E 713 .B86 Copy 1 / ?r \j REMARKS HON. J. H. BROMWELL. OF OHIO, HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 14, 1898. W A S M I N O TOM. 1898. ^^' 72949 B E M A K K S OP HON. J. H. BEOMWELL The House liaving under oousideration the joint resohition ( H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States- Mr. BROMWELL said: Mr, Speaker: After thirty years of peace at home and abroad we are to-day in the midst of war's alarm; the drumbeat and the bugle call once more resound throughout the land; gathering hosts are hurrying to the front; Old (llory waves over American soldiers marching in battle array; on our ships of war, more deadly than ever before, the crews stand ready for action; a naval victory, unique in the history of warfare, has placed the name of Dewey with those of Farragut, Decatur, and Nelson, and those of Bagley and Hobson fill the world with admiration. Another brilliant page is about to be added to the history of American triumph by land and sea over a hostile foe. Our arms are turned no longer against American soldiers and brethren in other States of the Union. The struggle is not maintained, as in the civil war, against the perpetuity of the American Govern- ment and the preservation of free institutions. We stand a united people in a united cause for a united purpose, to extend the priv- ileges of liberty to an oppressed people from the cruelty of a coun- try which has for hundreds of years been a disgrace to the civil- ization of the world, and to avenge an act of barbarism of which no other nation on earth would have been guilty save Spain. Side by side are the companies and regiments and brigades from the North and South. Northern soldiers will march under Wheeler and Lee, and Southern troops will fight with Miles and Merritt. On the quarter deck and in the gun rooms of our cruisers and battle ships will stand the men whose homes are on the Gulf with the men whose homes are on the Lakes. We have become a homogeneous people with one aim, one aspiration — the honor and glory of a common country. Thirty-five years ago the melodies of Dixie went up from one side of the armed fortifications, while the miisic of the Star Spangled Banner floated upward from the other. To-day the strains of both are heard in every camp and float across the water from every seacoast city on the oceans and the Gulf. In the armies which will ere long be marching through the Cuban Island will be found the children of Southern slaves, the children of their masters and of those who set them free, guided by a com- mon purpose, with a common motto, " Cuba libre." 3iU 3 LESSONS TO UK Dlt.VWN I'KO.M PKKSENT WAR. From sncli a war we can not, if we are wise, but draw lessons for our future conduct as a nation. We have slept for thirty- years contented with onr internal resources, strong in our ma- terial growth and development, self-contident to meet any strug- j:le in which we should be called to engage. We have reasoned that our isolation from the great powers of the other hemisphere would continue to bo our protection and our strength. We have forgotten the mighty progress which has been made in brmging more closely together the remotest corners of the earth. With no occasion to demand them, we have failed to keep abreast of the progress of the rest of the world in offensive and defensive preparations for war. While the first little monitor,' the product of American invention and genius, has revolution- ized naval warfare, wo have allowed ourselves to fall behind in our naval equipment/ until we have ceased to rank among the leaders in the matter of naval strength, and even the antagonism of a .sixth-rate power has found us unprepared for immediate ac- tion and filled with solicitude for immediate results. In the advancement of modern militarj- science requiring months of i)reparation f or the emplacement of modern batteries in ourse^T- coast fortifications and years for the construction of naval vessels and their armament and the manufacture of high-pov/er explo- sives, we can not afford, in time of peace, to neglect these great works until the call to war shall sound. When the Maine was blown up by the Spanish assassins not enough powder and shells were in the hands of the Ordnance Department to fight a single day's battle; not a fortification along the coast was in a condition to sustain the bombardment of a hostile fleet; not a sufficient force of troops, drilled and disciplined for active service, was at the dis- posal of the General Commanding the Armies for an invasion of Cuba. It has taken more than a hundred days of constant, unre- mitting, strenuous work to reach the point where we maj^ feel that we are at last prepared for offensive movements. I believe that this lesson will not have to be again repeated to the American people. In the history of England we read of one monarch, a Saxon king, who, surrounded by foreign foes, by procrastination failed to place his people in a proper condition to meet them, and his reign was a prolonged series of disasters. So conspicuous was this neglect that he has come down to us under the name of " Eth- elred the Unready." We have within our own experience seen even modem nations guilty of a similar blunder. France was overrun by Germany, China defeated by Japan, because they had not in time of peace properly prepared for time of war. Pray God that never in our history shall we be found, in a contest with a foreign nation, so unworthyas to be called "The United States the Unready." We have been daugerou.sly near it in the present instance. True, it costs vast sums of money to provide and maintain a naval armament and a coast defense which will put us on a fair footing of etiuality with the European powers; but the cost of hurried ])reparation, the expense of organizing and maintaining a preat army called together for an emergency, is