacroix, i, 338 et seq. 
 
 4. This document, together with the preliminaries extending over 
 several months previous to the event, are preserved in Arch. 
 Guerre, i, "St.D.," A, Correspondance (first carton). They were 
 found among Toussaint's archives after the capture of Port-au- 
 Prince by Napoleon's invading army in 1802. 
 
 5. That is, the striking honors shown Toussaint by the English. 
 For good account of this, see Lacroix, i, 344-45. 
 
 6. The English commander. 
 
 7. Lacroix, I, 346. 
 
 8. October, 1797. 
 
 9. Lacroix, i, 353-54. Lacroix is so careful in his quotations, and the 
 words themselves are so completely in accord with all Toussaint's 
 acts, that the interview above quoted must be considered as of 
 the highest authority and substantially correct. 
 
 10. Hedouville's report to the Directoire upon his return to France, 
 December, 1798 (Frimaire, An VII), Arch. Nat., AF-m, 210. 
 
 11. All this was quite true, as shown by the secret documents after- 
 ward discovered in Toussaint's archives and now preserved in the 
 Arch. Guerre. 
 
 12. Report to the Directoire, supra. 
 
386 NOTES 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 1. Roume to the Minister of Marine, " Port Republicain," February 
 11, 1799 (23d Pluvi63e, An VII), Arch. Nat., -AF-m, 210. 
 
 2. For accounts of this struggle see Lacroix, i, 373-94; Castonnet des 
 Fosses, 194-214; Poyen, 70-74; Schoelcher, 245-70 (for repro- 
 duced documents). 
 
 3. Castonnet des Fosses, 196. 
 
 4. Ibid., 199. 
 
 5. Lacroix, i, 379-80; Castonnet des Fosses, 205. 
 
 6. Lacroix, i, 381. 
 
 7. Besides the longer accounts quoted in note 2, a good short sum- 
 mary is found in Roloff, 17-18. 
 
 8. This was Toussaint's customary method. He could thus always 
 disavow particular acts as having exceeded his instructions. 
 
 9. Lacroix, i, 393-94; Castonnet des Fosses, 212-14; Poyen, 73-74. 
 
 10. Castonnet des Fosses, 214. 
 
 11. See ante, p. 7. 
 
 12. Castonnet des Fosses, 215. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 1. Roloff, 37-39. Henceforth Roloff is one of the main sources. His 
 work is based upon elaborate research in the French archives and 
 is in every way fundamental. See also Lacroix, opening pages of 
 vol. n; Castonnet des Fosses, 216-17. 
 
 2. November 9, 1799. 
 
 3. Toussaint was always well informed of European events and their 
 meaning. 
 
 4. Bonaparte's policy will be treated in the next chapter. 
 
 5. Roloff, 30-31. 
 
 6. Of course not to be confused with the negro general, Michel, 
 formerly commander of Le Cap. 
 
 7. See ante, p. 6. 
 
 8. See ante, pp. 281-82. 
 
 9. For this whole topic, see Roloff, 37-44; Lacroix, n, 1-21; Caston- 
 net des Fosses, 216-28; Poyen, 74-76. 
 
 10. Becker, " Observations sur l'etat deSaint-Domingue" (apparently 
 for the use of the Minister of War), Arch. Guerre, iv, Memoires 
 historiques, a, Periode de la Revolution, "Colonies" (1789-1804). 
 
 11. "La Colonie de Saint-Domingue " ; i.e., the French part of the 
 island. 
 
 12. Chanlatte to the First Consul, Santo Domingo, December 15, 
 1800 (24th Frimaire, An IX), Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1212. 
 
NOTES 387 
 
 13. Report to the Consuls on San Domingo by the Minister of Marine, 
 September 29, 1800 (7th Vendemiaire, An IX), Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 
 1187. 
 
 14. "Notes sur l'etat politique de Saint-Domingue"; addressed to the 
 Minister of Marine, Paris, December 30, 1800 (9th Niv6se, An 
 IX), Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1212. This memoir is apparently anno- 
 tated by the hand of Napoleon. 
 
 15. Roloff, 44-46; Lacroix, n, 46-47; Castonnet des Fosses, 233-38. 
 
 16. See ante, pp. 271-72. 
 
 17. Lacroix, i, 394-410; Castonnet des Fosses, 237-46; Poyen, 79-83. 
 
 18. Lacroix, n, 49. 
 
 19. Ibid., ii, 48-51. 
 
 20. Lacroix, n, 21-34; Roloff, 47-48; Castonnet des Fosses, 246-59. 
 
 21. Signed October 1, 1801. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 1. November 9, 1799. 
 
 2. Roloff, 18-24. This splendid work, based on the fullest archival 
 research, is the main source of this chapter. 
 
 3. Roloff, 24-28. 
 
 4. Ibid., 28-29. 
 
 5. At this moment (early 1800), people in France knew only of the 
 outbreak of the war between Rigaud and Toussaint Louverture. 
 
 6. For able memoirs not mentioned in Roloff, see the anonymous 
 "Memoire sur les Colonies," drawn up by an expert for the Min- 
 ister of Foreign Affairs, Aff. Etr., "F.D.," "Amerique," 20, as- 
 serting the necessity of subduing Toussaint; Admiral Truguet's 
 secret memoir to Napoleon, Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1187, strongly 
 asserting the contrary. 
 
 7. All realized that the sending of a large army was impossible during 
 the English war. No great fleet of slow-moving troop-ships could 
 possibly escape the English cruisers. 
 
 8. Roloff, 29-30. 
 
 9. See ante, pp. 284-85. 
 
 10.' Sahuguet to the First Consul, Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1187. . 
 
 11. Roloff, 32-33. 
 
 12. Ibid., 32-34. 
 
 13. See ante, pp. 284-85. 
 
 14. Roloff, 49-51. 
 
 15. Chanlatte to the First Consul, Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1212. 
 
 16. Hedouville to the First Consul, Philadelphia, November 15, 1800. 
 Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1212. 
 
 17. Roloff, 51-52. For draft instructions to the leader of this proposed 
 expedition, see Arch. Guerre, i, "St.D.," a, Correspondance. 
 
