aass_l_IM Book—JM '•if j The Presidential Battle ^'j of 1896 ^ EMBRACING The Great Parties— Political Leaders— The Tariff— Protection —Free Trade— Tariff Legislation— Gold and Silver— flono- metallsm—Bi=metalisni— History and Laws of Coinage — Reciprocity — Monroe Doctrine — Venezuelan Problem— Cuban Question— The Great Con= ventions — National Platforms — Lives of Men who are the Standard =bearers of the Republican, Democratic and Prohibition Parties, and the Leading Topics of the Day. PROFUSELY ILLUSTRATED _, ^ Written and Edited by v -^ -^ »— /■ JAMES HYDE CLARK, The WelI=known Author, Assisted by Political, Financial and Tariff Experts. PUBLISHED BY GLOBE BIBLE PUBLISHING CO., No. 723 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa. Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1896, By D. B. SHEPP, In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. All rights reserved. PRESS or ALFRED M. SLOCUM CO PHILADA. V ■- ^ <7 k C ^^ ?6 « *» cf ^ c: e-- i^ ii CO i ^ INTRODUCTORY. The national will finds expression for the twenty-eighth time in the presidential election of 1896. The last event is no less momentous than the first, or any intermediate one. Considered as a spectacle it is the most imposing of all, for everything that enters into it is on a stupendous scale. An empire of forty-five states, breasting the two great oceans of the globe, chooses by common consent its executive guardian for four years. Thirteen million voters meet in national tribunal to determine their quad- rennial policy. Never before has earth yielded areas of such magnitude to popular government. History no- wliere records the voluntary, peaceful judgment of so many freemen, spoken at an agreed upon time, and, as it were, with a single breath. But the recurrence of a national election in this great republic is far other than a mere spectacle. It is pre- eminently suggestive of the inner meaning of popular empire, and eloquently expressive of the underlying forces that make empire possible and permanent. It is the opened mouth of sovereignty, wliose voice is heard on hill- top and in valley, by river and lake, and whose speech is, for the time, the irresistible edict. And what a meaning the word sovereignty has in a republic like ours, as compared with other forms of em- pire ! It was never a part of any feudal government to (5) b INTRODUCTORY. recognize sovereignty as in the people. Yet it is doubtful if there was ever a time in the history of any nation when the people did not feel that sovereignty was in themselves. Many learned writers who recognize organic sovereignty as in the people, call it sovereignty only when it takes the tangible shape of government or law. But in the United States sovereignty is the undoubted birthright of the in- dividual. He gives it majesty and moving, visible effect w^hen he unites it with the same right in others, acting along the same plane of thought and desire. As it takes many soldiers to make an army, so individual sovereignty assumes imposing and effective force when it bubbles forth from a set of men, a society, a community, a people, a nation, and embodies an aggregate or joint will, the election providing the opportunity for, and the ballot be- ing the medium of, expression. In the individual it may be as a still small voice in a wilderness of men, but joined with other voices, in the same key of affirmation or pro- test, it becomes as Jove's voice thundering a verdict from Olympian heights. It is then that it speaks into existence legislators, laws, governors, presidents, policies, constitu- tions, states, empires. And, in hours of great public grievance, incendiary thought or violent partisan out- burst, it may mean defiance of all law, official dethrone- ment, smashing of constitutions, upheaval of states, crash- ing of empires. ' So then the inner, vital, inspiring force of republican empire which makes so omnipotently for weal, if rightly directed, may make equally for woe, if wrongly directed. The responsibility of proper direction is at the source of the force — in the individual voter. In the lower forms of government, individual instinct, that is, nature's educa- tion, is a sufficient directive energy. In higher forms of INTRODUCTORY. government intelligence must supplement instinct. In the highest form of government, as in our own republic, where there is scarcely a gap between the source of the governing force and its outward expression or even active application, intelligence ought to be the supreme qualifi- cation. Therein alone lies national stability and safety; therein only exists hope for the benefit of healthy, pure, re- sponsive government, and for the glory of free institutions. Therefore the awful responsibility of a vote is commen- surate with the mighty right to vote. Both are exalted with the magnitude, importance or complexity of the problems seeking solution. Public questions do not grow fewer with the years, nor become less momentous. On the contrary they by right expand in number and impor- tance just as territory grows, industries increase, commerce multiplies, and all social and economic interests amplify. Even should there come exceptional times when issues are narrow in number and complexity, it will be found that like finer metals they weigh all the more, and involve quite as much, as when they are many or less simple. The situation of this very hour may not be, comparatively speaking, complicated as to national issues, but who has ever seen the time in our political history when they con- cerned so intimately the pocket, food, raiment, slielter, health and happiness of the toiling masses, or were re- garded so nervously by the farmer, manufacturer, mer^ chant, banker and creditor? However careless the American voter may have hitherto been about preparation to cast a satisfactory ballot, or how^ever much he may have striven to exercise an intelligent will at the polls, it cannot at this juncture escape him that it is encumbent on him to do all in his power to make his exercise of personal sovereignty as clear 8 INTKODUCTORY. and decisive as possible. This work has been prepared with a view to helping him. If it should be accepted as his preparatory hand-book, he can readily prime himself for the election occasion and form a judgment which he can defei^d in the forum of conscience and before the world. One thing he can be sure of to start with, and that is that he will be unhampered by any attempt on the part of the author to sway his feelings or influence his in- clinations. As partisanship is not a proper part of free education, and as every fountain of knowledge should be i of unadulterated liquid, so the information offered in this volume is neither speculative nor biased, but only such as the historic verities warrant. The problems of the times are most serious, the issues broad. Voters are in no humor to " go it blind " for the sake of party. The spirit of this work meets their spirit. It presents the living questions, the issues that burn for solution, not as seen by partisan or party, not in any narrow, controversial view, but as the intelligent, inde- pendent voter would have them, and had best have them, so that he can see them from all sides and form for him- self an estimate of their worth. The constant aim of the author has been to steer clear of the narrowness, selfishness, partisanship and perish- ability of the ordinary campaign book, and to present the problems involved in the national election in all their phases, so that both, or all, sides may be studied, and so that their study may not be for to-day only, but for all the time the problems may be uppermost. In no other form could a work touching on political questions, and is- sued during a period of political controversy, prove as high a compliment to the intelligence and independence of the reader. In no other form could it deserve or find INTRODUCTORY. ^ SO permanent a place in the library and great school of the home. The problems amplified are those of President Making, Parties, Free Trade, Protection, Silver and Gold, Tariff Legislation, Reciprocity, Monroe Doctrine, Cuban Rela- tions — all vital and urgent. They are introduced with a horoscope of the campaign, interspersed with frequent portraits of eminent statesmen and political leaders of all parties, together with their biographies, and snpplemented with lives of the presidential candidates. The publishers have greatly helped the purpose of the author to provide a plain, impartial educational work of a political kind for legislators, public speakers and voters, by gracing it with so many beautiful illustrations, so clear and readable a type and such unsurpassed excellence and beauty of paper and binding. COITENTS. Political Lines of 1896. Trend of Political Sentiment — Earnestness of Voters — Solemnity of the Issues — Their Nearness to the Masses — Homes and Pockets Touched — Impotence of Mere Politicians — Sound Doctrines in Demand— Issues Make the Leaders — A Hard-working Cam- paign — Printing Press and Club Room — The Issue of Tariff— The Tariff Situation— View of Past Measures— Tariff Reform— The Wilson Bill — Trial in the Courts of Public Opinion— Finan- cial Depression — A Square Test Required — Results of Recent Elections — Revolution of Parties — Silver and Gold Problem — Rapid Growth of Silver Sentiment — Effect on Parties — A Battle Royal Anticipated — The Populist Attitude — Place of the Gold Men — Silver Legislation — Effects of Congressional Action — Great Importance of the National Election to Parties and the Country — The Currency Problem — Attitude of Sound Money Democrats — Republican and Prohibition Bolters — Union of Populists and Democrats **. .......... 23 II. President Making Since 1788. Electoral Votes by States in 1892, 1888 and 1884— Popular Votes- Electoral College in all Presidential Years — Candidates and Parties— Disputed Elections— Effect of the Twelfth Amend- ment — Votes for Each Candidate — The Popular Vote — When the Popular Vote Began to be Counted — As Cast for Each Can- didate — Valuable and Interesting Data 41 (11) 12 CONTENTS. III. Parties Past and Present. Use of Political Parties — Necessary in a Republic — Views Respect- ing Them — Fanciful Party Names — Origin of Whig, Tory, Lo- cofoco, Etc. — Colonial Parties — Parties of the Revolution — Par- ties of the Confederation — Extinction of Whig and Tory Titles — Rise of Federalism — Principles of Federalism — Rise of the Old Republican Party — Its Leaders and Principles — Fall of the Federal Party — Triumph of the Republican Party — Its Division and Fall — How the Whig Party Rose — Rise of Democratic Party — Principles and Leaders of Each — Impress on Legislation — De- cline of Whig Party — Its Legacy to the Nation — Slavery and Political Parties — Democratic Divisions — Free-soil Party — Rise of the New Republican Party — Its Principles, Leaders and Strength — Rise and Fall of Know-nothing Party — Its place in History — The Greenback Party — Revival of Democracy — Growth of Prohibition Party— Rise of Populism— The People's Party— Free Silver Partj; — Labor and Other Parties ...... 4L> lY. Principles of Free Trade. Definition of Free Trade— Principle of a Tariff— Early Free Traders —Tariff for Revenue— Tariff Reform— Politics Confuses Terms — The English Idea— Old and New Theories — Law as to Capital — As to Labor — Productiveness and Labor — Increased Price — Doctrine of "Laissez Faire " — Protection Iniquitous— Class Taxation— Diminished Labor— Wrong of the Custom House — Division of Labor — Aggregate of Labor — Diversified Industry — Produce for Produce — Value of Free Competition — Facility of Exchanges— Diminution of Labor — Capital and Employment — Independence of Foreigners— Free Trade in Politics— Tariff a Tax — Monopolies and Trusts — Views of Gladstone and Patrick Henry — Protection Invokes Wars — England Repudiated Her Own Protection Laws — Reaches Free Trade — Views of Wells, Taussig, Robert Peel, Jackson, Rowan, Dallas— Protection Leads to Smuggling — Comparison of Free Trade and Protection Eras— Views of Buchanan, Lloyd, Garfield— Smith— Free Trade Era of 1850 to 1860 one of Prosperity— General Principles . . . 105 CONTENTS. 13 V. Principles of Protection. Principle not in Doubt— Practiced by all Nations — Necessary to Commercial Supremacy — For Industrial and Mauufacturing In- dependence — Protection Unites Art and Nature — Protective and Revenue Tariffs — Revenue Duties Fall on Necessaries — Protect- ive Duties Fall ou Competitive Articles— Rate and Adjustment of Protective Duties — Prohibitory Rates — Essence of Labor in Products — Per Cent, of Labor — Application of Protection to Labor — Effect of Protection on Labor — Protection Does not In- crease Cost to Consumer — Competition Regulates Cost — Encour- agement to Capital — To Invention — More and Better Goods — Tariff for Protection not a Tax — Producers Pay the Duty — Sen- timent in Bradford — Opinions of List, Smith, Mill — Advantage of Protection to Agricultural Communities — "The American System" — Opinions of Washington, Madison, Jefferson, Taus- sig — American Conditions — European Conditions — Protection Cures Monopoly — Gives Competing Power Abroad — Revenue Tariff a Tax — Doctrine of Natural Right — Duty of Development — Use of Natural Gifts — Our Own Economics — Absolute Cheap- ness not Desirable — Protection Does not Tend to Overproduc- tion — Protection Since 1861 — Carey's Deductions — Uses to Farmers — Free "Raw Material " — Protection not for Privileged Classes— Does not Contribute to Great Fortunes— Nor to Trusts —Tends to Fairer Profits— Our Material Growth 126 VI. Silver and Gold. Importance of the Question, "What is Money ?" — Kinds of Money — Money Values — Money Systems — American Coinage — First Coin- age Act — Gold and Silver Values — Reasons for a Change— Coin- age Act of 1834 — Mistaken Ratios — Silver Monometalized — " Gresham's Law "— " Mint Act " of 1837— Coinage Act of 1849 — Effects of the Discovery of Gold — Alarm of the Commercial World---Our "Legal Tender Acts" — Resumption of the Coin- age Act of 1873— Silver Demonetized— The "Trade Dollar" of 1876— Extent of Coinage to 1878— Coinage Act of 1878— Free \ 14 CONTENTS. and Unlimited Coinage System — Restoration of the Silver Dol- lar—Coinage Act of 1890— What it Did— The Proposed Free Coinage Act of 1892 — What it Sought Compared with Other Acts — Repeal of Purchasing Clause in Sherman Act — Rapid Growth of Free Silver Coinage Sentiment — How it Affected Parties and Legislation — Place in Party Platforms — Effects Upon Finance and Business — Silver and the Campaign of 1896 — Opinions of Party Leaders 154 YII. HiSTOEY OF American Tariffs. English Colonial System — The Confederation and Free Trade — The Constitution and Imposts — Tariff Act of 1789 — Protective Era —Embargo and Tariff of 1812— High Protective Era- Act of 1816— Disasters of 1817-19— Act of 1824 and the "American System "—Attitude of Parties— Act of 1828— Hostility to It and Compromise Act of 1833 — Nullification — Panic of 1837 — Protective Rates of 1842— Repealing Act of 1846— Effect of Mex- ican War, Discovery of Gold, Foreign Wars and Famines — Tariff Act of 1857— Panic of 1857— Protective Act of 1861— Effect of Civil War— Panic of 1873 and Act of 1874— The Tariff Commis- sion and Tariff of 1883— The Morrison Bill— The Mills Bill- Tariff Act of 1890 — Policy of Reciprocity — Tariff Legislation in 1892— Doctrine of Tariff Reform— The Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 — Reduction of Duties — Destruction of Reciprocity — Failure of its Income Feature — A Deficit of Income — Panic and Industrial Depression— The Dingley Relief Measure of 1896— Tariff Senti- ment Abroad — Lord Salisbury's Views — Protective Legislation, 207 YIII. American Reciprocity. General View of Reciprocity — Commercial Treaties — " Most Favored Nation" Clause — Reciprocity and the American Republics — Modern Commercial Era — Escape from European Dominion — The *' Monroe Doctrine" — Prophecy of John Adams — The In- ternational Conference — Report on Reciprocity — Blaine's Re- view and Recommendation — Reciprocity and Tariff Act of 1890 — Second Stage of Reciprocity — Acceptance by Foreign Nations CONTENTS. 15 —Effect upon Commercial Relations— General View of its Oper- ations—Repeal of Reciprocity by Wilson Tariff Act— Effect of Repeal— Discrimination by Foreign Nations 300 IX. The Monroe Docteine. The Venezuelan Boundary Dispute— England's Attitude— Position of the United States— Arbitration Proposed, and Monroe Doc- trine Explained— England Denies tne Doctrine and Refuses to Arbitrate— Oluey's State Paper— The President's Bold Message —Response of the Congress— The Venezuelan Commission- American War Sentiment— A Firm Foreign Policy Demanded— Change in English Sentiment— Historic Review of Monroe Doctrine— The Holy Alliance— Attitude of Allied Monarchs To- ward America— Eugland's Proposition to America— Rush's First Announcement of the Doctrine— Consideration by Ameri- can Statesmen— Formulated and Announced by President Mon- roe—Supported by Adams, Clay, Webster and Other Statesmen —Various Announcements by Presidents and Secretaries of State— An Enduring Principle of Our Unwritten Law— How it is Applicable to the Venezuelan Question 366 Our Cuban Relations. Spain and Cuba— History of Cuban Insurrections— Spanish Attitude Toward the Island— The Last Uprising— Review of Insurgent Work— Victories Afield— Institution of a Government— Demand for Belligerent Rights by the United States— Resolutions by Congress— Attitude of President Cleveland— Should Our For- eign Relations Change as to Spain and Cuba— Sentiment of Statesmen and Publicists — Reasons For and Against a Grant of Belligerent Rights— Execution of Neutrality Laws- How Our Nation is Affected— American Interests in Cuba- Appeal of Patriotism and Humanity— Extent of American Sympathy ' ''l ^^^ 16 CONTENTS. XI, Life of William McKinley Parentage and Birth — Ea'ly Life and Education — Characteristics of Youth — Career as a Soldier — Promotions in Service — A Law Student — Admission to Bar — Success in Practice — Orator and Debater — District Attorney — In Public Life — Eapid Rise in Statesmanship-- "The A^postle of Protection" — Brilliant Speeches— Father of the "McKinley Bill" — As Governor of Ohio for Two Terms — His Tremendous Majorities — Popularity with the People — Family and Home Life — Personal Traits — The Popular Uprising — Strength in Republican Convention — Nom- ination for the Presidency — The Home Ovations and Speech of Acceptance — National Congratulations 435 XII. Life of Garret A. Hobart. Birth and Education — As a Lawyer — Rise to Public Station — Posi- tions of Civic Trust — In State Assembly — Member of State Committee — Powerful Political Worker— Personal Characteris- tics — Home and Social Position — Nomination for Vice-President Ovations and Acceptance 483 I XIII. The Republican Platform of 1896. 501 XIV. Life of William Jennings Bryan. Parentage and Birth— Common School Education— Farm Residence —At College— An Oratorical Student— Graduation with Honors — In the Law School — Admission to the Bar — In Practice at Salem — His Marriage — Removal to Lincoln, Nebraska — Law CONTENTS. 17 Firm of Talbot and Bryan— Success as a Lawyer— Fame as a Political Speaker— Election to 52d Congress— Remarkable Tariff Speech— Universal Congratulations- -Election to 53d Congress— Champion of Free Silver Coinage- Senatorial Aspir- ations—Personal Appearance— Leading Traits of Character— Their Washington Life— Wife's Appearance and Characteristics —Home Life— Powers as an Orator— A Leader in the Chicago Convention— His Magnetic Speech— Convention Acclaim— His Nomination for President— His Notification and Ovation- Triumphant Homeward Journey 510 XV. Life of Aktiiur Sewall. Parentage and Birth— Early Education— In the Calling of Ship- builder—A Practical Workman— Entry into the Shipbuilding Firm— Large Vessel Builder and Owner— Devotion to Cause of Merchant Marine— A Railway President a- d Manager— Bank President— Promoter and Manager of Industrial Enterprises- Personalism and Social Life— His Wife, Children and Home- Nomination as Vice-President— A Logical Selection— Reception of Nomination— Home Ovation 555 XVI. Democeatic Platfokm of 1896. ... 566 XVII. Life of Joshua Levering. Parentage and Birth— Education— Entry into Commercial Pursuits —Prominent Baltimore Merchant— Marriage and Family— Civic and Public Trusts— Political Career— Nomination for President —The Prohibition Platform— Proceedings of Pittsburg Conven- tioii 573 18 CONTENTS. XVIII. Life of Hale Johnson. Birth and Education — Career as Soldier — Admission to the Bar — Prom- inence in Practice — Honorary Positions— -Standing in Prohibi- tion Counsels — Nomination for Vice-President 586 XIX, The Nationai, Party and Platform of 1896. . 588 Hon. James McMillan. Born at Hamilton, Ont., May 12, 1838 ; prepared for College, but entered business in Detroit, 1855 ; established Michigan Car Company, 1863; member and chairman of Republican State Central Committee, 1876, 1886, 1890 ; President of Detroit Park Commission and Board of Estimates; Republican Presidential Elector, 1884; elected to United States Senate, as Republican, for term beginning March 4, 1889, and re- elected in 1895 ; an industrious, practical member, whose opinions com- mand respect; Chairman of Committee on District of Columbia and member of Committees on Commerce, Naval Affairs and Corporations in D. C. Hon. George Graham Vest. Born at Frankfort, Ky., December 6, 1830; graduated at Centre Col- lege, Ky., 1848, and at Law Department of Transylvania University, 1853; same year moved to Missouri and began practice of law; Presi- dential Elector on Democratic ticket, 1860 ; member of Missouri Legis- lature, 1860-61 ; served for two years as member of Confederate Congress, and one year in Confederate Senate ; elected to U. S. Senate, as a Democrat, 1879 ; re-elected 1885 and 1890 ; member of Committees on Finance, Commerce, Public Buildings and Grounds, and Epidemic Diseases. List of Illustrations. THE "WHITE HOUSE' JOHN ADAMS . N. W. ALDRICH JOHN QUINCY ADAMS WM. B. ALLISON . CHESTER A. ARTHUR RICHARD P. BLAND JAMES BUCHANAN J. C. S. BLACKBURN MARION BUTLER . HORACE BOIES CALVIN S. BRICE . W. J. BRYAN . GROVER CLEVELAND JOHN G. CARLISLE WM. E. CHANDLER CHAS. F. CRISP SHELBY M. CULLOM D. B. CULBERSON C. W. DEPEW . I. W. DANIEL . FRED F. DUBOIS . 8. B. ELKINS . PAGE ( Frontispiece. MILLARD FILLMORE 57 J. B. FORAKER . 73 WM. P. FRYE . . . 37 ULYSSES S. GRANT . 127 JAMES Z. GEORGE 56 JAMES A. GARFIELD . . . 181 ARTHUR P. GORMAN . . 55 MARK A. HANNA . 200 WM H. HARRISON : . 253 ISHAM G. HARRIS . 182 R. B. HAYES . . . 254 JOS. R. HAWLEY . . . 523 BENJAMIN HARRISON ) . 271 DAVID B. HILL 272 GARRET A. HOB ART 128 THOMAS JEFFERSON . 110 JAMES K. JONES . . 343 ANDREW JACKSON . . 416 HALE JOHNSON . . 470 ANDREW JOHNSON . . 415 HENRY CABOT LODGE 74 ABRAHAM LINCOLN 506 JOSHUA LEVERING PAGE 55 362 235 55 361 56 163 469 38 344 56 145 56 558 487 37 505 38 576 55 452 55 575 22 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE PAGE JAMES MADISON . . . 37 ARTHUR SEWALL . . 557 WM. Mckinley . . . 434 JOHN SHERMAN . . 433 JAMES MONROE . a? ADLAI E. STEVENSON 308 JAMES MCMILLAN 19 WM. M. STEWART 199 R.Q. MILLS . . . 217 W. J. SEWELL . . 290 LEVI P. MORTON . . 91 JOHN TYLER . 38 KNUTE NELSON . 289 HENRY M. TELLER . 164 JAMES K. POLK . 38 ZACHARY TAYLOR . 38 JOHN M. PALMER 325 BENJ. R. TILLMAN 109 FRANKLIN PIERCE . 55 DAVID TURPIE 236 ROBT. E. PATTISON . 379 MARTIN VAN BUREN 38 W. A. PEFFER 92 GEO. V. VEST . . . 20 R. F. PETTIGREW 380 WM F.VILAS . 307 THOS. G. PLATT . . 488 GEORGE WASHINGTON 37 REDFIELD PROCTOR . 398 WM. C.WHITNEY . . 524 JAMES L. PUGH . 397 WM. L. WILSON . . 218 M. S. QUAY 451 STEPHEN M. WHITE . . 326 THOS. B. REED . 146 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. The campaign of 1896 has much in common with pre- ceding ones, yet is so different in vital respects as to be of an exceptional kind in American political history. The turmoil incident to a national election, the blight of uncertainty that settles on enterprise, the suspension of industrial and mercantile energies in the midst of ex- citement, have, too often, contributed to the feeling that such an election was more of a visitation than a welcome event. Happily for the one now pending, it is eagerly looked to by all parties, and even by all classes of men, as an event which is to dispose of questions that more nearly concern their business efforts, mechanical skill and eco- nomic welfare, than their partisan prejudices. Never heretofore have the masses been in so subdued and thoughtful a mood, and never before have the issues in their hands for disposal reached down closer to their homes, pockets, prosperity and happiness. Therefore the campaign is more than ever a period of serious consider- ation rather than noisy excitement, and the election a welcome opportunity rather than a simple and recurrent political event. One feature not hitherto uncommon to national cam- paigns, and which, while fascinating, has been least pro- ductive of satisfactory results, is the outside place at pres- (23) 24 POLITICAL L1^^ES OP 1896. ent accorded to the politician pure and simple. This fea- ture has been prominent ever since the beginning of the presidential year. In all those preliminary stages of the campaign, when ground was being broken for the national conventions, and when political leaders expected to find rich soil in which to cultivate their crops of selfish pipe- laying and sordid patronage manipulation, they were, as a rule, relegated to the rear, or thwarted in their most cun- ning designs, by a majestic and irresistible flow of gen- eral sentiment. This was so marked in the Republican organization as to place both a unanimous party policy and a prospective candidate far beyond reach of ambitious coteries or scheming juntas ; and in the Democratic organ- ization, as to amount to a proclamation, '^ hands off till the hour of final counsel." And as the contentions took the glow and gleam of lieated campaign, as the stumj) became radiant with con- trovers}^ and redolent with eloquence, as the grand surges of political thought swept onward toward tha.goal of the ballot, more than ever was the politician lost sight of as either an animating or directing energy. He became as a mere piece of diift in a resistless current. There was no toleration of his presence or plans, no time nor opportu- nity for him to intrigue, flatter or control. In the two or three preceding presidential campaigns the presence of a cold-blooded, calculating element, capa- ble of dark, designing work which might have the effect of entra})ping candidates, modifying vital party measures, securing dangerous selfish concessions, or entirely con- trolling the problems of defeat and victory, served to cloud and chill the situations, to provoke doubts and as- perities, and to degrade all the functions of open, honor- able canvass. Good men grew ashamed, earnest men lost POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 25 heart, candid men became puzzled, convinced men wav- ered, those who sought conviction at the shrines of lead- ers came away in a shroud of doubt, or oftener, and what was worse, filled with false notions of duty to self, party and country. Such an element has been eliminated from this campaign by force of its very earliest conditions — a determination on the part of voters to think, speak and act moie largely and independently for themselves. The highest educative political forces, the most teach- able object lessons, of many years past, have so wrought upon individual welfares, have entered so minutely every sphere of activity, have so punctured every mind susceptible to impression, that indei)endency has come to be looked upon as a salvation. What was once holy allegiance to party creed is now the application of experience — often hard and bitter experience — to the more immediate conditions of existence. The party shibboleth is as nothing com- pared with the ultimate principle, the overspreading, all pervading law, whose practical application means the mental and moral lifting up, the social and industrial bet- terment, of those whose destinies are in their own keeping. It is likely that the radical political revolutions of the last few years have done more to call the attention of voters to themselves, to their personal and home needs, to the effect of tried principles upon the nation, its institu- tions, its industries, its prosperity, than ai^ other events could possibly have done. These revolutions have taught voters their power, yet at the same time that simple im- pulses should never be mistaken for judgments, and that where the latter strike so deeply as to reach the workshop and the hearthstone, they ought to be the most seriously considered of all judgments. They have still further taught that in the application of great economic laws and 26 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. broad business principles to human situations, mutation, even when it assumes the brilliant and fascinating hues of revolution, may prove to be means of devastation rather than help. Says that exquisite pundit, James Russell Lowell ; — " Change jes for change is like them big hotels, Where they change plates and let you live on smells." But independency on the part of voters is often in- separable from a species of tui'bulency most distracting to exact campaign methods. However it may gratify per- sonal sentiment or conviction, Avhatever the effect may be on individual or general welfare, there is, for the time being, party disconcert, amounting to even tlie fracture of old established lines, to the enunciation of fresh prin- ciples, to the establishment of new parties, to the multi- plication of candidatures. The time has been when these have gone so far as to entirely befog real situations and to lead to results quite contrary to what was desired by anyone. The present situation may not, in all respects, exactly repeat that above alluded to, but if not, it is be- cause the average voter sought a landing place before he took his leap. He has not allowed broken party allegiance to run wild, but has anchored it quickly and spontaneously on'a previously chosen bottom. In changing boats he has not become a waif, to be tossed helplessly on waves of tumultuous sentiment. Hence the very discords that have characterized former analogous situations and often thwarted their aims, are not now either dangerous or undesirable. Even supposing the disconcert to become most distracting, and the tumult most discordant, the life lines of very peculiar circumstances are out in pleni- tude, and voters can, if they choose, land themselves POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 27 safely on friendly shores. Even supposing candidatures to be inordinately multiplied, the room for wise choice can hardly be said to be so curtailed as to provoke lengthy doubt or impel to disastrous mistake. And this is particularly true because in all the outcrops of the present campaign thus far, the matter of mere men has been subordinated to the matter of measures. Con- sidering the earnestness of all, the magnitude of measures, the solemnity of the political situation, what we as a peo- ple of workers and business are to escape, what to remedy, what to confront, there is no good reason to sup- pose that campaign beginnings do not exactly reflect their endings, and that the final verdict will be the procla- mation of a much needed and desirable result. This displacement of leaders, especially the candidates, by the measures they represent, happily leaves little provocation for vulgar, personal politics. All must re- membijr with humiliation the indecent opening of the campaign of 1884. For weeks, and even months, it was a game of personal sharpshooting, an occasion of revile^nent, a fiery furnace of character attacks and defences, most degrading to party honor and despicable in the eyes of individuals whatever their political predilections. Such an exhibition cannot be repeated now, if ever. Candidates are not standing for more than measures. In this, as very likely in all the political battles of the near future, it is hardly probable that voters will permit an overthrow of their deliberative mood, and an eclipse of issues at stake, by halting to indulge in the vile tactics of personalism. Honorable partisanship is the making of a campaign. As issues broaden and deepen, their very solemnity smoothes the rough and acerb edges of partisanship, gives it healthy tone, adapts it to the high and noble work of 28 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. clear, fair, truthful statement, and calm, deliberative, forceful defence. The true partisan becomes the best of political school-teachers. He may be the statesman of the hour, the leader of the future. This campaign is prolific of opportunities for that class of partisans \yho have honest convictions, fearless natures, clear judgments, fair spirits and gifted expression. The partisan of only heated words, loud expletives, false assertions, specious logic. and idle promises, will find himself without a mission, or ought to so find himself, at a time when dispassionate discussions should rule the hour and when all bitterness and falsehood should be at lowest discount. The orator of this grandest of all political occasions, a presidential election, will have before him such an audience as he never before addressed. It will be a large audience, for the masses are in motion ; a critical audience, for the masses are inquiring ; a studious audience, for the masses are thinking; a subdued audience, for the masses are not in jubilee humor, but in grimly de- fiant mood. A forcible fact is going to avail far more than a pyrotechnic spurt. Vitnperative thunder is going to addle very few brains. Sophistical bailoons will find themselves punctured ere they reach a floating medium. There may be localities in which all this will prove an ex- ception, but they will be few and wide apart. There may be men foolish enough, or ignorant enough, to rely for argument and effort on sarcasm, bitterriess, vituperation and deceit, but they will certainly look in vain for spirited applause or sincere converts. The activities and energies of the campaign can hardly fail to prove variegated and interesting. What will be lacking in the spectacular will be made up in that as- siduity of speech and competitive vigor of work which the political situation demands. The crisis warrants a POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 29 '* campaign of education" in the highest and most diversified sense. The issues seek enlargement, require emphasis. Campaign agency must prove vigorous and untiring, energy, restless and persevering, devotion, sincere and uncompromising. National questions were never more national. So the popular verdict should be all the more dispassionate. This campaign and election should emphasize the era which notes the final departure of all dishonorable means for securing political victories. This campaign, as it surges along, makes rapid head- way toward the two only issues that the past few years have rendered logical and inevitable. The sweep of events has been so magnificent and irresistible as to crush out of sight party questions of minor moment, and to subordinate all lesser political differences to those of supreme magnitude. Ever since 1887, there existed a determination on the part of those who passed as tarifi" reformers to wage relentless war upon the existing economic system of the country. In the national battle of 1888 they buffered single defeat. Not daunted, how- ever, they rendered the w^ar more vigorously than ever, and in the national engagement of 1892 they scored a significant triumph, which they speedily put to use by overthrowing the tariff system of 1890, and introducing that quite opposite system of 1894. For reasons of whose accuracy everyone must be left to judge for himself, the country was dissatisfied with a regime so opposite to that which had been overthrown, and so full of melancholy contrasts with it. This dis- satisfaction was made manifest in the State elections of 1893. In the Congressional elections of 1894, it assumed the proportions of emphatic protest, and the political 30 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. situation was entirely reversed. In 1895 the verdicts of disapproval were still stranger. Democracy lost in its very strongest holds. Here, then, was a full three year trend toward a culmination which was unavoidable in 1896. No matter what politicians, economists and parties thought, as to the propriety of a battle royal, in 1896, over the tariff issue, the voters themselves had seemingly determined in advance thas the time was opportune for them to re- cast their judgment of 1892. Thus there was no escape in 1896, from the issue that had not been allowed to rest for three years. There must be another trial of strength over a question so vital to national welfare and so intimately woven with individual prosperity. In all the preliminaries of the campaign of 1896, throughout all its earliest stages, the parties looked to such a trial as inevitable and braced themselves for it. But the tariff was not to be an issue merely ; it was to be the main issue. Nothing could eclipse it in importance. It meant meat, clothing and shelter for toilers. It meant revived industry, living wages, an era of restored pros- perity and happiness, where all was idleness, poverty and discontent. This on the one hand ; on the other hand it meant for those who saw in the tariff of 1894 the culmination of anti-protectionism an opportunity to confirm the wisdom of the doctrine they had carried to triumph in 1892, and had so fully and energetically in- corporated into our economic system. They could not but be eager to repeat that triumph, for them the tariff policy of the country would be fixed in their favor for a generation at least. But while the parties with their banners were thus lining up for the tariff fray, there came upon them a POLITICAL LINES OP 1896. 31 diversion which quite transfixed them for a time at least., It could not be said to have come suddenly nor unex- pectedly, but its favor, manner and force were so over- whelming as to carry with it a sense of shock, if not dismay. The question of free silver coinage was an old one, and one which had been made familiar by its especial champion, Mr. Bland. It had been made a cardinal doctrine by the People's, or Populist, party in their platform of 1892, and had been stoutly advocated on the stump wherever that party exercised its cam- paign energies. With the spread of Populism in the West and South, it became more and more a party tenet, and its advocates in both Democratic and Repub- lican ranks made it stronger with themselves than their party allegiance. They used it in the Fifty-fourth Congress as a foil to the legislation which the House had passed, the condition being that no legislation of moment should be completed by the Senate unless it bore the free silver coinage stamp. Statesmen and publicists of both the leading parties felt that a grave political error had been committed in 1892 by Mr. Cleveland's party managers in seeking al- liances with the Populists in the Western States. They were warned by the most astute minds in the Democratic party that such alliances would prove troublesome, if not fatal. But they adhered to their purpose, feeling that all was fair in politics, that the Republicans could receive no harder blow, and trusting to Mr. Cleveland's power to hold all that would be gained to strict party allegiance, and mould all to the dominant party will. It took but little time to ascertain that these alliances had given an impetus to the free silver coinage senti- ment, which threatens to sweep Democracy from its 32 POLITICAL LIKES OF 1896. ancient moorings. What it had sown was not the true seed, but dragons' teeth; what it had admitted into its citadel was not a helpful engine, but a Trojan horse. It became a rule at Democratic conventions in the West and South, and especially in those conven- tions whose main object was to elect delegates to the Chicago Convention, to declare in favor of the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, which was one of the planks in the Populist platfoim of 1892, inserted at the Omaba Convention. In order to stem this rapidly rising silver tide, and to correct as far as possible the error of 1892, the admin- istration entered into contests in several States, notably in Kentucky, but with little avail. Its every advice and appeal either passed unheeded, or served to stir opposition to deeper depth and bitterer proportions^ The tide daily grew higher and swept along more irresistibly. It took on more and more the lines of sturdy purpose and intelligent direction. Direct antagonism to the administration was courted rather than feared, and defiance became a test of faith in the free silver doctrine. Meanwhile circumstances all contributed to a pos- sible coherence of the silver strength. The Prohibi- tionists met in National Convention at Pittsburgh in May, only to find that a large contingent of their strength was so infected with free silver coinage as to make its acceptance a condition of support of the old cardinal principles of the party. Being defeated, this *' broad guage " contingent bolted the convention and nominated a ticket on a free silver coinage platform. In June, the Republicans met in National Convention at St. Ivouis. There also a free silver contingent was on POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 33 hand, and in earnest demand for a free silver coinage plank in the platform of the party. Their request was denied, and they too bolted the convention to cast their political fortunes in with the other exponents of their doctrine. These bolts affected the respective parties more or less seriously. While they were deprecated, they served, perhaps, to clarify party situations; at least they served to encourage the free silver coinage senti- ment, and to render it brave for the work of closer amalgamation and final coherence. At length, the opportunity that had long been desired for a show of coherent strength and aggressive initial came with the Democratic Convention at Chicago, in July. A single test of strength showed that free silver coinage had captured the Democratic citadel, and that, as to aggressiveness, it was fully endowed with the old Democratic martial spirit. It would hear no concession or compromise, but enthroned itself as an only rightful master, determined that its cardinal doctrines which were many, novel, striking, and, as some say, dangerous, should henceforth bear the full Democratic stamp and possess the clear Democratic ring. This signal triumph gave new metes and bounds to the political situation. As to Democracy, it was a right- about-face of the oldest political organization in the country. It at once put the hitherto unorganized free silver element in possession of a party name and party machinery. It afforded them a nucleus around which every other free silver party, or element, by whatever name called, could rally. It imparted the prestige of generations of conflict to the newly pledged captors of a time-honored political army. The standard of Jeflfer- son, the gonfalon of Jackson, the ancient spirit of 34 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. battled-scarred Democracy, were all theirs by virtue of bravery and numbers, and for inspiration in fresh wars for newly engrafted principals. What matter if the dissaffected should bolt? Better that than divided counsels, or traitorous priests within the holy-of-holies. What matter if the unruly and untrue should set up counter tickets or go oflf into the wilderness of despair to worship strange gods? Every vacancy would be filled by two recuits. Thus hopefully did the enthusi- astic victors of Chicago reason, thus they presumed on the strength and character of their conquest. Their position had all the radiance of newly achieved glory, all the promise of a broad popular victory at the polls. Discomfitted and mourning Democrats likened the situation to that of 1860, when the party was rent into two irreconcilable factions over the question of slavery. They saw in the new departure of the majority of their party a step toward repudiation and anarchy, and they naturally likened it to a time when patriotism was pre- ferred to party allegiance. The problem was how best to cope with a situation they deemed revolutionary and dangerous. Should they cope with it by holding to the party name and making another nomination for Presi- dent? Should they quietly acknowledge the will of the majority and enter secret protest at the polls ? Never had dilemma two such formidable horns. Both were charged with a voltage that rendered their touch hazardous. A second ticket would divert strength that ought to go to to the defeat of the first, and which might, in the end, only show the weakness of the mi- nority. To let matters drift might, in the end, be accepted as acquiescence in what they regarded as absurd politics and as an attact on national credit and POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 35 institutions. Time alone could bring about an intelli- gent decision. The new frontage of Democracy not only bore the seeds of disintegration on the winds of alarm, but it presented a stragetic problem to the Republicans who were fully committed to the dual doc- trines of sound money and protective tariff. They had even dug their trenches and stretched their tents on an alignment by means of which they could most success- fully resist a free trade onslaught. Should they shift position and re-arrange for a currency attack by flank and front ? And if so, what was to become of the issue upon which they staked their most ardent hopes of success, which had for them involved a life or death principle throughout all the years of their existence ? The Democratic dilemma became the Republican quandary. ^ The judgment was eventually reached that the Repub- lican lines as first laid down were ample, with a little shifting so as to anticipate the free silver artillery charge, and a little strengthening in places, so as to provide against unexpected developments of strength by the enemy. It would still be an industrial battle as well as one of finance, but with the former as a reserve to the latter wherever the character of the fray deter- mined it wise . Thus the sudden and alarming diversion at Chicago would not necessarily prove fatal, however disturbing it might be to political calculations for a time. It is almost unnecessary to speak of the influence of the Chicago outcome upon the fortunes of the trium- phant majority of the Democratic party there, or rather upon the Democratic party as it existed after that triumph. Its platform called for much of a radical and impracticable nature, but on nothing so 36 POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. loudly, squarely and honestly as the free coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1. This was the momentous and absorbing tenet. In this it was to be original, in this wholly at variance with ancient party traditions. On this it was to go before the country as an independ- ent pleader for suffrage. It would scarcely have another battle cry. Around this standard it expected to rally the disaffected of all parties. With this inspiration it confidently counted on a campaign as triumphant in the end as that which had placed a venerable Democracy within its control. If nothing occurred to thwart its plans or depress its hopes, the country would certainly witness one of the grandest of marches of sentiment toward a coveted destination. No political calculation could for a time compass this novel, persistent, daunt- less and enthusiastic force. It certainly had a right to the confidence its captains of Democracy inspired. It also had a right to pose as the central planet about which all other silver planets should revolve. Upon it would rest the responsibility of every initiative in the pending battle, and with it would abide all the glories of victory or disgraces of defeat. Hence its boundless energy and restless determination ; hence also its right to expect, or even command, the adhesion of all senti- ment that looked toward free silver coinage as a relief from existing ills. At no stage of the campaign were party lines ever so tightly drawn as to exclude free intercourse between the pickets or free leaps over the parapets. This was essential. The educative work was stupendous — far more so than if tariflf alone had been an only, or the prime, issue, .for the average voter had made himself familiar with the objects and effects of a tariff. To George Washington. John Adams Thomas Jefferson. James Madison. James Monroe. John Quincy Adams. Andrew Jackson Martin Van Buren. William H. Harrison. John TyleR. .imnilHrailHIIIl James K. Polf Zachaey Taylor. POLITICAL LINES OF 1896. 39 Speak more accurately, the tariff had lost its mystery as an economical problem, and had become one of those every-day questions, comprehensive to everyone who had heads to shelter, mouths to feed, and backs to clothe. But it was not so with the financial question. The averment was that low prices, hard times, and every cognate ill, was due to the demonitization of silver, and would flee away under the spell of free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1. But who arose to prove all this ? It never at any time passed beyond the stage of vehement and plausible averment. And who understood all this? Certainly not the average voter to whom it was first introduced. Demonitization to him was the veriest Greek, and 16 to 1 was a Chinese puzzle. Ratios were as nothing compared with bread and butter. On the other hand the averment was that free silver coinage meant the repudiation of debts, the scaling of prices and wages, the introduction of panic, the destruction of credits, universal bankruptcy and demoralization. Admitting it all, still men would ask, how then comes it that so many advocates of disaster are found in the country? How could these calamity seekers walk into a great conservative and patriotic convention and walk away with it bodily? How could they make so many and such easy converts in so short a time ? Surely there must be some mis- representation of a situation which proves so alluring and potential as to attract and hold as this one does! It cannot be that the multitude are so filled with the gadarene spirit as to wish to rush over the precipice into the sea! All along in the campaign it has been the wish of 40 POLITICAL LIXES OF 1896. every man of patriotic instincts, and the expectation of parties, that the leading issues, as already foreshadowed, should never be lost sight of, but should be persistently fought to a finish. As the country has seen, dalliance with a great economic and industrial problem, like the tariff, is destructive of energies and hopes, subversive of investment and enterprise, and quite as costly in the end as actual war. The same can be truthfully said of agitation respecting the country's currency and finances, espec- ially when such agitation is suddenly sprung by those who oppose the established usages of credit and ex- change, and who favor radical departures in the interest of debtor and against creditor. If they are right, the quicker they establish the fact the better. The indi- vidual creditor, the savings bank, the building associa- tion, the bank of deposit, the stock-and-bond-owing cor- poration, the pensioner, the day laborer, are all in sus- pense, 'till they know whether what they are entitled to is above or below par. If they are wrong, let the ver- dict be emphatic, as that they will not soon return to vex the country with sophistries, distract it with conten- tions, threaten it with sectional division, or endanger it with internal convulsion. Let the campaign be hard and earnest ; let the lines be clear and strong ; let the result be an explosion forever of wrong thought and dangerous principle, and the permanent establishment of right doctrine and righteous aspiration, no matter what the standard upon which they are inscribed. PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788. ELECTORAL VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, 1892. Republican. Democrat. Populist. Qtatoa Basis of Votes. Harrison. Cleveland. Weaver, ftiaies. 173,901. Alabama 9 11 11 Arkansas 6 8 8 California...., 7 9 1 8 Colorado 2 4 4 Connecticut 4 6 6 Delaware 13 3 Florida 2 4 4 Georgia 11 13 13 Idaho 13 3 Illinois 22 24 24 Indiana. 13 15 15 Iowa 11 13 13 Kansas 8 10 10 Kentucky 11 13 13 Louisiana 6 8 8 Maine 4 6 6 Maryland 6 8 8 Massachusetts 13 15 15 Michigan 12 14 9 5 Minnesota 7 9 9 Mississippi 7 9 9 ]\Iissouri 15 17 17 Montana 13 3 Nebraska 6 8 8 Nevada 13 3 New Hampsliire 2 4 4 New Jersey 8 10 10 New York 34 36 36 Nortli Carolina 9 11 11 North Dakota 1 3 3 Oiiio 21 23 22 1 Oregon 2 4 3 1 Pennsylvania 30 32 32 Rhode Island 2 4 4 South Carolina 7 9 9 South Dakota 2 4 4 Tennessee 10 12 12 Texas 13 15 15 Vermont 2 4 4 Virginia 10 12 12 Wasliington ...2 4 4 West Virginia 4 6 6 Wisconsin 10 12 Wyoming. 13 3 12 Totals 356 444 144 277 "23* The popular vote was— Cleveland, Democrat, 5.545,227; Harrison, Republicao, 6,126,418; Weaver, Populist, 1,125,842; Bidwell, Prohibitionist, 262,386. (41) 42 PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788. ELECTORAL VOTE OF 1888. Basis of 154,325- States. Alabama , . Arkansas 5 California 6 Colorado I Connecticut. ... 4 Delaware i Florida ........ 2 Georgia 10 Illinois 20 Indiana 13 Iowa II Kansas 7 Kentucky ii Louisiana 6 Maine 4 Maryland. . . . Massachusetts Michigan. . . . Minnesota... . Mississippi . . Missouri 14 Nebraska 3 Nevada I New Hampshire 2 New Jersey. ... 7 New York 34 North Carolina. 9 Ohio 21 Oregon I Pennsylvania . ..28 Rhode Island. . 2 South Carolina. 7 Tennessee 10 Texas 11 Vermont 2 Virginia 10 West Virginia. . 4 Wisconsin 9 Votes. 10 7 8 3 6 3 4 12 22 15 13 9 13 14 13 7 9 16 5 3 4 9 36 II 23 3 30 4 9 12 13 4 12 6 Republi Benj. Harrison, Ind. Democrat. 5 3 4 36 23 3 30 4 II Levi P. Morton, N. Y. 5 3 4 36 23 3 30 4 Grover Cleveland, N. Y. 10 13 Allen G. Thurman, Ohio. 10 7 Totals.... 325 401 233 The Popular Vote. — Harrison, 5,438,157- 626 — 18 State.?; Prohibition, 250,157; Labor, 9 9 12 12 13 13 4 . , 12 12 6 6 II 22>?> 168 168 -20 States ; Cleveland, 5,53S. 50,624. PRESIDEXT MAKING SINCE 1788. ELECTORAL VOTE OF 1884. 43 Democrat. Republican. Grover Thos. A. James G. John A. Basis of Cleveland, Hendricks, Blaine, Logan. States. 154,325 Votes. N. Y. Ind. Maine. 111. Alabama 8 lo lo lo Arkansas 5 7 7 7 California 6 8 .. .. g g Colorado i 3 .. ., ^ ^ Connecticut 4 6 6 6 Delaware i 3 3 3 Florida 2 4 4 4 Georgia 10 12 12 12 Illinois 20 22 ., ,. 22 22 Iwfl'ana 13 15 15 i^ Jowa II 13 .. .. 13 13 Kansas 7 9 .. .. g Kentucky 11 13 13 13 Louisiana 6 8 8 8 Maine 4 6 .. .. 6 6 Maryland 6 8 8 8 Massachusetts .. 12 14 .. .. 14 j^^ Michigan u 13 .. ,, i^ j^ Minnesota 5 7 .. ., 7 « Mississippi 7 9 9 9 Missouri 14 16 16 16 Nebraska 3 5 , r ,- Nevada i 3 .. .*; 3 3 New Hampshire 2 4 . . . . 4 ^ New Jersey. ... 7 9 9 9 New York 34 36 36 36 North Carolina. 9 11 ji n Ohio 21 23 .. .. 23 23 Oregon i 3 .. ^ ^ ^ ~ Pennsylvania. . .28 30 .. .. 30 ^o Rhode Island . . 2 4 . . . . 4 a South Carolina. 7999 Tennessee 10 12 12 12 Texas II 13 13 13 Vermont 2 4 .. ,. 4 4 Virginia 10 12 12 12 West Virginia.. 4666 Wisconsin 9 n ., _ jj jj Totals 325 401 219 219 182 182 Popular Vote.— Cleveland, 4,911,017— States, 20; Blaine, 4,848,334— States, 18; Butler, Greenback-Labor, 133,825; St. John, Prohibition, 151,809: Scattering, 11,362. 44 PRESIDEXT MAKING SINCE 1788. PREVIOUS ELECTORAL VOTES. Republican. 1 880, Democrat. James A. Garfield, O., 214 Winfield S. Hancock, N. Y., 155 Chester A. Arthur, N. Y., 214 Wm. H. English, Ind., 155 Total electoral vote, 369 ; 38 States. Popular Vote.— Garfield, 4,449,053—19 States; Hancock, 4,442,035— 19 States; Weaver, Greenback, 308,578 ; Prohibition, 10,305 ; American, 707 ; Scattering, 989. Republican. 1 876. Democrat. R. B. Hayes, Ohio, 185 S. J. Tilden, N. Y., 184 W. A. Wheeler, N. Y., 185 T. A. Hendricks, Ind., 184 Total electoral vote, 369; 38 States. Popular Vote.— Hayes, 4,033,950—21 States; Tilden, 4,284,885—17 States; Cooper, Greenback, 81,740; Smith, Prohibition, 9,522; American, 539; Scattering, 14,715- Republican. 1 872. Democrat. Ulysses S. Grant, 111., 286 Horace Greeley Henry Wilson, Mass., 286 B. Gratz Brow* Total electoral vote, 366; 37 States. Popular Vote.— The death of Mr. Greeley before the electoral count caused the scattering of his 66 votes among various candidates. The votes of Louisiana and Arkansas were not counted on account of fraudulent returns. Grant, 3,597,071—31 States; Greeley, 2,834,079—6 States; O'Connor, Labor, 29,408; Black, Prohibition, 5,608. Republican. 1 868. Democrat. Ulysses S. Grant, 111., 214 Horatio Seymour, N. Y., 80 Schuyler Colfax, Ind., 214 Francis P. Blair, Mo., 80 Total electoral vote, 317; 34 States; Mississippi, Texas and Virginia still in rebellion, and not voting. Popular Vote. — Grant, 3,015,071 — 26 States; Seymour, 2,709,613 — 8 States. Republican. 1 864. Democrat. Abraham Lincoln, 111., 212 Geo. B. McClellan, N. J., 21 Andrew Johnson, Tenn., 212 Geo. H. Pendleton, Ohio, 21 Total electoral vote, 314; not voting, 11 States in rebellion. Popular Vote. — Lineoln, 2,216,067 — 22 States; McClellan, 1,808,725 — 3 States. PRESIDENT MAKING, SINCE 1788. 45 Reptiblican. i860. Democrat. Abraham Lincoln, 111., 180 Stephen A. Douglas, III,, 12 Hannibal Hamlin Me., 180 ' H. V. Johnson, Ga., 12 Jno. C. Breckinridge, Ky,, 72 J. Lane, Oregon, 72 Constitutional Union. John Bell, Tenn., 39 Edward Everett, Mass., 39 Total electoral vote, 303 ; 33 States. Popular Vote.— Lincoln, 1,866,352—17 States, N.J. divided; Douglas, I075.157— I State, N. J., divided; Breckinridge, 845,763—11 States; Bell, 589,581—3 States. Democrat. 1856. Republican. James Buchanan, Pa., 174 Jno. C. Fremont, Cal., 114 Jno. C. Breckinridge, Ky., 174 William L. Dayton, N. V., 114 American. Millard Fillmore, N. Y., 8 A. J. Donelson, Tenn., 8 Total electoral vote, 296; 31 States. Popular Vote.— Buchanan, 1,838,169— 19 States; Fremont, 1,341,264— II States; Fillmore, 874,534—1 State. Democrat. 1 85 2, Whig. Franklin Pearce, N. H., 254 Winfield Scott, Va., 42 William R. King, Ala., 254 Wm. A. Graham, N. €., 42 Total electoral vote, 296; 31 States. Popular Vote.— Pearce, 1,601,474—27 States; Scott, 1,386,578— 4 States; Hale, 156,149. ^^^'k- 1848. Democrat. Zachary Taylor, La., 163 Lewis Cass, Mich., 127 Millard Fillmore, N. ¥., 163 Wm. O. Butler, Ky., 127 Total electoral vote, 290; 30 States. Popular Vote. — Taylor, 1,360,101—15 States; Cass, 1,220,544—15 States; Van Buren, N. Y., Free-soil Dem., 291,263. Defnocrat. 1844. ^/^^V. James K. Polk, Tenn., 170 Henry Clay, Ky., ^ 105 George M. Dallas, Pa., 170 Theo. Frelinghuysen, N. J., 105 Total electoral vote, 275 ; 26 States. 46 PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788. Popular Vote.— Polk, 1,337,243—15 States; Clay, 1,299,068—11 States; Birney, 62,300. Whig. 1 840. Democrat. William Henry Harrison, Ohio, 234 Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 60 John Tyler, Va., 234 R. M. Johnson, Ky., 48 Total electoral vote, 294; 26 States. Popular Vote.— Harrison, 1,275,017—19 States; Van Buren, 1,128,702 — 7 Stales; Birney, 7,059. Democrat. 1836. '"' Whig. Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 170 Wm. H. Harrison, O., 73 R. M. Johnson, Ky., 147 ' F. Granger, N. Y., 77 Total electoral vote, 294 ; 26 States. Popular Vote. — Van Buren, 761,549 — 15 States; Harrison, 7 States; White, 2 States; Webster, i State; Mangum, I State— 236,656 votes. Democrat, 1 832. Nat. Repziblican. Andrew Jackson, Tenn. , 219 Henry Clay, Ky., 49 Martin Van Buren, N. Y., 189 J. Sergeant, Pa., 49 Anti-Maso7i. William Wirt, Va., 7 Amos EUmaker, Pa., 7 Total electoral vote, 288. Popular Vote.— Andrew Jackson, 687,502; Henry Clay, 530,189; Wil- liam Wirt, 33,108, Democrat. 1 828. Nat. Repiiblica7i. Andrew Jackson, Tenn., 178 Jno. Q. Adams, Mass., 83 Jno. C. Calhoun, S. C, 171 Richard Rush, Pa., ^Z Total electoral vote, 261. From the time of the disputed election, which resulted in the choice of John Adams, the popular vote began to be regarded as of importance. Popular Vote.— Jackson, 647,231— States, 15 ; Adams, 509,097— States. 9 Republican. 1824. Andrew Jackson, Tenn., 99 ^ \t"\?'n^^'"r\ ^r'"- ' ^'^ > For President. W. H. Crawford, Ga., 41 C Henry Clay, Ky., 37 J Jno^C. Calhoun S. C, 182 |^^^ V.-President. N. Sanford, N. Y., 30 j Total electoral vote, 261. PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788. 47 There being no choice for President under the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution, which requires that a can- didate shall have a majority of all the electoral votes, the election was thrown into the House. In the contest in the House, Clay, who was out of the fight, threw his strength, or as much of it as he could control, to Adams, which gave him 13 States, as against 7 for Jackson and 4 for Crawford. Though the election of Adams was perfectly regular and constitutional, it forced the liberal and strict schools of in- terpreters wide apart, and the latter, carrying their fight to the country in the shape of a rebuke to those Representa- tives who had slaughtered Jackson, soon had the vantage ground. Republican. * 1820 James Monroe, Va,, 231 Daniel D. Tompkins, N. Y., 218 Total electoral vote, 235. The Missouri vote was disputed; and New Hampshire gave one vote to J. Q. Adams. Republican. 1816. Federal. James Monroe, Va., 183 Rufus King, N. Y., 34 Daniel D. Tompkins, N. Y., 183 No nom. for V.-P. Total electoral vote, 221. Republican. 1812. Fed. or Clinton Dem. James Madison, Va., 12S De Witt Clinton, N. Y., 89 Elbridge Gerry, Mass., 131 jared Ingersoll, Pa., Z6 Total electoral vote, 218. Republican. 1808. Federal. ■ James Madison, Va., 122 C. C. Pinckney, S. C, 47 George Clinton, N. Y., 113 Rufus King, N. Y., 47 Total electoral vote, 176. Republican. 1804. Federal. Thomas Jefferson, Va., 162 C. C. Pinckney, S. C, 14 George Clinton, N. Y., 162 Rufus King, N. Y., 14 Total electoral vote, 176. 48 PRESIDENT MAKING SINCE 1788. This was the first National election which distinguished between nominees for President and Vice-President^ under Twelfth Amendment to Federal Constitution. Repiiblica7i. I'homas Jefferson, Va., *]2) Aaron Burr, N. Y., 73 [800. Federal. John Adams, Mass., 65 C. C. Pinckney, S. C, 64 As there was, up till this time, no distinction between nominees for President and Vice-President — the one having the highest number of votes being the President — and Jeffer^ son and Burr having each 73 votes, the election went to the House, where a prolonged and bitter struggle ensued, re- sulting in the choice of Jefferson. This dispute led to the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. Federal. John Adams, Mass., 71 Thos. Pinckney, Md., 59 Total electoral vote, 138. Federal. George Washington, Va., 132 John Adams, Mass., 77 Total electoral vote. 15- 796. 792. 788. Republican. Thomas Jefferson, Va., 68 Aaron Burr, N. Y., 30 Republican. Geo. Clinton^ N. Y., 50 George Washington was nominated by a caucus of the Continental Congress. The State Legislatures chose elec- tors for President and Vice-President on the first Wednes-. day of January, 1789. These electors voted on the first Wed- nesday in February, casting 69 votes for Washington as President, and 34 for John Adams as Vice-President. Washington was sworn into office by Chancellor Living- stone on April 29, 1789. PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. Political parties are inseparable from republican in- stitutions. They are the birth of free thought and ex- pression. If at all times they are the birth of higli and noble sentiment and have for a purpose something definite and useful, they are both a necessity and blessing. If, on the contrary, they find birth in ignorance, fanaticism or sheer arbitrariness, and in their exercise of power use only low and brutish forces, they become elements of danger, and are not to be classed as among the welcome political energies. Happily for our free institutions, volcanic parties, those of quick rise and fierce outburst, those that bear on their foreheads their own danger signal, are of short life. This is so for two great reasons. First, a high state of effer- vescence soon exhausts itself, and a high state of explos- iveness generally leads to a speedy bursting of the bands of organization. Second, the sober intelligence of tlie country, the property instinct, the solid business interests, the peace and order sentiment, will not, for any long time, tolerate threats of danger or intolerable disturbance. There are therefore philosopliers who look upon parties of an}^ and every kind as essential. Their argument is that no matter what may be tlie aim of a part}^, nor how narrow and fanatical, or even dangerous, it may be, it is better that it should find the rebuke and correction which (49) 50 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. an outlet affords, than smoulder and consume like some internal fire, and thus prolong apprehension of irruption. This argument shows a high appreciation of the corrective forces in society, and a strong reliance on the conservatism of our institutions. And it has the historic fact to sup- port it, that as yet excessive partyism has somewhat re- sembled violent disease, and run a swift course without detriment to a resolute constitution. Washington's opin- ion of political parties was this : " From the natural tendency of governments of a popular character, it is certain there will alwaj^s be enough of party spirit for salutary purposes. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, b}^ force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume." Names and Drift of Parties. Party names are frequently misnomers, in so far as tliey reflect the principles and objects of parties. Some have been assumed hastily, by force of outward circumstances, and without reference to preconceived purposes. Others have been forced upon new political organizations in a spirit of the ludicrous, or as a likeness of something fa- miliar, or as an expression of intense enmity. Thus *' Whig " came into use in America, as a distinctive and honorable party name, for no other reason than because it was familiar and suited an existing fancy. In its colonial sense it was a convenient set-off to the title " Tor}^" but in its truly national sense, and as the designation of the successor to the National Republican party, or as descrip- tive of one wlio favored internal improvements, a protect- ive tariff, and a strong central government, or as the op- PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 51 posite of " Democrat," it had no significance whatever. '' Whig " was originally the word " Whiggamore," a mem- ber of a body of insurgents, carters and others, who marched from the southwest of Scotland upon Edinburgh, in 1648, in opposition to the compromise with Charles I. Their cry of Whiggam, used in driving their horses, gave them the title of " Whiggamore raiders." The name, in the contracted form of Whig^ passed, in a spirit of deri- sion to the Presbyterian rebels of the west of Scotland. After the restoration, 1660, it was applied to the Round- heads or Parliamentarians, as opposed to the Cavaliers. Still a nickname, and opposed to that other nickname, " tory," it came to designate the liberal, or country, party of England, a use that was continued till the title " Tory " was lost in that of "Conservative," after 1832. " Tory " itself was an English party nickname for a hundred and fifty years, and while it covered those who sustained the court and the divine right of kings, its orig- inal use by the Whigs was to confuse all Tories with the tories or outlaws, inhabiting the Irish bogs. So the word "locofoco" as a designation of Democrat, and hence of the party, sprang into popular use, after 1835, through the incident of re-lighting the extinguished gas in Tammany Hall b}^ means of friction matches, then a new device, and called "locofocos" The title "Know Nothing," was meaningless as to the principles of the American party, and only indirectly perpetuates the fact tliat it grew out of a set of secret societies. But a greater anomaly as to political parties is that where they exist for any great lengtk of time they fre- quently cross their principles, and sometimes drift en- tirely away from the intentions of their founders. In such instances, where original principles are lost sight of, 52 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. the party name becomes a mere shibboleth, and blind partyism usurps intelligent adherence to principles. A party in such a strait is more of an obstruction and menace than a purifying, progressive and exalting agency, and it may well be questioned whether it is any longer entitled to the use of an ancient and honorable name. Early Parties. The Colonial period could develop no national parties as we now know them, for the colonies were disjointed. But as they began to adhere over the question of tax- ation without representation, two orders of thought arose, one of which favored the right of the British parliament to tax America, and the other opposed it. These same orders of thought existed in England, the former being designated by Tory and the latter by Whig, and these names were readil}^ transferred to America. Tlie Tory remained the fast friend of English sovereignty on our soil. The Whig, at first only an opponent of parlia- mentary claims, drifted into a Colonial unionist without separation from the mother country, and finally into a unionist with separation. The Declaration of Independence and the Revolution- ary war brought the Tory party under odium and left it without a mission on American soil. Its members be- came enemies of the country, and even traitors. As a party it met a speedy and deserved death. The j^nn- ciples of the Whig party became overwhelming, but its name grew to be traditional, through the almost universal use, according to locality or fancy, of such equivalents as "Popular Party," "Party of Independence," "American Party," " Liberty Party," " Patriots," etc. The Whig idea both brought about the Confederation PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 53 and forced its abandonment. It equally substituted the Constitution for the Articles, and Union for Confederacy. The Tory title being a thing of the past, there was little use for its antithesis. Whig. The dominant idea under the new constitution was how to unite the states more firmly, and how to provide for peace and war. This was federalism, or whigism under changed auspices, and in a new political role. Whigs lost their name entirely in the title Federalists. The Federal party became the national party, and in a certain sense the nation, for as yet Anti- Federalism had not become coherent, had accepted even what it opposed, so as not to jeopardize the experiment of Union. Thus Federalism, which was responsible for the new government, naturally sought its strength and per- petuity, by throwing all doubtful constructions of the Constitutions in favor of the central authority ; that is, it interpreted the Constitution openly and liberally, saw in it a spirit as well as a letter, looked upon government under it as a creation with powers and functions to be questioned only by the people at large. Now that the experiment of popular government had been fidly launched, and the fact of a Union was no longer in danger, the Anti-Federal spirit of the day began to take shape. It assumed the negative of the proposition of government as laid down by Federalism, and inclined to such a construction of the Constitution as would throw" all doubt in favor of the States ; that is, it interpreted the instrument closely, regarding it as an inelastic code, and government under it as simply an aggregate of powers with which the States had parted, and which they alone in their sovereign capacity were at liberty to ques- tion, or, if need be, recall. These may be regarded rather as schools of thought 54 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. tlian as active and antagonistic political parties, yet they laid the foundation of subsequent parties, coherent in organization and with contra-distinguishing titles. While both schools were united as to the policy of a protective tariff, the propriety of honoring Washington with a second term of office, and in general a scheme of funding the national debt, there was an unconscious drift apart upon the question of open or close construction of the Constitution, the trend of the liberal interpreters, or Federals, being more and more toward a fuller exercise of powers on the part of the national government, and of the close interpreters toward the doctrine of State rights. The adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which were regarded as in the nature of a declarative bill of rights, so disarmed all Anti- Federal opposition to the instrument, as to render the title " Anti-Federal " a party misnomer. Jefferson felt that it was a perpetual reminder of opposition to the fact of government, and that if ever the varying, and often discordant, sentiments it represented were to be crystalized, some new and more appropriate name must be adopted. His opportunity soon came. Aglow with the spirit of the French Revolution and the fires of the French Republic, his admiration, on his return to tliis country, became infectious, even assuming the fantastic form of dress and manner. The Federals, fearing the in- troduction of the ungovernable, leveling and communis- tic spirit of France, opposed such threatened innova- tions, and became more coherent than ever as a party. In proportion, Jefferson and his admirers grew warmer, more united, more aggressive. Only a name and banner were needed to complete a formidable organization. These the genius of Jefferson supplied. His party should, first MlI^LARD F1I.I.MORE. Franklin Pierce. James Buckanan. Abraham Lincoln. Andrew Johnson. Ulysses S. Grant. EUTHERFORD B. HAYES. James A. Gakfield. Chester a. Arthur. Grover Cleveland. Benjamin Harrison. PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 57 of all, be " Republican." That would set it off sharply against FederalisQi. In order to group all elements within it, it should be " Democratic." What therefore so com- prehensive, popular and imposing as " Democratic — Re- publican," for that because the new party name, symbol of all opposition to Federal, crystalization of everything Anti-Federal. Then began partyism as we have known it ever since. The Federals denounced Democratic Republicans as Jac- obins, held their pretensions up to contempt, and so ridi- culed their compound title as to force abandonment of its first part, leaving only the word " Republican " as the dis- tinctive and popular name. Nor was abuse wholly on the side of the Federals. The Republicans countered bit- terly, denouncing their opponents as aristocrats and mon- archists, and stirring all the fires of partisan animosity in tlie bosom of the masses. Such was the antagonism that Washington openly complained of it as a substitution of unjust suspicion and personal antipathy for the old spirit of friendly compromise. As already hitimated this alignment of parties did not : affect Washington's second election, though it brought the wrath of the Republicans on him and all Federals for their policy of neutrality between England and France. Jefferson left Washington's cabinet, and retired to his Virginia plantation to further develop, by writing and plan, the new Republican party of which he was the ac- knowledged founder. His master hand became visible in promoting attacks on the administration. The Republi- cans opposed indirect taxes with direct taxes, the liability of state to suit with the eleventh amendment to the Con- stitution, the Jay treaty with denunciation of Washington as an embezzler and usuiper. C8 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. The expiration of Washington's second term brought the two parties into square contentions for that national supremacy indicated by the choice of a presidential candi- date. Federal and Republican Parties. In the national convention of 1796, the Federals, with John Adams as candidate, and with no platform, except the claim to represent Washington's policy of peace, neu- trality, finance, progress and safety, won a victory over the Republicans, with Thomas Jefferson as candidate, and with no platform except the claim to economy, enlarged liberty, rights of man and rights of states. But this vic- tory was rendered incomplete and partially barren by the choice of a Republican Vice President in the person of Thomas Jefferson, the election at that time being held through the state legislatures, and the candidate receiving next to the highest number of votes becoming the Vice President. During Adams' administration the Republicans gained ground by their opposition to the Alien and Sedition laws* But their most substantial gain was that indirect one which grew out of division in the Federal ranks. Adams had estranged such advisors as Hamilton, and had ignored his entire cabinet in his change of policy toward France. Though nominated for the Presidency by the Federals in 1800, the Republicans won a victory with Jefferson and Burr, the contest between these two being settled in the House of Representatives. The Republican victory was nothing in its bearing on party lines as compared with the permanent breach in the Federal ranks. The strength and glory of Federalism seemed to have expended itself in placing the government PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 59 on a firm basis, in giving it such power as would make it respected at home and abroad, in restraining French Re- publican influence and in establishing a permanent policy of neutrality. The unanimity and boldnesss which had been equal to the solution of most intricate financial problems, to the provision of ample revenue, and to the building up of an enduring national credit, were in strange contrast with its divisions and weaknesses at the time the Republicans won their first national victory. Jefferson was supported by Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress. He mapped a vigorous policy for his party, and in his choice of of&cials, showed little mercy for the Federals. The act repealing the establish- ment of circuit courts drove the Federals from their last hold on the government, and they never recovered their lost ground. Though they largely typed the wealth, in- tellect and culture of the country, there seemed to be no escape from the blow of 1800. In 1804 they were van- quished in every state except Connecticut, Delaware and part of Maryland. Jefferson adroitly turned every new situation to popular account, and as he had the entire con- fidence of the masses, he kept his party on a happy van- tage ground with a vigor that was well-nigh autocratic. He gave to Republicanism a decided afiirmative in action, and kept the Federals on a distractive defensive but little removed from the sharp agony that presaged a not dis- tant death. The unpopular Embargo Act of 1807 proved to be a Republican boomerang, by which the Federals profited to the extent of greatly reducing Republican majorities for Madison as President and in the House. But threats of war with England, and finally the war of 1812, served to render Madison's reelection sure. Just here a notable 60 change came over the spirit of the Republican party. The ordeal of war had taught it the necessity of doing many things for the safety of the country it had before re- pudiated as Federal measures. If Federalism was dying, Republicanism was honoring it by occupying its ground on most of the questions relating to national preservation. While dire emergency was the excuse, the same excuse had not been accepted as g®od Federal logic. But more than this, a new school of thought had sprung up within Republican ranks. It was critical, independent, largely Federal in that it found in the preservation of our com- merce grounds for opposition to the war, progressive, in that it favored internal improvement, liberal in that it ob- jected to the Republican idea of strict construction. It did not dread the title Jacobin, and was rather pleased with the title Democrat. Indeed, as Clintonian Demo- crats, it made its presence and strength felt in the na- tional election of 1812, when it nominated De Witt Clin- ton for the presidency, which nomination was accepted by the Federals as the best that then offered. President Madison felt that the peace of 1814, meaning less though it was, was a narrow escape for him and the Republican party. The war, unpopular though it was, had proven another nail in the Federal coffin. Inflamed partisanslup formed in tlie Hartford convention a weapon botli keen for cutting and blunt for beating. The Federal decay was thenceforth rapid. The party nominated Rufus King for the presidency in 1816, but carried onl}^ Massa chusetts, Connecticut and Delaware. Upon the election of Monroe, in 1816, came what was called "The era of good feeling." Organized Feder;.! opposition had nearly ceased. The Republican House or- ganized by the unaniiiious election of Henry Clay as PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 61 Speaker. He was one of the liberal and advanced Re- publicans, able to carry his party with him as to protec- tion, internal improvement, and even the establishment of a national bank, all favorite Federal measures. Calhoun belonged to his school of thought. President Monroe favored it. The old, or strict construction, school of Re- publicans looked with alarm on the daily growing strength, number and boldness of the new element in their ranks. The movement, so ably led, so aggressive, so fully sup- ported by Federal aid as to absorb the remains of that party and stamp its extinction as complete, proved to be the germ of a new party, whose growth was hastened by the slavery discussions over the entry of Missouri as a State in 1818-20, and by the distinct affirmation of the protective doctrine in the same years. The latter doctrine fairly divided the Republican ranks. There were really no political parties in 1820, Monroe being chosen President without opposition, and without even a nomination by the Republicans. In the 16th Con- gress, Nov. 1820, Clay resigned the Speakership of the House. The election of his successor showed that the new and liberal wing of tlie Republican party was now tlie stronger, for Taylor of New York, the successful candi- date, was equally, if not further, advanced than Clay in his advocacy of a protective tariff and internal improvements, and in his opposition to the extension of slavery in the territories. During Monroe's second term, 1821-25, the contention between the old school element of the Republican party and the new, or liberal, school, grew bitter, and the breach rapidly widened. Monroe broke with the liberals, and opposed internal improvement. The contention reached down to the masses. The election of Clay as Speaker of 62 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESEKT. tlie House in 1823, was heralded as a significant victory of the Liberal Republican wing, which now took the affirmative of all national questions. Clay had already foreshadowed the " Monroe Doctrine," and Monroe swung back sufficiently to the liberal side to favor, in his message of 1823, the tariff act of 1824, and a plan of internal improvement, thus emphasizing what became known as " The American System." In the national election of 182-1, known as the "Scrub race," the two Republican wings ran separate presidential candidates, the Liberals supporting Clay and Adams, and the strict-constructionists Crawford and Jackson. The election went to the House, and John Adams was chosen. This result practically disrupted the Republican party and sounded its death knell. It was now to find a grave with its deceased antagonist, the Federal party, which it had outlived for but a few years. They both died of the same disease, inanition due to violent disruption. Whig and Democratic Parties. The political movement wdiich, as we have just seen, had ripened within the Republican ranks, and had broken them in twain, was now ready for separate identity under a na- tional name. But a proper title was not easy to be found at first. The right name must be evolved by the ferment of the situation. Adams, as was to be expected, entered on his administration with the Crawford adherents dead against him. These belonged to the "straightest sect" of strict constructionists. It was but reasonable for Adams to expect the support of Jackson and his followers, for all these had mostl}^ inclined to the old Federal ideas of pro- tection and internal improvement, and in this respect had PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 6^ cooperated witli Clay in bringing about revolution in the Republican ranks. But Jackson was embittered by his defeat by Adams, and he and his forces joined those of Crawford in opposi- tion to Adams' administration. Adams had made Clay his Secretary of State. This opened the way for charges of collusion between Adams and Clay, and much crimination and recrimination followed, serving to unite more closely tlie followers of Crawford and Jackson, as well as those of Adams and Clay. President Adams, in both his inaugural and first mes- sage to Congress, mapped a set of principles which, as to protection, internal improvement and liberal construction of the Constitution, answered as a permanent bond of agreement between his own followers and those of Clay. Thus solidified, the party, now virtually a separate one, with distinctive principles, and with John Adams as its candidate for President in 1828, adopted for its name that of "National Republican," though it passed through that campaign under the general designation of " Adams Men." The title " National Republican " was comprehensive and excellently chosen, for it not only showed that the new party had germinated within the old Republican ranks, but that it had assumed independent being as a liberal, or na- tional interpreter of the Constitution. But accurate and full of meaning as the title was, it was bound, by that strange fatality which sometimes attends party names, to be of short duration, for in a few years it was pushed aside to make room for the meaningless title of " Whig." The Crawford and Jackson followers were united only in their opposition to the National Republicans. No doubt they would have perpetuated the title of Republican in the campaign of 1828, but for the fact that Crawford was 64 PAllTlES, PAST AND PRESENT. sick, and it required the tremendous personalism of Jack- son to hold the two opposing wings of the party together. This he did by becoming a candidate for the Presidency against Adams, and by dropping the title Republican al- together, his followers becoming known as "Jackson Men," in contradistinction to ''Adams Men." But as the title " Adams Men " only temporarily usurped that of " National Republican," so when it became neces- sary to get rid of the personalism of Jackson, the title " Jackson Men " began to give away to something else. Men like Calhoun and others, wdio never cared for the name Republican, preferred to be spoken of as " Demo- crats." The title " Democrat" could not, however, be at once projected on the party, for Jackson's personalism w^as yet too strong, and if his own name was to be lost as a party shibboleth, he preferred that it should be swamped by a re- vival of the old Republican name, rather than by the new name of Democrat, especially since the latter had been proposed by the ultra wing of strict-constructionists. The time when " Democrat " began to have meaning in a party sei:se, and as comprehensive of " Jackson Men," or of Republican, and as expressive of definite principles, was in 1831, preparatory to the presidential election of 1832. Yet even in that election, the transition to " Demo- crat " was not complete, for the Jackson, or Republican, ticket was thus headed " Democrat -Repvhlican ticket for President in 1S32^ Andrew Jackson.'' While this compro- mise title showed the elimination of Jackson's personal- ism to a certain extent, it showed also that the time was not yet ripe for the entire dropping of the old word "Re- publican" and the complete substitution of the new word " Democrat." This substitution was not completed until 1832-33. PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 65 In 1832, the ticket of tlie National Republican party was headed, ^^ National Republican Candidate for President in 1832^ Henry Clay^' thus showing that the title had come into full recognition prior to that time. In the national campaign of 1832, the National Repub- licans, with Clay as their nominee, defined their principles as tariff, internal improvement, question of removing the Cherokee Indians, renewal of United States Bank Charter. The Democrat-Republican published no declar- ation of principles, they being agitated within either by the grave question of nullification, or by serious divisions respecting the tariff. In the former, Jackson scored a sig- nal triumph, after his election. Respecting the latter, Clay effected one of his disastrous compromises, by accepting the ten year scaling tariff of 1832-42. Jackson's financial policy, especially that relating to the destruction of the United States Bank, together with dis- satisfaction respecting the workings of the sliding-scale tariff, intensified opposition to his second administration, and to his party, which had by this time adopted the single term " Democrat." Party antagonism was heightened by the bursting on the country of the panic of 1837. During the latter part of Jackson's administration, the title " Whig " had come into general use as a substitute for that of Na- tional Republican, and as a party designation it was com- plete in the National campaign of 18 J6. In order to head off the strict State -rights Democrats of the South, who had early nominated H. L. White, of Tennessee, for the Presidency, the forces of Martin Van Buren, whom Jackson desired should be his successor, met in popular convention in Baltimore in May, 1835, nomi- nated Van Buren for President, and set forth a platform, QQ PARTIES, PAST AKD PRESENT. tlie most important plank in wliich was adherence to gold and silver as a circulating medium. The members of this convention were not designated as Democrats, but as " Locofocos," a term which had sprung into popular use the year before, and which grew out of an incident at Tammany Hall, New York, in which the lights were put out during a Democratic meeting, and re- lit by means of locofoco matches, then a new invention. Thus "Locofoco" and "Whig," coming into popular use at nearly the same time, were fair set-offs to each, other, and one was as meaningless as the other. In this campaign of 1836, the Whigs, Anti-Masons, and some other opponents of Van Buren nominated William Henry Harrison, of Ohio, for president. Van Buren was elected. During the closing days of Jackson's second administration a new and hitherto silent force, known as the National Anti-Slavery Society, incorporated in 1833, began to make itself felt in a political way. By means of lectures and literature it had given offence to the South, and a strenuous effort was made to deny it the use of the United States mails. But Congress was not yet found ripe for so hazardous an experiment. Van Buren felt himself to be the executor of Jackson's financial policy, but the crisis of 1837, and a violent fac- tion of his own party, calling themselves "Conservatives," caused the 25th Congress to defeat some of his pet schemes of finance. This Congress, too, was the scene of Jong debates over the question of Federal control of slavery, a question that entered nearly every subsequent congress till 1863. In 1840 the Whigs nominated William Henry Harrison for president, without a platform. The Democrats renomi- nated Martin Van Buren, with a lengthy platform, wliich PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 67 is curious as serving to shape Democratic policy for a long time, if not even to the present day. Its gist was (1) The Federal Government is one of limited powers. (2) The Constitution does not confer on the Government the right to carry on a system of internal improvement. (3) Nor to assume the debts of the States contracted for internal improvement. (4) Justice and sound policy forbids tlie Government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or one section to the injury of another. (5) Economy urged. (6) Congress has no power to charter a United States Bank. (7) No power to interfere with the domestic institutions of the States. (8) Government money must be separated from banking insti- tutions. (9) This country is an asylum for the oppressed of all nations. The Liberty Party. During this campaign, the Abolition or Liberty party first openly appeared in the political arena, with James G. Birney, as its candidate for President, and witli a plat- form favoring the abolition of slaveiy in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories ; stoppage of the inter- state slave trade ; and opposition to slavery to the fullest extent of all Constitutional powers. General Harrison was elected, but died April 4, 1841, leaving Tyler as his successor. Then came an era of antagonism between the President and the Whig majority in Congress, pending which Tyler was excommunicated by his party. The Whigs were greatly demoralized by Tyler's defection, and it was only with the greatest diffi- culty, and after repeated modifications, that they Fccured Presidential sanction of their favorite measure, the tariff act of 1842. Clay became so disgusted with attacks upon GS PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. him, and with public life in general, tliat he resigned from the Senate. This was a terrible blow to the Whigs, for in Clay's action they had lost their recognized leader. They lost the Congressional elections of 1842, and were furtlier demoralized by divisions over a policy suited to the questions of slavery and Texas annexation. In the campaign of 1844, the three existing political parties were in the field. The Liberty party nominated for president, James G. Birney, of Michigan, and adopted a platform which was explicit in its denunciation of slavery and tlie slave trade. The Whigs nominated Henry Clay for president, on a platform declaring for well regulated currency ; tariff for revenue, but discriminating in favor of domestic labor ; distribution of proceeds of sales of public lands; single term for the presidency ; refoim of executive usurpation. The Democrats tried to nominate Van Buren, but his defeat was accomplished by the adoption of the two-thirds rule for securing a nomination, a practice that has held ever since in Democratic national conventions. The nominee became James K. Polk, of Tennessee, on a plat- form affirming that of 1840, with the addition that Oregon and Texas ought to be annexed. The Whigs fought the battle on the lines of protection. It was a close battle, and would have been won for Clay, but for the fact that he unwisely undertook to conciliate southern Democrats by a letter favoring postponed action on the question of Texas annexation. Polk was elected, and with him a Democratic Congress. The leading party measures of Polk's administration were the Mexican war, which the Whigs could not, in a spirit of patriotism, bitterly oppose; the settlement of the Oregon boundary, in which the Whigs came to the rescue PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 69 of a Democi-atic minority ; llie disappointing tariff act of 1846, passed in defiance of Democratic campaign prom- ises not to disturb the tariff of 1842; and the historic " Wihnot Proviso," whose introduction marked the begin- ning of a wide split in the Democratic party. Free Soil Democrats. In 1848, the Democrats nominated for president, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, on a phatform affirming that of 1844, and adding congratulations over the results of the Mexican war ; denouncing a tariff, except for revenue ; hailing the tariff of 1846 as a substitute for that of 1842. The Whigs nominated General Zachary Taylor, of Louisiana, without a platform, but with a subsequent series of ratification resolutions endorsing the then well- known Whig principles of protection, etc. And now appeared tlie new political force foreshadowed by the introduction in Congress of the Wilmot Proviso. The Democratic position on the slavery question had for some time been too ultra and threatening to suit tlie views of a strong minority of the party. This minority could not brook the doctrine that the Government had no power to regulate slavery in the Territories. This doctrine was put to a test on the floor of the Convention that nominated Cass for president, and the rabid pro-slavery sentiment l)revailed. Thereupon, the Democrats who favored Gov- ernment interference with slavery in the Territories, or in other words, those who opposed the extension of slavery to the Territories, resolved to meet in Convention and nominate a ticket of their own. They so met at Buf- falo, in August, 1848, and nominated Martin Van Buren, of New York, for president, and Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, for vice president. They called them- 70 PARTIICS, PAST AND PRESENT. selves *'Free Soil Democrats," and they embraced two factions, one locally known as " Barnburners," opposed to the extension of slavery in the Territories, the other simply opposed to further agitation of slavery, and locally known as *' Hunkers." They adopted a lengthy platform, seeking free soil for a free people ; announcing that Congress had no more authority to make a slave than to make a king; affirming the ordi- nance of 1787 and the Jeffersonian doctrine that after 1800 no slavery should exist in the Territories; favoring internal improvements , proclaiming the watchword, "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, Free Men." In the campaign, the old Liberty party united with the Free Soil Democrats, wdiile many of the rabid southern Democrats preferred to trust Taylor, a southern man, to Cass, a northern man, on the slavery question. New York was the pivotal state, and as the Liberty party, by dividing the Whigs in 1844, had given it to the Democrats, so now the Free Soil Democrats by dividing the regular Democrats, gave it to the Whigs, and Taylor was elected. The question of introducing slavery into the vast Terri- tories acquired by the Mexican conquest, and of protecting it there, and, of course, everywhere, by Government inter- ference, was at its height during Taylor's administration. Calhoun, the recognized pro-slavery leader, pushed the question b}^ proposing to extend the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 clear through to the Pacific. Taylor's position was that California, then read}^ for statehood, should be admitted without slavery, as her constitution provided, and that the other Territories should be erected without reference to slavery, leaving them to settle that question for themselves when they came to be admitted as states. At this juncture, Clay offered his compromise measure of PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 71 1850, it being virtually the plan proposed by president Taylor, except that it embraced a more vigorous fugitive slave law. The Whigs and Free Soilers regarded this compromise as weak, and as an unnecessary surrender of free soil principles. The pro -slavery Democrats were but little better pleased with it, for opposite reasons. California came in as a free state September 9, 1850, and on September 15, 1850, slavery was abolished in the Dis- trict of Columbia. Taylor died, July 9, 1850. After Taylor's deatli the political situation became com- plex, and boded disaster to the Whigs, who in their na- tional convention had failed to commit themselves to the doctrine of the Wilmot Proviso, thereby estranging the Liberty party, which it might have readily attracted, and what was worse, driving out many of their leaders into the ranks of the Free Soil Democrats, who were now more bitter opponents of slavery extension than the Whigs themselves. A large part of the Whig strength lay in the South. Therefore it was hardly to be expected that the party could escape the slavery maelstrom. Calhoun's failure to force the slave line of 36^ 30' through to the Pacific, thus confirming a free and slave section of the Union, led to a hardening of the pro-slavery lines, to the broad denial of the Government's right to interfere with slavery at all, to threats of disunion and to talk of the necessity of setting up a new set of institutions whose object should be the protection of slavery. These discussions drew over the pro-slavery Whigs to the Democrats, but they carried along with them into the Democratic ranks the doctrine that had been broached, but voted down in the Democratic Na- tional Convention of 1848, to wit, that the people of ench Territory should be left free to treat the slavery question as they pleased. Coming from such a source and in such 72 PARTIES, PAST A^'D PRESENT. a way, the Democrats could not escape the force of this doctrine before the country. It was the doctrine that afterwards became known as " Popular " or " Squatter Sovereignty," which figured so prominently in the Kansas affair, and which served to draw such men as Douglas, Geary and Reeder outside of the Democratic lines. The California miners had applied it in their own state. While the doctrine, or its opposite, had forced the Whig party asunder, it was now about to do the same thing for the Democratic party. Decline of the Whig Paety. In 1852, the Democrats nominated Franklin Pierce, of New Hampshire, for the Presidency. Tlieir platform af- firmed that of 1848, and added an endorsement of the com- promise measures of 1850, emphatic opposition to the in- terference of Congress with State affairs, adhesion to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798, no monopoly for the few at the expense of the many, and the Union as it is and should be. The Whigs nominated General Winfield Scott, of Vir- ginia, for President, on a platform favoring tariff, internal improvement, a Government sufficiently strong to make it operative, the compromise measures of 1850. This last plank was also in the Democratic platform, but the Whigs fell into the trap set by the extreme pro-slavery leaders, and foolishly added to the plank the words " including the fugi- tive slave law.'' The plank was a bold stroke on the part of the pro-slavery people to commit both parties to the ex- tension of slavery, but the attempt reacted with thrice the effect on the Whig party that it did on the Democrats. The Free Soil Democrats nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, for President, on a platfoim denouncing Hon. Nelson W. Aldrich. Born at Foster, R. I., November 6, 1841. Academically educated; engaged in mercantile pursuits; President of Providence Common Council, 1871-73; member of State Assembly, 1875-76; Speaker of House of Representatives in 1876; elected to CongressVor 46th and 47th Congresses; elected, as Republican, to United States Senate, 1880; re-elected, 1886 and 1893; rose to prominence as advocate of Protec- tion ; authority in party and Senate on matters pertaining to Tariff Legis- lation ; conspicuous in preparation and adoption of Tariff act of 1890; Chairman of Committee on Rules and member of Committees on Finance and Transportation. r Hon. Fred. T. Dubois. Born in Crawford co., 111., May 29, 1851; graduated at Yale, 1872; Secretary of Board of Railway and Warehouse Commissioners of Illi- nois, 1875-76 ; moved to Idaho and entered business, 1880 ; United States Marshal of Idaho, 1882-86 ; elected Delegate to 50th and 51st Congresses; elected, as Republican, lo United States Senate, December 18, 1890; one of the youngest members of Senate; Chairman of Committee on Public Lands, and member of Committees on Civil Service, Enrolled Bills, Naval Affairs and National Banks. PARTIES, PAST AIsO PRESENT. 75 the fugitive slave law, the compromise measures of 1850, and slavery extension. The result of the election was most disastrous to the Whigs. They carried but four States. But this was by no means their worst blow. They stood appalled at the discovery that their endorsement of the compromise meas- ures of 1850 and of the fugitive slave law had proved to be a logical commitment of the party to further slavery agitation, if not to actual slavery extension. They could not advance except by going directly into the Democratic ranks. They could not retreat except with shame and de- moralization. They could not stand still, for the Free Soil Democrats had swept the ground from under their feet. They never recovered from their shock, lost their organi- zation, never ran another President. As was piquantly said, the Whig party died of too much compromise, of a " vain attempt to swallow the fugitive slave law." President Pierce moulded his administration wholly in the interest of the pro -slavery Democrats. This party was now in position to force its construction of the slavery issue, for it had large majorities in both House and Senate. The construction forced wasthat the compromise measures of 1850 repealed those of 1820, and therefore the slavery question was again open as to all the territory of the United States. The gage of battle was thrown down in the cele- brated Kansas-Nebraska contest which served to solidify the pro-slavery Democrats and Whigs, to divide the Northern Democrats into two equal factions and to divide the Northern Whigs into two parties, one of which coalesced with the Free Soil Democrats, the other to soon lose its name and identity entirely, for a time under the title of anti-Nebraska men, and afterwards in that of the modern Republican party. 5 76 parties, past and present. Native American Party. The Native American idea is almost as old as the country. It cropped out in 1790 in connection vith the passage of a naturalization law, and again in 1795, 1798, and again in 1802. The legislation of the latter date was designed to secure to the old Republican party the prepon- derance of foreign votes in the cities. To correct this, an organized movement was begun in New York as early as 1835, and in 1844 the Native Americans carried the city. The movement spread to other cities, and was signalized by great excitement and riots. In 1852, it reappeared in politics as a secret organiza- tion, known officially as the American party, but popularly as the Know Nothing party, from the reticence of its mem- bers. Its cardinal principle was " Americans must rule America." Its rise was rapid, and its existence being at a time when the Whig party was disintegrating, and when much dissatisfaction existed in all political organizations, it was greatly encouraged to exist by its ability to hold the bal- ance of power in many cities and even States. In 1855 it carried no less than nine State elections. In the national campaign of 1856, it entered the race for the Presidency, by nominating iMillard Fillmore, of New York, on a platform of distinct Americanism and naturalization, only after a residence of twenty-one years, with denunciation of existing parties as sectional. It succeeded in carrying the state of Maryland. In the 34tli Congress it had a strong contingent of members, forty- three in all in the House and five in the Senate. In the 35th Congress it had only five members in the House. In the vicissitude of parties between 1856 and 1860, its titles became merged into that of '•' Constitutional Union," PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 77 and ill the latter year it placed John Bell, of Tennessee, ill nomination for the President, Avho succeeded in secur- ing twelve electoral votes. It did not again appear in a presidential race. The Republican Party. It is not worth while here to go through the history of the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854, with its subsequent bloody contentions for political supremacy on the soil of these Territories. Suffice it to say that all efforts to fasten slavery on these Territories by Government intervention were met by a determined opposition sentiment, which was temporarily crystalized under the title of anti-Nebraska sentiment. Its exponents became known as anti-Nebraska men. They embraced men of all parties who opposed the pro-slavery methods of making slave States out of the Territories. These anti-Nebraska men controlled the House in the 34th Congress, and participated in one of the stormiest sessions of its history. In was seen b}^ political leaders, of anti-Nebraska senti- ment, that of the elements which composed such sentiment could be organized, a new national party would logically re- sult. The title ^' Republican " was said to have been sug- gested by Governor Seward, of New York, in the latter part of 1855 or early part of 1856, as a substitute for anti- Nebraska men, who were as a rule opposed to slavery and slavery extension . The former title would nationalize the lat- ter, and raise a standard around which could rally the old Liberty party, the Free Soil Democrats, the anti-slavery Whigs, and all who doubted the propriety of following further the Democratic party in its now rapid strides to- ward absolute State-rights and slavery extension. The name " Republican " served the purpose intended, 78 PARTIES, PAST AND TPvESENT. though it was for a time stigmatized as " Black Republi- can " by its enemies, on account of its sympathy with the colored race. By June 17, 1856, the title was sufficiently indicative of a national principle, and had served to cohere so large a number of leaders, that it ventured on a National Convention at Philadelphia, at which John C. Fremont, of California, was nominated for President. The platform declared that the Constitution, the lights of States and the union of States shall be preserved; that life, liberty and property shall be preserved by due process of law ; that Congress had no right to legislate slavery into a Territory ; that the administration had no right to defy the will of the people of the Territories; that the Government should ex- tend aid to a Pacific railroad and to internal improvements. In this campaign of 1856, the Know Nothing party was first in the field, as we have just seen. It was followed by the Democratic party at Cincinnati, which nominated James Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, on a platform affirming preceding ones, and adding an endorsement of the Kansas- Nebraska bill, and of the Squatter Sovereignty method of leaving slavery in the Territories to be settled by the peo- ple therein. What was left of the old Whig party met at Baltimore, where it joined with the Know Nothings in denouncing the Democratic and Republican parties as sectional, and in supporting Millard Fillmore for President. This was the last appearance of Whig on the party lists. The result of the campaign of 1856, was the election of Buchanan, the Democratic nominee, with a Democratic Congress, though the new Republican party had ninety-two members. The popuhir-vote showed the possibilities of the PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 79 new party, and the popular vote of the entire country was largely against the Democrats. The pro-slavery Democrats, though they had Buchan- an's administration with them, soon repented of their platform endorsement of Squatter Sovereignty, for they saw that they could not colonize the Territories as rapidly and effectually as the North could. They therefore drifted more and more toward other means of ex- tending slavery, even if the last desperate means of secession had to be resorted to. Their drift bore the administration witli it, and the way was illuminated by the Dred Scott Decision which in effect wiped out the compromises of 1820 and 1850, crushed the principle of Squatter or Popular Sovereignty, opened the Territories, and even States, to slavery, despite their local laws, and nationalized the in- stitution. This decision extinguished the last hope of Douglas and his now important Democratic following for a settle- ment of the vexatious and dangerous slavery question on the basis of Popular Sovereignty, and they began to drift away from the regular organization. When the question of admitting Kansas as a State under the famous Lecomp- ton Constitution was before the 35th Congress, 1857-58, the Douglas wing of the Democratic party, under the name of Anti Lecompton Democrats, voted with the Republicans against the measure. In tlie Congi-essional elections of 1858 the title of national sentiment ran strongly in favor of the new Re- publican party, and the number of their members in the House rose to one hundred and nine, or more than any other party, though not a majority of all. The slavery Question was still on in all its bitterness, and in 1859 it 80 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. was intensified by the John Brown affair at Harper's Ferry. The campaign of 1860 opened with the Democratic Convention at Charleston, S. C, April 23, 1860. It proved to be a battle ground for supremacy between the southern, or extreme pro-slavery, Democrats and the Douglas Democrats. The latter won, so far as the platform went. Many pro-slavery Democrats with- drew, but enough remained to prevent Douglas' nomina- tion. The Convention at length adjourned to meet in Baltimore, June 18th. Here Douglas was nominated for president. But a portion of the Baltimore Convention now seceded and met the seceders from the Charleston Convention, fiist at Charleston, then at Richmond and finally at Baltimore, where John C. Breckinridge of Ken- tucky, was nominated for president, on a pro-slavery plat- form. The Republicans met in National Convention at Chicago, May 16, 1860, and nominated Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, for president, on a platform announcing the necessity for a Republican party; denouncing all schemes of disunion, and the Kansas policy of the Buclianan administration; declaring in favor of protection, a Homestead law, internal improvements, and aid for a Pacific railroad. The Amer- ican party made its last appearance in the national arena, under the name of the Constitutional Union party, at Baltimore, and nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for president. The Republican party elected Mr. Lincoln president. This election resulted also in a Republican House and Senate. The pro-slavery wing of the Democratic party regarded this result as a cause for secession of the slave States from the Union. They setup the southern Con- PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT, 81 federacy and inaugurated war by firing on Fort Sumter, April 13, 1861. This was the great American Rebellion, or Civil War in tlie United States, which was to last for over four years, and to end with the extinction of the Confederacy and a restored Union of States. Pending this war, the Republican party held possession of all branches of the Government. In 1863 the vexatious question of slavery was forever settled by its entire aboli- tion in the United States. The measures of Lincoln's first administration were chiefly those of war and finance. In 1861, a tariff bill was passed in accordance with the Re- publican doctrine of protection. Though the Democrats of the northern States cooperated largely with the Repub- licans in measures looking to the direct suppression of the Rebellion, they still held to their party organization suffi- ciently to put all strictly party questions to severe test, and as the time for the national election of 1864 drew near they were encouraged to meet in National Convention at Chicago, and nominated General George B. iNIcLellan for president. This Convention was dominated by the reac- tionary or peace wing of the party, called "Copperheads," by their opponents. The platform announced adhesion to the Union under the Constitution ; demanded a cessa- tion of hostilities and a peace Convention, after four years of failure to restore the Union by war; opposed military interference with elections ; set forth the objects of the party as a restoration of the Union with the rights of the States unimpaired : denounced war measures in general ; expressed sympathy for soldiers and sailors. The Republican National Convention of 1860, at Balti- more, re-nominated Abraham Lincoln for president on a platform pledging the party to suppression of the Rebell- ion ; to peace on the unconditional surrender of all rebels; 82 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. to an amendment to the Constitution proliibiting slavery ; extending thanks to soldiers and sailors; approving Lin- coln's administration ; pledging the national faith to the redemption of the public debt ; approving the Monroe Doctrine. These two conventions were supplemented by one at Cleveland, Ohio, held under the auspices of '' Radical Men," a Republican faction opposed to Lincoln on account of his tardiness respecting matters appertaining to slavery. It nominated John C. Fremont for president, but the movement collapsed, and afterwards became a part of the regular Republicans party. The issue of war failure and of peace by compromise presented by the Democrats in 1864, was met squarel}^ by the Republicans, and the result was an overwhelming vic- tory for the latter, both as to the Presidency and the Con- gress. The w^ar practically ended wnth Lee's surrender, April 9, 1865. On April 14, President Lincoln w^as assas- sinated. He was succeeded bj^ Vice President Johnson, wdio was to play toward the Republicans the part of Tyler toward the Whigs, through the trying period of recon- struction of the seceded States. Though baffled at every turn by the President, the Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress were such as to enable the party to carry through most of its terms of reconstruction, and to amend the Constitution so as to secure civil rights and the right of suffrage to American citizens. This stormy period of reconstruction served to unite in a measure the Northern and Southern w'ings of the Dem- ocratic party. The disturbing question of slavery elimin- ated, they could once more make common cause against the Republicans, which they did in the campaign of 1868, w^ith Horatio Seymour, of New York as their candidate PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 83 for president, and with a platform recognizing the ques- tion of secession and slavery as settled; demanding the immediate restoration of the Southern States and the set- tlement of the question of suffrage by the States them- selves; amnesty for all offenses, payment of the public debt in lawful money, where coin is not called for ; equal taxation and one currency ; economy, and abolition of the Freedmen's Bureau ; tariff for revenue with incidental pro- tection ; general arraignment of the Republican party,- gratitude to Johnson for resisting the aggressions of Congress. The Republicans met in national convention at Chicago, May 20, 1868, and nominated General U. S. Grant for President. Their platform embodied the following : (1) Congratulation over the success of the reconstruction pol- icy of Congress. (2) Equal suffrage to all loyal men. (3) No repudiation of national promises to pay. (4) Equalization and reduction of taxation. (5) Reduction of interest on public debt and gradual payment of same, (6)Imiorovement of National credit. (7) Johnson's treach. ery denounced. (8) Honor to soldiers. (9) Encourage^ ment of immigration. (10) Commendation of all loyal men in the South. The main issues of the campaign were the reconstruct tion measures of Congress and equal suffrage, the latter a new question rising out of the condition of the fieedmen. The popular verdict was strongly in favor of the Repul)]i- cans, both as to President and Congress. Grant's first ad- ministration was full of vexations, on account of a new force in the South which, under the various names of *' Unreconstructed," *' Irreconcilables," '' Ku-Klux-Klan," etc., rose up in opposition to Federal authority, and espe- cially to the newly formed State governments, which were 84 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. denounced as " Carpet-Bag Governments." This force ap[)lied the doctrine of ''a wliile man's government" with such effect as to terrorize all organized opposition, and eventually gain its point. But while the administra- tion was thus struggling with ever-recurring vexations, the Supreme Court came to its rescue with a decision that Congress had the power to establish the relations of re- bellious States to the Union. An equally important de- cision declared the Legal Tender Act of 1862 to be constitutional, thus bringing the '• Greenback " into great popularity and laying the foundation of a new but ephemeral party. By Jul}^ 15, 1S70, the last seceded State was back in the Union, and the clouds of the reconstruc- tion period had well-nigh vanished. Lir>ERAL Republicans. Both the Republican and Democratic parties were now to be shaken up by the question of '"• amnesty to rebels." Many leaders in both parties thought the time had come when general amnesty should be extended to all who had engaged in the Rebellion, on the part of the South. The Re- publicans who thus thought met in convention at Cincin- nati, i\Iay 1, 1872, and nominated Horace Greeley, of New York, for president, on a platform pledging the party to Union, emancipation, enfranchisement ; opposition to the reopening of any question settled by the thirteenth, four- teenth and fifteenth amendments to tlie Constitution ; im- mediate removal of all political disabilities; local self-gov- ernment with impartial suffrage; civil service reform; modest Government revenue. But the remarkable part of the platform, considering that ]\Ir. Greele3% a lifelong protectionist, was the nominee of the i)art3', was the tariif PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 85 plank, which simply relegated the question of the tariff to the congressional districts for discussion. The Liberal Republican idea gained rapid headway in several States. It split the Republican party in twain in Missouri, and the Democratic party in Ohio. Accretions were so numerous from both parties, and the general am- nesty doctrine was so strong with Democrats, that the Lib- eral Republican Convention felt it could, by early and dis- creet action, capture the entire Democratic organization. Li this it counted correctly, for when the Democratic Convention met in Baltimore, July 9, 1872, it accepted the platform and nominees of the Liberal Republicans, with the hope of thus widening the schism in the Republican ranks and crushing the party forever. But not all Democrats fell thus to the Liberal Republi- can movement. A straight out Democratic Convention was held at Louisville, September 3, 1872, which nomi- nated Charles O'Conner, of New York, for president, on a platform containing a plea for State-rights, and repudiation of the Baltimore convention as a betrayal of the Demo- cratic party into a false creed and false leadership. The Republicans met in National Convention in Phila- delphia, June 5, 1872, and renominated U. S. Grant for president on a platform whose leading planks favored en- forcement of the new constitutional amendments, civil service reform, and maintenance of the public credit. The Prohibition Party. Up until 1865, what may be designated political tem- perance depended on the use of parties as they were found to exist in the States. This localized tlie temperance issue, and subjected it to the whim of opponents. The time had come for the nationalization of the cause. In 86 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 1868, the Grand Lodge of Good Templars moved for '^ the organization of a national political party whose principles should be prohibition of the manufacture, importation and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage." This sentiment was closely reflected by the Sixth National Temperance Convention at Cleveland, July 29, 1868. The next year, during a session of the Grand Lodge of Good Templars at Oswego, N. Y., a call was made for a Convention to organize a " National Prohibition party." This Convention met in Chicago, September 1. 1869, with five hundred delegates from twenty states, and launched the new party. The party held its first National Convention at Columbus, Ohio, February 22, 1872, and nominated James Black, of Pennsylvania for president, on a platform declaring that as all existing political parties had proved unwilling to adopt an adequate policy respecting traf- fic in intoxicating drinks, therefore the Prohibition party pledged itself to maintain the principles of its Declaration and Constitution ; that effective state as well as National prohibition is the only means of suppressing traffic in in- toxicants; that existing party competition for the liquor vote is a peril to the nation ; dissuasion from the use of intoxicants; competency, honesty and sobriety as qualifi- cations for office ; no removals from office for political opinions; economy; direct vote for president; sound national currency; labor reform ; suffrage without regard to sex ; fostering of common schools. All parties were now ready for the campaign of 1872— a campaign peculiar in every respect. Its burdens wera chiefly borne bj^the Liberal Republicans. The result was their overwhelming defeat. They had not captured the Democratic party, for what they gained from it was far more than offset by desertions to the Republicans. Nor PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 87 had tliey widened perceptiblj^ the schism in the Republi- can ranks. As was wittily said at the time, " fusion had resulted in confusion." The Greenback Party. In 1873 the Country passed through a panic. Cautious financial legislation became necessarj^ President Giant vetoed a measure increasing the national currency to the extent of 1400,000,000, because it tended to inflation at a time when the country was looking toward the resumption of specie payments. A strenuous effort was made by a strong minority of both parties to pass the bill over the veto. The effort failed, but here we have the germs of the "Greenback party." The rise of this party was encouraged by the stringency of the times, and by the propensity to hold the dominant party responsible for industrial and financial ills. It at first took form and name as '' The Independent party," that being best suited for a grouping of all the elements of discontent. But it could not escape the more suggest- ive name of " Greenback party," since its object was to relieve financial stringency and business depression by using the credit of the Government in the shape of green- backs, and insisting on a sufficient issue of them to answer the purposes intended. The greenback was then popular and was ere long to be redeemed in gold. But while the inception of the party was in 1873, it re- ceived its real impetus in the passage of the specie Resump- tion act of 1875, by the Republicans. The Democrat party, contrary to its traditions, had arrayed itself against the pas- sage of this act, and was therefore in a position to ally itself with tlie Greenbackers. This alliance was effected in many States, and it proved to be a very strong alliance in 88 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. industrial districts where the thought of unlimited money was a pleasing delusion. Campaign of 1876. This party was the first to enter the campaign of 1876. It met in National Convention at Indianapolis, May 17, 1876 and nominated Peter Cooper, of New York, for presi- dent, on a platform arraigning both Republican and Demo- cratic parties for refusing to foster financial reform and industrial emancipation ; demanding repeal of the Specie Resumption act of 1875; insisting upon the United States note (greenback) as a circulating medium and legal tender, and upon the Jeffersonian theory that " bank paper must be suppressed, and the circulation restored to the nation to whom it belongs ; declaring that the Government shall legislate for the full development of all legitimate business ; opposing further issue of gold bonds; no further sale of bonds with which to purchase silver as a substitute for fractional currency. This was a most remarkable platform in view of the strenuous opposition of the Democrats to the passage of the original Greenback act, of the traditions of the party in favor of hard money, and of the historic opposition of Democracy to Government legislation in favor of our in- dustries. Another party whicli had already entered the campaign of 1876, was the American National party, which met in mass meeting at Pittsburg, June 9, 1875, and nominated James B. Walker, of Illinois, for president. It favored a Sabbath, and prohibition, the tliirteenth, fourteenth and. fifteenth amendments, arbitration, Bible in schools, return to specie payments, direct vote of the people for president, and opposed Secret Societies. The Prohibition party, PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 89 under the name of " Prohibition Reform party," met in National Convention at Cleveland, May 17, 1876, and nominated Green C. Smith, of Kentucky, for president, on the usual platform of principles. The Republican party met in Convention at Cincinnati and nominated Rutherford B. Hayes, of Ohio, for presi- dent. This Convention broke the usual party practice of voting the States as units. It declared in its platform that the United States was a nation not a league ; that Republican work was not done till the Declaration was acknowledged in every State ; for protection of all citi- zens; for redemption of United States notes in coin ; for improved civil service; rigid responsibility in office; against sectarian control of schools ; for sufficient revenue with protection; against land-grants to corporations ; in favor of pensions to soldiers. The regular Democratic party met in convention at St. Louis. June 28, 1876, and nominated Samuel J. Tilden, of New York, for president, on a platform of general con- demnation of the Republican party and policy ; the lan- guage as to the existing tariff being that it is, "a master- piece of injustice, inequality and false pretence." This campaign led to the unfortunate result of a dis- puted return of electors from three of the Southern States and from Oregon— a result upon which the victory hung. The matter was carried before a special tribunal, called the "Electoral Commission." Its decision was that R. B. Hayes, the Republican nominee for president, had received one hundred and eighty-five electoral votes, and Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee, one hundred and eighty-four votes. A remarkable feature of this contest was that Republicans and Democrats had reversed their 90 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. ground as to open and strict construction of the Constitu- tion. The forty-fifth Congress, the first to meet under Playes' administration was Democratic in the House and Repub- lican in Senate. Strictly partisan legislation was there- fore blocked. This Congress witnessed the introduction of the silver question into politics, in the shape of the Bland bill remonetizing silver and authorizing the coinage of 5^2,000,000 Bland dollars, a month. In the forty-sixth Congress the Republicans made a determined effort to repeal the Bland silver act but failed. Campaign of 1880. In the campaign of 1880, the Republicans were first in the field. They met at Chicago, June 5, 1880, and nomi- nated James A. Garfield, of Ohio, for president. The platform recited the achievements of the Republican party from the suppression of the Rebellion to the resumption of gold payments, and extended the usual pledges in favor of protection, pensions, internal improvements, etc. The Convention of the National Greenback party was held at Chicago, June 9, 1880. It nominated James B. Weaver, of Iowa, for president upon a platform adhering to a large legal tender currency ; opposition to refunding of the national debt ; favoring abolition of national banks, an unlimited coinage of gold and silver and a graduated income tax. The Prohibition Reform party met at Cleveland, June 17, 1880, and nominated Neal Dow, of Maine, for presi- dent on the usual platform. The Democratic party met at Cincinnati, June 22, 1880, and nominated General Winfield S. Hancock, of New York, Hon. Levi P. Morton. Born at Shoreham, Vt., May 16, 1824; educated in common schools-, entered mercantile business at Concord, N. H. ; at twenty-five, mem- ber of firm of Morton & Co., Boston ; member of firm of Morton & Grinnell, New York, 1854; a banker in 1863; Morton, Bliss & Co., in 1868 ; elected to Congress in Twelth New York District in 1878 ; an authority in matters of finance ; declined Vice-Presidential nomination, 1880 ; furnished fourth of cargo to Irish sufferers ; declined Secretary- ship of Navy under Garfield ; Minister to France u'nder Garfield ; urged for U. S. Senator, 1885 ; elected Vice-President, 1888 ; elected Governor of New York by a large majority in 1894; noted for financial knowl- edge, charitable disposition, and nobility of character ; prominent candi- date for Presidential nominee on Republican ticket in 1896. l#»f Hon. William Alfred Peffer. Born in Cumberland co., Pa., September 10, 1831 ; educated in com- mon schools ; engaged in teaching and farming ; moved to Indiana, 1853, and engaged in farming; moved to Missouri, 1859, and to Illi- nois, 1861 ; .enlisted in Union army and served in Department of Nash- ville ; studied law and began practice in Clarksville, Tenn., 1865 ; moved to Kansas, 1870, to practice law and edit ; elected to State Senate, 1874; Republican elector in 1880; ed'iiov of Jvansas Farmer, 1881 ; elected to United States Senate, as a People's Party candidate, for term beginning March 4, 1891 ; an exponent of the ideas advocated by the Farmers' Alliance and other new parties ; Chairman of Com- mittee on Civil Service, and member of Commiltees on Immigration, Pensions, Irrigation and Woman's Suffrage. PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 93 for president, on a platform pledging the party to Demo- cratic traditions, and tariff for revenue only. The result pf the campaign was the election of Garfield, with a Republican majority in the House and a tie in the Senate. On July 2, 1881, President Garfield was mortally shot, and was succeeded by Vice President Arthur. The forty-seventh Congress enacted the important tariff bill of 1883, lowering duties. It also enacted the Civil Service Reform Bill, introduced into the Senate by Geo. H. Pen- dleton, Democrat of Ohio. The elections of 1882 had proven disastrous to the Republicans, and in the forty-eighth Con- gress there was a large preponderance of Democrats in the House, but no legislation of political moment was effected. Both parties preferred to stand as nearly still as possible, preparatory to the campaign of 1884. Campaign of 1884. The eighth National Convention on the history of the Republican party met at Chicago, June 3, 1884. James G. Blaine, of Maine, was nominated for president, on a platform which commended the party for its achievments ; lamented the death of Garfield; endorsed Arthur's admin- istration : favored a tariff for the protection of American industry; denounced Democratic measures in Congress; urged international standard of gold and silver ; suggested the regulation of interstate commerce ; favored interna- tional arbitration ; denounced the importation of contract labor ; favored civil service reform, liberal pensions, ex- tension of the navy; insisted on a free ballot and full count in southern States ; passed a pledge to secure to all persons full political rights. The Democrats met at Chicago, July 8, 1884, and nominated Grover Cleveland, of New York, for president, 94 PARTIES, PAST AND KRESENT. much against the wishes of Tammany Hall. The platform announced " the preservation of personal rights, equality of citizens before the law, reserved rights of States, suprem- acy of Federal Government within Constitutional pro- visions ; " that a change of parties was demanded ; that tlie will of the people was defeated by fraud in 1876 ; that the Republican party was extravagant, and had not kept its pledges to workingmen soldiers, and in favor of Amer- ican manufactures; that the Democratic party j^ledged itself to reform the existing tariff and internal revenue laws, and denounced the existing tariff; that the Govern- ment should secure equal rights to all citizens ; that there should be no sumptuary laws ; that the party favored Civil Service Reform, separation of church and state, leg- islation tending to advance labor, an American policy for restoration of American commerce. The Prohibition National Convention met in Pittsburg, Jul}^ 21, 1884, and nominated Ex-Governor John P. St. John, of Kansas, for president, on the usual Prohibi- tion platform. As a prelude to the National Convention of the Green- back party, a Convention of Anti-monopolists met at Chicago, May 14, 1884, whicli nominated Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, for president. When the Green- back party met in Chicago, May 28, 1884, it also nomi. nated Butler for president, on a platform demanding the issue of legal tender notes in quantities sufficient to supply actual demands of trade and commerce in accordance with increase of population. The campaign opened with great personal bitterness, and was conducted with an acerb spirit to the end. Mr. Blaine threw into it all his intense personalism, but the result was his defeat by the narrowest of all margins. At PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 95 the same time the. House was carried by the Democrats. At this time there were two wings to the Democratic party, one favoring a tariff for revenue with incidental protec- tion, the other standing squarely against the protective idea. The new president elect, Mr Cleveland, at first favored the former wing led by Mr. Randall, but he turned, and in his message of 1887, announced his tariff reform, or free trade, sentiments, which became the party doctrine for future campaigns. With their majority in the forty-ninth Congress, the Democrats achieved but little party legisla- tion. In the fiftieth Congress the Plouse still had a Demo- cratic majority, while there was a Republican majority of one in the Senate. The former passed the Mills Tariff Bill by a slender majority. It was defeated in tlie Senate. Nothing seriously affected the status of the two leading parties during Mr. Cleveland's first term of office. Campaign of 1888. The Democrats entered the lists first with their national Convention at St. Louis, at which President Cleveland was re-nominated by acclamation, on a platform reaffirming that of 1884, and inveighing against the Republican policy of accumulating a surplus in the treasury. The Republicans met in National Convention at Chi- cago, June 19, 1888, and nominated Benjamin Harrison of Indiana, for president, on a platform strongly favoring the protective idea and accepting the issue of free trade as presented by the Democrats. The Prohibition party met at Indianapolis and nomi- nated Clinton B. Fisk, of New Jersey, for president, on a distinctive party platform. The United Labor party placed R. H. Cowdrey in the 96 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. field as its candidate for president. The Greenbackers, now figuring faintly in political affairs, united with the Labor Reformers, and nominated Alson J. Streeter for president. The American party nominated James L. Curtis for president. The Equal Rights party, nominated Belva A. Lockwood for president. The campaign was one largely of discussion, the leading issue being that of Tariff vs. Free Trade. The result was the election of Harrison the Republican nominee, together with a Republican House of Representatives. The revo- lution of 188i was now reversed. The Harrison adminis- tration was signalized by the passage of the McKinley tariff bill of 1890, involving tlie principle of reciprocity, the Administrative Customs' Act and the Sherman Silver Bill changing the actual coinage of silver, as provided for in the Bland