F 411 .M12 Copy 1 u ■ -V" A n G U M E N T MADE BEFORE IMiiTEE ON THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS OF ARKANSAS, HON. JOHN McCLURE. December 17 and 18, ia74. . lUl^g Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee ; I shall assume for the purpose of argunieut, that the first question to be determiued in this case is, Wliicli is the true goverumeut of the State of Arkansas — that created by the constitution of 1868, or that set up by the pretended coustitntion of 1874 ! This question determiued, the next question is, Is it administered by the persons chosen in the manner and at the time prescribed by the constitution and laws of said State 1 The land and water within certain geographical limits do not consti- tute a State, nor do the peo[)le resident therein constitute it. Therefore, before proceeding further in this matter, I regard it a matter of para- mount importance to ascertain what constitutes a State. The land and water, as I have already stated, within certain geograph- ical limits, do not constitute a State; but the territor}^ over which the State exercises jurisdiction. Nor do the aggregate inhabitants within such limits constitute a State. A political State — and the States of the Union are all of this character — is a body-politic qualified to subsist by perpetual succession, and fron) generation to generation. It is an or- ganization where the innumeral>le will speaks as a unit by its legally authorized ofiicers and representatives. It is an organization where, in consideration of the surrender of certain natural rights belonging to man, the corporate body called the State undertakes the protection of the life, liberty, and property ot every person within its juris(li(!tion. To the State thus organized the first duty of every peison is allegiance; it begins with life and only ends with death. Without the uiiit\ which a corporate organization gives, there is no such thing as sovereiijn will. The sovereign will in all corporate bodies must be a unit — a legal entity; and the moment the sovereign will ceases to be the legal will of the body- politic, that moment the sovereignty of the State is at an (Hxd, and in its stead you have the personal will of an unorganized inass. Yon no longer have an existing State government, nor the seniblan(;e of one. The moment the corporate peo|)le cease to exist as such, everything is resolved into its natural elements, aiul you have teiritory and people, but no government. Under a corporate existence, tlie [)eop'e, in a le^al sense, have no right, of themselves., to change the form of government in any other manner than that assented to at the time of its organization. 1 A >N> In tlieir corporate cliaracter the people can chaiip:e their organic law in such parts as to them may seem meet, so loiij; as they do notliiii^i incon- sistent with tlie Constitution of the ITiiitecl States, and so loiiji as they themselves observe the mode agreed upon when they orf^ani/ed them- selves into a body-politic. \^ this mode be strictly adhered t(^ the po- litical State and its le<;al entity, are jireserved ; but tlie moment a chan.u'e is made by a departure I'rom tlie corporate i)owei's, or in a man- ner unknown to the or^anii; act, you have destroyed the corporate ex- istence of a State, and cut out the line of succession. Tlie will of the corporate body is no louf^vr heard. Its sovereij>iity no longer exists; and instead of one voice s])eakinj? f(u- the whole, the voic(Pof the State is distributed, not to the departments of governnuMit, but to an unor- ganized mob, who have withdrawn their allegiance from the State. Such action is nothing more nor less than revolution, anassion to au exiled I>ourbon that Europe consumed one whole generation in blood and carnage. The struggle was, not to place a Bourbon on the throne because he was a Bourbon, but to sustain their ile, in any other manner than that prescribed by the organic act. The constitution of this State pro- vides for its own amendment, and we insist, inasmuch as the people themselves have pointed out the manner of changing the organic law, that the mode ijointed out must be followed, to the exclusion of all other. In other words, the enumeration and pointing out how a change in the constitution may be effected, excludes the idea that it may be done in any other manner, or in any mode not pointed out by the con- stitution itself. The legislative power of the State is vested in the gen- eral assembly, but it is lodged there, not for the creation of new govern- ments, but for the enactment of laws, and with certain limitations and restrictions, among which are, that it shall not be so exercised as to conflict with the constitution itself, or in such manner as may result in the destruction of the instrument from which it derives its sole power to legislate. To deny the correctness of this proposition is to say that the creature is clothed with power to destioy its creator. Therefore, we say that the constitution having pointed oat how the legislature and the people may change the same, that mode must be followed, and that the pointing out a specific mode for the legislature and the peeple to pursue in changing the organic act is an inhibition upon that depart- ment of government, and the people themselves, to pursue or propose any other. Having in brief given you my idea of what constitutes a State, let us next inquire what a constitution is, and in making this in- quiry I shall not attempt to give you such a definition of the word as is attributed to it by politicians, but as the same is defined by eminent judges and jurists. Justice Patterson, in the case of Van Horne''s Lessee v. Dorrance, (2 Dall., 208,) asks, "What is a consti- tution?" In response to the question he said, '' It is the form of gov- ernment delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first princii)les of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed ; it contains (now mark well what he says) the 'permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land ; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only hi/ the authoritij that made it.'''' " Tiie constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon in the tem[)er of the times, nor rise and fall with the tide of events. Notwithstanding the competition of opposing interests, and the violence of contendmg ])arties, it remains firm and immovable as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves." Tiiat the people of Arkansas, in pursuance of the reconstruction acts, framed and adopted a constitution in the year 1808, and that the State thus formed was admitted to representation in Congress, is a matter the records of Congress fully establish, and one which Congress will no doubt take judicial cognizance of. We start, then, with the admission that the State of Arkansas, as organized under the reconstruction acts, and the constitution of 18(58, was a State of the United States, and as such entitled to the protection guaranteed by the fourth section of arti- cle four. Starting from this point our inquir}^ is, as I have stated, whether the StJiteof Arkansas, as orpiiiized uiKlcr tlu'coiistitiitiuii of LSOS, orasorgaii- ized consistent tluMi'witli, is yet one of the States of this Union. All States have a corporate existence, and in this respec^t they are not unlike corporations; and, bein^' so, the same <;eneral rules in relation to powers, succession, and liabilities, are not dissimilar. The stockholders in a pri- vate corporation may change daily. They may chanp^ their by-laws whenever it suits them i)rovided they do not trans<;iess or infringe upon the i)rovisions of their charter. So it is with the jieople of a State. They U)ay change the organic law thereof whenever it suits their cou- venience to do so, i)rovided they do not infringe u])on rights guaran- teed by the social comi)act. Majorities, iu a i)rivate coiporatiou, are never clothed with ])ower to do wrong, and so with all public cori)ora- tions. 1 concede that the i)e()])le of a State have a right to (jhange their ibrm of government, bnt hoiv that change is to be etifected, is the question now under discussion. That the peoi)le, on their oioi motion^ and without the sanction of law, can assemble together and change the form of government, I niost emphatically deny. And upon this proposi- tion we have what may be regarded as a precedent, and a preceilent that Congress is bound to follow. The i)eople of lihode Islaiul attempted to change their form of gov- ernment without the assent or authority of legislative action. The moveiricnt was inaugurated without the forms of law, and a nuijority of the legal electors of the State participated in the proceedings and voted for the Dorr constitution that was attempted to be foisted on the peo- ])le of Rhode Island. Jn s[)eHking of that movement, Mr. Webster said : " In the exercise of political power through representatives we know nothing, we never have known anything, but such an exercise as should take i)lace throii(/h the prescribed forms of law. The people limit their governments, jS^ational and State, but another principle is equally true and certain, and that is that they often limit themselves. Tliey set bounds to their own [)ower. They have chosen to secure the institutious whicii they establish against sudden impulses of mere majorities. But the i)eople limit themselves also in other ways. They limit themselves, first, in the exercise of their political rights. They linvit themselves by all their constitutions iu two imi)ortant respects — that is to say, in re- gard to the ([ualiticitions of electors and iu regard to the qualifications of the elected. In every State, and in all the States, the people have precluded themselves from voting for everybody they might wish to vote for — they have limited their own right of choosing. They have said, we will elect no man who has not su(;h and such qualifications. We will not vote ourselves unless we have such and such qualifications. They have also limited themselves to certain i)rescribed forms for the conduct of elections. They must vote at a particular place, at a par- ticular time, and under particidar conditions, or not at all. It is in these n;odes that we are to ascertain the will of the American people, and our Constitution and laws know no other mode. We are not to take the will of the people from public meetings nor from tumultuous assemblies, by whicii the timid are terrified, the prudent are alarmed, and by which society is disturbed. These are not American modes of signifying the will of the i)eople, and tliey never were. If anything in this country not ascertained by a regular vote, by regular returns, and by regular representation, has been established, it is an exception and not the rule. It is an anomaly which, I believe, can scarcely be found. Is it not ob- vious enough that men cannot get together and count themselves, and say they are so many hundreds and so many thousands, and call them- selves the people and set up a government l Why, another set of men, forty miles off, on the same day, with the same propriety, with as good qualifications and in as large numbers, may meet and set up another government. What is this bat anarchy ? What liberty is there here but tumultuous, tempestuous, violent, stormy liberty — a sort of South American liberty, without power, except in its spasms — a liberty sup- ported by arms to-day, crushed by arms to-morrow ? Is that our lib- erty ! Another well-settled principle is that when, in the course of events, it becomes necessary to ascertain the will of the people on a new exigency, or a new state of things or of opinion, the legislative power provides for that ascertainment by an ordinary act of legislation. * * * In what State has an assembly, calling itself the people, convened without law, without qualifications, without certain officers, with no oaths, securities, or sanctions of any kind, met and made a constitution, and called it the constitution of the State ? There must be some authentic mode of ascertaining the will of the people, else all is anarchy. It resolves itself into the law of the strongest, or, what is the same thing, of the most numerous for the moment ; and all con- stitutions and all legislative rights are prostrated and disregarded." An attempt was made to censure the President for recognizing the charter government, in the 23d Congress, but it failed. In that case, in response to Governor King, who represented the charter government, the President said: " I have, however, to assure your excellency that should the time arrive (and my fervent prayer is it may never come) when an insurrection shall exist against the government of Rhode Iskmd, and a requisition shall be made upon the Executive of the United States to furnish that protection which is guaranteed to each State by the Con- stitution and laws, I shall not be found to shrink from the performance of a duty which, while it is most painful, is at the same time most im- perative. I have also to say that in such a contingency the Executive could not look into any real or supposed defects of the existing govern- ment, in order to ascertain whether some other plan of government ])ro- posed for adoption was better suited to the wants and more in accord- ance with the wishes of any portion of her citizens. To throw the Exe- cutive i)Ower of the Government into any such controversy would be to make the President the armed arbitrator between the people of the dif- ferent States a?if? their constituted authorities, and might lead to usurped, power, dangerous alike to the stability of the State governments and the liberties of the people. It will be my duty, on the contrary, to re- spect the requisitions of that government which has been recognized as the existing government of the State through all time past, until I shall be advised in a regular manner that it has been altered and abolished and another substituted in its place, by legal and peaceable proceedings, adopted and pursued by the authorities and the people of the State." For assuming this position and for asserting he would sustain the existing government, a committee of the House of Representatives, after investigation, reported the following resolution as ex,pressive of the sense of that body : '•'-Resolved, That the interference by the President of the United States with the military power of the Union, on the side of the late charter government of Rhode Island, against the constitution adopted in 1841, and by which the same was suppressed, was unauthorized by the laws of the United States, and in derogation of the rights of the people of Rhode Island." This resolution failed to pass the House of Representatives, and from this it may be inferred that it did not meet the approval of that body, and, in point of fact, amounts to an indorsement of the President's ac- tion. Not only tliis, it anioiiuts almost, if not ijuitt', to an expiostsiou bj" the House of Kcpicsentatives that a State government cannot be overtlirown by the i)eop!e, on Ihcir oivn motion, regardless of the forms of law. But it maybe said that there is a great difference between the Rhode Island case and the Arkansas case. So there is. lu the charter of Ehode Island there was no mode prescribing how a cliange in the or- ganic act should be cflected, and in the Arkansas case there is. In the one case the (juestion was as to the power of the people, in their original and sovereign ca])acity, to nnmale and destroy an tu'/.s7»i^ government, and in the other the question is as to the power of a pretended lajislature to do the same thing. I am aware that there are instances where State constitutions have been altered, changed, and amended in a manner at variance with the constitution of the State, and no doubt these cases will be cited as precedents in this; but 1 deny that they are, and assign two reasons therefor : First, there was no question as to the organiza- tion and legality of the legislature ; and, second, before the action of ;New York, Illinois, and Tennessee can be accepted as precedents, Con GKESS must have taken such action in relation thereto as would author, ize the a])plication of the rule of stare decisis. There is a great difference between a precedent and an instance. The cases cited in the States of Xew York, Illinois, and Tennessee are mere instances, and not precedents. A county may vote to take stock in a rail- road company without authority of law. If the act be unquestioned and the citizens quietly submit and pay a tax levied to pay for the stock snbscribed, such action would not constitute a precedent, and the citation of such a case would only be the citation of an instance where the people had submitted to a wrong. There must be an adjudication of a question by a tribunal having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversy before a case can be cited as a precedent. We are here dis- cussing a question of knc, and not a question of force, acquiescence, or revolution. The instances cited wherein States have changed their organic law, in a manner at variance with the constitution, may be evidence of what was accomplished hy revolution, but they cannot be cited to establish what the law is. The supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Woods v. Secretary of State, (Philadelphia Legal Gazette,) in speaking of this subject of "precedent," say : *'Xo argument for the implied power of absolute sovereignty can be drawn from revolutionary times. Governments thus accepted and ratitied by silent submission aflbrd no precedents ior thei)owerof a conventionina time of profound tran(piillity, and for a people living under self established safe institutions. While conventions are well-known historical modes of pro- cedure in the formation of constitutions, they i)rove nothing; for history- does not deiine their powers, or estop the people from asserting theirown. Limits must be set to power. Liberty absolutely demands security. No people can be safe in the presence of a divine right to rule, or of self- imputed sovereignty in their servants to bind them. * * * in our day conventions imputing sovereignty to themselves have ordained se- cession, dragged States into rebellion against the well-known wishes of their quiet people, and erected in the midst of the naticm alien State gov- ernments and a southern confederacy. * * * We have seen a public sentiment formed and elections carried in a few months, and yet the ex- citement was as short-lived as it was sudden, moving like a whirlwind. Such excitements have tilled a legislature with its partisans. * * * Once assembled, a convention, according to this dogma, is all-powerful, 7 and may aunul auy declaration in the bill of rights, and proclaim a con- stitution without let or hinderance. The fundamental rights of the peo- ple, the true principles of civil liberty, the nature of delegated power, and the liability of the people to temporary commotion, all rise up in earnest protest against such a doctrine of imputed sovereignty in the mere servants of the people." I assert that the people of the State of Arkansas cannot change their constitution in any other mode or manner than that pointed out by the constitution itself. The general rule in relation to the construction of a constitution is that it is a limitation upon the powers of the legislative department, and a grant to the executive and judicial departments. Eut to all general rules there are exceptions. Ordinarily, in speaking of the power of the legislature, we say that it may do anything that it is not expressly prohibited from doing by the constitution, but this is not true. The true rule is that it may do anything it is not prohibited from doing by express inhibition, or necessary implication. Where the constitution directs or points out how a thing is to be done, this pointing out amounts to an implication that it is not to be done in any other manner, and it amounts to an inhibition upon the leg- islature, to pursue any other course, to accomplish the same object, or produce the same result. In the case of the C. W. d; Z. B. B. v. Clinton County, (1 O. S., 84,) Judge Eanney says : " The authority of the general assembly is much too broadly stated, when it is claimed that all their acts must be regarded as valid which are not expressly inhibited by the constitution." Continuing, he says : " A moment's attention to principles, which must be regarded as funda- mental, in all American systems of government, will demonstrate the unsoundness of such a conclusion. * * Unlike the constitution of the United States, and from the necessity of the case, no attempt at a spe- cific enumeration of tlte items of legislative power is made in a State constitution. This must always be determined from the nature of the power exercised. If it is found to fall within the general terms of the grant, we can only look to the other parts of the constitution for limita- tions upon it ; if none are there found, none exist. But as the general assembly, like other departments of the government, exercises delegated authority, it cannot be doubted that auy act passed by it, not falling FAIRLY within the scope of legislative power ^ is clearly as void as though expressly prohibited." There is a vast difference between legislative power and political l)ower. ISTow and then you may find a loose, unguarded expression, where some persons of judicial attainments may have said that the legislature was the political department of the government; but it is a perversion of the meaning of words to make such a declaration. I know of but two instances where the legislature of Arkansas is au- thorized to Qx.Qvf>litieal power is. The lirst section of the bill of rights declares that, ^^All jyolitical power is inherent (not in the legislature, but) in the people." Having shown, conclusively, that no power but legislative power is vested in the general assembly, and that all political power, by the terms of the constitution, is declared to be in the peoi)le, let us return and examine the constitution, and see, as Judge llanney says, if the act alluded to comes witliin any limitation of the constitution, either express or implied. The first section of the bill of rights declares that, "Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have a right to alter or reform tlie same, whenever the public good may require it." The declaration is, that the right to "alter" or "reform" the Govern- ment is a right that belongs to the people. ISl"ow, how is this alteration or reformation to be brought about? And have the people pointed out any method by which this is to be accom{)lished ! Article