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LIEUT- JOMN H. PARKER, 
 
 i:Vni U. S. Infantry, 
 
 LATK COMMANDINCi (iATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
HISTORY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 (Ratling \\m Detachments 
 
 FIFTH ARMY CORPS, 
 
 AT 
 
 SANTIAGO, 
 
 With a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning 
 that Expedition. 
 
 JOHN H. PARKER, 
 
 1st Lieut. Yith Inf. 
 
 (Late) Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 
 Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago. 
 
 FRESS OF THE 
 
 HUDSON-KIMBERLY PUBLISHING CO. 
 
 KAN SAS CITY, MO. 
 
 
 
h\~^^ 
 
 o' 
 
 X 
 
 Copyrighted 1898, 
 
 BY 
 HUDSON-KlMBEELY PdBLISHINO Co. 
 
 Kansas City, Mo. 
 
 '^i>°\^^ cvt^nv^"?> 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 To THE Enlisted Members of the Detach- 
 ment, Who, by Their Devotion, Cour- 
 age AND Endurance, Made Its Suc- 
 cess Possible, this Volume is 
 Dedicated as a Token of 
 Esteem by the 
 Author. 
 
The photographic illustrations in this work are 
 due to the courage and kindness of Mr. John N. 
 Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man was 
 first sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, 
 and took with him a large supply of material. It 
 was his delight to photograph everything that oc- 
 curred, and his pleasure to furnish a set of photo- 
 graphs for the use of the author. Mr. Weigle was 
 recommended for a commission in the Regular 
 Army of the United States, for his extreme gal- 
 lantry in action, and is a magnificent type of the 
 American youth. The thanks of the author are 
 tendered to him for the photographic illustrations 
 so generously supplied. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 On the morniug of July 1st, the dismounted 
 cavalry, including my regiment, stormed Kettle 
 Hill, driving the Spaniards from their trenches. 
 After taking the crest, I made the men under me 
 turn and begin volley-firing at the San Juan Block- 
 house and intrenchments against which Hawkins' 
 and Kent's Infantry were advancing. While thus 
 firing, there suddenly smote on our ears a pecu- 
 liar drumming sound. One or two of the men 
 cried out, "The Spanish machine guns!" but, after 
 listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and called, 
 *'It 's the Gatlings. men! It's our Gatlings!" 
 Immediately the troopers began to cheer lustily, 
 for the sound was most inspiring. Whenever the 
 drumming stopped, it was only to open again a lit- 
 tle nearer the front. Our artillery, using black 
 powder, had not been able to stand within range 
 of the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident 
 
tliat the Gatlings were troubled by no such consid- 
 eration, for they were advancing all the while. 
 
 Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, 
 after one false start, we in turn rushed the next 
 line of block-houses and intrenchments, and then 
 swung to the left and took the chain of hills 
 immediately fronting Santiago. Here I found my- 
 self on the extreme front, in command of the frag- 
 ments of all six regiments of the cavalry division. 
 I received orders to halt where I was, but to hold 
 the hill at all hazards. The Spaniards were 
 heavily reinforced and they opened a tremen- 
 dous fire upon us from their batteries and trenches. 
 We laid down just behind the gentle crest of 
 the hill, firing as we got the chance, but, for the 
 most part, taking the fire without responding. 
 As the afternoon wore on, however, the Spaniards 
 became bolder, and made an attack upon the posi- 
 tion. They did not push it home, but they did ad- 
 vance, their firing being redoubled. We at once 
 ran forward to the crest and opened on them, and, 
 as we did so, the unmistakable drumming of the 
 Gatlings opened abreast of us, to onr right, and 
 the men cheered again. As soon as the attack 
 was definitely repulsed, I strolled over to find 
 out about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut. 
 Parker with two of his guns right on our left, 
 
abreast of our men, who at that time were closer 
 to the Spaniards than any others. 
 
 From thence on, Parker's Gatlings were our 
 inseparable companions throughout the siege. 
 They were right up at the front. When we dug 
 our trenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and 
 put them in the trenches. His men and ours slept 
 in the same bomb-proofs and shared with one an- 
 other whenever either side got a supply of beans 
 or coffee and sugar. At no hour of the day or 
 night was Parker anywhere but where we wished 
 him to be, in the event of an attack. If a troop of 
 my regiment was sent off to guard some road or 
 some break in the lines, we were almost certain to 
 get Parker to send a Gatling along, and, whether 
 the change was made by day or by night, the Gat- 
 ling went. Sometimes we took the initiative and 
 started to quell the fire of the Spanish trenches; 
 sometimes they opened upon us ; but, at whatever 
 hour of the twenty-four the fighting began, the 
 drumming of the Gatlings was soon heard through 
 the cracking of our own carbines. 
 
 I have had too little experience to make my 
 judgment final; but certainly, if I were to com- 
 mand either a regiment or a brigade, whether of 
 cavalry or infantry, I would try to get a Gatling 
 battery — under a good man — with me. I feel sure 
 that the greatest possible assistance would be 
 
rendered, under almost all circumstances, by such 
 a Gatling battery, if well handled; for I believe 
 that it could be pushed fairly to the front of the 
 firing-line. At any rate, this is the way that Lieut. 
 Parker used his battery when he went into action 
 at San Juan, and when he kept it in the trenches 
 beside the Kough Riders before Santiago. 
 
 Theodore Roos&velt. 
 
FUB. CO.. LNut 3. >.. C. MO. 
 
TEE GATLIXG GUXS AT SIXTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 L'Envoi. 
 
 The history of the Gatling Guu Detachment, 
 Fifth Army Corps, is to a certain extent the his- 
 tory of the Santiago campaign. The detachment 
 was organized on the spur of the moment, to util- 
 ize material which would otherwise have been 
 useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all the 
 campaign. It participated in all the fighting of 
 that campaign, except the fight at La Guasimas, 
 and was disbanded upon the return of the Fifth 
 Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships were 
 endured by the Fifth Corps were shared by this 
 detachment; whatever dangers were faced by the 
 Fifth Corps were faced by it also; where the hot- 
 test fighting occurred this detachment went in 
 and stayed; and at the surrender it was paraded, 
 to use the words of General Shafter, "Upon that 
 portion of the line which it occupied so promptly 
 and defended so well." 
 
 But this memoir is not intended as a history of 
 that campaign nor of the Fifth Corps. The author 
 has not the data available to cover so large a field. 
 
10 
 
 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 nor the ability to do justice to the courage, forti- 
 tude, and endurance so heroically displayed by 
 that gallant army. That story will be written by 
 abler pens, and will be the wonder of the world 
 when it is told. 
 
 This story is that of an experiment. It is told 
 to lay before the general public, as well as the 
 military critic, the work of a little detachment of 
 thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon, 
 organized in the short space of four days preced- 
 ing July 1, 1898, and which without proper equip- 
 ment, adequate instruction, or i^revious training, 
 in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in 
 spite of obstacles enough to make the mere retro- 
 spect sickening, still achieved for itself a warm 
 place in the hearts of all true soldiers, and cov- 
 ered itself with glory upon the hardest fought 
 battle-field of the Hispano-American War. 
 
 This story is to commemorate the gallantry of 
 the enlisted men who helped to make history and 
 revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It will tell of 
 the heroism of the plain American Eegular, who, 
 without hope of preferment or possibility of re- 
 ward, boldly undertook to confute the erroneous 
 theories of military compilers, who, without orig- 
 inality or reason, have unblushingly cribbed the 
 
THE QATLi:SG OUNS AT SANTIAGO. U 
 
 labored efforts of foreign officers, and foisted these 
 compilations of second-hand opinions upon the 
 American Army as military text-books of author- 
 ity and weight. These literary soldiers declared, 
 following the lead of their foreign guides, that 
 "The value of machine guns on the battle-field is 
 doubtful," and that "Their offensive value is prob- 
 ably very small.'' They also agreed, with most 
 touching unanimity, that "A direct assault upon 
 a fortified position, occupied by good, unshaken 
 infantry, armed with the modern rifle and plenti- 
 fully supplied with ammunition is sure to fail, 
 unless made by overwhelming numbers and pre- 
 pared by strong and accurate fire by artillery." 
 
 These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers 
 were destined to see all their pet theories exploded 
 by the grim old mountain puma from California 
 and his brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, 
 so far as they are capable of learning, that the 
 American Kegular makes tactics as he needs 
 them; that the rules of war established by pen 
 soldiers do not form the basis of actual operations 
 in the field; that theories must go to the wall 
 before the stern logic of irrefutable facts; and 
 that deductions based on the drill-made autom- 
 atons of European armies are not applicable to 
 
12 THE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 an army composed of American Volunteer Regu- 
 lars, led by our trained oflBcers. 
 
 We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, 
 and hence without ''eyes"; not supported by artil- 
 lery; in the most difficult country over which sol- 
 diers ever operated, and without maps or recon- 
 noissance — in twenty days shut up and captured 
 an army of twice its own effective strength, in a 
 strongly fortified city, with better served and 
 more numerous artillery. 
 
 We shall find that when the ''sledge" was not 
 at hand, American ingenuity was able to use the 
 "mallet" instead, making light machine guns per- 
 form all the function of artillery, and dispensing 
 altogether, so far as any practical results were 
 concerned, with that expensive and much over- 
 rated arm; That the Regular private is capable of 
 meeting all demands upon his intelligence, and 
 that the American non. com. is the superior of for- 
 eign officers. 
 
 It is also hoped to place before the intelligent 
 American public some correct ideas of the new 
 arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiago for 
 the first time in the history of the world. The 
 machine gun is the latest practical product of 
 American inventive genius applied to war. The 
 
THE OATLING OVNS AT SANTIAGO. 13 
 
 first form of this ^veapou tried, the mitrailleuse, 
 was not very successful. It failed, not on account 
 of faults of construction, or imperfect mechanism, 
 but because its proper tactical employment had 
 not been thought out by the French army. Since 
 that time machine guns have been greatly im- 
 proved, but no one has succeeded in making their 
 great value appreciated by military authorities. 
 The failures of the French brought the gun into 
 disfavor, and created a prejudice against its 
 employment. 
 
 The Artillery of the world, which poses in every 
 country as an elite body of scientific fighters, and 
 is often found on the battle-field to be an aggrega- 
 tion of abstruse theorists, were jealous and con- 
 temptuous. They said, ^'See how easily the artil- 
 lery knocked out machine guns at Gravelotte." 
 The Cavalry of the world, famous everywhere for 
 an esprit-du-corps which looks haughtily down on 
 all other arms of the service, were too deeply ab- 
 sorbed in the merits of saber vs. revolver, and in 
 the proper length of their spectacular plumes, to 
 give a second thought to this new, untried, and 
 therefore worthless weapon. The world's Infant- 
 ry, resting upon the assumption that it is the back- 
 bone of all armies, and the only real, reliable fight- 
 
14 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ing body under all conditions, left the consid- 
 eration of these vague dreams of mechanical 
 destructiveness to lunatics, cranks, and philan- 
 thropists. 
 
 In our own country the Ordnance Department, 
 which is the trial court before which all military 
 inventions must appear, scouted the idea of use- 
 fulness of machine guns even after war was de- 
 clared, and adhered to the view that machine guns, 
 in the verv nature of things, could never be useful 
 except in the defense of fortified positions; that 
 they never could be brought up on the battle-field, 
 nor used if they were brought up. This view was 
 that of a prominent young officer of that depart- 
 ment who wa'ote a report on the subject, and it 
 seemed to express the views of the department. 
 
 This view must have been that of our War 
 Department, for it did not even acknowledge the 
 receipt of drawings and specifications for a ma- 
 chine gun carriage, offered freely to the Govern- 
 ment as a gift by the inventor six months before 
 the war, together with the first correct tactical 
 outline of the proper use of machine guns ever 
 filed in any War Office in the world. This inven- 
 tion was designed to facilitate the use of the 
 machine gun by making its advance with the skir- 
 
THE OATLINO OUNS AT 8 Ay TI AGO. 15 
 
 mish liue possible on the offensive, and was rec- 
 ommended by the whole staff of the Infantry and 
 Cavalry School as a meritorious device, worthy of 
 trial. The discussion filed with the invention 
 pointed out, for the first time, the correct tactical 
 employment of the weapon, and staked the mili- 
 tary reputation and ability of the author and in- 
 ventor on the correctness of his views. 
 
 From these facts it may be gathered that there 
 was required a certain degree of originality and 
 energy to get together and organize a machine 
 gun battery for the Santiago campaign. 
 
 The i)roject was conceived and executed. The 
 service rendered by this battery has forever set at 
 rest the question of the proper tactical use of the 
 machine gun arm, both on the offensive and de- 
 fensive. These things are now beyond the realm 
 of theor}-. They are a demonstrated problem. 
 The solution is universally acknowledged to be 
 correct. ^ 
 
 This is the history of that detachment. 
 
16 THE GATLING GUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Inception. 
 
 From the 2f;tb of April uutil the 6th of June, 
 Tanipa aud Port Tampa were the military centers 
 of greatest interest in the United States. Troops 
 were rushed into these places on special trains 
 and camped on available sites, pending the or- 
 ganization of a proposed expedition to — some- 
 where. Supplies of every description came pour- 
 ing in on long trains of express and freight cars^ 
 mounted officers and orderlies ploughed their 
 rushing way through great heaps and dunes of 
 ever-shifting sand, leaving behind them stifling 
 clouds of scintillating particles, which filtered 
 through every conceivable crevice and made the 
 effort to breathe a suffocating nightmare. Over 
 all the tumultuous scene a torrid sun beat down 
 from a cloudless sky, while its scorching rays^ 
 reflected from the fierce sand under foot, produced 
 a heat so intolerable that even the tropical vege- 
 tation looked withered and dying. In this cli- 
 mate officers and men, gathered mostly from 
 
THE GATLIXa GUyS AT SAyflAOO. 17 
 
 Northeiii posts, were to "acclimate'' themselves 
 for a tropical campaign — somewhere. 
 
 They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a 
 more pernicious climate, in Cuba nor in Porto 
 Eico, than that of southern Florida. Its first 
 effect upon men just emerging from a bracing 
 Northern winter was akin to prostration. Then 
 began to follow a decided tendency to languor; 
 after this one was liable to sudden attacks of 
 bowel troubles. The deadly malaria began to 
 insidiously prepare the way for a hospital cot; the 
 patient lost flesh, relish of food became a remi- 
 niscence, and an hour's exertion in the sun was 
 enough to put a man on his back for the rest of the 
 day. Exposure to the direct action of the sun's 
 rays was frequently followed by nausea, a slight 
 chill, and then a high fever. The doctors subse- 
 (juently called this "thermal fever," which is sus- 
 pected to be a high-sounding name calculated to 
 cover up a very dense ignorance of the nature of 
 the disease, because no one ever obtained any re- 
 lief from it from them. Recurrence of the expos- 
 ure brought recurrence of the fever, and, if per- 
 sisted in, finally produced a severe illness. 
 
 One reason for this w^as that the troops con- 
 tinued to wear the winter clothing they had worn 
 
18 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ou their arrival. Tlie promised "khaki" did not 
 materialize. Some regiments drew the brown 
 canvas fatigue uniform, but the only use made of 
 it was to put the white blanket-roll through the 
 legs of the trousers, thereby adding to the weight 
 of the roll, without perceptible benefit to the 
 soldier. 
 
 Such a climate, under such surroundings, was 
 not conducive to original thought, prolonged exer- 
 tion, or sustained study. Everybody felt "mean" 
 and was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to 
 listen to any new schemes. The highest ambition 
 seemed to be to get out of it to somewhere with 
 just as little delay and exertion as possible. It 
 was at this juncture that the plan of organizing a 
 Gatling gun battery was conceived, and the at- 
 tempt to obtain authority began. 
 
 The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns 
 adopted in the laud service of the United States. 
 Not to enter into a technical description, but 
 merely to convey a general idea of its working and 
 uses, it may be described as follows: 
 
 The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without 
 stocks, arranged around a rod, and parallel to it. 
 Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, and the 
 whole cluster can be made to revolve by turning a 
 
THE GATLINO aVNS AT SANTIAGO. 19 
 
 crank. The bolts are all covered in a brass case 
 at the breech, and the machine is loaded b}^ means 
 of a vertical groove in which cartridges are placed, 
 twenty at a time, and from which they fall into 
 the receivers one at a time. As the cluster of bar- 
 rels revolves each one is fired at the lowest point, 
 and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The* 
 gun is mounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the 
 lower end of the wye passes down into a socket in 
 the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as 
 one points a garden hose or sprinkler, with the 
 advantage that the gun can be clamped at any 
 instant, and will then continue to sprinkle its 
 drops of death over the same row of plants until 
 the clamps are released. The axle is hollow and 
 will hold about a thousand cartridges. It is hori- 
 zontal, and on its ends are heavy Archibald 
 wheels. There is also a heavy hollow trail, in 
 which tools and additional ammunition can be 
 stored. The limber resembles that used by the 
 Artillery, and is capable of carrying about 9G00 
 rounds of cartridges. The whole gun, thus 
 mounted, can be drawn by two mules, and worked 
 to good advantage by from six to eight men. It 
 is built of various calibers, and can fire from 300 to 
 900 shots per minute. The guns used by the Gat- 
 
20 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ling Guu Detacbmont, Fifth Army Corps, were 
 built by the Colt's Arms Co., were the latest im- 
 proved model, long ten-barrel gun, and fired the 
 Krag-Jorgenson ammunition used by the Regular 
 Army. 
 
 The attempt to obtain authority to organize a 
 machine gun battery met with many discourage- 
 ments and repeated failures. No one seemed to 
 have thought anything about the subject, and 
 Tampa was not a good place nor climate in which 
 to indulge in that form of exercise, apparently. 
 Perhaps the climate was one reason why so little 
 thinking was done, and everything went "at sixes 
 and sevens.'' 
 
 The officer who had conceived the scheme was 
 a young man, too. He was only a second lieutenant 
 ("Second lieutenants are fit for nothing except to 
 take reveille''), and had never, so far as his mili- 
 tary superiors knew, heard the whistle of a hostile 
 bullet. He had made no brilliant record at the 
 Academy, had never distinguished himself in the 
 service, and was not anybody's "pet." He was, 
 apparently, a safe man to ignore or snub if occa- 
 sion or bad temper made it desirable to ignore or 
 snub somebody, and, above all, had no political 
 friends who would be offended thereby. 
 
Xfx 
 
 a 
 
 > 
 > 
 
THE GATLINO 0UN8 AT SANTIAGO. 21 
 
 'Tolitics" cut quite a figure in Tampa in some 
 respects. An officer who was known to be a per- 
 sonal friend of Senator Somebody, or protege of 
 this or that great man, was regarded with consid- 
 erable awe and reverence by the common herd. 
 It was ludicrous to see the weight attached to the 
 crumbs of wisdom that fell from the friends of 
 the friends of somebody. They shone only by a 
 reflected light, it is true; but nobody there at 
 Tampa had a lamp of his own, except the few who 
 had won renown in the Civil War, and reflected 
 light was better than none at all. A very young 
 and green second lieutenant who was able to 
 boast that he had declined to be a major in a cer- 
 tain State was at once an oracle to other lieu- 
 tenants — and to some who w^ere not lieutenants. 
 The policy which governed these appointments 
 was not so well understood at that date in the 
 campaign as it is now. 
 
 When the court of a reigning favorite was es- 
 tablished at the Tampa Bay Hotel as a brigadier, 
 and people began to get themselves a little settled 
 into the idea that they knew who was in com- 
 mand, they were suddenly disillusioned by the 
 appointment of another and senior brigadier to 
 the command. They settled down to get ac- 
 
22 THE GATLING GUNS AT SAyTIAGO. 
 
 quainted with the new authority, and were just 
 beginning to find out who was w^ho, when the tele- 
 graph flashed the news that the deposed potentate 
 had been made a major-general, and, of course, 
 was now in command. The thing was becoming 
 interesting. Bets began to be made as to w^hich 
 would come in ahead under the wire. The other 
 also became a major-general. Then came a period 
 of uncertainty, because the question of rank 
 hinged upon some obscure and musty record of 
 forgotten service some thirty-four years before. 
 From these facts will be apparent the diflicurty 
 under which a subordinate labored in trying to 
 create anything. 
 
 It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort 
 to waste time with subordinates. The projector 
 of an enterprise had better go straight to the one 
 who has the necessary authority to order what is 
 wanted; if access to him can be had, and he can 
 be brought to recognize the merits of the plan — 
 that settles it; if not — that also settles it. In ei- 
 ther case the matter becomes a settled thing, and 
 one knows what to depend upon. 
 
 But who was the man to see there at Tampa? 
 Nobody knew. 
 
 The first officer approached was the one in 
 
THE QATLING 0VN8 AT SAXTIAGO. 23 
 
 direct line of snporiority. Col. A. T. Smith, 13th 
 Infantry. The idea was to ascertain his views 
 and try to obtain from him a favorable endorse- 
 ment upon a written plan to be submitted through 
 military channels to the commanding general at 
 Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; for 
 the reply to a request for a few minutes' audience 
 on the subject of machine guns was very gruff and 
 curt: "I don't want to hear anything about it. 
 I don't believe in it, and I don't feel like hearing 
 it. If you want to see me about this subject, come 
 to me in office hours." That settled it. Any 
 effort to get a written plan through would have to 
 carry the weight of official disapproval from the 
 start, and even a "shavey" knows that disapproval 
 at the start is enough to kill a paper in the official 
 routine. 
 
 The next officers approached were Major Will- 
 iam Auman and Capt. H. Cavanaugh, of the 13th 
 Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two 
 officers, both of whom rendered very distinguished 
 services on the battle-field, listened with interest 
 and were convinced. Their advice was: "Get 
 your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing 
 just what you propose; then go straight to the 
 commanding general himself. It he listens to 
 
24 THE GATLING GUNS AT 8AXTIAG0. 
 
 jou, he will be the responsible party, and will have 
 waived the informality; if he will not receive you, 
 no harm is done." 
 
 This advice was followed and the following plan 
 prepared : 
 
 Scheme for Organization of Division GatJing Gun 
 Detachment. 
 
 ^''Material: 
 
 "Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 
 horses and 16 saddles; 6 sets double harness, 
 wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team and driv- 
 er; and 100,000 rounds, .30 cal. 
 '■^Personnel: 
 
 ''One first lieutenant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 
 1 clerk, 1 cook, and 35 enlisted men selected for 
 their intelligence, activity, and daring; volunteers, 
 if possible to be obtained, as the service will be 
 hazardous. 
 
 '^Equipment : 
 
 "Officer: Revolver, saber, or machete, and field- 
 glass. 
 
 "Enlisted men : Revolver and knife. 
 
 "Fifty rounds to be carried on person for re- 
 volver, and 50 in ordnance train. 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 25 
 
 *'Camp Equipage: 
 
 "Four conical wall-tents, 2 'A' wall-tents, and 
 the ordinary cooking outfit for a company of 41 
 men. 
 ^'Organization: 
 
 "In the discretion of the detachment com- 
 mander, subject to approval of division com- 
 mander; probably as follows, subject to modifica- 
 tions by experience: 
 
 "Three detachments under a sergeant. A de- 
 tachment to be composed of 1 gunner and 7 men. 
 The gunner should be a corporal. 
 "-4 dmin isira tion : 
 
 "The Division Gatling Gun Detachment to be 
 subject only to the orders of the division com- 
 mander, or higher authority. Its members are 
 carried on 'd. s.' in their respective organizations. 
 Its commander exercises over it the same author- 
 ity as a company commander, and keeps the same 
 records. Returns, reports, and other business are 
 transacted as in company, except that the detach- 
 ment commander reports directly to and receives 
 orders directly from Division Headquarters. The 
 detachment is not subject to ordinary guard or 
 fatigue. When used as part of a guard, whole 
 detachments go with their pieces. 
 
26 TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 "Instruction: 
 
 "The organization is purely experimental ; hence 
 the greatest possible latitude must be allowed the 
 detachment commander, and he should be held 
 accountable for the results. He should not be 
 subjected to the orders or interference of any sub- 
 ordinates, however able, who have made no spe- 
 cial study of the tactical use or instruction for 
 machine guns, and who may not have faith in the 
 experiment. It will be useless to expect efficiency 
 of the proposed organization unless this liberty 
 be accorded its organizer. The field is a new one, 
 not yet well discussed by even the text-writers. 
 Organization and instruction must be largely ex- 
 perimental, subject to change as the result of 
 experience; but no change from the plans of the 
 organizer should be made except for good and 
 sufficient reasons. 
 ^^Tactical Employment: 
 
 "This organization is expected to develop: 
 "(a) The fire-action of good infantry. 
 "(&) The mobility of cavalry. 
 
 "Its qualities, therefore, must be rapidity and 
 accuracy, both of fire and movement. 
 
 "Its employment on the defensive is obvious. 
 On the offensive it is expected to be useful with 
 
TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 27 
 
 advance guards, rear guards, outposts, raids, and 
 in battle. The last use, novel as it is, will be most 
 important of all. Tlie flanks of tlie division cau 
 be secured by this organization, relieving reserves 
 of this duty; it will give a stiffening to the line of 
 support, and at every opportune occasion will 
 be pushed into action on the firing line. The moral 
 effect of its presence will be very great; it will be 
 able to render valuable assistance by its fire (over 
 the charging line) in many cases. Last, but very 
 important, the occupation of a captured line by 
 this organization at once will supply a powerful, 
 concentrated, and controlled fire, either to repulse 
 a counter-charge or to fire on a discomfited, re- 
 tiring enemy. Being a horsed organization, it can 
 arrive at the critical point at the vital moment 
 when, the defender's first line having been thrust 
 out, our line being disorganized, a counter-charge 
 by the enemy would be most effective, or con- 
 trolled fire by our own troops on him would be 
 most useful. 
 
 "It is urged that this last use of machine guns is 
 one of the most important functions, and one 
 which has been overlooked by writers and tac- 
 ticians. 
 
 "There is one vital limitation upon the proposed 
 
28 THE GATLING GVXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 organization; viz., it must not be pitted against 
 artillery. 
 
 "It is urgently suggested that this organization 
 can be perfected here and now without difficulty, 
 while it will be very difficult to perfect after the 
 forward movement has begun. Horses and har- 
 ness can be easily procured at Tampa; there will 
 be no difficulty if some energetic officer be author- 
 ized to proceed with the work, and directed to 
 attend to the details. 
 
 "Believing earnestly in the utility of the pro- 
 posed organization, which will convert useless im- 
 pedimenta into a fourth arm, and realizing the 
 dangerous nature of the proposed service, I re- 
 spectfully offer my services to carry these plans 
 into effect. John H. Parker, 
 
 "2d Lieut. 13th Infty." 
 
 With this plan well digested and with many a 
 plausible argument in its favor all thought out, 
 Col. Arthur McArthur, assistant adjutant-gen- 
 eral to Gen. Wade, who was at that moment in 
 command, was approached. 
 
 Col. McArthur was a very busy man. He was 
 also a very business-like man, and one of hand- 
 some appearance, easy access, and pleasant ad- 
 dress. He sandwiched in a fifteen-minute inter- 
 
M 
 
 w 
 r 
 o 
 
 w 
 > 
 
 M 
 
THE OATLiyO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 29 
 
 view between two pressing engagements, and 
 manifested both interest and approval. But noth- 
 ing could be done at that time. ''Come again a 
 week from to-day," said he, "and I will try to ob- 
 tain you a hearing before one who can do what 
 you wish by a single word. I believe in your 
 scheme and will help you if I can." The week 
 rolled by and a change of commanding generals 
 occurred. Gen. Wade was ordered away, taking 
 McArthur with him, and no progress had been 
 made. It was discouraging. 
 
 The next step in the plan was by lucky accident. 
 Lieutenant (now Lieut.-Col.) John T. Thompson, 
 Ordnance Department, who was in charge of the 
 Ordnance D^pot at Tampa, accidentally met the 
 would-be machine-gun man, and was promptly but- 
 tonholed over a dish of ice cream. Thompson was 
 himself a young man and a student. His depart- 
 ment placed an insuperable obstacle in the way 
 of himself carrying out a plan which he, also, 
 had conceived, and he was keen to see the 
 idea, which he fully believed in, demonstrated 
 on the battle-field. He had, moreover, as ord- 
 nance officer, just received an invoice of fifteen 
 Gatling guns, complete, of the latest model, and he 
 had access to the commanding general by virtue 
 
30 THE GITLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 of being a member of his staff. By reason of the 
 terrible rush of overwork, he needed an assistant, 
 and it seemed practicable to try to kill two birds 
 with one stone. But all he said was, "I believe in 
 the idea; I have long advocated it. It may be pos- 
 sible for me to get you your opportunity, and it 
 may not. If so, you will hear from the matter." 
 
 The attempt to get the thing going had been 
 apparently abandoned, when, utterly without 
 notice, the regimental commander received or- 
 ders per letter, from Headquarters Fifth Army 
 Corps, which resulted in the following orders: 
 
 ''Headquarters 13th Infantry, in the Field, 
 
 ''Tampa, Fla., May 27, 1898. 
 ''Special Orders No. 22: 
 
 "Pursuant to instructions contained in letter 
 fiom Headquarters 5th Army Corps, May 26, 
 1898, 
 
 2d Lieut. John H. Parker 1.3th Infantry, 
 
 Sergeant Alois Weischaar Company A, 
 
 Sergeant William Ryder Company G, 
 
 Pi-ivate Lewis Kastner Company A, 
 
 Private Joe Seman Company B, 
 
 Private Abram Greenberg Company C, 
 
 Private Joseph Hoft Company D, 
 
 Private O'Connor L. -lones Company D, 
 
THE OATLING 0UN8 AT SANTIAGO. 31 
 
 Private Louis Misiak Company E, 
 
 Trivate George C. Murray Company F, 
 
 Private John Bremer Company G. 
 
 Private Fred H. Chase Company H. 
 
 Private Martin Pyne Company H, 
 
 will report to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, ordnance 
 officer, for duty in connection with the Gatling 
 Gun Battery. 
 
 "These men will be fully equipped, with the ex- 
 ception of rifle, bayonet, scabbard, and blanket- 
 bag, and will be rationed to include May 31, 1898. 
 "By order of Colonel Smith. 
 
 "Jf. McFarland, 
 "1st Lieut. 13th Infty., Adjutant." 
 These men were selected by their company 
 commanders. It is not known whether the selec- 
 tions were made with a view to special fitness or 
 not. They had no notice that the detail was to 
 be anything but a transient character; in fact, 
 one company commander actually detailed the 
 cook of his private mess, and was intensely dis- 
 gusted when he found that the detail was to be 
 permanent or semi-permanent. The men were 
 sent fully armed and equipped; carrying rifles, 
 knapsacks, etc., and marched down to the Ord- 
 nance D^pot for instructions. These instructions 
 
32 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 were to return to camp, turn in their rifles, bay- 
 onets, cartridges, belts, and knapsacks, and return 
 early the following morning equipped with blank- 
 et-roll complete, haversack, and canteen. Each 
 man, after full explanation of the hazardous duty, 
 was given a chance to withdraw, but all volun- 
 teered to stay. 
 
 The instructions were obeyed, and the Gatling 
 Gun Detachment was born — a pigmy. 
 
THE QATLIXG QUXS AT SAXTIAGO. 33 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 The Ordnance Depot. 
 
 The Ordnance D^pot at Tampa was located on 
 Lafayette Street, at the end of the bridge over the 
 river, next to the Tampa Bay Hotel, The river 
 washed the sides of the building, which was occu- 
 pied by the Tampa Athletic Club, and had for- 
 merly been used as a club-house. There were two 
 stories and a basement. The basement was near- 
 ly on a level with the river, the main floor on a 
 level with the bridge, and there was also a spa- 
 cious upper floor. The main floor was used for 
 storage of light articles of ordnance; the base- 
 ment for heavy articles and ammunition. Hun- 
 dreds of thousands of rounds of rifle and revolver 
 ball cartridges, thousands of rounds of Hotch- 
 kiss fixed ammunition, and many hundreds of 
 pounds of powder charges for field artillery and 
 mortars were here stored. Miscellaneous assort- 
 ments were daily coming in, generally without 
 any mark on the box by which to learn what were 
 the contents. The name of the arsenal, if from 
 
34 THE OATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 an arsenal, was usually stamped ou the seal; gen- 
 erally there was no mark whatever to designate 
 the origin or contents of the many boxes which 
 came from ordinary posts. The invoices came 
 from a week to ten days behind or in advance of 
 the arrival of the boxes, and there was not the 
 slightest clue to be gained from them. Conse- 
 quently those who had to check up invoices and 
 prepare for issues were at their wits' end to keep 
 things straight. A requisition for so many articles 
 would come in, duly approved; unless the boxes 
 containing these articles happened to have been 
 unpacked, it was uncertain whether they were on 
 hand or not. No wholesale merchant of any sense 
 would ship out boxes of goods without some in- 
 dication of their contents; but that was exactly 
 what was done from all over the country to the 
 Ordnance D^pot at Tampa. 
 
 The upper floor consisted of one large room. A 
 rope railing was placed around it to preserve clear 
 space arouud the desks. There were several of 
 these for the ordnance officer and the various 
 clerks. A chief clerk, an assistant clerk, a ste- 
 nographer, and two ordnance sergeants looked 
 after the red tape. An overseer with four subordi- 
 nates and a gang of negro stevedores attended to 
 
TEE QATLISO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 35 
 
 loadinjij and unloading boxes, storing them, count- 
 ing out articles for issue or receipt, and such other 
 duties as thev were called on to perform. There 
 was an old janitor named McGee, a veteran of the 
 Civil War, whose business it was to look after the 
 sweeping and keep the floors clean. 
 
 Four guns in their original boxes were issued 
 to the detachment on the 27th of May. They were 
 new. and apparently had never been assembled. 
 On assembling them it was found that the parts 
 had been constructed with such '"scientific" ac- 
 curacy that the use of a mallet was necessary. 
 The binder-box on the pointing lever was so tight 
 that in attempting to depress the muzzle of the 
 gun it was possible to lift the trail oli the ground 
 before the binder-box would slide on the lever. 
 The axis-pin had to be driven in and out with an 
 axe, using a block of wood, of course, to prevent 
 battering. A truly pretty state of affairs for a 
 gun the value of which depends on the ease with 
 which it can be pointed in any direction. 
 
 Inquiry after the war at the factory where the 
 guns are made disclosed the fact that these parts 
 are rigidly tested by a gauge by the Government 
 inspectors, and that looseness is regarded as a 
 fatal defect. Even play of half a hundredth of an 
 
36 THE OATLING GUNS AT SA^'TIAGO. 
 
 inch is enough to insure the rejection of a piece. 
 The very first thing done by the Gatling Gun De- 
 tachment, upon assembling these guns, was to 
 obtain a set of armorers' tools and to file away 
 these parts by hand until the aim of the piece 
 could be changed by the touch of a feather. The 
 detachment was ordered to rely upon the friction 
 clutches for steadiness of aim, when necessary, 
 and not upon the tight fit of the parts. It was 
 ordered that there must be no doubt whatever of 
 easy, perfectly free manipulation at any and all 
 times, even if the pointing lever should become 
 rusted. This precaution proved on July 1st to 
 have been of great value. 
 
 The instruction of the detachment began imme- 
 diately, and consisted, at first, of unpacking, 
 mounting, dismounting, and repacking the guns. 
 The four guns were mounted and a drill held each 
 time in the loading and firing of the piece. This 
 system of instruction was continued until the de- 
 tachment was ordered on board ship on the 6th of 
 June. During this instruction members of the 
 detachment were designated by name to fall out, 
 and the remainder of the detachment required to 
 execute all the maneuvers of the piece as before. 
 In fact, this instruction was carried to such a 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 37 
 
 point that one man alone was required to load, 
 aim, and fire the gun at designated objects without 
 any assistance. 
 
 The drlachment at once assumed the position of 
 an independent command. It reported directly 
 to Ma j. -Gen. W. R. Shafter, commanding the 5th 
 Corps, in everything so far as its duties with Gat- 
 ling guns were concerned, was regarded as an in- 
 dependent command, kept its own records in the 
 same manner as a company, obtained cooking 
 utensils from the quartermaster and ran its own 
 mess, and furnished its own guard. This status, 
 that of a separate command, continued until the 
 detachment was finally disbanded at Montauk. 
 
 On the 27th of May the detachment commander 
 was summoned to Gen. Wheeler's headquarters 
 and there requested to explain to the general in 
 person his plans for organizing a Gatling gun de- 
 tachment. Gen. Wheeler had just assumed com- 
 mand of all the Cavalry belonging to the 5th Army 
 Corps. His headquarters, instead of being in a 
 suite of rooms in the palatial Tampa Bay Hotel, 
 where all the other general officers had their head- 
 quarters, were located about half a mile from the 
 hotel in a treeless pasture. The cavalry guidon 
 floating from a lance-head was the onlv indica- 
 
38 TEE GATLING GVXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 tion of headquarters, and the half-dozen "A" 
 tents in an irregular line gave no sign that one of 
 the most distinguished generals in the world had 
 here his headquarters in the field. 
 
 The general was easily accessible. The first 
 thing that impressed one of him was his extra- 
 ordinary quickness. His eye seemed to take in 
 everything within sight of him at a single glance, 
 and to read one's thoughts before the tongue could 
 give expression to them. He grasped ideas when 
 they were only half uttered and immediately drew 
 deductions from mere statements of simple facts, 
 the result of years of careful study. These deduc- 
 tions, which Gen. Wheeler drew instantly, were in 
 every case correct, and showed a keener and more 
 correct appreciation of the proper tactical employ- 
 ment of machine guns than was shown by any 
 other officer of the 5th Corps. The result of the 
 interview with the general was that a scheme for 
 the organization of a tactical unit to be composed 
 of three Gatling guns and to be employed with 
 the cavalry division, was drawn up on the spot, 
 under Gen. Wheeler's personal direction, and was 
 submitted by him to Gen. Shaffer, with the request 
 that authority be granted for the organization of 
 this command for the purpose indicated. 
 