Bill, to the i)urchase of 54,000,000 ounces of silver in a year — the amount of the American product — and the issuing of silver certificates against the bullion deposited. The Democrats were not daunted by the defeat of Tariff Reform in 1888, but pressed the issue before the country with sufficient success in the elections of 1890, to win a large majority in the fifty-second Congress. This majority proved to be too large, unsophisticated and un- wieldly. Such imposing questions as those appertaining to Samoa, the murder of Italians in New Orleans, the Chilian Imbroglio, overshadowed everj^thing narrower. The Congress achieved nothing outside of routine and such ^ew passing things as would contribute to success in the approaching campaign of 1892. The '' pop-gun" method of doing away with the Tariff act of 1890, proved unsatis- factory to even its advocates. But there was one question that would not down in PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 97 this Congress. Tliat was the free coinage of silver. It bobbed up at every turn to annoy the Democratic majority. The failure of silver producers to realize their expectations under the Slierman act of 1890, the growing desire on the part of the dissatisfied to change industrial and trade con- ditions in the South and West, had given the silver ques- tion a new and decidedly party turn. Democratic State Conventions had almost unanimously declared in favor of '^ free and unlimited coinage of silver." This was but an echo of the Greenback doctrine, now on its wane. Mr. Bhind, recognized leader of the silver agitation, formulated Ids " Free Silver Coinage Bill " and urged it with his tre- mendous ability. The belief tliat it could fail in a Demo- cratic House was not to be entertained. But wliat was his surprise to find that the eastern Democrats had turned in with the Republicans, and that the vote on his bill was a tie. Though the Speaker, Mr. Crisp, broke the tie in favor of the bill, it was afterwards defeated by dilatory motions. In comparison with the fifty-first Congress the fifty- second passed into history as tiie "do nothing Congress." It was frequently driven to protest against itself for^fili- bustering tactics. Owing its existence largely to '' The Billion Dollar " extravagance of its predecessor, it ex. ceeded that extravagance by a total of 144,000,000. Campaign op 1892. The Republican party held its National Convention at Minneapolis, June 7, 1892, and renominated President Harrison on a platform favoring American Protection, bimetalism with legislative restrictions, free ballot and honest count, extension of foreign commerce, enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, separations of church and state; 98 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. efficient protection to railroad employees, reduced postage and extension of free mail delivery. Civil Service, Nicara- gua canal, admissions of Territories as States, the World's Fair, pensions ; and opposing southern outrages, panper immigration, trusts, and intemperance. The Democrats met at Chicago, June 21, 1892, and re- nominated Grover Clevelaiid on a platform pledging the party to the principles of Jefferson, to opposition to the '^ Force Bill; " denouncing protection as a fraud and un- constitutional ; the McKinley act as the " culminating atrocity of class legislation ; " reciprocity as a fraud ; de- claring opposition to trusts ; to giving away of public lands to railroads; to the coinage act of 1890 ; to State banks ; to Republican foreign policy ; to pauper immigra- tion ; to Harrison's administration; favoring Mississippi improvements, Nicaragua canal, popular education, ad- mission of new States, protection of railway em])loyees, abolition of the "sweating system." The Prohibitionists met in National Convention at Cin- cinnati, June 30, 1892,* and nominated General John Bid- well, for president, on an elaborate platform expressive of the party's views. The People's or Populist Party. A new party had been for some time in process of quiet growth, formed of those who thought that the Govern- ment had not been sufficiently mindful of the welfare of the industrial classes. It had formulated its doctrines at a meeting at Ocala, Fla., and was sufficiently advanced to take its place in the campaign of 1892. This it did in National Canvention at Omaha on July 4, 1892, by the nommation of General James B. Weaver, of Iowa, for president. The party was recruited from both the lead- r^ARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 99 ing parties, and gave as reasons for its existence, those found in the preamble to its platform, to wit ; — that cor- ruption dominates the ballot box, the legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized, newspapers largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, homes mortgaged, labor impoverished, lands concentrated in the hands of capitalists, workmen denied right of organ- ization, imported pauperized labor beating down wages, the fruits of toil stolen to build up colossal fortunes, the national power to create money appropriated to enrich bond holders, a vast public debt funded into gold-bearing bonds, silver demonetized, the currency abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise and enslave industry. The preamble further charged both political parties with grievous wrongs and inability to right them, with engaging in sham political battles over tariffs for the sake of plunder, and w^ith proposing to sacrifice homes, lives and children on the altar of Mammon. The platform which followed contained a belief that a union of the labor forces of the country was necessary to its salvation, that wealth belonged to him who created it, and that the time 'had come when the Government should own and operate the railroads, telegraphs and telephones. On the question of finance the demand was for a safe, sound and flexible legal tender currency, for free and unlimited coinage of silver at a ratio of sixteen to one, for a gradu- ated income tax, for limitation of State and National rev- enues, for postal savings banks, for an eight hour law, for civil service regulations. These plain charges and broad demands sufficed to touch deeply an immense contingent of both parties in the far western States, and one of the curiosities of the campaign 100 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. of 1892 was a coalition of Democrats and Populists in many States with a view to securing Democratic electors. The growth of this new party in the Southern States was phenomenal. In more than one of these States it swept away old regimes and installed itself in the Governor's chairs and legislatures. The result of the national campaign of 1892 was a sur- prise to both the leading parties. There had been but little excitement, and nothing more than a quiet confi- dence manifested. But it was found that the labor vote had revolted against its employers, and that the Populist strength had proved enormous beyond all calculation, having swept several Republican states of the northwest from their political moorings. Ex-president Cleveland was elected, and with liim a large majority of Democrats in the fifty-third Congress, the strength of parties being two hundred and twenty-one Democrats, one hundred and twenty-five Republicans, ten Populists. The Senate was also Democratic, the party strength being forty-three Democrats, thirty-seven Republicans, and five Populists. This was really a greater political revolution than that of 1884 had been. The Democratic party found itself in possession of all branches of the Government for the first time in thirty- two years, and it could apply its piinciples at will. But though a triumphant, it was to be bv no means a happy, party. Its alliances with Populists en- couraged the free silver sentiment in its ranks, and out of fusion was to come confusion, as so often happens in party history. A feeling of discontent rested heavily on the country and a sense of danger haunted commercial centres. Gold went abroad rapidly. The Treasuiy reserve became de- pleted. Exports fell off. Expenditures exceeded receipts. PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 101 The Secretary of the Treasury intimated the probability of redeeming silver certificates in silver. At once solid dread fell on the banks and capitalists. Credits shrivelled, banks closed, corporations and firms went to the wall, business demoralization became well-nigh universal, mills closed, labor went idle. The period was one of panic, or rather of that awful suspension of faith and credit which is usually worse than panic, because it is less treatable by remedies and of longer duration. It was to rest like an incubus on the entire second administration of Mr. Cleve- land. It was thought that the Sherman Silver Act of 1890 had something to do with the disastrous times. Congress was called in special session, August 7, 189B, and the purchasing clause of the bill was repealed, but not with- out strenuous opposition by the free silver coinage men. Credit was somewhat fortified, but the industrial panic still prevailed and even assumed more disastrous forms. It was evident that the cause had not been rightly guessed. Amid this gloom the fifty-third Congress met in regular session, December 4, 1893. Its meeting was rendered more sombre by the fact that a counter political revolu- tion had set in, in 1893, less diffused but more emphatic than that of 1892 had been. Democratic States, like New York, were swept by the Republicans, by large majorities. It was evident that the country was in violent reaction. Still the Congress went actively about the work of sub- stituting a new Tariff act for that of 1890. The bill, which became known as the "Wilson Bill," was framed very far along the approaches to free trade, so much so indeed that the Democrats in the Senate forced into it many material amendments so as to make it secure more 102 PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. revenue. It was passed, but never received the Presidents' signature. It became a law not only without the Presi- dent's endorsement, but with his expressed disapprobation. The Democrats had now applied to the situation one of their most heroic remedies, had placed the countr}^ on a new economic plain. They had even incorporated in the Tariff the Populist doctrine of an income tax. This the Supreme Court decided to be unconstitutional. All the while the Treasury condition was growing worse. The Gold reserve could not be preserved, and the deficit was growing daily. In order to Uicet expenses and pre- serve the National credit, a resort was had to borrowing. $50,000,000 bonds were sold in order to replenish the Treasurv. This did not last long, and another, and still a third issue, became necessar}^ making a total of i5'262,- 000,000, in a little over a year. This use of bonds in order to keep the Treasury in funds was higld}^ exas- perating to free silver coinage sentiment in the Demo- cratic party, while the country at large felt great disap- pointment over the fact that the Wilson tariff was falling so far below the expectations and promises of its projec- tors in providing revenue sufficient for the needs of Gov- ernment in time of peace. Added to tins, Mr. Cleveland liadbeen unfortunate in his foreign policy, and had antag- onized the patriotic spirit of the people. It was hardl}^ surprising therefore, that the political reaction whicli be- gan in 1893 should assume fuller proportions in 1894. The large Democratic majority in the House was over- turned by an equally large Republican majority in the fifty-fourth Congress. It was therefore to a hostile body that President Cleveland made his plea for financial relief, in his message to the fifty-fourth Congress. The House came to his rescue with a provisional tariff bill designed PARTIES, PAST AND PRESENT. 103 to increase the Custom's revenue sufficiently to meet the needs of the Treasury. But this could not be passed in the Senate, owing to the attitude of parties there, the free silver coinage sentiment holding a balance of power, and being determined to fix a recognition of its principles on all the legislation it could. Campaign of 1896. The shapings of the campaign of 1896, proved to bo most interesting. The free silver coinage sentiment whicli, as we have seen, the Populists formulated in their plat- form erf 1892, but \vhich had been a prolific source of ao-i- tation long before, had well-nigh taken possession of the Democratic party in the Western and Southern States, and had come to tlie front in tlie Republican party of the mining States sufficiently to threaten their allegiance. So conspicuous and pervading had the sentiment become that the name " Populist " was almost lost in that of Free Silverite " as a party cognomen. While the free silver coinage sentiment was thus affect, ing both the Republican and Democratic parties in kind, it was not doing so in degree, for its invasion of the Demo- cratic ranks Avas where they had been strongest, while it penetrated but little into the strong Republican States. The Democrats stood in awe of it, for the reason that they had coquetted with and encouraged it in 1892, and for the additional reason that the administration had directly and bitterly antagonized it by seeking to make all that consti- tuted its ^opposite a part of administrative policy. The Republicans had less fear of it, for"" tlie reason that how- ever rabid the sentiment might become in the States that were most affected by it, the more important principle of protection would be there to modify or thwart it. 104 PARTIES, PAST AXD PRESENT. The first party to open the campaign was the Prohibi- tion party which met at Pittsburg, May 27, and nominated Joshua Levering, of Maryhmd, for president on a single plank platform setting forth the principles of the party. This Convention witnessed a bolt led by the free silver coinage men, on account of their failure to secure the in- sertion of a free silver plank in the platform. The bolters set up a new party and a separate ticket. The second National Convention was that of the Re- publican party, which met at St. Louis, June IG, 1895, and nominated William McKinley for [)resident. Tiie plat- form declared for an ample protective tariff and for the maintainance of the existing gold standard of money. The failure of the radical free silver coinage men to secure a plank in the platform pledging the party to free silver coinage at the ratio of sixteen to one, led to a bolt which portended the loss of several of the States interested in silver mining. The preliminary battle for ascendency in the Demo- cratic Convention called to meet in Chicago on July 6, 1896, was the fiercest in the annals of the party. The free silver coinage men were actively, boldly and bitterly aggressive from the very inception of the campaign, and were constantly encouraged by the local elections in the states. As time wore on their confidence was increased, and tiiat of the gold, or the sound money, wing fell. Even the heroic effort of President Cleveland, by open letter, tc sta}^ the free silver coinage tide passed without effect, and it was conceded, some time before the meeting of the Convention, that the master}^ of the free silver coinage wing of the party would be complete. The first test vote showed 556 for free silver to 349 against. PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. Free-trade exists only in theory. There is no actual free-trade in all the world. Those who ground their arguments on the abstract doc- trine of free-trade are free-traders. Those who admit the necessity or propriety of a tariff for revenue only are free-traders. All the political economists of the free-trade school — Adam Smith, Mill, Ricardo, Say, List, Laveleye, Wells, Wayland — say that a government has a right to levy a tax for its support, and that the tariff is the least onerous and easiest collected tax. A tariff for revenue with incidental protection begins to draw the line between the free-trader and the protectionist. A " Tariff Reformer " is either an outright free-trader, or a believer in a revenue tariff with incidental protection. He may be none the less a protectionist. Politics confuse these terms. American politics are espe- cially loose respecting them. We change both theories and terms with the rapidity of a new and enterprising country. In England " free-trade " and " free-trader " carry no re- proach. The meaning of the terms is understood, as well as the doctrine. In political economy there is no doubt about terms. The free-trader and protectionist are what they profess to be. The early economic writers were mostly free-traders. Protection, Vv^hich all nations practiced, did not seem to ad- mit of theories or encourage a literature. It is well to understand that the astounding revelations in connection with the development of the United States have (105) io6 PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. shaken all the old theories respecting free-trade and protec lion, and made a new political economy possible, if not necessary. A primary law of political economy is that an increase of the productiveness of the country implies an increase of its capital. No law can create capital. A second law is that productiveness depends on the num- ber of laborers. Legislation cannot create men. A third law is that productiveness depends on the stim- ulus to labor. Protection changes only the mode of labor. If it attracts manufacturers, it repels agriculturalists, and, vice versa. What it pays as a stimulus to one industry it subtracts from another. Hence there is no gain to labor as a whole. Protection increases the price of an article. As price in- creases, demand diminishes. The less an article is wanted, the less it will be produced. The demand for labor dimin- ishes. The price of labor diminishes. The stimulus to labor is decreased. The watchword of free-traders, or freedom of exchange, is Laissez faire ; laissez passer : "leave it alone." This is nature. Allow every one to buy and sell where he can do so most advantageously, whether in or out of his own country. Revenue from customs on foreign goods may be per- mitted by the doctrine of laissez faire, but it is a tax, and a bad one. To establish duties under the pretext of protecting national industries is an iniquitous measure fatal to the gen- eral interests. By forcing a consumer to buy at a higher price than he would have otherwise, or elsewhere, to pay, is to perpetrate the injustice of taxing one class for the benefit of another. PRINCIPIvKS OF FRBK-TRADE. 107 Political economy draws no distinction between classes. So, if it be said that protection by means of tariff duties has for its purpose the favor of labor, it favors a class, none the less. True industrial economy aims not to increase but dimin- ish labor. If, with what I can earn in one day, I can buy a yard of cloth from a foreigner, why force me to spend two days' labor for the same ? An injury is done to humanity by a system which forces men into manufactories. The custom house snatches men, women and children from open air tasks, and chains them in gloomy workshops for twelve to fourteen hours out of twenty-four. Free-trade applies to whole peoples the principle of the division of labor, assures them all that such principle can bestow, and thereby enhances their welfare. When each is employed at what he can do best, the indi- vidual shares are greatest. When each is compelled by legislation to do what he must, and what he may not have aptitude for, the aggregate of labor will not be so great, and the individual will be worse off. So when each country or nation fails to devote its ener- gies to what nature most favors, it will not bring to market the maximum obtained by the minimum of toil, but the re- sults of a diminished productivity. No man can be so self-sufficient as to confine himself to the manufacture of his food, clothing, furniture, books, etc. The nation is no better off than the man. Protection obliges me to grow wheat, without reference to soil. But in nature my soil may be sandy, and I could better afford to raise something else in exchange for wheat, which grows better on my neighbor's clay soil. roS PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADB. Commerce is always an exchange of produce against pro- duce. So much exported, so much imported. Therefore the foreigner cannot inundate us with goods. The differ- ent countries cannot sell more than they buy. Industrial progress begets competition. Don't limit it at the confines of a state or nation. The widest competition is the most universal profit. Monopoly means sloth ; pro- tection, routine. The manufacturer who is forced to keep hold of the home market will conquer the world. A railroad uniting two countries facilitates exchanges ; customs dues impede them. Free-trade has for its object the diminution of labor. Machinery has the same object. Protection, therefore, should demand the abolition of machinery, in order to be consistent. Capital turns spontaneously to the most lucrative employ- ment. Protection turns it to the less lucrative, and seeks to make up the difference by a tax on consumers. The argument that a country should be independent of foreigners in time of war is of no avail in this era of easy and ready transportation. Neutral ships may transport the goods of belligerents. The blockade of a nation is impos- sible. The doctrine of free-trade, like that of protection, is oftentimes best sustained by attacking and exploding the theories of the adversary. Modern politics, especially the politics of a free country like that of the United States, are prolific of arguments and phrases which greatly affect the stereotyped theories of free- trade and protection. Hence, having passed from the ascertained laws of free- trade, as found in^the books, and as built on the experience of foreign countries, on monarchical conditions, and on a Benjamin K Tillman. Born in Edgefield co., S. C, Aug. 11, 1847 ; joined Confederate Army, 1864; a farmer till 1886; engaged in agitaiion which led to establish- ment of Clemson Agriculiural and Mechanical College at Fort Hill ; farmers' candidate for Governor in 1890; elected in Nov.; re-elected in 1892; term signalized by passage of dispensary law and founding of another college, the Winthrop Normal and Industrial College for Women, at Rock Hill ; entered the race for candidate against Senator Builer, and the two canvassed the State together ; elected to U. S. Senate in 1895; member of Committees on Mines and Mining, Naval Affairs, Public Lands, Canada Relations, and Forest Preservation. .^m #* f Hon. Charles F. Crisp. educated i,. co„,n,on -^oo ^. "' ^^ av^n ^^^^ ^^^^^,^ ^,„,i,, , Confederate army, May. Ib61. a p..s ^^^.^^^ ._^ j,,,^^,,,^ . in Americas, Ga., ar,d -■-' ;^;:„,':'gi,!t ig's; moved .o Americus appointed Solicitor-general m lb/ a t, ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^„,^_ in'IsTS; appointed J-^'g^^^S-P ™;/r4 ulLtlr. 50th, 51s.,52d 53d 1878; re-elected J-^^gf ««" 'J^'X of House .n 52d and 53d Con- PRINCIPIvES OF FREE-TRADE. iii geography, climatology and sociology different from our own, there is opportunity for new laws founded on different natural and commercial conditions. This also gives free play to the doctrines respecting protection. Bearing this in mind, we are prepared for opinions and assertions which have weight in free discussion, but which are somewhat removed from the seriousness and weight of fortified laws. These are none the less worthy of consideration, for even if there is no economic law back of them, they may fore- shadow truths which experience will ripen into economic axiom. As other nations, less expansive than ours, less liberally endowed by nature, and altogether less advanced in industrial and commercial knowledge and opportunity, have formulated economic laws, which are quoted with favor and accepted as final, so this nation may well assume to ascertain what is best for itself, and to gives its conclu- sions the form of economic axiom. In this point of view the American politic^tl economist becomes an impressive and invaluable economist, and the passionate wisdom of the partisan something which is crude quartz to the view, yet with crystals of gold inside. As instances, the protectionist is challenged for reply by the declaration that the system of protection is sustained by the co-operation of its beneficiaries, and that they are held together by the "cohesive power of public plunder." Similarly, by the declaration that the tariff is a tax upon the consumer, and that, especially, when imposed on raw materials. Ten cents a pound upon wool means that the consumer will have to pay that much more for the cloth made of that pound. So, when a tariff is declared to be vicious in principle 112 PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. that seeks to perpetuate high rates. Hamilton is quoted, ill 1791 : " The continuance of bounties on manufactures long es- tablished must always be of questionable policy; because a presumption would arise in every such case that there were natural and inherent impediments to success." Clay is quoted, in 1833 : " The theory of protection supposes, too, that after a cer- tain time the protected arts will have acquired such strength and perfection as will enable them, subsequently, unaided to stand against foreign competition." The theory that a tariff protects labor by furnishing it employment is the old theory of " the maximum of toil and the minimum of profit," whereas the true economic theory is " the minimum of toil and the maximum of profit." A tariff fovors a class and tends to monopolies and the formation of trusts, with power to regulate prices and bur- den consumers. A protective tariff and protective policy is not such a public policy as needs to be supported by the people at large. The principle and fact are denied that protection of m article by levying a duty on it tends to cheapen the price of the article, after its manufacture has been established. To defend protection is to justify the taking of one man's money and putting it in another's pocket. The tariff that looks to the protection of labor really in- jures labor when it leads to the production of articles in this country cheaper than abroad. Gladstone defends free-trade on moral grounds — the com- mercial doing as you would wish to be done by. Patrick Henry said : " Commerce should be as free as the winds of heaven ; a restricted commerce is like a man in chains, crippled in all PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. 113 his movements and bowed to the earth ; but let him twisC the fetters from his legs and he stands erect." Protection has invol^'ed many wars and rebellions. The head-spring of the American Revolution was the Naviga- tion Act, an English system of protection which sacrificed to English monopoly the natural rights of her colonies. In keeping with the Navigation Act were other English laws suppressing important manufactures as well as internal trade in the colonies. In the land of the beaver no man could be a hatter unless he had served seven years as an apprentice at the trade. No American hat could be sent out of one province into another. Steel furnaces, plating forges and slitting mills were prohibited as nuisances. Lord Chatham said that in a certain contingency he would pro- hibit the manufacture in the American Colonies of even so much as a horseshoe or a hobnail. Lord Sheffield declared that the only use England had for the American Colonies was " the monopoly of their consumption and the carriage of their produce." These violations of natural law worked their own overthrow, and the mother .ountry lost the brightest jewel in her crown. This event led England to re-examine her commercial system and to adopt the policy of free-trade. Adam Smith completed his great work, " Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," the very year America declared her independence, 1776. In 1 8 17, when Parliament repealed the duty on salt, the agents of the salt monopolies plead for a prohibitory duty on it. " Thus fell," says Thomas H. Benton, " an odious, impious and criminal tax." " The leaven of free-trade principles continued to work in England under the wise and skilful supervision of Rich- 114 PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. ard Cobden, and reached its culminating triumph in the re- peal of the Corn Laws in 1846." — Ricliard Hazvley. In 1842 England exported goods to the amount of ;$570,- 000,000, and in 1865 to the amount of ;$ 1,8 15, 000,000. In the same time her imports rose from ;^326,ooo,000 to $<^0(^- 000,000. In 1842 the number of articles subject to duty- was 1,150; in 1870 only 43 articles were subject to duty, and the duty was not protective. Yet her revenue from customs was about the same in 1870 as in 1842. She now levies duty only on about a dozen articles, such as tea, coffee, tobacco, spirits, wines, etc. Hon. David A. Wells makes an argument for free-trade, or free exchange, thus : — " Population in the United States increased from i860 to 1870, 22.2 per cent. The products of our manufactures increased in the same period 52 per cent. This tendency of manufacturing products to increase faster than population gluts our home markets and shows the necessity for larger and freer commerce." " There is no nation," says he, " or country, or commu- nity, nor probably any one man, that is not, by reason of differences in soil, climate, physical or mental capacities, at advantage or disadvantage as respects some other nation, countr}', community or men in producing or doing some- thing useful. It is only a brute, furthermore, as economists have long recognized, that can find a full satisfaction for its desires in its immediate surroundings; while poor indeed must be the man of civilization that does not lay every quarter of the globe under contribution every morning for his breakfast. Hence — springing out of this diversity in the powers of production, and of wants in respect to locations and individuals — the origin of trade. Hence its necessity and advantage ; and the man who has not sufficient educa- tion to read the letters of any printed book perceives by PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. 115 instinct, more clearly, as a general rule, than the man of civilization, that if he can trade freely, he can better his con- dition and increase the sum of his happiness ; for the first thing the savage, when brought in contact with civilized man, wants to do, is to exchange ; and the first effort of every new settlement in any new country, after providing temporary food and shelter, is to open a road or other means of communication to some other setdement, in order that they may trade or exchange the commodities which they can produce to advantage, for the products which some others can produce to greater advantage. And, obeying this same natural instinct, the heart of every man, that has not been filled with prejudice of race or country, or per- verted by talk about the necessity of tariffs and custom- houses, experiences a pleasurable emotion when it learns that a new road has been opened, a new railroad constructed, or that the time of crossing the seas has been greatly short- ened ; and if to-day it could be announced that the problem of aerial navigation had been solved, and that hereafter everybody could go everywhere, with all their goods and chattels, for one-tenth of the cost and in one-tenth of the time that is now required, one universal shout of jubilation would arise spontaneously from the whole civilized world. And why? Simply because everybody would feel that there would be. forthwith a multitude of new wants, an equal multitude of new satisfactions, an increase of business in putting wants and satisfactions into the relations of equa- tions in which one side would balance the other, and an in- crease of comfort and happiness everywhere." "All trade," he says, " is at the bottom a matter of barter; product being given for product and service for service; that in order to sell we must buy, and in order to buy we must sell ; and that he who won't buy can't sell, and he who won't ii6 .PRIXCIPLEvS OF FREE-TRADE. sell can't buy. . . . The United States, for now a long series of years, has, in its fiscal policy, denied or ignored the truth of the above economic, axiomatic principles. It has not, indeed, in so many distinct words said to the American pro- ducers and laborers. You shall not sell your products and your labor to the people of other countries ; but it has em- phatically said to the producers and laborers of other coun- tries, We do not think it desirable that you should sell your products or your labor in this country; and, as far as we can interpose legal obstructions, we don't intend that you shall ! But in shutting others out, we have at the same time, and necessarily, shut ourselves in. And herein is trouble No. i. The house is too small, measured by the power of producing, for those that live in it. And remedy No. i is to be found in withdrawing the bolts, taking off the locks, opening tht- doors, and getting out and clear of all restrictions on pro ducing and the disposal of products." Mr. Wells illustrates his theory by the failure of the United States to compete with England for the trade of Chili, Argentine and other countries. For though we could place our cotton manufactures in those countries as cheaply as England could, we refused to take their products freely in turn, or except by first imposing a duty on them. The position assumed by Mr. Wells that " all trade is at the bot- tom a matter of barter," ignores, in part, the function of money in the making of exchanges. He was answered thus by a "Protection" writer: *' The function of money, or its representatives, is that of enabling indirect exchanges to be made. The shoemaker buys his cabbages from one man and sells his shoes to an • other. Trade, in place of being a right line between two points, becomes, so to speak, triangular and polygonal. " This applies pre-eminently to nations, which are aggre^ PRINCIPLEvS OF FREE-TRADB. 117 gations of individuals, each of whom acts according to his individual interest, in place of being, as Mr. Wells assumes, units actuated by a common purpose, and asking, before they buy a yard of calico, whether a half-pound of copper regulus will be taken in barter. If a ChiHan merchant can buy a salable bale of Fall River cloths cheaper than a simi- lar bale from Manchester, he will not reject it because the Fall River mill cannot buy Chilian copper. He knows that the copper will be sold to Swansea, and that the resulting bill of exchange on London will settle his debt at Fall River as readily as at Manchester, He knows, moreover, that if he patriotically refuses to buy the Fall River goods, his competitor across the street will do so and v/ill under- sell him. All this is the A B C of trade, and no pathetic groaning over the 55,000,000 yards of cotton supplied by England, in comparison with the 5,000,000 yards supplied by the United States in 1874, will get rid of it." Again, Mr. Wells' attention was called to the fact that the removal of restrictions on trade, which restrictions are occasioned by the imposition of duties, did not in fact tend to make countries buy of the United States, even though tlie United States was their best customer. Thus, in 1876, as an instance, the United States bought of Brazil coffee and India rubber, on which no duties were levied, to the amount of ;^44,000,000, and sent in turn only ;^7, 500,000 of her own products. This state of affairs Mr. Wells ascribes to the absence of shipping facilities on the part of the United States, which absence he accounts for by reason of the same mistaken fiscal and commercial policy he had been speaking against. Free-traders deny that protection tends to keep up the price of labor. Germany and France demand high duties in order to protect their ill-paid laborers from competition ii8 PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADK. witii the better paid labor of England. Therefore, low wages do not enable a country to compete with another country. As to this country, such are the advantages of combined capital and labor that the workmen are capable of a larger output than in other countries, and this enables the employer to afford them better wages. The general high rate of wages with us is due to the productiveness of labor, or, in other words, to the energy and efficiency of our laborers, the extended use of machinery and our great natural resources. Prof Taussig lays dov/n the doctrine that it is wrong to limit duties lO articles which can be produced in this coun- try. Many of such articles, sucli as wool, iron and silks, are in the nature of raw material and enter into the manu- facture of other articles. Tea, coffee and sugar are entered free of duty. A duty on these would have no such effect as a duty ou iron, namely, that of turning the industry of the country into unproductive channels. If revenue must be raised by duties on imports, those duties should fall on articles not produced in this country, just as the internal taxes fall on tobacco and spirits. During the thirty years that the English corn laws w^ere in existence the prosperity of the farmer continually de- clined. Earm labor suffered in proportion. Artisans and laborers in manufactories were reduced to penury. The peace of the country, and even the existence of the govern- ment, were threatened. Sir Robert Peel, who had changed from Protection to Free-trade and had championed the repeal of the Corn Laws, said on retiring from power: "I shall surrender power severely censured by those who, from no interested motives, adhere to Protection, considering it essential to the welfare and interests of the country. I shall leave p PRINCIPIvES OF FRKE-TRADB. 119 name execrated by every monopolist who, from less honor- able motives, clamors for Protection, because it conduces to his own individual benefit. But, it may be, that I shall leave a name sometimes remembered with expressions of good will in the abodes of those whose lot is to labor, and to earn their bread by the sweat of their brows, when they shall recruit their strength with abundant and untaxed food, the sweeter because it is no longer leavened with a sense of injustice." The entire doctrine of Free-trade was confirmed by reso- lution in the British House of Commons in 1852, and the Protectionists gave up the battle. In the United States, from 1824 to 1833, the demands of Protectionists threatened the peace of the nation, just as their demands did in England. At the time of the adoption of the compromise tariff of 1833, President Jackson said in his message of that year: '' Those who take an enlarged view of the condition of our country must be satisfied that the policy of Protection must be Ultimately limited to those articles of domestic manu- vacture which are indispensable to our safety in time of war. Within this scope, on a reasonable scale, it is recommended by every consideration of patriotism and duty, which will always, doubtless, secure for it a liberal support; but be- yond this object we have already seen the operation of the sj^stem productive of discontent. In some sections of the Union its influence is deprecated as tending to concentrate wealth in few hands and as creating those germs of de- pendence and vice which in other countries have character- ized the existence of monopolies and proved so destructive of liberty and the public good. A large proportion of the public in one section of the Union declares it not only in- expedient on these grounds, but as disturbing the equal 120 PRINCIPLES OF FREK-TRADE). relations of capital by legislation and therefore unconstitu- tional and unjust." Said Senator Rowan, of Kentucky, in 1828: ** It is in vain that Protection is called the 'American System.' Names do not alter things. There is but one American system, and that is delineated in the State and Federal Con- stitutions. It is the system of equal rights secured by the Constitution — a system which instead of subjecting the labor of some to taxation with a view to enrich others, se- cures to all the proceeds of their labor, exempt from taxa- tion except for the support of the protecting powers of the government." As chairman of the " Committee on Manufactures " in 1832, John Quincy Adams said : — " The doctrine that duties of import seem to cheapen the price of the article on which they are levied, seems to conflict with the first dictates of common sense. The duty constitutes a part of the price of the whole mass of the article in the market. It is substan- tially paid upon the article of domestic manufacture, as^well as upon that of foreign production. Upon one it is a bounty, upon the other a burden, and the repeal of the tax must operate as an equivalent reduction of the price of the article whether foreign or domestic We say so long as the importation continues, the duty must be paid by the pur- chaser ot the article." In 1846 George M. Dallas said: — "This exercise of the taxing (tariff) power was originally intended to be tem- porary. The design was to foster feeble infant manufactures, especially such as were essential for the defence of the coun- try in time of war. In this design the people have per- severed until these saplings have taken root, become vigorous, expanded and powerful, and are prepared to enter with con- fidence the field of fair, free and universal competition." PRINCIPIvKS OF FRKH-TRADR. 121 Protection is responsible for the evils resulting from a violation of law /cnown as smuggling. This practice, or crime, is as baneful and disastrous to the honest tradesmen as the competition of free-trade is healthful and beneficial. Taking the two decades, 1840 to 1850, and 1850 to i860 and regarding the first as a period which was most affected by the high tariff of 1842, and the last as most affected by the free-trade tariff of 1846, the contrast is in favor of the last decade. During the non-protective period cotton manu- factures increased 130 per cent., woollen manufactures in- creased 62 per cent, and mostly between 1857 and i860, when the cheaper grades of wool were admitted free. The year i860 saw the manufacture of 913,000 tons of pig-iron at good prices, or 100,000 tons more than any previous year. In i860 the aggregate of our exports showed an in- crease of 200 per cent, in ten years. The decade between 1850 and i860 showed an increase of agricultural produc- tions of 100 per cent, over the previous decade. In i860 our total exports were ^400,000,000, or ^43,500,000 more than any previous year ; and our imports were ^362,000.000, a much larger amount than any previous year. We con- sumed far more sugar, tea and coffee, per capita, during the free-trade tariff decade than the previous one, and also more than between the years of i860 and 1868, years of protec- tion. Farms increased in value 103 per cent, between 1850 and i860. Farm products increased frona 75 to 100 per cent. The products of all our manufactures was ^553,000,000 in 1850; in i860, it was ^1,009,000,000. From 1840 to 1850 the real and personal property in the United States in- creased 80 per cent; between 1850 and 1S60 it increasec! 126 per cent At no time prior to 1850-1860 had the cap- ital of the nation increased so fast, and nothing demonstrates so forcibly the success of free-trade principles in the United 122 PRINCIPLES OF FRKE-TRADE. States. In 1850 there were 872 banks; in i860, 1562; while banking capital increased from ;^2 27,500,000 to ^422,000,000. Vast sums were expended in railroad build- ing during the decade — 21,613 i^^iiles being built, as against 904 miles between 1842 and 1846. Protective duties on wool depress the price of domestic wool and injure wool-growers. The reason is that when the supply of wool-growing countries is shut out of our market, it floods Europe at so low a figure as to enable European manufacturers to make the finer class of goods and sell them to us, duty paid, at a lower figure than we can afford to make them. The price of American wool has not risen with higher tariffe. By the time Protection pays the penalty of over-produc- tion, it makes it too costly as an experiment. James Buchanan said in 1846: — "Our Domestic Manufactures have been saved by the election of James K. Polk from be- ing overwhelmed by the immense capital v/hich would have rushed into them for investment, and from an expan- sion of the currency which would have nullified any protec- tion short of prohibition." So Hon. James Lloyd, of Massachusetts, said in the Senate in 1820: — "I am interested in manufactures. I own stock in one of the cotton-mills running in my State. It regularly pays good dividends and is likely to do so con- tinually if the tariff is let alone. But if you pass the bill, hundreds of such factories will be erected, till tlie market is glutted with their fabrics, when prices must fall and our concern very possibly be broken down." Of the year i860, the end of the free-trade era. General J^mes A. Garfield said: — "I suppose it will be admitted on all hands that i860 was a year of unusual business prosperity in the United States. It was at a time when the bounties of PRINCIPI.BS OF FREE-TRADE. 123 Providence were scattered with a liberal hand over the face of the RepubHc ; it was at a time when all classes of our conniiunity were well and profitably employed ; it was a time of peace, the apprehension of our great war had not yet seized the minds of our people; great crops, north and south— great general prosperity— marked the era." Hon. Caleb B. Smith, President Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, says in his report :—" Without any special stimulus to growth— depressed indeed, during the years 1857 and 1858, in common with other public interests by the general embarrassments of those years, and with a powerful com- petition in the amazing growth of manufactures in Great Britain and nearly every other nation in Europe— the manu- factories of the United States had nevertheless augmented, diversified and perfected in nearly every branch and uni- formly throughout the Union. Domestic materials, whether animal, vegetable or mineral, found ready sales at remunera- tive prices and were increased in amount with the demand, while commerce and internal trade were invigorated by the distribution of both raw and manufactured products. Inven- tion was stimulated and rewarded. Labor and capital found ample and profitable employment, and new and unexpected fields were opened to each. Agriculture furnished food and materials at moderate cost, and the skill of our artisans cheap- ened and multiplied all artificial instruments of comfort and happiness for the people. Even the more purely agricul- tural States of the South were rapidly creating manufactories for the improvement of their great staples and their abundant natural resources. The nation seemed speedily approach- ing a period of complete independence in respect to the products of skilled labor, and national security and happi- ness seemed about to be insured by the harmonious develop- ment of all the great interests of the people." 124 PRINCIPLES OF FREE-TRADE. The principle of free trade has never been applied abso- lutely in the United States. No politcal party has been brave enough to dare the trial. Yet the arguments in favor of free trade are all invoked when the protective system is attacked, and even when the design is to lay down taiiff laws embod^dng only the doctrine of tariff for revenue. This has been strikingly exemplified in the history of tariff discussion subsequent to 1887, which was the date of Mr. Cleveland's celebrated message announc- ing the necessity for '* Tariff Reform. " His main argu- ment was an elaboration of the idea that tariffs were a source of burdensome and unnecessary taxes, bearing as directly on the people as any other taxes, and so to be gotten rid of as speedily as possible. So also, in these later discussions over tariff refurm, the free trade doctrine that tariffs fostered trusts was given un- usual importance. Perhaps this argument was never used so effectively before, for it was given strength by the fact that trusts had grown in number and extentout of all pro- portion to the legitimate needs of corporate orpartnershij) enterprise. Whether free trade, or even tariff reform, would prove a panacea for the evil of trusts, was not argued in an historic or even economic sense, for it was taken fur granted that since their presence in a time of protection was due to protection, therefore absence of jn'otection would work their destruction. Again, the argument that free trade meant for this and all countries an open and, therefore, more profitable market, was given especial significance in that economic revolution which came about through the passage of the Wilson tariff bill. It will be remembered that that bill as originally drafted went as faras its supporters dare go in the application of free trade principles, without trenching PRINCIPLES OF FKEE-THADE. 125 on the revenues of the government. It niiglit be men- tioned, that, as the sequel proved, they went further than tliey intended to go, for in its practical workings tlie Wilson act failed to pmcluce its share of public revenue. But the point in this connection was that it was to open the^ markets of this country to other countries, and, by parity of reasoning, the markets of other countries to this one. As this argument never before had such opportu- nity for direct and able support and for full and free appli- cation,economists as well as the interests affected will await with anxiety its practical results. And this anxiety will be intensified, and economic study greatly advanced, by coupling with those results the fact that in the application of the argument of open markets to the Wilson tariff bill, a part of the aim, and an aim wholly accomplished, was the destruction of the principle of reciprocity as found in- corpoi-ated in the McKinley Act of 1890. This principle, at^ the time of its incorporation into tlie above act, waii said to be a step in the direction of free trade. The argu^ ments in its favor were certainly analagous for a certtia distance, to those used by free traders in favor of open markets, and in principle the two aims to be accomplished are nearly identical. , PRINCIPLES OF PROTFXTION. The doctrine of protection starts without a doubt as to nomenclature. As a principle, it admits of no exception in the first chapters of the history of every commercial nation. The commercial nation never existed that did not, at first, protect itself So astute, refined and far-reaching has commerce become, that no nation which refuses to protect itself can ever hope to test its fitness for commercial suprem- acy, or independence, much less obtain it. The same is true of industrial and manufacturing inde-* pendence, both of which imply commercial independence, the moment transit is acknowledged as a subject of pro- tection. Nature supplemented by art made American transit supreme, or nearly so, when ships were of wood. Art combined with nature made English ships supreme, when ships came to he of iron. But nature is still on our side as to iron. Add the art of England to American nature, and transit will have ita old supremacy. Art is protection and protection art. A protective tariff provides revenue for the government in a better way than any other kind of a tariff England levies duties for revenue only. They fall on two classes of articles ; first, luxuries ; second, on articles that cannot be raised or produced profitably at home and cannot come into competition with home productions. It so happens that the latter class of articles embraces tea, coffee and many things which rank as necessities among the common people. Protection omits duties, when not required for simple 126 ! ! •' f i ^^^^' It i^ *• ^"""'^^Si, s "4* i .^^^H^^^^^^^H n ^ ^» Hon. WiLLiAJki B. Allison. Born at Perry, Ohio, March 2, 1829 ; educated at Western Reserve College ; admitted to bar in Ohio ; moved to Iowa, 1S57 ; served on Governor's staff during war; elected as Republican to 38th, 39th, 40ih and 41st Congresses ; elected to United States Senate, 1872; re-elected, 1878, 1884 and 1890 ; one of the oldest, ablest and most respected Senators ; Chairman oi Committee on Appropriations ; Member of Com- mittees on Engrossed Bills, Finance, Census, Extension of Library, and Geological Survey ; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee oil the Republican ticket in 1896. Hon. William E. Chandler. Born at Concord, New Hampshire, December 28, 1835 ; graduated at [ Harvard Law School and admitted to bar, 1855 ; reporter of Supreme Court, 1859; member of New Hampshire Legislature, 1862-63-64; Speaker of House, 1863-64; Solicitor and Judge Advocate-General of Navv Department, 1865 ; First Assistant Secretary of Treasury, June 17, 1865-November 30, 1867 ; member of the New Hampshire Con- stitutional Convention, 1876; elected to New Hampshire Legislature, 1881 ; appointed Solicitor-General by President Garfield, 1881, and re- jected by Senate ; appointed Secretary of Navy by President Arthur, April 12, 1882, and served till March 7, 1885; elected as Republican to United States Senate, June 14, 1887 ; re-elected June 18, 1889, and again, January 1(), 1895; Chairman of Committee on Census, and member of other important Committees. PRINCIPIvES OF PROTKCTION. 129 revenue, from tea, sugar, coffee, and articles which rank as necessities, and which cannot be produced profitably at home or cannot come into competition with home produc- tions, and in their stead levies discriminating duties upon articles that come in direct competition with home pro- ducts. The rate of such duties is adjusted, in theory, so that the foreign product cannot enter the home market at a price below what it can be produced for at home, with a fair profit included. Some rates are prohibitory, as when there is desire or determination to found a new industry; but as a rule they are simply discriminative, and in favor of industries which exist, but which would cease to exist unless protected. Since labor constitutes a large per cent, of manufactured products— in some products as much as ninety per cent, of the cost— the most direct effect of protection is to maintain the price of that labor as it enters into the home product, and preserve it from competition with the cheaper labor that enters into the same product abroad. The effect of protection on labor is direct and indirect. When the price of labor in protected industries is main- tained, that in the unprotected industries is also maintained. The application of protection to industries in this country reverses the doctrine of political economists that the price of an article is increased to the consumer by just the amount of duty imposed upon it. Protection may increase the price of an article temporarily, and by some per cent, of the duty levied, but the price de- clines as the home manufacture of the article enlarges and home competition sets in. Protection encourages capital and invites it into enter- I30 PRIXCIPIvES OF PROTECTION. prises from which it would shrink, owing to its natural conservatism. The spirit of invention and the employment of labor-sav- ing machinery and devices are encouraged by protection. Labor yields most when aided by artificial appliances and cheered by Hberal and certain remuneration. The last three factors render production exceptional in this country. Togetlier with the law of competition, they furnish an output of products better in quality and cheaper in price than those of nations that rely solely on cheap labor for cheap price. The cheapness of protection does not imply degradation of labor, but greater deftness of hand, quickened genius, advantage of natural opportunity. The tariff is not a tax. While most articles, whose home manufacture has been encouraged by a duty upon them, sell at no higher price than when imported, many such sell for a less price than the .duty imposed. When the foreign producer lands his goods here, and finds them in competition with home-made goods, he pays the duty. Says a Bradford, England, manufacturer: "The least pos- sible reduction in the American tariff will be a grand thing for Bradford. We are selling our goods for the same prices we did before the higher tariff was enacted, and I know the Bradford manufacturer is paying the duty, not the American consumer." Another English manufacturer says : " If the duties came out of the American consumer the English manufacturer would not care a button about the American tariff laws." Friedrich List, founder of the German Zollvcrein, or Cus- tom's Union, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, all sub- scribe to the doctrine that a country which is exclusively agricultural is necessarily backward. They instance Poland. PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 131 *^ Since, then, although it is undoubtedly bad for privileges to give rise to artificial industries, many industries well suited to the nature of a country will never develop there unless at first protected. The best road to arrive at free- trade and obtain from it the maximum advantage lies throuo^h a temporary adoption of protection." Protection in this country at first vindicated itself by the example of all civilized nations. Then, by universal ac- quiescence in the principle that duties on imports were more cheerfully paid than any species of tax for revenue. Now it vindicates itself by what it has achieved for the country in the domain of capital and labor. It claims to have won by honest effort and practical results the title, "American System." "The safety and interest of the people require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly for military, supplies." — George Washington. " That it may be expedient to guard the infancy of this improvement (' useful manufactures ') by legislation of the commercial tariff, cannot fail to suggest itself to your pa- triotic reflections." Again, "In adjusting the duties on imports to the object of revenue, the influence of the tariff on manufactures will necessarily present itself for considera- tion. However wise the theory may be which leaves to the sagacity and interest of individuals the application of their industry and resources, there are in this, as in all cases, ex- ceptions to the Y\x\Qr—ya?jies Madison. As to the highest duties of the government, Thomas Jefferson, in his second annual message, said : It is " to cul- tivate peace and maintain commerce and navigation in all their lawful enterprises ; to foster our fisheries as nurseries 132 PRINCIPLES OP PROTECTION. of navigation for the nurture of man ; and to protect the manufactures suited to our circumstances." "The restrictive legislation of 1808-15 was, for tlie time being, equivalent to extreme protection. The consequent rise of a considerable class of manufactures, whose success depended largely on the continuance of protection, formed the basis of a strong movement for more decided limitation of foreign competition." — Pi'of. Taussig. Adam Smith, the father of free-trade, admits that could any number of communities, producing what each other wants, be brought into commercial contact, there would have been no need of his evolving the doctrine of free- trade. In this country there are forty-four, and more, of such communities. What was a theory with Hamilton, that protection tended to lower the price of protected articles, became a fact under the operation of our tariff legislation. The genius of a nation is at its best when not subjected to conditions foreign to it. To let institutions have sway here which are born abroad, and which may be best for abroad, would be for us to subject ourselves to monarchy. It would be just the same if we lost our commercial or in- dustrial Americanism and became subject to the codes which demean labor by caste and enslave it by hereditary custom. The protection which monarchical countries, without ex- ception, patronized and by which they exist was never in the interest of labor as now in this country. The conditions which exist in America are wholly dif- ferent from those which gave color to free-trade as a doc- trine with European economists. Had they been situated as we are, and known what we know, they would have col- lated and deduced differently. In one hundred years PRINCIPIvBS OF PROTECTION. ^33 America has established a set of statistical facts which ut- terly destroy the deductions based on facts of an older regime and on conditions never dreamed of Protection in the United States is really a new political economy, of far more worth to us than the economic visions of one hundred years ago, indulged by men who knew no distinction be- tween labor and serfdom and who saw no hope for enter- prise outside of capital linked with landed aristocracy and lordly title. Protection has long since triumphed ov^er the argument tluit it was unconstitutional. This arcjument is not urcred to-day except by the very ignorant or very prejudiced. But the argument reappears in the charge that protection fosters monopoly. This was Calhoun's standing argument. He saw that it enured more to the benefit of free paid labor than of slave unpaid labor, and that it encouraged the manufac- turing as against the planting classes. The industries which involved invention, skill, competition, live capital and paid labor were the ones which protection favored. Those which involved none of these received no benefit from protection and did not need it. His views of monopoly turned on this point. Since the downfall of slavery the heart has been taken out of the monopoly argument, for it has become plain to all that what improves the condition of the entire people does not savor of monopoly. Protection protects against monopoly. Before the tariff of 1824 American cottons sold at 24 cents a yard. After that tariff, they sold at 7^ cents a yard. New mills, im- proved machinery and increased competition, put a better material in the market at a third of the price. The monopoly may be foreign. England sold us steel rails, for railroads, at ^150 per ton. She continued to do this till 1870, when a duty of ^28 a ton was levied. Under 134 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. this protection we began to build mills for their manufacture. The price of steel rails began to decline. They are now sold at a profit at from ^33 to ;$40 a ton. English monopol)^ was costing us five prices for a ton of rails. Protection gives us competing power abroad. Our cotton textiles are recognized as the best in the markets of the world. The same is true of our edge-tools and agricultural implements. European manufacturers imitate these Amer- ican goods and use American labels in order to hold the markets of South America and the Orient. When this competing power is amplified by reciprocity and by direct steam communication, both of which are protective, no na- tion can rival us in South American and Chinese markets. A tariff for revenue is a tax. A tariff on tea, coffee and sugar, raises the price to the consumer, because it offers no inducement, and cannot, by reason of soil and climate, for their home production. Sugar is partly an exception, as we can raise some sugar-cane. It may become wholly an exception if the experiment with beets prove a success. As to trading in manufactured articles, articles of art and handi- craft, the application of the doctrine of natural right as claimed by free-traders, is suicidal to the younger or weaker nation. No nation recognizes it except in theory. Nations are not natural, one to the other, as to trade, except in the respect that they are selfish. They all claim the natural right to exist, to grow, to develop, to be independent. The natural right to be what nature intends is higher than any other. Nature never intended that one nation with numer- ous, large, long and swift streams, equal to billions of horse- power, should buy for all time the manufactures of nations with fewer, smaller, shorter and duller streams, equal to only millions of horse-power, even though the latter nations had. PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 135 by reason of age, so far turned their power to account as to be able to furnish products cheaper than the former. Nature never intended that one nation with a riches of coal and ores far exceeding that of another, should perpetu- ally buy the manufactures of that other, because it had delved in its mines for ages, and could offer products cheaper thafn the first. Nature never intended that a new nation with infinite resources of climate, soil, mine, genius and industry should subordinate its traffic to nations of inferior resources, but with the temporary advantage of age. Nature never intended that nations that had erown old, ripe and rich by means of a protection, which was absolute in comparison with any that prevails to-day, should claim naturalness for a trade established by agencies they deny to others. Nature never intended that conditions of labor under which a laborer can be an earner, saver, head of a family, house owner, voter and public-spirited citizen, should be subjugated to conditions of labor which give caste to occupa- tion, demean calling, yield bare subsistence, crush manhood, stifle ambition, beget slavish routine, reduce to tread-mill task. Nature never intended that the genius and capital of one nation with opportunity should forever obey the commands of another, with less opportunity, but whose opportunity had the advantage of age. But nature did intend that each nation should profi.t by its gifts. If young and undeveloped, it should employ the arts of development that are commensurate with its gifts. If weak, it should cultivate strength; If dependent, it should learn independence. The art of doing this is its own affair. The art should be rational, based on what it knows of itself — its people, geography, topography, climate, soil, ores, streams, 136 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. woods, facilities and resources in general. If, in obedience to books and theories, it is wrong in doing this, no other nation is so white as to call it black. The consensus of na- tions in this respect is nature. The precise form of protec- tion and development is immaterial. English free-trade is the highest, severest, most arbitrary form of protection of which she is capable. It is no more condemnatory of t1ie American idea than was her duty of ;^2 50 on every ;S500 worth of iron, not otherwise enumerated, she imported from her colonies. It is no more acceptable to the American idea than was her stamped paper and tea-tax which brought on the Revolution. The highest duty of a nation is to cultivate nature, for nature means its people, institutions and resources. In this respect America means far more than professors dream of, far more than books teach, far more than little, narrow men with sectional or foreign predilections prate of, far more than England, all Europe, or all the world can in their selfishness impress us with. As a nation we have escaped the thraldom of monarchies, the shackles of caste, the hindrances of mediaeval institutions, the limitations of soil, climate and natural resource incident to a continent which last emerged from polar ice. As to people we are composite. Where and when the mentality and physique of civilization blend for the production of a type, that type will be what nature calls for, the survival of size, shape and qualities, fitted for, or rather shaped by, an environment such as has not hitherto existed. As to institution, we have inverted the pyramid of monarchy whose tip is on the throne and base in the air. Here the base is below% on the people, and the tip is in the air, a sublimation of popular will and not a matter of family or blood. As to areas and climate we blend orient and Occident, tropic and arctic. It is Italy and Russia, London PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 137 and Constantinople. As to soil, mineral, wood and stream the resource is varied and infinite. The alluvium between the Alleghenies and Rockies has no counterpart in the world. Not Ural, Alp or Apennine are richer in ores than our home ranges. No forests of Europe or Asia compare with our pme fastnesses. No streams run larger, fresher, swifter more constant and frequent. It is the place for new men' genms, mstitution, development. The law, doctrine or cus- tom, ripened by wholly different conditions, and sanctioned by antiquity, is not for us. We are a nation-an escape from antique environment. To be true we must be original. This IS especially so as to economics. The facts upon which Smith and Mill built free-trade theories are useless in America. Home facts, embracinc. periods of test, are the only true bases for home deductions'' It IS our right and duty to build on them and to evolve for ourselves the political economy which they warrant, regard- less of the conclusions reached and the laws adopted by other nations. These facts and this use of them have evolved the common law of protection in this country, have con- firmed a principle, have established a system-the system of American Protection. When free-trade makes the claim that home competition cannot cheapen certain classes of home manufactures pro- tection answers that in such cases cheapness equal to that of a foreign product is undesirable ; that there ought to be sufficient patriotic pride among us to pay more for such articles when home-made than when foreign-made their quality and utility being the same; that we will be more than repaid for the difference in price by the encouragement extended to a home industry and by the establishment of a home market; that every cent spent at home is a contribu- tion to the comfort of surroundings, the happiness of 138 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. neighbors, the erection of homes, the welfare of labor, the founding of a home market for the wool, wheat, corn, butter, cheese, eggs and vegetables of the farmers, for which there otherwise could be no possible demand ; or if so, the demand would be of so foreign a nature as to eat up profit by the cost of transportation, by commissions, and by perishability^ All free-traders make much of the argument that protec- tion tends to over-production and consequently to periods of depression and panic. The protectionists answer, first, that this is a confession that protection does stimulate pro- duction. Secondly, they deny iii toto that protection tends any more to over-production and to periods of depression and panic, than free-trade. England is as much subject to periodic visitations of glut and depression as any protected country. The glut and depression in the iron trade of 1884 extended to every iron-producing country, and England suffered most of all. In this connection protection points confidently to its history in this country, and relies upon the unshakable argument it furnishes. The absolutely free-trade era between 1783 and 1789 was characterized by a glut of foreign products, suspension of industries, bankruptcy of manufacturers and merchants, ruinous depreciation of prices, beggary of artisans and laborers, starvation of farmers. Says a writer of the period : " We are poor with a profusion of material wealth in our possession. That we are poor needs no other proof than our prisons, bankruptcies, judgments, executions, auctions, mortgages, etc., and the shameless quantity of business in our courts of law." This condition passed away with the enactment of the tariff Act of 1789. It was a modest provision, but sufficient to enunciate the principle of protection for new industries, PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 139 and to change the industrial and commercial situation. By 1808 the country had recovered from the evil effects of the free trade era. Then set in the restrictive measures pre- hminary to the war of i8i2,as the Embargo Act of 1807 and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. Duties were doubled by the Act of 1812 with a view to secure revenue. These restrictive measures, followed by actual hostilities, proved to be an absolutely prohibitive tariff. Immediately every branch of domestic industry felt the stimulus. Establish- ments for the manufacture of cottons, woolens, iron, glass, pottery, etc., sprang up like magic. This instant and mar- vellous result was due to extreme protection, and it really formed the basis for that strong, persistent and intelligent movement which had for its view legislative limitation on foreign competition, and logical protection, as found in Henry Clay's American System. This view found expression in the tariff act of 1816, which increased duties considerably, but most unfortunately for only a limited period. The 25 per cent, on cottons and woolens was to fall to 20 per cent, by 18 19. What was barely protective became non-protective in three years. Limitation was to undo the affirmative work of the act. Though all that grew out of the ground remained high in price for a time, owing to shortages in Europe, manufactured goods declined. The long pent-up stream of English mer- chandise flooded the country after the close of the Napo- leonic wars, and our manufacturers were forced to the wall. Panic set in, and with it depression, bankruptcy and all the evils of foreign inundation. The products of the soil found the level of devastation, and soon every interest was en- gulfed in the sad wave of commercial blight. The lesson of this crisis was not lost to our statesmen and economists. That strong protective movement set in 140 PRINCIPLES OE PROTECTION. which was to concern so intimately the next generation. England had grown restrictive, as evidenced by the passage of her corn laws. Cotton and all our farm products were ruinously cheap. The time was most favorable for the pro- tection and growth of home manufactures and for the estab- lishment of home markets. Home markets had not until this date been a leading argument for protection, but from this time on the argument grew in strength. The relief tariff of 1818 merely did away with the limitations of the Act of 1 8 16, and extended the duties of the latter act till 1826. After 1 8 19, that is, in 1820, the protectionists made a vigorous effort to enact a really protective act. They failed by a single vote in the Senate. They succeeded in 1824, with a modifiedly protective act, which became more con- firmedly protective in the act of 1828. This protective trend was most advantageous. Recovery from the effect of the panic of 18 19 was perfect. Manufactures again sprang up. Labor got employment and reward. The farmer rejoiced at his pjow. Prosperity and satisfaction reigned. The seven years after 1824 are counted as the most prosperous they had ever known. Free-trade now came to mean the perpetuation of slavery, the nullification of law, secession. It threw itself on the very legislation it had encouraged, and with such ferocity as to compel the compromise tariff of 1833, in which the principle of protection was abandoned. Then the history of 1 8 19 began to repeat itself Depression set in. Values fell. Manufactures ceased. Merchants went into bank- ruptcy. Farmers became impoverished. Labor begged for bread. The horrors of 18 19 were more than repeated in the final crash of 1837, ^^'^^^^^ cows sold for ;^i.oo a head and hogs for 25 cents. The panic of 1837 cost the country PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 141 ^1,000,000,000. To add to the terrible situation, the sliding scale of reduction of tariff rates brought duties so low by 1837 that the Government ran short of revenue, and the national credit fell so low that money could not be bor- rowed for necessary expenses except at enormous discount. The reaction caused by this disastrous epoch swept the free-traders from power and the protectionists enacted the protective tariff of 1842, over the veto of President Tyler. Financial skies began to clear. The sun of prosperity broke forth. Spindles began to hum and labor to smile. The farmer held his plow with confidence. Customs' revenues leaped to seventy per cent, more than during the last year of the compromise Act of 1833. Prices rose, and every in- dustry was inspired with new life. But in 1844 free-trade, more wedded than ever to unpaid labor, and shivering at the importance of paid labor and protected industry, ralh'ed under the banner of " Polk, Dal- las and the Tariff of '42." How much it believed in the "Tariff of '42 " was shown by the enactment of the Tariff of 1846, by the casting vote of Dallas in the Senate. This was a free-trade tariff, and its results were foreshadowed by its opponents. Happily there arose a series of circum- stances which operated very much like the restrictive meas- ures that followed the Act of 1808. They were all protective and sufficiently so to postpone the evil effects of the Act of 1846 for a time. They were the Mexican war, the discovery of gold in California, the Irish famine, and wars in Europe. But even by 1852 the decrease in the value of our exports of bread-stuffs and provisions had fallen off ^47,000,000, and the supposed incentive of a low tariff and increased importa- tions from abroad was not being realized. Another reduction of duties took place in 1857. Finan^ cial revolution set in, appalling m its widespread severity •142 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. and distress. The crisis of 1857 not only impoverished the people, but the public revenues became so small that the Government was compelled to borrow money at from 8 to 12 per cent, discount in order to provide running expenses. Said President Buchanan in his annual message : " With un- surpassed plenty in all the elements of national wealth, our manufactures have suspended; our public works arc re- tarded ; our private enterprises of different kinds are aban- doned and thousands of useful laborers are thrown out of employment and reduced to want." Since the passage of the Morrill Tariff Act of 1861, the doctrine of protection has found constant application. The Act of 1883 effected the largest change in that of 1 861, by reducing duties and enlarging the free list, but it was crude in many of its provisions. The Act of 1890, known as the McKinley Act, still further enlarged the free list, addressed the principle of protection more directly to American labor, and introduced the policy of reciprocity. Protectionists claim for this period, 1 86 1 to the present, the establishment and enjoyment of an industrial s}'stem which has assumed a larger national growth, a more rapid accumulation and broader distribution of wealth than ever before known in the history of our country. During that period there has been but one panic, that of 1873, and that differed from those of 1 8 19, 1837, and 1857, in not being confined to tliis country, but in havmc;" an ori""iii in creneral disturbance of credit abroad, the effect of which was to throw back upon us sud- 'ienly an inordinate number of our bonds. This caused sudden drain and great hardship for a time. The condition was almost repeated in 1890, when the failure of the Baring Brothers, and general disturbance in European credit, shook our commercial centres and tested our ability to withstand panic. In 1873 our mills did not stop running as in other PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 143 panics. Banks did not break by wholesale. Internal com- merce was not interrupted. Every recuperative agency had play. We sold more than we bought, and reduced our national debt. Protectionists aver that the panic of 1873 was a blessing in disguise. The eminent protectionist, Henry C. Carey, thus concludes his historic argument: — " We have had Protection in 1789, 1812, 1824, 1828, 1842, and from 1861 to 1894. We have had Free-Trade, or very low tariff, in 1783, 1816, 1832, 1846, 1857, 1894. Now note the unvarying results : Under protection we have had : | Under Free- Trade we have had • 1. Great demand for labor. i. Labor everywhere seeking em- ,,.,., ployment. 