XllI of the constitution reads as follows : Section 1. Any amendment to this constitution may be proposed in either bouse of the general assembly, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the houses, such pro- posed amendment shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature to be chosen at the next general election, and shall be pnblislied as provided by law for three months previous to the time of making such choice, and if the general assembly so next chosen, as aforesaid, (and if) such proposed amendment, or amendments, shall be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the general assembly to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people in such manner and at such time as the general assembly may provide, and if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the general assembly voting thereon, such amendment or amend- ments shall become a part of the constitution. Section 2. If two or more amendments shall be subniitted at the same time they shall be submitted in such a manner that the electors shall vote for or against each of said amendments. This is the mode pointed out by the people, by whicii the constitution was to be ^'^ aJtereiV oy '■'■reformed.''' In pointing out that mode the members of the legislature are made instruments to execute the will of the people in altering or reforming the government. Now, the question arises, does this fact, of itself, raise the implication that the constitution was not to be changed in any otlier manner? I think it does. In the case of Page v. Allen, (58 i'a., 3;38,) it was held that " the expression of one thing in the constitution is the exclusio]i of things not expressed." Tested by this ride, the expression of hoiv a constitution may be changed, excludes the idea that it may be done in another and dilferent manner than the mode therein specified. {Cronise v. Cronise, 54: Pa., 255 ; Tu-itchell v. JJlodget, 13 Mich., 127.) In the case of People v. Field, (2 Scam., 70,) the supreme court of Illi- nois said, " Where the means of a granted power are given, no other or different means or ])owers can he implied on account of convenience or of being more effectual." That the constitution points out how the members of the legislature mast proceed in the eveut a change is desired, in the fundamental law, cannot be denied. This being true, the rule laid down in the case of The People r. Field, would place the act calling a constitutional con- vention outside of the scope of the legislative power. Vattel says, (p. 11,) "It is asked whether the legislaiii'e power extends to the fundamental laws ; whether they may change the constitution of the Stated' In resxjonse to this question he says, "The principles we have laid down lead us to decide, with certaijity, that the authority of these legislators does not extend so far, and they ought to consider the fundamental law as sacred if the nation has not in express terms given them power to 'change it ; for the constitution of the State ought to possess stability, and since that was first established by the nation, which afterward intrusted certain persons with the legislative power, the fundamental law is excepted from their commission. " It is visible that the society only intended to make provision for having the State constantly famished with laws suited to particular conjanctures, and, for that purpose, gave the legislature the power of ahrogating the ancient civil and political laws that were not funda- mental, and of making new ones.'''' Here we have it asserted that the legislative department cannot change the constitution unless the power is conferred. In the present instance the |>ou-er is co?(/err^r7, and that brings us back to the propo- sition that we started with, that if a poicer he conferred, and the man- ner of exercising it is pointed out specifically, whether or not that pointing out does not amount to an inhibition on the legislature to pursue any other ? Judge Patterson, in the case of Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, (2 Dall., 303,) in speaking of the power of a legislature said, "What are legislatures? Creatures of the constitution; they owe their existence to the constitution; they derive their powers from the constitution. It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it or else they will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative and subor- dinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator, and the other of the creature. The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority and prescribes the orbit within which it must move." After citing the article in the bill of rights, declaring that all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of their own conscience, and the thirty-second section of the constitution that ordains "that all elections whether by the people, or in assembly, shall be by ballot, free and voluntary," he asks, "Could the legislature have annulled these articles, respecting religion, the rights of conscience, and elections by ballot "^j Sarely not. As to these points there was no devolution of power ; the authority was purposely with- held, and reserved by the people to themselves. * * * The consti- tution of the State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the temper of the times, nor. to rise and fall with the tide of events." But it is urged that the people in their sovereign power may do any- thing ; if this be true, no act of the legislature was needed ; if it is not true, an act of the legislature, not within the scope of legislative power, has not conferred any right on the people. There is quite a delusion in the minds of many apparently well-informed people, that the sovereignty of the State resides with and remains in the people in a constitutional government. This, however, is not true. Ml". Carpenter, in discussing the question of sovereignty in the peo- 10 pie, says, (4 Wis., 5!)0,) " Sometimes it is said soverclfjnty is with the peopU^ All this Jaiy^on comes from coiifouiKliiiji' the rights of the peo- ple under the government with t\w right of the people to overthrow the government. 'Tlie sovereignty of the i)eople' is to a politician a sweet morsel; to a lawyer and judge an unmeaning and seuseless sound. ♦ * * Xhe i>eopl(% under a government, have none of the attributes of sovereignty. Tliey establish the government, and in so doing part with tlieir sovereignty and tJie government \\\n}\\ established is as completely sovereign as Alexander is sovereign in his dominions. The sovereignty of the people under the government is ?i fiction.''^ (^►uoting from Vattel, (eh. 4,) he says : " Sovereignty is that public authority which commands in civil society, and orders and directs what each citizen is to perform to obtain the end of its institution. This au- thority originally and essentially belonged to the body of the society, to which each member submitted and ceded his natural right of con- ducting himself in everything as he pleased, according to the dictates of his ov>'u understanding, and of (h)ing himself justice.'' Mr. liyan, who 1 understand is now on the sui)reme bench of Wiscon- sin, in arguing and deiining this thing called " the sovereignty of the peoi)le,'' says: "We confound the idea of sovereignty with that of inde- pendent power. In international law nations are called _po/r'.s', but not sovereignties * * * ^ Wisconsin is a poicer among the other States of the nation ; it may be a sovereign power so far as by that is understood an independent power, and, except when it has parted with power by treaty or confederation ; but in its internal organization there is no sovereignty — it is a mere idea, a dream, a dormant fee, W'hich, at some future period, may be invoked and invested in a sov- ereign. The sovereign is the absolute power of law, of justice, and ad- ministration. 1 deny that in the people of this State (Wisconsin) is vested any such power. In our government there is no source from which sucli power can be derived. God gave us no sovereignty in a state of nature. The (u/yregate people of this State have no sovereignty, no absolute power of tyranny over the humblest person in its limits." Orton, in speaking of the same subject, says : " If the people are sov- ereign, they are above the law, they are above the constitution. But can any one man, can^ any ten men, can a majority of the peoi)le, defy the law, or violate the law f Suppose they all went on a certain day and voted to destroy the constitution ; is it destroyed ? The waves of pop- ular tumult may dash against it in vain. The constitution cannot be changed, except constitutionaUy. It provides in itsv'Z/just how it may be amended, and it can be amended in no other way. Can the people meet to-morrow and vote to strike out Article V 1 They cannot do it. It can only be done in the course provided by the constitution itself; and if the people cannot atnend it, they certainly cannot abrogate it." Judge Smith, (4 Wis., 750,) in commenting on the power of the people and the force of the constitution of Wisconsin, says : " They ordered a convention of delegates of the people to form a constitution, which should be proposed to the people as the fundamental law of the State, not for the guide and government of the agents only, but also for the guide and government of the people of the State, to abide and continue until they should alter the t^'Amn according to thcforniH hy them prescrihed.^^ In the case of Price v. Foster, (4 llarr., 4-8,) the supreme court of Delaware said : " The legislative, executive, and judicial powers compose the sovereign power of a State. The sovereign power, therefore, of this State resides with the legislative, executive, and judicial departments. Having thus 11 transferred tlte soverign power, tlie people cannot assume any portion of it. To do so would be tm iiifractiou of the coustitutiou aud a dissolution of the f/overmnent Nor can they interfere with the exercise of any part of tiie sovereign power, except by petition, remonstrance, and address. They have the power to change or alter the constitution, but this can be done only in the mode prescribed by the instrument itself. The attempt to do so in any other mode is revolutionary. * * * "Neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial department, sepa- rately, nor all combined, can devolve on the people the exercise of any part of the sovereign power. The assumption of power to do so would be usurpation. The department arrogating it would elevate itself above the constitution, overturn the foundation on which its own au- thority rests, demolish the whole frame and texture of our republican form of government, and prostrate everything to the worst species of tyranny and despotism or the ever-varying will of an irresponsible multitude. ***** The powers of government are trusts of high importance, and in no case whatever can they be transferred or delegated to any other body of persons, not even to the whole people of the State." I think the citations thus far made must convince you of three things : First, that only legislative power is vested in the general assembly ; second, that the political power of the government is in the jjcople ; and, third, that the sovereign power of the State is vested in the government. The constitution of the State of Massachusetts contained a provision for its amendment, in every respect similar to that of this State, and the house of representatives of that State submitted the following question to its supreme court : "Whether, if the legislature should submit to the people, to vote upon, the expediency of having a convention of delegates of the people, for the purpose of revising or altering the constitution of the Common- wealth, in any specified part of the same, and a majority of the people voting thereon should decide in favor thereof, couhl such convention holden in pursuance thereof act upon and propose to the people amend- ments in other parts of the constitution, not specified V Now mark the answer : " Considering that the constitution has vested no authority in the leg- islature, in its ordinary action, to provide by law for submitting to the people the expediency of calling a conVeution of delegates, for the purpose of revising or altering the constitution, it is difficult to give an opinion, what would be the power of such convention if called." (6 Cush., 673.) The point to which I desire to direct your attention in this answer is, that Judge Shaw plainly and distinctly asserts, that in its ordinary action (legislation) the legislature is not vested with authority to sub- mit such a question to the people. The constitution of this State has vested no authority in the legislature to submit such a question to the people of Arkansas, unless the powder belongs to it under the scope of ordinary legislative power ; and this the supreme court of JNIassachu- setts has distinctly and emphatically asserted it did not. The house of representatives of Massachusetts also submitted another question to the supreme court of that State, which it answered, that I regard as conclusively settling the question, so far as the law of the case is con- cerned. The question was, whether the constitution of Massachusetts could be amended, altered or changed, in any other manner than that pointed out by the constitution itself f In reply to this the court said : 12 " Cousidering that previous to 1S20 no mode was provided by the con- stitution for its aTuendment ; that no other power for tliat purpose, than in the mode uIUkUhI to, is anywhere given in the constitution, by impli- cation or otherwise, and that the mode provided thereby appears to have been carefully considered, and the power of altering tlie constitution cautiously restrained and guarded, we think a strong im])li('-ation arises against the existence of any other poiccr under the Constitution, for the same puri)ose.'' The constitution of Arkansas, like that of Massachusetts, upon its face, shows that the mode of altering or reforming the same was care- fully considered, and cautiously restrained, and if a strong iini)licatiou arises in the one case it arises in the other. This Massachusetts case is the only instance I have come across where a judicial tribunal has con- strued the powers of a legislature under a constitution almost indentical with our own. I could cite the expressions of other judges, and courts of ability, all going to prove and sustain the law as stated by the supreme court of Massachusetts ; but, if what the supreme courts of Dehiware, Wisconsin, and that of Massachusetts have said is not conclusive, and the revolu- tionary action of what has been clone in other States without warrant or authority of laic, and in defiance therof, is to be regarded as precedents of r/(y//^ instead of power and wrong, the decision of the supreme courts of ever}' State in the Union would not satisfy or convince the judgment of those who point to successful revolutions to evidence what the law is. The rule of construction applicable to a State constitution ought to be uniform ; that is, words that by implication amount to an inhibition in one portion of the instrument should raise the same implication in another. Section 19 of article 6 of the constitution ot Arkansas declares that, " contested elections (for the office of governor, &c.) shall be determined by both houses of the general assembly, in such manner as is, or may hereafter be, prescribed by law." After the adoption of the constitution containing the section quoted, the legislature passed an act allowing the claimant to an olfice to com- mence suit in the circuit court for the recovery of a State or county office wrongfully held by another. Under the statutes alluded to 13 rooks commenced an action against Baxter, in the proper court, for the recov- ery of the office of governor. In April last a judgment of ouster was rendered against Baxter, and a judgment for the office in favor of Brooks. The court rendering the judgment was one of original and general jurisdiction. Be/ore judgment no writ of prohibition was ap- jdied for or granted, aiul after judgment no supersedeas w\as applied for or granted, nor was the judg^ient even appealed from by Baxter. After tlie rendition of this judgment, the record in the case alluded to "was introduced as evidence in a cause pending in tlie supreme court to establish Brooks's right, as governor, to draw on a fund i)laced by law under the control of the governor of the State. For the reason stated the court admitted the record as evidence, and upon that state of case directed the treasurer of State to pay on the requisition of Brooks as governor. Baxter, treating both judgments as nullities, appealed to the Presi- dent for aid to oust Brooks, who had taken possession, from the office of governor. The Attorney-General, in disposing of thecpiestion, assumes the position that, under the provisions of section 19 of article 6, the act conferring jurisdiction on the courts is void, and that the legislature cannot delegate an exclusive power to another body or tribunal for the determination of a question that it must determine for itself. If you 13 * will examine the provisiou cited, you will find that no exclusive words are used ; you will fiud that uo prohibitory words are used ; yet the Attor- ney-General is of opinion that the designation of the general assembly to hear and determine a question of contest, inhibits any other tribunal from attempting to decide or deciding the same question, and the Pres- ident, acting on that ojnnion, commanded Mr. Brooks and his friends to disperse. Now, if it be true that the mere designation of the general assembly to hear a contest for the office of governor, (for it is a power the legislature could have conferred upon itself by an act, if the consti- tution had been silent,) precludes that body from delegating its power in case of contest, is it not equally true that the designation of the members of the general assembly as being the persons who should i)ro- pose and pass upon amendments to the constitution, precludes them from providing that it shall be done by any one else? What is the dif- ference between an attempt to confer jurisdiction on a court to hear and determine a matter that should be determined by the legislature, and an attempt to confer the power on a set of delegates to amend the constitu- tution, when the instrument itself says it shall be amended by the direct action of the members of the general assembly I The constitution was intended by the people, when it was framed and adopted, to create a permanent form of government. The eighth section of article five provides for the enumeration of the inhabitants of the State in the year 1875, and every ten years thereafter. It also provides " that there shall be uo apportionment (for representatives) other than that made in this constitution, until after the enumeration to be made in the year 1875." This clause evidences an intention to create a con- tinuous government, and one the representation in which was not to be changed until after the year 1875. This clause is just as much a limita- tion on the people as upon the legislature. The practice and theory of all the States has been that, if the consti- , tution w^as silent as to the manner and mode of amending or altering the instrnment, the legislature was clothed with power to submit the question to the people, not only as to the propriety of calling a conven- tion to amend the constitution, but to make a new constitution. The reason why the legislature was conceded the power of providing the mode and manner of taking the sense of the people on the subject of re- forming and amending the organic act is, that in this manner revolution was avoided and the line of succession could be preserved. Without a law, the voice of the people could not be heard in an authorized form. An unauthorized expression of the people cannot confer power. The people can only speak through the forms of the law. With this state- ment of facts before us, let us examine what could have been the object of the framers of the constitution when they inserted the thirteenth article in the constitution of the State of Arkansas. Let us examine that article and see what intent is disclosed therein. I insist that the whole spirit and intent of the article evinces a disposition to change the formerruleand to spare the people the cost and exi)enseof electing delegates to a convention, and tb confer the powers that had been previously exercised by a constitutional conv-ention on the members of the legislature. It not only discloses such an intent, but'it shows that the constitution was not to be hastily amended or changed. That the peo- pledidinteudtocarefully guard, and restrain any suddenand hasty change in their form of government, is evidenced by the fact that the amend- ments should be submitted to two different legislatures. It is not only evidenced in this, but it is evidenced by the fact that the proposed amendment should be published three months before the election of 14 the ropreseutatives that are to pass upon the aiuondineiit, inuiu'diately before the same is submitted to the people. It is iu)t only evidenced ia this, but it is evidenced in the fact that no amendment should be sub- mitted to the peoi)le and the State charged with the expense of an elec- tion, nidess the anuMidnuMit was of such a character as to comnuMid it to at least a majority of the members elected to each branch of the gen- eral assembly. Now take all these evidences of an intent to prevent any hasty amend- ment or alteration of the constitution, and tell me whether they do not raise an implication that ^'.s.v than a majority of the members of each house shoiUd have the [)owcr to take the initiative for tlu? (lestniction oH a constitution, they had not the power to take the preliminary stei)s for its anuMubuent. Does not the fact that less than a majority could not take the initiatory to amoid the constitution, raise the implication that they could not take the initiative to destroy it? It seems to me that the obvious intent of the thirteenth article of the constitution is to inhibit the submission of an amendment to, or a change in, the same to be made unless "a majority of the meml)er8 elected to each house"* shall be of opinion that a necessity existed for a change in the organic act. Forty-two members in the house constitute a quorum and fourteen in the senate. Twenty-two members of the house consti- tute a majority of a fpiorum, and eiglit members of the senate constitute a majority of a ([uorum in that body. Can it be true th;it ticcniy- two members