■ 1621 .N38 Copy 1 THE BRITISH NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1650-1700 A STUDY IN NAVAL ADMINISTRATION By Robert W. Neeser Reprinted from the United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 40, No. 6, Whole No. 154 Nov.-Dec, 1914 UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS Vol.40, No. 6 NOV.-DEC, 1914 Whole No. 154 [copteighted] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. THE BRITISH NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1650- 1 700' A STUDY IN NAVAL ADMINISTRATION By Robert W. Neeser The operations of the British Navy in West Indian waters during the latter half of the seventeenth century are not an un- known page of Colonial history. The fleet engagements, expedi- tions, and single-ship actions, all have been described time and again ; but they have, for the most part, been treated only as a series of isolated and independent facts, with no relation to each other or to the more important events of the period. Rarely have historians sought to discover the underlying causes for the out- come of the events which they recounted and for which they dis- tributed praise and blame among the commanders. Yet these very causes often spelled disaster long before an enemy was sighted, and mismanagement in the administration at homxC, lack of preparation, inferiority of persbnnel, and mediocrity of material, all, at some time, proved obstacles which the abilities of even the best captains were powerless to overcome. From the point of view of the naval student, the chief interest of the operations of this period lies in the light which they throw ^ Submitted in competition for prize essay, 1914, and accepted for publi- cation. i6oo British Naval Operations in the West Indies upon the administrative history of the Royal Navy. The expedi- tions sent to the West Indies were curious affairs, and notable examples of the manner in which the navy was run. Their his- tory is a repetition, truly amazing, of a series of gross mis- carriages, in which those in authority at home betrayed incredible ignorance of the condition of affairs in the plantations. Effort after effort was made to drive the French and Spanish from American waters. Expeditions by the score were sent out in the hope of effecting some important conquest, but the vessels were never despatched except in driblets, too few to produce the slight- est impression, too late for the purposes for which they were destined, and the result was nothing short of a series of reverses that make one wonder how the British ever had the courage to try again (i). In order to understand the underlying causes of these repeated failures, it may be well perhaps to consider the manner in which the service was at this time governed. Then only can we realize how the things came to be as they were. During the period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate the entire administration of the navy was assumed by Parliament through an Admiralty Council of State, assisted by a board called the Committee of the Navy and Customs, whose functions were chiefly financial, and another body known as the Commissioners of the Navy, upon whom fell the brunt of administrative responsibil- ity (2). With the Restoration, however, these commissions were dissolved. The old system of the monarchy, instituted by Henry VIII, in 1546, was revived under the control of the Duke of York, as Lord High Admiral, and the management of the navy was once more vested in a board of civil officers, known as the Four Principal Officers, and later as the Navy Board (3), who acted as the Lord High Admiral's Council of Advice insofar as matters of government were concerned. Theoretically they ex- isted only to carry out his instructions, but in practice they really enjoyed great administrative powers (4). Their duties were outlined at length in the Duke's orders. In their corporate capacity as the Navy Board, their business was to contract for the necessary stores and materials for the service, to superintend the supply of victuals, to pay the seamen and workmen, and to recom- mend persons for vacancies in the inferior offices. In addition to these functions, which they discharged at their weekly meetings Gift ■ for,'. '•'>) British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1601 at the Navy Office in Seething Lane and Crutched Friars, the Principal Officers were called upon to perform certain depart- mental duties. The treasurer, as his title shows, was held respon- sible for the financial management of the navy; he drew up the estimates, obtained the necessary funds from the Lord High Treasurer of England, and made a yearly report to the Lord High Admiral on the state of the departments. The surveyor prepared the estimates of the stores required by the navy, reported on the condition of the dockyards and of the King's ships in service and the repairs needed by them; he was also required to see that the prices paid for supplies were reasonable, and to make an annual survey of all the ships of the navy. The comptroller was supposed to act as a check upon both the treasurer and the surveyor; he superintended all the payments made by the board, kept a record of all moneys advanced, of all estimates, and of privy seals, reported annually to the Lord High Admiral, and watched his brother officers. The clerk of the navy, or clerk of the acts, answered to the permanent under secretary of the present time. He was the head of the office work, attended the meetings of the board, kept minutes of its transactions, and saw to it that the " plurality of persons was proposed for the supply of all wants." But his range of interest did not end here. No matter appears to have been too minute or insignificant to escape his attention, and the records show that everything from ship- building and the preservation of timber for the navy to the actual discipline and management of the service was personally looked into by him (5). Elaborate provisions are found in the Duke's orders for pre- venting fraud, and every care was taken to check the sins of one man by the vigilance of another. The task of reform, however, was not an easy one (6). Corruption was then an evil of long standing. Even had the code of honor been higher, it is doubtful whether it would have been possible to check the waste and mis- management. A proper supervision may have been possible in 1638, when the Earl of Northumberland issued his instructions for coping with a similar problem, but since that time the navy had so grown that it was beyond the power of the Four Principal Officers personally to superintend every detail of their office. Much that was expected of them personally had to be left to sub- ordinates, who in turn could do nothing without orders from their i6o2 British Naval Operations in the West Indies superiors (7). Consequently when it came to the fixing of responsibihty a serious difficulty arose. No one was really answerable. Divided control meant divided responsibility, and that in turn meant no responsibility, or, at least, one very hard to fix. Beneath these four great officers were a number of lesser officials who were not members of the board, such as the store- keeper, the clerk of the cheque, the clerk of the ropeyard, and the clerk of the survey. But as business increased and the work grew more complex other officers and boards sprang up, who took up the duties thrown off from the principal offices. In the course of a century, altogether 13 departments came into existence, no two of which were under the same roof. At this period the Navy Office was in Seething Lane and Crutched Friars ; the Navy Pay Office, in Old Broad Street ; the Victualling Office, at the end of East Smithfield ; the Board for Sick and Wounded, on Tower Hill ; the Treasurer's Office, in Leadenhall Street ; the Board of Transport, near Seething Lane; the Prize Office, in York Build- ings; the Chest, in Chatham; and Greenwich Hospital, at Green- wich (8). A further cause for confusion is found in the fact that even all these parts of the administrative machinery did not suffice for equipping and managing the navy. Other branches of the govern- ment also were depended upon and they likewise were scattered over every part of London. The Board of Ordnance was in the Tower ; the War Office, at Whitehall ; the Commissioners of Cus- toms, on