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NARRATIVE AND LETTER OF 
 WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT 
 CONCERNING THE NEGO- 
 TIATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH 
 CAROLINA AND PRESIDENT 
 BUCHANAN, IN DECEMBER, 
 i860 
 
 CONTRinUTKlJ «Y 
 
 GAILLARD HUNT 
 
 REPRINTF.I) FROM THK 
 
 3lmfvican JU^tovical ^mm 
 
 VOL. Xlll., NO. 3 APRIL, 190S 
 
[Reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol. XIII., \o. 3, April, 1908.] 
 
 DOCUMENTS 
 
 Narrative and Letter of Williaui Henry Trescot, concernino- the 
 
 Negotiations betzveen South Carolina and President 
 
 Buchanan in December, i860. 
 
 William Henry Trescot was born in Charleston, South Caro- 
 lina, November 22, 1822, and when he was thirty years old was 
 appointed Secretary of Legation at London, serving for two years, 
 when he returned to Charleston and entered upon the practice of 
 law. He also wrote on diplomatic and international subjects on 
 which he soon became recognized as an authority. 
 
 In 1852 appeared his book, The Diplomacy of the Revohition ; 
 an Historical Study (New York), and in 1857 ^^^^ Diplomatic 
 History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams (Boston). 
 He had planned the writing of a complete diplomatic history of the 
 United States, dividing it into four parts — the period of the Revo- 
 lution, from Washington to Jefiferson, from Jefferson to Monroe's 
 declaration, and from Monroe to his own time. The enduring 
 value of the only two volumes he completed must cause regret 
 that circumstances drew him away from carrying out his project. 
 
 His volume of the Diplomatic History of the Administrations of 
 Washington and Adams was still fresh from the press when Presi- 
 dent Buchanan invited him to occupy the congenial and dignified 
 office of Assistant Secretary of State. 
 
 The President regarded the place as one of great importance, 
 for he was aware that Lewis Cass, whom he appointed to be Secre- 
 tary of State, was indisposed to responsibility and not possessed 
 of the peculiar talents necessary to make a shining success in the 
 office he called him to fill.^ But Cass had a large following and 
 brought support to the Administration ; and Trescot's appointment 
 also meant more than merely bringing his individual talents into 
 the service of the government, for he represented in a notable de- 
 gree the ruling class of South Carolina and South Carolina repre- 
 sented and led the advanced school of slavery and states'-rights sen- 
 timent in the South. Himself of one of the old patrician families of 
 the state, his marriage to Miss Eliza Natalie Cuthbert had widened 
 
 ' See Curtis's Buchanan, II. 399. 
 
 (528) 
 
529 Documents 
 
 and confirmed his family influence, and family influence counted 
 for much in this unique commonwealth. He had a house in Charles- 
 ton where his law office was, a farm in the up-country at Pendleton 
 and an island on the coast which had come down to his wife by 
 royal grant of George III. 
 
 It cannot be truthfully said that the service which he found 
 himself performing soon after he became Assistant Secretary of 
 State came wholly as a surprise to him, for in the dedication of 
 his Diplomatic History written in 1857 he had spoken gloomily 
 of the " miserable dissension " then distracting the country, and 
 his knowledge of the sentiment of the people of his state must 
 have prepared him for what happened. How he became the unac- 
 credited envoy of South Carolina near the government of the 
 United States conducting negotiations upon the adjustment of 
 which seemed to hang the fate of the nation and of his state is 
 explained in the narrative which follows and which in its original 
 form has never before seen the light of day. It was written 
 in February, 1861, immediately after Mr. Trescot returned to 
 South Carolina to cast in his fortunes with his native state. Ten 
 years later (in 1871) using this account as the basis he wrote a 
 second narrative, which some years afterwards he lent to General 
 Samuel Wylie Crawford under stipulation and restrictions as to its 
 use which the borrower failed to observe, and a part of it was printed 
 in General Crawford's book The Genesis of the Civil War: the 
 Story of Sumter (New York, 1887). The original narrative has 
 never been heretofore printed. 
 
 During the Civil War Mr. Trescot served in the legislature, 
 ^s a member of the executive council of South Carolina and as a 
 colonel on the staff of General Roswell S. Ripley, C. S. A. ; but 
 in his chosen field, where he was a master and where his talents 
 would have been of greatest avail to the Confederate government, 
 he was given no opportunity to perform any service, being pre- 
 vented by the same cause which obscured so much of the best 
 talent of the South when it was most needed. In common with 
 many other Southerners he was not in sympathy with Jefferson 
 Davis and held him in slight esteem, and Davis made no effort 
 to make use of him in his administration. 
 
 The war having closed Mr. Trescot came to Washington, which 
 he made his chief place of residence until a few years before his death, 
 when he retired to Pendleton where he died May 4, 1898. During 
 the years of his residence in Washington he performed much service 
 for the government, all of the highest order, and occasionally con- 
 
 AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XIII. — 35. 
 
Nari^ative of William Henry Trcscot 530 
 
 tributed able and suggestive articles to the magazines. The com- 
 plete list of the public offices he held follows, with dates of ap- 
 pointment : secretary of legation at London, December 30, 1852 ; 
 assistant secretary of state, June 11, i860; commissioner to China 
 to negotiate treaty, April 9, 1880 (he signed the treaty) ; special 
 envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Chile, Novem- 
 ber 28, 1881 ; commissioner to negotiate commercial treaty with 
 Mexico, August 7, 1882 (he signed the treaty) ; delegate to Pan- 
 American Conference, April 2, 1889 ; counsel for the United States 
 before the Halifax Fishery Commission in 1877. 
 
 The following is a partial list of his writings. Books : The 
 Diplomacy of the Revolution; an Historical Study (New York, 
 1852) ; The Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washing- 
 ton and Adams, lySg-iSoi (Boston, 1857). Pamphlets: A Few 
 Thoughts on the Foreign Policy of the United States (Charleston,, 
 1849) 5 ^ ^ Oration delivered before the Beaufort Volunteer Artillery 
 on July 4, 1850 (Charleston, 1850) ;- The Position and Course of 
 the South (Charleston, 1850) ;- A Letter to Honorable A. P. Butler,. 
 U. S. Senate, on the Diplomatic System of the United States- 
 (Charleston, 1853) f An American Viezv of the Eastern Question 
 (Charleston, 1854) f Oration delivered before the South Carolina- 
 Historical Society (printed in the Collections of the South Carolina. 
 Historical Society, 1889, vol. HI. ; The Late General Stephen Elliott: 
 Eulogy delivered in the House of Representatives of South Carolina,. 
 Friday, September y, 1866 (London, 1867) ;- Three Letters for 
 James L. Orr, Governor of South Carolina, to the President of the 
 United States and the Secretary of the Treasury in reference to the 
 Sea Islands (Washington, Gibson Brothers, 1868) ; Memorial of the 
 Life of J. Johnston Pettigrew, Brigadier General, C. S. A. (Charles- 
 ton, 1870) ;- Letter Rez-iezmng the Bayard-Chamberlain Fishery 
 Treaty (Washington, 1888) f Oration before the Alumni of the Col- 
 lege of Charleston (Charleston, 1889). Gaillard Hunt. 
 
 [Although that version of his narrative which Mr. Trescot 
 wrote in February, 1861, is for obvious reasons preferred, as more 
 nearly contemporaneous, to that which he prepared in 1870, certain^ 
 portions of the latter which are not represented by parallel passages 
 in the former, and not printed in General Crawford's book, have 
 been inserted below in square brackets. For the contribution which 
 follows, we are indebted to Edward A. Trescot, Esq., the writer's, 
 son. Ed.] 
 
 ^ A copy is in the Library of Congress. 
 ' A copy is in the Department of State. 
 
531 Doamients 
 
 [Introduction to the second version, dated August, 18/O: — These 
 pages make no pretension to be either literature or history. They are 
 simply a record of the impression made upon me by events which have 
 been the subject of much controversy and the truth about which is of 
 essential importance to the future history of the Country. 
 
 I do not even claim that my impressions are correct. All I can claim 
 is that they are the honest impressions made by facts truthfully stated. 
 There may be other facts, unknown to me, equally true, and very dif- 
 ferent impressions may have been made by them on men equally honest. 
 
 But it is only by a rigid and impartial scrutiny of all the testimony 
 that the future historian can reach the positive truth. This is only a 
 contribution to the materials of that future history. 
 
 These pages were written in February 1861, immediately upon my 
 return from Washington, now nearly ten years ago.] 
 
 About the beginning of June i860, I reached Washington and was 
 ■confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Secretary of State in the place of 
 the Hon John Appleton appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia. 
 I did not know then and have not learned since to what influence the 
 appointment was due. It was made without consultation with my friends 
 and without previous intimation to me. At the time I was entirely 
 "withdrawn from public life and indeed with the exception of a very 
 •short Diplomatic service as Secretary of Legation at London while the 
 Hon J. R. Ingersoll was Minister and Mr Everett, Sec of State, I had 
 never been in public life at all. had never taken any active part in public 
 affairs either in the State or in the Union. Gen Cass, who was Secre- 
 tary of State was pleased to say that the appointment was made entirely 
 for its fitness evidenced by certain publications upon the subject of our 
 Diplomatic History to which it is unnecessary further to refer. Upon 
 my arrival in Washington I saw Mr Buchanan and Gen Cass for the 
 first' time and with the exception of the Senators and some of the Mem- 
 bers from South Carolina I had no personal acquaintance with any of 
 the public characters of the day. I ought perhaps to except Mr Slidell 
 the Senator from Louisiana whom I knew slightly. 
 
 Soon after my arrival Congress adjourned and just before the ad- 
 journment Gen Cass left on leave of absence to spend his summer at 
 Detroit and I was appointed by the President's warrant and in con- 
 formity with the Act of 1797 Acting Secretary of State. 
 