THE GATLIXG OCNS AT SAXTIAGO. 29 
 
 111 the application Gen. Wheeler stated that 
 he believed that such a battery of machine guns, 
 if properly handled, could go anywhere that cav- 
 alry could go, could take the place of infantry 
 supports, could dash up and hold any ground or 
 advantageous position that a body of cavalry 
 might seize, could be thrown out to one flank of 
 the enemy and assist in his demoralization in 
 preparation for the cavalry charge, and would be 
 of particular service in case the enemy attempted 
 to form infantry squares, which were at that time 
 supposed to be the main part of the Spanish tac- 
 tics of battle. This application was disapproved. 
 
 On the 30th of May, Gen, Lee sent for the de- 
 tachment commander for an interview on the 
 subject of Gatling guns. Gen. Lee w-as at this 
 time (quartered at the Tampa Bay Hotel, and was 
 engaged in the organization of the 7th Army 
 Corps. It was supposed that the 7th Corps was 
 designed for the Havana campaign, and it was 
 believed that the attack upon Havana would begin 
 at a very early date. The result of the interview 
 with Gen, Lee was that he directed a scheme for 
 the organization of a tactical unit to be composed 
 of 9 guns, 3 batteries of 3 guns each, to be pre- 
 pared for service with the 7th Army Corps. 
 
40 THE GATLING GUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 It was desired that this organization be a volun- 
 teer organization, and the application was there- 
 fore made for authority from the President, under 
 that law of Congress authorizing the employment 
 of special troops. Col. Guild, well and favora- 
 bly known from his connection with the Massa- 
 chusetts National Guard, was prepared to furnish 
 a volunteer organization already in existence, 
 well drilled and already oflQcered, composed of the 
 flower of the youth of Massachusetts, very largely 
 of college graduates, who had already been com- 
 municated with on the subject, and who were even 
 at that time expecting momentarily a telegram 
 calling them to this duty. Nothing resulted from 
 this effort. 
 
 Meantime the drill instruction of the little de- 
 tachment continued. Its members had acquired 
 a considerable degree of proficiency in the mechan- 
 ical handling of their guns, and were beginning to 
 appreciate the destructive possibilities of their 
 weapon. They were enjoying a degree of liberty 
 which they had not found in their regimental 
 camp, because when not on duty they were free 
 to come and go at will, when and where they 
 pleased. The hours for instruction were desig- 
 nated in the morning and in the cool of the after- 
 
THE GATLINO QUN& AT SANTIAGO. 41 
 
 noon, leaving the middle of the day and the eve- 
 ning for the men's own recreation. The resnlt of 
 this system of treatment was that esprit-du-corps 
 began to be developed in the detachment. They 
 began to feel that they were a special organization, 
 expected to do special work, and that they were 
 receiving very special treatment. They began to 
 be proud of being members of the Gatling Gun 
 Detachment, to take greater interest in the work, 
 and when on the first of June they received their 
 monthly pay not a single member of the detach- 
 ment committed any excesses in consequence of 
 this unusual degree of freedom. No one was 
 intoxicated. No one was absent without per- 
 mission. 
 
 The detachment had not been at the Ordnance 
 D^pot very long before an opportunity occurred 
 for some of its members to exhibit those qualities 
 which made the success of the battery so conspicu- 
 ous on the battle-field afterward. The detach- 
 ment commander had been detailed by verbal 
 orders on the first of June in charge of the issues 
 of ordnance property to the Santiago expedition. 
 This was in addition to his duties with the Gatling 
 guns. The work would commence about 
 o'clock in the morning, and from that time until 
 
42 THE GATLING GVN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 dark there was a continual stream of wagons car- 
 rying away stores such as rifles, haversacks, meat 
 ration cans, tin cups, and all the articles needed by 
 troops in the field during a campaign. The am- 
 munition which was issued to the troops at this 
 time was drawn at the same place. 
 
 When wagons arrived to receive issues, steve- 
 dores were directed to count out the different arti- 
 cles under the direction of an overseer, and these 
 piles of articles were verified by the officer in 
 charge of the issues. The stevedores then loaded 
 them on the wagons which were to haul them to 
 the different camps. Eeceipts in duplicate were 
 always taken and invoices in duplicate were al- 
 ways given, in the name, of course, of Lieut. John 
 T. Thompson, who was responsible for the stores. 
 
 On the 4th of June issues were being made of 
 rifle-ball cartridges. These cartridges came 
 packed in boxes of 1000 rounds each, and each box 
 weighed 78 pounds. A great quantity of it was 
 stored in the basement, where there was also a 
 considerable quantity of fixed Hotchkiss ammu- 
 nition, as well as several thousand rounds of 
 powder charges in boxes. The Hotchkiss ammu- 
 nition, which comes with projectile and powder 
 both set in a brass case, is bad ammunition to 
 
TEE OATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 43 
 
 pack; for, no matter how carefully it is handled, 
 there is almost always some leakage of powder 
 from the cartridge case, thus causing a certain 
 amount of loose powder to sift into the box in 
 which it is packed. 
 
 About half past 11 o'clock on this morning a 
 negro stevedore accidentally dropped a box of rifle 
 ammunition near a pile of Hotchkiss fixed, and the 
 next instant the laborers saw^ smoke ascending 
 toward the ceiling of the basement. They yelled 
 ''Fire! fire!'' at the top of their voices, and every- 
 body in the basement at once made a rush for the 
 two doors. It was a panic. The danger was 
 imminent. The smoke curled up to the ceiling 
 and then curled down again, and the excited, 
 panic-stricken faces of the negroes as they rushed 
 through the door made an awful picture of human 
 terror. People on the oustide of the building 
 began to shout *'Fire!" 
 
 At this juncture MeGee, the old janitor, who had 
 just reached the door, cried out, "Lieutenant, there 
 is a box in here on fire!" speaking to Lieut. Parker, 
 whowasverifying issues justoutside the door. The 
 lieutenant replied, "Let 's throw it into the river," 
 and dashed toward the box through the door, 
 pushing the excited negroes to each side in order 
 
44 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 to assist McGee, who had instantly started.for the 
 box. When Lieut. Parker reached the box, he 
 found that McGee had already taken it up, and 
 was staggering under its weight. He placed one 
 arm around McOee's shoulder and with the other 
 assisted him to support the box, from which the 
 smoke was still ascending, and the two rushed for 
 the door, throwing the whole momentum of their 
 weight and speed against the crowd of frightened 
 negroes, who were falling over each other in their 
 panic-stricken efforts to escape. Priv. Greenberg, 
 of the l.Sth Infantry, a member of the Gatling Gun 
 Detachment, who was the sentinel on post at the 
 time, saw the two men coming with the box, and 
 with great presence of mind added his own weight 
 with a rapid rush to the shock they had produced, 
 thus enabling them to break their way through 
 the dense throng at the door. It was only the 
 work of an instant to then throw the box in the 
 river, where it sank in the water and for a moment 
 the blue smoke continued to bubble up from the 
 box, which lay clearly visible on the bed of the 
 river, the water being only about two feet deep at 
 this point, which was, however, enough to entirely 
 cover the box and thus extinguish the fire. 
 
 At the outcry of 'Tire!" Lieut. H. L. Kinnison, 
 
THE OAT LINO OUNS AT SANTIAGO. 45 
 
 of the 25th Infantry, who was waiting outside of 
 the basement with a wagon, started in at the other 
 door, and Serg. Weischaar, acting first sergeant 
 of the Gatling Gun Detachment, started for water. 
 Just as the two men emerged from the door carry- 
 ing the box, Lieut. Kinnison reached the spot 
 where the fire had originated, and Serg. Weis- 
 chaar appeared with two buckets of water. He 
 and Lieut. Kinnison at once flooded the floor, 
 seized a woolen cloth which happened to be near, 
 and wetted down the boxes of Hotchkiss ammuni- 
 tion as a measure of precaution. 
 
 McGee, the hero of this episode, is an old vet- 
 eran of the Civil War, having served three years 
 in the Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry during 
 the war, and five years in the Regular Army after 
 the war. He has never drawn a pension nor ap- 
 plied for one, although he suffers considerably 
 from disease and wounds contracted and received 
 during the war, and certainly should be rewarded 
 by a grateful government for his conspicuous 
 heroism. The explosion of this magazine would 
 have brought the whole expedition to a standstill, 
 besides inflicting tremendous destruction of prop- 
 erty and frightful loss of life. 
 
 The same day the Artillery of the army began to 
 
46 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT S AX T I AGO. 
 
 draw its material for the campaign, and for a 
 period of thirty-nine hours there was no rest for 
 anybody connected with the issue of ordnance 
 stores. It was at this time that the lack of intel- 
 ligent marking and packing of the boxes was 
 keenly felt. The greatest difficulty was experi- 
 enced in selecting, from the mass of stores in the 
 d^pot, the stores that were required by the Artil- 
 lery. It was especially difficult during the work 
 by night, when the only light that could possibly 
 be allowed was a single lantern, on account of the 
 danger of fire. 
 
 At the close of this thirty-nine hours of arduous 
 duty, the officer in command of the Gatling Gun 
 Detachment learned that orders had been issued 
 for the embarkation of the 5th Army Corps at 
 Port Tampa, and that no reference had been made 
 to the Gatling Gun Detachment in these orders. 
 He at once sought Lieut. Thompson, who could 
 offer no light on the omission, but said, "I have 
 orders to send at once to the Cherokee 521,000 
 rounds of rifle-ball cartridges and all the revolver 
 ammunition on hand. This is the reserve ammu- 
 nition of the 5th Army Corps. I will send you in 
 charge of this ammunition and you will see it to its 
 destination. You mav take an escort or not. as 
 
THE GATLIXG OUXS AT SANTIAGO. 47 
 
 you i»l('aso. The aimiuinition is to go on the 4 
 o'clock train and you must make all the arrange- 
 ments in regard to it. Get box-cars, haul the 
 ammunition over there and put it in the cars, see 
 that it goes on that train, and as soon as it arrives 
 at Port Tampa, see that it is properly put on board 
 the Cherol-ce:^ 
 
 In order to fully understand the situation of the 
 Gatling Gun Detachment at this juncture, the 
 following correspondence on the subject is 
 necessary: 
 
 "Office of Ordnance Officer, 
 ''Lafayette Street, West of Bridge, 
 
 ''Tampa, Fla., June 3, 1898. 
 "TAe Assistant Adjutant -General, 5th Army Corps, 
 
 Tampa, Florida: 
 
 "Sir, — Replying to yonv letter of June 1, 1898, in 
 reference to Gatling Gun Detachment, I have the 
 honor to submit the following report: 
 Guns, men, and equipment required for a 1-gun 
 
 detachment: 
 
 Guns. Serg. Corp. Priv. 
 
 Total required: 4 5 4 28 
 
 Ou hand: 4 2 10 
 
 Required: 3 4 18 
 
 The gun crews thus organized will give most 
 effective service for the detachment. 
 
48 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 AmmnnitioD: Each limber carries 9,840 rounds 
 cal. .80. Four limbers, 27,360; nec- 
 essary reserve, 32,640; total, 60,000. 
 Tentage: Two conical wall-tents for enlisted 
 men; one 'A' wall-tent for officer. 
 Camp equipage, in addition to that on hand in 
 Gatling Gun Detachment: one buz- 
 zacot, small; four mess-pans, one 
 dish-pan, one coffee-mill. 
 Blanket-roll complete; revolver with 50 rounds 
 per man; w^aist-belts and entrench- 
 ing-knives. 
 "It is recommeneded that Priv. Butz, 'G' Co., 
 13th Infantry, Corp. Robert S. Smith, 'G' Co., 
 13th Infantry, and Serg. Weigle, 9th Infantry, be 
 members of the detachment; and that detachment 
 be taken from 9th Infantry, w^hich has some well- 
 instructed men. 
 
 "It is further recommended that the detachment 
 be fully horsed as soon as practicable, and that 
 the whole be placed under the command of Lieut. 
 John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, as acting captain. 
 
 "I recommend that I be authorized to issue the 
 4 Gatling guns and parts to him. 
 
 "The details should carry the rations prescribed 
 
THE GAT LING OUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 49 
 
 in General Orders oth, May 31, 1898, 5th Army 
 Corps. Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) ^'Jno. T. Thompson, 
 
 "1st Lieut.. Ord. Dept., U. S. A." 
 This letter, prepared by Lieut. Parker and signed 
 by Lieut. Thompson, was endorsed as follows: 
 
 First Endorsement. 
 "Headquarters oth Army Corps, 
 
 "Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. 
 "Kespectfully returned to Lieut. J. T. Thompson, 
 Ordnance OflScer. 
 
 "If Lieut. Parker, in charge of the detachment 
 as at present constituted, can make the arrange- 
 ments suggested within, he may take action; but, 
 in view of the limited time remaining, it is thought 
 the detachment already organized will answer. 
 "By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 
 
 "./?. J. McClernand, 
 "Assistant Adjutant-General." 
 
 Second Endnrsement. 
 "Office of the Ordnance Officer, 
 
 "Lafayette Street Bridge, 
 "Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898. 
 "Respectfully referred to Lieut. John H. Parker 
 for his information. Jno. T. Thompson, 
 
 "1st Lieut., Ordnance Dept., U. S. A." 
 
50 TEE GATLING GUKS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 It will be seen from the first endorsement that 
 a certain amount of discretion was left to the 
 detachment commander. He was authorized to 
 take action if he could make the arrangements 
 suggested within. Lieut. Thompson had author- 
 ized an escort for the reserve ammunition, if it 
 was considered necessary. The detachment com- 
 mander resolved to take action by using his whole 
 detachment as an escort, putting it on board the 
 Cherokee, with the reserve ammunition, and ac- 
 companying it to its destination — in Cuba, trust- 
 ing to the future to enable him to complete the 
 detachment according to the first endorsement. 
 
 It was now 11 o'clock in the forenoon. Between 
 that time and 4 o'clock it was necessary to obtain 
 two freight cars, have them placed upon the sid- 
 ing at a convenient point, have more than twenty 
 wagon-loads of ammunition, camp equipage, etc., 
 placed in these cars, have the four guns with their 
 limbers placed on board, and, more difficult than 
 all the rest, go through the necessary red tape at 
 the quar-termaster's ofiice in order to get the 
 two cars moved to Port Tampa. It was all 
 accomplished. 
 
 The general freight agent was bluffed into be- 
 lieving that unless the two cars were instantlv set 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 51 
 
 w hero they were wanted his whole railroad would 
 be tied up. The quartermaster was hypnotized 
 and dropped formality, putting all the clerks to 
 work upon papers and making out the necessary 
 bill of lading, invoices, etc., in time to catch the 
 4 o'clock train. He also issued the necessary 
 transportation for the officer and men of the de- 
 tachment from Tampa to Port Tampa, accepting 
 the first endorsement above as sufficient orders 
 for that purpose. 
 
 One member of the detachment, Priv. Murray, 
 had been very ill with what we afterward learned 
 to call the Cuban fever, and, while apparently con- 
 valescent, was entirely too weak to accompany 
 the detachment. He was a splendid fellow^, and 
 the tears rolled down his emaciated face when he 
 was told he must remain behind. He was fur- 
 nished Viith a descriptive list and a letter was writ- 
 ten to the chief surgeon of the Division Hospital, 
 requesting him to send an ambulance immediately 
 for the sick man. One member of the detachment 
 carried this letter to Tampa Heights, and so sharp 
 was the work of getting away that this man had 
 to board a moving train as it was pulling out to 
 keep from getting left; but Priv. Murray was 
 
52 THE GATLING GU^^S AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 taken to the hospital and eared for, and Priv. 
 Bremer did not get left. 
 
 The detachment reached Port Tampa about sun- 
 down, and Maj. Cushing, who had charge of the 
 loading of the transports, at once authorized the 
 cars to be set alongside the Cherokee. The am- 
 munition, guns, camp equipage, men, and all were 
 promptly put aboard. The training in packing 
 and unpacking the guns was the only thing which 
 enabled the work to be done in the limited time 
 allotted. Not so much as a ten-penny nail be- 
 longing to the detachment was left behind. 
 
 During the night the troops that were to occupy 
 the Cherol-ee came on board, and it was found the 
 next morning that five or six tons of regimental 
 baggage had been piled on top of the guns, mak- 
 ing it practically impossible to disembark, even if 
 such a movement should be ordered. 
 
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THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 53 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Voyage and DiseinbarkaUon. 
 
 It seemed that the work had been accomplished 
 none too soon, for on the morning of June 7th 
 orders came to the Cherokee to leave the slip and 
 l»roceed down the bay. There were on board at 
 this time, beside the little Gatling Gun Detach- 
 ment, the 17th Infantry, under command of Col. 
 Haskell, and a battalion of the 12th Infantry, un- 
 der command of Col. Comba, who was the senior 
 officer on board. The ship was frightfully 
 crowded. The berth deck and lower deck had 
 been arranged for the accommodation of the men 
 by nailing rows of two 2x4 scantlings just far 
 enough apart to leave room for a man to lie down, 
 and fastening three tiers of bunks to these scant- 
 lings. The men were packed in these bunks like 
 sardines in a box. The ventilation was conspicu- 
 ous by its absence, the heat below deck was fright- 
 ful and the misery entailed by such accommoda- 
 tions was beyond description. But the men were 
 very cheerful, and. being allowed the privilege of 
 
54 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 the upper deck, very little in the way of com- 
 plaint was heard. Everybody was anxious to be 
 off. The hope most frequently expressed was for 
 a quick passage and a sharp, swift campaign. 
 It was easily foreseen by the oflflcers on board the 
 ship that a long sojourn on shipboard under such 
 conditions would have a very bad effect on the 
 men. 
 
 The ship dropped down the bay to the quaran- 
 tine station, starting about noon, and there lay to, 
 waiting, as was supposed, for the remainder of 
 the fleet. Suddenly, about 8 p. m.. one of the tor- 
 pedo cruisers came tearing down the bay under 
 full steam, and we heard the message sounded 
 through the megaphone: ''Return to port. Three 
 Spanish cruisers within three hours' sail of the 
 offing." It was a thrilling moment. Officers and 
 men were lounging, taking, as they supposed, 
 their last view of the American shores, without 
 a suspicion of present danger, when they were 
 rapidly brought to a realizing sense that ''war 
 is hell," by a notice that the enemy was upon 
 them. Whether they were in danger or not, the 
 danger was deadly real and imminent to them at 
 the time. 
 
 The Cherokee had been anchored pretty well 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 55 
 
 inside. She immediately- ^ot up steam and went 
 out to warn other vessels fartlicr out in the ofling, 
 and then made safely for the harbor. Officers and 
 men behaved with perfect coolness. It was hope- 
 less to attempt to escape by concealment, so Col. 
 Comba ordered out the band of the 17th Infantry 
 and the good ship fled up the bay, in momentary 
 expectation of a smashing shot from the enemy, 
 to the strains of "There '11 be a hot time." What 
 little excitement there was displayed itself in a 
 feverish searching of the bay with field-glasses for 
 signs of the enemy. The older officers, upon 
 whom the responsibility was resting, sat upon the 
 quarter-deck, smoking their pipes and discussing 
 the situation. The captains quietly moved about, 
 assigning stations to their companies, in case of 
 attack, with the view of trying the effect of the 
 modem rifle upon the armored sides of a Spanish 
 man-of-war, and two of the younger officers took 
 advantage of the catchy air which the band was 
 playing to dance a two-step on the quarter-deck. 
 So the evening wore away. The moon went down. 
 The myriad little stars came out, twinkling in the 
 deep blue sky, and at last both officers and men, 
 tired of looking for an enemy who was never to 
 appear, turned in for such sleep as they could 
 
58 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 get, leaving a small guard on deck to keep a look- 
 out. When tliey awoke next morning, the ship 
 was in the deepest part of the nearest slip, moored 
 fast by her guy-ropes to the dock. Thus ended 
 the first engagement with the enemy. 
 
 From the 8th until the 13th, the Cherol-ee lay at 
 anchor in the slip. She w\^s relieved on the 10th 
 of about 200 men, thus slightly lightening her 
 overcrowded condition. In the meantime, this 
 overcrowded condition of the ship had led to 
 some discussion as to who could best be moved on 
 board some other ship, with some prospect that 
 the Gatling Gun Detachment might be disturbed. 
 The situation was not at all satisfactory. With 
 four guns, no mules, no harness, no authority, and 
 only twelve men, the Gatling Gun Detachment did 
 not appear to be in a very fair w^ay toward inflict- 
 ing much damage upon the enemy. So on the 11th 
 of June the detachment commander visited Gen. 
 Shatter at his headquarters, determined to bring 
 the matter to an issue, definitely, one way or the 
 other. This was the first time he had met the 
 general, and, under the circumstances, the manner 
 of his reception appeared to be doubtful. 
 
 Gen. Shatter is a big man. This is not noticed 
 at first glance. He is above the average height. 
 
THE GATLIXO OUXS AT l?AXTIAOO. 57 
 
 but his corpulent figure does not indicate that 
 he is full five feet nine inches in height, because 
 his girth is of like proportion. His hands are big; 
 his arm is big; his head is big. The occiput is 
 especially full, and the width of head just over the 
 ears is noticeable. There is plenty of room for 
 the organs of combativeness. One would think 
 he is probably a lover of children ; during this in- 
 terview he patted the head of an inquisitive dog, 
 which evidently belonged somewhere on board the 
 flag-ship, and which strayed into the room. His 
 eyes are big, very full and very keen. As you 
 enter he says curtly, "Take a seat." He waits, 
 looking down, for you to state your business, then 
 suddenly fixes you with a i)iercir.g glance, and 
 goes to the heart of the subject by one incisive sen- 
 tence, which leaves no more to be said. This 
 description is a general type of several interviews 
 with him. On this occasion the general inquired 
 concerning the facts, looking keenly, searchingly, 
 and meditatively at the detachment commander. 
 The machine gun man was "on trial." Then the 
 general broke the silence by one short question. 
 "What do you want?" and the reply was in kind, 
 "Twenty men. general, with the privilege of 
 selecting them." The general suggested the ad- 
 
58 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 yisability of taking a complete organization; to 
 which was replied, ''That at this late hour in the 
 expedition it is imperative to have selected men 
 in order to perform the required duty; that men 
 taken at random, as would be the case in a com- 
 plete organization such as a company, would not 
 be likely to have the required characteristics." 
 The general tersely remarked, "You may have 
 them. Make out your list, name any man in the 
 corps that you want, and hand the list to me. I 
 will send the men to yon." The trial was over, 
 and the Machine Gun Detachment was a settled 
 fact. 
 
 Accordingly on the following day Special Or- 
 ders No. IG were issued, as follows: 
 Extract. 
 "Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 
 
 "On Board S. S. Seguranga, 
 "Tampa Bay, Fla., June 11, 1898. 
 "Special Orders, No. IG: 
 
 ************ 
 "4. The following named enlisted men are de- 
 tailed for duty with the Gatling Gun Detachment, 
 5th Army Corps, and will report at once to 2d 
 Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, command- 
 ing the detachment for duty: 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 59 
 
 "9th Infantry: Sergeant Weigle. 
 
 "12th Infantry: Privates Voelker, Company A; 
 Anderson, Lauer, and Timberly, Company C; 
 Prazak, Company E. 
 
 ''13th Infantry: Sergeant Green, Company H; 
 Corporals Stiegerwald, Company A; Doyle, Smith, 
 and Rose, Company C ; Privates Corey and Power, 
 Company A; Parts, Company E; and Schmadt, 
 Company G. 
 
 ''17th Infantry: Privates Merryman and Schulze, 
 Company A; McDonald, Company B; Elkins, Del- 
 lett, and !McGoin, Company D; Click, Needle, Shif- 
 fer, and Sine, Company E. 
 
 "Each of the soldiers will report equipped as 
 follows: Blanket-roll comjilete, haversack and 
 contents, canteen, waist-belt of leather, hunting- 
 knife, and revolver, and they will bo rationed with 
 ten days' travel rations. Descriptive lists of these 
 men will be sent to the commanding officer of the 
 
 detachment. 
 
 ♦ ♦*#♦*»***** 
 
 "By command of Ma j. -Gen. Shafter. 
 
 "Official. J. D. MiUy, E. J. McClernand, 
 
 "Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen." 
 
60 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 "Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 
 
 "Ou Board S. S. Seguranga, 
 "Tanipa Bay, June 11, 1898. 
 
 "Special Orders, No. 16: 
 
 Extract. 
 
 "5. 2d Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, 
 commanding the Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th 
 Army Corps, is authorized to make the usual 
 requisitions for supplies. 
 
 "By command of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 
 
 "Official. J. D. Miley, E. J. McClernand, 
 
 "Aide. Asst. Adj.-Gen." 
 
 The organization was thus perfected by a single 
 stroke of the general's pen on the 11th of June, 
 theoretically; practically it was the 14th of June 
 before the details from the 12th and 17th Infantry 
 reported, and when they did, instead of being 
 equipped as directed, they carried rifles with 100 
 rounds of ammunition. 
 
 Serg. Weigle, of the 9th Infantry, w^ho reported 
 at the same time, carried a revolver. On the 14th 
 a wigwag message was received from the 13th 
 Infantry, inquiring whether the detail was desired 
 to report at once or not, to which the reply was 
 
THE GATLIXO GUyS AT SANTIAGO. 61 
 
 sent tliat it was desired to report at the earliest 
 possible moment. It did not report. 
 
 The detachment was at once organized as well 
 as possible for the trip on board the transport, and 
 the guns brought up from the hold of the ship and 
 mounted in such a way that they would be ready 
 for instant use. It was not known but that the 
 detachment might have to participate in a naval 
 engagement, and the value of machine guns in 
 the navy has long been demonstrated. At any 
 rate, it was determined to be ready to give a warm 
 reception to any torpedo vessel which might at- 
 tempt to attack the Cherokee. One object of get- 
 ting the guns up was to give instruction to the 
 new men who reported on the 14th. Sergt. Wei- 
 gle was well instructed in the use of Gatling guns, 
 but none of the other members of the detachment 
 had ever received any instruction, and had been 
 selected rather on the ground of their superior 
 intelligence and courage than on any special 
 knowledge of machine guns. They were given a 
 drill each day in loading and firing the piece, dur- 
 ing the time they remained on board the transport, 
 when the weather permitted. 
 
 The condition of the troops on board the trans 
 port was miserable. The following extract from 
 
62 THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 a letter written at that time will convey some idea 
 of the crowded, ill-ventilated condition of the 
 vessel : 
 
 "We have now been on board the transport 
 a week, and are getting into a frame of mind 
 suitable for desperate work. If you can imagine 
 1000 men crowded into space needed for 500, and 
 then kept there without room to stand or move 
 or sit for seven days, under a tropical sun, in foul 
 holds utterly without ventilation (just imagine 
 it!), endured without a single murmur or com- 
 plaint, not stoically, but patiently and intelligent- 
 ly, while every officer on board is kicking as hard 
 and as often as possible for the relief of his men, 
 then you will have some idea of the situation. The 
 men are very patient, but they know someone has 
 blundered. Talk about the heroism of the Light 
 Brigade! It is nothing to the heroism that goes 
 cheerfully and uncomplainingly into the Black 
 Hole of Calcutta (there is nothing else that will' 
 compare with these transports), all because it is 
 duty. When will the people appreciate the hero- 
 ism of the Regular Army?" 
 
 This was the actual condition of affairs on 
 board the Clierokee up to the time of leaving port 
 on the 14th of June, and it was modified only by 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 63 
 
 the hoisting of wind-sails, aftir wc got under way. 
 These were not very efficient and there were only 
 two of them, so very little relief was given to the 
 overcrowded berth-deck. Most of the men spent 
 their time on the upper deck, and one whole com- 
 pany was quartered there. At night, after 8 
 o'clock, Col. Comba authorized the men to sleep 
 on deck, and there was always a rush, when the 
 ship's bell struck the hour, for ^ood places on the 
 quarter-deck. The only thing that made the voy- 
 age endurable was the good w^eather which pre- 
 vailed. This prevented seasickness, to a certain 
 extent. 
 
 The squadron reached Santiago de Cuba, and 
 after tacking about for several days, either for 
 the purpose of deceiving the enemy, or of waiting 
 a decision as to the landing-place, finally ap- 
 proached Baiquiri, which had been selected for the 
 landing. The troops on the Cherol-ee began to 
 land on the 23d of June, the battalion of the 12th 
 Infantry going first. This was followed by the 
 17th Infantry, and upon its departure the captain 
 of the Clierol-ee put to sea. The reason for this 
 maneuver is not known. The orders issued by 
 Gen. Shafter in regard to the landing were that 
 the Catling Gun Detachment should accompany 
 
64 THE GATLING GVXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Gen. Lawton's Division. This movement of the 
 Cherokee completely blocked the landing of the 
 Gatling guns. The ship's captain was finally 
 induced to put back into the bay and speak to the 
 Segvranca, and Gen. Shatter directed that the 
 detachment should be taken off the next morning. 
 
 An effort was made, therefore, to obtain the use 
 of a lighter which was not at that time in use, but 
 the Commissary Department refused to yield the 
 boat, and it remained until 11 o'clock the next 
 morning tied up to the wharf with half a load of 
 commissaries on board before it became available, 
 and then was seized by the Quartermaster's De- 
 partment. An effort was then made to obtain 
 the use of three pontoons, belonging to the Engin- 
 eer Department, which had been drawn up to the 
 shore and were of no use to anybody. The young 
 engineer officer in charge of these boats, a pre- 
 mature graduate of the class of '98, was ''afraid 
 the boats might get smashed in the surf," and 
 could not consent without seeing Col. Derby. Col. 
 Derby could not be found. 
 
 A wigwag came from Gen. Shaffer, asking 
 whether the Gatling guns had been landed. The 
 reply, "No; may I use pontoons?" was answered 
 at once, "Use pontoons, and get oft' immediately.'^ 
 
THE OATLING GUXS AT SAXTIAGO. 65 
 
 On returuiiig to shore with a party to work the pon- 
 toons, the party was stopped in the act of launch- 
 ing the first boat by Gen. Sumner, and ordered 
 to proceed to the Cherokee, take her out into the 
 olTHug. and order another to take her phice to un- 
 kiad. Protesting against this action, and inform- 
 ing Gen. Sumner of the urgent orders for the Gat- 
 ling guns to disembark at once, that olficer in- 
 (luired the opinion of the prematurely graduated 
 engineer as to the practicability of using the pon- 
 toons, and this experienced young man again ex- 
 pressed the fear that the boats might be injured in 
 the surf. To the detachment commander's indig- 
 nant exclamation, "What the h — were these boats 
 made for, if they are not to be used and smashed?" 
 Gen. Sumner responded by a peremptory order to 
 warp the Cherol-ee out from the pier and send the 
 other vessels in. The order was obeyed, and all 
 the circumstances reported to Gen. Shatter the 
 same cTening, with the expression of the opinion 
 that if the general wanted the Gatling guns land- 
 ed, he would have to attend to it personally, be- 
 cause the Gatling gun commander did not have 
 sufficient rank to accomplish it in the face of all 
 these obstacles. Early on the morning of June 
 25th. therefore. Gen. Shafter sent peremptory 
 
66 THE GATLING GUN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 orders to the lighter to lay alongside the Cherokee, 
 take the Catling guns and detachment on board, 
 and land them on the dock. The transfer began 
 at 8 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Shafter coming 
 out in person in his steam launch to see that his 
 order was executed. By 11 o'clock the guns, car- 
 riages, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, four sets of 
 double harness, and the detachment were on board 
 the lighter. This had been accomplished a mile 
 outside in the offing, with the vessel rolling and 
 pitching in the trough of the sea and on the crest 
 of the gigantic rollers in so violent a manner that 
 it was almost impossible for men to stand on their 
 feet, much less handle such heavy material as 
 guns and ammunition. The lighter was warped 
 to the pier at 11 o'clock, and the general tied his 
 steam launch alongside to see that it was not dis- 
 turbed until the debarkation was completed. At 
 1 o'clock everything was ashore, and, in compli- 
 ance with the general's instructions, the best 
 mules in the corral were taken, and as they were 
 led away from the corral-gate, a fat, sleek, black- 
 streaked, long-eared specimen, which had been 
 selected for a saddle-mule, set up a cheerful "Aw! 
 hee haw! haw!" which produced a burst of laugh- 
 ter and cheering from the members of the detach- 
 
THE OATLIXG OVNS AT SAXTIAGO. 67 
 
 rnent aud the soldiers iu the vicinity. It was a 
 cheerful omen. These Missouri mules were capa- 
 ble of pulling anj'thing loose at both ends, and 
 four experienced drivers had been selected from 
 the detachment who were capable of riding any- 
 thing that walked on four feet, or driving any- 
 thing from an Arab courser to a pair of Shetland 
 ponies. 
 
 Priv. J. Shiffer had been selected as corral boss 
 of the detachment. The most picturesque figure, 
 the most boyish member, and as brave a soldier as 
 ever shouldered a musket; broad of shoulder, 
 stout of limb, full of joke, as cheerful as a ray of 
 sunlight, tliis man was the incarnation of courage 
 and devotion. He loved a mule. He was proud 
 of the job. With the instinct of a true teamster, 
 he had snapped up the best pair of mules in the 
 whole corral aud was out before the detachment 
 commander had selected a single mule. This 
 team was as black as Shiffer's shoes and as strong 
 as a pair of elephants. They were worked harder 
 than any other team iu the Dth Army Corps, and 
 when they were turned in to the quartermaster in 
 August, they were as fat, as sleek, as strong, and 
 as hardy as on the day they were taken from 
 the corral in Baiquiri. The other three team- 
 
68 TEE GATLING GVNS AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 sters were like unto the first. They were all 
 handy men. They were as capable of fighting 
 or aiming a gun as of driving a team. Any 
 one of the four could take a team of mules up 
 a mountain-side or down a vertical precipice in 
 perfect safety. They could do the impossible with 
 a team of mules, and they had to do it before the 
 detachment reached the firing-line. The success 
 of the battery was to depend to a very large degree 
 upon the coolness, good judgment, and perfect 
 bravery of these four teamsters. 
 
 It should be noted that the use of mules was an 
 experiment. The "scientific'' branch of service 
 has always held that the proper animal to draw a 
 field-piece is the horse. They expatiate vrith great 
 delight upon the almost human intelligence and 
 sagacity of that noble animal; upon his courage 
 "when he snuffeth the battle afar," and upon the 
 undaunted spirit with which he rushes upon the 
 enemy, and assists his master to work the destruc- 
 tion of his foes. The Artillery claims that mules 
 are entirely too stubborn, too cowardly, and too 
 hard to manage for the purpose of their arm of 
 the service. It was also an experiment to use two 
 mules per gun. The Engineer Department had 
 reported that the road to the front was impassable 
 
> 
 < 
 > 
 
 n 
 
THE QATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 69 
 
 for wheeled vehicles, and even the general had 
 apparently thought that four mules per gun would 
 be necessary. The necessity of economizing 
 mules, and the opinion of the detachment com- 
 mander that two mules per gun would be suffi- 
 cient, had led to the issue of that number. Those 
 who despise the army mule for the purposes of 
 field artillery know very little of the capacity of 
 this equine product of Missouri when properly 
 handled. It was demonstrated that two mules 
 can pull a Gatling gun with 10,000 rounds of am- 
 munition, loaded down with rations and forage, 
 where eight horses are required to draw a field- 
 piece; and that mules are equally as easy to man- 
 age under fire as horses. 
 
 The landing was completed and the detachment 
 organized at 3 p. m., having rations, forage, and 
 ammunition complete. There was no tentage, 
 except the shelter-halves which some of the men 
 had brought with them. Capt. Henry Marcotte, 
 retired, the correspondent of the Army and Navy 
 Journal, requested permission to accompany the 
 detachment, which was granted, and soon all 
 were en route for the front, entrusted with the task 
 of opening the way for wheeled transportation 
 
70 THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and of demonstrating the practicability of the 
 road for army wagons and field artillery. 
 
 For the first mile the road was excellent. It lay 
 through one of the most fertile parts of the most 
 fertile island in the world. A little stream trick- 
 ling along the side of the road furnished plenty of 
 water for both men and animals. At the end of 
 the mile the detachment found a steep hill to 
 descend. The Ordnance Department, which do- 
 signed and built the carriage for the Gatling guns, 
 had never foreseen the necessity for a brake, and 
 it was therefore necessary to cut down bushes 
 from the roadside and fasten the rear wheels by 
 placing a stout pole between the spokes and over 
 the trail of the piece. This locked the wheels, 
 and the guns were thus enabled to slide down the 
 steep hill without danger of a runaway. From 
 this point the road became a narrow defile. The 
 rank jungle closed in upon the trail, the long 
 barbed leaves of the Spanish bayonet hung across 
 and lacerated the legs of the mules until the 
 blood trickled down to the hoofs; the boughs of 
 the trees hung down over it so that even the men 
 on foot had to stoop to pass under them, and the 
 tortuous path winding in and out amid the dense 
 tropical undergrowth made it impossible to see 
 
THE OATLINO OUNS AT SAXTIAGO. 71 
 
 iu places more thau twenty-five or thirty yards 
 ahead at a time. 
 
 The advance guard, consisting of all the mem- 
 bers of one gun crew, had been organized at once 
 upon starting, and this guard moved along the 
 road about two hundred and fifty yards in advance 
 of the detachment, scouting every path vigilantly 
 to the right and left, and keeping a constant, care- 
 ful lookout to the front. Their orders were, in 
 case of encountering the enemy, to scatter in the 
 underbrush, open fire with magazines, so as to pro- 
 duce the impression upon the enemy that there 
 was a large force, and then slowly fall back upon 
 the battery. The plan was, upon the first alarm, to 
 bring the two leading guns into battery upon the 
 road, with the fourth gun ready to be opened to 
 either flank, while the gun crew of the third gun, 
 which formed the advance guard, were to act as 
 infantry support to the battery. It was hoped 
 that the enemy would follow the advance guard 
 as it retreated, and it was believed that the Gat- 
 ling gun battery could take care of two or three 
 regiments of Spaniards without help if necessary. 
 
 This form for the march had been adopted as 
 the result of mature reflection. The general had 
 offered a cavalry escort of two troops, and Gen. 
 
72 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Sumner had rather urged the use of au escort, but 
 it was desired to demonstrate that a battery of 
 machine guns, properly manned and equipped, is 
 capable of independent action, and does not need 
 the assistance of either arm of the service. In 
 fact, the Gatling gun men would have been rather 
 pleased than not to have had a brush with the 
 enemy without the assistance of either infantry or 
 cavalry. But it was not to be. 
 
