/ tr\ / ^> {^ \thbaTIiibune wae tracts, ' HOW BULL EUN BATTLE WAS LOST. THE BALL'S BLUFF MASSACRE. DEPAETMENT OF THE WEST-FEEMONT. BUIili RUN. The Joint Committee on the Condact of the War Buhmit the following report, with accompanying tes- timony, in relation to the Battle of Bull Eun, in July, 1861: So long a time has elapsed, and so many impor- tant events have occurred in the progress of tbe war, since tbe campaign which ended with the bat- tle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your Committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report. The testimony they submit here- with is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that campaign. They therefore sobmit a brief report, confining tlieir attention principally to the causes which kd to the defeat of our army in that battle. That which now appears to have been tbe great error of that campaign was the failure to occupy Ceatreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled tbe railroad communication in all that section of country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collect- ed and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months men could have made the place eas)ly defensible against j^ny force tbe enemy could have brought against it; and it is not at all probable that the Rebel forces would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops. The next cause of disaster was the delay ia pro- ceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was so nearly expired. In that respect the movement was made too late rather tbaa loo soon, and the enemy were a lowed lime to col- lect thiir forces at Manassas and to strengthen the position by defensive works. The reason why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to Bome extent, by the testimony, to which 7our Com- mittee would direct the attention of those who de- sire to examine that point. And when the movement was finally decided upon, much was needed to render the troops efficient. There had been but little time devoted to discipin- ing the troops and instructing them, even as regi- 'ments; hardly any instruction had been given them in reference lo brigade movement, and none at all as divisions. When Gen. McDowell reviewed eight regiments together — the only instance previous to the battle, as the evidence shows, that even that number ot troops were maneuvered in one body — lie was charged witi deeiring to make a show. Gen. AlcDowell was iustrucled, verbally, by Gen. Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of opeiaiions against tbe enemy at Manassas. This plan was con- siuered in Cabinet meeting, and agreed to; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by Gen. Scott as the day whentne army should move. The plan of Geu. McDowell was to move out ia the direction of Centreville, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and destroy bis communicaoion by railroad with Rich- mond. He asked that a certain number of troops be giv«a itiia, to ojperate against the force wbica it was estimated that EeatiTCgard had nnrleT his comttand. He was assuied that the enemy below should be kept occupied by Gen. Butler, wno was ia command at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under Jobnstoa, in the Winchester Valley, should be held there by Gen. Patterson. Some cays before the battle, upon expreesing some fears in regard to the force under Jollnston being detiiiued by Patterson, be was assured by Gen. iScott tliut " \f Johnston joined Beauregard', he slioald nave Patterson on hia iieels." The movement did not commence until the 16tli of July, a week later tban the- time first decided upon. The transportation was deficient, and Gen. Mc- Dowell bad to depend upon others to see that sup- plies were forwarded to him in time. Tlie marcii was slow, one reason being that, tince the afi'airat Vienna, near Alexandiia, and at Big Bsthel, near Fortress Monroe, a fear of f masked batteries " caused hesitation in regard to advancing upon points concerning which there was a want of inibrmation. There was some delay, on the march, m cousequtnce of the want of comyiete discipJine among some of the troops. They were not suiiicieutly under con- trol of olfieers to be pte»euted from leaving the raake ami straggling. The arfair at Blackburn's Ford on Tbnrsdny, the 18th, being more extem-ive than Gen. JUcDowell had ordered, drew the atteution of the enemy to tliat point; and, in consequence of the preparilions they made there to meet any attempt of Gen. Me-j Doweil to turn their position in that direciion, it became necessary to adopt another line of opera- tions. Gen. McDowell oeterujiued to make the at- tempt to turn their risiht;, and steps were taken to secure the necessary information. It was not until Saturday that tbe information which Geu. McDow- ell desired was obtained. He then issued orders for the troops to move the next morning, the 21st. some at 2 o'clock and 80m» at half-past is. Tbe division of Gen. Tyler was itt the advance, and was ordered to proceed directly out to Stone Bridge, and take up position there. Geu. Hunter's and Gen. Ileintzeluiau's divisions were to follow, and when they reached a road lead- ing to tbe rifebt, aljout a mile in advance of Gen. T^ler s camp, they wtre to lurn otf and proceed in the direction of fciudlKy s Church, and eujeavor to tarn the enemy's leit. The movement to the right was intended to be m^.ile under cover of Gen. 'A'y- iei's force at Si one Biiuge. But there was mncii delay in tbe movements of the troops that mornirjg. Tj;ler's (livjiiiou did m't pass the poiut, whera Hunter's ana Keintzp'-" divisions w^re to turn otf, until after th'- nated. Some of the trooris were de^ - hours, affording time to the enemygg^.- moveaieiit and make preparaiioCs Iv-nUitti Notwithstanding these disauvantagts, were sufcjssfal curing the fore part ot ' though Beauregard bad bee i re-cniorcer Johnston's forces from Winchester, were very muca fatigued. Tha cay wf warm, the roads were daety, and 1 8ome hours longer on the march tba ticipated. lu the afternoou additir mentB arrived from Jolmeton's army, and enddeoly Attacked our right and threw it into disorder. About the eame time two of our batteries (Eick- ett'8 and Griffin's) were captured by the enemy, and our entire force began to fall back in great confus- ion. In regard to the capture of the batteries, it appeals by the testimony that they were ordered to take an advanced and exposed position, and were not sufficiently supported. Not long after they were placed in position, a Rebel regiment appeared in their immediate vicinity. Capt. Griffin slates that he took them to be Rebels from the first, and directed one of his lieutenants to open upon them \Fith canister. But Major Barry, Chief of Artillery, coming up just at the time, told him that they were some of oar own troops coming to the support of the batteries, find directed him not to fire upon- them. The battery was accordingly turned in another di- rection, an3, almost immediately after, this regiment of the enemy opened fire upon it, disabling the horses, and killing and wounding most of the men at the guns. That completed the discomfiture of our troops, and the day which bad opened upon our buc- GOSB closed upon a defeated and retreating army. A division, under Col. Miles, had been stationed Bt Centreville, partly for the purpose of a reserve, and partlj»to guard against any flank attack. The enemy did attempt a movement upon our left, but ■were promptly met and checkad by our forces there. The principal cauee of the defeat on that day was the failure of Gen. Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah. He had a force of about 23,000 men ; while the force of the enemy opposed to him, according to the beet evi- dence your Committee could obtain, did not exceed from 12,000 to i,'i,<'iOO men. Gen. Patterson testifial that he -w»t satisfied thiwit, Johnston had from 35,000 to 40,000 men, and over tO ^i uns. He also states that a large number of his troops wGre anxious to return home; that their time had about expired, ar"l he could not persuade tbem to remain. There is considerable testimony to show that the troops be- came dissatisfied, and refused to remain, only when they learned that their movement' from Bunker Hill on the 17th of July was a retreat, and not an ad- vance upon the enemy; that while they supposed they were beiug led to the attack, little, if 'any, complaint was mcide, and they were in excellent ^ upiritB, In reference to the orders given to Gen. Patter- son, and the obiect to be accoaiphshed by his opera- tions, there seems to be no question. That object was to prevent Johnston from joining Beauregard before Gen. McDowell could have an opportunity to attack the forces under the latter. The character of the orders is indicated by the following telegram of the 13th of July (Satnrdayj from Gen. Scott to Gen. Patt^aon : I telegraphed yon yesterday, if Jiot strong enough to beat the enemy oaily uoxt week, make demonatiationa 60 as to de- tain him ia the valley of VViiichestor. But if he retreais in force toward Mauassas, and it be liazaraouB to follow liim, then consider the route via Keyes's Ferry, Leesburg, tc. Gen. Scott had, the day before, conveyed to Gen. Patterson the intimation that Gen. McDowell would commence hia movement on the 16th ol July, and on the 15th Gen. Patterson advanced from Martinabtirg to Bunker Hill, remaining there the 16th. On the 17tJi Gen. Scott telegraphs to Gen. Patter- sou: I have nothiD? official from yon since Sunday, but am glad to lesm from Philadelphia papers that you have advanced. Do jjoHet the enemy amuse and delay yoa with a small force iu "bije he re-enforces the Junction with Ms main body. first day's work has driven the enemy beyond •House. The Junction will probably be carried is no evidence at what time that dispatch ved. Bui, it could not have been received movement from Bunker Hill to Charles- nade by Gen. Patterson, for that move- 'mced very early in tne morning of the e of the dispatch: h Gen. Scott telegraphs: 'y been expecting you to beat the enemy. If i felt him :itron2ly, or at least had occupied d domonetratious. You have been at least ippp8», bis sgpetjor in numbsj. H»» be pot (tolen a march, and sent r«-enforcementi toward MaUMsaa Junction? A week is euough to win a victory. To this Gen. Patterson repUes on the same day: The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissanco in force, caused him to be le-euforced. Gen Patterson testifies as follows: Qneetion. During all this time you knew that Gen. Scott expected of you that you should either engage and beat John- ston, or detain him in the valley of Winchester ; or in the event that he should come down by a route where you conld not foUo w him, that you sbouid toilow him via Keyes's Ferry and Leesburg ? Answer. Yes, Sir. Question. And yet, when yon were at Cbarlestown, yon found yourself not in a condition to do either. Now, my question la: Why did vou not communicate that fact to Oen. Scott? Answer. There was no occasion for it, in my judgment. He knew my condition, and to have added to the information he already had would have been a waste of time and paper. I had informed him of my condition, and it was his business to order me what to do. I had asked him : " Shall I attack V It was not my business to say anything beyond that. When asked if the telegram of the 18th, Irom Gen. Scott, did not show tbat he still deemed it waa of the first importance that he (Patterson) should de- tain Johnston there, Gen. Patterson replies: I looked upon that telegraph, and so did every gentleman npon my staff, as nothing more nor less than an exhibition of bad temper. ^. Gen. Patterson also testifies: Question. You say you could have attacked on the 18tb if ordered to do so. You knew the necessity of detaining John- ston, and you must have inferred from the telegraph of Gen. Scott that he expected or required of you that you should do something in that direction. Why did you not do all that you could to detain him without an order ? Answer. Because 1 coul Poolesville, Oct. 20, 1861— 10§ p. m. 5 Special Order, No. — .—Col. Devens will land opposite Harrison's Island with five companies of his regiment, and proceed to surprise the eamp of the enemy discovered by Capt. Philbrick, in the direction of Leesburg. The l&cding and march will be effoctsd with silence and rapidity. Col. Lee, 20th Massachusetts Volunteers will, immediataly after Col. Devens's departure, occupy Harrison's Island wit^ four companies of his regiment, and will cause the four-oareS^ boat to ba taken across the island to the point of departure of Col. Dsvens. One company will be thrown across to occnpy the hights on the Virginia shore, afier Col. Deveos'i depart. ure, to cover his return. Two mountain howitzers will he taken silently up the tow- path and carried to the opposite aids of tbe island, under the orders of Col. Lee, Col. Devens will attack the camp of th« enemy at daybreak, and, having routed, will pursue them as far as he deems pru- dent, and will destroy tlie camp, if practicable, before returning. He will make all the observations possible on the country ; will, under all circnmstances, keep his command well in band. »ud not saciifice tbam to any supposed advant. age of rapid pursuit. Having accomplished this duty. Col. Devens will rfttnm to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until le-enforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In such case he will hold on and report. CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-GeneraL Great care will be used by Col. Devens to prevent any unnecessary injury of private property; and any officer or soldier straggling from the command for curiosity or plunder ' will bs iuitautly shot. OH AS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General. Col. Devens commenced crossing bis force between 12 and 1 o'clock at night, and about 4 o'clock J morning had crossed his five companiea. He pro- ceeded up the bluff and formed his command on the top of the bluff and remained there until it was light enough to find his way. Col. Lee also crossed with about 100 men, and took position upon the bluff. Col. Devens sent out scouts to the right and left, who reported that they could find no enemy. At the first dawn of" light. Col. Devens moved hia command out in the direction of