 Placed thus at the head of the State Department my relations with 
 the President, the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministers were naturally and 
 necessarily freer and more intimate than they would have been under 
 ordinary circumstances, with the President especially as he took a 
 special interest in that Department and watched its proceedings minutely 
 and carefully. His Diplomatic experience was large and his views very 
 cautious as well as very clear. I shall allways consider my official inter- 
 course with him a great advantage and whatever may have happened 
 since shall always remember with kindness his uniform courtesy and 
 
Narrative of William Henry Trescot 532 
 
 confidence and the many pleasant incidents of that summers association. 
 Of him and his cabinet I shall record my impressions hereafter. At 
 present my object is simply to preserve while they are fresh in my 
 memory a narrative of the events connected with the visit of the Com- 
 missioners from South Carolina. 
 
 By the time the autumn arrived a common interest in the political 
 questions of the day and frequent association had brought me into 
 rather intimate relations with the Southern Members of the Cabinet, 
 Cobb, Floyd and Thomson. At length the decisive day came and Lin- 
 colns election presented a practical issue to the South. The attitude 
 of South Carolina gave additional importance to my position for I was 
 the only South Carolinian connected with the administration with any- 
 thing like official rank and the only one who held anything like confi- 
 dential relations with the leaders of public opinion in the State and as 
 Congress was not in session it was very natural that upon the question 
 of the relations of the Government to the State I should be very freely 
 consulted. 
 
 It is unnecessary now to go through the various conversations espe- 
 cially with Mr Cobb and Gov : Floyd which accompanied the progress 
 of events. It is sufficient to say that from the election of Lincoln and 
 indeed from the time that his election was probable, Mr Cobb expressed 
 but one opinion, that it was the duty of the South in defence both of 
 honour and interest to dissolve the Union. He thought that every State 
 should secede by itself and that secession should be practically accom- 
 plished on the 4'" of March upon the close of Mr Buchanans adminis- 
 tration. This he thought most likely to unite the South and only due 
 to Mr Buchanans consistent support of Southern rights. 
 
 Gov : Floyd thought secession unwise and dissolution unnecessary. 
 He believed the Black republican triumph only temporary and that their 
 success would be their destruction. As a matter of policy therefore 
 he wished to fight in the Union but recognised the right of a State to 
 secede if she thought it necessary and fully sympathised with the South 
 in the opinion that as far as the North was concerned enough had been 
 done to justify any action the South might take. 
 
 Mr Thomsons general views I never did understand clearly. As far 
 as I could learn, he would go with the South but did not seem to think 
 that the South would act or would be forced to act. 
 
 The President and Gov: Toucey the Sec of the Navy seemed to me 
 to agree most perfectly. They thought with Gov Floyd that the repub- 
 lican victory was only illusory — that the party could not survive success 
 and that great and universal re-action had commenced at the North. 
 They did not believe that the South was in earnest and thought that 
 secession was probable only in the case of S. C. but they neither recog- 
 nised the right of a State to secede. 
 
 Gen Cass stood I think by himself. From the beginning he believed 
 Lincolns election certain and the dissolution of the Union inevitable. 
 
533 Uocuments 
 
 Not recognising any right in a State to secede except as a revolutionary 
 right, he would have resisted the right at the commencement and as the 
 sworn officer of the U. S. have done his utmost to preserve its integrity. 
 That he believed to be his duty and he would have done it altho he 
 believed he would not succeed in his attempt for a long and bloody civil 
 war, he has over and over again said to me, was the sure and necessary 
 result of the existing condition of things. 
 
 Judge Black, the Atty Gen, agreed more nearly with Gen Cass than 
 with anybody else but the Judge never at least before I left Washington 
 seemed to get beyond the legal bearings of the question. It was not 
 with him a question of State but a legal question submitted to the Atty 
 Gen for his opinion. 
 
 Of Mr Holt's opinion I had no personal knowledge — what it was has 
 been made very evident of late. 
 
 The first time that I was called on to do more than exchange opin- 
 ions was just after the Legislature of the State had determined to call 
 the Convention but before the election of Members of that body. Just 
 as I was sitting down to dinner one day I received a telegraph from 
 Charleston saying that intense excitement prevailed in the city on ac- 
 count of the removal by Col. Gardner then in command at Fort Moultrie 
 of some arms or ammunition from the U. S. Arsenal in the City, that 
 if the removal was by orders from the Dep of War, it ought to be 
 revoked, otherwise collission was inevitable. Knowing that the Cabinet 
 were then in session I went over immediately to the White House and 
 met the members as the Council broke up, coming down. I called Gov: 
 Floyd aside and he was joined I think by Cobb and Toucey to whom I 
 shewed the Despatch. Gov : Floyd replied " Telegraph back at once, 
 say you have seen me, that no such orders have been issued and none 
 such will be issued under any circumstances ". This I did immediately. 
 When a day or two after I received letters giving me a more detailed 
 account of the whole transaction I again saw Gov Floyd who commu- 
 nicated to me in a very full conversation the information he had received 
 and his impressions and his final determination to remove Col. Gardiner 
 and supply his place with Major Robert Anderson in whose discretion 
 coolness and judgment he put great confidence.* He also determined to 
 send Col. Ben Huger to take charge of the Arsenal, believing that his 
 high reputation, and his close association with many of the most influ- 
 ential people in Charleston and the fact of his being a Carolinian would 
 satis [f]y the people of the intentions of the Government. He said that 
 with his opinions he never could and never would consent to the coercion 
 of a Sovereign State — that while he did not think the action of S. C. 
 wise, he sympathised deeply with her spirit — that considering the re-in- 
 forcement of the garrisons in Charleston Harbour as looking very like 
 coercion and at any rate only calculated to excite and irritate the popular 
 feeling he would not consent to it. But that he would not submit to 
 * See Official Records of the War, I. 69-73. 
 
Narrative of Williani Henry Trescot 534 
 
 any attempt on the part of the people to take the forts^that he was 
 bound to resist and would resist. What would be the consequence of 
 the secession of the State was a grave question which had not yet arisen 
 but that at present he was resolved upon two things — not to reinforce 
 the forts and not to allow them to be taken by an unlawful force. In 
 these positions I agreed with him and both he and I agreed further in 
 believing that there was no danger of an attack on the forts by an 
 unlawful mob and that the State would take action she might deem 
 necessary regularly and with due notice to the Government at Wash- 
 ington. The position of Gov Floyd I explained fully by letters to those 
 at home who could in my opinion best use the knowledge for the purpose 
 of quieting the alarm and apprehension of the citizens of Charleston. 
 
 The apprehension of the people of Charleston however was not easily 
 quieted and Gen Cass and Judge Black were anxious to send reinforce- 
 ments to the Forts. The subject was one of constant discussion. Gov: 
 Floyd was earnest in his determination and resolved not to re-inforce 
 "but he thought that when such were his opinions he ought to be trusted, 
 that if in the ordinary routine of the business of his Dep, he sent a few 
 men to Fort Sumt[e]r or a few boxes of ammunition to Fort Moultrie, 
 they ought not to be objects of suspicion. They would never be used 
 and he argued with great force — " You tell me that if any attempt is 
 made to do what under ordinary circumstances is done every day, you 
 will be unable to restrain your people — suppose you are not able to 
 restrain them now, am I bound to leave those garrisons unprotected to 
 the mercy of a mob — am I not bound to enable them to resist the unlaw- 
 ful violence which you cannot resist? " 
 
 While I felt the force of this reasoning I knew also that in the then 
 condition of feeling in Charleston, anything that could be even misun- 
 derstood or misrepresented as reinforcement would lead to an explosion 
 which would injure the whole Southern cause. I therefore saw Gov 
 Cobb, explained to him what I understood to be Gov Floyds position. 
 I told him that while I admitted its strength things were in that con- 
 dition that he could not act from it — that I had the most perfect confi- 
 dence in him and had pledged myself that our people could trust him 
 perfectly but that any nice difference between what was re-inforcement 
 for the purpose of re-inforcement and what was only ordinary routine 
 would not be understood at such a time — and that unless the Sec of War 
 could make up his mind to allow no change in the Forts important or 
 not, I could not answer for the consequences and after what I had 
 written home would feel bound to resign and tell the authorities there 
 to judge for themselves. I believed such a step would lead to the occu-' 
 pation of Fort Snmter in forty eight hours. And I told him that I was 
 on my way to Gov Floyd to announce to him my conclusion. He pro- 
 posed that I should postpone my visit until after a conference which he 
 ■was to have that morning with Gov Floyd and Mr Thomson. I did so. 
 That night Gov Floyd called at my house and had a long and very free 
 
535 Documents 
 
 conversation in which he expressed his former convictions, his feeling; 
 that the South ought to accept his action without suspicion as his opin- 
 ions were well known and fixed and had been acted on consistently long- 
 before this crisis had come, but that if I thought that collision between 
 the people of the State and the Government forces would be precipitated 
 he would not consent that a man nor a gun should be sent to any of the 
 Forts in the harbour of Charleston and if his sense of duty induced any 
 change in his determination, I would be informed by him in advance of 
 any action and in ample time to pursue such a course as I deemed 
 proper. Things continued upon this footing while the cabinet was en- 
 gaged in the discussion of the President's annual message, but those 
 members of the Cabinet who desired that re-inforcements should be sent 
 pressed their policy and a few evenings after the last conversation with 
 Gov Floyd, he called upon me evidently much excited. He said that 
 just after dinner the President had sent for him, that when he reached 
 him (at his room in the State Dep : which he occupied while preparing 
 his message) he found Gen Cass and Judge Black there who retired 
 immediately upon his entrance. The President then informed him that 
 he had determined to re-inforce the garrisons in Charleston harbour 
 upon which a very animated discussion arose which had finally ended 
 by the Presidents suspending his decision until Gen Scott reached Wash- 
 ington and the Gen. had been immediately telegraphed to come on to 
 Washington. Gov : Floyd thought that he could satisfy Scott of the 
 impolicy of such a step. He asked me to accompany him to Mr Cobb. 
 Mr Cobb had been quite sick for a day or two and when we reached his 
 house we found that the Dr had given orders that he should not be dis- 
 turbed. We then started for Mr Thomson's but met him a very few 
 steps off on his way to Mr Cobbs and we all returned to Gov : Floyds 
 where we had a very long discussion of the whole question. Gov: Floyd 
 declared that his mind was made up, that he would cut off his right 
 hand before he would sign an order to send re-inforcements to the Caro- 
 lina forts and if the President insisted he would resign. Mr Thomson 
 said he agreed with him perfectly and would sustain his course and 
 follow him. 
 