 The march was continued until darkness fell 
 over the landscape, and the battery arrived at a 
 beautiful camping-place about one mile east of 
 Siboney, where a break in the water-pipe near the 
 railroad track gave an ample supply of excellent 
 Avater, and a ruined plantation, now overgrown 
 with luxuriant sugar-cane, provided ample forage 
 for the mules. The two troops of cavalry, which 
 had been offered and refused as an escort, had 
 reached this camping-place some time before, so 
 that the wearied members of the detachment 
 found pleasant camp-fires already throwing their 
 weird lights and shadows over the drooping 
 branches of the royal palm. 
 
 Here, in the midst of the jungle, they pitched 
 their first camp in Cuba. The condition of the 
 mules was duly looked to, their shoulders washed 
 
THE OATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 73 
 
 down with strong salty water, their feet carefully 
 examined, and the animals then tethered to graze 
 their fill on the succulent sugar-cane, after having 
 had a bountiful supply of oats. Meantime the 
 camp cooks had a kettle full of coffee simmering, 
 and canned roast beef warming over the fire, and 
 after a hearty meal the tired men stretched them- 
 selves upon the ground, with no canopy except the 
 stars and only one sentinel over the camp, and 
 slept more soundly than they had on board the 
 tossing Clierokee. 
 
TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The March. 
 
 At early dawn tlie battery arose, and, after a 
 quick breakfast, resumed the march. Some half- 
 mile farther on they passed a battery of light artil- 
 lery which had preceded them on the road by 
 some nine hours, and which had camped at this 
 point awaiting forage. At Siboney the detach- 
 ment stopped to look after the detail from the 13th 
 Infantry, which had not yet reported. The de- 
 tachment commander sought out the regimental 
 adjutant, who referred him to the regimental 
 commander. Col. Worth. This colonel was at 
 first reluctant to allow the men to go, but, on being 
 informed of the necessity for them, and after in- 
 quiring about the orders on the subject, he direct- 
 ed the detail to report immediately. All the mem- 
 bers of this detail reported at once, except Corp. 
 Rose, who had been left by his company com- 
 mander on board ship. 
 
 The road from Siboney to the front was not 
 known. There was no one in camp who even 
 
THE GATIjiyCr GVXt^ AT 8ANTIA00. 75 
 
 knew its general direction. Application was 
 therefore made to Gen. Castillo, who was in com- 
 mand of a body of Cubans at Siboney, for a guide. 
 After a great deal of gesticulation, much excited 
 talk between the general and members of his 
 gtaff, and numerous messengers had been dis- 
 patched hither and thither upon this important 
 and very difficult business, a Cuban oflficer was 
 sent with instructions to furnish a guide who 
 could conduct the detachment to Gen. Wheeler's 
 headquarters at the front. In the course of some 
 twenty minutes, a dirty slouchy, swarthy, lousy- 
 looking vagabond was pointed out as the desired 
 guide, and was said to know^ every by-path and 
 trail between Siboney and Santiago. He was told 
 to go -sxith the detachment to Gen. Wheeler's head- 
 quarters and then return, and the detachment 
 commander started for his command followed by 
 his sable guide. Passing through a group of these 
 brave Cuban heroes, he lost sight of his redoubta- 
 ble guide for an instant, and has never since found 
 that gentleman. 
 
 It would be just as well to add a description of 
 the patriotic Cuban as he was found by the Gat- 
 ling Gun Detachment during their campaign in 
 behalf of Cuban independence, in the name of 
 
76 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 humanity; and this description, it is thought, tal- 
 lies with the experience of all officers in the 
 expedition. 
 
 The valiant Cuban! He strikes you first by his 
 color. It ranges from chocolate yellow through all 
 the shades to deepest black with kinky hair ;butyou 
 never by any chance see a white Cuban, except the 
 fat, sleek, well-groomed, superbly mounted ones in 
 '■khaki," who loaf around headquarters with high- 
 ranking shoulder-straps. These are all imported 
 from the United States. They comprise the few 
 wealthy ones of Spanish descent, who are renegade 
 to their own nativity, and are appealing to the 
 good people of the United States to establish them 
 in their status of master of peons without any 
 overlord who can exact his tithes for the privilege. 
 
 The next thing you notice is the furtive look of 
 the thief. No one has ever yet had a chance 
 to look one of these chocolate-colored Cubans 
 straight in the eye. They sneak along. Their 
 gait has in it something of that of the Apache, the 
 same soft moccasined tread, noiseless and always 
 stealthy. Your impressions as to their honesty 
 can be instantly confirmed. Leave anything loose, 
 from a heavy winter overcoat, which no one could 
 possibly use in Cuba, to — oh well, anything — and 
 
p- 
 
 ^J"- 
 
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THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 77 
 
 any Cuban in sight Avill take great pleasure in dis- 
 pollin.n' any false iuipri'ssidiis lliat honesty is a 
 native virtue. 
 
 Next you notice that he is dirty. His wife does 
 sometimes make a faint attempt at personal clean- 
 liness; this is evident, because in one bright in- 
 stance a white dress was seen on a native woman, 
 that had been washed sometime in her history. 
 But as to his lordship, the proud male citizen of 
 Cuba libre, you would utterly and bitterly insult 
 him by the intimation that a man of his dignity 
 ought ever to bathe, put on clean clothes, or even 
 wash his hands. He is not merely dirty, he is 
 filthy. He is infested with things that crawl and 
 creep, often visibly, over his half-naked body, and 
 he is so accustomed to it that he does not even 
 scratch. 
 
 Next you observe the intense pride of this 
 Cuban libre. It is manifested the very first time 
 you suggest anything like manual labor — he is 
 incapable of any other — even for such purposes as 
 camp sanitation, carrying rations, or for any other 
 purpose. His manly chest swells with pride and 
 he exclaims in accents of wounded dignity, "Yo 
 soy soldado!" Still his pride does not by any 
 chance get him knowingly under fire. At El 
 
78 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Poso some of him did get under fire from artillery, 
 accidentally, and it took a strong provost guard to 
 keep him there. If he ever got under fire again 
 there was no officer on the firing-line who knew it. 
 
 He is a treacherous, lying cowardly, thieving, 
 worthless, half -breed mongrel; born of a mongrel 
 spawn of Europe, crossed upon the fetiches of 
 darkest Africa and aboriginal America. He is 
 no more capable of self-government than the Hot- 
 tentots that roam the wilds of Africa or the Bush- 
 men of Australia. He can not be trusted like the 
 Indian, will not work like a negro, and will not 
 fight like a Spaniard; but he will lie like a Cas- 
 tilian with polished suavity, and he will stab you 
 in the dark or in the back with all the dexterity of 
 a renegade graduate of Carlisle. 
 
 Providence has reserved a fairer future for this 
 noble country than to be possessed by this horde 
 of tatterdemalions. Under the impetus of Ameri- 
 can energy and capital, governed by a firm mill 
 tary hand with even justice, it will blossom as the 
 rose; and, in the course of three or four genera- 
 tions, even the Cuban may be brought to appre- 
 ciate the virtues of cleanliness, temperance, indus- 
 try, and honesty. 
 
 Our good roads ended at Siboney, and from 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 79 
 
 there ou to Gen, Wheeler's headquarters was 
 some of the worst road ever traveled. Part of 
 it lay through deep valleys, where the sun was vis- 
 ible scarcely more than an hour at noontime, and 
 the wet, fetid soil was tramped into a muck of 
 malarial slime under foot of the mules and men. 
 The jungle became ranker, the Spanish bayonets 
 longer and their barbs sharper in these low bot- 
 tom jungles. The larger undergrowth closed in 
 more sharply on the trail, and its boughs overhung 
 so much in some places that it became necessary 
 to cut them away with axes in order to pass. 
 
 These guns were the first wheeled vehicles that 
 had ever disturbed the solitude of this portion of 
 Cuba. The chocolate-colored natives of Cuba 
 sneak; the white native of Cuba, when he travels 
 at all, goes on horseback. He very seldom travels 
 in Cuba at all, because he is not often there. Con- 
 sequently the roads in Cuba, as a rule, are merely 
 small paths sufficient for the native to walk along, 
 and they carry the machete in order to open a path 
 if necessary. These low places in the valleys were 
 full of miasmatic odors, yellow fever, agues, and 
 all the ills that usually pertain to the West Indian 
 climate. 
 
 At other places the road ran along the tops of 
 
80 TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 the foot-hills from oue to two hundred feet higher 
 than the bottom of these valleys. Here the coun- 
 try was much more open. The path was usually 
 wide enough for the guns to move with compara- 
 tive ease. Sometimes one wagon could pass an- 
 other easily. These parts of the road were usually 
 more or less strewn with boulders. The road was 
 rarely level and frequently the upland parts were 
 washed out. Sometimes it was only the boulder- 
 clad bottom of a ravine; again the water would 
 have washed out the gully on one side so deep as to 
 threaten overturning the guns. The portions of 
 the road between the valleys and the top of these 
 foot-hills were the w^orst places the detachment 
 had to pass. These ascents and descents were 
 nearly always steep. While not at all diffi- 
 cult for the man upon horseback or for the 
 man on foot, they were frequently almost too 
 steep for draft, and they were always washed 
 out. In places it was necessary to stop and fill 
 up these washouts by shoveling earth and stone 
 into the places before the detachment could pass. 
 On one of these occasions, while heaving rock to 
 fill up a bad washout, Priv. Jones was stung by 
 a scorpion. Jones did not know what had bitten 
 him. and desciibed it as a little black thing about 
 
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THE GATLIXG QU^'S AT SANTIAGO. 81 
 
 as long as bis finger. Fortunately there was a 
 small supply of whisky with the detachment, and 
 this remedy was applied to Jones internally. Some 
 soldier in the detachment suggested that a quid of 
 tobacco externally would be beneficial, so this 
 also was done. It was not a dressing favorable 
 to an aseptic condition of the wound, perhaps, nor 
 was there anything in the quid of tobacco calcu- 
 lated to withdraw the poison or neutralize its 
 effects, so the doctors may characterize this as 
 a very foolish proceeding; but country people 
 skilled in simples and herb remedies might tell 
 some of these ultra scientific surgeons that the 
 application of a quid of tobacco or of a leaf of 
 tobacco to the sting of a wasp or the bite of a 
 spider, or even the sting of a scorpion, is nearly 
 always attended by beneficial results. In fact, 
 when Jones was stung there was a surgeon, a med- 
 ical officer, who turned up even before Jones was 
 treated with the whisky cure, and, upon receiving 
 Jones' explanation that he had been heaving rock 
 and had been bitten on the end of the finger by a 
 little black thing, and after hearing the remarks of 
 the men that it was very probably a scorpion sting, 
 this medical officer very sagely diagnosed the acci- 
 dent to that effect, but was unable to prescribe 
 
82 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 any remedy because be bad not biougbt along bis 
 emerg'ency case. Tbis medical oflficer, witb bis 
 two attendant bospital satellites, bad left botb 
 litter and emergency case upon tbe transport, 
 
 Tbe ordinary line officer or soldier wbo is some- 
 wbat accustomed to carrying weigbts and does 
 not require a bospital drill to teacb bim to carry a 
 wounded comrade a few yards, looks witb a cer- 
 tain degree of envy upon tbe possession of a bos- 
 pital litter witb its convenient straps for weight- 
 carrying, and would consider tbis a very conven- 
 ient means for carrying a pack. Tbis litter is 
 designed to enable two men, bospital attendants 
 or baud men, to pick up a wounded soldier weigb- 
 ing some 160 or 180 pounds and carry bim from 
 fifty yards to a mile if necessary, to a dressing- 
 station or bospital sback. Tbe medical field-case 
 No. 1 weigbs about sixty pounds filled, and field- 
 case Xo. 2 weigbs about forty pounds. Tbese 
 two cases contain all tbe medicines necessary to 
 run a division bospital ; tbe case of emergency in- 
 struments does not weigb above ten or twelve 
 pounds, and would not be a burden for a cbild to 
 carry. It is tberefore difficult for tbe small- 
 minded officer of tbe line to see wby tbe Medical 
 Department was unable to have tbese medicines 
 
THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 83 
 
 up at iho front. They had tlu' same means of 
 loroniotiou provided for the other soldiers, by 
 Nature, aud they had, moreover, no particular 
 necessity for all rushing to the extreme front. On 
 tie contrary, they had from the 23d of June, when 
 the landing began, at Baiquiri, until the 1st of 
 July, to accomplish a distance of less than twenty 
 miles; and it would seem reasonable that they 
 might have had their medicine-cases up where they 
 were needed by that time. 
 
 These gentlemen pose as the most learned, ex- 
 pert, scientific, highly trained body of medical 
 men in the world. They are undoubtedly as well 
 trained, as highly educated, and as thoroughly 
 proficient as the medical officers of any army in 
 the world. A summons of an ordinary practi- 
 tioner would bring with him his saddle-bags of 
 medicines; no physician in the city would pretend 
 to answer even an ambulance call without having a 
 few simple remedies — in other words, an emer- 
 gency case; but it was an exception, and a very 
 rare exception at that, to find a medical officer 
 who took the trouble to carry anything upon his 
 aristocratic back on that march to the front. 
 
 A conversation overheard between two medical 
 officers on board a transport just before landing 
 
84 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 may serve to partially explain the state of affairs. 
 Said surgeon No. 1 to surgeon No. 2, "We are going 
 to land this morning; are you going to carry your 
 field-case?'' To which surgeon No. 2 indignantly 
 replied, "No, I 'm not a pack-mule!" Surgeon No. 
 1 again inquired, "Are you going to make your 
 hospital men carry it?" To which surgeon No. 2 
 replied, "No; my men are not beasts of burden." 
 Both of these medical officers went ashore; one of 
 them had his field-case carried; the other did not. 
 Both of them were up at the firing-line, both did 
 good service in rendering first aid. Both of them 
 worked heroically, both seemed deeply touched by 
 the suffering they were compelled to witness, and 
 both contracted the climatic fever. But in the 
 absence of medicines the role of the surgeon can 
 be taken by the private soldier who has been in- 
 structed in first aid to the injured; for in the ab- 
 sence of medical cases and surgical instruments 
 the first-aid packet is the only available source of 
 relief, and these first-aid packets were carried by 
 the private soldier, not by the Medical Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 A little less "theory," a little less "science," a 
 little less tendency to dwell on the "officer" part 
 of the business, with a little more devotion to the 
 
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THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 85 
 
 duty of relieving suffering humanity — in short, a 
 little less insistence upon "rank," would have vast- 
 ly improved the medical service of the United 
 States Army in the field at this time. 
 
 These remarks do not apply to the heroes like 
 Ebert, Thorpe, Brewer, Kennedy, Warren, and a 
 few others, who fearlessly exposed their lives upon 
 the very firing-line. These men are the very "salt 
 of the earth." The escape of even a ''frazzle" of the 
 5th Corps was due to their superhuman energy 
 and exertions. They did much to redeem the good 
 name of their corps and to alleviate suffering. 
 
 But Priv. Jones recovered from the sting of 
 the scorpion. In fact, soldiers were heard to ex- 
 claim that they would be glad to fiud a scorpion 
 when they saw the character of the remedy ap- 
 plied in Jones' case. 
 
 The detachment left Sibouoy about 10 o'clock in 
 the morning and tramped steadily along the road 
 up hill and down until 12; then, upon finding a con- 
 venient place, it halted for dinner. The mules 
 were unharnessed, coffee prepared, and. just as the 
 detachment was about to begin this noonday meal, 
 two of the peripatetic newspaper fraternity joined, 
 en route to the rear. The ubiquitous correspond- 
 ent had for the first time discovered the Gat- 
 
86 THE OATLI^^G GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ling Gun Detachment, and they thought it was 
 Artillery. 
 
 One of these gentlemen was a long, slim, frayed- 
 out specimen of humanity, with a wearied and ex- 
 pressive droop of the shoulders; the other was a 
 short, stout, florid, rotund individual, and his "too, 
 too solid flesh'' was in the very visible act of melt- 
 ing. The newspaper gentlemen were invited to 
 participate in the noonday meal, and, with some 
 gentle urging, consented. It was only after the 
 meal was over that it was learned that this was 
 the first square meal these men had had in over 
 forty-eight hours. They had been with Gen. 
 Wheeler at La Guasimas, had rejoined Wheeler 
 after reporting that fight, in hopes of making an- 
 other '^scoop," and were now on their way to Sib- 
 oney, hoping to buy some provisions. Poor devils! 
 They had worked for a ''scoop'' at La Guasimas; 
 they had gone up on the firing-line and had sent 
 back authentic accounts of that little skirmish; 
 but they did not make the "scoop." The "scoop" 
 was made by newspaper men who had remained on 
 board the transports, and who took the excited ac- 
 count of a member of the command who had come 
 back delirious with excitement, crazed with fear, 
 trembling as though he had a congestive chill — 
 
THE GATLiyO GUNS AT FtAy'TIAdO. H7 
 
 who, ill fact, had come back faster than he had 
 gone to the front, and in his excited condition had 
 told the story of an ambnsrade; that Wheeler, 
 Wood, and Roosevelt were all dead; that the ene- 
 my was as thick as the barbs on the Spanish bay- 
 onet; and that he, only he, had escaped to tell the 
 tale. This was the account of the battle that got 
 back to the newspapers in the form of a "scoop," 
 and it was nothing more nor less than the excited 
 imagination of the only coward who at that time 
 or ever afterwards was a member of the famous 
 Rough Riders. He was consequently returned to 
 civil life prematurely. 
 
 The newspaper correspondent in Cuba was of a 
 distinguished type. You recognized him immedi- 
 ately. He was utterly fearless; he delighted in 
 getting up on the firing-line — that is, a few of him 
 did. Among these few might be mentioned Mar- 
 shall, and Davis, and Remington, and Marcotte, 
 and King, and some half-dozen others; but there 
 was another type of newspaper correspondent in 
 Cuba, who hung around from two miles and a half 
 to three miles in rear of the firing-line, and never by 
 any possibility got closer to the enemy than that. 
 The members of this guild of the newspaper fra- 
 ternitv were necessarilv nearer the cable office 
 
88 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 than their more daring comrades; in fact, there 
 were a few who were known to have been eight or 
 nine miles nearer to tJie cable office during bat- 
 tles, and those correspondents were the ones who 
 made the great "scoop" in the New York papers^ by 
 which a regiment that laid down and skulked in 
 the woods, or ran wildly to the rear, was made to 
 do all the fighting on the first day of July. This 
 latter class of journalists were a menace to the 
 army, a disgrace to their profession, and a blot 
 upon humanity. Even the Cubans were ashamed 
 of them. 
 
 The detachment resumed the march at half past 
 1, and encountered some very difficult road, diffi- 
 cult because it needed repairs. The most difficult 
 places were the ascents and descents of the hills, 
 and in nearly every case fifteen or twenty minutes' 
 careful investigation was able to discover a means 
 of getting around the worst places in the road. 
 When it was not practicable to go around. J. Shif- 
 fer and his three fellow-teamsters would take a 
 twist of their hands in the manes of their long- 
 eared chargers, and apparently lift them down, or 
 up, as the case might be, always landing on their 
 feet and always safely. It was merely a question 
 of good driving and will to go through. The 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 89 
 
 worst places were repaired by the detaehmeut be- 
 fore these reckless attempts at precipice-scaling 
 Avere made. At one place there was a detachment 
 of the 24th Infantry engaged in an alleged effort 
 to repair the road. They did not seem to work 
 with much vim. Chaplain Springer, having in the 
 morning exhorted them to repentance and a bet- 
 ter life and to doing good works unto their breth- 
 ren, the enemy, was engaged at this point in the 
 afternoon, it being Sunday, in a practical demon- 
 stration of what he considered good works. In 
 other words, the chaplain, whose religious enthu- 
 siasm no one doubts, was engaged in heaving 
 rocks with his own hands to show these colored 
 soldiers how they ought to make good road, and 
 he was doing "good works." 
 
 It is but a just tribute to Chaplains Springer 
 and Swift, of the Kegulars, to say that they were 
 conspicuous in the hour of danger at the point of 
 greatest peril. In the fearless discharge of their 
 holy office, they faced all the dangers of battle; 
 nor did they neglect the care of the body while 
 ministering to the spiritual needs of the soldiers. 
 Springer, for example, collected wood and made 
 coffee for all on the firing-line, within 400 yards 
 of the block-house at El Canev; and Swift was 
 
90 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SAyTIAOO. 
 
 equally conspicuous iu relieveing suffering, bind- 
 ing up wounds, and caring for the sick. There 
 were probably others equally as daring; but the 
 author knows of the deeds of these men, and de- 
 sires to pay a tribute of respect to them. Chaplains 
 of this stamp are always listened to with respect- 
 ful attention when they express their views of the 
 true course of life to obtain a blessed hereafter. 
 They were in very sharp contrast to the long- 
 visaged clerical gentlemen who were so much in 
 evidence at Tampa, and who never got within 500 
 miles of danger. 
 
 The detachment safely passed all the bad places 
 and obstacles iu the road, arriving at Gen. Wheel- 
 er's headquarters about half past 4 o'clock, and 
 reported. It was assigned a position between the 
 advance outposts and directed to dispose of its 
 guns in such a manner as to sweep the hills on 
 which these outposts were placed. High hills to 
 the right at a distance of about 2000 yards were 
 supposed to be infested by the enemy, and a block- 
 house which stood out against the sky-line was 
 thought to contain a Spanish detachment. A 
 high hill to the left at a distance of about 1000 
 yards had not yet been explored, and it was 
 thought probable that some of the enemy was con- 
 
THE GATLIXO GVXS AT SANTIAGO. 91 
 
 cealed on this bill also. The detachment com- 
 mander was directed to report, after posting his 
 battery, in which duty he was assisted by Col. 
 Dorst, to Gen. Chaffee, who had charge of the out- 
 posts. The General inquired what the battery 
 consisted of, and upon being informed that "It 
 consists of four Catling guns, posted so as to com- 
 mand the neighboring hills," remarked in a very 
 contemptuous manner, ''You can't command any- 
 thing.'' Gen. Chaffee subsequently had reason to 
 revise his opinion, if not to regret the expres- 
 sion of it. 
 
92 TEE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Tlie Battery in Camp Wheeler. 
 
 At this point in the history of the detachment, 
 it would be well to give some acount of the reason- 
 ing which led to its formation and the personnel 
 of the detachment. 
 
 Since the days of '65 the armies of the civilized 
 world have adopted a rifle whose effective range is 
 more than twice as great as that used in the Civil 
 War. Very able discussions have been made 
 upon the theoretical changes of the battle-field thus 
 brought about, but no proper conclusion had been 
 reached. It was acknowledged by all text-book 
 writers that the artillery arm of the service would 
 find much greater difficulty in operating at short 
 ranges, and that assaults upon fortified positions 
 would be much more difficult in the future. But 
 only Gen. Willistou, of the United States Artil- 
 lery, had ever taken the advanced ground that in 
 a machine gun arm would be found a valuable 
 auxiliary as a result of these changed conditions. 
 This theory of Gen. Williston's was published in 
 
TEE QATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 93 
 
 the Journal of lite Military Service Institute in tlie 
 spring of '86, but never went, so far as Geu, Wil- 
 liston was concerned, beyond a mere theory; nor 
 had the detachment commander ever heard of 
 Gen. Williston's article until after the battle of 
 Santiago. 
 
 A study of the science of tactics — not merely 
 drill regulations, but tactics in the broader sense of 
 maneuvering bodies of troops upon the battle-field 
 — had led Lieut. Parker to the conclusion that the 
 artillery arm of the service had been moved back 
 ui)on the battle-field to ranges not less than 1500 
 yards. This not because of lack of courage on the 
 part of the Artillery, but as an inherent defect in 
 any arm of the service which depends upon draft 
 to reach an effective position. It was not believed 
 that animals could live at a shorter range in any- 
 thing like open country. The problem of support- 
 ing an infantry charge by some sort of fire imme- 
 diately became the great tactical problem of the 
 battle-field. Admitting that the assault of a forti- 
 fied position has become much more difficult than 
 formerly, the necessity of artillery support, or 
 its equivalent in some kind of fire, became corre- 
 spondingly more important, while under the condi- 
 
94 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 tious it became doubly more difficult to bring up 
 this support in the form of artillery fire. 
 
 The solution of this problem, then, was the prin- 
 cipal difficulty of the modern battle-field; and yet. 
 strange to say, the curtailed usefulness of artil- 
 lery does not seem to have suggested itself to any- 
 body else in the service previous to the first day 
 of July. This problem had been made the subject 
 of special study by him for several years, and had 
 led to the conclusion that some form of machine 
 gun must be adopted to take the place of artillery 
 from 1500 yards down. This in turn led to the 
 study of machine guns. The different forms iu 
 use in the different armies of the world had been 
 considered, and it was found that there was none 
 in any service properly mounted for the particular 
 use desired. All of them required the service of 
 animals as pack-mules, or for draft, while the very 
 conditions of tbe problem required a gun to be so 
 mounted that the use of animals could be dis- 
 pensed with. 
 
 The Maxim gun has been reduced in weight to 
 about GO pounds, and is furnished with a tripod 
 weighing about the same; but this is too heavy, 
 and the supply of ammunition at once becomes a 
 critical question. The Colt's automatic rapid- 
 
THE GATLING GUN8 AT SANTIAGO. 95 
 
 fire gun has been irduct'd to 40 pounds, with a 
 tripod of cMiiial \s\'i<;ht, but licrc again the same 
 difiic'ulty i»resents itself. The soldier is capable 
 of carrying only a limited amount of weight; and 
 with his already too heavy pack, his three days' 
 rations, together with the heat, fatigue and excite- 
 ment of battle, it did not appear jtossible for any 
 tripod-mounted gun to be effectively used. 
 
 The problem therefore resolved itself into the 
 ((uestion of carriages: A carriage capable of car- 
 rying any form of machine gun using small-caliber 
 ammunition, capable of being moved anywhere by 
 draft, capable of being dismantled and carried on 
 a pack-mule, and, above, all, capable of being 
 moved by hand; reciuired also some device for get- 
 ting the reiiuisite amount of ammnuiti(m up to the 
 firing-line. A carriage and ammunition cart was 
 invented fulfilling all these conditions and the in- 
 vention was presented to the adjutant-general of 
 the army for consideration, accompanied by a dis- 
 cussion of the proper tactical use of the gun so 
 mounted. This discussion, in part, was as follows: 
 
 "It is claimed for this carriage that a machine 
 gun mounted on it can be carried with a firing-lint- 
 of infantry on the offensive, over almost any kind 
 of ground, into the decisive zone of ritti^' fii"c and to 
 
96 THE GATLING GUNS AT SA^'TIAGO. 
 
 the lodgmeut iu the enemy's line, if one is made. 
 
 "On broken ground the piece can be moved for- 
 ward by draft under cover of sheltering features 
 of the terrain to a position so near the enemy that, 
 under cover of its fire, an infantry line can effect 
 a lodgment, after which the piece can be rushed 
 forward by a sudden dasht. 
 
 "The machine gun, mounted on this carriage, is 
 especially adapted for service with the reserve of 
 a battalion on the offensive, acting either alone or 
 in regiment. Its use will enable the commander 
 to reduce the reserve, thereby increasing the 
 strength of the fighting-line, and yet his flanks 
 will be better protected than formerly, while he 
 will still have a more powerful reserve. If the 
 fighting-line be driven back, the machine guns 
 will establish a point of resistance on which the 
 line can rally, and from which it can not be driven, 
 unless the machine guns be annihilated by artil- 
 lery fire. 
 
 "In case of counter-charge by the enemy, the 
 superior weight and intensity of its fire will shake 
 the enemy and so demoralize him that, in all prob- 
 ability, a return counter-charge will result in his 
 complete discomfiture. 
 
 "Retiring troops as rear guards have in this 
 
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 15. 
 
THE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 97 
 
 weapon par excellence the weapon for a swift and 
 sharp return with the power of rapidly withdraw- 
 ing. If the enemy can by any means be enticed 
 within its range, he will certainly suffer great 
 losses. If he cannot be brought in range, his dis- 
 tance will be rather respectful." 
 
 This discussion as presented was entirely and 
 absolutely original with the author and the result 
 of his own unaided researches on the subject. It 
 will be seen in the account of the battle how ac- 
 curately the conditions there laid down were 
 fulfilled. 
 
 But the carriage in use by the Gatling Gun De- 
 tachment was not the one proposed to the War 
 l^epartment. That carriage has not, as yet, been 
 built, nor has the War Department in any way 
 recognized the invention or even acknowledged 
 the receipt of the communication and drawings. 
 
 The problem, therefore, confronting the Gatling 
 Gun Detachment was to demonstrate the above 
 uses of the machine gun, taking the obsolete artil- 
 lery carriage drawn by mules, and endeavor to get 
 the guns into action by draft. The personnel of 
 the detachment alone accounts for their success. 
 They got the guns up on the firing-line, not be- 
 cause of any superiority of the carriage over that 
 
98 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 in use by the artillery, for there was none; not 
 because of aid rendered by other arms of the ser- 
 vice, for they actually went into battle as far as 
 100 yards in advance of the infantry skirmishers; 
 but because the Gatling Gun Detachment was 
 there for the purpose of getting into the fight and 
 was determined to give the guns a trial. 
 
 In the first place, all the members of the Gatling 
 Gun Detachment were members of the Regular 
 Arm3^ All but three of them were natives of the 
 United States, and those three were American 
 citizens. Every man in the detachment had been 
 selected by the detachment commander, or had 
 voluntarily undertaken to perform this duty, real- 
 izing and believing that it was an extremely haz- 
 ardous duty. Every member of the detachment 
 possessed a common-school education, and some of 
 them were well educated. All of them were men 
 of exceptionally good character and sober habits. 
 The drivers were Privs. Shiffer, Correll, Merryman, 
 and Chase. The description formerly given of 
 Shiffer applies, with slight modifications, to all 
 the four. The first sergeant, Weigle, a native of 
 Gettysburg, a soldier of eight years' experience in 
 the Regular Army, a man of fine natural ability 
 and good educational attainments, was worthy to 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 99 
 
 command any conii)any in the Ignited States 
 Army. Thoroughly well instructed in the mechan- 
 ism of Gatling guns, of exceptionally cheerful and 
 buoyant disposition, he was an ideal first ser- 
 geant for any organization. Steigerwald, acting 
 chief of gun No. 1, was of German birth, well edu- 
 cated. He had chosen the military profession for 
 the love of it; he was a man of wonderfully fine 
 physique, a ''dead sure" shot, and one who hardly 
 understood the meaning of the word "fatigue." 
 He was ambitious, he was an ardent believer in the 
 Gatling gun, and he was determined to win a com- 
 mission on the battle-field. 
 
 Corporal Doyle was a magnificent type of the 
 old-time Regular— one of the kind that composed 
 the army before Proctorism tried to convert it into 
 a Sunday-school. In former days Doyle had been 
 a drinking man; but the common opinion as ex- 
 pressed by his company officers even in those days 
 was, "I would rather have Doyle, drunk, than any 
 other non-commissioned officer, sober; because 
 Doyle never gets too drunk to attend to duty." 
 Two years before this Doyle had quit drinking, 
 and the only drawback to this most excellent non- 
 commissioned oflicer had been removed. He was 
 a thorough discipliuarian; one of the kind that 
 
100 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 takes no back talk; one who is prone to using the 
 butt end of a musket as a persuader, if necessary ; 
 and Doyle was thoroughly devoted to the detach- 
 ment commander. Corp. Smith was another of 
 the same stamp, Corp. Smith loved poker. In 
 fact, his sobriquet was "Poker Smith." He was 
 one of the kind of poker-players who would ''see" 
 a |5 bet on a pair of deuces, raise it to $25, and 
 generally rake in the ''pot." It was Corp. Smith 
 who thought in this Catling guu deal he was hold- 
 ing a pair of deuces, because he didn't take much 
 stock in Catling guns, but he was a firm believer 
 in his commanding officer and was prepared to 
 "bluff" the Dons to the limit of the game. 
 
 Sergeants Ryder and Weischaar were splendid 
 types of the American Regular non-commissioned 
 officer, alert, respectful, attentive to duty, reso- 
 lute, unflinching, determined, magnificent soldiers. 
 Serg. Creen was a young man, only twenty-three, 
 the idolized son of his parents, in the army because 
 he loved it; enthusiastic over his gun, and fully 
 determined to "pot" every Spaniard in sight. 
 Corp. Rose was like unto him. They were eager 
 for nothing so much as a chance to get into action, 
 and equally determined to stay there. The pri- 
 vates of the detachment were like unto the non- 
 
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THE GATLIXG GUN^^ AT SANTIAGO. 101 
 
 commissioned officers. They had voliintccivd for 
 this duty from a h>ve of adventure, a desire to win 
 recognition, or from their personal attachment to 
 the commanding officer; and there was not a man 
 who was not willing to follow him into the "mouth 
 of hell" if necessary. The gunners were expert 
 shots with the rifle. Numbers 1 and 2, who turned 
 the crank and fed the gun, respectively, were se- 
 lected for their dexterity and coolness ; the drivers, 
 for their skill in handling mules: and each of the 
 other members of the detachment was placed on 
 that duty which he seemed best fitted to perform. 
 The roll of the detachment and its organization 
 as it w^ent into battle on the first day of July are 
 subjoined: 
 
 Gatling Gun Detacliment, Fifth Army Corps. 
 Commanding Officer, John H. Parker, first lieu- 
 tenant, 13th Infantry. 
 Acting First Sergeant, Alois Weischaar, sergeant, 
 
 Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
 Acting Quartermaster Sergeant, William Ryder, 
 
 Co. G, 13th Infantry. 
 Gun No. 1 : 
 
 Acting Chief and Gunner, Charles C. Steiger- 
 
 wald. corporal, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
 No. 1, Private Voelker, Co. A, 12th Infantry. 
 
102 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 No. 2, Private Elkins, Co. D, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 3, Private Sclimandt, Co. G, 13tli Infantry. 
 
 No. 4, Private Needles, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 5, Private Click, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 6, Private Jones, Co. D, 13th Infantry. 
 
 Driver, Private Shiffer, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 
 Gun No. 2: 
 
 Chief, Sergeant William Kyder, Co. G, 13th In- 
 fantry. 
 
 Gunner, Corporal Geo. N. Rose, Co. C, 13th In- 
 fantry. 
 
 No. 1, Private Seaman, Co. B, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 2, Private Kastner, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 3, Private Pyne, Co. H, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 4, Private Schulze, Co. A, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 5, Private Barts, Co. E, 13th Infantry. 
 
 Driver, Pivate Correll, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 
 Gun No. 3: 
 
 Chief, Sergeant Newton A. Green, Co. H, 13th 
 Infantry. 
 
 Gunner, Corporal Matthew Doyle, Co. C, 13th 
 Infantry. 
 
 No. 1, Private Anderson, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 
 
 No. 2, Private Sine, Co. E, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 3, Private Lauer, Co. C, 12th Infantry. 
 
 No. 4, Private Dellett, Co. D, 17th Infantry. 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 103 
 
 No. 5, Private Con, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 6, Private Greenbeig, Co. G, 13th Infantry. 
 
 Driver, Private Merryman, Co. A, 17th Infantry. 
 Gun No. 4: 
 
 Chief, Sergeant John N. Weigle, Co. L, 9th In- 
 fantry. 
 
 Gunner, Corporal Kobert S. Smith, Co. C, 13th 
 Infantry. 
 
 No. 1, Private McGoin, Co. D, ITth Infantry. 
 
 No. 2, Private Misiak, Co. E, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 3, Private Power, Co. A, 13th Infantry. 
 
 No. 4, Private McDonald, Co. B, 17th Infantry. 
 
 No. 5, Private Prazak, Co. E, 12th Infantry. 
 
 Driver, Private Chase, Co. H, 13th Infantry. 
 
 Cook, Private Hoft, Co. D, 13th Infantry. 
 
 Assistant cook. Private Bremer, Co. G, 13th In- 
 fantry. 
 
 Absent, sick, Private Murray, Co. F, 13th In- 
 fantry, at Tampa. 
 
 Sergeant Weigle was subsequently appointed 
 first sergeant of Co, L., 9th Infantry, and of the 
 Gatling Gun Detachment, vice Weischaar, re- 
 lieved at his own request. 
 
104 THE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Another element which contributed much to the 
 success of the detachment was the presence with 
 it of Captain Marcotte. This excellent officer had 
 served with great distinction in the Civil War, hav- 
 ing been promoted from a private in the ranks 
 through all of the grades up to a captaincy, for 
 meritorious conduct in battle, and having failed 
 of higher grades only because he was too badly 
 shot to pieces to continue with the Army. He 
 joined the detachment on the 25th of June, and 
 his valuable advice was always at the disposal 
 not merely of the commander, but of any member 
 of the detachment who wished to consult him. 
 He had spent seventeen years in the Cuban climate 
 and was thoroughly familiar with all the condi- 
 tions under which we were laboring. He con- 
 tributed not a little, by his presence, his example, 
 and his precept, to the final success of the organi- 
 zation. When the battery went under fire, Mar- 
 cotte was with it. It was the first time most of 
 the members had passed through this ordeal, but 
 who could run, or even feel nervous, with this 
 gray-haired man skipping about from point to 
 point and taking notes of the engagement as coolly 
 as though he were sitting in the shade of a tree 
 sipping lime-juice cocktails, a mile from danger. 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 105 
 
 Such was the personnel of the detachment. It 
 lay in Camp Wheeler, which was only about a mile 
 and a half from El Poso, where the first engage- 
 ment occurred ou the first of July, until that morn- 
 ing. The mules were daily harnessed up and 
 drilled in maneuvering the pieces, and the mem- 
 bers of the detachment experimentally posted in 
 different positions in order to get the most effect- 
 ive service. 
 
 On the 27th, Serg. Green was sent back to Sib- 
 oney with orders to bring Corp. Rose or his body. 
 He brought Corp. Rose, and the corporal was very 
 glad to be brought. 
 
 The mules were fed with oats and on the juicy 
 sugar-cane. It is worthy of mention that no other 
 organization at the front had oats. A feed or two 
 of oats was given to Gen. Wheeler and Col. Dorst 
 for their horses; it was the first time their horses 
 had tasted oats since leaving the transports, and 
 was probably the last time until after the sur- 
 render. Furthermore, the Gatling Gun Detach- 
 ment had "grub." Of course, it was "short" on po- 
 tatoes, onions, and vegetables generally; these lux- 
 uries were not to be well known again until it re- 
 turned to the United States; but it did have hard- 
 tack, bacon, canned roast beef, sugar, and coffee. 
 
