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 AUTHOR OF '^GREENMANTLE" 
 NELSON'S HISTORY OF THE WAR," etc., etc. 
 
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THE 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 JOHN BUCHAN 
 
 33^ 
 
ENTRANCE TO A CAPTURED 
 GERMAN DUG-OUT 
 
THE 
 
 BATTLE o/?)^^ SOMME 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN BUCHAN 
 
 AUTHOS OF "gREENMANTLE," "tHE THIRTY-NINE STEPS/ 
 
 "the power house," etc. 
 
 WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 NEW YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
 
 
^, 
 
 
 
 COPYRIGHT, 191 7, 
 BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 
 
 APR 3 1918 
 
 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMER[CA 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. Preliminaries 13 
 
 II. First Stage 34 
 
 III. Second Stage 65 
 
 IV. Third Stage 109 
 
 V. Fourth Stage 152 
 
 Appendix I. Sir Douglas Haig's Second Dis- 
 patch 175 
 
 Appendix II. Experiences of the IV German 
 Corps in the Battle of the Somme 
 During July, 19 16. General Sixt 
 von Armin's Report . . . . 225 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Entrance to a Captured German Dug-out .... Frontispiece 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sir Douglas Haig and Lieutenant-General Sir Pertab Singh . . 14 
 
 Road Making on the Battlefield 15 
 
 Infantry Going Into Action 15 
 
 Some Big Shells 24 
 
 Machine Gun Detail Equipped with Gas Masks 25 
 
 Distribution of Ammunition to Men Returning to Fire Trench . 36 
 
 A Roll Call on the Afternoon of July ist 37 
 
 Artillery Observation Post in Rear of German Line 44 
 
 Clearing a Road Through Contalmaison 45 
 
 Coming and Going 56 
 
 Canadians Preparing to Charge 57 
 
 In the Trenches Near Thiepval 66 
 
 Comfort in a Dug-out 67 
 
 Pipers of the Black Watch After the Capture of Longueval . . 74 
 
 A Trench at Ovillers 75 
 
 After the Rain. An Ambulance Stuck in the Mud 86 
 
 Welsh Guards in a Trench at Guillemont 87 
 
 The Worcester Regiment Going into Action 98 
 
 A Fifteen Inch Shell 99 
 
 British " Tanks " in Action 112 
 
 British Shells Bursting on German Trenches 113 
 
 Highland Brigade Relieved from Duty After the Capture of Martin- 
 
 puich 122 
 
 vii 
 
viii ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Martinpuich Main Street 123 
 
 Relieved Canadian Troops Passing Ammunition Train on Its Way 
 
 to the Firing Line 130 
 
 Moving a Big Gun 131 
 
 Pointing a Heavy Gun 146 
 
 Heavy Gun in Action I47 
 
 Ruins of Beaumont Hamel 158 
 
 The Railway at Beaucourt 159 
 
 Repairing a Captured German Aeroplane 162 
 
 A Mine Exploding Before the Assault 163 
 
 Devastation — " Somewhere in France " 170 
 
 Evening Behind the Lines . , 171 
 
MAPS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Trench Map of the German Defences 18,19 
 
 Contoured Map of the Ground on Which the British Army Was 
 Engaged 29 
 
 The Front from Monchy to Fay, July ist (showing general ar- 
 rangement of opposing armies) 37 
 
 Front of the British Left Attack, July ist (Gommecourt to Thiep- 
 val) 41 
 
 Front of the British Centre and Right Attack, July 1st (Ovillers 
 to Montauban) 42 
 
 The First French Advance North of the Somme 50 
 
 Allied Front on July 2nd (showing original line on the ist and 
 ground won up to the evening of the 2nd) 50, 5 1 
 
 Allied Front on July 3rd (showing the original line on July ist and 
 the ground won up to the evening of July 3rd) 52,53 
 
 Ovillers, La Boisselle, and Contalmaison 54, 55 
 
 The Wooded Hinterland of Fricourt and Mametz 58, 59 
 
 Bernafay and Trones Woods 61 
 
 Map Showing the Allied Front Line on July ist and the Ground 
 Gained up to July 14th 62,63 
 
 Longueval and Delville Wood 72 
 
 Pozieres 78 
 
 Guillemont and Ginchy 85 
 
 The French Advance, August I2th-i6th 95 
 
 Thiepval 97 
 
 Allied Front on August i8th (showing original line on July ist and 
 the ground gained (shaded) from August 14th to August i8th) .96,97 
 
 ix 
 
X MAPS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Advance of September 3rd 102 
 
 Falfemont Farm and Combles 1 04 
 
 Advance of Micheler's loth French Army, September 5th and 6th 
 (showing the original French front before July 1st, and the 
 ground gained by the advance) 106 
 
 The Allied Front on September loth (showing the original front on 
 July 1st and the ground gained up to September loth) . . 106, 107 
 
 The British Attack on September 15th 118 
 
 The French Advance of September I2th-I4th (capture of Boucha- 
 vesnes and Le Priez Farm) 126 
 
 The Attack of September 25th and 26th (the gains on the right) . 128 
 
 The Allied Front North of the Somme on October ist (showing the 
 front on July 14th and the ground gained from July 14th to Oc- 
 tober ist) 132, 133 
 
 The Gueudecourt and Warlencourt Spurs 138, 1 39 
 
 The Thiepval Ridge 140, 141 
 
 The French Advance During October North of the Somme | . . 145 
 
 The French Advance During October South of the Somme (showing 
 , the front of the loth Army on October ist and the ground gained^ 
 during the month) 147 
 
 The British Line North of Thiepval on November 13th .■^. . 156 
 
 The Attack on November 13th. (Scene of the victorious advance 
 of the centre and right) ..156,157 
 
 The Allied Front on November 19th (showing the original front on ^ 
 July ist and the.ground gained^up to November 19th) . . 164, 165 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
THE BATTLE 
 OF THE SOMME 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PR^UMINARlES 
 
 Jhe Picardy Landscape— The Sanferre— The Somme Front before 
 Midsummer 1916— -The German Situation — Why a Shorten- 
 ing of the Line was Impossible — The German Position on the 
 Somme — The Allied Plan — German Dispositions — The New Brit- 
 ish Army — Its Quality — Its Munitionment — British Dispositioss — 
 French Dispositions — The Great Bombardment — Trench Raids 
 and Gas Attacks — ^The Morning of the Attack, ist July. 
 
 FROM Arras southward the Western battle- 
 front left the coalpits and sour fields of the 
 Artois and entered the pleasant region of 
 Picardy. The great crook of the Upper Somme 
 and the tributary vale of the Ancre intersect a roll- 
 ing tableland, dotted with little towns and furrowed 
 by a hundred shallow chalk streams. Nowhere does 
 the land rise higher than 500 feet, but a trivial 
 swell — such is the nature of the landscape — may 
 carry the eye for thirty miles. There are few de- 
 tached farms, for it is a country of peasant culti- 
 vators who cluster in villages. Not a hedge breaks 
 the long roll of cornlands, and till the higher ground 
 is reached the lines of tall poplars flanking the great 
 
 13 
 
14 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Roman highroads are the chief landmarks. At the 
 Hft of country between Somme and Ancre copses 
 patch the slopes, and sometimes a church spire is 
 seen above the trees from some woodland hamlet. 
 The Somme winds in a broad valley between chalk 
 bluffs, faithfully dogged by a canal — a curious river 
 which strains, like the Oxus, "through matted rushy 
 isles,'' and is sometimes a lake and sometimes an 
 expanse of swamp. The Ancre is such a stream as 
 may be found in Wiltshire, with good trout in its 
 pools. On a hot midsummer day the slopes are 
 ablaze with yellow mustard, red poppies, and blue 
 cornflowers; and to one coming from the lush flats 
 of Flanders, or the "black country" of the Pas de 
 Calais, or the dreary levels of Champagne, or the 
 strange melancholy Verdun hills, this land wears a 
 habitable and cheerful air, as if remote from the 
 oppression of war. 
 
 The district is known as the Santerre. Some 
 derive the name from sana terra — the healthy land; 
 others from sarta terra — the cleared land. Some 
 say it is sancta terra, for Peter the Hermit was a 
 Picard, and the piety of the Crusaders enriched the 
 place with a thousand relics and a hundred noble 
 churches. But there are those — and they have much 
 to say for themselves — ^who read the name sang terre 
 — the bloody land, for the Picard was the Gascon of 
 the north, and the countryside is an old cockpit of 
 war. It was the seat of the government of Clovis 
 and Charlemagne. It was ravaged by the Normans, 
 and time and again by the English. There Louis 
 XI. and Charles the Bold fought their battles; it 
 suffered terribly in the Hundred Years' War; Ger- 
 man and Spaniard, the pandours of Eugene and the 
 
SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND 
 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR PERTAB SINGH 
 
INFANTRY GOING INTO ACTION 
 
 ROAD MAKING ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
 
PRELIMINARIES 15 
 
 Cossacks of Alexander marched across its fields; 
 from the walls of Peronne the last shot was fired in 
 the campaign of 1814. And in the greatest war of 
 all it was destined to be the theatre of a struggle 
 compared with which its ancient conflicts were like 
 the brawls of a village fair. 
 
 Till Midsummer in 191 6 the Picardy front had 
 shown little activity. Since that feverish September 
 when de Castelnau had extended on the Allies' left, 
 and Maud'huy beyond de Castelnau, in the great 
 race for the North Sea, there had been no serious 
 action. Just before the Battle of Verdun began the 
 Germans made a feint south of the Somme and 
 gained some ground at Frise and Dompierre. There 
 had been local raids and local bombardments, but 
 the trenches on both sides were good, and a partial 
 advance offered few attractions to either. Amiens 
 was miles behind one front, vital points like St. 
 Quentin and Cambrai and La Fere were far behind 
 the other. In that region only a very great and 
 continuous offensive would offer any strategic re- 
 sults. In July 191 5 the British took over most of 
 the line from Arras to the Somme, and on the whole 
 they had a quiet winter in their new trenches. This 
 long stagnation led to one result: it enabled the 
 industrious Germans to excavate the chalk hills on 
 w^hich they lay into a fortress which they believed 
 to be impregnable. Their position was naturally 
 strong, and they strengthened it by every device 
 which science could provide. Their High Com- 
 mand might look uneasily at the Aubers ridge and 
 Lens and Vimy, but it had no doubts about the 
 Albert heights. 
 
16 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The German plan in the West after the first 
 offensive had been checked at the Marne and 
 Ypres, was to hold their front with abundant 
 guns but the bare minimum of men, and use 
 their surplus forces to win a decision in the East 
 This scheme was foiled by the heroic steadfastness 
 of Russia's retreat, which surrendered territory 
 freely but kept her armies in being. During the 
 winter of 191 5-16 the German High Command 
 were growing anxious. They saw that their march 
 to the Dvina and their adventure in the Balkans had 
 failed to shake the resolution of their opponents. 
 They were aware that the Allies had learned with 
 some exactness the lesson of eighteen months of 
 war, and that even now they were superior in men, 
 and would presently be on an equality in munitions. 
 Moreover, the Allied Command was becoming con- 
 centrated and shaking itself free from its old passion 
 for divergent operations. Our generals had learned 
 the wisdom of the order of the King of Syria to his 
 captains: "Fight neither with small nor great but 
 only with the King of Israel''; and the King of 
 Israel did not welcome the prospect. 
 
 Now, to quote a famous saying of General Foch, 
 *^A weakening force must always be attacking," and 
 from the beginning of 1916 the Central Powers were 
 forced into a continuous offensive. Their economic 
 strength was draining steadily. Their people had 
 been told that victory was already won, and were 
 asking what had become of the fruits of it. They 
 feared greatly the coming Allied offensive, for they 
 knew that it would be simultaneous on all fronts, 
 and they cast about for a means of frustrating it. 
 That was the main reason of the great Verdun 
 
PRELIMINARIES 17 
 
 assault. Germany hoped, with the obtuseness that 
 has always marked her estimate of other races, so 
 to weaken the field strength of France that no future 
 blow would be possible, and the French nation, 
 weary and dispirited, would incline to peace. She 
 hoped, in any event, to lure the Allies into a pre- 
 mature counter-attack, so that their great offensive 
 might go off at half-cock and be defeated piece- 
 meal. 
 
 None of these things happened. Petain at 
 Verdun handled the defence like a master. With 
 a wise parsimony he refused to use up any 
 unit. When a division had suffered it was taken out 
 of the line and replaced by a fresh one, so that none 
 of the cadres were destroyed. He was willing enough 
 to yield ground, if only the enemy paid his price. 
 His aim was not to hold territory, but to cripple the 
 German field army, and his plan succeeded. The 
 German force was, as the French say, accroche at 
 Verdun, and was compelled to go on long after any 
 hope of true success had vanished. The place be- 
 came a trap where Germany was bleeding to death. 
 Meanwhile, with the full assent of General Joffre, 
 the Generalissimo in the West, the British armies 
 made no movement. They were biding their time. 
 
 Early in June the Austrian attack on the Tren- 
 tino had been checked by Italy, and suddenly — in 
 the East — Russia swung forward to a surprising 
 victory. Within a month nearly half a million 
 Austrians had been put out of action, and the dis- 
 tressed armies of the Dual Monarchy called on 
 Germany for help. The inevitable von Hindenburg 
 was brought into play, and such divisions as could 
 be spared were dispatched from the West. At this 
 
18 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 moment, when the grip was tightening in the East, 
 France and Britain made ready for a supreme effort. 
 Germany's situation was intricate and uneasy. 
 She had no large surplus of men immediately avail- 
 able at her interior depots. The wounded who were 
 ready again for the line and the young recruits from 
 the 19 1 7 class were all needed to fill up the normal 
 wastage in her ranks. She might create new divi- 
 sions, but it would be mainly done by skimming the 
 old. She had no longer any great mass of free stra- 
 tegic reserves. Most had been sucked into the mael- 
 strom of Verdun or dispatched east to von Hinden- 
 burg. At the best, she had a certain number of divi- 
 sions which represented a local and temporary sur- 
 plus in some particular area. Beyond these she could 
 only get reinforcements by the process known as 
 "milking the line" — taking out a battalion here and 
 a battalion there — an expedient both cumbrous and 
 wasteful, for these battalions were not fresh troops, 
 and their removal was bound to leave many parts 
 of her front perilously thin. Germany in the West 
 was holding a huge salient — from the North Sea to 
 Soissons, and from Soissons to Verdun. If a wedge 
 were driven in on one side the whole apex would 
 be in danger. The Russian field army could retire 
 safely from Warsaw and Vilna, because it was mobile 
 and lightly equipped, but an army which had been 
 stationary for eighteen months and had relied mainly 
 upon its fortifications would be apt to find a Sedan 
 in any rapid and extensive retirement. The very 
 strength of the German front in the West consti- 
 tuted its weakness. A breach in a fluid line may 
 be mended, but a breach in a rigid and most in- 
 tricate front is difficult to fill unless there are large 
 

 / 
 
 
TRENCHES 
 WIRE ENTANGLE 
 
 MENTS 
 CRATERS 
 
 RAILWAYS • ROADS 
 
 TRENCH MAP SHOWING THE GERMAN DEFENCES (TRENCHES IN RED) 
 
PRELIMINARIES 19 
 
 numbers of men available for the task or unlimited 
 time. We have seen that there were no such large 
 numbers, and it was likely that the Allies would 
 see that there was no superfluity of leisure. 
 
 The path of wisdom for Germany in June, it might 
 be argued with some force, was to fall back in good 
 order to a much shortened line, which with her num- 
 bers might be strongly held. There is reason to 
 believe that soon after the beginning of the Allied 
 bombardment some such policy was considered. The 
 infantry commanders of the 17th Corps were warned 
 to be prepared for long marches and heavy rear- 
 guard fighting, instructions were given for holding 
 bridgeheads well in the rear, and officers were ad- 
 vised that the retreat might be either a retirement 
 at ease or a withdrawal under pressure from the 
 enemy. Had such a course been taken it would have 
 been unfortunate for the Allied plans. But such 
 a course was not easy. The foolish glorification 
 after the naval battle of 31st May forbade it. The 
 German people had been buoyed up under the dis- 
 comfort of the British blockade by tales of decisive 
 successes in the field. The German Chancellor had 
 appealed to his enemies to look at the map, to con- 
 sider the extent of German territorial gains, and 
 to admit that they were beaten. He was one 
 of those who did not fulfil Foch's definition of 
 military wisdom. ^'The true soldier is the man 
 who ignores that science of geographical points 
 which is alien to war, which is the negation of war 
 and the sure proof of decadence, the man who knows 
 and follows one vital purpose — to smash the enemy's 
 field force." 
 
 Yet, in spite of this weakness in the strategic 
 
20 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 situation, the German stronghold in the West was 
 still formidable in the extreme. From Arras south- 
 ward they held in the main the higher ground. The 
 front consisted of a strong first position, with firing, 
 support, and reserve trenches, and a labyrinth of 
 deep dug-outs; a less strong intermediate line cov- 
 ering the field batteries; and a second position 
 some distance behind, which was of much the same 
 strength as the first. Behind lay fortified woods and 
 villages which could be readily linked up with trench 
 lines to form third and fourth positions. The at- 
 tached trench map will give some idea of the amaz- 
 ing complexity of the German defences. They were 
 well served by the great network of railways which 
 radiate from La Fere and Laon, Cambrai, and St 
 Quentin, and many new light lines had been con- 
 structed. They had ample artillery and shells, end- 
 less machine guns, and consummate skill in using 
 them. It was a fortress to which no front except 
 the West could show a parallel. In the East the 
 line was patchy and not continuous. The Russian 
 soldiers who in the early summer were brought to 
 France stared with amazement at a ramification of 
 trenches compared with which the lines in Poland 
 and Galicia were like hurried improvisations. 
 
 The German purpose in the event of an attack 
 was purely defensive. It was to hold their ground, 
 to maintain the mighty forts on which they had 
 spent so many months of labour, to beat off the 
 assault at whatever cost. In that section of their 
 front, at any rate, they were resolved to be a stone 
 wall and not a spear point. 
 
 The aim of the Allied Command must be clearly 
 understood. It was not to recover so many square 
 
PRELIMINARIES 21 
 
 miles of France; it was not to take Bapaume or 
 Peronne or St. Quentin; it was not even in the 
 strict sense to carry this or that position. All these 
 things were subsidiary and would follow in due 
 course, provided the main purpose succeeded. That 
 purpose was simply to exercise a steady and con- 
 tinued pressure on a certain section of the enemy's 
 front. 
 
 For nearly two years the world had been full 
 of theories as to the possibility of breaking the Ger- 
 man line. Many months before critics had pointed 
 out the futility of piercing that line on too narrow 
 a front, since all that was produced thereby was 
 an awkward salient. It was clear that any 
 breach must be made on a wide front, which would 
 allow the attacking wedge to manoeuvre in the gap, 
 and prevent reinforcements from coming up quickly 
 enough to reconstitute the line behind. But this 
 view took too little account of the strength of the 
 German fortifications. No doubt a breach could 
 be made; but its making would be desperately 
 costly, for no bombardment could destroy all the 
 defensive lines, and infantry in the attack would 
 be somewhere or other faced with unbroken wire 
 and unshaken parapets. Gradually it had been 
 accepted that an attack should proceed by stages, 
 with, as a prelude to each, a complete artillery 
 preparation, and that, since the struggle must be 
 long drawn out, fresh troops should be used at each 
 stage. 
 
 These were the tactics of the Germans at Ver- 
 dun, and they were obviously right. Why, then, 
 did the attack on Verdun fail? In the first place, 
 because after the first week the assault became 
 
22 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 spasmodic and the great plan fell to pieces. Infantry 
 were used wastefully in hopeless rushes. The pres- 
 sure was relaxed for days on end, and the defence 
 was allowed to reorganise itself. The second rea- 
 son, of which the first was a consequence, was that 
 Germany, after the initial onslaught, had not the 
 necessary superiority either in numbers or moral or 
 guns. At the Somme the Allies did not intend to 
 relax their pressure, and their strength was such that 
 they believed that, save in the event of abnormal 
 weather conditions, they could keep it continuously 
 at a high potential. 
 
 A strategical problem is not, as a rule, capable 
 of being presented in a simple metaphor, but Ave 
 may say that, to the view of the Allied strategy, the 
 huge German salient in the West was like an elastic 
 band drawn very tight. Each part of such a band 
 has lost elasticity, and may be severed by friction 
 which would do little harm to the band if less tautly 
 stretched. That represented one element in the 
 situation. Another aspect might be suggested by 
 the metaphor of a sea-dyke of stone in a flat country 
 where all stone must be imported. The waters 
 crumble the wall in one section, and all free reserves 
 of stone are used to strengthen that part. But the 
 crumbling goes on, and to fill the breach stones are 
 brought from other sections of the dyke. Some day 
 there may come an hour when the sea will wash 
 through the old breach, and a great length of the 
 weakened dyke will follow in the cataclysm. 
 
 There were two other motives in the Allied pur- 
 pose which may be regarded as subsidiary. One 
 was to ease the pressure on Verdun, which during 
 June had grown to fever pitch. The second was to 
 
PRELIMINARIES 20 
 
 prevent the transference of large bodies of enemy 
 troops from the Western to the Eastern front, a 
 transference which might have worked havoc with 
 Brussilov's plans. Sir Douglas Haig would have 
 preferred to postpone the offensive a little longer, 
 for his numbers and munitionment were still grow- 
 ing, and the training of the new levies was not yet 
 complete. But the general situation demanded that 
 the Allies in the West must not delay their stroke 
 much beyond midsummer. 
 
 The German front in the Somme area was held 
 by the right wing of the Second Army, formerly 
 von Buelow's, but now under Otto von Below.* 
 This army's area began just south of Monchy, north 
 of which lay the 6th Army under the Bavarian 
 Crown Prince. At the end of June the front be- 
 tween Gommecourt and Frise was held as follows: 
 North of the Ancre lay the 2nd Guard Reserve Divi- 
 siont and the 52nd Division. Between the Ancre 
 and the Somme lay two units of the 14th Reserve 
 Corps, J in order, the 26th Reserve Division, the 
 
 * His brother, Fritz von Below, was the general command- 
 ing the 8th Army on the extreme left of the Eastern front. 
 
 t The 2nd Guard Reserve were not true Guardsmen, but 
 only a division used as a reserve for the Guards. The 
 Guards proper were the Guard Corps, comprising the ist 
 and 2nd Guard Divisions ; the Guard Reserve Corps, com- 
 prising the 4th Guard Division and the ist Guard Reserve 
 Division; and the 3rd Guard Division (the "Cockchafers"), 
 who were not classified in any Corps. 
 
 J The 14th Reserve Corps was a mixed formation, nomi- 
 nally raised in Baden, but containing also Wurtembergers, 
 Prussians, and Alsatians. At the beginning of the cam- 
 paign it formed part of the 7th Army under von Heeringen 
 which advanced through the northern Vosges. In October 
 
24 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 28th Reserve Division, and then the 12th Division 
 of the 6th Reserve Corps. South of the river, guard- 
 ing the road to Peronne, were the 121st Division, 
 the nth Division, and the 36th Division, belonging 
 to the 17th (Dantzig) Corps. 
 
 The British armies had in less than two years 
 grown from the six divisions of the old Expedition- 
 ary Force to a total of some seventy divisions in the 
 field, leaving out of account the troops supplied by 
 the Dominions and by India. Behind these divisions 
 were masses of trained men to replace wastage 
 for at least another year. The quality of the 
 result was not less remarkable than the quan- 
 tity. The efficiency of the supply and transport, 
 the medical services, the aircraft work, was uni- 
 versally admitted. Our staff and intelligence 
 work — most difficult to improvise — was now equal 
 to the best in the field. Our gunnery was 
 praised by the French, a nation of expert gunners. 
 As for the troops themselves we had secured a homo- 
 geneous army of VN^hich it was hard to say that one 
 part was better than the other. The original Ex- 
 peditionary Force — the "Old Contemptibles," who 
 for their numbers were probably the best body of 
 fighting men on earth — had mostly disappeared. 
 Territorial battalions were present at the First 
 Battle of Ypres, and New Service battalions at 
 Hooge and Loos. By June 19 16 the term New 
 Armies was a misnomer. The whole British force 
 1914 it was transferred to the 2nd Army, and since then 
 it had remained in the same section north of the Somme. 
 It comprised the 26th and 28th Reserve Divisions, and the 
 52nd Division, which was formed early in 191 5. It was 
 commanded at the time of the Somme battle by General 
 von Stein. 
 
p 
 a 
 
PKELIMINARIES 25 
 
 in one sense was new. The famous old regiments 
 of the Hne had been completely renewed since Mons, 
 and their drafts were drawn from the same source 
 as the men of the new battalions. The only differ- 
 ence was that in the historic battalions there was a 
 tradition already existing, whereas in the new bat- 
 talions that tradition had to be created. And the 
 creation was quick. If the Old Army bore the brunt 
 of the First Battle of Ypres, the Territorials were 
 no less heroic in the Second Battle of Ypres, and 
 the New Army had to its credit the four-mile charge 
 at Loos. It was no patchwork force which in June 
 was drawn up in Picardy, but the flower of the man- 
 hood of the British Empire, differing in origin and 
 antecedents, but alike in discipline and courage and 
 resolution. 
 
 Munitions had grown with the numbers of men. 
 Any one who was present at Ypres in April and 
 May 191 5 saw the German guns all day pound- 
 ing our lines with only a feeble and intermittent 
 reply. It was better at Loos in September, when 
 we showed that we could achieve an intense bom- 
 bardment. But at that date our equipment sufficed 
 only for spasmodic efforts and not for that sustained 
 and continuous fire which was needed to destroy 
 the enemy's defences. Things were very different 
 in June 19 16. Everywhere on the long British 
 front there were British guns — heavy guns of all 
 calibres, field guns innumerable, and in the trenches 
 there were quantities of trench mortars. The great 
 munition dumps, constantly depleted and constantly 
 replenished from distant bases, showed that there 
 was food and to spare for this mass of artillery, 
 and in the factories and depots at home every minute 
 
26 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 saw the reserves growing. We no longer fought 
 against a far superior machine. We had created our 
 own machine to nullify the enemy's and allow our 
 man-power to come to grips. 
 
 The preparations for the attack were slow and 
 elaborate, and conducted during indifferent weather. 
 Sir Douglas Haig has described them. "Many 
 miles of new railways — both standard and narrow 
 gauge — and trench tramways were laid. All avail- 
 able roads were improved, many others were made, 
 and long causeways were built over marshy valleys. 
 Many additional dug-outs had to be provided as 
 shelter for the troops, for use as dressing stations 
 for the wounded, and as magazines for storing am- 
 munition, food, water, and engineering material. 
 Scores of miles of deep communication trenches had 
 to be dug, as well as trenches for telephone wires, 
 assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun 
 emplacements and observation posts. Important 
 mining operations were undertaken, and charges 
 were laid at various points beneath the enemy's 
 lines. Except in the river valleys, the existing 
 supplies of water were hopelessly insufficient to 
 meet the requirements of the numbers of men and 
 horses to be concentrated in this area as our prepara- 
 tions for the offensive proceeded. To meet this 
 difficulty many wells and borings were sunk, and 
 over one hundred pumping plants were installed. 
 More than one hundred and twenty miles of water 
 mains were laid, and everything was got ready to 
 ensure an adequate water supply as our troops ad- 
 vanced.'' 
 
 The coming attack was allotted to the Fourth 
 Army, under General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who 
 
PRELIMINARIES 27 
 
 had begun the campaign in command of the 7th 
 Division, and at Loos had commanded the 4th Corps. 
 His front ran from south of Gommecourt across the 
 Ancre valley to the junction with the French north 
 of Maricourt. In his line he had five corps — from 
 left to right, the 8th, under Lieutenant-General Sir 
 Aylmer Hunter-Weston ; the loth, under Lieutenant- 
 General Sir T. L. N. Morland; the 3rd, under Lieu- 
 tenant-General Sir W. P. Pulteney; the 15th, under 
 Lieutenant-General Home; and the 13th, under 
 Lieutenant-General Congreve, V.C. Behind in the 
 back areas lay the nucleus of another army, called 
 first the Reserve, and afterwards the Fifth, under 
 General Sir Hubert Gough, which at this time was 
 mainly composed of cavalry divisions. It was a 
 cadre which would receive its complement of infan- 
 try when the occasion arose. 
 
 The French striking force lay from Maricourt 
 astride the Somme to opposite the village of Fay. 
 It was the Sixth Army, once de Castelnau's, and now 
 under General Fayolle, one of the most distinguished 
 of French artillerymen. It comprised the 20th 
 Corps"*" of Verdun fame, under General Balfourier; 
 the 1st Colonial Corps under General Brandelat; 
 and the 35th Corps under General Allonier. Petain's 
 
 * The 20th Corps was composed of the nth, 39th, and 
 153rd Divisions. It drew its recruits from the best fighting 
 stocks of France, the cockneys of Paris and the countrymen 
 of Lorraine. Each of its divisions claimed to be a ''Division 
 de Fer," but this title was most generally bestowed upon 
 the 39th. Besides Verdun the 20th Corps had been with 
 Maud'huy in his great defence of Arras in October 1914, and 
 in the Artois fighting of the summer of 191 5. It was the 
 153rd Division that mainly turned the tide at Douaumont on 
 February 26, 1916, and later retook the Avocourt Redoubt. 
 
28 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 wise plan of allowing no formation to be used up 
 now received brilliant justification. The divisions 
 allotted to the new offensive were all troops who 
 had seen hard fighting, but the edge of their temper 
 was undulled. To one who visited them in the last 
 days of June it seemed that they awaited the day 
 with a boyish expectancy and glee. South of Fayolle 
 lay the Tenth Army, once d'Urbal's, but now com- 
 manded by General Micheler. Its part for the pres- 
 ent was to wait ; its turn would come when the time 
 arrived to broaden the front of assault. 
 
 About the middle of June on the whole ninety- 
 mile front held by the British, and on the French 
 front north and south of the Somme there began 
 an intermittent bombardm.ent of the German lines. 
 There were raids at different places, partly to mis- 
 lead the enemy as to the real point of assault, and 
 partly to identify the German units opposed to us. 
 Such raids varied widely in method, but they were 
 extraordinarily successful. Sometimes gas was used, 
 but more often after a short bombardment a picked 
 detachment crossed No Man's Land, cut the enemy's 
 wire, and dragged home a score or two of prisoners. 
 One, conducted by a company of the 9th Highland 
 Light Infantry (the Glasgow Highlanders) near the 
 Vermelles-La Bassee Road, deserves special men- 
 tion. Our guns had damaged the German parapets, 
 so when darkness came a German working-party 
 was put in to mend them. The Scots, while the 
 engineers neatly cut off a section of German trenches, 
 swooped down on the place, investigated the dug- 
 outs, killed two score Germans, brought back forty- 
 six prisoners, and had for total casualties two men 
 
PRELIMINARIES 29 
 
 slightly wounded."^ During these days, too, there 
 were many fights in the air. It was essential to 
 prevent German airplanes from crossing our front 
 and observing our preparations. Our own machines 
 scouted far into the enemy hinterland, reconnoitring 
 and destroying. 
 
 On Saturday, 24th June, the bombardment be- 
 came intenser. It fell everywhere on the front ; Ger- 
 man trenches were obliterated at Ypres j 
 and Arras as well as at Beaumont Hamel ^' 
 
 and Fricourt. There is nothing harder to measure 
 than the relative force of such a ^'preparation/' but 
 had a dispassionate observer been seated in the 
 clouds he would have noted that from Gommecourt 
 to a mile or two south of the Somme the Allied fire 
 was especially methodical and persistent. On Wed- 
 nesday, 2S June, from an artillery j r^ 
 observation post in that region it seemed 
 as if a complete devastation had been achieved. 
 Some things like broken telegraph poles were all 
 that remained of what, a week before, had been 
 leafy copses. Villages had become heaps of rubble. 
 Travelling at night on the roads behind the front — 
 from Bethune to Amiens — the whole eastern sky was 
 lit up with what seemed fitful summer lightning. 
 But there was curiously little noise. In Amiens, a 
 score or so of miles from the firing-line, the guns 
 were rarely heard, whereas fifty miles from Ypres 
 they sounded like a roll of drums and woke a man 
 
 * In the week preceding the attack — that is, June 24 to 
 July I — gas was discharged at more than forty places upon 
 a frontage which in total amounted to over fifteen miles. 
 During the same period some seventy raids were undertaken 
 between Gommecourt and our extreme left north of Ypres. 
 
30 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 in the night. The configuration of that part of 
 Picardy muffles sound, and the country folk call it 
 the Silent Land. 
 
 All the last week of June the weather was grey 
 and cloudy, with a thick brume on the uplands, 
 which made air-work unsatisfactory. There were 
 flying showers of rain and the roads were deep in 
 mire. At the front — through the haze — the guns 
 flashed incessantly, and there was that tense expec- 
 tancy which precedes a great battle. Troops were 
 everywhere on the move, and the shifting of am- 
 munition dumps nearer to the firing-line fore- 
 told what was coming. There was a curious ex- 
 hilaration everywhere. Men felt that the great 
 offensive had come, that this was no flash in the 
 pan, but a movement conceived on the grand scale 
 as to guns and men which would not cease until a 
 decision was reached. But, as the hours passed in 
 mist and wet, it seemed as if the fates were unpro- 
 pitious. Then, on the last afternoon of June, there 
 
 J came a sudden change. The pall of 
 
 *^ * cloud cleared away and all Picardy swam 
 
 in the translucent blue of a summer evening. That 
 
 night the orders went out. The attack was to be 
 
 delivered next morning three hours after dawn. 
 
 The first day of July dawned hot and cloud- 
 less, though a thin fog, the relic of the damp of the 
 
 J 1 past week, clung to the hollows. At 
 
 ^ ' half-past five the hill just west of Albert 
 offered a singular view. It was almost in the centre 
 of the section allotted to the Allied attack, and from 
 it the eye could range on the left up and beyond 
 the Ancre glen to the high ground around Beaumont 
 Hamel and Serre; in front to the great lift of 
 
PRELIMINARIES 
 
 31 
 
 MO melrca <46» a» «n<lj|r^ 
 upwards P-^-3 
 
 120 metres (304 H> to? 
 MO- metres 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — CONTOURED MAP OF THE GROUND ON WHICH THE 
 BRITISH ARMY WAS ENGAGED. 
 
32 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 tableland behind which lay Bapaume; and to the 
 right past the woods of Fricourt to the valley of the 
 Somme. Every slope to the east was wreathed in 
 smoke, which blew aside now and then and revealed 
 a patch of wood or a church spire. In the fore- 
 ground lay Albert, the target of an occasional Ger- 
 man shell, with its shattered Church of Notre Dame 
 de Bebrieres and the famous gilt Virgin hanging 
 head downward from the campanile. All along the 
 Allied front, a couple of miles behind the line, captive 
 kite balloons, the so-called "sausages," glittered in 
 the sunlight. Every gun on a front of twenty-five 
 miles was speaking, and speaking without pause. In 
 that week's bombardment more light and medium 
 ammunition was expended than the total amount 
 manufactured in Britain during the first eleven 
 months of war, while the heavy stuff produced dur- 
 ing the same period would not have kept our guns 
 going for a single day. Great spurts of dust on the 
 slopes showed where a heavy shell had burst, and 
 black and white gouts of smoke dotted the middle 
 distance like the little fires in a French autumn field. 
 Lace-like shrapnel wreaths hung in the sky, melting 
 into the morning haze. The noise was strangely 
 uniform, a steady rumbling, as if the solid earth 
 were muttering in a nightmare, and it was hard to 
 distinguish the deep tones of the heavies, the vicious 
 whip-like crack of the field guns and the bark of the 
 trench mortars. 
 
 About 7.15 the bombardment rose to that hurri- 
 cane pitch of fury which betokened its close. It was 
 as if titanic machine guns were at work round all 
 the horizon. Then appeared a marvellous sight, 
 the solid spouting of the enemy slopes — as if they 
 
PRELIMINARIES 33 
 
 were lines of reefs on which a strong tide was break- 
 ing. In such a hell it seemed that no human thing 
 could live. Through the thin summer vapour and 
 the thicker smoke which clung to the foreground 
 there were visions of a countryside actually moving 
 — moving bodily in debris into the air. And now 
 there was a fresh sound — a series of abrupt and 
 rapid bursts which came gustily from the first lines. 
 These were the new trench mortars — wonderful 
 little engines of death. There was another sound, 
 too, from the north, as if the cannonading had sud- 
 denly come nearer. It looked as if the Germans had 
 begun a counter-bombardment on part of the Brit- 
 ish front line. 
 
 The staff officers glanced at their watches, and 
 at half-past seven precisely there came a lull. It 
 lasted for a second or two, and then the guns con- 
 tinued their tale. But the range had been length- 
 ened everywhere, and from a bombardment the fire 
 had become a barrage. For, on a twenty-five mile 
 front, the Allied infantry had gone over the parapets. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 th]^ first stag^ 
 
 The Spirit of the Assault — The British Aim — The German First Po- 
 sition — Gommecourt to Thiepval — The Mine at Beaumont Hamel 
 — Temporary Gains — The Ulster Division — The Fricourt Area — 
 Fall of Mametz — Fall of Montauban — The Nature of the Cap- 
 tured Ground — Behaviour of British Troops — The French Suc- 
 cess — Fall of Dompierre, Becquincourt, Bussu, and Fay — Small 
 French Losses — Fall of Fricourt — French capture Curlu, Frise, 
 and Assevilliers — Von Below's Order to his Troops — Situation on 
 3rd July — The Two Sections of the British Battleground — Cap- 
 ture of La Boisselle — The Fight for Ovillers and Contalmaison — 
 Fall of Contalmaison — Description of the Captured Ground — The 
 Struggle for the Woods — The Fight for Mametz Wood — Berna- 
 fay and Trones Woods — The Difficulty of their Capture — French 
 fereak into the German Second Position — Capture of Belloy, Es- 
 trees, and Biaches — Sir Douglas Haig's First Summary. 
 
 THE point of view of the hill-top was not that 
 of the men in the front trenches. The cross- 
 ing of the parapets is the supreme moment in 
 modern war. The troops are outside defences, mov- 
 ing across the open to investigate the unknown. It 
 is the culmination of months of training for officers 
 and men, and the least sensitive feels the drama of 
 the crisis. Most of the British troops engaged had 
 twenty months before been employed in peaceable 
 civilian trades. In their ranks were every class and 
 condition — miners from north England, factory 
 hands from the industrial centres, clerks and shop- 
 boys, ploughmen and shepherds, Saxon and Celt, 
 college graduates and dock labourers, men who 
 in the wild places of the earth had often faced 
 danger, and men whose chief adventure had been 
 
 34 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 35 
 
 a Sunday bicycle ride. Nerves may be attuned to 
 the normal risks of trench warfare and yet shrink 
 from the desperate hazard of a charge into the 
 enemy's line. 
 
 But to one who visited the front before the 
 attack the most vivid impression was that of quiet 
 cheerfulness. There were no shirkers and few who 
 wished themselves elsewhere. One man's imagina- 
 tion might be more active than another's, but the 
 will to fight, and to fight desperately, was universal. 
 With the happy gift of the British soldier they had 
 turned the ghastly business of war into something 
 homely and familiar. Accordingly they took every- 
 thing as part of the day's work, and awaited the 
 supreme moment without heroics and without 
 tremor, confident in themselves, confident in their 
 guns, and confident in the triumph of their cause. 
 There was no savage lust of battle, but that far more 
 formidable thing — a resolution which needed no 
 rhetoric to support it. Norfolk's words were true 
 of every man of them: 
 
 "As gentle and as jocund as to jest 
 Go I to fight. Truth hath a quiet breast." * 
 
 * A letter written before the action by a young officer 
 gives expression to this joyful resolution. He fell in the 
 first day's battle and the letter was posted after his death : — 
 
 "I am writing this letter to you just before going into 
 action to-morrow morning about dawn. 
 
 "I am about to take part in the biggest battle that has 
 yet been fought in France, and one which ought to help to 
 end the war very quickly. 
 
 "I never felt more confident or cheerful in my life before, 
 and would not miss the attack for anything on earth. The 
 men are in splendid form, and every officer and man is more 
 happy and cheerful than I have ever seen them. I have 
 
36 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The British aim in this, the opening stage of the 
 battle, was the German first position. The attached 
 map shows its general line. In the section of assault, 
 running from north to south, it covered Gomme- 
 court, passed east of Hebuterne, followed the high 
 ground in front of Serre and Beaumont Hamel, and 
 crossed the Ancre a little to the north-west of Thiep- 
 val. It ran in front of Thiepval, which was very 
 strongly fortified, east of Authuille, and just covered 
 the hamlets of Ovillers and La Boisselle. There it 
 ran about a mile and a quarter east of Albert. It 
 then passed south round the woodland village of 
 
 just been playing a rag game of football in which the umpire 
 had a revolver and a whistle. 
 
 "My idea in writing this letter is in case I am one of the 
 'costs,' and get killed. I do not expect to be, but such things 
 have happened, and are always possible. 
 
 "It is impossible to fear death out here when one is no 
 longer an individual, but a member of a regiment and of an 
 army. To be killed means nothing to me, and it is only you 
 who suffer for it; you really pay the cost. 
 
 "I have been looking at the stars, and thinking what an 
 immense distance they are away. What an insignificant 
 thmg the loss of, say, 40 years of life is compared with them ! 
 It seems scarcely worth talking about. 
 
 "Well, good-bye, you darlings. Try not to worry about 
 it, and remember that we shall meet again really quite soon. 
 
 "This letter is going to be posted if . . . Lots of love. 
 From your loving son, 
 
 "Qui procul hinc 
 Ante diem periit, 
 Sed miles, sed pro Patria." 
 
 Fricourt, where it turned at right angles to the east, 
 covering Mametz and Montauban. Half-way be- 
 tween Maricourt and Hardecourt it turned south 
 
""'Ts — r 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 
 
 37 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE FRONT FROM MONCHY TO FAY^ JULY 1ST 
 XSHOWING GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES). 
 
88 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 again, covered Curlu, crossed the Somme at the 
 wide marsh near the place called Vaux, covered 
 Frise and Dompierre and Soyecourt, and passed just 
 east of Lihons, where it left the sector with which 
 we are now concerned. 
 
 The British front of attack"^ was disposed as 
 follows: From opposite Gommecourt to just south 
 of Beaumont Hamel lay the right wing of Sir Ed- 
 mund Allenby's Third Army and General Hunter 
 Weston's 8th Corps. From just north of the Ancre 
 to Authuille was General Morland's loth Corps, 
 East of Albert lay General Pulteney's 3rd Corps, 
 one division being directed against Ovillers, and 
 another against La Boisselle. South, curving round 
 the Fricourt salient to Mametz, lay General Home's 
 15th Corps. On the British right flank adjoining 
 the French lay General Congreve's 13th Corps. 
 
 It is clear that the Germans expected the attack 
 of the Allies, and had made a fairly accurate guess 
 as to its terrain. They assumed that the area would 
 be from Arras to Albert. In all that area they were 
 ready with a full concentration of men and guns. 
 South of Albert they were less prepared, and south 
 of the Somme they were caught napping. The 
 history of the first day is therefore the story of two 
 separate actions in the north and south, in the first 
 of which the Allies failed and in the second of which 
 they brilliantly succeeded. By the evening the first 
 action had definitely closed, and the weight of the 
 Allies was flung wholly into the second. That is 
 almost inevitable in an attack on a very broad front. 
 
 * According to the official dispatch the main British front 
 of attack was intended to be from Maricourt to the Ancre. 
 The attack from the Ancre to Gommecourt was subsidiary. 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 39 
 
 Some part will be found tougher than the rest, and 
 that part having been tried will be relinquished; 
 but it is the stubbornness of the knot and the failure 
 to take it which are the price of success elsewhere. 
 Let us first tell the tale of the desperate struggle 
 between Gommecourt and Thiepval. 
 
 The divisions in action there were three from 
 the New Army, two of the old regulars, which had 
 won fame both in Flanders and Gallipoli, and one 
 Territorial brigade. They had to face a chain of 
 fortified villages — Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont 
 Hamel, and Thiepval — and enemy positions which 
 were generally on higher and better ground. The 
 Ancre cut the line in two, with steep slopes rising 
 from the valley bottom. Each village had been so 
 fortified as to be almost impregnable, with a maze 
 of catacombs, often two stories deep, where whole 
 battalions could take refuge, underground passages 
 from the firing-line to sheltered places in the rear, 
 and pits into which machine guns could be lowered 
 during a bombardment. On the plateau behind, 
 with excellent direct observation, the Germans had 
 their guns massed. 
 
 It was this direct observation and the deep 
 shelters for machine guns which were the undoing 
 of the British attack from Gommecourt j , 
 to Thiepval. As our bombardment grew -^ 
 more intense on the morning of ist July, so did the 
 enemy's. Before our men could go over the para- 
 pets the Germans had plastered our front trenches 
 with high explosives, and in many places blotted 
 them out. All along our line, fifty yards before and 
 behind the first trench, they dropped 6-inch and 
 
40 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 8-inch high-explosive shells. The result was that 
 our men, instead of forming up in the front trench, 
 were compelled to form up in the open ground 
 behind, for the front trench had disappeared. In 
 addition to this there was an intense shrapnel bar- 
 rage, which must have been directed by observers, 
 for it followed our troops as they moved forward. 
 
 At Beaumont Hamel, under the place called 
 Hawthorn Redoubt, we had constructed a mine, the 
 largest yet known in the campaign. At 7.30 acres 
 of land leaped into the air, and our men advanced 
 imder the shadow of a pall of dust which turned 
 the morning into twilight. "The exploding cham- 
 ber,'' said a sergeant, describing it afterwards, "was 
 as big as a picture palace, and the gallery was an 
 awful length. It took us seven months to build, 
 and we were working under some of the crack Lan- 
 cashire miners. Every time a fresh fatigue party 
 came up they'd say to the miners. Ain't your grotto 
 ever going up?' But, my lord! it went up all 
 right on ist July. It was the sight of your life. 
 Half the village got a rise. The air was full of 
 stuff — wagons, wheels, horses, tins, boxes, and 
 Germans. It was seven months well spent getting 
 that mine ready. I believe some of the pieces are 
 coming down still." 
 
 As our men began to cross No Man's Land, the 
 Germans seemed to man their ruined parapets, and 
 fired rapidly with automatic rifles and machine guns. 
 They had special light musketon battalions, armed 
 with machine guns and automatic rifles, who showed 
 marvellous intrepidity, some even pushing their guns 
 forward into No Man's Land to enfilade our ad- 
 vance. Moreover they had machine-gun pits far 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — FRONT OF BRITISH LEFT ATTACK, JULY (gOMME- 
 
 COURT TO THIEPVAL). 
 
42 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 in front of their parapets, connected with their 
 trenches by deep tunnels secure from shell-fire. 
 The British moved forward in line after line, dressed 
 as if on parade; not a man wavered or broke rank; 
 but minute by minute the ordered lines melted away 
 under the deluge of high-explosive, shrapnel, rifle, 
 and machine-gun fire. There was no question about 
 the German weight of artillery. From dawn till long 
 after noon they maintained this steady drenching 
 fire. Gallant individuals or isolated detachments 
 managed here and there to break into the enemy 
 position, and some even penetrated well behind it, 
 but these were episodes, and the ground they won 
 could not be held. By the evening, from Gomme- 
 court to Thiepval, the attack had been everywhere 
 checked, and our troops — what was left of them — 
 were back again in their old line. They had struck 
 the core of the main German defence. 
 
