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 War and the 
 King Trust 
 
 An Address to the 
 Anglo-German Club 
 
 By 
 
 AMOS PINCHOT 
 
aite House, 
 
War and the King Trust 
 
 A lot of good people seem to have a beautiful faith in war. Editors, 
 congressmen, senators, Christian preachers, and Billy Sunday, Theodore 
 Roosevelt and others are highly outraged by the suggestion that war 
 should end without a knockout. They say they want Germany to be 
 spanked, so that she will not try another raid on civilization for genera- 
 tions to come. What is more, these good people are sincere about it. 
 They are honestly convinced that fighting it out on present lines, if it 
 takes all summer and half the young manhood of Europe, is a called-of- 
 God proposition. Even the gentleman who spoke at a patriotic society 
 luncheon at the Bankers' Club last Thursday and said he had "an abiding 
 faith" the war would go on a Toutrance was, I think, entirely sincere, 
 notwithstanding the fact that, at the moment, he happens to be making a 
 fortune out of war stocks. 
 
 Consequently when the President went up to the capitol and told the 
 Senate of his hope for peace without victory, the state of mind of some 
 of the gentlemen I have mentioned was genuinely disturbed. Of course, 
 they did not distrust Mr. Wilson. They merely said, each in his own 
 way, that he was insane, and his message Utopian ; and they immediately 
 began to talk about Bunker Hill and Valley Forge, the Mexican War, 
 1865 and the Spanish- American controversy. They wondered what was 
 the matter with the man who did not believe that the world could still be 
 smoothed out with gun powder. 
 
 Unquestionably the President did strike a novel note. For, whether 
 we are generally sympathetic with Mr. Wilson or not, we must admit that 
 his idea, that the only way to settle the war durably is, so to speak, not 
 to settle it, or at least to omit the final rounds of a knock-down and drag- 
 out affair, comes to the thorough-going believer in war as something 
 bizarre, if not unpatriotic and historically off-color. But times have 
 changed considerably since Bunker Hill. Since Bunker Hill, there has 
 not only been an alteration in the structure of society, but also a more or 
 less radical advance in the means of distribution of thought, and in the 
 effectiveness of thought itself; and this has, to some degree at least, 
 shifted the balance of power away from physical force toward the realm 
 of the mental and spiritual. In fact, ideas are coming into their own. 
 In spite of what is going on in Europe, the levers that move the world are 
 no longer exclusively in the palms of men of the stone age. 
 
 So, to these gentlemen we may say that, even if there were a true 
 analogy between our past wars and the great war today, we would hardly 
 be justified in saying that, because war brought fairly lasting peace once, 
 
 3 
 
it will bring it now. As a matter of fact, however, there is little or no 
 analogy. For, in the struggles to which our war-loving friends and news- 
 paper writers, signing themselves spirit of 76, etc., call our attention, the 
 situation was quite different. The Revolutionary and Civil Wars were 
 not between people of alien races, and they were fought on clearly defined 
 issues which would have, sooner or later, been decided in the general 
 course of education and mutual understanding, even if arms had not been 
 resorted to. As for the Mexican War, it was, as General Grant tells us, 
 an act of pure aggression on our part, — a land grabbing scheme which 
 sowed in Mexico the seeds of hatred that have today blossomed before 
 our eyes. And the Spanish-American War ; we can hardly point to it as 
 a triumph of justice through arms.- For General Woodford, American 
 Minister to Spain, had obtained from the Spanish government acquiescence 
 to alTof the United States' demands, when unluckily defective powder 
 blew up the magazine of the Maine, and jingoism and journalism did the 
 rest. """' 
 
 That Mr. Wilson's plea to the nations to stop the war short of 
 decisive victory seems shocking to many good people who retain, from 
 the time when our ancestors ate their food alive, a child-like belief in the 
 efificacy of the smashing process, is unquestionable. But that it is im- 
 practical is untrue. On the contrary, there is no other way to settle the 
 war and insure a lasting peace that is practical and based upon a solid 
 ■"ahd^denronstrabie foundation. I will, therefore, take up the peace-by- 
 smashing theory and try to show why, in the case of Europe, it will not 
 work. Not as an apologist for Germany, but only as an advocate of doing 
 something that will stay done, I will try to point out one reason why it is 
 impossible for practical men who understand Germany to believe that 
 peace will result from a decisive victory. 
 
