i /iO 299 A 1854 Copy 1 K^ AMERICAN YIEW OF THE m EASTERN QUESTION.! f BY WM. HENRY TRESCOT. ^:hian ^m^ CHAELESTOl^^S 0;' JOHN KITSSELL, KING -STREET. 1854. iP%fP f ^ HUNGARIAN REPE&BNCB UBRAKv PrOi>erty of THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS AN AMERICAN YIEW OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. BY WM. HENRY TEESCOT. > ^ V^9 ^ ^yi^i '/It:, or. CHAELESTOlSr, S C. JOHN RUSSELL, K I N G-S T K E E T , 1854. y 6 Copy 1396N 23JUL 19 53 AN AMERICAN VIEW 1^ OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. When, during one of the late debates in Parlia- ment, the Earl of Aberdeen described the condition of England, by saying that the nation was not at war, bnt was drifting to war, his words might have been a23plied, with a wider and truer significance to the state of all Europe for the last forty years. And the histor}^ of this time, when it comes to be written, will shew that never has European diplomacy been more wisely or actively employed, than during this very period, in postponing the dreaded consumma- tion. But it has proved beyond the power of human wisdom to control the issues of human passion ; and after a peace of half-a-century, partially broken, it is true, by revolutionary struggles, a whole continent is again in arms. The Danube, whose shores have re-echoed the war cry of the Dacian barbarian, and the tramp of the Eoman legion ; upon whose turbid waters have gleamed the victorious light of Sobfes- ki's sword, and the waning glory of the Turkish cres- cent, runs again, exulting to the Euxine, red with Christian blood ; and the banners of England, France 1^ AN AMERICAN VIEW and Russia, shaken from tlieir tropliiecl drapery, again '' stream like meteors to tke troubled air," Tlie mili- tary salute fired over the last of Napoleon's marshals, has scarcely died upon the ear ; the funeral pomp that marshaled England's great captain to the field of his only defeat, has not yet faded to the eye ; Met- ternich and IN'esselrode, the great draftsmen of the majD of modern Europe, are still alive, but already has their work grown old. The foundations they laid have been broken up ; the balance of power they adjusted is disturbed, and the world trembles in apprehension of a bloodier convulsion and a wil- der change than in their day rocked the thrones of ancient empires, and inscribed on the ensanguined battle roll of history the names of Moscow and Wa- terloo. Tlie late news from Europe not only proves the existence of war, by the report of battles and the formal declaration of hostilities, but it justifies the gravest apprehensions of a protracted and universal war. The mission of Prince George of Mechlen- berg, the last efi'ort of the Czar to avoid or postpone the crisis, has failed. And this must be considered, on the part of the allied powers, as a declaration that they are resolved to make a new and wider settle- ment of the Eastern question, before they lay down their arms. Tliey will not accept the status quo ante helium as the basis of an arrangement ; and as Russia cannot be expected to admit any other, it would seem that upon this contest her whole future power and policy are staked. Austria and Prussia have at last come to an explicit understanding. But OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. by signing with France and England the much talked of protocol, they have not committed themselves to the Western powers, but have simply indicated their readiness, in their own time and in their own inter- est, to abandon a neutrality which, in the interest of others, sooner or later, they would not be permit- ted to maintain. The insurrection in Greece, un- questionably encouraged by Russia, has become too formidable for the control of the Greek Government ; has already embroiled Greece with Turkey ; added another complication to the embarrassments of the Sultan, by forcing him to order all the Greek resi- dents — neither few nor feeble for mischief— to leave his dominions, and may eventually compel an armed demonstration on the part of England and France. Sweden is evidently uneasy, and is already taking measures which look suspiciously towards the aban- donment of her neutrality in the interest of Russia. Denmark, bound to Russia by the aid rendered in the affair of the Dutchies, has manifested very clearly to Sir Charles E'apier her dissatisfaction at the pres- ence of the combined fleets in the Baltic. The revo- lutionists of Lombardy and Hungary are alert, or- ganised and almost" desperate; while among the Turks themselves there is a strengthening discontent with the Sultan's reforms. '^ Menshikoff," say they, " came and asked for the Koran, and said, ^ Strike out these texts.' The French and English come, and they say, ' Throw this book into the Bosphorus.' " * * Since these introductory remarks were written, some modification has taken place in the relations of the European powers, between themselves. I have, however, left these observations as they stand, because no change AN AMEKICAK VIEW Lamentable as is this state of things, it is scarcely surprising. Events for the last forty years have been bringing on this war slowly, bnt surely, and nothing but the revolutionary dangers incident to general hostilities in Europe, have preserved peace so long among the rival nations. And it is therefore impossible to a23preciate the present disturbed con- dition of Europe, or even to approximate towards a in the position of the leading powers of Europe affects the argument at- tempted in the following pages, which rests entirely upon the past history of England and the diplomatic correspondence already exchanged. If the news be true that Austria and Prussia have joined in a treaty with the allied powers, one of two results seems to be certain : either, 1, that any marked and permanent success over Russia will dissolve a coalition repre- senting such divergent interests as belong to the varied policies of Eng- gland, France, Austria and Prussia ; or, 2, that the influence of Austria ■and Prussia will be used to facilitate a settlement which will compromise Russia as little as possible. The history of Europe proves that the more extensive a coalition, the more brittle is its bond. Prussia has more than once before this shewn England what little obligation interest at- taches to the most solemn treaties, and England has occasionally profited by the lesson. Besides which, the treaty, as reported in the papers, scarcely goes beyond the obligations of the protocol, and these obligations are in reference solely to the interests of Germany, as they may be endangered by the progress of the war. Indeed, some of the English papers have already said that this treaty is but the introduction to a renewal of nego- tiations on a new basis, and one adds : "While we are calculating upon the certainty of all the great powers being compactly allied against Russian policy, the Emperor of Russia has probably succeeded in changing the issue, and the controversy will be no longer as to the evacuation of the Turkish dominions, but on the recurrence to the status quo, or to a re-dis- tribution of territory with the four powers divided on the question." Besides the unsatisfactory nature of this condition of things, Greece is occupied by French troops, England seems likely to follow the same policy with Denmark, and the Times is busily employed in fomenting the differ- ences between the Swedish Government and the people excited against Eussia, in hope of obtaining a restoration of Finland. OF THE EASTEKN QUESTION. 9 reasonable opinion as to its probable results, without going furtliei* back tlian the recent controversy in Turkey. Tlie Congress of Yienna nndertook no less a task than the re-constrnction of Europe ; for the French revolution and its consequences interposed a great gulf between the Europe of 1815 and that defined in the treaties of Westphalia and IJtrecht. The Euro- pean system came out of the wars of 1800-1815, essentially changed, not merely in its relations, but in its very composition. Four new facts had been established, which must be assumed as the necessary basis of any future political arrangements. They were: — 1. The extinction of the old German empire, which was, in truth, the centre of the former system. 2. The astonishing developement of Russia. 3. Tlie consolidation of the British power in India, and con- sequent gigantic growth of her commercial influence ; and 4. The presence, in every State of Europe, of an active, organised and radical revolutionary party. It would be difficult to find in the proceedings of Yiemia any provision against the necessary conse- quence of such a condition of affairs. For, 1st, Instead of providing some substitute for the old centre furnished by the German empire, the Congress of Yienna left Germany divided into two factions — Austria and Prussia^ — supported by a crowd of small States, feeding their interests by a parasitical devo- tion to one or the other, and both striving for the autocracy of modern Germany. 2. Instead of pla- cing some one strong power between Russia and Western Europe, Russia was allowed to incorporate 10 AN AMERICAN VIEW enoiigli of Poland to "bring lier in contact with Prus- sia, as she ah^eacly w^as with Austria, and thus placed in position to play upon the jealousy or weakness of either, to set one against the other, or to control both. 3rd. Instead of attempting to create some balance against the enormous and overgrown com- mercial power of England, France was both morally and physically diminished, and the commercial in. terests of Great Britain strengthened by the creation of a new kingdom out of Belgium and Holland, where English influence would be dominant. And lastly, while organizing a sort of royal police over the reforming spirit of Europe, the Congress acWed fresh fuel to the smouldering fire of the Italian revo- lutionists, by the most arbitrary and offensive viola- tion of national feeling. Genoa, the superb, was de- graded into the provincial sea-port of a second rate sovereignty ; and "Venice, the bride of the sea, sub- mitted to the coarse grasp of an Austrian subaltern. AVhether the actual solution of the difticult questions then calling for settlement, was the only practical one, ought to have been better known to the states- men of that day, than it can be to students of this. But the results are ours, and are certain. The Con- gress of Vienna has proved little better than an ar- mistice, and from St. Petersburg to Naples, from Paris to Constantinople, the last forty years have developed an agitated life of change, confusion, and revolution. ITot only has much of the work of 1815 been undone, but it has been destroyed by its own creators. To use the strong language of Count Eic- quelmont, " Tlie two acts of the Congress of Vienna, OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 11 calculated to exercise the greatest influence on the future of central Europe, were the re-construction of Poland, and the creation of a kingdom of the low countries. These two new political bodies have been destroyed by the same powers who most largely con- tributed to their creation. It is Kussia who willed, I will not say the restoration, but the re-construction of a Poland — it is Russia who has been brought to de- stroy her own work. It is England who labored most earnestly in the creation of the kingdom of the low countries, and took the new State under her special protection. It was the illustrious warrior to whose genius she owed so many victories, to whom was committed the organization of the military system of the new State, which England wished to erect into her first line of defence against France. This terri- tory, circled by citadels, secured the communication between the armies of England and Germany. And it was England who eagerly seized the first occasion to destroy her own handiwork.''