Thames Street ; the Lord High Treasurer, in the palace at Whitehall ; the Post Office, in Bishopsgate, Brydges Street, or Lombard Street; the Board of Trade and Plantations, in the Cockpit ; and Apothecaries Hall, on the east side of Blackf riars. The government of the navy by the Four Principal Officers acting under the Lord High Admiral continued until July, 1673, when the authority of the Duke of York was overthrown by the passage of the Test Act. The administration now underwent a great chailge. The office of the Lord High Admiral still continued to exist, but its powers were restricted. The King practically reserved for himself the control of afifairs, the disposal of offices and places, and the collection of the Admiralty dues (9). At the same time, July 9, Lords Commissioners were appointed under the great seal to execute the office of the Lord High Admiral of British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1603 England, left vacant by the resignation of the Duke of York ( 10) . Their meetings began on the 19th of July, 1673, and were held three times a week, later twice a week, at the Council Chamber, the business of the navy abundantly calling for it (11). From its inception this new body showed considerable administrative ability and did its work energetically and effectively, though greatly handicapped by the usual lack of funds. There were now, then, two boards — the Admiralty Board and the Navy Board — the one executive and military, the other civil and administrative; the one nominally superior, the other, with the prestige of age and political power, practically independent. The result was divided control, and consequent antagonism be- tween the two.* One happy appointment in this year of upheavals, however, was that of Samuel Pepys to the newly created and influential posi- tion of Secretary to the King and the Commission " in the affairs of the Admiralty of England." The choice was inevitable, for Pepys was the one person in the country best acquainted with the workings of the management of the navy, having been, since 1660, clerk of the acts (12). Thus the administration continued for the next seven years. The King, with assistance of the Duke of York, who, though ex- cluded from office by the Test Act, still enjoyed a sort of formal control, endeavored to exercise his prerogative, in the hope that some day his brother might be restored to power as Lord High Admiral. But that was not to be. The discovery of the Popish plot worked the country into such paroxysms of madness that the Duke was obliged to flee to the Netherlands. Pepys also lost his post on a charge of being a convert. Even the commissioners were dismissed. No one was now left at Whitehall at all ac- " An instance- is to be found in the case of the agent appointed by the Lords of the Admiralty in the West Indies to furnish provisions and supplies to the ships-of-war of the Royal Navy, whom the Commissioners of the Navy suddenly deprived of his authority, with the result that no one was left to supply the wants of the men-of-war. The merchants would not furnish the money, lest on contradictory orders the bills would not be paid. Governor Beeston finally wrote to the Board of Trade, complaining that H. B. M. S. Hampshire had been in port nearly two years, but that neither men nor stores nor provisions had been sent out for her and that ' she was in consequence nearly spoiled. (Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.), 1696-7, No. loi.) 62 i6o4 British Naval Operations in the West Indies quainted with administering the service. The office of Lord High Admiral and the Navy Office were both suspended. The result of these wholesale changes was an organization such as had ruled the navy for Charles I, after the death of the Duke of Bucking- ham, in 1628 — a commission vested with all the powers heretofore granted to two separate boards. But the appointments were most injudicious. None of the members chosen had had any previous experience to fit them for the gigantic task that lay before them. All were " wholly ignorant " of naval affairs. Under their control the service was all but destroyed. The effective force was re- duced, probably on account of lack of funds, and what ships were kept in service were allowed to decay owing to neglect and waste (13). In five years the number in commission fell from 76^ large ships to 24 small ones, and the latter all " in harbor and so far out of repair " as to require the sum of no less than £120,000 to fit them for service (14) ! Fortunately this state of affairs did not continue for too long a period. The commission of 1679 was revoked by patent dated 19 May, 1684, and the office of the Lord High Admiral resumed by the King, just before his death, with the advice of " his royal brother, the Duke of York" (15). About the same time the " office of secretary for the affairs of the Admiralty of England " was formally established by letters patent under the great seal, and Pepys, who had been living in retirement, was appointed to this influential position. But Charles II died before anything could be done to better the condition of the navy. The fleet was indeed in a deplorable condition. The debt amounted to £384,000; old ships were decayed and unfit for service, and new ones still un- completed, though the money for their construction had already been supplied; and stores and supplies of every description were wanting at the dockyards ( 16) . Strong measures were imperative, otherwise the fate of the navy was sealed. The King bestirred himself, and, though he did none of the work himself, appointed to office the men best able to restore order out of anarchy. A special Board of Commissioners in quality of principal officers of the navy were appointed in April, 1686, with all the powers vested in former commissions (17). This marked a return to the system of 1673. During their incumbency the new officers brought the navy into a high state of efficiency, but they could not succeed in correcting all the evils brought about by so many years of mis- management (18). British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1605 In addition to the evils and defects already noted, several other causes contributed to the failures of these successive adminis- trative reforms. Foremost among these were the financial diffi- culties in which the government repeatedly found itself. Under the Commonwealth a liberal policy was indulged in for a time, but within four years, 1649 to 1654, such demands had been made upon the Treasury that the service was badly crippled (19). The restored monarchy consequently found itself burdened with the indebtedness of the interregnum, which, in November, 1659, was estimated at £722,000. As early as July, 1660, Pepys noted that the navy was in a very sad condition for want of funds, and this condition instead of improving became more and more serious as time went on. So enormous were the arrears, that in March, 1665-1666, over £2,500,000 were needed to pay the victuallers and provide supplies for the current year, whereas the available funds for this purpose amounted to but half that sum! Indeed at one time Pepys doubted whether even five ships could have been sent out without great difficulty. It is not surprising then that the people were reluctant to trust the government and refused to furnish supplies for the navy in spite of the good payments promised (20). " Personal and particular failings " are also mentioned by Pepys among his reasons for the failure of the administration to accom- plish more. The Navy Board in its corporate capacity failed lamentably in the discharge of its duties ; the treasurer was charged with a general remissness in executing his office; the comptroller had neglected to keep his accounts and to " comptroll " properly the treasurer and the victualler ; while the surveyor had not only failed to present the reports required of him, but had besides actually committed the most important functions of his office to " under-officers " (21). Among the officers afloat, also, negle.ct and inattention to their duties were noticeable. A serious feud between the tarpaulins, the genuine seamen, and court gentlemen distracted the service. As Macaulay aptly stated the question : " There were seamen and there were gentlemen in the navy of Charles II, but the seamen were not