2. Wages high and money cheap. \ 2. Wa-es low and money hicrh 3. Public and private revenues large ' ^ ^ & • 4. Immigration great and steadily in- creasing. 5. Public and private /r(?j;/^^r//)' great beyond all previous precedent. 6. Growing national independence. 3. Public and private revenues small and steadily decreasing. 4. Immigration declining. 5. Public and private bankruptcy nearly universal, 6. Growing national dependence. L The argument that protection injures the farmer has always been a favorite one with free-traders. It has steadily grown in favor, and has been given a decided turn in the Fifty-second Congress by the attempt to remove the duty from wool, binding twine and tin plate. The argument of the protectionist is that manufactured articles, and especially those which concern the farmer, are on an average 25 per cent, cheaper to-day than in i860, when 80 per cent, of them were made abroad. That now 80 per cent, of them are made at home. That the farmer has been saved the cost of ocean transportation on this 80 per cent, and has had the benefit «>f the home market their manufacture has created for his 144 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. produce. That such market is certain, at his door, and already takes 8o per cent, of his wheat and 92 per cent, of his corn. That it keeps even pace with the growth of manu- factures and will ere long take all his surplus, at a better rate than he can get for it abroad and in competition with the cheap wheat of India and Australia. In addition to the above argument, protectionists show- that our free list now embraces nearly half of our importa- tions ; that said list comprises all the articles which affect the comfort of the farmer or poor man, such as sugar, fi uit, rice, breeding animals, tea, coffee, etc. ; and that the dutiable list embraces high priced articles and articles of luxury, such as wines, liquors, cigars, silks, satins, glassware, dia- monds, linens, cottons, etc., the duties on which are paid mostly by the wealthy. The free-trader argues that " free raw material used in the manufactures " is especially worthy of a place on the free list. Among these he classes wool, flax, hemp, seeds, iron ore, pig iron, coal, marble, etc. The protectionist claims that the free-list, as enlarged under the Act of 1890, embraces a sufficient number of these articles ; that tliose, like wool, which pay duty, come into competition with the products of our farmers and laborers in shops, mines and furnaces ; that labor is a prime object of protection ; that all the articles, technically classed as " raw material," are not such to the farmer, laborer, miner and furnace man, because they represent the labor, skill and even capital of the latter, as much as cloth represents the skill and capital of the manu- facturer, or the coat those of the tailor. Protection repudiates the doctrine that it is a device for the benefit of the privileged classes. It rests on the principle that it operates for the general development of the resources and the encouragement of the industries of the country. If Hon. Joseph R. Hawley. Born in Richmond co., N, C, October 31st, 1826; educated ai Hamilton College, N. Y. ; admitted to bar in Hartford, Conn., 1850; editor of Hartford Evening Press and Coia-ant ixonv 1857 to present; enlisted in army April 15, 1861 ; mustered out as Brevet Major-General January 15, 1866; elected Governor of State, as a Republican, April, 1866; Delegate to Republican National Conventions, 1872-76-80; President of Centennial Exhibition ; elected to 42d Congress, November, 1872 ; re-elected to 43d and 46th Congresses ; elected to U. S. Senate, as a Republican, March 4,1881; re-elected in 1887, and again in 1893; Chairman of Committee on Military Affairs, and member of Committees on Coast Defences, Pensions, Nicaragua Canal, etc. Hon. Thomas B. Keed. Born at Portland, Maine, October 18, 1839 ; graduated at Bowdoin, 1860; studied law and admitted to bar; Assistant Paymaster in Navy, 1864-65 ; member of State House of Representatives, 1868-69, and of Senate, 187C ; Attorney General of Maine, 1870-72 ; Solicitor of Port- land, 1874-77 ; elected, as a Republican, to 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d, 53d and 54th Congresses; elected and presided as Speaker of House in 51st Congress ; an able and efficient parliamen- tarian ; his decision as to actual presence and constructive absence in counting a quorum was sustained by the U. S. Supreme Court ; a writer and speaker of originality and force ; elected Speaker of House in 54th Congress ; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee in 1896. PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 147 classes or capital are emboldened by it to undertake new ventures or to enter channels they would not otherwise do, that is a matter which does not affect the prime object of protection and cannot be controlled by legislation. It was not England's tariff system, but her free-trade system, which tended most to sustain her landed aristocracy. Out of the ten richest men in the United States, nine have accumulated fortunes in speculative and commercial pursuits, other than manufacturing, and one in manufactures that had to deal with protected articles. So as to trusts. Protectionists say the facts do not support the theory that protection leads to trusts. The worst trust- ridden countries are free-trade countries. Trusts in America are quite frequently the result of English genius and capital. The Standard oil, Chicago gas. Street railway. Electric lighting, Cotton seed oil. Sugar deal, Reading deal, Rich- mond terminal, and others, which rank as trusts or combina- tions, exist in spite of the doctrine of protection and in no way concern it. It is by no means certain that these com- binations are harmful to the public at large. For everyone that finds an existence by reason of dealing in protected articles, ten can be found that would exist, tariff or no tariff Protection has made the manufacturer content with a reasonable profit. An annual profit of ten per cent, is barely possible in this country in the best-established man- ufactories. Said Mr. Bright in the English Parliament, in 1842: ''America, as an independent country, has been a more valuable customer to England than she could possibly have been as a colony. On all the goods exported to America during the last quarter of a century you have made a net profit of forty per cent." Prices of home man- ufactures can therefore be trusted to home competition, but 148 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. foreign prices cannot be trusted at all, unless they are forced to meet our home competition. This was particularly glaring when England was charging ;^I50 for a ton of steel rails which afterwards, and in the face of our home compe- tition, she was glad to get ;^40 for. The removal of duty from tea and coffee in 1872 caused a rise in their price. There was a reason for the rise in coffee, because Brazil imme- diately levied an export tax on it. But neither tea nor cof- fee have been so cheap since 1872 as before, when tea paid fifteen cents and coffee two cents a pound duty. They avoid home competition entirely. The protectionist supports his doctrine by calling in as a witness the material growth of the country since 1861, and comparing it with that of countries wedded to free-trade. He confidently asks judgment on the practical workings of his policy, and claims for the results a fulfillment of the prophecies of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Benton, Clay, Webster and even Calhoun, who in 1 8 16 made his famous appeal in favor of the protection and importance of manufactures to the " national strength and perfection of our institutions," and in " binding more closely our widespread republic." During thirty years of protection, and notwithstanding the wastage of four years of war, our population has grown at the rate of one million annually — a greater rate than that of England, France, Germany and Austria combined. Our wealth has grown from ;^ 1 7,000,000,000 to nearly $^0,- 000,000,000, or at the rate of ;^ i ,000,000,000 a year. There has gone Into our savings ;^885, 000,000 yearly, or almost half as much as the savings of the entire world. The man- ufactories, mines and forests of Great Britain produced ^4,- 500,000,000 in 1886, an increase of 30 per cent since 1850. The same products in the United States in 1880 were vakicd PRINCIPLES OF^ PROTECTION 149 at ^5.500,000,000, an Increase of 160 per cent since 1S60 Since 1800 our farms have more than doubled in number andmcreased in value from ^6,000.000,000 to ^10 000 000- 000, while their products, which were ^i,8oo,ooo,ooG in 18&0, were ^3,800,000,000 in 1880. In 1880 the entire products of Great Britain— farms fac- tories, mines, forests and all-were ^6,200,000,000, or ^172 per capita. Of this product she exported ^1,300,000,000 In the same year the total products of the United States were ^10,000,000,000, or ^200 per capita. Of this product te,i76,ooo,ooo were consumed at home. Thus our home market consumed more than Great Britain consumed and exported, and more than double the combined exports of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Holland and Aus- tria. Besides this consumption of home products we im- ported ^700,000,000 as against ^335.ooo,ooo in i860 and exported ^750,000,000 as against ^373,ooo,ooo in i860 Protectionists do not claim that the system of protection IS, or ever has been, perfect. It is not possible to make it so. But It has proved in practice that the arguments of its opponents are unsound. It has established itself as an es- sential part of our commercial and business habit and thouo-ht and IS open to the same equities, and laws of progress and adjustment, as any essential feature of industrial welfare Its destruction, however, cannot be tolerated. Attack on It must be resented. It is not a system which can be trusted to Its enemies for safe-keeping, or modification. Its friends are its natural custodians, and they alone are capable of perpetuating it in the forms best calculated to make it repeat Its past triumphs for labor, capital and the general welfare and to fit it for the legitimate requirements of a still more growthy and imposing future. In 1890, under what was known as the McKinley Tar- 150 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. iff, the principle of protection was applied with a better understanding of its nie^-its than under any former Act. The application was not indiscriminate, but with a view to protecting by duties the labor that entered into wliat we could make or produce at home, and of relieving from duties what we could not make or produce at home. The Act had an existence of only four years, but protectionists found in its operations the strongest historic argument in favor of their doctrine that time had up to that date j^roduced. They found that at the end of the protective era of 1861-1894 the county had reached its highest degree of prosperity, witli a general diffusion of the comforts of life never before enjoyed by its people. The national treasury was in excellent condition, the country's credit above par, manufacturing, mining, farming and all industries were prosperous, labor was in demand and well paid, commerce was active. Hence they naturally pointed with pride to that vindication of their doctrine found in tlie statistics at command, for they had seen the total wealth of the coun- try according to the census, rise from $16,159,616,000 in 1860 to $^62,610,100,000 in 1890. Railroads had increased in the same time from 30,626 miles in length to 167,471 miles. As to manufactures they pointed to the following census figures: Capital ia niauufactnres, 1880, - - $1,233,000,000 '' " 1890, - - $2,950,735,000 Employees iu 1880, - - - 1,301,000 " " 1890, - - - 2,251,000 Wages earned iu 1880, - - - $501,965,000 '' " 1890, - - - $1,221,000,000 Value of products 1880, - - - $2,712,000,000 1890, - - - $4,860,000,100 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 151 More factories were started in 1892 than in any pre- ceding year, and in the same year the foreign trade increased 1128,000,000 over that of 1891, or 1400,000,000 over the average for the preceding ten years. Coastwise trade showed a proportionate increased. No. of depositors in saving funds I860, - - $ 693,370 1890, - - 4,258,893 Deposits in saving funds I860. - - - 149,277,000 1890, - - - 1,524,844,000 Rate of wages touched the highest point in time of peace. Valueof farm products I860, - - $1,364,000,000 " 1891, . - - 4,500,000,000 The national debt decreased $'245,000,000 from 1891 to 1893. The national income was more than enough to meet the annual expenditures. The principal of protection was practically eliminated from our economic system by the passing of the Wilson Tariff of 1894. Pending its passage, and after the coun- try passed through the throes of a depression which, at times, could hardly be distinguished from panic, so great was the change, or threatened change, in its economic policy. Protectionists found another powerful argument —the most powerful of any that had ever come to their support— in the condition of industrial financial and com- mercial affairs that set in in 1893 and lasted till 1897. They saw the manufactories of the country closed by the thousand, and innumerable hands thrown out of employ- ment. They saw business of every kind pass into bank- ruptcy, credits ruined, commerce curtailed, products with- 152 PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. out adequate price. In three years the treasury receipts fell off $80,000,000, and the principal of the public debt was increased by borrowing -f 262,000,000. In 1892, tlie average price of twenty different stocks was 75.68 per cent.; in a short time they fell to 49.10 per cent., a loss of 26.58 per cent. Exports declined rapidly, while imports increased greatly, those of woolens alone showing an in- crease of nearly 350 per cent, in 1894-95. Owing to re- moval of duty from wool, sheep decreased in number from 47,273,553 in 1893, to 33,298,783 in 1896, and the value decreased from $125,909,264 to 865,167,735, or nearly 50 per cent, in the same time. Each year of the Cleveland administration showed a large treasury deficit, that of the first being $72,000,000, of the second, $62,000,000 and of the third $30,000,000. The per capita circulation fell off from $24.44 in 1892 to $21.35 in 1896. The best financiers estimated the coun- try's losses between 1893 and 1896 at a greater total than tlie cost of the Civil war, and the question was trium- phantly asked by protectionists whether it was not entirel}^ too much to pay for a trial of free trade theory. They educed further figures: Interest bearing debt ^larcb 1, 1893, - |5P5,000,000 " " 1896, - 845,000,000 Value of railroads 1893, - - - $1,000,000,000 Depreciation iu tbree years - - - 250,000,000 Loss in value of farm animals in 1895, $91,000,000. De- cline in value of farm produce in 1895, $133,603,073. Total decline in value of farm animals from 1892 to 1896, $733,829,574. Total decline in value of farm crops from 1892 to 1896, $750,000,000. PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION. 153 And SO throughout every domain of industry and en- terprise figures were educed which rendered the contrast between the free trade, or reform, and protection eras per- fectly appalling ; with the inevitable result that protec- tionists fell that their doctrines had been more fully vindicated by an experiment with the opposing doctrines of free trade, than by any arguments they had liitherto used. The lesson was an objective one, and so highly concentrated as to time, so immediate in its application, and so drastic in its effects, as to prove of lasting and in- valuable benefit to economic science. SILVER AND GOLD— AN HISTORIC REVIEW. The use of metal as a medium of exchange and a measure of value has an old and interesting history. The province of' money has ever been a conspicuous theme in political economy. Lately in our country all discussion of money has been given a new turn, and been rendered momentous and exciting by the fact that political parties have chosen to divide upon questions of coinage, quantities, kinds and values of our metallic circulating medium, and seek to make them issues in their campaigns. This has given to what is popularly known as " The Sil- ver Question," or " The Free Coinage Question," a pronn'- nence it never had before. It is within the bounds of truth to say that the "Silver Question" quite overshadowed the *' Tariff Question " in the Fift3'-second Congress, and bids fair to divide honors with that question for a considerable time. Next to, and perhaps equal with, the doctrines of Free-Trade and Protection, it concerns the business inter- ests, the life and work, the labor and property, of every man in the country, from the humblest toiler to the largest capi- talist. No man who works for daily bread, no man who has a dollar saved, no man who has a house or farm, no man who has his capital in factories, stocks, mortgages, or other securities, ought to be ignorant of a question which so intimately concerns his welfare. It is, perhaps, a matter of regret that a question so purely economic should fall into political channels, but such is the fate of all these great questions under our free system of government, and our 154 SILVER AND GOLD. 155 people are seemingly better satisfied with results obtained in their own popular way, than through the media of learned theories and abstruse teachings. In as much they prefer to use their own judgments and to abide by their own verdicts, the obligation is imposed on them of informing themselves as far as possible respecting the merits of this question, and all questions that similarly affect them. WHAT IS MONEY ? Says Laveleye : " Money is the substance or substances which custom or the law causes to be employed as the means of payment, the instrument of exchange and the com- mon measure of values." The difficulty of bartering wares against wares brought into use an intermediate means of effecting the exchange. This means was money, which became an agent of circula- tion and a vehicle of exchange — the cart for transferring property in an object from one person to another, just as the actual cart transferred the object itself Again, money came to be the universal equivalent. When one sells a bushel of w^heat for a dollar, the dollar is the equivalent of the wheat. One can, in turn, make the dollar the equivalent of other goods, which he needs more than the wheat or the dollar. Says Adam Smith : "A piece of gold may be considered as an agreement for a certain quantity of goods payable by the tradesmen of the neigh- borhood." Still further, money is a common measure or standard of values. Some one has called it " The yardstick of com- merce." Length, weight, value, need to be compared with something, in order to subdivide them and turn their parts to use. Hence, a foot is made a standard of long measure, and when we say a stick is twelve feet long, we know ex- 156 SIIyVER AND GOI,D. actly how long it is, and all men will know. This is much more definite and satisfactory than to say, the stick is as long as twenty hand-breadths, for some hands are larger than others, and the stick would be longer or shorter, according to each measurer. So, if we say a barrel of flour weighs as much as two pigs, we get but a vague and varying idea of its weight, for pigs differ in size and weight. But when we set up the pound as a standard of weight, and say that a barrel of flour weighs 196 pounds, all men will have a com- mon idea of its weight. It is the same with value. The value of a horse may be equal to five cows, but as cows have one price to-day and another to-morrow, you have selected a very uncertain means of finding the value of a horse. By the use of money as a common valuer, as in the foot or the pound, you get a definite idea of the value of a horse. When you say it is worth one hundred dollars, or a hundred times one dollar — the dollar being the standard or measurer of value — all men fall to the idea, know what a horse is worth. The foot standard is exactly ascertained and rigidly fixed. The pound standard is also accurately ascertained and rig- idly fixed. In attempting to fix a standard for measuring values, great difficulty is encountered, for, unfortunately, the substances used for measuring the values of articles of com- merce are themselves merchandise, and subject to variation in value like all goods. The best that can be done, there- fore, as to values, is to select as true and invariable a standard of measurement as possible, to watch it closely, and to cor- rect from time to time the expansions and contractions oc- casioned by commercial heat and cold. KINDS OF MONEY. The Siberians used furs as money. The Spartans used silve:r and goivD. 157 iron. The African uses cloth, salt and cowrie-shells. Cat- tle held the largest place as money among the ancients and many of our financial and commercial words are derived from old words indicating the early prominence of the flock and herd. The arms of Diomede were valued at nine oxen ; those of Glaucus at one hundred oxen. The Franks levied a tribute of oxen on the conquered Saxons. Our word " pecuniary " is the Latin peais, *' cattle." Our " fee " is the Saxon /t'^/^, cattle. Metal money was first employed as representing value in cattle. The ox or sheep became its emblem and was stamped on the metal. As civilization progressed and exchanges became more frequent, gold and silver took the place of all cruder metals and devices, as money. This was because time and experience had proved their superiority as measurers of value and media of exchange. They do not deteriorate by keeping. Their production is limited by scarcity of their ores. This gives great value in proportion to weight, and facilitates handling, transport and hoarding. The annual losses of the precious metals by wear and tear and by absorption in the arts have so nearly equalled the annual production, as that the excess of production has sel- dom exceeded the ratio of increase in population and the growing demand for money. Thus the demand and supply being nearly equal, the value of gold and silver remains very stable, as compared with other metals, or other measures of value. The accumulated stock of the precious metals, estimated in money and ornaments at ;^i 0,000,000,000 in the world, tends to lessen variations in value that might be occasioned by diminution or failure of the annual supply. 158 SILVER AND GOLD. All civilized nations seek and accept gold and silver as a means of facilitating exchange. Gold and silver are easily divisible into parts and propor- tions of given weights and values. They receive with ease and permanently the impression which distinguishes their weight, size, design and value. They are readily distinguishable from other metals ; gold by its weight, silver by its sound. THE VALUE OF MONEY. The purchasing power of money ascertains its value. The pure silver which would have bought eight bushels of wheat during the Middle Ages, would bring only two bushels, after the discovery of America. Therefore, it was said of silver, that it had declined to one-fourth of its previous value. Supply of an article usually affects its value, but a supply of money involves the quantity in existence and the rapidity of its circulation. A dollar that makes three exchanges a day is worth three dollars that make one exchange a day. If the demand for money is less than the supply, its value decreases ; only we don't say so, but that prices rise. If the demand for money is greater than the supply, its value in- creases ; but we say, that prices fall. Alterations in the value of money lead to confusion in :ommercial, legal and economic relations. A decrease in the amount or value of money seriously affects the debtor classes. An increase in tlie amount or value of money in- jures the creditor classes. MONEY SYSTEMS. The gold and silver that enter into money are not pure, but mixed with alloy, usually copper, to save the coins from SILVER AND GOIvD. 159 wearing. The quantity of alloy generally introduced is about one-tenth, that is, one part alloy to nine parts of pure metal. In England, the unit of money, gold or silver, of which the other coins are multiples, is the sovereign or pound ; in PVance, the franc; in Germany, the mark; in Holland, the florin ; in the United States, the dollar. The larger coins are generally made a legal tender for debts, without limit. Smaller fractional or subsidiary coins are generally made a legal tender for debts, with a limit as to amount. Still smaller coins, cents, nickels, and such as rank as " token money," are made legal tender for debts of a still smaller amount Formerly, monarchs, cities, bishops and nobles claimed the right to coin money, and they frequently abused their right by diminishing the value of the currency, either by re- ducing the quantity of pure metal in the coins, or by declar- ing them to have a legal value far beyond their intrinsic value. Solon decreed that the mina should be worth a hun- dred drachmas instead of seventy-three. Plutarch says of this decree: ''In this way, by paying apparently the full value, though really less, those who owed large sums gained considerably, without causing any loss to their creditors." Says Laveleye, " Plutarch here expresses the error which has inspired all issues of depreciated and paper currency. No one seems to lose, because payments are made just as well with coins reduced in value as with the unreduced. What is forgotten is that prices rise in proportion as the unit of money loses its value." At the present time the right of coinage is, as a rule, re- served by the sovereign State, and is jealously guarded. In most countries the coining of the standard coin is free. In France, Italy, Switzerland and Belgium, which coun- tries agreed, in 1863, to form the Latin Monetary Union, t6o silver and gold. all gold coins and five-franc pieces are accepted as standard. The minor silver coins are a legal tender for only small debts, and the mints cannot issue them to a greater extent than tlie value of six francs for each inhabitant The sys- tem of the Latin Union is the double standard or bi-metallic system ; that is, it permits the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver pieces, to each of which it gives legal currency, or tlie right to be accepted in all payments. It has, however, been compelled to modify this system to suit circumstances. Countries whose system is "single standard or mono-me- tallic," whether such standard be gold as in some, or silver .as in others, accord free and unlimited coinage and legal- tender quality only to the metal they fix as the standard. The mono-metallic system is the simpler, as to relation of value between coins of different denominations; but as to relation of value between money and goods, the bi-metal- lic system is more sensitive and, consequently, exact. In 1558 Thomas Gresham, one of the councillors of Queen Elizabeth, demonstrated that the money which has the less value v/ill drive from circulation the money which has the greater value. This is known in monetary science as " Gresham's Law." In 17 17 Sir Isaac Newton showed that a means of obvi- ating the ill effects of *' Gresham's Law " existed, by fixing the relation of value between gold and silver the same in all countries. In later times attempts have been made to do this by means of International Monetary Congresses. Attempts to establish a fixed relation of value between gold and silver by single countries have not proved satisfactory. Economists are by no means agreed as to which metal, gold or silver, is preferable as a standard. That the largest number of countries, certainly the largest commercial coun- SIIvVKR AND GOr.D. igj tries, adopt gold as the standard metal, implies some pow^ erful reason for it; but it by no means disproves the theory that gold itself shifts in value like silver and probably quite as much. Indeed, not a few aver that much of what ap- pears to be a shift in the value of silver is really a shift in the value of gold, with which the silver is compared. They also say that in the very nature of things silver is a metal of more stable value than gold, because its production comes- from deep mines, with costly machinery, and an annual out- put which cannot be increased except at great expense, nor lessened without great loss ; whereas the product of gold, much of which comes from auriferous sands, may increase ©r diminish very greatly in a short space of time. BEGINNING OF AMERICAN COINAGE. Immediately after the peace of 1783, and while the Articles of Confederation constituted our only bonds of government, some of the prominent patriots, notably Morris, Jefferson and Hamilton, began agitation looking to the establishment of an American Mint. Naturally the char- acter of the proposed mintage came under discussion. This was the " Coinage Question " of that day. It was neither political nor bitter as at present, but it was none the less earnest, and involved many of the points now under dis- cussion. Great respect was paid to the views of Morris, who, as Superintendent of Finance, was well qualified to speak upon the character of the mintage. He reached the conclusion that in as much as the relative values of gold and silvei were continually changing, there could be no ratio estab- lished between them which would prove stable and satis- factory for purposes of law. Therefore, the only way out of the difficulty, as he reasoned, was for the government to i62 SILVER AND GOLD. adopt silver alone as its metallic money, and proceed to coin it. He was a silver mono-metallist. On account of Hamilton's mastery of finance, his views were equally courted. During the discussions of the sub- ject, which preceded the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, Hamilton made it plain that he was a mono-metallist like Morris, but recognizing the greater value of gold, its higher place among commercial nations and its lesser lia- bility to sudden and extreme fluctuation in price, he pre- ferred it to silver as the metallic standard. Pending these discussions the Confederation came to an end, and the new Constitution appeared (1787) with its provisions as to money and coinage : — The Congress shall have power " to coin money, regulate the value thereof and fix the standard of weights and measures." Art. I. ; Sec, 8. Again, " No State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." Art. I. ; Sec. 10. Here then was recognition of two metals as money, and provision for a bi-metallic currency, should such a result be deemed wise. The matter of establishing a mint came up as one of the earliest and most important under the new Constitution. Hamilton made it the subject of a full and able report to Congress in 1791. In this report he adhered to his views that, in the abstract, a mono-metallic standard would be best, but that such standard should be gold in preference to silver. However, reasoning on the line of expediency, he feared that the adoption of a single standard would tend to limit the amount of the circulating medium, a result by no means desirable, in the infant and experi- mental stage of the Government. Therefore, he concluded that a double standard would be best in practice, and as a policy sufficiently permanent to warrant the forms of law. Hon. Arthur P. Gorman. Born in Howard co., Md., March 11, 1839; appointed Senate page, 1852, and continued in service till 1866 ; served as Collector of Internal Revenue for Fifth Maryland District, 1866-69 ; elected as Democrat to Maryland Legislature, November, 1869. Re-elected 1871, and became Speaker of House; elected to State Senate, 1875 ; re-elected in 1879; elected to United States Senate, 1880; re-elected, 1886 and 1892; prominent exponent of Democratic thought and recognized leader; name familiar in connection with the Presidency; ability as an organ- izer conceded by all ; member of Committees on Appropriations, Com- merce, Inter-State Commerce, Printing, Rules, and Corporations Organ- ized in D. C. F^ON. Henry M. Tet.ler. Born in Allegany co., N. V., May 23, 1830 , admitted to bar in N. Y. , removed to Illinois, 1858; thence to Colorado, 1861; on admis- sion of Colorado to Statehood, 1876, was elected to U. S. Senate as a Republican; re-elected to U. S. Senate for the term 1876-1882; appointed Secretary of Interior by President Arthur in 1882, and served till March 3, 1885; re-elected to Senate in 1885, and again in 1890. Chairman of Committee on Claims; member of Committees on Judici- ary, Ajiproprialions, Rules, etc. SILVER AND GOI.D. 165 His reasons and conclusions proved to be acceptable to the Congress, but there was great diversity of opinion respecting the question of the relative value of the two metals. What should be the fixed ratio between gold and , silver? In fixing such ratio, should the price, or purchas- ing power, of gold at home or abroad be taken ? It was finally agreed that American values were alone to be con- sidered, and that the commercial ratio between gold and silver should be as one is to fifteen. One ounce of eold was to be taken as worth fifteen times as much as one ounce of silver. OUR FIRST COINAGE ACT. The first Act of Congress relating to coinage was passed April 2, 1792, and was entitled "An Act establishing a mint and regulating the coins of the United States." This Act provided for the coinage of eagles, half-eagles and quarter- eagles of gold, and for " dollars or units," half-dollars and quarter-dollars, dimes and half-dimes of silver. The coin- age of cents and half-cents of copper was also provided for. The value of each eagle was fixed as " ten dollars or units, and to contain 247 grains and four-eighths of a grain of pure or 270 grains of standard gold." The half and quarter-eagles bore respectively an exact proportion to the eagle in value, weight and fineness. The dollar, or unit, was thus provided for : — " Dollars or units — each to be of the value of a Spanish milled dollar, as the same is now current, and to contain 371 grains and four-sixteenths of a grain of pure, or 416 grains of standard silver." The fractional silver coins contained exactly one- half, one-f(^urth and one-tenth, respectively, of the quantity of fine silver and alloy prescribed for the dollar. The ideal unit for years prior and subsequent to the establishment of the Mint was the pound sterling, yet the Spanish dollar, i65 SILVER AND GOLD. during that early period, was the money of commerce and the practical monetary unit, and it was the general custom to express in contracts that payment should be made in Spanish ^milled dollars. The advocates of silver attach great importance to the expression, " dollars or units," and to the fact that the established unit was the silver dollar. Upon this is based their claim that the silver dollar is the unit of our monetary system, and that the gold coinage is based upon that unit. Each eagle is "to be of the value of ;^io or units," and it is declared that the dollar or unit shall be of silver. This Act provided for the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver, and that both coins should be a legal tender. Thus Section 14 reads : " It shall be lawful for any person or persons to bring to the said Mint gold and silver bullion in order to their being coined, and that the bullion so brought shall be assayed and coined free of expense to the person or persons by whom the same shall have been brought." Free coinage in this sense does not mean that the mint did its work for nothing. It charged one-half per cent, to indemnify it for the time expended in assaying and coining the bullion. Section 16 of the Act contained the legal tender clause, making the coins of both metals, even including the frac- tional silver coins, a legal tender. A cfold dollar, or rather a dollar in s^old, at the ratio fixed in the above Act, would contain 24.75 gi'ains of gold. Multiply this by 15 (for there must be fifteen times as much silver in a dollar) and you have 371.25 grains, as the quan- tity of fine silver for the silver dollar. This ratio was not quite that which prevailed at the time in Europe, the ratio there being about 15^ to I. Our Coinage Act, therefore, SILVER AND GOLD. ,5^ put too low a commej-cial value on gold. It was worth more as bullion in the markets of the world than in the shape of one of our coins. There was, therefore, little or no inducement for any one to take gold bullion or gold plate to the mint to get it coined into gold money, for the utmost they could get for it would be coin of gold equal to fifteen times its weight in silver. In Europe the same weight of gold would command fifteen and a half times its weight of silver. Not only was there no inducement to sell gold to the mint for purpose of coinage, but even what was coined followed to a great extent the law of a commercial commodity, and was retired as something more worthy to hold than the cheaper metal, silver, which measured its value in a popular sense, or else it sought, even as gold coin, the market abroad, where one part of gold com- manded fifteen and a half parts of silver. In those early times we were not in a position as a nation to impress a commercial value on metals used as coin. The law fixed a ratio. The mint impressed the law on the coins. After that they followed largely the higher and more arbitrary laws of commerce and of nations. They were in the markets of the world and subject to their fluctua- tions. And this was true, even though we had great need for metallic money, as all new countries have where popu- lation is sparse, where intercommunication is slow and ir- regular, and where credit has not yet learned to lend its conveniences to trade. In spite of the ratio of 15 to i, established for our bi- metallic currency by the Act of 1792, the foreign, or com- mercial, ratio forced itself upon us, and for forty-two years, that is from 1792 to 1834, the value of silver, as compared with gold, fluctuated, often rising nearly to 16 to i, but never falling to 15 to i.* It is clear, then, that silver was i68 SIIvVER AND GOLD. cheaper than gold, and silver currency than gold currency, which fact, as those who oppose the hee coinage of silvef aver, proved the truth of Greshani's law, mentioned above, that wliere two metals are made a legal tender and given free coinage at a fixed ratio of value, the cheaper metal will circulate to the exclusion of the dearer. To illustrate: A yard is 36 inches, but if a merchant finds that if, within law, he can satisfy his customers with a yard of 35^ inches, he will prefer the shorter standard of measure. Sixteen ounces make a pound avoirdupois, but if he can, within law, satisfy his customers with fifteen ounces, he will do so. An ounce of gold is worth in the markets i^y^ ounces of silver; he will not use the gold, but the legal equivalent of the gold, or the 15)^ ounces of sil- ver, namely, the 15 ounces which he finds in the shape of silver coin, and a legal tender. This presumes that the ounce of gold set up as the standard of value is fixed, like the yard, as a standard of measure and the pound as a standard of weight. Commer- cial custom and monetary science incline more and more to this presumption, and as a fact gold is made to so largely measure the value of silver as well as all other commodi- ties, among enlightened nations, as that it performs the functions of a yard stick as to lengths or a pound weight as to weights. But here the advocates of bi-metallism and free coinage say that gold is not in itself an unchangeable measure of value, as the yard stick is of length and the pound weight is of weight. It has its own fluctuations just as silver has, though perhaps not to the same extent. It is, therefore, not a true measure of value for silver. The Hon. Marcus A. Smith, of Arizona, in his recent ^speech upon " The free Coinage of Silver," thus treats of this question of gold SILVER AND GOLD. ,5 measurements and of the principle underlying " Gresham's Law : " " The inflexible and unchangeable value, which is often attributed to gold coin, is simply the arbitrary value of a standard only measured by itself This is the value to which the quoted words plainly apply. Governments can no more give fixed commodities, or comparative value, to gold and silver than they can arrest the motion of the stars. David Hume, John Locke, Adam Smith, and all the older economic writers agree that gold and silver both fluctuate in value. " Profs. Jevons and Walker, more recent authorities, show by compar3tive tables of statistics that between 1789 and 1809 gold fell 46 per cent. ; that between 1809 and 1849 it arose 145 per cent., and that within twenty years after the latter date it fell 20 per cent. It is estimated that during the past eighteen years gold has again risen 30 per cent. Jevons says that — " ' In respect to steadiness of values the metals are prob- ably less satisfactory, regarded as a standard of value, than many other commodities, such as corn.' " The discovery of new mines, the exhaustion of the old mines, the arbitrary adoption of the metals by governments for money purposes or their demonetization and disuse for such purposes, and the greater or less demand for them for artistic and mechanical uses, are accidents and circum- stances which contribute to fluctuation in their value. Use- fulness or utility gives desirability. This desirability leads to use, and whether the use be by governments or individuals, or both, for money or in the arts, or for both, it creates the demand which, in connection with supply, gives exchange va'lue. *' The law, custom, or usage, that rendered the fabled 170 SILVER AND GOLD. nugget of copper a proper tender by the mummy as a fee to Charon, gave it its monetary value for that purpose. It was the tribal law, custom, or usage which ordained the use of silver as money, that gave to the 400 shekels of silver which Abraham tendered to Ephron the Hittite, and * cur- rent money with the merchants/ its monetary value ; it was the law, custom, or usage which decreed the use of silver as money, that gave to the twenty pieces of silver for which Joseph was sold into slavery, and the thirty pieces of silver for which the gentle Nazarene was betrayed to his death, their monetary value. '' In each instance, even on the principles of barter, the use of silver, for other purposes than money, was a factor, contributing to its monetary value, and not by itself creating it. Where barter is applied the sum total of usage gives to the metals what is termed the monetary value, but what, more properly speaking, is only commercial value. Crusoe, on his desert isle, sitting among his sacks of gold, is the synonym of poverty until he finds the grain of wheat which gives promise of food and life. That gold had no commer- cial value. The grain of wheat was worth immeasurably more than all of it. But let civilized governments, or even barbarous tribes find it, and at once its use for the purposes of money makes it command a thousand times its weight in wheat. " So far from the value of given articles ^ for other pur- poses ' being the sole cause of their monetary value, the former is not always even co-existent with and equal to the latter. Was it the ' value for other purposes ' of the iron in the coins of Sparta, under Lycurgus, that gave to those coins their monetary value? Was it the value of the leather ' for other purposes ' that gave to the money of Car- thage its monetary value ? Was it its * value for other pur- SILVER AND ^OLD. i^, poses ' that gave to the money made in China in the thir- teenth century from the bark of the mulberry tree its mon- etary value? Was it its 'value for other purposes' that gave value to the wampum of the American Indians ? Was it their ' value for other purposes ' that gave to the glass coin of Arabia, the brass coins of Rome, the pasteboard bills of Holland, the tenpenny nails of Scotland, the musket- balls of Massachusetts, and the cocoa-beans of Mexico, their monetary value ? " Is it its value for other purposes that gives to the ^800,- 000,000 of silver coin in France to-day its monetary value ? Is it its value for other purposes that gives to our ;^400,- 000,000 of standard silver coin and the millions more of subsidiary and minor coin their monetary value? The commercial value of the silver in the coin of France is ;^ 1 70,000,000 less than its monetary value, and in the United States nearly ^100,000,000 less. How obvious, therefore, it is that governments not only by the use of the metals as money add to their commercial value, but at times confer a monetary value beyond and independent of the commercial value ? " Much is said about one kind of money driving another kind out of circulation. The Gresham Law is simply a law of displacement. It applies to all articles of commerce as well as to money. The self-binder displaces the sickle, and the railway train displaces the stage-coach. But the theory that the scarcest money is the best money is on par with the idea that the smallest crop is the best crop. Gold and silver, like other commodities, go where the highest prices are offered, whether the offer comes from individuals or governments. Monetary value is national; commercial value is cosmopolitan. The single-standard metal, whether it be gold or silver, if alternately money and commodity jy2 SILVER AND GOLD. instrument and article of commerce. Economic Iftw is in- exorable. "England adopted the single-standard in 1819, and Ger- many, the Latin Union, and minor European states, at a later day. Since 1819 the Bank of England has suspended specie payment nearly a dozen times, the land-owners of England have been reduced from 165,000 to less than 30,000. Her ^3,500,000,000 national debt is as large as at the close of the Napoleonic wars, yet bread riots have periodically startled her cities and agitated her statesmen. But two years ago, when heavy drafts were made on her gold by Russia, her Barings touched the borders of insol- vency, and, in spite of all the assistance of the Bank of England, plunged several leading New York banks into ruin and carried our country to the edge of panic and finan- cial disaster. Goschen, the chancellor of the British Ex- chequer, announced to Parliament that the perils attending the increasing competition for gold made a consideration of the return to bi-metallism advisable. "The rule or law of Sir Thomas Gresham did not apply to gold and silver. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth, I think it was, the coin in circulation was found to be degraded by clipping and general short weight. It was found that as long as any clipped or abraded piece of sih^er would bu}' as much as a full-weight piece of silver, the heavy piece was kept out of commerce and used in the arts, and the spurious piece did the trade of the realm. The light dis- placed the heavy in commerce, or had such tendency, and this is all that the Gresham law meant." However these things may be in theory, in fact our early gold coins, being worth more, when compared with silver, than the value which was stamped upon them, began to depart either from circulation or from the country entirely. SILVER AND COLD. 173 This movement began almost simultaneously with the pas- sage of our first Coinage Act. It was very perceptible by 1 8 10, and continued until 1834. In all that time there were less than ;^ 12,000,000 in gold coined, a large per cent, of which was lost entirely to the country by export. By 18 14 the mintage of gold coins had fallen to ;^77,ooo. In 18 15 it fell to ;^3,000. In 1 8 16 the coinage of gold amounted to nothing. After 18 19 gold disappeared as a circulating me- dium in the United States. During this time (1792-1834) there were only 1,439,417 silver dollars coined, and none of these were coined after 1805. The coinage of the silver dollar was in all probabil- ity discouraged by the fact that gold was seen to be disap- pearing, and with the hope that a scarcity of silver dollars might enhance their value. Or, their coinage may have ceased by reason of the fact that the foreign silver coins of that denomination were ample for trade purposes, the bulk of our metallic currency being at that time of foreign make. The mint was not, however, idle. It was busy on fractional or subsidiary coins. By 1 834 it had coined ;^50,ooo,ooo of silver half dollars, and a proportion of lesser coins, which, with the large per cent, of foreign subsidiary coins, furnished an ample minor currency. This currency condition was far from satisfactory. Bi- metallism was not proving the theories of its authors. The question of a change began to be mooted. Some few alter- ations were made in the Coinage Act from time to time, but the original Act remained in all its essential features up till iS34- By 1 83 1 Hon. Campbell P. White, an authority on such matters, had reached the conclusion that a system which sought to regulate the standard of value in both gold and silver had inherent and incurable defects. He thought it ,74 SILVER AND GOLD. had been clearly ascertained by experience that it was im- possible to maintain both metals in concurrent, simultaneous and promiscuous circulation. In 1832 a Committee on Coinage reported that it could not find " that both metals hav^e ever circulated simulta- neously, concurrently and indiscriminately in any country where there were banks or money dealers ; and they enter- tain the conviction that the nearest approach to an invariable standard is its establishment in one metal, which metal shall compose exclusively the currency of large payments." The time had now come for a substantial change in the Coinage Act of 1792. What was chiefly apparent to all in 1834 was the fact that the ratio between gold and silver, es- tablished by that Act, was no longer, if it had ever been, correct. It undervalued gold. But there was no general departure, so far as the debates show, from the bi-metallic idea. Statesmen still preferred to struggle with the intricate problem of finding a ratio between gold and silver which would prove to be the ratio of comm^erce. The Director of the Mint, in his report to the Congress for the year 1833, said that the " new coined gold frequently remains in the nunt uncalled for, though ready for delivery, until the day arrives for a packet to sail for Europe." And he concluded that the entire coinage of gold in the future, amounting to perhaps $2,000,000 annually, would be ex- ported, unless there was a reform of the gold standard. In his advocacy of a change in the ratio between gold and silver, Hora. Thomas H. Benton, in a speech delivered in the Senate in 1834, said: "The false valuation put upon gold has rendered the mint of the United States, so far as the gold coinage is concerned, a most ridiculous and absurd institu- tion. It has coined, and that at large expense to the United States, 2,262,177 pieces of gold, valued at $11,852,820, and SII^VKR AND GOLD. 175 where are the pieces now ? Not one of them to be seen ! All sold and exported ! To enable the friends of gold to go to work at the right place to effect the recovery of that precious metal which their fathers once possessed — which the subjects of European kings now possess — which the citizens of the young Republics of the south all possess — which even the free negroes of San Domingo possess — but which the yeomanry of this America have been deprived of for more than twenty years, and will be deprived of forever unless they discover the cause of the evil, and apply the remedy to the root." Under these auspices the Coinage Act of June 28, 1834, was passed. By this Act the pure gold in the eagle was reduced from 247^ grains to 232 grains, and a correspond- ing reduction was made in the half eagles and quarter eagles. The alloy was changed from 22^ to 26, making the eagle contain 258 grains of standard gold instead of 270 grains. The Act of 1834 made no change in the silver coins. This change in the gold coinage made the ratio nearly 16 to I, the exact ratio being 16.002 to i. Why this ratio was established, or, for that matter, why any change at all was made, is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that at that date the commercial ratio between the two metals was I to 15-6, which, for convenience, Europe was calling i to 15^. The new currency ratio of i to 16 was as far removed from the commercial ratio of I to 15^ as was the old cur- rency ratio of I to 15. Only now the boot was on the other foot. By the Act of 1792 gold was undervalued aiid silver overvalued. By the Act of 1834 the matter was reversed, and gold was overvalued and silver undervalued. Or con- sidering the bi-metallic views of the framers of these acts, the result of the Act of 1792 was to overvalue silver as to gold ; and the effect of the Act of 1834 was to overvalue gold 176 SILVER AND GOLD. as to silver. In their practical workings these Acts quite threw their framers from their bi-metalhc base, and inasmuch as in the Act of 1792 they attempted to exalt silver at the expense of gold, they became, according to the laws laid down in economics, sih^er monometaUists. So, inasmuch as in the Act of 1834 they sought to exalt gold at the expense of silver, they became gold monometallists. There were not wanting those who sounded the note of warning that the Act of 1834 would but repeat that of 1792, in the respect that cheap gold would drive out the silver circulation just as cheap silver had driven out the gold circulation. The Act of 1834 proved very unsatisfactory in its opera- tion. Silver fluctuated, in a commercial sense, for years, but it did not fall in price to the ratio of 16 to i of gold. Consequently silver became worth more, in relation to gold, as bullion or plate than as coin, and it began to dis- appear, there being no inducement to coin it. After 1840, sight of a silver dollar was rare, and as a coin, it played no conspicuous part in our circulation, for very many j^ears. Monometallists regard the effects of the Act of 1834 as another striking vindication of the truth of " Gresham's Law," that the cheaper money invariably drives the dearer from circulation. ACT OF 1837. Dissatisfaction with the Act of 1834 led to that of January 18, 1837, which was, in its form, a supplement to that of 1834, yet a complete revision of the laws of mintage, and was in fact known as "The Mint Act of 1837." This Act changed the standard of both gold and silver coins and the ratio between the metals. The standard for gold and silver coins was fixed at .900 fine, that is, 900 parts of pure metal to 100 parts of alloy. This increased the pure gold in the dallar from 23.20 to 23.22 grains, and fixed the ratio between SIIvVER AND GOI.D. 177 the two metals at 15.98 to I. The silver dollar was changed from 416 grains of standard silver to 412)4 grains, and the fractional coins were made to correspond in exact propor- tion. To make the alloy equal to one-tenth of the weight of the coin, it was necessary to add the small fraction of two-tenths of one grain of gold to the eagle. No change, however, was made in the quantity of pure silver contained in the dollar. That remained iit 3/1^4^ grains, and it con- tinued at that figure. This Act also provided that " gold and silver bullion brought to the mint for coinage shall be re- ceived and coined by the proper officers for the benefit of the depositor." This provision for coinage was taken from the previous Acts, and continued the coinage of the two metals upon the same footing. The fact that there was no change in the quantity of silver in the dollar has given origin and currency to the phrase " Dollar of the Fathers," or the more alliterative and catchy term " Dollar of the Daddies." What is regarded as a serious error in all the Coinage Acts up to and including that of 1837 was the fact that the minor coins had been made to contain the exact proportion cf silver contained in the dollar. They, therefore, paid the penalty visited on the silver dollar. They shrank from cir- culation, or left the country, and this became particularly manifest after the inequality between the production of gold and silver in this country set in with the discovery of gold in California. Prior to this discovery the world's production of gold and silver was nearly equal, the annual average of gold produc- tion between 1841 and 185 I being about ^38,000,000, and that of silver about ;^34,ooo,000. But from 1849 to 185 1 the world seems to have poured forth its treasures of gold with unparalleled liberality. California, Russia and Aus- tralia contributed a new and unprecedented output of gold. jy3 SILVER AND GOLD. In the five years, from 185 1 to 1855, the world's produc- tion of gold leaped from ;^38,ooo,ooo to ;^ 140,000,000 an- nually, while in those years the production of silver only increased from ^34,000,000 to ;^40,ooo,ooo annually. The equality between the two products prior to 1 849 did not serve to materially affect their commercial ratio, but the inequality after that year greatly affected it, by giving a still higher value to silver. This fact, co-operating with the effect of the Coinage Act, enhanced the difficulty already spoken of with the circulation of silver coins of every de- nomination. " There is," said Mr. Dunham in Congress in 1853, *'a constant stimulant to gather up every silver coin and send it to market as bullion, to be exchanged for gold, and the result is, the country is almost devoid of small change for the ordinary small transactions, and what we have is of a depreciated character." The commercial ratio in Europe being about 15%! to i, silver coins were worth three per cent, more for export than our gold coins ; that is, they were worth three per cent, more as bullion than as money. When it became apparent that the country was thus being depleted of its change, agitation set in for a remedy. COINAGE ACT OF I 849. The Coinage Act of March 3, 1849, was a provision for a fuller and larger mintage of gold, whose production bade fair to be greatly ijicreased in this country owing to devel- opments in California. It authorized the coinage of double eagles, and also of gold dollars. " Double eagles should each be of the value af twenty dollars, or units, and gold dollars should each be of the value of one dollar, or unit, these coins to be uniform in all respects to the standard for gold coins now established by law." SII.M.KU !^. Mil.LS. Born in Salem, Kentucky, in 1832 ; when seveHteen years of age he emigrated to Texas; he became a lawyer, and when twenty-seven years of age was elected to the Texas Legislature ; at the breaking out of the civil war he joined the Southern army as Colonel of a regiment of infantry; he was wounded a number of times, though not seriously, and, returning to his home at Corsicana, resumed the practice of his profes- sion ; in 1872 he was elected to Congress on the Democratic ticket, and has been returned at every subsequent election. His majority at the last election was over 16,000; Mr. Mills was always a tariff reformer, and he was entrusted by Speaker Carlisle in the Fiftieth Congress with the task of framing a tariff bill, which was the issue of the campaign of 1888, in which the Democrats were defeated ; Mr. MUIs was a candi- date for Speaker for the present House, but Mr. Crisp secured the prize; elected to U, S. Senate, March 22, 1892, and re-elected for the full term in 1893. W.M. L. Wilson, Chairman of House Committee of Ways and Means atid Atcthor of the Wilson Tariff Bill. Born in Jefferson co, Va., May 3, 1843 ; graduated from University of Virginia in 1860 ; served in the Confederate army ; for several years Professor in Columlnan College; resigned and entered practice of law at Charlestown, W. Va.; elected President of West Virginia University in 1882 ; elected to 49th, 50th, 51st, 52d and ,53d Congresses ; in latter Con- gress served as Chairman of Committee on Ways and Means ; father of the W^ilson Tariff Bill; nominated by President Cleveland as Postmaster-General, February 28, 1895, and took oath of office, April 4, 1895. HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 219 which had been burdened in the colonies was crushed in the free States. At the close of the revolution the mechanics and manufacturers of the country found themselves, in the bitterness of their hearts, independent — and ruined!' Says Bancroft, of the year 1785, "It is certain that the English have the trade of these States almost wholly in their hands, whereby their influence must increase; and a constantly increasing scarcity of money begins to be felt, since no ship sails to England without large sums of money aboard, especially the English packet boats, which monthly take with them between fort}^ and fifty thousand pounds sterl- ing. The scarcity of money makes the produce of the country cheap, to the disappointment of farmers and the discourage- ment of husbandry. Thus the two classes, the farmer and the merchant, that divide nearly all America, are discon- tented and distressed." Said Webster of this period, in a speech delivered in 1833, " From the close of the war of the Revolution there came a period of depression and distress on the Atlantic Coast, such as the people had hardly felt during the crisis of the war itself Ship-owners, ship-builders, mechanics, artisans, all were destitute of employment and some of them destitute of bread. British ships came freely, and British ships came plentifully; while to American ships and American prod- ucts there was neither protection on the one side nor the equivalent of reciprocal free-trade on the other. The cheaper labor of England supplied the inhabitants of the Atlantic shores with everything. Ready-made clothes, among the rest, from the crown of the head to the soles of the feet, were for sale in every city. All these things came free from any general system of imposts. Some of the States attempted to establish their own partial systems, but they failed." 