the supposed c^mp. Upon reaching the pohit to which the reconnoiterinfif party of the nigbt before had proceeded, it was dis- covered tbat wliat bad bceo faben for a camp was a single low of trees, the dim li^ht of the moou ehining between tbem, below the branches, presenting the appearance of a row of tenta. ''^ Col. Devens had advanced with his force to within about a mile of Leesburg; he halted his men there, and proceeded to examine the coantry about his positioa as far as practicable. He eent word to Gen. Stone that there had been a mistake about the camp of the enemy ; that he was well posted in a wood and concealed, and waited further orders. Not far from 7 o'clock in the moruing a body of Kebel riflemen was discovered to the right of Col. Devens's position, in the direction of Conrad's Ferry; Capt. Pbilbrick with his company advanced toward tbciii, when they fell back until they reached a ditch, under cover of which they halted and openfed fire upon our men; they were soon driven out of the ditch into a corn-field where they ob- tained cover behind some stacks of corn. Another company was ordered by Col. Devens to the support of Capt. Philbrick; but before they reached mm some of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance from the direction of Leesburg. The two com- panies were then ordered to fail back to the main body. About 8 o'clock Col. Devena determined to fall back to the bluff, where Col. Lee was, which was done in perfect order. He then reconnoitered the woods to his right and left, and discovering no ap- pearance of the enemy, moved forward to hjs former position. Between 8 and 9 o'clock the messenger of Col. Devens returned from Gen. Stone with lustruct'ons to him to remain where he was, and he would be supported. Col. Devens testifies that it was either ' then or soon after that he was told that Col. Baker was to come over and take command. He sent word to Gen. Stone that he was discovered by the enemy, but could still hold his old jiosition. About 10 o'clock the messenger returned with this message: *' Very well; Col. Baker will come and lake coja- mand." Col. Devens states that while awaiting^urther in- strnctions he directed his adjutant to abcertuin tbe amount of the force with him ; the report was 28 officers and 625 men. He eent once or twice to the river to ascertain if re-enfoicemeuts were coming, and what he was to do, but he received no further order or message. About 12 or 1 o'clock an attack was made upon ffuoh Devenb's rforce, which las'.ed some 10 or 15 minutes. Receiving no orders or message from the river, he fell back about 60 yards, reformed his line and made dispositions to retire still fui ther if ueces- eary. And in perhaps an hour he fell back to the field just in front of tue bluff, where the main action afterward took place. There he met Col. Baker, who congralulated him upon the manner in whicli bis men had conducted themselves. In relation to the orders to Col. Baker, Gen, Stone testifies: I can give you all the early orders to Col. Bater. I sent him •n order, about midnight on the 2CUi, to seijd the California Regiaieut to Conind's Ferry, aud have tliem there at day- break, to awult orders there ; to have the re- mainder of his brigade roused early ; have a comiurcable hreakfaat, and be in readiness to move at 7 o'clock in the moniiD?. Late in the night — it might have been between 2 and J o'clock in toe morLi^g — I Bent a cautionary order to Col. Baker, knowing that voluntsers make too much uoibr sometimes, to have that regiment niarcti with silence and vvitU unloaded guus. i<'i'om that time I ieot him no order. • Gen. Stone testifies that between 8 and Oj o'clock, when Col. Baker was with him, and they had dis- cuEseci the whole matter for some time, he save him s written order to take the entire command of the jight at Ball's Bluff. That order, witli a communi- cation from Gen. Stone to Col. Baker, sent some lime later, was found upon his body after he was killed. The two papers are as follows: " HEABQUAKTERS COKPS OP Observatiost. \ . •• Edwabds's Fkkey. Oct. 2i. 1851. J " Cot-ONEL: In Cise ol^eavy iijins; in front of Harrison's Island you v.ill advacce the Cahfornia regiment of your brigade, or retire the rtgimenls under Cols. Lee and Devena now on the Virciaia side of the river, at your diacietioa, as- •liming command on arrival. " Verv respec'fnl'V, Comoei, your most obedient servant, "'CHaKLES p. STOXlL, Bii^r.Geo. <;omiaaudiug. " Ccl. £. D. BaksKi CofiuuouiUug jBrisade." " Ebadqtjartbxr CoBPg OF Obskrvahow, > " liDWARDs'g Fbrrt, Oct. 22. 1861—11:50. 5 " CotoNEl: I am informed that the force of the enemy ll about 4.000, all told. If you can push them you may do so, BS far ea to have a strong position near Leesburg. if you can keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If they pass Leesburg, and take the Gum Spring Road, you will not follo<7 far, but seize the first jood position to cover that road. Their design is to draw us ou, if ttey are oblieed to retreat, as far as Goose Creek, where they can be re-enforced from Maneaaas and have a strong position. " Report frequently, so that when they are pushed Oorman can come in on their flank. " Yours respectfully and truly, " CHARLES p. STONE. Brig.-Gen. Commanding. " Col. £. D. Bakeb, Commanding Brigade." Col. Baker proceeded to Harrison's Island, and finally concluded to send over troops to re-enforce Col. Devens and Col. Lee. One of the witnesses states that Col. Baker was in doubt for a time whether to recall the troops already over, or to re- enforce them; but, upon hearing some one on the Virginia shore call out that they needed assistance, as the enemy were coming, he determined to re- enforce tbem, and proceeded himself to the Virgjinia side, and assumed command. Col. Baker directed the forces to cross at the point where Col. Devens and Col. Lse had crossed with their forces. The means of transporting troops at Ball's Bluff was exceedingly limited. Between the Maryland shore and Harrison's Island were only thr<.e flat- boats or scows, all together capable of cross^ing about 125 men at a time. On the Virginia si^e of the island there were at first only a Francis metallic life-boat and two small skiffs, together incapable of carrymg from 25 to 30 men at a time. Alter a time, one of the scows, or flatboats, was takeu from the Marj« land to tbe Virginia side of the island. The landing on the Virginia side was at the foot of a very steep bluff, up which a narrow path, wid- ening toward the top, wound its way; and on the top of the bluff was a cleared space or field, bor- dered by woods, which afforded a cover to tbe enemy until within a short distance of where our troops were formed. Col. Baker, according to the testimony, arrived on the field betw^een 1 and 2 o'clock, and proceeded at once to form a line of battle upon the field at the top of the bluff. Tbe amount of the force engaged upon our side was between 1,700 and 1,800 men, consisting of about one half of the 15th Massachu- setts Eegiment, under Col. Devens; a portion (317 men) of toe 20th Maesachusetts, under Col. Lee; the Tammany Refiiment, under Col. Cogswell; and the California llegiment, under Lient.