of the house and eight of the senate are clothed with power to provide a means whereby the constitution may be abolished,, M'lien the same instrument requires the asscuit of forty-ttco members of the house and fourteen members of the senate to assent to a proposi- tion to amend the same, on tico different occasions, before the people can vote thereon. The inherent right of the people is one thing ; but just what, is not well dehned. No matter what it is, it is separate and distinct from the rights of the members of the legislature. The '•'•inherent riglits" of a member of the general assembly, if he has any rights at all, is to legislate, and if he desires the constitution amended, the coustitution points out to him how he must proceed, and he can proceed in no other manner. If " the j)eople" of a State have the right to change tlieirform of government, in a manner at vari- ance with the constitution, then " the people " of the United States have the same right. The Constitution of the United States, like the constitu- tion of a State, is the work of the people. If they can destroy the one, they can destroy the «ther. Article 5 of the Constitution of the United States declares : "The Congress, w'henever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it nec- essary, shall proi)ose amendments to this Constitution ; or on the appli- cation of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a part of tliis Constitution, when ratitied by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States, or by conven- tions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other modeof ratitication may be proposed by Congress." There is nothing in the language of this section that /n express terms pr()hil)its the Congress of the United States from ])assing a law and taking the sense of the j)eople on th(; subject of calling a constitutional convention, and tiie election of delegates thereto; yet I api)rehend no one of you would entertain such a proposition for a moment. Why is it that you would entertain it in the one case ami not in the other f Under what rule of construction can you say that the language amounts 15 to an inliibition in the one case, and not in tbe other! The rule of con- struction, applicable to the Constitution of the United States is, that Congress has no powers save those granted in express terms or such as arise by necessary implication. It is construed almost with the strict- ness of a grant. The rights not granted are reserved to the States, or the people respectively. Why is it then that the people of the United States have not the power to alter, amend, or abolish the Constitution of the United States by a convention of delegates chosen in pursuance of an act of Congress, at variance with the fifth article thereof ? The answeris, they have pointed out how the change should be made, and bound them- selves to pursue that method. The duty of obedience is a necessary corollary to the right to contract. The very right to institute govern- ment, the right of individuals to part with a portion of natural power for the advantages of associated strength, the vesting of power in a common agency, proceeds upon the hypothesis, that the terms of the compact will be faithfully observed. If a mere majority may trample on the terms of the compact, when that majority has solemnly agreed that the terms of the compact shall not be altered without the assent of two-thirds, how are the weak to protect themselves against the oppres- sion of the strong ? How are the timid and prudent to protect them- selves against violence, and the accumulations of labor against rapacity ? 1^0 doubt it will be argued that the people have an inherent right to make governments and unmake them at pleasure, that they cannot limit or restrict themselves if they desire to, and that there is no power to supervise their action. This is the argument of the demagogue, the argument of the fanatic ; a delusion that led the South into rebellion, and which cost the iSTorth three hundred and twenty thousand lives to demonstrate was not true. The object of the people in forming civil government is to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and posterity. It is to this end constitutions are adopted and gov- ernments instituted. A constitution once adopted and a government organized thereunder, should not for light and transient causes be set aside. The causes that justify a departure from the terms of the com- pact are those that vio\\\y\. justify revolution. The signers of the Declara- tion of Independence declare that it is only the right of the people to change their form of government, and throw oft' their allegiance, when the government fails to protect them in life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. These are inalienable rights; these are the rights that cannot be alienated. The right to vote, and to make and unmake governments at pleasure, is not one of the inalienable rights of mankind or of an elector. The people of the United States limit themselves, and why cannot the people of the States do the same thing? Not a temporary limitation, but one that must exist for all time. For instance, the Con- stitution of the United States can never be so amended, without its consent, as to deprive any one of the States of equal representation in the Senate. Nor is it true that there is no power to supervise the 'action of the psople in the alteration of the constitution of a State. The object of sec- tion four of article four of the Constitution of the United States was to create a supervisory power over this very question, and to protect the States against a revolution founded on fraud or conspiracy, or a revolu- tion brought about by actual bloodshed and domestic violence. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on ai^plication of the legislature, or of the executive (when 16 the Icfjislatnre cannot be convened,) a^^ainst domestic violence." This laniv8ni)i)0.ses the existence of a State government havinf>' a leyishitnre and an executive. The contin<;ency eontem[)hited by tlie Constitution has arisen in the State of Arkansas. The executive of the State of Arkansas has ai)i)lied to tiie President to aid him in sui)j)ress- ing an insurrection against the State government thereof. Tlie Presi- dent seems to be in doubt as to who the executive of Arkansas is, or, if not in doubt on that subject, as to wliich government the guarantee ai)i)lies. The guarantee is, not that the President shall guarantee to each State of the Union a republican form of government, but that the United States shall. Congress, by the terms of the first article of the Constitution, is clothed with i)ower " to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all jiowers vested by this Constitution in the Government of tlie United StutesP The guarantee is that of the United States, and by the terms of the section quoted, Congress is designated as the power to carry the giuirantee into execution. We are here, among other things, asking the exercise of this poAver and the enforcement of the guarantee. If you will but stop and retlect one moment, you will at once see there is no necessity for indulging in the idea that the inherent right of recolution belongs to the people of a State. There is no state of case, nor can one be stated, that will justify the people of a State in embark- ing in, or resorting to, a revolution, either actual or political, to change their form of government. Inde})endent powers or independent sover- eignties may do as they please, but a State is not an independent potver, nor is it an independent sovereignty. The States are integral 4 parts of the American Union, and, as such, are guaranteed protection, \ by section four of article four of the Constitution of the United States, against invasion and domestic violence. Xot only this, but by the act of Congress of February 28, 1705, power is conferred on the President, "in case of insurrection in any State against the government thereof^'''' to suppress such insurrection. Not only this, but a republican form of government is guaranteed to the people of a State by the Government of the United States. This being true, what is there that justilies vio- lence or revolution toward an existing State government f You may say its officers may become corrupt, that the necessities of the times, and the i)rogress of events, absolutely demand a change. You may say all this, and it may all be admitted to be true, and it presents no state of case that cannot be remedied by amendment and under the forms of law. If the State government should be administered cor- ruptly and oppressively', the remedy of the people is not destroyed, nor is it taken away. If a government that was once republican iu form has ceased to be such, and the legislature would take no action to remedy the matter, the people are not powerless, nor would such state of case justify revolution. The first amendment to the Constitu- tion of the United States asserts that the people have " the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Would it not be a " grievance" if the officers of gov- ernmeut should so administer the State government, that it was no longer republican in form % Is not Congress clothed with power to ascertain the fact whether a republican form of government exists in a State? or is the question as to whether a republican form of govern- ment exists iu a State to be determined hg the people of the State f The Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798 asserted that the States Lad an eeopIe of a State have an inherent right of revolution, to violently displace an existing State gov- ernment whicli Congress has said was rei>ublican in form, when the right of amendment is given, and when, by petition to Congress, the people may have that form of government preserved, is beyond my comprehen- sion or understanding. But let us look at this thing from another stand-point. For the pur- pose of argument, let us suppose that the people have an inherent right to alter or cuange their constitution at pleasure, under the forms of law, and that the legislature has the undoubted power to provide for calling a constitutional convention. At this point, it becomes necessary, for the elucidation of the question, to refer to the statement of facts that is established by the evidence taken by the committee. It is in evidence that an election was held in the State of Arkansas, on the 5th of Noveml>er, 1872, for the elecition of State officers from governor down, and for the election of members of the general assembly. It is in evidence that a general assembly was duly organized in January of 1873, the members of which (saving and excepting such members of the senate as held over) were elected at the November election in 1872. It is in evidence that there was not a va(;ancy in either branch of the general assem- bly at the time of its adjourn-nent, in April of 1873, and that, on the 25th day of that month, the legislature adjourned sine die. It is in evidence that during the session no vacancies were declared in either house that 2 a"" 18 were not nilod durina- the session ; that but .s•^r members of tlK> bo se Iml none or tlie me.nbers of the senate resi.u'-.ea In^tween the a o eeet\o )a thatno member of either house died dunnj,- the period n^Zu^d^ that no writs of election have been issued, and noelee mns heldo till vacancies occurring between the 4th »^^.«;-*\"'^>7' V^,'^' an Vl.e lOth of May, 1874 ; that, on the 22d ot ^P-U^; ^;^^- - -- ter issued his proclamation as Sovenu^r convening tie eo.^^^^^^^^^^^ extraordinary sessh)n on the lUh of May, 18.4, and that, at the tii e ot Sm U said proclamation, a Jud;,ment of ouster ^^f ^>^f ".^j'^^;;; ,^f ^ ^^ said Baxter as oovernor, by the circuit court ot l'^^^'^;^'^' V^""^';, ,^ ruse iM din- therein, Nvierein Joseph lirooks was plaintiff, and Kbsha ^^er e&ant ; thk said Judguient had neither been appea ed tro.n^ bv s id Baxter, n. r had it been superseded; that, n teen memPers ol he honsrim /brr'raeinbers ot the senate, that ^vere e ected in ^^ov^'^'^J^; ol87'>nd that were in the i^eneral assembly that adjourned on he 25th o? Ap 1 1^''3, met at a place other than the capitol-budding the ns iilidace of meein^-,) and within the closed military lines o Eusha S^ x^^ vhm3 no man or men.ber of the general assembly' could en er w thou a pass from one of his military officers, on the 11th da> o Ma. , rs74 -in l thatsai(l fifteen members of the house and /ourmembers of Jit s^Mne here not being a quorum in either branch of the general /ssem ly instlml of sending for absent members and adjourning troin d 'v da\ as be constituth.n requires, admitted twenty-seven persons ; tlu' 1 u 4 a.Hl ten in the senate, to till vacancies, that did no occ u^ Vdeah or resignation, " during a recess of the general ;f «^»; ^ '" ' J that had never been declared to exist l^y the general assembly ; and that at the t me the legislature Nvas convened in extraordinary session by L sha B X er there was a quorum of each house m existence, about whose Hoht to seats in the general assembly there was no question ; that, by Uil re oo'iit on o 'r.u/,....m persons as members in the house, and by :\^^ion oiten persons as membei. in tlu> senjUe ^:^^ entitled to seats, each house, on the 13th day ot Ma^ , Ibrt, deohucd itscit nv'vniiiy.ul and so notified Elisha Baxter. i"l ke he osition that a legislature thus constituted and orS-amze hail no^uithofity or power to legislate for the people ot Arkansas, and ttuit its everv act was a nullity. . . /• n^,^„ . ilie thirteenth section of article 5 of the constitution is as follows : '^ 1 imj^^ty of the members of each house shall constitute a quoiMim to tnvi s act business, but a smaller number may adjourn trom day to d . Ind compel the attendance of absent members, m such manner and under such penalties as each house may prescribe. Section 7 of the same article is as follows : u ThcMnembers composing the senate shall be twenty-six, and of the ^XmtMn?wni"r!:infhStr^aUesiburte a quorum in ^vm^^ adjourn from day to day, ^nd compel tlje •'^tteiulance ot absermembers, and do not therefore constitute a duly organized s- ^te c-u, ble of transactuig any business whatever, save such as is meii- nonXi the constitution: and as may be incident thereto m the process ''TT^ow'ef conferred upon a less number than a quorum of either 19 house is, not to admit new members or pass upon their eleefion, qualifica- tion, and return, but is to adjouru ''froui day to day," aud compel tlie attendance of "absent meuibers." A less number than a le.2:al quorum cannot transact business, or au- thorize the swearing- in o£ new members. The admission of " new members" certainly comes under the head of " transacting- business." If it does, then there mnst be a quorum present, for the constitution declares that a majorifij of the members of each house shall constitute a quorum to "transact business." Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that the legislature of this State had adjourued to meet on the 11th of May, instead of being convened in extraordinary session, aud that, by some nnforeseeu accident, tifty republican members of the house failed to reach the capital on the day fixed for the assem- bling of the legislature, or that armed sentries prevented them froui participating in the exercise of their olficial duties, and that fifteen or twenty democrats in the house, (who were members,) iu the absence of the other fitly members, should recognize fifty of their political friends as members of the house, and swear them in as such, and elect new officers aud declare themselves "the house of representatives;" wonld it be contended that a house thns organized was the true house of rep- resentatives ? Why not ? Would not your answer be that the fifteen or twenty democrats, although members of the house, did not constitute a quorum ; that they were members of an organized house, and that less than a quorum could not pass upon the election-returns aud qualification of " new members." Suppose, again, that, during the sitting of the legislature, a new mem- ber had been elected to fill a vacancy in the senate, and that for some reason there was not a quorum present on the morning a new member appeared aud presented his certificate of election ; would less than a quorum of the senate undertaken to have admitted him to a seat! I think not. Gushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, (sec. 817,) says : " A message from one house to the other cannot be received by the house to which it is sent, nor can any answer to a message be received by the house by which it is sent unless a quorum is present." Is the re- ceiving a message from the clerk of the house that a bill has passed that branch of the general assembly, any less the " transaction of busi- ness," than the admitting, or passing upon the election, qualification, and return of a member ? If one comes under the head of " transacting business," does not the other ? A departure from the rule, that less than a quorum of a once legally organized house may pass upon the election, return, and qualification of persons claiming seats, establishes a precedent whereby a minority party may change the political com- plexion of a branch of the general assembly, if at any time during the sessions there should happen to be less than a quorum present. It may be said that the twenty-seven persons who wer© admitted to seats in the house of representatives, and the ten persons admitte Eisha Baxter for orderin- elections for the election ot thirtN-eij^ht ot^^.e uiem^ ers of the legislature is, as you will see by reierence to Ins e-mr"^^ that the members elected in 18712 had either "rem.ned umird s ict," or had been -apimnted to oflii.e," other than such as a mem lei ot the' general assembly can hold. The question raised by 'thii stau! of factsls, " Is the governor authorized, by the laws and con- s in.t 1 of this State, to detern.ine rchen and .r/../Aer a member ot t e ie. s u'c has 'removed from his .listrict,' or vacated his seat by rex^en- ing an appointment to ollice incompatible with the constitution ot the The'oeneral rule, as I have already stated, in regard to the construc- tion of -v State constitution is, that it is a UmiUaion upon the powers o t e legh^lative department, and a grant to the executive and .,u< ic a de parttnei ts. This being true, neither the executive nor the .ludu.a e r^^n e^ can exerciseany authority or power except such as iscleailj o • , t( b the constitution or conferred by statutory enaetments. ^ Sec on U of A tiLle V, which is headed ''Legislative ^epartmen^" is as t\ lows: " Each house shall choose its own oltu.ers (letermme the rule's of its proceedings, and judge of the election, <^uahJicaUon,:.n.\ re- turn of its own members," Section 3.'^ of the same article is as lollows: i • i ^. u'CgcMieral assembly shall regulate by law ^i/ «'/u>m, and in what manner, writs of election shall be issued to till vacancies which maj happen in either branch thereof." Section 34 of the same article is as lollows : "The general assembly may declare the cases in which any olhce shai?^be deen^d vacant. 'and ilso the manner of ^^^^^'^^ where no provision is made for that purpose by this const tution. Fiwrthe'e sections it appears, first, tliat each house ^^tbe judge of the dection, qualification, and return of its own -}-^^\^^^ the general assembly is (clothed with power o ^!'i'^^^t^^> l'}! ^.^^ •uidln what manner, writs of election shall be issued to hll vacancies wcbmav happen in either branch thereof; and third, the P^^ver le- cl re tlTe cases u which an office shall be deemed vacant, and the mau- ne^of mUng the sanie, except in cases otherwise provided by the con- '^ Tl.^e"c('>nstitution nowhere authorizes the governor, nor is there any stMt ite tl a I have been able to find, that authorizes hnn to deterin ne thni-nx office Is become vacant. Therefore, the words " except m the c-sesoln'rwle provided bv this constitution" have no retereiice to his ^^i^^'Thi^ei^l^ses clearly indicate tbat the pow.r of^.