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 TEN HINTS 
 
 Addressed to Wise Men ; concerning the 
 dispute which ended, on Nov, 8, 1809? 
 in the dismission of Mr, Jackson, the 
 British minister to the United States. 
 
 FIRST HINT. Foreign Ministers differ in tlieir powers. 
 
 IT appears that Mr. Jackson, at his first appointmentj 
 was intended to be the mere successor of Mr. Erskine, as the 
 British minister at Washington ; but before his departure 
 from England, he had farther objects assigned to him on this 
 ; mission. He received therefore a commission (or power 
 ,J/^ of attorney) from the King of England, to act in his name, 
 in certain special concerns ; and this power was not only cei'- 
 tified by the King's si .Tuature, but was sealed with the great 
 seal of the nation, and accompanied with particular instruc- 
 tions for his guidance on this occasion ; the whole arrange- 
 ment resembling, both as to form and precaution, what is seen 
 in proceedings of this sort in private life. This solemn na- 
 tional act or instrument formed the highest species of cre- 
 dentials which a subject, sent on a foreign mission, by the 
 supreme executive power of the British empire, is ever ac- 
 customed to receive ; and Mr. Jackson needed nothing be- 
 yond this to have enabled him to treat with Bonaparte him- 
 self. To have called Mr. Jackson, Ambassatlor Extraordin- 
 ary, might have added to his title, but not to his powers for 
 transacting business.— But great as these powers were, one 
 additional circumstance was necessary before they could have 
 complete effect. Whatever Mr. Jackson signed, required 
 his Master's ratification ; that is, the king's confirmation of 
 it, given in writing, to be put into the possessiort c^f the A7ne- 
 rican Government^ within a fixed time. The reason for this 
 last difference from the mode of proceeding usual in private 
 affairs, will be given under another head. 
 
 The instructions, which accompanied the above comnjis- 
 aion, authorized Mr. Jackson to conclude a treaty ; but on the 
 subject of the orders in council in particular, he was direct- 
 ed for the moment to avoid offering any proposals on his 
 side ; and merely to attend to such, as should be offered to 
 him. The reason for this restriction was, that it was diffi- 
 cult to know what terms he ought to offer, considering the 
 objections v/hich had occurred on the part ©f the Airtericv.n 
 
H^'> 
 
 Government to every thing hitherto done or said, on the 
 part of England, on this subject. Mr. Jackson however ob- 
 served to Mr. Smith, that several obstacles on this head had 
 latterly been removed. The orders in council of April 26, 
 1809, had made a change as to the places to which neutral 
 trade was left open ; certain offensive duties on neutral trade 
 had been abolished ; the increase of restrictions on the ene- 
 my's colonial trade had become less of an object to England, 
 than at former periods ; and the British Government no lon- 
 ger tendered the British navy to assist in enforcing American 
 laws against trading with the enemy, since the offer had ex- 
 cited jealousy. Mr. Jackson might have added, that it was 
 scarcely equitable to expect that England should prepare a 
 set of offers on this occasion, merely to be open to criticism, 
 when it was presumed that Mr. Madison would hitns elf de- 
 cide upon nothing, till the great events at issue in Europe 
 were decided ; and it was as reasonable for England to de- 
 sire to wait for this knowledge to govern its conduct, as for 
 the United States. 
 
 Respecting the negotiation however on the subject of the 
 Chesapeake, Mr, Jackson was authorized immediately to en- 
 ter upon it. He did this accordingly; but the issue proved, 
 that he was the third British minister destined to fail in the 
 attempt. 
 
 Concerning the full extent of Mr. Jackson's commission, 
 we are left much in the dark. But the close of his letter of 
 Oct. 11, 1809, implies, that his full powers regarded " the 
 maintaining a perfect and cordial understanding with the 
 United States, and bringing to a complete and satisfactory ad- 
 justment all the points of difference that had arisen between 
 the two governments ; fostering a mutual and solid friend- 
 ship and cordiality." His commission might also have ex- 
 tended to other objects ; but his government probably enter- 
 tained no immediate hope of his procuring a treaty of com- 
 merce, and a treaty of defence and alliance was still less pro- 
 bable, even if it had been conceived politic to suggest it. 
 
 The authority of Mr. Erskine fell considerably short of 
 that of Mr. Jackson ; and the publick peace and publick dig- 
 nity require, that this difference between a minister with full 
 powers (that is, with a regular commission) and a minister 
 in ordinary and without full powers, should be understood at 
 all times. 
 
 Common ministers with common letters of credence, (not* 
 withstanding they may be styled plenipotentiaries) ought to 
 confine themselves to common objects : such as represent- 
 ing their principal on publick occasions, delivering and re- 
 ceiving messages and explanations, collecting and sending 
 home political intelligence, preventing misunderstandings, 
 protecting the persons and property of their fellow subjects 
 
by passports and other means, introducing their countrymen 
 of certain descriptions at the courts at which they reside, set- 
 'ling light affairs, executing common orders, and acting as 
 •yell as the case admits in unforeseen occurrences till they 
 -"btain express directions from their principals. But to act 
 definitively in high concerns, without necessity, is highly im- 
 proper on their side ; and to bind their country by treaties 
 and contracts, is wholly out of their p.rovince. Peculiar con- 
 cerns and the conclusion of treaties and contracts require 
 powers far beyond any thing which can be held to be convey- 
 ed by the usual credential letters, presented on appearing for 
 the first time at a foreign court. Such powers may be added 
 from time to time in the form of special instructions ; or by 
 commission under the private or the national seal of the prin- 
 cipal ; and they often are so added, and as far as they go, 
 they communicate authority, according to the case, and no 
 farther. 
 
 Let us apply what has been said to Messi's. Jackson and 
 Erskine, the British ministers at Washington, as far as regards 
 treaties and ccatracts. — Mr. Jackson, by his commission un- 
 der the great seal of England was qualified to obtain credit 
 on his own word, on all the occasions, however multiplied 
 and important, to which his o/ien (or, as Mr. Smith calls it, 
 his patent) commission related. But Mr. Erskine was entit- 
 led to credit only in those concerns, in which he was special- 
 ly empowered to act by his instructions. Mr. Jackson, of the 
 two, was evidently the more dignijied agent ; because, before 
 he took leave of his court, his high office had been bestowed 
 upon him in preference to others, and did not fall to him as a 
 mere act of convenience or necessity ; whereas it so happen- 
 ed, that Mr. Erskine did not possess even his naked ap- 
 pointment as minister in ordinary, by the election of his last 
 superiours ; but merely because the^adrainistration, in which 
 Mr. Canning acted, found him stationed at Washington. 
 There was also a greater security in transacting business 
 with Mr. Jackson, than with Mr. Erskine, since the lord high 
 Chancellor of England would not have affixed the national 
 seal to Mr. Jackson's commission, had it not been pursuant 
 to a vote of the British cabinet ; but Mr. Erskine's instruc- 
 tions might have proceeded (or might afterwards have been 
 affirmed to have proceeded) singly from the act of the minis- 
 ter for the foreign department. 
 
 On the head of Instructions a feW words will serve us. 
 Each minister, just as in private life, receives the orders of 
 his principal for governing his conduct ; for, of course, he ii5 
 to act as little as possible from his own fancy. Such instruc- 
 tions may be given either to ministers with full powers (or 
 commissions) or to ministers without them. When given to 
 njinisters without full powers or regular commissions, they 
 
invest him "with a certain authority ; for when a man is direct- 
 ed to act in a certain case, he is emjiowercd to act, as far as 
 regards his principal. But something more is wanted for the 
 satisfaction of those nvith whom an ordinary minister is to 
 treat ; and therefore, besides his private instructions, he 
 ought to have some paper from his principal, which he may 
 defioait with the person who negotiates with him ; declaring 
 that he acts with authority in the case before him. This is 
 sometimes overlooked, Avhere there is a mutual confidence ; 
 but either this document, or a certijied co/iy of the authority 
 rectived in the private instructioiiSf ought habitually to be 
 asked for ; not only to give a title to claim ratification of what 
 may be done, or to demand exjilanations for refusing a rati- 
 fication ; but to prevent a court from spending its time fruit- 
 lessly in spurious negotiations, and perhaps making impru- 
 dent discoveries, and even becoming ridiculous for falling in- 
 to a trap either of the agent or of his court. This rule is 
 useful in proportion as courts are distant from each other ; 
 tricks, in this case being least easily discovered ; for between 
 neighbouring courts, the authenticity of what is going for- 
 ward may easily be known by each party, by means of appli- 
 cation for information through its own agent at the opposite 
 court. It follows also, from what has been said, that there is 
 no case where ratifications are more necessary, than that of 
 engagements made through oi'dinary ministers : for in pro- 
 portion to tiie 'ivant of power in the agent, there is a necessi- 
 ty for these engagements receiving the sanction of the prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 One additional remark will close all that is farther to be 
 observed on this head. — Ordi.iury and special powers (as in 
 the case of iVIr. Jackson) may reside in the same person : but 
 nothing on the other hand is more frequent than for a govern- 
 ment to pass by a common minister, and send a special agent 
 to the court where he resides to transact busmess ^part from 
 him ; not only in the case of treaties, but where it is neces- 
 sary for purposes of condolence, congratulation or apology. 
 Thus Mr. Jay concluded a treaty with England, without the 
 concurrence of the stationary minister ; Mr. Pinkney was 
 made joint commissioner with Mr. Munroc, the settled Ame- 
 rican minister in London, to negotiate another such treaty ; 
 and Mr. Rose came to apologize for the attack on the Chesa- 
 peake frigate, notwithstanding the British court had a fixed 
 minister here in the person oi Mr. Erskinc. Additional min- 
 isters of course make additional expense ; but the addition 
 of expense is too trifling for national consideration, if by this 
 means, nations have the opportunity of suiting persons to oc- 
 casions^ accordingly as these occasions demand talent, infor- 
 mation, dignity, or something to express a marked de^-ee of 
 attention. 
 
SECOND HINT. — Reasons for Mr. Erskine's being desired 
 to correct his own mistakes. 
 Mr. Madison having objected to the methods employed by 
 the British government for ex/ilaining its refusal to confirm 
 the arrangement made through Mr. Erskine, the subject re- 
 quires a distinct discussion. 
 
 The arrangement with Mr. Erskine, in April, 1809, regard- 
 ed two objects ; the orders in council, and the attack on the 
 Chesapeake. 
 
 As soon as the British government received news of this 
 arrangement, they resolved to disavow it. Accordingly they 
 immediately disavowed it in form. Mr. Canning (then British 
 secretary of State) waited with this view in person upon Mr. 
 Pinkney the American minister in London ; and having read 
 to him two despatches sent to Mr. Erskine, dated January 23, 
 1809, declared that Mr. Erskine's authority rested on these 
 despatches, which nevertheless not only differed from, but con- 
 tradicted, his arrangement. This he signified again to Mr. 
 Pinkney, by a letter, dated May 27. In this letter, he in- 
 closed the copy of a new order in council, dated May 24, by 
 which the King himself declared Mr. Erskine's arrangement to 
 be such, as he had not authorized^ and could not approve. 
 (The regulations contained in this order of council, we may 
 observe as we go along, were solely and avowedly calculated 
 to lesson the inconvenience arising to the United States from 
 its rejection ; and these regulations were afterwai-ds extend- 
 ed still farther, on the suggestion of Mr. Pinkney.) Mr. 
 Jackson's departure havin;^, in the event, been unexpectedly 
 delayed, " the reasons which induced the king to disavow the 
 act of Mr. Erskine" were (according to Mr. Jackson's letter 
 of October 11th) " veiy fully and forcibly stated to Mr. Er- 
 skine," "in the instructions conveying to him the King's in- 
 tentions on this subject;" and Mr. Erskine was relied upon 
 for a faithful commvinication of these reasons to the American 
 government. 
 
 What Mr. Erskine did as to these explanations was consid- 
 ered by Mr. Smith, as amounting to nothing; for he tells Mr. 
 Jackson (in his letter of October 19th) that '•'• the instructions 
 »n this jioint given to Mr. JLrskine were never carried into 
 execution ;" and, in truth, we find nothing on record from 
 Mr. Erskine which at all related to the subject, except in the 
 beginning of his letter of July 31st, and the close of his let- 
 ter of August 14th. 
 
 When Mr. Jackson however first arrived at Washington, 
 being ignorant of Mr. Erskine's silence, he conceived this 
 matter to be wholly set at rest. But Mr. Smith seems 
 to have understood, by a mistake which was natural enough, 
 that Mr. Canning on May 27 (or perhaps earlier) had said, 
 that Mr. Jackson ivould be directed to explain the disavowal. 
 
Though neither Mr. Jackson had sailed upoh his mission, nor 
 Mr. Erskine retired from his post, so early as Mr. Canning 
 had contemplated, yet Mr. Jackson was naturally asked by 
 Mr. Smith, whether he was the bearer of the expected expla- 
 nations ; and Mr. Jackson promptly replied, that he was not. 
 The two conferences which took place between Mr. Smith 
 and Mr. Jackson having passed over without any thing occur- 
 ring which was material on this head, Mr. Jackson, on Octo- 
 ber 9, was suddenly called upon to offer, in writings whatever 
 he chose to state on these subjects. — Mr. Jackson, though not 
 peculiarly instructed on this head, and though remaining per- 
 suaded in himself that enough had been done already, espe- 
 cially as no comlilaint had occurred on the subject, either to 
 himself or Mr. Erskine, nevertheless (in conformity to his or- 
 ders to settle all disjiutes) resolved to give the explanations, 
 as desired. He gave them in succession, as the case seemed 
 to call for them : but unfortunately, none of these explanations 
 •were cheerfully accepted ; and a part were so unfavourably 
 received, on the supposed ground of their implying blame in 
 the American government, that Mr. Jackson fell into disgx-ace. 
 A week had served to close the conferences with him ; and 
 the month which followed this week saw an end to the corres- 
 pondence also ; Mr. Jackson being informed, that " no farther 
 communications would be received from him." Such is the 
 historical part of this subject. 
 
 We are thus prepared to inquire, why Mr. Erskine was di- 
 rected to deliver the above written reasons^ notwithstanding 
 (to use the words of Mr. Smith's letter of October 19 to Mr. 
 Jackson) " the British government had publickly withdrawn 
 its confidence from Mr. Erskine." 
 
 First then, though the British administration had really 
 withdrawn its confidence in Mr. Erskine's discretion, they still 
 considered him as an obedient agent ; and they knew that he 
 retained the good opinion of the American government for in- 
 tegrity. Negociation and a pledge of the national faith had 
 no concern in the delivery of a written paper ; and in point of 
 dignity of family Mr. Erskine was Mr. Jackson's superior. 
 There seemed no objection therefore to Erskine as a channel 
 of communication, and orders were accordingly given to him 
 on this subject, though it seems that they have never been 
 sufficiently complied with. It must indeed be confessed to be 
 singular, that the American government should set its face 
 against Mr. Erskine as the bearer of exjilanations on this 
 subject, when Mr. Smith and Mr. Gallatin had themselves 
 looked to him as the giver of exfilanations on this occasion : 
 what is, if possible, still more remarkable, Mr. Smith more 
 than intimated a doubt, whether Mr. Erskine's authority was 
 not better than that of Mr. Jackson, though supported by that 
 of Mr. Canning and the King himself. But to proceed, — A 
 
second and very urgent consideration in favour of the em- 
 ployment of Mr. Erskine was, that this mode of proceeding 
 saved time at Washington. Mr. Erskine became acquainted 
 with the King's intentions as to this disavowal and his reasons 
 for that disavowal, at one and the same moment, which was at 
 least as far back as July 31. Compare here the passage in 
 Mr. Jackson's letter of October 11, above recited, and Mr^ 
 Erskine's letter of July 3 1 . Now since Mr. Jackson's first 
 conference at Washington did not occur till about October 2, 
 this (as it happened) made a difference of more than two 
 months in favour of the communication through Mr. Erskine.— 
 The next reflection is, that Mr. Erskine was not only the man 
 to be readily credited at Washington, in any acknowledgment 
 respecting his own personal mistakes ; but that the British 
 administration, by appealing to him, shewed their confidence 
 in their own cause. This indeed they have done throughout 
 the whole controversy with Mr. Erskine, since if they have 
 attacked him improperly, he holds in his hands the despatch- 
 es which ought to supply the means of his defence — Lastly, 
 as to any insult to the United States from Mr. Erskine's 
 mode of conducting himself on this occasion, the nature of 
 things did not admit of it, if the American government had 
 conducted itself so as to be free from censure towards Mr. 
 Erskine ; for the American government and himself arc, in 
 this case, to be considered as joined in one common cause ; 
 and it is with his em/iloyers alone that Mr. Erskine's temper 
 is to be tried on his return to England. 
 
 The English ministry, however, have not been entirely dis- 
 appointed by Mr. Erskine. He has twice expressed his re- 
 gret for what has passed, in a way to prove that there was no 
 collusion between himself and Mr. Canning; he has not as 
 yet censured his employers ; he has not even intimated that 
 the letter of his instructions stands on his side ; but on the 
 contrary he has dwelt principally on the conciliatory wishes^ 
 spirit, views, and intentions, of the British minister for his 
 justification. All therefore which he has omitted to say for 
 himself, he has said for his country. Mr. Jackson intimates 
 that Mr. Erskine might have done still better for his country* 
 had it not been " for the peculiar delicacy and embarrass- 
 ment of his situation." Perhaps it is this very situation 
 which gives force to Mr. Erskine's testimony, in favour of 
 the amicable temper of his employers ; for being privy to all 
 that passed, and a man sacrificed upon the occasion, and a warm 
 supporter of the English opposition, his knowledge must be 
 perfect and his evidence unbiassed, when he declares, that, 
 his government wished to do what was right and friendly to- 
 wards the United States. 
 
 But it may be said, that Mr. Erskine refers to other instruc- 
 tions than those of January *3. 1909. Wo do not forp-et this 
 
circumstance ; and it will accordingly be made the subject of 
 our next article. 
 
 THIRD HINT. — Mr. Erskine afifiears to haiie had no au- 
 thority fur chayiging the conditions sent in the letter of Jan. 
 23, 1809, respecting the Orders in Council. 
 THIS article, we see, properly regards the Orders in 
 Council only : for we shall speak of the Chesapeake frigate 
 under another head. 
 
 Mr. Erskine's letter of August 14, to Mr. Smith, is thought 
 to justify the opinion that there were two sets of instructions 
 respecting the orders in council, by the second of which Mr. 
 Erskine is said to have acted. " Finding (says Mr. Erskine) 
 that I could not obtain the recognitions, or acknowledgments 
 specified in Mr. Canning's despatch of the 23d of January, 
 (which formed but one part of his instructions to me) in the 
 formal manner required ; I considered that it would be in 
 vain to lay before the government of the United States the 
 despatch in question (which I was at liberty to have shewn 
 in extenso., had I thought proper ) But as I had such strong 
 grounds for believing that the object of his majesty's govern- 
 ment could be obtained, though in a different manner, and the 
 spirit at least of my several letters of instruction be fully 
 complied with ; I felt a thorough conviction on my mind, that 
 I should be acting in conformity with his majesty's wishes ; 
 and accordingly concluded the late provisional agreement, 
 on his majesty's behalf, with the United States." 
 
 The first impression from the passage is, that whether the 
 writer possessed one or many parts or letters of instructions 
 to guide him, he had exceeded the express words of his or- 
 ders, and could only be justified by the spirit of them ; so 
 that Avith candid reasoners, the discussion respecting the let- 
 ter of Mr. Erskine's instructions might here be safely closed. 
 But passing by this evident advantage in the argument, we 
 shall make two comments on the passage itself First, the 
 directions for healing the difficulty respecting the Chesapeake 
 h'igate (for such directions we find existed) have never yet 
 come before the publick ; and these directions formed anoth- 
 er part of Mr. Erskine's instructions ; and may here have 
 been referred to. In the next place, Mr. Erskine's impres- 
 sions respecting the friendly dispositions of his court may 
 not only have been gathered from these two parts of his in- 
 structions, but from certain additional letters A\hich he per- 
 haps received respecting the Chesapeake frigate and other ob- 
 jects. Whatever may be said of the temper of the letter of Jan. 
 23, 1809, sent by Mr. Canning to Mr. Erskine, Mr. Erskine 
 himself (whose judgment alone is here in question) thought 
 it conciliatory ; and had he concluded his arrangement under 
 a different impression, he must have opposed not ouJy the 
 
iecter, but the s^iirit of his instructions ; and had been left 
 doubly in the wrong. So much for the first pretence in fa- 
 vour of two sets of instructions, one behind the other, respect- 
 ing the orders in council. 
 
 We shall now examine a second evidence for the existence 
 of two sets of instructions. Mr. Jackson in his letter of Oc- 
 tober 1 1th to Mr. Smith, relates as follows : " You (Mr. Smith) 
 informed me, that you uiiderstood^ that Mr. Ersldne had two 
 sets of instructions to regulate his conduct ; and that upon 
 one of them, which had not been communicated either to you 
 or the publick, was to be rested the justification of the terms 
 finally agreed upon." Mr. Jackson thus replies to this, in 
 the next sentence : " It is my duty, sir, solemnly to declare to 
 you, and through you to the President, that the despatch from 
 Mr. Canning to Mr. Erskine (which you have made the basis 
 of an official corresfiondence with the latter gentleman, and 
 which was read by the former to the American minister in 
 London) is the only despatch by which the conditions were 
 prescribed to Mr. Erskine for the conclusion of an arrange- 
 ment with this country on the matter to which it relates" 
 (namely, the orders in council.) Mr. Jackson, who here 
 gives this statement, was loudly declared by the American 
 government to be the person "obviously" proper for the pur- 
 pose of this explanation ; and his solemn assurance, confirm- 
 ed as it has been by all his employers, would be accepted as 
 evidence in a case of this sort by any civilized government in 
 the world. We shall for the present therefore suppose it 
 correct, (reserving to ourselves the liberty afterwards of 
 proving it so :) and consequently decide, that there is noth- 
 ing yet proved in favour of the existence of a second set of 
 instructions, or of a modification of instructions, concerning 
 the orders of council. 
 
 To conceal nothing, however, in favour of the existence of 
 two sets of instructions, we pass to Mr. Smith's reply of Oc^ 
 tober I9thf to the solemn assura^ice of Mr. Jackson. Mr. S. 
 says, " nothing is more common in publick negociations, than 
 to begin with a higher demand ; and that failing, lo descend 
 to a lower," and " to have, if not two sets of instructions, two''> 
 or more grades of propositions, in the same set of instruc- 
 tions." Mr. Smith then asserts (what is not quite correct in 
 theory, as regards this dispute ; namely,) that " what were 
 the real and entire instructions given to Mr. Erskine, is a 
 matter essentially between him and his government ;" and 
 he then immediately adds, " Mr Erskine had., or at least be- 
 tiex^ed he had, sufficient authority to conclude the arrange- 
 ment ; [as] his formal assurances during our discussion left 
 no room to doubt, Sec." The conjectural statements in the two 
 first of these passages, cannot for a moment be admitted 
 in opposition to the positive evidence of Mr. Jackson and his 
 
10 
 
 whole court ;— and the offensive alternative in the last of 
 them is as little agreeable to the rules of evidence, as to na- 
 tional policy. 
 
 Is it proper for example, to insinuate, not only that Mr, 
 Jackson, but Mr. Canning, the king of England, the Cabinet 
 Ministers, and the privy council (since the orders of the king 
 in council, of May 24th, 1 809, imply all this) can possibly have 
 combined in a falsehood ; for it is thus intimated in that part 
 of the a/rerKa^i-ye, which supposed on OCTOBER 19th, 1809, 
 that Mr. Erskine " had authority" for what he did ? Is it can- 
 did to attribute to Mr. Erskine the continuance even of his 
 mere belief on this subject, when he himself professes to have 
 abandoned that belief ? Is it fair to deny at one moment the 
 propriety of employing Mr. Erskine to explain, because he 
 was a discredited agent, and to point out Mr. Jackson as " ob- 
 viously" the proper person for the object ; and then immedi- 
 ately after, to defame Mr. Jackson by means of worn out con- 
 jectures and alternatives, borrowed (according to appearance) 
 only from Mr. Erskine, six and eight months ago ? All this 
 would produce an insult and a challenge in private life ; and 
 this is a still more dangerous indecorum in public life ; and 
 far greater than it will be found that Mr. Smith had a right to 
 attribute to Mr. Jackson, Avhen he dismissed him from his 
 post as minister. 
 
 But it is said in the fourth place, that the British Cabinet 
 disavowed the arrangement with Mr. Erskine because their 
 affairs were more prosperous on May 24, 1809, when the king 
 rejected Mr. Erskine's arrangement, than in January, when 
 the instructions were framed. — This insinuation will succeed 
 no better than the other. The orders in council had been 
 imposed when Spain and Austria were connected with France ; 
 and therefore, we may conjecture that British measures re- 
 specting them were not influenced at any succeeding time by 
 the sentiments of those governments. But the matter does not 
 rest here. At the latter end of Januaryj 1809, it was known 
 that the English losses in Spain were moderate ; and that the 
 war there might be resumed on as favourable terms as before ; 
 and at that date also, Austria was supposed likely to declare 
 herself against France —-Consequently, England was not in a 
 state of vinusual discouragement in Jan. 1 809. Neither was she 
 in a state of much exultation in May following. Nothing had 
 then been done in Spain. Austria had declared war against 
 France, but it was only to end in new defeats ; and Sweden 
 had changed her government, and deserted England. To 
 these facts let us add another. The British, Avho yield much 
 less to circumstances than is supposed by some persons, 
 framed their orders of council in a moment of difficulty, to 
 meet that difficulty : and when they have relaxed respecting 
 them, ik has not always been to please the power which has 
 
11 
 
 been most clamorous against them.— Thus, a change in the 
 orders of council which took place on April 26, 1809, was an- 
 nounced six months before to Mr. Pinkney as probable ; and 
 it proved to be (according to the very natural explanation of it 
 by the English) an accommodation to the allies of England, 
 rather than to America ; except in some points, which were 
 yielded to America without any thing being asked in return. 
 This is a sufficient answer to a criminal charge, made upon 
 no other grounds, than that it would be convenient for certain 
 assertions, if it should firove to be true. 
 
 Having gone through what regards testimony and conjec- 
 ture on one side, let us next proceed to argument on the oth- 
 er, where we shall find the case equally clear ; still observ- 
 ing, that the inquiry only respects the orders of council ; for 
 what concerns the Chesapeake frigate will sufficiently be no- 
 ticed under another head. To save room and trouble, we 
 shall give our observations on this subject in an abridged, but 
 intelligible manner. 
 
 1st. The whole despatch of January 23, 1809, respecting 
 the orders in council, having been extended before us, we see 
 that it contains in itself no second set of instructions, and no 
 " second grade" of propositions ; nor does it leave room even 
 for variations,except such as itself prescribes ; and these varia- 
 tions regard the mode of procedure, and not the matter con- 
 cerned. 2d. No preceding set of instructions can easily have 
 been mixed with those of January 23 ; which, as being entire- 
 ly founded on new and unexjiected intelligence^ stand entirely 
 by themselves. 3d. Prior instructions, having been of a harsh- 
 er description, cannot have been employed to soften a set of 
 propositions, which (according to the supposition) were mild- 
 er than themselves in their origin. 4. The propositions fi- 
 nally signed by Mr. Erskine clearly could not have been among 
 these prior propositions, because Mr. Canning had rejected 
 those very propositions some time before, when they were of- 
 fered by Mr. Pinkney. 5. Mr. Smith himself admits, that 
 had the American government seen the whole of the despatch 
 of January 23, it would itself never have signed the arrange- 
 ment with Mr. Erskine ; plainly, as we are to presume, be- 
 cause this arrangement not only disagreed with the letter of 
 that despatch, but, in their opinion, even with its temper and 
 spirit, (as well as with their own feelings.) 6th. In the im- 
 portant subject of the orders of council, Mr. Erskine's politi- 
 cal connexions, both at home and in America, made it unlike- 
 ly that he would be entrusted with any second set of proposi- 
 tions, which would lessen his zeal in supporting the Jirs(. 
 7th. Whoever reads the despatch of January 23, respecting 
 the orders in council, must perceive that it tied Mr. Er- 
 skine's hands in every particular, rendering him a mere ma- 
 chine ; and plainly informing him that the finishing of the bu- 
 
12 
 
 sincss must be left to another agent, 8th. Under these im- 
 pressions INIr. Erskinc thrice culls what he had done " a pro- 
 visional agreement." 
 
 If to these considerations uc add the peremptory affirma- 
 mations of Mr. Jackson and of his court, and the present cau- 
 tious assertions of Mr. Erskine on this subject, with the easy- 
 way of explaining Avhat Mr. Erskine says as to " other in- 
 structions," we shall find that Ave may sufely cease to trouble 
 ourselves more about "•double sets of instructions." In case 
 however prejudice or pride should lead any to continue to 
 believe in the fact, it is not necessary that they should take 
 pains to insult a foreign court with a shfw of such belief, for 
 which they know, that they cannot produce a particle of cred- 
 ible evidence. They may believe, as men sometimes will, 
 ■what they have no right X.o:affirm ; but then, as in pi'ivate life, 
 they ought to keep such opinions to themselves. In cases of 
 apology, in particular, we frequently observe declarations ac- 
 cepted by men of all descriptions and under every circum- 
 stance, the terms of which are not fully credited ; but the 
 point in question we perceive is to obtain the apology, and 
 not to inquire (in a direct manner, and addressed to the party) 
 the -way in which the apologizer settles his accounts with his 
 conscience. To go beyond this is to bring ourselves into the 
 line of accountability, and to give others a right to demand 
 apologies from us. If this be true in private affairs, infinite- 
 ly more true is it in publick concerns. Here honour may con- 
 sist in demanding and in obtaining concessions ; but these be- 
 ing once obtained, the piiblick is afterwards to be kept as 
 much as possible out of qu.irrels, tiie consequence of which 
 may extLiid to an immense mass of property and ot life. 
 Should indiviauals therefore, entrusted with the government 
 of a LOuntry,contiLue reviling at every step on these occasions, 
 it must lead us to suspect tliat they have some other lessons 
 to learn in the art of government besides that of self-command. 
 
 FOURTH HINT. Concerning ratifications, and the cere- 
 monies to be used by those refusing to ratify the acts of 
 their agents. 
 
 WHEN the American Secretary of State, in his letter 
 to Mr. Jackson, of Oct. 19, refers to Vattel for the proceed- 
 ings proper in the case of a disavowed agent, he has not done 
 justice to his subject. He produces only one sentence from 
 that author, and overlooks vai'ious others, to which we must 
 of necessity refer. 
 
 " A treaty (says Vattel) is a pact [or covenant] made with 
 a view to the publick welfare by a superior power, either for 
 perpetuity or for a considerable time.. The pacts [or cove- 
 nants] with a view to transitory affairs, are called agreements, 
 conventions and pactions. Sovereigns treat with each other 
 
13 
 
 by their proxies, who are invested with sufficient power, and 
 who are commonly called plenipotentiaries. — The rights of 
 the proxy are exfiressed in the instructions that are given 
 him. He ought not to deviate from them ; but every thing 
 he promises, ivithin the terms of his commission and the ex- 
 tent of his powers, bind his constituent. At present, to avoid 
 all danger and difficulty, princes reserve to themselves the 
 ratification of Avhat has been concluded upon in their name, 
 by their ministers. The full power is nothing but a procu- 
 ration, (cum libera fiotestate ) : But as princes cannot be con- 
 strained to fulfil their engagements any otherwise than by 
 force of arms, they are accjistomed not to lay any stress on 
 their treaties^ till they have agreed upon and ratified them. 
 Every thing that their minister has concluded remaining 
 without force till the prince's ratification, there is [thus] less 
 danger in giving him a full power. But to refuse ivith hon- 
 our to ratify what has been concluded on by virtue of ^full 
 power, it is necessary that the sovereign should have strong 
 and solid reasons ; and that he should shew in particular, that 
 his minister has deviaced from his instructions. A treaty is 
 valid, if there be no fault in the manner in which it was con- 
 cluded ; and for this purpose, nothing more can be required, 
 than a sufficient power in the contracting parties, and their 
 mutual consent sufficiently declared." (See Vattel, Book 2, 
 articles 152, 153, 156, and 157.) It is somewhat peculiar, 
 that Mr. Smith should only refer to the last sentence but one, 
 in these extracts ; and not to what precedes and follows it. 
 
 The principle of a ratification, however, is here made clear: 
 and a ratification (we have said) is the chief particular by 
 which di pub lick is distinguished from a private contract. The 
 supreme executive power has too much at stake, not to wish 
 to revise the acts of its agents, especially if situated at a dis- 
 tance from the place where the contract was signed. Publick 
 contracts therefore have, by universal consent, in modern 
 times, been made subject to l\\c four following general rules. 
 They are to be founded on express powers of attorney, or their 
 equivalent ; these powers are, or ought to be, exchanged ; 
 private instructions are supposed to regulate the articles con- 
 tained in them ; and yet they are to be subject to the ap- 
 proval of each contracting party, expressed in writing, for the 
 purpose of being deposited with the principal on the other 
 side. Unfortunately every one of these four rules was neg- 
 lected in the case of Mr. Erskine's arrangement, either by 
 one or by both of the negotiating parties. This we shall shew 
 in an express manner. 
 
 Mr. Erskine had no power, separate from his instructions, 
 in the case of the agreement respecting the orders in council.^ 
 for reasons which will be evident on reading those instruc- 
 tions ; nor did Mr. Madison, who (as will be shewn) chose to 
 
14 
 
 have a treaty in this case, demand such power, which was 
 the first errour. Of course no powers were exchanged, 
 which was the second errour. Mr. Erskine departed from 
 his instructions, which was the third errour And Mr. Mad- 
 ison committed the fourth in proceeding to the execution of 
 this branch of the arrangement, previous to an exchange of 
 the ratifications, which is a great errour in policy, as well 
 as in rules. In the other branch of Mr. Erskine's arrange- 
 ment, which respects the Chesajieake frigate^ not only no 
 powers or orders were exchanged, or even shewn ; but those 
 which Mr. Erskine appears to have used were perverted and 
 departed from by Mr. Madison (as will be shewn in its place) ; 
 by which means the three first rules were in succession vio- 
 lated ; and though Mr. Madison threw nothing away in the 
 execution of this branch of the arrangement, because the 
 United States were here to be the receiuers ; yet he made 
 no provision for the time of its ratification, as he ought to 
 have done by the, fourth rule. The violation of those four 
 rules was aggravated by a fifth errour, which was that of 
 censuring the British government in a message to Congress, 
 and in an official correspondence, on account of the king of 
 England's lawful discharge of his authority in disavowing the 
 proceeding of Mr. Erskine. This was an errour more flag- 
 rant than all the rest, because of its danger ; and because 
 time and warning had been given for consultijig authorities 
 ufion this subject ; and because the very authority referred 
 to, if it had been properly consulted, is one (as we have seen) 
 which puts the complainant entirely in the wrong. 
 
 Our last inquiry under this head is, ivhat ste/is are to be 
 taken when a sovereign disavows his minister ? An injured 
 sovereign is not to be deemed a penitent before a father-con- 
 fessor, or a school-boy before his preceptor. He is an equals 
 standing upright before an equal ; for often the explanation 
 comes from a stronger power to one that is weaker ; and of- 
 ten from an offended power, sensible that its agent has been 
 bribed or misled by its opponent. The ceremony prescribed 
 is therefore judicious, manly, and simple. The sovereign 
 who disavows is merely to give strong and solid reasons for 
 his conduct ; and to shew wherein his agent has departed 
 from the authority given him in trust. JVo humiliations are 
 prescribed ; and sometimes the compliment may rise to 
 apology. But since little in general is to be uttered beyond 
 the expressions of justice, that little is to be received with 
 civility ; unless there are strong reasons to the contrary — 
 Captiousness and the logick of the schools by no means be- 
 come this or any other publick occasions ; there being per- 
 haps no style of address and remark less suited than this to 
 the feelings of men of rank, or of busiyiess ; and therefore few 
 Avhich are more to be avoided. Governments may as well 
 
15 
 
 make enemies by their acts as by their words ; and habits of 
 this kind are peculiarly unfortunate, as, according to a good 
 old book, now a little out of fashion, " a soft answer turneth 
 away wrath, but grievous words stir ufi anger." 
 
 One substantial point on these occasions is to shew, that 
 the disavowed propositions differ from the instructions given. 
 Mr. Canning accordingly performed this duty as to the orders 
 in council, in its strict forms ; he read the instructions as to 
 the orders in council in their full ejctent ; and though it is 
 more than doubtful, whether his letter of May 27 to Mr. 
 Pinkney promised any thing beyond recriminations through 
 Mr. Jackson (let this remark be remembered), yet exfilana- 
 /fon* were afterwards /2roz>erf to be given, through Mr. Er- 
 -skine, and were actually given through Mr. J. in his stead. 
 
 As to the Chesapeake concern, it has been explained with 
 an exemplary union of force and of delicacy by Mr. Jackson, 
 out of the terms and phrases of the arrangement itself, as will 
 be shewn in its place ; so as to render a display of the " in- 
 structions" sent to Mr. Erskine on this head, entirely need- 
 less. Yet these instructions were read to Mr. Pinkney, in 
 the first instance ; and this not being thought explanation 
 enough, reasons were forwarded to be made known by Mr. 
 Erskine, had Mr. Erskine had courage to deliver them. 
 
 Those who deny, that the rules of a treaty apply to Mr. 
 Erskine's arrangement, will find their objection answered un- 
 der a subsequent head, in a manner which will leave them 
 little room for triumph at this objection. 
 