220 HISTORY Ol? AMERICAN TARIFFS. There is no history of America covering tliis tin^.e but what repeats the above views, over and over again, and if anything, in still more lugubrious terms. The situation simply affirmed what Lord Goderich said in Parliament : — " Other nations know that what we English mean by free-trade is nothing more nor less than, by means of the great advantages we enjoy, to get the monopoly of all the markets of other nations for our manufactures, and to prevent them, one and all, from ever becoming manufac- turing nations." With equal sincerity and emphasis David Syme, another member of Parliament, declared :— *' In any quarter of the globe where competition shows itself as likely to interfere with English monopoly, immediately the capital of her manufacturers is massed in that particular quarter, and goods are exported there in large quantities, and sold at such prices that outside competition is immediately counted out. English manufacturers have been known to export goods to a distant market and sell them under cost for years with a view of getting the market into their own hands again, and keep that foreign market, and step in for the whole when prices revive." END OF THE FREE-TRADE ERA. It became manifest to even the dullest mind that America was about to lose her political independence in the mire of industrial and commercial subserviency. Says Mason : — *' Depreciation seized upon every species of property. Legal pressure to enforce payment of debts caused alarming sacrifices of both personal and real-estate ; spread distress far and wide among the masses of the people ; aroused in the hearts of the sufferers the bitterest feelings against lawyers, the courts and the whole creditor class ; led to a popular HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 22 [ clamor for stay-laws and various other radical measures of supposed relief, and finally filled the whole land with excite- ment, apprehension and sense of weakness and a tendency to despair of the Republic. Inability to pay even necessary taxes became general, and often these could be collected only by levy and sale of the homestead." Figures began to pile up and to tell their awful tale. In 1784-85, imports from Great Britain alone swelled to ;^30,000,coo, while our exports reached barely ^9,000,000. In Hildreth's history we read : " The large importation of foreign goods, subject to little or no duty, and sold at peace prices, was proving ruinous to all those domestic manufac- tures and mechanical employments which the non-consump- tion agreements and the war had created and fostered. Immediately after the peace, the country had been flooded with imported goods, and debts had been unwarily con- tracted, for which there was no means to pay." In Maine a Convention was held for the purpose of revolt- ing from Massachusetts on account of the prevailing distress. In New Hampshire the people surrounded the Legislative hall and declared the body should not adjourn till it passed a measure to absolve the people from debt. Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts was but a protest against suffering on the part of the people. In speaking of its causes Hildreth says : — "The want of a certain and remunerative market for the produce of the farmer, and the depression of domestic manu- factures by competition from abroad." In Connecticut alone five hundred farms were offered for sale to pay taxes. The condition was the same in Pennsyl- vania and the Carolinas. Real estate found no market. Debtors were compelled to close out at one-fourth the value of their lands. Men distrusted one another. The best securities were offered at half their face value. 222 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. At length the newspapers of the period, without regard to party, began to clamor for change. Pamphleteers arose with- out number, and joined in the cry of necessity for a change. Merchants, business men, farmers, artisans, laborers echoed the universal sentiment: — "We have had enough of free- trade. It has but one meaning for America, and that is utter neglect of ourselves and the forced sale of our ener- gies, opportunities and resources to the older and better equipped nations. We have won political independence at a cost of seven years of war, we have yet to win the still longer battle for industrial and commercial independence, or else the victory of foreign nations over us will be greater than our recent victory over them." Every one saw what was patent to John Stuart Mill, and what he incorporated into his '* Principles of Political Econ- omy," that : " What prevented the rapid recuperation of the United States, after the peace of 1783, was the 'system of free foreign trade, allowed to add its devastations upon in- dustry to those of the Revolution." Educated by a dreadful experience, it became the convic- tion of all parties that the power of industrial and commer- cial protection, so conspicuously and fatally absent in the Articles of Confederation, must repose somewhere. No other thought impelled more powerfully toward a Union of States under a Federal Constitution. " Four causes," says Bancroft, " above others, exercised a steady and commanding influence. The New Republic, as one nation, ;;///j/ /iai'e power to 7'cg2ilate its foreign covinierce ; to colonize its large domain ; to provide an adequate revenue ; to establish justice in domestic trade by prohibiting the separate States from impairing the obligation of contracts." From this time on till the Constitution became a fact, September 17, 1787, or rather, until the Government became HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 223 a fact, April 30, 1789, a unanimous political and business sentiment persistently and eloquently urged a stronger government, imbued with the paternal instinct, able and will- ino- to defend and encourage home industries and interests. State responded to State in this behalf; statesmen echoed the complaints and arguments of statesmen. Every politi- cal school joined in the pleas for industrial and commercial independence. One of the most assuring phases of the situation was the entire unanimity of artificers, mechanics and working men, who gathered in large assemblies, and by means of public speeches, whose logic was even more forci- ble than those of learned statesmen, and by printed resolu- tions of great vigor and aptness, demanded exemption from the degrading and ruinous competition forced upon them by the free and inordinate influx of foreign goods, upon whose manufacture they depended for a living. Under these auspices the New Constitution took shape, and Clause 1 of Section VIII. provided that " Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." In order to achieve what was equally important in an in- dustrial and commercial sense, viz., perfect interchange of goods and products between the States themselves, or in other words " free-trade " between all the inhabitants of the Union, it was ordained that Congress should never have the power to levy " a tax or duty on articles exported from any State." Thus endowed, the New Government started on its career. The writers of the Federalist, Hamilton, Madison and others, saw in the above clauses sufficient power to remedy the evils complained of, and they eloquently assured their coun- 224 HISTOID Y OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. trymen that the protection they demanded for their infant in- dustries could now be given beyond doubt. Says Bishop : " That the productive classes regarded the Constitution of 1787 as conferring the power and right of protection to the infant manufactures of the country is mani- fest from the jubilant feeling excited in various quarters upon the public ratification of that instrument." THE FIRST TARIFF ACT. The first petition presented to the First Congress, in March, 1789, came from 700 mechanics and tradesmen of Baltimore. It lamented the decline of manufactures since the Revolution, and prayed that the efficient Government with which they were, for the first time, blessed, would render the country " independent in fact as zvell as in name " by early attention to the encouragement and protection of American manufactures and by imposing on " all foreign articles which coidd not be made in America such duties as would give a decided preference to their labors!' Leagues of artisans and tradesmen, merchants and manu- facturers were formed in all the leading cities and industrial centres for the purpose of urging on Congress an early in- terpretation of the new powers conferred by the Constitu- tion in the interest of industry and commerce. Charleston shipwrights followed the Baltimore artisans with a powerful petition to the First Congress, Similar petitions came in from Boston, New York and Philadelphia. As already stated, the universal sentiment of the hour was that the Constitution gave Congress ample power to regulate commerce by a tariff for revenue, for protection or for prohibition, as the case might be. The words" for the regulation of commerce" had a well-understood meaning among American statesmen. They were the words used in HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 225 English enactments when hke objects were in view and when Hke powers were conferred, and they had been in- terpreted so often both on the bench and in actual practice that rational dissent to their meaning was out of the ques- tion. Hamilton, Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, Monroe, ac- corded perfectly as to the nature of the power and the ob- ject of the clause. Gallatin said that on his entrance into public life he found but one sentiment respecting the clause among statesmen. There was then no such objection as afterwards arose, and still exists, and which is to the effect that a power to raise revenue by a tariff does not carry the power to protect home manufactures and industries. Said Washington in his first annual message, " The safety and interest of a free people require that they promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essentials, particularly military supplies.'* The question of a tariff was thus injected into the First Congress, and became the first theme for discussion. It was a Conofress which embraced manv farmers, merchants and manufacturers, an industrial rather than professionaf Con- gress, though, of course, containing many illustrious lawyers and statesmen. That first great question thrust upon it has survived all others, and is as momentous to-day as ever. The other class of questions which drew fiercer, but not more learned, discussion, such as nullification, the national bank, slavery, secession, reconstruction, has happily found a grave. After the passage of a bill regulating the oath of office, the Congress took up the tariff bill, and it became the first general Act of the First Congress. Its preamble fore- shadowed its purport : " Whereas, it is necessary for the support of the Government, for the discharge of the debt of the United States, and for the encouragement and pro- 226 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. tection of manufactures, that duties be laid on imported goods, therefore be it enacted," etc. This preamble drew no dissent. Statesmen North and South gave it sanction. The bill itself drew the widest range of debate, and the learning brought into the discus- sion of its merits has never been surpassed in considering the same subject, though of course facts, statistics and ex- perience have changed the lines of argument, and remodelled theories. This learning not only bore on all the economic phases of the question, as then understood, but it was ex- haustive of the principle that the Constitution designed to secure to the infant manufactures and struggling industries of the country the protection they needed against the riper experience and cheaper labor of Europe. The debates upon this bill were not as to the necessity for protection, nor as to the fact that the legislation pro- posed was or was not in principle the best for the purpose. They were rather upon the question of general method of procedure, and as to whether or not the States might be robbed of some of their reserved rights if too liberal a con- struction were thus early put upon the Constitution. The question of what rate of duty would raise the required revenue and what would insure the needed protection was also a novel one and the subject of animated discussion, as it broke entirely new ground, and was beyond the range of all precedents and experience. Among the leading debaters were James Madison, Richard Henry Lee, Charles Carroll, Rufus King, Oliver Ellsworth, Fisher Ames, Roger Sher- man, James Trumbull, and others, and these all impressed their genius and wisdom on the First American Tariff Act. The Act became a law by the signature of Washington, affixed July 4, 1789. ^ The rates of duty provided by the Act were, in modern acceptation, ridiculously low, yet as HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 227 the legislation was entirely experimental, and as there were no precedents to steer by, there was general acquiescence in the provisions, not only as insuring revenue but as estab- lishing protection. The class of articles subjected to duty is the best guide to the spirit of the Act. It imposed the highest duties on those manufactures and industries which were deemed most in need and most worthy of encourage- ment. They embraced the iron and steel of Pennsylvania ; the glass of Maryland ; the cotton, indigo and tobacco of the Southern States ; the wool, leather, paper and fisheries of the Eastern States. There was hardly an article intro- duced into it whose freedom from foreign competition had not been petitioned for, and the desirability of whose home growth or manufacture had not been made clear to the majority in Congress. A powerful spur to the passage of this Act had been the oft-repeated boast of Great Britain that while America had achieved political independence, it had been reconquered commercially, and was a more abject and useful appendage than before. It was therefore quite natural that the friends of the Act, and those who hoped most from its provisions, should regard it as in the nature of a second Declaration of Independence, and as far more valuable to the Govern- ment and the people for the spirit it evinced and the possi- bilities it contained, than for the rates of duty it established. Tliis Act was followed the next year, 1790, by Hamilton's lengthy and able report upon " Commerce and Manufac- tures." This report was designed to emphasize the prin- ciple of protective legislation. It embraced all the learning and experience of the older nations bearing upon the sub- ject, and it served the purpose of reconciling an almost universal party sentiment to the operations of the Act of 1789, while it more than ever committed the budding nation 228 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. to the doctrine he advocated. It was in this report that he enunciated tlie principle which protectionists of to-day claim to be fully proved by experience, to wit, that internal compe- tition is an effectual corrective of monopoly, and in the end tends to a lower scale of prices for protected manufactures than prevailed for foreign. His interpretation of the powers conferred on the Government by the clause of the Consti- tution relating to taxes, revenue and the common defence has been accepted by all political parties, and it now pre- vails without regard to party lines. This Act of 1789 and this report of 1790 form the begin- ning of an historic and practical protectiv^e era in the United States. It was an era which lasted, under varying condi- tions, which we shall note, up until 18 16. The previous session of the First Congress had been an extra one. It was now, January 4, 1790, in First Regular Session at Philadelphia and had received Hamilton's cele- brated report. Federals and Anti-Federals divided over the payment of the debts, especially those of the States, and the doctrine of open or close construction of the Constitution 'was fast shaping up political lines. However, there was very little division of sentiment on the propriety of increas- ing the rates of duty provided by the Act of July 4, 1789, and they were increased by the Act of August 10, 1790, which went into effect January I, 1791. During the Second Session of the First Congress, which opened October 24, 1791, at Philadelphia, there was much excitenient owing to opposition to the Excise Laws of the previous session and the rebellion against them in Pennsyl- vania, known as the " Whiskey Rebellion." The animosities thus aroused served to widen the gap between the Federals and Anti-Federals, but not enougli to defeat further tariff legislation. The Act of May 2, 1 792, was passed without HISTORY OF AMJSIIICAN TARIFFS. 229 much difficulty. It took effect July i, 1792, and it increased the ad valorem rates of duty from 2^ to 5 per cent. This was the third Tariff Act in three years, and the drift of legisla- tion was in favor of higher and more protective duties. During the First Session of the Third Congress which met December 2, 1793, party lines became still more distinct over matters of tariff legislation. The Anti-Federals had now taken the name of Republicans, and, though without a definite policy of their own, found means of coherence and growth in opposing Federal doctrines. Yet it was a com- paratively easy matter to pass the Tariff Act of June 7, 1794, which took effect July i, 1794. All parties were agreed as to the necessity of providing additional revenue, which the increased ad valoreui rates in the Act were designed to secure. All parties were also agreed that a tariff was the quietest and easiest way of attaining such revenue, and the Anti-Federals, or Republicans, who had violently opposed the excise laws, were even more fully committed to a tariff as a revenue measure than the Federals. They, however, began to draw the line when the doctrine of protection was broached. Not all, of course, but a few whose strict con- struction notions dominated their economic views. The next tariff legislation was the Act of May 13, 1800, which took effect July I, 1800. This legislation was not difficult and was still in the line of protective duties. It raised the duties on sugar half a cent a pound and on silks 2yi per cent. On March 26, 1804, an amended Tariff Act was passed which took effect July 1, 1804. It must be remembered that now the country had undergone a political revolution, that the Republicans were in power in Congress and that Jefferson was President. Yet the Tariff Act of 1804 was in the line of increased duties. 230 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. All the Acts thus far were amendatory of the original Act of 1789, and were helpful of the provisions and operations of that Act. As sufficient time had elapsed to form opinions of the workings of that Act, or in other words, to witness the effects of incorporating protective tariff legislation into our institutions, it will be profitable to turn to the sentiment of the times respecting it. In his seventh annual message, Washington said : — " Our agriculture, commerce and manufactures prosper beyond example. Every part of the Union displays indications of rapid and various improvement, and with burdens so light as scarcely to be perceived." John Adams in his last annual message said : — '* I observe with much satisfaction that the product of the revenue dur- ing the present year is more considerable than at any former period." Thomas Jefferson in his second annual message said : — " To protect the manufactures adapted to our circumstances is one of the land-marks by which we should guide our- selves." The provisions of the Act of 1789 and its amendments had, in their practical workings, so far exceeded expecta- tions, that in 1806 Jefferson found the revenues more than ample for the requirements of the Government. In speak- ing of the surplus he said in his sixth annual message : — " Shall we suppress the imposts and give that advantage to foreign over our domestic manufactures ? On a few articles of more general and necessary use, the suppression, in due season, will doubtless be right, but the great mass of the articles on which imposts are laid are foreign luxuries, purchased only by the rich, who can afford themselves the use of them." In 1809 he wrote to Humphrey thus : — " My own idea is HIvSTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 231 that we should encourage home manufactures to the extent of our own home consumption of everything of which we raise the raw materials." Said Madison in his special message of May 23, 1809: — " It will be worthy of the just and provident care of Congress to make such further alterations in the laws as will more especially protect and foster the several branches of manu- factures which have been recently instituted or extended by the laudable exertions of our citizens." Says Harriman in writing of the Tariff of 1789: — "Agri- culture became more extensive and prosperous ; Commerce increased with wonderful rapidity ; old industries were re- vived and many new ones established ; our merchant navy revived and multiplied ; all branches of domestic trade pros- pered ; our revenues exceeded the wants of government; the people became contented and industrious; the whole country was on the high road to wealth and prosperity." THE EMBARGO AND TARIFF OF l8l2. Now while many provisions in the Tariff Acts up to 1 808 embraced the protective doctrine, such as duties on hemp, cordage, glass, nails, salt and various manufactures of iron, as has been noted the duties were low, according to present standards. Protection of the textiles and of unmanufactured iron had not been much thought of But they were soon to draw attention and become the great subjects of the pro- tective controversy. The year 1808 marks a turning-point in the industrial history of our country. The Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon and the English Orders in Council led to the Embargo Act of December, 1807. The Non-Intercourse Act followed it in 1809. War was declared against Great 232 HISTORY OF AIMERICAN TARIFFS. Britain in 1812. On July I, 18 1 2, the Tariff Act was passed, which became a law immediately. The passage of this Act was strongly urged by Madison in his message to the Twelfth Congress : — " As a means to preserve and promote the manufactures w^hich have sprung into existence and attained an unparalleled maturity through- out the United States during the period of the European wars." The younger leaders of the Republican party took up Madison's request and were prepared to go to any length to grant it. Calhoun and Lowndes joined their logic to Clay's eloquence in favor of the doctrine that protection to home industries should no longer occupy a place secondary to the revenue idea. South Carolina became the highest protection State in the Union, England having levied a duty on raw cotton. The entire Republican party swung away from its strict construction notions and became such liberal interpreters as that they quoted with the utmost favor the report of Hamilton upon which the earlier Tariff Acts were based. The Federals were dazed with the situation, and, failing to see anything good in their opponents, quite forgot their own traditions, and swung, under the lead of Webster, quite to the anti-protection side of the controversy. Out of the confused situation came the "American Idea" and the Whig party, which was Clay's outlet from the strict construction columns. The Tariff Act of the session — a Re- publican, or, as some have it, a Democratic Act — marks the highest rates of duty reached from the foundation of the government up till 1842. It practically doubled the rates existing before. Sugar went from 2^ cents per pound to 5 cents; coffee from 5 cents to 10 cents; tea from 18 cents to 36; pig iron from 17}^ per cent, to 30 per cent.; bar iron from 17^ per cent, to 30; glass from 22>^ per cent, to 40; manufactures of cotton from \y% per cent, to HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 233 30; woolens from 17 per cent, to 30; silk from 15 per cent, to 25. The Embargo Act of i8®8, the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, and the highly protective Tariff Act of 1812, constituted a series of restrictive measures which had the efficacy of prohibitive duties. They gave an enormous stimulus to all branches of industry whose products had before been im- ported. Establishments for the manufacture of cottons, woolens, iron, glass, pottery and other articles, sprang up as if by magic. The success of this extreme protection formed the basis of that powerful movement which subse- quently became the heritage of the Whig party, and which had for its object the decided limitation of foreign competi- tion both as to manufactures and commerce. TARIFF ACT OF 1816. The logic of the Tariff Act of 18 16 is not understood by economists, nor can it be accounted for by any one except upon the theory that having passed through a war, the country would probably settle back into some such condi- tion as existed prior to 1808. The controlling element in Congress was still the young element, the element respon- sible for the war and therefore responsible for its results. They had proven themselves avowed protectionists by the passage of the Tariff Act of 1 8 1 2, and by the favor with which they regarded the new manufactures which had arisen. They were still willing to assist them, for they clung to fair duties in the Act of April 27, 18 16, on those goods in which the most interest was felt, as in textile fabrics. But here the fatality which overhung the Act came in. Cotton and woolen goods were to pay a duty of 25 per cent. — a protective duty — till 18 19. After that they were to pay 20 per cent. On some other classes of goods the dutie5- 234 HISTORY OF A^.TKRICAN TARIFFS. were decreased directly, on others Increased. As to the textiles, Calhoun urged strongly the argument in favor of protecting young industries, and at the same time limiting the protection, after a period when they ought to be on their feet. As a whole the Act of 1816 was protective, but it looked to a period only three years off, when it would no longer be so. This was its misfortune. It prepared foreign nations for our market. Though our breadstuffs, provisions, cotton and every product of the soil were high in price; though wages and rents were high; the currency was very weak and unsettled. Home competition had reduced the price of our manufactured products. The manufacturers of Great Britain found their warehouses bursting with wares. They looked with awe on the American situation, which revealed to them the fact that our home industries had robbed them of a market. This must not be. Those industries are only tentative. By 1 8 19, when the duties of 1 8 16 reach their minimum, they can no longer survive. We will begin the crushing process now. Said Lord Brougham in the House of Commons, " It is well worth while to incur a loss upon our first exportation, in order, by the glut, to stifle in the cradle, those infant manufactures in the United States, which the war has forced into existence." Great Britain began to unload her surplus manufactures upon our shores at far below cost. They were goods that were not new, nor fashionable, nor in demand at home. The protective features of the Act of 1816 were nisufficlent to stay the flood. More than twice the quantity were imported that could be consumed. Great depression in business set in. Bankruptcy became general. The near approach of 1819, when the minimum rates of duty should go into effect, but encouraged the inflow of foreign products. Say^ Hon. William P. Frye. Born at Lewiston, Me., September 2,1831; graduated at Bowdoin College, 1850; educated for the bar; elected to State Legislature, 1861, 1862, 1867 ; Mayor of Lewiston, 1866-67 ; Attorney-General, 1867-68- 69 ; member of Republican National Executive Committee, 1872-76- 80; Presidential Elector, 1864; Delegate to Republican National Con- ventions, 1872-76-80 ; elected member of 42d, 43d, 44th, 45th, 46th and 47th Congresses; elected to succeed James G. Blaine in United States Senate in 1880 ; re-elected Senator in 1883, 1888 and 1895 ; Chairman of Committee on Commerce, and a member of Committee on Foreign Relations, and other important Committees. David Turpie. Admitted to practice at Logansport, Ind., 1849; Judge of Common Pleas, 1854; and of Circuit Court, 1856, both of which he resigned ; member of Ind. Legislature, 1853 and 1858; elected to U. S. Senate, 1863, for unexpired term of Jesse D. Bright; member of Ind. Gen. Assembly and Speaker of body, 1874-75 ; Commissioner for Revision of Indiana Laws; U. S. Dist. Atty., 1886-87; Delegate-nt-Large to Dem. Convention, 1888; elected U. S. Senator, 1,SS7 and 1893; member of Committees on Census, Foreign Relations, Land Claims, Privileges and Elections, Transportation, and U. S. University. HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 237 Thomas H. Benton, " No price for property ; no sales ex- cept those of the sheriff and marshal ; no purchasers at execution sales save the creditor or some money hoarder ; no employment for industry; no sale for the products of the farm ; no sound of the hammer save that of the auctioneer knocking down property. Distress was the universal cry of the people; relief, the universal demand, was thundered at the doors of Legislatures, State and Federal." This condition of affairs appalled Congress and brought about the Tariff Act of 18 18, which simply extended the already ineffective provisions of the Act of 1816 for a period of seven years and placed some few free articles on the duti- able list. It did not prove remedial to the extent expected and the panic of 1817-19 extended over a period of several years. TARIFF ACT OF 1 824. The sad condition of affairs, before described, rendered relief necessary. The liberal side of the Republican party held the ascendant in the Eighteenth Congress, December I, 1823, and elected Clay Speaker of the House. In his message, President Monroe not only announced the cele- brated " Monroe Doctrine," but inclined to the popular faction of his party on matters of protection and internal revenue. He urgently recommended " additional protection to those articles which we are prepared to manufacture." A bill was framed and debated for two months. Calhoun who had deserted Clay, Daniel Webster and John Randolph, led the free-trade forces. Andrew Jackson and James Buchanan were among the strongest advocates of the bill. It did not fix rates as high as the Act of 18 12, but it recog- nized the doctrine of protection more distinctly than any former Act. The strict constructionists urged their old argument against the constitutionality of protection and, for 238 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. the first time in our history, supplemented it with the argu ment that a protective tariff was unfair to the South. As the hnes shaped up they presented ahnost a soHd array of Southern against a soHd array of Northern States. The bill passed by a close vote, May 22, 1824, and it fully engrafted the ** American System " on our national politics. It fixed a duty on sugar of 3 cents per pound ; coffee, 5 cents; tea, 25 cents; salt, 20 cents; pig-iron, 20 per cent. ; bar-iron, $^,0 per ton ; glass, 30 per cent, and 3 cents a pound; manufactures of cotton, 25 per cent. ; wool- ens, 30 per cent.; silk, 25 per cent. The financial and industrial situation responded prompt!}' to this Act. There was such a pronounced betterment of affairs that the friends of the Act were encouraged to try their hand at further legislation in the line of protection. TARIFF OF 1828. In the Twentieth Congress the Democrats (formerly Re- publicans) were in a majority. They were divided, how- ever, over a Protective Tariff. Those of the Northern States united with the National Republicans (Whigs) and brought about the Tariff Act of May 19, 1828. It was largely a Jackson measure, who had carried New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois, on his protective tariff record. This Act of 1828 had little peculiar about it, except that it increased the duty on woolens and few raw materials, in- cluding wool. Yet it proved to be one of the most moment- ous Tariff Acts in our history. (i) It emphasized the " American Idea " by introducing protection in every change of the Act of 1824. (2) It was the turning-point of the hitherto hostile New England sentiment, Webster having changed ground and entered on its advocacy. (3) The South entirely sectionalizcd its opposition to it, and justified HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 239 nullification of it as a blow at the planting interests, as a dls- crinnnation against unpaid labor, and as unconstitutional. Of the operations of the two protective Acts of 1824 and 1828, Jackson said in his message of 1832 : — Our country presents on every side marks of prosperity and happiness, unequalled perhaps in any portion of the world." Webster said: — "The relief was profound and general, reaching all classes — farmers, manufacturers, ship-owners, mechanics, day laborers." Clay said :—" If the term of seven years were selected to measure the greatest prosperity of this people since the establishment of the Constitution, it would be exactly that period of seven years Vv'hich immediately followed the passage of the Tariff Act of 1824." TARIFF ACT OF 1 832. The Tariff Act of 1828 led to bitter party and sectional turmoil. The South was bitterly opposed to it. It had be- come a kind of fashion to prepare for a National Campaign by amending the Tariff Act. An Act passed May, 1830, Vv'hich scaled considerably the rates of duty of the Act of 1828, proved unsatisfactory, because it did not eliminate the protective feati^res of that Act. The nullifying sentiment of the South demanded the repudiation of the protective policy and the affirmation of the free-trade policy by the govern- ment. It was a powerful sentiment and must be appeased, else Jackson could not hope to succeed himself Hence the Tariff Act of 1832, which reduced the rates of duty considerably and placed coffee and teti on the free list. It failed of its purpose, because it contained no repudiation of the protective idea. Nullification set in all the same and South Carolina, November 19, 1832, declared the Tariff Acts of 1S2S and 1832 "null and void." 240 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. TARIFF ACT OF 1 833. The Twenty-second Congress — December 3, 1832 — at its second session, had to meet the question of Nullification. It passed the "Force Bill," which enabled Jackson to collect the duties under the Act of 1832, and then it changed the tenor of the Act by the Compromise Act introduced by Henry Clay, passed March 2, 1833, and designed to show to the nullifier* that the protectionists were not necessarily their enemies. It had the weakness of all compromises, and was immediately heralded by the nullifiers as their vindica- tion, as a surrender of the "American System" and as a justification of South Carolina. It did not enact anything affirmatively, but took the tariff of 1832 as a basis, and scaled its rates by biennial reductions, till at the end of ten years a uniform rate of not exceeding 20 per cent, should pre- vail. This was iigenious and gradual repeal of a protective Act and a practical abandonment of the protective principle. It was notice to the people and was accepted as such by all foreign countries, that the United States had repudiated its earlier policy of protection. Henceforth the tariff was fully afloat on the sea of politics. A very few biennial reductions brought the rates of the tariff of 1832 to where they were no longer protective, and there came an inundation of foreign goods as in 18 17-19. Financial depression followed. Prices fell ; production diminished ; workmen became idle; farm products found no market ; public revenue fell off 25 per cent. ; the government had to borrow at a ruinous discount in order to pay current expenses. The nation was iii the midst of the calamitous panic of 1837 — worse even than that of 18 18-19. Aside from the moral strain of the disaster, the money loss was estimated at ;^ i ,000,000,000. HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 241 TARIFF OF 1842. The drift of popular sentiment was entirely away from Van Buren, 1 837-1 841. The Whigs took the lead and nominated William Henry Harrison, in December, 1839, without a platform. The Democrats renominated Van Buren in May, 1840, and placed him on an elaborate plat- form which contained the plank: — "Justice and sound policy forbids the government to foster one branch of indus- try to the detriment of another, or one section to the injury of another." It also contained a plank which read : — " The Constitution does not confer the right on the government to carry on a system of internal improvements." Harrison was elected President and the Congress had a Whig majority of six in the Senate and twenty-five in the House. Harrison died in just one month after his inaugura- tion, April 4, 1 84 1, and Tyler became President. It was well known that he was not a protectionist. The Whigs enacted the Tariff Act of August 30, 1842, in obedience to a popular demand. The debates on it were acrimonious and, as to the opponents, involved the old arguments of 1828 and 1832, against the constitutionality of protection and the right to nullify an Act of Congress. It passed, however, and President Tylev vetoed it, giving as a reason that it violated the compromise of 1833, which, as to pro- tection and revenue, was to run till 1842, and, as to non-dis- crimination against the planting interests, was practically without time. This Act contained pronounced protective features. Another Act was passed, without protective feat- ures, but with a clause providing for the distribution of any surplus that might arise to the States. This too was vetoed. A third Act was passed without the stirphis clause. This became the Tariff Act of August 10, 1842. 242 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. It found, under the operation of the Scahng Act of 1833, a uniform duty of 20 per cent. This it changed, by raising cotton goods to 30 per cent. ; woolens to 40 per cent. ; silks to ;^2.50 per pound ; bar-iron to $2^ per ton ; pig-iron to $g per ton ; sugar to 2^ cents per pound. Tea and coffee remained free. Clay and Calhoun, who were together in the Compromise of 1833, were antagonists over this Act of 1842. This was the Twenty-seventh Congress. The Act of 1842 was so shorn of its original features that it could scarcely be called protective, but such as it was it sufficed to lift the cloud of depression and introduce an era of prosperity which had not been witnessed since 1832. Business revived. Factories began to operate. Customs receipts rose and put the Government in possession of much needed revenue. Labor sprang into demand. Farm pro- duce rose in price. A large demand arose for iron, wool, cotton, coal, and through competition in manufactures, and the introduction of labor-saving machinery, the prices of manufactured articles were cheaper than ever before. Roads, canals, ships, returned a profit. Corporations, States, and even the general Government, rose from bankruptcy to high credit. Said President Polk in his message of 1 846, '' Labor in all its branches is receiving ample reward. The progress of our country in resources and wealth and in the happy condition of our people, is without example in the history of nations." THE TARIFF ACT OF 1 846. The National Whig Convention of 1844 introduced thi-^ plank into its platform: — "A tariff for revenue, discriminat- ing with reference to protection of domestic labor." The Democrats reaffirmed their opposition to protection, as in the platform of 1840, though they went to the countcy on HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 243 IhQ cry of " Polk, Dallas and the Tariff of 1842." The elec- tion of Polk and a Democratic House favored the passage, in the Twenty-ninth Congress, of a Tariff Act which should repeal or modify that of 1842, for it was known that the South was bent on such repeal. But northern Democrats refused to bow to the situation. Debate took a sectional turn. Northern Democrats pleaded the promises of the campaign, not to interfere with the Tariff of 1842. They were overruled. The Act of July 30, 1846, passed the House, which had a Democratic majority of 61 votes. In the Senate, which had a Democratic majority of five, it met with a tie, and the tie was broken by the casting vote of George M. Dallas, Vice-President, who voted in favor of the measure. The Act of 1846 reduced the rates of 1842, from 5 to 25 per cent., introduced the theory of general ad valorem duties, and affirmed the doctrine of revenue without incident protection. It was a disappointing Act to Northern Demo- crats and Whigs, and while it was far removed from the promises of the campaign, it nevertheless fitted in with the National platform. While the reduced tariff of 1846, and the means by which such reduction was secured, led to that revulsion of public sentiment which culminated in the Whig successes of 1848, the country happily escaped for a time the disasters which had followed, quickly and inevitably, former tariff reduc- tions. The Mexican war (1846-48) created an extra demand for munitions and supplies estimated at over ;^i 00,000,000. The discovery of gold in California (1849) increased the demand for labor, agricultural products, mining materials and shipping; and sent for ten years ^55,000,000 a year in gold into the country. The European countries were in revolution (1848-51). Hi HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. Their agricultural and manufacturing industries were para- lyzed. They could not export; on the contrary required food supplies. The Crimean war followed., involving all Eiu'ope, and creating an extraordinary demand for American breadstuffs. The Irish famine occurred and added to the demand for additional breadstuffs. From 1846 to 1856 these adventitious aids to the indus- tries and trade of the United States proved to be better than any protective agency that might have been sought through forms of tariff laws. But unfortunately they were foreign to sober enactment and any economic principle. They came and went without regard to our domestic situation, our com- fort or discomfort, our weal or woe. By 1854 the true economic condition began to assert itself Foreign imports reappeared in our marts in amazing quantities and at demoralizing prices. The crises abroad being over, our exports declined. Manuflictories suspended operations, being unable to compete with the supply from abroad. In 1848 the national Democratic platform contained a plank denouncing a Tariff, except for revenue, and hailing "the noble impulse given to the cause of free-trade by the repeal of the tariff of 1842, and the creation of the more equal, honest and productive tariff of 1846." The Whigs did not adopt a platform. The National Democratic platform of 1852 reaffirmed that of 1848, in great part; and that of the Whigs affirmed "a tariff for revenue with suitable encouragement to American industry." The Democratic platform of 1856 contained the plank : — "That the time has come for the people of the United HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 245 States to declare themselves in favor of free seas and pro- gressive free trade throughout the world." The new Republican party did -not introduce a tariff plank into its platform of 1856. THE TARIFF ACT OF 1 85/. In the Thirty-fourth Congress, December 3, 1855, the Democrats had a majority of 9 in the Senate, but their magnificent majority in the previous House was turned into a medley of straight Democrats, pro-slavery Whigs, Know- Nothincrs and Anti-Nebraska men. Owinfj to the Kansas- Nebraska troubles, the Congress was not a dispassionate body. While it showed a spirit of generosity in encourag- ing railroad enterprise and grants of public lands, it swung without apparent cause, and in the face of solemn admoni- tions, clear over to a free-trade policy, and under existing circumstances struck the country a cruel blow on the very last day of its Second Session, March 3, 1857. This is the date of the Tariff Act of that year. The only excuse offered for its passage was the redundancy of revenue. This was almost instantaneously met by a flood of importations, for the Act reduced duties along the entire line of imports of leading articles, almost to such rates as had prevailed before the war of 1812, and had prevailed at no time since, except at the end of the sliding scale in 1841, as provided in the Compromise Act of 1833. i As had ever been, the already tottering industries were struck with paralysis, and there occurred an exhaustive out- pour of specie to foreign parts. Within six months of the passage of the Act the country was in the midst of distress- ing panic. No branch of industry escaped the disaster. Ruin was deep and universal. Ere it ceased there were 5,123 commercial failures. The government was compelled 246 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. to borrow money for necessary expenses at a discount of eight to ten per cent. Up to 1 86 1 the public debt increased ;^46,ooo,000, and during the same time the expendilures exceeded the receipts by ^77,234,1 16. President Buchanan, in his annual message, said : "With unsurpassed plenty in all the productions and all the elements of natural wealth, our manufacturers have suspended; our public works are retarded; our private enterprises of different kinds are abandoned ; thousands of useful laborers are thrown out of employment and reduced to want. We have possessed all the elements of material wealth in rich abundance, and yet, notwithstanding all these advantages, our country, in its monetary interests, is in a deplorable condition." TARIFF ACT OF 1 86 1. The Democratic platform of i860 affirmed that of 1856. The Republican platform favored a revenue for duties, with such adjustment of them as would " develop the industries of the whole country." By the withdrawal of members from the Thirty-sixth Congress, to follow the seceding States, the Republicans came into a stiong majority during the second session, met December 3, i860. They improved their opportunity by the passage of the Tariff Act of March 2, 186 1. The Act was natural to the party and the situation. It increased duties all along the line of imports, and reintroduced the protective principle which had prevailed with slight modifi- cation from 1789 to 1832, and from 1842 to 1846. It is needless here to inquire into the rates of duty established by this tariff They differed radically from those imposed in the Act of 1857, and were so laid as to best effect the object of revenue, which was then, or soon would be, greatly HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 247 needed, and at the same time apply and coliflrm the doctrine of protection, as to labor, manufactures and a home market. The war of the Rebellion helped to sanction this Act to the popular will and universal need. It was amended by the Act of December 24, 1861, so as to increase the revenues. It was still further amended by the Act of June 30, 1864, which increased rates of duty, and made them more protec- tive. There was another amendment, March 2, 1867, which chiefly related to manufacture of woolens, an industry which had been greatly stimulated by the war, and whicli was threatened by foreign competition in time of peace. The principle of both revenue and protection had now been strained to the uttermost by the exigency of war, and the period had arrived for a modification of duties. This modification came about under the amendatory Tariff Act of June 6, T872, which reduced duties to a considerable extent, but without much discrimination, and added largely to the free list. TARIFF ACT OF 1 874. Though this Act did not attempt general revision, and was still amendatory, it was nevertheless important in the respect that it was an attempt to correct the inconsiderate reduc- tions of the Act of 1872. The panic of 1873 had followed the reductions of 1872, and though it was a world's panic, and hardly attributable to the legislation of any one nation, it served as a reminder that such catastrophes had invariably succeeded a too rapid reduction of duties and too wide a departure from the policy of protection. Therefore the Act of June 22, 1874, stiffened rates on dutiable articles of a kind which was liable to suffer from competition, broadened the protective idea as to new industries and home labor, and ut the same time allowed a liberal free list, mostly of raw Jiaterials and unmanufactured articles. It was passed 248 HISTORY 01^ AMERICAN TARIFFS. during the first session of the Forty-third Congress, which had a large Repubhcan majority. TARIFF ACT OF 1 883. The Repubhcan platform of 1880 contained a distinctive protective plank ; the Democratic platform declared for " a tariff for revenue only." The Forty-seventh Congress had a Republican working majority in the House, but a tie in the Senate. Owing to the death of Garfield and the little v/ork done by the previous Congress, it stood at the apex of an immense amount of legislation. At the first session, a bill was passed. May 15, 1882, creating a Tariff Commis- sion. This Commission sat at various places during 1882, and its report became the basis of the Tariff Act of the succeeding session. It was a non-partisan Commission, and its existence was due to a sentiment pervading all parties that some highly deliberate step was necessary to correct the incongruities of existing Tariff Acts, and re-adapt rates of duty to our newer and more widely diversified industries. The Commission worked laboriously, and with deference to the spirit of reform wliich had called it into existence, and, it may be said, with due regard to the sentiment of the hour against prohibitive, or even protective, rates as to es- tablished industries. Its conclusions pointed to measures which reduced duties along the entire line of imports, in general at least 25 per cent., in some cases more, in others less. Though the Congress did not adopt all of the conclu- sions of the Commission, its report, as already stated, formed the groundwork of the Act of 1883. The Act w^as passed March 3, 1883, after protracted dis- cussion. While it strove to equalize rates and abolish in- congruities, it did not prove to be a success. Interests were so conflicting that it w^as impossible to avoid crudities and HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 249 hardships. The demands of manufacturers for lighter duties on, or for free, raw materials worked to the injury of the producing; classes, and vice versa. The Act was in the nature of a compromise all round, but it showed that the entire country had come to regard this class of legislation as of the highest moment, and vital to its interests. In the Forty-eighth Congress (1884), which, after the political *' tidal wave" of 1882, contained a large Demo- cratic majority in the House, a determined effort was made to pass the Morrison Tariff Bill, which provided for a hori- zontal reduction of duties to the extent of twenty per cent. The Democrats divided on the merits of the bill and it was disposed of by striking out its enacting clause. TARIFF ACT OF 1 89O. The Republican National platform of 1884 distinctly enunciated the doctrine of protection. The Democratic platform contained a pledge of " tariff revision." There was no further excitement over the tariff till President Cleveland delivered his message to Congress in December, 1887. It was devoted almost wholly to tariff systems and laws, excepted to existing duties on wool and necessaries, and directly opposed the protective idea. It was an earnest paper and had all the weight of a deliberate and special an- nouncement to the American people. The free-trade wing of the party hailed it as a recognition of their views. The " revenue reform " element, headed by Mr. Randall, re- garded it as unwise, as containing the seeds of political dis- aster, and as crushing out the minority element in the party. The Republicans treated it as a challenge to contest to the bitter end the issue of Free-Trade vs. Protection, though they regarded it as unnecessarily bitter in expression, es- pecially in such sentences as, ** But our present tariff laws, 250 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. the vicious, inequitable and illogical source of unnecessary taxation, ought to be at once revised and amended." The English press was profuse in its praise, and as the Spectator said, " His terse and telling message has struck a blow at American protection such as could never have been struck by any free-trade league." What became known as the " Mills' Tariff Bill," suppos- ably framed to meet the President's views, was reported to the House of Representatives March i, iS'88. It made sig- nificant reductions in existing tariff rates, and at once became the absorbing measure of the first session of the Fiftieth Congress. It was evident that upon it, and the repeal of internal taxation, party lines would be closely drawn, except as to the Democratic contingent led by Mr. Randall. The bill proved to have been hastily and crudely drawn, and the debates upon it took a wide range and were exhaustive of the merits of free-trade and protection. It passed the House July 21, 1888, but was met by a counter bill in the Senate, which embodied the Republican doctrine of protection. The two parties were now hopelessly wide apart, the time of the session was exhausted, and both appealed to the country on the record made in the Con- gress. The Republican national platform of 1888 pledged un- compromising favor for the American system of protection. The Democratic platform reaffirmed that of 1884, endorsed the views of President Cleveland in his last annual message, and also the efforts of the Democratic Congress to secure a reduction of excessive taxation. The issue of the campaign of 1888 is w^ell known. With Harrison was elected a Republican Congress. The issue had been so wholly that of Free-trade vs. Protection that the way of the Republican majority was plain. The Conv HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 251 mittee of Ways and Means, whose chairman was William McKinley, invited all the interests concerned in tariff revis- ion to a hearing. A bill was finally framed, which became known as the " McKinley Bill," The effort was to embody in the bill the experience of all former tariff legislation, and what was best of all former Acts ; to impose rates of a dis- tinctively protective character, and in the interest of Ameri- can labor, on manu^ctures which could exist here, but whose existence was threatened by foreign competition ; to impose similar rates on goods, such as tin plates, which we did not, but could manufacture, and ought to; to largely reduce the duty on necessaries, or exempt them altogether, as by making sugar free ; to increase the free list by placing all raw materials on it whose importation did not compete with the home growth of the same ; to introduce the policy of reciprocity by which we could gain something by en- larged trade in return for the loss of duties on sugars and such articles. A great deal of thought was given to the bill, and it was fully debated in Congress. Perhaps no Tariff Act was ever passed, in whose preparation so many interests had been so fully consulted, and with whose provisions the varied inter- ests were so fully satisfied. Certainly none ever passed that had to undergo more minute criticism, whose merits were more elaborately discussed, and respecting which so many prophecies, good and bad, were indulged. Its passage oc- cupied the entire time of the first session of the Fifty-first Congress, and it was not until October i, 1890, that it be- came a law. No other enactment of the Congress approached it in importance. So prominent was this legislation, and such the character of prophecies respecting it, that hardly anything else was heard in the Congressional campaign of 1890. As the im- 252 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. aginations of its opponents had free play, and as nothing could be affirmed of its practical workings by its friends before it began to work, there was another political "tidal wave" like that of 1882, and the Democrats entered the Fifty-second Congress with an overwhelming majority. They were under the same obligations to repeal the obnoxious McKinley Act, and enact a measure which embraced their views, as the Republicans were in the Fifty- first Congress. They were in far better condition to do this, as to the House, for their majority was overwhelming. They, however, did not attempt repeal or general revision, but introduced a series of Acts relating to special articles, such as the lowering of duties on manufactures of wool and on tin-plates, and the placing of wool, binding twine, etc., on the free list. The discussion of these provisions was ani- mated, and in general they passed the House. They served to keep the sentiment of the respective parties prominent, and to shape the issues for a retrial in the campaign of 1892, by which time the practical workings of the Act of 1890 will have tested many theories, and will compel orators to hew closely to lines of facts and figures in order to carry convic- tion. The McKinley Act increased duties on about 115 articles, embracing farm products, manufactures not sufficiently pro- tected, manufactures to be established, luxuries, such as wines. It decreased duties on about 190 articles, embracing manufactures established, or which could not suffer from foreign competition. It left the duties unchanged on 249 articles. It enlarged the free list till it embraces 55.75 per cent, of all imports, or 22.48 more than previous tariffs. The placing of sugar on the free list was a loss of revenue equal to ^54,000,000 a year. Yet in its practical workings, the act never failed to 3IARI0N Butler. Bom in Sampson Co., N. C, Mav 2ft 1 Sfm . i N.C., 1885; relinquished stjdy of 1^^^/ f ' '' ""'^"^"^ °' Alliance and edited CH.Uon cZ:^^. "Z^l fT' ^^ ' e ected president of Farnrers' Alliance, im^. y P^ «'"':' '''"' Allmnce, 1893; Pres.dent of same lsq4 ^^ V..p. of Nat. Farmers' P"ty in 1892. and built up Peol f """ '<"'"''"'™ «'«!< Den,. Populist Committee; member o7b„L''7. '" ''''"''' ^"•^'™"- °f ^p.aemie nisease:x;is;r:;:st oei:erii'ro;dr -^- Hon. Calvin S. Brice. Born, at Denmark, Ohio, September 17,1845; educated at Miami University ; served in Union army, as Captain of Company E, 108th Regiment Ohio Volunteers; studied law at University of Michigan ; ad- milted to practice, 1866; Presidential elector, on Democratic ticket, 1870 and 1884 ; Delegate-at-Large for Ohio to St. Louis National Demo- cratic Convention, 1888; member of Democratic National Campaign Committee, and Chairman of same for campaign of 1888 and since ; elected to United States Senate as Democrat, January, 1890 ; member of Committees on Irrigation, Pensions, Interstate Commerce, Appropria- tions, and Pacific Railroads. HISTORY OP AMERICAN TARIFFS. 255 raise the revenue expected of it, which was ample for all the needs of the Government, with a fair margin to spare. Tariff of 1894. It was tliought at the time that the failure of the Fifty- second Congress to pass a tariff act virtually repealing that of 1890 was due to the fine hand of Ex-President Cleveland. Whether this were true or not, there can be no doubt that the Democratic majority in the House of that Congress not only escaped the danger it feared through excess of untrained forces, but, consciously or unconsciously, paved the way for Mr. Cleveland's re- nomination. The lustre of bf« championship of tariff re- form, the making of it a party issue, the high hope he in- dulged as to its future success, the shrewd calculation on his part that the battles must be many and stubborn be- fore a system so strongly enti'enched as protection could be made to yield, were all so many pointers toward his selection as leader of his party in the Presidential campaign of 1892. In the Convention which placed him ni nomination, it was said of him that, "if he did not I create tariff reform he made it a presidential issue. He vitalized it, and presented it to the Democratic party as the issue for which we ought to fight, and continue to battle upon it until victory is now assured. It consoli- dated into one solid phalanx the Democracy of the nation. In every State of this Union that policy has been placed in Democratic platforms, and our battles have been fought upon it, and this great body of representative Democrats has seen its good results.'