106 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 having drawn all the rations it could carry before 
 leaving Baiquiri, and was the only organization 
 which had as much as twenty-four hours' rations. 
 Gen. Hawkins and his whole brigade were living 
 from hand to mouth, one meal at a time. The 
 same was true of Gen. Wheeler and the whole 
 cavalry division, and they were depending for that 
 one meal upon the pack-mule train. On the 30th 
 of June a complete set of muster- and pay-rolls, 
 was prepared for the detachment, and it was duly 
 mustered in the usual form and manner. It was 
 the only organization at the front of which a 
 formal muster was made, and was the only one 
 there which had muster- and pay-rolls. 
 
 It rained on the 29th and 30th of June. Not 
 such rains as the people of the United States are 
 familiar with, but Cuban rains. It was like stand- 
 ing under a barrel full of water and having the 
 bottom knocked out. These rains caused the rifles 
 and carbines of the army to rust, and some quick- 
 witted captain bethought himself to beg oil from 
 the Gatling Gun Detachment. He got it. An- 
 other, and another, and still another begged for 
 oil ; then regiments began to beg for oil ; and final- 
 ly application was made for oil for a whole bri- 
 gade. This led to the following correspondence: 
 
TBE OATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. ]07 
 
 "Camp Six Miles from Santiago, 
 
 "29th June, 1898. 
 "The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division, Present: 
 
 "Sir, — I have the honor to inform you that I 
 have learned that some of the rilles in this com- 
 mand are badly in need of oil, and that in some 
 companies there is no oil to use on them. These 
 facts I learned through requests to me for oil. 
 
 "I therefore report to you that my men found at 
 Altares (the second landing-place) and reported 
 to me four (4) barrels of lard oil and three (3) bar- 
 rels of cylinder oil, in an old oil-house near the 
 machine shops. 
 
 "If this be procured and issued, it will save the 
 rifles and carbines from rust. 
 
 "Very respectfully, 
 
 "Jo/t/i H. Parker, 
 "Lt. Comdg. G. G. Detachment, 5th Corps." 
 
 First Endorsement. 
 "Headquarters Cavalry Division, 
 "Camp 6 miles east of Santiago de Cuba, 
 
 "June 29, 1898. 
 "Kespectfully referred to the adjutant-general, 
 5th Army Corps. 
 
 "Jo5. ^ylleehr, 
 "Major-General U. S. Vols., Comdg." 
 
108 THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Second Endorsement. 
 
 "Headquarters 5th Corps, 
 
 "June 29, 1898. 
 "Return. Lt. Parker will send a man back to- 
 morrow to obtain the necessary oil. 
 "By command of Gen. Shafter. 
 
 ''E. J. McClernand, 
 
 "A. A. G." 
 
 Third Endorsement. 
 "Headquarters Cavalry Division, 
 
 "June 29, 1898. 
 "Eeturn Lt. Parker. Attention invited to the 
 foregoing endorsement. 
 
 "J". H. Dorst, 
 "Lieutenant-Colonel." 
 
 Fourth Endorsement. 
 
 "June 30, 1898. 
 "The Quartermaster, Altares, Cuba: 
 
 "Please furnish to Sergeant Green of my detach- 
 ment transportation for two (2) barrels of oil. He 
 will show you an order from Gen. Shafter, and 
 the matter is urgent. The soldiers must have this 
 oil at once, as their rifles are rusting badly. 
 
 "John II. Parher, 
 "Lt. Comdg. Gatling Gun Detach." 
 
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THE OATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 109 
 
 The quartermaster furnished the transportation 
 and two barrels of oil were duly forwarded to 
 the front and placed in charge of brigade quarter- 
 masters at different points, with orders to distrib- 
 ute out one quart to each company. This oil per- 
 raps, had some bearing upon the condition of the 
 rifles in the fight following. 
 
 On the 27th of June, Captain Marcotte and the 
 detachment commander made a reconnaissance of 
 a high hill to the left of Camp Wheeler, and, hav- 
 ing gained the top, reconuoitered the city of San- 
 tiago and its surrounding defenses with a power- 
 ful glass, and as a result reported to Gen. Wheeler 
 that the key of Santiago was the Morro mesa, 
 a promontory or tableland overlooking the city on 
 the east side at a distance of about a mile and a 
 half and not at that time occupied by the enemy, 
 with the proposition that a detail of a half-dozen 
 men from the detachment should make a rush 
 and capture this plateau, and hold it until the 
 guns could be brought up. The general could not 
 authorize the proposed undertaking, as it would 
 have endangered the safety of his army, perhaps 
 by leading to a premature engagement. By the 
 time a sufficient reconnaissance had been made 
 and convinced everybody of the value of this plan. 
 
110 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 the mesa had been strongly occupied by the ene- 
 my. It is still believed that the occupation of 
 this height was practicable on the 27th of June, 
 and thought, if it had been authorized, the Gat- 
 lings could have occupied and held this position 
 against all the Spaniards in the city of Santiago, 
 A glance at the map will show the extreme tact- 
 ical importance of this position. 
 
THE GATLINO OUXS AT SANTIAGO. Ill 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Battle. 
 
 On the 30tli day of June, General Shafter pitched 
 his camp about half a mile in advance of Camp 
 Wheeler in a valley, and about five o'clock in the 
 afternoon communicated the plan of battle to the 
 division commanders and to the commander of 
 the Catling Gun Detachment. 
 
 Reconnaissance had developed the fact that the 
 enemy occupied the village of El Caney, and that 
 their first line of v^'orks surrounded the city of 
 fc?antiago at a distance of about a mile, crown- 
 ing a semicircular ridge. Between the position 
 occupied by the general's camp and this ridge, a 
 distance of about two and one-half miles, flowed 
 the Aguadores and San Juan rivers, and about 
 one mile from the San Juan River, on the east side, 
 was a ruined plantation and mission house, called 
 El Poso. Midway betw^een El Caney and the 
 Spanish position was a large handsome mansion, 
 called the Du Cuorot house, standing in the midst 
 of a large plantation and owned by a Frenchman, 
 
112 TEE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 which both sides had agreed to respect as neutral 
 property. The general plan of the battle as given 
 to these officers on the 30th of June was for one 
 division of the army (Lawton's), assisted by one bat- 
 tery of artillery (Capron's), to make an attack at 
 daybreak upon the village of El Caney, and drive 
 the enemy out of it. Another division (Kent's) 
 was to make an attack upon the semicircular 
 ridge of hills south of El Caney as soon as Lawton 
 was well committed to the fight, both for the pur- 
 pose of preventing reinforcements from going to 
 El Caney and to develop the enemy's strength. It 
 was expected that Lawton would capture El Caney 
 about eight or nine o'clock in the morning, and 
 pursue the retreating enemy, by the way of the Du 
 Cuorot house, toward Santiago. This movement 
 would cause Lawton to execute, roughly, a left 
 wheel, and it was intended that in executing this 
 maneuver Kent's right should join, or nearly join, 
 Lawton's left, after which the whole line was to 
 move forward according to the developments of 
 the fight, Kent's attack was to be supported by 
 Grimes' Battery from El Poso. The Gatling Gun 
 Detachment was to move at daylight on the morn- 
 ing of July 1st, take position at El Poso sheltered 
 
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THE GATLIXa GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 113 
 
 by the hill, in support of Grimes' Battery, and 
 there await orders. 
 
 This outline of the battle, as laid down by Gen, 
 Shafter on the HOth day of June, was eventually 
 carried out to the letter; its successful op/g»ation 
 shut up a superior force in the city of Santiago, 
 and compelled the surrender of the city. 
 
 Perhaps no better comment can be made upon 
 the generalship of the corps commander, no higher 
 compliment be paid, than the mere statement that 
 he was able, fifteen hours before a shot was fired 
 in the battle, to prescribe the movements of the 
 different organizations of his command, and to 
 outline the plan of battle as it was finally car- 
 ried out, with a degree of precision which can be 
 fully appreciated only by those to whom the plan 
 was communicated in advance. In spite of slight 
 changes, made necessary by local failures and 
 unforeseen circumstances; in spite of the very poor 
 cooperation of the artillery arm; in spite of the 
 absence of cavalry, which made good reconnais- 
 sance practically impossible; in spite of the fact 
 that he was operating against a superior force in 
 strong intrenchments — the plan of battle thus laid 
 down was finally carried out with perfect success 
 in every detail. 
 
114 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 The Gatling Guu Detachment was assembled 
 at six o'clock, and so much of the plan of battle 
 was explained to them as it was proper to give 
 out, with orders that breakfast was to be prepared 
 by fcrur o'clock and the detachment be ready to 
 move at 4:30. The plans were heard with care- 
 ful attention by the men, and the wisdom of giv- 
 ing to them some idea of the work they were ex- 
 pected to do was fully vindicated on the following 
 day, when they were compelled to lie nearly three 
 hours under a dropping fire, waiting for "Lawton 
 to become well engaged,'' after which the detach- 
 ment moved forward, without a man missing, with 
 the utmost steadiness and coolness, to the attack. 
 
 There was no nervousness displayed by the men. 
 They knew their work was cut out for them, and 
 each man was eager to play his part in the great 
 drama of the morrow. There was no excited talk 
 indulged in. None of the buzz of preparation 
 nor the hum of anticipation which to the civilian 
 mind should precede a desperate battle, but three 
 or four members of the detachment took out their 
 soldiers' hand-books and wrote in them their last 
 will and testament, requesting their commander 
 to witness the same and act as executor. The 
 courage evinced by these men was not of that 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 115 
 
 brutal order which ignores danger, but of the 
 moral quality which, fully realizing that some- 
 body must get hurt, quietly resolves to face what- 
 ever may happen in the performance of the full 
 measure of duty. 
 
 At four o'clock the guard aroused the members 
 of the detachment quietly, and each man found 
 a good hearty bi-eakfast waiting for him, consist- 
 ing of hardtack, coffee, condensed milk, sugar, 
 bacon, canned roast beef, and some canned fruit, 
 which had been obtained somehow and was 
 opened upon this occasion. It was the last square 
 meal they were to have for several days. At half 
 past four the camp equipage had all been packed 
 upon the guns in such a manner as not to interfere 
 with their instantly getting into action, and the 
 battery started for the front. 
 
 The road to El Toso was very good and the 
 mules trotted merrily along, preceded and fol- 
 lowed by infantry also bound for the front. The 
 Cubans, too, were in evidence; an irregular, strug- 
 gling mob of undisciplined barbarians, vociferous, 
 clamorous, noisy, turbulent, excited. Presently 
 the Cubans and infantry in front of the battery 
 halted and it passed beyond them, immediately 
 throwing out the crew of the third gun in front 
 
116 THE OATLING 0UN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 as an advance guard. It reached El Poso at six 
 o'clock, at wbich time there were no other solidiers 
 there. The battery took position as directed, un- 
 der cover in rear of the hill and to the right front 
 of the El Poso house. The camp equipage and 
 blanket-rolls, were removed and piled neatly upon 
 the ground, and Priv. Hoft was detailed to guard 
 them, as well as one of the spare mules. About 
 half past seven o'clock Grimes' Battery arrived, 
 and Col. McClernand, the assistant adjutant-gen- 
 eral of the corps. The battery of artillery halted 
 upon the hill near the Gatlings, while its com- 
 mander, the adjutant-general, the Army and Navy 
 Journal correspondent, and the Gatling gun man 
 climbed to the top of the hill to recounoiter the 
 enemy. They were accompanied by several 
 attaches and a battalion of newspaper corre- 
 spondents. 
 
 To the southwest, at a distance of about 3,000 
 yards, the city of Santiago lay slumbering in the 
 morning sun. The chain of hills which sur- 
 rounded the city, lying between it and our posi- 
 tion, was crowned with rank tropical verdure, 
 and gave no indications of military fortifications. 
 There was no sign of life, a gentle land breeze 
 «waved the tops of the royal palms, and the little 
 
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THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 117 
 
 birds flitted from bough to bough caroliug their 
 morning songs as though uo such events were im- 
 pending as the bombardment of a city and the 
 death of 400 gallant soldiers. The gentle ripple of 
 the creek, lapping over its pebbly bed at the foot 
 of the hill, was distinctly audible. 
 
 The artillery officers produced their range-find- 
 ers and made a scientific guess at the distance 
 from the hill to a red brick building in the north- 
 ern edge of Santiago. This guess was 2G00 yards. 
 They signalled to the lead piece of Grimes' Light 
 Battery to ascend the hill. It was delayed for a 
 moment while picks and shovels were plied upon 
 the top of the hill to make slight emplacements 
 for the guns, and at last, at ten minutes before 
 eight o'clock, the first piece started the difficult 
 ascent. The drivers stood up in their stirrups 
 and lashed their horses and shouted; the horses 
 plunged and reared and jumped. The piece stuck 
 half way up the hill. The leaders were turned 
 slightly to the right to give new direction and 
 another attempt was made — ten yards gained. 
 The leaders were swung to the left, men and offi- 
 cers standing near by added their shouts and 
 blows from sticks. A tall artillery officer, whose 
 red stripes were conspicuous, jumped up and 
 
118 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 down and swore; tbe team gave a few more jumps, 
 then they wheeled the gun by a left about, with 
 its muzzle pointing toward the city. It was 
 quickly unlimbered and run to its place. 
 
 The second piece started up the hill. The driv- 
 ers of this piece sat quietly in their saddles, and, 
 with a cluck, started up the hill at a walk. The 
 tall artillery officer shouted, and a driver mut- 
 tered under his breath, "Damned fool !" Regard- 
 less of the orders to rnsh their horses, the drivers 
 of this piece continued to walk up the hill. At 
 the steepest part of the hill, they rose slightly in 
 their stirrups, as one man, and applied the spur 
 to the lead horses, and, at the same time, a lash 
 of the quirt to the off horses of the team. The 
 horses sprang forward, and in an instant the sec- 
 ond piece was in battery. The third and fourth 
 pieces were taken up in the same manner as the 
 second. 
 
 The pieces were loaded; a party of newspaper 
 correspondents produced their lead pencils aud 
 pads, and began to take notes; the little birds con- 
 tinued to sing. The Gatling Gun man, the Army 
 and Navy Journal man, and the assistant adju- 
 tant-general stepped to the windward a few yards 
 to be clear of the smoke. The range was given 
 
THE GATLIXG OUXS AT SANTIAGO. 119 
 
 by the battery commander — 2G00 yards; the ob- 
 jective was named, a small, almost indistinguish- 
 able redoubt, below the hospital about 300 yards. 
 The cannoneers braced themselves, No. 3 stretched 
 the lanyard taut on his piece, and Grimes re- 
 marked, in a conversational tone, ''Let her go." 
 
 The report of the field-piece burst with start- 
 ling suddenness upon the quiet summer morning, 
 and a dense cloud of grayish-colored smoke spurt- 
 ed from the muzzle of the gun. Everybody invol- 
 untarily jumped, the sound was so startling, al- 
 though expected. The piece recoiled eight or ten 
 feet, and the gunners jumped to the wheels and 
 ran it forward again into battery. Field-glasses 
 were glued upon the vicinity of the brick hos- 
 pital. There was a puff of white smoke and an 
 exclamation, "A trifle too long!" The second piece 
 was aimed and fired. There was no response. The 
 third, and fourth, and fifth, with like results. It 
 was like firing a salute on the Fourth of July. 
 There was no indication of any danger whatever; 
 laugh and jest were beginning to go round. 
 
 Suddenly a dull boom was heard from some- 
 where, the exact direction could not be located. 
 The next thing was a shrill whistle overhead, and 
 then a most startling report. The first Spanish 
 
120 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 shell exploded about twenty feet above the sur- 
 face of the ground, and about twenty yards in 
 rear of the crest of the hill. It exploded in the 
 midst of our brave Cuban contingents, killed one 
 and wounded several. The valiant sons of Cuba 
 libre took to their heels, and most of the news- 
 paper correspondents did likewise. The members 
 of Grimes' Battery, who were not needed at the 
 guns, were sent back to the caissons, and another 
 round of shrapnel was sent in reply. Again a 
 hurtling sound rent the air; again there was the 
 fierce crack of a Spanish shell in our immediate 
 vicinity, and, on looking around to see where this 
 shell struck, it was observed that it had burst 
 over the Catling battery. Luckily, it had gone six 
 or eight feet beyond the battery before exploding. 
 A fragment of the shell had struck Priv. Bremer 
 upon the hand, producing quite a. severe contu- 
 sion. The Missouri mules stamped the ground 
 impatiently; one of them uttered the character- 
 istic exclamation of his race, "Aw! hee! aw! heel 
 aw!" and the members of the detachment burst 
 into a merry peal of hearty laughter. It was evi- 
 dent that this detachment was not going to run, 
 and it was equally evident that the Missouri mules 
 would stand fire. 
 
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 A tliird shell whistled over the hill. This one 
 burst fairly over Grimes' third piece, killed the 
 cannoneer, and wounded several men. 
 
 The members of the detachment were now di- 
 rected to lie down under their guns and limbers, 
 except the drivers, who declined to do so, and still 
 stood at the heads of their mules. Priv. Hoft, dis- 
 daining to take cover, shouldered his rifle and 
 walked up and down, sentry fashion, over the 
 pile of camp equipage. 
 
 Serg. Weigle, who had brought along a small 
 portable camera, with a large supply of film-rolls, 
 requested permission to photograph the next shot 
 fired by Grimes' Battery. It was granted. He 
 climbed to the top of the hill, stepped off to the 
 left of the battery, and calmly focused his camera. 
 Grimes fired another salute, and Weigle secured 
 a good picture. A Spanish shell came whistling 
 over the hill; Weigle, judging where it would 
 burst from previous observations, focused his 
 camera, and secured a picture of the burst. He 
 then rejoined his detachment, and photographed 
 it as it stood. He seemed chiefly worried for fear 
 he would not get a picture of everything that hap 
 pened. 
 
122 THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 The artillery duel continued for some twenty 
 minutes. The infantry began to pass on, to the 
 front. Grimes no longer needed the support of 
 the Gatling guns, because he now had an infantry 
 support in front of him, and was firing over their 
 heads. Col. McClernand sent orders to the de- 
 tachment to move to the rear, out of range. The 
 order was obeyed. 
 
 Private Hoft, with the instinct of a true 
 soldier, continued to tramp back and forth guard- 
 ing the pile of camp equipage. The battery 
 moved to the rear at a gentle trot, and, as it turned 
 down the hill into the first ford by the El Poso 
 house, a Spanish shell whistled over the head of 
 Private Shiffer, who was leading the way, and 
 burst just beyond his off mule. Shiffer didn't duck 
 and nobody was hurt. Providence was taking 
 care of this experiment. Corporal Doyle and two 
 other members of the detachment got lost, and 
 wandered off among the crowd of Cubans, but 
 soon found the battery and rejoined. Orders were 
 given that as soon as the battery was out of range, 
 it should halt and face to the front, at the side of 
 the road. 
 
 The battery halted about half a mile to the rear, 
 and the 13th Infantry passed it here, on their 
 
THE OATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 123 
 
 way to the front. The eoiiiiiients bestowed were 
 not calculated to soothe the ruffled feelings of 
 people who had been ordered to retreat. "I told 
 you so." ''Why don't you go to the front?'' ''Go- 
 ing to begin firing here?" "Is this the place where 
 you shoot?" "Is this all there is of it?" "I knew 
 they would not get into the fight." "Watch them 
 hang around the rear." "Going to start in rais- 
 ing bananas back here, John Henry?" "What 
 do you think of machine guns now?" and similar 
 remarks, of a witty but exasperating nature, 
 greeted the detachment, from both officers and 
 men, as the regiment passed on its way to the 
 front. The only thing that could be done was to 
 endure it, in the hope of getting a chance to make 
 a retort later in the day. 
 
 About nine o'clock, the artillery firing ceased, 
 and the Gatling Gun Battery returned to El Poso. 
 Grimes' guns were still up on the hill, but there 
 were no cannoneers; they had ceased to fire, and 
 had left their guns. Two or three dead men were 
 lying on the side of the hill; wounded men were 
 limping around with bandages. Cubans were 
 again passing to the front. These fellows were 
 trying to reach El Caney. They never got into 
 the fight. They did reach the vicinity of El Caney, 
 
124 TEE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and the Spanish fired one volley at them. The 
 Cubans set up a great howl, accompanied by vocif- 
 erous gesticulations — and then ''skedaddled." 
 
 During all this time the sound of firing had 
 been heard toward El Caney. It had been opened 
 up there about half an hour before Grimes first 
 spoke at El Poso. The fire in this direction sound- 
 ed like ranging fire, a shot every two or three 
 minutes, and it was supposed that Capron was 
 trying to locate the enemy. The sharp crack of 
 musketry was heard on our front, it swelled and 
 became continuous. It was evident that quite a 
 fight was going on at El Caney, which was to our 
 right about one mile and to our front perhaps 
 half a mile. Kent's Division kept pushing forward 
 on the El Poso road. Col. McClernand was asked 
 for instructions for the Catling Gun Detachment. 
 He replied, "Find the 71st New York, and go in 
 with them, if you can. If this is not practicable, 
 find the best place you can, and make the best 
 use of your guns that you can.'' These were the 
 only instructions received by the Catling Gun 
 Detachment until one o'clock. 
 
 The Gatling Gun Detachment moved forward 
 about half a mile. They found the 71st New York 
 lying down by the side of the road, partially 
 
« 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 125 
 
 blocking it. Troops passing them toward the 
 front were compelled to break into columns of 
 twos, because the road was crowded by the 71st. 
 The colonel and his adjutant were sought and 
 found, and informed of the detachment's instruc- 
 tions, luforniation was requested as to when and 
 where the 71st was going into the fight. It ap- 
 peared, that they had a vague idea that they were 
 going in on the left center of the left wing. Law- 
 ton's Division at El Canej' wull be considered the 
 right w-ing; Kent's Division and Wheeler's Divis- 
 ion the left wing of the army at San Juan. The 
 71st did not seem to know when it w as going to 
 move toward the front, nor just where it was go- 
 ing; and there was no apparent effort being made 
 to get further down the road to the front. Wheel- 
 er's Division was also pressing forward on the 
 road, dismounted cavalrymen, with no arras in 
 their hands except their carbines without bay- 
 onets. With these same carbines these men were, 
 a little later, to storm the intrenchments, manned 
 by picked and veteran soldiers, who knew how to 
 die at their posts. 
 
 With Wheeler's Division wore the Rough Kiders, 
 the most unique aggregation of fighting men ever 
 gathered together in any army. There were cow- 
 
126 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 boys, bankers, brokers, merchants, city clubmen, 
 and society dudes ; commanded by a doctor, second 
 in command a literary politician; but every man 
 determined to get into the fight. About three- 
 quarters of a mile in advance was the first ford, the 
 ford of the Aguadores River; beyond this a quar- 
 ter of a mile was another ford, the ford of the San 
 Juan. The road forked about two hundred yards 
 east of the Aguadores ford, turning sharply to 
 the left. Down the road from El Poso crept the 
 military balloon, it halted near this fork — ''Bal- 
 loon Fork," Two officers were in its basket, six 
 or eight hundred feet above the surface of the 
 giound, observing the movements of the troops 
 and the disposition of the enemy. 
 
 The sharp crackle of the musketry began in 
 front, and still the Gatling Gun Detachment lay 
 beside the road with the 71st, waiting, swearing, 
 broiling, stewing in their own perspiration, mad 
 with thirst, and crazed with the fever of the battle. 
 The colonel of the 71st was again approached, to 
 ascertain whether he was now going to the front, 
 but still there were no signs of any indication to 
 move forward. So the long-eared steed was 
 mounted and the ford of the Aguadores reconnoi- 
 tered. The bullets were zipping through the rank 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 127 
 
 tropical jungle. Two or three men were hit. 
 Those who moved forward were going single file, 
 croiuhing low, at a dog trot. There was no evi- 
 dence of hesitation or fear here. Some of the 
 ^'Brunettes" passed, their blue shirts unbuttoned, 
 corded veins protruding as they slighly raised 
 their heads to look forward, great drops of per- 
 spiration rolling down their sleek, shiny, black 
 skins. There was a level spot, slightly open, be- 
 yond the ford of the Aguadores, which offered a 
 place for going into battery; from this place the 
 enemy's works on San Juan were visible, a faint 
 streak along the crest of the hill illumined from 
 time to time by the flash of Mausers. 
 
 On return to the battery, there were no signs 
 of being able to enter the action with the gallant 
 71st, and, acting under the second clause of the 
 instructions, the Gatling battery was moved for- 
 ward at a gallop. ]Major Sharpe, a mounted mem- 
 ber of Gen. Shafter's staff, helped to open a way 
 through this regiment to enable the guns to pass. 
 The reception of the battery by these valiant men 
 was very different from that so recently given by 
 the 13th Regulars. ''Give 'em hell, boys I" ''Let 
 'er go, Gallagher'" "Goin' to let the woodpeckers 
 go off?" — and cheer after cheer went up as the 
 
128 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 battery passed through. Vain efforts were made 
 to check this vociferous clamor, which was plainly 
 audible to the enemy, less than 1500 yards away, 
 The bullets of the enemy began to drop lower. 
 The cheering had furnished them the clew they 
 needed. They had located our position, and the 
 71st atoned for this thoughtlessness by the loss 
 of nearly eighty men, as it lay cowering in the 
 underbrush near Balloon Fork. 
 
 Just before reaching the Aguadores ford, the 
 battery was met by Col. Derby, who had been 
 observing the disposition of the troops, from the 
 balloon, and had afterward ridden to the front on 
 horseback. The colonel was riding along, to push 
 the infantry forward in position from the rear, 
 as coolly as if on the parade-ground. A blade of 
 grass had gotten twisted around a button of his 
 uniform and hung down like a buttonhole bouquet 
 over his breast. There was a genial smile on his 
 handsome face as he inquired, ''Where are you 
 going?" and, on being informed of the orders 
 of the detachment and of the intention to put the 
 battery into action, he replied, "The infantry are 
 not deployed enough to take advantage of your 
 fire. I would advise that you wait a short time. 
 I will send vou word when the time comes." 
 
TEE GATLiyCr OUXS AT SANTIAGO. 129 
 
 The advice was acted upon, the guus were turned 
 out by the side of the road, and the men directed 
 to lie down. 
 
 During the gallop to the front they had been 
 compelled to run to keep up, there not being suffi- 
 cient accommodation for them to all go mounted 
 on the guns. They were panting heavily, and 
 they obeyed the order and crept under the guns, 
 taking advantage of such little shade as was of- 
 fered. Troops continued to pass to the front. The 
 crackle of musketry gradually extended to the 
 right and to the left, showing that the deployment 
 was being completed. More men were hit, but no 
 complaints or groans were heard. A ball struck 
 a limber-chest; a man lying on bis face in thf* 
 road, during a momentary pause of one of the 
 companies, was perforated from head to foot: he 
 never moved — just continued to lie there; the 
 flies began to buzz around the spot and settle on 
 the clotted blood, that i)oured out from the fract- 
 ured skull, in the dust of the road. Down at 
 the ford, some twenty-five or thirty yards in ad- 
 vance, men were being hit continually. 
 
 Shots came down from the trees around. The 
 sharpshooters of the Spanish forces, who had 
 been up in the trees during the artillery duel, and 
 
130 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 beyond whom our advance had swept, fulh' 
 believing that they would be murdered if cap- 
 tured, expecting no quarter, were recklessly shoot- 
 ing at everything in sight. They made a special 
 target of every man who wore any indication of 
 rank. Some of our heaviest losses during the day, 
 especially among commissioned officers, were 
 caused by these sharpshooters. They shot indis- 
 criminately at wounded, at hospital nurses, at 
 medical officers wearing the red cross, and at 
 fighting men going to the front. 
 
 The firing became too warm, and the Gatling 
 battery was moved back about fifty yards, again 
 halted, and faced to the front. It was now nearly 
 one o'clock. The members of the detachment had 
 picked up their haversacks on leaving El Poso, 
 and now began to nibble pieces of hardtack. A 
 bullet broke a piece of hardtack which a man was 
 lifting to his mouth; without even stopping in the 
 act of lifting it to his mouth, he ate the piece, 
 with a jest. 
 
 Suddenly the clatter of hoofs was heard from 
 the front. Lieut. Miley dashed up and said, ''Gen. 
 Shaffer directs that you give one piece to me, and 
 take the other three beyond the ford, where the 
 dynamite gun is, find some position, and go into 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 131 
 
 action." Sergeaut ^yeigle'^ guii was placed at 
 Miley's disposal, and the other pieces dashed for- 
 ward at a dead run, led bv the musical mule who 
 uttered his characteristic exclamation as he 
 dashed through the ford of the Aguadores. 
 
 The place formerly selected for going into 
 action had been again twice reconnoitered dur- 
 ing the wait, and a better place had been found 
 about thirty yards beyond the ford of the 
 San Juan River. The dynamite gun had stuck 
 in the ford of the Aguadores; a shell had got 
 jammed in it. The Gatlings were compelled 
 to go around it. They dashed through the inter- 
 vening space, across the San Juan ford, and up on 
 the opening beyond. The position for the battery, 
 partially hidden from the view of the enemy by a 
 small clump of underbrush, was indicated. The 
 right piece, Serg. Green's, was compelled to go 
 into action in the middle of the road, and in plain 
 sight of the enemy. While the pieces were being 
 unlimbered, which was only the work of an in- 
 stant, an inquiry was made o-f Captain Bough- 
 ton, of the 3d Cavalry, whose troop had just 
 reached this point, as to the position of our troops 
 and of the enemy, with the further remark that 
 the battery had been under fire since eight o'clock. 
 
132 THE GATLING GVN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and had not seen a Spaniard. ''I can show you 
 plenty of Spaniards," replied Boughton, and, rais- 
 ing his hand, pointed toward the San Juan block- 
 house and the ridge in its vicinity, sweeping his 
 hand toward the right. It was enough. Before 
 his hand had fallen to his side, the pieces were 
 musically singing. 
 
 Corp. Steigerwald turned and asked, "What 
 is the range, sir?" To which was instantly replied, 
 ''Block-house, 600 yards; the ridge to the right, 
 800 yards." and Steigerwald's piece was grinding 
 500 shots a minute within a quarter of a second, 
 playing upon the San Juan block-house. Serg. 
 Green took 800 yards, and began to send his com- 
 pliments to the ridge beyond the block-house. In 
 an instant Priv. Sine, at Green's gun, who was 
 feeding, fell backward dead. At the same instant 
 Priv. Kastner fell out. Sine was shot through the 
 heart Kastner through the head and neck. At 
 this time Ryder's gun began to talk. It spoke 
 very voluble and eloquent orations, which, al- 
 though not delivered in the Spanish language, 
 were well understood by our friends, the enemy, 
 upon the hill. 
 
 Serg. Green, at the right gun. had run back for 
 ammunition, and Corp. Doyle, when Sine fell, 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 133 
 
 seized the pointing lever, and was coolly turning 
 the crank while he sighted the gim at the same 
 time. He was for the moment the only member of 
 the detachment left at the piece, but was given 
 assistance, and a moment later Green arrived and 
 began to feed the gun. 
 
 Steigerwald was short-handed. Some of his men 
 had been sun-struck during the run, and he, too, 
 was compelled to work his gun with only one as- 
 sistant. Then some of those who had been unable 
 to keep up arrived at the battery and began to 
 render assistance. Priv. Van Vaniugham, who 
 had gotten lost from his own command, began to 
 pass ammunition. Priv. Merryman, who was 
 holding his team back in the river, was im- 
 pressed by a doctor to help carry wounded men, 
 and Priv. Burkley, another man lost from his com- 
 mand, stepped into Merryman's place. Priv. 
 Chase left his team, seeing the piece short-handed, 
 and began to pass ammunition. The mules mere- 
 ly wagged their ears backward and forward and 
 stamped on account of the flies. 
 
 All these changes were accomplished, and the 
 pieces had not even ceased fire. Doyle had fed 
 about 100 rounds, alone. Capt. Landis. of the 1st 
 Cavalry, arrived just at this time, and volunteered 
 
134 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 to assist in observing the effect of the fire. He 
 stood fearlessly out in the middle of the road, just 
 to the right of Green's piece, in the very best posi- 
 tion for observation, but, at the same time, a most 
 conspicuous target for the enemy, and observed 
 the effect of the Gatling fire, as though he were 
 at target practice, reporting the same, continu- 
 ally, to the battery commander. 
 
 For the first two minutes the enemy seemed 
 dazed, then suddenly a perfect hell of leaden hail 
 swept through the foliage. The only thing that 
 saved the battery from absolute destruction was 
 that the enemy's shots were a little high. As it 
 was, many of them struck the ground between the 
 guns, and several hit the pieces. Three members of 
 the detachment v.ere slightly hurt. One mule was 
 shot through the ear. He sang the usual sovv; of 
 the mule, shook his head, and was suddenly hit 
 again on the fore leg. He plunged a little, but Priv. 
 Shiffer patted him on the head and he became 
 quiet. A bullet passed by Shiffer's head, so close 
 that he felt the wind fan his whiskers, and buried 
 itself in the saddle on the same mule. This sud- 
 den concentration of the enemy's fire lasted about 
 two minutes. 
 
 About the same time the detachment heard a 
 
TUE GATLI^a GVyS AT SANTIAaO. 135 
 
 ■wild cheer start on the left and gradual!}^ sweep 
 around to the left and right, until in every direc- 
 tion, sounding high above the din of battle and the 
 crackling of the Mausers, even above the rattle 
 of the Gatling guns, was heard the yell of recogni- 
 tion from our own troojjs. There was, for an 
 instant, a furious fusillade on our right and left, 
 and in a few moments the whole line of our troops 
 had risen and were moving forward to the San 
 Juan ridge. While moving forward, they neces- 
 sarily almost ceased to fire, but the fire of the Gat- 
 lings continued, deadly and accurate. A troop 
 of the 10th Cavalry, from our right and rear, 
 came up, part of the squadron commanded by Col. 
 Baldwin. Some of this troop did not understand 
 the Gatling gun drama, and were in the act of 
 firing a volley into our backs, when Lieut. Smith, 
 who was to so heroically lose his life within ten 
 minutes afterward, sprang out in front of the 
 excited troopers, and, with tears in his eyes, im- 
 plored them not to fire, that these were "our own 
 Gatlings." They did not fire in our direction, but 
 they did give a most thrilling and welcome cheer, 
 as the squadron swept forward by our right. Col. 
 Baldwin ran up, and shouted that he would place 
 two troops in support of the battery as long as 
 
136 THE GATLIXG GUMS AT SAXTIAUO. 
 
 they were needed. It was the first time the battery 
 had ever had a support of auy kind. 
 
 After a couple of minutes, the enemy's fire per- 
 ceptibly slackened. It was evident they were 
 seeking cover from our fire in the bottom of their 
 ditches, and our fire at this time was being made 
 chiefly from the Gatling battery. This cessation 
 of fire on the part of the enemy lasted about 
 two minutes, and then the Gatling gunners ob- 
 served the Spaniards climbing from their trenches. 
 Until that time the Gatling battery had been 
 worked with dogged persistency and grim silence, 
 but from that moment every member of the bat- 
 tery yelled at the top of his voice until the com- 
 mand "Cease firing'' was given. Groups of the 
 enemy, as they climbed from their trenches, were 
 caught by the fire of the guns, and were seen to 
 melt away like a lump of salt in a glass of water. 
 Bodies the size of a company would practically 
 disappear an instant after a gun had been turned 
 upon them. 
 
 This flight of the enemy from their trenches had 
 been caused by the fact that the charging line 
 had cut through the barb-wire fences at the foot 
 of the hill, and had started up the slope. The Span- 
 iards were unable to stav with their heads above 
 
THE GATLISU GUNS AT tiAXTIAUO. 137 
 
 the trenches to fire at the eharging-line, because 
 of the missiles of death poured iu by the machiue 
 guns; and to remain there awaiting the charge 
 was certain death. They did not have the nerve 
 to wait for the cold steel. They were demoralized 
 because they had been compelled to seek the bot- 
 tom of their trenches. American troops would 
 have awaited the charge, knowing that the ma- 
 chine gun lire must cease before contact could oc- 
 cur, but the Spaniards forgot this in their excite- 
 ment, and made the fatal mistake of running. 
 
 The Gatlings had the range to perfection. Capt. 
 Boughton, who was one of the first officers upon 
 the hill, stated, on the 1st of September at Mon- 
 tauk, that he visited a portion of the Spanish 
 trenches immediately upon arriving at the crest, 
 and that the trenches which he inspected were 
 literally filled with writhing, squirming, tangled 
 masses of dead and wounded Spaniards, and that 
 the edge of the trenches was covered with wound- 
 ed and dead Spaniards, who had been shot in the 
 act of climbing out. This execution was done 
 mainly by the machine guns, because the infantry 
 and cavalry were not firing much when it was 
 done; they were running up the hill to the charge. 
 
 Colonel Egbert, who commanded the 0th Infan- 
 
138 TEE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 try, states, in his official report, that when his reg- 
 iment reached the sharp incline near the top of 
 the hill they were brought to a standstill because 
 the Gatliug bullets were striking along the crest. 
 The officers of the 13th Infantry state the same 
 thing. It was Lieut. Ferguson, of the 13th, who, 
 when the troops had climbed as high as possible 
 under the leaden canopy which the Gatlings made 
 to cover their charge, w^aved his white handker- 
 chief as a signal to cease firing. At the same mo- 
 ment Landis exclaimed, "Better stop; our men are 
 climbing the hill now." A shrill whistle gave the 
 signal "Cease firing," and the Gatling Gun Bat- 
 tery, to a man, rose to their feet and gazed with 
 absorbing interest as the long, thin, blue line 
 swept forward and crowned the crest of the hill. 
 An instant later an American fiag floated proudly 
 from the San Juan block-house; then the roar of 
 musketry and the volley of rifles indicated that 
 the fleeing enemy was receiving warm messengers 
 as he ran down the hill toward his second line of 
 intrenchments. 
 