 The practical question was by what means the President could be 
 induced to change his purpose. I suggested three. 
 
 I. I was not a Cabinet Minister but as Acting Sec of State during 
 a great part of the summer had been in confidential relations with the 
 President. I was the only S. C. in Washington who occupied any posi- 
 tion that brought me into official relation with the President directly — he 
 had conversed with me more than once on this subject with freedom' 
 and my relations to the public men at home enabled me* to speak authori- 
 tatively of and to them. I proposed that I should go to the President, 
 state to him that the Sec of War had communicated to me his intentions, 
 disabuse his mind of any unfounded apprehensions as to the action of 
 the State and submit to him the reasons against such a policy as he 
 
Narrative of William Henry Trescot 536 
 
 thought of adopting. Should I make no impression I would then say- 
 that under the circumstances it was my duty however painful to submit 
 my resignation then and there and leave for Columbia the next morning 
 to submit all the facts to the Executive of S. C. I would be in Columbia 
 in 36 hours and upon such information there could be no earthly doubt 
 that the Forts would be occupied in the following 24. Such a resolution 
 respectfully but firmly stated would I thought make the President hesi- 
 tate. Indeed he could not have acted for he would have been forced 
 to remove Gov : Floyd and the time occupied in the changes and in the 
 execution of the orders would be more than enough to give the State 
 the necessary opportunity. This for reasons unnecessary now to state 
 but which were conclusive, was rejected. 
 
 2. To telegraph Mr Miles the M.C. from Charleston to come on 
 immediately in hopes that his representation of the public feeling in 
 Charleston very much exaggerated by the telegraph and letter writers, 
 would relieve the President. This was also rejected. 
 
 3. The third which was adopted was that I should write to the Gov- 
 ernor of the State (Gist) tell him that the President was under very 
 strong apprehensions that the people would sieze the Forts — that in 
 consequence he felt bound to send re-inforcements. That the Southern 
 Members of the Cabinet would resist this policy to resignation but that 
 they thought that if he felt authorized to write a letter assuring the 
 President that if no reinforcements were sent, there would be no attempt 
 upon the Forts before the meeting of the Convention and that then Com- 
 missioners would be sent to negotiate all the points of difference, that 
 their hands would be strengthened, the responsibility of provoking colli- 
 sion would be taken from the State and the President would probably 
 be relieved from the necessity of pursuing this policy. They added that 
 if such a letter was written and failed he should have information in 
 ample time to take such steps as the interest of the State required. 
 
 I wrote such a letter and in a few days received the following an- 
 swer — (see Letter )° which I communicated to Govs Floyd Cobb and 
 Mr Thomson. 
 
 While these consultations and conversations were occurring, the 
 President had prepared his Message and in view of its tenor and the 
 probable action of my State, I deemed it proper to say to the President 
 that I had informed Gen Cass I felt it my duty to resign and I would 
 be glad if he would make his selection for my successor as it would 
 probably not be convenient to him for me to leave the office without 
 any one in charge. My interview with the President was a very kind 
 ■one and at that time Mr Ledyard it was understood would be appointed. 
 He was the son-in-law of Gen Cass, had been his Sec. Legation in 
 France and was in every way very well qualified for the Post. I heard 
 
 ° Trescot's letter of November 26, i860, and Governor Gist's reply of No- 
 vember 29, and other letter of the same date, will be found in Crawford, Genesis of 
 the Civil War, pp. 30-32- 
 
537 Documents 
 
 afterwards that great objection was entertained in some quarters against 
 his appointment on account of his supposed preference for Mr Douglass 
 or a sympathy with the Black republicans. Of this I know nothing. 
 My intercourse with him was always pleasant. We differed widely but 
 ■ respected each others differences and never discussed party politics. A 
 day or two after the receipt of Gov. Gist's letter on the Saturday pre- 
 ceeding the Monday on which Congress assembled, Gov Cobb informed 
 me that the President was desirous that I should take a special copy of 
 his message in advance of its publication to Gov : Gist. That I had been 
 conversant with the discussions relating to it, understood the Presidents 
 views and could while in Columbia explain what was misunderstood 
 there and bring back correct and authoritative account of the state of 
 opinion in S. C. and thus serve to prepare the way for a temperate solu- 
 tion of the issues which must soon arise. The secession of the State 
 was considered certain but it was desirable that an issue of force or a 
 rude collision should if possible be avoided. I saw the President imme- 
 diately and expressed my willingness to go if he deemed it advisable 
 and he then requested me to withhold my resignation until my return 
 and appointed the hour of nine the next night to give me such instruc- 
 tions as he thought necessary. 
 
 On Sunday night" about nine o'clock the President sent for me. 
 While the President was preparing his Annual Message for Congress 
 it was his custom to spend the morning in a room at the State Dep. 
 specially set apart for him and on several occasions he had sent for 
 me in reference to Treaties and other papers relating to the Foreign 
 Affairs of the year. On several of these occasions the conversation 
 had turned upon the present condition of public affairs. As events 
 developed the President became very anxious and would always enquire 
 for the news from Carolina. He had come to the conclusion that the 
 State would secede and the two issues that seemed most to render him 
 uneasy were the collection of the revenues and the seizure of the Forts. 
 I assured him that I did not think he had much to apprehend in the way 
 of unlawful force, that the people of So. Ca. not only held the right of 
 Secession but that they took special pride in carrying out that ri<yht 
 quietly, regularly, peaceably as a right not as a revolutionary measure- 
 that I really believed it would mortify them to be compelled to resort to 
 force. That they would pass the Ordonnance of Secession and then 
 send regularly accredited agents to negotiate with the governments. 
 " But " said he " you know I cannot recognize them, all I can do is 
 to refer them to Congress ". I told him that I believed such a refer- 
 ence courteously made and in good faith would be accepted and that the 
 
 State would wait a reasonable time for the decision of Congress this 
 
 he seemed to think would be sufficient if the Secession was inevitable 
 but still he was very cautious and his great hope seemed to be by tem- 
 porizing to avoid an issue before the 4*'' March. 
 
 ° December 2. 
 
Narrative of William Henry Trescot 538 
 
 On Sunday night when I saw him, he went over the old ground, said 
 that he thought his message ought to be acceptable to the South that 
 he had spoken the truth boldly and clearly and that all that he had 
 declared was that with regard to the laws of the U. S and the property 
 he would discharge the obligations of his official oath. 
 
 I told him that I would take the message with pleasure because it 
 was a courtesy to the Executive of the State and because I thought that 
 waiving the opinions as to the right of Secession it was as conciliatory 
 as it was possible for him to make it from his position and indeed more 
 so than I had expected. But that I must say in candour that it would 
 have no effect upon the action of the Convention, that my recent letters 
 satisfied me that the State would not only secede but that it would secede 
 immediately — that delay until the 4*" March was impossible but that 
 having said that much I was perfectly willing to take the message as 
 he desired and I felt confident that he might rely upon my assurance 
 that there would be no violence used towards the Forts by any unlawful 
 assemblage or mob, and that I had in my pocket a letter from the Gov- 
 ernor of the State which I would read to him if he desired and_the- 
 tenour of which I then communicated to him. He then asked me if 
 I had seen Gen Cass. I said not that day but that I had talked over 
 the whole subject with him again and again and we always ended where- 
 we began. He said however that I must see him when I left the White- 
 House- — he wished it particularly and say to him all that I had just 
 said to him. I went to the Generals and did repeat my conversation^ 
 with the President and left Washington for Columbia on Monday- 
 morning.^ 
 
 [Governor Gist received the message in the spirit in which it was; 
 sent but he said at once, what indeed was evident from even two or three 
 days association with the members of the Legislature, that the State 
 was determined on immediate secession, that no scheme of policy how- 
 ever plausible could induce delay until the 4th March either in deference 
 to Mr Buchanans position or with a view to the co-operation of other 
 states. At the same time it was evident that the leaders of public opin- 
 ion did not desire an issue of force and would proceed, temperately but 
 resolutely in their work. It was also clear that to avoid such an issue, 
 the Federal Government, however it temporized, would have to concede 
 the principle upon which the State stood. There was also a strong- 
 resolution to prevent if possible any popular demonstration of force 
 either in violation of the laws or in the seizure of the property of the 
 United States.] 
 
 I reached Washington on Sunday* on my return and saw the Presi- 
 dent for a few moments that evening and made an appointment for 
 Monday. 
 
 On Monday when I called, the Carolina Delegation were with him,. 
 
 ' December 3. 
 * December 9. 
 