 1. Nations and individual men follow the same psychological pro- 
 gressions. For instance, the history of the nation, Germany, is paralleled 
 with amazing faithfulness by that of the man William the Second ; and in- 
 deed by the lives of many men, who, like William, began life handicapped, 
 and yet had the vitality and will-power to overcome or compensate for 
 early disabilities. Not only do such men and nations often succeed in 
 compensating; they frequently end in over-compensating to a point 
 where, to all outward appearances, they are stronger and more aggressive 
 than they would have been, if at the outset they had started on even 
 terms with the rest of the world. 
 
 The boy William was born with a physical inferiority. He was a 
 delicate child with a withered arm. When he came to manhood and the 
 throne his sense of disability was increased ; Bismarck was master of 
 Germany and William was permitted to be Emperor only in name. Then 
 William's compensatory process began. In the Austrian controversy, he 
 made Bismarck's position untenable ; and the Chancellor resigned, leaving 
 
 4 
 
him supreme. As for the withered arm, if William could not make it 
 sound, he has at least developed a great right arm, and with it lifted so 
 terrible a sword that the world has forgotten about the other one. 
 
 2. In early life, Theodore Roosevelt was shelved by bad_ health. 
 With a determination we now speak of as characteristic, but which may 
 not have been so then, he went West, lived for years the life of the open 
 and built up a constitution more than ordinarily robust. He came back, 
 went to the legislature, was civil service commissioner, governor, a great 
 president, a recipient of the Nobel prize and a writer of sorts. But these 
 accomplishments w-ere not enough ; they did not slake Mr. Roosevelt's 
 thirst for the purely physical qualities he once lacked and set up as his 
 model. They did not literally enough assure him of what he most wanted 
 to be told, to wit : that he had compeiisated successfully. Consequently, 
 A'Ir. Roosevelt selects other lines of action that emphasize possession of 
 physical strength. He goes in for the strenuous life, and becomes our 
 main apostle of virility. When occasion offers, he naturally assumes the 
 role of the cowboy, because the cowboy is highly symbolic of the vital 
 type he once fell short of. Next, in the Spanish War, he appears as a 
 rough-rider ; this is a distinct promotion in the scale of virility, the rough- 
 rider being in essence the cowboy plus the added feature of participation 
 in the virile game of war. Later on, as an explorer, plunging into jungles 
 and living among wild men and beasts, he approaches still nearer to the 
 primitive male; until finally, in the recent Mexican crisis, Colonel Roos^^ 
 velt reaches his apotheosis, for, lo ! he stands before us proposing to raise 
 a whole division of cowboys, rough-riders and explorers, and to be 
 supreme over this entire congress of virilities in the capacity of Major- 
 General. 
 
 3. Page, the American high-jumper of a generation ago, began life 
 a cripple. His problem was to walk as other men. But this accomplished, 
 he wanted to run, to jump, to jump higher than any man ever jumped, 
 and he succeeded. Why? Because a constant vision of the thing beyond, 
 soundness of limb, charged his will and created, in his years of invalidity, 
 impulses so durable as to still urge him forward after their mission of 
 bringing him to equality with other men had long been accomplished. 
 
 4. In his maturity, Nietzsche was Germany's most distinguished 
 preacher of aggression ; to him is attributed, rightly or wrongly, much 
 of the ithless power-worship of intellectual Germany of today. But 
 Nietzs.iie as a child was a weakling. After his father, the pastor of 
 Rocken, died, the boy was brought up mainly by grand-parents and female 
 relatives. 
 
 By them, as well as by the parochial conventions of a provincial 
 village, he was kindly, but none the less cruelly, repressed. Soon in this 
 restless, non-conforming spirit the compensatory process commenced. His 
 will-to-power philosophy, calling upon mankind to join him in repudiating 
 
 5 
 
all cultural restraint, expresses the swing of the pendulum from early 
 impotence to mastery, from daily repression by elderly female relatives to 
 unfettered libertarianism in the world of thought. Like the Kaiser, 
 Roosevelt and Page, Nietszche's aggression was rooted in weakness, not 
 in strength; like theirs, his insistence on power is reminiscent of a time 
 when, in spite of natural capacity, he was shut off from it by very positive 
 inhibitions. Like them, too, he sought to be the superman, because he 
 once fell so short of the average man, in power and opportunity to func- 
 tion. Nietzsche died insane, believing he was God. 
 