-Col. Wiatar. The enemy's forces were about 4,000 men. The enemy began the attack — some of the wit- nesses say between 2 and 3 o'clock, others at 3 o'clock — at first heavily, on the right of our line, then moving along toward the center and left, where tbe hardest fighting took place. Your Committee do not deem it necessary to go into tbe details of the action. It continued for over two hours, our troops contending most bravely a.eainst greatly superior numbers. Col. Baker fell between 4 and 5 o clock, having been most couspic- nous for his bravery aud almost recKless daring. When he fell the line began to waver, and some por- tions of it gave way before the destructive fiie of the enemv. After the death of Col. Baker, the command de- volved upon Col. Cogswell of the Tammany K«rgi- ment, who proposed to attempt to cut through to Edwards's Ferry, which was assented to by the other regimental commanders. Upon attempting a movement in that direction, they were met by a Mississippi regiment coming from below, which opened a must destructive fire upon them. Our troops gave way, and retreated down tbe bluff toward the river. This was about dusk, so that oiur troops were somewhat concealed by the bushes on the side of tbe bluff. The enemy continued to fire upon them from the top of the bluff. The men at- tempted to escape to the island in the boats and by ewimming, being exposed all the time to the fire of the enemy. The flat-boat was soon riddled and sunk, th« life-boat drifted down the stream, and the skiffs were lost. Many were shot while in the water; others suceeededinswimoiingto the island; ■ome few, under cover of the darkness, siicceeded in esoaping aloDg the bank of the river, and finally reached our lines. But the greater portion were killed or taken prisoners. In relation to the operations at Edwards's Ferry, under the supervisiou of Gen, Stone and the imme- diate command of Gen. Gorman, as there was no serious fighting there, it may not be necessary to go much into detail. The crossing was commenced abont daybreak by the forces under Col. Dana of the 1st Minnesota Regiment, and was continued until some 2,500 men were crossed over that day. The means of crossing were very limited, a6 at Har- rison's Landing, consisting of tbreo or four flat-boats or Bcows, propelled acroes by poles. The place of lauding was very good, and covered by our artillery on the Maryland side. There were no important demonstrations made by our forces on tbe Virginia side of Edwards's Ferry. Some rebonnoiseances were made tor a short distance, and one regiment of the enemy seen, probably the Mississippi regiment that arrived on the field at Ball's Bluff, near the close of the action there. Gen. McCall's division had remained at Draines- ville all ot Sunday and Sunday night. Gen. Mc- Call testifies : " At 6 o'clock on Monday morning I reported to him (Gen. McClellan) that the engineers whom I haa consulted reported to me that they would finish their work in two hours. I Bent that express to Gen. McCleildU at 6 o'clock, and got his reply, dated 8 o'cIock, telling me to return aa soon as the work was finished. I got bis answer between 9 and 10 o'clock. I oi- dercd the troops then to be ready to move, and as aoon as the work was hoished 1 returned to my camp under ordere." Both Gen. McClellan and Gen. McCall testify that tbe movement to Drainesville was for the pur- pose of reconnoitering the country in that direction. But Gen. Stone received no intimation of the object of the movement. On the contrary, the language of the dispatch of Sunday might well lead him to be- lieve that the movement had reference to driving the enemy from Leesburg. The dispatch contained no intimation that Gen. McCall was to be soon withdrawn from Drainesville. He was directed " to keep a good lookout upon Leesburg to see if this movement has the effect to drive them (the ene- my) away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effecc to move them." Gen. Stone made demonstrations both at Edwards's Ferry and at Ball's Bluff, and promptly notified Gen. Mc- Clellan of what he had done. He sent that inform- ation on Sunday night, and he testifies that he re- ceived no ifltiuiation from Gen. McClellan as to what he should do, whether to continue the demon- strations or not; and received no intimation that Gen. McCall was not close at hand to come to his assistance until about 11 o'clock on Monday night. It was a very general impression ayiong the officers and men at Edwards's Ferry during Monday 'that Gen. McCall would come to their assistance; and Gen. Stone testifies that he cautioned his artillery about firing upon any troops that might show them- selves in that direction, lest they might lire upon our ovrn forces. lu regard to that matter, Gen. McClellan testifies as follows: •' Question. Do you remember whether or not you informed bim (Gen. Stone) of the withdrawal of Smith and McCall to their former positions? " AusW'-r. 1 tnink I did," Gen. Stone (FeD. '27, 1863), after stating that upon hearing of the death of Col. Bviker he proceeded to Bali's Bluff, where he learned the full extent of the disaster, and at once determined to withdraw the troops at Edwards's Ferry, testifies as follows: " And then, kDowicg that 1 could go niyf elf quicker than anybody I could send, I turned ray horse and galloped down to withdraw my troops at Edwards's Kerry Duck to me Mary- land ehoie. I supposed at that time that I had about 2,5U0 njen across the river; and tiie reports 1 had heard oppasito Ball's Biutf were that the enemy had been lari^ely re-enforced, and they were then about 10,0(10 strong. I saw that there was great dauger of Gorman bolne overwhelmed at Edwards's Ferry. I did not know whether McCall would be there to as- bist him or not. 1 was in utter ignorance iu reference to him or bis position. " 1 at cnco commenced retiring my troops as quietly but as rapidly as 1 could, taking the precaution to have my artillery. on the Maryland side so placed as to cover the troops on the Vii'giiiia side. The ground on tbo Maryland shore comicjinii* perfectly the ground on tbe Virginia shore, >nd it would be aa exceedingly dangerouB thing for troops to advance and attac): any body of men on the Virginia shore, directly at Edwards'* Ferry, wljile the Maryland shore was well held by artillery. Tiie moment 1 had given the order for the retiring of those troops, I reported by telegitfph to Gen. McClellao, at Wash- ington that we had met with a repuUe on our right but I was doing the best I could to secure the left, and to retrieve. I am not quite sure now whether 1 telegraphed to Gen. Mc- Clellan, before I went up to Harriiou's Island, that Col, Ba- ker had been killed, or whether I put thit in the same dis- patch in which I informed him of the reunlse. Having sent that information to Gen. McClellan, I con- tinued withdrawing the troops, watching caretuUy, so aa to use the artillery for their protection if necrssary. After some time— I cannot tell hotv long, for one takes but little note of time under such circumstances, but apparently aa socn as a mesiage coald go to Washington and an answer be returned (being carried by a courier on horseback four milea