far in excess of the outlay which would be required to place ourselves in a state of preparation in times of peace such as would make unnecessary in most, if not all, cases a state of war. NECESSITY OF COALING STATIONS. Another lesson which comes home to ns is the fact that it wonld not do for us as a nation to ignore the necessity of acquiring and maintaining in other parts of the world, even though remote from our shores, places of rest and supply for the vessels of oar Navy. In the days of Nelson and Decatur, when the wind was the only motive power, cruises of months or years could be made Ly a naval fleet without the necessity of stopping at a port. But with the introduction of steam and the harnessing of the lightning to perform so many of the functions of a ship of war the usefulness of a fleet or vessel is limited by its capacity to carry its own sup- ply of coal. However magnificent and almost invulnerable a modern battle ship may seem to be, it becomes a helpless derelict upon the face of the waters when its bunkers are empty of coal and its supply station remote. Were the necessities of our naval service con- fined to our own immediate waters this would be perhaps a mat- ter of little concern to us, for so long as our mines yield their stored-up treasures and our great railroad systems carry their black but precious loads to our seaboard, our ships of war could supply their needs under the protection of skillfully equipped and well-manned coast defenses. [Applause.] REVIVAL OF MERCHANT MARINE. But we should not forget that the hope is cherished that at no remote time in the future the great merchant marine of the United States shall again be rebuilt; that our commerce will be found on every ocean and in every inlet floating on American bottoms; that American citizens will be found either in the pursuit of business or pleasure in every city in every corner of the earth. It will be our duty to spread the protection of this glorious banner of freedom over every American, however humble; over every American ves- sel, however remote. To do this will require an American Navy to enforce our just demands and command the respect of even the most powerful na- tion. We shall build more ships, we shall train more men for this service, we shall make our coasts invulnerable, and we shall rank among the most powerful instead of among the weakest in our military and naval strength. Not for aggression, except in the cause of right; not for oppression or territorial aggrandize- ment, but for the enforcement of justice to our own people and protection of liberty and free government to the countries of this Western Hemisphere. With this necessity for the promotion of our naval welfare are intimately associated two great subjects which have demanded the attention of the American nation and which the present war will no doubt bring to a fitting conclusion — the annexation of Hawaii and the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal. NICARAGUAN CANAL. Their necessity has come home to us as it never could had it not been for the experience of the last three months. The run of our magnificent battle ship, the Oregon, through 13,000 miles of water, amidst not only the perils of the sea, but of the danger of attack by a hostile fleet, is a wonderful one in the history of naval warfare. But how many sighs have gone up, how many apprehensions have besn felt for her safety and that of her men, 3Ut 6 which might have been spared had the shorter route through the Nicaraguan Canal been given her. We are sending relief to the gallant Dewey, adequate, I hope, even should a Spanish fleet be sent to the Pliilippines to recover those islands. With the great canal across the isthmus it would be at least an even race and a fair chance for our Atlantic fleet to succor Dewey and iiis gallant men. We need it for the proper defense of our western coast. We need it for the purpose of obviating the neces- sity of maintaining at a groat expense a double line of naval vessels wlion with it one alone would be sufficient. We need it to save the delay in sending our vessels from one coast to the other when the loss of a day might mean the destruction of lives and property more precious and valuable than any outlay we may make in its construction. We need it, too, in times of peace as well as in times of war. The great westei-n coast of South America should be the market for the manufactures of the East and the agricultural productions of the South and the great Mississippi Valley. We need it for the opening trade with the countries of eastern Asia, one day destined to eclipse all the other commerce of the world. We need it in times of war for our defense and in times of peace for our commerce. Before the dawn of the twentieth century I hope and I believe that it will be under way to its com- pletion. But important as this great enterprise is, we are confronted with the necessity of prompt action upon another far more im- portant from every standpoint and more urgent upon our de- mands for attention. That subject is the one now under discus- sion in this House — the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. COXSENSrS OF OPINION OF PUBLIC MEN. I can hope to add nothing new to the discussion that has occu- pied the attention and best minds of the country for the last fifty years. The messages of our Presidents; the state papers of our Cabinet officers, our ministers, and our consuls; the professional opinions of our best military and naval experts; the careful study and expression of judgment of leading statesmen of both Houses of Congress, and the editorial utterances of the great jiress of the country, ever the faithful reflector as well as the molder of the sentiments of the people at large, have united in one general, grand consensus of belief that it is a national duty which we owe to