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 JYo. 11. 
 
 From the "Atlantic Monthly" 
 
 We have reached a point in the history of our national 
 troubles "where it seems desirable to examine our present posi- 
 tion, and to consider whether we ought to surrender ourselves 
 to despair, or congratulate ourselves on decided success — 
 whether we should abandon all attempts to restore the Union, 
 assert the dignity of the Constitution, and punish treason, or 
 nerve ourselves to new effort, and determine to persevere in a 
 righteous cause so long as a single able-bodied man remains, or 
 a dollar of available property is unexpended. 
 
 It may be, it must be, conceded that we commenced the con- 
 test with very crude and inadequate notions of what war really 
 is. We proposed to decide the issue by appealing to the census 
 and the tax-list — tribunals naturally enough occurring to a 
 mercantile and manufacturing community — but how if the 
 enemy prefer cannon and cold steel? Our first campaign was 
 in the field of statistics, and we found the results highly satis- 
 factory. Our great numerical superiority, aided by our im- 
 mense material resources, gave us an early and an easy victory.. 
 We outnumbered the enemy everywhere, defeated them in 
 every pitched battle, starved them by a vigilant blockade, se- 
 cured meanwhile the sympathy and support of the whole civilized 
 world by the holiness of our cause, and commanded its respect 
 by the display of our material power and our military capacity 
 — and in a few short months crushed the rebellion, restored the 
 Union, vindicated the Constitution, hung the arch-traitors, and 
 saw peace in all our borders. This was our campaign — on 
 

 paper. I5ut war is something more than a sum in arithmetic. 
 A campaign cannot be decided by the rule of three. No finite 
 power can control every contingency, and have all the chances 
 in its favor. 
 
 War means alternate success and defeat, alternate hope and 
 disappointment, great suffering in the field, many vacant chairs 
 at many firesides, immense expenditures with little apparent 
 result, " the best-laid schemes foiled by a thousand unexpected 
 contingencies, lamentable indecision in the cabinet, glaring 
 blunders in the field, stagnation of industry, and heavy taxation. 
 
 " Win- is a game, which, were the nations wise, 
 Kings would not play at." 
 
 But nations are not always wise, and war often becomes a 
 necessity. When, then, the necessity arises, it should be met 
 manfully. The question once deliberately decided that peace 
 is no longer consistent with national honor or national safety, 
 the dread alternative must be accepted with all its hazards and 
 all its horrors. To organize only in anticipation of certain and 
 speedy success, to despise and underrate the enemy, to inquire 
 with how small an army and how limited an expenditure the 
 war can be carried on, is as unstatesmanlike as it is in flat de- 
 fiance of all historical teaching. But if we carry our folly still 
 farther in the same direction ; if we fail to take into grave ac- 
 count the most obvious and inevitable incidents of actual war- 
 fare ; if in our overweening confidence we neglect discipline, 
 underrate the prime importance of promptness and decision in 
 action, certainty and celerity in movement, and energy and ac- 
 tivity in pursuit ; if, in a word, we expect that the defences of 
 the enemy arc to fall into our hands by means as on warlike as 
 those that decided the fate of Jericho, or dream that because 
 our cause is just every precedent in historj T , and every principle 
 in human nature will be overruled in our favor — then we de- 
 serve to be outgeneralled, and are fortunate, if we escape 
 final and disastrous defeat. 
 
 Now, has not this been precisely our cardinal and capital 
 error, and arc we not to-day suffering its natural consequences ? 
 To the blind and unreasoning confidence with which we began 
 this war has succeeded a reaction running into the very opposite 
 
extreme. 'We are given over to a despondency quite as un- 
 warrantable as the extravagance of our early hopes. We de- 
 manded and expected impossibilities. Forgetting that the age 
 of miracles has passed, many are now bitterly complaining that 
 nothing has been accomplished, and predicting that all future 
 efforts will terminate in similar failure. Two years have not 
 elapsed since the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter; and yet 
 we are amazed and mortified that our forces have not overrun 
 the whole South, that victory has not crowned our arms in 
 every battle, and that our flag does not float triumphant over 
 every acre of every State once called Confederate. Whether 
 this most desirable result could have been accomplished, if this 
 or that policy had been adopted at the outset, is one of those 
 problems that will never be solved ; nor is the inquiry at pres- 
 ent pertinent or profitable. Let us rather ask whether, in view 
 of the means actually employed, our discontent with the exist- 
 ing condition of affairs is not unmanly aud unreasonable. 
 We are to measure results, not by the efforts that we ought 
 to have put forth, nor by those which we should put forth, 
 if, with our dear-bought experience, we were called upon 
 once more to undertake such a gigantic enterprise. We 
 must recall the aspect of affairs when we first embarked on this 
 perilous sea. We must remember how ignorant we were of all 
 the danger before us, how imperfect was the chart by which 
 our course was to be determined, how man}' shoals and sunken 
 rocks and cross-currents we were to encounter, as yet unknown 
 to any pilot on board our noble ship of state, how little we knew 
 of navigation in such angry waters, under so stormy a sky. 
 
 Turn back the pages of history for two short years, and dwell 
 a moment on the picture presented to our eyes. A nation, en- 
 joying to the utmost the substantial benefits belonging to fifty 
 years of profound peace and unexampled prosperity, enervated 
 by those habits of luxury which wealth easily accumulated 
 always fosters, with a standing army hardly large enough to 
 protect our Western frontier from the incursions of hostile In- 
 dians, and a navy ludicrously small in proportion to the extent 
 of our sea-coast and the value of our commerce, is suddenly 
 plunged into a war covering such an extent of territory, and 
 calling for such an array of power by sea and land as to dwarf 
 
I 
 
 into insignificance all modern wars, hardly excepting the : 
 tary operations of Napoleon I. 
 
 And it must be remembered that education and habit bad 
 trained us to an implicit reliance on the sufficiency of our laws 
 and the competency of our Constitution to meet and decide 
 every issue that could possibly be presented. We could con- 
 ceive of no public wrongs which could not be redressed by an 
 appeal to the ballot-box, and of no private injuries for which 
 our statutes did not provide a suitable remedy. 
 
