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 LOGIC 
 FOB THE MILLION. 
 
LONDON 
 CLAY, PRINTER, BREAT' STREET HILL. 
 

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LOGIC FOE THE MILLION; 
 
 Ji familiar fepita 
 
 OP 
 
 THE ART OF REASONING, 
 
 WITH AN APPENDIX ON 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 J. W. GILBABT, F.R.S. 
 
 gdl\ <£bxitoit. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS & ROBERTS. 
 1857. 
 
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PREFACE. 
 
 I have called this book, Logic foe the Million. By 
 this title, I mean that here the Art of Seasoning is ex- 
 plained in such a way as to be readily understood even 
 by those men and women who have not had the advantage 
 of a literary education. 
 
 The imperfection of the existing works on Logic, as 
 means of popular instruction, is thus stated by Mr. 
 Blakey : — 
 
 " There seem to be two principal causes which render 
 modern systems of logic both tiresome and comparatively 
 useless; and these are, first, the employment of a vast 
 number of the old scholastic terms and phrases, derived 
 from logicians of former times, which throw over the art 
 such an air of difficulty and perplexity, that the reader, 
 before he has well entered upon the study of his subjeet, 
 is worn out by the mere pressure of uncouth words, and is 
 glad to make his retreat from such an irksome task with 
 all possible expedition. The second cause, and one which 
 is by far the most important, is, that our common books 
 of logic may be said rather to treat of metaphysical systems 
 than to unfold those rules, precepts, and suggestions, which 
 are instrumental in directing the judgment to right con- 
 clusions on the various important subjects with which it 
 is necessary that man should be well acquainted. The 
 generality of the books here alluded to, have been founded 
 a 2 
 

 VI PKEFACE. 
 
 upon the principle, that before we could exercise our 
 reasoning powers with energy and effect, — before we could 
 form right notions, and give method and consistency to 
 our conceptions, — it was absolutely necessary that we 
 should be expert metaphysicians, should be acquainted 
 with all the mental speculations of the day, and intimately 
 and familiarly conversant with the anatomy and physiology 
 of our own minds. But this, I apprehend, is a radical 
 error in our common treatises on logic." 
 
 The first cause refers to scholastic logic, the second to 
 metaphysical logic. 
 
 The advocates of the scholastic system of logic still 
 contend for the use of a technical language. It has been 
 a great hindrance to popular education, that as soon as 
 any branch of knowledge is exalted into a science, it is 
 surrounded by a number of uncouth words, the under- 
 standing of which is more difficult than the understanding 
 of the science. The practice of using hard words to 
 denote common things was ridiculed in "Butler's Hudi- 
 bras," with reference to the rhetoricians, and the ridicule 
 will apply with equal justice to the scholastic logicians 
 
 " For rhetoric, he could not ope' 
 His mouth but out there flew a trope ; 
 And when he happen'd to break off 
 F the middle of his speech, or cough, 
 He 'd hard words ready to show why, 
 And tell what rules he did it by ; 
 Else, when with greatest art he spoke, 
 You 'd think he talk'd like other folk ; 
 For all the rhetorician's rules 
 Teach nothing but to name his tools." 
 
 Metaphysical logic consists in the knowledge of the 
 nature of those powers of the mind which are exercised in 
 
PREFACE. Vli 
 
 the act of reasoning. This subject is not discussed in the 
 following pages. It does not appear to me that this meta- 
 physical knowledge is at all necessary to the art of reason- 
 ing. The analogy between the body and the mind seems 
 to hold good in this case. Dancing is an act of the body. 
 Reasoning is an act of the mind. As it is not necessary 
 to understand the anatomy of the body in order to dance 
 well, so it is not necessary to understand the anatomy of 
 the mind in order to reason well. The study of meta- 
 physical science seems rather to teach the art of doubting 
 than the art of reasoning. By this kind of study Berkeley 
 was led to doubt the existence of matter, and Hume that 
 of mind. " No man," observes Mr. Blakey, " appears more 
 unfit for argumentative discussion, on the common and 
 every-day topics which engage the attention of men of the 
 world, than the profound thinker or the man of mental 
 abstraction. His power of mental analysis is too refined 
 for objects of a formidable and gigantic nature ; and when 
 he comes out into common life to measure his strength 
 with the rustic minds around him, he too often finds, to 
 his great mortification, that he is worsted and driven from 
 the field by the athletic vigour of those who know nothing 
 but what Nature has taught them about the abstract 
 nature of mind or the recondite rules of mental philo- 
 sophy." 
 
 It would be tedious to enumerate all the particulars in 
 which the system of logic described in this work differs 
 from the other systems now before the public. In one 
 respect the difference will be obvious — that is, in the 
 character and number of the illustrations. I have not 
 copied from other logical works trivial and fictitious ex- 
 amples, capable of no practical application. My illustra- 
 tions have been gathered from authors of established 
 reputation, and are generally upon subjects of great public 
 
VU1 PREFACE. 
 
 or private interest. I have taken most of my quotations 
 from the Bible, from books, on political economy, and from 
 newspapers-; others from books referring to the ordinary 
 affairs of life — chiefly to health, education, and conduct. 
 I have not stopped to examine whether I do or do not 
 concur in all the sentiments, they express. I adduce them 
 as illustrations of reasoning ; though I believe they will 
 generally be found. also to be otherwise useful. Some have 
 been selected because they are entertaining; others, be- 
 cause they teach lessons, of still higher importance than 
 even the art of reasoning. 
 
 Few alterations have been made, in this edition except 
 in regard to the illustrations. Some of these have been 
 shortened, some transposed, some ■ omitted, and others in- 
 troduced. Their bearing .as examples of reasoning has 
 occasionally been more clearly exhibited by a change of 
 type, the freer use of italics, and the excision of superfluous 
 sentences, so that the student may not allow the informa- 
 tion, the instruction, or the humour of the quotation to 
 render him unmindful of its logical character. For the 
 sake of those who might wish to study the science of logic 
 as well as the art, I have placed in the notes a few 
 references to the philosophical work recently published by 
 Mr. Samuel Bailey on " The Theory of Seasoning." The 
 object of these changes has been to render the work more 
 efficient as a teacher of the Art of Beasoning in either the 
 closet, the parlour, or the schoolroom, without making it less 
 interesting to the railway traveller or the general reader. 
 
 Let no one commence the perusal of this book under 
 the impression that he is about to engage in an exercise 
 that is dry, toilsome, or difficult. He will not find it so. 
 Here are no intricate theories in which the reader may 
 become bewildered — no knotty questions by which he may 
 be embarrassed — and no hard word) which he cannot 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 understand. These belong to metaphysical and to scholastic 
 logic. The system which this work professes to teach is 
 the logic of common sense. That this system is adapted 
 to the spirit of the age, and that the mode of illustration 
 I have adopted is not unsuitable to the subject, seems 
 abundantly shown by the rapid sale of the first edition, 
 and the strong commendations of many of our organs of 
 criticism. It is very gratifying to observe that the first 
 attempt to place before the -million in a simple form the 
 principles of an art hitherto confined to the educated 
 classes should at once have received the approbation of 
 the public, and of so large a number of literary men. 
 
 The Author. 
 
 London, Oct. 1, 1851. 
 
 The first and second editions of this work were 
 published—" by a Fellow of the Royal Society." The 
 Author has now prefixed his name. 
 
 J. W. G. 
 
 London, May 1," 1852. 
 
 This Edition differs from the last only in having an 
 Appendix on the Philosophy of Language. 
 
 J. W. G. 
 
 London, Jan. 1, 1854. 
 
 No alteration has been made in this Edition, and it 
 is not the Author's intention to make any in the future 
 Editions. 
 
 J. W. G. 
 
 London, July 1, 1857. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 The Introduction to Reasoning. 
 
 ;ect. page 
 
 I. — The name and nature of the Art of Eeasoning 2 
 
 II. — The subjects of the Art of Reasoning . 5 
 
 III — The utility of the Art of Reasoning .... 10 
 
 IV. — The dispositions necessary to the Art of Reasoning , . 17 
 
 V. — The knowledge necessary to the Art of Reasoning . . 24 
 
 PART II. 
 
 The Principles of Reasoning. 
 
 I. — The relation of a Subject and its Attributes . . 
 II. — The relation of a Whole and its Parts .... 
 
 III. — The relation of Genus and Species 
 
 IY. — The relation of Cause and Effect — Physical Causes 
 Y. — The relation of Cause and Effect— Moral Causes . 
 VI. — The relation of Cause and Effect — Conditional Causes 
 VII. — The relation of Cause and Effect— Final Causes . . 
 
 31 
 
 45 
 53 
 
 71 
 
 80 
 
 95 
 
 109 
 
 PART III. 
 
 The Principles op Reasoning— (continued.) 
 
 I. — Reasoning from Examples 127 
 
 tl. — Reasoning from Analogy, Comparison, and Contrast . 143 
 
Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 III. — Seasoning from Parables, Fables, and Proverbs . . . 166 
 
 IV. — Seasoning from Written Documents 184 
 
 V. — Errors in Seasoning 201 
 
 PAET IY. 
 
 The Forms of Seasoning. 
 
 I. — Descriptive Seasoning 224 
 
 II. — Interrogative Seasoning 237 
 
 III. — Conversational Seasoning . . . » 249 
 
 IV. — Seasoning by Single Syllogism 261 
 
 V. — Seasoning by Compound Syllogism 275 
 
 VI. — Series of Seasonings 288 
 
 PART V. 
 
 The Applications op Seasoning. 
 
 I. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to the ordinary 
 
 affairs of life 303 
 
 II. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to History . . 313 
 
 III. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Political 
 
 Economy 325 
 
 IV. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Statistics . 334 
 V. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to Moral 
 
 Philosophy 349 
 
 VI. — The application of the Art of Seasoning to the forma- 
 tion of habits of reasoning 357 
 
 Appendix ......* 368 
 
 Index 881 
 
 List op Works. 
 
LOGIC FOB THE MILLION. 
 
 You are informed, gentle Reader, that this book is written 
 upon the Art of Reasoning, and is divided into Five Parts. 
 The First Part treats of the Introduction to Reasoning ; 
 the Second and Third Parts treat of the Principles of 
 Reasoning; the Fourth Part treats of the Forms of 
 Reasoning ; and the Fifth Part treats of the Applications 
 of Reasoning. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE INTRODUCTION TO REASONING. 
 
 It seems proper that before we attempt to reason, we 
 should understand something of the Name and Nature of 
 the Art of Reasoning — of the Subjects on which we Reason 
 — of the Utility of Reasoning — of the Disposition of Mind 
 we should possess while engaged in Reasoning — and of the 
 Information that we should previously acquire. These 
 several topics will therefore form the subjects of the five 
 following Sections, which, taken together, are called "An 
 Introduction to the Art of Reasoning." 
 
 B 
 
2 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 THE NAME AND NATURE OF THE ART OF REASONING. 
 
 The art of reasoning is called Logic. But you know 
 Shakspeare has said — 
 
 "What we call a Rose, 
 By any other name would smell as sweet." 
 
 In the present case we have no occasion for any name. 
 We might simply say the " Art of Reasoning." In the 
 same way we say the art of nursing, the art of teaching, 
 the art of dancing, or the art of fencing. Had either of 
 these arts a Greek name, a writer would begin his treatise 
 with stating the meaning of this name ; and probably 
 learned men would differ as to the propriety and extent 
 of its application. 
 
 There is, however, a convenience in giving distinct 
 names to distinct branches of knowledge. But have a 
 care of supposing that because an art or a science has 
 got a hard name, there must be something very difficult 
 in the art or science itself. Many of our arts and sciences 
 were taught by the Greeks, and when our learned men 
 first wrote upon them in English, they very naturally 
 called them by their Greek names. Thus, the word logic 
 is derived from a Greek word (logos) that signifies dis- 
 course. But these words have no natural connexion with 
 the arts and sciences to which they are applied. You will 
 have made no unimportant step in a knowledge of the 
 art of reasoning, when you at all times recollect that the 
 names of things are quite distinct from the things them- 
 selves. All the processes of reasoning can be as clearly 
 described in " Household Words " as in those Greek words 
 in which they are usually expounded. To reason clearly 
 and forcibly, it is not necessary that you should under- 
 stand any other language than your own. 
 
 " Argumentation or reasoning," says Dr. Watts, " is that 
 operation of the mind, whereby we infer one thing, that is, 
 
WHAT IS LOGIC 1 3 
 
 one proposition, from two or more propositions premised* 
 Or it is the drawing a conclusion, which before was either 
 unknown, or dark, or doubtful, from some propositions 
 which are more known and evident. So when we have 
 judged that matter cannot think, and that the mind of 
 man doth think, we then infer and conclude, that therefore 
 the mind of man is not matter. 
 
 " So we judge that a just governor will make a difference 
 between the evil and the good ; we judge also that God is 
 a just governor ; and from thence we conclude, that God 
 will make a difference between the evil and the good. 
 
 " This argumentation may be carried on further, thus : 
 God will one time or another make a difference between the 
 good and the evil ; but there is little or no difference made 
 in this world ; therefore there must be another world 
 wherein this difference shall be made. 
 
 " These inferences or conclusions are the effects of rea- 
 soning, and the three propositions taken all together are 
 called a syllogism or argument." 
 
 " Archbishop Whately," observes Mr. Mill, " has denned 
 logic to be the science as well as the art of reasoning, 
 meaning by the former term the analysis of the mental 
 process which takes place whenever we reason ; and by the 
 latter the rules grounded upon that analysis for conducting 
 the process correctly. 
 
 " Logic then comprises the science of reasoning, as well 
 as an art founded on that science. But the word reason- 
 ing, like most other scientific terms in popular use, abounds 
 in ambiguities. In one of its acceptations it means syllo- 
 gising; in another of its senses, to reason is simply to 
 infer any assertion from assertions already admitted. The 
 latter and more extensive signification is that in which 
 I mean to use it.* 
 
 " Our object will be to attempt a correct analysis of the 
 intellectual process called reasoning or inference, and of 
 such other mental operations as are intended to facilitate 
 this, as well as on the foundation of this analysis, and 
 pari passu with it, to bring together or frame a set of 
 
 * " I am myself disposed to think that any fact which can he shown to he 
 implied or contained in another fact may conveniently and properly he said to 
 be inferred from it, and that the process may be with equal convenience and 
 propriety termed reasoning." — Bailey's Theory of Reasoning, p. 41. 
 
 b2 
 
4 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any giver* 
 evidence to prove any given proposition." 
 
 The reader will perceive that Mr. Mill's book is written 
 on the science of reasoning. Our book is written on the art 
 of reasoning. We use the word reasoning in the wider 
 sense used by Mr. Mill, and as including what is denoted 
 by arguing, proving, inferring, confirming, refuting, and 
 all similar words, in the sense in which they are popularly 
 understood. A knowledge of the art of reasoning is essen- 
 tial to the study of the science ; but an acquaintance with 
 the science is not necessary to the practice of the art. 
 Indeed it is only by the use of the art that the science 
 can be studied. We meddle not with the science. We 
 profess not to analyse any of the powers of the mind, nor 
 to lay down any new rules for conducting the process of 
 reasoning. We shall attempt only to describe those rules 
 that are already known, and to apply them correctly. And 
 we shall consider their application chiefly with reference to 
 those things with which people are most familiar. 
 
 If a man who understands grammar hear a person say. 
 " I speaks," he will know, from general practice, that the 
 language is improper ; but he will, moreover, quote the 
 rule, that " a verb should agree with its nominative case in 
 number and person." Now, a collection of such rules form 
 grammar, or the art of speaking correctly. So, if a man 
 hear a person say — " All men are liars, for a party has just 
 told me a lie," he will know from his own common sense 
 that this is not sound reasoning ; but if he has studied 
 logic, he will also cite the rule, " Universals cannot be in- 
 ferred from particulars." Now, a collection- of all these 
 rules form logic, or the art of reasoning correctly ; and the 
 man who has a knowledge of these rules, and is correct and 
 ready in applying them in practice, is called a logician. A 
 man may reason accurately without rules. But if he can 
 give the rules, he will have more confidence in the truth 
 of his reasonings. He will also be better able to perceive 
 the incorrect reasonings of others, and to show the sound- 
 ness or unsoundness of any opinions propounded for his 
 consideration. 
 
 These practical rules of reasoning collected together 
 form the art of reasoning, in the same way as a collection 
 
 
SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 5 
 
 of rules for speaking and writing with propriety form the 
 art of speaking and writing with propriety. The one art 
 is called logic — the other art is called grammar. These two 
 arts are useful to each other. Thoughts are expressed in 
 words. If we think clearly we shall speak clearly, and when 
 we are learning to arrange our words with accuracy and 
 order, we are learning to think with accuracy and order. 
 
 A person who has acquired a knowledge of grammar 
 will afterwards speak and write grammatically, without 
 ever thinking of the rules of grammar. So a person who 
 has acquired a knowledge of logic, will afterwards reason 
 logically, without ever thinking of the rules of logic. The 
 rules will have become so deeply fixed in his mind that 
 he will habitually reason accurately ; and by practice he 
 will come to reason promptly and forcibly. It is the chief 
 business both of grammar and logic to teach us how to 
 avoid errors. Grammar teaches us how to avoid the use of 
 words and sentences that are contrary to its rules. But a 
 beautiful or powerful style of writing must arise from the 
 constitution of our own minds, or the peculiar direction of 
 our studies, and is not to be acquired merely by an observ- 
 ance of grammatical construction. So logic teaches how 
 to know and to discard bad arguments. To be able to 
 reason promptly and forcibly, depends upon our attain- 
 ments in knowledge — the constitution of our mental powers 
 — the extent of our practice — and the degree with which 
 we are familiar with the writings of those learned men 
 who are celebrated as the masters of the art of reasoning. 
 Dr. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, compares logic 
 to the soul, and grammar to the body ; the union of both 
 being essential to an excellent discourse. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE SUBJECTS OP THE ART OF REASONING. 
 
 The human mind can think, can reason, can remember. 
 How it performs these operations we do not know. It 
 does perform them, that 's certain. 'Tis equally certain 
 that these operations are distinct from each other. The 
 
LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 mind may think of things without reasoning about them ; 
 and it may remember things without reasoning about them. 
 We shall in this section take a view of those truths with 
 which we become acquainted by other means than reason- 
 ing. They may be classed into truths of the senses — 
 truths of consciousness — truths of the intellect — and truths 
 of testimony. On these topics we shall quote Dr. Watts. 
 
 1. Truths of the senses : — 
 
 " The evidence of sense is, when we frame a proposition ac- 
 cording to the dictates of any of our senses ; so we judge that 
 grass is green ; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound ; that fire 
 burns wood ; water is soft ; and iron is hard ; for we have seen, 
 heard, or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of sense that 
 we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life ; and 
 almost all the histories of mankind, that are written by eye or 
 ear-witnesses, are built upon this principle. 
 
 "Under the evidence of sense we do not only include that 
 knowledge which is derived to us by our outward senses of 
 hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting, and smelling ; but that also which 
 is derived from the inward sensations and appetites of hunger, 
 thirst, ease, pleasure, pain, -weariness, rest, &c.,and all those things 
 which belong to the body ; as, ' hunger is a painful appetite ; light 
 is pleasant ; rest is sweet to the weary limbs. 5 " 
 
 2. Truths of consciousness : — 
 
 " As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence of 
 sense, so we learn what belongs to the soul by an inward conscious- 
 ness, which may be called a sort of internal feeling, or spiritual 
 sensation of what passes in the mind; as, 'I think before I speak ; 
 I desire large knowledge ; I suspect my own practice ; I studied 
 hard to-day ; my conscience bears witness of my sincerity ; my 
 soul hates vain thoughts ; fear is an uneasy passion ; long medi- 
 tation on one thing is tiresome. 5 
 
 " Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a multitude 
 of propositions, as well as of single ideas, by those two principles 
 which Mr. Locke calls sensation and reflection ; *one of them is a 
 sort of consciousness of what affects the body, and the other is 
 a consciousness of what passes in the mind." 
 
 3. Truths of the intellect : — 
 
 " Intellect relates chiefly to those abstracted propositions which 
 carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about 
 them. Our perception of this self -evidence in any proposition is 
 called intelligence. It is our knowledge of those first principles 
 
SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 7 
 
 of truth which are, as it were, wrought into the very nature 
 and make of our minds : they are so evident in themselves to 
 every man who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is 
 the prerogative and peculiar excellence of these propositions, 
 that they can scarce ever be proved or denied : they cannot easily 
 be proved, because there is nothing supposed to be more clear or 
 certain, from which an argument may be drawn to prove them. 
 They cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is so 
 bright and convincing, that, as soon as the terms are understood, 
 the mind necessarily assents ; such are these, — ' whatsoever acted 
 hath a being ; nothing has no properties ; a part is less than the 
 whole ; nothing can be the cause of itself. 5 
 
 " These propositions are called axioms or maxims, or first prin- 
 ciples ; these are the very foundations of all improved knowledge 
 and reasonings, and on that account these have been thought to 
 be innate propositions, or truths born with us." 
 
 4. Truths of testimony : — 
 
 " When we derive the evidence of any proposition from the 
 testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith; and this is 
 a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are 
 which we believe merely upon the authority or credit of those 
 who have spoken or written of them. It is by this evidence that 
 we know there is such a country as China, and there was such a 
 man as Cicero, who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the 
 transactions in human life are managed : we know our parents 
 and our kindred by this means, we know the persons and laws of 
 our present governors, as well as things that are at a vast distance 
 from us in foreign nations, or in ancient ages. 
 
 '•According as the persons that inform ns of anything are 
 many or few, or more or less wise, and faithful, and credible, so 
 our faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the proposition 
 believed is either certain or doubtful ; but in matters of faith, an 
 exceeding great probability is called a moral certainty" * 
 
 The truths of reasoning are distinct from all these. 
 They are derived from these truths, or such as these, by 
 natural and just methods of argumentation. 
 
 As logic is the art of reasoning it has nothing to do with 
 those truths that are self-evident, or which are known to 
 be true without reasoning. The positive testimony of the 
 
 * Mr. Bailey observes (p. 29), " In philosophical strictness, we can he said to know 
 only those things which we perceive, or have perceived, through our organs of 
 sense, and those states of mind or mental events of which we are or have been con- 
 scious. Other things we believe on evidence more or less cogent ; that is to say, 
 they are matters of inference." If so, the " truths of testimony" -will have to be 
 classed under "truths of inference." But the word know is often used in a 
 more extended sense. 
 
8 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 senses supersedes the necessity for reasoning. If you have 
 the tooth-ache or the gout, you want no logic to prove to 
 you that you suffer pain. And as we know what passes 
 without us, by the organs of hearing and seeing — and 
 what passes in our bodies, by means of our sensations — so 
 we know what passes in our minds, by means of conscious- 
 ness. We know that we think — that we judge — that we 
 remember. We know that we hope and we fear — we love 
 and we hate. All these, and a variety of other operations 
 and feelings, pass within our minds ; and we want no logic 
 to convince us of their existence. There are also many 
 other truths that are self-evident. We know that two and 
 two make four — that a part of anything is less than the 
 whole — that a cause must precede the effect — and that a 
 proposition cannot be both true and not true at the same 
 time, and in the same respect. These are called first 
 truths, or truths of intuition. They are wrought into our 
 very nature, and we cannot disbelieve them, if we would. 
 If we meet a man who denies them, we do not reason with 
 him. We conclude either that he does not understand the 
 meaning of the words, or that he has lost his reasoning 
 faculties. — Here logic has nothing to do. 
 
 As logic is merely the art of reasoning, it follows that 
 logic has nothing to do with those mental operations in 
 which we do not reason. The mere giving or receiving of 
 information is not reasoning. If you say to a friend, " It is 
 a cold day," there is no logic in that. But if you say, " I 
 think we shall have rain in the course of the day," that is 
 a logical conclusion ; and if asked to do so, you should be 
 prepared to give reasons for your opinion. So the acquisi- 
 tion of knowledge by reading or hearing is not reasoning. 
 You may possibly read history or biography, learn several 
 languages, and become acquainted with botany, natural 
 history, and several sciences, without reasoning. All this 
 requires nothing more than a good memory. And hence it 
 is possible to become a very learned man and yet not be a 
 logician. But if you begin to reason about anything you 
 learn, you immediately become a logician. Take, for illus- 
 tration, a case in history. You have read the life of Napo- 
 leon Bonaparte, and you remember all the events recorded, 
 and also the opinions of the historian. You are no logician 
 
SUBJECTS OF REASONING. 9 
 
 here'. But if you stop to ask if any particular event 
 be true — if you inquire whether in certain actions he 
 evinced sagacity or courage — and consider what were the 
 effects of his course on the state of Europe — as soon as you 
 commence to discuss these or any similar questions, you 
 become a logician. 
 
 As logic has nothing to do with receiving or retaining 
 information, so also it has nothing to do with imparting 
 information, or with the giving of advice or commands. 
 There is no logical process in the following words — " Be 
 not wise in your own conceit — Recompense to no man evil 
 for evil — Provide things honest in the sight of all men — ■ 
 If it be possible, as much as in you lieth, live peaceably 
 with all men — Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil 
 with good." — But sometimes the terms, though simply the 
 language of advice or command, will imply a logical pro- 
 cess: thus — "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her 
 ways and be wise," w T hich implies that there is some con- 
 nexion between going to the ant and becoming wise ; and 
 thus it denotes a logical process in the mind of the speaker. 
 So also, if a motive is added, this brings the command or 
 advice within the province of logic : thus — " Honour thy 
 father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the 
 land " — " Honour the Lord with thy substance, and with 
 the first-fruits of all thine increase ; so shall thy barns be 
 filled with plenty, and thy presses shall burst out with 
 new wine." 
 
 Logic has no province of its own. If you reason at all, 
 you must reason about something, and that something 
 may belong to any one of the arts or sciences. There is 
 no object in nature, nor any fact in history, but what may 
 become a subject of argument. Thus, while logic as an 
 art has no domain of its own, it has a province in every 
 other domain — or rather, it is called in whenever necessary 
 to settle disputes and exercise supremacy in all the other 
 departments of human knowledge. A judge on Circuit 
 has no property in the county in which he administers 
 justice, nor any authority over its population. But should 
 any estates in the county become the subject of litigation, 
 or any person become a party in a civil or criminal pro- 
 ceeding, then are they immediately brought under his 
 b3 
 
10 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 jurisdiction. So whenever any difference in opinion arises 
 either in the arts and sciences or in ordinary life, it is the 
 province of logic to adjust the dispute. Thus every object 
 in nature, every feeling of the mind, and every event in 
 history, may become connected with a logical process. We 
 will illustrate this by a few examples. 
 
 Take a flower : — 
 
 " Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, 
 neither do they spin : and yet I say unto you, that even Solomon 
 in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if 
 God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to- 
 morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, 
 ye of little faith ? "—Matt. vi. 28—30. 
 
 Take social relations : — 
 
 "If ye then, heing evil, know how to give good gifts unto 
 your children, how much more shall your Father which is in hea- 
 ven give good things to them that ask him ? " — Matt. vii. 11. 
 
 " He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can 
 he love God whom he hath not seen ? " — 1 John iv. 20. 
 
 Take historical events : — 
 
 " Now these things were our examples, to the intent we should 
 not lust after evil things, as they also lusted. Neither be ye 
 idolaters, as were some of them ; as- it is written, The people sat 
 down to eat and drink, and rose up to play. Neither let us com- 
 mit fornication, as some of them committed, and fell in one day 
 three and twenty thousand. Neither let us tempt Christ, as some 
 of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents. Neither ' 
 murmur ye, as some of them also murmured, and were destroyed 
 of the destroyer. Now all these things happened unto them for 
 ensamples : and they are written for our admonition, upon whom 
 the ends of the world are come. Wherefore let him that thinketh 
 he standeth take heed lest he fall. 5 ' — 1 Cor. x. 6 — 12 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE UTILITY OP THE ART OP REASONING. 
 
 All men and women reason from their infancy. 'Tis as 
 natural for them to do so as it is for dogs to bark or birds 
 to sing. And when they reason about things they under- 
 
UTILITY OF REASONING. 11 
 
 stand, they generally reason well. But sometimes they 
 reason ill ; and 'tis the business of the art of reasoning to 
 show them when they reason ill, and to teach them how to 
 reason well. Such an art cannot be otherwise than useful. 
 It mnst be useful to know how to do well anything we 
 have to do every day and several times a-day. And when 
 we recollect that much of our health, our success in busi- 
 ness, our moral and religious character, our present and 
 future happiness, our reputation in the world, and our 
 usefulness to others, will depend upon the soundness of 
 our reasonings, the art will appear to us to be of very high 
 importance. We shall point out a few respects in which it 
 is useful : — ■ 
 
 I. The Art of Reasoning is useful by enabling us to form 
 our own judgments. 
 
 You talk, of course, about a great many things. You 
 talk about yourself ; about your friends, and relations, and 
 acquaintances ; about your trade and profession ; about 
 the accidents and offences you read of in the newspaper ; 
 about public measures and public men ; about France, 
 and Russia, and America, and other nations with whom we 
 may be or expect to be at war ; about right and wrong ; 
 justice and injustice ; wealth and poverty ; slavery and 
 liberty ; and on Sundays, if not on other days, you will 
 talk about religion, or at least about the pope and the 
 Church, and the parson, and about people who are sup- 
 posed to be religious. Now, upon all these subjects, and 
 a variety of others, you will probably give opinions, and 
 most likely very correct opinions, provided you talk only 
 of what you understand. But to guard against giving 
 incorrect or unguarded opinions, you may as well take a 
 lesson or two upon the right way of reasoning. 
 
 You will say that you can do all this without the aid 
 of logic. So you can. But logic will teach you how to 
 do it better. Logic will teach you that you must form 
 your opinions by reason alone, without any bias from your 
 passions or feelings. Logic will teach you that you must 
 be able to give a reason for all the opinions you entertain. 
 Logic will teach you that you must look at both sides of 
 the question, and examine the arguments that can be 
 advanced against wy opinion as well as those that may be 
 
LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 advanced in its favour ; and that you must weigh these 
 arguments, and see which side preponderates. Logic will 
 teach you that after having done this, you must be ready 
 to admit any new facts or arguments that may appear on 
 either side of the question. In these various ways a know- 
 ledge of the art of reasoning will be useful to yourself. 
 
 By thus examining the reasons for your opinions you 
 will soon learn to distinguish between good reasons and 
 bad ones. You will get into the practice of using good 
 reasons and discarding bad ones. You will thus acquire 
 the habit of reasoning well, and when assailed with bad 
 reasons you will know how to refute them. 
 
 II. The Art of Reasoning is useful in teaching us how 
 to give instruction and advice to others. 
 
 You will have occasion to give instruction or advice to 
 others. You will often have occasion to do this in your 
 family. But, besides, you may be a director in a public 
 company, or on the committee of a charitable institution, 
 or may be consulted by your friends in cases of emergency. 
 In all these positions it is desirable you should be able to 
 give good advice, and to enforce it by reasonable conside- 
 rations. You know that the counsel of Ahithophel was so 
 highly esteemed that it was as if a man had inquired at 
 the oracle of God, (2 Sam. xvi. 23,) and doubtless you 
 have known men who, though not gifted with eloquence 
 or talent, have yet been so remarkable for soundness of 
 judgment that they have been treated with universal re- 
 spect. If you accustom yourself to reason well when 
 forming your own opinions, you will insensibly acquire the 
 habit of reasoning well when stating those opinions to 
 other people. 
 
 III. The Art of Reasoning is useful by enabling us to 
 defend our own principles against the attacks of opponents, 
 and to give them currency in the world. 
 
 You may have to defend your opinions against the 
 attacks of those who hold contrary opinions. You must 
 not hesitate to do this when the cause of truth or of justice 
 requires it. When your own character or that of your 
 friends, or your political or religious principles are assailed, 
 you are bound to make resistance, and it will be useful to 
 be able to do it well. The political and religious differ- 
 
UTILITY OF REASONING. 13 
 
 ences that exist among mankind are by no means to be 
 deplored as unmingled evils. They serve to awaken the 
 nobler feelings of the soul, and to maintain attention to 
 principles that might otherwise be forgotten. They stimu- 
 late the intellectual powers, and impart an energy to all 
 the faculties and to all the operations of the mind. To 
 engage in controversy does not imply that you are to vitu- 
 perate the person, misrepresent the opinions, or calumniate 
 the character of your opponents. You will be less liable 
 to fall into these practices if you understand the art of 
 reasoning. You will then have no occasion for these 
 ignoble weapons. — You will be conscious that the force 
 of truth and the power of logic will have much greater 
 effect in defeating your antagonists. 
 
 " A dispute," says Mr. Robinson, " is an oral controversy, and 
 a controversy is a written dispute. To controvert or dispute 
 a point, either by word or writing, is only to agitate a question 
 in order to obtain clear ideas of it. Can it be admitted that 
 religion does not admit of this ? The whole of the Jewish 
 religion was a controversy against heathenism. The writings of 
 prophets are eminently argumentative. The book of Job is a 
 controversy. St. Paul's Epistles are most of them controversial. 
 The Apostles arrived at truth by means of much disputing among 
 themselves (Acts xv. 7.) And they convinced the Jews and the 
 Gentiles by disputing with both. (Acts xvii. 17; xix. 8.) Every 
 article of religion is denied by some, and cannot be believed 
 without examination and discussion by any. Religion authorizes 
 us to investigate, debate, dispute, and controvert each article, in 
 order to ascertain its evidence." * 
 
 IV. The Art of Reasoning is useful by strengthening the 
 memory and systematizing our knowledge : — 
 
 " Memory may be wonderfully strengthened," says Sidney 
 Smith, " by referring single facts and observations to one simple 
 principle, and by these means we can either remember the prin- 
 ciple by remembering the fact, or the fact by remembering the 
 principle. Thus, if we were to prove that democracy leads to 
 despotism, we may refer to Julius Caesar, Cromwell, and Bona- 
 parte. France has fallen under the dominion of a single man, so 
 did Rome, so have innumerable free countries : the cause in many 
 instances has been precisely the same — that anarchy which has 
 been produced by the licentiousness of the people, and which has 
 
 * Notes to Claude's Essay on the Composition of a Sermon. 
 
14 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 rendered them an easy prey to the first ambitious man who could 
 ingratiate himself with the army. Such examples are very trite, 
 and what may occur to any one. I only mention them to illus- 
 trate the importance of philosophical arrangement to memory, 
 and to show how much more likely facts are to reappear when 
 we want them, if we have clustered numbers of them together 
 as illustrative of a simple principle, than if they are promis- 
 cuously scattered through the understanding without any such 
 connecting tie." * 
 
 V. The Art of Reasoning is useful by tending to prevent 
 those evils that arise from the passions or the imagination 
 obtaining an ascendancy over the judgment. 
 
 " The registers of the Bicetre, for a series of years, show that 
 even when madness affects those who belong to the educated 
 classes, it is chiefly seen in those whose education has been im- 
 perfect or irregular, and very rarely indeed in those whose minds 
 have been fully, equally, and systematically exercised. Priests, 
 artists, painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians, whose professions 
 so often appear marked in that register, are often persons of very 
 limited or exclusive education; their faculties have been unequally 
 exercised ; they have commonly given themselves up too much to 
 imagination, and have neglected comparison, and have not habi- 
 tually exercised the judgment. Even of this class it is to be 
 remembered that it is commonly those of the lowest order of the 
 class, in point of talent, who become thus affected : whilst of 
 naturalists, physicians, chemists, and geometricians, it is said not 
 one instance occurs in these registers. If one go from individual 
 to individual in any lunatic establishment, and investigate the 
 character and origin of the madness of each, we shall find for 
 every one who has become insane from the exercise of his mind, 
 at least a hundred have become insane from the undue indulgence 
 of their feelings. Those men who really most exercise the 
 faculties of their minds, meaning thereby all their faculties, their 
 attention, reflection, or comparison, as well as their imagination 
 and memory, are least liable to insanity. An irregular and in- 
 judicious cultivation of poetry and painting has often concurred 
 to produce madness, but nothing is rarer than to find a mad 
 mathematician : for, as no study demands more attention than 
 mathematics, so it secures the student, during a great part of his 
 time, from the recurrence of feelings which are always the most 
 imperious in those who are the least occupied." f 
 
 VI. The Art of Reasoning is useful, as it will not only 
 give method and system to our own habits, but it will by 
 
 * Elementary sketches of Moral Philosophy. 
 
 t On Man's Power over himself to prevent or control Insanity. (Pickering.) 
 
UTILITY OF SEASONING. 15 
 
 the force of example, enforce corresponding modes of 
 thinking and acting on those around us. And thus their 
 reasonings will often be useful in return to ourselves : — 
 
 It is useful to a husband to have a logical wife. 
 
 " But the angel of the Lord did no more appear to Manoah 
 and to his wife. Then Manoah knew that he was an angel of 
 the Lord. And Manoah said unto his wife, We shall surely die, 
 because we have seen God. But his wife said unto him, If the 
 Lord were pleased to kill us, he would not have received a burnt- 
 offering and a meat-offering at our hands, neither would he have 
 showed us all these things, nor would as at this time have told 
 us sucli things as these." — Judges xiii. 21 — 23. 
 
 It is useful to a wife to have a logical husband. 
 
 " Then said his wife unto him, Dost thou still retain thine 
 integrity ? curse God, and die. But he said unto her, Thou 
 speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What ? shall 
 we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive 
 evil?"— Job 'A. 9,10. 
 
 It is useful to a master to have logical servants. 
 
 " Now Naaman, captain of the host of the king of Syria, was 
 a great man with his master, and honourable, because by him the 
 Lord had given deliverance unto Syria: he was also a mighty 
 
 man in valour, but he was a leper So Naaman came with 
 
 his horses and with his chariot, and stood at the door of the house 
 of Elisha. And Elisha sent a messenger unto him, saying, Go 
 and wash in Jordan seven times, and thy flesh shall come again 
 to thee, and thou shalt be clean. But Naaman was wroth, and 
 went away, and said, Behold, I thought, He will surely come out 
 to me, and stand, and call on the name of the Lord his God, and 
 strike his hand over the place, and recover the leper. Are not 
 Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, better than all the 
 waters of Israel ? may I not wash in them, and be clean ? So 
 he turned and went away in a rage. And his servants came near, 
 and spake unto him, and said, My father, if the prophet had bid 
 thee do some great thing, wouldst thou not have done it ? how 
 much rather then, when he saith to thee, Wash, and be clean ? 
 Then went he down, and dipped himself seven times in Jordan, 
 according to the saying of the man of God : and his flesh came 
 again like unto the flesh of a little child, and he was clean." — 
 2 Kings v. 1, 9—14. 
 
 It is useful to servants to have a logical master. 
 " Ye call me Master and Lord : and ye say well ; for so I am. 
 If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet ; ye 
 
16 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an 
 example, that ye should do as I have done to you." — John xiii. 
 13—15. 
 
 It is useful to public bodies to have logical advisers. 
 
 " Then stood there up one in the council, a Pharisee, named 
 Gamaliel, a doctor of the law, had in reputation among all the 
 people, and commanded to put the apostles forth a little space ; 
 and said unto them, Ye men of Israel, take heed to yourselves what 
 ye intend to do as touching these men. For before these days 
 rose up Theudas, boasting himself to be somebody ; to whom a 
 number of men, about four hundred, joined themselves : who was 
 slain; and all, as many as obeyed him, were scattered, and brought 
 to nought. After this man rose up Judas of Galilee in the days 
 of the taxing, and drew away much people after him: he also 
 perished ; and all, even as many as obeyed him, were dispersed. 
 And now I say unto you, Refrain from these men, and let them 
 alone . for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to 
 nought : but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it ; lest haply 
 ye be found even to fight against God." — Acts v. 34 — 39. 
 
 " And when the town-clerk had appeased the people, he said, 
 Ye men of Ephesus, what man is there that knoweth not how 
 that the city of the Ephesians is a worshipper of the great goddess 
 Diana, and of the image which fell down from Jupiter ? Seeing 
 then that these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to be 
 quiet, and to do nothing rashly. For ye have brought hither 
 these men, which are neither robbers of churches, nor yet blas- 
 phemers of your goddess. Wherefore if Demetrius, and the 
 craftsmen which are with him, have a matter against any man, 
 the law is open, and there are deputies : let them implead one 
 another. But if ye enquire any thing concerning other matters, 
 it shall be determined in a lawful assembly. For we are in 
 danger to be called in question for this day's uproar, there being 
 no cause whereby we may give an account of this concourse. 
 And when he had thus spoken, he dismissed the assembly." — 
 Acts xix. 35 — 41. 
 
 It is useful to religion to have logical advocates. 
 
 " For in him we live, and move, and have our being ; as certain 
 also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. 
 Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to 
 think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, 
 graven by art and man's device." — Acts xvii. 28, 29. 
 
 " Then they reviled him, and said, Thou art his disciple ; but 
 we are Moses' disciples. We know that God spake unto Moses : 
 as for this fellow, we know not from whence he is. The man 
 answered and said unto them, Why herein is a marvellous thing, 
 
LOGICAL DISPOSITIONS. 17 
 
 that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened 
 mine eyes. Now we know that God heareth not sinners : but if 
 any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he 
 heareth. Since the world began was it not heard that any man 
 opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were 
 not of God, he could do nothing," — John ix. 28 — 33. 
 
 " We know that thou art a teacher come from God : for no 
 man can do" these miracles that thou doest, except God be with 
 him." — John iii. 2. 
 
 We shall conclude this section by a quotation from 
 Archbishop Whately. 
 
 " Among the enemies of the Gospel now, are to be found men 
 not only of learning and ingenuity, but of cultivated argumentative 
 powers, and not unversed in the principles of Logic. If the ad- 
 vocates of our religion think proper to disregard this help, they 
 will find, on careful inquiry, that their opponents do not. And let 
 them not trust too carelessly to the strength of their cause : 
 truth will, indeed, prevail, where all other points are nearly equal ; 
 but it may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if hasty assumptions, 
 unsound arguments, and vague and empty declamation, occupy 
 the place of a train of close, accurate, and luminous reasoning. 
 
 "It is not, however, solely or chiefly for polemical purposes 
 that the cultivation of the reasoning faculty is desirable. In per- 
 suading, and investigating, in learning, or teaching, — in all the 
 multitude of cases in which it is our object to arrive at just con- 
 clusions, or to lead others to them, it is most important. A 
 knowledge of logical rules will not indeed supply the want of 
 other knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by any one who 
 really understood this science, to substitute it for any other ; but 
 it is no less true that no other can be substituted for this : that 
 it is valuable in every branch of study ; and that it enables us to 
 use the knowledge we possess to the greatest advantage." — Pre- 
 face to Logic. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 THE DISPOSITIONS NECESSARY TO THE ART OP REASONING. 
 
 To reason well we must avoid prejudices or pre-judgments 
 — judgments formed before we begin to reason. Dr. Watts 
 has a chapter on the doctrine of prejudices or springs of 
 false judgments. He divides them into four classes — pre- 
 
18 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 judices arising from things, from words, from ourselves, 
 and from others. We shall copy from that chapter, and 
 from some other parts of his work, his observations on 
 two dispositions, which those who wish to reason well 
 ought to cultivate. We mean the love of truth, and a 
 spirit of mental independence. 
 
 I. The love of truth :— 
 
 " Search for evidence of truth with diligence and honesty, and 
 be heartily ready to receive evidence, whether for agreement or 
 disagreement of ideas. 
 
 " Search with diligence ; spare no labour in searching for the 
 truth in due proportion to the importance of the proposition. 
 Head the best authors who have writ on that subject ; consult 
 your wise and learned friends in conversation ; and be not un- 
 willing to borrow hints toward your improvement from the 
 meanest person, nor to receive any glimpse of light from the 
 most unlearned. Diligence and humility is the way to thrive in 
 the riches of the understanding, as well as in gold or silver. 
 Search carefully for the evidence of truth, and dig for wisdom as 
 for hid treasure. 
 
 " Search with a steady honesty of soul, and a sincere impartiality 
 to find the truth. Watch against every temptation that might 
 bribe your judgment or warp it aside from truth. Do not in- 
 dulge yourself to wish any unexamined proposition were true or 
 false. A wish often perverts the judgment, and tempts the 
 mind strangely to believe upon slight evidence whatsoever we 
 wish to be true or false. . . . 
 
 " Keep your mind always open to receive truth, and never set 
 limits to your own improvement. Be ready always to hear what 
 may be objected even against your favourite opinions, and those 
 which have had longer possession of your assent. And if there 
 should be any new and uncontrollable evidence brought against 
 these old or beloved sentiments, do not wink your eyes fast 
 against the light, but part with anything for the sake of truth : 
 remember when you overcome an error you gam truth ; the vic- 
 tory is on your side, and the advantage is all your own. ... 
 
 " In your whole course of reasoning keep your mind sincerely 
 intent on the pursuit of truth ; and follow solid argument where- 
 soever it leads you. Let not a party spirit, nor any passion or 
 prejudice whatsoever, stop or avert the current of your reasoning 
 in quest of true knowledge. 
 
 "When you are inquiring therefore into any subject, maintain 
 a due regard to the arguments and objections on both sides of a 
 question. Consider, compare, and balance them well, before you 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 19 
 
 determine for one side. It is a frequent, but a very faulty practice, 
 to hunt after arguments only to make good one side of a question, 
 and entirely to neglect and refuse those which favour the other 
 side. If we have not given a due weight to arguments on both 
 sides, we do but wilfully misguide our judgment, and abuse our 
 reason, by forbidding its search after truth. When we espouse 
 opinions by a secret bias on the mind, through the influences of 
 fear, hope, honour, credit, interest, or any other prejudice, and 
 then seek arguments only to support those opinions, we have 
 neither done our duty to God nor to ourselves ; and it is a matter 
 of mere chance if we stumble upon truth in our way to ease and 
 preferment. The power of reasoning was given us by our Maker 
 for this very end, to pursue truth ; and we abuse one of his 
 richest gifts, if we basely yield it up to be led astray by any of 
 the meaner powers of nature, or the perishing interests of this 
 life. Reason itself, if honestly obeyed, will lead us to receive the 
 divine revelation of the gospel, where it is duly proposed, and 
 this will show us the path of life everlasting." 
 
 II. The spirit of mental independence : — 
 1. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
 influence of authority : — 
 
 " To believe in all things as our predecessors did, is the ready 
 way to keep mankind in an everlasting state of infancy, and to 
 lay an eternal bar against all the improvements of our reason and 
 our happiness. Had the present age of philosophers satisfied 
 themselves with the substantial forms and occult qualities of 
 Aristotle, with the solid spheres, eccentrics, and epicycles of 
 Ptolemy, and the ancient astronomers ; then the great Lord 
 Bacon, Copernicus, and Descartes, with the greater Sir Isaac 
 Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Boyle, had risen in our world in 
 vain. We must have blundered on still in successive genera- 
 tions among absurdities and thick darkness, and a hundred use- 
 ful inventions for the happiness of human life had never been 
 known 
 
 "Besides, let us consider, that the great God, our common 
 maker, has never given one man's understanding a legal and 
 rightful sovereignty to determine truths for others, at least after 
 they are past the state of . childhood or minority. No single 
 person, how learned and wise and great soever, or whatsoever 
 natural, or civil, or ecclesiastical relation he may have to us, can 
 claim this dominion over our faith. St. Paul the Apostle, in his 
 private capacity would not do it ; nor hath an inspired man any 
 such authority, until he makes his divine commission appear. 
 Our Saviour himself tells the Jews, that c if he had not done such 
 wondrous works among them, they had not sinned in disbelieving 
 
20 LOGIC FOB THE MILLION. 
 
 his doctrines, and refusing him for the Messiah.' No bishop or 
 presbyter, no synod or council, no church or assembly of men, 
 since the days of inspiration, hath power derived to them from 
 God, to make creeds or articles of faith for us, and impose them 
 upon our understandings. We must all act according to the best 
 of our own light, and the judgment of our own consciences, using 
 the best advantages which Providence hath given us, with honest 
 and impartial diligence to inquire and search out the truth ; for 
 ' every one of us must give an account of himself to God.' " 
 
 2. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
 influence of the passions : — 
 
 " The various passions or affections of the mind are numerous 
 and endless springs of prejudice. They disguise every object 
 they converse with, and put their own colours upon it, and thus 
 lead the judgment astray from truth. It is love that makes the 
 mother think her own child the fairest, and will sometimes per- 
 suade us that a blemish is beauty. Hope and desire make an hour 
 of delay seem as long as two or three hours ; hope inclines us 
 to think there is nothing too difficult to be attempted; despair 
 tells us that a brave attempt is mere rashness, and that every 
 difficulty is insurmountable. Fear makes us imagine that a bush 
 shaken with the wind has some savage beast in it, and multiplies 
 
 the dangers that attend our path Sorrow and melancholy tempt 
 
 us to think- our circumstances much more dismal than they are, 
 that we may have some excuse for mourning ; and envy represents 
 the condition of our neighbour better than it is, that there may 
 be some pretence for her own vexation and uneasiness. Anger, 
 and icrath, and revenge, and all those hateful passions, excite in 
 us far worse ideas of men than they deserve, and persuade us to 
 believe all that is ill of them. A detail of the evil influence of 
 the affections of the mind upon our judgment, would make a large 
 volume." ^ 
 
 3. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
 influence of constitutional infirmities : — 
 
 " The credulous man is ready to receive everything for truth, 
 that has but a shadow of evidence ; every new book that he reads, 
 and every ingenious man with whom he converses, has power 
 enough to draw him into the sentiments of the speaker or writer. 
 He has so much complaisance in him, or weakness of soul, that 
 he is ready to resign his own opinion to the first objection which 
 he hears, and to receive any sentiments of another that are as- 
 serted with a positive air and much assurance. 
 
 " The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour, for he 
 stands ready to oppose everything that is said: he gives a slight 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 21 
 
 attention to the reasons of other men, from an inward scornful 
 presumption that they have no strength in them. When he reads 
 or hears a discourse different from his own sentiments, he does 
 not give himself leave to consider whether that discourse may 
 be true ; but employs all his powers immediately to confute it. 
 Your great disputers and your men of controversy, are in con- 
 tinual danger of this sort of prejudice : they contend often for 
 victory, and will maintain whatsoever they have asserted, while 
 truth is lost in the noise and tumult of reciprocal contradictions ; 
 and it frequently happens, that a debate about opinions is turned 
 into a mutual reproach of persons 
 
 "Another sort of temper that is very injurious to a right 
 judgment of things, is an inconstant, fickle, changeable spirit, and 
 a very uneven temper of mind. When such persons are in one 
 humour, they pass a judgment of things agreeable to it; when 
 their humour changes, they reverse their first judgment, and em- 
 brace a new opinion. They have no steadiness of soul; they 
 want firmness of mind sufficient to establish themselves in any 
 truth, and are' ready to change it for the next alluring falsehood 
 that is agreeable to their change of humour. This fickleness is 
 sometimes so mingled with their very constitution by nature, or 
 by distemper of body, that a cloudy day and lowering sky shall 
 strongly incline them to form an opinion both of themselves, and 
 of persons and things round about them, quite different from 
 what they believe when the sun shines, and the heavens are 
 serene. 
 
 " This sort of people ought to judge of things and persons in 
 their most sedate, peaceful, and composed hours of life, and 
 reserve these judgments for their conduct at more unhappy 
 seasons." 
 
 4. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
 influence of manner : — 
 
 " There is another tribe of prejudices which is near akin to 
 those of authority, and that is, when we receive a doctrine be- 
 cause of the manner in which it is proposed to us by others. I 
 have already-mentioned the powerful influence that oratory and 
 fine words have to insinuate a false opinion, and sometimes truth 
 is refused, and suffers contempt in the lips of a wise man, for want 
 of the charms of language : but there are several other manners 
 of proposals, whereby mistaken sentiments are powerfully con- 
 veyed into the mind. 
 
 " Some persons are easily persuaded to believe what another 
 dictates with a 'positive air, and a great degree of assurance : they 
 feel the overbearing force of a confident dictator, especially if he 
 be of a superior rank or character to themselves. 
 
22 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " Some are quickly convinced of the truth of any doctrine, 
 when he that proposes it puts on aP the airs of piety, and makes 
 solemn appeals to heaven, and protestations of the truth of it : 
 the pious mind of a weaker Christian is ready to receive any- 
 thing that is pronounced with such an awful solemnity. 
 
 " It is a prejudice near akin to this, when a humble soul is 
 frighted into any particular sentiments of religion, because a man 
 of great name or character pronounces heresy upon the contrary 
 sentiments, casts the disbeliever out of the church, and forbids 
 him the gates of heaven. 
 
 " Others are allured into particular opinions by gentler prac- 
 tices on the understanding ; not only the soft tempers of mankind, 
 but even hardy and rugged souls, are sometimes led away captives 
 to error by the soft air of address, and the sweet and engaging 
 methods of persuasion and kindness 
 
 " There is another manner of proposing our own opinion, or 
 rather opposing the opinions of others, which demands a mention 
 here, and that is when persons make a jest serve instead of an 
 argument; when they refute what they call error by a turn of wit, 
 and answer every objection against their own sentiments, by 
 casting a sneer upon the objector. These scoffers practise with 
 success upon weak and cowardly spirits : such as have not been 
 well established in religion or morality, have been laughed out of 
 the best principles by a confident buffoon ; they have yielded up 
 their opinions to a witty banter, and sold their faith and religion 
 for a jest. 
 
 " There is no way to cure these evils in such a degenerate 
 world as we live in, but by learning to distinguish well between 
 the substance of any doctrine, and the manner of address, either in 
 proposing, attacking, or defending it ; and then by setting a just 
 and severe guard of reason and conscience over all the exercises 
 of our judgment, resolving to yield to nothing but the convincing 
 evidence of truth, religiously obeying the light of reason in mat- 
 ters of pure reason, and the dictates of revelation in things that 
 relate to our faith." 
 
 5. Independence of mind implies exemption from the 
 influence of association: — 
 
 " A court lady, born and bred up amongst pomp and equipage, 
 and the vain notions of birth and quality, constantly joins and 
 mixes all these with the idea of herself, and she imagines these 
 to be essential to her nature, and as it were necessary to her 
 being : thence she is tempted to look upon menial servants, and 
 the lowest rank of mankind, as another species of beings, quite 
 distinct from herself. A plough-boy, that has never travelled be- 
 yond his own village, and has seen nothing but thatched houses, 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF MIND. 23 
 
 and his parish church, is naturally led to imagine that thatch 
 belongs to the very nature of a house, and that that must be 
 a church which is built of stone, and especially if it has a spire 
 upon it. A child whose uncle has been excessive fond, and his 
 schoolmaster very severe, easily believes that fondness always 
 belongs to uncles, and that severity is essential to masters or in- 
 structors. He has seen also soldiers with red coats, or ministers 
 with long black gowns, and therefore he persuades himself that 
 these garbs are essential to the characters, and that he is not a 
 minister who has not a long black gown, nor can he be a soldier 
 who is not dressed in red. It would be well if all such mistakes 
 ended with childhood 
 
 " When we have just reason to admire a man for his virtues, 
 we are sometimes inclined not only to neglect his weaknesses, but 
 even to put a good colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a book that has many excellent truths in it, and 
 divine sentiments, we are tempted to approve not only that whole 
 book, but even all the writings of that author. When a poet, an 
 orator, or a painter, has performed admirably in several illustrious 
 pieces, we sometimes also admire his very errors, we mistake his 
 blunders for beauties, and are so ignorantly fond as to copy after 
 them 
 
 " This sort of prejudice is relieved by learning to distinguish 
 things well, and not to judge in the lump. There is scarce any- 
 thing in the world of nature or art, in the world of morality or 
 religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a mixture of wisdom 
 and folly, vice and virtue, good and evil, both in men and things. 
 We should remember that some persons have great wit and little 
 judgment ; others are judicious, but not witty. Some are good 
 humoured without compliment ; others have all the formalities of 
 complaisance, but no good humour. We ought to know that one 
 man may be vicious and learned, while another has virtue without 
 learning. That many a man thinks admirably well, who has a 
 poor utterance ; while others have a charming manner of speech, 
 but their thoughts are trifling and impertinent. Some are good 
 neighbours, and courteous, and charitable toward men, who have 
 no piety towards God ; others are truly religious, but of morose 
 natural tempers. Some excellent sayings are found in very silly 
 books, and some silly thoughts appear in books of value. We 
 should neither praise or dispraise by wholesale, but separate the 
 good from the evil, and judge of them apart ; the accuracy of a 
 good judgment consists much in making such distinctions." 
 
24 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION Y. 
 
 THE KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO THE ART OF REASONING. 
 
 I need hardly observe that to reason well, you must have 
 common sense. This can be obtained only from Nature. 
 While learning will increase your information, extend 
 your range of inquiry, and unlock new sources of the 
 most refined pleasure, it will not give you common 
 sense. Nor does it appear that this common sense is ever 
 much improved by learning. As is the child in this 
 respect, so is the man. It is possible to have a strong 
 memory and a weak understanding. Fools have become 
 learned, and still have remained fools. Men of vast 
 erudition have shown themselves weak in judgment, even 
 in regard to those branches of knowledge in which they 
 have obtained distinction — and miserably deficient in the 
 ordinary affairs of life. It is only by common sense that 
 we can reason, and can judge of the soundness of our 
 reasonings. This power or faculty of the mind is not 
 sparingly bestowed. It is given to almost every man, and 
 to an extent that is found adequate for all the functions 
 he is called upon to discharge. Common sense has been 
 good sense in every age of the world. 
 
 Presuming, then, gentle reader, that you are endowed 
 with common sense, I will proceed to show you what 
 further is required to enable you to reason well. Our 
 instructions will be taken chiefly from the Logic of Dr. 
 Watts. 
 
 1. To reason well, you must understand the subjects 
 that you reason about. 
 
 Go to the market-place, and listen to the conversation 
 between the buyers and the sellers. How readily the 
 sellers advance arguments to show that their goods are 
 very cheap, and how promptly the buyers answer these 
 arguments, and strongly argue on the other side. Now 
 how is it that these uneducated people are enabled to 
 argue so forcibly and so fluently? It is that they un- 
 
LOGICAL DEFINITIONS. ' 25 
 
 derstand what they are talking about. Arid this must be 
 the first step in all our reasonings. 
 
 We begin, therefore, by stating clearly what is the sub- 
 ject of discussion : and this is called giving a definition 
 of it: 
 
 " In order to form a definition of anything, we must put forth 
 these three acts of the mind. 
 
 " First, Compare the thing to be defined with other things that 
 are most like itself, and see wherein its essence or nature agrees 
 with them : and this is called the general nature or genus in a 
 definition : so if you would define what wine is, first compare it 
 with other things like itself, as cider, perry, &c, and you will find 
 it agrees essentially with them in this, that it is a sort of juice. 
 
 " Secondly, Consider the most remarkable and primary attri- 
 bute, property, or idea wherein this thing differs from those other 
 things that are most like it ; and that is its essential or specific 
 difference: so wine differs from cider and perry, and all other 
 juices, in that it is pressed from a grape. This may he called its 
 special nature, which distinguishes it from other juices. 
 
 "Thirdly, Join the general and special nature together, or 
 (which is all one) the genus and the difference, and these make up 
 a definition. So the juice of a grape, or juice pressed from 
 grapes, is the definition of wine. 
 
 " So if I would define what winter is, I consider first wherein 
 it agrees with other things which are most like it, namely, 
 summer, spring, autumn, and I find they are all seasons of the 
 year ; therefore a season of the year is the genus. Then I ob- 
 serve wherein it differs from these, and that is in the shortness 
 of the days j for it is this which does primarily distinguish it 
 from other seasons; therefore this may be called its special 
 nature, or its difference. Then by joining these together, I make 
 a definition. Winter is that season of the year wherein the days 
 are shortest." 
 
 But everything cannot be defined in this formal manner, 
 and we may adopt any mode of expression we please, pro- 
 vided it will convey to others a correct description of what 
 we mean. Thus we may say — 
 
 " Motion is a change of place. Swiftness is the passing over a 
 long space in a short time. A natural day is the time of one 
 alternate revolution of light and darkness, or it is the duration 
 of twenty-four hours. An eclipse of the sun is a defect in the 
 sun's transmission of light to us by the moon interposing. Snow 
 is congealed vapour. Hail is congealed rain. An island is a 
 piece of land rising above the surrounding water. A hill is an 
 elevated part of the earth, and a grove is a piece of ground thick 
 set with trees. A house is a building made to dwell in. A 
 
 c 
 
26 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 cottage is a mean house in the country. A supper is that meal ' 
 which we make in the evening. A triangle is a figure composed 
 of three sides. A gallon is a measure containing eight pints. 
 A porter is a man who carries burthens for hire. A king is the 
 chief ruler in a kingdom. Veracity is the conformity of our 
 words to our thoughts. Covetousness is an excessive love of 
 money, or other possessions. Killing is the taking away the life 
 of an animal. Murder is the unlawful killing of a man. Rhetoric 
 is the art of speaking in a manner fit to persuade. Natural 
 philosophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies, and the 
 various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the various 
 appearances in nature, and their causes ; and logic is the art of 
 using our reason well, &c." 
 
 2. To reason well, you must clearly understand what is 
 asserted about the subject. 
 
 "A proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas or terms 
 are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or negation ; as, 'Plato 
 was a philosopher : every angle is formed by two lines meeting : 
 no man living on earth can be completely happy.' When there 
 are ever so many ideas or terms in the sentence, yet if they are 
 joined or disjoined merely by one single affirmation or negation, 
 they are properly called but one proposition, though they may be 
 resolved into several propositions which are implied therein, as 
 will appear hereafter. 
 
 " There are three things which go to the nature and constitu- 
 tion of a proposition ; namely, the subject, the predicate, and the 
 copula. 
 
 "The subject of a proposition is that concerning which anything 
 is affirmed or denied : So ' Plato, angle, man living on earth,' are 
 the subjects of the foregoing propositions. 
 
 " The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the sub- 
 ject : so 'philosopher' is the predicate of the first proposition; 
 e formed by two lines meeting,' is the predicate of the second ; 
 e capable of being completely happy,' the proper predicate of the 
 third. 
 
 " The subject and predicate of a proposition taken together, 
 are called the matter of it ; for these are the materials of which 
 it is made. 
 
 " The copula is the form of a proposition ; it represents the act 
 of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expressed by the words, 
 am, art, is, are, &c. ; or am not, art not, is not, are not, &c. 
 
 "The subject and predicate of a proposition, are not always 
 to be known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the 
 sentence, but by reflecting duly on the sense of the words, and 
 on the mind or design of the speaker or writer : as if I say, In 
 Africa there are many lions, I mean many lions are existent in 
 
LOGICAL LANGUAGE. 27 
 
 Africa : ' many lions ' is the subject, and ' existent in Africa ' is the 
 predicate. It is proper for a philosopher to understand geometry: 
 here the word ' proper ' is the predicate, and all the rest is the 
 subject, except • is,' the copula. 
 
 " But there are some propositions, wherein the terms of the 
 subject and predicate seem to be the same ; yet the ideas are not 
 the same ; nor can these be called pure identical or trifling pro- 
 positions ; such as, Home is home ; that is, home is a convenient 
 or delightful place ; Socrates is Socrates still ; that is, the man 
 Socrates is still a philosopher ; The hero was not a hero ; that is, 
 the hero did not show his courage ; What I have written, I have 
 written ; that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter 
 it : What is done, is done ; that is, it cannot be undone. It may 
 be easily observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, 
 for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in 
 the subject." 
 
 3. To reason well, you must know how to express your- 
 self in clear and intelligible language. 
 
 " As we are led into the knowledge of things by words, so we 
 are oftentimes led into error, or mistake, by the use or abuse of 
 words also. And in order to guard against such mistakes, as 
 well as to promote our improvements in knowledge, it is necessary 
 to acquaint ourselves a little with words and terms. 
 
 " Words (whether they are spoken or written) have no natural 
 connexion with the ideas they are designed to signify, nor with the 
 things which are represented in those ideas. There is no manner 
 of affinity between the sounds white in English, or blanc in French, 
 and that colour which we call by that name ; nor have the letters, 
 of which these words are composed, any natural aptness to signify 
 that colour rather than red or green. Words and names there- 
 fore are mere arbitrary signs invented by men to communicate 
 their thoughts or ideas to one another." 
 
 " Words and terms are either univocal or equivocal. Univocal 
 words are such as signify but one idea, or at least but one sort of 
 thing ; equivocal words are such as signify two or more different 
 ideas, or different sorts of objects. The words book, bible, fish, 
 house, elephant, may be called univocal words ; for I know not 
 that they signify anything else but those ideas to which they are 
 generally affixed ; but head is an equivocal word, for it signifies 
 the head of a nail, or of a pin, as well as of an animal : nail is an 
 equivocal word, it is used for the nail of the hand, or foot, and 
 for an iron nail to fasten anything. Post is equivocal, it is a 
 piece of timber, or a swift messenger. A church is a religious 
 assembly, or the large fair building where they meet ; and some- 
 times the same word means a synod of bishops, or of presbyters ; 
 and in some places it is the pope and a general council. 
 C2 
 
28 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 g-iiity 
 
 
 " Here let it be noted, that when two or more words signify 
 the same thing, as wave and billow, mead and meadow, they are 
 usually called synonymous words ; but it seems very strange, that 
 words, which are directly contrary to each other, should some- 
 times represent almost the same ideas; yet thus it is in some few 
 instances : a valuable or an invaluable blessing ; a shameful, or a 
 shameless villain ; a thick skull, or a thin-skulled fellow — a mere 
 paper skull; a man of a large conscience, little conscience, or no 
 conscience; a famous rascal, or an infamous one. So uncertain a 
 thing is human language, whose foundation and support is custom. 
 
 "As words signifying the same thing are called synonymous, so 
 equivocal words, or those which signify several things, are called 
 homonymous, or ambiguous; and when persons use such ambigu- 
 ous words with a design to deceive, if is called equivocation." 
 
 "In your own studies, as well as in the communication of your 
 thoughts to others merely for their information, avoid ambiguous 
 and equivocal terms as much as possible. Do not use such words 
 as have two or three definitions of the name belonging to them ; 
 that is, such words as have two or three senses, where there is 
 any danger of mistake. Where your chief business is to inform 
 the judgment, and to explain a matter, rather than to persuade 
 or affect, be not fond of expressing yourselves in figurative 
 language, when there are any proper words that signify the same 
 idea in their literal sense." 
 
 "When we communicate our notions to others, merely with a 
 design to inform and improve their knowledge, let us, in the be- 
 ginning of our discourse, take care to adjust the definition of 
 names, wheresoever there is need of it ; that is, to determine 
 plainly what we mean by the chief words which are the subject of 
 our discourse ; and be sure always to keep the same ideas when- 
 soever we use the same words, unless we give due notice of the 
 change. This will have a very large and happy influence, in 
 securing not only others, but ourselves too, from confusion and 
 mistake ; for even writers and speakers themselves, for want of 
 due watchfulness, are ready to affix different ideas to their own 
 words, in different parts of their discourses, and hereby bring per- 
 plexity into their own reasonings, and confound their hearers." 
 
 " in communicating your notions, use every word as near as 
 possible in the same 'sense in which mankind commonly use it ; or 
 which writers that have gone before you have usually affixed to 
 it, upon condition that it is free from ambiguity. Though names 
 are in their original merely arbitrary, yet we should always keep 
 to the established meaning of them, unless great necessity requires 
 the alteration ; for when any word has been used to signify an 
 idea, that old idea will recur in the mind when the word is heard 
 or read, rather than any new idea which we may fasten to it. 
 And this is one reason why the received definition of names 
 should be changed as little as possible." 
 
LOGICAL EXAMPLES. 29 
 
 4. To reason well, you must accustom yourself to ob- 
 serve the reasonings of others, whether in books or conver- 
 sation, and try to improve your own by meditation and 
 practice. 
 
 "Accustom yourselves to clear and distinct ideas, to evident 
 propositions, to strong and convincing arguments. Converse 
 much with those friends, and those • books, and those parts of 
 learning, where you meet with the greatest clearness of thought 
 and force of reasoning. The mathematical sciences, and particu- 
 larly arithmetic, geometry, and mechanics, abound with these 
 advantages : and if there were nothing valuable hi them for the 
 uses of human life, yet the very speculative parts of this sort of 
 learning are well worth our study ; for by perpetual examples 
 they teach us to conceive with clearness, to connect our ideas and 
 propositions in a train of dependence, to reason with strength and 
 demonstration, and to distinguish between truth and falsehood. 
 Something of these sciences should be studied by every man who 
 pretends to learning, and that, as Mr. Locke expresses it, not 
 so much to make us mathematicians, as to make us reasonable 
 creatures. 
 
 " We should gain such a familiarity with evidence of perception 
 and force of reasoning, and get such a habit of discerning clear 
 truths, that the mind may be soon offended with obscurity and 
 confusion : then we shall, as it were, naturally and with ease 
 restrain our minds from rash judgment, before we attain just 
 evidence of the proposition which is offered to us : and we shall 
 with the same ease, and, as it were, naturally seize and embrace 
 every truth that is proposed with just evidence. 
 
 " This habit of conceiving clearly, of judging justly, and of 
 reasoning well, is not to be attained merely by the happiness of 
 constitution, the brightness of genius, the best natural parts, or 
 the best collection of logical precepts. It is custom and practice 
 that must form and establish this habit. We must apply ourselves 
 to it till we perform all this readily, and without reflecting on 
 rules. A coherent thinker, and a strict reasoner, is not to be 
 made at once by a set of rules, any more than a good painter or 
 musician may be formed extempore, by an excellent lecture on 
 music or painting. It is of infinite importance, therefore, in our 
 younger years, to be taught both the value and the practice of 
 conceiving clearly and reasoning right ; for when we are grown 
 up to the middle of life, or past it, it is no wonder that we should 
 not learn good reasoning any more than that an ignorant clown 
 should not be able to learn fine language, dancing, or a courtly 
 behaviour, when Ms rustic airs have grown up with him till the 
 age of forty." 
 
PART II. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OP REASONING. 
 
 We have now made some progress. We have gone 
 through the first part of our book. We have considered 
 the nature of reasoning — the subjects to which it is 
 applied — its usefulness, and the dispositions and knowledge 
 necessary to enable us to reason well. 
 
 We have ascertained that reasoning is that operation of 
 the mind, whereby we infer one proposition from another 
 proposition. It is obvious that there must be some con- 
 nexion or relation between these two propositions. There 
 must be a relation between the proposition containing the 
 proof and the proposition which is to be proved. These 
 relations are the foundation of all our reasonings. They 
 are the principles on which we reason. There must be 
 a relation between any doctrine, and the reasons we assign 
 for believing that doctrine. There must be a relation 
 between any act, and the reason we assign for performing 
 that act. If we say, 
 
 Fire will burn, 
 Water will drown ; 
 
 here are two independent propositions. They have no con- 
 nexion with each other. We can infer nothing from them. 
 If we say, Fire will burn, and therefore water will drown, 
 we see at once that the reasoning is absurd. Both the 
 facts are true,/ but there is no foundation for the word 
 " therefore." One fact is not the cause of the other. But 
 if we say, Fire will burn, and therefore do not approach it 
 too nearly ; water will drown, and therefore do not bathe 
 in deep water, unless you can swim ; here the reasoning is 
 obvious. Here is a relation or connexion between the 
 proposition and the inference. 
 
 The power or faculty by which the mind perceives these 
 relations is .called common-sense. We cannot explain 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 31 
 
 how it is, but so it is.* These relations are so numerous 
 that we cannot attempt to describe them all. But we 
 will specify a few* and discuss them in the following 
 order : — 
 
 1. The relation of Subject and Attribute. 
 
 2. The relation of a Whole and its Parts. 
 
 3. The relation of Genus and Species. 
 
 4. The relation of Cause and Effect — Physical causes. 
 
 5. The relation of Cause and Effect — Moral causes. 
 
 6. The relation of Cause and Effect — Conditional causes. 
 
 7. The relation of Cause and Effect — Final causes. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 THE. RELATION OF A SUBJECT AND ITS ATTRIBUTES; 
 
 By attribute we mean generally a quality or circumstance 
 which is ascribed to some, person or thing ; and the subject 
 is that to which the attribute is ascribed. To explain : — 
 You understand Grammar. You know that a substan- 
 tive is the name of any person, place or thing; and that 
 an adjective is a word added to a substantive, to denote its 
 quality. Well ; for substantive and adjective, say subject 
 and attribute, and you will understand pretty clearly the 
 topics of the present section. But the word attribute has 
 a more extensive meaning than the word adjective. Every 
 adjective denotes an attribute ; but sometimes an attribute 
 is expressed by a verb, a particle, or by several words put 
 together. Often, too, an adjective united to a substantive 
 will become a subject. When you say simply, "A righteous 
 man," the word " man" denotes the subject, and " righteous- 
 ness" is the attribute. But when you say, "A -righteous man 
 regardeth the life of his beast," the words " righteous" and 
 "man" united denote the subject, and "regardeth the life 
 
 * " The cogency of no direct and simple process of reasoning can be the subject 
 of proof. The oniy question is, Does the reasoning when clearly expressed pro- 
 duce conviction ? Or in other words, Do the facts when presented clearly to the 
 mind determine it to believe that which is expressed in what is called the con- 
 clusion ? If they do, we have reached an ultimate fact, or law, or principle of 
 our mental constitution, beyond which it is impossible to go."— Bailey, p. 17. 
 See also p. 37. 
 
32 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 of his beast" is the attribute of the righteous man. What- 
 ever you talk about is a subject, and what you say about 
 it is an attribute. In many propositions, the subject of 
 the attribute is often the subject of the proposition, and 
 the attribute is the predicate. But this will depend on 
 the grammatical construction of the sentence. For ex- 
 ample, in the following sentence, "Blessed is the man 
 that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor 
 standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of 
 the scornful, but his delight is in the law of the Lord, 
 and in his law doth he meditate day and night," the word 
 "blessed" denotes the attribute, and all the rest of the 
 sentence is the subject. 
 
 Some attributes are called specific. They belong to the 
 subject, and to no other subject. These are attributes 
 chiefly that distinguish one class or species from others. 
 Thus man is called a rational animal. Rationality is 
 the specific attribute that distinguishes him from other 
 animals. The specific attribute is called by logicians, a 
 specific difference. 
 
 Other attributes are called common. They are essential 
 to the subject, but they belong also to other subjects. 
 Thus, it is an attribute of gold to be yellow. If -a metal is 
 not yellow, it is not gold. But other things are yellow 
 besides gold. The colour yellow is an attribute common 
 to many subjects. These common attributes are called 
 properties. 
 
 Other attributes are accidental. Whatever attribute 
 can be removed from the subject without destroying the 
 subject, is considered to be accidental. A hat may be 
 white, or black, or made of beaver, silk, or straw ; these 
 are accidental attributes, for they all might be changed, 
 and yet the subject remain a hat. These attributes are 
 called accidents. 
 
 This relation of subject and attribute is a very extensive 
 one. Almost everything we see, or hear, or know, is a 
 subject, and has some kind of attributes. The usual way 
 in which we define or describe anything, is by an enume- 
 ration of its attributes. We shall here adduce a few pro- 
 positions expressing this relation, and then we shall show 
 how this relation is employed in reasoning. 
 
 1 
 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 33 
 
 Attributes of inanimate objects — a tree : 
 
 " I saw, and behold a tree in the midst of the earth, and the 
 height thereof was great. The tree grew and was strong, and 
 the height thereof reached unto heaven, and the sight thereof to 
 the end of all the earth : the leaves thereof were fair, and the 
 fruit thereof much, and in it was meat for all : the beasts of the 
 field had shadow under it, and the fowls of the heaven dwelt in 
 the boughs thereof, and all flesh was fed of it." — Dan. iv. 10 — 12. 
 
 Attributes of animals — the eagle : 
 
 " Doth the eagle mount up at thy command, and make her 
 nest on high ? She dwelleth and abideth on the rock, upon the 
 crag of the rock, and the strong place. From thence she seeketh 
 the prey, and her eyes behold afar off. Her young ones also suck 
 up blood; and where the slain are, there is she." — Job xxxix. 
 27—30. 
 
 Attributes of a country — the land of Canaan : 
 
 " For the Lord thy God bringeth thee into a good land, a land 
 of brooks of water, of fountains and depths that spring out of 
 valleys and hills ; a land of wheat, and barley, and vines, and fig- 
 trees, and pomegranates ; a land of oil olive, and honey ; a land 
 wherein thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, thou shalt not 
 lack anything in it ; a land whose stones are iron, and out of 
 whose hills thou mayest dig brass." — Beut. viii. 7 — 9. 
 
 Personal attributes — St. Paul : 
 
 "lam verily a man which am a Jew, born in Tarsus, a city in 
 Cilicia, yet brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel, and 
 taught according to the perfect manner of the law of the fathers, 
 and was zealous toward God, as ye all are this day." — Acts 
 xxii. 3. 
 
 Attributes of moral virtues — divine wisdom : 
 
 " But the wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peace- 
 able, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good 
 fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy." — James iii. 17. 
 
 Attributes of a book — Logic for the Million : 
 
 " This is certainly the most useful and most amusing book on 
 the art of logic we ever met with. All the examples are drawn 
 from familiar writings. 'Punch' is quoted more than once for 
 logical examples, as well as ' Gilbart's Treatise on Banking/ and 
 works on political economy and general literature much in vogue. 
 The examples of reasoning by fables, by allegories, by description, 
 and by various other modes, as well as the examples of fallacies 
 c3 
 
34 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 and false reasoning, are all well chosen, and generally illustrate 
 some truth or some important fact, or are very amusing, while 
 they explain the art of logic. Generally, too, the author is as 
 correct as he is entertaining. We hope that 'Logic for the 
 Million ' will be read by the million : it will advance their know- 
 ledge and improve their taste, their style of writing, and their 
 skill in reasoning." — The Economist. 
 
 You will now observe how the relation of subject and 
 attribute is applied in reasoning. 
 
 1. From the presence of the subject, we infer the 
 presence of the attribute. 
 
 " A fool uttereth all his mind : but a wise man keepeth it in 
 till afterwards." — Prov. xxix. 11. 
 
 Hence, we should infer that if this man be a fool, he 
 will utter all his mind. And if he be a wise man, he will 
 be cautious in his conversation. From the presence of the 
 subject, we should infer the presence of the attribute. 
 
 Arguments of this kind are often expressed in a con- 
 ditional form. Thus, we may say — If this be a magnet, 
 it will attract iron. If this be an oyster, it is good for food. 
 If *he be a wise son, he will obey his father's instruction. 
 If he be an honest man, he will pay his debts when he has 
 the power, even though his creditors may have given him 
 a legal release. If he be a good father, he will attend to 
 the education of his children. " Could not this man, 
 which opened the eyes of the blind, have caused that even 
 this man should not have died 1" — John xi. 37. 
 
 So, if a man has wealth, we may infer that he has the 
 luxuries, enjoyments, and influence attendant on wealth. 
 If he has wisdom, we may infer that he will profit by in- 
 struction. " Give instruction to a wise man, and he will 
 be yet wiser." If a man is a rogue, we may infer that it 
 is not advisable to lend him any money, for " the wicked 
 borroweth, and payeth not again." 
 
 2. From the presence of the specific attribute, or of 
 all the common attributes, we infer the presence of the 
 subject. 
 
 " Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes 
 of thorns, or figs of thistles ? Even so every good tree bringeth 
 forth good fruit ; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 35 
 
 good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree 
 bring forth good fruit. "—Matt. vii. 16—18. 
 
 " Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you." — 
 John xv. 14. 
 
 You will observe that this rule is the reverse of the 
 former. By the former rule, from the presence of the 
 subject we inferred the presence of the attribute. By this 
 rule, from the presence of the attribute, we infer the 
 presence of the subject. In the former case we said — This 
 is a good tree, therefore it will bear good fruit. In the 
 present case we say — This tree bears good fruit, therefore 
 it is a good tree. 
 
 Thus, if we saw a tree bearing apples, we should know 
 that it was an apple-tree ; and from the quality of the 
 fruit we should judge of the character of the tree. In the 
 same manner, from the language or conduct of an indivi- 
 dual, we should form an opinion of his character. — " These 
 are not the words of him that hath a devil. Can a devil 
 open the eyes of the blind?" — John x. 21. 
 
 So, if we should find a metal having all the common 
 attributes of gold, we should know that it is gold. This 
 principle is of great use in chemical experiments. Thus, 
 we know that certain bodies have certain affinities for 
 other bodies. To ascertain, therefore, whether this body 
 be present in any compound substance, we add some body, 
 for which the body, whose presence we wish to detect, has 
 an affinity, or upon which it produces a known effect. 
 There are certain chemical tests which are in constant use 
 in such cases. Thus, the presence of the specific attribute 
 shows the presence of the subject. 
 
 So, if an auctioneer had to sell a house, he would enume- 
 rate all its attributes, in order to show that it is a most 
 agreeable residence. The projector of a new company enu- 
 merates all its attributes, in order to show that its shares 
 would turn out a most profitable investment. A candidate 
 for a seat in the House of Commons states all his attributes, 
 in order to prove that he should be a most valuable member. 
 
 To enable you to infer from a single attribute the 
 presence of the subject, that attribute must be a specific 
 attribute ; that is, it must belong to no other subject. (See 
 p. 32.) Thus, if it be an attribute of an express train on 
 
36 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 any railway, that it does not stop at the intermediate 
 stations, you may say — " This train does not stop at 
 the intermediate stations ;" therefore, " this train is an 
 express train." Here, from the presence of the attribute 
 we infer the presence of the subject. But mind, if there 
 are other trains besides the express trains that do not stop 
 at the intermediate stations, this conclusion may not be 
 correct. For then the attribute is no longer a specific 
 attribute, but a common attribute. And from the presence 
 of an attribute that is common to several subjects you can- 
 not infer the presence of any particular subject. All you 
 can do is, to infer the presence of either one or other of the 
 subjects. Thus, " The express trains and the mail trains 
 are the only trains that do not stop at this station. The 
 train which has just passed has not stopped at this station ; 
 therefore, the train which has just passed is either an 
 express train or a mail train." 
 
 But in conformity with the first rule, you may always 
 from the presence of the subject infer the presence of the 
 attributes, even though the same attributes may belong to 
 other subjects. Thus, you may say — None of the express 
 trains stop at the intermediate stations. The train that 
 leaves at nine o'clock is an express train ; therefore the 
 train that leaves at nine o'clock will not stop at the in- 
 termediate stations. 
 
 3. From the absence of the subject, we infer the absence 
 of its specific attribute. 
 
 " If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of 
 Abraham." — John viii. 39. 
 
 " He that is of God heareth God's words : ye therefore hear 
 them not, because ye are not of God." — John viii. 47. 
 
 Thus, we may say — This animal is not a human being ; 
 therefore he is not endowed with reason. Religion is the 
 only source of happiness : this man has no religion ; there- 
 fore he is not happy. This man is not an educated man ; 
 therefore he is not qualified to be a teacher. This man has 
 had no experience in war ; therefore he cannot be qualified 
 to be a general. He has an impediment in his speech ; 
 therefore, he is not fit for an orator. Those who had no 
 season tickets did not attend the opening of the Indus- 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 37 
 
 trial Exhibition of 1851 ; some of the Exhibitors had no 
 season tickets ; therefore some of the Exhibitors did not 
 attend the opening of the Exhibition. 
 
 Although the absence of a subject shows the absence 
 of its sioecific attribute, it does not prove the absence of any 
 of its common attributes or properties. For these attri- 
 butes belong also to other subjects. Thus, honesty is an 
 attribute of religion ; but we cannot say that if a man is 
 not a religious man, he is not an honest man, for a man 
 may be honest, without being religious. But we may 
 reverse the case, and from the absence of the common 
 attribute, infer the absence of the subject. We may say — 
 If a man is not an honest man, he is not a religious man. 
 
 4. From the absence of an essential attribute, we infer 
 the absence of the subject. 
 
 " And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release him : but the 
 Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not 
 Caesar's friend : whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against 
 Cassar." — Jo/m xix. 12. 
 
 This rule is the reverse of the last. By the last rule we 
 should say — This is not a good tree ; therefore it will not 
 bear good fruit. By the present rule we should say — This 
 tree does not bear good fruit; therefore it is not a good tree. 
 
 In the illustration we have given it is presumed that the 
 friend of Caesar must have as an attribute a desire of sup- 
 pressing all claims incompatible with his authority. The 
 absence of this attribute would prove the absence of the 
 friendship. The Pharisee employed the same reasoning. 
 i Now when the Pharisee which had bidden him saw it, he 
 spake within himself, saying, This man, if he were a prophet, 
 would have known who and what manner of woman this is 
 that toucheth him : for she is a sinner." {Luke vii. 39.) Here, 
 a knowledge of the moral character of those around him 
 is presumed to be an attribute of a prophet. And as the 
 Pharisee presumed from the circumstances that our Lord 
 did not possess this attribute, he inferred that he was no 
 prophet. King Nebuchadnezzar argued in the same way. 
 As the magicians could not tell him his dream, he inferred 
 that they did not possess those supernatural powers to 
 which they laid claim, but "had prepared lying and corrupt 
 
38 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 
 words to speak before him;" Dan. ii. 9. See other examples 
 in James i. 26, and 1 John ii. 19. 
 
 So it is an attribute of mind to think. Matter cannot 
 think, and hence we infer that matter is not mind. Again, 
 it is an attribute of matter to be divisible ; but mind is 
 not divisible ; hence we infer that mind is not matter. 
 
 The bread and wine used in the sacrament do not after 
 consecration possess the attributes of flesh and blood, and 
 hence we infer that they are not flesh and blood ; the ab- 
 sence of the attributes proves the absence of the subjects. 
 
 The following is an" illustration from a sermon of Dr. 
 Sumner, the present Archbishop of Canterbury, upon 
 " Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." 
 
 " My brethren, if any of you are conscious that you have not 
 forgiven a neighbour when he trespassed against you ; if any of 
 you are conscious that you have taken a malicious pleasure in 
 making a brother's offences known, and injuring his credit ; if 
 any have pushed your rights to an extreme, and insisted on a 
 severity of justice, when you might rather have shown mercy and 
 pity ; if any have no feeling for their fellow-creatures' wants, and 
 are contented to enjoy themselves, without bestowing a thought 
 on those who have in this life evil things ; you plainly perceive 
 that the blessing bestowed on the merciful is not addressed to 
 you: you must expect judgment without mercy, if you have 
 shown no mercy." 
 
 In the same way reasons St. John. " Whoso hath this 
 world's goods, and seeth his brother have need, and 
 shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how 
 dwelleth the love of God in him V* (1 John hi. 17.) Here 
 the argument is, Benevolence is an attribute of piety ; the 
 absence of benevolence, therefore, shows the absence of 
 piety. 
 
 The following anecdote of the Rev. Rowland Hill ilhiS' 
 trates the same principle of reasoning : — 
 
 " He always strongly urged upon the poor the necessity of 
 every possible adornment of the Christian character, particularly 
 cleanhness ; and used to consider a slovenly person and a dirty 
 house as an evidence that religion had effected no salutary change in 
 the character. The neatness of the inmates of his almshouses at 
 Wotton struck every one who visited them. The least symptom 
 of untidiness was noticed by him in an instant, with 'Here, 
 mistress, is a trifle for you to buy some soap and a scrubbing- 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 39 
 
 brush — there is plenty of water to be had for nothing. Good 
 Mr. Whitefield used to say, " Cleanliness is next to godliness." ' " 
 — Sherman. 
 
 5. If any two attributes may be ascribed to the same 
 subject, then we may infer that these two attributes are 
 not inconsistent with each other. 
 
 Sir Isaac Newton was a great philosopher, and also a 
 man of strong religious principle ; hence we infer that 
 philosophy is not incompatible with religion. The late 
 Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine arts, he was also a 
 good man of business ; hence we infer that a taste for the 
 fine arts is not incompatible with habits of business. Sir 
 Thomas Fowell Buxton was a very benevolent man, and 
 yet a great sportsman ; and hence we infer that benevolent 
 feelings are not incompatible with a fondness for field- 
 sports. The law of Moses required the Israelites to treat 
 all strangers with justice and kindness, and yet the law of 
 Moses allowed the Israelites to receive interest for money 
 lent to strangers ; we may therefore infer that it is not un- 
 just or unkind to receive interest for the loan of money. 
 
 Writers on scholastic logic repeat the subject in this 
 kind of argument so as to form two propositions, which 
 they usually place under one another, and the conclusion 
 under them ; and these three propositions taken together 
 they call a syllogism ; thus — 
 
 Sir Robert Peel had a taste for the fine arts. 
 Sir Robert Peel was a good man of business. 
 Therefore, a taste for the fine arts is not incompatible 
 with habits of business. 
 
 The following examples of the same kind are copied 
 from Mr. Munro's Manual of Logic : — 
 
 "All who assist in the progress of true science deserve the 
 respect of mankind. 
 All who assist in the progress of true science have to contend 
 
 with difficulties. 
 Some who have to contend with difficulties deserve the respect 
 of mankind. 
 
 Some distinguished poets have not escaped poverty. 
 All distinguished poets do honour to their country. 
 Some who do honour to their country have not escaped poverty 
 
40 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 No bombastic writers are worthy of imitation. 
 
 Some bombastic writers are amusing. 
 
 Some things amusing are not worthy of imitation." * 
 
 This mode of reasoning may also be expressed in the 
 form of example, thus : — " A taste for the fine arts is not 
 incompatible with habits of business. In proof of this we 
 may cite the example of Sir Robert Peel." " Some who do 
 honour to their country have not escaped poverty, which is 
 proved by the history of some of our distinguished poets." 
 " A very interesting book may consist chiefly of quotations. 
 Witness D 'Israeli's 'Curiosities of Literature.'" The fol- 
 lowing are instances of the same kind of argument expressed 
 in a different form : — " The example of Virgil shows that a 
 great poet may be seduced into some faults by the practice 
 of imitation." "A man remarkable for his knowledge and 
 policy, the wisdom of his maxims, the justness of his 
 reasoning, and the variety, distinctness, and strength of his 
 characters, may want exactness in his diction, and be care- 
 less in the art of writing, for we find all these qualities 
 united in Lord Clarendon." 
 
 You will observe that this argument must not be pushed 
 too far. It does not prove that either of the two attributes 
 is the cause of the other ; or that they always, or even 
 often, accompany one another • but merely that they are 
 not incompatible. Thus, if we say, The historian Gibbon 
 was a man of great learning, and a man of infidel opinions ; 
 this would not prove that great learning is the cause ot 
 infidel opinions, or that they often accompany each other ; 
 it shows only that they are not incompatible — that they 
 may co-exist in the same subject. 
 
 6. If the same attribute cannot be ascribed to two 
 specified subjects, then we may infer that those subjects 
 are different from each other. 
 
 Thus, if the soul of man can reason, and the soul of a 
 brute cannot reason, we infer that the soul of a man is 
 different from the soul of a brute. If all fever produces 
 thirst, and the patient does not suffer thirst, we infer that 
 the patient has no fever. "A spirit hath not flesh and 
 
 * These examples illustrate the third figure of syllogistic reasoning: the 
 maxim is, " When the whole of a class possess a certain attribute, and the whole 
 or part of the class possess another attribute, then some things that possess one 
 of these attributes, possess the other also." — See Bailey, p. 72. 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 41 
 
 bones ; you see that I have flesh and bones ; you see then 
 that I am not a spirit." The following examples are taken 
 from the Port Royal Logic : — 
 
 " No liar is to be believed ; 
 Every good man is to be believed ; 
 Therefore no good man is a liar. 
 No virtne is contrary to the love of truth ; 
 There is a love of peace which is opposed to a love of truth ; 
 Therefore there is a love of peace which is not a virtue. 
 
 Every virtue is accompanied with discretion ; 
 
 There is a zeal without discretion ; 
 
 Therefore there is a zeal which is not a virtue." * 
 
 You will observe that all these conclusions are negative. 
 We deny that one thing is another, because the attribute 
 can be ascribed to one of these things and not to the other. 
 
 7. If a subject have certain attributes, we infer that it is 
 adapted for the use to which those attributes are applicable. 
 
 Thus, from the attributes of Australia, Cape of Good 
 Hope, or Canada, we infer that those countries are adapted 
 for certain classes of emigrants. From the attributes of 
 the Isle of Wight, Torquay, and Penzance, we infer that 
 those places are suitable residences for people in danger of 
 consumption. From the attributes of wool, we infer that 
 a woollen garment worn next the skin is sometimes good 
 for rheumatism. From the attributes of certain medicines, 
 we endeavour to learn what are the respective complaints 
 for which they are adapted. From the attributes of bones, 
 lime, sea- weed, and fish we infer that they may be usefully 
 applied as manure to certain kinds of land. So if a man 
 have the attributes of honesty, industry, prudence, and 
 perseverance, we infer that he will thrive in his pursuits. 
 Il a man apply for the office of Member of Parliament, 
 excise officer, banker's clerk, or policeman, he must show 
 that he has those attributes which will qualify him for the 
 discharge of his official duties. The attributes of a joint- 
 stock bank are, that it has more than six partners, that it 
 
 **These examples are adduced as illustrations of the second figure of syllo 
 gistic reasoning. The maxims of this figure are, " When the whole of a class 
 possess a certain attribute, whatever does not possess the attribute, does not 
 belong to the class;" and, " When the whole of a class is excluded from the posses- 
 sion of an attribute, whatever possesses the attribute does not belong to the 
 class." — Bailey, p. 71. 
 
42 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 has an amount of paid-up capital, and that on the death 
 or retirement of any of its partners their portion of the 
 capital is not withdrawn, but is transferred to other parties; 
 and hence we infer that it is a safer system of banking for 
 the public than if the partners were no more than six, and 
 the death or retirement of any partner would cause the 
 withdrawal of his portion of the capital. So from the 
 attributes of the precious metals, it was inferred that they 
 were adapted for the purposes of coin. 
 
 " That medium of exchange must be best which unites in itself 
 the largest amount of the following qualities: — sameness of value 
 both as to time and place, divisibility, durability, and facility of 
 transportation. The metals — especially gold and silver — possess 
 all these qualities in a great degree. We may have them in tons 
 or in grains : wear is slow ; fire will not destroy them ; when 
 divided, they can be fused again and re-blended; and, except 
 where large values are concerned, they are easily conveyed from 
 place to place. Because metals possess these qualities, they were 
 early and (in civilized countries) universally adopted as a medium 
 of exchange " — Rev. S. Martin's Lecture o?i Money. 
 
 8. The presence of similar attributes in two or more 
 subjects shows the probability of their corresponding in 
 other attributes. This is called " reasoning by analogy," 
 which we shall discuss more at length hereafter. We will 
 here give only one example. 
 
 " It is natural to mankind to judge of things less known by 
 some similitude, real or imaginary, between them and things more 
 familiar or better known. And where the things compared have 
 really a great similitude in their nature, when there is reason to 
 think that they are subject to the same laws, there may be a 
 considerable degree of probability in conclusions drawn from 
 analogy. Thus we may observe a very great similitude between 
 this earth which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, 
 Mars, Yenus, and Mercury. They all revolve round the sun, as 
 the earth does, although at different distances and in different 
 periods. They borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth 
 does. Several of them are known to revolve round their axis, 
 like the earth ; and by that means must have a like succession of 
 day and night. Some of them have moons that serve to give 
 them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. 
 They are all in their motions subject to the same law of gravi- 
 tation as the earth is. From all this similitude, it is not un- 
 reasonable to think that those planets may, like our earth, be the 
 habitation of various orders of living creatures?' 
 
SUBJECT AND ATTRIBUTE. 43 
 
 9. The presence of any attribute shows the absence of 
 a contrary attribute. This, of course, refers only to acci- 
 dental attributes, for an essential attribute cannot be 
 absent from its subject. Thus, if the weather be hot, it 
 is not cold ; if a man be humble, he is not proud ; if 
 avaricious, he is not liberal ; if he have the gout, he is not 
 in good health. 
 
 The presence of an accidental attribute in one instance, 
 proves the possibility of such a subject becoming united 
 to such an attribute in any similar case. Wisdom is the 
 accidental attribute of a man, and therefore we are justified 
 in inferring that a man may become wise. In the same 
 way, wealth, learning, virtue, happiness, are attribt^es of 
 man, and though not essential attributes, but only acci- 
 dental, yet they may all be acquired. Sometimes, as we 
 have observed at page 31, an accidental attribute may be 
 united to a subject, and form a new subject, which may 
 have other attributes. Thus we may say — A wise man will 
 receive instruction. Here the word " wise " is not viewed 
 as an attribute, but as with "man" forming a subject, and 
 a readiness to receive instruction is an essential attribute 
 of a wise man. 
 
 In reasoniDg upon the relation subsisting between subject 
 and attribute, it is always necessary to distinguish between 
 those attributes which are essential, and those which are acci- 
 dental. For, if we take accidental attributes, and argue upon 
 them as though they were essential, our reasonings will be 
 erroneous. Thus, the poet Ovid had a large nose. This 
 was a mere accidental circumstance, and was by no means 
 essential to him as a poet. If, therefore, we were to meet a 
 man in the street with a large nose, we should not be justi- 
 fied in inferring that he was a poet. Some men of great 
 minds have had feeble bodies, but it does not follow that a 
 feeble body tends to invigorate the mind. Some men of 
 great intellectual powers have been addicted to great vices, 
 but it does not follow that great vices are a mark of 
 intellect. 
 
 Erroneous reasonings under this head sometimes arise 
 from our omission to take into account some one or more of 
 the essential attributes. A tradesman may have all the at- 
 tributes of a good man of business, except that he is fond 
 
44 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 of speculation. A young woman may have all the attri- 
 butes of a good wife, except sweetness of temper. A house 
 may have all the attributes of an agreeable residence, except 
 that the chimney smokes. A man may have all the attri- 
 butes of an excellent friend, except that he cannot keep a 
 secret. Now, in these cases, if you had, from a review of 
 the other attributes, come to the conclusion, " That trades- 
 man is worthy of high credit ;" u That young woman would 
 make an excellent wife;" " That house is a most agreeable 
 residence;" "That man is a most judicious friend," you 
 would have formed erroneous conclusions. We read of 
 several of the kings of Judah, who "walked in the ways of 
 David their father," " but the high places were not taken 
 away," " but the people still sacrificed in high places," and 
 hence, as an old divine observes, we often find that some 
 unlucky "but" or other comes in and spoils all. 
 
 It may also happen, that when we have noticed all the 
 attributes, our judgment may be kept in suspense from the 
 conflicting character of these attributes. If we have to hire 
 servants, those who are most skilled may be deficient in 
 sobriety, or, if not deficient in sobriety, they may be defi- 
 cient in industry, or in cleanliness. If we want a house, 
 we cannot find one that has all the attributes we require. 
 Tf we wish to emigrate, we can discover no colony exactly 
 suited to our circumstances. In these cases we must 
 balance the attributes one against the other. Here, a full 
 knowledge of the subject, and plenty of common sense, are 
 the best guides. The rules of logic, however, will teach us 
 to decide coolly and systematically. The best way is that 
 of Dr. Franklin. Write down on, paper first, all the reasons 
 for the affirmative, and then all the reasons for the nega- 
 tive. Having all the reasons thus before your eyes, weigh 
 them deliberately, and see which preponderate. 
 
 Let thine eyes look right on, 
 
 And let thine eyelids look straight before thee, 
 
 Ponder the path of thy feet, 
 
 And let all thy ways be established. — Prov. iv. 25, 26. 
 
A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 45 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE RELATION OP A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 
 
 You must observe that some ideas have no parts. Such 
 are many attributes. The colours green, red, blue, have no 
 parts ; nor have the tastes sweet, sour, bitter, &c. ; nor the 
 sounds, loud, sharp, shrill, &c. ; nor the various smells. 
 The things that have parts are subjects having attributes. 
 Such are all animals, all vegetables, all material objects, 
 and all particles of matter, and all mechanical instruments, 
 of every kind. An animal may be divided into head, 
 trunk, and limbs. A tree may be divided into root, trunk, 
 branches, leaves, and fruit. A steam-engine may be divided 
 into the several parts of which it is composed. A day may 
 be divided into hours. A book may be divided into parts, 
 or chapters, and those parts or chapters may be subdivided 
 into sections or verses. An art or science may be divided 
 into parts. Political economy may be divided into pro- 
 duction, distribution, interchange, and consumption. The 
 business of a manufactory may be divided into its various 
 operations. A cotton manufacture may be divided into 
 the departments of spinning, weaving, dyeing, and printing. 
 A pound sterling may be divided into shillings, and each 
 shilling into pence. A bushel may be divided into gallons, 
 and each gallon into quarts and pints. A mile may be 
 divided into furlongs, and each furlong into yards. A ton 
 weight may be divided into hundreds, and these into pounds 
 and ounces. A palace may be divided into apartments. 
 A house may be divided into rooms. A farm may be 
 divided into acres. 
 
 Upon this subject we shall quote Dr. Watts : — 
 
 " Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but 
 all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither 
 more nor less than the whole. Therefore, if in discoursing of a 
 tree you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect 
 division, because the root and the branches are needful to make 
 up the whole." 
 
 " In all divisions we should first consider the larsrer and mose 
 
46 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 immediate parts of the subject, and not divide it at once into the 
 more minute and remote parts. It would by no means be proper 
 to divide a kingdom first into streets, and lanes, and fields ; but 
 it must be first divided into provinces or counties, then those 
 counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c. ; and 
 towns into streets and lanes. 
 
 " The several parts of a division ought to be opposite, that is, 
 one part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous 
 division of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brains, for the 
 brains are contained in the head." 
 
 " Let not subdivisions be too numerous without necessity : for 
 it is better many times to distinguish more parts at once, if the 
 subject will bear it, than to mince the discourse by excessive 
 dividing and subdividing. It is preferable therefore in a treatise 
 of geography, to say, that in a city we will consider its walls, its 
 gates, its buildings, its streets, and lanes, than to divide it for- 
 mally first into the encompassing and the encompassed parts ; the 
 encompassing parts are the walls and gates ; the encompassed 
 parts include the ways and the buildings ; the ways are the streets 
 and the lanes; buildings consist of the foundations, and the 
 superstructure, &c. 
 
 "Divide every subject according to the special design you have 
 in view. One and the same idea or subject may be divided in 
 very different manners, according to the different purposes we 
 have in discoursing of it. So if a printer were to consider the 
 several parts of a book, he must divide it into sheets, the sheets 
 into pages, the pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a 
 grammarian divides a book into periods, sentences, and words, or 
 parts of speech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A logician considers 
 a book as divided into chapters, sections, arguments, propositions, 
 ideas ■ and, with the help of ontology, he divides the propositions 
 into subject, object, property, relation, action, passion, cause, 
 effect, &c. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician to 
 divide a book into sheets, pages, and lines ; or for a printer to 
 divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into propositions, ideas, 
 properties, or causes. 
 
 "In all your divisions observe with greatest exactness the 
 nature of things." 
 
 We shall consider the relation between a whole and its 
 parts, with reference to arithmetical numbers, physical 
 objects, and moral ideas. 
 
 1. With regard to arithmetical numbers. 
 
 Any arithmetical number may be divided into as many 
 parts as it contains units ; and again, a unit may be divided 
 into any number of fractional parts. It is obvious, that 
 
A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 47 
 
 all the parts into which any number is divided must, when 
 added together, be equal to the whole number. A sove- 
 reign is equal to twenty shillings ; if, then, you receive in 
 exchange for a sovereign only nineteen shillings, you will 
 infer that you have not the whole. A pound weight is 
 equal to sixteen ounces ; if, then, in buying a pound of tea, 
 or of sugar, you get only fifteen ounces, you will infer that 
 you have not the whole. 
 
 Again, if two numbers that are equal to one another be 
 multiplied respectively by any number, the products will 
 be equal. If one Indian rupee be equal to one shilling and 
 tenpence, you will infer that twenty rupees will be equal to 
 twenty times one shilling and tenpence. So also — 
 
 If equal numbers be added to equal numbers, the totals 
 will be equal. 
 
 If equal numbers be subtracted from equal numbers, 
 the remainders will be equal. 
 
 If equal numbers be divided by equal numbers, the 
 quotients will be equal. 
 
 These maxims are too obvious to require any illustration. 
 They form the foundation of much of our reasoning with 
 regard to figures and quantities. 
 
 Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are the 
 four operations with regard to numbers, and these opera- 
 tions are often called into exercise, not only with regard to 
 our physical, but also with regard to our moral reasonings. 
 
 All the portions of the sacred cross exhibited in Catholic 
 countries would, if put together, make a much larger cross 
 than could have been carried by Simon the Cyrenian. 
 Hence we infer, that some at least of these relics cannot 
 be genuine, for all the parts of anything taken together 
 cannot make more than the whole. 
 
 We use multiplication when we wish to present any 
 matter of quantity or numbers in a strong light. Thus, 
 in teaching economy, we may prove the evil of a daily 
 extravagance, by showing how much it would cost in the 
 course of a year : — 
 
 " Compute the pence of but one day's expense. 
 So many pounds, and angels, groats, and pence, 
 Are spent in one whole year's circumference." 
 
 To prove the danger of obstructed perspiration, Dr. 
 
48 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 Erasmus Wilson, in his "Practical Treatise on Healthy 
 Skin," states that the pores of the skin are apertures of 
 little tubes about a quarter of an inch long ; that upon 
 an average there are about 2,800 of these tubes in every 
 square inch, and that "the number of square inches of 
 surface in a man of ordinary height and bulk is 2,500. 
 The number of pores, therefore, is 7,000,000, and the 
 number of inches of perspiratory tube 1,750,000, that is, 
 145,833 feet, or 48,600 yards, or nearly 28 miles." 
 
 In the Report of the Board of Health upon the Supply 
 of Water, it is stated that the Thames, Lea, and New River 
 waters contain sixteen grains of lime in every gallon. " The 
 importance of this mineral ingredient, however, is only to 
 be correctly estimated when viewed in the aggregate ; " for 
 the daily supply of water is forty-six millions of gallons, 
 and this quantity will contain twenty-six tons of lime. 
 
 If you are a clerk in a public office, and are behind your 
 time a quarter of an hour every morning, in three hundred 
 days that will amount to seventy-five hours ; more than 
 equal at six hours a-day to a holiday of twelve days in the 
 course of the year. A large number of small parts will 
 make a great whole. 
 
 The following anecdote proves, by multiplication, the im- 
 portance of punctuality : — 
 
 "A member of the Committee being a quarter of an hour 
 behind the time, made an apology, saying, the time passed away 
 without his being aware of it. A Quaker present said — ' Friend, 
 I am not sure that we should admit thy apology. It were matter 
 of deep regret that thou shouldest have wasted thine own quarter 
 of an hour ; but there are seven besides thyself, whose time thou 
 hast also consumed, amounting in the whole to two hours — and 
 one-eighth of it only was thine own property.' " 
 
 Parties who keep omnibuses or other public conveyances 
 waiting for them, should recollect that they are sporting 
 with the time of all the other passengers. 
 
 While we multiply in order to prove the importance of 
 an object,, we use division when we wish to produce a con- 
 trary impression. Mr. Norman, the Bank Director, pub- 
 lished a pamphlet a short time ago to show the lightness of 
 our taxation. He divided the total amount of the taxes by 
 the total number of the population ; and he inferred that 
 
A WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 49 
 
 the taxation was light from the small average amount paid 
 by each individual. 
 
 2. We shall next consider this principle of the whole and 
 its parts with reference to physical objects. 
 
 By physical objects we mean objects known to the 
 senses, — such as relate to what is called natural philosophy. 
 By chemistry we ascertain what are the parts of which these 
 objects are composed. And hence we infer the purposes 
 to which they may be applied. Thus, we learn that cer- 
 tain substances may be employed as medicines ; and we 
 discover the effects of particular kinds of food : — 
 
 "Of what is water composed? Of two gases — oxygen and 
 hydrogen. In nine pounds of water, eight are oxygen, and one is 
 hydrogen. Of what is atmospheric air composed? Principally 
 of two gases, oxygen and nitrogen, mixed together in the propor- 
 tion oi one gallon of oxygen to four of nitrogen." — Dr. Brewer's 
 Guide to Science. 
 
 "Fruits consist principally of gum, sugar, starch, and vegetable 
 jelly, combined with different acids. They contain but little 
 nutritious matter, though, on account of then flavour and cool- 
 ness, they are very agreeable to the palate, and, therefore, much 
 prized as an article of diet. Their use is particularly beneficial 
 to the health." — Dr. Trueman, on Food. 
 
 Here from a knowledge of the constituent parts of these 
 substances we infer what would be the effect of the whole. 
 
 The relation between a part and a whole has sometimes 
 furnished important evidence in cases of judicial proceed- 
 ings. In a case of house-breaking, the thief had gained 
 admission into the house by means of a penknife, which 
 was broken in the attempt, and part left in the window- 
 frame. The broken knife was found in the pocket of the 
 prisoner, and perfectly corresponded with the fragment 
 left. In the case of a man who had been shot by a ball, 
 the wadding of the pistol, which stuck in the wound, was 
 found to be part of a ballad which corresponded with 
 another part found in the pocket of the prisoner. 
 
 The prophet Isaiah argues against the worship of images, 
 on the ground that the wood of the image was only part 
 of a tree, and could therefore have no more power or 
 sanctity than the other parts which were used as fueL 
 
 D 
 
50 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " The carpenter stretcheth out his rule ; he marketh it out with 
 a line ; he ntteth it with planes, and he marketh it out with the 
 compass, and maketh it after the figure of a man, according to the 
 beauty of a man ; that it may remain in the house. He heweth 
 him down cedars, and taketh the cypress and the oak, which he 
 strengtheneth for himself among the trees of the forest : he 
 planteth an ash, and the rain doth nourish it. Then shall it be 
 for a man to burn: for he will take thereof, and warm himself; 
 yea, he kindleth it, and baketh bread ; yea, he maketh a god, and 
 worshippeth it ; he maketh it a graven image, and. falleth down 
 thereto. He burneth part thereof in the fire ; with part thereof he 
 eateth flesh ; he roasteth roast, and is satisfied ; yea, he warmeth 
 himself, and saith, Aha, I am warm, I have seen the fire. And 
 the residue thereof he maketh a god, even his graven image : he 
 falleth down unto it, and worshippeth it, and prayeth unto it, and 
 saith, Deliver me ; for thou art my god. And none considereth 
 in his heart, neither is there knowledge nor understanding to say, 
 I have burned part of it in the fire ; yea, also I have baked bread 
 upon the coals thereof ; I have roasted flesh, and eaten it : and 
 shall I make the residue thereof an abomination? shall I fall 
 down to the stock of a tree ? " — Isa. xliv. 13 — 17, 19. 
 