 Before we conclude as to the ceremonies belonging to 
 treaties, we must observe that the ministers who sign treaties 
 generally (above their signatures) insert a notice referring to 
 their full powers ; frequently adding that they have either 
 communicated or exchanged them ; and sometimes they in- 
 sert copies of these full powers, under the express name of 
 full powers^ jxt the end of their treaty. And upon examining 
 the authentick copies of these full powers, we find, that re"- 
 ference is always made to a ratification^ as an act subsequent 
 to the signature of the treaty itself. Sometimes it has even 
 been added, that ratification is (in express words) reserved ; 
 but to say tliat ratification is ^o follow, as a necessary confir- 
 matory act, implies, that it may for a due cause be withheld ; 
 for there m ould be no use in dividing the proceedino- into 
 two acts, if one were not different from the other, and so as 
 to be included in the other. 
 
 FIFTH HINT. Mr. Madison has advanced some erroneous 
 doctrines in his ?nessage of November 29, 1809, respecting 
 the disavowal, by the king of England, of Mr. Erskine's 
 arrange?nent. 
 
 MR. Madison's message above mentioned warmly cen- 
 sures the king of England's refusal to ratify what had been 
 
16 
 
 done by Mr. Erskine, in April, 1809. This will appear from 
 the following passage. " Whatever pleas may be urged for 
 a disavowal of engagements formed by diplomatick function- 
 aries, in cases where by the terms of the engagements a mu- 
 tual ratification is reserved, or where notice at the time may 
 have been given of a departure from instructions, or in ex- 
 traordinary cases, essentially violating the principles of equi- 
 ty, a disavowal could not have been apprehended in a case, 
 where no such notice or violation existed, where no such 
 ratification was reserved, and more especially, where, as is 
 now in proof, an engagement, to be executed without any such 
 ratification, was contemplated by the instructions given ; and 
 where it had, with good faith, been carried into immediate 
 execution, on the part of the United States." 
 
 This passage being somewhat obscure, it shall be repeated 
 with a slight transposition and with the insertion of some ex- 
 planatory words, which will be distinguished by brackets. — 
 Whatever pleas may be urged for a disavowal of engage- 
 ments formed by diplomatick functionaries, in cases where 
 by the terms of the engagements a mutual ratification is re- 
 served ; or where notice may have been given [by a minister, 
 at the time of signing,] of a departure from instructions ; or 
 [lastly,] in extraordinary cases, essentially violating the prin- 
 ciples of equity : [yet] a disavowal could not have been ap- 
 prehended in a case, where no such notice or violation ex- 
 isted ; where no such I'atification was reserved ; and more 
 especially where (as is now in proof) an engagement to be 
 executed without any such ratification was contemplated by 
 the instructions given ; and where it had, with good faith, 
 been carried into immediate execution, on the part of the 
 United States." 
 
 In this passage, Mr. Madison shews himself somewhat 
 mistaken, as to the firinci/iles on which a vatificatAon or con- 
 firmation of a treaty is founded. A ratification is wholly in- 
 dejiendent of a minister, being reserved (by conunon con- 
 sent J to guard against the mistakes and the corrufition of a 
 minister. The tenth article of the definitive treaty of peace 
 between the United States and Great Britain, dated Septem- 
 ber 3d, 1783, runs thus : " The solemn ratifications of the 
 present treaty, expedited in good and due form, shall be ex- 
 changed between the contracting parties in the sjiace of six 
 months., or sooner if possible ; to be computed from the day 
 of the signature of the present treaty." 
 
 This article (which is substantially the same in all cases, 
 and stands the last article in every treaty,) merely declares 
 the time allowed to the principal on each side, for giving his 
 own ratification in the proper form, and receiving that of the 
 other party ; and it declares nothing further. — But no minis- 
 ter, of his otvn authority, can prevent the operation of the 
 
17 
 
 principles which make a ratification necessary. Sovereigns, 
 aware of the danger, from the misconduct of a foreign minis- 
 ter, (who is placed in situations where the opportunities of 
 making offers to corrupt him are frequent, and where at the 
 same time he is liable to have his understanding deceived, 
 even though he may be a man of talents) have without ex- 
 ception decided, that the immense interests concerned in ne- 
 gotiations require that a treaty shall not be held to be a treaty^ 
 till it is ratified by the sujireme fiower of each of the states 
 concerned in it. If either side can prove that its instructions 
 have not been followed, either in the way of omission or com- 
 mission, and that the case is important, they may r if they please ) 
 refuse to ratify. Common sense shews this to be reasona- 
 ble ; as the gain of a fortress or even of a province or 
 of some other great object, would often encourage the of- 
 fer of the most extravagant bribes ; and practice shews .the 
 precaution thus taken to be effectual, for o/ien infidelity as to 
 treaties has perhaps never occurred in diplomatick ministers, 
 since the practice has been established. 
 
 A rule of this kind, therefore, it is not in the power of a 
 minister to set aside. If he were even to omit the usual arti- 
 cle respecting the tiine for exchanging ratifications, or give 
 too short a time for this exchange, the treaty would thereby- 
 run great risks. Good will and justice might bring things 
 to a happy issue ; but a ratification must take place express- 
 ly, or be imfilied by the silent consent of the parties, before 
 the treaty would become a regular treaty, either for the mo- 
 ment, or for the use of posterity. 
 
 In military matters, where force governs, and opportunities 
 for acting are commonly short, Generals and Admirals can 
 do much within the immediate circle of their command^ with- 
 out waiting for ratifications ; but the weaker party has still 
 sometimes so much in his power, especially where his prin- 
 cipal is near, as to make a bargain which shall require to be 
 ratified ; as has happened in various recent cases among the 
 combatants of Europe.— But in state concerns, the rule in 
 question prevails even where the courts which negotiate arc 
 close at hand, and can watch the progress of things ; and the 
 rule is still more necessary, as we have said, where the go- 
 vernments are distant ; for none therefore can the rule be 
 more necessary, than for the United States, who, besides being 
 filaced at a distance from all governments in the world., may 
 sometimes like other countries have negotiators who arc not 
 very rich or honesc ; and yet they have no secret service mo- 
 ney for bribing, and perhaps no inclination to bribe, the ne- 
 ^jotiators they receive from other countries in return. 
 
 It is true that ratifications are sometimes dispensed with, 
 >iUt never by the authority of the agent, but of the /irincifial 
 only ; and the only Avay of being sife on this subject, i^ to 
 
18 
 
 begin by demanding from the agent the written authority of 
 his principal, which ought to be carefully placed among the 
 state records. A Secretary of State, in concerns of great 
 magnitude, is not an authority sufficient ; because, as he often 
 appoints the foreign agent, a state may be ruined by a collu- 
 sion between two of its servants. — In short, the great acts 
 between nation and nation are only perfect, when they re- 
 ceive the revision and the signature of the supreme execu- 
 tive on both sides at their close ; or else when they receive 
 an assent before hand ; or lastly when the ratification is in 
 due form abando7ied from haste or other causes. 
 
 Let us apply this reasoning to Mr. Erskine's agreement. 
 Mr. Canning, on the 23d of January, 1809, writes to Mr. Ers- 
 kine, in substance thus : " Since you say that the new Ad- 
 ministration in the United States holds a favourable language 
 to us, we will put this to the test. If France and England 
 are at last to be placed on an equal footing by the United 
 States, as to their men of war, and their trade, many objec- 
 tions are removed which heretofore made it inconsistent for 
 us to act, both as regarded our dignity and interest. Should 
 it also be true that a disposition exists to admit certain pro- 
 positions (which he then mentions, being t/iree in number) 
 we are ready to have the orders in council, on our side, can- 
 celled along with the restrictions on theirs. You may shew, 
 in its full extent, the letter, which I now send, containing 
 these three propositions ; the king will send a minister with- 
 out delay to put them into inform of a treaty. If the Ameri- 
 can government think this too long an operation, and are 
 ready actually to repeal their restrictions, or to engage to re- 
 peal them, you may give assurances, that the king is pre- 
 pared to meet this disposition in the way best calculated to 
 give it immediate effect. The despatch accordingly con- 
 cludes in the following words : " On the receipt here of an 
 official note, containing an engagement for the adoption by the 
 American government of the three conditions above specified., 
 his majesty will be prepared, on the faith of such engagements., 
 either immediately, if the repeal shall have been immediate in 
 America, or on any day specified by the American government 
 for that repeal, reciprocally to recall the orders in council, 
 without waiting for the conclusion of the treaty. And you are 
 authorized, in the circumstances herein described, to make such 
 reciprocal engagement on his Majesty's behalf." 
 
 Mr. Erskine did not obtain this official note : the three con- 
 ditions being rejected. On the contrary, he made an agree- 
 ment with Mr. Madison, without paying any regard to them ; 
 and fixed a day for its taking effect, answering to the day when 
 the arrangement might be likely to be known in England. The 
 English ministry not seeing that consent to the three condi- 
 tions, which was to foi-rn the price for their consent to Mr. 
 
19 
 
 Madison's ternls, refused to adopt the bargain ; and, according 
 to the rule in these cases, communicated to Mr. Pinkney, the 
 American minister in London, the instructions which had been 
 violated by Mr. Erskine ; at the same time doing Avhat they 
 thought right, in order to prevent or lessen the inconvenience 
 to the United States, 
 
 This is the measure, as to the orders of council, which has 
 been so violently censured ; and by Mr. Madison, it seems, 
 among the rest. One should rather mention it as a firoof oi the 
 wisdom of the rule above noticed ; namely, that ministers snould 
 not be trusted to act without a final control, in important cases. 
 Mr. Madison's assertion, that " it is now in /iroof that the 
 engagement with Mr. Erskine was to be executed ivithout 
 any ratification.^ according to the instruction given," must not 
 be considered as a violation of truth ; because, had Mr. Madison 
 himself felt the real truth on this occasion, he must have per-;^ 
 ceived that others would equally have felt it, and would have 
 detected the errour of his own remark. Mr. Madison has 
 merely mistaken Mr. Canning ; but he has mistaken him great- 
 ly. Speaking at the fire sent day^ tvith the despatch extended 
 before him, Mr. Madison must have seen, had he been perfect 
 in his recollections on these subjects, that this wa,s one of the 
 cases, where the ratification was required before hand, Mr. 
 Canning says, the king will execute what regards the orders in 
 council, without waiting for a treaty, on the receipt in Eng- 
 land, " of an official note, containing engagements for the ado/i- 
 tion by the American government of the three conditions above 
 specified.'* This is the fact, "?n proof ^^ for Mr. Madison to 
 reason upon ; and nothing else. Sun beams cannot write a 
 clearer case, on the side of Mr. Canning, than Mr. Canning's 
 own despatch, Mr. Canning looked for an official note as to 
 the three propositions ; and honoured Mr. Madison by his opin- 
 ion, that this note would be found binding on him and his coun- 
 try. Common law courts might have doubted whether such an 
 act ought to be held as the law of the land of the United States. 
 Yet w/ion this note alone, confirmed, as we are to suppose, by 
 the fedei-al Senate, would the king of England have repealed 
 his orders. These propositions, in truth, were principals and 
 •' materials for a treaty ;" and a treaty would have followed ac- 
 cording to the plan of Mr. Canning. 
 
 As to the execution of Mr. Erskine's arrangement, on the 
 part of Mr, Madison, before its time, on which we find that Mr. 
 Madison's message insists, several remarks present them- 
 selves. For example — if the execution of a treaty by one side, 
 previous to ratification on the other, created any claim to i-ati- 
 fication, it is only to perceive, that a fraudulent treaty might 
 be forced upon a state by an officious execution of it by its an- 
 tagonist which the independent feelings of sovereign states 
 and good reasoning can never have permitted to become an cs- 
 
20 
 
 tablished rule. The books consulted on these occasions some- 
 times, indeed, plead in behalf of the rights ^iven by the execu- 
 tion of a treaty on one side ; but it is chiefly in ^nilitarij ca/ies ; 
 ard the giving of hostages, which commonly accompanies these 
 doubtful cases, has implied how little dependence there would 
 have been placed upon a treaty concluded, under such circum- 
 stances, without this pledge ; a pledge which after all has been 
 repeatedly disregarded. But the present instance has no cir- 
 cumstances attending it, Avhich place it on a rank even with 
 these controverted cases. It did not regard the surrender of a 
 fleet or army in a distant situation ; it was no act of generosi- 
 ty performed toward England, before she could tell Mr. Mad- 
 ison what sacrifice she was ready to pay for it ; it was not an 
 act entered into on a sudden emergency, where England could 
 not be consulted ; and consequently as there was nothing un- 
 foreseen and nothing pressing, INlr. Madison imposed no obli- 
 gation even upon the gratitude of England, by the degree of 
 execution which he gave to the arrangement ; particularly as 
 we shall soon find that Mr. Madison derived advantages to his 
 own side, from all that he did. Under circumstances of this 
 kind Mr. Madison \\as entitled to no other return than he re- 
 ceived from the good faith of England, by means of her pro- 
 clamations. If the United States really suffer essential losses, 
 notwithstanding these proclamations, 3(Ir. Madison v^ould do 
 Avell to let them be forgotten, without reviving the controversy 
 through Mr Sm.ith — for the blame, it will now be seen, is his 
 own, and the evil is his country's. 
 
 But did Mr. Madison's country, or Mr. Madison's party, real- 
 ly suffer materiiiily by the degree of execution which he gave 
 to the arrangement ! Let us consider. Every one remembers 
 the embarrassing and discontented state of this country, at the 
 time that Mr. Jefferson quitted his office. Six weeks had 
 scarcely expired, when Mr. Madison produced a new state of 
 things by means of Mr. Erskine's arrangement. This measure 
 opened various foreign markets for much domestick and much 
 imported produce, which lay idle on hand throughout the Unit- 
 ed States ; it produced the importation of many useful articles ; 
 it employed much shipping ; it revived the most productive 
 branch of the public revenue ; and it created a considerable 
 activity in different employments, in many sea-ports, and in 
 many parts of the interior. And the result was no less favour- 
 able to the political outset of Mr. Madison in his new adminis- 
 tration. The final desertion of many of his doubtful friends 
 was prevented, at a moment of considerable ferment ; and the 
 objections of many federalists were so far checked, that some 
 of them Avere even preparing themselves to become the advo- 
 cates of his measures. 
 
 But it may be said, was not censure to be expected for Mr. 
 Madison, should Mr. Erskine's arrangentient be disavowed ? By 
 
21 
 
 no means. Mr, Madison, at that time, ran no risk of blame, 
 so well is his party organized. Upon this question, shall En- 
 gland be blamed, or Mr. Madison, no candid and informed man 
 of any party in the United States could hesitate as to a reply. 
 
 The blame, it must be foreseen, would fall upon England ; 
 and the event has answered to the expectation ; Mr. Madison 
 himself, as we find by his message, having contributed to the 
 decision. 
 
 To a part of Mr. Madison's friends (that part which seems 
 even to be greater than his own Cabinet,) the measure had the 
 alditional advantage of enabling them to accuse England of a 
 breach of engagement ; to smooth away the objections to Bon- 
 aparte ; to prepare the publick mind for war against England ; 
 to establish the principle, that when the war began, the mouth 
 of every objector was to be stopped by means, of which we 
 have yet no farther intelligence than that they are to be decisive. 
 But enough has been said of an arrangement which was nei- 
 ther perfect in its beginning, its middle, or its conclusion. It 
 failed in its beginnings because it was negotiated with a minis- 
 ter, who either exhibited or deposited no evidence of his pow- 
 ers to treat. It had no middle or substance, because the treaty 
 violated instructions on the part of Mr. Erskine ; which we 
 shall prove was evident on the face of the correspondence as to 
 the Chesapeake frigate, and was not less clear under the cir- 
 cumstances of the case as to the order in council. Lastly, it 
 had no conclusion, because it was without ratifications. 
 
 »♦■ 
 SIXTH HINT. The arrangement tvitli 3Ir. Erskine ':i>as real- 
 ly to be called a treaty ; a7id dejnanded the attendant ceremo- 
 nies usually accompanying treaties. 
 
 This head will furnish a reply to those who pretend that the 
 arrangement with Mr. Erskine was an agreement only, and 
 that on this account it did not require the usual ceremonies of 
 treaties, and particularly a ratification. 
 
 There is no statute of nations (answering to the act or statute 
 of a particular state) settling t\\& forins of tiN^aties ; but treaties 
 may be made in any form pleasing to the parties. The arrange- 
 ment with Mr. Erskine, therefore, was in its purport and inten- 
 tion a treaty. It was obtained by treating., that is, by negocia- 
 tion ; it had two parties to it ; it had one of the common ob- 
 jects of a treaty, the conclusion of national differences ; and the 
 parties signing it were the ministers of sovereign states, acting 
 for those states. It was therefore in its essence a national treaty. 
 But if we call it only an agreement., or covenant between nations, 
 says Vattel, it is to be considered as a treaty., and to be governed 
 by the same formalities. (See book 2, articles 206, 207, and 
 208, compared with the extract from Vattel under our fourth 
 head.) 
 
 This might serve to settle the point in dispute ; but we shall 
 
22 
 
 not be content with this proof but proceed to shew, that the 
 whole contention is a mere dispute about words. Every impor- 
 tant national agreement, concerning a great national object, and 
 particularly if either the agreement or the object be Jiermanenty 
 is a treaty, by whatever name it be called ; and all the rules 
 respecting ratifications apply to it. — Even a little change in a 
 little treaty requires its ratification. The rights of sovereigns 
 are thus protected ; sovereigns on both sides know what they 
 have to depend upon ; and fiostci-itj/ also what to refer to. Mr. 
 Canning indeed had another treaty in -vieiv^ in which the three 
 conditions respecting the orders in comncil might have been in- 
 serted ; and thus the two treaties might have been made into 
 one ; but while such treaties are kept separate, they really make 
 tnuo treaties. 
 
 The question then to be asked is, did Mr. Erskine's agree- 
 ment regard an imfiortant interest in an imfiortant object ; and 
 did it gain anew importance by regarding /u^wrf/'j/ .? The im- 
 portance of the object, we have here to remark, must be decided 
 by the value which either party evidently attaches to it, without 
 any relation to its worth in the estimation of the other party. 
 The reply to the question proposed, must comprehend both 
 what respects the orders in council, and the attack on the Ches- 
 apeake frigate ; for both were the objects of the arrangement 
 between Mr. Erskine and Mr. Madison. 
 
 Beginning then with the orders of council ; — vve ask whether 
 the British government has not manifested much reliance upon 
 them, as calculated to effect great national Jiurposes ; and has 
 not publickly avowed this, in a manner to involve the national 
 honour in their behalf ; and whether the struggle, in which it has 
 employed them, as the chief instrument, does not by its proba- 
 ble consequences Ye^avd. futurity ? — For example, has not the 
 name of the King been embarked in these orders ; and has not 
 the British parliament followed him in their support ; and is 
 not the policy of the orders in council avowed as the national 
 counterpart of those decrees, by which Bonaparte declared he 
 was to ruin England ; and has not the British government per- 
 sisted in its plan, in defiance of domestick opposition and of the 
 opposition of belligerents and neutral governments, conceiving 
 them essential to its highest interests, present and future ?>— 
 At a time therefore, when no obvious public change in circum- 
 stances had led to a supposition that Bonaparte would abandon 
 his projects, or that England would relinquish this particular 
 mode of resisting them, Mr. Erskine had not sufficient name 
 or weight, and possessed too little of the confidence of his em- 
 ployers, to make it be presumed, that he was really authorized to 
 surrender these essentials of the British system. The very three 
 propositions which Mr. Erskine avowedly produced, as Mr. Can- 
 ning's, and which were known to have come fresh from England^ 
 proved the continuance of the feelings of the British ministry ; 
 
23 
 
 and when Mr. Erskine suddenly fell off from these propositions, 
 and agreed to others utterly unlike them, the circumstance (one 
 should conceive) ought to have excited some surprize, and 
 therefore some doubts, in the mind of a sagacious government. 
 Two measures then became proper : one was, to ask for Mr. 
 Erskine's powers for concluding an arrangement upon so abrupt 
 a change of place ; and the other to wait for ratifications to this 
 change, England having always shewn that she was sturdy 
 enough to be willing either to give or to take time on these oc- 
 casions. — So far, as to the orders of council, under this head ; 
 an object, which shall be supposed interesting only to one side, 
 namely, the British ; but an interest on this side is sufficient, 
 as this is the side withholding the ratification 
 
 As to the case of the Chesapeake frigate, this was a concern 
 
 held interesting to both sides On the American side, the fever 
 
 it excited is not yet out of recollection ; and the public resent- 
 ment was called for, lest national rights at sea and national hon- 
 our should be lost forever. On the British side, much had 
 been brought into play. Passing over the conferences between 
 Mr. Canning and Mr. Munroe in London, we may remember 
 that a royal proclamation was issued in October, 1807, before 
 Mr. Rose arrived here, shewing the King's estimate of the 
 quarrel, and his opinion, that the object in question was, by its 
 nature, fierinanent. Mr. Rose's mission was the next royal act 
 respecting it. Parliament also was made privy to the dispute. — 
 The principles asserted respecting naturalization and deserters, 
 which were held to be connected subjects, were ancient ; they 
 were also in part maritime, and thence peculiarly affected Brit- 
 ish feelings ; but (what, if possible, created still more sensibili- 
 ty upon the occasion,) they were not only acknowledged ainong 
 all the nations of Europe, but they were even submitted to by 
 the United States, when acted upon by several of the European 
 powers. Lastly, the agreement concluded was to become a pre- 
 cedent Xo future times ; (on which subject let Vattcl be consult- 
 ed. Book 2, 152 and 153.) 
 
 Can it be denied, that all this was fair and natural subject- 
 matter for a treaty ; and that the arrangement made respecting 
 it demanded either a common ratification in the usual forms, or 
 its equivalent ; that is to say, a document signed by the King, 
 (or at least by his cabinet-minister) before-hand, declaring;- 
 that all that was to be done by Mr. Erskine would be confirmed, 
 be it what it would, without being held subject to ratification ? 
 Surely it must be confessed that Great Britain thus placed in the 
 public view of the great circle of Christendom, (including here- 
 in its own subjects,) was interested in having a good, and per- 
 manent and an honourable settlement on this subject ; and that 
 for each of these reasons, the case called for the revision of the 
 king of England. If the matter had been settled in London^ 
 ^Tould not Mr. Madison have insisted upon the right of seeing 
 
24 
 
 whether his instructions had been obeyed ; and if disobeyed, 
 would he not have rejected the measure ? — and as there are no 
 double rules on this occasion, what is just for one side is just 
 for both. 
 
 But in addition to all this we say, that the act of settlement, 
 respecting the attack on the Chesapeake frigate, might very 
 well have borne the exJiressfor7n of a treaty. This form would 
 have served not only to exclude the unmeaning and useless 
 parts of the corresfiondencehetwc&n Messrs. Erskine and Smith, 
 but also the contradictory parts of it : for each side must have 
 agreed as to the introduction to the treaty, as well as to its de- 
 claratory and enacting articles. There would thus have been a 
 little treaty of peace, calculated to settle a small and unauthor- 
 ized act of hostility : and at the same time to arrange all the 
 several disputes virtually connected with it, if the present were 
 the moment suitable for the purpose. Such a document thrown 
 into the usual form would have remained to posterity, open to 
 the appeal of both nations, as well as to the world at large ; and 
 as it contained the principles, and performed the offices of a 
 treaty, on important and permanent topicks, it required the main 
 conclusion of all public treaties ; namely, the ratification of the 
 supreme executive on both sides, 
 
 Mr. Rose and Mr. Jackson indeed thought of a third mode of 
 arrangement, which is sometimes employed ; and which is dif- 
 ferent from a treaty, as well as from a loose correspondence ; 
 namely, that of one declaration to be exchanged against another 
 declaration, each being known and agreed upon previous to its 
 delivery. But if a declai'ation and counter-declaration had thus 
 been mutually approved, and mutually exchanged, they would 
 still have formed (as Mr. Jackson says) no more than " one com- 
 Jiact,'^ by which the two countries Avould have been equally 
 bound. But even this mode of proceeding required a ratifica- 
 tion. Whatever contract is to bind a state ought to be known 
 lo the state, in all its parts., before the state gives its final sanc- 
 tion to it. The state ought to see the contract with the eyes, 
 and sign it nvith the hands of its own chief ; not only to prevent 
 injury from the fraud or the folly of its agent ; but to cut of all 
 future pretence, that the treaty may be rejected on account of 
 the crime or the errour of others. Thus the reason of what is 
 prescribed in books and observed in practice on these subjects, 
 is xmder every point of view, found to be solid. 
 
 One thing however is to be observed as to the ratification of 
 :i treaty on the subject of the Chesapeake frigate, which is, that 
 Mr. Madison here held the staff" in liis own hands, to use a phrase 
 of the vulgar ; for Mr. Jackson was to execute the treaty, a« 
 far as it could be executed, on the spot; and execution is a sol- 
 id security for ratification., as far as it extends itself. 
 
25 
 
 SEVENTH HINT. It was clear., ujion the very face of Mr, 
 Erskine's arrangement, that he had erred as to the Chesa- 
 peake frigate ; and the fact is confirmed by the separate let- 
 ters of Mr. Jackson and Mr. Smith. 
 
 VIOLENTLY as the point of honour agitates nations, as well 
 as individuals, it has nevertheless la^vs for regulating its pro- 
 ceedings ; and laws (we remember) operate impartially, that is, 
 they operate on both sides. 
 
 A British admiral, on a station remote from the scat of his 
 government, without the direction and without the privity of his 
 superiours, issued orders, which were interpreted to extend to 
 the forcible search of the Chesapeake frigate for certain deser- 
 ters, whose delivery had been refused to the remonstrances of 
 the British minister at Washington. The delivery being still 
 refused by the commander of the Chesapeake, who was civilly 
 applied to for that purpose, after he had arrived in the open 
 seas, a short action ensued, which ended in taking out of the 
 frigate all deserters whatever from the British service, who 
 were clearly known to be such, being four in number ; the 
 frigate being then left to pursue her course. Had this frigate 
 proceeded to sea full of deserters, and had this been done upon 
 the avowed plan of defiance, or wickedly to ensnare the British 
 into an attack which might end in a national dispute, even a 
 degree of provocation like this ought only to have led to an 
 increase of caution with a neutral power. The case required 
 no sudden decision ; and as it had already been the subject of 
 diplomatick ne;j;otiation, and must at last have been settled 
 through the British administration, it ought to have gone before 
 that tribunal in its original shape. Military men are merely 
 instruments in national disputes, and not judges ; and officers 
 in the British navy are generally too enthusiastick, and too 
 much used to defy the double dangers of war and of the ocean, 
 to possess the calm habits of deliberation. But if our own gov- 
 ernment shall be found to have done wrong in this affair. Ad- 
 miral Berekley also, who had no skill in the rules of publick 
 law, and who was distant from good advisers, well merits a few 
 candid indulgences on his side. 
 
 But the hasty conduct of this officer, though in some degree 
 provoked, did not mislead the British administration, who are 
 the real and sole re/irese?itatives of their nation in its executive 
 concer7is ivith foreign povjcrs. They learned the history of the 
 transaction in question from their o%vn officers, only to disavow 
 it instantly, frankly, and of their own accord. Their mode of 
 proceeding however, as we shall soon perceive, was dignified ; 
 and as they manifested by this means their sensibility to the 
 lights of both nations, it was no small proof of their sincerity. 
 They declared to the American minister in Loudon without 
 delay, through their Secretary of State for foreigii affairs in per- 
 son, that they were guiltless of a transaction, which was con- 
 
26 
 
 trary to general rules and to British practice ; and that they 
 felt no other wish on the subject, than first to estimate and then 
 to refiair the injury. They began therefore with an attempt to 
 learn the real state of facts in this distant transaction. In par- 
 ticular, they wished to discover what provocation had been giv- 
 en to Admiral Berkeley, and what degree of punishment the 
 American government had imposed by its own authority on the 
 British nation ; designing to proportion their own voluntary 
 concessions to the balance of mutual errour to be found among 
 all these circumstances. But, as it was soon perceived, after 
 making all allowances, that a large amount of apology would 
 remain due for so dangerous an infringement of a breach of the 
 national rights of America, deeply connected with its national 
 honour and its national feelings, they came to this conclusion. 
 In addition to this official disavowal of the principles on which 
 Admiral Berkeley had acted, they recalled that officer from his 
 station in the neighbourhood of the United States, and sent 
 Mr. Rose as a national minister to Washington with no other 
 object than to offer such apology and such redress to the Amei*- 
 ican government, as should be found at once to be due and to 
 be acceptable. Thus acted the British ministry at the outset 
 of this affair, which, on their side, was involuntary, unexpect- 
 ed, and embarrassing. 
 
 Let us next see how the American government conducted it- 
 self. Mr. Jefferson, who was then President of the United 
 States, issued a proclamation on July 2, 1807, excluding from 
 the use of American ports not only the offending squadron, but 
 the whole of the British navy ; and he most rigorously con- 
 tinued it after the knowledge of all that was done in England ; 
 and also after the British government, by energetick measures, 
 had brought their naval officers into such a state of complete 
 control, that he was more certain of obtaining good behaviour 
 on their side through British precautions, than through any of 
 his own. Whatever indiscretions also had been committed by 
 British men of war in American ports (the amount of which as 
 we shall hereafter learn has been exaggerated) the Chesapeake 
 frigate at least was not attacked till she was completely at sea, 
 where Mr. Jefferson's precautions were of no avail.— As a " pre- 
 cautionary" measure (which by authority it has been declared 
 to be) the proclamation could in fact have little influence ; but 
 its practical effects, on the other hand, caused it to be consid- 
 ered as a measure of retaliation As an affront, it certainly af- 
 fected the officers of the British navy ; and it wounded the 
 feelings of the British nation, who still continued to leave their 
 own ports open to American vessels of war ; and who saw 
 French vessels of Avar still admitted into the ports of the Unit- 
 ed States, though the French had been guilty of far higher of- 
 fences under the authority of their master's orders, given in va- 
 ried forms in the face of all the universe. At the same time, 
 
27 
 
 the measure operated as a real fiunis/iment ; incommoding not 
 only British vessels of war on the American station, but others 
 merely passing along the American coast ; who, when on short 
 alloivance for watery not only could not take it from a desolate 
 island remote from the main land and without inhabitants, but 
 could not purchase it on the open seas from American vessels, 
 otherwise eager to sell it. 
 
 Under these circumstances Mr. Rose arrived at Washington. 
 It is the modern custom, where a national officer injures a for- 
 eign nation in a national concern, to report his misdeeds in the 
 first instance to his court, and to seek a remedy through the 
 court itself without attempting to do more than to prevent 
 farther injury, until a hearing can be procured, unless in par- 
 ticular cases the person of the delinquent is to be secured, that 
 his court or his country may pronounce sentence upon him. 
 Customs of this sort are commonly justified both by theory and 
 experience, or they would not remain as customs ; and that 
 which is here noticed has evident advantages. Inferiour per- 
 sons, who are seldom qualified for the management of diplo- 
 matick concerns, are soon left out of the discussion ; the de- 
 mands of one side and the decisions of the other are exactly 
 such as suit the respective wishes of those who are in authori- 
 ty ; and whatever is done is done quickly, and of necessity is 
 final. Mr. Jefferson departed from these rules. He refused 
 to withdraw his proclamation, though a peace-maker was on the 
 spot, till the amount of the proposed reparation was first known 
 and approved, and till a written instrument in conformity to it 
 was ready for delivery. This was like dealing sword in hand 
 with an enemy, in whose candour and justice there is no reli- 
 ance. Compulsion consequently was introduced into an affair 
 of honour y in a case where the British government was equally 
 ill treated with the United States by the officer, for whose 
 faults they nevertheless had agreed to apologize. If Mr. Jef- 
 ferson had been a reader of plays, he ought to have learned an 
 old precedent as to honour from Shakespeare, who would not 
 permit even his buffoon Falstaff to '■'■give reasons ujion com- 
 pulsion.^* The whole concern of the mere point of honour 
 admits of strong doubts in the minds of some ; but Mr. Jeffer- 
 son and Mr. Madison by adopting a point of honour peculiarly 
 their own, (contrary to the general essence of honour, which 
 seeks to suit itself to the opinions and feelings of others) have 
 assumed a deep responsibility as to the consequences respect- 
 ing their own and other nations. They made it still deeper, by 
 refusing, as we have seen, to withdraw the proclamation during 
 the negotiation, notwithstanding it might easily have been re- 
 vived, in case the terms offered had been disapproved ; and this 
 suspension of the proclamation was certainly more reasonable, 
 thc^n the suspension of the orders of council during a general 
 negotiation, as proposed by the American government : (see 
 
28 
 
 Mr. Smith's letters of October 19, and November 24.) But to 
 return to Mr. Rose. As soon as he had ascertained that Mr. 
 Jefferson would not depart from his plan of justifying- the foixi- 
 bie remedy he had imposed, he withheld (as he was ordered to 
 do) the voluntary reparation which he had come prepared to 
 offer ; and returned to England, doubtless happy at present in 
 the reflection, that he escaped without giving oflpence. 
 
 This detail is requisite to the full understanding of Mr. Er- 
 skine's arrangement. 
 
 Mr. Erskinc had signified to his superiours that France was 
 at last about to be included in the restrictions hitherto confin- 
 ed to British men of war, Sec. and in consequence he received 
 orders to make fresh offers of reparation respecting the attack 
 on the Chesapeake frigate. Unfortunately, in pursuing the bu- 
 siness, he violated his instructions ; as will be perceived from 
 the negotiation itself, confirmed by other particulars. 
 
 Among the circumstances and expressions contained in Mr. 
 Erskine's correspondence with Mr. Smith of April 17, 1809, are 
 the following, to which we have given a connected, but impar- 
 tial form : " Congress (says Mr. Erskine) having evinced an 
 inttnlion of passing certain laws, which would place the rela- 
 tions of Great Britain with the United States upon an equal 
 footing, in all respects, with the belligerent powers ; and the 
 act, usually termed the non-intercourse act, being considered 
 as having \actiiallif\ {iroduced this equality, I submit, confor- 
 mably to my instructions, for the consideration of the American 
 government, such terms of satisfaction and honourable repara- 
 tion for the aggression and unauthorized act in the attack on 
 the Chesapeake frigate, as the king is induced to believe will 
 be accepted in the same sfiirit of conciliation, with which they 
 are proposed." Mr, Smith, in different parts of his reply to 
 Mr. Erskine, after speaking of " an atonement for an insult and 
 an aggression, and also of a satisfaction for an insult and an in- 
 jury," adds thus : " As it appeared at the same time, that in 
 making this offer, his Britannick majesty derived a motive from 
 the equality then existing in the relations of thfi United States 
 with the two belligerent powers, the president owes it to the 
 occasion and to himself, to let it be understood, that this equali- 
 ty was a result incident to a state of things growing out of dis- 
 tinct considerations." Both of these letters were published at 
 the same time, as forming between them but one measure. 
 
 We may now return to our introductory remark, that the 
 point of honour has its laws, which operate on boih sides. It is 
 one of those laws, and among the very first of them, that an 
 apology (unless where it is otherwise agreed) shall be receiv- 
 ed "in the terms and in the sense in which it is offered," par- 
 ticularly Avhen communicated through an agent professing to 
 act conformably to instructions ; and particularly also when it is 
 s!.sserted, that the party apologizing must not review what i!< 
 
29 
 
 done in his name. The change therefore of the expression 
 " honourable reparation for an aggression" to the words " atone- 
 ment for an insult" was unwarrantable. In the language of 
 men of the world, the word atonement here implied something 
 humiliating, done by way of expiation, on the part of England : 
 and the word insult also cannot regard Admiral Berkeley alone^ 
 for if it did, this atonement needed not to have come in the 
 name oi England. Both words therefore pressed harder upon 
 England, than England either intended or deserved ; especially 
 as even Admiral Berkeley is not to be conceived as having de- 
 signed an insult ; but merely to correct an insult received by 
 his nation, or rather merely to pursue the supposed rights of 
 his nation. This is one impropriety submitted to on the part 
 of Mr. Erskine, discoverable on the face of the correspondence. 
 He has suffered honourable words to be exchanged for such as 
 are not honourable. But to proceed. After Mr. Rose had, 
 pursuant to order, ceased to negotiate, in consequence of the 
 continuance of Mr. Jefferson's proclamation, and after England 
 had resisted the inconveniences of this proclamation, for upwards 
 of twenty months, no apology could well seem authorized, 
 'Mhich admitted the jirincifile of the firoclamation ; OY, in other 
 words, the principle of demanding two kinds of remedies for one 
 and the same injury ; namely, one as a superiour, and the other 
 as an equal ; one by authority as a judge, and the other by way 
 of reparation on the delicate grounds of honour, which must 
 always please itself at the same time that it satisfies another. 
 President Madison, however, in saying that the proclamation 
 was not withdrawn out of compliment to England, and that " he 
 owed it to the occasion and to himself to let this be understood," 
 plainly shewed, that the principle of the proclamation was still 
 mJntained in connection with the occasion of the frigate. This 
 acquiescence therefore in the proclamation, attempted to be es- 
 tablished with Mr. Erskine, contrary to the known and tried 
 determination of his employers, was a new reason, drawn from 
 the correspondence itself, for presuming that Mr. Erskine 
 must be disavowed for what he had done. In saying this, no 
 blaine is designed to be thrown on Mr. Madison for his austere 
 candour in desiring that he might be well understood on this 
 occasion, provided he was really satisfied of the justice of the 
 proclamation ; but he should have been equally candid to the 
 British, and permitted them to pursue their punctilios in re- 
 ttirn, without using harsh accusations. There is one more ar- 
 gument to be urged on this occasion, enforcing what has gone 
 before, which is this ; Either Mr. Erskine had instructions, 
 and ought to have complied with them, or he had no suflicient 
 instructions, and then he Avas not the proper person with whom 
 to negotiate ; and, in either case, his arrangement might be re- 
 jected by his superiours. The supposition of a double fiet of 
 instructions will not destroy the force of this alternative. Th> 
 
30 
 
 known firmness of Mr. Canning, Mr. Rose, and the British 
 government might have assured Mr. Madison that the utmost 
 extent of any discretion with which Mr. Erskine was likely to 
 have been intrusted even in the last resort^ could never have 
 permitted him to submit either to the proclamation or to some of 
 the expressions in Mr. Smith's letter. This letter evidently 
 makes part of the arrangement with Mr. Erskine, not only in 
 the opinion of Mr. Madison, but of the king of England ; since 
 the king of England looked for some communications from the 
 American government, which should manifest that the terms 
 offered through Mr. Erskine were "accepted in the same spirit 
 of conciliation with which they were proposed." If Mr. Er- 
 skine consequently made no remarks on what Mr. Smith wrote, 
 and the whole was published as a measure of mutual arrange- 
 ment, Mr. Erskine's silence must be considered as having 
 passed for his (and therefore for his master's) consent in a cor- 
 respondence, which was to be publick every where, and to be 
 placed among the national records of each of the two countries. 
 —Such therefore were the rational grounds upon the face of 
 this transaction, which irresistibly led to the conclusion, that 
 this part of the arrangement would be little approved in Eng- 
 land. And if this statement be true, some of the blame so 
 freely bestowed on the English government by the American 
 government, must be transferred to some other quarter. So 
 much for the arguments to be collected from the very face of 
 Mr. Erskine's arrangement. 
 