 We were not only a law-abiding, but a peace-loving people. 
 The report of the revolver was not heard in our streets, nor was 
 the glitter of the bowie-knife seen in our bar-room. We dep- 
 recated mob-violence, and disliked the summary proceedings 
 of Judge Lynch. We took no pains to conceal our horror of 
 unnecessary bloodshed, and shared the views of civilized Chris- 
 tendom about duelling. We still clung to our plebeian pre- 
 judices against lawless violence, and persisted in believing that 
 a swaggering bully could not be an ornament to cultivated and 
 refined society. In fact, some excellent individuals at the 
 North went so far as to seek to disseminate these old-fashioned 
 notions among their Southern brethren, and made annual sub- 
 scriptions to what was known (alas, that we must use the his- 
 toric tense !) as the "Southern Aid Society," having for its 
 praiseworthy object the support of ministers who should preach 
 the gospel to our ardent and impulsive neighbors. What a sad 
 and significant commentary is it upon the ingratitude of de- 
 praved human nature, that the condescending clergyman who 
 whilom consented to collect the offerings of these discriminating; 
 philanthropists is now a chaplain in the Confederate army, and 
 is invoking the most signal judgments of Heaven upon his for- 
 mer friends and fellow-laborers ! 
 
 This, then, was our condition, and these were our habits, when 
 we were rudely awakened from our dreams of peace by the roar 
 of cannon and the clash of arms. What wonder that the startling 
 summons found us all unready for such a crisis ? What wonder 
 that our early preparations to confront the issue thus forced upon 
 us without note of warning were hasty, incomplete, and quite 
 inadequate to the emergency? Is it discreditable to us that 
 we were slow to appreciate the bitterness and intensity of 
 
that hatred, which, long smouldering under the surface of 
 Southern society, burst forth at once into a wide spread confla- 
 gration, severing like flax all the ties of kindred, and all the 
 bonds of individual friendship and national intercourse which 
 had united us for half a century 1 Here was a section of our 
 Union which had always enjoyed equal rights with us under the 
 Constitution, and had known the Government only by its bless- 
 ings, — nay, more, had actually, by the confession of its own 
 statesmen, controlled the internal administration and dictated 
 the foreign policy of the country since the adoption of the Con- 
 stitution ; which had no substantial grievance to complain of, 
 and no fanciful injury which could not be readily redressed by 
 legal and constitutional methods. Are we to be bla-med because 
 we could not easily bring ourselves to believe that an integral 
 part of our nation, with such a history, could, under a pretence 
 so bald as to insult the common sense of Christendom, rush head- 
 long into a war which must close all its avenues of commerce, 
 paralyze all its industry, threaten the existence of its cherished 
 and peculiar institution, — in a word, whether successful or un- 
 successful, inevitably result in its political suicide? At this 
 very moment, accustomed as we have been for many sad and 
 weary months to the daily development of Southern folly and 
 madness, it is difficult, when we withdraw our minds from the 
 present, to realize that the whole war is not a hideous night- 
 mare. 
 
 In view of all this, I ask, is it strange that we did not at once 
 comprehend all our danger, and did not enter the field with all 
 our forces, — determined to fight with desperate energy until 
 every trace of rebellion was crushed out ? If, disturbed at 
 midnight by footsteps in your chamber, you start up from sound 
 slumber to see a truculent-looking vagabond prowling about 
 your room with a lighted candle, do you not at once spring to 
 your feet, collar the intruder, and shout lustily for help, if he 
 prove too strong for you ? Prompt and vigorovs action in such 
 a case is simply the impulse of instinct. But how if you recog- 
 nize in the untimely visitor a member of your own household ? 
 Will you seize and overpower him without asking a single ques- 
 tion, or waiting for a word of explanation ? "Will you not pause 
 for some overt act of hostility, some convincing proof of a fell 
 
6 
 
 purpose? Suppose it transpire that lie really means mischief, 
 and you lose an important advantage by yonr delay to strike. 
 You may regret the result ; but does it in the least tend to show 
 that you were cowardly or careless? Now, was not this our 
 exact dilemma ? Although the orgin of the war and the cir- 
 cumstances attendant upon its commencement are a thrice- 
 told tale, are we not in danger of overlooking their bearing 
 upon all our subsequent action ? And shall we not act wisely, 
 if we recur to them again and again, during this momentous 
 contest? 
 
 But, asks a timid Conservative, — from whose patient button the 
 fingers of an ardent apostle of peace have recently and most re- 
 luctantly parted,' — has not this war been shamefully mismanaged 
 by the Administration? have nut contractors grown rich while 
 soldiers have suffered ? have not incompetent generals been 
 unjustly advanced, and skillful commanders been summarily 
 shelved? have we gained any advantages at all commensurate 
 with our loss of blood and our expenditure of money ? would 
 not a cessation of hostilities on any terms be better than such a 
 Avar as we are now waging? If we might venture to suggest a 
 word of caution to our desponding friend, before attempting a 
 reply to his broadside of questions, we would say : Beware how 
 you indulge in too much conversation with a certain class of 
 our citizens, whose hearty loyalty has been more than doubted, 
 and whose conversion to the beauties of peace and the horrors 
 of war is so sudden as to be very suspicious. Examine their 
 antecedents, and you will find, that, when " border ruffians" in 
 Kansas threatened with fire and sword the inoffensive emigrants 
 from New England, these gentlemen saw nothing unusual in 
 such proceedings, and answered all remonstrances with ridicule. 
 But them to the question to-day, and it will appear, that, from 
 the very beginning of the struggle, all their sympathies have 
 been with the South. They will tell you that Northern Aboli- 
 tionists arc alone responsible for the war ; that the recession of 
 the Southern States may have been unwise, but was not unrea- 
 sonable ; that they have always condemned coercion and advo- 
 cated compromise ; and that there is no safe and satisfactory 
 way out of our existing difficulties but — peace. What do ihey 
 mean by peace ? Such peace as the highwayman, armed to the 
 
