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NOTICE 
 
 OB^ MR. ADAMS' EULOGIUM 
 
 ON THZI XiZFE AUTH CHARACTER OF 
 
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NOTICE 
 
 OF 
 
 MR. ADAMS' EULOGIUM 
 
 ox THE 
 
 -" If we owe regard to the memory of the dead, there is yet more respect to be paid 
 to knowledge, wisdom and truth." Joluisoti's Rambler. 
 
 It makes no part of our present purpose to speak of this work 
 as a specimen of eloquence; nor (could the task be avoided) are we 
 more disposed to pronounce on the merit or demerit, of the portrait 
 it professes to exhibit. Eulogy, as its name sufficiently imports, is 
 a song of praise — an effusion of fancy and friendship — an outpour- 
 ing of gratitude for benefits conferred; and as such, has a strong and 
 obvious tendency to exaggeration, in some cases, and to concealment 
 in others. To remedy this evil, philosophy, which alone has the 
 right of giving laws to literature, has prescribed a general rule, 
 equally sustained by good taste and good morals; viz: that, " Pane- 
 " gerick shall employ no misrepresentation, either in excuse, or in 
 " praise, of its own subject, nor in censure of any other." An 
 apparent indifference to both branches of this injunction, is the cir- 
 cumstance, in the work before us, which most attracts our notice, and 
 gives rise to the following remarks. 
 
 1. At page 73 of the pamphlet, we find the disaster af Wash- 
 ington, in 1814, characterised as the heaviest of the war; "the 
 " heaviest, because its remembrance must be coupled with shame.'''' 
 
 That this disaster furnishes no room for national vanity, is true — 
 nor is it less so, that the cxchisiveness of Mr Adams' censure with 
 regard to it, is unjust. Was there no other blot in our escutcheon, 
 that could warm and redden the cheek of the Rhetorician? Had he 
 forgotten, that in 1812, a strong fortification, a considerable army, and 
 an entire territory, had been surrendered to an inferior force, without 
 firing a gun? Bad as the disaster at Washington was, that at De- 
 troit was worse, whether examined in relation to the extent, or dura- 
 tion, or character, of the evils it inflicted on individuals or the na- 
 tion. Yet according to Mr. Adams' estimate, it was only the 
 former, that was coupled with shame — the latter, might be remem- 
 bered without blushing! 
 
 2. Mr. Adams' next step is to indicate the causes of thin 
 unparalleled calamity. " It should have been remembered,'' says he, 
 " that in war, heedless security on one side, stimulates to desperate 
 " expedients on the other; and that the enterprise, surely fatal to 
 " the undertaker zvhen encountered by precaution, becomes successful 
 
 • achievement over the helples?ness of neglected preparation. iSuch 
 
" had hec/i the uniform lesson of crperitncc in former ages; 
 " such had it emphatically been in onr oivn revolutionary loarJ' 
 
 As an abstract proposition, nothing is truer, than that, " in Avar 
 " lieedless security and neglected preparation" lead to defeat and 
 disgrace; and on meeting the maxim hero, we should have passed i). 
 by without notice, had we not found the Rhetorician, after carefully 
 exempting his patrons from the punishment he meditated, — not only 
 barbing his arrow, but directing its flight and leaving it to rankle in 
 the sides of the less favored members of the Cabinet of 1814. "No" 
 he exclaims, " Messrs. Madison and Monroe, incurred no blame in 
 " this business — they, saw the danger afar off — they, had not forgot- 
 " ten the lesssons taught by the war of the revolution — they, knew 
 " well the value and necessity of prompt and ample preparation." 
 And what then? Was the danger avoided? Not so; the army 
 tvas beaten, the city was sacked, and the Capitol burned. Whatl 
 a President of the United States, specially charged with the duty 
 of seeing that the re])ublic suftered no injury, — thoroughly impres- 
 sed with the nature and extent of the approaching danger — know- 
 ing sufficiently the means of meeting and repelling it — possessing, at 
 the same time, the whole power of the Nation for executing his pur- 
 poses, and aided, besides, with the constant presence of his Fidus 
 Achates, (that oracle, according to Mr. Adams, of energetic councils) 
 — is it credible, we ask, that under the guardianship of one so gifted, 
 so instructed, so disposed and so sustained, the metropolis of the Union 
 should have fallen a victim to " heedless security and neglected 
 " preparation?" The two facts assumed by Mr. Adams, cannot both 
 be true; they expressly contradict each other, and instead of presenting 
 to the mind any clear and probable conclusion, they offer only a silly 
 and contemptible paradox. Such is the " bad eminence" on which 
 the praises and prejudices of the Eulogist, have placed the venerable 
 Madison! But enough of this — we hasten to the rescue, and have 
 no doubt of being able to shew, by testimony equally abundant and 
 authentic, that the cause assigned by him for the disaster at Wash- 
 inton, is a mere fiction; — the product of an irritable temperament 
 and irregular mind, and even less worthy of credit, than his cunningly 
 devised fable of federal treason and disloyalty. 
 
 It will be remembered, that in September 1814, the Congress 
 of the Union assembled, on the ashes of the Capitol. The moment 
 was one of great excitement; and among the public objects most 
 interesting, was that of promptly and thoroughly investigating the 
 causes of the calamity and disgrace which had befallen the nation. 
 To this end a committee of seven was appointed, of whom we need 
 only say, that they were able and honorable men, having the best 
 means of judging, and no possible temptation to give an unjust ver- 
 dict, (i) And what, after long and patient enquiry v/as their report? 
 
 (1) The mnmbers were, Mr. Johnson of Iventiicky, Mr. Lowndes of Soivth Carolina, 
 Mr. Stockton of Now Jersey, Mr. Miller of New York, Mr. Goldsliorough of Maryland, Mr. 
 .Barbour of Virginia, and Mr. Pickins of South Carolina— /oMr federalists and thee republi- 
 cans, according to Ihe party denominations of that day. 
 
**' That in the opinion of the committee, the means authorised for the 
 ^' security of the lOth military district, by the F resident of the 
 " United States, i7i a cabinet council of the 1st of July, were Oinjde 
 " and sufficient, as to the extent of the force; and seasonable, as to 
 " the time, when the measures were authorised^ 
 
 Ol the Cabinet measures, referred to by the Committee in the 
 preceding extract, Mr. Monroe has given the following detail: — ''On 
 " or about the 1st of July last, the President convened the heads of 
 " departments and the attorney general, to consult on the measures 
 '" which it would be proper to adopt, for the safety of this city and 
 " district. He appeared to have digested a plan of the force to be 
 *' called immediately into the field; the additional force to be kept 
 '' under orders to march at a moment's notice; its composition and 
 " necessary equipment. It seemed to be his object, that some posi- 
 *' tion should be taken between the Eastern branch and tlic Patuxent 
 " with two or three thousand men; and that an additional force of 
 " ten or twelve thousand including the militia of the district, should 
 " be held in readiness in the neighboring states, to march when called 
 " on; the whole force to he put under the command of an officer of 
 " the regular army. The measures suggested by the President, 
 " were approved by all the members of the administration.^^ 
 
 Such was the substance of the President's plan of defence and 
 the extent of the means, deemed necessary by him, for that purpose. 
 Let us now see, what were the measures, taken to give effect to 
 this plan; so far as its execution depended on the War Department. 
 
 " On the 2d of July" says the Report of the Committee, " the 
 " 10th military district was constituted and the command given to 
 " General Winder. On the 4th, the requisition upon the states for 
 " 93,500 men was made. On the 14th, the Governors of Penn- 
 '•' sylvania and Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the requisition 
 '• of the 4th, and promised promptitude. About the 10th, the 
 *' Governor of IMaryland was served with a requisition, and took mea- 
 " sures to designate a corps of 6,000 men — the whole quota from that 
 '• state. On the 12th, General Winder was authorised, in case of 
 " menaced or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of 
 " Maryland. On the 17th, the General was further authorised, to 
 '' call into actual service not less than 2 nor more than 3,000 of the 
 •'• drafts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force; to be 
 " stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the City 
 *'■' of Washington. On the same day, he was authorised to call on the 
 " state of Pennsylvania for 5,000; on Virginia for 2,000; on the 
 *' militia of the District of Columbia (in a disposable state) for 2,000; 
 " together with the 6,000 from Maryland, making an aggregate force of 
 '■ 15,000 drafted militia; 3,000 of which, authorised to be called into 
 •' actual service (the residue in case of actual or menaced invasion) 
 *• besides the regular troops, estimated at 1,000 — making 16,000, in- 
 *' dependent of marines and flotilla men [600]. This was the mea- 
 sure of defence contemplated for military district No. 10, and the. 
 
 ii 
 
" measures iciJccn hij the War Department up to the 17th of July, in 
 " execution of it." Thus we see, that at tlie last mentioned date 
 (five tveeks before the enemifs attacJc on Washington) every thing 
 either ordered, or indicated, b)^ the President in relation to the kind 
 or degree of force to be employed, or to General Winder's authority 
 for assembling and employing it, was in fidl execution; so far, as the 
 agency of the War Department was necessary to the attainment of 
 these objects. 
 
 Our next subject of enquiry is — what employment was made 
 of the authorisations, thus given by the War Department, for calling 
 out the troops designated for the defence of District No. 10? On 
 this point the Report of the Committee with its accompanying 
 documents, furnish full and and decisive evidence. General Winder, 
 in the exercise of his new function, and after having made a topo- 
 graphical tour of the District — suggested in a letter of the 9th of July 
 an alteration in the President's plan; and instead of 2, or 3,000 men, 
 proposed that 4,000 should be promptly called and formed into two 
 camps, the one to be located " between the metropolis and the head 
 ^' oi South Bay'' — the other in the neigliborhood of BaUimore. To 
 this suggestion the General added, that " he had little doubt, but that 
 " the Executive of Maryland would cordially co-ojjerate in afford- 
 *' ing such means, as should be thought advisable," and that he was 
 then about " to fix upon the most eligible spot for the camp, inten- 
 *' ded to defend Washington." The Secretary's reply to this letter 
 is dated on the 12th; and the General's proposition being entirely ap- 
 proved, he was directed to call for such portion of llie quota of 
 Maryland [6,000,] as circumstances might render necessary or pro- 
 per. On the 16th, the General announced " the neighborhood of 
 *' Upper Marlborough, as the only place of tolerable convenience, 
 " with^reference to the objects of defence, or an encampment," but 
 was still embarrassed in choosing between two points — the one, " on 
 *' the road to Piscataway; the other on that leading to Bladensburg." 
 At the close of this letter he says " the Governor and Council have 
 ^' talce7i steps immediately to comply with the requisition of the 
 " general government; but I fear from my recent experience, it will 
 " be in vain to look for any efficient aid from a sudden call upon 
 *' the militia." To get over the General's fears on this subject, the 
 Secretary thought it advisable to place at once, the whole force de- 
 signated for the defence of the district, at his disposition; and accor- 
 dingly on the 17th of July apprised him, that " in addition to the 
 *' whole quota of Maryland (given by the letter of the 12th) he was 
 " authorised to draw from that of Virginia 2,000, and from that of 
 " Pennsylvania 5,000; and that the whole militia of the District of 
 " Columbia, (2,000) was kept in a disposable state, and subject to 
 '' his orders." In a second letter from the Secretary of the same 
 date, the General was reminded, that " it was the President's wish, 
 " that not less than 2, nor more than 3,000 of the drafts under the 
 ^' requishion of the 4th be organized, embodied and encamped at 
 
5 
 
 ''■ some middle point between Baltimore and JVashington.^^ (') In 
 a letter of the '20t]i, acknowledging the receipt of the Secretary's of 
 the 17th, the General says — " I have seized this moment to proceed 
 '' to this place to arrange the calling out the Maryland militia, de- 
 " manded by the requisition of the 4th inst. This xoiJl be immc- 
 " diately attended to by the Governor." Again: in a letter of the 
 23d, he says " the Governor has issued orders for calling out 3,000 
 '' of the drafts; and has, at my request, appointed Bladensburg, as 
 " the place of rendezvous." Yet on the 13th of August, twenty 
 one days after the Secretary had been thus inlormed — the General 
 lets him into the secret — that of the drafts to lorm the camp at Bla- 
 densburg, there would be nearly a total failure; as, " instead of 
 *' being 3,000, they would not exceed as many hundreds," — a pre- 
 diction unfortunately verified by the event; for, on the field of battle, 
 this central camp furnished but 250 men! 
 
 Perceiving then, as early as the 23d of July, that there was a 
 hazard of failure on the part of Maryland; and finding on the 13th of 
 August, that this hazard was reduced to a certainty — what were the 
 means employed by General Winder, to make good the deficiency? 
 Did he recur to the authority given him on the 17th, to draw from 
 the quota of Pennsylvania 5,000 men; from that of Virginia 2,000; 
 and from the District of Columbia, an equal number? No, The 
 letter conveying the authority to do so ^^ from his frequent change 
 '' ofplace'^ had not reached him, though steadily and vigorously pur- 
 suing him, from the 17th of July to the Gth or 8th of August! And 
 does he then put the Government in the possession of the fact, so 
 that if any evil had accrued, they might have sought and applied a 
 remedy? Does he express any regret at the circumstance, as one 
 having an unfavorable bearing on his measurps of defence? And 
 above all, does he hasten to give execution to the long suspended or- 
 der? Nothing of this kind — for in his subsequent correspondence 
 with the Government, not a word on this subject escapes him; and so 
 far from acting on the instruction, he consigns it quietly to his port- 
 folio, where it might have slept forever, but for a demonstration made 
 by the enemy on the 17th of August. On this day it was, that 
 finding the enemy's fleet much re-inforced, he recurred to his last au- 
 thorisation, and though making no calls yet on either Virginia or 
 the District of Columbia, he on that day, but required from Penn- 
 sylvania a single regiment! 
 