 The next immediate duty confronting the de- 
 tachment was to take stock of losses and to occupy 
 the captured position in case of necessity. 
 
 Private Sine had been killed and Private Kast- 
 
THE GATLING ODNS AT SANTIAGO. 139 
 
 ner was supposed to be mortally wounded. Pri- 
 vate Elkins fell exhausted just as the Stars and 
 Stripes were run up on the block-house. He had 
 been knocked down by the pole of a limber, which 
 struck him over the kidneys, but had continued 
 to feed his gun until the very last. He was utter- 
 ly exhausted. Sergeant Green had been wounded 
 slightly in the foot, but not enough to disable him. 
 Private Bremer had been hit early in the morning 
 by the fragment of a shell on the hand. One or 
 two other members had been merely touched, 
 grazed by balls. Private Greenberg had been 
 overcome by the heat. Merryman, one of the 
 teamsters, as stated before, had been seized to 
 carry wounded. Private Lauer was missing and 
 Dellett sunstruck. Private Hoft had joined the 
 battery on hearing it go into action, and it was 
 necessary to send someone back as guard over the 
 camp equipage. A volunteer was called for. and 
 it was with the utmost diflBculty that a member 
 of the detachment. Private Pyne, was induced to 
 take this duty. He shot four Spanish sharp- 
 shooters, who were shooting at our wounded and 
 our medical officers, out of trees near El Poso, 
 during the remainder of the day. Private Chase 
 had sprained his back so badly as to be unable to 
 
140 TEE GATLIXG GUX8 AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 ride a mule; aiid two places were vacant for 
 drivers. It w^as necessary to instantly supply 
 this deficiency. Private Burkley, IGtli Infantry, 
 wlio had assisted in passing ammunition during 
 the firing, volunteered to drive one of the teams, 
 and Private Correll the other. Private Eaymond^ 
 (5th Cavalry, aiid Private Van Vaningham, of the 
 same regiment, also joined the detachment at this 
 point, being separated from their own commands. 
 The pieces were limbered up as soon as these 
 dispositions could be made, except Sergeant Ry- 
 der's gun. which had bent the pintle-pin and con- 
 sequently could not be limbered quickly. The 
 other two pieces and the limber belonging to Ry- 
 der's gun were moved forward on a run to the 
 captured position on the San Juan ridge, gun 
 crew^s riding or following as best they could. Both 
 pieces went into action on the right of the road. 
 A limber was then sent back for Ryder's gun, and 
 it was brought up, Priv. Shiffer performing this 
 duty under a perfect hail of dropping fire. In ad- 
 vancing from the position at the ford to the cap- 
 tured position it was necessary to cut three barb- 
 wire fences. The members of the detachment be- 
 haved with the utmost coolness, all working to- 
 gether to remove these obstructions, and not a man 
 
m 
 
 ^ 
 
 O 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 141 
 
 sought shelter, although a dropping fire was strik- 
 ing around the detachment, from some source. 
 Where this fire came from it was impossible to 
 tell; but it did not come from the enemy. 
 
 The two pieces which first reached the top of 
 the hill were halted under shelter of the crc^st. 
 while the ground above was reconnoitered. It 
 was instantly observed that the enemy was com- 
 ing back for a counter-charge. Accordingly the 
 pieces were immediately run to the top of the hill, 
 the drivers, Shiffer and Correll, riding boldly up 
 and executing a left-about on the skirmish line, 
 where the skirmishers were hing down. The 
 pieces were unlimbered and instantly put into ac- 
 tion at point-blank range, the skirmishers giving 
 way to the right and left to make way for the 
 guns. The enemy was less than 300 yards away, 
 and apparently bent on recovering the position. 
 
 The fire immediately became very hot. A skir- 
 misher, who had thought to gain a little cover by 
 lying down beside the wheel of the right gun 
 (Green's), was shot through the arm. "I knowed 
 it," he growled; ''I might have knowed that if I 
 got near that durned gun. I "d get potted." He 
 rolled down behind the crest; a soldier produced 
 an emergency packet, staunched the blood, and 
 
142 THE CrATLIXG GUXS AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 the wounded soldier, finding no bones broken, 
 returned to the firing-line and resumed his work. 
 The enemy, at this part of the line, began to waver, 
 and again broke toward his second line of in- 
 trenchments. 
 
 Just at this moment, Lieut. Traub came up and 
 shouted, "Gen. Wood orders you to send one or 
 two of your guns over to help Roosevelt." The 
 order to move the guns was disregarded, but 
 Traub pointed out the enemy, which was menac- 
 ing Col. Roosevelt's position, and insisted. About 
 600 yards to the right, oblique from the position 
 of the guns and perhaps 200 yards, or less, in 
 front of the salient occupied by Col. Roosevelt and 
 the 3d Cavalry (afterward called Fort Roosevelt), 
 there was a group of about 400 of the enemy, 
 apparently endeavoring to charge the position. 
 There w'as no time to notify the second piece. 
 Serg. Green's gun was instantly turned upon this 
 group, at point-blank elevation. The group melt- 
 ed away. Capt. Marcotte states that, after the 
 surrender, some Spanish officers, whom he met, 
 and who were members of this group, described 
 this to liini, stating that the enemy seen at this 
 point was a body of about 600 escaping from El 
 Caney; that they were struck at this point by 
 
THE OATLIXO GUNS AT SAyTIAUO. 143 
 
 machine gun fire so effectively that only forty of 
 theui ever got back to !=5antiago; the rest were 
 killed. 
 
 Serg. Green's gun, already heated to a red heat 
 by the continuous firing of the day, had been 
 worked to its extreme limit of rapidity while firing 
 at this body of the enemy, and on ceasing to 
 fire, several cartridges exploded in the gun before 
 they could be withdrawn. A ball lodged in one 
 barrel from one of these explosions, and this piece 
 was drawn down out of action just as the piece 
 which had been left at the ford returned. Subse- 
 quently the disabled piece was sent back to the 
 ford, with the idea that that would be a safer 
 place to overhaul it than immediately in rear of 
 the firing-line. The piece remained at the ford 
 until the night of the 3d of July, when it was 
 brought up to the battery, then at Fort Roosevelt, 
 and on the 4th was finally overhauled and put into 
 action. This led to the impression, on the part 
 of some of the command, that one of the Gatlings 
 had been blown up, which was not true. The gun 
 was not injured, except that one barrel could 
 not be used during the remainder of the fighting, 
 but the gun was used on the morning of the -ith, 
 and during the whole of the engagement on the 
 
144 TEE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO., 
 
 10th and 11th, as well as on outpost duty, using 
 nine barrels instead of ten. 
 
 Following this repulse of the enemy, which oc- 
 curred about 4:30 p. m., there was a lull in the 
 firing. Advantage was taken of this to visit Col. 
 Eoosevelt's position and inspect the line of battle. 
 Upon reaching the salient, Col. Koosevelt was seen 
 walking up and down behind his line, encouraging 
 his men, while a group of them was held, just in 
 the rear of the crest, in charge of Maj. Jenkins, 
 to support the firing-line if necessary. On the 
 right of the Rough Riders, the 3d Cavalry were 
 in the fight, and Capt. Boughton was again en- 
 countered. 
 
 The firing suddenly began again, and it was 
 remarkable to observe the coolness with which 
 these two oflicers sauntered up and down the line, 
 utterly regardless of the bullets, which were cut- 
 ting the grass in every direction. There were no 
 soft places on this part of the hill. The enemy's 
 sharpshooters, up in high trees, were able to see 
 every point of the crest, and were dropping their 
 shots accurately behind it at all points. 
 
 Just at this moment, Serg. Weigle came up with 
 his gun. Serg. Weigle had had a hard time. His 
 gun had been taken, under direction of Lieut. 
 
o 
 
 o 
 
 d 
 w 
 
THE OATLINQ GUyS AT SANTIAGO. 145 
 
 Miley, to a point near the San Juan farm-house, 
 and pulled to the top of the hill. Weigle, whose 
 only idea of a battle, at this time, was a chance to 
 shoot, had been, to his intense disgust, restrained 
 from opening fire. Then the piece had been taken 
 down from the hill and around to the left of the 
 line, where Lieut. Miley's duty as aide had carried 
 him, to observe the progress of the battle, and 
 Weigle had been again denied the privilege of 
 "potting" a Spaniard. He was the most disgusted 
 man in the American Army; he was furious; he 
 was white-hot; he was so mad that the tears rolled 
 down his cheeks, as he reported with a soldierly 
 salute, "Sir, Serg. Weigle reports, with his gun. 
 Lieut. Miley did not allow me to open fire. I 
 would like to have orders." 
 
 In spite of the critical condition of the engage- 
 ment, it was extremely ludicrous; but the reopen- 
 ing of the fire at this moment presented an oppor- 
 tunity to accommodate the sergeant to his heart's 
 content. He was directed to run his piece up on 
 the firing-line, report to the officer in charge there- 
 of, and go into action as soon as he pleased. 
 Within thirty seconds he was getting his coveted 
 opportunity. He fired until his gun became ac- 
 cidentally jammed, pulled it down behind the 
 
146 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. ' 
 
 crest of the hill aud removed the defective cart- 
 ridge, returned it and repeated this operation, act- 
 ually bringing the gun down three times, and re- 
 turning it into action, doing very effective work, 
 and all the time displaying the utmost coolness 
 and good judgment, A sharpshooter began to 
 make a target of Weigle's gun, and "potted" a cou- 
 ple of men belonging to the cavalry near it. This 
 made Weigle so mad that he turned the guu, for 
 a moment, upon the tree in which the sharp- 
 shooter was concealed. That sharpshooter never 
 shot again. Finally, Weigle's gun got so hot, and 
 he himself so cool, that he concluded the piece 
 was too warm for further firing. So he ran it 
 down behind the hill, and ran his detachment back 
 on the hill with rifles, and, during the remainder 
 of the evening, the members of this crew practiced 
 with "long Toms" upon the Spanish soldiers. 
 
 On returning to the other two pieces near the 
 road, they were moved to another position, on the 
 other side of the road. This precaution was judi- 
 cious in order to conceal the pieces, or change 
 their position, because the enemy had pretty thor- 
 oughly located them in the previous brush, and it 
 was rather dangerous to remain at that place. It 
 was now nearly sundown. Scarcely had the pieces 
 
THE OATLING GUNS AT SAXTlAdO. 147 
 
 opened at this new position, when a battery of 
 the enemy's artillery, located near the hospital, 
 began to fire at them. There was a heavy gun, 
 which made a deep rumbling sound, and this 
 sound was supplemented by the sharp crack of 
 a field-piece. A shell came whistling overhead 
 and exploded within thirty yards of the battery, 
 just beyond it. Another one came, and this time 
 the enemy's artillery was located. Quick as a flash, 
 the two Gatlings were turned upon the enemy's 
 guns at the 2000-yard range. Another shell came 
 whistling along and exploded about ten feet over- 
 head and twenty feet in rear of the battery. 
 It tore up the grass in rear of the battery. After 
 this engagement was over, Priv. Shiffer picked up 
 the still hot fuse of this last shell. It was a large 
 brass combination fuse, and set at eight seconds, 
 which justified the estimated range. This third 
 shell was the last one the enemy was able to fire 
 from these pieces. The powerful field-glasses 
 which were used in locating the battery revealed 
 the fact that as soon as the Gatling guns were 
 turned on it, the Spanish gunners ran away from 
 their pieces. The big gun turned out to be a 
 IG-centimeter converted bronze piece, mounted 
 on a pintle in barbette, rifled and using smokeless 
 
148 THE GATLIXa GVX8 AT SA^^TIAGO. 
 
 powder. It was also found that they were firing 
 four 3-inch field-pieces of a similar character in 
 this battery, as well as two mountain guns. 
 
 It is claimed that this is the first time in the his- 
 tory of land fighting that a battery of heavy guns 
 was ever put out of action by machine-gun fire. 
 This battery of the Spanish was never afterward 
 able to get into action. Their pieces, which had 
 been loaded for the fourth shot, were found on the 
 18th of July, still loaded, and a Spanish ofiQcer 
 gave the information that they had lost more than 
 forty men trying to work that battery, since the 
 1st of July. This is accounted for by the fact that 
 this Spanish battery was made the subject of crit- 
 ical observation by the Gatling Gun Detachment 
 from this time on. 
 
 During this last engagement it had been neces- 
 sary to obtain more men to assist in carrying am- 
 munition, and Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, 
 had furnished a detail, consisting of Serg. Gra- 
 ham and Privates Smith and Taylor, Troop E, 
 10th Cavalry. These colored soldiers proved to 
 be excellent. They remained with the battery un- 
 til the end of the fighting on the 17th, and were 
 in every respect the peers of any soldier in the de- 
 tachment. Serg. Graham was recommended for 
 
THE GAT LING GUNS AT 8 AX T I AGO. 149 
 
 a medal of honor. Privates Smith and Taylor 
 did as good service, were as willing, as obedient, 
 as prompt, and as energetic in the discharge of 
 their duties as any commanding oflScer could wish 
 to have. It is a great pleasure to be able to give 
 this testimony to the merits of our colored troop- 
 ers, and to say, in addition, that no soldiers ever 
 fought better than the "Brunettes" of the 9th 
 and 10th Cavalry, who fought from the 3d of July 
 until the 12th, near or with the Gatlings. 
 
 After the firing at the ford had ceased, Capt. 
 Marcotte had returned to El Poso to investigate 
 the movements of our artillery. These were then, 
 and have remained, one of those inscrutable and 
 mysterious phenomena of a battle; incomprehen- 
 sible to the ordinary layman, and capable of be- 
 ing understood only by "scientific'' soldiers. The 
 charge upon the San Juan ridge was practically 
 unsupported by artillery. No American shells 
 had struck the San Juan block-house; none had 
 struck or burst in its vicinity; not even a moral 
 effect by our artillery had assisted in the assault. 
 So Marcotte had gone to investigate the artillery 
 arm. He returned at sundown, and brought the 
 iiifonnation that our baggage was safe at El Poso; 
 that Private Pyne, still alive and unhurt, had 
 
150 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 been doing good work against the enemy's sharp- 
 shooters; and, better than all this, had brought 
 back with him a canteen of water from the San 
 Juan River and a pocket full of hardtack. He 
 poured out his hardtack, and it was equally dis- 
 tributed among the members of the detachment, 
 each man's share amounting to two pieces. Each 
 man was also given a sup of water from the 
 canteen, and this constituted their only supper 
 on that night, as they had been compelled to throw 
 away everything to keep up with the guns. Hav- 
 ing disposed of that, exhausted Nature could do 
 no more; they lay down in the mud where they 
 stood, and slept so soundly that even the firing 
 which occurred that night did not arouse them 
 from their slumbers. They were not disturbed un- 
 til Best's Battery began to occupy this hill about 
 four o'clock in the morning. They were then 
 aroused and the Gatling guns were drawn down, 
 and the whole battery moved to the salient occu- 
 pied by the Rough Riders, because their position 
 was at that time closest to the enemy, and, as was 
 determined by the previous day's reconnaissance, 
 offered a chance to enfilade several of the enemy's 
 trenches with machine gun fire. 
 
TEE GATLIXa GC/X-S' AT SAXTIACO. 151 
 
 To dispose of the subject of artillery, it may l)e 
 said that Best's Battery and some other artillery 
 occupied the ground vacated by the Gatlings on 
 the morning of July 2d, fired four shots, and then 
 withdrew with more haste than dignity. They 
 remarked, 'This is the hottest fire to which artil- 
 lery has been subjected in modern times,'' and lit 
 out to find a cooler place. They found it — so far 
 in rear that their fire was almost equally danger- 
 ous to friends and foes on account of the close 
 proximity of the two firing-lines. The obvious 
 conclusion is that machine guns can live at close 
 ranges, where artillery can not stay. There is no 
 better light artillery in the world than that which 
 had to withdraw from San Juan block-house and 
 Its vicinity, on the morning of July 2d. 
 
152 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Tactical Analysis of the Battles at Santiago. 
 
 The situation of affairs on the night of the 1st 
 of July was rather critical. The plan which the 
 general had laid down had been delayed in exe- 
 cution at El Caney, while the impetuousity of the 
 troops had precipitated an unexpected rapidity 
 of movement at San Juan. Capron's Battery had 
 opened at El Caney about half past seven o'clock, 
 with badly aimed and ill-directed fire, which did 
 very little damage to the enemy. The troops en- 
 gaged in this part of the battle were pushed for- 
 ward until, by about eleven o'clock, they had be- 
 come pretty thoroughly deployed around the vicin- 
 ity of Las Guamas Creek. They had also extended 
 slightly to the right and to the left toward the 
 Du Cuorot house. The Spanish forts obstinately 
 held out. and the handful of Spanish soldiers in 
 El Caney and vicinity stubbornly resisted the at- 
 tack made by our troops. 
 
 About nine o'clock, Hamilton's right piece, No. 
 3 of Capron's Battery, succeeded in planting a 
 shell directly in the old stone fort, which knocked 
 
THE OATLING OVNS AT SAXTIACO. 153 
 
 a hole in the masoury; but, just at this juncture, 
 the batteiy was ordered to cease firing at the block- 
 house, and to shell the enemy's trenches. The 
 enemy forthwith utilized the hole made in the wall 
 by the shell as a loop-hole, and continued to fire 
 through it until the fort was taken by the infantry 
 assault at about half-past four o'clock. No worse 
 commentary than this could possiblybe made upon 
 the tactical handling of this battery of artillery, 
 because, having obtained perfectly the range of 
 the enemy's stronghold, it was simply asinine not 
 to knock that bloek-house to pieces immediately. 
 
 So Lawi:on's Division had remained in front of 
 El Caney, held by about 1000 Spaniards, while 
 the shadows crept from the west to the north, from 
 the north to the northeast, and from the northeast 
 toward the east. It was coming toward night be- 
 fore the artillery was finally turned loose. One 
 corner and the roof of this block-house were 
 knocked off, but even then the artillery was so 
 poorly handled that the enemy had to be dislodged 
 from this block-house by hand-to-hand fighting. 
 A single Hotchkiss gun, properly handled, should 
 have converted it into ruins in thirty minutes. 
 
 While these events were transpiring, Kent and 
 Wheeler, constituting the left wing of the army. 
 
154 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 had moved forward on the El Poso road, parallel 
 to the Aguadores Eiver, as far as the San Juan, 
 had captured the San Juan farm-house, and had 
 gradually deployed to the right and to the left 
 along the San Juan Eiver. About one o'clock 
 their line had swept forward and had captured 
 the first ridge between the San Juan and the city 
 of Santiago, the "San Juan ridge," driving the 
 enemy on this portion of the field into their last 
 trenches. But the right flank of this wing was 
 entirely unsupported, and the road by the way 
 of Fort Canosa to San Juan, passing by the por- 
 tion of the line subsequently occupied by the dyna- 
 mite gun, marked the extreme position of the right 
 of this wing of the army. The enemy was already 
 well toward its right, and had the excellent El 
 Caney road to move upon. He was thoroughly 
 familiar with the country, while the troops com- 
 posing this wing were exhausted by the charge. 
 This wing had no reserve that the firing-line 
 knew of, and, as a matter of fact, had none except 
 two battalions of the 71st New York, which had 
 not got into battle, and which were scattered 
 along the road from the San Juan River to 
 Siboney. 
 
THE GATLIXG GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 155 
 
 The position occui)ied by the left wing of the 
 army was a strong natural position, but had no 
 protection for the right flank. In this, Lawton's 
 Division did not execute the part of the battle as- 
 signed to it. Thus the officers on the San Juan 
 ridge, who knew anything about the plan of the 
 battle, were constantly directins their gaze, at 
 every lull in the fighting, toward El Caney, and to 
 the right of Gen. Wood's position, but there were 
 no indications of the approach of Gen. Lawton. 
 
 Keturning now to the right wing: the San Juan 
 block-house and the ridge in its vicinity having 
 been captured, a glance at the map will show that 
 the retreat of the Spanish forces at El Caney was 
 in imminent danger of being cut off. This capture 
 occurred at 1:23^ p. m. The Spanish commander 
 at El Caney had been killed about noon, his 
 men had suffered heavily, and the new command- 
 ing officer discovered that his retreat by the El 
 Caney road was threatened. The only other line 
 of retreat was by way of the San Miguel and 
 Cuabitas roads. The Spanish forces at El Caney 
 were also running low in their ammunition, and it 
 was therefore decided to withdraw. Portions of 
 the Spanish troops did withdraw, some by way 
 of the El Canev road toward Santiago; the re- 
 
156 THE GATLIXa GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 mainder, some 350 or 400, were crushed in the final 
 charge upon El Caney, between 4 and 4:30 o'clock. 
 Gen. Lawton's Division then proceeded down 
 the El Caney road to Santa Cruz, passing by way 
 of the masonry bridge. This was about dusk. The 
 division marched in columns of fours, with the 
 artillery in front in column of sections, and with- 
 out even an advance guard thrown out. The ar- 
 tillery had passed the masonry bridge and had 
 nearly reached the Santa Cruz farm-house, when 
 the order was given to halt. The division halted 
 in the road and began to cook supper. Fires were 
 kindled, and coffee put on to boil. Suddenly, a 
 few shots came scattering over the ridge and 
 dropped in among the troops. A messenger was 
 sent back to Gen. Shaffer to inform him that fur- 
 ther advance in this direction was not practicable, 
 as the enemy had been encountered in force. The 
 position this division was destined, in the begin- 
 ning, to occupy was within less than 300 yards 
 of where it halted. There was no large body of 
 Spanish troops in that portion of the field. The 
 whole valley between that ridge and Santiago 
 had been swept by machine gun fire during the 
 afternoon. It is possible that there might have 
 been a few Spanish pickets on the ridge, but this 
 
THE GATLiyO GDNS AT SAXTIAGO. 157 
 
 is not believed to be probable. There was some 
 firing about this time from the Spanish trenches 
 near Fort Canosa, at the 13th Infantry upon the 
 hill where the dynamite gun was subsequently 
 placed, A glance at the map will show that these 
 shots, having passed over the hill, would drop in 
 the vicinity of the masonry bridge and the Santa 
 Cruz farm-house. This was the firing that alarmed 
 Lawton's Division and caused the report men- 
 tioned to be sent back to General Shafter. 
 
 This statement of the conditions has been neces- 
 sary in order to understand why the counter- 
 march was made by Lawton's Division. The posi- 
 tion at El Caney had ceased to be of any import- 
 ance as soon as the San Juan block-house and 
 ridge were taken; any Spanish troops remaining at 
 El Caney were necessarily victims. But it was vi- 
 tally important to hold the position gained by the 
 left wing. The appearance of a heavy force of the 
 enemy in front of the masonry bridge could signify 
 only one thing, and that was that the left wing, 
 with its right flank in the air, was liable to be 
 doubled up at any moment by a heavy force of the 
 enemy striking it upon that flank. Further, that 
 Gen. Lawton, witli this column advancing on the 
 El Caney road as before explained, was liable to be 
 
158 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 struck at the head of his column and similarly 
 doubled up. The enemy would thus interpose be- 
 tween the two wings of the army, cutting Lawton 
 off, and probably defeating the anny in detail, 
 unless something be done immediately. 
 
 Of course, it is known now that this opera- 
 tion of the enemy was never probable for an in- 
 stant; but that was the status of affairs at mid- 
 night on July 1st, as then reported to the com- 
 manding general. 
 
 Lawton was, therefore, ordered to withdraw, by 
 way of the El Caney road, back to Gen Shaffer's 
 headquarters in rear of El Poso, from which posi- 
 tion his division was rushed forward on the El 
 Poso road to San Juan on the 2d of July. His men 
 were marched almost all night, almost all day the 
 next day, and were well-nigh utterly exhausted 
 when they reached a position in rear of the right 
 flank of the left wing. It was supposed, up to 
 this time, at headquarters, that the information on 
 which this marching was ordered was correct. 
 
 During the time that Lawton had been counter- 
 marching from Santa Cruz, back by way of El Poso. 
 there had been, as before stated, no reserve for the 
 left wing. The independent division of Gen. Bates 
 had been ordered to the front as rapidly as possi- 
 
THE OATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 159 
 
 blo. Part of it had reached the vicinity of El Poso, 
 and from there one or two of the regiments had 
 participated in the fight, late on July 1st; but 
 nobody on the firing line knew anything about 
 Bates' independent division at this time, and it 
 was too much exhausted to be useful as a reserve. 
 The morning of the 2d it was used to extend the 
 lines. It is therefore evident, now that the history 
 of the battle is understood, that the Gatling guns 
 were the only effective reserve which the left wing 
 of the army had during the night of July 1st and 
 all day on the 2d. 
 
 Acting on this belief, the Gatling Gun Battery 
 was placed in reserve, in the rear of Fort Roose- 
 velt, on the morning of July 2d, and was held 
 there in reserve all day on July the 2d and 3d. 
 The pieces were placed within twenty yards of the 
 firing-line, just below the crest of the hill. The 
 feed-guides were filled, and the gun crews lay 
 down beside their pieces. The battery was ready 
 to either support the firing-line against a charge, 
 or protect its flank against a turning movement. 
 But it was not considered necessary or desirable 
 to run the pieces up on the firing-line in the open, 
 and participate in the trench-firing, which was 
 the onlv fighting done on July 2d and 3d. It was 
 
16C TEE OATLING GVN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 considered that the battery was too valuable as a 
 reserve to sacrifice any of its men uselessly. Some 
 very well-meaning officers urged that the battery 
 be rushed up on the hill and put into action, but 
 this was stubbornly refused, under the third 
 clause of the instructions given on the 1st of July, 
 "to make the best use of the guns possible." 
 Gen. Wood and Col. Roosevelt were consulted, 
 and they concurred with the above views, and the 
 battery remained in reserve. 
 
 On the morning of the 2d of July a handsome 
 young soldier, in the uniform of a Rough Rider, 
 approached the battery commander, saluted, and 
 said, "Col. Roosevelt directs me to report to you 
 with my two guns." Inquiry elicited the fact that 
 the young trooper was Serg. William Tiffany, that 
 he had command of two Colt's automatic rapid- 
 fire guns, with a crew consisting of Corp. Ste- 
 vens and six men, and that he had 4,000 rounds 
 of T-millimeter ammunition. Four thousand was 
 not a very large supply for two guns which 
 could fire at the rate of 500 shots each per minute. 
 Fortunately, the Catling Gun Detachment had 
 found time, on the 1st of July, to collect about 
 10,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition in the cap- 
 tured trenches, and a comparison of the Mauser 
 
o 
 
 > 
 X 
 C 
 
 K 
 
 O 
 
 IT. 
 
 > 
 
THE GATLiya GUXS AT SAXTIAdd. ICl 
 
 >vith tlu' 7-millimeter ammunition at once dis- 
 closed the fact that it was precisely the same 
 ammunition which Tiffany had brought along for 
 his guns. The problem of ammunition supply for 
 Tiffany's guns was solved. He now had 14,000 
 rounds, and his j^nns became a very ])ow('rfnl 
 reinforcement at this point. 
 
 Serg. Tiffany and his men had carried these guns 
 from Siboney to the firing-line upon their backs. 
 How they got the four boxes of ammunition 
 through they themselves could hardly tell. The 
 firing was too heavy to mount the tripods in the 
 trenches during the daytime, so placing the guns 
 was deferred until night. For some reason it was 
 not practicable to place the tripods on the night 
 of the 2d, and they were finally placed on the 
 night of the 3d; Serg. Tiffany, with two of his men, 
 aiding in digging the emplacements. 
 
 While digging, suddenly a burst of firing broke 
 out, and it was believed by many that a serious 
 night attack had been made. Dniing the firing, 
 Capt. Ayers, of the 10th Cavalry, and Col. Roose- 
 velt again displayed those characteristics of fear- 
 less bravery which so endeared these two gallant 
 officers to their men. Some of the troops in the 
 trcniches had begun to fire wildly. In fact, all the 
 
162 THE GATLIXa GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 firing was done wild; there was no sense in any of 
 it; there was no occasion for it Intent listening to 
 the enemy's fire made it absolutely certain that 
 their firing never approached nearer our lines. 
 There may have been some small body seeking to 
 explore the road, but there was no indication of 
 any attack in force. At any rate, Roosevelt and 
 Ayers determined to stop the firing of our line, 
 and suddenly, above the din of battle, these two 
 officers could be heard, tramping up and down 
 the trench in front of their men, haranguing, com- 
 manding, ridiculing their men for shooting in the 
 dark. Ayers told his men that they were no bet- 
 ter than the Cubans, upon which the burly black 
 troopers burst into a loud guffaw, and then 
 stopped firing altogether. Roosevelt told his men 
 that he was ashamed of them. He was ashamed 
 to see them firing valuable ammunition into the 
 darkness of the night, aiming at nothing; that he 
 thought cowboys were men who shot only when 
 they could see the "whites of the other fellow's 
 eyes." They also stopped firing. The enemy's 
 bullets continued to whiz by for a few minutes, 
 and they too ceased firing, and everybody began 
 to laugh at everybody else. Tiffany had joined 
 the two officers in their walk up and down, expos- 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SAXTIAIJO. 103 
 
 ing himself with the utmost coolness. He and 
 his men now succeeded in placinj; his guns in the 
 trench, and, from that time until the end of the 
 fight, they could hardly be induced to leave them 
 long enough to eat; they didn't leave them to sleep 
 — they slept in the trench by the guns. 
 
 About one o'clock on the 3d there was a lull in 
 the firing, during which a flag of truce was sent 
 with a communication to General Toral, notify- 
 ing him that a bombardment would follow unless 
 he surrendered. The firing was resumed and con- 
 tinued until about half past twelve on the 4th of 
 July, at which time another flag of truce went up, 
 and there was no more firing until the 10th of 
 July at about three o'clock. Troops, however, 
 were compelled to lie on their arms; the relief 
 was constantly in the trenches, and the nervous 
 strain was even worse than the actual dangers of 
 battle. 
 
 Negotiations for capitulation having failed, fir- 
 ing was resumed about three o'clock on the 10th, 
 and continued until one o'clock on the 11th of July. 
 In this firing all four of the Gatling guns were 
 used; Tiffany's guns and the dynamite gun under 
 Serg. Borrowe participated. Three of the Gatling 
 guns had been placed in the trench on the night 
 
164 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 of July 3d. The wheels were taken off and laid on 
 the ground in the rear of the pieces; sand-bag re- 
 vetments were built up in front of the guns, and 
 each crew divided into two reliefs. One relief was 
 required to be constantly at the gun and always 
 ready for instant action. The fourth gun, the one 
 that had been temporarily disabled, was repaired 
 on the 4th, thoroughly cleaned, and placed in re- 
 serve behind the crest of the hill. On the 4th of 
 July, Serg. Borrowe had been directed to obey any 
 instructions given him by the Gatling gun com- 
 mander, and the dynamite gun had been placed 
 in position to cooperate with the battery of ma- 
 chine guns. There were now, therefore, seven 
 pieces in the battery. It was the most powerful 
 and unique battery ever used in battle. 
 
 The Sims-Dudley pneumatic dynamite gun 
 throws a Whitehead torpedo, carrying a charge 
 of four and one-half pounds of explosive gelatine; 
 the effective force of this charge is equal to that 
 of nine pounds of dynamite, No. 1. The charge 
 explodes, on striking, by means of a percussion 
 fuse, and steadiness of flight is secured by means 
 of a vane. The propeljing force is a charge of 
 seven ounces of smokeless powder. The gun is 
 pointed in the same manner as a mortar, and fired 
 
> 
 
 r 
 i-i 
 
 5! 
 
 O 
 
 > 
 
 td 
 
 C 
 
 2 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 a 
 
 o 
 
THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 165 
 
 in the same manner as a field-piece. Diinnf? the 
 10th and 11th considerable attention was devoted 
 to the tactical cooperation of the guns composing 
 this unique battery. 
 
 The plan adopted was for the dynamite gun to 
 throw a shell toward a designated point. Upon the 
 explosion of this shell the Spanish soldiers invari- 
 ably exposed themselves, and were immediately 
 assailed by machine gun fire. Occasionally a dy- 
 namite shell would fall with sufficient accuracy 
 to do efficient work on its own account. On the 
 afternoon of the 10th a dynamite shell fell in a 
 long trench near Fort Canosa, clearing out the 
 trench. The Spanish survivors were cut down 
 almost to a man by the machine gun fire, and the 
 Spanish troops were unable to occupy this trench 
 until the following morning, when the operation 
 was repeated, practically destroying the useful- 
 ness of this trench during the whole fight. Capt. 
 Duueau, of the 21st Infantry, states that this re- 
 lieved his battalion of an enfilading fire, and was 
 a valuable service to them. Another dynamite 
 shell, on the afternoon of the 10th. fell into a 
 Spanish battery of artillery, near the brick hos- 
 pital, and completely destroyed the battery, which 
 consisted of two .''>-ineh guns. In all. about a 
 
166 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 dozeu dynamite shells were thrown with some de- 
 gree of accuracy, and with good effect. 
 
 The fourth Gatliug gun, which had been held 
 in reserve, was used during the afternoon of July 
 10th, and all day on the 11th, to pour a vertical 
 fire upon the city of Santiago, beyond that por- 
 tion that was visible to the American troops. Per- 
 haps 6,000 or 7,000 shots were thus dropped into 
 the heart of the city, making the streets unsafe, 
 communication difficult, and striking terror to 
 the hearts of the Spanish troops who were held 
 there in reserve. Gen. Toral, in his official state- 
 ment to his own government, specifically men- 
 tions this fire as one of his principal reasons for 
 surrender. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 10th and during the 
 11th of July a battery of mortars, under command 
 of Capt. Ennis, posted about half a mile to the 
 right of the machine gun battery, threw a few 
 shells at the enemy's intrenchments. There were 
 four of these mortars in action and they >\ ere 
 placed behind the ridge in a perfectly safe posi- 
 tion. They threw, perhaps, twenty-five shells all 
 told. The first eight or ten failed to explode for the 
 reason that the fuses hadnot been punched. Final- 
 ly, Capt. Ennis discovered that his shells were not 
 
THE GITLISU ULSH AT ISASTIKIO. 167 
 
 exploding, and, on inquiry, found that there was 
 no fuse-punch in the battery. He succeeded in 
 finding a brad-awl, which, luckily, some member 
 of the battery had in his pocket, and showed a 
 sergeant how to punch the fuse with a brad-awl. 
 After this the mortar shells exploded all right. 
 None of this fire, however, was directed at the 
 city; it was directed at the trenches of the enemy, 
 and not over eight or ten of the shells fell with 
 any precision. The mortar fire was effective in 
 the sense that it tended to demoralize the enemy, 
 but its material effect was very small. 
 
 There was no firing of field-pieces during 
 all this time of which any account is necessary. 
 The field-pieces were even less useful during this 
 time than they were on the 1st of July, if such a 
 thing could be possible. 
 
 On the night of the 4th of July the reserve Gat- 
 ling gun was posted to command the Fort Canosa 
 road, in support of a picket on that road, and from 
 that time until the surrender this piece w^as post- 
 ed there every night. The members, therefore, 
 of this detachment did practically double duty. 
 This was the gun in charge of Sergts. Weischaar 
 and Eyder, referred to in the official report. Luck- 
 
168 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ily, it was not fired, but there can be no doubt of 
 the immense value it would have had if its use 
 had been necessary. 
 
 Summing up the use of machine guns from 
 the 2d to the 11th of July, inclusive, it may be 
 said that they demonstrated the use of the arm 
 as a tactical reserve and an auxiliary to an out- 
 post, and that, in combination with a dynamite 
 gun, they demonstrated that a new arm of the ser- 
 vice had been formed which can live at closer range 
 to the enemy, and do far more effective work, than 
 artillery. Nor is this all to be considered. It 
 shonld be remembered that a field-piece throws a 
 shell which breaks into 273 fragments. The ma- 
 chine gun throws 1000 shots, and each of these 
 shots is aimed with absolute precision. There- 
 fore, at any effective range, the machine gun is 
 far superior to a field-piece against anything ex- 
 cept material obstacles. Of course the machine 
 guns will not do to batter down stone walls, nor 
 to destroy block-houses. It had already been dem- 
 onstrated on the 1st of July that "machine guns 
 can go forward with the charging-line to the lodg- 
 ment in the enemy's position," and that "their 
 presence on the field of battle, with a supply of 
 
THE GATLINO OVNS AT SANTIAGO. 169 
 
 ammunitiou for teu minutes, is a decisive factor 
 in the engagement." 
 
 These were the principal points claimed for the 
 machine gun in the discussion of the subject on 
 the 1st of January. The use of the machine gun 
 for advance and rear guards was not demonstrated 
 at Santiago, for the reason that no opportunity 
 was presented. 
 
170 THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 The Volunteers. 
 
 The white flag went up at one o'clock on the 
 11th, and this was the end of the fighting at San- 
 tiago. The Rough Riders had been moved from 
 the hill at Fort Roosevelt to a position west of the 
 El Caney road, and one of the Gatling guns had 
 been sent with them. This gun was brought back 
 on the 17th after the surrender. Various other 
 movements of troops occurred before the 17th, 
 which had been decided upon by the generals as 
 the last day of grace. Gen. Toral had been noti- 
 fied that one o'clock on the 17th was the time for 
 either the surrender or the signal for the assault. 
 The hour approached, and still the Spaniard at- 
 tempted to delay. The orders for the assault were 
 issued. The troops lay in the trenches with their 
 fingers on the triggers. Gen. Randolph had come 
 and pushed the artillery into better positions. 
 The pieces were loaded and the gunners stood 
 with their lanyards in their hands. The ammuni- 
 tion-boxes were opened. The nervous tension of 
 
THE OATLINO auyS AT SANTIAdO. 171 
 
 the line was terrific. The troops on the extreme 
 rijiht and left, designated for the assault, were 
 only waiting the word to dash forward upon the 
 intrenchments of the enemy. Then suddenly from 
 Gen. Wheeler's head(iuarters a mounted officer 
 was seen spurring eastward along the crest. He 
 was waving his hat over his head. His horse 
 gathered speed, and the foam began to fly from 
 his flanks and nostrils, and as Capt. McKittrick 
 passed he called, "No cheering, please; the city 
 and province of Santiago have surrendered." 
 
 The members of the Gatling Gun Detachment 
 walked to the top of the hill, and, facing toward 
 the gallant enemy who had so valiantly defended 
 the foi-edoomed city, silently took off their hats. 
 