teeth, offers to the belated traveller ! Such pence as Benedict 
 Arnold sought to negotiate with the English general ! They 
 know that the South will accept no terms but the acknowledg- 
 ment of her independence, or the abject and unconditional sub- 
 mission of the Free States. They reject the first alternative, 
 because they dare not go before the North on such an issue. 
 Disguise it as they may, the} r are willing to adopt the second. 
 The party to which, without an exception, these men belong, 
 is powerless without the co-operation of the South, and would 
 consider no sacrifice of principle too great, and no humiliation 
 of the North too degrading, if it promised the restoration of 
 their political supremacy. Avoid all such men. Distrust their 
 advice. That way dishonor lies, and national disgrace. If yon 
 are not " armed so strong in honesty" as to be proof against 
 such treasonable talk, you will soon be aware of a softening of 
 your backbone, and a lamentable loss of earnest, active patriot- 
 ism. Take counsel rather of your own common sense. Look- 
 ing at the question in its narrowest and most selfish bearings, 
 you know that we can neither recede nor stand still. Submis- 
 sion is slavery. Disunion paves the way for endless secession, 
 and eternal warfare between rising and rival republics. 
 
 But there are other symptoms of disloyalty besides this per- 
 sistent demand for peace. There are indications of a desire to 
 array sections of the North against each other, and — Heaven 
 save the mark ! — by the very politicians who have been most 
 bitter in their denunciation of " geographical parties." Here 
 comes a little Western lawyer, with unlimited resources of slang 
 and slender capital of ideas, barely redeemed from being an 
 absolute blackguard by the humanizing influences of a New 
 England college, but showing fewer and fewer symptoms of 
 civilization as he forgets the lessons of his collegiate life ; and 
 he delights an audience of New York "roughs" by the novel 
 information, that " Puritanism is a reptile" and the cause of 
 all our troubles, and that we shall never fulfil our national des- 
 tiny until Puritanism has been crushed. Let us not elevate 
 this nauseating nonsense into importance by attempting a reply. 
 Such men must be left to follow out their inevitable instincts. 
 They are not worth the trouble necessary to civilize them. Mr. 
 Karey succeeded in taming a zebra from the London Zoological 
 
Gardens; but a sing'.j lesion could not permanently reclaim the 
 beast, and it soon relapsed into its native and normal ferocity. 
 One experiment sufficed to show the power of the artist ; no 
 possible increase of value in the educated animal would have 
 justified a prolonged and perfect training. 
 
 You ask if we have gained any advantages commensurate 
 with our efforts, or with the high-sounding phrase of our de- 
 clared purpose. Let us look at this a moment. Suppose we 
 begin with a glance at the other side of the picture. Has all 
 the boasting, have all the promises, been on the Federal side ? 
 Did we hear nothing of the Confederate flag floating over 
 Faneuil Hall ? — nothing of "Washington falling into the hands 
 of the enemy'? — nothing of a festive winter in Philadelphia, 
 and a general distribution of spoils in New York ? — nothing of 
 foreign intervention? — nothing of the cowardice of Northern 
 Mudsills, and the omnipotence of King Cotton 1 Decidedly, 
 the rebels begau with a sufficiently startling programme. Let 
 us see how far they have carried it oat. As they were cleaily 
 the assailants, we have an undoubted right to ask what they 
 have accomplished aggressively. "We say, then, that, excepting 
 in the case of one brief raid, the soil of a single Free State has 
 never been polluted by the hostile tread of an invading force ; 
 that every battle-field has been within the limits of State3 
 claimed as Confederate ; that while the war has desolated whole 
 States represented in the Confederate Congress, not an acre 
 north of Mason and Dixon's line has suffered from the ravages 
 of the rebel armies. AVas ever another scorpion more com- 
 pletely surrounded and shut in by a cordon of fire ? 
 
 This is surely something, but it is by no means all. Wave we 
 accomplished nothing aggressively? We will call into court a 
 witness from the enemy's camp. Hear the recent testimony of 
 a leading journal, published in the Confederate capital:* 
 
 " It is not altogether an empty boast on the part of the 
 Yankees, that they hold all that they have ever held, and that 
 another year or two of such progress as they have already made 
 will fiud them masters of the Southern Confederacy. They 
 who think independence is to achieved by brilliant but 
 inconsequential victories, would do well to look at the magni- 
 
 * Richmond Examiner, January 20th, 18G3. 
 
tilde of Yankee possessions in our country. Maryland, Ken- 
 tucky, and Missouri are claimed as constituent parts of the 
 Confederation : they are as much in the power of Lincoln as 
 Maine and Minnesota. The pledge once deemed foolish by the 
 South, that he would { hold, occupy, and possess' all the forts 
 belonging to the United States Government, has been redeemed 
 almost to the letter by Lincoln. Forts Pickens [Sumter?] and 
 Morgan we still retain ; but with these exceptions, all the strong- 
 holds on the seaboard, from Fortress Monroe to the Rio Grande, 
 are in the hands of the enemy. Very consoling and very easy 
 to say that it was impossible to prevent all this, and that the 
 occupation of the outer edge of the Republic amounts to 
 nothing. Drury's Bluff and Yicksburg give the lie to the first 
 assertion ; and the onward movement of Rosecrans towards 
 Alabama, the presence of Grant in North Mississippi and of 
 Curtis in Middle Arkansas, to say nothing of Banks at New 
 Orleans and Baton Rouge, set at rest the silly dream that 
 a thin strip of sea-coast only is in possession of our foes. The 
 truth is, the Yankees are in great force in the very heart of the 
 Confederacy ; they swarm on all our borders ; they threaten 
 every important city yet belonging to us ; and nearly two hun- 
 dred thousand of them are within two days' march of the Con- 
 federate capital. This is no fiction. It is a fact so positive 
 that no one can deny it." 
 
 But this reluctant recital by no means exhausts the record of 
 our success. We have put into the field a volunteer force, 
 fully armed and equipped, which, whether we consider its 
 magnitude, the rapidity with which it has been raised, its 
 fighting qualities, its patient endurance of unaccustomed hard- 
 ships, or its intelligent appreciation of the principles involved 
 in the contest, is without a counterpart in history. And yet 
 more, from the invention and achievements of our iron-clads 
 dates a new era in naval warfare, while in the value and variety 
 of our ordnance we have taken the lead of all civilized nations. 
 Can you find in all this nothing to quicken the pulse of your 
 patriotism? Is hero no ground for encouragement, no incite- 
 ment to renewed effort ? 
 