388 NOTES 
 
 18. See ante, pp. 281-82. 
 
 19. Forfait to the First Consul, February 14, 1801, Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 
 1188. 
 
 20. See ante, pp. 286-87. 
 
 21. Roloff, 52-56. 
 
 22. For details of these preparations, see Poyen, 87-94; also, Roloff, 
 65-67. 
 
 23. That is, legally free, but compelled to work. 
 
 That is, Toussaint's Constitution. See ante, p. 294. 
 
 25. The negro generals had greatly abused their power in this respect. 
 For Toussaint's gross misconduct in this regard, see Lacroix, u, 
 104-05. 
 
 26. "Notes pour servir aux instructions a donner au Capitaine- 
 Generale Leclerc," October 31, 1801 (9th Brumaire, An X), Arch. 
 Nat., AF-iv, 863: quoted in full by Roloff, 244-54. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 1. For details, see Poyen, 95-97; Roloff, 79-80. These two works, 
 both based on most extensive archival research and summarizing 
 the pith of contemporary secondary material, are my main au- 
 thorities for this and subsequent chapters. 
 
 2. Poyen, 98. 
 
 3. Poyen, 99-102; Roloff, 80. 
 
 4. Poyen, 104-11; Roloff, 80-81. 
 
 5. Poyen, 111-15; Roloff, 81. 
 
 6. Poyen, 117-18. 
 
 7. Ibid., 118-19. 
 
 8. Ibid., 115-17. 
 
 9. Poyen, 120-36; Roloff, 82-83. 
 
 10. Poyen, 130-31. 
 
 11. Quoted in Poyen, 138. 
 
 12. Poyen, 137-44; Roloff, 83-85. 
 
 13. The Revolutionary name of Port-au-Prince. 
 
 14. Quoted in Poyen, 148. 
 
 15. The author of the valuable work so often quoted. Poyen has, 
 however, incorporated the essential parts of Lacroix in his mili- 
 tary treatise, so I have forborne to quote Lacroix for the military 
 operations. 
 
 16. Poyen, 147-51; Roloff, 85. 
 
 17. Poyen, 141. 
 
 18. Poyen, 139-41; 144-46; Roloff, 85-86. 
 
 19. Poyen, 152-88; Roloff, 86-87. 
 
 20. General Dugua to the Minister of War, Arch. Guerre, I, "St.D.," 
 A, Correspondance. 
 
NOTES 389 
 
 21. Poyen, 189-95; Roloff, 87-88. 
 
 22. Poyen, 195-202; Roloff, 88-89. 
 
 23. Lacroix, n, 192-93. 
 
 24. Poyen, 200. 
 
 25. It was Lacroix who had so roughly handled Dessalines before Port- 
 au-Prince. 
 
 26. Lacroix, n, 191-92. 
 
 27. Leclerc to the First Consul, April 1, 1802 (11th Germinal, An X), 
 Arch. Nat., AF-rv, 1213. 
 
 28. See Leclerc's correspondence with the First Consul, Arch. Nat., 
 AF-iv, 1213; and with the Minister of Marine, Arch. Guerre, I, b, 
 Registre 4-a, 94, 8; also Rcloff, 89-91. 
 
 29. That is, negro and mulatto soldiers. 
 
 30. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, April 21 (1st Floreal, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, I, B, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 
 31. Leclerc to the First Consul, March 5 (14th Vent6se, An X), 
 Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 1. Poyen, 239-40. 
 
 2. Poyen, 240-54; Roloff, 93-94. 
 
 3. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, June 11 (22d Prairial, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-A, 94, 8. 
 
 4. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, July 6 (17th Messidor, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-A, 94, 8. 
 
 5. Poyen, 210-12; Roloff, 94-95. 
 
 6. Leclerc to the First Consul, June 6 (17th Prairial), Arch. Nat., 
 AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 7. Poyen, 212-15; Roloff, 95-96. 
 
 8. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, June 11 (22d Prairial, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-A, 94, 8. 
 
 9. Leclerc to the First Consul, June 11 (22d Prairial, An X), Arch. 
 Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 10. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, July 6 (17th Messidor, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 
 11. See Leclerc's correspondence, supra; also several reports of dis- 
 trict commanders preserved in Arch. Guerre, I, "St.D.," a, Cor- 
 respondance. 
 
 12. Toussaint's last letters and memorials are still preserved in Arch. 
 Nat., AF-iv, 1213. His appeals to Napoleon's clemency show a 
 rather surprising lack of fortitude. One of them has been published 
 under the title, "Memoires du General Toussaint Louverture, 
 ecrits par lui-m^me" (Paris, 1853). Poyen quotes some interest- 
 ing reports of officials at Fort de Joux, preserved in the Arch. Col. 
 
390 NOTES 
 
 (Poyen, 220-33) ; also, see journal of Caffarelli, Governor of Fort 
 de Joux, published under the title, "Toussaint Louverture au 
 Fort de Joux," " Nouvelle Revue Retrospective," vol. xvm, no. 94 
 (1902). 
 
 13. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, July 6 (17th Messidor, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-A, 94, 8. 
 
 14. Quoted in Poyen, 257. 
 
 15. See ante, pp. 303-304. 
 
 16. Roloff, 70-74. 
 
 _ 17. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, July 24 (5th Thermidor, An X), 
 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 -18. Roloff, 117-24. 
 
 19. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, August 6 (18th Thermidor, 
 An X), Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 
 20. Charles Belair had been Toussaint's favorite, and was the only 
 high general sincerely attached to Toussaint by personal affection. 
 Revenge for Toussaint's arrest played the leading r6le in his defec- 
 tion. 
 
 21. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, August 25 (7th Fructidor, 
 An X), Arch. Guerre, I, B, Reg. 4-A, 94, 8. 
 
 22. Leclerc to the First Consul, August 6 (18th Thermidor, An X), 
 Arch. Guerre, i, b, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 
 23. Leclerc to the Minister of Marine, September 13 (26th Fructidor, 
 An X), Arch. Guerre, I, b, Reg. 4-a, 94, 8. 
 
 24. A much higher death-rate than at first, considering the small 
 numbers of the French army. 
 
 25. Leclerc to the First Consul, September 16 (29th Fructidor, An X), 
 Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 26. Leclerc to the First Consul, September 26 (4th Vendemiaire, 
 An XI), Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 27. Ibid., September 27 (5th Vendemiaire, An XI), Arch. Nat., 
 AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 28. Leclerc to the First Consul, October 7 (15th Vendemiaire, An XI), 
 Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 29. Poyen, 298-302. 
 
