Class Book.CE ghtl^'il^ n ^L- ommEm OEPosm Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2010 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/orientalpolicyofOOchun The Oriental Policy of the United States By HENRY CHUNG, A. M. Compiler of Korean Treaties, Korean Envoy to the Paris Conference With Introductory Note by JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph. D., LL.D. Director of Far Eastern Bureau Research Professor of Government and Public Admin- istration ; New York University New York Chicago Fleming H. Revell Company London and Edinburgh Ca^^, ^^ Copyright, 1919, FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY i^^^^? >*" ?> '^. OCr 28 ,s,9 ^' New York : 1 58 Fifth Avenue Chicago: 17 North Wabash Ave. London : 2 1 Paternoster Square Edinburgh : 75 Princes Street C)C!.A 58 541)9 ^ 1^0 The Chinese Students in America whose mission it is to emancipate their country from the iron-bound traditions of the past and to instil the spirit of Western civilization into their ancient culture^ so that China henceforth will be not a passive and self-contained nation but a progressive and dynamic power taking its place, along with the United States, in the family of the worWs democracies Introductory Note By JEREMIAH W. JENKS, Ph.D., LL. D. THE publication of a book on the Oriental policy of the United States is peculiarly timely. In connection with the discussion and ap- proval of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and in connection with the much discussed League of Nations, it is essential that the gov- ernment of the United States now determine its Oriental policy. It seems probable that the former policy of the territorial integrity of China and the Open Door, with fair dealing and jus- tice, should be stated anew with a more vigorous determination to give it positive effect. If the policy is to be modified, the change should be made promptly and the world should know it. It is fortunate that this book is written by a citizen of the Far East, a Korean. The people of the United States need to see clearly the view-point of the Orientals. There is little dif- ficulty in getting the view-point of the Japanese. In fact, it is impossible for any reader of the public press to avoid getting the Japanese Gov- ernment's view-point. It is much more difficult to know what the Chinese are thinking because of the great variety of opinions published in the 7 8 INTEODUCTOEY NOTE press. Even the policy of the government of China is varying and undetermined, although the sentiments of the Chinese people now seem to be crystallizing. On the other hand, it has been almost impossible, owing to the Japanese censorship, to get an authoritative judgment or statement regarding Korean opinion. This book is admirably written, and although I should not find it possible to agree in all par- ticulars with the policies advocated and the views expressed, I believe it of very great im- portance to the American people that this view be known and understood in America. The book, aside from expressions of opinions, contains very valuable information. Public men in the United States will find the documents published in the appendices of decided interest. They have not been heretofore readily acces- sible, but they are important. It is especially desirable at this moment to be informed as fully as possible regarding the relations of Korea and Japan at the time when the Japanese Government is asking to have its influence over scores of millions of the people in China extended and strengthened. The whole civilization of the Orient, as well as the relations commercial, political and social, be- tween the Orient and the West are swinging in the balance. The public opinion of America and of Europe are determining factors. Everything that can throw real light upon the situation is valuable. This book contains much of importance. It should be widely read. J.W.J. Preface THE world's greatest war has come to an end, and, in so far as we are able to judge, autocracy and militarism have been driven from Europe once for all. Now the all-important question is : " Is this the last war, or has the Peace Conference failed to solve the problem, thereby sowing seeds for another world war — perhaps more horrible than the one just concluded? " Political cynics all over the world are already beginning to criticize the work of the Peace Conference as being no better than that of the Congress of Vienna; they assert that all the statesmen of the leading Powers went to the Peace Conference with the intention of getting out of it as much of material gain for their re- spective countries as they could, and that they have obtained as much as they had expected al- though not as much as they wanted; that the " Fourteen Points " were made a political re- volving door to admit whatever the Powers wanted to have included, and to exclude nearly everything that did not serve their purposes of nationalistic gain ; and that " self-determina- tion " of weaker nations turned out to be selfish 9 10 PEEFACB determination of stronger Powers. These are extreme views, unpleasant to be reminded of, but, perhaps, they are not without foundation. The League of Nations is as yet nothing more than a mere experiment, basing its strength upon the moral support of humanity. Will it be a new Holy AUiance, or will it serve as the framework for a world organization that will bind humanity into a mosaic of lasting peace and mutual good-will? The Peace Conference has virtually recognized the validity of secret treaties made prior to and during the war. Will the Powers, under the guidance of the League of Nations, abandon secret diplomacy and dis- continue their economic exploitation of less civ- ilized lands, thereby surrendering the particular purpose of individual states to the common will of mankind? Since the League of Nations is a league of free nations, will it not, even if it be- comes a complete success, be but another nail driven into the coffin of the already crushed nations, whose claims to the right of resurrec- tion were denied them at the Peace Table? It must be remembered that a right to revolt against foreign oppression is an inalienable right — a right upon the foundations of which the Fathers of the American Revolution built their nation. Peace at any price — especially, at the price of the political aspirations of nations whose people are crying for justice and free- PEEFACE 11 dom — is the worst kind of tyranny. It is, how- ever, quite possible in this pregnant century, that a new international standard of moral rec- titude will be born of mankind, which will bring pressure to bear upon the League so that this new world organization will slowly succeed in disentangling itself from the many things that have bound us in the past, and be guided in its actions by a sense of justice that plays no favourites. These are more or less academic speculations that occupy the minds of political students at the present as the aftermath of the war and the peace settlements. But the most vital question that is bound to engage the attention of the statesmen of the world is the Far Eastern ques- tion. The open door in the Far East cannot be maintained permanently by a balance of rival powers under the guidance of intrigue. China must not be left to herself, staggering under the strain of " spheres of influence," as she has been during the last twenty years. The present Eastern question is far more menacing to the future peace of the world than was the Balkan problem ten years ago. And if the Powers of the world do not solve it now by peaceful methods, then they must be prepared to solve it ten years hence on the field of battle. It must be remembered that China has one-fourth of 12 PEEFACE the world's population and an unlimited supply of natural resources — especially in coal and iron — to be exploited for peace or war. If this res- ervoir of power is permitted to be dominated by one nation — especially by such an ambitious empire as Japan — then it is obvious that the world cannot be made "safe for democracy"; there will be a drawn dagger at the heart of the United States and of the British possessions in the Far East. Consolidation of Asia under Japanese domination is the vision of the Japa- nese statesmen; and toward the attainment of this national goal there is unity of purpose among Japanese leaders. With this in view, Korea was annexed, Manchuria was absorbed, Inner Mongolia and Fukien province are being overwhelmed, and last but not least, Japan has obtained from the Powers at the Peace Confer- ence the official recognition of her paramount interests in Shantung. At the present rate of Japanese aggression, China cannot last very long. Shall she be left to her own fate, or will the Powers of the West take an active interest in the Far Eastern aflFairs and save her national entity? The United States is not interested in any particular European or Asiatic problem, in- dividual in character. But the United States is interested