 But you complain of corruption among contractors, and 
 of knavery among politicians. "Will you point me to a single 
 
10 
 
 ■war, ever waged on the face of the earth, where all the rulers 
 wore above reproach and all their subordinates unselfish ? But 
 what will you do about it? Grant that many contractors ha\e 
 made dishonest fortunes out of the calamities of their country, 
 and that there are office-holders with whom " Stand by the Con- 
 stitution ?" means, Stand by the public crib from which we are 
 richly and regularly fed, and " Uphold the Administration!" 
 should be translated, Give us our full four years' enjoyment of 
 the loaves and fishes. What then ? Shall a few worthless straws 
 here, and a few heaps of offal there, arrest or check the onward 
 march of a mighty army, the steady progression of a great princi- 
 ple? Away with such trumpery considerations! Punish with 
 the utmost severity of the law every public plunderer whose 
 crimes can be dragged into the light of day ; send to the 
 Coventry of universal contempt every lagging and lukewarm 
 official ; but, in the name of all that is holy in purpose and 
 noble in action, move on ! To hesitate is worse than folly ; to 
 delay is more than madness. The salvation of our country 
 trembles in the balance. The fate of free institutions for — 
 who shall say how long ? — may hang upon the issue of the 
 struggle. 
 
 Your catalogue of grievances, however, is still incomplete. 
 Ton are dissatisfied with our generalship as displayed in the 
 field, and with the wisdom of our policy as developed by the 
 cabinet. Unquestionably you have a constitutional right to 
 grumble to your heart's content ; but are you not aware that 
 such complaints are as old as the history of the human race ? 
 Do you believe this to be the first war that was ever mis- 
 managed, and that our undoubted blunders arc either novel or 
 peculiar to Republics? There never was a greater mistake. If 
 there were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise counsellors 
 before Ulysses, there certainly have been incompetent com- 
 manders before Mager-General A., and shallow statesmen 
 before Secretary B. We do not monopolize executive imbe- 
 cility, nor are our military blunders without parallel or precedent. 
 To attribute our occasional reverses, and our indecisive victories, 
 our inaction in the field and our confusion in the cabinet, to our 
 peculiar form of government, is as inconsequential as it would 
 be to trace all our disasters to the color of President Lincoln's 
 hair or the number of General Ilallcck's children. 
 
u 
 
 The enemies of free institutions, hardly yet recovered from 
 their astonishment at beholding an army of volunteers, superior 
 in number and quality to any the world ever saw, spring into 
 existence with such marvellous rapidity as to eclipse, in sober 
 fact, the fabulous birth of Minerva full- armed from the head 
 of Jove, or their still greater surprise at seeing the immense 
 expenses of so gigantic a w*tr readily met without assistance 
 from abroad, by large loans cheerfully made and heavy taxation 
 patiently borne, are reduced to the necessity of exulting over 
 what they term our " total want of military genius," and our 
 "incapacity to conduct a campaign successfully." 
 
 It is useless to deny that we may have challenged criticism 
 and provoked a smile by our large promise and our smaller 
 performance. But are we the sole and exclusive proprietors of 
 this experience ? Where in the past or the present shall we 
 find a great and powerful nation much addicted to modesty or 
 self-depreciation ? Least of all, should we have expected such 
 venomous criticism and such unsparing ridicule from England. 
 To be sure, we have long since ceased to look for sympathy or 
 even justice at her hands. We have come to understand and 
 appreciate the tone and temper of her ruling classes towards 
 this country. In addition to their inherited antipathy to Re- 
 publics, they believe in sober earnest what one of their greatest 
 wits said jocosely, that " the great object for which the Anglo- 
 Saxon race appears to have been created is the making of calico." 
 And whatever interferes, or threatens to interfere, with this enno- 
 bling occupation is sure to incur their passive displeasure, if not 
 their active hostility. We expect nothing, therefore, from their 
 good-will ; but we have a right to demand, as a matter of good 
 taste, that, in criticizing our campaigns, they shall not wholly 
 ignore their own military blunders, especially those so recent 
 as to be fresh, in the recollection of every third-form school-boy 
 in the kingdom. For, if campaigns carried on with the smallest 
 possible result in proportion to the magnitude of the sacrifice 
 of money and life — if a succession of incompetent generals in 
 command — if critical military opportunities neglected and 
 enormous stragetic blunders committed — if indecision, nepot- 
 ism, and red tape at home, envy, want of unity, and incapacity 
 among officers, and unnecessary and inexcusable hardship 
 
among the privates — if .nil tins declares the decadence of a 
 Government, then was the sun of England hastening to its set- 
 ting during the Crimean War. 
 
 "We hear much said abroad about our indecisive battles, our 
 barren victories, our failure to take advantage of the crippled 
 condition of a defeated enemy, and our unaccountable disinclina- 
 tion to follow up a successful attack by a prompt pursuit. Now, 
 not for the sake of excusing or palliating the numerous and 
 grave errors into which we have fallen during our own unhappy 
 struggle, nor yet to exonerate from censure any civil officers 
 or military leaders who may be wholly or in part responsible 
 for these errors, but simply to demonstrate that they are liable 
 to occur under any form of government, and, indeed, have re- 
 cently befallen the very government whose rulers now hold us 
 to the strictest account, and are most eager to convict us of ex- 
 traordinary misconduct and incapacity, we propose, very briefly 
 and without further introduction, to examine the record of the 
 English army during the Crimean War. 
 
 The first important battle fought on the Peninsula was that 
 of the Alma. We will give, as consisely as possible, so much 
 of the history of this engagement, compiled from authentic 
 English sources, as will present a correct picture of the plans 
 formed and the results accomplished. 
 