^ In that Convention the Committee on Resolutions re- ported a tariff plank which supported the traditions of the party, but it was not deemed radical enough bv a 15 256 HISTORY OF ami:rican tariffs. majority of the Convention, to whom " tariff reform " had no meaning, who wished to express tlieir disgust at the cowardice of the party in the Fifty-second Congress, or who believed that the time liad passed for further dis- guise of the fact that the real issue was one between '^ Free Trade and Protection." This majority, therefore, agreed to make their departure then and there, cost what it might to the party. It was loudly hinted that in their rather desperate action they cared but little for Mr. Cleveland's success, but it is more than likely that their real aim was an issue without disguises. They were con- fident of the support of the solid South, where the Con- federate Constitution had in years gone by enacted free trade. So they determined to throw the gauntlet squarely down, and by one herculean effort purge our institutions of the protective doctrine. They took their radical step by moving the following plank as a substitute for that which had been proposed by the Committee on Resolutions : "We denounce Republican protection as a fraud — as a robbery of a great majorit}' of tlie American people for the benefit of a few. We declare it to be a fundamental principal of the Democratic party that the Government has no constitutional power to impose and collect a dollar for tax except for purposes of revenue only, and demand that the collection of such taxes be imposed b}^ the Government when only honestly and economically ad- ministered. We denounce the McKinley law enacted by the Fifty-first Congress as the culminating atrocity of class legislation. We endorse the efforts of the Dem- ocrats of tlie present Congress to modify its most oppress- ive features in the direction of free raw materials and cheaper manufactured goods that enter into general con- I HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 257 sumption, and we promise its repeal as one of the benefi- cent results that will follow the action of the people in entrusting power to the Democratic party. Since the McKinley tariff went into operation there have been ten reductions of the wages of laboring men to one increase We deny that there has been any increase of prosperit}! to the country since that tariff went into operation, and we point to the dulness and distress, the wage reductions and strikes in the iron trade, as the best possible evidence that no such prosperity has resulted from the McKinley act." This extraordinarily bold announcement of sentiments to which a great party was asked to subscribe, and upon which it was to stake the issues of a presidential cam- paign, was everywhere received with surprise and conster- nation. The}' indicated such a bold advance and such a revolutionary temper as must have inevitably led to party schism and final defeat, had it not been possible to in. dulge the saving thought that Mr. Cleveland could well afford to be a platform unto himself, and would un- doubtedly repudiate whatever he found offensive in tlie above radical plank. Indeed he greatly modified the asperities of the plank in his letter of acceptance, and gave the country the assurance that no war of extermina- tion was contemplated against American interests. Hav- ing taken the sting out of the savage sentences of tlie platform on which he stood, he hoped thereby to reconcile tlie results of the Convention to those who before saw in them the seeds of certain disaster. Mr. Cleveland was elected President, and with him a majority of both Houses of the Fifty-third Congress, thus giving the Democrats full control of all the depart- ments of Government for the first time in thirty-two 258 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. years. So pronounced a victory brought the part}^ face to face with its platform doctrines and pledges, and not a few of the leaders clamored for a swift and deadly blow at the fabric of protection. But Mr. Cleveland was by no means as decided in his tariff reform views as he had been in his celebrated message of 1887. In his message to Congress he generalized on his favorite subject, and glossed his attacks on protection by referring to the evils of paternalism. His language Avas, "The verdict of our voters which condemned the injury of maintaining pro- tection for protection's sake, enjoins upon the people's servants the duty of exposing and destroying the brood of kindred evils which are the unwholesome progeny of paternalism. This is the bane of republican institutions and the constant peril of our Government b}^ the people. It degrades to the purposes of wil}^ craft the plan of rule our fathers established and bequeathed to us as an object of veneration. It perverts the patriotic sentiments of our countrymen and tempts them to a pitiful calculation of sordid gain to be derived from their Government's main- tenance. It undermines the self-reliance of our people and substitutes in its place dependence upon govern- mental favoritism. It stifles the spirit of true American- ism and stupefies ever}^ ennobling trait of citizenship." This generalization betokened caution on the part of the President,, and it was disapj^ointing to those wlio sought an immediate application of the unequivocpJ doctrine of the platform of 1892. But he had witnessed the dangers that arose from a large, newly elected and incongruous majority of his party in the House of the Fifty-second Con- gress. Now the elements were still more incongruous, for the political upheaval that had assured his election, and tlie majority in the Congress, had come about by strange HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 259 alliances with the populistic and communistic elements of the country, and with the discontented of every political persuasion ; and now too he was aware of the strong- disposition of his party to regard victory as a vindication of the bold stand taken in the tariff plank of the plat- form rather than of his modification of the same. He must, therefore, see these new men and get acquainted with these new forces, during the calm after the storm, in order to take the bearings for his administration. Almost synchronous with Mr. Cleveland's inauguration, waves of commercial doubt swept over the country. Amid conditions bordering on panic, industries withered, and idleness, want and distress became the portion of labor. The existence of the Sherman Silver Act was fixed on as a cause, thougli to all protectionists it was manifest that the real cause w^as the demoralizing uncer- tainty created by the threatened overthrow of the pro- tective system. In obedience to the clamor for the repeal of the Sherman Act, Mr. Cleveland called the Fifty-third Congress in extra session, August 7, 1893. It met the ob- ject of the call by repeal of the purchasing clause of the act. Though this was its exclusive official work, the frame- woik of what was to become known as the Wilson Tariff Bill was then and there erected. The election of Speaker of the House, the arrangement of committees, and such other steps as could be taken without interference with the special object of the session, all pointed to early ac- tion on the tariff bill. This was particularly true of the Committee on Ways and Means, with whom the bill was to originate. Hon. William L. AVilson, of West Virginia, was selected as chairman of the committee. This choice was pleasing to Mr. Cleveland, and was, perhaps, dictated by him. He had long admired Mr. Wilson for his industry 260 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS^ ill the House and bis grasp of economic questions. He was a scholarly man, and thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of tlie free trade school of statesmen, especially as found in books. As to fitness for the particular work in hand, the choice could not have fallen on better shoulders. What time could be spared from the immediate work of the special session of Congress, was devoted by the Democratic majority of the Committee of Ways and Means to the preparation of the new tariff bill. This work was extended over the vacation period, the object being to have the bill as far advanced as possible, and ready for early presentation to the Congress at its first regular session, December 4th, 1893. This object was achieved and the bill came into the House soon after the session opened. In the preparation of the bill the Democratic majority of the Committee permitted no interference with its pur- poses. Complaint was made that the various interests of the country were denied a hearing such as had been ac- corded when the McKinley bill of 1890 was under prep- aration, or, if granted a hearing, that their facts and arguments were ignored. But it was not deemed neces- sary to hear fully or favor at all, for the theor}^ of tliebill was to eliminate the protective principle as far as possible, and to establish a system of purely revenue duties, with as near an approach as circumstances would admit of, by an enlargement of the free list, to the principles of free trade. AVhen the bill appeared in the House, its opponents quickly pointed out that it was full of incongruities due to a desire to placate certain sections and favor certain in- dustries. In this respect it was at odds with the platform HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 261 of the party which had denounced as unconstitutional all duties levied for protective purposes, and it, at the time, contained the admission tliat, after all, protection WHS necessary for the existence and encouragement of certain industries. A leading characteristic of the bill was the almost universal departure from the principles of specific duties and the adoption of ad valorem rates. In this respect it copied the old Walker Tariff Act which went out of existence with the adoption of the iNIorill Tariff of 1861. Against this feature of the bill its op- ponents inveighed strongly in House and Senate, deeming the change a direct invitation to fraud upon the Govern- ment by undervaluation of goods by foreign exporters. The counter argument was tliat it was equitable and fur- nislied a sliding scale of duties according to the rise and fall of prices. In general terms the bill made sweeping reductions in duties as fixed in the McKinley Act, turned the lumber schedule practically into a free list, placed wool, coal, animals and iron ore on the free list, and brought all manufactures of wool below the protective rate. The further enlargement of the free list was effected by modi- fications in all the schedules, and especially in those which embraced products of the farm. It struck a direct and exterminating blow at the principle of reciprocity which had been incorporated into the McKinley Act, and brought about the speedy abrogation of the numerous treaties which had been negotiated under that Act, look- ing to an enlargement of reciprocal trade relations with other countries, and which had already brought about great increase in commerce. Perhaps the most conspicuous, certainly the most novel and unexpected feature of the bill, was that levying a tax 262 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. of two per cent, on all incomes in excess of $^4,000. Dur- ing the civil war a similar tax was levied, but it was deemed an emergency tax, was exacted for only a brief while, and after the return of peace, the unexpended pro- ceeds of the tax were refunded to the States. Such a tax had ever met with the bitterest hostility of the Demo- crats, who refused to justify it even as a war measure. It had never found favorable mention in any Democratic platform. There was no open evidence anywhere that the party had undergone a change of heart respect- ing this kind of taxation. The only platform af any party, in 1892, that contained a favorable mention of such a tax was the Populist platform, adopted at Omaha, in which the demand was for " a graduated income tax'' It was charged tliat this furnished the reason for the in- corporation of the income tax clauses in the Wilson Tariff bill, and that the demand for its insertion by those who had proved such willing and profitable allies of the Dem- ocrats in 1892 could not be denied, and this especially since the demand proved pleasing to the South, where the blendhig of Populistic and Democratic doctrines was such as to obscure the political identity of both. In the after discussion of the bill, especially in the Senate, the Popu- list members laid bold claim to the fathership of this in- come tax feature, a claim which was not denied. It was therefore a concession to this new and helpful political element, though a wide departure from the recognized })rinciples of Democracy, and a reflection on its record as spread abroad in convention, legislative hall and in the hust- ings. Its one justification by those who fathered it, was that the rich were not bearing their full share of taxation . To this argument, those who introduced it into the tariff added another, to the effect that it was a necessity be- HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 263 cause the tariff bill as then framed would fail to raise siif- ficient revenue to meet the wants of the Government. It is needless to say that this argument struck the minds of economists and statesmen as somewhat remarkable, since the underlying principle of the Wilson bill was to substitute a revenue tariff for a protective one ; and since in the introduction and establishment of a principle so momentous and a doctrine so cardinal, the one central feature of the bill, the reveyiue feature, should be so faulty as to wring a confession in advance that it was a failure. The heading of the Wilson Tariff bill was " A hill to re- duce taxation^ jjrovide reveiiue for the government and for other purposes.'' Mr. Wilson presented the bill in the House with a speech, in which he justified the departure indicated by the bill, by the doctrine that protection was opposed to the instincts of a free and prosperous people, that paternalism had proven harmful in widening the gap between labor and capital, and in favoring the classes at the expense of the masses. Passing over and explaining the various schedules, he asked for the measure that sup- port which his party was bound to give if it expected to redeem its pledges to the people. The parliamentary struggle over the bill now began. It was to be a prolonged contention. While Mr. Wilson in his introductory speech had sounded the keynote of ar- gument, and had the administration at his back, and therefore presumably his party at his back, it became apparent at an early day that the bill contained inherent weaknesses which might force its material modification and greatly postpone its passage. It was not such a bill as out and out free traders had demanded and expected. It alarmed conservative Democrats who found their home interests threatened by it. It became an object of per- 264 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. sistent and merciless attack by Republicans, who con- demned it more for its glaring inconsistencies tlian for its general aim. As was facetiously stated at the time, it was a bill which met the views of but few of its friends, yet to which all subscribed under the plea that party ne- cessity compelled its support without regard to its intrin- sic merits. The question of its passage in the House, therefore, became one of holding the party together, of keeping up a daily (|uoruni, and of forcing issues as they arose. The rules of the House had been made exceedingly strong fur this purpose, and the rulings of the speaker strenuous. Yet with all this it made difficult and tardy headway. In- terest flagged as the debates progressed, and it became possible for the opposition, by refusing to help the major- ity to keep up a quorum, to . check all progress. This brought about a change of rules, and the adoption of that principle of counting a quorum which the Republicans had adopted in the Fifty-first Congress, and which the Democrats had then so bitterly opposed. Thus fortified, and with the idea more dominant than ever that the bill was a party necessity, it moved moie rapidly toward passage. Few opportunities for amend- ment were given, though amendments were offered in great numbers. The lieavy, dangerous end of the bill was its income tax feature. This was teriffically attacked by the Republicans as giving to the bill a sectional and revenge- ful turn, and as being at odds with all ideas of justice and a discouragement to frugality. It was as powerfully at- tacked by an able Deniod'atic contingent, whose hostility, however, was rendered innocuous by the fact that in the end they would vote for it. After nearly two months of discussion in the House, HISTORY OF AMERICAK TARIFFS. ^65 the bill was passed, February 1st, 1894, by a large and almost strictly party majority, augmented by the Populist strength. The vote stood 204 for, and 140 against it, seventeen of the latter being Democrats. Tlie dominant forces had been well kept together during the struggle, and the passage of the bill was heralded as a signal vic- tory for Mr. Cleveland's administration. It was now ready for the Senate, and the great problem was how it would fare in a body of conservative tenden- cies and where the Democratic majority was meagre. Once in the Senate, it passed into the hands of the Fi- nance Committee, and was immediately referred to a sub- committee composed of Senators Mills of Texas, Jones of Arkansas and Vest of Missouri. The bill had been bit- tei'ly denounced by the Republicans in the House as the boldest stride toward free trade taken since the celebrated Walker Tariff Act of 1846, as a sectional bill framed in the interests of the South and containing a cruel and unnecessary blow at the wealth and industry of the North, and as utterly ruinous to American prosperity. If this were so, it was surely now in the hands of its real friends, for the subcommittee which had it in charge, represented three contiguous southern States, neither of which had large commercial or manufacturing interests at stake. The committee evidently knew for what it had been chosen, for it went about its work in earnest, but in a way which soon led to loud public censure. It refused hear- ings to manufacturing interests where they were confi- dently expected and had been usually granted, on the plea that such hearings would lead to waste of time and indefinite postponement of conclusions. It attempted to remedy, this defective method of procedure by sending out circulars inviting opinions as to the effect of changes 266 HrSTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. in rates of duty, but the complaint was still general, that answers, which could not be satisfactorily framed in this way, were treated with indifference or wholly ignored. After a period of suspense, which was greatly intensi- fied by the prostrated condition of the country, an outline of such bill as the Finance Committee had agreed to re- port was tentatively submitted to the Senate. It imme- diately drew the fierce fire of the Republicans, and after one or two tests of strength, it was seen that further at- tempt to push the measure would prove a failure. While it was not directly recalled, the Committee gave it out that it had a more complete and satisfactory measure in reserve. When this was forthcoming it proved to be a revelation and sensation. It was no longer the Wilson bill as it had passed the House, and hardly a semblance of it, for it had been disfigured and transformed by more than four hundred amendments. Why and how these amendments came to be made — amendments sufficient in number to constitute a new bill^ — can never be historically explained ; yet it may be truth- fully said that so far as conservative Democrats were con- cerned, they urged the importance of such concessions as would insure the speedy passage of the bill and give the -188U; elected to U. S. Senate, 1881; Delegate to Rep. Nat. Conventions, 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888, 1892; Nat. Com. to Col. Fair; V.-P. of Managers of Nat. Home for Disabled Vols.; Com- mander of 2d Brigade of N. J. ; connected wiih various l)anks, trusts and Philanthropic societies; re-elected to U. S. Senate, March 3, 1895; Chairman of Com. on Enrolled Bills ; member of other Committees. HISTORY OF A:MERICAN TARIFFS. 291 renuiiued absolutely non-couiuuttal, added to his absence, and the further fact that eveiy day the bill remained un- signed enured to the enrichment of the sugar and whiskey Trusts, intensified the anxiety respecting the fate of the bill, and multiplied conjectures. Even after the President's return to Washington in better healh, he refused to relieve the tension. Both Houses agreed to adjourn on August 28, at two P. M. The bill drifted into a law at midnight of August 27, 1894, without the President's sanction and signature. The only sentiment he made public respecting its fate was in a letter, dated Angust 27, addressed to Mr. Catchings of Mississippi and Mr. Clarke of Alabama, in which he said that he felt the utmost disappointment at being denied the privilege to sign such a bill, as he had hoped to see passed — one which embodied Democratic ideas of tariff reform. He did not claim to be better than his part}^, nor intend to shirk any of its responsibilities, but the bill contained provisions not in the line of ''honest tariff reform," and also "inconsistencies and crudities which ought not to appear in tariff' laws." He would not sepa- rate himself from his party by a "veto of tariff legislation which, though disappointing, was chargeable still to Demo- cratic effort.'* Besides, there were incidents attending the passage of the bill in its later stages which made every "sincere tariff reformer unhappy," and which "ought not to be tolerated in Democratic reform councils." Yet he looked to the bill as a " barrier against the return of mad protection," and a " vantage ground for further operations against protected monopoly." The President grew wai-mer as his letter proceeded. He said he took his "place with the rank and file of tlie Democratic party, v/ho believe in tariff reform and v/ho 17 292 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. know what it is, who refused to accept the results em- bodied ill this bill as the close of the war, who are not blinded to the fact that the livery of Democratic tariff reform has been stolen and worn in the service of Repub- lican protection, and who have marked the places where the deadly hlight of treason has blasted the counsels of the brave in the hour of their might. The trusts and combina- tions — the communism of pelf — whose machinations have prevented us from reaching the success we deserved, should not be forgotten nor forgiven. We shall recover from our astonishment at their exhibition of power, and then if the question is forced upon us whether they shall submit to the free legislative will of the people's repre- sentatives or shall dictate the laws which the people must obey, we will accept that issue as omc involving the in- tegrity and safety of American institutions." This animated and caustic letter concluded with an exhortation to Democrats to stand by the principle of free raw material, and censured those who refused to put coal and iron ore on the free list. The letter provoked wide discussion and received the severest criticism of the Presi- dent's party associates, some of whom denounced it as more fatal to Democratic political prospects than his Wilson letter had proven to be the cause of tariff leform. They refused to see in it an excuse for not signing the tariff bill, and looked upon the entire party situation as fur more complicated and serious than if the President had signed the bill without comment. In its practical workings the Wilson Tariff Act proved faulty in two important respects. First, its income fea- tures were declared to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, it failed to raise sufficient revenue to meet the wants of the Treasury. Whether in other respects it is meeting the theories of its HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 293 authors and advocates is more a matter of discussion tLau history. Protectionists have never ceased U) attribute the industrial and financial depression, extending from 1893 to 1896, to its presence. Tliej^ see in it, when coupled with other measures relating to finance, the source of those ills that characterized the entire pei'iod of Presi- dent Cleveland's second administration. Whether they are correct or not, is again a matter of discussion. But there are some historic contrasts that cannot be avoided by anyone. Says i\Ir. Mulhall, the great English statistician, in speaking of this countr}^ from 1880 to 1890 „• " It would be impossible to find in history a parallel to the progress of the United States in the last ten years. Ever}^ day that the sun rises on the American people it sees the addition of $2,500,000 to the accumulation of wealth in the Republic, which is one-third of the daily accumulation of all mankind outside of the United States." In the first year of the operation of the McKinley Tariff Act the Goverment receipts weve '5^'>7,239,763 in excess of expenditures. In 1892 the receipts were 19,904,453 greater than expenses, and in 1893, #2,341,674 greater. In the first year of the operation of the Wilson Tariff Act, the Government receipts ran #42,805,223 behind ex- penses, and in the second year about $30,000,000 beliind. In 1893, under the McKinley Act, the importation of woolen goods amounted only to $36,000,000 in value, from which the Treasury received $34,000,000 in revenue. Under the new tariff, in 1895, notwithstanding the re- duced per capita consumption of such goods, the importa- tion aggregated $60,000,000, from which the Government received a revenue of only $27,000,000. From wool and woolens together the Government obtained a revenue of nearly $14,000,000 in 1892 and only $27,000,000 in 1895. Here was a loss of $17,000,000 revenue in these two 291 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. aiticleSo At tlie same lime the iiuiiuifactiiie of $30,000,- 000 of woolen goods was transferred to Europe. For the fiscal year of 1894, the last full year under tlie Mclvinley law, the exports of manufactures amounted to .1i<183,718,484 m value. For the calendar year 1895, the first full official year under the Wilson Law, the exports of manufactures were 8201,152,771, an increase of 817,- 434,287. But tlie exports of agricultural products in the corresponding periods showed a net decline of 882,648,663. Hence the country gained m the exports of manufac- tures 817,434,287, and it lost in the exports of agricultural products 882,648,663, or a net loss of 865,214,356 in the exports of these two classes in a single 3'ear. In the total exports there was a net loss of $69,000,000 in the first calendar year of the new tariff as compared with the last fiscal year of the old tariff. But when the imports are taken also into consideration the difference is still greater. Under the McKinley tariff in the period mentioned, the imports were 8654,994,622. Under the Wilson tariff they were 1801,663,490, showing a net increase of imports of 8146,668,868. Add that amount to the net loss in exports and it shows a change in the trade balance of the United States of 8215,000,000 on the wrcuig side of the balance slieet. The Wilson Tariff Law had been in force nineteen months up to March 31, 1896. During that period the receipts from customs were 8257,069,000, and the receipts from internal revenue were 8201,069,000, During the first nineteen months of the operation of the McKinley Law the receipts from customs were 8302,884,000, and the receipts from internal revenne were 8231,222,000. Tlie revennes under the Wilson Law were, therefore, about 876,000,000 ])ehind those of the McKinley tariff during the first nineteen months of both laws. HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFI^S. 295 DRIFT OF TARIFF LEGISLATION ABROAD. The nations which occupy the Continent of Europe have without exception, introduced into their commercial and industrial systems, within a very few years, the prmciple of protection. This has been marked by economists of every scliool Great Britain alone has remained firm to her doc- trine of free-trade. On May 23, 1892, Lord Salisbury, the Fprdish Prer:;ier, delivered a speech at Hastings, in which he discussed the attitude of Great Britain as to her external trade The speech, coming from so high an authority, cre- ated cxreatexcicement among English Conservatives, drew a wide'range of comment from the newspapers of the world, and seemed to presage a new departure in the applied eco- nomics of the realm. Its points, bearing on external trade, were :— " After all, this little island lives as a trading island. We could not produce in foodstuffs enough to sustain the popu- lation that lives in this island, and it is only by the great industries which exist here, and which find markets in for- eign countries, that vv^e are able to maintain the vast popula- tion by which this island is inhabited. " But a danger is growing up. Forty or fifty years ago everybody belfeved that free- trade had conquered the world, and they prophesied that every nation would follow the ex- ample of England and give itself up to absolute free-trade. "^The results are not exactly what they prophesied, but tlie more adverse the results were, the more the devoted prophets of free-trade declared that all would come aright at last. "The worse the tariffs of foreign countries became the more confident were the prophecies of an early victory, but we see now, after many years experience that explain it, 296 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. how many foreign nations are raising, one after another, a wall — a brazen wall of protection — around their shores which excludes us from their markets, and, so far as they are concerned, do their best to kill our trade, and this state of things does not get better. On the contrary, it con- stantly seems to get worse. ** Now, of course, if I utter a word with reference to free- trade, I shall be accused of being a protectionist, of a desire to overthrow free-trade, and all t^ie other crimes which an ingenious imagination can attach to a conmiercial hetero- doxy. " But, nevertheless, I ask you to set yourselves free from all that merely vituperative doctrine and to consider whether the true doctrine of free-trade carries you as far as some of these gentlemen would wish you to go. " Every true religion has its counterpart in inventions and legends and traditions, which grow upon that religion. The Old Testament had its Canonical books and had also its Talmud and its Mishna, the inventions of rabbinical com- mentators. " There are a Mishna and a Talmud constantly growing up. One of the difficulties we have to contend with is the strange and unreasonable doctrine which these rabbis have imposed upon us. " If we look abroad into the world we will see it. In the office which I have the honor to hold I am obliged to see a great deal of it. " We live in an age of a war of tariffs. Every nation is trying how -it can, by agreement with its neighbor, get the greatest possible protection for its own industries, and at the same time the greatest possible access to the markets of its neighbors. "This kind of negotiation is continually going on. It HISTORY OK AME;rICAN^ TARIFFS. 297 has been going on for the last year and a half with great activity. " I want to point out to you that what I observe is that while A is very anxious to get a favor of B, and B is anx- ious to get a favor of C, nobody cares two straws about get- ting the commercial favor of Great Britain. '* What is the reason of that ? It is that in this great battle Great Britain has deliberately sU'ipped herself of the armor and the weapons by which the battle has to be fought. *' You cannot do business in this world of evil and suffer- ing on those terms. If you go to market, you must bring money with you. If you fight, you must fight with the vv^eapons with which those you have to contend against are fighting. ** The weapon with which they all fight is admission to their own markets, that is to say, A says to B : ' If you will make your duties such that I can sell in your market I will make my duties such that you can sell in my market.' " But we begin by saying that we will levy no duties on anybody, and we declare that it would be contrary and dis- loyal to the glorious and sacred doctrine of free-trade to levy any duty on anybody, for the ^ake of what we can get by it. " It may be noble, but it is not business. " On those terms you will get nothing, and I am sorry to have to tell you that you are practically getting nothing. "The opinion of this country, as stated by its authorized exponents, has been opposed by what is called a retaliatory policy. "We, as the government of the country, have laid it down for ourselves as a strict rule from which there is no departure, and we are bound not to alter the traditional 298 HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. policy of the country unless we are convinced that a large majority of the country is with us, because in these foreign affairs consistency of poHcy is beyond' all things unnecessary. " But, though that is the case, still if I may aspire to fill the office of a councillor to the public mind, I should ask you to form your own opinions without a reference to tradi- tions or denunciations, not to care two straws whether you are ortho'dox or not, but to form your opinions according to the dictates of common sense — I would impress upon you that if you intend in this conflict of commercial treaties to hold your own you must be prepared, if need be, to inflict upon the nations which injure you the penalty which is in your hands, that of refusing them access to your markets. "The power we have most reason to complain of is the United States, and what we want the United States to fur- nish us with mostly are articles of food essential to the feed- ing of the people and raw materials necessary to our manu- facturers, and we cannot exclude one or the other without serious injury to ourselves. " Now, I am not in the least prepared, for tlie sake of wounding other nations, to inflict any dangerous or serious wound upon ourselves. "We must confine ourselves, at least for the present, to those subjects on which we should not suffer very much, whether the importation continued or diminished. "But what I complain about of the rabbis of whom I have just spoken is, that they confuse this vital point. They say that everything must be given to the consumer. Well, if the consumer is the man who maintains the industries of the country or is the people at large, I agree with the rabbis. " You cannot raise the price of food or of raw material, but there is an enormous mass of other articles of importation from other countries besides the United States which are HISTORY OF AMERICAN TARIFFS. 299 mere matters of luxurious consumption, and if it is a ques- tion of wine or silk or spirits or gloves or lace, I should not in the least shrink from diminishing the consumption and interfering with the comfort of the excellent people who con- sume these articles of luxury, for the purpose of maintaining our rights in this commercial war, and of insisting on our right of access to the markets of our neighbors. " This is very heterodox doctrine, I know, and I should be excommunicated for maintaining it. *' But, as one's whole duty is to say what he thinks to the people of this country, I am bound to say that our rabbis have carried the matter too far. "We must distinguish between consumer and consumer, and while jealously preserving the rights of a consumer who is co-extensiv^e with a whole industry, or with the whole people of the country, we may fairly use our power over an importation which merely ministers to luxury in order to maintain our own in this great commercial battle." AMERICAN RECIPROCITY— AN HISTORIC REVIEW. GENERAL VIEW. The idea, or rather the doctrivie, of reciprocal trade is by no means new. As a principle it has been long recognized in this country. In England it is what is called *' Fair Trade," and is upheld by a school of economists and states- men who oppose ** Free Trade," or seek to escape from the effects of " Free Trade," by a system which shall not be one-sided only. The doctrine, pure and simple, is this, if a nation does not impose duties on our goods entering its ports, we will not impose duties on its goods entering our ports ; and if a nation levies duties on our goods, we will levy duty on its goods. This, say fair-traders, is but the doctrine of /e.v talionis, tit-for-tat, as applied to trade. This, say free-traders, is the folly of imposing a double loss on ourselves. Thus, foreign- ers tax our products when they enter their ports. This imposes a loss on us. Then, in turn, we tax their products when entering our ports. This imposes a second loss on us. They say, that for an injury done us by others, we fine our- selves. When others impoverish us, we respond by a system of impoverishment. Protectionists eschew theories and refinements, and say that each country is a law unto itself respecting trade. All prosperous countries have been built on this principle. All recognize it in one way or another, whatever their outward profession'^, or present economic leanings. It is but the 300 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 30/ duty of caring for one's self. It is but the right to live, and to enjoy advantages, if such exist. COMMERCIAL TREATIES. Reciprocity has for ages been established and determined between nations by means of commercial treaties. The usual process has been for two nations, about to treat, to consult their respective tariff hsts, and to grant reductions of duties on the clasT of goods which they desire most to receive from each other. Equally, each country seeks to secure the lowest rate of duty on the class of goods whose manufacture constitutes its own industry, and whose sale abroad it wishes to cultivate. Thus, England makes the best bargain she can for the foreign sale of her hardware and cottons, France for her silks and wines, Belgium for her iron products, the United States for her flour and meat. The free-trade countries of the world are the most prolific of reciprocity treaties, yet there never was a reciprocity treaty that did not recognize the doctrine of protection, else it would have been of no use. The essence of all com- mercial treaties is home-trade advantage, home-industry advantage, home-development advantage, whether directly by encouragement to labor and capital on the spot, or in- directly by reason of enlarged markets abroad. Says Leveleye, one of the ablest of French Political Economists, and a pronounced free-trader :—" Commercial treaties are useful in assuring to industry what is so essential to it, the fixity of foreign customs dues throughout the period embraced by the treaty. Nowadays commercial treaties are of more importance than political treaties, for it is on com- mercial treaties that the progress of industry in each country in a great measure depends, and also what is no less im- 302 AMERICAN RuClPROCITY. portant, the development of commercial relations and com- munity of interest between different lands." " MOST FAVORED NATION " CLAUSE. Very often the parties to commercial treaties stipulate that each of them shall enjoy all the advantages that may come to, or be secured by, the other through a reduction of duties between it and still other countries. This has come to be known in d^\^\ovi\?iZy d,?>^' tJie most favored nation clause I' 2i term which grows more familiar each year. It stands thus: — England agrees to abolish, or reduce to a minimum, her duties on French silks, as a concession to France for so re- ducing, or abolishing, her duties on English cottons. But at the same time England says to France, and it is agreed, that if you succeed in getting similar terms with any other country by reason of a desire for your silks, we expect our cottons to follow in the wake of your silks. The favors your silks secure for you must extend to our cottons. So France says to England, and it is agreed, that if you succeed in getting similar terms with any other country by reason of a desire for your cottons, we expect our silks to follow in the wake of your cottons. The favors your cottons secure for you must extend to our silks. Thus " tJie most favored nation clause'' may suffice to carry the favorite pro- duct of a highly industrial and ingenious nation, with com- mercial facilities, into every mart of the world. This extension of, and refinement on, the principle of reciprocity as established by commercial treaties, is only an enlargement of the spirit of advantage between nations. Clearly, nothing is given without something, and the like, is expected. As nations do not trade for pure love of the thing, something more is expected than is given, if not directly, at least indirectly. But this is protection, says AMERICAN RKCIPROCITY. 303 the protectionist, for each nation seeks to advantage itself, and it matters not whether it proceeds on the principle of denial or concession. Not so, says the free-trader; it is free-trade, for the moment you concede the principle of concession you repudiate that of denial, or, in other words, discrimination by duties. And so economists bandy theories, and prove to the world that their science is weightier in words than worth. But while commercial treaties have been the usual, almost the sole, means of establishing reciprocity, or reciprocal trade, between commercial nations, they have been slow and cumbrous of formation and operation, and always costly of negotiation. They have proved of doubtful construction and uncertain worth, except where the inducement to make them was very great, and the power to enforce them reposed in the contracting parties. New and weak countries were placed at a disadvantage by them, even if the inducement to make them existed, and, indeed, no such inducement could exist till a country was sufficiently advanced to have some- thing substantial to offer for what it desired to receive. POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES. As long as the United States was going through its early experiments with free-trade and protection, there was hardly a thought of reciprocity or reciprocal trade as we have come to understand it. In all the early arguments respecting the advantages of protection by means of duties on foreign im- ports, the central thought was that protection was necessary in order to foster infant industries. There was hardl}^ any diversity of opinion about this. Statesmen of all parties and economic schools joined in the thought and sought by speech and vote to establish the principle. Politics did not seriously tinge a tariff debate as long as the idea was 304 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. dominant that the infency of industry required the protective hand of the Government. In this the most pronounced free-traders had the sanction and support of the Enghsh economic writers, who, almost without exception, admitted the doctrine that in order to estabhsh and foster infant in- dustries, protection was right in law and morals. England had universally and persistently applied the principle, till she had grown rich, powerful and independent by means of it. It was not until 1824, when the old arguments respecting the uses of protection began to be tinged by partyism, that attention began to be turned seriously to the advantages of reciprocal trade. The country was then sufficiently ad- vanced to make it a question in the minds of statesmen. Free-traders, the very ones who had all along favored pro- tection as a means of fostering infant industries, now turned their arguments against protection in general. The peculiar condition of the country, divided into a strictly planting class, with unpaid labor at its command, and a manufactur- ing, commercial and more diversified industrial class, with only paid labor at its command, contributed to the change of sentiment and the tone of argument. The planting class, with its unpaid labor, saw a menace in the growth of manu- factures and commerce, with their paid labor. The system of free, paid labor was a harsh contrast with, and a standing threat upon, the system of slave, unpaid labor. Established manufactories and profitable commerce were proving a source of wealth, population, importance and comfort, which might in the end overshadow the planting class and its geographic section, even if it did not endanger the slave institution. Therefore the free-traders injected into their opposition to protection the argument that protection had already done AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 305 its legitimate work in grounding and fostering the young industries of the country, and was no longer necessary. They said it was a stretch of power any how on the part of the government, and was no longer justified. They said that inasmuch as it could be of no earthly use to the plant- ing sections, it was unfair for the nation to legislate in the interest of the manufacturing and commercial sections. They attacked the constitutionality of tariff legislation. As time went on, and the issue of slavery became more a mat- ter of question, the tariff debates brought out in stronger lines the above arguments. The doctrine of free-trade took passionate and almost sectional turn. It came nearer than ever to cleaving and dividing politics. Calhoun did not hesitate to declare that the further fostering of industries by means of protection would destroy the planting class and the institution of slavery ; that the object of free-trade, as he advocated it, was to strike a blow at paid labor and the prosperity of the manufacturing classes ; that the tariff sys- tem was so unfair, so unconstitutional, such an infliction on the States of his section, as to warrant nullification of tariff laws, and if this did not provide an escape from their opera- tion, then secession would be justified. THE NEW PROTECTIVE IDEA. These arguments were so ably maintained, and the situa- tion became so serious, as to force the protectionists on to new ground. It is no disparagement to their numbers or ability to say that they could no longer maintain themselves on the plea of protection to infant industries — the common ground of all statesmen in the beginning. They were com- pelled, or perhaps the time had arrived for it, to broaden their ground, and to make it more secure by a new declara- tion of protective principles by, one may say, a new depar^ 3o6 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. ture in political economy. This became the dawn of thbse doctrines which, elaborated by time and modified by cir- cumstances, comprise American protection as enunciated by modern statesmen, and as they seek to embody them in protective legislation. The gist of these doctrines is, that as labor constitutes a very large per cent, of the cost of an article, the true meas- ure of protection is a duty which will cover that element of cost, and thus save our labor from competition with the low- priced labor of foreign countries. Along with this goes the doctrine thatHhe free-list may safely embrace only those articles which are impossible of production with us by rea- son of our soil, climate and natural advantages. POLICY OF SUBSIDY. Abreast of this doctrine is another, daily growing more momentous, and one which has vbeen enforced by the fact that our genius and facilities tend to overcrowding in our own markets ; it is, that the very best protection that can be afforded in such case is the establishment of steamship lines to carry our surplus products to those who need them most, or to those of whom we buy most and to whom we have to pay most. This has been a favorite and universal means of protection with all commercial countries, and it has been employed at great outlay on the part of those countries in the way of pay, or subsidy, to said lines, first in order to start them, and second in order to maintain them. But this means of protection has not yet been reached in this coun- try. Subsidy is a word our people cannot yet abide. No theory of protection that embodies the word directly has ever yet been framed in this country that could withstand the assaults of its opponents. The reason is that it appeals too directly to the capitalistic or monopolistic spirit and Hon. William h\ Vilas. Born at Chelsea, Vt., July 9, 1840; moved to Madison, Wis., 1851 > graduated at State University, 1858 ; studied law at University of Al- bany, N. Y., 1860, and admitted to bars of New York and Wisconsin • Began practice at Madison, July 9, I860; entered Union army, and mu.stered out as Lieutenant-Colonel of 23d Reg. Wis. Vols. ; a Professor in Law Department of State University since 1868; Regent of same, 1880-85; member Board of Revision of Statutes, 1878; elected to Wis- consin Legislature, 18«5 ; delegate to Democratic National Conventions, 1876-80-84; appointed Postmaster-General by President Cleveland, March 7, 1885; appointed Secretary of Interior, January 16, 1888; elected to United States Senate, January 28, 1891 ; member of Com- mittees on Civil Service, Pensions, Judiciary, Post Offices and Roads and Public Lands. £r> ■%"^ k -u^ 1 Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson. Born in Christian co., Ky., October 23, 1835; moved to Bloomington, 111., 1852; educated at Wesleyan Univer.-^ity and Centre College, Ky. ; began practice of law in Metamor.i, 111., December, 1858; Chancery Master of Woodford co., 1861-65; State's Attorney, 1865-69; Demo- cratic Presidential Elector, 1864; moved to Bloomington, 1869; elected to 44th and 46th Congresse-. ; member of Board of Visitors to Wot Pomt, 1877; First Assistant Postmaster-General, 1885-89; elected Vice- President on Democratic ticket, 1892 ; took his .seat March 4, 1893. AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 309 class. On the part of the government it is too direct a kind of paternahsm. As to the recipients, it is too special a gift. It is no answer to all this, as yet, to say that as no other commercial country ever succeeded in protecting itself through the establishment of steamship lines, except by starting and fostering them by subsidies, so this country has not done, and can never be expected to do, the same with- out the employment of similar agencies. Nor is it, as yet, a sufficient answer to say that the word subsidy in this con- nection can only be rendered offensive when narrowed to its apparent recipients, who really ought not to be consid- e-^d at all, or, if considered, ought to find their true infini- tesimal place in comparison with the tens of thousands of manufactories, the hundreds of thousands of laborers and farmers, and the millions of capital, which an exit for our over products would keep employed. POLICY OF RECIPROCITY. Still further, abreast of this doctrine is the policy of reciprocity; or, as we had better say, the principle of practical, or applied, reciprocity, rendered conspicuous, as formulated in the Tariff Act of 1890, and adopted as a measure of the Harrison Administration. This policy pre- sumes that we ought to have better outlet for our manufac- tures. It presumes that direct trade with those from whom we buy most and to whom we sell least, would be a most desirable and advantageous trade to establish, as serving to balance accounts without draining us of gold cash. It presumes that, as to certain countries at least, notably those nearest to us, and especially those whose products we take largely and which we cannot duplicate at home, we are in a position to offer what they require, of as good /ii7ality and on as fair terms, as they can secure elsewhere. 3IO AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. It presumes that inasmuch as we are sufficiently advanced and sufficiently well off to remit entirely duties on their pro- ducts, — most of which are necessaries of life, and hitherto subjected to duty for sheer purposes of revenue, — and ac- tually do remit such duties, that they ought to reciprocate by either abolishing or lowering their duties on articles we send to them. Not to do so would be unreciprocal. It would be for us to enlarge our inducements for their trade, by removing duties upon it, and for them to reject these inducements by refusing to modify or abolish duties on our trade. COUNTRIES MOST INTERESTED. It is clear to every one that the countries most directly affected by what may now be called the American policy of reciprocity, are those countries to the south of us, which comprise Mexico, Central America afid South America. To these may be added other countries whose, or any part of whose, products are as theirs are. This being so, even the casual student of history will be struck by a comparison of two American continental epochs or eras, the one political, the other comnicrciaL Let us take the political one and consider it. It began in 1787, the date on which our Republican experiment was launched, the date of our Federal Constitution. Add thirty years to it, so as to make it embrace a period up to the date of what may be called general and successful revolt against Spanish supremacy in South America, and the establishment of the South American Republics. Fix this date at say about the year 1824. These thirty years, or thereabouts, saw the United States engaged in finding a permanent place for her political institutions. She was manfully meeting the trials to which young countries are subjected, and especially AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 311 those countries that have been compelled to conquer their independence by means of war, and have been bold enough to dare a political experiment at odds with the systems, tra- ditions and instincts of the mother countries. She was heroically and successfully passing through the stages — many of them severe, even to the point of a second war — which led up to full independence, to universal recognition of her right to exist as a government and nation, and to that conspicuous place in the firmament of Western Republics, which made her a cynosure in the eyes of all. At the beginning of this period what did she find ? The entire continent to the south of her was Spanish. Spanish political domination was complete as it could be, all things considered. Then came the gradual breaking away from foreign and monarchical moorings, under the lead of brave oenerals, like Bolivar, under the influence of enlaro"ed ideas of freedom, under the inspiration furnished by the success of the northern experiment. So busy had the United States been with her own exper- iment, that sh€ had not had time to more than note what was going on to the south of her. Her own expanse was so ample, her resources so sufficient, her thought so dis- tinctive, as that political confederacy on the continent had not occurred to her, or at least had taken no definite shape. Neither had political co-operation, or, in other words, polit- ical reciprocity, taken even vague shape. Sympathy existed for every effort looking to the breaking of the Spanish yoke. Indirect encouragement was offered to the erection of every republican temple founded on the ashes of European mon- archy. But that was all, until the time should come when, her own political destiny being assured, and a new order of statesmen having arisen, the Republic of the North could afford to recognize in a more direct manner those of the South. 312 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. POLITICAL INTEREST OF TH^ UNITED STATES IN SOUTH AMER- ICAN REPUBLICS. It was ill 1808 that the interference of Napoleon with the affairs of Spain enabled the South American republics to rejoice in the assurance of their own autonomy. But a long struggle was necessary in order to establish the independ- ence they hoped for. For twenty years they looked vainly for succor or approval from European monarchies. They had been all along looking to the Republic of the North, and copying her splendid example. They now began to look for substantial recognition, and they found in Henry Clay their earliest and ablest champion. In 18 18 Mr. Clay made a passionate appeal in the House of Representatives for their recognition, and in the same year the condition of the South American provinces became a subject of consid- eration at a cabinet meeting, James Monroe being President. Four years afterwards, the recognition they sought from the United States came, and it was soon followed by recognition on the part of Great Britain. In the next year, 1823, Pres- ident Monroe, in his message to Congress, and in discussing the relation of foreign powers toward those on the Ameri- can Continent, said : " In wars of European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it com- port with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we arc of necessity more immediately con- nected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlight- ened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers (of Europe) is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 313 And to the defence of our own which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under wh.ch we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the ami- cable relations subsisting between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hem- isphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the ex- istincr colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition Jor the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any hu- rjpean po-.ver, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This was the " Monroe Doctrine;" this the note of warn- inc to monarchical Europe to keep hands off the pohtica deTtiny of a Continent. It was of this doctrine that Daniel Webster, in a speech in the House, April, 1826, upon the subject of an appropriation to send a mission from the United States to the South American Congress at Panama, said: , " I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase ,t or tear it out, nor shall it by any act of mine be blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes and gratified the patriotism of the people. Over those hopes I will not bring a mildew, nor will I put that gratified patri- otism to shame." 3T4 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. CONGRESS OF REPUBLICS. In 1 82 1 the Republic of Colombia suggested the idea of a closer connection between the Spanish colonies in Central and South America. In July, 1822, and before their inde- pendence had been recognized by the United States, Colom- bia and Chili negotiated a treaty looking to a Congress of the new Republics, resembling the one already constructed in Europe (The Holy Alliance, which was an attempt to fetter all Europe with absolute monarchy), and having for its object ** The construction of a continental system for America." The idea ripened slowly, though it was sedulously cher- ished by Bolivar and other leaders, Bolivar being then at the head of the Republic of Peru. It was not until De- cember 7, 1824, that he issued his invitation to the Repub- lics south of us, to meet in conference at Panama. Most of them accepted, and the '* General Assembly of the Amer- ican Republics " met at Panama, June 22, 1826. What was singular about this Congress or General As- sembly was that it was no part of Bolivar's design to invite the United States to participate. The Republics of South America had abolished African slavery in 18 13. Doubtless Bolivar felt that the interest which the United States had at that time in preserving and extending slavery would tend to embarrass her acceptance of an invitation, or make her an unwelcome, if not dangerous, participant. The invitation to the United States came from Colombia and Mexico, after an inquiry through Mr. Clay as to whether it would be accep- table to President Adams. Mr. Adams was so far satisfied as that he appointed two representatives to the Congress or Conference, subject to the ''advice and consent of the Senate." In his message to the Senate^ Mr. Adams gave among AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 315 other reasons for his action the following, which is valuable in this connection as showing the dawn of the idea that mutual commercial intercourse with the South American States might well become a subject of consideration in such a conference as that proposed". He said : " But the South American nations, in the infancy of their independence, often find themselves in positions with refer- ence to other countries, with principles applicable to which, derivable from the state of independence itself, they have not been familiarized by experience. The result of this has been that sometimes in their intercourse with the United States they have manifested dispositions to reserve a right of granting special favors and privileges to the Spanish na- tion as the price of their recognition ; at others, they have actually established duties and impositions operating unf avoid- ably to the United States, to the advantage of European pow- ers ; and sometimes they have appeared to consider that they might interchange among themselves mutual conces- sions of exclusive favor, to which neither European powers nor the United States should be admitted. In most of these cases their regulations unfavorable to us have yielded to friendly expostulation and remonstrance ; but it is believed to be of infinite moment that the principles of a liberal coin- viercial ifitercourse should be exhibited to them and urged with interested and friendly persuasion upon them, when all are assembled for the avowed purpose of consulting together upon the establishment of such principles as may have an important bearing upon their future wel- fare." The debate in the Senate upon the proposed mission was exceedingly acrimonious. Serious charges were brought against President Adams, and the policy and purposes of his administration were denounced as dangerous. It was 3t6 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. declared that the mission would lead to international com- plications. The slave-holding members affirmed that in reference to the rest of America, as well as to Europe, slavery must be and remain the prime motive of the foreign policy of the United States, and they said that they saw in the conference peril to their "peculiar institutions," for the history of these Southern Republics as to slavery furnished an example "scarcely less fatal than the independence of Hayti to the repose of the slave States of the Union." They had not only copied from the revolutionary records of the United States the words "freedom," "equality" and " universal emancipation," but had actually broken the chains of all slaves. THE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT UPPERMOST. The defenders of the proposed mission and of the Presi- dent's action made many elaborate arguments for their side, all of which embraced in some form the idea of more ex- tended and intimate commercial intercourse, upon the basis of mutual or reciprocal trade. When Mr. Adams was asked by the House for further information respecting his view and his action he responded in a lengthy message, in which he said : — " The first and paramount principle upon which it was deemed wise and just to lay the corner-stone of all our future relations with them was disinterestedness ; the next was cordial good will to them ; tlic third ivas a claim of fair and equal reciprocity!' Then in further allusion to the commercial idea he said : — " It will be within the recollection of the House that im- mediately after our War of Independence a measure closely analogous to this Congress of Panama was adopted by tlie Congress of our Confederation and for purposes of precisely AMERICAN RKCIPROCITY. 5^7 the same character. Three commissioners with plenipoten- tiary powers were appointed to negotiate treaties of amity, navigation and commerce with all the principal powers of Europe. They met and resided at Paris for one year, for that purpose, and the only result of their negotiations was our first treaty between the United States and Prussia, memorable in the diplomatic annals of the world and pre- cious as a monument of principles in relation to commerce and maritime warfare, with which our country entered upon her career as a member of the great famil)- of independent nations." In the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported against the expediency of sending ministers to the Panama Congress, but afterwards, and very grudgingh', approved the President's selection. The House, after long delay, agreed to appropriate the necessary funds. The ministers were sent, but delay had done its designed work. They were too late for the Conference, which had adjourned previous to their arrival. Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, was much mortified at the fliilure, and the President, in 1829, in allud- ing to the failure said to the Senate :—" While there is no probability of the renewal of the negotiations, the purposes for which they were intended are still of the deepest inter- est to our coitntry and to the zuorid, and may, hereafter, call again for the active energies of the Government of the United Statesr \ It might be interesting in this connection to know that the South and Central American Republics continued to hold conferences for consideration and adjustment of their affairs and the unification of their interests. One was held at Lima in 1847, another in 1864, another was proposed at Panama in 1881, which was prevented by the South Amer- ican wars, and another was held at Montevideo in 1888-89. 3i8 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. The United States was not represented in any of them. The era of our political influence upon these RepubHcs, whether by example, or by the encouragement extended in the " Monroe Doctrine," or by the comity intended by Mr. Adams, had ended with their freedom from monarchical yoke and the assurance that they were forever committed to the Republican spirit. COMMERCIAL BONDAGE OF THE REPUBLICS. But singular as it may seem that political freedom was followed by commercial bondage. Commercial Europe set her head for conquest, and with her immense facilities over- ran the marts from which the Spanish warships had been driven. This invasion has become well nigh complete. We now come to the second era above mentioned — the commercial. We have seen how the end of the political era witnessed the dawn of the idea of commercial reciproc- ity with the Southern Republics. The idea lay dormant, so far as the United States was concerned, through the period devoted to working out its own i idustrial and com- mercial independence. The industrial and commercial pe- riod from 1824 to i860 may be likened to the political period prior to the Revolution. The industrial and com- mercial period from 1861 to the present may be likened to the political period from 1787 to 1824, each of these pe- riods being considered with reference to our relations to the Southern Republics. Strange to say, the above period from 1 86 1 to the present corresponds in length with the period from 1787 to 1824, at whose end we took political cogniz- ance of these Republics and witnessed their freedom from European monarchy. The settlement of our sectional differences by civil war, the establishment of a system of finance which gives us AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 319 rank among the nations, the practice of protection which made us industrially and commercially independent, brings us to a point of time when our example and influence must affect the countries of our continent to the south of us in a commercial sense, just as they were affected in a political sense. If their commercial subjugation by Europe is as complete as was their political subjugation by Spain, and their independence as desirable, they may well look once more to us for something which in commerce shall be the equivalent of the " Monroe Doctrine " in politics. We are in a position to extend it, at least that is the significance of practical reciprocity. A PEACE CONGRESS. What President Adams called " the deepest interests of our country," and what he prophesied might " hereafter call again for the -active energies of the Government of the United States," began its culmination with the invitation of President Garfield for all the independent governments of North and South America to meet in a Peace Congress at Washington. It has been given out that he aimed at some- thing more than a mere code of arbitration in case of dis- putes which might lead to war among American states, and that he contemplated making commercial reciprocity a leading feature of his administration. His death frustrated his design. A MORE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT. President Garfield's invitation was recalled by President Arthur in order that the Congress might be given opportu- nity to consider the advisability of the step. Just as soon as the Congress began to deliberate upon the matter, the subject took wider and wider range, and the idea of recip- rocal commerce became a conspicuous feature. On Jan- 320 AMERICAN R]^.CIPROClTY. uary 21, 1880, Senator Davis of Illinois first thtew his suggestion of an " International American Conference " into a Senate Bill in which occurred the following words: — " Whereas from the southern boundary of the United States to the Argentine Republic, and also the Republic of Chile, a distance of about 4,500 miles, including Mexico, Central Atnerica, Colombia, Venezuela, Pe-'u, Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, cont./,ining a popu- lation of, in all, about 40,000,000 industrious /nd progressive people, with whom -^he United Sl'ates hc^i, and d:-cire to maintain, the most frvindly relations, ^nd with whom a closer and reciprocal inter:3t in trade and commerce ought to be encouraged,' etc. The Davis proposition looked to this " closer and recip- rocal interest in trade and commerce " by means of a great southern railroad connecting the three Americas. On April 24, 1882, Senator Cockrell, of Missouri, intro- duced into the Senate a bill similar to the above, whose object was the " appointment of a special commissioner for promoting intercourse with such countries of Central and South America as may be found to possess natural facilities for railway communication with each other and with the United States." On the same date, April 24, 1882, Senator Morgan, of Alabama, introduced a kindred bill, " for the encouragement of closer commercial relations between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, Central America, the Empire of Brazil and the several Republics of South America." Similar bills were introduced into the House, all looking to " the promotion of commercial intercourse " with the countries to the south of us, all of which were reported adversely b}' the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In 1883 Senator Sherman reintroduced into the Senate AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 321 the Morgan Bill of 1882. In the first session of the Forty- eighth Congress, Mr. Townsend, of Illinois, introduced a Joint resolution, " inviting the co-operation of the Govern- nents of American nations in securing the estabhshnient of tee connnercial intercourse among those nations and an American Customs' Union." On March 3, 1884, Senator Cockrell introduced a Senate bill authorizing a commission to Central and South Amer- ica " for the purpose of collecting information looking to the extension of American trade and commerce," etc. This bill was reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Before taking action on this bill, the Committee on For- eign Affairs of the Senate requested the views of Mr. Fre- linghuysen, Secretary of State, as to the proposed legisla- tion. He reviewed the entire question very fully in his reply of March 26, 1884, and fully set forth the advantages of reciprocity with these countries. His arguments pointed directly to reciprocity as a necessity, in case duties were greatly lowered, or entirely removed, on the products of these countries. "I am," said he, ''thoroughly convinced of the advisa- bility of knitting closely our relations with the States of this Continent, and no effort on my part shall be wanting to accomplish* a result so consonant with the constant policy of this country and in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which, in excluding foreign political interference, recognizes the common interest of the States of North and South America. It is the history of all diplomacy that close po- litical relations and friendship spring from unity of com- mercial interests The true plan, it seems to me, is to make a series of reci- procity treaties with the States of Central and South 322 AMERICAN RECirROCITY. America, taking care that those nianu f:\ctu res, and as far as is practicable those products, Avhich would come into com- petition with our own manufactures and products should not be admitted to the free list. In* these treaties we might secure for valuable consideration so as not to violate the most-favored-nation clause of other treaties, further substan- tial advantages. Such, for example, as the free navigation o( their coasts, rivers and lakes. " Indiscriminate reduction of duties on materials pecu- liail}' the production oi' Central and South America would take from us the ability to offer reciprocit}% and we would thus lose the opportunity to secure valuable trade. Re- moval oi' duties from coffee, without greatly cheapening its price, deprived us of the power to negotiate with the coffee- growing countries of Spanish-America liighly advantageous reciprocity treaties, and indiscriminate reduction o^ duties on. sugar would complete our inability to establish favorable commercial relations with those countries \\hich form our natural market, and from which we are now almost entitely excluded. If we confine the reduction of duties on such articles as sugar and coffee to those Spanish-American coun- tries which are willing to negotiate with us treaties of reci- procity, we cheapen these products for our own people and at the same time gain the control o{ those markets for the products of our fields and factories." STARTLING REVELATIONS. The report of the House Committee, to which two of the above bills had been referred, was most elaborate and con- tained some startling revelations as to trade with these countries. It showed their total commerce in 1S83 to be $752,918,000, in which the United States participated onl\' to the extent of $142,282,000. It showed that their imports AMERICAN RKCIPROCITY. 323 to the United States amounted for that year to $93,3I9,CXX), whereas we sent in turn to them only ^48,963,000. It quoted from the work of a recent commercial traveller through those States, to this effect: " It always grieved me exceedingly, and was particularly offensive to my sense of the fitness of things, to find almost everything in the way of foreign merchandise, throughout the length and breadth of my routes, of European manufacture. At different points along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, in many cities of the plains, in various towns on the mountain slopes, on the apex of Potosi and on the tops of other An- dean peaks higher than Mount Hood, I have gone into stores and warehouses and looked in vain — utterly in vain — for one single article of American manufacture. From the little pin with which the lady fastens her beau-catching ribbons to the grand piano with which she enlivens and enchants the hearts of all her household ; from the tiniest thread and tack and tool needed in the mechanic arts to the largest plows and harrows and other agricultural implements and machines required for use on the farm — all these and other things, the wares and fabrics and light groceries and delicacies in common demand ; the drugs and chemicals sold by the apothecary ; the fermented, malt and spirituous liq- uors in the wine saloon ; the stationery and fancy goods in the book-store; the furniture in the parlor and the utensils in the kitchen, are, with rare exceptions, of Engli.sh, German, Spanish, or Italian manufacture. And what makes the matter still more unsatisfactory and vexatious to the North American and more expensive and otherwise disadvantageous to the South American, is that these articles are, as a gen- eral rule, inferior both in material and make. to the corre- sponding article of American manufacture." The report favored the appointment of a commission to 324 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. these countries. A bill authorizing such commission was passed, and George H. Sharpe, New York, Solon O. Thacher, Kansas, and Thomas C. Reynolds, Missouri, were appointed Commissioners, with Mr. W. E. Curtis as Secretary. They sat in our principal cities, visited the countries of Central and South America, and made valuable reports from time to time. On December 21, 1885, Mr. Townsend, of Illinois, rein- troduced his resolution into the House, looking to an Amer- ican Customs' Union. It was reported adversely, as was a bill providing for international arbitration. The same fatal- ity befell similar bills in the Senate. GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL THOUGHT. On February 22, 1886, Senator Frye, of Maine, intro- duced an elaborate bill into the Senate " to promote the political progress and commercial prosperity of the United States." It provided for an American International Con- gress at Washington on October i, 1887, and suggested a list of subjects to be considered, which list embraced : 1. Measures of peace and prosperity. 2. An American Customs' Union. 3. Regular and frequent steamship lines. 4. Uniform system of customs regulations. 5. Uniform weights and measures. 