in a problem that has far-reaching effects on the world's peace and the welfare of mankind. What are her obligations, by treaty. PEEFAOE 13 by policy, by moral rights, to her sister Republic in the East? These are some of the questions the author has in mind in presenting the follow- ing chapters. The author is not unaware of the possible criticism on the part of the reader that Parts I and II lack coordination. But the opinion of the writers on the Far Eastern questions are so often conflicting, even diametrically opposed to each other at times between those who regard the Japanese as a " model people " and those who regard them as "treacherous savages" mas- querading in the garb of civilization, that it is almost impossible for the average American reader to have a clear-cut conception as to what the Oriental policy of the United States ought to be unless he knows the subtle undercurrent that directs, in a large measure, the course of public opinion in the West with regard to Japan's for- eign policy. In this respect the author feels justified in considering the two parts as sup- plementary to each other. In preparing this volume, the author had at his disposal abundant Oriental sources. But he took pains to use as much as possible only those facts that had been corroborated by Western historians and publicists of unquestioned integ- rity, in order that the reader may have available references for the fuller support of the present author's statements. 14 PREFACE In conclusion, the author wishes to express his sincere appreciation of the kind encourage- ment and constructive criticism given him by Professor Hartley Burr Alexander, who has aided him to a deeper insight into and higher appreciation of Western culture. New York, Henry Chung. Contents PART I The Development of the Policy Introduction 21 I. The Opening of the East ... 25 1. Japan. -|f- 2. Korea. 3. China. II. China in the Twentieth Century . 49 1. "Spheres of Influence" versus *' Open Door." 2. The Boxer Uprising. 3. The Russo-Japanese Struggle. III. Aaierican Rivalry with Japan . . 62 1. TKe American Fleet in the Far East. 2. American and British Policies. 3. " Dollar Diplomacy." 4. The Twenty-one Demands. 5. China and the European War. IV. The Lansing-I§hii Agreement . , 83 1. The Diplomatic Procedure. 2. Reception of the Agreement. 3. Effect on Japanese Attitude. V. Present Policies and Opportunities . icx) 1. Japanese Plans and Ambitions. 2. American Duties and Opportunities. 15 16 CONTENTS PART II An Undercurrent Shaping the Policy: Japan's Control of Publicity Introduction 113 I. The Official Espionage . , .116 1. The Philosophy of the System. 2. Spies in Other Lands. 3. Espionage in Japan and Korea. II. *rHE Government Censorship . .129 1. Press Censorship. 2. Censorship of Postal and Telegraphic Com- munications. III. Publicity Propaganda . . . .144 1. Official Publications. 2. Government Agencies in Foreign Lands. 3. Manipulation of Foreign Visitors in Japan. Conclusion 167 Comparison of Russian and Japanese Diplomacy. \ PART III Documents in the Case A. Treaty Between the United States and Japan . 177 B. The Emigration Treaty Between China and the United States 192 C. Protocol Between China and the Treaty Powers Respecting the Settlement of the Boxer War . 198 D. The Hay Doctrine of the " Open Door " in China 21 1 E. The Anglo-Japanese Alliances . . . .216 CONTENTS 17 '^ F. Senate Resolution Requesting the President to Transmit to the Senate the Official Correspond- ence Between the United States and Korea . 227 ^' G. The President's Reply 228 ^ H. The Kflrean-AmericanJTreaty .... 229 I. Petition from the Koreans of Hawaii to President Roosevelt ..... . . . 241 American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium 245 Korea Under Japan .... . — - • 258 The Root-Takahira Agreement Concerning China 266 M. Count Okuma's Message to the American People Concerning China ..... *70 ■ The Twenty-One Demands . . . . 271 ' A Resume of Japan's Procedure in Connection with the Twenty-One Demands . . . 276 The Revised Demands Presented by Japan to China 278 China's Concession to the Demands . . .285 R. American Note to China and Japan Concerning the Agreement . . . . . . .286 S. The Peking Petition 287 ^T. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement . . . ,289 U. The New Sino-Japanese Military Agreement . 292 Selected Bibliography 296 J. K. L. N. O. P. Maps Possessions of the Great Powers in the Pacific . Frontispiece "Spheres of Influence" in China — 1898 and 191 8 . 49 Rail w^ays in China, 191 5 . . . . . 63 Trade Routes of the Pacific . . . . .83 China in 1919, Showing Railways and Spheres of In- fluence ......>• loi PART I The Development of the Policy Introduction SOME years ago Ex-Premier Kang Yu- Wei in an address before a group of Chinese in California made a statement that if China had been a strong and aggressive empire, California would be to-day a part of Chinese territory/ If we reflect for a moment that at the time of the American occupation of the Pacific coast, China was nearer to it than any other great empire excepting Japan, and that travel between China and California was less difficult, before the time of railroads, than that across the continent, we shall see that this utterance from the wise Chinese is not an empty remark. As early as 1860 there were 34,933 Chinese in the United States." And it would have been a comparatively easy matter for * Kang was premier under the late Emperor Kwang-Hsu, and was the leader of the reform movement of 1898. He has been the head of Pao Huang Hwei (empire reform association), and is known among the Chinese as the " Modern Sage." He made a trip around the world in 1905-06 at which time the writer heard him in Cali- fornia. 2 "Thirteenth Census of U. S., Abstract " (1910), p. 79. 31 22 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY China, had she been a powerful nation, to send colonies to the Pacific coast before that part of the continent became a part of the United States/ It is also easy to believe that had the Ameri- can Government, impelled by imperial tenden- cies, encouraged its merchants and seamen by subsidy and ample protection, the American " sphere of influence " would be to-day larger than that of any other nation in China, and American merchants would be enjoying the lion's share of the Oriental trade. The enterpris- ing Yankees who sailed to all parts of the globe as merchants and fishermen were not at all slow in getting their share of the Oriental trade. Thus the first American merchant vessel appeared in Chinese waters in 1784;* and the commerce of the United States in the palmy days of its Ori- ental trade was second in volume among that of the Western nations. But American statesmen of the early period believed that there was " room enough for our descendants to the thou- sandth and thousandth generation " on this 8 In 1850 California had a population of 92,597 (most of whom went out there after gold was discovered in 1848) ; Oregon had only 13,294; and the territory of Washington was not yet setoff from Oregon, which act came on March 2, 1853. * For a full account, see Callahan, " American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East," Johns Hopkins University Studies, XIX : 13 ff. ; also, Coolidge, " The United States as a World Power," 313 ff- INTEODUOTION 23 continent/ and the American Government was too busily occupied with internal problems to safeguard the commercial interests of its citi- zens in the Far East. The intercourse, there- fore, between North America and the Orient, built up at the close of the eighteenth century, was practically abandoned in later years, and so remained until the new efforts of the middle of the nineteenth century. The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century inaugurated indeed a new political regime in Europe and in America. By utiliza- tion of steam, electricity, and labour-saving ma- chinery, an industrial nation can produce manu- factured articles far beyond its own needs. Two things are essential to commercial expansion of a nation — to find raw material either at home or abroad, and to find a market for manufactured goods. Commerce has become the greatest of all political interests. Territories are sought to enlarge commerce, and great armies and navies are maintained to enforce commercial rights in foreign lands. The United States, which had remained hitherto a self-contained nation, could no longer hold its isolated position. With the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, and the coming of the " spheres of influence " in China, the United States was forced to become an 8 Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, Richardson, " Messages and Papers of the Presidents," i : 321-24. 