 In that stubborn action against impossible odds 
 the gallantry was so universal and absolute that it 
 is idle to select special cases. In each mile there 
 were men who performed the incredible. Nearly 
 every English, Scots, and Irish regiment was repre- 
 sented, as well as Midland and London Territorials, 
 a gallant little company of Rhodesians, and a New- 
 foundland battalion drawn from the hard-bitten 
 fishermen of that iron coast, who lost terribly on 
 the slopes of Beaumont Hamel. Repeatedly the 
 German position was pierced. At Serre fragments 
 of two battalions pushed as far as Pendant Copse, 
 2,000 yards from the British lines. Troops of one 
 division broke through south of Beaumont Hamel, 
 and got to the Station Road beyond the Quarry, 
 but few ever returned. One Scottish battalion en- 
 
;rs,'hi 
 
 >elville 
 .Wood 
 
 Farm 
 
 D / 
 
>^x. ^ -Becordel '''''"''ff'^'-^yV/^^ .■- 
 
 M\- '^«//,Maltzhorn Farm .7 
 Brickfields "^ %/ Vi !: 
 
 UK v-4., ^' 
 
 0,. M'jl 1 1 ? Hardecourt>\y/ 
 J|?<J jj^' o_ <,aux Bois V 
 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME — FRONT OF THE BRITISH CENTRE AND RIGHT ATTACK, JULY I 
 (OVILLERS TO MONTAUBAn) 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 43 
 
 tered Thiepval village. North of Thiepval the 
 Ulster Division broke through the enemy trenches, 
 passed the crest of the ridge, and reached the point 
 called The Crucifix, in rear of the first German 
 position. For a little they held the strong Schwaben 
 Redoubt, which we were not to enter again till after 
 three months of battle, and some even got into the 
 outskirts of Grandcourt. It was the anniversary day 
 of the Battle of the Boyne, and that charge when the 
 men shouted "Remember the Boyne'' will be for 
 ever a glorious page in the annals of Ireland. The 
 Royal Irish Fusiliers were first out of the trenches. 
 The Royal Irish Rifles followed them over the Ger- 
 man parapets, bayoneting the machine gunners, and 
 the Inniskillings cleared the trenches to which they 
 had given Irish names. Enfiladed on three sides they 
 went on through successive German lines, and only 
 a remnant came back to tell the tale. That rem- 
 nant brought many prisoners, one man herding fif- 
 teen of the enemy through their own barrage. In 
 the words of the general who commanded it: "The 
 division carried out every portion of its allotted task 
 in spite of the heaviest losses. It captured nearly 
 600 prisoners and carried its advance triumphantly 
 to the limits of the objective laid down." Nothing 
 finer was done in the war. The splendid troops, 
 drawn from those volunteers who had banded them- 
 selves together for another cause, now shed their 
 blood like water for the liberty of the world. 
 
 That grim struggle from Thiepval northward 
 was responsible for by far the greater number of 
 the Allied losses of the day. But, though costly, it 
 was not fruitless, for it occupied the bulk of the 
 German defence. It was the price which had to be 
 
44 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 paid for the advance of the rest of the front. For, 
 while in the north the Hving wave broke vainly and 
 gained little, in the south ''by creeks and inlets mak- 
 ing" the tide was flowing strongly shoreward. 
 
 The map will show that Fricourt forms a bold 
 salient; and it was the Allied purpose not to as- 
 sault this salient but to cut it off. An advance on 
 Ovillers and La Boisselle and up the long shallow 
 depression towards Contalmaison, which our men 
 called Sausage Valley, would, if united with the 
 carrying of Mametz, pinch it so tightly that it must 
 fall. Ovillers and La Boisselle were strongly fortified 
 villages, and on this first day, while we won the 
 outskirts and carried the entrenchments before them, 
 we did not control the ruins which our guns had 
 pounded out of the shape of habitable dwellings. 
 Elements of one brigade actually penetrated into La 
 Boisselle, and held a portion of the village. 
 
 Just west of Fricourt a division was engaged 
 which had suffered grave misfortunes at Loos. That 
 day it got back its own, and proved once again that 
 an enemy can meet no more formidable foes than 
 British troops which have a score to wipe off. It 
 made no mistake, but poured resolutely into the 
 angle east of Sausage Valley, carrying Lozenge 
 Wood and Round Wood, and driving in a deep 
 wedge north of Fricourt. 
 
 Before evening Mametz fell. Its church stood 
 up, a broken tooth of masonry among the shattered 
 houses, with an amphitheatre of splintered woods 
 behind and around it. South of it ran a high road, 
 and south of the road lay a little hill, with the Ger- 
 man trench lines on the southern side. Opposite 
 
o 
 
 en 
 
 h-t 
 < 
 
 < 
 
 O 
 U 
 
 W 
 o 
 
 w 
 
 H 
 
 Q 
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 O 
 
 P4 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 45 
 
 Mametz our assembly trenches had been destroyed 
 by the enemy's fire, so that the attacking infantry 
 had to advance over 400 yards of open ground. The 
 division which took the place was one of the most 
 renowned in the British Army. It had fought at 
 First Ypres, at Festubert, and at Loos. Since the 
 autumn of 1914 it had been changed in its compo- 
 sition, but there were in it battalions which had 
 been for twenty months in the field. The whole 
 division, old and new alike, went forward to their 
 task as if it were the first day of war. On the 
 slopes of the little hill three battalions advanced in 
 line — one from a southern English county, one from 
 a northern city, one of Highland regulars. They 
 carried everything before them, and to one who 
 followed their track the regularity of their advance 
 was astonishing, for the dead lay aligned as if on 
 some parade. 
 
 Montauban fell early in the day, the Manchesters 
 being the first troops to enter. The British lines lay 
 in the hollow north of the Albert-Peronne road, 
 where stands the hamlet of Carnoy. On the crest 
 of the ridge beyond lay Montauban, now, like most 
 Santerre villages, a few broken walls set among 
 splintered trees. The brickfields on the right were 
 expected to be the scene of a fierce struggle, but, 
 to our amazement, they had been so shattered by 
 our guns that they were taken easily. The Mon- 
 tauban attack was perhaps the most perfect of the 
 episodes of the day. The artillery had done its 
 work, and the 6th Bavarian Regiment opposed to 
 us lost 3,000 out of a total strength of 3,500. The 
 division which formed the British right wing moved 
 forward in parade order to a speedy success. 
 
46 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 At that point was seen a sight hitherto unwit- 
 nessed in the campaign — the advance in Hne of the 
 troops of Britain and France. On the British right 
 lay the 20th Corps — the corps which had held the 
 Grand Couronne of Nancy in the feverish days of 
 the Marne battle, and which by its counter-attack at 
 Douaumont on that snowy 26th of February had 
 turned the tide at Verdun. It was the 39th Divi- 
 sion, under General Nourrisson, which moved in 
 line with the British — horizon-blue beside khaki, 
 and behind both the comforting bark of the incom- 
 parable "7S's.'' 
 
 To walk over the captured ground was to learn 
 a profound respect for the beaver-like industry of 
 the German soldier. His fatigue-work must have 
 reached the heroic scale. The old firing trenches 
 were so badly smashed by our guns that it was hard 
 to follow them, but what was left was good. The 
 soil of the place was the best conceivable for dig- 
 ging, for it cut like cheese, and hardened like brick 
 in dry weather. The map shows a ramification of 
 little red lines, but only the actual sight of that 
 labyrinth could give a true impression of its strength. 
 One communication trench, for example, was a 
 tunnel a hundred yards long, lined with timber 
 throughout, and so deep as to be beyond the reach 
 of the heaviest shells. The small manholes used 
 for snipers' posts were skilfully contrived. Tunnels 
 led to them from the trenches, and the openings 
 were artfully screened by casual-looking debris. 
 But the greatest marvels were the dug-outs. One 
 at Fricourt had nine rooms and five bfelt-holes; it 
 had iron doors, gas curtains, linoleum on the floors, 
 wallpaper and pictures on the walls, and boasted 
 
THE FIKST STAGE 47 
 
 a good bath-room, electric light, and electric bells. 
 The staff which occupied it must have lived in 
 luxury. Many of these dug-outs had two storeys, 
 a thirty foot staircase, beautifully finished, leading 
 to the first suite, and a second stair of the same 
 length conducting to a lower storey. In such places 
 machine guns could be protected during any bom- 
 bardment. But the elaboration of such dwellings 
 went far beyond militar}^ needs. When the Ger- 
 mans boasted that their front on the West was im- 
 pregnable they sincerely believed it. They thought 
 they had established a continuing city, from which 
 they would emerge only at a triumphant peace. The 
 crumbling — not of their front trenches only but of 
 their whole first position — was such a shock as King 
 Priam's court must have received when the Wooden 
 Horse disgorged the Greeks in the heart of their 
 citadel. 
 
 It was not won without stark fighting. The 
 British soldiers were quick to kindle in the fight, 
 and more formidable figures than those bronzed, 
 steel-hatted warriors history has never seen on a 
 field of battle. Those who witnessed the charge of 
 the Highlanders at Loos were not likely to forget 
 its fierce resolution. Said a French officer who was 
 present: ''I don't know what effect it had on the 
 Boche, but it made my blood run cold." Our men 
 were fighting against the foes of humanity, and they 
 did not make war as a joke. But there was none 
 of the savagery which comes either from a half- 
 witted militarism or from rattled nerves. The Ger- 
 mans had been officially told that the British took 
 no prisoners, and this falsehood, while it made the 
 stouter fellows fight to the death, sent scores of 
 
48 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 poor creatures huddling in dug-outs, from which 
 they had to be extracted like shell-fish. But, after 
 surrender, there was no brutality — very much the 
 reverse. As one watched the long line of wounded 
 — the ''walking cases" — straggling back from the 
 firing-line to a dressing-station, they might have 
 been all of one side. One picture remains in the 
 memory. Two wounded Gordon Highlanders were 
 hobbling along, and supported between them a 
 wounded Badener. The last seen of the trio was 
 that the Scots were giving him water and cigarettes, 
 and he was cutting buttons from his tunic as souve- 
 nirs for his comforters. A letter of an officer on 
 this point is worth quoting: — 
 
 "The more I see of war the more I am convinced of the 
 fundamental decency of our own folk. They may have a 
 crude taste in music and art and things of that sort; they 
 may lack the patient industry of the Boche; but for sheer 
 goodness of heart, for kindness to all unfortunate things, 
 like prisoners, wounded, animals, and ugly women, they fairly 
 beat the band." 
 
 It is the kind of tribute which most Britons would 
 prefer to any other. 
 
 From the point of junction with the British for 
 eight miles southward the French advanced with 
 lightning speed and complete success. From Mari- 
 court to the Somme the country was still upland, 
 but lower than the region to the north. South of 
 the marshy Somme valley an undulating plain 
 stretched east to the great crook of the river beyond 
 which lay Peronne, a fortress girdled by its moat of 
 three streams. General Foch had planned his ad- 
 vance on the same lines as the British, the same 
 methodical preparation, the same limited objective 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 49 
 
 for each stage. North of the Somrne, where Bal- 
 fourier had to face the loth Bavarians and the 12th 
 Division, there was a stiff fight on the Albert-Pe- 
 ronne road, at the cHff abutting on the river called 
 the "Gendarme's Hat," and in front of the villages 
 of Curlu and Hardecourt. Of these on that ist day 
 of July the French reached the outskirts, as we 
 reached the outskirts of Fricourt and La Boisselle, 
 but had to postpone their capture till the morrow. 
 South of the river the Colonials, whose attack did 
 not begin till 9.30 a.m., took the enemy completely 
 by surprise. Officers were captured shaving in their 
 dug-outs, whole battalions were rounded up, and all 
 was done with the minimum of loss. One French 
 regiment had two casualties; 800 was the total of 
 one division. Long ere the evening the villages of 
 Dompierre, Becquincourt, and Bussu were in their 
 hands, and five miles had been bitten out of the 
 German front. Fay was taken the same day by the 
 Bretons of the 35th Corps. Between them the Allies 
 that day had captured the enemy first position in 
 its entirety from Mametz to Fay, a front of four- 
 teen miles. Some six thousand prisoners were in 
 their hands, and a great quantity of guns and stores. 
 In the powdered trenches, in the woods and valleys 
 behind, and in the labyrinths of ruined dwellings, 
 the German dead lay thick. '^That is the purpose 
 of the battle/' said a French ofiicer. "We do not 
 want guns, for Krupp can make them faster than 
 we can take them. But Krupp cannot make 
 men." 
 
 Sunday, the 2nd of July, was a day of level 
 heat, when the dust stood in steady walls on every 
 road behind the front and in the tortured areas of 
 
50 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE FIRST FRENCH ADVANCE NORTH OF THE 
 
 SOMME. 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — ALLIED FRONT ON JULY 2 (SHOWING ORIGINAL LINE ON THE 1ST AND 
 GROUND WON UP TO THE EVENING OF THE 2Nd) 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 51 
 
 the captured ground. The success of the Saturday- 
 had, as we have seen, put the British right wing 
 well in advance of their centre, and it was neces- 
 sary to bring forward the left part of r , 
 the line from Thiepval to Fricourt so as -^ ' 
 to make the breach in the German position uniform 
 over a broad enough front. The extreme British 
 left was now inactive. A new attack in the circum- 
 stances would have given no results, and the Ulster 
 Division — what remained of its advanced guard — 
 fell back from the Schwaben Redoubt to its original 
 line. The front was rapidly getting too large and 
 intricate for any single army commander to handle, 
 so it was resolved to give the terrain north of the 
 Albert-Bapaume road, including the area of the 4th 
 and 8th Corps, to the Reserve or Fifth Army, un- 
 der Sir Hubert Gough. 
 
 All that day a fierce struggle was waged by the 
 3rd Corps at Ovillers and La Boisselle. Two new 
 divisions had entered the line. At Ovillers one of 
 them carried the entrenchments before it, and late 
 in the evening the other succeeded in entering 
 the labyrinth of cellars, the ruins of what had been 
 La Boisselle. The troops on their right, pushing 
 across Sausage Valley, came to the skirts of the 
 Round Wood. As yet there was no counter-attack. 
 The surprise in the south had been too great, and 
 the Germans had not yet brought up their reserve 
 divisions. All that day squadrons of Allied air- 
 planes bombed depots and lines of communications 
 in the German hinterland. The long echelons of 
 the Allied ^'sausages'' glittered in the sun, but only 
 one German kite balloon could be detected. We had 
 found a way — the Verdun way — of bombing those 
 
52 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 fragile gas-bags and turning them into wisps of 
 flame. The Fokkers strove in vain to check our air- 
 men, and at least two were brought crashing to the 
 earth. 
 
 At noon on Sunday Fricourt fell; the taking of 
 Mametz and the positions won in the Fricourt Wood 
 to the east had made its capture certain. One divi- 
 sion took Round Wood ; a second, brought up from 
 corps reserve, attacked across the Fricourt-Contal- 
 maison road ; and a third carried the village. During 
 the night part of the garrison had slipped out, but 
 when our men entered it, bombing from house to 
 house, they made a great haul of prisoners and guns. 
 Early that morning the Germans had counter-at- 
 tacked at Montauban, and been easily repulsed, and 
 during the day our patrols were pushed east into 
 Bernafay Wood. 
 
 Farther south the French continued their vic- 
 torious progress. They destroyed a German coun- 
 ter-attack on the new position at Hardecourt; they 
 took Curlu; and, south of the river, they took Frise 
 and the wood of Mereaucourt beyond it, and the 
 strongly fortified village of Herbecourt. They did 
 more, for at many points between the river and 
 Assevilliers they broke into the German second posi- 
 tion. Fayolle's left now commanded the Hght rail- 
 way from Combles to Peronne, his centre held the 
 big loop of the Somme at Frise, and his right was 
 only four miles from Peronne itself. 
 
 On Monday, 3rd July, General von Below issued 
 an order to his troops, which showed that, whatever 
 
 Julv 'I ^ffi^j^l Germany might say, the German 
 soldiers had no delusion as to the gravity 
 of the Allied offensive. 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — ALLIED FRONT ON JULY 3 (SHOWING THE ORIGINAL LINE ON JULY I 
 AND THE GROUND WON UP TO THE EVENING OF JULY 3) 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 53 
 
 "The decisive issue of the war depends on the victory 
 of the 2nd Army on the Somme. We must win this battle 
 in spite of the enemy's temporary superiority in artillery 
 and infantry. The important ground lost in certain places 
 will be recaptured by our attack after the arrival of rein- 
 forcements. The vital thing is to hold on to our present 
 positions at all costs and to improve them. I forbid the 
 voluntary evacuation of trenches. The will to stand firm 
 must be impressed on every man in the army. The enemy 
 should have to carve his way over heaps of corpses. ... I 
 require commanding officers to devote their utmost energies 
 to the establishment of order behind the front." 
 
 Von Below had correctly estimated the position. 
 The old ground, with all it held, must be re-won if 
 possible; no more must be lost; fresh lines must be 
 constructed in the rear. But the new improvised 
 lines could be no equivalent of those mighty fast- 
 nesses which represented the work of eighteen 
 months. Therefore those fastnesses must be re- 
 gained. We shall learn how ill his enterprise pros- 
 pered. 
 
 For a correct understanding of the position on 
 Monday, 3rd July, it is necessary to recall the exact 
 alignment of the new British front. It fell into two 
 sections. The first lay from Thiepval to Fricourt, 
 and was bisected by the Albert-Bapaume road, which 
 ran like an arrow over the watershed. Here Thiep- 
 val, Ovillers, and La Boisselle were positions in the 
 German first line. Contalmaison, to the east of La 
 Boisselle, was a strongly fortified village on high 
 ground, which formed, so to speak, a pivot in the 
 German intermediate line — the line which covered 
 their field guns. The second position ran through 
 Pozieres to the two Bazentins and on to Guillemont. 
 On the morning of 3rd July the British had not got 
 
54 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Thiepval, nor Ovillers; they had only a portion of 
 La Boisselle ; but south of it they had broken through 
 the first position and were well on the road to Con- 
 talmaison. All this northern section consisted of 
 bare undulating" slopes — once covered with crops, 
 but now powdered and bare like some alkali desert. 
 Everywhere it was seamed with the scars of trenches 
 and pock-marked with shell holes. The few trees 
 lining the roads had been long razed, and the only 
 vegetation was coarse grass, thistles, and the ubiqui- 
 tous poppy and mustard. 
 
 The southern section, from Fricourt to Mon- 
 tauban, was of a different character. It was patched 
 with large woods, curiously clean cut like the copses 
 in the park of a country house. A line of them ran 
 from Fricourt north-eastward — Fricourt Wood, Bot- 
 tom Wood, the big wood of Mametz, the woods of 
 Bazentin, and the wood of Foureaux, which our men 
 called High Wood; while from Montauban ran a 
 second line, the woods of Bernafay and Trones and 
 Delville Wood around Longueval. Here all the 
 German first position had been captured. The sec- 
 ond position ran through the Bazentins, Longueval, 
 and Guillemont, but to reach it some difficult wood- 
 land country had to be traversed. On 3rd July, 
 therefore, the southern half of the British line was 
 advancing against the enemy's second position, while 
 the northern half had still for its objective Ovillers 
 and La Boisselle in the first position and the inter- 
 mediate point, Contalmaison. 
 
 It will be convenient to take the two sections sep- 
 arately, since their problems were different, and 
 see the progress of the British advance in each, pre- 
 paratory to the assault on the enemy's second posi- 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME— OVILLERS, LA BOISSELLE, AND CONTALMAISON 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 55 
 
 tion. In the north our task was to carry the three 
 fortified places, Ovillers, La Boisselle, and Contal- 
 maison, which were on a large scale the equivalent 
 of the fortius, manned by machine guns, which we 
 had known to our cost at Festubert and Loos. 
 Thiepval on the extreme left was less important, for 
 the high ground could be won without its capture. 
 The German troops in this area obeyed to the full 
 von Below's instructions and fought hard for every 
 acre. On the night of Sunday, 2nd July, La Bois- 
 selle was penetrated, ?nd all Monday the struggle 
 swayed around that village and Ovillers. La Bois- 
 selle lies on the right of the high road; Ovillers is 
 to the north and a little to the east, separated by 
 a dry hollow which we called Mash Valley. On 
 Monday one division attacked south of Thiepval, 
 but failed to advance, largely because its left flank 
 was unsupported. All night the struggle see-sawed, 
 our troops winning ground and the Germans win- 
 ning back small portions. On Tuesday, j , 
 the 4th, the heat wave broke in thunder- ^ ^' 
 
 storms and torrential rain, and the dusty hollows 
 became quagmires. Next morning La Boisselle was 
 finally carried, after one of the bloodiest contests of 
 the battle, and the attack was carried forwards to- 
 ward Bailiff Wood and Contalmaison. 
 
 That day, Wednesday, the 5 th, we attacked the 
 Horseshoe Trench, the main defence of Contal- 
 maison from the west. There a West ^ , 
 Yorks battalion distinguished themselves *^ 
 
 by a bold advance. On Friday, 7th July, came 
 the first big attack on Contalmaison from Sausage 
 Valley on the south-west, and from the tangle of 
 copses north-east of Fricourt, through which ran 
 
56 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the Fricourt-Contalmaison high road. On the latter 
 side good work had already been done, the enemy 
 fortius at Birch Tree Wood and Shelter Wood and 
 the work called the Quadrangle having been taken 
 on 3rd July, along with 1,100 prisoners. On the 
 r 7 Friday the attack ranged from the Leip- 
 
 ^ ^' zig Redoubt, south of Thiepval, and the 
 environs of Ovillers to the skirts of Contalmaison. 
 About noon our infantry, after carrying Bailiff 
 Wood, took Contalmaison by storm, releasing a small 
 party of Northumberland Fusiliers, who had been 
 made prisoners four days earlier. The 3rd Prussian 
 Guard Division — the famous "Cockchafers" — were 
 now our opponents. They were heavily punished, 
 and 700 of them fell as prisoners into our hands. But 
 our success at Contalmaison was beyond our strength 
 to maintain, and in the afternoon a counter-attack 
 forced us out of the village. That same day our left 
 wing had pushed their front nearly half a mile along 
 the Bapaume road, east of La Boisselle, and taken 
 most of the Leipzig Redoubt. Ovillers was now in 
 danger of envelopment. One brigade had attacked 
 in front, and another, pressing in on the north-east 
 flank, was cutting the position in two. All that day 
 there was a deluge of rain, and the sodden ground 
 and flooded trenches crippled the movement of our 
 men. 
 
 Next day the struggle for Ovillers continued. The 
 place was now a mass of battered trenches, rub- 
 T r. ble, and muddy shell-holes, and every 
 -^ * yzvd had to be fought for. We were also 
 slowly consolidating our ground around Contalmai- 
 son, and driving the Germans from their strong- 
 holds in the little copses. Ever since 7th July we 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 57 
 
 had held the southern corner of the village. On 
 the night of Monday, the loth, pushing j. ^^ 
 from Bailiff Wood on the west side in . f 
 four successive waves, with the guns lifting the 
 range in front of us, we broke into the north-west 
 corner, swept round on the north, and after bitter 
 hand-to-hand fighting conquered the whole village. 
 As for Ovillers, it was now surrounded and beyond 
 succour, and it was only a question of days till its 
 stubborn garrison must yield. It did not actually fall 
 till Sunday, i6th July, when the gallant j, ^g 
 remnant — two officers and 124 Guards- ^ -^ 
 men — surrendered. By that time our main push had 
 swept far to the eastward. 
 
 A good description of the country over which we 
 had advanced is contained in a letter of an officer 
 to a friend who had been invalided home: — 
 
 "I suppose it would seem nothing to other people, but 
 you, who were here with us through all those dismal winter 
 months, will understand how thrilling it was to be able to 
 walk about on that ground in broad dayHght, smoking one's 
 pipe. You remember how our chaps used to risk their lives 
 in the early days for such silly souvenirs as nose-caps and that 
 kind of thing. You could gather them by the cartload now, 
 and Boche caps and buttons, and bits of uniform and boots, 
 and broken rifles and odd tags of equipment — cartloads of it. 
 To other folk, and on the maps, one place seems just like 
 another, I suppose ; but to us — La Boisselle and Ovillers — my 
 hat ! To walk about in those hells ! Not one of those broken 
 walls we knew so well (through our glasses) is standing now ; 
 and only a few jagged spikes where the trees were. I went 
 along the 'sunken road' all the way to Contalmaison. Talk 
 about sacred ground. When I think what that No Man's 
 Land was to us for nearly a year ! The new troops coming 
 up now go barging across it in the most light-hearted way. 
 They know nothing about it. It means no more to them 
 than the roads behind used to mean to us. It's all behind. 
 
58 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 to them, and never was the front. But when I think how we 
 watered every yard of it with blood and sweat! Children 
 might play there now, if it didn't look so much like the after- 
 math of an earthquake. But you know there's a kind of a 
 wrench about seeing the new chaps swagger over it so care- 
 lessly, and seeing it gradually merged into the ^behind the 
 line' country. I have a sort of feeling it ought to be marked 
 off somehow, a permanent memorial. 
 
 "You remember that old couple who had the blacksmith's 
 
 shop at . The wife was down at the comer by 
 
 the other night, when I came along with half the platoon. 
 I found her wringing the hands of some of our stolid chaps, 
 and couldn't make it out. Then she told me, half sobbing, 
 how she and her husband owned a couple of fields just beyond 
 our old front line, and how she wanted to thank us for getting 
 them back. Think what those fields must have been in the 
 spring of 1914, and what they are to-day, every yard of 
 them torn by shells, burrowed through and through by old 
 trenches and dug-outs; think of the hundreds of tons of 
 wire, sand-bags, timber, galvanised iron, duck-boards, re- 
 vetting stuff, steel, iron, blood and sweat, the rum jars, bully 
 beef tins, old trench boots, field dressings, cartridge cases, 
 rockets, wire stanchions and stakes, gas gongs, bomb boxes, 
 S.A.A. cases, broken canteens, bits of uniforms, and buried 
 soldiers, and Boches — all in the old lady's two little fields. 
 Think how she must have felt, after two years, to know we'd 
 got them back. She's walked over them by now, I daresay." 
 
 To turn to the southern sector, where the prob- 
 lem was to clear out the fortified woods which in- 
 tervened between us and the German second line. 
 From the crest of the first ridge behind Fricourt and 
 Montauban one looks into a shallow trough, called 
 Caterpillar Valley, beyond which the ground rises 
 to the Bazentin-Longueval line. On the left, toward 
 Contalmaison, is the big Mametz Wood ; to the right, 
 beyond Montauban, the pear-shaped woods of Berna- 
 f ay and Trones. 
 
 On Monday, the 3rd, the ground east of Fricourt 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — THE WOODED HINTEKLAND OF FRICOURT AND MAMETZ 
 
•^ 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 59 
 
 »■' 
 
 Wood was cleared, and the approaches to Mametz 
 Wood won. That day a German counter- j , 
 attack developed. A fresh division ar- ^ ^* 
 
 rived at Montauban, which was faithfully handled 
 by our guns. The ''milking of the line" had begun, 
 for a battalion from the Champagne front appeared 
 east of Mametz early on Monday morning. With- 
 in a very short time of detraining at railhead the 
 whole battalion had been destroyed or made pris- 
 oners. In one small area over a thousand men were 
 taken. A wounded officer of a Highland regiment 
 has described the scene : — 
 
 "It was the finest show I ever saw in my life. There 
 were six hundred Boches of all ranks marching in column 
 of route across the open back towards our rear. They were 
 disarmed, of course. And what do you think they had for 
 escort? Three ragged Jocks of our battalion, all blood and 
 dirt and rags, with their rifles at the slope, doing a sort of 
 G.O.C.'s inspection parade march, like pipers at the head 
 of a battalion. That was good enough for me. I brought 
 up the rear, and that's how I got to a dressing-station and 
 had my arm dressed. I walked behind a six hundred strong 
 column of Boches, but I couldn't equal the swagger of those 
 three Jocks in the lead." 
 
 Next day, Tuesday, 4th July, we had entered the 
 Wood of Mametz, 3,000 yards north of Mametz 
 village, and had taken the Wood of Ber- j , 
 nafay. These intermediate positions ^ y A- 
 were not acquired without a grim struggle. The 
 woods were thick with undergrowth which had not 
 been cut for two seasons, and though our artillery 
 played havoc with the trees it could not clear away 
 the tangled shrubbery beneath them. The Ger- 
 mans had filled the place with machine-gun re- 
 doubts, connected by concealed trenches, and in 
 
60 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 some cases they had machine guns in positions in 
 the trees. Each step in our advance had to be fought 
 for, and in that briery labyrinth the battle tended 
 always to become a series of individual combats. 
 Every position we won was subjected at once to a 
 heavy counter-bombardment. During the first two 
 days of July it was possible to move in moderate 
 safety almost up to the British firing-lines, but from 
 the 4th onward the enemy kept up a steady bom- 
 bardment of our whole new front, and barraged 
 heavily in all the hinterland around Fricourt, Ma- 
 metz, and Montauban. 
 
 On Saturday, 8th July, we made a lodgment in 
 the Wood of Trones, assisted by the flanking fire 
 
 T J o of the French guns. On that day the 
 ■^ ' French on our right were advancing 
 towards Maltzhorn Farm. For the next five days 
 Trones Wood was the hottest corner in the south- 
 ern British sector. Its peculiar situation gave every 
 chance to the defence. There was only one cov- 
 ered approach to it from the west — by way of the 
 trench called Trones Alley. The southern part was 
 commanded by the Maltzhorn ridge, and the north- 
 ern by the German position at Longueval. Around 
 the wood to north and east the enemy second line 
 lay in a half -moon, so that they could concen- 
 trate upon it a converging artillery fire, and 
 could feed their own garrison in the place with re- 
 serves at their pleasure. Finally, the denseness of 
 the covert, cut only by the railway clearings and the 
 German communication trenches, made organised 
 movement impossible. It was not till our pressure 
 elsewhere diverted the German artillery fire that the 
 wood as a whole could be won. Slowly and stub- 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 
 
 61 
 
 bornly we pushed our way northwards from our 
 point of lodgment in the southern end. Six counter- 
 attacks were launched against us on Sunday night 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — ^BERNAFAY AND TRONES WOODS. 
 
 and Monday, and on Monday afternoon the sixth 
 succeeded in winning back some of the j ■, 
 wood. These desperate efforts exactly ^ 
 suited our purpose, for the German losses under our 
 artillery fire were enormous. The fighting was con- 
 tinued on Tuesday, when we recaptured the whole 
 of the wood except the extreme northern r , 
 corner. That same day we approached ^ 
 
 the north end of Mametz Wood. The difficulty of 
 
62 THE BATTLE OP THE SOMME 
 
 the fighting and the strength of the defence may 
 be realised from the fact that the taking of a few 
 hundred yards or so of woodland meant invariably 
 the capture of several hundred prisoners. 
 
 By Wednesday evening, 12th July, we had taken 
 virtually the whole of Mametz Wood. Its two hun- 
 
 j J dred odd acres, interlaced with barbed 
 
 ^ * wire, honeycombed with trenches, and 
 .bristling with machine guns, had given us a tough 
 struggle, especially the last strip on the north side, 
 where the German machine-gun positions enfiladed 
 every advance. Next day we cleared this corner and 
 broke out of the wood, and were face to face at last 
 with the main German second position. Meantime, 
 the Wood of Trones had become a Tom Tiddler's 
 Ground, which neither antagonist could fully claim 
 or use as a base. It was at the mercy of the ar- 
 tillery fire of both sides, and it was impossible in 
 the time to construct shell-proof defences. 
 
 In the French section the advance had been swift 
 and continuous. The attack, as we have seen, 
 was a complete surprise; for, half an hour before 
 it began on ist July, an order was issued to 
 the German troops, predicting the imminent fall of 
 Verdun, and announcing that a French offensive 
 elsewhere had thereby been prevented. On the 
 nine-mile front from Maricourt to Estrees the 
 German first position had been carried the first 
 day. The heavy guns, when they had sufficiently 
 pounded it, ceased their fire; then the ^'75's" took 
 up the tale and plastered the front and com- 
 munication trenches with shrapnel; then a skir- 
 mishing line advanced to report the damage done; 
 and finally the infantry moved forward to an easy 
 
ALBER^^^ Bdcourt O 
 
 mcsnii- 1 o , 
 lAartinsart ^ 
 
 Petit 
 
 Miraunjont 
 Grandcourt 
 
 'Thicpval 
 
 Aui.lmile "^'^ 
 
 ° o aOvillers- <f ^^ ..„. 
 
 La_^Boisclle ''A;^ o^i-i-i^' V \^lbi ^■^ "ehille ~--^^^ gj^;,. 
 
 ft Q.<i fotireaux Ij 
 
 -"i.-""'>y*'— 
 
 i^Beaulencourt 
 
 iLe Translojr 
 
 \ O 
 
 OLeo Bceuls \ Ro'quieny 
 
 8m 
 
 Wmd 
 
 ■t .t trQoa y li" > — -^ /V_, s^ft'^UGuilleinOnt 1 II « * * t * 
 
 •i. / ■=- Monlauban -^^><;U-5 ^„ ,^,^, oJcOMBLES // %f,';- 
 
 V O Fricourt / \Jr "^ K' ^ Z/l A "'^'' 
 
 O Mametz ,. ^ W \- '%f~ 
 
 1 . If ^a^Hai'decourt ., 
 
 i Carnoy / ^\I^(( *^"'!,i G 1 ■ 'J7 -' O Leforest 
 
 -«* ' ' ■\\xf-' iMaurepas 
 
 '"'^ I \\V/ ''" '■; • •« Bouchavcsncs 
 
 \ -^ It) ' \ ... *"" * V « \t) 
 
 1 S /^j O 
 
 8.. To St Qucnlin 
 
 J M.IM 111 
 
 BAITLK OF THE SOMME— MAI- SHOWING THE AU-lEO FSONT LINE ON JULY I AND THE OIOUND 
 GAINED UI" TO JULY I4 
 
THE FIRST STAGE 63 
 
 occupation. It had been the German method at 
 Verdun; but it was practised by the French with 
 far greater precision, and with far better fighting 
 material. 
 
 On Monday, 3rd July, they were into the Ger- 
 man second position south of the Somme. Twelve 
 German battalions were hurried up from r , 
 the Aisne, only to be destroyed. By the ^ ^' 
 
 next day the Foreign Legion in the Colonial Corps 
 had taken Belloy-en-Santerre, a point in the third 
 line. On Wednesday the 35th Corps j , 
 had the better part of Estrees and were ^ ^' 
 
 within three miles of Peronne. Counter-attacks by 
 the 17th Division, which had been brought up in 
 support, achieved nothing, and the German rail- 
 head was moved from Peronne to Chaulnes. On 
 the night of Sunday, 9th July, Fayolle took Biaches, 
 a mile from Peronne, and the high j i p. 
 ground called La Maisonnette, and held ^ ^' 
 
 a front from there to north of Barleux — a position 
 beyond the German third line. There was now noth- 
 ing in front of him in this section except the line 
 of the Upper Somme. This was south of the river. 
 North of it he had attained points in the second line, 
 but had not yet carried it wholly from Hem north- 
 wards. 
 
 The deep and broad wedge which their centre had 
 driven towards Peronne gave the French positions 
 for a flanking fire on the enemy ground on the left. 
 Their artillery, even the heavies, was now far for- 
 ward in the open, and old peasants beyond the 
 Somme, waiting patiently in their captivity, heard 
 the guns of their countrymen sounding daily nearer. 
 In less than a fortnight Fayolle had, on a front ten 
 
64 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 miles long, with a maximum depth of six and a half 
 miles, carried 50 square miles of fortifications, and 
 captured 85 guns, vast quantities of war material, 
 236 officers, and 12,000 men. 
 
 The next step was for the British to attack the 
 enemy second position before them. It ran, as we 
 have seen, from Pozieres through the Bazentins and 
 
 J J Longueval to Guillemont. On Thurs- 
 
 ^ ^' day, 13th July, we were in a condition 
 to begin the next stage of our advance. The capture 
 of Contalmaison had been the indispensable pre- 
 liminary, and immediately following its fall Sir 
 Douglas Haig issued his first summary. '^After ten 
 days and nights of continuous fighting, our troops 
 have completed the methodical capture of the whole 
 of the enemy's first system of defence on a front of 
 14,000 yards. This system of defence consisted of 
 numerous and continuous lines of fire trenches, 
 extending to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000 
 yards, and included five strongly fortified villages, 
 numerous heavily wired and entrenched woods, and 
 a large number of immensely strong redoubts. The 
 capture of each of these trenches represented an 
 operation of some importance, and the whole of 
 them are now in our hands.'' The summary did 
 not err from over-statement. If the northern part 
 of our front, from Thiepval to Gommecourt, had not 
 succeeded, the southern part had steadily bitten its 
 way like a deadly acid into as strong a position as 
 any terrain of the campaign could show. The Allies 
 had already attracted against them the bulk of the 
 available German reserves, and had largely destroyed 
 them. The strength of their plan lay in its deliber- 
 ateness, and the mathematical sequence of its stages. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THD SE^COND STAGE 
 
 The British Attack on German Second Position — The Fete-Day of 
 France — The Front attacked — British Dispositions — The Eve of 
 the Attack — The Wood of Trones cleared — Capture of Bazen- 
 tin-le-Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand, and Longueval — High Wood en- 
 tered — British Cavalry in Action — Fight of the South Africans 
 in Delville Wood — Fate of the 3rd Guard and 5th Brandenburg 
 Divisions — Fall of Ovillers — Capture of Waterlot Farm — Diffi- 
 culty of Longueval Position — British and German Losses — Ger- 
 man and Allied Moral— The Attack on Pozieres — Bad Weather 
 — First Attack on Guillemont — Capture of Pozieres — The Aus- 
 tralians in Action — The Fight for the Windmill — Capture of the 
 Windmill — Failure at Guillemont — Advance toward Mouquet 
 Farm — German Disorganisation — The Somme Offensive compared 
 with Verdun — Quality of British Forces — Records of Heroism — 
 Great French Advance — British carry Leipzig Redoubt — Failure 
 of Attack on Guillemont — German Counter-attacks — Efficiency of 
 British Aircraft — French carry Maurepas — Capture of Mouquet 
 Farm — Fall of Guillemont — Leuze Wood occupied — French loth 
 Army comes into Action — French Advance north of the Somme 
 — Fall of Ginchy — French cut Chaulnes-Roye Railway — End of 
 First Phase — Capture of German Prepared Positions. 
 
 AT dawn on Friday, the 14th, began the second 
 stage of the battle. 
 
 The most methodical action has its gamb- 
 ling element, its moments when a risk must be 
 boldly taken. Without such hazards r t 
 there can be no chance of surprise. ■^ ^' 
 
 The British attack of 14th July had much of this 
 calculated audacity. In certain parts — as at Con- 
 
 65 
 
(56 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 talmaison Villa and Mametz Wood — we held posi- 
 tions within a few hundred yards of the enemy's 
 line. But in the section from Bazentin-le-Grand to 
 Longueval there was a long advance — in some places 
 almost a mile — ^before us up the slopes north of 
 Caterpillar Valley. On the extreme right the Wood 
 of Trones gave us a somewhat indifferent place of 
 assembly. "The decision," wrote Sir Douglas Haig, 
 "to attempt a night attack of this magnitude with 
 an army, the bulk of which had been raised 
 since the beginning of the war, was perhaps the 
 highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of 
 our troops." 
 
 The difficulties before the British attack were so 
 great that more than one distinguished French offi- 
 cer doubted its possibility. One British General, in 
 conversation with a French Colleague, undertook, if 
 the thing did not succeed, to eat his hat. When 
 about noon on the 14th the French General heard 
 what had happened, he is reported to have observed : 
 "C'est bien! le General X ne mange pas son cha- 
 peau!'* It was a pleasant reflection for the British 
 troops that they had surprised their Allies; France 
 had so often during the campaign exceeded the 
 wildest expectations of her friends. 
 
 The day of the attack was of fortunate omen, 
 for the 14th of July was the anniversary of the fall 
 of the Bastille, the fete-day of France. In Paris 
 there was such a parade as that city had not seen 
 in its long history — a procession of Allied troops, 
 Belgians, Russians, British infantry, and last of all, 
 the blue-coated heroes of France's incomparable 
 line. It was a shining proof to the world of the 
 unity of the Alliance. And on the same day, while 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 67 
 
 the Paris crowd was cheering the Scottish pipers as 
 they swung down the boulevards, the British troops 
 in Picardy were breaking through the German Hne, 
 crying Vive la France! in all varieties of accent. 
 It was France's Day in the eyes of every soldier, 
 the sacred day of that people whom in farm and 
 village and trench they had come to reverence and 
 love. 
 
 The front chosen for attack was from a point 
 south-east of Pozieres to Longueval and Delville 
 Wood, a space of some four miles. Incidentally, it 
 was necessary for our right flank to clear out the 
 Wood of Trones. Each village in the second line 
 had its adjacent or enfolding wood — Bazentin-le- 
 Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand, and at Longueval the big 
 wood of Delville. In the centre, a mile and more 
 beyond the German position, the wood of Foureaux, 
 which we called High Wood, hung like a dark cloud 
 on the sky line. 
 
 The British plan was for the 3rd Corps on the 
 left to form a defensive flank, pushing out patrols 
 in the direction of Pozieres. On its right the 15th 
 Corps moved against Bazentin-le-Petit Wood and 
 village, and the slopes leading up to High Wood. On 
 their right, again, the 13th Corps was to take 
 Bazentin-le-Grand, to carry Longueval and Delville 
 Wood, and to clear Trones Wood and form a de- 
 fensive flank. In the event of a rapid success 
 the occasion might arise for the use of cavalry, so 
 cavalry divisions were put under the orders of the 
 two corps. The preceding bombardment was to be 
 assisted by the French heavy guns firing on Ginchy, 
 Guillemont, and Leuze and Bouleaux Woods. In 
 order to distract the enemy, the 8th Corps north 
 
68 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 of the Ancre attacked with gas and smoke as if 
 theirs was to be the main area of our effort. 
 
 It was only the day before that we had consoH- 
 dated our new Hne, and the work required to pre- 
 pare for the attack was colossal. The Germans did 
 not believe in an immediate assault, and when the 
 bombardment began they thought it was no more 
 than one of the spasmodic "preparations" with which 
 we had already cloaked our purpose. In the small 
 hours of the morning our guns opened and continued 
 in a crescendo till 3.20 a.m., when the final hurri- 
 cane fell. An observer"^ has described the specta- 
 cle: — 
 
 "It was a thick night, the sky veiled in clouds, mottled 
 and hurrying clouds, through which only one planet shone 
 serene and steadily high up in the eastern sky. But the 
 wonderful and appalling thing was the belt of flame which 
 fringed a great arc of the horizon before us, It was not, of 
 course, a steady flame, but it was one which never went out, 
 rising and falling, flashing and flickering, half dimmed with 
 its own smoke, against which the stabs and jets of fire from 
 the bursting shells flared out intensely white or dully orange. 
 Out of it all, now here, now there, rose like fountains the 
 great balls of star shells and signal lights — theirs or ours — 
 white and crimson and green. The noise of the shells was 
 terrific, and when the guns near us spoke, not only the air 
 but the earth beneath us shook. All the while, too, overhead, 
 amid all the clamour and shock, in the darkness and no less 
 as night paled to day, the larks sang. Only now and again 
 would the song be audible, but whenever there was an interval 
 between the roaring of the nearer guns, above all the distant 
 tumult, it came down clear and very beautiful by contrast. 
 Nor was the lark the only bird that was awake, for close by 
 us, somewhere in the dark, a quail kept constantly urging 
 us — or the guns — to be Quick-be-quick/' 
 
 * The Times correspondent. 
 
THE SECOXD STAGE 69 
 
 At 3.25 a.m., when the cloudy dawn had fully 
 come, the infantry attacked. In some places they 
 had had to cover a long distance before reaching 
 their striking-point. So complete was the surprise 
 that, in the dark the battalions which had the farthest 
 road to go came within 200 yards of the enemy's 
 wire with scarcely a casualty. When the German 
 barrage came it fell behind them. 
 
 The attack failed nowhere. In some parts it was 
 slower than others — where the enemy's defence 
 had been less comprehensively destroyed, but by 
 the afternoon all our tasks had been accomplished. 
 To take one instance. The two attacking brigades 
 of one division were each composed of two bat- 
 talions of the New Army and two of the old Regu- 
 lars. The general commanding put the four new 
 battalions into the first line. The experiment proved 
 the worth of the new troops, for a little after mid- 
 day their w^ork was done, their part of the German 
 second line was taken, and 662 unwounded men, 36 
 officers (including a battalion commander), 4 how- 
 itzers, 4 field guns, and 14 machine guns were in 
 their hands. One division had Bazentin-le-Petit 
 Wood and village, and a second was far up the 
 slopes towards High Wood, after taking Bazentin- 
 le-Grand Wood; another had Bazentin-le-Grand, 
 and another had all but a portion of Longueval. 
 Trones Wood had been cleared, and a line was held 
 eastward to Maltzhorn Farm. By the evening we 
 had the whole second line from Bazentin-le-Petit 
 to Longueval, a front of over three miles, and in 
 the twenty-four hours' battle we took over 2,000 
 prisoners, many of them of the 3rd Division 
 of the German Guard. The audacious enter- 
 
70 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 prise had been crowned with a miraculous 
 success. 
 
 In the Wood of Trones on our right flank oc- 
 curred one of the most romantic incidents of the 
 action. On Thursday night an attack had been de- 
 livered there, and 170 men of the Royal West 
 Kents became separated from their battalion. They 
 had machine guns with them and sufficient ammu- 
 nition, so they were able to fortify one or two posts 
 which they maintained all night against tremendous 
 odds. Next morning the British sweep retrieved 
 them, and the position they had maintained gave 
 our troops invaluable aid in the clearing of the wood. 
 All through this Battle of the Somme there were 
 similar incidents; an advance would go too far and 
 the point would be cut off, but that point would suc- 
 ceed in maintaining itself till a fresh advance re- 
 claimed it. A better proof of discipline and resolu- 
 tion could not be desired. 
 
 But the great event of the day fell in the late 
 afternoon. One division, pushing northward against 
 the loth Bavarian Division, penetrated the enemy's 
 third position at High Wood, having their flank 
 supported by cavalry. It was 6.15 p.m. when 
 the advance was made, the first in eighteen months 
 which had seen the use of mounted men. In the 
 Champagne battle of 25th September the French 
 had used some squadrons of General Baratier's 
 Colonial Horse in the ground between the first and 
 second German lines to sweep up prisoners and 
 capture guns. This tactical expedient was now fol- 
 lowed by the British, with the difference that in 
 Champagne the fortified second line had not been 
 taken, while in Picardy we were through the two 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 71 
 
 main fortifications and operating against a more or 
 less improvised position. The cavalry used were a 
 troop of the Dragoon Guards and a troop of Deccan 
 Horse. They made their way up the shallow valley 
 beyond Bazentin-le-Gran^, finding cover in the slope 
 of the ground and the growing corn. The final ad- 
 vance, about 8 p.m., was made partly on foot and 
 partly on horseback, and the enemy in the corn were 
 ridden down, captured, or slain with lance and sabre. 
 The cavalry then set to work to entrench themselves, 
 to protect the flank of the advancing infantry in 
 High Wood. It was a clean and workmanlike job, 
 and the news of it exhilarated the whole line. That 
 cavalry should be used at all seemed to forecast the 
 end of the long trench fighting and the beginning of 
 a campaign in the open. 
 
 On Saturday, 15th July, we were busy consoli- 
 dating the ground won, and at some points pushing 
 farther. Our aircraft, in spite of the x , 
 haze, were never idle, and in twenty- four ^ ^' 
 
 hours they destroyed four Fokkers, three biplanes, 
 and a double-engined plane, without the loss of a 
 single machine. On the left we fought our way to 
 the skirts of Pozieres, attacked the Leipzig Redoubt, 
 south of Thiepval, and continued the struggle for 
 Ovillers. We also advanced against the new switch 
 line with which the Germans connected the uncap- 
 tured portion of the second position with their third. 
 We lost most of High Wood under the pressure of 
 counter-attacks by the German 7th Division, and 
 next day we withdrew all troops from the place. 
 They had done their work, and had formed a screen 
 behind which we had consolidated our line. 
 
 On the right, around Longueval and Delville 
 
72 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Wood, was being waged the fiercest contest of all. 
 The position there was now an awkward salient, for 
 our front ran on one side westward to Pozieres, and 
 on the other southward to Maltzhorn Farm. The 
 division concerned had on the 14th taken the greater 
 part of the village, and on the morning of the 15th 
 its reserve brigade (the South African under Briga- 
 
 I 
 
 
 «S0»'<^'**»*''''*»">»,, 
 
 WOOL 
 
 _j Yard* v. \N ''^m,^-y? 
 
 Cermart entrenchments shown t»y ttnes pi shade 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — ^LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD. 
 
 dier-General Lukin) was ordered to clear the wood. 
 The struggle which began on that Saturday before 
 dawn was to last for thirteen days, and to prove 
 one of the costliest episodes of the whole battle. The 
 situation was an ideal one for the defence. Longue- 
 val lies to the south-west of the wood, a straggling 
 village with orchards at its northern end where the 
 road climbs towards Flers. Delville itself was a 
 mass of broken tree trunks, matted undergrowth, 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 73 
 
 and shell holes. It had rides cut in it, running from 
 north to south and from east to west, which were 
 called by such names as "The Strand" and "Princes 
 Street," and along these were the enemy trenches. 
 The place was terribly at the mercy of the enemy 
 guns, and on the north and south-east sides the Ger- 
 mans had a strong trench line, some seventy yards 
 from the trees, bristling with machine guns. The 
 problem for the attack was far less to carry the wood 
 than to hold it, for as soon as the perimeter 
 was reached, our men came under machine-gun 
 fire, while the whole interior was incessantly bom- 
 barded. 
 