539 Documents 
 
 I did not interrupt them but when they had gone I saw him. He shewed 
 me a paper signed by all of them I think but Col Ashmore — the paper 
 which has been published in the correspondence between the President 
 and the Commissioners." He appeared to be much gratified by it and 
 much relieved and said that he had asked them to see me and he 
 would then have a talk with me. I told him that I had not seen 
 them but that paper did not go any farther if as far as the Governors 
 letter which I had communicated to him. " What letter " said he " I 
 do not recollect it and when ? " " The evening on which you gave me 
 your message to take to Columbia." He said he did not remember it, 
 " have you got it ? " I said it was at my house and I could get it in 
 five minutes and added that as the Sec of the Interior had just come in 
 I would leave them to their business while I went for it. I brought it 
 back and read it to the President in Mr Thomson's presence. We then 
 discussed it and the whole subject and I told the President that my 
 impression from my visit confirmed exactly what I had said to him 
 tjefore I went. " Well ", said he, " that is all very well up to the point 
 where the negotiation stops — for Congress may refuse to entertain it — 
 what then?" "Then Sir", said I, "I will speak with the most perfect 
 candour, then the State will take the Forts — what else can she do if 
 she is in earnest? But I hope the negotiation will not fail. And", I 
 added, " Mr President, why keep troops in the Forts at all ? — \i I under- 
 stand your message rightly you consider them simply as property just 
 as you do the Post Office and the Sub Treasury building — You dont 
 propose to guard them do you?" He said "No". "Then", said I, 
 ■" why not treat the Forts precisely in the same manner — keep an orderly 
 sergeant and one or two men there only? " He said he had great faith 
 in the honour of the State and that the Governors letter and the Memo- 
 randum of the M.C's was a guarantee he believed that nothing violent 
 would be done. That he would receive the Commissioners kindly and 
 refer the whole matter to Congress and so on travelling round in the 
 same circle — and I took my leave. 
 
 Soon after my return to Washington I received late one night a 
 telegraph from Charleston informing me that some muskets had been 
 removed from the Arsenal in Charleston by Captn Foster U. S. A. I 
 took the telegraph over to Gov: Floyd who was confined to his bed and 
 was requested by him to see Col Drinkard the C.C. of the Dep and tell 
 him to issue an order by telegraph for their immediate restoration. 
 The order was sent and by the telegraph which was kept open all night, 
 was acknowledged. The next morning the arms were restored." 
 
 * 36 Cong., 2 sess., House Ex. Doc, no. 26, vol. VI., p. 9 ; Official Records of 
 the War, I. 116 ; Curtis, Buchanan, II. 377. Statement of Miles and Keitt to the 
 South Carolina Convention, Official Records, I. 125-128. 
 
 " Official Records, I. 95-100. Two telegrams to Mr. Trescot upon the sub- 
 ject, taken from the second version of his narrative, are given in Crawford, 
 Genesis, pp. 77, 78. 
 
Narrative of William Hejiry Trescot 540 
 
 In the meantime Gen Cass who had from the beginning of the con- 
 troversy held but one opinion and one language, submitted to the Presi- 
 dent his formal advice that re-inforcements should be sent to the Forts 
 at Charleston. The morning on which he submitted his opinion I went 
 into his room to hand him my resignation which I had withdrawn until 
 my return from Columbia. He begged me to keep it for a day or two 
 for events might render it unnecessary, at least he perhaps could not 
 act on it — he said he could not speak more plainly then but the next 
 day he would explain all altho I probably understood him. This of 
 course I knew meant only one thing and the next day he resigned, the 
 President having refused to accept his advice. Under the circumstances 
 I felt bound to say to the President that I would continue in office until 
 he appointed a New Secretary provided the appointment was made 
 before the Act of Secession was passed by the Convention. For the 
 refusal to adopt Gen Cass' advice was in the interest of the State and 
 it would have embarrassed the President to have the Dep without either 
 a Secretary or an Asst Sec. Judge Black, the Atty Gen who was 
 appointed was very busy in the Supreme Court and it was not I think 
 before the 17th the day of the passage of the Act that I fairly ceased 
 official action at the Dep. 
 
 The Legislature of S. C. had elected by this time the new Governor 
 Pickens. I wrote to him informing him that his predecessor Gov: Gist 
 had desired me to remain in Washington after my resignation in order 
 that there might be some authorized channel of communication until the 
 arrival of Commissioners from the Convention and I described to the 
 Gov: the then condition of things. This invitation of Gov: Gist I had 
 communicated to the Pres and such members of the Cabinet as I con- 
 sulted or even spoke to freely on public affairs. (See letter.)" 
 
 Soon after Gov P's election the Convention met and passed the Ordi- 
 nance of Secession, but before the Ordinance passed, D. H. Hamilton 
 arrived from Gov : P. with a letter for me" covering a sealed letter to 
 
 "The letter, Trescot to Pickens, December 14, i860, follows on a later page. 
 
 '-This letter, dated Columbia, December 17, and marked "Strictly con- 
 fidential ", is here transcribed from the copy in the second version of Mr. Trescot's 
 narrative : 
 
 "My Dear Sir: — I send Daniel H. Hamilton, the bearer of a very important 
 confidential letter to the President of the United States and would be deeply 
 obliged to you, as you are now in Washington under request of Gov : Gist, to 
 attend to him immediately and go with him to see that he most certainly is able 
 to deliver himself the letter to the President of the U. S. 
 
 " You will take occasion to say to the President that Mr Hamilton will remain 
 one day if it is desired he shall wait that long, to receive any letter or com- 
 munication that may be made and that you will deliver it yourself— and if you 
 think it necessary you may yourself bring the answer if the President accompanies 
 it by any verbal explanation that may be trusted to you from the President. 
 
 " And by the end of one day you will communicate with Mr Hamilton and 
 inform him whether he will bring the answer or whether you will bring it your- 
 self." 
 
541 Documents 
 
 the President which I was directed to see delivered by Hamilton. Its 
 contents were not communicated but I was informed that Hamilton was 
 to wait 24 hours for an answer, but that if the President preferred 
 sending an answer by me accompanied by a verbal communication, I 
 was instructed to bring it. The nature of this extraordinary missive 
 I had received notice of in a confidential letter by the previous mail not 
 from the Gov: however. I saw the President and returned with Ham- 
 ilton at an hour appointed. The President received us in the Library, 
 read the letter and asked Hamilton when he expected to return. He 
 replied the next morning. The P. said it was impossible to give him 
 the answer by that time — could he not wait longer? Hamilton said 
 Yes, until the next evening. The P. said the answer would then be 
 ready. Hamilton then said, " Mr President I am aware of the contents 
 of that letter and think that if you would accept them it would greatly 
 facilitate the negotiations between my government and the U. S." The 
 President said he would consider it and give Mr Hamilton his answer 
 the next day. The President as I was leaving the room called me 
 back, gave me the letter, asked me to read it and return to him, to talk 
 it over." 
 
 The letter proposed that in order to quiet the apprehensions of the 
 people of the State as to the Forts, Gov P. should be authorized by the 
 President to occupy Fort Sumter with a small body of State troops, the 
 answer to the request or demand to be given in 24 hours. 
 
 The objections to this demand it is useless to state, but if Gov P had 
 simply asked the President for an assurance that Sumter should not 
 be occupied and that Anderson should be so instructed I think it could 
 have been obtained. As it was, this demand if persisted in released the 
 President from his pledge to the Members of C and placed them in a 
 very awkward attitude and in my opinion would lead to exactly what it 
 wanted to avoid. I consulted Senators Davis and Slidell and we were 
 very much embarrassed what to do. Gen Bonham and McQueen dined 
 with me that day and as Hamilton had told them of the object of his 
 mission I communicated to them the contents of his letter and told them 
 that if they would join me I would telegraph the Gov for authority to 
 withdraw it. We did so, I received the authority and the next morning 
 withdrew the letter." The President expressed his gratification, repeated 
 to me over and again his desire to avoid a collision, his readiness to 
 receive Commissioners, to refer them to Congress in good faith and his 
 determination not to disturb the Status of the Forts but to wait the 
 result of their negotiation. He was pledged, he said, not to disturb the 
 Status in the favour of the U. S. and the Gov ought not and could not 
 justly ask him to disturb it in favour of the State. He was trusting to 
 
 ''This letter of Pickens, December 17, i860, the day of his inauguration as 
 governor, and three days before the secession of the state, was printed in the 
 Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, regular session of 
 November, 1861, p. 67, and reprinted in Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, III. 2. 
 
 " See Buchanan's memorandum in Curtis, 11. 383. 
 
Narrative of Willia^n Henry Trescot 542 
 
 the honour of Carolina and they ought not to suspect him, he was acting 
 under the obligations of his honour and I and the State might rely upon 
 it, would redeem it to the uttermost. He said he had taken no copy of 
 the letter but would be glad if I had no objections to have a copy of the 
 telegraph under which I withdrew it which I gave him. I accordingly 
 returned the letter to Hamilton with a letter to the Governor stating 
 my reasons for desiring to withdraw it. (See letter.)" 
 [On the 23'' I received the following telegram 
 
 W H Trcscott Charleston Deer 23, 60 
 
 I have been informed that thirteen men have arrived by the North 
 Eastern rail road and they say they were sent to Fort Moultrie and are 
 a part of one hundred and fifty (150). I desire to know immediately 
 if it is intended to reinforce the forts or to transfer any force from Fort 
 Moultrie to Fort Sumter. I want a clear answer on this immediately. 
 Until the Commissioners shall negotiate at Washington, there can be no 
 change here. F. W. Pickens. 
 