24 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY active participant in Oriental politics. From now on, American diplomacy was what the Jef- fersonian Republicans might have called ag- gressive imperialsm. THE OPENING OF THE EAST I. Japan WHEN Commodore Perry reached Japan in 1853, he presented to the Emperor of Japan President Fill- more's letter asking for the friendship and com- mercial intercourse of the two nations. The American Government had long since wanted to open Japan to American trade. In 1815 Secre- tary Monroe had planned to send Commodore Porter to open Japan to trade. In 1837 the American ship Morrison had arrived in Yedo Bay, Japan, in hope of opening up trade, but had been driven away by bombardment. The mo- tive of the American Government in its attempt to open Japan in 1853 was, as stated in Presi- dent Fillmore's letter to the Japanese Emperor, " friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people." The American whale industry in the Pacific Ocean about this time was estimated at about $17,000,000. In several instances Ameri- can whalers had been wrecked on the Japanese coasts and the crews had been maltreated by the Japanese officials, as in the case of the Lawrence 25 26 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY in 1846, and the Ladoga in 1848. Then, too, it was quite necessary for ocean liners plying be- tween California and China to stop over in Jap- anese ports to provision themselves. In addi- tion to all these material reasons, there was some sense of moral duty on the part of Chris- tian America to open up heathen Japan to the penetrating rays of Christian civilization. In- deed, as early as 1816, John Quincy Adams urged the opening of Japan as a duty of Chris- tian nations. Between 1854, when the first American-Jap- anese treaty was signed at Yokohama, and 1899, when the Western nations recognized the full sovereignty of Dai Nippon, many significant historical events happened in the Sunrise King- dom. It was during the early part of this period that the Japanese embassies returned from Europe and America with the astonishing discovery that " it is not the foreigners, but we ourselves who are barbarous." Japanese stu- dents were sent abroad to learn Western arts and sciences; foreign teachers were employed to reorganize the school system; the army was organized after the Western model, and the navy changed from fishermen's junks to iron-clad men-of-war; and feudal barons were forced to give up their powers to the central government. In short, Japan emerged from a state of mediae- val feudalism into that of a modern constitu- THE OPENING OF THE EAST 27 tional monarchy, strongly centralized and highly efficient in its working order. In the Boxer up- rising, 1900, she joined hands with the Western nations, and in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-6, she completely surprised the world with the efficiency of her mihtary organization. It was the first time since the Turk had pounded the gates of Vienna that a heathen nation of the East had shown itself able successfully to meet a Christian power of the West on the military field. With good reason did President Roose- velt pay high tribute in his message to Con- gress, 1906, to the spirit and methods of Japan in her acceptance and promotion of modern civilization; and it was largely through the in- strumentality of President Roosevelt that the peace negotiations at Portsmouth were brought to a successful issue. When in 1908 Japan sent her first envoy, Viscount Shuzo Aoki, to the United States with the rank of Ambassador, it was the culmination of the long friendship be- tween the two countries. American relations with Japan in interna- tional questions have always been fair, and Jap- anese statesmen have looked up to the United States for moral support in their struggle for recognition by the Western Powers.' They * The United States was the first of Western nations to with- draw the right of extra-territoriality from Japan by a treaty signed Nov. 22, 1894. See Part III. 28 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY knew the American lack of sinister designs in foreign lands, and had the utmost faith in the American sense of fair play, until the question of Japanese immigration and citizen- ship in America came up. This embarrassing question was complicated by discriminatory laws passed by some of the western states of the American Union — especially California — against aliens not qualified for citizenship. The labour element on the Pacific coast carried on a crusade against the Japanese on the grounds that the market for labour was cheapened by the presence of the Orientals. Politicians found a popular issue in vehement denunciations of the Japanese. For a time the Japanese question in California, serving as a football in local politics, furnished a source of grave complications be- tween America and Japan. It is not the purpose of this study to trace the historical relations between the United States and Japan, nor to deal with the Japanese prob- lem within the United States. Many excellent volumes have been written on these topics.' * On the historical relations between Japan and the United States, P. J. Treat, " Early Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan ; " John W. Foster, " American Diplomacy in the Orient ; " W, E. Griffis, " America in the East ; " J. M. Callahan, " American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East," are among the best accounts. For full treatment of the Japanese question in the United States, see : Sidney L. Gulick, " The American Japanese Problem ; " K. K. Kawakami, " American Japanese Relations, THE OPENING OF THE EAST 29 SufHce it to say here that the present friendship between the United States and Japan is largely traditional/ although the recent Imperial Com- mission headed by Viscount Ishii painted over the ugly spots of local friction with a fresh var- nish of alliance against the " Common Enemy,"* and the Japanese question in the United States is still an unsettled issue. No unbiased student of international relations will deny that a sover- eign nation has a right to close its doors to undesirable immigrants, or that citizenship is a privilege to be granted and not a universal right to be claimed by every alien that comes to its shores. But in the interest of fairness, the ques- tion presents itself, should the United States, the champion of world democracy, continue to deny its citizenship, which is open to all other races, including the blacks from the jungles of Africa, to Asiatics permanently settled in this country, who have educational and financial qualifications for all the duties and obligations of American citizenship? The future affairs of the world must be settled by both the white and Asia at the Door; " Harry Alvin Mills, "The Japanese Problem in the United States ; " Lindsay Russell, " America to Japan ; " Monta- ville Flowers, " Japanese Conquest of American Opinion; " J. F. Steiner, " The Japanese Invasion," ' Cf. K. K. Kawakami, " Japan and the United States," Atlantic 119:671-81, May, 1917. *See Viscount Ishii's speeches during his visit in America, 1917, together with editorial comments on them by the American press. 30 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY the yellow races. Let it be known to the states- men of the world — especially to the American statesmen — that the ultimate welfare of the hu- man race depends largely upon the wise ad- justment of the relations between these two dominant races, that the peace of the world cannot be "planted upon the tested founda- tions of political liberty," unless this compli- cated problem is correctly solved. Surely the American public should not, through indiffer- ence, leave this problem to the hands of agita- tors and propagandists, when a lasting solution can be made only in the light of its best reason and highest wisdom. (2. Korea Before passing to the Chinese question, it might be worth our while to take a glance at the closing chapter of the least known nation — once a nation — in Asia. The United States was the first Western power to enter the gates of Korea." The first article of the Korean-American treaty signed at Wonsan, Korea, May 22, 1882 (ratifications ex- changed at Seoul, Korea, May 19, 1883), reads as follows: " There shall be perpetual peace and friend- ship between the President of the United States ■ For early diplomatic intercourse between America and Korea, see Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient," chap. IX. THE OPENING OF THE EAST 31 and the King of Chosen and citizens and sub- jects of their respective governments. If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good ofjfices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings." ' Interpreting this diplomatic phraseology into every-day language, it meant that America would stand sponsor for the political independ- ence and territorial integrity of Korea. And- the simple-minded Korean Government from the Emperor down literally believed in it. In fact, they had no reason to doubt the sincerity of the United States. They saw the splendid work of American philanthropy through mis- sionary channels ; the integrity of the American Government was exemplified by the integrity of American citizens there. They thought that there was at least one great nation that was un- selfish and honest and upon which they could rely for support, as it was provided in the Korean-American treaty, whenever their na- tional life was in jeopardy. American citizens were accorded greater privilege than any other foreigners in Korea. The first Korean rail- way — Seoul-Chemulpo line — was built and owned by an American concern; the first elec- ' Complete text of the treaty reprinted in Senate Docu- ment, No. 342, 64th Congress, 1st Session. 