 All along the line the reception of the glorious 
 news was marked by comments upon the gallant 
 defense which had been made. There was no dem- 
 onstration w^hich could have hurt the feelings of 
 so magnificent a foe. Five minutes after the sur- 
 render the American trench was lined by Amer- 
 ican troops on our side and Spanish troops on the 
 other. The Spanish troops brought bottles of mes- 
 cal, aguardiente, and wine. Our troops carried 
 hardtack and canned roast beef. These recent 
 foes began at once to exchange the necessaries 
 
172 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 of life and souvenirs of the siegeof Santiago. Ttiey 
 fraternized as all brave men do after the battle. 
 A few Cubans skulked around the rear of our line, 
 despised by both sides. 
 
 The next day witnessed the formal surrender 
 of the city. At twelve o'clock, the preliminary 
 formalities having been complied with, the 9th In- 
 fantry and a battalion of the 13th Infantry, the 
 two regiments which had been adjudged first hon- 
 ors in the assault, were ready as an escort to raise 
 the flag in the heart of the city. All of the other 
 regiments were formed upon the ground which 
 they occupied during the siege. As the second- 
 hands of our watches showed the minute of 
 twelve, noon, a field-piece burst upon the stillness 
 of the sultry day, and the band began the strains 
 of ''The Star-spangled Banner." Every hat was 
 taken off, and an instant later, efforts to restrain 
 it being ineffectual, six miles of solid cheering en- 
 compassed the latest American city. 
 
 Grizzled old soldiers, scarred with wounds from 
 Indian wars, and gay recruits who had arrived 
 too late to join in the fighting, gray-haired gener- 
 als and athletic young subalterns, all forgot pro- 
 priety and the silence usually enjoined in ranks 
 and joined in that tremendous yell. From over on 
 
THE GATLING GVNS AT SANTIAGO. 173 
 
 the right of the El Caiiey road we could hear the 
 "Eah! rah! rah!" of Harvard and the '^Rah! rah! 
 rah!" of Yale, mingled with the cowboy yell of the 
 Indian Territory. From the ranks of the Regu- 
 lars came the old Southern yell, mingled with the 
 Northern cheer. The most thrilling and dramatic 
 moment of the Spanish-American War had passed 
 into history. 
 
 The troops settled themselves down to wait for 
 developments, and while they waited, opportuni- 
 ties were presented for the first time to make ob- 
 servations of the personnel of this heterogeneous 
 army. 
 
 The American Regular is a type of his own, and 
 no description of him is necessary. He was the 
 fighting strength of the 5th Corps. Only three 
 Volunteer regiments participated in the charges 
 of July 1st— the 71st New York, the 2d Massachu- 
 setts, and the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. 
 
 The Volunteers presented many different types, 
 some good, some otherwise. There should be no 
 sympathy with that servile truckling to popular 
 sentiment which speaks of our brave Volunteers 
 indiscriminately, as if they were all good and all 
 equally w^ell instructed. There w^ere Volunteers 
 who were the equals of the Regulars in fighting 
 
174 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and in leadership. And there were some who 
 should have been at home pulling on a nursing- 
 bottle or attending a kindergarten. To praise 
 them indiscriminately creates a false impression 
 on the public, and works a rank injustice toward 
 those who were really good and efficient in the 
 service. It does even worse than that: it fosters 
 the popular idea that all there is to do to make 
 soldiers is to take so many laborers, clerks, hod- 
 carriers, or farmers, and put on them uniforms, 
 arm them with rifles, and call them "gallant Vol- 
 unteers"! Out upon such an insane delusion! 
 
 Fighting is a scientific trade. It would be no 
 more absurd to give an idiot a tambourine and 
 call him a musician — he w^ould be an idiot all the 
 same. So with the clerk, the laborer, the hod-car- 
 rier, the teacher; he remains the same in spite of 
 all the polished arms, resplendent uniforms, and 
 pompous titles bestowed upon him. He remains 
 just what he was before, until he learns his new 
 trade and becomes a. soldier by the acquisition of 
 the necessary knowledge and experience to prac- 
 tice his new calling. 
 
 It is one of the duties of trained officers to tell 
 these homely truths to the people who have not 
 made a study of the matter, in order that they 
 
THE OATUNO 0UN8 AT (SANTIAGO. 175 
 
 who foot the bills may understand what they pay 
 for and why they do it. And it is equally the 
 duty of the citizen who has no knowledge of the 
 subject to give a fair hearing to such statements, 
 and, if he finds them correct after due investiga- 
 tion, to translate the information thus imparted 
 into such laws as will in future supply an army 
 composed of soldiers who can fight, instead of a 
 herd of ignorant incompetents who die like rotten 
 sheep within half an hour's ride by rail of their 
 own homes. 
 
 These remarks can be illustrated by observa- 
 tions in Cuba. 
 
 For example, the .34th Michigan pitched its 
 camp on the hill at Fort Roosevelt on the 2d of 
 August. They were in an awful condition. A 
 man had died in one company the day before, and 
 there had not been enough able-bodied men in the 
 company to bury him. A detail had to be made 
 from another company to dig the grave. More 
 than fifty per cent of the regiment were sick, and 
 the remainder were far from well. At this time, 
 more than two w'eeks after the surrender, they 
 were still cooking individually. Within fifteen 
 minutes after their arrival they were overrunning 
 the Gatling gun camp, picking up the firewood 
 
176 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 which had been gathered by the detachment for 
 cooking purposes. An attempt to stop this 
 marauding was received with jeers. A green- 
 looking Wolverine at once began to make cat- 
 calls, and was ably seconded by his comrades. 
 Sentinels were then posted over the Gatling gun 
 camp, with orders to keep the Michiganders out; 
 they abused the sentinels in the same manner. 
 and their ofiScers made no effort to restrain 
 them. It became necessary to make a personal 
 matter of it. which was promptly done, and one 
 Wolverine was thereafter respectful — so respect- 
 ful, in fact, that he jumped to attention and took 
 off his hat to even the privates of the detachment. 
 The regiment took a delicate revenge. They 
 had dug neither latrines nor sinks. Up to this 
 time they used the surface of the camp-ground 
 over their own camp for this purpose. They now 
 took possession of a trench within twenty yards 
 of the battery's tents. The nuisance was intoler- 
 able, and was reported to their brigade head- 
 quarters. No attention was paid to the report. 
 Twelve hours later it was again reported, with the 
 same result. Twelve hours after this it was a 
 third time reported, with the same result. In the 
 meantime not a single shovelful of dirt had been 
 
THE GATLiyO GLXS AT SANTIAGO. 177 
 
 thrown on the trench and an odor arose from it 
 which was not exactly like the perfume of "Araby 
 the blest.'' 
 
 Forty-five hours after the arrival of the regi- 
 ment notice was served upon the brigade com- 
 mander thereof that, unless the nuisance was 
 abated immediately, a sentinel would be placed 
 over the offending ditch and notice would be given 
 to General Bates, the division commander, re- 
 questing the action of an inspector; notice was 
 further served that if any resistance were made, 
 four Gatlipg guns would be turned loose upon 
 the 34th Michigan and the regiment swept off the 
 face of the hill and into Santiago Bay for a much- 
 needed bath. It was enough. Officers and men 
 ran instantly for spades and proceeded to fill up 
 the trench. Report was then made to Gen. Bates, 
 the division commander, of the offense and action 
 had thereon, with the information that the Gat- 
 ling gun commander awaited to answer any com- 
 plaints. An investigation was immediately made, 
 with the result that such action was sustained. 
 
 There were some ignorant Volunteers at Santi- 
 ago, but of all the willful violation of all the laws 
 of sanitation, camp hygiene, and health ever seen, 
 these particular Volunteers did the most outra- 
 
178 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 geous tilings. They threw their kitchen refuse out 
 on the ground anywhere; half of the time they did 
 not visit the sink at all, but used the surface of 
 the ground anywhere instead ; and they continued 
 these offenses at Montauk Point. They raked 
 over an abandoned camp of the Spanish prisoners 
 on their arrival at Fort Koosevelt, and appropri- 
 ated all the cast-off articles they could find, using 
 the debris for bedding. This surgeon, a "family 
 doctor'- from the pine woods in northern Michi- 
 gan, did not seem to regard these matters as of 
 any importance. His attention was called to 
 them, but he took no action. In short, there was 
 no law of health which these people did not utterly 
 ignore, no excess dangerous to health which they 
 did not commit. Three-fourths of them were too 
 sick for duty, and the rest looked like living skele- 
 tons. They fairly wallowed in their own filth — 
 and cursed the climate of Cuba on account of their 
 sickness. 
 
 In sharp contrast to the 34th Michigan was the 
 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, the Rough Riders. 
 This was an organization the peer of any in the 
 Regular Army in morale, in fighting, and in every 
 quality that goes to make up a fine body of soldiers. 
 They were picked men; all classes were shown in 
 
THE GATLiyU GUXii AT SANTIAGO. 179 
 
 that or<2:anizatioii. The tennis champion was a 
 private, Ihe clianipion oarsman of ilaivard a cor- 
 poral. On the 2d of Jnly a stock-broker of Wall 
 Street who can sig^n his check for f3. 000,000 was 
 seen haggling with a cow-puncher from the Indian 
 Territory over a j)iece of hardtack. Both were 
 privates and both were fine soldiers. The whole 
 regiment was just such a medley, but fought like 
 Regulars, and endured like Spartans. They hung 
 on like bull-dogs, and charged like demons. They 
 were as strict about the camp police as Regu- 
 lar Army surgeons, and as punctilious about salut- 
 ing as a K. O. on ^'official relations." Withal, they 
 were a clean-mouthed, clean-clad, clean-camped 
 lot of gentlemen, each in his way, from the "Hello, 
 pard!" of the cowboy to the frozen stare of the 
 monocled dude from Broadway. And they fought 
 — like Regulars; there is no other just comparison. 
 Roosevelt said: "They are the 11th Cavalry." 
 He found enthusiastic endorsers of this remark 
 in every Regular who saw them fight. They were 
 the finest body of Volunteers who ever wore uni- 
 form, and they were stamped indelibly with the 
 personality of Theodore Roosevelt. Pushing, ag- 
 gressive, resolute, tenacious, but self-contained, 
 cool, and restrained, they represented the very 
 
180 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 best type of what the Volunteer ought to be — 
 but often was not. 
 
 Above them all, however, shone out three types. 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt. He needs no eulogy from 
 my pen. He has done everything, and in each oc- 
 cupation has been conspicuously successful. He 
 is, however, a born soldier. His virile frame con- 
 tains the vigorous mind, the keen intellect, the 
 cool judgment, and the unswerving, never-hesi- 
 tating courage of the natural soldier. He is affa- 
 ble and courteous, or stern and scathing, as cir- 
 cumstances demand. One instant genial smiles 
 overspread his expressive countenance, whereon 
 the faintest emotion w-rites its legend with in- 
 stantaneous and responsive touch; the next, on 
 occasion, a Jove-like sternness settles on his face, 
 and, with a facility of expression bevv^ildering to 
 less gifted tongues, scathing invective, cutting 
 sarcasm, or bitter irony impress upon an offender 
 the gravity of a breach of discipline. Withal, he is 
 modest. He appreciates his own powder, but 
 there is no undue display of that appreciation, no 
 vainglorious boasting over achievements w'hich 
 read like a fairy-tale. Fittest to lead or follow, 
 idol of every true soldier. Who, that knows him 
 as those w^ho fought beside him, does not wish to 
 
THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 181 
 
 see him at the head of that army and that nation 
 of which he is the bri<;htest ornament in evrry po- 
 sition, civil, military, or political? 
 
 Woodbury Kane — social leader. Fortune's fav- 
 orite, aristocratic, refined, cultured, wealthy, hmii 
 ton de haul ton, and sahreur sans peur et sans reproche 
 —how shall I paint him to you as I learned to 
 know him in those dreadful, delightful seventeen 
 days in which we lived only from instant to in- 
 stant, and every man unconsciously bared his soul 
 to his comrades because he could not help it? 
 
 A gentleman — he always looked that in the 
 fullest sense of the word. Well groomed; in those 
 days when our bed was a mud-puddle and our 
 canopy the stars, when the music which lulled us 
 to sleep was the hum of the Mauser bullets and 
 the vicious popping of the Kemingtons, when water 
 to drink had to be brought at the peril of life for 
 every mouthful, Kane turned up every morning 
 clean-shaved and neatly groomed, shoes duly pol- 
 ished, neat khaki, fitting like a glove and brushed 
 to perfection, nails polished, and hair parted as 
 nicely as if he were dressed by his valet in his 
 Xew York apartments. How did he do it? We 
 never knew. He kept no servant; he took his 
 regular turn in the ditches, in the mud, or tor- 
 
182 THE GATLING GVNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 rid sun, or smotbering rain. Xo night alarm came 
 that did not find Kane first to spring to the trench 
 — and vet he did it, somehow. The courteous 
 phrases of politest speech fell ever from his 
 ready lips, as easil}^ as they would have done in 
 the boudoir of any belle in the metropolis. The 
 shrieking of a shell or tingling hiss of a sharp- 
 shooter's close-aimed bullet never came so near 
 as to interrupt whatever polished expression of 
 thanks, regret, or comment he might be uttering. 
 And it was the real thing, too. The gentle heart 
 was there. No man was readier to bind a wound 
 or aid a sun-struck soldier in the ranks; none 
 more ready to deny himself a comfort or a luxury 
 to help a more needy comrade. A braver man, a 
 surer or more reliable ofiQcer, never trod in shoe- 
 leather. A grand example to our pessimistic, 
 socialistic friends and cheap demagogues of the 
 sterling worth and noble, chivalric character of 
 a "society man of wealth." He is a living type 
 of ''Bel a faire pevr,'' without the idiotic sentiment- 
 ality of that maudlin hero, and with all his other 
 characteristics. 
 
 Greenway and Tiffany. The one a Harvard 
 football-player, just out, plunging into the great 
 game of war with all the zest he formerly found 
 
THE OATLiya aUMi at SANTIAGO. 183 
 
 in the great college game. The other the i)etted 
 son of wealthy i>arents, also a college graduate, 
 and the idolized fia)ic(' of his cliildhood's sweet- 
 heart. Equally ready for fight or fun, they were 
 the finest type of youthful manhood to be found- 
 Endowed by Nature with every gift, educated at 
 the best of colleges, bred in the best of society, 
 ready to enter upon the most desirable of careers, 
 they threw all upon the altar of country's love. 
 They entered battle as one might go to a game 
 or begin a play. All of unbounded zeal, youthful 
 enthusiasm, restless energy, keen enjoyment — 
 everything seemed to be equally acceptable to 
 them, and no discomfort ever assumed any guise 
 other than that of a novel and untried sensation. 
 
 They are the type of our young manhood — our 
 representative American youth — as Roosevelt is 
 of its vigorous manhood. They are the salt of the 
 earth, and Kane — is both salt and spice. All 
 were comrades in arms, t.ypes of American man- 
 hood unspoiled by Fortune's favors, capable of 
 anything and everything. Such men mould the 
 destiny of this great nation, and in their hands it 
 is safe. 
 
 But neither of these two regiments is a fair type 
 of the Volunteers; they are the two extremes. For 
 
184 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 a type, take the 1st Illinois. They were a Chicago 
 regiment with fifteen years' service, and they en- 
 listed in a body to a man. They reached the firing 
 line on the 10th and participated in the fight with 
 two battalions, with distinguished gallantry. The 
 third battalion was detailed on the necessary but 
 unpleasant duty of caring for the yellow fever 
 hospital at Siboney. These city-bred Volunteers 
 peeled off their coats, buried yellow fever corpses, 
 policed the hospital and hospital grounds, and 
 nursed the victims of the scourge. They did not 
 utter a complaint nor ask for a "soft" detail; they 
 did their duty as they found it. Another battal- 
 ion was detailed immediately after the surrender 
 to guard the Spanish prisoners. This most thank- 
 less duty was performed by them with fidelity and 
 care. The commander of the battalion and half 
 his officers were proficient in the Spanish lan- 
 guage as a part of their preparation for the cam- 
 paign, and they soon established cordial relations 
 with the prisoners they were set to guard. It was 
 a trying duty, but they performed it faithfully. 
 Sickness visited this battalion, and sometimes 
 guard duty had to be performed with only one 
 day off, but they never whimpered. The other bat- 
 talion was detailed after the surrender to do steve- 
 
THE OATLINO GONS AT SANTIAGO. 185 
 
 dore work at the commissary d^p6t. The slender 
 clerks and soft-handed city men slung boxes of 
 hardtack and sacks of bacon and barrels of coffee, 
 and performed manual labor with all the faithful- 
 ness that would be expected of men accustomed 
 to such work, and with never a complaint. The 
 sanitary measures of this regiment were perfect, 
 and they bore themselves like Regulars. It is 
 now recognized that this is a compliment to any 
 Volunteer organization. 
 
186 TEE GATLIXO GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 The Sufferings of the Fifth Army Corps. 
 
 In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a cer- 
 tain amount of suffering is inevitable. In such a 
 climate as that of southern Cuba, a certain amount 
 of disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of 
 yellow fever and malaria, no army could hope to 
 escape without contracting these diseases; and 
 in a campaign conducted with the marvelous ce- 
 lerity of the one at Santiago, some difficulty 
 in forwarding supplies must necessarily be en- 
 countered. 
 
 The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact 
 that the commanding general had under him sup- 
 ply departments whose officers reported to heads 
 of bureaus not under control of the corps com- 
 mander. This caused unnecessary delays in ob- 
 taining supplies, entailed confusion in their dis- 
 tribution, and led to suffering beyond what was 
 necessarily the result of the climate and the 
 campaign. 
 
THE OATLINO GINS AT SANTIAGO. ]87 
 
 A brief tlescriijtioii of the method of ol»taiiiing 
 sujiplies will make this [)oiiit more clear . When a 
 given article was wanted, whether it was soap, 
 quinine, tentage, or transportaion, a requisition 
 ui)on the chief of the proper bureau at Washington 
 had to be made, with full statement of the reasons 
 for the request; this requisition had to be approved 
 b}- all intermediate commanders and go through 
 military channels to the chief of the bureau, 
 who might or might not be convinced of the 
 necessity' for the article wanted. His action be- 
 ing endorsed thereon, the requisition returned 
 through the same devious route, and possibly 
 might be followed in course of time, either by 
 invoices from some distant purchasing agent of 
 the required articles, or by directions of the bureau 
 chief to make further explanations. The usual 
 length of time allowed for an official communi- 
 cation through military channels, in time of peace 
 at home, from any regimental head(iuarters to 
 W^ashington and return, is from ten to thirty days. 
 Here was the first cause of suffering. 
 
 If the heads of the supply departments in the 
 field, beginning at Tampa, could have acted 
 promptly upon the orders of their respective com- 
 manding officers, without the action of any other 
 
188 THE OATLIlsG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 authority, unnecessary delay would have been 
 avoided. 
 
 To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun De- 
 tachment was ordered to be equipped with revolv- 
 ers upon reporting to the detachment commander, 
 and this order was issued on the 11th of June, 
 before sailing from Port Tampa. They did not 
 so report, and it devolved upon the detachment 
 commander to make requisition for the necessary 
 equipment. This was done, but no revolvers ar- 
 rived. The invoices for revolvers reached the de- 
 tachment commander on the 15th of September, 
 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was then, 
 on leave of absence, sick, ten days after the de- 
 tachment was disbanded. 
 
 This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty 
 was experienced in obtaining supplies of all de- 
 scriptions. It was, therefore, very difficult for a 
 quartermaster, a commissary, a medical oflScer, or 
 any other officer whose duty it was to obtain sup- 
 plies, to have the same when emergency demanded 
 it. The necessity for supplies could not always 
 be foreseen, the quantity desired could not always 
 be estimated for with precision, and it followed 
 that sometimes there was a deficiency when the 
 articles were needed. 
 
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 w 
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 W 
 
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THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 189 
 
 Again, the trauspoi'tation of the 5th Army 
 Corps could uot be made available at first to cai-ry 
 supplies up from the lauding-place. The troops 
 had drawn travel rations, which lasted them until 
 they disembarked. The first supply problem, upon 
 landing, was that of issuing rations; and, at the 
 moment when every available boat was engaged 
 in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary 
 to put rations ashore also. The exigency demand- 
 ed the speedy disembarkation of the greatest pos- 
 sible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas 
 emphasized the necessity of getting men to the 
 front. It was no time to delay the movement of 
 troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tent- 
 age, or rations. The safety of the expedition, 
 the fate of the whole campaign, depended upon 
 energetic and rapid movement to the front. Con- 
 secjuently regiments were put forth with only such 
 amounts of rations and tentage as they could 
 carry upon their backs. It will be readily seen 
 that this amount was ver^ limited, and the only 
 tentage possible was the shelter tent. 
 
 There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Chero- 
 l-ce, but it was not practicable to delay the dis- 
 embarkation of the corps and hazard the fate of 
 the whole campaign by utilizing the only wharf 
 
190 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and all the boats two or three days to land these 
 wagons. By the time they could be taken off, the 
 rains had made the roads almost impassable, and 
 they could not all be used. It was therefore a daily 
 struggle to get enough rations forward to feed the 
 fighting-line from day to day. Greatly to the credit 
 of those who performed the duty, it can be said 
 that, with rare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 
 5th Army Corps had every day, when they could 
 possibly cook the same, hardtack and bacon, roast 
 beef, and coffee. This much was accomplished in 
 the face of insurmountable obstacles by the heroic 
 exertions of the pack-train. When the 1st of 
 July arrived, and the battle began, it was ordered 
 that all soldiers carry three days' rations. The 
 heat was intense, the fight exceedingly hot, and 
 marching through the jungle extremely diflicult. 
 The consequence was that the soldiers threw aside 
 all impedimenta in order to fight more effectively, 
 and, of course, the rations went with the blankets 
 and the overcoats. The man who held on to a 
 canteen and haversack was fortunate; very many 
 abandoned the haversack, and a considerable 
 number abandoned everything except rifle and 
 ammunition. That was wiiat won the fight; but it 
 made hungry men, and it caused men to sleep on 
 
THE OATLING QUNS AT SANTIAGO. 191 
 
 the wet ground under the open sky, without 
 bhinkets or tentage. The pack-train continued 
 its magnificent work. During the fighting it had 
 to bring ainniunition. The men were supposed 
 to have three days' rations. As soon as the defi- 
 ciency became known to the higher officials, the 
 pack-train began to bring food. Commissary de- 
 pots were established immediately in rear of the 
 tiring-line, and issues of hardtack, bacon, and cof- 
 fee, which were about the only components of the 
 ration that could be brought forward in sufficient 
 (quantities, were made without formality or red 
 tape. It was almost impossible to get a sufficient 
 quantity of even these components to the front. 
 Sometimes the ration was a little short. Bacon 
 and hardtack for seventeen consecutive days, 
 after three weeks of travel ration, do not form the 
 most appetizing diet in the world. The exposure 
 consequent upon the fighting and lack of tentage 
 had its inevitable result in sickness. 
 
 The same difficulties which had beset the quar- 
 termaster and commissary departments were also 
 encountered by the surgeons. Hospital accom- 
 modations were scanty, the quantity of medicines 
 available was very limited, the number of wound- 
 ed men disproportionately large, and, when sick- 
 
192 TEE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ness was added to the wounds, the small number 
 of surgeons available at the front were not able 
 to give the individual attention and scientific 
 treatment which forms a part of our admirable 
 medical system in time of peace. There were 
 only three or four ambulances available until 
 after the 11th of July. A considerable number of 
 the surgeons were on duty at the general hospitals 
 far in the rear; the number at the front was not 
 suflficient to attend to all the duties which de- 
 volved upon them. This deplorable condition re- 
 acted, causing a greater amount of illness. To 
 add to this difficulty, the Volunteers began to 
 suffer excessively from the results of their own 
 ignorance and carelessness; and when the yel- 
 low fever scourge was added to all the other diffi- 
 culties which beset the 5th Corps, the outlook be- 
 came gloomy. 
 
 The attempt has been made in the foregoing ex- 
 position of the conditions at Santiago to repre- 
 sent fairly the difficulties under which all parts 
 of the army labored. The fact remains, neverthe- 
 less, that there was an appalling amount of suffer- 
 ing due to causes which might have been foreseen 
 and which were easily preventable. 
 
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THE GATLiyO GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 193 
 
 On the 18th day of July the transports entered 
 the harbor of Santiago. From that day forward 
 there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, and 
 there were excellent macadamized roads leading to 
 all parts of the command. The fall of Santiago had 
 been foreseen more than a week, and if there was 
 not a sufficient quantity of wagons present on 
 board the ships, there had been ample time to 
 make telegraphic requisition for them to Wash- 
 ington. Up to the surrender, the suffering from 
 sickness had been exceedingly light. There was 
 something stimulating about the nervous strain 
 and excitement of the time which kept the men up 
 to their work ; but the inadequacy of the medical 
 supplies on hand had been amply demonstrated 
 by the 10th. and it had become fully apparent that 
 the medical corps was unable to handle the number 
 of patients on hand. The previous remark about 
 the practicability of telegraphing to headquarters 
 for additional force applies to this department 
 also. 
 
 The principal sufferings after the surrender 
 were due to four causes: first, improper clothes; 
 second, improper food; third, lack of shelter; 
 fourth, lack of proper medical attention. 
 
 In regard to clothing and these other neces- 
 
194 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 saries, it should be borne in mind that the corps 
 which went to Santiago was virtually the Reg- 
 ular Army. Every regiment which went to Tampa 
 went there ready for service. Its equipment was 
 just as complete on the 26th of April as it was on 
 the 6th of June. There should have been no prob- 
 lems to solve in regard to them — and yet there 
 were many. 
 
 First — Clotliing. 
 
 The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba 
 they had brought from Sheridan, Assinniboine, 
 and Sherman. They wore winter clothing for 
 their service in the torrid zoue, and those who 
 received summer clothing at all received it late 
 in August, just in time to return to the bracing 
 breezes of Montauk Point, where, in their en- 
 feebled condition, winter clothing would have 
 been more suitable. It did not require a professor 
 of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothing used 
 in northern Michigan would not be suitable for 
 campaigning in southern Cuba in July; or that 
 summer clothing suitable for southern Cuba 
 would be too light for men returning to the north- 
 ern part of Long Island. Is it to be concluded that 
 it was impossible to obtain summer clothing for 
 
THE GAT LING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 195 
 
 18,000 men between the 26th of April and the 6th 
 of June? 
 
 Second — Improper Food. 
 
 Most of the troops were embarked upon the 
 transports by the 10th of June. Their food on 
 transport consisted of the travel ration: canned 
 roast beef, canned baked beans, canned tomatoes, 
 and hardtack, with coffee, were the components. 
 They subsisted upon this food, imprisoned in fetid 
 holds of foul transports, unfit for the proper trans- 
 portation of convicts, until the 25th day of June, 
 when they disembarked. On drawing rations for 
 the field, it was found that the field ration would 
 be of the same components, with the addition of 
 bacon and minus the baked beans and tomatoes. 
 During the emergency, up to include the 18th day 
 of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few 
 cans of tomatoes found their way to camp, but 
 rarely. The ration was always short, such as it 
 was, but this the soldiers could have endured 
 and did endure without a murmur. 
 
 But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharf- 
 age at a distance of two miles and a half, with 
 excellent roads, and with abundance of transpor- 
 tation (see Gen. Shafter's Official Report), and 
 
196 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 with surrender foreknown for a sufficient length 
 of time to have brought any quantity of vege- 
 tables from New York City, the ration continued 
 to be bacon, canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. 
 Finally, about the 25th of July, small amounts of 
 soft bread began to be doled out, and an occasional 
 issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soon 
 demonstrated that not sufficient fresh beef could 
 be made available. The vegetables which had been 
 brought had nearly all spoiled on the transports. 
 Hundreds of barrels of potatoes and onions were 
 unloaded upon the docks and were so badly de- 
 cayed as to make them useless. These vegetables 
 had been drifting about the Caribbean Sea and 
 upon the Atlantic Ocean since the 9th and 10th 
 of June. Occasionally it was practicable to get a 
 quarter or a half ration of potatoes and half of 
 the usual allowance of canned tomatoes, but that 
 was all. 
 
 It did not require a professor of hygienic dietet- 
 ics to predict that men fed in the tropics upon a 
 diet suited to the icy shores of Greenland would 
 become ill, especially when they were clad in a 
 manner suited to the climate of Labrador. Are we 
 to conclude that it was impossible to get rice, 
 
o 
 
 > 
 
 « 
 w 
 
 (-1 
 
 o 
 
 w 
 
 O 
 
 w 
 
THE OAT LINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 197 
 
 beans, canned fruits, canned corn, and other vege- 
 tables to take the place of potatoes and onions? 
 
 Third— Lad- of Shelter. 
 
 The allowance of tentage was prescribed for 
 each regiment. Granted that it was impossible to 
 get tentage up until after the surrender; yet 
 it should have been practicable to forward tent- 
 age over two and one-half miles of macadamized 
 roads. Yet whole regiments remained without 
 tentage until they embarked for the United States. 
 The 13th Infantry did not get tentage until the 
 5th of August. The 20th Infantry and the 3d 
 Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage about 
 the same time, but a large part of these regiments 
 remained under shelter tents until they reem- 
 barked. The 1st Illinois and the 34th Michigan 
 remained in shelter tents until the 15th of August, 
 at which time the author embarked for the United 
 States. These regiments are fair examples. 
 
 The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided 
 with shelter-halves and remained under them un- 
 til the 10th of August. Repeated applications 
 for proper tentage were made, accompanied by 
 medical certificates that the issue of tentage 
 was imperatively necessary for the health of 
 
198 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 the command. Endorsements thereon by the chief 
 quartermaster of the 5th Corps as late as the 5th 
 of August show that there was no available tent- 
 age for issue. Application was made to the regi- 
 mental commander, 13th Infantry, for a portion 
 of regimental tentage for the detachment of the 
 13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the 
 reduced regiment had on hand all the canvas pre- 
 scribed for the full regiment, none could be ob- 
 tained for the detachment. The detachment com- 
 mander was entirely without tentage from the 
 25th of June until the 5th of August — forty-five 
 days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to the 
 torrid sun by day, to chilling dews by night, and 
 the drenching rains of the afternoon, without 
 shelter from any inclemencies of the weather, and 
 this in spite of repeated applications to proper 
 authorities for the suitable allowance of tentage. 
 Is it any wonder that men grew sick, and that 
 death stalked broadcast through the camp of 
 the 5th Corps, under these conditions? 
 
 Fourth — Lad- of Proper Medical Attendance. 
 
 The surgeons who were at the front with the 
 firing-line worked heroically, but were burdened 
 beyond their physical powers. Owing to the fore- 
 
TEE OATLING QUNS AT SANTIAGO. 199 
 
 going causes, great numbers of men became ill as 
 soon as the strain and tension of tbo battle were 
 relieved. It was not uncommon to find twenty or 
 twenty-five per cent of a command on tlie sick- 
 report, and in some cases the sick-list went as 
 high as fifty per cent. There were no well men in 
 the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused to go 
 on the sick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The 
 author has yet to find a single member of the 
 expedition who did not suffer from the climatic 
 fever. The surgeons themselves were not exempt, 
 and the very limited supply of doctors was speed- 
 ily decreased by sickness. Were there no doctors 
 in the United States who w^ere willing to come to 
 Cuba? 
 
 Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines 
 was very deficient. There was never a suflScient 
 supply of ambulances. The accommodations in 
 the hospitals were even worse than those on the 
 firing-line. A sick soldier on the firing-line could 
 always find some comrade who would cut green 
 boughs or gather grass for a bed, but the one 
 who went to the hospital had to lie on the ground. 
 The supply of hospital cots was ridiculously in- 
 adequate, and this condition did not improve. 
 
200 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical at- 
 tendance may be illustrated by the case of Priv. 
 Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry, member of 
 the Gatling Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had 
 been hurt in the fight on the 1st of July and had 
 been sent to the hospital. He found the accommo- 
 dations so wretched that he feigned improvement 
 and returned to his detachment. He remained with 
 the detachment until the 14th of July, improving so 
 far as his injury was concerned,but contracted the 
 climatic fever. During this time he was prescribed 
 for twice by the assistant surgeon with the Rough 
 Riders, Dr. Thorpe, previous to the time this reg- 
 iment was moved westward on the firing-line. His 
 condition became worse, and on the 12th of July 
 Dr. Brewer, 1st lieutenant and assistant surgeon 
 with the 10th Cavalry, was called upon to examine 
 him. This surgeon had then under treatment over 
 100 cases pertaining to his proper command, and 
 was himself ill, but he readily came and inspected 
 the patient. He promised to send medicines for 
 him, but in the rush of overwork forgot to do so, 
 and on the 13th of July he was again summoned. 
 This time he sent a hospital attendant to take the 
 patient's temperature, which was 101°. No medi- 
 cines were sent. On the 14th of July the patient be- 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 201 
 
 came delirious. The detaoliment commander weut 
 in person to request the same surgeon to attend to 
 the case, he being the only one available at that 
 time. The hosjntal attendant Avas again ordered to 
 take the temperature. At the end of an hour even 
 this had been neglected. The hospital man was 
 sick, and had been without sleep for fifty hours. 
 Priv. Elkins ^^as put upon a board and carried to 
 Brewer's tent, with his descriptive list in his 
 pocket. The surgeon was told the name of the 
 patient and the facts that he was related to a dis- 
 tinguished family and had been recommended for 
 a commission for gallantry upon the field of battle. 
 Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at the time, with 
 a temperature of 103°, but he rose from his own 
 sick-bed and administered remedies which relieved 
 the patient. The following day, the third of his 
 illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering from 
 yellow fever, and was carried back to the yellow 
 fever hospital at Siboney along with Priv. Elkins. 
 He had been sick all the time, but had done his 
 best. Priv. Elkins improved sufficiently to write 
 a letter to his commanding officer from the hos- 
 pital at Siboney, on the 25th of July, which 
 reached that officer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
 on the 12th day of September. In spite of the fact 
 
202 THE GATLIKG 0UN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 that the patient was furnished with descriptive 
 list, and was specially commended to the care of 
 the surgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gal- 
 lantry, all trace of him had been lost; and although 
 two private detectives were searching for him a 
 month, no further clew had been found to his 
 whereabouts or fate as late as the 1st of October. 
 Even if his descriptive list had not been furnished 
 with this man, the fact that he was alive and ra- 
 tional enough on the 25th day of July to write a let- 
 ter concerning his approaching discharge should 
 have made it easy for some record of his case to 
 have been kept. 
 
 But this one isolated case sinks into insignifi- 
 cance beside the condition in which some of the 
 sick were left by commands returning to the 
 United States. All cases of yellow fever sus- 
 pects were left behind, and in the mad scramble 
 to embark for the return voyage many of these 
 were left without proper attention or supplies. 
 
 Gen. Kent's Division had left by the 11th of 
 August. The following extract from a letter dated 
 Santiago de Cuba, August 12, 1898, will convey 
 some idea of the condition in which the sick of 
 this division were left: 
 
 ^'Yesterday Gen. Kent's Division left for Mon- 
 
THE GATLIXG GUXS AT 8A\T1A(J0. 203 
 
 tauk, and thej left behind 350 sick, many of them 
 too ill to care for themselves. This humane coun- 
 try, of course, left ample care for them? There was 
 left one surgeon, one steward, and one case of 
 medicines. Many of these men are too ill to rise. 
 They are 'suspected' of having yellow fever. They 
 are suffering from Cuban malaria, and many of 
 them from diarrhea. There was not left a single 
 bed-pan for this battalion of bed-ridden, suffering 
 humanity, nor any well men to nurse the sick. 
 There was not even left any to cook food for them. 
 Those left by the 9th Infantry had to bribe ma- 
 rauding, pilfering Cubans, with a part of their 
 rations, to carry food to the camp of the 13th, 
 where there were a few less ill, to get it cooked. 
 
 ''They are too sick to dig sinks; some are delir- 
 ious. When the poor emaciated wrecks of man- 
 hood have to obey the calls of Nature, they must 
 either wallow in their own filth or stagger a few 
 paces from their wet beds on the slimy soil to de- 
 posit more germs of disease and death on the sur- 
 face already reeking with ghastly, joint-racking 
 rheums. 
 
 "There were left less than fifty cots for these 
 350 sick men — ^men compelled by sheer weakness 
 to lie on the ground which will soon lie on them. 
 
204 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 if enough strong men are left by that time to cover 
 them mercifully over with the loathsome, reeking 
 vegetable detritus which passes here for soil, and 
 which is so fairly animate that you can see every 
 spadeful of it writhe and wriggle as you throw it 
 over the rotting hour-dead shell of what was a 
 free American citizen and a Chevalier Bayard. 
 
 "When the last man and wagon of the flying 
 division disappeared over the hill toward health 
 and home, a despairing wail went up from the 
 doomed 350 left in this condition of indescribable 
 horror. 'We are abandoned to die!' they cried; 
 'we are deserted by our own comrades in the hour 
 of danger and left to helplessly perish!' 
 
 ''These men are those who fought the climate, 
 hunger, and the enemy on the battle-field which 
 has shed so much undying glory on the American 
 arms. They are the men who have accomplished 
 unheard-of feats of endurance and performed in- 
 credible feats of valor on the same ground — not 
 for Cuba, but at the call of duty. They are citi- 
 zens. They are brave soldiers who have done 
 their full duty because it was duty." 
 
 The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of 
 mail were stacked up at Siboney for weeks; and 
 although there was more transportation on hand 
 
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 W 
 
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 w 
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 w 
 
 
 A' 
 
 ^^^V 
 
TUE OATLIXG GUNS AT SAyTIAGO. 205 
 
 than could be used, the officer detailed to attend 
 to the mail business of the corps, Lieut. Saville, 
 of the 10th Infantry, could not succeed in secur- 
 ing a wagon to haul this mail to the front. Since 
 the corps returned to the United States a dozen 
 letters have reached the author which have chased 
 him by way of Santiago and Moutauk, since dates 
 between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The 
 person to whom these letters were addressed was 
 well known to every officer and employee in the 
 corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well 
 known could go astray in this manner, what could 
 an unknown private expect? This may seem like 
 a little hardship, but to men in the weakened and 
 enfeebled condition of the survivors of the 5th 
 Corps a letter from home was both food and medi- 
 cine. Scores of men who are to-day rotting in 
 Cuban graves died of nostalgia, and might have 
 lived if they had received the letters from home 
 which were sent to them. 
 