 Again I called upon Gov : Floyd. The Gov was evidently becoming 
 impatient under the embarrassments of his position for it was difficult 
 to be accountable to the President on the one hand and to the State of 
 S. C. on the other. He had done every thing that a man in his situation 
 could do to prove his good faith and he felt very naturally that the 
 difficulties of his position ought to be appreciated and that explanations 
 and pledges perhaps inconsistent with his duties should not be pressed 
 except under the very gravest necessity. It was moreover a matter of 
 great moment that in this juncture Gov Floyd should retain his place in 
 the Cabinet as long as possible and every step he took or did not take 
 was watched and misrepresented for no man at the South was more 
 cordially detested by the Black Republican Party. Gov Floyd told me 
 to reply to the Governor that there was not the slightest foundation for 
 any alarm, that he knew nothing of any such men and any statement to 
 such an effect was a sheer fabrication, made he must suppose, for pur- 
 poses of mischief. As for the removal of troops to Sumter, he could 
 not see any likelihood of it, that he did not think it necessary to send 
 special orders to that end to Maj Anderson for he could not consider 
 it at all probable and that in fact he thought any such contingency pro- 
 vided against by orders already sent to which he did not feel at liberty 
 to refer more specially ; that the Commissioners must soon be in Wash- 
 ington and that he could see no rational ground for anticipating pre- 
 mature difficulty. I thought this as far really as he could go and that 
 to press upon him or the President more positive action was to risk the 
 advantage that continued delay on the part of the Government was 
 giving to the State. I therefore telegraphed the Governor the con- 
 tradiction he authorized and waited with anxiety the arrival of the 
 Commissioners.] 
 
 "This letter, Trescot to Pickens, December 21, i860, was printed in the 
 Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, regular session of 
 November, 1861, pp. 169-171. and reprinted in Nicolay and Hay, III. 7-9. 
 
543 Documents 
 
 Within a very few days I received from the Governor a formal 
 despatch by telegraph stating the appointment by the Convention of 
 Commissioners and instructing me to communicate their appointment and 
 the time of their departure to the President which I did. He asked the 
 character of the appointments, expressed himself pleased with the 
 selection, disclosed his readiness to see them and to refer them courte- 
 ously to Congress and his intention to act in perfect good faith. 
 
 The Commissioners telegraphed me to remain in Washington until 
 they came. I made the necessary arrangements for them, received them 
 and called the evening of their arrival'" on the President to inform him 
 of their presence in Washington. Judge Black was with him. We 
 talked over a good deal that we had gone over before and the President 
 appointed an hour — one, I think, the next day — to receive them. I told 
 him they would submit their credentials to him and have an informal 
 conversation with him but that if he submitted the matter of their 
 reception to Congress they would wish to send a communication to go 
 in with his message — they would come prepared with it, or if he agreed 
 with me in thinking it best, they would not prepare it until after the 
 conversation when perhaps all parties would understand each other 
 better but it was to be considered as submitted on the conversation, to 
 which he cheerfully assented. 
 
 The Commissioners upon their arrival invited me to act as their 
 Secretary which I declined for reasons which it is unnecessary to men- 
 tion and they then insisted upon my remaining with them in Washington 
 and acting with them unofficially which I did altho with great reluctance. 
 
 The day after their arrival was spent in preparing their credentials 
 for delivery to the President. The next morning I was at their residence 
 and while talking over the condition of affairs Col Wigfall one of the 
 Texas Senators came in to inform us that the telegraph had just brought 
 the news that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, spiked his guns, 
 burned his gun carriages, cut down the flag staiT and removed his com- 
 mand to Sumter. We all expressed our disbelief in the intelligence and 
 after a good deal of discussion I said, " Well at any rate Col., True or 
 not I will pledge my life that if it has been done it has been without 
 orders from Washington ". Just as I made the remark Gov : Floyd, the 
 Sec at War was announced. After the usual courtesies of a meeting 
 I said, " Gov., Col Wigfall has just brought us this news and as you 
 were coming up the stairs I said I would pledge my life it was without 
 orders ". " You can do more " said he smiling " You can pledge your 
 life Mr Trescot that it is not so. It is impossible. It would be not only 
 against orders but in the face of orders. To be very frank Anderson 
 was instructed in case he had to abandon his position, to dismantle Fort 
 Sumter not Fort Moultrie ". I asked him if his carriage was at the 
 door to let me take it and go home — there might be telegraphs there. 
 
 " Wednesday, December 26. The commissioners, it will be remembered, were 
 Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams and James L. Orr. 
 
Nar7'ative of William Henry Trescot 544 
 
 I took the carriage, drove home and returned immediately with two 
 telegrams for Col Barnwell which he read and handed them to Gov 
 Floyd saying " I am afraid Gov : it is too true ". Floyd read the 
 telegram (from Gen Jones) asked the Commissioners whether they 
 considered the authority sufficient and then rose adding " I must go to 
 the Dep : at once ". He immediately went to the War Dep. I went up 
 to the Senate, communicated the news to Senator Davis of Miss and Sen- 
 ator Hunter and asked them if they would go with me to the President. 
 We drove down to the White House and sent in our names, were asked 
 into the Presidents room where he joined us in a few moments. When he 
 came in he was evidently nervous. I knew his manner too well to be mis- 
 taken and he immediately commenced by making some remark to Mr 
 Hunter about the removal of Beverly Tucker the Consul at Liverpool to 
 which Mr Hunter made a general reply. Col Davis then said " Mr Presi- 
 dent we have called upon an infinitely greater matter than any consulate". 
 " What is it ", asked the P. " Have you received any intel[l]igence from 
 Charleston in the last two or three hours ", said Col D. " None ", said 
 the P. " Then ", said Col D. " I have a great calamity to announce to 
 you ''. He then stated the facts and added " and now Mr President you 
 are surrounded with blood and dishonour on all sides ". The President 
 was standing by the mantelpeice crushing up a cigar into pieces in his 
 hand — a habit I have seen him practice often. He sat down as Col 
 D finished and exclaimed — " My God are calamities (or misfortunes, I 
 forget which) never to come singly. I call God to witness — you 
 gentlemen better than anybody know — that this is not only without but 
 against my orders, it is against my policy." He then expressed his 
 doubt of the truth of the telegram, thought it strange that nothing had 
 been heard at the War Dep — said he had not seen Gov: Floyd and 
 finally sent a messenger for him. When Gov Floyd came he said that 
 no telegram had come to the Dep: that the heads of Bureaux there 
 thought it unlikely but that he had telegraphed to this effect himself — 
 " There is a report here that you have abandoned Fort Moultrie, spiked 
 your guns, burned your carriages and gone to Fort Sumter. It is not 
 believed as you had no orders to justify it. Say at one [once] what 
 could have given rise to such a story "." 
 
 The President was urged to take immediate action — he was told that 
 the probability was that the remaining Forts would be seized and gar- 
 risoned by S. C and that Fort Sumter would be attacked— that if he 
 would only say that he would replace matters as he had pledged himself 
 that they should remain, there was yet time to remedy the michief. 
 The discussion was long and earnest. At first he seemed disposed to 
 declare that he would restore the Status but then hesitated, said he 
 must call his cabinet together, he could not condemn Maj Anderson 
 unheard. .He was told that nobody asked that, only say that if the 
 " The texts of the telegram and of Anderson's replies are in Official Records, 
 I. 3. 
 
545 Documents 
 
 move had been made without a previous attack on Anderson he would 
 restore the status. Assure us of that determination and then take what 
 time was necessary for consultation and information. That resolution 
 telegraphed would restore confidence and enable the Commissioners to 
 •continue their negotiation. This he declined doing and we left. On 
 •our way out we met Gen Lane, Senator Bigler, Yulee, Mallory on their 
 way to make the same remonstrance for the news was over the City. 
 Later in the day I saw him to shew him some more detailed telegraphs. 
 Senator Slidell was with him but all that he did was to authorize me to 
 telegraph that Andersons movement was not only without but against 
 his orders. 
 
 The interview with the Commissioners was postponed until the next 
 •day when they presented him their credentials and the first letter of 
 their correspondence (See Correspondence).^' I was not present at that 
 interview. 
 
 The following days were consumed in Cabinet meetings duri[n]g 
 which Gov : Floyd resigned for the reasons stated in his published letter.'* 
 The answer to the Commissioners was in the mean while sent. Upon 
 Floyds resignation Holt was appointed Sec at War. On Sunday I 
 •determined to see the President once more. I found him with Mr 
 Toucey the Sec of the Navy. I told him I would like with his per- 
 mission to have a half hours conversation with him to which he very 
 courteously assented. I then as temperately as I could reviewed the 
 whole transaction— he stopped me at first saying that I of all persons 
 •ought to know it was exceedingly irregular and improper for the Presi- 
 dent to discuss such matters with the Sec of the Commission. I told 
 him I was not Sec nor had any sort of official connection with the 
 Comm : that I came to him simply because he himself had established 
 my connection with this affair and in such a way that I had a right I 
 thought to speak freely to him. He then said — in that case proceed. 
 I could not now repeat the conversation, it was very earnest but very 
 temperate. He shewed a good deal of feeling and seemed very much 
 v^'orn and distressed. I inferred from all that passed that his difficulty 
 consisted in this — that the seizure of the other Forts by S. C. rendered 
 the restoration of the former status impossible for if he ordered Ander- 
 son from Sumter he had nowhere to send him unless he withdrew him 
 altogether from the harbour. Under this impression I went to Mr 
 Hunter of Virginia and told him if this is the difficulty tell the Presi- 
 dent that if he will withdraw from Sumter, the State will withdraw 
 from the other Forts and that Maj Anderson will be as safe in Fort 
 Moultrie as if he were here. The Comm : will accept this return to 
 the status and guarantee his safety. Mr Hunter immediately went to 
 
 '* 36 Cong., 2 sess.. House Ex. Doc. no. 26, vol. VI., pp. 5-12. Buchanan's 
 account of the interview of December 28 is in Mr. Buchanan's Administration, 
 pp. 181, 182 : an account by one of the commissioners is in Crawford, Genesis 
 ■of the Civil War, p. 148. 
 