32 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY trie plant in Korea was installed by the Edison Company in 1895. The first and largest elec- tric road and water works in Korea were built and owned by Americans/ The richest gold mine in Korea was given to an American firm. Dr. Horace N. Allen, former American minister to Korea, thus describes the gaining of the con- cession : "As the result of a long train of circum- stances, it had become known to me exactly which district was considered the richest by the natives, and it was this district, twenty-five by thirty miles in extent, that I named in the con- cession.*'^ It must be remembered that America did not get all these concessions from Korea by force as European nations got theirs in China. They were given to American concerns by the Korean Government in return for the good will and friendship of the United States. Numerous other American industries in Korea might be mentioned, but it is enough to say that while Korea was an independent nation, the American business man had the best of the ad- vantages open to foreigners in Korea. After mapping out her imperial program, and through the clever use of her publicity propaganda' Japan convinced the American public — espe- 'See Horace N. Allen, "Things Korean," chap. XIV; Thomas F. Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," chap. XII, " The Open Door in Korea." * Allen, "Things Korean," pp. 232-233. » See Part II. THE OPENING OP THE EAST 33 daily official Washington — that she must have Korea in order to preserve peace in the Far East. "Japan began and carried through this whole matter," said Homer B. Hulbert, an American educator and for some time political adviser to the Korean Emperor, " by clever use of misinformation and broken promises, which successfully hoodwinked the American pub- lic."" The first obvious step taken by the United States in handing Korea over to Japan was at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan violated Korean neutrality and exacted certain concessions from the Korean Govern- ment under " military necessity." The Secre- tary of State, John Hay, instructed the American minister at Seoul, Horace N. Allen, to observe strict neutrality and not cable the text of any agreement that Korea and Japan might come to." This was undoubtedly done to avoid recog- nition of Korea's appeal against Japanese ag- gressions. The next move the United States made to aid Japan in this game of Oriental politics was the recall of Dr. Allen from Korea. Dr. Allen had stayed in Korea over twenty years and was highly esteemed by both the natives and for- " Homer B. Hulbert, " The Passing of Korea," p. 462. "Cablegram sent from Washington, Feb. 23, 1904; re- corded in Senate Document, No. 342 p. 11, 64th Congress, 1st Session. h 34 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY eigners. When the Japanese began to tighten their grip in the peninsula, he told his govern- ment a few unpalatable truths about what the Japanese were doing in Korea. Immediately subtle influences were put in operation at Wash- ington intimating that Minister Allen was a persona non grata to the Japanese. As a result Dr. Allen, despite his unquestioned integrity and long years of loyal service to his govern- ment, was summarily recalled, to the great sur- prise and indignation of American communities in Korea. When hostilities began between Russia and Japan, America was officially neutral, but her sympathies were with Japan. There were three possible reasons for this: (1) Japan through her publicity propaganda created a favourable opin- ion of herself in America;" (2) Japan bor- rowed vast sums of money from America for war purposes, and Japanese success was natu- rally wished for by American capitalists; (3) at the beginning of the war Japan was thought of by the outside world as an " under-dog " trying to get loose from the brutal clutch of the Rus- sian Bear. An incident which happened at Chemulpo Harbour immediately preceding the naval encounter of the two belligerents fur- "For various methods of controlling American public opinion by Japan in regard to Japanese affairs, see Part II, "Japan's Control of Publicity." See also Flowers, "Japanese Conquest of American Opinion." THE OPENING OP THE EAST 35 nishes an illuminating illustration of American attitude toward the three nations directly con- cerned in the war, — ^Japan, Russia, and Korea. On February 9, 1904, Admiral Uriu, the com- mander of the Japanese fleet, sent an ultimatum to the captain of the Variag, the Russian war- ship lying in the harbour of Chemulpo, that he would give the Russian ships until twelve o'clock to leave the harbour, and if they had not moved by four o'clock that afternoon, the Japanese fleet would come in and sink them at their anchorage — in a neutral port of a neutral country. There were at that time in the harbour four other foreign war-ships : the Talbot (British), the Blba (ItaHan), the Pascal (French), and the Vickshurg (American). The commander of the British war-ship, notwithstanding the fact that Great Britain was an ally of Japan, was indig- nant at the insolence of the Japanese Admiral, and invited the commanders of the other for- eign ships to a conference on board the Talbot to decide what action should be taken. " The British, French, and Italian commanders at once decided that Admiral Uriu was proposing to commit a gross breach of international law, and they unanimously resolved to give the Russian ships whatever protection they could. A mes- sage was sent to the commander of the Variag informing him of this determination, and ad- 36 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICT vising him to refuse to leave the harbour.** But the captain of the Vicksburg explained to the other commanders that he had received ex- plicit instructions from his government to re- main strictly neutral in the coming event. And the American war-ship Vicksburg, with its proud name, skulked into the inner harbour of safety. The Russian naval ofHcers keenly resented this action of the Vicksburg, and the Russian press made bitter references to this incident as well as to the generally pro-Japanese tendency in America at that time as a breach of the historic friendship between America and Russia." At the time of the Portsmouth Conference between Russia and Japan, July, 1905, the Koreans in Hawaii sent their two delegates, Syngman Rhee and P. K. Yoon, to present a petition to President Roosevelt, asking that he " see to it that Korea may preserve her autono- mous government."" The delegates were re- ceived unofficially, and their petition was given a sympathetic consideration. But this did not "For full discussion o£ this incident, see Millard, "The New Far East " chap. V. " Ever since the birth of the American nation, there has been no serious friction of any kind between the United States and Russia. During the Civil War the Russian fleet anchored outside the New York Harbour. It was generally understood, although not officially stated, that in case Eng- land and France took sides with the South, Russia would intervene on behalf of the North. Thus the Russian fleet gave no small moral support to the cause of the Union. " See full text of the petition, Part III, I. THE OPENING OF THE EAST 37 change the President's settled policy toward Korea. When the Emperor of Korea sent Homer B. Hulbert to present his letter to Presi- dent Roosevelt asking for aid against Japan's aggression, Mr. Hulbert was refused an inter- view by both the President and Secretary of State Root on one excuse after another until it was too late." " So far from pleading the case of Korea with Japan, America was the first to fall in with and give its open assent to the destruction of the old administration. On the first intimation from Japan it agreed, without inquiry and with almost indecent haste, to with- draw its minister from Seoul." " When the United States declared neutrality at the beginning of the recent European war, the very men who ignored treaty obligations and handed over, as far as America was con- cerned, the " Belgium of the East " to Japan, Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, were the loudest in denouncing the Wilson Administra- tion for not going to war against Germany in defense of Belgian neutrality. There was no treaty binding upon the United States to defend Belgium against the unrighteous aggressor as in the case of Korea. The Democratic President and Congress retaliated by publishing the ac- "For a full description of Hulbert's mission, see Part III, J, "American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Bel- gium." " F. A. McKenzie, " Tragedy of Korea," p. 131. 