 Admiral Berkeley's share in this controversy is not forgot- 
 ten ; but as there will be a better opportunity for attending to 
 it under another head, we shall proceed to notice Mr. Jackson's 
 management of it. We shall leave out various particulars of 
 little moment to our view of the subject, and often only use the 
 substance of what is written ; and we shall avoid repeating the 
 reasons for having committed the explanation of the disavowal 
 of Mr. Erskine's arrangement to Mr. Erskine himself. 
 
 Mr. Smith, the American Secretary of State, observes thus 
 to Mr. Jackson, in a letter, dated October 9, 1809. " The Pre- 
 sident learns that you state in your conferences with me, that 
 in the case of the Chesapeake, your instructions only authorize 
 you (without assigning any reason whatever why the hon- 
 ourable terms of satisfaction tendered and accepted have not 
 been carried into effect) to communicate to this government a 
 note tendering satisfaction, with an understanding that such 
 note should not be signed and delivered by you, until you had 
 previously seen and approved the proposed answer of this gov- 
 ernment," &.C. 
 
 Mr. Jackson's reply to Mr. Smith on the subject of " these 
 honourable terms" may be learned from what follows. After 
 signifying under date of Oct. II th, that notwithstanding what 
 had passed through Mr. Rose, he was authorized to renew that 
 
31 
 
 offer of satisfaction for the affair of the Chesapeake, which Mr. 
 Erskine was instructed to make, he goes on thus : *' You havc' 
 said, that you so fully understood the particulars of that offer, 
 that I deem it unnecessary to recapitulate them here. I regret 
 that since they were so clearly understood by you, you should 
 not yet have been enabled to state to nic (cither in our person- 
 al communications, or in the letter which I am now answering) 
 whether they are considered by the President as satisfactory, 
 &c." My proposal was not to communicate a note tendcrint; 
 satisfaction, but to agree with you before hand upon the terms 
 of a Declaration on the part of his Majesty, which should ac- 
 tually give the satisfaction, (the conditions of which I informed 
 you that I was authorized to carry into immediate execution,) 
 and of a counter declaration to be signed by you on the part of 
 the United States for the purpose of accc/iling such satisfac- 
 tion. Mr. Jackson then intimates, that personal conferences 
 were originally intended to have prepared these declarations ; 
 which, being reciprocally corrected and modified, and deliver- 
 ed one against the other, would have formed one co?ti/iact by 
 which the countries would have been mutually bound, conform- 
 ably to a practice of the courts of Europe on similar occasions. 
 Mr. Jackson then adds, as follows : " You did not at the time 
 appear to object to this : You even requested mc to come the 
 next day, prepared with a draft or project of a paper, framed 
 in pursuance to these ideas ; and although you desired to refer 
 the subject to the President for his approbation, I do not find 
 in your letter either an expression of his sentiments upon it, 
 or the substitution of any other form that might be more agree- 
 able to him than the one which I have proposed. I touch with 
 considerable and very sincere reluctance upon that part of your 
 letter, in which you state, that I had not assigned any reason 
 whatever, why the reasonable terms of satisfaction tendered 
 and accepted have not been carried into effect. I believe I ob- 
 served to you, in the words of my inntructionH,, that if his Maj- 
 esty were capable of being actuated by any desire to retract an 
 offer of reparation which he had once made, his majesty might 
 be well warranted in doing so, both by the form in which his 
 accredited minister had tendered that reparation, and by the 
 manner in which that tender had been received^ I believe that 
 I elucidated this observation by a reference to the iiarticular 
 exfireaniona^ which made the terms of the satisfaction appear to 
 be unacceptable even to the American government, at the very 
 moment when they were accepted^ and which at all events put 
 it totally out of his Majesty's power to ratify and confirm, an act 
 in which such ejcfirefmions were contairied." Thus faj- this let- 
 ter of Mr. Jackson's. 
 
 Mr. Smith, in his letter of October 19, after referring to this 
 passage, signified, " that he was authorized to receive in a pro- 
 per form whatever explicit exfilanation/s Mr. Jackson might 
 
32 
 
 choose to make with respect to the grounds of this part of the 
 disavowal of Mr. Erskine's arrangement, without inquiring 
 whether his authority was derived from instructions addressed 
 to himself, or devolved on him as the successor of the minister 
 who had declined to execute them." — In other parts of his let- 
 ter Mr. Smith spoke also of explanations of the disavowal of 
 what regarded the orders in council. 
 
 Mr. Jackson, in his reply of October 23, states what he con- 
 ceives applicable to both objects. " It could not (says he) en- 
 ter into my view to withhold from you an explanation, merely 
 because it had been already given ; but because, having been 
 so given, I could not imagine until informed by you, that a re- 
 petition of it would be required at my hands. I am quite cer- 
 tain that his Majesty's government, having complied with what 
 was considered to be the substantial duty imposed upon it on this 
 occasion, would, had this been foreseen, have added to thefiroofs 
 of conciliatory good faith already manifested, the farther com- 
 placency to the wishes of the United States of adopting the 
 form of communication most agreeable to them ; and of giving 
 through me the explanation in question. I have therefore no 
 hesitation in informing you, that his majesty was pleased to dis- 
 avow the agreement concluded between you and Mr. Erskine, 
 because it was concluded in violation of that gentleman's in- 
 structions, and altogether ivithout authority to subscribe to the 
 terms of it." Mr. Jackson then refers to the knowledge pro- 
 fessed by tlie American government of Mr. Canning's three 
 conditions, as confirming his assertions ; four days afterwards, 
 (October 27) he sends proposals as to the Chesapeake affair, 
 which will be noticed under another article. 
 
 On November, Mr. Smith remarks thus to Mr. Jackson : 
 " Whilst you have deemed it proper to offer an explanation 
 with respect to the disavowal of one part of the arrangement, I 
 must remind you, that there is not to be found in your letter 
 any like specification of the reasons for the disavowal (nor par- 
 ticularly is it shewn that the instructions were violated) as to 
 the other part, viz. the case of the Chesapeake ; the case in 
 which, in an especial manner, an explanation was required ; 
 and in which only, you professed to have authority to make 
 this government any overtures." 
 
 We repeat that nothing new will be said in this place as to 
 the delay in delivering the reasons for disavowing what Mr. 
 Erskine did as to the Chesapeake. If the instructions on this 
 subject have never been communicated to the American gov- 
 ernment, it is perhaps because the instructions which served 
 Mr. Erskine on this occasion are to a certain degree the same 
 with those which were afterwards given to Mr. Jackson ; for 
 the latter gentlemen on the 1 Uh of October informed Mr. 
 Smith, that he was authorized to renew that offer of satisfaction 
 which Mr. Krskine was instructed to make. In this case (or ia 
 
33 
 
 any case approaching to this) the American government must 
 be content at present to remain ignorant of the instructions. 
 But they need not remain ignorant of other grounds which jus- 
 tify the rejection of this branch of Mr. Erskine's arrangement ; 
 particularly after reading what Mr. Jackson states in his next 
 and final answer to Mr. Smith. 
 
 On Nov, 4, Mr. Jackson observes thus to him : " When I in- 
 formed you that the agreement concluded here in April last 
 had been framed in deviation from the instructions given for 
 the occasion, my explanation Avas intended to apply to both 
 parts of that agreement. That nothing required by the most 
 scrupulous accuracy may be wanting, I now arfc/, that the devia- 
 tion consisted in not recording in the official documents signed 
 here, the abrogation of the President's proclamation of the 2d 
 July, 1807, as well as the two reserves specified in the paper of 
 memoranda enclosed in my official letter to you of the 27th 
 October. [N. B. These memoranda are to be noticed in a 
 proper place.] There is another motive for the disavowal of 
 this part of the arrangement, considered to be so strong and so 
 self evident upon the very fact of the transaction, that I am not 
 commanded to do more than indicate it in the manner I have 
 already done. By this forbearance his Majesty conceives, that 
 he is giving an additional pledge of his sincere disposition to 
 maintain a good imder standing with the United States." In 
 these last expressions of Mr. Jackson we perceive a reference 
 to those phrases and suggestions in Mr. Erskine's letter of 
 Api'il 17, 1809, from which Mr. Smith chose to depart in his 
 reply of the same date ; thereby proving them " unaccepta- 
 ble," though " conveying terms which were accepted." The 
 manner in which Mr. Jackson conducted this reference to Mr. 
 Smith's letter was delicate, as well as judicious ; and in any 
 event shewed a desire of maintaining a good understanding 
 with the United States, by not insisting upon a topick which 
 had given offence to the king of England. 
 
 But let us regret, that all these explanations and apologies, 
 (which Avere the last Mr Jackson was allowed to oflFer) failed 
 to give the required satisfaction. The American government 
 continues to this moment unrelenting. The letter of Mr. 
 Smith to Mr. Pinkney, dated November 24, in stating the of- 
 fences of Mr. Jackson, affirms, among other remarks on this 
 subject, that " pains had been taken by Mr. Jackson, to substi- 
 tute verbal and vague observations on this part of the arrange- 
 ment [of Mr. Erskine] for an obvious and formal explanation ;" 
 that " when finally brought to the point, Mr. Jackson referred 
 ****** to allusions to an explanation in the arrangement, with- 
 out giving to his meaning the distinctness prerequisite to a just 
 reply ;" and lastly, that his explanation was "reluctant and in* 
 distinct." These remarks were laid before Congress and the 
 publick. On November 29, President Madison csnfirmed them 
 
34 
 
 in person. He signified to Congress in his message of that 
 date, that it " could not be doubted that the new mission [from 
 England] would at least be charged with conciliatory explana- 
 tions. *** Reasonable and universal as this expectation was, 
 it has not been fulfilled. *** The correspondence between the 
 department of State and Mr. Jackson will shew how unessen- 
 tially the features presented in its commencement, have been 
 varied in its progress." These remarks regard the proceedings 
 as to both branches of Mr, Erskine's arrangement. 
 
 Such are the extracts, which, while they confirm the king of 
 England's right to disclaim Mr. Erskine, manifest the species 
 of temper shewn on each side in this branch of the correspon- 
 dence. 
 
 We shall make but one observation, and in the form of a 
 double query. Would such repeated apologies have been eith- 
 er required or rejected in a dispute Avith Bonaparte ? If not, 
 why have they been required and rejected in a dispute with 
 England ? 
 
 Before taking a final leave of our general subject, we have 
 to mention an objection. — Mr. Smith writes to Mr. Pinkney, 
 on November 24, 1809, that after the American government 
 had repeatedly refused to repeal a proclamation which was jus- 
 tifiable as being precautionary, the English government ought 
 to have ceased to notice the proclamation, when it had died a 
 natural death.— The answer is easy. The English having wait- 
 ed till the plea that the proclamation was precautionary was 
 done away by the non-intercourse act, which of itself closed the 
 American ports to both belligerents, they renewed their nego- 
 tiation. Though the expedient therefore proposed by Mr. 
 Smith was (as he admits) obvious, yet the English we perceive 
 disdained to use it, unwilling to seek a hiding place for their 
 honour. From the first to the last, they have proposed an hon- 
 ourable reparation, and no other ; and the reparation must 
 cease to be honourable, as soon as they consent to the princi- 
 ple of a compulsive proclamation. In the shape of a compul- 
 sive contest, the English had much to urge, without an appeal 
 to arms ; but to nothing of this kind have the English had re- 
 sort. And granting that the proclamation has become a dead 
 letter, why should Mr. Madison more insist upon maintaining 
 the principle of it, than the king of England insist upon reject- 
 ing it ? The English probably never believed the proclamation 
 to have been wholly precautionary : and so much of its motives 
 as seemed retaliatory or vindictive contradicted that species 
 of reparation which it is customary to ask and to give upon this 
 occasion. 
 
 To conclude. The English felt that something was due to 
 the dignity of the U. States ; and what was due in form and in 
 nature, according to the modern usages of nations, they have 
 proved by a long succession of measures, that they Avere desir- 
 
35 
 
 ous of giving. Such an obstinacy in desiring to do right on a 
 subject of this sort has not commonly been seen in the history 
 of modern nations ; and whether it has been met with a corres- 
 ponding desire of conciliation on our side, the American nation 
 and posterity will have to pronounce. — Without yielding too 
 much to the fanciful principles of honour, we may make the 
 following practical observation. If the English begin to barter 
 away their honour, they know where to barter it more to their 
 purpose, than at Washington ; for with France, they can sell 
 it, so as to obtain (if that could be their wish) their full revenge 
 upon the United States. Happily they do not yet appear to 
 have contemplated a measure so disastrous to themselves and 
 the United States, notwithstanding all the efforts of certain 
 persons in this country to drive them to desperation. 
 
 Let us then come to this persuasion, as to the disavowal of 
 Mr. Erskine's arrangement respecting the Chesapeake, narne- 
 ly, that the disavowal was to have been expected. The nation 
 Avhich has braved Bonaparte in his Cabinet, through Lord 
 Whitworth and Earl Lauderdale, the nation which has never 
 given up any of its supposed rights to any other nation upon 
 earth, till it has first shewn a stout heart in defending them, 
 the nation in short which is the proud mother of proud Ameri- 
 ca, was ill understood by her daughter, when she was conceiv- 
 ed to have surrendered a long contested point in a single in- 
 stant through a negotiator so little confided in on account of 
 his politicks and connections as Mr. Erskine. Havmg once 
 taken her stand on this subject, had she given way to the de- 
 mands made on her at Washington, she would have lost more 
 than equal grounds with Bonaparte, with whom she had as 
 much to gain by her firmness as by her resources ; for what 
 are resources, when there is not firmness to employ them? 
 
 EIGHTH HINT. Mr. Jackson did not insult the Ainerican 
 Administration^ 'When he firo-ved that Mr. Erskine had exceed' 
 ed his instructions as to the Orders in Council. 
 
 THERE is an excessively simple mode of viewing the con- 
 troversy, as to the disavowal of the branch of Mr. Erskine's ar- 
 rangement, which respects the orders in council. It is the fol- 
 lowing. 
 
 We have only to remember, that the subject is to be distin- 
 guished as it regards parties, and as it regards periods of time 
 1st. As to parties ; Mr. Jackson censures Mr. Erskine (and Mr. 
 Erskine only) as having acted contrary to his instructions at 
 the time of concluding the arrangement ; and to convince Mr. 
 Madison, that this censure of Mr. Erskine is just, he supplies 
 him, through Mr. Smith, with facts of which he was before ig- 
 norant, to be joined to such as he already knew. After re- 
 minding him, that Mr. Erskine had abandoned the three propo- 
 sitions from England to adopt another framed for him at Wash- 
 
36 
 
 ington, he adds, that Mr. Erskine's power only regarded the 
 three propositions. — This mode of proceeding was so perfectly 
 just, that Mr. Smith (it is true, without designing it) has THREE 
 TIMES confirmed it, by declaring tht^t had Mr. Madison either 
 seen the despatch of January 23, 1809, OR known that Mr. 
 Erskine had no power to go beyond the three propositions, the 
 arrangement with Mr. Erskine would never have been conclud- 
 ed : certainly not because Mr. Madison disliked it, (for it has 
 never been denied that the American government itself suggest- 
 ed it) but because he knew that it might be disavoived^ as being 
 unsupported by Mr. Erskine's instructions. Thus both sides 
 in effect, fix blame upon INIr. Erskine ; but Mr. Jackson fixes 
 none upon the American government. 2d. A like caution may 
 be given as to fieriods of time ; for we must not confound the 
 time of first signing the treaty, with the period in which the 
 dispute commenced as to the rejection of it. The British gov- 
 ernment always knew the confined powers, which it had given 
 to Mr. Erskine ; but Mr. Madison (according to Mr. Jackson's 
 express admission) did not know this fact,until soine time after the 
 disavowal of Mr. Erskine's arrangement. Mr. Madison, indeed, 
 only became acquainted with the circumstance by degrees ; for, 
 though he knew at the moment, that the three propositions had 
 come from England, yet Mr. Erskine led him to believe (both 
 then and for some time afterwards) that he had other instruc- 
 tions, which admitted his adoption of the propositions framed at 
 Washington. If the letter ol January 23 would alone have suf- 
 ficed (as we have seei ) to change Mr. M.^dison's judgment as 
 to the propriety of signing the arrangement, still stronger was 
 bis objection to become when he learned the fact, that but one 
 set of instructions existed as to the orders of council ; a fact, 
 ■which Mr. Jackson told him, as new to him, in October last. 
 Thus there is a distinction to be made as to times, like that 
 just made as to persons. 
 
 We now proceed to make ourselves acquainted with the 
 grounds of the celebrated insult said to be contained in Mr. 
 Jackson's letters ; an insult, whose precise form was matter of 
 dispute among a multitude of Mr. Madison's adherents, until 
 Congress pointed it out in its declaratory resolutions on this 
 subject. 
 
 Mr. Smith, the American Secretary of State, opens this cor- 
 respondence by a letter to Mr. Jackson, dated October 9, 1809. 
 Considering the rejected arrangement with Mr. Erskine as hav- 
 ing been faithfully executed to the injury of the United States, 
 he tells Mr. Jackson (among other particulars) that it was a 
 course of proceeding prescribed by the ordinary respect due to 
 the disappointed party to explain promptly and explicitly by 
 the new minister the grounds of the disavowal ; and accompany 
 it with the offer of new propositions. 
 
 Mr. Jackson, on Ociohtr 1 1, 1809, signifies in reply, that Mr. 
 
57 
 
 Smith's inquiry may regard either 1st, the disavowal itself; or 
 2d, the reasons for not having explained the disavowal ; or 3d, 
 the cause why the disavowal had not been explained by himself. 
 That nothing might escape him, he treats the subject amply, 
 under each of these heads; but as the two last have already been 
 noticed, we shall confine ourselves in this place only to the first 
 of them, which regards substance rather than ceremony. 
 
 As to the disavovjal itself, Mr. Jackson intimates that he 
 could find no trace, in the communications between Mr. Ers- 
 kine and Mr. Smith of its having been made a subject of com- 
 plaint, and he adds tiiat no distinct complaint concerning it had 
 appeared in the coLiferences with himself. He then states, that 
 he considered this as a mark of candour ; ' in as much (says he 
 to Mr. Smith) as you could not but have thought it unreasona- 
 ble to complain of the disavowal of an act, done [that is done by 
 Mr. Erskine~\ under such circumstances as could only lead to 
 the consequences that have actually followed.' Mr. Jackson 
 then proceeds, in a new paragraph, to shew the want of cor- 
 rectness in Mr. Erskine's diplomatick conduct respecting the 
 orders in council. For this purpose, he details some little facts 
 historically, marking them in a way to impress them on the re- 
 collection both of ;Mr. Smith and Mr. Madison ; adding a new 
 and very important circumstance, to produce the joint convic- 
 tion of these state officers. '• It was not known (he says) when 
 I left England, whether Mr. Erskine [at the time of signing 
 the arrangement] had *** communicated to you **** his origi- 
 nal instructions. It noiv appears that he did not. But in re- 
 verting to his official correspondence, *** I find that he there 
 states, that he had submitted to your consideration the three 
 conditions specified in those instructions, as the ground work 
 of an arrangement which (according to information received 
 from his country) it was thought, in England., might be made 
 with great prospect of mutual advantage. Mr. Erkine then re- 
 ports [word for word, and in order,] your observations upon 
 each of the three conditions, and the reasons which induced 
 you to think, that others might be substituted in lieu of them. 
 It may have been concluded between you, that these latter were 
 an equivalent for the original conditions ; but the very act of 
 substitution evidently shv.^ws, that the original conditions were 
 in fact very explicitly communicated to you, and by you, of 
 course, laia before the president for his consideration. / nee J 
 hardlii add, that the difference between these conditions and 
 those cont^iined in the arrangement **** is sufficiently obvious 
 to require no elucidation, nor need I add the conclusion (which 
 I consider as admitted by the absence of all complain: on the 
 p.irt of the Americiui government) viz. that under such circum- 
 stances his majesty had an undoubted and incontrovertible right 
 to disavow the act of his minister. I must here allude to the 
 supposition **** by which, if it had any the slightest founder- 
 
38 
 
 tion, this right might perhaps in some degree have been affect- 
 ed." Here Mr. Jackson refers to the supposition of two sets 
 of instructions, by the less rigid of which the arrangement was 
 to be justified ; but Mr. Jackson gives his solemn assurance, 
 that Mr. Erskine had but one set of instructions ; namely> that 
 contained in the despatch of January 23, with which despatch 
 Mr Smith had latterly become acquainted. The nature then 
 of the proof is this : " Though you knew nothing in April 
 last of the despatch of January 23, yet you remember that Mx'. 
 Erskine set aside three British propositions to adopt yours. 
 The very great difference of the two does not require to be 
 pointed out ; nor yet the consequent rights of the king to reject 
 the proposition that was signed ; for I now tell you, that Mr. 
 Erskine was not authorized to make any variation in his first 
 offer." 
 
 Mr. Jackson, we shall find, has high authority for concluding 
 Mr. Erskine in an errour in what he did resfiecting the orders 
 in council ; no less than that of Mr. Smith and Mr. Madison, 
 who consider Mr. Erskine's instructions on this head, as not 
 warranting his proceeding. " The declaration (says Mr. Smith 
 in his letter of October 19th) that the only despatch by which 
 the conditions were prescribed to Mr. Erskine for the conclu- 
 sion of an arrangement on the matter to which it relates [that 
 is, the orders in council,] is now for \\\g, first time made known 
 to this government. -And I need hardly add, that if that des- 
 patch had been communicated at the tijne of the arrangement ; 
 OR if it had been known, that the propositions contained in it, 
 and which were first presented by Mr. Erskine, were the only 
 ones on which he was authorized to make an arrangement, the 
 arrangement would never have been made." Mr. Smith coU' 
 firms this declaration, in the letter of November I ; thus prov- 
 ing, that Mr. Jackson had judged well in conjectui'ing, that 
 Mr. Smith and Mr. Madison would not differ from him in his 
 opinion on this subject. And if such is the present judgment 
 of the American government as to the variation of the arrange- 
 ment from the instructions, shall not the English government 
 be held justified in having, in May last, formed the same judg- 
 ment from the same (and perhaps better) materials ? 
 
 But we are noAv to proceed to other passages in the letter of 
 October 19th, in which Mr. Smith actually commences that 
 dispute, which ended in the formal dismission of Mr. Jackson 
 from his functions as minister. 
 
 " Although (says Mr. Smith) it may not have been your in- 
 tention to have given to this subject a posture, which it would 
 not naturally have assumed, yet such has been the tendency 
 of some of your remarks ; — and, particularly, of the conclusion 
 you have drawn from two circumstances. [N. B. What these 
 circumstances were, will be collected from what follows.] If 
 there be no trace of complaint against the disavowal in the ar- 
 
39 
 
 chives of the \^Britts/i^ mission^ it is because this government 
 could not have entered such complaint before the reasons of 
 the disavowal had been explained ; and especially as the expla- 
 nations were justly and confidently expected through the new 
 functionary. And as to the supposed reserve on 7ny part on this 
 subject, in our several conferences, I did imagine that my re- 
 peated intimations to you of the necessity of satisfactory expla- 
 nations as to the disavowal, were sufficient indications of the 
 dissatisfaction of this government with respect to the disavowal 
 itself. [N. B. Both parties may have had a fair right to make 
 these respective statements, as to the first circumstance. We 
 proceed therefore to the second.] The stress you have laid 
 (says Mr. Smith) on what you have been pleased to state as to 
 the substitution of the terms finally agreed on, for the terms 
 first proposed, has excited no small degree of surprize. Cer- 
 tain it is, that your predecessor did present for my considera- 
 tion the three conditions, which now appear in the printed 
 document [that is of January 23] ; and that, on finding his first 
 proposal vmsuccessful, the more reasonable terms, comprised in 
 the arrangements respecting the orders in council, were adopt- 
 ed. And what, sir, is there in this, to countenance the conclu- 
 sion you have drawn in favour of the right of his Britannick 
 Majesty to disavow the proceeding ? Is any thing more com- 
 mon in publick negotiations, than to begin with an higher de- 
 mand, and that failing, to descend to a lower ? To have, if not 
 two sets of instructions, two or more grades of propositions in 
 the same set of instructions ? — What were the real and entire 
 instructions given to your predecessor is a question essentially 
 between him and his government. That he had, or at least be- 
 lieved he had, sufficient authority to conclude the arrangement, 
 his formal assurances during our discussions were such, as to 
 leave no room for doubt. His subsequent letter of the 15th 
 June *** is an evident indication of what his persuasion then 
 was, as to his instructions ; and with a view to shew what his 
 impressions have been ever since the disavowal, I must take 
 the liberty of referring you to the annexed extracts of his offi- 
 cial letters of the 3 1st July and of the 14th August." — After 
 these passages in Mr. Smith's letter, we come to the passage 
 given above, containing the declaration, that either the sight of 
 the whole of the despatch of January 23, or the knowledge of 
 the single fact, that Mr. Erskine was confined to the three pro- 
 positions contained in it, would have prevented Mr. Madison 
 from making the arrangement with Mr. Erskine. 
 
 Before continuing our extracts, we shall remark, that not- 
 withstanding Mr. Jackson rested much on the very great dif- 
 ference between the British and the American propositions, 
 brought forward in that negotiation, yet he did not consider 
 the propriety of the disavow -il, as completely proved, till he 
 had shewn, that Mr. Erskine's authority extended onli/ to the 
 
40 
 
 support of the three British propositions — As to the American 
 proposition, (that is, the one from the American government) 
 Mr Erskine had no more authority to sign it for the king of 
 England, than any Englishman or American walking in the 
 streets of Washington, while Mr. Erskine was negotiating this 
 unauthorized arrangement. 
 
 But it will be convenient to pursue to its close this contest 
 as to the insult ; and Mr. Jackson's reply on October 23, to 
 this attack, is as follows : " Nothing can be more notorious than 
 the frequency with which, in the course of a complicated nego- 
 tiation, ministers are furnished with a gradation of conditions 
 on which they may be successively authorized to conclude. So 
 common is the case which you put Injiiotheticallij^ that in ac- 
 ceding to the justice of your statement, I feel myself impelled 
 to make only one observation upon it, which is, that it does 
 not strike me as bearing upon the unauthorized agreement [that 
 is, unauthorized on the part of Mr. Erskine,] concluded here ; 
 in as much, as in point of fact^ Mr. Erskine had no such grad- 
 uated instruction. You are already acquainted with that, which 
 was given ; and / have had the honour of informing you that it 
 was the only one by which the conditions, on which he was to 
 conclude, were prescribed. So far from the terms, which he 
 was actually induced to accept, having been conte?n/ilated in that 
 instruction, he himself states, that they were substituted by yoVf 
 in lieu of those originally proposed." The strength of this 
 reasoning of Mr. Jackson admits of no addition, except in small 
 particulars : for example ; Mr. Jackson does not say, you laere 
 acquainted with the instruction at the time of signing ; but, you 
 are acquainted ; and to make it clear, when it was first known 
 to the American government, that there was no double set of 
 instructions, he says, / informed you of it, (that is in October 
 last, or about five months after the signing of Mr. Erskine's ar- 
 rangement.) It was not indeed till the close of July, that Mr. 
 Madison saw even the whole of the despatch of January 23. — Mr. 
 Jackson therefore does not in the slightest degree insinuate, that 
 the American government proceeded in that negotiation with 
 any other knowledge, than Xh^lthe three propositions came froin 
 England. If it had any other knowledge, it certainly never has 
 been alluded to by the British administration in any of the com- 
 munications with the American government yet made publick. 
 
 It is Mr. Smithes turn next to notice Mr. Jackson ; which he 
 does with an air of some authority at the conclusion of his let- 
 ter, November 1. "I abstain, sir, from making any particular 
 animadversions on several irrele-vant and improper allusions in 
 your letter, not at all comporting with the professed disposition 
 to adjust, in an amicable manner, the differences unhappily sub- 
 sisting between the two countries. But it would be improper 
 to conclude the few observations to which I purposely limit 
 myself, without adverting to your repetition of a language, im- 
 
41 
 
 plying a knonvledge on the pait of this government, that the in* 
 structions of your predecessor did not authorize the arrange- 
 ment formed by him. Jfter the explicit and peremptory as- 
 severation, that this government had no such knowledge, and 
 that tvith such knowledge no such arrangement would have 
 been entered into, the view which you have again presented of 
 the subject makes it my duty to apprize you, that such iJisinna- 
 Hons are inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreign minister 
 with a government that understands what it owes to itself." 
 Our remark here is, that Mr. Jackson never attributed to the 
 American government a knowledge by evidence^ that Mr. Ers- 
 kine was not empowered to form his arrangement, though he 
 went some way to imply it by argument, as every man may do 
 (and as has been done in our pages) without impeaching the 
 honour or " veracity" of the American government. In the 
 present letter, however, Mr. Smith takes the matter up on the 
 footing of Mr. Jackson's letter of October 23, last quoted, where 
 it is made to rest on grounds, which do not by their nature ap- 
 pear offensive, being confined to the fact, that Mr. Erskhie 
 had only power to sign one set of propositions, but that he really 
 signed another, namely, one coming from the government with 
 which he had to treat. 
 
 That Mr. Jackson, the agent of a great and proud nation, 
 should catch some of Mr. Smith's vivacity, was to be expected ; 
 but, with his spirit, he endeavours to connect a train of reason- 
 ing founded on publick rights, which of course gives it some ap- 
 pearance of dignity. It is at the close of his last letter of No- 
 vember 4, that he writes thus : " I am concerned, sir, to be 
 obliged, a second time, to appeal to those principles of publick 
 law, under the sanction and protection of which I was sent to 
 this country. Where there is not freedom of communication 
 in the form substituted [that is, by letter] or the niore usual 
 one of verbal discussion, there can be little useful intercourse 
 between ministers ; and one at least of the epithets which you 
 have thought proper to apply to my last letter is such as neces- 
 sarily abridges that freedom. 
 
 " That any thing therein contained m.ay be irrelevant to the 
 subject it is of course competent to you to endeavour to shew ; 
 and as far as you succeed in so doing, so far will my argument 
 lose its validity. But as to the Jiro/irieiy of my allusions you 
 must allow me to acknowledge only the decision of my own 
 sovereign, whose commands I obey, and to whom alone I can 
 consider myself responsible. Beyond this, it suffices that I do 
 not deviate from the respect due to the government to which i 
 am accredited. — You will find that in my correspondence with 
 you, 1 have carefully avoided drawing conclusions th.it did not 
 necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me ; and 
 least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I 
 was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, such as I have be*- 
 
42 
 
 come acquainted with, I have scrupulously adhered ; and in so 
 doing I mnst continue, whenever (he good /ait h of his Majesty's 
 government is called in questioii ; [with a view] to vindicate its 
 honour and dignity in the manner that appears to me best cal- 
 culated for that purpose." 
 
 The time was now come for closing the mission of Mr. 
 Jackson. His sentence was accordingly pronounced in the fol- 
 lowing words, in a letter dated Nov. 8, of which the whole must 
 here be exhibited. " Sir, in my letter of the 19th ult. I stated 
 to you, that the declaration in your letter of the Wth, tliat the 
 despatch from Mr. Canning to Mr. Erskine of the 23d January 
 was the only despatch by which the conditions were prescribed 
 to Mr. Erskine for the conclusion of an arrangement on the 
 matter to which it related, was THEN for the first time made 
 to this government. And it was added, that if that despatch 
 had been communicated at the ti7ne of the arrangement, or if it 
 had been known that the propositions contained in it were the 
 only ones on which he was authorized to make an arrangement, 
 the arrangement would not have been made. In my letter of 
 the 1st inst. adverting to the repetition in your letter of the 
 23d ult. of a Janguage implying a knowledge in this govern- 
 ment that the instructions of your predecessor did not authorize 
 the arrangement formed by him, an intimation was distinctly 
 given to you, that after the explicit and peremptory assevera- 
 tion, that this government had not any such knowledge, and 
 that, with such a knowledge, such an arrangement would not 
 have been made, no such insiJiuation could be admitted by this 
 government. Finding that in your reply of the 4th instant you 
 have used a language which cannot be understood but as reite- 
 rating, and even aggravating the same gross insinuation, it 
 only remains (in order to preclude opportunities which are thus 
 abused) to inform you that no farther communications will be 
 received from you, and that the necessity of this determination 
 will, without delay, be made known to your government. In 
 the mean time, a ready attention will be given to any commu- 
 nication affecting the interests of the two nations, through any 
 other channel that may be substituted. I have the honour to 
 be, &c. R. SMITH." 
 
 To this letter, Mr. Jackson made no reply. — He demanded 
 passports through the principal secretary of his mission (called, 
 in modern language, the secretary of legation.) Through the 
 same channel also, he made some mild comments on Mr. Smith's 
 last letter ; closing them with an intimation, that he should 
 withdraw from Washington. In his own name also he wrote a 
 circular letter to the British consuls in America informing 
 them of this last fact, and of some general circumstances. But 
 a notice of these documents would call for much room, which 
 Ave rather devote to shew in what terms Mr. Smith was directed 
 to convey the intelligence of these events to Mr. Pinkney, the 
 
43 
 
 American minister at the court of London. — November 23, Mr. 
 Smith writes that minister as follows : — " It was in the outset 
 perceived that Mr. Jackson's object was to bring us to resume 
 the arrangement of April in a way that would imply, that we 
 were aware that the arrangement was not binding on his gov- 
 ernment, because made with a knowledge on our part that Mr. 
 Erskine had no authority to make it, and thus to convert the 
 responsibility of his government, for the disavowal, into a re- 
 proach on this for its conduct in the transaction disavowed. — In 
 the first instance, it was deemed best rather to repel his obser- 
 vations argumentatively, than to meet them as an offensive in- 
 timation. This forbearance had not the expected effect of re- 
 straining him from a repetition of the offence. And even, on 
 his farther insinuations, nothing more was done than to t^re- 
 monish him of the inadmissibility of so indecorous a course of 
 proceeding. This also being without effect, nothing remained 
 but the step finally taken. And there was the less hesitation in 
 shutting the door to farther opportunities for insulting insinua- 
 tions, as the disclosures he had made, and the spirit of his dis- 
 cussions had so entirely shut it to the hope of any favourable 
 result from his miiision." We must interrupt our extracts 
 here to introduce two or three observations. First, we leai'n 
 here a novelty ; namely, that the British government rejected 
 Mr. Erskine's arrangement under pretence that Mr. Madison 
 knew it to be unauthorized when Mr. Erskine signed it. ; whereas 
 Mr. Jackson said, that it was rejected because it was in itself 
 unauthorized, not because it was known by others to be unau- 
 thoi'ized ; and because it was wrong in itself, and not because 
 Mr. Madison had penetrated into the secrets of the authority 
 by which it was made. Secondly, the British administration 
 never sought to reproach the American government by way of 
 clearing itself ; since it sought to become clear, not by accus- 
 ing others, but by defending itself. Lastly, the British govern- 
 ment was content at first with giving very general but solid rea- 
 sons for its conduct, minute explanations being forced upon 
 it by Mr. Madison, (who condescended to demand them of 
 Mr. Jackson, even though he should have no higher authority 
 for offering them than a common letter of credence or intro- 
 duction, such as Mr. Erskine possesssed.) We say nothing of 
 Mr. Smith's use of his argumeritative talents, except that it is 
 to be feared that his reproaches will be much more felt in Eng- 
 land than his arguments. 
 
 But we go on to another passage in Mr. Smith's despatch to 
 Mr. Pinkney, in which notice is taken of Mr. Oakley's note, 
 signifying Mr. Jackson's design of quitting Washington, since 
 he had given offence where none was designed, Sec. " The 
 second note (observes Mr. Smith) seems to be essentially in- 
 tended as a justification of the conduct of Mr. Jackson in that 
 part of his correspondence which has given umbrage. If he 
 
44 
 
 intended it as a conciliatory advance, he ought not to have pre- 
 ceded it by a demand of passports, nor by the spirit or the man- 
 ner in Avhich that demand v.as made He ought in fact, if such 
 
 was his object, to have substituted an explanation in the place 
 of his reply to my premonitory letter. But whether he had one 
 or other, or both of these objects in view, it was necessaiy for 
 him to have done more than is attempted in this paper. It was 
 never objected to Mr Jackson, [N. B. Here Mr. Smith refers 
 to Mr. Oakley's note,] that he had stated it as a fact, that the 
 three propositions in question had been submitted to me by 
 Mr. Erskine ; nor that he stated it (as made known to him by 
 the instructions of Mr. Canning) that the instructions to Mr. 
 Erskine, containing those three conditions, was the only one 
 from which his authority was derived to conclude an arrange- 
 ment in the matter to which it related — [namely, the order in 
 council.] The objectioji tvas, that a knowledge of this restric- 
 tion of the authority of Mr. Erskine was imjiutcd to this govern- 
 ment ; and the repetition of the imjiutation even after it had 
 been peremptorily disclaimed. This was so gross an attack on 
 the honour and veracity of the government as to forbid all fur- 
 ther communications from him. Care was nevertheless taken 
 at the same time to leave the door open for such as might be 
 made through any other channel, however little the probability 
 that any satisfactory communications would be received through 
 any other channel here." 
 