206 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 The Cause. 
 
 The causes of these conditions are not far to 
 seek. The United States has not had an army 
 since 1866. There has been no such a thing as a 
 brigade, a division, or a corps. There has been no 
 opportunity to study and practice on a large scale, 
 in a practical way, the problems of organization 
 and supply. The Army has been administered as 
 a unit, and the usual routine of business gradually 
 became such that not a wheel could be turned nor 
 a nail driven in any of the supply departments 
 without express permission, previously obtained 
 from the bureau chief in Washington. The same 
 remarks apply equally to all the other staff de- 
 partments. The administration had become a 
 bureaucracy because the whole Army for thirty 
 years had been administered as one body, without 
 the subdivisions into organizations which are in- 
 evitable in war-time and in larger bodies. 
 
 War became a reality with great suddenness. 
 Those who have grown gray in the service, and 
 whose capacity, honesty, and industry had never 
 
THE OATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 207 
 
 been and can not be impeached, found them- 
 selves confronted with the problem of handling 
 nearly three hundred thousand men, without au- 
 thority to change the system of supply and trans- 
 portation. The minutest acts of officers of these 
 departments are regulated by laws of Congress, 
 enacted with a view of the small regular force in 
 time of peace, and with no provisions for modifi- 
 cations in war. In authorizing the formation of 
 large volunteer armies. Congress did not author- 
 ize any change in the system of administration 
 or make any emergency provision. As before, 
 every detail of supply and transportation had to 
 be authorized from the central head. 
 
 The administrative bureaus were handicai)ped 
 to some extent by incompetent and ignorant mem- 
 bers. Late in the campaign it was learned that 
 the way to a ''soft snap" was through the Capitol, 
 and some came in that way who would certainly 
 never have entered the Army in any other. 
 
 There were alleged staff officers who had tried 
 to enter the service through the regular channels 
 and who had failed, either by lack of ability or 
 bad conduct, to keep up with the pace set by class- 
 mates at the Academy; there were others who 
 were known as failures in civil life and as the 
 
208 THE GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 "black sheep" uf eminent families; and there were 
 some who must have been utterly unknown before 
 the war, as they will be afterward. 
 
 How these persons ever obtained places high 
 above deserving ofiQcers of capacity and experi- 
 ence is a question which cries aloud ior exposure 
 — but in a good many cases they did. Indeed, it 
 is to be observed that, for that matter, the next 
 register of the Army will show a great man}- more 
 promotions into the Volunteer service, of oflS- 
 cers who never heard a hostile bullet during the 
 war, who never left the United States at all, than 
 it will of deserving oflScers who bore the heat and 
 burden of the march and the battle. 
 
 The most discouraging thing about it all to a 
 line officer is that this same register will afford 
 no means of determining who did the service and 
 who did the "baby act." Lieut. Blank will be 
 borne thereon as major and subsequently colonel 
 of the Steenth Volunteers (which never left the 
 State rendezvous, probably) during the war with 
 Spain; Lieut. Blank No. 2 will be carried on the 
 
 same book as second lieutenant, Infantry, 
 
 during the same war. The gentle reader will at 
 once "spot" the man who was so highly promoted 
 as a gallant fellow who distinguished himself 
 
THE OATLIXG Gt/-A'S AT SANTIAGO. 209 
 
 upon tlio bloody tiekl; tbe other will be set down 
 as the man who did nothing and deserved nothing. 
 
 Yet — the ones who went received no promotion, 
 and those who staid behind and by their careless 
 incompetence permitted cami)S amid the peaceful 
 scenes of homes and plenty to become the hot-beds 
 of fever and disease — these are the ones borne as 
 field and other oflicers of the Volunteers. 
 
 To illustrate some of the material with big titles 
 sent to "assist" in running the staff departments, 
 two incidents will suffice. 
 
 On the 11th of June, at a certain headquarters, 
 it w as desired to send a message, demanding reply, 
 to each transport. A gray-haired oflficer turned 
 to another and said. "Whom shall we send with 
 this? Will vSo-and-so do?" naming one of the be- 
 fore-mentioned civil appointments. "For heaven's 
 sake, no! He would tie up the whole business. 
 Send an orderly," was the reply. The orderly, an 
 enlisted man of the Regulars, was sent. The offi- 
 cer thus adjudged less competent to carry a mes- 
 sage than a private soldier was perhaps actuated 
 by a high sense of duty; but he filled a place which 
 should have been occupied by an experienced and 
 able officer — no, he did not fill it, but he prevented 
 such a man from doing so. 
 
210 THE GATLINa GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 The second incident was related by an oflScer 
 on a transport bound for home. Say his name 
 was — oh well, Smith. 
 
 Smith went, on the 20th of July, to a certain 
 headquarters in the field on business. Those who 
 could have attended to it were absent, but there 
 was one of the recent arrivals, a high-ranking aide, 
 there, and he, sorry for Smith's woru-out look of 
 hunger, heat, and thirst, asked if he would have 
 a drink. Smith, expecting at the best a canteen 
 of San Juan River water, said he was a little dry. 
 
 The newly-arrived clapped his hands, and, at the 
 summons, a colored waiter in spotless white duck 
 appeared. "Waitah, take this gentleman's ordah," 
 said the host. Smith, greatly astonished, asked 
 what could be had, and was yet more astonished 
 to learn that he could be served with Canadian 
 or domestic whisky, claret, champagne, or sherry. 
 Much bewildered, and utterly forgetting the aw- 
 ful dangers of liquor in the tropics, he called for 
 Canadian Club. When it came, on a napkin-cov- 
 ered tray, he looked for water, and was about to 
 use some from a bucket full of ice which he at 
 that moment espied. ''Aw! hold on," exclaimed 
 the host; "we nevah use that, don't y' know, ex- 
 cept to cool the apollinaris. Waitah. bring the 
 
THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 211 
 
 gentleman a bottle of apollinaris to wash down 
 Lis liquor." 
 
 Within half a mile were soldiers and oflficers 
 lying sick in hospital on the ground, eating hard- 
 tack and bacon, and drinking San Juan straight, 
 because hospital supplies and rations could not 
 be got to the front ! 
 
 It was this same oflScer who explained that he 
 approached his headquarters ''by rushes," upon 
 his arrival, for fear the enemy would see him and 
 consider this reinforcement a violation of the 
 truce. 
 
 These are two examples of some of the able as- 
 sistants from civil life who were sent to help feed, 
 clothe, and transport the 5th Corps. 
 
 With such assistants, is it any wonder that, un- 
 der such extraordinary circumstances as those en- 
 countered in Cuba, a system designed for peace 
 and 25,000 men w^eakened in some respects when 
 the attempt was made to apply it to 300,000 in 
 time of war? 
 
 The great wonder is that it did the work as 
 well as it did. And this was due to the super- 
 human exertions of the chief officers of the supply 
 departments and their experienced assistants. 
 These men knew no rest. They were untiring 
 
212 THE GATLING GUX8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and zealous. On tbeir own responsibility they cut 
 the red tape to the very smallest limit. Instead 
 of the regular returns and requisitions, the mere- 
 est form of lead-pencil memorandum was suffi- 
 cient to obtain the necessary supplies, wiienever 
 they were available. This much was absolutely 
 necessary, for these officers were personally re- 
 sponsible for every dollar's worth of supplies and 
 had to protect themselves in some degree. As it 
 is now, many of them will find it years before their 
 accounts are finally settled, unless some provision 
 be made by law for their relief. This disregard of 
 routine was essential; but how much to be desired 
 is a system suited to the exigencies of the service, 
 both in peace and war! 
 
 There is a lesson to be learned from these ex- 
 periences, and it is this: The commanding officer 
 of any army organization should not be hampered 
 in the matter of supplies by having to obtain the 
 approval or disapproval of a junior in rank, in a 
 distant bureau, who knows nothing about the cir- 
 cumstances. In other words, the system which 
 causes the staff departments of the United States 
 Army to regard a civilian as their head, and makes 
 them virtually independent of their line command- 
 ers, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer is 
 
TUi: OITLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 213 
 
 competent to commaud au orj^auizatiou, be should 
 be cousidered competent to look after the details 
 of its administration, and should be held responsi- 
 ble, not only for its serviceable condition at all 
 times, but for the care of its property and for all 
 the other details connected with its service. 
 
 The quartermaster, or commissary, or other oflS- 
 cer of a supply department should not know any 
 authority on earth higher or other than the officer 
 in command of the force he is to serve, except 
 those in the line above such chief, and then only 
 when such orders come through his chief. 
 
 The commanding officer having ordered supplies 
 to be procured, there should be no question what- 
 ever in regard to their being furnished. They 
 should come at once and without fail. If they 
 were not necessary, hold him responsible. 
 
 This theory of administration eliminates the 
 bureaucracy which has insidiously crept upon the 
 Army, and relegates to their proper position the 
 supply departments. 
 
 The General Staff proper has a higher field of 
 usefulness than the mere problems of supply. 
 Its business is to care for the organization, mobil- 
 ization, and strategic disposition of all the forces, 
 both naval and military, of the United States. 
 
214 THE GATLING GUNS AT SAl^'TIAGO. 
 
 Its head should be the President, and the two divi- 
 sions should be under the general commanding 
 the Army and the admiral commanding the Navy. 
 The remainder of this staff should be composed of 
 a small but select personnel, and should limit its 
 duties exclusively to those set forth above. 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 215 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Voyage Home and the End of the Gatling 
 Gun Detachment. 
 
 The detachment received permission on the 10th 
 of August to use any standing tentage which it 
 could find, and it was thoroughly under shelter an 
 hour after this permission was received. The cli- 
 mate of Cuba was not so disagreeable when one 
 could look at it through the door of a tent, but we 
 were not destined to enjoy our tentage very long. 
 On the 15th, at two o'clock, orders were received to 
 go on board the Leona at Santiago, bound for Mon- 
 tauk Point, and at half-past five o'clock men, 
 guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the 
 voyage home. 
 
 It was much more agreeable than the one to 
 Cuba. The transport was not crowded, the men 
 had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled 
 up during the day, thus leaving the whole berth 
 deck for exercise and ventilation, and the Leona 
 was a much better vessel than the CheroTcee. 
 
 The detachment finally disembarked at Mon- 
 tauk Point on the 23d, passed through the usual 
 
216 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 detention camp, and was assigned a camping- 
 place. It was disbanded per instructions from 
 headquarters, Montauk Point, on tlie 5tli of Sep- 
 tember, the members of the detachment returning 
 to their respective regiments, well satisfied with 
 the work thej had done and with each other. 
 
 In concluding this memoir the author desires 
 to pay a personal tribute of admiration and re- 
 spect to the brave men composing the detachment, 
 both individually and collectively. Some of them 
 have figured more prominently in these pages than 
 others, but there was not a man in the detachment 
 who was not worthy to be called the highest term 
 that can be applied to any man — a brave Ameri- 
 can soldier. 
 
 The End. 
 
TUE UlTLIMt aUMS AT iSAMlAGit. 217 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Headquarters U. S. Troops, 
 Santiago <le Cuba, July 19, 1808. 
 
 General Orders No. 26. 
 
 The suocoi=;sful accomplishmeut of the campaign 
 against Santiago de Cuba, resulting in its downfall and 
 surrender of Spanish forces, the capture of large mili- 
 tary stores, together with the destruction of the entire 
 Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment 
 of the city, was forced to leave, is one of which the Army 
 can well be proud. 
 
 This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds 
 of the Army and its officers and men. The major-general 
 commanding offers his sincere thanks for their endurance 
 of hardships heretofore unknown in the American Army. 
 
 The work you have accomplished may well appeal to 
 the pride of your countiymen and has been rivaled upon 
 but few occasions in the world's history. Landing upon 
 an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking 
 and overcame obstacles that even in looking back upon 
 seem insurmountable. Seizing, with the assistance of the 
 Navy, the towns of Daiquiri and Siboney, you pushed 
 boldly forth, gallantly driving back the enemy's out- 
 posts in the vicinity of La Guasimas, and completed 
 the concentration of the army near Sevilla, within sight 
 of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The out- 
 look from Sevilla was one that might have appalled 
 
218 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road made 
 well-nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you 
 looked upon high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical 
 growth, which could only be traversed by bridle-paths 
 terminating within range of the enemy's guns. Nothing 
 daunted, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon 
 the foe, and, attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove 
 him from work to work until he took refuge within his 
 last and strongest entrenchment immediately surround- 
 ing the city. Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun, 
 and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstood 
 his attempts to drive you from the position your valor 
 had won, holding in your vise-like grip the army op- 
 posed to you. After seventeen days of battle and siege, 
 you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000 
 prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate front, 
 the others scattered in the various towns of eastern Cuba, 
 freeing completely the eastern part of the island from 
 Spanish troops. 
 
 This was not done without great saciifices. The death 
 of 2.30 gallant soldiers and the wounding of 1,284 others 
 shows but too plainly the fierce contest in which you were 
 engaged. The few reported missing are undoubtedly 
 among the dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those 
 who have fallen in battle, with you the commanding 
 general sorrows, and with you will ever cherish their 
 memoi'y. Their devotion to duty sets a high example 
 of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. 
 All who have participated in the campaign, battle, and 
 siege of Santiago de Cuba will recall with pride the 
 grand deeds accomplished, and will hold one another 
 
THE GATLINO OUNS AT SA2fTIA00. 219 
 
 dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and 
 trlnmphs together. 
 
 All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners 
 the name of Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 By command of Major-General Shaffer. 
 
 Official: John B. Miley, ■ E. J. McClernand, 
 
 Aide. Asst. Adj. -Gen. 
 
220 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 The Santiago Campaign. 
 
 Report of Major-General Wm. R. Shafter, Commanding. 
 
 September 13, 1898. 
 
 Sir, — I tiave tlie lionor to submit tlie following report 
 of the campaign which terminated in the fall of Sant- 
 iago de Cuba and the adjacent territory, and the estab- 
 lishment of the military government thex'ein. 
 
 The expedition was undertaken in compliance with 
 telegraphic instructions of May 30, 1898, from Head- 
 quarters of the Army, in which it was stated: 
 
 "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two 
 topedo boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. 
 Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and as- 
 sist in capturing harbor and fleet." 
 
 On this date there were a large number of transports 
 in Port Tampa Bay. which had been collected for the 
 purpose of an expedition which it had been previously 
 contemplated I should command, and for such other 
 emergencies as might arise. Orders were immediately 
 given for loading aboard those transports the necessary 
 subsistence and quartermaster supplies, and for the em- 
 barkation of the authorized number of troops and their 
 material. General Orders No. 5, from these headquarters, 
 indicate the organizations it was at first proposed to take. 
 
THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 221 
 
 The order is as follows: 
 
 "Headquarters 5th Army Corps, 
 "G. O. 5. Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898. 
 
 "The follovring troops will liolil themselves in readi- 
 ness to move immediately on board transports upon noti- 
 fication from these headquarters: 
 
 "1. The 5th Aruiy Corps. 
 
 "2, The Battalion of Engineers. 
 
 "3. The detachment of the Signal Corps. 
 
 "4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the 
 commanding general of the cavalry division, in accord- 
 ance with instructions previously given. 
 
 "5. Four batteries of liglit artillery, to be commanded 
 by a major, to be selected by the commanding officer of 
 the light artillery brigade. 
 
 "6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by 
 the commanding officer of the siege artillery battalion, 
 with eight (S) guns and eight (S) field mortars. 
 
 "7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry and cav- 
 alry will be supplied with 500 rounds of ammunition per 
 man. 
 
 "8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen 
 (14) days' field rations now on hand, ten (10) days' travel 
 rations. 
 
 "0. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage 
 as prescribed in G. 0. 54, A. (I. 0., c. s., will be taken. 
 
 "10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 
 8 of this order, the chief commissary will provide sixty 
 (60) days' field rations for the entire command, 
 
 "11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be 
 stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp 
 
222 TEE GATLING GUX8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the 
 regimental commander. Where there are no recruits 
 available, the necessary guard only will be left. 
 
 "12. Travel rations will be drawn at once by the sev- 
 eral commands, as indicated in paragi-aph 8. 
 
 "By comamnd of Maj.-Gen. Shafter. 
 
 "E. J. McClernand, 
 "A. A. G." 
 
 This order w^as afterwards changed to include twelve 
 squadrons of cavalry, all of which were dismounted 
 because of lack of transportation for the animals, and 
 because it was believed, from the best sources of infor- 
 mation obtainable, that mounted cavalry could not oper- 
 ate efficiently in the neighborhood of Santiago. This 
 was found subsequently to be correct. 
 
 The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa for embark- 
 ing the troops and the large amount of supplies re- 
 quired were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it 
 was not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as 
 I hoped and desired. 
 
 On the evening of June 7th I received orders to sail 
 without delay, but not with less than 10,000 men. 
 
 The orders referred to caused one division, composed 
 of Volunteer troops, commanded by Brig. -Gen. Snyder, 
 and which it had been intended to include in my com- 
 mand, to be left behind. I was joined, however, by Brig.- 
 Gen. Bates, who had already arrived on transports from 
 Mobile, Ala., with the 3d and 20th Infantry and one 
 squadron of the 2d Cavalry with their horses, the latter 
 being the only mounted troops in my command. 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SAXTLldO. 223 
 
 After some of them hnd ahead}' reached the lower 
 bay, telegraphic instructions were received from the 
 honorable Secretary of War, directing that the sailing of 
 the expedition be delayed, waiting furtlier orders. This 
 delay was occasioned by the Navy reporting that a Span- 
 ish war vessel liad been sighted in the Nicholas Channel. 
 The ships in the lower bay were immediately recalled. 
 On tlie next day. in compliance witli instructions from 
 the adjutant-general of the Army, the necessary steps 
 were taken to increase the command to the full cai>acity 
 of the transports, and the expedition sailed on June 14th 
 with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men. 
 
 The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and 
 uneventful. The liealth of the command remained re- 
 markably good, notwithstanding the fact that the con- 
 veniences on many of the transports, in the nature of 
 sleeping accommodations, space for exercise, closet accom- 
 modations, etc.. were not all that could have been de- 
 sired. While commenting upon this subject, it is appro- 
 priate to add that the opinion was general throughout 
 the Army that the travel ration should include tomatoes, 
 beginning with the first day, and tliat a small quantity 
 of canned fi-uit would prove to be a most welcome ad- 
 dition while traveling at sea in the tropics. If the fu- 
 ture policy of our Government requires much transpor- 
 tation for the military forces by sea. definite arrange- 
 ments should be determined upon to provide the neces- 
 sary hammock accommodations for sleeping. Ham- 
 mocks interfere immeasurably less than bunks with the 
 proper ventilation of the ships and during the day can 
 
224 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 be easily removed, thus greatly increasing space for ex- 
 ercise; moreover, they greatly diminish the clanger of 
 fire. 
 
 While passing along the north coast of Cuba one of 
 the two barges we had in tow broke away during the 
 night, and was not recovered. This loss proved to be 
 very serious, for it delayed and embarassed the disem- 
 barkation of the army. On the morning of June 20th 
 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay, and about noon reached 
 the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came 
 on board my headquarters transport. It was arranged 
 between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban general 
 (Garcia) at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west 
 of the Morro. During the interview Gen. Garcia offered 
 tlie services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men 
 in the vicinity of Aserraderos and about 500, under Gen. 
 Castillo, at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles 
 east of Baiquiri. I accepted his offer, impressing it 
 upon him that I could exercise no military control over 
 him except such as he would concede, and as long as 
 he served iinder me I would furnish him rations and 
 ammunition. 
 
THE GATLiyG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 225 
 
 DISEMBARKATION IN CUBA. 
 
 Ever siuce the receipt of uiy onlers I had made a 
 study of the terrain surrouudius Santiago, gathering in- 
 formation mainly from the former residents of the city, 
 several of whom were on tlie transports with me. At 
 this interview all the possible points of attack were for 
 the last time carefully weighed, and then, for the infor- 
 mation and guidance of Admiral Sampson and Gen. 
 Garcia. I outlined the plan of campaign, which was as 
 follows: 
 
 With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, 
 the disembarkation was to commence on the morning 
 of the 22d at Baiquiri; on the 21st .jOO insurgent troops 
 were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, 
 increasing the force already there to 1.000 men. This 
 force, under Gen. Castillo, was to attack the Spanish 
 force at Baiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarka- 
 tion. This movment was successfully made. To mis- 
 lead the enemy as to the real point of our intended land- 
 ing, I requested Gen. Garcia to send a small force (about 
 500 men), under Gen, Rabi, to attack the little town of 
 Cabanas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west 
 of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was 
 reported the enemy had several men intrenched, and 
 from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay 
 to Santiago. 
 
 I also requested Admiral Sampson to send several 
 of his warships, with a uumli>er of my transports, oppo- 
 
226 THE GATLING GUN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 site this town, for the purpose of making a show of dis- 
 embarking there. 
 
 In addition, I asked the admiral to cause a bombard- 
 ment to be made at Cabanas and also at the forts around 
 the Morro and at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney, and 
 Baiquiri. The troops under Gen. Garcia remaining at 
 Aserraderos were to be transferred to Baiquiri or Sib- 
 oney on the 24th. This was successfully accomplished 
 at Siboney. 
 
 These movements committed me to approaching Sant- 
 iago from the east oyer a narrow road, at first in some 
 places not better than a trail, running from Baiquiri 
 through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from 
 that quarter. This, in my judgment, was the only feas- 
 ible plan, and subsequent information and results con- 
 firmed my judgment. 
 
 On the morning of the 22d the Army commenced to 
 disembark at Baiquiri. The following general order in- 
 dicates the manner in which the troops left the trans- 
 ports and the amount of supplies carried immediately with 
 them: 
 
 "Headquarters .5th Army Corps, 
 "On board S. S. Segwancn, 
 "G. O. 18. "At Sea. June 20, 1898. 
 
 (Extract.) 
 
 "1. Under instructions to be communicated to the 
 proper commanders, troops will disembark in the follow- 
 ing order: 
 
THE GATLlXa GUXS AT SAXTIA(JO. 227 
 
 "First— The 2d Division, 5th Corps (Lawton's). The 
 Catling: Gun Detachment will accompany this division. 
 
 "Second — Gen. Bates' Brigade. This brigade will form 
 a« a reserve to the 2d Division, 5th Corps. 
 
 "Third — The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). 
 
 "Fourth— The 1st Division, 5th Corps (Kent's), 
 
 "Fifth— The squadron of the 2d Cavalry (Rafferty's). 
 
 "Sixth— If the enemy in force vigorously resist the 
 landing, the light artillery, or a partof it, will be disem- 
 barked by the battalion commander, and brought to the 
 assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposi- 
 tion be offered this artillery will be unloaded after the 
 mounted squadron. 
 
 "2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket- 
 roll (with shelter-tent and poncho), three days' field ra- 
 tions (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds 
 of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, al- 
 ready issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and com- 
 pany cooking utensils will be left under charge of the 
 regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned 
 officer and two privates from each company. 
 
 "3. All persons not immediately on duty with and 
 constituting a part of the organizations mentioned in the 
 foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship until the 
 lauding be accomplished, and until notified they can land. 
 
 "4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will 
 control all small boats and will distribute them to the 
 best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indi- 
 cated in paragraph 1. 
 
 "5. The ordnance officer- 2d Lieut. Brooke. 4th Infan- 
 try—will put on shore at once 100 rounds of ammunition 
 
228 THE OATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 per man. and have it ready for distribution on the firing- 
 line. 
 
 "6. The commanding general wishes to impress offi- 
 cers and men with the crushing effect a well-directed 
 fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers con- 
 cerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution 
 their men to fire only when they can be see the enemy. 
 ************* 
 
 "By command of Maj.-Gen. Shatter. 
 
 "E. J. McClemand, 
 'A. A. G." 
 
 The small boats belonging to the Navy and the trans- 
 ports, together with a number of steam launches, fur- 
 nished by the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded 
 with troops as prescribed in tlie order just quoted. 
 When Gen. Lawton's Division was fairly loaded in the 
 small boats, the latter were towed in long lines by the 
 steam launches toward the shore. The sea was some- 
 what rough, but by the exercise of cautiou and good 
 judgment the beach was reached and the troops disem- 
 barked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible 
 attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have 
 been hidden in the adjacent block-houses and woods, the 
 Navy opened a furious cannonade on these places while 
 the troops were moving toward the shore. It was learned 
 afterward that the Spanish garrison had retired in the 
 direction of Siboney soon after daylight. 
 
 By night about 6.000 troops were on shore. Gen. Law- 
 ton was ordered to push down a strong force to seize 
 and hold Siboney. 
 
77//; GATLING GUXS AT SANTIAGO. 229 
 
 On tlie -.'id the disembarkation was continued and 
 about (J.(KK) more men landed. Early on this date Gren. 
 Lawton's advance reachtxl Silwney. the Spiinish garri- 
 son of about (UM) men retiriujr as he came up, and offer- 
 iuy; no opposition excepi a few scattering shots at long 
 range. Some of the Cuban troops pursued the retreat- 
 ing Spaniards and skirmished with them. During the 
 afternoon of this date the disembarkation of Kent's Di- 
 vision was commenced at Siboney, which enabled me to 
 establish a base eight miles nearer Santiago and to con- 
 tinue the unloading of troops and suppplies at both 
 points. 
 
 The disembarkation was continued throughout the 
 night of the 23d and 24th, and by the evening of the 24th 
 the disembarkation of my command was practically 
 completed. 
 
230 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 PREPARING FOR THE ADVANCE. 
 
 The orders for June 24th contemplated Gen. Lawton's 
 Division taking a strong defensive position a short dis- 
 tance from Siboney, on the road to Santiago; Kent's Di- 
 vision was to be held near Santiago, where he disem- 
 barked; Bates' Brigade was to take position in support 
 of Lawton, while Wheeler's Division was to be some- 
 what to the rear on the road from Siboney to Daiquiri. 
 It was intended to maintain this situation until the 
 troops and transportation were disembarked and a rea- 
 sonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen. 
 Young's Brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the 
 night of the 23d-24th, thus taking the advance, and on 
 the morning of the latter date became engaged with a 
 Spanish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guas- 
 ima, a point on the Santiago road about three miles from 
 Siboney. Gen. Young's force consisted of one squadron 
 of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, and two of 
 the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry; in all, 964 oflB- 
 cers and men. 
 
 The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were 
 driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own 
 loss was 1 ofiicer and 1.5 men killed, 6 officers and 46 men 
 wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 
 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiring 
 effect upon our men and doubtless correspondingly de- 
 pressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated 
 
77//; aATLIXG (HUNf^ AT SANTIAGO. 231 
 
 to tbem that they had a foe to meet who would advance 
 upon them under a heavy fire delivered from intrench- 
 ments. Gen. Wheeler, division commander, was present 
 during the engagement and reports that our troops, offi- 
 cers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. His 
 report is attached, marked "A." This engagement gave 
 us a well-watered country farther to the front on which to 
 encamp our troops. 
 
 My efforts to unload transportation and subsistence 
 stores, so that we might have several days' rations on 
 shore, were continued during the remainder of the month. 
 In this work I was ably seconded by Lieut.-Col. Charles F. 
 Humphrey, deputy Q. M. G., U. S. A., chief quarter- 
 master, and Col. Joliu F. Weston, A. C. G. S., chief com- 
 missary; but, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, it was 
 difficult to laud supplies in exce^^s of those required daily 
 to feed the men and animals, and the loss of the scow, 
 mentioned as having broken away during fhe voyage, 
 as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent by Quartermas- 
 ter's Department was greatly felt. Indeed, the lack of 
 steam launches, lighters, scows, and wharves can only 
 be appreciated by those who were on the ground direct- 
 ing the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was 
 not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that 
 it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in 
 excess of those required for the daily consumption. 
 
 After the engagement at La Guasinia, and before the 
 end of the month, the army, including Gen. Garcia's 
 command, which liad been brouglit on transports to SI- 
 boney from Aserraderos, was mostly concentrated at Se- 
 
232 THE GATLIXa GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 villa, with the exception of the necessary detachments 
 at Baiquiri and Siboney- 
 
 On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about San- 
 tiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from 
 which the city was in plain view, 1 could see the San 
 Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads 
 were very poor, and, indeed, little better than bridle- 
 paths until the San Juan River and El Caney were 
 reached. 
 
 The position of El Caney, to the northeast of Santi- 
 ago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the 
 Guautanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a 
 strong outpost that might be used to assail the right 
 flank of any force operating against San Juan HilJ. 
 
 In view of this, I decided to begin the attack next 
 day at El Caney with one division, while sending two 
 divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing by the 
 El Pozo house, and as a diversion to direct a small force 
 against Aguadores, from Siboney along the railroad by 
 the sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the 
 Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing them 
 from attacking our left flank. 
 
 During the afternoon I assembled the division com- 
 manders and explained to them my general plan of bat- 
 tle. Lawton's Division, assisted by Capron's Light Bat- 
 tery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon to- 
 ward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next 
 morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move 
 by the El Caney road toward Santiago, and take position 
 on the right of the line. Wheeler's Division of dismount- 
 
TinJ (lATLlSll (II XS AT HANTIAOO. 233 
 
 ed cavalry, and Kent's Division of infantry, were direct- 
 ed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting 
 near El Pozo. toward which heights Grimes' Battery 
 moved on the afternoon of the 30th. with orders to take 
 position thereon early the next morning, and at the 
 proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler 
 and Ivent. on Sau Juan Hill. The attacli at this point 
 was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El 
 Caney :uul his infantry fire showed ho had become well 
 engaged. 
 
 The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted 
 to cutting out and repairing the roads, and other nec- 
 essary preparations for battle. These preparations were 
 far from what I desired them to be. but we were in a 
 sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward 
 by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any 
 time render impassable; fear was entertained that a 
 storm might drive the vessels containing our stores to 
 sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies; and, 
 lastly, it was reported that Gen. Paudo, with 8,000 re- 
 inforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manza- 
 nillo, and might be expected in a few days. Under these 
 conditions, I determined to give battle without defey. 
 
234 TBE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY. 
 
 Early on the morning of July 1st, Lawton was in 
 position around El Caney, Chaffee's Brigade on the right, 
 across the Guantanamo road, Miles' Brigade in the cen- 
 ter, and Ludlow's on the left. The duty of cutting off 
 the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assigned 
 to the latter brigade. The artillery opened on the town 
 at 6:15 a. m. The battle here soon became general, and 
 was hotly contested. The enemy's position was nat- 
 urally strong, and was rendered more so by block-houses, 
 a stone fort, and intrenchments cut in solid rock, and 
 tlie loop-holing of a solidly built stone church. The oppo- 
 sition offered by the enemy was greater than had been 
 anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right 
 of the main line during the day, as had been intended. 
 After the battle had continued for some time, Bates' Bri- 
 gade of two regiments reached my headquarters from 
 Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give 
 assistance if necessary. He did so, and was put in posi- 
 tion between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued 
 with varying intensity during most of the day and until 
 the place was carried by assault about 4:30 p. m. As 
 the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago 
 road, Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective 
 work, and to practically cut off all retreat in that 
 direction. 
 
 After the battle at El Caney was well opened, and 
 the sound of the small-arm fire caused us to believe that 
 
THE GATLING GUyS! AT f^AyTIAGO. 236 
 
 Lawton was driving the enemy before him, I directed 
 Grimes' Battery to open fire from the heights of El 
 Pozo on the San Juan block-house, wliich could be soen 
 situated in tlie entMuy's intreuthmfnts extending along 
 the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective, and 
 the enemy could be soen running away from the vicinity 
 of the block-house. The artillery fire from El Pozo was 
 soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently 
 had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed 
 and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used 
 smokeless powder, it was very difficult to locate the posi- 
 tion of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke 
 caused by our black powder plainly indicated the posi- 
 tion of our battery. 
 
 At this time the cavalry division, iinder Gen. Sum- 
 ner, W'hich was lying concealed in the general vicinity 
 of the El Pozo house, was ordered forward with direc- 
 tions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right 
 of the Santiago side, while Kent's Division was to follow 
 closely in its rear and deploy to the left. 
 
 These troops moved forward in compliance with or- 
 ders, but the road was so narrow as to render it imprac- 
 ticable to retain the column of fours formation at all 
 points, while the undergrowth on either side was so 
 dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmish- 
 ers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was 
 slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry 
 killed and wounded a number of our men while march- 
 ing along this road, and before there was any opportu- 
 nity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and 
 Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible 
 
236 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 haste and place their troops in position to engage the 
 enemy. Gen. Kent, with this end in view, forced the 
 head of liis column alongside of the cavalry column as 
 far as the nari-ow trail permitted, and thus huiTied his 
 arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that 
 stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San 
 Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieut- 
 Col. Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the 
 front in a war balloon. This information he furnished 
 to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right- 
 hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road 
 to the left. 
 
 Gen. Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cav- 
 alry division, who had been ill, came forward during 
 the morning, and later returned to duty and rendered 
 most gallant and efficient service during the remainder 
 of the day. 
 
 After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the 
 right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left, 
 when he could come up. and with their left resting near 
 the Santiago road. 
 
 In the mantime Kent's Division, with the exception 
 of two regiments of Hawkins' Brigade, being thus un- 
 covered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks pre- 
 viously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but 
 more especially the one to the left, and, crossing the 
 creek, formed for attack in front of San Juan Hill. 
 During the formation the 2d Brigade suffered severely. 
 While personally superintending this movement, its gal- 
 lant commander. Col. Wikoff, was killed. The command 
 
TEE GATLIXG OVM^ AT FiiXTIAOO. 237 
 
 of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, 
 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and 
 next upon Lleut.-Col. Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five 
 minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of the ene- 
 my, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon 
 Lieut.-Col. Ewers, 9th Infantry. 
 
 While the formation just described was taking place. 
 Gen. Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear bri- 
 gade. The 10th and 2d Infantry were ordered to fol- 
 low. Wikoff's Brigade, while the 21st was sent on the 
 right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under Gen, 
 Haw^kins, who had crossed the stream and formed on 
 the right of the division. The 2d and 10th Infantry, 
 Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good 
 order on the left of the division, passed over a green 
 knoll, and drove the enemy back toward his trenches. 
 
 After completing their formation under a destructive 
 fire, and advancing a short distance, both divisions found 
 in tlieir front a wide bottom, in which had been placed 
 a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond which there was 
 a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was 
 strongly posted. Nothing daunted, these gallani men 
 pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position, 
 both divisions losing heavily. In this assault Col. Ham- 
 ilton, Lieuts. Smith and Shipp were killed, and Co!. Car- 
 roll, Lieuts. Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were 
 wounded. 
 
 Great credit is due to Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins, who, 
 placing himself between his regiments, urged them on 
 
238 TEE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 by voice and bugle calls to the attack so brilliantly 
 executed. 
 
 In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the 
 gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, 
 for, while the generals indicated the formations and the 
 points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery 
 of the subordinate officers and men that planted our col- 
 ors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy 
 from his trenches and block-houses, thus gaining a posi- 
 tion which sealed the fate of Santiago. 
 
 In this action on tJUs part of the field most efficient ser- 
 vice was rendered by Lieut. .lohn H. Parker, 13th Infantry, 
 and the Gatling Gun Detachment under his command. The 
 fighting contimied at intervals until nightfall, but our men 
 held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much 
 blood and toil. 
 
 I am greatly indebted to Gen. Wheeler, who, as pre- 
 viously stated, returned from the sick-list to duty during 
 the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made 
 itself felt on this part of the battle-field, and the infor- 
 mation he furnished to me at various stages of the bat- 
 tle proved to be most useful. 
 
THE GATLIXa GUNS AT SANTIAOO. 239 
 
 THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 My own health was impaired by overexertion in tlie 
 sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented 
 me from participating as actively in the battle as I de- 
 sired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had 
 a general view of the battle-field, extending from El 
 Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan 
 Hill. His staff oflacers were stationed at various points 
 on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them, 
 by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was en- 
 abled to transmit my orders. During the afternoon I 
 visited the position of Grimes' Battery on the heights of 
 El Pozo, and saw Sumner and Kent in firm possession of 
 San Juan Hill, which I directed should be intrenched 
 during the night. My engineer officer, Lieut.-Col. Derby, 
 collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and dur- 
 ing the night trenches of very considerable strength were 
 constructed. 
 
 During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, 
 brought forward the two remaining batteries of his bat- 
 talion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left 
 of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries 
 were moved forward to positions near the firing-line, 
 but the nature of the country and the intensity of the 
 enemy's small-arm fire was such that no substantial re- 
 sults were gained by our artillery in the new positions. 
 The batteries were intrenched during the night. Gen. 
 Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as 
 
240 THE CATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to de- 
 tain the Spaniards in that vicinity. 
 
 After the brilliant and important victory gained at El 
 Caney, Lawton started his tried troops, who had been 
 fighting all day and marching much of the night before, 
 to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night 
 came on before this movement could be accomplished. 
 In the darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered, 
 and the division commander, being uncertain of the 
 ground and as to what might be in his front, halted 
 his command and reported the situation to me. This in- 
 formation was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed 
 Gen. Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El 
 Pozo house as the only certain way of gaining his new 
 position. 
 
 This was done, and the division took position on the 
 right of the cavalry early next morning; Chaffee's Bri- 
 gade arriving first, about half-past seven, and the other 
 brigades before noon. 
 
 On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffleld, at 
 Siboney, to send forward the 34th Michigan and the 9th 
 Massachusetts. Both of which had just arrived from 
 the United States. These regiments reached the front 
 the next morning. The 34th was placed in rear of Kent, 
 and the 9th was assigned to Bates, who placed it on his 
 left. 
 
 Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened bat- 
 tle, but because of the intrenchments made during the 
 night, the approach of Lawton's Division, and the pres- 
 ence of Bates' Brigade, which had taken position during 
 
THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 241 
 
 the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as 
 to our ability to repel the Spaniards. 
 
 It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his 
 brigade had performed most arduous and efficient ser- 
 vice, having marched much of the night of June 30th- 
 July 1st, and a good part of the latter day, during which 
 he also participated in the battle of El Caney, after 
 which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of 
 the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about 
 midnight. 
 