^ Tlie absence of any real German unity, has given play to a rivalry between Austria and Prussia, dan- gerous not only to themselves, but to some of the gravest European interests — opened a field for the exhibition of the miserable folly of the Frankfort Parliament, and permitted the dishonest and dis- graceful invasion of the rights of Denmark, in the Dutchies of Schleswig and Holstein. France, Italy and Austria have been weakened and distracted by the fiercest civil commotion ; and the present condition of Europe, in contrast with the * " Lord Palmerston I'Angleterre et le continent," vol. ii., p. 3. 12 AN AMERICAN VIEW provisions of the diplomacy of 1815, points, with pain- ful emphasis, the moral of human foresight. One fact remains, indeed, unchanged : England and Eus- sia were the controlling authorities at Yienna, and after half-a-centuiy of change and controversy, they now front each other, in armed hostility, the rival powers of Europe. But how wide the diiference be- tween the courses of their respective policies and their resulting positions. With the exception of the United States, it may safely be said that Russia is the only power in the world with a fixed policy and a constant progress. England has strength, but she needs it all to hold her own. Her immense com- mercial development has given to her foreign policy a mercantile rather than a political character, and shifting her conduct to suit her interests, she has been forced to keep the police of Europe in the interest of Manchester and Liverpool. Russia, on the contrary, has devoted near two centuries of as- tute and systematic diplomacy to one idea — the extension of her empire to Constantinople. Twenty years have never passed, since her first step towards the Bosphorus, that she has not taken another, in advance. The fall of markets has not checked her progress — ^tlie complications of parliamentary strife have not disturbed lier course — she has moved steadily on, " unchanged through all — ^unchanging- ly." And not forgetting her object, she has yet con- trived, not only to do justice, but to do efficient ser- vice, in Europe, to the cause of justice. In the case of Greece, as far as England was concerned, the Czar acted both wiselv and too w^ell. In the contest be- OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 13 tween Denmark and the Dutcliies, he vindicated, effi- ciently and promptly, the treaties of Europe, while Lord Palmerston finessed England into a state of faithless imbecility. During the struggle in Austria, when the future fortunes of all Europe were com- promised by a rash revolution, and while the same Lord Palmerston w^as contriving a modified policy which would have saved the Italian republicans, at the expense of the Hungarian, the Czar ended the contest by an armed interference, wdiich preserved both to the Austrian crown. Of course, it would be easy to shew a direct interest, on the part of Russia, in every one of these questions ; but w^ho can deny the wisdom of a policy which, without weakening its own strength, made Russia the natural and necessary support of the conservatism of the world? It is true that Russia has systematically and successfully en- croached on Turkey. Forced, by the character of her possessions, to seek an outlet into the w^orld of com- merce, confined in the Baltic by States whose rights she was bound to respect, and has respected, there was but one direction in which she could advance. Now, on this subject, if there is any people in the world who should avoid the cant of English coininer- cial conservatism, w^e are that people. The history of the world is the history of encroachment, of inva- sion, of wrong, if you so will. " It must be that of- fenses come," but for him only who knoweth the whole counsel of God, is it to say, " Woe unto him by whom the offense cometh." Tliis all history teaches : the strong and weak will not lie down to- 14 AN AMERICAN VIEW getlier. You cannot ])ring into contact an earnest, living will, and a feeble, effete nature, without the absorption of tlie one into the other. Place England alongside of India, the United States by Mexico and Cuba, Eussia by Turkey, and a half century of diplo- macy or war will not, cannot prevent the inevitable result. The first princij^le of life is progress. As one of our own poets has well said — "This, the true sign of ruin to a race — It undertakes no march, and day by day Drowzes in camp, or with a laggard's pace Walks sentry o'er possessions that decay : Destined with sensible waste to fleet away ; — For the first secret of continued power Is the continued conquest." — Simms. We propose, therefore, to review rapidly the rela- tions of England and Eussia to Turkey, since the Congress of Vienna, in order to appreciate the value of their present relative j)ositions. Turkey has never been considered as forming an element of the Euro- pean balance of power. In 1791 Burke said, " He had never heard it said before that the Turkish em- pire w^as ever considered as any part of the balance of power in Europe. Tliey had nothing to do with European policy — they considered themselves as wholly Asiatic. What had these worse than savages to do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war, destruction and pestilence among them ? Tlie min- istry and policy which should give these people any weight in Europe, would deserve all the bans and curses of posterity. All that was holy in reli- gion, all that was moral and humane demanded an OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 15 abhorrence of every tiling wliicli tended to extend the power of the cruel and wasteful empire. Any Chris- tian power was to he preferred to these destructive savages." It would be interesting to trace the policy of Eu- rope towards the Turks, from the time when, to the horror of Christendom, Francis the First made an ally of Solyman against Charles the Fifth, to the present day, when the Koran finds its safest refuge under the shadow of St. George's cross, but such a sketch would interfere too largely with our present purpose. It is sufficient now, that at the Congress of Yienna which terminated the long and fierce con- test, at the commencement of which Mr. Burke used the memorable words which we have just quoted, the Sultan was not represented. He had not then entered the circle of civilized nations, and according to one of the ablest historians of that Congress, '' the balance of power in the East was not confided to Congress."^ At the close of 1815, England was unquestionably the dominant power of the world — a great position, doubtless, but one which, in the history of empires, no nation has retained long, or held more than once. Her material resources were almost incalculable ; her armies in the highest discipline, and brilliant with the trophies of an hundred victories; her navies floated upon the subject waters of almost every sea. In close alliance with her old companions, the States of the Baltic, she controlled the ISTorth- *Flassan Cong, de Vienne, vol. ii: 114. 16 AN AMEEICAN VIEW ern Ocean and the shores of Germany ; of the new kingdom of the low countries she had made a cause- way into the heart of Europe ; while in posses- sion of Gibraltar and Corfu and Malta, she threat- ened the Italian provinces of Austria, and claimed the Mediterranean as a subject lake. Her colonies, each a link in the long chain of her commercial de- pendencies, girdled the globe and bracing her strength, served also as conductors of her influence. Such power, Kussia only could resist, because, except in the case of a general coalition, slie was defended by all Europe, and through Turkey she had the means of offensive operations, without the necessity of violating the riglits of her nearest neighbors. To this conflict Eussia lias resolutely addressed herself. Since 1815 there have been three questions directly affecting Turkey, in the solution of which, Russia and England have been immediate parties. The Greek insurrection — the war of 1828, between Rus- sia and Turkey, terminated by the treaty of Adriano- ple — and the revolt of the Egyptian Pacha, or what is known as the Eastern question of 1811. Now, this whole series of transactions, (and among them w^e should include the colonization of Algiers as an- other illustration of the same principles,) indicated very clearly the position in which Europe, under the lead of England, intended to place the Turkish Em- pire. They established first — that Turkey was not able to maintain her own integrity' — and secondly, that the European powers would modify her bound- aries, or sustain her provincial authority as suited OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. IT their own interests, not liers. In other words — that Tnrkev was only a legal fiction in the name of which, certain territory should be held for the joint benefit of the great powers : the respective shares of each others' influence to be determined by their own di- plomatic relations. More than this, the independ- ence of Greece, and the treaty of Adrianople, the moderation of which must fairly be attributed to Russia herself, established distinctly the principle and policy of a progressive encroachment upon the Turkish Empire. For the freedom of Greece rested on the principle of Christian resistance to the op- pressive power of Turkey, and its natural and logical inference promised the same privilege to Albania, Thessalia and the neighboring j)rovinces, whenever they could organize a like resistance. Indeed, the unwise limitation of the boundaries of the new kingdom, and the refusal to annex Candia to Greece, where she naturally belongs, is to be attributed sim- ply to the timid selfishness of the mediating powers : to which of those powers and selfishness was most specially to be credited, may be inferred from the ofi'er of Candia to England in the late famous secret correspondence. While Greece was thus taken from Turkey, and, instead of being made strong enough for independent life, was placed in a condition of miserable dependence on Europe, the treaty of Adri- anople regulated anew another portion of the Turk- ish territory. For, by its provisions, Moldavia and Wallachia were elevated into a quasi independence placed under the immediate influence of Kussia, and 2* 18 AN AMERICAN VIEW diplomatized into a position whence they must either degenerate into mere Russian provinces, or develope into the proportions of a new and independent Christian State. Of conrse, such a sohition of these partial questions brought on worse complication. — The utter weakness of Turkey, ascertained by Europe, was soon made manifest in its own provinces. Me- hemed Ali, the Pacha of Egypt, who had rendered great services to the Sultan during the Greek insur- rection, was rewarded by the further addition to his Government, of the island of Candia. Wiser and stronger than his master, he too resolved on inde- pendence. A series of victories rapidly and bril- liantly achieved, alarmed the great powers of Europe, and the whole machinery of European di- plomacy was brought to bear on the Turkish ques- tion. The protracted and irritating conferences of the European powers on the Eastern question as it was then called, proved only too clearly the utter and insincere selfishness of their whole policy so far as any interest of Turkey was concerned, and demon- strated that though Russia might be as selfish as the rest, her policy was guided by an ability, reticence, and calm assured strength that could not finally fail in its ultimate objects. Let us examine these dis- cussions more closely. Mehemet Ali, imder the pretence of subduing some rebellious Pachas, over-ran Syria, and, backed by a victorious army, made his demands upon the Sultan. They were refused. He crossed the Syrian fi'ontier, defeated the Turkish army, and turned his conquering columns towards Constantinople. Terri- / OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 19 fiecl at the prospect, tlie Sultan Malimovid aj)pealed to Enssia for aid. It was promptly rendered, and on 20tli February, 1833, the Russian fleet, sailing from Sebastopol, anchored at the mouth of the Bosphorus. At this crisis the French Ambassador arrived, and uneasy at the prospective results of such aid, insisted that the Russian fleet should retire. It did so ; and France applied directly to Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet, and then in command