 The relation of a whole and its parts has sometimes a 
 reference to questions in political economy. 
 
 " Let us now observe how the value of a commodity resolves 
 itself into three component parts. Take for instance a load of 
 hay ; its price pays first the wages of the labourer who cut down 
 the grass and made it into hay — then the profits of the farmer 
 who sells it, — and lastly, the rent of the field in which it grew. 
 This, therefore, constitutes the whole cost of production of the 
 load of hay, and may be called its natural value." — Mrs. Marcet. 
 
 3. We shall now consider the application of this prin- 
 ciple to moral ideas. 
 
 The word moral is not used here in its ethical sense, as 
 opposed to immoral, but as opposed to physical. We 
 cannot divide these ideas into parts so readily as we can 
 divide arithmetical numbers, or as we may carve a fowl. 
 Hence we often use the words imply or include, in order 
 to denote the simple ideas of which they are composed. 
 Thus at page 19, I have considered independence of mind 
 as implying or including several things. Possibly it 
 includes several other things besides those I have men- 
 tioned. But we are able to argue from these. For if it 
 be a duty to cherish independence of mind, then it is a 
 
WHOLE AND ITS PARTS. 51 
 
 duty to cherish every one of the parts or principles of 
 which it is composed. So gratitude includes a consciousness 
 of favours received — a disposition to acknowledge them on 
 proper occasions — and a resolution to return them when 
 an opportunity occurs. Honour includes a regard to truth 
 in words — humanity and generosity in actions — candour 
 and forgiveness in thought, and resentment of insult or 
 affront. 
 
 Under this relation we may class the points of belief, or 
 practice adopted by any public body. The following are 
 the points of the charter contended for by ifae Chartist : 
 1. Equal Electoral Districts. 2. Universal Suffrage. 3. 
 Vote by Ballot. 4. Triennial Parliaments. 5. No Pro- 
 perty Qualification for Members. 6. Payment of Repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 Lord John Russell, in his letter to the Bishop of 
 Durham, thus enumerates the several parts or doctrines 
 that form what is called Puseyism. 
 
 " Clergymen of our own Church, who have subscribed the 
 Thirty-nine Articles, and acknowledged in explicit terms the 
 Queen's supremacy, have been the most forward in leading their 
 flocks, ' step by step to the very verge of the precipice. 5 The 
 honour paid to saints, the claim of infallibility for the Church, 
 the superstitious use of the sign of the cross, the muttering of 
 the Liturgy so as to disguise the language in which it is written, 
 the recommendation of auricular confession, and the administra- 
 tion of penance and absolution — all these things are pointed out 
 by clergymen of the Church of England as worthy of adoption, 
 and are now openly reprehended by the Bishop of London in his 
 Charge to the clergy of his diocese." 
 
 From the character of the individual doctrines, or prac- 
 tices, we infer the character of the whole system. 
 
 The settlement of a public question will sometimes turn 
 upon this relation of a whole and its parts. Baron Roths- 
 child took all the oath required from Members of Parlia- 
 ment, except the words, " Upon the true faith of a 
 Christian." His friends contended that these words were 
 not part of the oath, and that the Baron, having now 
 taken the oath, should be allowed to take his seat. The 
 House of Commons decided that these words formed a 
 part of the oath. The Baron, therefore, could not take 
 his seat. 
 
 d2 
 
52 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 4. The following are erroneous reasonings in relation to 
 this principle. 
 
 Saul, the king of Israel, was commanded to destroy the 
 Amalekites, and their cattle. He destroyed the Amale- 
 kites but not their cattle. He afterwards contended that 
 he had obeyed the command. He considered that a part 
 was equal to the whole. 
 
 When a public body, or society governed jointly by a 
 number of managers, is prosperous, each manager will 
 take to himself a high degree of credit for having caused 
 that prosperity. On the other hand, when the society 
 becomes involved in difficulties, each manager is anxious 
 to show that no part of the blame belongs to him ; thus 
 the totals of the praise or blame which each manager 
 is willing to take to himself is more or less than the total 
 that belongs to the whole body. It should be recollected 
 in such cases that, whether of applause or censure, the 
 total of all the parts cannot be either more or less than 
 the whole. 
 
 Mr. Caudle having lent a friend five pounds, Mrs. Caudle 
 enumerates four or five ways in which this amount might 
 have been employed, and then concludes that the lending 
 of this one sum of five pounds has subjected her to all 
 those privations. 
 
 "You ought to be very rich, Mr. Caudle. I wonder who'd lerd 
 you five pounds ? But so it is : a wife may work and may slave ! 
 Ha, dear ! the many things that might have been done with five 
 pounds. As if people picked up money in the street ! But you 
 always were a fool, Mr. Caudle ! I 've wanted a black satin gown 
 these three years, and that five pounds would have pretty well 
 bought it. All the girls want bonnets, and where they 're to come 
 from I can't tell. Half five pounds would have bought 'em — but 
 now they must go without. Next Tuesday the fire-insurance is 
 due. I should like to know how it's to be paid. Why, it can't 
 be paid at all. That five pounds would have just done it — and 
 now, insurance is out of the question. I did think we might go 
 to Margate this summer. There 's poor little Caroline, I'm sure 
 she wants the sea. But no, dear creature ! she must stop at 
 home — all of us must stop at home — she '11 go into a consump- 
 tion, there's no doubt of that; yes, sweet little angel! I've 
 made up my mind to lose her, now. The child might have been 
 saved ; but people can't save then children and throw away their 
 five pounds too." 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 53 
 
 Dean Swift, in his sarcastic "Advice to Servants," 
 counsels them to act on the same fallacy. 
 
 " The cook, the butler, the groom, the market-man, and every 
 other servant who is concerned in the expenses of the family, 
 should act as if his master's whole estate ought to be applied to 
 that servant's particular business. For instance, if the cook com- 
 putes his master's estate to be a thousand pounds a-year, he 
 reasonably concludes, that a thousand pounds a-year will afford 
 meat enough, and therefore he need not be sparing ; the butler 
 makes the same judgment, so may the groom and the coachman ; 
 and thus every branch of expense will be filled to your master's 
 honour." 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE EELATION OF GENUS AND SPECIES. 
 
 This relation is founded upon the act of classification. 
 Let us take a tree. There are many kinds of trees, as the 
 oak, the elm, and there is a great number of oaks and 
 elms. Here, then, a tree is the genus, oak, elm, are the 
 species, and a particular oak or elm that we may happen 
 to see, is an individual. 
 
 In all the branches of natural history, classification is 
 very generally introduced. It is a rule, that the genus 
 can always be asserted of each species. Thus we can say, 
 an oak is a tree, — an elm is a tree, — a vine is a tree. 
 This shows that tree is a genus, and that oak, elm, and 
 vine, are species under that particular genus. We may 
 say — a horse is an animal, an ox is an animal, a dog is an 
 animal. This proves that animal is a genus, and that dog, 
 horse, and ox, are species under that genus. Each species 
 may again be divided into inferior species, as there are 
 various kinds of dogs, horses, and oxen. 
 
 Genus and species have a reference to moral ideas, as 
 well as to physical ones. Thus we may say, industry is a 
 virtue, frugality is a virtue, temperance is a virtue. This 
 shows that virtue is a genus, and that frugality, industry, 
 and temperance are its species. 
 
 You will observe that, although I call this, for brevity 
 
54 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 sake, the relation of genus and species, you must always 
 remember that, while a genus may be divided into species, 
 each species may again be subdivided into individuals, I 
 use these words, genus and species, being words in common 
 use, to express the general idea of classification. The word 
 genus denotes a large class — the word species a small class 
 included in the large class. This small class may some- 
 times be again subdivided into smaller classes, and an 
 individual is a single thing forming a part of the smallest 
 class. It is clear that any single thing included in a 
 smaller class must be included in a larger class. This is 
 the foundation of all our reasonings from the relation of 
 genus and species. 
 
 1. The following are examples of classification: — 
 
 " All flesh is not the same flesh : but there is one kind of flesh 
 of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of 
 birds."— 1 Cor. xv. 39. 
 
 " Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is 
 fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter 
 against them. Children, obey your parents in all things : for this 
 is well pleasing unto the Lord. Fathers, provoke not your chil- 
 dren to anger, lest they be discouraged." — Col. iii. 18 — 21. 
 
 " Mountain water, as it is pure and cold to the taste, is also 
 beneficial to the health for drinking. If it cannot be obtained, 
 river water may be resorted to. Well water I put in the last 
 place, although everywhere it is agreeable for its coldness. It is 
 almost always hard, unsuitable for dissolving soap and for cooking 
 vegetables. The water of lakes, even although they may contain 
 the purest waters, and appear pellucid, nevertheless become tepid 
 from their isolation, and are flat and vapid." — Report of the General 
 Board of Health. 
 
 " The capital of a manufacturer is of two hinds, fixed and cir- 
 culating. The fixed capital remains always in his possession, as 
 the mills, warehouses, &c. The circulating capital is always 
 going out of his possession, as the materials of the manufacture, 
 the wages of the workmen, &c. So the horses that draw the 
 plough are part of the farmer's fixed capital, the sheep and oxen 
 he sends to market for sale are part of his circulating capital." — 
 
 " We are authorized to announce that J. W. Gilbart, Esq., 
 F.R.S., will present the sum of One Hundred Pounds to the 
 author of the best Essay which shall be written in reply to the 
 following question : — ' Li what way can any of the articles col- 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 55 
 
 lected at the Industrial Exhibition of 1851 be rendered especially 
 serviceable to the interests of ' Practical Banking?' These articles 
 may be architectural models that may suggest improvements in 
 the hank-house or office — inventions by which light, heat, and 
 ventilation may be secured, so as to promote the health and com- 
 fort of the bank-clerks — discoveries in the fine arts by which the 
 interior of a bank may be decorated, or the bank furniture ren- 
 dered more eommodious — improvements in writing-paper, pens, 
 ink, account-books, scales, letter-copying machines, or other in- 
 struments used in carrying on the business — improvements in 
 printing and engraving, by which banks may get their notes, 
 receipts, letters of credit, and other documents of a better kind 
 at a less expense, or so as to prevent forgery — new inventions 
 in the construction of locks, cash-boxes, and safes, which shall 
 render property more secure against fire or thieves — and generally 
 all articles of every kind which can be so applied as to improve, 
 cheapen, or facilitate any of the practical operations of banking." 
 — Banker's Magazine for January, 1851. 
 
 2. The rules for dividing a genus into its species, are 
 similar to those for dividing a whole into its parts. A 
 species is part of a genus. 
 
 " Each part singly taken must contain less than the whole, but 
 all the parts taken collectively, or together, must contain neither 
 more nor less than the whole ; or, as logicians sometimes express 
 it, the parts of the division ought to exhaust the whole thing 
 which is divided." 
 
 " In all distributions we should first consider the larger and 
 more immediate kinds or species, or ranks of being, and not 
 divide a thing at once into the more minute and remote." 
 
 " The several parts of a distribution ought to be opposite ; that 
 is, one species or class of beings in the same rank of division 
 ought not to contain or include another ; so men ought not to be 
 divided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and the tall; for poor 
 men may be both learned and tall, and so may the rich." 
 
 " Let not subdivisions be too numerous, without necessity ; 
 therefore I think quantity is better distinguished at once into a 
 line, a surface, and a solid ; than to say, as Ramus does, that 
 quantity is either a line or a thing lined ; and a thing lined is 
 either a surface or a solid. 
 
 "Distribute every subject according to the special design you 
 have in view, so far as is necessary or useful to your present in- 
 quiry. Thus a politician distributes mankind according to their 
 civil characters into the rulers and the ruled; and a physician 
 divides them into the sick or the healthy; but a divine distri- 
 Dutes them into Turks, heathens, Jews, or Christians." 
 
56 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " It is to this doctrine of distribution of a genus into its several 
 species, we must also refer the distribution of a cause according 
 to its several effects, as some medicines are heating, some are 
 cooling : or an effect, when it is distinguished by its causes ; as 
 faith is either built upon divine testimony or human. It is to 
 this head we refer particular artificial bodies, when they are dis- 
 tinguished according to the matter they are made of, as a statue 
 is either of brass, of marble, or wood, &c. ; and any other beings, 
 when they are distinguished according to their end and design, as 
 the furniture of body or mind is either for ornament or use. To 
 this head also we refer subjects, when they are divided according 
 to their modes or accidents ; as men are either merry, or grave, 
 or sad ; and modes, when they are divided by their subjects, as 
 distempers belong to the fluid, or to the solid parts of the 
 animal.' 5 — Watts' Logic. 
 
 3. The mode of reasoning from genus and species is 
 merely to show that a certain species is properly classed 
 under a certain genus, and then to affirm or deny of the 
 species what you may affirm or deny of the genus.* 
 
 Thus you may say, All fruit is useful to health : the 
 apple is a kind of fruit, therefore the apple is useful to 
 health. I may observe that this principle of reasoning 
 from genus to species is the only kind of reasoning in 
 which you gain anything by placing it in the form of a 
 syllogism. And here, mind, the argument gains nothing 
 in point of strength, but sometimes it gains a little in point 
 of clearness ; or, at least, it gives a clearer statement of the 
 meaning of the reasoner. 
 
 The following are the examples given in the Logic of 
 Dr. Watts :— 
 
 " Every wicked man is truly miserable ; 
 All tyrants are wicked men ; 
 Therefore all tyrants are truly miserable. 
 He that's always in fear is not happy ; 
 Covetous men are always in fear ; 
 Therefore covetous men are not happy. 
 Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us ; 
 Some afflictions further our salvation ; 
 Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 
 
 * This is the principle of the first figure of syllogistic reasoning ; or, as- Mr. 
 Bailey calls it, "class reasoning." The maxim is, "Whatever is predicated 
 universally of any class of things, may be predicated in like manner of anything 
 comprehended in that class."— See Bailey, p. 64. 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 57 
 
 Nothing that must be repented of is truly desirable ; 
 Some pleasures must be repented of; 
 Therefore there are some pleasures which are not truly 
 desirable." 
 
 Here you will observe, that in the first syllogism, the 
 genus is, " Every wicked man," — that is, "All wicked men" 
 — and the species, u all tyrants." 
 
 In the second syllogism, " He that's always in fear," is 
 the genus, and " covetous man " is the species under that 
 genus. 
 
 In the third syllogism, " Whatever furthers our salva- 
 tion " is the genus, and " some afflictions " is the species. 
 
 In the fourth syllogism, " Nothing that must be repented 
 of" is the genus, and " some pleasures " is the species. 
 
 In natural logic we need not use these syllogisms. We 
 should, in the above cases, express our reasons in the 
 following manner : — 
 
 All tyrants are truly miserable, because they are wicked 
 men. 
 
 Covetous men are not happy, because they are always 
 in fear. 
 
 Some afflictions are good for us, because they further 
 our salvation. 
 
 Some pleasures are not truly desirable, because they 
 must be repented of. 
 
 4. The application of a general principle to a particular 
 case, is another mode of reasoning, from the relation of 
 genus and species. 
 
 " Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal, 
 knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven." * 
 
 This general principle is thus applied with reference to 
 the servants of public companies : — ■ 
 
 " Be just in your appointments, and select those who are the 
 most worthy and the best qualified for the duties they will have 
 to discharge. Be just in the amount of your remuneration ; recol- 
 lect that many of the servants of public companies have greater 
 trusts and heavier responsibilities than the servants of individuals; 
 and in this case, it is just and equal that they be rewarded accord- 
 ingly. Be just in your promotions, and let not merit be supplanted 
 by patronage or favouritism. Be just in the quantity of labour you 
 
 * Col. iv. 1. 
 
 d3 
 
58 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 exact. Appoint a sufficient number of servants to do the work 
 easily. Do not compel them to keep late hours ; nor refuse 
 reasonable holidays, for the purposes of health and recreation. 
 Be just in your pensions, and let your aged and worn-out servants 
 be treated with respect and liberality. Be just in your reproofs. 
 Let not your censures or your punishments be more than 
 proportionate to the offence; and be as ready at all times 
 to acknowledge the merits of your servants as to notice their 
 defects. All complaints, and all applications for increased re- 
 muneration or privileges, from the servants of public companies, 
 should receive mature consideration; and all refusals should be 
 given with kindness and courtesy." — Gilbart's Practical Treatise 
 on Banking. 
 
 5. In the application of general proverbs we reason from 
 the relation of genus and species. 
 
 Thus, " Honesty is the best policy." Therefore, when a 
 public company has sustained losses, it is the best policy to 
 announce them in its annual report to the shareholders, as 
 that is the most honest procedure. This is one of the 
 numerous cases to which this maxim may be applied. Dr. 
 Franklin describes several specific characters under the 
 genus that they " paid too dear for their whistle." And in 
 daily life we meet with people to whom is applied the 
 maxim, that " they have too many irons in the fire ;" or 
 that " they carry too many eggs in one basket ;" or that 
 " they are penny wise and pound foolish." In these cases 
 the proverb is regarded as the genus, and the particular 
 case to which it is applied is the species. This will appear 
 the more evident if placed in the form of a syllogism. 
 
 It is unwise to have too many irons in the fire. 
 
 The man who carries on more trades than he can attend 
 to, has too many irons in the fire. 
 
 Therefore, the man who carries on more trades than he 
 can attend to, acts unwisely. 
 
 6. Rules and examples in any art or science sustain the 
 relation to each other of genus and species. 
 
 Take the following general rule in grammar from Lindley 
 Murray : — " Two or more nouns, &c. in the singular 
 number joined together by a copulative conjunction, 
 expressed or understood, must have verbs, nouns, and 
 pronouns agreeing with them in the plural number.' 
 Here is the general rule. Now, when we meet with two 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 59 
 
 or more nouns, joined together in the manner stated, we 
 apply the rule, and if we find that the verbs, nouns, and 
 pronouns agreeing with them are put in the plural number, 
 we infer that the sentence is grammatical ; but, if other- 
 wise, we say the sentence is ungrammatical. Now then, 
 try by this rule the following sentences : — " Socrates and 
 Plato were wise, they were the most eminent philosophers 
 of Greece." Here the rule is observed. " And so was also 
 James and John, the sons of Zebedee, who were partners 
 with Simon." Here the rule is violated. 
 
 You perceive then that the application of any general 
 rule to a particular case, is a logical process, and forms an 
 argument on the principle of genus and species. I may 
 also observe, that although in teaching an art systema- 
 tically, we lay down our rules first, and then give the 
 examples, yet, in the practical operations of teaching, espe- 
 cially in conversation, it is usually best to state the example 
 first, and then state the rule as a deduction from the 
 example. Indeed, most general rules were probably in the 
 first instance deduced from examples. Men did not invent 
 grammar first, and then learn to speak, but speech existed 
 before grammar. The same remark may be applied -very 
 extensively. Poets existed before critics, and the practical 
 arts before the sciences. 
 
 7. Arguments from enumeration may justly be classed 
 under genus and species, as the enumeration is either of 
 the individuals of a species, or of the species of a genus. 
 
 Sometimes we enumerate the several arguments by 
 which an opinion may be supported. Public speakers at 
 the close of their address often do this. And judges on 
 the bench enumerate, or sum up, as it is called, the argu- 
 ments that have been used by the advocates. 
 
 Sometimes, to prove the advantages or disadvantages of 
 any engagement or pursuit, we enumerate them. In order 
 to show that there is a pleasure in science, Lord Brougham 
 thus enumerates the pleasures that it tends to produce : — 
 
 " It is easy to show that there is a positive gratification result- 
 ing from the study of the sciences. If it be a pleasure to gratify 
 curiosity — to know what we are ignorant of — to have our feelings 
 of wonder called forth ; how pure a delight of this very kind does 
 natural science hold out to its students ! Recollect some of the 
 
60 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 extraordinary discoveries of mechanical philosophy. Observe the 
 extraordinary truths which optical science discloses. Chemistry 
 is not behind in its wonders; and yet these are trifling when 
 compared to the prodigies which astronomy opens to our view : 
 the enormous masses of the heavenly bodies; their immense dis- 
 tances ; their countless numbers ; and their motions, whose swift- 
 ness mocks the uttermost efforts of the imagination. Then, if 
 we raise our view to the structure of the heavens, we are again 
 gratified by tracing accurate, but most unexpected resemblances. 
 Is it not in the highest degree interesting to find that the power 
 which keeps the earth in its shape, and in its path wheeling round 
 the sun, extends over all the other worlds that compose the uni- 
 verse, and gives to each its proper place and motion ; that the 
 same power keeps the moon in her path round the earth; that the 
 same power causes the tides upon our earth, and the peculiar 
 form of the earth itself; — and that, after all, it is the same power 
 which makes a stone fall to the ground ? To learn these things, 
 and to reflect upon them, produces certain as well as pure grati- 
 fication." — Sullivan's Literary Class Book. 
 
 In the following quotation, the genus is "various 
 writers ;" and Moses, the prophets, the evangelists, &c, are 
 enumerated as the species. 
 
 " The various writers of the Bible were themselves persuaded 
 that they wrote under Divine inspiration, and claimed the acknow- 
 ledgment of that inspiration from others. Moses ascended *the 
 mount in the view of all the people, and, surrounded by the 
 visible and refulgent glories of the present Deity, he there re- 
 ceived the law immediately from his mouth. The economy of 
 religion he established included, according to divine institution, 
 the symbols of the presiding presence of God, and the means of 
 infallibly ascertaining his will, giving the character of divinity to 
 the whole. And all its several parts, relating both to faith and 
 practice, were devoutly regarded by the Israelitish people, as 
 'the words which the Lord their God had commanded them' to 
 believe and to do. The prophets uniformly acknowledged their 
 belief in the agency of divine influence, calling them from their 
 respective avocations in life, revealing to them important religious 
 truths previously unconceived, and commissioning them to pro- 
 claim those truths in the hearing of the people: — in perfect 
 accordance with such an acknowledgment, their several messages 
 usually bear the affixment of a signature — at once descriptive of 
 their character and origin as divine — ' Thus saith the Lord.' The 
 evangelists, though in express terms they do not affirm their own 
 inspiration, yet tell us that Christ promised to ' send the Spirit 
 of truth to guide them into all truth, and to bring all things to 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 61 
 
 their remembrance, whatsoever he had said unto them ;' and in 
 recording such promises they obviously imply, 'that it was in 
 virtue of their accomplishment, or by the promised assistance of 
 the Spirit, that they were enabled to give a faithful narrative of 
 the words and works of their Redeemer.' The apostles, in a 
 great variety of texts, and in language the most unequivocal and 
 clear, affirm, that 'the things which they taught, God had re- 
 vealed them by his Spirit,' and that 'he who despised those 
 things, despised not man but God.' The careful and specific 
 notification of one or two matters as of private opinion, in con- 
 tradistinction to the general tenor of their writings as of divine 
 authority, is corroborative of their persuasion in this particular. 
 The New Testament, speaking of itself, certifies that the Gospel 
 it contains ' was not received of man, but by the revelation of 
 Jesus Christ,' — speaking of the Old Testament, it asserts that 
 ' the prophecy came not in old time, by the will of man, but holy 
 men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost ' — 
 uniting the Old and the New together in one testimony, it 
 declares that ' God, who at sundry times and in divers manners 
 spake unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days 
 spoken unto us by his Son ' — and in the union of the Old and 
 New Testaments closing the canon of divine truth, it solemnly 
 affirms ' All scripture is given by inspiration of God :' and ' If any 
 man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the 
 plagues that are written in this book : and if any man shall take 
 away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take 
 away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, 
 and from the things which are written in this book.' " — Lectures 
 on the Holy Bible. By the Rev. Thomas Gilbart, Minister of York 
 Street Chapel, Dublin, 1820. 
 
 Sometimes, in regard to public questions, we enumerate 
 the parties whose opinions are in favour of the proposed 
 measure. There is an excellent example of this kind of 
 argument in the Speech delivered in the House of Com- 
 mons, by Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, on the Amelioration 
 of the Criminal Code. It is copied into the Preface to his 
 Life, written by his son. The following example is taken 
 from a speech delivered at the Mansion House, in January 
 1850, by Mr. Samuel Jones Loyd, now Lord Overstone, in 
 favour of the Industrial Exhibition : — 
 
 " It was no longer necessary for them to discuss its character 
 or expediency; on these points the public were united. The 
 scheme now went forth to the world stamped by the approbation 
 and recommendation of our gracious Sovereign, as expressed in the 
 
62 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 act constituting the Royal Commission, and as further proved 
 by the munificent donation with which she had headed the sub- 
 scription. It was further stamped with the continued support of 
 her illustrious Consort, whose original suggestion it was, and who 
 had already been alluded to in terras not more complimentary 
 than he deserved • for those who wished to know his true cha- 
 racter should see hirn seated at the council board, and observe 
 his capacity for conducting complicated public business with 
 sagacity, perseverance, and energy. Beyond this the project 
 went forth sanctioned by the authority of the Ministers of this 
 country, as evidenced by their advising the Crown to issue the 
 Royal Commission, and by their presence on this occasion, 
 through which so much weight was given to the proceedings of 
 the day. It was still further sanctioned by the recorded resolu- 
 tions of the people of 'England assembled in almost every great 
 district of the empire, and lastly, by the two great meetings held in 
 the Egyptian-hall." 
 
 8. Under this head of genus and species we may place 
 reasoning from the definition. 
 
 The genus and the specific difference, as we have already 
 stated, are joined together to make a formal definition. 
 Thus, in the example quoted from Dr. Watts, at page 25, 
 juice is the genus, and pressed from grapes the specific 
 difference, and those together, the juice of the grape, is the 
 definition of wine. A definition formed in this way by the 
 union of the genus and the difference, is called by scho- 
 lastic logicians a formal definition. We cannot always 
 obtain a definition of this kind, but when we can do so, we 
 may reason from it in various ways. 
 
 We may infer that everything to which this definition 
 will apply are so many species under this generic term. 
 Thus, port, sherry, claret, champagne, being all juices of 
 grapes, are so many species of wine. All subjects will 
 not, as we have said, admit of this formal definition. But 
 you may generally commence your definition by stating 
 the genus or general nature. Thus, if asked what is justice, 
 you may say it is " a moral virtue." This is the genus. 
 And then you may state wherein it differs from other 
 moral virtues, as temperance, cleanliness, patience, &c. ; 
 and you may say, Justice is a moral virtue which consists 
 in giving to every one his due. So, if you have seen the 
 hippopotamus, and are asked what sort of a thing it is, 
 you may say it is an animal that resembles a pig. This is 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 63 
 
 the genus. And then you may state the points wherein it 
 differs from a pig ; and this will complete the description. 
 Now, having got a definition, you may consider it as 
 a species, and affirm of it what you may affirm of the 
 genus. Thus, haying defined justice to be a moral virtue, 
 you may infer that it ought to be cultivated, inasmuch as 
 all the moral virtues ought to be cultivated. Then you 
 may consider the definition as a general principle appli- 
 cable to individual cases. And as the specific difference of 
 justice consists " in giving to every one his due," you will 
 infer that a master who defrauds his servant of his wages, 
 a tradesman who cheats his creditors, a slanderer who 
 speaks ill of worthy men, a magistrate who punishes the 
 innocent, or who lets the guilty go free, does not act con- 
 sistently with justice, as these parties do not give to every 
 one his due. 
 
 But you must not be too precise about this matter of 
 definition. If your opponent is disposed to cavil, he may 
 easily find fault with any definition you can give. Even 
 men of great talent and learning cannot agree among 
 themselves upon this subject. The most eminent poli- 
 tical economists give different definitions of such plain 
 words as capital, profit, rent, wages, — words that we use in 
 our ordinary conversation, without fancying that there is 
 any difficulty or mystery about them. Sydney Smith, the 
 most witty man of his time, was at a loss to find a defini- 
 tion for wit, and at the same time is very witty upon the 
 definitions he quotes from other writers. Dryden's defini- 
 tion of wit, he says, will apply to Blair's Sermons, and 
 Pope's to the Funeral Orations of Bossuet. 
 
 9. We reason erroneously from the relation of genus 
 and species, when we place under the genus several species 
 that do not belong to it, and then assert of each species 
 what may be truly asserted of the genus. 
 
 Mrs. Opie, who had previously become a member of the 
 Society of Friends, published a book entitled, "Illustra- 
 tions of Lying in all its Branches." Under the class of 
 •'■' practical lies," she places the practice of wearing false 
 hair. This we think is an erroneous classification ; for 
 if we use the word liar in the sense in which it is usually 
 employed, the wearer of false hair is not a species of that 
 
64 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 genus. A lie implies something immoral, but we do not 
 think it is immoral to conceal defects that are inconvenient 
 to the party himself, or that would be unpleasant to the 
 beholders. Mrs. Opie's argument stands thus : — 
 
 A liar is one who wishes to deceive. He who wears 
 false hair wishes to deceive. Therefore he who wears false 
 hair is a liar. 
 
 We may refute this argument in the following ways :- — 
 We may say that the words " wishes to deceive," have 
 not the same meaning in the first or major proposition 
 which they have in the second or minor proposition, and 
 hence the two propositions are independent of each other, 
 and they have no relation that can be a foundation for any 
 reasoning respecting them. (See page 30.) 
 
 Or, we may admit that in both propositions the words 
 "wishes to deceive" have the same meaning. But then 
 they merely denote a common property — not a specific 
 difference — and hence they do not prove that the two 
 subjects are the same. Gold is yellow, and saffron is 
 yellow, but it does not follow that saffron is gold. So in 
 the present case, the common attribute does not prove 
 that the two subjects are the same. (See page 32.) 
 
 Or we may reduce the conclusion to an absurdity, thus : 
 — AH liars shall have their portion in the lake that burns 
 with fire and brimstone. The man who wears false hair 
 is a liar. Therefore the man who wears false hair shall 
 have his portion in the lake that burns with fire and 
 brimstone. This conclusion shows the absurdity of the 
 classification. 
 
 In actual life we often meet with erroneous classifica- 
 tions of this kind. The words "want of courtesy" is a 
 general term, often unjustly applied to individual actions. 
 A person goes to transact some business at a public office, 
 and is detained much longer than he expected. He be- 
 comes irritated, and declares he is treated with want of 
 courtesy ; whereas the delay may have been occasioned 
 by the necessary forms of the office, or by his own igno- 
 rance of those forms. When a servant for some trifling 
 oversight is charged with " neglect of duty," it is a fallacy 
 of the same kind. The words "neglect of duty," is a 
 generic phrase that is applied only to cases of wilful or 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 65 
 
 serious omissions. To apply it in trifling cases is to use 
 it illogically. Whenever we wish to represent any act in 
 its worst colours, we use generic terms of so wide a mean- 
 ing as to include several species of offences of a deeper 
 dye than that we are called upon to censure ; and, on the 
 other hand, when we wish to extenuate, we employ generic 
 terms that shall include only offences of a lighter hue. 
 All these are fallacies arising from erroneous classification 
 similar to that we have exemplified from Mrs. Opie. 
 
 10. We must also avoid the error of confounding two 
 or more species because they belong to the same genus. 
 
 Thus when we find that two species resemble each other 
 in some respects (which of course they always must do), 
 we should not infer that they resemble each other in all 
 respects. For example — 
 
 " He that says you are an animal, says true. He that 
 says you are a goose says you are an animal. Therefore he 
 that says you are a goose says true." Here the two pre- 
 mises are true, and yet the conclusion is absurd. It is true 
 that you are an animal, and that a goose is an animal, and 
 yet it is not true (of course I mean literally) that you are 
 a goose : For you and the goose belong to different species, 
 and although you resemble each other so far as to be 
 properly classed under the same genus (animal), yet you 
 cannot be asserted to be each other. So, dog, horse, camel, 
 elephant, are species of animal, but a dog is not a horse, 
 nor is a camel an elephant. 
 
 In the case of the genus " animal" we are not in much 
 danger of falling into error. But we meet with similar errors 
 elsewhere. I have read a debate in the House of Commons 
 in which Unitarians were called Mahometans. Both these 
 bodies agree in disbelieving the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 But under this generic description, they form two widely 
 different species, and one cannot logically be confounded 
 with the other. You will often observe this practice in 
 party writers. They will class the party against whom 
 they write with some other party that has a disreputable 
 name, and confound them both together under some generic 
 description. 
 
 11. In reasoning on this principle we should always be 
 on our guard against mere mental classifications. I mean 
 
66 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 such as exist only in the mind, and not in the nature of 
 the things themselves. The following quotation from Dr. 
 Watts will explain what I mean. 
 
 " I may borrow a remarkable instance for my purpose almost 
 out of every garden, which contains a variety of plants in it. 
 Most or all plants agree in this, that they have a root, a stalk, 
 leaves, buds, blossoms, and seeds : but the gardener ranges them 
 under very different names, as though they were really different 
 kinds of beings, merely because of the different use and service 
 to which they are applied by men : as for instance, those plants 
 whose roots are eaten, shall appropriate the name of roots to 
 themselves ; such are carrots, turnips, radishes, &c. If the leaves 
 are of chief use to us, then we call them herbs, as sage, mint, 
 thyme; if the leaves are eaten raw, they are termed salad, as 
 lettuce, purslain ; if boiled, they become pot-herbs, as spinage, 
 coleworts ; and some of those plants which are pot-herbs in one 
 family are salad in another. If the buds are made our food, they 
 are called heads or tops ; so cabbage heads, heads of asparagus 
 and artichokes. If the blossom be of most importance, we call 
 it a flower ; such are daisies, tulips, and carnations, which are 
 the mere blossoms of those plants. If the husk or seeds are 
 eaten, they are called the fruits of the ground; as peas, beans, 
 strawberries, &c. If any part of the plant be of known and 
 common use to us in medicine, we call it a physical herb ; as car- 
 duus, scurvy-grass ; but if we count no part useful, we call it a 
 weed, and throw it out of the garden ; and yet, perhaps, our next 
 neighbour knows some valuable property and use of it ; he plants 
 it in his garden, and gives it the title of an herb, or a flower. 
 
 " Now, when things are set in this clear Light, it appears how 
 ridiculous it would be for two persons to contend, whether dan- 
 delion be an herb or a weed; whether it be a pot-herb or a salad; 
 when, by the custom or fancy of different families, this one plant 
 obtains all these names, according to the several uses of it, and 
 the value that is put upon it." 
 
 A dispute somewhat similar to what is here intimated 
 took place between Mr. Maculloch and Mr. Malthus upon 
 the classification of labourers into productive and unpro- 
 ductive. Mr. Malthus, following Adam Smith, applied the 
 word productive to such labourers only whose exertions 
 directly produced material wealth. Mr. Maculloch ex- 
 tended the word so as to include those also whose labour 
 indirectly produced wealth. Hence arose the important 
 question, whether a dancer at the opera should be styled 
 a productive or an unproductive labourer 1 Some good 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 67 
 
 paper and printing were expended in this wordy warfare. 
 And after all, it was only a dispute about classification, for 
 in other respects the antagonists did not differ in opinion. 
 This example may teach us to use caution in the choice 
 of the words we employ to denote our classifications. The 
 words productive and unproductive seem to convey praise 
 and censure. Had other words been employed, Adam 
 Smith's distinction would not probably have been thought 
 worthy of so much reproach.* 
 
 12. In reasoning from this relation of genus and species, 
 we should carefully notice the kind of universality which 
 is attributable to the genus ; for, if the general proposition 
 be taken in too extensive a sense, the conclusion will be 
 erroneous. On this subject we quote Dr. Watts : — 
 
 " Universal terms may either denote a mathematical, a physical, 
 or a moral universality. 
 
 " A mathematical universality, is when all the particulars con- 
 tained under any general idea have the same predicate belonging 
 to them without any exception whatsoever ; or when the predi- 
 cate is so essential to the universal subject, that it destroys the 
 very nature of the subject to be without it ; as, All circles have 
 a centre and circumference : All spirits in their own nature are 
 immortal. 
 
 " A physical or natural universality, is when, according to the 
 order and common course of nature, a predicate agrees to all the 
 subjects of that kind, though there may be some accidental and 
 preternatural exceptions ; as, All men use words to express their 
 thoughts, yet dumb persons are excepted, for they cannot speak. 
 All beasts have four feet, yet there may be some monsters with 
 five ; or maimed, who have but three. 
 
 "A moral universality, is when the predicate agrees to the 
 greatest part of the particulars which are contained under the 
 universal subject; as, All negroes are stupid creatures : All men 
 are governed by affection rather than by reason: All the old 
 Romans loved their country: and the scripture uses this language 
 when St. Paul tells us, ' The Cretes are always bars/ 
 
 " Now it is evident, that a special or singular conclusion cannot 
 be inferred from a moral universality, nor always and infallibly 
 from a physical one, though it may be always inferred from a 
 universality which is mathematical, without any danger or possi- 
 bility of a mistake. 
 
 * We fear Mr. Bailey has committed an error of this kind in dividing reasoning 
 into demonstrative and contingent (page 5). In defiance of all explanation the 
 mind -will associate some degree of uncertainty with the word " contingent." 
 
68 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " Let it be observed also, that usually we make little or no 
 distinction in common language, between a subject that is physi- 
 cally or mathematically universal." 
 
 You will find that some political economists lay down 
 general propositions, and reason from them as though they 
 possessed a mathematical universality. But, from the 
 nature of the science, this cannot be the case. It is a 
 moral science, and its general propositions have only a 
 moral universality. I mean that these rules have a good 
 many exceptions. For example ; ©ne of its principles is, 
 that the Government should not interfere with matters of 
 trade — a very good rule, as a general rule ; but when we 
 are told that this rule is so inflexible that the Government 
 must not interfere even in behalf of humanity and religion, 
 then we contend that its advocates claim for this rule 
 a universality to which it is not entitled. In this sense 
 we deny the soundness of the rule. Nay, even those 
 political economists who maintain most strongly this 
 principle, maintain at the same time that the Govern- 
 ment ought to pass laws for the regulation of the currency 
 — a subject with which trade has a very close affinity. 
 
 It is rarely that a mathematical universality can be 
 obtained with regard to those propositions that we usually 
 act upon in ordinary life. We believe that all noblemen 
 have honourable and patriotic feelings — that all judges are 
 impartial in their decisions — that all London merchants 
 are honest in their dealings — that no clergyman would tell 
 an untruth — that our friends, whose constancy we have 
 tried, will never desert us — that a man who has main- 
 tained a high reputation for thirty years will maintain it 
 as long as he lives. But we have only moral evidence 
 for all these propositions, and we can get no more. He 
 who, in these and similar instances, would refuse to act 
 until he should obtain mathematical evidence, would show 
 a want of that wisdom and decision which are essential to 
 the good administration of the affairs either of a family, a 
 commercial establishment, or a political community. 
 
 13. We may observe, that all arguments formed on the 
 relation of subject and attribute may also be brought 
 under the relation of genus and species. 
 
 All subjects may be distributed into class:s, according to 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 69 
 
 their attributes. Thus, some horses are of a grey colour, 
 Now, we may consider grey as an attribute of the horses, 
 or we may consider grey horses as forming a class, and our 
 reasonings will be substantially the same, though, perhaps, 
 changed in regard to form. Let us take an example from 
 Dr. Watts :— 
 
 " No liar is fit to be believed. 
 
 Every good christian is fit to be believed. 
 
 Therefore, no good christian is a liar." 
 
 Here the words " fit to be believed" express an attri- 
 bute, and, as this attribute will not apply to both the 
 subjects, we infer that these subjects are different. See 
 page 40. 
 
 But let us suppose that these words " fit to be believed" 
 denote a class, then the argument will stand thus : — 
 
 " No man who is fit to be believed is a liar. 
 Every good christian is fit to be believed. 
 Therefore, no good christian is a liar." 
 
 Here "fit to be believed" denotes a class of persons, and 
 " a good christian " is one of that class. 
 
 Let us take another instance of a different kind : — 
 
 " Whosoever loves God shall be saved. 
 All the lovers of God have their imperfections. 
 Therefore, some who have imperfections shall be saved." 
 
 Here we consider "shall be saved" and "have their 
 imperfections," as denoting attributes, and as these attri- 
 butes belong to the same subject, we infer they are not 
 incompatible with each other. See page 39. But we may 
 put the argument in a different form ; we may consider 
 the words, " lovers of God," as denoting a class or genus, 
 and " some who have imperfections," as a species under 
 that class. The reasoning would then stand thus : — 
 
 " All the lovers of God shall be saved. 
 
 Some who have imperfections are lovers of God. 
 Therefore, some who have imperfections shall be saved." 
 
 14. So, arguments founded on the principle of cause and 
 effect may be brought under the principle of genus and 
 species. 
 
 One of the examples taken from Dr. Watts will exem- 
 plify this. " Some afflictions are good for us, because they 
 
70 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 further our salvation." Here we have evidently cause and 
 effect, and this, in fact, is the best mode of stating the 
 argument. But in the syllogism, Dr. Watts makes a class 
 of " all those things that further our salvation," and then 
 "some afflictions" become a subordinate class under that 
 larger class, a species under a genus. 
 
 Whatsoever furthers our salvation is good for us. 
 Some afflictions further our salvation. 
 Therefore some afflictions are good for us. 
 Again, "A good education is highly valuable, for it 
 softens the manners, and ameliorates the dispositions of 
 the heart." Here is the relation of cause and effect. But 
 a scholastic logician would not be satisfied with the argu- 
 ment in this form, but would turn it into genus and 
 species. This is done by making the effect a genus, and 
 the cause a species, thus : — 
 
 " Everything that softens the manners, and ameliorates 
 the disposition of the heart, is highly valuable. 
 
 But a good education softens the manners, and amelio- 
 rates the dispositions of the heart. 
 
 Therefore, a good education is highly valuable." 
 
 You will observe, that this relation of genus and species 
 does not strengthen your argument. It rather weakens 
 it ; or, at least, it widens the field of objection. An 
 opponent might deny your first proposition. He might 
 say, "I do not admit that everything that softens the 
 manners and ameliorates the disposition of the heart is 
 highly valuable : For there are some things that produce 
 these effects, but at the same time produce other effects of 
 a dangerous character. Such things, for instance, it might 
 be said, are theatrical exhibitions." Here you see a new 
 field of argumentation is at once thrown open. Had you 
 stuck to your original principle of cause and effect, you 
 would have been on safer ground. It is never advisable 
 in argumentation to put yourself in a position to be called 
 upon to prove the affirmative of a universal proposition. 
 If a single exception can be adduced, your proposition is 
 refuted, and your argument is overthrown. 
 
 It is generally best to argue from those principles of 
 reasoning which arise from the relation of the things 
 
GENUS AND SPECIES. 71 
 
 themselves, and not to attempt by mere verbal changes 
 to bring your reasonings under a different principle. You 
 should be on your guard against this practice, lest you fall 
 into that system of scholastic logic which refers only to the 
 use of words, and leaves unnoticed the nature of things. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT PHYSICAL CAUSES. 
 
 The Relation of Cause and Effect is a principle of exten- 
 sive use in the art of reasoning. But as causes are of 
 various kinds, we must consider them separately in dif- 
 ferent sections ; and in this section we shall confine our 
 attention to those causes that refer to material substances, 
 and are consequently styled physical. We shall, in the 
 subsequent sections, consider those causes that are moral, 
 conditional, and final. We may observe, with regard to 
 these four kinds of causes — physical, moral, conditional, 
 and final — the first has reference to the physical sciences, 
 as botany, physiology, geography, chemistry, &c. ; the 
 second has a reference to the sciences of politics and 
 political economy ; the third has a reference to jurispru- 
 dence and the affairs of ordinary life ; the fourth has a 
 reference to ethics and theology. We do not mean an 
 exclusive reference, but a general reference. 
 
 1. The first class of causes we call physical causes. To 
 this class of causes we refer all those effects which are pro- 
 duced by the uniform and necessary operations of nature. 
 Thus, it is an established law of nature that the earth 
 should move round the sun, and that the moon should 
 move round the earth. All the phenomena which result 
 from the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are the result 
 of natural causes. It is a law of nature that all bodies on 
 the earth should tend towards the centre ; and that dif- 
 ferent kinds of matter, whether fluid or solid, should have 
 certain properties, and that some of them should have an 
 affinity for each other. Hence, all reasonings connected 
 with astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, and the other 
 
72 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 branches of experimental philosophy, are founded on 
 natural causes. The reasonings founded on this class of 
 causes amount to demonstration. The cause necessarily 
 and invariably produces the effect. The following are 
 examples : — 
 
 " He sendeth the springs into the valleys, which run among 
 the hills. They give drink to every beast of the field : the wild 
 asses quench their thirst. By them the fowls of the heaven have 
 their habitation, which sing among the branches. He watereth 
 the hills from his chambers. He causeth the grass to grow for 
 the cattle, and herb for the service of man : that he may bring 
 forth food out of the earth ; and wine that maketh glad the heart 
 of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which 
 strengthened man's heart/ 5 — Psalm civ. 10—15. 
 
 " The benefits arising from the winds are almost innumerable ; 
 they purify the air, moderate the heat, dry wet lands and damp 
 houses, chase away the fogs and hazy weather, and bring us rain 
 in due season ; also frost and snow, and even mild weather. 
 They are particularly serviceable for navigation and commerce. 
 When the air is so full of heavy vapours that it can no longer 
 sustain them, then these small moist particles run together, and 
 fall down in fine drops, which we call rain. The rain descending 
 in drops is a further manifestation of Divine wisdom ; for if it 
 fell in strong streams it would injure the earth, by washing away 
 its fine light mould from the roots and seeds of plants ; and we 
 should suffer great inconvenience from it." — Joyce's Catechism 
 of Nature. 
 
 11 The annual overflowing of the Kile is caused by the periodical 
 rains in Ethiopia. The river begins to rise in the latter end of 
 June, and attains its utmost height about the middle of August, 
 when Egypt presents the appearance of a vast sea, while the cities 
 and towns appear like so many islands ; after this the waters 
 gradually subside, and about the end of November the river has 
 returned to its ordinary limits. During this period the earth, or 
 mud, which the waters held in solution, has fallen on the soil ; 
 and on the retiring of the waters, the whole land is covered with 
 a rich manure ; and, according to Herodotus, required so little 
 cultivation, that, in some cases, it was only necessary that the 
 seed should be thrown upon the surface, and trodden down by 
 pigs." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 2. There are four ways of reasoning in regard to these 
 physical causes. First, from the existence of the cause, we 
 may infer the existence of the effect ; if the sun has arisen, 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 73 
 
 we know it must be day ; if the earth comes between the 
 sun and the moon, the moon will be eclipsed : if a body, of 
 less specific gravity than water, be thrown into water, we 
 know it will float. If fire be applied to gunpowder, an 
 explosion will take place ; if the colours blue and yellow 
 be mixed together, they will produce a green ; if a man 
 has had his head cut off, we may infer that he is dead. 
 The second mode of reasoning is, from the existence of 
 the effect to infer the existence of the cause. All theories 
 or systems are founded upon this mode of reasoning. We 
 observe the appearances of nature, and we endeavour to 
 ascertain the causes which have produced them : if we see 
 an abundant harvest, we may infer that the land is good. 
 The third mode of reasoning is, from the non-existence of 
 the cause to infer the non-existence of the effect : in the 
 deserts of Arabia there is no rain, consequently there can 
 be no vegetation. The fourth mode of reasoning is, from 
 the non-existence of the effect to infer the non-existence 
 of the cause : the streets are not wet, therefore it cannot 
 have rained recently. 
 
 Upon the farther application of this principle to reason- 
 ing we quote Dr. Watts : — 
 
 " There is a system of beings round about us, of which we our- 
 selves are a part, which we call the world, and in this world there 
 is a course of nature, or a settled order of causes, effects, antece- 
 dents, concomitants, consequences, &c. from which the Author of 
 Nature doth not vary but upon very important occasions. 
 
 "Where antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, causes 
 and effects, signs and things signified, subjects and adjuncts, are 
 necessarily connected with each other, we may infer the causes 
 from the effects, and effects from causes, the antecedents from 
 the consequents, as well as consequents from antecedents, &c, 
 and thereby be pretty certain of many things both past, present, 
 and to come. It is by this principle that astrondmers can tell 
 what day and hour the sun and moon were eclipsed five hundred 
 years ago, and predict all future eclipses as long as the world 
 shall stand. They can tell precisely at what minute the sun rises 
 or sets this day at Pequin in China, or what altitudes the dog-star 
 had at midnight or midnoon in Rome on the day when Julius 
 Caesar was slain. Gardeners upon the same principle can foretell 
 the months when every plant will be in bloom, and the ploughman 
 knows the weeks of harvest : we are sure, if there be a chicken, 
 there was an egg ; if there be a rainbow, we are certain it rains, 
 
74 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 not far off ; if we behold a tree growing on the earth, we know it 
 has naturally a root under ground. 
 
 "Where there is a necessary connexion between causes and 
 effects, antecedents and consequents, signs and things signified, 
 we know also that like causes will have like effects, and propor- 
 tionable causes will have proportionable effects, contrary causes 
 will have contrary effects ; and observing men may form many 
 judgments by the rules of similitude and proportion, where the 
 causes, effects, &c. are not entirely the same. 
 
 " Where there is but a probable and uncertain connexion be- 
 tween antecedents, concomitants, and consequents, we can give 
 but a conjecture, or a probable determination. If the clouds 
 gather, or the weather-glass sinks, we suppose it will rain : if a 
 man spit blood frequently with coughing, we suppose his lungs 
 are hurt : if verv dangerous symptoms appear, we expect his 
 death." 
 
 3. We are in danger of false reasoning when we ascribe 
 effects to wrong causes. 
 
 Thus, for many ages the appearances of the celestial 
 bodies were ascribed to their motion round the earth ; 
 whereas it has since been demonstrated that these effects 
 could not be produced by such a cause. The French 
 philosopher, Des Cartes, imagined certain whirlpools in 
 the atmosphere, by which he attempted to account for the 
 appearances of nature. Thunder and lightning, earth- 
 quakes and volcanoes, are effects which have been ascribed 
 to a variety of causes, according to the hypotheses of 
 different philosophers : The flux and reflux of the tide, 
 the origin of rivers, the phenomena of electricity, and 
 many other appearances connected with natural philo- 
 sophy, have furnished curious specimens of false reasoning 
 in assigning causes. 
 
 " I would make this matter a little plainer still by instances 
 borrowed from the peripatetic philosophy, which was once taught 
 in all the schools. The professor fancies he has assigned the true 
 reason why all heavy bodies tend downward, why amber will draw 
 feathers or straws, and the loadstone draw iron, when he tells you 
 that this is done by certain gravitating and attractive qualities, 
 which proceed from the substantial forms of those various bodies. 
 He imagines that he has explained why the loadstone's north pole 
 shall repel the north end of a magnetic needle, and attract the 
 south, when he affirms that this is done by its sympathy with one 
 end of it, and its antipathy against the other end. Whereas in 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 75 
 
 truth, all these names of sympathy, antipathy, substantial forms, 
 and qualities, when they are put for the causes of these effects 
 in bodies, are but hard words, which only express a learned and 
 pompous ignorance of the true cause of natural appearances." 
 —Watts. 
 
 Writers on metaphysics have also adopted theories cal- 
 culated to weaken our confidence in the relation of physical 
 causes and effects. The most remarkable of these writers 
 is Bishop Berkeley — " Since, he asks, the mind does not 
 perceive physical objects, but merely the images of those 
 objects formed in the eye, how do you know that any such 
 objects exist." To this we may reply, that the representa- 
 tion formed in the eye, is the effect of the external objects, 
 and is in itself a proof of their existence. When we look 
 at an object through a telescope, we know that the object 
 exists, though we see only the image formed by the specu- 
 lum. Mr. Mill observes in his System of Logic : — 
 
 (C I affirm that I saw my brother at a certain hour this morning. 
 If any proposition concerning a matter of fact would commonly 
 be said to be known by the direct testimony of the senses, this 
 surely would be so. The truth, however, is far otherwise. I 
 only saw a certain coloured surface, or rather I had the kind of 
 visual sensations which are usually produced by a coloured sur- 
 face, and from these, as marks known to be such by previous 
 experience, I concluded that I saw my brother." — Mill's Lope, 
 vol. ii. p. 208. 
 
 Upon this theory we should suppose, that as soon as 
 an infant can recognise its mother, it has begun to draw 
 conclusions, and has also had sufficient experience in the 
 arts to know that a human body may be represented on a 
 coloured surface. 
 
 To all theories of this description we may reply in the 
 words of Dr. Watts : — 
 
 " Though onr senses are sometimes liable to be deceived, yet 
 when they are rightly disposed, and fitly exercised about their 
 proper objects, with the just assistance of reason, they give us 
 sufficient evidence of truth. 
 
 " This may be proved by an argument drawn from the wisdom, 
 
 goodness, and faithfulness of God onr Creator. It was he gave us 
 
 our senses, and he would not make us of such a constitution as to 
 
 be liable to perpetual deception, and unavoidable error, in using 
 
 E2 
 
76 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 these faculties of sense in the best manner we are capable of, 
 about those verj things which are the proper objects of them. 
 
 " This may be proved also by the ill consequences that would 
 follow from the supposition of the contrary. If we could have no 
 certainty of the dictates of our senses, we could never be sure of 
 any of the common affairs and occurrences of life. Men could 
 not transact any of their civil or moral concerns with any cer- 
 tainty of justice ; nor indeed could we eat or drink, walk or move, 
 with safety. Our senses direct us in all these. 
 
 "Again, the matters of religion depend in some measure upon 
 the certainty of the dictates of sense: for faith comes by hearing ; 
 and it is to our senses that God appeals in working miracles to 
 prove his own revelation. Now if when our eyes and ears, and 
 other organs of sense, are rightly disposed and exercised about 
 their proper objects, they were always liable to be deceived, there 
 could be no knowledge of the gospel, no proof of divine revela- 
 tion by visions, voices, or miracles." 
 
 4. To prove the connexion between a physical canse and 
 its effects, is not the province of reasoning, but of obser- 
 vation and experiment. 
 
 During the middle ages, the scholastic logicians treated 
 the physical sciences in the way intimated by Dr. Watts. 
 Lord Bacon first advocated the necessity of a different 
 course. Soon afterwards, the " Royal Society, for the im- 
 provement of Natural Science," was established, and its trans- 
 actions were very influential to leading to a more accurate 
 mode of ascertaining the causes of natural phenomena. 
 
 " But it must not be forgotten how much is due to Lord 
 Bacon, who died only thirty-six years before the incorpo- 
 ration of the Royal Society. With a comprehensive and 
 commanding mind, patient in inquiry, subtile in discrimi- 
 nation, neither affecting novelty, nor idolizing antiquity, 
 Bacon formed, and in a great measure executed, his great 
 work, on the Instauration of the Sciences, which being 
 clearly connected in its main features with the Royal 
 Society, connects itself with our inquiry. The design was 
 divided into six capital divisions. The first proposes a 
 general survey of human knowledge, and is executed in 
 the admirable treatise, The Advancement of Learning. In 
 this Lord Bacon critically examines the state of learning 
 in its various branches at that period, observes and points 
 our defects and errors, and then suggests proper means for 
 supplying omissions and rectifying mistakes. 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 77 
 
 " The second, and the most considerable part, is the 
 Novum Organum, in which the author, rejecting syllogism 
 as a mere instrument of disputation, and putting no trust 
 in the hypothetical systems of ancient philosophy, recom- 
 mends the more slow, but more satisfactory method of 
 induction, which subjects natural objects to the test of 
 observation and experience, and subdues nature by experi- 
 ment and inquiry. It will be seen how rigidly the early 
 Fellows of the Royal Society followed Bacon's advice." 
 
 " Whilst the memory of this great man was cherished, 
 and the spirit of his philosophy abroad, the establishment 
 of the Royal Society was accomplished. A great number 
 of eminent men existed at that period in England, nearly 
 all of whom were warmly interested in the progress of 
 science ; and it thus only required the cessation of domestic 
 troubles, to cause their attention to be turned to experi- 
 mental philosophy." 
 
 In the year 1662 the Royal Society obtained a charter 
 of incorporation from Charles II. The following is an 
 extract from the preamble : — 
 
 " And, whereas we are well informed, that a competent 
 number of persons, of eminent learning, ingenuity, and 
 honour, concording in their inclinations and studies towards 
 this employment, have for some time accustomed them- 
 selves to meet weekly, and orderly, to confer about the 
 hidden causes of things, with a design to establish certain, 
 and correct uncertain theories in philosophy, and by their 
 labours in the disquisition of nature, to prove themselves 
 real benefactors to mankind ; and that they have already 
 made a considerable progress by divers useful and remark- 
 able discoveries, inventions, and experiments in the im- 
 provement of mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, naviga- 
 tion, physic, and chemistry, we have determined to grant 
 our Royal favour, patronage, and all due encouragement 
 to this illustrious assembly, and so beneficial and laudable 
 an enterprise." — History of the Royal Society, by G. R. Weld. 
 
 It has been asserted that the Incorporation of the 
 Royal Society was the only wise act of Charles II. On 
 one occasion the merry monarch is said to have asked 
 a company of philosophers how they could account for 
 the fact that if a live fish were put into a vessel of 
 
78 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 water, the vessel would weigh no heavier than before. 
 Some of them learnedly discussed the question, broaching 
 several theories respecting the properties of water and air, 
 the phenomena of life, &c. At last the king said to one 
 who had not previously spoken on the subject, "Well, 
 doctor, how do you account for this 1 He replied, Before 
 I assign any cause for it, I should like to ascertain the 
 fact : suppose we make the experiment. A vessel of water 
 was accordingly brought in and weighed; a live fish was 
 then put into the water : and behold, the weight of the 
 vessel was increased by precisely the weight of the fish. 
 
 To form theories without investigating the facts was the 
 method of the Aristotelian Philosophy. To ascertain the 
 facts first by experiment was the method introduced and 
 recommended by Lord Bacon. 
 
 5. The sciences of medicine, politics, and political eco- 
 nomy, are partly physical, partly moral. You maintain 
 your health by wholesome diet, pure air, early rising, 
 occupation, and exercise. These are physical causes. It is 
 also maintained by the discipline of the mind, and the 
 government of the passions. These are moral causes. 
 
 Under the head of physical causes and effects we include 
 those which refer to living animals. Our knowledge here 
 is derived from observation. But still there is much room 
 for reasoning. We may inflate a balloon with certainty 
 whenever we please ; but we cannot with equal certainty 
 fatten an ox. There is an art in this. Some kinds of 
 cattle will fatten sooner than others ; and some kinds of 
 food will produce fat sooner than others. To ascertain the 
 cheapest and best modes of fattening, we must have recourse 
 to experiments. The results of such experiments are exhi- 
 bited at the agricultural shows. We sometimes read in 
 the public papers complaints against the excessive fattening 
 of cattle, inasmuch as these cattle become unfit for food. 
 We think these complaints have no solid foundation. The 
 cattle are not fattened for food ; they are fattened to teach 
 the art of fattening : And whether these few cattle thus 
 fattened to excess should be eaten or not, is a matter of 
 little importance, as compared with the practical know- 
 ledge which by this means the agriculturist may be able 
 to obtain. 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 79 
 
 The human body is an animal. But from its union to 
 mind it is less than other animals under the control of 
 physical agencies. We cannot fatten a man with as much 
 certainty as we can fatten an ox. A tradesman on the 
 verge of bankruptcy, a lady languishing with a broken 
 heart, would from anxiety of mind baffle all attempts to 
 make them fat. But when the mind is unoccupied, the 
 body will yield to physical treatment. Pugilists and 
 pedestrians undergo a course of training previous to their 
 performances. By a regular course of diet and exercise, 
 strength and agility are greatly increased. 
 
 The science of medicine is founded on experiments. 
 What effect any substance taken into the stomach would 
 produce generally upon the body could only be known at 
 first by making the trial. But in the use of new medi- 
 cines, and in the application of medicines generally to 
 different constitutions, there is much need of sound rea- 
 soning. But after all, the result is the only test of medical 
 skill. The surest proof of good treatment is the recovery 
 of the patient. 
 
 Homoeopathy must likewise be tested by experiments. 
 The homoeopathists contend that every disease has a specific 
 remedy. This remedy will cure the disease with as much 
 certainty as bark cures ague or as acids cure scurvy. They 
 say they have discovered all these specifie remedies. This 
 is the fundamental principle of the system. The doctrine 
 of small doses is subordinate. - They say that by tritura- 
 tion the power of medicines is so much increased, that a 
 small dose will have a greater effect than a larger dose 
 which has not undergone this operation. These are the 
 two main principles of homoeopathy. Their truth must be 
 proved by experiment, not by reasoning. But reasoning- 
 may be useful in deciding on the best ways of making the 
 experiments. 
 
 The relation between physical causes and effects is first 
 proved by observation and experiment. Having ascer- 
 tained this, we employ reasoning for the purpose of apply- 
 ing this knowledge to a practical purpose. For instance, 
 we ascertain, not by reasoning, but by experiment or 
 observation, that fire will turn water into steam ; and then 
 by reasoning we apply that steam to work an engine. 
 
80 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT — MORAL CAUSES. 
 
 While physical causes refer to the operations of matter, 
 moral causes refer to the operations of mind. The former 
 relate to the sciences of chemistry, geology, astronomy and 
 other physical sciences. The latter relate to moral philo- 
 sophy, political economy, and those other sciences that 
 relate to the acts and habits of intelligent beings. We 
 trace the operations of these causes, with reference to indi- 
 viduals, families, and nations. 
 
 1. The following are examples of moral causes and 
 effects : — 
 
 " Who hath woe ? Who hatli sorrow ? 
 Who hath contentions ? Who hath babbling ? 
 Who hath wounds without cause ? Who hath redness of eyes ? 
 They that tarry long at the wine ; 
 They that go to seek mixed wine." — Prov. xxiii. 29, 30. 
 
 " Certainly," says Sydney Smith, " the two human beings who 
 have had the greatest influence upon the understandings of mankind 
 have been Aristotle and Lord Bacon. To Lord Bacon we are 
 indebted for an almost daily extension of our knowledge of the 
 laws of nature in the outward world ; and the same modest and 
 cautious spirit of mquiry, extended to moral philosophy, will pro- 
 bably at last give us clear, intelligible ideas of our spiritual nature. 
 Every succeeding year is an additional confirmation to us that we 
 are travelling in the true path of knowledge ; and as it brings in 
 fresh tributes of science for the increase of human happiness, it 
 extorts from us fresh tributes of praise to the guide and father of 
 true philosophy. To the understanding of Aristotle, equally vast, 
 perhaps, and equally original, we are indebted for fifteen hundred 
 years of quibbling and ignorance, in which the earth fell under 
 the tyranny of words, and philosophers quarrelled with one 
 another, like drunken men in dark rooms, who hate peace without 
 knowing why they fight, or seeing how to take aim." — Smith's 
 Moral Philosophy. 
 
 "It is a doctrine of Mr. Hume, in his 'Essay on Money,' that 
 an influx of the precious metals gives great encouragement to 
 industry, during the interval which elapses before the prices of 
 commodities are adjusted to the increased quantity of specie. 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 81 
 
 'We find/ says he, 'that in every kingdom into which, money 
 begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, everything 
 takes a new face: labour and industry gain life; the merchant 
 becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent and 
 skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater 
 alacrity and attention. In my opinion,' he continues, ' it is only 
 in this interval, or intermediate situation, between the acquisi- 
 tion of money and rise of prices, that the increased quantity of 
 gold and silver is favourable to industry. 5 " — Questions on Poli- 
 tical Economy. 
 
 " We hold that a Church Establishment is the most effective of 
 all machines for the moral instruction of the people, and that, if 
 once taken down, there is no other instrumentality by which it 
 can be adequately replaced. We are aware, that it may be feebly 
 and even corruptly administered; but the way to rectify tins, is 
 not to demolish the apparatus, but to direct its movements. It 
 is the means of turning so much unproductive into productive 
 consumption. "Without a church the whole of our ecclesiastical 
 wealth would have been in the hands of those who give no return 
 for it. With a church we have the return of all its usefulness — 
 its theological learning — the protection which it affords against a 
 desolating infidelity — the service which it renders to the morality 
 of the commonwealth — and, above all, to the eternal well-being 
 of the individual members who compose it." — Br. Chalmen 
 Political ~ 
 
 " To all who desire a clear, common-sense, and eminently prac- 
 tical system of logic, and do not object to the volume that 
 contains it comprising also a most entertaining series of extracts 
 from some of the ablest pieces of modern argumentation, we 
 heartily commend this 'Logic for the Million.' We know not 
 where a young man desirous of self-cultivation could more 
 certainly or more pleasurably find it than in this volume. He 
 will only have himself to blame if he does not rise from its study 
 with clearer thought, invigorated powers, and a mind enriched by 
 some of the best good sense of our best writers." — Weekly News. 
 
 " Even with reference to the parts of any single nation, it is 
 the lack of facility of intercourse which is the acknowledged cause 
 of all that is defective in the rural population. It perpetuates 
 peculiarities of idiom and of pronunciation, local prejudices, 
 inactivity of mind, roughness of manner, and subjection to the 
 power of superstition. Everything, therefore, which -quickens 
 circulation or facilitates intercourse between either the different 
 members of the same nation, or between members of different 
 nations, is calculated to promote the general welfare." — The 
 Great Exhibition Prize Essay. By the Rev. J. G. Whish, M.A. 
 e3 
 
82 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 2. With regard to moral causes, we may adopt the fol- 
 lowing modes of reasoning. 
 
 First. From the existence of the cause we may infer the 
 existence of the effect. Thus, if a man be industrious, vre 
 may infer that he will get rich. If a man be given to 
 intoxication, we may infer that he will reduce himself to 
 beggary. If a man exercise his intellectual faculties, we 
 know he will improve them. 
 
 Secondly. From the existence of the effect we may 
 infer the existence of the cause. Thus, if a servant enjoy 
 in a high degree the confidence of his master, we may infer 
 that he has served him well. If a man be involved in 
 debts which he is unable to pay, we may infer that he has 
 been either imprudent or unfortunate. 
 
 Thirdly. From the non-existence of the cause, we may 
 infer the non-existence of the effect. Thus, if a man has 
 not been unfortunate nor improvident, we may argue that 
 he cannot be poor. 
 
 Fourthly. From the non-existence of the effect we may 
 infer the non-existence of the cause. Thus, we may say, 
 such a person is not poor; he cannot then have been 
 extravagant. Such a person is not an intelligent man; he 
 cannot, then, have spent much time in reading and study. 
 He does not speak correctly; therefore he cannot have 
 learned grammar. On one occasion when speaking to the 
 working classes Rowland Hill observed, — "I don't think 
 much of that man's religion who is without his Sunday 
 coat, when a good Providence gives him plenty of work." — 
 (Sherman.) 
 
 3. In the relation of moral causes and effects, we have, 
 generally, in the first instance, to prove by reasoning that 
 such a relation exists. 
 
 If, for instance, I contend that education produces good 
 morals, and hence, ask my neighbours to assist me in esta- 
 blishing a school for the poor, — I may be asked to prove, 
 in the first instance, that education does produce good 
 morals ; for, unless I can prove the relation of cause and 
 effect in this case, my efforts will be unavailing. So in 
 many of the acts of ordinary life, and in nearly all our 
 public proceedings, whether a certain cause will produce a 
 certain effect is, in fact, the whole question in dispute. 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 83 
 
 In reasoning upon moral causes, we are exposed to much 
 difficulty from the circumstance, that one effect is often 
 produced by a variety of causes. 
 
 The greatest sophistry arises from imputing to one par- 
 ticular cause an effect which results from the joint opera- 
 tion of many causes. Thus, the ruin of an individual may 
 be the consequence of the accidental burning of his house ; 
 of imprudent conduct ; of the treachery of friends, and of 
 robbery by thieves. The fall of a state may be the effect 
 of the united operation of a tyrannical government, a sedi- 
 tious people, the encroachments of a foreign enemy, and 
 pestilence and famine. Now, should a person take the 
 effect, and argue that it was produced solely by one cause, 
 he would be in error. 
 
 We shall also fall into error if we deny the existence of 
 any one cause, because other causes contributed to produce 
 the effect. 
 
 Thus, it has been contended that Sir Robert Peel's Act 
 for Regulating the Currency, passed in the year 1844, was 
 a cause of the commercial distress that occurred in the 
 year 1847. In reply, it was contended, that the distress 
 of 1847 was produced by the famine in Ireland and the 
 speculations in railways. Now this is no refutation of the 
 former opinion ; for all the three causes may have united 
 in producing the same effect. 
 
 We should also fall into error were we to infer, that of 
 two events one is the cause of the other, merely because it 
 occurred first in the order of time. 
 
 This fallacy is often ridiculed by a reference to the 
 building of Tenterden steeple being the cause of the Good- 
 win sands. The story is told, I believe, by Bishop Latimer. 
 There was a time when the Goodwin sands, which lie in 
 the neighbourhood of Dover, did not exist. Sometime 
 after they had collected, Government commissioners were 
 appointed to ascertain the cause. They accordingly pro- 
 ceeded to the spot to examine witnesses. Among others, 
 an old man assured them that the cause of the Goodwin 
 sands was the building of the Tenterden steeple. They 
 asked him how this could be. He stated, he could not 
 tell how, but he knew it was so ; for he recollected that 
 when there was no steeple there were no sands, but soon 
 
84 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 after the building of the steeple in came the sands. He, 
 therefore, inferred that the building of the steeple was the 
 cause of the sands. 
 
 We shall give an example of the way in which this allu- 
 sion is applied. 
 
 The following argument is taken from the " Sophisms 
 of Free Trade, by a Barrister." 
 
 " All great manufactures had their origin in the protective 
 system. Take our own, the greatest and least sickly of any. 
 All our own manufactures took their rise in a system of protective 
 duties, so high as to amount to prohibitions. In addition to this, 
 owing to the fearful hostilities that raged in Europe for nearly 
 a quarter of a century before 1815, we enjoyed a further acci- 
 dental monopoly of the manufacturing industry of the world. 
 And this stringent protection has not only created manufactures, 
 but created them where they would not naturally have existed, in 
 spite of great natural disadvantages. Other nations have coal 
 and iron ore as well as we. The United States are even richer 
 in this respect. But other nations have, also, what we have not, 
 they have native raw materials. It has been justly observed, that 
 Great Britain is singularly poor in the raw materials which con- 
 stitute the basis of the greater portion of her manufacturing in- 
 dustry. We have no cotton, no silk, no fine wool. Even our best 
 iron for the manufacture of hardware, comes from Sweden ; our 
 oils, gums, colours, woods, from the ends of the earth. 
 
 " Next to us in manufacturing industry, is France. Her 
 manufacturing industry, thougli still inferior to ours, has never- 
 theless, since the peace, augmented in an even greater ratio, but 
 under strict and jealous protection." — Sophisms of Free Trade, by 
 a Barrister.] 
 
 The following reply is taken from " Free Trade and its 
 so-called Sophisms." 
 
 " There is no doubt that, until recently, the governments of 
 almost all countries considered that the way to establish an 
 industry, and make it prosper, was to 'protect' it; and conse- 
 quently, whenever an industry flourishes simultaneously with 
 the existence of protection, a great shout of triumph is raised, as 
 if the former were dependent on the latter — the old fallacy of 
 post hoe, ergo propter hoc. It is only necessary to refer to the 
 well-known case of Tenterden steeple and the Goodwin sands for 
 an illustration." — Free Trade and its so-called Sophisms. 
 
 The reader will observe, that the Barrister's argument 
 with regard to manufactures is, that in several countries 
 protection preceded prosperity ; and he infers that pro- 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 85 
 
 tection was the cause of prosperity. His opponent replies, 
 that though protection preceded prosperity, it was not the 
 cause of prosperity ; the two facts having no more relation 
 to each other than Tenterden steeple and the Goodwin sands. 
 
 In order to prove that two events sustain the relation 
 to each other of cause and effect, it is necessary to show, 
 first, that the two events did actually occur ; secondly, that 
 the event which we call the cause, occurred in the order 
 of time before the effect ; and, thirdly, that there was an 
 adaptation in the cause to produce the effect. In refutation 
 we may state, that one or both of the two events did not 
 occur — or that they did not occur in the order of time — 
 or that there was no adaptation in the one to produce the 
 other. We may go further, and maintain that the alleged 
 cause, so far from being the cause, was an obstruction to 
 the effect. The words, " in spite of/' are sometimes used 
 on such occasions. " Gentlemen, I contend that trade did 
 not prosper in consequence of protection, but that it pro- 
 spered in spite of protection." 
 
 4. Public measures are usually approved or condemned 
 on account of the effects they are alleged to produce. 
 
 Here is a wide field for controversy. The affairs of a 
 nation are so multifarious, so many causes are perpetually 
 at work, that it is difficult to trace with certainty the pre- 
 cise effects of any one cause. Even after measures have 
 become law, and we have had some experience of their opera- 
 tion, the same difference of opinion is still maintained. If 
 a measure already adopted is applauded on account of the 
 good effect it has produced, we may contend in opposition 
 to this, that the event, called the effect, has not taken 
 place — or admit that the event has taken place, but was 
 not the effect of that cause. Or, we may go further, and 
 admit that the event was the effect of the cause, but that 
 the effect was a bad effect. Or, we may go still further, 
 and admit that the effect was a good effect, and then 
 contend that the same cause produced other effects of 
 a different character, so that the bad consequences more 
 than counterbalanced the good ones. 
 
 Sometimes it is matter of dispute, w T hen two circum- 
 stances sustain the relation of cause and effect, which is the 
 cause and which is the effect. 
 
86 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Heretofore the landlords have been accused of keeping 
 up the price of corn, by demanding high rents : but Dr. 
 Chalmers observes that there is no sounder principle in 
 political economy than that the high prices of corn are not 
 the effect, but the cause of high rents. The country bankers 
 were accused of causing a general rise in prices by an ex- 
 cessive issue of their notes ; but they stated in reply, that 
 it was not the increased issue of notes that caused the high 
 prices, but the high prices called out the notes. 
 
 " The error of the Ricardo system of political economy on the 
 subject of rent, has been well characterised by Mr. T. Perronet 
 Thomson as the fallacy of inversion. It confounds the effect 
 with the cause. It is not because of the existence of inferior 
 soils that the superior pay a rent, but it is because the superior 
 pay a rent that the inferior are taken into occupation. There 
 does not occur to us any logical term by which to denominate the 
 fallacy that is now under consideration ; but it is not less a fallacy 
 notwithstanding." — Dr. Chalmers. 
 
 If the effect may have been produced by several causes, 
 and we can prove the absence of all the causes except one, 
 this fixes the effect upon that one cause. We take the 
 following extract from the Report of the General Board of 
 Health on the Supply of Water to the Metropolis : — 
 
 11 With respect to this case of Rotherhithe, the fact of the 
 people in the first street mentioned having been the first victims 
 m the great outbreak, shows that they must have been highly 
 predisposed; and as they lived in decent houses, and were in 
 comfortable circumstances, two of the more ordinary causes of 
 the disease — overcrowding and poverty — could not have operated. 
 Those considerations can leave no doubt that the one main cause 
 of the great severity of the attack was the use for domestic pur- 
 poses of polluted Thames water/' 
 
 In investigating the relation of cause and effect, it is 
 sometimes advisable not to stop at the immediate causes, 
 but to go further back, and ascertain what are the original 
 causes of that immediate cause. It has been disputed 
 whether the price of food has any influence on the rate of 
 wages. It has been answered, No ; for the rate of wages 
 is regulated by the proportion between the demand for 
 labour and the supply. Admitting the latter opinion to 
 be correct, it does not refute the former ; For the demand 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 87 
 
 and the supply of labour are influenced by anterior causes, 
 and the price of food may be one of those anterior causes. 
 So, we are told that the rate of interest is regulated by the 
 proportion that may exist between the demand and the 
 supply of capital. This throws but little light upon the 
 matter, unless we are told at the same time what are the 
 anterior causes that regulate this demand and this supply. 
 If it be a matter of dispute whether two events sustain 
 the relation of cause and effect, we may be able to solve 
 the difficulty, if it is found that the removal of the supposed 
 cause is followed by the removal of the supposed ejj 
 
 " There was the case of a man who lived in the Coburg-road, in 
 Camberwell parish, in a semi-detached house, in a healthy situa- 
 tion, and with a garden behind the premises ; his wife had noticed 
 that the water supplied to them was exceedingly bad, and, having 
 been informed that it was likely to affect the health of her family, 
 she invariably boiled and filtered it: all kept in perfect health 
 except the father, who objected to drink this water, from its 
 being flat and unaerated ; he would still drink it as it came from 
 the water-butt, and the consequence was that he was attacked 
 with choleraic-diarrhoea : he afterioards drank no more of it, and 
 got well." — Report of the Board of Health. 
 
 Thus, it was disputed whether the Act of 1844 for regu- 
 lating the currency was the cause of the monetary pressure 
 of 1847 ; but it was found that when the act was suspended 
 in October, 1847, the pressure immediately ceased. A 
 writer on this subject observes — " It has been denied that 
 this pressure was produced or increased by the Act. But 
 how stand the facts ? The Act was passed, and, as pre- 
 dicted, a pressure came — the Act was continued, and the 
 pressure increased — the Act was suspended, and the pres- 
 sure went away. These are not opinions — they are facts." 
 
 In reasoning upon moral causes and effects we should 
 inquire whether at all times and under all circumstances 
 the same causes will produce precisely the same effects. 
 
 We often meet with cases of this kind in the consider- 
 ation of historical and international questions. Thus it is 
 said the Woollen Manufacture in England, and the Linen 
 Manufacture in Ireland, prospered in consequence of pro- 
 tective laws, and therefore the same laws would cause in- 
 creased prosperity at the present time. The Navigation 
 
88 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Laws were useful to England at the time of Oliver Crom- 
 well, therefore they would be useful still. A few years ago 
 it was contended that Joint Stock Banks were adapted 
 only for countries having little capital, such as Ireland and 
 as Scotland when they were first established there, but 
 were quite unsuitable for a wealthy country like England. 
 The same argument is now employed against the introduc- 
 tion of " Partnerships en Commandite," such as exist in 
 France and America. 
 
 5. We sometimes attempt to refute a doctrine by tracing 
 the absurd consequences that must result from it. This is 
 called by scholastic logicians a reductio ad absurdum — you 
 reduce it to an absurdity. 
 
 It is not necessary, however, in this mode of reasoning, 
 that the deduction should be absurd, in the ordinary sense 
 of the word. It is sufficient if it shows the unsoundness of 
 the sentiment from which it is fairly inferred. 
 
 To prove the utility of labour, of property, or of money, 
 show the evils that would arise from its abolition. 
 
 Labour. — " Were mankind not under the necessity of labour- 
 ing for a subsistence, so far from becoming philosophers, I am in- 
 clined to think that they would ever have remained a race of 
 indolent savages, scarcely raised above the brute creation. What 
 motive would they have had for exertion, what incentive to 
 awaken their faculties, and rouse them from the apathy of indo- 
 lence so natural to man ? The necessity of regular industry to 
 secure subsistence appears to be the first step towards the de- 
 velopment of their faculties, both physical and mental." — Mrs. 
 Marcefs Conversations on Political Economy. 
 
 Property. — " Can it be supposed that the poor would be 
 better off if all the property of the rich were taken away and 
 divided among the poor, and no one allowed to become rich for 
 the future ? The poor would then he much worse off than they 
 are now. They would still have to work for their living, as they 
 do now ; for food and clothes cannot be had without somebody's 
 labour. But they would not work near so profitably as they do 
 now ; because no one would be able to keep up a large manu- 
 factory or farm, well-stocked, and to advance wages to workmen 
 (as is done now), for work which does not bring in any return 
 for, perhaps, a year or two. And if a bad crop, or a sickly family, 
 brought any one into distress, which would soon be the case with 
 many, what could he do after he had spent his little property ? 
 He would be willino; to work for hire : but no one could afford to 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 89 
 
 employ him, except in something that would bring in a very 
 speedy return. 
 
 Money. — " What a useful thing is money ! If there was no 
 such thing as money, we should be much at a loss to get anything 
 we might want. The shoemaker, for instance, who might want 
 bread, and meat, and beer, for his family, would have nothing to 
 give in exchange but shoes. He must go to the baker, and oifer 
 him a pair of shoes for as much bread as they were worth : and 
 lie must do the same thing if he went to the butcher for meat, or 
 to the brewer for beer." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 
 
 Sometimes we meet with zealous advocates, who reduce 
 their own principles to an absurdity by deducing from 
 them extravagant conclusions. 
 
 Dr. Chalmers adopted the Malthusian theory of popu- 
 lation, and drew from it such startling, and yet apparently 
 legitimate conclusions, that his readers were led to doubt 
 the soundness of the theory : They judged of the tree by 
 its fruits. Dr. Alexander of Edinburgh, in an address re- 
 specting recent events, has pointed out a similar example 
 in the conduct of some advocates of a popular principle : — 
 
 " It is possible to drive a good horse to death ; it is equally 
 possible to drive a sound principle to weakness and contempt. | Mr. 
 Holloway's pills are, we believe, very fair and honest sort of 
 pills, and very good for some purposes ; but when Mr. Holloway 
 advertises them as good for every disease the human body is heii 
 to, sensible people are apt to treat Mr. Holloway as a quack, and 
 his pills as trash. We fear the voluntary principle is about to be 
 served in the same way. With some people it seems the one 
 truth for the age. It is the grand religious catholicon — the 
 panacea of piety — like the mistletoe of the Druids, a heal-all for 
 the ills of the community. We dread the effect of this indiscreet 
 advocacy on the minds of the nation at large. We fear that it 
 will retard, rather than promote, the cause of voluntaryism. We 
 fear lest, when men are incessantly told that it is good for every- 
 thing, they will turn from it in disgust, and hold it to be good 
 for nothing." 
 
 If an absurd conclusion can be legitimately deduced 
 from any general principle, it is a sufficient proof that the 
 principle is unsound ; but in this case we should carefully 
 investigate the logical accuracy of the deduction, for weak 
 or zealous advocates will sometimes make 
 deductions from even sound principles. 
 
90 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 6. Akin to the reduction ad dbsurdum is an exposure 
 of the fallacy called " proving too much." 
 
 This fallacy is an argument that, if admitted to prove the 
 point in dispute, would, if carried out to all its legitimate 
 consequences, also prove other points that neither of the dis- 
 putants admit to be true. 
 
 As an example of proving too much, we may adduce 
 all the arguments that go to prove the impropriety of 
 closing the post-offices throughout the country on the 
 Sunday ; for if these arguments prove the point in regard 
 to provincial towns, they also prove the propriety of 
 opening the post-office on Sunday in London. But if the 
 argument fails when applied to London, then, a fortiori, 
 it must be inconclusive when applied to a country town. 
 This argument can be resisted only by showing that there 
 are peculiar circumstances in the country which do not 
 apply to London. 
 
 So the argument of Mr. Cobden, against granting loans 
 to the Emperor of Russia proves too much. For if it were 
 immoral to lend money to the Emperor because he might 
 employ it in carrying on war against the Hungarians, then 
 by parity of reasoning it would also be immoral to have 
 any transactions with him by which his finances might be 
 improved. And hence, all trade with Russia should cease. 
 Upon the same ground, we ought to abstain from the use 
 of sugar and cotton, and all other commodities which are 
 produced by the labour of slaves, if by using them we 
 increase the property of those who, in defiance of all the 
 principles of morality, hold in bondage then fellow-man. 
 
 7. Arguments founded on the advantages or disadvan- 
 tages that may result from any measure under considera- 
 tion, come under the head of reasonings from the relation 
 of cause and effect. 
 
 As an illustration of this principle, we transcribe part of 
 a prize essay, written by Mr. Briggs, a working millwright, 
 upon the advantages likely to be gained by working men 
 visiting the Industrial Exhibition of 1851 : — 
 
 " The working man, let him be engaged in whatever kind of 
 labour or handicraft, by attending the Exhibition, will find infor- 
 mation, valuable and essentially useful to him. The mechanic, 
 and the worker in metals, will be able there to trace the mineral 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 91 
 
 as it appears when first dug from mother earth, through all its 
 varied processes, till finished in the powerful and almost intel- 
 lectual steam engine. The workers of textile fabrics will there 
 be able to inspect the silk as produced from the silk-worm, and 
 the cotton from the plant, tracing their progress until, by the aid 
 of man and machinery, they appear in the finished fabric, exhi- 
 biting the greatest beauty of design and skilful workmanship. 
 The workman, at this Exhibition, will be able to compare the 
 textile and other productions of France, the marble productions 
 of Florence, and specimens of art and science from all parts of 
 the Continent, with those exhibited by our country, and perceive 
 that the respect in which our continental neighbours excel us is • 
 in fertility and beauty of design. He will see that no nation 
 executes so well as the English ; that we stand unrivalled in the 
 superiority of our workmanship ; and that the only thing we are 
 short of is design. And if a visit to the Exhibition conduce to 
 the cultivation of a superior style of design among our artisans, 
 it will repay a hundred-fold any expense they may incur by 
 attending it, and confer lasting benefit on their country, for the 
 acknowledged character of the British, as the most skilful of 
 workers, added to that of superior designers, would always 
 demand for us a trade which would proudly and successfully 
 outstrip every other nation in the world in the race of competi- 
 tion. The history of the marble trade in my native county of 
 Derbyshire, is a striking illustration of the truth of this. Twenty 
 or thirty years ago the art of inlaying in marble was not known 
 there. And why is it known now ? Because the museums of 
 Matlock and Buxton imported from Florence, Borne, and other 
 parts of Italy, specimens of the art, which were seen and imitated 
 by the workers of Derbyshire ; until at length they are able to 
 equal, and, in some respects, surpass the productions of Florence. 
 And if the small exhibition of Matlock has been the means of 
 producing an entirely new and beautiful art amongst the inha- 
 bitants of the Peak of Derbyshire, what may we confidently 
 expect to result from this great and mighty Exhibition, which, in 
 comparison to that at Matlock, is like the broad Atlantic to a 
 gentleman's fish-pond. The great want of our country is design ; 
 we have no other want that prevents us from successfully com- 
 peting with foreigners. Then let our artisans attend this Exhi- 
 bition, and ascertain where and in what they excel them ; and it 
 will propel the current of improvement at home, and thus minister 
 to their advantage, and to the comfort and happiness of the whole 
 people." 
 
 8. We shall close this section with a few examples of 
 this principle of reasoning, applied to some measures of 
 public interest : — 
 
92 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 "Early Marriages. — Lord Harewood, to get rid of the evil 
 of over-crowding in country villages, refuses to permit his cottage 
 tenantry to take lodgers, or to allow a son or daughter to marry 
 from the cottage, and continue to occupy it with the wife or hus- 
 band conjointly with the parents. The first of these regulations 
 is one with which every landlord is familiar. The offence lies in 
 the second, which has been interpreted to mean a prohibition to 
 the poor to marry : and some country newspaper talks about 
 feudal laws, and we know not what besides. Now the regulation 
 means nothing of the sort. It is a simple refusal on the part of 
 Lord Harewood to permit persons to continue his tenants who 
 marry without the power of having a house of their own. 
 
 " Now we are quite satisfied that it is the bounden duty of. a 
 landlord to put every check in his power upon the mania of the 
 poor for headlong marriages. God forbid we should attempt to 
 restrain them from marrying at all. But in the name of morality 
 and decency, let them wait till they have a chair and bed of their 
 own. Without question or doubt, nine-tenths of agrarian misery, 
 pauperism, and crime, arise from the extraordinary hurry and 
 recklessness of the poor in marrying early. It is a madness — 
 neither more nor less. A young woman in the country is never 
 satisfied till she has got a sweetheart. As soon as she has caught 
 her Lubin, she must needs fix him, lest, as she says, ' next time 
 she should get a worse. 5 And so, in one half-year, a tidy lad 
 and decent lass become a couple of ragged, ill-looking, slovenly 
 trampers. Let them only do as all other members of society do, 
 from the top of the ladder downwards, until it reaches themselves 
 — let them be patient and provident — let them stay till they have 
 bought a pot to boil their potatoes in, and a sack in advance ; — 
 many a couple begin life without either. The poor obtain a 
 multitude of advantages by delay; they start fair— they learn 
 carefulness — they have an idea of comfort, and some notion of 
 character ; and, more than all — Malthusian though the considera- 
 tion be — they will find four children much easier to bring up than 
 fourteen. 
 
 " A landlord has an unquestioned right to keep bad characters 
 from his cottages. He owes this duty to himself and to his 
 honester tenants. He has an equal right to exclude those who, 
 from their circumstances, are certain — we use the word advisedly 
 — to become bad characters. In the last case he may prevent, 
 not the contagion alone, but the evil itself. If this right were 
 used, cautiously and yet firmly, throughout the country, the 
 villages would not be what they are." — Atlas. 
 
 " Crime — the cause oe its increase. — The case of Professor 
 "Webster has excited among the philanthropists of the United 
 States no small concern of late, giving intensity to the controversy 
 
MORAL CAUSES. 93 
 
 which has for years been going on between the advocates of death 
 punishment and its opponents, who have, in perfect consistency, 
 clamoured most vehemently for the preservation of the life of 
 this execrable monster of human depravity. But notwithstanding: 
 the clamour of a few, the voice of the millions, as with the sounH. 
 of many waters, has called for his execution. In truth, the people 
 of Massachusetts were in some degree prepared for decision in 
 this case, inasmuch as past leniency has materially contributed to 
 the increase of crime, as will appear from the following extract 
 from a transatlantic paper of great respectability : — 
 
 " It appears from Governor Briggs's annual address to the 
 Legislature, that there has been for the last ten years a great 
 increase of convicts in our State Prison. The wav in which 
 some, and, if we remember right, the Governor with the rest, 
 account for the increase, is that the sentences of the courts have 
 been much less severe than formerly. We will not undertake to 
 say how much of the effect is to be attributed to this cause. But 
 there has been another cause of more evident potency. The last 
 ten years have been specially marked by the efforts of the so-called 
 prisoner's friends, alias criminal's aids. The class of people, called 
 by courtesy the Philanthropists, have worked with no little energy 
 a broad machinery, not only against capital punishment, but really 
 against all punishments. Prom them the sentiment has had a 
 wide diffusion, that crime is a mere disease or misfortune, deserv- 
 ing to be treated with medicine rather than with punishment ; 
 and, to some extent, the idea has been conveyed, that the robber, 
 thief, and murderer, have a sure passport to public sympathy. 
 Now, what else could we expect, than that this class of operatives 
 would be greatly increased ? "What is more natural than that the 
 demand should create the supply ? 
 
 " And if the leniency of the courts has been a cause cooperating, 
 that itself has had a cause. If the courts have been unduly lenient 
 in the administration of the laws, it has doubtless been by yielding 
 to a morbid public sentiment, which to them has seemed to re- 
 quire it. And how has that sentiment been created ? Either we 
 come to the conclusion that it is our spurious philanthropists that 
 have added so many recruits to the army that wars upon the 
 peace, property, and lives of the community. At any rate, the fact 
 that a time which has been distinguished for unusual leniency in 
 punishments, has been as distinguished for the increase of crime, 
 is a very effectual condemnation of the theory of those philan- 
 thropists." — British Banner. 
 
 "Abolition op the office of Lord-lieutenant of Ire- 
 land. — In the first place, the office of Lord-lieutenant is an 
 anomaly for which the reason and justification ceased, when the 
 modern improvements in locomotion, both by sea and land, made 
 
94 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 the communication between London and Dublin as easy and 
 regular as that between London and York. Secondly, the sepa- 
 rate form of government tends to divide the people of Ireland 
 from the people of Great Britain, to keep up separate views, ideas, 
 and sentiments, unfounded notions of an opposition of interests, 
 mutual jealousy, ignorance, and estrangement. Thirdly, it in- 
 volves a division of responsibility, a clashing of authorities, a 
 confusion of jurisdictions, which impede the march of government, 
 and tend to weaken and retard it, when vigour and promptitude 
 are of the most consequence. Fourthly, the local government of 
 Ireland tends more than any other cause we know of, to encou- 
 rage that inveterate and fatal habit to which Irishmen of all classes 
 and positions are so notoriously addicted, — the habit of leaning 
 upon Government in all their difficulties, instead of depending 
 upon their individual resources, and relying upon themselves." — 
 Edinburgh Review. 
 
 The Convocation. — "I believe that there are formal and techni- 
 cal difficulties attending the revival of the powers of Convocation, 
 and the noble lord has already acknowledged that before it can act 
 it must be remodelled : into these I will not enter. I will suppose 
 that all such technicalities are overcome, all obstacles removed, 
 her Majesty's advisers satisfied, her Majesty consenting, and 
 Convocation called together; what would follow? Great dis- 
 appointment, or great excitement. What business is to be 
 despatched? Some would say 'the Liturgy requires revision. 
 Some rubrics are inconsistent, and others unintelligible/ If the 
 assembling of Convocation were to end in the reconciliation of 
 some conflicting rubrics, or in supplying the deficiency of others, 
 or even in the change of a few obsolete words or questionable 
 phrases, the result would be little worth the cost of production. 
 Thus far, then, you disappoint ; go further, and you excite. If 
 more were attempted, and the doctrine of the Prayer-book were 
 touched, even with the lightest hand, a flame would be lighted 
 up from one end of the country to the other. Where we have 
 now a smothered fire, hotter perhaps than is agreeable, but still 
 managable, we should raise a conflagration which it would require 
 all her Majesty's prerogative to extinguish. Suppose, then, the 
 Liturgy untouched, and nothing more attempted than what we 
 know to be desired by many members of the church — the issuing 
 a declaration which should contradict a recent decision of the 
 Privy Council, and define the effect of baptism more exactly than 
 it is defined in our articles. Would peace follow? Can we 
 suppose that this would prove a healing measure ? I cannot so 
 interpret the spirit of the age as to believe that the great body 
 of the church, laity or clergy, are prepared to restrict the liberty 
 of opinion on matters hitherto undecided, which our forefathers 
 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 95 
 
 have always enjoyed, and under which the church has flourished 
 for three hundred years." — Speech of the Archbishop of Canterbury 
 in the Rouse of Lords, July 12th, 1851. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 THE EELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 
 
 A conditional cause is a circumstance, or state of things, 
 which is necessary to the production of an effect, but 
 which does not actively produce that effect. 
 
 Thus, if a man fall from his horse, it is a necessary con- 
 dition that he should previously have been on his horse, 
 otherwise he could not have fallen. If a man is hanged 
 for forgery, the active or efficient cause of his being hanged 
 is the commission of the crime ; but if he had never learned 
 to write, he could not have committed a forgery ; hence 
 his knowledge of writing is a necessary condition. 
 
 As the condition does not thus actively, or necessarily 
 produce the effect, we do not usually use the words " con- 
 ditional cause " and " effect," but we say the " condition," 
 and the " sign." Thus, a physician feels the pulse of his 
 patient, to ascertain the state of his health ; the state of 
 health is the condition, the state of the pulse is the sign. 
 Now, a man may be in a bad state of health, and yet his 
 pulse may be regular : the existence of the condition is no 
 proof of the existence of the sign. But if the pulse be irre- 
 gular, it shows that the health is disturbed : the existence 
 of the sign is a proof of the existence of the condition. 
 
 So it is a necessary condition to the performance of any 
 act, that the man who performs it should be alive. Now 
 then, if a will is produced of a date some years subse- 
 quent to the death of the alleged testator, it proves that 
 the will is a forgery. The man might have been alive 
 without making a will, but he could not have made a will 
 unless he had been alive. The condition must have 
 preceded the sign. 
 
 1. This relation of condition and sign supplies us with 
 various modes of reasoning. 
 
 From the non-existence of the condition, we infer the 
 non-existence of the sign. 
 
96 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 Qualifications, instruments, and opportunities are neces- 
 sary conditions to the performance of any act. If we 
 prove the absence of these we prove the non-performance 
 of the act. If a man has committed murder, it is a neces- 
 sary condition, that he should have been at the place when 
 the murder was committed, and at the time the murder 
 was committed. Now, if he can prove an alibi, (this word 
 is Latin for elsewhere}) that is, if he can prove that he was 
 at a distant place at the time the murder was committed, 
 this proves that he did not commit the murder. The non- 
 existence of the condition proves the non-existence of the 
 sign. But you cannot reverse this rule. The existence of 
 the condition will not of itself prove the existence of the 
 sign ; for he might have been at the place where, and at 
 the time when, the murder was committed, and yet might 
 not have committed the murder. It might have been com- 
 mitted by some of his companions. 
 
 Again, from the existence of the sign we infer the exist- 
 ence of the condition. 
 
 Take the same instance. If a man is proved to have 
 committed a murder, it proves the condition, that he was 
 at the place where, and at the time when, the murder was 
 committed. But if it is proved that he did not commit 
 the murder, that is in itself no proof that he was not 
 present when the murder was committed. The non- 
 existence of the sign is no proof of the non-existence of 
 the condition. 
 
 Sometimes it is contended in favour of a proposed 
 measure, that it is a necessary condition, i.e. a conditional 
 cause, to some other measure of still greater importance. 
 
 Thus the Earl of Shaftesbury advocated in the House of 
 Lords the establishment of Lodging Houses for the poor, 
 upon the ground that domestic comfort is a necessary con- 
 dition to their intellectual and moral improvement. 
 
 " Could their Lordships suppose that these physical evils pro- 
 duced no mischievous moral consequences ? He was sorry to 
 have to inform them that they produced the most fatal and deadly 
 consequences. They generated habits of drinking — they led to 
 the overthrow of decency. Every function of nature was per- 
 formed in public — there was no retirement for any purpose — for 
 any purpose ; — there was no domestic education — nay, education 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 97 
 
 itself was useless, if children returned to their homes to unlearn 
 by example what they had learned elsewhere by precept. He 
 grieved to reflect that in these dens there could be no domestic 
 training of that description which was more valuable than any 
 other training — the training of the mother ; and that the want of 
 such domestic training could not be compensated by any system 
 of public education which could be devised. This he saw daily. 
 He had, as many of their lordships perhaps knew, been for some 
 time connected with the ragged schools recently established in 
 the metropolis. Most of the ragged children whom they saw 
 about the streets attended those schools, and not, he trusted, 
 without benefit. A young boy or girl received there useful 
 lessons, but they returned to the single room, in which six fami- 
 lies might be residing, without any regard to the restraints which 
 were necessary for a social, moral, and religious life ; and they 
 lost, in one hour, all the decent impressions which they had gained 
 in the previous six. Until this source of evil were removed, all 
 your hopes to improve the morals of your people, all your efforts 
 to give them a useful and religious education, will be vain. You 
 must stop this welling fountain of disaster, if you would carry 
 into execution the benevolent and provident views which you, in 
 common with all who have property to protect, entertain towards 
 the lower class." 
 
 Dr. Hamilton uses the same kind of argument in his 
 Sermon upon early closing the shops in London : — 
 
 " Vainly, my friends, shall we multiply the means of rational 
 instruction if we do not shorten the hours of labour. Yainly 
 shall libraries and reading-rooms hold out their attractions, and 
 vainly shall popular lectures and polytechnic exhibitions keep 
 open till late at night, unless, along with, the lecture or the show, 
 we give the leisure to look and listen. And vainly shall kind- 
 hearted tradesmen treat their hands to an occasional holiday 
 evening, in order to visit some instructive sight or hear some 
 appropriate address, — unless the boon be prolonged and perpetua- 
 ted : unless time be afforded to follow up the study, or drink 
 again the stream they have once tasted." 
 
 By a similar mode of reasoning we sometimes adduce 
 a precept to prove a doctrine, the truth of which seems 
 a necessary condition to the justice of the command. 
 Thus the commands of Scripture to repent, believe, obey, 
 imply as a necessary condition that man has the power to 
 repent, believe and obey. The threatenings of punishment 
 imply as a necessary condition that man is a free agent ; 
 otherwise he could not justly incur punishment. So Arch- 
 
98 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 bishop Whately cites an injunction to almsgiving as a 
 scriptural authority for the institution of property : — 
 
 " It is plain from this, and from many other such injunctions 
 of the apostles, that they did not intend to destroy, among Chris- 
 tians, the security of property which leads to the distinction be- 
 tween the rich and the poor. For, their exhortations to the rich, 
 to be kind and charitable to the poor, would have been absurd, 
 if they had not allowed that any of their people should be rich. 
 And there could be no such thing as charity in giving anything to 
 the poor, if it were not left to each man's free choice, to give or 
 spend what is his own. Indeed, nothing can be called your own, 
 which you are not left free to dispose of as you will. The very 
 nature of charity implies that it must be voluntary ; for no one 
 can be properly said to give anything that he has no power to 
 withhold." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 
 
 2. You will observe, that much erroneous reasoning has 
 taken place from confounding the conditional with the 
 active cause. 
 
 In cases where a number of causes, some active, and 
 some only conditional, conspire to produce the same effect, 
 it is not always easy to distinguish between the active and 
 the conditional causes. This difficulty is often experienced 
 in the investigation of historical facts. Thus, it has been 
 said that the Reformation was the cause of all the wars in 
 Germany in the fifteenth century. The Reformation was 
 certainly a condition, for if there had been no Reformation, 
 there could have been no fighting about it. But it was 
 only the condition, the active cause of those wars was the in- 
 terference of those hostile parties, who would not allow the 
 people to follow the convictions of their own judgments. 
 
 In the following argument the existence of the condition 
 is insisted on as essential to the sign. 
 
 " No man will excel in his profession if he thinks himself above 
 it ; and commerce will never flourish in any country where com- 
 merce is not respected. Commerce flourished in England, be- 
 cause there a merchant was respected, and was thought worthy 
 of the highest honour his country could bestow. Commerce never 
 flourished in .Prance, because there it was despised ; and the cha- 
 racter of un riche bourgeois, a rich citizen, was the character which 
 their dramatic writers were fond of introducing as the subject of 
 ridicule. Commerce will never flourish in a country where young 
 men, whose fathers are barely able to maintain a genteel appear- 
 ance, think it beneath their rank to enter a counting-house, and 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 99 
 
 prefer sustaining the character of segar-smoking loungers. Com- 
 merce will never nourish in a country where property acquired 
 by industry is considered less deserving of respect than property 
 acquired by inheritance. Commerce will never nourish in a 
 country where men in business, instead of bringing up their sons 
 to the same business, think it more respectable to send them to 
 professions. Commerce will never nourish in a country where 
 men, as soon as they get a few thousand pounds by trade, are 
 anxious to get out of trade, and to mix with the society of the 
 fashionable world." — Lectures on Commerce. 
 
 3. This principle of reasoning is used very extensively 
 in the examination of evidence adduced in our Courts 
 of Law. Sometimes parties are accused of crimes, to the 
 perpetration of which there were no witnesses. Their guilt 
 is inferred from the circumstances of the case. This is 
 called " circumstantial evidence," and sometimes " pre- 
 sumptive evidence," as the guilt is 'presumed from the cir- 
 cumstances adduced. Some lawyers have maintained that 
 circumstantial evidence is more conclusive than direct 
 evidence, as there is no danger from the perjury of the 
 witnesses. But others have thought differently. No certain 
 rules can be given for circumstantial evidence. Each cause 
 must depend upon itself. The reader will remember, that 
 within a short period, several atrocious criminals have been 
 convicted upon circumstantial evidence. 
 
 The following are some general remarks on this kind of 
 evidence : — 
 
 " The force and effect of circumstantial evidence depend 
 upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of, explana- 
 tion or solution upon any other supposition than that of 
 the truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove ; the 
 mode of argument resembling the method of demonstra- 
 tion by the reductio ad absurdum." 
 
 " These circumstances may be considered under the heads 
 of — motives to crime, — declarations indicative of inten- 
 tion, — preparations for the commission of crime, — pos- 
 session of the fruits of crime, — refusal to account for 
 appearances of suspicion, or unsatisfactory explanations 
 of such appearances, — evidence indirectly confessional, — 
 and the suppression, destruction, simulation, and fabrica- 
 tion of evidence." 
 
 r2 
 
100 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " The principal facts of circumstantial evidence, of an 
 external character, relate to questions of identity, — (1) of 
 person ; (2) of things ; (3) of hand-writing ; and (4) of 
 time ; but there must necessarily be a number of isolated 
 facts which admit of no more specific classification." 
 
 " Since an action without a motive would be an effect 
 without a cause, a presumption is created in favour of in- 
 nocence from the absence of all apparent inducement to 
 the commission of the imputed offence. But the investi- 
 gation of human motives is often a matter of great diffi- 
 culty from their latency or remoteness ; and experience 
 shows that aggravated crimes are sometimes committed 
 from very slight causes, and occasionally even without any 
 ajDparent or discoverable motive. This particular pre- 
 sumption would therefore seem to be applicable only to 
 cases where the guilt of the individual is involved in doubt ; 
 and the consideration for the jury in general is rather 
 whether upon the other parts of the evidence the party 
 accused has committed the crime, than whether he had 
 any adequate motive." 
 
 " Since falsehood, concealment, flight, and other like 
 acts, are generally regarded as indications of conscious guilt, 
 it naturally follows that the absence of these marks of 
 mental emotion, and still more a voluntary surrender to 
 justice, when the party had the opportunity of conceal- 
 ment or flight, must be considered as leading to the 
 opposite presumption ; and these considerations are fre- 
 quently ruged with just effect as indicative of innocence } 
 but the force of the latter circumstance may be weakened 
 by the consideration that the party has been the object of 
 diligent pursuit. It must be also remembered, that flight 
 and other similar indications of fear may be referable to 
 guilt of another and less penal character than that involved 
 in the particular charge." 
 
 " If it be proved that a party charged with crime has 
 been placed in circumstances which commonly operate as 
 inducements to commit the act in question, — that he has 
 so far yielded to the operation of those inducements as to 
 have manifested the disposition to commit the particular 
 crime, — that he has possessed the requisite means and 
 opportunities of effecting the object of his wishes, — that 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 101 
 
 recently after the commission of the act he has become 
 possessed of the fruits or other consequential advantages 
 of the crime, — if he be identified with the corpus delicti 
 by any conclusive mechanical circumstances, as by the 
 impressions of his footsteps, or the discovery of any article 
 of his apparel or property at or near the scene of the 
 crime, — if there be relevant appearances of suspicion, con- 
 nected with his conduct, person, or dress, and such as he 
 might reasonably be presumed to be able to account for, 
 but which nevertheless he cannot or will not explain, — if 
 he be put upon his defence recently after the crime, under 
 strong circumstances of adverse presumption, and cannot 
 show where he was at the time of its commission, — if he 
 attempt to evade the force of those circumstances of pre- 
 sumption by false or incredible pretences, or by endeavours 
 to evade or pervert the course of justice by conduct in- 
 consistent with the supposition of his innocence, — the con- 
 currence of all or of many of these cogent circumstances, 
 unopposed by facts leading to a counter presumption, 
 naturally, reasonably, and satisfactorily establishes the 
 moral certainty of his guilt, — if not with precisely the same 
 kind of assurance as if he had been seen to commit the 
 deed, at least with all the assurance which the nature of the 
 case and the vast majority of human actions admit. In 
 such circumstances we are justly warranted in adopting, 
 without qualification or reserve, the conclusions to which, 
 ' by a broad, general, and comprehensive view of the facts, 
 and not relying upon minute circumstances with respect to 
 which there may be some source of error,' the mind is thus 
 naturally and inevitably conducted, and in regarding the 
 application of the sanctions of penal law as a mere corol- 
 lary. Nor can any practice be more absurd and unjust, 
 than that perpetuated in some modern codes, which, while 
 they admit of proof by circumstantial evidence, inconsis- 
 tently denies to it its logical and ordinary consequences." — 
 Will's Principles of Circumstantial Evidence. 
 
 It may be observed that the conclusiveness of circum- 
 stantial evidence does not depend upon the force of any one 
 circumstance, but upon the strength of the whole united. 
 If we see a man coming out of a house, with blood on his 
 clothes, that is no proof that he has committed murder. 
 
102 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 There are many other ways in which his dress may have 
 become bloody. But if we enter the house, and find there 
 a person who has the appearance of having been recently 
 murdered, this causes the former individual to become 
 suspected. If, again, you find the hat of this person in 
 the house of the murdered man ; and when this person is 
 apprehended, he denies ever having been in the house ; 
 and, moreover, you find concealed in his dress some pro- 
 perty proved to have belonged to the man who was 
 murdered ; — now, putting these and similar circumstances 
 together, you may have sufficient proof of the prisoner's 
 guilt ; for although you might easily assign other causes 
 for any one of these circumstances separately, you cannot 
 assign sufficient causes to account for them all, except on 
 the supposition that the prisoner is the man who has com- 
 mitted the crime. In cases of this kind the prisoner's 
 counsel exercises his ingenuity in assigning other causes to 
 account for these criminating appearances. And some 
 barristers think themselves justified in doing this, even 
 after the prisoner has confessed his guilt. Lawyers of 
 high standing have declared that such conduct is not, in 
 their judgment, a violation of 'professional morality. 
 
 It must also be observed, that if the circumstances 
 brought in evidence against a prisoner can be accounted 
 for on any other supposition than his guilt, he is entitled 
 to an acquittal. The evidence must prove, not merely 
 that he may be guilty, but that he must be guilty. The 
 circumstances adduced must be wholly incompatible with 
 the supposition that he is innocent, and incapable of ex- 
 plauation upon any other hypothesis than that of his 
 guilt. It is upon this kind of evidence that most crimi- 
 nals are convicted. As crimes are usually committed in 
 secret, witnesses can rarely be obtained, and circumstantial 
 evidence is the only evidence that can be adduced ; and 
 Providence seems always to have arranged that all great 
 crimes shall in this way be brought to light. Plans hatched 
 with consummate ingenuity, and in profound secrecy, have 
 in their execution been attended with some slight oversight, 
 which has supplied a thread by which the whole plot has 
 been unravelled. True, some persons convicted upon cir- 
 cumstantial evidence have afterwards been proved to be inno- 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 103 
 
 cent ; so also persons convicted upon direct evidence have 
 afterwards been proved to be innocent. If, on the one 
 hand, circumstances may seem to warrant an erroneous 
 conclusion, on the other hand you may have mistaken or 
 perjured witnesses. 
 