each way from the telegraph station to Edwards's Ferry)— I received orders from Gen. McClellan to this effect; "Hold all the ground you now have on the Virginia shore if your men will fight, intrenching, if n»ce^sary. You will be re- enforced." Perhaps the words "if your men will fight" came before the rest of the dispatch; and my impression is, though I will not be positive, that the words " at all hazards" were used in the dlrecUon to hold all the ground on the Vir* ginia shore. I am sorry that I have not possession of a single paper, tel- egraph or otherwise, of the records connected with my di- vision. You know the way in which I was removed from my command. I was ordered to report myself here, in Wash- ington, at once ; and having not the slightest suspicion of why I was required here. I left all my papers as I would have done had I been going out for a two nour»' ride; and from that time to this I have never seen a single paper of any kind I then left behind me. I make this explanation to show why it is that I cannot speak posirively about the language of dis- patches received and sent ; why I canuot, perhaps, give their exact words. I saw all the danger in which my troops were on the Vir- ginia side, but 1 supposed at that time that Gen. McCall was very near there, and I took it for granted when Gen. McClel- lan telegraphed me to hold my position on the Virginia side at 'all liaziir is, and that I should be re-enforced, that be had the means of immediatelv securing me. I cannot state positively when it was that I telegraphed to Gen. Banks. F.ut my impression now is that just as 1 started to go up to Ball's Bluff, when the news of Col. Baker's death reached me, I telegraphed to Gen. Banks, requesting him to send up a brigade. When I got to Harrison's Island, and be- fore I returned to Edwards's Ferry, I dispatched a messenger to meet whatever brigade Gen. Banks might send, and con- duct it to Conrad's Ferry, instead of to Edwards's Ferry, from which my dispatch to Gen. Banks was sent. And my lnip_re6sion is that when 1 returned to Edwards's Ferry, and ti-legranhed to Gen. McClellan the fact of the re- pulse at Ball's Bluff, I sent another telegram to Gen, Banks that he had better brins up his whole division. I know 1 sent Gen. Banks such a telegram ; but at what time X will not be positive. Some time was lost in communicating with Gen. McClel- lan, by my receiving a dispatch, in cipher, of which I had not the key, from him or from his Chief of Staff. What the con- tents of that dispatch were, I have never learned. I iaime- diately responded to it : "I have received the box, but have no key." What that dispatch was, I have no knowledge of whatever; but I presume that the dispatches which came af- terward covered the same ground. I cannot sate now. after so long 6fn interval of time, at what hour I telegraphed to Gen. McClellan. urging that the re- enfurcements should be sent to Goose Creek, on the Virginia side, supposing all the time that Gen. McCall was not far off. The response to tliat, which I thick I received about 11 o'clock on Monday night, was the first intimation I ever re- ceived toat McCall had not all the time been near me. That dispatch informed me that no reenforcemeuts could reach ma from the Virginia side, but that Gen. BmjkB would reeuforce me from the Maryland side. Question. Uow far was Gen. Banks from you ? Answer. He was about 14 miles in my rear. Question. Did that first dispatch from Gen. McClellan, promising you reeuforcements, contemplate that they should come from Gen. Banks'? Answer. Yes, Sir, I suppose so; but at the time my idea was that McCall was close by me. And I was led into sa error, late in the evening, by receiving a dispatch frem Gen. McClellau's headquarters, whether signed by him or his chief of staff, I do not now recollect, asking me if there was a road from " Darnesville " to Edwards's Ferry. Now, there is no snch place as " Darnesville;" but ther2_Ja_^ " Drainesville." And havinj in my mind that McCiilwas at Diainesville, I took it for granted that the operator had made a mistake, and had meant Drainesville instead of "Darnes- town," which was the name of a place in Maryland, and which proved to bo the place meant. I replied to that dis- patch to tbe best of my rwcollection, that there was a good road from Drainesville to Edwards's Ferry. I presume that that caused some misconception at Iieridquarters, because they undoubtedly had "Darnestown" in their minds when they telegraphed "Darnesville;" just as I had " Draiues- yille" in my mind when 1 saw " Darnesville" in the dis- patch. But that is not very important, only to show how errors will creep in. 1 think that by this statement I must remove any unpleas- ant impression with retard to my improperly exposing troops to disaster at Edwards's Fert^, since I acced under the in- BttnctioBfof my inperioroffieer; andalaoundei: the Impres- eion that oar force* under Geo. McCall were near us on the Vir£inia side of Edwards's Ferry. Question. How happened it that you failed to make this ■tatement, concerning those orders, on your former examina- tion? Answer. Because I did not deem it proper to give any of the orders of my superior officer which he had not himself previously published or authorized me to use. The morning that I came before your Committee I was inatrncted at Gen. McClellau's headquarters that it was the desire of the General that officers giving testimony before the Committee should not state, without his authority, anything regarding his plans, his orders for the movements of troops, or his orders concern- ing the position of troops. That covered this case. Question. Did you understand that to apply to past orders and tranaactions as well as those to be executed in the future ? Answer. I did ; because I could not know, and did not know, what orders to others were given coteojporaneous with those I received, and I might create wrong impressions by giving the orders I had received from my commanding General, unless there were at the same time produced cotem- poraneous orders given to other Generals. And 1 presume that the Chairman will remember that I stited, when giving my testimony^before, that I could not give any orders from my commanding General except such as he himself had made public. Question. Did Gen. McClellan approve of the crossing at Edwards's Ferry end Ball's Bluft', on the 2l6t of October, 1861 ? Answer. I received a dispatch from Gen. McClellan in reply to onn which I had sent him, informing him of the crossing of Gen. Gorman and Col. £ater. That dispatch to me commeuced with these words: " I congratulate you and your command." I took that congratulation, on the fact of lay having ciossed. as an approval of the crossing; and as I had received no information whatever concerning Gen. Mc- Call, iu my own mind I supposed tiiat it was but a simple thiug of Gen. McClellan in connection with any other move- ments he might be making. Question Was Gen. McClellan informed of your means of traueportation for crossing troops ? Answer. Some time during the day— and I think it was in the same dispatch in which he atfced me for inlormatiou of the enemy, and 1 shonld think that that