of the Egyptian army, for a suspension of arms. It was granted, and negotiations followed. They were unsuccessful, and the army resumed its hostile march. Again Russian aid was invoked. The fleet again entered the Bosphorus, and fifteen thousand Russian soldiers disembarked at Scutari and took position between the Bosphorus and the Egyptian army. Alarmed, however, almost as much at the probable consequences of Russian help as at the ap- proach of his revolted subject, to avoid the one, the Sultan came to terms with the other, and granted in full the demands of Mehemet Ali. The Egyptian army commenced its retreat in one direction, and Turkey's dangerous ally withdrew in the other. But the services rendered so promptly by Russia's ad- vance, and the still greater service by her prompt retreat, disposed the Sultan favorably to the diplo- matic proposals of Russia ; and the treaty of Unkiar- Skelessi was the consequence. By this treaty Russia bound herself to defend Turkey against all enemies civil or foreign, and Turkey closed the Dardanelles to the armed vessels of all other foreign powers. — The immense advantage to Russia of such a treaty, ^0 AN a:merican view need not be 23ointed out. Meliemet Ali was not sat- isfied. He demanded the hereditary government of his provinces ; for he was ambitions of becoming an indejDendent prince. War was again imminent. — The great j^owers discouraged his ambition, but he persevered. The famous battle of Nezib terminated in the complete defeat of the Turkish army, the old Sultan died, and the Turkish Admiral by an act of unparalleled treachery, delivered the whole Ottoman fleet into the hands of the rebel Pacha at Alexan- dria. The fate of the Turkish Empire seemed rapid- ly approaching its crisis. But on the 23d July, 1839, a French messenger having again induced the victo- rious Ibrahim to pause, the representatives of the S.ye great powers, Russia, England, France, Austria, and Prussia, addressed the following note to the new Sultan Abduel Medjid : "The five ambassadors un- dersigned, in conformity with their instructions re- ceived yesterday from their respective courts, con- gratulate themselves on having to announce to the ministers of the Sublime Porte, that the agreement between the five powers touching the Eastern ques- tion is certain. And they entreat the Sublime Porte, in waiting for the fruits of their friendly disposition, (leurs dispositions bienveillantes) not to decide abso- lutely on the said question in a definite manner without their concurrence (leur concours)." Here, surely, one would think was a case in which, if the interests of Turkey Avere the object, the action of the mediators would have been prompt and unanimous. What was the fact ? From July, 1838, when the note was sent, to July, 1841, when they agreed upon a OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 21 joint treaty, these great powers consumed their time in perpetual disputes and diplomatic intrigue. They could not agree on a policy to be executed, nor upon a plan of execution. A conference called to give peace to the East, came near embroiling all Europe in war. France, who most eagerly com- menced the pacification, was diplomatized out of all participation in the concluding treaty ; and the Eastern question was finally settled, more by the rough and ready responsibility of Sir Charles ISTapier, than by the subtle dexterity of the ambassadors at London. For when, after the acceptance of their ofier, the representatives of the Five Powers met, the Turkish Secretary of State exposed the weakness of the Em- pire ; declared that they looked to Europe for their salvation, and tlianking the Powers for their friendly intervention, submitted, as the first of his demands, that Syria should be restored to the Sultan ; and very naturally. England and Austria sustained the de- mand. Russia and France opposed it. Tliey de- manded that Egypt and the Syrian Pachaliks should be OTven to Mehemet, with an hereditarv title. Prus- sia sided with England and France. Tliese confer- ences were finally adjourned to London, and the Four Powers combined against France. Russia did not wish to weaken Turkey too far at that time ; for Eu- rope was not ready for the partition. England not only did not wish to weaken Turkey as against Russia, but she was vehemently opposed to the growth of Mehemet All's power in Egypt. France, on the contrary, was anxious to make Mehemet Ali 22 AN AMERIC^VN VIEW an independent prince with Egypt and Syria, per- haps, because it reduced English influence in the Mediterranean, and on the India over-land route. Li this, Kussia at first agreed with her, but finding it easier to manage the English Cabinet than to oppose it, adopted English policy, and used it for her own purposes. Austria and Prussia acted on reasons it is not worth while to examine. Finding France steady in her purpose towards Mehemet Ali, the Czar, through Baron Brunow, induced England, b}^ some concessions of the advantages obtained under the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, to exclude France from any further deliberation, and with herself, Austria and Prussia, to sign a treaty which would terminate the question. Tlie treaty was signed. France was indignant, but submitted, and after some belligerent manifestations, acquiesced. Sir Charles ^N^apier de- feated the Egyptians on the shores of Syria, and upon the taking of St. Juan d'Acre, Mehemet Ali con- sented to the terms of the Sultan, by which he re- mained hereditary Pacha of Egypt ; and thus ano- ther practical dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was effected. Thus, by 1842, in the name of the integrity of the Turkish Emj)ire, Greece had been created an independent kingdom, Servia and Walla- chia in a large degree enfranchised, and Egypt con- verted into an hereditary pachalik only nominally dependent on the Porte. And all this was done with the unanimous consent of the Euro]3ean Pow- ers, acting in difierent directions, and in furtherance of divergent interests. Whatever of Turkey was left, was left only because the Great Powers could OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 23 not agree how it was to be divided. At this i3eriod then, it may be considered that the gradual extinc- tion and absorption of Turkey, was a leading idea of European diplomacy. We are not discussing, and do not intend to discuss, the moral value of such a principle. We are simply reviewing the facts of the diplomatic history of that day. France had Algiers ; English influence was dominant in Syria and Egypt ; Greece was a constant protest "against Turkish rule over Christian subjects ; and the Slave provinces of Turkey were open to and prepared for Russian in- terference. Turkey herself was prostrate after more than ten years of constant warfare,|^and as constant defeat. In this condition of aifairs, with a j)i*iiici- ple so obvious, and a policy so tempting, the Czar thought it wisest to prepare for the future — to avoid, if possible, the disturbance of Europe by any sudden and rude collision in the East, of interests which had by this time taken almost a traditional character. As his late experience had proved that Russia and England could control the Eastern question, to Eng- land he applied for counsel. And here we reach at last the famous memorandum of 1844. In analyzing this memorandum, and the correspondence on the questions arising in 1852 and '53, we certainly shall not follow the order of their publication, but their actual chronology. For Part v. of the Parliamen- tary documents, is really Part i. of the correspond- ence, and the English cabinet and press have derived no little advantage in their argument by this tem- porary suppression of the earlier papers. In 1844, soon after the termination of the Egyp- 24 AN AMERICAN VIEW tian and Syrian difSculties, while the perplexities of that question were fresh in the memories of the Powers of Europe, the Czar visited England. Du- ring that visit, he had full and frank explanations with tlie ministry, as to the probable future of Turkey, and the proper policy in that regard, of the two Powers. The result of these conferences was summed up in a memorandum, and this memoran- dum, the Earl of Aberdeen stated in his speech of March 31, was sanctioned and approved by himself, the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. Tlie memorandum recites the anxiety of both powers for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, states the diffi- culties which are most probable in the internal ad- ministration of Turkey, recommends a conciliatory but firm course of conduct on the part of the Euro- pean powers, which would keep Turkey true to all lier engagements, and then proceeds in the following- distinct language : "However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that Empire con- tains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall without its being in the power of the friendly cabinets to prevent it. As it is not given to human foresight to settle before-hand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would lye premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realized. " In the uncertainty which hangs over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application; it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 25 mucli diminisliecl, if in tlie event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common. — Tliat understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the af- fairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conserva- tism and of peace. " In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to be desired, but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view. The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple. "On land Russia exercises in regard to Turkey, a preponderant action. " On sea England occupies the same position. Iso- lated, the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit: and hence the advantage of coming to a previous understanding, before having recourse to action. This motion was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. Tlie result was the eventual engagement, that if anything un- foreseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common. Tlie object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding, may be expressed in the following manner : "1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Otto- 3 26 AN AMEKICAN VIEW man Empire in its present state, so long as that polit- ical combination shall be possible. " 2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to every thing relating to the establishment of a new order of things, in- tended to replace that which now exists ; and in con- junction with each other, to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of )'y the Empire, shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own States, and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the main- tenance of the balance of power in Europe. " For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg!!, London and Yienna. " Conflict between the great powers being thus ob- viated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest if the case occurs; that as the Emperor agreed with her Brittanic Majesty's ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves, must be directed." Blue Book, Part vi., p.p. 3. 