^..;;.;^^ whether a vacancy exists, either in the general assembly, oi i>i <^'^ otOi^ deimr .mn r^f government, is not vested in the executive of tl e St^te, unless conferix^l on him by statute, which has not been done. In- deed, it may well be doubted whether it could be done. Sccf ion 10 of Article V is as follows : , , " lS,val^of seUtors and representatives from their respective dis- tricts shall be deemed a vacation of their otlice. Section 11 of the same article is as tollows : " Ko person holding any office under the United States or tins htare, or any county ofiice,T'Xc4'ting postmasters, notaru'S public, othceis ot th/dlt aid township olheers, shall be eligible to,or A«^^e a^^«^ , either bi ami of the general assembly, and all votes given tor an> such person shall be void." n {.ondi- I uuderstand this section to mean that all votes cast toi anj canai 21 date for election to tlie general assembly, who holds any office, at the time of being voted for, save those excepted, are void. I farther under- stand it to mean that a person elected a member of the general assem- bly shall not have a seat therein, if he holds any oftice other than those specifically excepted, The language of tlie constitution is not that the "appointment" to one of the prohibited offices shall create a vacancy, as it IS in the case of " removal from the district," but that no person hold- ing one of the prohil)ited offices shall have "« seat in either branch of the general assembly." The members of the legislature are, in my opin- ion, a general assembly only when they are convened in accordance with law, and in session. The object of prohibiting a member of the general assembly from hold- ing any of the prescribed offices, obviously was to guard against him hohling any position that might influence his action as a legislator. The duties of a legislator are not continuous, and if at the tini^e he is called u[)on f:o act as such, he is not of the proscribed class, I cannot see any objections to his holding his seat, notwithstanding he mav have been " appointed to oftice." But, be this as it may, one thing is verv clear ; and that is, it is no part of the duties of the }/overnor to deterinine the question, and order an election to fill vacancies where none have been declared. We have already seen that the general asserablv is clothed Mith the exclusive power to regulate by whom and in what niauner writs of election shall be issued to fill vacancies in either branch of the legis- lature. The conference of power to designate by ivhom the writ of elec- tion shall be issued, shows, conclusively, that'the issuing of writs of election is not a duty devolving, by the constitution, on the chief execu- tive of the State. The legislature, under the power conferred, could have designated the secretary of state, or any other person, to have per- formed this duty, just as easily as it designated the governor. This shows that the duty of issuing writs of election, to fill vacancies, is not a prerogrativeof the governor, but a plain, simple, statutory duty, in the execution of which he has no more discretion than the sheriff of a county would have had, had he been charged with the duty. Now let us see what the statute says. Section 1, chapter SO, of Gould's Digest, p. 507, is as folows: "When any memberl elected to either house of the general assembly shall resign in the recess thereof] he shall address and transmit his res- ignation in writing to the governor, and Avhen any such member shall resign, (luring any se ssion, he shall address his resignation to the presi- ding officer of the house of which he is a member, which resignation shall be entered on the journals 5 in which case, and in all cases of va- cancy happening or being 'declared during any session of the general assembly, by death, expulsion, or otherwise, the presiding officer of the house in which such vacancy shall happen shall immediately notify the governor thereof, who shall immediately issue a writ of election to sup- ply such vacancy." Section 2 of said act is as follows: "'Whenever the governor sliall re- ceive any resignation, or notice of vacancy, or when he shall be sat- isfied of the death of any member of either house, during the recess thereof, he shall, without delay, issue a writ of election to supply such vacancy. Three things are observable in the section quoted: first, that the resignations made in vacation are to be addressed to the governor ; sec- ond, that the resignations made during the session, are to be made to the presiding officer of the house of which the person is a member; and third, that these sections contemplate, except in case of death or resig- 22 nation diirntfi ihc recess of ilic general as.souhli/, tliat eacb house, ichen the hijisUiinre is in session, sliall declare the eases iu which va- cancies exist, uliether they arise from ''death, resignation, or otherwise." There are only two cases where the governor is authoiized to issue a Avrit of election to till a va(!ancy on his own motion. One is wliere a vacancy occurs by resignation ' otlicers of each house may have commu- nicated to him. liaxter issued writs of election in two cases to fill vacancies occasioned l)y "removal from the district," and forty-two writs of election to fill vacan(nes arising I'rom members of the general assem- bly having been "appointed to oftices" other than those the constitution lierujits a member of the legislature to hold; he did this on his own motion, and this was done without receiving notice of the existence of any vacancies in either house "yro?H the presidiny officers thereof .''^ This clearly is beyond the scope of his authority and the statutes. It would be a dangerous power to place in the hands of any man, especially the chief executive oflicer of the tState, to determine or declare vacancies in the general assend)ly. Mere " ajypointment to ofli(^e " is not a ground of disqualification to sit as a member of the general assembly. It is the holdinpointment,") is a matter for the determination of the house of whi(;h he is a member, and not for the governor. Upon this question, it being a legislative and not a judicial deternjination, there are no adjudicated cases to be found in the books of the i)rofession. The only two cases that I have seen that have any bearing on the question, are to be found in 17 Serg. and Eawle, (Pa.,) 219, and Brightley's Election Cases, 640. The oidy use which can be made of these cases is that they are pre- cedents to show that the question of holding an office inhibited by the constitution, is a matter for the determination of the house of which he is a mcinher, and that until it has adjudicated and declared a vacancy, that none exists, and if none exists, it must be i)atent to all, that the governor, under the law regulating the issuing of writs of election, is not authorized to order elections to fill vacancies that mag or mag not he declared. But iu order to remove ail doubts on this subject, let us ])ut the question so there can no longer be any dodging it, and this uiay be done by asking if the power of determining whether a vacancy existed con Id he conferred upon the governor, trrw hg an act of the legislature? That it is not conferred by the constitution we have seen, because the constitution says, "Each house shall be the Judge of the election, qualifi- cation, and return of its own members." That it is not ex necessitate an executive duty, we have also seen ; that the holding oian inhibited office is a thing that goes to the disqualification of a member the constitution declares. Under this state of facts, let us see if the legislature could confer the power on a governor, even if it were so disposed, to deter- mine whether a member had vacated his office by being "appointed" to another. I say it could not. By the constitution the sole power of Judging of the election, qual- ification, and return of a member, is conferred on "each house." The ride in relation to a conference of ])ower is, that it cannot be delegat- ed unless the authority delegating the power has so declared. The 23 power to pass laws, or tlie pov.er to allow a statute to become a law, subject to the approval ot the people, has time and time again been de- cided coidd not be done. The anlhority to issue writs of election mny be delegated because the constitution so declares. What is the decla- ration that a vacancy exists in either house, but tlie declaration and passing upon the (liHqualrftcdtion of a member f Is not the determination that a member of the legislature lias accepted an office, that disqualifies him, a passing upon his disiinalifimtiofis f Does not the constitution say that "each house" must do this! If it does, what implication does it raise ? Would not the exercise of such a power be an exercise of a power lodged with each house of the legislative dei)artment ? Does not the constitution say that "no person belonging to one department shall exercise the power properly belonging to another?" Does the governor belong to the legislative department'? I do not say that the act!ei)tance of a prohibited office does not disqualify one, who had been a meiiiber of the legislature, from thereafter acting as a member of the general as- sembly. This, I say, I do not deny. " But I do deny that the governor was, is, or can be, clothed with power to declare a vacancy in either branch of the general assembly and order an election to fill the same. The fact of disqualification may be known to every man, w^oman, and child in the State, but until it luis been declared by a tribunal that is authorized to ascertain and declare the fact, it does not exist. A sheriff may have seen a man commit a most atrocious and wanton murder. He may be perfectly confident that when the court meets a jury would convict him, ami that the judge would sentence him to be hanged, but all this would not vearrant the sheriff in executing the murderer until his guilt had been declared in the manner [)rescribed by law. And so with the governor: he may have been satisfied in his own mind tiiat the persons whose seats he declared vacant had accepted offices that would disqualify them from serving as members of the gen- eral assenibly, but until tliis fact was determined and declared by the only tribunal authorized to make that declaration, he had no right or power to order au election. It may have been done with the best of motives, and with the belief that he had the power; but neither mofivefs nor heliif changes the fact that he did not have the 'poivcr to issue 'writs of election to till anticipated instead of real vacancies. The governor does not even pretend that any one of the persons ever accepted or entered upon the discharge of the duties of the otiice to which he says they were "appointed." If the governor can dis(jualify a member of the general assembly from acting as such, by mere " ap- pointment" to office, you have i)laced it within his powder to get rid of his political enemies in the legislature at all times. The question, not only of having received an " appointment," but of having accepted it, as well as having performed the other })rerequisites necessary to clothe one with the insignia of office, are questions that cannot be delegated to any other department of government. Au attempt was>^ made in the case of The People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich., to get the supreme court of Michigan to declare a law unconstitutional because three members of the legislature whose votes were necessary to the requisite majority, in point "of fact, were not entitled to seats. In response to the demand. Judge Cooley said : "The general judicial power of the State upon the courts and officers specifiedis conferred by the constitution, and there are other powers of a judicial nature, which, by the same instrument, are expressly con- ferred upon other bodies or' officers, and among them is the power to judge of the election, qualification, and returns of members of the legis- 24 latnro. Tlio tiTins employed clearly show that each house, in decidinji-, acts in a judicial capacity, and tliere is no clause in the constitution which empowers this or any other court to review tiicir action. * * The (lucstion of the lcj;al electi(Ui of a member is usiuilly a question compounded of law and fa(;t, and the house must necessarily i)ass ui)on both. * * * It is sufticient for us to say that the constitution has not conferred u])on us tliis Jurisdiction ; we leave it where it has been left by the fundamental law of the State." It appears perfectly plain to me that if a court could not pass upon the election, returns, and qualifications of a member of the legislature, that a governor cannot. I ex])ect our friends on the other side will contend that a body of men callinj^- themselves a lej^islature, can pass u])on their own qualifications, and that no other tribunal can review their finding. So far as /State authoi'ity is concerned, the statement is abso- lutely true ; but so far as United States authority is concerned, it is not true. It may be asked if Congress shall hear ami determine election contests between mend)ers of the legislature of a State ? My answer is, that Congress has no such power; but it has the power to determine which of two bodies iti the Icgishiture of a State, or whether a body of nuMi acting as such are what they pretend to be. Without this power, how is (Jongress to act in the event a legislature should ask the guar- antee given by section four of article four of the Constitution of the United States, to protect the State against domestic violence";? But a short time since there were tv.o bodies of men in the State of Alabama, each claiming to be the general assembly of that State. Sup- pose one of them had aj)pealed for aid to sup{)ress an insurrection against the State government of Alabama? Will it be contended that in su(!h case Congress could not, before taking action on the api)lication to enforce the guarantee, determine for its own guidance whetlier the per- sons (ilaiming to be elected, and claiming to constitute the general assembly of that State, were in fact duly and legally chosen by the peoi>le, or whether they were mere pretenders 1 AVhy, sirs, a mere statement of the question eliminates its absurdity. The guarantee of the constitution can only be invoked by the legisla- ture of a State, or by its executive when the legislature cannot be con- vened ; and to deny that Congress cannot determine in such a case, which of two bodies claiming to be a legislature, or whether a body of men claiming to be a legislature are such ; or which of two persons claiming to be the governor of the State, is in fact what they rei)resent themselves to be, is to render nugatory a provision of the Constitution of the United States. The evich'uce in this case shows clearly and distinctly that there was not a quorum of the legislature present, and that there was a legal quorum in existence at the time of the pretended organization. The organization of the legislature is not a thing the law contenq)lates should take i)lace every time it is convened. Its members are elected for two and four years, aiul when on(!e organized that organization stands for two years. Now, the legislature that elected Baxter attem[)ted to convene in extraordinary session; was an organized body at the date of its adjournment. He called it together, and because some of the members did not suit his purposes he kept them out at the point of the bayonet. Because he kept them out he could not get a quorum ; but a legislature was necessary, and a legislature he must have. If the absent members were admitted to seats they would not do his bidding. Here was an emergency, ami a man was found equal to it. In looking over the election-law lie found the followinu' section: 25 "Sec. 54 It sliall be the duty of the secretary of state on the j^/n^if day of each regular session of the general assembly to lay before each house a; list of the members elected agreeably to the returns." Under the law of Arkansas each house of the general assembly is organized upou the roll furnished by the secretary of state, and the members have no other credentials. The authority conferred by the section cited, as will be observed, is conferred on the secretary of state, and on the first day of the regular sessio7i. This is no authority to any one to make out a roll at the beginning of an extrao r dinar g session. On the roll submitted were the uames of forty persons, and tirenty-si.v of them, in the house of representatives, voted for the bill calling a con- stitutional convention. Attached to this roll is the following certificate : " To the speaker of the house of reiyresentatives : " I herewith transmit a true and correct list of the members of the legislature elected to the lower house of the legislature at a special election held on the 4th of jSTovember, 1873, as appears/ro?» /^/jereiwnts on Me in my office. "JAMES M. JOHNSON, " jSecretary of State. " By A. H. GARLAND, " Deiruty Secretary of State.''' You will recollect that I called this man to the witness-stand and exhibited to him a copy of this pa[)er and asked him if he furnished the list and certificate to the house of representatives. His reply was that he did. I then asked him if, at the time of making that certificate and furnishing the roll, he was in possession of any of the records of the office of secretary of state. His answer w^as, " None at all." I then asked him it he had the returns from the election officers. To this ques- tion he responded by saying, "No, sir; I had uo records at all in rela- tion to the election of these men." Without a legislature a constitutional convention could not be called. x\ll that was necessary was to make a roll and send it to the fifteen democrats inside of Baxter's military lines, aud the work was accom- plished. Without ever having seen an election-return. Garland made out a roll on which he says forty persons w^ere elected as members of the legisla- ture, according to the returns on file in his office^ and when interrogated about returns he says he did not have any. By the act described, Gar- land created a legislature and paved his w\ay to the gubernatorial chair, where he sits to-day. Who will say after this that virtue hath not its own reward "? Before leaving this subject I desire to call your attention to one fact in connection with the evidence, and that is that there is no proof that any one of the persons that Elisha Baxter ajypointed to office ever ac- cepted the same or entered u[)on the discharge of the diUies thereof. Under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States the gov- ernor of the State is authorized to issue writs of election to fill vacancies happening in the House of Bepresentatives. Suppose that during the term ot Andrew Johnson he had aiipointed all the leading republicans that w^ere obnoxious to him to some office incompatible with that of a member of the House, and suppose the governor of the State, upon public rumor of such an appointment, had ordered an election to fill a sup- posed vacancy, when the person appointed had \\G\l\\ex accepted the s.ime nor entered upou the discharge of the duties of the office to which he was 26 appointed, and suppose the person elected to fill the supposed vacancj', to.iivtlier witli otluTs similarly chosen, at the time lixed for the meeting ot Coniiifss should have come here, and Andrew Johnson had sur- rounded the (\ii»itol with the Army of the United States, and woidd noj let liny of the nuMubers of ('onu'iess, save such as were liis ])olitieal friends, within the Cajtitol building, and that the persons elected under the circumstances 1 have indicated had met with a few members of the old Congress and organized a new House of liepieseutatives and a neio Senate, with new officers from the highest to the lowest, and that the Congress thus constituted should pass a bill submitting the question of calling a convention of the people to frame a new Constitution, by a direct vote of the peojile of the United States, and in the same bill pro- vide that the officers to canvass the vote shonld be chosen by the revo- lutionary body, and that the ofificers thus chosen should have the ap- pointment of every Judge of election and election oflicer throughout the United States, for tlie holding and dechiring the result of said election, and that Aiulrew Johnson, in aid of that revolutionary movement, placed the District of Columbia under martial law, and kept it there during said ele(;ti()n and the session of the convention, aiul that the Congress of his own creation had ])assed a law first providing that all oflicers, upon the i)assage of articles of imi)eaclrinent by the House, should be suspended from the exercise of tlieir functions, and authoiizing the President to appoint other persons to act during the i)eriod of suspen- sion ; and that within a day or two thereafter every officer obnoxious to his aiUninistratiou, not only in the executive, but in the judicial dei)art- Uicnts, should be impeached by the House for an act that, under no state of case, was an impeachable offense; and when the chairman of the committee reporting the articles stated publicly, on the floor of the House, before the vote was taken, that he had not examined a single \Nitness in su])port of any one of the charges, and that Congress, fear- ing even the jndges of Johnson's own ai)polntment, should pass a law inhibiting the opening of any court of the Ujiited States for a period of seven months, for the purpose of j^rc venting any adjndi(;ation or deter- mination of the legality and validity of the proceedings which led to the calling of the convention ; and that after the election the commis- sioners should declare that a majority of the votes were cast for a con- vention, and that certain persons were elected delegates thereto, and the delegates should frame a constitution, and in the ordinance submit- ting it to a vote of the peoi)le should [)rovide for three commissioners of their own selection to canvass the vote and declare the result on its adoption, and who were elected to ottices thereunder, and conferring on these three commissioners the selection of every election-officer, and at the same time making no provision for a contest of the vote, nor a tri- bunal to hear and determine the legality thereof, and that these com- missioners should declare the same ratified, and that Aiulrew Johnson, on the declaration of who was elected President, should have turned the office over to Jefferson Davis or Jtobert Toombs; the question I de- sire to ask is, what words you would find to express your indignation at such violence and disregard of law ? Ail that is hero supposed in this case has actually happened in Ar- kansas, and you will be asked to sustain it and thereby make a prece- dent, declaring that sucli action is legal, or that it is revolutionary. In exanuning the make-up of the legislature, you have a right to go into the details of its election. The resolution under which this com- mittee is appointed confers full and ample authority upon you to make the inquiry. 