 30. Roloff, 112-13. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 1. Roloff, 74. 
 
 2. Poyen, 270-72. 
 
 3. Ibid., 273-74. 
 
 4. Ibid., 289-97; 303-20. 
 
 5. Roloff, 130-32; 142-43. 
 
 6. Poyen, 321-85; Roloff, 114-16. 
 
NOTES S91 
 
 7. See ante, p. 342. 
 - 8. Letter from Le Cap, October 6 (14th Vendemiaire, An XI), Arch. 
 Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
 9. Roloff, 143-44. 
 -10. For a very able discussion of these events, see Roloff, 134-50. 
 
 11. Poyen, 401-59. 
 
 12. Roloff, 157; Poyen, 459-66. 
 
 13. Poyen, 477-546. After Napoleon's seizure of Spain in 1808 this 
 French force was expelled by an uprising of the Spanish inhab- 
 itants. 
 
 14. In imitation of Napoleon's recent action. 
 
 15. Poyen, 467-75; Castonnet des Fosses, 350-52. 
 
 16. That is, impaled in Dessalines's own special fashion. 
 
 17. Private letter from Kingston, Jamaica, to a friend in France, June 
 1, 1805, Arch. Nat., AF-iv, 1213. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 (This is a select bibliography. It mentions only the sources used, and, 
 except in the section devoted to works on Toussaint Louverture, it 
 makes no mention of material only remotely pertinent.) 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 A. Archival Material. 
 
 1. Archives du Ministere des Colonies. 
 
 2. Archives Nationales. 
 
 3. Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. 
 
 4. Archives du Ministere de la Guerre. 
 
 5. Bibliotheque Nationale (Departement des Manuscrits). 
 
 b. Published Documents. 
 
 c. Contemporary Books and Pamphlets. 
 
 1. Books. 
 
 2. Pamphlets. 
 
 d. Modern Works. 
 
 1. Books. 
 -2. Articles. 
 
 e. Works on Toussaint Louverture. 
 
 A. ARCHIVAL MATERIAL 
 
 1. Archives du Ministere des Colonies. 
 
 These archives contain the best material. Unfortunately I 
 was able to obtain access to only a small portion of all that is 
 here preserved. The contents of these archives are still imper- 
 fectly known; no complete inventory exists; and access is 
 granted to only a part of even that which is known and in- 
 ventoried. 
 
 The most important collection of documents for my subject 
 is Series "C." The sub-series "C-9" contains the official cor- 
 respondence from San Domingo to the Minister of Marine. 
 Series "C" is the chief source used by modern writers on the 
 Old Regime in the Antilles (Vaissiere, Peytraud, Lebeau), and 
 is one of the main sources of the modern writers on Napoleon's 
 
396 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 expedition to San Domingo (Poyen, Roloff). Unfortunately 
 that portion of the series dealingwith the years 1792-1804 is now 
 completely closed to investigation, and I was permitted to see 
 only nos. C-9, 164, 165, 166, covering the years 1790-92. This 
 was extremely unfortunate. I was able to turn the difficulty 
 somewhat as regards the official despatches of the highest func- 
 tionaries, since many of these were copied for the use of the 
 Committees on Colonies in the various National Assemblies, 
 which copies are still preserved in the Archives Nationales. 
 But "C-9" also contains numerous reports and letters from 
 minor officials and private individuals, and this loss was of 
 course irreparable, especially as the period from 1789 to 1802 
 has never been worked up from archival material. 
 
 The other chief source that I was permitted to see was the 
 "Collection Moreau de Saint-Mery," Series "F-3." This con- 
 tains many copies of official correspondence, otherwise inac- 
 cessible, for the early years of the Revolution, and, still more 
 important, the files of Moreau de Saint-Mery's private cor- 
 respondence from his friends in San Domingo for the years 
 1789-92; also a few scattering letters, etc., of later date. The 
 important numbers of this series are F-3, 150, 194, 195, 196, 
 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202. 
 
 2. Archives Nationales. 
 
 This is the main field of my accessible archival source ma- 
 terial. The most important series is "D-xxv," an extensive 
 series of 114 large cartons exclusively devoted to the Revolu- 
 tionary troubles in San Domingo. Nos. 1-45 deal with the first 
 three Civil Commissions. The subsequent numbers contain a 
 great variety of material; copies of official correspondence, col- 
 lections of private letters and memoirs, minutes of colonial as- 
 semblies, etc.; the whole forming a collection of the greatest 
 value. 
 
 Series "AF-m," nos. 202-10 and 244-51, contain official 
 correspondence, etc., for the period of the Directoire (1796- 
 99). 
 
 Series "AF-iv," nos. 1187-94, 1212-16, contain the same 
 material for the period of the Consulate (1799-1804). 
 
 3. Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. 
 The section "Fonds Divers," Series "Amerique," nos. 14, 
 
 15, 17, 20, contains a large number of official letters and many 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 397 
 
 valuable memoirs drawn up for government information. In 
 series "Espagne," nos. 50 and 210, there are a few documents 
 of some value. 
 
 4. Archives du Ministere de la Guerre. 
 
 A vast amount of material on my field is here preserved. 
 Most of it is technical military matter, but there is a certain 
 amount possessing distinct value for the subject as herein 
 treated. In "i Partie," the section "a, Correspondance, Ex- 
 pedition puis Armee de Saint-Domingue (1792-Mars, 1802)" 
 (2 cartons), contains many important documents, especially the 
 originals of Toussaint Louverture's correspondence with the 
 English; also a number of special reports of Government agents 
 and army officers upon political and social conditions. The 
 series "Armee de Saint-Domingue (7 Mars, 1802-12)" (9 car- 
 tons) contains a number of important letters and reports. The 
 same is true of the section "Armee de Saint-Domingue (affaires 
 politiques, commerciales, etc.) (1791-1812)" (2 cartons). The 
 most important material preserved in these archives for my 
 purposes, however, is found in "b, Registre 4-A, 94, 8," a valu- 
 able collection of copies of Leclerc's correspondence with the 
 Minister of Marine and of much of his correspondence with the 
 First Consul. Some of these letters are quoted by Poyen and 
 a few are found in Henry Adams's article (infra). In "rV 
 Partie," the series "Memoires historiques, a, Periode de la 
 Revolution (1789-1804)," nos. 1-16, contains a number of 
 valuable reports and memoirs by army officers. 
 