 '° Printed in Moore's Rebellion Record, I., Documents, p. 10. 
 
 AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XIII. — 36. 
 
^^Narrative of WiUiani Henry Trescot 546 
 
 him and when he returned — I was waiting at his rooms — he said : " Tell 
 the Comm: it is hopeless. The President has taken his ground — I cant 
 repeat what passed between us but if you can get a telegram to Charles- 
 ton, telegraph at once to your people to sink vessels in the channel of 
 the harbour." This message he sent the next morni[n]g again to the 
 Comm by his colleague Mr Mason. There is no doubt that orders for 
 reinforcements had then been issued altho afterwards countermanded. 
 After this there was no further hope, the Commissioners replied as 
 appears by their correspondence"" and left Washington. 
 
 The above is merely a rough outline to be made complete at my 
 leisure and the letters and telegrams to be inserted. One or two facts 
 and some conversations are omitted and I intend to add my views of the 
 facts as they occur. 
 
 Wm Henry Trescott 
 
 Feby 1861 
 
 In the whole of these transactions Mr Buchanans position was a 
 very difficult one and it was aggravated by three things, i. Mr Buchanan 
 never not even I think at the last moment realized the danger. The 
 representations made to him of the condition of feeling and opinion of 
 the South he never would believe. He thought it likely that South 
 Carolina would secede but that she would not be supported by any other 
 state and not even Mr Cobbs resignation opened his eyes altho he had 
 great respect for Mr Cobbs judgment and must have seen that this 
 resignation was the utter destruction of Mr Cobbs future if he had 
 misinterpreted Georgia. The first time he seemed really to begin to 
 believe in what was so near at hand was when Mr Toombs called on 
 him. While the Commissioners from S. C. were waiting in Washington, 
 several gentlemen of influence in Savannah Georgia, telegraphed both 
 Mr Toombs and Mr Orr to know whether Fort Sumter would be re- 
 stored to its status by the withdrawal of Anderson and whether it 
 would be held by the Government. The object of the enquiry was clear 
 and it was thought not impolitic to give' the President information of 
 the consequence of his persistence. Mr Toombs accordingly went to the 
 White House and sent in his card. The Cabinet was in session but 
 the President received him in the next room. " I am aware Mr Presi- 
 dent " said T " that the Cabinet is in session and that today is the 
 annual dinner to the Supreme Court and that you have scarcely time 
 to see me. But while I apologize for the intrusion, it is an evidence 
 what importance I attach to the interview. I would ask Mr President 
 whether you have decided upon your course as to Fort Sumter ? " " No 
 Sir, I have not yet decided. The Cabinet is now in session upon that 
 very subject." " I thank you Sir for the information that is all I 
 wanted to know", said T. retiring. "But Mr T. why do you ask?" 
 ^Official Records, I. 120-125. 
 
547 Doctunents 
 
 " Because Sir my State has a deep interest in the decision." " How 
 your State — what is it to Georgia whether a fort in Charleston harbour 
 is abandoned?" "Sir, the cause of Charleston is the cause of the 
 South ". " Good God Mr Toombs do you mean that I am in the midst 
 of a revolution ? " " Yes Sir — more than that — you have been there for 
 a year and have not yet found it out " — and he retired. When the 
 President returned to the Cabinet he seemed very much excited and 
 said, " Gentlemen I really begin to believe that this is revolution ". But 
 Mr Buchanan ought to have known the truth better and sooner. He 
 was not ignorant of the consequences of such a move as one state at 
 least even in his opinion was sure to make. I was much impressed with 
 a remark of his on that very subject. I was spending one night with 
 him during the summer at his residence — the Soldiers Home — and after 
 tea Gov: Floyd joined us in the porch and the conversation became very 
 interesting. Turning at last upon the probable result of the coming 
 Presidential election and its consequences, he said " well there is no 
 danger as long as the States wait upon each other — as long as they 
 wait for joint resolutions to act, but if any one state is bold enough to 
 act — to secede by itself, then questions will be raised beyond the solu- 
 tion of any statesman in this country " — or words to that effect. 
 
 But when the fact happened, he could not believe it. Accustomed 
 like all Northern statesmen to look at the Union rather than the 
 States, habituated to use state politics merely as counters in the game 
 for Federal power and belonging to a party which had never hesitated 
 to make " a cry " of the most solemn and important issues, he could 
 not realize that this popular excitement was any thing wider or deeper 
 than the thousand and one political agitations on which skillful men 
 had come into power. It would run its course, a little more violently 
 perhaps than usual — there would be a re-action at the North and all 
 would be well for another four years. 
 
 2. In the next place Mr B. was really powerless. Few men have 
 ever in four years been so completelly stripped of real authority. Cold 
 and calculating, with a clear head but no heart, ready at any moment 
 to desert a friend whom he had used in order to secure an enemy whom 
 he wanted to use — with a habit of indirectness that at times almost 
 became falsehood and a wariness that sometimes degenerated into crafti- 
 ness — with no faith in sentiment and a cynical estimate of men the 
 result of long party experience, and all this justified in his own eyes 
 by the fact, which nobody can dispute who knows him. that he really had 
 no ulterior selfish purpose — that he wished to serve his country and was 
 a man in his individual relations of perfectly clean hands — Mr Buchanan 
 was just the man to utterly belittle a great cause, misunderstand a real 
 national crisis and compromise a great position by small acts and smaller 
 motives. He had identified the Government with himself and to take 
 care therefore of his own position, to save himself embarrassment and 
 mortification, was to protect the government. When Mr Buchanan 
 
Narrative of William Henry Irescot 548 
 
 therefore became aware of the trouble which was closing all round him 
 — " apres moi le deluge " was his first principle of action. To protract 
 the issue, not to close it, was his policy. Like Hesekiah when the 
 prophet denounced the destruction of his house and the captivity of his 
 children, the piteous burden of his cry was " Is it not good, if peace and 
 truth be in my day ? " 
 
 He therefore diplomatized with those whose action he could not 
 entirely stay. He promised not to force an issue, to receive Commis- 
 sioners, to refer to Congress and in this policy he persevered even in 
 face of Gen Cass's resignation. But the issue came nevertheless and 
 Maj Andersons removal to Sumter, placed it sharp and sudden before 
 the country. Now this policy of delay and compromise and reference 
 was Mr Buchanans not his cabinets — it was conducted without the 
 intervention of his Northern Members and in private consultations with 
 his Southern — not exactly in official pledges but in conversations with 
 Southern Members of Congress — in adopting suggestions from Floyd and 
 Thompson — and keeping up indirect communications with those in au- 
 thority and influence in South Carolina. When Andersons conduct 
 made the issue, official action was necessary. Mr Buchanan had to 
 take his choice between two courses, to sustain him or to condemn. 
 The conduct of his officer was in direct contradiction to the whole under- 
 current of his policy but not so in regard to the positian of his message, 
 nor the official action of the Cabinet. He wavered — but what could he 
 do — Cobb was gone, Floyd went, Thompson and Thomas had to go, the 
 excitement in the South grew fiercer, the act of Anderson had fired the 
 whole train of Southern feeling — to go with the South now was to go 
 entirely with them. Black and Toucey, Stanton and Holt, said decide — 
 whatever you may have done we are uncommitted — keep the word which 
 the South says you have pledged and we resign — we believe in the 
 Union and will not betray it. In the Senate, every State that seceded— 
 and at length even he saw that the secession of six states was certain — 
 swept away his former friends and the Black Republican Majority grew 
 in grim proportions, while the few Southern Senators left bore him no 
 love and owed him no allegiance. He surrendered into the hands of the 
 North and refused to withdraw Anderson. Besides, like the Northern 
 Members of his Cabinet, he was a Northern man. If this revolution 
 was checked he and they would claim credit for their firmness, if it 
 succeeded they were to remain at the North and must be supported by 
 Northern opinion. To those Southern men who were for conciliating 
 and humouring Mr B, this was evident from the first — when the issue 
 came, they and he must separate but they were willing for reasons of 
 their own to make the issue as peaceful as possible and lost nothing by 
 meeting Mr Buchanan, half way. A day or two before I left Wash- 
 ington I called on Judge Black at the State Dep : to tell him goodbye. 
 I liked the Judge very much; he was peculiar almost eccentric in his 
 way, a very simple and somewhat awkward manner, a rumpled look as 
 
549 
 
 Dociunents 
 
 if neither his wig nor his clothes would fit his ungainly person, but his 
 conversation was delightful, original and rather quaint in his conceptions 
 and at times wonderfully rich and full in his expression. We had a 
 very curious conversation, all things considered. We first talked about 
 the appointment of the new collector for Charleston upon which I said, 
 " Well Judge if you people of Pennsylvania are not statesmen, at least 
 you are heroes." " How ? " — " Why, have you not found a man bold 
 enough to make a martyr of himself by taking the collectorship at 
 Charleston? " " You are joking aren't you — there is no danger." " The 
 devil — there isnt'. I would not like to be in his place. Why they will 
 hang him to a certainty." " Then by the Lord Jehovah — do it and add 
 murder to your other crimes but you will repent it in sackloth and ashes 
 — and the Judge hitched up his trousers and walked up and down the 
 room very indignantly." After a hearty laugh I said, " Not exactly 
 hang him Judge, but seriously he will be informed that he cannot assume 
 his office and be politely requested to leave at his earliest possible con- 
 venience." " Well, Well " — said the Judge " that wont hurt him and if 
 he cant stay why he'll have to go I suppose." Then the Judge broke 
 out into an eulogy on South Carolina, " There," said he, " a little state 
 no bigger than the palm of my hand, has broken tip this mighty empire. 
 Like Athens you controul Greece — you have made and you will controul 
 this revolution by your indomitable spirit. Up to this time you have 
 played your part with great wisdom — unequalled, but now you are going 
 wrong ". Then he went into a discussion of the position of things but 
 what seemed to annoy him that we would not call it revolution, that we 
 claimed secession to be a right under the constitution and said what his 
 policy would have been from the first. As I understand him, but I am 
 by no means sure that I did understand him, he would have garrisoned 
 every southern port so that a violent secession would have been hopeless 
 and the State would have been forced to call a convention of states to 
 decide upon the alleged grievances and that convention called upon the 
 re-action at the North would have represented the true conservative 
 element of the nation, have done full justice to the South and thus 
 settled the Union firmly forever. When he was done I said jestingly, 
 " Well if we have made mistakes, some other people have made mis- 
 takes too." " Yes," he said — " there were two broad roads to be followed 
 and one narrow strip between where nobody could move and with won- 
 derful ingenuity we have got just on that spot. Yes, you nearly carried 
 your point, you had every thing your own way. As for anybodys word 
 of honour being involved I cant help that. The President must take 
 care of his own honour. We had to take care of the coimtrys. I dont 
 know anything about that, if he committed himself so much the worse 
 — it was for a good, an honest purpose but that is not our concern. You 
 nearly beat us but we had one card left and fortunately that was a trump, 
 so we beat you." 
 