4: We honestly think, that in view of the past, the Earl OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 27 of Aberdeen was warranted in saying : that supposing tlie Emperor right in his apprehension of the dissohi- tion of Turkey, he saw "but that which is wise and moderate, and judicious in the memorandum." And when, in 1852, the difficulties arose concerning the Holy Places, the Czar, in perfect faith with this agree- ment, directly approached the British Government, and-aiiited the joint consultation thus provided for ten i^^w/ years before. And it must be recollected, at the outset of this examination, that Russia did not pro- voke this crisis. For Lord John Russell on 28th January, 1853, and after he had received the first secret dispatch from Sir Hamilton Seymour, detailing the commencement of the Emperor's confidential conversations, which reached him on the 23d of the same month, says to Lord Cowley, the British min- ister in Paris — "In the first place. Her Majesty's desire is, to abstain altogether from giving any opinion on the merits of the question. Treaties, Conventions and Firmans, are quoted with equal confidence on both sides. But Her Majesty's Gov- ernment cannot avoid perceiving that the Ambassa- dor of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the status quo in which the matter rested. — Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Church- es were not very active, but that without some po- litical action on the part of France, those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of the friendly powers. " In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force and to tlireaten the intervention of 28 AN AMERICAN VIEW a French fleet, to enforce the demands of his coun- try." Bhie Books, Part i., p. 67. It is imjDossible of course to enter at large into the technical perplexities of such questions, as to whether the key of the Church at Bethlehem should be en- trusted to the Latin Bishop, or to the Greek Patri- arch. But this much is clear to all, that as Turkey holds her place in the political world, only by the mutual sufferance of the European powers, the prac- tical question with them is, as to balance of their respective influence with the Sublime Porte ; and as the influences of Russia and France are represented through the privileges of the Greeks and Latins, of whom they are the representatives, questions of ap- parent insignificance assume importance, as indi- cating the real power of these several courts. jN^ow, it appears that in 1852, the French Government was not satisfied with the status quo of these two parties, and made certain demands in favor of the Latins upon the Porte. Russia considered these demands as inadmissible. The Porte fearful of oflending either, hesitated and prevaricated with both. France and Russia both grew angry. France threatened force, and Russia prepared to use it. Tlie Czar be- lieving that he saw danger of a rupture, the conse- quences of which might extend further than the abstract value of the questions indicated, thought that the case provided for in the memorandum, had occurred, and through Sir Hamilton Seymour opened the consultation to which England and him- self were pledged. Tlie first secret dispatch of Sir Hamilton Seymour is dated 11th January, 1853, and OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 29 the question of the Holy Places assumed its very- grave character towards the close of 1852, at which time Kussia had evidently begun to make prepara- tions for hostilities. Upon the appreciation of these confidential disclosures will depend the character of Rusia's conduct ; for her intentions, as manifested in them, will give color to her after proceedings. They require, therefore, a careful analysis. These conver- sations was of course oj^ened by the Czar, and on his part were directed to three points. First — ^the ex- pression of his strong desire, that in any future policy towards Turkey, himself and the English Government should be in perfect accord. Second — the declaration of his belief that the condition of the Turkish Empire was such, that at any moment, a revolution of the Christians, or a complicated dispute between any of the leading powers of Europe on a Turkish question, would lead to sudden collapse of the Ottoman Empire. And third — an invitation to the English Government to discuss fully and frankly the consequences of such an occurrence, in order to come to some general principles which should regu- late their action. And referring to one point of special importance, he said: '^ Frankly then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly : for my part I am equally disposed to take the en- gagement, not to establish myself there, as proprie- tor, that is to say ; for as occiq^ier, I do not say : it tnight happen that circumstances^ if no previous 3* 30 AN AMERICAN VIEW provision were made, if every thing should he left to chance^ might place me in the jmsitioji of occupy- ing Constanti7iople.^^^ Sir Hamilton Seymour sums up the value of these conversations fairly, when he says : " With regard to the extremely important over- ture to which this report relates, I will only observe, that as it is my duty to record impressions, as well as facts and statements; I am bound to say, that if words, tone and manner oifer any criterion, by which, intentions are to be judged, the Emperor is prepared to act with perfect fairness and openess to- wards Her Maj esty 's Government. His Maj esty has, no doubt, his own objects in view; and he is, in my opinion, too strong a believer in the imminence of dangers in Turkey. I am, however, impressed with the belief, that in carrying out those objects, and in guarding against those dangers. His Majesty is sin- cerely desirous of acting in harmony with Her Ma- jesty's Government. I would now submit to your lordship, that this overture cannot with })ropriety pass unnoticed by Her Majesty's Government. It has been on a first occasion glanced at, and on a second distinctly, made by the Emperor himself to the Queen's minister at his court, whilst the conver- sation held some years ago with the Duke of "Wel- lington, proves that the object in view, is one which has long occupied the thoughts of his ImjDerial Ma- jesty. If then, the proposal were to remain unan- swered, a decided advantage would be secured to the Imperial Cabinet, which, in the event of some great *Blue Books, Part vi., p. 4. OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 31 catastroi)lie taking place in Turkey, would be able to point to proposals made to England, and wliicli not liaving been responded to, left the Empero?^ at liberty J or placed him under the necessity of folloiv- ing his own line of policy in the East. " Again I would remark, that the anxiety expressed by tlie Emperor, even looking to liis own interests for an extension of the days 'of the dying man,' ap- pears to me to jnstify Her Majesty's Government in proposing to His Imperial Majesty, to imite with England in the adoption of such measures as may lead to prop up the failing authority of the Sultan. Lastly, I would observe that even if the Emperor should be found disinclined to lend himself to such a course of policy as might arrest the downfall of Turkey, his declarations to me pledge him to be ready to take before-hand, in concert with Her Ma- jesty's Government, such precautions as may possibly prevent the fatal crisis being followed by a scramble, for the rich inheritance which would remain to be disposed of " A noble triumph would be obtained by the civili- zation of the nineteenth century, if the void left by the extinction of Mahommedan rule in Europe could be filled up, without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments, the most interested in the destinies of Turkey."''^ To this dispatch. Lord John Kussel replied on the 9th February, 1853. He was " happy to acknow- ledge the moderation, the frankness, and the friend- *Blue Books, Part vi., p. 5, 6. AN AMERICAN VIEW ly disposition of His Imperial Majesty ;" and repeats distinctly and fairly the point of the Imperial com- munication. "The question raised by His Imperial Majesty is a very serious one. It is supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire to be probable, or even imminent ; whether it is not better to be provided before-hand for a contingency, than to in<3ur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of an European war ; all of which must attend the catastrophe, if it should occur unexpectedly and before some ulterior system has been sketched :" And this "ulterior system" he declines to join in sketch- ing, for the reasons he gives, viz: 1. Because "no actual crisis has occurred, which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem." 2. The impossibility of making any arrangement without the participation of the other leading European pow- ers. 3. Because any such arrangement would only hasten the catastrophe it was intended to avoid. And he concludes by stating "that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Euro|)e, than that which His Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous Sovereigns, Avho have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory." After this dispatch, the conversations were still conducted through Sir Hamilton Seymour, and the Czar opened himself more fully. " I wdll not" said he "tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Kussians : having said this, I will say, that it never shall be held by the English or French, or any other OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 33 great nation. Again — I never will permit an at- tempt at the re-construction of a Byrantine Empire, or sncli an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful State — still less would I permit the breaking up of Turkey Into little republics ; asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolution- ists of Europe ; rather than submit to any of these arrangements, I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on." "^ * "^ "^ " The Emperor went on to say, that in the event of the dissolution of the Otto- man Emj^ire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than Avas commonly believed. The Principalities are, he said, in fact an independent State under my protec- tion — this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of Government. So again with Bul- garia — there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State. As to Egypt — I quite imderstand the importance to Eng- land, of that territory. I can then only say, that if in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succes- sion upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia — that Island might suit you ; and I do not know why it should not become an English possession. As I did not wish that the Emperor should imagine that an English public servant was caught by this sort of overture, I simply answered that I had always un- derstood that the English views upon Egypt, did not go beyond the j)oint of securing a safe and ready 34: AJST a:merican view communication between British India and the mother country." Li fact, the summing of this whole very remarkable series of conversations, may be accurate- ly stated on the part of Eussia, in the language of the memorandum furnished ^ir Hamilton Seymour by Count E"esselrode, February 12, 1853 ; and, on the part of England, in the language of the dispatch of Lord Clarendon to the same ambassador, on March 23, 1853. The memorandum concludes : "In short, the Em- peror cannot but congratulate himself at having given occasion for this intimate interchange of confi- dential communications between Her Majesty and himself. He has found therein value assurances, of which he takes note with lively satisfaction. Tlie two Sovereigns have frankly explained to each other what, in the extreme case of which, they have been treating of their respective interests cannot endure. England understands that Russia camiot suffer the establishment at Constantinople of a Christian power sufficiently strong to control and disquiet her. She declares that for herself, she renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople. Tlie Emperor equally disclaims any wish or design of establishing himself there. England promises that she will enter into no arrangements for determining the measures to be taken, in the event of the fall of the Turkish Empire, without a previous understanding with the Emperor. The Emperor on his side willingly con- tracts the same engagement ; as he is aware, that in such a case, he can equally reckon upon Austria who is bound by her promises to concert with him, he OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 35 regards with less apprehension the catastroj)he which he still desires to prevent and avert, as much as it shall depend on him to do so." Lord Clarendon's dispatch says : " Her Majesty's Government