 5. Why is Germany aggressive ? Why is she militarist ? Why have 
 people who understand Germany little hope of ending her militarism 
 through war? And, why are those who want a lasting peace and yet 
 protest against an early one — why are those well-meaning believers in the 
 healing power of the sword working against the end they have in view? 
 
 Germany has had only a few years of nationality. In 71 Bismarck, 
 Moltke and the old Emperor made a unification of unsympathetic, half- 
 hostile states. The unification was not a natural growth, not a popular 
 movement, but a feat of strength performed by a handful of men who 
 said, "Let there be a nation.'' But if the foundations of German unity 
 are insecure, the soil in which they were laid is still more so ; from 
 the ninth century to the unification, the German story is one of attempted 
 ■^ffipire that rose, towered and crashed into disorganized fragments. 
 In 843, the Treaty of \''erdun made Charlemagne's son ruler of a loosely 
 joined empire. By the tenth century it had grown to include what is now 
 Germany and also Holland, Belgium, and a part of Poland and Italy. 
 Though not a nation in the modern sense, still there was distinct con- 
 sciousness of nationalism. Then came disintegration, which continued 
 for centuries, not steadily but with a tragic downward sag, until, in the 
 Thirty Years War, Germany lost all semblance of nationality ; her popula- 
 tion went from twenty to six million ; her people starved and wallowed 
 in ignorance ; her princes fled and lived abroad in more civilized courts. 
 The project of German nationalism was over for the time being. 
 
 By Frederick the Great's time, reconstruction had begun, but it had 
 not gone far. Though he was a Prussian and a Brandenburger, no one 
 more frankly than Frederick admitted this ; he said that the Germans 
 were still barbarians and the rear-guard of civilization. And, on the 
 whole, Germany seems to have agreed with him ; she was unsure of her- 
 self, tender of her past, without confidence in the future, and aggressive 
 in proportion to her lack of self-confidence. 
 
 Next came the Napoleonic period of humiliation. Bonaparte crushed 
 Prussia, made his headquarters in the palaces of the Hohenzollerns ; said 
 of the latter and the Prussian aristocracy in general : 'T will make this 
 noblesse beg bread in the street," and forced a division of German troops 
 to fight in the French army. That success in the Franco-Prussian War 
 
 6 
 
did not remove from the German soul the humiliation of 1806 is shown 
 a hundred years later, when, through the mouth of William the Second, 
 Germany is still talking revanche, still proposing to wipe out with blood 
 the score chalked up against her honor by Bonaparte. 
 
 6. The psychology of modern Germany has been profoundly in- 
 fluenced by her history. A picture of continuing failure, amounting, in 
 fact, to a racial tragedy, has entered deeply into G-erman subconscious- 
 ness and become a sort of permanent background, against which are 
 judged the phenomena of recent times. And Germany's geographical 
 position has powerfully reinforced the fear element aroused by her 
 history. Germany grew up, like a lonely imaginative child, surrounded 
 by menacing giants and ogres. There was Russia to the north, huge, slow- 
 moving, drowsy, of unmeasured strength ; some day Russia was sure to 
 wake up and move across Europe like a tide. And France to the west 
 and south, tempered, flexible, a nation at home with ideas, — the despair 
 of raw, unformed Germany. To Germany France has been a country of 
 infinite possibilities ; first, because France had her diseases of militarism 
 and kuhur under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and reacted from them into 
 democracy. And second, because France has gone through the unifying 
 process of popular revolution, and by this her people have become 
 thoughtful, sure of their fundamentals and extraordinarily competent in 
 distinguishing between class aims and popular aims. Germany, on the 
 other hand, like the United States, has had no popular revolution, "aF 
 least no successful one. The Reformation was not a revolution, not a 
 real break for freedom, but a promotion by the clergy and the upper 
 middle class of a new set of dogma ; and the peasant uprising which fol- 
 lowed it was an unorganized and unsuccessful revolt against the land- 
 owning class. 
 