 The South African Brigade''' carried the whole 
 wood by noon on the 15th, but the other brigades 
 did not obtain the whole of Longueval, and the 
 enemy, from the northern end of the village, was 
 able to counter-attack and force us back. The 
 South Africans tried again on the i6th, j , ^ 
 but they had no chance under the hos- ^ 
 
 tile fire, and a counter-attack of the German 8th 
 Division forced them in on the central alley. Again 
 on the 17th they endeavoured to clear the j j 
 place, and again with heavy losses they ^ ^' 
 
 failed. But they clung desperately to the south-west 
 corner, and it was not until the 20th that they were 
 relieved. This is not the place to tell the detailed 
 
 * The Brigade had already fought in Egypt against the 
 Senussi. It was composed of the ist South African Infantry- 
 Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson) drawn from the 
 Cape; the 2nd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner) from 
 Natal, Orange River Colony, and the Border district; the 
 3rd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray) from the 
 Transvaal; and the 4th Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Jones) 
 from Scotsmen throughout South Africa. 
 
74 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 story of those days; but it may be hoped that, for 
 the sake of the British Army and South Africa, the 
 tactical history of that stand will be written. For 
 four days the heroic remnant, under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Thackeray of the 3rd Battalion, along with 
 the Scots of the other brigades, wrestled in hand- 
 to-hand fighting such as the American armies knew 
 in the last Wilderness Campaign. Their assault had 
 been splendid, but their defence was a greater ex- 
 ploit. They hung on without food or water, while 
 their ranks were terribly thinned, and at the end 
 
 XT when one battalion had lost all its officers, 
 
 •^ * they repulsed an attack by the German 
 5th Division, the corps d' elite of Brandenburg. In 
 this far-flung battle all parts of the empire won 
 fame, and not least was the glory of the South 
 African contingent."^ 
 
 In this stage of the action we tried conclusions 
 with two of the most celebrated of the German 
 formations. For some days we had engaged the 
 3rd Guard Division — that division which in April 
 had been brought from the Russian front, and had 
 been hailed by the Kaiser as the hope of his throne 
 and empire. It contained three regiments — the 
 Guards Fusiliers, the Lehr Regiment, and the 9th 
 Grenadiers — and every one had suffered heavily. 
 Some of them showed fine fighting quality, such as 
 the garrison at Ovillers, but they met something 
 more than their match in our New Army. About 
 the 20th of the month the 5th Brandenburg Division 
 appeared, that division which had attacked at Dou- 
 aumont on 25th February and at Vaux on 9th March. 
 
 * Delville Wood was not wholly in our hands till the attack 
 of 25th August. 
 
K-- 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 75 
 
 Now it was virtually a new formation, for at Verdun 
 it had lost considerably more than its original 
 strength. It was scarcely more fortunate at Longue- 
 val. ''The enemy/' said the Kaiser, in his address 
 on 20th April, ''has prepared his own soup, and 
 now he must sup it, and I look to you to see to it 
 May the appearance of the 3rd Guards Division in- 
 form him what soldiers are facing him/' The in- 
 formation had been conveyed to us, and our men 
 were by no means depressed. They desired to meet 
 with the best that Germany could produce, for they 
 were confident that they could put that best out of 
 action. 
 
 On Sunday, the i6th, Ovillers was at last com- 
 pletely taken after a stout defence, and the way was 
 prepared for a general assault on j j ^ 
 Pozieres. That day, too, on our right we 3^ • 
 
 widened the gap in the German front by the capture 
 of Waterlot Farm, half-way between Longueval and 
 Guillemont. The weather broke from the i6th to 
 the 1 8th, and drenching rain and low mists made 
 progress difficult. The enemy had got up many new 
 batteries, whose positions could not be detected in 
 such weather by our aircraft. He himself was bet- 
 ter off, since we were fighting on ground he had 
 once held, and he had the register of our trench 
 lines and most of our possible gun positions. Our 
 situation at I^ongueval was now an uncomfortable 
 salient, and it was necessary to broaden it by push- 
 ing out towards High Wood. On the 20th, accord- 
 ingly, the 7th Division attacked again at High Wood, 
 and carried all of it except the north part. A trench 
 line ran across that north corner, where the prospect 
 began to open towards Flers and Le Sars. The 
 
76 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 position was held with extraordinary resolution by 
 the 8th Division of the 4th (Magdeburg) Corps, and 
 it was two months from the first assault before the 
 whole wood was in our possession. 
 
 The total of unwounded prisoners in British hands 
 at this stage was 189 officers and 10,779 men. The 
 armament taken included five 8-inch and three 6- 
 inch howitzers, four 6-inch guns, five other heavies, 
 thirty-seven field guns, thirty trench mortars, and 
 sixty-six machine guns. Of the German losses in 
 dead and wounded no exact estimate is possible, but 
 they were beyond doubt very great, and their abor- 
 tive counter-attacks had probably already brought 
 up the total of the defence to a figure as high as 
 that of the attack. Captured letters all told the 
 same tale. Instant relief was begged for; one bat- 
 talion consisted of three officers, two N.C.O.'s, and 
 nineteen men ; another was so exhausted that it could 
 no longer be employed; another had completely lost 
 its fighting spirit. 
 
 No British soldier decried the quality of his op- 
 ponents. At the most he declared that it was 
 ^'patchy/' which was the truth. There were ex- 
 traordinarily gallant elements in the German ranks, 
 but they were watered down with much indifferent 
 stuff. Many had lost heart for the fight; they had 
 been told so often of victory assured that they ended 
 by disbelieving everything. On one occasion a 
 hundred men put up their hands while actually 
 charging. Distressful letters from their homes, a 
 lack of confidence in their officers and enthusiasm 
 for their cause, and the suspicion which comes from 
 a foolish censoring of all truth, had impaired the 
 fibre of men who in normal circumstances would 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 77 
 
 have fought stoutly. The German machine was 
 still formidable, but its motive power was weaken- 
 ing. 
 
 As for the Allies, every day that passed nerved 
 and steeled them. The French had made the final 
 resolution and the ultimate sacrifice, and of the same 
 quality was the British temper. "Most of these 
 men," said a chaplain, "never handled a gun till they 
 joined up. Yet they have faced bigger things than 
 any veteran ever faced before, and faced them stead- 
 ily, seeing it all very clearly and fearing it not one 
 scrap ; though they have again and again forced mad 
 fear into the highly trained troops facing them. That 
 is because they have something that you cannot make 
 in foundries, that you cannot even give by training. 
 I could give it a name the Church would recognise. 
 Let's say they know their cause is good, as they very 
 surely do. The Germans may write on their badges 
 that God is with them, but our men — they know." 
 
 The next step was to round off our capture of 
 the enemy second position, and consolidate our 
 ground, for it was very certain that the Germans 
 would not be content to leave us in quiet posses- 
 sion. The second line being lost from east of 
 Pozieres to Delville Wood, the enemy was com- 
 pelled to make a switch line to connect his third 
 position with an uncaptured point in his second, 
 such as Pozieres. Fighting continued in the 
 skirts of Delville, and among the orchards of Lon- 
 gueval, which had to be taken one by one. Apart 
 from this general activity, our two main objectives 
 were Pozieres and Guillemont. The first, with the 
 Windmill beyond it, was part of the crest of the 
 
78 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Thiepval plateau. Our aim was the crown of the 
 ridge, the watershed, which would give us direct 
 observation over all the rolling country to the east. 
 The vital points on this watershed were Mouquet 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — POZIERES. 
 
 Farm, between Thiepval and Pozieres; the Wind- 
 mill, now only a stone pedestal, on the high road 
 east of Pozieres; High Wood; and the high ground 
 direct east of Longueval. Guillemont was neces- 
 sary to us before we could align our next advance 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 70 
 
 with that of the French. Its special difficulties lay 
 in the fact that the approach to it from Trones Wood 
 lay over a perfectly bare and open piece of country; 
 that the enemy had excellent direct observation from 
 Leuze Wood in its rear; that the quarry on its 
 western edge had been made into a strong redoubt; 
 and that the ground to the south of it between 
 Maltzhorn and Falfemont Farms was broken by 
 a three-pronged ravine, with Angle Wood in the cen- 
 tre, which the Germans held in strength, and which 
 made it hard to form a defensive flank or link up 
 with the French advance. 
 
 Sir Douglas Haig has summarised the position: 
 ''The line of demarcation agreed upon between the 
 French commander and myself ran from Maltzhorn 
 Farm due eastward to the Combles valley, and then 
 north-eastward up the valley to a point midway be- 
 tween Sailly-Saillisel and Morval. These two vil- 
 lages had been fixed upon as the objective respec- 
 tively of the French left and of my right. In order 
 to advance in co-operation with my right, and even- 
 tually to reach Sailly-Saillisel, our Allies had still to 
 fight their way up that portion of the main ridge 
 which lies between the Combles valley on the west 
 and the river Tortille on the east. To do so, they 
 had to capture in the first place the strongly- fortified 
 villages of Maurepas, Le Forest, Rancourt, and 
 Fregicourt, besides many woods and strong systems 
 of trenches. As the high ground on each side of 
 the Combles valley commands the slopes of the ridge 
 on the opposite side, it was essential that the advance 
 of the two armies should be simultaneous and made 
 in the closest co-operation." 
 
 The weather did not favour us. The third week 
 
80 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 of July was rain and fog. The last week and the 
 first fortnight of August saw blazing summer ' 
 weather, which in that arid and dusty land told 
 severely on men wearing heavy steel helmets and 
 carrying a load of equipment. There was little wind, 
 and a heat-haze lay low on the uplands. This meant 
 poor visibility at a time when air reconnaissance 
 was most vital. Hence the task of counter-bombard- 
 ment grew very difficult, and the steps in our prog- 
 ress became for the moment slow and irregular. A 
 battle which advances without a hitch exists only 
 in a Staff college kriegspiel, and the wise general, 
 in preparing his plans, makes ample allowance for 
 delays. 
 
 On 19th July there came the first attempt on 
 Guillemont from Trones Wood, an attack which 
 
 j^ J failed to advance. On the 20th the 
 
 ^ ^ French made fine progress, pushing 
 their front east of Hardecourt beyond 
 the Combles-Clery light railway, and south of the 
 Somme widening the gap by carrying the whole 
 German defence system from Barleux to Verman- 
 dovillers. For the two days following our guns 
 bombarded the whole enemy front, and on the Sun- 
 
 j- J ^ day, 23rd July, came the next great in- 
 -^ '^'^' fantry attack. Two new corps had been 
 introduced into the Fifth Army from left to right, 
 the 2nd and the ist Anzac, which took up ground 
 between the Ancre and just south of the Albert- 
 Bapaume road. 
 
 That attack had a wide front, but its main fury 
 was on the left, where Pozieres and its Windmill 
 crowned the slope up which ran the Albert-Bapaume 
 road. The village had long ere this been pounded 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 81 
 
 flat, the Windmill was a stump, and the trees m the 
 gardens matchwood, but every yard of those devas- 
 tated acres was fortified in the German fashion with 
 covered trenches, deep dug-outs, and machine-gun 
 emplacements. 
 
 The assault was delivered from two sides — a Mid- 
 land Territorial division moving from the south- 
 west in the ground between Pozieres and Ovillers, 
 and an Anzac division from the south-east, advanc- 
 ing from the direction of Contalmaison Villa. The 
 movement began about midnight, and the Midland- 
 ers speedily cleared out the defences which the Ger- 
 mans had flung out south of the village to the left 
 of the high road, and held a line along the outskirts 
 of the place in the direction of Thiepval. The Aus- 
 tralians had a difficult task — for they had first to 
 take a sunken road parallel with the highway, then 
 a formidable line of trenches, and finally the high 
 road itself which runs straight through the middle 
 of the village. 
 
 The Australian troops were second to none in the 
 new British Army. In the famous landing at Galli- 
 poli and in a dozen desperate fights in the peninsula, 
 culminating in the great battle which began on Au- 
 gust 6, 191 5, they had shown themselves incompara- 
 ble in the fury of assault and in reckless personal 
 valour. In the grim struggle now beginning they 
 had to face a far heavier fire and far more formida- 
 ble defences than anything that Gallipoli could show. 
 For their task not gallantry only but perfect disci- 
 pline and perfect coolness were needed. The splen- 
 did troops were equal to the call. They won the 
 high road after desperate fighting in the ruined 
 houses, and established a line where the breath of 
 
82 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the road alone separated them from the enemy. A 
 famous division of British regulars on their flank 
 sent them a message to say that they were proud to 
 fight by their side. 
 
 When all were gallant it is hard to select special 
 incidents, but in their record of personal bravery 
 the Australians in the West rivalled their famous 
 attack on the Lone Pine position in Gallipoli. The 
 list of Victoria Crosses awarded is sufficient proof. 
 Second-Lieutenant Blackburn led four parties of 
 bombers against a German stronghold and took 250 
 yards of trench. He then crawled forward with a 
 sergeant to reconnoitre, and, returning, led his men 
 to a capture of a further 120 yards. Private Thomas 
 Cooke, a machine gunner, went on firing when he 
 was the only man left, and was found dead beside 
 his gun. Private William Jackson brought in 
 wounded men from No Man's Land till his arm 
 was blown off by a shell, and then, after obtaining 
 assistance, went out again to find two wounded 
 comrades. Private Martin O'Meara for four days 
 brought in wounded under heavy fire, and carried 
 ammunition to a vital point through an incessant 
 barrage. Private John Leak was one of a party 
 which captured a German stronghold. At one 
 moment, when the enemy's bombs were outrang- 
 ing ours, he leaped from the trench, ran forward 
 under close-range machine-gun fire, and bombed 
 the enemy's post. He then jumped into the post 
 and bayoneted three German bombers. Later, 
 when the party was driven back by overwhelming 
 numbers, he was at every stage the last to with- 
 draw. "His courage was amazing," says the official 
 report, "and had such an effect on the enemy that, 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 83 
 
 on the arrival of reinforcements, the whole trench 
 was recaptured." 
 
 On Monday and Tuesday the battle continued, 
 and by the evening of the latter day most of Pozieres 
 was in our hands. By Wednesday morn- j . ^ 
 ing, 26th July, the v/hole village was ours, ^ 
 
 and the Midlanders on the left were pushing north- 
 ward and had taken two lines of trenches. The two 
 divisions joined hands at the north corner, where 
 they occupied the cemetery, and held a portion of 
 the switch line. Here they lived under a perpetual 
 enemy bombardment. The Germans still held the 
 Windmill, which was the higher ground and gave 
 them a good observation point. The sight of that 
 ridge from the road east of Ovillers was one that 
 no man who saw it was likely to forget. It seemed 
 to be smothered monotonously in smoke and fire. 
 Wafts of the thick heliotrope smell of the lachry- 
 matory shells floated down from it. Out of the dust 
 and glare would come Australian units which had 
 been relieved, long, lean men with the shadows of 
 a great fatigue around their deep-set, far-sighted 
 eyes. They were perfectly cheerful and composed, 
 and no Lowland Scot was ever less inclined to ex- 
 pansive speech. At the most they would admit in 
 their slow, quiet voices that what they had been 
 through had been "some battle.'' 
 
 An observer "^ with the Australians has described 
 the unceasing bombardment: — 
 
 "Hour after hour, day and night, with increasing intensity 
 as the time went on, the enemy rained heavy shell into the 
 area. Now he would send them crashing in on a line south 
 of the road — eight heavy shells at a time, minute after minute, 
 
 * Captain C. W. Bean. 
 
84 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 followed by a burst of shrapnel. Now he would place a cur- 
 tain straight across this valley or that till the sky and land- 
 scape were blotted out, except for fleeting glimpses seen as 
 through a lift of fog. . . . Day and night the men worked 
 through it, fighting the horrid machinery far over the horizon 
 as if they were fighting Germans hand to hand; building 
 up whatever it battered down ; buried some of them, not once, 
 but again and again and again. What is a barrage against 
 such troops ? They went through it as you would go through 
 a summer shower, too proud to bend their heads, many of 
 them, because their mates were looking. I am telling you 
 of things I have seen. As one of the best of their ofificers 
 said to me: *I have to walk about as if I liked it; what 
 else can you do when your own men teach you to ?' " 
 
 Meantime there had been heavy fighting around 
 Longueval and in Delville Wood. On Thursday, 
 
 r » the 27th, the wood was cleared all but 
 
 ^ '' its eastern side, and next day the last 
 
 enemy outpost in Longueval village was captured.* 
 
 T 1 ^o In this action we accounted for the re- 
 •^ * mains of the Brandenburgers, taking 
 prisoner three officers and 158 men. It was our first 
 meeting with them since that day on the Aisne, when 
 they had been forced back by our ist Division behind 
 the edge of the plateau. At the same time a High- 
 land Territorial division was almost continuously 
 engaged at High Wood, where in one week they 
 made three fruitless attempts to drive the enemy- 
 out of the northern segment. On 23rd July we 
 attacked Guillemont from the south and west, but 
 failed, owing to the strength of the enemy's machine- 
 gun fire. 
 
 * The German troops employed in the defence of Longueval 
 and Delville Wood since 14th July were successively the 6th 
 Regiment of the loth Bavarian Division, the 8th Division 
 of the 4th Corps, and the 5th Division of the 3rd Corps. 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 
 
 85 
 
 Early on the morning of Sunday, the 30th, the 
 Australians attacked at Pozieres towards the Wind- 
 mill, and after a fierce hand-to-hand j, 
 struggle in the darkness, advanced their . 
 front to the edge of the trench labyrinth which con- 
 
 Hetgtits m metres. 
 
 Position «f eftemy'3 
 trenches ■t>own by 
 lines o* shade. 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — GUILLEMONT AND GINCHY. 
 
 stituted that position. Next morning we attacked 
 Guillemont from the north-west and west, while the 
 French pushed almost to the edge of Maurepas. 
 Battalions of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Man- 
 chesters advanced right through Guillemont, till the 
 
86 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 failure of the attack on the left compelled them to 
 retire, with heavy losses. Our farthest limit was the 
 station on the light railway just outside Guillemont 
 village. 
 
 Little happened for some days. The heat was 
 now very great, so great that even men inured to 
 an Australian summer found it hard to bear, and 
 the maddening haze still muffled the landscape. We 
 were aware that the enemy had strengthened his 
 position, and brought up new troops and batteries. 
 The French were meantime fighting their way 
 through the remnants of the German second posi- 
 tion north of the Somme between Hem Wood and 
 Monacu Farm. There were strong counter-attacks 
 against Delville Wood, which were beaten off by 
 our guns before they got to close range. Daily we 
 bombarded points in the enemy hinterland, and did 
 much destruction among their depots and billets 
 and heavy batteries. And then on the night of 
 
 J Friday, 4th August, came the final at- 
 
 ^' ^' tack at Pozieres. 
 
 We had already won the German second posi- 
 tion up to the top of the village, where the new 
 switch line joined on. The attack was in the nature 
 of a surprise. It began at nine in the evening, when 
 the light was still strong. An Australian division 
 advanced on the right at the Windmill, and a New 
 Army division on the left. The trenches, which had 
 been almost obliterated by our guns, were carried 
 at a rush, and before the darkness came we had 
 
 A taken the rest of the second position on 
 
 ^' ^' a front of 2,000 yards. Counter-at- 
 tacks followed all through the night, but they were 
 badly co-ordinated, and achieved nothing. On Sat- 
 
-s'<'w»r!W«?»«s«5Pw»w 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 87 
 
 urday we had pushed our line north and west of the 
 village from 400 to 600 yards on a front of 3,000. 
 Early on Sunday morning the Germans a ^ 
 counter-attacked with liquid fire, and ^' 
 
 gained a small portion of the trench line, which was 
 speedily recovered. The position was now that we 
 held the much-contested Windmill, and that we 
 extended on the east of the village to the v/est end of 
 the Switch, while west of Pozieres we had pushed 
 so far north that the German line was drooping like 
 the eaves of a steep roof. We had taken some 600 
 prisoners, and at last we were looking over the 
 watershed. 
 
 The following week saw repeated attempts by the 
 enemy to recover his losses. The German bom- 
 bardment was incessant and intense, and on the 
 high bare scarp around the Windmill our troops 
 had to make heavy drafts on their fortitude. On 
 Tuesday, 8th August, the British right, a r. 
 attacking at 4.20 a.m. in conjunction ^' 
 
 with the French, closed farther in on Guillemont. 
 At Pozieres, too, every day our lines advanced, 
 especially in the angle toward Mouquet Farm, be- 
 tween the village and Thiepval. We were exposed 
 to a flanking fire from Thiepval, and to the exactly 
 ranged heavy batteries around Courcelette and 
 Grandcourt. Our task was to break off and take 
 heavy toll of the many German counter-attacks and 
 on the rebound to win, yard by yard, ground which 
 made our position secure. 
 
 In the desperate strain of this fighting there was 
 evidence that the superb German machine was be- 
 ginning to creak and falter. Hitherto its strength 
 had lain in the automatic precision of its ordering. 
 
88 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Now, since reserves had to be hastily collected from 
 all quarters, there was some fumbling in the direc- 
 tion. Attacks made by half a dozen battalions col- 
 lected from three divisions, battalions which had 
 never before been brigaded together, were bound 
 to lack the old vigour and cohesion. Units lost 
 direction. Staff work was imperfect, and what should 
 have been a hammer-blow became a loose scrim- 
 mage.* A captured letter written by an officer of 
 the German 19th Corps revealed a change from the 
 perfect co-ordination of the first year of war. "The 
 job of relieving yesterday was incredible. From 
 Courcelette we relieved across the open. Our posi- 
 tion, of course, was quite different to what we had 
 been told. Our company alone relieved a full bat- 
 talion, though we were only told to relieve a com- 
 pany of fifty men weakened through casualties. 
 Those we relieved had no idea where the enemy was, 
 how far off he was, or if any of our own troops 
 were in front of us. We got no idea of our sup- 
 posed position till six o'clock this evening. The 
 English were 400 metres away, the Windmill just 
 over the hill. We shall have to look to it to-night 
 not to get taken prisoners. We have no dug-outs; 
 we dig a hole in the side of a shell hole, and lie 
 and get rheumatism. We get nothing to eat and 
 drink. Yesterday each man drew two bottles of 
 water and three iron rations, and these must last 
 
 * The German High Command showed themselves good 
 professional soldiers, and did their best to readjust their 
 ideas to meet the new situation. See the report of General 
 Sixt von Armin, which is printed in Appendix II. Von Armin 
 commanded the 4th Corps, and was the general who first 
 entered Brussels in August 19 14. 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 89 
 
 till we are relieved. The ceaseless roar of the guns 
 is driving us mad, and many of the men are knocked 
 up." Much of this discomfort was, to be sure, the 
 fate of any troops in an advanced position, but there 
 seemed to be an uncertainty as to purpose and a 
 confusion in Staff work from which the Allies were 
 now free. 
 
 It was the fashion in the German Press, at this 
 time, to compare the Picardy offensive of the Allies 
 with the German attack on Verdun, very much to 
 the advantage of the latter. The deduction was 
 false. In every military aspect — in the extent of 
 ground won, in the respective losses, in the accuracy 
 and weight of artillery, in the quality of the infantry 
 attacks, and in the precision of the generalship — the 
 Verdun attack fell far short of the Picardy battle. 
 The Verdun front, in its operative part, had been 
 narrower than that of the Somme, but at least ten 
 more enemy divisions had by the beginning of 
 August been attracted to Picardy than had appeared 
 between Avocourt and Vaux up to the end of April. 
 The Crown Prince at Verdun speedily lost the ini- 
 tiative in any serious sense; on the Somme von 
 Below and von Gallwitz never possessed it. There 
 the enemy had to accept battle as the Allied will 
 imposed it, and no counter-attack could for a mo- 
 ment divert the resolute Allied purpose."^ 
 
 * The German Commands deserve a note. At the begin- 
 ning of the battle von Below was in command of the 2nd 
 Army, but as the attack developed and new troops had to 
 be brought up, it was found convenient to revive the old 
 1st Army (abolished since the spring of 1916), and put von 
 Below in command of it. The 2nd Army farther south was 
 commanded by von Gallwitz. Later a plan was adopted 
 similar to the British, and corps commanders were given 
 
90 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 We have spoken of the stamina of the British 
 troops, which was never tried more hardly than in 
 the close-quarters fighting in the ruined villages 
 and desolated woods of the German second posi- 
 tion. No small part of it was due to the quality of 
 the officers. When our great armies were impro- 
 vised, the current fear was that a sufficient number 
 of trained officers could not be provided to lead them. 
 But the fear was groundless. The typical public- 
 school boy proved a born leader of men. His good- 
 humour and camaraderie, his high sense of duty, his 
 personal gallantry were the qualities most needed 
 in the long months of trench warfare. When the 
 advance came he was equal to the occasion. Much 
 of the fighting was in small units, and the dash and 
 intrepidity of men who a little before had been 
 schoolboys was a notable asset in this struggle of 
 sheer human quality. The younger officers sacrificed 
 themselves freely, and it was the names of platoon 
 commanders that filled most of the casualty lists. 
 
 Men fell who promised to win the highest dis- 
 tinction in civilian life. Many died, who were of 
 the stuff from which the future leaders of the British 
 Army would have been drawn. Such, to name one 
 conspicuous instance, was Major William Congreve, 
 who fell at Delville Wood at the age of twenty-five, 
 having in two years of war already proved that he 
 possessed the mind and character of a great soldier."*" 
 
 groups similar to the British corps, through which a large 
 number of divisions were formed. Among the group com- 
 manders were von Stein, von Quast, Sixt von Armin, von 
 Marschall, von Kirchbach, von Hugel, and von Fasbender. 
 * He was the son of the General commanding the 13th 
 Corps, and had won the D.S.O., the Military Cross, and the 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 91 
 
 And to take an instance from the French side, on the 
 night of 13th July fell the last Due de Rohan, who 
 had already been wounded at Verdun in command 
 of his company of Chasseurs. He was killed in the 
 course of a daring night reconnaissance, a young 
 man with great possessions and a great future, who 
 brought to the defence of republican France the 
 proudest blood and most ancient lineage in Europe.* 
 It was a heavy price that the Allies paid, but who 
 shall say that it was not well paid — not only in 
 military results, but in the proof to themselves and 
 to the world that their officers were worthy of their 
 men, and that they realised to the full the pride and 
 duty of leadership? 
 
 The list of Victoria Crosses can never be an 
 adequate record of gallantry; it is no more than a 
 sample of what in less conspicuous form was found 
 everywhere in the battle. But in that short list 
 there are exploits of courage and sacrifice which 
 have never been surpassed. Major Loudoun-Shand, 
 of the Yorkshires, fell mortally wounded while lead- 
 ing his men over the parapets, but he insisted on 
 being propped up in a trench and encouraged his 
 battalion till he died. Lieutenant Cather, of the 
 Royal Irish Fusiliers, died while bringing in 
 wounded from No Man's Land and carrying water 
 to those who could not be moved, in full view and 
 under the direct fire of the enemy. Second- 
 Cross of the Legion of Honour. He received posthumously 
 the Victoria Cross. 
 
 * Compare the Rohan motto : 
 "Roi ne puis. 
 
 Prince ne daigne. 
 
 Rohan suis." 
 
92 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Lieutenant Simpson Bell, of the Yorkshires, found 
 his company enfiladed, during an attack, by a Ger- 
 man machine gun. Of his own initiative he crept 
 with a corporal and a private up a communication 
 trench, crossed the open, and destroyed the machine 
 gun and its gunners, thereby saving many lives and 
 ensuring the success of the British movement. A 
 similar exploit was that of Company Sergeant-Major 
 Carter, of the Royal Sussex, who fell in the attempt. 
 Corporal Sanders, of the West Yorkshires, found 
 himself cut off in the enemy line with a party of 
 thirty men. For two days he held the post, without 
 food or water, and beat off German attacks, till relief 
 came and he brought back his remnant of nineteen 
 to our lines. Private Miller, of the Royal Lan- 
 cashires, was sent through a heavy barrage with a 
 message to which a reply was urgently wanted. Al- 
 most at once he was shot through the back, the 
 bullet coming out in front. "In spite of this, with 
 heroic courage and self-sacrifice, he compressed 
 with his hand the gaping wound in his abdomen, 
 delivered his message, staggered back with the an- 
 swer, and fell at the feet of the officer to whom he 
 delivered it. He gave his life with a supreme devo- 
 tion to duty." Private Short, of the Yorkshires, 
 was foremost in a bombing attack and refused to 
 go back though severely wounded. Finally his leg 
 was shattered by a shell, but as he lay dying he was 
 adjusting detonators and straightening bomb-pins 
 for his comrades. "For the last eleven months he 
 had always volunteered for dangerous enterprises, 
 and has always set a magnificent example of bravery 
 and devotion to duty.'' 
 
 Officers sacrificed themselves for their men, and 
 
THE SECOND STAGE ^3 
 
 men gave their lives for their officers. Private Veale, 
 of the Devons, went out to look for an officer and 
 found him among standing corn fifty yards from the 
 enemy. He dragged him to a shell hole and went 
 back for water. Then, after vain efforts to bring 
 him in, he went out with a party at dusk, and while 
 they did their work he kept off an enemy patrol 
 with a Lewis gun. Private Turrall, of the Wor- 
 cesters, when an officer was badly wounded in a 
 bombing attack which had been compelled to fall 
 back, stayed with him for three hours under con- 
 tinuous fire, completely surrounded by the enemy. 
 When a counter-attack made it possible, he carried 
 the officer back to our lines. Private Quigg, of the 
 Royal Irish Rifles, went out seven times under heavy 
 machine-gun and shell fire to look for a lost platoon 
 commander, and for seven hours laboured to bring 
 in wounded. Another type of service was that of 
 Drummer Ritchie, of the Seaforths, who stood on 
 the parapet of an enemy trench sounding the charge 
 to rally men of various units who had lost their 
 leaders and were beginning to retire. And, per- 
 haps the finest of all, there was Private McFad- 
 zean, of the Royal Irish Rifles, who, while opening 
 a box of bombs before an attack, let the box slip 
 so that two of the safety-pins fell out. Like Lieu- 
 tenant Smith, of the East Lancashires, at Gallipoli, 
 he flung himself on the bombs, and the explosion, 
 which blew him to pieces, only injured one other 
 man. ''He well knew the danger, being himself a 
 bomber, but without a minute's hesitation he gave 
 his life for his comrades." The General was right 
 who told his hearers that the British soldier had a 
 great soul. 
 
H THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The French by the second week of August had 
 carried all the German third position south of the 
 
 A Somme. On Saturday, 12th August, 
 
 ^' * after preparatory reconnaissances, they 
 attacked the third line north of the river from the 
 east of Hardecourt to opposite Buscourt. It was a 
 superbly organised assault, which on a front of over 
 four miles swept away the enemy trenches and re- 
 doubts to an average depth of three-quarters of a 
 mile. They entered the cemetery of Maurepas and 
 the southern slopes of Hill 109 on the Maurepas- 
 Clery road, and reached the saddle west of Clery 
 village. By the evening over 1,000 prisoners were 
 in their hands. Four days later, on Wednesday, 
 
 J ^ 1 6th August, they pushed their left flank 
 ^' ' — there adjoining the British — north of 
 Maurepas, taking a mile of trenches, and south of 
 that village captured all the enemy line on a front 
 of a mile and a quarter. Except for a few incon- 
 siderable sections the enemy third position opposite 
 the French had gone. 
 
 The British to the north were not yet ready for 
 their grand assault. They had the more difficult 
 ground and the stronger enemy forces against them, 
 and for six weeks had been steadily fighting up hill. 
 At points they had reached the watershed, but they 
 had not won enough of the high ground to give 
 them positions against the German third line on the 
 reverse slopes. The following week was therefore a 
 
 ^ tale of slow progress to the rim of the 
 
 ^' ^" plateau, around Pozieres, High Wood, 
 
 ^* and Guillemont. Each day saw something 
 
 gained by hard fighting. On Sunday, the 13th, it 
 
 was a section of trench north-west of Pozieres, and 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 
 
 95 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE FRENCH ADVANCE, AUGUST I2TH-i6tH. 
 
96 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 another between Bazentin-le-Petit and Martmpuich. 
 On Tuesday it was ground close to Mouquet Farm. 
 On Wednesday it was the west and south-west en- 
 virons of Guillemont and a 300-yards advance at 
 High Wood. On Thursday there was progress 
 north~v/est of Bazentin-le-Petit towards Martinpuich 
 and between Ginchy and Guillemont. 
 
 On Friday, i8th August, came the next combined 
 attack. There was a steady pressure everywhere 
 
 J o from Thiepval to the Somme. The main 
 ''^' ' advance took place at 2.45 in the after- 
 noon, in fantastic weather, with bursts of hot sun- 
 shine followed by thunderstorms and flights of rain- 
 bows. On the left of the front the attack was timed 
 for 8 a.m. 
 
 South of Thiepval, in the old German first line, 
 was a strong work, the Leipzig Redoubt, into which 
 we had already bitten. It was such a stronghold as 
 we had seen at Beaumont Hamel, a nest of deep 
 dug-outs and subterranean galleries, well stocked 
 with machine guns. As our front moved east to 
 Pozieres and Contalmaison we had neglected this 
 corner, which had gradually become the apex of a 
 sharp salient. It was garrisoned by Prussians of the 
 29th Regiment, who were confident in the impreg- 
 nability of their refuge. They led an easy life, while 
 their confederates on the crest were crowding in im- 
 provised trenches under our shelling. Those not 
 on duty slept peacefully in their bunks at night, and 
 played cards in the deep shelters. On Friday, after 
 a sharp and sudden artillery preparation, two British 
 battalions rushed the redoubt. We had learned by 
 this time how to deal with the German machine 
 guns. Many of the garrison fought stubbornly to 
 
k«mj 0* raa 
 
 ' •■ atxvct it tmtmi»% r«a 
 f » w» > rtt>B •»,( IT 14 ■• •!;«««? 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 
 
 97 
 
 the end; others we smoked out and rounded up 
 like the occupants of a gambhng-house surprised by 
 the police. Six officers and 170 men surrendered in 
 a body. In all, some two thousand Germans were 
 caught in this trap by numbers less than their own. 
 There was no chance of a counter-stroke, for we got 
 our machine guns in position at once, and our artil- 
 lery caught every enemy attempt in the open. 
 
 7 
 
 The CrtKifis 
 
 t 
 
 
 ^\ 
 
 9 
 
 t 
 
 
 .^/ 
 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 / 
 
 i^ 
 
 J9» 
 
 / 
 
 
 W-f *f^'-' 
 
 
 Heights tn metres 
 
 «ooo leco 
 
 Vards 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME, — THIEPVAL. 
 
 Elsewhere on the front the fighting was harder 
 and less successful. In the centre a famous divi- 
 sion pushed closer to Martinpuich, and from High 
 Wood southward we slightly advanced our lines. 
 We also carried the last orchard in Longueval, and 
 pressed towards the eastern rim of Delville Wood. 
 Farther south we took the stone quarry on the edge 
 of Guillemont after a hand-to-hand struggle of sev- 
 eral hours, but failed to hold it. Meantime the 
 
98 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 French carried the greater part of Maurepas village, 
 and the place called Calvary Hill to the south-east. 
 This last was a great feat of arms, for they had 
 against them a fresh division of the Prussian Guard 
 (the 2nd), which had seen no serious action for 
 many months.* 
 
 We were now fighting on the watershed. At 
 Thiepval we held the ridge that overlooked the vil- 
 lage from the south-east. We held all the high 
 ground north of Pozieres, which gave us a clear 
 view of the country towards Bapaume, and our lines 
 lay 300 yards beyond the Windmill. We had all the 
 west side of High Wood and the ground between it 
 and the Albert-Bapaume road. We were half-way 
 between Longueval and Ginchy, and our pincers 
 were encircling Guillemont. At last we were in posi- 
 tion over against, and in direct view of, the German 
 third line. 
 
 The next week was occupied in repelling German 
 attempts to recover lost ground, and in efforts to 
 sharpen still further the Thiepval salient and to cap- 
 ture Guillemont. Thiepval, it should be remem- 
 bered, was a point in the old German first line on 
 the left flank of the great breach, and Guillemont was 
 the one big position still untaken in the German 
 
 A second line. On Sunday, the 20th, the 
 
 ^* * Germans shelled our front heavily, and 
 
 at about noon attacked our new lines on the western 
 
 side of High Wood. They reached a portion of our 
 
 A trenches, but were immediately driven 
 
 ^' ' out by our infantry. Next day, at High 
 
 Wood and at Mouquet Farm, there were frequent 
 
 * The whole of the ist Guard Corps — the ist and 2nd 
 Divisions — were now facing the French north of the Somme. 
 
H 
 W 
 
 w 
 
 o 
 
 n 
 w 
 
 w 
 
 w 
 o 
 
 l-H 
 
 % 
 
 M 
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 H 
 
 O 
 Q 
 
 I— I 
 
 !z; 
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 M 
 
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 H 
 
 I— t 
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THE SECOND STAGE 99 
 
 bombing attacks which came to nothing. On Tues- 
 day, 22nd August, we advanced steadily on our left, 
 pushing our line to the very edge of what ^^ ^^ 
 was once Mouquet Farm as well as to the ^' 
 north-east of it, and closing in to within 1,000 yards 
 of Thiepval. 
 
 The weather had become clearer, and our counter- 
 battery work silenced some of the enemy's guns, 
 while our aircraft fought many battles. We lost no 
 single machine, but four enemy airplanes were de- 
 stroyed and many others driven to the ground in a 
 damaged condition. A sentence in a captured letter 
 paid a tribute to the efficiency of the British airmen: 
 "The airmen circle over us and try to do damage, 
 but only enemy ones, for a German airman will not 
 try to come near. Behind the front there is a great 
 crowd of them, but here not one makes his appear- 
 ance.'' 
 
 Throughout the whole battle there was no 
 question which side possessed the ascendancy in 
 the air. Captured documents bore continual witness 
 to our superiority. One corps report described 
 our air work as "surprisingly bold"; another, 
 emanating from an army headquarters, suggested 
 methods of reorganisation, whereby "it is hoped 
 that it will be possible, at least for some hours, to 
 contest the supremacy in the air of the enemy." 
 Here is the record of the doings of one flight-lieu- 
 tenant, who encountered a detachment of twelve 
 German machines. "He dived in among them, 
 firing one drum. The formation was broken up. 
 
 Lieutenant then got under the nearest machine 
 
 and fired one drum at fifteen yards under the pilot's 
 seat, causing the machine to plunge to earth south- 
 
100 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 east of Baupaume. Shortly afterwards some more 
 hostile aeroplanes came up in formation. Lieutenant 
 
 attacked one, which went down and landed in a 
 
 gap between the woods. Several other machines 
 were engaged with indecisive results, and, having 
 expended all his ammunition, Lieutenant re- 
 turned." This was on ist September, when part- 
 ridge shooting begins. Lieutenant took the 
 
 day's work as calmly as if he had been tramping 
 the stubble. 
 
 On Wednesday night and Thursday morning a 
 very severe counter-attack on our position at Guille- 
 
 A mont, pressed with great determination, 
 
 ^* ^ failed to win any ground. That after- 
 ^* noon, 24th August, we advanced nearer 
 Thiepval, carrying Hindenburg Trench, and com- 
 ing, at one point, within 500 yards of the place. 
 In the evening, at five o'clock, the French carried 
 Maurepas, and pushed their right on to the Combles 
 railway, while a light division succeeded at last in 
 clearing Delville Wood. Next day the French suc- 
 
 A cess enabled us to join up with our Allies 
 
 ^' ^' south-east of Guillemont, where our 
 pincers were now beginning to grip hard. 
 
 The following week was one of slow and 
 steady progress. We cleared the ground immedi- 
 ately north of Delville Wood by a dashing charge 
 of a Rifle Brigade battalion. The most satis- 
 factory feature of these days was the frequency of 
 the German counter-attacks and their failure. On 
 
 A ^ 26th August, for example, troops of the 
 
 ^* * 4th Division of the Prussian Guard, after 
 
 a heavy bombardment, attacked south of Thiepval 
 
 village, and were completely repulsed by the Wilt- 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 101 
 
 shire and Worcestershire battalions holding that 
 front. One incident of that day deserves record. 
 A dispatch runner was sent back with a message 
 to the rear, which he reached safely. He started 
 back, came unscathed through the German bar- 
 rage, but in the general ruin of the trench lines 
 failed to find the place he had left. He wandered 
 on and on till he reached something that looked like 
 his old trench, and was just about to enter it when 
 he found it packed with Germans. He immediately 
 jumped to the conclusion that a counter-attack was 
 about to be launched, and, slipping back, managed 
 to reach our own lines, where he told the news. In 
 a minute or two our artillery got on to the spot, 
 and the counter-attack of the Prussian Guard was 
 annihilated before it began. On Thursday even- 
 ing, 31st August, five violent and futile a 
 assaults were made on our front between ^' ^ 
 High Wood and Ginchy, in which a battalion of 
 the Sussex Regiment won great honour. It looked 
 as if the enemy was trying in vain to anticipate the 
 next great stage of our offensive which was now 
 imminent. 
 
 On Sunday, 3rd September, at twelve noon, the 
 whole Allied front pressed forward. Australian and 
 British troops attacked on the extreme ^ .. 
 left — near Mouquet Farm and towards ^ ' ^* 
 
 Thiepval, and against the enemy position just north 
 of the Ancre. In their task they encountered the 
 1st Guard Reserve Division, and took several hun- 
 dred prisoners. They carried various strong posi- 
 tions, won ground east of Mouquet Farm, and still 
 further narrowed the Thiepval salient. Our centre 
 took High Wood in the afternoon, but pressed on 
 
102 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE ADVANCE OF SEPTEMBER 3. 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 103 
 
 too far, and had to give ground before a German 
 counter-attack. On their right one division took 
 and lost Ginchy, while another division and one 
 brigade swept through Guillemont to the sunken 
 road, 500 yards to the east. Farther south we 
 attacked but failed to capture Falfemont Farm. 
 Meantime the French— the ist Corps *— had 
 marched steadily from victory to victory. Shortly 
 after noon, on a 3% miles front between Maurepas 
 and the Somme, they had attacked after an intense 
 artillery preparation. They carried the villages 
 of Le Forest and Clery, and north of the former 
 place won the German lines to the outskirts of Com- 
 
 bles. 
 
 As the bloody angle south of Beaumont Hamel 
 will be for ever associated with the Ulster Division, 
 so Guillemont was a triumph for the troops of 
 southern and western Ireland. The men of Mun- 
 ster, Leinster, and Connaught broke through the 
 intricate defences of the enemy as a torrent sweeps 
 down rubble. The place was one of the strongest 
 of all the many fortified villages in the German line, 
 and its capture was the most important achievement 
 of the British since the taking of Pozieres. It was 
 the last uncaptured point in the old German second 
 position between Mouquet Farm and the junction 
 with the French. It was most resolutely defended, 
 since, being close to the point of junction, it com- 
 pelled a hiatus in the advance of the Allied front. 
 With its fall the work of two years was swept away, 
 
 * The 1st Corps belonged to north-east France, and most 
 of its men came from districts like Lille, Arras, and Roubaix, 
 which had suffered severely from the German occupation. 
 They fought literally to recover their homes. 
 
104 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 105 
 
 and in the whole section the enemy were now in 
 new and improvised positions. 
 
 But the advance was only beginning. On Mon- 
 day, 4th September, all enemy counter-attacks were 
 beaten off, and further ground won by c /,+ ^ 
 the British near Falfemont Farm. That ^ * ^' 
 night, in a torrent of rain, our men pressed on, and 
 before midday on Tuesday, 5th September, they 
 were nearly a mile east of Guillemont, n .. ^ 
 and well into Leuze Wood. That even- P - o- 
 ing the whole of the wood was taken, as well as 
 the hotly disputed Falfemont Farm, and the British 
 were less than 1,000 yards from the town of Com- 
 bles, on which the French were pressing in on the 
 south. 
 
 Meantime, about two in the afternoon, a new 
 French army came into action south of the Somme 
 on a front of a dozen miles from Barleux to south 
 of Chaulnes. This was General Micheler's Tenth 
 Army, which had been waiting for two months on 
 the order to advance. At a bound it carried the 
 whole of the German first position from Verman- 
 dovillers to Chilly, a front of nearly three miles, 
 and took some 3,000 unwounded prisoners. Next 
 day the French pressed on both north and south 
 of the river, and in the former area c jjf f. 
 reached the west end of the Anderlu ^ * * 
 Wood, carried the Hopital Farm, the Rainette Wood, 
 part of the Marriere Wood, the ridge on which runs 
 the road from Bouchavesnes to Clery, and the village 
 of Omiecourt. 
 
 From Wednesday, 6th September, to the night 
 of Friday, the 8th, the Germans strove in vain to 
 win back what they had lost. On the whole thirty 
 
106 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — ^ADVANCE OF MICHELER'S TENTH FRENCH ARMY, 
 SEPT. 5th and 6tH (showing THE ORIGINAL FRENCH FRONT BEFORE 
 JULY 1ST, AND THE GROUND GAINED BY THE ADVANCE). 
 
y 
 
 i 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — THE ALLIED FRONT ON SEPTEMBER lOTH (SHOWING THl ORIGINAL 
 FRONT ON JULY 1ST AND THE GROUND GAINED UP TO SEPTEMBER IOTH) 
 
THE SECOND STAGE 107 
 
 miles from Thiepval to Chilly there were violent 
 counter-attacks which had no success, though four 
 divisions of the Prussian Guard shared ^ ^ ^_g 
 in them. The Allied artillery broke ^ * 
 up the massed infantry in most cases long before 
 they reached our trenches. On Saturday, 9th Sep- 
 tember, the same Irish regiments which ^ ^ 
 had helped to take Guillemont carried ^ * ^* 
 Ginchy. The attack was delivered at 4.45 in the 
 afternoon, on a broad front, but though highly suc- 
 cessful in this one area, it failed elsewhere. We 
 made no progress in High Wood, we were checked 
 east of Delville, and, most important of all, we did 
 not succeed in carrying the work east of Ginchy 
 called the Quadrilateral, which at a later day was to 
 prove a thorn in our side. 
 
 Nevertheless the main objects had been attained. 
 The Allied front was now in a symmetrical line, and 
 everywhere on the highest ground. Combles was 
 held in a tight clutch, and the French Tenth Army 
 was within 800 yards of Chaulnes Station, and was 
 holding 2^ miles of the Chaulnes-Roye railway, 
 thereby cutting the chief German line of lateral 
 communication. The first objective which the Allies 
 had set before themselves on ist July had been 
 amply won. 
 
 By the loth of September the British had made 
 good the old German second position, and had 
 won the crest of the uplands, while the <-. , 
 French in their section had advanced ^ * 
 almost to the gates of Peronne, and their new army 
 on the right had begun to widen the breach. That 
 moment was in a very real sense the end of a phase. 
 
108 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the first and perhaps the most critical phase of the 
 great Western offensive. A man may have saved 
 money so that he can face the beginnings of ad- 
 versity with cheerfulness; but if the stress con- 
 tinues, his money will come to an end, and he will 
 be no better than his fellows in misfortune. The 
 immense fortifications of her main position repre- 
 sented for Germany the accumulated capital of two 
 years. She had raised these defences when she was 
 stronger than her adversaries in guns and in men. 
 Now she was weaker, and her capital was gone. 
 Thenceforth the campaign entered upon a new stage, 
 new alike in strategical and tactical problems. From 
 Thiepval to Chaulnes the enemy was now in impro- 
 vised positions. The day of manoeuvre battles had 
 not come, but in that section the rigidity of the old 
 trench warfare had vanished. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 the: third stage: 
 
 Situation after 3rd September — The German Third Position — The 
 Strain on the Defence — Favourable Outlook for the Allies — Be- 
 ginning of the New Bombardment — The Allied Plan — The Brit- 
 ish Dispositions — The "Tanks" — The Battle of 15th September 
 — Fall of Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers — High Wood 
 cleared — Check on the British Right — Summary of Results — 
 Achievements of British Aircraft — Death of Raymond Asquith — 
 The French Advance — Capture of the Quadrilateral — The Bat- 
 tle of 25th September — Fall of Morval and Lesbceufs — Battle of 
 26th September — Fall of Gueudecourt, Combles, and Thiepval — 
 Allied Outlook at Close of September — Nature of the Battle- 
 ground — The Weather of October — Difficulties of Transport — • 
 The Struggle for the Spurs — Its Peculiar Severity — Capture of 
 Regina Trench and the rest of Thiepval Ridge — The French take 
 Sailly — Micheler's Advance — Summary of the Month — Death of 
 Lord Lucas. 
 