 Still it must not be forgotten, that with all these drawbacks on 
 the calculations of the Cabinet, the General was enabled, on the 
 24th of August, to present to the enemy a line of 7,000 combat- 
 ants; a force greatly superior to that of his adversary; (2) and dou- 
 
 (1) The limitation in this order, was expressly intended to leave sutiicient defences for 
 other points liable to attack — as for example Baltimore and Annapolis; two places oifering, in 
 the General's opinion, <,'reat temptations to the enemy. See pages 98, 1 14-15. 
 
 (2) Nothing could be more vague than the estimates made of the numbers of the British 
 army before the battle. Araon^ the wildest of these conjectures, was that of Colonel Monroe; 
 who stated them to be 7,000 men. Colonel Beall, with the same means of judninti, eslinialerl' 
 them, at 4,U00. After the battle they we're fixed by Dr. Catlett and others, at 3,500; of wluch 
 ij500 only participtitcd in the action. See Adniiral Coclibwrn's official lotterj &c. 
 
6 
 
 ble the numl^er given to Genera] Jackson, to combat a veteran army 
 amounting to more than 12,000 men! 
 
 Having taken this view of the General's conduct in assembling 
 the militia destined to his command, our next and last duty, under 
 this head, will be to consider the use made, by himself and others, of 
 the force actually assembled, and of the conduct of that force in de- 
 fending the Capitol. 
 
 The details given by the General of his labors, during this short 
 campaign of seven days, furnish sufficient evidence of zeal, activity 
 and courage, — nor arc his statements (in these respects) impaired by 
 the reports of others, having a competent knowledge of what he did, 
 and a sufficient capacity to decide on its character and effects. But 
 here our approbation must end — as many well authenticated facts 
 lead to conclusions, much less favorable, with regard to his profes- 
 sional knowledge and judgment. Of these, we shall present the 
 following series, sustained by appropriate evidence. 
 
 1st. Passing over the omission to call for the Pennsylvania and 
 Virginia drafts, which has already been sufficiently indicated, the 
 General's hesitancy to assemble the forces within the District and at 
 all times subject to his disposition, had an unfortunate influence on 
 the issue of the campaign. Though informed, on the 19th of 
 August, of the arrival in the Patuxent of the invading aj-mament, 
 and the preparations making at Benedict, for debarking troops — the 
 General on the 21st suspended the march of Stanbury's brigade near 
 Baltimore till the morning of the 22d, under an apprehension, as 
 expressed by himself, that " it would reach Bladenshurg too soon.'" Q) 
 On the same day (21st) he directed Colonel Sterret, ('command- 
 ing a detachment from Striker's Brigade, which had not yet left 
 Baltimore^ to advance sloivly as far as Snpvyden'.s^ and there await 
 further orders. At 2 'o'clock P. M., of th~e"22d, these further 
 orders were received, and directed an immediate and forced march 
 to Bladerisburg. Again: a corps of 800 men, stationed at Annapo- 
 lis and taken ~as part of the Maryland quota on the 13th of August, 
 was not called till the 23d, and was barely able to reach Bladens- 
 burg, six or eight minutes before the action began. The effect of 
 these delays and the forced marches they made necessary, on the 
 fighting condition of the troops, will be best seen by recurring to the 
 reports of the three commandants. 
 
 " Early in the morning of the 24th," says Stanbury, " Ides- 
 " patched Major Woodyear to Washington to inform General Winder 
 " of my movements and situation — of the exhausted state of the 
 " troops and the impracticability of their meeting the enemy, in their 
 " present fatigued state, with any prospect of success unless re-in- 
 " forced." Of Sterret's corps we have even a worse account: "My 
 " men," says this officer, "by a forced march on the 23d from the 
 " Buck tavern, or Snowden's, reached Bladendsburg without halting 
 
 (1)P.296. 
 
" to cook; and had been under arms ike tvhole night ivithout sleep 
 " or food. Major Pinkney's riflemen and the two companies of 
 " artillery were in the same situation, and completely loorn down and 
 " exhausted.'" Colonel Beall's account of his corps does not difiev 
 from the preceding. " Having marched" he says, " about sixteen 
 " miles that morning (the 24th^ before the battle, my men were 
 " fatigued and exhausted." See pages i79, SO, and 243, of the 
 
 Report. 
 
 With regard to Minor's regiment, the General's inattention was 
 still greater; Tor after having given them a position in front of the 
 Capi'tol, with instructions there to await further orders, he in the 
 hurry of the day, entirely forgot them, and of course, lost the aid of 
 600 infantry and 100 horse in the battle, fij 
 
 2d. The General had altogether mistaken the character of dc- 
 fentive war; which, (while careful to avoid a general action, unless 
 given under circumstances the most favorable, or imperative,) inces- 
 santly employs itself in harrassing the march, and disquieting the 
 positions of the enemy — obstructing roads, breaking up bridges, 
 assailing patroles, videttes and pickets — and, in a word, refusing to 
 him a moment's repose, for the purpose of sleep or food: — a state of 
 things, which will sooner break down the strength and spirit of the 
 best disciplined army, than repeated and even stubborn actions, under 
 ordinary indulgencies; and which, had it been produced, even in a 
 slight degree on the part of Ross, would have effectually prevented 
 his visit to Washington. Such was not however General Winders 
 opinion; for though this course was distinctly indicated to him on the 
 19th of August, "(2) he adopted and pursued one of a character di- 
 rectly the reverse — avoiding all collision with the enemy — rarely 
 going within sight of him — leaving his march from Benedict to Marl- 
 borough, entirely undisturbed by night or by day; and lastly, after 
 executing for him, his projected vengence on Barney's flotilla — with- 
 drawing every man to his front; and leaving him nothing to apprehend 
 for either /ZomA: or rear! Such an invitation could not be resisted — 
 the condition, (^) on which Ross had agreed to risk a coup de main 
 on Washington, had now arisen; and he accordingly began his march 
 for that place on the evening of the 23d of August. 
 
 (1) p. 232 of the Report. (2) See Secretary of War's letter of this date, directing tht? 
 General to push forward his cavalry on the enemy's front. McLane's Journal; " Secretary 
 advised the General, to push forward Tilghman's Militia Dragoons at once, and clear the ene^ 
 my's line of march, of cattle, horses &c. and with his best'infantry, attack wherever the ground 
 favored it; while General Stewart's Brigade, should be employed on his rear in the same way." 
 " Wrote the General on the 22d, to place Barney's and other troops on the west of Notting- 
 ham, to menace the enemy's rear and his communications; and on the 23d (after seeing the 
 army) repeated the advice, to form and place a corps so as to attack the rear of Ross's column, 
 should he move from Marlborough to Washington— by no means to risk a field fight; but to re- 
 tire on the Capitol and defend that, to the last." " Your men" he said, " will do well under 
 cover— badly in the field. The enemy is not now prepared for seige or investment, being with- 
 out cannon, "baggage or provision train. What he docs, must be done at once, and by storm. 
 Resist his first attack, and he is beaten; and may be routed and captured." 
 
 (3) The attack on Washington was co?;(w£-€.'!«--" if it might be made with any prosi 
 pect of success;" Cockrane's official letter. 
 
8 
 
 All op|3ortunity now presented itself for the field fight by 
 "whicli the General had hoped to redeem the time he had lost in 
 movements without an object, and which, directly tended to break 
 down the moral as well as physical strength of his troops. "The 
 " enemy" says Colonel Mouroe, (in a note to the President of the 
 23d) " are advanced six miles on the road to the Wood-yard, and 
 " our troops retiring. They were on their march to meet him, but 
 " in too smaU a jiumbcr to engage: General Winder proposes to 
 " retire, until he can collect them in a body.''' 
 
 3d. The General's next error lay, in not taking the most direct 
 means to accomplish his own object — that of concentrating his 
 forces; for instead of immediately repairing to Bladensburg, where 
 he would have found the Baltimore troops and Cramer's battalion, 
 amounting to 3,000 combatants, he retreated to the Eastern-branch 
 bridge, on the very improbable supposition, — that the enemy would 
 (ivail himself of that pass (so easilj^ defended or destroyed) ^o ^e/^ 
 into the city. The character of this retreat was unfortunately worse 
 than its direction; for according to the report of the committee, 
 *' the march of the army was extremely rapid and precipitate; and 
 " orders were occasionally given to the Captains to hurry on the 
 *•' men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted, before they 
 " reached the camping ground near the Eastern-branch bridge." 
 
 Having passed the night here and in quiet, and secured ample 
 means for shutting out the enemy from this avenue to the city, (i) it 
 was to be expected that he would have pursued his professed inten- 
 tion of concentrating his force. But though advised, early in the 
 morning of the 24th, of the perturbed state in which Stanbury's divi- 
 sion had passed the preceding night; and of its entire unfitness to 
 meet the enemy, unless promptly re-enforced, (2) he continued to 
 be tenacious of his separate position; and contented himself with a 
 peremptory order to Stanbury — " to give battle to the enemy, should 
 " he appear at Bladensburg,'' " in lohich case" he says " if neces- 
 *' sary; J will join yo2(." And again: though advised as early as 
 ten o'clock, A. M., that Ross was in full march (not, as he had 
 expected, to the Eastern-branch bridge, but to Bladensburg^ it was 
 eleven o'clock, before he detached General Smith to that point. See 
 Smith's Report. 
 
 4th. Another error of the General, will be found, infighting 
 a battle, on dispositions not made by himself, and of which he was 
 ■nearly or altogether ignorant, until the moment of conflict; and 
 which, ('to say the leat of themj betrayed an utter ignorance of the 
 art of war. 
 
 On these points, we have the benefit of the General's narrative; 
 in which he says — " If I had had longer time, or [were] to repeat the 
 " action of Bladensburg, I could correct several errors which might 
 '• materially have effected the issue of that battle. 1st. The advanc- 
 
 (1) See p. 159 of tho Report (2) See p. 179. 
 
-'• ed force oughi to have been nearer to the creek along the edge of 
 '' the low ground; where they would have been sknted with bushes 
 "■ and have avoided the inconvenience of the cover which the orch- 
 " ard afforded the enemy. 2d. The edge of the low grounds, on the 
 *' ri«ht of the road, ought to have been lined with musketry and a 
 *' battery of cannon planted in the field, on the right of the road, di- 
 " rectly fronting the bridge. 3d. If Barney's heavy artillery, with 
 "' his more expert artillerists, had occupied the position which the 
 " advanced artillerists did, the enemy would not have crossed the 
 " river at that point; but have been obliged to make a circuit round 
 " to his right and have crossed above at the npper end of the town: — 
 '■■ or 4th. If the whole force had been posted at the position of the 
 " second line, with all the advantages it afforded, and have acted 
 " with tolerable firmness and courage, the event might have been 
 " different." 
 
 This confession, witli a single exception, is sufficiently candid; 
 but fails altogether, in ascribing to a ivant of time, what was notoriously 
 the result of a very different cause. The simple fact, without con- 
 cealment or distortion, is — that the repqited march of the enemy to 
 Bladensburg found the General in a kind of extra-cabinet (composed 
 of the President, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, 
 Commodore Tingey, and Colonel Wadsworth) and much too busy in 
 discussing ivhat ought to be the enemy's mode of proceeding, to pay 
 much regard to the information just given, of his actual movement. 
 It was under these circumstances, that Colonel Monroe, quite as 
 charitable as energetic, proposed to set out for Bladensburg to assist 
 General Stansbury in giving an order of battle for the day. The 
 proposition was immediately approved by the President and the 
 General, (i) and the Colonel, knowing the value of time, hastened 
 to the camp and entered at once, and without any kind of ceremony 
 on the exercise of his new functions. 
 
 From the following statements it will appear, that the assistance 
 rendered by the Colonel on this occasion was particularly mischiev- 
 ous. 
 
 " While" says Stansbury, " I was giving some directions to the 
 " artillery, I found Lieutenant Colonel Ragan and Schutz's regi- 
 « ments had been moved from the place ivhere I had stationed them,^ 
 " and marched out of the orchard up the hill, and formed in order of 
 '< battle about 250 yards above the orchard, and upwards of 500 yards 
 " in the rear of the artillery and riflemen. Thus uncovered by the 
 " trees of the' orchard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen 
 " by the enemy from Lowndes's hill, and ihe flanks of the artillery 
 " and riflemen ivere unprotected, and laid liable to be turned, our main 
 " body being placed too far offto renderthem any aid.'' " Again: Ihe 
 '<' 5th Regiment was taken out of the orchard, marched up the hill,^ 
 " and stationed on the left of Colonel Schutz's regiment; that of 
 
 ^l) See p. 86. 
 
 2 
 
10 
 
 '• Colonel Ragan being on the right, its right resting on the main 
 " road; but as I before observed, the whole at so great a distance from 
 " the artillery and rijiemen, that they had to contend with the whole 
 " British force, and so much exposed, that it has been a cause of 
 " astonishment they preserved their ground so long, and ultimaiely 
 " succeeded in retreating. Whose plan this ivas, I know not; it was 
 " not mine, nor did it meet with my approbation.''^ 
 
 Pinkney's estimate of this new order of battle, was not better 
 than Stansbury's. In his narrative he says; " The 5th Regiment 
 " ivhich had been removed from its position, ivhere it might have 
 " contrived to repulse the enemy in his attempts to leave the vicinity 
 " of the bridge, had now, to the great discouragement of my compa- 
 " nies and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hi\\, several 
 " hundred yards in our rear, but visible nevertheless to the enemy; 
 " where it could do little more than display its gallantry. The two 
 " companies of General Stansbury^s brigade, acting as riflemen, had 
 " changed their station, so that I no longer perceived them. The 
 " residue of General Stansbury's brigade had been moved from, the 
 " left, and made to take gi-ound (invisible to us by reason of the 
 ^' intervening orchard) on the right of the 5th regiment; with its own 
 " right resting upon the main road, and disclosed to the enemy." 
 Sucfi was the assistance, derived from Colonel Monroe's interference 
 on this occasion; and what made the thing worse was, that the blund- 
 ers were incurable; for Winder tells us, that though invited by Co- 
 lonel Monroe to examine his labors, he was but able to correct one of 
 them before the action began, when all farther examination and 
 amendment became impossible. See p. 163. 
 