 Coming to the so-called revolution of '48, there is only a flash in the 
 pan that resulted in the expulsion from Germany of her most democratic 
 spirits, of such men as Carl Schurz, who could not find in Germany a 
 home for a freer body of ideas. Germany, like the United States, has 
 had no real struggle for democracy, in which the lines between privilege 
 and the people, wealth and poverty, were sharply drawn. And her people, 
 like ours, have therefore only been half armed against the attacks of 
 absolutism. They have none of that immunity against militarism that is 
 enjoyed by the French, mainly perhaps on account of France's revolu- 
 tions, and also because of the deep currents of democratic thought long 
 ago turned into the national consciousness by the writings of a uniquely 
 emancipated group of thinkers, including Voltaire, Rabelais, Rousseau 
 and Montaigne. 
 
 But more important than the fear and inferiority sense aroused in 
 Germany by the somnolent power of Russia and the developed civiliza- 
 tion of France, there has been the threat of England — England, master 
 
of the seas, successful in colonization, unresting in her policy of empire 
 and trade supremacy. England most of all has given Germany a sense 
 of impotence, loneliness, newness and comparative poverty. 
 
 7. Thus starting from a history that rang the changes on calamity, 
 and a geographical position that stimulated the fear complex formed by 
 such a history, Germany has unrestingly carried on her compensatory 
 struggle; and it has been a successful one, at least in a material sense. 
 From Bismarck's time up to the present war, there is a pulling together 
 of the states, not a spiritual union, but, at all events, a strong political 
 one. Nationalism, driven on by a consciousness of past failure and 
 present superficiality, has been cultivated in a subservient people by the 
 government, by school and university, until it has become a religion and 
 finally a fanaticism. There has been a great industrial renaissance; a 
 perfectioned, smooth-functioning state-absolute has arisen; and in the 
 last ten years Germany has become the first military power of the world. 
 But all this is not enough. As in the case of the Kaiser, Roosevelt, 
 Page and Nietzsche, arrival at the point of equality with others has only 
 been a signal for departure for goals beyond. Those vital compensatory 
 forces, created through centuries of fear and disability, still hold Germany 
 and drive her on — to supremacy in arms because she was humbled in 
 arms; to supremacy in nationalism because she once had none; to 
 supremacy in culture because, while Europe was semi-civilized, she was 
 -savage; to world conquest, because she had been taught to see herself 
 ringed by hostile nations crouching to spring. 
 
 8. The writer is not pro-German ; he is what is called pro-Ally. He 
 loathes the German state, because it forces the individual into a rigid 
 government-made mould; he thinks that authority, especially military 
 authority, has made Germany a poor place for the average man to live in. 
 He believes that the German government has been the main, though not 
 the only, aggressor ; that it prepared for and forced war ; that the enslave- 
 ment of the Belgians and the Zeppelin raids are atrocities, although, in 
 fact, mere fringes of the huge fabric of cruelty woven by the super- 
 atrocity of war. Above all, he sees in German militarism a sword over 
 peace — a worse menace even than England's navalism or American mili- 
 tarism as promoted here by our own absolutists and commercial buc- 
 caneers. And, for these very reasons, he looks with dismay at the sheer 
 futility of any plan to crush militarism by prolonging the war. 
 
 Extreme pressure from without, fear, humiliation, a virtual repetition 
 of old disasters, will only strengthen militarism, justify it, harden 
 it, and make the crust of official absolutism that now covers Germany 
 so metallic that her democratic impulses will be unable to germinate and 
 break through. If there is anything to be learned from the history of 
 Germany, or from a study of the psychological cause of the effect we call 
 militarism, a crushing victory for the Allies wull accomplish one im- 
 
 8 
 
portant result, and only one. It will set the stage upon which the old 
 progressions from inferiority to compensation, from compensation to 
 over-compensation, and from over-compensation to aggression and world 
 mastery, will be re-enacted in another tragedy, terrible for both Germany 
 and the rest of the world. 
 