27 " Tbe validity of an electiou depends upon its being held and con- ducted at the proper time and place, and in the manner provided by law." ^atterlee v. San Francisco, (23 Gal., 320.) I shall not trespass upon your time in citing authorities, or in ad- ducing arguments, to convince you that an election held to till n vacancy when no vacancy exists, confers no authority upou a person elected at such an election. The books of the profession are full of cases upon this point, and are no doubt familiar to all of you. I think I have ali-eady shown you that the governor of Arkansas is not clothed with the power, under the constitution and laws of Arkan- sas, to determine ivlten a vacancy exists in the legislature, other than those happening bj' death or resignation during the recess of the .same. But suppose for argument's sake that I am wrong in this, we still have to ascertain whether the election was held at the time, mamier, and place provided by law. Upou this subject there can be no diversity of opinion. The ballot in the American form of government is the instru- ment by which the voice of the people is heard and ascertained. It is hedged around with certain safeguards, and around it is thrown the protection of the law. We hear men talk of the " will of the people," as though the clamor of the mob and the cry of revolutionists was en- titled to respect. The people of this country are n corporate peoi)le, and they can only speak, legally, at the time and in the manner agreed upon. It ai)pears from the evidence that at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, previous to the ISTovember election of 1872, registrars were appointed, and that said registrars made a registration of the legal electors of said State of Arkansas, and that neither said board, nor the persons composing the same, have died or resigned, buc are yet resi- dents and citizens of said State, except in a few isolated instances, and these occurred before the adjournment of the Senate on the 25th of April, 1873 ; that afterwards, to wit, on the 18th day of September, 1873, the f/overnor of said State ordered a registration of the legal elect- ors of the State, and appointed a new board of registration, composed^ of different persons than those who constituted the registration board of 1872; that the persons so appointed by the governor in 1873, made a registration of the electors of said State, and that at the election held in ISTovember of 1873, to till vacancies in the general assembly, the persons registered as electors by the board of registration appointed by the governor in 1873 were allowed to vote, and that the election was held by persons appointed judges of election by the board so appointed by the governor in the year last named. Upon this state of facts, the question is, " Whether the appointment of registrars made by Baxter in 1873 was authorized by hiw!" Section one of the registration act (Sess. Acts of 1st sess., 1868) reads as follows: " That on or before the first day of August, 1868, and every two years thereafter, the governor shall, hy and with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint three loyal, competent, and discreet citizens in each county, who shall have resided at least six months in the county next preceding their appointment; said persons to be styled and called a board of registration." The second section of said act reads as follows: "The governor shall till any vacancy occurring in any of the appoint- ments made hy him, and may, in his discretion, remove any one so ap- pointed hy him for incompetency or other sulticient cause." The power of removal conferred by the second section of the registra- 28 tion act is limited to persons that the governor maij have appointed to Jill a vaeiDicii. The hm^^uage of the section is that he may "remove any one so appointed by /jiw." Tlie only case where the absolnte power of a{)pointment is given to the governor, alone, is to till a vacancy The api)()intment of registrars, in the iirst instance, is by the governor, by and icifk the advice and con- sent of the senate. The power of removal conferred by the second sec- tion is not broad enongh, nor do I think it was the design of the same, to authorize the removal of persons that had been appointed " by and with the consent of the senate." The twenty-third section of the act authorizes the governor, "where, for any reason, \\ proper registration has not been made previous to any general election, to cause a new registration to be made lor the purpose of any munici[)al, State, or county eIe(;tion." This section contains no conference of i)o\ver to reniore any one. The i)Ower conferred is to cause a " new registration ■' to be made. The registrars appointed in 1872 were, under the law,, appointed for two years, and, if they did not resign or abandon the oltice, the second section confers no ])ower to remove any one save such as tlie governor had ai>pointed to Jill iKicancies. The appointment of other persons to make the registration amounted to a removal of the old registrars (/"the act was authorized by law ; if it was not, it was a usurpation of power, and all acts had, done, and performed thereunder are absolutely void. The power to_/?7/ a racroclaniatiou, previous to the '' general election " held in ISTovember of 1872. His proclamation says " a registration of the legal electors of the State has not been made since the adoption and ratification of the amend- ment to the constitution known as Article VIII." The question then is. Does the twenty- third section of the registra- tion act authorize the governor to order a registration, to place the names of persons on the registration-books wlio did not possess the qnali- fication of electors at the timethe registration was made " previous to the general election" in 1S72? I think not. The registration, when once uuide, is expected to stand for two years. It frequently happens that many persons who are not possessed of the requisite qualifications of an elector at the time the registration is being made, on account of want of residence and non-age, outgrow, within a very short time after the election, the disqualificatious that existed when the law fixed the time for ascertaining- the qualifications of electors. If, after they have outgrown their disabilities, a special election should be ordered, these persons could not vote, because the law makes no provision by, which their names may be placed on the registration-books. Registration, under the constitution and laws of this State, is a prereqnlsite to voting. It may be a hardship on those persons who may have come into the possession of the requisite qualifications since the registration to deny them the privilege of electors at special elections being held after their disabili- ties no longer exist. If it is, it is one the law imposes, and the remedy is by legislation. Would the governor have the power to order a regis- tration preceding a special election for the purpose of giving the per- sons who had become of age since the " previous registration " an oppor- tunity to vote ? Would he have the power to order a registration to 30 Q'ivo flic persons nn op]iortniiity to vote at a sponial election who, by residence, had accpiired tiie riglit to be electors, but who did not possess tliis right at the time the general election was to be held? I think not ? An elector, not only at a general but at a special election, must have his riglits ascertained iinmediatel.y preceding a general election. The fact that a considerable nnniber of persons, by the adoption of the ainendnient to the constitution known as Article VIII, became entitled to tlu^ ballot who were not entitled to it prior to the November election of 1872, does not go to establish the fact that " a i)roper regis- tration" was not made preceding the general election." In fact, the l)roclaitmtion of the governor clearly and distinctly shows that the ob- ject in making the registration was to register a class of persons to vote at a special election that were not entitled to the use of the ballot at the time the registration was made in 1872. The law does not autliorize any such registration. The governor had a right to order a new registration without assigning any cause or reason therefor ; but in the making of that registration tlui persons registered would have been examined, or shoulcl have been examined, with a view to ascertaining whether the persons applying therefor were possessed of the proper qualitications, not at the time the " neio registra- tion^^ was being made, but whether the persons ai)])lyiug had the proper qualifications of electors at the time '' a pro[)er registration " slioiild have been made, to wit, before the general election. No one can examine the registration law of Arkansas and tind any authority whatever for the placing of any name on the registration-book that did not possess the qualitications of au elector at the ^i»*t' the regis- tration was being made, previous to "a" general election, nor can he find any authority for allowing a person to vote at a special election that did not possess all the qualifications of an elector at the general election immediatelij preceding it. The right to vote at a special election, under the laws of this State, depends solely upon the right to vote at n general election. Under a statute in Missouri, the law requires the registration-book ^o be opened fifteen days before a special election, for the purpose of add- ing the names of such i)ersons to the registry " as have become qualified voters after the closing of the registration made preceding the general election." Breckenridge, who had been a Federal soldier during the war, and who possessed all the qualifications of an elector at the tiuie the registration was made preceding the general election, and who was regularly registered at said registiation, but the same having been declared illegal, and the entire registration of the county having been set aside, he applied to be registered before a "special election." In disposing of the application for mandamus, the supreme court of Mis- souri said, {State v. Cool; 41 Mo., 5i>7:) " It seems that the law makes no ju-ovisiou, in case where the books are destroyed, or they have been rendered ineffective for any reason, for making the registration anew. No UGRv registration can be nuule until the next biennial ele(;tion. There is undoubtedly a palpable defect in the law, a clear eausus omissus ; but this court cannot be appealed to to amend and perfect laws by judicial legislation. "There is no provision made for registering any persons except such as have qualified since the closing of the last general registry. A per- son therefore who was duly entitled to registration, and failed from any cause to be registered, cannot a^ ail himself of the privilege when the lists are being completed in view of a special election." 31 It is a defect in the law, that ])ersons in this State who may have become possessed of the requisite qnalitications of aji ek^ctor since the rej^istra- tion was made, cannot participate in the special elections happening after they are qoalitied ; but tliis defect cannot be remedied bj' the governor any more than it can by the courts. It is clear to my mind that no per- son can be permitted to register or vote at any election, no matter how many registrations may be ordered, that did not possess tlie requisite qualiticatious of an elector at the time '•'•a proper registration'''' should have been made. The next question for consideration is whether the boards of registra- tion appointed by Elisha Baxter, in 1873, were clothed with power to re- move the old judges of election and appoint others in their places ; and whether an election held by judges appointed by registrars whose own a[)pointments were void could hold a legal election to fill vacancies that had not been declared to exist, by the only power that could rightfully determine the question. I have already stated that Baxter had no authority under the laws of this State to appoint registrars, save to fill such vacancies as occurred since the 25th of April, 1873, the time of the adjournment of the legis- lature. If vacancies existed prior to that date, it was his duty under the law fo have sent the nominations to the senate. In those counties where there was a board of registration in existence, he had no power to appoint another, and if the boards thus illegally appointed attem[)ted to or did appoint persons as judges of election in the different precincts of their respective counties, the act was an absolute nullity. The first section of the election act is as follows : (Sess. Acts, first sess. 1868, p. 315.) "AH general elections for the election of any executive or judicial offi- cers, members of the general assembly, &c., shall bo held on the Tuesday next after the tirst Monday in November, and shall be biennial, com- mencing at the general election in 18G8." Section 4 of the same act is as follows : "The board of registration for each county, immediately before such election, (the general election,) shall appoint three discreet persons in each election district, having the qualifications of electors, to act as judges of election within the election district," &c. Section 6 of said act is as follows : "The judges of election apjiointed as aforesaid shall continue to be the judges of all elections within their respective districts until the next general election.*' The time of appointing the judges of election is immediately before " such election." The words " such election " refer to the general elec- tion spoken of in the first section, and not to a special election to fill va- cancies. Once appointed, the law says they shall be judges of all elec- tions within their respective districts until the next general election, not until the next special election. It is a well-established .principle of law, and so generally understood that it.is scarcely necessary to cite au- th.>rities in support of the proposition, that where a power of appoint- ment is conferred on a board and it is once exercised, at the time desig' nated by law, that the board cannot revoke its action after once having made an appointment. It mighr be conceded, for the sake of argument, that Governor Baxter had the powder to appoint new boards of registra- tion, but even this new board could not exercise the power of appoint- ing judges of election to hold the election in 1873, because the law says the appointment shall be made immediatelv i)receding a general election, and that, when so appointed, they " shall be the judges of all elections 32 held within tlioir respective districts until tlio noxt genornl oloction.-' Tlie election in 1873 was not a (/oteral election, it was a special election, and tlieie is no law authorizing' the board of registration to a|)|)oi!it judj^es of election at any other time than '• immediately before a general election." This appointment having been nnule, the board of registra- tion, as an appointing board, was functus officio. A failure on the i)art of the board of registration that was ai)pointed in iSTii to appoint judges of election, would not have authorized the board api)ointed in 1873 to have appointed others. The law itself says hoic the jiulges of election shall be chosen in the event of failure of the board of registra- tion to appoint at the time designated by law. It is as follows : " Section 7. if * * * the board of registratiou fails to appoint judges of election, or those a])pointe(l fail to act, * * * the voters when assembled may ai>i)oint the judges." The law nowhere i)rovides for the removal of a judge of election, but does ])rovide how another shall be selected, if he fails to act. It may be admitted that the i)ersons making the registration in 187."> were all legally appointed; and what follows!? Why, this: that they could not exercise other i)owers than hcloiujed to the Ixxird of re(jistration. Suppose tliere had beeu no change in the board, and that the registratiou nuule in 187o had been made by the registrars appointed in 1ST2, would the board of registratiou have beeu empowered to appoint new judges of election ? I answer, no, em[)hatically ; for the law says, if the ai)point- ment is made by the board, that it must be niade " before the general election," and if not done then, that the electors, ivhen assembled at the polls, shall unike the ai)pointment. It nniy be said that these things are technicalities. It is not true that they are technicalilies ; they are departures from law* and evidence of lawlessness. These acts evidence a total disregard of the law ; they not only evidence this, but the proof shows conclusively that he who was sworn to take care that the laws were faithfully executed, was the lirst to violate them. For the time being I will now leave these questions, and pass to one where the answer of "technicality" cannot be raised. Let us admit, for the argnuu'Ut, that there was no question as to tiie legality of the legis- lature [)assing the act calling a constitutional convention ; let us admit that the governor had the right to remove the registrars and appoint others in their places; let us admit that the registrars thus appointed had a perfe(;t right to register a class that were not entitled to registra- tion under the law^, and that they had a right to remove the old judges and appoint the new ; let us admit that every step in the election and elsewhere was regular, in every resi)ect, up to the time the legislatuie passed the act calling a convention, and tiiatthe legislature was clothed with power to provide for calling a constitutional convention. These things admitted, we are still confronted with another question, that will not down at the bidding of any man. Tiie (juestiou now arising is: " What effect did the marking of ballots have, if any, on the election, to determine whether a constitutional convention should be called, and upon the election of delegates, under the peculiar provisions of our con- stitution f In construing the constitution of a State, the object ought to be to ascertain the intent, uot only of the framers, but of the people, when it was adopted. Intent may as often be inferred and discovered by examining the amemlments nuide from time to time, as from any other source. The 33 constitntional convention of 1S68 passed an ordinance and appended it to the constitution, the fourth section of which is as follows: " The secrecy of the ballot shall be preserved inviolate. No judue, inspector, or other election ofticer shall inarlc or deface, or permit to he marl-ed or defaced, any ballot cast (at an election) at which he is acting, whereby may be ascertained the manner in which any elector voted." This section, I say, was apf)ended to the constitution of 1868, but is found in an ordinance of the convention. Many persons doubted whether this section of an ordinance was of the same force and effect as a provision of the constitution. Under the constitution of 1836, and that of 1804, elections were not necessarily by ballot, but viva voce. The eighth sec- tion of Article VI of the constitution of 1836 is as follows : ''All general elections shall be viva voce, until otherwise directed by law." This same ])rovision was incorporated in the constitution of 1864, ver- batim et literatim. In 1846 (Gould's Digest, p. 470) the legislature, under the power conferred by the constitution, changed the mode of voting from that of viva voce to that of ballot. The section alluded to is as fol- lows : " Section 36. The mode of voting at all general and other elections authorized by the constitution and laws of this State shall be hj ballot.''' The forty-sixth section of the election law is as follows : " It shall be the duty of the clerks of all elections to register the names of each and all electors in the orolls to vote, thejudiics shall i)ass u)»on theii' (jualilications, whereu])on the clerks of election shall rejiister their names on the ]»oll-b()oks, if ((ualilied, and such reii'istration by said clerks shall be a suflicient re,uistration in con- formity to the constitution of this istate, and then their votes shall be taken : Provided, no person shall vote outside or elsewhere than in the township, ward, or precinct in which he resides. The electors siiall be numbered and the number of each elector marked on his ballot, by one of the judges, when dejwsited." The question now arises, does the niarkin"' of a ballot deprive it of the sanctity of secrecy thrown around it by the constitution ; and if so, what is the result 't Chi<'f-Justice Denio, in the case of People v. Pease, {21 N. Y., 45,) uses the followiufi' lari,n'uai:e: " 1 have already alluded to the policy of the law providino; for a secret ballot. The right to vote in this manner lias usually been considered an important and valnable safeguard of the independence of the humble citi/en against tlie inlluence which wealth and station may be sup])0se«l to exercise. This object would be accon)i)lished but very imperfectly, if the privacy supposed to be secured was limited to the moment of de- ])ositing the ballot. The spirit of the system requires that the elector should be secured then, and at all times thereafter, against reproach or animadversion, or any other prejudice, on account of having voted according to his own unbiased jiulgment; ami that security is made to consist in shutting uj) within the ])rivacy of his own luind all knowledge of the manner in which he has bestowed his suffrage." Judge Cooley, in his work on "Constitutiotuil Limitations," ( ) says : "The mode of voting in this country at all general elections is almost universally by ballot. The distinguishing feature of this mode of voting is, that every voter is thus enabled to secure and ju'eserve the most com})lete and inviolable secrecy in regard to the persons for whom he votes, and thus escape the intluences which, under the system of oral suffrages, may be brought to bear upon him, with a view to overbear and intimidate, and thus prevent the real expression of public senti- ment." ] have quoted these authorities for the purpose of showing the object of the secret ballot, and the importance it is to the citizen at a time when i)artisan ])rejudice may be running at high tide. There are many instances where the law was silent as to whether the ballot was to be secret or not, where the courts have decided that an elector could not be compelled to diselose how or for whouj he voted. {People x. Pease, L'7 N. Y., 81 : People v. Cicotf, 10 Mich., 2.S3.) The thirteenth section of the constitution of the State of Indiana (Art. "2) is as follows: "All elections by the people shall be by ballot." 