 5th. The propriety of the General's retreat presents a question 
 of more difficulty. Smith's division believed, or atiected to believe, 
 that the order was given too soon, as they were prevented by it from 
 fleshing their maiden swords upon the enemy; while that of Stans- 
 bury (who had made the experiment) were entirely convinced, that 
 the order was judiciously given. (') Still, a prehminary and high- 
 ly important measure, concerning which there can be no doubt, was 
 altogether omitted. We here allude to a designation, before the bat- 
 tle, of some well known point in the rear, as a place for re-union, in 
 the event of retreat. This was, as we have stated, unfortunately 
 forgotten; and what rendered the case worse was, tliat the two routes 
 at last indicated by the General, the one to the Capitol, the other to 
 Georgetown, so far diverged from each other, as to prevent the troops 
 from meeting until after they had passed the latter of these places, 
 and thus fumisher! the only plausible argument given against defend- 
 ing the Capitol, as advised by the Secretary of War. (-) 
 
 (1) Major Pinkney's Report. (2) Colonel McLane's journal; " 26th August, at 10 
 o'clock A. M. General Wiiifler (being advised of Ross's retreat the preceding night from 
 Washington) began his march for Baltimore: Regretted much his not defending the Capitol, 
 as advised to do by General Armstrong, as it was now plain, that the enemy's movement was 
 a mere Coxsack Hurrah^ as General A. called it." 
 
11 
 
 6tb. Though this last mentioned functionary did at length assent 
 to the retreat on Georgetown, it was under an express understanding 
 1st, that it should not extend beyond that place; and 2d, that a light 
 corps should be promptly organized and employed, within the city, 
 in watching the movements and striking at such small detached par- 
 ties of the enemy, as might be met with during the night. But 
 neither condition of this agreement was fulfilled. Such of the mili- 
 tia as pleased retired to their own houses; while the remainder, were 
 led by the General to Montgomery Court-house. Tlie effect was, that 
 during a single night, a British detachment of tico hundred men, were 
 permitted to inflict on the place all the mischiefs it suffered. {\) 
 
 Lastly: On the morning of the '21th, before making any ex- 
 periment of his strength with the enemy, General Winder (believing 
 Fort Washington to be untenable) despatched an order to Young's 
 brigade to cross the Potomac immediately; and to Captain Dyson to 
 follow the example so soon as he had reason to expect an attack on 
 his rear. The Secretary of War, having received an intimation of 
 this order, and fearing that its effect would be mischievous, inmaedi- 
 ately despatched a counter order — instructing General Young ''to 
 " hold fast his position in the rear of the fort, imtil assured th.at 
 ^' the enemy was in force and about to attack him; and in the mean 
 " time, to keep his videttes well posted on every road." The 
 General, whom this instruction found in the act of crossing the Po- 
 tomac, hastened to resume his position on Oxen Hill, and immediately 
 sent back the express, with advice that he was doing so. The 
 carrier of the message, not finding the Secretary, delivered it to the 
 President and General Winder zxiA took back their orders, " tliatthe 
 *' Brigade should pursue its first intention, and pass the Potomac." (2) 
 The issue is sufficiently known. Two days after the Brhish army 
 had retreated J rom Washington Capin'm Dyson, without either seeing- 
 or hearing B.n enemy, dismantled the fort dindcrossed the river! The 
 event has shown, that there would have been no hazard in leaving 
 General Young in his covering position; nor will any one believe, 
 that had he been left in it, either the loss incurred at Alexandria, or 
 the disgrace suffered at Fort Washington, would have taken place. 
 His patroles, would have kept him advised of Ross's movements; his 
 communications with the City, would have been re-estabiished, and 
 his authority and example, would have fortified the mind, or at least 
 restrained the madness, of Captain Dyson — and in either case, the 
 post would have been secure, and its flag not dishonored. 
 
 Having thus pointed out the errors of the Commanding Gene- 
 ral, it but remains under this head to shew what was the conduct of 
 the troops: — a story, which, as Mr. Adams truly says, cannot even now 
 be heard without blushing. General Ross's strength, on leaving Marl- 
 borough, amounted to 3,^^00 men; who, from the excessive heat of 
 the weather and the long disuse of their legs on ship-board, were 
 
 (1) Wilkinson's Memoirs. (2) Young's Report, p. 222. 
 
i2 
 
 reduced before their arrival at Bladensburg to 1,500 combatants; — a 
 circumstance, which could hardly have failed to impose some degree 
 of restraint on a leader ol cooler temperament, or one having more 
 respect for his enemy, than this disciple of Wellington, who, refusing 
 to wait a moment for his main body, or artillery dragged by seamen, 
 ('') dashed at once across a narrow bridge — threw out a few skirm- 
 ishers on his flank, and with the remainder of his infantry, stmck at 
 the very heart of our battalions, and defeated them, in as short a time 
 as Ca?sar defeated Pharnaces at Zela. But here, we must invoke 
 the aid of Mr. Rush, Colonel Sterett and General Winder, to go on 
 with the story — which, were it not shameful, would be highly ludic- 
 rous. The first of these gentlemen, (a mere spectator of tlie 
 combat, who had under his eye the whole theatre of the war,) says — 
 " When the President arrived, the dispositions for the battle, whate- 
 " ver they may have been, were apparently made. It [the battle] 
 " commenced in a very few minutes; and in not many more, some of 
 " our troops began to break.'''' Colonel Sterett's summary view, is 
 brief and pointed. — " Tlie imposing front of the enemy" he says, 
 " never was disconcerted by the fire of the artillery, or the riflemen; 
 " and General Stansbury's brigade was seen to fly, as soon as the 
 " action became serious. No second line appeared to support us; 
 " and we were outflanJccd and defeated, in as short a lime, as such 
 " an operation could ivcll be performed." 
 
 " Our advanced riflemen," says General Winder, " now began 
 ■" to fire, and continued it for half a dozen rounds, when I observed 
 " them to run back to an orchard. They halted there, and seemed, 
 " for a moment, about returning to their original position; but, in a 
 "■ few minutes, entirely broke and retired to the left of Stansbury^s 
 " /^ne. The advanced artillery, immediately followed the riflemen, 
 " and retired on the left of the 5th Baltimore regiment; which had 
 " been pushed forward to sustain them. The first three or four 
 " rockets fired by the enemy, being much above the heads of Sta7is- 
 " burfs line, now received a more horizontal direction, and passed 
 " close above the heads of Schutz and Ragan's re^^mew^^s, composing 
 " the centre and left of Stansbury's line. A universal flight of the 
 ^' tivo regiments, WQ.S the consequence. The 5th, and the artillery 
 " still remained, and I hoped would prevent the enemy's approach; 
 " but they [the enemy] advancing singly, their fire annoyed the 5th 
 " considerably; when I ordered it to retire, for ihe purjmse of putting 
 " it out of reach of the enemy. This order was however immedi- 
 " ately countermanded, from an aversion to retire before the necessity 
 " became stronger, and from a hope, that the enemy would issue in 
 " a body, and enable us to act upon him on terms of equahty. But 
 " his f re beginning to annoy this corps [the 5th regiment] still more, 
 " by woiinding several of them, and a strong column passing up the 
 
 (1) General Ross' Division orders of the 17th of August, (a copy of which was dropt at 
 Washington) shew that liis wholu train of artillery consisted of one 3 poxmder, coitunanded by 
 Captain Carinichael, R. A. 
 
IS 
 
 •* road and deploying on its left, I ordered them to retire: — their re- 
 " treat becdime d a Jiight of absolute and total disorder;^' (') a fact, 
 furnishing the General with a conclusion, that " no advantage of 
 " position, IS jJi'ooJ against groundless jfanic, and the total want of 
 *' discipline, skill and experience.^' 
 
 With these quotations, we close our remarks on this head — hav- 
 ing, as we trust sufficiently shewn, that the disaster of Washington 
 was, not the effect of heedless security and neglected preparation, as 
 asserted or insinuated by Mr. Adams, but, of mismanagement, on the 
 part of the General, and misconduct, on that of the troops. {-) 
 
 3. At page 93 of the Eulogium, we find the following pas- 
 sage: — " Follow him through a long series of years of laborious tra- 
 " vels and intricate negociations, at imperial courts and in the palaces 
 " of kings, winding his way amidst the ferocious and party colored 
 " revolutions of France, and the life-guard favorites and camarillas 
 " of Spain. Then look at the map of United North America, as it 
 " was at the definitive peace of 1783. Compare it with the map of 
 " that same empire, as it is now, limited by the Sabine and the Pa- 
 " cific ocean, and say, the change, more than of any other man living 
 " or dead, was the work of James Monroe." 
 
 To try the correctness of this conclusion, we accept the invita- 
 tion, and shall proceed to take a view, as brief as may be consistent 
 with perspicuity, of Mr. Monroe's dijjlomatic labors. 
 
 The policy of the United States, in relation to the war waged 
 in Europe in 1794, was that of strict neutrality; and Mr. G. Morris, 
 our minister at Paris, w as recalled at the instance of the French gov- 
 ernment, and on a suggestion made by it, that he had not sufficiently 
 respected that system. To supply his place Mr. Monroe w as select- 
 ed, P) under the hope that he would have filled it, if not with more 
 general ability, at least with a greater degree oi circumspection. Old 
 politicians who have bad memories, and young ones who have little 
 mstruction, will permit us to remark, that many causes of irritation, 
 besides those growing out of the indiscretion of political agents, had 
 now arisen between the two republics; that the French government 
 had wantonly and injuriously embargoed many of our ships; that they 
 had issued a decree, violating the provisions of the 23d and 24th 
 articles of our treaty of commerce; and that under this decree, many 
 seizures had been made of American vessels and cargoes, by their 
 cruizers. Against these outrages, Mr. Monroe was instructed to re- 
 monstrate, and in the latter cases " to insist on compensation.'''' 
 
 (1) Winder'sNaiTative, p. 165of the Report. (2) Had Mr. Adams, before pronoun- 
 cing his diatribe of neglected preparation, taken the trouble of conBiiltino the records of the War 
 Department, he would have found that the Secretary of that Department as earlv as the month 
 of June 1813, made a report to the Military Comniiftee of the Senate, on the subject of sea- 
 board defence, which had for one of its objects, an ample supply of regular troops and addi- 
 tional fortifications, for district No. 5. (3) Acrordinj toMr Adams, Mr. Monroe was General 
 Washington's first choice, for the mission to France, after the recal of Mr. Morris. A better 
 acquaintance with the records of an office, over which the writer presided for eirrht years in 
 succession, would have taught him, that the appointment was first offered, not to Mr. Monroe, 
 but to the late Chancellor liivingston. 
 
14 
 
 It is certainly an extraordinary fact, perliaps an unique in diplo- 
 matic history, that the first official letter from our new minister, alter 
 being accredited to the French government, should have caused his 
 own to question the wisdom of the selection they had made, and to 
 extort, from the delicacy and forbearance of Washington, a pointed 
 admonition to greater caution, — to more self-respect, — to a temper 
 less ardent and amatory in his intercourse with the French govern- 
 ment, and lastly, to a stricter adherence to the letter of his instructions. 
 
 If such was the effect produced by Mr. Monroe's first despatch, 
 " exhibiting only the details of his triumphal entry into the bosom of 
 the French Convention," how much greater must have been the as- 
 tonishment and mortification of his own crovernment on receiving 
 his second, dated on the 15th of September, 1794; in which he says 
 — " I was not instructed to desire the repeal of the decree, under 
 " which our ships had been seized by French cruizers; and did not 
 " knoiv but what it had been tolerated, from the soundest motives of 
 " political expediency.'''' Again: in a memorial to the Fretich gov- 
 ernment (of which he enclosed a copy to his own) he says, — " It is 
 " my duty to observe to you, that latn under no instructions to com- 
 " plain of or request the repeal of the decree, authorising a 
 " departure from the 23d and '24th articles of the treaty of amity 
 " and commerce, en the contrary, I loell know, that if upon consider- 
 '' atio7i, ajler the experiment made, you should be of opinion, that it 
 " [the capture of our ships and cargoes] produces any solid benefit to 
 " Ike republic, the Jlmerican government and my countrymen in 
 " general, ivill not only bear the departure ivith patience, but u'ith 
 " pleasure.'' (i) 
 
 The follow ing, made part of the answer of the American Sec- 
 retary of State — " If my letter of July the 30th, has not already 
 " stimulated you to remonstrate against the decree, do so without 
 " delay. We do not wish you to swerve from the line of conciliation, 
 " marked out in the last paragragh in your letter. On the contrary, 
 " conciliation which does not detract from the dignity of his gov- 
 "■ ernment or its rights, or from his own self-respect, is a valuable 
 " quality in a minister. We only hope, that the Committee of Pub- 
 " lie safety may not continue in the belief, that the Executive are of 
 " opinion^ that it will be satisfactory to dispense ivith the articles 23 and 
 " 24 of the treaty of commerce.^^ 
 
 Unfortunately, correction does not always produce amendment; 
 and our Minister was perhaps of that order of animals, which is 
 made not less, but more intractable, by its application. Instead of 
 kissing the rod, he disputed its justice and continued his foUies — the 
 next of which, in the order of time, was an attempt to extort from 
 Mr. Jay, a copy of the treaty he had just concluded with England, 
 and for the express purpose of communicating it toFrance, before it 
 had been submitted to our own government. (^^ Assurances given by 
 
 (1) Monroe's view of the conduct of the E.\ecutive of the United States, p. 27 and 34- 
 (2) Monroe's view, p. 144 and 146. 
 