 9. But still our trusters in violence are undismayed. They continue 
 to assure us that the smashing prescription will do the trick. They are 
 particularly anxious to have the war go on, so that the Kaiser and the 
 military class may be properly punished; they say they want the King 
 trust broken up. They stipulate, too, that Germany shall repent, confess 
 her sin and acknowledge the saving grace of countries with more guns 
 of heavier calibre. They cannot see that the Kaiser and the military class 
 are, like militarism, only surface expressions of something that is going 
 on deep in the German soul. They insist that a nation of seventy million 
 people can be permanently broken and incapacitated for aggressive war, as 
 simply and as satisfactorily as we break men and boys in our prisons and 
 reformatories and incapacitate them for rebellion against society. They 
 do not take into account the fact that fifteenj^ears from now Germany, 
 left with a grudge, will have practically as many men of fighting age as 
 she would have had if the war had never happened, and probably a good 
 many more than she has today. Apparently, they fail to realize that 
 Germany's material resources will not stay crippled, because her landi;. 
 and her industries cannot be destroyed and her children will continue to 
 grow into men and women. Early peace, they say, would be a calamity, 
 because Germany has not yet suffered enough to learn her lesson. The 
 loss of seven thousand young men a day, more or less, for two years and 
 a half, mourning in almost every home in the empire, hunger, bankruptcy 
 and the rest of it — in the eyes of our Christian advocates of dreadfulness, 
 these do not seem to add up to enough misery to put the fear of God into 
 Germany as completely as they desire. Even though postponing peace 
 until victory is won means, as it must, a greater slaughter of the Allies than 
 has yet taken place, even if it foreshadows the starvation, at no distant 
 time, of the prisoners in the German prison camps, and death by hunger 
 and sickness of literally millions of children in the ravaged districts, and a 
 continuation of the racking anxiety and despair of millions of women, non- 
 combatants and old people at home, and the partings, the emptiness and 
 desolation of the last two years prolonged indefinitely into a horrible 
 future; even if victory must be purchased at such a price, and notwith- 
 standihg the fact that when bought, it can give no shred of assurance 
 against the repetition of the whole unparalleled tragedy — our friends, 
 faithful to war, do not hesitate. They are willing to stake the future of 
 the world on war's exploded rep utation as a peacemaker. 
 
 10. The world is filled with men who believe in force; our laws 
 and institutions, our property rights, our economic system, and privilege 
 
 9 
 
itself, which is the economic expression of violence, is deeply rooted in it. 
 We cannot doubt that these people conscientiously believe in force, trust 
 it, honor it, and gladly embrace an opportunity of recommending it as a 
 sovereign remedy. It is the one great principle of the world that they 
 have been taught to confide in and found not wanting. But whether these 
 good people are not really a good deal more interested in justifying and 
 exalting the force principle, which is woven so intimately into the struc- 
 ture of the society in which they live, than they are in ending militarism, 
 or bringing about a lasting peace, is a question that we, and perhaps they 
 themselves, would have a good deal of difficulty in answering. But still 
 we cannot help noticing, for it is significant, that these very people, who 
 are most tireless in telling us that the war should go on, so that militarism 
 in Germany may be crushed, are also the most tireless in booming militar- 
 ism in America. They are preaching the same narrow nationalism, the 
 same fear of other nations, the same concentration of power in the mili- 
 tary, and the same annulment of individual rights and liberties that was 
 promoted in Germany for generations before the war, by German militar- 
 ists, by the German clergy, profiteers, politicians and power-preaching 
 professors. But here in America they tell us all these things are not for 
 aggression, but purely in the interest of national defense. And so it was 
 in Germany; and no amount of argument will ever persuade the average 
 German that his nation was organized for anything but to repel boarders. 
 Xet us not deceive ourselves, America too has her power cult, her Ameri- 
 can branch of the King Trust, her class that believes in force because it is 
 founded on force, and that instinctively wants to see force made 
 triumphant and honorific by being the means of settling the world's prob- 
 lems. 
 
 What, then, is the answer to those who expect that a knockout blow, 
 that punishment will bring lasting peace and an end to German aggres- 
 sion; to men like Colonel Roosevelt, for instance (who, by the way, does 
 not seem to have been rendered less aggressive by the fact that, for 
 quite awhile now, he has been constrained to take his political bread 
 and water off the mantelpiece) ? What shall we say to our bishops, 
 munition sellers, amateur soldier men and distinguished lawyer-publicists, 
 who tell us that Europe must be bled into lasting tranquillity? To them 
 no answer can be made that will carry conviction ; for they do not think 
 in terms of history or human psychology, but in those of primal instincts. 
 But to the liberal thought of the world, the answer is simple. No matter 
 how much she may or may not deserve it, Germany cannot be whipped 
 either into impotence or consciousness of her own aggression. The ag- 
 gression itself must be attacked through a policy that is understanding of 
 its causes. And the first step is to switch the controversy from the 
 physical into the realm of reason. 
 