35 Here, it will be seen, the kind of ballot, whether secret or otherwise, is Jiot stated as it is in the constitution of this State. Under the constitution of Indiana the leresented, the court said, {3S Ind., 89:) "I am not unmindful of the rule that all doubts are to be solved in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments. This rule is well established, and is founded in the highest wisdom. But my con- victions are clear that our constitution was intended to, and does, secure the absolute secrecy of the ballot, and that the act in question, which directs the numbering of tickets to correspond with the numbers opposite the names of the electors on the poll-lists, is in palpable contlict, not only with the spirit but with the substance of the constitutional pro- vision. Tins act was intended to, and does clearly, identify every man's ticket, and renders it easy to ascertain exactly how any particular per- son voted. "That secrecy which is esteemed by all authority to be essential to the free exercise of sutfrage, is as much violated by this law as it it had declared that the election should be viva voce. If the constitution secures to the voter in popular elections the protection and immunity of secrecy, there can be no doubt that section two of the act of 1809, which authorized the inspector to number ballots, is in contlict with it, aud void." Tested by the rule laid down in the case of Williams v. Stein, the eleventh section of the act, providing for a constitutional convention, is void. But, it may be saul that the decision in the case of "^ Williams v. Stein does not prove or establish the fact that the election held wa ; a nullity, or that it was void. It is true the court did not decide that the persons voted for at that election were not entitled to their o//?ce6'. This question was not before the court. But it did decide that a "law requir- ing ballots to be numbered was unconstitutional. This brings us to a consideration of the question whether an eleetion held under an uncim- stitutional law, confers the same power it would if the act were valid, and whether the parties damnified thereby have to submit to the exer- cise of power delegated to third persons in violation of all law, and whether the elector in such case is remitted to a personal action against 36 those who oxocnted tlie hnv lor an invasion of his constitutional priv- ileges and Irancliises ? The mere statement of the proposition shows its absurdity. In tne case of The People v. Churchy (0 Cal., 78,) the .supreme court of Cali- fornia held that an election held at a time not authorized by law, was void. Ordinarily, one would think there could be little difference be- tween an election held at a time not authorized by law, and one that was not held in the manner provided by law. Judge Crocker, in the case of Satterlee v. San Franci.sco, (23 Cal., 3120,) says: "The validity of an election does not depend on the eligibility of the candidates, lor if it did, it might be contended that an election would be invalid because an unsuccessful candidate was discpuilfied to hold the othce voted for. The validity of ;in election depends upon its being held and conducted at the [)roper time and place, in the manner, and by the persons and officers as lecpiired by law." The manner of holding elections is fixed by the constitution, and it says, first, it shall be by ballot, and second, that the secrecy of that bal- lot shall be preserved inviolate. Is an election held with any other ballot than the one prescribed by the constitution a legal election ? Is an election held under a law where it may be ascertained by reference to the tickets and the poll-books just how every man voted, such an election or such a ballot as the constitu- tion contemplates f In the case of McKune v. Wcller, (11 Cal., 49,) the supreme court of Cali- fornia said : " All the efficacy given to the act of casting a ballot is derived from the Unc-making poicer, and through legislative enactment." If it be true that a ballot receives its efficacy from the " law-making- power,'' does it not necessarily follow that an exercise thereof in viola- tion of the fundamental law cannot give it etlicacy ? The power to hold the constitutional convention is founded on the vote cast at the election. If the vote cast, and the ballot used, was one that the constitution iidiibited, then there was uo election, for au election can only be held with the ballot the constitution provides. What the supreme court of Indiana would have decided on quo war- ranto as to what rights, if any, were conferred by a marked ballot, at the election held in that State under the law the court declared was nnconstitutional, can only be a matter of conjecture; but as to what other C(mrts have decided undev a similar state of facts is well known. The question in the case of The Commonivealth v. Woelper, (3 Serg. »!!fc Kawle, 2!>,) was, whether a ballot, used at an election, that had a design thereon, by which it might be ascertained how certain persons voted, should be counted. Chief-Justice Tilgiunan, in disposing of the case, says: " The tickets in favor of those persons who succeeded in the election had on them the engraving of an eagle." The judge who tried the cause charged the jury that those tickets ought not to have been counted. # * * # * "This engraving might have several ill effects. In the first place, it might be perceived by the inspector, even when the ticket was folded. This knowledge might possibly intiuence him in receiving or rejecting the vote. But in the next place, it deprived those persons who did not vote the German tichets of that secrecy which the elei;tion by ballot ivas ■intended to secure.'^ The ballot used in the case just cited had an eagle on it. The by- law governing' the election said, that if besides the names there are 37 otlier things on the ticket it vshall not be counted. Tiie court held tliat the placing a picture of an eagle on the ballot invalida^ted the ticket ; first, because the ballot was not such»a ticket as the law required, and second, because it had a tendency to destroy the secrecy wkieh electio)i hy haUot icas intended to secure. This being true the court would not allow the ballots thus marked to be counted. Apply the law as laid down in this case to the matter now before us, and what is the result"? It is that neither office nor power can be conferred by an illegal ballot. The marking the ballots destroyed the secrecy which the constitution guarantees. When that was destroyed the efficaci/ of the ballot was gone. The question of wha,t effect should be given to a vote that was taken in a manner at variance with the law arose in the case of Saint Joe & Denver City Railroad v. Buchanan Connty, (31) j\Io., 488.) There was a law authorizing the county court to make subscriptions to railroad enterprises, if a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the county voted therefor. Before the vote was taken, the State of Missouri adopted a new con- stitution, and continued "all statute laws now in force not inconsistent Avith the constitution, until they expire by their own limitation, or be amended or repealed by the general assembly.'' One of the provisions of the constitution was, that •" no county should loan its credit or become 11 stockholder in any company or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified electors, at a regular or si)ecial election, should assent thereto." In disposing of the case .Judge Wagner saul : " The act of the general assembly, providing for taking the vote of the people of Buchanan County, and conliuing it to the majority ot taxable iiihabitants, is repugnant to the constitution. * * * xhe constitu- tion imposes no such restrictions, but opens the ballot to all who are qualified voters." A two-thirds vote was received in favor of the proposition at the election ; but how many were disqualified, by reason of the restriction to taxable inhabitants, does not appear. The eftbrt evidently was to con- form to the constitutional requirements, as to the qualification of voters, and also to carry out the act of the legislature by restricting the vote to those who are taxable inhabitants, or, in other words, to engraft the constitutional provision upon the enactment as an amendment. " We think this could not be done. Laws, therefore, which are inop- erative, on account of repugnancy to, or inconsistency with, tlie consti- tution, must be legislatively amended before they are capable of execu- tion." That the law providing for numbering the ballot, thereby destroying the secrecy thereof, is repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the consti- tution, I think has been clearly shown, and if it be true that all such laws must be amended before they are "cai)ableof executi"t)n," it follows that, before the people of this State can have a constitutional conven- tion composed of delegates selected at an election by ballot, they must be elected under the provisions of an act that is not repugnant to the fundamental law. The answer to all this is that the ^'people,''^ in their sovereign might, have expressed an unmistakable desire to rid themselves of an obnox- ious government. I now proi)Ose to refer to a few of the changes made by the so called people of Arkansas. The preamble to the act calling a constitutional convention commences by saying : " Whereas it is manifest that there are many defects and objectionable 38 ])roi'isio)is in tlic present constitution of tlie State, and that it is not sat- isfactory to the i)C()|)lc thereof/' It is hut .just and fair to assuni* that those provisions of a State con- stitution tluit luvve been ignored in the Ibrniin,!; of the new, are anion<^ tlie i>i()\ isions that the preand)k' to tlie act describes as heiii,i;' "objec- tionable and unsatisfactory to the people," and more esj)ecially does tills inference arise if nineteen-twentieths of the old constitution is re- tained intact. In the (jonstitution of 1808 was this provision : ^'- The jioramovnt allegiance of every citizen is due to the Federal Government in the exercise of its constitutional powers, as the same may have been, or may be, defined by tlieSui)reme Court of the United States ; and no i)ower exists in the people of this or any other State of the Federal ITnion to dissolve their connection therewith, or perform any act teiuling to imjjair, subvert, or resist the supreme authority of the United States. The Constitution of the United States confeivs full powers on the Federal Government to maintain and perpetuate its ex- istence, and whensoever any of the States, or the i)eoi)ie thereof, at- tempt to secede liom the Feileial Union, or forcibly resist the execution of tlie laws, the Federal Goveiiiment nu'.y, by warrant of the Constitu- tion, emj)loy armed force in (;omi)ellin,i>' obedience to its authority." The doctriiu^ enunciated in this provision was simply a declaration of what the loyal men of the United States contended for, and just what; the disloyal element denied. Here is an assertion of four distinct i)rop- ositions : First, that the paramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the Federal Government, and not to the State ; second, that no power existed in the ])eoplo of any State to dissolve their connection with the Federal Union; third, a denial of the right to secede; and fourth, that the Federal Constitution is a warrant of sufficient authority to author- ize the employment of force if a State attempted to secede or forcibly resist the execution of the laws of the United States. The first thing — the first act of the "people," whose shortcomings and violations of the laws and constitution of the State you are ex- pected to overlook, was to strike this provision out of the constitution of Arkansas. This act of the so-called peoj)le of Arkansas simi)ly amounts to a denial of the concessions therein made. It not oidy amounts to a denial of the concessions therein made, but it amounts, under the cir(aim stances, to an assertion, first, that the paramount allegiance of the citizen is not due to the Federal Government; second, that the power exists in the people of any State to dissolve their con- nection with the Federal Union; third, that the right to secede exists and belongs to the ])eople of any State; and, fourth, that the Constitu- tion of the United States does not warrant the employment of armed force to prevent a dissolutioti of the Union, or prevent a State from seceding, or to compel obedience to the laws. Not (content with asserting tliat Wn' paramount allegiance of the citi- zen is not due to the Federal Government, and re-assertnig the right of secession, they next i)roceeded to strike out the following provision: "All action of the State of Arkansas under the authority of the con- vention which assembled at Little liock on the ■4th of March, 18(51, its ordinances or its constitution, whether legislative, judicial or military, was, and is hereby, declared null and void; and no debt or Uahility of the State of Arkansas, incurred by the action of said convention, or of the general assembly, or any department of the government under the authority of either, shall be recognized as obligator3\" A provision similar to this was inserted in the constitution of 18G4, but the supreme court of the State, as organized before re construction, 39 in coiistrning' this provision of the constitution of 1864, in the case of Hawkins v. Fikius^ (24 Ark., 280,) tlecUived that all the acts of the State of Arkansas, save and except such as conflicted with the Constitution and hiws of the United States, were as valid and binding as though the State had sustained its rehitions v/ith the Federal Government, instead of aiding the rebellion with the revenues of the State, and with the ser- vices of the able-bodied men thereof. At this point I desire to direct your attention to another historical fact. The fourteenth amendment was submitted to a legislature composed of the same class of men who now constitute the Garhind legislature ; in fact, many of the members of the Garland legislature were members of the legislature to which the fourteenth amendment was first submitted. That le,i;islature refused to ratify the amendment and treated it in the most contemptuous manner. There is not a single letter, word or sentence, in the proposed new con- stitution, recognizing or accepting a single provision of the fourteenth amendment. Yon will be told these people accept the thirteenth, four- teenth, and fifteenth amendmentsto the Constitution of the United States, yet before I have done with this subject 1 will show to you that every pro- vision of the constitution of 1808, that in any manner recognized the four- teenth amendment, has been stricken out, and ignored inthelbrmingof the new. If it be true that these men have accepted the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, why is it we find them in hot haste to strike out a provision of the State constitution, that inhibited the payment of any debtor Gbligation incurred by the action of the secession convention, the assembly tliat met thereunder, or any department of government!^ That the State did incur debts and obligations in aid of insurrection and rebellion that have not been paid, is well known. This being true, 1 re- peat, what was the object in striking out the provision 1 The truth of the matter is, the way is being paved to legalize the acts of the State of Arkansas during the time it yielded allegiance to the C'onfederate States government, and to assume the payment of its outstanding rebel debts. Why, sir, during last week the house of representatives of that State passed a bill the first section of which is as follows : " AN ACT to coufirin and make valid the title to certain scbool-lands. "^e it enacted hy the general assembly of the State of Arkansas : Sec- tion 1. That all patents issued for the sixteenth sections, or any part thereof, or common-school land, during the war of the rebellion, and all the official acts of the officers of this State in regard to such lands during the said war, and also all deeds made by the common-school commis- sioners of the several counties in compliance with the act of the legis- lature of this State entitled 'An act to relieve certain citizens of Arkan- sas who purchased school-lands,' passed March 4, 1807, be, and the same is hereby, confir]}ie(l, ratified, and made valid, and full faith and credit shall be given to said patents', deeds, and official ucts in all the courts of this State." This is nothing more nor less than an attempt to rob the children of that State of the benefit of the school-fund arising from the sale of huids donated to the State by the United States for school-purposes. The lands described in the bill were paid for, if paid at all, in confederate money or Arkansas war-bonds, all of which was spent in aid of the re- bellion long since. On the adoption of the constitution of 1808, the issuing of patents for lands thus sold ceased, but it seems they are now to be validated at the exj)ense of a trust fund given the State by the United States for purposes of public education. 40 The fourteen til aiueiulinent not only inhibits a State from ])aying (l('l)ts and ol)li.u;itions incurred in aid of the rebellion, but it also in- hibits a Stiite Ironi i);iyin.u, or assuming "to i)ay, any debt or obliga- tion or claim lor the emancipation of slaves." In the constitution of 1S08 was the following- provision on the subject of i)aying for slaves emancipated : (Sec. 3S, Art. V.) " The general assembly shall have no power to make comi)ensation for emancioated slaves." This provision, like the two others 1 have named, has been stricken out. In the (-onstitution of 18(i.S, was a provision which reads as follows : (Sec. 20, Art. XV.) "No ])ersou shall be allowed or qualihed to sit on a jury wiio is not a qualified elector." This ])rovisi()u has been stricken out, and the legislature may now fix such qualifications forjurors as may seem meet to that body. The objeci is to deprive colored men of the right to sit on juries. The striking out of these provisions is not the result of ignorance or oversight. They rehite to prominent issues that have been before the country for years. In the constitution of 18GS, the oath of office prescribed by the con- stitution of the State is as follows: "I, , do solemnly swear that * * * i ^yjn honestly and faithfully su])port and defend the Constitution and laics of the United States, the Union of the States, and the constitution and laws of the State of Arkansas." In revising the oath of office, the framers of the Garland constitution liave so amended the same as to read as follows: "I do solemnly swear that I w ill su{)i)ort the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Arkauvsas. " !Xow let us examine these changes, and find what " objectionable pro- A'isions" were in the first oath that were " not satisfactory to the people of Arkansas." After the word " sui)port" the words " and defend" are stricken out. After the wxud "Constitution," where the Constitution of the United States is referred to, the words "and laws" are stricken out. After the words "the Constitution of the United States, " the words, " //(C Union of the States^^ are stricken out. After the word "constitu- tion," where reference is made to the constitution of Arkansas, the woids " and laws" are stricken out. The men who revised this oath must have had some object in view. First, we find the words "and dcfeiul," where they occur after the word " support," stricken out. This evidences that there is a class of men in Arkansas that are willing to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, but are not willing to defend the same nor support the "/«/r.s-." It evidences the fact that there is a class of men in Ar- kansas who are not willing to take an oath to either support or defend "the Union of the States" nor the " laws " of the State of Arkansas. It may be said that an oath to sui)i)ort the Constitution of the United States is equivalent to swearing that they will "defend" the same. Ordinarily the word "sui)port" would include a defense of the thing to be su[)[)orted. I>ut it must be borne in mind tluit the oath of office is a revision of the oath of office inesciibed by the constitution of 1SG8. Answer me this question: Does not the striking out the words "and defend," where they occur after the word "su])])ort," conclusively show that the word "suj)poit" is not intended to be used in its broadest sense, l)ut that it is used in a qualified sense? What does the word " sup- port" mean when it is used with such qualifications? Webster says it means " to bear, to endure." Xow, sirs, we have it as the oath of office 41 that the officers of the Garland government are willing " to bear" and ''to endure" the Constitution of the United States. How long is not stated. IS^or does tlie animus of these men stop here. The Vlth article of the Constitution of the United States declares, "This Consti- tution and the laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land." ISTotwitiistanding this provision, the "i)eople" of Arkan- sas, whose revolutionary acts you will be asked to legalize, are unwilling that any ofilicer of their government shall take an oath to either " sup- port or defend " the latvs of the United States, or the laws of the State wherein they reside. It is a well-known fact that but few, if any, of the persons who support the Garland government were either pleased or gratified at the enactment and enforcement of the reconstruction acts. It is a well-known fact that the legislature of 1800-67, which refused to ratify the XlVth amendment, appointed ten or fifteen of its members to visit Andrew Johnson, and condole with him over the fact that he was hampered by a loyal and republican Congress. It is evi- dent that the men who did not want to take an oath to support and defend the "/a»'s" of the United States must have had some reason for so doing. My impression is that the reason why they are not willing to take an oath to support the Imvs of the United States is that they are not willing to support the legislation enacted by Congress to enforce the Xlllth, XlVik, and XVth amendments. There are a great many persons in the United States who do not believe these amendments to have been legally ratified 5 and no State of this Union, in proportion to her poj)ulation, has so many persons who indulge in that belief as has the State of Arkansas, and I think the matters to which I have called your attention warrant me in making the assertion. Now, sirs, take the changes made in the form of the oath : the striking out of a provision asserting that the paramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the Federal Government; the striking out of a provision that asserted no power existed in the people to dissolve their connection v\'ith the Federal Government ; the striking out of a provision denying the right of secession ; the striking out of a provision asserting that the Fed- eral Government is clothed with jjower to perpetuate its existence by force of arms; the striking out of a provision inhibiting the legislature from paying for emancipated slaves ; the striking out of a provision pro- hibiting the legislature from ])aying any debt or liability incurred in support of the rebellion, and tell me what these things evidence. You cannot shut your eyes to the fact, nor can Congress shut its eyes to the fact, that Arkansas has taken a stej) that, if not checked, will lead to an unsettlement of the issues of the war. It is well known, and is a part of the- public history of the countrj^, that the States of Vir- ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas were in rebellion against the United States and its authority. It is also well known that all of the States named, under some pretended authority of the President, framed and adopted constitutions, before the passage of the reconstruction acts. It is also well known that Congress for some reason would not admit any of these States to representation in Congress under the constitutions so framed. On examination of the constitutions of the States named, I find that no one of them recognized the doctrine that the paramount al- legiance of the citizen was due to the United States. On examination of the constitutions framed under the reconstruction acts, I find that everu one of them has a clause recognizing that the i)aramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the United States, and a denial of the right of secession. 