15 
 
 the Secretary of Stnte, that Mr. Jay liad no authority to enter into any 
 stipulation which sh^ aiid derogate from the rights of France, and that 
 if he should do so, the government would reject such stipulation, 
 was not sufficient to satisfy either his own impatience, or that of the 
 French cabinet. The latter, claimed the communication of the 
 whole secret of the negociation, and the mhiister openly lent himself 
 to the support of this claim, and even refused to receive the commu- 
 nication under any injunction which should restrain him from ex- 
 tending it to the French government. In the present cool and 
 reasonable condition of public opinion and feeling towards foreign 
 nations, these facts will be reviewed with astonishment and pity, and 
 be regarded only as evidences of mental derangement in the minister. 
 It was perhaps in this mild view of the subject, that the Secretary of 
 State, in his letter of the 7th of April 1795, says, " the obligation 
 " of all prior treaties is expressly saved; France, from the circum- 
 '^' stance of being the most favored nation, immediately inherits upon 
 " equal terms, the concessions, indulgencies, or conditions made to 
 " other nations; and the confining its contents to the President and 
 " the Secretary of State, is not from any thing sinister towards 
 " France, but from the usage in such cases; not from an unwilling- 
 " ness that the Executive conduct should be canvassed, but from a 
 " certain fitness and expectation, arising from such a diplomatic act." 
 Other instances of Franco-mania in the minister occurred 
 about the same time, and gave disquietudes to the government, which 
 were not expressed with equal good humour. In his letter of the 
 10th of December 1795, and consequently after knowing that the 
 treaty had been acted upon by the Senate, and after having been 
 specially admonished, on the 7th of April preceding, that the inva- 
 riable policy of the President was to be as independent as possible 
 of all foreign nations — he endeavors to seduce the Cabinet from this 
 wise and wary policy; connect it by new and more intimate ties with 
 France, and embark the United States in the war which then desola- 
 ted Europe! " Without compulsion" says he " we know we shall 
 " not gain from England, what we are entitled to; and if this coin- 
 " pulsion is to be procured from France, will it not be more efficacious 
 '•' when she [England] sees that our harmony with France is complete, 
 " and beyond lier leach to disturb it? But can we accomplish what 
 " We wish by the fortunes of France, by any kind of negociation we 
 " can set on foot, without any efforts of our own; and if any such ef- 
 " fort is to be made, of what kind must it be? To this I can give 
 " no answer, other than by referring you to my former letters on 
 " that head (i) for latterly, I have had no communication with this 
 " government on it. If it can be done, the above is the way to do 
 " it, but to ensure success, by embarking this government with full 
 " zeal in our behalf, and striking terror into England, it will be 
 «' necessary to lay hold of her property within the United States, 
 " take the posts, and invade Canada. This would not only secure. 
 
 (1) Suggesting a loan of money, Monroe's view p. 72, and a letter of the 20th November. 
 
16 
 
 '"^ to us completiiy our claims upon Bntain, and especially, if we 
 ^^ likewise cut up her trade by privateers — hnihy making a decisive 
 " and powerjul diversion in favoicr of France, promote, and very 
 ^^ essentially, a general peace." Can any sober man recalling the 
 circumstances of the times, read these wild and extravagant notions, 
 and retain any high degree of respect for the understanding of James 
 Monroe? " The ideas you have detailed are quite foreign to the views 
 " of the government of the United States" — was the short, compre- 
 hensive and contemptuous answer, of the Secretary of State. 
 
 We now hasten to the catastrophe of this gentleman's first 
 mission. Nor, after what we have seen of his diplomatic talents, 
 can we express any surprise at either the shortness of its duration, or 
 the character of its end. The biographer of Washington, presents 
 it in the following words: " In the anxiety which was felt by the 
 " Executive, to come to full and immediate explanations on this 
 " treaty, the American minister at Paris had been furnished, even 
 " before its ratification, and still more fully afterwards, with ample 
 " materials for the justification of his government. But misconceiving 
 " the views of the Administration, he reserved these representations, 
 " to answer complaints which were expected, and omitted to make 
 " them in the first instance, while the course to be pursued by the 
 " Directory was under deliberation. Meanwhile, his letters kept up 
 " the alarm, which had been excited, with regard to the dispositions 
 " of France, and intelligence from the West Indies served to con- 
 " firm it." 
 
 " The President had relied with confidence on early and candid 
 *' communications for the removal of any prejudices or misconcep- 
 " tions, which the passions of the moment might have occasioned. 
 " That the French government would be disappointed at the adjust- 
 " ment of those differences, which had threatened to embroil the 
 " United States with Great Britain, could not be doubted; but as 
 '• neither this adjustment nor the arrangements connected with it^ 
 " had furnished any real cause of complaint, he had cherished the 
 " hope, that it would produce no serious consequences, if the proper 
 " means of prevention shoidd be applied in time. He was therefore 
 " dissatisfied uith delays which he had not expected; and seems to 
 " have believed, that they originated in a want of zeal to justify a 
 " measure, which neither the minister himself, nor his political friends 
 •' had ever approved." 
 
 " It being thought essential to the interests of the United States, 
 " that they should be represented at Paris, by a person who would 
 " enter cordially into the views of the Administration, the resolution 
 " was taken to appoint a successor to Colonel Monroe." {}) 
 
 Mr. Monroe's second mission to France, took place in the year 
 1803. Various causes combined to produce it. This gentleman, to 
 whom public patronage was never inconvenient, was a personal 
 
 (\\ Marshal's life of Wasliington. 
 
R 
 
 friend and E^tve of the President; cneofilie pillars elect of Virginia- 
 supremacy, anl lastly, a martyr to tiiedcct;ii'es,i:n"elatio' to Fiance, 
 which had ciiaraci irise;! the Jciiersonian sclioo' . To cn-ole feeungs 
 deeply wounded, and to abate or extinguis' , the odium wliich Wash- 
 inj^ton's declu-ed want of contidence had created, becau;e therefore, 
 with ihe head of that sciiool, not merely a dictate of private re.,ard 
 and humanity, but of political justice. An occasion, well calculated 
 tobpgin these experiments of friendship and policy, offered eaily in 
 18031 Spain had ceded Louisiana tf> France: tins change of neigh- 
 bors could'not be in'ifferent to the United States, and tie less so, as 
 Bonaparte, (appealing to set a high value upon ti e acquisidon he had 
 m?.de) was professecily employed m sending thiti.er a large nival and 
 military arniament, and had in tlie mean time refused to our JVLnister, 
 all e-cpla'iation on ti.e subject of our rig it of deposit at New Oi leans — 
 a right, gained by treaty, ii-om Spain. Mr. Jetierson was among the 
 fe^y°politicians, on this side of the Atlantic, who conjectured the real 
 object of these measures. Parma had been seized i'or the purpose of 
 extorting money from Spain — tl e treasury of his Cat toiie Majesty 
 was not in a condition to supply the demand, and Louisiana was ta- 
 ken as a commodity that might beprojitahJy brought to market. The 
 whole operation was one of finance, and the armament in Holland, 
 while 'ts pretended destination deceived us, was re dly meant to alarm 
 En .land, (i) With this clue, every ti.ing was intell gible to the Presi- 
 dent; and believing that the cession to France was more extensive 
 than it re.dly was, our Minister at Paris was instructed to ask, — 
 whether, if the LTnited Slates were disposed to buy, France would be 
 willing to sell, the Island of Orleans and the two F'loridas to the Uni- 
 ted States? The prosecution of this policy produced the occasion, 
 on wlich Mr. Monroe was to be called back to natiorial confidence 
 and distinction; and tie more stron ■.ly to mark the ciicur.iStance, Pa- 
 ris, which .ad been the theatre of his disgrace, was now to be made 
 that of his triumph. He was accordingly associated with Mr Liv- 
 ingston, in an extraordinary mission to the French republic; and 
 joined his colleague at Paris, on the 12th of April, 1803. 
 
 If the treaty which followed, and which was signed on the 30th 
 day of April, presents any peculiar claim to public gratitude and 
 respect, we confidently assert, that this belongs, not to Mr. Monroe, 
 but to Mr Livin-iston. The latter, had opened the subject as eariy 
 as the 11th of the preceding December, and had pressed the cession, 
 on the part of France, by a number of informal notes written be- 
 tween that period and the 25th of Febmary. (2) On this day, he 
 addressed a letter to the First Consul, in which a cession of territory 
 and a discharge of debts, due by France to American citizens, were 
 
 (I) And produced its full effect. See Ca.min;,''.s Speech in the House of Commons, No- 
 vember 1802. (2) Where is the evidence of any labors, oral, or written ot Mr. Monroe s, 
 havin" a similar character and tendency? Can a sin<?le line of his on.this subject, or any other 
 connected with the treaty of 1803, and intended to operate on the French Government, be 
 produced? To tbe?e questions wc say— No. If in 4oing so, w« are wrong, .give us the pror.i 
 'hat we r.ro so. 
 
18 
 
 the objects recommended for notice and provision. The result, a.- 
 respected the debts, was prompt and fortunate. The First Consul 
 gave him the fullest assurance, that they should be equitably settled 
 and honorably discharzed. 
 
 Nor can it be reasonably doubted, but that Mr. Livingston's re- 
 monstrances on the subject of onr right of deposit at Nnv Orleans,- 
 and a territorial cession of a part of Loui'^iana to the United States, 
 made as already stated on t!e 11th of December 1802, had tbir in- 
 fluence on the subsequent decisions of the Fnnch cabinet — a con- 
 clusion, t':at Mr. Monroe himself could not have re-is'ed, if he had 
 taken the trouble to compare the language and arguments employed by 
 Mr. Livingston on t'at occasion, with those ottered by the First Con- 
 sul, when, on thf 22d of March and 10th A; ril, he manifested his 
 intention of ceding Louisiana to the United StiUes. fi) The better 
 to comprehend the force of this comparison, it may be necessary to 
 subjoin the following extracts from Mr. Livingston's letter above 
 mentioned, and the details given by the French minister, Barbe de 
 Marbois, of the motives which induced Napoleon to adopt the pro- 
 ject of a cession. "I am going to propose" says Mr. Livingston (in 
 a note to Mr. Talleyrand) " what 1 believe to be the true policy of 
 " France to ado^t, and what will fu'fil ail l<er views; at the same 
 " time tl at ;t will be a means of conciliating the affection of the 
 " United States and securing the permanency of the settlement. 
 
 " 1st. France shall cede £o tie United States that part of 
 " Lou'siana ivhi h is above the mouth of the river Arl^ansas; there 
 " will thus be interposed between the French part and Canada, a 
 " barrier, without which the provnre might b;^ easily attacked and 
 " lost to France before the arrival of assislan'e.(^) 
 
 " 2d. France shall cede to the United Spates West Florida, 
 *^ New Orleans and the territory on the left bank of the Mississijypi. 
 '' This cession is only valuable to the Americans, inasmuch as it 
 " gives them the embouchure of the Mobile and other small rivers 
 " which pass through their territory, and would calm their anxiety 
 " respecting the Mississippi. 
 
 " If any other course be adopted, the whole settlement will fall into 
 " the hands of the English, who at the same time that they comynand the 
 " sea, have within reach a ivarlike colony possessing all the means of 
 " attacJc; and while the fleet blockades the harbors, they may without 
 '' the least difliculty, cause NewOrleans to be attacked through Can- 
 " ada, by fifteen oi' tvA'enty thousand men, aided by hordes of Indians. 
 
 " France by seizing on a wilderness and an insignificant city, and 
 " thus throwhig the United States into the scale on the side of Eng- 
 " la7id, is going to make t!iis power the 7nistress of the new ivorld: 
 " the possession of Louisiana and of Trinidad, vill put the Spanish 
 " colonies at her mercy; and by taking away the Floridas from Spain 
 
 (1) P. 260 Marbois' History of Louisiana. (2) This passage contains the first intima- 
 tion given by any functionary of the United States of a desire on their part, to purchase anv, 
 portion of Louisiana, on the western side of the Mississippi. 
 
19 
 
 '' and getting possession of the gulph of Mexico, she will command 
 " the West Indies; the tivo Indies will then pour their treasuresinto 
 ^' her ports, and the precious metals of Mexico, united ivith the 
 " treasures of Hindostan, loill furnish the means of buying nations, 
 *•' ivhose forces she will employ to secure her power " (i) 
 
 About the middle of March, a note from Lord Hawkesbury, 
 (substantially refusing to withdraw the British army from Malta) was 
 transmitted to Paris, and being there considered as deciding, affirma- 
 tively, the question of the renewal of war, drew from the first Consul, 
 the following sentiments, addressed to his council of state, in a private 
 conference held at the Thuilleries. — " Leave commerce and navisia- 
 " tion in the exclusive possession of a single people and the globe 
 ■' will be subjected by their arms and by the^oW which supplies the 
 " place of arms. To emancipate nations from the commercial 
 "tyranny of England, it is necessary to balance her infuence by a 
 '■' maratime power, that may one day become her rival; that power is 
 " the United States. The English aspire to dispose of all the riches in 
 ^' the world. I shall be useful to the whole universe, if I can prevent 
 " their ruling America as they rule Asia." Again: on the 10th 
 '•'of April, he said, "The English have successively taken from 
 " France, Canada, Cape Breton, New Foundland, Nova Scotia and 
 *•' the richest portions of Asia. They have now twenty ships of war 
 " in the gulph of Mexico, and sail over those seas as sovereigns. 
 " The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the 
 " trouble to make a decent there. I have not a moment to lose in 
 " putting it out of their reach. I wish, if there is still time, to take 
 *• from them any idea which they may have of ever possessing that 
 " colony. / think of ceding it to the United States. They only 
 " ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony 
 as entirely lost, and it appears to me that, in the hands of this 
 growing power, it ivill be more useful to the policy, and even to 
 the commerce, of France, than if I should attempt to keep it.''' (2) 
 These extracts, made from a work of admitted authority, abundantly 
 show the co-incidence to which we alluded; and even prove, that 
 Napoleon's determination to sell, was taken on considerations, sub- 
 stantially identical with those, which Mr. Livingston, (to produce 
 this very effect) had submitted to the French Cabinet, as early as 
 the 1 1 th of the preceding December. 
 