 THE capture of Guillemont on 3rd September 
 meant the end of the German second position 
 on the whole front between Thiepval and Es- 
 trees. The Allies were faced with a new problem, 
 to understand which it is necessary to consider the 
 nature of the defences still before them and the 
 peculiar configuration of the country. 
 
 The advance of ist July had carried the first 
 enemy lines on a broad front, but the failure of 
 the attack between Gommecourt and Thiepval had 
 made the breach eight miles less than the original 
 plan. The advance of 14th July gave us the second 
 
 109 
 
110 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 line on a still narrower front — from Bazentin-le- 
 Petit to Longueval. The danger now was that the 
 Allied thrust, if continued, might show a rapidly 
 narrowing wedge which would result in the for- 
 mation of a sharp and precarious salient. Accord- 
 ingly Sir Douglas Haig broadened the breach by 
 striking out to left and right, capturing first Pozieres 
 and the high ground at Mouquet Farm, and then — 
 on his other flank — Guillemont and Ginchy. These 
 successes made the gap in the second position some 
 seven miles wide, and brought the British front in 
 most places to the highest ground, from which 
 direct observation was obtainable over the lower 
 slopes and valley pockets to the east. We did not 
 yet hold the complete crown of the ridge, though 
 at Mouquet Farm and at High Wood we had posi- 
 tions which no superior height commanded. 
 
 The German third position had at the beginning 
 of the battle been only in embryo. Before the at- 
 tack of 14th July it had been more or less completed, 
 and by the beginning of September it had been 
 greatly elaborated and a fourth position prepared 
 behind it. It was based on a string of fortified 
 villages which lie on the reverse slopes of the main 
 ridge — Courcelette, Martinpuich, Flers, Lesboeufs, 
 and Morval. Behind it was an intermediate line, 
 with Le Sars, Eaucourt lAbbaye, and Gueude- 
 court as strong positions in it; and further back 
 a fourth position, which lay just west of the Ba- 
 paume-Peronne road, covering the villages of Sailly- 
 Saillisel and Le Transloy. This was the line pro- 
 tecting Bapaume; the next position, at this moment 
 only roughly sketched out, lay well to the east of 
 that town. 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 111 
 
 Since the battle began the Germans had, up to 
 the second week in September, brought sixty-one 
 divisions into action in the Somme area; seven had 
 been refitted and sent in again; on 14th September 
 they were holding the line with fifteen divisions — 
 which gives us fifty-three as the number which had 
 been used up. The German losses throughout had 
 been high. The French casualties had been singu- 
 larly light — for they had fought economically un- 
 der close cover of their guns, and had had, on the 
 whole, the easier tactical problem to face. The 
 British losses had been, beyond doubt, lower than 
 those of the enemy, and our most conspicuous suc- 
 cesses, such as the advance of ist July south of 
 Thiepval and the action of 14th July, had been 
 achieved at a comparatively small cost. Our main 
 casualties arose from the failure north of Thiepval 
 on the first day, and the taking of desperately de- 
 fended and almost impregnable positions like Del- 
 ville Wood and Guillemont. 
 
 In the ten weeks' battle the enemy had shown 
 many ups and downs of strength. At one moment 
 his whole front would appear to be crumbling; at 
 another the arrival of fresh batteries from Verdun 
 and new troops would solidify his line. The effort 
 had strained his capacity to its full. He had revived 
 the old First Army — which had been in abeyance 
 since the preceding spring — and given it to von 
 Below north of the Somme, while the Second Army, 
 now under von Gallwitz, held the front south of the 
 river. He had placed the Crown Prince of Bavaria, 
 commanding the Sixth Army, in charge of the sector 
 comprising his own and the First and Second Armies. 
 He had followed the British plan of departing from 
 
112 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the corps system and creating groups, through 
 which a large number of divisions, drawn from 
 many corps, were successively passed. He had 
 used in his defence the best fighting material he 
 possessed. During those ten weeks almost all the 
 most famous German units had appeared on the 
 Somme — the cream of the Bavarian troops, the Fifth 
 Brandenburgers, and every single division of the 
 Guard and Guard Reserve Corps. 
 
 In the early days of September there was evidence 
 that the enemy was in no very happy condition. 
 The loss of Ginchy and Guillemont had enabled the 
 British to come into line with the left wing of 
 Fayolle's great advance, while the fall of certain 
 vital positions on the Thiepval Ridge gave us ob- 
 servation over a great space of country and threat- 
 ened Thiepval, which was the pivot of all the Ger- 
 man defence in the northern section of the battle- 
 ground. The Allied front north of the Somme had 
 the river as a defensive flank on its right, and might 
 presently have the Ancre to fill the same part on 
 its left. Hence the situation was ripe for a further 
 thrust which, if successful, might give our advance 
 a new orientation. If the German third line could 
 be carried it might be possible to strike out on the 
 flanks, repeating on a far greater scale the prac- 
 tice already followed. Bapaume itself was not 
 the objective, but a thrust north-eastward across 
 the Upper Ancre, which might get behind the great 
 slab of unbroken enemy positions from Thiepval 
 northwards. That would be the ultimate reward 
 of a complete success; in the meantime our task 
 was to break through the enemy's third line and 
 test his powers of resistance. 
 

THE THIRD STAGE 113 
 
 It seemed a propitious moment for a concerted 
 blow. The situation on the whole front was good. 
 Fayolle's left wing had won conspicuous successes 
 and had their spirits high, while Micheler was mov- 
 ing his pincers towards Chaulnes and playing havoc 
 with the main German lateral communications. 
 Elsewhere in Europe things went well for the Allies. 
 On 28th August Rumania had entered the war and 
 her troops were pouring into Transylvania. As it 
 happened, it was a premature and fruitless move- 
 ment, but it compelled Germany to take instant steps 
 to meet the menace. There had been important 
 changes in the German Higher Commands, and it 
 might reasonably be assumed that von Hindenburg 
 and von Ludendorff were not yet quite at ease in 
 the saddle. Brussilov was still pinning down the 
 Austro-German forces on the Russian front, and 
 Sarrail had just begun his serious offensive in the 
 Balkans. In the event of a real debacle in the West 
 the enemy might be hard pressed to find the men 
 to fill the breach. Every action, it should be re- 
 membered, is a packet of surprises. There is an 
 immediate local objective, but on success any one 
 of twenty consequences may follow. The wise com- 
 mander cannot count on any of these consequences, 
 but he must not neglect them in his calculations. 
 If the gods send him good fortune he must be ready 
 to take it, and he naturally chooses a season when 
 the gods seem propitious. 
 
 On Tuesday, 12th September, a comprehensive 
 bombardment began all along the British ^ .. 
 front from Thiepval to Ginchy. The ^ * 
 whole of Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army was 
 
114 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 destined for the action, as well as the right corps — 
 the First Canadian — of the Fifth Army, while on 
 the left of the battle to another division was allotted 
 a preliminary attack, which was partly in the nature 
 of a feint and partly a necessary preparatory step.. 
 The immediate objective of the different units must 
 be clearly noted. On the left of the main front one 
 Canadian division was directed against Courcelette. 
 On their right a division of the New Army — that 
 Scottish division which had won high honour at 
 Loos — ^had for its task to clear the remains of the 
 old Switch line and encircle Martinpuich, but not 
 — on the first day at any rate — to attempt the cap- 
 ture of what was believed to be a most formidable 
 stronghold. Going south, two Territorial divisions 
 — Northumbrian and London — had to clear High 
 Wood. On their right the New Zealanders had 
 Flers as their objective, while two divisions of the 
 New Army had to make good the ground east and 
 north of Delville Wood. Next to them the Guards 
 and a division of the old Regulars were to move 
 north-east from Ginchy against Lesboeufs and Mor- 
 val, while on the extreme right of the British front 
 another division of London Territorials were to 
 carry Bouleaux Wood and form a defensive flank. 
 It had been agreed between Sir Douglas Haig 
 and General Foch that Combles should not be di- 
 rectly attacked, but pinched by an advance on both 
 sides of it. This advance was no easy problem, 
 for, in Sir Douglas Haig's words, ''the line of the 
 French advance was narrowed almost to a defile by 
 the extensive and strongly fortified wood of St. 
 Pierre Vaast on the one side, and on the other by 
 the Combles valley." The closest co-operation was 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 115 
 
 necessary to enable the two Commands to solve a 
 highly intricate tactical problem. 
 
 The British force to be used in the new advance 
 was for the most part fresh. The Guards had not 
 been in action since Loos the previous September, 
 the Canadians were new to the Somme area, while 
 it was the first experience of the New Zealanders 
 on the Western front. Two of the divisions had 
 been some considerable time already in the front 
 trenches, but the others had been brought up for 
 the purpose only a few days before. All the troops 
 were of the best quality, and had a proud record be- 
 hind them. More perhaps than any other part of the 
 battle this was an action of the British corps d' elite. 
 
 In this stage, too, a new weapon was to be used. 
 The ''tanks," officially known as "Machine Gun 
 Corps, Heavy Section," had come out from home 
 some time before, and had been parked in secluded 
 spots at the back of the front. The world is now 
 familiar with descriptions and pictures of those 
 strange machines, which, shaped like monstrous 
 toads, crawled imperturbably over wire and para- 
 pets, butted down houses, shouldered trees aside, 
 and humped themselves over the stoutest walls. 
 They were an experiment which could only be proved 
 in practice, and the design in using them at this 
 stage was principally to find out their weak points, 
 so as to perfect their mechanism for the future. 
 Their main tactical purpose was to clear out re- 
 doubts and nests of machine guns which, as we 
 had found to our sorrow at Loos, might hang up 
 the most resolute troops. For this object they must 
 precede the infantry attack, and the task of as- 
 sembling them before the parapets were crossed was 
 
116 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 fraught with difficulty, for they were neither silent 
 nor inconspicuous. The things had been kept a 
 profound secret, and until the very eve of the ad- 
 vance few in the British army had even heard of 
 them. On 14th September, the day before our at- 
 tack, some of them were seen by German aeroplanes, 
 and the German troops were warned that the British 
 had some strange new engine. Rumours also seem 
 to have reached Germany five or six weeks earlier, 
 for orders had been issued to supply the soldiers 
 with a special kind of armour-piercing bullet. But 
 as to the real nature of the device the Germans had 
 no inkling. 
 
 On the night of Thursday, the 14th, the Fifth 
 Army carried out their preliminary task. On a front 
 
 ^ of a thousand yards south-east of Thiep- 
 
 ;^ep . 14. ^^1 ^ brigade of the New Army stormed 
 the Hohenzollern trench and the strong redoubt 
 which the Germans called the ''Wunderwerk," 
 taking many prisoners and themselves losing little. 
 The fame of this enterprise has been somewhat ob- 
 scured by the great advance which followed, but 
 it was a most workmanlike and skilful performance, 
 and it had a real effect on the subsequent battle. 
 It deceived the enemy as to the exact terrain of the 
 main assault, and it caused him to launch a counter- 
 attack in an area which was part of the principal 
 battle-ground, with the result that our left wing, 
 after checking his attack, was able to catch him on 
 the rebound. 
 
 The morning of Friday, 15th September, was 
 perfect autumn weather, with a light mist filling 
 the hollows and shrouding the slopes. At 6 a.m. 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 117 
 
 the British bombardment, which had now lasted for 
 three days, rose to the fury of hurricane ^ , . 
 fire. The enemy had a thousand guns of ^ ' ^' 
 all calibres massed against us, and his defences con- 
 sisted of a triple line of entrenchments and a series 
 of advanced posts manned by machine guns. Our 
 earlier bombardment had cut his wire and destroyed 
 many of his trenches, besides hampering greatly 
 his bringing up of men, rations, and shells. The 
 final twenty minutes of intense fire, slowly creep- 
 ing forward with our infantry close under its 
 shadow, pinned him to his positions and interfered 
 with his counter-barrage. To an observer it seemed 
 that the deafening crescendo all round the horizon 
 was wholly British. 
 
 At twenty minutes past six our men crossed the 
 parapets and moved forward methodically towards 
 the enemy. The Germans, manning their trenches 
 as our guns lengthened, saw through the thin mist 
 inhuman shapes crawling towards them, things like 
 gigantic slugs, spitting fire from their mottled sides. 
 They had been warned of a new weapon, but what 
 mortal weapon was this terror that walked by day? 
 And ere they could collect their dazed wits the Brit- 
 ish bayonets v/ere upon them. 
 
 On the left and centre the attack was instantly 
 successful. The Canadians, after beating off the 
 German counter-attack, carried Courcelette in the 
 afternoon. In this advance French-Canadian troops 
 played a distinguished part in winning back some 
 miles of French soil for their ancient motherland. 
 On their right the Scottish division, which had al- 
 ready been six weeks in line, performed something 
 more than the task allotted it. The capture of 
 
'-;^ 
 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 119 
 
 Martinpuich was not part of the programme of 
 the day's operations, but the Scots pushed east and 
 west of the village, and at a quarter past five in the 
 evening had the place in their hands. Farther 
 south there was fierce fighting in the old cockpit 
 of High Wood. It was two months since we had 
 first effected an entrance into its ill-omened shades, 
 but we had been forced back, and for long had to 
 be content with its southern corner. The strong 
 German third line — which ran across its northern 
 half on the very crest of the ridge — and the endless 
 craters and machine-gun redoubts made it a des- 
 perate nut to crack. We had pushed out horns to 
 east and west of it, but the northern stronghold in 
 the wood itself had defied all our efforts. It was 
 held on that day by troops of the 2nd Bavarian 
 Corps, and the German ranks have shown no better 
 fighting stuff. Our first attack failed, but on a 
 second attempt the London Territorials, a little 
 after noon, swept the place clear, though not with- 
 out heavy losses. 
 
 Beyond them the New Zealand Division, with a 
 New Army Division on its right, carried the Switch 
 line and took Flers with little trouble. They were 
 preceded by a tank, which waddled complacently 
 up the main street of the village, with the enemy's 
 bullets rattling harmlessly off its sides, followed by 
 cheering and laughing British troops. Farther south 
 we advanced our front for nearly a mile and a half. 
 A light division of the New Army, debouching from 
 Delville Wood, cleared Mystery Corner on its eastern 
 side before the general attack began, and then with 
 splendid elan pushed forward north of Ginchy in 
 the direction of Lesboeufs. 
 
120 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Only on the right wing was the tale of success 
 incomplete. Ginchy, it will be remembered, had 
 been carried by Irish troops on 9th September, but 
 its environs were not yet fully cleared, and the 
 enemy held the formidable point known as the 
 Quadrilateral. This was situated about 700 yards 
 east of Ginchy at a bend of the Morval road, where 
 it passed through a deep wooded ravine. One of the 
 old Regular divisions was directed against it, with 
 the Guards on their left and the London Territorials 
 on their right. The business of the last-named was 
 to carry Bouleaux Wood and form a defensive flank 
 north of Combles, while the Guards were to ad- 
 vance from Ginchy on Lesboeufs. But the strength 
 of the Quadrilateral foiled the plan. The Londoners 
 did indeed enter Bouleaux Wood, but the division 
 on their left was fatally hung up in front of the 
 Quadrilateral, and this in turn exposed the right 
 flank of the Guards. The Guards Brigades ad- 
 vanced, as they have always advanced, with perfect 
 discipline and courage. But both their flanks were 
 enfiladed; the front of attack was too narrow; the 
 sunken road before them was strongly held by ma- 
 chine guns; they somewhat lost direction; and, in 
 consequence, no part of our right attack gained its 
 full objective. There, and in High Wood, we in- 
 curred most of the casualties of the day. The check 
 was the more regrettable since complete success in this 
 area was tactically more important than elsewhere. 
 
 But after all deductions were made the day's re- 
 sults were in a high degree satisfactory. We had 
 broken in one day through three of the enemy's main 
 defensive systems, and on a front of over six miles 
 had advanced to an average depth of a mile. It was 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 121 
 
 the most effective blow yet dealt at the enemy by 
 British troops. It gave us not only the high ground 
 between Thiepval and the Combles valley, but placed 
 us well down the forward slopes. *'The damage 
 to the enemy's moral," said the official summary, 
 "is probably of greater consequence than the seizure 
 of dominating positions and the capture of between 
 four and five thousand prisoners." Three famous 
 Bavarian divisions had been engaged and completely 
 shattered, and the whole enemy front thrown into 
 a state of disorder. 
 
 The tanks had, for a new experiment, done 
 wonders. Some of them broke down on the way 
 up, and, of the twenty-four which crossed the Ger- 
 man lines, seven came to grief early in the day. The 
 remaining seventeen did brilliant service, some squat- 
 ting on enemy trenches and clearing them by ma- 
 chine-gun fire, some flattening out uncut wire, others 
 destroying machine-gun nests and redoubts or strong 
 points like the sugar factory at Courcelette. But 
 their moral effect was greater than the material 
 damage they wrought. The sight of those delib- 
 erate impersonal engines ruthlessly grinding down 
 the most cherished defences put something like panic 
 into troops who had always prided themselves upon 
 the superior merit of their own fighting "machine." 
 Beyond doubt, too, the presence of the tanks added 
 greatly to the zeal and confidence of our assault- 
 ing infantry. An element of sheer comedy was 
 introduced into the grim business of war, and com- 
 edy is dear to the heart of the British soldier. The 
 crews of the tanks — which they called His Majesty's 
 Landships — seemed to have acquired some of the 
 light-heartedness of the British sailor. Penned up 
 
122 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 in a narrow stuffy space, condemned to a form of 
 motion compared with which that of the queasiest 
 vessel was steady, and at the mercy of unknown 
 perils, these adventurers faced their task with the 
 zest of a boy on holiday. With infinite humour 
 they described how the enemy had surrounded 
 them when they were stuck, and had tried in vain 
 to crack their shell, while they themselves sat laugh- 
 ing inside. 
 
 In the achievements of the day our aircraft nobly 
 co-operated. They destroyed thirteen hostile ma- 
 chines and drove nine more in a broken condition 
 to ground. They bombarded enemy headquarters 
 and vital points on all his railway lines. They de- 
 stroyed German kite balloons and so put out the 
 eyes of the defence. They guided our artillery fire 
 and they brought back frequent and accurate reports 
 of every stage in the infantry advance. Moreover, 
 they attacked both enemy artillery and infantry with 
 their machine-gun fire from a low elevation. Such 
 performances were a proof of that resolute and ex- 
 alted spirit of the offensive which inspired all arms 
 of the service. In the week of the action on the 
 whole Somme battle-ground only fourteen enemy 
 machines managed to cross our lines, while our air- 
 planes made between two thousand and three 
 thousand flights far behind the German front. 
 
 In the Guards' advance, among many other 
 gallant and distinguished officers, there fell one 
 whose death was, in a peculiar sense, a loss to his 
 country and the future. Lieutenant Raymond As- 
 quith, of the Grenadier Guards, the eldest son of 
 the British Prime Minister, died while leading his 
 men through the fatal enfilading fire from the 
 
L„. 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 123 
 
 corner of Ginchy village. In this war the gods 
 took toll of every rank and class. Few generals and 
 statesmen in the Allied nations but had to mourn 
 intimate bereavements, and de Castelnau had given 
 three sons for his country. But the death of Ray- 
 mond Asquith had a poignancy apart from his birth 
 and position, and it may be permitted to one 
 of his oldest friends to pay his tribute to a heroic 
 memory. 
 
 A scholar of the ripe Elizabethan type, a brilliant 
 wit, an accomplished poet, a sound lawyer — these 
 things were borne lightly, for his greatness was not 
 in his attainments but in himself. He had always 
 a curious aloofness towards mere worldly success. 
 He loved the things of the mind for their own sake 
 — good books, good talk, the company of old friends 
 • — and the rewards of common ambition seemed to 
 him too trivial for a man's care. He was of the 
 spending type in life, giving freely of the riches of 
 his nature, but asking nothing in return. His care- 
 lessness of personal gain, his inability to trim or 
 truckle, and his aloofness from the facile acquaint- 
 anceships of the modern world made him incom- 
 prehensible to many, and his high fastidiousness 
 gave him a certain air of coldness. Most noble in 
 presence, and with every grace of voice and manner, 
 he moved among men like a being of another race, 
 scornfully detached from the common struggle; and 
 only his friends knew the warmth and loyalty of his 
 soul. 
 
 At the outbreak of war he joined a Territorial 
 battalion, from which he was later transferred to 
 the Grenadiers. More than most men he hated the 
 loud bellicosities of politics, and he had never done 
 
124 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 homage to the deities of the crowd. His critical 
 sense made him chary of enthusiasm, and it was no 
 sudden sentimental fervour that swept him into the 
 Army. He saw his duty, and, though it meant the 
 shattering of every taste and interest, he did it joy- 
 fully, and did it to the full. For a little he had a 
 post on the Staff, but applied to be sent back to his 
 battalion, since he wished no privileges. In the 
 Guards he was extraordinarily happy, finding the 
 same kind of light-hearted and high-spirited com- 
 panionship which had made Oxford for him a place 
 of delectable memories. He was an admirable bat- 
 talion officer, and thought seriously of taking up the 
 Army as his profession after the war, for he had all 
 the qualities which go to the making of a good soldier. 
 In our long roll of honour no nobler figure will 
 find a place. He was a' type of his country at its 
 best — shy of rhetorical professions, austerely self- 
 respecting, one who hid his devotion under a mask 
 of indifference, and, when the hour came, revealed 
 it only in deeds. Many gave their all for the cause,l 
 but few, if any, had so much to give. He loved his ! 
 youth, and his youth has become eternal. Debonair 
 and brilliant and brave, he is now part of that im- , 
 mortal England which knows not age or weariness i 
 or defeat. 
 
 Meanwhile the French had not been idle. On 
 
 Wednesday, 13th September, two days before the 
 
 ^ British advance, Fayolle carried Bou- 
 
 oep . 3. (^i^^yggj^gg Q2iS>t of the Bapaume-Peronne 
 
 road, taking over two thousand prisoners. He was 
 now not three miles from the vital position of Mont 
 St. Quentin — the key of Peronne — facing it across 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 125 
 
 the little valley of the Tortille. Next day the French 
 had the farm of Le Priez, south-east of <^ , , 
 Combles, and on the afternoon of Sun- ^ * ^* 
 day, the 17th, south of the Somme their right wing 
 carried the remainder of Vermandovil- ^ , 
 lers and Berny, and the intervening ^ * ^' 
 ground around Deniecourt. The following day 
 Deniecourt, with its strongly fortified ^ , , r^ 
 park, was captured. This gave them ^ * 
 the whole of the Berny-Deniecourt plateau, com- 
 manding the lower plateau where stood the villages 
 of Ablaincourt and Pressoire, and menaced Barleux 
 — the pivot of enemy resistance south of the river. 
 
 For the next week there was a lull in the main 
 operations while the hammer was swung back for 
 another blow. On the 1 6th the 45th Ger- ^ . ^ 
 man Reserve Division counter-attacked ^ * 
 the Canadians at Courcelette, and the 6th Bavarian 
 Division, newly arrived, struck at the New Zealand- 
 ers at Flers. Both failed, and south of Combles the 
 fresh troops of the German i8th Corps succeeded 
 no better against the French. The most vigorous 
 counter-strokes were those which the Canadians 
 received, and which were repeated daily for nearly 
 a week. Meantime, on Monday, the ^ .. r^ 
 i8th, the Quadrilateral was carried — ^ * 
 carried by the division which had been blocked by 
 it three days before. It was not won without a 
 heavy fight at close quarters, for the garrison re- 
 sisted stoutly, but we closed in on it from all sides, 
 and by the evening had pushed our front five hun- 
 dred yards beyond it to the hollow before Morval. 
 
 The week was dull and cloudy, and from the 
 Monday to the Wednesday it rained without ceas- 
 
battle of the somme. — the french advance of september 12-14 
 (capture of bouchavesnes and le priez farm). 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 127 
 
 ing. But by the Friday it had cleared, though the 
 mornings were now thick with autumn haze, and 
 we were able once more to get that direct observa- 
 tion and aerial reconnaissance which is an indis- 
 pensable preliminary to a great attack. On Sunday, 
 the 24th, our batteries opened again, this ^ , 
 time against the uncaptured points in r • 4- 
 the German third line like Morval and Lesboeufs, 
 against intermediate positions like Gueudecourt, and 
 especially against Thiepval, which we now com- 
 manded from the east. On that day, too, our air- 
 craft destroyed six enemy machines and drove three 
 more to earth. The plan was for an attack by the 
 Fourth Army on Monday, the 25th, with — on its 
 left wing — small local objectives; but, on the right 
 and centre, aiming at completing the captures which 
 had been the ultimate objectives of the advance of 
 the iSth. The following day the right wing of the 
 Fifth Army would come into action, and it was 
 hoped that from Thiepval to Combles the enemy 
 would be driven back to his fourth line of defence 
 and our own front pushed up well within assault- 
 ing distance. 
 
 The hour of attack on the 25th was fixed at 
 thirty-five minutes after noon. It was bright, 
 cloudless weather, but the heat of the ^ , 
 sun had lost its summer strength. That ^ * ^' 
 day saw an advance the most perfect yet made in 
 any stage of the battle, for in almost every part of 
 the field we won what we sought. The extreme left 
 of the 3rd Corps was held up north of Cource- 
 lette, but the remaining two divisions carried out 
 the tasks assigned to them. So did the centre 
 and left divisions of the 15th Corps, while part 
 
128 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 iudecourt 
 
 
 ^L 
 
 J Miles 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE ATTACK OF SEPTEMBER 25 AND 26 (tHE 
 
 GAINS ON THE RIGHT). 
 
 of the right division managed to penetrate into 
 Gueudecourt, but was compelled to retire owing 
 to the supporting brigade on its flank being 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 129 
 
 checked by uncut wire. The 14th Corps succeeded 
 everywhere. The Guards, eager to avenge their 
 sufferings of the week before, despite the heavy 
 losses on their left, swept irresistibly upon Les- 
 boeufs. South of them a Regular division took 
 Morval — the village on the height north of Combles 
 which, with its subterranean quarries and elaborate 
 trench system, was a most formidable stronghold. 
 The London Territorials on their right formed a 
 defensive flank facing south from Bouleaux Wood. 
 Combles was now fairly between the pincers. It 
 might have fallen that day, but the French attack 
 on Fregicourt failed, though they carried the village 
 of Rancourt on the Bapaume-Peronne road. 
 
 By the evening of the 25th the British had stormed 
 an enemy front of six miles between Combles and 
 Martinpuich to a depth of more than a mile. The 
 fall of Morval gave them the last piece of un- 
 captured high ground on that backbone of ridge 
 which runs from Thiepval through High Wood 
 and Ginchy. The next day we reaped in full 
 the fruit of these successes. The divi- (^ . , ^ 
 sion of the New Army which had en- ^ * 
 tered Gueudecourt the day before — but had failed 
 to maintain their ground, now captured the famous 
 Gird trench, assisted by a tank and an aeroplane — 
 which attacked the enemy with machine-gun fire "^ 
 
 * The official dispatch thus describes this incident : "In 
 the early morning a 'tank' started down the portion of the 
 trench held by the enemy from the north-west, firing its 
 machine guns, and followed by bombers. The enemy could 
 not escape, as we held the trench at its southern end. At the 
 same time an aeroplane flew down the length of the trench, 
 also firing a machine gun at the enemy holding it. These 
 then waved white handkerchiefs in token of surrender, and 
 
130 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 — and by the afternoon had the village in their 
 hands. This division was one which had suffered 
 disaster at Loos a year before on that very day, 
 and had, since the beginning of the Somme battle, 
 shown itself resistless in attack. It had already 
 played a large part in the capture of Fricourt; it 
 had cleared Mametz Wood, and it had taken Bazen- 
 tin-le-Petit Wood on 14th July. It now crowned 
 a brilliant record by the capture of Gueudecourt 
 and an advance to within a mile of the German 
 fourth position. That day, too, the French took 
 Fregicourt, and Combles fell."^ The enemy had 
 evacuated it, and, though great stores of material 
 were taken in its catacombs, the number of prisoners 
 was small. 
 
 Meantime, on the British left the success was 
 not less conspicuous. Two divisions of the New 
 Army, advancing at twenty-five minutes after noon 
 under the cover of our artillery barrage, had carried 
 Thiepval, the north-west corner of Mouquet Farm, 
 and the Zollern Redoubt on the eastern crest. The 
 German pivot had gone, the pivot which they 
 
 when this was reported by the aeroplane the infantry accepted 
 the surrender of the garrison. By 8.30 a.m. the whole trench 
 had been cleared, great numbers of the enemy had been killed, 
 and eight officers and 362 other ranks made prisoners. Our 
 total casualties amounted to five." 
 
 * The French ist Corps entered the line north of the 
 Somme on 23rd August. At the end of six weeks, when they 
 were relieved, they had taken the remainder of Maurepas, 
 and the villages of Le Forest, Bouchavesnes, Rancourt, Fregi- 
 court, and Combles, together with 4,000 prisoners, 23 guns, 
 and 70 machine guns. They believed that they had inflicted 
 at least 40,000 casualties on the enemy. They had the satis- 
 faction of breaking up two divisions of the Prussian Guard, 
 and of advancing two miles on a front of six. 
 
;;mi^'*--' 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 131 
 
 had believed impregnable. So skilful was our bar- 
 rage that our men were over the German parapets 
 and into the dug-outs before machine guns could 
 be got up to repel them. Here the prisoners were 
 numerous, for the attack was in the nature of a 
 surprise. 
 
 On the evening of 26th September the Allied for- 
 tunes in the West had never looked brighter. The 
 enemy was now on his fourth line, without the bene- 
 fit of the high ground, and there was no chance of 
 retrieving his disadvantages by observation from 
 the air. Since ist July the British alone had taken 
 over twenty-six thousand prisoners, and had engaged 
 thirty-eight German divisions, the flower of the 
 Army, of which twenty-nine had been withdrawn 
 exhausted and broken. The enemy had been com- 
 pelled to use up his reserves in repeated costly and 
 futile counter-attacks without compelling the Allies 
 to relax for one moment their steady and methodical 
 pressure. Every part of the armies of France and 
 Britain had done gloriously, and the new divisions 
 had shown the courage and discipline of veterans. 
 A hundred captured documents showed that the 
 German moral had been shaken and that the Ger- 
 man machine was falling badly out of gear. In 
 normal seasons at least another month of fine 
 weather might be reasonably counted on, and in 
 that month further blows might be struck with 
 cumulative force. In France they spoke of a 
 'Ticardy summer" — of fair bright days at the 
 end of autumn when the ground was dry and the 
 air of a crystal clearness. A fortnight of such days 
 would suffice for a crowning achievement. 
 
 The hope was destined to fail. The guns were 
 
132 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 scarcely silent after the great attack of the 26th, 
 when the weather broke, and October was one long 
 succession of tempestuous gales and drenching rains. 
 
 To understand the difficulties which untoward 
 weather imposed on the Allied advance, it is neces- 
 sary to grasp the nature of the fifty square miles of 
 tortured ground which three months' fighting had 
 given them, and over which lay the communications 
 between their firing line and the rear. From a 
 position like the north end of High Wood almost 
 the whole British battle-ground on a clear day was 
 visible to the eye. To reach the place from the old 
 Allied front line some four miles of bad roads had 
 to be traversed. They would have been bad roads 
 in a moorland parish, where they suffered only the 
 transit of the infrequent carrier's cart, for, at the 
 best, they were mere country tracks, casually en- 
 gineered, and with no solid foundation. But here 
 they had to support such a traffic as the world had 
 scarcely seen before. Not the biggest mining camp 
 or the vastest engineering undertaking had ever pro- 
 duced one tithe of the activity which existed behind 
 each section of the battle line. There were places like 
 Crewe, places like the skirts of Birmingham, places 
 like Aldershot or Salisbury Plain. It has often been 
 pointed out that the immense and complex mechan- 
 ism of modern armies resembles a series of pyra- 
 mids which taper to a point as they near the front. 
 Though all modern science had gone to the making 
 of this war, at the end, in spite of every artificial 
 aid, it became elementary, akin in many respects 
 to the days of bows and arrows. 
 
 It was true of the whole front, but the Somme 
 
bo 
 
 J 
 
 S^jjy ojL 
 
 U 
 
 9 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOUME — THE ALLIED FRONT NORTH OF THE SOMUE ON OCTOBEB 1ST (SHOWING 
 THE FRONT ON JULY I4TH AND THE GROUND GAINED FROM JULY I4TH TO OCTOBER 1ST) 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 133 
 
 battle-ground was peculiar in this, that the area of 
 land where the devices of civilisation broke down 
 was far larger than elsewhere. El-sewhere it was 
 defined more or less by the limits of the enemy's 
 observation and fire. On the Somme it was de- 
 fined by the previous three months' battle. It 
 was not the German guns which made the trouble 
 on the ground between the Albert-Peronne road and 
 the British firing line. Casual bombardments trou- 
 bled us little. It was the hostile elements and the 
 unkindly nature of Mother Earth. 
 
 The country roads had been rutted out of recog- 
 nition by endless transport, and, since they never 
 had much of a bottom, the toil of the road-menders 
 had nothing to build upon. New roads were hard 
 to make, for the chalky soil was poor and had been 
 so churned up by shelling and the movement of guns 
 and troops that it had lost all cohesion. Count- 
 less shells had burst below the ground, causing 
 everywhere subsidences and cavities. There was no 
 stone in the countryside and little wood, so repair- 
 ing materials had to be brought from a distance, 
 which still further complicated the problem. To 
 mend a road you must give it a rest, but there was 
 little chance of a rest for any of those poor tortured 
 passages. In all the district there were but two good 
 highways, one running at right angles to our front 
 from Albert to Bapaume, the other parallel to our 
 old front line from Albert to Peronne. These, to 
 begin with, were the best type of routes nationales 
 — -broad, well-engineered, lined with orderly pop- 
 lars. By the third month of the battle even these 
 were showing signs of wear, and to travel on either 
 in a motor car was a switchback journey. If the 
 
134 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 famous highroads declined, what was likely to be 
 the condition of the country lanes which rayed 
 around Contalmaison, Longueval, and Guillemont? 
 
 Let us take our stand at the northern angle of 
 High Wood. It is only a spectre of a wood, a hor- 
 rible place of matted tree trunks and crumbling 
 trench lines, full of mementoes of the dead and all 
 the dreadful debris of battle. To reach it we have 
 walked across two miles of what once must have 
 been breezy downland, patched with little fields of 
 roots and grain. It is now like a waste brickfield 
 in a decaying suburb, pock-marked with shell-holes, 
 littered with cartridge clips, equipment, fragments 
 of wire, and every kind of tin can. Over all the 
 area hangs the curious, acrid, unwholesome smell 
 of burning, an odour which will always recall to 
 every soldier the immediate front of battle. 
 
 The air is clear, and we look from the height 
 over a shallow trough towards the low slopes in 
 front of the Transloy road, behind which lies the 
 German fourth line. Our own front is some thou- 
 sands of yards ofif, close under that hillock which 
 is the famous Butte de Warlencourt. Far on our 
 left is the lift of the Thiepval ridge, and nearer us, 
 hidden by the slope, are the ruins of Martinpuich. 
 Le Sars and Eaucourt TAbbaye are before us, Flers 
 a little to the right, and beyond it Gueudecourt. On 
 our extreme right rise the slopes of Sailly-Saillisel 
 — one can see the shattered trees lining the Bapaume- 
 Peronne road — and, hidden by the fall of the ground, 
 are Lesboeufs and Morval. Behind us are things 
 like scarred patches on the hillsides. They are 
 the remains of the Bazentin woods and the ominous 
 wood of Delville. The whole confines of the British 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 135 
 
 battle-ground lie open to the eye from the Thiepval 
 ridge in the north to the downs which ring the site 
 of Combles. 
 
 Look west, and beyond the dreary country we 
 have crossed rise green downs set with woods un- 
 touched by shell — the normal, pleasant land of 
 Picardy. Look east, beyond our front line and the 
 smoke puffs, across the Warlencourt and Gueude- 
 court ridges, and on the sky-line there also appear 
 unbroken woods, and here and there a church spire 
 and the smoke of villages. The German retirement 
 in September had been rapid, and we have reached 
 the fringes of a land as yet little scarred by combat. 
 We are looking at the boundaries of the battlefield. 
 We have pushed the enemy right up to the edge of 
 habitable and undevastated country, but we pay for 
 our success in having behind us a strip of sheer 
 desolation. 
 
 There were now two No Man's Lands. One was 
 between the front lines; the other lay between the 
 old enemy front and the front we had won. The 
 second was the bigger problem, for across it must 
 be brought the supplies of a great army. This was 
 a war of motor transport, and we were doing to-day 
 what the Early Victorians pronounced impossible 
 — running the equivalent of steam engines not on 
 prepared tracks, but on highroads, running them 
 day and night in endless relays. And these high- 
 roads were not the decent macadamized ways of 
 England, but roads which would be despised in 
 Sutherland or Connaught. 
 
 The problem was hard enough in fine weather; 
 but let the rain come and soak the churned-up soil 
 and the whole land became a morass. There was 
 
lae THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 no pave, as in Flanders, to make a firm causeway, 
 Every road became a water-course, and in the hol- 
 lows the mud was as deep as a man's thighs. An 
 army must be fed, troops must be relieved, guns 
 must be supplied, and so there could be no slacken- 
 ing of the traffic. Off the roads the ground was a 
 squelching bog, dug-outs crumbled in, and communi- 
 cation trenches ceased to be. In areas like Ypres 
 and Festubert, where the soil was naturally 
 water-logged, the conditions were worse, but at 
 Ypres and Festubert we had not six miles of sponge, 
 varied by mud torrents, across which all transport 
 must pass. 
 
 Weather is a vital condition of success in opera- 
 tions where great armies are concerned, for men and 
 guns cannot fight on air. In modern war it is more 
 urgent than ever, since aerial reconnaissance plays 
 so great a part, and Napoleon's "fifth element," mud, 
 grows in importance with the complexity of the fight- 
 ing machine. Again, in semi-static trench warfare, 
 where the same area remains for long the battle- 
 field, the condition of the ground is the first fact 
 to be reckoned with. Once we grasp this, the diffi- 
 culty of the October campaign, waged in almost con- 
 tinuous rain, will be apparent. But no words can 
 convey an adequate impression of the Somme area 
 after a week's downpour. Its discomforts had to 
 be endured to be understood. 
 
 The topography of the immediate battle-ground 
 demands a note from the point of view of its tactical 
 peculiarities. The British line at the end of Sep- 
 tember ran from the Schwaben Redoubt, i,ooo 
 yards north of Thiepval, along the ridge to a point 
 north-east of Courcelette ; then just in front of 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 137 
 
 Martinpuich, Flers, Gueudecourt, and Lesboeufs to 
 the junction with the French. Morval was now 
 part of the French area. From Thiepval to the 
 north-east of Courcelette the Hne w^as for the most 
 part on the crest of the ridge; it then bent south- 
 ward and followed generally the foot of the eastern 
 slopes. But a special topographical feature com- 
 plicated the position. Before our front a shallow 
 depression ran north-west from north of Sailly- 
 Saillisel to about 2,000 yards south of Bapaume, 
 where it turned westward and joined the glen of 
 the Ancre at Miraumont. From the main Thiepval- 
 Morval ridge a series of long spurs descended 
 into this valley, of which two were of special 
 importance. One was the hammer-headed spur im- 
 mediately west of Flers, at the western end of which 
 stood the tumulus called the Butte de Warlencourt. 
 The other was a spur which, lying across the main 
 trend of the ground, ran north from Morval to Thil- 
 loy, passing 1,000 yards to the east of Gueudecourt. 
 Behind these spurs lay the German fourth position. 
 It was in the main a position on reverse slopes, and 
 so screened from immediate observation, though our 
 command of the higher ground gave us a view of its 
 hinterland. Our own possession of the heights, great 
 though its advantages were, had certain drawbacks, 
 for it meant that our communications had to make 
 the descent of the reverse slopes and were thus ex- 
 posed to some extent to the enemy's observation and 
 long-range fire. 
 
 The next advance of the British army had there- 
 fore two distinct objectives. The first — the task of 
 the Fourth Army — was to carry the two spurs and 
 so get within assaulting distance of the German 
 
138 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 fourth line. Even if the grand assault should be 
 postponed, the possession of the spurs would greatly 
 relieve our situation, by giving us cover for our ad- 
 vanced gun positions and a certain shelter for the 
 bringing up of supplies. It should be remembered 
 that the spurs were not part of the German main 
 front. They were held by the enemy as intermediate 
 positions, and very strongly held — every advantage 
 being taken of sunken roads, buildings, and the un- 
 dulating nature of the country. They represented 
 for the fourth German line what Contalmaison had 
 represented for the second ; till they were carried no 
 general assault on the main front could be under- 
 taken. The second task — that of the Fifth Army — 
 was to master the whole of the high ground on the 
 Thiepval ridge, so as to get direct observation into 
 the Ancre glen and over the uplands north and north- 
 east of it. 
 
 The expected fine weather of October did not come. 
 On the contrary, the month provided a record in 
 wet, spells of drenching rain being varied by dull, 
 misty days, so that the sodden land had no chance 
 of drying. The carrying of the spurs — meant as a 
 preliminary step to a general attack — proved an 
 operation so full of difficulties that it occupied all 
 our efforts during the month, and with it all was 
 not completed. The story of these weeks is one of 
 minor operations, local actions with strictly limited 
 objectives undertaken by only a few battalions. In 
 the face of every conceivable difficulty we moved 
 gradually up the intervening slopes. 
 
 At first there was a certain briskness in our move- 
 ment. From Flers north-westward, in front of Eau- 
 
1^ 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME— THE GUEUDECOURT AND WARLENCOURT SPURS 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 139 
 
 court TAbbaye and Le Sars, ran a very strong- trench 
 system, which we called the Flers line, and which was 
 virtually a switch connecting the old German third 
 line with the intermediate positions in front of the 
 spurs. The capture of Flers gave us the south-east- 
 ern part of the line, and the last days of September 
 and the first of October were occupied in win- 
 ning the remainder of it. On 29th September 
 a single company of a Northumbrian ^ 
 division carried the farm of Destre- ^ * ^* 
 mont, some 400 yards south-west of Le Sars and 
 just north of the Albert-Bapaume road. On the 
 afternoon of ist October we advanced q . 
 <Dn a front of 3,000 yards, taking the Flers 
 line north of Destremont, while a London Terri- 
 torial division — the same which had taken High 
 Wood — occupied the buildings of the old abbey of 
 Eaucourt, less than a mile south-east of Le Sars 
 village. Here for several days remnants of the 6th 
 Bavarian Division made a stout resistance. On the 
 morning of 2nd October the enemy had q . 
 regained a footing in the abbey, and 
 during the whole of the next day and night the bat- 
 tle fluctuated. It was not till the morning of the 4th 
 that we finally cleared the place, and on ^ , ^ 
 6th October the Londoners won the mill ' ^ 
 
 north-west of it. 
 
 On the afternoon of 7th October — a day of cloud 
 and strong winds, but free from rain — ^we attacked 
 on a broader front, while the French on q . 
 our right moved against the key position * ^' 
 
 of Sailly-Saillisel. After a heavy struggle a division 
 of the New Army captured Le Sars and won posi- 
 tions to the east and west of it, while our line was 
 
140 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 considerably advanced between Gueudecourt and 
 Lesboeufs. 
 
 From that date for a month on we struggled up 
 the slopes, gaining ground, but never winning the 
 crests. The enemy now followed a new practice. 
 He had his machine guns well back in prepared 
 positions and caught our attack with their long-range 
 fire. To chronicle in detail those indeterminate 
 actions would be a laborious task, and would demand 
 for its elucidation a map on the largest scale. We 
 wrestled for odd lengths of fantastically named 
 trenches which were often three feet deep in water. 
 It was no light job to get out over the slimy parapets, 
 and the bringing up of supplies and the evacuation 
 of the wounded placed a terrible burden on our 
 strength. Under conditions of such grievous dis- 
 comfort an attack on a comprehensive scale was out 
 of the question, the more when we remember the 
 condition of the area behind our lines. At one mo- 
 ment it seemed as if the Butte had been won. On 
 1IT 5th November we were over it and hold- 
 
 ' '^' ing positions on the eastern side, but that 
 night a counter-attack by fresh troops of the 4th 
 Guard Division — who had just come up — forced us 
 to fall back. This was the one successful enemy 
 counter-stroke in this stage of the battle. For the 
 most part they were too weak, if delivered promptly ; 
 and when they came later in strength they were 
 broken up by our guns. 
 
 The struggle of these days deserves to rank high 
 in the records of British hardihood. The fighting 
 had not the swift pace and the brilliant successes of 
 the September battles. Our men had to fight for 
 minor objectives, and such a task lacks the impetus 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME — THE THIEPVAL EIDGE 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 141 
 
 and exhilaration of a great combined assault. On 
 many occasions the battle resolved itself into isolated 
 struggles, a handful of men in a mud-hole holding 
 out and consolidating their ground till their post 
 was linked up with our main front. Rain, cold, 
 slow reliefs, the absence of hot food, and sometimes 
 of any food at all, made these episodes a severe test 
 of endurance and devotion. During this period the 
 enemy, amazed at his good fortune, inasmuch as the 
 weather had crippled our advance, fell into a flam- 
 boyant mood and represented the result as a triumph 
 of the fighting quality of his own troops. From day 
 to day he announced a series of desperate British 
 assaults invariably repulsed with heavy losses. He 
 spoke of British corps and divisions advancing in 
 massed formation, when, at the most, it had been 
 an affair of a few battalions. Often he announced 
 an attack on a day and in a locality where nothing 
 whatever had happened. It is worth remembering 
 that, except for the highly successful action of 21st 
 October, which we shall presently record, there was 
 no British attack during the month on anything like 
 a large scale, and that the various minor actions, so 
 far from having cost us high, were among the most 
 economical of the campaign. 
 
 Our second task, in which we brilliantly succeeded, 
 was to master completely the Thiepval ridge. By 
 the end of September the strong redoubts north- 
 east of the village — called Stuff and Zollern — were in 
 our hands, and on the 28th of that month we had 
 carried all Schwaben Redoubt except c a* o 
 the north-west corner. It was Schwaben "^^P -^ • 
 Redoubt to which the heroic advance of the Ulster 
 
142 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Division had penetrated on the first day of the bat- 
 tle ; but next day the advanced posts had been drawn 
 in, and three months had elapsed before we again 
 entered it. It was now a very different place from 
 1st July. Our guns had pounded it out of recogni- 
 tion; but it remained — from its situation — the pivot 
 of the whole German line on the heights. Thence 
 the trenches called Stuff and Regina ran east 
 for some 5,000 yards to a point north-east of 
 Courcelette. These trenches, representing many of 
 the dominating points of the ridge south of the 
 Ancre, were defended by the enemy with the most 
 admirable tenacity. Between 30th September and 
 20th October, while we were oattling for the last 
 corner of the Schwaben, he delivered not less than 
 eleven counter-attacks against our front in that 
 neighbourhood, counter-attacks which in every case 
 were repulsed with heavy losses. His front was 
 held by the 26th Reserve Division and by Marines 
 of the Naval Division, who had been brought down 
 from the Yser, and who gave a better account of 
 themselves than their previous record had led us to 
 expect. A captured German regimental order, dated 
 Oct 20 ^^^^ October, emphasised the necessity 
 of regaining the Schwaben Redoubt. 
 "Men are to be informed by their immediate supe- 
 riors that this attack is not merely a matter of re- 
 taking a trench because it was formerly in German 
 possession, but that the recapture of an extremely 
 important point is involved. If the enemy remains 
 on the ridge he can blow our artillery in the Ancre 
 valley to pieces, and the protection of the infantry 
 will then be destroyed.'' 
 
 From 20th October to 23rd there came a short spell 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 143 
 
 of fine weather. There was frost at night, a strong 
 easterly wind dried the ground, and the air condi- 
 tions were perfect for observation. The enemy was 
 quick to take advantage of the change, and early on 
 the morning of Saturday, 21st October, n + ^ 
 delivered that attack upon the Schwaben 
 Redoubt for which the order quoted above was a 
 preparation. 
 