ourselves to annex these islands. While it is true perhajis that there is a certain amount of sen- timentality connected with this belief, arising from the fact that the progress of these islands from a state of paganism to the high- est plane of Christian civilization has been due to the efforts of American missionaries: that the development of her magnificent natural resources and the upbuilding of her commei-ce have been the result of American immigration; that the overthrow of a cor- rupt and dissolute monarchy and the establishment of a constitu- tional republican government, modeled largely from the pattern of our own, have been wrought by American sympathizers, there is added to this a practical phase of the question which appeals not only to our self-interest but to considerations of the highest iijiportance affecting our future welfare and protection. Divorcing, therefore, from our consideration of this subject all questions of mere sentiment, ignoring the fact that American in- terests dominate and control its aft'airs, shutting our eyes even to the sympathy which has heretofore existed between the two coun- :0 miles distant from Hawaii, on the South Pacific route. Great Britain has advanced from Fiji toward the intersecting point on clearly de- fined lines, annexing group after group and detached islands when they were in the lino of approach, even though uninhabited or without harbors or com- mercial value, until in 1891 her flag was planted on Johnston Island, 600 miles from Hawaii and the nearest point she can approach to her American terri- tory, unless the next move be the occupation of Hawaii itself. Hon. Lorin Thurston says: In the Pacific Ocean from the Equator to Alaska, from the coasts of China and Japan to the American Continent, there is but one spot where a ton of coal, a pound of bread, or a gallon of water can be obtained by a passing yes- Bel, and that spot is Hawaii. In the necessities of modern naval warfare, the architect is con- fronted by the three serious problems of formidable armament, invulnerable armor, and coal-caiTying capacity, and the nice ad- justment of these three elements in such a way as to procure, at the same time, the greatest speed is the one problem which is engaging the attention of naval experts throughout the world. Any one of these three features abnormally developed at the ex- pense of the others impairs the efficiency of the fighting machine. A battle ship or cruiser with large storage capacity for coal can carry proportionately fewer guns of lighter caliber and with arma- ment more liable to penetration by the modern projectile. So that while she might obtain the advantage of remaining long at eea without recoaling, she would at the same time be at a serious disadvantage in conflict with a vessel carrying heavier armor and throwing a greater weight of projectile to a greater distance. On the other hand, it matters not how impervious her armor or deadly her armament, if she can not carry within herself her means of locomotion, she becomes worthless except for purposes of coast defense. "A modern battle ship without coal is like a caged lion— mag- nificent, but harmless." So unanimous are modern strategists upon the importance of Hawaii as a strategic point tliat it has been aptly named and uni- versally referred to as "the key of the Pacific." Its importance to the United States as a means of protection to our western coast has attracted the attention of this Government for many years. General Schofield, who visited the islands under the instructions Of the Secretary of War in 1872, said: q)' . __ our commerce on the Pacific Ocean, they would afford the means of incal- culable injury to the United States. If the absolute neutrality of the islands could always bo insured, that would suffice; but they have not and never could liave the power to maintain their own neutrality, and now their neces- yiti 9 Bitioi? force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve their embarrassment. The British Empire stands ready to enter into such an alli- ance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Australia to British Columbia. We can not refuse the islands the little aid they need and at tho same time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when we must secure forever the desired control over those islands or let it pass into other hands. The financial interest to the United States involved in this treaty is very small, and if it were much greater it would still be insipr- niflcant when compared to the importance of such a military and naval sta- tion to the national security and welfare. Quoting again from Captain Malian: Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles— or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming— an impediment to sustained maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive. The coal mines of British Columbia constitute, of course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we might at least hope to impose some trammels by action from the land side. It is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defense of a coast line— of a sea frontier— is concentrated in a single position, and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can. Admiral Eelknap reenforces these opinions in tlie following language: A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer the great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic point and commercial center. * * * Not to take the fruit witliin our grasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would he folly indeed— a mistake of a gravest character, both for tho statesmen of the day and for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises. OUR PRESENT NEED OF THE ISLANDS. But we need not depend upon the theoretical considerations which evolve the opinions of these distinguished