dispatch must have* reached nie about noon — Gen. McClellan asked what means of transportation I had. I replied to him by telegraph, slat- ing the number and character of the boats at each crossing — at Edwards's Ferry and at Harrison's Island. Gen. McClellan testifies ia reference to the cross- ing of Gea. Stone's forces into Virginia: I have no recollection of any order which justified the pas- sage uf the tiTer in force. I am sare that I had no inten- tion that he should do that. , The events that occnrred subsequently to the operations of Monday— the arrival of Gen. Banks with hia forces, the arrival of Gen. McClellan, and the final withdrawal of all our forces to the Maryland side of the river — are fully set forth in the teetioiouy herewith submitted, and your Com'Jiittee do not deem any comments by them to be necessary. In connection with the battle of Ball's Bluff, two points remain to be considered: I'irst, whether a croesiog was jusiifiable nnder any circumstances, considering the very insufficient means of transporta- tion at the command of Gen. Stone. Second, whether the forces under Col. Baker could, and should, have been, reenforced from the Virginia side of Euward'a Ferry, when it was known tbat the troops under his command were engaged with the enemy. In regard to tbe first point, all tbe testimony goes t© prove that the means of transportation were very inadequate. The testimony of Gen. Stone would eeem to indicate that, while he was inclined to deem it suflicient, under what he nnderetood to be the cir- cumstances under which tbe movement was made, he left much to tbe judgment of others; and this much can be said for him, that he received no inti- mation that a movement across the river would be expected from him, or would be justified, until the day before (Sunday) it was actually made. And the ' "TgSSDirt-iuai he had for supposing that other forces were within a short distance to render him assistance are set forth in the previous portion of this report. In reference to re-enforcing Col. Baker, the testi- mony is very conflicting. There is no question that it was known that the forces at Ball's Blulf were engaged with the enemy. The firing or musketry was distinctly heard »t Edward.s's Ferry, on both sides of the river. The only question is wneiher re- enforcements should have been sent under the cir- cumstances, and wnether there was any sufiicient reason whv they were not eent. Gen. Stoue testi- fies tliat he received no intimation irom Col. Baker that he needed re-enforcemeals; that he received lit- tle, if any, information from Col. Baker in refer- ence to the condition and progress of afFaira at BaU'B Blufi'; and he also testifies that, even if re-enforce- ments had been needed, they could not have been sent up on tbe Virginia side; that the enemy had earthworks and batteries between Edwards's Perry and Ball's Bluff, which would have made- it ex- tremely hazardous, if not impossible, to have sent any re -enforcements by that route. Some of the other witnesses testify to the same effect. Others testify most positively that, so far as they were able to judge, there was no obstacle whatever in the way of ourtroope passing up on the Virginia side from Ed- wards's Ferry. It cannot be denied that had re-enforcements promptly arrived at Ball's Blviff from Edwards's Perry, the result of the battle there would, in all probability, have been greatly to our advanta£;e, instead 'of being a most melancholy disaster. The evidence is so veiy contradictory that your Commit- tee retrain from expressing any positive opinion upon that point, but allow each one to form his own conclui-ion from the testimony they have been able to obtain. One other subject remains to be considered before closing this report — the arrest and imprisonment of Gen. Stone. Your Comroittee would bave made no reference to that subject, but have submitted the testimony without comment upon their part, had it not been for tbe efforts that have been made by many to hold them responsible for all that has taken place in reference to the arrest of Gen. Stone. In the course of their investigation concerning the causes of tbe disaster at Ball's BluiF they obtained •testimony, most unexpectedly to them all, which,' without explanation, seemed to impeach the military capacity and the loyalty of Gen. Stone. That testi- mony, as in every other instance that they deemed of iniDorlance, was brought to the attention of the proper authorities here, and the War Department was informed that, in the opinion of the Committee, a prompt investigation should be instituted. First, Secretary Cameron, and afterward Secretary Stan- ton, were informed that the testimony before your Committee was of such a character that some ex- planation by Gen. Stone was required. Gen. Stoue was called to this city, and on the 3lBt of Janudry, 1862, appeared :hefore your Committee, at thj instance of Gfen. McClellan, and stated that he had been informed that certain testimony before this Committee affected him in such a way as to require his explanation. He was informed that tbere was testimony which might appear to impeach his conduct in the Ball's Bluff ■ affair ; to show that he had had undue inter- course with the enemy, both by letter and by per- sonal intercourse with their officers; and also that he had permitted the enemy to erect formidable for- tifications and batteries within reach of his guns, and which he could have prevented. The statement was made in general terms to Gen. Stone, and with- out ir.dicatmg who were the witnesses who had tes- tified, in order that they should not be called to ac- count by their commanding general for statements made before a commit; ee of Congress. In reply to this general statement upon the part of your Committee Gen. Stone proceeded to make an explanation in general terms. ' They then reported to the Secretary of War that the testimony upon the points to which his attention had been called was conflicting. They made no recommendation as to what should be done, one way or the other; merely reported to him that tbe testimony was conflicting. Not long afterward they learned through the press that Gen. Stone had been arrested, and sent to Fort Lafayette. The immediate cause of his arrest they did not know. Thev were satisfieid that tbe informa- tion which they had furnished to the department had in all probability furnished some of the grounds upon which his arrest had been made; but they did not learn until more than a year afteward what was the immediate cause of his arrest at the time it was made. Gen. Stone was arrested on the 8th of February, 1862. On the 28th of February, 1863, Gen. Mc- Clellan testified before your Committee as follows; About ten days or two weeks before Gen. Stone was actually arrested, the Secretary of War gave me a written order to ar- rest Gen. Stone, for the reason that he had heen informed by the members of the Committee pa the Conduct of the War that they had taken testimony /iJ'jiiig to show that Gen. Stone had been guilty of conduct iiot'consistent with loj-alty. Gea. Stone was removed from hii> Command, and, I uudecetood, ap- peared before this Committee. Finally, on the very oay