6. A common silver coin. 7. A definite plan of arbitration. On March 29, 1886, Mr. McCreary, of Kentucky, intro- duced in the House a bill " authorizing the President to arrange a conference for the purpose of encouraging peace- ful and reciprocal commercial relations between the United States and Mexico, the Central American and South Amer- Hon. John M. Palmer. Born in Scott co., Ky., September 18, 1817 ; moved to Illinois, 1831 ; studied at Alton College; admitted to bar, 1839; elected Probate Judge of Macoupin co., 1843; member of Constitutional Convention, 1847; elected County Judge, 1848 ; elected to State Senate, 1852; elected to State Senate, 1855, as Anti-Nebraska Democrat ; Delegate to Republican National Convention, 1856 ; candidate for Congress, 1859, on Republican ticket and defeated ; member of Peace Conference, 1861 ; entered Union army (1861) as Colonel of 14tli Illinois Regiment ; promoted to Brigadier General, 1861 ; promoted to Major General, 1863 ; commanded 14th Army Corps, 1863; operated on Mississippi, with army of Cumberland and v^^ith Sherman to Atlanta ; elected Governor of Illinois, 1868 ; nominated for Governor on Democratic ticket, 1888, and defeated; elected U. S. Senator, as Democrat, 1891c Stki>iikn M. W'iiitk. Born in San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 1<), ISoH ; graduated from Santa Clara College, 1871 ; admitted to practice of law, 1874; j.racticed and resided in Los Angeles co. ; District Atty. of his co., 1882 ; Chairman of Dem. State Convention, 18S4 and 1886 ; elected to State Senate, 1880 ; acting Lieut.-Governor, 1888; temporary President of Dem. Nat. Con. at St. Louis, 1888; Del. at Large to Dem. Nat. Con., 1892; elected to U. S. Senate, 189;^; member of Committees on Census, Coast Defences, Com- merce, Finance, Irrigation and Territories. AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 327 ican States." On the same day Mr. McKinley, of Ohio, introduced a bill favoring an Arbitration Conference. On April 15, 1886, Mr. McCreary, of Kentucky, reported his bill from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a com- plete text and favorable report. It provided for an Inter- national Conference at Washington, and for " considering questions relating to the improvement of business inter- course between said countries, and to encourage such recip- rocal commercial relations as will be beneficial to all and secure more extensive markets for the products of each of said countries." NECESSITY FOR RECIPROCAL TRADE. The report of the majority of the committee - accompa- nying this bill was a very able one, and particularly valuable as a matter of economic and commercial history, and as coming from a committee not regarded as favorable to the reciprocity idea. The report set forth among other things : "The subject of establishing closer international relations between all the Republics of the American continent and also the Empire of Brazil, containing in the aggregate one hundred millions of people, for the purpose of improving the business intercourse between those countries and secur- ing more extensive markets for the products of each, is both interesting and important. Sixty years ago this subject was discussed and a conference was suggested between rep- resentatives of our Government and the other Governments, and President John Quincy Adams appointed representa- tives to the Congress held at Panama to consider measures for promoting peace and reciprocal commercial relations between said countries. This Conference was beneficial, but at that time our people were looking more to Europe 328 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. for business and commerce than to' the countries south of us, and no action was taken by our Congress. Now the United States is at peace with all the world and our popu- lation and wealth make this the foremost Republic of the world, and our Government should inaugurate the move- ment in favor of an American Conference. " The present depression of business and low price of farm products are caused, to a considerable extent, by a limited market for our surplus products. Some of the best markets we can look to are not far beyond our southern border. They are nearer to us than to any other commer- cial nation. The people of Mexico and of Central and South America produce much that we need, and our abun- dant agricultural, manufactured, and mineral productions are greatly needed by them. These countries cover an area of 8,118,844 square miles, and have a population of 42,- 770,374. Their people recognize the superiority of our products, and desire more intimate business intercourse with our people, but the great bulk of their commerce and trade is with Europe. The Argentine Republic has from forty-five to sixty steamships running regularly between Buenos Ayres and European ports, and no regular line be- tween that country and the United States, and our commer- cial facilities with the other republics of Central and South America are about the same. " In 1884 our exports were valued at ^733,768,764. " Of this amount we exported but ^64,719,000 to Mexico and South and Central America. " Our annual mechanical and agricultural products are valued at ;^ 1 5 ,000,000,000, while we seldom have sold more than ;^75, 000,000 worth of these products to our nearest neighbors, who buy in Europe at least five times as much as they get here. AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 329 "The total commerce of the countries named in 1883 was as follows : Imports, ^331,100,599; exports, ;^39 1,294,- ;8i. "Of the ;^33i, 100,599 of merchandise sold to those coun- tries, the share of the United States was only ;^42, 598,469; yet we are their closest neighbor. "The disparity of our trade with Peru, Chili, Argentine Republic and Brazil is both amazing and humiliating. To From Great From United Britain. States. Peru ^6,235,685 , 1743,105 Chili 11,060,880 2,211,007 Argentine Republic 29,692,295 4.317,293 ^'^azil 33,946,215 7,317,293 " The consumption of cotton goods in Central and South America and in Mexico amounts to nearly ^100,000,000 an- nually, and although they are so near our cotton-fields, England furnishes about 95 per cent, of these goods. " Cotton fabrics constitute the wearing apparel of nearly three-fourths of those people, and they have to import all they use. "England monopolizes this trade because of her cheap transportation facilities, and because her mills furnish goods especially adapted to the wants and tastes of the consumers, which our mills have never attempted to produce. " It is very important that transportation facilities between the United States and her southern neighbors should be im- proved ; for as long as the freight from' Liverpool, Hamburg and Bordeaux is ^15 a ton, they cannot be induced to pay ;^40 a ton to bring merchandise from the United States. " There is not a commercial city in these countries where the manufacturers of the United States cannot compete with 330 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. their European rivals in every article we produce for ex- port. " The report of the South American Commission shows, by the testimony of the importing merchants of those coun- tries, that aside from the difference in cost and convenience in transporting, it is to their advantage to buy in the United States, because the quality of our products is superior, and our prices are usually as low as those of Europe." AN OPPOSING VIEW. Mr. Belmont presented a minority, and opposing, report to the above bill. In discussing it from a commercial stand- point, he made quite prominent a fact, if not a principle, though unintended on his part, that was fully recognized when reciprocity was introduced into the Tariff Act of 1890. He said : " Nothing is now so desirable for our own people as a free and reciprocal interchange of products between ourselves and the people of other nations on this continent. But what now hinders such free interchange so much as our tariff laws? If this Government shall invite Brazil, Mexico and the Re- publics of Central America and South America to join us in a conference to promote such free and reciprocal interchange of products, what concessions in our tariff schedules is the President to be authorized to instruct our commissioners to propose on our part? The question of our own tariff will naturally and immediately come up for discussion and con- sideration. Shall, for example, our conmiissioners be au- thorized to offer to the Argentine Republic to admit its wool into our ports free of duty ? ** No one can be more sensible than I am of the great ad- vantages which in our country flow from that free commer- cial intercourse, unvexed by tariffs or custom-houses^ which AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 331 the Federal Constitution secures. I wish by some possible and wise contrivance those advantages now enjoyed by and between Maine and California, Florida and Alaska, could be realized by and between every nation and every producer on this hemisphere from Baffin's Bay to Cape Horn. But is this Government now in condition to successfully ask in a diplomatic way the accomplishment of such a result? To use Mr. Gladstone's language, should we not first of all begin to govern ourselves in tariff matters with 'justice and moderation?' And then, too, does opinion in this House tend to tolerate a reform or protective system by treaties? " One of the difficulties with which we in the United States have now to contend is that, by reason of our present tariff laws, we cannot in our own workshops compete with European manufacturers, notwithstanding the great advan- tage we have from the efficiency of better paid and better educated labor. So long as such tariff laws shall be main- tained it is not believed that any diplomatic negotiations will enable the United States to do in the Dominion of Canada, or in Mexico, or in Central America, or in South America what we cannot do at home — which is to compete with European manufacturers. Freedom to buy in these com- munities we now have, and we can enlarge its use to any degree, but freedom to sell to those communities we can only enlarge by producing equally good articles which we will sell at least as cheaply as our European competitors. All schemes whatever for retaining a protective system and gaining foreign markets are impossible of success, no matter how many railways we may build or steamships we may subsidize. It will be seen from the statistics already given that a large part of the products of our neighbors to the south of us are now admitted at our custom-houses free of duty, but the difficulty of increasing the exports of our 532 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. manufactured products to those countries remains, because our protective tariff inflicts what, owing to .the increased cost of manufacture, is in effect au export tax upon our prod- ucts, which frustrates the efforts of our enterprising and inventive people to have more complete possession of the neighboring markets upon this continent." ARGUMENTS FOR RECIPROCITY. It was not until May 6, 1886, that Senator Frye's bill, be- fore alluded to, was reported to the Senate by the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations. Its provisions were very like those of the McCreary bill. It was accompanied by a still more elaborate report than that in the House, which report included the reports made from time to time by the com- missioners who had visited the Central and South American countries. This report, or, rather, these reports, left little to be added upon the propriety of an international confer- ence, and the necessity for reciprocity in trade and com- merce. We first use the language of Commissioner Thacher : — " The peculiarities of the Latin race in America lead it away from manufacturing pursuits. Valencia centuries ago imported wool from England and returned it in cloths, but the process is now reversed. " Great Britain manufactures for the world, and Spain, with all the colonies she planted, contributes to her com- mercial supremacy. *' In Spain there is cheap fuel and plenty of water-power. In Spanish America, from Mexico to Magellan, there are few coal-fields, but almost everywhere flowing streams, furnishing the cheapest and most abundant power. " Guatemala, Costa Rica, the western slopes of the Andes, Uruguay, and portions of the Argentine Republic have un- AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 333 fairing and enormous stores of this easily-used motor. Yet in Costa Rica I saw only two water-driven mills; in Guate- mala there were a few more ; yet not one-thousandth part of the water-power was utilized. The Rimac for nearly 70 miles is a dashing cascade, with only a tannery, a brewery, and possibly a few other industries at Lima holding in check for a few minutes its rushing flood. "ChiU in the Mopocho and the Maipo has powerful streams, and hundreds of smaller water-courses find their way to the ocean. '' The report from Uruguay calls attention to its mternal water-power, and the statements submitted with the report from the Argentine Republic show how immense is the water-power in the Gran Chaco region. •' We must conclude, then, that the want of manufactured products in these countries grows out of either or both of two causes ; the one a disinclination to take up the patient, steady 'routine of daily toil necessary to successful manu- facturing, and the other a greater profitableness m other more congenial pursuits. '• Without dwelling on the point, I may say that it is safe to aver that these countries will for years be great consumers of foreign manufactured goods. " In Chili the war with Peru demoralized the soldiers, many of whom were taken from the ordinary pursuits, and returning from their conquest, failed to take up the peaceful avocations they left ; and yet Chili is beyond doubt in manu- factories the New England of South America. The special report on this country fully covers this question. '' In any trade relations we may establish with those coun- tries we may reasonably count on the permanence of the demand for our goods. -The larger portion of the commerce we are seeking has 334 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. been in the hands of Great Britain, but of recent years another, and what promises to be a more formidable rival, has come to the front. "The German manufacturers, intrenched behind encour- aging and# protecting legislative walls, hav^e pushed their products far beyond the home demand. Always sure of their own market without competition, they have turned their unflacff^ins: energies to secure centers of trade in the Western Hemisphere. They are clever imitators of every new invention, of every improved machine, and of many of the most useful and popular goods produced in the United States. They send out counterfeits of the famous * Collins' wares, even to the very brand ; they make mowers and agricultural implements as nearly like ours as possible. Our sewing-machines are copied by these people, and the imita- tions are palmed off on the South American trade as com- ing from the United States. The character and ways of these new rivals for the trade of our neighbors is thus graph- ically portrayed by our former consul-general in Mexico, Mr. Strother, and I may add that what the German is in Mexico he is in all the other Central and South American nations. " General Strother says : " ' For the rest it will still remain with American manu- facturers and merchants to solve the question of successful competition with their European rivals, the most formidable of whom at present are the Germans, whose commercial establishments are more substantially planted and more widely extended than those of any other foreign nation. And it may be well here to note their methods and the causes of their success. The German who comes to Mexico to establish himself in business is carefully educated for the purpose, not only in the special branch which he proposes AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 33. to follow, but he is also an accomplished linguist, being generally able to converse and correspond in the four great commercial languages— German, English, French, and Span- ish. His enterprise is usually backed by large capital in the mother country. He does not come to speculate, or inflated with the hope of acquiring sudden fortune, but expecting to succeed in time by close attention, patient labor and econoni}/, looking forward twenty, thirty, or even forty years for the realization of his hopes. He builds up his business as one builds a house, brick by brick, and with a solid foundation. He can brook delays, give long credits, sustain reverses, and tide over dull times. He never meddles with the politics of the country; keeps on good terms with its governors, who- ever they may be. He rarely makes complaints through his minister or consul, but if caught evading the revenue laws, or in other illegal practices, he pays his fine and goes on with his business. With these methods and character- istics, the German merchant generally succeeds in securing wealth and the respect of any community in which he may have established himself " In a conversation with the British minister, Sir Spencer St. John, in Mexico, he observed to me that the success of the Germans in dealing with the revenue officials and in pushing their trade had driven out of Mexico every whole- sale English house, whereas the foreign commerce was once largely in the hands of his countrymen. " In passing from this point we must not forget that not- withstanding all this copying of our productions by the German manufacturer, yet the deception deceives (qw, and that were the markets open to our dealers the superior material, workmanship, and fidelity of our goods would defy all competition. " The French, equally protected by home legislation and ^2>6 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. altve to the wants of the South American markets, are in- creasing their trade tiiere. " Indeed we must meet in the ports of our neighbors the wares of many of the European countries, all of which are borne to their destination in vessels flyirtg their own national ensign." FURTHER ARGUMENTS. Mr. Reynolds, another of the Commissioners, discussed the reciprocal trade idea still more ably and exhaustively, and in fact left the matter in such shape as that the system of practical reciprocity incorporated into the Act of 1 890 was the inevitable outcome of his logic. He says : "Among" the means to secure more intimate commer- cial relations between the United States and the several countries of Central and South America, suggested in the first report of the Commission to those States (transmitted by the President to Congress on February 13, 1885, and printed as Ex. Doc. No. 226), were the following (p. 4) : * Commercial treaties with actual and equivalent reciprocal concessions in tariff duties.' As the words ' actual and equiv- alent, were adopted at my suggestion, an explanation of their full force may not be superfluous. A stipulation in a treaty that certain products of one country shall be admitted free, or at a reduced duty, into another country, may, on paper, appear to offer a reciprocal concession for a like ad- mission of certain other products of the latter country into the former. But the seeming effect of it may be neutralized in various ways, so that it will be, to the one country or the other, not an actual concession. Chief among those ways are, the existence of treaties with other nations, placing them on the footing of the ' most favored nation,* export duties, home bounties, drawbacks, monopolies, and muni- AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 337 cfpal or other local taxation. The skill of the diplomatist, aided by information from consuls, merchants, shippers, and other experts in the question, should be exerted to frame the treaty so as to prevent the defeat of its real object by such collateral disadvanta^res and burdens. To explain them, or point out modes of removing them, severally, would unduly extend the length of this letter. "But one of them, the 'most favored nation clause,' de- serves special consideration. It is understood that Great Britain, Germany, and probably other countries, claim that a reciprocity treaty with the United States by a Spanish American country apphes to them, under that clause in their treaties with the last-mentioned country, with the same effect as if their names had been in the treaty instead of or along with that of the United States. For example, should the United States, resuming import duties on coffee, grant to Brazil freedom from them, on the * reciprocal concession ' that flour and certain American manufactures should be admitted free into that Empire, Great Britain, which con- sumes very little coffee of any kind, and probably none from Brazil, would claim the same freedom for her like manufact- ures. Tiius, in return for our being customers of Brazil, in coffee to the amount of about ;^50,ooo,ooo annually. Great Britain, offering no ' equivalent ' concession in fact, would still be able to drive (or rather, keep) us out of the Brazil- ian market for those manufoctures which she can supply more cheaply or with greater facility through her lines of steamers, "After much thought on the subject, I have found no surer mode of making reciprocity * equivalent ' than by ex- pressing in the treaty itself, and as a condition of it, the real object of every reciprocity treaty, the actual and equivalent increase of the commerce between the parties to it. For 338 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. illustration, should the United States make a reciprocity treaty with Spain for certain concessions designed to increase our exports to Cuba, in consideration of a reduction of our du- ties on Cuban sugars, the treaty should provide, that that reductio^i should exist only as long as Cuba imported from the United States at least a certain fixed amount in value annually, and Spain might justly require a like condition as to the annual amount of our imports of Cuban sugars. The custom-house returns of the two countries would readily fix the respective amounts, and the reciprocity of the treaty, whenever it ceased to be actual and equivalent, could be suspended by a proclamation of the President, on due notice to be provided for in the treaty. " As it is undeniable, and even generally admitted, that the ' most favored nation clause ' entitles a country having the privilege of it to be merely ' on all fours ' with any other nation, and share the adv^antages of it only on the identical conditions accompanying them, such a proviso as that above mentioned would effectually block the diplomatic game which Germany is understood to have played upon us in Mexico, by claiming for herself the benefits of our recent reciprocity treaty with that Republic. Taking, in fact, no sugar and little tobacco or anything else from Mexico, she sagaciously offers to remit her duties on them, and claims for her exports to that Republic, mainly in manufactures^ the same concessions it made to the United States in order to increase rhe exports of its own products to our country. With such a proviso as that above suggested, Germany would be beaten on her own diplomatic ground. Mexico would be obligated by the ' most favored nation clause ' only to offer to Germany the same treaty, iiui tails mutandis^ her name taking the place of that of the United States. As her imports from Mexico would not compare with ours, such a AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 339 treaty would give her no actual advantage over us. So, also, with Cuba in her commerce with Germany, and prob- ably, also, with Great Britain and France. No one of those countries (France and Germany making their own beet- root sugar, and Great Britain being supplied principally by her own colonies) would be able to take from Cuba the amount of sugars which would be the treaty ' equivalent * for the concessions made to the United States. "Another important consideration in deciding what kind of a reciprocity treaty to make, or whether to make it at all, is the effect it would have on some equally advantageous indirect trade. By driving out of some South American market some other country which trades with us, we may diminish the purchasing power of that country in our own markets, and increased indirect trade with the former may not compensate us for a loss of trade with the latter. In this connection, the effect of several misused terms is to be deprecated. Generally when our imports from and exports to any particular country do not balance at all, the very bad English is common of speaking of a ' balance of trade ' for or against us. It is refreshing to notice that in the reports of our Bureau of Statistics that improper phrase is discarded, and the difference between exports and imports is described as an excess of one over the other. An excess of imports over exports in a particular venture may represent a gam, and not a loss. A familiar illustration is that of a Boston ship which, in former times, would take a cargo belonging to the ship's owner, worth, say, ^loo.ooo, to China, and re- turn with one, also belonging to the same owner, worth twice the amount. The difference, being the returns for the expenses of the voyage, the profit in China on the original venture, and that in Boston on the return cargo, would be all gain. The same may be the case with the entire com- 340 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY, merce of one country with another, as could be amply shown from the statistics of British trade with Asia, given in Mr. Frelinghuysen's letter on the ' Commerce of the world.' Of course, in some other special case it might be otherwise. "Another very general error is to treat an excess of inv ports over exports in our trade with a particular country as a difference which we pay in cash. This is rarely, if ever, the case. It is usually paid in exchange on some other country, obtained by selling to it our own products. Brazil affords a very fair illustration. We take from that Empire directly products many millions in value in excess of what we send directly to it. That excess is paid for by exchange on London, based on our exports of provisions, cotton, etc., and with that exchange the Brazilian pays for English manufac- tures to be sent to Rio. The indirect trade may be differ- ent. The Englishman may sell his manufactures in Brazil, convert the proceeds directly, or indirectly by purchase of exchange, into coffee, with the proceeds of which in New York he purchases provisions to be sent to England. In either case the result is the same. England gains some profit in exchange, as London is the world's money centre, and in freights which her ships carry. But to the extent to which England is crippled in h^r sales to Brazil, her pur- chasing power in our provision markets maybe diminished. " Therefore, before making a reciprocity treaty, we should carefully consider, in each particular case, whether, even with the profits in exchange and shipping in a direct trade, we may not be losing a more profitable commerce in a dif- ferent direction, by diminishing the power of others of our regular customers to purchase products from us." A STILL FURTHER VIEW. Mr. Curtis, Secretary of the Commission and afterwards a AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 34i Commissioner, added a very interesting report, which still further elaborated the necessity for reciprocal trade. He said : — " During the last twenty years the value of the exports from the United States to the Spanish Americans was |>442,048,975, and during that time we purchased of them raw products to the amount of ^1,185,828,579, showing an excess of imports during the twenty years amounting to ^765,992,219, which was paid in cash. It will thus be seen that our commerce with Central and South America has left a very large balance on the wrong side of the ledger, while those GOMntries have all the time been buying in Europe the very merchandise we have for sale. Being the very reverse of the United States in climate and resources, they constitute our natural commercial allies, and the exchange should at least be even ; but they sell their raw products here and buy their manufactured articles in Europe. The principal reason for this is that the carrying trade is in the hands of English- men. The statistics show, that, of the total imports into the United States from Spanish America, which, in 1884, amounted to ;^ 159,000,000, three-fourths were carried in foreign vessels. Of our exports to those countries, amount- ing last year to 1^64,000,000, ^46,000,000 were carried in American vessels, while only ;^i 8,000,000 were carried by foreign vessels. It will thus be seen that nearly everything we buy is brought to us from Spanish America by English- men, while nearly everything we sell we have to carry there ourselves. The logic of these facts is irresistible. "The most absurd spectacle in the commercial world is the trade we carry on with Brazil. We buy nearly all her raw products, while she spends the money we pay for them in England and France. "In 1884, of the exports of Brazil ;^50,266,000 went to 342 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. the United States, ;$29,ooo,ooo to England, and ^24,000,000 to France. Of the imports of Brazil in 1884, $35,000,000 came from England, ;^ 15,000,000 from France, and $8,ooopo3 from the United States. "Another peculiar feature of this commerce was that of the exports of Brazil to the United States ;^32,000,000 were carried in English vessels and $9,000,000 in American vessels, while of her imports from the United States $6,000,000 were carried in American vessels and only $2,000,000 in English vessels. The trade is carried on by triangular voyages. Two lines of steamships sailing under the .British flag load every week at Rio for New York. Arriving at the latter port they place their cargoes of coffee and hides in the hands of commission merchants, and sail for Europe, where they draw against these consignments, and buy Manchester cotton, Birmingham hardware, and other goods which they carry to Brazil. During the last twenty years this absurd spectacle has cost the United States $600,000,000, every cent of which has gone into the pockets of English and French manufacturers. We have not only paid for the goods that England has sold Brazil, but as we have had no banking connections with that coun- try and no ships on the sea, nearly every ton of this com- merce has paid a tax to English bankers and vessel-owners. " Several years ago, when we removed the import tax on coffee, Brazil put an export duty on, so that the attempt of Congress to secure a cheap breakfast for the workingman simply resulted in diverting several million dollars from the treasury of the United States into the treasury of Brazil, without changing the price of the article. Mexico and the countries washed by the Caribbean Sea produce a better quality of coffee than is grown in Brazil, and if the United States Government would consent to discriminate against Hon. Shelby ^1. Cullom. Born in Wayne Co., Ky., November 22, 1829 ; next year parents moved to Tazewell CO., 111. ; educated at academy and university; ad- mitted to bar in Springfield and practiced there ; elected to State Legis- lature, 1856, 1860, 1872, 1874; was Speaker in 1861 and 1873; elected a Representative to 39th, 40th and 41st Congresses ; elected Governor of Illinois in 1876, and re-elected in 1880; resigned, February 5, 1883, to accept seat in United States Senate, as a Republican, and successor to Hon. David Davis; re-elected in 1888 and again in 1894; father of the Inter-State Commerce Law ; Chairman of Committee on Inter-State Commerce, and member of Committees on Census, Foreign Relations, etc. Hon. Isham G. Harris. Born in Franldin co., Tenn. ; educated at Winchester Academy; ad- mitted to bar at Paris, Tenn., 1841 ; elected as Democrat to State Legis- lature, 1847 ; elected to Congress as Democrat to represeni Ninth Con- gressional District, 1849 ; re-elected in 1851 ; moved to Memphis and continued law practice ; elected Governor of State in 1857,1859 and 1861 ; served during war as Aid to Commanding General of Confederate Army of Tennessee; resumed law practice at Memphis, 1867, elected the United States Senate in 1876; re-elected 1883,1889, and 1895-, an able debater, earnest statesman of the strict-construction school, and popular with his constituents. AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 345 Brazilian coffee, raised by slave labor, the nations of Central America and the Spanish Main would reciprocate by ad- mitting free to their ports our flour, lumber, provisions, lard, dairy products, kerosene, and other articles which are now kept from the common people by an almost prohibitory tariff " Brazil is in such a critical condition, financially and com- mercially, that if we did not buy her coffee it would rot on the trees, and the Englishmen who control her foreign com- merce would have to close their warehouses and throw all the Brazilian planters into the bankrupt court. These Eng- li.hmen have secured mortgages upon the plantations of Brazil by supplying the planters with merchandise on credit and taking the crop at the end of the season in payment; but as the crop seldom pays the advances, the mortgages have been lapping over upon the plantations, until now the Englishmen have the Brazilians bv the throat, making their own terms, charging one profit on the merchandise sold, another as interest on the advances, a third on the coffee purchased, and a fourth as interest on payments deferred, while they make three profits out of us : first, on coffee they sell us ; second, on transportation charges ; third, in dis- counting our bills on London. | " The greater part of our exports to Spanish America go to Mexico and the West Indies. Deducting these from the total, it will be found that we buy over 30 per cent, of what the South American countries have for sale, and furnish them only 6 per cent, of their imports. The balance of trade goes on piling up at the rate of nearly ^ioo,000,ooo a year. This was not always so. Twenty years ago more than half the commerce of this hemisphere was controlled by the merchants of New York, Boston, and Baltimore, and iriore than half the ships in its harbors sailed from those 346 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. ports. Now only a small percentage of the carrying trade is done in American bottoms, while English ship-owners who control the transportation facilities permit the Spanish- American merchants to buy in this country only such goods us they cannot obtain elsewhere. " The cause of this astonishing phenomenon is our neglect )o furnish the ways and means of commerce. We can no more prevent trade following facilities for communication than we can repeal the law of gravity. While we have been pointing with pride at our internal development, England and France have been stealing our markets away from us. The problem of recovering them is easy of solution. The States of Central and South America will buy what we have to sell if intelligent measures are used to cultivate the mar- kets and means are provided for the deliver}^ of the goods. " The Spanish-American nations seek political intimacy with the United States, and look to this, the mother of re- publics, for example and encouragement. They recognize and assert the superiority of our products. They offer and pay subsidies to our ships. Brazil now pays ^loo.ooo a year as a subsidy to an American steamship line, while the United States Government paid only ;^4,ooo last year to the same line for carrying our mails. The Argentine Re- public had a law upon its statute-books representing a stand- ing offer of a subsidy of 96,000 silver dollars a year to any company that will establish a steamship line between Buenos Ayres and New York, under the American flag, and at the same time has twenty-one lines of steamships, sailing from forty-five to sixty vessels a month, between Buenos Ayres and the ports of Europe, to which it pays nothing. We have no steamship communication with the Argentine Republic whatever. During the last year, out pf the millions of tons of shipping represented in the harbor AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 347 of that metropolis, there were no steamers from the United States, and our flag was seen upon but 2 per cent, of the saihng vessels. Here is a nation purchasing in Europe ^;o,ooo,ooo worth of merchandise every year, and only spending about ^4,000,000 in the United States, and these ^4,000,000 represent articles, such as petroleum, lumber, lard and other pork products, which could not elsewhere be obtained." THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. The Senate passed the Frye bill on June 17, 1886, but it did not become a law until May 24, 1888, when the International American Conference became a possi- bility. It was for this Conference to give wider, fuller, more learned arid disinterested consideration to the question of trade relations and reciprocal commerce between the American nations than ever before. It was called by the President to meet in Washington, October 2, 1889. Invita- tions were duly issued, and the Conference met with dele- gates present from Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hayti, Hon- duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. Hon. James G. Blaine was elected President of the Con- ference. It remained in session until April, 1 890, and dis- cussed and reported upon all the subjects prescribed in the Act authorizing the call, to wit : — Plan of Arbitration ; Reciprocity Treaties ; Inter-Conti- nental Railway; Steamship Communication; Sanitary Regulations ; Customs Regulations ; Common Silver Coin ; Patents and Trade Marks; Weights and Measures; Port Dues; International Laws; Extradition Treaties; Inter- national Bank. 34S AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. . In the discussions upon " Reciprocity Treaties," all of which were very able and interesting, two lines of thought appeared. That which represented all of the countries ex- cept Argentine and Chili, was in the direction of reci- procity, whose advantages were conceded, and whose practical operation needed but the encouragement of some acceptable concession on the part of the United States. The thought of Argentine and Chili seemed to be that reci- procity was impracticable, unless enlarged to suit the world, and that the United States was not yet so commcr- cially strong, or was too hampered with her tariff system to offer the necessary concessions to all the nations. The attitude and the logic of these two States were fully met by the delegates of the United States in the Conference, show- ing in detail that the first stage of national growth is agri- cultural, the second is manufacturing, and the third is com- mercial. The first two stages with us have been reached, and we now enter upon the third. The same restless energy, the same enterprise, and the same inventive genius which crave success to a2:riculture and manufactures will mark the development of commerce. " The spirit of enterprise begins to spread like contagion into Central America. Imagination already paints on her canals the commerce of the woild. The locomotive is there a messenger of peace, the steel rail a bond of friend- ship. " Colombia and Venezuela and Brazil and Ecuador and Peru already feel the irresistible impulse which impels to a closer union. The Argentine and Chili may hesitate for a time, but finally they too will join hands with their sister Republics, and joyfully assist to fulfil the bright destiny that awaits us all." AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 349 CONFERENCE REPORT AND BLAINE'S REVIEW. The Conference adopted a Report which recognized the pohcy of reciprocity and the " need of closer and more re- ciprocal commercial relations among American States." Secretary Blaine submitted this Report to the President, June 19, 1890, with an exhaustive review of its contents. This review was so exhaustive, and is, moreover, such an important part of the literature of reciprocity, that inability to publish it here in full, for lack of space, is greatly regretted. But its gist was that out of a total of ^233,000,000 imports furnished to Chih and Argentine alone in 1888, England contributed ^90,000,000, Germany $43,000,000, France ;^34,ooo,ooo, the United States only ;^ 13,000,000, and this, notwithstanding the facts that our ports were nearest, and the bulk of those imports were of articles we were actually manufacturing better and as cheaply as foreign nations. That in 1868 our total exports were $375,737>ooo, of which $53,197,000, or 14 per cent., went to Spanish America, while in 1888 our total exports were $742,368,000, of which $69,273,000, or only 9 per cent., went to Spanish America. That it was the unanimous judgment of the delegates that our exports to these countries and the other Republics could b^ increased to a great extent by the negotiations of proper reciprocity treaties. That lack of means for reaching their markets was the chief obstacle in the way of increased exports. The carry ' ing trade has been controlled by European merchants who have forbidden an exchange of commodities. Under liberal encouragement from the government and the establishment of regular steamship lines, France increased her exports to South America from $8,292,000 in 1880 to $22,996,000 in 1888. By the same means Germany increased her exports 350 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. to South America from ;^2, 365,000 in 1880 to ^13,310,000 in 1888. That the Conference beheves that while great profit would come to all countries under reciprocity treaties, the United States would be far the greatest gainer, and that especially since ^y per cent, of our imports from those countries came in duty free, while nearly all our exports to them were heavily dutiable at their ports, in some cases to the extent of prohibition. That increased exports would draw alike from our farms, factories and forests, such being the character of the articles required by those countries. A steamer load from New York to Rio Janeiro, which was traced to its origin, as to the articles which comprised it, showed that thirty-six of our States and Territories had contributed to the cargo. That, excepting raw cotton, our four largest exports are brcadstuffs, provisions, petroleum and lumber. In 1889 our export of these articles was : — Breadstufifs, ^I23,876,- 423, of which only ;^5, 1 23.528 went to Latin America; Pro- visions, $104,122,328, of which only 1^2,507,375 went tliither; Petroleum, $44,830,424, of which $2,948,149 went thither; Lumber, $26,907,000, of which $5,039,886 went thither. Since the United States is almost the only source of supply for these articles, which rank as necessaries of life, and there are 50,000,000 of population in Latin America, the advantages of a direct and larger trade are apparent. That fifteen of the seventeen Republics in the Conference indicated their. desire to enter upon reciprocal commercial relations with the United States; the remaining two ex- pressed equal willingness, could they be assured that their advances would be favorably considered. That to " escape the delay and uncertainty of treaties it AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 35^ has been suggested that a practicable and prompt mode of testing- the question was to submit an amendment to the pending tariff bill, authorizing the President to declare the ports of the United States free to all the products of any nation of the American hemisphere upon which no export duties are imposed, whenever and so long as such nation shall admit to its ports free of all national, provincial (state), municipal, and other taxes, our flour, corn-meal, and other breadstuffs, preserved meats, fish, vegetables and fruits, cot • ton-seed oil, rice and other provisions, including all articles of food, lumber, furniture and other articles of wood, agri- cultural implements and machinery, mining and mechanical machinery, structural steel and iron, steel rails, locomotives, railway cars and supplies, street cars, and refined petroleum. These particular articles are mentioned because they have been most frequently referred to as those with which a val- uable exchange could be readily effected. The list could no doubt be profitably enlarged by a careful investigation of the needs and advantages of both the home and foreign markets. "The opinion was general among the foreign delegates that the legislation herein referred to would lead to the opening of new and profitable markets for the products of which we have so large a surplus, and thus invigorate every branch of agricultural and mechanical industry. Of course the exchanges involved in these propositions would be ren- dered impossible if Congress in its wisdom should repeal the duty on sugar by direct legislation, instead of allowing the same object to be attained by the reciprocal arrangement suggested." RECIPROCITY AND THE ACT OF 189O. We have now reached a period in the history of reci- procity when it was to be given practical application, out- 352 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. side of the usual form of prolix and uncertain treaty, and in the form of a specific enactment or declaration. The proposition, just above noted, to incorporate it as a policy in our Tariff laws, was at first received with misgivings by the most ardent friends of protection. They doubted the propriety of introducing it into strictly tariff legislation, lest it might endanger the success of such legislation, or ai least subtract from the strength and efficacy of some of the protective doctrines. But the matter was persistently urged upon the attention of those who had the Tariff Act of 1890 in charge. The more it was studied the more it grew in favor. The litera- ture bearing upon it, the facts it embraced, the theories and promises involved, proved startling and convincing. The administration saw that it could well afford to accept it as a measure and abide by its consequences. Political lines be- gan to harden respecting it, and the one party shrank not from its advocacy nor the other from attack upon it. Thus it ripened, and the Tariff Act of 1890 became its opportu- nity, not only as to time, but as to the fact that the contem- plated enlargement of the free list, by the removal of millions of duties from sugars and other articles, would provide the concessions to other nations necessary for a fair and perhaps successful trial of it, in the proposed way. At last it found its place in the pending Tariff Act — the Tariff Act of 1890 — as Section 3 of the Free List. It reads : — "That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with coun- tries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, 1892, whenever and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the govcinment of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides raw and uncured, or any of such AMERICAN '.RECIPROCITY. 355 articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agri- cultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hide^ nito the United States he may deem to be re- ciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power, and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this Act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the production of such couiitry, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country, as follows : — ''* Here follow the rates in detail, the rate on sugar being from 7-ioth of a cent per pound to 2 cents per pound ac- cording to test ; on molasses 4 cents a gallon ; on coffee 3 cents per pound ; on tea 10 cents per pound ; and on hides I J^ cents per pound. APPLIED RECIPROCITY. By the middle of March, 1892 (March 15), all the coun- tries of the American Continent south of the United States had either assented to the doctrine of reciprocal trade as in- corporated in the McKinley Act of 1890, or had entered into negotiations which looked to a speedy acceptance of the doctrine, with the exceptions of Venezuela, Hayti and Colombia. The refusal of these three to join in reciprocity as offered by the Act of 1890 led to an event which marked the second stage of the reciprocity policy. Their refusal being complete, for the time being at least. President Harri- son, under the powers conferred upon him by the Act, issued his proclamation to them, imposing on their sugars, mo- lasses, coffees, teas and raw hides, exported to the United 354 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. States and entered at its ports, the duties provided for in th^ Act, which duties were, as to sugars and molasses, less than under the Act of 1 883, or the Mills Bill, and amounted to tiiree cents a pound on coffee, ten cents a pound on tea, and one and one half cents per pound on hides. These duties, therefore, as to coffee, tea and hides, be- came really discriminative, for these articles were, and had been for a long time, upon the free list of the United States. They were ratably discriminative as to sugar and molasses, which articles had just gone upon our free list; but then, these three countries did not export sugar to the United States. In order to meet this stage of the reciprocity policy, those who opposed it with the objection that the Act of 1890 was unconstitutional, as conferring upon the Executive powers which belonged wholly to the Legislative branch of the government, carried a test case into the United States Supreme Court. That tribunal decided that the power con- ferred upon the President by the Act was not unconstitu- tional, that the Congress had legislated as clearly respecting the duties to be imposed upon the products of dissenting countries as it had in the regular schedules of the Act, and that the only exceptional feature of the legislation, which was that the President should be left to ascertain the date when a country refused to accept reciprocity, was not fatal to the Act, since it was a fact only whicli had to be ascer- tained, and a fact which would have to be ascertained out »f the State Department in any event. At this stage, too, reciprocity met renewed and active opposition in the form of arguments as to its cost to the people of this country. The exports to the United States of the three dissenting countries were, in 1890, as follows :— AMERICAN RKCIPROCITY. 355 Coffee. Hides. Venezuela.... ^9,662,207 ^812,347 Colombia i ,849,441 630,099 Hayti 1,270,247 30.39I ^12,781,895 ^^1,472,837 Taking the above item of coffee, which represented an ex- port of about 76,000,000 pounds, these opponents argued that this quantity of coffee, which was about fifteen per cent, of our entire annual supply — 500,000,000 pounds — would, at three cents a pound, subject our people to a tax of ;^2, 280,000 per annum. To this the friends of reciprocity answered : — that if this duty of three cents a pound were levied upon these coffees it would prove not only discriminating but prohibitory, for these countries could not afford to compete with other coffee- growing countries in a market which was free to them.. Therefore, in as much as no coffee could come to us from these dissenting countries, our people would have no duties to pay. But, said the opposition, in that event our annual supply of coffee will be reduced, and w^e will have to pay more for what does come. To this the answer was, that there is no market for those coffees except in the United States, and that as they would have to come here ulti- mately, the only condition upon which they could be marketed was by the payment of the duty by the pro- ducers ; that is to say, they would have to throw off the duty in order to enter the market on the same footing as other countries. And the further answer was given, that even if those coff es never reached our market, the vacuum occasioned thereby would be only temporary, and would be speedily fiUed by Mexico Central America and Brazil. As an assp ?nce of this, it wa- pointed out that all the coffee- 3^6 AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. growing countries, notably Brazil, that had accepted reci- procity, were already experiencing improvement in their industrial interests, and feeling the impetus of enlarged trade with the United States. ACCEPTANCE OF RECIPROCITY. This stage of the reciprocity policy had been anticipated by all the important sugar-producing countries, or a suffi- cient number of them to place ninety-five per cent, of our raw sugar supply under the regulation of reciprocity con- ventions. The Spanish West Indies, whence forty-two per cent, of our supply is derived, German}^, the British West Indies, Hawaii, the Philippines, San Domingo, Brazil, Austria-Hungary, France and colonies, Central America, Mexico, had either accepted reciprocity or called conven- tions for that purpose. Many of these countries had main- tained high rates of duty against exports from the United States, some had imposed prohibitive rates, a few had for- bidden altogether the entry of our products, American pork for instance, into their ports. The concessions granted by these countries in their reci- procity conventions have resulted in opening their ports to a large class of the products of the United States, either by removing duties on them entirely, or by reducing said duties to a minimum. Germany, by her reciprocity agreement, admitted free, or at reduced rates of duty, American meats, (Vuits, cereals, furniture and farming utensils. France did ihc same thing, and so of the various countries whose com- mercial interests were touched by the enlargement of the free list of imports into the United States under the Act of 1890, and the introduction of the reciprocity policy as a provision of said Act. 01 course it would require time to demonstrate by AMERICAN IILCIPIIUCITY. 357 actual figures the effects of reciprocity on tlie commerce r,r the nations interested. Yet very soon figures were ob- tiiiiable showing an increase of exports to and imports from such countries. Brazil accepted the policy of reci- ,,ro('ity April 1, 1891, In nine months her imports to the United' States showed a total of $79,183,238, as against n ' total of #52,861,398 for the corresponding nine months o^ 1890. Tlie exports from this country showed §11,555,447 as against #10,081,871, in the months* above mentioned. The reciprocity treaty with Spain which took effect September 1, 1891, was followed in four months by an i;nportation of §14,950,808, as against #11,782,023, for the corresponding four months of 1890. In the same four months the exports were #7,063,222, as against #4,816,029, in the corresponding months of 1890. These indications continued to be sui)ported by statis- tics, and in cumuhitive form, till the principle of reciproc- ity was swept out of our economic system by the passage of the Wilson TariH Bill of 1894. That act rendered nuoatory all the reciprocity treaties with other nations, and instead of what was known as reciprocal relations, came a system of retaliations, especially on the part of Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Spain which worked great injury to the agricultural interests of this country. They excluded our flour, meats live animals and agricultural implements to an extent that amounted almost to prohibition, so that what bade fair under reciprocity, to become an even balance of trade was turned into the old channels against us. Ihus m l^Jo, t'.e Republics to the south of us sold us products, admit- Ld p actically free of duty, to the extent of #246,000 while in the same year we only exported to them goods to the value of #143,000,000, every ounce of which was cOQ AMERICAN RPXIPROCITY. taxed from five to one hundred per cent, on its value in their custom houses. The balance of trade against us, ^103,000,000, was paid for in gold. Tlie gain from the incorporation of reciprocity into our economy under the tariff act of 1890 was sufficiently manifest to furnish the basis of intelligent argument, when it was swept away by the Wilson Tariff Act of lb94 It is sad to contemplate that a doctrine which promised so much should have beei? so summarily expelled. And I lie regret over its expulsion is all the deeper from tlio tact that those who ejected it charged its advocates with taking a step toward free trade, the very doctrine tliey themselves sought to apply as fully as they could in the Wilson Tariff Bill of 1894. Aside from partyism and all narrow theoiy the doctrine of reciprocity is one which deserves the broadest study and, as this country is situated, the fairest of trials, it is a policy really far removed from mere parties and poli- tics, and is a matter of truly national and international import, all of whose features are economic and commer- cial. It was thought that its incorporation into our commer- cial polity was a declaration on the part of the United States tliat it had reached a place among commercial na- tions where it was no longer a law into itself, but that in order to compete with the older nations in the markets (if the world, it would have to strive as they were doing for legitimate supremacy. Happily for our civilization, the in- corporation of reciprocity into our statutes proposed only a peaceful solution of social and economic problems and an amicable assertion of our industrial supremacy and independence. AMERICAN IIECIPKOCITY. 359 What Europe Saw and Did. One must contrast tins American purpose with that of the nations of Europe, who woukl not willingly lose their trade with the Republics to the south of us, but would maintain it with every art known to their diplomacy, all the ingenuity and force born of superiority, all the finesse bred by ages of shrewdness and self assertion. England, especially seems to have been deeply impressed with the magnitude of tlte new commercial departure on the part of the United States, and with her usual astute- ness earliest foresaw its effects on her markets in Central and South America Countries. Her press became bitter in its denunciations of the new policy, and when the difficulty with Chile arose, the same press made it all too plain that there was concerted effort on the part of Eng- lish diplomats to crush out intercouisc, conuuercial and social, with our continental neighbor. The United States could not have gone to war with Chile, except by fightii g England either openly, or under cover of deeply disguised diplomacy. The English idea of reciprocity being that it involves the principle of lex tcdioiiis, or law of revenge, ''an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," it would have been easy for her to find arguments or excuses for frustrating all our efforts toward more intimate trade rela. tions with all South American Countries. Our imbroglio with Chile made the fact almost patent that foreign na- tions stood ready to challenge our right to entrench on their commercial domains by means of reciprucity, and their anxiety and attitude showed that they were more fully aware of the effects of reciprocity on their trade in these countries than even our wisest statesmen and shrewd- ebt merchants had been. This attitude of foreign nations 360 AMERICAN RECIPKOCITY. WLis the greatest compliment that coiikl have been paid to ieci[)rocity as an economic principle and commercial force. England, France, Germany and Italy had for generations been engaged in a neck and neck race for the markets of ?>Iexico, Central America and South America. They had used every art of diplomacy and all the genius of com-i merce to head off rivalry and establish supremacy. They manufactured and priced and Labelled with specific intent to occupy these markets. They established lines of steamers, whose guage and velocity were best adapted for intercourse. They subsidized ocean transit to secure dis- patch. They loaned credit on must dangerous securities. They sent drummers, agents and other interested parties to prospect, represent and persuade. They formed huge syndicates which took possession of immense inland inter- ests, like the Peruvian nitre beds, and worked them with untold profit. The result was that they came to own and control the markets of South America. The productions of these countries, destined for the United States, came to us in the ships of Europe, and by way of European ports, where they paid the rich bounty of ocean freight and the inevitable commissions for handling, that the European merchant has ever been privileged to suck from the world's goods in transit. Two or three steamers a month sufficed to carry to South American countries all they cared to take from us in the shape of our products. The bulk of wliat they sold to us — many times over and over again in value what we sold to them — was paid fur in gold, through European houses, with another commission for negotiation. Europe saw that every bill of goods we could place to our credit in a South American port would be deducted from her account. Hence her nervousness, her hostility Hon. James Z. George. Born in Monroe Co., Ga., October 20,1826; moved to Mississippi when young; participated in Mexican war; studied law and admitted to practice in Carroll co. ; elected Reporter of Appellate Court, 1854 and 1860; reported ten volumes of reports and published a digest of decisions ; member of Secession Convention, 1861 ; Brigadier-General in Confederate army; Chairman of Democratic State Executive Com- mittee, 1875-76 ; appointed a Judge of State Supreme Court, 1879 ; elected Chief-Justice; elected to United States Senate, 1881; re-elected 1886 and 1892 ; member ef the Mississippi Constitutional Convention, 1890; member of Committees on Agriculture, Education and Labor, Judiciary, Transportation, etc. Hon. Joseph B. Foraker. Born near Rainsborough, Ohio, July 5, 1846 ; enlisted from farm in 89th Ohio Regiment ; served in army of Cumberland till close of war ; Sergeant in 1862; Fiist Lieutenant in 1864; Captain in 1865; Aide to General Slocum ; after war entered Wesleyan University ; graduated al Cornell, 1869; studied law and admitted to bar; Judge of Cincinnati Superior Court, 1879-82 ; nominated as Republican candidate for Gov ernor in 1883, and defeated; re-nominated in 1885 and elected; re- nominated, but defeated by Governor Campbell in 1889; noted for fiery eloquence and dovotion to cause of soldiers; elected to U. S. Senate, 1896, to succeed Hon. Calvin S. Brice, whose term expires March 3, 1897. AMERICAN RECIPROClTYo 363 to Aniciican reciprocity. She could not, she would not, sit idly by and witness this threatened inroad into her trade, this disturbance of the commercial nests she had built and snugly feathered in Central and South America. In affairs of this kind, and amid such conditions, affairs and conditions which concern only national pocketbooks and national prestige, there is absolutely no sentiment, nothing to be hoped for from real or imaginary national condescension or sympathy. We must have expected just what came, unless all history belied itself, to wit, the criticism, the antagonism, the counter efforts of the nations whose interests were touched and whose trade was threatened. We must have expected even more, and that was preparation on our part to hold what we could gain, on the principle that our right to obtain was equal witli the right of any other nation, and in a geographic sense more natural than with any nation across the sea. Wliat we could not have anticipated was that this conn- try itself should be the first to strike the blow looked for only from other countries, and that at a time when the experiment of reciprocity gave every guarantee of repeat- ing commercially the history which led to the Monroe Doctrine in diplomacy and politics. When the Monroe Doctrine was announced, and on every occasion that has required its re-assertion, it was notice to Europe that the American republics constituted a political system so continental, unique and independent, that monarchical interference with it would not be toler- ated. The introduction of reciprocity into American commerce in 1890, was legarded as a departure of equal moment with that political departure of Monroe in 1823. It was looked upon as the beginning of a continental era looking to commercial freedom and independence, and as 21 864 AMERICAN KEClPKOCITr. likely to result in the commercial emaiicipaiiun and solidarit}^ of American countries, as that of Monroe cM politically. Repeal of Reciprocity. The life of the reciprocity experiment was unhappily short. What was most unfortunate about it was tliat it was forced to bow to the behests of party. As has been seen, it was in no sense a party problem, but one of plain business. Its workings were of the purely economic order. To sustain it helped no party. To sacrifice it helped no party. No time had been given to ascertain its real worth, nor to assert as a fact that it had proven harm- ful. What time was given it, pointed to an outcome highly beneficial to the country, and which should have been the delight of all parties. Tlie passage of the WMson Tariff Bill of 1894 left reci- procity without the sanction of law, left it to fall after an experimental life of four years. There had grown up about it, and by means of it, treaties with nearlj^ ever}^ country to the south of us, and with many in Europe, establishing commerce on a reciprocal basis. These trea- ties were in opemtion when the Reciprocity Act was re- peated by the Wilson Tariff Bill. They fell to the ground with that repeal, much to the regret of all the treaty countries, and to the anger and contempt of not a few of them. The milling interests, live stock industries, and manufactures of furniture and farming implements, in this country felt the loss of reciprocity to a lamentable extent. The largely increased export 'trade, especially to Cuba, Brazil and other important countries, which had come about under reciprocity, fell off and the old trade balance against us was lecijtablibhed. How heavy and ruinous AMERICAN RECIPROCITY. 