 The attack was made in strength, and at all points 
 but two were repulsed by our fire before reaching 
 our lines. At two points the Germans entered our 
 trenches, but were promptly driven out, leaving many 
 dead in front of our positions, and five officers and 
 seventy-nine other ranks prisoners in our hands. 
 
 This counter-stroke came opportunely for us, for 
 it enabled us to catch the enemy on the rebound. 
 We struck shortly after noon, attacking against the 
 whole length of the Regina trench, with troops of 
 the New Army on our left and centre and the Cana- 
 dians on our right. The attack was completely suc- 
 cessful, for the enemy, disorganised by his failure 
 of the morning, was in no condition for prolonged 
 resistance. We attained all our objectives, taking 
 the whole of Stuff and Regina trenches, pushing out 
 advanced posts well to the north and north-east of 
 Schwaben Redoubt, and establishing our position 
 on the crown of the ridge between the Upper Ancre 
 and Courcelette. In the course of the day we took 
 nearly 1,100 prisoners at the expense of less than 
 1,200 casualties, many of which were extremely 
 slight. The whole course of the battle showed no 
 more workmanlike performance. 
 
 There still remained one small section of the ridge 
 where our position was unsatisfactory. This was 
 
IM THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 at the extreme eastern end of Regina trench, just 
 west of the Bapaume road. Its capture was achieved 
 
 ,x on the night of loth November, when we 
 
 * carried it on a front of i,ooo yards. This 
 rounded off our gains and allowed us to dominate 
 the upper valley of the Ancre and the uplands beyond 
 it behind the unbroken German first line from Beau- 
 mont Hamel to Serre. 
 
 Meantime, during the month, the French armies 
 on our right had pressed forward. At the end of 
 September they had penetrated into St. Pierre Vaast 
 Wood, whose labyrinthine depths extended east of 
 Rancourt and south of Saillisel. The British gains 
 of 26th September filled the whole French nation 
 with enthusiasm, and General Joffre and Sir Douglas 
 Haig exchanged the warmest greetings. The imme- 
 diate object of the forces under Foch was to co- 
 operate with the British advance by taking the height 
 of Sailly-Saillisel, and so to work round Mont St. 
 Quentin, the main defence of Peronne on the north. 
 
 ^ On 4th October they carried the German 
 
 * ^' intermediate line between Morval and 
 
 St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and on 8th October — in a 
 
 ^ J. o splendid movement — they swept up the 
 
 ' ' Sailly-Saillisel slopes and won the Ba- 
 
 paume-Peronne road to a point 200 yards from its 
 
 northern entry into the village. On loth October 
 
 ^ Micheler's Tenth Army was in action 
 
 on a front of three miles, and carried the 
 
 western outskirts of Ablaincourt and the greater part 
 
 of the wood north-west of Chaulnes, taking nearly 
 
 ^ 1,300 prisoners. On the 15th Fayolle 
 
 ^' pushed east of Bouchavesnes, and on the 
 
 same day, south of the Somme, Micheler, after beat- 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 
 
 145 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. 
 
 -THE FRENCH ADVANCE DURING OCTOBER NCmTH 
 OF THE SOMME. 
 
146 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 ing off a counter-attack, carried a mile and a quarter 
 of the German front west of Belloy, and advanced 
 well to the north-east of Ablaincourt, taking some 
 1,000 prisoners. This brought the French nearer 
 to the ridge of Villers-Carbonnel, behind which the 
 German batteries played the same part for the 
 southern defence of Peronne as Mont St. Quentin 
 did for the northern. 
 
 Next day Sailly-Saillisel was entered and occu- 
 pied as far as the cross-roads, the Saillisel section of 
 
 Oct t6 ^^^ village on the road running eastwards 
 being still in German hands. For the 
 next few days the enemy delivered violent counter- 
 attacks from both north and east, using liquid fire, 
 but they failed to oust the garrison, and that 
 part of the village held by the Germans was 
 mercilessly pounded by the French guns. On the 
 
 Oct 2T ^^^^ ^^ newly arrived 2nd Bavarian 
 Division made a desperate attack from 
 the southern border of Saillisel and the ridge north- 
 east of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, but failed with many 
 losses. There were other heavy and fruitless coun- 
 ter-strokes south of the Somme in the regions of 
 Biaches and Chaulnes. The month closed with the 
 French holding Sailly but not Saillisel; holding the 
 western skirts of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and south 
 of the river outflanking Ablaincourt and Chaulnes. 
 
 The record of the month, though short of ex- 
 pectations, was far from mediocre; and, consider- 
 ing the difficulties of weather, was not less creditable 
 than that of September. The Allies at one point 
 had broken into the German fourth position, while 
 at others they had won positions of assault against it, 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 
 
 147 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE FRENCH ADVANCE DITRINGl OCTOBER SOUTH 
 OF THE SOMME (SHOWING THE FRONT OF THE TENTH ARMY ON OCT. 
 1ST, AND THE GROUND GAINED DURING THE MONTH). 
 
148 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 and the southward extension of the battle-ground 
 had been greatly deepened. They had added an- 
 other 10,000 prisoners to their roll, bringing the 
 total from ist July to 1,469 officers and 71,532 other 
 ranks, while they had also taken 173 field guns, 130 
 heavy pieces, 215 trench mortars, and 988 machine 
 guns. They had engaged ninety enemy divisions, 
 of which twenty-six had been taken out, refitted, 
 and sent back again — making a total of 1 16 brought 
 j^ into action. On ist November the 
 
 enemy was holding his front with twenty- 
 one divisions, so that ninety-five had been used up 
 and withdrawn. Any calculation of enemy losses 
 during the actual progress of operations must be a 
 very rough estimate, but it may be taken for granted 
 that no German division was taken out of the line 
 till it had lost at least 5,000 men. This gives a 
 minimum figure for enemy losses during the four 
 months' battle of close on half a million, and it seems 
 certain that the real figure was at least 25 per cent, 
 greater. It must further be noted that, according 
 to the German published returns, 41 per cent, of 
 their casualties were irreplaceable — dead, prisoners, 
 or so badly wounded as to be useless for the re- 
 mainder of the war — a proportion greatly in excess 
 of that which obtained among the Allies. During the 
 rnonth of October the British casualties were little 
 beyond those of a normal month of trench warfare. 
 The study of captured documents cast an inter- 
 esting light upon the condition of the enemy under 
 the pressure of our attacks. Letters of individual 
 soldiers and the reports of commanding officers alike 
 showed that the strain had been very great There 
 were constant appeals to troops to hold some point as 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 149 
 
 vital to the whole position, and these points invari- 
 ably fell into our hands. There were endless com- 
 plaints of the ruin wrought by our artillery and of 
 the ceaseless activity of our aircraft, and there were 
 many unwilling tributes to the fighting quality of 
 the Allied soldiers. But though indications of weak- 
 ened enemy moral and failure in enemy organisa- 
 tion were frequent, he was still a most formidable 
 antagonist. He had accumulated his best troops and 
 batteries on the Somme front, and was fighting with 
 the stubborn resolution of those who knew that they 
 were facing the final peril, and that they alone stood 
 between their country and defeat. 
 
 In the various actions the work of the Allied ar- 
 tillery was extraordinarily efficient. Their barrages 
 brilliantly covered the advance of the infantry; they 
 searched out and silenced enemy batteries; they 
 destroyed great lengths of enemy trenches and count- 
 less enemy strongholds ; and they kept up a continu- 
 ous fire behind the enemy's front, interfering 
 with the movement of troops and supplies, and 
 giving him no peace for eight or ten miles behind 
 his line. The ''tanks," though only occasionally 
 used, had some remarkable achievements to their 
 credit. On a certain day one got behind the enemy's 
 front, and by itself compelled the surrender of a 
 whole battalion, including the battalion commander. 
 Much credit was due also to the transport service, 
 which faithfully performed its duties under the most 
 trying conditions. 
 
 The weather was bad for all, but perhaps it was 
 worst for our aircraft. The strong south-westerly 
 gales greatly increased the complexity of their task, 
 since our machines were drifted far behind the 
 
150 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 enemy's front and compelled to return against a 
 head-wind, which made their progress slow and 
 thereby exposed them to fire, and, in the case of a 
 damaged engine, forbade a glide into safety. Yet, 
 in spite of adverse conditions, they showed in the 
 highest degree the spirit of the offensive. They 
 patrolled regularly far behind the enemy lines, and 
 fought many battles in the air with hostile machines, 
 and many with enemy troops on the ground. They 
 did much valuable reconnaissance, and repeatedly 
 attacked with success enemy lines of communication, 
 ammunition dumps, billets, and depots. Toward the 
 latter part of October the German machines were 
 more in evidence, but we dealt satisfactorily with this 
 increased activity. As an instance of the audacity 
 of our aviators we may quote the case of one pilot 
 who, encountering a formation of ten hostile ma- 
 chines, attacked them single-handed and dispersed 
 them far behind their own front. 
 
 We inflicted many losses on the foe, but we did 
 not go scathless ourselves. The curt announcement 
 in the communiques — "One of our machines has not 
 returned" — covered many a tale of bravery and 
 misfortune. About half the missing came down in 
 enemy territory and were made prisoners ; the others 
 perished in battle in the air, shot by machine 
 or anti-aircraft gun, or dashed to earth by a crippled 
 airplane. In a flight over the German lines on 4th 
 j^ November there died one of the most 
 
 * '^* gallant figures of our day, conspicuous 
 even in the universal heroism of his service. Lord 
 Lucas, whom Oxford of twenty years ago knew as 
 ''Bron Herbert,'' had joined the Flying Corps at 
 the age of forty. He had lost a leg in the South 
 
THE THIRD STAGE 151 
 
 African War; he had had a distinguished poHtical 
 career, culminating in a seat in the Cabinet as Presi- 
 dent of the Board of Agriculture; he had great 
 possessions and a thousand ties to ease; if ever 
 man might have found his reasonable duty in a less 
 perilous sphere it was he. But after the formation 
 of the Coalition Government in May 1915, he went 
 straight into training for his pilot's certificate, and 
 soon proved himself an exceptionally bold and skilful 
 aviator. He did good work in Egypt, whence he re- 
 turned in the spring of 191 6, and after a few months 
 spent in instructing recruits at home he came out to 
 France in the early autumn. He was one who re- 
 tained in all his many activities the adventurous zest 
 and the strange endearing simplicity of a boy. With 
 his genius for happiness the world in which he 
 dwelt could never be a common place. In the air 
 he found the pure exultant joy of living that he had 
 always sought, and he passed out of life like some 
 hero of romance, with his ardour undimmed and 
 his dream untarnished.* 
 
 * "When the Greeks made their fine saying that those 
 whom the gods love die young, I cannot help believing they 
 had this sort of death in their eye. For surely, at whatever 
 age it overtakes the man, this is to die young. Death has not 
 been suffered to take so much as an illusion from his heart. 
 In the hot-fit of life, a-tiptoe on the highest point of being, 
 he passes at a bound on to the other side. The noise of the 
 mallet and chisel is scarcely quenched, the trumpets are 
 hardly done blowing, when, trailing with him clouds of glory, 
 this happy-starred, full-blooded spirit shoots into the spiritual 
 land." — R. L. Stevenson, ^s Triplex. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE li^OURTH STAGE 
 
 Improvement in the Weather — The Position North of Thiepval — The 
 British Advantages — British Dispositions — The Battle of the 
 Ancre — Failure at Serre — Ground gained North of Beaumont 
 Hamel — Capture of St. Pierre Divion — The Taking of Beaumont 
 Hamel — Fall of Beaucourt — Lieutenant-Colonel Freyberg's Ex- 
 ploit — Number of Prisoners — Position at End of November — 
 General Results of the Battle of the Somme — The Allied Pur- 
 poses effected — Sir Douglas Haig's Summary — New German Ef- 
 forts — Effect of the Battle on German Opinion — The Major Pur- 
 pose — The British Achievement and its Cost. 
 
 N 9th November the weather improved. The 
 wind swung round to the north and the rain 
 ceased, but owing to the season of the year 
 the ground was slow to dry, and in the area of the 
 Nov o Fourth Army the roads were still past 
 ' ^' praying for. Presently frost came and 
 a powder of snow, and then once more the rain. But 
 in the few days of comparatively good conditions 
 the British Commander-in-Chief brought the battle 
 to a fourth stage, and won a conspicuous victory. 
 
 On the first day of July, as we have seen, our at- 
 tack failed on the eight miles between Gomme- 
 court and Thiepval. For four months we drove far 
 into the heart of the German defences farther south, 
 but the stubborn enemy front before Beaumont 
 
 152 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 153 
 
 Hamel and Serre remained untried. The position 
 was immensely strong, and its holders — not without 
 reason — ^believed it to be impregnable. All the 
 slopes were tunnelled deep with old catacombs — 
 many of them made originally as hiding-places in 
 the French Wars of Religion — and these had been 
 linked up by passages to constitute a subterranean 
 city, where whole battalions could be assembled. 
 There were endless redoubts and strong points armed 
 with machine guns, as we knew to our cost in July, 
 and the wire entanglements were on a scale which 
 has probably never been paralleled. Looked at from 
 our first line they resembled a solid wall of red rust. 
 Very strong, too, were the sides of the Ancre, should 
 we seek to force a passage that way, and the hamlets 
 of Beaucourt and St. Pierre Divion, one on each 
 bank, were fortresses of the Beaumont Hamel stamp. 
 From Gommecourt to the Thiepval ridge the enemy 
 positions were the old first line ones, prepared dur- 
 ing two years of leisure, and not the improvised de- 
 fences on which they had been thrown back between 
 Thiepval and Chaulnes. 
 
 At the beginning of November the area of the 
 Allied pressure was over thirty miles, but we had 
 never lost sight of the necessity of widening the 
 breach. It was desirable, with a view to the winter 
 warfare, that the enemy should be driven out of his 
 prepared defences on the broadest front possible. 
 The scheme of an assault upon the Serre-Ancre line 
 might seem a desperate one so late in the season, 
 but we had learned much since ist July, and, as 
 compared with that date, we had now certain real 
 advantages. In the first place our whole tactical use 
 of artillery had undergone a change. Our creeping 
 
154 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 barrage, moving in front of advancing infantry, pro- 
 tected them to a great extent from the machine-gun 
 fusilade from parapets and shell holes which had 
 been our undoing in the earlier battle, and assisted 
 them in keeping direction. In the second place our 
 possession of the whole Thiepval ridge seriously out- 
 flanked the German front north of the Ancre. In 
 the dips of the high ground behind Serre and Beau- 
 mont Hamel their batteries had been skilfully em- 
 placed in the beginning of July, and they had been 
 able to devote their whole energy to the attack com- 
 ing from the west. But now they were facing south- 
 ward and operating against our lines on the Thiepval 
 ridge, and we commanded them to some extent by 
 possessing the higher ground and the better observa- 
 tion. If, therefore, we should attack again from the 
 west, supported also by our artillery fire from the 
 south, the enemy guns would be fighting on two 
 fronts. The German position in July had been a 
 straight line; it was now a salient. 
 
 We had two other assets for a November assault. 
 The slow progress of the Fourth Army during Oc- 
 tober had led the enemy to conclude that our offen- 
 sive had ceased for the winter. Drawing a natural 
 deduction from the condition of the country, he 
 argued that an attack on a grand scale was physically 
 impossible, especially an attack upon a fortress which 
 had defied our efforts when we advanced with fresh 
 troops and unwearied impetus in the height of sum- 
 mer. Again, the area from Thiepval northward did 
 not suffer from transport difficulties in the same de- 
 gree as the southern terrain. Since we would be 
 advancing from what was virtually our old front line, 
 we would escape the problem of crossing five or six 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 155 
 
 miles of shell-torn ground by roads ploughed up and 
 broken from four months' traffic. 
 
 It is necessary to grasp the topographical features 
 of the new battle-ground. From north of the 
 Schwaben Redoubt our front curved sharply to the 
 north-west, crossing the Ancre 500 yards south of 
 the hamlet of St. Pierre Divion, and extending north- 
 ward along the foot of the slopes on which lay the 
 villages of Beaumont Hamel and Serre. From the 
 high ground north-west of the Ancre several clearly 
 marked spurs descend to the upper valley of that 
 stream. The chief is a long ridge with Serre at its 
 western extremity, the village of Puisieux on the 
 north, Beaucourt-sur- Ancre on the south, and Mirau- 
 mont at the eastern end. South of this there is an- 
 other feature running from a point a thousand yards 
 north of Beaumont Hamel to the village of Beau- 
 court. This latter spur has on its south-west side 
 a shallow depression up which runs the Beau- 
 court-Beaumont Hamel road, and it is defined on 
 the north-east by the Beaucourt-Serre road. All 
 the right bank of the Ancre is thus a country of 
 slopes and pockets. On the left bank there is a 
 stretch of flattish ground under the Thiepval ridge 
 extending up the valley past St. Pierre Divion to 
 Grandcourt. 
 
 On Sunday, 12th November, Sir Hubert Gough's 
 Fifth Army held the area from Gommecourt in the 
 north to the Albert-Bapaume road. Op- yy 
 posite Serre and extending south to a 
 point just north of Beaumont Hamel lay two divi- 
 sions of the old Regulars, now much changed in com- 
 position, but containing battalions that had been 
 through the whole campaign since Mons. In front 
 
156 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 BATTLE OF THE SOMME. — THE BRITISH LINE NORTH OF THIEPVAL ON 
 
 NOVEMBER 1 3. 
 
BATTLE OF THE SOMME— THE ATTACK OF NOVEMBER I3TH. (SCENE OF THE VICTORIOUS ADVANCE 
 OF THE CENTRE AND RIGHT.) 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 157 
 
 of Beaumont Hamel was a Highland Territorial 
 Division. They had been more than eighteen months 
 in France, and at the end of July and the beginning 
 of August had spent seventeen days in the line at 
 High Wood. On their right, from a point just 
 south of the famous Y Ravine to the Ancre, lay the 
 Naval Division, which had had a long record of 
 fighting from Antwerp to Gallipoli, but now for the 
 first time took part in an action on the Western front. 
 Across the river lay two divisions of the New 
 Army. The boundary of the attack on the right 
 was roughly defined by the Thiepval-Grandcourt 
 road. 
 
 The British guns began on the morning of Sat- 
 urday, the nth, a bombardment devoted to the de- 
 struction of the enemy's wire and parapets. It went 
 on fiercely during Sunday, but did not increase to 
 hurricane fire, so that the enemy had no warning 
 of the hour of our attack. In the darkness of the 
 early morning of Monday, 13th November, the fog 
 gathered thick — a cold, raw vapour which j^ 
 wrapped the ground like a garment. It * ^* 
 
 was still black darkness, darker even than the usual 
 moonless winter night, when, at 5.45 a.m., our 
 troops crossed the parapets. The attack had been 
 most carefully planned, but in that dense shroud it 
 was hard for the best trained soldiers to keep direc- 
 tion. On the other hand, the enemy had no warn- 
 ing of our coming till our men were surging over 
 his trenches. 
 
 The attack of the British left wing on Serre failed, 
 as it had failed on ist July. That stronghold, be- 
 ing farther removed from the effect of our flank- 
 ing fire from the Thiepval ridge, presented all the 
 
158 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 difficulties which had baffled us at the first attempt. 
 South of it and north of Beaumont Hamel we 
 carried the German first position and swept be- 
 yond the fortress called the Quadrilateral — which 
 had proved too hard a knot to unravel four months 
 earlier. This gave us the northern part of the under 
 feature which we have already described as run- 
 ning south-east to Beaucourt. Out right wing had 
 a triumphant progress. Almost at once it gained 
 its objectives. St. Pierre Divion fell early in the 
 morning, and the division of the New Army engaged 
 there advanced a mile and took nearly 1,400 prison- 
 ers at a total cost of less than 600 casualties.* By 
 the evening they were holding the Hansa line 
 which runs from the neighbourhood of Stuff trench 
 on the heights to the bank of the river opposite 
 Beaucourt. 
 
 But it was on the doings of the two central divi- 
 sions that the fortune of the day depended, and their 
 achievement was so remarkable and presented so 
 many curious features that it is worth telling in some 
 detail. The Highland Territorials — a kilted division 
 except for their lowland Pioneer battalion — had one 
 of the hardest tasks that had faced troops in the 
 whole battle, a task comparable to the taking of Con- 
 talmaison and Guillemont and Delville Wood. They 
 had before them the fortress-village of Beaumont 
 Hamel itself. South of it lay the strong Ridge Re- 
 doubt, and south again the Y Ravine, whose prongs 
 projected down to the German front line and whose 
 tail ran back towards Station Road south of the 
 
 *At one moment the number of prisoners was actually 
 greater than the attacking force. 
 

 IL.»r«,'- . ..J -V.' .■.!»: 
 
 
 
 jL/'*.»ii_ .^it^ 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 159 
 
 Cemetery. This Y Ravine was some 800 yards 
 long, and in places 30 feet deep, with over-hanging 
 sides. In its precipitous banks were the entrances 
 to the German dug-outs, completely screened from 
 shell fire and connecting farther back by means of 
 tunnels with the great catacombs. Such a position 
 allowed reinforcements to be sent up underground, 
 even though we might be holding all the sides. The 
 four successive German lines were so skilfully linked 
 up subterraneously that they formed virtually a sin- 
 gle line, no part of which could be considered to be 
 captured till the whole was taken. 
 
 The first assault took the Scots through the Ger- 
 man defences on all their front, except just before 
 the ends of the Y Ravine. They advanced on both 
 sides of that gully and carried the third enemy line 
 shortly after daybreak. There was much stern fight- 
 ing in the honeycombed land, but early in the fore- 
 noon they had pushed right through the German 
 main position and were pressing beyond Station Road 
 and the hollow where the village lies towards Mu- 
 nich trench and their ultimate objective — the Beau- 
 court-Serre road. The chief fighting of the day cen- 
 tred round Y Ravine. So soon as we had gained 
 the third line on both sides of it our men leaped 
 down the steep sides into the gully. Then fol- 
 lowed a desperate struggle, for the entrances to 
 the dug-outs had been obscured by our bombard- 
 ment, and no man knew from what direction 
 the enemy might appear. About mid-day the east- 
 ern part of the ravine was full of our men, but 
 the Germans were in the prongs. Early in the 
 afternoon we delivered a fresh attack from the west 
 iand gradually forced the defence to surrender. After 
 
160 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 that it became a battle of nettoyeiirs, small parties 
 digging out Germans from underground lairs — for 
 the very strength of his fortifications proved a trap 
 to the enemy once they had been breached. If he 
 failed to prevent our entrance he himself was wholly 
 unable to get out. 
 
 The foggy autumn day was full of wild adven- 
 tures. One Scots officer and two men, who took 
 prisoner a German battalion commander and his 
 staff, found themselves cut off and the position re- 
 versed, and then, as supports came up, once more 
 claimed their captives. A wounded signaller held up 
 a German company in a burrow while he telephoned 
 back for help. Ration stores were captured and 
 muddy Highlanders went about the business of war 
 eating tinned meats with one hand and smoking large 
 cigars. By the evening the whole of Beaumont 
 Hamel was occupied and posts were out as far as 
 Munich trench, while over 1,400 prisoners and be- 
 tween fifty and sixty machine guns were the prize of 
 the conquerors. To their eternal honour the High- 
 land Territorials had stormed, by sheer hand-to-hand 
 fighting, one of the strongest German forts on the 
 Western front. 
 
 On their right the Naval Division advanced against 
 Beaucourt, attacking over the ground which had been 
 partly covered by the left of the Ulster Division on 
 1st July. On that day the British trenches had been 
 between 500 and 700 yards from the German front 
 line, leaving too great an extent of No Man's Land 
 to be covered by the attacking infantry. But before 
 the present action the Naval Division had dug ad- 
 vanced trenches, and now possessed a line of depart* 
 ure not more than 250 yards from the enemy. 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 161 
 
 Their first objective was the German support line, 
 the second Station Road — which ran from Beaumont 
 Hamel to the main Albert-Lille railway — and their 
 third the trench line outside Beaucourt village. The 
 wave of assault carried our men over the first two 
 German lines, and for a moment it looked as if the 
 advance was about to go smoothly forward to its 
 goal. But in the centre of our front of attack, in a 
 communication trench between the second and third 
 German lines and about 800 yards from the river 
 bank, was a very strong redoubt manned by machine 
 guns. This had not been touched by our artillery, 
 and it effectively blocked the centre of our advance, 
 while at the same time flanking fire from the slopes 
 behind Beaumont Hamel checked our left. Various 
 parties got through and reached the German sup- 
 port line and even as far as Station Road. But at 
 about 8.30 the situation, as reviewed by the divi- 
 sional commander, bore an ominous likeness to what 
 had happened to the Ulstermen on ist July. Isolated 
 detachments had gone forward, but the enemy 
 had manned his reserve trenches behind them, 
 and the formidable redoubt was blocking any gen- 
 eral progress. 
 
 At this moment there came news by a pigeon mes- 
 sage of the right battalion. It was commanded by 
 a young New Zealander, Lieutenant-Colonel Frey- 
 berg, who had done brilliant service in Gallipoli, and 
 had before the war been engaged in many ad- 
 venturous pursuits. The message announced that 
 his battalion had gone clean through to the third 
 objective, and was now waiting outside Beaucourt 
 village for our barrage to lift in order to take the 
 place. He had led his men along the edge of the 
 
162 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 river to Station Road, where he had collected 
 odd parties of other battalions, and at 8.21 had 
 reached Beaucourt trench — a mile distant from our 
 front of assault. On receipt of this startling news a 
 Territorial battalion was sent up to his support, and 
 all that day a precarious avenue of communication 
 for food and ammunition was kept open along the 
 edge of the stream, under such shelter as the banks 
 afforded. A second attack on the whole front was 
 delivered in the afternoon by the supporting brigade 
 of the Naval Division, but this, too, was held up by 
 the redoubt, though again a certain number got 
 through and reached Station Road and even the 
 slopes beyond it. It was at this time that seventeen 
 men of the Dublin Fusiliers, accompanied by a priest, 
 performed a singular feat. Far up on the high 
 ground east of Beaumont Hamel they came upon a 
 large party of Germans in dug-outs, and compelled 
 their surrender. They marched their 400 prisoners 
 stolidly back to our line through the enemy barrage 
 and our own. 
 
 That night it was resolved to make a great effort 
 to put the redoubt out of action. Two tanks were 
 brought up, one of which succeeded in getting within 
 range, and the garrison of the stronghold hoisted 
 the white flag. The way was now clear for a gen- 
 eral advance next morning, to assist in which a 
 brigade of another division was brought up in sup- 
 j^ port. Part of the advance lost direction, 
 
 ^* but the result was to clear the German 
 first position and the ground between Station Road 
 and Beaucourt trench. At the same time the right 
 battalion — which had been waiting outside Beau- 
 court for twenty- four hours — carried the place by 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 163 
 
 storm. Its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Freyberg, had been already three times wounded, 
 but that morning he led the charge in person. 
 Though wounded a fourth time most severely, he 
 refused to lay down his command till he had placed 
 posts with perfect military judgment to the east and 
 north-east to prevent a surprise and had given full 
 instructions to his successor. To his brilliant leader- 
 ship the main achievement of the Naval Division 
 was due."^ His success is an instructive proof of the 
 value of holding forward positions even though 
 flanks and rear are threatened, if you are dealing 
 with a shaken enemy and have a certainty of sup- 
 ports behind you. Troops who make a bold ad- 
 vance will, if they retire, have achieved nothing, 
 and will certainly lose a large proportion of their 
 strength. If they stay where they are they run the 
 risk of being totally destroyed; but, on the other 
 hand, there is a chance of completely turning the 
 scale. For it should be remembered that an iso- 
 lated detachment, if it has the enemy on its flank 
 and rear, is itself on the flank and rear of the enemy, 
 and the moral effect of its position may be the 
 determining factor in breaking the enemy's resist- 
 ance. 
 
 By the night of Tuesday, 14th November, our 
 
 * Colonel Freyberg had received the D.S.O. in Gallipoli 
 for swimming ashore and lighting flares during the feint of 
 landing in the Gulf of Saros on April 24-25, 1915. He re- 
 ceived the Victoria Cross for the taking of Beaucourt. "The 
 personality, valour, and utter contempt of danger on the part 
 of this single officer," so ran the official announcement, "en- 
 abled the lodgement in the most advanced objectives of the 
 corps to be permanently held, and on this point d'appui the 
 line was eventually formed." 
 
164 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 total of prisoners on the five-mile front of battle was 
 well over 5,000 — the largest captures yet made in 
 the time by any army in the West since the cam- 
 paign began. And the advance was not yet over. 
 The German counter-attack of the 15th failed to 
 
 Nov IK ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ground. Just east of 
 ^* Beaumont Hamel there was an exten- 
 sive No Man's Land, for Munich trench could not be 
 claimed by either side, but in the Beaucourt area we 
 steadily pressed on. On Thursday, the i6th, we 
 
 Nov 16 Pushed east from Beaucourt village along 
 the north bank of the Ancre, establish- 
 ing posts in the Bois d'Hollande to the north-west 
 of Grandcourt. Frost had set in, and it was possi- 
 ble from the Thiepval ridge or from the slopes above 
 Hamel to see clearly the whole new battlefield, and 
 even in places to follow the infantry advance — a 
 thing which had not been feasible since the summer 
 fighting. By that day our total of prisoners was 
 over 6,000. On the 17th we again advanced, and on 
 
 Nov 18 Saturday, the i8th, in a downpour of icy 
 rain, the Canadians on the right of the 
 Fifth Army, attacking from Regina trench, moved 
 far down the slope towards the river, while the 
 centre pushed close to the western skirts of Grand- 
 court. 
 
 It was the last attack, with which concluded the 
 fourth stage of the Battle of the Somme. The 
 weather now closed down like a curtain upon the 
 drama. Though in modern war we may disregard 
 the seasons, the elements take their revenge and 
 armies are forced at a certain stage, whether they 
 will it or not, into that trench warfare which takes 
 the place of the winter quarters of Marlborough's 
 
ll\mr. 0> Tll« SOMMI — THE AIXIU) nMJNI ON NOt-UIIOl KJTH i>Ml>WIMj THt .Kli.lMAL 
 r»ONT ON Jt'LV 1ST AHO THt OHOUSD OAlKm VT TO HOVIltm igm) 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 165 
 
 day. The Battle of the Ancre was a fitting denoue- 
 ment to the great action. It gave us three strongly 
 fortified villages, and practically the whole of the 
 minor spur which runs from north of Beaumont 
 Hamel to Beaucourt. It extended the breach in the 
 main enemy position by fiYt miles. Our front was 
 now far down the slopes from the Thiepval ridge and 
 north and west of Grandcourt. We had taken well 
 over 7,000 prisoners and vast quantities of material, 
 including several hundred machine guns. Our losses 
 had been comparatively slight, while those of the 
 enemy were — on his own admission — severe. Above 
 all, just when he was beginning to argue himself 
 into the belief that the Somme offensive was over we 
 upset all his calculations by an unexpected stroke. 
 We had opened the old wound and undermined his 
 moral by reviving the terrors of the unknown and 
 the unexpected. 
 
 We are still too close to events to attempt an 
 estimate of the Battle of the Somme as a whole. It 
 will be the task of later historians to present it in its 
 true perspective. Even now one thing is clear. Be- 
 fore ist July Verdun had been the greatest continu- 
 ous battle fought in the world's history; but the 
 Somme surpassed it both in numbers of men en- 
 gaged, in the tactical difficulty of the objectives, and 
 in its importance in the strategical scheme of the 
 campaign. Calculations of the forces employed 
 would for the present be indiscreet and estimates of 
 casualties untrustworthy, but some idea of its sig- 
 nificance may be gathered from the way in which 
 it preoccupied the enemy High Command. It was 
 the fashion in Germany to describe it as a futile 
 
166 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 attack upon an unshakable fortress, an attack which 
 might be disregarded by her public opinion while 
 she continued her true business of conquest in the 
 East. But the fact remained that the great bulk of 
 the German troops and by far the best of them were 
 kept congregated in this area. In November Ger- 
 many had 127 divisions on the Western front, and 
 no more than seventy-five in the East. Though 
 Brussilov's attack and von Falkenhayn's Rumanian 
 expedition compelled her to send fresh troops east- 
 ward she did not diminish but increased her strength 
 in the West. In June she had fourteen divisions 
 on the Somme ; in November she had in line or just 
 out of it well over forty. 
 
 By what test are we to judge the result of a battle 
 in modern war? In the old days of open fighting 
 there was little room' for doubt, since the retreat or 
 rout or envelopment of the beaten army was too clear 
 for argument. To-day, when the total battle-front 
 is 3,000 miles, such easy proofs are lacking; but the 
 principle remains the same. A battle is final when 
 it ends in the destruction of the enemy's fighting 
 strength. A battle is won — and it may be decisively 
 won — when it results in achieving the strategic pur- 
 pose of one of the combatants, provided that pur- 
 pose is, on military grounds, a wise one. Hence the 
 amount of territory occupied and the number of im- 
 portant points captured are not necessarily sound 
 criteria at all. If they were, the German over- 
 running of Poland would have been a great victory, 
 when, as a matter of fact, it was a failure. Von 
 Hindenburg sought to destroy the Russian army, 
 and the Russian army declined the honour. The suc- 
 cess or defeat of a strategic purpose, that is the sole. 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 167 
 
 test. Judging by this, Tannenberg was a victory for 
 Germany, the Marne for France, and the First Bat- 
 tle of Ypres for Britain. The Battle of the Somme 
 was no less a victory since it achieved the purpose of 
 the Allies. 
 
 In the first place, it relieved Verdun, and en- 
 abled Nivelle to advance presently to conspicuous 
 victories. In the second place, it detained the main 
 German forces on the Western front. In the third 
 place, it drew into the battle, and gravely depleted, 
 the surplus man-power of the enemy, and struck a 
 shattering blow at his moral. For two years the 
 German behind the shelter of his trench-works and 
 the great engine of his artillery had fought with 
 comparatively little cost against opponents far less 
 well equipped. The Somme put the shoe on the 
 other foot, and he came to know what the British 
 learned at Ypres and the French in the Artois — 
 what it felt like to be bombarded out of existence, 
 and to cling to shell holes and the ruins of trenches 
 under a pitiless fire. It was a new thing in his ex- 
 perience, and took the heart out of men who, under 
 other conditions, had fought with skill and courage. 
 Further, the Allies had dislocated his whole military 
 machine. Their ceaseless pressure had crippled his 
 Staff work, and confused the organisation of which 
 he had justly boasted. 
 
 P' Sir Douglas Haig's sober summary is the last word 
 on the subject. "The enemy's power has not yet 
 been broken, nor is it yet possible to form an 
 estimate of the time the war may last before the 
 objects for which the Allies are fighting have been 
 attained. But the Somme battle has placed beyond 
 doubt the ability of the Allies to gain these objects. 
 
168 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The German army is the mainstay of the Central 
 Powers, and a full half of that army, despite all the 
 advantages of the defensive, supported by the 
 strongest fortifications, suffered defeat on the Somme 
 this year. Neither the victors nor the vanquished 
 will forget this ; and, though bad weather has given 
 the enemy a respite, there will undoubtedly be many 
 thousands in his ranks who will begin the new cam- 
 paign with little confidence in their ability to resist 
 our assaults or to overcome our defence." 
 
 Let it be freely granted that Germany met the 
 strain in a soldierly fashion. As von Armin's re- 
 port showed, she set herself at once to learn the 
 lessons of the battle and to revise her methods where 
 revision was needed. She made drastic changes in 
 her High Commands. She endeavoured still further 
 to exploit her already much-exploited man-power. 
 She decreed a levee-en-masse, and combed out even 
 from vital industries every man who was capable of 
 taking the field. She swept the young and old into 
 her ranks, and, as was said of Lee's army in its last 
 campaign, she robbed the cradle and the grave. Her 
 effort was magnificent — and it was war. She had 
 created since ist July some thirty odd new divisions, 
 formed partly by converting garrison units into field 
 troops, and partly by regrouping units from existing 
 formations — taking a regiment away from a four- 
 regiment division, and a battalion from a four-bat- 
 talion regiment, and withdrawing the Jaeger bat- 
 talions. But these changes, though they increased 
 the number of her units, did not add proportionately 
 to the aggregate of her numerical strength, and we 
 may take 100,000 men as the maximum of the total 
 gain in field troops from this readjustment. More- 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 169 
 
 over, she had to provide artillery and Staffs for each 
 of the new divisions, v^hich involved a heavy strain 
 upon services already taxed to the full. We know 
 that her commissioned classes had been badly de- 
 pleted. "The shortage,'' so ran an order of von 
 Hindenburg's in September, ''due to our heavy casu- 
 alties, of experienced, energetic, and well-trained 
 junior officers is sorely felt at the present time." 
 
 The Battle of the Somme had, therefore, fulfilled 
 the Allied purpose in taxing to the uttermost the Ger- 
 man war machine. It tried the Command, it tried 
 the nation at home, and it tried to the last limit of 
 endurance the men in the line. The place became a 
 name of terror. Though belittled in communiques, 
 and rarely mentioned in the Press, it was a word of 
 ill-omen to the whole German people, that "blood- 
 bath" to which many journeyed and from which few 
 returned. Of what avail their easy conquests on 
 the Danube when this deadly cancer in the West was 
 eating into the vitals of the nation? Winter might 
 give a short respite — though the Battle of the Ancre 
 had been fought in winter weather — but spring 
 would come, and the evil would grow malignant 
 again. Germany gathered herself for a great 
 effort, marshalling for compulsory war work the 
 whole male population between seventeen and sixty, 
 sending every man to the trenches who could 
 walk on sound feet, doling out food supplies on the 
 minimum scale for the support of life, and making 
 desperate efforts by submarine warfare to cripple 
 her enemies' strength. But what if her enemies fol- 
 lowed her example? The Allies lagged far behind 
 her in their adoption of drastic remedies and even so 
 they had won to an equality and more than an equal- 
 
170 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 ity in battle power. What if they also took the final 
 step? They had shown that they had no thought 
 of peace except at their own dictation. They had 
 willed the end; what if they also willed the ultimate 
 means ? 
 
 In November, behind the rodomontade of German 
 journalists over Rumanian victories and the stout 
 words of German statesmen, it was easy to dis- 
 cern a profound and abiding anxiety. Let us 
 take two quotations from a heavily censored Press. 
 The Leipsiger Neueste Nachrichten wrote: "We 
 realise now that England is our real enemy, and that 
 she is prepared to do everything in her power to 
 conquer us. She has gone so far as to introduce 
 compulsory service to attain her aims. Let us recog- 
 nise her strength of purpose, and take the necessary 
 precautions. It is more than probable that, if the 
 lack of war material and supplies does not put a stop 
 to the Battle of the Somme, she will not abandon 
 her plans. On the contrary, she will make use of 
 the winter to accumulate immense reserves of am- 
 munition. There is no doubt as to her having the 
 money necessary, and it would be foolish optimism 
 on our part to imagine that the terrible fighting on 
 the Western front will not start again next spring.'' 
 And this from the Berliner Lokalanzeiger: "We 
 recognise that the whole war to-day is, in the main, 
 a cpestion of labour resources, and England has 
 taken the lead in welding together all such resources. 
 Thanks to her immense achievement in this sphere, 
 our- most dangerous enemy has arrived at a position 
 in which she is able to set enormous weapons against 
 us. It is the Battle of the Somme above all that 
 teaches us this." 
 
THE FOURTH STAGE 171 
 
 In every great action there is a major purpose, a 
 reasoned and calculated purpose which takes no ac- 
 count of the accidents of fortune. But in most ac- 
 tions there come sudden strokes of luck which turn 
 the scale. For such strokes a general has a right 
 to hope, but on them he dare not build. Marengo, 
 Waterloo, Chancellor sville — most of the great bat- 
 tles of older times — showed these good gifts of des- 
 tiny. But in the elaborate and mechanical warfare 
 of to-day they come rarely, and at the Battle of the 
 Somme they did not fall to the lot of the British 
 Commander-in-Chief. He did what he set out to 
 do; step by step he drove his way through the Ger- 
 man defences ; but it was all done by hard and stub- 
 born fighting, without any bounty from capricious 
 fortune. The Germans had claimed that their line 
 was impregnable ; we broke it again and again. They 
 had counted on their artillery machine; we crippled 
 and outmatched it. They had decried the fighting 
 stuff of our new armies; we showed that it was 
 more than a match for their Guards and Bran- 
 denburgers.* All these things we did, soberly, 
 patiently, after the British fashion. Our major 
 purpose was attained. Like some harsh and re- 
 morseless chemical, the waxing Allied energy was 
 eating into the German waning mass. There was 
 thought and care in the plan, and that resolution 
 which is so strong that it can dare to be patient. 
 The guarantee of the continuity of the Allied effort 
 was its orderly progress. The heroic dash may fail 
 
 * Between 1st July and i8th November the British on the 
 Somme took just over 38,000 prisoners, including 800 officers, 
 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns, 136 trench mortars, and 514 
 machine guns. 
 
172 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 and be shattered by the counter-attack, but this sure 
 and methodical pressure had the inevitabihty of a 
 natural law. It was attrition, but attrition in the 
 acute form — not like the slow erosion of cliffs by the 
 sea, but like the steady crumbling of a mountain to 
 which hydraulic engineers have applied a mighty 
 head of water. 
 
 The fall of winter, with its storms and sodden 
 ground and brief hours of daylight, marked the 
 close of a stage, but not of the battle. Advances 
 might be fewer, the territory gained might be less, 
 but the offensive did not slacken. Still on a broad 
 front the Allied pressure was continuously main- 
 tained by means of their artillery and other services, 
 and the sapping of the enemy's strength went on 
 without ceasing. The hardships of winter would 
 be felt more acutely by forces which had been out- 
 matched in the long five months' battle; for it is 
 a law of life and of war that the weakness of the less 
 strong grows pari passu with the power of the 
 stronger. Those who judged of success only by the 
 ground occupied might grow restive during those 
 days of apparent inaction, but the soldier knew that 
 they represented blows struck at the enemy which 
 were not less deadly in effect than a spectacular ad- 
 vance. The major purpose was still proceeding. 
 
 v^ A sketch of the main features of a great action 
 is like the rough outline of a picture before the 
 artist has added the colours and the proportions of 
 life. It cannot even hint at the rich humian quality 
 of it all, the staunch brotherhood in arms, the faith- 
 fulness, the cheerful sacrifice, the fortitude, any 
 more than it can portray the terror and suffering. 
 
\ 
 
 THE FOURTH STAGE 173 
 
 But it is well to realise that this battle, unparalleled 
 in its magnitude and gravity, was also unique in 
 another circumstance. It was the effort of the whole 
 British nation, and an effort made of each man's ( 
 free will. Her armies were not a separate caste, / 
 whose doings the ordinary citizen watched with in- 
 terest and excitement but with a certain detachment, 
 as those of friendly gladiators hired for a purpose 
 foreign to the decent routine of his life. They were 
 composed of the ordinary citizen himself. The 
 Army was the people. Not a class or profession 
 or trade but had sent its tens of thousands to the 
 ranks, and scarcely a British home but had losses 
 to mourn. Those fighting men had come willingly 
 to the task, because their own interest and happiness 
 were become one with their country's victory. 
 Having willed the end, they willed also the means, 
 and showed themselves gluttons for the full rigour 
 of service. The riddle which Lincoln propounded 
 had been nobly answered. 
 
 No great thing is achieved without a price, and 
 on the Somme fell the very flower of our race, the 
 straightest of limb, the keenest of brain, the most 
 eager of spirit. In such a mourning each man 
 thinks first of his friends. Each of us has seen his 
 crov/ded circle become like the stalls of a theatre at 
 an unpopular play. Each has suddenly found the 
 world of time strangely empty and eternity strangely 
 thronged. To look back upon the gallant proces-*"' 
 sion of those who offered their all and had their gift 
 accepted, is to know exultation as well as sorrow. 
 The young men who died almost before they had 
 gazed on the world, the makers and the doers who 
 left their tasks unfinished, were greater in their 
 
174 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 deaths than in their lives. They builded better 
 than they knew, for the sum of their imperfections 
 was made perfect, and out of loss they won for their 
 country and mankind an enduring gain. Their 
 memory will abide so long as men are found to set 
 honour before ease, and a nation lives not for its 
 ledgers alone but for some purpose of virtue. They 
 have become, in the fancy of Henry Vaughan, the 
 shining spires of that City to which we travel. 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S SECOND DISPATCH 
 
 War Office, 2gth December 1916. 
 
 The following Dispatch has been received by the Secre- 
 tary of State for War from General Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., 
 Commanding-in-Chief, the British Forces in France: — 
 
 General HeadquarterSj 
 23rd December 191 6. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 I have the honour to submit the following report on the 
 operations of the Forces under my Command since the 19th 
 May, the date of my last Dispatch. 
 
 I. The principle of an offensive campaign during the 
 summer of 19 16 had already been decided on by all the 
 Allies. The various possible alternatives on the Western 
 front had been studied and discussed by General Joffre and 
 myself, and we were in complete agreement as to the front 
 to be attacked by the combined French and British Armies. 
 Preparations for our offensive had made considerable prog- 
 ress; but as the date on which the attack should begin was 
 dependent on many doubtful factors, a final decision on that 
 point was deferred until the general situation should become 
 clearer. 
 
 Subject to the necessity of commencing operations before 
 the summer was too far advanced, and with due regard to 
 
 175 
 
176 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the general situation, I desired to postpone my attack as 
 long as possible. The British Armies were growing in num- 
 bers and the supply of munitions was steadily increasing. 
 Moreover, a very large proportion of the officers and men 
 under my command were still far from being fully trained, 
 and the longer the attack could be deferred the more efficient 
 they would become. On the other hand the Germans were 
 continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there 
 and on the Itahan front, where the Austrian offensive was 
 gaining ground, it was evident that the strain might become 
 too great to be borne unless timely action were taken to 
 relieve it. Accordingly, while maintaining constant touch 
 with General Joffre in regard to all these considerations, my 
 preparations were pushed on, and I agreed, with the consent 
 of H.M. Government, that my attack should be launched 
 whenever the general situation required it with as great a 
 force as I might then be able to make available. 
 
 2. By the end of May the pressure of the enemy on the 
 Italian front had assumed such serious proportions that the 
 Russian campaign was opened early in June, and the brilliant 
 successes gained by our Allies against the Austrians at once 
 caused a movement of German troops from the Western to 
 the Eastern front. This, however, did not lessen the pres- 
 sure on Verdun. The heroic defence of our French Allies 
 had already gained many weeks of inestimable value and 
 had caused the enemy very heavy losses; but the strain 
 continued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation 
 in the various theatres of war, it was eventually agreed be- 
 tween General Joffre and myself that the combined French 
 and British offensive should not be postponed beyond the 
 end of June. 
 
 The British Objective 
 
 The object of that offensive was threefold: 
 (i.) To relieve the pressure on Verdun, 
 (ii.) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war 
 
APPENDIX I 177 
 
 by stopping any further transfer of German troops from 
 the Western front. 
 
 (iii.) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed 
 to us. 
 
 3. While my final preparations were in progress the 
 enemy made two unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my 
 arrangements. The first, directed on the 21st May against 
 our positions on the Vimy Ridge, south and south-east of 
 Souchez, resulted in a small enemy gain of no strategic or 
 tactical importance; and rather than weaken my offensive 
 by involving additional troops in the task of recovering the 
 lost ground, I decided to consolidate a position in rear of 
 our original line. 
 
 The second enemy attack was delivered on the 2nd June 
 on a front of over one and a half miles from Mount Sorrell 
 to Hooge, and succeeded in penetrating to a maximum depth 
 of 700 yards. As the southern part of the lost position com- 
 manded our trenches, I judged it necessary to recover it, 
 and by an attack launched on the 13th June, carefully pre- 
 pared and well executed, this was successfully accomplished 
 by the troops on the spot. 
 
 Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying 
 the preparations for the major operations which I had in 
 view. 
 