 5. Bibliotheque Nationale (Departement des Manu- 
 
 scrits). 
 In"Fonds Francais," nos. 12102, 12103, 12104, contain the 
 correspondence between Toussaint Louverture and General 
 Laveaux (1794-98). Also, "Nouv. Acquisitions Franchises," 
 no. 9326, a manuscript history of San Domingo by Beauval- 
 Segur (eighteenth century). 
 
 B. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS 
 
 The great collection of published documents for this subject 
 is the "Archives Parlementaires," a work unfortunately not yet 
 completed. It gives not only the minutes of the various Na- 
 tional Assemblies, but also many reports, letters, etc. For the 
 
398 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 period subsequent to that reached by the Archives Parlemen- 
 taires, see the official minutes of the National Assemblies pub- 
 lished in the "Moniteur Officiel." Also, most* of the important 
 speeches and reports were published in pamphlet form, and 
 this series is preserved complete in the "Collection Camus" of 
 the Archives Nationales, — Series " AD-xvtii-c." Most of the 
 official proclamations, etc., published in San Domingo, are 
 preserved in the "Collection Rondonneau" of the Archives 
 Nationales, — " AD-vn." 
 
 C. CONTEMPORARY BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS 
 
 1. Books. 
 
 Abeille (J.): "Essai sur nos Colonies et sur la Retablissement 
 de Saint-Domingue" (Paris, 1805). A panegyric of Bonaparte. 
 Extremely anti-negro in tone. Written by a former planter. 
 Of little value. 
 
 Anonymous: "Details sur quelques-uns des Evenemens qui 
 ont eu lieu en Amerique pendant les Annees xi et xu" (Paris, 
 1804). The comments of an army officer on the last phase of 
 Leclerc's expedition. 
 
 Anonymous: "Histoire des Desastres de Saint-Domingue; 
 precedee d'un Tableau du Regime et des Progres de cette 
 Colonie depuis sa Fondation jusqu'a, l'Epoque de la Revolu- 
 tion franchise" (Paris, 1795). A very detailed account of 
 events down to the destruction of Le Cap (June, 1793). View- 
 point that of a moderate Liberal. Well informed. Generally 
 attributed to Barbe-Marbois, though from internal evidence I 
 believe that he is not the author. 
 
 Anonymous : "Reflexions sur la Colonie de Saint-Domingue" 
 (2 vols., Paris, 1796). A series of general observations of no 
 special importance in this connection. Attributed to Barbe- 
 Marbois. 
 
 BarrS Saint-Venant : "Des Colonies Modernes sous la Zone 
 torride, et particulierement celle de Saint-Domingue" (Paris, 
 1802). Exceedingly thin. 
 
 Carteau (F.): "Soirees Bermudiennes : ou Entretiens sur les 
 Evenemens qui ont opere la Ruine de la Partie frangaise de 
 Saint-Domingue" (Bordeaux, 1802). An account of events in 
 San Domingo down to October, 1793, by an upper-class colonial 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 399 
 
 planter, an eye-witness of events in the North Province. In- 
 teresting and valuable. 
 
 Chalmers (C): "Remarks on the late war in San Domingo" 
 (London, 1803). On the English intervention. Unreliable and 
 of no special value. 
 
 1 Charlevoix (Pere P. F. X. de): "Histoire de l'lsle Espagnole 
 ou de Saint-Domingue. Ecrite particulierement sur des Me- 
 moires manuscrits du Pere Jean-Baptiste le Pons, Jesuite, 
 Missionaire a Saint-Domingue, et sur les pieces originates qui se 
 conservent au Dep6t de la Marine" (4 vols., Amsterdam, 1733). 
 The standard work on early San Domingo. 
 
 Cullion (C. F. V. de): "Examen de l'Esclavage en generale, 
 et particulierement des Negres dans les Colonies francaises de 
 l'Amerique" (2 vols., Paris, 1802). Written from a strong pro- 
 slavery standpoint. 
 
 Dalmas (M.) : "Histoire de la Revolution de Saint-Domingue: 
 depuis le Commencement des Troubles jusqu' au Prise de 
 Jeremie et du Mole-Saint-Nicolas par les Anglais" (2 vols., 
 Paris, 1814). Written in exile in the United States during the 
 winter of 1793-94. Gives events in San Domingo down to the 
 autumn of 1793. The viewpoint is strongly Royalist, the 
 author being the apologist of the "Government" party. 
 
 Delacroix (J. V.): "Memoires d'un Americain" (Lausanne, 
 1771). Shows anti-slavery feeling in radical circles thus early. 
 
 DSscourtilz: "Voyage d'un Naturaliste" (3 vols., Paris, 1809). 
 The author, a botanist, was for some time a prisoner of the 
 blacks. Fairly good. 
 
 De Wimpffen {Baron F. A.S.):"A Voyage to Saint-Domingo. 
 In the Years 1788, 1789 and 1790" (translated by J. Wright, 
 London, 1797). A keen observer and trenchant critic. Of great 
 value both for conditions on the eve of the Revolution and for 
 the early events in 1789-90. 
 
 Dorvo-Soulastre : "Voyage par terre de Santo-Domingo au 
 Cap Francais" (Paris, 1809). Mainly descriptive of the Span- 
 ish portion of the island. 
 
 Du Buisson (P. U.): "Nouvelles Considerations sur Saint- 
 Domingue, en reponse a, celles de Monsieur H. D'A" (2 vols., 
 Paris, 1780). A criticism of Hilliard d'Auberteuil (infra). Val- 
 uable both as a check on d'Auberteuil and as showing the colo- 
 nial viewpoint at that date. 
 
400 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Ducceurjoly (S. J.): "Manuel des Habitants de Saint-Do- 
 mingue" (2 vols., Paris, 1803). The work of a former planter. 
 Some interesting comments on social and racial problems. 
 
 Edwards (Bryan): "An Historical Survey of the French 
 Colony of San Domingo: comprehending an Account of the 
 Revolt of the Negroes in the Year 1791, and a Detail of the 
 Military Transactions of the British Army in that Island in the 
 Years 1793 and 1794" (first edition, London, 1796). The edi- 
 tion here used contains a postscript of events down to the Brit- 
 ish evacuation in 1798 (Philadelphia, 1806). The best account 
 in English of events in San Domingo, especially down to the fall 
 of Le Cap in June, 1793. An eye-witness of the negro insurrec- 
 tion of 1791. Valuable for the English viewpoint as well as a 
 record of events. 
 