38 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY counts of the Roosevelt and Root Administra- tion ignoring Korea's appeal in the last days of her struggle against Japan." For the first time the part played, or not played, by the United States in that tragedy in the Far East came to light. When newspaper reporters in- terviewed Root on the subject, he refused to comment on it. Alvey A. Adee, who was the Second Assistant Secretary of State under Root, and who is the star witness of the Korean case at Washington, also refused to comment on the matter, but said, " It is ancient history, any- how." " Korea was the bone of contention of the East for a number of years. It was only through a favourable combination of circumstances that Japan was enabled to occupy it. Russia gave her consent to Japanese occupation as her war indemnity ; England welcomed the expansion of her ally's influence on the mainland of Asia to checkmate^^the Russian advance and to protect the British interests in the East, so that she might concentrate her navy in the North Sea to counteract Germany. But the United States, instead of gaining something by the " deal," lost all the advantages she had held before. Be- fore the Russo-Japanese War, American busi- ness men enjoyed the largest share of foreign ^^ Senate Document, No. 342, 64th Congress, ist Session. ^ " Ne-iv York Times, March 6, 1916. THE OPENING OF THE EAST 39 trade in Korea and Manchuria/" But now their place is taken by Japanese. The American policy then, as now, was not motivated by material gains. The statesmen at Washington were con- vinced that Korea was utterly " incapable of in- dependence " — the same kind of conviction that Metternich had toward Italy, George III to- ward American colonies, and the statesmen of the Central Powers toward Serbia, Belgium, and all the constituent states of Austria-Hun- gary. The principle of " no people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live " " was as yet too far off an ideal to be a common expression of American statesmen. The Korean people learned too late that there is no such a thing as international honesty, and that treaty obligations backed by no force are not worth the paper upon which they are written. The United States was the first of Western nations to enter Korea, the first to enjoy the preferential treatment and commer- cial advantages in that land, and the first to desert her in the time of her dire need of Amer- ican friendship. Dr. Allen well sums up the case of Korean- American treaty obligations in the following words: '" See Alleu, " Things Korean," pp. 215, if. "From President Wilson's Message to Russia, May 26. 1917. 40 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY " Korea has taken that treaty to mean just what the words say, while we seem to have utterly disregarded the solemn promise we therein voluntarily made, that we would lend her our good offices should she be oppressed by a third power; thus breaking faith with a people who trusted us implicitly, and who consented to the opening of her doors on this guarantee of friendly aid." *' Thus the United States of America " sneered at freedom and lent arms to the tyrant " in the demolition of a civilization that began long be- fore David became the king of Israel.'* ^ 3. China A prominent Western historian and scientist won distinction for a time by his advocacy of a novel idea that a nation, like an individual, has its infancy, maturity, senility, and final extinc- tion.^ This idea was supported by a few super- ficial observers of Oriental politics who main- tained that the Eastern nations had long since reached the summit of their evolution, and that no further progress in the future was to be ex- » Allen, "Things Korean," p. 214. *'For antiquity of Korean civilization, see W. E. GriflSs, ;• Corea— The Hermit Nation " ; H. B. Hulbert, " The Pass- ing of Korea." " See John William Draper, " History of the Intellectual Development of Europe." THE OPENING OP THE BAST 41 pected," Interesting though these theories may- be, they have little historical foundation. A na- tion may have ebbs and flows of civilization in the cycle of its life, but there is no reason for its predestined maturity and decay except through its adoption of wrong institutions. Egypt in Africa, Italy in Europe, and China in Asia furnish ample evidences to upset the theory of an analogy between the life of a nation and that of an individual. When China opened her gates to the treaty powers of the West, her civilization was at its ebb. The China that Marco Polo found in the thirteenth century was undoubtedly in a higher stage of civilization than the China of the nine- teenth century. The " foreign-devil " notion and the spirit of exclusiveness were not the atti- tude of China toward foreigners in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, the alien then enjoyed in China rights and privileges such as he could enjoy in few, if any, countries of modern times. " The imperial government placed the aliens practically on the same footing as its own sub- jects: it opened to them public employments and extended to them the fullest protection. Olopun, one of the Nestorians who entered China in the Tang Dynasty, was raised to the " See Henry Sumner Maine's "Ancient Law" and his the- ory of progressive and non-progressive races together with the theories advanced by his followers along the same line. 42 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY rank of high priest and national protector by Emperor Kautsung. Marco Polo, though a Venetian by birth, was appointed to the office of prefect of Yangchow, which he held for three St 3S years. When the Portuguese first entered the Can- ton River in 1517, they were received in a kindly spirit. But their greedy and high-handed methods in their relations with the natives turned the feeling of amity into one of hatred, and caused the Ming Emperor in 1545 to issue an edict to attack the foreigners. The Span- iards made their appearance in 1575, but they were as cruel and greedy as the Portuguese, and failed to restore the prestige of Westerners in the eyes of the Chinese. The successive events of European expansion in the East, — the con- quest of the East Indies, and the forcible occu- pation of parts of India and the Malay Penin- sula by Portuguese adventurers, — awakened the suspicions of the Chinese as to the ulterior motives of the foreigners rapidly flocking to their shores. At this early period of European intercourse, China unfortunately received a bad impression that all Europeans were barbarians and adventurers. Commercial relations between England and China began in 1635, when Captain John Wed- dell was sent to China with a small fleet of " V. K. W. Koo, " The Status of Aliens in China," p. 19. THE OPENING OF THE EAST 43 vessels. Later two missions — one under the Earl of Macartney in 1793, and the other under Lord Amherst in 1816 — were sent to China from England for the purpose of arriving at a better understanding in regard to the trade relations between the two countries. Lord Napier was appointed as Commercial Superin- tendent of the British Government in China in 1833, when the control of the British trade at Canton passed out of the hands of the East India Company. All the British had accom- plished during the two hundred years of com- mercial intercourse with China was the estab- lishment of a trading post in Canton. Their attempt to enter into a cordial relationship with China on the basis of international comity and mutual understanding had been a complete fail- ure. The Chinese continued to suspect the motive of the foreigner and treated him as a barbarian. This suspicion and hatred was in- tensified when opium was forced upon China through the muzzles of the British men-of-war, and the Chinese Government was compelled to submit to the demands of the British." The treaty of Nanking, signed at the close of *' The treaty was signed in 1842 at the close of the " Opium War." By this treaty, the island of Hongkong was ceded to Great Britain, an indemnity was paid for the opium des- troyed, official correspondence was to be carried on on equal terms, and Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were opened to foreign trade as treaty ports, where for- eigners could reside. 