 This portion of our extracts being finished, our remarks 
 must close also. And our concluding remarks will be aided 
 by a distinction made in our outset, namely, that we must not 
 confound the debates concerning the ratification of the treaty in 
 October and November last with what occurred at the sig- 
 nature of the treaty in the preceding month of April. In justi- 
 fying also the rejection of a treaty, it is by no means necessary 
 that more than oyie of the parties signing it shcdl merit disap- 
 probation ; and, in the present instance, the party censured is 
 the agent of the government which utters the censure. The 
 government which censures, neither by itself nor by any of its 
 officers, censures the other government, but supplies that other 
 government with facts and arguments to make it join with it- 
 self in laying the blame in the right quarter, namely, on Mr. 
 Erskine, who, however estimable he may be in private life, and 
 however well he may have acted in other parts of his diplomat- 
 ick character, has certainly erred in signing the two branches 
 of the arrangement of April last with the American government. 
 
 Thus then we perceive, that to suppose that Great Britain has 
 attributed to the American government a knonvledge that Mr. 
 Erskine had no powers to sign the arrangement, while signing 
 it in April last, is to all appearance a -very great errour ; and, 
 if this be true, the steps taken in consequence make it a -very 
 (i(ing(rous erroxir, as will be mentioned under another head. 
 
45 
 
 We shall now proceed to the considerations which Mr. Ja-ck- 
 son urges, to prove that Mr. Erskine has exceeded his instruc- 
 tions as to the orders in council^ excluding, as much as possi- 
 ble, what has before been said on this subject. We shall begin 
 with a short general view of these arguments, given in Mr. 
 Jackson's own words, and then proceed to his more extensive 
 detail of one portion of them. " I beg leave (says this gentle- 
 man to Mr. Smith, on October 23) briefly to recapitulate the 
 substance of what I have had the honour to communicate to you, 
 (as well in verbal, as in written communications) **** [as to] 
 the reasons of his Majesty's disavowal of the agreement so often 
 mentioned. I have shewn them, in obedience to the authority 
 which you have quoted, [namely, Vattel] to be both strong and 
 solid ; and such as outweigh, in the judgment of his Majesty's 
 government, every other consideration which you have contem- 
 plated. I have shewn, that that agreement was not concluded 
 in virtue of a full power, and that the [mere] instructions given 
 on the occasion were violated." — Such is Mr. Jackson's general 
 view of his subject. A part of his particular reasonings has 
 already been seen : We now go to a part as yet unnoticed in 
 these pages. — " That his Majesty had strong and solid reasons 
 [for disavowing an act so concluded,] will appear not only from 
 hio instructions having been violated, but from the circumstance, 
 that the violation of them involved the sacrifice of a great sys- 
 tem of policy, deliberately adopted, and acted upon in just and 
 necessary retaliation of the unprecedented modes of hostility 
 resorted to by his enemy. — There appears to have prevailed, 
 throughout the whole of this transaction, a fundamental mis- 
 take, which would suggest that his Majesty had proposed to 
 propitiate the government of the United States in order to in- 
 duce it to consent to the renewal of the commercial intercourse 
 between the two countries, as if such had been the relations 
 between Great Britain and America, that the advantages of that 
 intercourse were wholly on the side of the former ; and as if in 
 any arrangement (whether commercial or political) his Majesty 
 could condescend to barter objects of national policy and dig- 
 nity for permission to trade with another country Without 
 
 minutely calculating what may be the degree of pressure felt 
 at Paris by the ditferencc in the price of goods, whether landed 
 at Havre or at Hamburg, I will in my turn appeal to your judg- 
 ment, sir, whether it be not a strong and solid reason (worthy 
 to guide the councils of a great and powerful monarch) to set 
 bounds to that spirit of encroachrnent and universal dominion, 
 which would bend all things to its own standard ? Is it nothing, 
 in the present state of the world, when the agents of France 
 authoritatively announce to their victims, " that Europe is sub- 
 mitting and surrendering by degrees," that the world should 
 know that there is a nation, which by that divine goodness so 
 strongly appealed to in the paper [Angereau's proclamation to 
 
46 
 
 the Catalonians] to which I allude, is enabled to falsify this as- 
 sertion ? Is it not important, at such a moment, that Europe 
 and America should be convinced, that from whatever countries 
 honourable and manly resistance to such a spirit may have been 
 banished, it will still be found in the sovereign of the British 
 nation, and in the hearts of his subjects ? As to the precautions 
 taken in England, to insure from injury upon this occasion the 
 citizens of the United States, and which appear to you to be 
 even yet insufficient, I am confident that, in every doubtful case, 
 the usual liberality of our tribunals will be exercised in deter- 
 mining upon it ; and it was at Mr. Pinkney's express requisi- 
 tion, that additional instructions were given to the commanders 
 of his Majesty's ships of war and privateers," &c. 
 
 Whether these arguments be agreed to or not at Washington, 
 it is sufficient that they are such as are known to be sincerely 
 felt at London, and that the king of England had a right to act 
 upon them by disavowing the branch of Mr. Erskine's arrange- 
 ment, which respects the orders in council, as being signed 
 without a full power, and being in no respect warranted by 
 special instructions, but, on the contrary, varying nmost essen- 
 tially from the instructions which were given — As it now ap- 
 pears also, that the sole reason urged for sending away Mr. 
 Jackson arose from the ill-founded suspicion of his having im- 
 iiuted to Mr. Madison " a knowledge of the restriction of the 
 authority of Mr. Erskine," it confirms what M^as before proved, 
 that it was because this restriction made it wrong for Mr. Ers- 
 kine to sign the arrangement. If Mr. Erskine then had done 
 that, which it was disgraceful for Mr. Madison either to partake 
 in, or to privy to, surely there was ground enough in the case 
 for the king of England to refuse to ratify what Avas equally 
 contrary to his actual instructions, as to his constant policy. 
 
 NINTH HINT. .An accommodation seemed possible upon ?nore 
 than one point, through Mr. Jackson, 
 FIRST, as to the Orders in Council. 
 
 Before we touch upon the concessions which might possibly 
 have been obtained from Mr. Jackson, respecting the orders of 
 council, by candid and able negotiators, we must note certain 
 principles and occurrences. 
 
 We begin with an observation which is important at the pres- 
 ent crisis, viz. that honest men must become reconciled to the 
 idea, that -violence is so7ne times to be allowed to take the very shape 
 and form of law, in consequence of our lot in this world being 
 essentially interwoven with that of other men. Many examples 
 of this necessity are found in social and civil life ; and it is no 
 less seen in the great community of nations, especially when 
 wars occur with states Avhich have much intercourse with the 
 seas. — When an enemy attacks the commerce and navigation 
 proceeding to and from such states, with a view to create dis- 
 
47 
 
 tress, especially by injuring what is commonly a great source of 
 revenue, and obstructing essentially channels either of sale or 
 of purchase ; if neutrals prevent the effect of these attacks by 
 means of their flag, they are considered as aiders, comforters, 
 and abettors ; and thence are held, to a certain degree, as en- 
 emies themselves. The appeals of the neutrals to simfile jus- 
 tice on this occasion must be vain, for the assailant also ap- 
 peals to justice, affirming that his right to pursue his enemy 
 is as great, as that of the neutral to pursue his trade ; and if 
 the belligerent is weak, his dangers give a just increase of 
 weight to his argument. On the other hand, the means oi for- 
 cible redress left to the neutral are scarcely more useful, than 
 an appeal to justice. He can only resort to a war of restrictions, 
 or a war of blood. — Commercial restrictions sometimes make 
 but a weak impression upon a belligerent ; and when it is oth- 
 erwise, the neutral often suffers as much from this mode of 
 punishment, as the belligerent. A war of blood is still more ob- 
 jectionable. To go to war for a part of our neutral rights, is to 
 lose the quiet enjoyment of the remainder of them ; and there- 
 fore resembles the case of a thoughtless boy, who lets fly a 
 handful of birds, in order to run after a single one which had 
 escaped from him. The neutral also must fight both sides, if 
 both sides happen to oppose his claims. He must farther know, 
 at the proper time, how to make his peace with both sides, 
 lest one or both of the belligerents should sooner or later shew 
 resentment againt him when the original war is ended. The 
 struggle in the last place must often be renewed with other 
 powers, or with the same powers in proportion as new wars 
 spring up. For these and other reasons added to the general 
 objections against war, a certain degree of restraint from bellig- 
 erents has always, in modern times, been submitted to by neu- 
 trals ; and there are generally sooner or later two additional 
 motives found to confirm them in this determination.. — One is, 
 that when neutrals become belligerents themselves, they profit by 
 the very principles of which they before complained, when they 
 were merely neutrals. The other is, that, during the occupation 
 of the belligerents in war, much new trade falls into the hands of 
 neutrals, so that the amount of trade lost in one direction is of- 
 ten more than made up by new trade obtained in others. Trade 
 in this case is a flood which obstructs the course of rivulets in 
 order to open torrents ; the supply is irregular, but ovei'flowing. 
 Such then is the ground of neutral law in its ordinary state. 
 And it is thus found to be nothing more than the practical 
 boundary between the contending claims and interests of bel- 
 ligerents and of neutrals ; or, in other words, the middle line 
 which the majority of the concerned ultinvately consent to ob- 
 serve, in order on both sides to possess the remainder of their 
 claims free from opposition. Some differences of opinion how- 
 ever commonly exist respecting the limits of the syatom. Nor 
 
48 
 
 is it always, even with the same parties, found to be ^Jlxed sys- 
 tem. The great power of some belligerents, the occasionally 
 desperate state of others of them, and the passions of a third 
 set, with the frequent want of strength or of exertion in mari- 
 time neutrals, make the variations in it sometimes so great, that 
 neutrals are obliged to negociate over again for new terms of 
 neutrality, and thus to experience a renewal of their original 
 difficulties. There are indeed, sometimes, cases of defensive 
 war, so urgent as to authorize peculiar liberties with neutral 
 trade ; the right to self fireservation with moralists having, in- 
 many instances, a clear preference over the right to mercantile 
 profit. 
 
 The present is a moment of this description ; exhibiting one 
 of those extreme cases, of which even the airy disputants at 
 college would at one time scarcely have admitted the possibili- 
 ty. The European world is now completely divided into two 
 contending parts, ourselves being the only real neutrals con- 
 nected with it; and the oppression of commerce is employed 
 by each set of combatants, as one of its principal weapons for 
 injuring the other. By one side it is considered as the almost 
 sole means of restraining its antagonist ; and by the other, it is 
 held as the certain means of ruining him. Viewing therefore 
 the question of neutral rights, at the present moment, and 
 under the above impression, we must be convinced, that al- 
 though we should seek to do the best we possibly can, it ought 
 to be done at the least possible expense and risk. What we 
 omit to claim on this occasion, can never operate as -a precedent 
 against ourselves ; for as long as the precedent can be remem- 
 bered and have weight, the world is never likely again to be 
 seen in the same situation. The world must soon either have 
 one master over the w hole, including the United States, or re- 
 turn at last to different independent governments, directly or 
 indirectly forming a balance to each other. 
 
 In addition to these general ideas^ let us next notice the fol- 
 \o\i\Xi% facts. To persons of judgment the detail will not seem 
 unnecessarily long ; for facts which were thought interesting 
 when viewed separately will not appear less so ivhen arrang- 
 ed in a proper connexion. 
 
 The Hercules of Antiquity is said to have conquered one of 
 his enemies by holding him up from the earth : and Bonaparte 
 has endeavoured to conquer the English by keeping them off 
 from the seas. Before the Berlin decree took place, every port 
 of the European coast, excepting in portions of the Baltic and 
 Mediterranean, was closed not only to the British nation, but to 
 the productions of the British dominions, even after these pro- 
 ductions had passed into the hands of neutrals. This extensive 
 and provoking measure however did not give rise to that blocka- 
 ding system, whicht he British finally pursued in Europe, in their 
 second war with revolutionary France ; for the British were a' 
 
49 
 
 first content with resorting to former modes of proceeding 
 against neutrals (such as had been confirmed by old French ex- 
 amples ) as a sufficient remedy against this commercial difficul- 
 ty. It was merely to oppose the armament collected for the in- 
 vasion of Great Britain and Ireland, that the entrances of twelve 
 ports in the neighbourhood of these forces (reckoning from Os- 
 tend to Fecamp, in Normandy) were ordered, in August 1804, 
 to be most rigorously blockaded in a manner " suited to the 
 usages of w- ar acknowledged in similar cases," This therefore 
 was simply a military firecaiition,, and not a commercial restriction. 
 In 1806 a new event happened, during the Fox and Grenville 
 administration, which produced a blockade upon a third ground, 
 that oi political resentment. Prussia, by order of Bonaparte, had 
 seized the Hanoverian dominions of the King of England, be- 
 sides joining in his attacks on British trade ; and, in return for 
 this, England (in April, 1806) ordered the entrances of the 
 Eins, Weser, Elbe and Trave to be most rigorously blocka- 
 ded, " according to the acknowledged and allo'ivcd usa.f^es of war 
 in similar cases." If we adopt a conjecture (patronized by 
 Mr. Monroe, according to our published documents, and which 
 -carries with It its owr. confirmation) it was in order to relieve 
 American traders from the effects of a part of this real block- 
 ade, that vlr. Fox, in May, 1806, contrived an extensive, but 
 nomi'iial blockaac, stretching from the Elbe to Brest ; and then 
 artfully narrowed the operation of it by a clause, which left it 
 only in force against enemy's property and coniraband of ivar ; 
 so that, unless becvfcen the Ems and the Elbe, and unless be- 
 tv/een Ostend and the Seine, this whole extent of coast wais 
 treated only as a common coast of a common enemy is treated 
 in all wars whatever. This therefore, when properly under- 
 stood, was a measure of civility, rather than a measure of op- 
 pression to American neutral traders. It happened dso 
 that the blockade was still farther moderated in September fol- 
 lowing, in consequence of Prussia having attempted at that 
 moment to resist France, which naturally led the English to 
 terminate the blockade between the Ems and Elbe. 
 
 Here let us turn from England to look at Bonaparte, who at 
 this time adopted a desperate step against neutral commerce 
 and against England, to which he was particularly excited by 
 an immediate prospect of gain, as he had entered into a new 
 territory where there were many large deposits of £?ig!isA 
 goods. Having prepared his measure by pretended arguments, 
 and by the march of different detachnaents of troops, he issued 
 his famous decree of Nov. 21, 1806 from the capital of the 
 Prussian dominions, then in his possession, directing this de- 
 cree to be communicated to his allies for their adoption ; and 
 declaring it a funda-fiental law of the French empire, and of 
 Italy, as long as England should refuse to acknowledge certain 
 neutral laws invented by himself. By this Berlin decree he 
 
50 
 
 ordered the blockade of the British islands ; the seizure of the 
 persons of the British, though unconcerned in war, wherever 
 found ; as also of their letters and property of every kind, real 
 and personal ; the stoppage of all trade with them ; the capture 
 of all articles coming from their colonies or manufactures ; [for 
 neutrals who had innocently bought them were to forfeit them, 
 as being, by the very purchase, proved to be " the accomfilices 
 of England"] together with the exclusion of all which had 
 touched in England or its colonies. Half the amount of the 
 confiscations of the first seizures was to be applied to indem- 
 nify the sufferers by English cruisers, though we may pre- 
 sume, without any breach of candour, that it has never reached 
 that benevolent destination. 
 
 The English, upon this renewed provocation, resolved to treat 
 the matter under a commercial point of view ; but American 
 considerations still came across them to check this conduct. 
 On December 31, 1806, they had arranged their treaty with 
 Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney ; but they honourably declared, 
 that the signature given to it must only he. jiroxnsional ; for if 
 America should, at the order of Bonaparte, abandon her neu- 
 tral rights, where they were useful to England, it was clear, 
 that notwithstanding this treaty, England could not respect 
 such of these rights, as were to be exercised in favour of 
 France. In the meantime the British government, as to im- 
 mediate measures, acted with moderation. They only adopted 
 what has been an acknowledged French practice ; that is, they 
 stopped the trade between one enemif s jiort and another, (which 
 was done by orders in council dated January 7, 1807) after 
 which they rested on their arms to observe the measures of 
 the United States ; for the restoration of the full blockade from 
 the Ems to the Elbe, which occurred in 1 807, was the mere 
 consequence of the return of Prussia to French subjection.— 
 But the Berlin decree we are to remember acted both by sea and 
 by land ; and the British, who had severely suffered by actual 
 seizures on the continent, and by the necessity of stopping far- 
 ther very extensive shipments which were actually prepared 
 for the same market, began, after vainly waiting above eleven 
 months for American retaliations, to proceed in retaliations of 
 their own. Violence on the ojieri seas, by order of Bonaparte, 
 seems to have been held by the government of the United 
 States, as alone meriting its consideration ; for the hostility to 
 the British by land seems never to have been inquired after; 
 and the mere prohibition of entry to particular articles, and to 
 vessels which had touched in the British dominions, was called 
 a municipal (or internal) regulation on the side of France. — On 
 Nov. 11, 1807, therefore, the British began a series of orders in 
 council on this subject, which reached down to March, 1808. 
 
 By the first and principal one, the blockade of the enemy's 
 coasts was declared universal ; trade in all articles produced 
 
51 
 
 by the enemy was forbidden ; and confiscation was to follow 
 the acceptance of certificates of origin, (that is, certificates re- 
 quired by the enemy to prevent the concealment of British ar- 
 ticles.) Such was the general plan. But excefitions of very 
 great moment were made, firincifially and avowedly to favour 
 the United States ; which we shall recapitulate nearly in the 
 words used by Mr. Erskine to our government. The inter- 
 course of the United States to the colonies of the enemy was 
 left unrestrained ; the transportation of the produce of these 
 colonies from the U. States (instead of being prohibited by a 
 natural retaliation) Avas freely permitted to the ports of Great 
 Britain, with the poAver afterwards of transporting it to any 
 port of Europe tinder such a jirotecting duty as should prevent 
 the enemy from receiving his own produce at a cheaper rate 
 than Great Britain received hers, (America being able, as was 
 said, amply to indemnify herself for the advance of the duty at 
 the expense of the foreign consumer) : and the importation of 
 all flour, meal, grain, tobacco and other articles, produced by 
 the American soil, was permitted through British ports, into 
 those of the enemy, without the payment of any transit (or pas- 
 sage) duties. Cotton alone, of all the American products, was 
 intended to be taxed, as being the raw material of a manufac- 
 ture Avhich France had pushed to a great extent ; but this tax 
 having been objected to in America, it was exchanged for a 
 prohibition. All the taxes upon the other articles also, and the 
 ceremony of acting under licences in the trade going to ports 
 possessed by the enemy in Europe, were afterwards equally 
 abandoned, in consequence of a change of system. — The orders 
 themselves however were not carried into execution, when they 
 were issued, till a sufficient time was given to neutrals to be 
 acquainted with them, according to the respective cases to 
 which they related. 
 
 Bonaparte, previous to the date of these orders (namely, in 
 September, 1807) having sufficiently ascertained the feelings of 
 Europe and of the United States respecting himself and his 
 Berlin decree, resolved to give full eft'ecl to the decree by 
 ifa, as well as by land. This, however, though a measure cal- 
 culated to excite some attention in the American government, 
 still was not a measure of a nature ,to content Bonaparte. The 
 decree from iV/iVon of December 17, 1807, soon therefore fol- 
 lowed, in revenge for the British orders in council of the pre- 
 ceding month, declaring that every vessel which submitted to 
 be searched, or which had visited England, or paid a tax under 
 the orders in council, was thereby denationalized (or discon- 
 nected vvith its nation) and being said thence to have become 
 British, was to be forfeited ; that the British islands were now 
 to be blockaded, not only by sea, but by land^ that is, measures 
 by land v/ere to be taken to render the blockade, both ways, 
 more eltectual ; intercourse between one port of the British 
 
52 
 
 dominions or of its connections and another such port was for- 
 bidden, under penalty of confiscation ; and this decree, like the 
 fonner, was to last till the English should come to their senses, 
 being made void as to all neutrals who should assert their rights 
 against Great Britain. January 15, 1808, M, Ghampagiry was 
 ordered to declare to the American n^.inister at Paris, that his 
 master Bonaparte cousidered ivar as actually exUting between 
 England and the United States from the day on which England 
 published the above orders ; and that American vessels would 
 continue sequestered in France until it was decided how the 
 American government stood disposed on this occasion. On 
 April 17, 1807, by the Bayonne decree, American vessels com- 
 ing into France were ordered to be seized, because acting con- 
 trary to the laws of their country, and furnishing a presump- 
 tion that they did so on British account or in British connex- 
 ion. In general we may add, that the Berlin, Milan, and Bay- 
 onne decrees have had their operation only occasionally sus- 
 pended in some particulars ; and with a view probably, from 
 time to time, to entice American traders to put fresh property 
 into the way of seizure. In fact, so many American vessels and 
 cargoes have at last been seized in France and its subject 
 countries, that the sequestered property has arisen to a stupen- 
 dous amount, and inclines many to a struggle with England, 
 rather than with Bonaparte, the English having been too just 
 to possess any corresponding stake belonging to America. 
 
 On the side of Great Britain matters remained for some time 
 with little change, except as to the conduct of its naval officers 
 and prize courts; the system of respect which these had adopt- 
 ed towards American traders being at this period daily in- 
 creasing. At last an alteration of moment occurred in a high- 
 er quai'ter, in consequence of " divers events which afiected 
 the relations between Great Britain and the territories of other 
 powers" (that is Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sec.) an alteration, 
 which had chiefly taken place since the orders of March, 1808 ; 
 orders, which were connected with those of November, 11, 
 1807. By an order in council, dated April 26, 1809, that of 
 November 11, 1807, and those connected with it, were all re- 
 pealed ; and this branch of the restrictive system of Great Brit- 
 ain was greatly simplified. — Finance, Holland, and the north of 
 Italy, with the foreign dominions of the two former, were de- 
 clared, as to trade and navigation, to be in such a state, as would 
 follow from an actual blockade ; and voyages to or from French 
 and Dutch colonies were forbidden to neutrals. The times for 
 the operation of the respective clauses were to be as indulgent 
 here as in the case of the former orders ; and no advantage 
 was to be taken of those who should be found concerned in 
 voyages which were before prohibited, provided they were novj 
 allowed. The principles of this change are understood to have 
 been, in general, these : to increase the v, eight of the retalia- 
 
53 
 
 tion against the governments most concerned in the establish- 
 ment of the commercial restrictions, and to lessen it towards 
 the others ; to enlarge the market for the colonial and other 
 productions of Great Britain, Portugal and S/iain ; to check 
 the sale of the colonial productions of Fi'ance and Holland ; to 
 secure to the United States, by an addition to their trade in 
 Europe, more than a compensation for what she might lose in 
 colonial trade, which captures and blockades had otherwise es- 
 sentially abridged and might still farther lessen ; and to sub- 
 stitute prohibitions for taxes and licences, as less tending to 
 give oflfence. As to France and her more immediate connec- 
 tions, it will be observed that they had -voluntarily renounced 
 part of the American trade by their own laws, and that they 
 subjected much of the rest to great hazards ; and that the Ame- 
 rican non-intercourse act also cut off much of it ; so as to les- 
 sen the difficulties under this head in a negotiation with the 
 British. 
 
 A hint of this new system will be found to have been given to 
 Mr. Pinkney, in September, 1808. But these orders of April 
 26, 1809, would (equally with those of November 1 1, 1807) have 
 given way, as respects America, to an engagement fairly bot- 
 tomed on Mr. Canning's despatch of January 23, 1809. Mr. 
 Erskine indeed was officially authorized to declare this ; (and 
 in performing this duty on June 15, 1809, he properly observed, 
 that the new order did not repeal the orders of January 7, 1807, 
 respecting the trade between port and port, which yet was pro- 
 posed to be repealed by his own arrangement.) 
 
 We are now arrived at the moment for noticing Mr. Can- 
 ning's three profiositions., which have been so often mentioned. 
 The substance of them follows, together with the substance of 
 Mr. Canning's concessions under each head as made on June 
 22, 1809, in a conversation with Mr. Pinkney. — Profiosition I. 
 The British orders in council of January and November, 1807, 
 so far as regards the United States, and the exclusion of ves- 
 sels of war from American ports, with the non-intercourse and 
 non-importation acts, so far as regards Great Britain, shall all 
 cease on the same day ; but the restrictions imposed upon 
 France, and the powers giving force to her decrees, shall con- 
 ti7iue so long as the decrees themselves shall continue. But, ad- 
 ded Mr. Canning afterwards, trade possibly might h^-ve been 
 admitted to Holland, except so far as an actual blockade should 
 have prevented it. As to the continuance of the restrictions 
 towards France and her companions, Mr. Canning insisted that 
 there should be a /zosz7zx>e or implied pledge on this subject, 
 since Congress might make laws against the enemy for Ameri- 
 can purposes, and these laws might expire 'without any breach 
 of contract ; and, in this case, the renewal of an intercourse 
 with America was all that Great Britain would gain, by a re- 
 peal as to the orders of council. — Proposition II. The United 
 
54 
 
 States shall renounce such trade with the colonies of the enemy, 
 as was not enjoyed during a state of peace. Mr. Canning con- 
 fessed, that this had no necessary connection with the orders in 
 council ; and that the question might be left to future discus- 
 sion, being only introduced because Mr. Ersklac represented, 
 that it would meet with no difficulty at Washington. — Propo- 
 sition III. The observance of the non-intercourse law, as re- 
 garded France, shall be enforced by British cruisers ; since, 
 without this precaution, the raising of the embargo as regarded 
 England, would have the effect of raising it with respect to ev- 
 ery other power. A/r» Canning- admitted that this idea could 
 not well find its way into a national engagement ; and that 
 though he had judged proper to propose it, yet he should have 
 been satisfied with its rejection ; since, if commerce occurred 
 contrary to rule, it might be stopped. — This view of the dis- 
 pute, shews how slenderly Great Britain was attached to any 
 of the points contained in the three propositions, excepting this 
 f>i7igle one^ viz. that the ofifiosition of America to the French 
 decrees must be engaged for, as long as the decrees themselves 
 lasted ; (a condition however, which Mr. Erskine, in his own 
 arrangement, gave up with all the rest.) 
 
 We shall now take another view of the dispute as to the three 
 propositions ; and shew, that various points in these three pro- 
 positions might fairly have been admitted at Washington. For 
 this purpose we shall examine the temper and the obligations 
 of the American admAnistration on this head at three different 
 periods. 
 
 The jhrst period is about the close of November, 1808, soon 
 after the intelligence had been received here, of the rejection of 
 Mr. Jefferson's proposition made (through Mr. Pinkney) for 
 the removal of the eiKbargo as respected Great Britain, upon 
 condition that the orders in council should be withdrawn as re- 
 spected the United States, and Mr. Madison's sentiments (as 
 Mr. Erskine conceived) were expressed thereon " in order that 
 Mr. Erskine might convey thein to the British government, so 
 as to lead to a reconsideration of the above proposition." Mr. 
 Erskine in his explanatory letter to Mr. Smith, dated August 
 14, 1808 declares, that Mr. Madison then stated, that if Ameri- 
 ca were driven to it, "she must even endeavour to maintain 
 her rights against the two greatest powers in the world, unless 
 either of them should relax their restrictions upon neutral 
 commerce, in which case the United States would at once side 
 with that power against the other which might continue its ag- 
 gressions. Mr. Erskine admits, that " he never considered 
 that Mr. Madison meant that the government of the United 
 States would pledge themselves beyond the proposition respect- 
 ing the embargo, as above stated ; (because that was the ex- 
 tent of the power of the President by the constitution of the 
 United States.) He understood very distinctly, that the obser- 
 
55 
 
 vations of Mr. Madison were intended to convey an ofiinion^ as 
 to what ought to be and would be the course pursued by the 
 United States in the event of the orders in council being with- 
 drawn." In these sentiments and opinions Mr. Erskine says, 
 that he recollected that Mr. Smith also concurred. So much as 
 to the first proposition at this fieriod. — As to the second propo- 
 sition, Mr. Erskine says, that Mr. Gallatin intimated, in a pri- 
 vate interview, "that the non-intercourse law, then likely to be 
 passed in Congress, might be considered as removing (though 
 not by way of concession) two great obstacles to a conciliation 
 with England, viz. the non-impoi'tation act, and the proclama- 
 tion" as to British ships of war. At the same time he refer- 
 red " to the probability of the adjustment of another important 
 point in dispute, as he said he knew that it was intended by the 
 United States to abandon the attempt to carry on a trade 
 with the colonies of belligerents in time of war., which ivas 
 not allowed in time of peace ; and to trust to their being 
 permitted [hereafter] by the Fi'ench to carry on sucli a 
 trade in peace., as to entitle them to a continuance of it in time 
 of war.''' The third of Mr. Canning's propositions was not no- 
 ticed at this time, because founded on information supposed to 
 have been received from Mr. Pinkney in England. On the 
 whole, Mr. Erskine considers these unofficial conversations 
 with Messrs. Madison, Gallatin and Smith merely as '■^endeav- 
 ours [on their side] to bring about the repeal of the orders in 
 council, by shewing that many of the obstacles which had stood 
 in the way of an amicable adjustment of the differences between 
 the two countries were already removed ; and that a fair pros- 
 pect existed of settling what remained, since the U. States 
 had exhibited a determination to resist the unjust aggression 
 upon her neutral rights, which was all that Great Britain had 
 ever required." — Mr. Erskine hoAvever acknowledges, that he 
 .certainly never received assurances that the conditions specifi- 
 ed by Mr. Canning would be adopted as preliminaries ; having 
 always stated, that, in the event of the orders in council being 
 withdrawn, the President would take off the embargo as re- 
 spected England, leaving it in operation against the enemy, ac- 
 cording to the authority vested in him at the time by Congress. 
 (These statements of Mr. Erskine's not being replied to are 
 to be considered as admitted by Messrs. Madison, Gallatin and 
 Smith to be correct.) 
 
 Before this reply of Mr. Erskine could be received by Mr. 
 Smith (namely, August 13) Mr. Gallatin himself wrote a sejia- 
 rate letter to Mr. Erskine, respecting what passed on the above 
 subject towards the close of 1808, (being the period still under 
 our consideration.) Mr. Gallatin states therein, as to the first 
 proposition, that it was sufficiently evident, that the United 
 States intended to continue the restrictions on the commercial 
 intercourse with France, whiht such of her decrees as violatcci 
 
56 
 
 our neutral rig-hts, continued in force ; and to remove those vc- 
 stvictions in relation to Great Britain in the eve?it oi a. revoca- 
 tion of the orders in council. But he added, " that the state of 
 tilings, so far as it related to France, was to result from otir 
 own laws (known or anticipated by the British government 
 ■when they authorized an arrangement) and that it was not pro- 
 posed that the continuance of the non-intercourse with France 
 should be made a condition of that arrangement." Mr. Galla- 
 tin then makes a fair comparative remark as to Holland and 
 Portugal, which it is needless to notice here. — He next goes to 
 the second Jirofiosition^ which regards the trade between the 
 colonies of the enemy and foreign ports, carried on in a direct 
 manner. He asserts as to this, that the relinquishment during 
 the present war of what is called the direct trade was alone 
 contemplated ; and that no arrangement on that subject was 
 suggested, as a condition of the revocation of the orders in 
 council. Mr. Gallatin states, on this head, that the two subjects 
 were unconnected ; that the demand implied, that the orders 
 in council would not be repealed, unless, in addition to the re- 
 sistance to French decrees, there was a new price paid, (name- 
 ly, by the abandonment of a branch of trade) ; that if a treaty 
 was in view, other subjects must be included in it, but that he 
 " believed that the United States in the event of a treaty would 
 still be disposed to wave for the present in the manner and on 
 the terms contemplated by the instructions [to Messrs. Monroe 
 and Pinkney] their right to that branch (and to that branch only) 
 of the colonial trade, known by the name of direct trade ; that 
 is to say, the trade carried directly from belligerent colonies to 
 the belligerents in Europe, when that trade was not permanent- 
 ly in peace (as in war) permitted by the laws of the country to 
 which those colonies belonged ; that the right to a trade be- 
 tween such colonies and the United States generally, and to 
 that in colonial articles between the United States and other 
 counti'ies, never could (nor would in his opinion) be abandoned, 
 or its exercise be suspended, by the American government ; 
 that, on the contrary, it was solely in order to secure, by an ex- 
 press treaty article, that trade against interruption (and thus by 
 a mutual spirit of accommodation to avoid collision) that the 
 abandonment of the direct trade could ever be assented to." 
 Mr. Erskine, in his reply of August 15, agrees in essentials with 
 Mr. Gallatin as to facts, but says, that the relinquishment, dur- 
 ing the present war, of the direct branch of this colonial trade 
 was a measure " suggested by Mr. Gallatin himself ;" but yet 
 not as a condition of the repeal of the orders in council, with 
 which it was unconnected ; nor as Sl fireliminary pledge, which 
 he says that he never represented as intended to be given. 
 
 We have thus finished what was to be stated as to the three 
 propositions, as far as regards the Jirst period of time in view, 
 namely, when Mr. Erskine communicated that information to 
 
57 
 
 England, which led to Mr. Canning's despatch of January 23, 
 containing his three famous propositions. 
 
 We have now to proceed to a far more simple inquiry, name- 
 ly, as to the second jieriod of time ; that is, when Mr. Canning's 
 three propositions had arrived and ivere rejected, a.nd when Mr. 
 Madison substituted that very proposition, the rejection of 
 which, when sent through Mr. Pinkney, had occasioned himself 
 and Mr. Gallatin to make the above overtures to renew the nego- 
 tiation as to the orders of council. The account comes from Mr. 
 Erskine : but being received in silence by Mr. Smith in reply 
 to inquiries on this very subject, and published as such reply 
 by President Madison, it is to be held as completely authentick. 
 
 On this head we have but a single passage to exhibit. " I 
 consider it (writes Mr. Erskine to Mr. Smith, August 14, 1809) 
 to be my duty to declare, that during my negotiation with you, 
 which led to the conclusion of the provisional agreement, I 
 found no reason to believe that any difficulties would occur in 
 the accomplishment of the tivo former conditions, as far as it 
 was in the power of the President of the United States to accede 
 to thtjirst, and consistently with the explanation which I have 
 before given of the second point, [that is, concerning the direct 
 colonial trade of enemies.] 
 
 " On the contrary, I received assurances through you, that 
 the President would comply (as far as it was in his power) with 
 the first condition ; and that there could be no doubt that the 
 Congress would think it incumbent upon them to assert the 
 •rights of the United States against such powers as should 
 adopt or act under the decrees of France, as soon as their ac- 
 tual conduct or determinations upon that subject could be ascer- 
 tained. But that, in the mean time, the President had not the 
 power, and could not undertake \o pledge himselfin the FOR- 
 MAL MANNER required to that effect. I received also as- 
 surances from you that no doubt could be reasonably entertain- 
 ed, that a satisfactory arrangement might be made in a treaty 
 upon the subject of the second condition mentioned in Mr. 
 Canning's instructions, according to my explanation of it *** ; 
 but that it would necessarily form an article of a treaty in 
 which the various pretentions of the two countries should be 
 settled. The third condition you certainly very distinctly in- 
 formed me could not be recognized by the President ; but you 
 added (what had great weight in my mind) that you did not see 
 vv'hy any great importance should be attached to such a recog- 
 nition ; because it was impossible, that a citizen of the United 
 States could prefer a complaint to his government on account 
 of the capture of his vessel, while engaged in a trade absolute- 
 ly interdicted by the laws of his country." 
 
 Mr. Erskine then proceeds to say, that though he could not 
 obtain the acceptance of the three propositions in the '''■formal 
 manner" required, yet " as he had such strong grounds for be- 
 
58 
 
 Ueving; that the object of his Majesty's government could be at- 
 tained, though in a different 7nannery and the spirit at least ol 
 his several letters of instructions be fully complied with, he 
 felt a thorough conviction upon his mind that he should be act- 
 ing in conformity with his Majesty's wishes ; and accordingly 
 concluded the late //rox'fifoTzc/ agreement on his Majesty's be- 
 half, with the government of the United States." 
 
 Thus we see that Mr. Erskine stood convinced, that the sev- 
 eral confessions (as to the subjects of the three propositions) 
 demonstrated to have been obtained in \\\& first period from 
 Mr. Madison, Mr. Gallatin, and Mr. Smith, held good during 
 his negotiation in the second period. And, as Mr. Erskine is 
 esteemed by this government as a man of honour, it is fair to 
 argue that he never would have signed the agreement without 
 such conviction ; and therefore the sole difficulty was how to 
 secure the continuance of the restrictions against France and 
 her subject states nvhile the French decrees continued. As 
 there were no permanent laws on the subject, and Congress 
 could not be bound to make such by the President, one method 
 only remained to him, and that was to frame a treaty, which, 
 when ratified by the Senate, would bind even Congress itself. 
 By confining the objects of this treaty to the orders in council, 
 and by obtaining from the British minister a proof that a com- 
 pensation had been provided in return for the abandonment of 
 the colony trade still remaining ivith the enemy, a treaty might 
 have been framed by common consent. The orders of April 
 26, 1809, were officially declared by England to be no objec- 
 tion ; Mr. Canning's letter had given up the order of January 
 23, 1807 as to the direct trade between two hostile fiorts, (a 
 branch of commerce separately prohibited by the non-inter- 
 course act) and as most or all of the enemy's colonies might 
 be seized or blockaded, an equivalent to trading with these was 
 better than the trade itself. 
 