 We need scarcely i-emark, that with the First Consul, to resolve, 
 was nearly the same thing as to execute; and having now made his 
 decision, he at daybreak on the 1 1th, called his minister plenipoten- 
 tiary and gave him the following orders: " 1 renounce Louisiana. 
 " It is not onlyiVis?/; Orleans I will cede, but the whole colony without 
 " reservation. I direct you to negociate this affair with the Envoys 
 " of the United States. Do not even ivaitthe arrival of Mr. Mon- 
 " roe, and have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston. If 
 
 (1) Mr.LivingstontoMr.Tallayrand,4thDec, 1802. (") P. 263-4, Marbois' Hist, of Louisiana, 
 
 ^c 
 
 ci 
 
20 
 
 '•' I should regulate my terms, according to the value of these vast 
 " regions, to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits, 
 " I will be moderate: I want fifty millions, and for a less sum I ivill 
 " not treaty Mr. Marbois lost no time in entering on these new du- 
 ties. As directed, he saw Mr. Livingston on the llth, and declared 
 himself openly on the three objects of the proposed negociation: 
 1st. The entire cession of Louisiana: !2d. The price to be paid for 
 it; and 3d. The amount of indemnity to be granted to American citi- 
 zens, for spoliations committed on their property by French cruizers. 
 On the first of these subjects he said, "I am authorised to sell the 
 *' whole of Louisiana and not a part. On the second and third, 
 " I am restricted also, but give us sixty millions of francs and assume 
 *' the debt due by us to your chizens of twenty millions, and 1 will 
 " see what may be done." (i) 
 
 Such was the state of the business on the llth, when as Mr. 
 Marbois tells us, information was first received of Mr. Monroe's lan- 
 ding at Havre. C^) But a fact still more important to the purposes 
 of this investigation is, that after this minister's arrival at Paris, 
 which did not take place until the 12th, neither his presence nor his 
 labors, produced the smallest possible change in these decisions. " As 
 " soon," says Mr. Marbois, " as the negociation was entered upon, 
 " the American ministers declared, that they were ready to treat on 
 " the footing of the cession of the entire colony; and did not hesitate 
 *' to take on themselves the responsibility of augmenting the sum that 
 " they had been authorised to offer." The reasons which governed 
 them, in thus proinptly assenting to the terms proposed by the French 
 negociator, were (according to a statement of Mr. Monroe, made to 
 the American Secretary of State on the 7th of June, 1803) of a 
 character so imperative, as left them without a choice. " We found" 
 he says, " that Mr. Marbois was absolutely restricted to the disposi- 
 " tion of the whole [province,] and of course, that it was useless to 
 '' urge it. [the sale of a part.] Again: " the first proposition made to 
 " us [as to price] was, that we should pay eighty millions, sixty in 
 " cash and the balance to our citizens, and the whole in one yearj 
 " and from the. quantum he never u'ould depart." 
 
 Here then is proof the most conclusive, derived as well from 
 Mr. Monroe's own official letter, as from Mr. Marbois' narrative of 
 the negociation, that the endeavors of the former, whatever they 
 may have been, altogether failed in making any change in the prin- 
 ciples of the treaty, as announced to his colleague, the day preceding 
 his own arrival in JParis. Nor shall we find, that in what followed and 
 was merely technical, this minister's agency was either more active 
 or more useful. He was willing to take the form, as he had already 
 taken the substance of the treaty from the French negociator, (3) 
 and on the 30th of April, the draft prepared by this functionary, with 
 
 (1) P. 277 Marbois' Louisiana and Mr. Livingston's letter to Mr. Madison, ISthofApril, 
 1803. (4) P. g78j MarbQis' Louisiana. (3) Marbois' history of Louisiana, p. 283. 
 
21 
 
 a single and unimportant alteration, (i) was executed by the three 
 plenipotentiaries. (^) 
 
 It does not however follow, that because a public agent has been 
 unable to do good, that he on the same occasion, has been unwilHng 
 to do mischief. If the atmosphere of Paris was, in 1794, unfriendly 
 to either the moral sense, or sound discretion of Mr. Monroe, it was 
 scarcely less so in 1803. His disorder, at the former of these epochs, 
 led hhn to give assurances to the French Government, that if on 
 experiment, they found the spoliation of our commerce convenient 
 to them, they might safely multiply and prolong it; as the people 
 and government of the United States, would not only bear it patient- 
 ly, but be delighted by having their friendship and attachment to the 
 Great Nation, so tested. So in 1803, when his colleague, after many 
 trials and much trouble, had obtained a promise of prompt and substan- 
 tial justice (for the very wrongs which his [Mr. Monroe's] conduct 
 bad no tendency to restrain or diminish) and when at last, the French 
 government was in a condition and humour to fulfil its engagen)ent, 
 what was the creed and the conduct of our Envoy Extraordinary? — 
 To disavow all approbaUon of that provision in the treaty, tchich 
 gave to American citizens twenty miflions out of the eighty, (the 
 price of Louisiana;) and to express an opinion that " the ivhole sum 
 " should have been paid into the French Treasury.''^ To relieve 
 his anxiety on this score, his colleague hastened to assure him in a 
 letter of the 25th of November, that in his reply to the Secretary of 
 State, " he icould charge himself with the whole responsibility of 
 " this act." (3) 
 
 Tlie next theatre on which we discover our Plenipo-itinerant 
 and Extraordinary, is the court of Spain, — whither his patron had 
 sent him to complete his arrondissement of fame and wages. The 
 man or the minister, who accomplishes one half of his objects, has 
 little reason to complain, and such was the case of Mr. Monroe at Ma- 
 drid. He got the wages, but the fame escaped him. (4) Returning 
 
 (1) Substituting stock for cash — a mere pro forma business, — as that great alchymist, 
 Alexander Barrins, was on the spot and prepared to commute the paper into gold and silver. 
 
 (2) Yet with a full knowledge of all these facts. Mr. Monroe publicly asserted, in his 
 last letter toCongress onthe subje«t of his claims, hat **njthing was done, nov intended to 
 be done in the opinion of the First Consul, until his arrival; and that vhatever was accomplish* 
 erf aftenvard^, was attributable to his mission.^'' Seepages 9, 10, of his letter. 
 
 (3) Mr. Livingston to Mr. Monroe, '25th of November, 1803, "You mention a fact of 
 which I was the», and till the receipt of your letter, continued to be totally ignorant, viz:— 
 •' that it was your sentiment, that the twenty millions, should have been paid to the French 
 governmrnt, rather than to oia citizens." 
 
 (4) Mr. Adams asserts, that much ability was shewn in this abortive negociation by 
 Mr. M. and his colleague Mr. P. Does he forget, or has he overlooked the admission to be 
 found in Mr. M's preliminary letter to Talleyrand — "that we had bought from France, only 
 what France had bought from SpainV By this admission, the question became one, not of 
 construction, but of fact. It was no longer, what the terms of the treaty of St. Ildefonso would 
 warrant us in demandiii"? but how those terms were understood by the parties to that instru- 
 ment? Spain denied, tnat she had ceded West Florida to France: and France denied, that 
 she had either sold, or intended to sell to us, more than she had bought from Spain. Such 
 was the Pons Asinorum, which stopped the progress of Mr. M. and his colleague at Madrid, 
 By the way — the construction given to the treaty of St. Ildefonso on which the United States 
 so long and perlinaciouslv relied and which Mr. Madison's in^renuity made so plausible — was 
 a suggestion of Mr Livingston's, submitted by him to his government and adopted by it, but to 
 which Mr. M. for some time, refused his (isstnt. See Mr. L's official correspondence with 
 Mr. Madison in the Spring of 180S, 
 
2-2 
 
 to London in the spring, or summerof 1805, he entered upon a new 
 and highly interesting negociation with the British cabinet; and in his 
 haste to do something, conckided a treaty which his own government 
 peremptorily rejected: — a fact the more extraordinary in itself, as 
 the instructions given him in 1804, and repeated in 1806, left no 
 room for misconception. The following is an extract from them: — 
 " The importance of an effectual remedy for this practice [i7npress- 
 '• ment] derives urgency from the licentiousness with which it is still 
 *•' pursued. So indispensible is some adequate provision for the case, 
 " that the President makes it o necessary preliminary, to any stipula- 
 " Hon requiring a repeal of the act, shutting the market of the 
 " United States against certain British manufactures.'' The ne- 
 gociation opened on the 26th of August 1806, and ended in a treaty 
 of amity, commerce and navigation, on the 31st December following. 
 A letter of the 27th of that month from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, 
 preceded this instrument, and thus announced its character and ap- 
 proach. " We have the pleasure to acquaint you, that we have this 
 " day agreed with the British commissioners to conclude a treaty on 
 " all the points ivhich had formed the object of our negociation; and 
 '"' on terms, which we trust our government will approve. It will 
 "^ require only a few days to reduce it to torm. When that is done, 
 " we shall transmit it to you by a special messenger. We hasten to 
 " communicate to you this interesting intelligence; lor the information 
 " and guidance of our government, in such measures as may have 
 " reference to the subject." 
 
 A letter, in terms thus assured and self-complacent, could not 
 fail to deceive. It was received by the President in full faith, that 
 what was asserted, was true — that all the points in discussion, were 
 at last settled in a way the government could approve; and, in this 
 faith, was communicated by him to congress. Judge then of his 
 surprise and mortification, on receiving the treaty itself, and on find- 
 ing the leading point of impressment, entirely omitted, and the instru- 
 ment otherwise so objectionable, as to forbid the ordinary measure of 
 submitting it to the Senate ! What was the result ? Why, that this 
 diplomatic chef-d'oeuvre, of twenty nine articles, from which he had 
 hoped so much, and which he had forwarded by a special messenger 
 for the information and guidance of the government, was sent back 
 with a long list of minor objections, which might be got over, and 
 one nearly as long, of others which w^ere deemed insuperable. Such 
 was the last of Mr. Monroe's missions to Europe. And on which of 
 these, we ask, is it, that any intelligent and unprejudiced enquirer, 
 would rest the evidence of that universally acJcnorvl edged ability, and 
 deep self-devotion to the interests of his country, which the Eulogist 
 ascribes to his patron and predecessor? Not surely, on his willingness 
 to leave England, in the exercise of her cruel and illegal doctrine of 
 impressment? Not, on his avowed opinion, that the twenty millions 
 of francs, made payable by the treaty of 1803, to American sufferers 
 under French spoliation, should have been left to sw^ell the French 
 
23 
 
 treasury? Not on the support he gave to the Impudent pretensions 
 of the French Bureau, to be made acquainted with the conitnts of 
 Mr. .lay's treaty, even before the instrnnient Lad been submitted to 
 the i.'^spection of his own government? Not, on his avowed poUcy 
 of c( nn'ving ai the rtbberies, committed by French cruizers on the 
 legit male ''ommerce of the Uniied States? Ani most assuredly not, 
 on his rejjeate.l eilbrts to di\ert Wasliington (rom that system of 
 niutrality, vvliicii he had so wisely ado; ted — and bv a stnci adher- 
 ence to whi :h !ie had b« en able, like a second Moses, to lead his 
 pe pie safely through the Red Sea of crime and misery, connected 
 with t e Ficnc' Revolution? 
 
 4. Atp;'ges7-2-3, we (ind t!ie followins: passage. " It may suffice 
 " to say, that unti' the war br( keoutand during its continiutnce, the du- 
 " tie = of the offices held by Mr. Monroe, attleheadsu; cessively of the 
 '^ De-artmentsof Stateand War, were perforuie-^! with uniiringassidu- 
 " itt/,withuniv rsally acknowledged ability undiAiha zealofpatriot- 
 " ism,xohich counted heath, fortune, aadlifeit^elf, for nothinginthe 
 " ardor of ^^eJf devntiontothe cause of his country. It is a tribute of 
 '• ju rice to his memory to say, that he was invariably the adviser of 
 " cnevi^et^c rounrils; nor is tlie conjecture hazardous that had Ms 
 " c'jjpoifitment to the Department of War preceded by six months its 
 *' ' ctud date, the heuviist disaster of the war, would have been 
 -' spared, as a blotted page in the a7inals of our Union." 
 
 O Mr. Monroe's managemM of the State Department, we 
 shall say nothmg; believing as we do, that this was merely nominal, 
 and iliat every thing important coming from it was so revised and 
 altered by Mr. Madison, as ('n the famous case of Sir John Suck- 
 ling's stockings,) to make it doul)tful, whetlier enough of the original 
 labor was left, to give the Secretary any degree of claim to the pro- 
 duction as amemied. T')us restricted in our object, we proceed to 
 an exam-nation of his mhii^try of the War Department. It has not 
 been forgotten, that after a kw months trial of Dr. Eustis' war direct- 
 ing faculties, that gentleman was invited towitiidraw, and make room 
 for Mr. Monroe; of whose apttude for military business, an experi- 
 ment was also to be made. If the armour of Achilles fitted the Co- 
 lonel, 1)6 was destined to wear it — but if on the other hand, it was 
 found to be neither adapted to his shape nor his size, or too cumbrous 
 for his strength, in either or in all of these cases, he was in his turn, to 
 lay it aside, and re-invest himself in the less splendid, but safer habili- 
 ments of the State Department. A short trial, satisfied at once the 
 incumbent and his friends, that this new vocation was neither suited to 
 his talents, his knowledge, nor his views. Besides the intrinsic ob- 
 jections, arising from the variety and importance of its duties, it was 
 seen that a prompt, steady and impartial execution of these, without 
 %vhich the progress and end of the war must be alike unsuccessfol, had 
 no tendency either to make a man popular, or to keep him so.(i^ 
 To an ambitious and calculating as pi rant, (already the heir apparent 
 ex-officio of the Presidency) this circumstance alone, would probably 
 
 (I) "I much rcf/retted your acceptance of the War Department. Not that I know 
 i( c P*^""!"" who I think would better conduct it: But conduct it ever so wisely, it will be a sacri- 
 «< ?j y°"''^*^"^'. Were an ansrel from heaven to undertake that office, all our miscarriages 
 ^^ would be ascribed to him. Raw troops, no troops, insubordinate militia, want of arms, 
 ^^ want of money, want of provisions, all will be charged to want of management in you. No 
 Generals have yet an interest in shifting their own incompetence on you, no army agents, 
 • their rogueriCT." LeUers to Mr. Monroe, p. 348 vol. 4 •f Jefferson's correspondence. 
 