 4. Circumstantial evidence is also employed by theo- 
 logians. 
 
 Under this principle of reasoning we may class Paley's 
 Horoe Paulince, and similar works, designed to prove the 
 authenticity of the sacred writings. This work of Paley 
 is confined to the consideration of the Acts and the Epi- 
 stles. It does not attempt to prove they are genuine, but 
 to prove they are not forgeries. The result is the same, but 
 the mode of reasoning is different. It is presumed that 
 some party has accused these books of being forgeries ; 
 and the reasoning is to show, by circumstantial evidence, 
 that the accusation is not true. The evidence is derived 
 from the writings themselves, and rests upon the inci- 
 dental coincidences that occur between the "Acts of the 
 Apostles" and the " Epistles." The following example is 
 taken from Paley : — 
 
 " In the Acts of the Apostles, in the sixteenth chapter, and at 
 the first verse, we are told that Paul 'canie to Derbe andLystra: 
 and, behold, a certain disciple was there, named Timotheus, the 
 son of a certain woman, which was a Jewess, and believed ; but 
 his father was a Greek.' In the epistle before us, in the first 
 chapter, and at the fourth and fifth verses, St. Paul writes tD 
 Timothy thus : ' Greatly desiring to see thee, being mindful of 
 thy tears, that I may be filled with joy; when I call to remem- 
 brance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first ia 
 thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice ; and I am per- 
 suaded that in thee also.' Here we have a fan, unforced example 
 of coincidence. In the history Timothy was the ' son of a Jewess 
 that believed:' in the epistle St. Paul applauds 'the faith which 
 dwelt in his mother Eunice.' In the history it is said of the 
 mother, 'that she was a Jewess, and believed:' of the father, 
 s that he was a Greek.' Now when it is said of the mother alone 
 ' that she believed,' the father being nevertheless mentioned in 
 the same sentence, we are led to suppose of the father that he 
 did not believe, that is, either that he was dead, or that he re- 
 mained unconverted. Agreeably hereunto, whilst praise is 
 bestowed in the epistle upon one parent, and upon her sincerity iu 
 the faith, no notice is taken of the other. The mention of the 
 
104 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 grandmother is the addition of a circumstance not fonnd in the 
 history; but it is a circumstance which, as well as the names of 
 the parties, might naturally be expected to be known to the 
 apostle, though overlooked by Ms historian." 
 
 A new edition of Paley's Horce Paulince has recently 
 been published by the Religions Tract Society, with large 
 additions, by the Rev. T. R. Birks, late Fellow of Trinity 
 College, Cambridge. We take the following example from 
 Mr. Birks :— 
 
 " 2 Tim. iv. 13, 21. ' The cloak that I left at Troas with 
 Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books, but 
 especially the parchments/ 
 
 " ' Do thy diligence to come before winter.' 
 
 " The deep and touching significance of this direction, however 
 trivial it may seem, has been beautifully explained by Mons. 
 Gaussen, in his Theopneustia. 
 
 " ' During near thirty years he had been poor, in labours more 
 abundant than others, in stripes above measure beyond them, in 
 prisons more frequent than they : of the Jews he had five times 
 received forty stripes save one, thrice he had been beaten with 
 rods, once stoned, thrice shipwrecked, in journeyings often, in 
 perils at sea, in towns, in deserts, among the heathen, and among 
 his own countrymen, in watchings often, in hunger and thirst, in 
 cold and nakedness, with the care of all the churches. He was 
 now Paul the aged, and in his last prison at Rome, expecting the 
 sentence of death, and ready to be offered • he had fought a good 
 fight, finished his course, and kept the faith. Even his friends 
 had shrunk from him on his first arraignment ; only Luke was 
 with him, the rest had left or forsaken him ; the winter was about 
 to set in, and in the chilly dungeons of Rome he was in want of 
 his cloak, which he had left with Carpus at Troas, two hundred 
 leagues away. The writer was himself in Rome last year, at the 
 commencement of November ; and with what vivid reality, under 
 the influence of the evening cold, could he imagine the aged 
 apostle in the dungeons of the Capitol, dictating the last of his 
 letters, regretting the absence of his cloak, and begging Timothy 
 to bring it before winter.' 
 
 " In another view, these passages bear the same impress of 
 reality. The apostle had wintered at Nicopolis, journeyed north- 
 ward early in the spring, dismissed Titus to Dalmatia, crossed 
 Macedonia by the Egnatian Way to Neapolis, and embarked for 
 Troas ; proceeded to Miletus, and in that neighbourhood been 
 seized, examined, and sent off to Rome, from whence he writes 
 to Timothy, in time for him to return, but only with a speedy 
 journey, before winter sets in again. From this outline, deduced 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. 105 
 
 by a careful comparison of many scattered hints, about what time 
 would he have passed through Troas ? Most probably, about the 
 month of May. How natural for him to leave his cloak behind, 
 when the summer months were now begun, and especially if he 
 purposed to return by the same route, so as to winter in Thrace 
 or Macedonia ! Yet, as Mr. Biley has justly observed, ' there 
 is no allusion to the season in the first letter to Timothy ; no 
 allusion to the proposed return to Asia after the winter, in that 
 to Titus; no allusion to the winter at Nicopolis, or to the 
 second interview with Timothy, in the present letter. The 
 harmony is as completely hidden below the surface as it could 
 possibly be !' " 
 
 A similar work has been published by the Rev. J. J. 
 Blunt, B.D. Margaret Professor of Divinity, Cambridge, en- 
 titled, " Undesigned Coincidences in the Writings both of 
 ,the Old and New Testament, an Argument of their Vera- 
 city." We take an example from this work : — 
 
 "Towards the end of the famine caused by this drought, Elijah 
 is commanded by God to ' get him to Zarephath, which belongeth 
 to Zidon, and dwell there ;' where a widow woman was to sustain 
 him.* He goes : finds the woman gathering sticks near the gate 
 of the city ; and asks her to fetch him a little water and a morsel 
 of bread. She replies, ' As the Lord thy God liveth, I have not 
 a cake, but an handful of meal in a barrel, and a little oil in a 
 cruse : and, behold, I am gathering two sticks, that I may go in 
 and dress it for me and my son, that we may eat it, and die.'f 
 
 " This widow-woman, then, it seems, dwelt at Zarephath, or 
 Sarepta, which belongeth to Zidon. Now, from a passage in the 
 book of Joshua,^ we learn that the district of Zidon, in the divi- 
 sion of the land of Canaan, fell to the lot of Asher. Let us, 
 then, turn to the thirty-third chapter of Deuteronomy, where 
 Moses blesses the tribes, and see the character he gives of this 
 part of the country : ' Of Asher he said, Let Asher be blessed 
 with children ; let him be acceptable to his brethren, and let him 
 dip his foot in oil;'\ indicating the future fertility of that region, 
 and the nature of its principal crop. It is likely, therefore, that 
 at the end of a dearth of three years and a half, oil should be 
 found there, if anywhere. Yet this symptom of truth occurs once 
 more as an ingredient in a miraculous history — for the oil was 
 made not to fail till the rain came. The incident itself is a very 
 minute one ; and minute as it is, only discovered to be a coinci- 
 dence by the juxtaposition of several texts from several books of 
 Scripture. It would require a very circumspect forger of the 
 
 * 1 Kings xvii. 9. +1 Kings xvii. 12. 
 
 % Josh. xix. 28. § Deut. xxxiii. 24. 
 
 F3 
 
106 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 story to introduce the mention of the oil ; and when he had intro- 
 duced it, not to be tempted to betray himself by throwing out 
 some slight hint why he had done so." 
 
 The same coincidences are observable in the Gospel his- 
 tories. " In every narrative," observes Paley, " we perceive 
 simplicity and undesignedness,— the air and the language 
 of reality. When we compare the different narratives 
 together, we find them so varying as to repel all suspicion 
 of confederacy ; so agreeing under this variety, as to show 
 that the accounts had one real transaction for their common 
 foundation; often attributing different actions and dis- 
 courses to the Person whose history, or rather memoirs of 
 whose history, they profess to relate ; yet actions and dis- 
 courses so similar as very much to bespeak the same charac- 
 ter, which is a coincidence that, in such writers as they were,, 
 could only be the consequence of their writing from fact, 
 and not from imagination." — Evidences of Christianity. 
 
 I know of no better mode of training the reasoning 
 faculties than the perusal of works like these. — They re- 
 quire not extensive information nor profound thinking. 
 The mode of reasoning is familiar to the apprehension of a 
 child. It is reasoning made easy. At the same time, the 
 facts investigated are very interesting, and the lessons 
 acquired are of the utmost importance. The circum- 
 stances of each case, too, have so much similarity with the 
 transactions of ordinaiy life, as to give an aptitude for 
 discussing the affairs of daily occurrence. The reader will 
 observe that all this reasoning is founded on the second 
 rule of circumstantial evidence ; that is, from the existence 
 of the sign we prove the existence of the condition ; or, as 
 it has been otherwise expressed, the existence of the con- 
 sequent proves the existence of the antecedent. Upon the 
 supposition that these writings are forgeries, the circum- 
 stances mentioned could not have occurred. "We know this 
 from our own common sense, and from our knowledge of 
 human nature and of human affairs. Upon the supposi- 
 tion that these writings are genuine, these circumstances 
 would naturally occur ; and hence, from the existence of 
 the sign, we prove the existence of the condition. 
 
 5. Circumstantial evidence is employed too with refer- 
 ence to the affairs of ordinary life. 
 
CONDITIONAL CAUSES. v 107 
 
 Bankers, merchants, and traders judge by this kind of 
 evidence of the solvency and responsibility of the parties 
 with whom they deal. The actual amount of a man's pro- 
 perty is probably known only to himself. His standing on 
 the exchange or in the market will depend upon his per- 
 sonal character, his business habits, his conformity to esta- 
 blished rules, and the extent to which he practises those 
 moral virtues which are known to be the surest guide to 
 wealth. We are told that " it is of great importance to a 
 banker to have an ample knowledge of the means and 
 transactions of his customers. The customer, when he opens 
 his account, will give him some information on this sub- 
 ject. The banker will afterwards get information from his 
 own books. The amount of transactions that his customer 
 passes through his current account, will show the extent of 
 his business. The amount of his daily balance will show if 
 he has much ready cash. The extent and character of the 
 bills he offers for discount, will show if he trust large 
 amounts to individual houses, and if these are respectable. 
 On the other hand, the bills his customer may accept to 
 other parties, and his payments, will show the class of 
 people with whom he deals, or who are in the habit of 
 giving him credit."* Another banker observes that, " Next 
 in importance to a study of his accounts, the habits and 
 character of a client are deserving of your attentive con- 
 sideration. If a man's style of living, for example, becomes 
 extravagant, and he gives himself over to excess, you can- 
 not too promptly apply the curb, however regular the 
 transactions upon his account may seem."t 
 
 Now, this is judging from circumstantial evidence. By 
 the same kind of evidence we are guided in our domestic 
 adjudications. In this mode of reasoning we judge of the 
 honesty of our servants, of the truthfulness of our children, 
 and of many other transactions connected with family 
 discipline. By this mode too we often judge of the sin- 
 cerity of our friends, and of the character of public men. 
 
 6. The Scriptures furnish us with a good many instances 
 of both right and wrong judgments founded on circum- 
 stantial evidence. 
 
 * Gilbart's Practical Treatise on Banking. 
 
 t The " Internal Management of a Country Bank." By Thomas Bullion. 
 
108 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Saul put to the sword the priests of the Lord upon cir- 
 cumstantial evidence. The high priest had given bread to 
 David's troop, had supplied him with a sword, and had 
 inquired of God for him. He made a most logical defence : 
 — He had been in the habit of inquiring of God for him. 
 David was the king's son-in-law ; he was a distinguished 
 man in the nation ; and the high priest did not know that 
 a rupture had taken place between him and Saul. Samuel 
 convicted Saul of disobedience and falsehood by circum- 
 stantial evidence. Saul said : " I have performed the com- 
 mandment of the Lord." Samuel said : " What meaneth 
 then this bleating of the sheep in mine ears, and the lowing 
 of the oxen which I hear 1 ?" Peter was accused upon cir- 
 cumstantial evidence. He was a Galilean ; he spoke a 
 provincial dialect ; and he had been seen in the garden — 
 all these circumstances seemed to warrant a suspicion that 
 he also "was one of this man's disciples." St. Paul was 
 accused upon circumstantial evidence. The charge was, 
 that he had denied the temple : the proof was, that he had 
 been seen walking the streets of Jerusalem in company 
 with Trophimus, an Ephesian. The tribes beyond Jordan 
 were accused of idolatry, upon circumstantial evidence. 
 They had built an altar. It was shown that this altar was 
 not intended for sacrifice. 
 
 7. You will observe that arguments are often expressed 
 in a conditional form when they have no reference to the 
 relation of conditional cause and effect. ♦ 
 
 In these cases, the relation is usually denoted by the words 
 antecedent and consequent. The antecedent denotes what 
 goes before, and the consequent denotes what follows after. 
 The consequent is the result of the antecedent, or is a natural 
 inference from the antecedent. Thus — If the sun be fixed, 
 the earth must move. If there be no fire, there will be no 
 smoke. If it be our duty to love our neighbours as our- 
 selves, very few people perform their duty. " If we say, 
 We have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Dr. Watts observes, 
 that " the truth of these propositions depends not at all 
 on the truth or falsehood of their two parts, but on the 
 truth of the connexion of them ; for each part of them 
 may be false, and yet the whole proposition true, as — " If 
 there be no Providence, there will be no future punishment." 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 109 
 
 In many cases, indeed, we do not intend to denote any 
 kind of condition or contingency, but adopt this form of 
 reasoning merely because it is a more forcible way of stating 
 the argument. Arguments from analogy, and a fortiori, 
 as will be explained hereafter, are almost always expressed 
 in this form, as well as those advanced in the way of objec- 
 tions. — " If the Lord be with us, why is all this evil be- 
 fallen us?" — Judg. vi. 13. — "If Baal be a god, let him 
 plead for himself, because one hath cast down his altar." — 
 Judg. vi. 31. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 THE RELATION OP CAUSE AND EFFECT FINAL CAUSES. 
 
 With regard to intelligent beings, actions are the effects 
 of motives or feelings. Hence the motive or design of 
 an action is called its final cause. With regard to final 
 causes and effects, the mode of reasoning is from the 
 existence of the cause to infer the existence of the effect, or 
 from the existence of the effect to infer the existence of the 
 cause. Moral causes refer to habits, events, and institu- 
 tions. Final causes refer generally to individual acts. 
 1. The following are examples : — 
 
 " And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for 
 to show hi thee my power ; and that my name may be declared 
 throughout all the earth." — Exocl. ix. 16. 
 
 " Dearly beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry- 
 places to acknowledge and confess our manifold sins and wicked- 
 ness ; and that we should not dissemble nor cloke them before 
 the face of Almighty God our heavenly Father ; but confess them 
 with an humble, lowly, penitent, and obedient heart ; to the e?id 
 that we may obtain forgiveness of the same by his infinite good- 
 ness and mercy." — Prayer-Book. 
 
 " The gentleman travels for pleasure. The lady rides for 
 exercise. The merchant toils for wealth. The soldier fights for 
 glory" 
 
 " Smith has shown that labour is the real source of wealth : 
 that the wish to augment our fortune and to rise in the world — 
 
110 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 a wish that comes with us from the womb and never leaves us till 
 we go into the grave — is the cause of wealth being saved and 
 accumulated." — Macculloch. 
 
 "It is the interest of every master that the persons in his 
 employment should be contented with their position, and feel a 
 pride in everything which contributes to the success of the esta- 
 blishment of which they form a part. The mere labourer for hire, 
 who has no interest in his work beyond the performance of a con- 
 tract, for which he is to obtain a certain amount of wages, will 
 not be the same zealous workman as the man who brings to his 
 work a feeling of anxiety to perform it in a manner which will 
 redound the most to the credit of the master who employs him." 
 — The Responsibilities of Employers. (Pickering.) 
 
 2. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into the 
 science of Natural Theology. 
 
 From the adaptation of certain arrangements to answer 
 certain purposes, we infer that these arrangements were 
 designed to answer these purposes. Thus, the eye is adapted 
 for seeing : we infer it was made to answer that purpose. 
 And so we argue respecting hearing, and of all the other 
 animal functions. You may see a large enumeration of 
 similar instances in Paley's Natural Theology, and in the 
 Bridgewater Treatises. 
 
 From the manifold proofs of design in the world, . we 
 infer the existence of a Designer. These effects denote 
 intelligence, and hence we infer the existence of an Intel- 
 ligent Cause. 
 
 " He that planted the ear, shall he not hear ? he that formed 
 the eye, shall he not see ? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall 
 not he correct ? he that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he 
 know ? "—Psalm xciv. 9, 40. . 
 
 " But to proceed to show that in all science there was evidence 
 of a God. Take a fount of types, and scatter them over the floor 
 of Exeter-hall ; would they arrange themselves into the shape 
 and order of Milton's 'Paradise Lost,' or one of Shakspeare's 
 plays ? Certainly not ; but if, on the other hand, they found them 
 arranged in the composing-stick in the shape and order of either 
 the one or the other, would not the natural inference be, that it 
 had been done by some person who had first designed the work, 
 and then carried that design into execution ? Or if a man who 
 had never seen a watch, found one in the desert, and on opening 
 it discovered its wheels and cranks all working together, and 
 some of them apparently in opposition to each other, yet all 
 
FINAL CAUSES. Ill 
 
 combining to show the hour of the day — would he not infer that 
 some ingenious and contriving person had been at work arranging 
 all this delicate and complicated machinery for a definite result ? 
 Again, if you took all the bricks of which London was composed 
 and heaped them together, they would be bricks, but nothing 
 more ; but when they were arranged and built up into buildings 
 like that hall, into houses, streets, and squares, then there was 
 evidence of design and aim. So with the universe; from the 
 largest star that shone in the firmament to the minutest insect 
 that floated in the sunbeam — in everything — the evidences of 
 design were so various, so clear, so magnificent, so grand, that 
 that man who would still say, c There is no Author here, all is 
 chance,' must be blind or mad — as the Psalmist said, it was ' the 
 fool who said in his heart, There is no God. 5 * * * * In the human 
 eye, which, while lighting us on our way, was made capable of 
 receiving the most pleasurable impressions from external objects 
 — the ear, which, while performing its duty of warning us of 
 danger, was made also the storehouse of the most exquisite 
 sounds — the taste, which, while pressing us to eat, gave us satis- 
 faction and delight in eating — the muscles of the body, which, 
 while designed with the greatest strength, combined with that 
 strength the greatest lightness and the utmost symmetry and 
 elegance of form — all this, the Atheist would tell you, was the 
 result of mere accident ; but the Christian said : c All this proves 
 the design of a wise, a beneficent, and an omnipotent God.' So 
 with everything in animal life, the wing of the bird, the cell of 
 the bee, the adaptation of everything to its use and purpose, all 
 was indicative of the same great design. * * * * Take another 
 fact from science. During the months of June, July, and August, 
 the rise in the temperature of the day was so great, that if the 
 heat continued to increase from nine to twelve in the morning, at 
 the same rate as it increased from six to nine, every green thing 
 would be scorched, and the atmosphere would be unbearable. 
 How was this heat modified ? Water, in process of conversion 
 into steam, absorbed heat, and in summer, as the sun rose higher 
 in the heavens, the heat of its rays converted the dew-drops on 
 the flowers and the little pools of water on the ground into 
 steam, and the heat was carried off by it. Again, when the sun 
 went down, excessive cold was prevented by another arrange- 
 ment. Those mists which the sun had taken up in the morning 
 to keep the day cool, were again condensed at night into dew, 
 and water going back from the state of steam to water gave out 
 heat, and thus the night was made warm. And in winter, the 
 rapid increase of cold was prevented by the frosts, which, by 
 converting water into ice, compelled it to pass off its superabun- 
 dant caloric into the atmosphere, which was thus warmed by it." 
 — Dr. Gumming *s Sermon on God in Science. 
 
112 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 3. From the manifestation of certain attributes or qua- 
 lities in the works of Creation and Providence, we infer the 
 existence of these attributes and qualities in the Intelligent 
 Cause. 
 
 Hence we demonstrate the power, wisdom, goodness, and 
 other attributes of God. Thus we prove the goodness of 
 God by facts showing that the works of nature are so con- 
 structed as to produce pleasure as well as utility to his 
 intellectual creatures. 
 
 " Nevertheless, he left not himself without witness, in that he 
 did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, 
 filling our hearts with food and gladness." — Acts xiv. 17. 
 
 " But why was man so constituted, as to require food ? Is 
 not the obvious answer to be found in that Divine benevolence 
 by which enjoyment is spread so largely over all life ? There can 
 be no question of the resources of Omnipotence; man might 
 have been formed with no more necessity for food than the flower. 
 But all know that food is capable of giving pleasure, and by this 
 daily necessity a general pleasure was constantly combined with 
 existence." 
 
 " He who made the organs of nutrition might have adapted 
 them to any food, or any food to them. Or he might have made 
 but one species of food, or made that one repulsive, and yet 
 nutritious. Yet, what is the reality ? He has given us food in 
 astonishing variety, generally under forms of great beauty, and 
 universally pleasing to the taste. But he has not merely diver- 
 sified the necessary subsistence of man, and thus met the diversi- 
 fied climates of the globe ; but he has given luxuries, unessential 
 to the actual support of man : the syrups of the East, the spices 
 of the South, the rich fruitage of the West, the refreshing pro- 
 ducts of Southern Europe ; the lemon, the orange, the melon, 
 and the vine, salutary luxuries in their own climates, delicious 
 luxuries in all. 
 
 " But now to take the world of vegetation in another aspect, 
 and perhaps the most distinctly evidential of the Divme goodwill 
 to man, — the beauty of the vegetable kingdom." 
 
 "The progress of the fruit-tree is almost a succession, of beauty; 
 from the springing foliage, the bud, the blossom, the formed fruit, 
 to the ripened colouring. In all the loveliness of nature I know 
 nothing lovelier than the orchard of our own country, under the 
 varying lights of leaves and colour, of spring, summer, and 
 autumn." 
 
 " But another enjoyment still remains for man, — in the fra- 
 grance of the vegetable world. Yegetation is almost the only 
 source of fragrance, and yet how copious, how constant, and how 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 113 
 
 exquisite is its enjoyment ! Who has not owned the delight of 
 the morning air, as it comes freshened from the field ? Who has 
 not felt the cool odours of the forest, as he walks under its shade, 
 while the sun is blazing abroad ? Or, when the day goes down, 
 who has not enjoyed the sudden sweetness of the flowers beginning 
 to breathe under the dew ? or, at night-fall, has not scented the 
 new-mown hay, and felt all this as a pleasure distinct from all 
 others ; or which even more than pleases, awakening a finer sen- 
 sibility than of sight, and seeming to soothe, and perhaps even to 
 purify, the mind ? 
 
 "But there is still an immense region of the vegetable king- 
 dom which yet more strongly marks the Divine design of human 
 happiness. — The whole boundless race of flowers ; whose chief 
 conceivable purpose is for the enjoyment of the human sense. 
 •Such subjects as those are familiar, but not trifling. Our Lord 
 himself did not disdain to recall our thoughts to those works of 
 his Almighty Father: 'Behold the lilies of the field, — Solomon, 
 in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these.' " — Br. Crolfs 
 Sermons. 
 
 4. The doctrine of final causes also enters largely into our 
 reasonings on the nature and character of the human mind, 
 and on the circumstances by which we are surrounded. 
 
 From the properties, or qualities, or faculties of the mind, 
 we infer the existence of a corresponding design. Man has 
 a capacity for being happy — we infer he was designed to be 
 happy. Man has a capacity for acquiring knowledge — we 
 infer he was designed to acquire knowledge. Man has 
 feelings and capacities adapted for society — we infer he was 
 designed to live in society. Man has faculties and capa- 
 cities adapted for an immortal state of existence — we infer 
 he is destined to be immortal. 
 
 " The Creator has put forth in his gifts a magnificence which 
 should impress our hearts. What variety in those affectionate 
 sentiments, of the delights of which our natures are susceptible ! 
 Without going out of the family circle, I enumerate filial piety, 
 fraternal affection, friendship, love, and parental tenderness. 
 These different sentiments can all exist equally in our hearts, and 
 so far from weakening, each tends to give vigour and intensity to 
 the other." 
 
 " The destiny of all the inferior orders that surround us, appears 
 to terminate upon the earth. Ours alone is evidently not accom- 
 plished here. The animals, exempt from vice, incapable of virtue, 
 experience, in ceasing to live, neither hopes nor regrets. They 
 die without the foresight of death. Man, in the course of an 
 
114 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 agitated life, degrades himself by follies and vices, or honours 
 himself by generous and useful actions. Remembrances, loves, 
 ties, in countless forms, twine about his heart. He is torn, in 
 agony, from beings for whom he has commenced an affection that 
 he feels might be eternal. Persecuted for his virtue, proscribed 
 for his wisdom and courage, calumniated for his most conscien- 
 tious acts, he turns to heaven a fixed look of confidence and hope. 
 Has he nothing to perform beyond death ? Has the Author of 
 nature forgotten his justice, only in completing his most perfect 
 work ? 
 
 " Our immortality is a necessary consequence of the existence 
 of God. Let us not wander astray in vain discussions, which, 
 with our present faculties, we can never master, such as relate to 
 the nature of the soul. It is enough for me that there is a God. 
 Virtue in misfortune must have hopes which do not terminate in 
 the tomb." — The Art of being Happy. 
 
 5. In the same way, from the attributes, qualities, and 
 capacities of the animal creation, we infer the design or 
 final cause of their creation. 
 
 " All the wonderful instincts of animals, which, in my humble 
 opinion, are proved beyond a doubt, and the belief in which has 
 not decreased with the increase of science and investigation, — all 
 these instincts are given them only for the combination or pre- 
 servation of their species. If they had not these instincts, they 
 would be swept off the earth in an instant. This bee, that under- 
 stands architecture so well, is as stupid as a pebble-stone, out of 
 his own particular business of making honey; and, with all his 
 talents, he only exists that boys may eat his labours, and poets 
 sing about them. JJt pueris placeas et declamatio fias. A peasant 
 girl of ten years old puts the whole republic to death with a 
 little smoke ; their palaces are turned into candles, and every 
 clergyman's wife makes mead-wine of the honey ; and there is an 
 end of the glory and wisdom of the bees ! Whereas, man has 
 talents that have no sort of reference to his existence; and with- 
 out which, his species might remain upon earth in the same safety 
 as if they had them not. The bee works at that particular angle 
 which saves most time and labour ; and the boasted edifice he is 
 constructing is only for his egg : but Somerset house, and Blen- 
 heim, and the Louvre, have nothing to do with breeding. Epic 
 poems, and Apollo Belvideres, and Venus de Medicis, have nothing 
 to do with living and eating. We might have discovered pig- 
 nuts without the Royal Society, and gathered acorns without 
 reasoning about curves of the ninth order. The immense super- 
 fluity of talent given to man, which has no bearing upon animal 
 life, which has nothing to do with the mere preservation of exist- 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 115 
 
 ence, is one very distinguishing circumstance in this comparison. 
 There is no other animal but man to whom mind appears to be 
 given for any other purpose than the preservation of body." — 
 Sydney Smith's Sketches of Moral Philosophy. 
 
 The following argument, from the relation of final cause 
 and effect, has been advanced in favour of sporting : — 
 
 " As Nature, with a liberal but not lavish hand, has bestowed 
 on her offspring those powers and propensities only, which their 
 own necessities, or the general order and economy of the system 
 require ; the gifts of scent to the hound, swiftness to the grey- 
 hound, and sagacity to the pointer, denote the use which she 
 intended man to make of these animals ; and, therefore, the 
 diversions in question are justifiable, as fulfilling the •intentions 
 of Nature herself." — Questions in Political Economy. 
 
 6. It is a principle of moral philosophers, that the final 
 cause or motive of an action forms the moral character of 
 the action. 
 
 " That the moral quality of the action resides in the intention, is 
 evident from various considerations. 
 
 "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate 
 others, or ourselves, without any respect to the happiness or 
 misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what 
 it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention, 
 or, on the same ground, we hold him innocent. Thus, also, of 
 ourselves. We are conscious of guilt or of innocence, not from 
 the result of an action, but from the intention by which we were 
 actuated. 
 
 "We always distinguish between being the instrument of 
 1, and intending it. We are grateful to one who is the cause 
 of good, not in the proportion of the amount effected, but of the 
 amount intended." 
 
 " As the right and wrong of an action reside in the intention, 
 it is evident, that, where an action is intended, though it be not 
 actually performed, that intention is worthy of praise or blame, 
 as truly as the action itself, provided the action itself be wholly 
 out of our power. Thus God rewarded David for intending to 
 build the temple, though he did not permit him actually to build 
 it. So, he who intends to murder another, though he may fail to 
 execute his purpose, is, in the sight of God, a murderer. The 
 meditation upon wickedness with pleasure, comes under the same 
 condemnation. 
 
 "As the right or wrong exists in the intention, wherever a 
 particular intention is essential to virtuous action, the perform- 
 ance of the external act, without that intention, is destitute of 
 
116 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 the element of virtue. Thus, a child is bound to obey his parents, 
 with the intention of thus manifesting his love and gratitude. If 
 he do it from fear, or from hope of gain, the act is destitute of 
 the virtue of filial obedience, and becomes merely the result of 
 passion or self-interest. And thus our Saviour charges upon the 
 Jews the want of the proper intention, in all their dealings with 
 God. C I know you/ said he, 'that ye have not the love of God 
 in you. 5 " — Waylan&'s Elements of Moral Science. 
 
 7. Under this head of final cause and effect, we may 
 class those reasonings that are designed to prove the object 
 or design of the laws of ancient nations. 
 
 Montesquieu's " Spirit of Laws," and Michaelis's " Com- 
 mentaries* on the Laws of Moses," are full of reasonings of 
 this description,, In cases when a legislator has not him- 
 self stated the object of his laws, their design can be gathered 
 only from a consideration of the nature of the enactments 
 in connexion with the character of the people among whom 
 they were promulgated. In his pamphlet on " Marriage 
 with the Sister of a Deceased Wife," Dr. Croly has made 
 some striking remarks on " The Mosaic Code." 
 
 " The first years of the Jewish people had been spent in con- 
 tact with Syrian and Arabian life. ' A Syrian ready to perish was 
 thy father.' Eroru this school of the harshest and most prejudiced 
 habits of the East, they were given into the hands of the Egyp- 
 tian, the most subtle, artificial, and superstitious nation of the 
 ancient world. The Jews, in the course of four centuries, 
 naturally acquired the habits of both. But, when about to be 
 formed into a new nation in Palestine, the first step of their Moral 
 Code was, to purify the national spirit ; to extinguish all the evil, 
 that could be extinguished ; and to qualify all that was beyo?id 
 extinction. 
 
 " The law of Blood-revenge appears to have been universal in 
 Western Asia and Arabia. By this law, the man who killed 
 another, even by accident, was to be slain by the next kinsman. — 
 The Mosaic Code, without insisting on the abandonment of the 
 custom, provided six cities, three on each side of the river Jordan, 
 to which the homicide might flee, and where he was secure, until 
 formal trial. Thus, the principle was modified. 
 
 " By an ancient oriental custom, the creditor was entitled to 
 sell the debtor. — The Mosaic Code, without disputing the right, 
 ordered that the bondage of the debtor, if an Israelite, should not 
 continue beyond the Sabbatical year, except by his own choice; 
 and that no Israelite bondman should, be sold into a foreign 
 country. Thus the principle was modified. 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 117 
 
 C( Polygamy was an established right throughout the East. — The 
 Mosaic Code interfered, simply to forbid one of its frequent acts 
 of injustice. It ordered, that the inheritance of the earlier wife's 
 offspring should be secured against the favouritism of the second, 
 or her offspring. The principle was modified" 
 
 "Slavery was retained. — But a provision against its excess in 
 numbers was enacted, by the Mosaic prohibitions of man-stealing, 
 still so common among the nations of the South; and of that 
 cruelty which so generally marks the trade in man. The master 
 who killed his slave by an act of passion, must be put to death. 
 Even the lower degrees of injury were punished ; the loss of an 
 eye, or of a tooth, by the master's violence, entitled the slave, 
 male or female, to freedom. The principle was modified. 
 
 "Divorce was probably common in the earlier ages of Syria aud 
 Arabia, for it was always regarded as an essential privilege ; and, 
 in the more civilized times of Palestine, was still considered to be 
 of so much importance, that even the disciples of our Lord pro- 
 nounced its extinction a sufficient ground for declining marriage 
 altogether. — In the Mosaic Code, formalities and delays were en- 
 joined in practice, which must have greatly restricted the custom, 
 and which, at least, softened the painful abruptness, of Divorce. 
 A period of three months must pass before the separation could 
 be valid ; during which time the husband and wife were to be 
 allowed the opportunity of reconciliation. The principle was 
 inodified. 
 
 " In all Heathenism, and, of course, in Syria and Arabia, the 
 father had the power of death over a rebellious child. Of a right 
 so firmly established, it might have been impossible to prevent the 
 exercise. — The Mosaic Code reduced the practice into an appeal 
 to the public tribunals; thus rescuing the son from the immediate 
 fury of the father, and giving his case over to impartial judg- 
 ment. The principle was modified" — Marriage with the Sister of 
 a Deceased Wife. 
 
 8. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into the 
 administration of the law. 
 
 Sometimes this mode of reasoning is employed by the 
 lawyers in fixing the meaning of an Act of Parliament. 
 Our laws are made by the legislature, but their meaning is 
 fixed by the judges. It sometimes happens that the word- 
 ing is uncertain or obscure, and that one clause appears to 
 contradict some other clause. In these cases the judges 
 inquire into the intention of the act : that is, the intention 
 of the legislature in passing the act. This intention is 
 sometimes called the spirit of the act, and when a clause 
 has two meanings, the judges will decide in favour of that 
 
118 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 meaning which is most i» conformity with the spirit of 
 the act. Take for example the Reform Act passed in 1831. 
 The intention of the act was to extend the privilege of 
 voting for members of Parliament. In case, therefore, the 
 meaning of any of the clauses should be doubtful, that 
 meaning which is most favourable to the extension of the 
 privilege of voting for members of Parliament is most in 
 conformity with the spirit of the act. If you watch the 
 proceedings of the Courts of Law you will observe many 
 cases illustrative of this kind of reasoning. 
 
 9. In judicial cases, also, this principle of final causes is 
 acknowledged. 
 
 From the effects of any motive, the law infers the existence 
 of the motive. If a man commits murder, the law as- 
 sumes that he intended to commit murder. So, if a dozen 
 persons, who never saw each other before, should join in 
 an illegal act, they may be indicted for a conspiracy ; for 
 their acting in concert will be considered as a proof of an 
 intention to act in concert. In the case of Dr. Webster, 
 who was hanged at Boston in 1850 for the murder of Dr. 
 Parkman, the following observations appeared in the Lite- 
 rary World, a paper published at New York : — 
 
 " Suppose the facts as stated in the confession had been proved 
 by a witness present on the spot, but without the knowledge of 
 the accused ; and then apply the law as laid down by the Chief 
 Justice, and which we see no reason to question. 
 
 " ' In murder, to escape the imputation of malice, the prisoner 
 must prove the provocation, the accident, or any; other circum- 
 stance which goes to preclude the malice ; otherwise it is argued 
 from the act itself. No provocation of words, however oppro- 
 brious, will mitigate the motive for a mortal blow, or one intended 
 to produce death, where there is an intent to kill. If there is 
 sufficient provocation, it is manslaughter ; but words are not a 
 sufficient provocation. Malice is implied from any deliberate, 
 cruel act against another, however sudden. "When there is a blow 
 of a deadly weapon, with intent to do some great bodily harm, 
 and death ensues, malice is presumed.' 
 
 "Amongst the interstices of this net-work of distinctions, 
 there may possibly be room to extricate the killing of Dr. Park- 
 man from the category of murder ; but we confess the distinctions 
 of the law seem framed to meet this very description of sudden, 
 unjustifiable, passionate, revengeful, and reckless homicide. Were 
 the contrary the case, few of the usual forms of murder would 
 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 119 
 
 come within the definition. This confession of Dr. Webster may 
 be only another link in the chain of fatalities which he has been 
 forging for his own destruction." 
 
 10. Final causes form an important part of the investi- 
 gation in cases of circumstantial evidence. 
 
 If we show that the prisoner had a strong motive for 
 committing the offence, such as avarice, revenge, &c, or 
 had stated beforehand a determination that he would com- 
 mit it, this, with other circumstances, will be considered as 
 tending to prove that he did commit it. 
 
 " Motives are, with relation to moral conduct," says Mr. Wills, 
 " what physical power is to mechanics ; and both of these kinds 
 of impulse are equally under the influence of known laws. But 
 in reasoning upon motives and their resulting actions, it is im- 
 practicable to obtain the same sure data as when material phe- 
 nomena only are involved, since it is not possible to discover all 
 the modifying circumstances of human conduct, or to assign with 
 unerring certainty the true character of the motives from which 
 they spring. Nevertheless, we naturally, reasonably, and safely, 
 judge of men's motives by their conduct, as we conclude from the 
 nature of the stream the qualities of the fountain whence it 
 proceeds. 
 
 "An evil motive constitutes in law, as in morals, the essence of 
 guilt ; and the existence of an inducing motive for the voluntary 
 acts of a rational agent, is assumed as naturally as secondary 
 causes are concluded to exist for material phenomena. The pre- 
 dominant desires of the mind are invariably followed by corre- 
 sponding volitions and actions. It is therefore indispensable, in 
 the investigation of moral actions, to look at all the surrounding 
 circumstances which connect the supposed actor with other 
 persons and things, and may have influenced his motives. 
 
 " The usual inducements to crime, are the desire of revenging 
 real or fancied wrongs, — of obtaining some object of desire which 
 rightfully belongs to another. — or of preserving reputation, either 
 that of general character or the conventional reputation of sex or 
 profession." — Wills' 's Circumstantial Evidence. 
 
 " In many things which we do, we ought not only to consider 
 the mere naked action itself, but the persons who act, the persons 
 towards whom, the time when, the place where, the manner how, 
 the end for which the action is done, together with the effects that 
 must, or that may follow, and all other surrounding circumstances : 
 these things must necessarily be taken into our view, in order to 
 determine whether the action, which is indifferent in itself, be 
 either lawful or unlawful, good or evil, wise or foolish, decent or 
 indecent, proper or improper, as it is so circumstantiated. 
 
120 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " Let me give a plain instance for the illustration of this matter. 
 — Mario kills a dog, which, considered merely in itself, seems to 
 be an indifferent action : now the dog was Timon's, and not his 
 own ; this makes it look unlawful. But Timon bid him do it ; 
 this gives it an appearance of lawfulness again. It was done at 
 church, and in time of divine service ; these circumstances added, 
 cast on it an air of irreligion. But the dog flew at Mario, and put 
 him in danger of his life ; this relieves the seeming impiety of the 
 action. Yet Mario might have escaped by flying thence ; there- 
 fore the action appears to be improper. But the dog was known 
 to be mad ; this further circumstance makes it almost necessary 
 that the dog should be slain, lest he might worry the assembly, 
 and do much mischief. Yet again, Mario killed him with a pistol, 
 which he happened to have in his pocket since yesterday's journey; 
 now, hereby the whole congregation was terrified and discomposed, 
 and divine service was broken off ; this carries an appearance of 
 great indecency and impropriety in it : but after all, when we con- 
 sider a further circumstance, that Mario, being thus violently 
 assaulted by a' mad dog, had no way of escape, and had no other 
 weapon about him, it seems to take away all the colours of im- 
 propriety, indecency, or unlawfulness, and to allow that the pre- 
 servation of one or many lives will justify the act as wise and 
 good. Now, all these concurrent appendices of the action ought 
 to be surveyed, in order to pronounce with justice and truth con- 
 cerning it." — Watts' 's Improvement of the Mind. 
 
 11. Under the head of final causes we may place those 
 reasonings that are founded on the presumed object of the 
 measures we advocate. 
 
 Thus, in regard to the punishment of criminals, one 
 party contends that the main object is the punishment of 
 the criminal ; another contends that the main object is the 
 reformation of the criminal; and a third contends that 
 the main object of punishment is the prevention of crime. 
 The opinion any one may entertain as to the final cause or 
 main object of punishment, will, of course, influence his 
 sentiments as to the nature, duration, and severity of the 
 punishments that ought to be inflicted. 
 
 "The proper end of punishment is said by some to be the 
 satisfaction of justice ; by others the prevention of crimes ; by 
 others the reformation of the offender. The first^ doctrine is that 
 which most immediately occurs to a mind beginning to reflect on 
 the subject ; and it is often warmly defended, although it is now 
 pretty nearly abandoned by systematic writers on legislation. One 
 of the last instances of a laboured defence of it. which we have 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 121 
 
 met with, is to be found in a dissertation by Lord Woodhouselee, 
 appended to his life of Lord Karnes. The second opinion is sup- 
 ported by the generality of writers, although they by no means 
 reject the third object, as a subordinate consideration. Of late 
 years, a few philanthropists have argued, that the principal object 
 of punishment should be the reformation of the offender, and 
 that other ends are of inferior consequence." 
 
 "If crimes could be more effectually prevented by any one 
 punishment than another, the tendency of that punishment to 
 satisfy the demand for justice, or to reform the offender, would be 
 a secondary consideration. If the crime of murder, for example, 
 could be more effectually prevented by the penalty of death than 
 by a term of imprisonment, which would give an opportunity for 
 the reformation of the criminal, that penalty ought to be inflicted, 
 and the reformation of the offender abandoned, otherwise we should 
 be showing more regard for the life of a murderer than for the 
 lives of innocent persons." — Questions in Political Economy. 
 
 12. Political economists sometimes argue upon this prin- 
 ciple. The j assign motives to different classes of society, and 
 then infer that persons under the influence of such motives, 
 would act in a certain manner ; and on the conduct thus 
 assumed, they construct a theory. 
 
 Thus, Mr. Macculloch states that " the wish to augment 
 our fortunes comes with us from the womb, and never leaves, 
 us till we go into the grave." This may be the case gene- 
 rally in Scotland, but it is not so in Ireland, and it is not 
 so universally anywhere. In all classes of society, many 
 individuals are found who prefer present enjoyment to a 
 future improvement of their condition. Another erroneous 
 assumption is, that the uninstructed classes of society, 
 when left to themselves, will always do that which is most 
 conducive to their own advantage. This argument has 
 been advanced in opposition to those acts of the legislature 
 that refer to regulating the hours of labour in the manu- 
 factories, and to the working of women and children in 
 mines. The reasonings of some economists, with reference 
 to these matters, will, on examination, be found to rest on 
 erroneous assumptions. 
 
 In tracing the progress of society, too, the economists 
 assume that mankind were originally savages, then became 
 hunters, then shepherds, then agriculturists, and at last 
 merchants and manufacturers; and they attribute -to, 
 
 G 
 
122 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 mankind in these several stages, precisely the same feeling's 
 and motives which men entertain in the highest degree of 
 civilization. Some political economists have written very 
 fallaciously on this subject. But, in the first place, there 
 is no foundation for the theory that the savage life was the 
 original state of man ; and, in the next place, man in a 
 savage state does not possess within himself that thirst for 
 knowledge and desire for improvement which is exhibited 
 by man in a state of civilization. 
 
 " Bat the opinion that all mankind were originally savages, is 
 unsupported by either reason or history. Had they been created 
 savages, they would probably have remained savages for ever. 
 They could have formed no idea of a civilization which had never 
 existed, nor have desired comforts, the want of which they did 
 not feel. History does not record a single instance of a savage 
 nation having become civilized by its own unassisted exertions. 
 Civilization has never sprung up spontaneously from the soil ; it 
 has always been imported from abroad. The Greeks derived their 
 civilization from the Egyptians ; the Romans theirs from the 
 Greeks ; the nations conquered by Rome became civilized from 
 their intercourse with the Romans. But if we attempt to trace 
 the origin of civilization in Egypt and Babylon, we are at a loss ; 
 for neither history, nor even tradition, mentions any period at 
 which these nations were not civilized. Eounded soon after the 
 Elood, they possessed the knowledge of all the arts and sciences 
 known to the antediluvian world. The fertility of their soils, and 
 the extent of their plains, furnished ample provision for their 
 population : hence, as population increased, their civilization in- 
 creased. While, on the other hand, those tribes or families who 
 wandered in quest of new settlements, became separated from the 
 rest of mankind by mountains, and forests, and rivers ; and their 
 time being wholly occupied in seeking supplies of food, they lost, 
 in the course of a few generations, the knowledge they originally 
 possessed, and fell into the savage state. It would thus appear, 
 from history and from reason, that the savage state was not the 
 original state of man, but a departure from that state, arising 
 from a want of communication through several ages with the 
 other branches of the family of mankind." — Lecture on the Philo- 
 sophy of Language. 
 
 13. As all actions result from the feelings of the mind, 
 when we wish to induce any person to perform certain 
 actions, we try to produce in the mind those convictions 
 and feelings which are the usual cause of such actions. 
 
 It is the great object of logic to teach us how to select 
 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 123 
 
 and use those arguments that have an effect upon the 
 judgment and understanding. But sometimes people are 
 influenced more by their feelings than by their judgment. 
 In this case, if we wish to convince or persuade them, we 
 must adapt our arguments to their feelings. The parties 
 who are thus influenced by their passions can hardly be 
 said to reason ; but we who are trying to influence them 
 may be reasoning nevertheless : We are using a means to 
 accomplish an end ; we are selecting such arguments, and 
 placing them in such a form, as are best adapted to pro- 
 duce an impression on the mind of the individual with 
 whom we converse. These arguments, according to Dr. 
 Watts, are the following : — 
 
 " There is yet another rank of arguments which have Latin 
 names ; their true distinction is derived from the topics or middle 
 terms which are used in them, though they are called an address 
 to our judgment, our faith, our ignorance, our profession, our 
 modesty, and our passions. If an argument be taken from the 
 nature or existence of things, and addressed to the reason of man- 
 kind, it is called argumentum ad judicium. When it is borrowed 
 from some convincing testimony, it is argumentum ad fidem, an 
 address to our faith. When it is drawn from any insufficient- 
 medium whatsoever, and yet the opposer has not skill to refute or 
 answer it, this is argumentum ad ignorantiam, an address to our 
 ignorance. When it is built upon the professed principles or 
 opinions of the person with whom we argue, whether the 
 opinions be true or false, it is named argumentum ad hominem, an 
 address to our professed principles. St. Paul often uses this argu- 
 ment when he reasons with the Jews, and when he says, ' I speak 
 as a man/ When the argument is fetched from the sentiments of 
 some wise, great, or good men, whose authority we reverence and 
 hardly dare oppose, it is called argumentum ad verecundium, an 
 address to our modesty. I add finally. When an argument is bor- 
 rowed from any topics which are suited to engage the inclinations 
 and passions of the hearers on the side of the speaker, rather 
 than to convince the judgment, this is argumentum ad passiones, 
 an address to the passions ; or, if it be made publicly, it is called 
 ad populum, or an appeal to the people" — Watts' 's Logic. 
 
 The argument called Argumentum ad hominem requires 
 a further illustration, and this we have in the Doctor's 
 " Improvement of the Mind :" — 
 
 '' Somethnes we may make use of the very prejudices under 
 which a person labours, in order to convince him of some parti- 
 G 2 
 
124 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 cular truth, and argue with him upon his own professed principles 
 as though they were true. This is called argument-urn ad hominem, 
 and is another way of dealing with the prejudices of men. 
 
 " Suppose a Jew lies sick of a fever, and is forbidden flesh by his 
 physician : but hearing that rabbits were provided for the dinner 
 of the family, desired earnestly to eat of them ; and suppose he 
 became impatient because his physician did not permit him, and 
 he insisted upon it, that it could do him no hurt ; surely, rather 
 than let him persist in that fancy and that desire, to the danger 
 of his life, I would tell him that these animals were strangled, 
 which sort of food was forbidden by the Jewish law, though I 
 myself may believe that law is now abolished. 
 
 " Encrates used the same means of conviction when he saw a 
 Mahometan drink wine to excess, and heard him maintain the 
 lawfulness and pleasure of drunkenness : Encrates reminded him 
 that his own prophet Mahomet had utterly forbidden all wine to 
 his followers : and the good man restrained his vicious appetite 
 by his superstition, when he could no otherwise convince him 
 that drunkenness was unlawful, nor withhold him from excess ! " 
 
 14. The effects of circumstances upon the disposition of 
 the mind may fairly be placed under this head, and they 
 enter largely into our daily reasonings. 
 
 On this ground Lord Ersjrine advocated his bill for pre- 
 venting cruelty to animals. 
 
 "In what I am proposing to your lordships, disinterested 
 virtue, as in all other cases, will have its own certain reward. 
 The humanity you shall extend to the lower creation, will come 
 abundantly round in its consequences to the whole human race. 
 The moral sense, which this law will awaken and inculcate, cannot 
 but have a most 'powerful effect upon our feelings and sympathies for 
 one another. The violences and outrages committed by the lower 
 orders of the people, are offences more owing to want of thought 
 and reflection than to any malignant principle; and whatever, 
 therefore, sets them a-thinking upon the duties of humanity, 
 more especially where they have no rivalries nor resentments, 
 and where there is a peculiar generosity in forbearance and com- 
 passion, has an evident tendency to soften their natures, and to 
 moderate their passions in their dealings with one another. The 
 effect of laws, which promulgate a sound moral principle, is 
 incalculable ; I have traced it in a thousand instances, and it is 
 impossible to describe its value." 
 
 In conformity with this principle, if a man has received 
 a good education, we expect to find him well informed ; 
 if he has mixed in polite society, we presume his manners 
 
FINAL CAUSES. 125 
 
 are courteous ; if he has held certain positions in society, 
 we infer that he has the excellencies, and probably the 
 defects, connected with that position ; and if we are wise, 
 we shall consider the peculiar temptations to which our 
 own circumstances expose us, and endeavour to guard our 
 minds against them. 
 
 " Different employments, and different conditions of life, beget 
 in us a tendency to our different passions. Those who are exalted 
 above others in their daily stations, and especially if they have to 
 do with many persons under them, and in many affairs, are too 
 often tempted to the haughty, the morose, the surly, and the more 
 unfriendly ruffles and disturbances of nature, unless they watch 
 against them with daily care. The commanders in armies and 
 navies, the governors of workhouses, the masters of public 
 schools, or those who have a great number of servants under 
 them, and a multitude of cares and concerns in human life, should 
 continually set a guard upon themselves, lest they get a habit of 
 affected superiority, pride, and vanity of mind, of fretfulness, 
 impatience, and criminal anger." — Anon. 
 
 Upon this ground, we avoid dangerous society, knowing 
 that evil communications corrupt good manners. 
 
 "And here I would advise you to have no dealings with a man 
 who is known to be a rogue, even though he should offer a 
 bargain that may, in that instance, be for your advantage to 
 accept. To avoid him is your duty, on the ground of morality ; 
 but it is, moreover, your interest in a pecuniary point of view : 
 for, depend upon it, although he may let you get money by him 
 at first, he will contrive to cheat you in the end. An additional 
 reason is, that your own reputation, and even your moral sensi- 
 bilities, may be endangered by the contact. If you get money 
 by a rogue, there is a danger that you will feel disposed to apolo- 
 gize for his rogueries ; and, when you have once become an 
 apologist for roguery, you will probably, on the first temptation, 
 become a rogue yourself." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 15. The doctrine of final causes enters largely into our 
 reasonings on the ordinary affairs of human life. 
 
 We act upon this principle in judging of other people. 
 As actions are the effect of motives and feelings, we infer 
 from the character of the actions the character of the mo- 
 tives or feelings. " A good tree bringeth forth good fruit, 
 and an evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit; for a tree is 
 known by its fruits." 
 
 In cases where the same action may arise from different 
 
126 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 motives, we endeavour to ascertain to which motive the 
 action should be ascribed. Our usual mode of reasoning in 
 this case is from circumstantial evidence : from the existence 
 of the sign, we infer the existence of the condition. 
 
 There are certain social relations which are usually 
 attended with certain feelings; and hence we expect in 
 such relations to find such feelings, and that the actions will 
 correspond with such feelings. Where there is no such 
 correspondence, we infer that the parties have been un- 
 faithful to their duty. Hence, an unrighteous judge, a 
 cruel husband, an unkind father, an undutiful son, are 
 characters which mankind in all ages have unanimously 
 denounced. 
 
 And, finally, we endeavour to act towards other people 
 in such a way as we judge, from the ordinary principles of 
 human nature, is likely to procure for us their good 
 opinion. On the best means of effecting this object, we 
 subjoin the observations of an American writer : — 
 
 " If we desire to be deemed religious, we have only to be reli- 
 gious, and we must be thus deemed. If you desire to be deemed 
 veracious, speak the truth habitually, and you must be thus 
 deemed. If you desire to be deemed trustworthy, patriotic, 
 benevolent, just, hospitable, philanthropic, studious, learned, be 
 what you desire to be deemed, and your reputation must conform 
 to what you are. While the senses and intellect of men are so 
 organized that men must, as we have see?i, impute to us the qualities 
 which we possess, tJw moral feelings of mankind are so organized 
 that men must feel towards us according to the moral qualities 
 ■which we possess. If we are lovely, we must be loved ; if hateful, 
 we must be hated ; if contemptible, we must be contemned ; if 
 despicable, we must be despised." — Lectures to Young Men on the 
 art of controlling others, by A. B. Johnson, JJtica, New York. 
 
PART III. 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OE REASONING— (continued.) 
 
 We have now gone through the second part of our book. 
 In the first, you will recollect, we considered the Introduc- 
 tion to Reasoning. In the second part, we considered the 
 Principles of Reasoning. In this part, we are going to 
 consider still further the principles of reasoning. But these 
 principles are of a different kind. In the former part the 
 principles had a direct relation to the subject itself; we 
 took the subject, and considered its attributes, its parts, 
 its kinds, its causes, and its effects. In this part we shall 
 consider the subject in its relation to other things. You 
 may therefore, if you please, call the principles we have 
 discussed, the internal principles of reasoning ; and those 
 we are going to discuss, the external principles of reasoning. 
 These we shall consider in separate sections, under the 
 following heads : — Section 1. Reasoning from Examples. 
 
 2. Reasoning from Analogy, Comparison, and Contrast. 
 
 3. Reasoning from Parables, Fables, and Proverbs. 4. Rea- 
 soning from Written Documents. 5. Errors in Reasoning. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 
 
 In reasoning from examples we adduce examples in proof 
 of the propositions we desire to establish. 
 
 1. The following are instances : — 
 
 " And it came to pass, that lie went through the corn fields on 
 the sabbath day; and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck 
 the ears of corn. And the Pharisees said unto him, Behold, why 
 do they on the sabbath day that which is not lawful ? And he 
 
128 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 said unto them, Have ye never read what David did, when be had 
 need, and was an hungred, he, and they that were with him ? 
 How he went into the house of God in the days of Abiathar the 
 high priest, and did eat the shewbread, which is not lawful to eat 
 but for the priests, and gave also to them which were with him ? 
 And he said unto them, The sabbath was made for man, and not man 
 for the sabbath : therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the 
 sabbajfck,"— Mark ii. 23—28. 
 
 " It would be an extremely profitable thing to draw up a short 
 and well-authenticated account of the habits of study of the most 
 celebrated writers with whose style of literary industry we happen 
 to be most acquainted. It would go very far to destroy the 
 absurd and pernicious association of genius and idleness, by 
 showing them that the greatest poets, orators, statesmen, and 
 historians, — men of the most brilliant and imposing talents, — 
 have actually laboured as hard as the makers of dictionaries and 
 the arrangers of indexes ; and that the most obvious reason tohy 
 they have been superior to other men is, that they have take?i more 
 pains than other men. Gibbon was in his study every morning, 
 winter and summer, at six o'clock ; Mr. Burke was the most 
 laborious and indefatigable of human beings ; Leibnitz was never 
 out of his library ; Pascal killed himself by study ; Cicero nar- 
 rowly escaped death by the same cause ; Milton was at his books 
 with as much regularity as a merchant or an attorney,— he had 
 mastered all the knowledge of his time ; so had Homer. Haffaelle 
 lived but thirty-seven years ; and in that short space carried the 
 art so far beyond what it had before reached, that he appears to 
 stand alone as a model to his successors. There are instances to 
 the contrary ; but, generally speaking, the life of all truly great 
 men has been a life of intense and incessant labour" — Rev. Sydney 
 Smith's Moral Philosophy. 
 
 " If then we consider the perpetual conflicts of savage tribes, 
 the frequent wars of the rival republics of Greece with each other, 
 and with their common enemies ; if we remember that the temple 
 of Janus at Rome, always open in the time of war, was never 
 closed during five centuries, till the end of the second Punic war, 
 and then only for a short time ; if we advert to the desolation 
 caused by the Scythians, Goths, Yandals, Tartars, and the de- 
 struction of about two millions of human beings in the Crusades, 
 it seems to be evident that wars were anciently, and before the 
 general use of firearms and cannon, more frequent, protracted, de- 
 structive, and cruel than they are now" — Aiken on War. 
 
 " Yes, sir, if ever you was to Antwerp, you'd see what it is to 
 lose colonies. When that place belonged to Holland, and had 
 colonial trade, five thousand marchants used to meet on 'Change ; 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 129 
 
 now the Exchange is left, but the marchant is gone. Look at 
 the great docks built there, at so much expense, and no shipping 
 there. Look at one man-of-war for a navy that has a pennant as 
 long as from to-day to the middle of next week, that can't get 
 out for the Dutch forts, is of no use in, and if it did get out has 
 no place to go to. Buonaparte said he wanted ships, colonies, 
 and commerce ; Buonaparte was a fool, and didn't know what he 
 was a-talkin' about, for colonies means all three." — Sam Slick. 
 
 2. This mode of reasoning from examples is called by 
 scholastic logicians induction, and is opposed to deduction. 
 
 We will, then, illustrate the difference between reasoning 
 by induction and reasoning by deduction. You have ob- 
 served an individual come to poverty by a dishonest course 
 of action, and another arrive at wealth by a life of recti- 
 tude ; and you remark, "■ Honesty is the best policy." 
 Here you reason by induction. From these individual 
 cases you gather a proof of the general maxim, " Honesty 
 is the best policy." But suppose a person should ask your 
 advice how to act in a case wherein strict integrity might 
 appear to be less advantageous than a more crooked pro- 
 cedure, and you observe to him, " Honesty is the best 
 policy ;" here you reason by deduction. You apply the 
 general principle to an individual case ; you reason on the 
 principle of genus and species. These two kinds of reason- 
 ing are just the reverse of each other. When from one or 
 more examples you infer a general principle, that is called 
 induction, or reasoning from examples. When from the 
 general principle you infer an individual case, that is called 
 deduction, or reasoning from genus and species. Induction 
 is reasoning from particulars to generals, and deduction is 
 reasoning from generals to particulars. 
 
 But you ask, How can I infer a general proposition from 
 a small number of examples 1 Is it not a rule, that 
 " generals cannot be inferred from particulars 1 " Very 
 true. You cannot infer generals from particulars, unless 
 you have reason to believe that all the particulars are 
 alike. Our reasoning here must depend upon the uni- 
 formity of the laws of nature. When the law is uniform, 
 we can infer generals from particulars, because we know 
 that all particulars are in fact generals. This is the case 
 most frequently in the physical sciences. All animals of 
 g3 
 
130 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 the same species are alike. I see that a horse has four 
 legs : I may assert then that every horse in the world has 
 four legs, though I have not seen them all. I decompose 
 a glass of water, and find it is formed of oxygen and hydro- 
 gen : I therefore assert that all water, everywhere, is com- 
 posed of oxygen and hydrogen. But when this constant 
 uniformity does not exist, I cannot reason so conclusively ; 
 and my reasonings will be weaker and weaker in propor- 
 tion to this want of uniformity ; and hence we shall have 
 to descend from certain reasonings, to probable reasonings, 
 and then lower, to doubtful reasonings, until at last our 
 examples may be so few or so conflicting, that we may 
 have no foundation for any reasoning at all respecting the 
 matter in dispute.* 
 
 " Be not too hasty to erect general theories from a few pecu- 
 liar observations, appearances, or experiments. This is what the 
 logicians call a false induction. When general observations are 
 drawn from so many particulars as to become certain and indu- 
 bitable, these are jewels of knowledge, comprehending great trea- 
 sure in a little room : but 'they are therefore to be made with the 
 greater care and caution, lest errors become large and diffusive, 
 if we should mistake in these general notions." — Watts on the 
 Improvement of the Mind. 
 
 Some writers make a distinction between reasoning from 
 example and reasoning from induction, — the example is one, 
 induction is more than one. But there seems no ground for 
 this distinction. The mode of reasoning is the same ; the 
 only difference is in the degree of proof. The greater the 
 number of examples, of course, the greater is the amount 
 of evidence in proof of the general proposition, f 
 
 In reasoning then from genus and species, we infer, you 
 perceive, individual cases from universal rules. In reason- 
 ing from examples, we reverse our mode of reasoning ; and 
 from one or more examples we prove the general rule. 
 
 * " When the grounds for believing anything are slight, we term the mental act 
 or state induced, a conjecture ; when they are strong, we term it an inference or 
 conclusion. Increase the evidence for a conjecture, it becomes a conclusion ; 
 diminish the evidence for a conclusion, it passes into a conjecture. The process 
 which ends in a conclusion, and the process which ends in a conjecture, are thus 
 essentially the same, and differ only in degree, or in the force of the evidence." — 
 Bailey, p. 31. 
 
 t " It is obvious that whether we can draw an inference from a single fact, 
 or whether it is needful to have a collection of facts, depends altogether on what 
 is requisite for establishing a similarity in the influential circumstances of each 
 case, and does not affect the character of the reasoning." — Bailey, p. 10. 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 131 
 
 • 
 
 We use the inductive method in regard to the physical 
 sciences, such as astronomy, chemistry, &c. We see seve- 
 ral instances in which fire melts lead ; we infer it will 
 always do so ; and when we are satisfied that this is the 
 case, we call it a law of nature. It was also by this 
 method that philosophers have discovered the laws of astro- 
 nomy. By the same rule we discover the laws of medi- 
 cine : if a medicine cures in a great number of cases, we 
 infer that it will always cure in similar cases. In the 
 science of morals, we also observe that certain vices lead to 
 misery • and we infer that vice will always lead to misery, 
 and virtue to happiness. In politics, we observe in the 
 history of the world what institutions and what laws have 
 conduced to the happiness of the people ; we gather toge- 
 ther these instances, and thus form maxims for the govern- 
 ment of nations. In political economy we observe, or 
 should observe, the same practice. But political econo- 
 mists have too often wandered into other paths. Instead 
 of deducing their principles from facts, they have first 
 formed their theories, and then made facts bend to their 
 theories. Hence we have theories of population, theories 
 of rent, theories of the currency, and theories of taxation, 
 advanced and supported in a way more in accordance 
 with the Aristotelian than with the Baconian system of 
 philosophy. 
 
 3. The following explanation of the nature of induction 
 is taken from Mr. Hill's Logic : — 
 
 " An induction in which every individual case is enumerated is 
 a perfect demonstration. And in general, the more nearly we 
 approach to the entire enumeration, the higher is the degree of 
 probability attained by the induction : provided, at least, that no 
 facts of an opposite tendency are discoverable ; or that if they 
 occur, they are satisfactorily shown not to be really inconsistent 
 with the principle deduced. The great error in induction is too 
 great haste in drawing a conclusion without having premised a 
 sufficient number of individual cases. Many, for example, if they 
 have met with or heard of one or two dishonest lawyers, or observed 
 a comet in a zoarm summer, think themselves authorized to draw 
 the sweeping inference, that all lawyers are dishonest, or all comets 
 occasion a warm, season" 
 
 " A beautiful specimen of moral induction occurs, 2 Peter if. 
 4—9. The conclusion is two-fold; and the sacred writer accord- 
 
132 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 • 
 
 ingly adduces a double train, of individual instances, strikingly 
 contrasted with each other. The substance of the arguments is 
 this : The offending angels, — the antediluvian world, — the inhabi- 
 tants of Sodom and Gomorrah, — were divinely punished ; therefore, 
 all the unjust shall be divinely punished. Again, The holy angels 
 who did not offend, — Noah, the preacher of righteousness, — and just 
 Lot, — were delivered from trial; therefore, all the godly shall be 
 delivered from trial. 
 
 " The three introductory chapters of the Epistle to the Romans 
 contain an inductive argument; in which the proposition, All have 
 sinned, is inferred to be universally true, because it has been suc- 
 cessively proved true, first concerning all Jews, and then concern- 
 ing all Gentiles. 
 
 "Again, the general conclusion in Psalm xxxvii. 23, 24, as de- 
 duced from the train of observation mentioned in the subsequent 
 verse; — and that in the 38th verse, as deduced from verses 35, 
 36, are specimens of moral induction." 
 
 " A correct and forcible instance of this mode of argument by 
 analogy occurs in 1 Sam. xvii. 34 — 37. The examples also used 
 by the Israelites in their lively remonstrance with the Reubenites, 
 &c. (Josh. xxii. 17, 18, 20) ; by the Jewish elders in behalf of 
 Jeremiah (Jer. xxvi. 17 — 19) ; and by Gamaliel in behalf of the 
 apostles (Acts v. 36 — 39), are very apposite and striking. The 
 speech of Rabshakeh, recorded in Isaiah xxxvi. 18 — 20, presents 
 a fallacious instance of the same. The conclusion in this case is 
 not drawn de simili ; there was no just comparison between the 
 omnipotent God of Israel and the idol-gods of the heathen." 
 
 If you turn to your Bible and read the texts to which 
 Mr. Hill has referred, you will perceive that his illustra- 
 tions are exceedingly apposite, and they will give you a 
 very clear idea of the nature of induction, or reasoning 
 from example. 
 
 4. This kind of reasoning is very common throughout 
 the Bible. 
 
 It abounds in the Psalms ; the Prophets often used it ; and 
 after the captivity, when Nehemiah reproved the Jew T s for 
 their violation of the sabbath, he referred to the former 
 instances wherein such a course of conduct had provoked 
 the Divine displeasure. — Neh. xiii. 15 — 18. 
 
 Reasoning by example abounds also in the New Testa- 
 ment These examples are of various kinds, and adduced 
 for various purposes. The eleventh chapter of the Epistle 
 to the Hebrews is a chapter of examples, and the inference 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 133 
 
 from the whole is given in the first verse of the twelfth 
 chapter : — 
 
 " Wherefore seeing we also are compassed about with so great 
 a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin 
 which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the 
 race that is set before us." 
 
 First, we have examples to be imitated : — 
 " Take, my brethren, the prophets, who have spoken in the 
 name of the Lord, for an example of suffering affliction, and of 
 patience. Behold, we count them happy which endure. Ye have 
 heard of the patience of Job, and have seen the end of the Lord; 
 that the Lord is very pitiful, and of tender mercy." — James v. 
 10, 11. See also James v. 16—18 ; 1 Pet. iii. 5, 6. 
 
 Examples are adduced to be avoided : — 
 
 " Now as Jannes and Jambres withstood Moses, so do these also 
 resist the truth : men of corrupt minds, reprobate concerning the 
 faith. But they shall proceed no further : for their folly shall be 
 manifest unto all men, as theirs also was." — 2 Tim. iii. 8, 9. See 
 also 1 John iii. 11, 12 ; and 1 Corinthians x. 6 — 11. 
 
 Examples are adduced worthy of imitation, in order to 
 censure by contrast the conduct of the Jews : — 
 
 "The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this genera- 
 tion, and shall condemn it : because they repented at the preaching 
 of Jonas ; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here. The queen 
 of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, 
 and shall condemn it : for she came from the uttermost parts of 
 the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon ; and, behold, a greater 
 than Solomon is here." — Matt. xii. 41, 42. 
 
 Principles are often confirmed or,, illustrated by exam- 
 ples. The following is adduced to show that a prophet 
 has no honour in his own country : — 
 
 "And he said, Yerily I say unto you, No prophet is accepted 
 in his own country. But I tell you of a truth, many widows were 
 in Israel in the days of Elias, when the heaven was shut up three 
 years and six months, when great famine was throughout all the 
 land ; but unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta, 
 a city of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow." — Tjuke iv. 
 24—27. 
 
 The example of David, a man of decided piety, was 
 adduced to show that, in a case of necessity, a positive 
 law might be violated to satisfy hunger : — 
 
134 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 "At that time Jesus went on the sabbath day through the corn; 
 and his disciples were an hungred, and began to pluck the ears of 
 corn, and to eat. But when the Pharisees saw it, they said unto 
 him, Behold, thy disciples do that which is not lawful to do upon 
 the sabbath day. But he said unto them, Have ye not read what 
 David did, when he was an hungred, and they that were with him ; 
 how he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, 
 which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were 
 with him, but only for the priests ? " — Matt. xii. 1 — 4. 
 
 To prove that God had not cast away the Jewish people, 
 allusion is made to the days of Elijah : — 
 
 " I say then, Hath God cast away his people ? God forbid. 
 For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe 
 of Benjamin. God hath not cast away his people which he fore- 
 knew. Wot ye not what the Scripture saith of Elias ? how he 
 maketh intercession to God against Israel, saying, Lord, they have 
 killed thy prophets, and digged down thine altars ; and I am left 
 alone, and they seek my life. But what saith the answer of God 
 unto him ? I have reserved to myself seven thousand men, who 
 have not bowed the knee to the image of Baal. Even so then at 
 this present time also there is a remnant according to the election 
 of grace." — Romans xi. 1 — 5. 
 
 Agreeably to the above models, divines are in the habit 
 of enforcing moral injunctions by scriptural examples. 
 The following is an extract from Barrow's Sermon on the 
 Industry of a Gentleman : — 
 
 " It is Iris business to administer relief to his poor neighbours, 
 in their want and distresses, by his wealth ; to be such a gentleman 
 and so employed as Job was ; who ' did not see any perish for want 
 of clothing, or any poor without covering ;' who ' delivered the 
 poor that cried, and the fatherless, and him that had none to 
 help him.' 
 
 "It is his business to be hospitable; kind and helpful to 
 strangers ; following those noble gentlemen, Abraham and Lot, who 
 were so ready to invite and entertain strangers with bountiful 
 courtesy. 
 
 " It is his business to maintain peace, and appease dissensions 
 among his neighbours, interposing his counsel and authority in 
 order thereto : whereto he hath that brave gentleman, Moses, 
 recommended for his pattern. 
 
 " It is his business to promote the welfare and prosperity of his 
 country with his best endeavours, and by all his interest ; in which 
 practice the Sacred History doth propound divers gallant gentlemen 
 (Joseph, Moses, Samuel, Nehemiah, Daniel, Mordecai, and all 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 135 
 
 such renowned patriots) to guide him." — Knights Half-hours with 
 the best Authors. 
 
 5. The examples I have hitherto brought before you 
 have been examples of persons. But there is another 
 kind of examples you will often meet with in your reading. 
 After an author has laid down a general principle, he will 
 state an individual case by which that principle is proved 
 or illustrated. Read the following quotations, and you 
 will know what I mean : — 
 
 "Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord. 
 Behold, the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the 
 earth, and hath long patience for it, until he receive the early and 
 latter rain." — James v. 7. 
 
 "Habit uniformly and constantly strengthens all our active 
 exertions. Whatever we do often, we become more and more apt 
 to do. A snuff-taker begins with a pinch of snuff per day, and 
 ends with a pound or two every month. Swearing begins in 
 anger : it ends by mingling itself with ordinary conversation." — 
 Sidney Smith's Moral Philosophy. 
 
 " Some labourers are paid higher than others. A carpenter earns 
 more than a ploughman, and a watchmaker more than either ; and 
 yet this is not from the one working harder than the other. 
 
 " And it is the same with the labour of the mind as with that of 
 the body. A banker's clerk, who has to work hard at keeping 
 accounts, is not paid so high as a lawyer or a physician. 
 
 " You see, from this, that the rate of wages does not depend on 
 the hardness of the labour, but on the value of the work done." — 
 Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 
 
 " The invention of machinery, I allow, is often attended with 
 much partial and temporary inconvenience and hardship ; but on 
 the other hand, the advantages resulting from it are almost incalcu- 
 lable both in extent and duration. When, for instance, the machine 
 for weaving stockings was first invented, it was considered as a 
 severe hardship on those who had earned a maintenance by knit- 
 ting them ; but the superior facility with which stockings were 
 made in the loom, rendered them so much cheaper, that those, 
 who before were unable to purchase them, could now indulge in 
 the comfort of wearing them, and the prodigious increase of 
 demand for stockings enabled all the knitters to gain a livelihood 
 by spinning the materials that were to be woven into stockings." 
 — Mrs. Marcefs Conversations on Political Economy . 
 
 " Ln all slave countries there is an aversion to labour, at least an 
 aversion to that kind of labour which is performed by slaves. At 
 
136 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 the commencement of the Roman state, agriculture was con- 
 sidered honourable, and the greatest of her sons worked at the 
 plough ; but, when agriculture was performed by slaves, the citi- 
 zens refrained from labour, and Rome imported her provisions 
 from abroad. This change produced disastrous effects. As the 
 poorer citizens could not engage in manual work, they were, when 
 not engaged in war, dependent on the bounty of the state, and 
 received a certain sum for their support. Had not slavery existed 
 they might have become artisans ; but, as slaves were artisans, 
 the citizens became paupers." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 6. Reasoning by example is in great use among lawyers. 
 One chief mode of reasoning with them is by what is 
 called a case in point, that is, an example in point. When 
 a case is in dispute, the plan is to show that a case similar 
 to the present has already been decided. But the example 
 or case adduced will not, of course, be the same in all its 
 circumstances as the case under trial. If so, there would 
 have been no ground for a law-suit, as the point would 
 then have been already decided. But it is the object of 
 the advocate to show that the case adduced establishes a 
 principle, and that this principle thus established will 
 apply to the case under consideration. 
 
 I do not know that I can better illustrate the case in 
 point than by considering the argument of the Apostle 
 Paul. His object is to prove that the apostles ought to be 
 supported by the churches. First, then, he appeals to 
 the ecclesiastical law of the Jews : "Do ye not know 
 that they which minister about holy things, live of the 
 things of the temple 1 and they which wait at the altar, 
 are partakers with the altar 1 " This is an example — a 
 direct case in point. Secondly. He refers to the civil laws 
 of Moses. There it is enacted : " Thou shalt not muzzle the 
 mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn." It might 
 be asked, How is this a case in point 1 What resemblance 
 is there between the case of an unmuzzled ox and that of 
 the apostle 1 The point is this ; the enactment respecting 
 the ox establishes the principle that the labourer should 
 partake of the fruit of his labour, and this principle ap- 
 plied to the case of the apostles, proves that they which 
 preach the gospel should live of the gospel. This case of 
 the ox is then an indirect case in point. The reasoning is 
 first by induction, and then by deduction. 
 
EEASONING FEOM EXAMPLES. 137 
 
 7. Sometimes an individual case is adduced for the 
 purpose, not of establishing, but of overthrowing a general 
 principle. 
 
 When your opponent tries to apply a general principle 
 to an individual case, you have two methods of reply. You 
 may either deny the general principle, or deny that it is 
 applicable to the case under consideration. If you adopt 
 the first mode, you will endeavour to show that the general 
 principle is untrue, or unjust, or inexpedient, according to 
 the object you have in view. Here again I can give you 
 a Scriptural example : — 
 
 " Then came to Jesus Scribes and Pharisees, which were of 
 Jerusalem, saying, "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition 
 of the elders ? for they wash not their hands when they eat bread. 
 But he answered and said unto them, Why do ye also transgress 
 the commandment of God by your tradition? Eor God com- 
 manded, saying, Honour thy father and mother : and, He that 
 curseth father or mother, let him die the death. But ye say, 
 Whoever shall say to his father or his mother, It is a gift, by 
 whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me: and honour not his 
 father or his mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the 
 commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." — Matt. 
 xv. 1—6. 
 
 Here the argument of the Scribes is, that the disciples 
 ought to have observed the tradition of the elders ; that 
 these traditions prohibited the taking of food with un- 
 washed hands, and that the disciples, therefore, had vio- 
 lated the tradition. The reply does not deny the fact that 
 the disciples had violated the tradition, but it attacks the 
 tradition itself — not this individual tradition, but the whole 
 body of traditions, — by showing that in one instance, at 
 least, they were in opposition to the moral law. As some 
 of these traditions were thus shown to be in direct oppo- 
 sition to the Divine law, the authority of all the traditions 
 was impeached, and consequently, the one the disciples had 
 violated was not obligatory. 
 
 As examples can often be adduced on both sides of a 
 question, we shall have to balance one set of examples 
 against another, in order to judge of the probability of the 
 case under consideration. You doubt whether you will 
 buy any shares in a Railway Company. Your friend, who 
 is a director, tells you of several cases in which parties 
 
138 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 have become wealthy, by taking shares in such companies. 
 Your wife tells you of other cases in which the parties 
 have been ruined. Here you must decide according to 
 what is called " the doctrine of chances," or more properly, 
 the doctrine of probabilities. 
 
 " We may observe these three rules, in judging of probabilities 
 which are to be determined by reason, relating either to things 
 past or things to come. 
 
 "That which agrees most with the constitution of nature 
 carries the greatest probability in it, where no other circumstance 
 appears to counterpoise it : as, if I let loose a greyhound within 
 sight of a hare upon a large plain, there is great probability the 
 greyhound will seize her ; that a thousand sparrows will fly away 
 at the sight of a hawk among them. 
 
 " That which is most conformable to the constant observations 
 of men, or to experiments frequently repeated, is most likely to 
 be true : as, that a winter will not pass away in England without 
 some frost and snow ; that if you deal out great quantities of 
 strong liquor to the mob there will be many drunk ; that a large 
 assembly of men will be of different opinions in any doubtful 
 point ; that a thief will make his escape out of prison if the doors 
 of it are unguarded at midnight. 
 
 " In matters of fact, which are past or present, where neither 
 nature, nor observation, nor custom gives us any sufficient infor- 
 mation on either side of the question, there we may derive a pro- 
 bability from the attestation of wise and honest men by word or 
 .writing, or the concurring witnesses of multitudes who have seen 
 and known what they relate, &c. Tins testimony in many cases 
 will arise to the degree of moral certainty. So we believe that 
 the plant tea grows in China ; and that the emperor of the Turks 
 lives at Constantinople; that Julius Caesar conquered France; 
 and that Jesus, our Saviour, lived and died in Judea; that 
 thousands were converted to the Christian faith hi a century 
 after the death of Christ ; and that the books which contain the 
 Christian religion are certain histories and epistles, which were 
 written above a thousand years ago." — Watts' 's Improvement of 
 the Mind. 
 
 8. Among the modes of reasoning from example, we 
 may place the practice of divines, who in commentating 
 on the historical parts of Scripture, raise from individual 
 facts some general principle, containing a lesson in morals, 
 or religion. 
 
 " Historical passages must be discussed by way of observation. 
 I have seen no expositor who affords more obvious, pertinent, 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 139 
 
 and edifying observations, than our excellent Mr. Henry. Those 
 parts of holy Scripture which seem at first sight the least instruc- 
 tive, furnish in the hand of this ingenious man much instruction, 
 or, at least, much opportunity of instruction. What in Scripture 
 seems less interesting to us than, that Ebedmelech the Ethiopian 
 drew Jeremiah out of a dungeon with cords, old cast clouts, and 
 rotten rags ? Yet our expositor observes several useful articles 
 in this history. 
 
 " 'Fad. — Ebedmelech took old clouts and rags from under the 
 treasury in the king's house. 
 
 " ' Observation.— -No waste should be made even in knits' 
 palaces : broken linen, like broken meat, should be preserved for 
 the use of the poor. 
 
 " ' Fact. — Ebedmelech directed Jeremiah to put the soft rags 
 under his arm-holes. 
 
 " ' Observation. — Distressed people should be relieved with 
 tenderness. 
 
 " ' Fact. — Ebedmelech did not throw the rags down ; but let 
 them down by cords. 
 
 Observation. — The poor should be relieved with respect.' " 
 's Notes to Claude. 
 
 Philosophical historians adopt the same course. From 
 the facts they relate they make observations, which, from 
 their great importance and general application, may justly 
 be denominated principles. And then they establish these 
 principles by adducing other facts not connected with their 
 immediate history. Thus Mr. Macaulay, after giving a 
 dismal account of the character of the clergy of that day, 
 observes : " It would be a great error to imagine, because 
 the country rector was in general not regarded as a gentle- 
 man, because he could not dare to aspire to the hand of one 
 of the young ladies at the manor house, because he was not 
 asked into the parlours of the great, but was left to drink 
 and smoke with grooms and butlers, that the power of the 
 clerical body was smaller than at present." Then follows 
 the observation or principle he raises or founds on these 
 facts. The influence of a class is by no means proportioned 
 to the consideration which the members of that class enjoy in 
 their individual capacity. This principle requires a further 
 confirmation. Here it is : "A cardinal is a much more 
 exalted personage than a begging friar, but it would be a 
 grievous mistake to suppose that the college of cardinals 
 has exercised a greater dominion over the public mind of 
 
140 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Europe, than the order of St. Francis. In Ireland at present, 
 a peer holds a far higher station in society than a Eoman 
 Catholic priest, yet there are in Munster and Connaught 
 few counties where a combination of priests would not 
 carry an election against a combination of peers." — Macau- 
 lay s History of England, vol. i. p. 333. 
 
 9. Examples are often employed in conversational dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 In this case they usually assume the form of anecdotes. 
 The word anecdote signifies not published, a meaning that 
 does not apply in our times, as all anecdotes are sure to 
 be published, and we have volumes of them upon almost 
 every subject. 
 
 All anecdotes are arguments. They all prove some- 
 thing, or may be so applied as to prove something ; and 
 they should, when related, be associated with the principle 
 they are adapted to prove. " A writer of penetration," 
 says Disraeli, " sees connexions in literary anecdotes which 
 are not immediately perceived by others : in his hands 
 anecdotes, even should they be familiar to us, are suscep- 
 tible of deductions and inferences which become novel and 
 important truths. Facts of themselves are barren : it is 
 when these facts pass through reflections, and become 
 interwoven with our feelings or our reasonings, that they 
 are the finest illustrations ; that they assume the dignity 
 of ' philosophy teaching by example ;' that in the moral 
 world they are what the wise system of Bacon inculcated 
 in the natural knowledge deduced from experiments— the 
 study of nature in her operations. ' When examples are 
 pointed out to us,' says Lord Bolingbroke, ' there is a 
 kind of appeal, with which we are flattered, made to our 
 senses as well as to our understandings. The instruction 
 comes then from our authority — we yield to fact when we 
 resist speculation.' " — Curiosities of Literature. 
 
 The principles of morality and religion are enforced by 
 collections of anecdotes. We have seen books, both in 
 French and English, entitled " The Beauties of History," 
 in which the anecdotes gleaned from history are classified 
 under the names of the moral virtues, as Industry, Filial 
 affection, Humanity, &c. An " Encyclopedia of Religious 
 Anecdotes " has recently been published by the Rev. Geo.. 
 
REASONING FROM EXAMPLES. 141 
 
 Cheever of New York ; and Mr, Wilson, a Wesleyan clergy- 
 man, has published a collection under the title of " Facts 
 and Incidents, illustrative of the Scripture Doctrines as 
 set forth in the First and Second Catechisms of the Wes- 
 leyan Methodists." 
 
 As an anecdote records only one example, it may not of 
 itself amount to proof ; but it may be an additional item 
 in the accumulated proofs by which a certain proposition 
 is established. All travellers relate anecdotes denoting 
 the peculiar characters of the people amoDg whom they 
 have travelled. This is in fact the chief kind of evidence 
 we can have upon the subject. Travellers into the East 
 have recorded many anecdotes tending to explain some 
 of the passages of the Holy Scriptures. On this ground 
 " Burder's Oriental Customs" and the writings of Dr. Kitto 
 are exceedingly valuable. Some anecdotes refer only to 
 individual character. You have an abundance of them in 
 Boswell's Life of Johnson. 
 
 Anecdotes have often a good effect when discreetly re- 
 lated at public meetings. The Rev. R Bickersteth of 
 Clapham, in a speech before the Tract Society, thus illus- 
 trates the advantages that may be obtained from the 
 union of a great number of small exertions : — 
 
 " He remembered, to have heard of a vessel being wrecked in 
 one of the beautiful bays on the coast of that beautiful island — 
 Jersey. A number of the inhabitants crowded the cliff, and 
 looked on with feelings of despair, for they felt that it was hope- 
 less to attempt doing anything for the crew. At length it was 
 suggested by one present that they should all hurry away, to find 
 as much rope as possible, and then return to try to aid those who 
 were in such jeopardy. The advice was acted upon, and some 
 brought long pieces, and some short. Joining them all together, 
 they stretched the united rope from cliff to cliff, suffering the 
 middle of it to dip down into the unfortunate vessel stranded on 
 the rocks. By that means the poor mariners were enabled to 
 lash themselves to the cord, and were drawn up safely to the top 
 of the cliff. Those who went to fetch the rope did not argue, 
 because they could not bring a long piece, that therefore their 
 contribution was useless ; but they brought as much as they 
 could, and all joined together effected the rescue." 
 
 We transcribe the following anecdotes from Sydney Smith, 
 as illustrating the nature of wit, of a pun, and of a bull : — 
 
142 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 "Wit. — Louis XIV. was exceedingly molested by the solici- 
 tations of a general officer at the levee, and cried out loud enough 
 to be overheard, c That gentleman is the most troublesome officer 
 in the whole army. 5 The officer replied, ' Your majesty's enemies 
 have more than once said the same thing.' " — " A Pun. — Miss 
 Hamilton, in her book on education, mentions the instance of a 
 boy so very neglectful that he could never be brought to read 
 the word patriarchs, but whenever he met with it he always 
 pronounced it partridges. A friend of the writer observed to 
 her that it could hardly be considered as a mere piece of negli- 
 gence, for it appeared to him that the boy, in calling them par- 
 tridges, was making game of the patriarchs." — "A Bull. — A 
 gentleman, in speaking of a nobleman's wife of great rank and 
 fortune, lamented very much that she had no children. A 
 medical gentleman who was present observed, that to have no 
 children was a great misfortune, but he thought he had remarked 
 that it was hereditary in some families." 
 
 The following anecdote may be related to illustrate the 
 rule that when you have advanced arguments enough to 
 prove your point you should advance no more. 
 
 " Eighteen Reasons eob, Absence. — The Prince of Conde 
 passing through Beaune, the public authorities went to meet him 
 at the gates of the town. After many high-flown compliments, 
 the mayor added : — ' To display our joy, we wished to receive you 
 with the reports of a numerous artillery, but we have not been 
 able to fire the cannons for eighteen reasons ; — in the first place, 
 we have none : secondly,' — ' My good friend,' said the prince, 
 ' the first reason is so good, I will excuse the other seventeen.' " 
 — Laughing Philosopher. 
 
 It is well to store our minds with anecdotes. But every 
 anecdote should be associated with some principle that it 
 is adapted to prove or to illustrate. Then the recollection 
 of the anecdote will remind us of the principle, and the 
 recollection of the principle will remind us of the anecdote. 
 When you relate them, they should be related in illustration 
 of the principle that may be the subject of the conversation, 
 and introduced with propriety and good taste. Do not tell 
 long anecdotes, as they will become tedious. If any other 
 person is about to relate an anecdote that you know, do 
 not interrupt him, but observe how he relates it, that you 
 may learn to relate it better yourself. There is an art in 
 this as in other things. It is generally best to begin with 
 the time or occasion when the event occurred, then the 
 
 
REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 143 
 
 persons, and then the actions. The following will illustrate 
 the order I mean : — " In the beginning God created the 
 heavens and the earth." " While he was teaching in the 
 temple the Pharisees came unto him." The gist or point 
 of the anecdote should always be related last. To learn 
 how anecdotes may be related argumentatively, read Dis- 
 raeli's Curiosities of Literature. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 REASONING FROM ANALOGY, COMPARISON, AND CONTRAST. 
 
 Analogy is different from either deduction or induction. 
 The word analogy means resemblance. By " reasoning 
 from analogy " we mean reasoning about one thing from its 
 resemblance to another thing. 
 
 1. The following are examples of this kind of reasoning: 
 
 " And, behold, there was a man which had his hand withered. 
 And they asked him, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath 
 days ? that they might accuse him. ■ And he said unto them, What 
 man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if 
 it fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, 
 and lift it out ? How much then is a man better that a sheep ? 
 Wherefore it is lawful to do well on the sabbath days." — Matt. 
 xii. 10—12. 
 
 " It would be a very curious question to agitate, how far under- 
 standing is transmitted from parent to child ; and within what 
 limits it can be improved by culture : whether all men are born 
 equal with respect to then understanding ; or whether there is 
 an original diversity antecedent to all imitation and instruction. 
 The analogy of animals is in favour of the trans missibility of 
 mind. Some ill-tempered horses constantly breed ill-tempered 
 colts ; and the foal never has seen the sire, — therefore, in this, 
 there can be no imitation. If the eggs of a wild duck are hatched 
 under a tame duck, the young brood will be much wilder than 
 any common brood of poultry : if they are kept all their lives in 
 a farm-yard, and treated kindly, and fed well, then- eggs hatched 
 under another bird produce a much tamer race." — Sydney SmiWs 
 Sketches of Moral Philosophy. 
 
 "I suppose it will be allowed, that, to advance a direct false- 
 hood, in recommendation of our wares, by ascribing to them some 
 quality which we know that they have not, is dishonest. Now, 
 compare with this the designed concealment of some fault, which 
 
144 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 we know that they have ; the motive in these two cases is the 
 same, and the prejudice to the buyer is also the same. 
 
 " The practice of passing bad money is sometimes defended by 
 a vulgar excuse, that we have taken the money for good, and must 
 therefore get rid of it. . Which excuse is much, the same as if one 
 who had been robbed on the highway, should imagine he had a 
 right to reimburse himself out of the pocket of the first traveller 
 he met." — Foley's Moral Philosophy. 
 
 2. We shall now show the application of this kind of 
 reasoning to several of the sciences. 
 
 " In almost every department of human knowledge," 
 says Mr. Blakey, " analogical reasonings are employed to a 
 great extent, and are found to be of great utility. In the 
 science of comparative anatomy, for example, it is of sin- 
 gular importance to trace out the resemblances between 
 the structures of different animals, their organs of sensa- 
 tion, digestion, and motion ; and from this analogical 
 inquiry we may draw useful conclusions for the govern- 
 ment of our own conduct and constitution, and the promo- 
 tion of our interests. For example, we make experiments 
 with certain kinds of food on the digestive organs of dogs, 
 and from these we infer or draw conclusions that such and 
 such effects will result to ourselves from taking these same 
 kinds of food : and these experiments have often led to 
 the formation of rules of diet and regimen of considerable 
 importance to our bodily health. Many highly beneficial 
 discoveries in medicine may be traced to experiments and 
 observations made upon the inferior animals, founded 
 upon the resemblance between their functions of life and 
 our own." — Essay on Logic. 
 
 The principle of analogy has been applied to some of our 
 reasonings in connexion with astronomy. We have given 
 you one example of this at page 42. Here is another — 
 
 " A person on the earth can no more be sensible of its undis- 
 turbed motion on its axis, than one in the cabin of a ship on 
 smooth water, can be sensible of the ship's motion, when it turns 
 gently and uniformly round. It is, therefore, no argument against 
 the earth's diurnal motion, that we do not feel it, nor is the 
 apparent revolution of the celestial bodies, every day a proof oi 
 the reality of these motions, for whether we or they revolve, the 
 appearance is the very same. A person looking through the cabin 
 windows of a ship, as strongly fancies the objects on land to go 
 
REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 145 
 
 round when the ship turns, as if they were actually in motion." 
 — Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 
 The principle of analogy is also often employed in our 
 moral reasonings. 
 
 "Public companies are analogous to other collective bodies 
 who are acknowledged to be moral agents. 
 
 " It will not be denied that a nation may declare an unjust war 
 — may carry it on in a cruel manner — may treat a conquered 
 nation with oppression, or may conduct a treaty of peace with 
 duplicity and fraud. Nor will it be denied, that a nation may 
 become immoral by the extinction of moral feeling in its rulers, 
 and throughout the population." 
 
 " As, then, large bodies of men, like nations, are rewarded or 
 punished in their collective capacity, for their virtuous or vicious 
 actions, it would seem to follow, that smaller bodies of men, like 
 public companies, may be subjected to the same moral discipline. 
 
 " A public company, like a nation, is composed of a number of 
 individuals who have a government for the regulation of their 
 affairs, and whose acts are considered as the acts of the whole 
 body. It is true that a public company is composed of a smaller 
 number of persons than a nation, but that cannot affect the moral 
 character of its actions. It is also true, that while a nation 
 must always act through its government, a public company may, 
 and often does, at the general meeting of its shareholders, act 
 independently of its government ; but neither can this alter its 
 moral agency, for whether the form of government be aristocratical 
 or democratical, the duties of a nation, or of a public company, 
 remain the same. 
 
 " In opposition to this doctrine, it may be contended that, to 
 render public bodies of men responsible in their collective capacity, 
 would be destructive of personal or individual responsibility. But 
 this is not the case. A nation may be punished for its national 
 crimes, and yet the individual who may have caused these crimes, 
 may sustain an individual punishment. Thus, Jeroboam, Ahab, 
 and other kings of Israel were individually punished, while, at 
 the same time, the nation was also punished in its collective 
 capacity. So a public company may be punished or rewarded 
 for its actions, while, at the same time, any individual who caused 
 these actions, may also be personally rewarded or punished. It 
 may too be objected, that if a public company is to be punished, 
 as such, for its acts, then all the partners would share in the 
 punishment, though many of them may have been quite innocent 
 of the crime. To this we answer, that the same objection would 
 apply to the doctrine of national responsibility.* It is not pos- 
 
 * The logical reader need not be reminded, that in arguments from analogy it 
 is a sufficient answer to an objection to show that the objection applies with equal 
 H 
 
146 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 sible in the case of a large body of men, for every individual to 
 take part in its actions. The act of the authorized government, 
 or of the majority of the members, must be regarded as the act 
 of the whole community, and every individual must share, in the 
 prosperity or adversity resulting from such acts." — Gilbarfs Prac- 
 tical Treatise on Banking. 
 
 Analogy is also used in legal argumentation : — 
 
 <c When a point of law has been once adjudged, neither that 
 question, nor any which completely and in all its circumstances 
 corresponds with that, can be brought a second time into dispute : 
 but questions arise, which resemble this only indirectly and in part, 
 in certain views and circumstances, and which may seem to bear 
 an equal or a greater affinity to other adjudged cases ; questions 
 which can be brought within any affixed rule only by analogy, and 
 which hold a relation by analogy to different rules. It is by the 
 urging of these different analogies that the conte?ition of the bar is 
 carried on : and it is in the comparison, adjustment, and reconci- 
 liation of them with one another ; in the discerning of such dis- 
 tinctions, and in the framing of such a determination, as may 
 either save the various rules alleged in the cause, or, if that be 
 impossible, may give up the weaker analogy to the stronger, that 
 the sagacity and wisdom of the court are seen and exercised. 
 Amongst a thousand instances of this, we may cite one of general 
 notoriety, in the contest that has lately been agitated concerning 
 literary property. The personal industry which an author ex- 
 pends upon the composition of his work, bears so near a resem- 
 blance to that by which every other kind of property is earned, 
 or deserved, or acquired; or rather there exists such a corre- 
 spondency between what is created by the study of a man's mind, 
 and the production of his labour in any other way of applying it, 
 that he seems entitled to the same exclusive, assignable, and per- 
 petual right in both ; and that right to the same protection of law. 
 This was the analogy contended for on one side. On the other 
 hand, a book, as to the author's right in it, appears similar to an 
 invention of art, as a machine, an engine, a medicine : and since 
 the law permits these to be copied and imitated, except where an 
 exclusive use or sale is reserved to the inventor by patent, the 
 same liberty should be allowed in the publication and sale of 
 books. This was the analogy maintained by the advocates of an 
 
 force to the doctrine from which the analogy is drawn. Thus, in the text, the 
 moral responsibUity of nations is assumed as admitted by all parties, and, there- 
 fore, requiring no further proof. From the resemblance, or analogy between the 
 two cases, we infer the moral responsibility of public companies. It is, therefore, 
 a sufficient answer to any objection against the latter doctrine, to show that it will 
 equally apply to the former. Indeed, the more numerous the objections, if they 
 will apply equally in both cases, the more the argument is strengthened ; as they 
 are confirmatory of the soundness of the analogy. 
 
 
REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 147 
 
 open trade. And the competition of these opposite analogies 
 constituted the difficulty of the case, as far as the same was argued, 
 or adjudged upon principles of common law. — One example may 
 serve to illustrate our meaning : but whoever takes up a volume 
 of Reports, will find most of the arguments it contains capable 
 of the same analysis ; although the analogies, it must be confessed, 
 are sometimes so entangled as not to be easily unravelled, or even 
 perceived." — Foley s Moral Philosophy. 
 
 Analogy is used in political economy. 
 The following analogy is drawn between interest and 
 rent : — 
 
 " I have said that there is no real difference between paying 
 for the loan of money, and for the loan of anything else. For 
 suppose I have one hundred pounds lying by me, you will easily 
 see that it comes to the same thing, whether I buy a house or a 
 piece of land with the money, and let it to my neighbour at so 
 much a-year, or whether I lend him the money to buy the house 
 or the land for himself, on condition of his paying me so much 
 a-year for the use of my money. But in the one case his yearly 
 payment would be called Rent ; and in the other case it gets the 
 name of Interest." — Easy Lessons on Money Matters. 
 
 Mr. Macculloch's fondness for generalization has some- 
 times led him into singular analogies. Thus, when dis- 
 cussing the utility of machinery, he observes : " Every 
 individual who has arrived at maturity, though he may 
 not happen to be initiated in any particular art or profes- 
 sion, may with perfect propriety be viewed as a machine 
 which has. cost twenty years of assiduous attention, and 
 the expenditure of a considerable capital to construct.'" 
 A further outlay of capital may improve the machine. 
 " And if a further sum has been laid out in educating, 
 or qualifying him for the exercise of a business or profes- 
 sion requiring manual skill, his value will be proportionably 
 increased, and he will be entitled to a greater reward for 
 his exertions : — just as a machine becomes more valuable 
 when new powers are given to it by the expenditure of 
 additional capital or labour in its construction." 
 
 Arguments from analogy are often employed in theology 
 to refute objections that have been advanced against Divine 
 revelation. 
 
 Thus, should one object to Christianity that God is re- 
 presented as refusing to pardon offences even upon the 
 h2 
 
148 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 sincere repentance of the offender, it may be replied, that 
 in the moral government of the world, we do not find that 
 the effects of sin are removed even upon sincere repentance : 
 thus, if a man gamble away his property, sincere repent- 
 ance will not bring it back ; should he ruin his constitution 
 by intemperance, and then repent, his repentance will not 
 restore his health ; should he, by a mean, or unjust action, 
 damage his reputation, and then repent of his crime, his 
 repentance will not bring back his good name. Thus, it 
 is not a doctrine of natural any more than of revealed reli- 
 gion, that God will pardon sin upon repentance without an 
 atonement. 
 
 In the present life your happiness or misery will in many 
 cases depend upon your own actions. It is therefore pos- 
 sible that your happiness or misery in the future world will 
 depend upon your actions in the present world. 
 
 If it be objected that the duration of happiness or 
 misery in the future world is disproportionate to the dura- 
 tion of the crime, it may be replied, that such is the case 
 to a certain degree in the present world, for one short act 
 of imprudence or folly committed in early years will some- 
 times embitter a whole life. 
 
 Many similar cases may be seen in "Butler's Ana- 
 logy." 
 
 This kind of argument is used rather to remove objec- 
 tions than to adduce proof. 
 
 Analogical reasoning abounds in the Holy Scripture : — 
 " A son honoureth his father, and a servant his master : 
 if then I be a father, where is mine honour 1 and if I be a 
 master, where is my fear?" (Malachi i. 6.) 
 
 " And the ruler of the synagogue answered with indig- 
 nation, because that Jesus had healed on the sabbath day, 
 and said unto the people, There are six days in which men 
 ought to work : in them therefore come and be healed, 
 and not on the sabbath day. The Lord then answered 
 him, and said, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you 
 on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and 
 lead him away to watering ? and ought not this woman, 
 being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, 
 lo. these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the 
 sabbath day?" (Luke xiii. 14—16.) 
 
REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 149 
 
 Some divines occasionally preach analogically ; that is, 
 they apply their text to some topic different from that 
 to which it originally referred. The Kev. Matthew Wilks 
 preached sometimes from singular, but at the same time 
 appropriate texts. A sermon of his, on " Unsanctified 
 Prosperity," was preached from " Jeshurun waxed fat and 
 kicked ;" another, on " Little Sins," from " Catch us the 
 foxes, even the little foxes, that spoil the vines." His 
 sermon before the London Missionary Society was from 
 Jeremiah vii. 18 : — " The children gather wood, and the 
 fathers kindle the fire, and the women knead their dough, 
 to make cakes to the queen of heaven, and to pour out 
 drink offerings unto other gods, that they may provoke 
 me to anger." From "The children gather wood," he 
 urged the formation of Juvenile Missionary Societies. We 
 have read a printed sermon, entitled " The devil driving 
 his hogs to market ;" the text was Mark v. 12, 13 : — " And 
 all the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the 
 swine, that we may enter into them. And forthwith Jesus 
 gave them leave. And the unclean spirits went out, and 
 entered into the swine : and the herd ran violently down a 
 steep place into the sea, (they were about two thousand ;) 
 and were choked in the sea." The possessed swine that 
 ran violently down a steep place till they perished in the 
 sea, were considered to represent vicious men, who under 
 the influence of the devil are urged forward in a course 
 that ends in their destruction. It is said that when 
 Mr. Pitt, the prime minister, then a young man, visited 
 one of the universities, a dignitary of the Church preached 
 from John vi. 9 : — " There is a lad here, which hath five 
 barley loaves, and two small fishes : but what are they 
 among so many V And a pleasant anecdote is related of 
 the Duke of Ormond (whose family name was Butler), 
 when Viceroy of Ireland, being reminded of a promise 
 of preferment he had made to a worthy clergyman named 
 Joseph, by a sermon which the latter preached in the 
 Castle Chapel, from Gen. xl. 23 :*," Yet did not the chief 
 butler remember Joseph, but forgat him." 
 
 The Rev. John Newton defended forms of prayer upon 
 the analogy that exists between such forms and psalms and 
 hymns — all being acts of devotion ; — 
 
150 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " Crito freely will rehearse 
 Forms of prayer and praise in verse : 
 Why should Crito then suppose 
 Forms are sinful when in prose ?" 
 
 
 3. Analogy influences our reasonings very much by 
 the extent to which it has contributed to the formation of 
 language. 
 
 "The faculty of association is not employed merely in the 
 formation of new words, but it leads also to the application of 
 old words to new ideas. Sometimes the material of which any- 
 thing was formed was employed to denote the thing itself, as a 
 stick, a horn, a stone. The name of one object was also applied 
 to some other, to which it seemed to bear a resemblance. Thus, 
 the word branch, which denotes a part of a tree, is applied to a 
 part of almost every object that is capable of division; hence we 
 speak of the branch of a road, the branch of a river, the branch 
 of a family, the branch of a discourse. 
 
 " Words which were originally employed to denote sensible 
 objects were afterwards applied to intellectual ideas. The last 
 object to which man directs his attention, and that which he finds 
 the most difficult to comprehend, are the powers of his own mind. 
 Hence mankind have usually a large stock of words denoting 
 sensible ideas before they think of naming those ideas which are 
 intellectual. And the operations of the mind can scarcely be 
 understood but by comparison with external objects. Mankind, 
 therefore, having found or fancied some resemblance between 
 sensible and intellectual ideas applied the same words to both. 
 In all languages we find that words denoting intellectual ideas, 
 when traced to their origin, are taken from sensible objects, and 
 were at first metaphors. The words understanding, evidence, 
 reflection, as well as the words I have employed to denote the 
 faculties of invention, association, and abstraction, are all taken 
 from objects of sense. These words have now lost their meta- 
 phorical meaning, and have become quite literal, through being so 
 frequently used. So we still speak of a man being burning with 
 zeal, inflamed with anger, swollen with rage, and inflated with 
 pride ; and by the same figure of speech we talk of a man having 
 a hard heart, or a soft heart ; a thick head, or a long head ; a 
 fertile imagination, a sound judgment, a strong memory, polished 
 manners. And when we recommend circumspection to an indi- 
 vidual, we tell him to ' look sharp.' 
 
 " By the same principle of association, we apply to inanimate 
 objects words denoting ideas peculiar to animals. Thus we speak 
 of the head of a river, the face of a country, a neck of land, and 
 an arm of the sea ; of a running stream, and a standing pool ; 
 
REASONING FROM ANALOGY. 151 
 
 we say the ground thirsts for rain ; the earth smiles with plenty ; 
 and so we speak of a learned age, a happy period, and a melan- 
 choly disaster." — Lecture on the Philosophy of Language. 
 
 Analogy is the foundation of nearly the whole of our 
 figurative language. Lindley Murray observes that " figure? 
 of speech frequently give us a much clearer and more 
 striking view of the principal object than we could have if 
 it were expressed in simple terms and divested of its 
 accessory idea. By a well-chosen figure even conviction is 
 assisted, and the impression of a truth upon the mind 
 made more lively and forcible than it would otherwise be. 
 We perceive this in the following illustration of Young — 
 i When we dip too deep into pleasure we always stir 
 a sediment that renders it impure and noxious :' and 
 in this instance, ' A heart boiling with violent passions 
 will always send up infatuating fumes to the head.' An 
 image that presents so much congruity between a moral 
 and a sensible idea serves like an argument from ana- 
 logy to enforce what the author asserts and to induce 
 belief." 
 
 The language of satire is usually the language of analogy. 
 Logic and wit are far oftener associated than opposed, and 
 satire will sometimes succeed where reasoning fails. Writers 
 on public questions often employ this weapon. The poli- 
 tical and religious parties that existed in England in the 
 reign of George I. were represented by Dean Swift in his 
 description of the parties in Lilliput. The political parties 
 were distinguished from each other by the high and low 
 heels of their shoes. The heir apparent (afterwards George 
 II.) wore one heel higher than the other, which gave him 
 a hobble in his gait — he was evidently halting between 
 two opinions. The religious parties were styled the Big- 
 endians and the Little-endians ; the former always broke 
 their eggs before they ate them on the big end, the latter 
 on the little end. The words of their prophet were, " Let 
 all true believers break their eggs on the most convenient 
 end." A few statesmen thought this meant " that every 
 true believer should break his egg on that end which 
 seemed to him to be the most convenient." But this con- 
 struction was not generally admitted, and many hundred 
 large volumes had been published on the controversy. In 
 his " Tale of a Tub" the Dean has, in the supposed adven- 
 
152 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 tures of three brothers, Peter, Martin, and Jack, given what 
 he deems a representation of the Catholic, Lutheran, and 
 Calvinistic churches. 
 
 All caricatures are founded on the principle of analogy. 
 So are the weekly representations in Punch. The proro- 
 gation of Parliament in 1850 was represented by "Lord 
 John Russell shutting up shop," and the opening of the 
 following session by " The Writing Lesson," in which Lord 
 John Russell is guiding the hand of the Queen when 
 writing the speech from the throne. This kind of repre- 
 sentation is sometimes found in the sacred writings. 
 
 " Then Aniaziak sent messengers to Jehoash, the son of 
 Jehoahaz son of Jehu, king of Israel, saying, Come, let us look 
 one another in the face. And Jehoash the king of Israel sent to 
 Amaziak king of Judah, saying, The thistle that was in Lebanon 
 sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying, Give thy daughter 
 to my son to wife : and there passed by a wild beast that was in 
 Lebanon, and trode down the thistle. Thou hast indeed smitten 
 Edom, and thine heart hath lifted thee up: glory of this, and 
 tarry at home : for why shouldest thou meddle to thy hurt, that 
 thou shouldest fall, even thou, and Judah with thee ?" — 2 Kings 
 xiv. 8—10. 
 
 And Elijah addressed the priests of Baal in the language 
 of satire : — 
 
 " And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them, and 
 said, Cry aloud : for he is a god ; either he is talking, or he is 
 pursuing, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and 
 must be awaked." — 1 Kings xviii. 27. 
 
 This is sound reasoning as well as satire. It contains 
 an argument from the relation of subject and attribute. 
 A God must possess omnipresence and omniscience, and 
 as Baal did not possess these attributes, it was a proof that 
 he was no God. 
 
 4. An analogy means a relation or agreement between 
 two or more things, which in other respects are entirely 
 different. But when there are several points of agreement, 
 it is not then an analogy, but a comparison. 
 
 In the book of Proverbs, comparisons abound : — 
 "Better is a little with righteousness, 
 Than great revenues without right. 
 He that is slow to anger is better than the mighty ; 
 And he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a city." 
 See also John viii. 53 ; xix. 11; 1 Cor. xih\. 8— 13. 
 
REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 153 
 
 Dr. Watts gives the following examples of arguments 
 founded on comparison : — " Knowledge is better than 
 riches ; virtue is better than knowledge ; therefore, virtue 
 is better than riches. A dove will fly a mile a minute.; a 
 swallow flies swifter than a dove ; therefore a swallow will 
 fly more than a mile a minute." * 
 
 The following comparison is drawn by the Rev. Sydney 
 Smith, between books and conversation : — 
 
 " A book has no eyes, and ears, and feelings ; the best are apt 
 every now and then to become a little languid ; whereas a living 
 book walks about, and varies his conversation and manner, and 
 prevents you from going to sleep. There is certainly a great evil 
 in this, as well as a good ; for the interest between a man and his 
 living folio becomes sometimes a little too keen, and in the com- 
 petition for victory they become a little too animated towards, 
 and sometimes exasperated against each other; whereas a man 
 and his book generally keep the peace with tolerable success ; and 
 if they disagree, the man shuts his book, and tosses it into a 
 corner of the room, which it might not be quite so safe or easy 
 to do with a living folio. It is an inconvenience in a book, that 
 you cannot ask questions ; there is no explanation ; and a man is 
 less guarded in conversation than in a book, and tells you with 
 more honesty the little niceties and exceptions of his opinions ; 
 whereas, hi a book, as his opinions are canvassed where they 
 cannot be explained and defended, he often overstates a point for 
 fear of being misunderstood ; but then, on the contrary, almost 
 every man talks a great deal better in his books, with more sense, 
 more information, and more reflection, than he can possibly do in 
 his conversation, because he has more time." — Moral Philosophy. 
 
 The following is a comparison of different places in the 
 vicinity of London : — 
 
 ""Twoulcl add thirty years to your life — and think what a 
 blessing that would be to me ; not that I shall live a tenth part 
 of the time — thirty years, if you'd take a nice little house some- 
 where at Brixton. You hate Brixton ? I must say it, Caudle, 
 that's so like you : any place that's really genteel, you can't abide. 
 Now Brixton and Balaam Hill I think delightful. So select ! 
 There, nobody visits nobody, unless they're somebody. To say 
 nothing of the delightful pews that make the churches so re- 
 spectable. 
 
 " ' However, do as you like. If you won't go to Brixton, what 
 do you say to Clapham Common ? Oh, that's a very fine story ! 
 Never tell me ! No ; you woiddn't be left alone, a Robinson 
 h3 
 
154 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Crusoe with, wife and children, because you're in the retail way. 
 What ! The retired wholesales never visit the retired retails at 
 Clapham? Ha! that's only your old sneering at the world, Mr. 
 Caudle ; but I don't believe it. And after all, people should keep 
 to their station, or what was this life made for ? Suppose a tallow- 
 merchant does keep himself above a tallow-chandler, — I call it 
 only a proper pride. What ? You call it the aristocracy of fat ? 
 I don't know what you mean by aristocracy ; but I suppose it's 
 only_ another of your dictionary words, that's hardly worth the 
 finding out. 
 
 " ' What do you say to Hornsey or Muswell Hill ? Eh ? Too 
 Ugh ? What a man you are ! Well, then — Battersea ? Too low ? 
 You 're an aggravating creature, Caudle, you must own that ! 
 Hampstead, then ? Too cold ? Nonsense ; it would brace you up 
 like a drum, Caudle ; and that's what you want. But you don't 
 deserve anybody to think of your health or your comforts either. 
 There's some pretty spots, I'm told, about Eulham. Now, Caudle, 
 I won't have you say a word against Eulham. That must be a 
 sweet place : "dry, and healthy, and every comfort of life about 
 it — else is it likely that a bishop would live there?'" — Mrs. 
 Caudles Curtain Lectures. 
 
 Comparison is a principle of extensive use in reasoning. 
 In deliberating upon any step we are about to take, we 
 make a comparison between the good and the evil effects 
 it is likely to produce. We make comparisons between 
 different men, and different qualities, and different actions, 
 and between the laws and customs of different countries ; 
 and we approve or disapprove, according to the award of 
 our judgments. And indeed our descriptions of persons, 
 places and things, consist chiefly of points of comparison 
 with other persons, places and things. 
 
 " Lord Campbell says of Holt : — ' Of all the lawyers in our 
 annals, Holt has gained the highest reputation, merely by the 
 exercise of judicial functions. He was not a statesman like 
 Clarendon — he was not a philosopher like Bacon — he was not an 
 orator like Mansfield ; yet he fills nearly as great a space in the 
 eye of posterity ; and some enthusiastic lovers of jurisprudence 
 regard him with higher veneration than any English judge who 
 preceded or has followed him.' " — Lives of the Chancellors. 
 
 " In America all our farms a'most have what we call the rough 
 pastur' — that is, a great rough field of a hundred acres or so near 
 the woods, where we turn in our young cattle, and breedin' mares, 
 and colts, and dry cows, and what not, where they take care of 
 themselves, and the young stock grow up, and the old stock grow 
 
REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 155 
 
 fat. It's a grand outlet that to the farm, that would he over- 
 • stocked without it. We could not do without it nohow. Now, 
 your colonies are a great field for a redundant population, a grand 
 outlet" — Sam Slick. 
 
 " Let us consider some of those points in "which other nations 
 offer us a high example. We may mention, for instance, that there 
 is among the continental nations a general amenity of manners, 
 a freedom of intercourse between the various classes of society, 
 which certainly gives them the appearance of great amiability, 
 besides that it is the source of other advantages. Again, we find 
 in the nations that belong to the Roman Catholic Church, a 
 straightforward unaffected boldness in the profession of their 
 religion, which is worthy of a purer creed. There is also in 
 Roman Catholic countries a regard to the outward forms of reli- 
 gion which, though not in itself all that is required of the Chris- 
 tian, nor even the most important part of his duty, is yet the 
 natural manner in which a real spirit of religion should exhibit 
 itself. It is, however, in the eastern world that religious feeling 
 is exhibited in the most natural manner. We may perhaps have 
 among the approaching throng of interested spectators some of 
 the followers of Mahomet, whose well-known custom it is fre- 
 quently to ejaculate their brief confession of faith, and who would 
 never think of writing a book without prefacing it by an inscrip- 
 tion of praise to God. We shall doubtless have a close criticism 
 instituted upon our mode of education, and inquiry as to the 
 degree in which it meets the wants of our population. The in- 
 habitants of those countries where attendance upon schools is 
 compulsory upon children of a suitable age, or of those in which 
 it is universally adopted from a real estimation of the benefits to be 
 derived therefrom, may perhaps be surprised at the defects and im- 
 perfections which are allowed to exist in our system. The ample 
 provision which has been made in many of the American States, 
 for this purpose, at a very early period too after their first establish- 
 ment, deserves to be noticed as affording an example most worthy 
 of imitation. We might go on in the same strain and speak of that 
 high sense of filial duty, which the disciples of Confucius would 
 expect to find in us, and which is among themselves an effectual 
 principle of government, or of that tenderness towards dumb 
 animals, and that strong feeling of brotherhood pervading the 
 different sects, and superseding all necessity for poor-houses, which 
 are so generally manifested by the worshippers of Brahma, and 
 which may therefore be considered by them as the best evidences 
 of moral excellence." — Great Exhibition Prize Essay. 
 
 5. In reasoning from analogy or comparison, if the case 
 to be proved appears to be stronger even than the case 
 with which it is compared, the analogy is called by scho- 
 
156 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 lastic logicians, an argumentum ct fortiori, that is, "a 
 stronger argument." 
 
 This kind of argument is often denoted in Scripture by 
 the words, " How," " How much more," or " How much 
 rather." The following are examples : — 
 
 " And David answered Rechab and Baanah his brother, the 
 sons of Rimmon the Beerothite, and said unto them, As the Lord 
 liveth, who hath redeemed my soul out of all adversity, when one 
 told me, saying, Behold, Saul is dead, th inking to have brought 
 good tidings, I took hold of him, and slew him in Ziklag, who 
 thought that I would have given him a reward for his tidings : 
 how much more, when wicked men have slain a righteous person 
 in his own house upon his bed ? shall I not therefore now require 
 his blood of your hand, and take you away from the earth ? " — 
 2 Sam. iv. 9—11. 
 
 " And why take ye thought for raiment ? Consider the lilies 
 of the field, how they grow ; they toil not, neither do they spin : 
 and yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was 
 not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the 
 grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the 
 oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith ?" — 
 Matt. vi. 28—30. See also Matt. vii. 11 ; Matt, xxiii. 16—19 ; 
 2 Chron. vi. 18 ; Rom. viii. 32 ; Heb. ii. 1—3 ; Jonah iv. 10, 11 ; 
 Job iv. 19 ; 1 Tim. hi. 5 ; Heb. ii. 2, 3 ; ix. 13, 14 ; xii. 9. 
 
 The text, Matt. xix. 9 — " And I say unto you, Who- 
 soever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, 
 and shall marry another, committeth adultery : and whoso 
 marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery" — 
 contains an <% fortiori argument against polygamy. For 
 if it is criminal for a man to put away his wife and marry 
 anpther, then, cb fortiori, it must be criminal for him to 
 many another without putting the first away. 
 
 The following is a comparison of this kind that formed 
 part of the indictment of Guy Fawkes : — 
 
 " The matter that is now to be offered to you, my Lords the 
 Commissioners, and to the trial of you the knights and gentlemen 
 of the jury, is matter of treason; but of such horror and mon- 
 strous nature, that before now the tongue of man never delivered, 
 the ear of man never heard, the heart of man never conceited, 
 nor the malice of hellish or earthly devil ever practised. For if 
 it be abominable to murder the least ; if to touch God's anointed 
 be to oppose themselves against God ; if (by blood) to subvert 
 princes, states, and kingdoms, be hateful to God and man, as all 
 
REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 157 
 
 true Christians must acknowledge ; then how much more than too 
 monstrous shall all Christian hearts judge the horror of this 
 treason, to murder and subvert such a king, such a queen, such a 
 prince, such a progeny, such a state, such a government, so com- 
 plete and absolute ; that God approves : the world admires : all 
 true English hearts honour and reverence : the Pope and his dis- 
 ciples only envy and malign." 
 
 The following h fortiori argument is used by the Hon. 
 Joshua R. Giddmgs, Member of Congress for the state of 
 Ohio, with reference to the Fugitive Slave Bill. This bill 
 requires the inhabitants of the free states to assist in 
 apprehending the fugitive slaves, and delivering them back 
 to the state from which they had escaped : — 
 
 " Thus, fellow-citizens, you and I are liable at any hour, to be 
 called upon to pursue the flying bondman as he hastens towards 
 a land of freedom. We have become a nation of slave-hunters, 
 and slave-catchers. 
 
 " The man who shall seize a slave upon the African coast, is 
 by our law consigned to the gallows, and deemed unworthy of an 
 existence among civilized, and even barbarous people ; but how 
 much greater must be the guilt of him who seizes the enlightened 
 and intelligent Christian, one who holds the same religion, and 
 trusts in the same salvation as himself, and riveting the cold 
 iron upon his trembling limbs, sends him back to bondage and 
 suffering. 
 
 " We know that the benighted African is unconscious of his 
 rights, and incapable of appreciating his degradation : yet we 
 hang the man who arrests and consigns him to slavery. This we 
 regard as just : but what penalty can be regarded as commen- 
 surate with the crime of seizing upon our fellow-man whose mind 
 has been enlightened, who knows the rights with which God has 
 endowed him, who comprehends the crime committed against 
 him, and of sending him back to a land of chains, and whips, and 
 suffering ? In my opinion, such crime far transcends that of the 
 ordinary pirate. Indeed, I think the thief or the pirate far more 
 entitled to our friendship, than he who under such circumstances 
 will lend himself to the commission of the crimes which the law 
 requires us to perpetrate." 
 
 Sometimes clergymen take a text referring to temporal 
 affairs and apply it to such as are spiritual, contending 
 that the duty enforced in reference to things of this life 
 is still more important when applied to the life to come. 
 Thus, from the text, " Be thou diligent to know the state 
 
158 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 of thy flocks, and look well to thy herds," the preacher 
 remarked, that if diligence be a duty in reference to our 
 temporal affairs, a fortiori, it was a duty still more impera- 
 tive in regard to our eternal interests. And the Apostle 
 Paul uses a similar argument in 1 Corinthians ix. 11, in 
 reference to the support of the Christian ministry : — "If 
 we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing 
 if we shall reap your carnal things 1 " 
 
 6. Sometimes we compare two things together, not so 
 much to discover wherein they agree, but wherein they 
 differ; and we rest our argument upon the contrast. — 
 Matt. vi. 19, 20 ; 2 Cor. iv. 17 ; Proverbs iii. 35. " • 
 
 The Earl of Carlisle in his Lecture on America, delivered 
 before the Leeds Mechanics Institution, has pointed out 
 a want of resemblance between England and America with 
 reference to the question of Religious Establishments : — 
 
 " It is my wish to touch very lightly upon any point which 
 among us, among even some of us now here, may be matter of 
 controversy; I, however, honestly think that the experience of 
 the United States does not as yet enable them to decide on 
 either side the argument between the established and voluntary 
 systems in religion; take the towns by themselves, and I think 
 the voluntary principle appears fully adequate to satisfy all reli- . 
 gious exigencies; then it must be remembered that the class 
 which makes the main difficulty elsewhere, scarcely, if at all, 
 exists in America; it is the blessed privilege of the L'nited 
 States, and it is one which goes very far to counterbalance any 
 drawbacks at which I may have to hint, that they really have 
 not, as a class, any poor among them. A real beggar is what you 
 never see. On the other hand, over their immense tracts of ter- 
 ritory, the voluntary system has not sufficed to produce sufficient 
 religious accommodation ; it may, however, be truly questioned, 
 whether any establishment would be equal to that function. This 
 is, however, one among the many questions which the republican 
 experience of America has not yet solved. As matters stand at 
 present, indifference to religion cannot be fairly laid to her 
 charge ; probably religious extremes are pushed further than else- 
 where ; there certainly is a breadth and universality of religious 
 liberty which I do not regard without some degree of envy." 
 
 Some have contended for universal suffrage upon the 
 ground that it exists in America. An opponent of this 
 sentiment shows wherein America differs from England 
 in this respect : — 
 
 
REASONING FROM COMPARISON. 159 
 
 " The United States are, singularly enough, taken by both the 
 advocates and the opponents of universal suffrage as a conclusive 
 example for and against the same system ; and it is not the least 
 curious part of the paradox that the principal cause of the facts 
 which are pleaded and exaggerated by both parties lies out of the 
 sphere of politics altogether. It is to the prodigious amount of 
 fertile soil, compared with the smallness of the population, and 
 to the consequent cheapness of land and dearness of labour, that 
 North America owes, in a great measure, the prosperity, morality, 
 and contentment of her people, and the comparative security of 
 life and property. And it is to the same cause that we should 
 attribute the major part of that spirit of speculation, that rabid 
 thirst for wealth, that inferiority in arts and literature, that 
 absence of refinement, that selfish kimboing, jostling race through 
 life, of which brother Jonathan is sometimes justly, and oftener 
 unjustly, accused : the United States are, and must long remain, 
 a country of material production, with its advantages and its 
 disadvantages. It follows, that the conditions under which com- 
 plete consistent democracy has been tried on the other side of 
 the Atlantic are so unlike those of Europe, that we cannot infer, 
 with any certainty, from the success of the institutions of the 
 former, that they would succeed on our more crowded shores.' 
 Christian ~ 
 
 The contrast between Protestant and Catholic states is 
 thus described by Mr. Macaulay : — 
 
 "From the time when the barbarians overran the Western 
 Empire, to the time of the revival of letters, the influence of the 
 Church of Rome had been generally favourable to science, to 
 civilization, and to good government. But during the last three 
 centuries, to stunt the growth of the human mind has been her 
 chief object. Throughout Christendom, whatever advance has 
 been made in knowledge, in freedom, in wealth, and in the arts of 
 life, has been made in spite of her, and has everywhere been in 
 inverse proportion to her power. The loveliest and most fertile 
 provinces of Europe have, under her rule, been sunk in poverty, 
 in political servitude, and in intellectual torpor, while Protestant 
 countries, once proverbial for sterility and barbarism, have been 
 turned by skill and industry' into gardens, and can boast of a long 
 list of heroes and statesmen, philosophers and poets. Whoever, 
 knowing what Italy and Scotland naturally are, and what four 
 hundred years ago they actually were, shall now compare the 
 country round Rome with the country round Edinburgh, will be 
 able to form some judgment as to the tendency of Papal domina- 
 tion. The descent of Spain, once the first among monarchies, to 
 the lowest depths of degradation; the elevation of Holland, in 
 
1G0 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 spite of many natural disadvantages, to a position such as no 
 commonwealth so small has ever reached, teach the same lesson. 
 Whoever passes, in Germany, from a Roman Catholic to a Pro- 
 testant principality ; in Switzerland from a Roman Catholic to a 
 Protestant canton ; in Ireland from a Roman Catholic to a Pro- 
 testant county, finds that he has passed from a lower to a higher 
 grade of civilization. On the other side of the Atlantic the same 
 law prevails. The Protestants of the United States have left far 
 behind them the Roman Catholics of Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. 
 The Roman Catholics of Canada remain inert, while the whole 
 continent round them is in a ferment with Protestant activity 
 and enterprise." — History of England. 
 
 The following are examples of contrasts in literary 
 criticism : — 
 
 "The hook answers its title, and is well calculated to fami- 
 liarize the million with the forms of logical reasonings. — -We hope 
 that e Logic for the Million ' will be read by the Million. It will 
 advance their knowledge, and improve their taste, their style of 
 writing, and their skill in reasoning." Economist. — " This anony- 
 mous publication is as unfit for the Million as it is unworthy to 
 be called Logic." — Athenaeum. 
 
 " The illustrations he has given, in order to show the faculty 
 in action, are selected with admirable judgment, and are in them- 
 selves so instructive, readable, and entertaining, that they would 
 alone suffice to make the volume well worth its purchase money." 
 Weekly News. — " To call such a jumble of odds and ends 'Logic 
 for the Million' is absurd in the extreme." — u ' " 
 
 "No young man desirous of improving himself in the art of 
 reasoning could more profitably employ his leisure hours_than in 
 studying this volume; indeed we heartily recommend it for 
 general perusal." Oxford Journal. — "If the Million want to 
 learn Logic they must not come here." — Athenaeum. 
 
 "We cannot lay down this admirable little treatise without 
 recommending its perusal to the masses, for whom it has been 
 specially written, and especially to the learned, who will find in 
 its pages logic without jargon, and literary illustration without 
 pedantry." The Globe. — " One would think from many passages 
 that it was intended to be a burlesque on Logic and Logicians — 
 a sort of Don Quixote or Hudibras in a small way — rather than 
 a serious treatise on the subject." — Athenceum. 
 
 " By the production of the first really popular work on a 
 subject of no mean importance our P.R.S. has added to his own 
 laurels, and conferred a signal service on the whole community." 
 Morning Post. — " The author of this work has done well in 
 
FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 161 
 
 concealing his name. His present performance is too worthless 
 to derive any weight from his other literary achievements, though 
 it is quite capable of damaging a good reputation." — Athenaeum. 
 
 The principle of contrast is much used in theology : — 
 
 " Contrast Words and Actions.— This is, as our author 
 presently expresses it, one of the finest topics of illustration. 
 There is no end of the utility of it in theology. It illustrates 
 revelation by contrasting it with all systems of natural religion. 
 * Never man spake like this man.' It illustrates Christianity by 
 placing it opposite to Judaism. c Ye are not come to Mount 
 Sinai : but ye are come to Mount Zion.' It distinguisheth true 
 ministers of Christ from pret* nders. * We are not as many who 
 corrupt the word of God : bul we speak as of God.' It displays 
 the beauty of a true church b» comparing it with the deformity 
 of false religion. Of Mohanr-.iedism, Popery, and all political 
 religions, it may safely be as<ed, 'What agreement hath the 
 temple of God with idols ?' ] * is of excellent use in preaching 
 the law, by contrasting what IK en are with what they ought to 
 be. It is excellently adapted to comfort, by comparing the 
 wisdom of Providence with the lolly of him who complains of it ; 
 the sufficiency of pardoning mercy with the abundance of a 
 sinner's unworthiness ; the pleasures of piety with the amuse- 
 ments of sin ; the privileges of a saint with the licentiousness of 
 a sinner; the aids of the Holy Spirit with the efforts of the 
 tempter ; the joys beyond death with the agonies of dying. It is 
 useful to recover a backslider, by comparing his present state 
 with a former state. c Did I appear to the house of thy father ? ' 
 &c. In these, and in a thousand other cases, contrast is lovely 
 beyond conception, and Scripture abounds with it. Contrasts 
 may be taken from person : ' What God hath cleansed, call not 
 thou common,' — from place : ■' Pass over the isles, send unto 
 Kedar, and see, hath a nation changed their idols : but my people 
 [in Judea] have changed their glory ; ' — from time, relation, &c. 
 &c." — Robinson's Notes to Claude. 
 
 7. Having now taken a view of analogy, comparison, 
 and contrast, we will conclude this section by taking a view 
 of fallacious analogies. 
 
 Analogies are of two kinds. They may denote a resem- 
 blance between two things themselves, or merely a resem- 
 blance between the circumstances in which they are placed. 
 Thus, when Sydney Smith argues that dispositions are 
 hereditary, from the analogy between men and animals, 
 the resemblance is between the things themselves. But 
 when he tells us we ought not to decry the science of 
 
162 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Moral Philosophy, inasmuch as several other sciences are 
 liable to the same objections, the analogy is between the 
 circumstances in which these sciences are placed. We 
 are thus liable to make two mistakes. When we find there 
 is an analogy between the things themselves, we may erro- 
 neously infer there is an analogy in their circumstances. 
 Or when we find an analogy in their circumstances, we 
 may infer there is an analogy in the things themselves. 
 
 The first error is exhibited very often in the analogies 
 drawn between men and animals. There is, no doubt, a 
 resemblance between reason and instinct. Hence some 
 have inferred that there is an analogy between men and 
 animals in their rights with reference to each other. Paley 
 and others have contended on this ground that men have 
 no right to kill animals for food. We think they are in- 
 correct in their analogies. 
 
 " The reasons alleged in vindication of this practice, are the 
 following: that the several species of brutes being created to 
 prey upon one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove that 
 the human species were intended to feed upon them ; that, if let 
 alone, they would overrun the earth, and exclude mankind from 
 the occupation of it ; that they are requited for what they suffer 
 at our hands, by our care and protection. 
 
 " Upon which reasons I would observe, that the analogy con- 
 tended for is extremely lame ; since brutes have no power to 
 support life by any other means, and since we have; for the 
 whole human species might subsist entirely upon fruit, pulse, 
 herbs, and roots, as many tribes of Hindoos actually do. The 
 two other reasons may be valid reasons as far as they go ; for, 
 no doubt, if man had been supported entirely by vegetable food, 
 a great part of those animals which die to furnish his table, would 
 never have lived; but they by no means justify our right over 
 the lives of brutes to the extent in which we exercise it. What 
 danger is there, for instance, of fish interfering with us, in the use 
 of their element ? or what do we contribute to their support or 
 preservation ? " — Foley's Moral 
 
 In his speech at the Peace Congress held in Frankfort, 
 Mr. Cobden contended for the principle of arbitration 
 between nations, upon the ground of the analogy between 
 nations and individuals : " It is done in private life con- 
 tinually. Scores and hundreds of British Acts of Parlia- 
 ment have been passed, requiring that such disputes should 
 
FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 163 
 
 be settled by arbitration : and the principle you find good 
 for individuals you will find good for nations." Here there 
 is a want of analogy in the circumstances of the parties. 
 If two individuals in a state refer their dispute to arbi- 
 tration, the law will compel them to abide by the de- 
 cision of the arbitrator. But in the case of nations, if either 
 party chooses to dispute the decision of the arbitrator, 
 who is to enforce obedience, and by what means, except 
 by war 1 
 
 The second error is when, from an analogy in circum- 
 stances, we infer an analogy in the things themselves. 
 
 Archbishop Whately defends logic by the analogical 
 mode of reasoning ; and when he confines his analogies 
 merely to the circumstances in which logic resembles other 
 sciences, his reasoning is generally conclusive. But some- 
 times he goes beyond this, and finds, or fancies, analogies 
 between the nature of logic and that of other sciences to 
 which it bears no resemblance. For example, he finds 
 an analogy between logic and chemistry. I quote Mr. 
 Blakey : — 
 
 " In an able work recently published by Archbishop Whately, 
 on the use of the syllogistic theory, the author observes, that 
 ' Logic, which is as it were the grammar of reasoning, does not 
 bring forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode of argu- 
 mentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode ; but 
 as the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately 
 reduced ; and which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we 
 are employing logic as an art) of a test to try the validity of any 
 argument ; in the same maimer as by chemical analysis we de- 
 velop and submit to a distinct examination the elements of which 
 any compound body is composed, and are thus enabled to detect 
 any latent sophistication and impurity. 5 
 
 " It appears to me, that the Archbishop has fallen into error 
 regarding the nature and importance of the syllogism, from in- 
 stituting certain analogies between it and some other departments 
 of knowledge, such as chemistry, grammar, and arithmetic. He 
 compares the analysis of a piece of reasoning, to the chemical 
 analysis of any material substance ; he imagines that the logic 
 of syllogisms bears the same relation to general reasoning that 
 grammar does to language ; and the technical terms in which the 
 syllogistic process is couched, are viewed as resembling the arbi- 
 trary signs affixed to arithmetical quantities. A very slight atten- 
 tion, however, to these analogical illustrations will be sufficient 
 
164 9 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 to convince the reader that they are by no means perfect." — 
 Essay on Logic. 
 
 Archbishop Whately usually argues by analogy. In 
 reading through his book on logic, I have marked with a 
 pencil thirty-four instances of his arguing by analogy. But 
 the most striking example he has given of this principle of 
 reasoning is in his pamphlet, entitled ' Historic Doubts 
 relative to Napoleon Buonaparte.' The object of this 
 pamphlet was to show that by the same reasoning through 
 which infidel writers have attempted to cast doubts on the 
 New Testament history, they might cast doubts on the 
 history of Napoleon Buonaparte; and as we know the 
 history of Napoleon Buonaparte to be true, although it is 
 exposed to these objections, so the history of the New 
 Testament may be true, although it has been attacked by 
 similar objections. We shall have occasion hereafter to 
 make a few extracts from this singular pamphlet. 
 
 Another kind of fallacious reasoning is when the analogy 
 is merely verbal, or metaphorical, and there is no real 
 resemblance between the things, or their circumstances. 
 
 " Among the metaphors which conceal an altogether fatal 
 theory, there is none more commonly used than that put forward 
 hi the words tribute, tributary. 
 
 " These words have become so common, that they are used as 
 synonymes of purchase, purchaser, and the "words are used indif- 
 ferently, for the one or the other. 
 
 " But nevertheless, there is as great a difference between tri- 
 bute and purchase, as between theft and exchange, and I would 
 just as soon hear it said that Cartouche has broken open a strong 
 box and has purchased a thousand crowns, as I would hear our 
 honourable deputies repeat : We have paid to Germany a tribute 
 for a thousand horses which she has sold to us. 
 
 "Eor that which renders Cartouche's action no purchase is, 
 that he has not put, and with my consent, into my strong box, 
 a value equivalent to that -which he has taken out. 
 
 " And that which causes the payment of 500,000 francs, which 
 we have made to Germany, to be no tribute, is because she has 
 not received it gratuitously, but by giving us in exchange a thou- 
 sand horses which we ourselves have judged to be worth our 
 500,000 francs/; 
 
 " How has this improper trope found its way into the rhetoric 
 of the monopolists ? Some money leaves the country to satisfy 
 the rapacity of a victorious enemy. Some more money leaves the 
 
FALLACIOUS ANALOGIES. 165 
 
 country also to pay for merchandise. They establish the analogy 
 between the two cases by only taking into account the circum- 
 stances in which they resemble each other, and leaving out of the 
 question those in which they differ." — Basiiafs " Popular Falla- 
 cies respecting General Interests" translated by 67. R. Porter. 
 
 In using the principle of analogy you must be careful 
 that your analogical case is one that is sound, or at least 
 is admitted to be sound by the party you are anxious to 
 convince. Your opponent may, and probably will, deny 
 the analogy between the two cases. This is a fair reply, 
 and brings the argument to a practical discussion. But if 
 your opponent takes a different view from yours of the 
 parallel case that you adduce, you have been unfortunate 
 in the choice of your analogy. For instance, suppose you 
 are disputing with a person who contends that a man ought 
 to be allowed to marry the sister of his deceased wife, and 
 you say, " Upon this ground you ought to admit that a 
 woman should be allowed to marry the brother of her 
 deceased husband." He might reply, " So I do; I contend 
 for both." Here your analogy has missed fire ; and the 
 ground of controversy must be changed. But if your op- 
 ponent denies the latter case, but contends for the former, 
 then your argumentation will naturally take the form of 
 analogy. 
 
 I shall conclude this section by noticing a very inge- 
 nious argument, drawn from the doctrine of analogy. In 
 reasoning from analogy, w T e usually compare good things 
 with good things, and evil things with evil things. Hence 
 Mr. Aiken considers that the analogies drawn in the New 
 Testament between a Christian and a soldier, are a proof 
 of the innocency of war. He has put this argument very 
 forcibly in the following words : — ■ 
 
 " It appears, on the grounds already stated, that reason and the 
 natural law of self-preservation, and our duty to ourselves, rela- 
 tions, friends, and countrymen, also that the Divine command 
 and permission to the Jews, all prove that war may be necessary 
 and just; and such a war is not expressly prohibited by the 
 Clnistian religion. On the contrary, there are frequent allusions 
 to war in the New Testament, in which no censure is implied or 
 expressed. The trumpet, the weapons, the armour of war, are 
 often employed as images to illustrate the Christian warfare. 
 Here the analogy is, that the Christian is a spiritual warrior, 
 
166 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 in a good cause, against an evil adversary. Thus the apostle 
 Paid speaks of Epaphroditus and Archippus as Mis fellow-soldiers. 
 If war were only and absolutely criminal, the analogy would be 
 unsuitable. How could the Christian apostle have addressed, in 
 a good sense, Epaphroditus my fellow-robber, and Archippus my 
 fellow-murderer ? It is at least remarkable, that although the 
 Saviour drove the money-changers and sellers of doves from the 
 temple, he never found fault with soldiers for their occupation, 
 but commended the Centurion's faith." — Aiken on War. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 reasoning' from parables, fables, and proverbs. 
 
 We take the following explanation of the word parable from 
 Dr. Black's " Student's Manual." " Para-ble, from para, 
 side by side, and hallo, I put. Thus parable means a simili- 
 tude, or one thing compared to another. It is usually em- 
 ployed to designate a fable or allegorical instruction founded 
 on something real or apparent in nature, or history, from 
 which a moral is drawn, by comparing it with something in 
 which the people are more immediately concerned." 
 
 The word parable is applied in the New Testament to 
 four different kinds of literary compositions. These are 
 tales, comparisons, parables strictly so called, i. e. allegories, 
 and fables. We will give an example of each. 
 
 The following is a tale : — 
 
 " And he spake a parable unto them, saying, The ground of a 
 certain rich man brought forth plentifully : And he thought 
 within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room 
 where to bestow my fruits ? And he said, This will I do : I will 
 pull down my barns, and build greater ; and there will I bestow 
 all my fruits and my goods. And I will say to my soul, Soul, 
 thou hast much goods laid up for many years ; take thine ease, 
 eat, drink, and be merry. But God said unto him, Thou fool, 
 this night thy soul shall be required of thee : then whose shall 
 those things be, which thou hast provided ? So is he that layeth 
 up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God." — Luke xii. 
 16—21. 
 
 A tale differs from a parable, strictly so called, in having 
 no reference beyond itself. The above tale illustrates the 
 futility and uncertainty of riches, but it has no allegorical 
 
REASONING FROM PARABLES. 167 
 
 meaning. It is not employed as a similitude or com- 
 parison, to illustrate anything else. The same observation 
 may be applied to the parables, as they are called, of the 
 rich man and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19 — 31); the pharisee 
 and publican (Luke xviii. 9 — 14) ; the unprofitable servant 
 (Luke xix. 12 — 24) ; and the unfeeling servant, (Matt. 
 xviii. 23 — 34) ; which, viewed as literary compositions, are, 
 strictly speaking, not parables but tales. 
 
 The mode of reasoning from tales is the same as reason- 
 ing from examples. Tales are records of events that have 
 occurred, or are so probable, t],iat they might have occurred. 
 The lessons drawn from these tales are the general prin- 
 ciples which the facts tend to prove. It is a mode of 
 reasoning by induction. We have discussed this subject 
 in the first section of this part of our work. 
 
 The following is a comparison : — 
 
 " Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The king- 
 dom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard-seed, which a man 
 took and sowed in his field: Which indeed is the least of all 
 seeds : hut when it is grown it is the greatest among herbs, and 
 becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in 
 the branches thereof." — Matt. xhi. 31, 32. 
 
 A comparison differs from a tale in that it is employed 
 to illustrate something beyond itself. It differs from a para- 
 ble in that the illustration is confined generally to one point. 
 In the above example, the comparison between the illus- 
 tration and the thing illustrated, is confined to one quality, 
 that of rapid and extensive increase. There is no general 
 resemblance in other respects between the two things com- 
 pared. An attempt to discover such resemblances would 
 be ridiculous. To the same class of compositions belong, 
 the two foundations (Matt. vii. 24 — 26) ; the leaven hid 
 in the meal (Matt. xiii. 33) ; the treasure hid in a field 
 (Matt. xiii. 44) ; the merchant seeking goodly pearls (Matt, 
 xiii. 45, 46); the net cast into the sea (Matt. xiii. 47, 48) ; 
 the fig-tree (Luke xxi. 29); and several others. 
 
 Of comparison as a principle of reasoning we have 
 already treated. Here comparison is brought before us in 
 the way of metaphor. In this point of view it can never 
 amount to proof. But, nevertheless, its consideration is 
 fairly within the province of logic. One part of our duty 
 
168 LOGIC FOR- THE MILLION. 
 
 as logicians is to state clearly the propositions we intend 
 to prove. Metaphorical comparisons are of great use 
 in enabling us to make this clear statement. Half the 
 disputes that exist among men arise from their misunder- 
 standing one another. We should endeavour to acquire 
 the art of stating clearly and vividly what it is that we 
 mean. And when we have done this, we shall in most cases 
 have obviated the necessity for any further controversy. 
 
 The following is a parable in the strict sense of the 
 word : — 
 
 " Hearken ; Behold, there went out a sower to sow : And it 
 came to pass, as he sowed, some fell by the way-side, and the 
 fowls of the air came and devoured it up. And some fell on 
 stony ground where it had not much earth ; and immediately it 
 sprang np, because it had no depth of earth ; But when the sun 
 was up it was scorched ; and because it had no root, it withered 
 away. And some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up and 
 choked it, and it yielded no fruit. And other fell on good ground, 
 and did yield fruit that sprang up and increased, and brought 
 forth, some thirty and some sixty, and some an hundred." — 
 Mark iv. 3—8. 
 
 The parable strictly so called is an allegory. It is em 
 ployed to illustrate something that seems at first to have 
 no connexion with it, and the machinery of the composition 
 must correspond with the several parts of the matter to be 
 illustrated. The following explanation of the above parable 
 will exemplify this in a very striking manner : — 
 
 "The sower soweth the word. And these are they by the 
 way-side, where the word is sown ; but when they have heard, 
 Satan cometh immediately, and taketh away the word that was 
 sown in their hearts. And these are they likewise which are sown 
 on stony ground ; who, when they have heard the word, imme- 
 diately receive it with gladness ; and have no root in themselves, 
 and so endure but for a time : afterward, when affliction or perse- 
 cution ariseth for the word's sake, immediately they are offended. 
 And these are they which are sown among thorns ; such as hear 
 the word, arid the cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of 
 riches, and the lusts of other things entering in, choke the word, 
 and it becometh unfruitful. And these are they which are sown 
 on good ground; such as hear the word, and receive it, and 
 bring forth fruit, some thirty-fold, some sixty, and some an 
 hundred." — Mark iv. 14 — 20. 
 
 
REASONING FROM PARABLES. 169 
 
 To this class of compositions belong the parable of the 
 tares (Matt. xiii. 24 — 30 ) ; the day labourers (Matt. xx. 
 1 — 15); the nuptial entertainment (Matt. xxii. 1 — 13); the 
 ten virgins (Matt. xxv. 1 — 12) ; the faithless husbandmen 
 (Mark xii. 1 — 9) ; and several others. There are also 
 many examples of this kind of composition in the Old 
 Testament. Such are the royal bramble (Judges ix. 
 8 — 15) ; the ewe lamb (2 Sam. xii. 1 — 7) ; the fruitless 
 vineyard (Isaiah v. 1 — 6) ; the eagles and the vine tree 
 (Ezekiel xvii. 3 — 8). In minuteness of illustration the 
 parables have an advantage over comparisons. But the 
 application of minute portions of the parable should not 
 be strained. I have heard of a divine, who, in explaining 
 the parable of the good Samaritan, stated that the " two 
 pence " denoted the Old and the New Testament. 
 
 Parables, like comparisons, are not proofs. They are, 
 however, vivid illustrations; and the more minute the 
 particulars, the stronger is the illustration. There is, of 
 course, always an analogy between the illustration and the 
 matter to be illustrated. But we must distinguish between 
 a logical and a metaphorical analogy. For instance, the 
 analogy between an animal who had fallen into a pit, and a 
 man who was lame, was a logical analogy, and it was clear 
 that if one might be relieved on the sabbath-day, so might 
 the other. But the analogy between the kingdom of heaven 
 and a grain of mustard seed, was a metaphorical analogy, 
 and the rapid increase of the mustard seed was no proof 
 of the future rapid spread of Christianity, though it was a 
 vivid representation of it. 
 
 I may state to you, that sometimes the same composition 
 may be either a tale, a comparison, a fable, or a parable, 
 according to the manner in which it is viewed. Thus, " The 
 good Samaritan," if viewed as an answer to the question, 
 Who is my neighbour 1 and as inculcating the exercise of 
 kindness and benevolence, is a tale. But if the condition 
 of the man who fell among thieves is considered as repre- 
 senting the moral state of mankind, and the good Samaritan 
 as representing the Saviour of the world, (and divines often 
 take this view,) then it is a parable. So a comparison be- 
 comes a parable when we can trace more than one or two- 
 points of resemblance. The fable of the rebellion of the; 
 
 I 
 
170 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 members against the stomach, when related as a represen- 
 tation of the rebellion of the Roman citizens against the 
 senate, is more properly a parable. 
 
 The following letter from a young tradesman is a 
 parable : — 
 
 " Sir, — In reply to your complaints, allow me to tell you a 
 story. Once on a time, two persons were walking on the sea- 
 shore, when one of them picked up a valuable article which had 
 been washed in by the tide. His companion cried, ' Half ! ' The 
 finder was annoyed at this, and to prevent his companion having 
 the half, he threw the article back into the sea. You have for 
 many years carried on a profitable trade in this town. The in- 
 creasing population led me to suppose there might be room for 
 me. I had no wish to undersell you; I wished only to share 
 your profits. To prevent my getting any portion of these profits, 
 you now sell your goods at a price that yields no profit to 
 yourself." 
 
 The dreams and visions which are recorded in Scripture 
 may be regarded as comparisons or parables, and the in- 
 terpretations were the facts they were designed to prefigure 
 or illustrate. The soldier's dream (Judges vii. 13 — 15) 
 may be regarded as a comparison, and St. Peter's vision 
 (Acts si. 4 — 8) as a parable. 
 
 We now proceed to Fables. 
 
 We need hardly observe that we do not use the word 
 fable in any disreputable sense, as denoting falsehood, but 
 merely as the name of a certain kind of literary com- 
 position. 
 
 The following is a fable : — 
 
 "And he spake a parable unto them to this end, that men 
 ought always to pray, and not to faint : saying, There was in a 
 city a judge, which feared not God, neither regarded man : and 
 there was a widow in that city ; and she came unto him, saying, 
 Avenge me of mine adversary. And he would not for a while : 
 but afterward he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor 
 regard man ; yet, because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge 
 her, lest by her continual coming she weary me." — Luke xviii. 
 1 — 5. 
 
 The fable is a composition designed to illustrate a pro- 
 position, which is called the moral of the fable. It is not 
 necessary that the machinery of the fable should bear any 
 resemblance to any moral process to which the proposition 
 
 
REASONING FROM FABLES. 171 
 
 may be applied. Herein it differs from the parable. The 
 machinery of the parable, or allegory, must correspond 
 with the moral processes it is intended to illustrate. The 
 machinery of the fable represents nothing. It is required 
 only that the result shall illustrate a proposition, and this 
 proposition must seem to flow from the plot of the fable. 
 In the fable we have quoted, the proposition to be proved 
 or illustrated, is the advantage of perseverance in prayer. 
 But there is no correspondence between the machinery of 
 the fable and the parties to whom reference is made. In 
 fact, the fable derives no small portion of its force from 
 this want of resemblance. It amounts to an a fortiori 
 argument. The reasoning is thus : if an unjust judge is 
 induced by importunity to grant a request, how much 
 rather shall the Judge in heaven grant the requests of his 
 servants. This is the application in the subsequent verses : 
 " And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day 
 and night unto him, though he bear long with them 1 I 
 tell you that he will avenge them speedily." The same 
 lesson is taught by the fable of the midnight visitor, Luke 
 xi. 5 — 8. 
 
 Fables occupied in ancient times a more honourable 
 station in the estimation of mankind than they do at 
 present They are now employed chiefly as the means of 
 imparting instruction to children, or as the profitable 
 amusement of a leisure hour. In former days, the con- 
 struction of fables was the serious employment of states- 
 men and philosophers. It always ensured to such as were 
 successful a degree of literary eminence, and sometimes 
 even conferred upon them political distinctions. But 
 though we are not now accustomed to consider fables as 
 the most eminent literary productions, they are by no 
 means the least useful. It is from fables that the greater 
 part of mankind derive their first lessons in moral science, 
 at a time when their minds are incapable of abstract 
 reflection, and when no other mode of instruction would 
 be either so entertaining or so efficacious. The knowledge 
 thus acquired becomes interwoven with the earliest recol- 
 lections of the mind, and often regulates the conduct in 
 maturer years. The design of fable is to place some 
 important truth in a striking point of view. The proposi- 
 i2 
 
172 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 tion we wish to exhibit appears to flow from the plot of the 
 fable, and thus makes deeper impression on the mind than 
 if it had been expressed in literal terms. This truth is 
 commonly a moral one, and hence it is called the moral of 
 the fable ; but it is not necessarily connected with ethics, 
 for it may be connected with politics, or with the ordinary 
 affairs of life. The subject of a fable should not be a 
 truth so obvious that it could not have escaped the most 
 ordinary observation. It would be ridiculous to invent a 
 fable to show that every man is subject to death. But the 
 observation, that, although in our distress we may some- 
 times call out for death, yet that when he arrives we receive 
 him with reluctance, may properly become the subject of a 
 fable, and it has been well illustrated in the story of the 
 old man and his bundle of sticks. 
 
 A fable is different from an example. Upon the relative 
 merits of fables and examples, Aristotle makes the follow- 
 ing remarks : " The occasion wherein fables are more in 
 point, and employed with the greatest success, is in popular 
 addresses, and in debates upon great questions. They have 
 this advantage over example, that it is difficult to find in 
 history circumstances perfectly relevant to what we would 
 wish to prove ; whereas a fable is easily invented ; and, in 
 order to this, nothing more is necessary than to draw a 
 parable, which any man may do who knows in what resem- 
 blance consists, a thing by no means difficult to the least 
 proficient in philosophy:" 
 
 " Example, however, surpasses fable in this respect, that 
 its proofs, which are founded upon the truth of history, 
 and the decided allegation of events, are of much greater 
 effect in deliberation, and more appropriate to persuasive 
 oratory. This happens on account of the great resemblance 
 between all occurrences, inasmuch as it may be said that 
 the past is commonly a presage of the future ; and that 
 nothing almost is done now-a-days which was not for- 
 merly done." 
 
 The German fabulist, Lessing, controverts this opinion ; 
 but here we think that Aristotle is right. Let us suppose 
 that in the senate of our land a measure is introduced 
 which involves the question, whether standing armies are 
 unfriendly to liberty. Let a speaker, who wished to prove 
 
REASONING FROM FABLES. 173 
 
 the affirmative of this question, adduce the fable cited 
 by the author, of the horse, who allowed the man to 
 get on his back, that he might be revenged on the deer. 
 Let another speaker attempt to prove the same proposition 
 from historical examples — let him adduce the numerous 
 instances in which despotic and tyrannical governments 
 have been supported by means of standing armies — let 
 him refer to the times of Julius Csesar, of Cromwell, and 
 of Napoleon — let him do this, and then we will ask, 
 Which speaker is the more likely to carry conviction to 
 the mind % In fact, the evidence derived from fables, and 
 particularly from fables in which animals are introduced, 
 never can amount to proof. How easily, for instance, 
 might the fable we have mentioned, excellent as it is, be 
 overturned : for if the horse were a rational animal, as 
 the fable supposes him to be, could he not easily throw 
 the man from his back 1 and hence, might not an oppo- 
 nent contend, that the citizens being rational beings, might 
 with equal ease throw off a military government as soon as 
 they found it oppressive % Facts, however, are stubborn 
 things, and their testimony is not so easily refuted. 
 
 The following examples of fables are taken from Lessing. 
 Fable the twelfth exposes those who take credit to them-' 
 selves for abstaining from vices they cannot practice : — 
 
 " The Sick Wolf. — The wolf being at the point of death, cast 
 a retrospective glance on his past life. ' I am certainly a sinner,' 
 lie plaintively observed, ' but, I trust, not one of the greatest. I 
 have doubtless committed evil ; but I have also done much good. 
 I remember that once, when a lamb, which had strayed from the 
 flock, came so near me, I might have devoured it with the 
 greatest ease; I forebore to do so. About the same time, I 
 listened to the abuse of an angry sheep with the most edifying 
 indifference, although no watch-dog was to be feared. 5 ' To all 
 this I can bear witness,' said the fox, who was assisting his 
 ghostly preparations : ' I recollect all the particulars. It was 
 just at the time you suffered so much from the bone in your 
 throat.' " 
 
 To deny the excellencies of a man while he lives, and 
 to praise him after he is dead, is a common practice, and 
 is thus exhibited : — 
 
 " The Oak Tree. — One stormy night the raging north wind 
 exercised its strength on a lofta oak, which it levelled with the 
 
174 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 ground, where it lay with many small trees crushed beneath it. 
 A fox, whose den was not far distant, happened to pass the next 
 morning : ' What a noble tree !' exclaimed he ; ' I never thought 
 it so great while standing.' " 
 
 The twenty-fifth fable is designed to show that friend- 
 ship is more permanent between persons who excel in 
 different kinds of merit, than it is between those whose 
 excellence is of the same kind : — 
 
 "The Nightingale and the Peacock. — A social nightin- 
 gale found among the singers of the wood many enviers, but no 
 friends. ' Perhaps I shall find one in another species/ said the 
 nightingale, and flew with confidence to the peacock. • 
 
 " ' Handsome peacock, I exceedingly admire you.' c And I 
 equally admire you, lovely nightingale,' exclaimed the one to the 
 other. ' Then let us be friends,' continued the latter ; ' we shall 
 not be tempted to envy each other. You are as agreeable to the 
 eye as I am to the ear.' " 
 
 Eminence in one kind of merit is often associated with 
 deficiency in another : — 
 
 "The Nightingale and the Hawk. — A mellifluous night- 
 ingale was one day pounced upon by a hawk. ' As you sing so 
 charmingly,' he exclaimed, ' how deliciously must you taste !' " 
 
 No gratitude is due for favours conferred ninten- 
 tionally. 
 
 " The Oak-teee and the Swine. — A greedy swine fed under 
 a lofty oak, on the fruit which plentifully fell from its boughs ; 
 and while he cracked one acorn with his teeth, devoured another 
 with his eyes. 
 
 " ' Ungrateful beast,' exclaimed the oak, ' you feed rapaciously 
 on my fruit, without casting up one grateful look to me !' 
 
 " The swine was silent for a moment, and then grunted an 
 answer : - My grateful look should not be wanting, was I certain 
 that you threw down your acorns for the love of me.' " 
 
 The vanity of rank is thus exposed : — 
 
 "The Knight in Chess.— Two boys who wished to play at 
 chess, being deficient in a knight, constituted one out of a super- 
 fluous pawn, by placing a mark upon it. 
 
 " ' How ! ' cried the other knights. ' Keep your place, sir ; one 
 step at a time.' 
 
 " The boys, who overheard their insolence, exclaimed. * Silence ; 
 it performs exactly the same service as yourselves.' * 
 
REASONING FROM FABLES. 175 
 
 If a man claim more merit than is due to him, man- 
 kind will give him less than his due : — 
 
 "The Peacock and the Crow. — A foolish crow adorned 
 itself with the cast plumage of the peacock, and when it con- 
 ceived itself sufficiently ornamented, mingled with the brilliant 
 birds of Juno ; being quickly recognised, the peacocks, with their 
 sharp bills, soon stripped her of her deceptive apparel. 
 
 " ' Cease/ the crow at last exclaimed, ' you have now got back 
 all that belongs to you.' But the peacocks, perceiving a few 
 brilliant feathers in the crow's own plumage, answered, 'Be 
 silent, impostor, even these camiot belong to you.' " 
 
 The direction of Solomon, " Go to the ant, thou slug- 
 gard ; consider her ways, and be wise," has often been 
 quoted to reprove slothfulness ; it contains also another 
 lessoD, which has hitherto been overlooked : — 
 
 " The Spirit of Solomon. — An aged man, in order to plough 
 his field and to strew the fruitful seed in the willing bosom of the 
 earth, bore up against the toil of his employment and the heat of 
 the weather. On a sudden, a divine spectre stood before him 
 under the broad shadow of a lime-tree. The old man started : 
 
 " ' I am Solomon,' said the phantom emphatically. c What are 
 you doing here, old man ? ' 
 
 " ' If you are Solomon,' replied the old man, ' why need you 
 ask ? You sent me in my youth to the ant. I attended to its 
 ways, and became industrious, and what I then learned, I am 
 still practising.' 
 
 " ' You have learned but half the lesson,' returned the shadow. 
 ' Repair once more to the ant, and let it teach you to repose in 
 the winter of your years, and enjoy what you have already 
 gathered/ " 
 
 Parables, we have already observed, do not prove, they 
 only illustrate. Indeed, they are rarely used for the 
 purposes of controversy. They serve to explain what was 
 previously obscure, and thus enable the mind to perceive 
 the truths more clearly, and hence to believe them more 
 firmly. Fables are of a more controversial character. 
 Many of them were originally invented for political pur- 
 poses. Their object is to illustrate a general proposition, 
 which general proposition is applied to the particular case 
 that we wish to demonstrate. In the composition of the 
 fable, we invent a series of supposed facts, which, by a 
 species of induction, are designed to prove, as far as they 
 
176 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 go, a general proposition, which is called the moral of the 
 fable. We then take this general proposition, and apply 
 it to any case, or to all the cases to which it will apply. 
 This is deduction. It is a kind of argument that we have 
 classed under the relation of genus and species, and would 
 rank under the first figure of syllogisms in scholastic logic. 
 The design of fables, then, is to teach us general maxims 
 and propositions, which we are to apply as we may have 
 occasion, to practical purposes, in our progress through 
 the world. Hence the propriety of teaching them to 
 children. By this means, they acquire at an early age 
 lessons of profound wisdom, in an interesting and agreeable 
 manner, which is likely to make a deep impression on the 
 memory. 
 
 We shall further explain the mode of reasoning through 
 the application of fables, by an example from the fables 
 of iEsop. In most of these fables we find that actions 
 are attributed to animals. The reason is, that certain 
 animals are supposed to represent certain characters or 
 dispositions. Thus, the lion is the representative of' 
 courage and magnanimity ; the fox of cunning ; the pea- 
 cock, of beauty. This, however, is not a necessary feature 
 in the composition of a fable. We have many excellent 
 fables, both ancient and modern, in which no animals are 
 introduced. 
 
 The following is a well-known fable, taken from ^Esop, 
 with the application of Dr. Croxall : — 
 
 " The Wind and the Sun. — A dispute once arose betwixt the 
 north-wind and sun, about the superiority of their power ; and 
 they agreed to try their strength upon a traveller, which should be 
 able to get his cloak off first. The north- wind began, and blew a 
 very cold blast, accompanied with a sharp driving shower : but 
 this, and whatever else he could do, instead of making the man 
 quit his cloak, obliged him to gird it about his body as close as 
 possible. Next came the sun, who, breaking out from a thick watery 
 cloud, drove away the cold vapours from the sky, and darted his 
 warm, sultry beams upon the head of the poor weather-beaten 
 traveller. The man growing faint with the heat, and unable to 
 endure it any longer, first throws off his heavy cloak, and then 
 flies for protection to the shade of a neighbouring grove. 
 
 " The Application. — There is something in the temper of men 
 so averse to severe and boisterous treatment, that he who endea- 
 
REASONING FROM FABLES. 177 
 
 vours to carry his point that way, instead of prevailing, generally 
 leaves the mind of him, whom he has thus attempted, in a more 
 confirmed and obstinate situation than he found it at first. Bitter 
 words and hard usage freeze the heart into a kind of obduracy, 
 which mild persuasion and gentle language only can dissolve and 
 soften. Persecution has always fixed and riveted those opinions 
 which it was intended to dispel ; and some discerning men have 
 attributed the quick growth of Christianity, in a great measure, 
 to the rougli and barbarous reception which its first teachers met 
 with in* the world. The same may have been observed of our 
 Reformation : the blood of the martyrs was the manure which 
 produced that great Protestant crop, on which the Church of 
 England has subsisted ever since. Providence, which always 
 makes use of the most natural means to attain its purpose, has 
 thought fit to establish the purest religion by this method : the 
 consideration of which may give a proper check to those who are 
 continually endeavouring to root out errors by that very manage- 
 ment which so infallibly fixes and implants all opinions, as well 
 erroneous as orthodox. When an opinion is so violently attacked, 
 it raises an attention in the persecuted party, and gives an alarm 
 to their vanity, by making them think that worth defending and 
 keeping at the hazard of their lives, which, perhaps, otherwise, 
 they would only have admired awhile for the sake of its novelty, 
 and afterwards resigned of their own accord. In short, a fierce, 
 turbulent opposition, like the north-wind, only serves to make a 
 man wrap his notions more closely about him ; but we know not 
 what a kind, warm, sunshiny behaviour, rightly applied, would 
 not be able to effect." 
 
 The Rev. Samuel Lysons has published some of the fables 
 of JEsop, accompanied with an evangelical application. 
 The following is his application of the above fable : — 
 
 "Moral. — In Scripture, religion is frequently compared to a 
 cloak or garment. Job (xxix. 14) says, e I put on righteousness, 
 and it clothed me.' Isaiah (lix. 17) says, ' he was clad with zeal 
 as a cloak.' The rude blasts and storms of affliction and adversity 
 are far less likely to make men throw off their religion, than the 
 sunny warmth of prosperity. We perceive the former to be 
 enemies and are on our guard, we hold closer to our protection ; 
 but the latter, coming under the specious guise of friendship, in- 
 sinuates itself, and strips us bare of our religion, and renders us 
 open to the attacks of a thousand other enemies to our souls. 
 We should be most especially on our guard in the sunny days of 
 prosperity, lest our religion get a chill in the groves of worldly 
 pleasure and wanton enjoyment." 
 
 i 3 
 
178 logic for the million. 
 
 We now proceed to Proverbs. 
 
 Disraeli has an article on the Philosophy of Proverbs. 
 He observes that some difficnlty has occurred in the defi- 
 nition. I shall assume that you know what is meant by 
 a proverb ; and when a thing is well known, definition 
 may do more harm than good. Formal logical definitions 
 of things well known, sometimes lead to verbal quibbling ; 
 and after all can seldom be so worded as to include every 
 individual of the species. A lady asked a gentleman the 
 meaning of a Pun. He was puzzled to find a definition, 
 but he replied, " Give me a subject, and I will make one." 
 The lady replied, " Well, I give you the queen." He replied, 
 " The queen is no subject." Some one has observed that 
 a proverb should have " sense, shortness, and salt." 
 
 " From the antiquity of proverbs, they may be denned 
 the primitive language of mankind, in which knowledge 
 was preserved prior to the invention of letters. In the 
 early stages of society, its progress is retarded by three 
 causes : the scarcity of words to express ideas ; the feeble- 
 ness of memory, from the absence of intellectual exertion ; 
 and the want of a durable character, by which the dis- 
 coveries of one generation may be retained and transmitted 
 to another. Proverbs are well adapted for removing these 
 first obstacles to improvement : by a figurative expression 
 they supply the place of verbal description ; their brevity 
 is an aid to memory ; while, by being connected with local 
 circumstances and surrounding objects, they form a visible 
 type, in which passing occurrences and observations may 
 be recorded. Accordingly, we find that all nations have 
 had recourse to aphoristic language, and doubtless it was 
 in this style the first knowledge of the world, its laws, 
 morals, husbandry, and observations on the weather, were 
 preserved. 
 
 " Proverbs formed the encyclopaedia of former times, 
 comprising all the existing observations on human nature, 
 natural phenomena, and local history. Men acquired 
 wisdom, not from books, but oral communication. All 
 the apparatus of the modern system of education — Horn- 
 books, Reading Made Easys, and Pleasing Instructors, were 
 unknown. Children did not learn their alphabet, nor their 
 catechism ; but an adult system prevailed, in which grown 
 
REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 179 
 
 persons were taught the arts of life — the mysteries of good 
 housekeeping, of economy, longevity, husbandry and mete- 
 orology, in some traditionary maxim, handed down from 
 generation to generation, time out of mind." — Fielding's 
 Select Proverbs of all Nations. 
 
 " One permanent use of the Book of Proverbs deserves 
 to be particularly noticed, because it has hitherto been 
 overlooked by critics and commentators. I refer to the 
 use and value of this book as a standing witness to the 
 veracity of the Old Testament historians. If I am not 
 mistaken, this collection of national proverbs furnishes a 
 branch of historical evidence substantially the same in 
 kind with that by which the acute and sagacious Paley 
 has demonstrated the truth of the Scripture history of St. 
 Paul. The argument of that master of reasoning is founded 
 on the undesigned coincidences between certain passages in 
 St. Paul's Epistles, and some particulars of the Apostle's 
 life and labours as related by St. Luke in the Acts ; and 
 every intelligent reader of his Treatise will admit that he 
 has pointed out and illustrated such a series of minute and 
 ud designed agreements between those two narrations, as 
 can in no way be accounted for but by a supposition of 
 their truth. Similar latent proofs of harmony and verity 
 may, I think, be detected by comparing the allusions in 
 the Book of Proverbs with the Old Testament history. 
 Just as Dr. Paley, by placing the Pauline Epistles and St. 
 Luke's narrative, as it were, in the witness-box, and sub- 
 jecting them to a searching cross-examination, has elicited 
 from both that kind of testimony which has most weight 
 with judge and jury — coincident testimony so minute and 
 circumstantial as to exclude the suspicion of collusion ; so, 
 I apprehend, a critic of competent learning and acuteness 
 might without much difficulty produce from the Book of 
 Proverbs a rich assemblage of most decisive, because un- 
 designed, corroborations of the sacred annals of the Jews." 
 
 « Proverbs are, in fact, themselves of the nature of his- 
 tory; for when arranged in the order of their respective 
 dates, they form a continuous record of the prevailing 
 opinions and feelings of a nation. They usually go back 
 to its infancy ; they grow with its growth ; they vary with 
 its various changes of fortune : and owing their origin and 
 
180 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 currency to the impressions made on the national mind by 
 particular events and institutions, they necessarily reflect 
 and retain not a little of the colour and character of these 
 events and institutions." — Dr. M'Culloclis Literary Cha- 
 racteristics of the Holy Scriptures. 
 
 Mr. Nicholls, M.A. of Queen's College, Cambridge, has 
 published a work entitled, " The Book of Proverbs Ex- 
 plained and Illustrated from Holy Scripture." He makes 
 the following observations on the Proverbs of Solomon : — 
 
 " A proverb, strictly speaking, is a short moral sentence, 
 which means something further than what the words lite- 
 rally imply. It is : as apples of gold in a net-work of silver/ 
 grave and profound sentiment, the truth of which acquires 
 additional beauty when partially discovered through the 
 veil of elegant fiction and imagery. But most of Solo- 
 mon's proverbs are rather to be called maxims or sentences. 
 The distinction between a proverb strictly so called, and a 
 maxim, or sentence, may be thus illustrated : When Solo- 
 mon says, ' Trust in the Lord with all thine heart, and 
 lean not to thine own understanding,' this is no proverb, 
 but a moral sentence. When he says, ' Drink waters out 
 of thine own cistern,' this is a proverb ; and it means, 
 meddle not with that which belongs to another." 
 
 " Out of the vast treasures of learning left us in this 
 small volume, the best advice is furnished to princes, 
 counsellors, judges, and other public ministers, to all sorts 
 of subjects in their several relations, and in every condition ; 
 to make them both pious and politic; to direct them in the 
 choice of their comforts, in the education of their children, 
 in the management of domestic affairs, and in their trans- 
 actions with other men ; in contracting or conducting their 
 friendships, in giving or taking good counsel and reproof, 
 in making or preserving peace, in judging of men, and of 
 the event of their designs. This book bridles the injurious 
 tongue, corrects the wanton eye, and ties the unjust hands 
 in chains. It persecutes sloth, chastises all absurd desires, 
 teaches prudence, raises men's courage, and represents tem 7 
 perance and chastity after such a fashion, that one cannot 
 but have them in .veneration • — and thus is, as Basil says, 
 an universal direction for all men, and for the whole of life. 
 It, moreover, not only gives such universal directions, but 
 
 
REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 181 
 
 enforces attention to them from those motives which can 
 alone secure obedience to them, such as the authority of 
 God, his exact notice of all men's ways and hearts, the 
 rewards which attend righteousness, and the punishments 
 which follow wickedness, by his just appointment, both in 
 this world and the next." 
 
 The mode of illustration adopted by Mr. Nicholls, is to 
 state the proverb, and then to cite those instances in 
 which the principle has been exemplified in Scripture 
 History. These facts, like an argument from induction, 
 tend to prove the truth of the proverb. We give the fol- 
 lowing as an example : — 
 
 " The merciful man doeth good to his own soul. — Prov. xi. 17. 
 
 "Joseph had sorrows of his own (Psalm cv. 18), but he took 
 an interest in those of his fellow-prisoners, the chief butler and 
 the chief baker. (Gen. xl. 6.) This led them to unburden the 
 cause of their sorrow to him ; and hence arose the opportunity 
 of interpreting their dreams which ultimately led to his own ad- 
 vancement. (Gen. xli. 9 — 14.) — The Kenites ; the kindness shown 
 by them to the Israelites was gratefully remembered many hun- 
 dreds of years after, to the benefit of their descendants. 1 Sam. 
 xv. 6. Eccles. xi. 1. — David's compassion to the Egyptian slave 
 was the means of his signal success. 1 Sam. xxx. 11 — 20. — Jona- 
 thans kindness to David led to his children's preservation. 2 Sam. 
 ix. 7 ; xxi. 7. — Job, in seeking mercy for others, found good to 
 himself. He eat good by the fruit of his mouth. (Prov. xiii. 2.) 
 The Lord turned the captivity of Job when he prayed for his 
 friends. Job xlii. 10. — The centurion, having built the Jews a 
 synagogue, they interceded for him; and his anxiety for the wel- 
 fare of his sick servant was the means of confirming his own faith 
 in Christ. (Luke vii. 2 — 10.) Let thy soul love a good servant. 
 Ecclus. vii. 21. — Cornelius. Acts x. 4. Prov. xii. 14. — The bar- 
 barous people ; their mercy to those who had been wrecked on 
 their coast, and the blessing they received. Acts xxviii. 1 — 10." 
 
 Proverbs are often the morals of fables. They are not 
 usually capable of being proved by reasoning, They are 
 proved by observation and experience, and are many of 
 them the results of the experience of ages. But, referring 
 chiefly to morals and manners, they possess only a moral 
 universality, and hence it is often easy to point out some 
 cases in which they are not realized. Thus — " The diligent 
 hand maketh rich ;" " Train up a child in the way he 
 
182 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it," 
 are sound maxims ; but cases do sometimes occur in 
 which they will not apply. This is no valid objection to 
 them as rules for our guidance. In human affairs we can 
 have no certain and infallible rule. "We must be contented 
 with a high degree of probability. It is the part of true 
 wisdom to submit our conduct to the guidance of this 
 high degree of probability. " To be indecisive and reluc- 
 tant to act," says Mr. Mill, " because we have not evidence 
 of a perfectly conclusive character to act upon, is a defect 
 sometimes incident to scientific minds, but which, wherever 
 it exists, renders them unfit for practical emergencies. If 
 we would succeed in action, we must judge by indications, 
 which, although they do not generally mislead us, some- 
 times do, and must make up as far as possible for the in- 
 complete conclusiveness of any one indication, by obtaining 
 others to corroborate it." 
 
 The mode of reasoning from proverbs, as we have shown 
 at pages 58 and 129, is by the application of a general 
 principle to an individual case, and falls under the class of 
 genus and species. We shall now give a further illustra- 
 tion from Dr. Franklin's Poor Richard's Almanack : — 
 
 "It would be thought a hard government that should tax its 
 people one-tenth part of their time to be employed in its service : 
 but idleness taxes many of us much more : sloth, by bringing on 
 diseases, absolutely shortens life. 'Sloth, like rust, consumes 
 faster than labour wears, while the used key is always bright/ as 
 poor Richard says. ' But dost thou love life, then do not squander 
 time, for that is the stuff life is made of,' as poor Richard says. 
 How much more than is necessary do we spend in sleep ! for- 
 getting that 'The sleeping fox catches no poultrv,' and that 'there 
 will be sleeping enough in the grave,' as poor Richard says." 
 
 " But with our industry we must likewise be steady, settled, 
 and careful, and oversee our own affairs with our own eyes, and 
 not trust too much to others, for, as poor Richard says, 
 
 " ' I never saw an oft removed tree, 
 Nor yet an oft removed family, 
 That throve so well as those that settled be. 
 
 And again, 'Three removes is as bad as a fire;' and again, 
 'Keep thy shop, and thy shop will keep thee;' and again, 'If 
 you would have your business done, go ; if not, send ; ' and 
 again, 
 
REASONING FROM PROVERBS. 183 
 
 ; He that by the plough would thrive, 
 Himself must either hold or drive/ 
 
 And again, c The eye of the master will do more work than both 
 his hands;' and again, 'Want of care does us more damage than 
 want of knowledge ; ' and again, ' Not to oversee workmen, is to 
 leave them your purse open/ Trusting too much to others' care 
 is the ruin of many ; for ' In the affairs of this world, men are 
 saved, not by faith, but by the want of it ;' but a man's own care 
 is profitable, for ' If you would have a faithful servant, and one 
 that you like, serve yourself. A little neglect may breed great 
 mischief ; for want of a nail the shoe was lost ; for want of a shoe 
 the horse was lost ; and for want of a horse the rider was lost,' 
 being overtaken and slain by the enemy ; all for want of a little 
 care about a horse-shoe nail. 
 
 " So much for industry, my friends, and attention to one's own 
 business ; but to these we must add frugality, if we would make 
 our industry more certainly successful. A man' may, if he knows 
 not how to save as he gets, 'keep his nose all his life to the 
 grindstone, and die not worth a groat at last. A fat kitchen 
 makes a lean will ;' and, 
 
 " ' Many estates are spent in the getting, 
 
 Since women for tea forsook spinning and knitting, 
 And men for punch forsook hewing and splitting/ 
 
 If you would be wealthy, think of saving as well as of getting. 
 The Indies have not made Spain rich, because her out- goes are 
 greater than her in-comes/ " 
 
 " This doctrine, my friends, is reason and wisdom ; but, after 
 all, do not depend too much upon your own industry, and fru- 
 gality, and prudence, though excellent things ; for they may all 
 be blasted without the blessing of Heaven; and, therefore, ask 
 that blessing humbly, and be not uncharitable to those that at 
 present seem to want it, but comfort and help them. Remember, 
 Job suffered, and was afterwards prosperous. 
 
 " And now to conclude, * Experience keeps a dear school, but 
 fools will learn in no other,' as poor Richard says, and scarce in 
 that ; for it is true, ' We may give advice, but we cannot give 
 conduct/ However, remember this, ' They that will not be 
 counselled, cannot be helped;' and further, that, c If you will 
 not hear reason, she will surely rap your knuckles/ as poor 
 Uichard says." 
 
184 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 
 
 Written documents give rise to a vast deal of argu- 
 mentation. Different meanings are attached to letters, to 
 agreements, to wills, and to many other writings. To decide 
 the questions which are thus raised, we must have recourse 
 to reasoning. Sometimes the authenticity of the document 
 is denied. We have then to prove that it was written by 
 the author whose name it bears ; and in the case of wills, 
 we have also to prove that the party was of sound mind 
 when he affixed his signature. At other times, the dispute 
 has reference to the meaning of the document. Here we 
 have to show what was the meaning intended by the author. 
 Wlien there is no doubt about either the authenticity or 
 the meaning, the questions raised will have a reference to 
 the character of those cases to which the terms of the 
 document may be applied. For example, the written law 
 prohibits murder. If, then, one man kills another in a 
 duel, is that murder, or only manslaughter? The law 
 prohibits swindling. If, then, a man borrows money, know- 
 ing that he cannot repay it, is that swindling, or is it an 
 ordinary debt 1 
 
 The trials that take place in our civil and criminal 
 courts, with a view to ascertain the facts of the case, are not 
 reasonings from written documents. The object is merely 
 to prove the facts. The evidence received is either direct 
 or indirect. Direct evidence is the testimony of witnesses, 
 and here reasoning is employed only in regard to the cha- 
 racter and credibility of the witnesses. The other kind of 
 evidence is indirect, or, as it is called, circumstantial. We 
 have explained this kind of evidence in the Section on 
 Conditional Causes, at page 95. When points of law are 
 reserved for the opinions of the judges, or cases are argued 
 in banco, the reasonings have a reference to written 
 documents — that is, to the meaning and application of 
 the laws. 
 
 I. — The Statute Law. 
 
 All our statute laws are written documents. They are 
 enacted by the three estates of the realm, — King, Lords, 
 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 185 
 
 and Commons. But the laws sometimes require to be 
 explained. The duty of explaining the laws devolves on 
 the judges. But the judges explain only those portions 
 respecting which there is any doubt : and these portions 
 are pointed out to them by the disputes that arise between 
 the citizens. These disputes refer to various points. Some- 
 times two laws appear to contradict one another. In this 
 case the judges will fix upon the meaning that is supposed 
 to be most in accordance with the intentions of the legis- 
 lature ; for the judges always pay the legislature the com- 
 pliment to suppose that it did not intend to enact contra- 
 dictory laws. In these cases, the principle of reasoning is, 
 as we have already seen, from final cause and effect. 
 Sometimes the question is, whether a certain action, or a 
 certain class of actions, is included within certain phrase- 
 ology : here the reasoning is between genus and species. 
 Often the question is, whether laws passed in former times 
 do apply to modern inventions or practices : here the rea- 
 soning is often by analogy. 
 
 This mode of reasoning from written documents, so far 
 as it refers to the laws of our country, will, perhaps, be 
 best explained by a practical illustration. And for this 
 purpose we shall notice the legal decisions that have taken 
 place with reference to joint-stock banking. 
 
 At the renewal of the Bank of England Charter, in the 
 year 1708, a clause was introduced which prohibited any 
 other company, consisting of more than six persons, "to 
 borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of money on 
 their bills or notes, payable on demand, or at a less time 
 than six months from the borrowing thereof." 
 
 This clause, intended" to prohibit the issue of notes, 
 was supposed to prevent the formation of any banks con- 
 sisting of more than six persons, even should they not 
 issue notes. 
 
 But in the year 1833, when the Bank Charter was 
 about to be again renewed, a doubt arose as to whether 
 this was the meaning of the law. The Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, Lord Althorp, required the opinion of the 
 Attorney and the Solicitor-General, who stated that the law 
 did not prohibit the formation of banks having more than 
 six partners, provided they did not issue notes. Two other 
 
186 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 counsel of equal eminence gave their opinion the other 
 way. To remove all doubts, a clause was ultimately intro- 
 duced, which " declared and enacted," that such companies 
 might be formed. Here was an instance of the uncertainty 
 of the law being removed, not by an appeal to the judges, 
 but by a declaratory enactment. 
 
 The law having thus sanctioned the establishment of 
 joint-stock banks in London, a joint-stock bank was 
 formed, and, like other banks in London, accepted bills of 
 exchange drawn by its country connexions. But the Bank 
 of England alleged that this was a violation of the above 
 prohibition against "borrowing, owing, or taking up 
 money," &c. Here the reasoning was on the relation 
 of genus and species. The words prohibited a certain 
 class of actions, and the question was, whether accepting 
 bills, as well as issuing notes, was included in the pro- 
 hibited class. The law decided that it was ; and an 
 injunction was obtained in 1837, prohibiting the accept- 
 ance of all bills drawn at less than six months after date. 
 In the year 1844, an Act of Parliament granted to such 
 banks the same privileges as are exercised by private 
 bankers. 
 
 The lawyers have always maintained that a strict 
 analogy exists between private partnerships and public 
 companies. The only difference, they contend, is- in the 
 number of the partners. And hence the laws passed 
 originally with reference to small partnerships they think 
 ought to be applied to large partnerships. From this 
 cause has arisen much litigation, and many appeals to the 
 Government to amend the laws. In the following cases, 
 the appeals have been successful. 
 
 The law requires that the names of all the partners in a 
 firm that is either plaintiff or defendant in a suit, should be 
 placed on the record. When joint-stock banks were first 
 allowed in England, in 1826, beyond sixty-five miles from 
 London they were allowed to sue or be sued in the name of 
 one or two partners, who were registered for that purpose at 
 the Stamp Office. But this privilege was not granted to the 
 banks formed in London. Hence, previous to 1844, those 
 banks were compelled to make a special agreement with 
 every customer, whereby he held himself answerable per- 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 187 
 
 sonally to the trustees for any sum he might become 
 indebted to the bank. 
 
 It is against the law for any clergyman to be a trader. 
 Several clergymen became shareholders in joint-stock 
 banks. It was contended, and successfully, that the 
 clergyman having become a partner in a trading com- 
 pany, was a trader. The company was therefore illegal, 
 and consequently could neither sue nor be sued in a court 
 of law. An act of parliament was obtained to remedy 
 this defect. 
 
 The Northern and Central Bank at Manchester had 
 occasion to sue for debt some of its own shareholders. 
 No private partnership can sue a member of its own firm. 
 It was held that the same rule held in regard to joint- 
 stock banks. The action was lost. But the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer, Mr. Spring Rice, (now Lord Monteagle,) 
 brought in an act of parliament to meet the case. 
 
 The manager of a joint-stock bank at Walsal was tried 
 for robbing the bank of about 7,000£. At the trial it 
 was shown that he was a partner in the company. His 
 advocate contended that he was a joint owner of the pro- 
 perty, and therefore could not be guilty of robbery. The 
 judge took the same view, and he was acquitted. This 
 evil, too, was amended by a new act of parliament. 
 
 Lord Denman brought in an act for allowing share- 
 holders in joint-stock banks, and other parties in similar 
 circumstances, to be examined as witnesses. (6 & 7 Vic. 
 c. 86.) It was enacted, that " no person should be ex- 
 cluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from 
 giving evidence" in a court of law. But the act contained 
 a proviso that excluded the plaintiff himself. An action 
 was brought by a public company, and one of the wit- 
 nesses was a shareholder in the company. The question 
 was raised, whether he could be legally examined as a 
 witness. The Court of Exchequer^ decided that he could 
 not. Thus a shareholder in a public company was consi- 
 dered to be the same as a partner in a private firm. So 
 far, therefore, as concerns the shareholders in joint-stock 
 banks, this proviso annihilated the act. 
 
 By the Act to Amend the Law of Evidence (14 & 15 
 Vic. c. 99), passed in the Session of 1851, the proviso in 
 
188 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Lord Denman's Act is repealed, and the shareholders in 
 joint-stock banks, and in all other public companies, may 
 be examined as witnesses even in cases where those compa- 
 nies may be either plaintiffs or defendants. 
 
 II. — The Ecclesiastical Law. 
 
 In ecclesiastical, as well as in civil law, we have to 
 *eason from written documents. 
 
 " The ecclesiastical laws have been, for the most part, derived 
 from the authority exercised by the Roman Pontiff, in the dif- 
 ferent states and kingdoms of Europe. The decrees and canons 
 of the Church are said to have been adopted in England as early 
 as the seventh century; but the system of laws at present in 
 force depends upon the decretals and constitutions compiled and 
 promulgated under the influence of successive popes at various 
 periods. In England, the authority of the canon law has been at 
 all times much restricted, being considered, in many points, 
 repugnant to the law of the land, or incompatible with the juris- 
 diction of the courts of common law. So much of it as has been 
 received, has been gradually accommodated by our lawyers to the 
 habits and customs of the country; and the ecclesiastical laws 
 may now be described, in the language of our statutes, ' laws 
 which the people have taken at their free liberty by their own 
 consent, to be used among them, and not as the laws of any 
 foreign prince, potentate, or prelate.' " — M'Calloch's Statistical 
 Account of the British Empire. 
 
 With reference to the questions that may arise in the 
 ecclesiastical courts, that call for the exercise of reasoning, 
 in regard to written documents, we cannot adduce a better 
 illustration than by referring to the case that has recently 
 excited so much interest, between the Bishop of Exeter and 
 the Rev. Mr. Gorham. Our quotations are taken from the 
 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as 
 reported in the Times of the 9th March, 1850. We take, 
 however, such portions only as will serve to exemplify the 
 method of interpretation with regard to ecclesiastical law :«— 
 
 " Gokhah v. the Bishop or Exeter. — The judgment in this 
 important appeal, which has been looked forward to with so 
 much interest by the public, was pronounced at two o'clock 
 yesterday by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. The 
 members of the committee present were, the Marquis of Lans- 
 downe, Lord Campbell, Lord Brougham, Lord Langdale, Dr, 
 Lushington, Mr. Pemberton Leigh, and Sir Edward Ryan." 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 189 
 
 " Lord Langdale read the printed judgment of the committee, 
 which was as follows : — 
 
 "This is an appeal by the Rev. George Cornelius Gorham 
 against the sentence of the Dean of the Arches Court of Canter- 
 bury, in a proceeding termed a duplex querela, in which the 
 Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Exeter, at the instance of Mr. 
 Gorham, was called upon to show cause why he had refused to 
 institute Mr. Gorham to the vicarage of Brampford Speke. 
 
 " The judge pronounced that the bishop had shown sufficient 
 cause for his refusal, and thereupon dismissed him from all 
 further observance of justice in the premises ; and, moreover, 
 condemned Mr. Gorham in costs. 
 
 "From this sentence Mr. Gorham appealed to Her Majesty in 
 Council. The case was referred by Her Majesty to this com- 
 mittee. It has been fully heard before us ; and, by the direction 
 of Her Majesty, the hearing was attended by my Lords the 
 Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and the Bishop of London, 
 who are members of Her Majesty's Privy Council. We have 
 satisfaction in being authorized to state, that the Most Rev. 
 Prelates the Archbishops of Canterbury and of York, after having 
 perused copies of this judgment, have expressed their approba- 
 tion thereof. The Bishop of London does not concur. 
 
 "The facts, so far as it is necessary to state them, are as 
 follow : — 
 
 "Mr. Gorham, being vicar of St. Just-in-Penwith, in the 
 diocese of Exeter, on the 2d of November, 1847, was presented 
 by Her Majesty to the vicarage of Brampford Speke, in the 
 same diocese, and soon after applied to the Lord Bishop of 
 Exeter for admission and institution to the vicarage. 
 
 "The bishop, on the 13th of November, caused Mr. Gorham 
 to be informed that his Lordship felt it his duty to ascertain, by 
 examination, whether Mr. Gorham was sound in doctrine, before 
 he should be instituted to the vicarage of Brampford Speke. 
 
 "The examination commenced on the 17th of December, and 
 was continued at very great length for five days in the same- 
 month of December, and (after some suspension) for three more 
 days in the following month of March. 
 
 " The questions proposed by the bishop related principally to 
 the sacrament of baptism, and were very numerous, much varied 
 in form, embracing many points of difficulty, and often referring 
 to the answers given to previous questions." 
 
 "Mr. Gorham, being refused institution, commenced pro- 
 ceedings in the Arches Court of Canterbury ; and at his promo- 
 tion, a monition with intimation issued on the 15th June, 1848, 
 and thereby the bishop was monished to admit Mr. Gorham to 
 the vicarage, and to institute and invest him therein, or otherwise 
 to appear to show cause why Mr. Gorham should not be admitted 
 
190 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 and instituted by the official Principal of the Arches Court of 
 Canterbury." 
 
 " Adopting this course, the doctrine held by Mr. Gorham 
 appears to us to be this — that baptism is a sacrament generally 
 necessary to salvation, but that the grace of regeneration does 
 not so necessarily accompany the act of baptism that regene- 
 ration invariably takes place in baptism ; that the grace may be 
 granted before, in, or after baptism ; that baptism is an effectual 
 sign of grace, by which God works invisibly in us, but only in 
 such as worthily receive it, — in them alone it has a wholesome 
 effect; and that, without reference to the qualification of the 
 recipient, it is not in itself an effectual sign of grace. That 
 infants baptized, and dying before actual sin, are certainly saved ; 
 but that in no case is regeneration in baptism unconditional. 
 
 " These being, as we collect them, the opinions of Mr. Gorham, 
 the question which we have to decide is, not whether they are 
 theologically sound or unsound — not whether, upon some of the 
 doctrines comprised in the opinions, other opinions opposite to them 
 may, or may not be held with equal or even greater reason by other 
 learned and pious ministers of the Church, but whether these 
 opinions now under our consideration are contrary or repugnant 
 to the doctrines which the Church of England, by its articles, 
 formularies, and rubrics, requires to be held by its ministers, so 
 that upon the ground of those opinions the appellant can lawfully 
 be excluded from the benefice to which he has been presented. 
 
 " This question must be decided by the articles and liturgy, 
 and we must apply to the construction of those boohs the same rules 
 which have long been established, and are by the law applicable to 
 the construction of all written instruments. We must endeavour 
 to attain for ourselves the true meaning of the language employed, 
 assisted only by the consideration of such external or historical 
 facts as we may find necessary to enable us to understand the 
 subject matter to which the instruments relate, and the meaning 
 of the words employed. 
 
 " In our endeavours to ascertain the true meaning and effect of 
 the articles, formularies, and rubrics, we must by no means inten- 
 tionally swerve from the old established rules of construction, or 
 depart from the principles which have received the sanction and 
 approbation of the most learned persons in times past, as being 
 on the whole the best calculated to determine the true meaning of 
 the documents to be examined. If these principles are not adhered 
 to, all the rights, both spiritual and temporal, of Her Majesty s 
 subjects would be endangered. 
 
 " If it were supposed that all points of doctrine were decided 
 by the Church of England, the law could not consider any point 
 as left doubtful. The application of the law, or of the doctrine 
 of the Church of England, to any theological question which 
 
EEASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 191 
 
 arose, must be the subject of decision; and the decision would be 
 governed by the construction of the terms in which the doctrine of 
 the Church is expressed, viz. the construction which, on the whole, 
 would seem most likely to be right. 
 
 " But if the case be, as undoubtedly it is, that in the Church 
 of England, many points of theological doctrine have not been 
 decided, then the first and great question which arises in such 
 cases as the present is, whether the disputed point is or was meant 
 to be settled at all, or whether it is left open for each member of 
 the Church to decide for himself according to his own conscien- 
 tious opinion. If there be any doctrine on which the articles 
 are silent, or ambiguously expressed, so as to be capable of two 
 meanings, we must suppose that it was intended to leave that doc- 
 trine to private judgment, unless the rubrics and formularies clearly 
 and distinctly decide it. If they do, we must conclude that the 
 doctrine so decided is the doctrine of the Church. But, on the 
 other hand, if the expressions used in the rubrics and formularies 
 are ambiguous, it is not to be concluded that the Church meant 
 to establish indirectly as a doctrine that which it did not establish 
 directly as such by the articles of faith — the code avowedly made 
 for the avoiding of diversities of opinion, and for the establishing 
 of consent touching true religion. 
 
 " We must proceed, therefore, with the freedom which the ad- 
 ministration of the law requires, to examine the Articles and the 
 Prayer-book, for the purpose of discovering what it is, if any- 
 thing, which, by the law of England, or the doctrine of the Church 
 of England as by law established, is declared as to the matter now 
 in question ; and to ascertain whether the doctrine held by Mr. 
 Gorham, as we understand it to be disclosed in his examination, is 
 directly contrary or repugnant to the doctrine of the Church." 
 
 " On a consideration of the articles, it appears that, besides this 
 particular point, there are others which are left undecided. It is 
 not particularly declared what is the distinct meaning and effect 
 of the grace of regeneration, — whether it is a change of nature, 
 a change of condition, or a change of the relation subsisting be- 
 tween sinful man and his Creator; and there are other points 
 which may very plainly be open to different considerations in dif- 
 ferent cases. 
 
 " Upon the points which were left open, differences of opinion 
 could not be avoided, even amongst those who sincerely subscribed 
 to the articles ; and that such differences amongst such persons 
 were thought consistent with subscription to the articles, and 
 were not contemplated with disapprobation, appears from a pas- 
 sage in the Royal Declaration, now prefixed to the articles, and 
 which was first added in the reign of King Charles I., long after 
 the articles were finally settled : — ' Though some differences have 
 been ill-raised, yet we take comfort in this, that all clergymen 
 
192 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 within our realm have always most willingly subscribed to the 
 articles established ; which is an argument to us that they all 
 agree in the true usual literal meaning of the said articles, and 
 that even in those curious points in which the present differences 
 lie, men of all sorts take the articles of the Church of England to be 
 for them, which is an argument, again, that none of them intend 
 any desertion of the articles established.' 
 
 " If the articles which constitute the code of faith, and from 
 which any differences are prohibited, nevertheless contain expres- 
 sions which unavoidably admit of different constructions, — and mem- 
 bers of the Church are left at liberty to draw from the articles 
 different inferences in matters of faith not expressly decided, and 
 upon such points to exercise their private judgments, — we may 
 reasonably expect to find such differences of opinion allowable in the 
 interpretation of the devotional services, which were framed, not 
 for the purpose of determining points of faith, but of establish- 
 ing (to use the expression of the statute of Elizabeth) an uniform 
 order of common prayer, and of the administration of sacraments, 
 rites, and ceremonies of the Church of England." * * 
 
 "We express no opinion upon the theological accuracy of 
 these opinions, or any of them. The writers whom we have cited 
 are not always consistent with themselves, and other writers of 
 great eminence, and worthy of great respect, have held and pub- 
 lished very different opinions. 33ut the mere fact that such opinions 
 have been propounded, and maintained by persons so eminent, and 
 so much respected, as well as by very many others, appears to us 
 sufficiently to prove that the liberty which was left by the articles 
 and formularies, has been actually enjoyed and exercised by the 
 members and ministers of the Church of England. 
 
 " The case not requiring it, we have abstained from expressing 
 any opinion of our own upon the theological correctness or error 
 of the doctrine of Mr. Gorham, which was discussed before us at 
 such great length and with so much learning. His Honour the 
 Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce dissents from the opinion we have 
 formed, but all the other members of the Judicial Committee who 
 were present, are unanimously agreed in opinion — that the doc- 
 trine held by Mr. Gorham is not contrary or repugnant to the de- 
 clared doctrine of the Church of England as by law established ; 
 and that Mr. Gorham ought not by reason of the doctrine held 
 by him, to have been refused admission to the vicarage of Bramp- 
 ford Speke. 
 
 " And we shall, therefore, humbly report to Her Majesty that 
 the sentence pronounced by the learned Judge in the Arches 
 Court of Canterbury ought to be reversed ; and that it ought to 
 be declared that the Lord Bishop of Exeter has not shown suffi- 
 cient cause why he did not institute Mr. Gorham to the said 
 vicarage." 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, 193 
 
 III. — The Sacred Scriptures. 
 
 The doctrines and precepts of our holy religion are also 
 contained in written documents. On this subject a few 
 quotations from theologians of high reputation will pro- 
 bably be more acceptable to the reader than any language 
 of my own : — 
 
 I. A Summary of the principal Evidences for the 
 Truth and Divine Origin of the Christian Revelation. 
 By Bishop Porteus. 
 
 " 1. From considering the state of the heathen world, 
 before the appearance of our Lord upon earth, it is evident 
 that there was an absolute necessity for a revelation of 
 God's will, and, of course, a great probability beforehand, 
 that such a revelation would be granted. 
 
 " 2. At the very time when there was a general expec- 
 tation in the world of some extraordinary personage mak- 
 ing his appearance in it, a person called Jesus Christ did. 
 actually appear upon earth, asserting that he was the Son 
 of God, and that he was sent from heaven to teach mankind 
 true religion ; and he did accordingly found a religion, 
 whicli from him was called the Christian Religion, and 
 which has been professed by great numbers of people from 
 that time to the present. 
 
 " 3. The books of the New Testament were written by 
 those persons to whom they are ascribed, and contain a 
 faithful history of Christ and his religion ; and the account 
 there given of both, may be securely relied upon as strictly 
 true. 
 
 " 4. The Scriptures of the Old Testament (which are 
 connected with those of the New) are the genuine writings 
 of those whose names they bear ; and give a true account 
 of the Mosaic dispensation, of the historical facts, the 
 divine commands, the moral precepts, and the prophecies 
 which they contain. 
 
 " 5. The character of Christ, as represented in the Gos- 
 pels, affords, very strong ground for believing that he was a 
 divine persom 
 
 " 6. The sublimity of his doctrines, and the purity of! 
 his moral precepts, confirm this belief. 
 
194 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " 7. The rapid and successful propagation of the Gospel 
 by the first teachers of it, through a large part of the world, 
 is a proof that they were favoured with divine assistance 
 and support. 
 
 " 8. A comparison betwixt Christ and Mahomet, and 
 their respective religions, leads us to conclude, that as 
 the religion of the latter was confessedly the invention of 
 man, that of the former was derived from God. 
 
 " 9. The predictions delivered by the ancient prophets, 
 and fulfilled in our Saviour, show that he was the Messiah 
 expected by the Jews, and that he came into the world by 
 divine appointment, to be the great Deliverer and Re- 
 deemer of mankind. 
 
 " 10. The prophecies delivered by our Saviour himself, 
 j>rove that he was endued with the foreknowledge of future 
 events, which belongs only to God, and to those inspired 
 by him. 
 
 "11. The miracles performed by our Lord demonstrate 
 him to have possessed divine power. 
 
 " 12. The resurrection of our Lord from the "dead, is 
 a fact fully proved by the clearest evidence, and is the seal 
 and confirmation of his divinity, and of the truth of his 
 divinity." 
 
 II. Internal Evidences op the Divine Inspiration op 
 the Scriptures. By Dr. Baffles. 
 
 " The Christian Religion assumes that the Bible is the 
 word of God, that the books of the Old and New Testa- 
 ment are Divinely inspired, and that, being so, they con- 
 tain a revelation of his will. Now, the proof of this 
 proposition is of two kinds ; the first embracing those 
 evidences which are external, arising from prophecy, from 
 miracles, from the testimony of ancient heathen writers, 
 and the like ; the second embracing those which are in- 
 ternal, and which are furnished by the character and the 
 discoveries of the book itself, the principles and spirit by 
 which it is pervaded, and the influence which it exerts upon 
 the condition and conduct of mankind. It is to this latter 
 kind of evidence that your attention is to be directed this 
 evening. And I may be permitted to observe, that while 
 the external evidences of Divine Revelation have been most 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 195 
 
 frequently adduced and illustrated, I cannot but regard 
 the internal evidences, after all, as most satisfactory and 
 conclusive. 
 
 " I now proceed to enumerate the principal articles of 
 internal evidence of the Divine inspiration and authority 
 of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. 
 
 " The first I would specify is, The noble and rational 
 theology of the Old Testament, compared with the low state 
 of literature and philosophy amongst the Jews. In the 
 second place, I would specify, as another article of internal 
 evidence. The moral precepts, especially of the New Tes- 
 tament. Thirdly, the Bible supplies the purest, noblest, 
 and most powerful motives to holiness and virtue — motives 
 indeed which deists reject, though they cannot but admire 
 the effects they uniformly produce in the character and 
 conduct of such as live habitually beneath their influence. 
 I proceed to specify, fourthly, The spirit breathed through- 
 out the Holy Scriptures. It is such as highly becomes 
 what they profess to be — a revelation from God. In the 
 fifth place, I would mention the candour and impartiality 
 of the writers of the New Testament. In the sixth place, 
 There is in the Bible, and especially in the discourses of 
 our Lord, an originality of manner which one would 
 imagine could not fail to strike even the most careless and 
 inattentive reader. In the seventh place, An argument 
 of great importance is derived from the perfect conformity 
 of the facts and occurrences mentioned or alluded to by 
 the sacred writers, and especially of the New Testament, 
 with the accounts preserved in history, and other authen- 
 tic records altogether foreign and independent. But a 
 still more powerful argument, in the eighth place, in 
 favour of the inspiration of the sacred Scriptures, arises 
 from the perfect, and, on their part, obviously undesigned, 
 coincidences between the sacred writers themselves. We 
 now proceed, in the ninth place, to mention as another 
 article of internal evidence, The positive institutions ob- 
 served both by Jews and Christians. That there are 
 such institutions observed to the present hour, is a thing 
 sufficiently notorious. As, for instance, the Passover, the 
 Feast of Tabernacles, and Circumcision, amongst the Jews ; 
 and Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the Ministry of the 
 k 2 
 
196 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION". 
 
 Gospel amongst Christians." In the tenth place, the most 
 inveterate opponents of Christianity cannot bnt admire 
 its effects on the character and conduct of those who feel 
 the strong influence of its motives, and act under the 
 guidance of its principles. Finally ; we may specify, as 
 the last article of internal evidence of the Divine inspira- 
 tion of the Scriptures, Their influence on the general 
 condition of society. Never did a nation become worse 
 for its reception of the Gospel. On the contrary, wherever 
 it has been introduced, in proportion to the cordiality 
 with which it has been welcomed, have been its salutary 
 and beneficial consequences in the moral and social condi- 
 tion of that people." 
 
 " And now, on a review of the argument, at what con- 
 clusion are you prepared — are you compelled — in all 
 honesty and fairness, to arrive 1 There is the book ; there 
 is the system. Whence is it — from earth or heaven] 
 What is its origin— human or divine 1 Human it cannot 
 be ; for, if it were, it would be a fable and a forgery — a 
 fable and a forgery too cunningly devised for human skill, 
 and in the principles and spirit with which, it is pervaded, 
 too pure and holy for so base a purpose, or so gross an 
 origin. Human ingenuity could not produce it ; human 
 depravity would not if it could. Then, if it be not human, 
 there is no other alternative — 4t must be Divine ! " — Lec- 
 ture to Young Men. 
 
 III. Bible Landmarks. By the Rev. R. Bickersteth, 
 A.M. 
 
 " The apocrypha is not inspired. I gave, in the discourse of 
 this morning, my reasons for saying so ; its writers do not claim 
 inspiration ; the Jews never considered it to be inspired ; there is 
 not a single quotation from the apocrypha in either the Old or 
 New Testament ; it contains statements that are false and con- 
 tradictory ; (for example, the Book of Wisdom pretends to have 
 been written by Solomon, and yet the writer, whoever he may 
 have been, quotes many passages from Isaiah and Jeremiah, who 
 did not prophecy till many ages after the time of Solomon. It 
 also represents the Israelites as under subjection to their enemies, 
 w-hereas, during the reign of Solomon, they enjoyed the utmost 
 freedom and prosperity.) Besides all this, the apocryphal books 
 sanction doctrines that are false, and practices that are immoral. 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 197 
 
 • Alms,' we are therein told, c make an atonement for sin.' And 
 from the books of the apocrypha it is easy to defend falsehood, 
 suicide, murder, and the practice of magic. We shrink from the 
 admission of books like these into a position of co-ordinate autho- 
 rity with the word of God, and we cannot forbear repeating, that 
 while the Church of England does permit the occasional use of 
 certain portions of the apocrypha in the course of her public 
 services, she has most carefully guarded, by her sixth Article, 
 against the supposition that the apocryphal writings are to rank 
 with inspired compositions, or to be ever made the source of 
 appeal to establish any point of doctrine. 
 
 "With reference to the use of tradition, I have shown you, 
 from various quotations of Scripture, the light in which tradition 
 is placed by God's word; our Saviour mentioned it, never to 
 approve, but invariably to rebuke its authority. Inspired apostles 
 equally disown it. ' Forasmuch,' writes St. Peter, ' as ye know 
 that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and 
 gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your 
 fathers.' Tradition is therefore condemned by Scripture. Its 
 tendency is invariably represented to be to the subversion of 
 truth, the fostering of error, and the perversion of the command- 
 ments of God. I look upon the Romish use of tradition, there- 
 fore, first, as wholly unnecessary ; the written word is by itself 
 perfect and all-sufficient. 1 look upon it, secondly, as forbidden 
 by the teaching of our Lord and his apostles. And I look upon 
 it, thirdly, as the prop to error, and the bane of godliness." — 
 Bickerstettis Bible Landmarks. 
 
 IV. — Different Degrees of Assent. By Dr. Watts. 
 
 " There are many things even in religion, as well as in 
 philosophy and civil life, which we believe with very 
 different degrees of assent ; and this is, or should be, always 
 regulated according to the different degrees of evidence 
 which we enjoy: and, perhaps, there are a thousand grada- 
 tions in our assent to the things we believe, because there 
 are thousands of circumstances relating to different ques- 
 tions, which increase or diminish the evidence we have 
 concerning them, and that in matters both of reason and 
 revelation. 
 
 " I believe there is a God, and that obedience is due to him 
 from every reasonable creature : this I am most fully assured of, 
 because I have the strongest evidence, since it is the plain dictate 
 both of reason and revelation. 
 
 " Again, I believe there is a future resurrection of the dead, 
 
198 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 because Scripture tells us so in the plainest terms, though reason 
 says nothing of it. I believe also that the same matter of our 
 bodies which died (in part at least) shall arise ; but I am not so 
 fully assured of this circumstance, because the revelation of it is 
 not quite so clear and express. Yet further I believe that the 
 good men who were acquainted here on earth, shall know each 
 other in heaven ; but my persuasion of it is not absolutely cer- 
 tain, because my assent to it arises only from circumstantial 
 reasoning of men upon what God has told us, and therefore my 
 evidences are not strong beyond a possibility of mistake." 
 
 "What is said before concerning truth or doctrines maybe 
 also affirmed concerning duties ; the reason of both is the same ; 
 as the one are truths for our speculation, the others are truths for 
 our practice. Duties which are expressly required in the plain 
 language of Scripture, or dictated by the most evident reasoning 
 upon first principles, ought to bind our consciences more than 
 those which are but dubiously inferred, and that only from occa- 
 sional occurrences, incidents, and circumstances : as, for instance, 
 I am certain that I ought to pray to God; my conscience is 
 bound to this, because there are most evident commands for it to 
 be found in Scripture, as well as to be derived from reason. I 
 believe also that I may pray to God either by a written form, or 
 without one, because neither reason nor revelation expressly 
 requires either of these modes of prayer at all times, or forbids 
 the other. I cannot, therefore, bind my conscience to practise 
 the one so as utterly to renounce the other; but I would practise 
 either of them as my reason and other circumstances direct met" 
 — Wang's Improvement of the Mind. 
 
 V. — Literary Characteristics op the Bible. By Dr. 
 McCulloch. 
 
 " An ordinary writer who had a new theory of doctrine and 
 duty to propound, would probably throw his materials into a sys- 
 tematic form. But the Bible, instead of being a compact and 
 orderly treatise, consists of a series of independent works, charac- 
 terised by the utmost diversity of structure. Instead of presenting 
 the principles of our religion in the form of a system, it sets them 
 before us in a miscellaneous and incidental manner — scattering 
 them here and there, from one end to another of a collection of 
 historical, devotional, prophetic, and epistolary compositions. In 
 a systematic work, you can refer to the very section where infor- 
 mation as to any given doctrine may be found. You cannot do 
 this with the Scriptures. The given doctrine may be detailed 
 more at large in one book or in one chapter than in another : but 
 the whole truth concerning it is not to be found in any single 
 chapter or even in any single book : it is to be discovered only by 
 'searching' the Scriptures, by comparing Scripture with Scrip- 
 
REASONING FROM WRITTEN DOCUMENTS. 199 
 
 ture, and thus supplementing the partial information of one portion 
 by the fuller information of another. Nay, not only so; but 'the 
 truth,' even where most fully revealed, is generally stated in an 
 indirect and incidental form. I know not that a single instance 
 can be produced of a doctrine announced in the shape of an 
 abstract proposition. The articles of our faith are all exhibited ; 
 but they are not propounded in their naked form, as in human 
 creeds and confessions : — they are never introduced but in con- 
 nexion with something of a practical nature. If we are taught, 
 for example, the doctrine of the Trinity, we are taught it not in 
 express terms, but indirectly, as in Christ's commission to the 
 apostles. If we are taught the doctrine of the atonement, we 
 are taught it — not abstractly as a mere article of faith, but prac- 
 tically as an illustration of the Divine love, or as a proof of the 
 malignity of sin, or as an incentive to gratitude and holiness. In 
 short, the Christian doctrines are revealed — not in an insulated 
 form, but obliquely and incidentally — here in a ftarrative of facts, 
 there in the course of an argument — here as things to be pre- 
 supposed, there as things to be inferred, — now in plain and literal 
 terms, now under the veil of metaphor and allegory. So that, in 
 order to ascertain the real amount of the system of theology and 
 morals which the Bible reveals, it is necessary to explore the 
 whole sacred territory — to compare book with book and passage 
 with passage —to collect from each its peculiar contribution — and 
 to collate the whole into one systematic body." 
 
 " The Bible, observe, is not one book, but a collection of sixty- 
 six different books. It is the production, not of one writer, but of 
 thirty-six different writers — men of every diversity of rank, talent, 
 and mental culture — from the monarch to the gatherer of syca- 
 more fruit, from the accomplished pupil of Gamaliel to the un- 
 lettered fisherman of Galilee. It is a work, moreover, not of one 
 age, but of many and distant ages. The opening books date six 
 hundred years earlier than any other literary composition extant, 
 while the closing book is a production of the age of the Caesars ; 
 the whole is the connected literature of a period not short of 
 fifteen centuries. Then how various are the books in kind. Some 
 are histories ; some, biographies ; some, poems ; some, digests of 
 public law ; some, collections of national proverbs ; some, epistles 
 to churches ; some, private letters to friends. Nor are their 
 subjects less diversified than the dates and the authors. Instead 
 of discussing only one or two points, they discuss a thousand — 
 and these the most profound and perplexing within the whole 
 range of human inquiry, the most unfavourable to unity of senti- 
 ment, the most vexed by controversy and debate. 
 
 " Now certainly it could never have been expected beforehand, 
 on any ordinary grounds of probability, that a series of works, 
 open to so many sources of diversity, should exhibit such a thing 
 
200 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 as uniformity of sentiment, or congruity of design. The analogy of 
 all other instances in the history of literature, would have led us 
 to anticipate the utmost diversity of doctrine, no less than of 
 style and execution. Anything like a systematic unity of thought 
 and purpose would have been pronounced impossible. Neverthe- 
 less, the perfect doctrinal agreement of the sacred books is one 
 of their most indisputable properties. The Scripture authors, 
 though living in ages very distant from each other, and writing 
 under circumstances as dissimilar as can well be imagined, are not 
 only entirely at one on all the subjects which they touch, but un- 
 designedly contribute, each his contingent, towards the comple- 
 tion of a magnificent Unity." — McCullocKs Literary Character- 
 istics of the Holy Scriptures. 
 
 VI. Rules op Interpretation. By Robert Robinson. 
 
 " Every author proposes some end in writing ; this end 
 must needs agree with his general character, peculiar 
 circumstances, &c. To observe this design is no small 
 help, towards understanding the biblical writers. On the 
 contrary, to consider the whole Bible as we consider the 
 book of Proverbs, and to ground enormous doctrines on 
 detached sentences, are gross absurdities, manifest abuses 
 of the word of God." 
 
 " ' Consult good sense,' adds 'Mr. Claude. Very proper 
 advice, for good natural sense will go far in understanding 
 plain primitive Christianity : and, indeed, will often take 
 a hint from the most common incident on any subject. A 
 friend of mine, disgusted with the common representation 
 of the devil carrying our Saviour in his claws, as a bird of 
 prey carries a dove through the air, and setting him on a 
 pinnacle of the temple, tried Mr. Claude's experiment. 
 He set a sensible little boy to read the fourth of Matthew, 
 and after he had read the fifth verse, 'The devil taketh 
 him up into the holy city, and setteth him on a pinnacle 
 of the temple,' he asked the little gentleman, ' How do 
 you think the devil took Jesus Christ, and set him on 
 a pinnacle of the temple 1 ' { Why, sir,' replied the little 
 expositor, ' as you would take me up to the top of St. 
 Paul's.' 1 ' — Robinsons Notes to Claude. 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 201 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ERRORS IN REASONING. 
 
 "The art of false reasoning is of great antiquity. It is 
 nearly as old as the creation. We learn from the Bible, 
 that it was first discovered and successfully made use of 
 by the Angel of Deceit, when, in the apparent light of 
 reason, he availed himself of the serpent's ingenuity to 
 seduce our first parents from their state of happiness to his 
 own state of misery — from a state of peaceful enjoyment, 
 the natural consequence of obedience to their Creator, to 
 a state of misery, the never-failing result of disobedience. 
 This art is very simple in itself, and may easily be acquired 
 by any one who possesses an ordinary share of the actor's 
 talent, and is endowed with a persuasive tongue and an 
 unscrupulous conscience. 
 
 " The process, as set forth in the third chapter of the 
 first book in the Bible, is very short and simple. A doubt 
 as to the truth of God's word is first ingeniously suggested 
 — ' Yea, hath God said, Ye shall surely not eat of every 
 tree of the garden 1 ' Then the truth of that word is 
 positively denied — * Ye shall not surely die.' And, lastly, 
 the expediency of acting in opposition to the command 
 of God is adroitly introduced into the argument of the 
 arch-deceiver, namely, the beauty of the fruit, and its 
 virtue to make wise those that partake of it — ' God doth 
 know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall 
 be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.' 
 
 " This kind of reasoning seldom fails to succeed with 
 persons who are themselves unconscious of deceit, if they 
 once begin to palter with the truth, — if error be allowed 
 to insinuate the first doubt of the truthfulness of God's 
 word. But to perfect the delusion, the plea in a false 
 argument should not be altogether false — a little truth 
 should be interwoven with it — truth so stated as to con- 
 stitute a practical lie. In the case just stated, the great 
 deceiver spoke truth when he told the woman that after 
 she had tasted the forbidden fruit her eyes would be 
 opened to discern both good and evil — so it proved : 
 k 3 
 
202 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 hitherto Adam and herself had known only good ; now, 
 to their sorrow, they knew what evil was also. 
 
 " But in these latter days, the art of false reasoning has 
 been greatly elaborated. The short straightforward pro- 
 cess adopted by the inventor of the science would scarcely 
 answer the purposes to which it is now applied. The mis- 
 chievous result which was then attained in a day, is now 
 often made the work of years, requiring the support of 
 many positive and reiterated denials of the truth for its 
 completion. Sometimes we see one error established, and 
 the supposed impossibility of uprooting it made the rea- 
 son for engrafting upon it many others. At other times 
 a dexterous transposition of the right order of things — 
 inverting the order of cause and effect, or, in other words, 
 'putting the cart before the horse' — proves a very suc- 
 cessful method of thwarting the truth, and of preparing 
 the way for the establishment of false conclusions. But 
 when the truth to be opposed is so self-evidently true as to 
 baffle every attempt to find a plausible argument against 
 it, the advocate of error may even then possibly succeed 
 by availing himself of the power of ridicule — the power 
 of which is oftentimes the greater in its effect upon shal- 
 low-minded men, in proportion as the truth which it assails 
 is grave and important. This may occasionally be seen 
 when the sacred truths of Scripture are made the subject 
 of profane jokes. Ridicule may, however, be used with 
 great effect in support of the truth as well as against it, as 
 is evident in the conflict which the prophet Elijah had 
 with the prophets of Baal. It is a powerful weapon for 
 good or evil, just as the object to which it is made sub- 
 servient is true or false. 
 
 "We may safely assume that no wise man, however 
 clever he may be, will ever think of studying the art of 
 false reasoning with the intention of practising it ; but 
 although no wise man would wish to make use of this 
 delusive art himself, he may find it very useful to be so 
 far acquainted with it, as to enable him to see through the 
 ingenuity of those who are disposed to use it, and thus 
 to avail himself of the serpent's wisdom to neutralize its 
 sting. To be very skilful in the practice of the science, 
 it requires the professor to possess several qualifications 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 203 
 
 natural and acquired ; but to guard against its mischievous 
 power, the only qualifications which are essentially neces- 
 sary, are a sound judgment and a sincere love of the truth ; 
 and these qualifications are happily within the reach of 
 every honest man, though his sphere may be ever so 
 humble, and his literary acquirements equally small. When 
 it has fallen to the lot of any of these humble disciples of 
 the truth to become its active advocates, they have often 
 accomplished, by a few words judiciously spoken, effects 
 most beneficial to mankind. We are told that the truly 
 great General Washington rarely required so much as ten 
 minutes to give utterance to the remarks which he had to 
 offer to the American Senate, and it may generally be 
 assumed that where a practised speaker requires an hour 
 or two to make a speech on a simple question, and has the 
 power of charming his hearers for that length of time, 
 there is great reason for his audience to be on their guard, 
 lest the brilliancy of the orator should conceal some dupli- 
 city in his argument ; but, wherever this duplicity does 
 exist, the more any one is acquainted with the devices of 
 the false reasoner, the better able he will of course be to 
 detect and expose the cloven foot, which even in these days 
 may sometimes be found under a garment of light." — The 
 Art of false Reasoning exemplified. 
 