 We now go to the third period, in which our examination as 
 to the three propositions of Mr. Canning is to take place, name- 
 ly, after the arrival of Mr. Jackson. It is true that we have 
 no longer here a right to argue in favour of an amicable issue 
 to a negotiation with Mr. Jackson on account of the friendly 
 dispositions manifested by the American government on this 
 occasion ; but this cannot depi'ive us of our right to argue up- 
 on the ground of what our government owed to its own consist- 
 ency, and to the national interests. As regards Mr. Jackson, 
 we shall have to acknowledge, that he has placed the subject 
 on the ground of argument and of option, and was (equally 
 with the United States) bound to accede to an arrangement 
 equivalent to Mr. Erskine's, provided it was accompanied with 
 a clause binding the United States to a resistance to the French 
 decrees while the French decrees remained. 
 
 Mr. ^mith writes thus to Mr. Jackson on October 9, 1809 : 
 
59 
 
 " The President has learned with no less surprise than regret, 
 that, in your several conferences -with me, you have stated, that 
 you have no instructions which authorize you to make to this 
 government any propositions whatever in relation to the revo- 
 cation of the British orders in council ; but only to receive such, 
 as this government may deem it proper to make to you. That, 
 at all events, it is not the disposition or the intention of the 
 British government to revoke their orders in council, as they 
 respect the United States, but upon th formal stipulation (on the 
 part of the United States) to accede to the following terms and 
 conditions ; viz. Jlrst, that the act of Congress commonly called 
 the non-intercourse law be continued against France, as long 
 as she shall continue her decrees ; secondly, that the navy of 
 Great Britain be authorised to aid in enforcing the provisions 
 of the said act of Congress ; thirdly, that the United States 
 shall explicitly renounce during the present war the right of 
 carrying on any trade whatever (direct or indirect) Avith 
 any colony of any enemy of Great Britain from which they were 
 excluded during peace ; and that this renunciation must extend 
 not only to the trade between the colony and the mother coun- 
 try, but to the trade between the colony and the United States. 
 'Mr. Jackson replies to this, October 11, 1809, to the follow- 
 ing effect : He states, that the sentiments of the American go- 
 vernment having been ascertained to be different, as to Mr. 
 Canning's proposals, from what they were first understood to 
 be, he was not instructed to renew them, especially as the state 
 of things had made them less important, in consequence of the 
 trade being open to Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the south of Italy, 
 and the north of Europe ; as also by the exchange of prohibi- 
 tions for transit duties, which had been much complained of ; 
 and by the capture or blockade of various hostile colonics, 
 whose trade England ever held herself entitled to control in 
 war, however she might occasionally moderate her exercise of 
 her right on this subject. Mr. Jackson then remarks thus : 
 " Under the order of April 26, therefore, while there are on 
 the one hand fewer points of difference to stand in the way of 
 a satisfactory an-angcment between Great Britain and the Unit- 
 ed States, it is possible there may be less temptation [to the 
 United States] to enter into such an arrangement, as the extent 
 of their commerce may be (if they please) nearly as great under 
 the order of council of April 26, as it would be under any ar- 
 rangement which should effect the indispensable objects to 
 which that order applies ; or, as it would be, even without any 
 such order, so long as France, and the powers subservient to 
 France, continue to enforce their decrees. It is in the same 
 proportion, matter of indifference to Great Britain whether the 
 order in council be continued ; or an arrangement, by mutual 
 consent, substituted in its room. Such, sir, are the grounds on 
 which it has appeared to his Majesty to be unnecessary to com-, 
 
60 
 
 mand mc to propose to the government of the United States 
 any formal agreement to be substituted for that which his Ma- 
 jesty has been under the necessity of disavowing ; but I am di- 
 rected to receive and discuss w^ith you any proposal, which ijou 
 may be authorised to make to me on this head." Mr. Jackson 
 tells Mr. Smith, however, " that no disposition had hitherto 
 been shewn, on his part, to make any such proposal." 
 
 Mr. Smith, October 19, ufter observing that Mr. Jackson was 
 only to receive and discuss proposals, remarks, that these pro- 
 posals (it appears) must include a stipulation on the part of the 
 United States to relinquish the trade with the enemies' colo- 
 nies, even in branches not hitherto interrupted by British or- 
 ders for capture ; and also a sanction to the enforcing an act of 
 Congress by the British navy." Much is said on this subject, 
 which it is needless to recite, though it would afford considi'7'a- 
 blc room for comments. At the close of this letter Mr. Smith 
 stutes, that, notwithstanding the mention of the two conditions, 
 (one altogether irrelevant to the subject, and the other requir- 
 ing nothing less than a surrender of an inalienable function of 
 the national sovereignty) such was the disposition of tiie Pre- 
 sident to facilitate a final, and most comprehensive accommo- 
 dation between the two nations, that he is ready (as he had al- 
 ready had the honour of signifying to him) to favour any model 
 of bringing about so happy an event, that may be found consist- 
 ent with the honour and the essential interests of the United 
 States. 
 
 Mr. Jackson, content with what he had before said on thia 
 subject, says, October 23, 1809, that "his instructions were 
 prospective " and did not " authorize him to renew proposi- 
 tions which had been declared unacceptable^ but to receive and 
 discuss any proposal made on the part of the United States, and 
 eventually to conclude a convention between the two countries I" 
 
 Mr. Smith, A'ovember 1, repeats, that " it was vmderstood 
 that the King of England persevered in requiring, as indispen- 
 pensable conditions on the part of the United States, an entire 
 relinquishment of the right to trade with enemies' colonics, 
 and also permission to the British navy to aid in executing a 
 law of Congress, pretensions which could not but render abor- 
 tive all proposals whatever upon this subject, whether made by 
 the United States, or by his Britannick Majesty." 
 
 Mr. Jackson, November 4, makes a finishing answer to these 
 charges. " When I forwarded to my court (says Mr. Jackson) 
 your letter of the 19th ult. and the answer which I returned to 
 it, I imagined (and I may add, I hoped) that the retrospective 
 correspondence into which you thought it necessary to enter 
 with me, had been closed. *** It is necessary to place in the 
 most unequivocal light a topick, which I observe to be con- 
 stantly and prominently re-stated in your letters, notwithstand- 
 ing the repeated (but as it should seem fruitless) endeavours 
 
61 
 
 used in mine to clear it from the slightest shadow of obscurity, 
 you say that it is understood that his Britannick Majesty pei- 
 severes in requiring, as indispensable conditions on the part of 
 the United States, an entire relinquishment of the right to trade 
 Avith the enemies' colonies, and also a permission to the British 
 navy to aid in executing a law of Congress. This same state- 
 ment is contained in your letter of the 9th ult. and represented 
 as the substance of what had fallen from me in our previous 
 conferences. 
 
 " In my answer to that letter I took the liberty of shewing, 
 that such a supposition was erroneous ; and I have looked in 
 vain to my letter of the 23d to find in it any suggestion of a sim- 
 ilar tenor. I believe therefore that by reference to my two let- 
 ters you will find that the statement, now again brought for- 
 ward, is contained in neither of them, that it made no part of 
 my previous conversations with you, and that I have in no way 
 given room to suppose that I ever made such statement at all. 
 
 " That, before the orders in council can be revoked, their ob- 
 ject must be obtained in some other way, is unquestionably true. 
 
 " But you may be assured, sir, that there is no wish what- 
 ever entertained in England that the British navy should be 
 employed in executing a law of Congress. If the proposal that 
 was made upon that subject (and made, as you know, because 
 it was believed to be acceptable here) had been adopted, and 
 had become a matter of comfiact between the two countries, 
 and thereby a part, not of the law of Congress, but of the pub- 
 lick law binding upon both parties, and which both would have 
 had a common intercut in seeing duly executed ; in that case 
 the agency of the British navy Avould not have had the invid- 
 ious aspect which is now attempted to be given to it. At pres- 
 ent there is no engagement between the two countries, no laws 
 of Congress which bear a reference to any such engagement, 
 and consequently it cannot be wished to take any share what- 
 ever in the execution of those laws. 
 
 " In regard to the colonial trade I need only observe, that all 
 or nearly all the enemies' colonies are blockaded by British 
 squadrons. It cannot thei-efore be so much an object of solici- 
 tude as you imagine to obtain the relinquishment of the trade 
 of a7iy country to those colonies. On the contrary, you will 
 find it stated in my letter of the 11th ult. to be a matter of in- 
 difference^ whether the order in council [April 26] be contin- 
 ued, or an arrangement by mutual consent substituted in its 
 room." — Thus far Mr. Jackson ; and we are to hear no more 
 of him, under this head, as the correspondent of Mr. Smith. 
 
 Having brought our extracts on this subject to a conclusion, 
 we shall introduce two observations. — First, it appears on re- 
 ferring to the extract from Mr. Smith's letter of October 9, 
 that he confounded the provisions of the order in council of 
 April 26, 1809, which prohibits trade with an enemy's colony, 
 
62 
 
 but which is silent ahout the employment of British cruise i 
 to execute laws of the United States, with the propositions ( 
 Mr. Canning. Mr. Canning at first spoke of the use of thcs 
 cruisers, but ceased to mention them, when he found they ha 
 been objected to, though the expedient of using them ^^^as s 
 natural, that Mr.Erskine tells Mr. Smith, August 15, 1809,th: 
 he thought it had received some countenance from himscl 
 (as Mr. Canning once conceived it had done from Mr. Pini 
 ney.) Secondly, we must never forget that a system of blocl- 
 adesmust have superseded all controversy on Jhis occasion r. 
 specting the trade with the colonies of France and Holland ; 
 controversy which in itself however cannot die, because -Fra//( 
 holds the same doctrines as to an encmx/s colony which a 
 held by England. . . 
 
 Thus Ave have finished our proofs as to the practicability ( 
 a negotiation at the time when Mr. Jackson arrived,^ (which : 
 the third Jieriod of our inquiry.) — If we have not in this la; 
 period brought direct proofs of a conciliatory disposition n 
 maining in the American government, the English governmei 
 is at least found to have been in the same temper of mind ri 
 specting America, as when Mr. Canning agreed to the proprielj 
 of modifying his three propositions. England being ready i 
 adopt equivalent terms with those in question at that perio' 
 the matter therefore reduces itself to this point. Would tl 
 United States again have agreed to Mr. Erskine's arrangemei 
 as to the orders in council, if made effectual against France t 
 a law or a treaty, to remain so long as France maintained he 
 decrees ? If they would have agreed to this, then they had on 
 to say, that they would consent to the equivalent to this, ar 
 the two countries were prepared to treat, for they had only 
 treat about the equivalent. , 
 
 But it may be objected to the whole of these arrangement, 
 that they consist of co?n/iroinises respecting the American righ' 
 To this we have two answers : — 
 
 In the way of precedent, we appeal to Mr. Jefferson's neg ^ 
 tiations with England and France, in which he offered to close h^. 
 bargains with a sacrifice of a portion of our neutral rights. 21 
 In the way oi theory, we refer to what has been said above, as 
 the basis of neutral law. We have seen that both sides in it ha 
 rights, and that both sides compound them ; and that when ci 
 cumstances vary very essentially, neutral law itself varies, 
 neutral law thus proving itself a law of composition, and a la 
 of circumstances. We could appeal to history to confirm tl 
 fact, as also to the best writers on the subject, observing th 
 many of those who consult history and theorists on these occ 
 sions, confine their notice to common cases, whereas the prese 
 is so uncommon a case, as almost to surpass the bounds of ai 
 law. 
 
 But if it can be proved that either rules, or the allowed e^^^ 
 
63 
 
 ccptions to rules, shelter us from reproach i„ .i„M- 
 oeeas,ons,our honour remains ^n,l?Zi ll^ltZT,"^''" 
 
 ?rt„^.sraer..-^,.T-"\.errmlt ^ /-"-■-- 
 
 T„e mtforo^^^^co^fme cTi.'re™,:;;"rs*rir °s" '""•'"f ' 
 it ever was : and shnll „„ ,.':,' 5, '". ?" " '.=! '.^ K''"""- tl«n 
 
 ind a trade with the British dominionsrf V ° , ^^'u '^^' "'°^' 
 deprive o„r„7.„) it will be ,ee°Uefr,r ,'■',',''' ^? '=''"^'=" 
 -ith the enenties- eolonies wh eh are n^ ' "^ ""^ '™''' 
 aarkct either for snppl, ^'r fc^'^l^ns^ump .^^ wh™h%-e,ro" 
 
 hiiig Avhich we cannot eet elspu'hr.,.r. „ i • u **"^^" \.cicino- 
 pen, or blockade ..:: lawfu ^elo e .d wl.Sr^-V"' ""^^ \'I 
 remayyieldwithapVotestinUT'orour p^^^ 
 Here IS the place to observe that Mr Smith in > 
 
 Ir. Pinkney on November 23, 1809, pays a lu". 1"'^ '" 
 . the order in council of Anr 1 og i?oq n '''^:^^^^ ^«"^Pli"^^^t 
 ew nf u u T. • . -P ' '^*^^' ^^^^" ^t merited in /Us 
 
 ew ot it.~» It might be important Tsavs Mr Sm;t^^ » 
 
 ";::^:i-:4i^f"'^"'^^^"-" 
 
 r Frskh .' serious consequences of the disavow,! Tof 
 
 .^•if nn T '™^5T"'-^ Under the order in council oi 
 
 dont TIT "^1 ^r^P^' '■'-"'^^l^^ ^'^'•^""' inciudi^^. the 
 
 i^'doms of Italy and Holland, with their dependencies" are 
 
 ened to our commerce. Under the arran!i-e,ne7it of April, 
 
 vbiJied with our act of non-intercourse, all the ports of Eu- 
 
 )e, except France and her dependencies, including the king- 
 
 -n of Italy, would have been opened to our commerce. The 
 
 ./erence then is reduced merely to Holland ; and that again 
 
 :-educed to the difference between a direct trade to the lorts 
 
 Holland, and an indirect trade through the neighbouiino- 
 
 ts of Tonningen, Hamburg, Bremen, and Embden."— But 
 
 ortunately Mr. Smith commits various oversights here. He 
 
 ;ets that the order in council of April 26, 1809, cut off the 
 
 le to and from the enemies' colonies; that it made the trade 
 
 vnd from Holland take a circuit, chiefly that there mio-ht'be 
 
 ill greater circuit to and from France, where France traded 
 
 ough Holland ; and that it depended on the British navy for 
 
 execution, whereas Mr. Madi-on, under Mr. Erskinc's ar- 
 gement, retamed the chief of this colony trade, and desired 
 ihut out the British navy from all control over the execudon 
 he arrangement, as well as refused to give his countevancc 
 
64 
 
 to measures for rendering permanent the interruption of the 
 intercourse with France while she maintained her decrees, 
 though the interruption of this intercourse by publick authority 
 in the United States (as we see) was allowed to be necessary 
 to give efficacy to the arrangement. Thus notwithstanding the 
 two measures considerably approached each other in their na- 
 ture and extent, especially by the aid of Mr. Canning's expla- 
 nations to Mr. Pinkney, yet they by no means corresponded 
 even in the minds of the American government, as will have 
 been seen from the above extensive extracts respecting Mr. 
 Erskine's arrangement. It is true, that friendly concessions on 
 each side might have removed all differences between them. 
 And therefore if this friendly disposition really existed in our 
 government, it is to be regretted that Mr, Smith did not point 
 out his opinion of the resemblance between the two ineasures 
 at a time when it could have been of practical use, instead of 
 referring to it after Mr, Jackson's negotiation had terminated, 
 merely to serve as a reproach to the British, who, it is clear, 
 have no greater proportion of the blame resting upon them on 
 this occasion than rests on the American government, or rather 
 they have less from the concessions actually made by Mr. Can- 
 ning (which were well known before the dismis.no7i of Mr. Jack- 
 son.) Lastly, with respect to the injury to the United States 
 from the refusal to ratify Mr. Erskine's arrangement, in addi- 
 tion to former observations upon this head we remark, that for 
 a considerable time past the course of the American trade has 
 by some unknoAvn means insensibly shaped itself to the model 
 of what might have been obtained under the order of April 26, 
 1809, which, like some other blessings, was vmdervalued when 
 openly prevented, but is now praised and enjoyed where its 
 continuance is precarious. 
 
 We have thus finished our inquiries respecting the possibil- 
 ity of concluding an arrangement, on the subject of the orders 
 in council.) with Mr. Jackson. 
 
 We pass, secondly., to a brief exair.ination of the possibility 
 which lately existed of obtaining an arrangement of the diffi- 
 culty respecting the Chesapeake^ through the same negotiator, 
 Mr. Jackson. 
 
 Mr. Canning, on May 28, 1809, informed Mr. Pinkney that 
 Mr, Erskine had represented the American government " as 
 disposed, in the case of the Chesapeake, to receive as a suf- 
 ficient reparation (in addition to the prompt disavowal and re- 
 call of Admiral Berkeley) the restoration of the seamen taken 
 out of that vessel." — Mr. Pinkney adds, that Mr. Canning " read 
 to him the passages in Mr. Erskine's letter (written, as he be- 
 lieved, in December, 1808) containing the above mentioned 
 representation." 
 
 October 27, 1809, Mr. Jackson sent a "paper or memoranda'* 
 to Mr, Smith, as the basis of the satisfaction to be proposed to 
 
65 
 
 this country for the unauthorized attack of this frigate, of which 
 the following is the substance : — The President's proclamation 
 against British vessels of war was to be annulled, on one side ; 
 on the other, the seamen taken aw ay were to be restored, the 
 king reserving to himself the right of claiming in a regular ivay, 
 by application to the American government, the discharge of 
 such (if any) as should be proved natural born subjects or de- 
 serters ; and the king was moreover declared to be ready to 
 provide a bounty for the families of the slain, except where the 
 parties slain had been of either of these descriptions. 
 
 Mr. Smith makes i-emarks on these facts in a letter to Mr. 
 Pinkney, dated November 24, 1809. For example, he says, 
 that Mr. Jackson was left without answer to his memoranda, 
 owing to his " offensive insinuations" having commenced before 
 he had properly explained the disavowal of Mr. Erskine's ar- 
 rangement as it regarded the Chesapeake ; that it was not 
 known that Mr. Jackson had any proper powers for negotiation 
 as to the Cheasapeake ; that Mr. Jackson insisted on having 
 the proclamation withdrawn, though this was well known to be 
 inadmissible ; that Admiral Berkeley, instead of being punish- 
 ed, was promoted ; and that the subject of naturalization and 
 deserters, &c. made a new source of difficulty. We shall notice 
 a part of these topicks under our last hint, and the remainder 
 of them in our general view of the present subject now to follow. 
 
 1st. As to Mr. Jefferson's proclamation, we were told that this 
 was issued merely by way of /jrccazf^zon, to prevent insults from 
 British naval officers in our own ports. Mr. Jefferson, however, 
 nearly two years since, having been ready to withdraw this proc- 
 lamation, (if Mr. Rose would at the same time produce terms 
 on his side proper for acceptance) and Mr. Madison also in 
 April last, having actually abandoned the use of the proclama- 
 tion by his arrangement with Mr. Erskine, we have authentick 
 proof, that Messrs. Jefferson and Madison have thought (and 
 thought justly) that British vessels of war might again be re- 
 ceived with safety among us : so that the proclamation has thus 
 been given up as a fire cautionary measure. As a com/iulsory 
 measure in order to bring England to terms as to the attack on 
 the Chesapeake, it has met no countenance either from Mr. 
 Jefferson, Mr. Madison, or any of their ministers. Being 
 therefore (by confession from the due authorities) neither held 
 jirecauiionary at this time, nor comfiulai-ve at any time, it may 
 on this ground now be safely and honourably deserted; not on- 
 ly to satisfy England, but the interests and the reputation of the 
 United States. 2d. With respect to powers to treat on the 
 subject of the Chesapeake, it is enou£,h to remark for the pres- 
 ent, that Mr. Jackson possessed such as would have been satis- 
 factory had they been iyicjuired after. 3d. Respecting the doc- 
 trines of citizenship, naturalization, and deserters, there is so 
 much alike on this head, in the present laws of America and 
 
66 
 
 Great Britain, that if one set of laws merits censure, so doeii 
 the other. 4th. Of Admiral Berkley we are bound to say a 
 few words by promise. We remark then, that this officei- 
 Gould not have been broug-ht to a court martial without having 
 had the privilege of defending himself, which might have open- 
 ed the v/ay for observations little suited to improve the nation- 
 al harmony. If there is any reason also for supposing that, in a 
 moral view, he has received as much punishment as his conduct 
 under the circumstances of the case really merited., that punish- 
 ment ought not to be increased from motives of mere political 
 convenience. To have punished him indeed after a long intei*"- 
 val of time, would have seemed like a punishment in cold blood, 
 in a case where the American government by its own creation 
 of delay and by other proceedings on this subject, had diminish- 
 ed its claims against him. His restoration to employment like- 
 wise (on another station) was declared by Mr. Canning to have 
 been pursuant to navy rules ; as every Admiral has his turn of 
 employment, if he has been disabled by no sentence of a court 
 martial, (a declaration, which was itself a concession to the Uni- 
 ted States.) Men unused to the world may farther ask, why 
 Admiral Berkeley has not been made to apologize to the A- 
 merican governnaent ifi his onvn name? To which the answer is, 
 that individuals count but for little when nation treats with na- 
 tion ; though it must be confessed that it would often be use- 
 ful, if a public agent knew that he would bring upon himself 
 this species of disgrace by acting improperly in national af- 
 fairs ; nor would the public business be likely to suffer from 
 the caution introduced by the practice ; since stopping short in 
 the commencement of a contest of this kind, is more easily I'e- 
 paired, than advancing too far in it. 
 
 From the American side of the question let us pass to the 
 British offers. 
 
 And here we find no objection m^ade to the mode used for 
 disavowing Admiral Berkley. It would have been equally un- 
 reasonable to have rejected the condition reserved for a power 
 to claim back the seamen ; for as the return of them was made to 
 depend on the consent of the American government, the condi- 
 tion Avas safe : and as the British government was to make afi- 
 jilication on this occasion, it was also honourable. The distinction 
 as to the pensions to relatives of the slain, in the confused state 
 of the pubiick law as to citizenship in modern times, leads to 
 so many great difficulties of principle, upon a s?naU incidental 
 article., that a go-by may be given to the whole ; for which dif- 
 ferent methods may be contrived ; and the following is submit- 
 ted as one among the rest. Mr. INIadison speaks of ^' extensive 
 repairs" to the Chesapeake, and of a " frustrated voyage," it 
 gives a hint to substitute for the partial idea implied in the word 
 bounty^ the more general one implied in the word indemnity. 
 " Reparation for damages," " satisfaction for expenses incurred." 
 
67 
 
 are phrases not offending just feelings on either side on such an 
 occasion ; and principles of this sort are well understood in na- 
 tional affairs, (as was seen by what passed between Mr. Jeffer- 
 son and France in the case of the Berceau.) It is doubtless not 
 only amiable, but noble, to attend to suffering humanity ; but 
 humanity is clearly best attended to by settling national disjiutes ; 
 and this government on receiving money on a general principle 
 from England, might have shewn its value for human life, by 
 preserving the application of it to a charitable, rather than a me- 
 chanical object. But to say the truth, pensions to the families 
 of the slain and disabled, in publick contests, ought to be estab- 
 lished (if provided at all) on national principles v.'ith national 
 funds, and in an universal manner. 
 
 To conclude : the whole business of the Chesapeake was 
 what lawyers might call an interlocutory matter, having noth- 
 ing to do with the great concerns of the present period. It is 
 clear indeed, that the present is the proper time for settling it ; 
 but we have thrice let the opportunity for it pass. If we cannot 
 regain our advantages in this respect, the rule in cases of this 
 sort is now so well known, that whoever attempts to evade it 
 will still run the risk of ^publick and ignomz?2ions /imtis/inirnt, 
 as a debt to the peace of both countries. 
 
 Here we conclude these commcnls on our ninth hint. If the 
 discussions ai. to the orders in council and the attack on the Ches- 
 apeake, have been long, the question is, could they have been 
 shorter on the principle of doing justice to the matter in dis/mtp 
 and to the tnvo sets of disjmtants ? 
 
 TENTH HINT. In state, as well as injudicial conccrjis, the 
 scales of justice shotild be used, before tve employ its sword. 
 WHEN there is at any time danger of war, and the war, if 
 it occurs, is likely to be on the wrong side, it is not the momen- 
 tary suspension of its outward symptoms, and still less a mere 
 fluctuation iji them, which ought to quiet our jealousies. In 
 taking leave therefore, in this our last hint, of the controversies 
 which agitate the present moment, we cannot but speak of a 
 war with England ; a war, which many on our side have ad- 
 vised, and some have tried to provoke, and which others have 
 pretended to expect would be declared by the British. The 
 prudence of ILngland however has hitherto protected 60/"//. sides 
 from this evil ; but it may be diflicult to answer for \.\\efuturr 
 state of things, since not only irritations, but even plots, raav 
 be used by some to produce it. Besides, while we are censur- 
 ing the greatest extent to which hostility against England can 
 be carried, \\c shall necessarily examine the grounds on v/hich 
 even smaller measures of resentment continue to be founded. 
 Lastly, in exposing the arguments used for a war with England. 
 and an alliance v/ith France, we shall go some way towards es- 
 timating the judgment and the impartiality of those who hav- 
 
68 
 
 either recommended this course, or iit least taken no pains to 
 avoid it, and this is a point on which the discussion will be ser-« 
 viceable, even to the historian, for the use of posterity, should it 
 be lost for present purposes. 
 
 In every question of war we ought to weigh its juatice by 
 attending to its motives ; its jioUcij^ by tracing its tendencies ; 
 its jirudencc^ by comparing its gains and its losses with the 
 means of supporting it ; and its safety^ by considering the posi- 
 tion in which the v.-ar may ultimately leave us. It is this course 
 accordingly which will be pursued on the present occasion. 
 And first, of the justice of a war with England. 
 It is probable, if the sword is drawn, that it will be in defence 
 of what are said to be our neutral rights. 
 
 A war with both of the belligerents, to obtain by force the 
 trade of both^ has been gravely spoken of by persons in author- 
 ity on our side ; but the measure will not for a moment bear the 
 test of practice. On the other hand, a war with France singly 
 has never once been suggested. It remains therefore for in- 
 quiry, M'hether there is any greater necessity for a war with 
 E7igland singly. 
 
 Dry as this part of the discussion must be, not only to farmers 
 and mechanics, but even to traders and students, it must be en- 
 countered by those who mean to understand the case. Without 
 this, the most serious question in our time may be settled by 
 passion or by guess. 
 
 Under our ninth hint it appeared, that neutral law has sev- 
 eral stages or degrees. If the dangers of belligerents increase 
 at any time, so must their privileges ; and an increase of their 
 power or animosity will have the same practical effects, es- 
 pecially as the measures of one side will usually be retaliated 
 by the other. Thus (as the situation of neutrals is commonly 
 uniform, and rarely critical) the proportion of things between 
 neutrals and belligerents must frequently vary, and, with it, the 
 state of neutral law. Whatever also be the theory in this case, 
 firudence alone, on the side of neutrals, must often call for a 
 difference of conduct. For example ; at present, when the 
 chiefs of almost two hundred millions of souls (including all 
 their dependencies) are engaged in a war of arms, of passions, 
 and of commercial restrictions, six or seven millions of people, 
 like ourselves, in a remote situation, cannot assert their highest 
 form of neutral claims to much advantage. By becoming com- 
 batants, indeed, they may obtain the trade of one side, exposed 
 to capture and burthencd with war ; but this is not neutrality. 
 We shall at present urge little that is new in theory, but we 
 shall confirm what has been said by referring to a great exam- 
 ple in practice^ singled out from various others, because it Avas 
 doubtless regarded Avith enthusiasm by our protestant ancestors 
 in these colonies. It occurred in consequence of the revolution 
 in England in 1688, under the Prince of Orange, in order to 
 
69 
 
 preserve a succession of firotestant p.rincea to the English 
 throne, and to save the civil and religious liberties of mankind 
 from the ambition and bigotry of Louis XIV. of France. As 
 this very menaorable precedent is stated with sufficient exact- 
 ness by the late Mr. Charles Jenkinson, (afterwards Lord 
 Hawkesbury and Earl of Liverpool) in his discourse on the con- 
 duct of Great Britain ivith resfiect to neutral nations^ (a trea- 
 tise which was read here with applause in the war of 175 6) we 
 shall exhibit it in his words ; first, however, introducing some 
 of his remarks on the ordinary state of neutral law, as being 
 writen with ability and perspicuity. 
 
 On the subject of this ordinary state of neutral law, Mr. 
 Jenkinson writes thus : " It has been pretended that the liberty 
 *' of navigation is destroyed by means of captures, and that a 
 " violent restraint has been put upon the lawful industry of man- 
 *' kind. The liberty of navigation (in fair construction) can 
 *' mean nothing more than the right of carrying to any mart unr 
 " molested the product of one's country or labour, and bring- 
 *' ing back the emolument of it ; but can it be lawful that you 
 " should extend this to detriment ? *** Each man hath a right 
 " to perform certain actions ; but if the destruction of another 
 " should follow from them, would not this be a just reason of 
 " restraint ? The' rights of men admit of different degrees ; and 
 " whenever two of these come into competition, the lowest in 
 " the scale must always give place to the higher. But you will 
 " say, that you have a firojit in doing this. If, however, it is 
 " otherwise unjust, will that consideration convert it into a 
 " right ? If you mean that your own commerce ought to be 
 " free, that right is not in the least denied you ; but if, under 
 " this commerce, you intend to convey freedom to the commerce 
 " of the enemy^ what policy or what justice can require it : 
 " What can neutral nations desire more than to remain, amid 
 " the ravages of war, in the same happy circumstances which 
 " the tranquillity of peace would have afforded them ? But can 
 " any right from hence arise, that you should take occasion from 
 " the war itself to constitute a new species of traffic, which in 
 " peace you never enjoyed, and which the necessity of one part xj 
 " is obliged to grant you, to the detriment, perhaps destruction. 
 " of the other. If this right was admitted, it would become the 
 " interest of all commercial states to promote dissention ainong 
 " their neighbours : ** and from the contentions of others they 
 " would gather wealth and power. But after all, the rights of 
 "commerce are not the real cause of this dispute, [in 1757] 
 " and liberty of navigation is only a fair pretence which ambi- 
 " tion hath thought fit to hold forth to interest the trading world 
 " in its cciuse, and to draw down their indignation upon England 
 " This is not the first time that a deceit like this has been prac- 
 *' tised. When the power of Spain was at its greatest height- 
 " and Elizabeth wisely contended against the juighty designs o1 
 
70 
 
 »• Philijt^ the capture of some vessels belonging to the Hanse 
 " towns, gave occasion to a contest of this nature. But it was 
 »' the emissaries of Phiilji that then blew up the flame ; and 
 *' pretending a love to commerce, promoted the ambitious 
 '' projects of their master." [N. B. He cites the great and honest 
 Thuanus (or De Thou) to prove this.] *** " The real end was, to 
 " serve the cause of ambition.^ and to destroy the government of 
 " England. This case need not be compared with our own at 
 " present : the resemblance is too obvious." 'J'hus far we 
 think it worth while to quote from our author as to common times. 
 What he saj's of uncommon times is most remarkable for the 
 precedent noticed in it, and above referred to ; but it will be 
 seen with pleasure, that the author does not speak of thfs pre- 
 cedent alone, which his country ought often to copy. *' After 
 " the Dutch (says Mr. Jenkinson) had by their negotiations en- 
 " deavourcd to establish it as a general maxim, that the goods 
 '* of an enemy.) under a neutral banner should pass unmolested^ 
 " at the commencement of that war which broke out immedi- 
 "' ately after the [English] revolution, when the first grand al- 
 " liance was formed against France^ Holland entered into a con- 
 " vention with England, to prohibit totally the commerce of neu- 
 *•' tral flowers with the enemy. In the preamble of this they 
 -'■ say, that it behoves them to 'do as much damage as possible 
 " to the common enemy, in order to bring him to agree to such 
 •• conditions as may restore the repose of Christendom ; and 
 '' that for this end it was necessary to interrupt all trade and 
 ^■^ commerce Avith the subjects of the king of France, and that to 
 " effect this, they had ordered their fleets to block up all the 
 "' PORTS AND HAVENS OF FRANCE ; and aftcrwards (in the 
 •' second and third articles of the convention, it is agreed) that 
 " they would take any vessel, -jhatever king or state it luight 
 " belong to, that shall be found sailing into or out of the ports 
 " of France, and condemn both vessel and merchandize as legal 
 " prize ; and that this resolution should be notified to all the 
 " neuti'al states." [N. B. Other states were said to have 
 already prohibited, or to be about to prohibit, all commerce with 
 France. Shipping also, with their cargoes, on their passage 
 to the ports, havens, or roads, under the obedience of the king 
 of France, were to be taken and condemned ; and even vessels 
 already on their voyage to ports under French obedience, v/cre 
 (without previous notice) to be turned back ; and those from 
 thence were to be made to turn back and unload. And this is 
 by no means the only case of the kind in modern ages. But to 
 return to Mr. Jenkinson.] " Such at this time [1689] was the 
 '• avowed opinion (he says) of Holland. And England was in- 
 •• duced to join with her in this convention ; exceeding thereby 
 
 • those bounds of equity and moderation, which she had almost 
 
 • always practised in this point before, and Avhich she will, I 
 - hope, most faithfully observe for the future. The jiorthern 
 
-' crowns, who were particularly affected by this prohibition, 
 « contended very vehemently against it. In answer to their 
 « objections were urged the circumstances of affairs, the dan- 
 « ger of Europe, and the mighty strength of that ambitious 
 " power, which, if some extraordinary effort was not made, 
 « would bring marikind under its subjection. It is remarkable, 
 " that Puffendorf, (who owed his fortune and employment to one 
 « of these northern courts) was of opinion in this case againsc 
 " them, and thought that this convention might be justified. It 
 " is not meant here either to censure or commend. Clrciim- 
 " stances may soiTietimes make a thing to be lawful, which, con- 
 " sidered by itselj\ would be unjust. But such times are truly 
 " unhappy, when ?ifcfi'sz7£/ must be fiieadctlin su/ifiort of a right." 
 
 This precedent then (we are to observe) is one for blockadinsfk 
 not a petty colony, but one of ttie largest kingdoms in Europe, 
 nearly two thirds of whose boundaries coasist of coast ; and at: 
 a time when navies were small. It was the act also of William 
 III. and therefore originally came from Holland. The blockade 
 held from August 22, 16S9,till after March 17, 1693, when Swe- 
 den and Denmark entered into an alliance against it, and the 
 original allies were no longer able to maintain their power suf- 
 ficiently at sea to enforce it : but it ivas not given ii/i from amj 
 sense of its imfirojiriety. Other precedents equally strong 
 might be mentioned, which were in general enforced to the last, 
 without, or in spite of contradiction ; but the recital is for the 
 present needless. 
 
 The system" on which the above precedent was founded, we 
 have said, was once favoured among us ; but it was when the 
 liberty of 77ian was more valued than the pretended liberty of 
 the seas ; when a balance of iiotver between different states was 
 preferred to an universal despotism, and when the near ap- 
 proach either of popery, infidelity, or immorality 'created jeal- 
 ousy. Our British kinsmen (the Amighty be praised) have bet- 
 ter memories, and more knowledge of their rights and duties. 
 or are made of firmer materials, than some of their degenerate 
 relatives on this continent, and still adhere to these importam 
 persuasions. They have less need however of referring to the 
 above precedent, (and toothers equally striking on the part ol 
 NEARLY EVERY maritime state in Europe) because their enemy, 
 by taking the lead in commercial restrictions, has left to then\ 
 the mere province of retaliation ; a declaration being uniformly 
 added on their .side, when tliey retaliate, that they will withdraw 
 their ne-iv restrictions whenever the enemy shall v/ithdraw his 
 neio decrees. To declare a whole kingdom blockaded, as 
 France has done, merely with a viey/ to take a few vessels to 
 the injury of neutrals., is far different from the blockade at pres- 
 ent proclaimed by EngUnid, v.hich approaches very near to a 
 real blockade, and by seriously affecting the exportations and 
 importations of France, produces som.e disaffection to Bonaparte. 
 
72 
 
 and a loss oi" various resources for war, particularly those of 
 money and naval stores. But we return to our subject. 
 
 And here let us ask, upon winding up the viere question of 
 neutral projit cnrf /oss, what has been the balance^ under this 
 head, to American traders, as far as the case has depended upon 
 England ? 
 
 American traders and American rulers, if they please, may 
 complain of injuries done to neutral trade by Great Britain, 
 but they must confess, that many gains that are scattered may 
 exceed a few that are more compact. The rights, as they are 
 called, of neutral traders, have been considerably invaded in 
 name, but solidly enjoyed as to profit. Neutral traders have 
 made cheap purchases in places where commodities had no sale, 
 jRid high sales in other places where commodities were want- 
 ing ; they have everywhere found either freighters or purchas- 
 ers for their vessels, when their vessels have not been required 
 for their own speculations ; and they have acquainted them- 
 selves with a multitude of commercial secrets, both as regards 
 markets, and the courses to be taken to find them. In short, 
 let us ask our great commercial men, whether they have ac- 
 quired their overgrown riches during the tranquil or the con- 
 vulsed state of Europe ; and whether they dare hope for sim- 
 ilar returns on their trading capitals when peace shall revisit 
 Europe ? The growth of the American nation in wealth, within 
 a few years, has been unequalled in history, considering the 
 large mass of jieofile which has been enriched. Every corner 
 of the seas has been visited by us ; and besides the deserted 
 trade of other nations which has been revived, new branches of 
 commerce have been created. Yet the same men who boast 
 that we now enjoy more commerce and navigation than any na- 
 tion upon earth, excepting England, complain of England for 
 leaving us so little. It is natural for those who are inconsiderate 
 in their assertions, to be also inconsistent. It is true, that our 
 progress has not been uniform during the troubles of Europe ; 
 but the chief of the checks to our commerce have arisen, 1st, 
 from the decrees of France.^ which operated without warning ; 
 2d, from the ttmfiorary fieace of Ajnicns.^ which many of our 
 commercial patriots thought far more mischievous than the 
 restrictions put upon American neutrals ; or 3d, from non- 
 imfiortatioTif embargo.^ and non-intercourse laws of our oivn 
 formation. At present, after having been puzzled into a situa- 
 tion whicii may be called that of no laivsj many seem anxious^ 
 to deprive themselves of the character of 7ieutrals^ as a new 
 proof of their progress in the art of self tormenting. One im- 
 mense branch of trade also, namely, that to France, which the 
 British have shut up, has at times been equally shut up by 
 French decrees and the laws of Congress. 
 