44 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY the first Anglo-Chinese War, did not settle all the pending issues between the Chinese and the British. The constant friction between the Chinese and the British officials in regard to their respective rights, and the continuance of opium smuggling by the British merchants at Canton and Hongkong, furnished causes for an- other war. This time the French, actuated partly by the desire to seek reparation for the massacre of a missionary in West Kwangsi, and partly by the spirit of imperial aggrandizement, joined with the English in war against China. The allied forces took Canton, and then carried war to the north. The Chinese were forced to sue for peace, and the war was brought to a close by the treaty of Tientsin, signed June 26, 1859. The treaty provided among other things the right of residence by foreign ministers in Peking, the opening of five additional treaty ports, and the toleration of the Christian re- ligion.'* The Chinese, later on, tried to evade the carrying out of these provisions. This caused the allied armies to make an expedition to Peking, where they burned the Summer Palace as a punitive measure, and compelled the Chinese Government to sign another treaty on October 22, 1860. In addition to the terms of "At this time the United States and Russia also made treaties with China, although they took no part in the con- flict. THE OPENING OF THE EAST 45 the treaty of Tientsin, Kowloon was ceded to the British and Tientsin was opened as a treaty- port. Foreign ministers for the first time took up their residence in Peking, Anson Burlingame representing the United States.** Repeated defeats and humihations caused the Chinese Government to make feeble attempts at reform. In 1867 the first Chinese embassy was sent to foreign countries for the purpose of winning for China more favourable treatment from Western nations. The embassy was headed by Anson Burlingame, who had completed his term as the first American minister to China. This was the beginning of American prestige in the Far East. Minister Burlingame, through his personal integrity and diplomatic foresight, won the respect and confidence of the Chinese. He convinced the Chinese Government that his country of all Western nations had no ulterior motives in Chinese territory.*" The most notable achievement of the embassy was the conclusion of the treaty of 1868 with the United States. " It stipulated the territorial integrity of China by disavowing any right to interfere with its eminent domain or sovereign jurisdiction over "For Burlingame's career as the American minister to China, see U. S. "Diplomatic Correspondence," 1862-68, China ; Martin's " Cathay," pt. II, chap. II. *° See U. S. " Diplomatic Correspondence," 1S68, pt. I, pp. 493, 502, 601; 1870, pp. 317, 332; 1871, p. 166; Martin's "Cathay," p. 374; Speer's "China," p. 429. 46 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY its subjects and property; it recognized the right of China to regulate its internal trade not affected by treaty; provided for the appoint- ment of consuls ; secured exemption from perse- cution or disability on account of reHgion; recognized the right of voluntary emigration; pledged the privilege of residence and travel in either country on the basis of most favoured nation; granted the privilege of schools and colleges; disavowed the intention to interfere in the domestic administration of China in re- spect to public improvements, but expressed the willingness of the United States to aid in such enterprise when requested by China." " All these outward signs of change and reform did not affect the core of China. The depths of Chinese conservatism were like those of a vast ocean undisturbed by the surface ripples of wars and treaties. The literati of China were as firm as ever in their beHef that China was the center of the world's culture — hence the name, "Middle Kingdom " — and that all the foreign nations were barbarians. When the first imperial audience for foreign ambassadors was held in "Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient" pp. 365- 366. The vohmtary emigration clause of this treaty was revised later, and exclusion laws were passed against Chinese labourers. For voluminous findings of investigating com- mittees, debates in Congress, editorial comments pro and con on the subject, see " Select List of References on Chinese Immigration," compiled by A. P. C. GrifBn, Library of Con- gress, Washington, 1904, THE OPENING OF THE EAST 47 Peking in 1873, it took place in the " Pavilion of Purple Light," a hall used for receiving tributary nations. Something decidedly violent was needed to stir the complacency of the Chinese and upset their naive attitude of superiority. Now Japan was ready to play her role in Eastern politics. For centuries China considered Korea as a vassal nation ^ and Japan as an archipelago of barbarous tribes. Japan patiently forebore the insolence of China during the early period of Meiji Era with the anticipation of coming back at her later. After the internal troubles were settled and the country was thoroughly organ- ized on a modern basis, the Japanese statesmen launched the program of imperial expansion, and hastened military and naval preparations with astonishing rapidity for what they deemed to be the inevitable conflict with China. When they thought they were sufficiently prepared, they struck the blow in 1894, and China was completely prostrated.'* ** Korea had her autonomy in all its essentials. Dynasties changed, wars and treaties were made with foreign countries without regard to China. See Bishop, " Korea and Her Neighbours " ; Griffis, " Corea — The Hermit Nation " ; Long- ford, " The Story of Korea " ; McKenzie, " The Tragedy of Korea"; Hulbert, "The History of Korea." ''For the causes of the war, see Sengman Rhee, "The Spirit of Korean Independence," pp. 164-173 (Korean) ; "U. S. Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 5-23; Williams, "History of China," pp. 437-444; Griffis, "Corea," pp. 460-462 ; Henry Norman, " The People and Politics of 48 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY The United States performed an important mission during and at the close of the war. When the war was declared, both belligerent countries intrusted the archives and property of their legations and consulates and the interests of their subjects in the enemy country to the care of the United States ministers and consuls in the respective countries. At the close of the conflict, peace overtures were made through American ministers both at Peking and Tokyo." Thus the United States proved herself a dis- interested friend to both China and Japan, and established the foundation for further diplo- matic achievements in the East. The Emperor of Japan, soon after the close of the war, sent a letter to the President of the United States ex- pressing his cordial thanks for the good offices of the United States during the war. A similar sentiment was expressed by China through Li Hung Chang on his visit to the United States in 1896." the Far East," pp. 259-266; Curzon, "Far East," pp. 196- 208. For the events of the war, see " Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 44-104 ; Williams, " China," pp. 444-459 ; " Vladimir," " The China-Japan War," London, 1896, pts. II and III, Appendix D, F-H. For results of the war, see J. H, Wilson, U. S. A., " China, Travels in the Middle Kingdom," chap. XX. ** For peace negotiations, see " Foreign Relations," 1894, Appendix I, pp. 29-106 ; 1895, p. 969 ; " History of Peace Negotiations Between China and Japan," officially revised, Tientsin, 1895 ; Williams, " China," p. 459. *^ See " Memoirs of Li Hung Chang," edited by W. F. Mannix, Shanghai, 1912. II CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY I. " Spheres of Influence " vs. " Open Door " THE position of China at the opening of the twentieth century was pecuHar. The China-Japanese War, 1894-95, re- vealed the utter helplessness of China. When the three European powers — Germany, France, and Russia — sent a notice to Japan to withdraw from the mainland of Asia and to return to China the conquered territory of the Liaotung Peninsula, they did not do so with the altruistic motive of helping China preserve her territorial integrity. Their action was motivated, as was proved by subsequent events, by a desire to curb the expansion of Japanese influence on the Asiatic mainland, and to appropriate for them- selves, in time, what Japan wanted as a prize of her victory. The downfall of China was pre- dicted, and the partition of that vast empire among civilized nations was freely discussed. Then arose the " sphere of influence " doctrine. This peculiar modern doctrine, paraphrased, 49 50 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY means that each nation that has some interest in China shall map out a certain district as its own sphere in which it will have a paramount influence, and out of which other nations must stay. In case of final partition, each district thus mapped out will become a territory of its respective owner. Even in far-off China, as in Europe proper, the spirit of European rivalry was based on the theory and practice of bal- ance of power. And every incident was utilized as a pretext to press upon the Chinese Govern- ment claims for leases, concessions, and privi- leges of one kind or