of his arrest, a written report was made to me of the cxamiuation of a refugee from Leeaburg, which, so far as e jch a thing could, tended to corroborate some of the charges made against Gen. Stone. I satisfied my own mind of the sincerity of this refugee by personal examination, and then showed the statement to the Secretary of War, upon which he directed me to give the order to arrest Gen. Stone immediately, and to send him under guard to' Fort Lafay- ette. The order was carried into execution the saine even- ing. Since the release of Gen. Stone he has been per- mitted by your Committee, in consideration of the peculiar circumstances attending his arrest, to exam- ine all the -testimony -which your Committee have taken in reference to the administration of his de- partment, and to make as full a statement to the Committee as he considered necessary. That state- ment, togethel" with all the testimony, is herewith submitted. It is due to Gen. Stone that your Committee should state that it appears, from the documents be- fore your Committee, that immediately upon his ar- rest be demanded that he should be furnished -with a copy of the charges against him, and be allowed the opportunity of promptly meeting them; -why his request was not granted your Committee have never been informed. B. F. Wade, Chairman. SEPARTiarENT OF TW.M TVE»T. The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War submit the following report, with the accompanying testimony in relation to the Department of the West: Your Committee have been unable to take all the testimony necessary to enable them to present a com- prehensive report in relation to the administration of a.fairs in the Department of the West, more partica- lurly while under the command of Gen. John C. Fremont. Compelled to remain in attendance upon Congress during its sessions, they were unable to visitthe Department in order to take the teatiniony of witnesses there. And they did not feel willing to call from so great a distance the witnesses whose testimony was , necessary to fully elucidate all the facts, as their services were constantly required in the field. Throughout their investigations your Committee have strictly adhered to the rule adopted by them from the first, to ask the attendance of those in the military service only when no detri- ment to the public interests would result from a temporary absence from their command. When Congress closed its session last Summer, many of those who had been most actively engaged in the operations to which your Committee desired to direct their attention had been ordered to other parts of the country; some were in Tennessee and Mississippi, some in Arkansas, ' some in the Army of the Potomac, and others in the Department of the South under Gen. Hunter. Such testimony as was within reach your Committe, have taken. Bat they are fully aware that their investi- gation upon that subject has been far trom complete ; and they, therefore, present bdt a brief report, toi^ether with siicU testimony as they have obt-aiaed. When the R-?b«llion commenced Missouri was one of the most turbulent among those States which tbe itebel leaders sought to gain over to their cause by the connivance and treachery of the State authori- ties, and by the presence of armed forces to operate upon the fears of the people. The number of Fed- eral troops in that regiou was very small ; a great portion of our troops, siutioned in the Territories and at oar military posts upon the Western frontier, had been basely surrentiered by Twiggs to the Rebpis in Texas. St. Louin, the great commercial "emporium of the State, was preserved from falliug into Rebel control only by 'Jie prompt and fearless course pur- sued by General, then Captain, Lyon, who, not waiting for orders or authority, occupied th'^ United States arsenal, 'when threatened by the traitor Gov- ernor of the Ctate, and dispersed the Rebel troops who were collected under the specious name of State Guards, in a camp of iustruction near SI. Louis. The difficulty under which our commanders there labored in obtaining supplies of arms, clothing, &.c., for volunteers, was far greater than was telt in any other part of the country. Distant from all the principal depots, at a time when the ability of the Government was taxed to the utmost to arm and equip the large number of volunteers called into the field, those who were, from time to time, placed in charge of that department, were compelled to act under the greatest disadvantages. Just previous to the appointment of Gen. Fremont to th^ command of that Department, the state of affairs in Missouri had become very alarming. In every portion of the State the Rebel forces had ap- peared and assumed the offensive; all through the State they were committing their depredations, and Jackson, the Governor, had appeared with a large force of troops furnished by the Rebel aathorities from Arkansas and Texas, in addition to those he had been able to collect in Missouri. Pillow and other Rebel Generals had collected a large force from Tennessee, Kentucky, &c., and were threaten- ing the south-western portion of the State and Cairo at the mouth ot the Ohio. Gen. Lyon, who was the highest oflicer in command after the removal of Gen. Harney, had, with his limited means, been most ac- tive, and had taken the field for the purpose of p?e- ventiug Jackson, with his superior forces, from get- ting possession of the northern portion of the State. In July, Gen. Fremont was assigned to that com- mand. He proceeded to New- York City, wbere he spent some days, endeavoring to arrange for supply- ing his Department with the arms, &c., which were absolutely requisite. He reached St. Louis on the 25tb of July. Gen. Pope, who had been assigned the command in Northern Missouri, was calling for troops to enable him to take the field ; Gen, Lyon, In the south-western portion of the State, had been calling for re-enforcements for some time; Gen. Prentiss, at Cairo, was also asking for re-enforce- ments. Gen. Fremont first re-enforced Cairo, as being the most imDortant point, situated, as it was at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, and con- trolling the navigation of those two rivers. The number of troops that he could obtain for that pur- pose was small ; but the enemy were led to believe, by the large number of steamboats that went down from St. Louis that the re-enl'orcement was far greater than it really was; and PiUow, who had 'a force estimated at 12,000 men, was de- terred from making the attack he had contemplated. Cairo being re-enforced, Gen. Fremont at once took steps to send troops to Gen. Lyon. The num- ber of the enemy opposed to Gen. Lyon was almost overwhelmmg. It was supposed by many that he would retire before them until he should meet sup- ports. He himself seems to have contemplated such a movement, for, after the affair of Dug iJpriugs, he retired to Springfield ; and Gen. Sturgts testifies that at that time. Gen. Lyon expressed his convictions that re-enforcements could not be sent to him. Upon reaching Springfield, Gen. Lyon halted his forces, and, alter waiiiug there some four or five days, announced his intention to march out