 On comparing the injuries done to us, as neutrals, by Eng- 
 land and France, we may make this general remark, namely. 
 
73 
 
 that the French have been foremost in obstructing neutral trade, 
 especially whenever they have had a char.ce of obtaining plun- 
 der, or of tempting England to retaliate and displease the 
 United States. England for a long time confined herself to 
 blockades vipon the usual principles, and under the usual forms, 
 her navy enabling her to make them very extensive. She omit- 
 ted to retaliate even the Berlin decree, till after an interval of 
 nearly a year, except by stopping the trade betnveen the several 
 ports of the enemy. This last is an operation in war, which 
 ,-treaties sometimes guard against ; but which, in the absence of 
 treaties, is perfectly well known in practice. The trade between 
 two ports of an enemy is of a nature to give a double relief to 
 the enemy's distresses, is often carried on upon enemy's ac- 
 count, and is sometimes a cover for military and other improptr 
 transactions. As regards the neutral trader also, it lessens his 
 freights^ rather than his commercial adventures ; and the pro- 
 hibition of it genera.lly places him merely where peace com- 
 monly places him, and where France herself, t-ven in her wars, 
 has often been accustomed to place him. 
 
 But let us return to our contrast. England has chiefly aimed 
 at injuring her enemy ; but France has often desired pure pluH- 
 der, collected indiscriminately from enemies and neutrals, even 
 by lajid, v/here, she says, that such things have ever been un- 
 known. England has given warni;z^ with respect to her orders 
 in council, (for mere blockades require only to be notified ;) but 
 France has purposely acted without warning. France' lays hold 
 of neutral property not only in pursuance of her own decrees, 
 but in execution of the pretended laws of Congress, a mea- 
 sure, Avhich it is made a crime for England even to propose. 
 England directs a legal trial for all prizes from neutrals ; but 
 France, without any trial, orders neutral property to be destroy- 
 ed at sea ; and when this has been done, to conceal the course 
 of a fugitive squadron, no compensation has been provided. 
 England tries neutral causes in her prize courts,, in the accus- 
 tomed manner seen in other courts of law ; but France Jiublickly 
 pays for false ivitnesses and informers oiU of the firofiertij of 
 the neutral trader, punishing those detected in thfe trade she ' 
 dislikes by reducing them to an option between a prison and 
 service in her vessels. By sea, in short, France has done us 
 most wrong in proportion to her means ; and in iiort and by 
 land she has committed the only wrongs experienced. England 
 has never seized neutral property on neutral territory, which 
 has been the constant habit of Bonaparte when any one would 
 pretend for him, that the property to be confiscated came origi- 
 nally from the British. Vessels and cargoes thus seized under 
 his decrees, and still uncondemned, are not |D be surrendered 
 till it is seen that we consent to be his allies in war. 
 
 How then are we to give credit to Bonaparte, when he makes 
 his ministers sav, in their mcinorials and rehorts, not in the 
 
 10 
 
74 
 
 common strain, that neutral vessels shall be held to communicate 
 neutrality to their cargoes, but that hereafter there shall be no 
 capture of merchantmen, and 710 search ;) no search, as we are 
 to suppose, even for contraband of war, and for the military- 
 subjects of an enemy !) If Bonaparte ever renounces the right 
 of capture and of search, it must be when he has enslaved the 
 ivhole nvorlcl, and finds none who dare become his enemies ; for 
 the man who commits outrages by lajid., does not govern his 
 morality by geography, and mean to become just at sea. Bona- 
 parte indeed says, I will be just hereafter ; but he adds, that in 
 order to have this in his power, he must be allowed in the pres- 
 ent moment to carry his injustice to the lengths seen " in bar- 
 barous ages." This is the precise language with which he 
 thought fit to prepare the world for the reception of his Berlin 
 decree ; but our last and present Presidents have so little rel- 
 ished this official explanation of his wrongs to us, that they have 
 not given it among the documents printed for Congress. Such 
 hollow professions indeed, which Bonaparte knew would be seen 
 through by those whom they were designed to injure, shewed a 
 perfect carelessness about their effect on our feelings. It is 
 needless here to trace all the turnings and doublings of the 
 ministers of Bonafiarte in their memorials, one specimen of 
 their manner serving for the whole. They commonly speak 
 merely to avoid the appearance of silence, and are privileged to 
 utter contradictions and absurdities, as well as to confound facts 
 and dates, because it is Avell known that their master's sagacity 
 is seen in his measures, and not in his arguments. Whoever 
 believes in these memorials does more than is commonly calcu- 
 lated, as they are designed to be obeyed rather than to be be- 
 lieved ; and therefore few hope to gain any thing by answering 
 them, for measures can only be met by measures. The memo- 
 rials of England, on the other hand, are argumentative and sin- 
 cere ; and though they take firm ground, they are never design- 
 edly wanting'in respect. England, in short, descends with us 
 into the fair field of controversy ; but in disputing with France, 
 we always feel that Ave arc " talkiyig with Ccesar and his legio?is." 
 The modern Caesar sometimes even seems to delight in shew- 
 ing the outrages on reason, which he can make foreign nations 
 receive at his hands, Avithout their daring to murmur. 
 
 From memorials let us carry on the contrast to treaties. We 
 say nothing of Bonaparte's treaties Avith other states, Avhich he 
 himself never regards, (unless they are useful to bind others ,•) 
 but we shall consider Avhat occurs in his proceedings Avith our- 
 selves. Congress having dissolved our treaties Avith France, 
 because she refused to observe her share of them, Bonaparte 
 thought it prudent to call the stray sheep back again to the fold, 
 and made anew treaty of commeice Avith u,3 in Se/itejuber, 1800 ; 
 and as matters had gone to the length of some hostilities, it in 
 fact operated also as a treaty ol peace. This treaty (indepen- 
 
75 
 
 dent of smaller violations of it) was fiublickly and formally 
 broken, before three 7nont/is had ended, in one of the principal 
 points for which it was made. Bonaparte, in December, 1800, 
 revived the French ordinance of July, 1778, which says, that 
 neutral vessels, though laden only in jiart in an enemy's port 
 to go to other ports not of their own nation, shall be legal prize, 
 with their cargoes ;) and the rest of this commercial treaty 
 disappeared as fast as occasion called for it. As to s/ioilatio?is 
 on our commerce, none were ever paid for by France, except 
 out of our own treasury, under the form of a discount from the 
 purchase money which we gave for Louisiana. The conduct 
 of England both under her treaties, and after these engage- 
 ments had ( xpired, has been very different. To go back even 
 to her treaty of Jieace with us, (unpleasant as was the subject 
 of it) it was carried into effect without any difficulty, except 
 such as she Avas ready by new arrangements to remove. Mr. 
 Jay's treaty of cojnjnerce also has been in general as Avell ob- 
 served as other treaties of this sort usually are under the cir- 
 cumstances of war ; and when the temporary articles of it ex- 
 pired, England desired their renewal, or another treaty to be 
 put in their place, and honestly signed another, which Mr. Jef- 
 ferson unfortunately did not sufficiently respect to lay before the 
 senate. England was not hoAvever thus to be repulsed ; but 
 placed us in a treaty-state by means of her own laws in commer- 
 cial cases, till our restrictions obliged her reluctantly to make 
 changes to which the state of markets has in most instances 
 happily rendered us insensible. In purely neutral cases, the 
 law of nations, and the course pursued by the enemy, have been 
 the professed guides of England ; but yet with so much soften- 
 ing thrown into her conduct, as tends to leave us a far greater 
 trade than we enjoy in peace. For spoliations lastly on our 
 commerce, in early cases, Messrs. Gore and Pinkney were fully 
 paid out of the honest, solid treasury of England to the advan- 
 tage of many of those who still censure England. Such is a 
 part of the comparison to be made of the proceedings of Eng- 
 land and France as to treaties. 
 
 We have still a farther parallel to offer, which will confirm 
 the foregoing, and will still be to the advantage of England, 
 namely, as to the feelings and projects of the two belligerents. 
 Bonaparte appears to persuade himself, that our President, Sen- 
 ate, and patriotic newspapers, will never call for war against 
 him ; and that if he for a moment shocks their feelings, a tem- 
 porary suspension of his violence will restore matters, or else 
 that time or repetition will make the outrage familiar. He 
 therefore commits robbery after robbery upon us, as neutrals, 
 in order to collect such an amount of property in his hands, as 
 shall either incline our nation to become his ally in war with a 
 view to regain it, or otherwise give him pecuniary resources. 
 Experience indeed has discovered to him in his extensive con- 
 
76 
 
 ccrns, that threats ansivcr in his hands nearbj as well as khid- 
 jiess ; so that it is but momentarily, that he resorts even to state- 
 ly condescensions and a proud supercilious pity. Far different 
 is the course pursued by Enji-land. Convinced more or less of 
 the abo-ve facts^ and of the labour used to revive old animosities 
 against her, she conceives that the first false step she makes, 
 or the first snare into -which she shall be betrayed, Avill produce 
 a war. The deepest wounds which France can inflict, carry 
 Avith them a balm, by Avhich they ai'e instantly healed, while 
 the slightest superficial Avounds from England assume an angry 
 aspect and become difficult to cure. England therefore com- 
 monly manifests considerable circumspection, and a constant 
 desire of explaining or of softening Avhatever seems harsh in her 
 measures, as far as her dignity and safety permit. But all that 
 she can hope for being merely to prevent luar, she will make 
 no sacrifice Avhich can impair her powers of self defence, or les- 
 sen her appearance of confidence in her resources. In particu- 
 lar, Avhile Bonaparte takes away trade, revenue, and naval stores 
 from her, she Avill permit none to carry them to hhn. Thus 
 Bonaparte's system is that of a conqueror, who feels secure of 
 carrying many of his points either by consent or by menace, 
 while England has the difficult part of trying not to offend 
 where there is so little disposition to be pleased, that things of- 
 fend Avhen done by herself, Avhich pass Avholly unnoticed in her 
 adversary. We may readily judge Avhat '.ire the effects upon the 
 conduct of the parties likely to spring from this difference in 
 ihe priricifiles of action. 
 
 But it is time to close this head as to the comfiaraiive justice 
 of a Avar Avith England (rather than France) if undertaken on 
 neutral grounds ; and therefore Ave turn to a brief vicAv of ob- 
 jections. 
 
 It is said, first, that England Avrongs us by impressing seamen. 
 It is needless to inquire how far impressments in themselves are 
 right ; this question solely regarding Great Britain and its sub- 
 jects. Were it othcrAvise, however, this consideration may be 
 balanced by recollecting, that Bonaparte not only impresses sea- 
 men, but employs a conscription for landsme?i of the most af- 
 flicting nature throughout France, Holland, Italy and Westphalia, 
 and probably throughout Bavaria and other countries. As to the 
 right oi searching Jbr British seaiiien in Jlmerican vessels it was 
 conducted at first in an inconsiderate manner, and American 
 seamen Averc taken in many instances, as Avell as British ; but at 
 present this grievance has in a manner disappeared, and the 
 British government has lately seemed more desirous of adjust- 
 ing this point than our own ; our own appearing rather to Avish 
 to resist the right of search for seamen, than to regulate it. 
 But the right must be regulated ; for other nations besides 
 England are determined to maintain the right, as experience 
 has taught us : and Avhen the French reappear upon the seas, 
 
77 
 
 they will search after the seamen of many dependent nations, as 
 well as after the seamen of their enemy ; and their demands on 
 these subjects will certainly not be withstood. If merchants 
 and captains, in the mean time, choose to receive seamen of 
 these descriptions on board their vessels (to the Jirejudice of the 
 maritime interests of their country) they must not complain of 
 the injury which the detention of them may occasion ; knowing, 
 as they do, the conditions on which they employ them. Indeed, 
 if the law of nations admits that the seamen of an enemy (as 
 constituting the chief proportion of the crews of fighting ves- 
 sels) may be seized by an enemy, the British may surely be 
 permitted by neutrals to carry away their oion seamen, as a 
 measure of general policy in use with them and various other 
 nations. As one compensation however for this inconvenience, 
 we must not forget the many late marked attentions of British 
 officers, not only in aiding our vessels when in distress, but in 
 protecting them froin injury from the French confederacy, by 
 granting them the benefit of convoy ^ oy by giving them intelli- 
 gence as to the position or designs of the enemy ; notwithstand- 
 ing certain Americans have fin various ways J ill repaid them. 
 
 The coniinct oi prize courts forms another subject of com- 
 plaint against the British. Prize courts rest on the principle, 
 that belligerents can neither trust foreigners, nor yet their pri- 
 vate subjects, to decide the cases which concern their wars ; 
 but choose to depend on state tribunals, Avholly of their own ap- 
 pointment, hoping by this means to make the inconveniences 
 of the war ta.ke the mildest and least offensive shape without af- 
 fecting their own rights. In the first of the late wars with 
 France the vice-admiraliy courts of England were much to be 
 complained of, (though far less so than those of France.) But 
 after the peace of Amiens, a complete reform, amounting to a 
 revolution, took place in the very principle on which these courts 
 were formed throughout the Altantic, much to the credit of 
 England, and to the benefit of those who were suitors in these 
 courts. 
 
 Others again have disputed the right of England to trade ivith 
 an enemy in cases where her orders in council or her blockades 
 cut off that trade to neutral powers. If the belligerent however 
 has a right to restrain the trade of an enemy, he has a right also 
 to abate that restraint, and of course to abate it in a way to ben- 
 efit himself. He may thus levy not only profits, but even taxes 
 upon an enemy. Similar transactions may occur in territorial 
 wars ; for Henry IV. of France might have supplied bread to 
 the people of Paris, (whom he was besieging) not only from po- 
 licy as a sovereign, but, if he had so pleased, as a merchant and 
 a tax gatherer, without admitting others to partake in the priv- 
 ilege unless on /laying for the licence. Accordingly Bonaparte 
 and the emperor of Russia, and various of their allies in the pre- 
 sent war, have allowed a direct trade with England in several 
 
78 
 
 articles for a limited time, and through prescribed channels, 
 though they had forbidden to neutrals a similar intercourse. 
 
 Respecting the right to search into the oionershifi and nature 
 of cargoes, and into the ownership of vessels, it is founded on 
 the right to make captures. If search in these cases be denied, 
 not only an enemy's property, but contraband of war and military 
 enemies may escape. The right of search being thus clear, it 
 is equally clear, that the search if possible ought to occur on the 
 spot. The proudest nations cannot object to this right on the 
 part of powers of any consequence, though it is (at times) sub- 
 jected to some restrictions in the case of convoys. 
 
 Such are the chief objections, under this head to be noticed 
 in inquiring into the conduct of England at this crisis to neutral 
 nations, and particularly to ourselves. 
 
 A general remark or two Avill finish this division of our sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Our citizens who pretend to reason as to neutral law may be 
 divided into three classes. One set of them being accustomed 
 to a small scale of action, conceive that no war should interrupt 
 their trade in anij direction, as long as they remain neutral. Un- 
 fortunately these citizens are more numerous, than by some may 
 be suspected ; and, on the present occasion, they add to the in- 
 fluence of the next class to be mentioned. It is composed of 
 those, M'ho but half understood neutral law ; for though these 
 may allow that belligerents and neutrals in many points have 
 contending or concurrent rights (as they arc called) Avhich re- 
 quire to be settled upon some middle ground, yet they suppose 
 that when this is done for commo7i cases every thing is settled. 
 But there is a third set of theorists, who acknowledge that the 
 peculiar situation of belligerents may sometimes call for great 
 consideration on the part of neutrals ; and this class (which 
 ought to include our rulers) is alone qualified to treat the ques- 
 tions of the present day. Desperate cases suspend civil rights 
 at home, and they do it also with neutral traders abroad ; and 
 this is what makes the uncommon or strained state of neutral 
 law. 
 
 Such extraordinary positions of things as are here referred 
 to occur once, or perhaps twice, in a century ; and still more 
 extraordinary cases (like that of our oivr„ times J occur once in 
 a dozen centuries. When a case of this kind is indubitable, 
 great allowance is to be made for the extremities to which it 
 leads, existence being a primary right of man, taking place of 
 every other, while mercantile profit (especially if it be acci- 
 dental) is only secondary. The belligerent judges as to this 
 fact in the first instance ; and the neutral has an equal right to 
 decide whether he has judged properly. At the present mo- 
 ment, the whole of Europe (excepting a few fragments connected 
 with the Mediterranean) is avowedly combined to destroy the 
 trade, navy and revenue of England, by vieans of commercial re- 
 
79 
 
 strictions ; and the most efficient part of this confederacy hav- 
 ing also become her military enemy, England is clearly in a 
 critical state. Shall Ave then oppress her yet more by going to war 
 with her ? Shall we break down the last bulwark which stands 
 between us and a tyrant's will } *This indeed would be to shew 
 ourselves anxious, in the worst of ways, " to take uji the con- 
 queror" in the present struggle. 
 
 In the extreme case of belligerent claims here alluded to, one 
 thing may always afford immense relief to neutrals. It is this. 
 Notwithstanding military tyrants despise both neutrals and trad- 
 ers, yet a commercial nation, which knows what commerce 
 means, and which from its danger feels an interest in pacifying 
 every one, may study how to serve itself with comfiarativelij 
 little injury to others. This is what has been done by England, 
 on the present occasion ; and the very excefitions made to the 
 influence of general rules, in the immense concerns here in 
 question, furnish us more trade, than a neutral state commonly 
 enjoys for its single share in times o{ peace. But for a meas- 
 ure of this kind to be effectual, according to the intention of it, 
 it must be accepted ; and this, it seems, is the last thing in the 
 minds of some, who by voluntary restrictions would destroy a 
 part of the concession, and by ivar would extinguish the rest. 
 
 \These remarks., having long been held back for reasons which 
 need not be explained^ may not apply throughout to the present 
 state of Europe. But changes in Europe having been spoken 
 of as possible, no credit is lost by them ; and the memory of 
 several facts and impressions among ourselves will be preserv- 
 ed^ by continuing in its original form what is here presented! 
 We are now to speak of the policy of a war with England. 
 This, we have intimated, is to be judged of by its tendencies; 
 which, being various, must be noticed under different heads. 
 
 First then we say, that no management can make the v/ar with 
 England ■•serviceable to us as a neutral nation. We mean here 
 to discuss the question not as regards right, but as regards 
 utility. 
 
 Where neutral powers can obtain their points with bellige- 
 rents merely by making demonstrations (as military men call 
 them) that is, by a shew of measures, it is well. But when tnis 
 and other stratagems fail, and the grievance is not excessive, and 
 is accompanied with something like fair excuses, and cannot be- 
 come a precedent to affect future times, the question is, how- 
 far a war, in this precise case, is to be approved. Several argu- 
 ments in the present instance occur in favour of moderation. 
 First; as England leaves us a trade with herself, and with near- 
 ly all beyond the atlantic, and also much trade with many of the 
 confederates, the contest is only as to the difference between 
 what we have, and what we might have. Secondly ; the harsh- 
 er restrictions of England have consisted of retaliations against 
 
80 
 
 Friiiicc ; and when France closes her owji ports from spite, or 
 opens them for plunder, England having neither caused nor 
 imitated these operations, they are not to be counted against 
 England, but against France. Thirdly ; neutral law, even in its 
 ordinary state, is fluctuating, as it holds but an inferior rank in 
 the minds of many sovereigns, and changes often, even by posi- 
 tive treaty. The gain of fortresses and of /iroviJices may be sub- 
 stantial^ because they may be secured by garrisons ; but how 
 shall we keep a neutral right (that is, a mere declaratory pro- 
 position) which depends on the consent of others ? The opin- 
 ion of others may change with circumstances ; and on some 
 occasions (as when ive become belligerents) we ourselves may 
 cease to value the very objects for which we have thus con- 
 tendied. In the last place, doubtful neutral rights are by no 
 means an object of constant and extensi've enjoyment^ since they 
 are useless in peace, and regard only a part of our trade even 
 in war ; and when they are gained from one power, they still re- 
 main to be gained from others ; and, if extorted from a nation 
 possessed of firmness, are of precarious tenure. Such are a 
 part of the arguments in favour of good temper with England, 
 on this subject, at the present moment. 
 
 But it is said that an armed neutrality is now under negotia- 
 tion with the powers of the north. This then shall be remark- 
 ed upon ; and part of our remarks will apply to cases of a more 
 general description. 
 
 Before inquiring however into the merits of such a plan (if 
 such a plan exists) we ought to be told who are neutral in the 
 north, and what is the state and character of these northern 
 poivers. 
 
 At present, all the powers of the north seem combined against 
 England in a commercial league ; and England better supports 
 the loss of the trade Avhich they command, than they support the 
 loss of that Avhich she commands, as is proved by their having 
 lately (like ourselves) made considerable exchanges of commo- 
 dities with England to prevent popular discontents, and to re- 
 cruit their finances. As members of an armed naval associa- 
 tion against England various circumstances occur, at present, to 
 weaken these powers. Add to this, that the Baltic is an incon- 
 venient port for a naval armament ; being incommoded with ice, 
 or the fear of ice, for a very large portion of the year, and it is 
 exposed at other seasons to blockade in consequence of its very 
 long and narrow entrance. 
 
 Could we, by our persuasions alone, arm a number of powers 
 in the north, not before connected in the /ilan, and who would at- 
 tend solely to the protection of 7ieutral trade., this might be an 
 armed neutrality worthy of attention ; but the north affords no 
 such hopes. To join it therefore at present, is only to throiv 
 aivay our neutrality, under a specious name, and join in labour- 
 ing for the downfal of England. 
 
81 
 
 Combinations under the patronage of Russia are indeed sel- 
 dom lasting. In February, 1780, during our revolutionary war, 
 arose the ffimed armed neutrality again&t England, headed by 
 Catharine of Russia, (who once had acted under a different sys- 
 tem.) But, though various belligerents gave weight to it, Eng- 
 land yielded to it nothing that was permanent ; and all but its 
 name expired at the peace of 1 782—3. In 1793 the same 
 Catharine took the lead in an extensive combination against the 
 commerce and supplies oi Fraiicc ; which nevertheless closed 
 before the war ended. Her son Paul bore a part afterwards in 
 the military operations against France ; and under his orders 
 Suwarrow entered Italy. In 1800, however, Paul, like one wak- 
 ing from a dream, declared officiaUu, that he had misimderstood 
 his affairs, and, upon better i-eflcction, should z'evive the armed 
 neutrality in favour of France, (to whom it seems that he had 
 more than one cause of attachment.) His assassination, and the 
 naval operations of Admirals Parker and Nelson against Den- 
 mark and Sweden, dissipated this new confederacy, and a con- 
 vention followed under Alexander, which settled only a few 
 neutral points of smaller moment, and left the rest untouched. 
 Alexander then leagued himself offensively with England, Swe- 
 den and Austria, and afterwards vv^ith Prussia, against Fra?ice ; 
 but, in 1806, he abruptly entered into a treaty with Bonaparte 
 for the ruin of England and for the pretended freedom of the 
 seas. It is to this weather-cock of a combination, directed by 
 the fickle breath of Russia, that some desire us to attach our 
 fate, notwithstanding the changes which have thus happened 
 in that quarter within thirty years, (though more than a third of 
 them were years of peace.) 
 
 But how indeed can a combination under Russia be stable 
 when Russia herself has no stability ? Her throne is unstable, 
 and her cabinet more so ; and her injustice is still more flagrant 
 than her changcableness. The reign of Alexander, celebrated 
 as he has been, shall alone serve as a specimen. He suddenly 
 succeeded his father, and as suddenly changed the plans of Rus- 
 sia, M^hich he pronounced to be friendly to the independence of 
 Europe and to trade. But his various defeats having procured 
 him an acquaintance v^ ith Bonaparte, he instantly became an ad- 
 vocate for the slavery of Europe ; and, like ourselves, he totally 
 forgot all commerce {excejit commerce that was neutral.) To 
 please Alexander, England had discontinued her negotiations 
 for peace Mith Bonaparte, as vv'ell as her connection with Tur- 
 key ; and, in requital for these compliments, England was left to 
 shift with both as she could, (for the haughty offer of mediating 
 for her with Bonaparte called only for indignation.) Other allies", 
 with whom Alexander had been used to act, received a similar 
 treatment. Sweden, for example, v/ith whose king Alexander 
 ^yas related, suifered a revolution, and lost Finland ; Austria 
 'as made to surrender to him a part of GDllicia ; and Poland br- 
 
82 
 
 cumc more and move decisively dismembered. Such is the coiv 
 duct of one of the intended chiefs of this armed neutrality, and 
 surely ive cannot hope for an exception to be made in our fa- 
 vour. We are republicans, and therefore hated by desfiots ; we 
 may become a naval power, and are therefore hated by cotiquerers; 
 Ave arc supposed to have views on the western side of our con- 
 tinent, which interfere with those of Russia, and are held as ri- 
 ■vals ; and, as we are without the means of resenting any act of 
 infidelity in Russia, we are without one of the best securities for 
 the observance of treaties. 
 
 As to Sweden, Denmark and Prussia, they will enter these 
 confederations by order, and quit them by order ; but should 
 they ever recover their freedom, they may lawfully release 
 themselves from these obligations, as every one knows that they 
 act by constraint. They have by this time also learned, (if we 
 have not) that security is preferable to neutral trade ; in which 
 indeed Prussia has almost no concern. 
 
 But we have hitherto treated Russia as the chief in these con- 
 federations ; but, at the present moment, this is a false supposi- 
 tion. The present plan is that of Bonaparte ; and therefore it 
 becomes necessary to examine the real opinion of France on 
 neutral questions. Her views then are not to be learned from 
 treaties, which are made and kept according to convenience, 
 but from her general directions to her own subjects in past 
 times on points of neutral law ; and of the spirit of these we 
 shall collect a s/iecimcn from Mr. Jenkinson. "By some very 
 " old French ordinances," says this writer, (and he remains un- 
 contradicted) " it is declared not only that enemies goods shall 
 « be adjudged to be lawful prize, but that the neutral vessel 
 " which carries them, or the property of any ally that shall be 
 ii joined with them, shall be joined also in the condemnation.*** 
 " The laws which established it, were repeatedly enacted in the 
 <' reigns of two of their kings, P'rancis I. and Henry III. ; [that 
 " is, between 1515 and 1589.] That the practice of the French 
 » marine hath, in this particular, been conformable to their laws 
 " may be proved by a thousand instances. *** It is observable, 
 " that although the ordinance which contains these laws was in 
 " 1C81, several years subsequent to the treaties by which France 
 " agreed that neutral vessels should protect the property of the 
 " enemy, yet it pays no attention to them ; and establishes the con- 
 " trary doctrine. *** The words of the ordinance expressly 
 I' condemn not only enemies goods, but the neutral ship which 
 'i carries them." Such has been, in former times, a part of the 
 standing policy of France ; and the late masterly and admirable 
 inquiries on this subject in Boston have shewn, that much of 
 the general spirit of these laws has been preserved to our time. 
 We may conclude then, that France has heretofore considered 
 itself as entitled to command the seas ; that she has esteemed 
 the claims of England and others, as mere interferences with her 
 
83 
 
 prerogatives, and that all temporary relaxations, as well as 
 treaties in favour of neutrals, which are ill observed on her side, 
 instead of being proofs of her moderation, are proofs of her do- 
 mineering spirit, which never stoops but with a view to conquer 
 by it. We may equally conclude, that Bonaparte, when oppor- 
 tunity offers, will revive all claims which France has at aJiy time 
 maintained. The treaties of February, 1778, and September, 
 1 800, between ourselves and France, were overruled not by the 
 mere authority of the royal ordinance of July, 1778, but because 
 France is always averse to the proposition, that vessels, which 
 are free from capture, shall render free the goods they carry. 
 No treaty will long bind France to the doctrine, that free bot- 
 toms make free goods where her adversary does not maintain 
 the same doctrine, or where she is not herself the neutral car- 
 rier. The armed neutrality in 1800 fixed her in this point for 
 two or three years, because it for the moment put many advan- 
 tages on her side. But in her last war with England, wheje we 
 were neutrals, (disregarding the treaties of 1778 and of the 
 armed neutrality) she affirmed, that she would never suffer our 
 vessels to protect an enemy's goods, if they did not protect hers 
 also. She speciously said, that there was no equivaleyit to pay 
 her forbearance in this case, and was in vain told (by Col. Pick- 
 ering) that freedom from capture in neutral vessels was an ad- 
 vantage, which the contracting parties could only enjoy in suc- 
 cession. But when our treaty of 1800 was made, even this pre- 
 text was done away ; for in full memory of this official dispute, 
 and with the express view of correcting the point complained 
 of, and while France ivas actually at war and we at Jieace, this 
 condition (that free bottoms should make free goods) was again 
 agi'eed upon, and an immense price paid for it ; and yet in three 
 months it was officially set aside by reference to the above nam- 
 ed decree of 1778, as a decree '■'■ firoficr to conciliate the inter- 
 ests of France with the rights of neutral powers !" We repeat 
 then, that France equally intending to be mistress of the sea, as 
 of the land, will only execute in neutral contracts so much, a'5 
 is for her present advantage. 
 
 Such then is the prospect of going to the north to oblaiii ihc 
 benefit of an armed neutrality under the patronage of Rxissia 
 and France ; a benefit, which cannot be obtained even in nam'\ 
 Nothing practical can be had from it during the present war, 
 and nothing in the way of establishing a jirincifilc at a fieacc. 
 Yet for this we must surrender our trade to the British domin- 
 ions (which much exceeds the addition we seek to our present 
 neutral trade) and endanger the rest of our neutral trade, and 
 the whole of our free trade. We are besides to expect to be 
 pledged in this case to prepare for war, which, to a nation un- 
 prepared as we are, implies heavy expenses ; and yet such a war 
 promises nothing which can be advantageous to us. The peace, 
 too, when it comes, must be made through the great chieftaii^v 
 
84. 
 
 of Europe at their own time and on their own plan ; and a na- 
 tional policy is afterwards likely to be followed, which will ruin 
 commerce and liberty together. Such is the beginning and 
 ending to be expected from this proposal of an alliance with the 
 north. Like the northern lights in the air it may for a moment 
 Appear brilliant, but it Avill quickly vanish, and, in vanishing, will 
 not only leave us \\\ darkness, but the darkness will seem great- 
 er than ever. 
 
 If a treaty ivith France is to be made, declaring that./rce bot- 
 ttms shall make free goods., and it is only likely to be kept hon- 
 estly on our side, the making of it can only deceive us. A trea- 
 ty of a different kind was made with England, and considered 
 by Mr. Jefferson as the then real law of nations, and it might be 
 adopted with France, if France could be trusted at present in any 
 treaty. An abandonment of this mode of oblaitiing freights for 
 our -vessels does not prevent our buying enemy's property and 
 caarying it on our o'ivn account, or carrying enemy's property 
 at the risk of that etiemy, (provided we could trust to the pre- 
 sent limes.) As to trading betroecn port a7id Jiort, both belong- 
 ing to an enemy, if the French and English mutually firohihit it-, 
 the case has no remedy but one, which is worse than the evil. 
 And wc may in general pronounce the like of all principles, 
 which are maintained by both sets of com.batants ; for America 
 is yet too young, too feeble, and we hope too wise, to think of 
 reforming the customs of Europe hy force. 
 
 We shall conclude what regards neutral topics by two re- 
 marks. 
 
 1. To side yvhh the frst of the two belligerents that changes 
 its conduct, according to the ideas which long prevailed with 
 some of the first persons among us, is to go to war with the oth- 
 er without allowing the other time to change according to its 
 promise ; and this measure being in fact only designed to ope- 
 rate against England (as may be demonstrated by official proofs) 
 it was not fair to drive Mr. Jackson out of the reach of negotia- 
 tion. England however has offered to change singly, provided 
 vte luill bind ourselves to keep up our restrictions against France 
 as long as France continues her decrees, (an offer not yet made 
 by France, and our not agreeing to which, when coming from 
 England, has never been exfilainedy and never will be.) To side 
 ■with France only, signifies, that we will purchase a freedom 
 from French captures by increasing our risks from English 
 captures ; so that all we shall obtain by ceasing to be neutral 
 is to have the liberty of defending ourselves by sea, and inviting 
 the French among us to perfect our means of defence and of- 
 fence by land. Going to war therefore for Avhat is compara- 
 tively but a moderate portion of our neutral claims resembles 
 the case of a man, who, because he cannot place an additional 
 cape on his great coat, chooses to be naked. And calling in the 
 French to help us, is like the case of another man, who admits 
 
85 
 
 a loose and hungry lion into his house, by way of being cfefend- 
 ed, when, if in danger, he might easily defend himself. 
 
 2. Even useful allies are attended with some inconveniences ; 
 and, where they are not useful^ they take away our freedom of 
 action with belligerents and others. And here we shall men^ 
 tion two circumstances, which, if we go upon the plan of tem- 
 porary foreign alliances, must embarrass our negotiations with 
 Europe. T\\& first is our distance. On November 11, Mr. 
 Jackson was dismissed ; and the national business has lingered 
 for several months, that we might learn the effect of this event 
 upon England. Again : Mr. J. Q. Adams sailed on August 5, 
 for Russia; and those who have expected their country's safe- 
 ty from that quarter have doubtless been equally distressed 
 by the delay of his despatches. How then can we negotiate to 
 advantage in Europe against European courts, which are close 
 together, or at least are comparatively near ? The second em- 
 barrassment to our negotiations arises from the nature of our 
 government ; since our President must consult the Senate on 
 the subject of a treaty, and Congress also on the subject of a war, 
 (and sometimes after long delays ;) whereas, in Europe nothing 
 is necessary to be consulted but the decision of the sovereign 
 These difficulties aggravate each other ; and shew the danger 
 of connecting ourselves with despotic and intriguing courts iii 
 Europe, and the necessity of our pursuing a plain and simph 
 line of conduct. 
 
 Thus far as to the fiolicij of a war with England merely as 
 concerns our neiiti-al claims. 
 
 But the war with England is equally impolitic for us, as re- 
 jiubliccms. 
 
 It must injure our rep.ublican feelings, by putting our tempo 
 rary interests on the side of despotism. The acts of Bonaparte 
 will thenceforth be free frorji criticism. If there is another roy- 
 al family to be deceived, and another nation to be ruined in Eu- 
 rope, the treachery and the ruin must be approved of here. If 
 encroachments begin upon our own liberties we have flaming pa- 
 triots, in every quarter of the union, ready to tell us, '• do not 
 you know that Bonaparte means our good, and if it were other- 
 wise, that it is too late to seem to doubt it." The more defence- 
 less we are by sea and land, the more are the motives (it v/ill be 
 pretended) for calling in French assistance ; and the stronger 
 the evidence, that we are unfit to take care of ourselves. li 
 Bonaparte can influence many of us to wish ill to Spain, while 
 he is stealing or burning our ships, or ridiculing us by mock 
 propositions, what are we not to expect when his generals, em- 
 issaries and troops are among us, and he obtains the direction 
 (as he then doubtless will) of our own treasuries and offices to 
 ])ribe us ? Already can some hear witli a smile, that Napoleon 
 is our king ; and that our constitutions are impracticable 
 ficbemes I Already has liberty with many become an affiiir of 
 
86 
 
 persons, and not of principles ; and already are many made shar- 
 ers in the secret of a plot which has widely spread over this con- 
 tinent ! Is this state of things then to be aggravated, and ren- 
 dered permanent, in order that our neutral traders may have 
 pretended concessions made to them for which they have ceas- 
 ed to ask ; concessions, which are a tempted to be imposed upon 
 them by countrymen of theirs, Avho are careless of commerce., 
 and which, at the very instant they are gained for them under 
 the name o^ allies with one power, are lost for them under the 
 name of enemies with the other ? 
 
 But the war with England must next injure us as members of 
 ■^i federative government. 
 
 The existence of a republick is often precarious ; and still 
 more so that oi 2i federative republick, where the disaffection of 
 any part weakens the connection of the whole. To load, there- 
 fore, our federal union with burthens and difficulties, before its 
 members are duly knit and strengthened, must be unwise. It 
 must be no less unwise to injure the peculiar interests of a large 
 branch of the union on the presumption that the men luho do 
 not foresee evils before they arrive nvill not feel them while they 
 are operating. A continuance of peace, on the other hand, will 
 largely multiply our people, and favour the payment of our pub- 
 lick debts, as well as improve our resources. All wanton strug- 
 gles therefore should be deferred till the larger branches of the 
 union shall be of a sufficient size to stand up in the world as inde- 
 pendent states, and maintain their existence with ease and dig- 
 nity. This is a debt which we owe to one another and to hu- 
 manity, and it is superior in importance to any thing which can 
 regard our neutral rights during the remnant of a Avar. 
 
 We proceed next to shew the impolicy of a war with England 
 from an exayyiination of the character and views of the present 
 ruler of France. 
 
 We call Bonaparte a military despot, for he governs by 
 armies, and will listen to no control. If he loved liberty, liberty 
 ■would prevail wherever he had rule, that is, at home and abroad ; 
 but he persecutes its very name. He has accordingly formed 
 for his relations and dependents two arbitrary kingdoms in Ita- 
 ly, four in Germany, one in Holland, and one in the Spanish 
 peninsula ; so that, including France, he has niiic crowns con- 
 nected under him, besides being mediator (that is dictator) for 
 Switzerland. During a state of profound peace in the central 
 parts of the European continent he has recently promised to 
 add to the territories of his vassals and allies, as well as to in- 
 crease the size of France ; which implies that others must lose 
 what some are thus to gain. In short, Bonaparte is a conquer- 
 er, that is, an accumulator ; the passion of avarice, which in 
 some men is applied to money being in him applied to king- 
 doms. In less than twelve years, he has obtained a personal 
 sAvay over Europe exceeding any which the Romans obtained 
 
87 
 
 ever it in the famous twelve centuries allotted for the duration 
 of their empire ; but still he possesses none, or next to none, of 
 the eastern empire of Rome, and he is master of none of the 
 colonies of Europe. These then are farther objects of his pur- 
 suit, for his passion is not merely to equal, but to surpass the 
 greatest conquerors upon record ; and in his project against 
 colonies we ourselves shall be included. 
 