42 Tlio presont oonstitution of Alabama coutains this provision : '• That this State lias no right to sever its relations to the Federal Union, or to pass any law in deroj^ation of tlie paramount allei>ianc(i oi the (citizens of this State to the Government of tlie United States.'' Tlie constitution of Florida has tliis provision : '' The paramount allei^iance of every citizen is due to tlie Federal Government, and no power exists with the people of this State to dis- solve its (;onnection tlierewitli. This State shall ever remain a member of the American Union ; the people thereof, a part of the American nation. Any attempt, from whatever source or upon whatever pretense, to dissolve said Union or to sever said nation, shall be resisted with the whole i)ower of the State." • The constitution of Geor>ia shall ever remain a member of the American Union ; the peoi)le thereof are a part of the American nation ; every citizen thereof owes paramont alle<»iance to the Constitution and Gov- ernment of the United States, and no law or ordinance of this State, in contravention or subversion thereof, shall ever have any binding force." The constitution of Louisiana has this provision : "The citizens of this State owe allegiance to the United States, and this allegiance is paramount to that they owe to this State." The constitution of Mississi[)pi has this i)rovision : "The right to withdraw from the Federal Union on account of any real or supposed grievance shall never be assumed by this State, nor shall any law be passed in derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of this State to the Government of the United States." The constitution of North Carolina has this provision : " That this State shall ever remain a member of the American Union ; that the people thereof are a part of the American nation ; that there is no right on the part of this State to secede, and that all attem[)ts, from whatever source or upon whatever pretext, to dissolve said Union or to sever said nation, ought to be resisted with the whole i)ower of the State. That every citizen of said State owes paramount allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States, and that no law or ordinance of the State, in contravention or subversion thereof, can have any binding force." The constitution of South Carolina has this provision: "Every citizen of this State owes paramount allegiance to the Consti tution and Government of the United States, and no law or ordinance of this State, in contravention or subversion tiiereof, can have any binding force. This State shall ever remain a member of the American Union, and all attempts, from whatever sonrce or u[)on whatever pretext, to dissolve the said Union, shall be resisted with the whole power of the State." The constitution of Texas has this provision : " That the heresies of nnllitication and secession, which brought the country to grief, may be eliminated from future political discussion, we declare that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties made, and to be made, in pursuance thereof, are acknowledged to be the suinenie law, and that this constitution is framed in harmony with and in subordination thereto." The constitution of Virginia has a provision the same as that of Georgia. Of the four States (West Virginia, Maryland, Missouri, and Nebraska) hokiin^ ( oustitutional conventions since or during the existence of the 43 rebellion, all have similar provisions on the subject of allegiance and of that of secession as the States from whose constitutions I have quoted. I talve it, sirs, the concessions made by the States lately in rebellion, that the paramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the Federal Gov- ernment, and renouncing the doctrine of secession, are in the nature of a compact, and a part of the terms of surrender. The State of Arkansas, if the Garland government is recognized, has a constitution that Congress would not have aduiitted it to representation with at any time since the surrender. When you take into consideration the fact that, in order to get the acknowledgment that the paramount allegiance of the citizen was due to the General Government, and a renunciation of the doctrine of secession, from these States, Congress had to disfranchise a consid- erable number of the white electors of those States, and enfranchise the male black i)opulation over the age of twenty-one years, in order to get the concessions now made in their constitutions, it becomes Congress, now that disfranchisement no longer exists in any of the States, to jeal- ously watch every attempt to withdraw them. At the tiuie of the adoption of the constitution of 1SG8, the State of Arkansas had a debt which, when funded, amounted to about live mil- lions of dollars. One and oue-half millions of this amount is due to the United States, arising out of investing the Smithsonian fund in the bonds of the State of Arkansas, and the investment of certain Indian trust-funds therein. Under the constitution of 1808, the fiiith and credit of the State was i)ledged to the payment of this debt, and a sink- ing-fund ])rovided to pay the same. Under the Garland constitution, the faith and credit of the State is no longer pledged to the payment of this debt, and no provision is made for a sinking-fund. When the con- vention that framed the constitution of 1874, that Mr. Garland is now administering, was considering the financial clause thereof, Mr. Barnes otfered a new section, as follows : '• The faith and credit of the State of Arkansas is pledged to the pay- ment of all bonds issued under the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to aid in the construction of railroads,' approved July 1, 1808; of all bonds issued under the provisions of an act entitled 'An act to provide for the fuiuling of the public; debt of the State,' approved April 0, 1801) ; and of all bonds issued under the provision of an act entitled 'An act providing for the building and repairing of the public levees of the State,' approved March 10, ISOl), and all acts amendatory thereof or amendatory thereto ; and the auditor of state shall annually, on the first day of Septem- ber in each and every year, by computation, ascertain the amount of money required to i)ay the interest on said bonds as the same become due, and to meet the principal at maturity of the bonds ; and when the amount shall be so ascertained, the auditor of state shall notify the county clerks of the different counties of the rate per cent, necessary to pay said interest and create a fund sufficient to pay the principal at the maturity of the bonds ; and the same shall be placed on the tax-books of said coijnty and col- lected in the same manner as other taxes, and paid over to the State treasurer." Mr. Smoote moved to table the section. The yeas and nays were ordered, as follows : Yeas, 77 ; nays, 9. You will see by this, that the question of paying the public debt of the State was presented directly to the attention of the convention, and that it refused to renew the pledges given by the constitution of 1808, or to create a sinking-fund for the payment of either the inincipal or interest thereof. But, instead of making any such provision, the con- vention inserted the following provision : 44 " Sec. 8. The general assembly shall not have power to levy State taxes ior any one year to exceed in the aggregate one per cent.oH the as- sessed valuation of the property of the State for that year." With thisrestriction ni)OM the taxing-i)0\verof the general assembly, the interest upon her bonded debt and the ordinary exi)enst's of the State government cannot be paid. A jjortion of the debt of xVrkansas was at onetime in dispute, but when the same was ordi-red funded the disputed debt was i)laced on the same efow, sir, I come to a point tiiat I regard as fatal to the Garland gov- ernment, if all the others named are i)ronounced untenable. We have already seen that, in a peaceful government, the only manner in which the voice of the people can be obtained is under the operation and in accordance with a law of the State. The constitutional convention of Arkansas attempted to pass a law regulating and i)rescribiiighow the judges of election should be selected; to whom the returns should be made, and how the constitution should be declared ratified. The act calling the constitutional convention failed to provide the manner and mode that should be pursued by the people for ascertaining the sense of the peoi)le thereon. I shall not insult your intelligence by entering into any lengthy argument, or citing any great number of authorities to show that a constitutional convention is not clothed with lefjislative power. In speaking of the power of a constitu- tional convention to pass an ordinance regulating the taking of a vote thereon, the supreme court of Pennsylvania said, ( Wells and others v. Election Commissioners : "The convention is not a co-ordinate branch of the government. It exercises no (jovernmeatal poicer^ but is a body raised by laa-^ in aid of the i)0i)ular desire to discuss and propose amendments, which have no fjorernimj force, so long as they remain pro[)ositions. While it acts within the scope of its delegated jjowers it is not amenable for its 45 acts; but when it assumes to lef/inJafc, to repeal and displace existing institutions, it acts without antho)' it ij.''^ Just what the supreme court of Pennsylvania said a constitutional convention could not do has been done by the pretended constitutional convention of Arkansas. The constitution and laws of Arkansas make registration a prerequisite to voting-. The registration once made, it staiuls for two years, unless it should be made to ap[)ear to the governor that a pro}>er registration was not made at the time prescribed by law, in which evauit he is authorized to order another. The regular time for making the registration was preceding the election held on the 5tli of November of 1S72, but for reasons not within the law Elisha Baxter ordered anotlier just preceding the election held in November of 1S73. No subsequent registration having been made, by the governor, one of two things becomes indisputably true, and that is that one or the other of these registrations fixed and determined the qualifications of electors at all elections to be holden thereafter until a new registration was made in pursuance of law. This proposition, I presume, will not be denied. The question now arises, " Did the constitutional convention have the power to order a registration for the purpose of holding an election for the adoption or rejection of the constitution?" The 23d section of the registration act confers this power on the governor. If the supreme court of Pennsylvania are correct as to the law of the case — and I think they are — the sole power of the convention was to discuss and propose amendments. I have not tlie time to go into all the acts of lawlessness and usurpation of power that have kept pace with the initiation and the pretended adoption of the Garland constitution, but it will be sntficient to say their name is legion, and of a character the mere recital of which shocks the moral sensibilities of every man who has any regard for the law. The constitution, and the new amendments to the same, require a registration of voters previous to voting, as a j)rerequisite. It was held, in the case of The People v. Kopplekorn, (16 Mich., 342,) that an election is void where there had been no registration, notwithstanding the persons voting were other- wise legal voters. The 6th section of the election act says : "The judges of election, apjjointed as aforesaid, shall be the judges of all elections, within their respective districts, until the next general election.'''' By the ordinance of the convention, that body elected three commis- sioners and clothed them with authority (that is, if the ordinance could confer it) to appoint su})ervisors for each county, whose duty it was to ap[)oint the jiulges of election. These jiidges of election received the votes and made a return of them to the men who appointed them, and these appointees made a return to the men who appointed them. I insist a constitutional convention is not, and cannot be, clothed inher- ently with any such power. In the first place, if the legislature had proposed to give the convention the power of legislation-^it could not have done so. Legislative power cannot be delegated, {Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr., Del.) Legislative power can neither be delegated to the dele- gates of a constitutional convention nor to the people themselves. This question has been so often adjudicated that I do not feel it even neces- sary to cite the cases, much less to go into any extended argument on the subject. There seems to be a wild and ungovernable delusion in the minds of some people that a constitutional convention may do anything. There is notliing in it ; nor is it necessary to clothe it with any other power than to discuss and propose propositions for adoption. A constitutional 4G convention is snpposed to be a creature of the laic ; it is presumed to be subordinate to the constitution, and to be sitting- ninU'r the author- ity :ind protection of the constitution iind laws of the State. If it is not, it is a revolutionary body, and must sujtport itself by force. It must be a lawful or an uidawiid assemblage, lor, under the American system of government, there is no such thing as a governuient of half force and half laic. The power of susjiending and setting aside the laws is i)ur(dy a ler/- islatire function. If it is, then it "must be exercised by thi^ Icuislatiire. The error in supposing a constitutional convention is clotlied witii extra- ordinary i)owers grows out of the fact that the ignorant too often con- found the members of the coni'cutioH with the people. The delegates ai'e 110 more 'Hhe people" than are the members of the legislatui-e. Each are representatives, and each have separate functions to perform. One enacts laics for a body-corporate, while the other seeks to devise and ])ropose a system of government, wherein the defects of the old govern- ment shall be remedied. The convention proposes, and the people dispose of its work. As to whether that system is better than the old, is a question the people determine for themselves, through the forms of law. If yon will but keej) before your minds that a constitutional convention is only a rejnesentative body for rhe pnrj)ose for which it is called ; if you will not lose sight of the fact that it is an assemblage having only delegated poicers, you will have no trouble in arriving at the conclusion that the coiivention and the p(M:)])le are not ideHtieal. But sui)pose we admit that they are, and what follows'^ Are the friends of tin; (larland government any better oif with this admission than they are without it? 1 think not. At the time of the calling of the convention all the legis- lative ])ower of the people of the State of Arkansas was lodged with the legislature. This being true, the peoi)le of Arkam-as had no legislative poicer to delegate, either to a constitutional convention or any other body of men. Does it not stand to reason that if the people themselves could not give force, validity, and effect to an act of the legislature, they cannot confer legislative power! If in the formation of the gov- ernment the people delegated away all the legislative power they i)os- sessed, does it not stand to reason that there was nothing left to dele- gate ? The manner and mode of })assiug laics for the government of the peo- ple of Arkansas is ])lainly and distinetly de(ined. First. Every bill must be read three times, on different days, before the iina! ])assage thereof, unless two-thirds of the house where the same is pending siiall dis[)ense with the rules. tSce<»ioii i\\(i jonrnid? Did a majority vote for it 'I ^Vilere is the evidence that any one ever voted for this ordinance ? 1 su[)])ose some one will say it will be found in the journal of tiie convention. Sup- j)()se it is found there, it proves nothing. The convention icas not required to IxCep a journal, and there is not a court in existence anywliere in the civilized world that would admit in evidence the records of a body 47 that was not bound to make a record of its proceedings to prove any- thing'. A constitutional convention does not need a journal. Its action binds no one nntil the people have ratitied its work; and that done, it is a matter of no importance to know whether a section was read once, twice, or three times before it was submitted. Laws for the State of Arkansas cannot be made in this manner, nor can the laws be suspended and set aside hy an assemblage that is only clothed with power to propose and suggest improvements in the funda- niental law. No doubt some of our learned friends on the other side will call yonr attention to the fact that the act calling the convention authorizes it to frame a constitution and provide for putting the same in force. What power is conferred by the language "and provide for putting the same in force!" It will be observed that nothing is said as to the time, place, and manner of submitting the same, nor is there any mode pointed out lioiv the same was to be " put in force." It may be said under this power that the convention could have declared the con- stitution ratitied and in force without having submitted the same to the people. What it might have done is one thing, and what it did do is quite another; therefore I shall not discuss the abstract proposition of what the convention " might have done." I have a case in point, where, according to my notion of things, greater power was conferred on a constitutional convention than in tlie present case. The question arose in the State of Pennsylvania, and was, whether, under the tifth section of the act convening a constitu- tional convention, the convention had the power to regulate the mode and manner of voting thereon, or of ascertaining and declaring the re- sult. The fifth section alluded to reads as follows : " The convention shall subujit the amendments agreed to by it to the qualified voters of the State for their adoption or rejection, at such time or times and in such manner as the convention shall prescribe." Under the authority conferred, or rather supposed to be conferred, by this section, the coiivention passed an ordinance appointing five commissioners, and au- thorizing them to make a registration of the voters of the city of Phil- adelphia and appoint the persons to conduct the election. The povrer exercised by the constitutioiial convention in Pennsylvania, as will be seen, was almost identical with that exercised in Arkansas. It strikes me that the power to provide the time and manner of taking the sense of the people upon the adoption or rejection of an instrunsent is the conference of as much power as is contained in the words "to provide for i)utting the same into force." The power of providing for pntting a thing in force is to fix a time when (in the event the constitution was adopted) it should go into effect, and dues not include the power to regulate the means to be pursued /or its adoption or for the ascertainment and declaration of the fact. The supreme court of Pennsylvania, in disposing of the question pre- sented by the section quoted, and the facts stated, said: s " The power claimed for the conveiition is, by ordinance, to raise a commission to direct the election npon the amended constitution in the city of Philadelphia, and to confer on this commission the power to iiuike a registration of voters and furnish a list so nnule to theeletjtiou ofdcers of each precinct; to appoint a judge and two inspectors for each divis- ion, by whom the election therein shall be conducted. This ordinance further claims the power to regulate the qualifications of the officers thus appointed to hold the election, and to control the general returns of the election. It is clear, therefore, that the ordinance assumes a present power to displace the election officers now in office under the election 48 laws for tlio city ; to substitute ofticers nj^pointod under the autlinrity of the convention, and to set aside tlu\se (election hiws so laras lehites to the qualilicatiou of the oflicers and tlie manner in \vhi(;h tiie general returns shall be made. The authority to do this is claiiiu'd under the liltli section, iiiving tlie convention i)o\ver to suhmit thv amendments at su(.'li tinu' or times and in such Duoiner as the convention shall prescribe. It is ariiucd tiiat the manner of submission confers a power to vondnet the cleetUm upon the mutter snbmittcd. To slate the ])roi)()sitioii is to refute it. For the manner of submittinj;' the amendments is a totally dilfereut thing' from conducting the election upmi the submitted amendments. "The question before us is, Cau the convention, belore they either pro- claim a constitution themselves, if they have the power, or before any ratification, if they have uot, pass an ordinance to repeal an existing sys- tem of laws on a particular subject '? This is a question oH power, and uot of wisdom. However wisethe substitution of their own election-machinery for that ])rovided by law for this city may be, the question is not for us. "We can decide oidy the question of pon-er. The convention is not a co- ordinate branch of government. It exercises no (jovernmental poiccr, but is a body raised by law, in aid of the popular desire to discuss and pro- pose anuMulments vrhich have no governimi force so long as they remain ]>ropositions. ^Vhile it acts within the scope of its delegated powers it is not amenable for its acts, but when it assumes to legislate, to re})eal and displace existing institufio)ts before they are displaced by the adop- tion of its propositions, it acts without authority^ I do not deem it necessary to comment on this decision, for it seems to me it settles this case, even if you should disagree with me as to all the other points. The powers of a convention of the people are not often the subject of judicial determination. Indeed, I know of but few instances where the courts have adjudicated the question. A convention of the people was called in South Carolina, for a specific purpose, to wit, that of nullify- ing certain acts of Congress. Among other things, the convention passed an ordinance empowering the general asseudjly "to provide for the administration of an oath to the citizens and ofQcers of the State," &c. The legislature, under the power conferred by the ordinance of the convention, passed an act requiring, in addition to the oath prescril)ed by the constitution of the State, that the person named would be "faith- ful and bear true allegiance to the State of South Carolina." JMcCready having been appointed to an office in the militia, took the