and at- tack the enemy. What reasons influenced him in forming that determination are not well establiished by the testimony. Some of the officers liave ex- pressed their conviction that he apprehended that the enemy, should ho retire further from them, would fall upon bis rear and cripple him, or foi(^\r^ him to fight a battle under great disadvantages, iiia brave spirit, doubtless, led him to meet the jemy he had gone so far to reach, and endeavor to inflict such a blow as would lead them not to press very closely upon him. Whatever his reasons msy have been, he determined upon the attack. The battle was fought at Wilson's Creek, on the 10th of August, and, though the enemy outnumbered our forces four to one, our army was eminently successful. Gen. Lyon fell leading on a regiment to the attack. His loss at that tipae was most deeply felt. Dying a< a brave soldier wonld wish to die, fighting for the cause of hiB country against those who were seeking -its destruction, his example has exercised its influence upon those who have since won the glorious victories Which have made onr armies in the West so iUus- tnons. After that battle our forces retired to Rolla, the enemy beiug so severely punished that they followed only at a distance. At Rolla they were joined by the troops that had been started to their relief, but had been delayed for want of transportation. In September, Col. Mulligan, who had been npon an expedition ia the northern part of the State, was obliged to fall back before the forces of the enemy advuncing against him under Gen. Price. Col. Mul- ligan made a stand at Lexington, and prepared to resist them, sending for re-enforcements. Gen. Fremont, upon hearing of Col. Mulligan's situation, made arrangements to send troops to his assistance; but from various causes they were unable to reach him, and the enemy succeeding in cutting off hie supply of water, he "was compelled to surrender. Snortly after this, Gen. Fremont determined to take the 'field m person, with all the forces he could collect together. He was deficient in transporta- tion; BO much 80 that the Adjutant-General of the army reported to the Secretary of War that Gen. Fremont would be unable to move. He did move, however, and by Nov. 1 succeeded in reaching Springfield. The enemy, some 2,000 strong, had been driven from Ihatjplace by Major Zagonyi, who, with barely 100 cavalry, made the most brilaant charge of ttie war. Preparations were made to engage the enemy, who were understood to be in force in the immediate neighborhood of Springfield. The day was fixed, and the order of the attack determined npon. Just then Gen. Fremont was removed from the com- mand, and Gen. Hunter appointed as his successor. Gen. Hunter testifies that he became satisfied that the enemy were not bo near as Gen. Fremont had supposed. He determined, therefore, to withdraw to St. Louis, which was done, and active operations in the State were suspended for some time. In relation to the administration of Gen. Fremont, much has been said about the high prices paid by him for arms and other supplies; the unnecessary fortification of St. Louis; "delay in re-enforcing points threatened by the enemy; undue assumption of authority, &.c. Year Committee can but briefly notice those dtflferent points, on account of their ina- bility to obtain full evidence in relation to them. This much, at least, appears to be established: .Gen. Fremont, upon takiug the command, was clothed with the most ample authority, and the ex- igencies of the Department were such that much ehould be pardoned in one comoelled to act so promptly, and with so little ai bis command. Whether that authority was exercieed, in all re- spects, as it should have been — whether Gen. Fre- mont was justifieii ia all that he did by the circuin- Btanbes UDder which he was called upon to act — your Committee do not undertake to express a pos- itive opinion. In relation to the purchase of arms, ' &.C., it ap- pears that the Department was very destitute of BOpplies of all kinds;. the demand was most pres-ing, and the Government was unable to supply it. Some ■ of the arms engaged by Gen. Fremont for the sol- diers in his department were diverted to the Army of the Potomac — the primary object of the Govern- inept then being to collect and equip an army at Washington as soon as could possibly be doue. This ^"■"jendered it the more important tbat other arms 8h\)iJcl be '"btaiiied. Yet with all that Gen. Fre- mont deemed it proper to do, his department long felt the want of adequate supplies. In reference to the fortifications about St. Louis, Gen. Fremont but carried out what Gen. Lyon be- fore him had deemed necenrces at his com- mand, that even if he failed to do all ."lat one under other circumstances might have done, still yoni Committee can discover no cause of censure against him. But in regard to both Gen. Lyon and Col. Mulli- gan, your Commitree have discovered no evidence of any disregard for the public interest, or want ol energy or inclination npon the part of Gen. Fre- mont. Troops were collected by him as soon aa could be done, and they were promptly sent where the exigencies of the 8er\'ice demanded. Some ol them were diverted to other purposes than those for which Gen. Fremont desittned them. The Govern- ment Citiiod upon him lor troops to be sent to the east, at a time when he was most earnestly engaged in procuring forces for »,;•»• assistance rff Col. Mulli- gan. Thqfie that were left were sent promptly, and only failed to render the assistance needed from causes over which Gen. Fremont had no control. Gen. Fremont early turned his attention to the building of gunboats tor oar Western rivers. Who- ever is entitled to the credit o'' originating the idea of employing such means of warfare in that section of country, it is not to be denied that Gen. Fremont perceived the advantage to result from them. Our brilhant victories in tuo West will bear enduring testimony to the correctness of his judgment in that respect. _ Bat that feature of Gen. Fremont's administration which attracted the most attention at the time, and which will ever be most prominent among ihe many points of interest connected with the history of that Department, is his Proclamation of Emancipation. Wiiatever opinion may be entertained in relerence to the time when the po icy of Emancipation should have been inaugurated, or by whose authority it should have been promulgated, there can be no doui>t that Gen. Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of subdumg this lie hellion. In proof of that it is only necessary to reter to the fact that his successor, when trans- ferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying the same principle. And the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has applied the same principle to all the rebellions States, and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vesiige of treason and rebellion is destroyed. Tne administration of Gen. Fremont was eminent- ly characterized by earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty. In the exercise ol the almost unlimited power delegated to him. there was no evidence of any tenderness toward treason,