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 DANIEL WEBSTER 
 
 AND 
 
 THE SPOILS SYSTEM 
 
 AN EXTRACT 
 
 FROM SENATOR BAYARD S ORATION AT DARTMOUTH 
 COLLEGE, JUNE, 1 882 
 
 I 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 PUBLISHED FOR THE 
 
 CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM ASSOCIATION 
 
 BV 
 
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 
 1882 
 
Press of 
 
 G. P. Putnam's Sons 
 
 New York 
 
 
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PUBLICATIONS OF THE CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM 
 
 ASSOCIATION 
 
 DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SPOILS 
 
 SYSTEM 
 
 The need for Webster and men of his type exists to-day, and 
 ever will exist. Questions involving a restraint upon the exercise 
 of governmental power are before us to-day, and many threaten 
 danger to our prosperity, and some, the very existence of our form 
 of government. " Great empire and little minds go ill together," 
 said Lord Bacon, and assuredly we do possess a " great empire " 
 which we see too often ruled by " little minds." A system has 
 grown up gradually, yet almost imperceptibly, in our government, 
 which has reached a point of growth and power that enables it to 
 overthrow the main objects for which our Constitution and laws 
 were established, and to substitute a system which enables men 
 once vested with official power, to use that power as a stepping- 
 stone for its own perpetuation and advancement, regardless of all 
 changes in the condition of popular sentiment. 
 
 This is commonly known as the "spoils system," and rests upon 
 the dogma that the offices of a government are instituted for the 
 emolument and advantage of the official and the political party 
 to which he belongs, and not for the public use and benefit. With 
 the growth of the country and development of its resources, the 
 expansion of the official corps has naturally followed, until to-day 
 the Civil-Service roll of the Federal Government contains over 
 one hundred thousand names, and directly and indirectly con- 
 nected with and dependent upon them and the execution of their 
 powers, it may be safely estimated there are five times as many 
 more. Under a system which disregards the fact that public ser- 
 vice is the great end of office-holding, and which substitutes the 
 personal interests of the incumbent for that of the public, indi- 
 vidual interests have organized-ander the name and forms of polit- 
 ical parties, and a compact and drilled machine has been brought 
 into existence, which, under the rules of party discipline, has be- 
 come a " power behind the throne greater than the throne itself": 
 and, unknown to our Constitution or any law, is actually more 
 powerful in controlling our forms of elections than any power 
 known to and defined by law itself. 
 
 \ 
 
Like every thing else founded upon a false principle, its evil 
 effects grow steadily, and gather strength from the very abuses 
 which they create and perpetuate. The consequences are not 
 simply a loss to the public from the presence of inefficient ser- 
 vants, but the utter destruction of those personal virtues of self- 
 respect, integrity, and conscientiousness which places every public 
 interest in jeopardy. Original appointment to office no longer de- 
 pends on character, capability, or presumed or proven fitness ; nor 
 does the tenure depend upon fidelity and capacity; but unhesitat- 
 ing service as a political and personal partisan, to whom scruple 
 of any kind will be only an incumbrance, has become the most 
 reliable groundwork for success in procuring or retaining public 
 office. Thus, gradually, an army of mercenaries has been organ- 
 ized, who are strong enough to control conventions and nominating 
 assemblies, set at defiance public opinion, and laugh to scorn pub- 
 lic conscience. 
 
 The effect of such a system upon our elections is demoralizing 
 and degrading in the extreme, as it proceeds upon the doctrine 
 that the official positions of the government are the spoils of party 
 conquests. The incumbents find the means of support for them- 
 selves and their families placed in jeopardy on the recurrence of 
 each election. 
 
 "You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I 
 live ; " and so believing, they fight as for their lives, and go through 
 periodical seasons of 'an^^iety and distress, demoralizing, disastrous, 
 and distracting in the effects upon them and upon the performance 
 of their duty. 
 