 Esmangart (C): "Des Colonies Franchises, et en particuliere 
 de lisle de Saint-Domingue " (Paris, 1802). Of little value. 
 
 Fedon (B.): "Reclamations contre un Ouvrage intitule: 
 'Campagnes des Frangais a Saint-Domingue'" (1805). A 
 criticism of Rochambeau's governorship. 
 
 Gala (I.): "Memorias de la Colonia francesa de Santo Do- 
 mingo; por un viagero espafiol" (Madrid, 1787). Superficial. 
 
 Garran-Coulon (J.): "Rapport sur les Troubles de Saint- 
 Domingue, fait au Nom de la Commission des Colonies, des 
 Comites de Salut Public, de Legislation, et de la Marine, 
 Reunis" (official publication, 4 vols., Paris, An VI, 1798). The 
 main official report for the troubles in San Domingo down to 
 1794. An immense amount of official and private correspond- 
 ence, memoirs, and pamphlet literature summarized and dis- 
 cussed. The last two volumes, dealing with the second Civil 
 Commissioners (Sonthonax, Polverel, and Ailhaud), are of 
 much less value than the first two volumes, which deal with 
 earlier events of the Revolution. These later volumes are a 
 whitewash of the Commissioners and are so prejudiced that they 
 must be used with the greatest caution. 
 
 Girod-Chantrans (J.): "Voyage d'un Suisse dans differentes 
 Colonies d'Amerique pendant la derniere Guerre" (Neufchatel, 
 1785). A good observer. The book contains reflections of some 
 value. 
 
 Guillermin (G.): "Precis historique des derniers Evenemens 
 de la Partie de l'Est de Saint-Domingue" (Paris, 1811). Con- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 401 
 
 fined to a relation of events in the Spanish portion after the 
 death of Leclerc. 
 
 Hassal (Miss): "Secret History; or the horrors of St. Do- 
 mingo, in a series of letters, written by a lady at Cape Francois 
 to Colonel Burr, Late Vice-President of the United States. 
 Principally during the Command of General Rochambeau" 
 (Philadelphia, 1808). Miss Hassal arrived at Le Cap in May, 
 1802, and remained until shortly before Rochambeau's evacua- 
 tion in November, 1803. Interesting viewpoint, though so 
 gossipy and personal in tone as to be generally unavailable for 
 exact quotation in this connection. 
 
 Hilliard d'Auberteuil (M. R.): "Considerations sur l'Etat 
 Present de la Colonie francaise de Saint-Domingue. Ouvrage 
 Politique et Legislatif, Presente au Ministre de la Marine" 
 (Paris, 1776). A detailed discussion of conditions in San Do- 
 mingo toward the close of the Old Regime. Should be read in 
 connection with the critical work of Du Buisson (supra), to 
 understand mutual prejudices. 
 
 Howard (Lieutenant): Manuscript journal of occurrences 
 during service in the British army of occupation in San Do- 
 mingo (3 blankbooks). In Boston Public Library. Interesting 
 details, especially of the sufferings of the British. 
 
 Joinville-Gauban: "Voyage d'Outre-mer et Infortunes de M. 
 Joinville-Gauban" (Bordeaux, 180-). The reminiscences of a 
 former overseer. Extremely anti-negro. Some instructive fea- 
 tures, but generally unreliable. 
 
 Laborie (P. J.): "The Coffee-Planter of San Domingo; con- 
 taining a view of the Constitution, Government, Laws, and 
 State of the Colony previous to 1789" (London, 1798). Ex- 
 tremely thin. 
 
 Lacroix (General P. A. de): "Memories pour Servir a l'His- 
 toire de la Revolution de Saint-Domingue " (2 vols., Paris, 1819). 
 The standard general work on the entire subject. Good through- 
 out. Lacroix was an* eye-witness of events during Leclerc's 
 expedition and a prominent actor therein as well. 
 
 Lattre (P. A. de): "Campagne des Frangais a Saint-Do- 
 mingue, et refutation des Reproches faits au Capitaine- 
 General Rochambeau" (Paris, 1805). A spirited defense of 
 Rochambeau's governorship subsequent to Leclerc's death. 
 Note that the author was a former planter. 
 
402 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Lemonnier-Delafosse: "Seconde Campagne de Saint-Do- 
 mingue, precedee de Souvenirs historiques de la premiere Cam- 
 pagne" (Havre, 1846). The memoirs of an army officer; an eye- 
 witness, though one of minor importance. Good local color. 
 
 Maclean (H.): "An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
 the Great Mortality among the Troops at San Domingo" (Lon- 
 don, 1797). The author was three years with the British army 
 of occupation. Some interesting points. 
 
 Malenfant: "Des Colonies, et particulierement de celle de 
 Saint-Domingue " (Paris, 1819). Of little value. 
 
 Malouet (V. P.): "Collection des Memoires et Correspond- 
 ances officielles sur l'Administration des Colonies" (4 vols., 
 Paris, 1802). Contain much valuable information concerning 
 the old colonial system. 
 
 Mantegazza (C): "Viaggio a Santo Domingo" (Milan, 1803). 
 A series of letters during the period of Leclerc's expedition. 
 Superficial. 
 
 Mazeres (F.): "De l'Utilite des Colonies, des Causes de la 
 Perte de Saint-Domingue, et des Moyens d'en recouvrir la 
 Possession" (Paris, 1814). Extremely thin and visionary. 
 
 Moreau de Saint-MSry (M. L. E.): "Description Topogra- 
 phique, Physique, Civile, Politique et Historique de la Partie 
 Francaise de Saint-Domingue. Avec des Observations gen- 
 erates sur la Population, sur la Caractere et les Mceurs de ses 
 divers Habitans; sur son Climat, sa Culture, ses Productions, 
 son Administration, etc. Accompagnees des Details les plus 
 propres a faire connaitre l'etat de cette Colonie a l'Epoque du 
 18 Octobre, 1789" (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1797). An invaluable 
 compendium of information of every kind about San Domingo. 
 The fruit of many years' researches. It stops strictly at 1789. 
 This, indeed, is one of its best features, for the author sticks 
 to his material and does not allow later events to color his work 
 in the least. After much general information of the highest 
 value, the bulk of the work is a description of the colony parish 
 by parish; the most remote and unimportant being included. 
 