 It is not necessary here to inspect the bosom of Bonaparte to 
 obtain a knowledge of his thoughts, since thoughts, after a time, 
 may better be known from actions than from words. Bonaparte 
 then, we say, is not only a conqueror, but a conqueror who, like 
 THE Romans, uses policij more than force, (force only preparing 
 the way for his policy.) By policy we do not mean a wise or 
 peaceable mode for obtaining ends, but a way founded upon sys- 
 tem, and sufficiently sure considering that the fierson ive sfieak 
 of /lossesses force and thinks he can succeed on the whole by 
 terror better than by kindness or moderation, particularly as he 
 wishes to succeed rapidly. 
 
 To prove this, we shall exhibit some reflections on the Ro- 
 mans proceeding from a Frenchman of eminent talents, namely, 
 the great Montesquieu, in his discourse o?i the causes of the 
 greatness cmd decline of the Roman e?npire. We shall intermix 
 them with a large proportion of warnings, gathered from the 
 same author, for the use of those v/ho are wise enough to notice 
 warnings. Extracts, which are of doth descri/itions, follow in 
 the order in which the original work presents them. 
 
 " A nation which is always at war by the very principle of its 
 " government must necessarily be destroyed, or subdue all other 
 " nations. When two great nations ai'e seen to wage a long 
 " and obstinate war it is often ill policy to imagine that the resi 
 " of the world may continue idle spectators. The Greeks aban- 
 " doned themselves to a stupid joy, and fondly imagined thai 
 " they were really free, because the Romans had declared them 
 " so. Certain little fearful states of Asia always considered the 
 " depression of their former masters., as the making of theii 
 " own fortune. In contending with an enemy the Romans 
 " made use of its allies ; but immediately rooted out the destroy- 
 " ers. When the Romans were opposed by several encmie?. 
 " at the same time they granted a truce to the weakest. When 
 " they were engaged in a considerable war they winked at 
 " wrongs of every kind, and silently waited the proper season 
 " for chastisement. Every peace the Romans granted to au 
 " enemy included an alliance in it ; or, in other words, they 
 " made every nation they subdued contribute to the depressioi-. 
 " of others. When they permitted to any cities the enjoyment 
 *' of their liberties, they immediately raised rwo factions in 
 " them, one of which asserted that the will of the Romans was 
 " the only law, and as this Wds always the most powerful, liber- 
 " ty could only be a name. When masters of the universe, they 
 
88 
 
 <' claimed all its treasures ; and were still more unjust in their 
 " robberies as legislators^ than as leaders of armies. Nothing 
 " v/as of greater advantage to this people, than the anve nvith which 
 " they struck the nvholc earth : in one instant kings were put 
 " to silence, and seemed as if they had become stupid. After 
 " the defeat of Antiochus (though they possessed Africa, Asia, 
 " and Greece) they had scarcely one city which was properly 
 " their own : they seemed to conquer only to bestow. But 
 " yet their power was so complete, that whenever they attacked 
 " any prince they oppressed him (as it were) with the ivhole 
 " weight of the universe. The proper time for seizing upon the 
 " conquered countries was not yet come : they waited till all 
 " nations were accustomed to obey, as free and as confederatcy 
 " before they attempted to command over them as subjects. 
 " After overcoming a nation, they weakened it: if it recovered 
 " they weakened it still more : and it became subject without 
 " a possibility of dating the first moment of its subjection. Thus 
 " Rome was the head of a body composed of all the nations of 
 " the universe. A wise republic ought not to run any hazard^ 
 " which may expose it to good or ill fortune : its only object 
 " ought to be, the jierp.eluity of its existence. No state threat- 
 " ens its neighbours with conquest so much, as that which is 
 " involved in civil wars : the Avhole body of the people become 
 " soldiers ; and when peace has united all parties, the state en- 
 " joys great advantages over others whose subjects are merely 
 " citizens. Man's desire of power is always most insatiable 
 " when he enjoys most of it ; and it is from possessing much, 
 " that he desires all. Men are very rarely known to renounce, 
 " in a moment, the pursuit which has engaged the attention of 
 '* their life. After the emperors had assumed the sovereign 
 " power it grew more difficult to write history. Every thing 
 " became secret ; the despatches from the provinces went to the 
 " imperial cabinet : and little transpired, except Avhat mad or 
 " rash tyrants were careless about concealing, or such events as 
 " fell within the conjectures of historians. No tyranny can be 
 "• more cruel, than that which is exercised under the name of 
 " law, and with the false colours of justice. A tyrant has never 
 " been found v/anting in instruments to aid his tyranny. We 
 " are fatigued with seeing, in the history of the emperors, such 
 " an infinite number of people whom they destroyed for no oth- 
 " cr end, than to obtain their iirofierty. When the reign of a 
 '' monarch succeeds a reiiublick, no authority can be more abso- 
 " lute, since he comes into possession of all the power which 
 " the people had chosen to enjoy without limitation ; and, far 
 " this reason, the royal power in Denmark is now the most un- 
 " bounded in Europe." 
 
 Such are our citations from a work, of which the first half (as 
 if growing great y/ith its subject) is unrivalled for its penetra- 
 tration and its brilliancv. Tts latter hplf aceins as if tlie author 
 
89 
 
 had designedly left a place for Mr. Gibbon's History of the de- 
 cline and fall of the Roman empire ; and reminds us of the au- 
 thor's own concluding figure as to the fate of the Eastern (or 
 Grecian) empire of Rome. " This empire, under its last mon- 
 " archs, being concentrated -within the suburbs of Constanti- 
 " nople, finished its progress like the Rhine, which fihrinks into 
 " a rivulet before it loses itself in the ocean." 
 
 The scheme of Roman policy, as to conquests, may be so far 
 understood from the above quotations, as to make it needless t9 
 refer to Polybius to confirm it. 
 
 We therefore proceed to observe, that the mode by which 
 Philip of Macedon undermined the states and cities of Greece 
 offers another picture applicable to the present occasion ; since 
 (with the necessary changes to suit the times) it is the exact 
 counterpart of the plan now used for undermining the indepen- 
 dence of Europe and America. The same bribery and intrigue, 
 the same pretexts and deceit, the same mixture of secret agen- 
 cy and open force, the same careful preparation of events, and 
 the same unrelenting and insulting temper shewn to him that is 
 at last declared a victim, mark the correspondence of the two 
 periods in question. In both cases wiiversal monarchy was in 
 view ; and as Alexander v/as enabled, by the result of his father 
 Philip's endeavours, immediately to execute the plan built on 
 this foundation, we ought to catch the alarm on our side before 
 "it becomes too late. Bonaparte indeed from the magnitude of 
 the states which he now calls his own, may count his success in 
 these previous measures, as so much solid progress made in his 
 final plan. But alas 1 every Demosthenes in our cou?itry, from 
 Maine to Georgia, who calls himself an exclusive republican, and 
 is a constant supporter of our admi?iistration, sees Philip in the 
 wrong place : With them George III. is the wolf, and Bona- 
 parte the lamb. 
 
 ' If we are to speak of the Italian, Machiavel, it will be but in 
 few words. Machiavel was a political artist, who, having not 
 only studied Greek and Roman policy, but the craft of his own 
 country and of his own times, as also of his own bosom, taught 
 the modes of doing whatever was right and whatever was 
 wrong in politics with an equal satisfaction. As his works 
 were much studied by certain of the French revolutionists, they 
 have not been overlooked by Bonaparte, (who receives plans 
 from every quarter) and therefore they will obtain here a slight 
 notice. In his treatise called the Prifzce, he ^ays, that the mon- 
 ster of his time, (who was his own piuticular acquaintance) 
 Csesar Borgia, did nothing which under his circumstances was 
 not to be approved ; that a sovereign would be ruined, who 
 should always attempt to do good ; and that he ought therefore 
 to shift his sails to suit the winds, taking care to utter no words 
 which do not denote " a heart full of goodness, mercy, truth, 
 humanity and religion." Frederick of Prussia (called ?he ^reat) 
 
90 
 
 pretended to answer this book in the soft and honied style here 
 Tecommended ; and when, under this cloak, he had won the con- 
 fidence of his neighbours he treacherously, and in the very midst 
 of peace, seized a considerable territory belonging to Austria, 
 proving thus, that he preferred Machiavel's book to his own an- 
 swer to it ; and that conquerors only speak truth when it 
 does not contradict their interests. 
 
 Thus professed conquerors are men determined to be great 
 at the expense of others ; all of them employ force, (that is, they 
 kill, rob and destroy, whenever they think proper) and those 
 among them who are politic intermix deceit, which they praise 
 as saving harsher measures. Politic conquerors then are actors 
 on a theatre, who suit their looks and their words to the part 
 they perform, changing both whenever they change the play* 
 Hence, during the French republic, Bonaparte was marked by 
 no zeal for religion ; in his great Eastern expedition, he talked 
 liked a Mahommedan ; when he was to be crowned emperor by 
 the pope, he was a Papist ; and when he was to possess Rome, 
 (to entitle himself to be called Caesar) he discovered that popes 
 were simply religious pastors, who must render to Caesar the 
 things that are Caesar's. He must have read his Bible, however, 
 very conveniently, not to have discovered in it, that all men are 
 to be humble, do justice, and love mercy. Though historians 
 therefore stupidly applavid conquerors because of their exploits, 
 and thus voluntarily inflame the minds of the ambitious, yet we, 
 who are exposed to suffer by conquerors, ought to understand 
 their characters. Bonaparte then, we say, has done enough to 
 shcAv that he is of the breed of conquerors ; and it would con- 
 sequently be madness to wait till he shall actually have subdued 
 us by way of being convinced that he intends to subdue us. A 
 man who is at the head of ten great governments, by a mixture 
 oi violence and crafty is a conqueror of the most dangerous de- 
 scription ; and will, by the same means, (and with still more 
 ease) seize ten or twenty governments in addition. High in- 
 deed must be the confidence of those rulers, who flatter them- 
 selves with being able to soften the heart of Bonaparte, when 
 the experiment has so often failed in the hands of others. The 
 government of the United States in particular, has been too 
 boastful of its resources, too fond of intrigue, and (strange as it 
 may seem to say it) too proud of being able to treat England with 
 haughtiness^ not to have established its claim to the notice of 
 Bonaparte. If any of our rulers think that an alliance nvith him 
 will save them, they forget that the Spanish alliance with France 
 only served to fill Spain with French troops, and to afford an 
 easy means of betraying that devoted nation, and its princes. — 
 Whoever are the allies of Bonaparte must give him entrance 
 into their territoi'ies, must count upon never losing his com- 
 pany, and, after serving him as lackeys, Avill end in being his 
 slaves. To one class of dependents alone Bonapai'te can be 
 
91 
 
 true, namely, to kis family connections and generals, as far as 
 they answer his purposes. But we must do him the justice to 
 say, that he has seldom kept the fate of rejiublics long in sus- 
 pense ; as France, Holland, Cisalpine-Italy, and Switzerland can 
 tell to their cost ; and the United States in their turn may soon 
 have to learn the fact from experience, if they have not wisdom 
 enough to guess it from observation. 
 
 But for the present we drop the subject of the policij of a war 
 with England, (a war which can only end in hastening the peri- 
 od when Bonaparte will be at leisure to attend to us.) 
 
 3. Let us next then briefly consider the prudence of such a 
 war. 
 
 The direct gains of the war cannot long occupy attention. To 
 go to war for neutral rights, without a strong necessity, and by 
 this very act to extinguish them, is like the folly of him in the 
 fable who killed the goose while it was layjag golden eggs in 
 order to be rich all at once. Or it is the case of the captain of 
 a vessel, who being checked in a part of his own trade, and meet- 
 ing by chance a deserted ship larger than his own, and three 
 parts richly laden, from vexation at not finding her full, blows 
 her up, while his own vessel lies by her side. The vt'ar proba-r 
 biy in no event can procure more in favour of its original ob- 
 ject, than a treaty to operate in some future war, which, being 
 obtained by force, may be set aside in a similar manner. This 
 treaty we may put on the same shelf with our violated commer- 
 cial treaties made with France in 1778 and 1800, and we may in- 
 dorse it thus : " Oiie hundred millions given for moon-shine^ for 
 which we must again contend, when our right to it is again dis- 
 puted ;"or thus, " the birthright of the modern Esau sold for the 
 mere promise of a mess of pottage," As the Dutch have suffered 
 more by an obstinate contention for these and similar objects, 
 than they have profited by the gain oi ix part of them, particular- 
 ly during the later periods of their republic, when they prefer- 
 red trade and ambition to the security of their civil and relig- 
 ious liberties, their example may be an useful warning, espe- 
 cially as our southern states, under a change of circumstances, 
 may refuse to support their present artificial opinions on thest 
 subjects. 
 
 Nor are the indirect gains, by means of the war, less visionary 
 than the direct. 1. We do not want the territory contained in 
 the British provinces which it is proposed that v/c shall seize ; 
 and still less their inhabitants, whom we dare not call citizens 
 and ought not to call subjects, and whose numbers will be in- 
 ferior to two or three year's increase of our own people. 2. We 
 have lost our chance oi-^vo^mry^hy privateering, which, accord- 
 ing to General Washington, ceased in our revolutionary war at 
 soon as the British had time to be prepared against it. 3. Bon- 
 aparte will permit us to hold no foreign conquests that will be 
 useful to us ; and certainly not the Floridas. 4. Nor can wc cure; 
 
92 
 
 our wovinded honour by a war vith England ; for our honour has 
 been less injured by England, than by France and ourselves. 
 
 The losses by war on the other hand will be many and great. 
 We shall resign sofnething better than a false honour, namely, 
 reputation. We shall lose the trade arising from neutrality in 
 war with trade which is peculiar to us in peace. Our revenue 
 will diminish, being now chiefly founded on commerce. We 
 shall sacrifice money and comforts, and many lives in addition. 
 We shall endanger our union. And v/c may make shipwreck 
 of our liberties ; for when the influence of Bonaparte has once 
 been admitted into any country, there has been no examfile of 
 that country being erver of ter freed from it. 
 
 As to the various means and resources for conducting war, 
 such as depend on conquests, privateering and allies, have just 
 been touched upon. It will consume a season to add material- 
 ly to our navy, eveuwith our utmost exertions ; and vessels built 
 in haste will decay with rapidity. If we determine on conquest, 
 we must raise an army also, which will equally consume a sea- 
 son ; and if, instead of an army we employ militia, the work will 
 still be slow, without being sure. We m.ust, in the mean time, 
 provide for the defence of our territory, which contains some 
 very unhealthy military stations, and which from its immense size 
 may give occasion to many harrassing marches. Should the British 
 injure our commerce and our custom-house receipts, and should 
 internal taxes (by the consent of great and of little men) in gen- 
 eral be avoided, we must look to the sale of wild lands and to 
 loans for much of our supplies. But wild lands will only sell 
 and be paid for in proportio/i as markets offer for their produce ; 
 and markets will fail, if the British block up our v/estern waters. 
 Should doubts arise as to the stability of the Louisiana purchase 
 (and arise they must as we soon shall demonstrate) the very 
 title to the lands in that quarter will fall into disrepute. On the 
 other hand, our partnership with Napoleon will shake that cred- 
 it oi;i which loans depend with men of prudence ; his plan be- 
 ing to produce contem/it for our gox-ernment., and division among 
 our states on every subject, except that of agreeing with him- 
 self. Foreign plunder stands with Bonafiarte in the place of 
 loans ; but this is a resource which nve cannot possess ; for he 
 will forbid our plundering Spanish America, to which he lays 
 claims ; and the plunder to arise from the British colonies can 
 furnish little or nothing to the public treasury. 
 
 4. But to proceed to our last general division, let us consider 
 in what position tltc war may leave ^^y, in order to know its safety. 
 
 If success shall have attended tis, and likewise attended France, 
 jEngland ivill then be Uk-ely to have been so far humbled as to be 
 obliged to remain quiet for a considerable time. We know the 
 joy which some will feel on this occasion ; for Nero fiddled 
 while Rome was burning ; and some can even poison themselves, 
 provided others die by the same cup. But when this delirium 
 
.93 
 
 is over, the eyes of honest men will open, but too late for their 
 safety, if Bonaparte retains his power. We shall first be re- 
 duced to order ourselves. Our power of aidinj^ the foreign 
 plans of Bonaparte will next be examined by his agents, and they 
 are great as respects fleets, transport-vessels, and provisions. " 
 If we inquire how these means for conquest are to be employed, 
 we answer, that we ourselves in America have pointed out the 
 evils of the great naval power of England, as an immediate ob- 
 ject of attention ; and when the reduction of this'is accomplish- 
 ed, it is clear that it will be difficult for us afterwards to refuse 
 any thing to France. Enough will be found for us to do, to suf- 
 fer, and to repent of. Bonaparte's own views will extend from 
 St Domingo to India, and possibly from India to China and Ja- 
 p.m ; and we may judge how far we shall be spared from giving 
 him assistance when he thinks proper to demand it. 
 
 There are two dangers to arise, should the influence of Bon- 
 aparte prevail here, which demand particular comment from 
 their importance. 
 
 The first respects our commerce. Wealth in general excites 
 envy ; but in proud minds wealth from commerce excites con- 
 tempt or anger. Thus the other day at Canton a deputy of the 
 Chinese emperor called the English a nation of watch-makers ; 
 and tlie ruler of France a little before (in the same spirit) called 
 them a shop-keeping nation. If Great Britain with all its equal- 
 ity with France cannot avoid such sneers, surely the citizens o' 
 the United States, who pretend neither to nobility nor antiquity, 
 cannot expect to be nauch complimented. Contempt is a pow- 
 erful agent on the human mind, not only with those who are \}cic 
 objects of it, but with those who bestow it, especially where ii 
 is aggravated by other considerations. In the case before u? 
 Bonaparte knows that Tyre in its day materially interrupted th(.' 
 progress both of Nebuchadnezzar and of Alexander ; and thai 
 various commercial states in the east (including Athenrs) intc--- 
 mixed essentially in the concerns of various great monarchies. 
 He finds also, that Carthage gave serious opposition to Rome ; 
 that Venice, Genoa, the Hanse Towns, and Holland, have since 
 done the same to other military states, including the Turks: 
 and his own experience shews what impressions the British can 
 make by their fleets, money and daring character. During the 
 French revolution also, the trading cities of Marseilles, Bor- 
 deaux, Lyons and Nantz, exerted themselves (each in its Avay) 
 with more than common energy. Thus there is a spring of ac- 
 tion belonging to commerce, which must be displeasing to one 
 who desires no moving power in the world besides his own, es- 
 pecially while any doubt can remain as to his own security or 
 that of his successor. Commerce is the parent of numbers, 
 shipping, capital, revenue, enterprize, intelligence, and inter- 
 course between diff'erent countries ; and, lastly, of a spirit of in- 
 dependence, which, though it may submit to infuence^ wll eith- 
 
94 
 
 er resistybrrt' or else ily from it. The rapid growth of our own 
 republic, which possesses European manners and ideds, which 
 is capable of forming a navy, which it may soon furnish with ad- 
 mirable officers, and which is advantageously posted for giving 
 trouble to the foreign trade and possessions of Europe, can nev- 
 er be viewed with common patience by Bonaparte. He Avishes 
 that no occupation should prevail in his subject states which 
 can interfere with the recruiting of his forces ; confident that 
 the sword in victorious hands will always support him that wears 
 it, and that a general state of poverty in the world M'ill make 
 the money which circulates go the farther. The simplicity 
 which will thus arise to his extensive governments is another 
 recommendation for discouraging commerce ; for though he 
 himself can reduce great objects to a familiar form which makes 
 them ready subjects of examination, yet a multi/ilicity of objects 
 must lessen his own ease, and may oppress those who succeed 
 iiim. In case therefore a war should give the French a footing 
 here, commercial men Avill first be taxed for all they choose to 
 lend, and then for all they are able to pay ; as it is more easy 
 to take honey from the hive, than to gather it from the scatter- 
 ed flowers of the field. A rich merchant, (and indeed every one 
 who is rich) may consider himself as carrying a ticket of pro- 
 scription at his back, under a military despotism The awful 
 words of Montesquieu on this subject are therefore worth 
 repeating: " We arc fatigued with seeing, in the history of the 
 " Roman emperors, such an infinite number of people whom 
 " these emperors destroyed for no other end than to obtain their 
 " property." Besides this public robbery, there axe. private op- 
 pressions to be endured from soldiery ; and the military men of 
 France are peculiarly dangerous in families where there are fe- 
 males. Great landed proprietors also in the southern states, for 
 some pretended fault, or some real insurrection, may have their 
 
 SLAVES TAKEN AWAY TO GO TO THE FrENCH COLONIES. Ma- 
 
 chiavel gives a hint on this subject, which will form an instruc- 
 tive addition to that from iSIontesquieu. " Some have been of 
 " opinion (he says) that a Avise prince, upon certain occasions, 
 " should artfully excite feeble insurrections against himself, by 
 " quelling which he Avill grow stronger ;" and (we may add) be 
 able to make himself and his dependents richer. These remarks 
 may suffice not only as to commerce, but as to property in case 
 the French should gain footing here. If Bonaparte however 
 should fail in his views against England, his desire of undermin- 
 ing her commerce may then make him encourage his ovjn op- 
 portunities for trade. 
 
 The second object which may suffer from the French being 
 introduced here is, our liberty. We have already said, that we 
 may gradually injure our sentiments, as freemen, by being on 
 the sa7nc side with Bonaparte ; but our liberties may also suffer 
 from him ac^ainst our ivJshc£. Wherever he goes, every thing 
 
95 
 
 must monarchize with him and for him : he teaches indeed that 
 sovereigns are only accountable to God : and renders war, trib- 
 ute, and a blind obedience to himself the law of the land wherc- 
 ever he has influence. Young men must no longer pursue their 
 education, no longer choose their course of life, and no longer 
 remain at home vvhere their morals can be protected. They 
 must leave those they love and by v,diom they are loved, and 
 fight those to whom they have no enmity for the sake of him 
 for whom they have no esteem. The subject states of Bona- 
 parte never can pursue their own true interests'. Like a great 
 load-stone among magnetic needles he prevents their turning 
 to their ow'i pole, making all point as he points, and change as 
 he changes. This then is the man whose friendships, whose 
 hatreds, and whose pursuits we are to countenance for the sake 
 of a bazardoua^ accidental commerce^ of which the nature is so 
 fickle and fleeting, that it vanishes the instant we begin to fight 
 for it. If a desire to su/iport our honour influenced us, we 
 might have a far better excuse ; but our honour (we have said) 
 is not to be defended against England, but against France, who 
 has violated our sovereignty, broken her plighted faith to us, 
 and been the first to begin a system of violence towards our 
 commerce . 
 
 These evils and disgraces, we say, man happen, should our war 
 prove successful ; and if they do not, no thanks will be due to 
 those who put us in danger of them, since a struggle to pro- 
 cure relief against them may cost us more than any thing which 
 can be gained for our neutral rights. 
 
 But a war against England, in the next place, may after all 
 fail of success. Whatever is human is liable to accidents ; and 
 accidents therefore may happen either to Bonaparte or ourselves. 
 If England also should lose its provinces on this continent, yet 
 still, 6i/ establishing proper stations on 07ir coast, she may greatly 
 control our trade, England and France also may make their 
 peace at our expense.) as we shall soon find that France intend- 
 ed to do in 1782—3. In any of these cases when our national 
 treasurer comes to settle our accoimts, and our private losses 
 are combined with our public expenditure, we shall discover 
 that though it is hard to gain by a war for neutral rights it is 
 easy to lose by it. Nor will our loss be confined, as we have 
 seen, to money. Onv fame will be among the articles which 
 will particuLu'ly sufi'er, pledged as we have been to Europe and 
 posterity in favour of liberty, and of providing an asylum for the 
 persecuted members of the human race. A war too which v»'as 
 ridiculous in its pretexts will be rendered stil! more ridiculous 
 by disappointment as to its issue. 
 
 If the war then with England \tili not only do us injury if it 
 fails, but still more injury if it should be succes'-.ful, it is clear- 
 ly an unwise war. 
 
96 
 
 What then are the real motives for it ; for hitherto we have 
 seen nothing urged v/hich men of talents can employ for any 
 other purpose than as secondary arguments, or as deceitful 
 pretexts ? 
 
 The reasons urged in. fniblic for engaging in a war with Eng- 
 land at the present moment have been discussed with confi- 
 dence ; but other motives for such a war can only be spoken of 
 by conjecture. We shall enter, however, upon a candid and ex- 
 tensive search after other motives ; and, if we fail in discovering 
 them, the blame must rest elsewhere. Such motives however, 
 as suggest themselves shall be fairly examined. 
 
 Time has tvorn out several pretexts for the war, among which 
 are the following. 
 
 First, it cannot be pretended that the war against England is 
 designed to secure our national iiidependence from the attempts 
 of that nation. It is true, that a conspicuous individual in these 
 states, two years since, intimated, that a party in England, then 
 in power, desired to re-establish the lost dominion of the Brit- 
 ish over America : but the deliberate opinion of the immense 
 majority of able men among us does not correspond with this 
 hasty surmise : our real persuasion as to the probable revival 
 of the British claim of sovereignty must depend chiefly on the 
 ansM'cr to the following question : If the British nation declined 
 i,u/i/!orting- its king- in this attempt, when America had only its 
 former powers of resistance, will it think it prudent to do it at 
 present when America has trebled her power, and in a short 
 period may become stronger than Great Britain ? The royal 
 family of England, having lost thirteen provinces by its first 
 war, must beware of a second, which may deprive it of its throne 
 ut a time when no retreat is to be depended upon in Hanover. 
 England accordingly, under all her various administrations dur- 
 ing the last 28 years, has shewn no tendency whatever to renew 
 this contest. Victory in the struggle would be more than un- 
 certain ; and the enjoyment of the fruits of victory }nust neces- 
 sarily be short. Why indeed should force be used when Grea*. 
 Britain, by the quiet operation of circumstances, possesses an 
 immense trade with us, without expense, trouble or risk, and is 
 freed from the perplexities attached to our government, which 
 are now perceived to be extreme ? But were it otherwise, an 
 offensive war against England, when her claims are for the mo- 
 ment at rest, will be of no use to our independence, unless we 
 expect materially to weaken her. A plan for acting in concei't 
 with France with a view to disable England, is not very well 
 timed ; and before engaging in it, avc ought to have as unanswer- 
 able evidence, that Fra?ice does not desire to violate our nation- 
 al independence, as that whicli disproves the like design in 
 England. 
 
 Again : it cantiot now be affirmed.^ that a war with England 
 .tud an alliance with France can assist our liberties. The pros- 
 
97 
 
 pects of improvement in France were once, it is true, conceived 
 by many to be encouraging. Even Mr. Pitt at one moment de- 
 clared in parliament, that the French revolution might end well. 
 The London Court Gazette for an instant spoke of it with some- 
 thing like complacency. General Washington, at a much later 
 period, viewed it even with attachment. Others adhered to 
 France as long as any remnant of republican government sub- 
 sisted ; for while the French had many generals of whom one 
 might be opposed to the other, and while the civil power con- 
 trolled the whole, this seemed a state of things v.hich might 
 continue for a time in France, as it had done in ancient Rome. 
 Some honest enthusiasts also continued to think, that they could 
 trace the finger of heaven not only in the events of France, but 
 of Europe, particularly as connected with the situation of pope- 
 ry. A few good men afterwards lingered on the side of France 
 till the character of Bonaparte should be found decisively hos- 
 tile to liberty, unwilling to renounce what may be called the 
 habit of their ho/ies. But these, alas, soon saw the republic ex- 
 tinguished both in form and in name, foreign conquests pursu- 
 ed as a national system, privileged orders revived in their worst 
 (that is, under a military) form, and the fable of the coming of 
 the golden age vanished like a dream. When times change 
 knaves change in them, at the expense of their morality ; and 
 honest men ought to change to save their morals. In short, 
 varnish the cup and platter presented by France as we may, 
 within it there is "extortion and excess ;" and let the sepulchre 
 be whitened and made beautiful outwardly, still it contains 
 •' dead men's bones and all uncleanness." In a word, none can 
 look to a country for liberty^ in v/hich the name of liberty can- 
 not now be pronounced. 
 
 Thirdly, it is no longer to be pretended that we Oiveany 
 Uilng to France for favours conferred upon us. It shall be ad- 
 mitted that many in the French nation once felt ardently for our 
 cause ; but their ardour has been fully returned ; especially by 
 our paying that money to the republic vihich was lent us by the 
 monarchy. But the designs of the old French court are now 
 proved not to have been friendly either at the commencement 
 or at the close of our revolution. In its outset. Count Ver- 
 gennes, minister for foreign affairs, and the famous M, Turgot^ 
 minister of finance, recommended such a course to be pursued 
 respecting it, as should iveaken both us and England. Their 
 original memoirs (or reports) to this effect, were found in the 
 strong box of Louis XVI. ; and the official instructions to M. 
 Genet, minister from the French republic to this country (which 
 were published here) have confirmed the fact. Indeed, M. Tur- 
 got's memoir is foiHid to have been in circulation among his 
 friends before the French revolution, and a translation of it was 
 even printed as early as 1789. It was pursuant to the system 
 ]ald dov.-n in these memoirs, that France embarked in the war, 
 
 13 
 
98 
 
 solely to PREVENT a fieace between America and England, at a 
 time when the surrender of General Burgoyne had made such 
 an event appear neither improbable nor distant. The same 
 crooked policy ruled the negotiations for peace in 1782, the 
 French attempting to limit our pretensions on the subject of our 
 boundaries, fisheries, and refugees ; not only to obtain a greater 
 share in the sacrifices expected from England with a view to 
 obtain peace, but to leave room for quarrels between us and 
 England. Influenced by a wiser and deeper policy, England 
 rejected the snare, being resolved to leave no " seeds of discord" 
 (as the provisional articles express it) lest they should operate 
 to incline America to continue attached to France. Notwith- 
 standing therefore our negotiators had orders to make their 
 proceedings known to the French court, and notwithstanding 
 they held their assemblies at Paris, yet they found themselves 
 obliged to conclude firi-vately, and without the immediate know- 
 ledge of France, articles of peace with England, (which however 
 were not to be reduced to a foi'mal treaty till France should 
 have settled a peace for herself.) Such was the sincerity of the 
 Court of France ! The republic, by various misdeeds towards 
 us as a neutral nation, induced Congress to dissolve our two 
 treaties and our consular convention with her. To complete 
 the history of our connections with France, we add, that its /2rf- 
 sent ruler designed his treaty of commerce in 1800, and that for 
 the sale of Louisiana, as mere impositions ; and has added ta 
 them grievances and insults of the most flagrant nature. When 
 we reflect consequently, that our independence diminished the 
 power of England ; that France made more than a saving peace 
 for herself, and conferred benefits on her allies by means of our 
 revolution ; that we have sufi'ered immense spoliations and great 
 impediments from her in her oivn two revolutionary wars, and 
 that we are likely in the end to forfeit the money paid for Loui- 
 siana, it will be seen that France has but a small bill of accounts 
 left to settle with us. National gratitude ought to be observed 
 where due ; but if the Bourbons, who were our allies, and if 
 those amiable individuals who admired our revolutionary cause, 
 could each now be consulted, they would be far from encourag- 
 ing an alli<ince at this moment with Bonaparte, which should 
 end in covjirming his usurpation over France and his tyrafiny 
 over the nvorld. So much then for the gratitude due to France, 
 and particularly as to the persons to whom it is due, and the 
 mode in which it ought to operate. 
 
 Another motive lor a war with England, which ought at this 
 time to cease, is founded on resentment for certain occurrences 
 during our revolutionary war. On this head, our treaty of peace 
 with England in 1782—3 furnishes the proper answer. Four ar- 
 ticles of this treaty regard either our independence, boundaries, 
 fisheries, or else the joint navigation of the Mississippi, while the 
 remaining ^i^e, with the intrjatiuction to the provisional and de- 
 
99 
 
 finitive treaties, require us to lay aside all hostility and animos- 
 ity, except in certain points as to the refugees ; the gains on 
 each side in this treaty being supposed to balance the conces- 
 sions by each. As the treaty was founded on liberal principles, 
 it ought, for the sake of good example, to be the more respect- 
 ed. But even had nothing been retaliated on our part agamst 
 the British, it is uncandid to dwell for ever on the misconduc- 
 of military men, of whom a part were foreigners, and of whom 
 the majority are dead, and at the same time forget, that peace 
 was made in compliance with the wishes of the British nation. In a 
 controversy, where England is to be compared with France, we 
 have a right to affirm that the French in their late civil war com- 
 mitted more and greater crimes against justice and humanity, than 
 the British in their war with ourselves ; and most of the milita- 
 ry measures formerly undertaken by England on this side of the 
 atlantic against the French, were produced by our solicitations, 
 on account of the ambition, intrigues, and cruehies of the French, 
 seconded by Indians. 
 
 But enough has been said of these worn-out (or extinguished) 
 reasons for a war with England. 
 
 There is a set of reasons which certain /ihiloso/ihers appear 
 to employ for reconciling themselves to the idea of Bonaparte 
 being at the head of the world, (and consequently to our being 
 connected with him, rather than with England ;) which shall 
 ,Tiext be touched upon. 
 
 For instance ; an union of the world under a single chief has 
 been supposed calculated to /irevent wars and national jealousies. 
 The oppressions necessary to establish an universal monarchy 
 shall be passed over ; for the state of things to occur at Bon- 
 aparte's death, if he leaves no issue, or none but infants or fe- 
 males, will alone shew the danger of this opinion. His decease 
 will probably, either be the signal for plots among his generals 
 (as that of Alexander the great was) or produce contests be- 
 tween his own successors for supremacy, or enable vanquished 
 nations to throw of the yoke ; and in either way union ceases 
 with its splendid promises No citizen of these states can pre- 
 tend that despotism is beneficial in firofiortion as it is extensive 
 without censuring the resistance we made to England, and our 
 own separation into small states. In our proud revolutionary 
 days, the idea of suffering one man to assume, by force, the pow- 
 er of thinking and acting for the universe, would have excited 
 horrour. It would have been said, that the evils to follow from 
 the jealousy of a despot towards his subjects must exceed any 
 which national jealousy could produce ; and that the troops of 
 a tyrant must be more oppressive than foreign troops, which in- 
 dependent nations keep at a distance. But so little merit has 
 Bonaparte, compared with many others, that, without going back 
 to ancient examples, we find from Sir George Staunton that even 
 the government of China put his own to shame, for a. foreign 
 
100 
 
 race of princes in China produces tranquillity and prosperity 
 with the help of one soldier where Bonaparte employs three, 
 notwithstanding China is said to contain twice as many people 
 as Europe. But Bonaparte will not, like the Chinese, seek the 
 influence of old men and men of letters, and the maxims and 
 example of ancient popular characters, to support a tame sys- 
 tem of industry, peace, and mutual civility. His pride lies in 
 conquests and in parade ; and the aversion in which he is held 
 by the nations of Europe, and their means for successful revolt 
 are such, that he cannot, upon his plan of proceeding, avoid the 
 use of force to control^ and of art to di-uide and weaken those 
 Avho are opposed to him. 
 
 Another persuasion which may dispose the minds of some 
 philosophers to favour Bonaparte is, that his fiolilicat sufiremacy 
 ivill be fatal to false religion. Mere political rulers, however, 
 are careless as to the nature of the popular religion, where it 
 does not oppose their views ; Catherine II. of Russia, though 
 an infidel, yet in her day pr.tronizing a mixture of Christianity 
 and heathenism, and Bonaparte having by turns professed to 
 admire the pope and Mahoinct, and each with a view to please 
 the vulgar. But Bonaparte cannot destroy an extensive religion 
 by any methods which he will condescend to employ ; and in 
 struggling against it by force he must be ruined. Certain feel- 
 ings of the human mind cail for religion in the shape of super- 
 stition or of enthusiasm, of ceremony, or of contemplation ; and 
 where a religion has long been established, priests and people 
 will adhere to it, were it only from habit or interest^ or else 
 something more gross Avill soon arise to fill the vacancy. Mr. 
 Hume himself in saying that the literary men in China are " the 
 ONLY regular body of deists in the universe" admits the case 
 as singular ; but the author just quoted, and others, shew it to 
 be imaginary ; for tliough no religion is established in China, 
 yet the Chinese in general worship gods visible or invisible, and ' 
 all of them employ ceremonies by way of p.iying reverence, not 
 only to the reigning prince, but to the great Confucius, and to 
 living and dead relations made venerable by age or time. Re- 
 ligion finds in the human mind too fertile a soil to be easily 
 rooted out : for man is born to fear and to hope ; he requires 
 occupation for vacant moments, he is subject to contagious 
 mental feelings, and his ignorance but renders him the more 
 ready to embrace a religion that is false ; and wise men, as well 
 as fools, will always be inquisitive after the unseen cause of 
 what surrounds them. Hence fortune and luck, ghosts and 
 omens, often remain the gods even of philosophers, after other 
 gods have been discarded ; and the most formidable man whom 
 the universe has known for many ages, has yielded (as is said) 
 to impressions as to the influence of fortune and omens for 
 which he could assign no reason. If any body of men therefore 
 occasionally exists without religion or nvithout its substitutes 
 ■we may venture to assert that the period will be short. 
 