 3. But there was another motive at the bottom of the Presidents 
 
Narrative of Willia^n Henry Trescot 550" 
 
 vacillation and apparent weakness. He could not bring himself to take 
 decisive measures in Lincolns interest. While he was anxious to pre- 
 serve the Union — was not willing to allow the extent of the danger, his- 
 secret sympathy was with the South. In his heart he felt that their 
 protest was his defence. The Black Republican triumph was one espe- 
 cially over him — they had denounced him and his policy — they had taken 
 away his own Pensylvania — they had personally libelled him and held 
 him up to scorn by the famous Covode Committee. The South had, 
 elected him, had supported his administration and after all their indig- 
 nation to accept Lincoln and submit to Bk. Republican rule was almost 
 to acquiesce in his condemnation. He had no objections to see the 
 storm rage if it stopped short of shipwreck — to see the Republicans 
 broken to pieces in the very flush of their insolent triumph and a re- 
 action sweep over the North and float the old Democracy into power in 
 1864. He would not therefore encourage " the rebels ", he would check 
 them as far as he could, but the Constitution had not given him authority, 
 he could not stain his executive robes w'ith the blood of American citizens- 
 and if he could fight off the issue instead of fighting it, until Lincoln 
 who had sowed the storm had arrived in person to reap the whirlwind, 
 why that was all the country had a right to expect and he could go home 
 to Wheatlands with a quiet conscience and if the ship of state must 
 go down — at least his hand was not on the helm. Now I could not 
 prove all this but if human nature is human nature it is true and I firmly 
 believe it and it is the only explanation of the extraordinary conduct of 
 the President from the departure of the Commissioners until the inaugu- 
 ration of Lincoln. 
 
 Note. 
 
 I have omitted to mention above, Mr Cobbs resignation as Secretery- 
 of the Treasury, because it was not directly connected with the events- 
 to which I was referring. Mr Cobb had early in the summer made up 
 his mind as to vvhat ought to be the consequences of Lincolns election 
 and as the day of election drew nigh had written to his friends in 
 Georgia that whatever the State might do in that event they must should' 
 it occur withdraw his name from before the Legislature as a candidate- 
 for the vacant Senatorship U. S. as he could not consent to represent 
 the State under such circumstances and preferred to consider his public 
 life closed. But Mr Cobb was personally much attached to Mr Buchanan. 
 He thought the South owed it to Mr B to save him this issue if possible 
 and moreover there was a greater probability of action on the part of 
 Georgia if the people were called on to resist the inauguration of a 
 Black Republican Administration than if compelled to secede under an 
 Administration which they had brought into power and the course of 
 which had generally met their approbation. He was also anxious that 
 Mr Buchanans message should take such ground in reference to the 
 great question dividing the country as to justify if possible the course 
 which the Sotith would probably adopt. He therefore determined tc 
 
5 5 1 Documents 
 
 remain until the message went in to Congress and used what influence 
 he possessed in support of that policy which proposed the joint Secession 
 •of the Southern States on the 4th March. When the Message went in 
 therefore, he published an address to the people of Georgia declaring 
 his views and as they included both the right and duty of the Secession 
 of that State, he naturally but not abruptly closed his connection with 
 Mr Buchanans administration. 
 
 Mr Cobb made a very favourable impression on me. He was a man 
 of amiable and conciliatory temper well adapted to serve as a modifying 
 centre for extreme opinions, with a clear head, very decided opinions 
 himself but always willing to listen to and combine the opinions of 
 others for practical action and as far as I could judge, truly heartily 
 and unselfishly devoted to the cause of the South. 
 
 [Mr Cobb with his usual clear judgment and sound common sense 
 retired before the issue became too complicated. The States to which 
 Gov Floyd and Mr Thomson belonged had not yet seceeded. Until they 
 did these gentlemen had a perfect constitutional right to remain in the 
 Cabinet for two purposes, i. Either to devise some plan of compromise 
 or, 2. to maintain if they could the constitutional doctrine which they 
 held, that force could not be used against a seceeding State. This was 
 all they did and this they had a right to do. Gov : Floyd refused to use 
 force against South Carolina and the President sustained him until the 
 seizure of Fort Sumter and then changing his policy. Gov Floyd very 
 properly resigned. Mr Thomson, thinking that until this change of 
 policy was carried into action it might be again reversed, remained but 
 in a few days was forced to follow Gov : Floyd and leaving the President 
 free to re-construct his Cabinet which he did by making Mr Holt Sec 
 at War and Mr Stanton Atty General, thus giving it an unity of pur- 
 pose and an ability which would soon have been felt but for his own 
 persistent and consistent indecision, if that can properly be called inde- 
 cision which was really a fixed purpose to be undecided.] 
 
 The position of all the Southern Members of the Cabint was difficult 
 and anomalous and just as in any other government the Secession of a 
 State would have been absolute rebellion, so in any other kind of Admin- 
 istration, their conduct may have been denounced as treason. But with 
 the theory upon which the South has based its action that the Union 
 was a confederacy the members of the cabinet must be allowed the same 
 freedom of contrave[n]ing the policy of the administration as the states 
 have of destroying the structure of the Constitution. In other words, 
 the Administration being only the official exponent of the constitution 
 in its daily practical life, the moment the Union is disintegrated, so is 
 the cabinet, and the contest there to prevent the power of the Govern- 
 ment from interfering against either party on the ground that is the 
 mere agent of both and without independent authority, becomes legiti- 
 mate. To apply the words treason and treachery therefore to the con- 
 duct of the Southern Members of Mr B's Cabinet is to borrow a technical 
 
Narrative of Williayn Henry Trescot 552: 
 
 language from Foreign Governments which has no true apphcation to 
 the circumstances of our own. In fact the condition of the Cabinet was 
 the genuine exponent of the unexampled condition of the Country. 
 
 That such a state of things is desirable or profitable either to the 
 character or interest of a Nation, I am far from saying, but it is the 
 inevitable result of our history which in its results has now proved that 
 the Union was only a state of transition and that the U. S were in no 
 true sense ever one nation. 
 
 What the new development will be, it is now to early to speculate 
 upon but as a generalization it does not seem to be risking much to say 
 that if there is real homogeneity in the sentiment and interests of the 
 South, it will find its expression in unity of national feeling and cen- 
 tralization of national Government, accelerated or retarded of course 
 by the influence of external events. 
 
 [The negotiation which the Commissioners from South Carolina went 
 to Washington to open was never commenced. The Commissioners 
 themselves were admirably selected. They had all filled with distinc- 
 tion very eminent places either in the Federal or State Governments, 
 some of them in both. They were men of decided and varied ability 
 and while they represented the unity of the States purpose, also repre- 
 sented with singular accuracy the minor differences of opinion which- 
 existed in the State. They came to Washington with an implicit confidence 
 in Mr Buchanans intention to deal fairly with them and were anxious to- 
 do all that was consistent with their sense of. duty, to feolve the issue as 
 temperately as circumstances would permit and however they may have 
 been controulled by their knowledge of public opinion at home, they were 
 allowed by the Convention which appointed them, unlimited discretion in 
 the discharge of their grave responsibility. That Mr Buchanan was sin- 
 cere in his desire to meet them in the same spirit is evident from the 
 necessities of his position and his course both before and after their visit. 
 But Major Andersons movement, made the very day of their arrival, com- 
 plicated the whole subject beyond solution. That Mr Buchanan failed to 
 redeem very solemn pledges when he acquiesced in Major Andersons con- 
 duct, there can be no question. But it is a question whether he could have- 
 done otherwise. At the commencement of an Administration, with a strong 
 and successful party behind him he could have done it. Perhaps even 
 then with a resolute will and perfect directness of purpose he could 
 have done it. But all substantial authority had departed from him and 
 he was not a man of direct ways. The threat of impeachment with no 
 friendly Senate to sit in judgment stood in his way, popular clamour 
 became loud at the North and as he said to a friend " If I withdraw 
 Anderson from Sumter, I can travel home to Wheatlands by the light 
 of my own burning effigies ". His cabinet was resolute, as Mr Stanton 
 expressed himself very strongly to me " You say the President has 
 pledged himself. I dont know it, I have not heard his account but I 
 know you believe it. For the present I will admit it. The President 
 
553 Documents 
 
 was pledged. Andersons conduct has broken that pledge. You had 
 two courses to choose. You had a right to either. You could have 
 appealed to the President to redeem his pledge or you could have said 
 the circumstances under which Anderson has acted prove bad faith, we 
 will not trust you any further and then have acted as you saw fit: but 
 you have no right to adopt both — stand on the Presidents pledge and 
 give him the chance to redeem it or take the matter in your own hands. 
 Now you have chosen — you have by seizing the remaining forts and 
 arsenals undertaken to redress yourselves. The Presidents pledge may 
 be broken or not — that now concerns him individually — as to the Gov- 
 ernment you have passed by the pledge and assumed in vindication a 
 position of hostility — with that alone I have to deal." 
 