have accordingly learnt, with sincere satisfaction, that the Emperor considers himself even more interested than England, in preventing a Turk- ish catastrophe : because they are persuaded, that His Imperial Majesty towards Turkey will mainly depend the hastening or indefinite postponement, of an event which every power in Europe is concerned in averting. Her Majesty's Government are con- vinced that nothing is more calculated to precipitate that event, than the constant prediction of its being near at hand ; that nothing can be more fatal to the vitality of Turkey, than the assumption of its rapid and inevitable decay ; and that if the opinion of the Emperor, that the days of the'Turkish Empire were numbered became notorious, its downfall must occur even sooner than His Imperial Majesty appears now to expect. "But on the supposition, that from unavoidable causes the catastrophe did take place. Her Majesty's Government entirely share the opinion of the Em- peror; that the occupation of Constantinople by either of the great powers, would be incompatible w^ith the present balance of power and the mainte- nance of peace in Europe, and must at once be re- garded as impossible ; that there are no elements for the re-construction of a Byrantine Empire, that the systematic misgovernment of Greece offers no en- couragement to extend its territorial dominion ; and 36 AN A^IERICAN VIEW that as there are no materials for provincial or com- munal government, anarchy would be the result of leaving the provinces of Turkey to themselves, or permitting them to form separate republic." The dispatch considers "that the simple pre-determina- tion of what shall not be tolerated, does little towards solving the real difficulties, or settling in what man- ner it would be practicable, or even desirable to deal with, the heterogeneous materials of which the Turk- ish Empire is composed ;" and his Lordship declares that " England desires no territorial aggrandisement, and could be no party to a previous arrangement from which she was to derive any such benefit. — England could be no party to any understanding how- ever general, that was to be kept secret from other powers." At the close then of these conversations, that is, about the time of Prince MenschikoflPs mis- sion, the history of Europe since 1815, and the di- plomatic papers exchanged between Russia and England, had established three facts. 1. Tliat since the Congress of Vienna, a steady and gradual dis- memberment of the Turkish Empire had been effect- ed by the joint action of the great powers. 2. That Russia and England distinctly recognizes as one of the probable eventualities of European politics the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and pledged themselves to a joint consultation, with a view to joint action in such an emergency. 3. Tliat the English Ministry (see the dispatch of Lord John Russell already quoted) acknowledged the existence of a critical and complicated state of affairs in Tiirkey, threatening the mutual relations of the OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 37 great j^owers, and brought on by the rash action of the French Government. And it must also be borne in mind that Lord Clarendon had expressly stated, that " if the opinion of the Emperor, that the days of the Turkish Empire were numbered, became notorious, its downfall must occur even sooner than His Imperial Maj esty appears now to expect." E'ow, this opinion the Czar did hold and did express ; so that, according to the principles laid down by the British Government itself, the contemplated crisis was at hand. Tlie justice of Russia's position at this moment depends upon two questions. 1. Whether Russia had in good faith carried out the agreement contained in the memorandum of 1844, by which she bound herself to consult with England in case of certain eventualities. 2. And whetlier the prin- ciples upon which she proposed an agreement were fair and honest, Tlie first question has already been answered in the dispatch of Sir Hamilton Seymour first quoted, from the highest authority, and in the most unequivocal manner. To the second then, let us address ourselves. It has been urged that the dishonesty of these overtures is evident from the de- liberate exclusion of the other great powers. Eng- land herself furnishes a complete reply to this charge, both in words and deeds. For in 1841, in arrangi^jg the Eastern question of that day, she acted heartily with Russia, not in excluding France from informal deliberations, but in fraudulently shutting France out from participation in a treaty, to the pre- liminary steps of which France had been a constant and deeply interested party ; and this she did under k 38 AN AMERICAN VIEW the influence of Russian diplomacy, and very nearly at the expense of the peace of Europe. And in the memorandum of 1844, approved, it must be remem- bered, by "Wellington, Peel and Aberdeen, she entered into a distinct agreement with Russia, on the ground that Russia and herself were all-powerful in the East, to discuss their future policy together, and has put upon that record the emphatic declaration — "If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them (i. e., Russia and Austria,) it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon be- tween St. Petersburg, London and Yienna." We need scarcely say, that at that time Yienna and St. Petersburg!! were so identical, that the former might have been stricken out of the sentence without weak- ening its force — and that Prussia was not even re- ferred to by either of the contracting parties. If France, then, was excluded from the discussion, the memorandum of 1844 had worked the exclusion. It is next declared that the proposals of the Czar amount to an iniquitous proposition to partition the territory of an independent and allied power in a time of profound peace, and w^ithout suJfficient pro- vocation. Now we might well remark, that this moral sensibility would have exerted a better influ- ence if a little sooner manifested ; and that after the independence of Greece, Egypt, and the provinces, its sudden exhibition may be the miraculous cure of a moral paralysis that seemed almost hopeless with the great powers ; but it may also be the hypocritical indignation of a very selfish virtue. But the truth OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 39 is, Turkey is not an independent poAver, and is only so far an allied one, that the great powers in their own interest have combined to preserve it, nntil they can agree npon the distribution of its territory. The Turks have no part in Europe ; they share neither its civilization, its interests, nor its policy ; and if we are to look for the criminal selfishness of European poli- tics, it will be found in the miserable cant of "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." The great pow- ers of Europe have stood like an armed police on the borders of this country, to prevent the natural and necessary development of its Christian popula- tion ; and they have combined in fear, not of Turkey, but of an independent Christian power which should re-assume the Byzantine diadem. Eussia and Eng- land both agree in this wish, hoAvever this material diiference. Russia is willing to create a set of inde- pendent provinces under her protectorate. England prefers the preservation of Turkish rule over the same provinces. Tlie history of Europe and the di- plomatic language of each of the great powxrs, prove that the final extinction of Turkish rule is considered one of the established facts of European policy ; and even now, while France and England take arms to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, they call for concessions which amomit almost to a national conversion, which must end in revolution, and either leave Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Latins, to tear each other to pieces, with all the fervor of religious zeal, and the intensity of civil hatred, or call the allied powers in to measure out the territory, and re-adjust the authority of an Empire without 40 AN AIMEKIC^VN VIEW subjects, and a j^eople witliout a country : for we are told, on liigli authority, that even now the highest am- bition of a Christian rajah, is to become the subject of a foreign power. To talk about Turkey as an inde- pendent power, having a recognized place in the Eu- ropean system like Austria or Prussia, or even like Belgium or Switzerland, is to use language contra- dicted by every fact of European history, and every sentence in the Eastern dispatches of European diplo- macy. Tlie extinction of Turkey as the land of Otto- man rule, is simply a matter of time. Eussia and England, France, Austria and Prussia, have long since resolved upon its consummation. And England, even that England, who, in the language of Lord Clarendon, "desires no territorial aggrandizement, and could be no party to a previous arrangement from which she was to derive any such benefit," will not come out of this war victorious, as she has never come out of any other, without " dividing the prey." And we honestly believe that both she and they are right ; that no principle of justice, no interest of civ- ilization calls for the preservation of Turkey. The Turks came with the sword, let them go by the sword ; wherever they spread, cruelty camped under their tents, and desolation was the shadow of their bamiers. In the annals of their barren and bloody history, we can find nothing that they have j)i*e- served — nothing that they have achieved. Ferocious in their strength, and false in their weakness, tyran- ny and treachery make the antithesis of their chron- icles. Like the repulsive creations of their own fic- tion, the vampire and the ghoul, they have sucked OF TIIE EASTERN QUESTION. 41 the substance of the fairest portions of the world to prolong a monstrous and abhorred life, and feasted among the tombs of ancient and renowned nations. And when they shall have been expelled from the soil they desolate, and from among the people they oppress, history will only have recorded another ex- ample of God's retributive justice. It is, however, when that destruction shall be accomplished, that the true policy of Europe will show itself, and the world will learn whether the great powers would govern in a spirit of wise and honest statesmanship, or short- sighted and greedy selfishness. Tlie dissolution of the Turkish Empire, therefore, is not the crime of Eussia ; but the use which she proposes to make of that event, must determine the moral character of her policy. What, then, is the nature of her propo- sals ? And it must not be forgotten that conversa- tions contain no distinct propositions ; they include and were intended to convey only an exchange of opinions as the basis of future agreement. Were they just towards the various people who have hith- erto lived subject to Turkish rule, and were they in harmony with that principle of European policy, which forbids the sudden and disproportionate growth of any one of its leading powders ? Tlie idea suggested by Russia in these conversations was, that in case of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, as neither England nor herself could hold Constantino- ple, the Christian population of Turkey with the Slave provinces should be formed into independent governments under a Russian protectorate, wliile Egypt and Candia should become English provinces. 