gentlemen and the gentlemen were not seamen." Neither got along with the other, nor could they apparently succeed with- out each other. Sir Anthony Deane lamented that he could not help feeling contempt for the " gentlemen commanders who must i6o6 British Naval Operations in the West Indies have all their effeminate accommodations for pomp; and that it all would be the ruin of our fleets if such persons were continued in command, they having neither experience nor being capable of learning, because they would not submit to the fatigue and inconvenience which those who bred seamen would undergo." " Bethink yourself," he wrote, " what sort of sea captains the honor and safety of the crown and government will have to rely upon for support at sea, when the few commanders (for God knows they are but few) that are now surviving of the true breed shall be worn out " (22) . The Revolution of 1688 brought no considerable changes in the mere administration of the navy. Its influence was in another direction, and in this it affected the sea service as deeply as it did the rest of the nation. Parliament was now the dominating body. Court favor and the influence of favorites no longer secured the best commands. It was through Parliament that promotions were now earned, and, what was still more important, by Parliament that pay was supplied. Improvement resulted from this change. The sea service became sharply distinguished from the army. Previously men not infrequently served on both land and sea. But the army now drew to it the gentlemen volunteers who formerly had been in the fleets of Charles II, and the-navy was left to the sole care of the tarpaulins who had been bred to the sea and were willing to endure its hardships. The purely technical part, the handling of the ships, was now done better than before, but the good seamen were not necessarily good fighting men, and the change involved a fall in the purely military spirit that, with- out a doubt, was a great misfortune (23). Such was then the administration to which the country looked for the management of its fleets and squadrons. It was a form of government that developed with the growth of the navy itself, an administration devised to meet the exigencies of the times. Historically, its institution and development were essentially a civil process, the purpose of which was to provide a national sea force for war. But that very civil branch, the Navy Board, in the course of years became so powerful through its political associations as to get out of harmony with the Admiralty, which was charged with the responsibility of waging successful war with the means furnished by the lesser board. Opposition between the civil and military branches consequently was born with the very in- British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1607 ception of the Royal Navy's Administration, and it was only when the Navy Board was abolished in 1830, when its duties were dis- tributed among the members of the Board of Admiralty, that the organization became logical and effective. Until then matters went on much as before, and the same errors were committed time and again. It is interesting to see how the system worked out in practice. The condition of the island possessions in the West Indies and in the Caribbean, which England was striving to retain at this period, was far from enviable. Surrounded by French and Spanish settlements, they were continually embroiled in the cur- rent European wars, and a prey to the hordes of buccaneers and pirates that infested the Antilles. Never were they secure from attack ; never were their merchant fleets certain of reaching their destinations unless convoyed by men-of-war; dependent upon the mother country and their New England neighbors for their very subsistence, they lived in continual dread lest this supply should be interrupted (24) . How greatly in need of protection then were they, and how modest their demands upon the government at home ! A frigate or two, or a fireship, was usually all they asked ; and surely no more than they received (25). The question naturally arises why so few vessels were allowed them in their dire need, for a dire need it really was. Could the vessels not be spared from home waters, or was it neglect and indifference on the part of the authorities in London? True, the events in the West Indies were only of very minor importance compared to the operations which the British fleets were carrying on in the English Channel — the two conflicts with Holland and the wars of the League of Augsburg and of the Spanish Succession— which com- pelled the King to center his forces about his own shores. But the repeated efforts made to secure the command of the sea in the West Indies at this period were far too numerous for us to believe that great importance was not attached to the results it was hoped these expeditions would bring about. It cannot be denied that the officials at home, enjoying the ease of their lucrative political posts, were directly responsible for the disasters that followed one another so rapidly. They could not understand the true state of affairs as they existed in the planta- tions ; they would not. The story that follows reveals the scene beyond question. But, then, there was also another answer to the i6o8 British Naval Operations in the West Indies question; an answer that had to be sought elsewhere — in the plantations themselves — for the difficulties which the governors and their subjects experienced in obtaining aid from England were as nothing compared to the hopeless task of trying to keep in service the few ships with which they had, perchance, been supplied. For there was not a place in the islands where these ships might refit or repair damages (26) ; no men available to refill their depleted crews ; no guns to arm them ; no way of obtain- ing supplies and provisions even for short cruises, as the planters seldom would spare any or else refused to sell their products in exchange for valueless pursers' bills (27). And lastly, there was the serious question of the tropical climate which played so im- portant a role, as ships never could stay in those waters more than a season without losing so many of their men that barely enough would be left to navigate them back to England (28) . One of the first services for which the navy was employed by the Council of State after the close of the Civil War was to stamp out what royalist sentiment still existed in England's out- lying possessions in the West Indies. The despatch of a fleet to Barbados was therefore considered early in December of the year 1650, and the Committee of Barbados received instructions to prepare for this purpose. Sir George Ayscue was the Council of State's choice for the command of this squadron, and the Committee of the Navy were directed to pay him the necessary sums to defray the contingencies of a fleet. By the last week of January, 165 1, the Committee of the Navy was able to report on the strength of " The Barbados Fleet " which should be sent out, and the Council of State instructed them to attend to this matter at once. But delays occurred which put to stop to all expeditions. Ayscue never received his instructions till the middle of February; two months later the question of victualling the fleet was yet un- settled; and the Council of State still considering the "business concerning the fleet." The vessels were now at Plymouth, where they had been ordered to await further instructions previous to sailing, when suddenly came orders for part of them to repair to the Scilly Islands. Everything had now to be done over again. The Council of State proceeded immediately to give instructions for the fitting out of new ships. Four were ordered victualled for nine months, the Committee of the Navy were required to see that the wishes of Parliament were faithfully carried out, and British Naval Operations in the West Indies '1609 Sir George Ayscue was directed to proceed on his voyage as soon as possible. This was on the 20th of June. Within the next week, however, reports came to the Council of State which caused an investigation into the seaworthiness of the vessels chosen for this service, which finally influenced the Council again to change its orders and recall the vessels employed off the Scilly Islands in order that they might be fitted out as originally