101 
 
 A third motive for favouring the conquests of France which 
 operates with certain bold, speculative minds is, that she will 
 spf aside many mischievous fiolitical establishme7its. But will she 
 put any thing better in their place ? The earthquake, which 
 destroys an ill built city, is not the agent which rebuilds and 
 improves its edifices. Bonaparte, with an unlimited power to 
 do good, has been chiefly anxious where he has had power to 
 establish an internal despotism, adapted to the support of his 
 pian oi foreign conquests. If camps and military despotic courts 
 ave the proper schools for teaching the useful arts and sciences, 
 with Avibdoiu and benevolence in legislation, the world has hith- 
 erto been under a considerable mistake. It was certainly under 
 a different system, that France produced those many great 
 men, who preceded and began her revolution ; and it was un- 
 der a different system, that the great men of England, and of 
 cur own and various other nations, in modern times, have risen 
 ard flourished. This system (so opposite to that of Bonaparte) 
 is the system of independent governments, sufficiently balanced 
 in their rcspvctive powers and alliances, to prevent one from 
 conquering the whole ; and, under favour of it, improvements 
 have penetrated even into adjoining despotic countries, the 
 princes and great men of which respected not only the talents, 
 but the opinions of their wiser neighbours. Whenever we can 
 ascertain the origin of human arts or sciences they have been 
 the result of freedom in a whole nation, or in one or more of its 
 branches, or of individuals who have obtained the rudiments of 
 their knowledge and their turn for improvements from these 
 sources. Pure, resistless, military despotism, however osten- 
 tatiously it may begin, soon ends in thinking only of itself ; and 
 public communities then become divided into oppressors and 
 sufferers, into wild and tame beasts, and whatever happiness is 
 afterwards enjoyed by an ignorant and diminished people is 
 slender, and (as being the result of accident) cannot long be felt 
 as permanent. 
 
 The three preceding reasons, though (as we think) un- 
 founded, do not belong to frivolous minds. 
 
 There is a sentiment, however, in favour of our allying our- 
 selves to France to which we cannot pay the same compliment, 
 namely, a blind Love of the French. Love and aversion ought to 
 have little concern with national measures, Avhich should be 
 founded on national interests. Without therefore being sus- 
 pected of assuming any undue preferences for England, we 
 shall place England exactly where she has been placed by Vol- 
 taire, Montesquieu, and many independent Frenchmen, who 
 certainly have never taught that she is unworthy of esteem in a 
 comparative view, or that she merits to be made subject to 
 Fruca. Avoiding also all controversy as to the claims of the 
 Fr^'iich to pre-eminence in literature and useful discoveries, in 
 v/hich view they have clearly much to bonst, we shall observe 
 
102 
 
 that (had these circumstances any claim to weight in our dis- 
 pute) whatever is useful in these respects may be spread among 
 us by books or otherwise, without our taking a course to secure 
 them which must endanger our peace and independence. 
 
 Another argument for attaching us to France has been founded 
 on the idea, that Bonaparte is an agent commissiomd from above. 
 This opinion ascribes no particular virtues to Bonaparte, but 
 merely power and success. Christians, who hold to it, chiefly 
 refer on this occasion to the notion, that Bonaparte is employed 
 in fulfilling prophecies supposed to foretel the ruin of popery. 
 But excepting as to temporal power and riches, which are acci- 
 dental circumstances, and excepting in resisting encroachments 
 on the French church, (which the French clergy themselves al- 
 ways resisted) Bonaparte in his own person has done nothing final 
 against the pope or Roman Catholic priests. How long even what 
 he has done will remain, time alone will shew ; for churches 
 often undergo temporary persecutions, and the pope's fortune 
 has ever been changeable. No interpretation however of these 
 prophecies can furnish a pretence for a war with England, 
 England being a Protestant power, whose king has set his 
 face against the Catholics of his own dominions in several 
 particulars. But the opinion, that the instant consequence of 
 the French revolution would be the destruction of popery, roy- 
 alty, and the Turks, and the re-establishment of the Jews in the 
 holy land, is now known to be false. In this fluctuating world, 
 many years must often pass before political events can be called 
 fixed ; and hence it is still difficult to say, what will be the fate 
 not only of the pope, but of the Bourbons, and even of American 
 liberty ! 
 
 But some think that Bonaparte has a decree o^fate in his be- 
 half. We shall not inquire what is meant by fate, as nothing 
 judicious or distinct can be said on this head. We are content 
 with knowing, that fatalists collect their opinions of it from the 
 ■fiast and the present. Though fatalists therefore may confirm 
 us in our resignation as to what has happened, they can boast 
 nothing as to powers of prophecy. Judging therefore from the 
 same materials, as to xht. future, with themselves, we affirm that 
 England has as much right to plead a decree of fate in her be- 
 half, as France. If France has been successful by land, England 
 has been no less so by sea, so that each has had its sphere of 
 prosperity, with this diff'erence, that France has never obtained 
 a single victory by sea, whereas England has repeatedly beaten 
 the French on shore. What is farther reserved for each, is as 
 much unknown to the fatalists as to others, fortune being a 
 capricious deity, often undoing in a moment what it has cost 
 her years to accomplish. In the mean time we remark, that the 
 fatalist has not only been deceived in his firo/ihccics as to the 
 speedy downfal of England, but has even been mistaken as to 
 her existing circumstances. England has disappointed both 
 
103 
 
 subtle politicians and the interpreters of prophecy and of fktC 
 not only as to her resources, her union, and the superior quality 
 of her land forces, but even as to the amount of her population ; 
 and, for the happiness of human kind, may the disappointment 
 long continue ! 
 
 Let us now turn back to note our progress in searching after 
 the real motives for a war with England ; a search, begun in 
 consequence of our having discovered no neutral grounds to 
 justify this war, particulu-riy after having compared the conduct 
 of England and France towards the United States. We have 
 hitherto then, enumerated, in the whole, ten distinct pretexts 
 in favour of France against England, without finding any one 
 of them valid. Four of them we answered on the ground of 
 their being at this time out of date ; for first, England no lon^ 
 ger disputes our national independence ; next, France has for 
 some time ceased to plead the cause of liberty ; thirdly, the 
 present government of France is different from that which as- 
 sisted us during our revolution ; and lastly, resentment to Eng- 
 land for the transactions of that period ought no longer to ap- 
 pear in our practice. We have next replied to three reasons 
 suited only to certain speculative minds, having shewn first, that 
 Bonaparte's scheme of universal monarchy by no means favours 
 peace and national harmony ; next, that Bonaparte cannot be 
 depended upon for extinguishing false religions ; and lastly, that 
 the removal of one set of bad governments is useless, if a worse 
 is to be substituted. In the last place, we have rejected three 
 motives for the war, as resting solely upon fanciful grounds ; 
 one of these being a blind love of France ; another, a supposed 
 divine commission given to Bonaparte ; and the last, an imagi- 
 nary decree of fate in favour of the same person. 
 
 The considerations thus noticed and set aside, we divided 
 into the antiquated, the speculative, and the fanciful. A few 
 are now to follow which relate indeed to the present moment, 
 and which by some may be called practical, but which are not 
 less empty than the preceding. 
 
 The first pretext in this new set is, that no danger being to 
 be apprehended from Bonaparte, we may fearlessly settle our 
 quarrel with England by arms. Though unwilling to employ 
 harsh expressions towards antagonists in the present contro- 
 versy we are not the less determined to arrive at truth, and 
 therefore we affirm that this is an egregious misrepresentation. 
 What is future is commonly only matter of probability ; but 
 the probability here is such, that it ought to govern us equally 
 with certainty, if it be true that we 7nust take a part ir. the war, 
 AVe prove then our danger from Bonaparte by his temper and 
 his conduct, his power and his successes ; by the unanimous 
 opinions of all in our day, who have sense, information, and in- 
 dependence ; by evidence also collected from similar cases in 
 former times, and by the principles of human nature, for jus- 
 
104 
 
 tice and a love of conquest are ever inconsistent. As to the 
 fact of the power of Bonaparte, we must recollect that since 
 he ruled in France seueral of his great wars have been decided 
 by a campaign of three months ; that his last Russian war had in 
 it only six months of active operations ; and that if the war in 
 the Spanish peninsula has lasted almost two years, Bonaparte's 
 attention has been interrupted by other concerns. England, it 
 is true, has of herself and single handed, uniformly defied him ; 
 but allowing to ourselves a similar energy of character under 
 similar circumstances, can we, like England, maintain several 
 hundred thousand men in arms, year after year, and cover tlie 
 seas with vessels of war ? Can we, as England did in 1809, fur- 
 nish three hundred and fifty millions of dollars in a year towards 
 expenditures and debts, and go on without appearance of over- 
 whelming ourselves or posterity with the burthen ? Our own 
 regular troops will only suffice to garrison an European fortress 
 of the second rank, and cannot be called an army. Nor will 
 our militia serve to free us from uneasiness ; for if Austria in 
 1809, with near 700,000 disci/ilined men (of which half were 
 regulars, and all had veteran officers) sued for peace in three 
 months, can ive expect better events from our ordinary militia, 
 whose total numbers are indeed similar to the above, but who 
 are destitute not only of discipline and experience, but even of 
 arms ? The ocean lies between us and Bonaparte, but the 
 ocean is no obstacle, but, on the contrary, an advantage to those 
 who possess fleets ; for in the manner in which the French 
 convey their troops by sea, one hundred thousand men may be 
 transported to our shores from France in as short a time, and 
 (in the case of Bonaparte, who will put Europe into requisition 
 on this occasion) with as little cxpence as a like army can be 
 inarched from France to Poland. If then we assist France in 
 reducing England to Si fixed state of peace ^ and leave ourselves 
 to contend alone afterwards with Bonaparte, what must be our 
 .•>ituation f Will he not say to us, as he did to the betrayed 
 Spaniards, Receive a sovereign at my hands, or be treated as a 
 conquered country ? We shall therefore in this case either be 
 governed by his nephew in Baltimore, the little Jerome Bona- 
 parte, or his council of regency ; or have to sustain a war within 
 our territory not like that with England, but with an enemy far 
 more bloody, prompt, and desperate. 
 
 The next pretext for an English war, which stands in this 
 class is, that the danger from Bonaparte is so great, that we can 
 no longer be neutral with safety, and of course can have no ally 
 but him. This is the opposite of the foregoing argument ; yet 
 some use the two alternately, according to the persons with 
 whom they converse ; thus saying in the same breath, that Bon- 
 aparte is to be feared, and not to be feared. But the ancient 
 maxim, tliat we should always be the strongest, or on the side of 
 the strongest, is open (rjliere existerice is at stake ) to the fol- 
 
105 
 
 lowing query : Are there no means of balancing the stronger 
 power by a connection with one Avho is only a little wei^ker ? 
 Though it should therefore be true, that safety requires us to 
 take a side, still it will be contrary to wisdom to join Bonaparte, 
 if the result is to put us at his mercy, by depressing England ; 
 and especially when, by reversing the measure, we may answer 
 our ends much better both for ourselves and the world at large. 
 Though the sea is a source of weakness to us, while an enemy 
 commands it, yet it may be a means both of defence, and of of- 
 fence, if we associate ourselves with England (provided we are 
 to associate ourselves with any one.) A navy is so effectual in 
 preventing attack, or in cutting oif t'.^.e supplies and retreat of 
 an assailant, that though one part of England is only seven 
 leagues from France, and oae part of Sicily only two leagues 
 from Italy, yet the French, as yet, have attempted to attack 
 neither, discouraged by the little success they experienced in 
 Ireland ; and au expedition against ourselves, should we be aid- 
 ed by British fleets, would by no means be more promising — 
 In any event, there is this objection to becoming the ally of Bon- 
 aparte, and especially for a republic, namely, that it may give 
 him opportunities (as in Spain) for doing mischief, which would 
 be refused to him as an enemy. But the assertion that we can- 
 not be safe from Bonaparte, unless we seek his protection, leads 
 to the following queries : Can we be any otherwise in danger 
 from Bonaparte than because Bonaparte has dangerous designs ? 
 Are not the comynands which he has repeatedly issued for us to 
 fight on his side, alone a reason for not choosing him as our 
 protector ? Does he not take, burn, and sink our vessels at sea, 
 as if he were at firesent our enemy ? Are the rumours circulat- 
 ed from time to time, that he designs to stop his seizures, and 
 which are sometimes for a moment acted upon, any thing more 
 than the stale trick of all keepers of traps, who now and then 
 suffer a sufficient number of victims to escape, to prevent their 
 snares growing out of repute ? Do not his custom-house officers 
 (like spiders fixed at their webs) take so tjianij /irizes in port^ 
 by means of these and other contrivances, as to prove a cheafi 
 substitute for cruizers at sea ? Are not our traders in going in- 
 to his ports less blameable than the administration, which, by 
 not consenting to admit that France is as bad to us as England, 
 encourages them to go ? If England used our traders in a sivii- 
 lar manner, would not a laAv instantly be passed, to forbid their 
 going there, and Avould there not be loud clamours in favour of 
 war with her, or at least of reprisals ? Is not the deliberate de- 
 struction of our property at sea by official orders, without trial 
 and upon false pretences, not only wanton piracy, but a special 
 violation of the first principles of neutral law ? for all agree, that 
 prize questions between belligerents and neutrals require to be 
 settled before a /n/6//c ^r/6Mf?G/. Is not the conduct of Bona- 
 parte a proof, we will not say of his hoiding correspondence 
 
106 
 
 with some of our rulers, but of his contempt for the whole of our 
 rulers and nation, since he shews to what extent he thinks he 
 can proceed with impunity ? Or at least does it not manifest, 
 that one of his usual modes of gaining his points with foreign 
 powers, is to load them with injuries and insults ? Is it not pro- 
 bable, if by means of a promise to restore our property, he en- 
 gages us in a war from which we cannot retreat, that he will 
 still detain much of what belongs to us, on the principle on 
 which he first seized it, namely, to make us obey other orders 
 which he may yet have to give us ? These are queries, which, 
 sooner or later, must be answered to the American people, and 
 to posterity. 
 
 A third pretext for a -war with England is, that France is a 
 better alhj than £ngland, in a practical point of view. We shall 
 not deny that Bonaparte can be useful to those, whom he chooses 
 to serve : but has he manifested any disposition to serve us ? 
 On the contrary ; are there not obvious motives, with a man of 
 his character, for wishing our ruin ? Having never yet been true 
 to any republic, he must not be expected to begin by favouring 
 ours. He remembers that we are descended from his gre^t ri- 
 vals ; and that we still retain their religion, language, manners, 
 and habits ; and likewise generally prefer their markets. He 
 is Jealous of our numbers, knowing, (as every statesman now 
 does) that whenever the principle of population acts vigorously, 
 within an immense territory like ours, it must soon produce num- 
 bers exceeding those of his own subjects. He is jealous also of 
 our maritime turn, because it may oppose his own projects by sea. 
 He is jealous of our position, which not only threatens the West 
 Indies and their trade,with the fisheries in the northern part of the 
 Atlantic, but (what is still more important in his view) the gold 
 and silver mines of the Spaniards and Portuguese ; and enables us 
 besides to intrigue and combine with the European colonists 
 throughout the two Americas. He is, above all, jealous of our 
 spirit of enterprize, which makes us doubly ready to cultivate 
 many of our advantages. He is certainly not jealous of our 
 boastings ; but he is necessarily irritated by them ; for as fame 
 is the great motive of a conqueror, he thinks that no praises 
 should be heard besides his own. Bonaparte therefore never 
 can be an useful ally, though under the pretence of an alliance 
 he may do us irreparable mischief. 
 
 Let us now then inquire (upon the supposed ground that we 
 can no longer be neutral) whether England, compared ivith 
 France^ has not equal power to serve us, less power to injure 
 us, and far more sincerity. As to services, if England can do 
 all we require^ it is all we want ; and more poAver on her side 
 might only endanger us. She can supply not only money and 
 arms, but vessels of war for us to navigate ; she can secure to 
 us a trtide with herself, and with all other ports which are not 
 under the influence of Frunce ; and a connectipn between her- 
 
107 
 
 self and us will make the defence of each more easy. But with 
 all this power to aid us, England has little means of doing us 
 permanent injury. It is our farther security on this occasion, 
 that England knotas her weakness in this respect by experience. 
 Time also has proved to her, as far as regards her prime ob- 
 ject, namely, trade, not only that nature provides better markets 
 than either force or art, but that a little rivalship is no impedi- 
 ment to a beneficial commercial intercourse. But the principal 
 recommendation which England holds forth, lies in the nature 
 of her government, and in the moderation of her habits. Her 
 government, as being to a considerable degree public, and lia- 
 iale to answer to the nation for its acts, excludes much of those 
 secret and selfish plots which belong to arbitrary monarchies. 
 Foreign conquest moreover is not the habit of England. In- 
 deed, there has scarcely been a war made by England since 
 1688 (except our revolutionary war) which our ancestors did 
 not afiprovcy and consider as defensive ; and yet they have been 
 chiefly wars against. France. In very early ages England was 
 so far from being given to conquest, that she was herself re- 
 peatedly subdued ; and it has been the fate of every royal fam- 
 ily that has since sat upon her throne, for any time, to lose its 
 foreign possessions, if it had any. Her increase of dominion in 
 Europe has been confined to her own islands, and no real change 
 has been made even there for many ages. In the Mediterra- 
 nean she has, in later periods, possessed only one or two fortres- 
 ses at a time, by means of the marriage of one of her kings, or 
 by conquest ; but it has been for the protection of trade only ; 
 and Tangiers was even voluntarily abandoned. Her conquests 
 on this side the Cape of Good Hope, do not contain more 
 than a few hundred thousand inhabitants, unless by her own ad- 
 ditions to them since they were acquired. Beyond the Cape, 
 French intrigues almost exclusively operated to render the Eng- 
 ish East India Company military ; and though the British gov- 
 ernment from having first supported this company by sea, and 
 then by land, has since claimed a share in their concerns, yet 
 could India be secured from the ambition of France and other 
 foreign powers, every thing gained there would gladly be aban- 
 doned by the nation, as a dangerous as well as uncertain posses- 
 sion. It is to colonization that England has been indebted for 
 the most valuable of her foreign possessions. Thirteen of her 
 colonies (now forming the United States) were however lost by 
 an arbitrary claim, which Great Britain afterwards renounced, 
 not only as to us, but in effect as to her other colonics ; her in- 
 discretion being thus as short as it was great ; (though not 
 greater indeed than our own indiscretion at the present mo- 
 ment towards herself) Various circumstances have contribu- 
 ted to confirm her in this temperate system. England, from her 
 moderate size, and the protection derived from the sea, as well 
 as from the jealousy of her people, has hitherto kept small ar- 
 
108 
 
 mies, and therefore has lost one of the usual temptations to con^ 
 quest. Since 1 6S8, likevise, the religion of her prin&cs, who were 
 Protestants, has prevented their intermarrying with the great 
 Catholic powers of the European continent ; and has equally led 
 them to the support of some of the weaker European powers 
 against the strong-er, so as to form another impediment. A 
 disputed title to the tlirone also, and the disaffection of many of the 
 Iri^h nation, have furnished other checks. Lastly, liberty, science, 
 agriculture, commerce, navigutioii, and colonies, have given the 
 nation so much power that it hj.s been needless to seek to add to 
 it by oppressing others. Tae conduct of the British to their 
 subjects at home has little to alarm us. Religious sectaries 
 p.'.y tythes indeed to the estciblished church, and are excluded 
 from many offices, impressments are used also for the sea ser- 
 vice, though not for the land service, and the taxes are very 
 heavy ; but a part of the government is elective, the debates 
 in Parliament are less rcntrictcd than those in Cong-ress^ the press 
 is free, and the slave trade is abolished, and negro slavery in the 
 colonies is softened. Disaffected persons, who come among us 
 from Great Britain and Ireland sometimes forget to tell, that 
 political sufferings, when experienced at home, are not always 
 unprovoked, and that those who live tranquilly, suffer more 
 from the distresses of the times than from any other cause ; 
 distresses, Avhich must always remain while Bonaparte lives to 
 occasion them. Those who are most uneasy will find enough 
 to quiet them in the accounts of the horrid calamities of the 
 French protestants under Louis XIV. or of the French in La 
 Vendee under the revolutionists, or of the continent of Europe 
 at this moment under the rod of France. Any other proof re- 
 specting the conduct of France compared Avith England is un- 
 necessary. 
 
 We shall, however, observe under this head, that the /iro- 
 ceedings of Rngland towards some of her late allies have been 
 misapprehended. To the great landed powers of Europe, 
 England gave all that was asked by them, namely, money or 
 arms, though in several instances she prepared troops to act 
 jointly Avith their armies, or by way of diversion ; but the par- 
 ties could not hold cut long enough to receive this aid. A 
 land force indeed might, at one time have acted in Sweden; 
 but so wild an employment (as is said) was proposed for it, that 
 Sir John More withatew it to employ it more gloriously, if not 
 more hopefully, in Spain. The succours to Spain and Portugal, 
 which have been aniple and prompt, have been as voluntary, as 
 they have been various. England, in truth, has latterly acted 
 with much generosity towards her European friends. Thinking 
 that they were safest from Bonaparte while they were at peace, 
 she has neither encouraged any to go to war, nor prevented any 
 from making peace, but, while at war, she has done her best 
 to serve them. She has drawn the bonds somewhat closer in- 
 
109 
 
 deed in the case of Spain and Portugal, because, from variouti 
 causes, the hopes there seemed somewhat brighter. In the be- 
 ginning of the French revolution the conduct of England was 
 less circumspect with some of the smaller Eui'opean powers ; 
 but she was then in general seconded by all the rest of Europe. 
 She attempted also, after she had embarked in the war, to influ- 
 ence the internal government of France. But the basis of all 
 her proceedings at that period was, either to restore things to 
 their old footing, or to keefi them from changing^ aiming to in- 
 troduce no novelties ivith others^ and seeking no concjuestg for 
 herself IIow different is this from the measures of France, 
 who has every where sought to establish novelties under false 
 pretences, with a view to serve herself and has every where en- 
 deavoured to overthrow that independence of the European go- 
 vernments, on which rests the general safety of mankind ; being 
 for tliis end, steady on her side to two points, amidst all her in- 
 ternal changes, namely, the increase of her military forces^ and 
 the ejL-ten.Aon of h-r po wer over other nations. We maintain 
 therefore, that, if we inust have an ally, England will answer the 
 purpose better tnan Bonaparte. Alliances have the chance of 
 being most beneficial and permanent, when they are formed be- 
 tween two inferior powers against a stronger ; when both the 
 parties have moderate views ; when their religion, governments^ 
 manners, and dangers have a certain degree of correspondence ; 
 and when their mutual trade and intercourse surpasses, on both 
 sides, those which they possess with any other nation. 
 
 We shall only refer to another pretext for a war with Eng- 
 land standing under the present class, which is, that an alliance 
 with France will be useful iov preserving Louisiana. But sure- 
 ly this is making Louisiana moi'e important than our liberty and 
 our general prosperity, if it be true (as we think has been prov- 
 ed) that these will be endangered by a connection with Bona- 
 parte. Louisiana, however, is in itself a very insecure posses- 
 sion. Nocture forbids our holding it for any long period, unless 
 by force of arms, or a display of greater wisdom and virtue than 
 has been seen under our present confederation. The Missis- 
 sippi waters belong to a territory larger than the old portion o; 
 the United States ; the inhabitants of which, having their owi> 
 interests, which are separate from ours, must in the end be gov- 
 erned by themselves ; and it is within this territory and its de- 
 pendencies that Louisiana stands included. Besides, France and 
 Spain are against our having any share in the Mississippi terri 
 tory, or in the great and important systems connected with it. 
 Not only gold and silver mines, together with many colonist^ 
 who may e:.sily be excited to desii'e independence, lie to the 
 Avestward and southward of this great tract of country (iu all 
 which France feels a close interest j) but a fertile climate ren- 
 ders the unequal soil of this territory as good, upon an average. 
 as that of the best lands situated to the north. Louisiana ron 
 
no 
 
 tains in its southern district the only fierfect colony for certain 
 West India productions, yet known to have connection with the 
 altantic seas ; because lumber and provisions, with white inhab- 
 itants for its defence, are all to be fouid clo.-;? at hand. A naval 
 power also, like France or Spain, can lor a iontjtifne control the 
 trade of Louisiana ; for notwithstanding this country is of immense 
 extent, and is watered with many navigable streams, yet its whole 
 access to the sea is through the Mississippi. These are facts 
 well known in Europe, and our own declarations on the subject 
 have more and more established a belief in them. It is a discredit 
 to us however to be any longer deceived respecting the footing on 
 which we stand as to Louisiana The sale of it made to us by 
 Bonaparte was a fraud on his side, attended with great political 
 uses. Louisiana Avas by this means put out of the reach of Brit- 
 ish attacks during the war ; and all disputes and jealousies like-' 
 wise respecting the free passage of the Mis-^issippi (which 
 might have led us to seek a connection with England) were 
 prevented. An immense sum of money was received by him at 
 a convenient moment ; and the expense of reimbursing our cit- 
 izens, whom the French had plundered, was in effect thrown 
 upon ourselves ; a part even of this very payment going (as is 
 said) into the hands of his own dependents. This fictitious sale 
 therefore answered a number of purposes to France, if it be 
 said, that the transaction gave us a truce from wur, at a time 
 when even war itself could not have procured a permanent 
 peace, this is to confess that we bought tranquillity, rather than 
 territory ; and therefore new sacrifices are needless for a bar- 
 gain suspected, from the first, to be insincere on the part of 
 France, Certain it is, that when the governments of Europe 
 shall have a settled peace among themselves, nothing but the 
 sword, always in use and always victorious.) can retain Louisia- 
 na. Bonaparte has many soldiers whom it will cost him little 
 to see hazarded in that quarter Disaffected Americans will 
 render him services on this occasion, and suspected Frenchmen 
 may seek to regain their standing with him by exertions for the 
 same object. Those indeed must be lavish of their confidence, 
 who believe that Bonaparte desires to be true to his bargain, when 
 (by every theory of public law) it can be made void by a war ; 
 so that by threatening war on other grounds, he may persuade 
 or force us to restore Louisiana, as a fresh mode of paying him 
 for a peace. Such transactions are perfectly familiar to him. 
 A few years ago Louisiana was exchanged by him with the king 
 of Spain for Etruria (better known by the name of Tuscany) and 
 yet, in 1809, the king of Spain's daughter was obliged to resign 
 this mock throne of Etruria by his orders ; and if liberties were 
 thus taken against Spain with Etruria, surely they may be taken 
 against us with Louisiana, which was thus declared its equiva- 
 lent. Again ; a few years since, Bonaparte directed the king of 
 Prussia, against his will, to accept of Hanover, as the equivalen.. 
 
Ill 
 
 of certain Prussian provinces which Bonaparte chose to claim ; 
 and having by this means prodv.ced a quarrel between this king 
 and George III. (to whom Hanover belonged) he attacked Prus- 
 sia whom he had thus weakened, in order to add Hanover and 
 other territories to what he had seized already. And here let 
 us observe the contrast of characters. The king of England for- 
 gave the wrong done to him in Hanover, and assisted Prussia in 
 her war. He also (though no treaty existed between us) sent 
 Col. Burr out of the British dominions, because he stood charg- 
 ed with an attempt to stir up a revolt in Louisiana ; while on the 
 other hand Col. Burr at this moment remains protected in Paris. 
 As the ties^of honour therefore are of little account with am- 
 bitious men, it is by an alliance with England rather than France 
 that we must save Louisiana, unless we choose to pay /;er//e^M- 
 al tribute for it to Bonaparte, or think we can hold it by perfietu- 
 al ivar against his consent. Indeed, the very idea of saving 
 Louisiana by courting Bpnaparte, shev/s what opinion his friends 
 in this country have of his sincerity as to treaties. It is need- 
 less consequently to go into any specific objections against our 
 running any hazards to secure the po?session of Louisiana. 
 The dispersion it produces among our people, the difficulty of 
 educating its scattered inhabitants, the danger of civil wars on 
 one side or a relaxed government on the other, the opposition 
 of interests introduced in our national government, the corrup- 
 tion to follow from the disposal of an increased number of pub- 
 lic offices, the misrepresentation of facts usual in remote situa- 
 tions, the delays arising from the immense distances between 
 the different branches of the confederation, the necessity of per- 
 petually shifting the seat of government to follow the centre of 
 population, with the indiscretion of putting any thing at risk by 
 any essential change in our circumstances ; these, with other im- 
 portant considerations, may all be spared the moment we per- 
 ceive that Louisiana is not to remain ivith us. Indeed, the meril 
 of Bonaparte's sagacity in consenting to the sale of this territo- 
 ry would be lost, if it rested in our hands on any other plan, 
 than that of inducing us to make new sacrifices in order to re- 
 tain it. But even this hold must fail when the time shall ar- 
 rive in which both the United States and Louisiana are to be 
 swept away by the same draught of the same net, and cast into 
 the maw of the mighty fisher. Should Bonaparte's power cease 
 by death or otherwise, Spain uutl France on falling into other 
 hands will be bound by none of his bargains ; and we, as having 
 bought of an u,->ur/ierf must lose uur money, or have to fight for 
 Louisiana, with the great m„ss of ioi'cign populatioa in its south- 
 ern aj,id western purts opposed to us. 
 
 Thus then we have examined y^u?- af/rf/^/owa/ arguments for a 
 
 -ivar V. J h Eiigiuad, which may be thouj^lit to regard jiractict and 
 
 nc li/ncs^ nansely, that no danger fiom Bontparte pre- 
 
 . attacking England, thctt dttnger trom Bonaparte never- 
 
112 
 
 theless makes it indispensable to choose him for our patron, that 
 he will be a better ally than England, and that by his alliance 
 Louisiana may be saved to us. 
 
 Among the whole fourteen arguments thus discussed (in ad- 
 dition to that founded on our neutral rights) none appear to have 
 resisted criticism. — Are there personal motives, then, which 
 lead any to desire the war with England, since the public mo- 
 tives for it seem to be thus defective ? We shall affirm nothing 
 positive on this head, but give the following intimation for the 
 government of such, if any there be^ whom motives of this kind 
 can influence. 
 
 Individuals of this description miscalculate greatly, if they 
 count upon receiving gratitude from Bonaparte. Ambitious 
 chiefs think they owe nothing of this sort for services which 
 they purchase ; a love of the treason (as we know) being per' 
 fectly consistent with a hatred of the ti'aitor. Returns from 
 persons of this haughty description are commonly slender and 
 uncertain, even for favours proceeding from a more indepen- 
 dent source. Despots, in truth, are unwilling to hear it pre- 
 tended that they are indebted to any one. The members of the 
 French directory who gave to Bonaparte his high military com- 
 mand in Italy, and the member of the same directory who fa- 
 voured his becoming the ruler over France, enjoy at present 
 neither power nor high honours under him : and the services of 
 the king of Prussia and of the king of Spain, as well as of the 
 Prince of Peace and of M. Schimmelpeninck of Holland, have 
 been recompensed only by wrongs or by neglect. Men in this 
 country therefore who are of far inferior eminence can expect 
 little permament countenance from Bonaparte. If, for example, 
 they have contributed to bring about a revolution in the United 
 States in his favour, they will be suspected of being capable of 
 aiding another revolution against him ; and if they can betray 
 the interests of their country, they may be thought still more 
 likely to betray those of a foreign chief As Bonaparte conse- 
 quently may turn against them, on these or on other accounts, 
 they should consider what means will be left on their side for 
 procuring justice from him, when every claim they can make 
 out against liim is a proof that they deserve the aversion of their 
 countrymen. Inferior instruments will succeed still worse with 
 him than the principal leaders. In the end indeed, none but 
 Frenchmen will be trusted ; of Avhom many, who understand our 
 language will easily persuade Bonaparte, that they understand 
 our manners also sutficiently well to be made his agents here. 
 ■ The best reason however for not confiding in Bonaparte is to 
 be derived from the temper of our onvn countrymen. It must 
 be allowed, indeed, that many among us appear to have lost all 
 love for the liberty of foreign nations, since they rejoice at the 
 conquests of Bonaparte, and deny or else excuse his enormi- 
 ties : aiid devoutly desire the extermination of England, hi? 
 
113 
 
 great opposer. They calmly also hear our government ridi- 
 culed, and make little or no complaint when proposals are ut- 
 tered for changing it into a monarchy ; and see without appar- 
 ent jealousy the infant king Jerome living in state at Baltimore 
 or Washington, where he is protected (strange as the expres- 
 sion may seem) by the /lOTjerJ'ul sile7ice of those who never speak 
 and never are silent without a motive. What is no less re- 
 markable, MANY LOUD PROFESSORS OF RELIGION, who are re- 
 publicans, applaud many in this country, who are wholly with- 
 out religion and morals ; and pray for the success of Roman 
 Catholics or of men, who arc scoffers at religion, in Europe, 
 when these are evidently distressing the great interest of the 
 protestant religion. The danger from the progress of Bonaparte, 
 attending the British subjects Avho are followers of Whitfield, 
 Wesley, Lutlier, Calvin, Penn, and other founders of protestant 
 sects, makes not the slightest impression upon them ; the orily 
 great body of friends which these good American Protestants 
 seem to have in the British dominions, being the Catholics in 
 Ireland ; so completely do the political concerns of this world 
 in their minds outweigh the more serious concerns of the next. 
 But though these and other circumstances are true, they signify 
 but little. A great part of these men, who are now deceived 
 by falsehoods, will, in case the French enter our country, be 
 undeceived by insults and by sufferings, and will separate them- 
 selves from leaders who have abused their confidence. It is 
 then that the American character will be found to include three 
 important particulars. 1. An aversion to arbitrary commrmds, 
 not merely from a love of liberty, but from habits of personal 
 independence. The authority of parents and teachers being 
 commonly feebly exerted among us, this means of subduing or 
 disciplining the temper is weakened ; and, on the other hand, 
 early marriages and the exertions necessary to procure a living 
 give a great sense of individual importance, which increases by 
 the share we have in our own government. 2. Our citizens are 
 remarkably opposed to the payment of taxes, unless where their 
 feelings favour the object for which the taxes are raised. 3. 
 They have a like aversion to military duty, except in their own 
 defence, not because they are wanting in courage, but because 
 they object to the small pay of our soldiery, and to the manners 
 of a military life. When a foreigii master therefore shall re- 
 quire heavy taxes and military duty in foreign parts, wc shall 
 become sensible of our fool-hardiness in supposing that we 
 could be safe while France v/as conquering so many other na- 
 tions ; and we shall perceive tiie necessity, in such a case, of a 
 connection with England to enable us to regain the lost inde- 
 pendence of our nation. Astonishment Vv'ill then arise at the 
 deceptions to which we have submitted ; fjr there are those 
 ' !io !ia\e s;\id that Bonaparte is the friend of freedom, though 
 J 5 
 
114 
 
 he has every where put down representative governments, to 
 substitute the sword, the prison, and restraints on the liberty of 
 the press. They have in particular affirmed that he is the poor 
 man's friend, though his oppression every where makes the poor 
 still poorer, to enable him to pay his troops and enrich his gen- 
 erals, the youthful sons of the poor being in addition carried 
 away (and often in chains) to fight his battles. They have pre- 
 tended also, that he is in like manner the lover of commerce 
 and of neutral rights, though the only evidence which he him- 
 self has chosen to offer on this subject, is, that his present 
 " barbarian-like" destruction of them is his way of securing 
 their future re-establishment. They have also as boldly main- 
 tained that he is a favourer of peace and moderation, though he 
 suddenly made war on Spain, while it was in alliance with him, 
 for the single and avowed object of placing his brother on its 
 throne, and threatened, if Spain did not submit, that he would 
 treat it as a conquered province. In the last place, they have 
 assured us, that he will i-espect his political engagements, 
 though he has violated his promises to Touissaint and to the 
 royal family of Spain, broke the peace of Amiens with England, 
 even between the date of the preliminary and definitive arti- 
 cles, and set aside his own treaty of commerce with America 
 before it was three months old. Such have been the modest, 
 candid assertions of some persons in favour of Bonaparte. He 
 could not be more civilly treated at Paris, and when the popular 
 tide changes, the fact will be remembered and rewarded. 
 
 But as it is time to conclude these Hints^ it will be done by 
 three general observations. Th^Jirst is, that it is by way of suppo- 
 sition only, that we have at any time admitted that Bonaparte 
 will conquer England. Notwithstanding the perpetual cry of 
 wonders as to the military experience, skill, and power of the 
 French, we believe that England can and will resist him, pro- 
 vided she has fair play. England, like France, has her swarms 
 of sharp shooters, her flying artillery, her ordinary land and 
 sea artillery, and her numerous horse and foot soldiers for 
 home defence ; and in India, where alone she has wanted them, 
 she has her corps of guides as an old establishment, with a very 
 large proportion of cavalry ; and she adds to these advantages, 
 a great navy, great trade and revenue, a good cause, and sound, 
 stout British hearts ; and therefore, with the blessing of God, 
 resist Bonaparte she will, in defiance of his favourers in the 
 United States. The second general observation is, that the 
 French nation ought to be distinguished from its unjust rulers ; 
 for it is a very great nation in every point of view, and has been 
 as much wronged by Bonaparte as any other of his subject 
 people. All that has been said therefore of France applies to it 
 only while under ambitious and tyrannical rulers. It must 
 however be confessed, that so many of the French at this time 
 
115 
 
 have become military and fond of glory^ and are so convinced 
 that their country ought to take the lead of all others^ that, for- 
 getting their Fenelons and their Fleurys, they may easily be 
 misled in a manner dangerous for mankind and themselves, un- 
 less something eventful should arise to alter their feelings and 
 opinions. Lastly^ the limitation of the rigiits of neutrals estab- 
 lished in these hints is founded on no love to belligerents. It 
 would be happy if neutrals could always disarm belligerents ; 
 but this not being at this time possible, the question is, How shall 
 nevitrals secure most trade-with least exfience and hazard till 
 the conduct of nations as to wars shall become more just and 
 enlightened ; for as the evil begins there, so m.ust the remedy. 
 Thus have our enquiries come to a close ; and whoever docs 
 not perceive that on many points we have suppressed more than 
 we have written, neither does justice to us nor to our subject 
 
 From the Press of 
 JOHN ELIOT, Jun. 
 
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