42 AN AMERICAN VIEW As far as the Christian population of Turkey is con- cerned, such an arrangement would be a great gain. They would at once be delivered from the degrading tyranny of Turkish rule ; and although still governed to a great degree by a foreign will, they would be govered in sympathy with their faith and habits, and in view of their own interest. For it is clear, that the interest of Eussia w^ould be to develope the commercial and agricultural resources of these coun- tries to their fullest extent ; and the use which Russia has already in her history made of her gigantic power in promoting art, commerce and industry, is a sufficient guarantee of the future. It is admitted on all sides, that the elements of a new Byzantine Empire do not at present exist. What better, then, could happen to the Slave provinces of Turkey, than the quasi independence of a Russian protectorate ? Under such protection they would either become gradually integral parts of the Russian Empire, or they would form by consolidation among themselves a new kingdom, with its capital at Constantinople. Which of these results would occur would depend upon the interests of the Slave population them- selves. In the meantime, Russia is specially adapted for their guardianship. It would be Russian inter- est to develope their resources, and to perfect their military strength and commercial capabilities. Tliey would preserve under Russian rule more of their native habits and peculiar institutions, than under any other power ; for Russia is, in fact, a vast con- federacy of differing nationalities. It has been very justly and very well said, that ''Ruling over eighty OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 43 different nations or tribes, the autocrat of all tlie Kiissias claims tlie allegiance of people of every va- riety of race, tongue and religion. Were it possible to transport to one common centre of liis Empire the gay oj)era lounger of St. Petersburgh, habited in the Parisian mode ; the fierce Bashkir of the Ural moun- tains, clad in rude armor, and armed with bow and arrows ; the Armenian, with his camel from the Southern steppes ; and the Esquimaux, who traverses with his dogs the frozen regions of the JSTorth ; these fellow subjects of one potentate would encounter each other with all the surprise and ignorance of in- dividuals meeting from England, China, Peru, and 'New Holland ; nor would the time or expense in- curred in the journey be greater in the latter than in the former interview." JSTow Russia, on this vast and varied field of labor, with what was originally a barbarous aristocracy, and a brutal serfage, has achieved miracles ; she has built splendid cities, created a wide and rich commerce, nourished great statesmen, and given birth to renowned warriors; she has improved the manners, increased the com- forts, and as far as possible ameliorated the condition of her people ; and in doing all this, while she has of necessity centralized to an almost incredible degree the power by which she acts, she has not destroyed these j)eculiar habits, nor obliterated the native na- tionality of any one of her component people. The Slave provinces of Turkey, are not, it is ad- mitted, ready for independence — they cannot yet consolidate into one free, firm government. What 44 AN AMERICAN VIEW better condition, then, conlcl be found than a quasi independence under the protection of Turkey, which woukl enable them in the pursuit of their own inter- ests to develope either into Eussian provinces, or into the centre of a new European State as the wants of the future may require? We cannot reahze, w^e must confess, the existence of one Empire with two capitals, like St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, and would consider even the unmodified absorption of Turkey into Russia but as one stage in that constant process of growth and dissolution, which has marked the history of all the great Empires of the world. But wdiether Russia is destined to absorb Turkey, and to become the vast Empire that terrifies European di- plomacy, or whether she is destined to divide into two great kingdoms in the East of Europe, we can- not feel a doubt that, as far as the interests of the Christian population of Turkey is concerned, the change from the rule of the Sultan to the dominion of the Czar, is to them a change for a better, freer and higher political life. It must be noticed also, that wdiile the Czar claims the gradual incorporation of those populations between whom and himself there exists the sympathy of race and faith, he is willing to relinquish the sovereignty of Egypt to England. He recognizes the truth of that principle, by which England has conquered India — the domi- nation of the Anglo-Saxon race in its contact with the inferior nature of the Asiatic people. Wherever the English settler lands, he conquers — he never incorporates, he subjects. E'ow the Turkish OF TIIE EASTERN QUESTON. 4:5 possessions cover two classes. 1. The Cliristian popu- lation of Turkey in Enrope, avIio have in themselves the elements of life, activity, and prosperity : These, the Czar says, mnst be incorporated into an Empire mi~ derstanding, and sharing their sympathies. 2. The Mahometan populations of Asia and Egypt : These have no vitality drawn from the past, no progress to be hoped for the future: they must be the subjects of Christian civilization ; and he accordingly delivers them to the great Colonial nation of the world, whose commerce will renew, whose colonial genius will govern, and whose maritime power will protect, the trade, life and territory, of these conquered coun- tries, until they shall have been re-created by Eng- lish capital and enterprise for a newer and more vig- orous life. If, then, this scheme was just, as concerned the Christian provinces of Turkey, was it a fair pro- position, in reference to the balance of power? — Taking for granted the principles of this very inde- finite system called the balance of power, we might fairly object to the theory of that system which con- founds the balance of European power with the balance of the world. England herself, by the vast extension of her colonial Empire, an expansion which, taken together with her maritime force, is equivalent to the territorial increase of any other nation of the w^orld, has disturbed the old balance, and by extend- ing herself in all parts of the globe, has brought all parts of the globe into the relations of this system. Having done so, she must adjust the balance on a new and larger scale. But we do not intend now to dwell on that point of view. We assume the Euro- 46 AN AMERICAN VIEW pean stand-point, and wonld remark, first, that the balance of power is a defensive system ; not to pre- vent change, "but to forbid oppression. Tlie gradual, natural growth of any one nation, is not in violation of its principles, be the degree of power to which it attains ever so exaggerated, as is proved by the his- tory of England herself. England came out of the wars of 1815 with immensely increased strength ; both military and moral. She naturally, necessarily, without fraud or force, developed her commercial capabilities, and her colonial Empire, until she has become the greatest nation that history has recorded. This progress was owing, not only to her wealth, in- tellect, and enterprise, but to the exemption from the desolation of war, wdthin her own borders, which had ravaged the continent from Moscow to Madrid, con- suming its wealth, palsying its energy, and shutting out all field for the exertions of iDeaceful and in- dustrial genius. With such a start, England has distanced Europe, and her power has grown with her prosperity, and on account of her prosperity. But a half-century of peace has been rapidly improved by all the relations of Europe ; and at their head stands Russia, who has developed her energies with gigantic efibrts. Tlie natural result is, that as Europe approximates to the prosperity of England, the power of Europe and England becomes more equally balanced, and the very same principles which, in their successful working from 1815 on, have made England the great power of the world, are in their extension bringing other powers more nearly to an equality. ISTow any change thus effected, is a legiti- OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 47 mate and natural variation of the balance to be cor- rected, or confirmed by the progress of time ; and any change in the relative power of England spring- ing from the gradual increase of any other national prosperity, is just and proper. And it seems to us, that it cannot be denied that some such process has been at work in Euroj)e, and that English influence, which has been dominant for the last half-century, is about to be naturally and necessarily modified. Tlie increase, then, of Eussian influence, is not of itself a proof that the balance of power has been irregular- ly disturbed. The question should be — does the action of Russia threaten to subordinate the power of England, so as to neutralize or to destroy a neces- sary element in that balance? not whether the power of England is diminished — for the balance itself may call for such diminution — Ijut whether any power is to be strengthened into an autocracy ? Now the Russian scheme, if it increased the power of Russia, did not certainly diminish the power of England. — For even if it be granted that Russia would possess Constantinople, its natural power as the mistress of such a situation would be materially modified, by the neighborhood of England's great maritime power at Alexandria. And if Candia be added to Malta, Corfu and Gibralter, she would indeed be ruler of the Mediterranean. As far, therefore, as the relative proportion of Russian and English j)ower would af- fect the general balance, it must be admitted that the proposed scheme preserved the old proportions in its development. We think, then, that at the close of the conversations between the Czar and the 48 A^ AMERICAN VIEW British ambassador, Russia liad fulfilled all lier obli- gations to England, frankly and faitlifully. A case bad arisen which, in the oj)inion of the Russian Em- peror, met the provisions of the memorandum of 1844. The crisis had, according to Lord John Rus- sell, been unprovoked by Russia, and forced on France — it had assumed a very grave character. The Emperor called upon England for consultation and advice. He stated his opinions frankly, and without asking for any action which should initiate the de- struction of the Ottoman Empire ; he simply suggest- ed the basis of a future understanding ; and the lead- ing ideas of his scheme, as w^e have shown, combined justice to the constituent elements of the Turkish Empire, with due regard to the preservation of Eu- ropean balance. England declined the responsibility of concerted action, and thus afforded the Czar the advantage pointed out by the British minister ; and in his own words, which will form the verdict of his- tory, " left the Emiyeror at liberty^ or placed him under the necessity of follounng his oion line of policy in the EastP And we insist the more strenuously upon this view, "because from this stand-point only can we perceive the full character and consequence of Prince Men- schikoff's mission. For upon this Turkish question Russia was forced to act either in concert with Eng- land, or alone. Tlie concert whicli she sought was refused, and her own independent action v/as the only course left open. What influence, then, had Europe a right to exercise upon the relations of Turkey and Russia ? and what restraint had Europe OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 49 a right to put upon Russian policy ? And here again we must repeat, that the whole policy of Europe in the East, has been based upon two principles. 