 " The 15th of August, 1854, was the first date fixed for the sail- 
 ing of the allied forces from Varna to the Crimea. It was post- 
 poned until the 20th, then till the 22d, then the 26th— then 
 successively to the 1st, 2d, and 7th of September; that is, the 
 French ileet left Varna on the 5th, and the English sailed from 
 the neighboring port of Baltschick on the 7th." It is admitted 
 that " these delays hazarded not only the success, but even the 
 practicability of the whole design, as between the 15th and 25th 
 of September the great equinoctial gales sweep over the Black 
 Sea, and lash into tempests of the most destructive nature." 
 
 The voyage, however, was accomplished in safety, and on the 
 14th of September the Allies arrived at the Crimea, off a place 
 called the " Old Fort," only about thirty miles north of Sabas- 
 topol. The whole army was composed of 27,000 English, 
 24,000 French, and 8,000 Turks. The landing occupied the 
 14th, 15th, and 16th of September. At nine o'clock A. M., 
 
13 
 
 of September 19th, the army began the advance, and on the 
 evening of the same day rested for the night within sight of the 
 Russian forces, strongly intrenched on the banks of the Alma, 
 about twelve miles distant from the " Old Fort." Early in the 
 afternoon of the following day the Allies attacked the strong- 
 hold of the enemy, and'in less than three hours the Russian in- 
 trenchments were successfully stormed, and the Russian army 
 was in full retreat. The English and French troops fought with 
 determined and distinguished bravery, and their victory was 
 complete. But what was decided by this bloody struggle? 
 Bad generalship on the part of the Russians, certainly ; but 
 what else ? Mr. Russell says, — "This great battle was not de- 
 cisive, so far as the fate of Sebastopol was concerned, merely 
 because we lacked either the means or the military genious to 
 make it so." The victory was not followed up, the retreating 
 foe were not pursued, ample time was given to the enemy to 
 reorganize and retrieve their losses, and the evening of the event- 
 ful 20th September found the allied forces no nearer the cap- 
 ture of Sebastopol than they were before the battle. 
 
 Did " the Alma " crown the allied generals with fresh and 
 well-earned laurels? We appeal once more to Mr. Russell: 
 " I may inquire, Was there any generalship shown by any of 
 the allied generals at the Alma ? We have Lord Raglan painted 
 by one of his staff, trotting in front of his army, amid a shower 
 of balls, 'just as if he were riding down Rotten Row,' with a 
 kind nod for every one, and leaving his generals to fight it out 
 as the best they could ; riding across the stream through the 
 French Riflemen, not knowing where he was going to, or where 
 the enemy were, till fate led him to a little knoll, from which 
 he saw some of the Russian guns on his flank ; whereupon he 
 sent an order to Turner's battery for guns, and seemed surprised 
 that they could not be dragged across a stream and up a hill 
 which presented some difficulties to an unencumbered horse- 
 man ; then cantering off" to join the Guards just ere they made 
 their charge, and finding it all over while he was in a hollow of 
 the ground." Lord Raglan, let it be remembered, was the 
 Commander-in-Chief of the English forces. And again : " The 
 Light Division was strangely handled. Sir George Brown, 
 whose sight was so indifferent that he had to get one of his offi- 
 
14 
 
 cers to lead Lis horse across the river, seemed not to know where 
 his division was If the conduct of a campaign be a suc- 
 cession of errors, the Crimean expedition was certainly carried 
 on secundum artem." Once more, on the same point, and 
 quoting from the same authority : " All the Russian ollicers 
 with whom I have conversed, all the 'testimony I have heard 
 or read, coincide on those two points : first, that, if, on the 
 25th, we had moved to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians, 
 we should have found their army in a state of the most com- 
 plete demoralization, and might have forced the great majority 
 of them to surrender as prisoners of war, in a sort of cul-de-sac, 
 from which but few could have escaped ; secondly, that, had 
 we advanced directly against Sebastopol, the town would have 
 surrendered, after some slight show of insistence to save the 
 honor of the officers." Certainly, such generalship as this did 
 not promise very well for the results of the campaign. 
 
 Let us follow the movements of the Allies a little farther. 
 On the morning of September 25th, the combined forces took 
 up their line of march southward. On the 26th, they reached 
 and occupied the town of Balaklava, about six miles distant 
 from Sebastopol. On the 2Sth of the same month, Lord Raglan 
 wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of War, ' : We 
 are busily engaged in disembarking our siege-train and pro- 
 visions, and we arc most desirous of undertaking the attack of 
 Sebastopol icithout the loss of a dctij." And yet it is not until 
 October 10th, that the Allies commence digging their trenches 
 before the town. Meanwhile the allied army was anxious and 
 impatient. "' When will the siege commence?' was the con- 
 stant inquiry of the wearied and expectant troops. 'To-mor- 
 row,' was the usual response, ' most probably to-morrow.' But 
 day after day came and went, and the Allies still rusted in inac- 
 tion, while the Russians worked day and night at strengthening 
 their defences." "The time dragged heavily on ; still the Rus- 
 sians worked with incredible industry, and still the cannon of 
 the Allies had not yet. opened their thunders upon Sebastopol." 
 On the 17th of October, twenty one days after the occupation 
 of Balaklava, the allied forces commenced fire by land and sea 
 on the stronghold of the enemy. The bombardment continued 
 from half-past six A. M., until nightfall, but is conceded to 
 
15 
 
 have been a complete and mortifying failure. From this time 
 until the 5th of November, it will not be contended that any 
 substantial advantage was gained by the invading forces, or 
 that material progress was made towards the reduction of the 
 Russian Gibraltar. 
 