 The different kinds of false reasons are called sophisms 
 or fallacies. We shall take our description of these falla- 
 cies chiefly from Dr. Watts, but classified according to our 
 own arrangement of the principles of reasoning. 
 
 False reasons may assume any of the following forms : — 
 
 I. — Fallacies arising from not understanding the ques- 
 tion. (See page 24.) 
 
 1. Proving a different question from that in dispute : — 
 
 "The first sort of sophism is called ignoratio elenchi, 
 or a mistake of the question ; that is, when something 
 else is proved, which has neither any necessary connexion ' 
 or consistency with the thing inquired, and consequently 
 gives no determination to the inquiry, though it may seem 
 at first sight to determine the question : as, if any should 
 conclude that St. Paul was not a native Jew, by proving 
 
204 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 that lie was born a Koman ; or if they should pretend to 
 determine that he was neither Roman nor Jew, by proving 
 that he was born at Tarsus in Cilicia : these sophisms are 
 refuted by showing that all these three may be true ; for 
 he was born of Jewish parents in the city of Tarsus, and 
 by some peculiar privilege granted to his parents, or his 
 native city, he was born a denizen of Rome. Thus there 
 is neither of these three characters of the apostle incon- 
 sistent with each other, and therefore the proving one of 
 them true does not refute the others." — Watts s Logic. 
 
 2. Assuming as true the question in dispute : — 
 
 " The next sophism is called petitio principii, or a sup- 
 position of what is not granted : that is, when any propo- 
 sition is proved by the same proposition in other words, or 
 by something that is equally uncertain and disputed ; as 
 if any one undertake to prove that the human soul is 
 extended through all the parts of the body, because it 
 resides in every member, which is but the same thing in 
 other words. ' Or, if a Papist should pretend to prove that 
 his religion is the only Catholic religion, and is derived 
 from Christ and his apostles, because it agrees with the 
 doctrine of all the fathers of the Church, all the holy 
 martyrs, and all the Christian world throughout all ages ; 
 whereas this is the great point in contest, whether their 
 religion does 'agree with that of all the ancients and the 
 primitive Christians, or no, 
 
 " That sort of fallacy which is called a circle, is very 
 near akin to the petitio principii ; as when one of the 
 premises in a syllogism is questioned and opposed, and we 
 intend to prove it by the conclusion ; or, when in a train 
 of syllogisms we prove the last by recurring to what was 
 the conclusion of the first. The Papists are famous at 
 this sort of fallacy ; when they prove the Scripture to be 
 the word of God by the authority or infallible testimony 
 of their Church ; and when they are called to show the 
 infallible authority of their Church, they pretend to prove 
 it by the Scripture." — Ibid. 
 
 3. Abusing the ambiguity of words, which may be done 
 in different ways : — 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 205 
 
 " The next sort of sophisms arises from our abuse of the 
 ambiguity of words, which is the largest and most exten- 
 sive kind of fallacy ; and indeed several of the other falla- 
 cies might be reduced to this head. 
 
 " When the words or phrases are plainly equivocal, they 
 are called sophisms of equivocation ; as, if we should argue 
 thus : ' He that sends forth a book into the light, desires 
 it to be read ; he that throws a book into the fire, sends it 
 into the light ; therefore, he that throws a book into the 
 fire, desires it to be read.' 
 
 " This sophism, as well as the foregoing, and all of the 
 like nature, are solved by showing the different senses of 
 the words, terms, or phrases. Here light in the major 
 proposition signifies the public view of the world ; in the 
 minor it signifies the brightness of flame and fire ; and 
 therefore the syllogism has four terms, or rather it has no 
 middle term, and proves nothing. 
 
 " But where such gross equivocations and ambiguities 
 appear in arguments, there is little danger of imposing 
 upon ourselves or others. The greatest danger, and which 
 we are perpetually exposed to in reasoning, is, where the 
 two senses or significations of one term are near akin, and 
 not plainly distinguished, and yet they are really suffi- 
 ciently different in their sense to lead us into great mis- 
 takes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the greatest 
 part of controversies in the sacred or civil life, arise from 
 the different senses that are put upon words, and the dif- 
 ferent ideas which are included in them." — Ibid. 
 
 II. — Fallacies connected with the relation of subject and 
 attribute. (See page 31.) 
 
 1. Judging of a thing by that which only belongs to it 
 accidentally : — 
 
 " The next is called fallacia-accidentis, or a sophism 
 wherein we pronounce concerning the nature and essential 
 properties of any subject according to something which is 
 merely accidental to it. This is akin to the former, and is 
 also very frequent in human life. So if opium or the Peru- 
 vian bark has been used imprudently, or unsuccessfully, 
 whereby the patient has received injury, some weaker 
 
206 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 people absolutely pronounce against the use of the bark or 
 opium upon all occasions whatsoever, and are ready to 
 call them poison. So wine has been the accidental occa- 
 sion of drunkenness and quarrels; learning and printing 
 may have been the accidental cause of sedition in a state ; 
 the reading of the Bible, by accident, has been abused to 
 promote heresies or destructive errors ; and for these rea- 
 sons they have all been pronounced evil things. Mahomet 
 forbade his followers the use of wine ; the Turks discourage 
 learning in their dominions ; and the Papists forbid the 
 Scripture to be read by the laity. But how very unreason- 
 able are these inferences, and these prohibitions which are 
 built upon them 1" — Ibid. 
 
 2. Passing from what is true in some respects to what 
 is true absolutely : — 
 
 " The next sophism borders upon the former ; and that 
 is, when we argue from that which is true in particular 
 circumstances, to prove the same thing true absolutely, 
 simply, and abstracted from all circumstances : this is 
 called in the schools a sophism, a dicto secundum quid 
 ad dictum simpliciter ; as, That which is bought in the 
 shambles is eaten for dinner ; raw meat is bought in the 
 shambles : therefore raw meat is eaten for dinner. Or 
 thus, Livy writes fables and improbabilities when he de- 
 scribes prodigies and omens ; therefore Livy's Roman 
 History is never to be believed in anything. Or thus, 
 There may be some mistake of transcribers in some part 
 of Scripture ; therefore Scripture alone is not a. safe guide 
 for our faith. 
 
 " This sort of sophism has its reverse also ; as when we 
 argue from that which is true simply and absolutely, to 
 prove the same thing true in all particular circumstances 
 whatsoever ; as if a traitor should argue from the sixth 
 commandment, ' Thou shalt not kill a man,' to prove 
 that he himself ought not to be hanged : or if a madman 
 should tell me, ' I ought not to withhold his sword from 
 him, because no man ought to withhold the property of 
 another.' 
 
 " These two last species of sophisms are easily solved, 
 by showing the difference betwixt things in their absolute 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 207 
 
 nature, and the same thing surrounded with peculiar cir- 
 cumstances, and considered in regard to special times, 
 places, persons, and occasions ; or by showing the differ- 
 ence between a moral and a metaphysical universality, and 
 that the proposition will hold good in one case, but not iu 
 the other.''-— Ibid. 
 
 3. The two errors in reasoning to which Scholastic 
 Logicians give the names of " Undistributed Middle," and 
 " Illicit Process," may be classed under this head. The 
 "undistributed middle" is when we argue that because 
 two things have a common attribute, therefore they are 
 the same thing ; as, " Gold is yellow, and saffron is yellow 
 — therefore saffron is gold." The " illicit process " is when, 
 because two things are not the same thing, we infer 
 they have not a common attribute ; as, " Gold is yel- 
 low ; saffron is not gold : therefore, saffron is not yel- 
 low." * (See page 32.) We sometimes meet with fallacies of 
 this description in the controversy respecting religious 
 education. Thus, u Religion produces morality ; education 
 produces morality ; therefore, education is religion ;" and, 
 on the other side, " Eeligion produces morality ; educa- 
 tion is not religion ; therefore, education does not produce 
 morality." 
 
 III. — Fallacies connected with the relation of a whole 
 and its parts. (See page 45.) 
 
 Passing from a divided sense to a connected sense, or 
 from a connected sense to a divided sense : — 
 
 " The sophisms of composition and division come next to 
 be mentioned. The sophism of composition is when we infer 
 anything concerning ideas in a compounded sense, which is 
 only true in a divided sense. And when it is said in the Gospel 
 that Christ made the blind to see, and the deaf to hear, and 
 the lame to walk, we ought not to infer hence that Christ 
 
 * Mr. Bailey thinks these fallacies when clearly stated are too absurd to be com- 
 mitted, and that the technical rules for their discovery are intricate and unneces- 
 sary. See Theory of Reasoning, pp. 139, 148, 150. The rules given by Mr. Bailey 
 in these cases are, 1. The possession of one quality, or one set of qualities, in 
 common with a given class, does not of itself prove the possessors to belong to the 
 ciass. 2. Your not belonging to a given class, is no proof that you do not possess 
 any quality in common with the class. 
 
208 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 performed contradictions ; but those who were blind before, 
 were made to see, and those who were deaf before, were 
 made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture assures us the 
 worst of sinners may be saved, it signifies only, that they 
 who have been the worst of sinners may repent and be 
 saved, not that they shall be saved in their sins. Or if 
 any one should argue thus : Two and three are even and 
 odd ; five are two and three ; therefore five are even and 
 odd. Here that is very falsely inferred concerning two or 
 three in union, which is only true of them divided. 
 
 " The sophism of division is when we infer the same 
 thing concerning ideas in a divided sense, which is only 
 true in a compounded sense ; as, if we should pretend to 
 prove that every soldier in the Grecian army put an 
 hundred thousand Persians to flight, because the Grecian 
 soldiers did so. Or if a man should argue thus : Five is 
 one number ; two and three are five ; therefore two and 
 three are one number." — Ibid. 
 
 IV — Fallacies connected with the relation of genus and 
 species. (See page 53.) 
 
 1. Misapplication of general principles : — 
 
 " A third example is the opposition sometimes made to 
 legitimate interferences of government in the economical 
 affairs of society, grounded upon a misapplication of the 
 maxim, that an individual is a better judge than the govern- 
 ment of what is for his own pecuniary interest. This objec- 
 tion was urged to Mr. Wakefield's system of colonization, 
 one of the greatest practical improvements in public affairs 
 which have been made in our time. Mr. Wakefield's prin- 
 ciple, as most people are now aware, is the artificial concen- 
 tration of the settlers, by fixing such a price upon un- 
 occupied land as may preserve the most desirable proportion 
 between the quantity of land in culture, and the labouring 
 population. Against this it was argued, that if individuals 
 found it for their advantage to occupy extensive tracts of 
 land, they, being better judges of their own interest than 
 the legislature (which can only proceed on general rules), 
 ought not to be restrained from doing so. But in this 
 argument it was forgotten that the fact of a mans taking 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 209 
 
 a large tract of land is evidence only that it is his interest 
 to take as mnch as other people, but not that it might not 
 be for his interest to content himself with less, if he could 
 be assured that other people would do so too ; an assurauce 
 which nothing but a government regulation can give. If 
 all other people took much, and he only a little, he would 
 reap none of the advantages derived from the concentration 
 of the population and the consequent possibility of pro- 
 curing labour for hire, but would have placed himself, 
 without equivalent, in a situation of voluntary inferiority. 
 The proposition, therefore, that the quantity of land which 
 people will take when left to themselves is that which it 
 is most for their interest to take, is true only secundum 
 quid: it is only their interest while they have no guarantee 
 for the conduct of one another. But the argument dis- 
 regards the limitation, and takes the proposition for true 
 simpliciter." 
 
 " Under the same head of fallacy (a dicto secundum quid 
 ad dictum simpliciter) might be placed all the errors which 
 are vulgarly called misapplications of abstract truths : that 
 is, where a principle, true (as the common expression is) in 
 the abstract, that is, all modifying causes being supposed 
 absent, is reasoned upon as if it were true absolutely, and 
 no modifying circumstances could ever by possibility 
 exist." — MilVs Logic. 
 
 2. Reasoning from loose definitions : — 
 
 " Those who are familiar with the writings of Madame 
 de Stael, know how constantly it was the practice of that 
 acute and plausible writer, to have recourse to what may 
 be called the fallacy of definition, which consists in giving 
 an arbitrary meaning to some well-known expression, 
 sufficiently large to include, or sufficiently narrow to ex- 
 clude, the subject under discussion. Never was this fallacy 
 more adroitly employed than in the very able and inge- 
 nious speech of Mr. Roundell Palmer, in Friday night's 
 debate ; a speech, the very ability and ingenuity of which 
 render it peculiarly satisfactory to those who, like ourselves, 
 entertain the opposite opinion, because we feel that few are 
 likely to succeed where so adroit an advocate has failed. 
 The familiar term which Mr. Palmer sought unduly to 
 
210 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 extend by definition, is 'religious liberty.'" — Times, March 
 17, 1851. 
 
 Y. — Fallacies connected with the relation of cause and 
 effect, — whether the cause be physical, moral, conditional, 
 or final. See pages 71, 80, 95, 109. 
 
 Taking for a cause that which is not a cause : — 
 
 " The next kind of sophism is called non causa pro causd, 
 or the assignation of a false cause. This the peripatetic 
 philosophers were guilty of continually, when they told us 
 that certain beings, which they called substantial forms, 
 were the springs of colour, motion, vegetation, and the 
 various operations of natural beings in the animate and 
 inanimate world ; when they inform us that nature was 
 terribly afraid of a vacuum ; and that this was the cause 
 why the water would not fall out of a long tube if it was 
 turned upside down : the moderns, as well as the ancients, 
 fall often into this fallacy, when they positively assign the 
 reasons of natural appearances, without sufficient experi- 
 ments to prove them. 
 
 " Astrologers are overrun with this sort of fallacies, and 
 they cheat the people grossly by pretending to tell for- 
 tunes, and to deduce the cause of the various occurrences 
 in the lives of men from the various positions of the stars 
 and planets, which they call aspects. 
 
 " When comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon, are 
 construed to signify the fate of princes, the revolution of 
 states, famine, wars, and calamities of all kinds, it is a 
 fallacy that belongs to this rank of sophisms. 
 
 " There is scarce anything more common in human life 
 than this sort of deceitful argument. If any two acci- 
 dental events happen to concur, one is presently made the 
 cause of the other. If Titus wronged his neighbour of a 
 guinea, and in six months after he fell down and broke his 
 leg, weak men will impute it to the divine vengeance on 
 Titus for his former injustice. This sophism was found 
 also in the early days of the world ; for when holy Job 
 was surrounded with uncommon miseries, his own friends 
 inferred, that he was a most heinous criminal, and charged 
 him with aggravated guilt as the cause of his calamities; 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 211 
 
 though God himself by a voice from heaven solved this 
 uncharitable sophism, and cleared his servant Job of that 
 charge. 
 
 " How frequent is it among men to impute crimes to 
 wrong persons ! We too often charge that upon the wicked 
 contrivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, which 
 arose merely from ignorance, or from an unguarded tem- 
 per. And on the other hand, when we have a mind to 
 excuse ourselves, we practise the same sophism, and charge 
 that upon our inadvertence or our ignorance, which per- 
 haps was designed wickedness. What is really done by a 
 necessity of circumstances, we sometimes impute to choice. 
 And again, we charge that upon necessity which was really 
 desired and chosen. 
 
 " Sometimes a person acts out of judgment in opposition 
 to his inclination; another person perhaps acts the same 
 thing out of inclination, and against his judgment. It is 
 hard for us to determine with assurance what are the in- 
 ward springs and secret causes of every man's conduct ; 
 and therefore we should be cautious and slow in passing a 
 judgment where the case is not exceedingly evident : and if 
 we should mistake, let it rather be on the charitable than 
 on the censorious side." — Watts 9 s Logic. 
 
 "And when Paul had gathered a bundle of sticks, and laid 
 them on the fire, there came a viper out of the heat, and fastened 
 on his hand. And when the barbarians saw the venomous beast 
 hang on his hand, they said among themselves, No doubt this man 
 is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the sea, yet ven- 
 geance suffereth not to live. And he shook off the beast into tiie 
 fire, .and felt no harm. Howbeit they looked when he should 
 have swollen, or fallen down dead suddenly : but after they had 
 looked a great while, and saw no harm come to him, they changed 
 their minds, and said that he was a god." — Acts xxviii. 3 — 6. See 
 also Jeremiah xliv. 15—18. 
 
 VI. Fallacies connected with reasoning from examples. 
 (See page 127.) 
 
 Drawing a general conclusion from a defective induc- 
 tion : — 
 
 " There is, after all these, another sort of sophism, which 
 is wont to be called an imperfect Enumeration, or a False 
 Induction, when from a few experiments or observations 
 
212 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 men infer general theorems and universal propositions." — 
 Watts's Logic. 
 
 " Nivio in his youth observed, that on three Christmas 
 days together there fell a good quantity of snow, and now 
 hath writ it down in his almanack, as a part of his wise 
 remarks on the weather, that it will always snow at Christ- 
 mas. — Euron, a young lad, took notice ten times, that 
 there was a sharp frost when the wind was in the north- 
 east ; therefore in the middle of last July he almost ex- 
 pected it should freeze, because the weathercocks showed 
 him a north-east wind ; and he was still more disappointed, 
 when he found it a very sultry season. It is the same 
 hasty judgment that hath thrown scandal on a whole 
 nation for the sake of some culpable characters belonging 
 to several particular natives of that country ; whereas all 
 the Frenchmen are not gay and airy ; all the Italians are 
 not jealous and revengeful ; nor all the English overrun 
 with the spleen." — Watts on the Improvement of the Mind. 
 
 " I have already said that the mode of Simple Enume- 
 ration is still the common and received method of Induc- 
 tion in whatever relates to man and society. Of this a 
 very few instances, more by way of memento than of instruc- 
 tion, may suffice. What, for example, is to be thought of 
 all the ' common-sense' maxims for which the following 
 may serve as the universal formula : ' Whatsoever has 
 never been^ will never be.' As for example : Negroes have 
 never been as civilized as whites sometimes are, therefore 
 it is impossible they should be so. Women, as a class, 
 have not hitherto equalled men as a class in intellectual 
 energy and comprehensiveness, therefore they are neces- 
 sarily inferior. Society cannot prosper without this or 
 the other institution ; e.g. in Aristotle's time, without 
 slavery ; in later times, without an established priesthood, 
 without artificial distinctions of ranks, &c. One working 
 man in a thousand, educated, while the nine hundred and 
 ninety-nine remain uneducated, has usually aimed at raising 
 himself out of his class, therefore education makes people 
 dissatisfied with their condition in life. Bookish men, 
 taken from speculative pursuits, and set to work on some- 
 thing they know nothing about, have generally been found 
 or thought to do it ill ; therefore, philosophers are unfit for 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 213 
 
 business, &c. &c. All these are inductions by simple 
 enumeration." — Mill's Logic. 
 
 VII. — Fallacies connected with the relation of analogy, 
 comparison, and contrast. (See page 143.) 
 
 " But this is only one of the modes of error in the 
 employment of arguments of analogy. There is another, 
 more properly deserving the name of fallacy ; namely, when 
 resemblance in one point is inferred from resemblance in 
 another point, although there is not only no evidence to 
 comiect the two circumstances by way of causation, but the 
 evidence tends positively to disconnect them. This is pro- 
 perly the Fallacy of False Analogies. 
 
 " As a first instance, we may cite that favourite argu- 
 ment in defence of absolute power, drawn from the analogy 
 of paternal government in a family, which government is 
 not, and by universal admission ought not to be, controlled 
 by (though it sometimes ought to be controlled for) the 
 children. Paternal government, in a family, works well ; 
 therefore, says the argument, despotic government in a 
 state will work well : implying that the beneficial working 
 of parental government depends, in the family, upon the 
 only point which it has in common with political despotism, 
 namely, irresponsibility. Whereas it does not depend upon 
 that, but upon two other attributes of parental govern- 
 ment, the affection of the parent for the children, and the 
 superiority of the parent in wisdom and experience ; neither 
 of which properties can be reckoned upon, or are at all 
 likely to exist, between a political despot and his subjects ; 
 and when either of these circumstances fails, even in the 
 family, and the influence of the irresponsibility is allowed 
 to work uncorrected, the result is anything but good 
 government. This, therefore, is a false analogy. 
 
 " Another example is the not uncommon dictum, that 
 bodies politic have youth, maturity, old age, and death, 
 like bodies natural : that after a certain duration of pro- 
 sperity, they tend spontaneously to decay. This also is a 
 false analogy, because the decay of the vital powers in an 
 animated body can be distinctly traced to the natural pro- 
 gress of those very changes of structure which, in their 
 earlier stages, constitute its growth to maturity ; while in 
 
214 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 the body politic the progress of those changes cannot, gene- 
 rally speaking, have any effect but the still further con- 
 tinuance of growth : it is the stoppage of that progress, and 
 the commencement of retrogression, that alone would con- 
 stitute decay. Bodies politic die, but it is of disease, or 
 violent death : they have no old age." — Mill's Logic. 
 
 VIII. — Fallacies connected with reasoning from parables, 
 fables, and proverbs. (See page 166.) 
 
 A similitude or parable " should not be false in itself, as 
 in this case the mind revolts not only against the thing 
 itself but against the conclusion drawn from it. On this 
 rule I shall take the liberty of making the following obser- 
 vations : — Several of the ancients illustrated and endea- 
 voured to prove the truth and certainty of the resurrection 
 by the history of the Phoenix, a bird supposed to be pro- 
 duced in Arabia once in one hundred years, — there never 
 being more than one at a time. It is reported that, when 
 this bird finds its end approaching, it builds itself a nest 
 of the most fragrant spices and aromatic plants, which, 
 being set on fire by the rays of the sun, the bird is 
 consumed in it ; but from its ashes a worm or grub 
 is formed, out of which another Phoenix in process 
 of time arises. Others say, that it dies in the nest, 
 and a grub is formed out of the marrow of its bones. Both 
 these relations are equally true. Herodotus, Dion Cassius, 
 Tacitus, and Pliny, mention this fabulous animal ; and I 
 have met with this account seriously produced by Clemens 
 Alexandrinus, and other Christian fathers, to prove the 
 resurrection of the body. Now it is well known no such 
 bird ever did or ever could exist, that the supposed fact 
 is impossible, and that the conclusion drawn from it, is not 
 only not solid and convincing, but absurd, because the pre- 
 mises are all false." — Br. Adam Clarke s Commentary on the 
 Bible, Matt xiii. See ahoUzeh xviii. 1 — 4. Lukeiv. 2B — 27. 
 
 IX. — Fallacies connected with reasonings from written 
 documents. (See page 184.) 
 
 1. — Forced interpretation. 
 
 " Next winter, a player, hired for the purpose by the Corpora- 
 tion of Eringemakers, acted his part in a new comedy, all covered 
 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 215 
 
 -with silver fringe, and according to the laudable custom gave rise 
 to that fashion. Upon which the brothers, consulting their father's 
 will, to their great astonishment found these words : ' Item, I 
 charge and command my said three sons, to wear no sort of silver 
 fringe upon or about their said coats,' &c., with a penalty in case 
 of disobedience too long here to insert. However, after some 
 pause, the brother so often mentioned for his erudition, who was 
 well skilled in criticisms, had found in a certain author, which he 
 said should be nameless, that the same word which in the will is 
 called fringe, does also signify a broomstick ; and doubtless ought 
 to have the same interpretation in this paragraph. This, another 
 of the brothers disliked, because of that epithet, silver, which 
 could not, lie humbly conceived, in propriety of speech be reason- 
 ably applied to a broomstick ; but it was replied upon him, that 
 this epithet was understood in a mythological and allegorical 
 sense. However, he objected again, why their father should 
 forbid them to wear a broomstick on their coats, a caution that 
 seemed unnatural and impertinent ; upon which he was taken up 
 short, as one that spoke irreverently of a mystery, which doubt- 
 less was very useful anjl significant, but ought not to be over- 
 curiously pried into, or nicely reasoned upon. And in short, 
 their father's authority being now considerably sunk, this expe- 
 dient was allowed to serve as a lawful dispensation for wearing 
 their full proportion of silver fringe." — Bean Swiff 's Tale of a Tub. 
 
 2. — Verbal quibbling. 
 
 " Dr. Franklin had no taste for verbal criticism. On one occa- 
 sion, when the Senate of Pennsylvania were engaged in a long 
 discussion upon the wording of a resolution, he retired to one of 
 the back seats, and engaged in conversation with a friend on this 
 subject. He said : ' When I was a journeyman printer, a young 
 tradesman, named John Owen, who was about to set up business 
 as a ropemaker, came into the printing-office, and asked us what 
 writing he should place over his shop window. The foreman 
 immediately wrote on a board, " John Owen, Ropemaker, makes 
 and sells ropes;" with a coil of rope at the end. One man 
 objected to the word ropemaker, as superfluous; for if he made 
 ropes, he was certainly a ropemaker. This word was accordingly 
 struck out. Another objected to makes. He said, "Your work- 
 men make the ropes, not you, and if you sell good ropes, people 
 won't care whether you make them or not." The sentence then 
 stood — "John Owen sells ropes." "John Owen sells ropes!" 
 exclaimed another ; "why, who would suppose that you intended 
 to give them away ? what do you open a shop for but to sell 
 them?" The word sells was then struck out, and ropes followed 
 of course. Nothing then remained but "John Owen," and a 
 coil of rope.' " — Anon. 
 
216 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 X. — Miscellaneous fallacies. 
 
 1. — Historical evidence — Napoleon Buonaparte: 
 
 " I suppose it will not be denied, that the three following are 
 among the most important points to be ascertained, in deciding 
 on the credibility of witnesses; first, whether they have the 
 means of gaining correct information; secondly, whether they 
 have any interest in concealing truth, or propagating falsehood ; 
 and, thirdly, whether they agree in their testimony. Let us 
 examine the present witnesses upon all these points. 
 
 " First, what means have the editors of newspapers for gaining 
 correct information ? We know not, except from their own state- 
 ments. Besides what is copied from other journals, foreign or 
 British, (which is usually more than three-fourths of the news 
 published,) they profess to refer to the authority of certain ' pri- 
 vate correspondents ' abroad ; who these correspondents are, what 
 means they have of obtaining information, or whether they exist 
 at all, we have no way of ascertaining. We find ourselves in the 
 condition of the Hindoos, who are told by their priests that the 
 earth stands on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise ; but 
 are left to find out for themselves what the tortoise stands on, or 
 whether it stands on anything at all. 
 
 " So much for our clear knowledge of the means of information 
 possessed by these witnesses ; next, for the grounds on which we 
 are to calculate on their veracity. 
 
 " Have they not a manifest interest in circulating the won- 
 derful accounts of Napoleon Buonaparte and his achievements, 
 whether true or false ? Few would read newspapers if they did 
 not sometimes find wonderful or important news in them ; and 
 we may safely say that no subject was ever found so inexhaustibly 
 interesting as the present." 
 
 " Still it will be said, that unless we suppose a regularly pre- 
 concerted plan, we must at least expect to find great discre- 
 pancies in the accounts published. Though they might adopt 
 the general outline of facts one from another, they would have to 
 fill up the detail for themselves ; and in this, therefore, we should 
 meet with infinite and irreconeileable variety. 
 
 " Now this is precisely the point I am tending to ; for the fact 
 exactly accords with the above supposition; the discordance and 
 mutual contradictions of these witnesses being such as would 
 alone throw a considerable shade of doubt over their testimony. 
 It is not in minute circumstances alone that the discrepancy 
 appears, such as might be expected to appear in a narrative sub- 
 stantially true ; but in very great and leading transactions, and 
 such as are very intimately connected with the supposed hero. 
 For instance, it is by no means agreed whether Buonaparte led 
 in person the celebrated charge over the bridge of Lodi, (for 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 217 
 
 celebrated it certainly is, as well as the siege of Troy, whether 
 either event ever really took place or no,) or was safe in the rear, 
 while Augereau performed the exploit. The same doubt hangs 
 over the charge of the Prench cavalry at Waterloo. The peasant 
 Lacoste, who professed to have been Buonaparte's guide on the 
 day of battle, and who earned a fortune by detailing over and 
 over again to visitors all the particulars of what the great man 
 said and did up to the moment of flight, — this same Lacoste has 
 been suspected by others, besides me, of having never even been 
 near the great man, and having fabricated the whole story for the 
 sake of making a gain of the credulity of travellers." 
 
 "It appears, then, that those on whose testimony the existence 
 and actions of Buonaparte are generally believed, fail in all the 
 most essential points on which the credibility of witnesses depends ; 
 first, we have no assurance that they have access to correct infor- 
 mation ; secondly, they have an apparent interest in propagating 
 falsehood ; and, thirdly, they palpably contradict each other in the 
 most important points." 
 
 " ' But what shall we say to the testimony of those many 
 respectable persons who went to Plymouth on purpose, and saw 
 Buonaparte with their own eyes? must they not trust, their 
 senses ?' I would not disparage either the eyesight or the vera- 
 city of these gentlemen. I am ready to allow that they went to 
 Plymouth for the purpose of seeing Buonaparte ; nay, more, that 
 they actually rowed out into the harbour in a boat, and came 
 alongside of a man-of-war, on whose deck they saw a man in a 
 cocked hat, who, they were told, was Buonaparte. This is the 
 utmost point to which their testimony goes ; how they ascer- 
 tained that this man in the cocked hat had gone through all the 
 marvellous and romantic adventures with which we have so. long 
 been amused, we are not told." 
 
 " There is one more circumstance which I cannot forbear 
 mentioning, because it so much adds to the air of. fiction which 
 pervades every part of this marvellous tale- and. that is the 
 nationality of it. 
 
 " Buonaparte prevailed over all the hostile states in turn except 
 England ; in the zenith of his power, Ins fleets'- were swept from 
 the sea, by England; his troops always defeat an equal, and fre- 
 quently even a superior number of those of any other nation, 
 except the English; and with them it is just the reverse; twice, 
 and twice only, he is personally engaged against an English com- 
 mander, and both times he is totally defeated ; at Acre, and at 
 Waterloo ; and to crown all, England finally crushes this tremen- 
 dous power, which had so long kept the continent in subjection 
 or in alarm ; and to the English he surrenders himself prisoner ! 
 Thoroughly national, to be sure ! It may be all very true ; but 
 I would only ask, if a story had been fabricated for the express 
 
 L 
 
218 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 purpose of amusing the English nation, could it have been con- 
 trived more ingeniously ? " — Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon 
 Buonaparte. See page 164. 
 
 2. — Time-serving in religion : — 
 
 " By-ends. — My brethren, we are, as you see, going all on pil- 
 grimage ; and for our better diversion from things that are bad, 
 give me leave to propound unto you this question. 
 
 " Suppose a man, a minister or a tradesman, &c, should have an 
 advantage lie before him to get the good blessings of this life, yet 
 so as that he can by no means come by them, except, in appear- 
 ance at least, he becomes extraordinary zealous in some points of 
 religion that he meddled not with before ; may he not use this 
 means to attain his end, and yet be a right honest man ? 
 
 "Money-love. — I see the bottom of your question; and, with 
 these gentlemen's good leave, I will endeavour to shape you an 
 answer. And, first, to speak to your question as it concemeth a 
 minister himself: suppose a minister, a worthy man, possessed 
 but of a very small benefice, and has in his eye a greater, more 
 fat and plump by far ; he has also now an opportunity of getting 
 it, yet so as by being more studious, by preaching more frequently 
 and zealously, and, because the temper of the people requires it, 
 by altering of some of his principles ; for my part, I see no reason 
 why a man may not do this, provided he has a call, ay, and more, 
 a great deal besides, and yet be an honest man. For why ? 
 
 " 1. His desire of a greater benefice is lawful, (tins cannot be 
 contradicted,) since it is set before him by Providence ; so then 
 he may get it if he can, making no question for conscience sake. * 
 
 " 2. Besides, his desire after that benefice makes him more 
 studious, a more zealous preacher, &c, and so makes him a better 
 man, yea, makes him better improve his parts, which is according 
 to the mind of God. 
 
 " 3. Now, as for his complying with the temper of his people, 
 by deserting, to serve them, some of his principles, this argue th, 
 1. That he is of a self-denying temper. 2. Of a sweet and 
 winning deportment. And, 3. So more fit for the ministerial 
 function. 
 
 " 4. I conclude, then, that a minister that changes a small for 
 a great, should not, for so doing, be judged as covetous ; but 
 rather, since he is improved in his parts and industry hereby, be 
 counted as one that pursues his call, and the opportunity put into 
 his hand to do good. 
 
 " And now to the second part of the question, which concerns 
 the tradesman you mentioned. Suppose such an one to have but 
 a poor employ in the world, but by becoming religious, he may 
 mend his market, perhaps get a rich wife, or more and far better 
 
ERRORS IN REASONING. 219 
 
 customers to his shop ; for my part, I see no reason but this may- 
 be lawfully done. For why ? 
 
 " 1. To become religious is a virtue, by what means soever a 
 man becomes so. 
 
 " 2. Nor is it unlawful to get a rich wife, or more custom to 
 my shop. 
 
 " 3. Besides, the man that gets these by becoming religious, 
 gets that which is good of them that are good, by becoming good 
 himself: so then here is a good wife, and good customers, and 
 good gain, and all these by becoming religious, which is good ; 
 therefore, to become religious to get all these is a good and pro- 
 fitable design." — Bunyarfs Pilgrim's Progress. 
 
 3. — Mental reservation : — 
 
 " Verity and falsity being proprieties of an enunciative speech, 
 as Aristotle teacheth us, that is, of that speech either conceived 
 only in the mind or uttered by words or writing, by which we 
 affirm or deny anything — which we call a proposition — that we 
 may the better discern this verity and falsity, we must needs 
 consider the variety of propositions. And we may say with the 
 logicians, that there be four kinds of propositions. The first is 
 a mental proposition, only conceived in the mind, and not uttered 
 by any exterior signification : as when I think with myself these 
 words, ■ God is not unjust.' The second is a vocal proposition, 
 as when 1 utter those words with my mouth. The third is a 
 written proposition, as if I should set the same down in writing. 
 The last of all is a mixed proposition, when we mingle some of 
 these propositions or parts of them together, as in our purpose, 
 when being demanded whether John at Style be in such a place, 
 I, knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless, ' I know 
 not/ — reserving or understanding within myself these other 
 words, {to the end for to tell you.) Here is a mixed proposition 
 containing all this, — c I know not to the end for to tell you/ 
 And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mind." 
 
 "Our Saviour said to his disciples that he himself knew not 
 the day of judgment, but his Father only, which by consent of 
 the holy Fathers is to be understood that he knew it not for to 
 utter it, although they were never so desirous to know it ; whereas 
 his Father knowing it, had uttered it unto him as man : for other- 
 wise we know that St. Peter truly said, ' Lord, thou knowest 
 all things/ And St. Paul affirmeth that in Christ were hidden 
 all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God. So that' 
 it is a Catholic verity that he knew the day and hour of his 
 dreadful judgment, notwithstanding this equivocal sentence, 
 wherein he seemeth to deny that he had any such knowledge." 
 
 " Besides these kinds of propositions which we have hitherto 
 defended not to be lies, although by them always some truth is 
 l 2 
 
220 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 concealed, there be some other ways, whereby, without a lie, a 
 truth may be covered, which I will briefly set down. 
 
 "1. First, we may use some equivocal word which hath many 
 significations, and we understand it in one sense, which is true, 
 although the hearer conceive the other, which is false. So did 
 Abraham and Isaac say, that their wives were their sisters, which 
 was not true as the hearers understood it, or in the proper mean- 
 ing, whereby a sister signifieth one born of the same father or 
 mother, or of both, but in a general signification, whereby a 
 brother or sister signifieth one near of kindred, as Abraham called 
 Lot his brother, who was but his brother's son; and our Lord is 
 said to have had brothers and sisters, whereas properly he had 
 neither. The like unto this were if one should be asked whether 
 such a stranger lodgeth in my house, and I should answer, ' He 
 lieth not in my house,' meaning that he doth not tell a lie there, 
 although he lodge there. 
 
 " 2. Secondly, when unto one question may be given many 
 answers, we may yield one and conceal the other. So Samuel, 
 being commanded by God to go to Bethlehem to anoint David 
 king, said unto God, ' How shall I go ? for Saul will hear of it, 
 and kill me. 5 And our Lord said, ' Thou shalt take a calf out of 
 the herd, and shalt say, I come to do sacrifice to our Lord.' And 
 Samuel did as our Lord said unto him, and came into Bethlehem. 
 But the ancients of the city, wondering thereat, met him and 
 said, 'Is thy coming peaceable?' who answered, 'It is peace- 
 able ; I am come to do sacrifice unto our Lord.' Here Samuel 
 uttered the secondary cause of his coming, and warily dissembled 
 the principal, which notwithstanding they principally intended to 
 know, and by this answer were put out of suspicion thereof. So 
 may it happen that one coming to a place to hear mass may an- 
 swer them who ask the cause of his coming, that he came to 
 dinner or to visit some person who is there, or with some other 
 true alleged cause satisfy the demanders. 
 
 " 3. Thirdly, the whole sentence which we pronounce, or some 
 word thereof, or the manner of pointing or dividing the sentence, 
 may be ambiguous, and we may speak it in one sense true for our 
 own advantage. So it is recorded of St. Erancis, that being asked 
 of one who was sought for to death, whether he came not that 
 way, he answered (putting his hand into his sleeve, or, as some say, 
 into his ear), ' he came not this way! " 
 
 " 4. To these three ways of concealing a truth by words if we 
 add the other of which we spoke before, that is, when we utter 
 certain words, which of themselves may engender a false conceit in 
 the mind of the hearers, and yet with somewhat which we under- 
 stand and reserve in our minds, maketh a true proposition, then 
 shall we have four ways how to conceal a truth without making 
 of a lie." — A Treatise on Equivocation. 
 
PART IV. 
 
 THE FORMS OE REASONING. 
 
 We have now, gentle reader, passed through three parts of 
 our work. In the First Part we considered the Introduc- 
 tion to Reasoning. In the Second Part we considered some 
 of the Principles of Reasoning. In the Third Part we 
 considered another class of the Principles of Reasoning. 
 In this, the Fourth Part, we are going to consider the 
 Forms of Reasoning. But you may ask what is the differ- 
 ence between the principles of reasoning and the forms of 
 reasoning 1 The difference is this, — the principle refers to 
 the nature of the reason, the form refers to the manner of 
 expressing it ; the principle refers to ideas, the form refers 
 to the language and the method. We will explain this by 
 an example. Suppose in the morning, your wife advises 
 you to put on your great-coat, to prevent your taking cold. 
 Here the principle of the argument is the relation of cause 
 and effect. And the validity or strength of this argument 
 must depend upon the soundness of this principle in its 
 application to the present case ; that is, upon the proba- 
 bility that you will take cold if you do not wear your 
 great-coat. But this argument may be proposed in a variety 
 of forms. She may say, " My dear, put on your great-coat, 
 this morning ; if you don't, you'll be sure to take cold." 
 Or she may speak interrogatively: "Why don't you put 
 on your great-coat this morning 1 Do you wish to take 
 cold again as you did before % What's the use of having a 
 great- coat, if you don't wear it such a day as this." Or she 
 may speak syllogistically, and say, " Whenever you are in 
 danger of taking cold, you should put on a great-coat ; I 
 am sure you are in danger of taking cold this morning ; 
 therefore, this morning you should put on your great- 
 coat." 
 
 You will perceive, then, that by the forms of reasoning, 
 
222 LOGIC FOR THE MILLTON. 
 
 we mean the different ways in which reasons may be placed 
 before us. The strength of an argument must depend 
 upon the soundness of its principles : but the readiness 
 with which that strength is perceived, will depend very 
 often upon the manner in which the argument may be 
 presented to the mind. Hence, different arguments are 
 drawn up in different forms, according to the subjects dis- 
 cussed, and the character of the audience to whom they 
 are addressed. These different forms chiefly refer to the 
 method, and the style. To be able to reason with the 
 greatest effect, we should study not only the rules of logic, 
 but also the rules of grammar, and endeavour to acquire 
 a facility of expressing the same ideas in different words. 
 Dr. Watts, in his Improvement of the Mind, has given us 
 some rules for the acquisition of this useful talent : — 
 
 " 1. Accustom yourselves to read those authors who think and 
 write with great clearness and evidence, such as convey their 
 ideas into your understanding, as fast as your eye or tongue can 
 run over their sentences : this will imprint upon the mind a habit 
 of imitation; we shall learn the style with which we are very 
 conversant, and practise it with ease and success. 
 
 " 2. Get a distinct and comprehensive knowledge of the sub- 
 ject which you treat of; survey it on all sides, and make yourself 
 perfect master of it ; then you will have all the sentiments that 
 relate to it in your view, and under your command, and your 
 tongue will very easily clothe those ideas with words which your 
 mind has first made so familiar and easy to itself. 
 
 Scribendi rede sapere est et principium etfons, 
 Verbaque provisam rem non invito, sequentur. 
 
 Hoe. de Arte Poet. 
 Good teaching from good knowledge springs ; 
 Words will make haste to follow things. 
 
 " 3. Be well skilled in the language which you speak ; acquaint 
 yourself with all the idioms and special phrases of it, which are 
 necessary to convey the needful ideas on the subject of which you 
 treat, in the most various and most easy manner to the under- 
 standing of the hearer : the variation of a phrase in several forms 
 is of admirable use to instruct ; it is like turning all sides of the 
 subject to view ; and if the learner happens not to take in the 
 ideas in one form of speech, probably another may be successful 
 for that end. 
 
 " Upon this account I have always thought it a useful manner 
 of instruction, which is used in some Latin schools, which they 
 
FORMS OP REASONING. 223 
 
 call variation. Take some plain sentence in the English tongue, 
 and then turn it into many forms in Latin ; * as, for instance, A 
 wolf let into the sheep-fold will devour the sheep : If you let a 
 wolf into the fold, the sheep will be devoured: The wolf will 
 devour the sheep, if the sheep-fold be left open : If the fold be 
 not left shut carefully, the wolf will devour the sheep : The sheep 
 will be devoured by the wolf, if it find the way into the fold 
 open : There is no defence of the sheep from the wolf, unless it 
 be kept out of the fold : A slaughter will be made among the 
 sheep, if the wolf can get into the fold. Thus, by turning the 
 active voice of verbs into the passive, and the nominative case of 
 nouns into the accusative, and altering the connexion of short 
 sentences by different adverbs or conjunctions, and by ablative 
 cases with a preposition brought instead of the nominative, or by 
 participles sometimes put instead of the verbs, the negation of 
 and the contrary, instead of the assertion of the thing first pro- 
 posed, a great variety of forms of speech will be created, which 
 shall express the same sense. 
 
 " 4. Acquire a variety of words, a copia verborum. Let your 
 memory be rich in synonymous terms, or words expressing the 
 same happy effect with the variation of the same thing : this will 
 not only attain the phrases in the foregoing direction, but it will 
 add a beauty also to your style, by securing you from an appear- 
 ance of tautology, or repeating the same words too often, which 
 sometimes may disgust the ear of the learner. 
 
 "5. Learn the art of shortening your sentences, by dividing 
 a long complicated period into two or three small ones. When 
 others connect and join two or three sentences in one by relative 
 pronouns, as which, whereof, wherein, whereto, &c, and by paren- 
 theses frequently inserted, do you rather divide them into distinct 
 periods ; or at least, if they must be united, let it be done rather 
 by conjunctions and copulatives, that they may appear like distinct 
 sentences, and give less confusion to the hearer or reader. 
 
 " I know no method so effectual to learn what I mean, as to 
 take now and then some page of an author, who is guilty of such 
 a long involved parenthetical style, and translate it into plainer 
 English, by dividing the ideas or the sentences asunder, and multi- 
 plying the periods, till the language become smooth and easy, and 
 intelligible at first reading. 
 
 " 6. Talk frequently to young and ignorant persons upon sub- 
 jects which are new and unknown to them, and be diligent to 
 inquire whether they understand you or not ; this will put you 
 upon changing your phrases and forms of speech in a variety, till 
 you can hit their capacity, and convey your ideas into their un- 
 derstanding.''' — Waits s Improvement of the Mind. 
 
 * This can be done in English as well as in Latin. See Lindley Murray's 
 Exercises. 
 

 224 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 
 
 I must tell you what I mean by descriptive reasoning. 
 I mean a description which forms part of a piece of reason- 
 ing. I told you at the commencement of my book that 
 any fact in history, or any object in nature, might become 
 the subject of an argument. Now then, if we describe an 
 object with a view to reason about it, I call that descriptive 
 reasoning. For example, were a lecturer on anatomy to 
 describe the eye, with the view of showing its construction 
 to his pupils, that would be a description, and nothing 
 more. Were a theologian to describe the eye in order to 
 show that it must have had an intelligent author, then the 
 description would become a piece of descriptive reasoning. 
 Archdeacon Paley has done this : — 
 
 " Observe a new-born child first lifting up its eyelids. What 
 does the opening of the curtain discover ! The anterior part of 
 two pellucid globes, which, when they come to be examined, are 
 found to be constructed upon strict optical principles ; the self- 
 same principles upon which we ourselves construct optical instru- 
 ments. We find them perfect for the purpose of forming an 
 image by refraction ; composed of parts executing different offices : 
 one part having fulfilled its office upon the pencil of light deliver- 
 ing it over to the action of another part ; that to a third, and so 
 onward: the progressive action depending for its success upon 
 the nicest and minutest adjustment of the parts concerned ; yet 
 these parts so in fact adjusted, as to produce, not by a simple action 
 or effect, but by a combination of actions and effects, the result 
 which is ultimately wanted. And forasmuch as this organ would 
 have to operate under different circumstances, with strong degrees 
 of light, and with weak degrees, upon near objects, and upon 
 remote ones, and these differences demanded, according to the 
 laws by which the transmission of light is regulated, a correspond- 
 ing diversity of structure ; that the aperture, for example, through 
 which the light passes, should be larger or less ; the lenses rounder 
 or flatter, or that their distance from the tablet, upon which the 
 picture is delineated, should be shortened or lengthened ; this, I 
 say, being the case, and the difficulty to which the eye was to be 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 225 
 
 adapted, we find its several parts capable of being occasionally 
 changed, and a most artificial apparatus provided to produce that 
 change." — Paley's Natural Theology. 
 
 In all our reasonings, great use is made of description. 
 When a member of parliament proposes a new law, he 
 commences with describing the present state of the law, 
 shows what improvement is necessary, and then proposes 
 his remedy. A barrister opens his address to the jury by 
 a statement of the case ; this statement is descriptive ; 
 and descriptions of past events, and of good and bad 
 characters, form a large portion of the addresses from the 
 pulpit. In long speeches, generally, there is often much 
 minute detail, and reporters w T ho cut down these speeches 
 for the newspapers usually shorten or omit the descrip- 
 tions. The reasoning process by which the description is 
 connected with the point to be proved, may exist only in 
 the mind, or it may be expressed in a subsequent stage of 
 the argument. 
 
 I. A description is a statement of the particular circum- 
 stances by which persons, places, and objects, are distin- 
 guished from other persons, places, and objects. 
 
 The description of a person sometimes refers only to his 
 fgure and countenance. " Leah was tender-eyed, but 
 Iiachael was beautiful and well-favoured." " Joseph was a 
 goodly person, and well-favoured." " In all Israel there 
 was none to be so much praised as Absalom for his beauty ; 
 from the sole of his foot even to the crown of his head, 
 there was no blemish in him." " The stature of William 
 the Conqueror was tall, and the composition of his bones 
 and muscles uncommonly strong." " The exterior of 
 Henry V., as well as his deportment, was engaging. His 
 stature was somewhat above the middle size. His coun- 
 tenance beautiful, his limbs genteel and slender, but full 
 of vigour." 
 
 Descriptions of a person sometimes refer only to appear- 
 ance, manners, or habits. " And he said unto them, What 
 manner of man was he which came up to meet you, and 
 told you these words ? And they answered him, He was 
 an hairy man, and girt with a girdle of leather about his 
 l3 
 
226 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 loins. And lie said, It is Elijah the Tishbite." — 2 Kings, 
 i. 7, 8. 
 
 The poet Southey, in Dec. 1823, went to hear Mr. Hill 
 preach, who, at that date, must have been seventy-nine 
 years of age. The following description is extracted from 
 one of his letters : — 
 
 " ' Rowland, a fine tall old man, with strong features, very like 
 his portrait, began by reading three verses for his text, stooping 
 to the book in a very peculiar manner. Having done this, he 
 stood up erect, and said, " Why, the text is a sermon, and a very 
 weighty one too." I could not always follow his delivery, the 
 loss of his teeth rendering his words sometimes indistinct, and 
 the more so, because his pronunciation is peculiar, generally giv- 
 ing e the sound of ai, like the Erench. His manner was animated 
 and striking, sometimes impressive and dignified, always remark- 
 able, and so powerful a voice I have rarely or never heard. Some- 
 times he took off his spectacles, frequently stooped down to read 
 a text, and on these occasions, he seemed to double his body, so 
 high did he stand. He told one or two familiar stories, and used 
 some odd expressions, such as, " A murrain on those who preach, 
 that, when we are sanctified, we do not grow in grace ! " And 
 again, "I had almost said I had rather see the devil in the pulpit 
 than an Antinomian." The purport of his sermon was good; 
 nothing fanatical, nothing enthusiastic ; and the Calvinism it ex- 
 pressed was so qualified as to be harmless. The manner, that of 
 a performer, as great in his line as Kean or Kernble ; and the 
 manner it is which has attracted so large a congregation about 
 him, all of the better order of persons in business.' " — Sherman's 
 Anecdotes of Rowland Hill. 
 
 Sometimes the description of a person refers to his 
 mental faculties or attainments. u Behold, I have seen a 
 son of Jesse the Beth-lehemite, that is cunning in playing, 
 and a miglny valiant man, and a man of war, and prudent 
 in matters, and a comely person, and the Lord is with 
 him." — 1 Sam. xvi. 18. 
 
 " John Wesley at Oxeord. — At college he continued his 
 studies with all diligence, and was noticed there for his attain- 
 ments, and especially for his skill in logic, by which he frequently 
 put to silence those who contended with him in after life. No 
 man, indeed, was ever more dexterous in the art of reasoning. 
 A charge was once brought against him that he delighted to per- 
 plex his opponents by his expertness in sophistry. He repelled 
 it with indignation. ' It has been my first care/ says he, ' to see 
 that my cause was good, and never either in jest or earnest to 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 227 
 
 defend the wrong side of a question, and shame on me if I can- 
 not defend the right after so much practice, and after having been 
 so early accustomed to. separate truth from falsehood, how artfully 
 soever they are twisted together.' " — Southefs Life of Wesley. 
 
 Sometimes the description is not of a person, but of a 
 character. This description consists in an enumeration of 
 particulars. See the description of a good wife in the last 
 chapter of Proverbs. See also I Tim. iii. 2 — 7. 
 
 A description of a place may include its situation, cli- 
 mate, productions, both of nature and art, and its peculiar 
 beauties, curiosities, advantages, and inconveniences. But 
 such full descriptions occur chiefly in books of history or 
 geography. A description intended to be used in reason- 
 ing embraces only the chief point in which that country, 
 city, town, village, &c, differs from others of the same class. 
 See a description of Tyre in the 27th chapter of the 
 Prophet Ezekiel. See also a description of the Land of 
 Canaan, at page 33. 
 
 Descriptions of objects are of two kinds, — one relating 
 to living forms, and the other to such, as are inanimate. 
 The latter refer to those which are the works of nature, 
 and to those which are produced by art. 
 
 " Hast thou given the horse strength ? hast thou clothed his 
 neck with thunder? Canst thou make him afraid as a grass- 
 hopper ? the glory of his nostrils is terrible. He paweth in the 
 valley, and rejoiceth in his strength : he goeth on to meet the 
 armed men. He mocketh at fear, and is not affrighted ; neither 
 turneth he back from the sword. The quiver rattleth against 
 him, the glittering spear and the shield. He swalloweth the 
 ground with fierceness and rage : neither believeth he that it is 
 the sound of the trumpet. He saith among the trumpets, Ha, 
 ha, and he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the cap- 
 tains, and the shouting." — Job xxxix. 19 — 25. 
 
 " I went by the field of the slothful, and by the vineyard of 
 the man void of understanding; and, lo, it was all grown over 
 with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof, and the 
 stone wall thereof was broken down. Then I saw, and consi- 
 dered it well: I looked upon it, and received instruction." — 
 Prov. xxiv. 30—32. 
 
 II. A description of past events is called a narrative. A 
 narrative is an account of events, and of the persons or 
 
228 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 objects concerned in them. It includes detached events, 
 biography, and history. 
 
 Detached events are single circumstances generally pre- 
 served on account of some particular instruction or amuse- 
 ment which they convey. Such are fables and anecdotes, 
 and they are often used to inculcate a mere principle or 
 opinion, or to illustrate the truth or efficacy of an opinion 
 or principle previously stated. Dr. Watts has given us 
 several examples of this in his "Improvement of the 
 Mind:" — 
 
 " In learning any new thing, there should be as little as possible 
 first proposed to the mind at once, and that being understood, and 
 fully mastered, proceed then to the next adjoining part yet unknown. 
 This is a slow but safe and sure way to arrive at knowledge. If 
 the mind apply itself at first to easier subjects and things near 
 akin to what is already known, and then advance to the more 
 remote and knotty parts of knowledge by slow degrees, it will 
 be able in this manner to cope with great difficulties, and prevail 
 over them with amazing and happy success. Mathon happened 
 to dip into the two last chapters of a new book of geometry and 
 mensurations ; as soon as he saw it, and was frightened with the 
 complicated diagrams which he found there, about the frustums 
 of cones and pyramids, &c, and some deep demonstrations among 
 conic sections, he shut the book again in despair, and imagined 
 none but a Sir Isaac Newton was ever fit to read it. But his 
 tutor happily persuaded him to begin the first pages about lines. 
 and angles ; and he found such surprising pleasure in three weeks-'' 
 time in the victories he daily obtained, that at last he became one 
 of the chief geometers of his age." 
 
 Biography is a successive account of the events which 
 have affected or distinguished particular individuals. In 
 biography we relate the particular qualities for which the 
 person is admired or esteemed, and observe the instances 
 which are given of those qualities. 
 
 " Dr. Watts. — Isaac Watts was born at Southampton, July 
 17, 1674. He was the eldest of eight children, and was named 
 after his father, who kept a respectable boarding-school in that 
 town, and was a deacon of the Independent Church. His mother 
 was a Miss Taunton. Mr. Watts had suffered for his Noncon- 
 formity, both in his paternal property and in person, having been 
 more than once imprisoned. During his incarceration, Mrs. Watts 
 was to be seen sitting on a stone near the prison -door, nursing 
 her infant-son Isaac. Mr. Watts, nevertheless, brought up his 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING, 229 
 
 large family in much respectability, and had the happiness of sur- 
 viving to see his eldest son ' eminent for literature and venerable 
 for piety : ' he died in a good old age, February 10, 1736-7. 
 Young Isaac gave early indications of a precocious intellect. At 
 four years old he began to learn Latin ; at seven, he lisped in 
 numbers. He received his early education in the Eree-School at 
 Southampton, then under the ilev. Mr. Pinhorne, Hector of All 
 Saints', to whom the grateful pupil, at the age of twenty, ad- 
 dressed an elegant Latin Ode. In his sixteenth year, having 
 declined a generous offer made for his support at one of the 
 Universities, he was sent to an Academy of some repute in Lon- 
 don, kept by the Rev. Thomas Howe, pastor of the Independent 
 Church then meeting at Girdler's Hall ; and, three years after- 
 wards, being in his nineteenth year, he joined in communion with 
 that church. His constitution received irreparable injury from 
 the intemperate ardour with which he at this time pursued his 
 studies. At the age of twenty, he returned to his father's house, 
 where he continued for two years, preparing himself more ex- 
 pressly for the work of the ministry. The state of his health 
 may have rendered it advisable that he should remain for some 
 time under his father's roof. The first engagement which he 
 accepted, was that of tutor in the family of Sir John Hartopp, 
 Bart., at Stoke Newington. In 1696, he appears to have been 
 called to the ministry ; but his first sermon was preached on the 
 birth-day that completed his twenty-fourth year, a. d. 1698." 
 
 " His ' Treatise on Logic,' originally composed for the use of 
 his pupil, young Hartopp, was published in 1724, and was soon 
 adopted as a text-book in the Dissenting Academies. It was also 
 introduced into the Universities, and therefore, says Dr. Johnson, 
 ' wants no private recommendation.' " 
 
 " The closing scene was worthy of his saintly career : and he 
 expired without a struggle, Nov. 25, 1748, in his seventy-fifth 
 year." — Cinder's Poet of the Sanctuary. 
 
 History is a successive and connected account of the 
 events which have affected nations or people. Such are 
 the History of England, the History of the Jews, &c. The 
 substance of history is called chronology, which is merely 
 a list of the events which have occurred to any nation 
 or people, with the date when each of those events hap- 
 pened. In writing history, we should observe the geo- 
 graphical situation of the country where the events took 
 place, its latitude and longitude, climate, the countries ad- 
 joining, &c. ; and we should ascertain the chronology of 
 the events, and observe what was passing at the same time 
 
230 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 in the countries with which the country under considera- 
 tion had intercourse. We should also remark what is the 
 religion of the people, and its particular ceremonies. And 
 we should observe the form of government, whether 
 monarchical, aristocratical, democratical, or mixed; and 
 in what way it is administered, whether generally by 
 priests, soldiers, or civilians. We shall have occasion to 
 speak further of history, in the next part of our work. 
 
 III. Every principle of reasoning will give rise to descrip- 
 tions. The relation of subject and attributes supplied the 
 descriptions we have given at page 33. The relation of a 
 whole and its parts sometimes will also give rise to de- 
 scriptive reasoning : the description consists in the enume- 
 ration of all the parts that compose the whole. Thus Job 
 describes his former prosperity (Job xxix. 7 — 17). The 
 punishment of the wicked is described with the same 
 minuteness. (See Job xxi. 17 — 20; xxvii. 13 — 23; and 
 xviii. 5 — 21.) The relation of genus and species also 
 gives rise to descriptive reasoning. The description con- 
 sists in the enumeration of the species. Thus Job describes 
 the various kinds of wrongs perpetrated by wicked men 
 (Job xxiv. 1 — 12). And we have also an enumeration 
 of the various kinds of blessings bestowed on the 
 righteous (Job xxii. 23 — 29). The relation of cause and 
 effect also is a source of description. The description 
 is usually a portraiture of the effect. Examples are 
 narratives, and are descriptions of past events. (See the 
 Section on Examples.) Analogies, comparisons, and con- 
 trasts are sometimes formed by lengthened descriptions. 
 (See Job iv. 3 — 5 ; xiv. 7 — 10.) Thus Job contrasts his 
 prosperity (xxix. 7 — 25) with his adversity (xxx. 1 — 31.) 
 Parables, fables, and allegories are of course descriptions. 
 (See Psalms lxxx. 8 — 14.) In Sacred poetry we often find 
 that descriptions are given in the form of interrogations. 
 We have examples of this frequently in the Psalms and 
 the Prophets, and more especially in the thirty-eighth and 
 thirty-ninth chapters of the Book of Job. 
 
 Descriptions are sometimes rendered more vivid by the 
 use of that figure of rhetoric which is called amplification. 
 This is often used in describing; moral effects. All the 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 231 
 
 circumstances are mentioned, and placed in such a way 
 that the impression shall increase as you proceed, and 
 end in a climax. Thus it has been stated, that in London 
 one thousand young men die every year of consumption, 
 in consequence of their late hours of employment. Dr. 
 Hamilton, in a sermon on the subject, thus amplifies the 
 statement : — 
 
 "When a physician tells you that a thousand young men die 
 every year of consumption, caused by the shop-system of the 
 capital, the statement makes little impression. It is a statistical 
 fact, and makes no appeal to the feelings. But what does it 
 imply ? It means, that in consequence of this system, if they all 
 be collected in one consumption hospital, a thousand young men 
 are stricken down before the prime of life, with incurable and 
 lingering disease. It means, that at the period of existence when 
 the pulse should be the firmest, and the zest of life the fullest, 
 a thousand youths are wasting away in racking pain, and in the 
 dreariness and dejection of hopeless invalidism. It means, that 
 when the yearly battle of competition is ended, trade burie's a 
 thousand of its soldiers, and votes no pensions to the widows, 
 whom it has bereft of sons, or the sisters, whom it has robbed of 
 brothers. It means, that a thousand graves are digged and filled, 
 and that in these graves are entombed the hopes of many a 
 family. It means, what statistics cannot tell ; it means — this list 
 of a thousand untimely deaths— it means misery and mourning, 
 blasted prospects, broken hearts, desolate homes, and (it is to be 
 feared, sometimes) the forfeited hope of heaven." 
 
 In the same way the apprehension of a fugitive slave is 
 thus described in a newspaper called the New York Inde- 
 pendent : — 
 
 "Last week, on Wednesday, an honest and intelligent man, 
 guilty of no crime, who had peacefully supported himself by his 
 industry and economy in this city for two years past, to whom 
 life was as dear and liberty as sweet as to any of us, was taken 
 by an oificer of the United States Govermnent, under the order 
 of another officer of the same Government, and consigned to a 
 bondage in the comparison of which no temporary imprisonment 
 would be other than insignificant ; to a bondage that puts him 
 completely at the disposal of an irresponsible master ; that denies 
 him the right to wife or children, except so long as the master 
 allows; that deprives him of property, of liberty, and of the 
 Bible; that makes him a chattel to be sold at will, and dooms 
 him to labour through life for another. He is to be ' sold South/ 
 
232 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 it is said, that his chance of again escaping may thereby be dimi- 
 nished ; and the fearful probability is, that he will never again 
 taste the sweetness of freedom. The rest of his years must be 
 spent under oppression. It is the United States Government 
 that has done this ; the Government which represents the citi- 
 zens of the North as well as of the South ; and for which we ail 
 together are responsible. Because this man was poor and op- 
 pressed from his birth — because his every faculty of body and of 
 mind has been thus far through his life used by another without 
 return — because the master, in concert with others, has passed a 
 law that he shall work thus hereafter — therefore he is forced 
 back to this bondage, after having escaped it." 
 
 Moral descriptions are sometimes given in the form of 
 personification. See Prov. iii. 13 — 17. 
 
 "The objects of war and of commerce are the same; that is, 
 to obtain possession of what we do not possess. But though 
 the object is the same, the means are different. War exclaims : 
 ' See ! the people of yonder country have comforts and luxuries 
 which our country does not produce ; we are stronger than they, 
 let us go and kill them, and take their country for ourselves.' 
 ' No ! ' says Commerce, ' while their country produces commo- 
 dities which ours does not, our country produces commodities 
 which theirs does not ; let us then take some of the commodities of 
 which we have a greater abundance than we need, and offer them 
 in exchange for those commodities we wish to acquire. By this 
 course we shall avoid the guilt of a quarrel, and the danger of a 
 defeat ; we shall obtain an ample supply of all the enjoyments 
 we need ; and we shall promote the happiness of other nations as 
 well as our own.' " — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 As an example of a description of a peculiar kind, I now 
 give you an advertisement of the late Mr. George Robins. 
 He was remarkable for the mode in which he described 
 those properties which, as an auctioneer, he was entrusted 
 to sell. His advertisements are curious, even if viewed 
 only as specimens of his professional ingenuity. They are 
 still more interesting if regarded as a satire on that florid 
 style of description in which some authors are apt to 
 indulge. 
 
 The Colosseum, in the Regent's Park. 
 
 "Mr. George Robins respectfully makes known to all those 
 who would speculate where risk appears so far removed, that he 
 is directed to offer by public competition, at the Auction Mart, 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 233 
 
 London, on Thursday, April 27, at 12, the Colosseum, in the 
 Regent's Park. Fortunately this Cyclopean structure has ac- 
 quired a fame that relieves the individual who is honoured by the 
 direction of the sale from the necessity to exert his inventive 
 faculties, or to give a lengthened description of its prominent 
 features. It may suffice for the present to say, the Colosseum is 
 ihe most classical building throughout Europe; where descrip- 
 tion fails to portray 
 
 c Its eloquent proportions, 
 Its mighty graduations,' • 
 
 which even when seen, 
 
 ' Thou seest not all, but piecemeal thou must break, 
 To separate contemplation, the great whole.' 
 
 The dome, it is believed, is of larger dimensions than any other 
 of a similar nature, being 
 
 ' To art a model — 
 
 Simple, erect, severe, austere, sublime, 
 
 It looks tranquillity.' 
 
 The most celebrated construction of antiquity does not surpass 
 the gigantic elegance of this building. The solidity of this 
 enormous mass of classic architecture is equal to its colossal 
 dimensions, and is calculated to stand the rigid test of time. 
 ' Glorious dome, 
 Shalt thou not last ?' 
 This mighty labour, the modern Babylon, has secured for many 
 years an income varying from £3,000 to £5,000 a-year, without 
 the slightest artificial aid, and it is placed beyond doubt that in 
 the hands of a talented and ingenious possessor this income will 
 be in due time greatly increased. The picture of London has 
 been its great feature, and 2,800 persons have paid for their 
 admission in one day. There are magnificent conservatories, 
 fountains, and jets d'eau, a Swiss cottage with its lakes and 
 woods, a hall of mirrors, and an extensive theatre, together with 
 a large frontage in Albany-street. It needs only the magic influ- 
 ence of Stanfield's pencil to place it high above all contempora- 
 ries. The tenure may be assimilated to freehold, inasmuch as the 
 ground rent is a mere bagatelle, and the lease from the Crown 
 hath 70 years still unexpired. Descriptive particulars will be 
 ready a month antecedent to the sale ; in the meantime principals 
 may obtain information from Messrs. Eladgate, Young, and 
 Jackson, solicitors, Essex-street, Strand; and at Mr. George 
 Hobins's offices, Covent-garden. It is open as usual, or it can 
 be seen by tickets, to be procured at Mr. George Robins' s offices, 
 at Is. each, or cards for four persons at 2s. Qd." — Times. 
 
234 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 IV. The following are practical applications of descrip- 
 tive reasoning. 
 
 In tracing the effects of any measure that we wish to have 
 altered or abandoned; the effects are sometimes described 
 very minutely : — 
 
 " The reasons against extracting a revenue out of soap are 
 obvious and unanswerable. In the first place, it is a tax upon a 
 necessary of life. Moreover, it presses on the poor in a dispro- 
 portionate degree as compared with the rich, since, the duty being 
 uniform on all descriptions of the article, the commoner qualities 
 pay of course a much larger per centage to the Exchequer than 
 those of higher price. But the particular mode in which this 
 duty affects the humbler classes, makes it especially injurious to 
 then* interests. It operates as a discouragement to cleanliness — 
 a premium pro tanto upon dirt and disease. To enhance, by fiscal 
 regulations, the price of a commodity which is indispensable to 
 the purification of the dwellings, the apparel, and the persons of 
 the poor, is, to say the least, a glaring contravention of the policy 
 -which has but lately taken the health of the people under legisla- 
 tive protection, and which regards baths and washhouses, drain- 
 age and ventilation, as fit objects of public care and official 
 supervision." 
 
 "But we have not yet done with the evils of the soap tax. 
 Another well-founded objection against it is, that it operates, like 
 all Excise duties on articles of manufacture, injuriously upon 
 production — exposing us to a disadvantageous rivalry with the 
 foreign maker, and depressing what might otherwise be a flourish- 
 ing branch of trade. The same arguments, in fact, which induced 
 Sir It. Peel to take off the glass duties, might be urged with 
 almost the same force for repealing the duty upon soap. Lastly, 
 to complete the case of inexpediency, the tax to which we refer 
 does not extend to Ireland ; a preference not only indefensible 
 on grounds of justice, but furthermore conducive, as is well 
 known, to a great amount of evasion and fraud. It has been a 
 common practice to export English soap, with the benefit of the 
 drawback, to the sister country, and afterwards to smuggle the 
 same back again to England, thus defrauding at once the revenue 
 and the manufacturer who honestly pays the duty." — Morning 
 Chronicle. 
 
 In describing acts of injustice or oppression, it is seldom 
 necessary to have recourse to any forms of reasoning. The 
 description itself will usually in this country produce all the 
 impression that could be obtained by the most profound 
 argumentation. So also, in regard to the abuses of the law, 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE REASONING. 235 
 
 to show that they ought to be corrected, it is enough to 
 describe them : — 
 
 " A. has an estate left to kis wife, with remainder to her 
 children upon her death. B., the executor, being about to sell 
 some of the houses and lands, for the purpose of satisfying debts 
 due from the testator, A., believing that sufficient assets were in 
 B.'s hands to meet the demands upon the estate, files a bill in 
 Chancery for an account. This was in 1833. B. puts in answers 
 — the bill is amended, and amended answers follow. In 1835 
 A.'s wife bears a child. The Lord Chancellor insists upon the 
 infant being brought into court. The suit is ' abated ' — a supple- 
 mental bill has to be filed, making the infant a plaintiff, and all 
 the other parties have again to put in answers. The child, how- 
 ever, dies a few weeks after birth. A. has then- to take out 
 letters of administration to the estate of the deceased infant, and 
 to file another supplemental bill, demanding another edition of 
 answers. In 1836 A.'s wife bears him a second child, which has 
 to be presented in court. This babe also dies, and all the form- 
 alities necessary in the former case are repeated in this. In 1838 
 another child is born to A., and the whole process has to be gone 
 through again; and in 1840 a fourth child, and the necessary 
 Chancery consequences. In 1841 one of the executors dies, 
 when another supplemental bill has to be filed, and all parties in- 
 terested to put in their answers. After this occurs a bankruptcy, 
 when there is another repetition of the whole case. It comes at 
 last before the Lord Chancellor for a hearing, who decrees to 
 refer it to the Master, ' to take the accounts in the usual way/ 
 Twelve months are consumed in drawing up the decree — five 
 years in going through the accounts, which might have been 
 gone through in five hours — and, at last, a re-hearing of the suit 
 is reached. The Master's report is given in, the Court confirms 
 it, and makes a decree, that the estates shall be sold to pay the 
 costs, the balance, if any, to be paid into the Bank, ' to await the 
 further directions of the Court? The minutes of the decree, how- 
 ever, have to be settled by counsel, who spend over them two 
 years more. Meanwhile, another bankruptcy occurs — the process 
 has again to be gone through. The case is not yet ended, and 
 costs considerably more than half the original legacy have already 
 been incurred." — Nonconformist. 
 
 V. A logical description will have an adaptation to the 
 points it is designed to prove. Thus, the description of a 
 town by a physician, an architect, a political economist, or 
 a clergyman, will probably have a reference to its health- 
 fulness, its buildings, its manufacture, or its spiritual des- 
 titution, and hence the descriptions, though all correct, will 
 
236 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION 
 
 be different from each other. Logical descriptions shonld 
 not be too long. Dr. Young observes in his Paraphrase 
 on the Book of Job, that the description of an object is 
 complete, when you can add nothing but what is common 
 to other objects. Hence we read in that poem, of the 
 beauty of the peacock, the migration of the hawk, the 
 swiftness of the ostrich, and the sharp-sightedness oi the 
 eagle, these being the main points by which they are 
 respectively distinguished. 
 
 In descriptive reasoning, all the reasoning is in the 
 mind. There may be no reasoning process manifest in the 
 description. But though no reasoning is required to prove 
 the truth of the description, there is still a reasoning process 
 going on in the mind. It is admitted, for example, that 
 the eye is correctly described. The only reasoning in the 
 mind is whether this description is a proof of an intelligent 
 maker. When you have finished your description, you have 
 proved your proposition. For the other part of the argu- 
 ment, that " an instrument so constructed must have had 
 an intelligent maker," is a "truth of intellect," that re- 
 quires not to be proved by reasoning. 
 
 There are two cases in which descriptions may lead us 
 to erroneous conclusions. 
 
 The first is when the description is incorrect. A friend 
 who recommends a servant, may give an incorrect, or at 
 least, a defective account of his character. A party who 
 wishes to sell us an estate, may give a description that shall 
 prepossess us too strongly in its favour. Or a traveller into 
 a foreign country may give a description, either of the 
 scenery or of the inhabitants, that shall lead us into false 
 judgments either in regard to the conveniences of the 
 country, or the character of its inhabitants. 
 
 In the second place, the description may be correct, and 
 hence we may too readily embrace the reasoning with 
 which it is connected. How often have we heard vivid, 
 and probably correct descriptions of the misery of Ireland ! 
 But the accuracy of the description was no proof that the 
 specific measure which the speaker proposed would relieve 
 that misery. An honourable member may correctly enough 
 describe the inconveniences of an existing law, but this 
 is no proof that the remedy he proposes would remove 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 237 
 
 those inconveniences, or that it would not introduce more 
 weighty evils. So we may sometimes have appeals to our 
 charity, made on behalf of people in great distress, but 
 the relief solicited might have the effect of increasing the 
 misery it is intended to relieve. A talent for vivid de- 
 scription is a great advantage to a public speaker. But 
 we should always recollect that the description is only half 
 the argument, and like the half of a pair of scissors, will be 
 quite inoperative unless well united to the other half. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 
 
 By Interrogative reasoning we mean reasoning by asking 
 questions. Dr. Young observes, in his Paraphrase of the 
 Book of Job, that an interrogation differs from an ordi- 
 nary argument as much as telling a man to hang himself 
 differs from a common execution. By putting an appro- 
 priate question, you compel the party to pass sentence on 
 himself. 
 
 Sometimes interrogation is employed for the purpose of 
 more emphatic assertion, and often gives much additional 
 force to the expression. Thus : " King Agrippa, believest 
 thou the prophets ? I know that thou believest " — is more 
 forcible than, " King Agrippa, I know that thou believest 
 the prophets." " Is he the God of the Jews only 1 Is 
 he not also of the Gentiles 1 Yes, of the Gentiles also." 
 This is more forcible than, " He is not only the God of the 
 Jews, but also of the Gentiles." (See also Jer. xlvii. 6, 7.) 
 
 Interrogation i? the proper language of majesty incensed. 
 (See Job xxxviii. 1 — 7 ; Ezek. xviii. 23 — 25.) It is also 
 the language of compassionate reproof. (Hosea xi. 8 ; vi. 4.) 
 It is also the language of wonder and adoration. (See 
 Job xi. 7 — 9 j Isaiah xl. 12 — 14.) It is also the language 
 of fervent importunity. (Psalms lxxvii. 7 — 10 ; lxxxviii. 
 10—14 ; lxxxix. 46—49.) 
 
 Interrogation is sometimes employed, as we have inti- 
 
238 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 mated in the last Section, to give a more vivid description. 
 (See Isaiah Iviii. 3—10 ; lxiii. 1—4 ; Matt. xi. 7—9.) 
 
 But we are more particularly to observe the use of 
 questions as employed in reasoning. Interrogative reason- 
 ing is of various kinds. 
 
 1. The first kind is the Socratical form of reasoning. 
 The following description of it is taken from Dr. Watts's 
 " Improvement of the Mind :" — 
 
 " The Socratical Way of Disputation. — This method 
 of dispute derives its name from Socrates, by whom it was 
 practised, and by other philosophers in his age, long before 
 Aristotle invented the particular forms of syllogism in 
 mood and figure, which are now used in scholastic dispu- 
 tations. The Socratical way is managed by questions and 
 answers, in such a manner as this, viz. if I would lead a 
 person into the belief of a heaven and a hell, or a future 
 state of rewards and punishments, I might begin in some 
 such manner of inquiry, and suppose the most obvious and 
 easy answers. 
 
 " Quest. Does not God govern the world ? 
 
 " Ans. Surely he that made it governs it. 
 
 " Q. Is not God both a good and righteous governor ? 
 
 " A. Both these characters doubtless belong to him. 
 
 " Q. "What is the true notion of a good and righteous governor? 
 
 " A. That he punishes the wicked, and rewards the good. 
 
 " Q. Are the good always rewarded in this life ? 
 
 " A. No, surely ; for many virtuous men are miserable here, 
 and greatly afflicted. 
 
 " Q. Are the wicked always punished in this life ? 
 
 " A. No, certainly ; for many of them live without sorrow, and 
 some of the vilest of men are often raised to great riches and 
 honour. 
 
 " Q. Wherein then doth God make it appear that he is good 
 and righteous ? 
 
 " A. I own there is but little appearance of it on earth. 
 
 " Q. Will there not be a time when the tables shall be turned, 
 and the scene of things changed, since God governs mankind 
 righteously ? 
 
 " A. Doubtless there must be a proper time, wherein God will 
 make that goodness and that righteousness to appear. 
 
 " Q. If this be not before then* death, how can it be done ? 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 239 
 
 " A. I can think of no other way bnt by supposing man to 
 have some existence after this life. 
 
 " Q. Are you not convinced, then, that there must be a state 
 of reward and punishment after death ? 
 
 " A. Yes, surely ; I now see plainly that the goodness and 
 righteousness of God, as governor of the world, necessarily re- 
 quire it. 
 
 " Now the advantages of this method are very con- 
 siderable. — It represents the form of a dialogue, or common 
 conversation, which is much more easy, more pleasant, and 
 a more sprightly way of instruction, and more fit to excite 
 the attention, and sharpen the penetration of the learner, 
 than solitary reading, or silent attention to a lecture. Man 
 being a sociable creature, delights more in conversation, 
 and learns better this way, if it could always be wisely 
 and happily practised. — This method hath something very 
 obliging in it, and carries a very humble and condescending- 
 air, when he that instructs seems to be the inquirer, and 
 seeks information from him who learns. — It leads the 
 learner into the knowledge of truth as it were by his own 
 invention, which is a very pleasing thing to human nature ; 
 and by questions pertinently and artificially proposed, it 
 does as effectually draw him on to discover his own 
 mistakes, which he is much more easily persuaded to 
 relinquish when he seems to have discovered them himself. 
 —It is managed in a great measure in the form of the 
 most easy reasoning, always arising from something asserted 
 or known in the foregoing answer, and so proceeding to in- 
 quire something unknown in the following question, which 
 again makes way for the next answer. Now such an exer- 
 cise is very alluring and entertaining to the understanding, 
 while its own reasoning powers are all along employed, 
 and that without labour or difficulty, because the querist 
 finds out and proposes all the intermediate ideas or 
 middle terms." 
 
 2. The second kind of Interrogative reasoning is the 
 catechetical form. 
 
 Dr. Watts intimates that the Socratical mode of dispu- 
 tation might be introduced into catechisms for the in- 
 struction of children ; and Mrs. Marcet seems to have 
 
240 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 followed this form of reasoning in some of her interesting 
 " Conversations." We take the following quotation from 
 her " Willy's Grammar :" — 
 
 " The following morning Willy came into the school-room with 
 Lis grammar in his hand as usual. ' What am I to learn to-day, 
 sir ?' said he ; ' I begin to like my grammar : especially now that 
 there are stories belonging to it.' 
 
 " ' I am very glad to hear it/ observed Mr. Thompson ; ' to- 
 day you shall learn what an adjective is.' 
 
 " ' Pray explain it, sir, for it is a very hard word.' 
 
 "'Let us see first what the grammar says about it, Willy;' 
 and he read, — ' "An adjective is a word added to a noun, to ex- 
 press its quality ; as, a good child, a wise man." ' 
 
 " ' Oh, but sir, I do not know what " to express its quality " 
 means : you must tell me all about it, or I shall never under- 
 stand it.' 
 
 " ' Quality,' replied Mr. Thompson, ' means the sort of thing. 
 Tell me what sort of a table this is.' 
 
 "Willy, after looking at the table a few seconds, said, e It is a 
 round table.' 
 
 "'Well, then, round is an adjective, because it points out the 
 quality of the table.' 
 
 " ' But it has other qualities, sir ; it is a large table ; is large 
 an adjective too ?' 
 
 " ' Yes, every word added to a noun which expresses a quality 
 is an adjective.' 
 
 " ' If that is all, an adjective is not half so difficult as I thought ; 
 I dare say that I can find out some more adjectives for the table. 
 Let me think a little : it is a wooden table : so wooden must be 
 an adjective ; then it is a pretty table, and pretty must also be au 
 adjective ; besides, it is an old table, for it has been in the room, 
 I believe, before I was born. I can't think of any more adjec- 
 tives for the table,' said Willy ; and, starting up suddenly to look 
 at a bird that flew across the window, he upset an inkstand which 
 stood upon the table. At first he was frightened, thinking he 
 had broken it, but finding he had only spilled some of the ink, 
 he said, ' Oh, sir, it is only another adjective for the table; for 
 now,' added he, 'it is a dirty table.' Then taking a piece of 
 blotting-paper, he soaked up the ink, and wiping the table care- 
 fully, said, ' And now it is a clean table.' 
 
 " ' You have gained two adjectives for the table,' said Mr. 
 Thompson, ' and one for yourself.' 
 
 " ' One for me, sir ? what is that ?' 
 
 " ' Do not you think that you are an awkward child, to have 
 overset the inkstand ? ' 
 
 " ' Yes ; but, then, 1 am a tidy one, for having wiped the table 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 241 
 
 clean ; so there is another adjective for me. But, sir, this other 
 table has different adjectives ; for it is square and small, not round 
 and large, like the other.' " — Mrs. Marcet. 
 
 Catechisms as they are generally constructed, are not 
 pieces of interrogative reasoning. The question merely 
 asks for information what is supplied by the answer. They 
 do not, therefore, come under our present notice. I may 
 observe that in the catechisms of the Wesleyan Methodists 
 the answer to each question is put in the form of a complete 
 proposition, embodying the entire sense of both the question 
 and the answer. Thus : " How many sacraments hath Christ 
 ordained in his Church 1 Christ hath ordained two sacra- 
 ments in his Church, Baptism and the Lord's Supper." 
 
 3. Sometimes we ask questions in order to answer them 
 with the view of removing from the discussion the topics 
 to which they refer, or to increase the force of our 
 expression. 
 
 Thus a writer on agricultural distress commences with 
 questions in the form of inquiries to which he replies : — 
 
 " There is no denial, and there can be no doubt, that the whole 
 agriculture of England is menaced at this moment with ruin. . . . 
 But what is the cause? Has Heaven stricken the land with 
 barrenness ? — the late harvest has been remarkably productive. 
 Has the land been trampled by insurrection ? — it has exhibited a 
 contrast to all Europe in its tranquillity. Has commercial failure 
 driven away its credit ? — the panic of 1847 has virtually invigo- 
 rated, by purifying, speculation. Has the country been stripped 
 of its coin ? — fifteen millions of bullion are lying in the cellars of 
 the Bank, Consols are at 96, a Russian loan of five millions is 
 taken up in five hours, and the grand difficulty of moneyed life 
 now is to know what to do with money. . . . Again we ask, what 
 is the cause ? The cause is simply this," &c. — Britannia. 
 
 The following address of Curran to a jury contains a 
 good many interrogations : — 
 
 " Upon what are you to found your verdict ? Upon your 
 oaths. And what are they to be founded upon ? Upon the oath 
 of the witness. And what is that founded upon? Upon this, 
 and this only, that he does believe there is an eternal God — an 
 intelligent Supreme Existence — capable of inflicting eternal 
 punishment for offences, or conferring eternal compensation upon 
 man, after he has passed the boundary of the grave. But where 
 the witness believes that he is possessed of a perishing soul, and 
 that there is nothing upon which punishment or reward can be 
 
 M 
 
242 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 exerted, lie proceeds, regardless of the number of his offences, 
 and undisturbed by the terrors of excited fancy, which might 
 save you from the fear that your verdict is founded upon perjury. 
 Suppose he imagine that the body is actuated by some kind of 
 animal machinery — I know not in what language to describe his 
 notions — suppose his opinion of the beautiful system framed by 
 the Almighty hand to be, that it is all folly and blindness, com- 
 pared to the manner in which he considers himself to have been 
 created, or his abominable heart conceives his ideas, or his abomi- 
 nable tongue communicates his notions ; suppose him, I say, to 
 think so, what is perjury to him? He needs no creed, if he 
 thinks his miserable body can take eternal refuge in the grave, 
 and the last puff of his nostrils sends his soul into annihilation ! 
 He laughs at the idea of eternal justice, and tells you that the 
 grave, into which he sinks as a log, forms an intrenchment 
 against the throne of God, and the vengeance of exasperated 
 justice ! Do you not feel, my fellow-countrymen, a sort of anti- 
 cipated consolation in reflecting upon the religion which gave us 
 comfort in our early days, enabled us to sustain the stroke of 
 affliction, and endeared us to one another ; and when we see our 
 friends sinking into the earth, fills us with the expectation that 
 we rise again — that we but sleep for a while to wake for ever ? 
 But what kind of communication can you hold, what interchange 
 expect, M r hat confidence place, in that abkject slave — that con- 
 demned, despaired of wretch, who acts under the idea that he is 
 only the folly of a moment, that he cannot step beyond the 
 threshold of the grave ? That which is an object of terror to the 
 best, and of hope to the confiding, is to him contempt or despair. 
 Bear with me : I feel my heart running away with me : the 
 worst men only can be cool. What is the law of this country ? 
 If the witness does not believe in God, or in a future state, you 
 cannot swear him. What swear him upon ? Is it upon the book 
 or the leaf ? You might as well swear him by a bramble or a 
 coin. The ceremony of kissing is only the external symbol by 
 which man seals himself to the precept, and says, ' May God so 
 help me as I swear the truth!' He is then attached to the 
 Divinity on condition of telling truth; and he expects mercy 
 from Heaven as he performs his undertaking. But the infidel, 
 by what can you catch his soul ? Or by what can you hold it ? 
 You repulse him from giving evidence, for he has no conscience, 
 no hope to cheer him, nor punishment to dread." — Mr. Phillips' 
 Life of Curraii. 
 
 " Baptismal Regeneration. — When was it ever asserted by 
 Jesus Christ, or by his apostles, that the mere act of baptizing 
 conferred the grace of regeneration ? In the primitive adminis- 
 tration of this rite, it was the sign or symbol of regeneration ; 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 243 
 
 and its observance by adults afforded a presumptive proof of 
 their actual regeneration. But what in their case was the design 
 of the ordinance ? It was the evidence of their faith, and the 
 attestation of their conversion to Christianity. Faith was inva- 
 riably presupposed as the moral requisite, which justified the 
 application of the outward rite. To whom did Peter on the day 
 of Pentecost administer this sacramental rite ? To those who by 
 his preaching 'were pricked to the heart, 5 and whom he pre- 
 viously exhorted to repentance. On what did Philip insist, as 
 essential to baptism, on the part of the eunuch? 'If thou 
 believest with all thine heart, thou mayest.' What compelled 
 Peter to baptize Cornelius and his family ? The visible proof of 
 their having received the Holy Ghost : ' Can any man forbid 
 water, that these be not baptized, who have received the Holy 
 Ghost as well as we ?' Not a single instance can be adduced to 
 afford rational support to the notion of baptism conferring rege- 
 neration, from the records of the New Testament." — Fletcher s 
 Lectures. 
 
 4. Sometimes we place in the form of questions thjose 
 objections which our opponents might advance against ns. 
 St. Paul often reasons in this way. See the third, fourth, 
 sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh chapters of the 
 Komans. 
 
 " It is much to be regretted that people who have realized a 
 little money by trade should retire and take out their capital, and 
 thus reduce the commercial capital of the country. What reason 
 can you assign for this ? Do you say you are independent ? Go 
 on, get wealthy. Do you say you are wealthy? Go and get 
 more wealth. The more wealth you get, the more you serve 
 your country, and the greater power you have of doing good to 
 others. Do you say you are getting old ? Take a young partner : 
 do you find capital and knowledge, and let him find labour and 
 activity. Do you say you have toiled long enough ; you wish to 
 retire and enjoy yourself? Retirement will be no enjoyment to 
 you : to a man of your active habits, solitude and idleness will 
 have no charms. The most effectual means you can adopt to 
 make yourself wretched, and to shorten your days, will be to 
 place yourself in a situation where you will have nothing to do. 
 But do you say, you think it will be more respectable to be out 
 of business — to have an establishment like a nobleman — and to 
 introduce your sons and daughters into fashionable society ? Oh, 
 if that is the reason, by all means go ; if you have become so high 
 that you look down upon your business, the sooner you leave it 
 the better. I have now nothing more to say to you." — Lectures 
 on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 M 2 
 
244 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 5. The relation of cause and effect is often intimated by 
 interrogations. When a wrong cause, as we think, has been 
 assigned for an effect, and we desire to intimate the true 
 cause, we can do this by asking questions. 
 
 " One man pines under a broken constitution. But let us ask 
 him, whether he can, fairly and honestly, assign no cause for this, 
 but the unknown decree of heaven? Has he duly valued the 
 blessing of health, and always observed the rules of virtue and 
 sobriety ? Has he been moderate in his life, and temperate in all 
 his pleasures ? If now he is only paying the price of his former, 
 perhaps his forgotten indulgences, has he any title to complain as 
 if he were suffering unjustly ? . . . But you, perhaps, complain of 
 hardships of another kind— of the injustice of the world; of the 
 poverty which you suffer, and the discouragements under winch 
 you labour ; of the crosses and disappointments of which your 
 life has been doomed to be full. Before you give too much scope 
 to your discontent, let me desire you to reflect impartially upon 
 your past train of life. Has not sloth, or pride, or ill temper, or 
 sinful passions, misled you often from the path of sound and wise 
 conduct ? Have you not been wanting to yourselves, in improv- 
 ing those opportunities which Providence offered you, for better- 
 ing and advancing your state ? If you have chosen to indulge 
 your humour, or your taste, in the gratification of indolence or 
 pleasure, can you complain, because others, in preference to you, 
 have obtained those advantages which naturally belong to useful 
 labours, and honourable pursuits ? Have not the consequences of 
 some false steps, into which your passions, or your pleasures, have 
 betrayed you, pursued you through much of your life; tainted, 
 perhaps, your characters, involved you in embarrassments, or 
 sunk you into neglect ?" — Anon. 
 
 6. Points of comparison are often brought forward by 
 questions. 
 
 " There is no country upon earth whose inhabitants have a 
 juster right to boast of their social progress. In what country 
 beside do you find, I will not say a greater, where do you find an 
 equal degree of civil, political, and religious freedom ? Where do 
 you find a system of jurisprudence more wisely contrived, or 
 more impartially administered ? Where do you find power more 
 nicely balanced, or subjection more cheerfully rendered ? Where 
 do you find a greater respect for the laws, or a more perfect union 
 of all classes to maintain the supremacy of legitimate authority ? 
 Where else is there a stricter regard felt for the rights of all 
 classes ? Where is there more of practical effort to mitigate the 
 woes of human life, in all their diversified forms ? — nobler, more 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 245 
 
 expansive, and further-reaching endeavour to ameliorate the phy- 
 sical and the moral condition of humanity ? Where does there 
 exist greater security of person, property, life, and limb ? Where 
 do you discover finer safeguards for public morality ? more effi- 
 cient measures to detect or repress crime ? Take and compare 
 England with any other civilized nation upon the face of the 
 globe, in all these respects, and I venture to affirm that the com- 
 parison will serve to place in bolder relief her own surpassing 
 preeminence." — Bicker&tetlts National Obligation to the Bible. 
 
 7. Arguments from analogy, and more especially a for- 
 tiori arguments, are expressed in an interrogative form : — 
 
 " Why should there be all these difficulties about the letting 
 or selling an estate or a piece of land ? — difficulties common to 
 England and Ireland, but felt in Ireland more severely than in 
 England, from a difference of practice prevailing between land- 
 lord and tenant. If a merchant goes into a linen or a cloth hall 
 to purchase goods to the amount of several thousands of pounds, 
 he does not find it necessary to employ a lawyer to examine the 
 rights of the merchant from whom he buys it, to its possession, 
 and back from one owner to another, until he finds that the seller 
 of the raw material came by it legally, not to say honestly. Why 
 should there not be the same facility in selling a piece of land as 
 in selling a steam-engine or a piece of cloth ? Why should land 
 be protected more than tallow, cotton, wool, or other merchan- 
 dise ?" — Irish paper. 
 
 When we reprove any inconsistency in the opinions or 
 the conduct of the party we address, we often do it in the 
 form of inquiry. Mr. Seymour, in his " Mornings with 
 the Jesuits," asks how the Church of Rome can maintain 
 that the state of celibacy is one of superior purity, and 
 at the same time contend that marriage is a sacrament 
 which confers additional grace ? 
 
 " But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to 
 the truth of the gospel, I said unto Peter before them all, If 
 thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as 
 do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the 
 Jews?"— Gal. ii. 14. 
 
 " Then said Paul unto him, God shall smite thee, thou whited 
 wall : for sittest thou to judge me after the law, and commandest 
 me to be smitten contrary to the law?" — Acts xxiii. 3. 
 
 "Literary Institutions. — f But then such institutions in- 
 crease the number of smallerers.' To be sure they do. And is 
 
246 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 it not one of the most desirable of all things that they should be 
 increased? If you plant 50,000 oaks in five acres, have you not 
 a better chance of fine trees than when you only plant 10,000 in 
 one acre ? Has the production of eggs ever yet been considered 
 as unfavourable to the growth of chickens ? Or has any reasoner 
 yet contended that in any country where boys and girls are very 
 numerous, men and women must be very scarce ? Every one in 
 every art and science is of course at first nothing but a smatterer. 
 Of these some cannot advance, from stupidity ; others wall not 
 advance, from idleness. Some get in the wrong road, from error ; 
 some quit the right, from affectation. A few only reach the des- 
 tined point. But of course the number of these last will be 
 directly and immediately in the proportion of those who started 
 for the race." — Sidney Smith's Moral Philosophy. 
 
 8. We often ask a series of questions immediately after 
 one another, in order to bring our arguments to bear more 
 forcibly upon the subject under discussion. See Rom. 
 viii. 31—37 • Mai. ii. 10 ; 1 Cor. iv. 7. 
 
 " Eor whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be 
 saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not 
 believed ? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have 
 not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and 
 how shall they preach, except they be sent?" — Horn. x. 13 — 15. 
 
 " Immoral Poetry. — Was it for this that Poesy was endued 
 with all those allurements that lead the mind away in a pleasing 
 captivity ? Was it for this she was furnished with so many in- 
 tellectual charms, that she might seduce the heart from God, the 
 original beauty, and the most lovely of beings ? Can I ever be 
 persuaded that those sweet and resistless forces of metaphor, wit, 
 sound, and number, were given with this design, that they should 
 be all ranged under the banner of the great malicious spirit, to 
 invade the rights of heaven, and to bring swift and everlasting 
 destruction upon men ! How will these allies of the nether-world, 
 the lewd and profane versifiers, stand aghast before the great 
 Judge, when the blood of many souls, whom they never saw, shall 
 be laid to the charge of their writings, and be dreadfully requited 
 at their hands ! " — Preface to Watts y s Lyric Poems. 
 
 " It is a favourite argument in vindication of the papal hier- 
 archy, that it bears an analogy to the constitution of the Jewish 
 Church. According to this idea, the high priest of the Mosaic 
 economy is succeeded by the supreme pontiff of the Christian 
 dispensation ; and the various orders of the clergy are the priests 
 and the Levites ! It is easy for an ingenious fancy to trace 
 analogies on any subject, and substitute them for proofs ; but on 
 
INTERROGATIVE REASONING. 247 
 
 the point before us, the great question is — whether Jesus Christ 
 and his apostles intended that the Jewish economy should furnish 
 a model for the arrangements and discipline of the Christian 
 church ? If this be assumed, where, I ask, is the evidence of 
 this intention ? Why are the pastors of the Christian church 
 never termed priests or sacrificers? Why is their office never 
 represented as sacerdotal? Why is Jesus Christ alone 'the 
 High Priest of our profession/ and the priesthood under the law 
 considered as symbolical, not of the ministers in particular, but 
 of the whole collective body of the Christian church in general ? 
 Why is it, that we find no remote or incidental allusions to this 
 resemblance ? Why is nothing recorded about degrees of office — 
 the extent of episcopal jurisdiction— the adaptation of the system 
 to the different orders of civil society — the nature of the apo- 
 stolic succession, on which depends the validity of sacramental 
 rites ? Why is there such an inexplicable silence pervading the 
 oracles of inspiration on these c weighty matters V " — Fletcher '$ 
 Lectures. 
 
 9. By asking questions you will sometimes be able to 
 throw the onus probandi upon your opponent. It is gene- 
 rally much easier to ask questions than to answer them, 
 and it is often an advantage in disputation, if you can put 
 your antagonist into a defensive position. He had better 
 be employed in defending himself than in attacking you. 
 This is usually the case when positive proof cannot be 
 adduced on either side. 
 
 "Dr. Watts was aware — he could not indeed fail to perceive — 
 that he exposed himself to some reproach for supposing that the 
 distinctions of human society were, in a certain sense, continued 
 beyond this world. ' Some, 5 said he, ' will reprove me here, and 
 say — What, must none but ministers and authors and learned 
 men have their distinguished rewards and glories in the world of 
 spirits ? May not artificers and traders and pious women be 
 fitted by their character and conduct on earth for peculiar sta- 
 tions and employment in heaven? Yes, doubtless, 5 he answers. 
 But he asks whether Deborah, who animated the armies of Israel, 
 and sang their victories, is not engaged in some more illustrious 
 employment among the heavenly tribes than Dorcas, whose 
 highest character is that she was full of alms-deeds, and made 
 coats and garments for the poor? and whether Dorcas is not 
 ' prepared for some greater enjoyments, some sweeter relish of 
 mercy, or some special taste of the divine goodness above Bahab 
 the harlot ? 5 Different, however, as may be the degrees of good 
 in heaven, all may be perfect there, and free from every defect.' 5 
 — Southefs Life of Watts. 
 
248 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 The words onus probandi mean the burden of proving. 
 It may be useful to notice the cases in which this burden 
 may rightfully fall upon you. In all cases when you attack 
 a generally received opinion, you are bound to prove the 
 unsoundness of that opinion. Sentiments which are uni- 
 versally acknowledged to be true, are seldom very minutely 
 examined. There is no object in inquiring into the ground 
 of a doctrine that no one ever denies. If you think any 
 opinion of this kind is erroneous, you have a right to 
 assail it ; but you have no right to single out at a moment's 
 warning any professed believer in that doctrine, and demand 
 from him a reason for his creed. If you wish for contro- 
 versy, you are bound to lead the attack. If you cannot 
 do this, you had better hold your tongue. 
 
 If you advocate any kind of political or social reform, 
 the onus probandi falls upon you. You are bound to show 
 the advantages of the change. You have no right, in the 
 first instance, to call upon your opponent to show that the 
 proposed change would not be advantageous. Every new 
 act of parliament is a change, and every member who 
 brings forward a new bill is bound to show the advantages 
 that would result from the adoption of the measures that 
 he recommends. 
 
 If you offer a bill to your banker for discount, the onus 
 probandi falls upon you to prove that it is a good bill. 
 If you cannot do this, he will be justified in refusing to dis- 
 count it. You have no right to call upon him to prove that 
 it is not a good one. So, if you give a bad character to any 
 one, you are bound to prove the truth of your accusation. 
 You have no right to call upon him to disprove the charge, 
 and to assume it to be true if he cannot do so. The onus 
 probandi in this as in the former case falls clearly on 
 yourself 
 
 Generally speaking, the onus probandi falls upon the 
 advocate of the affirmative of any proposition. . No man 
 should be called upon to prove a negative. In practical 
 questions, however, it is not always easy to state which side 
 is properly the affirmative, as much will depend upon the 
 wording of the sentence. But in all cases the assailant or 
 challenger is bound to prove his own case ; the onus pro- 
 bandi most unquestionably falls upon him. But a party 
 
 * 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 249 
 
 is not in all cases called upon to accept the challenge. 
 And we will now notice the cases in which a challenge 
 to controversy may be honourably declined. You are 
 not bound to accept a challenge, to dispute upon a subject 
 that you do not understand. If pressed for an opinion, 
 you may fairly say, " I am not sufficiently acquainted 
 with the matter to be able to offer any opinion on the sub- 
 ject." Nor are you bound to accept a challenge to dispu- 
 tation from a party who does not himself understand the 
 question. We daily meet with people who think they 
 know our business better than we do ourselves, and who 
 are anxious to dispute with us upon the most knotty 
 points of our profession. In this case we had better answer 
 one question by asking another, and if we have nothing to 
 contend against but simple ignorance, without conceit or 
 obstinacy, we may, peradventure, by the adoption of Socra- 
 tical interrogations, lead our pugnacious friend into a 
 better knowledge of the subject. When Nathanael asked, 
 "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth V Philip did 
 not engage in controversy on the question, but merely 
 replied, " Come and see." 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 
 
 By conversational reasoning, I mean that kind of reason- 
 ing which is employed chiefly in conversation. I say 
 chiefly, for there is no kind of reasoning that is employed 
 exclusively in conversation, nor is conversational reasoning 
 confined to only one kind. But all kinds of reasoning, 
 when employed in conversation, are employed in a different 
 manner as to the form or mode of expression, than when 
 employed in books or in speeches. It is impossible to 
 describe all these forms. Every man will express his 
 reasons in conversation in a way of his own, according to 
 his constitutional temperament, his education, his temper 
 at the time, the occasion, or the manners of the society in 
 which he is accustomed to move. You may therefore 
 
 m 3 
 
250 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 improve your knowledge daily by merely observing the 
 conversation of your friends. You will find examples of 
 conversational reasoning in the fifteenth chapter of the 
 first book of Samuel, and in the eighth chapter of the 
 Gospel according to St. John. 
 
 1. The language and form of conversational reasoning. 
 
 This is chiefly by enthymemes. I wish I had a good 
 English word to substitute for the Greek word enthymeme 
 — it signifies, from the mind. Reasoning by enthymemes 
 therefore means reasoning from the mind : — reasoning as 
 you think, or talk, or write, in the ordinary affairs of life. 
 You have heard of a character in a French play, who was 
 surprised to learn that he had been talking prose for fifty 
 years without knowing it. He might have made the same 
 observation respecting enthymemes. Whenever you have 
 given a reason, you have spoken an enthymeme. If you 
 observe to a friend, " It is a fine day," that is a description. 
 If you ask, " Is it going to be wet ?" that is an interroga- 
 tion. If you say, " I shall take my umbrella, for I think 
 it will rain," that is an enthymeme. 
 
 Enthymemes are treated of largely in Aristotle's Rhe- 
 toric. The following is the substance of his doctrine 
 respecting them. An enthymeme bears the same relation 
 to rhetoric as a syllogism to logic. It is composed of a 
 sentence and a reason. A sentence is a general proposi- 
 tion concerning those things which are to be desired, or 
 avoided, and it bears the same relation to an enthymeme 
 as any proposition to a syllogism. And therefore a sen- 
 tence, if a reason he rendered, becomes a conclusion, and 
 both together make an enthymeme. The following is an 
 example given by Aristotle : " To be over-learned produces 
 effeminacy and envy. Therefore, he that is wise, will not 
 suffer his children to be over-learned." The form of this 
 enthymeme may be reversed thus : — " A wise man will not 
 suffer his children to be over-learned, because too much 
 learning produces effeminacy and envy." 
 
 The Rev. John Huyshe, M.A. of Brazenose College, 
 Oxford, in a Treatise on Logic, intended to assist those 
 who wish to study Aldrich's Logic, in order to pass their 
 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 2-51 
 
 examination in the Oxford schools, has thus treated of 
 enthymemes : — 
 
 " The entliymeme is a defective syllogism, which consists of 
 one premiss and a conclusion ; e.g. 
 
 ' Diamonds are jewels ; they are therefore valuable.' 
 ' God is a spirit ; therefore he is eternal/ 
 "An entliymeme may easily be reduced to a regular syllogistic 
 form ; for since the conclusion and one premiss are given, the 
 three terms may be known, and the omitted premiss may be sup- 
 plied : thus, in the above example, the major, ' All jewels are 
 valuable,' is omitted, and, if supplied, the syllogism will be 
 regular, thus : 
 
 ' All jewels are valuable j s 
 'Diamonds are jewels ;' 
 therefore, ' Diamonds are valuable;' 
 
 " Again : 
 
 ' Every spirit is eternal ; ' 
 'God is a spirit ;' 
 therefore, ' God is eternal.' 
 
 "In both these examples, the major premiss is suppressed ; for, 
 as was before observed, the major premiss is, generally speaking, 
 some universal and incontrovertible principle, which is so evident 
 that it is left to the hearer's judgment ; but the minor premiss is 
 most commoidy expressed, because it has more particular refer- 
 ence to the question which is to be proved. 
 
 " In common, discourse the usual mode of expressing an argument 
 is by means of the entliymeme ; it being unnecessary to adduce both 
 the premises, when o?ie is so evident that it may very fairly be left 
 to the hearer's judgment ; e.g. 
 
 " 'When we find a book quoted, or referred to by an ancient 
 author, we are entitled to conclude that it was read and received 
 in the age and country in which that author lived.' This sen- 
 tence is an enthymeme, in which the major premiss is suppressed, 
 but which may easily be supplied as follows : ' Every book quoted, 
 or referred to by an ancient author, must have been read and re- 
 ceived in the age and country in which that author lived.' The 
 sentence may thus be reduced to a regular syllogism in Barbara : 
 this maybe effected in most enthymemes without much difficulty, 
 whether their conclusions be negative or affirmative. 
 
 " Although the major premiss is generally suppressed in most 
 enthymemes, yet there are some enthymemes in which the minor 
 premiss is found to be omitted : this may happen when the minor 
 premiss is very evident, or when much stress is meant to be laid 
 upon the major ; e. g. 'Every tyrannical king deserves to be de- 
 posed by his subjects; therefore Nero deserved to be deposed by 
 
252 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 the Romans.' The minor premiss, which is suppressed, may be 
 thus supplied : 
 
 ' Nero was a tyrannical king : ' 
 
 and thus the argument is reduced to the regular syllogistic form. 
 "An enthymeme is sometimes condensed into one sentence, 
 which is called an enthymematic sentence ; viz. when the premiss 
 is united in one ■ proposition with the conclusion ; e.g. ' All 
 machines, being of human manufacture, are liable to imperfec- 
 tions. 5 This argument may be thus expanded into a regular 
 syllogism : 
 
 ' All things of human manufacture are liable to im- 
 perfections ; ' 
 e All machines are of human manufacture : ' 
 therefore, ' They are liable to imperfections.' " 
 — Huyshis Treatise on Logic. 
 
 The following are examples of enthymemes given by 
 Mr. Hill. 
 
 " The human soul is immaterial, consequently it is immortal. 
 
 " We enjoy a greater degree of political liberty than any civi- 
 lized people on earth, and therefore have no excuse for a seditious 
 disposition. 
 
 " The power of ridicule is a dangerous faculty, since it tempts 
 its possessor to find fault unjustly, and to distress some for the 
 gratification of others. 
 
 " The study of mathematics is essential to a complete course 
 of education, because it induces a habit of close and regular 
 reasoning. 
 
 " Hard substances may be elastic, for ivory is both hard and 
 elastic." 
 
 The following are examples of enthymematic sen- 
 tences : — 
 
 " The example of Virgil shows that even a great poet may be 
 seduced into some faults by the practice of imitation. 
 
 " The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own 
 happiness or safety, compels us to seek from one another assist- 
 ance and support. 
 
 " Should such a man as I flee ? 
 
 " Real learning is too valuable a thing to be within the grasp 
 of the idle. 
 
 " I ask your lordships, whether Parliament will be in a state 
 to transact public business, or be attended by a sufficient number 
 of members, while engaged in preparing for a public election." — 
 Hill's Logic. 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 253 
 
 You will observe that although an enthymeme is called 
 by scholastic logicians a defective syllogism, yet the syllo- 
 gism is formed from the enthymeme, not the enthymeme 
 from the syllogism. The enthymeme is the natural 
 mode of reasoning ; the syllogism is the artificial mode. 
 The argument first occurs to our mind in the form of an 
 enthymeme, but when we wish to make it clearer, we 
 extend it to a syllogism. 
 
 You will remember that the occurrence of "/or," "be- 
 cause,'" " therefore" or any similar word, either in conver- 
 sation or in reading, usually denotes an enthymeme ; in 
 other words, denotes a reason or argument expressed natu- 
 rally, without the formality of scholastic logic. 
 
 In the refutation of enthymemes we sometimes reply to 
 the implied proposition. For example, if the enthymeme 
 be — " You ought to do this, because the clergyman bids 
 you ;" the reply may be — "And ought I do everything which 
 the clergyman bids me 1 " Of this kind is the scriptural 
 example : " Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition 
 of the elders ? for they wash not their hands when they 
 eat bread. But he answered and said unto them, Why do 
 ye transgress the commandment of God by your tradi- 
 tion 1 " — Matt. xv. 2. At other times, we admit the im- 
 plied proposition of the enthymeme, and object only to 
 the proposition which is expressed. Thus, in reply to — 
 " You had better take your umbrella, for it is going to 
 rain ;" you may say — " No ; I don't think it will rain." 
 The implied proposition that " When it is going to rain, 
 you should take your umbrella," is not disputed. 
 
 2. The principles of reasoning most in use in conver- 
 sation. 
 
 We refer not here to that communication which takes 
 place on occasion of buying and selling, or in any other 
 of the business transactions of life. We speak of that 
 kind of conversation which takes place in the hours of 
 social intercourse. Into this circle, formal logical defi- 
 nitions, and processes of syllogistic reasoning, are never 
 introduced. Nor do we witness any pitched battles of 
 controversy — nor systematic discussions of any one topic 
 — nor captious objections — nor triumphant boastings. 
 
254 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Every principle of reasoning may be introduced into con 
 versation, but I think those most frequently employed are 
 the relation of cause and effect, of example and of ana- 
 logy. You call on a friend, and find he has taken cold. 
 You inquire the cause. It may be he rode in an omnibus 
 with the windows open ; he was caught in a shower with- 
 out an umbrella, or he got wet in the feet, and did not 
 change his boots ; or perhaps his female relations will tell 
 you that it was all his own fault, as he never takes proper 
 care of himself. Here you will have an interesting dis- 
 cussion upon the relation of cause and effect. But you 
 observe, you had previously called on half a dozen of your 
 friends, and they all had colds. You infer it is a very 
 unhealthy season. Here you reason from example, and 
 you arrive at your conclusion by induction. But you think 
 the situation of your friend's house is a very exposed one, 
 and you make a comparison between that and other situ- 
 ations which are more sheltered. The language of conver- 
 sational reasoning will be, as we have stated, enthymemical. 
 Descriptions, when introduced, will be short, unless one of 
 the party is describing an object which the others have not 
 seen, as the hippopotamus, or the crystal palace. Inter- 
 rogative reasoning is sometimes employed, but chiefly in 
 the form of inquiry, — • How do you account for this ? " 
 And in this mode it is sometimes prefixed to an argument 
 from analogy. The form of dilemma— a form to be here- 
 after described — is also often used in conversation. By a 
 little observation on those conversations that come under 
 your notice, you will soon, be able to discover the principles 
 and forms of reasoning that enter into their composition. 
 