intended. Two weeks more were spent in preparations; then came the long awaited supplies of ordnance, and finally on the 5th of August, 1 65 1, the expedition sailed. The coasts of Portugal and Spain were first visited in a vain search for Prince Rupert's squadron, after which the vessels headed for Barbados. Calms and light winds, however, greatly delayed the passage, so that it was not until the middle of October that they made their appearance in those waters. The island was not the least prepared for a long resistance. Nevertheless, Governor Willoughby resolved to hold out as long as possible, and in this decision he was ably supported by the planters, until the effective blockade established by Ayscue convinced them of the hopelessness of further resistance and the island capitulated (29). Over two years elapsed before another force was despatched to American waters. Lawless violence had reached such a stage that the government no longer could allow the urgent appeals from the English settlements to remain unheeded. A large force was therefore organized during the summer and fall of 1654 to bring relief to the oppressed planters (30), and operate against the Spanish, French and Dutch, in retaliation for their aggressions on English trade. Thirty-eight ships-of-war, carrying 1134 guns, 4380 seamen, and 3000 troops, were proposed for this service under the joint leadership of Admiral William Penn and General Robert Venables. This selection of leaders, however, proved unfortunate from the very start. Troubles arose almost immedi- ately ; the two commanders could not agree ; they quarreled even before the expedition sailed ; and, to make the situation still worse, they found themselves continually opposed by a committee which Cromwell, following the practice of Parliament, had also placed in charge of the expedition. But this was not all that boded ill for success. None of the troops were seasoned, their numbers far below the stated figures, and besides the victualling had been very badly done — possibly because of the poverty of the administra- i6io British Naval Operations in the West Indies tion — what few stores obtained were found to be defective, and the greater part could not be prepared in time and had to follow the ships at a later date. Toward the close of December, 1654, Rear Admiral Dakins was finally despatched in advance with 14 ships. The main squadron followed five days later, but many of the vessels were such dull sailers that Penn and Venables left them behind and pressed on with the rest to Carlisle Bay, in Barbados, which had been desig- nated as the rendezvous. There the whole armament assembled on the last day of January, 1655. When the expedition was planned its leaders had hoped for active co-operation from the planters of the islands. But in this they were destined to be dis- appointed. However anxious the islanders may have been for the government to protect them, they were exceedingly loath to take any measures for their own defence or to aid the expedition in any way, so that it was only with the greatest difficulty, that a single regiment was raised from among them. Two months were spent at Barbados when the time might have been more profitably devoted to attacking the Spaniards before they had had the opportunity of strengthening their de- fence. On the last day of March the expedition at last got under way, and, after two weeks cruising, arrived oflf the island of San Domingo. The troops were immediately landed for an advance upon the town. But they were badly led, ill-armed, undisciplined, without supplies and water, and suflfered every hardship in the tropical climate. The attack was a hopeless failure, an uncon- trollable panic seized the whole army, and the rout became com- plete. The officers were thoroughly cowed by this disaster, and the men in no mood to attempt anything more. But something had to be done to escape reproach of failure. Fortunately the thinly populated and defenceless island of Jamaica, belonging- then to the Spaniards, furnished the leaders with the desired prize, and thither they at once took themselves (31). The failure of this expedition left the English settlements in a pitiable state and at the mercy of enemies whom they now, more than ever before, had reason to fear." Appeals for help became more and more frequent. By 1666 St. Christopher had fallen, and the Governor of Barbados wrote that, unless the enemy's advance was stopped immediately, all the islands would be lost (32). Yet the administration at home was slow to appreciate the gravity of British Naval Operations in the West Indies i6ii the situation; an occasional vessel-of-war was sent out, but that was all/ so that the settlers soon realized that it was futile to depend upon the King's ships. Consequently they set about taking measures in self-defence. The danger of attack forced upon the English governors the policy of encoiiraging buccaneers. Letters of marque were conferred upon all who would wage war against the Spaniards, and there is little doubt that these new allies did much to save the islands for the English (33). The outbreak of hostilities with Holland and the alliance of the French King with the Dutch in 1666 introduced a new element into the war in the Antilles. Heretofore all had worked pretty harmoniously against the common enemy, the Spaniards ; now the situation was changed, and the English were obliged to face also their former allies. A French fleet soon appeared among the West India Islands, Montserrat and Antigua were compelled to surrender, and St. Christopher was taken possession of almost as easily (34). The news of these successes of the enemy stirred the government of London to make an effort at least to relieve the plantations. Ten ships, mostly merchant vessels pressed into service and fitted for war purposes, were immediately ordered to sail under Captain Sir John Berry. They were expected to inflict great damage on the enemy, but the French were found to be already in such force that all the English could do was to keep them at bay until reenforcements should arrive. These came in the following month, in June, 1667, under Sir John Harman (35), who at once proceeded to inaugurate an energetic offensive cam- paign. The French commander, M. de la Barre, however, did not wait for him. The news that the two English forces had effected a junction apparently was all that was needed to overawe the enemy; they left to the English the command of the sea, and sought refuge under the guns of their forts at Martinique. Har- man had hoped first to retake St. Christopher, but as he had no troops to co-operate with him, he was obliged to confine his operations to the sea. He therefore proceeded in search of the French admiral and found him anchored in the road of St. Pierre under the guns of his shore batteries. Undaunted by the strength of this position, Harman began a series of attacks which lasted 'In the years 1661 and 1662 only four king's ships cruised in the West Indies, and then for short periods only. See Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.), 1661-68. i6i2 British Naval Operations in the West Indies from June 29 until July 6. After these unsuccessful attempts, the English fleet finally forced the passage (36). A fireship was ranged alongside the French flagship, and she and three other vessels were reduced to ashes. The conflagration threatened to spread to the rest of the fleet. A panic seized their crews. All seemed lost. But at that moment the wind shifted. The French once more took heart, and by heroic efforts saved the day. The English, discouraged by this unexpected resistance, retired and thereby lost a complete victory. Had they pressed home the attack nothing could have checked them. As it was, a great disaster had been inflicted upon the French. It was not the overwhelming victory claimed by the English reports. But the control of the sea did thereafter pass to them and commerce became impossible for their rivals. The peace of Breda, signed on July 31, 1667, brought hostilities to a close and restored the status ante bellum as far as the islands were concerned. Harman, however, remained in the West Indies six months longer to give the necessary protection to the homeward-bound trade, and then, having accomplished all that had been expected of him, returned to England with a