!24 
 
 have been a sufficient dissuasive; but what left him no hesitation on 
 the subject, was the liirtiier disc^nery — that in all cases of hnpiovi- 
 dence in the Government, incaparity in its Generals, or inefiicienc) in 
 its troops, the Secretary of tlie War Department was to be sclcc'ed as 
 the victim on whom the sins of the wiiole people were to be laid and 
 expiaied. He accordingly about the 23d of February 1813, retired 
 to tile asylum prepare.! for hiiu. 
 
 But, though the period of this first incumbency, was short — it 
 was one of no small or ordinary interest to the United States — involv- 
 ing tise organization of a general stali^^ — the creation of a new and com- 
 petent code of military rides and regulation:^' — the means best calcu- 
 lated for coinpleting the rank and file of the army — the instruction^, to 
 be given to the general ofhcers and others, with regard to tl e future 
 conduct of the war; and lastly — the measures to be adopted for giving 
 to important and exposed places, an enciea^ed security. Now we 
 ask — to what extent and in what manner, \^er8 these several duties 
 performed by Mr. Monroe? What, for instance, under the last of these 
 heads, did he either do, or suggest, for placing the metropolis of the 
 union, beyond the reach of injury or insult? To this question we an- 
 swer — nothing! And how is conduct so extraordinary to be expl ; ned? 
 Was it tiiat the example ofthree successive administrations w) !cl: had 
 iiitherto neglected this object, outweighed the present belligerent po- 
 licy of the union? Wjs it that tlie liability of the Capitol to attack, 
 was less apparent in 1812, than in 1814? Was it that ths early stage 
 of the contest, was deemed less proper for defensive meau.es, than 
 one of later date? Was it that the enemy's occupation in Europe 
 furnished a sufficient sh.ield against his enterprises here? Had the 
 uses, formerly made by the British of that great Etuary the Clesa- 
 peake, and its tributary sti earns, been lost sight of? Can it be possible, 
 that they whoso well remembered the prudential lessons taught by the 
 revolution, should have forgotten tlie losses and humiuations inflected 
 on their native state, by two small British corps, under Arnold and 
 Cornwallis — and which could only be terminated by tlie interpostion 
 of Washington and the combined French and American armies in 
 1781? However these questions be answered, the fact was as we 
 Iiave stated it — nothing was either done or projected, for th'C increased 
 security of the sent of Government, during Mr. Monroe's f^st di- 
 rection of the War D partment. 
 
 With respect to the other subjects, enumerated in the preceding 
 paragraph, and requiring, on the part of the Secietary, the most proD^pt 
 attention, but two of them were permitted to occupy liis thoughts; 
 and on these, his decisions were palpably wrong and extensively 
 jTilschievous. We allude to trie expedient employed for encreasing 
 the army; and to the carte-blanche, given to General Harrison to con- 
 tinue his winter-crusade on the elements and the Treasury. On each 
 of these points, some detail may be necessary. 
 
 1st. The losses arisin'^; from sickness, desertion, capture and 
 death, sustained by the army during the summer and autumn of 
 1812, sufficiently indicated the necessity of immediately employing 
 means for filling up the cha'^^ms thus created in its rank and file. 
 But though each monthly return furnished a new and encreased ad- 
 monition to promptitude, so tardily did this business go on, that it 
 
S5 
 
 Vras not till the 29th of January, ISH, that any definitive act wAu 
 taken by the Government upon it. This delay was generally, per- 
 haps justly, ascribed to a want of decision in ilie War Department — 
 whose duty it was to investigate and recommend the means, best 
 adapted to accomplish the purpose. Of those under deliberation, 
 but two are worthy of notice — the one, proposing an immediate re- 
 currence to the revolutionary policy of classing and drafting the mili- 
 tia, which should, from time to time, supply all losses sustained by 
 the Regiments already authorised by law; — the other, the creation of 
 a new and distinct corps of twenty thousand men, destined to local 
 defence, and engaged for the service of a single year — with pecuniary 
 inducements, little, if at all, inferior to those profiered to recruits for 
 the more permanent corps. The question of preference, between 
 these two plans, was at last decided by the acting Secretary — who, in 
 despite of all his revolutionary lessons,adopted the latter, — not because 
 it was the cheapest, the most efficient, or the safest, but because its 
 rival " was less likely to be acceptable to the people." (i) 
 
 2d. When in December 1812, Mr. jMonroe took the direction 
 of the War Department, the campaign in the West (begun and pro- 
 secuted against all the admonitions of wisdom and experience) (2) 
 though now degenerated into a hopeless struggle \a ith bad roads and 
 inclement weather — was still pending. The General to whom the 
 direction of it had been given, under some new and special revela- 
 tion of military principles, had not only divided his army (intended 
 to act offensively) into three corps — but had so located these, tl;at in 
 the event of an attack, they could not by any possible exertion sus- 
 tain each other; — and what was yet more extraordinary, had selected 
 a position on the west bank of the Miami, 70 miles in front of his 
 own head quarters, as the site of his magazines, and was now 
 hurrying thither the million of rations without which he thought it 
 imprudent to go on with the enterprise. The custody of this sine 
 qua non, was given to his advanced corps; now reduced by fatigue, 
 sickness, and hunger, to less than 1000 combatants; (3) destitute 
 alike of fortification or cannon, and twenty miles nearer to the ene- 
 my's main body, than to their own. Yet was Mr Harrison, under 
 these circumstances meditating, and actually 'rdermg, a farther 
 reducti"n of this diminshed corps, for the laiidablf purpose of sav ng 
 a few cents, on the transportation of the rations, necessary to keep 
 
 (1) "The Session is, I fear too far advanced for any of the changes you suggest in the law 
 " for raising 20 additional Regiments. The conscription principle was suggested by Col. Cush- 
 " iu2, and considered by the Acting Secretary as the true one — but was laid aside by hi» 
 " hom an apprehension, that it would be unpopular in practice. I am &c. 
 
 ^^ ' rr.i- ^ ^ WILLIAMS, 
 
 Secretary of War. Cli. Mil. Committee. 
 
 (2) " The Armv of Gen. Wayne, after a whole summer's preparation was unable to ad- 
 " vanri; more than 70 miles from ihe Ohio, and the prudent caution of Gin. Wasninton placed 
 «' it in VVmter Quarters at the very season, tha' our arrans-ements were commenced." Gen. 
 Harrison's official letter to the War Department of the Sih of December, 1812. 
 
 (3) See Wmchester's statements,&c,— JMc^ffee's Bistvry of the tftte War,&c. page 18S 
 
 4 
 
26 
 
 them alive. Q) A state of things, more alarming in all its aspect?, 
 could not have arisen, and required, on the part of the Government, 
 an interposition the most active and vigorous. 
 
 But instead of a peremptory order, either to re-enforce his ad- 
 vanced guard, or to withdraw it without a moment's delay — tie Se- 
 cretary satisfied his sense of duty, by writing a long letter to the Gen- 
 eral, begining with compliments to his knowledge and judgment, and 
 ending with a pel-mission "to do what he pleased." All know that 
 it pleased that functionary to do nothing, and that the consequences 
 of the two omissions (the Secretary's and the General's) were — 
 the capture or slaughter of Winchester's corps — the conflagration of 
 the supplies collected at the Rapids, and the General's own precipi- 
 tate and ill-judged flight to the river Portage. 
 
 Mr. Monroe's second ministry of the War Department, began 
 in September, 1814, and ending with the war, necessarily embraced 
 the defences of Plattshurgh and Baltimore — \\\e termination given to 
 the Campaign onti e Niagai-a and the defeat of the British Army 
 before New Orleans. On this branch of our subject, we have there- 
 fore to examine — how far the agency, personal or official, of the new 
 Secretary, was useful or otherwise, on these several occasions? 
 
 On this question, and in relation to ihe first and second of the 
 events above mentioned, our enquiries, often and carefully made, re- 
 sult in the belief — that no direct aid, furnished by the advice or au- 
 thority of Mr. Monroe, contributed to their successful issue. The 
 gallant officer who commanded at Plattshurgh (though left in circum- 
 stances of great peril by General Izard) was not honored with any 
 notice from the War Department, till fifteen days after his battle with 
 Sir George Prevost, had been fought and won — when the Secretary 
 transmitted to him an authority (^which he had already possessed and 
 exercised J of calling to his aid the New York and Vermont mili- 
 tia! Nor was the attention paid to the veteran charged with the 
 defence of Baltimore, characterised by more of either efficiency or 
 foresight. Both Commanders were, in fact, left to the use of means 
 either previously accumulated, or directly produced, by the excite- 
 ment and accidents of the times. Of this latter species, were the 
 militia aids rendered in the north by Generals Moore and Strong; 
 and in the south, by the Virginia Brigade of General Douglass — by- 
 several volunteer corps from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and by a 
 formidable body of seamen brought from Philadelphia by Commo- 
 dores Rodgers and Porter and whose presence at Washington, (had 
 Secretary Jones better understood his duty) would, in all probability, 
 have terminated General Ross's career on the heights of Bladensburg, 
 or the vestibule of the Capitol. 
 
 With regard to the third event in our series, the following let- 
 ter from the late Major General Brown is so full and clear, as to 
 render all comment on our part unnecessary. 
 
 (1) UarrisQB'6 letter of the 8th of December to the War Department. 
 
27 
 Saclcett^s Harbour, Novemher 28tb, 1814. 
 
 Mt DEAR sir: 
 
 Here I am with the remains of my Division once more. The 
 fleet, that last summer shyed all co-operation with the Army and 
 would pursue only the high destiny given to them by the Naval Se- 
 cretary — have again, taken refuge in port, and not believing that its 
 own force, and that of a regular garrison of near 1200 combatants, 
 with the land batteries to back them — will aftbrd a sufficient protec- 
 tion — hav^e sounded the customary alarm at Washington, and to such 
 purpose, that the new Secretary of War has called for the militia ia 
 mass of several populous counties, who were here and on their way 
 here, to the tune of at least 6000 men. My first duty, on my 
 arrival, was to investigate the reports on the credit of which an ar- 
 mament so large, and which will cost the United States from 3 to 
 400,000 dollars, was called out. The result of a careful and minute 
 investigation was, that the enemy's force at Kingston, at no time 
 during the present campaign, exceeded 3000 men — 1,200 of whom 
 were sent up the Lake to Drummond's assistance f37th and 90tli 
 Regiments^ about ten days after General Izard's arrival in my camp. 
 The balance is therefore but 1.800, who are more afraid of being at- 
 tacked, than willing to make an attack on this place. Having ascertain- 
 ed these facts, 1. did not hesitate to do what I believed to be my duty — • 
 I dismissed this militia army to their own firesides, where I am sure 
 they will be more useful as well as comfortable — have taken on my 
 own shoulders the whole responsibility of the measure, and have 
 written a respectful, but free letter to the Secretary, in the hope that 
 it may hereafter put him on his guard against alarms as imaginary 
 as the late one — and which are so troublesome to the militia and so 
 exhausting to the treasury. 
 
 Of the conclusion of our campaign on the Niagara, you must 
 already know all that has been published — but many things occurred 
 in it that may not have reached you, and which 1 shall now mention. 
 It was the 26th of September before Gen. Izard got to Batavia, 
 where I found him on the 27th, and to my surprise, learnt from him, 
 that his intention was to beseige Fort Niagara with his division, while 
 I was to remain on the Canada side to watch and amuse Dmmmond. 
 With this view, he got on to I.ewisto\\Ti in thecoiu-se of nine days — 
 on the evening of the 5th of October, I took with me Gen. Porter, 
 and made him a second visit. During this, we prevailed upon him to 
 give up his absurd plan, which, however succesful, would have given 
 him a useless fortress and a few convalescents and invalids, who 
 made up the garrison — while to Drununond, it would give, what was to 
 him all-important, time to get tip his expected re-inforcements and 
 supplies from Kingston. It was now detennined, that we should 
 cross the Niagara and concentrate our whole force on Drummond's 
 position. This was done on the 10th and llth. The army being 
 now concentrated and being in high spirits and discipline, and little 
 short of double the number of the enemy — I now proposed to at- 
 
tack Drummond, lolio had neither received as yet, reinforcements or 
 siqypiies, Rxid who, as our information stated — was even badly off for 
 amrrmnition. The plan was simple and sure — viz: that while one of 
 the divisions turned his right and compelled him to chan2;e his front — 
 forego the use of some of his redoubts and fight a battle with a 
 deep and rapid river in his rear — the otlier should pass the stream 
 that separated them from his left, and by a rapid assault on that side, 
 compel him to a runious retreat or a speedy surrender. To this pi'o- 
 posal, he gave rather a reluctant assent, but he did give one; when 
 1 set out to make some necessary preparations, but before concluding 
 them, I was recalled and informed, that on further reflection, he had 
 changed Ids mind and determined to act on the defensive; and that to 
 this change of opinions, he was led by two great considerations — 
 the eminent danger that threatened the fleet, now that it was driven 
 into port; and the importance of keeping the strength of the army 
 entire for the next campaign, (i) 
 
 Being now satisfied, that all active service on the Straight was 
 at an end, and tliat the strength of Drunmiond's army was to be 
 kept entire, as well as thatof our own, for the next campaign; I asked 
 permission to march the remains of my division to this place, in the 
 safety of which I felt more than an ordinary interest. Tins request 
 was immediately granted, and on the 20th, I accordingly took my depar- 
 ture and was followed by Gen. Winder and the division on tlje 24th. 
 