 4. These preparations were necessarily very elaborate and 
 took considerable time. 
 
 Vast stocks of ammunition and stores of all kinds had to 
 be accumulated beforehand within a convenient distance of 
 our front. To deal with these many miles of new railways — ' 
 both standard and narrow gauge — and trench tramways were 
 laid. All available roads were improved, many others were 
 made, and long causeways were built over marshy valleys. 
 Many additional dug-outs had to be provided as shelter for 
 the troops, for use as dressing stations for the wounded, and 
 as magazines for storing ammunition, food, water, and en- 
 gineering material. Scores of miles of deep communication 
 trenches had to be dug, as well as trenches for telephone 
 
178 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 wires, assembly and assault trenches, and numerous gun 
 emplacements and observation posts. 
 
 Important mining operations were undertaken, and 
 charges were laid at various points beneath the enemy's lines. 
 
 Except in the river valleys, the existing supplies of water 
 were hopelessly insufficient to meet the requirements of the 
 numbers of men and horses to be concentrated in this area 
 as the preparations for our offensive proceeded. To meet 
 this difficulty many wells and borings were sunk, and over 
 one hundred pumping plants were installed. More than one 
 hundred and twenty miles of water mains were laid, and 
 everything was got ready to ensure an adequate water supply 
 as our troops advanced. 
 
 Much of this preparatory work had to be done under very 
 trying conditions, and was liable to constant interruption 
 from the enemy's fire. The weather, on the whole, was bad, 
 and the local accommodation totally insufficient for housing 
 the troops employed, who consequently had to content them- 
 selves with such rough shelter as could be provided in the 
 circumstances. All this labour, too, had to be carried out 
 in addition to fighting and to the everyday work of main- 
 taining existing defences. It threw a very heavy strain on 
 the troops, which was borne by them with a cheerfulness 
 beyond all praise. 
 
 The German Positiqin 
 
 5. The enemy's position to be attacked was of a very 
 formidable character, situated on a high, undulating tract 
 of ground, which rises to more than 500 feet above sea-level, 
 and forms the watershed between the Somme on the one 
 side and the rivers of south-western Belgium on the other. 
 On the southern face of this watershed, the general trend of 
 which is from east-south-east to west-north-west, the ground 
 falls in a series of long irregular spurs and deep depressions 
 to the valley of the Somme. Well down the forward slopes 
 
APPENDIX I 179 
 
 of this face the enemy's first system of defence, starting from 
 the Somme near Curlu, ran at first northwards for 3,000 
 yards, then westwards for 7,000 yards to near Fricourt, 
 where it turned nearly due north, forming a great saUent 
 angle in the enemy's line. 
 
 Some 10,000 yards north of Fricourt the trenches crossed 
 the River Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, and still running 
 northwards passed over the summit of the watershed, about 
 Hebuterne and Gommecourt, and then down its northern 
 spurs to Arras. 
 
 On the 20,000 yards front between the Somme and the 
 Ancre the enemy had a strong second system of defence, sited 
 generally on or near the southern crest of the highest part 
 of the watershed, at an average distance of from 3,000 to 
 5,000 yards behind his first system of trenches. 
 
 During nearly two years' preparation he had spared no 
 pains to render these defences impregnable. The first and 
 second systems each consisted of several lines of deep 
 trenches, well provided with bomb-proof shelters and with 
 numerous communication trenches connecting them. The 
 front of the trenches in each system was protected by wire 
 entanglements, many of them in two belts forty yards broad, 
 built of iron stakes interlaced with barbed wire, often almost 
 as thick as a man's finger. 
 
 The numerous woods and villages in and between these 
 systems of defence had been turned into veritable fortresses. 
 The deep cellars usually to be found in the villages, and the 
 numerous pits and quarries common to a chalk country, were 
 used to provide cover for machine guns and trench mortars. 
 The existing cellars were supplemented by elaborate dug-outs, 
 sometimes in two storeys, and these were connected up by 
 passages as much as thirty feet below the surface of the 
 ground. The salients in the enemy's line, from which he 
 could bring enfilade fire across his front, were made into self- 
 contained forts, and often protected by mine fields; while 
 strong redoubts and concrete machine gun emplacements had 
 been constructed in positions from which he could sweep 
 
180 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 his own trenches should these be taken. The ground 
 lent itself to good artillery observation on the enemy's 
 part, and he had skilfully arranged for cross fire by his 
 guns. 
 
 These various systems of defence, with the fortified locali- 
 ties and other supporting points between them, were cun- 
 ningly sited to afford each other mutual assistance and to 
 admit of the utmost possible development of enfilade and 
 flanking fire by machine guns and artillery. They formed, 
 in short, not merely a series of successive lines, but one com- 
 posite system of enormous depth and strength. 
 
 Behind his second system of trenches, in addition to 
 woods, villages and other strong points prepared for defence, 
 the enemy had several other lines already completed; and 
 we had learned from aeroplane reconnaissance that he was 
 hard at work improving and strengthening these and digging 
 fresh ones between them and still further back. 
 
 In the area above described, between the Somme and 
 the Ancre, our front line trenches ran parallel and close to 
 those of the enemy, but below them. We had good direct 
 observation on his front system of trenches and on the various 
 defences sited on the slopes above us between his first and 
 second systems; but the second system itself, in many 
 places, could not be observed from the ground in our pos- 
 session, while, except from the air, nothing could be seen of 
 his more distant defences. 
 
 North of the Ancre, where the opposing trenches ran 
 transversely across the main ridge, the enemy's defences were 
 equally elaborate and formidable. So far as command of 
 ground was concerned, we were here practically on level 
 terms; but, partly as a result of this, our direct observation 
 over the ground held by the enemy was not so good as it 
 was further south. On portions of this front, the opposing 
 first line trenches were more widely separated from each 
 other; while in the valleys to the north were many hidden 
 gun positions from which the enemy could develop flanking 
 fire on our troops as they advanced across the open. 
 
APPENDIX I 181 
 
 The Three Phases 
 
 6. The period of active operations dealt with in this 
 dispatch divides itself roughly into three phases. The first 
 phase opened with the attack of the ist July, the success of 
 which evidently came as a surprise to the enemy and caused 
 considerable confusion and disorganisation in his ranks. The 
 advantages gained on that date and developed during the 
 first half of July may be regarded as having been rounded 
 off by the operations of the 14th July and three following 
 days, which gave us possession of the southern crest of the 
 main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le- 
 Petit. 
 
 We then entered upon a contest lasting for many weeks, 
 during which the enemy, having found his strongest defences 
 unavailing, and now fully alive to his danger, put forth his 
 utmost efforts to keep his hold on the main ridge. This stage 
 of the battle constituted a prolonged and severe struggle for 
 mastery between the contending armies, in which, although 
 progress was slow and difficult, the confidence of our troops 
 in their ability to win was never shaken. Their tenacity and 
 determination proved more than equal to their task, and by 
 the first week in September they had established a fighting 
 superiority that has left its mark on the enemy, of which 
 possession of the ridge was merely the visible proof. 
 
 The way was then opened for the third phase, in which 
 our advance was pushed down the ' forward slopes of the 
 ridge and further extended on both flanks until, from Morval 
 to Thiepval, the whole plateau and a good deal of ground 
 beyond were in our possession. Meanwhile our gallant Allies, 
 in addition to great successes south of the Somme, had pushed 
 their advance, against equally determined opposition, and 
 under most difficult tactical conditions, up the long slopes 
 on our immediate right, and were now preparing to drive 
 the enemy from the summit of the narrow and difficult por- 
 tion of the main ridge which lies between the Combles Valley 
 
182 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 and the River Tortille, a stream flowing from the north into 
 the Somme just below Peronne. 
 
 7. Defences of the nature described could only be attacked 
 with any prospect of success after careful artillery prepara- 
 tion. It Vv^as accordingly decided that our bombardment 
 should begin on the 24th June, and a large force of artillery 
 was brought into action for the purpose. 
 
 Artillery bombardments were also carried out daily at 
 different points on the rest of our front, and during the period 
 from the 24th June to ist July gas was discharged with good 
 effect at more than forty places along our line upon a frontage 
 which in total amounted to over 15 miles. Some 70 raids, 
 too, were undertaken by our infantry between Gommecourt 
 and our extreme left north of Ypres during the week pre- 
 ceding the attack, and these kept me well informed as to the 
 enemy's dispositions, besides serving other useful purposes. 
 
 On the 25th June the Royal Flying Corps carried out a 
 general attack on the enemy's observation balloons, destroy- 
 ing nine of them, and depriving the enemy for the time being 
 of this form of observation. 
 
 The First Stage 
 
 8. On July ist, at 7.30 a.m., after a final hour of ex- 
 ceptionally violent bombardment, our infantry assault was 
 launched. Simultaneously the French attacked on both sides 
 of the Somme, co-operating closely with us. 
 
 The British main front of attack extended from Mari- 
 court on our right, round the salient at Fricourt, to the Ancre 
 in front of St. Pierre Divion. To assist this main attack by 
 holding the enemy's reserves and occupying his artillery, the 
 enemy's trenches north of the Ancre, as far as Serre inclu- 
 sive, were to be assaulted simultaneously ; while further north 
 a subsidiary attack was to be made on both sides of the 
 salient at Gommecourt. 
 
APPENDIX I 183 
 
 I had entrusted the attack on the front from Marlcourt 
 to Serre to the Fourth Army, under the command of General 
 Sir Henry S. RawHnson, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., with five 
 Army Corps at his disposal. The subsidiary attack at Gomme- 
 court was carried out by troops from the Army commanded 
 by General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, K.C.B. 
 
 Just prior to the attack the mines which had been pre- 
 pared under the enemy's lines were exploded, and smoke was 
 discharged at many places along our front. Through this 
 smoke our infantry advanced to the attack with the utmost 
 steadiness, in spite of the very heavy barrage of the enemy's 
 guns. On our right our troops met with immediate success, 
 and rapid progress was made. Before midday Montauban 
 had been carried, and shortly afterwards the Briqueterie, to 
 the east, and the whole of the ridge to the west of the village 
 were in our hands. Opposite Mametz part of our assembly 
 trenches had been practically levelled by the enemy artillery, 
 making it necessary for our infantry to advance to the attack 
 across 400 yards of open ground. None the less they forced 
 their way into Mametz, and reached their objective in the 
 valley beyond, first throwing out a defensive flank towards 
 Fricourt on their left. At the same time the enemy's trenches 
 were entered north of Fricourt, so that the enemy's garrison 
 in that village was pressed on three sides. Further north, 
 though the villages of La Boisselle and Ovillers for the time 
 being resisted our attack, our troops drove deeply into the 
 German lines on the flanks of these strongholds, and so paved 
 the way for their capture later. On the spur running south 
 from Thiepval the work known as the Leipzig Salient was 
 stormed, and severe fighting took place for the possession of 
 the village and its defences. Here and north of the valley 
 of the Ancre as far as Serre, on the left flank of our attack, 
 our initial successes were not sustained. Striking progress 
 was made at many points, and parties of troops penetrated the 
 enemy's positions to the outer defences of Grandcourt, and 
 also to Pendant Copse and Serre ; but the enemy's continued 
 resistance at Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel made it im- 
 
184 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 possible to forward reinforcements and ammunition, and, in 
 spite of their gallant efforts, our troops were forced to with- 
 draw during the night to their own lines. 
 
 The subsidiary attack at Gommecourt also forced its way 
 into the enemy's positions ; but there met with such vigorous 
 opposition, that as soon as it was considered that the attack 
 had fulfilled its object our troops were withdrawn. 
 
 9. In view of the general situation at the end of the first 
 day's operations, I decided that the best course was to press 
 forward on a front extending from our junction with the 
 French to a point halfway between La Boisselle and Con- 
 talmaison, and to limit the offensive on our left for the pres- 
 ent to a slow and methodical advance. North of the Ancre 
 such preparations were to be made as would hold the enemy to 
 his positions, and enable the attack to be resumed there later 
 if desirable. In order that General Sir Henry Rawlinson 
 might be left free to concentrate his attention on the portion 
 of the front where the attack was to be pushed home, I also 
 decided to place the operations against the front. La Boisselle 
 to Serre, under the command of General Sir Hubert de la 
 P. Gough, K.C.B., to whom I accordingly allotted the two 
 northern corps of Sir Henry Rawlinson's army. My instruc- 
 tions to Sir Hubert Gough were that his Army was to main- 
 tain a steady pressure on the front from La Boisselle to the 
 Serre Road, and to act as a pivot, on which our line could 
 swing as our attacks on his right made progress towards the 
 north. 
 
 10. During the succeeding days the attack was continued 
 on these lines. In spite of strong counter-attacks on the 
 Briqueterie and Montauban, by midday on the 2nd July our 
 troops had captured Fricourt, and in the afternoon and even- 
 ing stormed Fricourt Wood and the farm to the north. Dur- 
 ing the 3rd and 4th July Bernafay and Caterpillar Woods 
 were also captured, and our troops pushed forward to the 
 railway north of Mametz. On these days the reduction of La 
 Boisselle was completed after hard fighting, while the out- 
 skirts of Contalmaison were reached on the 5th July. North 
 
APPENDIX I 185 
 
 of La Boisselle also the enemy's forces opposite us were kept 
 constantly engaged; and our holding in the Leipzig Salient 
 was gradually increased. 
 
 To sum up the results of the fighting of these five days, 
 on a front of over six miles, from the Briqueterie to La Bois- 
 selle, our troops had swept over the whole of the enemy's 
 first and strongest system of defence, which he had done his 
 utmost to render impregnable. They had driven him back 
 over a distance of more than a mile, and had carried four 
 elaborately fortified villages. 
 
 The number of prisoners passed back at the close of the 
 5th July had already reached the total of ninety-four officers 
 and 5,724 other ranks. 
 
 The Result of Five Days 
 
 II. After the five days' heavy and continuous fighting 
 just described it was essential to carry out certain readjust- 
 ments and reliefs of the forces engaged. In normal condi- 
 tions of enemy resistance the amount of progress that can 
 be made at any time without a pause in the general advance 
 is necessarily limited. Apart from the physical exhaustion 
 of the attacking troops and the considerable distances sepa- 
 rating the enemy's successive main systems of defence, special 
 artillery preparation was required before a successful assault 
 could be delivered. Meanwhile, however, local operations 
 were continued in spite of much unfavourable weather. The 
 attack on Contalmaison and Mametz Wood was undertaken 
 on the 7th July, and after three days' obstinate fighting, in 
 the course of which the enemy delivered several powerful 
 counter-attacks, the village and the whole of the wood, ex- 
 cept its northern border, were finally secured. On the 7th 
 July also a footing was gained in the outer defences of 
 Ovillers, while on the 9th July on our extreme right Maltz 
 Horn Farm — an important point on the spur north of Harde- 
 court — was secured. 
 
 A thousand yards north of this farm our troops had sue- 
 
186 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 ceeded at the second attempt in establishing themselves on 
 the 8th July in the southern end of Trones Wood. The 
 enemy's positions in the northern and eastern parts of this 
 wood were very strong, and no less than eight powerful 
 German counter-attacks were made here during the next 
 five days. In the course of this struggle portions of the 
 wood changed hands several times ; but we were left eventu- 
 ally, on the 13th July, in possession of the southern part of it. 
 
 12. Meanwhile Mametz Wood had been entirely cleared 
 of the enemy, and with Trones Wood also practically in our 
 possession we were in a position to undertake an assault 
 upon the enemy's second system of defences. Arrangements 
 were accordingly made for an attack to be delivered at day- 
 break on the morning of the 14th July against a front ex- 
 tending from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, both 
 inclusive. Contalmaison Villa, on a spur 1,000 yards west 
 of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, had already been captured to 
 secure the left flank of the attack, and advantage had been 
 taken of the progress made by our infantry to move our 
 artillery forward into new positions. The preliminary bom- 
 bardment had opened on the nth July. The opportunities 
 offered by the ground for enfilading the enemy's lines were 
 fully utilised and did much to secure the success of our attack. 
 
 13. In the early hours of the 14th July the attacking 
 troops moved out over the open for a distance of from about 
 1,000 to 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness just below 
 the crest and some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. 
 Their advance was covered by strong patrols, and their cor- 
 rect deployment had been ensured by careful previous prep- 
 arations. The whole movement was carried out unobserved 
 and without touch being lost in any case. The decision to 
 attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an Army, 
 the bulk of which has been raised since the beginning of the 
 war, was perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to 
 the quality of our troops. It would not have been possible 
 but for the most careful preparation and forethought, as well 
 as thorough reconnaissance of the ground, which was in 
 
APPENDIX I 187 
 
 many cases made personally by Divisional, Brigade and Bat- 
 talion Commanders and their staffs before framing their 
 detailed orders for the advance. 
 
 The Second Stage 
 
 The actual assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m. on the 14th 
 July, when there was just sufficient light to be able to dis- 
 tinguish friend from foe at short ranges, and along the whole 
 front attacked our troops, preceded by a very effective ar- 
 tillery barrage, swept over the enemy's first trenches and on 
 into the defences beyond. 
 
 On our right the enemy was driven from his last foot- 
 hold in Trones Wood, and by 8.0 a.m. we had cleared the 
 whole of it, relieving a body of 170 men who had maintained 
 themselves all night in the northern corner of the wood, 
 although completely surrounded by the enemy. Our posi- 
 tion in the wood was finally consolidated, and strong patrols 
 were sent out from it in the direction of Guillemont and 
 Longueval. The southern half of this latter village was 
 already in the hands of our troops who had advanced west 
 of Trones Wood. The northern half, with the exception of 
 two strong points, was captured by 4.0 p.m. after a severe 
 struggle. 
 
 In the centre of our attack Bazentin-le-Grand village and 
 wood were also gained, and our troops pushing northwards 
 captured Bazentin-le-Petit village, and the cemetery to the 
 east. Here the enemy counter-attacked twice about mid- 
 day without success, and again in the afternoon, on the latter 
 occasion momentarily reoccupying the northern half of the 
 village as far as the church. Our troops immediately re- 
 turned to the attack, and drove him out again with heavy 
 losses. To the left of the village Bazentin-le-Petit Wood 
 was cleared, in spite of the considerable resistance of the 
 enemy along its western edge, where we successfully repulsed 
 
188 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 a counter-attack. In the afternoon further ground was 
 gained to the west of the Wood, and posts were established 
 immediately south of Pozieres. 
 
 The enemy's troops, who had been severely handled in 
 these attacks and counter-attacks, began to show signs of 
 disorganisation, and it was reported early in the afternoon 
 that it was possible to advance to High Wood. General 
 Rawlinson, who had held a force of cavalry in readiness for 
 such an eventuality, decided to employ a part of it. As the 
 fight progressed small bodies of this force had pushed for- 
 ward gradually, keeping in close touch with the development 
 of the action and prepared to seize quickly any opportunity 
 that might occur. A squadron now came up on the flanks 
 of our infantry, who entered High Wood at about 8.0 p.m., 
 and, after some hand-to-hand fighting, cleared the whole of 
 the Wood with the exception of the northern apex. Acting 
 mounted in co-operation with the infantry the cavalry came 
 into action with good effect, killing several of the enemy 
 and capturing some prisoners. 
 
 14. On the 15th July the battle still continued, though on 
 a reduced scale. Arrow Head Copse, between the southern 
 edge of Trones Wood and Guillemont, and Waterlot Farm, 
 on the Longueval-Guillemont Road, were seized, and Delville 
 Wood was captured and held against several hostile counter- 
 attacks. In Longueval fierce fighting continued until dusk 
 for the possession of the two strong points and the orchards 
 to the north of the village. The situation in this area made 
 the position of our troops in High Wood somewhat precari- 
 ous, and they now began to suffer numerous casualties from 
 the enemy's heavy shelling. Accordingly orders were given 
 for their withdrawal, and this was effected during the night 
 of the i5-i6th July without interference by the enemy. All 
 the wounded were brought in. 
 
 In spite of repeated enemy counter-attacks further prog- 
 ress was made on the night of the i6th July along the enemy's 
 main second line trenches north-west of Bazentin-le-Petit 
 Wood to within 500 yards of the north-east corner of the 
 
APPENDIX I 189 
 
 village of Pozieres, which our troops were already approach- 
 ing from the South. 
 
 Meanwhile the operations further north had also made 
 progress. Since the attack of the 7th July the enemy in and 
 about Ovillers had been pressed relentlessly, and gradually 
 driven back by incessant bombing attacks and local assaults, 
 in accordance with the general instructions I had given to 
 General Sir Hubert Gough. On the i6th July a large body 
 of the garrison of Ovillers surrendered, and that night and 
 during the following day, by a direct advance from the west 
 across No Man's Land, our troops carried the remainder of 
 the village and pushed out along the spur to the north and 
 eastwards towards Pozieres. 
 
 15. The results of the operations of the 14th July and 
 subsequent days were of considerable importance. The 
 enemy's second main system of defence had been captured 
 on a front of over three miles. We had again forced him 
 back more than a mile, and had gained possession of the 
 southern crest of the main ridge on a front of 6,000 yards. 
 Four more of his fortified villages and three woods had been 
 wrested from him by determined fighting, and our advanced 
 troops had penetrated as far as his third line of defence. 
 In spite of a resolute resistance and many counter-attacks, 
 in which the enemy had suffered severely, our line was defi- 
 nitely established from Maltz Horn Farm, where we met the 
 French left, northwards along the eastern edge of Trones 
 Wood to Longueval, then westwards past Bazentin-le-Grand 
 to the northern corner of Bazentin-le-Petit and Bazentin-le- 
 Petit Wood, and then westwards again past the southern 
 face of Pozieres to the north of Ovillers. Posts were estab- 
 lished at Arrow Head Copse and Waterlot Farm, while we 
 had troops thrown forward in Delville Wood and towards 
 High Wood, though their position was not yet secure. 
 
 I cannot speak too highly of the skill, daring, endurance 
 and determination by which these results had been achieved. 
 Great credit is due to Sir Henry Rawlinson for the thorough- 
 ness and care with which this difficult undertaking was 
 
190 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 planned; while the advance and deployment made by night 
 without confusion, and the complete success of the subse- 
 quent attack, constitute a striking tribute to the discipline 
 and spirit of the troops engaged, as well as to the powers of 
 leadership and organisation of their commanders and staffs. 
 During these operations and their development on the 
 15th a number of enemy guns were taken, making our total 
 captures since the ist July 8 heavy howitzers, 4 heavy gims, 
 42 field and light guns and field howitzers, 30 trench mortars 
 and 52 machine guns. Very considerable losses had been 
 inflicted on the enemy, and the prisoners captured amounted 
 to over 2,000, bringing the total since the ist July to over 
 10,000. 
 
 The New Situation 
 
 16. There was strong evidence that the enemy forces 
 engaged on the battle front had been severely shaken by 
 the repeated successes gained by ourselves and our Allies; 
 but the great strength and depth of his defences had secured 
 for him sufficient time to bring up fresh troops, and he had 
 still many powerful fortifications, both trenches, villages and 
 woods, to which he could cling in our front and on our flanks. 
 
 We had, indeed, secured a footing on the main ridge, but 
 only on a front of 6,000 yards; and desirous though I was 
 to follow up quickly the successes we had won, it was nec^- 
 sary first to widen this front. 
 
 West of Bazentin-le-Petit the villages of Pozieres and 
 Thiepval, together with the whole elaborate system of 
 trenches round, between and on the main ridge behind them, 
 had still to be carried. An advance further east would, 
 however, eventually turn these defences, and all that was for 
 the present required on the left flank of our attack was a 
 steady, methodical, step by step advance as already ordered. 
 
 On our right flank the situation called for stronger meas- 
 ures. At Delville Wood and Longueval our lines formed a 
 sharp salient, from which our front ran on the one side west- 
 
APPENDIX I 191 
 
 wards to Pozieres, and on the other southwards to Maltz 
 Horn Farm. At Maltz Horn Farm our Hnes joined the 
 French, and the Allied front continued still southwards to 
 the village of Hem on the Somme. 
 
 This pronounced salient invited counter-attacks by the 
 enemy. He possessed direct observation on it all round 
 from Guillemont on the south-east to High Wood on the 
 north-west. He could bring a concentric fire of artillery to 
 bear not only on the wood and village, but also on the con- 
 fined space behind, through which ran the French communi- 
 cations as well as ours, where great numbers of guns, besides 
 ammunition and impedimenta of all sorts, had necessarily 
 to be crowded together. Having been in occupation of this 
 ground for nearly two years he knew every foot of it, and 
 could not fail to appreciate the possibilities of causing us 
 heavy loss there by indirect artillery fire; while it was evi- 
 dent that if he could drive in the salient in our line and so 
 gain direct observation on to the ground behind, our posi- 
 tion in that area would become very uncomfortable. 
 
 If there had not been good grounds for confidence that 
 the enemy was not capable of driving from this position 
 troops who had shown themselves able to wrest it from him, 
 the situation would have been an anxious one. In any case it 
 was clear that the first requirement at the moment was that 
 our right flank, and the French troops in extension of it, 
 should swing up into line with our centre. To effect this, 
 however, strong enemy positions had to be captured both 
 by ourselves and by our Allies. 
 
 From Delville Wood the main plateau extends for 4,000 
 yards east-north-east to Les Boeufs and Morval, and for 
 about the same distance south-eastwards to Leuze and Bou- 
 leaux Woods, which stand above and about 1,000 yards to 
 the west of Combles. To bring my right up into line with 
 the rest of my front it was necessary to capture Guillemont, 
 Falfemont Farm and Leuze Wood, and then Ginchy and Rou- 
 leaux Wood. These localities were naturally very strong, 
 and they had been elaborately fortified. The enemy's main 
 
192 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 second line system of defence ran in front of them from Wa- 
 terlot Farm, which was already in our hands, south-eastwards 
 to Falfemont Farm, and thence southwards to the Somme. 
 The importance of holding us back in this area could not 
 escape the enemy's notice, and he had dug and wired many 
 new trenches, both in front of and behind his original lines. 
 He had also brought up fresh troops, and there was no possi- 
 bility of taking him by surprise; 
 
 The task before us was therefore a very difficult one and 
 entailed a real trial of strength between the opposing forces. 
 At this juncture its difficulties were increased by unfavourable 
 weather. The nature of the ground limited the possibility 
 of direct observation by our artillery fire, and we were conse- 
 quently much dependent on observation from the air. As 
 in that element we had attained almost complete superiority, 
 all that we required was a clear atmosphere; but with this 
 we were not favoured for several weeks. We had rather 
 more rain than is usual in July and August, and even when 
 no rain fell there was an almost constant haze and frequent 
 low clouds. 
 
 The Swinging up of the Flanks 
 
 In swinging up my own right it was very important that 
 the French line north of the Somme should be advanced at 
 the same time in close combination with the movement of 
 the British troops. The line of demarcation agreed on 
 between the French commander and myself ran from Maltz 
 Horn Farm due eastwards to the Combles Valley and then 
 north-eastwards up that valley to a point midway between 
 Sailly-Saillisel and Morval. These two villages had been 
 fixed upon as the objectives, respectively, of the French left 
 and of my right. In order to advance in co-operation with 
 my right, and eventually to reach Sailly-Saillisel, our Allies 
 had still to fight their way up that portion of the main ridge 
 which lies between the Combles Valley on the west and the 
 
APPENDIX I 193 
 
 River Tortille on the east. To do so they had to capture, 
 in the first place, the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, 
 Le Forest, Rancourt, and Fregicourt, besides many woods 
 and strong systems of trenches. As the high ground on 
 each side of the Combles Valley commands the slopes of the 
 ridge on the opposite side, it was essential that the advance 
 of the two armies should be simultaneous and made in the 
 closest co-operation. This was fully recognized by both 
 armies, and our plans were made accordingly. 
 
 To carry out the necessary preparations to deal with the 
 difficult situation outlined above a short pause was necessary 
 to enable tired troops to be relieved and guns to be moved 
 forward; while at the same time old communications 
 had to be improved and new ones made. Entrenchments 
 against probable counter-attacks could not be neglected, 
 and fresh dispositions of troops were required for the new 
 attacks to be directed eastwards. 
 
 It was also necessary to continue such pressure on the 
 rest of our front, not only on the Ancre but further south, 
 as would make it impossible for the enemy to devote himself 
 entirely to resisting the advance between Delville Wood and 
 the Somme. In addition it was desirable further to secure 
 our hold on the main ridge west of Delville Wood by gaining 
 more groimd to our front in that direction. Orders were 
 therefore issued in accordance with the general considera- 
 tions explained above, and, without relaxing pressure along 
 the enemy's front from Delville Wood to the West, prepara- 
 tions for an attack on Guillemont were pushed on. 
 
 17. During the afternoon of the i8th July the enemy 
 developed his expected counter-attack against Delville Wood, 
 after heavy preliminary shelling. By sheer weight of num- 
 bers and at very heavy cost he forced his way through the 
 northern and north-eastern portions of the wood and into 
 the northern half of Longueval, which our troops had cleared 
 only that morning. In the south-east corner of the wood he 
 was held up by a gallant defence, and further south three 
 attacks on our positions in Waterlot Farm failed. 
 
194 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 This enemy attack on Delville Wood marked the com- 
 mencement of the long closely contested struggle which was 
 not finally decided in our favour till the fall of Guillemont 
 on the 3rd September, a decision which was confirmed by 
 the capture of Ginchy six days later. Considerable gains 
 were indeed made during this period ; but progress was slow 
 and bought only by hard fighting. A footing was established 
 in High Wood on the 20th July and our line linked up thence 
 with Longueval. A subsequent advance by the Fourth Army 
 on the 23rd July on a wide front from Guillemont to near 
 Pozieres found the enemy in great strength all along the line, 
 with machine guns and forward troops in shell holes and 
 newly constructed trenches well in front of his main defences. 
 Although ground was won the strength of the resistance ex- 
 perienced showed that the hostile troops had recovered from 
 their previous confusion sufiiciently to necessitate long and 
 careful preparation before further successes on any great 
 scale could be secured. 
 
 An assault delivered simultaneously on this date by 
 General Gough's Army against Pozieres gained considerable 
 results, and by the morning of the 25th July the whole of 
 that village was carried, including the cemetery, and im- 
 portant progress was made along the enemy's trenches to 
 the north-east. That evening, after heavy artillery prepara- 
 tion, the enemy launched two more powerful counter-attacks, 
 the one directed against our new position in and around 
 High Wood and the other delivered from the north-west of 
 Delville Wood. Both attacks were completely broken up 
 with very heavy losses to the enemy. 
 
 On the 27th July the remainder of Delville Wood was 
 recovered, and two days later the northern portion of Lon- 
 gueval and the orchards were cleared of the enemy, after 
 severe fighting, in which our own and the enemy's artillery 
 were very active. 
 
 18. On the 30th July the village of Guillemont and Falfe- 
 mont Farm to the south-east were attacked, in conjunction 
 with a French attack north of the Somme. A battalion 
 
APPENDIX I 195 
 
 entered Guillemont, and part of it passed through to the far 
 side; but as the battalions on either flank did not reach 
 their objectives, it was obliged to fall back, after holding 
 out for some hours on the western edge of the village. In a 
 subsequent local attack on the 7th August our troops again 
 entered Guillemont, but were again compelled to fall back 
 owing to the failure of a simultaneous effort against the 
 enemy's trenches on the flanks of the village. 
 
 The ground to the south of Guillemont was dominated 
 by the enemy's positions in and about that village. It was 
 therefore hoped that these positions might be captured first, 
 before an advance to the south of them in the direction of 
 Falfemont Farm was pushed further forward. It had now 
 become evident, however, that Guillemont could not be cap- 
 tured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy loss, 
 and, accordingly, arrangements were made with the French 
 Army on our immediate right for a series of combined at- 
 tacks, to be delivered in progressive stages, which should 
 embrace Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze 
 Wood and Ginchy. 
 
 An attempt on the i6th August to carry out the first stage 
 of the pre-arranged scheme met with only partial success, 
 and two days later, after a preliminary bombardment, last- 
 ing thirty-six hours, a larger combined attack was under- 
 taken. In spite of a number of enemy counter-attacks — the 
 most violent of which, levelled at the point of junction of 
 the British with the French, succeeded in forcing our Allies 
 and ourselves back from a part of the ground won — very 
 valuable progress was made, and our troops established them- 
 selves in the outskirts of Guillemont village and occupied 
 Guillemont Station. A violent counter-attack on Guillemont 
 Station was repulsed on the 23rd August, and next day 
 further important progress was made on a wide front north 
 and east of Delville Wood. 
 
 19. Apart from the operations already described, others 
 of a minor character, yet involving much fierce and obstinate 
 fighting, continued during this period on the fronts of both 
 
196 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the British Armies. Our Hnes were pushed forward wher- 
 ever possible by means of local attacks and by bombing and 
 sapping, and the enemy was driven out of various forward 
 positions from which he might hamper our progress. By 
 these means many gains were made which, though small in 
 themselves, in the aggregate represented very considerable 
 advances. In this way our line was brought to the crest 
 of the ridge above Martinpuich, and Pozieres Windmill and 
 the high ground north of the village were secured, and with 
 them observation over Martinpuich and Courcelette and the 
 enemy's gun positions in their neighbourhood and around 
 Le Sars. At a later date our troops reached the defences 
 of Mouquet Farm, north-west of Pozieres, and made progress 
 in the enemy's trenches south of Thiepval. The enemy's 
 counter-attacks were incessant and frequently of great vio- 
 lence, but they were made in vain, and at heavy cost to him. 
 The fierceness of the fighting can be gathered from the fact 
 that one regiment of the German Guards Reserve Corps 
 which had been in the Thiepval salient opposite Mouquet 
 Farm is known to have lost 1,400 men in fifteen days. 
 
 20. The first two days of September on both Army fronts 
 were spent in preparation for a more general attack, which 
 the gradual progress made during the preceding month had 
 placed us in a position to undertake. Our assault was de- 
 livered at 12 noon on the 3rd September on a front extend- 
 ing from our extreme right to the enemy trenches on the 
 right bank of the Ancre, north of Hamel. Our Allies attacked 
 simultaneously on our right. 
 
 Guillemont was storm.ed and at once consolidated, and 
 our troops pushed on unchecked to Ginchy and the line of 
 the road running south to Wedge Wood. Ginchy was also 
 seized, but here in the afternoon we were very strongly 
 counter-attacked. For three days the tide of attack and 
 counter-attack swayed backwards and forwards amongst the 
 ruined houses of the village, till, in the end, for three days 
 more the greater part of it remained in the enemy's pos- 
 session. Three counter-attacks made on the evening of the 
 
APPENDIX I 197 
 
 3rd September against our troops in Guillemont all failed 
 with considerable loss to the enemy. We also gained ground 
 north of Delville Wood and in High Wood, though here 
 an enemy counter-attack recovered part of the ground 
 won. 
 
 On the front of General Cough's Army, though the enemy 
 suffered heavy losses in personnel, our gain in ground was 
 slight. 
 
 21. In order to keep touch with the French who were 
 attacking on our right, the assault on Falfemont Farm on 
 the 3rd September was delivered three hours before the 
 opening of the main assault. In the impetus of their first rush 
 our troops reached the farm, but could not hold it. Never- 
 theless, they pushed on to the north of it, and on the 4th 
 September delivered a series of fresh assaults upon it from 
 the west and north. 
 
 Ultimately this strongly fortified position was occupied 
 piece by piece, and by the morning of the 5th September the 
 whole of it was in our possession. Meanwhile further prog- 
 ress had been made to the north-east of the farm, where con- 
 siderable initiative was shown by the local commanders. By 
 the evening of the same day our troops were established 
 strongly in Leuze Wood, which on the following day was 
 finally cleared of the enemy. 
 
 22. In spite of the fact that most of Ginchy and of High 
 Wood remained in the enemy's hands, very noteworthy 
 progress had been made in the course of these four days' 
 operations, exceeding anything that had been achieved since 
 the 14th July. Our right was advanced on a front of nearly 
 two miles to an average depth of nearly one mile, penetrat- 
 ing the enemy's original second line of defence on this front, 
 and capturing strongly fortified positions at Falfemont Farm, 
 Leuze Wood, Guillemont, and south-east of Delville Wood, 
 where we reached the western outskirts of Ginchy. More 
 important than this gain in territory was the fact that the 
 barrier which for seven weeks the enemy had maintained 
 against our further advance had at last been broken. Over 
 
198 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 i,ooo prisoners were made and many machine guns taken or 
 destroyed in the course of the fighting. 
 
 23. Preparations for a further attack upon Ginchy con- 
 tinued without intermission, and at 4.45 p.m. on the 9th 
 September the attack was reopened on the whole of the 
 Fourth Army front. At Ginchy and to the north of Leuze 
 Wood it met with almost immediate success. On the right 
 the enemy's line was seized over a front of more than 1,000 
 yards from the south-west comer of Bouleaux Wood in a 
 north-westerly direction to a point just south of the Guilfe- 
 mont-Morval tramway. Our troops again forced their way 
 into Ginchy, and passing beyond it carried the line of enemy 
 trenches to the east. Further progress was made east of 
 Delville Wood and south and east of High Wood. 
 
 Over 500 prisoners were taken in the operations of the 
 9th September and following days, making the total since th€ 
 1st July over 17,000. 
 
 24, Meanwhile the French had made great progress on our 
 right, bringing their line forward to Leuze Wood (just south 
 of Combles)-Le Forest-Clery-sur-Somme, all three inclusive. 
 The weak salient in the Allied line had therefore disappeared 
 and we had gained the front required for further opera- 
 tions. 
 
 Still more importance, however, lay in the proof afforded by 
 the results described of the ability of our new Armies not only 
 to rush the enemy's strongest defences, as had been accom- 
 plished on the 1st and 14th July, but also to wear down 
 and break his power of resistance by a steady, relentless pres- 
 sure, as they had done during the weeks of this fierce and 
 protracted struggle. As has already been recounted, the 
 preparations made for our assault on the ist July had been 
 long and elaborate; but though the enemy knew that an 
 attack was coming, it would seem that he considered the 
 troops already on the spot, secure in their apparently im- 
 pregnable defences, would sufiice to deal with it. The svkc- 
 cess of that assault, combined with the vigour and deter- 
 mination with which our troops pressed their advantage, and 
 
APPENDIX I 199 
 
 followed by the successful night attack of the 14th July, all 
 served to awaken him to a fuller realisation of his danger. 
 The great depth of his system of fortification, to which refer- 
 ence has been made, gave him time to reorganise his defeated 
 troops, and to hurry up numerous fresh divisions and more 
 guns. Yet in spite of this, he was still pushed back, steadily 
 and continuously. Trench after trench, and strong point 
 after strong point, were wrested from him. The great major- 
 ity of his frequent counter-attacks failed completely, with 
 heavy loss; while the few that achieved temporary local 
 success purchased it dearly, and were soon thrown back from 
 the ground they had for the moment regained. 
 
 The enemy had, it is true, delayed our advance con- 
 siderably, but the effort had cost him dear; and the com- 
 parative collapse of his resistance during the last few days 
 of the struggle justified the belief that in the long run de- 
 cisive victory would lie with our troops, who had displayed 
 such fine fighting qualities and such indomitable endurance 
 and resolution. 
 
 The Situation in Early September 
 
 2$. Practically the whole of the forward crest of the 
 main ridge, on a front of some 9,000 yards from Delville 
 Wood to the road above Mouquet Farm, was now in our 
 hands, and with it the advantage of observation over the 
 slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood, for a further 3,000 
 yards to Leuze Wood, we were firmly established on the 
 main ridge; while further east, across the Combles Valley, 
 the French were advancing victoriously on our right. But 
 though the centre of our line was well placed, on our flanks 
 there was still difficult ground to be won. 
 
 From Ginchy the crest of the high ground runs northward 
 for 2,000 yards, and then eastward, in a long spur, for nearly 
 4,000 yards. Near the eastern extremity of this spur stands 
 the village of Morval, commanding a wide field of view and 
 
200 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 fire in every direction. At Leuze Wood my right was still 
 2,000 yards from its objective at this village, and between 
 lay a broad and deep branch of the main Combles Valley, 
 completely commanded by the Morval spur, and flanked, not 
 only from its head north-east of Ginchy, but also from the 
 high ground east of the Combles Valley, which looks directly 
 into it. 
 
 Up this high ground beyond the Combles Valley the French 
 were working their way towards their objective at Sailly- 
 Saillisel, situated due east of Morval, and standing at the 
 same level. Between these two villages the ground falls away 
 to the head of the Combles Valley, which runs thence in a 
 south-westerly direction. In the bottom of this valley lies 
 the small town of Combles, then well fortified and strongly 
 held, though dominated by my right at Leuze Wood, and 
 by the French left on the opposite heights. It had been 
 agreed between the French and myself that an assault on 
 Combles would not be necessary, as the place could be ren- 
 dered untenable by pressing forward along the ridges above 
 it in on either side. 
 
 The capture of Morval from the south presented a very 
 difficult problem, while the capture of Sailly-Saillisel, at that 
 time some 3,000 yards to the north of the French left, was 
 in some respects even more difficult. The line of the French 
 advance was narrowed almost to a defile by the extensive 
 and strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast on the one 
 side, and on the other by the Combles Valley, which, with 
 the branches running out from it, and the slope on each side, 
 is completely commanded, as has been pointed out, by the 
 heights bounding the valley on the east and west. 
 
 On my right flanks, therefore, the progress of the French 
 and British forces was still interdependent, and the closest 
 co-operation continued to be necessary in order to gain the 
 further ground required to enable my centre to advance on 
 a sufficiently wide front. To cope with such a situation 
 unity of command is usually essential, but in this case the 
 cordial good feeling between the Allied Armies, and the 
 
APPENDIX I 201 
 
 earnest desire of each to assist the other, proved equally 
 effective, and removed all difficulties. 
 
 On my left flank the front of General Cough's Army bent 
 back from the main ridge near Mouquet Farm down a spur 
 descending south-westwards, and then crossed a broad valley 
 to the Wonderwork, a strong point situated in the enemy's 
 front-line system near the southern end of the spur on the 
 higher slopes of which Thiepval stands. Opposite this part 
 of our line we had still to carry the enemy's original defences 
 on the main ridge above Thiepval, and in the village itself, 
 defences which may fairly be described as being as nearly 
 impregnable as nature, art, and the unstinted labour of 
 nearly two years could make them. 
 
 Our advance on Thiepval, and on the defences above it, 
 had been carried out up to this date, in accordance with my 
 instructions given on the 3rd July, by a slow and methodical 
 progression, in which great skill and much patience and 
 endurance had been displayed with entirely satisfactory 
 results. General Gough's Army had, in fact, acted most 
 successfully in the required manner as a pivot to the re- 
 mainder of the attack. The Thiepval defences were known 
 to be exceptionally strong, and as immediate possession of 
 them was not necessary to the development of my plans after 
 the 1st July, there had been no need to incur the heavy casu- 
 alties to be expected in an attempt to rush them. The time 
 was now approaching, although it had not yet arrived, when 
 their capture would become necessary ; but from the positions 
 we had now reached and those which we expected shortly 
 to obtain, I had no doubt that they could be rushed when 
 required without undue loss. An important part of the 
 remaining positions required for my assault on them was 
 now won by a highly successful enterprise carried out on 
 the evening of the 14th September, by which the Wonder- 
 work was stormed. 
 
202 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The Third Stage 
 
 26. The general plan of the combined Allied attack which 
 was opened on the 15th September was to pivot on the high 
 ground south of the Ancre and north of the Albert-Bapaume 
 road, while the Fourth Army devoted its whole effort to the 
 rearmost of the enemy's original systems of defence between 
 Morval and Le Sars. Should our success in this direction 
 warrant it I made arrangements to enable me to extend the 
 left of the attack to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and 
 Courcelette. As soon as our advance on this front had 
 reached the Morval line, the time would have arrived to bring 
 forward my left across the Thiepval Ridge. Meanwhile on 
 my right our Allies arranged to continue the line of advance 
 in close co-operation with me from the Somme to the slopes 
 above Combles; but directing their main effort northwards 
 against the villages of Rancourt and Fregicourt, so as to 
 complete the isolation of Combles and open the way for 
 their attack upon Sailly-Saillisel. 
 
 27. A methodical bombardment was commenced at 6.0 
 a.m. on the 12th September and was continued steadily and 
 uninterruptedly till the moment of attack. 
 
 At 6.20 a.m. on the 15th September the infantry assault 
 commenced, and at the same moment the bombardment 
 became intense. Our new heavily armoured cars, known 
 as "Tanks," now brought into action for the first time, suc- 
 cessfully co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a 
 surprise to the enemy rank and file gave valuable help in 
 breaking down their resistance. 
 
 The advance met with immediate success on almost the 
 whole of the front attacked. At 8.40 a.m. Tanks were seen 
 to be entering Flers, followed by large numbers of troops. 
 Fighting continued in Flers for some time, but by lo.o a.m. 
 our troops had reached the north side of the village, and by 
 midday had occupied the enemy's trenches for some distance 
 beyond. On our right our line was advanced to within as- 
 
APPENDIX I 203 
 
 saulting distance of the strong line of defence running before 
 Morval, Les Boeufs and Gueudecourt, and on our left High 
 Wood was at last carried, after many hours of very severe 
 fighting, reflecting great credit on the attacking battalions. 
 Our success made it possible to carry out during the after- 
 noon that part of the plan which provided for the capture 
 of Martinpuich and Courcelette, and by the end of the day 
 both these villages were in our hands. On the i8th Sep- 
 tember the work of this day was completed by the capture 
 of the Quadrilateral, an enemy stronghold which had hitherto 
 blocked the progress of our right towards Morval. Further 
 progress was also made between Flers and Martinpuich. 
 
 28. The result of the fighting of the 15th September and 
 following days was a gain more considerable than any which 
 had attended our arms in the course of a single operation 
 since the commencement of the offensive. In the course of 
 one day's fighting we had broken through two of the enemy's 
 main defensive systems and had advanced on a front of over 
 six miles to an average depth of a mile. In the course of this 
 advance we had taken three large villages, each powerfully 
 organised for prolonged resistance. Two of these villages had 
 been carried by assault with short preparation in the course 
 of a few hours' fighting. All this had been accomplished 
 with a small number of casualties in comparison with the 
 troops employed, and in spite of the fact that, as was after- 
 wards discovered, the attack did not come as a complete sur- 
 prise to the enemy. 
 
 The total number of prisoners taken by us in these opera- 
 tions since their commencement on the evening of the 14th 
 September amounted at this date to over 4,000, including 
 127 officers. 
 
 29. Preparations for our further advance were again 
 hindered by bad weather, but at 12.35 P-^- on the 25th Sep- 
 tember, after a bombardment commenced early in the morn- 
 ing of the 24th, a general attack by the Allies was launched 
 on the whole front between the Somme and Martinpuich. 
 The objectives on the British front included the villages of 
 
204 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 Morval, Les Boeufs, and Giieudecourt, and a belt of country 
 about 1,000 yards deep curving round the north of Flers to 
 a point midway between that village and Martinpuich. By 
 nightfall the whole of these objectives were in our hands, 
 with the exception of the village of Gueudecourt, before which 
 our troops met with very serious resistance from a party of 
 the enemy in a section of his fourth main system of de- 
 fence. 
 
 On our right our Allies carried the village of Rancourt, 
 and advanced their line to the outskirts of Fregicourt, cap- 
 turing that village also during the night and early morning. 
 Combles was therefore nearly surrounded by the Allied forces, 
 and in the early morning of the 26th September the village 
 was occupied simultaneously by the Allied forces, the British 
 to the north and the French to the south of the railway. 
 The capture of Combles in this inexpensive fashion repre- 
 sented a not inconsiderable tactical success. Though lying 
 in a hollow, the village was very strongly fortified, and pos- 
 sessed, in addition to the works which the enemy had con- 
 structed, exceptionally large cellars and galleries, at a great 
 depth underground, sufficient to give effectual shelter to 
 troops and material under the heaviest bombardment. Great 
 quantities of stores and ammunition of all sorts were found 
 in these cellars when the village was taken. 
 y On the same day Gueudecourt was carried, after the pro- 
 tecting trench to the west had been captured in a somewhat 
 interesting fashion. In the early morning a Tank started 
 down the portion of the trench held by the enemy from the 
 north-west, firing its machine guns and followed by bombers. 
 The enemy could not escape, as we held the trench at the 
 southern end. At the same time an aeroplane flew down 
 the length of the trench, also firing a machine gun at the 
 enemy holding it. These then waved white handkerchiefs 
 in token of surrender, and when this was reported by the 
 aeroplane the infantry accepted the surrender of the garri- 
 son. By 8.30 a.m. the whole trench had been cleared, great 
 numbers of the enemy had been killed, and 8 officers and 362 
 
APPENDIX I 205 
 
 other ranks made prisoners. Our total casualties amounted 
 to five. 
 