 All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less 
 fury, but such of our troops as were in position at day- 
 light held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong 
 and commanding position on the right. 
 
 About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to 
 break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points. 
 
242 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER. 
 
 On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but 
 the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the 
 assault of the previous night, and the firing along the 
 lines was desultory until stopped by my sending the 
 following letter within the Spanish lines: 
 
 "Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River, 
 
 "July 3, 1898—8:80 a. m. 
 "Sir, — I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell 
 Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of for- 
 eign countries, and all the women and children, that they 
 should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "William R. Shafter. 
 "Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols. 
 "The Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, 
 Santiago de Cuba." 
 
 To this letter I received the following reply: 
 
 "Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898. 
 "His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the 
 United States, near San Junn River: 
 "Sir, — I have the honor to reply to your communica- 
 tion of to-day, written at 8:30 a. m. and received at 1 
 p. m., demanding the surrender of this city, or, in the 
 contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard 
 this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women and 
 
THE GATLINO ODNS AT SANTIAGO. 243 
 
 children, that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock 
 to-morrow morning. 
 
 "It is my duty to say to you that this city will not sur- 
 render, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and 
 inhabitants of the contents of your message. 
 
 "Very respectfully, Jos6 Toral, 
 
 "Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps." 
 
 Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and 
 asked that the time given for them— the women and 
 children— to depart from the city be extended until 10 
 o'clock on July 5th. This induced me to write a second 
 letter, as follows: 
 
 "Santiago de Cuba, July 3d. 1898. 
 
 "Sir, — In consideration of a request of the consular 
 officers in your city for further delay in carrying out 
 my intentions to fire on the city, and iu the interests of 
 the poor women and cliildren who will suffer very great- 
 ly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, 
 I liave the honor to announce that I will delay such ac- 
 tion, solely in their interests, until noon of the 5th, pro- 
 vided that during the interim your forces make no dem- 
 onstration whatever upon those of my own. 
 
 "I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 "William R Shnfter, 
 "Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 "The Commanding General, Spanish Forces." 
 
 My first message went under a flag of truce at 12:42 
 p. m. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would 
 surrender if given a little time, and I thought this re- 
 sult would be hastened if the men of their army could be 
 
244 THE GATLTNG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 made to imderstancl they would be ■well treated as pris- 
 oners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I deter- 
 mined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers 
 at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and 
 who were willing to give their paroles not to serve 
 against the forces of the United States until regularly 
 exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These 
 officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish pri- 
 vates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under 
 the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops 
 were received with honors, and I have every reason to 
 believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a 
 good impression on their comrades. 
 
THE OATLIXG GUNS AT ;<:A\TIAGO. 245 
 
 OrERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO— OUR LOSSES. 
 
 The cessation of Uriug about uoou on the 3d prac- 
 tically terminated the battle of Santiago; all that oc- 
 curred after this time may properly be treated under the 
 head of the siege which followed. After deducting the 
 detachments required at Siboney and Daiquiri to render 
 those depots secure from attack, organizations held to 
 protect our flanlis, others acting as escorts and guards 
 to light batteries, the members of the Hospital Corps, 
 guards left in charge of blanket-rolls which the intense 
 heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle, 
 orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 
 men on the firing-line on July 1. when the battle was 
 fiercest and when the important and strong positions of 
 El Caney and San Juan were captured. 
 
 A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and 
 fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to 
 materially change tlie strength, as indicated above. The 
 enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our 
 own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched 
 positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the 
 intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men, and 
 the benefits derived from the careful training and instruc- 
 tion given in the company in the recent years in rifle 
 practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these 
 1 tattles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers 
 and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with 
 few exceptions, reported later. 
 
246 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, 
 and his entrance into the city was not anticipated, for 
 although it was known, as previously stated, that Gen. 
 Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the 
 garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his troops 
 could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, w^ith between 4,000 
 and 5,000 Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watch- 
 ing for and intercepting the reinforcement expected. 
 This, however, he failed to do, and Escario passed into 
 the city along on my extreme right and near the bay. 
 Up to this time I had been unable to complete in- 
 ventment of the town with my own men; but to prevent 
 any more reinforcements coming in or the enemy escap- 
 ing. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible to the 
 extreme right, and completed the investment of the place, 
 leaving Gen. Garcia's forces in the rear of my right flanl<; 
 to scout the country for any approaching Spanish rein- 
 forcements, a duty which his forces were very compe- 
 tent to perform. 
 
 It had been reported that 8,000 Spanish troops had left 
 Holquin for Santiago. It was also known that there 
 was a considerable force at San Luis, twenty miles to 
 the north. 
 
 In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored 
 to shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter 
 were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and 
 the shells did little, if any, harm. Their naval forces 
 also assisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and 
 I am informed they sustained considerable loss; among 
 others. Admiral Cervera's chief-of-staff was killed. Be- 
 
THE OATLING OUNS AT SANTIAGO. 247 
 
 ing convinced that the city would fall, Admiral Cervera de- 
 termined to put to sea, informing the French consul it was 
 better to die lighting than to sink his ships. The news 
 of the great naval victory which followed was enthu- 
 siastically received by the Army. 
 
 The information of our naval victory was transmitted 
 under flag of truce to the Spanish commander in San- 
 tiago on July 4th, and the suggestion again made that he 
 surrender to save needless effusion of blood. 
 
 On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that 
 if he would force his way into the harbor the city would 
 surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commo- 
 dore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was tempo- 
 rarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the 
 Navy should not enter the harbor. 
 
 In the meanwhile letters passing between Gen. Toral 
 and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue. 
 Each army, however, continued to strengthen its in- 
 trenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards 
 would surrender without much more fighting, and on 
 July 6th called Gen. Toral's attention to the changed 
 conditions, and at his request gave him time to consult 
 his home government. This he did, asking that the Brit- 
 ish consul, with the employees of the cable company, 
 be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This I 
 granted. 
 
 The strength of the enemy's position was such I did 
 not wish to assault if it could be avoided. 
 
248 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 An examination of the enemy's worlds, made after the 
 surrender, fully justifies the wisdom of the course 
 adopted. The intrenchments could only have been car- 
 ried with very great loss of life, probably with not less 
 than 6,000 liilled and wounded. 
 
77//; a.\Tfj\a at xs at .v.t.v/Y.ir/o. 249 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL. 
 
 On July 8tli Ceu. Toral offered to march out of the 
 tit}- with arms aud baggage, provided be would not be 
 molested before reaching Holquin, and to surrender to 
 tlie American forces the territory tbon occupied by him. 
 I replied that while I would submit liis proposition to 
 my liome government, I did not tliink it would be ac- 
 cepted. 
 
 In the meauwiiile arrangements were made with Ad- 
 miral Sampson that when the Army again engaged the 
 enemy the Navy would assist by shelling the city from 
 ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few 
 minutes. 
 
 On July lOtb the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of 
 Columbia arrived and Avere placed on the line to the 
 right of the Cavalry division. This enabled me to push 
 Lawton farther to the right and to practically command 
 the Cobre road. 
 
 On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce 
 was broken off at i p. m., and I determined to open with 
 four batteries of artillery and went forward in person 
 to the trenches to give the necessary orders, but the 
 enemy anticipated us by opening fire with his artillery a 
 few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were 
 apparently silenced before night, while ours continued 
 playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing 
 the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells fall- 
 
250 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 ing in the city. Thei'e was also some small arms firing. 
 On this afternoon and the next morning, we lost Capt. 
 Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and one man killed, and 
 Lieut. Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten men wounded. 
 
 On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the 
 Navy and my field guns was renewed, and continued 
 until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to 
 the Adjutant General of the Army that the right of Lud- 
 low's brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. 
 Thus our hold upon the enemy was complete. 
 
 At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the 
 city was again demanded. The firing ceased, and was 
 not again renewed. By this date the sickness in the 
 Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of expo- 
 sure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and 
 the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost 
 euqal to rains. The weakness of the troops was be- 
 coming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege 
 to an end, but in common with most of the officers of 
 the Army, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, 
 especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good 
 faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender. 
 
 On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows: 
 
 "With the largely increased forces which have come 
 to me and the fact that I have your line of retreat 
 securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I 
 should again demand of your excellency the surrender 
 of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am author- 
 ized to state that should your excellency so desire, the 
 Government of the United States will transport the en- 
 tire command of your excellency to Spain." 
 
THE GATLINO GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 251 
 
 General Toral replied that he had communicated my 
 proposition to his General-in-Chief, General Blanco. 
 
 July 12th I informed the Spanish commander that 
 Major General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the Amer- 
 ican Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested 
 him to grant us a personal interview on the following 
 day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The 
 interview took place on the 13th. and I informed him 
 his surrender only could be considered, and that as he 
 was without hope of escape he had no right to continue 
 the ficht. 
 
 On the 14tl. another interview tooli place, during 
 which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis 
 of his army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to 
 Spain, the capitulation embracing all of Eastern Cuba, 
 east of a line passing from Aserraderos, on the south, 
 to Sagua de Tanamo, on the north, via Palma, Soriano. 
 It v/as agreed Commissioners should meet during the 
 afternoon to definitely arrange the terms of surrender, 
 and I appointed Major Generals Wheeler and Lawton 
 and Lieutensnt Miley to represent the United States. 
 
 The Spanish Commissioners raised many points, and 
 were especially desirous of retaining their arms. The 
 discussion lasted until late at night and was renewed 
 at 9:30 o'clock next morning. The terms of surrender 
 finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops 
 in the city and as many more in the surrendered district. 
 
 It was arranged that the formal surrender should take 
 place between the lines on the morning of July 17th, 
 each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the 
 
252 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 time appoiiited, I appeared at the place agreed upon, with 
 my general oflBcers, staff, and 100 troopers of the 2d 
 Cavalry, under Captain Brett. General Tt>ral also ar- 
 rived v/ith a number of his officers and 100 infantry. 
 We met midway between the representatives of our two 
 Armies, and the Spanish commander formally consum- 
 mated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in 
 Santiago and the surrendered district. 
 
 Alter this ceremony I entered the city with my staff 
 and escort, and at 12 o'clock, noon, the American flag 
 was raised over the Governor's palace with appropriate 
 ceremonies. 
 
 The 'Jth Infantry immediately took possession of the 
 city and perfect order was maintained. The surrender 
 included a small gunboat and about 200 seamen, together 
 with five merchant ships in the harbor. One of these 
 vessels, the Mexico, had been used as a war vessel, and 
 had four guns mounted on it. 
 
 In taking charge of the civil government, all officials 
 who were willing to serve were retained in office, and 
 the established order of government was preserved as 
 far as consistent with the necessities of military rule. 
 
 I soon found the number of officials was excessive, 
 and I greatly reduced the list, and some departments 
 were entirely abolished. 
 
 A collector of customs, Mr. Donaldson, arrived soon 
 after the surrender, and, due to his energy and efficiency, 
 this departrL-ent was soon working satisfactorily. The 
 total receipts had, up to my departure, been $102,000. 
 
THE GATLIXG OC/.V.S AT SANTIAGO. 253 
 
 On August 4th I received orders to begin the embark- 
 ation of my command and ship them to Montauk Point 
 Long Island, New York. The movement continued with- 
 out interruption until August 25th, when I sailed for 
 Montauk with the last troops in my command, turning 
 over the command of the district to Major General 
 Lawton. 
 
254 THE GATLINa GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Before closing my report I wish to dwell upon the 
 natural obstacles I had to encounter and which no fore- 
 sight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and 
 precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, 
 the roads were mere bridle-paths, the effect of the tropical 
 sun and rains upon the unacclimated troops was deadly, 
 and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its 
 effect on ihe Army. 
 
 At Baiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was 
 made a small wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried 
 to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed 
 into the water and guided to a sandy beach about 200 
 yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on 
 the beach and at a small wharf erected by the engineers. 
 
 I had neither the time nor the men to spare to con- 
 struct permanent wharves. 
 
 In spite of the fact that I had nearly 1,000 men con- 
 tinuously at work on the roads, they were at times im- 
 passable for wagons. 
 
 The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often sud- 
 denly rise yo as to prevent the passage of wagons, and 
 thou the eight pack trains with the command had to 
 be depended upon for the victualing of my Army, as 
 well as the 2(>,000 refugees, who could not in the interests 
 of humanity be left to starve while we had rations. 
 
 Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack 
 trains. 
 
THE GATLINO OUNS AT SANTIAGO. 255 
 
 After the great physical strain and exposure of July 
 Tst and 2d, the malarial and other fevers began to rapidly 
 advance throughout the command, and on July 4th the 
 yellow fever appeared at Siboney. Though efforts were 
 made to keep this fact from the Army, it soon became 
 known. 
 
 The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores 
 during the cair-paign was abundant, and notwithstand- 
 ing the difficulties in landing and transporting the ration, 
 the troops on the firing line were at all times supplied 
 with iti- coarser components, namely, of bread, meat, 
 sugar, and coffee. 
 
 There was nc lack of transportation, for at no time 
 up to the surrender could all the wagons I h.ad be used. 
 
 In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say 
 that they received every attention that was possible to 
 give them. The medical officers, without exception, 
 worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which 
 was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. 
 It would have bt-en better if we had had more ambulances, 
 but as many were taken as was thought necessary, judg- 
 ing from previous campaigns. 
 
 The discipline of the command was superb, and I wish 
 to invite attention to the fact that not an oflScer was 
 brought to trial by court martial, and, as far as I know, 
 no enlisted men. This speaks volumes for an Army of 
 this size and in a campaign of such duration. 
 
 In conclusion, I desire to express to the members of 
 my staff my thanks for their efficient performance of all 
 the duties required of them, and the good judgment and 
 bravery displayed on all occasions when demanded. 
 
256 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 I submit the following recommendations for promo- 
 tion, which I earnestly desire to see made. It is a very 
 little reward to give them for their devotion and fear- 
 less exposure of their lives in their country's cause: 
 
 E. J. McClernand, Lieutenant Colonel and Adjutant 
 General, U. S. A., to be brevetted Colonel for gallantry 
 in the face of the enemy on the 1st and 2d of July, and 
 to be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meri- 
 torious service throughout the campaign. 
 
 Geo. McC. Derby, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, 
 U. S. v., to be brevetted Colonel for hazardous service 
 on July 1st and 2d in reconnoitering the enemy's lines, 
 an(i to be brevetted Brigadier General for hazardous and 
 meritorious service in ascending, under a hot fire, in a 
 war balloon on July 1st, thus gaining valuable informa- 
 tion. 
 
 J. D. Miley, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector Gen- 
 eral, T^ S A., to be brevetted Colonel for conspicuous 
 gallantry in the battle of San Juan on July 1st, and to 
 be brevetted Brigadier General for faithful and meritori- 
 ous service throughout the campaign. 
 
 R. H. Noble, Major and Adjutant General, U. S. V., 
 to be brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
 torious service throughout the campaign. 
 
 J. J. Astor, Lieutenant Colonel and Inspector General, 
 U. S. v., to be brevetted Colonel for faithful and meri- 
 torious service during the campaign. 
 
 B. F. Pope. Lieutenant Colcnel and Surgpon, U. S. V., 
 to be brevetted Colonel for faithful and meritorious ser- 
 vice during the campaign. 
 
niE GATLiya guns at santiaoo. 257 
 
 Maj. S. W. Grcesbeck, Judge Advocate, U. S. A., to be 
 brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meritori- 
 ous service throughout the campaign. 
 
 Charles F. Humphrey, Lit-utenant Colonel, Quarter- 
 master's Department, to be brevetted Brigadier General 
 for faithful and meritorious service throughout the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 John F. Weston, Colonol and Assistant Commissary 
 General of Subsistence, Chief Commissary, to be brev- 
 etted Brigadier General for meritorious service through- 
 out the campaign. 
 
 C. G. Starr, Major and Inspector General, U. S. V., to 
 be brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
 torious service throughout the campaign. 
 
 Leon Roudiez, Major and Quartermastsr, U. S. V., to 
 be brevetted Lieutenant Colonel for faithful and meri- 
 torious conduct throughout the canipaign. 
 
 H. J. Gallagher, Major and Commissary of oubsist- 
 ence, U. S. V.. to be brevettei Lieutenant Color.el for 
 faithful and meritorious service throughout the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 Capt. Brice, Commissary of Subsistence. U. S. V., to 
 be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
 throughout the campaign. 
 
 B. H. Plummer, Captain, U. S. A., A. D. C, to be 
 brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
 throughout the campaign. 
 
 J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Captain and Assistant Adjutant 
 General, U. S, V., to be brevetted Major for faithful and 
 meritorious service during the campaign. 
 
 W. H. McKittrick, Captain and Assistant Adjutant 
 
258 TEE GATLlNa GUX8 AT 8AXTIAG0. 
 
 General, U. S. V., to be brevetted Major for faithful and 
 meritorious service during thie campaign. 
 
 Capt. Johnson, Assistant Quartermaster, U. S. V., to 
 be brevetted Major for faithful and meritorious service 
 during the campaign. 
 
 I wish to invite special attention to Dr. G. Goodfel- 
 low, of New York, who accompanied me throughout the 
 campaign and performed much professional service as 
 well as duties as Volunteer aid. I recommend him for 
 favorable consideration of the War Department. 
 
 Mr. G. F. Hawkins, of New York, also accompanied 
 me as Volunteer aid, and I recommend him for favorable 
 consideration of the War Department for faithful and 
 important services rendered. 
 
 My thanks are due to Admiral Sampson and Captain 
 Goodrich, U. S. N., for their efficient aid in disembark- 
 ing my Army. Without their assistance it would have 
 been impossible to have landed in the time I did. 
 
 I also express my warmest thanks to division, brigade, 
 and regimental commanders, without exception, for their 
 earnest efforts in carrying out my wishes and for the 
 good judgment they invariably displayed in handling 
 their troops. 
 
 The reports of the division commanders are attached 
 hereto, and those of the brigade and regimental com- 
 manders forwarded herewith, and attention respectfully 
 invited to them. Very respectfully, 
 
 Wm.. R. Shifter, 
 Major-General, United States Volunteers, 
 Cammanding United States Forces in Cuba. 
 
 Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
 
Tin: (lATl.IXG GUXS AT SA\TI.\aO. 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 Bivouac, near Santiago, Cuba, 
 July 23, 1898. 
 The Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Sir, — In compliance with orders I have the honor to 
 submit the following report of my command, the Gatling 
 Gun Detachment, 5th Army Corps, covering its opera- 
 tions down to the present date: 
 
 1. Organization. — Pursuant to instructions from Gen. 
 Shafter I was given a detail of two sergeants and ten 
 men on the 2(ith of May, 18!)S, from the 13th Infantry, 
 then in camp near Tampa, Fla., and directed to report to 
 1st Lieut. John T. Thompson, 0. D., ordinance officer, 
 Tampa, "for duty with Gatling guns." I was placed in 
 charge of four guns, model ^s.'^'. cal. 30, and at once 
 began the instruction of the detachment. On June 1st 
 I received verbal instruction to assist Lieut. Thompson 
 in his work at the ordinance depot, and performed this 
 duty in addition to my duties with the guns until June 
 6, 1S98, superintending issues to the expedition (-jth 
 Corps) then fitting out for Cuba. 
 
 On June 6th I took my men and guns aboard the 
 transport Chrmkrr. and on June 11th. per special orders 
 No. 16 of that date, my detail was increased to thirty- 
 seven men, all told, of whom one was left sick in hospi- 
 tal at Tampa. About twelve of these did not join me, 
 however, until after debarkation at Daiquiri, Cuba. Ou 
 
260 THE GATZING GU^!^ AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 June 2."'>th I received verbal instructions from Gen. Shaf- 
 ter to disembark at once, select the necessary number of 
 mules (two per gun), and get to the front as soon as pos- 
 sible, reporting on my arrival there to Gen. Wheeler, 
 then in command of all the troops at the front. I was 
 unable to obtain any tentage for myself, and had only 
 shelter-tents for my men. 
 
 I was joined on June 25th by Capt. Henry Marcotte, 
 17th Infantry, retired, regularly authorized correspon- 
 dent of the Army and Navy Journal, who has been with 
 me ever since, enduring all the vicissitudes of the season 
 with Spartan fortitude, although equally destitute of 
 cover as myself and 60 years of age. I desire to express 
 here officially and fully, my sincere gratitude for the 
 kindness which permitted him to accompany my com- 
 mand, and the great appreciation of the valuable advice 
 and assistance which he has given continually. His large 
 experience of war, his clear head and good judgment have 
 always been at hand to aid, and his cool example to my- 
 self and my men under fire did much to steady us and 
 keep us up to our work when we were first called on to 
 face that ordeal. 
 
 All of the detachments, who had not previously joined 
 me, did so on June 2Gth, on which day I reached the ex- 
 treme front and reported to Gen. Wheeler. The guns 
 were posted in a position to sweep the neighboring bills 
 toward the enemy, and I went into camp, remaining there 
 until the morning of July 1st. 
 
 Summing up the organization, it should be stated here 
 that the detachment was organized at the first, and has 
 
THE GATLIXG OUyS AT SANTIAGO. 261 
 
 ever since remained an independent command, receiving 
 its orders directly from the corps commander. It has 
 had its own records, returns, rolls, etc., and has been 
 rationed separately all the time, and is composed of men 
 selected by myself from various regiments. 
 
 2. The Battery in Action. — On the morning of July 
 1st, I broke camp at 4:30 a. m., and pursuant to instruc- 
 tions from Gon. Shaffer, proceeded to El Poso, placing 
 my battery, as I shall henceforth call it, in support be- 
 hind the position taken by a battery of artillery. I took 
 this position about 6 a. m., and soon after the artillery 
 arrived, wont on to battery and opened fire at Salitiago, 
 the range being 2,600 yards. After some time the enemy 
 replied with a well-directed fire, the second shell burst- 
 ing directly over my battery in rear of artillery. Neither 
 my men nor mules showed any signs of disturbance, and 
 we remained in our perilous position nearly twenty min- 
 utes, the enemy's shells bursting all around us, until 
 ordered to the rear by the chief-of-staff. The battery 
 went to the rear under fire quietly until out of range, and 
 remained there nnVl the ai'tilkry ;!re ceased, at about 
 a. m. Private Hoft, Company D, 1.3th Infantry, a mem- 
 ber of the detachment v/ho had been detailed to guard 
 the camp equipage at El Poso, remained at his post during 
 the whole of the artillery fight, and deserves great credit 
 therefor, his battery having been ordered to the rear. 
 
 At 9 a. m. I returned to El Poso, and there received 
 the following instructions from Col. McClernand, A. A. 
 G., r)th Corps: "Find the 71st N. Y. V. and go on with 
 them, if you can. If this is not practical, find the best 
 
262 THE GATLING GUXS AT SAXTIAGO. 
 
 position you can, and use your guns to the best advan- 
 tage." Pursuant to these instructions, I went forward 
 about a half-mile and found the 71st N. Y. V. halting to 
 learn what their instructions were. I could get no clear 
 idea of what they were going to do, but waited about 
 fifteen minutes in their rear to find out. Meantime 
 troops continually passed us toward the front. Then, 
 about 10:15, firing began in front. I rode for^^ard alone 
 along the rode, which was a narrow defile through the 
 jungle, and found that about a half-mile in front was a 
 creek, upon the crossing of which the enemy's fire seemed 
 concentrated. In front of this crossing seemed to be a 
 level plain of about 400 to 800 yards, beyond which was 
 a semi-circular ridge crowned with Spanish trenches from 
 which the Spanish fire seemed to come. Men were being 
 hit continually at this place (the ford), but it seemed to me 
 to be a good place to work my battery effectively. 
 
 I rode back, finding the Seventy-first still lying beside 
 the road without any apparent intention of moving. I 
 determined to leave them and go into action. Taking a 
 gallop I moved the battery forward nearly to the ford 
 (about 150 yards), where I met Col. Derby of Gen. SI af- 
 ter's staff, who informed me that the troops were not yet 
 sufficiently deployed to take advantage of my fire, and 
 advised me to wait. The bullets were cutting through all 
 around, and, as we learned afterward, the enemy's sharp- 
 shooters were actually in the woods near us, up in tall 
 trees, picking off officers and men. It should be stated 
 here that the sudden increase of the enemy's fire at this 
 time was caused by a wild cheering set up by the 71st N. 
 
THE GATLIXU Ui.Ws AT ^U.Vr/.lGO. 263 
 
 Y. v., as the battery passed them on its way to the front. 
 The cheering located our position for the enemy and drew 
 his fire. Many a brave soldier who had gone to the front 
 was put forever beyond the possibility of cheering by 
 this outburst of ignorant enthusiasm. 
 
 I acted on Col. Derby's advice, and he promised to send 
 me word when the moment for proper action came. This 
 was necessary, as I knew only part of the plan of battle 
 and might have jeopardized other parts of prematurely 
 exposing our strength at this point. The gun crews lay 
 down under their guns and steadily remained at this posts. 
 The fire finally grew so hot that I moved about 100 
 yards back. This was about 12, noon. At 1 p. m., or about 
 that time, I received a message sent by Col. Derby, I think, 
 as follows: "Gen. Shafter directs that you give one of 
 your guns to Lieut. Miley. take the others forward beyond 
 the ford where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at 
 the best point you can find." I obeyed the order, giving 
 Lieut. Miley Sergeant Weigle's gun and crew and moving 
 the rest forward at a gallop to the point beyond the ford, 
 which I had already selected as a good place. The battery 
 opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of GOO to 
 800 yards at 1:15 p. m. The enemy at first concentrated 
 his fire upon us, but soon weakened and in five minutes 
 was clambering from his trenches and running to the rear. 
 We fired as rapidly as possible upon the groups thus pre- 
 sented until I saw a white handkerchief waved by some 
 one of my own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and at the 
 same moment Capt. Landis, 1st Cavalry, who had volun- 
 tarily assisted me throughout, said: "Better stop; our 
 
264 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 own men are climbing up the ridge." I ordered the fire to 
 coase at 1:23^^ p. m., and a moment later saw our own 
 troops occupy the crest of the hill. The firing had been 
 continued by the battery until our own troops were within 
 150 yards of the enemy's trench, a fact made possible by 
 the steep slope of the hill upon which the enemy had been. 
 
 At the time when my battery went into action I had 
 no support, and the position I took was at least 100 yards 
 in front of any of our troops along this part of the line. 
 About the time I ceased firing Lieut.-Col. Baldwin, 10th 
 Cavalry, put two troops in support of my battery. 
 
 I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General 
 from Fort Leavenworth, dated January 1st, 1898, the 
 theory that such guns as these can be used offensively. 
 The conditions of this assault were favorable, the morale 
 of my men superb, and the use made of the guns followed 
 the theory therein set forth with the exactness of a math- 
 ematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry had 
 been pounding away for two hours on these positions; in 
 eight and one-half minutes after the Gatlings opened the 
 the works were ours. Inspired by the friendly rattle of 
 the machine guns, our own troops rose to the charge; 
 while the enemy amazed by our sudden and tremendous 
 increase of fire, first diverted his fire to my battery, and 
 then, unable to withstand the hail of bullets, augmented 
 by the moral effect of our battery fire and the charging 
 line, broke madly from his safe trenches and was merci- 
 lessly cut by fire from these guns during his flight. 
 
 I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One 
 man was killed, one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, 
 but not much injured, and several men were missing. 
 
TUE CATLING OC/1V&' AT SANTIAGO. 265 
 
 Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my 
 three pieces forward again at a gallop, and went into 
 action on the skirmish line on top of the captured position, 
 with two pieces to the right and one to the left of the 
 main road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelled to 
 make the skirmishers give way to the right and left in 
 order to get room for my guns on the firing-line, and to 
 impress stragglers to carry ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 
 10th Cavalry, gave me a detail of one sergeant and two 
 privates, all of whom did fine service. It seemed to me 
 that the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 
 4 to 4:14 p. m. I saw a body, apparently about 400, of the 
 enemy to the right front of my position, apparently in 
 front of the position occupied by Lieut. -Col. Roosevelt 
 with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned a Gatling gun 
 on them, using 000-yard range, and they disappeared. 
 Soon after the firing sensibly slackened. 
 
 In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had 
 overheated one piece, and it went temporarily out of action. 
 I went over to Col. Roosevelt's position, about a quarter 
 of a mile to the right of a salient, and reconnoitered. 
 While there Sergeant Weigle reported to me with his 
 piece, informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it Into 
 action, and asked for instructions. This was about the 
 hour of 5 p. m., and the fire became warmer at that mo- 
 ment. I directed Sergeant Weigle to run his piece up on 
 the firing-line and to report to the officer in charge thereof. 
 He did so and went into action at once. Col. Roosevelt, 
 who was and remained present, informs me that the gun 
 was very effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns 
 
266 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 and put both of them on the line at the left of the El 
 Poso road. At sundown the enemy made a sharp attack, 
 and all three of my guns were effectively used. During 
 the fight a battery in the city opened on my two guns, fir- 
 ing 16 cm. shells. I at once turned my guns on it and kept 
 up so warm a fire that the cannoneers left their battery 
 and did not return. In all they had fired three shells at us, 
 all of which broke just over or beyond the battery. I 
 secured the fuse of one, still warm, and after the sur- 
 render visited the battery which had fired at us and ex- 
 amined the gun. It is a 16 cm. (6.2992 inches) bronze 
 rifie gun in barbette on a pintle. This is probably the 
 first time in land fighting that such a piece was ever sil- 
 enced by machine-gun fire. The range I used was 2,000 
 yards (estimated). 
 
 The guns were used during the remainder of the fight- 
 ing in the trenches. I took off the wheels and put the 
 guns on the carriages in emplacements, erecting a sand- 
 bag parapet in front as cover during the night of July 4th. 
 The disabled gun was brought up and repaired, subse- 
 quently participating in the fighting. The dynamite gun, 
 under Sergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, co- 
 operated with the battery thus formed, and the whole 
 battery, including the two Colt automatic rapid-fire guns 
 under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, 
 did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I supplied 
 about eight thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges 
 to Tiffany, which had been captured by my battery, and 
 which he used effectively in his Colt's guns. I had a 
 strong fire directed upon a battery of seven pieces of the 
 
THE GATLiyO QUXS AT SAyTIAGO. 267 
 
 enemy's artillery at a distance of 1,500 yards in front every 
 time any attempt was made to use this battery. The re- 
 sult was that only three shots were fired from these guns 
 after July 4th. I visited this battery after the surrender 
 and found every gun in working order, the KJ cm. gun be- 
 ing actually loaded. As no organization, except my bat- 
 tery, of which I had general direction, had such orders, so 
 far as I can learn, the conclusion is that this battery of 
 machine guns kept out of action seven pieces of t"he ene- 
 my's artillery by making it too warm for his gunners to 
 stay in their batteries. 
 
 I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports 
 for gallantry, which I personally witnessed. They were 
 as follows: 
 
 Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. 
 Volunteered to assist observation of fire July IsT, and 
 rendered great service at imminent peril of his life made 
 necessary in order to render such service. 
 
 Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant 
 U. S. Army (regulars). For conspicuous daring, intelli- 
 gence, and coolness in action. July 1st. 
 
 Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d 
 Lieutenant U. S. Army (regulars). For coolness and judg- 
 ment in keeping his gun in action with only one man to 
 help on July 1st. 
 
 Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant 
 United States Volunteers. For conspicuous daring and 
 courage in action. Although wounded, he remained at 
 his post until he fell from exhaustion, July 1st. 
 
 Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of hon- 
 
268 THE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 or. Conspicuous gallantry and coolness In action. When 
 two men had been shot down by his side he continued to 
 work his gun effectively alone until assistance arrived, 
 July 1st. 
 
 Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of 
 honor. Conspicuous coolness and steadiness in handling 
 his piece under hot fire, July 1st. 
 
 Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. 
 Conspicuous coolness and steadiness under fire, July 1st. 
 
 Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate 
 of merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of 
 July 6th. Being put on outpost duty with a Gatling gun 
 in time of truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, 
 whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy's approach, 
 he cooly reserved his fire for personal investigation and 
 prevented a violation of the truce. 
 
 Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of 
 merit. Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 
 6th. Being on outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of 
 truce, and having been alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty 
 it was to warn him of the enemy's approach, he coolly 
 held his fire for personal investigation and prevented a 
 violation of the truce. 
 
 In making these recommendations, I have limited my- 
 self to those which I personally observed. If I recom- 
 mended for .every deserving act, there is not a man in my 
 whole detachment who has not deserved a certificate of 
 merit. They were selected in the beginning from an army 
 corps for what I knew of them, and they have abundantly 
 justified my confidence in them. With a less efficient per- 
 
THE GATLIXO GUNS AT SAyTIAGO. 269 
 
 sonnel it would have been absolutely impossible to or- 
 agnize, equip and instruct the first battery of Catling guns 
 ever used in the history of war, in the short space of 
 time allotted me, and put it in effecieut fighting shape. 
 They fought their guns on the skirmish line and in ad- 
 vance of it, standing boldly up to do it when the skirmish- 
 ers themselves lay down close for cover. My loss, as 
 footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent, 
 killed, wounded, and missing. The eflaciency of the work 
 of my guns was attested to me by numerous Spanish ofii- 
 cers and prisoners. Their favorite expression was: "It 
 was terrible when your guns opened, always. They went 
 b-r-r-r-r, like a lawn mower cutting the grass over our 
 trenches. We could not stick a finger up when you fired 
 without getting it cut off— so!" 
 
 The work of this experimental battery proves that in 
 this weapon we have a new arm supplementary to in- 
 fantry and cavalry, independent of both as one arm is of 
 another, and more nearly capable of independent action 
 than any other arm of the service. It is equally demon- 
 strated that this new arm is entirely different from artil- 
 lery in its functions, and can live where the latter is com- 
 pelled to retire. 
 
 It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I 
 have, at the request of General Wheeler, drawn up a 
 scheme of such an organization and submitted it to him. 
 
 Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. 
 I can only renew the representations contained in my 
 letter of January 1, 1898, to the Adjutant General, ac- 
 companying drawing, etc., of my proposed carriage for 
 
270 TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 machine guns. I would now, based on experience, mod- 
 ify my theory of oragnization as then proposed, and 
 would make several changes in the model of carriage 
 then proposed without departing from the general 
 principles. 
 
 If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be 
 very glad to submit them when called upon by the War 
 Department to do so. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 John H. Parker, 
 2d Lieut., 13th Infantry, 
 Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Corps. 
 
TEE GATLING GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 271 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 L'ENVOI. 
 
 Record of the Detachment 9 
 
 The New Arm of the Service 12 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 INCEPTION OF THE SCHEME. 
 
 Conditions at Tampa 16 
 
 Florida Climate and its Effects 17 
 
 Description of the Catling Gun 18 
 
 Difficulties Encountered 20 
 
 Politics at Tampa 21 
 
 First Efforts to obtain Authority 21 
 
 Original Plan of Organization 2i 
 
 Tactical Employment of Machine Guns 26 
 
 A Lucky Accident 29 
 
 The First Detail 30 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ORDNANCE DEPOT. 
 
 Defects in the Guns 33 
 
 Instruction of the Detachment 36 
 
 Status of the Detachment 37 
 
 Interview with General Wheeler 37 
 
 General Wheeler's Views .38 
 
 Interview with General Lee 39 
 
272 THE GATLIXG GUNS AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Issues of Ordnance 41 
 
 Fire in the Magazine 43 
 
 Embarkation 46 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION. 
 
 A Night Alarm on Transport 54 
 
 Decisive Interview with General Shafter 56 
 
 The Official Authority at Last 58 
 
 Condition of Transports 61 
 
 Disembarkation 63 
 
 Private J. Shifter— Corral Boss 67 
 
 The Missouri Mule 67 
 
 The First March 70 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE MARCH. 
 
 The 13th Infantry Detail 71 
 
 The Cuban Guide 75 
 
 The Cuban as He Is 76 
 
 Roads in Cuba 78 
 
 Private Jones and the Scorpion 80 
 
 The Medical Department 83 
 
 The Newspaper Fraternity 87 
 
 Chaplain Springer 89 
 
 Arrival at the Front 90 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER. 
 Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun. . 93 
 The Problem Presented to this Detachment 95 
 
THE GAT LI NO OUNS AT SANTIAGO. 273 
 
 Personnel of the Detachment 95 
 
 Roster on July 1st 101 
 
 Captain Marcotte 104 
 
 Oil for an Army lOG 
 
 Futile Plans 109 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 THE BATTLE. 
 
 The Plan of Battle by General Shatter Ill 
 
 Did General Shafter Capture Santiago? HE DID 11 :! 
 
 The Night Before the Battle 114 
 
 El Poso 115 
 
 The Final Instructions 124 
 
 The 71st New York 124 
 
 Waiting for the Decisive Moment 12S 
 
 In Action at Last 132 
 
 The Killed and Wounded 138 
 
 On the Skirmish Line 141 
 
 Reconnoissance 144 
 
 Weigle Gets His Opportunity 144 
 
 The Catlings Knock out a Heavy Battery 14U 
 
 The Brunettes 148 
 
 The Artillery 151 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SAN- 
 TIAGO. 
 
 El Caney 152 
 
 San Juan 151 
 
 Movements of Lawton's Division 151 
 
 The Catlings as a Tactical Reserve 159 
 
274 THE OATLING GVN8 AT SANTIAGO. 
 
 Sergeant William Tiffany 160 
 
 The Night Alarm 161 
 
 The Dynamite Gun 164 
 
 The Mortar Battery 166 
 
 Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine 
 Guns as Demonstrated in Battle 168 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 The Surrender 170 
 
 General Observations upon the Volunteers 173 
 
 The 34th Michigan 175 
 
 The Rough Riders 178 
 
 The 1st Illinois 184 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 The Difficulties of the Campaign 186 
 
 Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes 193 
 
 The Case of Private Elkins 200 
 
 The Sick Left by Kent's Division 202 
 
 Some Staff— and Some Others 207 
 
 The Lesson to be Derived 212 
 
 The General Staff— Proper 213 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 HOME AGAIN. 
 
 The Home Voyage 215 
 
 The End of the Detachment 215 
 
 Appendix 1 21 < 
 
 Appendix II 220 
 
 Appendix III 259 
 
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