 Though the following conversation is not very contro- 
 versial, the subject may interest the reader. It is taken 
 from an article on " The Literature of the Rail," reprinted 
 by Murray from the Times of August 9th, 1851 : — 
 
 "As we progressed north, a loholesome change, we rejoice to say, 
 became visible in railway bookstalls. We had trudged in vain 
 after the schoolmaster elsewhere, but we caught niin by the 
 button at Euston-square ; and it is with the object of inducing 
 kirn to be less partial in his walks that we now venture thus 
 publicly to appeal to him. At the North-Western terminus we 
 diligently searched for that which required but little looking after 
 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 255 
 
 in other places, but we poked in vain for the trash. If it had 
 ever been there, the broom had been before us and swept it clean 
 away. We asked for something ' highly coloured. 5 The book- 
 seller politely presented us with Kiigler's ' Handbook of Paint- 
 ing. 5 We shook our head and demanded a volume more intimately 
 concerned with life and the world. We were offered ' Kosmos. 5 
 'Something less universal, 5 said we 'befits the London travel- 
 ler. 5 We were answered by ' Prescott 5 s Mexico, 5 ' Modern 
 Travel, 5 and 'Murray's Handbook of France. 5 We could not 
 get rubbish, whatever price we might offer to pay for it. There 
 were no ' Eugene Sues 5 for love or money — no cheap transla- 
 tions of any kind — no bribes to ignorance or unholy temptations 
 to folly. ' You'll soon be in the " Gazette, 55 5 we said commise- 
 ratingly to the bookseller. The bookseller smiled. ' You never 
 sell those things, 5 we added mildly. ' Constantly ; we can sell 
 nothing else. 5 'What have you nothing for the million? 5 
 ' Certainly ; here is " Logic for the Million, 55 price 6s. ; will you 
 buy it V ' Thank you, but surely books of a more chatty charac- 
 ter .' 'Chatty — oh, yes! "Coleridge's Table Talk 55 is a 
 
 standard dish here, and never wants purchasers. 5 Deeming our 
 friend facetious, we entered into further conversation and more 
 minute inquiry." — The Literature of the Rail. 
 
 3. The rules usually observed in conversational rea- 
 soning. 
 
 Dr. Watts, in his " Improvement of the Mind," has 
 some excellent observations on this subject, as well as on 
 conversation in general. Presuming that with these my 
 readers are already familiar, I shall lay before them some 
 extracts from a work published under the title of " The 
 Art of Conversation, with Pvemarks on Fashion and Dress, 
 by Captain Orlando Sabertash :" — 
 
 "If you have been an observer in the world, you will have 
 seen how much information is pleasantly conveyed to the mind 
 by its means ; and how often new ideas are awakened, and new 
 sources of thought, study, and reflection opened out by a little 
 lively discourse. 
 
 " But not to speak of instruction alone ; recollect how great 
 and essential a part conversation acts in life and society ; how 
 much of our happiness, how many of our joys result from plea- 
 sant, lively, and agreeable discourse ; consider how often we have 
 seen it alleviate pain, sorrow, and affliction, and soothe the bed of 
 sickness : and then smile, if you can, at this attempt to give its 
 better influence a wider range. Does not cheerful conversation 
 exhilarate and expand the heart, make the blood circulate freely 
 
256 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 through the veins, brighten and give elasticity to the spirit, and 
 cast over the whole frame that glow of healthy satisfaction phy- 
 sicians deem it the greatest proof of skill to call forth ? It thus 
 acts beneficially on the body even, and is one of the best medi- 
 cines that can be administered. 5 ' 
 
 " How often have we not seen pleasant conversation charm the 
 family circle assembled round the evening fire ; link the members 
 in happy union together, and prevent the idle from rambling 
 abroad in search of thoughtless amusements, ending too fre- 
 quently in ruinous dissipation ? " 
 
 "As the object of conversation is pleasure and improvement, 
 those subjects only which are of universal interest can be made 
 legitimate topics of pleasantry or discussion. And it is the gift 
 of expressing thoughts and fancies in a quick, brilliant, and grace- 
 ful manner on such topics, — of striking out new ideas, eliciting 
 the views and opinions of others, of attaching the interest of all 
 to the subject discussed, — giving it, however trifling in itself, 
 weight and importance in the estimation of the hearers, that con- 
 stitutes the great talent for conversation." 
 
 "As to subjects for conversation, what difficulty can there be 
 about them? Will not books, balls, bonnets, and metaphysics 
 furnish pleasant topics of discourse ? Can you not speak of the 
 
 " 'Philosophy and science, and the springs 
 
 Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world ? ' — 
 Are flirtation, travelling, love, and speech making at an end ; is 
 St. Stephen's shut up ; or is the great globe itself and the weather 
 on its surface so perfectly stationary that you can find nothing 
 to say about them ? No, no, let us not deceive ourselves : we 
 never want subjects of conversation; but we often want the 
 knowledge how to treat them; above all, how to bring them for- 
 ward in a graceful and pleasing manner." 
 
 " There is, I am sorry to say, a great deal of servility in the 
 very best society : a needless meanness, seen through at once ; 
 for you may be pleasant, courteous, and well-bred, without 
 cringing to the wit or opinions of others. All that is expected, 
 or can be expected from you, is, that you are not to shock the 
 unsuccessful wit by exposing his stupidity, however glaring it 
 may be, nor mark dissent from opinions in which you may not coin- 
 cide, in such a manner as to bring on an argument or discussion. 
 Any pleasant, passing, and good-humoured jest, will free you 
 from noticing the wit, if particularly forced upon your attention ; 
 even as an easy, playful dissent from objectionable opinions will 
 relieve you from the necessity of disputing or submitting to them. 
 
 "Franklin says, that you must never contradict in conversa- 
 tion, nor correct facts if wrongly stated. This is going much too 
 far: you must never contradict in a short, direct, or positive 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 257 
 
 tone : but with politeness, you may easily, when necessary, 
 express a difference of opinion in a graceful and even complimen- 
 tary manner. And I would almost say, that the art of conversa- 
 tion consists in knowing; how to contradict, and when to be silent ; 
 for, as to constantly acting a fawning and meanly deferential part 
 in society, it is offensive to all persons of good sense and good 
 feeling. In regard to facts wrongly stated, no well-bred man 
 ever thinks of correcting them, merely to show his wisdom in 
 trifles ; but with politeness, it is perfectly easy to rectify an error, 
 when the nature of the conversation demands the explanation. 
 
 " Whenever the lady or gentleman with whom you are discus- 
 sing a point, whether of love, war, science, or politics, begins to 
 sophisticate, drop the subject instantly. Your adversary either 
 wants the ability to maintain his opinion, — and then it would be 
 uncivil to press it ;— or he wants the still more useful ability to 
 yield the point with unaffected grace and good humour ; or, what 
 is also possible, his vanity is in some way engaged in defending 
 views on which he may probably have acted, so that to demolish 
 his opinions is perhaps to reprove his conduct, and no well-bred 
 man goes into society for the purpose of sermonising." 
 
 " In merely relating an ordinary tale or anecdote, you will 
 most certainly, — if you are an observer of character, — relate it 
 differently, — not in import perhaps, but in voice and manner, — 
 to different persons. A man of the world will naturally, and 
 without premeditated effort or thought, so regulate his words, 
 tone, and the very voice in which he speaks, as to make the best 
 impression on the individual addressed. And as no two persons 
 are exactly alike in the world, a good judge will not address them 
 as if they were." 
 
 "Anecdotes are pretty gems in conversation, and furnish admir- 
 able illustrations : they also serve to fill up a threatening pause, 
 and give fresh life to expiring discourse ; and must, of course, be 
 appropriate, short, well timed, and well told. But let no one 
 hope to found a claim for conversational powers on a mere col- 
 lection of anecdotes ; for however numerous, they will necessarily 
 wear out, and they never admit of being repeated." 
 
 " Anecdotes must be looked upon as particles of well-flavoured 
 spice, to season and enliven discourse, rather than as a very 
 essential portion of the dish itself. Still a good relater of anec- 
 dotes is a great acquisition in company ; for he can not only link 
 the scattered fragments of discourse round some well-applied 
 illustration, but if skilful in his line, can give a pleasing turn to 
 conversation when taking a faulty direction." 
 
 Man's superiority over other animals has been attributed 
 to his powers of association and conversation : — 
 
 " His gregarious nature is another cause of man's superiority 
 
258 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 over all otlier animals. A lion lies under a hole in a rock; and ii 
 any otlier lion happen to pass by, they fight. Now, whoever gets 
 a habit of lying under a hole in a rock, and fighting with every 
 gentleman who passes near him, cannot possibly make any pro- 
 gress. Every man's understanding and acquirements, how great 
 and extensive soever they may appear, are made up from the con- 
 tributions of his friends and companions. You spend your morn- 
 ing in learning from Hume what happened at particular periods 
 of your own history : you dine where some man tells you what 
 he has observed in the East Indies, and another discourses of 
 brown sugar and Jamaica. It is from these perpetual rills of 
 knowledge that you refresh yourself, and become strong and 
 healthy as you are. If lions would consort together, and growl 
 out the observations they have made, about killing sheep and 
 shepherds, the most likely places for catching a calf grazing, and 
 so forth, they could not fail to improve ; because they would be 
 actuated by such a wide range of observation, and operating 
 by the joint force of so many minds." — Sydney Smittis Moral 
 Philosophy. 
 
 " By the power of language we are enabled to be useful to 
 others. We can instruct the ignorant, caution the unwary, or 
 console the afflicted. Of what use is the intense application of 
 the student, the conceptions of the poet, or the contemplations 
 of the philosopher, if the result of their labours is known only to 
 themselves ? Thoughts valuable as gold in the mine are of no 
 use to others until coined into words. And by imparting infor- 
 mation to others, our own faculties are improved. Our intellec- 
 tual weapons are kept polished by us. Knowledge shut up in 
 the mind of its possessor is like a stagnant pool, useful to none ; 
 but when allowed to flow out freely in the channels of language, 
 it becomes a living fountain, the streams of which carry health 
 and beauty and fertility into every district through which they 
 roll." — Lecture on the Philosophy of Language. 
 
 4. The following are examples of conversational rea- 
 soning : — 
 
 " I praised the accuracy of an account-book of a lady whom I 
 mentioned. Johnson : ' Keeping accounts, Sir, is of no use 
 when a man is spending his own money, and has nobody to whom 
 he is to account. You won't eat less beef to-day because you 
 have written down what it cost yesterday.' I mentioned another 
 lady who thought as he did, so that her husband could not get 
 her to keep an account of the expense of the family, as she 
 thought it enough that she never exceeded the sum allowed her. 
 Johnson : ' Sir, it is fit she should keep an account, because her 
 husband wishes it ; but 'I do not see its use.' I maintained that 
 
CONVERSATIONAL REASONING. 259 
 
 keeping an account has this advantage, that it satisfies a man 
 that his money has not been lost or stolen, which he might some- 
 times be apt to imagine, were there no written state of his ex- 
 pense : and, besides, a calculation of economy, so as not to exceed 
 one's income, cannot be made without a view of the different 
 articles in figures, that one may see how to retrench in some 
 particulars less necessary than others. This he did not attempt 
 to answer." 
 
 " Mr. Walker, the celebrated master of elocution, came in, and 
 then we went up stairs into the study. I asked him if he had 
 taught many clergymen. Johnson: 'I hope not. 5 Walker: 
 ' I have taught only one, and he is the best reader I ever heard, 
 not by my teaching, but by his own natural talents.' Johnson : 
 ' Were he the best reader in the world, I would not have it told 
 that he was taught.' Here was one of his peculiar prejudices. 
 Could it be any disadvantage to the clergyman to have it known 
 that he was taught an easy and graceful delivery? Boswell: 
 'Will you not allow, Sir, that a man may be taught to read 
 well ? ' Johnson : ' Why, Sir, so far as to read better than he 
 might do without being taught, yes. Formerly it was supposed 
 that there was no difference in reading, but that one read as well 
 as another.' Boswell : ' It is wonderful to see old Sheridan as 
 enthusiastic about oratory as ever.' Walker : ' His enthusiasm 
 as to what oratory will do, may be too great : but he reads well.' 
 Johnson : ' He reads well, but he reads low ; and you know it is 
 much easier to read low than to read high ; for when you read 
 high you are much more limited, your loudest note can be but 
 one, and so the variety is less in proportion to the loudness. Now 
 some people have occasion to speak to an extensive audience, and 
 must speak loud to be heard.' Walker : ' The art is to read 
 strong, though low.' 
 
 " Talking of the origin of language : — Johnson : ' It must 
 have come by inspiration. A thousand, nay a million of children 
 could not invent a language. While the organs are pliable, there 
 is not understanding enough to form a language; by the time 
 that there is understanding enough the organs are become stiff. 
 We know that after a certain age we cannot learn to pronounce 
 a new language. No foreigner who comes to England when 
 advanced in life ever pronounces English tolerably well ; at least, 
 such instances are very rare. When I maintain that language 
 must have come by inspiration, I do not mean that inspiration is 
 required for rhetoric, and all the beauties of language ; for when 
 once man has language, we can conceive that he may gradually 
 form modifications of it. I mean only that inspiration seems to 
 me to be necessary to give man the faculty of speech ; to inform 
 him that he may have speech ; which I think he could no more 
 find out without inspiration than cows or hogs would think of 
 
260 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 such a faculty.' "Walker : ' Do you think, Sir, that there are 
 auy perfect synonymes in any language ?' Johnson : ' Originally 
 there were not ; but by using words negligently, or in poetry, 
 one word conies to be confounded with another.' " — BoswelVs 
 Life of Johnson. 
 
 5. After the above examples of conversational reasoning, 
 I will conclude this Section with an example of a conversa- 
 tion without reasoning. It is taken from Miss Austen's 
 description of " The Voluble Lady :" — 
 
 " My dear sir, you are too obliging. Is there nobody you 
 would not rather ? — I am not helpless. Sir, you are most kind. 
 Upon my word, Jane on one arm, and me on the other ! Stop, 
 stop, let us stand a little back, Mrs. Elton is going; dear Mrs. 
 Elton, how elegant she looks — beautiful lace ! — Now we all follow 
 in her train. Quite the queen of the evening ! — Well, here we 
 are at the passage. Two steps, Jane, take care of the two steps. 
 Oh ! no, there is but one. Well, I was persuaded there were 
 two. How very odd! I was convinced there were two, and 
 there is but one. I never saw anything equal to the comfort 
 and style — candles everywhere. I was telling you of your grand- 
 mamma, Jane, — there was a little disappointment. The baked 
 apples and biscuits, excellent in their way, you know ; but there 
 was a delicate fricassee of sweetbread and some asparagus brought 
 in at first, and good Mr. Woodhouse, not thinking the asparagus 
 quite boiled enough, sent it all out again. Now there is nothing 
 grandmamma loves better than sweetbread and asparagus — so she 
 was rather disappointed; but we agreed we would not speak of 
 it to anybody, for fear of its getting round to dear Miss Wood- 
 house, who would be so very much concerned. Well, this is 
 brilliant ! I am all amazement I — could not have supposed any- 
 thing ! — such elegance and profusion ! I have seen nothing like 
 it since. — Well, where shall we sit ? Where shall we sit ? Any- 
 where, so that Jane is not in a draught. Where / sit is of no 
 consequence. Oh ! do you recommend this side ? Well, I am 
 sure, Mr. Churchill — only it seems too good — but just as you 
 please. What you direct in this house cannot be wrong. Dear 
 Jane, how shall we ever recollect half the dishes for grand- 
 mamma ? Soup too ! Bless me ! I should not he helped so 
 soon, but it smells most excellent, and I cannot help beginning." 
 — Half-hours with the best Authors. 
 
KEASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 2G1 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 EEASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 
 
 The following description of the nature of the syllogism 
 is taken from Dr. Watts : — 
 
 " If the mere perception and comparison of two ideas 
 would always show us whether they agree or disagree ; then 
 all rational propositions would be matters of intelligence, 
 or first principles, and there would be no use of reasoning, 
 or drawing any consequences. It is the narrowness of the 
 human mind which introduces the necessity of reasoning. 
 When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of 
 a proposition in an immediate manner, by the mere con- 
 templation of its subject and predicate, we are then con- 
 strained to use a medium, and to compare each of them 
 with some third idea, that by seeing how far they agree or 
 disagree with it, we may be able to judge how far they 
 agree or disagree among themselves : as if there are two 
 lines, a and b, and I know not whether they are equal or 
 no, I take a third line c, or an inch, and apply it to each 
 of them ; if it agree with them both, then I infer that a 
 and b are equal : but if it agree with one and not with the 
 other, then I. conclude a and b are unequal : if it agree 
 with neither of them, there can be no comparison. 
 
 " So if the question be, whether God must be worshipped, 
 we seek a third idea, suppose the idea of a Creator, and say, 
 
 " Our Creator must be worshipped: 
 God is our Creator ; 
 Therefore, God must be worshipped. 
 
 " The comparison of this third idea, with the two dis- 
 tinct parts of the questions, usually requires two proposi- 
 tions, which are called the premises : the third proposition 
 which is drawn from them is the conclusion. 
 
 " Thus it appears what is the strict and just notion of a 
 syllogism : it is a sentence or argument made up of three 
 propositions, so disposed as that the last is necessarily 
 inferred from those which go before, as in the instances 
 which have been just mentioned. 
 
262 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " The three terms are named the major, the minor, and 
 the middle. The predicate of the conclusion is called the 
 major term, because it is generally of a larger extension 
 than the minor term, or the subject. The major and minor 
 terms are called the extremes. The middle term is the 
 third idea, invented and disposed in two propositions, in 
 such a manner as to show the connexion between the major 
 and minor term in the conclusion ; for which reason the 
 middle term itself is sometimes called the argument. 
 
 " That proposition which contains the predicate of the 
 conclusion, connected with the middle term, is usually called 
 the major proposition, whereas the minor proposition con- 
 nects the middle term with the subject of the conclusion, 
 and is sometimes called the assumption. 
 
 u This exact distinction of the several parts of a syllo- 
 gism, and of the major and minor terms connected with the 
 middle term in the major and minor propositions, does 
 chiefly belong to simple or categorical syllogisms, though 
 all syllogisms whatsoever have something analogical to it." 
 
 " /Single syllogisms are made up of three propositions : 
 compound syllogisms contain more than three propositions, 
 and may be formed into two or more syllogisms. 
 
 " Single syllogisms, for distinction's sake, may be divided 
 into simple, complex, and conjunctive." 
 
 I. — Simple Syllogism. 
 
 ( i Those are properly called simple or categorical syllo- 
 gisms, which are made up of three plain, single, or cate- 
 gorical propositions, wherein the middle term is evidently 
 and regularly joined with one part of the question in the 
 major proposition, and with the other in the minor, 
 whence there flows a plain single conclusion ; as, ' Every 
 human virtue is to be sought with diligence ; prudence 
 is a human virtue ; therefore, prudence is to be sought 
 with diligence.'" 
 
 II. — Complex Syllogism. 
 
 Those are properly called complex syllogisms, in which 
 the middle term is not connected with the whole subject, 
 or the whole predicate in two distinct propositions, but is 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISMS. 2G3 
 
 intermingled and compared with them by parts, or in a more 
 confused manner, in different forms of speech ; as, — 
 
 " The sun. is a senseless being ; 
 The Persians worshipped the sun ; 
 Therefore, the Persians worshipped a senseless being. 
 
 Here the predicate of the conclusion is, ' worshipped a 
 senseless being,' part of which is joined with the middle 
 term, ' sun,' in the major proposition, and the other part 
 in the minor. 
 
 " Though this sort of argument is confessed to be en- 
 tangled or confused, and irregular, if examined by the 
 rules of simple syllogisms ; yet there is a great variety of 
 arguments used in books of learning, and in common life, 
 whose consequence is strong and evident, and which must 
 be ranked under this head ; as, — ■ 
 
 " Pious men are the only favourites of heaven ; true Christians 
 are favourites of heaven; therefore, true Christians are pious 
 men. Or thus, Hypocrites are not pious men ; therefore, hypo- 
 crites are not favourites of heaven. 
 
 " &Tone but physicians came to the consultation ; the nurse is 
 no physician ; therefore, the nurse came not to the consultation. 
 
 " The fogs vanish as the sun rises ; but the fogs have not yet 
 begun to vanish; therefore, the sun is not yet risen. 
 
 " It is necessary that a general understand the art of war ; but 
 Caius does not understand the art of war ; therefore, it is neces- 
 sary Caius should not be a general. A total eclipse of the sun 
 would cause darkness at noon ; it is possible that the moon at 
 that time may totally eclipse the sun ; therefore, it is possible 
 that the moon may cause darkness at noon. 
 
 " Now the force of all these arguments is so evident 
 and conclusive, that though the form of the syllogism be 
 never so irregular, yet we are sure the inferences are just 
 and true ; for the premises, according to the reason oi 
 things, do really contain the conclusion that is deduced 
 from them, which is a never-failing test of a true syllo- 
 gism." 
 
 III. — Conjunctive Syllogism. 
 
 " Those are called conjunctive syllogisms, wherein one of 
 the premises, namely the major, has distinct parts, which 
 are joined by a conjunction, or some such particle of 
 
2G4; LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 speech. Most times the major or minor, or both, are 
 explicitly compound propositions; and generally the major 
 proposition is made up of two distinct parts or proposi- 
 tions, in such a manner, as that by the assertion of one in 
 the minor, the other is either asserted or denied in the 
 conclusion : or, by the denial of one in the minor, the 
 other is either asserted or denied in the conclusion. It 
 is hardly possible indeed to fit any short definition to 
 include all the kinds of them ; but the chief amongst them 
 are the conditional syllogism, the disjunctive, the relative, 
 and the connexive. 
 
 " 1. The conditional or hypothetical syllogism, is that 
 whose major or minor, or both, are conditional proposi- 
 tions ; as, If there be a God, the world is governed by 
 Providence ; but there is a God ; therefore the world is 
 governed by Providence. 
 
 " These syllogisms admit two sorts of true argumentation, 
 where the major is conditional. Pirst, When the antecedent is 
 asserted in the minor, that the consequent may be asserted in the 
 conclusion; such is the preceding example. This is called 
 arguing from the position of the antecedent to the position of 
 the consequent. Secondly, When the consequent is contradicted 
 in the minor proposition, that the antecedent may be contra- 
 dicted in the conclusion : as, If atheists are in the right, then 
 the world exists without a cause ; but the world does not exist 
 without a cause ; therefore, atheists are not in the right. This 
 is called arguing from the removing of the consequent to the 
 removing of the antecedent." 
 
 "2. A disjunctive syllogism is when the major propo- 
 sition is disjunctive ; as, The earth moves in a circle or an 
 ellipsis ; but it does not move in a circle ; therefore, it 
 moves in an ellipsis. 
 
 " A disjunctive syllogism may have many members or parts ; 
 thus, It is either spring, summer, autumn, or winter ; but it is 
 not spring, autumn, or winter ; therefore, it is summer. 
 
 " 3. A relative syllogism requires the major proposition 
 to be relative ; as, Where Christ is, there shall his servants 
 be ; but Christ is in heaven ; therefore, his servants shall 
 be there also. Or, As is the captain, so are his soldiers ; 
 but the captain is a coward ; therefore, his soldiers are 
 so too. 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 265 
 
 " Arguments that relate to the doctrine of proportion must be 
 referred to this head ; as, As two are to four, so are three to six ; 
 but two make the half of four; therefore, three make the halt' 
 of six. 
 
 " 4. A connexive syllogism requires that two or more 
 ideas be so connected, either in the complex subject or 
 predicate of the major, that if one of them be affirmed or 
 denied in the minor, common sense will naturally show us 
 w r hat will be the consequence. 
 
 "Meekness and humility always go together; Moses was a 
 man of meekness ; therefore, Moses was also humble. Or we 
 may form this minor, Pharaoh was no humble man ; therefore, he 
 was not meek. 
 
 "No man can serve God and Mammon; the covetous man 
 serves Mammon ; therefore, he cannot serve God. Or the minor 
 may run thus, The true Christian serves God ; therefore, he does 
 not serve Mammon." — Watts' 's Logic. 
 
 Academic or scholastic disputation, which was carried on 
 by syllogism, is thus described in Dr. Watts's " Improve- 
 ment of the Mind :" — 
 
 " The common methods in which disputes are managed in the 
 schools of learning are these ; viz. 
 
 " 1. The tutor appoints a question in some of the sciences to 
 be debated amongst his students : one of them undertakes to 
 affirm or to deny the question, and to defend his assertion or 
 negation, and to answer all objections against it : he is called the 
 respondent ; and the rest of the students in the same class, or 
 who pursue the same science, are the opponents, who are ap- 
 pointed to dispute or raise objections against the proposition 
 thus affirmed or denied. 
 
 " 2. Each of the students successively in their turn becomes 
 the respondent or the defender of that proposition, while the rest 
 oppose it also successively in their turns. 
 
 "3. It is the business of the respondent to write a thesis in 
 Latin, or short discourse on the question proposed ; and he either 
 affirms or denies the question according to the opinion of the 
 tutor, which is supposed to be the truth, and he reads it at the 
 beginning of the dispute. 
 
 "4. In his discourse (which is written with as great accuracy 
 as the youth is capable of) s he explains the terms of the question, 
 frees them from all ambiguity, fixes their sense, declares the true 
 intent and meaning of the question itself, separates it from other 
 questions with which it may have been complicated, and distin- 
 guishes it from other questions which may happen to be akin to 
 
 N 
 
2QQ LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 it, and then pronounces in the negative or affirmative concern- 
 ing it. 
 
 "5. When this is done, then in the second part of his dis- 
 course he gives his own strongest arguments to confirm the pro- 
 position he has laid down, i. e. to vindicate his own side of the 
 question : but he does not usually proceed to represent the objec- 
 tions against it, and to solve or answer them ; for it is the busi- 
 ness of the other students to raise objections in disputing. 
 
 "6. When the respondent has read over his thesis in the 
 school, the junior student makes an objection, and draws it up in 
 the regular form of a syllogism: the respondent repeats the 
 objection, and either denies the major or minor proposition 
 directly, or he distinguishes upon some word or phrase in the 
 major or minor, and shows in what sense the proposition may be 
 true, but that that sense does not affect the question ; and then 
 declares, that in the sense in which it affects the present question, 
 the proposition is not true, and, consequently, he denies it. 
 
 " 7. Then the opponent proceeds by another syllogism to vindi- 
 cate the proposition that is denied ; again the respondent answers 
 by denying or distinguishing. 
 
 "Thus the disputation goes on in a series or succession of 
 syllogisms and answers, till the objector is silenced, and has no 
 more to say. 
 
 "8. When he can go no further, the next student begins to . 
 propose his objection, and then the third and the fourth, even to 
 the senior, who is the last opponent. 
 
 "9. During this time, the tutor sits in the chair as president, 
 or moderator, to see that the rules of disputation and decency be 
 observed on both sides ; and to admonish each disputant of any 
 irregularity in their conduct. His work is also to illustrate and 
 explain the answer or distinction of the respondent where it is 
 obscure, to strengthen it where it is weak, and to correct it where 
 it is false ; and when the respondent is pinched with a strong 
 objection and is at a loss for an answer, the moderator assists 
 him, and suggests some answer to the objection of the opponent, 
 in defence of the question, according to his own opinion or 
 sentiment/' 
 
 The advantages and disadvantages of this method of dis- 
 putation are thus pointed out : — 
 
 "It must be confessed there are some advantages to be 
 attained by academical disputation. It gives vigour and briskness 
 to the mind thus exercised, and relieves the langour of private 
 study and meditation. It sharpens the wit, and all the inventive 
 powers. It makes the thoughts active, and sends them on all 
 sides to find arguments and answers both for opposition and de- 
 fence. It gives opportunity of viewing the subject of discourse 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 267 
 
 on all sides, and of learning what inconveniences, difficulties, and 
 objections, attend particular opinions. It furnishes the soul with 
 various occasions of starting such thoughts as otherwise would 
 never have come into the mind. It makes a student more ex- 
 pert in attacking and refuting an error, as well as in vindicating. a 
 truth. It instructs the scholar in the various methods of warding 
 off the form of objections, and of discovering and repelling the 
 subtile tricks of sophisters. It procures also a' freedom and readi- 
 ness of speech, and raises the modest and diffident genius to a 
 due degree of courage. 
 
 " But there are some very grievous inconveniences that may 
 sometimes overbalance all these advantages. Tor many young 
 students, by a constant habit of disputing, grow impudent and 
 audacious, proud and disdainful, talkative and impertinent, and 
 render themselves intolerable by an obstinate humour of main- 
 taining whatever they have asserted, as well as by a spirit of 
 contradiction, opposing almost everything that they hear. The 
 disputation itself often awakens the passions of ambition, emula- 
 tion, and anger ; it carries away the mind from that calm and 
 sedate temper which is so necessary to contemplate truth. 
 
 " It is evident, also, that by frequent exercises of this sort, 
 wherein opinions true and false are argued, supported and refuted 
 on both sides, the mind of man is led by insensible degrees to an 
 uncertain and fluctuating temper, and falls into danger of a scep- 
 tical humour, which never comes to an establishment in any 
 doctrines. Many persons by this means become much more 
 ready to oppose whatsoever is offered in searching out truth ; they 
 hardly wait till they have read or heard the sentiment of any 
 person, before their heads are busily employed to seek out argu- 
 ments against it. They grow naturally sharp in finding out 
 difficulties ; and by indulging this humour, they converse with 
 the dark and doubtful parts of a subject so long, till they almost 
 render themselves incapable of receiving the full evidence of 'a 
 proposition, and acknowledging the light of truth. It has 'some 
 tendency to make a youth a carping critic, rather than a judi- 
 cious man." 
 
 We presume that disputes of this kind were carried on 
 at Oxford in the time of Mr. John Wesley. 
 
 " Eight months after his election to a fellowship he was ap- 
 pointed Greek lecturer, and moderator of the classes. At that 
 time disputations were held six times a-week at Lincoln College, 
 and however the students may have profited by them, they were 
 of singular use to the moderator. ' I could not avoid/ he says, 
 ' acquiring hereby some degree of expertness in arguing, and 
 especially in discerning and pointing out well-covered and plau- 
 sible fallacies. I have since found abundant reason to praise 
 n 2 
 
268 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 God for giving me this honest art. By this, when men have 
 hedged me in by what they called demonstrations, I have been 
 many times able to dash them in pieces, and in spite of all its 
 covers, to tonch the very point where the fallacy lay, and it flew 
 open in a moment. 5 " — Southefs Life of Wesley. 
 
 Lord Bacon observed in his Novum Organum, published 
 in the year 1605, " that the logic now in use is not con- 
 ducible to the rinding out of true science, but tends to 
 the establishment and confirmation of errours which are 
 founded in vulgar notions, rather than to a serious inquiry 
 after truth." 
 
 " A syllogisme," he states, " is not used among the prin- 
 ciples of sciences, and in medial axioms it is employed in 
 vain, for it falls much short of Nature's subtilty. It con- 
 sists of propositions, propositions of words, words interpret 
 notions ; therefore, if notions, the basis of things, be con- 
 fused and rashly abstracted from things, nothing will be 
 firm that is built upon them ; therefore, our only assurance 
 is in a right induction." 
 
 The Port Royal Logic was published at Paris by the 
 Jansenists, in the year 1662. The authors seem to have 
 had no very high opinion of the Aristotelian forms of logic. 
 They refer to " certain matters difficult enough, but of little 
 use, such as the conversion of propositions, and the demon- 
 stration of the rules of figure." And they express a doubt 
 of the usefulness of the syllogism, saying, " that the greater 
 part of the errors of men arise much more from their rea- 
 soning on false principles, than from their reasoning wrongly 
 on their principles." 
 
 Mr. Hallam observes in his " Literature of Europe," 
 that after the publication of the Port Royal Logic, " it 
 became more and more acknowledged, that the rules of 
 syllogism go a very little way in rendering the mind able 
 to follow a course of inquiry without error, much less in 
 assisting it to discover truth, and that even their vaunted 
 prerogative of securing us from fallacy is nearly ineffectual 
 in exercise." 
 
 Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding was pub- 
 lished in the year 1688. He condemns strongly the syllo- 
 gistical form of reasoning. It is useless, inasmuch as you 
 must understand your argument before you can form the 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 269 
 
 syllogism ; and then it comes too late to settle the matter. 
 It is of no assistance to reasoning, as it is more difficult to 
 understand the rules of syllogism than it is to understand 
 the argument. The mass of mankind know nothing of it, 
 and yet they reason well, and did so long before syllo- 
 gisms were invented. God did not make men two-legged 
 creatures, and leave it to Aristotle to make them reason- 
 able beings. 
 
 Dr. Watts, throughout Ins work, has strongly enforced 
 the doctrine, that an acquaintance with the things them- 
 selves is the only way of reasoning correctly about them. 
 And he exhorts his readers not to rely upon the mere forms 
 of scholastic logic. 
 
 He thus speaks of formal definitions : — 
 
 "After all, it must be confessed that many logicians and philo- 
 sophers, in former ages, have made too great a bustle about the 
 exactness of their definition of things, and entered into long, 
 fruitless controversies, and very ridiculous debates in the several 
 sciences, about adjusting the logical formalities of every defini- 
 tion ; whereas that sort of wrangling is now grown very justly 
 contemptible, since it is agreed that true learning and the know- 
 ledge of things depends much more upon a large acquaintance 
 with their various properties, causes, effects, subject, object, ends, 
 and designs, than it does upon the formal and scholastic niceties 
 of genus and difference." — Watts' s Logic. 
 
 In the section on the opposition and conversion of pro- 
 positions, he observes : 
 
 " The logicians of the schools have written manv large trifles 
 concerning the opposition and conversion of propositions. It will 
 be sufficient here to give a few brief hints of these things, that 
 the learner may not be utterly ignorant of them " — Ibid. 
 
 The following are his remarks on the moods and figures 
 of simple syllogisms : — 
 
 " Simple syllogisms are adorned and surrounded in the common 
 books of logic with a variety of inventions about moods and 
 figures, wherein by the artificial contexture of the letters A, E, I, 
 and O, men have endeavoured to transform Logic, or the Art of 
 Reasoning, into a sort of mechanism, and to teach boys to syllo- 
 gise, or frame arguments and refute them, without any real in- 
 ward knowledge of the question. 
 
 " This is almost in the same manner as schoolboys have been 
 
270 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 taught perhaps in their trifling years to compose Latin verses, 
 that is, by certain tables and squares, with a variety of letters in 
 them, wherein by counting every sixth, seventh, or eighth letter, 
 certain Latin words should be framed in the form of hexameters 
 or pentameters, and this may be done by those who know nothing 
 of Latin or of verses. 
 
 " I confess some of these logical subtleties have much more 
 use than those versifying tables, and there is much ingenuity 
 discovered in determining the precise number of syllogisms that 
 may be formed in every figure, and giving the reasons of them ; 
 yet the light of nature, a good judgment, and due consideration 
 of things, tend more to true reasoning than all the trappings of 
 moods and figures/' — Ibid. 
 
 Dr. Campbell published his Bhetoric in the year 1776. 
 He strongly condemns the syllogistic mode of reasoning 
 as unnatural and prolix. Its rules are cumbersome to the 
 memory, and unnecessary in practice. This method of 
 arguing has not the least affinity to moral reasoning. In 
 matters that we know by experience, it can be of little or 
 no utility. And it has produced two evils ; — a desire of 
 disputing on every subject, however incontrovertible, and 
 a philosophical pride, which will not permit us to believe 
 anything, even a self-evident principle, without a previous 
 reason or argument. 
 
 From the time of the publication of Dr. Watts's Logic, 
 the scholastic forms of reasoning appear to have fallen into 
 disuse. Dr. Whately, the present Archbishop of Dublin, 
 was the means of reviving attention to the subject in the 
 University of Oxford. He was at that time the Principal 
 of St. Alban's Hall. His publication on the subject first 
 appeared in the " Encyclopaedia Metropolitana," and was 
 afterwards published separately. Not only were the scho- 
 lastic forms resumed, but new definitions of logic were 
 brought forward ; and they who had stated in their works 
 any theory inconsistent with these definitions were charged 
 with being ignorant of the nature of the science. Dr. Watts 
 is repeatedly censured for calling logic the art of using our 
 reason well. And we are told that " Logic is the art of 
 employing language properly for the purpose of reasoning ;" 
 and " is entirely conversant about language." According 
 to Dr. Whately, the principle of the syllogism is the prin- 
 ciple of all reasoning. The art of reasoning is the art of 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 271 
 
 syllogizing. It is not the province of logic to prove the 
 truth of the proposition employed in the syllogism, but 
 merely to see that the conclusion follows naturally from 
 those propositions, supposing them to be true. And this 
 point is to be ascertained, not by the exercise of the judgment, 
 but by the application of certain rules which scholastic 
 logicians have drawn up for this purpose. To perceive the 
 force of a syllogistic argument, it is not necessary to be 
 acquainted with the subject, nor even in some cases to 
 understand the meaning of the words. 
 
 Sir William Hamilton, a Professor of Logic and Meta- 
 physics in the University of Edinburgh, has proposed what 
 he deems an improvement in the syllogistic mode of reason- 
 ing, by the adoption of what he calls " the quantification of 
 the predicate." By this phrase he means nothing more than 
 that the word " all " or " some " should be attached to the 
 predicate of the propositions that enter into the syllogism. 
 Thus, instead of saying " All men are mortal ;" he would 
 say, " All men are some mortal ;" to denote that other 
 beings are mortal besides men. A book has been published 
 on this subject by Mr. Thomas Spencer Baynes, under the 
 sanction and approval of Sir William Hamilton, entitled, 
 " An Essay on the New Analytic of Logical Forms." It 
 is difficult to perceive what great practical advantage 
 would be gained by this suggestion, even were it uni- 
 versally adopted. The arguments in favour of its adoption 
 rest mainly on the defects of the present system. Mr. 
 Baynes states, that logic has remained imperfect and de- 
 formed in the hands of all previous logicians ; and that in 
 regard to " the common doctrine of syllogistic figure, mood 
 and reduction, the whole doctrine is cumbrous and unsatis- 
 factory ; inconsistent, and destructive of the science itself." 
 Mr. Baynes, from the extent of his logical reading, should 
 be a very competent witness on this subject. He has shown, 
 we think, that the rules of scholastic logic contain some 
 great inconsistencies. It is remarkable how ready scholastic 
 logicians are to censure their own system as explained by 
 other writers. Archbishop Whately accuses I know not 
 how many preceding authors of being totally ignorant 
 of the nature of logic. And Mr. Baynes considers the 
 whole science to have been imperfect from the days of 
 
Aristotle to Sir William Hamilton ; and he rejoices " to 
 know that one has at length arisen able to recognise and 
 complete the plan of the mighty builder, Aristotle ; to lay 
 the, top-stone on that fabric, the foundations of which were 
 laid more than two thousand years ago by the master hand 
 of the Stagyrite." We will not deny that the censures on 
 the scholastic logicians are some deserved ; but we think 
 the eulogium on Sir W. Hamilton's discovery is in a high 
 degree some excessive. 
 
 Mr. Mill steers a middle course with regard to the syllo- 
 gism. He says, — " Archbishop Whately has contended that 
 syllogizing or reasoning from generals to particulars is not, 
 agreeably to the vulgar idea, a peculiar mode of reasoning ; 
 but the philosophical analysis of the mode in which all 
 men reason, and must do so, if they reason at all. With 
 the deference due to so high an authority, I cannot help 
 thinking that the vulgar notion is in this case the more 
 correct." In the syllogism, All men are mortal ; the 
 Duke of Wellington is a man ; therefore, the Duke of Wel- 
 lington is mortal : — Mr. Mill thinks that we do not infer 
 the mortality of the Duke of Wellington from the general 
 proposition, All men are mortal, but " from our experience 
 of John, Thomas, &c, who once were in being, but are now 
 dead." He contends that all inference is from particulars 
 to particulars, and that general propositions are merely 
 registers of such inferences. Dr. Whewell thinks that this 
 doctrine of Mr. Mill, "that the force of the syllogism con- 
 sists in an inductive assertion with an interpretation added 
 to it, solves very happily the difficulties which baffle the 
 other theories of this subject." This question is rather 
 beyond the limits we have assigned to our own inquiries. 
 But it appears to us that if the individual conclusion is not 
 a deduction from the general principle, the argument is no 
 longer a syllogism. It may, nevertheless, be a good mode 
 of reasoning, but surely it is not a syllogism in the sense 
 in which Archbishop Whately and other logical writers use 
 the term. At the same time it appears to put the syllogism 
 in the same place that we have assigned to it in the pre- 
 sent work. It is received as one of the forms of reasoning ; 
 in some cases a very useful form, but not necessarily con- 
 nected more than any other form with the reasoning pro- 
 
REASONING BY SINGLE SYLLOGISM. 273 
 
 cess. And whether Mr. Mill gets his conclusion from the 
 general proposition, or from certain facts of which the gene- 
 ral proposition is a correct register, does not appear to be 
 of much practical importance. 
 
 After a consideration of all the above writers, and of 
 others whom we have consulted on the subject, we have 
 arrived at the conclusion, that the syllogism is only one of 
 the forms of reasoning ; a useful form, certainly, in some 
 cases, but still only a form, and by no means necessarily 
 connected with any of the principles of reasoning. 
 
 It has been said that all other modes of reasoning may 
 be turned into syllogisms. It would be difficult to prove 
 this, but it is not worth while to ask for proof. Let it be 
 admitted that all other forms of reasoning may be turned 
 into syllogisms, and that all syllogisms may be turned into 
 other forms of reasoning. This convertibility shows that 
 syllogism is only one of the forms in which all reasons 
 may be expressed. Another argument to prove that it is 
 only a form, is, that the mass of mankind reason well, and 
 yet know nothing about it. None of the writers of the Old 
 Testament knew anything about syllogism, nor have we any 
 proof that it was known to the writers of the New. We are 
 not aware that it has ever been known to the Chinese, or 
 to any other people unacquainted with Greek. We are 
 sure that the mass of the population in our own country 
 are wholly unacquainted with it. 
 
 Seeing, then, that syllogism is one of the forms of reason- 
 ing, it may be well to inquire for what kinds of reasoning- 
 it is best adapted. 
 
 It does not appear to be well adapted for arguments 
 founded on induction, or on analogy, or on mere proba- 
 bility. The conclusion of a syllogism should be a certainty, 
 and a certain deduction from the premises. Let us take 
 Mr. Mill's example : — 
 
 " All men are mortal ; 
 The Duke of Wellington is a man ; 
 Therefore, the Duke of Wellington is mortal." 
 
 Here you will observe, it is essential to the validity of 
 this argument, that the first proposition should be univer- 
 sally true. Had it been said, " All men (except one) are 
 n 3 
 
274 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 mortal ; the Duke of "Wellington is a man ;" we could not 
 have inferred that the Duke of Wellington is mortal, for 
 that excepted one might, for ought we know, be the Duke 
 of Wellington. 
 
 It would appear from this example, that the syllogism 
 is not adapted for probable arguments, however high the 
 degree of probability may be. Hence, as in the moral 
 sciences, and in the ordinary affairs of life, we cannot 
 always have more than a high degree of probability, it 
 seems to follow that in these sciences, and in these affairs, 
 we cannot always employ the syllogism. 
 
 The chief principle of reasoning for which the syllogism 
 appears to be adapted, is that of genus and species, and here 
 chiefly when the relation of genus and species is founded 
 in nature. When we try to form this relation mentally, by 
 simply changing the mode of expression, we may weaken 
 our reasoning. We have shown this at page 70. In similar 
 cases we can rarely form a major proposition, capable of 
 being proved to be universally true. We place ourselves 
 by syllogism under the necessity of proving a universal, 
 when the argument requires us to prove only a particular. 
 And we attempt to prove by reasoning, a proposition that 
 cannot be proved but by observation and experience. 
 
 Although an argument legitimately founded on any other 
 relation than genus and species, such as the relation of 
 subject and attribute, cause and effect, can seldom be so 
 well expressed by syllogism, yet, when an argument is 
 legitimately founded on the relation of genus and species, 
 and that a natural, not an artificial relation, the syllogism 
 will sometimes afford the means of expressing the argu- 
 ment with superior clearness. Perhaps this is the case in 
 the example we have noticed. Were we to say, " As the 
 Duke of Wellington is a man, he must be mortal ;" or, 
 " As all men are mortal, the Duke of Wellington must be 
 mortal, for he is only a man;" or any similar mode of 
 expression, we should not, perchance, express our meaning 
 with as much clearness as in the above syllogism. 
 
 While we are thus ready to admit that the syllogism is 
 sometimes a useful form of reasoning, we do not admit that 
 an argument derives greater strength from being put into 
 this form. In fact, no argument obtains increased strength 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 275 
 
 by being expressed in one form more than in another. The 
 advantage gained is in point of clearness, or in adaptation 
 to the party to whom the argument may be addressed. 
 The same form is not suitable for all occasions. The form 
 which gives clearness and adaptation in one case may in 
 another case be attended with obscurity and unsuitableness. 
 The case in which syllogism may be used with advantage 
 is, as we have said, in natural relations of genus and species. 
 In many other cases we think it unsuitable, and in some, 
 probably injurious.* 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 
 
 " We properly call those compound syllogisms, which are 
 made of two or more single syllogisms, and may be resolved 
 into them. The chief kinds are these : epichirema, dilemma, 
 prosyllogismus, and sorites. 
 
 " I. Epichirema is a syllogism which contains the proof 
 of the major or minor, or both, before it draws the con- 
 clusion. 
 
 " This is often used in writing, in public speeches, and in com- 
 mon conversation ; that so each, part of the discourse may be 
 confirmed and put out of doubt, as it moves on toward the con- 
 clusion which was chiefly designed. Take this instance : 
 
 " Sickness may be good for us ; for it weans us from the 
 pleasures of life, and makes us think of dying ; 
 
 "But we are uneasy under sickness, which, appears by our 
 impatience, complaints, groanings, &c. ; 
 
 " Therefore, we are uneasy sometimes under that which is good 
 for us. 
 
 " Another instance you may see in Cicero's oration in defence 
 of Milo, who had slain Clodius. His major proposition is, that 
 4 it is lawful for one man to kill another who lies in wait to kill 
 
 * With, reference to the system of scholastic logic, Mr. Bailey observes : — 
 " Such an artificial system is needless, because the natural method is ready of 
 application and sufficient of itself. It does not substitute compendious processes 
 for long ones, nor such as are easy for such as are difficult ; nor those which are 
 more certain for those which are less to be relied upon. And it has not the 
 slightest pretensions to the power of conducting us to results which we could not 
 reach without its assistance ; while, on the other hand, the study of it requires a 
 great expenditure of time and labour, and is attended from its very nature with 
 intellectual evils of no inconsiderable moment." — Page 146. 
 
276 FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 him ;' which he proves from the custom of nations, from natural 
 equity, examples, &c. His minor is, that Clodius ' laid wait for 
 Milo ;' which he proves by his arms, guards, &c. ; and then in- 
 fers the conclusion, that ' it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius.' 
 
 " II. A Dilemma is an argument which divides the whole 
 into all its parts or members by a disjunctive proposition, 
 and then infers something concerning each part which is 
 finally inferred concerning the whole. 
 
 " Instances of this are frequent; as, In this life we must either 
 obey our vicious inclinations, or resist them : to obey them will 
 bring sin and sorrow ; to resist them is laborious and painful : 
 therefore, we cannot be perfectly free from sorrow or pain in 
 this life. 
 
 " A dilemma becomes faulty or ineffectual three ways : Eirst, 
 When the members of the division are not well opposed, or not 
 fully enumerated ; for then the major is false. Secondly, when 
 what is asserted concerning each part is not j ust ; for then the 
 minor is not true. Thirdly, when it may be retorted with equal 
 force upon him who utters it. 
 
 " There was a famous ancient instance of this case, wherein 
 a dilemma was retorted. Euathlus promised Protagoras a reward 
 when he had taught him the art of pleading ; and it was to be 
 paid the first day that he gained any cause in the court. After 
 a considerable time Protagoras goes to law with Euathlus for the 
 reward, and uses this dilemma : ' Either the cause will go on my 
 side, or on yours : if the cause goes on my side, you must pay 
 me, according to the sentence of the judge ; if the cause goes on 
 your side, you must pay me according to your bargain ; therefore, 
 whether the cause goes for me or against me, you must pay me 
 the reward.' But Euathlus retorted this dilemma, thus : ' Either 
 I shall gain the cause, or lose it : if I gain the cause, then 
 nothing will be due to you, according to the sentence of the 
 judge ; but if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to you, ac- 
 cording to my bargain ; therefore, whether I lose or gain the 
 cause, I will not pay you, for nothing will be due to you.' 
 
 " This sort of argument may be composed of three or more 
 members, and may be called a trilemma. 
 
 " III. A Prosyllogism is when two or more syllogisms 
 are so connected together, that the conclusion of the former 
 is the major or the minor of the following : 
 
 Example — 
 
 "Blood cannot think ; but the soul of man thinks; therefore, 
 the soul of man is not blood : but the soul of a brute is his blood, 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 277 
 
 according to the Scripture ; therefore, the soul of man is different 
 from the soul of a brute. 
 
 " IV. A Sorites is when several middle terms are chosen 
 to connect one another successively in several propositions, 
 till the last proposition connects its predicate with the first 
 subject. 
 
 " Thus : All men of revenge have their souls often uneasy ; un- 
 easy souls are a plague to themselves ; now to be one's own plague 
 is folly in the extreme ; therefore, all men of revenge are extreme 
 fools. The Apostle (Rom. viii. 29) gives us an instance of this 
 sort of argument, if it were reduced to exact form : ' Whom he 
 foreknew those he predestinated; whom he predestinated he 
 called ; whom he called he justified ; whom he justified he glori- 
 fied ; therefore, whom he foreknew he glorified.' 
 
 " To these syllogisms it may not be improper to add 
 Induction, which is, when from several particular proposi- 
 tions we infer one general ; as, The doctrine of the Soci- 
 nians cannot be proved from the Gospels, it cannot be 
 proved from the Acts of the Apostles, it cannot be proved 
 from the Epistles, nor the Book of Revelation ; therefore, 
 it cannot be proved from the New Testament." — Watts 
 Logic. 
 
 We shall here give an example of each of these compound 
 syllogisms : — 
 
 I. — The Epichirema. 
 
 Happiness is the result of certain habits ; 
 Man has the power of acquiring those habits ; 
 Therefore, man has the power of making himself happy. 
 
 The first and second of these propositions require to be 
 separately proved. Here is the proof : — 
 
 1. Happiness is the result of certain habits. 
 
 "We find ourselves making a part of an existing universe, 
 which neither ignorance nor wisdom, doubting nor confidence 
 can alter. If we know the order of which we are the subjects, 
 and conform to it, we are happy. 
 
 "The natural laws of this system are universal, invariable, 
 unbending : that physical and moral tendencies are the same all 
 over our world; and we have every reason to believe over all 
 
278 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 other worlds. Wherever moral beings keep in harmony with these 
 laws, there is no instance in which happiness is not the result. Men 
 never enjoy health, vigour, and felicity in disobedience to them. 
 The whole" infinite contrivance of everything above, around, and 
 within us, appears directed to certain benevolent issues ; and all 
 the laws of nature are in perfect harmony with the whole consti- 
 tution of men." 
 
 " In all positions man finds himself called upon, by the clear 
 indications of the organic laws, to take that free and cheerful 
 exercise, which is calculated to develope vigorous muscular, and 
 nervous and mental action. The peasant digs, and the hunter 
 chases for subsistence. ; and each finds at the same time health 
 and cheerfulness. The penalty of the violation of this organic 
 law by the indulgence of indolence is debility, enfeebled action 
 both bodily and mental, dyspepsia with all its painful train, and 
 finally death. On the other hand, the penalty of over exertion, 
 debauchery, intemperance, and excess of every species, comes in 
 other forms of disease and suffering. These laws, though not so 
 obviously and palpably so, are as invariable and inevitable, as 
 those of attraction or magnetism." 
 
 " If then, by any process of instruction, discipline, and mental 
 force, we can influence our circumstances, banish grief, create 
 cheerfulness, we can, in the same degree, reduce rules for the 
 pursuit of happiness to a system ; and make that system a matter 
 of science. Can we not do this ?" — Art of being Happy. 
 
 2. Man has the power of acquiring these habits. 
 
 <c The elements upon which we should operate are circum- 
 stances, habits, and modes of thinking and acting. The impulse 
 of all our actions from birth to death, the spring of all our move- 
 ments, is a conviction that, by the blessing and help of the Most 
 High, we can alter and improve our condition. We have a con- 
 sciousness stronger than our reason, that we can control our 
 circumstances. We can change our regimen and habits ; and, by 
 patience and perseverance, even our temperament. Every one can 
 cite innumerable and most melancholy instances of those who 
 have done it for evil. The habit of indulging in opium, tobacco, 
 ardent spirits, or any of the pernicious narcotics, soon reduces 
 the physical and mental constitution to that temperament in 
 which those stimulants are felt to be necessary. A corresponding 
 change is produced in the mind and disposition. The frequent 
 and regular use of medicine, though it may have been wholly 
 unnecessary at first, finally becomes an inveterate habit. No 
 phenomenon of physiology is more striking than the facility with 
 which the human constitution immediately commences a confor- 
 mity to whatever change of circumstances, as of climate, habit, 
 
BEASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 279 
 
 or aliment, we impose upon it. It is a most impressive proof, 
 that the Creator has formed man capable of becoming the creature 
 of all climates and conditions. 
 
 " If toe may change our temperament both of body and mind for 
 evil, as innumerable examples prove that we may, why not also for 
 good ? Our habits certainly are very much under our control : 
 and our modes of thinking, however little the process may have 
 been explained, are in some way shaped by our voluntary disci- 
 pline. We have powers of self-command, as every one who has 
 made the effort to exercise them must be conscious. We have 
 inexhaustible moral force for self-direction, if we will only recog- 
 nise and exert it. We owe most of our disgusts and disappoint- 
 ments, our corroding passions and unreasonable desires, our 
 fretfulness, gloom and self-torment, neither to nature nor fate ; 
 but to ourselves, and our reckless indifference to those rules that 
 ought to guide our pursuit of happiness. Let a higher education 
 and a truer wisdom detach us from our passions, dispel the mists 
 of opinion, aud silence the authority of example. Let us com- 
 mence the pursuit of happiness on the right course, and seek it 
 where alone it is to be found. Equanimity and moderation will 
 shed their mild radiance upon our enjoyments; and in our 
 reverses we shall summon resignation and force of character; 
 and, according to the sublime ancient maxim, we shall, in some 
 useful degree, become masters of events and of ourselves." — Ibid. 
 
 The conclusion follows, that man has the power of 
 making himself happy. 
 
 II. — The Dilemma. 
 
 The following are examples of the dilemma : — 
 
 " And there were four leprous men at the entering in of the 
 gate : and they said one to another, Why sit we here until we 
 die ? If we say, We will enter into the city, then the famine is 
 in the city, and we shall die there : and if we sit still here, we 
 die also. Now therefore come, and let us fall unto the host of 
 the Assyrians : if they save us alive, we shall live ; and if they 
 kill us, we shall but die. 3 ' — 2 Kings vii. 3, 4. See also Luke xx. 
 3_7 . John xviii. 23. 
 
 " I will always place restrictive laws in this dilemma : Either 
 you agree that you do produce scarcity, or you do not agree to 
 it. If you agree to it, you confess, as a consequence, that you 
 inflict upon the people all the harm you can. If you do not agree 
 to it, then you deny having restricted supply and raised prices, 
 and, consequently, you deny having favoured the producer. You 
 are either hurtful or inefficient ; you cannot be useful." — Bastiafs 
 Popular Fallacies regarding General Interests. 
 
280 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Mr. Burke uses the dilemma in arguing against public 
 debts. — " If/' says he, " Governmeuts provide for these 
 debts by public impositions, they perish by becoming 
 odious to the people. If they do not provide for them, 
 they will be undone by the efforts of the most dangerous 
 of all parties, I mean an extensive discontented monied in- 
 terest, injured and not destroyed." The objections to the 
 law which prohibits the payment of wages in goods, have 
 been made in the same form. " Either the law will be gene- 
 rally observed, or it will not. If it be generally observed, 
 it will frequently prevent the workmen from procuring 
 employment, since manufacturers may be able to pay 
 wages in goods when they are totally incapable of furnish- 
 ing money. If it be not generally observed, which is the 
 most probable case, it will be the means of giving an 
 advantage to those who are dishonest and loose in principle, 
 over the strictly upright and conscientious manufacturers, 
 without any benefit to the workmen." Colonel Torrens 
 employs the dilemma in arguing against the construction 
 of canals (or other public works) by the Government. " If 
 canals could be profitably opened, it would not only be super- 
 fluous and absurd, but positively pernicious for Government 
 to undertake them ; for in this case, private interests would 
 accomplish the object far more economically. If they could 
 not be opened with a profit, it would be pernicious to force 
 capital into an unproductive channel. In either case, there- 
 fore, nothing but mischief can result from the interference 
 of Government." 
 
 In the same form of reasoning Monsieur Say argues 
 against Sumptuary Laws. " Sumptuary Laws are super- 
 fluous and unjust. The indulgence proscribed is either 
 within the means of the individual or not. In the former 
 case it is an act of oppression to prohibit a gratification 
 involving no injury to others ; in the latter case, it is, at 
 all events, nugatory to do so, for there is no occasion for 
 legal interference where pecuniary circumstances alone are 
 an effectual bar." The Rev. Mr. Seymour, in his " Mornings 
 with the Jesuits," attacks the doctrine of priestly absolution 
 by way of dilemma : — " At the time of confession the 
 penitent is sincere, or he is not. If he is sincere in his 
 repentance, then God has already forgiven him, and abso- 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 281 
 
 lution by the priest is useless. If he is not sincere, the 
 absolution by the priest is of no value according to the 
 doctrine of the Catholic Church. Therefore, whether 
 the penitent is sincere or not, the priestly absolution is 
 useless." 
 
 The following is the language of Lord Beaumont, a 
 Catholic nobleman, with respect to the recent appointment 
 to English bishoprics by the Pope : — 
 
 " The Pope by his ill-advised measures has placed the Roman 
 Catholics in this country in a position where they must either 
 break with Rome, or violate their allegiance to the constitution 
 of these realms ; they must either consider the Papal bull as null 
 and void, or assert the right of a foreign prince to create, by his 
 sovereign authority, English titles, and to erect English bishop- 
 rics. To send a bishop to Beverley for the spiritual direction of 
 the Roman Catholic clergy in Yorkshire, and to create a see of 
 Beverley, are two very different things — the one is allowed by 
 the tolerant laws of the country ; the other requires territorial 
 dominion and sovereign power within the country. If you deny 
 that this country is a fief of Rome, and that the Pontiff has any 
 dominion over it, you deny his power to create a territorial see, 
 and you condemn the late bull as 'sound and fury, signifying 
 nothing.' If, on the contrary, you admit his power to raise 
 Westminster into an archbishopric, and Beverley into a bishopric, 
 you make over to the Pope a power which, according to the con- 
 stitution, rests solely with the Queen and her Parliament, and 
 thereby infringe the prerogative of the one and interfere with the 
 authority of the other. It is impossible to act up to the spirit of 
 the British constitution, and at the same time to acknowledge the 
 jurisdiction of the Pope in local matters. Such is the dilemma 
 in which the lately published bull places the English Roman 
 Catholic." 
 
 " Synods. — Synods will either be mere party affairs — in which 
 case they will produce a schism in each diocese ; or they will not 
 be party affairs — in which case they will bring the presiding 
 Bishop into collision with his clergy. If freedom of speech is 
 really bona fide allowed, the clergy will soon be found to be 
 at variance on many essential points with their bishops — if it is 
 not allowed, the clergy are degraded by attending synods." — 
 Morning Herald, 
 
 "Knowledge. — Let us, then, while engaged in the honour- 
 able pursuit of wealth, engage at the same time, with at least 
 equal eagerness, in the pursuit of knowledge. If Providence 
 should smile on our exertions to obtain wealth, our intellectual 
 
282 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 attainments will enable ns to enjoy that wealth with elegance 
 and taste — to employ that wealth, so as to promote the happiness 
 of others — to move with honour in that higher class of society to 
 which our wealth will introduce us— and to discharge faithfully 
 any public duties which our country's voice may call us to per- 
 form. But if, on the other hand, the winds of heaven should 
 scatter our ships, the fire devour our storehouses, or the sons of 
 wickedness rob us of the fruits of our industry, — still, amid the 
 wreck of our fortunes, our intellectual and moral worth will 
 secure the respect of those around us, and we shall possess within 
 ourselves a source of happiness more pure, more serene, more 
 constant than all the wealth and all the luxuries of India can 
 supply. c Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man 
 that getteth understanding. Eor the merchandise of it is better 
 than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine 
 gold.'" — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 III. — The Trilemma. 
 
 It has been remarked as a characteristic of the late Sir 
 Robert Peel, that in introducing his measures to the House 
 of Commons, he often used the trilemma. " Three courses 
 are before us — to go backward, to stand still, to go forward. 
 We cannot go backward ; we cannot stand still ; we must, 
 then, go forward." 
 
 ".Go and say unto David, Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee 
 three things ; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto 
 thee. So Gad came to David, and told him, and said unto him, 
 Shall seven years of famine come unto thee in thy land ? or wilt 
 thou flee three months before thine enemies, while they pursue 
 thee ? or that there be three days' pestilence in thy land ? now 
 advise, and see what answer I shall return to him that sent me. 
 And David said unto Gad, I am in a great strait : let us fall now 
 into the hand of the Lord ; for his mercies are great : and let me 
 not fall into the hand of men. So the Lord sent a pestilence upon 
 Israel from the morning even to the time appointed : and there 
 died of the people from Dan even to Beer-sheba seventy thousand 
 men." — 2 Sam. xxiv. 12 — 15. 
 
 Sometimes a subject is divided into three parts, with the 
 view of disproving two of these parts in order to affirm the 
 third. Thus, workmen must have fair wages — not too high 
 or too low. 
 
 "And each of these employers is forced to pay each of his 
 workmen as high wages as the work which the workman does,- 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 283 
 
 and the price which goods sell for, will allow. For if he paid 
 less, his workmen would leave him to get better wages else- 
 where ; and if he paid more, he would lose instead of gaining, 
 by employing them ; and if he were to pay every workman alike, 
 whatever were the quantity or goodness of the work done by 
 him, it is certain that in most cases he would be paying either 
 too much or too little : too much to the bad workmen, and too 
 little to the good ones. Besides this, when workmen are not 
 paid according to their merit, there are scarcely any good ones : 
 because when they see that they are no gamers by working well, 
 and working hard, they all become idle or careless." — Easy Lessons 
 on Money Matters. 
 
 Mr. Gilfillan thus describes the Scripture idea of the 
 Universe : — 
 
 "There are three methods of contemplating the universe. 
 These are the material, the shadowy, and the mediatorial. The 
 materialist looks upon it as the only reality. It is a vast solid 
 fact, for ever burning and rolling around, below and above him. 
 The idealist, on the contrary, regards it as a shadow, a mode of 
 mind, an infinite projection of his own thought. The man who 
 stands between the two extremes, looks on nature as a great but 
 not ultimate or everlasting scheme of mediation or compromise 
 between pure and absolute spirit and the incarnate soul of man. 
 To the materialist there is an altar, the lighted, heaven-high, but 
 no God. To the idealist there is a God, but no altar. He who 
 holds the theory of mediation has the Great Spirit as his God, 
 and the universe as the altar on which he presents the gift of his 
 worship or poetic praise." — Gilfillan 's Bards of the Bible. 
 
 The following trilemma has been employed in defence of 
 the writings of the Old Testament: — " If the books of the 
 Old Testament be forgeries, they must have been invented 
 by either the Gentiles, the Christians, or the Jews. They 
 could not have been invented by the Gentiles, because they 
 were all ignorant of the history and sacred rites of the 
 Hebrews; they could not have been invented by the Chris- 
 tians, as no Christians existed previous to the introduction 
 of Christianity ; they could not have been invented by the 
 Jews, because they contain difficult laws and rules, and 
 relate all their idolatrous crimes and punishments, which 
 would not have been inserted if the writings had been 
 forged by Jews ; therefore, these writings could not have 
 been forged at all." 
 
284 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 IV. — The Prosyllogism. 
 
 Happiness is the result of certain habits ; 
 Man has the power of acquiring those habits ; 
 Therefore, man has the power of making himself happy. 
 
 Man has the power of making himself happy • 
 Every wise man uses this power ; 
 Therefore, every wise man is a happy man. 
 
 V. — The Sorites. 
 
 " Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, 
 how say some among you that there is no resurrection of 
 the dead 1 But if there be no resurrection of the dead, 
 then is Christ not risen : and if Christ be not risen, then 
 is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, 
 and we are found false witnesses of God ; because we have 
 testified of God that he raised up Christ : whom he raised 
 not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead 
 rise not, then is not Christ raised." — 1 Cor. xv. 12 — 16. 
 
 This argument may be placed in the form of a sorites, 
 thus : — 
 
 If Christ rose from the dead, it must have been through a 
 divine power. 
 
 If Christ was raised from the dead by divine power, it proved 
 that he was a prophet sent of God. 
 
 If he was a prophet sent of God, then all his predictions will 
 be accomplished. 
 
 If all his predictions will be accomplished, then his prediction 
 that the dead shall be raised will be accomplished. 
 
 Therefore, if Christ rose from the dead, the dead will be 
 raised. 
 
 Other Scriptural examples may be seen in Rom. viii. 
 29, 30; andx. 13—15. 
 
 The following is the train of reasoning followed by those 
 who adopt the principle of the Act of 1844 with reference 
 to the administration of the currency : — 
 
 A favourable state of the Exchange will cause an importation 
 of gold. 
 
 This importation of gold will cause a corresponding issue of 
 bank notes. 
 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 28-5 
 
 This issue of bank notes will cause a general advance in the 
 prices of commodities. 
 
 This general advance of prices will check exportation and 
 encourage importation. 
 
 This decrease of exports and increase of imports will turn the 
 exchanges against us. 
 
 The exchange being turned against us, will cause a demand for 
 the exportation of gold. 
 
 This demand for the exportation of gold will cause the notes 
 to be taken to the bank of England, and payment demanded in 
 gold. 
 
 The notes in circulation will thus be diminished, and the cur- 
 rency will again be placed in a sound state. 
 
 The sorites, it will be seen, embraces a number of argu- 
 ments connected together. It is therefore called a chain 
 of reasoning. It resembles a chain in this, that if one 
 link be broken, the whole argument is destroyed. In the 
 example we have just given, the third link is denied by 
 Mr. Tooke, who contends that an increase in the amount 
 of the circulation has no effect on the prices of commo- 
 dities. Were this doctrine demonstrated, the chain would 
 be broken, and the whole reasoning annihilated.* 
 
 The sorites is the form of reasoning employed in mathe- 
 matical deductions. If you pay attention, I will give you 
 an illustration of this, and explain it so clearly, that you 
 will be able to understand all the operations, even though 
 you may not have learned algebra. I take the question 
 from one of my old school-books : 
 
 "When first the marriage knot was tied 
 
 Betwixt my wife and me, 
 My age did hers as far exceed 
 
 As three times three does three ; 
 But when ten years and half ten years 
 
 We man and wife had been, 
 Her age came up as near to mine 
 
 As eight is to sixteen. 
 
 Now tell me, I pray, 
 
 What were our ages on the wedding-day ?" 
 
 I will presume at starting that you know the sign -f- 
 denotes plus or more, the sign — denotes minus or less, 
 
 * "A chain may be composed of bo^h strong and wenk links, but its strength as 
 a chain can never be greater than that of the weakest imk in it." — Bailey, p. 58. 
 
2SQ LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 X denotes multiplication, and = denotes equality. Now 
 then we will begin. The figures 1, 2, &c., at your left 
 hand express the number of operations. 
 
 1. Let the age of the wife on the wedding-day be represented 
 by the letter x. 
 
 2. Then, as the husband's age to the wife's is as "three times 
 three to three," his age must be three times x, say 3 x. 
 
 3. Ten years and half ten years are equal to fifteen years. 
 
 4. At the end of fifteen years the wife's age will be x + 15, 
 chat is, x added to 15. 
 
 5. And the husband's age will be 3 x + 15, that is, three times 
 x added to 15. 
 
 6. By the question, the wife's and the husband's ages should 
 at this period be in the proportion of 8 to 16. As 8 is to 16 so 
 is x + 15 to 3 x + 15 ; expressed thus ; 
 
 8 : 16 : : x + 15 : 3 x + 15. 
 
 7. Now you know by the rule of three, that if the two ex- 
 tremes (that is, the first and the fourth terms) be multiplied 
 together, the product will be the same as the product of the 
 multiplication of the two means (that is, the second and third 
 terms). Now, 
 
 3 x + 15 multiplied by 8 give 24 x + 120, and 
 x + 15 multiplied by 16 give 16 x -f 240. 
 
 8. As these two products are equal to each other, we thus 
 form our equation ; 
 
 24 # + 120 = 16.?+ 240. 
 You will read the equation thus, — Twenty-four x plus 120 equal 
 sixteen x plus 240. 
 
 9. Our uext operation will be to transpose the 16 # to the other 
 side of the equation. In doiug this we must of course change 
 the sign. As it is now plus, we must make it minus. Our equa- 
 tion will then stand thus ; 
 
 24# — 16 x + 120 = 240; 
 that is, 24 x minus 16 x plus 120 equals 240. 
 
 10. We will now deduct the — 16 x from the 24 x. The equa- 
 tion will stand thus ; 
 
 8 x + 120 = 240. 
 
 11. "We will now transpose the 120 to the other side of the 
 equation, changing its sign of course, thus ; 
 
 8 x = 240 — 120 ; 
 that is, 8 x equals 240 minus 120. 
 
 12. We will now deduct the —120 from the 240, and the 
 equation will stand thus ; 
 
 _ 8.? = 120. 
 
 13. We will now divide both sides of the equation by 8, and 
 we shall have, 1 x == 15. 
 
 ft 
 
REASONING BY COMPOUND SYLLOGISM. 28T 
 
 14. Now then we have discovered the value of x ; that is, we 
 have found that the age of the wife on the wedding-day was 15 
 years. And as the husband's age was as three times three to 
 three, his age must have been 45. Then after ten years and half 
 ten years— that is, 15 years — the wife's age would be 30 and the 
 husband's 60, which is as eight is to sixteen. 
 
 You see what a beautiful process of reasoning we have 
 gone through, and with what certainty we have arrived at 
 the result. This is called mathematical reasoning. It 
 is the kind of reasoning employed in Algebra, Geome- 
 try, Astronomy, Navigation, and the other Mathematical 
 Sciences. 
 
 I will close this Section by another problem : — 
 
 " "While I was coursing on the forest grounds, 
 Up starts a hare before my two greyhounds : 
 The dogs, being light of foot, did fairly run, 
 Unto her fifteen rods just twenty-one. 
 The distance that she started up before 
 "Was fourscore fifteen rods just "and no more. 
 I pray you, scholar, unto me declare, 
 How far they ran before they caught the hare ?" 
 
 1. For the distance they ran put x. 
 
 2. Then the distance the hare ran will be x — 95 rods. 
 
 3. Then as 21 is to 15 so is x to x — 95. 
 
 21 : 15 : : x : x — 95 
 
 4. Then multiply the two extremes together and the two 
 means together, and we have an equation, thus : — 
 
 21 x — 1995 = 15 x. 
 
 5. 21 x = 15 x + 1995. 
 
 6. 21 x — 15 x = 1995. 
 
 7. &x = 1995. 
 
 8. x = 332|rods. 
 
 Distance run by the dogs, 332| rods. 
 Do. (95 less) run by the hare, 237| do. 
 As 21 is to 15 so is 3321 to 237i 
 
28S LOGIC FOR THE MILLION, 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 SERIES OF REASONINGS. 
 
 We have shown that a chain of reasoning consists cf a 
 number of reasons so connected with each other, that the 
 failure of one reason would destroy the whole argument. 
 A series of reasoning denotes a number of reasons all 
 bearing to prove the same sentiment, but so far uncon- 
 nected with each other, that the failure of one reason does 
 not weaken the force of the others. 
 
 It is impossible to lay down rules whereby a number of 
 reasons may be so arranged as to produce the best effect 
 in establishing the point for which they are adduced. 
 Indeed, people who are sufficiently skilled in logic to be 
 able to maintain their sentiments in a set discourse, must 
 have acquired that systematic habit of mind which will sug- 
 gest the best rules for the arrangement of their thoughts. 
 For the sake of the young we will transcribe a few rules, 
 which have chiefly a reference to the writing of themes, 
 published by an author who has had great experience in 
 tuition : — 
 
 "In treating of method in reasoning, it is common to divide it 
 into two kinds, analysis and synthesis. All, however, that seems 
 necessary to be said in this treatise concerning these distinctions, 
 is, that in the mode of reasoning called synthesis, the proposition 
 is the conclusion sought ; but in the reasoning called analysis, 
 the conclusion cannot be previously proposed ; for till the argu- 
 ments on which it depends are unfolded, it is presumed to be 
 unknown. In reasoning synthetically, the arguer knows before- 
 hand what is to be established : and he may, at his option, pro- 
 pose it first, and add his arguments afterwards, or he may neglect 
 to state the intended proposition, till he has brought forward 
 what he has to advance in support of it. In reasoning analyti- 
 cally, the arguer lays down nothing to be proved, nor has he any 
 foreknown conclusion in view, but he goes on, unfolding one 
 argument after another, till he reaches a conclusion. Analysis, 
 therefore, is the way by which we attain truth ; synthesis, that 
 by which we communicate it. We pursue the method of analysis, 
 when, not having formed our judgment on a subject, we tliink to 
 ourselves in order to form one : we pursue the method of synthesis, 
 
SERIES OP REASONINGS. 289 
 
 when our judgment is formed, and we undertake to convince 
 others. It is scarcely necessary to add that in writing themes, 
 the principle on which we proceed is synthesis. 
 
 "Before anything more particular is advanced on the method 
 of writing themes, it must be mentioned, that the manner in 
 which a theme is given out, determines what latitude is allowed 
 to the writer in treating it. When a theme is given out thus — 
 ' On education/ ' On a knowledge of the world ' — the theme may 
 be called unlimited ; for the writer is left to lay down any propo- 
 sitions to be proved which he may think fit, provided they bear a 
 due relation to the subject. But a particular proposition being 
 laid down to be proved, necessarily limits the theme; as for 
 instance, when a theme is given out thus — ' Man is the creature 
 of education ;' ' A proper knowledge of the world is favourable 
 to virtue.' This kind of theme is called a thesis, — a Greek word 
 signifying position or proposition; — in the plural, theses. An 
 unlimited theme generally contains many theses ; for whenever 
 the writer goes into a new branch of his subject, he must lay 
 down, or have in view, some new proposition, — that is, a thesis. 
 In a limited theme there is but one main proposition, to which 
 every other ought to be subservient. This main proposition is 
 called, by distinction, the thesis, and the theme which is written 
 in support of it, takes the same name." 
 
 " Suppose the theme given out to be c Eriendship ;' — teachers 
 recommend the pupil to consider it under the following heads : — 
 the Definition ; the Cause ; the state in ancient and in modern 
 times ; the Advantages ; the Disadvantages. Proper answers to 
 the following questions will form such a theme as is here 
 required : — 
 
 "1. What is friendship? 2. What is the cause of friendship? 
 3. What was anciently thought of friendship, and what examples 
 are on record ? 4. What is friendship often found to be in these 
 days? 5. What are the benefits of true friendship? 6. What 
 are the evils of false friendship ?" 
 
 " When, instead of an unlimited title, a thesis is given out to 
 be proved, teachers recommend the following heads as helps to 
 find the arguments : — the Proposition ; the Reason ; the Confir- 
 mation ; the Simile ; the Testimony ; the Example ; the Conclu- 
 sion. Under the first head, the writer restates his thesis in such 
 a shape, that the arguments he designs to use will easily connect 
 with it. Under the second, he brings forth the strongest direct 
 internal argument he can find in proof of it, — that is, from the 
 nature of the thing, from enumeration, from the cause, the effect, 
 the adjuncts, the antecedents, or the consequents. Under the 
 third, he tries to strengthen his proof by showing the absurdity 
 of the contrary proposition, or by advancing some fresh argument 
 of whatever kind that is not taken from the same source as tha 
 
290 LOGIC EOS THE MILLION. 
 
 preceding, and does not anticipate those that are to follow. 
 Under the fourth, he uses an argument from similitude. These 
 are internal arguments. Under the next two heads, he brings 
 forward testimonies or authorities from authors of repute, and 
 facts from history. And lastly, he forms his conclusion not 
 merely in the words of the proposition with which he set out, 
 (though in strictness the conclusion would be nothing more,) but 
 with some practical inference or inferences appended to it." — 
 Practical Logic, or Hints to Theme- Writers. By B. H. Smart. 
 
 We shall now present the reader with some examples of 
 propositions being proved by series of reasonings. 
 
 I. — The Industrial Exhibition. 
 
 From an Address delivered by the Earl of Carlisle at the Meeting 
 at Westminster. 
 
 "The object of the undertaking was too generally known to 
 call for explanation, and too generally approved of throughout the 
 country to stand in need of defence. He was not a member of 
 the Royal Commission to which the office had been entrusted of 
 superintending the management and execution of the project, 
 and he was therefore not called upon to enlighten them with 
 reference to the specific details. He could only make the most 
 general remarks, and submit the most general grounds which, as 
 he conceived, this undertaking put forward for their support. 
 The first ground was one of a very general character, because it 
 rested on the constitution of our common nature. He liked the 
 occasional recurrence of celebrations, pomps, festivities, com- 
 memorations — call them by whatever name you please. They 
 seemed to him in accordance with the feelings and instincts im- 
 planted in the human breast. He did not call to muid any 
 country or era which had dispensed with them. In the primitive 
 east, both in ancient and in our own times, they were, for the 
 most part, associated with ceremonies of worship, with uncouth, 
 and too often horrid rites. In more enlightened and civilized 
 Greece, they consisted of public games, in displays of physical 
 strength, ennobled, it was true, by the susceptibility of her people 
 to all the forms of taste and beauty, and recorded in immortal 
 song. Among the sterner Romans they generally accompanied 
 the long train of martial triumphs up the steep ascent of the 
 Capitol, or the more degrading spectacles which summoned the 
 men, and, alas ! the women of Rome, to witness the dying throes 
 of the gladiator, or the bloody struggles of captives and wild 
 beasts. In our own age and country they naturally wore a softer 
 aspect ; but still, in his judgment, had been too much confined 
 to the easier and wealthier classes, or connected with the pursuits 
 
SERIES OF REASONINGS. 291 
 
 of frivolity and dissipation. It seemed, therefore, but natural 
 and becoming at the period of the world at which we were 
 arrived, that industry, that skill, that enterprise should in their 
 turn have their own ovation, their own triumph, their own high 
 holiday, where the workmen and workwomen of the world might 
 enjoy a day's pause from their engrossing toils for the purpose of 
 seeing what their fellow-workmen and workwomen were doing 
 and could do all the world over — that they might see, not barbaric 
 rites, but useful inventions ; not exhibitions of physical prowess 
 in the prize ring, or the foot-race, but results which interested 
 the mind and elevated the soul; not suppliant provinces and 
 chained captives, but the pursuits of peace and of civilization — not 
 crowded saloons and heated theatres, but an arena where all ranks 
 might mingle, where all might learn, and all might profit by what 
 they saw. This was one of the grounds which the undertaking 
 put forward for support. It might be reckoned one, perhaps, 
 rather of a sentimental and fanciful character ; he would proceed 
 to one somewhat more practical. The exhibition, carried into 
 effect on the scale proposed, would give people in. all pursuits and 
 professions, in all classes and callings, the opportunity of examin- 
 ing and ascertaining methods by which the work which formed 
 the daily business of their lives might be expedited, facilitated, 
 assisted, and improved. There might be the textures which best 
 suited the climate in which we lived. There might be the tools 
 and implements calculated to lighten or shorten labour. There 
 might be the discoveries in mechanics which should mould to the 
 purpose of man the unvarying attributes of matter, space, and 
 time ; discoveries of which we, perhaps, had long been in the un- 
 conscious need, but which had long been beneficially adopted in 
 other countries. He could not but look forward with pleasure 
 and hope to the evidences which our countrymen would afford of 
 the distinguished progress they had made in the pursuits of 
 civilized life, and especially in those which interested most per- 
 manently the well-being and comfort of the millions. And though, 
 he could not forget, on this occasion, as he could not forget on 
 any occasion, his long connexion with a district which had attained 
 a marked eminence in all these departments of production — the 
 West Riding of Yorkshire, the region of our cutlery, of our hard- 
 ware, of our great woollen and worsted manufactures — yet he 
 must say, that he not only anticipated advantage to the country 
 from our victories on this occasion, but also from our defeats. It 
 was only when we could compare and put side by side what we 
 could not do and what we were not with what we could do and 
 with what we were, that we could attain the true measure of our 
 superiority and of our deficiencies. Nations, equally with indi- 
 viduals, should say, after Brutus, — 
 
 ' I should be glad to learn of better men.' " 
 2 
 
LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 II. — The Industrial Exhibition and the London 
 Shopkeepers. 
 
 " In what way can the Exhibition have injured trade ? Let us 
 place the matter steadily before us for consideration, and ask 
 ourselves by what conceivable means the vast addition that has 
 been made to the floating population of London can possibly take 
 money out of the pockets of our tradesmen ? Here are the rail- 
 way termini and steamboat quays daily pouring upon the town 
 their thousands of visitors to the Crystal Palace. How can the 
 presence of these almost innumerable multitudes be said to injure 
 trade? Granted that considerable bodies of the labouring popu- 
 lation come and go in the same day, even these have given a 
 considerable stimulus to the receipts of the railways, and of the 
 ordinary conveyances which ply about our streets. Thousands 
 no doubt come and go, but thousands remain for twenty-four, for 
 forty- eight hours, for a week. About 50,000 persons daily visit 
 the Crystal Palace. We presume that these sojourners are 
 affected by the ordinary wants of humanity. They must eat 
 something, they must drink something, they must sleep some- 
 where. It is certain that the great bulk of the number will soon 
 have returned to their homes, yet they will be replaced by others, 
 who will be replaced by others in their turn. Now, is it natural 
 to suppose that the ladies of the different parties, old or young, 
 will be indisposed to carry back from ' town ' such articles of 
 finery as may be best calculated for the enslavement of the 
 country-side? We will not confine the observation to ladies 
 alone, for we have yet to learn that men who come up from the 
 provinces to make holiday, with a reasonable amount of ready 
 money in their pockets, do not usually succumb to temptation 
 before the brilliant shop-fronts of the metropolis. A watch must 
 be purchased for one fair cousin, a dress for another, and so on. 
 Each lays in a stock of presents for absent friends, according 
 to his means and degree — the selfish fellows' buy for themselves. 
 We are surely not exaggerating matters, for we find, on turning 
 to the traffic returns of the railways for the past week, as com- 
 pared with the corresponding week of last year, that the London 
 and NorthWestern has taken 66,561/?. as against 51,492/. Now, 
 all due abatement made for other causes which might have stimu- 
 lated traffic, is there not here enough to show the nature of the 
 addition that must have been made to the floating population of 
 the metropolis during the past week ? The past week is merely 
 a repetition of other weeks that have preceded it, and a sample 
 of others that are to follow. 
 
 "We have not dwelt upon the influx of foreigners that has 
 actually taken place, although a considerable increase in the usual 
 number of our continental visitors must, of necessity, exercise a 
 
SERIES OF REASONINGS. 293 
 
 very important influence upon trade. Granting that the ex- 
 penditure of each of them individually may be but slight, yet, 
 taken collectively, that expenditure must represent a vast amount 
 of consumption, and consequently of profit to the London trades- 
 man. Common sense, then, would tell us a priori that a great 
 concourse of people within the limits of a particular town must" 
 exercise a very beneficial influence upon trade. When we come 
 to try the case by other tests, how does it stand ? Were the 
 streets of London ever more crowded than during the present 
 Exhibition year? Are they not swarming with carriages and 
 throngs of well-dressed people? Is there not more than the 
 usual difficulty in getting served in any shop which has attained 
 a celebrity in any particular department of trade ? Has the 
 ' season,' as it is called, been a bad one for those tradesmen who 
 minister to the luxurious tastes of the fashionable world ? If you 
 passed at night through any of the quarters of the town in which 
 Eashion holds her seat, you might see mansion after mansion 
 lighted up, and find to your sore discomfort that the usual strings 
 of carriages 'stopped the way.' A bare reference to the columns 
 of the public journals hi which such matters are usually recorded 
 would be sufficient to show that never, as far as entertainments 
 go, has a gayer season been known. Of all the ill-timed and 
 illogical cries that ever were raised, this one of injury to the 
 trade of London in consequence of the Great Exhibition is the 
 most fatuous and the most untrue. We should be curious to 
 have in a succinct form a detailed account of the miseries of some 
 London shopkeeper who could establish any connexion between 
 his losses and the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. Still more 
 should we feel obliged to any one who could favour us with any 
 approximation to the per contra." — Times, Aug. 11, 1851. 
 
 III. — The Permanency of Modern Civilization. 
 
 "A youthful student, returning from a journey which he had 
 undertaken for the purpose ot viewing some newly-discovered 
 Roman coins, became fatigued, and reclining beneath the spread- 
 ing branches of an oak, he sank into a profound meditation. His 
 thoughts were directed by the subject of his recent investigations. 
 ' Yes,' he exclaimed, ' it must be so ; the civilization of the mo- 
 derns, like that of the ancients, will decline : it is the law of 
 nature. The flower at my feet will wither by to-morrow's noon. 
 This forest will in a few revolving months be bereft of its foliage. 
 The sun is now on its decline, and will shortly fall below the 
 horizon. The surface of the earth, now clothed with beauty, 
 will soon be stripped of all its charms, by the ruffian hand of 
 winter. Science is no doubt subject to similar revolutions. Where 
 are the glories of Egypt and Constantinople ? where now is the 
 
29 i LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 learning of Persia and Arabia ? and what are the modern charac- 
 ters of Athens and of Rome ? Ah, Rome, how art thou fallen ! 
 We seek thy honours beneath the clod : the monuments of thy 
 greatness are buried in the earth. How many of thy arts are 
 lost, never to be restored ! Neither eminent science, nor exten- 
 sive dominion, nor military prowess, could prevent thy fall ! And 
 what a long and dreary night succeeded thy meridian splendour ? 
 The lapse of ages, impelling wave after wave, has hitherto over- 
 whelmed all human greatness. Modern science will no doubt be 
 subject to a similar doom, and sink into the abyss of oblivion. 
 Yes, in a few years all the discoveries in art will be forgotten — 
 all our labours in science will be unknown — our exertions in 
 literature will be buried in darkness. The world will again be 
 immersed in barbarism, and exhibit no more traces of its present 
 civilization, than is to be found of the loveliness of summer after 
 the devastations of a winter's storm.' 
 
 " An aged philosopher who had overheard this soliloquy, now 
 approached : ' My son, 5 he exclaimed, c despair not of the per- 
 manency of modern science : the waves of time have indeed washed 
 away the frail fabrics of ancient institutions ; the leaves of ancient 
 lore have, it is true, withered away, and even the tree was 
 plucked up by its roots by the hand of the Barbarian : but does 
 that justify the supposition, that modern science will share a 
 similar fate ? Listen now to me, and perceive how different are 
 the cases from each other : — 
 
 " ' Knowledge was never general among the ancients : a few 
 favoured individuals were admitted to the temple of science, and 
 were initiated into the knowledge of what were then her myste- 
 ries ; but the mass of the people were excluded, and remained 
 untaught : the necessary time and expense were an eternal bar 
 to their attainment of knowledge. With us education will soon 
 be universal : knowledge, like the light of heaven, is now poured 
 over all the land. Had the mass of the people been educated, 
 when the barbarians overthrew the Roman empire, the conquered 
 would soon have civilized the conquerors, and science would have 
 been preserved. The Tartars conquered the Chinese; the Romans 
 conquered the Greeks : but these events did not destroy, but ex- 
 tended the triumphs of civilization. 
 
 " ' The ancients were unacquainted with the art of printing. 
 The student, in ancient times, attended the lectures of his 
 master, and from his oral instructions obtained a knowledge of 
 the science he wished to learn. The arts of ancient times were 
 enclosed in manuscripts, and placed in the libraries of the schools; 
 hence, when these libraries were destroyed, all knowledge was 
 destroyed. Then science was placed in large reservoirs, and 
 those who had leisure and means, might resort thither and drink: 
 but the art of printing has supplied aqueducts, and conveyances, 
 
SERIES OF REASONINGS. 205 
 
 fcy which, the streams of knowledge are conducted to every 
 private habitation. 
 
 " ' The art of war, too, has undergone an alteration, which is 
 friendly to civilization. In ancient times, poor nations conquered 
 the wealthy, and the barbarous those which were civilized. The 
 invention of gunpowder, by rendering wars less frequent and less 
 destructive, has been productive of advantage to mankind. Our 
 fortified places cannot now be taken by barbarians. War is now 
 expensive and systematic ; and in the conflict all the advantages 
 are on the side of the wealthy and the civilized. Civilization 
 found the Genius of War in a savage state ; she taught him, and 
 disciplined him ; and now, in return, the Genius of War protects 
 and extends the empire of Civilization. 
 
 " ' But, were we less able to repel the attacks of barbarians, 
 from whence are those barbarians to arrive ? Where are now the 
 forests, from which, as from a hive, they are to issue forth, and 
 devastate civilized Europe ? Is it from the empire of the Czar ? 
 Is it not the most thinly populated country of Europe ? And 
 even had it been more populous, or more powerful, has it mani- 
 fested any desire to exterminate the arts ? 
 
 " ' But suppose, in defiance of all probability, that a horde of 
 savages may again issue from the regions of the North : suppose 
 them to be successful, and to effect what Napoleon, with all his 
 gigantic powers and his immense resources, could never effect — 
 the subjugation of Europe, — have we not another advantage 
 over the ancients ? Have we not an immense navigation ? Have 
 we not numerous ships ? Could we not take our arts and our 
 sciences and carry them to distant nations, to which barbarians 
 could not follow us ? No ; the lamp of science could not be 
 extinguished — it would be rekindled in a distant hemisphere, and 
 its piercing rays would illumine the seats of its former glory. 5 " 
 — The Author. 
 
 IV. — The Advantages op Music. 
 
 " Music exists not only in the lower, but also in the higher, 
 grades of creation. We laugh, and cry, and speak music. 
 Everybody is more or less of a musician, though he knows it not. 
 A laugh is produced by repeating in quick succession two sounds 
 which differ from each other by a single whole tone. A cry aris- 
 ing from pain, grief, or bereavement, is the utterance of two 
 sounds differing from each other half a tone. A yawn runs down 
 a whole octave before it ceases. A cough may be expressed by 
 musical intervals. A question camiot be asked without that 
 change of tone which musicians call a fifth, a sixth, or an eighth. 
 This is the music of nature. There is not a man who speaks five 
 minutes without gliding through the whole gamut, only in speak- 
 
296 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 ing 3 the tones, from not being* protracted, slide imperceptibly into 
 each other. In short, every sound of the human lip is loaded 
 with music." 
 
 "Music was part of the preparatory Pythagorean discipline. 
 Aristides says, ' Music is calculated to compose the mind and fit 
 it for instruction ;' Picus Mirandola, ' Music produces like effects 
 on the mind as medicine on the body;' Plato, 'Music to the 
 mind is as air to the body ;' Homer, ' Achilles was taught music 
 in order to moderate his passions ;' Aulus Gellius, ' Sciatica is 
 cured by music ;' Milton, ' If wise men are not such, music has 
 a great power and disposition to make them gentle;' Chry- 
 sostom, ' God has joined music with worship, that we might with 
 cheerfulness and readiness of mind express his praise in sacred 
 hymns ;' Bishop Home, ' The heart may be weaned from every- 
 thing base and mean, and elevated to everything excellent and 
 praiseworthy, by sacred music' Martin Luther was deeply 
 affected by music. One day two of Luther's friends, on visiting 
 him, found him in deep despondency, and prostrate on the floor. 
 They struck up one of the solemn and beautiful tunes which the 
 Reformer loved. His melancholy fled ; he rose and joined his 
 friends, adding, ' The devil hates good music' " 
 
 "Music has a wonderfully soothing influence : purer than 
 painting, more ethereal than poetry, and the least sensuous of 
 any, it exercises the greatest power over the human mind. Are 
 you, young men, worn out with the toils of the day, and anxious 
 to drown the lingering echoes of the roar of the wheels and ma- 
 chinery of mammon ? Learn to sing, or play on the violin, 
 sacred anthems, airs, and tunes. Amusement or relaxation you 
 must have. Try this ; it will exert on you all the power and none 
 of the poison of opium. Singing keeps off pulmonary disease. 
 Disease of the lungs often arises from failing fully to inflate them. 
 Now moderate exercise of the voice is just as necessary to the 
 health of the whole chest as exercise of the whole body to its 
 healthy development. Music has also an inspiring power. If 
 you feel dull, sleepy, and exhausted, a lively tune on the violin 
 will rouse your nerves, and restore them to harmony. Don't 
 have recourse to wine or alcohol ; these will aggravate, not cure. 
 Try music ; it is essentially teetotal, and yet inspiriting." 
 
 " Adam and Eve, as sketched by Milton, delighted in song ; 
 they sang many a beautiful duet, and knew not what discord was 
 till sin entered and death by sin. The music of the spheres is 
 intimated by David when he states, 'The heavens declare the 
 glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handywork.' The 
 children of Israel, on their escape from the reach of Pharaoh, 
 sang, 'I will sing unto the Lord, for he hath triumphed gloriously;' 
 ' and Miriam the prophetess, and all the women went out after 
 her with timbrels.' David was a great musical reformer ; at the 
 
 to 
 
 id 
 
SERIES OP REASONINGS. 297 
 
 close of his reign four thousand Levites praised the Lord. When 
 the ark was brought into Solomon's temple, 'It came to pass 
 that the trumpeters and singers were as one in praising and 
 thanking the Lord : and when they lifted up their voice with 
 trumpets, and cymbals, and instruments of music, saying, For he 
 is good, his mercy endureth for ever ; and when all the children 
 of Israel saw it they bowed themselves, with their faces to the 
 ground, upon the pavement, and worshipped and praised the 
 Lord, saying, Eor he is good, for his mercy endureth for ever.' " 
 
 " It has been urged that the study of music leads to dissipa- 
 tion, that musical, men are not of the most temperate or domestic 
 habits. If it be so, it is deeply to be deplored ; but surely there 
 is no essential connexion between music and wine : Apollo and 
 Bacchus are not Siamese twins : wine-glasses, and quavers, and 
 semibreves, are not sisters, nor even second cousins. In the 
 natural world, Music and Temperance are plainly sisters. The 
 blackbird, thrush, canary, and nightingale, all exquisitely musical, 
 drink nothing but water, and smoke nothing but fresh air. A 
 grove or wood in spring echoes with feathered musicians, each a 
 teetotaller, temperate without a pledge, and ever singing and 
 never dry." — Lecture on Music, by the Rev. Dr. Gumming. 
 
 V. — Congregational Chanting. 
 
 " We go back to the ancient Jewish Church ; that Church, we 
 know, was formed, presided over, and guided in all things by God. 
 I don't myself see that the Jews could know anything at all about 
 our kind of psalmody. Their psalmody must have been a species of 
 chanting, because, from the very nature of Hebrew poetry, it could 
 not have been anything else. The poetry and sacred psalms of the 
 ancient Church were not in common metre, long metre, and short 
 metre, such as you have : not verses with exact number of feet and 
 syllables that can be sung to a tune. The poetry of the Bible is 
 rather in thought, though it is also in expression. There is an idea, 
 and then there is the echo of the idea ; and so the poetry goes on, 
 idea contrasting, or repeating, or illustrating idea, and thus we have 
 parallel lines. These lines, however, are not of the same length ; 
 hence the very construction of the song prevented its being sung to 
 a tune like our psalm-tune, and so the praise of the ancient Church 
 must of necessity have been of the nature of our chanting. And 
 not only so, but you will see, from the very structure of many of 
 the Psalms, that they were responsive ; one class of the singers 
 sang one sentence, and another class responded to it. We have 
 a representation of what I mean in the vision of Isaiah, where 
 the seraphim are represented as answering one another ; and you 
 have another specimen of it in that very ancient song of Miriam's, 
 which was sung when the Israelites had passed through the Red 
 o 3 
 
298 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Sea — though that is rather choral than antiphonal. Many of 
 the Psalms, however, are obviously constructed to be used anti- 
 phonally. We can hardly conceive, in reference to the 136th 
 Psalm, but that in worship the manner was to take up each clause 
 alternately. The 118th Psalm is a very remarkable Psalm : if you 
 look attentively into that, you will see that the different clauses 
 are constructed to be sung by different persons. So of the 24th. 
 A question is asked by one party of singers, and an answer is 
 given by another party. That is, these Psalms were composed 
 for chanting antiphonally." 
 
 " To me there is something exceedingly solemn, something 
 very touching in looking back to the last supper. Our Lord had 
 performed the last act with his disciples as Jews in the Jewish 
 Church ; and, along with that, had established the ordinance of 
 the Christian dispensation. And it was after he had done this — 
 after he had added the Christian to the Jewish, that he sang a 
 hymn with his disciples, according to the mode in use in the Jewish 
 Church. Chanting psalms was the course of the service of praise 
 at that time; and after our Lord had united with his disciples in 
 one of these songs, he went forth to that great agony which was 
 to be the subject of the song of the new dispensation. Why, the 
 very first, the greatest, and sublimest act of praise in the Chris- 
 tian Church, in which the Master and Head of that Church 
 joined, would be something in the nature of a chant — the sacred 
 song which belonged to that peculiar service. Well, then, you 
 know the same thing must have taken place in the first assem- 
 blies of Christians. They did not change the Jewish language or 
 the form of Jewish poetry — there was the introduction of no new 
 metrical literature ; the old songs continued, but a new sense was 
 attached to the words : the songs of the ancient Church were 
 sung with the glorious associations of the new dispensation. I 
 cannot see myself that there was room or opportunity for any- 
 thing but this kind of praise in the Apostolic Church. I am very 
 much disposed to think that when the disciples carried out the 
 injunction which had been given them, f to teach one another in 
 psalms, and hymns, and spiritual songs/ not only was chanting 
 the kind of singing employed, but that they answered one an- 
 other in their songs ; and when Paul and Silas sang praises to 
 God while in the prison, it is not improbable that they did this 
 antiphonally." 
 
 " Here it may be remarked that there are no reasons for think- 
 ing that Christian praise was originally official, — that the singers 
 were kept separate from the congregation, and took the singing, 
 as it were, out of their mouth. AJ1 the people had a right, and 
 were required to take part in this service. It was from the 
 circumstance that the people got into the habit of singing without 
 proper feeling and decorum, that official singing was introduced. 
 
SERIES OP REASONINGS. 299 
 
 It was not introduced with the design of preventing the people 
 singing, but for the purpose of reformation, — to bring the Church, 
 properly so called, back again to a more reverent and simple mode 
 of performing this part of worship." — Lecture on Congregational 
 Chanting, by the Rev. T. Binney. 
 
 VI. — Social Responsibility. 
 
 "It is not consistent with the teaching of our intellectual 
 faculties, nor with the impulses of our moral feelings, that a 
 Being of immaculate holiness and inflexible justice, and possessed, 
 moreover, of omniscience and omnipotence, should permit, in 
 even a single instance, that virtue should go unrewarded, and 
 vice should remain unpunished. If the Creator of the world 
 were not a righteous Being, he would not have implanted a love 
 of righteousness in the minds of his creatures; and if he be 
 a righteous Being, it is reasonable to expect that his righteous- 
 ness should appear in all the operations of his moral govern- 
 ment. And as we find this is not universally the case, we are 
 driven to the conclusion, that the present state is not a state of 
 final retribution; that the enjoyments and the afflictions of 
 the present life are intended chiefly as instruments of moral 
 discipline ; and that there is a future state of existence, in which 
 the final distribution of rewards and punishments will take place. 
 Thus reason concurs with Revelation in teaching us that c it is 
 appointed unto men once to die, and after that the judgment.' 
 The inequalities of the present world will thus be rectified in 
 the next, and ' every man will be rewarded according to his 
 works.' 
 
 "But, however satisfactory this solution of the difficulty may be 
 with regard to individuals, it does not apply to the case of public 
 companies. Their existence commences and terminates in the 
 present world, and they must be rewarded or punished in the 
 present world, or they will not be punished or rewarded at all. 
 In the latter case they are exempted from the moral government 
 of God. With them virtue has no reward and vice no punish- 
 ment. In reply to any exhortations to perform their moral and 
 religious duties, they may exclaim, c What is the Almighty, that 
 we should serve him, and what profit should we have if we pray 
 unto him ?' ' We know not the Lord, neither will we obey his 
 voice.' As, however, we cannot suppose that God has exempted 
 public companies from his moral government, we must infer that 
 they are punished or rewarded in the present state. • ■ 
 
 " This conclusion rests upon the same evidence as the argu- 
 ment we have just stated. In the former case the argument 
 stands thus : — 
 
 The Righteous Governor of the world must reward the good 
 and punish, the wicked. 
 
300 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 But this is not done in the present world. 
 Therefore, there must be a future world, in which this retribu- 
 tion will take' place. 
 Our present argument stands thus : — 
 
 The Righteous Governor of the world must reward the good 
 and punish the wicked, whether those actions are performed 
 bj public bodies, or private individuals. 
 But the public companies who now perform good or evil actions 
 
 will not exist in a future world. 
 Therefore, public companies must be rewarded or punished in 
 
 the present world. 
 " The only way of resisting this argument is either to maintain 
 that public companies are not moral agents, and therefore not 
 responsible for their good or evil actions, or that they will exist 
 in a future world. The former part of the alternative we think 
 we have sufficiently refuted — the latter is too wild to need refu- 
 tation." — Gilbarts Practical Treatise on Banking. 
 
 VII. Experience the Test of Truth. 
 
 From a Sermon preached at St. Margaret's Church, 
 Lothbury, by the Rev. Henry Melvill, B.D. 
 
 " ' Philip findeth Nathanael, and saith unto him, We have found 
 him, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, 
 Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph. And Nathanael said unto 
 him, Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth ? Philip 
 saith unto him, Come and see.' — John i. 45, 46. 
 
 " But now let us turn to the remaining topic presented by our 
 text — the treatment which a prejudiced man should receive from 
 a believer. It is very observable that Philip declined all contro- 
 versy with Nathanael, though a fairer opening could hardly have 
 been offered. Nathanael' s question might almost be said to have 
 challenged controversy, or, if not controversy, some measure of 
 expostulation. But Philip attempted no correction of the mis- 
 take into which Nathanael had fallen ; he undertook no argument 
 to prove to him the unreasonableness of his question. His only 
 anxiety was to bring Nathanael into personal communication with 
 Jesus : this was the method which had succeeded with himself, 
 and he felt as though it could not possibly fail with another. And 
 there was great wisdom in this : for it does not often happen 
 that men are convinced by an argument. There is something in the 
 intellectual warfare, whatever the subject which comes under dis- 
 cussion, which seems generally to strengthen the combatants in 
 their respective opinions. It may, therefore, be better in many 
 cases, to try the ' Come and see' which Philip tried, and with 
 which he succeeded. I will not endeavour by abstract arguments 
 
SERIES OF REASONINGS. 301 
 
 to convince Nathanael that c good' can ' come out of Nazareth/ 
 when I have that good to show him if he will only accompany 
 me and look. If, for example, I can persuade a man to read the 
 Bible, it may be immeasurably better than if I draw him into 
 debate on the evidences of the Bible. He says to me, c Can 
 there any good thing come out of Nazareth ? This Bible of 
 yours is confessedly the work of illiterate men : would you per- 
 suade me that I may be instructed from its pages?' And such 
 a question tempts us to go straightway into controversy, to the 
 varied and multiplied proofs of inspiration from the heaven above 
 and from the earth beneath, from the past, the present, and the 
 future. All crave to be urged — and occasions will arise in which 
 it is indispensable to urge them; but, they are, perhaps, less 
 numerous than those in which it were wiser to waive them, and 
 bend all the effort to the persuading a man to c come and see ' for 
 himself. "We like leaving the Bible to defend its own character, 
 and make good its own pretensions. We have every confidence 
 in the self-evidencing power of Scripture, in the power which 
 there is in the contents of the Bible of acting as the credentials 
 of the Bible. We have every faith in the fine saying, that there 
 is no evidence of the truth of Christianity like that which a man 
 knocks out for himself with the simple apparatus of a Bible and 
 a conscience. The thorough suitableness of the gospel — its 
 exact adaptation to our wants and our circumstances — in this 
 lies a mighty argument that the gospel is from God. You admit 
 the argument in regard to creation ; you admit that the precise 
 adaptation of the world in which we dwell to the beings who 
 inhabit it, is a vast proof that a supreme Intelligence prepared 
 the dwelling-place for the creatures, and the creatures for the 
 dwelling-place. You think that the existence of such a series of 
 adjustments and contrivances seems to prove the one made on 
 purpose for the other, and shows such evidence of design as 
 should leave no doubt on the authorship of creation. Now we 
 claim the very same admission in reference to redemption. If 
 the exact adaptation of the world to our natural circumstances 
 be received in evidence that God made the world, the just as 
 exact adaptation of the gospel to our spiritual circumstances 
 should be received in evidence that God planned the gospel. 
 Ay, and as even a poor man, who has never been schooled in the 
 lessons of natural theology, might feel the smile of a Deity in 
 the sunshine which gladdened him, and hear the voice of a Deity 
 in the melodies which soothed him, and trace the hand of a Deity 
 in the supplies which sustained him, so might he convince him- 
 self of the divinity of doctrines which dispersed all his anxieties, 
 met all his wishes, and satisfied all his wants, though he never 
 heard of the demonstrations of the schools, and was never 
 trained to the defence of Christianity. And, therefore, ' Come 
 
302 LOGIC FOR TEE MILLION. 
 
 and see' may be the best tiling to say to the modern Nathanael, 
 who is inclined towards Deism; towards the rejection, that is, of 
 the Scriptures as a revelation from Gocl. We ask him to read 
 the Bible ; for, unfair as it is, the Bible may be rejected where 
 it has never been read ; and many a sceptic, and many a young 
 man who thinks it shows independence of mind to boast his infi- 
 delity, if he be only close pressed, will be hardly able to tell you 
 what those things are which he affects to disbelieve. Let there 
 be only an endeavour to lay aside prejudice, and to read Scrip- 
 ture with the same candour as is given to an ordinary book, and 
 we can almost dare to answer that men will rise from the perusal 
 disposed to confess that it is indeed the Word of God ; at least 
 we can believe, that if no effect were wrought through Philip's 
 method, ' Come and see,' neither would there have been through 
 the more combative method, ' Come and debate.' " 
 
PART V. 
 
 THE APPLICATIONS OP REASONING. 
 
 We have now nearly completed our book. We have gone 
 through the introduction to reasoning, the principles of 
 reasoning, and the forms of reasoning. We have only 
 to consider the applications of reasoning. Many of these 
 applications you will have already noticed in the observa- 
 tions and quotations I have brought before you. But as 
 this matter is of great importance, we must consider it by 
 itself. For the practical application of our reasonings is, 
 after all, the great end of our acquiring a knowledge of the 
 art of reasoning. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OF REASONING TO THE 
 ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 
 
 In the application of logic to the ordinary affairs of life, 
 we have first to discover general principles, and then to 
 apply these general principles to particular circumstances. 
 In the affairs of life you will have to rely mainly on your 
 own judgment. And what are you reading logic for, but 
 to enable you to form sound opinions for yourself 1 The 
 following are some of the points that will require your con- 
 sideration. Do not, however, confine your attention to the 
 few illustrations I may quote, but consider each topic as 
 the representative of a class of questions and opinions on 
 which, in the ordinary course of events, you may be called 
 upon to exercise your powers of reasoning. Take, for 
 example, the subject of dress, and, view it in all its rela- 
 
304 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 tions — consider its attributes, parts, species, causes, and 
 effects — call to mind the examples, comparisons, proverbs, 
 and laws or other written documents with which it may 
 be connected — and discuss the various opinions that may- 
 be entertained respecting it. 
 
 This topic is one of frequent occurrence. With regard 
 to the statue about to be erected in the city to Sir Robert 
 Peel, discussion took place as to the comparative merits of 
 the Roman and the English dress. And whether the Euro- 
 pean or the Oriental costume is the more suitable for ladies, 
 is a question that now excites great interest throughout the 
 United States of America. So, under the head " The Logic 
 of Food," you may consider the principle of the Tempe- 
 rance and Vegetarian Societies. And under " Logic to 
 Children " you may class the various questions that have 
 a reference to education. Endeavour so to discipline your 
 mind as to be able readily to put together under one gene- 
 ral head those topics and questions that have a reference 
 to the same class. You will then easily add from your 
 own experience, observation, or reading, other illustrations 
 as suitable as those now before you. 
 