 Time and energy which should be devoted to the public are 
 given to party ends, and the public money paid to them for public 
 service is extorted from them by the party tax-gatherer, who spares 
 neither age, nor sex, nor station ; but bleeds all, from the Cabinet 
 Minister to the errand boy and the woman who scrubs the steps. 
 Opposed to this array we see a far more numerous but less disci- 
 plined and organized body of hungry seekers for office, savage with 
 delay and disappointment, and furious for success. In such a 
 contest the natural excitements of political passions and clash of 
 opinions are heated almost to frenzy, and all restraints of morality, 
 honor, and legality are consumed and destroyed in the political 
 furnace. 
 
 / 
 
From such scenes and controversies men of dignity, refinement, 
 and self-respect naturally shrink, and a measurable excuse is thus 
 furnished for the non-performance of political duties, of which 
 we see so many of those whose criticisms are so fluent and un- 
 sparing are quick to avail themselves ; and places that should be 
 filled by men possessing qualities that win and deserve private 
 and public confidence, are filled by adroit, scheming, unblushing 
 manipulators, who scoff at personal dignity and self-respect, and 
 avow themselves " practical politicians." These men deride the 
 idea of conscience in politics and scout every suggestion of puri- 
 fication and reform. The impressive admonitions of Washington, 
 repeated and renewed by Webster, fall upon unheeding ears ; for 
 what are the character and lives of such men as Washington and 
 Webster but a standing rebuke to the class of men elevated to 
 control by the system of official spoils ? 
 
 By the law of its being, each member of the " political ma- 
 chine " is also its slave, whether he be its so-called " boss " and 
 leader or one of its humbler members. Personal independence, 
 individual conscience, fidelity to honest conviction weigh nothing 
 and can avail nothing to the man enlisted in the spoils system of 
 politics. The e^'-ils are progressing, and each day public com- 
 prehension of the system and its results is increasing as its dan- 
 gers are unfolded. 
 
 One of these evils is the exclusion of men of self-respect and 
 independence of character from the public counsels and from 
 public service, by which the prime object of our system of free 
 choice of their representatives by the people, is substantially de- 
 feated. The power that defeats is unknown to law, and, there- 
 fore, is uncontrolled by law. These dangers are fortunately be- 
 ginning to attract public attention, and are well calculated to 
 excite public alarm. In a less degree they existed in Mr. 
 Webster's day, and in 1832 he called public attention to them in 
 a speech before the convention at Worcester : 
 
 " Mr. President — As far as I know, there is no civilized country 
 on earth in which, on a change of rulers, there is such an 
 inquisition for spoil as we have witnessed in this free republic. 
 The inaugural address of 1829 spoke of a searching operation of 
 government. The most searching operation, sir, of the present 
 administration has been its search for office and place. Whea 
 
sir, did any English Minister, Whig or Tory, ever make such an 
 inquest. When did he ever go down to low-water mark to make 
 an ousting of tide-waiters ? When did he ever take away the 
 daily bread of weighers and gaugers and measurers ? When did 
 he ever go into the villages to disturb the little post-offices, the 
 mail contracts, and every thing else in the remotest degree con- 
 nected with government ? Sir, a British Minister who should do 
 this and should afterward show his head in a British House of 
 Commons would be received by a universal hiss. I have but 
 little to say of the selections made to fill vacancies thus created. 
 It is true, however, and it is a natural consequence of the system 
 which has been acted on, that within the last three years more 
 nominations have been rejected on the ground of unfitness than in 
 all the preceding forty years of the government. And those 
 nominations, you know, sir, could not have been rejected but by 
 votes of the President's own friends. The cases were too strong 
 to be resisted. Even party attachment could not stand them. 
 In some not a third of the Senate, in others not ten votes, and in 
 others not a single vote could be obtained ; and this for no par- 
 ticular reason known only to the Senate, but on general grounds 
 of the want of character and qualifications ; on grounds known to 
 everybody else as well as to the Senate. All this, sir, is perfectly 
 natural and consistent. The same party selfishness which drives 
 good men out of office will push bad men in. Political proscrip- 
 tion leads necessarily to the filling of offices with incompetent per- 
 sons, and to a consequent mal-execution of official duties. And 
 in my opinion, sir, this principle of claiming monopoly of office by 
 the right of conquest^ unless the public shall effectually rebuke and 
 restrain it, will effectually change the character of our govern- 
 ment. It elevates party above country ; it forgets the common 
 weal in the pursuit of personal emolument ; it tends to form, it 
 does form, we see that it has formed, a political combination,, 
 united by no common principles or opinions among its members, 
 either upon the powers of the government or the true policy of 
 the country, but held together simply as an association, under the 
 charm of a popular head, seeking to maintain possession of the 
 government by a vigorous exercise of its patronage^ and for this 
 purpose agitating and alarming and distressing social life by the 
 exercise of a tyrannical party proscription. Sir, if this course of 
 