 In the whoh: o Gen. Izard's conduct with ri;:;arri to the pro- 
 jected co-operation against Drummond, we have evident signs of an 
 indisposition to fulfil the orders you gave him — nothing could be 
 more unwise, or unfounded, than the preference he gave to the 
 round-about route by Lake George, Glenn's falls &.c. instead of the 
 direct one by Chateaugay to tlie Harbor, unless it was the two pre- 
 tences under which he did it — the ivant of money in the hands of the 
 Quarter Master, and the dread, that the enemy had already beset 
 that route and would cut him to pieces on the road. (^) Mr. Parish 
 ofiered to supply the first; and Major Brown, wlio had travelled the 
 road to his camp at Champlain, was able to assure him, that no ene- 
 my would be found upon, or near it; but nothwithstanding this, he 
 adhered to a route, that nearly doubled the distance, and of course, 
 the time necessary to travel it. At setting out, his belief was, that Pre- 
 vost would anticipate him and push on reinforcements to save Drum- 
 
 (1) In the General's letter of the 16th of October, to Mr. Monroe, we find a third reason 
 for his pacific aiid conservative system, viz; that " he could discern no object [on the Niagara] 
 " worthy of ttie risk which would follow any attempt to obtain it." And this he says, wlien at 
 tne head of nearly 7000 combatants and in the front of an enemy, little, if at all, exceeding 
 SOOO men! It is not on this occasion, improper to remark, that the defeat and capture of 
 Drummond and bis army in the month of October, v\ ould liave done more to produce a peace — 
 than SIX months ialkingof our five commissioners at Ghent. Even Mr. Monroe is compelled 
 to say, in his letter of the 24lh of October: " If it be practicable to demolish the army before 
 *'you (and Gen. Brown shews that it was so) it would certainly be a happy ivent. The gooi 
 '■^effects of it would be felt through the whole Northern and Western frontier—along the coait 
 ** [of the Atlantic] and in Europe. 
 
 (2J See Gen. Izard's letter of the 23d of August, —14. 
 
559 
 
 mond; but a despatch from the former to tlie latter, fell into the hands 
 of Col. Mitchell, who unmediately sent it to him — by wiiich he found, 
 that he had yet full time to reach the Harbor and execute your orders 
 at the head of the Lake, before any re-inforcenient could reach 
 Drummond. Yet of this circumstance he did not avail himself On 
 getting to Sackett's Harbor he found the fleet was out — but Chauncey 
 soon got in, and offered to carry him directly to his object; after 
 manoeuvreing a good deal to get from tlie Commodore somet'.ing ti)at 
 would furnish him with an excuse for disobedience — and failing in 
 this, he, the very night before he sailed, came under the most solemn 
 promise to Gen. Swartwout, that he would proceed to execute ex- 
 actly your plan of campaign — believing that the best and most im- 
 •portant consequences ivould follow. (^) Yet after sleeping on this 
 promise, he broke it — landed at the Genesee and as we have seen, 
 made no haste in joining me. 
 
 I should not perhaps have gone into these details at present, but 
 from a curious circumstance which occurred shortly before the Gen- 
 eral's arrival on the Niagara and which if taken litterally, will lead to 
 some strange conjectures on the policy and conduct of some of our 
 great men at Washington, as well as on those of Major Gen. Izard, 
 The story is substantially as follows — Col. Snelhng, late of General 
 Izard's Staff and entirely in his confidence, came on hei'e as his 
 foreiunner from Ciiamplain, and asserted without any qualification 
 whatever, that Ge7i. Izard would not co-operate, as ordered, with 
 my division — that he disapproved the whole plan (^) and had a pa- 
 tron in the Cabinet, who could and would protect him in this act of 
 disobedience — as he had already done, when the Gen. refused to 
 fortify Rouse's point, though ordered to do so by you. (3) Tins per- 
 son and patron, he added was Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State — 
 whose confidential letters to Gen. Jzard he [Snelling] had seen and 
 read. My first impression was, that Snelling was directed to hold 
 out this language, hoping that it might mduce me to abandon my po- 
 
 ( I) Letter from Gen. Izard to Geu. Brown. (2) There was a moment, but only a mo- 
 ment, when Gen. Izard's head was sufficiently clear, to obiain a glimpse of the advantages 
 of the plan prescribed to him. In his letter of the 13th of September to Gen. Brown, he 
 says — " should nothing intervene to alter my destination, I will proceed to the head of the lake 
 and place myself in the rear of the Britishforces in your fronl. Should the reinforcements des- 
 tined to the enemy not join him before we land," [and it was more than a month after the date 
 of this letter before they did join him] "the happiest consequences may result from this move- 
 ment." 
 
 (3) During the early pari of tlie campaign. Commodore McDonough recommended to his 
 proper Department an increase of naval means on Lake Champlain aiid (should that be incon- 
 venient or impracticable) that a fortification at the Narrovis should be substituted for it; which 
 ■with the aid he could afford, would have the efeci of shutting up the British fleet in the Sorrel Mr. 
 Jones, having declined to adopt the first suggestion, sent the Commodore's leiierto General 
 Armstrong, wiio immediately directed Izard to occupy and fortify Rouse's Point. The Gen. 
 disapproving the plan, quite as much as he did thai for capturing Drummond — gave no public 
 attention to the order — thought a battery on Cumberland head, would better answer the purpose 
 of shutting up the British fleet in the Sorrel, and secretly requested his friend Mr. Monroe to ob- 
 tain for this opinion, the sanction of the President. The sanction, was given in the same se- 
 cret wav in which the request ha<l been madv' — and the Secretary of War was thus left lo confide 
 in ■), work, that never was executed. It is to this transaction that Gen. Brown alludes in the 
 letter makmg part of the test. 
 
30 
 
 sition, and cross the Niaj!;ava, and by so doing, furnish some plausabk 
 ground Ibv Izard's intended plan ol" doing notiiing. More acquain- 
 tance v/ith Snelling, induces me to think differently, and to believe 
 the facts to have been just as he staled tliem and without intention to 
 deceive me into such a movement. I shall probably after a whilcj 
 go on to Wasliington and shall not neglect seeing you as 1 go along. 
 
 Believe me, iic. 
 Gen. Armstrong. JACOB BROWN. 
 
 To this document v/e shall but add a single paragraph, from Gen. 
 Izard's letter of the SOth of October, 1814; which will be found 
 Jo verify at once, the extent and value of Mr. Monroe's patronage 
 during the late war; and the total want of both judgment and justice, 
 •with which, on this occasion, it was exercised. It is in the follow- 
 ing words — " It is exceedingly satisfactory to find, that my conduct 
 '' has met the approhation of the President, and your own. There 
 " are few attractions in our career: the reward that 1 have it most at 
 *' heart to obtain is, (with the consciousness of having done my duty) 
 *' the applause of the government which employs me, and of the hon- 
 " est and independent portion of the community." 
 
 We may here safely conclude, that the preceeding cases fur- 
 nished no sufficient ground for any new ck.im, on the part of the Se- 
 cretary, to national favor — nor, indeed, have we any satisfactory 
 evidence, that he made the events in question, a pretext for setting 
 up such claim. Whether this forbearance was the result of a sense 
 of justice or a matter of mere calculation, cannot now be either well, 
 or readily, ascertained. Selfishness the most rapacious, will occa- 
 sionally listen to the demands of equity; and tlie wildest ambition, 
 sometimes attempt to cover itself under the mask of modesty and 
 moderation. On this point therefore, our decision must be conjec- 
 tural; and, but amounts to this — that on examination, the honorl 
 hitherto gained, were in the opinion of the Secietary, neither suffi- 
 ciently brilliant nor abundant, to justify the risk of a contest for them. 
 
 Such could not however be the conclusion, with regard to the 
 laurels won in the great and finishing act of the war; — the spolia 
 opima, of a commander slain and an army routed; forming, at once, 
 the pride of the nation, the glory of the winner, and a title to all 
 that /reemen could give, or a freemayi accept. A state of things so 
 extraordinary and unexpected, and of such doubtful operation on the 
 s;reat object of the Secretary's ambition [a succession to the Presi- 
 dency] could not fail to en\barrass that functionary. The first pro- 
 ject resorted to was, to break down the fame of one, who might pro- 
 bably become a rival; and, with this view, the records of the Seminole 
 War, were, for the first time, carefully examined and weighed; but 
 the result, appearing to be doubtful, if not dangerous, this expedient 
 was exchanged for another — that of so practising on public opinion, 
 through executive, and other government-channels; as to create a be- 
 lief; that the eventual success of the General, was but a natural ani 
 
81 
 
 liecessart/ consequence, of the sldll, activiiy md foresight of ih) 
 Secretary. To give color to this pretension, it was boldly asserted — 
 that New Orleans had been twice won by the adroitness and vij^or 
 of Mr. Monroe — first by negotiation with France in 1803; and again 
 in 1814, by the wisdom and promptitude, w^ith which he provided 
 tlie means and directed the measures, necessary for the safety of the 
 eity. (1) Let us briefly examine these pretensions. 
 
 1st. His agency in producing the treaty of Paris of 1803, has 
 been already discussed, and shewn to have been whoWy inoperative; 
 inasmuch, as Bonaparte, before Mr. Monroe's arrival in Paris— 
 (and on reasoning, employed by Mr. Livingston as far back as De- 
 cember 1802) — had determined to sell Louisiana to the United 
 States — had declared the terms on which he would do so — had 
 directed M. Marbois to open the negotiation instanter w'ith Mr. 
 Livingston, and "-without even ivniting the arrival of Mr. Mon- 
 roe^' and lastly— inasmuch, as Mr. Monroe, after his arrival 
 either did not attempt to obtain any change in the terms offered to 
 his colleague, or entirely failed to obtain an alteration of them. Sucli 
 was the character and fate of Mr. Monroe's diplomacy in 1803; — 
 leaving to him a credit only (which the horses tliat brought liim from 
 Havre to Paris, shared in common with himself) of being the hearer 
 »f a despatch, authorising a negotiation, on the part of the United 
 States, for the purchase of the Floridas, &c. 
 
 2d. The important services said to have been performed in 1814 
 in defence of New Orleans and ascribed to Mr. Monroe, are made 
 to rest on the following assumptions — 1st, that foreseeing the impen- 
 ding storm, and descrying in Jackson the qualities best fitted to repel 
 it, he hastened to select him from the crowd — despatched him to 
 the South and vested him with the command of district No. 7. 2d, 
 that wdih a similar degree of circumspection and diligence, he sup- 
 plied the Gen. with men, arms, ammunition and other articles, useful 
 and necessary to the service; and 3d, that mo7iey being also indispen- 
 sable, yet apparently unattainable by ordinary means, (as the Trea- 
 sury, at this epoch, was known to be empty and the nation believed to 
 be insolvent) he did not hesitate, though already burthened with the 
 duties of two departments, to take on himself the great and essential 
 functions of a third; and by an effort of personal credit, founded on 
 the well known extent of his property and the proverbial punctuality 
 with which he discharged all his pecuniary engagements — he soon and 
 triumphantly supplied the great desideratum of the crisis and the 
 country, and thus verified at once and in no small degree, the fables 
 of Atlas and Crassus; — carrying the nation on his back, and convert- 
 ing into gold whatever he touched. 
 
 How lamentable that a picture so impressive, of foresight, judg- 
 
 (1) Mr. Monroe's pretensions stated substantially as above, (and given on the faith 
 of declarations made by tense// and Mr. James Brown, formerly a Senator from New Orleans 
 and more recently a Minister resident of the UiutGd States at Paris) appeared in a New lorK 
 Journal, after the war. 
 
33 
 
 uient. efficiency and patriotism, should be merely a dream of empty 
 pretension, altogether unsupported by facts, and evidently got up to 
 lessen the lustre of achievements, with which he well knew no action 
 of his own life — (not even that which covered him with glory at 
 Trenton) (]) could bear the smallest comparison. That this judg- 
 ment is neither hasty nor uncharitable, will be sufficiently shewn by 
 the following details — 
 
 1st. General Jackson's designation to the command of District 
 No. 7, (of which New Orleans made a part) took place in May 
 1814; and so far from being a measure of Mr. Monroe's suagest'ng, 
 was not even fortunate enough, when adopted, to meet his approba- 
 tion. His eye, like that of the President, was directed to him, who 
 by some strange perversion of language and ideas, has been de- 
 nominated tlie Washington of the West. (2) 
 
 2d. Mr. Monroe's foresight with regard to the views of the 
 enemy and the means best adapted to defeat them, was even less ju- 
 dicifus, than would have been his selection of a commander. The 
 Br'tish Cabinet, in lorming it's project of campaign for 1814 (of 
 which the capture of New Orleans was the principal object^ was 
 thoroughly apprised of the ini{)ortance of giving such occupation to 
 tlie militia of Tennessee and Georgia, on their respective frontiers, 
 as 'vould have the effect of depriving Louisiana of those means of 
 defence, vhich otherwise, would be directed to her security. To 
 this end therefore, were detached from the West Indies, (in the 
 month of June ) British agents and troops, who found in the town 
 an"' harbor of Pensacola, a position in all respects favorable to theii" 
 purposes; and what was neither less convenient or useful, a e;overn- 
 ment, nominally neutral, but perfectly willing to supply their wants, 
 and secretly disposed, perhaps instructed, to promote their designs. 
 With such objects and under such auspices, the work of mischief 
 
 (l"i Lieutenant Monroe " bleeding in all his s'ory at Trenton." Query — Is it a fact that 
 he lost a drop of b'oodon that occasion? What documentary evidence liave vveofit? The Com- 
 mander-in-Chief either knew nothing ofit, or thoupht the injury too inconsiderable to he nien- 
 tioneJ No historian of the war ever heard of it, and what is yet more extraordinary, it appears 
 to have entirely escaped the notice of the Daily and VVeekly Chronicles of the Times. By the 
 wa,' — the Eulogist should have at least remembered the general character of ihe battle of 
 Trenton — which was bv no means remarkable for bloodshed. Gordon, says of it — " The Ameri- 
 cans lost about two men, besides twoor three frozen to death," the only officer wounded accor- 
 ding to him, was Captain W. Washington. 
 