 30. The success of the Fourth Army had now brought 
 our advance to the stage at which I judged it advisable that 
 Thiepval should be taken, in order to bring our left flank 
 into line and establish it on the main ridge above that village, 
 the possession of which would be of considerable tactical 
 value in future operations. 
 
 Accordingly at 12.25 p.m. on the 26th September, before 
 the enemy had been given time to recover from the blow 
 struck by the Fourth Army, a general attack was launched 
 against Thiepval and the Thiepval Ridge. The objective 
 consisted of the whole of the high ground still remaining in 
 enemy hands extending over a front of some 3,000 yards 
 north and east of Thiepval, and including, in addition to 
 that fortress, the Zollern Redoubt, the Stuff Redoubt, 
 and the Schwaben Redoubt, with the connecting lines of 
 trenches. 
 
 The attack was a brilliant success. On the right our 
 troops reached the system of enemy trenches which formed 
 their objectives without great difficulty. In Thiepval and 
 the strong works to the north of it the enemy's resistance 
 was more desperate. Three waves of our attacking troops 
 carried the outer defences of Mouquet Farm, and, pushing on, 
 entered Zollem Redoubt, which they stormed and consoli- 
 dated. In the strong point formed by the buildings of the 
 Farm itself, the enemy garrison, securely posted in deep 
 cellars, held out until 6.0 p.m., when their last defences were 
 forced by a working party of a Pioneer Battalion acting on its 
 own initiative. 
 
 On the left of the attack fierce fighting, in which Tanks 
 again gave valuable assistance to our troops, continued in 
 Thiepval during that day and the following night, but by 
 8.30 a.m. on the 27th September the whole of the village 
 of Thiepval was in our hands. 
 
 Some 2,300 prisoners were taken in the course of the fight- 
 ing on the Thiepval Ridge on these and the subsequent days, 
 
206 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 bringing the total number of prisoners taken in the battle 
 area in the operations of the I4th-30th September to nearly 
 10,000. In the same period we had captured 2"] guns, over 
 200 machine guns, and some 40 trench mortars. 
 
 31. On the same date the south and west sides of Stuff 
 Redoubt were carried by our troops, together with the length 
 of trench connecting that strong point with Schwaben Re- 
 doubt to the west and also the greater part of the enemy's 
 defensive line eastwards along the northern slopes of the 
 ridge. Schwaben Redoubt was assaulted during the after- 
 noon, and in spite of counter attacks, delivered by strong 
 enemy reinforcements, we captured the whole of the southern 
 face of the Redoubt and pushed out patrols to the northern 
 face and towards St. Pierre Divion. 
 
 Our line was also advanced north of Courcelette, while 
 on the Fourth Army front a further portion of the enemy's 
 fourth system of defence north-west of Gueudecourt was 
 carried on a front of a mile. Between these two points the 
 enemy fell back upon his defences running in front of Eau- 
 court I'Abbaye and Le Sars, and on the afternoon and even- 
 ing of the 27th September our troops were able to make a 
 very considerable advance in this area without encountering 
 serious opposition until within a few hundred yards of this 
 line. The ground thus occupied extended to a depth of 
 from 500 to 600 yards on a front of nearly two miles between 
 the Bazentin-le-Petit, Ligny, Thilloy, and Albert-Bapaume 
 roads. 
 
 Destremont Farm^ south-west of Le Sars, was carried by 
 a single company on the 29th September, and on the after- 
 noon of the 1st October a successful attack was launched 
 against Eaucourt I'Abbaye and the enemy defences to the 
 east and west of it, comprising a total front of about 3,000 
 yards. Our artillery barrage was extremely accurate, and 
 contributed greatly to the success of the attack. Bomb fight- 
 ing continued among the buildings during the next two days, 
 but by the evening of the 3rd October the whole of Eaucourt 
 I'Abbaye was in our hands. 
 
APPENDIX I 207 
 
 The October Fighting 
 
 32. At the end of September I had handed over Morval 
 to the French, in order to facilitate their attacks on Sailly- 
 Saillisel, and on the 7th October, after a postponement ren- 
 dered necessary by three days' continuous rain, our Allies 
 made a considerable advance in the direction of the latter 
 village. On the same day the Fourth Army attacked along 
 the whole front from Les Boeufs to Destremont Farm in sup- 
 port of the operations of our Allies. 
 
 The village of Le Sars was captured, together with the 
 Quarry to the north-west, while considerable progress was 
 made at other points along the front attacked. In par- 
 ticular, to the east of Gueudecourt, the enemy's trenches 
 were carried on a breadth of some 2,000 yards, and a footing 
 gained on the crest of the long spur which screens the de- 
 fences of Le Transloy from the south-west. Nearly 1,000 
 prisoners were secured by the Fourth Army in the course of 
 these operations. 
 
 33. With the exception of his positions in the neighbour- 
 hood of Sailly-Saillisel, and his scanty foothold on the north- 
 ern crest of the high ground above Thiepval, the enemy had 
 now been driven from the whole of the ridge lying between 
 the Tortille and the Ancre. 
 
 Possession of the north-western portion of the ridge north 
 of the latter village carried with it observation over the 
 valley of the Ancre between Miraumont and Hamel and the 
 spurs and valleys held by the enemy on the right bank of 
 the river. The Germans, therefore, made desperate efforts 
 to cling to their last remaining trenches in this area, and in 
 the course of the three weeks following our advance made 
 repeated counter-attacks at heavy cost in the vain hope of 
 recovering the ground they had lost. During this period 
 our gains in the neighbourhood of Stuff and Schwaben Re- 
 doubts were gradually increased and secured in readiness for 
 future operations, and I was quite confident of the ability 
 
208 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMITE 
 
 of our troops, not only to repulse the enemy's attacks, but 
 to clear him entirely from his last positions on the ridge 
 whenever it should suit my plans to do so. I was, therefore, 
 well content with the situation on this flank. 
 
 Along the centre of our line from Gueudecourt to the 
 west of Le Sars similar considerations applied. As we were 
 already well down the forward slopes of the ridge on this 
 iront, it was for the time being inadvisable to make any 
 serious advance. Pending developments elsewhere all that 
 was necessary or indeed desirable was to carry on local opera- 
 tions to improve our positions and to keep the enemy fully 
 employed. 
 
 On our eastern flank, on the other hand, it was important 
 to gain ground. Here the enemy still possessed a strong 
 system of trenches covering the villages of Le Transloy and 
 Beaulencourt and the town of Bapaume ; but, although he 
 was digging with feverish haste, he had not yet been able to 
 create any very formidable defences behind this line. In 
 this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at which 
 a successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield 
 much greater results than anything we had yet attained. 
 The resistance of the troops opposed to us had seriously 
 weakened in the course of our recent operations, and there 
 was no reason to suppose that the effort required would not 
 be within our powers. 
 
 This last completed system of defence, before Le Trans- 
 loy, was flanked to the south by the enemy's positions at 
 Sailly-Saillisel and screened to the west by the spur lying be- 
 tween Le Transloy and Les Boeuf s. A necessary preliminary, 
 therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and 
 the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground 
 at this latter village would at once give a far better command 
 over the ground to the north and north-west, secure the flank 
 of our operations towards Le Transloy, and deprive the 
 enemy of observation over the Allied communications in 
 the Combles Valley. In view of the enemy's efforts to con- 
 struct new systems of defence behind the Le Transloy line. 
 
APPENDIX I 209 
 
 it was desirable to lose no time in dealing with the situation. 
 
 Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavourable weather 
 set in and continued with scarcely a break during the re- 
 mainder of October and the early part of November. Poor 
 visibility seriously interfered with the work of our artillery, 
 and constant rain turned the mass of hastily dug trenches for 
 which we were fighting into channels of deep mud. The 
 country roads, broken by countless shell craters, that cross 
 the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly be- 
 came almost impassable, making the supply of food, stores 
 and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions multi- 
 plied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that it was 
 found impossible to exploit the situation with the rapidity 
 necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of the ad- 
 vantages we had gained. 
 
 None the less my right flank continued to assist the opera- 
 tions of our Allies against Saillisel, and attacks were made 
 to this end, whenever a slight improvement in the weather 
 made the co-operation of artillery and infantry at all possible. 
 The delay in our advance, however, though unavoidable, had 
 given the enemy time to reorganise and rally his troops. His 
 resistance again became stubborn, and he seized every fa- 
 vourable opportunity for counter-attacks. Trenches changed 
 hands with great frequency, the conditions of ground making 
 it difficult to renew exhausted supplies of bombs and am- 
 munition, or to consolidate the ground won, and so rendering 
 it an easier matter to take a battered trench than to hold 
 it. 
 
 34. On the I2th and i8th September further gains were 
 made to the east of Les Boeufs-Gueudecourt line and east 
 of Le Sars, and some hundreds of prisoners were taken. On 
 these dates, despite all the difficulties of ground, the French 
 first reached and then captured the villages of Sailly-Saillisel, 
 but the moment for decisive action was rapidly passing away, 
 while the weather showed no signs of improvement. By 
 this time, too, the ground had already become so bad that 
 nothing less than a prolonged period of drying weather, 
 
210 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 which at that season of the year was most unlikely to occur, 
 would suit our purpose. 
 
 In these circumstances, while continuing to do all that 
 was possible to improve my position on my right flank, I 
 determined to press on with preparations for the exploitation 
 of the favourable local situation on my left flank. At mid- 
 day on the 2 1 St October, during a short spell of fine, cold 
 weather, the line of Regina Trench and Stuff Trench, from 
 the west Courcelette-Pys road westward to Schwaben Re- 
 doubt, was attacked with complete success. Assisted by 
 an excellent artillery preparation and barrage, our infantry 
 carried the whole of their objectives very quickly and with 
 remarkably little loss, and our new line was firmly estab- 
 lished in spite of the enemy's shell fire. Over i,ooo prisoners 
 were taken in the course of the day's fighting, a figure only 
 slightly exceeded by our casualties. 
 
 On the 23rd October, and again on the 5th November, 
 while awaiting better weather for further operations on the 
 Ancre, our attacks on the enemy's positions to the east of Les 
 Boeufs and Gueudecourt were renewed, in conjunction with 
 French operations against the Sailly-Saillisel heights and 
 St. Pierre Vaast Wood. Considerable further progress was 
 achieved. Our footing on the crest of the Le Transloy Spur 
 was extended and secured, and the much contested tangle of 
 trenches at our junction with the French left at last passed 
 definitely into our possession. Many smaller gains were 
 made in this neighbourhood by local assaults during these 
 days, in spite of the difficult conditions of the ground. In 
 particular, on the loth November, after a day of improved 
 weather, the portion of Regina Trench lying to the east of 
 the Courcelette-Pys Road was carried on a front of about 
 1,000 yards. 
 
 Throughout these operations the enemy's counter-attacks 
 were very numerous and determined, succeeding indeed in 
 the evening of the 23rd October in regaining a portion of the 
 ground east of Le Sars taken from him by our attack on 
 that day. On all other occasions his attacks were broken 
 
APPENDIX I 211 
 
 by our artillery or infantry, and the losses incurred by him 
 in these attempts, made frequently with considerable effec- 
 tives, were undoubtedly very severe. 
 
 The Fourth Stage 
 
 35. On the 9th November the long continued bad weather 
 took a turn for the better, and thereafter remained dry and 
 cold, with frosty nights and misty mornings, for some days. 
 Final preparations were therefore pushed on for the attack 
 on the Ancre, though, as the ground was still very bad in 
 places, it was necessary to limit the operations to what it 
 would be reasonably possible to consolidate and hold under 
 the existing conditions. 
 
 The enemy's defences in this area were already extremely 
 formidable when they resisted our assault on the ist July, 
 "and the succeeding period of four months had been spent in 
 improving and adding to them in the light of the experience 
 he had gained in the course of our attacks further south. 
 The hamlet of St. Pierre Divion and the villages of Beau- 
 court-sur-Ancre and Beaumont Hamel, like the rest of the 
 villages forming part of the enemy's original front in this 
 district, were evidently intended by him to form a permanent 
 line of fortifications, while he developed his offensive else- 
 where. Realising that his position in them had become a 
 dangerous one, the enemy had multiplied the number of his 
 guns covering this part of his line, and at the end of October 
 introduced an additional Division on his front between Grand- 
 court and Hebuterne. 
 
 36. At 5 a.m. on the morning of the nth November the 
 special bombardment preliminary to the attack was com- 
 menced. It continued with bursts of great intensity until 
 5.45 a.m. on the morning of the 13th November, when it 
 developed into a very effective barrage covering the assault- 
 ing infantry. 
 
 At that hour our troops advanced on the enemy's position 
 
212 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 through dense fog, and rapidly entered his first line trenches 
 on almost the whole of the front attacked, from east of 
 Schwaben Redoubt to the north of Serre. South of the 
 Ancre, where our assault was directed northwards against 
 the enemy's trenches on the northern slopes of the Thiepval 
 ridge, it met with a success altogether remarkable for rapidity 
 of execution and lightness of cost. By 7.20 a.m. our ob- 
 jectives east of St. Pierre Divion had been captured, and the 
 Germans in and about that hamlet were hemmed in between 
 our troops and the river. Many of the enemy were driven 
 into their dug-outs and surrendered, and at 9.0 a.m. the 
 number of prisoners was actually greater than the attacking 
 force. St. Pierre Divion soon fell, and in this area nearly 
 1,400 prisoners were taken by a single division at the expense 
 of less than 600 casualties. The rest of our forces operating 
 south of the Ancre attained their objectives with equal com- 
 pleteness and success. 
 
 North of the river the struggle was more severe, but very 
 satisfactory results were achieved. Though parties of the 
 enemy held out for some hours during the day in strong 
 points at various places along his first line and in Beaumont 
 Hamel, the main attack pushed on. The troops attacking 
 close to the right bank of the Ancre reached their second 
 objectives to the west and north-west of Beaucourt during 
 the morning, and held on there for the remainder of the 
 day and night, though practically isolated from the rest of 
 our attacking troops. Their tenacity was of the utmost 
 value, and contributed very largely to the success of the 
 operations. 
 
 At nightfall our troops were established on the western 
 outskirts of Beaucourt, in touch with our forces south of the 
 river, and held a line along the station road from the Ancre 
 towards Beaumont Hamel, where we occupied the village. 
 Further north the enemy's first line system for a distance 
 of about half-a-mile beyond Beaumont Hamel was also in 
 our hands. Still further north — opposite Serre — the ground 
 was so heavy that it became necessary to abandon the attack 
 
APPENDIX I 213 
 
 at an early stage ; although, despite all difficulties, our troops 
 had in places reached the enemy's trenches in the course of 
 their assault. 
 
 Next morning, at an early hour, the attack was renewed 
 between Beaucourt and the top of the spur just north of 
 Beaumont Hamel. The whole of Beaucourt was carried, and 
 our line extended to the north-west along the Beaucourt road 
 across the southern end of the Beaumont Hamel spur. The 
 number of our prisoners steadily rose, and during this and 
 the succeeding days our front was carried forward east- 
 wards and northwards up the slopes of the Beaumont 
 Hamel spur. 
 
 The results of this attack were very satisfactory, especially 
 as before its completion bad weather had set in again. We 
 had secured the command of the Ancre valley on both banks 
 of the river at the point where it entered the enemy's lines, 
 and, without great cost to ourselves, losses had been inflicted 
 on the enemy which he himself admitted to be considerable. 
 Our final total of prisoners taken in these operations, and 
 their development during the subsequent days, exceeded 
 7,200, including 149 officers. 
 
 The Rest of the British Front 
 
 37. Throughout the period dealt with in this dispatch 
 the role of the other armies holding our defensive line from 
 the northern limits of the battle front to beyond Ypres was 
 necessarily a secondary one, but their task was neither light 
 nor unimportant. While required to give precedence in all 
 respects to the needs of the Somme battle, they were respon- 
 sible for the security of the line held by them and for keep- 
 ing the enemy on their front constantly on the alert. Their 
 role was a very trying one, entailing heavy work on the troops 
 and constant vigilance on the part of Commanders and Staflfs. 
 It was carried out to my entire satisfaction, and in an un- 
 failing spirit of unselfish and broad-minded devotion to the 
 
214 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 general good, which is deserving of the highest commendation. 
 Some idea of the thoroughness with which their duties 
 were performed can be gathered from the fact that in the 
 period of four and a half months from the ist July some 360 
 raids were carried out, in the course of which the enemy 
 suffered many casualties and some hundreds of prisoners 
 were taken by us. The largest of these operations was 
 undertaken on the 19th July in the neighbourhood of Armen- 
 tieres. Our troops penetrated deeply into the enemy's de- 
 fences, doing much damage to his works and inflicting severe 
 losses upon him. 
 
 The Objects Attained 
 
 38. The three main objects with which we had com- 
 menced our offensive in July had already been achieved at 
 the date when this account closes; in spite of the fact that 
 the heavy autumn rains had prevented full advantage being 
 taken of the favourable situation created by our advance, 
 at a time when he had good grounds for hoping to achieve 
 yet more important successes. 
 
 Verdun had been relieved; the main German forces had 
 been held on the Western front; and the enemy's strength 
 had been very considerably worn down. 
 
 Any one of these three results is in itself sufficient to 
 justify the Somme battle. The attainment of all three of 
 them affords ample compensation for the splendid efforts of 
 our troops and for the sacrifices made by ourselves and our 
 Allies. They have brought us a long step forward towards 
 the final victory of the Allied cause. 
 
 The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had 
 invested that place with a moral and political importance 
 out of all proportion to its military value. Its fall would un- 
 doubtedly have been proclaimed as a great victory for our 
 enemies, and would have shaken the faith of many in our 
 ultimate success. The failure of the enemy to capture it, 
 
APPENDIX I 215 
 
 despite great efforts and very heavy losses, was a severe 
 blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he 
 had openly expressed as to the results of the struggle. 
 
 Information obtained both during the progress of the 
 Somme battle and since the suspension of active operations 
 has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the 
 enemy's main forces tied to the Western front. A move- 
 ment of German troops eastward, which had commenced in 
 June as a result of the Russian successes, continued for a 
 short time only after the opening of the Allied attack. There- 
 after the enemy forces that moved east consisted, with one 
 exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme 
 battle, and these troops were always replaced on the Western 
 front by fresh divisions. In November the strength of the 
 enemy in the Western theatre of war was greater than in 
 July, notwithstanding the abandonment of his offensive at 
 Verdun. It is possible that if Verdun had fallen large forces 
 might still have been employed in an endeavour further to 
 exploit that success. It is, however, far more probable, in 
 view of developments in the Eastern theatre, that a consider- 
 able transfer of troops in that direction would have followed. 
 It is therefore justifiable to conclude that the Somme offensive 
 not only relieved Verdun, but held large forces which would 
 otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the 
 east. 
 
 The third great object of the Allied operations on the 
 Somme was the wearing down of the enemy's powers of 
 resistance. Any statement of the extent to which this has 
 been attained must depend in some degree on estimates. 
 There is, nevertheless, sufficient evidence to place it beyond 
 doubt that the enemy's losses in men and material have 
 been very considerably higher than those of the Allies, 
 while morally the balance of advantage on our side is still 
 greater . 
 
 During the period under review a steady deterioration 
 took place in the moral of large numbers of the enemy's 
 troops Many of them, it is true, fought with the greatest 
 
216 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 determination, even in the latest encounters, but the resist- 
 ance of still larger numbers became latterly decidedly 
 feebler than it had been in the earlier stages of the battle. 
 Aided by the great depth of his defences, and by the frequent 
 reliefs which his resources in men enabled him to effect, 
 discipline and training held the machine together sufficiently 
 to enable the enemy to rally and reorganise his troops after 
 each fresh defeat. As our advance progressed four-fifths 
 of the total number of divisions engaged on the Western 
 front were thrown one after another into the Somme battle, 
 some of them twice, and some three times ; and towards 
 the end of the operations, when the weather unfortunately 
 broke, there can be no doubt that his power of resistance 
 had been very seriously diminished. 
 
 The total number of prisoners taken by us in the Somme 
 battle between the ist July and the i8th November is just 
 over 38,000, including over 800 officers. During the same 
 period we captured 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns and field 
 howitzers, 136 trench mortars, and 514 machine guns. 
 
 So far as these results are due to the action of the British, 
 forces, they have been attained by troops the vast majority 
 of whom had been raised and trained during the war. Many 
 of them, especially amongst the drafts sent to replace wastage, 
 counted their service by months, and gained in the Somme 
 battle their first experience of war. The conditions under 
 which we entered the war had made this unavoidable. We 
 were compelled either to use hastily trained and inexperi- 
 enced officers and men, or else to defer the offensive until 
 we had trained them. In this latter case we should have 
 failed our Allies. That these troops should have accom- 
 plished so much under such conditions, and against an 
 Army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years 
 has been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the 
 history of our nation records no equal. The difficulties and 
 hardships cheerfully overcome, and the endurance, determina- 
 tion, and invincible courage shown in meeting them, can 
 hardly be imagined by those who have not had personal 
 
APPENDIX I 217 
 
 experience of the battle, even though they have themselves 
 seen something of war. 
 
 The British Achievement 
 
 The events which I have described in this Dispatch form 
 but a bare outline of the more important occurrences. To 
 deal in any detail even with these without touching on the 
 smaller fights and the ceaseless work in the trenches con- 
 tinuing day and night for five months, is not possible here. 
 Nor have I deemed it permissible in this Dispatch, much as 
 I desired to do so, to particularise the units, brigades, or divi- 
 sions especially connected with the different events described. 
 It would not be possible to do so without giving useful in- 
 formation to the enemy. Recommendations for individual 
 rewards have been forwarded separately, and in due course 
 full details will be made known. Meanwhile, it must suffice 
 to say that troops from every part of the British Isles, and 
 from every Dominion and quarter of the Empire, whether 
 Regulars, Territorials, or men of the New Armies, have borne 
 a share in the Battle of the Somme. While some have been 
 more fortunate than others in opportunities for distinction^ 
 all have done their duty nobly. 
 
 Among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours 
 of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of the 
 endurance and resolution of our infantry. They have shown 
 themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and 
 of the proud records of former wars. 
 
 Against such defences as we had to assault — far more 
 formidable in many respects than those of the most famous 
 fortresses in history — infantry would have been powerless 
 without thoroughly efficient artillery preparation and support. 
 The work of our artillery was wholly admirable, though the 
 strain on the personnel was enormous. The excellence of 
 the results attained was the more remarkable, in view of 
 the shortness of the training of most of the junior officers. 
 
218 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 and of the N.C.Os. and men. Despite this, they rose to a 
 very high level of technical and tactical skill, and the com- 
 bination between artillery and infantry, on which, above 
 everything, victory depends, was an outstanding feature of 
 the battle. Good even in July, it improved with experience, 
 until in the latter assaults it approached perfection. 
 
 In this combination between infantry and artillery the 
 Royal Flying Corps played a highly important part. The 
 admirable work of this Corps has been a very satisfactory 
 feature of the battle. Under the conditions of modern war 
 the duties of the Air Service are many and varied. They 
 include the regulation and control of artillery fire by indi- 
 cating targets and observing and reporting the results of 
 rounds ; the taking of photographs of enemy trenches, strong 
 points, battery positions, and of the effect of bombardments ; 
 and the observation of the movements of the enemy behind 
 his lines. 
 
 The greatest skill and daring has been shown in the 
 performance of all these duties, as well as in bombing ex- 
 peditions. Our Air Service has also co-operated with our 
 infantry in their assaults, signalling the position of our 
 attacking troops and turning machine guns on to the enemy 
 infantry and even on to his batteries in action. 
 
 Not only has the work of the Royal Flying Corps to be 
 carried out in all weathers and under constant fire from the 
 ground, but fighting in the air has now become a normal 
 procedure, in order to maintain the mastery over the enemy's 
 Air Service. In these fights the greatest skill and determi- 
 nation have been shown, and great success has attended the 
 efforts of the Royal Flying Corps. I desire to point out, 
 however, that the maintenance of mastery in the air, which 
 is essential, entails a constant and liberal supply of the most 
 up-to-date machines, without which even the most skilful 
 pilots cannot succeed. 
 
 The style of warfare in which we have been engaged 
 offered no scope for cavalry action, with the exception of 
 the one instance already mentioned, in which a small body 
 
APPENDIX I 219 
 
 of cavalry gave useful assistance in the advance on High 
 Wood. 
 
 Intimately associated with the artillery and infantry in 
 attack and defence the work of various special services con- 
 tributed much towards the successes gained. 
 
 Trench mortars, both heavy and light, have become an 
 important adjunct to artillery in trench warfare, and valu- 
 able work has been done by the personnel in charge of these 
 weapons. Considerable experience has been gained in their 
 use, and they are likely to be employed even more frequently 
 in the struggle in future. 
 
 Machine guns play a great part — almost a decisive part 
 under some conditions — in modern war, and our Machine 
 Gun Corps has attained to considerable proficiency in their 
 use, handling them with great boldness and skill. The 
 highest value of these weapons is displayed on the defensive 
 rather than in the offensive, and we were attacking. Never- 
 theless, in attack also machine guns can exercise very great 
 influence in the hands of men with a quick eye for oppor- 
 tunity and capable of a bold initiative. The Machine Gun 
 Corps, though comparatively recently formed, has done very 
 valuable work and will increase in importance. 
 
 The part played by the new armoured cars — known as 
 "Tanks" — in some of the later fights has been brought to 
 notice by me already in my daily reports. These cars proved 
 of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in 
 charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour. 
 
 The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame 
 as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways 
 to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise 
 means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. 
 Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great 
 credit is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity 
 and success with which these new arms have been developed 
 and perfected, and for the very great devotion to duty they 
 have displayed in a difficult and dangerous service. The 
 Army owes its thanks to the chemists, physiologists and 
 
220 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 physicists of the highest rank who devoted their energies to 
 enabling us to surpass the enemy in the use of a means of 
 warfare which took the civilised world by surprise. Our 
 own experience of the numerous experiments and trials neces- 
 sary before gas and flame could be used, of the great prepara- 
 tions which had to be made for their manufacture, and of 
 the special training required for the personnel employed, 
 shows that the employment of such methods by the Ger- 
 mans was not the result of a desperate decision, but had 
 been prepared for deliberately. 
 
 Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use 
 similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the 
 evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our 
 own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casu- 
 alties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection 
 adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective. 
 
 Throughout the operations Engineer troops, both from 
 home and overseas, have played an important role, and in 
 every engagement the Field Companies, assisted by Pioneers, 
 have co-operated with the other arms with the greatest 
 gallantry and devotion to duty. 
 
 In addition to the demands made on the services of the 
 Royal Engineers in the firing line, the duties of the Corps 
 during the preparation and development of the offensive 
 embraced the execution of a vast variety of important works, 
 to which attention has already been drawn in this dispatch. 
 Whether in or behind the firing line, or on the lines of com- 
 munication, these skilled troops have continued to show the 
 power of resource and the devotion to duty by which they 
 have ever been characterised. 
 
 The Tunnelling Companies still maintain their superiority 
 over the enemy underground, thus safeguarding their com- 
 rades in the trenches. Their skill, enterprise and courage 
 have been remarkable, and, thanks to their efforts, the enemy 
 has nowhere been able to achieve a success of any impor- 
 tance by mining. 
 
 During the Battle of the Somme the work of the Tunnel- 
 
APPENDIX I 221 
 
 ling Companies contributed in no small degree to the success- 
 ful issue of several operations. 
 
 The Field Survey Companies have worked throughout 
 with ability and devotion, and have not only maintained 
 a constant supply of the various maps required as the battle 
 progressed, but have in various other ways been of great 
 assistance to the artillery. 
 
 The Signal Service, created a short time before the war 
 began on a very small scale, has expanded in proportion with 
 the rest of the Army, and is now a very large organisa- 
 tion. 
 
 It provides the means of inter-communication between 
 all the Armies and all parts of them, and in modern war 
 requirements in this respect are on an immense and elaborate 
 scale. The calls on this service have been very heavy, 
 entailing a most severe strain, often under most trying and 
 dangerous conditions. Those calls have invariably been met 
 with conspicuous success, and no service has shown a more 
 whole-hearted and untiring energy in the fulfilment of its 
 duty. 
 
 The great strain of the five months' battle was met with 
 equal success by the Army Service Corps and the Ordnance 
 Corps, as well as by all the other Administrative Services 
 and Departments, both on the Lines of Communication and 
 in front of them. The maintenance of large armies in a great 
 battle under modern conditions is a colossal task. Though 
 bad weather often added very considerably to the difficulties 
 of transport, the troops never wanted for food, ammunition, 
 or any of the other many and varied requirements for the 
 supply of which these Services and Departments are respon- 
 sible. This fact in itself is the highest testimony that can 
 be given to the energy and efficiency with which the work 
 was conducted. 
 
 In connection with the maintenance and supply of our 
 troops, I desire to express the obligation of the Army to the 
 Navy for the unfailing success with which, in the face of 
 every difficulty, the large numbers of men and the vast quan- 
 
222 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 titles of material required by us have been transported across 
 the seas. 
 
 I also desire to record the obligation of the Army in the 
 Field to the various authorities at home, and to the workers 
 under them — women as well as men — ^by whose efforts and 
 self-sacrifice all our requirements were met. Without the 
 vast quantities of munitions and stores of all sorts provided, 
 and without the drafts of men sent to replace wastage, the 
 efforts of our troops could not have been maintained. 
 
 The losses entailed by the constant fighting threw a 
 specially heavy strain on the Medical Services. This has 
 been met with the greatest zeal and efficiency. The gallantry 
 and devotion with which officers and men of the regimental 
 medical service and Field Ambulances have discharged their 
 duties is shown by the large number of the R.A.M.C. and 
 Medical Corps of the Dominions who have fallen in the Field. 
 The work of the Medical Services behind the front has been 
 no less arduous. The untiring professional zeal and marked 
 ability of the surgical specialists and consulting surgeons, 
 combined with the skill and devotion of the medical and 
 nursing staffs, both at the Casualty Clearing Stations in the 
 Field and the Stationary and General Hospitals at the Base, 
 have been beyond praise. In this respect also the Director 
 General has on many occasions expressed to me the immense 
 help the British Red Cross have been to him in assisting the 
 R.A.M.C. in their work. 
 
 The health of the troops has been most satisfactory, and, 
 during the period to which this dispatch refers, there has 
 been an almost complete absence of wastage due to disease 
 of a preventable nature. 
 
 With such large forces as we now have in the Field, the 
 control exercised by a Commander-in-Chief is necessarily 
 restricted to a general guidance, and great responsibilities 
 devolve on the Army Commanders. 
 
 In the Somme Battle these responsibilities were entrusted 
 to Generals Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Hubert Gough, 
 commanding respectively the Fourth and Fifth Armies, who 
 
APPENDIX I 223 
 
 for five months controlled the operations of very large forces 
 in one of the greatest, if not absolutely the greatest struggle 
 that has ever taken place. 
 
 It is impossible to speak too highly of the great qualities 
 displayed by these commanders throughout the battle. 
 Their thorough knowledge of the profession, and their cool 
 and sound judgment, tact and determination proved fully 
 equal to every call on them. They entirely justified their 
 selection for such responsible commands. 
 
 The preparations for the battle, with the exception of 
 those at Gommecourt, were carried out under Sir Henry 
 Rawlinson's orders. It was not until after the assault of 
 the 1st July that Sir Hubert Gough was placed in charge 
 of a portion of the front of attack, in order to enable Sir 
 Henry Rawlinson to devote his whole attention to the area 
 in which I then decided to concentrate the main effort. 
 
 The Army Commanders have brought to my notice the 
 excellent work done by their Staff Officers and Technical 
 Advisers, as well as by the various commanders and staffs 
 serving under them, and I have already submitted the names 
 of the various officers and others recommended by them. 
 
 I desire also to record my obligation to my own Staff at 
 General Headquarters and on the Lines of Communication, 
 and to the various Technical Advisers attached thereto for 
 their loyal and untiring assistance. 
 
 Throughout the operations the whole Army has worked 
 with a remarkable absence of friction and with a self-sacrifice 
 and whole-hearted devotion to the common cause which is 
 beyond praise. This has ensured and will continue to ensure 
 the utmost concentration of effort. It is indeed a privilege 
 to work with such officers and with such men. 
 
 I cannot close this dispatch without alluding to the 
 happy relations which continue to exist between the Allied 
 Armies and between our troops and the civil population in 
 France and Belgium. The unfailing co-operation of our 
 Allies, their splendid fighting qualities, and the kindness 
 and goodwill universally displayed towards us have won the 
 
224 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 gratitude, as well as the respect and admiration, of all ranks 
 of the British Armies. 
 
 The Future Prospects 
 
 In conclusion, I desire to add a few words as to future 
 prospects. 
 
 The enemy's power has not yet been broken, nor is it yet 
 possible to form an estimate of the time the war may last 
 before the objects for which the Allies are fighting have been 
 attained. But the Somme battle has placed beyond doubt the 
 ability of the Allies to gain those objects. The German Army 
 is the mainstay of the Central Powers, and a full half of that 
 Army, despite all the advantages of the defensive, supported 
 by the strongest fortifications, suffered defeat on the Somme 
 this year. Neither victors nor the vanquished will forget 
 this ; and, though bad weather has given the enemy a respite, 
 there will undoubtedly be many thousands in his ranks who 
 ■will begin the new campaign with little confidence in their 
 ability to resist our assaults or to overcome our defence. 
 
 Our new Armies entered the battle with the determina- 
 tion to win and with confidence in their power to do so. They 
 have proved to themselves, to the enemy, and to the world 
 that this confidence was justified, and in the fierce struggle 
 they have been through they have learned many valuable 
 lessons which will help them in the future. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Your Lordship's obedient Servant, 
 
 D. HAIG, 
 General, Commanding-in-Chief, 
 
 British Armies in France. 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 EXPERIENCES OF THE IV. GERMAN CORPS IN 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME DURING 
 
 JULY, 1916 
 
 GENERAL SIXT VON ARMIN'S REPORT 
 
 I. English Tactics 
 
 I. Infantry 
 
 The English infantry has undoubtedly learnt much since 
 the autumn offensive. It shows great dash in the attack, 
 a factor to which immense confidence in its overwhelm- 
 ing artillery probably greatly contributes. The Englishman 
 also has his physique and training in his favour. Com- 
 manders, however, in difficult situations, showed that they 
 were not yet equal to their tasks. The men lost their heads 
 and surrendered if they thought they were cut off. It was 
 most striking how the enemy assembled and brought up large 
 bodies of troops in close order into our zone of fire. The 
 losses caused by our artillery fire were consequently large. 
 One must, however, acknowledge the skill with which the 
 English rapidly consolidate captured positions. 
 
 The English infantry showed great tenacity in defence. 
 This was especially noticeable in the case of small parties, 
 which, when once established with machine guns in the corner 
 of a wood or a group of houses, were very difficult to drive 
 out. 
 
 Generally speaking, however, our infantry returned from 
 
 225 
 
226 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the fight filled with the conviction that it was superior to 
 the English infantry. 
 
 2. Artillery 
 
 Particularly noticeable was the high percentage of medium 
 and heavy guns with the artillery, which apart from this was 
 numerically far superior to ours. The ammunition has ap- 
 parently improved considerably. 
 
 All our tactically important positions were methodically 
 bombarded by the English artillery, as well as all known 
 infantry and battery positions. Extremely heavy fire was 
 continuously directed on the villages situated immediately 
 behind the firing line, as well as on all natural cover afforded 
 by the ground. Registration and fire control were assisted 
 by well organised aerial observation. At night the villages 
 also were frequently bombed by aeroplanes. 
 
 3. Cavalry 
 
 The frontal attacks over open ground against a portion 
 of our unshaken infantry, carried out by several English 
 cavalry regiments, which had to retire with heavy losses, 
 give some indication of the tactical knowledge of the Higher 
 Command. 
 
 II. Organisation 
 
 4. 'Allotment of Special Formations for the Battle 
 
 The reports on the experience in the Battle of the Somme, 
 submitted to Corps H.Q., unanimously agree as to the neces- 
 sity for an increased allotment of weapons, means of com- 
 munication and transport of all kinds, such as, Flammen- 
 werfer, anti-aircraft sections, anti-aircraft machine guns, 
 captive balloons, reconnaissance and battle planes, double 
 telephone sections, motor-lorries, horse-drawn vehicles, 
 motor-cycles, bicycles, light-signalling detachments, wireless 
 stations, etc. The heavy fighting has undoubtedly proved 
 the great value and the necessity for the allotment of all 
 
APPENDIX II 22T 
 
 these means of warfare. On the other hand, it is not con- 
 sidered possible to allot all these permanently to, and as 
 part of the war establishment of, Divisions and Corps, on as 
 large a scale as is required. 
 
 It is therefore necessary to hold ready in reserve for large 
 operations sufficient numbers of additional units of the above 
 mentioned description, under Army or General Headquarters, 
 just as is done in the case of heavy artillery, battle-plane 
 squadrons and pioneer formations, and to place them at the 
 disposal of new Corps brought up for the battle. 
 
 In this memorandum a permanent increase of personnel 
 and materiel has only been asked for on the scale considered 
 necessary for the normal conditions of trench warfare. 
 
 5. Increasing the Staffs. 
 
 The composition of the staffs of the Higher Commands, 
 which have been reduced during the war, proved inadequate 
 in actual fighting. It is necessary to detail to staffs, as soon 
 as the nature of the tasks is known, a sufficient number of 
 orderly officers, and intelligence and liaison officers. The 
 orderly officers are at the disposal of the commander con- 
 cerned, chiefly for the collection of intelligence in the front 
 line. 
 
 6. Corps Headquarters 
 
 The staffs of the XIV. Reserve Corps and the IV. Corps 
 were quartered for several days in the same building. 
 
 They had to share the available telephone communica- 
 tions during that time. This caused difficulties, which were 
 particularly felt during critical periods in the fighting, when 
 all branches of both staffs were working at extremely high 
 pressure at the same time. 
 
 7. Drafts in Reserve for the Infantry Companies 
 
 In the 5th Division, a fourth platoon was formed in the 
 infantry companies. At first, these reinforcements for re- 
 
228 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 placing casualties were kept back with the ist Hne transport 
 (field kitchens). They were sent forward only when the 
 losses of the three other platoons made reinforcements neces- 
 sary. When they went forward, the fourth platoon took with 
 it all that had been found necessary in the particular fighting 
 (hand grenades, entrenching tools, rations, etc.). This ar- 
 rangement proved very successful. 
 
 8. Infantry Pioneer Companies 
 
 The infantry pioneer companies of each infantry regiment 
 of the Corps proved of great value. Full use, however, was 
 not made of their special training, as the fighting provided 
 them with more urgent work. These companies, which con- 
 sisted of men of experience and accustomed to work together, 
 proved most valuable in the many difficult and unexpected 
 problems which continually faced the regiments : — for in- 
 stance, in the provision of the front line trenches with the 
 materiel necessary for carrying on the fight. 
 
 9. Increase in Machine Guns 
 
 A wish is generally expressed for an increase in the number 
 of machine guns. Their value in defence has again been 
 shown, particularly in those cases where gaps in our position, 
 caused by a long continued, concentrated, heavy artillery 
 fire, could not be filled. 
 
 Machine gun reserves, with the necessary men, ought 
 undoubtedly to be provided for every Regiment, Brigade 
 and Division. On the whole, it is considered to be very 
 desirable to have at least 30 machine guns for every infantry 
 regiment. 
 
 III. Training 
 
 10. Training 
 
 The instructions based on our previous experience in 
 defence and attack all took for granted a carefully constructed 
 
APPENDIX II 229 
 
 trench system. The troops on the Somme found practically 
 no trenches at all. 
 
 The front line, and the ground for a considerable distance 
 behind the fighting front, was kept under fire by the enemy's 
 artillery; this fire was almost continuous and of a volume 
 never before experienced. Several lessons for the training 
 of the troops were learnt as the result of this bombardment; 
 the most important ones, on which all the troops are agreed, 
 are the following : — 
 
 Every individual must be trained to the highest 
 possible degree of self-reliance, so that he may know 
 how to act during the critical periods of his own or 
 the enemy's attacks, when he must generally be left 
 to his own resources, and is beyond the control of his 
 superiors. 
 
 Crossing ground which is being heavily shelled. 
 Training of the infantry in establishing relays of 
 runners. 
 
 Increase in the personnel trained in the use of our 
 own and captured machine guns (officers and men). 
 
 Training in the use of all kinds of German hand 
 grenades. 
 
 Training as many men as possible in the use of 
 the enemy's hand grenades. 
 
 Attacks by sectors, according to time table, fol- 
 lowing close up to our barrage. Formations organised 
 in as great depth as possible to be able to cope with 
 surprises. The absolute necessity of this has again 
 been proved in attacking in wooded country with a 
 restricted range of vision. 
 
 Rapid execution of counter-attacks over open 
 ground under different conditions. Bombers in front, 
 skirmishers about lo metres behind them, a number 
 of small bodies in support slightly further in rear. 
 In wooded country these move in file, otherwise in 
 extended order. 
 
 Training in the rapid preparation of shell holes 
 
230 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 for defence, and in digging trenches by small parties 
 in captured ground. Marching in file to form up on 
 the tracing tape. 
 
 The employment of improvised materials in con- 
 structing defences if prepared materials are not 
 available. 
 
 IV. Lessons from the Fighting 
 
 A. CONSTRUCTION OF POSITIONS AND THE DEFENCE 
 
 II. Infantry Positions 
 
 Narrow trenches with steep sides again proved very 
 disadvantageous and caused considerably more casualties 
 (men being buried) than shallower trenches with a wide 
 sole. This result is due to the fact that the splinter effect 
 of the majority of English shells is not as good as their 
 destructive effect. One regiment is of opinion that the gar- 
 rison is better protected if the men lie down or crouch at 
 the bottom of the trench without any further cover, than it 
 is if the so-called "rabbit-holes" are used. 
 
 A cover trench roughly parallel to the front fire trench 
 is not sound. Such trenches are destroyed by the enemy's 
 fire at the same time, and in exactly the same way, as the 
 actual fire trenches. To obviate this, trenches sited more 
 in accordance with the ground, and consequently with certain 
 irregularity of trace, are recommended instead of the formal 
 type of cover trench hitherto in vogue. 
 
 The Lochmann wire entanglement ("carpet" entangle- 
 ment) has not proved satisfactory, as its transport is too 
 difficult. A better method is that of screw posts and barbed 
 wire, which is cut up into 20-30 metre lengths under cover, 
 and then fastened to the posts. 
 
 Curved sheet iron frames are considered a suitable substi- 
 
APPENDIX II 231 
 
 tute for timber frames, as their elasticity frequently enables 
 them to keep out heavy shells. 
 
 12. Artillery Positions 
 
 The English custom of shelling villages heavily, led to 
 the adoption of the principle that batteries should never 
 be sited in the villages themselves, but at least loo metres 
 away. In this manner the casualties of the artillery were 
 considerably diminished. 
 
 The employment of steep slopes for battery positions 
 must also be discarded for similar reasons. When not 
 possible to site batteries alongside existing fire trenches, etc., 
 which are not in use, it has been found best, having regard 
 to English methods of fighting, to select sites for batteries in 
 open country which is merely concealed from direct observa- 
 tion. The main essential is, of course, that such positions 
 in the open should be immediately concealed from aeroplane 
 observation. Wire netting, tent squares, etc., covered with 
 material found on the surface of the ground round the posi- 
 tion, have proved useful. As material for the construction of 
 dug-outs arrived, a greater degree of security was attained. 
 
 13. Battle Headquarters 
 
 Battle Headquarters, also, when the artillery fire is so 
 heavy, should not be sited in villages, on steep slopes, or at 
 other points which stand out conspicuously on the ground 
 or on the map. In cases where the existing telephone system 
 necessitated the utilisation of such unsuitable points as Battle 
 Headquarters, it resulted in frequent interruptions in per- 
 sonal and telephone traffic by artillery fire, and overcrowding 
 in the few available cellars in the villages. 
 
 Staffs when going into their Battle Headquarters must 
 see that tiiere are as many clear signboards as possible to 
 indicate the way to them. Owing to lengthy searches for 
 Battle Headquarters, many casualties have occurred which 
 might have been avoided. 
 
232 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 14. Relief of Infantry and Pioneers 
 
 When troops are relieved in the trenches, it is of the 
 utmost importance that the outgoing troops are careful in 
 handing over the position. Whenever the tactical conditions 
 permit, this should take place on the spot, the various com- 
 manders and subordinate commanders meeting together 
 for the purpose. At any rate, it is absolutely essential that 
 the incoming troops should be thoroughly informed as to the 
 tactical situation, by means of personal conferences between 
 the outgoing and incoming commanders, with the assistance 
 of maps and sketches which will be taken over by the latter. 
 A perfectly clear picture must be given of the state of the 
 positions, etc., particularly of their weak points, and also 
 of any work which it had been intended to carry out, the 
 degree of importance attached to it being specified. 
 
 In order that a relief may be properly carried out, it is 
 also necessary that the commanders of the incoming troops 
 should acquaint themselves, by daylight, with the lie of the 
 ground ; it may be necessary to send them on ahead in motor 
 cars. The troops, too, must if possible be able to gain a 
 general idea of the position while it is still daylight. Reliefs 
 must therefore, unless there are cogent reasons against it, 
 be begun at dusk and completed during the early hours of 
 the night. 
 
 If it is impossible to give the incoming troops an idea of 
 the ground beforehand, then detachments of the outgoing 
 troops must be left behind in the trenches. It is very im- 
 portant that the junction points with other troops should 
 be absolutely clearly indicated, as these are so easily forgotten 
 when reliefs are carried out under heavy fire. 
 
 Losses on the march up to the trenches can be minimized 
 if the stretches of ground which are under fire are crossed in 
 as small parties as possible. One Infantry Brigade recom- 
 mends that the relief be carried out by platoons, at short 
 intervals of time, and considers that the troops should move 
 up in file. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. The 
 
APPENDIX II 233 
 
 choice of the formation in which the troops are to move will 
 always depend on the nature of the ground. 
 
 When troops which are advancing are to be relieved, as 
 much engineering and constructional material as possible 
 must be taken with the relieving troops. In all cases the 
 men must carry as many large entrenching tools as they can. 
 
 15. Engagement and Relief of Artillery 
 
 The same principles hold good for the relief of batteries 
 as for infantry. If the tactical situation is such that rein- 
 forcing batteries have to be brought up at night, without 
 having had time to reconnoitre by day, then the want of 
 knowledge of the ground must at least be counterbalanced 
 by getting into touch as soon as possible with the artillery 
 already in position, and by making the fullest possible use 
 of the knowledge of the ground which that artillery possesses. 
 If the reinforcements come under the orders of Artillery 
 Commanders who are already in command in the sector, the 
 staffs and officers already engaged must, as soon as it is 
 known that reinforcing batteries are to be brought up, be 
 detailed to reconnoitre battery positions for the commanders 
 who have not yet arrived. The officers who carry out these 
 reconnaissances must then be allotted as guides to the new 
 batteries when these move up into position. 
 
 16. Distribution of the Infantry 
 
 One of the most important lessons drawn from the Battle 
 of the Somme is that, under heavy, methodical artillery fire, 
 the front line should be only thinly held, but by reliable men 
 and a few machine guns, even when there is always a possi- 
 bility of a hostile attack. When this was not done, the 
 casualties were so great before the enemy's attack was 
 launched, that the possibility of the front line repulsing the 
 attack by its own unaided efforts was very doubtful. The 
 danger of the front line being rushed when so lightly held 
 must be overcome by placing supports (infantry and machine 
 
234 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 guns), distributed in groups according to the ground, as 
 close as possible behind the foremost fighting line. Their 
 task is to rush forward to reinforce the front line at the 
 moment the enemy attacks, without waiting for orders from 
 the rear. In all cases where this procedure was adopted, we 
 succeeded in repulsing and inflicting very heavy losses on 
 the enemy, who imagined that he had merely to drop into a 
 trench filled with dead. 
 
 The essential conditions for success are, therefore, that 
 the various formations should be organised in depth but that 
 their units should be employed side by side. Only in this 
 way is it possible to ensure that a counter-attack in sufficient 
 strength and with unmixed units can be made, if the enemy 
 has succeeded in penetrating the line, an occurrence which 
 cannot always be avoided when the artillery fire is so heavy. 
 