 Moreau de Saint-MSry (M. L. E.)\ "Description ... de la 
 Partie Espagnole de ITsle Saint-Domingue" (Philadelphia, 
 1799). Similar to the former work. Briefer but excellent. 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte: "Memoires" (Montholon). Four notes 
 on the book of General Lacroix (supra). In vol. i, pp. 194-218. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 403 
 
 These remarks are an attempt to throw the blame of the failure 
 in San Domingo on to the shoulders of Leclerc. Extremely 
 unfair. Characteristic Napoleonic special pleading. 
 
 Nicolson (Pere): "Essai sur FHistoire Naturelle de Saint- 
 Domingue" (Paris, 1776). The author was Apostolic Prefect of 
 the Dominican Mission. Mostly concerned with natural history, 
 the book contains a few remarks on the state of the colony. 
 
 Page: "Traite d'Economie politique et de Commerce des 
 Colonies" (Paris, 1802). The work of a former colonist. Of 
 little value. 
 
 Pradt: "Les Trois Ages des Colonies" (2 vols., Paris, 1802). 
 Fantastic and unreliable. 
 
 Rainsford (Marcus): "An Historical Account of the Black 
 Empire of Hayti, comprehending a view of the Principal Trans- 
 actions in the Revolution of Saint Domingo, with its Antient 
 and Modern State" (London, 1805). Pompous, and devoid of 
 merit or accuracy. , 
 
 Raynal (the AbbS): "Essai sur 1' Administration de la Colonie 
 de Saint-Domingue" (?, 1785). A detailed discussion of condi- 
 tions in San Domingo on the eve of the Revolution. 
 
 Saintard: "Essai sur les Colonies frangaises; ou Discours 
 politique sur la Nature du Gouvernement, de la Population, 
 et Commerce de Saint-Domingue" (Paris, 1754). An arraign- 
 ment of the arbitrary nature of the colonial government of the 
 Old Regime. Interesting as belonging to such an early date. 
 
 Sanchez Valverde (A.): "Idea del Valor de la Isla Espanola" 
 (Madrid, 1785). French translation in manuscript in the Bib- 
 liotheque Nationale, Departement des Manuscrits, "Nouv. Ac- 
 quisitions franchises," no. 1371. Mostly on the Spanish part of 
 the island. Interesting as being one of Moreau de Saint-Mery's 
 chief sources for his work on the Spanish part of San Domingo 
 (supra) . 
 
 Venault de Charmilly: "Lettre a Bryan Edwards " (London, 
 1797). Despite its title, a good-sized volume, criticizing Ed- 
 wards's book (supra). The writer, an actor in the early troubles 
 of the Revolution in San Domingo, furnishes material of con- 
 siderable value. He convicts Edwards of many minor errors, 
 but fails to shake the Englishman's work as a whole. 
 
 Wante: "Importance de nos Colonies Occidentals " (Paris, 
 1805). Of little value. 
 
404 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 2. Pamphlets. 
 
 The pamphlet literature is extensive, but its value is much 
 less than its size would lead one to expect. The most valuable 
 portion is that appearing before the year 1793, although even 
 here the authors are concerned more with France than San Do- 
 mingo. After 1792 the Terror prevents any free discussion of the 
 general subject, and the pamphlets of the next few years are 
 mere personal recrimination. The Consulate was also a period 
 unfavorable to free discussion, and the pamphlets and brochures 
 of this epoch are generally apologetics for the policy of Bonaparte. 
 
 The valuable part of this literature has been analyzed and 
 discussed by modern writers or in Garran-Coulon's voluminous 
 official report published in 1798 (supra). A nearly complete 
 collection is preserved in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Series 
 LK-9 and LK-12. The next best collection in existence is prob- 
 ably that bequeathed to Cornell University by Andrew D. 
 White. The Harvard University Library possesses a collection 
 of considerable importance, and a number of pamphlets relating 
 to San Domingo are also to be found in the British Museum. 
 
 References to all pamphlets directly utilized in this work will 
 be found in the Notes. The great body of official aud private 
 correspondence preserved in the French archives has yielded 
 such superior historical material that I have generally preferred 
 it for exact quotation. 
 
 D. MODERN WORKS 
 
 1. Books. 
 
 Boissonnade (P.): " Saint-Domingue a la Veille de la Revo- 
 lution et la Question de la Representation aux Etats-Gen- 
 eraux (Janvier, 1788-Juillet, 1789)" (Paris, 1906). Avery able 
 monograph based on archival material, published documents, 
 and all important contemporary books and pamphlets. Impar- 
 tial, it exhausts the subject. 
 
 Daubigny (E.): "Choiseul et la France d'Outre-Mer apres la 
 Traite de Paris (1763)" (Paris, 1892). An able general account 
 of the attempts made to remedy the abuses of the colonial 
 regime after 1763. 
 
 Castonnet des Fosses (H.): "La Revolution de Saint-Do- 
 mingue" (Paris, 1893). Popular in form (no footnotes), and 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 405 
 
 contains many minor errors; yet good on the whole. Contains 
 some things not well treated elsewhere. 
 
 DSschamps (L.): "Les Colonies pendant la Revolution: la 
 Constituante et la Reforme Coloniale" (Paris, 1898). A de- 
 tailed discussion of the colonial question in the Constituent 
 Assembly (i.e., to October, 1791) . Based mainly on the Archives 
 Parlementaires. Prejudiced in favor of the Revolutionary ideas. 
 Devoted to events in France, it is of little value for events in 
 San Domingo. 
 
 Gaffarel (P.): "La Politique Cploniale en France, de 1789 a, 
 1830" (Paris, 1908). Good summary, though of course very 
 general. 
 
 Lebeau (A.): "Dela Condition des Gens de Couleur Libres 
 sous l'Ancien Regime (These pour le doctorat en droit, — Uni- 
 versite de Poitiers," Poitiers, 1903). A very able, unprejudiced, 
 and scientific discussion of the color line under the Old Regime. 
 Based on archival material, juristic works, etc. Of the highest 
 value. 
 