great convoy. When hostilities broke out again in 1688 the home government's attention was once more attracted to its possessions in the West Indies through its desire of reducing the more important islands belonging to its enemies. Orders were therefore despatched to the officers commanding in those waters to harass the French as much as possible until reenf orcements could be sent out. This proposal received the approval of the King, April 26, 1689, and the Lords of Trade and Plantations at once proceeded to fit out the necessary force. They first consulted with the Commissioners of the Admiralty (May 2), who submitted a list of ships that might be hired for the service and which might be ready in three weeks. Two weeks later came another account of ships to be sent out, this time from the Navy Commissioners. In the meantime, through the co-operation of the War Office and the Board of Ordnance, a regiment of infantry had been raised * and equipped to accom- pany the expedition. The Lords of Trade, however, had not yet heard from the Admiralty where the troops should embark or how many the ships would hold. So a further delay occurred until . *"For a description of the novel manner in which this was done, cf. Fortescue, The British Army, 1783- 1802 (Macmillan, 1905), page 5. British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1613 this information could be obtained. In due time it came, but in a manner as astounding as it was unexpected. The Admiralty, with . characteristic independence, had discharged practically all the ships hired for the expedition, having decided to use in their place vessels of the Royal Navy ; but as these were still at sea with the . fleet, they really could not say when the West India squadron would be ready to sail. Some days later, however, they con- descendingly sent a new list of ships which they promised would be ready in two weeks. A voluminous correspondence then arose over the fitting out of the squadron and the instructions for its commander. Although nearly four months had already been spent in preparations, the Admiralty had never been informed of the fleet's destination or of the amount of stores and provisions it was to carry to the islands. They raged and stormed ; but to no avail. The Lords of Trade knew as little as they did of the King's intentions, so could only reply that the orders were to send out several months' provisions with the troops and that several gov- ernors for the West India Islands were to take passage on the ships. The governors, however, had not yet been appointed. Then arose a protracted discussion over the instructions that were to be issued to the commander of the squadron. They were first considered in the month of October, approved a few days later, then recon- sidered, amended, further modified, and finally drafted early in December. But the troubles were not yet at an end. The victualling office in despair wrote that it could not obtain pro- visions, as it had not the money to pay for them, and the con- tractors refused to deliver anything " without ready money." So the Treasury had to be called upon to produce the desired funds ; but as it usually had none to produce, the question arises how the supplies were ever obtained. Next the Admiralty took offence because orders had been issued over its head to the com- mander of the squadron relative to the embarkation of the troops. More correspondence followed, more complications, until finally the expedition at last got to sea, March 8, 1690, after ten months of "preparation" (37). The squadron consisted of nine ships and two smaller vessels, under the command of Captain Lawrence Wright, an officer of 25 years' service, who had been in the West Indies before. Sailing from Plymouth, the vessels shaped their course toward the Leeward Islands, where a junction was to be effected with Governor Codrington's forces. But stormy weather i6i4 British Naval Operations in the West Indies so delayed and scattered the convoy that it was not until the last of May that they were all collected at Antigua, and then in so battered a state and with crews so sickly that a further delay was unavoidable. The governor was called upon to furnish troops to accompany the vessels on their coming cruise, but he had nothing wherewith to equip or arm them. The stores sent out with the squadron were so bad as to be utterly useless ; the muskets " are of no use," wrote Codrington in despair, and " as to the firelocks, the locks are very bad, the steel being so very soft that they are as likely to miss fire as not. Both matchlocks and firelocks are extraordinarily heavy, which is a great inconvenience in these hot countries." And to add to his troubles no good pistol powder had been sent out. " It is a great misfortune to us," added the gov- ernor, " that the officers entrusted with these matters have not been more careful." The regiments sent as reenforcements were almost in as deplorable condition; one whose strength had been mentioned as 930 men, was found to little exceed 500, while the wants of the men had been so " extremely neglected " that, as Governor Kendall wrote to the Earl of Shrewsbury, " we clothed the whole regiment which was naked before." The season was now far advanced, so much so that operations had to be begun immediately. Codrington added some soldiers to Wright's forces, and together the two began a series of depredatory expeditions. St. Christopher and St. Eustatius were first attacked. Men were landed, works captured, plantations plundered and houses burnt. But to hold the islands was out of the question ; the English force was far too small even to think of it. The coming of the hurri- cane season in July and sickness among the men now compelled the commanders to discontinue their operations until the month of October. Then Wright again put to sea (38), but with his complements so diminished by the fever that he was compelled to press men from merchant ships at Barbados. Plans had been made for an attack upon Guadeloupe. Misunderstandings, how- ever, and Wright's refusal to obey his orders and backwardness in seeking the enemy delayed the expedition until the close of March. Then the attempt was made, a landing was effected, and all was progressing well, when suddenly came the news of the arrival of a French fleet of 12 sail. This intelligence, following closely upon a bitter quarrel between the two commanders, was all that was needed to bring the expedition to a speedy end. Wright, British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1615 broken in health, sailed for home ; some of his ships followed him with a convoy ; the others remained to protect the islands from the enemy (39). When Captain Wright returned to England, a new expedition under Captain Ralph Wrenn was immediately ordered to the West Indies to take his place. But it did not leave Plymouth until the close of December, 1691. Then, again, the force despatched was lamentably inadequate. We have already seen that the French had sent out 12 vessels. Yet Wrenn's force consisted of but five men-of-war, with troops, and a convoy of transports and vict- uallers. Perhaps the Admiralty had counted upon the vessels which Wright had left behind ; but some of these had in the mean- time fallen a prey to the French fleet, so that when Wrenn began operations in January, 1692, he found himself in possession of only seven vessels-of-war, and the enemy stronger than he had even supposed. In fact it was not long before he fell in with their entire fleet of 18 sail. In spite of the odds he fought his way clear and reached Barbados without the loss of a single ship. But he got no further. Sickness here overcame him and the greater part of his men, and such as survived reached England only after great hardships (40) . The failure of this second effort brought the officials to the realization of the fact that the conquest of the French in Ameri- can waters was not such an easy matter and that, if they were to succeed at all, expeditions of sufficient force must be sent out. Great preparations were therefore begun. An armada was now to be sent out that would destroy the French factories in New France, Canada and Quebec, dispossess the enemy of the New- foundland fisheries, and overwhelm their forces in the West Indies. The fleet was to be commanded by Captain Meese and to sail by the