 But while it was impossible for Mr Buchanan to redeem his word, 
 the Commissioners could accept nothing less. They knew the temper 
 of their people, they knew with what difficulty they had been restrained 
 from seizing Fort Sumter when it was undefended, they knew that the 
 possession of Fort Sumter meant the sealing up of the harbour of 
 Charleston and the collection of Federal Revenue by the Federal navy 
 and they knew that nothing but the practical disavowal of instant re- 
 moval would convince the State that she had not been treacherously 
 duped. All this they stated frankly to Mr Buchanan in their interview 
 and in their first letter. His reply left little hope that there would be 
 room for negotiation. He refused positively to disavow Major Ander- 
 son or to countermand his movement. Even then the Commissioners 
 hesitated to abandon all hope of an arrangement. After careful delib- 
 eration, with a full sense of the responsibility of their act, an act indeed 
 touching the utmost verge of their largest discretion, they made as I 
 have already stated through Mr Hunter the proposition that they would 
 engage to restore the forts which had been seized if the President would 
 withdraw Major Anderson from Sumter and return him to Moultrie 
 and with the status thus re-established they were still ready to negotiate. 
 This was declined and Mr Hunters message indicated that active meas- 
 ures had been taken in precisely the contrary direction. Then but not 
 imtil then did the Commissioners write their concluding letter. It was 
 in no sense a Diplomatic Document. It was formally addressed to the 
 President but in reality to the country. It was meant and ought so to 
 be considered as a vindication of the earnestness and sincerity of the 
 State in the pacific course which she had attempted, as a proof to the 
 South that the issue was not to be avoided and as an explanation and 
 justification of their own conduct in terminating their mission and 
 returning home.] 
 
Narrative of William Henry Trescot 554 
 
 Trescot to the Governor of South Carolina." 
 Confidential 
 To His Excellency 
 
 The Governor of the State of So. Ca. 
 
 Washington, D. C 
 
 Decern. 14, i860 
 Sir 
 
 Having resigned my place as Assistant Secretary of State of the 
 U. S. I shall remain here in pursuance of the request of Gov: Gist, con- 
 veyed to me in a letter of the 29*'' Novem. and in conformity with the 
 wishes expressed in the same letter shall submit to your attention such 
 information as I deem either interesting or important in the present 
 condition of public affairs. 
 
 Before entering upon the immediate subject of this communication 
 it is proper that I should inform you of an event of very considerable 
 significance which has just occurred. You will have learned from the 
 papers that previous to the delivery of the Presidents Message there 
 was a general apprehension that its publication would lead to a disso- 
 lution of the Cabinet. This did not happen, the concessions of the mes- 
 sage appeared to have brought about the agreement of the Cabinet upon 
 a common but rather uncertain ground. Immediately after its promul- 
 gation however Mr Cobb, the Secretary of the Treasury deemed it his 
 duty to retire from the Cabinet for reasons which he has given to the 
 public. He was succeded by Gov : Thomas of Maryland whose views 
 are considered as identical with those of the Southern section of the 
 Cabinet and the balance might therefore be fairly held to be undisturbed. 
 Within the last two or three days Gen Cass, the Secretary of State, sub- 
 mitted to the President his opinion that a reinforcement of the garrisons 
 in Charleston Harbour was the imperative duty of the Administration 
 and upon the refusal of the President to concur in that policy. Gen 
 Cass has resigned. His resignation has been accepted and the President 
 thus stands committed to maintain a policy, the advantage of which to 
 South Carolina it is impossible to exaggerate. I have no doubt that the 
 resignation of Gen Cass will be made the subject of universal eulogy 
 at the North and North West and the opportunity be improved for the 
 extremest denunciation of the President. I am satisfied that you will 
 feel with me that such a course on the part of the President deserves 
 the recognition of South Carolina and gives him a claim as far as it 
 can be done consistently with our principles and our interest, that the 
 State should facilitate any honourable accommodation which will avoid 
 collision. It is clear that in a movement like the present it will be 
 impossible to reach any temporary accommodation if both parties stand 
 upon strict logical consequence, there must be a mutual recognition that 
 the position is an anomalous one to be treated with reference to the 
 
 ^ From a press copy, separate from the manuscript of the foregoing narra- 
 tive. Pickens was inaugurated December 17. 
 
555 Docimients 
 
 great interests involved rather than to the theoretical consistency of the 
 principles implied. 
 
 There is I assume no rational doubt that the Convention of S.C 
 will pass the Ordinance of Secession within a week from its organiza- 
 tion. No such doubt exists here — that is considered as an accomplished 
 fact. Upon this occurence questions demanding immediate solution arise. 
 
 1. In reference to U. S. property including the Forts and Garrisons 
 
 2. In reference to the execution of the revenue laws 
 
 3. In reference to the Postal arrangements. 
 
 1. In reference to the Forts and Garrisons I believe that owing to 
 the fact, that the Southern Members of the Cabinet are pledged to 
 resist to resignation any attempt at re-inforcement — that the temper of 
 the President leads him most earnestly as far as his sense of duty will 
 permit to avoid anything that will in the present excited condition of 
 public feeling, provoke conflict — and to the event to which I have re- 
 ferred, that the resignation of the Secretary of State has been accepted 
 because the President would not consent to send more troops into the 
 Harbour, it may safely be inferred that this question is capable of 
 arrangement. But it is scarcely necessary to add that when the resig- 
 nation of Gen Cass is publicly announced the probability is that a great 
 pressure of Northern opinion will be created for the purpose of forcing 
 the President from the ground which he has taken, clamour which ought 
 not to be allowed to disturb our own public feeling or to force us into 
 precipitate action but which it would be judicious and right to meet by 
 giving to the President whatever support we can under the circumstances. 
 
 2. With regard to the revenue laws. It is impossible now to enter 
 into any detail as to these laws but the point to which I would call 
 your attention is that upon the Secession of the State, force need not 
 be resorted to by the Federal Government to produce great confusion 
 and perhaps distress. The resignation of the Collector would by itself 
 if his place were left vacant bring about these results as a cursory 
 inspection of our commercial regulations will shew. I shall only men- 
 tion one illustration. The Beacon lights and light houses along our 
 coast are Government property and if the Act of Secession prevents 
 their keepers from the discharge of their ordinary duties until that 
 question of proprietorship is settled, they will all go out. 
 
 3. The postal regulations. The Post Master General holds that the 
 Ordinance of Secession once passed and notice of that fact commu- 
 nicated to Congress he has no right individually to decide the question 
 but that until it is settled he is bound to continue the Mails where- 
 ever there are Post Masters to receive them. If the action of the State 
 or the resignation of the Post Masters, removes the necessary officers 
 he can do nothing because the postal laws require imperatively that no 
 mail shall be delivered to any but szvorn officers of the U.S. 
 
 In view of these difficulties I consulted several Southern Senators 
 whose characters and eminent abilities give weight to their advice. 
 
A'arj-aiive of Willia7n Henry Trescot 556 
 
 After a very full and free discussion in which the question submitted 
 was — If South Carolina passes her Ordinance of Secession immediately 
 say within the first week of the session of her Convention — is there a 
 practical and practicable plan of accommodating these difficulties which 
 must arise between the time of her action and the action of other States 
 which shall neither compromise her principles nor her honour. I cannot 
 go now into a detailed account of the very interesting consultation. 
 The result I must briefly indicate. It was this. That the State should 
 pass her Ordinance of Secession definitely clearly and irrevocably declar- 
 ing the State of South Carolina out of the Union, that then she should 
 appoint a Commissioner or Commissioners to announce to the Govern- 
 ment of the U.S. that fact and that they were fully empowered to enter 
 into a Treaty of Arrangement for all points such as public debt, public 
 property etc., etc. And lastly that the Ordinance should state that in 
 order for the orderly and peaceable execution of its provisions all Col- 
 lectors, Post Masters, Treasury and other officers holding Commissions 
 
 under the U.S. should be allowed days to settle the accounts and 
 
 close the business of their respective offices, at the end of which time 
 their offices should be considered vacated and abolished. 
 
 Whether this period runs with the time allowed the Commissioners 
 or falls short does not make much difference. The Act of Secession is 
 complete, the officers of the Government are allowed such time to settle 
 their accounts etc *as would not be denied a dissolving firm and while 
 they are winding up their business the mails could be received, the 
 revenue collected and accounted for and collision thus avoided until the 
 action of other Conventions in January had placed other States in the 
 same position. This plan explains itself so plainly and forcibly that I 
 do not deem it necessary to dwell upon it especially as I have made this 
 letter a longer one than is desirable altho it has seemed to me necessary. 
 
 I must therefore defer until another time such information and views 
 as to the general condition of parties and interests here as I wish to 
 submit to your attention. 
 
 It is proper to state that in consequence of the resignation of Gen 
 Cass, altho my resignation had been tendered and accepted, I am as a 
 matter of courtesy discharging those duties which belong to the routine 
 of the Department until the appointment of a successor but hope to be 
 entirely relieved by a nomination of a New Sec of State to the Senate 
 on Monday. I have the honour to be 
 
 Sir 
 
 Very Respectfully 
 Wm Henry Trescot. 
 
 P.S. I must ask your indulgence for a letter written in the midst of 
 constant interruption as you may well suppose under the circumstances 
 but I think it advisable to write bv this mail. 
 
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