5 
 
 things cannot be checked, good men will grow tired of the exer- 
 cise of political privileges. They will see that such elections are 
 but a mere selfish contest for office, and they will abandon the 
 government to the scramble of the bold, the daring, and the des- 
 perate." 
 
 Three years subsequently he denounced the spoils system in 
 the Senate, and in discussing the appointing and removing power 
 of the President, said : 
 
 " The unlimited power to grant office and to take it away 
 gives a command over the hopes and fears of a vast multitude of 
 men. It is generally true that he who controls another man's 
 means of living controls his will. Where there are favors to be 
 granted there are usually enough to solicit for them ; and when 
 favors once granted may be withdrawn at pleasure, there is ordi- 
 narily little security for personal independence of character. The 
 power of giving office thus affects the fears of all who are in and 
 the hopes of all who are out. Those who are out endeavor to 
 distinguish themselves by active political friendship, by warm 
 personal devotion, by clamorous support of men in whose hands 
 is the power of reward ; while those who are in ordinarily take 
 care that others shall not surpass them in such qualities or 
 such conduct as are most likely to secure favor. They re- 
 solve not to be oAitdone in any of the works of partisanship. 
 The consequence of all this is obvious. A competition ensues, 
 not of patriotic labors, not of rough and severe toils for the 
 public good, not of manliness, independence, and public spirit ; 
 but of complacence, of indiscriminate support of Executive meas- 
 ures, of pliant subserviency and gross adulation. All throng and 
 rush together to the altar of man-worship, and there they offer 
 sacrifices and pour out libations, till the thick fumes of their 
 incense turn their own heads, and turn, also, the head of him who 
 is the object of their idolatry." 
 
 And in the course of the same speech he placed the question of 
 Civil Service on its true grounds, when he affirmed that the civil 
 officers of the government should not be the mere instrument of 
 the administration, any "more than the officers of the military and 
 naval branches, nor in the civil more than in the military and 
 naval service should the offices be converted into mere rewards 
 for party services. This proposition should, of course, be stated 
 
with important qualifications, so as to permit a change in the gov- 
 ernment policy to be executed by officials whose sentiments were in 
 accord with the reforms proposed — not as rewards or punishments 
 for indi'/idual opinions, but as agencies to execute well-settled 
 public opinion. The underlying theory of our government, that 
 the will of the majority, legally expressed, shall be represented 
 and shall control in the administration of public affairs, should 
 not suffer obstruction from the opinions of any set of office- 
 holders. The agent must follow the principal, and obstruc- 
 tion to the expressed will of the majority would be just cause for 
 the substitution of other agents to secure its execution. 
 
 Said Mr. Webster in February, 1835 : 
 
 *' It is necessary to bring back public officers to the conviction 
 that they belong to the country, and not to any administration, or 
 to any one man. The army is the army of the country ; the 
 navy is the navy of the country ; neither of them is either the 
 mere instrument of the administration for the time being, or 
 of him who is at the head of it. The Post-Office, the Land- 
 Office, the Custom-House, are in like manner institutions of the 
 country, established for the good of the people ; and it may well 
 alarm the lovers of free institutions, when all the offices in these 
 several departments, are spoken of in high places as being 
 ' spoils of victory,* to be enjoyed by those who are successful in 
 contest, in which they profess this grasping of the spoils to have 
 been the object of their efforts." 
 