first of August, 1692 (41). The governors of Massa- chusetts and New York were notified to expect it in May or June of the year following and to collect troops to co-operate with the vessels immediately upon their arrival (42). But delays of one kind or another postponed the sailing, first, until the end of August, and then, till January, 1693 (43). Sir Francis Wheeler was now in command. The squadron (18 ships) finally reached Barbados in March — just three months too late. Even here more delays occurred. No preparations had been made by the officers in the Indies for any such operations as were intended i6i6 British Naval Operations in the West Indies by Wheeler's instructions. Before sufficient forces could be collected the month of March was over. Martinique was made the first objective. All the troops available and 1500 seamen were landed on the island. They ravaged the whole coast; then wondered what to do next. Their force was too weak to think of making an attempt on the French works. Still a council of war decided to attempt St. Pierre. The enemy were driven into their works but no further. Sickness broke out among the English forces. Eight hundred men went down with wounds or sickness in three days. Further operations under such conditions would have been sheer madness. A hasty retreat was therefore begun and St. Christopher sought as the least unhealthy spot for the men, but before the month of May was half over Wheeler had lost half his men and most of his officers (44) . . Codrington, the captain general of the Leeward Islands, next proposed an attack upon Guadeloupe, but Wheeler's orders were to leave the Indies by the end of May at the latest and proceed to Boston. Even here his vessels were followed by disease and death, and his men were refused permission to land lest they should bring their infections on shore. But the most stunning blow to Wheeler was the intelligence that the governor had had no intimation of his coming till the fleet arrived and that no troops were ready for an attack upon Canada. The letter from England (written on February 2, 1693) conveying the government's in- structions to the colonial governor on this subject had been sent by way of Virginia, and never reached him until July 24 ! In despair, Wheeler finally went to Newfoundland alone. But here al^^o the French were in too strong force to be attacked in a casual way, and he was obliged to return to England, where his ships arrived in October, but in so reduced a state that there were scarcely men enough to navigate them. Such was the end of the expedition from which so much had been expected (45). Over a year elapsed before another effort was made to dispute the command of the sea with France. Like its predecessors it was doomed to failure. The situation in the West India Islands was indeed desperate. Jamaica, nearly ruined by earthquake and pestilence, was unable to oppose even the privateers that hovered on her coasts and threatened her communications with the conti- nent. Daily the situation became more menacing. Governor Beeston implored aid; his forces were so depleted that he was British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1617 practically at the mercy of the enemy and every moment dreading their approach (46). On June 17, 1694, the blow fell. Twenty ships and 3000 men under Monsieur Ducasse came from liis- paniola. Fortunately the governor had had warning of their coming some weeks before, thanks to the heroism of a merchant- skipper, then a prisoner at Petit Guavos, who made his escape in a small canoe over 300 miles of open sea to give the alarm in Jamaica. Beeston prepared for a gallant resistance, and wrote urgent messages to England, saying that without speedy succor, he should not be able to hold out long (47). The Committee on Plantations at once replied, August 3, 1694, that a force would soon sail to his relief, and proceeded to carry out these inten- tions (48). But the departmental administration in London was not so easily moved to haste. Both the Commissioners of the Navy and of the Admiralty were of the opinion that they had all they could attend to without sending expeditions to the West Indies. The Committee on Plantations then turned to the Commissioners of Transportation, but received little encouragement from their reports. Meanwhile it had been decided to raise two regiments, each of 600 men, which involved complicated estimates of ex- penses. Then followed a long correspondence with the Victual- ling Board as to feeding these men. This correspondence, natu- rally voluminous, became much more so because the Privy Council had named the force to be sent at 1600 men, whereas the Com- missioners on Plantations had placed it at 1700, and the Com- missioners of Transportation had been ordered to provide ships for 2000 men, and later for 1700. Then came the arrangements for appointment of a Commissary by the Treasury, to take charge of the military chest and for the supply of medical stores by Apothecaries' Hall. And lastly came the selection of the military commander who complicated matters still more by his demands. Preparations were well under way and everything was apparently progressing satisfactorily when difficulties arose in rapid suc- cession. First, all previous calculations were upset by a sudden increase of the number of troops to be sent out ; then their com- mander complained that not enough money, clothing or provisions had been furnished ; then the Victualling Board raged because the unexpected call for provisions came just as Admiral Russell's fleet was returning to port to revictual. A torrent of estimates and a volume of correspondence followed in the next two weeks. ' i6i8 British Naval Operations in the West Indies By this time the month of November was almost past. The expedition to have arrived in time should have sailed by the end of October. But moneys were not forthcoming from the Treas- ury, quite possibly because it had none to produce ; and the masters of the transports refused to obey their orders. Then the Com- missioners of Transportation discovered to their dismay that only 1400 troops were going out, whereas they had provided passage for 1800, and they dreaded the unnecessary expense ; and to bring the comedy, or tragedy — for indeed it was a tragedy — to a close, the Admiralty neglected to provide any convoy at all. On January 23, 1695, however, the expedition finally got to sea, and the " speedy succor " so unhesitatingly promised by the Commis- sioners of Plantations was on its way to Jamaica three months behind time (49). Before the vessels sailed, the King, who was greatly concerned at the failure of the three previous expeditions, summoned to his presence both Captain Wilmot and Colonel Lillingston, the naval and military commanders, and personally entreated them to co- operate in harmony during the coming operations. This they promised to do ; but before they had been at sea a week furious disputes and bitter jealousy over the question of prize money, which the King had ordered should be shared by both services, presaged ill for the results of their joint efforts. In fact Wilmot became so furious that he tried to be rid of Lillingston by in- veigling him ashore at Madeira. Failing in this, he next bribed the Treasury's commissary to wreck the military operations, so that the fleet, and he in particular, should have all the booty. The English commanders were instructed to co-operate with the Spanish in attacking the French settlements in the islands, so immediately upon their arrival in those waters Wilmot and Lillingston visited the Spanish governor at St. Domingo to arrange upon a plan of operations. St. Christopher was chosen as the first objective, and troops at once despatched there. Wil- mot, however, delayed the departure of his vessels for several days for no reason whatever, except the furtherance of his petty schemes, and when he reached the place chosen for the landing of the troops caused every difficulty imaginable. Lillingston, in spite of all obstacles, pushed on valiantly ; the French were com- pelled to abandon their works in haste, but not before setting the match to their magazine. Wilmot made a rush for the place to British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1619 seize all the plunder before the troops could reach it. So pre- cipitate was he