 Even the Company Commander must, in no circumstances, 
 neglect to provide himself with a reserve consisting of a few 
 groups and, if possible, of machine guns as well. The Sub- 
 sector Commanders must also have at all times sufficient 
 troops at their disposal to be able at once to drive the enemy 
 out, by means of a counter-attack, should he succeed in pene- 
 trating into the position. It is self-evident that Regimental 
 and Higher Commanders must have complete units at their 
 disposal as a reserve. The more troops that are held in 
 reserve the better. A considerably greater allotment of 
 machine guns by Army Headquarters when troops are 
 moved to the battle front is absolutely necessary, as this will 
 enable infantry to be held in reserve on a sufficiently large 
 scale. The great advantage offered by the increased possi- 
 bility of exchanging the garrison of the front line with the 
 reserves, is perfectly obvious. 
 
 17. Organisation of the Artillery 
 
 The formation of Corps Artillery was ordered by Army 
 Headquarters with the object of avoiding, at any rate as far 
 as the more permanent heavy artillery was concerned, the 
 
APPENDIX II 235 
 
 frequent changes in command, due to the frequent changes 
 of the Field Artillery Brigades. From the experience now 
 gained, it seems advisable to place a few heavy batteries 
 under the Commanders of the Divisional Artillery, in order 
 to enable them to carry out all the tasks allotted to them 
 as rapidly as possible. 
 
 1 8. Reserve of Personnel and Materiel for the Artillery 
 
 The supply of fresh guns was usually carried out rapidly. 
 Nevertheless, it is very desirable that each Field Artillery 
 Brigade should retain a few guns, with their detachments, 
 to act as a reserve. Possibly it might be sound only to engage 
 two of the three batteries of an Ahteilung at first, and to 
 retain one in reserve to replace casualties. Heavy batteries 
 of four guns should only have three of their guns in posi- 
 tion during such critical fighting, in order to have a reserve 
 available for immediate use. 
 
 19. Artillery Barrage Fire 
 
 It was found very difficult to form a continuous barrage, 
 without gaps, in front of our own lines, owing to the occa- 
 sional uncertainty as to the position of our front line, which 
 was continually changing during the fighting, the frequent 
 changing of batteries, the re-grouping of the artillery which 
 was often necessary, the bad conditions for observation, the 
 permanent interruption of the telephone communications, 
 and the practically continuous heavy fire which was main- 
 tained behind our front line. 
 
 Whenever we were successful in establishing such a 
 barrage in a comparatively short time, it was entirely due to 
 the forward artillery observation officers. The only means 
 of communication which these officers possessed, as a rule, 
 were light-pistols and runners. By full use of these means 
 it was possible to carry out an approximate registration. 
 The method employed was for the battery, at the exact time 
 previously agreed upon, to open fire with a definite number 
 
236 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 of rounds on a point which was easy to observe. The fall of 
 the shell relative to this point served as the basis of the regis- 
 tration for the barrage in front of a specified sector. It was 
 necessary to supplement these observations by means of 
 personal verbal reports. It was found specially useful for 
 artillery observation officers, who relieved each other, to go 
 forward twice a day. This, unfortunately, led to heavy 
 casualties among artillery officers, but saved the infantry 
 many losses. (Regarding the action of the artillery obser- 
 vation officers during an attack, see para. IV. C. 34.) 
 
 In cases where it was not possible to register for the 
 barrage in the ordinary manner, the employment of various 
 natures of shell (time shrapnel, time H.E. shell and percus- 
 sion H.E. shell), fired at various ranges, proved to be a 
 useful expedient for a barrage. The different effects of the 
 various natures of shell at any rate caused the fire to be dis- 
 tributed in depth and breadth over a considerable area. The 
 disadvantage of this method is the large expenditure of am- 
 munition incurred, without which the desired effect cannot 
 be obtained. 
 
 20. Barrage Fire of Infantry and Snipers 
 
 Over ground which cannot be observed, and at night, the 
 unaimed but horizontal barrage fire of infantry and machine 
 guns, during and immediately after critical periods, affords 
 rest and protection to troops who are probably shaken for 
 the moment, and not only scares the enemy but inflicts losses 
 on him. 
 
 The excellent results obtained from selected snipers posted 
 at good view points, in trees, etc., are particularly emphasised 
 by one Regiment. 
 
 21. Action to Be Taken During Continuous Heavy Shelling 
 
 It has been found to be a good plan, during the continuous 
 heavy bombardment of incomplete front line positions, for 
 
APPENDIX II 237 
 
 the garrison to advance 100-200 metres and to lie down in 
 the open without any cover. 
 
 It is advisable for a battery, the position of which has 
 been discovered by the enemy, not to change its position in 
 such circumstances, but to increase its cover as much as 
 possible, as every new battery position is soon discovered 
 when the enemy's aerial activity is so great. Further, fre- 
 quent changes of position, involving new digging-in and the 
 removal of the ammunition during the same night if pos- 
 sible, are beyond the strength of the detachments, which 
 has already been taxed by continuous firing. 
 
 2.2. Employment of "Green Cross'* (Gas) Shell 
 
 The wish expressed in many quarters that the question 
 of firing with "green cross" (gas) shell should be left to 
 the Artillery Commanders of Divisions, with a view to taking 
 better advantage of the tactical situation, could not be ac- 
 ceded to, as the employment of this ammunition depends 
 too much on the nature of the ground and weather condi- 
 tions, which can only be fully appreciated by experts, and 
 these were all, in the case in question, at the Army Group 
 Headquarters. 
 
 It is, however, sound, if sufficient field artillery is available, 
 to allot permanently several batteries for the purpose of firing 
 with "green cross" ammunition so as to avoid taking away 
 batteries for firing with it from the Divisional Artillery 
 Commanders without previous notice, at a time when their 
 services are being relied on for the execution of other tasks. 
 During the periods when it is not possible to fire with "green 
 cross" ammunition (for instance, almost always during the 
 day time), the batteries will be at the disposal of Artillery 
 Commanders as reinforcements. 
 
 According to apparently reliable information, the effect 
 of the "green cross" ammunition was good. 
 
238 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 2^. Bomb-Throwers and Trench Mortars 
 
 The *Triester" bomb-thrower again proved itself to be a 
 very effective weapon in the fighting on the Somme. 
 
 Trench mortars, at least the light pattern, should be 
 brought up into position at the earliest possible moment, 
 even if the trenches are bad or if there are no trenches at all. 
 They must not be held in reserve for fear of possible losses. 
 
 24. Strong Points 
 
 The preparation, for subsequent defence, of villages and 
 other strong points afforded by the form of the ground 
 behind the front line, cannot be begun too soon. Villages 
 should be divided into sectors for purposes of defence, and 
 should be provided with garrisons, however small these may 
 be, and machine guns. Supports and reserves must not be 
 quartered in the villages close to the line, owing to the par- 
 ticularly heavy shelling to which these are exposed. The 
 boundary of a sector should never run through a village. 
 
 25. Retired Infantry Positions and Switch Lines 
 
 The first necessities for retired positions and the extremely 
 important diagonal switch lines, are entanglements, dug-outs 
 and communication trenches. The number of these positions 
 should be increased by continual work, and by making the 
 fullest possible use of all available forces. It is always 
 possible to dispense with digging the fire trench, which can 
 be comparatively quickly constructed. This point must also 
 be kept in mind from the start, when constructing retired 
 positions in quiet sectors. 
 
 In view of the experience gained, the following scheme 
 appears to provide the most practical organisation for the 
 construction of retired positions and communication trenches 
 while fighting is in progress : — 
 
 In the front-line area (the rearward limits of which vary 
 according to the circumstances) the work will be done by 
 
APPENDIX II 239 
 
 the Divisions. A responsible commander and a party of 
 pioneers, who do not change when the Division is relieved, 
 will be allotted to each of these positions, etc., to assist the 
 Divisions. The working parties detailed by the Divisions 
 will be under the command of officers from those Divisions, 
 who are responsible for the quantity of work that is done. 
 Particular conditions may make it necessary to attach work- 
 ing parties to the Divisions to prepare positions, the rapid 
 construction of which is of great importance. These must 
 be detailed from troops not intended to take part in the 
 fighting, otherwise they must be provided from the Divisional 
 reserves. It is an established principle that any detachment 
 of troops which is holding a position in the rear must work 
 at strengthening it. 
 
 The supervision of the Labour formations working at 
 night requires much personnel. It is better to avoid the use 
 of labour formations in the construction of positions which, 
 though only occasionally, are under heavy fire. 
 
 Special officers must be detailed for the construction of 
 positions, etc., required in the area behind the lines. These 
 will be immediately under the orders of the Army Group or 
 of Army Headquarters. In order to furnish the necessary 
 labour, pioneer and labour companies must be permanently 
 allotted to them, as well as reliefs of other available troops 
 and the necessary transport for bringing up materials. 
 
 26. Retired Artillery Positions 
 
 Experience has shown that the important point in the 
 construction of artillery positions behind the lines is to begin 
 with the construction of observation posts, cable trenches, 
 and communication trenches. Battery positions can be con- 
 structed by a battery in one night if necessary, provided 
 that the materials are available. 
 
240 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 B. ATTACK 
 
 2J. Method of Attack and Time Required 
 
 Insufficiently prepared attacks and counter-attacks nearly 
 always fail through being too hurried. 
 
 The greatest care must be taken to differentiate between 
 counter-attacks which are undertaken immediately after the 
 loss of a length of trench, or of any other section of ground, 
 with reserves which are on the spot, and those which are 
 ordered by a Higher Commander and for which the reserves 
 of a higher formation must be brought up. 
 
 In the latter case, the full time necessary for the prep- 
 aration of the attack and the disposition of troops in the 
 front line is frequently not sufficiently considered. In this 
 respect, it is to be noted that the transmission of orders to 
 the front line occupies more time than is often supposed; 
 the telephone lines are destroyed, and messengers can only 
 work their way slowly through the enemy's barrage. Even 
 if the order has reached the front line, it requires some time 
 to circulate it and explain the method of carrying out the 
 attack and its objective, to the troops, distributed, as they 
 are, in groups. Similar difficulties arise in the case of reserves 
 which have been brought up. They advance slowly across 
 country with which they are generally unacquainted, and 
 which lies under heavy fire. The commanders of the reserves 
 have to form an idea of the tactical situation, and for this 
 purpose are obliged to get into communication with com- 
 manders already in the front line. This all requires time and 
 creates friction, both of which are increased at night and in 
 country where the view is restricted (village or wood). 
 
 In the case of counter-attacks which are to be carried out 
 with the aid of strong reserves, a thorough artillery prepara- 
 tion is necessary. This, too, requires time. The experience 
 of the Battle of the Somme has again and fully confirmed 
 the long established principle: — 
 
 A counter-attack must either follow immediately and the 
 
APPENDIX II 241 
 
 decision to counter-attack must come from the front line 
 and the forces for it must be ready to hand before the enemy's 
 attack is entirely finished, or the counter-attack must be 
 methodically and thoroughly prepared by the artillery and 
 carried out with reserves who have been instructed as to the 
 tactical situation and the nature of the ground. 
 
 // counter-attacks which, on account of the situation, ought 
 to be methodically prepared are Jturried, they cost much 
 blood and cause the troops to lose their trust in their leaders 
 if they fail, which nearly always happens in such a case. 
 
 28. Approach March and Deployment 
 
 Before bringing up troops into the zone of the enemy's 
 artillery fire, the commander must obtain a clear idea, by 
 means of clever scouts and by his own observation, how the 
 enemy's fire is distributed over the ground to be crossed. 
 When selecting the route, areas which are hardly or not 
 under fire will be taken into consideration rather than the 
 nature of the ground and the cultivation. Depressions and 
 sunken roads which are invisible to the enemy are, as a rule, 
 under such heavy barrage fire that it is not advisable to make 
 use of them. Villages which lie in the enemy's zone of fire 
 are to be avoided on principle. 
 
 29. Methodical Attack 
 
 An advance to the assault with a simultaneous lifting of 
 our own artillery fire has proved extremely successful in 
 attack. This was also the case when a definite rate of ad- 
 vance for the infantry was settled and our artillery fire was 
 lifted step by step, in accordance with this, on a pre-arranged 
 time table. Only in cases where the infantry, through lack 
 of practice in this new method of attack, pushed right through 
 was the progress of the attack checked. 
 
 30. Assaulting Parties 
 
 The detailing of assaulting parties in an attack has proved 
 very useful. Their chief advantage lay in the freshness of 
 
242 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the specially selected personnel who had not been engaged 
 in previous fighting. The careful training beforehand of 
 the assaulting parties resulted in these troops proving them- 
 selves quite equal to all tasks which fell to their lot in village 
 or wood fighting. They felt that they were a body of elite 
 troops, which indeed they proved themselves to be. 
 
 31. Attacks in Woods 
 
 When attacking in a wood, it is preferable, instead of the 
 usual skirmish lines, following one after the other, to employ 
 small assaulting columns following a single line of assault. 
 
 The empoyment of small Flammenwerfer in wooded 
 country which is full of obstacles, and in which there is no 
 extended view, suffers, in an attack with a distant objective, 
 under the disadvantage of the heavy weight of the apparatus. 
 It is better to use the Flammenwerfer from a well prepared 
 assaulting position and against well defined, close objectives 
 which have been previously reconnoitred. 
 
 The "Priester" bomb-throwers have been successfully 
 used to clear out shell-holes which could not be reached with 
 hand grenades. 
 
 32. Procedure after a Successful Attack 
 
 In order to be able to entrench rapidly and hold captured 
 ground, carrying and working parties {see also para. XL, 65) 
 must follow the assaulting troops under the leadership of 
 energetic officers. 
 
 C. CO-OPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY 
 
 33. Communication between Commanders 
 
 When the Corps was put into battle, the units of the 
 troops already engaged were very much mixed. The ar- 
 rangements for artillery command were not sufficiently clear 
 in all cases. 
 
APPENDIX II 243 
 
 The bringing up of new Divisions had, on account of the 
 tactical situation, to take place as quickly as possible and in 
 the dark. Necessary reliefs and movements of troops were 
 taking place almost daily. 
 
 Owing to all these circumstances and to faulty telephone 
 communications, it was very difficult to establish touch be- 
 tween infantry and artillery. In many places it was a long 
 time before touch was obtained, greatly to the disadvantage 
 of our infantry, which was heavily engaged. The greater 
 the difficulties in establishing this absolutely necessary 
 touch between infantry and artillery, the greater must be 
 the efforts of both sides to secure communication. The best 
 means to this end is for the infantry Regimental Commander 
 and the Artillery Group Commander to be near each other. 
 If this is impossible, their posts must be connected by tele- 
 phone as soon as possible, in order that there may be con- 
 tinuous change of important information. One artillery 
 liaison officer of each of the groups in question (in certain 
 circumstances, several groups) must remain continuously 
 with the Infantry Regimental Commander. 
 
 34. Communications in the Front Line 
 
 The number and position of artillery observation officers 
 {see also para. IV. A. 19) depend on the tactical situation 
 and the ground. They must be connected with the sub- 
 sector (battalion) Commanders in front of whose sector their 
 artillery is working, in order to be able to receive and forward 
 rapidly all requests and messages which come from the front 
 line. In an attack, artillery observation officers must be 
 sufficiently far forward to be able to observe our own front 
 line continuously. It is not usually sound for them to 
 remain in the foremost firing line. In country with a re- 
 stricted view, as was the case in Delville Wood and Longueval 
 village, our own front line could only be seen by the artillery 
 observation officers if they followed immediately behind the 
 foremost line. There still remain, of course, the difficulties 
 
244 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 of sending back important messages as rapidly as possible, 
 especially those with reference to shells which fall short and 
 so endanger our own infantry. These difficulties can be over- 
 come by means of signals with light-pistols and by orderlies 
 (relays), if proper arrangements are previously made, and 
 the most reliable officers and orderlies (cyclists) are detailed 
 for the responsible task of artillery observation and for the 
 delivery of messages during an attack. 
 
 It may, nevertheless, happen that events on the battlefield, 
 especially if the fire is as heavy as that in Delville Wood 
 and Longueval, may prevent important messages from the 
 artillery observers from reaching the fire commander suffi- 
 ciently quickly. One Regiment, therefore, has made the very 
 valuable suggestion that artillery information centres should 
 be pushed forward as an additional safeguard. Battalions 
 and companies should be informed of the position of these 
 centres, so that the result of their observation and their 
 requests can be sent there as well as to the normal centres. 
 
 V. Means of Communication 
 
 35. Telephone Communications 
 
 The existing telephone system proved totally inadequate 
 in consequence of the development which the fighting took. 
 This was aggravated by the division of the sector hitherto 
 held by Stein's Army Group into two separate Army Groups, 
 which required the provision of several new lines. The con- 
 ditions here were, therefore, particularly unfavourable. But 
 in trench warfare difficult conditions must always be reckoned 
 with in this relation. It is therefore considered necessary to 
 allot a double telephone section to each Division to reinforce 
 the Corps Telephone Detachment, and to extend the existing 
 lines by means of the stores in reserve, as soon as the Division 
 arrives in the front line. The shortage of lines which was 
 discovered to exist reacted most disadvantageously on the 
 
APPENDIX II 245 
 
 communication between the infantry and the artillery, and 
 could only be by degrees made good. 
 
 It is advisable as far as possible to avoid erecting lines 
 through villages, as they are subject to a heavy fire there. 
 If lines start from villages, they should be diverted by the 
 shortest route over open fields in the desired direction. 
 
 To enable lines, which have been damaged by shell fire, 
 to be repaired as quickly as possible, it has been found useful 
 in practice to establish permanent telephone parties in dug- 
 outs along the lines; it is the duty of these parties to test 
 the lines frequently and see that they are in working order. 
 
 It is most desirable that the staffs of every field artillery 
 regiment and Abteilung, as well as those of every foot artil- 
 lery regiment and foot artillery battalion, should be per- 
 manently provided with the larger pattern folding telephone 
 box, so as to avoid the large number of separate boxes other- 
 wise necessary at a regimental, or Abteilung, or battalion com- 
 mand post. These take up room and are difficult to super- 
 vise properly. 
 
 The usual practice of changing telephone apparatus when 
 reliefs were carried out, proved to be a source of very marked 
 interruption. It must not take place when the fighting is 
 so severe. The outgoing units should hand over their appa- 
 ratus to the units which are relieving them. These remarks 
 apply particularly to folding telephone boxes, the removal 
 of which caused considerable interruption in the service. 
 
 36. Wireless Communications 
 
 It is desirable that light wireless stations should be allotted 
 to the staffs of infantry regiments and battalions, in order to 
 improve the communications in the front area. They could 
 be formed from the stores in reserve. 
 
 37. Runners 
 
 Runners, and the establishment of relays of runners, have 
 proved very useful everywhere. The casualties were com- 
 
246 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 paratively slight. All important information and orders 
 should always be sent in duplicate. One Infantry Brigade 
 recommends that lOO metres should be the normal distance 
 between the relay stations of runners in the fire zone. 
 
 38. Motor-Cycles and Bicycles 
 
 The Headquarters of Corps, Divisions, and Brigades must 
 each have two motor-cycles from the reserve stores placed 
 at their disposal when they go into the front line. The 
 establishment of motor-cycles proved insufficient for the heavy 
 fighting; this deficiency was painfully evident. The estab- 
 lishment of ordinary bicycles was also not sufficient for the 
 work to be done. 
 
 39. Light-Signalling Lines 
 
 The existing organisation of the light-signalling service 
 does not meet requirements. It is considered urgently neces- 
 sary that a complete light-signal detachment should be formed 
 in each Corps. A total of about 30 signal lamps of medium 
 range is required to enable a signal line to be established for 
 every infantry regiment and every artillery group. Besides 
 these, four light-signal sections, with apparatus of a greater 
 range, are required to establish long distance light-signal 
 communications in the Divisional sectors. The temporary 
 allotment of light-signalling apparatus from reserve stores 
 cannot be considered satisfactory, as the full utilisation of 
 this method of communication depends mostly on the signal 
 stations working well together and with their respective 
 command posts. 
 
 Until this urgent demand can be complied with, it is 
 suggested that an auxiliary light-signal detachment should 
 be formed in each Division by making use of the personnel 
 of the search-light sections. It was not possible to employ 
 the search-light sections for their proper work in the fighting 
 on the Somme. Good results were obtained by an attached 
 Division, which had already formed an auxiliary light-signal 
 
APPENDIX II 247 
 
 detachment. Another Division of the Corps succeeded in 
 forming two auxiliary hght-signal stations, and in maintain- 
 ing satisfactory communication over a distance of 12 kilo- 
 metres by flashes on the horizon, although direct vision was 
 not obtainable. The great value of communication by light- 
 signalling was made doubly clear by the continual interrup- 
 tions of the telephone communications. 
 
 40. Light-Pistol Signals 
 
 The communication between the front line and the artillery 
 for the direction of barrage fire was entirely confined to light- 
 pistol signals. It was found that three light-pistols per 
 company are not enough, and that the ammunition supply 
 is too small. It is considered necessary that the establish- 
 ment of light-pistols should be at least doubled by additional 
 pistols from the reserve stocks, and that a large supply of 
 ammunition should be provided before units go into the front 
 line. As a result of the difficulties experienced. Corps Head- 
 quarters were obliged, when the IV. Corps was relieved, to 
 order all light-pistols the which were still available, together 
 with their ammunition, to be handed over to its successors, 
 although the light-pistols were part of the war establishment. 
 
 41. Balloon and Aeroplane Observation 
 
 The means for providing the artillery with aerial observa- 
 tion has proved to be insufficient. It has again been shown, 
 as indeed had already been recognised under less difficult 
 conditions, that it would be a great advantage to add a 
 captive balloon and at least two observation aeroplanes to 
 the war establishment of each Field Artillery Brigade (of two 
 regiments). 
 
 Matters would not be improved by temporarily allotting 
 these important means of obtaining observation, for good 
 results can only be attained by continual co-operation be- 
 tween the observer and the fire commander. 
 
248 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 The numerical superiority of the enemy's airmen and the 
 fact that their machines were better, were made disagreeably 
 apparent to us, particularly in their direction of the enemy's 
 artillery fire and in bomb-dropping. 
 
 The English aeroplane observers also made use of sound 
 signals to communicate with their batteries while in the air. 
 It is very likely possible that a rapid means of communica- 
 tion with the batteries can be established in this way; it 
 might be very serviceable as a complement to wireless mes- 
 sages, which are frequently interrupted. Experiments in 
 this direction are being carried out in the IV. Corps. 
 
 42. AntirAircraft Measures 
 
 The number of our battle-planes was also too small. The 
 enemy's airmen were often able to fire successfully on our 
 troops with machine guns, by descending to a height of a 
 few hundred metres. The German anti-aircraft gun sections 
 could not continue firing at that height without exposing 
 their own troops to serious danger from fragments of shell. 
 This has produced a desire for the anti-aircraft defences to 
 be supplemented by machine guns; these must, if necessary, 
 be supplied from the reserve stocks. A further lesson to 
 be learnt from this surprisingly bold procedure on the part 
 of the English airmen, is that the infantry make too little 
 use of their rifles as a means of driving off aircraft. 
 
 The best defensive weapons among the anti-aircraft guns 
 were the batteries of four lo-cm. guns of the foot artillery. 
 The anti-aircraft guns mounted on motor-cars are considered 
 less useful for the present conditions of fighting than the 
 stationary guns, as they continually require new telephone 
 connections with the anti-aircraft telephone exchange system 
 as they alter their positions. 
 
 It has already been found necessary, even in quiet sectors, 
 to fit up some field gun sections as auxiliary anti-aircraft 
 defences, to supplement the regular anti-aircraft gun sections. 
 
APPENDIX II 249 
 
 This was still more necessary in the Battle of the Somme. 
 It is desirable that at least one battery of each Field Artillery 
 Brigade should be equipped with guns mounted on light field 
 howitzer carriages, so as to have guns at hand which can be 
 quickly employed either for anti-aircraft purposes or for 
 forming a barrage. To make these guns still more useful 
 for defence against aircraft, it is also desirable that each Field 
 Artillery Brigade be equipped with portable anti-aircraft 
 mountings (pivots) for two anti-aircraft gun sections. It 
 would be possible to arrange for the transport of these mount- 
 ings by the light ammunition column, on two-wheeled 
 trailers. 
 
 43. Special Reporting Detachments 
 
 In consequence of the comparative slowness with which 
 reports from the front line trenches reach the Higher Com- 
 manders when sent by the usual channels, it has been found 
 necessary for commanders to make arrangements independ- 
 ent of these channels, and to keep themselves informed by 
 their own agents of the course of the fighting. For this pur- 
 pose the most practical method is the employment of so-called 
 "spy-troops" {Spdh-Triipps) as well as the orderly officers 
 who go forward from time to time. These special reporting 
 detachments consist of one officer and a few picked non- 
 commissioned officers and men, equipped with infantry tele- 
 phone apparatus, to connect up with existing lines. They 
 should choose their own position, so that they can observe 
 any particular sector in which fighting is taking place. 
 
 Their duty is to ensure that reports on the progress of the 
 fighting reach the commander by whom they have been sent 
 out, as quickly as possible, by means of a combined system 
 of telephones and runners. To enable these detachments 
 to work successfully in action, they should be formed in the 
 Divisions during quiet periods, and be thoroughly trained 
 in the duties which they have to perform. 
 
250 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 VI. Arms 
 
 44. Small-Arms 
 
 Numerous complaints have been received of rifle breech- 
 actions being completely clogged with dirt both in attack 
 and defence. It is, therefore, advisable to fit a cover over 
 the breech of the rifles, like that used in the English Army, 
 which can be easily unfastened and then hangs from the 
 rifle. 
 
 The 1908 pattern pistol has proved to be a very useful 
 weapon for hand-to-hand fighting in villages and woods. It 
 is also recommended by several units as a useful weapon for 
 machine gun detachments in close fighting. One Field 
 Artillery Regiment recommends the adoption of the new 
 pattern sword bayonet with saw-edge, which has already 
 been experimentally adopted for mounted troops. Auto- 
 matic rifles (Musket en) are stated to be useful weapons for 
 trench warfare. 
 
 45. Machine Guns 
 
 Machine guns usually have to be brought up over open 
 ground under a heavy barrage. The great weight of the gun 
 has again proved to be a serious disadvantage under these 
 conditions. Even if the gun is dismounted, it is very difficult 
 to drag up the heavy sledge over ground which is under fire. 
 All regiments are unanimous in recommending the introduc- 
 tion of a lighter form of gun-carriage, modelled on that of 
 the improvised gun-carriage used by the machine gun marks- 
 man sections. One regiment has obtained good results with 
 a gun-carriage of its own invention, which is even lighter. 
 
 Complaints have also been received that the ammunition 
 boxes and water-jackets of the machine guns are too heavy. 
 It is proposed that the lighter boxes and jackets used by the 
 machine gun marksman sections should be generally adopted. 
 
 The wheels of the machine gun hand carriages, used by 
 the marksman sections, are not strong enough for paved 
 
APPENDIX II 251 
 
 roads, so that these carriages are not adapted for use on the 
 march, but they have proved suitable for bringing the machine 
 guns into action, and very useful for the transport of ammu- 
 nition, rations and wounded. 
 
 Spare parts for machine guns must be kept in readiness in 
 large quantities behind the front line, so that they can be 
 brought up to the troops quickly if required. 
 
 46. Hand Grenades 
 
 The hand grenade was the most important infantry 
 weapon both in attack and defence. It is universally sug- 
 gested that the supply of hand grenades should be increased. 
 If it is possible to ensure a supply of different kinds of hand 
 grenades, the general opinion is in favour of the use of "Ball" 
 and "Egg" grenades for attack, despite their small effect, in 
 preference to cylindrical grenades with handles, as a larger 
 supply of the two former can be taken into action. 
 
 It would appear advisable to use only one kind of hand 
 grenade. This would simplify training in the use of hand 
 grenades. In fighting such as we have had on the Somme, 
 defence and attack continually alternate. It is not always 
 possible to bring up sufficient quantities of the particular 
 hand grenade which is best suited to the conditions of the 
 fighting at the moment, but as the cylindrical grenade with 
 handle is on the whole the most effective, it is recommended 
 that this pattern should be universally adopted. 
 
 47. Guns 
 
 The guns of the field artillery proved on the whole to be 
 thoroughly satisfactory. Their failure was usually due to 
 the ammunition, or to the fact that the number of rounds 
 fired was greater than the life of a tube permits. Jams 
 were frequently experienced with field guns. These were due 
 to steel cartridge cases (manufacturer's mark A. E.G.) and 
 brass cartridge cases with steel base (Sp:6i). These car- 
 
252 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 tridges often jammed when the breech was opened, and could 
 only be removed by the use of the rammer. The rate of fire 
 was in consequence considerably reduced. Repeated forcible 
 opening also damages the breech. It is true that many 
 jams may have been due to the fact that the necessary care 
 in the storing and handling of ammunition could not be 
 observed under the conditions which existed on the Somme. 
 The buffer proved to be the weakest point of the howitzer. 
 The leather washers burn through and the glycerine runs out. 
 The bad working of the buffer affects the sides of the car- 
 riage, which are rather weak, so that damage easily occurs. 
 
 VII. Ammunition » 
 
 48. Various Kinds of Ammunition 
 
 A supply of good ammunition of even quality and character 
 is an absolute necessity for rapid preparation for action, a 
 high rate of fire and accurate shooting, particularly if a bar- 
 rage is to be placed close in front of our infantry. 
 
 The long shell of the light field howitzer was supplied with 
 five dift'erent fuses, of which two kinds had to be fired with 
 safety precautions. Fresh registration or ranging is required 
 when a change is made from one ammunition to another. At 
 critical moments, or in the dark, it is not possible to ascertain 
 with what kind of fuse every shell is fitted. This ammunition 
 besides is supplied without shell baskets. It is therefore dif- 
 ficult, and takes time, to bring the reserves of long shell up 
 to the guns. 
 
 The old pattern of field gun ammunition has proved 
 efficient. 
 
 The use of the "green cross" ammunition is very hard 
 on the guns, for in consequence of the limited possibilities of 
 using it, a great quantity of ammunition has to be expended 
 in a short time. For example, a light field howitzer battery 
 fired over 3,500 rounds of this ammunition in 24 hours. 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 253 
 
 49. Expenditure of Ammunition 
 
 The average daily expenditure of ammunition per gun 
 during the whole period of the fighting was : — 
 
 Field guns . 
 Light field howitzers 
 Heavy field howitzers 
 lo-cm. guns 
 (21-cm.) mortars . 
 
 145 rounds 
 170 " 
 119 " 
 118 '' 
 
 51 " 
 
 The small expenditure of (field) gun ammunition is to be 
 attributed to the small supplies available. Instructions had to 
 be issued to the troops to be economical with (field) gun shell. 
 
 The highest daily average expenditure per gun reached 
 during the period of fighting in the Army Group for the 
 different kinds of guns was : — 
 
 Field guns . « . • r, . . 322 rounds 
 
 Light field howitzers . . , > 479 " 
 
 Heavy field howitzers .... 233 " 
 
 lo-cm. guns ...... 321 
 
 (21-cm.) mortars ..... 116 " 
 
 The following quantity of ammunition is considered neces- 
 sary : — 
 
 Battery. 
 
 Field guns 
 
 Light field howitzers 
 
 Heavy field howitzers 
 
 lO-cm. guns 
 
 (21-cm.) mortars (2 mortars) 
 
 In the Battery 
 position. 
 
 2200 rounds. 
 2200 „ 
 1400 „ 
 1600 „ 
 
 300 „ 
 
 In reserve with 
 the Division. 
 
 500 rounds. 
 500 „ 
 300 „ 
 400 „ 
 80 „ 
 
 In reserve with 
 the Corps. 
 
 2200 rounds. 
 2200 „ 
 1400 „ 
 1600 ,, 
 300 „ 
 
 Large quantities of ammunition can only be provided 
 near the battery by extensive distribution in the surrounding 
 
254. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 country. Carrying ammunition over long distances by men 
 must be avoided, as their endurance is fully taxed day and 
 night by firing and entrenching. The more ammunition is 
 collected near the battery position, the more will be exploded 
 by being hit. Another result of storing large quantities of 
 ammunition in the battery position is that, on changing 
 position, a large part of it must be left behind in the old 
 position, the subsequent removal of which, if indeed this is 
 possible, can only be accomplished with the greatest difficulty. 
 
 50. Ammunition Supply 
 
 The supply of artillery ammunition of all kinds, during 
 the first days of the battle, did not equal the great expendi- 
 ture. Reserve supplies were only available in very small 
 quantities. On the 14th July an English attack took place, 
 which necessitated a great expenditure of ammunition. It 
 was impossible to replenish the supply in the battery positions 
 from the ammunition brought up by the L. of C, or from the 
 ammunition depots of the Army Groups, to such an extent 
 as to ensure that the requirements for the next day would 
 be met. The Army Group was compelled to ask for ammu- 
 nition from Stein's Army Group, and this had to be partly 
 brought up by night, under difficult conditions, from the 
 advanced ammunition depots of the two Divisions nearest 
 to the Army Group in the North. 
 
 From the 15th July onwards, the supply of ammunition 
 was better. The amount sent up to the batteries was made 
 up by supplies from the L. of C. in such quantities that, as a 
 general rule, the amount of ammunition laid down in para. 
 49, as being necessary in the battery positions and in reserve 
 with the Divisions, was always available. The Army Group 
 was also able to collect gradually a small reserve of ammuni- 
 tion (exclusively field-gun ammunition), but the supply was 
 never sufficient to make good the expenditure in the event of 
 the railway being blocked for one or two days. The lack of 
 gun ammunition was always felt, and large reserves were 
 
APPENDIX II 255 
 
 never available. It is true that Army Headquarters always 
 succeeded in bringing up the gun ammunition trains quickly, 
 and sending the ammunition from these trains to the battery 
 positions, but a block on the railway might have had serious 
 consequences. It is absolutely necessary to place so much 
 ammunition at the disposal of the Army Groups that the 
 above mentioned "iron rations" are available in the battery 
 positions, and in the Divisional and Corps ammunition depots. 
 
 The supply of ammunition was arranged for by Corps 
 Headquarters as far as the Corps and Divisional depots. 
 Motor-lorries, artillery ammunition columns, and infantry 
 ammunition columns, supply parks and supply columns 
 equipped with heavy country carts, were all under one or- 
 ganisation. As soon as the arrival of the trains was an- 
 nounced, the columns were despatched to the detraining 
 stations. The means of transport were sufficient. The Di- 
 visions had at their disposal the battery and light ammu- 
 nition columns, one supply park or supply column, and in 
 some cases a foot artillery ammunition column as well. 
 
 Motor-lorry columns have been very efficient, and have 
 carried out their duties very satisfactorily. The allotment of 
 the country carts to the columns which were used as a 
 temporary measure to bring up artillery ammunition, proved 
 a practical arrangement. 
 
 There should be ammunition depots for a large quantity 
 of ammunition close to the detraining stations. In addition, 
 light railways are required from the detraining stations to 
 the depots. These were not provided, and consequently a 
 large quantity of ammunition was piled up along the railway 
 lines immediately beside the detraining station. 
 
 VIII. Engineer Stores 
 
 51. Pioneer Park Detachment 
 
 A pioneer park detachment must be available in every 
 Corps to take over the management of the parks and the 
 
256 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 supply of engineer stores, as soon as the Corps is moved into 
 a new position. Until an establishment for it is approved, 
 the detachment must consist of troops drawn from the Corps, 
 but it must be formed before the Corps takes up its new posi- 
 tion. The Pioneer Commander must have a suitable officer at 
 his disposal, who will be in charge of the supply of stores ; he 
 should not, if possible, be on the establishment of any pioneer 
 unit. The park detachment must be sent to its sphere of 
 action as soon as the employment of the Corps is decided 
 upon. In the interest of the troops, only specialists should 
 be attached to it. 
 
 The officer in charge of the supply stores must be able to 
 move about, so that he can take personal action quickly 
 should blocks occur. A small motor-car should, therefore, 
 be allotted to him. 
 
 52. Pioneer Parks and the Supply of Engineer Stores 
 
 A special pioneer railhead for pioneer stores must be pro- 
 vided. In order to facilitate supervision and traffic, ammu- 
 nition and food supplies should not be unloaded at this 
 station if possible. Entire trains loaded with pioneer stores 
 must be brought up to ensure an ample supply. This will 
 also obviate the necessity of shunting at the stations in the 
 zone of operations. 
 
 To enable him to send pioneer stores quickly up to the 
 parks, the officer in charge of stores must have sufficient 
 transport at his disposal; motor-lorries from the reserve 
 depots are most suitable. Each Divisional Pioneer Park 
 must have half a motor-lorry column at its disposal. Horse- 
 drawn vehicles are only to be used in cases of emergency, 
 owing to their limited capacity and speed. 
 
 In front of the Divisional Pioneer Parks, small regimental 
 parks containing pioneer stores, rations, and the most im- 
 portant articles of equipment, must be pushed forward for 
 the battle and established in convenient positions, distributed 
 along the front immediately behind the trenches. The fur- 
 
APPENDIX II 257 
 
 ther forward these regimental parks are, the better for the 
 fighting troops who have to fetch their material from them. 
 They should be under the supervision of officers or senior 
 non-commissioned officers. It is the duty of the regimental 
 store officers to see that the parks are constantly kept filled. 
 
 IX. Clothing and Equipment 
 
 53. Steel Helmets 
 
 The steel helmets, issued immediately before and during 
 the battle, gained a great reputation among the troops in a 
 very short time. It is considered desirable to equip artillery 
 observers and anti-aircraft posts with steel helmets. 
 
 54. Jackets and Footgear 
 
 Owing to the fact that the buttons down the front of 
 officers' jackets are now covered up, it is impossible to attach 
 field glasses and pocket torches to them. For the assaulting 
 parties lace boots and puttees proved satisfactory. 
 
 55. Packs 
 
 Generally speaking, the knapsack has proved superfluous 
 in such critical fighting, both in defence and attack. The 
 fighting kit is sufficient. A sandbag converted into a knap- 
 sack, in addition to the haversack and jacket and trouser 
 pockets, has proved useful for taking a larger amount of 
 supplies into the fighting line. 
 
 56. Water Bottles 
 
 It has been found necessary, during hard fighting, to 
 supply infantry with large tin water bottles (capable of being 
 slung) from the reserve depots, in order to carry a double 
 supply of water, as infantry fighting in the front line suffers 
 more from thirst than from hunger. 
 
258 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 57. Entrenching Tools 
 
 Repeated requests from all arms for an increased supply 
 of entrenching tools must be met by their provision from 
 the reserve depots behind the battle sector. 
 
 58. Hand Stereo-Telescopes 
 
 It is very desirable that the troops be supplied with hand 
 stereo-telescopes, as they are easy to carry, and are there- 
 fore more convenient than stereo-telescopes or semi-stereo- 
 telescopes for observers during heavy fighting. 
 
 59. Maps 
 
 The original supply of maps was insufficient, not only as 
 regards quantity but also as regards detail. The latter was 
 particularly apparent, owing to the fact that during the 
 unfavourable conditions for observing which prevailed, firing 
 had at first to be carried out chiefly by the map. Even if it 
 could not be expected that all the numerous battery positions 
 (which in comparison to the original front in June, are well 
 behind the line) could be reconnoitred and fixed before- 
 hand, it would nevertheless have been of advantage if a 
 large number of points on the ground in question had been 
 fixed and inserted on the maps. The subsequent supply of 
 maps was also inadequate. 
 
 60. Illuminating Material 
 
 Arrangements can be made for the troops to have at their 
 disposal a sufficient supply of illuminating material, by the 
 issue of a certain quantity from the reserve supply of paraffin, 
 lights, and spare batteries for electric pocket lamps. For 
 the artillery, illumination is absolutely essential when firing 
 at night, to enable it to distinguish the reference points, to 
 set fuses, etc. 
 
APPENDIX II 259 
 
 X. Horses and Vehicles 
 
 6i. Horses and Vehicles 
 
 ^ The horses have stood their strenuous exertions compara- 
 tively well. This may be attributed to the fact that oats 
 were available in considerable quantities. 
 
 The supply of horses and vehicles to the troops has reached 
 the utmost limits owing, on the one hand, to the permanent 
 reduction in the establishment of horses and, on the other 
 hand, to the permanent increase in fighting material and 
 articles of equipment. 
 
 For bringing up trench material and sending forward 
 food and ammunition at times when there are heavy demands 
 for transport, it is very desirable that Divisions should be 
 allotted motor-lorries and sections of horse-drawn columns 
 from the reserve supply. 
 
 In the case of machine guns, the absence of spare horses, 
 which had been struck off the establishment, was badly felt. 
 In one machine gun company all the riding horses, including 
 that of the Company Commander, had, owing to the lack of 
 spare horses, to be used as draught horses. 
 
 XI. Food Supply 
 
 62. Rations 
 
 It is necessary that fresh troops going into the line, when 
 the precise state of the battle is uncertain, should be supplied 
 with the 3rd iron ration. All troops were unanimous in their 
 request for increased supplies of bread, rusks, sausage, tinned 
 sausages,^ tinned fat bacon, tinned and smoked meat, and 
 tobacco, in addition. There was also urgent need for soHdi- 
 fied alcohol for the preparation of hot meals. 
 
 In various quarters, the necessity for a plentiful supply 
 of liquid refreshments of all kinds, such as coffee, tea, cocoa, 
 
260 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 mineral waters, etc., is emphasised still more. On the other 
 hand, the supply of salt herrings, which increase the thirst, 
 was found to be, as a general rule, very undesirable. There 
 is no necessity for an issue of alcoholic drink in warm and 
 dry weather. 
 
 Similar requests for improved rations, suited to the pre- 
 vailing conditions, when in position, were made by the ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 63. Canteen Stores 
 
 The fact that individual batteries of a field artillery 
 Ahteilung are often, for tactical reasons, some little distance 
 apart, and the supply wagons are engaged in bringing up 
 rations, has the result that the field artillery is in a less 
 favourable position than the infantry as regards the supply 
 of canteen stores, which are carried on the supply wagons of 
 the Ahteilung staffs. A large number of other units, by 
 regulation, carry no canteen stores with them, and have to 
 depend upon the friendly assistance of other troops. It is 
 therefore necessary, on principle, that infantry units should 
 allow the sale of canteen goods to artillery units, etc. 
 
 64. Ration Supply 
 
 No special difficulties arose. The supply columns proved 
 sufficient. The Corps arranged for rations to be brought up 
 to the Divisional depots. 
 
 65. Carrying up Rations 
 
 The formation of carrying parties {see also para. IV. B. 
 32) was of great use in bringing up rations and also in sup- 
 plying troops with ammunition and stores. Wherever infan- 
 try pioneer companies were not used for this purpose, those 
 carrying parties were formed within companies ; this has the 
 advantage of the feeling of camaraderie which prevails be- 
 tween such carrying parties and their fighting troops. 
 
 During a battle, it is advisable to provide each battery with 
 four "food-carriers" from the reserve supplies. 
 
APPENDIX II 261 
 
 XII. Medical Services 
 
 66. Reliefs 
 
 The medical units of the Corps went into the line with 
 the Divisions. The reliefs necessitated by this proved very 
 useful, and this arrangement is preferable to taking over 
 medical units already in the line and belonging to other Corps, 
 when the latter are relieved. The duties of the medical 
 services during continuous fighting in trench warfare are so 
 strenuous, that the medical personnel urgently requires relief 
 at the same time as the troops. Furthermore, the medical 
 personnel takes greater pleasure in its difficult task and car- 
 ries it out with more devotion if it is assisting the forma- 
 tion to which it belongs. 
 
 The relief of a field ambulance presents, it is true, many 
 difficulties. It is best for the incoming personnel to arrive 
 in the morning and for the outgoing personnel to leave 
 during the afternoon of the same day. Should both parties 
 be spending the night in the same place, the outgoing per- 
 sonnel must, if necessary, bivouac, in order that the quarters 
 may be at the disposal of the personnel on duty. 
 
 6y. Motor-Ambulances 
 
 The attaching of a motor-ambulance column to the Army 
 Group proved itself very useful. In this connection it was 
 found sufficient to place only a small proportion of the cars 
 at the disposal of the casualty clearing stations (Hauptver- 
 handpldtze) , The majority must be kept together so as to 
 have a supply of cars available for use wherever they are 
 most needed for the moment. This motor-ambulance reserve 
 was principally used to transport cases to hospital trains. 
 
 68. Stretcher Bearers 
 
 It was of great advantage that before the Corps was sent 
 into line, 50 stretcher bearers had been trained in each of 
 
262 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 the Divisional Field Recruit Depots, and were still there at 
 the time the Corps went in. The great demand for stretcher 
 bearers, which was universal, was in this way met to a certain 
 
 extent. 
 
 69. Communication between Medical Units 
 
 Telephone communications also assumed great importance 
 in consequence of the wide distribution of the medical ar- 
 rangements. It is desirable that the Regulations should point 
 out the importance of having ample telephone communi- 
 cations between all the various medical units in the line, so 
 that these are not neglected until all the other telephone 
 communications have been provided. 
 
 XIII. Billeting and Traffic behind the Front 
 
 70. Billeting 
 
 Owing to troops in the front line being constantly re- 
 lieved, a frequent change of Town-Majors was necessary. 
 In the case of extensive billeting, difficulties occurred owing 
 to Town-Majors having first to acquaint themselves with the 
 billeting conditions whenever troops moved in, and, further, 
 agricultural products, special buildings and orders in force 
 could not be properly handed over. Permanent Town- 
 Majors must be appointed for villages in the areas in which 
 the columns and trains are working, and in the rear por- 
 tions of the Divisional billeting areas. 
 
 At times when there is no great activity at the front, 
 arrangements must be made for the construction of large 
 wooden sheds in the back areas to accommodate men and 
 horses. 
 
 71. Military Police 
 
 The police service behind the front is of the utmost im- 
 portance. During any protracted fighting, men of sufficient 
 authority and energy should be posted on all roads leading 
 to the rear from the battle zone. Points of concentration 
 
APPENDIX II 263 
 
 for suspects should be arranged by the Divisions as close as 
 possible to the dressing stations and casualty clearing stations. 
 In the villages behind the fighting line, not only should there 
 be a strict control on all exits, but an internal control should 
 also be inaugurated. Detailed regulations should be issued 
 by the Town-Major, who will appoint sergeant-majors and 
 other personnel for carrying out this service. 
 
 'J2. Road Traffic 
 
 Regulation of traffic on all roads is the duty of the Field 
 Mounted Police, assisted by cavalry. Each Division should 
 have at least one through road allotted to it whenever possible. 
 
 XIV. Railways 
 
 73. Railway Buildings 
 
 The fighting front of the Army Group Stein (later Armin) 
 was at first dependent on the railway station at Bapaume 
 for the whole of its supplies. This station was complete and 
 well constructed. During the first days of the operations, 
 the railway buildings came under fire; trains could only 
 run into Bapaume during the night, and the detraining sta- 
 tion could no longer be used. The stations under construc- 
 tion further to the rear were not yet complete. In addition 
 to the detraining stations required in normal times, well 
 constructed detraining stations must be provided so far 
 back that, even if the first or second line has to be aban- 
 doned, the enemy's artillery will not be able to shell them 
 (about 13 kilometres). 
 
 Even in quiet times, all railway construction must be car- 
 ried out from this point of view, taking into consideration 
 the fact that, during operations on a large scale, at least three 
 times the usual number of men must be provided for. The 
 wish expressed by the troops that railways should be pro- 
 vided to facilitate the transport of material to the front line 
 trenches, and that the pioneer depots, sawmills, etc., which 
 
264 THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 
 
 in normal times are dose to the front, should be connected 
 by railways, is easily understood. On no account, however, 
 should comprehensive railway establishments further in rear 
 be neglected; during the battle period these ensure supplies, 
 although during quiet periods their importance is not so 
 apparent. 
 
 All such railway stations must be provided with long 
 sidings for ammunition, pioneer, supply and hospital trains. 
 In addition, each siding will be provided with good roads 
 to and from it, and good dumping places. 
 
 74. Detraining Personnel 
 
 During important operations, the detraining personnel must 
 be permanent. The changes in commanders and men de- 
 tailed from the front for this duty, caused by the continual 
 reliefs of the fighting troops, had a very disturbing effect, 
 and every one of these men is urgently required in the 
 front line. The work at the detraining stations requires 
 a staff with knowledge of local conditions, under the leader- 
 ship of an experienced and energetic official. Insufficient 
 staff is the cause of slow detraining, congestion at the stations, 
 and blocks in the traffic along the whole section of the line. 
 
 One officer provided with a motor-car must be made re- 
 sponsible for the whole of the detraining arrangements. 
 
 (Signed) SIXT v. ARMIN, 
 
 General Officer Commanding, 
 
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