 Then came the battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate 
 sortie of the Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the 
 besiegers. The loss of life on both sides was terrible. To what 
 extent was this battle decisive ? Mr. Russell shall give his own 
 testimony on this point: " We had nothing to rejoice over, and 
 almost everything to deplore, in the battle of Inkerman. We 
 defeated the enemy, indeed, but had not advanced one step 
 nearer the citadel of Sebastopol." In other words, the Allies 
 had repulsed the Russians, but had barely escaped annihilation, 
 wiiile, from having been the besiegers, they became the be- 
 sieged, and remained so until largely reinforced from home. 
 " A. heavy responsibility," says Mr. Russell, "rests on those 
 whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack us where we were 
 least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them to despise 
 precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many 
 valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy.'"' The 
 English not only committed the serious error of underrating the 
 enemy, and neglecting the most ordinary precautions against 
 surprise, but, during the whole of the desperate and bloody 
 fight, they gave no proof whatever of generalship. The stub- 
 born, unyielding bravery of the troops was the salvation of 
 the army. " We owed the victory, such as it was, to strength, 
 not to superior intelligence and foresight. It was a soldiers' 
 battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and cour- 
 age of our men." Humanity shudders and the heart sickens 
 over the sufferings of that gallant army of martyrs to Cabinet 
 incapacity and military imbecility during the long and dreary 
 winter of 1S51-55. 
 
 On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand 
 bombardment of Sebastopol, which, though continuing for 
 twelve days, resulted, like the first, in mortifying failure, no se- 
 rious or irreparable injuries being caused to the main defences 
 of the enemy. " The real strength of the place remained un- 
 impaired. That which was injured during the day the Russian s 
 
1G 
 
 repaired as if by magic during the night. The particulars of 
 this twelve days' bombardment are wearisome. The same 
 wasted energy, the same night skirmishes without effect, the 
 same battering and repairing, the same unwearied exertions on 
 the part of the Allies and wonderful endurance and resistance 
 on the part of the Russians, together with, on each side, the 
 same loss of life and frightful mutilations." 
 
 Two months were passed in comparative inaction, the sad 
 monotony being varied only by ineffective sorties and indecisive 
 skirmishes. On the 18th of June the first grand assault of the 
 Malakoff and Redan was attempted. The allied troops dis- 
 played the utmost gallantry, and did all that brave men could 
 do under disgracefully incompetent commanders, but were re- 
 pulsed with horrible slaughter. No one can read the details of 
 the fruitless massacre, without fully confirming the indignant 
 testimony of an intelligent eye-witness, writing from the camp: 
 
 " I know not what may have been the feelings of your home 
 public, on reading the telegraphic news of our defeat, (for I 
 presume the scribes at headquarters made no attempt to conceal 
 the naked truth, that our repulse was neither more or less than 
 a defeat,) but here mingled shame and indignation were general 
 throughout the camp. Officers and men alike felt that dis- 
 grace had been incurred, and that solely in consequence of the 
 unredeemed mismanagement of their generals. Remembering 
 the confusion which characterized the commencement of our 
 movement, and coupling this with the murderous preparations 
 made by the enemy, you will be at no loss to understand that 
 success was most improbable. During the whole affair, Lord 
 Raglan and Sir George Brown were ensconced within our eight- 
 gun battery; but, though this afforded a good view of the scene 
 of the struggle, and of the disorder which marked it, they ap- 
 peared to be unable to give any efficient directions for the cor- 
 rection of our multipled blunders. When the whole sad scene 
 was ended, our men straggled back to the camp in a state of 
 dispirited confusion, well in keeping with the mob-like disorder 
 in which they had been throughout the assault." 
 
 The final bombardment of Sebastopol took place on 
 the 5th of September, followed on the 8th by the renewed 
 assault of the French on the Malakoff and of the Eng- 
 lish on the Redan. Skillful generalship, adequate forces, 
 
and desperate bravery gave victory to the French, and " the 
 key to Sebastopol" remained in their hands. Meanwhile the 
 English assault upon the Redan was repulsed with frightful 
 sacrifice of life. It will not be contended that the French owed 
 any part of their success to superior good fortune. Indeed, all 
 the extrinsic advantages were on the side of the English. The 
 French were to lead off in the assault, and the tri-color waving 
 over the captured fortification was to be the signal for the ad- 
 vance of the English. If the French succeeded, every senti- 
 ment of personal ambition and national pride would stimulate 
 their allies to achieve an equal victory. If the French failed, 
 the English had only to remain in their trenches. 
 
 Now let us examine the comparative generalship displayed 
 in the two assaults. We are quite willing that English author- 
 ity should draw the contrast. " The preparations of the French 
 were actually scientific in their vigorous attention to every mat- 
 ter calculated to lead to victory ; nothing appeared to have 
 been forgotten, nothing neglected. Even the watches of the 
 leading officers had been regulated, that there might not be the 
 smallest error with regard to time. It is a painful reflection 
 that this carefulness of preparation, and prescience with respect 
 to probabilities, was not shown by the English general and Ills 
 associates in arranging the mode of attack. When the orders 
 were promulgated, on the 7th, many officers shook their heads 
 cloubtingly, and observed, in deprecating tones, ' This looks 
 like another 18th of June.' It was generally observed that the 
 attacking columns were not strong enough, that they were too 
 far behind, and that the trenches did not afford room for a suf- 
 ficient number of men." 
 
 The signal for the French assault was given; thirty thousand 
 men, weary of long inactivity, and burning to add new lustre 
 to the bright record of their country's military glory — drums 
 and trumpets meanwhile sounding the charge, and the air re- 
 sounding with shouts of " Vive V Empereuv'''' — darted from 
 their trenches, swarmed up the embankments, dashed over the 
 parapet, swept the enemy like chaff before them, and the Mal- 
 akofi' was . won. Hours of the fiercest fighting found the 
 French still mast.p.rs of the situation ; at nightfall the Russian 
 
IS 
 
 general sullenly drew oil* his defeated forces, and the victory 
 was complete. 
 
 It is painful to turn from this brilliant picture to the sombre 
 ring and the dreary details of the attack on the Uedan. To 
 thiec thousand doomed men was 1 the perilous undcr- 
 
 taking. Incredible as it m i ar 3 in view of previous 
 
 failure, there seems to have been no adequate preparation, no 
 intelligible plan, no competent leader. It was simply brut.' 
 force assailing brute force. The few men who actually entered 
 the Redan neglected to spike the guns; no reinforcements came 
 to their aid; everything was blind excitement, and headlong, 
 undisciplined haste. " The men of the different regiments be- 
 came mingled together in inextricable confusion. The Nine- 
 teenth men did not care for the officers of the Eighty-eighth, 
 nor did the soldiers of the Twenty-third heed the command of 
 an officer who did not, belong to their regiment. The officers 
 could not find their men — the men lost sight of their officers." 
 But why dwell on what soon became mere butchery 1 The 
 loss of the storming parly, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 
 2,41-7! 
 