oath prescribed by the constitution, and demanded his commission. This was refused him unless he would take the additional oath. Thereupon he applied for a nmndamus against the person holding bis commission, to compel its delivery. The ordinance to which 1 call your attention, like the ordinance in Soutii Caroliim, was not submitted to the peoi)le. Judge O'Neal, in commenting on the power of a convention of the lieople, says, {State v. Hunt, 2 Hill, S. C, 2-!3 :) ^, "In one point of view, a convention may be illimitable. It is, how- ever, then a revolutionary and not a constitutional convention. I do not understand that this revolutionary character is claimed for the conven- tion Avhich ordained the ordinance iu)w under consideration. * * It is true the legislature cannot limit the convention, but if the people elect for the ])urpose of doing a specihc act or duty, pointed out f)y the act of the legislature, the act could detine their powers. For the people elect with reference to that and nothing else. A convention assembled 49 under the consfitntion is onlv the people for the [)ari)o.se for ichlch it as sembles^ and if they exceed those purposes their act is void uuless it is submitted to tlie people aud affirined by them." Judge Thompson, in the same case, says: " In the a}>pointmeut of delegates to that convention, the people acted on the faith that they were to be charged with those duties, (those named in the act,) and no other, and the assumption of any other powers than those necessary to the attainment of the objects in view w^ould have been a violation of trust reposed in them, and a usurpation of the rights of the {)eopie. The idea is, that the convention is possessed of all the powers of the people, and might rightfully exercise it in relation to all subjects, and in any manner they might think tit. Can it be supposed that the good people ot this State thought that in the appointment of delegates to that convention they were conferring on them the author- ity to transfer their allegiance to the Grand Turk or the Emperor of Russia ? * * * The foundation upon which all our institutions are built is, that the will of the people is supreme, nor will it be questioned that it is equally imperative when expressed through agents regularly constituted by them for that purpose. But surely, when any body of men, however august, take upon themselves to act in the name of the people, an individual who supposes his rights invaded, may be permit- ted, respectfully, to ask for their authority, and to that request, the courts, the organs appointed by the constitution to administer justice, are bound to respond. If an unauthorized assembly should take upon itself to send forth an edict, in the name of the ])eople, commanding obedience to its dictates, would that be binding on the citizens 1 Cer- tainly not. And in what does this differ from the act of a regularly constituted body who assume powers not delegated by the peoplef" In the year 1849 the people of California adopted a constitution in which 1 tind the following ])rovision : " If at any time two-thirds of the senate and assembly shall think it necessary to revise and change this entire constitution, they shall recom- mend to the electors at the next election for members of the legislature to vote for or against the convention ; and if it shall appear that a ma- jority of the electors voting at such election have voted in favor of call- ing a convention, the legislature shall, at its next session, provide by law for calling a convention, to be holden within six months after the passage of such law ; and such convention shall consist of a number of members not less than that of both branches of the legislature." You will observe that this clause does not provide the machinery for the conduct of the election, and the ascertainment and declaration of its result. Now, I desire to call .your attention to an amendment made to the constitution of that State, and the conference of power therein con- tained. The amendment is as follows : "The constitution that may have been agreed upon and adopted by such convention shallbe submitted to the people at a spec^ial election, to be provided for by law. * * * Thefreturnsof such election shall, in such manner as the cnnnentioti shall direct^ be certihed to the executive of the State, who shillca'l to his assistance the treasurer and secretary of state, and compare the v^otes so certified to him. If, by such exami- nation, it be ascertained that the whole number of votes cast at such election be in favor ot such new constitution, the executive of this State sliall, by proclamation, declare such new constitution to be the constitu- tion of the State of California." This amendment seems to have been added to the constitution of California for the sole purpose of conferring on the constitutional con- 4 a 50 ventioii tbe power to provide for the conduct of the election to beholden for the adoption of the constitution. Is it at all ])robal)le the people of that State would havejione to the trouble of adding an aniendnieut to their constitution conferring' this power if the legislature could have delegated the power to a convention, or if it was one of the inherent poweis of the convention ? The trouble in this country is, that we are liable to attribute entirely too much power to irresjionsible bodies. Naitoleou the First derived the ])ovver that afterward made him Emperor of rranc(^ through the action of au assemblage that claimed and exer- cised no greater j)Owers than our opponents claim belong to a constitu- tional convention. The idea that a constitutional convention and its members are above all law is simi>ly preposterous. If it is above the constitution, if it is beyond the control of law, you have created a gov- ernmeut in which the executive, legislative, and judicial departments are all united, and united irrevocably. Would that be a republican form of government where the whole power of the State is lodged in the hands of seventy-five or eighty men who are above all law, and who have the right to suspend courts, judges, and the whole machinery of government by a simple ordinance, the people havingno meansof ascertaining whether it everreceived even a majority vote of the members? If the power extends to the suspen- sion of one law, it extends to all ; if their acts are biiuling in one re- spect, they are binding in all. Have you ever paused to reflect on what would be the condition of a State if a constitutional convention should assert the power our friends on the other side say it possesses, if it re- fused to surrender the pon^er? They are elected /o?* an indefinite term ; will any one of you tell me the tenure of office belonging to a delegate to a constitutional convention ? Is it possible that the i)eople of this country cannot take the steps to quietly and peacefully alter and amend their organic act without i)lacing a ])ower in the hands of the persons selected for that purpose that may be destructive of their own liberties, and that, too, without their assent ? The question is not whether the delegates will use their power oppressively 5 this, I say, is not the ques- tion, but it is, do they possess it at all ? Let me direct your attention to the ordinance of the convention, and I do this not for the i)urpose of pointing out a defect in the ordinance as an ordinance, but tor the purpose of showing the danger to all con- stitutioiuil forms of government if the action of the Arkansas constitu- tional convention is allowed to pass into a precedent. The power to de- clare the constitution adopted is vested in tliree i)ersous selected by the convention itself. From the decision of these three men there is no ap-« peal, save to the Congress of the United States. In the ordinance sub- mitting the constitution of 18GS to a vote of the qualitied electors was this i)rovision: ''The said commissioners shall have power to inquire into the fairness or validity of the voting upon the ratitication of this constitution, * * * and shall also have i)ower, when it is made to appear that fraud, fear, violence, imi)ro|)er influence, or restraint were used, or per- sons were prevented, or intimidated, from voting at such elections, to take such steps, either by setting aside the election and ordering a new one, or rejecting votes, or correcting the result in any county or pre- cinct, as may in such cases be just and equitable." When we come to take into consideration that the ordinance sub- mitting the (constitution of 1874 is almost identical in every res])ect with the ordinance submitting the constitution of I8G8, except that the section cited has been strielcen out, does it not at once become apparent 51 that the coustitntion of 1874 was to have been declared adopted at all hazards ? And more especially does this appear so, when you come to examine the ordinance and find no provision in it punishing- them for any act of misfeasance or maladministration. Senator Bnckalew, when the bill for the admission of Arkansas was pending before the Senate, criticised very severely the action of the constitutional convention of 1868 for lodging power of this kiud in a board composed of three persons. If indignation conld be indulged in by a Senator of the United States over a provision allowing a contest., what would he have said about an ordinance that did not allow a contest to be made at alH The Garland constitution was put in force by the declaration of three persons appointed by the convention. The result was ascertained and declared by persons in no manner responsible to the then existing State government of Arkansas. President Tyler said to the governor of lihode Island, that "until he was advised, in a regular manner, that the constitution of that State had been altered and abolished, and an- other substituted in its place, by legal and peaceable proceedings, adopt- ed and pursued hy the authorities and people of the State, he would respect the requisitions of that government which has been recognized as the existing government through all time pastP Answer me if the proceedings in the Arkansas case have been legal and peaceable., and whether another constitution has been substituted and adopted hy the authorities and the people of the State'? If so, point out to me what " authorities" of the State have so declared. Will it be contended that the three persons who declared the constitution ratified were ^^ authori- ties^^ of the State f The supreme court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Wells and others v. Election Commissioners, said that if a constitutional convention assumed " to legislate to repeal and displace existing insti- tutions before they are displaced by the adoption of its propositions, * * * the citizens injured thereby are entitled, under the declaration of rights, to an oi^e/t court, and redress at our hands." Judge Thomp- son, in the case of The State v. Hunt (2 Hill, S. C, 223,) said: " When any body of men, however august, take upon themselves to act in the name of the people, an individual who supposes his rights in- vaded may be permitted respectfully to ask for their authority, and to that request the courts, the organs ap[)ointed by the constitution to ad- minister justice, are bound to respond." What courts are bound to respond! The courts that are created by the exercise of fraud, violence, and in violation of all law, or the courts of the existing government f These courts both agree that the courts have jurisdiction of all questions of this character. Does not this show conclusively that these are ^/te "authorities" referred to by President Tyler? What evideuce have you, or in what are you advised, that the "authorities" of Arkansas have altered and abolished the government created by the constitution of 1868? It may be urged that the fact that tli'e constitutional convention of 1868 passed an ordinance for submitting the constitution is a precedent to prove that a constitutional convention possesses this power. Lest this thing should mislead those who are not familiar with the facts, allow me to direct your attention to two things : First, that the fourth section of the act of Congress of March 3, 1867, provides " that said constitution shall be submitted by the coui^ention for ratification to the persons registered ;" and second, that no attempt was made to, in any manner, antagonize or change the mode of election prescribed by the act of Congress. 52 But, vsiis, suppose we admit for argument' sake that the conveution possessed the i)ower to i)rovide for and conth of October, and tbe announcement of the result was not made until the 30th. (Jan the peoi)le of a State give an ordinance a retroactive effect when it is not so provided in the act! If tliey cannot, Mr. Garland and the othcers of his government derived their title to otlice at an election, or rather a pretemled election, not au- thorized by law. It may be said that the constitutional conveution of 1808 did the same thing now complained of. So it did ; but Congress by the admission of Senators and Representatives recognized that elec- tion. There is no doubt but Congress could have ordered an election to be held for State and county oflicers, notwithstanding the election held under the provisions of the ordinance. When California was acbnitted she came in with a full set of oflicers, without the assistance of an ena- bling act, or any provision having been made for the election of State and county oiH(;ers by Congress, and the recognition thus given was curative of all that preceded the election -, and the same is true of the election of State oflicers for Arkansas under the constitution of 18G8. If Congress should approve the election held under the (Jarland con- stitution it would cure all defects, at least so as to i)reclude inquiry. There is one matter more that I desire to call your attention to, and I will close. Arkansas was admitted to representation under the pro- visions of "An act to admit the State of Arkansas to representation in Congress," passed June 22, 18G8, upon the tbllowing fundamental con- dition : "That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen, or class of citizens, of the United States of the right to vote, who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein recognized, * * * * Provided^ That any alteration of said constitution, prospective in its effect, may be made in legard to the time and place of residence of voters." The " fundamental condition " upon which Arkansas was admitted has been violated. Under the constitution of 1808 "every male person Avho has been naturalized, or has legally declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, who is twenty-one years old and upward, and who shall have resided in this State six months next pre-, ceding the election, and who at the time is an actual resident of the county in which he ofl'ers to vote, shall be deemed an elector." Under the i)rovisions of the Garland constitution the term of residence in the State is changed from si.v to tu-elve months, and where the consti- tution of 1808 did not specify the length of residence in the county or township, the Garland constitution imi)oses a residence of six months in the co'iUity and thirty days in the township. 1 do not say this is not a wise provision, but I do say that it is not '■'■ prospect ire in its eifect'\siS to the time and j;/rtce of residence of voters. This provision, on account of not being i)rospectivc in effect, struck the ballot from the hand of thousands of persons who were allowed to vote at the adoption of the 53 constitution, but who were denied the right at the election on the 3d of November for Congressmen. Under the constitution of 1868, and the act of admission, the State of Arkansas was prohibited in plain and express terms from making any alterations in regard to the " time and place of residence " of electors. Yet, in the face of this inhibition, the Garland constitution requires a residence of six months in the county, ■when there was no such requirement before, and a residence of one month in the township when none was required under the constitution of 1868. The object of the proviso was to keep the ballot in the hands of every person that became entitled to it under the constitution of 1868, no matter how often the constitution might be changed. The compact is just as much violated by striking out six months and inserting twelve as though they had stricken out six months and inserted twelve years. If they had the right to do the one, they had the right to do the other. That this compact is binding on the people of the State of Arkansas I apprehend will not be questioned, except by those who deny the validity, force, and effect of the reconstruction acts. Compacts of one character and another have been assented to by all the States of the Union, save the original thirteen, and in most instances they have been sacredly observed. Under the first act of admission, (June 23, 1836.) the State of Arkan- sas, by the terms Of her compact, agreed that no tax should be imposed on the lands and property of the United States ; that non-resident pro- prietors should not be taxed higher than resident ; that the lands granted soldiers for military services should not be taxed for three years. The ordinance of 1787, in relation to the Northwestern Territory, among other tilings inhibited any of the States formed out of that Territory flom establishing or maintaining slavery. Judge McLean, of the Su- preme Court of the United States, in the case of Spooner v. McGonnell, (1 McLean, 312,) goes into this question at great length and exhausts it. When Virginia assented that Kentucky might become a separate and independent State, it was a part of the (jompact that the title to the lands in that State should be determined by the laws of Virginia. Afterward Kentucky passed other laws upon the subject and the courts held the legislation of Kentucky violated the compact and declared the subsequent law a nullity. But it may be said that Congress had no riglit to require such a con- dition, and that the States havp the sole right to fix the qualifications of electors. The assertion of a doctrine like this would be nothing netv. Why, sirs, Andrew Johnson asserted the same doctrine in 1868, in his message vetoing the bill for the admission of Arkansas. The attention of Congress was directly called to that feature of the bill, and Congress passed it by a two-thirds vote of each House over his veto. In the face of that vote, with the attention of Congress called directly to the ques- tion of its power, an argument from me would be a W'ork of superero- gation. No doubt, sirs, you will be told that the people of Arkansas have cured all the defects and irregularities mentioned hy ^'■acquiescence.''^ Now, let us see if this be true. Where is the evidence of acquiescence ? W^hat witness testified to it? 1 say to you that there never has been any acquiescence in the matter, save such as the prisoner yields to his captor, and such as the prudent have indulged to avoid violence and bloodshed. Under the decision of the President, the people of Arkan- 54 the Pri'sitlent's decision may have been, the people of Arkansas had but one of two things to do : to array themselves against the j^ower and authority of the United States (lovernmeiit, or to (piietly submit until su(;h time as their grievances could be redressed by Congress, the only tribunal to which they could ai)ply. In Mny last the House appointed a committee to incjuire into the condition of att'airs in Arkansas, and we have been laboring assiduously ever since that time to redress our grievances. It is true the legislature, or rather a body of men that Baxter calls a legislature, has been in session since the time the Presi- dent said the determination of who is governor of Arkansas was a question for the determination of the general assembly; but during the greater portion of the time it was in session Elisha Baxter had it sur- rounded with armed sentries, through which the members of the legis- lature themselves could only i)ass by virtue of the passes of one of Bax- ter's officers. On tlu» day alter the recognition of Baxter as governor, by the J'resident, the bill calling a constitutional convention was passed, calling a convention to meet in July. The legislature was in session but seventeen days, all told, during which time it passed a bill prevent- ing the supreme court from convening until the 4th Monday in Xov^eni- ber; an act suspending officers from the exercise of their duties after the house had passed articles of imi)eachment against them ; and in three days thereafter passed articles of impeachment against every offi- cer of state who would not resign, both executive and judicial, without taking a scintilla of testimony, as the evidence belbre the committee shows, charging them with treason, an offense that is not a cause of impeachment under the constitution of the State. This last-mentioned act also authorized the governor to appoint other persons to act during the suspension of the persons the house had impeacdied. In tilling the three vacancies on the supreme bench occasioned by impeachment, he api)ointed his leading counsel in the quo-u-arranto and in the Brooks- Baxter case chief -justice, and the associate counsel associate justice. The office of attorney-general he tilled with one of his brigadier-gener- als ; the office of treasurer of state Avith a major-general ; the otlice of superintendent of the penitentiary with another major-general ; and the office of commissioner of public lands and immigration with one of his uewspai)er editors and an agent of the associated press, as a compensation for falsehoods told and to be told. During all this time martial law prevailed, and State troops were regularly on duty and iu barracks at the, State-house, and at the private residence of the gov- ernor. The legislature had adjourned, and we could not prosecute a contest there. The convention act was so amended as to read as fol- lows: "That all judges of this State are prohibited from issuing any writ or process whatever, or of taking any action, or assuming any jurisdiction in or about or in connection with the election provided for in the act to which this is supi)lemental and amendatory." This act ousted the jurisdiction of the judges at chambers, and the act of May 27, 1874, adjourns the circuit courts all over to the fall terms, none of which w ere to be holden until after the constitutional convention adjourned. From this statement you will see that all the avenues through which legal redress could be sought were closed. All that we could do was to sit