 1. The Logic of Dress : — 
 
 " The numerous advantages, with the importance resulting 
 from an elegant personal appearance, are too generally known and 
 appreciated throughout civilized Europe, to require much comment 
 here. It is only to be lamented, that the enormous charges usually 
 incident to a desirable apppearance, preclude many of limited in- 
 comes from enjoying it, while it brings down distress upon others. 
 Eor I think it will almost invariably be found, that the first 
 embarrassment young men — more especially our city youth with 
 small salaries — bring upon themselves, is through endeavouring 
 to support a fashionable exterior in the usually expensive method ; 
 hence in time results inability to pay, with the certain after con- 
 sequences of arrest, and, with sorrow I pen it, too frequently 
 entire ruin." — The Whole AH of Dress. 
 
 The book from winch I have taken the above extract, 
 has separate chapters upon coats, waistcoats, ' and panta- 
 loons, stocks . and neckcloths, shirts, pocket-handkerchiefs, 
 stockings, socks and gloves, hats and caps, boots and 
 shoes, and the adaptation of dress to tall and short men, 
 
APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 305 
 
 and to fair and dark complexions. He shows that on all 
 these points much logic may be expended both in regard 
 to taste and economy. 
 
 "Fair, and Dark Complexions. — The appearance of the 
 countenance is very greatly subjected to be relieved or depressed 
 by the influence of colours. To be aware immediately of this 
 fact, you have only to perceive how wretched white neckcloths 
 make some people appear ; those, for instance, of a sallow skin ; 
 while, on the opposite, a black velvet or satin stock throws, by 
 its comparative depth of hue, the former into shade. All this is 
 either more or less regulated by other colours. On dark people 
 a dark coat looks best ; black for the neck most assuredly ; then, 
 as too much black would look gloomy, they should be relieved by 
 a white or buff waistcoat." — The Whole Art of Dress. 
 
 In Mr. Hall's " Book of the Feet," we have an example 
 of the truths of science being applied to the promotion of 
 personal comfort. The anatomy of the foot proves the 
 injury of tight shoes : — 
 
 " ' There is nothing more beautiful than the structure of the 
 human foot,' says Sir Charles Bell, ' nor perhaps any demonstra- 
 tion which would lead a well-educated person to desire to know 
 more of anatomy than that of the foot. The foot has in its 
 structure all the fine appliances you see in a building. In the 
 first place, there is an arch in whatever way you regard the foot ; 
 looking down upon it we perceive several bones coming round 
 the astrologos, and forming an entire circle of surfaces in the 
 contact. If we look at the profile of the foot, an arch is still 
 manifest, of which the posterior part is formed by the heel, and 
 the anterior by the ball of the gieat toe, and in the front we 
 find in that direction a transverse arch : so that instead of 
 standing, as might be imagined, on a solid bone, we stand upon 
 an arch composed of a series of bones, which are united by the 
 most curious provision for the elasticity of the foot ; hence, if we 
 jump from a height directly upon the heel, a severe shock is felt ; 
 not so if we alight upon the ball of the great toe, for there an 
 elasticity is formed in the whole foot, and the weight of the body 
 is thrown upon this arch, and the shock avoided." 
 
 " For upwards of twenty years as a bootmaker, I have made 
 the feet my study, and during that period many thousand pairs 
 of feet have received my attention. I have observed with minute 
 care the cast from the antique as well as i the modern instances/ 
 and I am obliged to admit, that much of the pain I have wit- 
 nessed, much of the distortion of the toes, the corns on the top 
 
306 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 of the feet, the bunion on the side, the callosities beneath, and 
 the growing in of the nails between, are attributable to the shoe- 
 maker. The feet, with proper treatment, might be as free from 
 disease and pain as the hands ; their structure and adaptation to 
 the wants and comfort of man, as we have seen, is most perfect." 
 — Hall's Book of the Feet. 
 
 2. The Logic of Marriage. To wed, or not to wed % that 
 is the question : — 
 
 " Man is airthenware, coarse, rude, rough, and onseemly. 
 Woman is porcelain, a crittur highly finished and delicate. Man 
 was made for knockin' about, he is tough and strong; but wo- 
 man, to be taken care of and handled gently. What a sweet 
 thing is innocence, Sam; how beautiful to contemplate, how 
 lovely to associate with ! As a philosopher, I admire purity in 
 the abstract ; but, as a man and a Christian, I love it when par- 
 sonified. Purity in a child, of such is heaven ; purity in woman, 
 of such also is the realms of bliss ; but purity in man — oh, Sam, 
 I am most afeerd, sometimes, there ain't much of it any where 
 now a days, I snore : but matrimony, Sam, is a state ordained by 
 God, not only to carry out his great purposes that is above our 
 comprehension, but also for our happiness ; yes, it is a nateral 
 state, and a considerable of a pleasant one too, when well consi- 
 dered, and rightly entered upon. Don't put it off too long, Sam ; 
 don't wait till the heart ossifies." 
 
 " Yes, my son, said he, get married, and marry soon ; it 's time 
 you were a-thinkin' on it now in airnest. — Well, I feel most 
 plaguily skeered, minister, says I, to try, for if once you get into 
 the wrong box, and the door is locked on you, there is no escape 
 as I see; and besides, women are so everlastin' full of tricks, 
 and so cunnin' in hiden 5 em aforehand, that it 's no easy matter 
 to tell whether the bait has a hook in it or not ; and if you go 
 a-playin' round it, and a-nibblin' at it, why a sudden jerk given by 
 a skilful hand may whip it into your gills afore you know where 
 you be, and your flint is fixed as shure as there are snakes in 
 varginy." 
 
 " I must go now ; but I '11 give you a word of advice at 
 partin', my dear boy. Don't marry too poor a gall, for they are 
 apt to think there is no eend to then: husband's puss ; nor too 
 rich a gall, for they are apt to remind you of it onpleasant some- 
 times ; nor too giddy a gall, for they neglect their families ; nor 
 too demure a one, for they are most apt to give you the dodge, 
 race off, and leave you ; nor one of a different sect, for it breeds 
 discord; nor a weak-minded one, for children take all their talents 
 
 from their mothers ; nor a Lord ! says I, minister, how you 
 
 skeer a body ! Where onder the sun will you find a nonsuch like 
 
APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 307 
 
 what you describe ? There ain't actilly no such critturs among 
 women. — I'll tell you, my son, said he, for I'd like afore I die to 
 see you well mated ; I would, indeed ! I'll tell you, tho' you 
 talk to me sometimes as if I didn't know nothin' of women. 
 You think nobody can't know 'em but them as romp all their 
 days with them as you do ; but them, let me tell you, know the 
 least, for they are only acquainted with the least deserving. 
 I'll gin you a gage to know 'em by that is almost invariable, 
 universal, infallible. The character and conduct of the mother is a 
 sure and certain guarantee for that of the darter" — Sam Slick, 
 
 3. The Logic of Age. Ought the husband to be older 
 than the wife 1 : — 
 
 " We say disproportion of age, for allowing their years to be 
 equal, as they usually are, the lady is virtually many years in 
 advance. A woman, all the world over, is as old at twenty as a 
 man is at twenty-eight ; that is to say, she has as much world- 
 knowledge, as much tact, as much finesse, as much judgment of 
 character, as much self-possession, as much — cunning we were 
 going to say, but that is rather a harsh term to apply to a lady. 
 
 "Now this disproportion of ages gives rise to many serious 
 evils ; so many, that we hardly know which to begin with. The 
 young women must despise or at least undervalue the young men 
 with whom they associate, as inferior to themselves in manner, 
 tact, and conversational power. Hence they 'form a low opinion 
 of men, as men, and are tempted to value them only for their 
 external advantage, — personal beauty, skill in dancing — above 
 all, wealth. Here is a fearful incentive to mercenary marriages. 
 But we prefer to confine ourselves to its effects on married hfe. 
 The bride and bridegroom are the same age, say twenty-three or 
 four, unless indeed she happens to be a year older than he. In 
 a mere external and physical point of view the first consequence 
 is that she is an old woman while he is in the prime of life, for 
 though both sexes among us are too apt to break themselves down, 
 and grow old before their time, this premature decay is more 
 general and more speedy with our females. The inconveniences, 
 mistakes, mortifications, and jealousies that constantly arise from 
 such discrepancy, are too evident to require more than being 
 hinted at. But this is nothing to the moral phase of the ques- 
 tion, — the effect which a virtual disparity of ages has had in 
 establishing a gynocracy, That a gynocracy does exist, no one 
 conversant with fashionable life will be hardy enough to deny. 
 In nine cases out of ten the lady rules the roast. That cardinal 
 duty of a wife, respect for her husband, is utterly ignored by her. 
 He is regarded as little more than an upper servant. Now the 
 main cause of this is undoubtedly the original equality (which is 
 
308 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 virtual disproportion) of ages. As the bride, we repeat it, is 
 substantially ten years older in all world -knowledge than the 
 bridegroom, she soon gets the upper hand of him. If he is a man 
 of some character, the fight may last two or three years ; occa- 
 sionally he is driven by his domestic troubles into evil courses, 
 in which cases he usually goes to work with the national rapidity 
 and earnestness, so as to kill himself off in twelve months, and 
 leave his widow more triumphant than disconsolate." — New York 
 Literary World. 
 
 4. The Logic of Diet : — 
 
 " You hate cold mutton ! The more shame for you, Mr. Caudle. 
 I'm sure you 've the stomach of a lord, you have. No, sir ; I 
 didn't choose to hash the mutton. It 's very easy for you to say, 
 hash it ; but / know what a joint loses in hashing : it 's a day's 
 dinner the less if it's a bit. Yes,, I dare say; other people may 
 have puddings with cold mutton. No doubt of it ; and other 
 people become bankrupts. But if ever you get into the Gazette, 
 it shan't be my fault. 
 
 " Where do you think pudding 's to come from every day ? You 
 show a nice example to your children, you do ; complaining, and 
 turning your nose up at a sweet piece of cold mutton, because 
 there's no pudding ! You go a nice way to make 'em extrava- 
 gant — teach 'em nice lessons to begin the world with. Do you 
 know what puddings cost; or do you think they fly in at the 
 window ? 
 
 "Apples arrft so dear, am't they? I know what apples are, 
 Mr. Caudle, without your telling me. But I suppose you want 
 something more than apples for dumplings ? I suppose sugar 
 costs something, doesn't it ? And that 's how it is. That 's how. 
 one expense brings on another, and that 's how people go to ruin.' 3 ' 
 — Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures. 
 
 " To be easy all night, 
 Let your supper be light ; 
 Or else you '11 complain 
 Of a stomach in pain." 
 
 5. Logic to Children : — 
 
 " When the parent is sufficiently enlightened to rear his child 
 himself, instead of plying him with rudimental books, dictionaries, 
 and restraint, let him impart the first instructions by familiar 
 conversation. Ideas advanced in this way are accommodated to 
 the comprehension of the pupil, by mutual good feeling rendered 
 attractive, and brought directly within the embrace of his mind. 
 This instruction leads him to observe, and accustoms him to com- 
 pare, reflect, and discriminate, offers the sciences under interest- 
 
APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 309 
 
 ing associations, and inspires a natural thirst for instruction. Of 
 all results which education can produce, this is the most useful. 
 A youth of fifteen trained in this way, will come into possession 
 of more truths, mixed with fewer errors, than much older per- 
 sons reared in the common way. He will be distinguished by the 
 early maturity of his reason, and by his eagerness to cultivate the 
 sciences, which, instead of producing fatigue or disgust, will every 
 day give birth to new ideas and new pleasures. I am neverthe- 
 less little surprised, that the scrupulous advocates of the existing 
 routine should insist that such a method tends to form superficial 
 thinkers. I can only say to these profound panegyrists of the 
 present order of instruction, that the method which I recommend 
 was that of the Greeks. Their philosophers taught while walking 
 in the shade of the portico, or of trees, and were ignorant of the 
 art of rendering study tiresome, and not disposed to throw over it 
 the benefits of constraint. Modern instructors ought, therefore, 
 to find that they were shallow reasoners, and that their poets and 
 artists could have produced only crude and unfinished efforts." — 
 Art of Being Happy. 
 
 " It is of great importance that you know what you cannot do, 
 as well as what you can do. For this reason, with all the temp- 
 tations and dangers attending a public education, I am satisfied 
 it is much to be preferred to a private one. The wisest period in 
 the whole of a man's existence, is when he has just entered col- 
 lege. And why ? Simply because the youth has not yet had the 
 opportunity of measuring his attainments and capacity with that 
 of his fellows. It is not merely that you sharpen the intellect, 
 and add a keenness to the mind, by contact with other minds, but 
 you strengthen it by the contact, and you learn to be modest in 
 regard to your own powers. You will see many with intellects 
 of a high order, and with attainments far beyond anything which 
 you have dared call your own. There must be some radical de- 
 fect in that man's nature, who can be associated in study, for 
 years, with those who are severe students, and at the end of the 
 period feel that he is a very wise or a very great man." — Todd's 
 Students Manual. 
 
 6. Logic to Servants : — 
 
 " I feel almost ashamed to urge upon the master and mistress 
 the propriety of using kind language to their domestics, so much 
 a matter of course it ought to be that in addressing those who 
 are rendering a service to us, we should be kind. Yet to scold 
 servants is the usual process by which an attempt is made to 
 make them better. Nay, sometimes although the servant is not 
 to blame for the mistake which excites the master's displeasure, 
 he is nevertheless scolded, and is made the object upon whom the 
 
310 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 ill-temper of the master vents itself, as if to bear that were part 
 of the consideration for which he receives wages. The effect is, 
 to wound unnecessarily the feelings of a sensitive man, and to 
 still further brutalize one who is indifferent." 
 
 " It is so easy to add ■ if you please ' to a request ; to speak 
 in a gentle tone of voice ; to be thankful when what you have 
 asked for has been done : moreover, the service is then performed 
 with, so much alacrity and cheerfulness. Unkind language ex- 
 pressed in a harsh voice is listened to certainly, and obeyed ; but 
 it is obeyed through fear, or some other equally low motive, and 
 if a stronger motive comes there will be no obedience. A reason, 
 also might generally accompany the request. When it does, the 
 necessity for its performance is more strongly impressed upon the 
 servant ; his employment is no longer so purely mechanical, and 
 he increases therefore in intelligence." — On the Responsibilities of 
 Employers. 
 
 "The female servants of the middle and upper classes of 
 society are generally daughters of working men. Many of the 
 faults which we so often hear their superiors complain of may be 
 traced to the deficiencies of their early education. The utter 
 neglect in which their childhood is passed, and their consequent 
 ignorance, unfit them for understanding very clearly the nature 
 of moral obligation, or for appreciating the importance of relative 
 duties, while the habits to which they are accustomed in child- 
 hood are seldom of a kind to render them active in the discharge 
 of their daily labour. Much of that dishonest grudging and 
 awkward performance of duty, those rude maimers and slovenly 
 habits which frequently occasion so much annoyance in respectable 
 families, spring altogether from ignorance. Self-interest, even 
 where they are not influenced by higher motives, ought to induce 
 the upper classes of society to devise means for securing a more 
 liberal education for the daughters of the poor. The more so 
 when it is considered that they frequently entrust their own little 
 ones to the care of domestics. A very little attention to the 
 situation and duties of female servants must convince every one 
 capable of reflection that moral principle and intellectual cultiva- 
 tion of a very high order must be necessary to their usefulness, 
 respectability, and happiness." — Female Education, by a Labourer's 
 Daughter. 
 
 7. The Logic of Domestic Consultation : — 
 
 " But all I want to ask you is this : do you intend to go to 
 the sea-side this summer? Yes? yoiillgo to Gravesend! Then 
 you '11 go alone, that's all I know. Gravesend! You might as 
 well empty a salt-cellar in the New River, and call that the sea- 
 side. What ? It's handy for business ? There you are again ! 
 
 
APPLICATION TO THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE. 311 
 
 I can never speak of taking a little enjoyment, but yon fling 
 business in my teeth. I'm sure you never let business stand in 
 the way of your own pleasure, Mr. Caudle — not you. It would 
 be all the better for your family if you did." 
 
 " What do you say ? How much will it cost ? There you are, 
 Mr. Caudle, with your meanness again. When you want to go 
 yourself to Blackwall or to Greenwich, you never ask, How much 
 will it cost? What? You never go to Blackwall? Ha! I don't 
 know that ; and if you don't, that's nothing at all to do with it. 
 Yes, you can give a guinea a plate for whitebait for yourself. 
 No, sir ; I'm not a foolish woman ; and I know very well what 
 I'm talking about — nobody better. A guinea for whitebait for 
 yourself, when you grudge a pint of shrimps for your poor family. 
 Eh? You don't grudge 'em anything? Yes, it's very well for 
 you to lie there and say so. What will it cost? It's no matter 
 what it will cost, for we won't go at all now. No ; we '11 stay 
 at home. We shall all be ill in the winter— every one of us, all 
 but you ; and nothing ever makes you ill. I've no doubt we shall 
 all be laid up, and there'll be a doctor's bill as long as a railroad ; 
 but never mind that. It's better — much better — to pay for nasty 
 physic than for fresh air and wholesome salt water." 
 
 " What will I do at Margate ? Why, isn't there bathing, and 
 picking up shells ; and arn't there the packets, with the donkeys ; 
 and the last new novel — whatever it is, to read — for the only 
 place where I really relish a book, is at the sea-side. No, it isn't 
 that I like salt with my reading, Mr. Caudle ! I suppose you 
 call that a joke ? You might keep your jokes for the day-time, I 
 think. But as I was saying — only you always will interrupt me 
 — the ocean always seems to me to open the mind. I see nothing 
 to laugh at ; but you always laugh when I say anything. Some- 
 times at the sea-side — especially when the tide's down— I feel so 
 happy ; quite as if I could cry. 
 
 "When shall I get the things ready? Eor next Sunday? 
 What will it cost ? Oh, there — don't talk of it. No : we won't 
 go. I shall send for the painters to-morrow. What ? I can go 
 and take the children, and you'll stay? No, sir; you go with me, 
 or I don't stir. I'm not going to be turned loose like a hen 
 with her chickens, and nobody to protect me. So we '11 go on 
 Monday ? Eh ?" — Mrs. Caudle's Curtain Lectures. 
 
 8. The Logic of Social Intercourse : — 
 
 " What is it, then, that constitutes a gentleman in your mind ? 
 Not his station — for he may disgrace it. Not his power — for he 
 may misuse it. Not his graces and endowments, — for you may 
 despise them. It is, in the nakedness of truth, because he pos- 
 sesses qualities which ennoble him, and shed a lustre over his 
 
312 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 actions, in their ntter separation from those of the common herd 
 by whom he is surrounded. Because you see in that man a depth 
 of feeling and right principle, which you look in vain for in the 
 ordinary run of the men you meet. 
 
 " When, then, you hear any one giving himself airs, and despis- 
 ing his part in the world, you will say immediately, that he can- 
 not have the true feeling of a gentleman; because, instead of 
 looking into his own mind as the seat and source of honour, he 
 descends to the external trappings and decorations of his office ; 
 and only regards himself with complacency, as he glitters in the 
 eyes of others." 
 
 " Again, should you unfortunately find yourself embroiled in 
 any dispute or quarrel — which may occur to the most peaceable 
 — and perceive, on reflection, that you have been betrayed by the 
 heat of the moment into any intemperance, or that there is any 
 one point in which you are not completely satisfied with yourself, 
 — do not fancy it derogatory to your manhood to acknowledge 
 your error, and to make a just reparation. You may, at first, 
 have an idea, that it is inconsistent with true courage to make 
 this concession, and that you should bear the brunt of the oifence 
 with a total disregard of personal consequences. But as you mix 
 more with the world, you will find, that in very many cases a 
 much higher degree of courage is necessary to the avowal of a 
 
 fault, than to sustaining it "We should wish you to be firm 
 
 as a rock in repelling an aggression or an insult ; — but still we 
 would strongly impress upon you, that it is, in every case, far 
 more consistent with high courage and gentlemanly feelings to 
 own a wrong than to defend it ; and to allay, than to confirm an 
 injury." 
 
 " When therefore you enter into society, whatever may be the 
 state of your mind, put such a restraint on the expression of it, 
 that you shall appear pleased and cheerful. Consider, that people 
 meet together for instruction and enjoyment, and to rub out the 
 cares and cobwebs of the day. You wish to join them to promote 
 these good objects; and if you are so dispirited and careworn, 
 that you cannot promote them, a just and correct tone of feeling 
 would induce you to remain at home." 
 
 "There are two or three minor subjects that occur to me, 
 which may be dismissed at once in a few words. On no account 
 swear, or use cant terms. Never be inquisitive. Never interrupt 
 a speaker. Always take off your hat to a woman. Scrupulously 
 acknowledge the salute of a poor man. Eat slowly and quietly, 
 and without any show of eagerness. This last is a serious sole- 
 cism in good-breeding. Indeed, it is impossible for you to be too 
 careful in your own person of the niceties of the table, and too 
 vigilant of offending against its recognised proprieties. I will not 
 attempt to give any description of them ; as it would lead me 
 
APPLICATION OP REASONING TO HISTORF. 313 
 
 into a long detail of things -which might seem trifling, and occa- 
 sionally, perhaps, ridiculous ; but you may receive it as an un- 
 doubted truth, that they bear great weight with them in the 
 world; and that a disgust against a man is seldom more readily 
 taken, than in a dereliction of these little points, either through 
 ignorance or wilful rudeness." — The English Gentleman. 
 
 There are many other topics on which you will have to 
 exercise your reasoning powers. Among others, let me 
 request you not to forget to inquire into the reasons for 
 insuring ones life, and the reasons for making a will. You 
 should also exercise your reasoning powers in the choice of 
 your amusements. As, however, on this subject you will 
 also consult your inclination, I will conclude with merely a 
 quotation in favour of the game of chess : — 
 
 " There are two important lessons to be learned at chess. 
 
 " The first is the value of acquired knowledge. A person who 
 has studied the game of chess and knows it, will beat with ease 
 and certainty one of much more talent for the game, who under- 
 stands its general principles only. 
 
 " The second is, encouragement never to give up a losing game, 
 but still to struggle on for success, playing only with increased 
 caution and thought, as the difficulties muster around you. In 
 life, as at chess, no one can anticipate the remote consequences 
 of every position, and the skilful management of disastrous cir- 
 cumstances may be the road to prosperity." — Maya's Philosophy 
 of Living. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OP REASONING TO HISTORY. 
 
 Some years ago I commenced a work on the Philosophy 
 of History. It was proposed to be written in the form of 
 Lectures. After writing two Lectures, I was compelled, 
 from want of leisure, to lay the subject aside, and it will 
 probably never be resumed. The commencement of the 
 work may now for the first time be useful by standing at 
 the head of this Section : — 
 
 "Philosophy has been defined, 'the knowledge of the reasons 
 of things;' in opposition to History, which is the bare knowledge 
 
 P 
 
314 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 of facts ; or to Mathematics, which is the knowledge of the quan- 
 tity of things, or their measures. It is the province of philosophy 
 to collect together those facts which have occurred; to investi- 
 gate their causes and operations ; and to classify them according 
 to the principles they may have developed. It is thus that the 
 chemist takes every object in nature, examines its constituent 
 principles, notices their operation when brought into combination 
 with other bodies, and from the effects he observes he forms 
 those general rules, which are universally true, and which, when 
 arranged and demonstrated, form what may be called the Philo- 
 sophy of the Science. 
 
 "Thus it is in every branch of experimental philosophy. At 
 first the substances of water or air, or other natural objects, are 
 merely observed. By and by a few experiments are made upon 
 them. Other experiments follow, and either correct or confirm 
 those which preceded. Experiments are multiplied, until it is 
 found at last that in a variety of instances the same experiments 
 are uniformly followed by the same results. These are then con- 
 sidered as established truths ; the knowledge thus acquired is 
 acted upon in the investigation of other bodies ; fresh truths are 
 elicited ; and the whole body of truths or general principles thus 
 established by repeated experiments, constitute what is termed 
 Natural and Experimental Philosophy. 
 
 " But this course of procedure is not confined to material sub- 
 stances. The moralist observes minutely what actions conduce 
 to happiness and what lead to misery. Those actions which lead 
 to happiness, he calls good or virtuous ; those actions which lead 
 to misery, he calls bad or vicious. He examines the causes or 
 motives from whence those actions proceed, and he considers the 
 motives to be good or evil according to the good or bad actions 
 they produce. Hence he forms general rules by which he declares 
 that certain classes of actions or motives are good, and ought to 
 be inculcated, while other classes of actions or motives are evil, 
 and ought to be condemned. He compares these rules with the 
 relations which man sustains in reference to other beings in the 
 universe. Hence, to examine the reasonableness and propriety 
 of moral conduct, and to investigate and lay down rules for 
 moral action, constitute what is termed the Science of Moral 
 Philosophy. 
 
 " Thus, too, the political economist views the increase and the 
 diminution of those products which constitute national wealth. 
 He traces the various circumstances by which either the one or 
 the other may be promoted ; and from the observation of indi- 
 vidual examples and instances, he lays down general principles 
 for the regulation of future conduct in affairs of state economy. 
 This constitutes the philosophy of the science. 
 
 " Political economy bears the same relation to history as morals 
 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 315 
 
 do to biography. History records those facts which have oc- 
 curred in the affairs of nations. From these facts political eco- 
 nomy derives her principles. She arranges these facts, not 
 according to their chronological order, but accordingly as they 
 concurred in exhibiting the good or evil of any line of political 
 conduct. So biography records those events that have occurred 
 in the lives of individuals ; and the moralist hence derives prin- 
 ciples for the regulation of individual conduct. 
 
 " All philosophy, whether it refer to material or immaterial sub- 
 jects, is founded on fact. It is not philosophy to build castles in 
 the air ; to fancy theories, and then maintain them in defiance of 
 evidence. If we wish to lay any claim to the character of philo- 
 sophers, we must not first assume principles, and then hunt for 
 facts in order to establish them; but our principles must be 
 deductions from the facts with which we were previously ac- 
 quainted. 
 
 "When, however, the facts by which our principles are sup- 
 ported are so numerous or so decisive, that few persons are 
 disposed to dispute the conclusion to which they lead, it is not 
 always necessary, in teaching our general principles, to detail all 
 the individual facts upon which they may be founded. A few 
 pertinent examples are sufficient for the purpose. 
 
 " From what I have said, none of my auditors will be at a loss 
 to conjecture what ideas I attach, to the Philosophy of History. 
 The Philosophy of History means those general principles which 
 the facts of history clearly establish. It is not, therefore, my 
 intention to detail all the events which are recorded in the page 
 of history. I shall attempt to exhibit those principles which are 
 deduced from those events, and shall consider those events them- 
 selves, not in their chronological order, but as they tend to esta- 
 blish the principles I had previously advanced. 
 
 " The philosophy of history takes a much wider range than 
 political economy. The economist views only those facts which 
 have an influence on the accumulation of national wealth. The 
 philosopher views also those facts which have a reference to the 
 character of man ; to the development of his physical powers ; 
 the exercise of his intellectual faculties : his progress in scientific 
 inquiry; the formation of domestic and civil society; and his 
 performance of moral and religious duties. 
 
 " In pursuing these inquiries, I propose to deliver five lectures. 
 The first will be on the Philosophy of Geographical History ; the 
 second, the Philosophy of Domestic History ; the third, the 
 Philosophy of Intellectual History ; the fourth, the Philosophy 
 of Political History; fifthly, the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical 
 History. 
 
 "In the first lecture, upon the Philosophy of Geographical 
 History, I propose to inquire what are the effects which history 
 p 2 
 
316 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 records to have been produced upon man and upon human socio 
 by geographical circumstances — by the varieties of climate ; by 
 the mountainous character of countries; by the fertility or bar- 
 renness of the soil; or by the intervention of rivers or arms of 
 the sea. 
 
 " In the second lecture, I shall inquire what is the langu age 
 of history as to the relation of husband and wife ; the institu- 
 tions of polygamy and divorce ; the relation between parents and 
 children, masters and servants ; and the rise and progress of 
 domestic slavery. This lecture will be on the Philosophy of 
 Domestic History. 
 
 "In the third lecture, on the Philosophy of Intellectual or 
 Scientific History, I shall inquire into the circumstances which 
 have developed the intellectual faculties ; the rise and progress 
 of the arts ; the circumstances by which they are promoted or 
 retarded; the advantages which the moderns have over the 
 ancients ; and the benefits to be expected from universal 
 education. 
 
 "In the fourth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Political His- 
 tory, I shall inquire what is the evidence of history as to the 
 origin of government ; the advantages and disadvantages of par- 
 ticular forms of government ; and the union of the simple forms 
 in the British Constitution. 
 
 " In the fifth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical 
 History, I propose to examine whether it is obvious from history 
 that man is endowed with a moral sense ; to inquire what are the 
 different forms of polytheism ; and how far it is necessary that 
 the church should be established by the civil power ; and to trace 
 the influence of religion upon the political, intellectual, and social 
 happiness of man." 
 
 We shall now point out some of the different ways in 
 which logic is applied to history. 
 
 1. Logic is applied to history in examining the evidence 
 either for or against the truth of disputed facts : — 
 
 " Without this exercise of the reasoning faculties, books will 
 as often mislead as instruct us. In making an estimate of the 
 authenticity of historical relations, three principal rules are to be 
 observed, — the probability or improbability of the facts recorded, 
 the nature of the evidence attesting them, and in what degree 
 they are corroborated or contradicted by the general circum- 
 stances of the world in the period of time alluded to. On these 
 principles the reader must exercise a discretionary power of 
 yielding or suspending his belief; but he ought carefully to avoid 
 the two extremes of scepticism and credulity, which are equally 
 
 
APPLICATION OF EEASONING TO HISTORY 317 
 
 inimical to the improvement of the human mind." — Bigland's 
 Letters on History. 
 
 " There is a minuteness in the details of the Mosaic writings, 
 which argues their truth ; for it often argues the eye-witness, as 
 in the adventures of the wilderness ; and often seems intended 
 to supply directions to the artificer, as in the construction of the 
 tabernacle. 
 
 " There are touches of nature in the narrative, which argue its 
 truth ; for it is not easy to regard them otherwise than as strokes 
 from the life — as where the ' mixed multitude,' whether half-casts 
 or Egyptians, are the first to sigh for the cucumbers and melons 
 of Egypt, and to spread discontent through the camp ; as, the 
 miserable exculpation of himself, which Aaron attempts, with all 
 the cowardice of conscious guilt — ' I cast into the fire, and there 
 came out this calf : ' the fire, to be sure, being in the fault." 
 
 "There is a candour in the treatment of his subject by Moses, 
 which argues his truth ; as when he tells of his own want of 
 eloquence, which unfitted him for a leader — Ms own want of faith, 
 which prevented him from entering the promised land — the idola- 
 try of Aaron his brother — the profaneness of Nadab and Abihu, 
 his nephews — the disaffection and punishment of Miriam, his 
 sister — the relationship which Amram his father bore to Jochebed 
 his mother, which became afterwards one of the prohibited 
 degrees in the marriage tables of the Levitical law." — Blunts 
 Scriptural Coincidences. 
 
 2. Logic is applied to history in discussing the charac- 
 ters of distinguished men : — 
 
 " If Alexander had not been at the head of such an army, and 
 assisted by the counsels and exertions of such commanders as 
 Parmenio, Lysimachus, Antigonus, Perdiccas, Craterus, Ptolemy, 
 and others ; or if he had turned his arms westward against the 
 warlike Romans, instead of the effeminate Persians, his affairs 
 would, in all probability, have assumed a very different aspect, 
 and he would scarcely have shone in the page of history as the 
 invincible conqueror. But every observing and intelligent reader 
 of history cannot but see, that in this war the circumstances of 
 the two belligerent nations, and the state of their armies, were 
 such that a general of ordinary abilities in Alexander's place 
 could hardly have failed of success. Possessing all the advan- 
 tages of an excellent literary and military education, and endowed 
 by nature with courage, magnanimity, and genius, Alexander 
 appears to have been capable of the greatest things ; but we can 
 only estimate his political and military character by what he 
 actually performed ; and in this estimation we must allow that, 
 
318 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 every circumstance duly considered, Alexander's achievements 
 were a much less arduous task than those of many other warriors, 
 whose successes have been far less brilliant, and whose names 
 shine with a much less dazzling lustre. 
 
 "It must, however, be confessed, that some of Alexander's 
 projects are characteristic of a political and commercial, as well 
 as a warlike genius, and redound more to his honour than his 
 mad career of conquest. His foundation of the city of Alexandria 
 in a situation so extremely favourable to commerce, seems to in- 
 dicate an extensive view of the advantages accruing from trade ; 
 and the nourishing state of that city, both while it continued the 
 capital of an independent kingdom, and afterwards under the 
 Roman and Byzantine empires, displays the justness of his under- 
 standing in the choice of so excellent a situation for a great mer- 
 cantile city. His sending out his admiral Nearchus, to explore 
 the coasts of Persia and India, also shows that he was actuated 
 by a spirit of discovery, as well as an avidity of conquest ; and 
 if he had attained to an advanced age, it is not possible to con- 
 ceive what he might have performed, when, the best parts of the 
 world being subdued, conquest could no longer have presented to 
 him the same allurements." — Bigland's Letters on History. 
 
 3. Logic is applied to history in drawing parallels or 
 contrasts between persons or epochs or events : — 
 
 " England under Cromwell was in a high state of general pro- 
 sperity. Its domestic commerce prospered. Cromwell was the 
 chief founder of our maritime greatness. The seas were swept 
 of all obstruction, to an unprecedented freedom of trade. The 
 merchants who had ordered the most costly goods from abroad, 
 could rest in quiet and contentment until the appointed time for 
 their expected arrival; or, having shipped some of their most 
 costly produce for distant lands, they could indulge in a well- 
 grounded confidence that, at the appointed time, the needful 
 equivalent would arrive. This wonderful confidence derived its 
 chief strength from the fact, that the great name of Cromwell 
 was a mighty safeguard to property both at home and abroad ; a 
 very terror to all evil-doers as well on sea as on the land. Learn- 
 ing prospered. In illustration of this it will be enough to con- 
 template the state of Oxford under the vice-chancellorship of 
 Dr. Owen. There was liberty at home and abroad. Of the prin- 
 ciples of equity and toleration which the Protector had esta- 
 blished in England, he became the great champion and defender 
 in foreign lands. 
 
 " I certainly could not divine what Oliver Cromwell would do, 
 were he now at the head of the Government of these kingdoms ; 
 but it were easy to know what he would not do. He would not 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 319 
 
 have submitted your institutions to Rome, for the consideration, 
 revision, and approval of an Italian priest. He would not compel 
 the people of Great Britain, out of their hard earnings, to pay 
 thirty thousand pounds a-year for the support of Maynooth. He 
 would not have meddled with the foundation of those new em- 
 pires now rising up in our colonial dominions, by supporting, at 
 the cost of England, Romish priests and bishops, and by erect- 
 ing from the same source Popish chapels and schools. He would 
 not have allowed of any unconstitutional Papal aggression. He 
 would not allow British subjects to suffer persecution, or lie 
 unbefriended in remote Inquisitions on account of their religion. 
 He would not be at a loss to know was the Papal system a reli- 
 gious system or a secular system, half religious or half secular. 
 He would not have been at a loss to know how to deal with 
 Cardinal "Wiseman. Such is what Oliver Cromwell would not 
 have done in England of the seventeenth century ; and such, in 
 some respects, is what he would have done. Say, do we or do we 
 not want a man of similar policy, and of a kindred fortitude for 
 England of the nineteenth century ? Do we, or do we not ? is 
 the question. Let the remarkable times, now passing over us, 
 declare." — Rev. Joseph Denham Smith's Lecture on Olioer Cromwell; 
 or England in the past, viewed in relation to England in the 
 
 4. Logic is applied to history in considering the wisdom 
 or justice of individual acts : — 
 
 "Although historians may conjecture that the removal of 
 the imperial residence contributed to hasten the downfal of the 
 empire, it is a certain fact, that the fixing of it at Constantinople 
 put a final period to the passage of the barbarians through the Bos- 
 phorus, who could never after force that insurmountable barrier ; 
 and Greece, as well as Asia Minor, was secure from their ravages, 
 until Valens unadvisedly suffered the Goths to pass the Danube, 
 and received their armed bands into the heart of the empire. In 
 after ages Constantinople presented an insurmountable obstacle to 
 the progress of the Persians under Chosroes, and resisted all the 
 attacks of the Avans, the Goths, and other northern enemies. 
 During the existence of the Caliphate, that city was the bulwark of 
 Europe against the Saracens ; and fell a prey to the Turks so late 
 as a.d. 1453, one thousand and forty -three years after Rome was 
 taken and plundered by Alaric, and nine hundred and seventy- 
 seven years after the entire subversion of the western empire. 
 Indeed, no good reason can be given why the empire might not 
 have been as well defended, when Constantinople was the capital, 
 as if Rome had always retained that prerogative; and it is no 
 improbable conjecture, that if the imperial residence had not 
 
320 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 been removed to Constantinople, all the eastern parts of the empire 
 would have fallen a prey to the Persians, on the one hand, and to 
 the Goths on the other, without prolonging for any considerable 
 time the existence of the western empire." — Bigland's Letters on 
 History. 
 
 5. Logic is applied to history in tracing the adaptation 
 or effects of particular laws or institutions : — 
 
 "The Hebrew laws concerning debt were remarkably different, 
 in many respects, from those which prevail in European countries. 
 This difference probably arose in a great degree from the peculia- 
 rities in the condition of the people ; but, however this be, their 
 singularity, their high antiquity, and the sanction under which 
 they come to us, recommend them to greater attention than they 
 seem generally to have received. It will be recollected, that it 
 was provided that, as soon as Palestine was conquered, there 
 should not be one individual without property. Every one had 
 his hereditary land, which he might alienate until the fiftieth 
 year, but not for ever. Poverty, therefore, eould rarely prevent 
 the ultimate safety of what was advanced in loan: and of an 
 insolvent debtor, destitute of property on which execution could 
 be made, the Hebrew could scarcely have an idea. The following 
 useful summary of these laws is from T. H. Home, who seems to 
 have condensed it from Michaelis. It will serve as an index to 
 the various details which we shall consider separately, as they 
 hereafter come under our notice. ' The debt which remained unpaid 
 until the seventh or sabbatic year (during which the soil remained 
 without cultivation, and, consequently, a person was supposed not 
 to be in a condition to make payments) could not be exacted 
 during that period (Deut. xv. 1 — 11). But, at other times, in 
 case the debt was not paid, the creditor might seize, first, the 
 hereditary land of the debtor, and enjoy its produce till the debt 
 was paid, or at least until the year of jubilee ; or, secondly, his 
 houses. These might be sold in perpetuity, except those belong- 
 ing to the Levites (Lev. xxv. 14 — 32). Thirdly, in case the 
 house or land was not sufficient to cancel the debt, or if it so 
 happened that the debtor had none, the person of the debtor 
 might be sold, together with his wife and children, if he had any. 
 This is implied in Lev. xxv. 39 ; and this custom is alluded to in 
 Job xxiv. 9. It existed in the time of Elisha (2 Kings iv. 1) ; 
 and on the return of the Jews from their Babylonish captivity, 
 some rich persons exercised this right over their poor debtors 
 (Nehem. v. 1 — 13). Our Lord alludes to the same custom in 
 Matt, xviii. 25. As the person of the debtor might thus be 
 seized and sold, his cattle and furniture might consequently be 
 liable for his debts. This is alluded to by Solomon, in Prov. xxii. 
 27. It does not appear that imprisonment for debt existed in the 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 321 
 
 age of Moses, but it seems to have prevailed in the time of Jesus 
 Christ.' " — Pictorial Bible. Note on Deut. xv. 2. 
 
 6. Logic is applied to history in observing the rise and 
 progress of arts and sciences : — 
 
 " At the close of the fifteenth century, an extraordinary activity 
 was reigning in Europe. Bold investigations were remarkable 
 everywhere. A general yearning for truer, more real science, 
 was manifest. This movement continued during the greater part 
 of the sixteenth century without results, owing to the absence of 
 unity and method; a confusion also ensued, arising from the 
 revival of the systems of antiquity, and the mystical philosophy 
 so pregnant with fruitless efforts. In the meantime, however, 
 new discoveries gave a fresh impulse to the human mind. 
 Copernicus described the true system of the world. Kepler some- 
 what foreshadowed the discoveries of Newton. Tycho Brahe was 
 collecting the most invaluable observations. Then came Lord 
 Bacon, whose great genius dissipated the mists of error, and 
 broke down the obstacles which impeded advancement in useful 
 science. His works present an 'estimate on the actual attain- 
 ments in all the sciences, a catalogue of the desiderata in each 
 department, and the detail of the methods best suited to pro- 
 secute improvements and new discoveries. The world owes to 
 Bacon the sure method of advanciug hi knowledge by experiment 
 and the observation of nature, instead of system and conjecture. 
 
 "Bacon, said Horace Walpole, has been the prophet of truths 
 that Newton came to reveal to mankind. True; but between 
 Bacon and Newton, a man arose who followed the track of 
 Bacon, and inflicted a mortal blow on all systems— who created 
 a new method and a general theory of the world : we allude to 
 Descartes, who was the first to lay down the laws of motion, 
 especially that all bodies persist in their present state of rest or 
 uniform rectilineal motion, till affected by some force." 
 
 "Galileo, in 1609, constructed telescopes, and discovered the 
 satellites of the larger planets. Kepler investigated the laws 
 which regulate the motions of the planets, and the analogy 
 between their distances from the sun, and periodical revolutions. 
 The discoveries in astronomy led to improvements in navigation, 
 and a great advancement of geometry in all its branches. Napier, 
 in 1614, abridged calculation by the invention of logarithms. 
 The Torricellian experiments determined the weight of the atmo- 
 sphere. In 1616, Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood. 
 The Royal Society was incorporated in 1662. The Royal Aca- 
 demy of Sciences was instituted by Louis XIV. in 1666 ; and 
 similar institutions were founded in most of the countries of 
 Europe. In the end of the seventeenth century arose the 
 immortal Newton, and Leibnitz, the universal genius. Newton 
 p3 
 
322 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 had discovered, before the age of twenty-four, the theory of 
 universal gravitation, a priuciple which solves the chief pheno- 
 mena of nature, and connects and regulates the whole machine 
 of the universe. His theory of light and colours is the founda- 
 tion of the science of optics, and his Principia the basis and 
 elements of all philosophy. Locke, his contemporary, investi- 
 gated the operations of the human mind, examined the soul by 
 attending to its operations, and has been a priori the founder 
 of the sensualist school of intellectual philosophy." — Historical 
 Analysis of Christian Civilization ; by Pe,oeessor De Yeeicotjr, 
 Queen's College, Cork. 
 
 7. Logic is applied to history in observing the remark- 
 able occurrences with regard to individuals or nations : — 
 
 " It is, however, a remarkable fact, that some of the greatest 
 men, both in ancient and modern times, have been extremely 
 unhappy in their domestic concerns. The rebellion of Absalom 
 against his father David, and its tragical issue ; the murder of 
 Sennacherib, in the temple of the god Nisroch, by the hands of 
 his own sons, Adrammelech and Sharezar ; the severities which 
 Augustus Caesar was obliged to use against his only child, his 
 daughter Julia, on account of her scandalous life ; and the 
 havoc which Herod the Great made in his own family, by the 
 execution of his beautiful and beloved wife Mariamne, his two 
 most promising sons, and others of his near relatives, may be 
 adduced as instances, among a great number of others which 
 occur in ancient history, that the highest degrees of human 
 power, exaltation, and splendour, do not always exempt their 
 possessors from domestic infelicity, no more than from personal 
 misfortunes and the ordinary sufferings of mortality. To these 
 instances, and many others in ancient history, may be added a 
 number of a similar nature, in more modern times ; among which 
 the tragical catastrophe of Don Carlos, son of Philip the Second 
 of Spain ; and that of the Czarowitz, son of the immortal Peter the 
 Great, of Russia, stands as conspicuous and distinguished proofs 
 of the uncertain and fluctuating nature of all human felicity." — 
 Bigland's Letters on History. 
 
 8. Logic is applied to history in deducing general prin- 
 ciples in the science of politics : — 
 
 " Much has been said by many writers against the pernicious 
 effects of extensive empire, but many arguments may also be 
 adduced in its favour. The union of a numerous mass of people 
 in one political system is one of the surest preventives of war, as 
 the division of countries into a greater number of independent 
 states is a never-failing source of predatory hostilities, of blood- 
 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO HISTORY. 323 
 
 shed, rapine, and anarchy. Wherever a country is thus divided, 
 such a multiplicity of jarring interests arise, and so many objects 
 of ambition present themselves, as cannot fail of producing con- 
 tinual scenes of contention, originating in the ambition, the 
 avarice, and the jarring interests of the rulers or the subjects, 
 which, involve the people in all sorts of calamities. Instances 
 without number might be adduced, but a glance at the state of 
 England during the time of the Heptarchy will suffice to exemplify 
 the propriety of this observation. In an extensive monarchy there 
 is only one great political interest, and the objects of ambition, 
 however splendid and attractive, are fewer, and consequently 
 within the reach of a smaller number of persons ; in such a state 
 all tends to one central point, instead of deviating to different 
 centres. The vast collective mass of the people is united in one 
 political system, and in one general interest, and the different 
 provinces which compose the empire enjoy the advantages of a 
 free and uninterrupted commerce ; a circumstance of incalculable 
 benefit, both to individuals and to the whole community. Sup- 
 posing even an extensive monarchy to he despotic, and the monarch 
 himself a sanguinary and unfeeling tyrant, yet, by reason of the 
 extent of his dominions, only a few individuals, who most of them 
 voluntarily bring themselves into contact with him, feel the effects of 
 his cruelty and despotism. Those who, from motives of ambition 
 or interest, approach his person, and serve him as the instruments 
 of his tyranny, are the persons who principally feel the heavy 
 hand of the tyrant. The great mass of the people feel its pres- 
 sure in a much lighter degree. Distance of situation, and the 
 great multitude of subjects, cause individuals to escape his 
 notice. The reverse is the case in petty states, where the eye 
 of the tyrant is always upon the individuals of his contracted 
 dominions ; and a tyrant at the distance of a thousand miles, is 
 infinitely preferable to a tyrant at home, at our very doors. The 
 history of mankind affords a multiplicity of proofs, that extensive 
 monarchies are more conducive to the tranquillity of the world, and 
 the general interests of humanity, than petty states."— Ibid. 
 
 9. Logic is applied to history in inculcating the truths 
 and lessons of morality and religion : — 
 
 " Besides, it is the history of the Bible which hath conveyed 
 down to us the knowledge of those miracles and divine wonders 
 which have been wrought by the prophets, the immediate messen- 
 gers of heaven, to prove that they were sent of God. It is hi this 
 history we read of those Prophecies of things to come, together 
 with the accomplishment of them, which stand in a beautiful 
 connexion from the beginning of the world to the days of the 
 Messiah. All of them join to confirm our faith in the several 
 
324 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 revelations of religion which God has made to the sons of men ; 
 and all concur to establish the last and noblest scheme of religion, 
 that is, Christianity. Thns the very history of Scripture has a 
 powerful and rational influence to establish our belief of the 
 Gospel, and to make us Christians upon solid and reasonable 
 grounds. 
 
 " I add yet further, that in the historical part of Scripture we 
 read the holy Laws of God, exemplified in the life and practice of 
 good men in several ages of the world : and when we see the 
 rules of religion copied out in the words and actions of our fellow- 
 creatures, it renders the performance of them more practicable 
 and more delightful to us. While the word of command stands 
 in the law to require our obedience, the actual obedience of our 
 fathers to those commands recorded in the history, invites our 
 imitation, and makes the work more easy. 
 
 " We find not only the precepts but the sanctions of the law 
 of God exemplified in the narratives of Scripture. How often do 
 we read the promises of God fulfilled in the rewards of the 
 righteous, and his threatenings executed against wilful transgres- 
 sors ! these things set the government of God before our eyes in 
 a stronger light ; they show us that his words of promise and 
 threatening are not empty sounds ; and make it appear, with sen- 
 sible conviction, that he will certainly reward, and that he will as 
 certainly punish. The many wonderful instances of a Divine Pro.- 
 vidence which concerns itself in the affairs of men, and which are 
 recorded in the word of God, have a natural tendency to awaken 
 our fear of so great and glorious a Being, and to encourage our 
 hope and trust in him. In a word, the perfections of God, 
 whereby he made and governs the world, are set before our eyes 
 by the Scripture History in such divine colours, as give us a more 
 awful and more amiable idea of God himself, than any words of 
 description could have done, without such an historical account 
 of his works of nature, grace, and providence." — Br. Watts' 's 
 Scripture History. 
 
 There are many other ways in which logic is applied to 
 history. Such, for example, as in the investigation of the 
 causes of " great facts " — the cause of the spread of Chris- 
 tianity — cause of the rise of Mahometanism — of the Refor- 
 mation — of the French Revolution, &c. &c. Also, in tracing 
 effects, — as the effects of the feudal system — of the crusades 
 — of the discovery of America, &c. &c. I mentioned to 
 you, at the commencement of my book, that although the 
 mere acquiring of information is not reasoning, yet every 
 fact in history may, in some way or other, become the 
 subject of a reasoning process. 
 
APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 325 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OP REASONING TO POLITICAL 
 ECONOMY. 
 
 " Political Economy " is the name which is given to the 
 Science of Wealth. Adam Smith does not use this name, 
 but simply calls his work " An Inquiry into the Nature 
 and Causes of the Wealth of Nations." A political econo- 
 mist is one who studies or explains the doctrines of political 
 economy. He is not merely one who believes Malthus's 
 theory of the population, Huskisson's system of free trade, 
 Ricardo's theory of rent, and Sir Robert Peel's opinions on 
 the currency. These doctrines do not constitute the 
 science ; they are some of the disputed doctrines of the 
 science. He who rejects them is, in our view, as much a 
 political economist as he who maintains them. 
 
 I am not going to teach you political economy, but 
 merely to give you a few hints as to the use of the art 
 of reasoning in acquiring a knowledge of some of its 
 principles : — 
 
 I. — The art of reasoning then will teach you that you 
 should understand clearly the nature of the science you 
 intend to learn. 
 
 " The science of political economy is intimately connected with 
 the daily occurrences of life, and in this respect differs materially 
 from that of chemistry, astronomy, or any of the natural sciences ; 
 the mistakes we may fall into in the latter sciences can have little 
 sensible effect upon our conduct, whilst our ignorance of the for- 
 mer may lead us into serious practical errors. There is scarcely 
 any history or any account of voyages or travels that does not 
 abound with facts and opinions, the bearings of which cannot be 
 understood without some previous acquaintance with the prin- 
 ciples of political economy : besides, should the author himself 
 be deficient in this knowledge, you will be continually liable to 
 adopt his errors from inability to detect them." 
 
 " This science is essentially founded upon history, — not the his- 
 tory of sovereigns, of wars, and of intrigues ; but the history of 
 the arts, of trade, of discoveries, and of civilization. We see 
 some countries, like America, increase rapidly in wealth and pro- 
 
326 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 sperity, whilst others, like Egypt and Syria, are impoverished, 
 depopulated, and fa l ling to decay : when the causes which produce 
 these various effects are well understood, some judgment may be 
 formed of the measures which governments have adopted to con- 
 tribute to the welfare of their people ; whether such or such a 
 branch of commerce should be encouraged in preference to others ; 
 whether it be proper to prohibit this or that kind of merchandise ; 
 whether any peculiar encouragement should be given to agricul- 
 ture ; whether it be right to establish by law the price of pro- 
 visions or the price of labour, or whether they should be left 
 without control ; and so on. You see, therefore, that political 
 economy consists of two parts, — theory and practice ; the science 
 and the art. The science comprehends a knowledge of the facts 
 which we have enumerated : the art relates more particularly to 
 legislation, and consists in doing whatever is requisite to contri- 
 bute to the increase of national wealth, and avoiding whatever 
 would be prejudicial to it." — Mrs. Marcefs Conversations on 
 Political Economy. 
 
 II. — The art of reasoning will teach you to be systematic 
 and methodical in your studies. 
 
 Dr. Watts observes, in his " Improvement of the Mind," 
 that " the best way to learn any science is to begin with 
 a regular system, or a short and plain scheme of that 
 science, well drawn up into a narrow compass, omitting 
 the deeper and more abstruse parts of it /' and he remarks 
 in another place, that if a man in his younger days has 
 arranged all his sentiments in any particular order, it will 
 be much more natural and easy for him to continue to dis- 
 pose all his further acquirements in the same order. And 
 he illustrates this by the arrangement of books in a library : 
 when we have accustomed ourselves to any particular ar- 
 rangement, we can find a book more readily than if they 
 were again to be arranged in even a better order. 
 
 Recent writers on political economy have usually divided 
 the science into four parts, — Production, Distribution, In- 
 terchange, and Consumption. Under the first division, 
 they have considered labour and capital ; under the second, 
 rent, profit, and wages ; under the third, commerce and 
 money ; and under the fourth, the consumption of Govern- 
 ment and that of individuals. It cannot be denied that 
 there is a neatness in this division, aDd doubtless all the 
 topics of the science may be discussed under one or other 
 
 ce 
 
APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 327 
 
 of these heads. But perhaps we cannot have a better divi- 
 sion of the science than into — the Nature, — the Causes, — 
 and the Effects of National Wealth. Under the first head, 
 you might enumerate the articles that constitute wealth ; 
 under the second head, specify the causes ; and under the 
 third head, trace the consequences of wealth on the happi- 
 ness, intelligence, and morals of the population, &c. The 
 main object of a plan is to assist the memory by a syste- 
 matic arrangement of your knowledge ; and the next object 
 is to be able to adjust under some head or division of your 
 plan, any additional knowledge you may acquire. 
 
 The nature of national wealth is thus described by one 
 who was both a poet and a monarch : — 
 
 " Rid me, and deliver me from the hand of strange children, 
 whose mouth speaketh vanity, and their right hand is a right 
 hand of falsehood : that our sons may be as plants grown up in 
 their youth ; that our daughters may be as corner stones, polished 
 after the similitude of a palace : that our garners may be full, 
 affording all manner of store : that our sheep may bring forth 
 thousands and ten thousands in our streets : that our oxen may 
 be strong to labour ; that there be no breaking in nor going out ; 
 that there be no complaining in our streets. Happy is that people, 
 that is in such a case ; yea, happy is that people whose God is 
 the Lord." — Psalm cxliv. 11 — 15. 
 
 The causes of wealth may be thus enumerated : — 
 
 1. The physical characteristics of a country are a source 
 of its wealth. 
 
 " Moses, in describing the Land of Promise, uses the follow- 
 ing language ; and, like a skilful orator, fixes upon those points 
 in which Canaan was superior to Egypt : ' For the land whither 
 thou goest in to possess it is not as the land of Egypt, from 
 whence ye came out. But the land is a land of hills and valleys, 
 and drinketh water of the rain of heaven.' ' The Lord thy God 
 bringeth thee into a good land, a land of brooks of water, of 
 fountains and depths that spring out of valleys and hills. A land 
 of wheat and barley, and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates. 
 A land of oil olive, and honey. A land wherein thou shalt eat 
 bread without scarceness, thou shalt not lack anything in it. A 
 land whose stones are iron, and out of whose hills thou mayest 
 dig brass. 5 This may be regarded as a negative description of 
 Egypt. The land of Canaan was not, like the land of Egypt, a 
 
328 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 level country on which there was no rain, but whose fertility was 
 caused by the overflowing of the river. It was a land of hills 
 and valleys, which drank water of the rain of heaven; it was, 
 also, more picturesque, and afforded everywhere a constant sup- 
 ply of water for themselves and their cattle, for it had brooks of 
 water, and fountains springing out of valleys and hills ; it not 
 only produced, like Egypt, wheat and barley, but also vines, and 
 fig-trees, and pomegranates, and oil olive, and honey, which Egypt 
 did not produce : and, moreover, Egypt had no mines of copper 
 or of iron, but this is ' a land, whose stones are iron, and out 
 of whose hills thou mayest dig brass. 5 " — Lectures on Ancient 
 
 2. The moral habits of its population are a source of its 
 wealth. 
 
 " The hand of the diligent maketh rich. — He that loveth plea- 
 sure shall be a poor man ; he that loveth wine and oil shall not be 
 rich. — The drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty, and 
 drowsiness shall clothe a man with rags. — He that tilleth his land 
 shall be satisfied with bread, but he that followeth after vain per- 
 sons shall have poverty enough. — He that is slothful in his work 
 is brother to him that is a great waster. — A prudent man fore- 
 seeth the evil, and hideth himself ; but the simple pass on and are 
 punished. — The sluggard will not plough by reason of the cold ; 
 therefore shall he beg in harvest, and have nothing. — Love not 
 sleep, lest thou come to poverty. Open thine eyes, and thou 
 shalt be satisfied with bread. — In all labour there is profit : but 
 the talk of the lips tendeth only to penury." — Book of Proverbs, 
 
 " Let us, in conclusion, take for our practical government our 
 last observation — the commerce of a country depends upon the 
 character of the people. Let us never forget, that the main cause 
 of the prosperity of any country or of any city lies in the mental 
 and moral character of its inhabitants. Every possible advantage 
 of situation may be rendered nugatory by the misconduct of the 
 people. If, instead of availing themselves of these natural ad- 
 vantages, and persevering in the steady pursuits of trade, the 
 merchants neglect their business, or have recourse to swindling, 
 or gambling, or smuggling, they will assuredly bring upon them- 
 selves that ruin and degradation which such practices never fail 
 to produce. It is by honesty, by industry, by prudence, by per- 
 severance, and by public spirit that nations and cities are made to 
 prosper." — Lectures on Ancient Commerce. 
 
 3. Political institutions are a source of wealth, — such 
 as security of property, a good government, wise laws, 
 and the impartial administration of public justice. 
 
APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 329 
 
 " The right of private property can be secured only by law ; 
 and the laws affecting property are more numerous in commercial 
 than in other countries ; because the modes of acquiring and 
 conveying property are more numerous, and the rights of dif- 
 ferent claimants cannot be so easily defined. Commerce is 
 affected by all laws relating to the production of commercial 
 commodities — the mode of transferring property — the facility 01 
 transport — the laying on of taxes — or the punishment of crimes. 
 Besides these general laws, which affect all branches of com- 
 merce, there are in many countries laws affecting particular 
 trades, or the export and import of particular commodities." — 
 Ibid. 
 
 4. Social institutions are a source of wealth, — as mints, 
 banks, post-offices, roads, canals, railways, harbours, ex- 
 changes, markets, &c. &c. 
 
 " Banking institutions cannot flourish in any society in which 
 property is insecure, whether that insecurity arises from the 
 tyranny of the government, the turbulence of the people, or the 
 incursions of foreign enemies. In oriental countries, where the 
 possession of wealth invites the rapacity of the government, 
 people conceal their wealth by burying it in the earth, and hence 
 we read in Scripture of ' treasures hid in a field.' A similar prac- 
 tice prevailed in Europe during the times of the feudal system ; 
 and treasure-trove was a source of royal revenue, as all the con- 
 cealed treasure, when found, belonged to the king. In the early 
 ages of Greece property was very insecure ; partly from the tur- 
 bulence of the people, partly from the incursions of the neighbour- 
 ing states. In this state of society, the temples were employed 
 as banks. People who had got money lodged it with the priests, 
 and the sanctity of the place preserved it from violation. Even 
 hostile tribes would not take this treasure, lest they should incur 
 the vengeance of the deity to whom the temple was consecrated." 
 —Ibid. 
 
 5. Commerce is a source of wealth. 
 
 " Tyre is thus described in the Holy Scriptures : c A joyous 
 city, whose antiquity is of ancient days, whose merchants are 
 princes, whose traffickers are the honourable of the earth/ — 
 ' Tyrus did build herself a stronghold, and heaped up silver as 
 the dust, and fine gold as the mire of the street. When the 
 waves went forth out of the seas, thou nlledst many people ; thou 
 didst enrich the kings of the earth with the multitude of thy 
 riches and of thy merchandise. 5 " — Ibid. 
 
330 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 6. Manufactures are a source of wealth. 
 
 " Manufacturing nations rise to -wealth from the additional 
 value which they give to the raw materials ; for there is an im- 
 mense difference between the value of the raw materials and the 
 value of the same materials in a manufactured state. Thus, for 
 instance, it has been stated that a pound of cotton wool, when 
 spun, has been worth five pounds sterling ; and when wove into 
 muslin, and ornamented in the tambour, is worth fifteen pounds, 
 yielding 5,900/. per cent, on the raw material. An ounce of fine 
 Manders thread has been sold in London for four pounds. Such 
 an ounce made into lace may be sold for forty pounds, which is 
 ten times the price of standard gold, weight for weight. Steel 
 may be made three hundred times dearer than standard gold, 
 weight for weight. Six steel wire springs for watch pendulums 
 weigh one grain, to the artist seven shillings and sixpence each, 
 equal to two pounds five shillings. One grain of gold costs only 
 two-pence. So a service of cut glass, or of fine porcelain, will 
 cost many hundred times the value of the raw materials of which 
 it is composed." — Ibid. 
 
 7. Colonies are a souree of wealth. They are a certain 
 market for your manufactures; they supply you with food 
 and raw materials ; they are a place whither your surplus 
 population may emigrate ; and in case of war, they are 
 out-posts of defence. 
 
 " The Greeks established colonies for the purpose of getting 
 rid of a superabundant population, and their colonies soon became 
 independent. The Roman colonies were established partly for the 
 same purpose, and partly for the purpose of acting as garrisons, 
 and thus keeping possession of the countries they had conquered. 
 The Tyrians and Carthaginians established colonies for the pur- 
 pose of extending their trade. The Tyrians are said to have planted 
 forty colonies in different parts of the Mediterranean, and the 
 Carthaginians periodically sent out a number of their citizens in 
 new places where they thought an advantageous trade might be 
 opened."— Ibid. 
 
 After noticing the nature and the causes, you may 
 notice the effects of wealth. 
 
 " 'Tis not correct that the possession of wealth, honestly ac- 
 quired, has any tendency either to enervate the intellect, to 
 corrupt the morals, or to impair the happiness of man. The fact 
 is the reverse. 'Tis poverty which is the source of crime — 'tis 
 poverty which is the great barrier to the acquisition of knowledge 
 — 'tis poverty which is the great source of human woe. If you 
 
APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 331 
 
 wish to increase your knowledge, increase yonr wealth : you will 
 then have more leisure to study, and be better able to purchase 
 the means of instruction. If you wish to increase your virtue, 
 increase your wealth : you will then have a higher character to 
 support, and fewer and less powerful temptations to act disho- 
 nourably and disreputably. If you wish to increase your happi- 
 ness, increase your wealth : you will then have more numerous 
 sources of pleasure, and, above all, you will be able to indulge in 
 the luxury of doing good. Away with the notion that wealth is 
 an evil. If wealth be an evil, industry is a vice ; for the tendency 
 of industry is to produce wealth. If wealth be an evil, commerce 
 should be abandoned ; for the object of commerce is to acquire 
 wealth. If wealth be an evil, those efforts which are made by 
 benevolence or patriotism, to improve the condition of the poor, 
 are deserving, not of support, but of execration. But wealth is 
 not an evil. However much the doctrine may have been counte- 
 nanced by mistaken moralists or dreaming poets, it has never been 
 generally acted upon, for it is one opposed to the common sense 
 of mankind. Both to individuals and to nations wealth is a 
 blessing. It is only when nations become wealthy that the popu- 
 lation are well fed and well clothed, and reside in roomy habita- 
 tions well furnished. It is only when nations become wealthy that 
 the cities and towns have wide streets, well formed for carriages 
 and for foot-passengers, and apparatus for conveying the water 
 to every private habitation, and for supplying light in the streets 
 at night. It is only when nations become wealthy that famines 
 are less frequent, epidemic and contagious disorders less fatal, 
 and institutions are formed for relieving the distresses and pro- 
 moting the education of the poor. It is only when nations have 
 become wealthy that men have leisure for study— that literature 
 flourishes — that science is explored — that mechanical inventions 
 are discovered — and that the fine arts are patronised and encou- 
 raged : — all these are the effects of wealth." — Ibid. 
 
 III. — The art of reasoning will teach you how to apply 
 general principles to practical cases. 
 
 The general principles of political economy differ from 
 those of geometry. In the first place, these principles are 
 not self-evident, but are inferences derived by induction 
 from a series of facts ; and, secondly, they possess only a 
 moral, not a mathematical universality. 
 
 " That a free commercial intercourse amongst different nations 
 would be for their mutual advantage, is a proposition which is 
 very generally true ; and being so, every proposal for restriction 
 on commerce may be fairly presumed to be inexpedient till the 
 
332 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 reverse be established. There can, however, be no manner of 
 donbt that there are cases, though but few in number, in which 
 nations would grossly overlook their own interests if they per- 
 mitted a free intercourse with their neighbours. Suppose, for 
 example, we had a monopoly of the supply of coal, it would not 
 be difficult to show that it would be good policy, with a view to 
 the increase of national wealth and security, either wholly to pro- 
 hibit, or to lay a high duty on its exportation ; and so in other 
 instances. The recent history of the theory of population affords 
 a striking instance of the abuse of general principles, or rather of 
 the folly of building exclusively upon one set of principles, with- 
 out attending to the influence of the antagonist principles by 
 which they are partly or wholly countervailed. The principle of 
 increase, as explained by Mr. Malthus, and more recently by Dr. 
 Chalmers, appeared to form an insuperable obstacle to all per- 
 manent improvement in the condition of society, and to condemn 
 the great majority of the human race to a state approaching to 
 destitution." 
 
 " The real difficulty does not lie in discussing matters connected 
 with this science, in the statement of general principles, or in 
 reasoning fairly from them : but it lies in the discovery of the 
 secondary or modifying principles, which are always in action, and 
 hi making proper allowance for their influence. . . . Generally, 
 indeed, we may predicate, with considerable confidence, the more 
 immediate results that would follow the adoption of any novel 
 system of measures ; but it is extremely difficult, or rather, per- 
 haps, impossible, without an extensive analogous experience, to 
 foretell its remoter consequences ; because we must, in the ab- 
 sence of such experience, be necessarily in the dark respecting 
 the nature and influence of the modifying principles which a 
 change of measures would no doubt bring into action." — M'Cul- 
 loctis Principles of Political Economy. 
 
 IV. — The art of reasoning will teach you the best ways 
 of increasing your knowledge of the subject. 
 
 In the pursuit of information, you should read chiefly 
 those works that are practically useful. Read such books 
 as Dr. Kane on the Industrial Resources of Ireland ; the 
 Letters of the " Commissioners" of the Times and Morning 
 Chronicle; the various Trade Circulars ; and the Public 
 Documents issued by the Government. Take every oppor- 
 tunity of going over dockyards, warehouses, and manu- 
 factories j and there trace the production of commodities, 
 from the raw material to the finished article. And be 
 sure you go to the Industrial Exhibition. Get a catalogue 
 
 
APPLICATION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY. 333 
 
 beforehand, and mark those things you intend more mi- 
 nutely to inspect. This will save your time when you 
 arrive ; and you will be able to employ your opportunities 
 more effectively and profitably. 
 
 When you read history, you will observe that the 
 sources of national wealth were as well understood in 
 ancient as in modern times. That more corn could be 
 produced from the soil than was necessary for the Wcints 
 of the population, and the surplus could be sold to 
 foreigners, was as well known in Egypt and Sicily as it is 
 now known in Poland and Canada ; the effect of manu- 
 factures to produce wealth was as well understood in Tyre 
 and Corinth as it is now in Birmingham and Manchester ; 
 ''- ships, colonies, and commerce " were as highly appreciated 
 at Athens and at Carthage as they have since been at 
 Amsterdam and London ; and the Eomans knew the ad- 
 vantages to be gained by facility of intercourse as well as 
 it is now known by the advocates of our modern railways. 
 And with regard to moral causes : that industry, frugality, 
 and prudence, are the road to wealth, is as distinctly taught 
 in the Proverbs of Solomon as in any of our modem sys- 
 tems of political economy ; and the denunciations of the 
 prophets against fraud, robbery, injustice, and oppression, 
 are proofs that they taught the doctrine, that security of 
 property is essential to national prosperity. 
 
 I advise you thus to study political economy. Study it 
 because it is interesting, and will form an agreeable recrea- 
 tion to your reasoning faculties. Study it because it con- 
 cerns the welfare of others ; and a new discovery of any 
 important principle may cause you to become a public 
 benefactor. Study it because it contains no principles 
 adverse to morality and religion, and the investigation of 
 its doctrines is not attended with that danger to which 
 weak minds are exposed by the study of the abstract 
 principles of morals and metaphysics. Study it because 
 it will lead your mind into the contemplation of the divine 
 wisdom and goodness, manifested no less in the organiza- 
 tion of society than in the construction of the material 
 universe. 
 
334 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 
 
 1. The nature and extent of the Science of Statistics is 
 thus described in the Sixth Annual Report of the Statis- 
 tical Society of London : — 
 
 "The first sentence of the prospectus of the Society, issued in 
 1834, which states that the object of its establishment is 'to 
 procure, arrange, and publish facts, calculated to illustrate the 
 condition and prospects of society/ contains, perhaps, the best 
 definition of statistics which has yet been attempted ; and, if it 
 be imperfect, its imperfection assuredly consists in its being, not 
 too narrow, but too comprehensive. Statistics, as thus defined, 
 and as a branch of study worthy of our efforts, are assuredly not 
 the mere ' method' of stating the observations and experiments 
 of the physical or other sciences, as seems, in some instances, to 
 have been supposed. Such was not the duty assigned to this 
 Society by its founders ; — it was not to perfect the mere art of 
 'tabulating' that it was embodied;— it was not to make us 
 hewers and drawers to those engaged on any edifice of physical 
 science : — but it was that we should ourselves be the architects 
 of a science or of sciences; the perfecters of some definite branch 
 or branches of knowledge, which should do honour to ourselves 
 and our country, and at the same time to the distinguished men 
 who summoned us to the labour ; the elaborators, in fine, of 
 truths which we feel to be necessary to our happiness, but which 
 are yet wholly hidden from us, or but partially revealed." 
 
 " The whole field of our labours appears to be divisible into the 
 following chief sections : — 
 
 " I. The Statistics of Physical Geography, Division, and Ap- 
 propriation ; or geographical and proprietary statistics. 
 
 "II. The Statistics of Production; or agricultural, mining, 
 fishing, manufacturing, and commercial statistics. 
 
 "III. The Statistics of Instruction; or ecclesiastical, scien- 
 tific, literary, and academical statistics. 
 
 "IV. The Statistics of Protection; or constitutional, legal, 
 judicial, and criminal statistics. 
 
 "V. The Statistics of Consumption and Enjoyment; or of 
 population, distribution, consumption, diversions, life, health, and 
 public and private charity." 
 
 2. The importance of the science is now universally 
 acknowledged. It is manifested in the attention paid by 
 the Government to the register of births, marriages, and 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 335 
 
 deaths, and by the anxiety shown at the present time with 
 regard to the census. It was not always so. The following 
 are extracts from a letter I addressed, on the 17th of 
 October, 1823, to the then prime minister, the Earl of 
 Liverpool : — 
 
 " Under these circumstances, I beg leave to suggest to your 
 Lordship the propriety of establishing a public register of all 
 births (not baptisms), marriages, and deaths that may occur in 
 the nation, including all the circumstances of sex, age, and occu- 
 pation of the parties. 
 
 " The utility of such a measure is obvious. Independently of 
 its use in ascertaining the descent of every individual, and thus 
 preventing disputed successions, it would possess numerous ad- 
 vantages. The system of insurance on lives would be perfected. 
 The influence of different occupations, or of different parts of 
 the country, in extending or abridging the term of human life, 
 would be clearly exhibited. The theories which are now advo- 
 cated in regard to population, would be confuted or confirmed. 
 A variety of useful truths, equally curious and important, would 
 be elicited ; and the science of political economy, instead of rest- 
 ing on probability and conjecture, would be founded on the rock 
 of mathematical certainty. It would then be easy to ascertain 
 the exact number of each respective class, or of any given age in 
 society; and the information thus obtained might be usefully 
 applied to subjects connected with taxation, to quotas required 
 for military service, and to a variety of other subjects. 
 
 "Had such a register been established three centuries ago, 
 what a fund of knowledge would it supply ; what a number of 
 tedious and expensive lawsuits would have been prevented ; how 
 many visionary theories would have been suppressed ; how dis- 
 tinctly should we be able to trace the progress of national pro- 
 sperity ; and how highly should we esteem the author of so useful 
 a regulation." 
 
 POPULATION OP GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Rate per cent. 
 1841. 1851. of increase. 
 
 Males 9,077,004 . 10,192,721 . 12 
 
 Females 9,581,368 . 10,743,747 . 12 
 
 1 2i£S2.^S£SWB8.3W . 20,936,468 . 12 
 
 POPULATION OF IRELAND. „ L 
 
 Rate per cent. 
 1841. 1851. of decrease. 
 
 Males 4,019,576 . 3,176,727 . 20 
 
 Females 4,155,548 . 3,339,067 . 20 
 
 Total . . . 8,175,124 . 6,515,794 
 
336 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEEICA. 
 
 Rate per cent. 
 1841. 1851, of increase. 
 
 United States, free po- 
 pulation (31 states) . 17,064,688 . 23,347,884 . 36.8 
 Slave ditto in 16 states 2,468,138 . 3,178,055 . 29.4 
 
 3. The facts with which this science is conversant are 
 those which are susceptible of being represented and regis- 
 tered by figures. Its arithmetical operations are chiefly 
 multiplication and division, the calculation of ratios, and 
 the construction of tables. 
 
 In treating of the relation of a whole and its parts, in 
 the second section of the second part of this work, I have 
 observed that we employ multiplication, when we wish to 
 magnify the importance of any matter, and division when 
 we wish to produce a contrary effect. Thus if a party 
 wished to show that the Established Church is in posses- 
 sion of enormous wealth, he would endeavour to obtain an 
 account of all ecclesiastical property, and present it in one 
 sum. But if another party wished to produce a different 
 impression, he would divide this sum by the number of 
 clergymen, and contend that upon, an average they do not 
 receive, individually, a higher income than an educated 
 man should receive for the kind of duty he performs. 
 It was by simple multiplication that Mr. G. R. Porter 
 ascertained the amount spent annually in the purchase of 
 Spirits, Beer, and Tobacco — sums which he happily styled 
 " self-imposed taxes." The following is the amount taken 
 from the paper he read on the subject, at Edinburgh, be- 
 fore the Statistical Section of the British Association : — 
 
 British and Colonial Spirits . . . , £20,810,208 
 
 Brandy 3,281,2 50 
 
 Total of Spirits . . 24,091,458 
 Beer of all kinds, exclusive of that 
 
 brewed in private families .... 25,383,165 
 
 Tobacco and snuff 7,588,607 
 
 Total self-imposed taxes . . . £57,063,230 
 
 When we wish to compare a number of things together 
 in some one respect, we employ a ratio. The ratio usually 
 employed is a per centage. For example, if we wish to show 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 
 
 337 
 
 the number of crimes in each county or district, as com- 
 pared with its population, we should place in one column 
 the population of each county, and, in an adjoining column, 
 the number of crimes in each county. We should then 
 reduce these figures to a ratio, that is, we would, by the 
 rule of three, ascertain what per cent in each county the 
 crimes bore to the population. We might then, in making 
 our comparisons, dispense with both the preceding columns ; 
 and place against the name of each county its per centage 
 of crime. 
 
 A series of figures may be placed either longitudinally 
 or horizontally. In the former case they are called a column 
 of figures ; and in the latter case a row of figures. A 
 table of figures combines both. Several columns of figures 
 are placed side by side, but at the same time there is a 
 connexion between all these columns horizontally.* Such 
 a table admits of being added together in two ways. You 
 may add longitudinally, and place at the bottom the 
 amount of each column ; and you may add horizontally, 
 and place in a column at your right hand, the separate 
 amount of each row. You will understand what I mean 
 by the following table, which I have taken from " The 
 Statistical Companion," published by T. C. Banfield and 
 C. R. Weld, of the Royal Society : — 
 
 Classified Abstracts of the numbers of Electors in the Counties, Cities, and Boroughs 
 of Great Britain, for the year 1846. The total number of registered Electors. 
 in 1846 was as follows : — 
 
 
 Counties. 
 
 Cities and 
 Boroughs. 
 
 Total. 
 
 475,036 
 37,340 
 48,953 
 
 342,342 
 11,205 
 
 817,378 
 48.545 
 
 Wales 
 
 
 29,597 | 78,550 
 
 Totals 
 
 561,329 
 
 383,144 944 473 
 
 
 
 
 All tables are not drawn up in this form. Some consist 
 only of a series of columns placed side by side without 
 any horizontal connexion, and sometimes the columns are 
 not added up longitudinally. 
 
 4. From the facts represented and registered by the 
 figures, the statician endeavours to deduce new truths. 
 
 * See the description of the horizontal system of bookkeeping in Gilbavt's 
 Practical Treatise on Banking, p. 325. 
 
 Q 
 
>38 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 leful 
 
 By 
 
 There is scarcely a science from which so many useful 
 truths may so readily be drawn as from statistics 
 new truths I mean, of course, truths that are new to us. 
 No truth is new in itself. The doctrine of gravitation was 
 a truth in itself before it was discovered by Newton. But 
 he made us acquainted with it. It is only in this sense 
 that any truth can be new. By statistics many discoveries 
 have been made — discoveries, too, of great importance — 
 and made by very simple means. For instance, it was a 
 new discovery in Edinburgh, last year, that the annual con- 
 sumption of spirits in Scotland was in the proportion of 
 lie gallons to every individual ; while in Ireland it was in 
 the proportion of 2>\ gallons, and in England it was only 
 in the proportion of 2 J gallons. It was also a new truth 
 that the wealth of the lower classes is increasing— and in- 
 creasing too in a higher proportion than that of the higher 
 classes. For these truths we are indebted to Mr. Porter. 
 
 " Proportions of Rich and Poor. — In a paper read by 
 Mr. Porter before the British. Association, he shows that it is 
 altogether a mistake to suppose that the rich are growing richer, 
 and the poor are becoming poorer in this country, for there is 
 abundant evidence of a much larger increase in the numbers 
 of the middle classes than of either the rich or the poor. He 
 states that between 1831 and 1848 there was a great propor- 
 tionate increase in the number of small dividends paid at the 
 Bank of England to the holders of money in the funds. Also 
 that the incomes from trades and professions above 150/. a-year, 
 which paid income tax, only amounted in 1812 to 21,247,621/., 
 whilst in 1848 they amounted to 56,990,224/. ; and that the in- 
 comes below 500/. a-year had increased several millions beyond 
 any other class of incomes. Further, that the personal property 
 on which probate duty was paid, increased from 14,757,420/. in 
 1811, -to 44,348,721/. in 1848, — of which the increase was chiefly 
 in the smaller properties. The conclusion of Mr. Porter is justi- 
 fied by these figures, and it is one that should remove the 
 popular prejudice on the subject — a prejudice that is equally 
 painful and mischievous." 
 
 These new truths are sometimes discovered by simple 
 multiplication and division as already shown ; sometimes 
 by ratios, and sometimes by placing interesting informa- 
 tion in a tabular form. 
 
 When our figures are chronological registers of facts, 
 
APPLICATION OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 339 
 
 new and highly important truths are sometimes ascer- 
 tained by merely observing if any specific facts re-occur at 
 tertain periods. When we have ascertained any unifor- 
 mity in the occurrence of certain events, we call that uni- 
 formity a law. Thus those uniformities that were found 
 to occur in regard to the deaths at various ages, are now 
 called the Laws of Mortality. A few years ago a Com- 
 mittee of the House of Commons published the average 
 monthly circulation for several years of the notes that 
 had been issued respectively by the Bank of England, 
 the Country Banks, the Banks of Scotland, and the Banks 
 of Ireland. From these returns* Mr. Gilbart deduced 
 what he terms " The Laws of the Currency : " — 
 
 " "We will take the monthly returns of the circulation for the 
 period that is past, that is, from the end of September 1833 to 
 the end of 18 43, and endeavour, by observing their various revo- 
 lutions, to discover if they are governed by any fixed causes or 
 principles— to ascertain if those principles are uniform in their 
 operation ; and if we should discover that the revolutions of the 
 currency are regulated by any uniform principles, we shall call 
 those principles the Laws of the Currency. 
 
 "We shall begin with that portion of the currency which con- 
 sists of notes issued by the Bank of England. On looking over 
 the monthly circulation of the Bank of England, given in the 
 Table, No. 34, in the Appendix to the Report of 1840, we 
 observe, that the circulation of the months in which the public 
 dividends are paid is higher than in the subsequent months. Thus, 
 the average circulation of January is higher than that of Eebruary 
 or March. The circulation of April is higher than that of May 
 or June. The circulation of July is higher than that of August 
 or September. And the circulation of October is higher than 
 that of November or December. This, then, we may consider as 
 one law of the circulation of the Bank of England — that it ebbs 
 and flows four times in the year, in consequence of the payment 
 of the quarterly dividends. This law does not apply to any 
 other bank, as all the Government dividends are paid by the 
 Bank of England." 
 
 " On inspecting the monthly returns of the country circulation 
 for the last ten years, we find that the highest amount is in the 
 month of April : thence it descends, and arrives at the lowest 
 point by the end of August, which is the lowest point in the 
 
 * These returns were laid before a select committee of the House of Commons 
 on Banks of Issue. A summary of the evidence has been published by Mr 
 G. M. Bell, under the title of " The Country Banks and the Currency." 
 
340 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 year. It gradually increases to November; a slight reaction 
 takes place in December ; but it then advances until it reaches the 
 highest point in April. The general law is, that the country cir- 
 culation always makes one circuit in the year — being at its lowest 
 point in August, and advancing to December, and continuing to 
 advance to its highest point in the month of April, and then 
 again descending to its lowest point in August." 
 
 " In Scotland the lowest point of the circulation is in March, 
 and the highest in November. The advance, however, between 
 these two points is not uniform — for the highest of the interven- 
 ing months is May, after which there is a slight reaction ; but it 
 increases again until November, and falls off in December. The 
 reason of the great increase in May and November is, that these 
 are the seasons of making payments. The interest due on mort- 
 gages is then settled, annuities are then paid, the country people 
 usually take the interest on their deposit receipts, and the 
 servants receive their wages. There are frequently large sums 
 transferred by way of mortgage. It is the custom of Scotland 
 to settle all transactions, large as well as small, by bank notes — 
 not by cheques on bankers, as in London. It is remarkable that 
 these monthly variations occur uniformly every year, while the 
 amount of the circulation in the corresponding months of different 
 years undergoes comparatively very little change. 5 ' 
 
 " From what we have already said of the laws of the currency, 
 those of our readers who are acquainted with Ireland will be able 
 to judge beforehand of the revolutions of her circulation. Being 
 purely an agricultural country, the lowest points will of course 
 be in August or September, immediately before the harvest, and 
 the commencement of the cattle and bacon trade. Then it rises 
 rapidly till it reaches its highest point in January, and then 
 gradually declines. As an agricultural country, we should natu- 
 rally expect that during the season of increase the circulation 
 would expand most in the rural districts ; and so we find that 
 the circulation of the Bank of Ireland in Dublin, expands very 
 moderately — that of her branches, which are located chiefly in 
 large towns, expands more — while the circulation of the joint- 
 stock banks, which are located in the agricultural districts, 
 receives the largest increase. Again, the purchases and sales of 
 agricultural produce are known to be in small amounts ; and 
 hence tne notes of the smallest denomination receive the largest 
 relative increase. The annual changes of the Irish circulation 
 are governed chiefly by the produce of the harvest, and the 
 prices of agricultural products. These are the laws of the circu- 
 lation of Ireland." — Gilbarfs Practical Treatise on Banking. 
 
 The figures which represent tangible objects often indi- 
 cate truths of an intellectual and moral character. Thus 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 341 
 
 if we found that the consumption of spirits had decreased 
 in a district, while the consumption of tea and coffee had 
 increased, we should infer that the population had become 
 more temperate ; and if the number of schools had in- 
 creased, we should infer that the people had become 
 better instructed. The following statistics, from Dickens's 
 " Household Words," are an indication of the intelligence 
 of the inhabitants of London. 
 
 " The area of a single morning paper — ' The Times/ say — is 
 more than nineteen and a half square feet, or nearly five feet by 
 four. Compared with an ordinary octavo volume, the quantity 
 of matter daily issued is equal to three hundred pages. There 
 are four morning papers whose superficies are nearly as great, with- 
 out supplements, which they seldom publish. A fifth is only half 
 the size. We may reckon, therefore, that the constant craving 
 of the Londoners for news is supplied every morning with as 
 much as would fill about twelve hundred pages of an ordinary 
 novel, or not less than five volumes." 
 
 5. The relation of cause and effect has a close con- 
 nexion with statistics. Indeed, we may almost give the 
 same definition of statistics which has been given of 
 philosophy, the "science which teaches the causes of 
 things." 
 
 We discover the " causes of things " in various ways. 
 
 Sometimes statistics will merely give us the facts, 
 and we have to ascertain the causes from other sources. 
 Thus we have fluctuation in the prices of corn — of the 
 funds — and we have to judge of the causes. Here there 
 is much room for difference of opinion. For instance, 
 statistics will tell us that there was a great fall in the price 
 of the funds in February 1848 — History will tell us that 
 just before this, occurred the revolution in France. We 
 may therefore infer with confidence that the French revo- 
 lution was the cause of a decline in the English funds. 
 But generally the relation of cause and effect is less 
 obvious and less sudden, and consequently there is more 
 occasion for sound reasoning. 
 
 Sometimes the causes of things are discovered by taking 
 two similar series of figures from two different localities. 
 Thus at the time of the cholera the number of deaths 
 was registered in a district where the people drank im- 
 
342 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 pure water, and in another district where the people 
 drank pure water : and as the deaths were far more nume- 
 rous in the former locality it was inferred that impure 
 water produced the cholera. So in India the number of 
 deaths from disease in the different regiments stationed 
 in different parts of India was ascertained, and it was 
 inferred that in the places where the deaths were most 
 numerous, the climate was most unhealthy. 
 
 Sometimes "the causes of things" are discovered by 
 taking similar series of facts at different periods. Thus 
 the number of letters passed through the Post Office before 
 the adoption of "the penny postage," and subsequent to 
 that event, will show the effect of that measure in in- 
 creasing the number of letters. 
 
 Sometimes causes are shown by two series of figures — 
 one representing the effect, and the other the cause. Thus, 
 if we have from various districts a series of figures show- 
 ing the number of schools in each district, and another 
 column of figures showing the number of crimes com- 
 mitted in each district, and if we find that generally the 
 number of crimes is in an inverse proportion to the num- 
 ber of schools, we may then infer that want of education 
 is the cause of crime. 
 
 Causes are often discovered by various and minute 
 classifications. We ascertain the number of people that 
 die annually out of a given population. With this know- 
 ledge only we should do as the Amicable Insurance did 
 when first established, — charge the same premium on all 
 lives indiscriminately. But we classify this total according 
 to their ages, and hence we can charge a premium pro- 
 portionate to the age. We go further, and classify the 
 male and female lives ; and again we vaiy our premiums. 
 We may again subdivide according to the districts, and 
 ascertain how far the probabilities on life in the country 
 vary from those in cities. Again, we may classify accord- 
 ing to employments, and ascertain the influence of employ- 
 ments on the duration of human life. So ; we may take 
 a number of criminals, and classify them according to their 
 antecedents, — that is, according to their previous circum- 
 stances in regard to age, residence, employment, character 
 of parents, education, &c. &c, and hence attempt to dis- 
 
APPLICATION OP REASONING TO STATISTICS. 
 
 343 
 
 cover those circumstances that lead to the formation of 
 character, and therefore tend to produce crime. 
 
 The principle of classification — that is, of genus and 
 species — is of very extensive use in statistics ; and we can 
 rarely apply it in any case without obtaining some impor- 
 tant information. This remark is illustrated in the follow- 
 ing table, from the Statistical Companion : — 
 
 National Debt. — Numbers and Classification of Fundholders. 
 
 Persons entitled to 
 receive dividends 
 October 10, 1846. 
 
 Persons entitled to 
 receive dividends 
 October 10, 1847. 
 
 Amount of Dividend each 
 Person was entitled to receive. 
 
 No. 
 
 50,008 
 
 24,978 
 
 53,829 
 
 13,119 
 
 6,893 
 
 1,903 
 
 1,225 
 
 529 
 
 164 
 
 92 
 
 No. 
 
 51,609 
 
 25,274 
 
 54,145 
 
 13,087 
 
 6,889 
 
 1,917 
 
 1,203 
 
 520 
 
 163 
 
 97 
 
 £ 
 
 „ 10 
 
 50 
 
 „ 100 
 
 200 
 
 300 
 
 500 
 
 1,000 
 
 2,000 
 
 Exceeding 2,000 
 
 152,740 
 
 154,904 
 
 
 Showing that the number of persons thus entitled to Dividends on the 10th 
 October, 1847, was 2,164 more than at the same period of last year, by 
 far the largest portion of the increase being in the smallest amounts. 
 
 6. In reply to a statistical argument, Mr. Canning ex- 
 claimed : — " Not figures, but facts." All figures should 
 represent facts. But we cannot deny that even the facts 
 represented by figures may, like other facts, become the 
 basis of erroneous reasoning. 
 
 Our reasoning may be erroneous from the inaccuracy 
 of the data. In some cases no records may have been kept, 
 and hence we have no authenticated facts. From this 
 cause our reasoning may be defective respecting the po- 
 pulousness of ancient nations — the average duration of 
 life in the middle ages — the amount of the revenue the 
 pope derived from England previous to the Reformation. 
 Sometimes when records have been kept they are defective. 
 Thus, the produce of the gold and silver mines in America 
 and in Russia has been calculated from the amount of 
 the duty paid to the State. But, of course, we have no 
 
344 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 record of the cases in which the duty has been evaded. 
 We have records of the importation of tobacco, but we 
 can have no records of the quantity introduced by smug- 
 glers. We know the quantity of spirits that pay duty 
 in Great Britain and Ireland every year, but we have no 
 records of the illicit distillation. 
 
 So in taking our series of figures from different coun- 
 tries, we are liable to error in making comparisons between 
 those things to which these series of figures may respec- 
 tively refer. The prices of commodities, for instance, 
 though referring to things called by the same name, may 
 not refer to things of the same kind or the same quality. 
 In comparing the wages of different countries, we may be 
 led astray, for the quantity of labour rendered in return 
 for these respective rates of wages may very much differ. 
 When the union between England and Ireland was under 
 consideration in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilberforce 
 presented a petition from the Woollen Manufacturers of 
 Yorkshire, praying to be protected against the low wages 
 of Ireland. It was presumed that if woollen manufactures 
 were established in Ireland, they would be able, from 
 the low rate of wages, to undersell those of Yorkshire. 
 Certain duties, called "Union duties," were accordingly 
 continued for twenty years. But though those duties 
 have ceased for thirty years, the woollen manufactures, 
 notwithstanding the low wages, have shown no disposition 
 to take flight from Leeds to Gal way. 
 
 We are sometimes led astray in making comparisons 
 beirween two series of figures, by confining our attention 
 simply to the figures, without noticing the different cir- 
 cumstances of the respective periods to which those figures 
 refer. Thus, during the commercial pressure of 1847, the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer stated to some deputations 
 that waited upon him on the subject, that the restrictions 
 on the issue of Bank notes, by the act of 1844, could not 
 be the cause of the pressure, for the amount of notes then 
 in circulation was higher than it had been in former years 
 when no pressure existed. It was afterwards stated before 
 the Parliamentary Committee, that of the notes in circula- 
 tion, above 4,000,000Z. were locked up in the vaults of the 
 London and Country Bankers, as a provision for any 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 345 
 
 demand that might be made upon them for payment of 
 their notes or deposits. 
 
 Sometimes, as we have stated, two series of figures 
 will, by their correspondence, show that the facts denoted 
 in one series, are the cause of the facts denoted in the 
 other series. But this will not be uniformly the case. 
 We cannot always conclude that, because two rows of 
 figures increase simultaneously, therefore the facts regis- 
 tered by one series of figures are the cause of the facts 
 registered in the other series. The Morning Chronicle 
 produced two series of figures — the one showing the in- 
 crease in the number of boys who attended the Kagged 
 Schools — the other showing the increase in the number of 
 juvenile culprits brought before the police magistrate. 
 It seems that within the same period of time, both the 
 series of numbers had increased. It was, therefore, in- 
 ferred that the establishment of the Ragged Schools had 
 been the cause of an increase in the number of juvenile 
 thieves. In reply to this inference, the Christian Times 
 observes : — " As to the specific value of the statistical 
 figures of the Morning Chronicle, we conceive the utmost 
 merit that can be allowed them, is to consider them an- 
 other ingenious illustration of the frequent fallacy cum hoc 
 propter hoc : for more they can never pass, since they 
 have not a whit better claim to be regarded as proofs than 
 the declaration of a country cousin of ours the other day, 
 who maintained that England had been falling ever since 
 apple-dumplings on a Sunday went out of fashion. Our 
 contemporary might, with equal truth, have shown that 
 the increase of juvenile delinquency had kept pace with 
 the increase of railway traffic, or with the sale of Banbury 
 cakes, or the new discovery of apricot lozenges, or with the 
 use of the magnetic telegraph : and there would have been 
 this advantage in these comparisons — that they are facts. 
 Many things have a co-existence, and preserve a marvellous 
 ratio in their increments, and yet have not the remotest con- 
 nexion as cause and, effect ; and this, we are convinced, is 
 the predicament of the accidental co-increase of juvenile 
 rogueries and Ragged Schools." 
 
 Another case in which statistics have been found to be 
 at fault, is in regard to the future. No one can doubt the 
 Q 3 
 
346 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 beneficial effects of the penny postage. Yet it cannot be 
 denied that those calculations which were made to show 
 that this measure would increase the Kevenue to the State 
 have not been realized. So those calculations which were 
 made a few years ago, by distinguished staticians, as to the 
 lowest price at which foreign corn could be imported into 
 England, have not hitherto turned out to be correct. 
 Perhaps, in these cases, our reasonings more than our 
 calculations have been fallacious. We may, by statistics, 
 establish the truth of general principles. And as a general 
 rule, we may assume that the future will resemble the 
 past. But as the influence of general principles is liable 
 to be counteracted by special circumstances, we cannot 
 predict the future without having also a previous know- 
 ledge of those special circumstances. It is the business of 
 statistics to calculate, not to prophesy. 
 
 7. The following are extracts from the address of the 
 Earl of Harrowby to the Statistical Society of London, at 
 the annual meeting held March 15, 1851. 
 
 " It is important in all sciences to know what is to be expected 
 from them — what they can do, and what they cannot — and for 
 this purpose it should be always kept in mind that a mere perusal 
 of statistical truths gives no short, no royal road to knowledge, 
 but is merely one of the aids to its acquisition. For instance, 
 submit to a man totally ignorant of medicine a table containing a 
 number of facts recorded on a medical subject, — and how many 
 false conclusions will he draw from it ! He must know more 
 than the number of deaths in the year, or even the enumeration 
 of the diseases, before he dares to draw any conclusion as to the 
 sanitary condition of the place. He must know whether epide- 
 mics have prevailed in the year in question — whether war, pesti- 
 lence, or famine have swelled the usual numbers. It must be 
 remembered, that it is only a class of facts, it is not all the facts, 
 that can be tabulated ; and these are only materials towards a 
 conclusion, requiring themselves a running commentary from the 
 knowledge, judgment, and impartiality of either the man who 
 supplies, or the man who reads, the tables — without which quali- 
 fication they not only do not give .the whole facts of the case, but 
 absolutely mislead, by an appearance of completeness which they 
 do not possess. 
 
 " If, again, we were to take tables with regard to criminals, 
 there is no man who, without considerable knowledge of the 
 legal history, and more than the legal history, of the country, 
 would not be misled bv the inspection. He would see, perhaps, 
 
APPLICATION OF REASONING TO STATISTICS. 347 
 
 a considerable increase in the criminality of the country ; but it 
 is desirable to know what was included in the criminality at the 
 beginning of the time, and what is now included ; what changes 
 have taken place in the laws, how much is now submitted to the 
 public observation which once was not; whether crimes which 
 once went under greater names and titles now wear lighter ones, 
 and vice versa; whether the jurisdiction of one tribunal has been 
 transferred to another; whether matters which formerly were 
 submitted to the adjudication of a formal tribunal are now handed 
 over to a summary jurisdiction. If you come further to details, 
 they are of most essential importance in ascertaining the value of 
 the tables. For the purpose of ascertaining the real fact at issue, 
 which is the real increase or decrease of crime, it is essential to 
 know still more — you must take county by county. In one case 
 you have a rural police, in another you have not ; in one case you 
 have a much stricter and more rigorous enforcement of the law 
 than in others. I recollect, on a former occasion, I think *at 
 Glasgow, there were comparisons between the different amounts 
 of drunkenness of different towns. Then came the question — 
 what did the magistrates of one town hold to be drunkenness of 
 a kind to be submitted to the law, and what the magistrates of 
 another town held to be such ? and rather an amusing test was 
 submitted for drunkenness which would come within the law, 
 namely, that as long as a man could walk on the curb-stone with- 
 out going off, he was allowed to escape with impunity ; but if he 
 could not keep on the curb-stone, he immediately was handed 
 over to the proper tribunal. 
 
 " Now, if we were to look at the statistics of circulation alone 
 — the circulation of bank notes by itself — we surely should be 
 very ill-informed as to the amount of means for promoting the 
 exchange of commodities in actual operation, and yet, apparently, 
 the Bank issues should be considered a sufficient test. But if we 
 look back to the amount of circulation at the beginning of the 
 present century, and see how little ifc varies from the amount at 
 the present moment, and compare the amount of pecuniary trans- 
 actions in the one case and in the other, which have to be 
 carried on apparently by that same means of exchange, we should 
 be extremely ill-informed if we did not take into our considera- 
 tion the immense economy of exchange which has taken place by 
 clearing houses and bills of exchange, and every kind of mercan- 
 tile facility, which, in fact, makes the circulation, which, fifty 
 years ago, represented one amount of transactions, to be a very 
 imperfect test for purposes of comparison with the circulation of 
 the present time." 
 
 8. We shall conclude this section with some statistics 
 respecting the Industrial Exhibition. 
 
348 
 
 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 " The ' Crystal, or Glass Palace/ prepared for the 'World's 
 Fair/ or great industrial exhibition of 1851, is 1,848 feet long, 
 by 456 in width. The height of the three roofs is 64, 44, and 24 
 feet ; and that of the transept, 108 feet. The ground floor occu- 
 pies 752,832 superficial or square feet ; and the galleries, 102,528 
 feet, making, in all, an exhibiting surface of some 21 acres, wit! 
 a length of tables of about eight miles. There are 3,500 cast and 
 wrought-iron columns, varying from 14^ to 20 feet in length ; 
 2,224 cast-iron girders, and 1,128 supporters for the galleries. 
 The glass necessary to cover this immense building, is 900,000 
 square feet ; the length of sash-bars is 205 miles ; and there are 
 34 miles of gutters to carry off rain-water to the hollow columns, 
 through which it passes into drains or sewers under ground." 
 
 The following Return has been compiled from the official lists published daily, and 
 shows the estimated weekly number of visitors, and the money taken at the doors t 
 • from the week ending May 3d, to Saturday the 30th of August. 
 
 
 
 ID 
 
 
 Estimated 
 
 Total No. who 
 
 Week 
 ending 
 
 
 fe 
 
 Amount 
 
 number of 
 
 enter weekly, 
 
 Number. 
 
 5 
 
 received at the 
 
 persons 
 entering 
 
 including the 
 staff, exhibitors' 
 
 
 
 doors. 
 
 with season 
 
 attendants, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 tickets. 
 
 the press. 
 
 
 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 
 
 May 3 
 
 1,042 
 
 £1 
 
 1,042 
 
 49,000 
 
 56,042 
 
 10 
 
 41,194 
 
 5s. 
 
 10,298 10 
 
 77,056 
 
 118,250 
 
 17 
 
 53,386 
 
 5s. 
 
 13,346 10 
 
 80,121 
 
 145,507 
 
 24 
 
 89,458 
 
 5s. 
 
 22,189 
 
 91,440 
 
 192,869 
 
 31 
 
 160,857 
 
 Is. 
 
 11,123 5 
 
 61,2.:7 
 
 222,114 
 
 June 7 
 
 218,799 
 
 — 
 
 13,694 2 
 
 27,129 
 
 245,928 
 
 14 
 
 206,233 
 
 — 
 
 12,943 12 
 
 32,352 
 
 238,585 
 
 21 
 
 267,800 
 
 — 
 
 16,421 S 
 
 35,215 
 
 303,015 
 
 28 
 
 262,464 
 
 — 
 
 16,177 8 
 
 30,245 
 
 292,709 
 
 July 5 
 
 225,503 
 
 — 
 
 14,073 
 
 21,436 
 
 246,739 
 
 12 
 
 265,319 
 
 — 
 
 16,427 5 
 
 23,108 
 
 288,427 
 
 19 
 
 283,400 
 
 — 
 
 17,516 
 
 22,453 
 
 3(15,853 
 
 26 
 
 255,768 
 
 — 
 
 15,761 4 
 
 18,371 
 
 247,139 
 
 Aug. 2 
 
 270,900 
 
 — 
 
 16,315 17 6 
 
 15,617 
 
 288,519 
 
 9 
 
 266,770 
 
 — 
 
 15,440 14 6 
 
 20.001 
 
 186.771 
 
 16 
 
 236,096 
 
 — 
 
 14,050 18 ' 6 
 
 15,961 
 
 252,057 
 
 23 
 
 226,502 
 
 — 
 
 13,360 12 6 
 
 10,037 
 
 2 6,539 
 
 30 
 
 202,808 
 Total numt 
 
 erofV 
 
 11,860 7 6 
 isitors from May 
 
 8,638 
 1 to Aug. 30 
 
 211,446 
 
 4,205,509 
 
APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 349 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OP THE ART OF REASONING TO MORAL 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Moral Philosophy has been denned by Paley as the 
 science that teaches men their duty, and the reasons of it. 
 It is thus described by Dr. Croly : — 
 
 "Moral philosophy is tlie teaching of human happiness, in the 
 hands of man; as religion is the teaching of human happiness, in 
 the hands of the Creator. It is the history of the rules, impulses, 
 and objects of hnman virtue. It was the earliest of all studies ; 
 for the obvious reason, that it was the most essential. The first 
 associations of men must have felt the value of truth, of a respect 
 for property, and of the avoidance of mutual injury. Thus, we 
 can expect no practical discoveries in morality, its* principles being 
 fixed by the primal necessities of our nature. Still, though no 
 tactical difficulties exist in its rules, their grounds, their action, 
 and their objects abound in the most refined problems. The dis- 
 tinction of vice and virtue, the supreme good, the foundation of 
 obedience, the rights of man, the origin of evil, have exercised 
 the subtlest intellects since the days of the illustrious author of 
 the Proverbs ; a volume to which may be traced the greater por- 
 tion of all the Eastern maxims ; the doctrines of the early sages, 
 known as the 'wise men of Greece;' and, perhaps, the principles 
 of the three great schools, the Platonic, the Stoic, and the Epicu- 
 rean. With the restoration of learning in Europe, the subject 
 was resumed, and has occupied powerful minds, from the logical 
 acuteness of Hobbes and the profound learning of Cudworth, 
 down to the dexterous simplicity, but dubious conclusions of 
 Paley. To be ' able to give a reason of the hope that is in us,' 
 is a divine command. Next in importance is, to be able to give 
 to ourselves a reason for our duties. But, to give that reason 
 requires the study of moral philosophy." — National Knowledge, 
 National Power. 
 
 In the application of logic to this science, we may 
 observe : — 
 
 1. Logic will teach ns that there are moral truths. 
 
 " The first proposition which I assume, and which I wish you 
 to bear in your minds as firmly established, is, that there are 
 moral truths. So, however, it is. I am solicitous that you should, 
 from the very first, constantly carry with you the firm conviction 
 
350 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 and clear apprehension of this proposition. And I venture to 
 say, that if there be firmly established in your minds a conviction 
 that there are moral truths, many of the difficulties which arise, 
 respecting morality in general, will vanish of themselves, or will 
 be easily removed. 
 
 " Perhaps the best way of illustrating this doctrine, that there 
 are moral truths, is by mentioning some of the most simple and 
 familiar propositions of this kind, which are commonly delivered 
 and assented to by men, both on practical occasions, and in the 
 course of speculative discussions. Of this kind are the following : 
 — That murder, theft, robbery, adultery, are wrong : that breach 
 of promise is wrong ; that a man cannot liberate himself from the 
 obligation of his own promise ; that it is wrong to treat a person 
 as a mere thing; that we must, in general, recognise the autho- 
 rity of the law of the land ; tkat the law ought to conform to 
 justice ; that when a man acts against his conscience, his act is 
 morally wrong. Of this kind, I say, are moral truths. I do not 
 say that all these are certainly moral truths. I do not say this 
 at present, at least. Still less do I say that all these propositions 
 are evidently true, or that they do not admit of limitations and 
 exceptions ; but I say that there are moral truths of this kind. 
 If any of those which I have enumerated be not exactly true, or 
 not true without exception, then there are corrections of them 
 which are the truths at which I point; — then the proposition 
 properly limited by exception is such a truth as I mean. Every 
 body, upon every occasion in which man's moral nature comes 
 into question, — and what occasion is unconnected with man's 
 moral nature ? — every man, I say, upon every occasion, is ready 
 to utter and to assent to propositions such as these; if not 
 exactly these, still such as these. And I say, that this per- 
 petual enunciation and acceptance of such propositions implies, 
 and makes it indisputably certain, that they have in them a sub- 
 stantial truth." — WhewelVs Lectures on Systematic Morality. 
 
 "The view which I take of this subject is briefly as follows : — 
 "It is manifest to every one, that we all stand in various and 
 dissimilar relations to all the sentient beings, created and un- 
 created, with which we are acquainted. Among our relations to 
 created beings are those of man to man, or that of substantial 
 equality, of parent and child, of benefactor and recipient, of 
 husband and wife, of brother and brother, citizen and citizen, 
 citizen and magistrate, and a thousand others. 
 
 " Now, it seems to me, that, as soon as a human being com- 
 prehends the relation in which two human beings stand to each 
 other, there arises in his mind a consciousness of moral obliga- 
 tion, connected, by our Creator, with the very conception of this 
 relation. And the fact is the same, 'whether he be one of the 
 
APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 351 
 
 parties or not. The nature of this feeling is, that the one ought 
 to exercise certain dispositions towards the others to v/hom he is 
 thus related: and to act towards them in a manner corre- 
 sponding with those dispositions." — WaylanoVs Elements of Moral 
 Science. 
 
 2. Logic will teach us to observe the foundation of the 
 distinctions between moral good and evil. 
 
 " All the systems we have examined may, I conceive, be re- 
 ferred to six distinct heads. 1st, The eternal and immutable 
 nature of all moral distinctions. 2d, That utility, public or 
 private, is the foundation of moral obligation. 3d, That all 
 morality is founded upon the will of God. 4th, That a moral 
 sense, feeling, or emotion, is the ground of virtue. 5th, That it 
 is by supposing ourselves in the situation of others, or by a 
 species of sympathetic mechanism, that we derive our notions of 
 good and evil. And 6th, The doctrine of vibrations, and the 
 association of ideas. 
 
 " Those whose doctrine is -mainly founded upon the first prin- 
 ciple, — that of the eternal and immutable nature of all moral 
 distinctions, — are Dr. Cudworth and Mr. John Locke ; Bishop 
 Cumberland, who adopts, however, this principle with more quali- 
 fication than several others ; Mr. Wollaston, by his fitness of 
 things ; and Dr. Clarke, by his truth of things ; Dr. Price, Mr. 
 Gisborne, and Dr. Dewar. 
 
 " Those writers who ground their theories upon the doctrine 
 of utility, or, as it is sometimes termed, the selfish system, are 
 rather numerous. Mr. Hobbes is the first on the list. Mr. 
 Stewart remarks, that there is in point of principle a far more 
 close and intimate connexion between the opinions of this writer 
 and Mr. Hume, and others of this school, than what has com- 
 monly been imagined ; and this remark is perfectly correct. Mr. 
 Hume himself is at the head of this philosophical party. Man- 
 deville's Fable of the Bees, is, though in a caricaturist's dress, 
 bottomed on the same views of human nature. Pope and Boling- 
 broke take the universal weal as the standard of morals. Mr. 
 B.utherford considers the advantages which the Scriptures hold 
 out to those who practise virtue, as the ultimate end of it. 
 Paley's system is well known as grounded on the general good. 
 Godwin's Political Justice, and Mr. Bentham's system, are 
 founded upon the same principle. 
 
 " Archbishop King stands alone in maintaining that the will 
 of God is the sole foundation of virtue ; if we except Dr. Paley, 
 who has coupled this principle with the system of expediency. 
 
 " Those who are advocates for a If oral Sense, are Shaftesbury, 
 Bishop Butler, Dr. Hutcheson, Lord Karnes, Professor Stewart, 
 
352 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 and Dr. Thomas Brown. Dr. Cogan's views seem grounded on 
 the same views. 
 
 " Dr. Adam Smith's work on Moral Sentiments is the only one 
 which is grounded solely on the principle of sympathy. 
 
 " Dr. Priestley and Dr. Hartley are the only two writers who 
 maintain that the Association of Ideas is the ground of good and 
 evil. 
 
 "There are none of these different systems that are not in 
 some degree founded on truth ; but the great imperfection which 
 runs through them all is, that they attempt to generalise too 
 much. We cannot resolve all the moral feelings and habits of 
 our nature into one general principle." — Blakey's History of 
 Moral Science. 
 
 3. Logic will teach us a proper mode of classification 
 with regard to those actions or motives that are morally- 
 good or evil. 
 
 " The division of virtue, to which we are now-a-days most 
 accustomed, is into duties : — 
 
 " Towards God ; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c. 
 
 "Towards other men (or relative duties) ; as justice, charity, 
 loyalty, &c. 
 