 Considered as a military movement, it would seem to becon- 
 1 that no grosser blunder could have been made than the 
 selection of so small a force for so desperate an undertaking. 
 There was no chance of success but by attacking simultaneously 
 both flanks and the salient of the Redan. The storming party 
 was barely large enough for the assault of the salient, thus ex- 
 posing the handful of men to a murderous and fatally destruct- 
 ive lire from the flanks. This was bad enough, certainly, but 
 worse remains behind. English critics have most severely cen- 
 sured our generals for sometimes placing new recruits in posts 
 of danger, requiring cool heads, steady nerves, and the habits 
 of discipline. Perhaps they have forgotten the following inci- 
 dent. Among the picked men selected out of the entire British 
 forces as this very storming party, were raw recruits from the 
 Ninety- seventh regiment, who were designated for this perilous 
 service as a punishment for their cowardice in a recent skirmish ! 
 —and to make this punishment still \ ere, they were order- 
 
 ed to in the assault ! A n historian of the war says : " The 
 
 inexperience of some of these recruits seems almost incredible. 
 
10 
 
 One young fellow, who came to the field-hospital with a broken 
 arm and a bullet in his shoulder, carried his firelock with him, 
 but confessed that he had never fired it off, as lie %oas unable to 
 do so. The piece, upon being examined, was found to be in 
 perfect order. Such poor, undisciplined lads, fresh from the 
 plough, ought never on any occasion to have been pitted against 
 the well-drilled soldiers of Russia; but it was something worse 
 than blundering to lead them on to the assault of a formidable 
 work like the Redan. Such generalship recalls to our mind the 
 remark of the Russian officer with regard to the military force 
 of England, that ' it was an army of lions led by donkeys.' " 
 Mr. Russell states that many of these recruits " had only been 
 enlisted a few days, and had never fired a rifle in their lives." 
 
 Now, will it be believed that General Codrington, to whom 
 was committed the planning and directing of this ill-starred 
 and disastrous enterprise, succeeded Sir J.ames Simpson as 
 commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's forces in the Crimea? 
 How must the shade of Admiral Byng have haunted Her 
 Majesty's Government, unless it was a most forgiving ghost ! 
 If General Codrington's promotion could have been delayed a 
 little more than eighteen months, it might have occurred appro- 
 priately on the centennial anniversary of the death of that ill- 
 fated naval commander, convicted by court-martial and shot for" 
 " not doing his utmost !" 
 
 On the evening of the 8th of September, the Russians blew 
 up their magazines, fired the buildings, and evacuated the town. 
 So fell Sebastopol, after a siege of three hundred and forty-five 
 days. It has been considered by the English a bit of very 
 choice pleasantry to allude to our oft-recurring statement, that 
 " the decisive blow had been struck," and that " the backbone 
 of the Rebellion was broken." It may not be impertinent to 
 remind them, that the report, first circulated in France and 
 England in the latter part of September, 1854, and fortified by 
 minute details, that Sebastopol — the backbone of Russian re- 
 sistance to the allied arms — had fallen, was repeated and reiter- 
 ated from time to time during the war, until the phrase, " Sebas- 
 topol estpris," passed into a by-word, and did good service in 
 relieving the cruelly overworked Greek Kalends. 
 
 And now we come naturally to the consideration of another 
 
20 
 
 and an important inquiry. Did the beginning of the war find^ 
 or did its progress develop or create, a single English general 
 of commanding military capacity, competent to handle in the 
 field even so small an army as the British contingent in the 
 Crimea? Of Lord Raglan Mr. Russell says, and without doubt 
 says truly : " That he was a great chief, or even a moderately 
 able general, I have every reason to doubt, and I look in vain 
 for any proof of it, whilst he commanded the English army in 
 the Crimea." Another authority says : " The conviction that 
 he was not a great general is universal and uncontradicted. 
 lie could perform the ordinary duties of a general satisfactorily, 
 but he was lamentably deficient in those qualities which consti- 
 tute military genius. lie possessed considerable professional 
 experience, great application, and remarkable powers of en- 
 durance ; but he lacked the energy, vehemence, and decision of 
 character which are essential to the constitution of a successful 
 military chieftain." To his hesitation in council, and his want 
 of energy and promptness in action, have always been attrib- 
 uted, in large measure, the ruinous delays and the fearful suf- 
 fering in the army which he commanded. Lord Raglan died 
 in June, 1855, in his sixty-seventh year. General Simpson 
 succeeded him. " It was believed at the time," writes Mr. 
 Russell, " and now is almost notorious, that he opposed his own 
 appointment, and bore testimony to his own incapacity." " lie 
 was slow and cautious in council, and it is no wonder that 
 where Lord Raglan failed, General Simpson did not meet with 
 success." The English press and people demanded his recall. 
 His incompetency was everywhere acknowledged, and indeed 
 he himself would have been the last man to deny it. In about 
 three months from the date of General Simpson's appointment, 
 "the Queen was graciously pleased to permit him to resign the 
 command of the army." As we have already seen, his place 
 was filled by General Codrington. This officer was as signally 
 rewarded, because he had failed, as he could have been, if he 
 had succeeded. Mr. Russell quotes approvingly the comment 
 of a French officer upon this appointment: "If General Cod- 
 rington had taken the Redan, what more cuuld yon have done 
 lor him than to make him General, and to give him command 
 of the army? But he did not take if, and lie is made General 
 
21 
 
 and Commander-in-Chief." With equal discrimination, Sir 
 James Simpson was created Field-Marshal ! The remainder of 
 the campaign gave General Codrington no further opportunity 
 of displaying his qualities for command. No other important 
 action occurred before the termination of hostilities. 
 