 11. On England mainly devolves the duty of bringing about a settle- 
 ment along the lines of President Wilson's suggestion, that is to say, one 
 
 10 
 
which will take into account the causes of Germany's aggression and pro- 
 vide conditions that will tend to end them. England explicitly renounces 
 all intention of conquest; she says she only wants to guarantee freedom 
 for Europe. And, since she largely controls the credit of the belligerents, 
 she can go far toward dictating to her allies the terms of peace. No 
 doubt, it will be hard for England to accept as sound the President's 
 proposition, that peace must not be preceded by victory. England has 
 never been strong at understanding the psychology of situations. This 
 was shown in the recent Irish uprising, when she apparently labored 
 under the impression that she could stand the idea of Irish nationalism 
 up against a wall and shoot it. Like Germany, like Napoleon, but unlike 
 Bismarck, England has centred her attention too rigidly on the mechanics 
 of international politics. She has not touched the spirit of other peoples ; 
 that was why she lost America. What she has accomplished in her con- 
 quests and colonies has been by the weight of her wealth and the dogged 
 courage of her national character. 
 
 But Eng[an_d is now up against a different problem than India or 
 Egypt. In Germany she is dealing with a nation of tremendous vitality, 
 power of organization, and fanatical determination not to be the under 
 dog. The balance of power plan of an alliance of nations, not to include 
 Germany, that will hold German aggression in check after a thorough 
 thrashing has been administered, is worse than impractical; it is a- prexu^ 
 of psychological error; it is impossible and based on an almost criminal 
 disregard of history. It might do if Germany were a country of brown 
 or yellow men ; but it will never work with a proud people that has once 
 proved its ability, in war and commerce, to hold the world at bay. 
 
 In both America and Europe those who believe in force as the con- 
 trolling principle of society are very busy scoffing at the President's 
 proposal that all nations shall be members of a league to preserve peace. 
 They do not want that ; they want a group of nations, representing a 
 majority of power, that will force peace on the rest. Of course, they do. 
 Naturally they are hostile to Mr. Wilson's proposal, for between his and 
 their's, there is a very fundamental difference, an irreconcilable difference, 
 that lies between two diametrically opposing principles. Men divide tem- 
 peramentally on an issue like this ; it goes down to their instinctive philos- 
 ophy of life. For the balance of power scheme is, in effect, nothing more 
 or less than a plan to establish a preferred class of nations which will be 
 able, through superior force, to dictate to the other nations outside that 
 class. It is simply the application of undemocracy, of privilege on a 
 gigantic, international scale, just as the President's proposal is the appli- 
 cation of equality and democracy in world relations. 
 
 To the temptation of demanding an international reorganization in 
 which they will come in, as it were, on the ground floor, and receive better 
 terms than the Central Powers, it is to be hoped England and the allies 
 will turn a deaf ear. Certainly their statesmen of vision may be expected 
 
 11 
 
IpV.^JAJJO': CONGRESS 
 015 845 518 3 C 
 
 to see how small will be the hope of permanence in such an arrangement. 
 
 No matter who began the war, no matter how terrible the aggres- 
 sions and atrocities and reprisals, there can be no benefit to humanity in 
 apportioning the blame, or in making the sins or virtues of nations an 
 excuse for inequality of treatment. If there is to be civilization worth 
 living in for our children, some one must wipe the slate clean with a 
 gesture so noble, so prophetic of an unembittered future, as to give hope 
 to the world, and an amnesty to all men, whether saints or sinners. And 
 this can only be done by England. It is England's supreme chance for an 
 immortal victory, greater than any war. 
 
 Reading between the lines, this seems to be the message of the 
 President. If it is impractical, Utopian, visionary, or the effort of a 
 man speaking wisdom to unwilling ears, so were other messages that 
 have come down to us through the ages. No one needs to be persuaded 
 of the unacceptability of the truth. 
 
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