 " Towards ourselves ; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, preser- 
 vation of life, care of health, &c." — Palefs Moral Philosophy. 
 
 The following is an enumeration of some of the duties 
 of a public company : — 
 
 The Duties op Public Companies. — "The first of these 
 duties is to obey the lazes — a public company should abstain 
 from smuggling and all other illicit proceedings — should make 
 correct returns to Government, and pay its fair proportion of the 
 property -tax, and of all other duties. ' Render unto Caesar the 
 things which are Caesar's. Render to all their dues ; tribute to 
 whom tribute is due ; custom, to whom custom ; fear, to whom 
 fear; honour, to whom honour.'* Another duty is to enforce 
 the laws upon others. Individuals sometimes abstain from pro- 
 secuting frauds upon themselves, from a misapplied feeling of 
 compassion, an unwillingness to incur odium, or the fear of 
 expense; but none of these feelings are sufficient to justify a 
 public company in abstaining from this duty. Such a course is 
 injurious to the public, by holding out inducements to the com- 
 mission of similar crimes. 'Because sentence against an evil 
 work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of 
 men is fully set in them to do evil.'-j- It is also the duty of public 
 companies to support the cause of order and of due submission to 
 
 * Rom. xiii. 7. t Eccles. viii. 11. 
 
APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 353 
 
 constituted authorities — the rights of property — the supremacy 
 of the law — the impartial administration of public justice — ana 
 to honour the constitutional form of government of the country, 
 by whatever party it may be administered. ' Put them in mind 
 to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to 
 be ready to every good work, to speak evil of no man, to be no 
 brawlers, but gentle, showing all meekness unto all men.'* 
 Another duty is to conduct the affairs of the company on such a 
 liberal, yet prudent scale of expense, as shall afford encourage- 
 ment to the industry, trade, and fine arts of the country. Solomon 
 says, ' Prepare thy work without, and make it fit for thyself in 
 the field, and afterwards build thy house. 5 f Which means, if we 
 understand it rightly, ' Get your money before you spend it, but 
 having got it, live in a scale of expense corresponding to your 
 means — afterwards build thy house.' Individuals may be justified 
 in living much within their means, in order to provide for old 
 age, or for the proper settlement of their children ; but public 
 companies cannot have such motives for conducting their esta- 
 blishments with an unsuitable economy. But, above all, it is the 
 duty of a public company to maintain, in all its transactions, a 
 high-toned morality. 'Righteousness exalteth a nation.' % A 
 departure from moral rectitude is altogether inexcusable in a 
 public company. As all their actions are presumed to be the 
 result of previous deliberations, they cannot plead in excuse, as 
 individuals do, the power of passion, the impulse of the moment, 
 or the force of habit. In proportion to the weakness, or the 
 absence of temptation, in such proportion would their conduct 
 be the more criminal ; § while their wealth and influence would 
 render their example more extensively injurious to the public 
 morality. If parties of high station in society depart from the 
 strict rule of duty, those of inferior station will deviate still more 
 widely. ' If a ruler hearken to lies, all his servants are wicked.' " || 
 Gilbarfs Practical Treatise on 
 
 4. Logic will teach us to notice the different species of 
 any particular virtue or vice. 
 
 " Question. What is forbidden in the Eighth Commandment ? 
 
 "Answer. The Eighth Commandment forbiddeth whatsoever 
 doth or may unjustly hinder our own or our neighbour's wealth 
 or outward estate. 
 
 " Q. How may we be said to steal from ourselves ? 
 
 "A. By idleness, niggardliness, and prodigality. 
 
 " Q. How many ways may persons be said to steal from 
 others, or unjustly hinder their neighbour's wealth or outward 
 estate ? 
 
 * Tit. iii. 1, 2. t Prov. xxiv. 27. % Prov. xiv. 34. 
 
 § Prov. vi. 30. 1] Prov. xxix. 12. 
 
354 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 "A. Several ways; particularly by theft, robbery, resetting, 
 defrauding, monopolizing, and taking unlawful usury." — Assem- 
 bly's Shorter Catechism explained by James Fisher. 
 
 " A merchant should be an honourable man. Although a man 
 cannot be an honourable man without being an honest man, yet 
 a man may be strictly honest without being honourable. Honesty 
 refers to pecuniary affairs ; honour refers to the principles and 
 feelings. You may pay your debts punctually, you may defraud 
 no man, and yet you may act dishonourably. You act dishonour- 
 ably when you give your correspondents a worse opinion of your 
 rivals in trade than you know they deserve. You act dishonour- 
 ably when you sell your commodities at less than their real value, 
 in order to get away your neighbour's customers. You act dis- 
 honourably when you purchase at higher than the market price, 
 in order that you may raise the market upon another buyer. You 
 act dishonourably when you draw accommodation bills, and pass 
 them to your banker for discount, as if they rose out of real 
 transactions. You act dishonourably in every case wherein your 
 external conduct is at variance with your real opinions. You act 
 dishonourably if, when carrying on a prosperous trade, you do 
 not allow your servants and assistants, through whose exertions 
 you obtain your success, to participate in your prosperity. You 
 act dishonourably if, after you have become rich, you are un- 
 mindful of the favours you received when you were poor. In all 
 these cases there may be no intentional fraud. It may not be 
 dishonest, but it is dishonourable conduct." — Lectures on Ancient 
 Commerce. 
 
 5. Logic will teach us to investigate the causes and 
 consequences of virtues and vices, and the various circum- 
 stances by which they may be attended. 
 
 " The effect of intemperance in shortening life is strikingly 
 exemplified in the contrast afforded by other classes of society to 
 the Quakers, a set of people of whom I must again speak 
 favourably. It appears from accurate calculation, that in London 
 only one person in forty attains the age of fourscore, while among 
 the Quakers, whose sobriety is proverbial, and who have long set 
 themselves against the use of ardent spirits, not less than one in 
 ten reaches that age — a most striking difference, and one which 
 carries its own inference along with it. 
 
 " It is remarked by an eminent practitioner, that of more than 
 a hundred men in a glass manufactory, three drank nothing but 
 water, and these three appeared to be of their proper age, while 
 the rest who indulged in strong drinks seemed ten or twelve years 
 older than they proved to be. This is conclusive." — Macnislis 
 Anatomy of Drunkenness. 
 
APPLICATION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 355 
 
 " But if a man is a fool to expect to attain wealth by dishonest 
 means, he is a still greater fool if he expects that wealth so 
 acquired will afford him any enjoyment. — Enjoyment, did I say? 
 Is it possible, that in such a case any man can expect enjoyment ? 
 What ! enjoyment for you — you who have obtained wealth by 
 falsehood — by deception — by extortion — by oppression — you ex- 
 pect enjoyment ? Listen — listen to the hearty denunciations of 
 all honest men; to the awful imprecations of those you have 
 injured ; to the reproaches of your family, whose name you have 
 dishonoured ; to the accusations of that conscience whose voice 
 you have stifled, and to the wrathful thunder of that heaven 
 whose laws you have outraged ! Listen to these — these are the 
 enjoyments that will attend your ill-gotten wealth : — ' He that 
 getteth riches and not by right, shall leave them in the midst of 
 his days : and at his end shall be a fool.' " — Lectures on Ancient 
 Commerce. 
 
 6. Logic will teach us how to apply general principles to 
 particular acts, institutions, or opinions, and to judge of 
 their propriety : — 
 
 Wab,. — " When we contemplate the example of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ, forming a perfect contrast to the war character, and 
 remember that this was designed as a pattern for our conduct — 
 when we consider his precepts, and reflect that these are of per- 
 petual obligation ; and further bring to mind, that his followers 
 took no part in wars for more than tioo hundred years after his 
 personal appearance on earth, can we entertain a doubt of the 
 incompatibility of war with the duties of a Christian ? Can we 
 draw any other conclusion, than that, in adopting the spirit and 
 practice of war, we must act with such inconsistency with the 
 precepts and example of Jesus Christ, and the example of his fol- 
 lowers, as amounts to a dereliction of Christianity itself ! " 
 
 Oaths. — " The imposition of an oath carries with it the strong 
 presumption, that the individual is not to be believed without it. 
 This idea has an extensively demoralizing effect, on those who 
 are placed within the sphere of its influence. It opens a wide 
 door to the disgusting vice of lying. When men become recon- 
 ciled to the idea, that an oath is necessary to the truth, it is a 
 kindred feeling to reconcile them to falsehood, in their ordinary 
 communications. Nor is this the only immoral tendency of 
 requiring oaths, to ensure the truth. lit holds out a temptation 
 to swearing in conversation. Reconciled, in the first place, to 
 speak falsehood, unless under the coercion of an oath, and, in the 
 next place, to attest the truth by swearing, a disposition is pro- 
 duced, in some men, to give their conversation the appearance of 
 truth, by interspersing it with profane oaths." 
 
356 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Salutations. — " They believe there is no propriety in bowing 
 the body, and uncovering the head, to any created beings ; for 
 worship belongs to God only. But if we are told, that in fashion- 
 able life these actions have no such intention, we reply, that if 
 they have become unmeaning, men of correct feelings ought 
 neither to offer nor receive them. If they are intended only to 
 express civility and ordinary respect, we say, that these can be 
 expressed in a more appropriate manner, than by degrading the 
 outward acts of Divine worship down to a mere expression of 
 common civility, or even nothing at all. Everything which relates 
 to Divine worship, or that homage we pay to the Almighty, should 
 be carefully guarded from being introduced into the familiar in- 
 tercourse between man and man ; lest, by the association of ideas, 
 our worship itself become adulterated and offensive. 
 
 " We believe that, under the Gospel, we are bound to speak 
 every man truth to his neighbour. The expressions, mister, or 
 master, and your most obedient, &c. your humble servant, &c. 
 being in the common application untrue, we decline to use. The 
 love and charity which the Gospel inspires, are above all compli- 
 mental expressions, and need neither flattery nor falsehood to set 
 them off to advantage. 
 
 " The plain language, as we term it, or the use of the singular 
 pronouns to a single person, has much to recommend it. In the 
 first place, it is consonant to truth ; for the plural pronoun does 
 express a plurality of persons to whom it relates : hence, we 
 consider it a departure from truth, to address a single individual 
 with a word that conveys an idea of more than one. We consider 
 the plain language, too, as the language of the greatest and best 
 of men that have ever lived, to one another and to God. And we 
 think this authority ought to possess great weight. The rules of 
 the language contribute something to the same effect. It must 
 be admitted, that the beauty and precision of the language are 
 greatly injured by the promiscuous use of the plural pronouns." 
 
 Amusements. — " Those vain amusements which have been de- 
 nominated Recreations, we consider beneath the dignity of the 
 Christian character; and they frequently prove the inlet to much 
 vice and corruption. H. Tuke, in his ' Principles of Religion,' 
 chap. 9, says : ' There are three rules relating to amusements, 
 by which our conduct should be regulated. 1. — To avoid all 
 those which tend needlessly to oppress and injure any part of the 
 animal creation. Of this class are cock-fighting and horse-racing : also 
 hunting, &c. when engaged in for diversion and pleasure. 2. — To 
 abstain from such as are connected with a spirit of hazardous 
 enterprise ; by which the property and temporal happiness of 
 individuals and families are often made to depend on the most 
 precarious circumstances ; and the gain of one frequently entails 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 357 
 
 misery on many. Of this class are all games in which property is 
 staked. 3. — To avoid such as expose us to unnecessary tempta- 
 tions, with respect to our virtue ; or which dissipate the mind, so 
 as to render a return to civil and religious duties ungrateful. Of 
 this kind, stage entertainme?its are peculiarly to be avoided, with 
 various other places of public amusement, which have a tendency 
 to corrupt the heart, or to alienate it from the love and fear of 
 God.' " — The Doctrines of Friends, by Elisha Bates. 
 
 I shall conclude this section by a quotation on the 
 moral effects of the Industrial Exhibition. 
 
 " The many friendships that will be established during the 
 existence of the Exhibition between the members of different 
 nations, will be so many powerful motives for resisting war, so 
 many guarantees for quiet and reasonable legislation ; the breaking 
 down of unfounded prejudices, a more accurate and enlarged 
 knowledge of the real character of our neighbours, the right 
 appreciation of their talents and other excellences, the perception 
 of those points in which we ourselves are inferior to them, — all 
 these things have the same tendency, and they may rationally be 
 expected to follow from that more close collision with foreigners 
 which will be caused by the Great Exhibition of Industry. It is 
 not enough, therefore, to say that it will, under this aspect, pro- 
 mote the welfare of mankind ; we may boldly say, it will promote 
 their moral and religious welfare." — Mr. Whish's Prize Essay. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OF REASONING TO THE 
 FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 
 
 The object of all rules is the formation of habits. Habits 
 can be formed only by repeated acts. The rules direct 
 how the act should be performed. The repetition of the 
 act produces the habit. And when the habit is fixed 
 there is no further occasion for rules. But practice is still 
 necessary in order to confirm and strengthen the habit. 
 
 1. To form a habit of reasoning, take care of your 
 health. 
 
 The possession of health seems essential to independence 
 of mind. 'Tis those who have a weakly constitution whu 
 
358 LOGIC FOE THE MILLION. 
 
 are led astray by the persuasion of others. The means 
 that promote health— as temperance, early rising, and 
 exercise in the open air, tend also to produce clearness and 
 cheerfulness of mind. Do not let the love of reading lead 
 you to sit up late, or deprive you of proper rest and exer- 
 cise. Literary knowledge, valuable as it is, is but a poor 
 compensation for the loss of health. If you are one of the 
 million, one who has employment to attend to during the 
 day, do not in the evening engage in those studies that 
 require strong or continuous mental exertion, such as 
 Greek, Latin, Mathematics, Chemistry, &c. ; but rather 
 direct your attention to those sciences which combine 
 amusement with instruction, and the knowledge of which 
 can be obtained with a moderate degree of application. If 
 you are of such a temperament that the state of your health 
 is likely to affect your judgment, J advise you to read fre- 
 quently those quotations I have made from Dr. Watts in 
 the fourth section of the first part of this work. 
 
 " Huffland has published a work, upon the art of prolonging 
 life, full of interesting observations. ' Philosophers/ says he, 
 ' enjoy a delightful leisure. Their thoughts, generally estranged 
 from vulgar interests, have nothing in common with those afflict- 
 ing ideas with which other men are continually agitated and 
 corroded. Their reflections are agreeable by their variety, their 
 liberty, and sometimes even by their frivolity. Devoted to the 
 pursuits of their choice, the occupations of their taste, they dis- 
 pose freely of their time. Oftentimes they surround themselves 
 with young people, that their natural vivacity may be communi- 
 cated to them, and in some sort, produce a renewal of their 
 youth.' We may make a distinction between the different kinds 
 of philosophy, in relation to their influence upon the duration of 
 life. Those which direct the mind towards sublime contempla- 
 tions, even were they in some degree superstitious, such as those 
 of Pythagoras and Plato, are the most salutary. Next to them, 
 I place those, the study of which, embracing nature, gives 
 enlarged and elevated ideas upon infinity, the stars, the wonders 
 of the universe, the heroic virtues, and the pure and elevated 
 doctrines of Divine revelation. ' Bat those systems,' says the 
 writer just quoted, 'which turn only upon painful subtilties, 
 which are dogmatic and positive, which bend all facts and opinions 
 to form, and adjust them to certain preconceived principles ; in 
 fine, such as are thorny, barren, narrow, and contentious, these 
 are fatal in tendency, and cannot but abridge the lives of those 
 who cultivate them. Of this class was the philosophy of the 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 359 
 
 Peripatetics, and that also of the scholastics.' Tumultuous pas- 
 sions, and corroding cares, are two sources of evil influences, 
 which a true philosophy avoids. Another influence, adverse 
 to life, is that mental feebleness, which renders persons perpe- 
 tually solicitous about their health, effeminate and unhappy. 
 Fixing their thoughts intensely on the functions of life, those 
 functions that are subjects of this anxious inspection, become 
 wearied. Imagining themselves diseased, they soon become so. 
 The undoubting confidence that we shall enjoy health, is perhaps 
 one of the best means of preserving it." — Art of Being Happy. 
 
 2. To form a habit of reasoning, attend to the health of 
 your mind. 
 
 Do not exercise any one faculty unduly. Do not in- 
 dulge the imagination. Read no novels, and but little 
 poetry. Do not overload the memory. Think as well as 
 read ; but do not think intensely on any one subject ; the 
 reasoning powers then become distracted and enfeebled. 
 
 "A quickness of mental perception, a lively and vigorous 
 imagination, and a ready and retentive memory, are highly useful 
 and ornamental qualities ; but they are individually limited in 
 their beneficial influence. The reasoning power, however, is of 
 vital use. It is the corner-stone of the intellectual building, 
 giving grace and strength to the whole structure ; without it all 
 the other faculties of the soul would be of little or no utility. 
 All the differences in the mental qualifications of men may be 
 traced to the various degrees of original strength in this quality 
 of the mind, or to the successful manner in which it has been 
 cultivated and improved." — Blaketfs Essay on Logic. 
 
 In order to improve yourself in Logic, I would advise 
 you to avoid, especially in your youth, discussions on those 
 abstract principles of morals and metaphysics, which in 
 every age of the world have puzzled, and which continue 
 to puzzle, the most profound philosophers. Limit your 
 inquiries and investigations to those things respecting 
 which you may hope to arrive at some satisfactory con- 
 clusion, and which are also capable of some useful practical 
 application. The absorption of the mind in mysticism 
 tends to impair both the faculty of perception, and the 
 power of reasoning. I would also advise you to avoid 
 reading books written in an obscure or affected style. Such 
 writings tend to injure the perceptive faculty, and to 
 
360 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 familiarise the mind with obscure ideas, or with ideas 
 obscurely expressed. Eead those works which are remark- 
 able for profound reasoning and clear expression. Read 
 with a pencil in your hand, and mark those paragraphs that 
 contain any examples of clear and beautiful reasoning. 
 If the newspapers you read are your own, cut out with a 
 penknife all the good pieces of argumentation you may 
 find, and after a while read them over again, and classify 
 them according to the principles or forms of reasoning 
 they can be employed to illustrate. 
 
 3. To form a habit of reasoning, associate your reason- 
 ings with your daily avocations. 
 
 Don't imagine that the great end of the art of reasoning 
 is to enable you to refute or to instruct other people. Its 
 chief end is to enable you to teach yourself. " Logic," says 
 Dr. Watts, "is the art of using our reason well in the 
 search after truth and in the communication of it to others." 
 But don't fancy that " to search after truth," means nothing 
 more than reading books, or what is called study. You 
 will find that your daily duties, your own reflections, and 
 the conduct of mankind around you, will supply you with 
 truths quite as interesting and as important as any that 
 you will meet with in books. Think on these. Before per- 
 forming any action, ask yourself what are the reasons for 
 doing it, and ■ then ask what are the reasons for not doing 
 it. Then consider the principles of your arguments and 
 the various forms in which they may be expressed. When 
 you have acquired the habit of thus reasoning on your 
 own actions, you will soon learn to apply the same mode of 
 reasoning to the actions of other people. 
 
 We never hear any one praised for being a good logician. 
 The fact is, that when a man reasons well, he is famed not 
 for his knowledge of logic, but for his knowledge of the 
 art to which his logic is applied. When a lawyer reasons 
 well he is celebrated not as a good logician, but as a good 
 lawyer. The late Sir William Follett owed much of his 
 reputation to the beautiful clearness of his reasoning. It is 
 the same in every other profession. If a tradesman reasons 
 well when talking with his customers, he is never suspected 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 361 
 
 of being skilled in logic, but, what is of more importance, 
 he gets the character of being a good tradesman. And if 
 a man reasons well upon " matters in general," he is 
 reckoned a sensible man. Never boast of your logic. A 
 reputation as a logician will damage the effect of your 
 reasonings. Your opponent may fancy that his inability 
 to answer your arguments arises, not from the weakness 
 of his cause, but from your superior skill as a disputant. 
 
 4. To form a habit of reasoning, rather divide your 
 reading and studies among a variety of subjects, than con- 
 fine yourself to one subject. 
 
 Try to be distinguished in your profession, but do not 
 be distinguished in anything else. If so, those engaged in 
 the same profession will endeavour to detract from your 
 professional reputation, by praising you for other attain- 
 ments. You had better divide your unprofessional reading 
 and studies among a good many subjects, rather than con- 
 fine them to one. This will afford you more pleasure, 
 impose less mental labour, and give a more lively exercise 
 to your powers of reasoning. You will get the character 
 of being a well-informed man, and awaken no envy by 
 any special kind of superiority. Lord Bacon was a 
 great lawyer, but he was also a great philosopher. And 
 because he was a philosopher, he was supposed to be no 
 lawyer. This opinion was entertained even by his distin- 
 guished contemporaries, the Minister Cecil, and the Attorney 
 General, Coke. Disraeli observes, that " both were mere 
 practical men of business, whose narrow conceptions, and 
 whose stubborn habits, assume that whenever a man ac- 
 quires much knowledge foreign to his profession, he will 
 have less of professional knowledge than he ought." 
 
 Beyond your profession, then, it is better you should know 
 a little about a good many things, than know a great deal 
 about some one thing. This will give a more expansive 
 character to your mind, and greater variety to the exercise 
 of your reasoning powers. Get, therefore, a general 
 acquaintance with every branch of knowledge. You will 
 find that the sciences to which I have more especially 
 directed your attention, History, Political Economy, 
 Statistics, and Moral Philosophy, will supply you with an 
 
 R 
 
362 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. f 
 
 inexhaustible fund of topics, about which you will have 
 occasion to reason. They can be studied without any 
 expensive apparatus — without any knowledge of Latin or 
 Greek — and they refer to matters of the highest import- 
 ance, as well as to the affairs of every-day life. The lessons 
 they teach will enable you both to judge of the conduct of 
 nations and to regulate your own. These sciences ar 
 strictly logical sciences. The physical and mathematical 
 sciences will not, so far as you are concerned, call for the 
 same exercise of your reasoning powers. The knowledge 
 of the physical sciences is acquired by observation and 
 experience, and imparted by writing or conversation. Here 
 there is little ground for reasoning. All that is known is 
 certain and cannot be disputed. What is unknown does 
 not afford sufficient evidence for the formation of opinions. 
 In Botany, Natural History, Geography, Geology, and the 
 other Physical Sciences, all we have to do is to listen and 
 learn. Mathematics is all severe reasoning, but the prac- 
 tical application is mere routine. We learn cyphering at 
 school mechanically. We add, subtract, multiply and 
 divide. We learn fractions and decimals, and know how 
 to extract the square and cube roots, all by rule. Nor can 
 it be denied, that all these operations may be performed 
 very well without any knowledge of the scientific princi- 
 ples on which they are founded. The higher branches of 
 mathematics and their application to Geometry, Astro- 
 nomy, Navigation, &c. require great exertions of the 
 reasoning powers, and eminence is rarely attained in this 
 kind of knowledge but by the devotion of the whole time 
 to its pursuit. Happily, however, this high degree of 
 knowledge is not necessary to every member of the com- 
 munity. If- you are acquainted with Arithmetic, understand 
 simple equations in Algebra, and know how to use a table 
 of Logariths, you have as much knowledge of Mathematics 
 as you are likely to require in the ordinary business of life, 
 and this will not tax very heavily your powers of reasoning. 
 It has often been asserted that a familiarity with mathe- 
 matical reasoning unfits the mind for proficiency in moral 
 reasoning. I have never seen any evidence that has con- 
 vinced me of the soundness of this opinion. No doubt a 
 man will enter more readily upon that kind of reasoning 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 3G3 
 
 with which he is most familiar. A professor of mathe- 
 matics may reason well on mathematics, and badly on 
 morals, simply because he is accustomed to one kind of 
 reasoning and not accustomed to the other. This affords 
 no evidence that his capacity for moral reasoning has been 
 impaired by his study of mathematics. It appears to me 
 more rational to suppose, that the discipline imparted to 
 the mind by mathematical studies, tends to give increased 
 precision and energy to all the other operations in which 
 it may engage. At the same time, in passing through 
 life, you will find that a dexterity in performing the 
 operations of Arithmetic will be of more use to you than 
 a knowledge of the abstract principles on which these 
 operations are founded. Sam Slick says, " If you wish to 
 go a-head, there's nothing like cyphering." 
 
 5. To form a habit of reasoning, you must keep your- 
 self in practice. 
 
 One way of doing this is frequently to review all your 
 opinions, and examine the arguments by which they are 
 supported, and the objections to which they are exposed. 
 Do not take your opinions in clusters upon the authority 
 of the party or body to which you belong. Examine 
 them one by one for yourself, and be at all times prepared 
 to render a reason for any doctrine that forms an article 
 in either your political or your religious creed. Read 
 occasionally those books or newspapers that contain 
 attacks upon the sentiments you hold, and think to your- 
 self what you would say in case you were called upon to 
 reply to those attacks. Take a parliamentary speech, for 
 instance, and fancy how you would reply to it. In cases 
 of actual contest attack the most able man of r his party. 
 You pay yourself a poor compliment by selecting a weak 
 opponent. It is by wrestling with superior minds that 
 we increase our own strength. In logical disputation, as 
 in social life, no honour can be gained by quarrels with 
 inferiors. You should engage only in those contests in 
 which victory is attended with renown. 
 
 Many of our most distinguished men have in their 
 youth been members of debating societies. We have in 
 r2 
 
364 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 former days met at such societies men of high talent, who 
 have rendered, and are still rendering good service to their 
 country and to the world. These associations possess the 
 same advantages, and are liable to -the same objections that 
 are pointed out by Dr. Watts in regard to scholastic dispu- 
 tations. (See page 268.) I believe that societies formed for 
 the sole purpose of debate are not so numerous as formerly, 
 but most of our literary and scientific institutions have a 
 " discussion class," which answers the same purpose. I 
 advise you to join this class. Institutions that. are adapted 
 to make wise men wiser should not be laid aside merely 
 because in some instances they may do injury to men who 
 are not wise. If you have a talent for speaking, by all 
 means cultivate it, but do not fancy that a fluent speaker 
 is necessarily a good logician. Study your speeches be- 
 forehand, and arrange your thoughts under one, two, or 
 three heads, but do not write them out. Guard against 
 dogmatism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other. 
 Discuss only those questions on which there can be a 
 reasonable difference of opinion. Never attempt to prove a 
 doctrine that is transparently true, nor to refute a doctrine 
 that is transparently absurd; and never, even to get up a 
 debate, argue in favour of any doctrine that you do not 
 honestly believe. At the close of every debate, sum up in 
 your own mind the arguments that have been advanced on 
 both sides of the question that has been discussed, and then 
 form, correct, or confirm your own opinion. 
 
 On this subject, I will quote from Mr. John Mottram's 
 " Institutional Education." This essay obtained the prize 
 offered to its members by the City of London Literary 
 and Scientific Institution, for the best essay on " The 
 Characteristics and Advantages of Literary and Scientific 
 Institutions; their claims to the support of society; and 
 the best means of extending their usefulness." 
 
 " It is a good thing for a man that lie should bring his opinion 
 into occasional conflict with those of other men : that he should 
 regard those opinions from other points of view than what his 
 own mind can furnish of itself; that he should look upon them 
 as others look upon them ; and either be strengthened in his own 
 im iressions, or suffer those impressions to pass away ; in either 
 case becoming mentally and morally advantaged. And this has its 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 365 
 
 practical advantages in our daily life. It is necessary for a man 
 that he should be prepared to take part in the conflict of opinion 
 that is constantly going on in the world ; and these occasional 
 argumentative contests prepare him for this work." 
 
 " The power of accustoming ourselves to discuss the opinions 
 of others, becomes a habit of the greatest advantage to society ; 
 it prevents the taking upon trust new opinions, or the pinning 
 our faith to any, however prevalent they may be ; and it promotes 
 that spirit of inquiry into the rationality of an opinion that must 
 tend very considerably to augment the predominance of truth 
 among men, and to aid on their progress. The man who feels 
 the power within himself which frequent discussion upon all mat- 
 ters moral and political will give him — who appreciates the much 
 higher character of this power over other modes of influencing 
 men's minds — will not be the man to apply to the legislature of 
 his country for acts to coerce the opinions of his fellow-man, or 
 to legalise and support his own views, by this course seeking to 
 bring discredit and ruin upon the opinions of others ; nor will he 
 be the man to raise the standard of rebellion, making violence the 
 arbitrator between truth and error ; but ever struggling on, eager 
 in the promulgation of his convictions, ever preparing and ever 
 using the weapons mind places at his disposal, he will in this way, 
 and in no other, seek to make his opinions prevail around him. 
 These Institutions, in affording ssope for the necessary inquiries, 
 and for the preparation necessary to the culture of this reliance 
 upon the power of argument, and the continual progress of truth, 
 put forward great claims to the support and attention of society. 
 They are the schools, and they might be made more effectual 
 schools, for the preparation required for taking part in the active 
 duties and struggles of the world. Within their walls there is 
 much of the information, order, and propriety of arrangements 
 acquired, which fit a man for taking part in public business, to the 
 advantage of the society of which he is a member." — Institutional 
 Education. 
 
 6. To form a habit of reasoning, attend to the disci- 
 pline of your own mind with regard to its moral principles 
 and dispositions. 
 
 The cultivation of the moral feelings improves the 
 intellectual faculties. A sound heart is less likely to go- 
 astray than a clever head. " The entrance of thy words 
 giveth light, it giveth understanding to the simple." On 
 this subject w r e shall be content to quote from two authors 
 —not theologians — who have written on very different 
 subjects. 
 
366 LOGIC FOR THE MILLION. 
 
 Mr. Taylor, of the Colonial Office, thus writes in his 
 work entitled " The Statesman : " — 
 
 " If there be in the character not only sense and soundness, 
 hut virtue of a high order, then, however little appearance there 
 may be of talent, a certain portion of wisdom may be relied upon 
 almost implicitly. For the correspondencies of wisdom and good- 
 ness are manifold ; and that they will accompany each other is to 
 be inferred, not only because men's wisdom makes them good, 
 but also because their goodness makes them wise. Questions of 
 right and wrong are a perpetual exercise of the faculties of those 
 who are solicitous as to the right and wrong of what they do and 
 see ; and a deep interest of the heart in these questions carries 
 with it a deeper cultivation of the understanding than can be 
 easily effected by any other excitement to intellectual activity. 
 Although, therefore, simple goodness does not imply every sort of 
 wisdom, it unerringly implies some essential conditions of wisdom ; 
 it implies a negative on folly, and an exercised judgment within 
 such limits as nature shall have prescribed to the capacity. And 
 where virtue and extent of capacity are combined, there is im- 
 plied the highest wisdom, being that which includes the worldly 
 wisdom with the spiritual." — The Statesman. 
 
 Mr. Blakey, who is now the Professor of Logic and 
 Metaphysics in the Queen's College, Belfast, writes as 
 follows : — 
 
 " 1 am fully convinced that there is a much closer connexion 
 between mental superiority, and a belief in the Scriptures, than is 
 commonly imagined. Sceptical modes of thinking have a direct 
 and natural tendency to beget a captious, quibbling, sophistical, 
 habit ; to create and foster literary arrogance and conceit ; to de- 
 stroy whatever is candid and ingenuous in controversial warfare ; 
 to make the mind diminutive, rickety, and distorted ; and to in- 
 duce men to set a higher value on crotchety sophisms than on 
 the inspirations of real wisdom and science, .... On the other 
 hand, where the Scriptures are embraced with that sincerity, 
 heartiness, and singleness of mind, to which their manifest import- 
 ance so justly entitles them, we will perceive a comprehensive- 
 ness, a vigour, and elasticity given to our minds, which cannot fail 
 to vlace us on the vantage ground, whatever branch of knowledge 
 we may choose to cultivate, or to excel in. The mind, no longer 
 groping its way through the hazy and murky atmosphere of doubt 
 and uncertainty, advances with a firm and confident step, under 
 the bright and irradiating influence of the sun of truth. By the 
 contemplation of whatever is grand and sublime in doctrine, and 
 
FORMATION OF HABITS OF REASONING. 307 
 
 pure and simple in precept, our minds are naturally led, by our 
 established constitution, to spread themselves into a wider com- 
 pass ; to improve their various powers or faculties, by giving them 
 an enlarged sphere of action ; to dwell upon what is great, noble, 
 and excellent; to pursue our course with freedom and boldness, 
 unencumbered with babbling sophistries, and cheered with the 
 consolatory reflection, that we are engaged in promoting whatever 
 is esteemed among mankind fair, honourable, and praiseworthy." 
 ■ — Blakeys History of Moral Science. 
 
 And now, gentle reader, I have finished my book upon 
 the Art of Reasoning. But as there is an intimate con- 
 nexion between reasoning and speaking, I shall add an 
 Appendix on the Philosophy of Language. This appendix 
 is the substance of a lecture I delivered in November, 
 1832, before the Waterford Literary and Scientific Insti- 
 tution. After you have read it, I advise you to read the 
 index, as this will recal to your mind the principal topics 
 discussed in the body of the w 7 ork. Yon may then place 
 the book in the hands of your children, or of your 
 younger brothers and sisters. But before you do this, 
 you had better read it a second time, and mark with a 
 pencil those parts best adapted for their first reading. 
 You will, perhaps, think that they may commit to 
 memory the leading paragraphs in the second and third 
 parts, in ttie same way that they have learned at school 
 the first principles of grammar and geography; and that 
 the other parts of the work may be divided into Lessons in 
 Reading. Young men may form themselves into classes, 
 and read a section at each of their meetings, and every 
 member might, from his own reading, occupation, or pro- 
 fession, give an additional illustration of the rules pro- 
 pounded in the section. In this way they might train 
 their minds into an accurate mode of thinking and of 
 reasoning without encumbering themselves with the tech- 
 nicalities and subtilities of scholastic logic. They who 
 desire nothing more than useful amusement, may skip the 
 rules, and read the illustrations. These, in the language 
 of a Reviewer, form " a collection of Elegant Extracts." 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 Philosophers have given various definitions of Man. These 
 definitions have been founded on the circumstances by which he 
 is chiefly distinguished from other animals. 
 
 By some he is styled a rational animal — being endowed with 
 reason. Though several of the inferior animals, such as dogs, 
 horses, and elephants, discover great sagacity in particular circum- 
 stances, yet none seem to be endowed with that faculty which we 
 style reason — the power of reflecting— of comparing ideas — of 
 drawing inferences, and of tracing consequences. The instinct 
 which they possess is sufficient for the station which Providence 
 has assigned to them in this lower world. It rises at once to 
 maturity, and is not, like the reason of men, developed by slow 
 and imperceptible degrees. While instinct thus rises rapidly to 
 maturity, it never surpasses a certain point. Reason seems 
 capable of an indefinite degree of improvement. The arts and 
 sciences are progressive through succeeding generations — where 
 one ends another begins. But instinct makes no improvement. 
 A bird of the nineteenth century will build his nest in the same 
 way as a bird that lived two thousand years ago, and build it, too, 
 without any previous instruction, and without having seen a single 
 nest constructed. 
 
 Man has been defined a religious animal. No other animal 
 that we are aware of has any sense of religion. They have no 
 consciousness that they are indebted for their existence to the 
 power of a superior being — no sense of obligation to him — no 
 anticipation of their own death ; of course they have no assemblies 
 for religious worship— they perform no act of devotion — their 
 conduct cannot be influenced by a fear of punishment or a hope 
 of reward in a future state of existence. It is true, they have 
 some dispositions which, among mankind, are deemed moral 
 qualities. They are more temperate than men; they possess 
 attachment for their offspring, and are free from that ambition and 
 avarice which are the great sources of human vices : but these 
 dispositions being conferred by nature, and not regulated by con- 
 siderations of duty or propriety, ought more properly to be termed 
 instincts than moral qualities. 
 
 Man has been defined a political animal, as men only are found 
 to associate in a political society. The inferior animals seem to 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 369 
 
 have no notion of the advantages to be derived from a division of 
 labour ; each animal provides its own food, makes its own nest, 
 and performs everything for itself. Nor do we find among them 
 any class who devote themselves to the service of the community, 
 and who, consequently, are supported by the labour of others. 
 They have no lawyers, no judges, no magistrates, to adjust their 
 disputes; no professors to impart knowledge; no physicians to 
 heal the sick. There are a few cases in which animals live in 
 society : such are the bees, who live under a monarchy, even in 
 North America ; and' even in France and Germany, where the salic 
 law is in force, their monarch is always a female. 
 
 Man has been defined a cooking animal, because he alone cooks 
 his food before he eats it. The bird eats the worm without either 
 roasting or boiling it ; and all animals eat their food, whether it 
 be animal or vegetable, in the state in which it is produced. But 
 nearly all the food of man first undergoes an artificial preparation; 
 fruits and salads are the chief things he eats raw. Nor does man, 
 like the other animals, confine his beverage to the pure water of 
 the spring, but has recourse to infusions and distillations, in order 
 to render his drink more palatable or more potent. 
 
 Man has been defined a tool-making animal. Whatever other 
 animals perform^ whether they collect their food, or construct 
 their habitation, they use only those instruments with which 
 nature has endowed them ; but man looks about for tools, and 
 constructs machines. By these means he increases his power, and 
 effects his objects better and more rapidly than he could other- 
 wise do. 
 
 Man has been defined a pugnacious animal ; that is, — he alone 
 in contending against his enemies employs artificial weapons. 
 When the other animals fight, they use only the weapons which 
 nature has given them ; it is by their horns, their teeth, their 
 claws, or their poison, that they assail their foes. But man has 
 put every part of nature under contribution to supply him with 
 weapons of destruction. He has depopulated forests, and 
 drawn iron from the mine, and compelled chemistry to furnish 
 materials by which he might more effectually destroy his fellow- 
 creatures : — 
 
 " Oh shame to man ! 
 Devil with devil damn'd firm concord holds ; 
 Men only disagree of creatures rational." 
 
 This definition, however, is said to be not strictly correct, as 
 several tribes of monkeys are known to use sticks and branches 
 of trees in contending against each other; If, however, this dis- 
 tinction is not peculiar to man, we have the consolation to reflect 
 that it is not shared with us by any but monkeys. 
 
 Man has been defined a laughing animal. Though all animals 
 jb3 
 
370 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 
 
 are susceptible of pleasure, yet none of tbem express it in that 
 peculiar way which is styled laughing. 
 
 But the definition of man which has the nearest relation to our 
 present subject is, that he is a talking animal. No other animal 
 is endowed with the faculty of speech. 
 
 A language is a collection of sounds employed by the people of 
 any country to convey their ideas to each other. The word 
 Philosophy is derived from two Greek words, which mean " the 
 love of learning," and in modern use is employed to denote the 
 investigation of abstract principles. The various branches or de- 
 partments of Philosophy are usually called Sciences. A Science 
 is different from an Art. Science consists in the investigation of 
 causes and principles, with a view to the discovery of general 
 rules. Art consists in the application of those rules to practical 
 purposes. All art is founded on some science, and most sciences 
 lead to the practice of some useful art. Though the words Science 
 and Philosophy may, in point of meaning, be considered as nearly 
 synonymous, both denoting the investigation of principles, yet 
 from custom the word Science is limited to those branches of 
 human knowledge which have a reference to the properties of 
 matter, such as Astronomy, Navigation, and the different branches 
 of the Mathematics ; while the term Philosophy is applied to those 
 branches of knowledge which have a reference to the faculties of 
 the mind, and to the various relations of human life. Thus we 
 speak of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, of Moral Philosophy, 
 the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Taste, the Philosophy 
 of Rhetoric, and the Philosophy of Language. 
 
 Philosophy as applied to language bears the same relation to 
 grammar as science does to art, or as the business of an architect 
 does to that of a mason. The grammarian, like the mason, is 
 governed by the established rules. He requires that sentences 
 should be constructed according to the acknowledged laws of the 
 language. The philosophy or the science of language investigates 
 the propriety of these laws, considers the circumstances in which 
 they originated, and endeavours to ascertain whether, in some 
 cases, more elegance and convenience may not be obtained by a 
 departure from them than by their rigid observance. 
 
 In the prosecution of this subject, 1 shall in the present lecture 
 consider the Nature, the Origin, and the Porrnation of Language. 
 
 I. The Nature of Language. 
 
 Language is a collection of sounds expressive of ideas, and em- 
 ployed as a means of intercourse among mankind. The inferior 
 animals have certain sounds by which they express their feelings. 
 Many fishes, indeed, cannot utter any kind of sounds, and many 
 worms are in the same state. But most birds and beasts have the 
 power of uttering sounds. If they feel pain, they express the sen- 
 sation by a certain sound ; if they feel pleasure, they express it 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 371 
 
 by another sound ; if exposed to danger, too, they employ another 
 sound. But this is not language ; for men, too, express their 
 sensations by certain sounds distinct from words ; and even men 
 who are born dumb will express the sensations of pain and plea- 
 sure, fear and desire, by certain natural sounds wholly distinct 
 from articulate language. But animals have a further power than 
 this. Not only do they express sensations by peculiar sounds, 
 but they also employ certain sounds as a means of intercourse 
 with each other. A hen, by a certain sound, will inform her 
 chickens that she has found some food for them to eat, and they 
 will all run to devour it. By another sound she can inform them 
 of the near approach of a hawk, and they will all rush beneath her 
 wings. So, also, most animals appear to be acquainted with the 
 voices of their enemies. When the lion roars, the beasts of the 
 forest will run to a place of shelter, and a hare will hasten away 
 when she hears the voice of a pack of hounds. 
 
 These sounds, however, which animals have the power of utter- 
 ing, seem totally distinct from language, and are analogous to 
 those sounds which men can utter who are unable to speak. An 
 infant can express pain and pleasure by certain sounds, even in its 
 tenderest age ; and long before it has learned the use of language, 
 it has acquired certain sounds of its own, which it employs as a 
 means of intercourse with those around. 
 
 These animal sounds differ from language, in the first place, in 
 being natural and instinctive, whereas language is always acquired. 
 If a dog were bred up apart from all other dogs, it would never- 
 theless acquire the practice of barking ; and were there only one 
 bird in the world, that bird would sing. These exercises would 
 be as natural to them as it is natural for a child to cry. But if a 
 child were brought up by itself, it would never learn to speak. 
 We know very well that when children are born deaf they always 
 remain dumb. Nay more, even speech when once acquired is 
 liable to be lost. Some of us, I dare say, have forgotten in a 
 great degree languages which we understood pretty well when we 
 were at school. And Selkirk, whose solitary residence in a desert 
 island for four years gave rise to the popular novel of Robinson 
 Crusoe, had, when taken away, nearly lost the use of speech, and 
 pronounced his words very imperfectly. If we wish to retain the 
 knowledge of any language, it is indispensably necessary that we 
 write and talk it frequently; but animals retain the sounds by 
 which they communicate with each other without any danger of 
 losing them, or of becoming unable to utter them distinctly. The 
 reason is, that with them the sounds are natural, while with us, 
 language is always acquired. 
 
 Another difference between these animal sounds and human 
 language is, that these sounds are expressive of sensations, but 
 language is* expressive of ideas. If I feel cold, 1 have a sensation 
 
372 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 
 
 of cold ; but if I think of cold without feeling it, I have then an 
 idea of cold. Animals feel external impressions like men, and 
 they have sounds to denote those feelings. As sounds are expres- 
 sive of sensations, it follows that they are all similar, for a similar 
 sensation will produce a similar sound. All dogs of the same 
 species will bark alike; all birds of" the same species will sing 
 alike; but twenty men will express the same idea in as many 
 different ways. Thus, if a man has a very painful tooth-ache, he 
 may sigh, he may groan, he may weep. This is the expression of 
 the sensation, and all men expressing the same sensations might 
 express it in the same way and by similar sounds. But if he 
 wished to communicate to some other person the idea that he had 
 a very painful tooth-ache, this idea might be conveyed in as many 
 different ways as there are languages ; and even twenty people 
 who spoke the same language might use different words to con- 
 vey this idea. Sensations are expressed by nearly similar sounds, 
 but the same ideas may be expressed by various sounds. 
 
 Another difference between animal sounds and human language 
 is, that the latter is capable of being subdivided into syllables. 
 Animals are without articulation. A word is not a continuous 
 sound; it is a succession of sounds gradually sliding into each 
 other. Let any one keep his organs of speech in a fixed position, 
 and try how many sounds he can utter by the mere emission of 
 his breath, and he will find that these sounds are exceedingly few. 
 In speaking, the organs of speech are perpetually varying their 
 position, and thus they form articulate language. It is a remark- 
 able fact, that while we can construct mechanical instruments that 
 shall emit sounds resembling the music of the birds, we can form 
 none that are capable of uttering words. To this point our dis- 
 coveries in mechanical science have not yet been carried. And 
 we have to look forward to future inventions, when our harps and 
 pianos shall accompany their music with their voices, and the 
 organs in our churches shall not only sound the tunes but also 
 sing the psalms. 
 
 II. I now proceed to consider the Origin of Language. 
 
 It is very certain that infants do not speak as soon as they are 
 born, and if born deaf they do not learn to speak at all. Lan- 
 guage, then, is not essential to existence : man may exist without 
 language. It has been a matter of much inquiry, whether there 
 was any period in the history of mankind wherein they were 
 destitute of speech, and, if so, in what way they became ac- 
 quainted with the use of language. 
 
 Some philosophers, both ancient and modern, have believed 
 that mankind were originally savages, destitute of any knowledge 
 of the arts and sciences, and even of the. use of language ; and 
 then, by their own unassisted exertions, they reached their sub- 
 sequent state of improvement — that language is entirely of human 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 373 
 
 invention; and that previous to its discovery the communication 
 of ideas among mankind was carried on by signs and gestures. 
 Hence we may account for the variety of languages that exists in 
 the world, on the supposition that different branches of mankind 
 fixed upon different sounds, as the representatives of their ideas. 
 
 But the opinion that all mankind were originally savages, is 
 unsupported by either reason or history. Had they been created 
 savages, they would probably have remained savages for ever. 
 They could have formed no idea of a civilization which had never 
 existed, nor have desired comforts, the want of which they did 
 not feel. History does not record a single instance of a savage 
 nation having become civilized by its own unassisted exertions. 
 Civilization has never sprung up spontaneously from the soil ; it 
 has always been imported from abroad. The Greeks derived 
 their civilization from the Egyptians ; the Romans theirs from 
 the Greeks ; the nations conquered by Rome became civilized 
 from their intercourse with the Romans. But if we attempt to 
 trace the origin of civilization in Egypt and Babylon, we are at a 
 loss ; for neither history, nor even tradition, mentions any period 
 at which these nations were not civilized. Founded soon after 
 the flood, they possessed the knowledge of all the arts and 
 sciences known to the antediluvian world. The fertility of 
 their soils, and the extent of their plains, furnished ample pro- 
 vision for their population : hence, as population increased, their 
 civilization increased. While, on the other hand, those tribes or 
 families who wandered in quest of new settlements became sepa- 
 rated from the rest of mankind by mountains, and forests, and 
 rivers ; and their time being wholly occupied in seeking supplies 
 of food, they lost, in the course of a few generations, the know- 
 ledge they originally possessed, and fell into the savage state. It 
 would thus appear, from history and from reason, that the savage 
 state was not the original state of man, but a departure from that 
 state, arising from a want of communication through several ages 
 with the other branches of the family of mankind. 
 
 But although, in various places, man has been found in a savage 
 state, he has never yet been found so far brutalized as to be desti- 
 tute of speech. All tribes of savages, however widely separated 
 from each other, in various parts of the world, possess the know- 
 ledge of some articulate language. Among these savages, then, 
 the invention of speech must have preceded their advance from 
 the savage state. But is it not very unlikely that men who were in 
 so rude a state as to be unable to invent the simplest implement 
 of agriculture, should invent a language ? Even in our present 
 state of civilization, were we suddenly bereft of our language and 
 of all recollection of it, we should find sume difficulty in framing 
 a new language for ourselves. How then could a nation of 
 savages be competent to effect such an object ? Besides, in what 
 
374 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 way, previous to the invention of language, could a tribe of 
 savages carry on the discussions upon the propriety of inventing 
 it? Would it not be a curious sight were we to see a hundred, or 
 a thousand, or ten thousand savages, discussing, without language, 
 the propriety of inventing speech, and of fixing upon the various 
 sounds that might be suitable to their respective ideas ? Can we 
 imagine for a moment that either House of Parliament could 
 fully discuss, without language, the plainest matter connected 
 with our national interests ? And if not, how could a nation of 
 savages discuss, without speaking, so abstruse a subject as that of 
 language ? 
 
 If, then, language be not a human invention, it must have been 
 communicated to man by some superior being. When man was 
 first created, he must have been informed of the variety of sounds 
 he was capable of uttering, and instructed in the way in which 
 these sounds might be employed, to denote sensations and ideas. 
 The following account of the invention of the first language is 
 given by Moses : — " And out of the ground the Lord God formed 
 every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought 
 them unto Adam to see what he would call them ; and whatever 
 Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. 
 And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, 
 and to every beast of the field." 
 
 Here it is presupposed that man was originally endowed with 
 the faculty of speech, and was at the same time rendered capable 
 of applying certain sounds to denote certain objects, and of 
 remembering the association which he had thus formed. Agree- 
 ably with this sentiment is the representation of Milton, in his 
 Paradise Lost : — 
 
 " To speak I tried, and forthwith spake ; 
 My tongue obey'd, and readily could name 
 Whate'er I saw. Thou Sun, said I, fair light, 
 And thou enlighten'd Earth, so fresh and gay, 
 Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods and plains, 
 And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell, 
 Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here? 
 Not of myself; by some great Maker, then, 
 In goodness and in power pre-eminent ; 
 Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, 
 From whom I have that thus I move and live, 
 And feel that I am happier than I know." 
 
 III. We shall now consider the Formation of Language. 
 
 We contend, then, that man was originally taught the nature of 
 speech, and supernaturally endowed with the power of forming a 
 language. And we shall now inquire what are those faculties of 
 the mind which are brought into exercise by the attempt to em- 
 ploy this power, and what are the steps by which language would 
 be gradually formed. These faculties we consider would be Inven- 
 tion, Association, and Abstraction. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 375 
 
 As man at the first moment of his existence could have had no 
 language, it is evident that the first words he uttered must have 
 been words of pure invention. They could not have been 
 borrowed from other languages, or derived from other words, 
 because no other words or language had any existence. To exer- 
 cise this power of invention to an extent sufficient to form a 
 language, it would be necessary that man should be capable of 
 uttering a variety of sounds — that he should be able to assign 
 distinct sounds to denote distinct ideas — and that he should be 
 able to remember each sound which had thus been appropriated. 
 He would, in the first place, form words to denote those objects 
 which were visible to his senses, and by which he was immedi- 
 ately surrounded. These words must originally have been very 
 few. His stock of words could not be greater than his stock of 
 ideas : as his ideas increased, his words would increase. The 
 three great classes of words in all languages are, — the names of 
 things, the names of qualities, and the names of actions. Man 
 would begin his efforts at language by giving names to things. 
 The heavenly bodies; the natural scenery around him, the moun- 
 tains, the hills, the rivers, the trees, and the fields; the birds, 
 beasts, and other animals ; and the several objects with which he 
 came in more immediate contact, would be designated by appro- 
 priate sounds. The qualities which are obvious to the senses 
 would next be noticed; and the different colours, figures, tastes, 
 and sounds would be named as soon as occasion presenied them to 
 his view. And then he would name those actions which he himself 
 performed, or which he saw performed by the animals around him. 
 
 Some philologists have considered that man did not invent any 
 part of his language, but merely imitated the sounds issued by 
 other animals, or by parts of the material universe. In support 
 of this theory, they have adduced some words which resemble the 
 sounds they are employed to denote — such as roar, crash, whisper. 
 But these instances are too few to support a general theory. The 
 greater part of the objects of our ideas are those which do not 
 emit sounds, and to these the theory will not apply : besides, this 
 theory would import that man had heard all these various sounds 
 before he had commenced to form words. 
 
 The faculty of invention, however, would very soon be assisted 
 by the faculty of association. It is not necessary to the present 
 subject that I should enter into any metaphysical discussion of 
 the principle of association. It is sufficient for us to know, that 
 when two ideas have a resemblance to each other, the occurrence 
 of one to the mind often brings in the other. Hence, when the 
 mind had, by the power of invention, appropriated a certain 
 sound to denote a certain idea, if another idea occurred resem- 
 bling the former, the association would lead to the formation of a 
 sound that resembled the former sound. So, if we entertained 
 
376 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 an idea formed of two ideas, each of which had its respective 
 name, we should, by the power of association, call the compounded 
 idea by a word formed of the names of the two single ideas. 
 Thus, if we had formed an idea of a horse, and an idea of the sea, 
 and had afterwards seen in the sea an animal resembling a horse, 
 we should naturally call it a sea-horse. Hence, in all languages 
 have arisen compounded words, in some of which the parts have 
 been so blended, that the primitives of which they are composed 
 cannot be ascertained but by the labour of philologists. 
 
 There are numerous other ways in which the names of things 
 would, by association, give rise to the names of other things. The 
 names of trades and professions, for instance, are generally derived 
 from the names of the commodities employed in carrying them on. 
 
 Nouns, too, are often derived from verbs. These nouns denote 
 the agent and the subject of the action. The agent in our 
 language is denoted very often by adding r or er to the verb, as 
 love, lover. Our language is deficient in not having words to 
 denote the subject upon which the verb operates. Thus, we have 
 no word to denote the person who is loved. We have only a few 
 legal correlative terms of this sort, as payer, payee — drawer, 
 drawee — mortgager, mortgagee. 
 
 By association, too, words denoting things would give rise to 
 words denoting qualities. Thus, if a house were made of wood, 
 it would be very natural to call it a wooden house. And in this 
 way there are in all languages numerous classes of adjective? 
 formed by changing the termination of the substantives. Al- 
 though in our own language we often use the substantive as an 
 adjective without changing its termination, as a gold chain, a 
 silver watch ; yet, in many others, we change the termination, or 
 make an addition to it ; as, a sandy soil, a mountainous country, 
 a ^fruitful tree. Some writers have contended that in this way 
 were formed all our adjectives denoting colours and other simple 
 sensations. Thus, when we say a chestnut horse, the word 
 chestnut is employed as the name of a colour ; so also are the 
 words orange, violet, indigo. 
 
 Names of qualities are not only derived from the names of 
 things, but also from names of actions. Thus, we have a class of 
 adjectives ending in able, which were formed by associating the 
 idea of capability with the ideas of the verbs, such are eatable, 
 marketable, teachable. 
 
 Mankind would soon perceive that actions have qualities similar 
 to those which are ascribed to things ; and hence the names of 
 the qualities of things would be employed with some little change 
 to express the qualities of actions : hence from adjectives, which 
 are the names of the qualities of things, would be formed adverbs, 
 which are the names of the qualities of actions. The ideas being 
 associated in the mind, the words would, by that association, be 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 377 
 
 brought to resemble each other. In our language adverbs of 
 quality are often formed from adjectives, by the addition of ly, 
 as wise, wisely ; beautiful, beautifully ; cruel, cruelly. 
 
 The faculty of association is not employed merely in the forma- 
 tion of new words, but it leads also to the application of old 
 words to new ideas. Sometimes the material of whicli anything 
 was formed, was employed to denote the thing itself, as a stick, a 
 horn, a stone. The name of one object was also applied to some 
 other, to which it seemed to bear a resemblance. Thus, the word 
 branch, which denotes a part of a tree, is applied to a part of 
 almost every object that is capable of division : hence we speak 
 of the branch of a road, the branch of a river, the branch of a 
 family, the branch of a discourse. 
 
 Words which were originally employed to denote sensible 
 objects were afterwards applied to intellectual ideas. The last 
 object to which man directs his attention, and that which he finds 
 the most difficult to comprehend, are the powers of his own mind. 
 Hence mankind have usually a large stock of words denoting 
 sensible ideas before they think of naming those ideas which are 
 intellectual. And the operations of the mind can scarcely be 
 understood but by comparison with external objects. Mankind, 
 therefore, having found or fancied some resemblance between 
 sensible and intellectual ideas, applied the same words to both. 
 In all languages we find that words denoting intellectual ideas, 
 when traced to their origin, are taken from sensible objects, and 
 were at first metaphors. The words understanding \ evidence, 
 reflection, as well as the words I have employed to denote the 
 faculties of invention, association, and abstraction, are all taken 
 from objects of sense. These words have now lost their meta- 
 phorical meaning, and have become literal, through being so fre- 
 quently used. So we still speak of a man being burning with 
 zeal, inflamed with anger, swollen with rage, and inflated with 
 pride ; and by the same figure of speech we talk of a man having 
 a hard heart, or a soft heart ; a thick head, or a long head ; a 
 fertile imagination, a sound judgment, a strong memory, polished 
 manners. And when we recommend circumspection to an in- 
 dividual, we tell him to " look sharp." 
 
 By the same principle of association, we apply to inanimate 
 objects words denoting ideas peculiar to animals. Thus we speak 
 of the head of a river, the face of a country, a neck of land, and 
 an arm of the sea, of a running stream, and a standing pool; we 
 say the ground thirsts for rain, the earth smiles with plenty ; and 
 so we speak of a learned age, a happy period, and a melancholy 
 disaster. 
 
 It may be observed, that in order to form an association between 
 any two ideas in the mind, it is by no means necessary that there 
 should be any resemblance between the ideas themselves. The 
 
378 THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 
 
 mind is exceedingly capricious in its associations, and this caprice 
 is abundantly evident in the formation of language. In former 
 times young women employed a good deal of their time in spin- 
 ning; the idea of spinning became associated with the idea of a 
 young woman ; and, to this day, an unmarried lady is called a 
 spinster. It was also usual to keep footboys, who were generally 
 styled Jack, as a sailor is styled Jack in the present day. One 
 part of the duty of a footboy was to pull off his master's boots. 
 But in the progress of society an instrument was invented, by 
 which the master could take off his own boots ; and this instru- 
 ment was called a Jack. Another part of the business of a foot- 
 boy was to turn the spit ; but here, too, manual labour was 
 superseded by machinery. An instrument was invented, by which 
 a piece of meat could be roasted without the assistance of Jack ; 
 but his name was retained, and the new instrument was called a 
 Jack. Mr. Arkwright called some parts of his cotton machinery 
 Spinning Jennies. The words Jack and Jenny, therefore, awaken 
 very different ideas from those to which they were first applied. 
 
 The power of association may from one word form a variety of 
 others ; and although all the derivations may bear some resem- 
 blance to the primitive word, yet they may have meanings widely 
 different from each other. Thus, the word get means to acquire ; 
 but it is used in a variety of senses : a man may get hungry, or 
 he may get wet ; he may get a wager, or he may get a cold ; he 
 may get money, or he may get drank. By associating the word 
 get with particles, the number of meanings is still farther in- 
 creased : we may get in or get out, we may get off or get on, we 
 may get up or get down, we may get through or get along. Each 
 of these phrases has again a variety of meanings. When we say 
 a man has got off, we may mean that he has alighted from his 
 horse, or that he has escaped being hanged. But in all these 
 various meanings the primitive idea Is^retained, though the deri- 
 vatives differ so widely. I might illustrate this observation by 
 numerous other words of the same kkid. 
 
 Having considered the faculties of Invention and Association, I 
 will now make a few observations upon the faculty of Abstraction. 
 To abstract means to draw from, to withdraw. I may see a white 
 hat, a white horse, a white wall. Now, if I think of a white 
 colour without thinking of the hat, or the horse, or the wall, I 
 have then an abstract idea of white, which I may call whiteness. 
 Now, this is called an abstract idea, because it is drawn from some 
 other idea with which it is naturally associated. It is impossible 
 for the colour white to exist by itself; there must be some object 
 that is white. But, in the mind, we draw it from this object, 
 and hence it is an abstract idea. In our language, the names of 
 many of these ideas end in ness, as whiteness, blackness, sweet- 
 ness, thickness. These are abstract sensible ideas derived from 
 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OP LANGUAGE. 379 
 
 sensible ideas. But there are also abstract moral and intellectual 
 ideas. Many of these are denoted by words ending in ity and ce> 
 and are chiefly of Latin derivation, — as frugality, hospitality, dili- 
 gence, prudence. 
 
 The faculty of abstraction not only gives rise to words denoting 
 abstract qualities, but also to words denoting abstract actions. 
 These are chiefly nouns and participles. There is a large class of 
 nouns ending in ion which are derived from Latin verbs, and 
 which denote the abstract action of those verbs ; such are pro- 
 duction, destruction, persuasion, vision, motion, &c. Some of 
 these nouns are used not only in the sense of abstract actions, but 
 also to denote the effect of the action. Thus, when we say, That 
 country is remarkable for the production of corn, we use the word 
 production in the sense of abstract action, and might supply its 
 place by the present participle producing. But when we say, Corn 
 is the chief production of that country, it is used as the name for 
 the thing produced, and we could not supply its place by the pre- 
 sent participle. These two different senses of the word are in some 
 instances expressed by two different words. Thus, the abstract 
 action of the word create is denoted by the word creation, and the 
 thing created is called a creature. So the word edify means to 
 build up ; edification denotes the abstract action of building, and 
 the thing built is called an edifice. So, imagine, imagination, image. 
 
 The words formed by abstraction become more numerous as 
 society becomes more intellectual. Association belongs to poetry, 
 abstraction to philosophy. A poetic imagination grasps at resem- 
 blances, and hence brings together ideas that seemed at first to 
 have no connexion. It gives life and animation to every thing 
 beneath its touch. Its vivid conceptions cannot be expressed in 
 ordinary language. New words are formed by combination, or 
 words previously formed are applied in new and bold significa- 
 tions. But when mankind begin to study mental philosophy, when 
 they begin to investigate causes, to trace consequences, and to 
 discuss theories, then arise words of abstraction. It .becomes 
 necessary to form words that shall express ideas and relations 
 remote from common observation. Precision of conception becomes 
 necessary ; and to assist precision of conception it is necessary to 
 have precision of language. An idea that is to be the subject of 
 investigation must be detached from all other ideas with which it 
 may be found in combination, and viewed entirely alone. Hence 
 arises the necessity of words of abstraction. Thus it is to inven- 
 tion, association, and abstraction that we are indebted for the for- 
 mation of language. 
 
 While there is nothing more important, there is nothing more 
 mysterious than language. How is it that by a single act of 
 volition I can form sounds denoting the ideas that may exist in 
 my mind ? — that these sounds are carried by the atmosphere to 
 
380 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 the ears of my auditors, and awaken in their minds the same 
 ideas which exist in my own ? To explain in what mysterious 
 manner this is effected is beyond the power of our philosophy. It 
 is one of the secrets of nature known only to Him who formed the 
 ear and created the mind of man. 
 
 One great advantage which, man has over the other animals 
 consists in the power of co-operation. It is by this means that 
 the whole community is benefited by the exertions of each indi- 
 vidual. This power of co-operation could not exist unless man- 
 kind possessed a prompt and perfect mode of communicating their 
 ideas to each other. And this ready communication exists only 
 by means of language. Language, too, is not merely a channel of 
 thought, it is a vehicle of feelings, and by it we are able to impart 
 our sentiments in such a way as to impress our emotions on the 
 minds of our auditors. By language men are aroused into indig- 
 nation or softened into sympathy. Without language we could 
 not be enlightened with the instructions of science, or enraptured 
 with the beauties of poetry. To this we owe all the pleasures of 
 our public assemblies and all the luxuries of social intercourse ; it 
 is from this we derive all the happiness we receive from the specu- 
 lations of philosophy, the brilliancy of wit, the thunders of elo- 
 quence, and the melody of song. 
 
 By the power of language we are enabled to be useful to others. 
 "We can instruct the ignorant, caution the unwary, or console the 
 afflicted. Of what use is the intense application of the student, 
 the conceptions of the poet, or the contemplations of the philo- 
 sopher, if the result of their labours is known only to themselves ? 
 Thoughts valuable as gold in the mine are of no use to others 
 until coined into words. And by imparting information to others, 
 our own faculties are improved. Our intellectual weapons are 
 kept polished by use. Knowledge shut up in the mind of its 
 possessor is like a stagnant pool, useful to none; but when 
 allowed to flow out freely in the channels of language, it becomes 
 a living fountain, the streams of which carry health and beauty 
 and fertility into every district through which they roll. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 Absolution, priestly : Mr. Seymour's 
 
 diJemma against, 280. 
 Account-book: the advantages of keep- 
 ing one, 25S. 
 
 Act of 1844 for Regulating the Cur- 
 rency, S3, 87, 344; a sorites respect- 
 ing its principles, 284. 
 
 Actions are judged by their motives, 
 115, 119. 
 
 Acts of Parliament : their meaning 
 fixed by their intention, 117. 
 
 Advantages of the Industrial Exhibi- 
 tion, GO, 290, 357. 
 
 Advantages of a measure referred to 
 effects, 90. 
 
 Advice to Servants, by Dean Swift, 53. 
 
 Advisers, logical, useful, 16. 
 
 Advocates, logical, useful, 16. 
 
 -<Esop's Fables quoted, 176. 
 
 Age, the logic of, 307. 
 
 Aiken, on "War, quoted, 128, 165. 
 
 Alexander, Dr. : his censure of the 
 voluntarians, 89. 
 
 Alexanderthe Great: his character,317. 
 
 Ambiguity of words a source of false 
 reasoning, 27, 205. 
 
 America : Law of Partnership in, 88 ; 
 universal suffrage in, 159 ; Earl of 
 Carlyle's Lecture on, 158; population 
 of, 336. 
 
 Amusements : we should be guided by 
 reasoning in the choice of, 313 ; les- 
 sons taught by chess, 313 ; those con- 
 demned by the Society of Friends, 
 356. 
 
 Analogy ; reasoning by, 42, 143 ; appli- 
 cation of, 144; fallacious analogies, 
 161, 213; applied to public conapanies, 
 186 ; in an interrogative form, 245. 
 
 Analysis : wherein i t differs from syn- 
 thesis, 288. 
 
 Ancients : their festivals, 290 ; com- 
 pared with the moderns, 294 ; under- 
 stood political economy, 333. 
 
 Anecdotes are arguments, 140 ; collec- 
 tions of, 141 ; examples of, 142. 
 
 Animals : knowledge of, derived from 
 observation, 78 ; analogy between 
 them and human beings, 114, 143, 
 257; have we a right to eat them? 
 162. 
 Anonymous quotations, 125, 215, 244. 
 Antecedent and Consequent, the rela- 
 tion of, 73, 108. 
 
 Apocrypha : reasons for its rejection, 
 
 197. 
 Argumentation : what is it 1 2. 
 Arguments addressed to feelings or 
 
 prejudices, 123; do not advance too 
 
 many, 142. 
 Argumentum a fortiori: what is it? 
 
 155 ; examples of, 156. 
 Argumentum ad hominem: what is it? 
 
 123. 
 Aristotle : what Sydney Smith says of 
 
 him, 80. 
 Arithmetic: its rules, 47; importance 
 
 of, 363. 
 Art of Being Happy, by the Rev. B. H. 
 
 Draper, quoted, 113, 277, 308, 35S. 
 Art of Equivocation, 21. 
 Art of False Reasoning Exemplified, 
 
 quoted, 201. 
 Art of Prolonging Life, 358. 
 Art of Reasoning : introduction to, 1 ; 
 
 its name, 2. 
 Assembly's Catechism quoted, 353. 
 Association of ideas aids the memory, 
 
 13. 
 Astronomy: reasoning by analogy ap- 
 plied to, 42, 144. 
 Atlas newspaper quoted, 92. 
 Attributes: reasoning from, 34. 
 Author, the, quoted, 293, 313. 
 
 B. 
 
 Bacon, Lord, 76; Sydney Smith, re- 
 specting, 80; quoted, 268. 
 
 Bai!ev's Theory of Reasoning quoted, .3, 
 7, 31, 40, 41, 56, 67, 130, 207, 275. 
 
 his Questions in Political Econ- 
 omy quoted, 80, 115, 120. 
 
 Bank of England, 339. 
 
 Bankers : judge from circumstantial 
 evidence, 107 ; Onus probandi re- 
 specting, 248 ; dishonourable conduct 
 towards, 354. 
 
 Banking : Prize Essay, 54. 
 
 Baptismal Regeneration, 242. 
 
 Barrow's Sermons quoted, 134. 
 
 Bastiat's Popular Fallacies on General 
 Interests quoted, 164, 279. 
 
 Baynes : his Essay on Logical Forais 
 quoted, 271. 
 
 Beaumont, Lord, quotation from his 
 letter, 281. 
 
 Bell, Sir Charles : his remarks on the 
 feet, 305. 
 
382 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Bell, G. M. : his " Country- Banks and 
 the Currency, 339." 
 
 Berkeley's system, 75. 
 
 Bible : Lectures on, by the Rev. T. 
 Gilbart, quoted, 60; its evidences, 
 193; landmarks, 197; a belief in, 
 strengthens the powers of reasoning, 
 366. 
 
 Bickersteth,Rev.R.: his speech quoted, 
 141 ; his Bible Landmarks quoted, 
 197 ; his National Obligations to the 
 Bible quoted, 244. 
 
 Bigland's Letters on History 'quoted, 
 316, 317, 3i9, 322. 
 
 Blakey's Essay on Logic quoted, 144, 
 163, 359. 
 
 his Historv of Moral Science 
 
 quoted, 351, 366. 
 
 Bloomer dress, 304. 
 
 Blum's Undesigned Coincidences, 105, 
 317. 
 
 Board of Health, their Report quoted, 
 48, 54, 86, 87. 
 
 Books : immoral, none sold at the 
 stations of the North- Western Rail- 
 way, 254. 
 
 Boswell's Life of Johnson quoted, 258. 
 
 Branches of knowledge should have 
 distinct names, 2. 
 
 Brewer's Guide to Science quoted, 49. 
 
 Briggs, Mr., a working millwright, 
 his prize essay on the Industrial 
 Exhibition quoted, 90. 
 
 Britannia newspaper quoted, 241. 
 
 British Association for the Advance- 
 ment of Science, 336, 338. 
 
 British Banner quoted, 92. 
 
 Broumam, Lord, quoted, 59. 
 
 Bull, an example of, 142. 
 
 Bullion's Internal Management of a 
 Country Bank, 107. 
 
 Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress quoted, 
 218. 
 
 Buxton, Sir Thomas Fowell, his attri- 
 butes, i 9 ; his argument from enu- 
 meration quoted in his Life by his 
 son, 61. 
 
 Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric 
 quoted, 5, 270. 
 
 , Lord, Lives of the Chan- 
 cellors quoted, 154. 
 
 Canaan, the Land of: its attributes, 33, 
 327. 
 
 Capital: its divisions, 54. 
 
 Carlisle, the Earl of, his Lecture on 
 America quoted, 158. 
 
 his Speech on the Industrial 
 
 Exhibition quoted,290. 
 
 Case in point: what is it? 136. 
 
 Catechetical way of reasoning, 239. 
 
 Caudle's, Mrs., Lectures ; by Douglas 
 
 . Jerrold, quoted, 52, 153, 308, 310. 
 
 Cause and effect: arguments from, 
 may be brought under genus and 
 species, 69 ; the relation of, 71 ; 
 physical, 71; moral, 80; conditional, 
 95; final, 109; fallacies connected 
 with, 210 ; connected with history, 
 324 ; the relation of, connected with 
 statistics, 341 ; of virtues and vices, 
 354. 
 
 Chain of reasoning : wherein it differs 
 from a series of reasonings, 285. 
 
 Chalmers, Dr., on Political Economy, 
 quoted, 81, 86 ; his opinion of Church 
 establishments, 81 ; of Ricardo's 
 theory of rent, 86 ; adopted the 
 Malthusian theory of population, 89, 
 332. 
 
 Chances, the doctrine of, 138. 
 
 Charles II. granted a Charter to the 
 Royal Society, 77; anecdote of, 78. 
 
 Chartists : their principles, 51. 
 
 Chess, lessons taught by, 313. 
 
 Children, logic to, 308. 
 
 Christian Times quoted, 159, 345. 
 
 Christianity, evidences of, 193. 
 
 Church establishment: its advantages, 
 81. 
 
 Circumstantial evidence, 99 ; the prin- 
 ciples of. 100 ; employed by theolo- 
 gians, 103; Paley's Horas Paulinae, 
 ib. ; Blunt's Undesigned Coinci- 
 dences, 105 ; application to the ordi- 
 nary affairs of life, 106; Scriptural 
 instances of, 107 ; final cause an 
 item in, 119; illustration of! 120. 
 
 City of London Literary and Scientific 
 Institution: its prize essay, 364. 
 
 Civilization, origin of, 122. 
 
 Clarendon, Lord : his attributes, 40. 
 
 Clarke's, Dr. Adam, Commentary on 
 the Bible quoted, 214. 
 
 Classification, examples of, 54 ; mental, 
 66. 
 
 Classifications of moral duties. 352. 
 
 Clergymen, laws respecting, 187. 
 
 Cobden, Mr. : his opinions on the 
 Russian loan, 90 ; his argument 
 against war from analogy, 162. 
 
 Colonies, advantages of, 128 ; defended 
 by comparison, 154; a source of 
 national wealth, 330. 
 
 Commerce : conditions of its prosperity, 
 98 ; a source of national wealth, 329. 
 
 Common-sense necessary to reasoning, 
 24. 
 
 Company, bad: its effects on the mind, 
 125. 
 
 Comparisons, logical, 152 : metaphori- 
 cal, reasoning from, 167; by ques- 
 tions, 244. 
 
 Conder's Poet of the Sanctuary quoted, 
 228. 
 
 Conditional causes, the relation of, 94; 
 mode of reasoning from, 95, 264 ; fal- 
 lacies connected with, 234. 
 
 Congregational chanting, 297. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 383 
 
 Consciousness, truths that we know 
 by, 6. 
 
 Constantine the Great removed the 
 seat of empire, 319. 
 
 Contrast: a principle of reasoning, 158; 
 examples of, 1G0 ; used in theology, 
 161. 
 
 Controversy not inconsistent with re- 
 ligion, 13 ; may sometimes be better 
 declined, 249, 300. 
 
 Conversation, compared with reading, 
 153; rules of, 255; cause of man's 
 superiority over animals, 257 ; with- 
 out reasoning, 260. 
 
 Conversational reasoning, 249, 254 ; 
 examples of, 258. 
 
 Convocation, the Archbishop of Canter- 
 bury's Speech on, 94. 
 
 Country bank notes, 339. 
 
 Court of Chancery, abuses in, 235. 
 
 Courtesy in controversy, 300. 
 
 Courts of Law, evidence in, 99. 
 
 Crime : causes of its increase, 92. 
 
 Criticisms on Logic for the Million, 33, 
 81, 160, 255. 
 
 Croly's, Dr., Sermons quoted, 112; on 
 Marriage with the Sister of a deceased 
 "Wife quoted, 116; National Know- 
 ledge, National Power, quoted, 349. 
 
 Cromwell, Oliver: his government, 31S. 
 
 Croxall's yEsop's Fables quoted, 176. 
 
 Cruelty to animals, Lord Erskine's 
 speech upon, 124. 
 
 Crystal Palace : its size, 348. 
 
 Cumming's, Dr., Sermon on God in 
 Science quoted, 110 ; Lecture on 
 Music quoted, 295. 
 
 Curran ; his address to a jury, 241. 
 
 Daily avocations, our reasonings should 
 be associated with, 360. 
 
 David : what he did when hungry, 
 127, 134. 
 
 Debating societies, 363 ; advantages 
 of, 364. 
 
 Debtors, the laws of Moses resDecting, 
 320. 
 
 Debts, public : Mr. Burke's dilemma 
 against, 280. 
 
 Deduction: what is it? 129. 
 
 Definition: what is it? 25; reasoning 
 from, 62 ; errors in reasoning from, 
 209. 
 
 Degrees of assent, 198. 
 
 Degrees of rank in heaven, Dr. "Watts 
 on, 247. 
 
 Deity, proofs of his existence, 110,224; 
 proofs of his goodness, 112, 113. 
 
 Descriptive reasoning, 224, 227 ; the 
 principles of reasoning connected 
 with, 230 ; how rendered more vivid, 
 231 ; in the form of personification, 
 232; descriptions of Geo. Robins's, 
 232 ; practical application of, 234 : 
 erroneous reasoning from, 236. 
 
 De Vericour's Historical Analysis of 
 Christian Civilization quoted, 321. 
 
 Dickens'sHousohol d Words quoted,341. 
 
 Diet, the logic of, 308. 
 
 Dilemma: what is it? 276 ; examples 
 of, 279 ; Bastiat's in favour of free- 
 trade, 279; Burke's against public 
 debts, 280; Torrens's against works 
 conducted by the Government, 280; 
 Say's against Sumptuary Laws, 280; 
 Seymour's against Priestly Abso- 
 lution, 280 ; Lord Beaumont's against 
 Bishops appointed by Borne, 281 ; 
 dilemma against Synods, 281 ; in 
 favour of the Pursuit of Knowledge, 
 281. 
 
 Discontent, reasons against, 244. 
 
 Discoveries that may arise from the 
 Industrial Exhibition, 291; in science, 
 321. 
 
 Disputation, scholastic, 266, 268. 
 
 Disputes not incompatible with re- 
 ligion, 13; are sometimes better 
 avoided, 300. 
 
 D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature 
 quoted, 40, 143, 178, 361, 140. 
 
 Dissenters, Dr. Alexander on, 89. 
 
 Distinctions between moral good and 
 evil, 351. 
 
 Division, rules of, 45 ; the application 
 of, 48. 
 
 Doctnne3 of the Catholic Church : 
 tranoubstantiation, 38 ; confession 
 and absolurion, 2S0 ; celibacy of the 
 clergy, 245 ; baptismal regeneration, 
 242; papal hierarchy, 246. 
 
 Doctrines of the Society of Friends, 
 on war and oaths, 355 ; on salutations 
 and amusements, 356. 
 
 Domestic concerns, great men un- 
 happy in, 322. 
 
 Domestic consultation, the logic of, 310. 
 
 Doubting : the ait of, taught by meta- 
 physical logic, preface vii. 75. 
 
 Dress, the logic of, 304. 
 
 Drunkenness : its effects, . c 0, 354. 
 
 Duke of Wellington : how proved to be 
 mortal according to Mr. Mill, 272. 
 
 Ear] of Liverpool : letter from .the 
 author to, 335. 
 
 Early Marriages : evils of, 92. 
 
 Ecclesiastical law : its origin, 1S8. 
 
 Edinburgh Review quoted, 93. 
 
 Education: public and private com- 
 pared, 309. 
 
 Effects : modes of reasoning respect- 
 ing, 85. 
 
 Effects of national wealth, 330. 
 
 Egypt, Ancient : its characteristics, 
 327. 
 
 Electors : numbers and classification 
 of, 337. 
 
384 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Elijah : his residence at Zarephath,105; 
 another reference to, 13S. 
 
 Employments : their effects on the 
 mind, 125 
 
 Encyclopaedia Britannica quoted, 144. 
 
 England: superiority of, 244. 
 
 English Gentleman, The, quoted, 311. 
 
 Enthymeme: what is it? 250; examples 
 of, 252. 
 
 Enumeration : arguments from, 59 ; of 
 the duties of public companies, 352. 
 
 Epichirema : a compound syllogism, 
 275, 277. 
 
 Erroneous reasonings of political eco- 
 nomists, 68, 121. 
 
 Errors in reasoning, 201 ; from not un- 
 derstanding the question, 204; from 
 the relation of subject and attribute, 
 205 ; from a whole and its parts, 207 ; 
 from genus and species, 208 ; from 
 cause and effect, 210 ; from examples, 
 211 ; from analogy, comparison and 
 contrast, 213 ; from parables, fables, 
 and proverbs, 214 ; from written do- 
 cuments, 214; miscellaneous errors, 
 216. 
 
 Erskine,- Lord: his speech quoted on 
 cruelty to animals, 124. 
 
 Evidence of our sense : can we believe 
 it ? 75. 
 
 Examples, good, to be imitated, 133. 
 
 Examples : mode of reasoning from, 
 127 ; exemplified from Scripture, 132 ; 
 differ from fables, 172 ; fallacies con- 
 nected with, 211. 
 
 Exeter, Bishop of: his trial with the 
 Rev. Mr. Gorham, 189. 
 
 Exhibition, the Great : Banking Prize 
 Essays in connexion with, 54 ; Lord 
 Overstone's speech on, 61; PrizeEssay, 
 by the Rev. Mr. Whish, 81, 154, 357 ; 
 Prize Essay, by a working millwright, 
 on, 90 ; speech of the Earl of Carlisle 
 on, 290 ; article from the Times on, 
 292; statistics of, 348; Moral effects 
 of, 357,. 
 
 Experience the test of truth, 300. 
 
 Extensive empires, advantages of, 322. 
 
 Eye : a description of, 224. 
 
 Fables: reasoning from, 170; Lessing's, 
 
 173; jEsop's, 176. 
 Facility of intercourse ; beneficial 
 
 effects of, 88. 
 Fallacies : with regard to moral causes 
 
 and effects, 90 ; of various kinds, 204; 
 
 of reasoning from description, 236 ; 
 
 in statistics, 343. 
 False induction: example of, 212. 
 Female servants : education of, 310. , 
 Festivals, ancient, 290. 
 Fielding's Select Proverbs quoted, 178. 
 Figurative language : effect of analogy, 
 
 150. 
 
 Final cause and effect : the relation of, 
 109 ; application of, to natural theo- 
 logy;, 110; to the divine attributes, 
 112 ;' to the human mind, 113 ; to the 
 animal creation, 114; to moral ac- 
 tions; 115; the design of legislators, 
 116; the interpretation of the law, 
 117; in judicial cases, 118; in cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, 119; in politi- 
 cal economy, 121 ; to the feelings of 
 the mind, 122 ; effects of training 
 on the mind, 124 ; the ordinary af- 
 fairs of life, 125 ; fallacies connected 
 with, 211. 
 
 Fletcher's Lectures on the Roman 
 Catholic Religion quoted, 242, 246. 
 
 Follett, Sir William : his clear reason- 
 ings, 360. 
 
 Forced interpretation, 214. 
 
 Forgery of the Old Testament : dis- 
 proved by a trilemma, 283. 
 
 Forms of reasoning, 221, 274. 
 
 France : law of partnership in, 88. 
 
 Francis, St. : his Equivocation, 220. 
 
 Franklyn, Dr. : his mode of reasoning, 
 44; anecdote of, 215 ; his Poor 
 Richard's Almanack quoted, 182. 
 
 Free-Trade and its so-called Sophisms 
 quoted, 84. 
 
 Friendship : outlines of a theme on, 
 289. 
 
 Fugitive slave-bill in America: an a 
 fortiori argument respecting, 157; 
 description of a capture, 231. 
 
 Fundholders: numbers and classifica- 
 tion of, 343. 
 
 Garden supplies examples for classifi- 
 cation, 66. 
 
 General principles : their application 
 to particular cases, 57, 137 ; misap- 
 plication of, 208; application of in 
 political economy, 331 ; in moral 
 philosophy, 355. 
 
 General theories should not be raised 
 on a small number of particulars, 
 130, 211. 
 
 Gentleman: what forms one, 311. 
 
 Genus and species: the relation of, 
 53; rules for dividing, 55 ; mode of 
 reasoning from, 56, 130; errors in 
 reasoning from, 63, 208; in statis- 
 tics, 343; in morals, S53. 
 
 Giddings, J. R. of America : his speech 
 on slavery quoted, 157. 
 
 Gilbart J. W. : his prize for a Banking 
 Essay in connexion with the Great 
 Exhibition, 54. 
 
 his Practical Treatise on 
 
 Banking quoted, 57, 107, 145, 299, 
 339, 352. 
 
 his Lectures on Ancient Com- 
 
 merce quoted, 72, 98, 125, 135, 243, 
 281, 327, 354, 355. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 385 
 
 Gilbart J. W.: his Lecture on the Philo- 
 sophy of Language quoted, 150, 258. 
 
 Gilbart, Rev. Thomas : his Lectures 
 on the Bible quoted, 60. 
 
 Gilfillan's Bards of the Bible quoted, 
 283. 
 
 Goodwill of other people : how to ob- 
 tain, 126. 
 
 Gorham, Rev. Mr. : his trial with the 
 Bishop of Exeter, 189. 
 
 Grammar compared with Logic, 4 ; sub- 
 stantives and adjectives compared 
 with subject and attribute, 31. 
 
 Guilt; indications of, 100. 
 
 GuyFawkes's Indictment quoted, 156. 
 
 H. 
 
 Habit, the effect of, 135. 
 
 Habits, good: the source of happiness, 
 277 ; man has the power of forming 
 them, 278 ; of reasoning, how formed, 
 357. 
 
 Hall's Book of the Feet quoted, 305. 
 
 Hallam's Literature of Europe quoted, 
 270. 
 
 Hamilton, Dr. : his sermon on Early 
 Closing quoted, 97, 231. 
 
 Sir William : his new ana- 
 lytic, 271. 
 
 Health necessary to reasoning well, 
 357 ; effects of certain studies upon, 
 358. 
 
 Health of mind; how promoted, 359. 
 
 Henry, Rev. Matthew: quoted, 139. 
 
 Hill, Rev. Rowland: Sherman's Anec- 
 dotes of, 38, 82 ; Southey's description 
 of, 226. 
 
 Hill's Logic quoted, 131, 252. 
 
 Historians, philosophical, 139. 
 
 Historical evidence, 229. 
 
 History: mode of writing, 216, 316; 
 logic applied to, 313; political eco- 
 nomy founded on, 325 ; the philosophy 
 of, 315. 
 
 Holt, Judge : Lord Campbell's charac- 
 ter of, in his Lives of the Lord Chan- 
 cellors, 154. 
 
 Homoeopathy : must be proved by ex- 
 periment, not by reasoning, 79. 
 
 Honourable man ; a merchant should 
 be one, 354. 
 
 Horae faulinae of Paley, quotations 
 from, 103. 
 
 Human body : is an animal, 79. 
 
 Husband: logical, is useful, 15. 
 
 Huyshe, Rev. John : his Logic quoted, 
 250. 
 
 I. 
 
 Ignorantia elenc'hi: what is it? 204. 
 Illicit process: what is it? 207. 
 Imagination is restrained by reasoning, 
 
 14, 359. 
 Independence of mind : what it implies, 
 
 19. 
 
 Induction: what is it? 129; explained 
 by Mr. Hill, 131. 
 
 Industrial Exhihition : Lord Overstone 
 on. 61 ; Rev. Mr. Whish on, 81, 154, 
 357 ; a working man's essay on, 90; 
 the Earl of Carlisle on, 290, 
 
 Industry: the cause of distinction. 128; 
 the cause of wealth, 328 ; of a gentle- 
 man, 134. 
 
 Intellect: truths of, 6. 
 
 Internal evidences of the Divine in- 
 spiration of the Scriptures, 194. 
 
 Interpretation : rules of, in regard to 
 legal instruments, 191; of the Holy 
 Scriptures, 200. 
 
 Interrogative reasoning, 237. 
 
 Ireland, Lord-Lieutenancy of: effects 
 of its abolition, 93; population of, 
 335 ; circulation of. 340. 
 
 Johnson's Lectures to Yonng Men, 126. 
 
 Joint responsibility of a Board of Man- 
 agers implies the personal responsi- 
 bility of its individual members, 52. 
 
 Joint Stock Banks, 88 ; their attributes, 
 41; laws respecting them, 185; how 
 affected by the Law of Evidence Bill, 
 188. 
 
 Joyce's Catechism of Nature quoted, 72. 
 
 Judicial Committee of Privy Council : 
 their decision in the case of Gorham 
 v. the Bishop of Exeter, 189. 
 
 Judicial proceedings : evidence in, 49. 
 
 K. 
 
 Knight's Half-hours with the Best 
 
 Authors quoted, 134, 260. 
 Knowledge: necessary to reasoning, 
 
 24 ; a dilemma respecting, 281. 
 
 Labour ; evil of its abolition, 88. 
 
 Land of Canaan : its physical attri- 
 butes, 33, 327. 
 
 Landlords : their rights and duties, 92. 
 
 Language, clear: necessary to reason- 
 ing, 27 ; formed by analogy, 150 ; 
 rules for acquiring good, 222 ; means 
 of co-operation, 257 ; origin of, 259. 
 
 Laughing Philosopher quoted, 142. 
 
 Law of Evidence Bill : how it affects 
 Joint Stock Banks, 188. 
 
 Law Reform, 235. 
 
 Laws of the currency, 339. 
 
 Learning any new thing : how to do it, 
 228. 
 
 Lectures quoted : on the Holy Bible; 
 60; on Ancient Commerce, 72, &c. , 
 on God in Science, 110; on the Phi- 
 losophy of Languge, 150, 258 ; on the 
 Internal Evidences of the Sacred 
 Scripture, 194; on the National Obli- 
 
386 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 gations to the Bible, 244; on Music, 
 295 ; on Congregational Chanting, 
 297; on the Philosophy of History, 
 313 ; on Oliver Cromwell, 318 ; on 
 systematic morality, 349. 
 
 Legal argumentation : the principle of 
 analogy applied to, 146. 
 
 Lessing's Fables quoted, 1 73. 
 
 Literary Characteristics of the Bible 
 quoted, 179, 199. 
 
 Literary Institutions : their effects, 245, 
 364. 
 
 Literary World of New York quoted, 
 118, 307. 
 
 Locke on the Human Understanding 
 quoted, 26S. 
 
 Logic : definition of, 3 ; compared with 
 grammar, 4. 
 
 Loose definitions : reasoning from, 209. 
 
 Love of truth necessary to sound reason- 
 ing, 18. 
 
 Lysson's iEsop's Fables quoted, 177. 
 
 M. 
 
 Macaulay's History of England quoted, 
 
 139, 159. 
 McCulloch, Mr. : his dispute with 
 
 Malthus, 66 ; his Analogies, 147. 
 his Political Economy 
 
 quoted, 109, 331. 
 his Statistical Account 
 
 of the British Empire quoted, 188. 
 Macculloch'S; Dr., Literary Character- 
 istics of the Holy Scriptures quoted, 
 
 179, 199. 
 Macnish's Anatomy of Drunkenness 
 
 quoted, 354. 
 Malthus, his dispute with Macculloch, 
 
 66; his theory of population, 89, 332. 
 Man's power over himself to prevent 
 
 or control Insanity quoted, 14. 
 Manner: influence of, 21. 
 Manufactures a source of national 
 
 wealth, 230. 
 Marcet,Mrs.: Conversations on Political 
 
 Economy quoted, 50, 88, 135, 325; 
 
 her Willy's Grammar quoted, 240. 
 Marriage: the logic of, 306. 
 Marriage with the sister of a deceased 
 
 wife, 165. 
 Martin, Rev. S. Lecture on Money 
 
 quoted, 42. 
 Master, logical : useful, 15. 
 Mathematical reasoning, 47, 285, 362. 
 Mayo's Philosophy of Living quoted, 
 
 313. 
 Medicine, its character as a science, 
 
 78, 79. 
 Melvill, Rev. H. : his sermon quoted, 
 
 300. 
 Memory strengthened by the art of 
 
 reasoning, 13. 
 Mental independence should be culti- 
 vated, 19. 
 Mental reservation, 219. 
 
 Metaphors are not arguments, 164. 
 Mill's Logic quoted, 31, 75, 180, 208, 
 
 212, 213, 272. 
 Mind : its powers, 5. 
 Modern civilization : the permanency 
 
 of, 293. 
 Money, metallic : its attributes, 42 ; 
 effects of its increase, 30; evils of its 
 abolition, 89. 
 Moral cause and effect: the relation 
 of, 78, 80 ; examples of, 81 ; modes of 
 reasoning from this relation, 82 ; dif- 
 ficulty in proving that a specific 
 cause does produce a specific effect, 
 83 ; public measures are usually 
 judged by their effects, 85; sometimes 
 effects are put for causes, 85; the 
 same cause does not always produce 
 the same effect, 87 ; the reductio ad 
 absurdam, or pointing out the absurd 
 effects, 88 ; proving too much, 90 ; ad- 
 vantages and disadvantages of pro- 
 posed measures are referred to cause 
 and effect, 90; effects of early mar- 
 riages, 92; causes of the increase of 
 crime, 92; effects of the Lord Lieu- 
 tenancy of Ireland, 93 ; probable 
 effects of a convocation, 94; fallacies 
 connected with cause and effect, 210. 
 
 Moral habits a source of wealth, 328. 
 
 Moral philosophy : application of logic 
 to, 349. 
 
 Moral principle connected with sound 
 reasoning, 365. 
 
 Moral reasonings: the principle of ana- 
 logy applied to, 145. 
 
 Moral truths proved to exist, 349. 
 
 Morality of actions consists in their 
 motives, 115. 
 
 Morning Chronicle quoted, 234, 345. 
 
 Morning Herald quoted, 281. 
 
 Mosaic code of law: its spirit, 116; 
 writings, authenticity of, 317. 
 
 Moses : allowed interest for money, 39; 
 the spirit of his laws, 116; respecting 
 debt, 320. 
 
 Motives to actions,'' 109 ; form the 
 morality of actions, 115; inferred 
 from the actions, 119, 125 ; fallacy of 
 assigning wrong motives, 211. 
 
 Mottram's prize essay on Institutional 
 Education quoted, 364. 
 
 Multiplication : application of, 48, 336. 
 
 Munro's Manual of Logic quoted, 39. 
 
 Music : advantages of, 295. 
 
 N. 
 
 Names have no necessary connexion 
 
 with things, 2. 
 Napoleon Buonaparte, 8, 13, 173, 216. 
 Narratives, 227. 
 National debt Mr. Burke's dilemma 
 
 on, 280. 
 National wealth: its nature, 327; its 
 
 causes, 327; its effects, 330. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 387 
 
 Natural philosophy, 73 ; errors in, 74. 
 
 Natural theology, 110, 112. 
 
 Nature : how we reason respecting, 73 ; 
 
 , uniformity of its laws the founda- 
 tion of induction, 129. 
 
 Narigation Laws, 87. 
 
 New York Independent quoted, 231. 
 
 Newspapers, London : the number of 
 square feet they measure, 341. 
 
 Newton, Sir Isaac: his attributes, 39, 
 
 321. 
 . Newton, Rev. John : his defence of 
 forms of prayer, 150. 
 
 Nicholls on the Book of Proverbs 
 quoted, 181. 
 
 Nile : its overflowing, 72. 
 
 Nonconformist quoted, 235. 
 
 Oaths : Curran upon, 241 ; the opinions 
 of the Quakers respecting, 355. 
 
 Observation and experiment : their 
 province, 76, 78. 
 
 Oliver Cromwell : established the Navi- 
 gation Act, 88. 
 
 Onusprobandi: what is it? 248. 
 
 Oral traditions : why rejected, 197. 
 
 Overstone, Lord : his speech in favour 
 of the Industrial Exhibition, 61. 
 
 P. 
 
 Paley's Horae Paulinae quoted, 103. 
 ■ Moral Philosophy quoted, 143, 
 
 146, 162, 352. 
 
 Natural Theology quoted, 224. 
 
 Parables, reasoning from, 166, 168; 
 
 fallacies connected with, 214. 
 Partnerships era commandite, 88. 
 Paul, St. : his attributes, 33 ; his letters 
 
 to Timothy, 103; his cloak, 104. 
 Peel, Sir Robert: his attributes, 39; 
 
 his trilemma, 282. 
 Personal descriptions, 225. 
 Petitio principii: what is it? 204. 
 Philosophy of History, 313. 
 Physical causes and effects : the rela- 
 tion of, 71 ; modes of reasoning from, 
 
 72 ; errors in reasoning from, 74 ; 
 
 physical attributes of a country a 
 
 source of its wealth, 327. 
 Pictorial Bible quoted, 320. 
 Places : description of, 235. 
 Political economy, 50; its character as 
 
 a science, 78; analogy employed in, 
 
 147; application of logic to, 325. 
 Political economists : their mode of 
 
 reasoning, 68, 121. 
 Politicalinstitutions a source of national 
 
 wealth, 328. 
 Politics: its character as a science, 78. 
 Poetry, immoral, Dr. Watts on, 246. 
 Polygamy : an a fortiori argument 
 
 against, 156. 
 
 Population of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land, 335 ; of the United States of 
 America, 336. 
 
 Port Royal Logic quoted, 41, 269. 
 
 Porter, G. R., author of the Progress of 
 the Nation: his statistics ouoted, 
 336, 338. 
 
 translator of Bastiat, 164, 
 
 279. 
 
 Porteua's Summary of Christian Evi- 
 dence quoted, 193. 
 
 Power of man to prevent or control 
 insanity, 14; his power over his own 
 habits, 278. 
 
 Prayer: forms of, defended by analogy, 
 150. 
 
 Prayer Book quoted, 109. 
 
 Principles of reasoning : what are they? 
 30. 
 
 Prize essays on the Industrial Exhi- 
 bition, 54, 81,90, 154, 357; on Literary 
 Institutions, 364. 
 
 Property: the evils that would result 
 from its abolition, 88. 
 
 Proposition : what is it? 26. 
 
 Prosyllogism, a compound syllogism, 
 276, 284. 
 
 Protective system: historical defence 
 of, 84. 
 
 Protestant and Catholic states con- 
 trasted, 159. 
 
 Proverbs: their application, 58; Solo- 
 mon's, 152 ; reasoning from, 166, 
 178; Fielding's collection of, 178; 
 Dr. Macculloch on do., 179 ; Nicholls 
 on Solomon's, 181 ; Dr. Franklin's 
 application of, 182; fallacies con- 
 nected with, 214. 
 
 Proving too much, 90. 
 
 Public bodies : logical advisers useful 
 to, 16 ; Responsibility of their man 
 agers, 52. 
 
 Public companies : laws respecting, 186; 
 their moral duties, 145, 299, 352. 
 
 Public measures: how they are»judged, 
 85. 
 
 Public works: Colonel Torrens' dilemma 
 against their construction by the 
 government, 280. 
 
 Pun : an example of, 142. 
 
 Punch: its representations founded on 
 analogy, 152. 
 
 Punishment: the end of, 120. 
 
 Puseyism: the observances of, 51. 
 
 Quakers: their opinions on war and 
 oaths, 355 ; on salutations and amuse- 
 ments, 356. 
 
 Questions, reasoning by, 237. 
 
 Questions on Political Economy, &c, 
 for Discussion in Literary Societies, 
 by Samuel Bailey, quoted, 80, 115, 
 120. 
 
388 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Raffles's Lecture to Young Men quoted, 
 195 
 
 Rail, Literature of the, quoted, 254. 
 
 Railways : special trains, 36 ; advan- 
 tages of free intercourse between 
 different parts of a country, 81 ; books 
 sold at the stations, 254 ; how affected 
 by the Great Exhibition, 292. 
 
 Reading compared with conversation, 
 153. 
 
 Reasoning : what is it ? 2 ; subjects of, 
 7 ; utility of, 10 ; principles of, 30 ; 
 forms of, 221 ; applications of, 303. 
 
 Reductio ad absurdam : what is it ? 88; 
 examples of, 76, 88. 
 
 Relations are the foundation of reason- 
 ing, 30. 
 
 Religion, logical advocates useful to, 
 16. 
 
 Religion, revealed, the evidence of 
 appeals to our senses, 76. 
 
 Rent : are high rents the cause of high 
 price of corn ? 86 ; Dr. Chalmers's 
 opinion of the Ricardo theory, 86. 
 
 Responsibility of employers quoted, 
 110, 309. 
 
 Restrictive laws, Monsieur Bastiat's 
 dilemma respecting, 279. 
 
 Resurrection of the dead proved by a 
 Sorites, 284. 
 
 Retiring from trade, objections to, 243. 
 
 Rights between different species of 
 animals are not the same as rights 
 between the individuals of the same 
 species; men may have a right to 
 eat fish, though theyhave no right to 
 eat one another, 162. 
 
 Robins, George: his descriptions; 232. 
 
 Robinson's Notes to Claude's Essay 
 on the Composition of a Sermon, 
 quoted, 13, 138, 161, 200. 
 
 Rogue: the way to become one, 125. 
 
 Rothschild, Baron, took part of an 
 oath, 51. 
 
 Royal Society : the formation of, 76 ; 
 its charter, 77. 
 
 Rules : their application, 58; of inter- 
 pretation of the Holy Scriptures, 200. 
 
 Russell, Lord John : his letter to the 
 Bishop of Durham quoted, 51. 
 
 S. 
 
 Sabbath-day was made for man, 128 ; 
 
 the conduct of Nehemiah respecting, 
 
 132. 
 Sabertash's Art of Conversation quoted, 
 
 255. 
 Salutations, of the Society of Friends, 
 
 356. 
 Sam Slick quoted, 128, 154, 306. 
 Satire often the language of analogy, 
 
 151 ; used in Scripture, 152. 
 
 Saul, King of Israel, obeyed part of a 
 command, 52 ; convicted by circum- 
 stantial evidence, 108. 
 
 Savage state, not the original state of 
 mankind, 122. 
 
 Scholastic disputation, 275. 
 
 Scholastic logic : refers only to words, 
 71 ; its defects, 275. 
 
 Scotland, statistics respecting, 340. 
 
 Scripture, sacred, instance of satire in, 
 152; reasonings respecting, 193. 
 
 Self-imposed taxes, 336. 
 
 Senses, truths that we know by the, 6. 
 
 Senses, the evidence of our : can we 
 believe it? 75. 
 
 Sermons quoted : Mr. Gilbart's, 60 ; 
 Dr. Croly's, 112; Mr. Bickersteth's, 
 197 ; Mr. Melvill's, 300. 
 
 Servants, female : the education of, 
 310. 
 
 Servants, logical, are useful, 15 ; Dean 
 Swift's advice to, 53 ; logic to, 309. 
 
 Seymour : Mornings with the Jesuits 
 quoted, 245, 280. » 
 
 Shaftesbury, Earl of: his speech on 
 lodging-houses quoted, 96. 
 
 Shakspeare quoted, 2. 
 
 Sherman's Anecdotes of Rowland Hill 
 quoted, 38, 82, 226. 
 
 Shopkeepers in London : how affected 
 by the Great Exhibition, 292. 
 
 Smart's Logic quoted, 288. 
 
 Smith Rev. J. D. : his lecture on Crom- 
 well quoted, 318. 
 
 Rev. Sydney: his Sketches of 
 
 Moral Philosophy, 13, 80, 114, 128, 
 142, 143, 153, 245, 257 ; anecdotes 
 from, 142. 
 
 Soap, reasons against the tax on, 234. 
 
 Social institutions a source of national 
 wealth, 329. 
 
 Social intercourse, the logic of, 311. 
 
 Social responsibility, 299. 
 
 Socratical way of reasoning, 238. 
 
 Sophisms of Free-trade, by a Barrister, 
 quoted, 84. 
 
 Sorites : a compound syllogism, 277, 
 284; applied to prove the resurrec- 
 tion of the dead, 284 ; to the laws of 
 the currency, 284; to mathematics, 
 285. 
 
 Southey's Life of Wesley quoted, 226, 
 269 ; his description ofRowland Hill, 
 226 ; his Life of Dr. Watts quoted, 
 247. 
 
 Sporting, argument for, 115. 
 
 Statistical Companion quoted, 337, 343. 
 
 Society of London : their 
 
 Report quoted, 334. 
 
 Statements: population of 
 
 Great Britain and Ireland, 335 ; of 
 the United States of America, 336; 
 the consumption of brandy, beer, 
 and tobacco, 336 ; number of electors 
 for Members of Parliament, 337 ; 
 the increase of wealth among the 
 
INDEX 
 
 389 
 
 middle classes, 338 ; the monthly 
 circulation of "Bank 'Notes, 339 ; the 
 London newspapers, 341 ; the number 
 and classification of fundholders, 343; 
 the size of the Crystal Palace, 348; 
 the number, of persons who attended 
 the Great Exhibition, 348. 
 
 .Statistics application of logic to, 334; 
 nature of the Science, 334; its im- 
 portance, 334; its operations, 336; its 
 principles, 337 ; its fallacies, 346. 
 
 Statute Law, reasoning from, 185. 
 
 Subject and attribute : the relation of, 
 31 ; arguments from may be brought 
 under genus and species, 68; falla- 
 cies connected with, 205. 
 
 Suburbs of London, comparison of, 
 153. 
 
 Summary of the Evidences of the 
 Christian Religion, 193. 
 
 Sumner, Dr. Archbishop of Canterbury, 
 quoted, 38 ; his opinion of a convo- 
 cation, 94. 
 
 Sumptuary Laws, Monsieur Say's di- 
 lemma against, 280. 
 
 Swift, Dean : his Advice to Servants 
 quoted, 53; his satire, 151 ; his Tale 
 of a Tub quoted, 214. 
 
 Syllogism single, 261; simple, 262; 
 complex, 262; conjunctive, 263. 
 
 compound, 275 ; epichirema, 
 
 275,277; dilemma, 276, 279; tri- 
 lemma, 282 ; prosyllogism, 276, 284 : 
 sorites, 277, 284. 
 
 Syllogistic reasoning : Lord Bacon on, 
 268 ; Mr. Hallam, 268 ; Locke, 268 ; 
 Dr. Watts on, 269 ; Dr. Campbell, 
 270; Dr. Whately, 270 ; Sir W. Ha- 
 milton, 271; Mr. Mill, 272; the 
 Author, 56, 71, 273. 
 
 Synthesis : wherein it differs from ana- 
 lysis, 288. 
 
 System to be observed in study, 326. 
 
 Tales, reasoning from, 166. 
 
 Taxes on soap, 234. 
 
 Taylor's Statesman quoted, 366. 
 
 Tenterden steeple and Goodwin sands, 
 83. 
 
 Testimony, truths of, 7. 
 
 Texts, preached from analogically, 149. 
 
 Themes, rules for writing, 288. 
 
 Theology, the principle of analogy 
 employed in, 1 47. 
 
 Times newspaper quoted, 189, 209, 
 233, 254, 292. 
 
 Timeserving in religion, 218. 
 
 Timothy, his parentage and infirmi- 
 ties, 103. 
 
 Tradesman's parable against undersel- 
 ling, 170. 
 
 Traditions of the elders, an argument 
 respecting, 137. 
 
 Training, its effects, 79. 
 
 Tribute : a metaphor used as an argu- 
 ment, 164. 
 
 Trilemma, what is it? 282 ; Sir Robert 
 Peel's, 282; one respecting wages, 
 282; in defence of the Old Testament, 
 283. 
 
 Trueman on Food quoted, 49. 
 
 Truths, classes of, that we know with- 
 out reasoning, 5 ; new, how disco- 
 vered, 337. 
 
 Underselling, argument against, from 
 a parable, 170. 
 
 Understanding the question: false rea- 
 sonings from not doing so, 204. 
 
 Undistributed Middle : what is it, 207. 
 
 Universal Suffrage, 159. 
 
 Universality : difference between a ma- 
 thematical, physical, and moral, 67. 
 
 Universe, the: a trilemma respecting, 
 288. 
 
 Utility of the art of reasoning, 10. 
 
 V. 
 
 Variety of studies recommended, 361. 
 
 Verbal quibbling, 215. 
 
 Verbal analogies, reasoning from, 164. 
 
 Virgil: his character as a poet, 40. 
 
 Voluble lady, 260. 
 
 Voluntaryism, Dr. Alexander on, 89. 
 
 W. 
 
 Wages, payment in goods : a dilemma 
 against, 280 ; how regulated, 282. 
 
 War, arguments in defence of, 165 ; 
 opinion of Quakers respecting, 355. 
 
 War-horse : a description of, 227. 
 
 Wars diminished by the invention of 
 fire-arms, 128. 
 
 Water, lime in different kinds of, 54; 
 how essential to health, 86, 87. 
 
 Watts, Dr. : his Life by Conder quoted, 
 228 ; his life by Southey quoted, 247. 
 
 ■ his Logic quoted, 2, 6, 18, 25, 
 
 45, 55, 56, 66, 67, 73, 74, 123, 203, 204, 
 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 261, 269, 275. 
 
 his Improvement of the Mind 
 
 quoted, 119, 123, 130, 138, 19S, 212, 
 222,228,238, 266, 326. 
 
 his preface to his Lyric Poems 
 
 quoted, 246. 
 
 his preface to his Scripture His- 
 tory quoted, 323. 
 
 Wayland's Elements of Moral Science 
 quoted, 115, 350. 
 
 Wealth, the science that treats of, is 
 called political economy, 325 ; its 
 nature, 327 ; its causes, 327; its effects, 
 330; ill-gotten, its effects, 355. 
 
 Webster, Dr., hanged at Boston for the 
 murder of Dr. Parkman, 118. 
 
390 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Weld's History of the Royal Society- 
 quoted, 76, 77 ; his Statistical Com- 
 panion quoted, 337, 343. 
 
 Wesley, John, at Oxford : his skill in 
 logic, 226, 267. 
 
 Whately, Dr., Archbishop of Dublin, 
 usually reasons by analogy, 164. 
 
 his Logic quoted, 270. 
 
 his Easy Lessons on Money 
 
 Matters quoted, 89, 135, 147, 283. 
 
 his Historic Doubts about 
 
 Napoleon Buonaparte quoted, 216. 
 Whewell, Dr. : his opinion of Mr. 
 
 Mill's theory of the syllogism, 272 ; 
 
 his Lectures on Systematic Morality 
 
 quoted, 349. 
 Whish, Rev. J. C. : his Prize Essay on 
 
 the Great Exhibition quoted, 81, 154, 
 
 357. 
 Whole Art of Dress quoted, 304. 
 
 Whole and its parts : the relation of, a 
 principle of reasoning, 45, 336; fal- 
 lacies connected with, 207. 
 
 Wife: logical, is useful, 15. 
 
 Wilks, Rev. Matthew: his texts, 149. 
 
 Wills's Principles of Circumstantial 
 Evidence quoted, 99, 119. 
 
 Winds : benefits arising from, 72. 
 
 Wisdom is associated with goodness, 
 366. 
 
 Wit, example of, 142; usually asso- 
 ciated with logic, 151. 
 
 Words, caution in the choice of, 27, 67. 
 
 Written documents, reasoning from, 
 184; fallacies connected with, 214. 
 
 Y. 
 
 Young's Paraphrase on the Book of 
 Job quoted, 236, 237. 
 
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