that one of his captains and several men were blown up by the train of powder left by the enemy. The troops, furious at being defrauded, were on the point of mutiny, and were with difficulty persuaded to serve longer. An attack on Port de Paix was next attempted. But Wilmot as usual stood in the way of success. He refused to land siege materials except at places miles away from the points chosen for batteries. In the face of such obstacles, the troops worked heroically, and the French were finally compelled to evacuate the fort. Lillingston took immediate possession of the place, whereupon Wilmot attacked him with a superior force and took away all the plunder. This brought all operations to an abrupt end. Lillingston and his men, more dead than alive, were in no condition to continue hostilities under these conditions, and Wilmot certainly had no intention of staying with them any longer. Intent upon making the most of his voyage, he continued his cruise alone. But he was not destined to see the fulfilment of his dreams. Before he was able to reach England, down came the yellow fever, sweeping away the commodore, his accomplices, and three-fourths of his force (50). The fate of Jamaica now appeared sealed. The helpless state of the island, its position and absolute inability to act in its own defence in case of danger, kept the inhabitants in continual fear for what was in store for them. Appeals to England for aid became more and more frequent (51). Yet no steps appear to have been taken by the authorities until November, 1696, when the disquieting intelligence came from France that a fleet was being fitted out for the West Indies. The Board of Trade immediately recommended the despatch of an engineer and fire-ships to pro- tect Jamaica. These " re-enforcements" arrived in due time, but as usual proved quite useless. Capable as the engineer may have been, he could not understand the needs of the island as well as the people themselves, and besides, of what use were an engineer and his fortifications when there was no money to build them or men to man them? The Board of Trade at last appear to have realized this, and urged upon the King (December 3, 1696) the necessity of sending out a squadron. Preparations were accordingly begun to carry out these orders, and, after the usual delays and con- fusions, Vice Admiral John Nevill was despatched in command of a sufficient force to foil the enemy's plans (52). But he i620 British Naval Operations in the West Indies arrived just too late. Cartagena had already been sacked, and the French fleet was on its way home laden with booty. Nevill had barely time to collect his forces and sail in pursuit ; but he was finally obliged to give over the chase without having been able to bring the enemy to action. He then shaped his course for Havana to consult with the governor as to providing convoy for the treasure fleet lying there. The Spaniard, however, had become suspicious of the English since Wilmot's behavior two years before, and would not even allow Nevill to enter the harbor. Then followed the same old story. The crews were overcome by a raging fever ; such great numbers died that Nevill steered for the Virginia coast in the hope of obtaining relief from the change of climate, but even here ill fortune pursued him, and he himself finally fell a victim of the plague (53). The peace of Ryswick now brought hostilities to a close. Four years of truce elapsed before the next outbreak. But these years were by no means years of peace for the plantations. A new evil far more terrible than any they had experienced now came upon them. This was the evil of piracy. Hundreds of sailors thrown out of employment and a host of desperadoes set free on the cessation of the more legitimate industry of privateering found this new occupation too tempting to resist. The era of buccaneer- ing, in which before this some patriotism at least had been evinced, was now followed by an era of unmitigated piracy. Some of the officials took early measures to stamp out the new evil, but in spite of the number of captures, it continued on the increase (54)- It cannot be said, however, that the inhabitants of the plantations were not wholly to blame in this matter; too often were they in league with the pirates and smugglers, and not infrequently did the officials show a suspicious tenderness for the law breakers (55). Even the very naval officers that were sent out to cruise against the buccaneers in some cases violated their orders to the point of using them as means for blackmailing the colonists and traders they were supposed to protect — a fact that none dared complain about, for they were powerless before the captains with armed forces at their backs, and besides the Admiralty was known to countenance their behavior (56). But even when the authorities were zealous in their efforts they found it extremely difficult to adopt repressive measures with the small forces at their command (57) . " Upon view of our stores," British Naval Operations in the West Indies 162 i wrote Governor Codrington from Antigua, " I find no ammuni- tion, it being- four or five years since the King sent us any powder," and no supplies had been received from the Victualhng Office, " so that for the last six weeks our two men-of-war have been useless" (58). The Governor of Barbados not long after complained that he had but one " heavy, crazy vessel, miscalled a cruiser," at his disposal (59), with which he was powerless to annoy the pirates, though the latter were all but annihilating the trade of Barbados, while Governor Stapleton of the Leeward Islands only once enjoyed the luxury of having a man-of-war under a good officer at his disposal (60). Cases even occurred where cruisers were obliged to take to their heels when encounter- ing the rovers (61) . Repeated appeals and demands for aid were sent to England (62), for piracy had reached such proportions that the entire legitimate trade of America was threatened with ruin. Practically a state of war existed (63). Spanish corsairs plundered English vessels without possibility of redress from the authorities into whose ports the captures were brought (64). So serious did the situation become that in August, 1687, the King commissioned Sir Robert Holmes to proceed with a squadron to the Caribbean and suppress the outlaws. A special proclamation was issued to insure a proper co-operation between him and the royal governors, but the task of the squadron proved far more serious than had been anticipated. The presence of the ships for a while checked the evil, but only for a time. Holmes' agents met with so much opposition from the faction which had gained the upper hand in Jamaica that they despaired of success. Warrants were even issued for Holmes' arrest, and the suit brought against him by the pirates resulted in his being thrown into gaol (65). The Board of Trade made every effort to obtain assistance for the traders, but it received little encouragement in answer to its recommendations. The Admiralty could not see the need for increased protection ; one vessel was already cruising in Virginia waters and four were stationed in the West Indies (66) . Besides, it could not spare the ships (67). The peace then reigning over Europe was but a momentary breathing spell; war might break out at any moment; it was therefore inadvisable to scatter the naval forces ; and besides there was the question of expense, as money was none too handy. There the matter was dropped, and the colonies were left to look out for themselves as best they could. i622 British Naval Operations in the West Indies The Admiralty's judgment with regard to the near approach of war was well-founded. A new cause for quarrel soon arose which culminated in the war of the Spanish Succession. The declara- tion of war came only on May 4, 1702, but preparations had not been delayed until then. King William's interest was not so much to dispute the claim of Philip as to seize such of the Spanish pos- sessions in America as would increase the commercial and colonial ascendancy of England. The main efforts of his fleets were to be directed against America. Subsequent causes led to a change in these plans. Before that decision had been reached, however, the Admiralty had already sent out a squadron of ten sail under Vice Admiral John Benbow. At the time of the