another. Germany fired the opening gun in this Euro- pean lease scramble in China. In 189T two Ger- man missionaries were killed by a Chinese mob. The German Government lost no time in seiz- ing this opportunity. German men-of-war ap- peared promptly in Kiaochow Bay, occupied the city, demanded, as an indemnity, the lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years, and the recog- nition of a German sphere of influence in the greater part of Shantung Peninsula. These de- mands were complied with by the Chinese Gov- ernment in the treaty signed March 8, 1898. This move of Germany turned loose the pent-up ambition of European nations to ex- ploit China. Russia, who had already held rail- road franchises in northern Manchuria, now ap- proached China with cajolery, intimidation, and CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 61 promises of aid in case of further aggression by other European nations/ and succeeded in leas- ing Port Arthur, Talienwan, and the adjacent waters as naval bases. The Manchurian Rail- way Company under Russian control was given the right to construct a branch line to Port Arthur. England forced China to sign a lease of Weihaiwei together with the adjacent waters, July 1, 1898. In like manner France occupied Kwangchow Bay under a ninety-nine year lease; and Italy obtained the right to de- velop the port of Sanmun. In April, 1898, England and Russia made an agreement that Russia should have her sphere of influence to the north of the Great Wall of China, and Eng- land to have hers to the south. The movement for the partition of China was thus well under way. Unless some counteract- ing influence was introduced, China no longer could maintain her national entity. The United States with her newly acquired insular posses- sions in the East could not afford to be in- different to the partition of China. There were two courses open to her: She had either to deviate entirely from her traditional foreign policy and seize her share of land and commer- cial advantages in China, regardless of justice and fairness to the Chinese, or to exercise her * For Russian intrigues in China, see Rhee, " The Spirit of Korean Independence," pp.. 173, ff. 52 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY good offices to preserve the integrity of the Chinese Empire. She chose the nobler way. '^On September 6, 1899, the Secretary of State, John Hay, addressed notes to England, Ger- many, and Russia, and later to France, Italy, and Japan, declaring the " open door " doctrine in China.* This formal protest of the United States in behalf of China requested the Powers to give their official assurances to the effect: (1) that they would not interfere with any treaty port or vested interest in their respective spheres of influence; (2) that the Chinese tariff should continue to be collected by Chinese of- ficials; (3) that they would not discriminate against other foreigners in the matter of port dues or railroad rates.' England expressed her willingness to sign such a declaration, and other powers, while carefully avoiding to commit themselves, showed their accord with the prin- ciples set forth by Mr. Hay. These principles, together with the principle of the territorial and ' For full discussion of diplomatic intercourse between the United States and other powers and the part played by John Hay, consult W. R. Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," 2 vols., 1915. • This doctrine is being violated by Japanese in Manchuria now. Japanese merchants through government subsidies, special railway rebates, preferential customs treatment, and exemption from internal taxation, have monopolized the Manchurian market. Consult Millard, " The Far Eastern Question," chaps. XV-XX; Hollington K. Tong, "American Money and Japanese Brains in China," Review of Reviews, 53 : 452-455, April, 1916 ; " Japan, China, and American Money," Harper's Weekly, 62 : 298-299, March 25, 1916. CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH OENTUEY 53 administrative integrity of China, were empha- sized by the American Government in the settle- ment of the Boxer trouble in China, and since then the principle of the " open door *' in China has become an American doctrine, recognized as such by the Powers just as the time-honoured Monroe Doctrine is recognized. ? 2. The Boxer Uprising The rapid foreign exploitation of Chinese territory, the introduction of Christianity into China, the constant bullying of the natives by foreigners, aroused the Chinese to concerted action. To the fogyish Chinese mind, every- thing foreign was repulsive. They could not distinguish the work of an American missionary from the opium traffic of a British merchant. The only way, they thought, that they could enjoy again the undisturbed peace of the old times was to drive all the " foreign devils " out of the country. Prince Tuan, an influential reactionary, formed an organization known as the Society of Boxers to expel all foreigners from China. This movement was secretly en- couraged by the Empress Dowager, who was holding the supreme power in China after the coup d'etat in 1898, and by all the reactionary officials under her. The movement spread like wild-fare, and the army of Boxers joined by im- perial forces occupied Peking. Foreign repre- 54 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY sentatives fled to the British Legation. Many tragic incidents occurred to both the Chinese and the foreigners in China during the struggle.* Promptly an expeditionary force composed of English, French, German," Russian, Japanese, and American soldiers marched to Peking and lifted the siege. The imperial court fled west- ward, and later appointed Li Hung Chang as its representative to negotiate with the Powers. This was the most critical period of Chinese history in recent times. China had incurred ** well-nigh universal indignation," as Minister Wu expressed it, when he was presenting a cablegram from his emperor to President Mc- Kinley, asking for American aid in settling her difficulties with the Powers. The Powers, with good reason, looked upon the Chinese Govern- ment as hostile, and many of them — especially Russia — were willing to consent to the partition of China. But the United States insisted on re- garding the outrages as the work of insurrec- tionists, and remained on friendly terms with the constituted authorities, thus firmly uphold- ing the territorial and administrative integrity *For full account of the Boxer War, consult Paul Henry Clemants, " The Boxer Rebellion," Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 66, 1915 ; Rhee, " Spirit of Korean Independence," pp. 175, ff. ; " Foreign Relations," 1900, pp. ^J, ff. * The German troops remained at Kiaochow and took no part in the expedition, although the allied forces were led by Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee chosen as Generalissimo to satisfy the Kaiser. CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 55 of China. Then, too, many a wise statesman in the world saw a condition of general anarchy and the possibility of world war over the spoils, in case China were partitioned. It was much better for a nation like England, which enjoyed the largest foreign trade in China, to restore the status quo, and enjoy the commercial privi- leges, than to take the chance of losing them by partition. Thus the Powers finally followed the lead of the United States in preserving China as a nation and maintaining there the principle of the " open door." The final protocol settling the difficulties con- sequential to the Boxer Uprising was signed on September 7, 1901. China agreed: (1) to pun- ish those who were responsible for and who took part in foreign massacres; (2) to adopt adequate measures to prevent recurrence of such disorders; (3) to indemnify the losses sus- tained by foreign nations and individuals ; (4) to improve trade relation with foreign nations. ^During the lengthy negotiation prior to the signing of this protocol the United States threw the weight of its influence on the side of modera- tion, urging the powers not to make the burden too heavy for China. The total indemnity ($333,000,000 approximately) imposed upon China was far in excess of the actual losses sus- tained by the powers. The share that was as- signed to the United States was a little over 56 THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE POLICY $24,000,000, whereas the actual loss sustained by the American Government and its citizens was only about $11,000,000. Once more the American Government deviated from the grab- it-all spirit of modern diplomacy, and in 1907 returned the amount in excess of actual losses. The Chinese Government, in return, sent Tang Shao Yi as its special envoy to thank the United States, and decided to use the money thus re- turned by the American Government to educate Chinese students in American colleges and uni- versities.' This step taken by the American Government was an act of simple justice, and it