 Leroy-Beaulieu (Paul): "De la Colonisation chez les Peuples 
 Modernes" (4th edition). An authoritative general economic 
 work. 
 
 Levasseur (E.) : "Histoire du Commerce de la France" (vol. i, 
 avant 1789, Paris, 1911). Another economic work, more de- 
 tailed and a good complement to Leroy-Beaulieu (supra). 
 
 Magnac (Dr.): "La Perte de Saint-Domingue : 1789-1809" 
 (Paris, 1909). A brief popular work. Inaccurate and with no 
 new features. 
 
 Mills (H. E.): "The Early Years of the French Revolution 
 in San Domingo." (Doctor's thesis, Cornell University, Cornell, 
 N.Y., 1889.) A scholarly discussion of events down to May, 
 1791. No unpublished archival material has been used, but 
 nearly all the published documents and pamphlets are examined 
 and discussed. Of great value. 
 
 Pauliat (£.): "La Politique Coloniale sous l'Ancien Regime" 
 (Paris, 1887). An attempt to prove the superlative excellence 
 of the Old Regime. Curious distortions of fact. Of little value. 
 
 Parsons (R.): "Montesquieu et l'Esclavage. Etudes sur les 
 Origines de l'Opinion anti-esclavagiste en France au XVIII e 
 Siecle" (Paris, 1911). An interesting study of the anti-slavery 
 movement preceding the French Revolution. 
 
406 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Poyen (Lieutenant-Colonel H. de): "Histoire militaire de la 
 Revolution de Saint-Domingue " (Paris, 1899). A technical 
 military history by a French army officer. For the period of 
 Leclerc's expedition (the bulk of the work), it is based on a 
 wealth of archival material and on all the important publica- 
 tions of the time. From its special viewpoint it exhausts the 
 subject. 
 
 Poyen (Lieutenant-Colonel H. de): "Les Guerres des Antilles, 
 de 1793 a 1815 " (Paris, 1896). Valuable for checking up events 
 in the other islands. 
 
 Pritchard (Hesketh): "Where Black Rules White" (London, 
 1900). An Englishman's travels through the Black Republic. 
 Interesting description of present conditions, which appear to 
 have changed but little since the early years of negro independ- 
 ence. 
 
 Roloff (G.): "Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I" (Munich, 
 1899). A very able, authoritative, and unprejudiced exposition 
 of this subject; based on archival material, published docu- 
 ments, and all the important works. From the standpoint of 
 international politics it exhausts the subject and is an excellent 
 complement to Poyen's military work (supra). 
 
 St. John (Sir Spenser): "Haiti, or the Black Bepublic" (Lon- 
 don, 1884). The author was for many years British Minister at 
 Port-au-Prince. He traces the historical continuity of present 
 conditions from the early period in most instructive fashion. 
 An extremely useful book. 
 
 Schoelcher (V.): "Vie de Toussaint Louverture" (Paris, 
 1889). The work of a French anti-slavery writer of the mid- 
 nineteenth century, it is so prejudiced as to be of little value 
 as a book, but since it contains many documents and letters 
 quoted in extenso, its serves occasionally as a handy collection 
 of printed documents. 
 
 Treille (M.): "Le Commerce de Nantes et la Revolution" 
 (Paris, 1908). This work, based upon the local archival ma- 
 terial of the Nantes Chambre de Commerce, throws much light 
 . on the old colonial system, especially since Nantes was the chief 
 centre of San Domingo commerce and of the slave-trade. Thor- 
 oughly scientific and reliable in character. 
 
 Vaissiere (P. de): "Saint-Domingue: La Societe et la vie 
 Creoles sous l'Ancien Regime" (Paris, 1909). An exceedingly 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 407 
 
 able and valuable exposition of colonial conditions under the 
 Old Regime, based on archival material, both French and Eng- 
 lish, and on a wealth of publications, many of them very rare. 
 This book, together with those of Lebeau and Peytraud (supra), 
 forms a trilogy invaluable for an understanding of conditions in 
 San Domingo before the Revolution. 
 
 Zimmermann: "Die Franzoesische Kolonien" (Berlin, 1901). 
 The best general work on the history of the French colonies. 
 2. Articles. 
 
 Adams (Henry): "Napoleon I and San Domingo." In "His- 
 torical Essays" (New York, 1891). A scholarly discussion of 
 Napoleon's colonial policy, with special reference to its bearing 
 upon the United States. 
 
 Brette (A.): "Les Gens de Couleur Libres et Leurs Deputes 
 en 1789." Published in "La Revolution Francaise," vol. xxix 
 (1895), pp. 326-45; 385-407. A minute analysis of speeches in 
 the Constituent Assembly and of pamphlets on the point. 
 Rather partial to the mulattoes. 
 
 Deschamps (L.): "La Representation Coloniale au Constit- 
 uante." In "La Revolution Francaise," vol. xxxvn (1899), 
 pp. 130 et seq. An expansion of one or two points in his book 
 (supra). 
 
 Du Hautais (Vicomte Odon) : "Une Famille bretonne a Saint- 
 Domingue au XVIII e Siecle." In "Revue de Bretagne," vol. 
 pp. 237-64 (1899). Some local color. 
 
 Girault (A.): "La Politique Coloniale de la Revolution 
 Franchise." In "Revue Politique et Parlementaire" (1899), 
 pp. 358-64. Comment and critique of Deschamps' book (supra). 
 
 Hardy (J.): " Correspondance intime du General Hardy de 
 1797 a 1802 (Expeditions dTrlande et de Saint-Domingue)." In 
 "Revue des Deux Mondes," IV e periode, vol. clxi, pp. 92-134 
 (1900). Some interesting letters of one of Leclerc's most vigor- 
 ous division commanders. Good local color. 
 
 Hennet: "Rentree en France de la Depouille mortelle du Gen- 
 eral Leclerc." In "Carnet de la Sabretache," November, 1908. 
 Explained by title. 
 
 Lallemand: "Saint-Domingue sous le Consulat. Fragment 
 des Souvenirs du General Lallemand." In "La Nouvelle Revue 
 Retrospective," vol. xvii, pp. 361-73; vol. xvin, pp. 37-41 
 (1903). Recollections of some interest. 
 