 Great credit is certainly due to Mr. Russell for fearlessly ex- 
 posing the errors and incompetency of the three officers suc- 
 cessively at the head of the English army, in spite of " much 
 obloquy, vituperation, and injustice," and for bearing his 
 invariable and eloquent testimony to the bravery, endurance, 
 and patience of the British private soldier. 
 
 In this brief recital of English blunders during the Crimean 
 war, we have made no mention of the desperate and disastrous 
 " charge of the light brigade," the gross and culpable inef- 
 ficiency of the Baltic fleet under Admiral Sir Charles Napier, 
 and other instances of military incapacity no less monstrous. 
 Enough, however, has been told to more than justify the very 
 mild summing-up of Mr. Russell, that the " war had exposed 
 the weakness of our military organization in the grave emer- 
 gencies of a winter campaign, and the canker of a long peace 
 was unmistakably manifested in our desolated camps and deci- 
 mated battalions." 
 
 Why should we add to this dismal recital the appalling suf 
 fering of the soldiers—helpless victims to bad management at 
 home and shameful neglect in the field — 'the long, freezing 
 nights of trench-work under a driving rain, " without warm or 
 water-proof clothing — the trenches two and three feet deep with 
 mud, snow, and half-frozen slush, so that many, when they took 
 off their shoes, were unable to get their swollen feet into them 
 again, and might be seen barefooted about the camp, the snow 
 half a foot deep on the ground," creeping for shelter into 
 " miserable tents pitched as it were at the bottom of a marsh, 
 where twelve or fourteen unhappy creatures lay soaking with- 
 out change of clothing," until they were called out again to 
 their worse than slave labor — disease, brought on by exhaustion, 
 exposure, overwork, and deficient food, sweeping the men off 
 by thousands, and yet no sufficient supply of medical stores and 
 no adequate number of medical attendants, not a soul seeming 
 to care for their comfort or even for their lives — so neglected 
 
22 
 
 and ill-treated that " the wretched beggar who wandered about 
 the streets of London led the life of a prince compared with the 
 British soldiers who were fighting for their country, and who 
 were complacently assured by the home authorities that they 
 were the best- appointed army in Europe." The world knows 
 the whole sad story by heart. And is it not written in the 
 volumes of evidence sworn to before the Commission appointed 
 by Parliament to inquire into the condition of the army? 
 
 Nor is it necessary to dwell upon the extent to which the 
 home administration was responsible for the general misman- 
 agement of the war, in its main features, and its minute 
 details, nor the thoroughly English stolidity with which all com- 
 plaints were received by every member of the Government, 
 from the cabinet minister who dictated pompous and unmeaning 
 despatches, down to the meanest official who measured red tape, 
 nor the intense and universal popular indignation which, after 
 a year " full of horrors," compelled the resignation of the Ab- 
 erdeen Ministry. Lord Derby did not, perhaps, overstate the 
 verdict of the nation, when he said in the House of Lords : 
 " From the very first to the very last, there ha9 been apparent 
 in the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government a want of 
 previous preparation, a total want of prescience ; and they 
 have appeared to live from day to day providing for each suc- 
 cessive exigency after it arose, and not uefore it arose. Too 
 l.vtk have been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct 
 of Her Majesty's Government in the course of the war." The 
 change in the ministry, however, by no means cured all the 
 evils which had existed ; for, although the sufferings of the 
 soldiers — thanks in large part to the providential appearance 
 and heroic conduct of Florence Nightingale — were greatly di- 
 minished, still, as we have seen, the military blunders con- 
 tinued to the close of the war. 
 
 Now, if we do not greatly mistake, the les on which this 
 country should learn from the mortifying experience ol the 
 English army in the Crimea is not one of exultation over 
 its lamentable and unnecessary errors, but rath r >f indifference 
 to the insulting criticism of a nation which can so ill afford to 
 be critical, and of determination to profit in every possible way 
 by those blunders which might have been avoided. The his- 
 
tory of all wars, moreover, should teach us that now and then 
 there comes a time when to hold the olive-branch in one hand 
 and the sword in the other, especially if the olive-branch is kept 
 in the foreground and the sword in the background, involves 
 not only a sad waste of energy, but is mistaken kindness to our 
 enemies. 
 
 Use every weapon which the God of Battles has placed in 
 our hands. Put forth all the power of the nation. Encourage 
 and promote all fighting generals ; cashier all officers who are 
 determined to make war on peace principles ; arm, equip, and 
 discipline negroes, not to burn, plunder, and massacre, but to 
 meet their and our enemies in fair and open fight.* Demon- 
 strate to the world that we are terribly in earnest. Waste no 
 time in discussing the chance of foreign intervention. Postpone 
 polygamy in Utah, African colonization, everything, to the 
 engrossing and emergent crisis which now confrouts the Gov- 
 ernment. Make the contest sharp, short and decisive. Put 
 down the Rebellion, vindicate the majesty of the Law, the 
 sacredness of the Union, and the integrity of the Constitution. 
 There will be time enough, after this is done, to discuss all minor 
 questions and all collateral issues. One paramount duty lies 
 directly before us. Let us perform this duty fearlessly, and 
 leave the future with God, 
 
 * The opposition to the employment of negro regiments, if made by traitors 
 North or South, can be easily comprehended ; if made by loyal men, is wholly 
 inexplicable. Your neighbor's house takes fire at night. The flames, long smoul- 
 dering, make rapid progress, and threaten the comfort, certainly, if not the lives of 
 the household, and the total destruction of his property. The alarm is given. An 
 engine comes promptly to the rescue. It is just in season to save his dwelling. 
 The firemen spring with ready alacrity to their places. But stop ! He suddenly 
 discovers the appalling fact that they are negroes ! True, there is not a moment to 
 be lost. No other engine is, or can be, within helping distance. The least delay 
 means poverty and a houseless family. And yet he rudely dismisses the dusky 
 re men, folds his arm with Spartan stoicism, and, looking complacently on the 
 burning building, says: "Better this than to rely on the assistance of niggers .''> 
 Is it Spartan stoicism ? Is it not rather stark lunacy ? And would you not take 
 immediate measures to provide such a man with permanent quarters in a mad- 
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