experts. We are having to-day a practical illustration of the absolute necessity of these islands to the United States in the conduct of the war we are waging against Spain. Not a vessel that we are sending to Dewey's relief could reach him, not a battalion of the troops which are being carried on transports to complete the subjugation of Manila could be landed at that port, if we were deprived of the privilege of obtaining fresh supplies at this great halfway port in the long journey cross the broad expanse of the Pacific. It is not sufficient to say that when the war with Spain is ended there will be little occasion for offensive operations by American fleets and armies in the waters of eastern Asia. Little did we imagine before the present war that we should find it necessary to carry offensive operations to so remote a point aa the Philippines, and it will not do for us to blindly shut our eyes to the possibility of just such future contingencies again arising. We have learned the Issson that in a war with a foreign power we must be prepared for offensive as well as defensive action, and with every European nation stretching out for bases of supply from which their fleets may operate, and already forming a cordoa of advanced posts drawing nearer year by year to our Pacific coast, we shall soon be hemmed in on the west as we are now upon the east and south. With Hawaii in our possession we shall be reasonably secure. Without it, and especially in the hands of an unfriendly nation, we have a menace continually threatening us. I shall not comment upon the importance of these islands to us from a commercial standpoint, although their accession to our control would mean a vast increase in profitable commerce by ths investment of American capital and a rapid growth of our mer- chant marine for handling the trade of these islands. These mere 10 pecuniary and commercial considerations are so far overshadowed by their im])ortance to us for offensive and defensive inarposes that they may bo left out of consideration. POME OIIJELTIONS CONSIDEUED. And now lot us see what are some of the objections to and ar- guments aj^ainst the union that is proposed. The first, and what would be the most serious one if it were ten- able, is the claim that such action would be contrary to our own Constitution. This claim of unconstitutionality proceeds upon the theory that because there is not a distinct grant of power to annex territorj-, or because tlie territory is not contiguous, or because the character of its people is not similar to those of the territory now occupied by the United States, we have not the power to act. ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY ALREADY MADE. Fortunately these questions are not new and have all been set- tled by the highest authorities known to our system of govern- ment. While it may be true that the Constitution does not, in so many words, refer to our right to annex additional territory, as a, matter of fact we commenced such annexation in the very infancy of our Republic and have continued in that policy down to the present time. We have annexed by purchase, we have annexed by treaty, and we have annexed practically by conquest, or by treaty as a result of conquest. We purchased Louisiana in 1803; Florida in 1819; California, New Mexico, and Arizona, in 1849, came to us as a result of the Mexican war; we annexed Texas by joint resolution of Congress in 1844, and bought Alaska from Rus- eia in 18G7. We have occupied and practically annexed the Mid- way Island in the North Pacific, even farther from our coast than the Hawaiian Islands, and the right to make these annexations has been pas.sed upon by the highest constitutional authority in existence, the Supreme Court of the United States. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANNEXATION. Chief Justice Marshall, in 1 Peters, 542, said: The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the power of ni;iking wars and making treaties. Consequently that Government possesses the power of acquiring tei'ritory, either by conquest or treaty. And this doctrine has been even more recently reaffirmed by the same court in the following words: The power to acquire territory is derived from the treaty-making power, and the power to declare and carry on war. The incidents of these powers are those of national sovereignty, and be- long to all independent governments. So much, then, for the objection that because the Constitution does not contain a specific grant of power we have no authority; for we see that this power to annex is a necessary consequence of our existence as a sovereign and independent nation. These de- cisions would seem to be broad enough to cover equally the other two constitutional objections, even it they were strictly new ques- tions. But here again -we have precedents, upon which no ques- tions have been raised, to establish our rights. The objection that Hawaii is not contiguous becomes of little importance when wo recall that the greater portion of the magnificent domain of Alaska is more remote from the nearest point of the rest of our 11 United States territory than is Hawaii and that we are separated from the former by the domain of a foreign government as well as by an equal stretch of ocean, and that the Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands are absolutely detached from contiguous territory. This objection, therefore, fails. CHARACTER OF INHABITANTS. That the inhabitants of Hawaii, or at least a majority of them, are of different race and civilization from those of the United States is undoubtedly true; but did not the same objection lie to the inhabitant of all the territory wliich we have annexed from the beginning? At the time of the Louisiana purchase the Indians far exceeded in number the white inhabitants, and the latter were largely made up