remains to be seen whether the European Powers who took advantage of China's prostra- tion to demand far heavier indemnities than their claims justified will yet take similar action.' y 3. The Russo-Japanese Struggle After the protocol was signed, other nations withdrew their forces from China, but Russia retained her forces in Manchuria and gradually strengthened her position in eastern China. She not only retained all vantages gained prior to and during the Boxer Uprising, but was • There were 679 Chinese students (male alone) in Ameri- can colleges and universities in 1916, accordinp^ to the Directory of Foreign Students, published by the Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students, Interna- tional Y. M. C. A., New York City. ' Washington Post, June 19,1907; opinion of Judge Charles Sumner Lobinger of the American Court in Shanghai, China, Nebraska State Journal, October 11, 191 7. CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 57 secretly pressing upon the Chinese Government for further conceSvSions. This serious situation led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to put a check upon Russian influence. The United States entered a formal protest at Petrograd and succeeded in getting a definite promise from the Russian Government not to oppose the opening of two Manchurian cities, Mukden and Antung, to foreign commerce by China. This did not, however, check the out- stretching clutch of the Northern Bear, and Russian influence in Manchuria kept on increas- ing. Japan was now ready to make an active re- sistance. Her attempts to negotiate with Russia the question of neutrality and the " open door " in Manchuria and China were fruitless.' Feeling that she was strong enough to combat her rival, and that the Anglo-Japanese AlHance safeguarded her from the attack of a third power in alliance with Russia, she struck the first blow on February 10, 1904. Secretary Hay promptly sent identical notes to Russia and to Japan, expressing the wish of the United States that the neutrality and administrative entity of China should be respected by the belligerents. In reply both Russia and Japan agreed to re- ■ For the complete ^ diplomatic correspondence between Russia and Japan prior to the opening of hostility, see "Russo-Japanese War," published by Collier & Son, New York. 58 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY spect Chinese neutrality outside of Manchuria. On January 10, 1905, Hay addressed circular notes to the powers to the effect that it was the wish of the United States that the war would not result in any concession of Chinese terri- tory. This note met with the hearty approval of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, and Italy, ^he greatest single stroke of diplomacy that established American dignity and prestige in the Pacific basin since the declaration of the " open door " doctrine, was the mediation of President Roosevelt on behalf of the two bel- ligerent nations. Russia was completely pros- trated, and Japan, though victorious, was at the end of her financial resources. On June 8, 1905, President Roosevelt made a formal appeal in the interest of the civilized world to the em- perors of Japan and Russia to cease hostilities and open direct negotiations. Both nations complied with the request and sent their envoys to the United States to open a peace conference. The conference began its regular sessions at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on August 8th, and the treaty was signed September 5th. More than once during the negotiations, the en- voys came to points of controversy and were unable to reach an agreement. The Russian commission was headed by the astute diplomat, Count Witte, who made a most favourable im- CHINA m THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 59 pression and drew to himself the sympathetic interest of the public. In presenting the cause of his country, he capitaHzed the situation created by his striking personality. He con- ceded every demand made by Japan, but refused to pay a single ruble of indemnity. President Roosevelt unofficially advised, restrained, and urged the envoys to compromise their differ- ences. Russia finally agreed to recognize Japan's paramount interest in Korea; to trans- fer, with the consent of China, her lease of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and adjacent territories to Japan ; and to evacuate Manchuria and leave its doors wide open to the trade of the worlj. By the result of this conference Japan, per- haps, got as much as she had expected, although not as much as she wanted. The Japanese envoys went home somewhat disgruntled — at least outwardly so — and when they reached home they had to have police protection from howling mobs. Japanese dailies made bitter comments to the effect that Japan won all the battles in the war, and lost all the spoils on the green table. Later, when the anti-American feeling was high as an echo of the anti- Japanese sentiment in California, more than one period- ical in Japan referred to the diplomatic " loss '* sustained by Japan at the Portsmouth confer- ence as the result of American intervention. The close of the Russo-Japanese War marks 60 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY the beginning of new political relations between the East and the West Up to this time the Western nations — especially the United States — looked upon the East with sympathetic regard. But now, one of the nations of the effete East had proved herself equal to a Western Power in the field of military operations, and able to give as well as take blows. From now on the West must necessarily change its attitude toward the East from that of patronage to one of recog- nition on the basis of honour and equality. The United States has the proud distinction of having opened Japan and Korea to modern civilization, and of having saved China from disintegration after the Boxer rebellion. Japan knew the honourable intentions of the United States in the Orient, and looked up to her for moral support in her struggle for recognition from the Western Powers. And the United States regarded Japan as one of her brightest proteges and took pride in having played such an important part in bringing a secluded mediaeval nation up to the first rank among the modern civilized nations. All this era of good feeling and mutual trust ended with the Ports- mouth conference. Henceforth Japan was to be a rival of the United States in the theater of Eastern commerce and politics. Japan, a new recruit in the field of commercial and political expansion of the world, must necessarily in- CHINA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTUEY 61 fringe upon the rights of the pioneer nations of the West, including the United States, in order to realize her dream of greatness. And the United States, for the safeguarding of its interests, was compelled to lay certain restric- tions upon Japan, such as restriction of Japa- nese immigration into the United States and its insular possessions, and vindication of the prin- ciples of the " open door " and the political in- tegrity of China. Japan in turn resented these restrictions as an obstruction of her imperial progress. But she is at present in no position to make a vigorous protest to the United States. Economically, the United States is her second best customer, China being the first ; and from a military standpoint, the United States is far superior both in man-power and in resources, Japan feels that she must " eat worms " for the time being. She prefers to have all negotia- tions not satisfactory to her postponed indefi- nitely until such time when she will be in a position to make demands as well as to make " appeals." She must be content to cover her wounds with diplomatic grace. In 1914, when Secretary Bryan handed the American reply to the Japanese note concerning the pending California Alien Law question, Ambassador Chinda said, "Will this be final?" Secretary Bryan replied, " There is nothing final between friends." Ill AMERICAN RIVALRY WITH JAPAN I. The American Fleet in the Far East SUBSEQUENT American policies in the Far East have been along the path laid down by John Hay. The Root-Takahira agreement exchanged at Washington, Novem- ber 30, 1908, outlined the mutual position of the United States and Japan regarding China as follows: (1) to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific; (2) to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, and to preserve the principle of equal commercial opportunity in China; (3) to reciprocally "re- spect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region " ; (4) to preserve and maintain the independence and integrity of China; (5) the two governments will communi- cate with each other in case the status quo or the principle of equal opportunity is threatened as above defined. It was not a formal treaty but merely an agreement — a " gentlemen's agreement " — rely- 62 ^TRersr^sK l^M£/?e£N ^ \N/1NK/N