 (2) luMai- 1814, Gen. Jackson was appointed a Brisadier General in the Army of the 
 Uni-ed States. The commission sent to him, on this occasion, was accompanied by a promise, 
 that he should fill the first vacancy occurring in the grade of Major General. A few days 
 aflerthis promise hadbeen made and transmitted, Gen. Harrison's resignation was received at 
 the War office, and furnished the means of immediately fulfilling li>e engagement above men- 
 tioned. Under these circumstances, the Secretary, (in the absence of the President who was 
 then on a vint to his friends in Virginia,) considering the arrangement as settled, hastened to 
 send the promised commission to the General. A letter from the President, received by the 
 next post, corrected this error, and shewed, that he, (the President) had either forgotten the 
 prom^^^e made to Gen. Jackson, or had considered its terms less obligatory, than Gen. A. had 
 supposed them to be. In a conver-aiion on this subject between the Secretaries (M.and A.) 
 the former remarked, that the President's hesitation in this case, probably arose from a de- 
 sire to ascertain, whether Gen. Harrison's objections to a continuance in the Army niight net 
 Ije removed, by giving him the command of District No. 7? 
 
33 
 
 began. Partisans, of every name and complexion, — Hostile In- 
 dians, Runaway Negroes, Spanish Culprits and French Banditti, 
 were alike invited and equally welcome to the British standard; and 
 fed, clothed, armed and drilled for future service. 
 
 Such was the condition of things in Eastern Florida, when 
 General Jackson, in the month of July, set out for the Alabama, to 
 hold a treaty of peace with what remained of the hostile Creeks. 
 During his journey thither, and while the treaty was pending, he 
 received abundant evidence of the facts, stated in the preceding 
 paragraph; and having no doubt, but that the measures, adopted by 
 the enemy, were the precursors of some enterprise, of higher char- 
 acter and deeper interest than would attach to a mere border-war — 
 he hastened to communicate to the Government the information he 
 had acquired, and to seek from it such increase of authority, as would 
 enable him to strike at Pensacola, as the measure most obvious and 
 efficient for crushing in the germ, the approaching evil. Unfortu- 
 nately, neither the General's report of facts, nor proposition founded 
 upon it, was favorably received. " The latter" it was said, " could 
 only be justified by the correctness of the former" — and of this, 
 many doubts existed, founded, as is believed, on the deceptive di- 
 plomacy of the period. All therefore that the Secretary of War 
 was permitted to say in reply was, that, "if, on full investigation, the 
 patronage and aid, said to be afforded by Spanish authorities to 
 British operations, were already established, as the j-esult of a spon- 
 taneous compliance — in that case and in that alone, he might go on 
 to execute the proposed attack." (i) Qualified as this new authori- 
 ty was, (and it will be seen that, by its express terms, it approached 
 as nearly as possible to a prohibition to do any thing) it was believed 
 to be dangerous; and though written, signed, sealed and despatched 
 in the ordinary way, means were secretly employed to stop its far- 
 ther progress; nor was it permitted to reach its destination, till the 
 middle of January, 1815. (2) Whence it necessarily follows— that 
 
 (1) See Gen. Armstrong's letter of the 18th July, 1814. 
 
 (2) That the President had a right to stop the letter in question at any point of its pro- 
 gress, and to keep it out of sight as long as he pleased, never has been doubted; but in cxer- 
 rising this right, why should there have been any concealment? Why was not the Secretary 
 made the instrument for stopping it, or rather for writing another e'xpressly forbidding the 
 projected enterprise? An open, no less than a decided course, was due as well to him as to 
 the General and the more so, as they united in opinion not merely witli regard to the expedien- 
 cy, but, the necessity also of taking Pensacola. As the thing was managed, lliey were respec- 
 tively subjected to the reproach of neglecting to do, what bodi were desirous of accomplishin<T, 
 Jackson's opinions on this point are already sufficiently known. Wliat those of General 
 Armstrong were, will be found in the following extracts from his official correspondence of 1813. 
 
 ,.„ , _. ,^ War Dept. 24th July, 1813. 
 
 If these [disturbances among the Creeks, affecting the peace of our Southern Frontier,] 
 .-ire found to be the result of Spanish, as well as British intrigue, and that the agents of the 
 former give them nourishment and support, it will be an act of war, which may leave us at 
 liberty to strike at Pensacola— a ;jow< which, from local and other circumstances, in my 
 judgment, is essential to the safety of our frontier on the Gulph." 
 
 Major General Pinckney. 
 
 ,,„ ^ _ Sacketts Harbor, 26th Sept, 1313. 
 
 FM^' f"'- *^'«'"™"y's '^'^P'' of <Jie 27th of June— it appears that the Spanish Government 
 ot fc. I' lorida, IS determined to furnish us with sufficient cause of war. Such being the case, 
 
 5 
 
34 
 
 the agency of the Government, so far as it went on this occasion, had 
 the direct effect of leaving to the enemy the undisturbed prosecution 
 of his plan for rekindling an Indian umrin the South. 
 
 And is it, we ask, in apohcy, thus timid and juggling, (of which 
 Mr. Monroe was an active agent) that we are to look for evidences 
 of that sagacity, which foresees the intentions of an enemy; or of 
 that energy, which finds, or makes, the means best calculated to repel 
 him? 
 
 3d. The regular force, assigned by Mr. Monroe's predecessor, 
 for the defeiice of District No. 7, consisted of the 2d, 3d, 7th, 38th 
 and 44th U. S. Regiments of Infantry and three companies ol 
 the corps of artillery. To these were added of Blilitia drafts — 
 from Kentucky 5,500, from Tennessee 2,500, from Louisiana 
 1,000; and from the Mississippi Territory 500 — making an aggregate 
 of 9,500 troops, of the latter description. This arrangement, made 
 and promulgated as early as the 4th of July, gave ample time for pre- 
 paration and movement; but though General Jackson's Alabama 
 report was followed by others, equally demonstrative of the hostile 
 intentions and conduct of both British and Spanish authoi'ities — so 
 inveterate was the incredulity of the Cabinet, that no measure, in 
 conformity to his views and in relation to either the attack on Pen- 
 sacola or the security of New Orleans, was taken, before the 21th of 
 September. On that day, the movement of the Kentucky and 
 Tennessee militia, as designated in July, was directed by the new 
 Secretary; but it will not be forgotten, that though the impediments 
 to a rapid march, were greatly and fortunately lessened by physical 
 and other causes, Q) not a man of the Kentucky corps, was able to 
 reach the American camp, until after the invading army had placed 
 itself within grasp of its object; and was only prevented from seizing 
 it, by the interposition of a battle fought in the night against great 
 odds, and by men. the majority of whom had been brought together 
 exclusively by Gen. Jackson's influence. (2) 
 
 4th. Mr. Monroe's efforts to produce a physical force, (com- 
 mensurate with the exigencies of the case,) being thus tardy, injudi- 
 cious and inefficient, those adopted for equipping what of this 
 species of force was assembled, were still more so. Though ad- 
 monished by Jackson early in September, of the existing want of 
 arms, tents, and camp kettles in District No 7, it was not until the 
 2d or 3d of November, that the Secretary found time to order a 
 supply of these articles from the North. And even at that advanced 
 period, instead of directing a speedy transmission of them, under the 
 custody of a conductor amenable to military law, (which ought 
 never to be omitted) the Secretary prescribed only, that " they should 
 
 the force, assembling for the reduction of the hostile Creeks, will be competent to the reduc- 
 tion of Pensacola also. Should your decision authorise this course, 1 v^^ill have measures 
 taken bv Flournov, which will soon place him within stroke of this object." 
 The President of the U. S. 
 
 (1 ) An uncommon rise in the Cumberland river. Eatons life of Jackson, p. 193. 
 
 (2) Coffee's Tennessee Volunteers. Idem pages 226 & 7. 
 
35 
 
 be forwarded to the commanding officer at Baton Rouge" — leaving. 
 of course, to tlie knowledge and discretion of the store keeper at 
 Pittsburgh, the entn-e control of the time and 7??fl7!«<:?%of pertcrnilng 
 this important service. {^) Under pretext (professedly) of saving a 
 few dollars to the U. S., but, more probably, for the purpose of se- 
 curing to some friend or partner, a profitable job — the arms &:c., 
 were sent, not by a Sleamhoat, (which offered to con^ ey and deliver 
 them, quickly and safely) but by two River Traders, known to be 
 in the practice of stopping at every landing place on the route, that 
 offered a market for the sale of any part of the produce they carried. 
 Fortunately, one of these vessels was fallen in with, on the Mississip- 
 pi (in the month of December) by General Carroll, who soon found 
 means to quicken her passage to New Orleans; and thus secured to 
 the service, the use of such portion of the public supplies as had been 
 confided to her conveyance. T1k3 other, carrying the remaining 
 arms and left entirely to her corximercial operations, did not reach 
 her destination, until after the fate of the campaign was decided— u 
 fact, which (according to General Jackson's estimate of its mischiev- 
 ous tendency) deprived him of the means of capturing or destroying 
 the whole British army. {-) 
 
 5th. The last ground of distinction set up for Mr. Monroe, is 
 the successful direction given to his personal credit, in aid '■ of the 
 Treasury Department, during the last months of 1814; and v/ithout 
 which, the display made of courage and energy at New Orleans, 
 would have been bsi to the national glory. 
 
 This pretension, improbable in itself, is rendered utterly in- 
 <;redible, by what is known of the practice and principles of money 
 lenders; by what is believed to have been the condition of Mr. Mon- 
 roe's pecuniary means and credit, at that period; and lastly, by certain 
 well authenticated historical facts, which have fallen under our notice, 
 and of which we offer the following examples. The moment that 
 the enemy's plans were so far developed, as left little if any doubt, 
 but that New Orleans was their point of attack; the removal of the 
 army from the neighborhood of Mobile to that place, became indis- 
 pensable. But the means necessary for doing this, were wanting. 
 Of actual funds in the hands of the Quarter Master, there were 
 none; and of national credit, at that remote point of the Union, too 
 little, to supply the want. In this dilemma, as in many others, 
 Jackson was compelled, to look to his own resources and by the use 
 of his limited funds, and of loans effected on his personal responsi- 
 bility — he was enabled to move the army to the place of its destina- 
 tion. (3) Again: When, on the 27th of September, the Secretary 
 
 /■ar Dept. contain no order of Mr. Monroe's for a supply ot 
 i, because in a letter to Gov. Blount, lie says — " an order for 
 Tennessee and Kentucky militia, has been sent to Pittsburg." 
 
 (1) The records of the War 
 arms — one is however presumed, 
 
 5000 arms for the supply of the Te „ , . 
 
 It was not uncommon, to give Col. Wadsv.'orth (then at the head of the Ordnance Dcpt.) 
 i}frbal orders on the magazines, for arms Sac. 
 
 (2) Jackson's letter of th-eSth of Jan. 1815. (3) Eaton's life of Jackson, page •243, 
 
36 
 
 directed the movement of the Kentucky militia to New Orleans, he 
 entirely forgot, that money was at all necessary to give execution to 
 the order. To supply an omission, so extraordinary in itself and 
 so menacing to the campaign, z. few patriotic individuals of that State 
 came forward, pledged their names a.ndproperti/, raised the necessa- 
 r)/ funds and expedited the march of the troops. Q) And lastly, 
 when from a change of season and the wear and tear, arising from 
 sudden movements by night and by day, the summer dress of the 
 army had ceased to furnish a comfortable covering, and had 
 even become a fmiiful source of disease among them- — neither 
 clothing, nor money to buy it, was found in the hands of any public 
 agent of the War Department, at New Orleans. As in the former 
 case, a provision against a circumstance of this kind, had entirely 
 escaped the Secretary's revolutionary foresight, so that had it not 
 heanhr the interposition of the State Legislature, (2) the army 
 jnust have beconie useless, or have been permitted to clothe itself, 
 at the expense of its morality and discipline. 
 
 With these details we terminate our remarks on the Eulogy — 
 which, it may be thought, has, already, been permitted to occupy more 
 of our attention, than either its own merit, or that of its subject, 
 could justly have claimed. 
 
 (1) Eaton's Life of Jackson, p. 266. (2) Idem, p. 331. 
 
 AJd to the first note (page 2,) relative to the committee appointed by the H. of R. on the 
 disaster at Washington, that — their Report, of which the conclusion is here given, and the docu- 
 ments wliich are herein referred to, were published by order of Congress on the 29th of No- 
 vember, 1814. 
 
 *^* Circumstances, altogether personal and priA^ate, prevented 
 the writer of the foregoing remarks from seeing the " Eulogium" to 
 which they apply, for several months after its publication; — and 
 others of a similar character, happening to the publisher since their 
 reception, may have too long retarded their appearance: — but, with 
 the judicious and unprejudiced, these facts will have no unfavorable 
 bearing on either the statements or conclusions, to be found in thr 
 Notice. 
 
 Washington, 1832, 
 
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