 The great mass of official duties under our system are simply 
 ministerial, the performance of which is no more affected by a 
 man's political opinion than by his religious tenets. The judicial 
 powers of the Constitution are expressly vested during the good 
 behavior of the judges, whose pecuniary independence of popular 
 will is additionally secured, a his would leave, therefore, a com- 
 paratively small number of those leading and controlling offices, 
 in which the political opinions of the incumbent should accord 
 with the policy of the Executive, in favor of which public opinion 
 had been expressed, and whose removal could justly take place 
 on such grounds. 
 
 In 1 84 1, when Mr. Webster first filled the office of Secretary of 
 State, he had occasion to appoint a commission to inquire into 
 the condition of certain public buildings then in the course of 
 
erection, and he issued instructions showing that he proposed to 
 carry into practice the methods which he had recommended to an 
 opposing administration. Said he : 
 
 " You will inquire into no man's political opinions or preferences ; 
 but if it be alleged that any person having power, either in em- 
 ploying or dismissing laborers with any reference to the political 
 opinions of those who may have been employed or dismissed, or 
 for any political or party object whatever, or in any other way has 
 violated his duty for party or electioneering purposes ^ you will inquire 
 into the truth of such accusation and make report to me." 
 
 To such principles of administration must the American people 
 return if they hope to see such men as Webster in the public service. 
 Such a character as his, and a man holding such views, would create 
 consternation nowaday in a convention composed of the spoilsmen 
 of politics. 
 
 The evil is deeply seated and difficult of extirpation. Its fatal 
 consequences I do not believe are overestimated or overstated ; 
 and speaking, not without practical knowledge of its effect upon 
 the whole framework of our government in all of its three great 
 departments, I aver my belief that unless an end shall soon be put 
 to a system under which at every election the offices of the country 
 are, to use the words of Webster, " claimed by the right of party 
 conquest," and have that claim allowed, we shall lose even our 
 form of government, of which, long before, the substance will 
 have disappeared. 
 
 Statesmanship is impossible with men whose only thought and 
 occupation is official brokerage, and who administer the powers 
 of official patronage not by the measure of the applicant's charac- 
 ter, ability, or fitness to perform the duties of the place, but 
 by his servility and unscrupulous devotion to the objects of the 
 political conspiracy into which he has been admitted. 
 
 " Never forget," wrote Macaulay to his constituents when leaving 
 for India," that the worst and most degrading species of corruption 
 is the corruption which operates not by hopes but by fears." And 
 once in office under the spoils system the trembling possessor is 
 induced to commit any act of unmanly servility in the fear that be 
 will be dismissed. And for the same reasons he does not venture to 
 disclose abuses going on around him, when to do so would subject 
 him to certain and instant dismissal " for the good of the party." 
 
8 
 
 The operation of such exciting hopes and fears upon the 
 unprincipled and morbid has had lately a fearful illustration, 
 at which the nation still shudders ; but^ who shall say that the. 
 utter demoralization and destruction of the better nature of men 
 by politics under the spoils system, did not find a natural outcome 
 in the murder — under a confusion of hope and revenge concern- 
 ing office — of a blameless and patriotic President ? 
 
 Sentences to beggary and distress, to which death would be 
 almost a relief, have been not infrequent, under the form of dis- 
 missal from minor offices, for no other cause than to carry out the 
 system that converts public trusts of power into the spoils of party 
 conquest. 
 
PRESIDENl 
 GEORGE WILLIAM 
 
 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 012 183 738 9 O 
 
 VICE-PRESIDENTS. 
 BENJ. H. BRISTOW, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, 
 
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 OSWALD OTTENDORFER, GEO. B. BUTLER. 
 
 TREASURER. 
 
 JOHN C. ENO. 
 SECRE TARY A SSI STAN T SECRE TAR Y. 
 
 WILLIAM POTTS. WILLARD BROWN. 
 
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 EVERETT P. WHEELER, Chairman. 
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