1. The final extinction of the Ottoman Empire — and 2, the presence of a certain degree of Russian influence over the Slave provinces of Turkey, as one of the elements to govern the future distribution of Turkish territory. Tlie conversations and private correspond- ence between Russia and England began in January, and may be considered as terminated in April, 1853. Prince Menschikoff received orders in February to prepare for his immediate departure to Constantino- ple. And towards the close of May, having failed in his mission, he withdrew fi'om Constantinople. Wliat difference was there between the Russian represen- tation of his mission and its reality ? Prince Men- schikoif 's mission ran parallel in point of time with the confidential communications to which we have already referred ; and the correspondence in relation to it establishes two points : 1. That in the settle- ment of the Holy Places, while the Emperor de- clared that he would not require the withdrawal of any advantages gained by the French court, he dis- tinctly announced that his leading object would be to obtain an equwalent for any such concessions — and 2, that in expectation of difficulty, the Czar did openly commence military preparations to meet any such emergency. "In speaking to me yesterday," says Sir Hamilton Seymour, on February 10, 1853, "of Prince Men- schikoff 's instructions, which were again represented to be moderate in their character, the Chancellor ob- 5 60 AN AMERICAN VIEW served that there was necessarily some vagueness in his orders; as on one side it was hardly ascertained to what extent the rights secured last year to the Greeks had been infringed ; and on the other, there could be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any of the privileges which they might sub- sequently have acquired at Jerusalemx. The object to he sought for was^ therefore, cm equivalent for any jprimlege lost lyy the GreelisP Blue Books, Part i, Y9. On March 24, 1853, Lord Cowley, the British am- bassador at Paris, says, " assurances are given that there is no intention on the part of Russia to disturb any arrangement made between France and the Porte in regard to the sacred buildings ; hut it is laid down that if concessions ha/oe heen made to the Latins, a/n equivalent will he required for the Greehs. The whole tenor of the corresi3ondence shows further that the Emperor of Russia has no hostile feeling towards Turkey, and is anxious for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Blue Book, Part I, 96. And again, on March 31, the same am- bassador, repeating the substance of the French dis- patches from Constantinople, says : " He said that after the positive assurances given by the Russian Government, that there was no intention on their part to procure any retractation of the concessions made to France, the French Government were per- fectly satisfied. Tlie latter, moreover, had no pre- tension to interfere with any concessions which the Porte might think fit to accord, in compensation to the Greeks, unless the independence of Turkey should thereby be threatened, and even then it would OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 51 be a case for tlie consideration of the great powers of Europe collectively, and not of France individu- ally." Idem, p. 100, 101. That England was aware of the military prepara- tion of Russia, is evident in nearly all of the dis- patches from St. Petersburg. On April Yth, 1853, Sir Hamilton Seymour writes to the Earl of Claren- don, '' I observed that with the j)eaceful prospects which were now opening on us, I flattered myself His Excellency could now give me the assurance that military preparations were laid aside ; at all events that there was some commencement of dis- continuance of military preparation. Count Nessel- rode replied that he did not feel at liberty to give me that assurance^ but that he did not hesitate to express to me his own conviction, that the negotiation at Constantinople would be brought, and speedily, to a happy conclusion." Idem, 142. And Lord Clarendon himself, in his dispatch of May 31, to Sir Hamilton Seymour, says : " The nego- tiations at Constantinople have been supported by great demonstrations of force, and every preparation for war has been made in the Southern provinces of Russia. Great Britain has long heen a guiet specta- tor of those armaments ; but now that the relations between Russia and Turkey are broken off, it be- comes our duty to ascertain, &c., &c." Idem, 203. During the whole of the discussions, therefore, it is clear that Prince Menschikoff's mission, "support- ed by great demonstrations of force," had for its open and avowed object, the attainment of '^ an eguiva- lent " for the Greeks. What must have been included 52 AN AMERICAN VIEW in such an object? As long as the so-called integrity of tlie Ottoman Empire is presei»ved, the difficulty always must be to preserve the statics quo of the contrarient influences of the European courts in Constantinople. Upon the proper and natural balance of these influences, indeed dej^ends that in- tegrity ; and this was the principle of the treaty of 1841 — a treaty, it must be recollected, signed without the knowledge, and against the interest of France, and to which she gave, finally, a forced and sullen acquiescence. From the treaty of 1841 to 1852, the action of natural causes has modified the balance of these influences. Tlie very elements of influence recognised in that treaty, were gradually developing a modification of the relation of its parties in regard to Turkey. Between the Christian j)opulation of Turkey and Russia, the bonds of religious and politi- cal sympathy grew stronger and closer every day, and it could not be otherwise than that, in the natural course of events, Russian influence in Turkey must be predominant. This was only the necessary result of time, and the treaty of 1841. The growth, there- fore, of this Russian influence must have been antici- pated, and the memorandum of 1844 proves, was anticipated by England herself; and this State paper looks forward evidently to the action of Russia modi- fied, restrained by, and concerted with England, as the regulator of the fate of the Ottoman Emj^ire. It is admitted, as we have shewn by Lord John Russell's own language, that the status quo of European influ- ence, as represented in Constantinople by the respec- tive privileges of the Greeks and Latins, was violated OF THE EASTERN QUESTION". 53 by France, and that the French Minister had threat- ened the Snltan with the French fleet to carry his point. Here, then, was a distinct violation of the established balance against Knssia. A long contro- versy ensned, and finally the Czar declared that he wonld leave the advantages gained by the French nntonched, provided he received in turn from the Porte a guaranteed equivalent. E^ow the only dif- ference, in fact, between Count ISTesselrode's state- ment to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and Prince Menschi- koff 's demands upon the Sultan, was the guarantee of the equivalent. Count I*Tesselrode always said that an equivalent was his ultimatum. Prince Menschi- koff required the equivalent to be guaranteed by a treaty : For Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in his dis- patch of May 19, 1853, says, explicitly, "of the Porte's intended note, it is but justice to say, that it declared a readiness to concede every ^oint demanded hy Russia^ with the single exception of that form of guccrcmtee j I mean an engagement loith the force of treaty^ lohich the Porte conceives to le inconsistent with its indej^endence and sovereignty^ and which opinion is more or less entertained by every one who may be supposed to have acquired a competent knowledge of the subject. Blue Books, Part i, 205. Taking this, then, as granted, we confess we cannot see, whatever may have been the variation in the style of language used by Count ISTesselrode to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and that held by Prince Men- schikoff to the Sultan, any real and substantial differ- ence between the object of the mission, as declared at St. Petersburg, and the object as demanded at *5 54 AN AlklEEICAN VIEW Constantinople. The demand of an equivalent im- plied the guarantee of the equivalent, particularly under the circumstances. For, "it is but justice," says Lord Stratford, in his dispatch of May 22, 1853, after the departure of Prince Menschikoff from Constantinople, ''to admit that Russia had some- thing to complain of, in the affair of the holy places ; nor can it be denied that much remains to be done for the welfare and security of the Christian popula- tion in Turkey. But it is equally true, that a fair measure of reparation has been given to the Russian ambassador," &c. E'ow, on this latter point, Russia was as much authorized to judge for herself, as England was to judge for her ; and as to the great and leading objection afterwards made in the same dispatch, and in the English State papers generally, " as to the dangerous and inadmissible character of the powers which His Majesty's ambassador has sought to obtain at the Sultan's expense," we con- fess we realise the full force of Count ISTesselrode's brief but practical reply to Sir Hamilton Seymour. "I admitted," says Sir Hamilton Seymour, in the dispatch of May 27th, 1853, ''having some consid- erable time since learned from His Excellency that it was considered essential that the two firmans should be re-inforced by, or, if he pleased, embodied in a convention; but, that there was entirely new matter in the 'Projet de Traite' brought forward by Prince Menschikoff ; that there was now cjuestion of granting to the Emperor a right of protection over 10,000,000 of Greeks, which would render him more powerful in Turkev than the Sultan himself, ivMch OF THE EASTERN QUESTION". 65 icoiild make them all lookup to a foreign sovereign^ and not to their own master. Have they looked^ Count Nesselrode replied, for the last hundred years in any other direction V^ It is unnecessary to follow the course of nego- tiations from the departure of Prince MenscliikofF to tlie declaration of war, because the effort of diplomacy was then simply to relieve the parties in controversy from the consequences of the posi- tion in which they stood to each other at that point. Tliese efforts having failed, the parties stood, therefore, at their close, just where they were at its commencement. An impartial statement of the whole controversy would appear to be this : The difficulty has arisen, not from any regard to Turkey, nor from any real interest in her Christian subjects, but from the jealousy of the great powers of their respective influence, and seems to be the natural and unavoidable result of the treaty of 1841, and the condition of Turkey. By that treaty, Turkey was deprived of all real independence, her dissolu- tion rendered certain, and Constantinople made the battle-field of foreign and contending interests. In 1852, France having made certain demands by which Russia considered the equilibrium of influ- ences disturbed, the Czar finally required from Turkey a settlement of the local question in disj)ute, guaranteed by such a diplomatic transaction, whether treaty or note, as would protect the Greek Church for the futm-e ; but which in so doing, necessarily owing to the relations between Russia and the mil- 56 AN AMEKICAN VIEW lions of Greek subjects of Turkey, would give ex- tended force and increased energy to Russian influ- ence in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, sustained directly by the counsel and arms of England and France, refused to enter into any such diplomatic arrangement. Upon this refusal, Russia suspended all diplomatic relations with Turkey, and occupied the Danubian principalities. The allies of Turkey entered the Bay of Besika with their fleets, and Turkey declared war. The points which, we think, demon- strated by the corresj)ondence, are : 1. That France, in the first place, disturbed the status quo. 2. That Russia claimed what she considered an equivalent, and England and France sustained the Turkish re- fusal, on the ground that what was claimed, gave an influence to Russia so large, as to disturb the balance of European power in Turkey. 