408 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Le Maire (D.): "Un Dunkerquois Colon a Saint-Domingue. 
 Lettres inedites de Domenique le Maire." In "Bulletin de 
 rUnion Fauconnier. Societe Historique de Dunquerque," vol. 
 IV, pp. 461-529 (1901). Certain instructive points. 
 
 Mojrinot (J.) : "Ma Campagne a Saint-Domingue (1802-04)." 
 In "Revue de Champagne et de Brie," II e serie, vol. xn, pp. 
 1-36 (1900). The reminiscences of an officer in Leclerc's ex- 
 pedition. Some good points. 
 
 Mosback (A.): "Der Franzoesische Feldzug auf Sanct Do- 
 mingo (1802-03). Nach den Berichten vierpolnischer Offiziere" 
 (Breslau, 1882). 
 
 Moulin (H.): "Le 'Courrier' et le 'Hazard'; dernier Episode 
 de l'lnsurrection de Saint-Domingue." In "La Revolution 
 Frangaise," vol. vi, p. 683. 
 
 Sciout (L.): "La Revolution a, Saint-Domingue: les Com- 
 missaires Sonthonax et Polverel." In "Revue des Questions 
 Historiques," no. cxxvm (October 1, 1898), pp. 399-470. 
 Based on archival material, it is a most useful monograph, 
 though with a certain Royalist-Clerical bias. 
 
 Tremaudan (J. de): "Le Commerce de Nantes (XVH e et 
 XVIII e Siecles)." In "Revue de Bretagne," vol. xxx, pp. 16- 
 22 (1903). Another sidelight on the colonial trade under the 
 Old Regime. 
 
 E. WORKS ON TOUSSAINT LOUVERTURE 
 
 Because of the special interest in Toussaint Louverture I have 
 thought it advisable to devote to him a special section of this 
 bibliography. The poverty of the appended list will be disap- 
 pointing to those interested in the personality and carrer of the 
 black leader, but it will show the difficulty in the way of any 
 scientific biography. 
 
 Cousin d'Avallon (C. Y.) : "Histoire de Toussaint Louverture, 
 chef des Noirs Insurges de Saint-Domingue" (Paris, 1802). 
 Stolen from Dubroca (infra). 
 
 Dubroea (J. F.): "La Vie de Toussaint Louverture" (Paris, 
 1802). Short and thin. Apparently a bookseller's job, written 
 to support Bonaparte's policy in sending out Leclerc's expedi- 
 tion. Wholly unreliable. 
 
 Gragnon-Lacoste: "Toussaint Louverture" (Paris, 1877). A 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 panegyric of the black leader. Full of apocryphal and legendary 
 matter. 
 
 " Letters of Toussaint Lou verture and Edward Stevens, 1798- 
 1800." Collection of documents published in the "American 
 Historical Review " (October, 1910), vol. xvi, pp. 64-101. Con- 
 cerned with trade relations between San Domingo and the 
 United States during the period of Toussaint's rule. 
 
 "Memoires du General Toussaint Louverture, ecrits par 
 lui-meme," with appendix by Saint-Remy (Paris, 1853). De- 
 spite its pretentious title, these so-called "Memoires" of Tous- 
 saint Louverture are merely one of several justificatory me- 
 morials written during his French captivity to obtain Bonaparte's 
 clemency. Concerned only with certain of his public acts during 
 the last years of his career, it is extreme special pleading. The 
 original manuscript is preserved in Archives Nationales, AF-iv, 
 1213. 
 
 Mitral (A.): "Histoire de 1'Expedition des Frangais a Saint- 
 Domingue sous le Consulat de Napoleon Bonaparte; suivie des 
 Memoires et Notes dTsaac Louverture sur la meme Expedition 
 et sur la Vie de Son Pere" (Paris, 1825). Metral's account is 
 brief and unimportant. The appended account of Isaac Lou- 
 verture, son of the black leader, contains certain interesting 
 features, though inexact and romantic in character. 
 
 Pirin (R.): "LTncendie du Cap, ou le Regne de Toussaint 
 Louverture" (Paris, 1802). A diatribe against the black leader. 
 Of little value. 
 
 Rainsford (Marcus) : "St. Domingo, or an Historical, Political, 
 and Military Sketch of the projected Black Republic, with a 
 view of Toussaint Louverture" (London, 1802). A pretentious 
 bit of "fine writing"; most inaccurate and of practically no 
 value. 
 
 "Recueil de lettres et pieces originales sur Saint-Domingue." 
 Three manuscript volumes in the Bibliotheque Nationale, 
 Departement des Manuscrits, "Fonds Francais," nos. 12102, 
 12103, 12104. Contains many of Toussaint's proclamations and 
 numerous letters to General Laveaux between the years 1794 
 and 1798. This material, quoted largely in extenso, forms the 
 bulk of Schoelcher's book (supra). The letters were intended for 
 public consumption; their tone is extremely inflated and arti- 
 ficial. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Saint-Remy : "Vie de Toussaint Louverture" (Paris, 1850). 
 Written at second-hand on rather slender material, it is of 
 little value. The author, a mulatto, is not over-fond of the 
 black leader. 
 
 Stephen (J.): "Buonaparte in the West Indies; or, the Story 
 of Toussaint Louverture, the African Hero" (London, 1803). 
 A panegyric of the black leader and a diatribe against the French 
 in general and the First Consul in particular. Absurdly prej- 
 udiced and very thin. 
 
 Stephen (J.): "The History of Toussaint Louverture" (Lon- 
 don, 1814). A variation of the earlier work (supra), and equally 
 devoid of value. 
 
 "The Life and Military Achievements of Toussaint Louver- 
 ture, from 1792 until the arrival of General Leclerc. Also his 
 Successor's till 1803" (London, 1805). A pamphlet, similar in 
 character to Stephen's productions. 
 
 "Toussaint Louverture au Fort de Joux" (1802). Article 
 in "Nouvelle Revue Retrospective," XVIIP annee, no. 94, 10 
 Avril, 1902. The journal of Caffarelli, Governor of Fort de 
 Joux, the place of Toussaint's French captivity. An eye-wit- 
 ness's account of the black leader's last days. Of the highest 
 value. In this connection, note also some interesting reports 
 of officials at Fort de Joux, preserved in the French colonial 
 archives and never previously published, quoted in Poyen, 
 pp. 220-33. 
 
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