arrival (November 3, 1701) of this armament in the West Indies there were, as we have already seen, only a few English men-of-war in these waters, while the French and Spanish were in considerable force. But Benbow was fortunate in meeting the French squadron under M. Ducasse before the latter could effect a junction with his ally. Every advantage lay now with the English as they outnumbered their opponent. Benbow's captains, however, refused to engage the enemy, and the latter was allowed to escape after having been within the gasp of a superior force for five days (68). Four other expeditions were despatched to the West Indies during the course of the next eight years (69), but, like their predecessors, they, one and all, failed signally to accomplish their purpose, and after repeated disgraces, disasters, and tremendous expenditures of lives and money by England, the French were as formidable as ever. " When had we an opportunity or at least when was there any attempt made by us," wrote the Secretary of the Admiralty, Josiah Burchett, in 1704, " from the beginning of the last war to this very time, where the advantage proved in any degree equal to the charge and inconveniences that did attend it? The injuries we did the French when Sir Francis Wheeler com- manded in the West Indies were inconsiderable, and what have our successes been before and after that expedition? I doubt it was found that our squadrons came home in much worse condition than when they set forth, both as to men, and all other circum- stances; and not having the good fortune to do any sensible in- juries to our enemy, they had the satisfaction of knowing what inconveniences we involved ourselves in " (70) . And it was much in this way that most of the naval expeditions, even in the century British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1623 following, were organized, until that greater War Minister, the elder Pitt, rose to power and accomplished what his predecessors never for one moment doubted their perfect competence to do. REFERENCES (i) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, p. 100; 1696-97, No. m, 768: 1685-88, No. 1218, 1507, 1774, 1264, 849; Acts of the Privy Council II, 629; Hannay's Short History of the Royal Navy, II, 71-72. (2) Hannay, I, 184, 196; Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, I, 346-351 ; English Historical Review, IX, 480; XI, 57. (3) Hannay, I, 309; Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 21 ; Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1660- 61, p. no. (4) Monson, Naval Tracts, Book HI, p. 321. (5) Monson, Book HI, pp. 322-324; Hannay, I, 310-312. (6) House of Lords MSS., V, 269-290; 368-372. (7) Slyngesbie's Discourses of the Navy (Tanner), pp. ZZl-Z^- (8) Eng. Hist. Rev., XI, 60; Hannay, I, 317-318; Pepys' Diary (Wheatley), II, 37n, 258n, etc., etc. (9) Moorehouse, Samuel Pepys, p. 240. (10) Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 679-681; Tanner, Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval Manuscripts in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, III, IX. (11) Pepys to Anglesey, July 31, 1675. (12) Moorehouse, p. 241. (13) Hannay, I, 447. (14) Eng. Hist. Rev., XIV, 47-49. (15) Idem XIV, 54- (16) Idem XIV, 53- (17) Idem XIV, 65; Hannay, I, 450-451. (18) Eng. Hist. Rev. XIV, 262. (19) Hannay, I, 197, 253. (20) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1660-61, pp. 364, 403, 603 ; Pepys' Diary, July 31, 1660; June II, July 11, Aug. 14, 17, 31, Dec. 31, 166 1 ; Apr. 7, 1665; Jan. 26, Feb. 19, 1665-6; July 14, 1666; Apr. i, 1667. (21) Eng. Hist. Rev., XII, 42-43; Ho. Lds. MSS., V, 368-372. (22) Moorehouse, Life of Pepys, 90-91, 253. (23) Hannay, II, 1-3. (24) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 508. (25) Ho. Lds. ,MSS., IV, 161, V, 475 ; Acts of the Privy Council, II, 174, 285, 287, 296, 547, 606, 628, 629, 870, 882 ; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1697-98, p. 8. (26) Acts of Privy Council, II, 629. (27) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, p. 473, No. 1807, No. 1884; 1696-97, No. loi, No. 103, No. 859. (28) Hannay, II, n-T2. 1624 British Naval Operations in the "West Indies (29) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Colonial) 1574-1660, p. 347, 348, 349, 351, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 362, 374. (30) Idem 419. (31) Hannay, I, 279-289. (32) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1204. (33) Amer. Hist. Rev., XVI? pp. 540-541; Beer, The Colonial System, I, 121 ; II, 59. (34) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1212, 1214, No. 1220, 1476, 1477. (35) Idem No. 1484 ; Hannay, I, 386-388. (36) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1661-68, No. 1273, 1520, 1521, 1524, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1584, 1596. (37) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92, No. 90, loi, 106, 130, 146, 147, 169, 263, 379, 386, 391, 419, 519, 527, 528, 533, 545, 552, 571, 581, 586' 593, 617, 620, 733. (38) Note : Just before starting Wright was recalled to England by orders from home ; but at Barbados counter-orders were received with promises of re-inforcements. In January 1791, these " re-inforce- ments " came in the form of one man-of-war! (See Hannay, II, 69-71.) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92. (39) Idem No. 625, 927, 1004, 1034, 968, iioi, 1212, 1319, 1384, 1557, 1617, 1621, pp. 402-404; Hannay, II, 69-71; Clowes, The Royal Navy, II, 463- (40) Clowes, II, 466; Diet, of Natl. Biog., LXIII, 98; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92, No. 2025, 21 10. . (41) Ho. Lds. MSS., 1692-93, pp. 221, 222. (42) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, No. 48, 116. (43) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1689-92, No. 1775, 1787, 1804, 1829, 2457, 2504. (44) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693-96, No. 48, 116, 336, 276, 281, 296, 338-340, 347- (45) Idem No. 410, 578, 48, I16, 545 ; Diet. Natl. Biog., LX, 444. (46) Idem No. 209, 334, 336, 359, 876, 1004. (47) Idem No. 329, 1109. (48) Idem No. 1189, 1223. (49) Cal. Sta. Pap. (Dom.) 1694-9S, P- 271. Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1693, 96, No. 1239, 1240, 1244, 1245, 1259-1264, 1280, 1301, 1302, 1313, 1348, 1360, 1377, 1381, 1384, 1387, 1532, 1555, 1574, 1582, 1602. (50) Idem No. 1946, 1973, 1980, 1983, 2022, 2026, 2021, 2023, p. 554. (51) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 97, 130, 163, 222, 232-234, 508 ; Acts of Privy Council, II, 629. (52) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 374, 391, 1080, 453- (53) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97; No. 990; 1201, 1184; Diet. Natl. Biog., XL, 242 ; Clowes, II, 492. (54) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, p. XI, p. 69, No. 116; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1127; Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681- 85, No. 1 168. British Naval Operations in the West Indies 1625 (55) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1356, 1463, 1865, 1884, 678; 1699, No. 116, p. 69. (56) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 377, 461, 768; 1685-88, No. 849, 1264, 1218, 1507, 1774. (57) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 572, 602, 607, 684, 762. (58) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1696-97, No. 859. (59) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 72. (60) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 1147, 1168. (61) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 711. (62) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 239, 340, 395; 1685-88, No. 1210. (63) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1681-85, No. 963, 992, 668, 1938; 1685-88; No. 1276, 1278, 1406. (64) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1685-88, No. 1958, 1962, 1964, 1991, 2000, 218, 269, 569, 591, 609, 706, 739. (65) Idem No. 1463, 1602, 141 1, 1508, 1602, 1865, 1884. (66) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1697-98, No. 8, 499. (67) Cal. Sta. Pap. (A. & W. I.) 1699, No. 29, 42. (68) Clowes, II, 367. (69) Clowes, II, 373, 502 ; Ho. Lds. MSS., V, 462. Diet. Natl. Biog., XXIII, 28 ; XXIX, 330 ; LX, 453 ; LVIII, 7,72. (70) Hannay, II, 68. r JAN 11 19(5 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS I III nil II 015 823 201 7 i c