of men alien to our civilization, laws, and cus- toms. Alaska contained nothing but a few Indian tribes, Esqui- mos, and Russian traders. In comparison with these the popula- tion of Hawaii would be far more desirable, for they have had the benefit of Christian education and the enlightening influences of commercial intercourse with civilized nations. The fear that we would not assimilate this population deserves but little consideration in the face of our experience with the im- migration from foreign countries and the rapidity with which within one or two generations at the most they become homoge- neous with our other citizens. Once in our possession, too, suit- able restrictions can be thrown around the further settlement of ^ these islands by the undesirable class of Asiatics who have within • the last few years threatened to overwhelm with their numbers _j the white population. All other objections to the annexation of these islands seem to be based rather upon the question of the wisdom of the policy than upon the power to annex. One of the most frequently urged objections on this score is that its remoteness from the continental portion of the United States would render it an object of special attack by hostile nations and would entail upon us the necessity of keeping up a much greater navy and of entailing much heavier expenditures in order to protect it in time of war. Neither of these positions is, in the judgment of those best qualified to speak, tenable. WILL SAVE EXPENSE OF KEEPING UP LARGE NAVY IN THE PACIFIC. With Pearl Harbor, the only inlet upon any of the islands capable of receiving and protecting a fleet of large war vessels, well defended, and Honohilu, a few miles distant, properly forti- fied by American soldiers drawn from the Hawaiian residents, a mere handful of men and one or two battle ships or monitors could protect the island against any hostile fleet that might be sent against it. An attack, if made and unsuccessful, would almost necessarily mean the loss of the attacking fleet, for no vessels that could be sent from any other coal-supply station could run to Hawaii, remain any considerable time to make an attack, and then return to the station which it had left. Its coal bunkers would, long before its arrival, be exhausted, and it would be helpless and defenseless against not only a hostile fleet but even the elements themselves. As to the fear that it would require a greater Navy and entail greater expense to this Government, it would seem to be reason- able that if by maintaining two or three modern vessels of war at 3il4 the Hawaiian Islands we can absolutely prevent the approach of hostile fleets from eastern Asia, it would be far less expensive than maintaining a large number of vessels at each of our unprotected points upon the Pacific coast. An ounce of prevention would, in this case, be far better than a pound of cure. Especially does this argument become convincing should the Nicaraguan Canal be constructed and controlled by the United States, for then our ves- sels in the Atlantic Heet could reenforce our squadron in the Pa- cific before the vessels of a hostile power covild reach Hawaii from any except the nearest outlying station. It is the opinion of those best qualified to judge that its annex- ation will obviate the necessity for large expenditures rather than cause them. We have to take care of Hawaii in the sense of not allowing any other nation to occupy it. This doctrine we have affirmed and reaffirmed on many occasions, and it is now recog- nized and conceded by every nation on earth that we have that right. It is sufficiently within the sphere of the American influ- ence to bring it strictly within the provisions of the Monroe doc- trine, and on more than one occasion that doctrine has been invoked to prevent the occupation of those islands by other powers. If, therefore, we have this responsibility cast upon us, and re- membering that in carrying it out we may become involved at almost any time with another nation who finds it necessary to take military possession of them, how much wiser, easier, and less expensive it would be to us were we to exercise this control not as a mere protectorate over a little helpless nation, but as a part of our own independent and sovereign territory. lilGHT OF ItAWAIIAX GOVERNMENT TO ACT. As to arguments which are raised against the project for rea- sons growing out of the fact that the governing element of the island constitutes but a mere minority of the entire population, that a large number of its people are denied the right of suffrage, and tliat any proposition to annex should be submitted to a vote of the entire people instead of the Government now in existence, it is sufficient to say that none of these things have been regarded as of any importance in other cases in which we have acquired territory. With the exception of Texas, the consent of these peo- ple was neither asked nor received. The negotiations were conducted with the sovereign authorities controlling the territory. Even in the case of Texas the people themselves did not pass upon the question directly. It is sufficient for us to know, therefore, that there is a stable Government in these islands, which, acting under constitutional provision spe- cifically set forth, has the right to propose and consummate this annexation. This Government has been recognized by every civ- ilized nation not only as de facto but de jure. It has all the powers of sovereignty, including tliat of joining the island by cession to a foreign power. This has been universally recognized as a result of con(iuest and as i)reliminary to the sale or cession of territory by ijeaceful means. We are not hampered, therefore, by any (juestion of the power of the Government with which we will deal. Sl'MMAItV. The whole situation, therefore, seems to resolve it