3. And that it fol- lows, from these facts, that Russia could not yield her claim, without deferring, to the joint and superior in- fluence of France and England ; and that thus any termination of the difficulty w^ould be a diminution of influence on one side or the other, and equally a disturbance of the balance which all the powers pro- fessed themselves anxious to preserve. Now, what- ever we may think of the value of the controversy between Russia and the rest of Europe, it is clear that they are all fighting their own battles; that Turkey is only what she has always been — a prize over which these powers are contending — and not an equal ally, whose interests they are protecting ; and that, be the resiilt of this war what it may, it must OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 57 end only in a change of masters — in the ntter dissohi- tion, or very serions diminution of the " integrity of the Ottoman Empire." For it has been the fortune of Turkey, in all her alliances, to illustrate the warn- ing of Prince Metternich to Mons. de Saint- Aulaire, " Prenez-y-garde cependant ; rien n'est plus utile que I'alliance de I'homme avec le cheval, mais il faut I'etre I'homme et non le cheval." Considered simply in its effects upon Turkey, this question can have no interest for the American peo- ple. But there are some points of view, in which it does assume proportions of a larger consequence : 1. If the war just commenced in Europe, should be prolonged, or widened into a general war, no result can compensate its disastrous action. If Austria and Prussia fail, finally, in devising some ground for diplomatic reconciliation, the war must become a tremendous struggle for power between Russia and England — France, in all probability, reaping the resulting benefits. For, however the other States of Europe may range themselves, these two Empires stand foremost in the contest. We con- sider them in the fullness of their strength, as both absolutely necessary to the safety and the future of Europe. We think there is, however, this difference between them : England has already touched that point beyond which any increase of her power is dangerous to the world, while Russia has not yet de- veloped the matured proportions of that influence which she can fairly use for the world's benefit. Tlie rest of Europe is in a transition state ; its principles 58 AN AMERICAN VIEW unsettled ; its populations ripe for revolution ; and its territorial limits marked for change. In that change, which is surely coming, Russia and England alone can exercise the influence of established power, and consistent principles. Widely different as are their respective forms of government, they are yet both the natural creation of their respective situations ; and their joint action, in a spirit of justice, would be powerful to shape and control the future developement of Europe. We would not have the power of England positively diminished an iota • for she has played a great and noble part in the world's history. She has been the foster-mother of commerce, and the founder of arts : nursed at her bosom, great Empires have grown into the perfected manhood of national life; and in her living language were uttered the first broken sentences of constitu- tional liberty. But England has presumed too far in her pride of j)lace. Of late, especially, she has interfered rashly, inconsequentially and wrongfully, in every quarter of the globe. Tlie centre of the world's commerce ; secure in her Island position ; fortified almost impregnably in Asia, Africa, and America ; armed with a naval power, unequalled in history, she has subjected the policy of the world to the test of her trading necessities, and has converted the business card of every itinerant bagman, who seeks orders for the hardware of Sheffield, or the dry goods of Manchester, into a proclamation of British possession. Tlie natural growth, therefore, of any counter-balancing European power, is a clear OF THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 59 gain to the world at large ; especially where such a developement neither springs from, nor necessitates a violent invasion of England's present strength. — In this light, the discomfiture of Russia, by the alli- ance of France and England, will be disastrous to Europe, and dangerous to the world — for it increases the power, and stimulates the ambitious activity of the two most restless kingdoms of Europe — ^king- doms, whose natural jealousy has hitherto served as a mutual check. Any such result must give a j)re- ponderant continental influence to France ; and should the yearning of France for the waters of the Rhine, and the passion of the revolutionary liberals undertake the re-construction of Europe, as every thing indicates they will do, England must either renew the broken covenant with Russia, or sub- mit to some re-division of Europe, in the interest of Napoleon. But passing by all such speculations, the alliance of England and France for joint action, according to Lord Clarendon, in hoth hemisjyheres^ is a baleful phenomenon in politics. It bodes no good anywhere ; but the Tripartite Convention as to Cuba, illustrates fvdly its consequences in this country. 2. It is clear, that the allied powers have gone to war, not in the maintenance of rights, or the defense of plain and direct interests, but for the preservation of their influence in the East. A glance at any map which marks the proportion between the territory of Turkey belonging to the Turks, and that occupied by her Christian populations ; the natural sympathy of race and religion, and the history of the last century, prove, beyond ca^dl, that the influence of Russia in 60 AN ameeica:^ view Turkey has grown largely, systematically and na- turally ; that it is the legitimate developement of elements, distributed there by the God of nations, himself ; and that any check upon it is the result of an artificial political system, just, only so far as it works with the natural principles of national pro- gress, and not against them. Kow, this Russian in- fluence England and France have combined to neu- tralize, and they rest their right of interference upon their relations to each other, and their guarantee of Turkish existence in 1841. Now, this is precisely the relation of England, France, and the United States, to Cuba. The natural developement of this country's influence upon Cuba must grow stronger and larger ; the Tripartite Convention rested upon the claim of equal interest, on the part of the Euro- pean powers, and would, if adopted, have placed the existence of Cuba, in its present condition, under the same sort of treaty guarantee ; and thus the very same principle which has carried the allied fleets into the w^aters of the Baltic, would have heralded their gracious presence in the Mexican gulf. While, then, the relative interests of the contending j)owers are, to the American people, of no immediate con- cern, they may very naturally feel a sympathy with any power which threatens the destruction of an alliance which has professed principles of direct in- terference with their own interests. More than this, in the present condition of the world, there are cer- tain duties which such a crisis imposes upon this Government. OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 61 1. If this war continues, Russia, England and France, have all colonial possessions on this continent. Russia's possessions, on the Pacific, are becoming every day more important ; and the relations of the European powers in the "West Indies, with the Uni- ted States, are becoming every day more threaten- ing. Standing perfectly apart from the European quarrel, has not the United States the perfect right to declare that hostilities can, under no possible cir- cumstance, be allowed to extend to this continent ; that there shall be no change of possession, among the colonial provinces of any of the contending powers ? If the papers are correct, the Government has already been notified of the presence of British vessels of war near the Pacific possessions of Rus- sia ; and if the war between these powers be once allowed to extend to these shores, it will not be long before the United States finds her interests compro- mised. If, as the Times of 24th May significantly says, " From Archangel, in the north, to Erzeroum — from the confines of Prussia to the north-ivestern territoTies of America — there rages, or is about to rage, a conflict, gradually drawing within its exterminating vortex the leading nations of the world "^ — has not this Government a right to insist upon such a pre- cautionary policy on this continent, at least, as will preserve the possibility of her neutrality ? I^ow, situated as this country is, towards the West Indies and the Pacific coast, we ought distinctly and decid- edly to make it known, that European interests can- not influence the political adjustments of this quarter 6 62 AN AlklEEICAN ^'lEW of the globe ; that no change can take place in the relations of the colonial possessions of Europe here, except in subordination to the interest of the " lead- ing powers " of the western world. And would it not be wiser to make such a declaration now^, w^hen it would apply with equal justice to all — than after- wards, when, if this war shall become universal, such a declaration may work, indirectly, a violation of our neutrality ? 2. A perfectly honest neutrality, is possible only to a strong nation. All history proves, that a weak nation is never allowed to maintain a neutral posi- tion, if the interests of greater kingdoms require its services. And this is more specially true of a mari- time powder ; and in the ]3resent condition of interna- tional relations, a great maritime nation, armed with its due and proj)ortionate naval strength, would be, if faithfully neutral, the great mediating power of the world. But it must be al)lc to speak with the authority of might, as well as right. If the fleet of Sir Charles Kapier were now in the Gulf, wdiat would be \\\Q force of our protest. 3. In the present condition of things, and in the complications which the future seems to threaten — if there is one thing more necessary to this Govern- ment than another, it is full, accurate, imj)artial in- formation of the strength, feelings, interests and in- tentions of the leading European powders. !Now, there are two kinds of diplomatic service — the one consists in a direct interference with, and interest in, the political schemes of other nations, in an effort to modify or control the action of other powers, for OF THE EASTEEN QUESTION. 63 our own purposes. And wliere nations are closely associated, as in Europe, in material and political interests, this service is one of great delicacy, dig- nity, and difficulty. Situated as the United States are, tlieir interests open scarce any field for a like activity. But we stand, somewhat like the old neu- tral and trading republic of Venice ; and, like her, we might wisely cultivate the other kind of diplo- matic service. Tlieir ambassadors were everywhere thoroughly trained for observation ; they passed gradually through the circle of national relations, and impartial spectators of the whole field of poli- tics ; they supplied the Government with such full and minute information, that it could, at any moment, comprehend the whole scope of European politics, and give each separate event its true significance. — To do this, however, would require a thorough re- organization of our whole diplomatic system, on a higher basis, and upon a vastly more liberal scale, than is tolerated at present. Perhaps this, in the temper of the times, is impossible ; but it is certain, that questions of vast importance are casting por- tentous shadows as they come. If the struggle in Europe assumes the proportions of univei*sal war, this country will have a noble, but difficult, task before it. It may not be able to stand between the contending parties as arbiter ; but it can, at least, hold above the hot strife those principles of interna- tional right, which would be otherwise trampled out in the struggle, and stand in wise neutrality apart from the bloody follies of older nations. We can preserve, to this continent at least, the blessings and 64 AN AMERICAN VIEW benefits of a well-giiarded peace. But to do this, requires knowledge, strength and temper ; and if the United States is to play a proper part in the troubled times at hand, they will need three things : a tho- roughly organized diplomatic system to tell them the truth — a navy commensurate with their rank, to sup- port their decisions — -and an honest, determined neu- trality, as the corner-stone of their policy. FINIS. EREATA. Page 1, line 18, for "Sobresky" read -'Sobiesky.'^' " 26, " 9, for " injudiciously " read '^injuriously.'' " 27, " 8, for "united " read " mrtYed." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS m 426 590 fl WALKER & EVANS, STATIONERS AND PRmTERS, NO. 101 EAST BAY. CHAELESTON, S. C. COPTBIGHT SaCUBEJ), |L«SI °^ CONGRESS MB. 426 590 Q