365 this balance was in 1895, has already been seen in this article. As has alread}^ been intimated, the countries of Europe ^yith whom reciprocit}' treaties had been made, entered tlieir protests in our State Department against their repeal. Tliese protests passed unheeded. They, tlierefore, began a Jiystem of retaliation by excluding our products from their ports, much to our commercial detriment, and especially to the injury ot our agricultural interests. This humiliating and injurious warfare they could not carry on under the reciproc- ity treties which pledged mutual consideration of interna- tional products entering into commerce. THE MONROE DOCTRINE, AND VENE- ZUELA DISPUTE. History of the Dispute. The dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela re- specting the western boundar}^ of British Guiana began with the cession of the Colon}^ of British Guiana to Great Britain by Holland, under the Netherland treaty of 1814. Venezuela, in all her constitutions, declared her territorial Innits to be that of the Captaincy-General of Venezuela, in 1810, but for prudential reasons was content with the general line of the Essequibo river as boundary between herself and British Guiana. Great Britain never laid claim to a definite western boundary for her possessions till 1840, when she com- missioned Sir Robert Schomburgk to lay down boundaries, • which he did by means of landmarks and maps. Vene- zuela protested so vehemently against the Schomburgk boundary, that Great Britain was forced to ex[)lain that ' she regarded the line as only tentative, and as part of her plan to arrive at boundary conclusions between herself and Brazil as well as Venezuela. The monuments of the line were removed by the express orders of Lord Aber- deen, wlio in 1844, proposed another line, beginning at the river Moroco. After 1840, Great Britain drew several lines, all more or less imaginary, but each one infringing more and more on Venezuela territory, and correspondingly enlarging (366) THE MONROE DOCTRINE, 307 her own. None of these lines were predicated on legal right, and to all the assent of Venezuela was asked and denied. Each new claim to extended boundary brought up the question of arbitration in futile form, and each at- tracted the attention of the United States, sometimes as an invited arbiter, always as a party jealous of monar- chical encroaclmient on western soil. Tlie Granville line of 1881 started twenty-nine miles west of the Moroco river. The Rosebery line of 1886 increased the area of British Guiana from seventy six thousand to one hundred thousand square miles. The Salisbury line of 1890, and the second Rosebery Une of 1893, showed similar ag- gressiveness on the part of Great Britain. These later claims were followed by attempts at occupation and the exercise of jurisdiction, despite a solemn agreement made between the two countries, in 1850, that neither country should attempt jiermanent occupation pending the settlement of the dispute. Throughout the entire dispute, Venezuela, as her only hope against a powerful adversary, repeatedly sought an understanding through arbitration. Her efforts were baffled, for various reasons, till in 1886 a ti-eaty was drafted between her and Great Britain, which provided for a settlement of all boundary disputes by arbitration. This treaty was not ratified owing to the fall of the Gladstone ministry. Lord Salisbury, Gladstone's successor, refused to accede to the arbitration clause. To every subsequent appeal for arbitration, the answer of Great Britain was that arbitration could be had but only respecting such disputed territory as lay west of a line designated by her. self. Of course such an arbitrary condition was inadmissible by Venezuela, and owing to new appropriations of 368 THE M()^'ROE doctrine. territory by Great Britain, Venezuela, in 1887, suspended diplomatic relations, and protested before the British Gov- ernment and the world " against the acts of spoliation committed to her detriment by the government of Great Britain, which she at no time and on no account will recognize as capable of altering in the least the rights which she has inherited from Spain, and respecting which she will ever be willing to submit to the decision of a third power." Diplomatic relations were not afterward renewed be- tween the two countries, but owing to further aggressions on the part of Great Britain, Venezuela was forced to re- sume negotiations respecting the boundary question. But her efforts of 1890 and 1893 failed, for the reason that Great Britain again refused to arbitrate, except as to ter- ritory west of an arbitrary line drawn by herself. In 1893, farther negotiations were broken off by another protest, and appeal of Venezuela to the world, in which it was stated that there was seemingly nothing left for her to do but to accept the painful and peremptory duty of providing for her own legitimate defence against the encroachments of Great Britain. To put the entire British-Venezuela question into a few words, it then appears : (1) The dispute between Great Britian and Venezuela is as to territory of indefinite but confessedly large ex- tent. (2) On account of the great strength of Great Britain, Venezuela can only hope to estal)lish her claim through a direct agreement with her adversary, or by means of ar- bitration. (3) The controversy has extended over half a centur}^ with constantly varying claims on the part of Great THE MONKOE DOCTRINE, ^69 Britain, and persistent efforts on the part of Venezuela to establish a permanent boundary by agreement. (4) The futility of seeking direct agreement induced Venezuela to ask and strive for arbitration for at least a quarter of a century. (5) Great Britian has always and continuously refused to arbitrate except on condition that Venezuela would re- nounce a large part of her claim, and concede in advance a large share of the territory in controversy. The United States and The Dispute. There has never been a time when the United States, or for that matter, any American republic, could be in- different to the controversy, in view of their traditional policy as to monarchism on the western continent. But the United States on account of her great strength and prestige, and because she had an earlier and more clearly defined policy than the other Republics, was looked to by Venezuela as the Republic most likely to see that she was not finally wronged by Great Britain, in case of abitration or warlike clash. In general Venezuela kept the United States informed of her efforts to end the controversy, and very often sought to supplement her efforts by the good offices of this country. Thus in 1876, when Venezuela sought to open negotiations with Great Britain, the fact, and even the note to Great Britain were communicated to this government. In 1881, when the fact that Great Britain was making a naval demonstration off the mouth of the Orinoco was communicated to this government by the Venezuela min- ister. Secretary of State, Evarts, replied that - m view of the deep interest which the government of the United States takes in all transactions tending to attempted en- 370 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. croacliments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the Republics of this continent, this government could not look with indifference to the forcible acquisition of such territory by England if the mission of the vessels now at the mouth of the Orinoco should be found to be for that end." In November, 1882, Venezuela sought the advice and support of the United States respecting another effort at arbitration with Great Britain. In response, Secretary of State, Frelinghuysen, replied in substance that the United States stood willing, at the desire of Venezuela, to propose arbitration to Great Britain as a means of settling the boundary disputes, and that the best tender of the good offices of tliis country to Venezuela would be in the direction of arbitration. Further, that the United States, while not seeking to become, would not refuse to be, an arbiter between the two countries. In 1884 the Venezuela minister to England, appointed with a view of negotiating a treaty respecting tt.e boundary dispute, came to Washington first, and after many interviews with our Secretary of State, went to England with commendations to the good offices of Mr. Lowell, the American Minister in London, and with authority to represent to the British Government that this country viewed with concern whatever might affect the interests of a sister republic of the American continent and its position in the family of nations. When, in 188G, it became apparent that this Venezuela Minister was about, to fail in his negotiations, and that diplomatic rela- tions were again about to be broken off, our Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, with a view to preventing such rujjture between Venezuela and Great Britain, authorized our Min- ister to Great Britain to tender the good offices of the THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 371 United States to promote an amicable settlement of the boundary differences, and even to extend an offer to the two countries to act as arbiter if agreeable to both. This tender was accompanied by the following clear state- ment of the relation of tlie United States to the contro- vei'sy : " Her Majesty's Government will readily understand that this attitude of friendly neutrality and entire impar- tiality touching the merits of the controversy, consisting wholly in a difference of facts between our friends and neighbors, is entirely consistent and compatible with the sense of responsibility that rests upon the United States in relation to the South American Republics. The doc- trines we announced two generations ago, at the instance and with the moral support and approval of the British Government, have lost none of their force or importance in the progress of time, and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States are equally interested in conserving a status, the wisdom of which has been demon- strated by the experience of more than half a century." Great Britain declined this offer. Again in 1888, British Guiana widened her boundary pretensions by proposing to build a railroad on soil claimed by Venezuela. This inten- sification of the dispute attracted the notice of the United States, and once more this country offered to assist in end- ing the controversy, at the same time calling the attention of Great Britain to the fact that her repeated change of boundaries, her frequeut enlargements of them, her refusals to arbitrate with Venezuela, were sources of grave conceru to the Government of the United States. Ill 1889, word was received that Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, had been declared a British port. Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, immediately instructed 372 THE MOKROE DOCTRINE. Mr. Lincoln, our Minister to England, to offer to Great Britain the good offices of the United States with a view- to opening diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Venezuela, and as a preliminary step toward ending their controversy by arbitration. A conference between the three powers was proposed, to meet in London, in which the attitude of the United States should be that of impar- tial friend to the other two. Of this proposal nothing came, but in 1890 and again in 1893, Great Britain refused to hearken to the proposals of Venezuela to reopen diplomatic relations, because a condition of such resumption, steadily adhered to by Venezuela, was the reference of the bound- ary dispute to arbitration. After 1893, Venezuela repeatedly brought the contro- versy to the notice of the United States, and insisted upun its importance to this country and to herself. Her notices came to this country in the form of appeals for serv- ice and support. They showed an acute stage of the controversy with Great Britain, which might burst out in war between her and Venezuela at any moment, and with the result that the weaker government must be driven to the wall. These appeals were not received with indifference by this country, indeed they could not be because of the traditional policy of the United States toward the Western Republics, and in every instance an Ambassador to Great Britain was instructed to exert his influence toward the renewel of diplomatic relations, between the two estranged coinitries, and to urge arbitration as a means of settling all boundary differences. Thus much the United IStates felt free at all times to urge, in its attitude of neutrality and friendship toward botli countriies. In the insructions of our Secretar}^ of State to Mr. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 373 Bayard at London, July 13, 1894, the following language occurs : " The President (Mr. Cleveland) is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and honoral>le settlement of the existing difficulties between an American State and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would be glad to see the recstab- lishment of such diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end. " I can discern but two equitable solutions of the pres- ent controversy. One is the arbitral determination of the rights of the disputants as the respective successors of the historical rights of Holland and Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a new boundary line in accordance with the dictates of mutual expediency and consideration. The two governments having so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent and conspicuous advocacy by the United States and England of the principle of arbitration, and their recourse thereto in settlement of important questions arising between them, makes such mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present instance, and this Government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense." In the above the point is made conspicuous that in her relations with the United States, Great Britain was as much committed to the principle of arbitration as the for- mer country, and hence the United States could not be urging a novel or Unacceptable method of settlement as to the Venezuelan boundaries. The implication would be fair that Great Britain's refusal to arbitrate in a matter which came so nearly home to the United States, as one of the western Republics, had behind it a desire to bully a weak government like Venezuela into submission, or to 374 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. keep tlie controversy open till, at some opportune time, a warlike blow forced a settlement. In his annual message of December 3, 1894, President Cleveland felt warranted in calling the attention of Con- gress and the country to the condition of the Venezuelan dis- pute. His language was, " The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute between Great Britain andVenezu- ela. Believing that its early settlement on some just basis, alike honorable to both parties, is in the line of our estab- lished policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of dip- lomatic relations between the disputants, and to induce a reference to arbitration, a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversar3\" On Februar}^ 25, 1895, Congress took action on the above suggestion of the President, and gave it the moral support of a joint resolution to the effect that Great Britain and Venezuela were recommended to refer their dispute to friendly arbitrament. It will thus be seen that this acute stage of the contro- versy between Great Britain and Venezuela was fast be- coming a source of irritation to the United States, which saw her offer of good offices repeatedly ignored, her policy of arbitration repudiated by a country which had uniformly accepted it, and the question of monarchical encroach- ment on the rights of a sister Republic unceremoniously shoved further and further into the I)ackgronnd. A full, clear statement of the position of tlie United States at Ihis time would be that given in the language of Mr. Olney, Secretary of State : " By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 375 instance of Venezuela, by constant urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two contending countries, by pressing for arbitration of the dis- puted boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by ex- piessing its grave concern wlienever new alleged instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor and interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot re- gard with indifference." A Speck Of War. On July 20, 1895, Secretary of State, Olney, at the instance of President Cleveland, presented to Lord Salis- bury, tlie English premier, a full review of the Venezue- lan dispute from the standpoint of the United States, and especially with reference to the attitude of tliis country toward a question involving the Monroe Doctrine, and likewise the principle of arbitration. The object was to plac» the United States upon such a plane as that its own people and all tlie world might see how it stood in rela- tion to the controvers}^ and might have resj^ect for its efforts at further solution of a noAv vexatious problem. The time had come for a full and fair expression of a truly American view, and a frank showing of the status of the United States respecting its future interests and course of action. The situation was such as to compel the United States to ascertain and decide to what extent, if any, it should intervene in a controversy primarily between Great Brit- ain and Venezuela, and how far it should go toward see- ing that the integrity of Venezuelan territory was not 876 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist. If the United States had no right to intervene, it were best to know it, for then it had done all it could do to bring about a proper understanding between the two dis- puting countries. If, on the contrary, it had a right to intervene, the quicher it were known the better, for theri it became proper and necessary to promptly exercise the right and discharge the duty so as not to fail of the end in view. The question would be easy of solution, so far as it involved a mere matter of principle or related to a settled national policy. It would prove more difficult, when its momentous practical consequences came to be weighed. International law makes it clear that one na- tion may interpose in a controversy between two others whenever what said nations propose or do becomes a menace to the integrity, peace or welfare of said fijst na- tion. Washington in liis farewell addres.s had laid duwn the doctrine that America should exclude herself from Euro- pean politics, but he was silent as to the part Europe might play in American politics. Inside of twenty years the necessity arose for a full consideration of the momentous problem of how far American exclusion from European politics implied European exclusion from American i)oli-j tics. Discussion of this problem led to the announce- ment of that Ameiican policy which became known as the Monroe Doctrine, and whose history and juirport are given in after pages. Secretary Olney, in his paper, entered into a full dis- cussio^l of the *^ronroe Doctrine, and concluded tliat un- der all the rules that had hitherto regulated its affirma- tion and application in America, the Venezuelan con- troversy was clearly within its scope, at least to the ex- tent of warranting full inquiry into the merits of said THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 377 controversy and ascertaining where the right lay. His urgency on Great Britain to submit the matter to arbitra- tion was very powerful, and almost amounted to an arraignment of the British position, for says he, " She (Great Britain) says to Venezuela in substance, ' You can get none of the debatable land by force, because you are, not st*rong enough; you can get none by treaty, because I will not agree, and you can take your chance of getting a portion by arbitrtition only if you first agree to abandon to me such other portion as I may designate.' It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended, nor how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently characteristic of the English race. It in effect deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested from her by tlie strong hand as if oc- cupied by British troops or covered by British fleets. It seems, therefore, quite impossible that this position of Great Britain should be assented to by the United States, or that if such position be adhered to witli the result of eidarging the bounds of British Guiana, it should not be regarded as amounting in substance to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory. "In these circumstances the duty of the President ap-' pears to him unmistakable and imperative. Great Brit- ain's assertion of title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, being a substantial appropriation of the territory to her own use, not to protest and give warning that the transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of tlie people of the United States, as well as oppressive in itself, would be to ignore an established policy with whicli the honor and welfare of tliis country are closely identified." 878 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. This frank, elaborate and advanced paper concluded with instructions to the American Minister at London to inform Lord Salisbury of its contents, and to urge on him that they called for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain would consent or decline to sub- mit the Venezuela boundary question in its entirety, to impartial arbitration. A prompt reply was also requested, in order that the future relations between this country and Great Britain might be understood at the State De- partment and, if necessary, laid before Congress in the President's annual message. Lord Salisbury did not reply to this document till No- vember. 26, 1865. In his reply he took direct issue with Secretary Olney as to the applicability of the Monroe Doc- trine to the Venezuelan controvers}-, and denied that the dispute was any concern of the United States. As to arbi- tration, lie took the ground that this mode of settling dis- putes of the kind in question was not free from defects, that im[)artial arbiters were hard to find, and that the task of insuring compliance with an award Was always fraught with difficult}^ At any rate, he reasoned further, the Cjuestion of arbitration was one entirely between tlie parties directly in contest, and tliat the claim of any third nation, unaffected by the controversy, to impose arbitra- tion on others had no foundation in the law of nations. This reply was so defiant in s[)irit, or so suggestive of a determination on the jiart of Great Britain to ignore entirely the position of the United States, and to pursue lier policy of postponement and embarrassment toward Venezuela, that President Cleveland su!)mitted a Sj^ecial message, bearing on the controversy, to Congress, together with the diplomatic correspondence, on December 17, 1895. This paper, while regarded > as timely, was some- / f Hon. Robert E. Pattison. Born in Quantico. Somerset co., Md., December 8, 1850; moved to Philadelphia when young and graduated at Central High School; admitted to bar, 1872; elected Comptroller of Philadelphia, 1877 and 1880 • elected Governor of Pennsylvania, on Democratic ticket, 1882 ; appointed member of Pacific R. R. Commission by President Cleveland, 1887; helped to organize and became President of Chestnut Street National Bank; prominent member of Morning Record Co., Limited; re-elected Governor of Pennsylvania, on Democratic ticket, 1890; prominently mentioned in connection with Presidential nomination on Democratic ticket in 1896. Hon. Richard V. PErriGiiEW. Born at Ludlow, Vermont, July, 1848; moved to Wisconsin, 1854; studied at Beloit College, 1865-66; member of law class of Wisconsin University, 1870v; moved to Dakota, 1869; engaged in surveying and real estate at Sioux Falls; practiced law since 1872; elected to Dakota Legislature, 1877 and 1879 ; elected Territorial delegate to 47th Con- gress; re-elected to Legislature, 1884-85; member of South Dakota Conslitulional Convention, 1883; elected U. S. Senator, as a Republican, from South Dakota, October 16, 1889; chairman of Quadro CeiUennial Committee, and member of Committees on Improvement of Mississippi River, Indian Affairs, I'ublic Lands and Railroads; re-elected to Senate in 1895. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 381 wliat extraordinarily worded, and aside from its merits, excited iiuicli discussion as to its manner, and real value as a contribution to the strength of the American position. The President saw no good reason why the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to the Venezuela case, since the taking possession of the territory of a neighboring Repub- lic in derogation of its rights, by a European power, was clearly an attempt on the part of such power to thereby extend its system of government on this continent. As to the Monroe Doctrine not embodying any principle of international law founded on the general consent of n.. lions, the President contended that it finds its recog- nition in those principles of international law which are based on the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. After stating fully the position of this Government respecting the con- troversy, the President found the reply of Great Britain very unsatisfactory. " It is," said he, " deeply disappoint- ing that such an appeal as ours, actuated by the most friendly spirit toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world and touching its relations to one comparatively weak and small, should have produced no better results." He further said, in substance, that the course of this Government, in view of everything that had transpired, admitted of no serious doubt ; that Great Britain's final refusal to arbitrate must be accepted and dealt with ac- cordingly ; that since it could not be hoped that the atti- tude of Venezuela would change, it w^as incumbent on the United States to take measures, for its justification, toward ascertaining for itself what was the true divisional line between British Guiana and Venezuela. To reach 22 r5S2 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. t!iis end, a comniissiuii of iuquiry was suggested, and an appropriation asked to meet its expenses. Upon its report, rurllier action on the part of the United States was to be based, even to the extent of resisting, b}^ eveiy possible means, the aggressions of Gieat Britain bej'ond sucli boLindar}' as said Commission might decide to be the just oiie. In conclusion the President said, "In making these recommendations I am full}' alive to the responsibility in- curred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am, nevertheless, firm in ni}^ conviction that, while it is a grievous thing to contemj^late the two great Engli:rh speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civiliza- tion and strenuous and worthy rivals in all tlie arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can in vite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injus-tice, and the consequent loss of natignal self respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's greatness and safety." The publication of this message led to great excitement in America and England and called forth a great variety of comment. For a time the skies of peace were dee})l3' clouded, and mutterings of war were heard along the murky horizon. In official circles, and in the Congress, the spirit of the message was applauded, not more for its bold afiirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and its thorough going Americanism, than for its contrast with other l)ai)ers of the President, bearing on the foreign polic}' of his administration. On the other hand, many newspapers and [Hiblic writers regarded the message as a blunder, construing it as purely an emanation of jingoism, as written in bad diplomatic taste, in that it contained a threat of war, and THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 383 as likely to pLice the United States in the same bullying category as England. The English sentiment was, of course, firmly and bitterly against the attitude of the President. His message was regarded as a challenge, and calculated to awaken only a bellicose spirit on the part of England. But however sentiment may have differed among pnb- licists and nations, the Congress was almost unanimous that the nation could well afford to make the position of the President its own. So with remarkable promptitude, it gave the sanction of a law to the appointment of such commission of inquiry as the President Jnid suggested, and authorized a liberal appropriation to pay all expenses. The President speedily announced the commission and set it to work to ascertain a boundary which this nation could afford to accept as righteous, and u.^jou which it could honorably and finally rely in the maintainance of its atti- tude toward the disputing parties and in the defense of its material and political interests as a distinguished mem- ber of the sisterhood of western republics. The Montjoe Doctrine. We now turn to the Monroe Doctrine, which the Ven- ezuelan dispute brought into such prominence, which, as we have -seen, has within it the possibilities of war, and which seemingly needs occasional patriotic spurts to keep it in memory, aud enlarge its meaning in proportion to our growing importance as a western republic. Our re- view of it will be historical rather thaii critical. If not in its very inception, at least in the earliest en- couragement given to it, the Monroe Doctrine was as much English as American. The restoration of Louis XVIII. to the throne of France, after Napoleon's defeat 384 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. at Waterloo, was the signal for a congre;-s of llio allied kings of Europe at Paris. The rulers of Kuirsia, Prussia and Austria so met and formed a league called ''The Holy Alliance," whose ohject was to stamp out all constitu- tional governments, banish liberal ideas, and establish all powers in accordance with the princi[)les of the Christian religion. They thus explained the pledge that passed between them: — ''They had no other aim than to mani- fest to the World their unchangeable determination to ado[;t no rule of conduct either in the government of their respective countries or in their political relations with other governments than the precej^ts of that h(;ly religion, the precepts of justice, charity and peace." This innocent appearing alliance was joined, in two months, l)y England, and immediately perverted by treaty to the special objectNjf an alliance to exclude Napoleon forever from power, maintain the government they had just set up in Fiance, resist all attacks on the armies then oceup3-ing Fiance, and meet in 1818 to consult respecting the condition of Europe. The four powers met, according to agreement, at Aix- la Cha[)elle. They found momirchy so fiindy established in France, that the army of occupation was withdrawn, and Louis XVIII. admitted to a vote in the affairs of Euro[)e. But Spain was in dire straits. Her South American colonics were, and had been, in open revolt. She had well nigh exhausted lier resources in attempting to subjugate them, and had ap[)ealcd to both Russia and England for aid. Pussia sold to Spain an unseaworthy fleet. Enoland refused aid, fearin<>- to lose her commerce with tlie rebellious colonies. The Czar laid tlie Spiinisli condition before the powers, in a paper which deseiihed the dangers to which European monarchies would be ex- THE MONKOE DOCTRINE. 885 no.ed if a feJeration of republics were allowed to grow f; • the western Heun.pUere. Fron. this .t because ap- nreut what •' government in accordance with tire pnn- ; of the Christian religion," n.eant, and the du.ect.on l\e given to the "precepts of justice, charity and ^''■rhc Czar proposed a conference of European ambassa- ao s t Mad id,'over which the Duke of Wellington was t .reside, having for its object to decule wha enn Sp in should oifer to her colonies. England retused t< •In this conference. Spain was left to f:ght her ccdonia battles alone. She carried on her An.er.can -- n n 1 a .vay as to breed revolution at home. Liberah.m b .ke forth with such fury as to compel Kmg Perdtnand to 1 pt a new constitution. The fires of revolufon Bi-tead Por ngal, and a Cortes was elected to fran.e a hUeta Tonstitntfon. France would have yjel ed to the popu.ar furore, but the original members of the Ho y Alliance Russia, Prussia. Austria, with England and Ftance ^ lookers-on, met at Troppan, in Moravia in 1820, and ad iourned to meet the next year at Laybach. The Congress at Laybach adjourned to meet at Vienna in 1822, but really met in Verona, where the question of overturning the new liberal constitution in Spain and re- establishing absolute monarchy was long debated wi!h i-esnlt fiiat certain changes in the Spanisi coust^i ion should be demanded, and if not granted, that a Hen army should invade Spain and compel acquiescence Spa i refused the demands, and a French army crossed the hue and occupied Madrid and Cadiz. The object of the Holy Alliance now became planer than ever. If its accredited army could enter a neighbor- ing domain and force a change of government m accord- 386 THE MONKOE DOCTBlNE. aiice with its wishes, it would not hesitate to settle in an equally heroic way the affairs of the Spanish and Portu- guese colonies iii America, or wherever found. The eyes of American statesmen were fixed intently on this situa- tion, for most of the revolting colonies had become re- publics and had been recognized by the United States. To admit Ihat absolute monarchism, under the plea of ''government in accordance with the Christian Religion," or under the thin disguise of an Holy Alliance, should again become the fate of these young Kepublics was horri« fying to our people, and dangerous to the ascendency of the Republican idea on the Western Continent. England became interested also in the pretensions of the allied monarchs, for she had large colonial interests in America which might be seriously aflected by the absolute monarchical claims of the Holy Allies. This was in 1823, and Canning was premier of England. The American Ambassador at London was Richard Rush. Canning pi-oposed to Rush that the United States should join England in a declaration to the effect that while neither power desired the colonies of Spain for hei'self, it was im- possib^e t© look with indifference on European interven- tion in their affairs, or to see them acquired by a third power. Canning received notice that in the latter part of 1823 a Congress of the allied monarchs would meet to consider the affairs of Spanish America. He urged upon Rush the propriet}" of a quick answer to his proposition to him. Rush, without waiting for home instructions, ventured to pen the following in repljs promishig to join the United States with England in making it a formal dec- laration, on condition that England would first acknowl- edge the independence of the western republics : — " We THE MONROE DOCTRINE. SST sliould regard as Jiiyhly luijust and as fruiiful of disastrous consequences any attempt on the part of any European poiver to take possession of them by conquest, by cession, or on any ground or pretext whatsoever. '" Plere were the gems of the Monroe Doctrine. Rush's bold, sagacious but unauthorized announcement was made at the instance of the English premier, and as part of a plan by which both the United States and England might head off the proposed scheme of the allied monarchs of Europe to interfere with the young American republics and reintroduce governments of monarchical form. But while Rush's announcement was such as England had proposed, Rush coupled its public promulgation and the final joining of his name and country in it with England with the condition that England should first recognize the inc>ependence of the young American republics. This England refused to do, and the joint declaration was never made. That the policy thus far was original Avith England, and was really more English than American, is plaiu from tlie reasons urged upon Mr. R^sh by Mr. Canning. Further, Ml'. Canning had evidently conceived of the policy, not as a temporary e??pedient but as one of perpetual applica- tion, for he thus said to Rush:—" The United States were the first power established on the continent, and now con- fessedly the leading power. They are connected with South America by their position and with Europe by their relations. Wa« it possible they could see with indiffer- ence tlieir fate decided upon by Europe? Had not a new epoch arrived in the relative position of the United States toward Europe which Europe must acknowledge? Were the great political and commercial interests which hung upon the destiny of the new continent to be canvassed 388 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. and adj Listed on this hemisphere without the cooperation or even knowledge of the United States?" The above was embodied in Rush's letter upon the sub- ject addressed to Monroe's Secretary of State, Jolm Quincy Adams. The importance of the matter, the strength and urgency of Rush's reasons, the singularity of the proposition as emanating from England, seem to have disconcerted President Monroe. He found Inmself con- fronted with the solemn, and then popular, advice of Washington in his Farewell Address; an advice which had become almost a policy in -itself, and which ran: '' Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence slie must be en- gaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course." Jefferson's warning against entangling foreign alli- ances, in his first inaugural, had been equally strong. JNIonroe, himself, had in two inaugurals and an half a dozen other messages, seriously advised against violation of the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the colonies. No wonder he was in a quandary over Rush's letters and the proposition of a new and widely variant policy. He had not the courage to venture on a depart- ure so radical as the one proposed, till he thoroughly weighed the situation. In his doubt he sent the Rush correspondence to Thomas Jefferson, then in retiracy at Monticello, for review and the expression of an Ojiinion. Jefferson's reply came with no uncertain sound, and it will THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 389 be seen from it tluit be besitated not to run counter, in great part, to tbe policy be bad bitberto accepted and pro- mulgated. He said: '' Tbe question presented by tbe letters you bave sent me is tbe most momentous wbicb bas ever been offered to my contemplation since tbat of lu'lependence. Tbat made us a nation ; tbis sets our compass and points tbe course wbicb we are to steer tbrougb tbe ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fun- damental maxim sbould be, never to entangle ourselves in tbe broils of Europe ; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle witb cisatlantic affairs. America, Nortb and Soutli, bas a set of interests distinct fiom tbose of Europe, and peculiarly ber own. Sbe sbould, tberefore, liave a system of ber own, separate and apart from tbat of Europe. Wbile tbe last is laboring to become tbe domicil of despotism, our endeavor sbould be to make our bemispbere tbat of freedom." Tbus encouraged by one in wbom be bad so great con- fidence, Monroe made tbe subject one of special study, seeking tbe advice and co'iperation of bis cabinet, and of otbers, witb a view to all tbe practical consequences of a formal declaration of tbe new doctrine. It was seen tbat wbile tbe policy enumerated by Wasbington and pursued by bis successors took America out of tbe domain of Europe 'politics, it was silent as to tbe part Europe migbt be per- mitted to play in America. Doubtless it was tbougbt tbe latest addition to tbe family of nations sbould not make baste to prescribe rules for tbe guidance of its older mem- bers, and tbe expediency and propriety of serving tbe powers of Europe witb notice of a complete and distinct- ive American policy excluding tbem from interference 390 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. with American political affairs, might well seem dubious to a generation to whom the French alliance, with its manifold advantages to the cause of American independ- ence, was fresh in nnnd. Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed. Tlie lately born nation had greatly increased in power and resonrces, had demonstrated its strength on land and sea, and as well in the conflicts of arms as in the pursuits of i)eace, and had begun to realize the commanding position on this continent, wliich the character of its people, their free institntions, and their remoteness from the chief scene of European contentions combined to give to it. The Monroe administration therefore did not hesitate to accept and apply the logic of the farewell adilress by declaring, in effect, that American non-intervention in European affairs necessarilj^ implied and meant European non-inter- vention in American affairs. Conceiving unquestionably that complete European non-interference in American con- cerns would be cheaply purchased by complete American noil interference in European concerns. President Monroe, in the celebrated message of December 2, 1823, thus for- mulated the doctrine which afterwards took his name : *'In the wars of the European powers in matters relat- ing to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by cnuses which must be obvious to all enligliteiied and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference pro- ceeds from that which exists in their respective Govern- l^llE MONROE DOCTRINE. 891 meiits. Ai.tl to the defense of our own, wiiich has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of our most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we sh(juld consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. '' With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not in- terfere. But with the Governments who have declared their hidependence and maintained it, and whose inde- pendence w^e have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter- position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. * * * Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so lung agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains tjie same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers ; to consider the Government de facto as the legit- imate Government for us ; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace 392 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. and happiness ; nor can an}- one believe that our Southern brethren, if kft to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form with indif- ference." The Monroe administration, however, did not content itself with formulating a correct rule for tlie regulation of the relations between Europe and America. It aimed at also securing the practical benefits to result from tlie appli- cation of the rule. Hence the message just quoted de- clared that the American continents were fully occupied and were not the subjects for future colonization by Euro- pean powers. To this sjDirit and this purpose also are to be attributed the passages of the same message which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the powers of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it was futile to lay down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that tlie United States was the only power in this hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was therefore courageously declared not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European power doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests and invit- ing the opposition of the United States. The announcement of the Monroe Doctrine to the world brought speedy opportunity for its explanation, develop- ment and application. Gallatin applied it in his French diplomacy. Clay, as Secretary of State, thus instructed our Minister to Mexico respecting it in 1825: " The other principle asserted in the message is that while we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied powers, we should regard as dangerous to our THE MO^^KOE DOCTRINE. 393 oeace and safety any attenn-t on their part to extend U,eh- systen, to any part of tins hennspl.eve. The o- r.tical systen.s of tl,e two continents are essent al y :,ifferent Each has an exclusive right to judge or Usef .vhat is best suited to its o^^^> condition and most hke y to ,,von,ote its happiness, but "either has a r.ght to enlorce np,n the other the establislunent of 'ts pecuUar s tc m ■Ls principle was declared in the face of l.e ...rid a . ,,on,ent when there was reason to apprehend ha e nllicd powers were entertaining designs mrnncal to the edom if not to the independence of the new Govern- lients. There is a ground for believing that the declara- tion of it had considerable effect in preventing, if not in ,„.oducing the abandonment of all such designs. bo h ,Hnciple: were laid down after innch and anxious deb eration on the part of the late administration. 1 he es- ident, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to eoincide in both. And you will urge upon the Cxovern- nient of Mexico the utility and expediency of asseitmg the same princiL-les on all occasions." The new doctrine passed through the f.erce fiies of partisan debate, when what was called the I'a-.n.a Mis- ion was up for discussion in the ^-"^^'^^ ^ ''-'■ Columbia and Mexico had invited the Lnitcd State, to , to,l nt ', Concri-ess of Republics at Panama. be reijvesented at a t^ongiess >i j , . ^, • ;,., One of the aims of this Congress, as stated in the m - tion, was to consider " the means of -fung/f f ^ ^ declarations of the President of the United States respecting any ulterior design of foreign power to co.o- ,ize any portion of this continent, and also the means of resisting all iuterference from abroad with the dcynestic concerns of American Governments. , . ,,„p. President Adams, Clay, Webster, and a host of power- 394 THE MONROE DOCTIUNE. fill statesmen approved of sending commissioners. Tliey "were opposed by many able men, in a purely partisan spirit, among whom were Polk and Buchanan, both of whom lived to reverse their arguments and positions. The result of the debate was a resolution of the House practically affirming the Monroe Doctrine in two essen- tials, (1) that the United States should form no alliance with any foreign nation, nor join it in any declaration concerning the interference of any European power in its affairs, and (2) that we act toward them in an}^ crisis as our honor and policy may at the time dictate. In the debates of 1826, Polk took the ground that Monroe's declaration was a " mere expression of executive opinion, designed to produce an effect on the H0I3' Alli- ance in relation to their supposed intention to interfere in the war between Spain and her former colonies. It had probabl}' produced the designed effect, and therefore, per- formed its office. President Monroe had no powen- to bind the nation by his pledges." In 1845, when Mr. Polk was President and confronted with such momentous questionsas the Mexican war and trouble uith England over the Oregon boundary, he said in his message to Congress : — ''In the existing circumstances of the world, the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principlei avoweil by Mr. Monroe, and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy. The reas- sertion of this pi-in<3i[)le, especially in reference to North America, is, at this day, but the promulgation of a policy which no European power should oherish the disposition to resist. Existing rights of every European iiation should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws, THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 895 should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or domin- ion, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American Continent." Again in 1848, when war was being waged in Yucatan, between the Indians and whites, and when the former had appealed to England and Spain for aid, President Polk sounded the following note of warning :— " While it is not our purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure with a view to the acquisition of dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet according to our established policy we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty to either Spain, Great Britain or any other European power. In the language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823, we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion oi this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety." And so Buchanan, during his presidential term, re- versed his position in the debates of 1826, and stoutly adhered to the Monroe Doctrine. It was in 1859-60, when England, France and Spain had decided on armed intervention in the then distracted affairs of Mexico. In his messa.ge of 1859, President Buchanan advised the employment of a sufficient military force to penetrate into the interior of Mexico, if necessary. In his message of 1860, he deprecates the failure to thus employ force, b}^ saying: '' European Governments would have been deprived ot all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic con- cerns of Mexico. We should thus have been relieved 396 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. from the obligation of resisting, even by force slioukl this become necessaiy, any attempt by' these Governments to deprive our neighboring republic of portions of her terri- tory a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people." In the debates of 1826, My. Webster thus replied to those who were contending that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere executive o[)inion, of transitory moment: '^Sir, I agree with those who maiiifain tlie proposition, and I contend agidnst those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant much; and I main- tain against both that the declaration effected much good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight and the spirit of the Government, and that it cannot now be taken back, retracted, or annulled without disgiace. It met. Sir, with the entire concurrence and the liearty approbation of the country. The tone which it uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people of the United States. That pooj^le saw^, and they rejoiced to see, that on a fit occasion our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful and something effectual for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perfection of the considerations which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms." Mr. Seward thus affirmed the doctrine in 1861 : "The Government of the United States would regard with grave concern and dissatisfaction movements in Hon. James L. Pugk. Born in Burke co., Ga., December 12, 1820; moved early to Ala- bama, and received academic education ; admitted to bar in 1841, and acquired a lucrative practice ; elected to 36th Congress, but -withdrew when State seceded; served in Confederate army; elected to Confederate Congress, 1861-63 ; resumed law practice at Eufaula ; member of Con- vention that framed State Constitution in 1875 ; elected to U. S. Senate in 1880 ; re-elected 1884 and 1890 ; member of Committees on Educa- tion and Judiciary, Privileges and Elections, Revolutionary Claims and Extension of Congressional Library. IIuN. IvEDFiELD PRUCTOR. Born at Pioctorsville, Vermont, June 1, 1831 ; graduated from Dart- mouth, 1851, and from Albany Law School in 1859; practiced law in Boston; served in Army 1861-63; rose to be Colonel of F"ifteenth Vermont Volunteers; relumed to practice of law; elected to Assembly, 1867-68; again, 1888; served in State Senate, 1874-76; elected Lieu- tenant-Governor, 1876; advanced to Governor, 1878 ; delegate-at-large to Republican National Conventions, 1884, ] 888 ; appointed Secretary of War by President Harrison, 1889; resigned November 1, 1891, to take place of Senator Edmumls in United States Senate ; and October 18, 1892, was elected to fill both the unexpired and. the full terms. His term expires in 1899. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 399 Cuba to introduce Spanisli authority within the territory of Dominica." President Grant's position in 1870, was this: '' The allied and other Republics of Spanish origin on this continent may see in this fact a new proof of our sin- cere interest in their welfare ; of our desire to see them blessed with good Government, capable of maintaining order and of preserving their respective territorial integ- rity, and of our sincere wish to extend our own commer- cial and social relations with them. The time is not probably far distant when, in the natural course of events, the European political connection with this continent will cease. Our politics will be shaped in view of this prob- ability, so as to ally the commercial interests of the Spanish-American States more closely to our own, and thus give the United States all the preeminence and all the advantages which Mr. Monroe, ]Mr. Adams, and Mr. Clay contemplated when they proposed to join in the Congress of Panama." President Cleveland, in his special message of Decem- ber 17, 1895, upon the boundary controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela, thus .applied the doctrine : "Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine upon which we stand is strongand soundbecause its enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to the integrity of our free insti- tutions and the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of Government. It was intended to apply to every stage of our National life, and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endui^s. If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the Governments 23 400 THE MONROE DOCTRINE. of the Old World and a subject for our absolute iionin- lerfercuce, none the less is an observance of the Monroe ,Ooctrine of vital concern to our people and their Govern- ment. "Assuming, therefore, that we may properly insist upon ^,his doctrine without regard to ' the state of things in which we live,' or any changed conditions here or else- Tvhere, it is not apparent why its application may not be .invoked in the present controversy. "If a European power, by an extensionof its boundaries, ^akes possession of the territory of one of our neighboring Republics against its will and in derogation of its riglits, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of Government to that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe declared to be ' dangerous to our peace and safety,' and it can make no difference whether the European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise." Thus the Monroe Doctrine has been accepted as a [)ub- lic law of the country ever since its announcement. It was the controlling factor in the emancipation of South America, and to it the independent states which now divide that region between them are largely indebted for their very existence. Since then the most striking single achievement to be credited to the rule is the evacuation of Mexico, by the French upon the termination of the Civil war. But we are also indebted to it for the provi- sions of the Clayton Bui wer treaty, which both neutral- ized any interoceanic canal across Central America and expressly excluded Great Britain from occupying or ex- ercising any dominion over any part of Cental America. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 401 It lias been used in the case of Cuba as if justifying the position tliat, while the sovereignty of S[)ain will be re- spected, the island will not be permitted to become the possession of any other European po^^■er. It has been in. fluential in bringing about the definite relinquishment of any supposed protectorate by Great Britain over the Mos- quito coast. OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. First Point of View. Every effort of Cuba to liberate lierself from the gal ling j^oke of Spain has met with large sympathy in the United States. The more modern the efforts, the larger the sympathy. The revolution in the island, on in its fury in 1896, so impressed our peo})ie that the Congiess felt warranted by resolution in expressing its horror of Spain's conduct toward this, its richest colony, and, by implication, the hope of that colony's success in its effort for independence. The passage of the resolution through both houses brought forth in each a depth of sentiment which did not hesitate to hold Spain up to the civilized world as a rapacious and tyrannical monster, unworthy of respect as mistress of a fruitful island, and a veritable stumbling-block in the march of a people inspired with free notions. Doubtless, much of the boldness and bitter- ness of s[)eech was intended as a prick for a seemingly slothful and indifferent President, and it was only the in- tent to give the Executive a little time to study the direc- tion of the wind of popular sentiment that prevented the Congress from making its resolution a joint one, and to include a grant of full belligerent riglits to the struggling Cubans. This question of our encouragement in the shape of an (402) OUE CUBAN EELATIOKS. 403 offer of belligerent rights opened up the whole subject of Spanish and Cuban relations, and imposed on our govern- ment a task as delicate as it was exacting. Historically con- sidered, the task was an old one, and had been variously viewed and weighed. AVe find that with wrestling with it, such a grave statesman as John Quincy Adams had thrown him- self open to the charge of jingoism by the announcement that, '^ These islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] from their local position are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, has, from a multitude of considerations, become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interest of our Union. . . . Such, indeed, are the relations between that island and this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations formed by nature, gntliering in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short j)eriod of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. . . . Cuba, foiciblj' disjoined Ironi its cwn unnatural connection v.itli S| ain, and incp.pable of self- support, can gravitate only toward tlie North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom." Nor wasC!lay less pronounced in his opinion of a situa- tion liardl}^ differing from tliat of 1806, when lie said, " ]f the war sliould continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] should become the object and theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States 404 OUB CUBAN EELATIONS. that they could not be indifferent spectators, and the pos- sible Contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the government of the United States duties and ob- ligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, tliey might not be at liberty to decline." These expressions of public opinion, uttered by the wisest statesmen of their day, sliow that the Cuban ques- tion is by no means a new one, but that it dates back in all its solemn depth and multiform ramifications to quite an early period in our history. Late attempts at its solu- tion are not novel. The boldness and violence of speech in the 54th Congress respecting it have been lieard before, the patriotic outbursts liave been witnessed, the threats of war encountered. But these facts intensify, rather than chill, interest in tlie question, for it is conceded that almost enough of yejirs have elapsed to bring about a consummation such as every Cuban patriot has devoutly wished and strenuously striven for. Therefore, in making up the history of the Cuban problem it will appear strange that administrations prior to that of Mr. Cleveland, have uniformly declared to Spain and the world that the condition of Cuba was a matter in which the United States had a vital interest and which could never be disregarded. To put it in the bold language of Edward Everett, " the Cuban question \^ purely an American one." Especially is this true of that phase of the question which contemplated the transfer of tlie island to some more powerful and, perhaps, congenial European power than Spain, even if the object in view were the payment of debts which Spain could not otlierwise hope to liqui- date. It has been repeated by our Secretaries of State, and by Senators and members of Congress that the United OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 405 States could never suffer Cuba to pass into the hands of another European power. It has been often announced by our representatives abroad that any attempt on the part of Spain to transfer Cuba to another European power would be regarded by the United States as an act of war. And this could hardly be otherwise, for the. situa- tion of the island is such as to make its possession by other tlian Spain a double menace to our commerce and to our coasts. Such has been the interest of the United States in the island that during the war of 1868, an offer of a large sum of money, or a guarantee of the Cuban debt, was made if Spain would declare the independence of the island. Later on, and during the same uprising, a threat of intervention was made by the United States. Thus our policy as to Cuba and our foreign relations have taken shape. Whether they shall be modified, or what further shape they shall take, depends on a full un- derstanding of the history of Cuba and of the attitude of the United States toward her, not in the line of selfishness, but in the interest of humanity and civilization. Cuba remained faithful to Spain amid all those revolu- tions which swept away her South American possessions and made them Republics. True there were juntas there which had aided the Republics, and, as a compensation, Bolivar offered to pay off the debt by helping the island to obtain independence of Spain. Pie was persuaded to desist by this country for certain diplomatic reasons. Spain suspected the whole island of insincerity in her allegiance, and in 1825 transferred to the captain-general all the authority of the local governors. This was as much as to proclaim the island under martial law, and with the event began the history of Cuba's resistance to the sweeping and needless tyranny of Spain. Since then, 406 OUK CUBAN EELATIONS. each revolutioiiary outbreak has become more desperate and formidable than the preceding one. The march of these revolutions have been, iji brief, the insurrection of 1826, resulting in the execution of the two leaders ; the " Conspiracy of the bald Eiagles," quicklj^ repressed, and the leaders, imprisoned, banished or exe- cuted ; the exclusion of the Cuban and Porto-Ricom rep- resentatives from the Cortes in 1837, on the ground that special laws were applicable to the islands ; the expedi- tions under Quitman and others in 1855, where many leaders were executed and others banished. Now many years elapsed during which the Cubans en- deavored by peaceful means to secure from Spain relief from their oppression and wrongs. Every change that Spain could be induced to make was made for the worse. With tlie decadence of Spanish power the island became a more imposing part of empire. With the increase of Spanish debt, the island became a more necessar^y source of revenue. The tyranny that was at first natural on the part of Spain, became imperaytive as a means of squeezing every available dollar from patient and opulent subjects. The revolution of 1868, under Cespedes, was inevitable. Years of oppression had pointed to it. Though it was limited to the eai^^tern portion of the island, it lasted for ten years and was only brought to an end by a treaty in which Spain promised to the revolutioni^sts the reforms for whicli they had taken up arms. Thus the revolutionists gained a moral victory, and one which cri[)pled tlie already broken power of Spain. They laid down their arms, and kept their compact. But not so with Spain. Tlie treaty with her was a mere i)retext. She disregarded licr pledges of amnesty in great part, and imprisoned or executed many who had been engaged in OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 407 the insurgent cause. Her proniised reforuis were either withheld, or proposed and carried out in a spirit of moclv- ery. They were of no value to the ishind in either politi- cal or connnercial sense. If any residt followed, it was to aggravate a strained situation by sup[)lenienting tyranny with treachery and bloodshed. In the Spanish attitude were all the seeds of further revolt, and the period from 1878 to 1895 was one of civic protest and warlike prepara- tion. The flames of revolution broke out anew in 1895, and under auspices far different from those of former out- bursts. The feeling back of it was one of intense ani- mosity toward Spain on account of her broken pledges, manifest double dealing and bloody cruelty. It was a wider-spread and more unanimous feeling than everbefoi'e. The quiet warlike preparations liad brought to the front men of executive force and considerable military experi- ence. There was abroad a local spirit of amor patr ice, and a supreme confidence inspired by leadership and organiza- tion. There was little money, few arms and supplies, but it was felt these would come after a few successes along lines of matured military plan, and especially through the agency of that sympathy which was sure to be evoked in the bosoms of Cuban residents in tlie United States, and perhaps among all lovers of liberty and independence. The first S(uind of arms was in 1895 when General Gomez landed 500 men on the extreme end of Cuba, near Santiago de Cuba. Around this nucleus gathered other forces under the lead of such men as Maceo. By rapid accretions the number swelled to 30,000, all fairly armed. The number could liave readily been made 60,000 had arms been obtainable. The leaders \A'ished to avoid the troubles and excesses incident to an untrained, unarmed rabble, 408 OUK CUBAN IlELATIONS. lieiice they wisely organized and mobilized only those they could arm and render effective in tlie field. The ten year rebellion of 1868-78 had been confined to the eastern part of the island. This localization, desirable in every sense on the part of Spain, was a seiions draw- back to the insurgents. It dwarfed operations and senti- ment respecting them. It prevented the spread of en- thusiasm, and interfered with those cooperative uprisings the earlier insurgents had a right to expect. This upris- ing would avoid many of the errors of former ones. In a single year the Cuban army was marched from the east to the west of the island, through fruitful provinces, soHrces of the great wealth which Spain extracted from the island, and past the lines of Spanish soldiers thrown across the island to break the force of insurrection. Havana was encircled and repeatedly threatened. Her inland commu- nications were often cut, and the sugar and tobacco plan- tations largely devastated. Spain augmented her armies in Cuba till a force of over 100,000 men was on the scene, 3'et the operations of the insurgents received no serious check. They passed and repassed the celebrated troclta^ or armed trench across the island, with ease and without loss, always, of course, avoiding decisive battles for want of heavy artillery. In strategy they were more than a match for the Spaniards, and in their tactical delays, forays and surprises they pioved more formidable than if they had sought successes through direct blows. They saw their foes harried and weakened at everj^ point, exhausted by exertion here, mutinous for lack of food there, decimated by disease everywhere. S])ain's best military talent was disconcerted, and could neither prepar.e nor deliver an ef- fective l)low. Time, which was everything to Spain in her imptjverished condition, was in complete control of the in- OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 409 surgeiits, who lengthened it to suit themselves, and spread it out so as to mature their own plans, or till they witnessed the dissipation of offensive projects on the part of their foes. Spain held nothing securely by means of lier armies, exce[)t her armed camps near seaports, and these latter were held by means of warships. In any liberal military sense the insurgents were possessors of the island, and could not be ousted. Thuy had enjoyed a military success far beyond their most sanguine expectations. Meanwhile, they had held two elections of national im- port to them, had set up a provisional government at a stated capital, and had drafted and adopted a constitution. Civic officers had been inaugurated and civic officers duly installed. Generals and minor army officers held their commissions by virture of regular constituted civic author- ity. Official life represented the two races on the island, white and black, the burden of civic affiiirs falling to the Avhites, the blacks being represented in the field by the two able Maceos and others. The seat of government was not stable. It could not be by virtue of circumstances, for it had to keep pace with the swift moving camps. Yet it was none the less a seat of government, always a desir- able object of attack by the Spaniards, yet never captured. What the insurgents lacked most, at the end of a year's fighting, was a seaport. This fact was urged against them by Spain and her friends in America in the arguments against a state of actual war on the island and the propriety of granting belligerent rights to the strug- gling patriots. But they more than once proved their ability to capture seaports, as at Batabano. There was hardly a time when they were not confident of being able to capture any of the Spanish seaports. Their inability to hold them, however, through lack of heavy guns and 410 OUK CUBAN RELATIONS. battle ships, iiKide their possession undesirable. In reality there Avas no need for them. The minor ports were open and but little difficulty was experienced in obtaining food and munitions of war from friends in other countries. Jt is, of course, difficult to verity absolutely all the foregoing history. But it is such as is furnislied to the world by the best autliorities at command, to wit, disin- terested travelers and coi-respondents, Amei-ican consuls, and others. Spanish officials, by means of an imperious censorship, and even by resort to imprisonment of news gatherers, permitted no report to go out fiom the island except those colored to suit their interests. Yet it was submitted by the friends of Cuba in America that enough \vas surely known to make out a case on which the United States could securely stand, should it choose to grant bel ligerent rights to the Cubans. As put by one publicist of note, the case historically resolved itself into this: ''The island of Cuba, which lies but a short di^tance from our coast, is n.ow again, after recurring revolutions and disorders extending over seventy years, the scene of a revolution more formidable and successful than au}^ which has preceded it. American pioperty m the island is being destroyed, and our commerce with Cuba is being ruined. The ablest and most humane general in Spain, who brought the previous insurrection to a close by judi- cious concessions, has been recalled, — which is in itself a confession of failure, — and has been replaced by a man notorious for his ferocity and brutality. This new gen- eral, Weyler, has reverted to the methods of wai'fare em- ployed by the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands three hundred years' ago, \\\wn the ruin of the Spanish Empire bega]i; which is very characteristic, for the Sjaniards, OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 411 alUioiigli they learii iiotliing, have, unlike the Bourbons, forgotten many things. For many years it has been clear that Spain could not hold the island. If this war fails, it will be followed by another a i^ew years lience. But it seems tolerably clear that Spain is unable to su[)press this insurrection. She may complete the ruin of Cuba, but she cannot conquer the Cubans. The present war there- fore is as useless as it is blood}^ and savage." It is reasonably clear, therefore, that our relationship of indiffei-ence toward the struggling Cubans, or which is the same thing, of favoritism toward Spain, must sooner or later give way to sometliing more pronounced. Should that something be recognition of belligerent rights ? It might well be such, argue those who are satisfied with the facts heretofore stated. Cuban belligerency was withheld during the ten years' struggle from 18G8 to 1878. In this lespect the United States did not copy Spain's haste to recognize the belligerency of the rebellious States of the Union, at a time vvithin sixty days of the firing on Fort Sumter, and before word of any other combat of arms had reached her. The Cuban insuriection of 1895 went on a year, with the establishment of a government, with bat- tles fought and victories won, with the island conquered except as to its port towns. Here then was a condition far more fully justifying a recognition of belligerency l)y the United States, than what Spain found in this country when she recognized the war status of the South in 1861. Belligerency is at most a question of fact. It is not, and has never been, regarded by nations as an occasion for war. As a fact it is one wholly within the breasts of the nations ashing and granting it. If the fact is clearly es- tablished, the granting nation may proclaim its determina- tion, without right of question by any third nation. 412 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. A different polic}^ was adopted by the United States during the Cuban insurrection of 1868-78. It \yas the policy of good offices toward the contending parties, looking toward Cuban independence, and even going so far as an offer to purchase of Spain the independence of the island. Many of our leading statesmen favored it among them, even such as were coldlj^ disposed toward Cuba on account of the existence of the negro slavery on her soil. This policy became that 'of the Grant adminis- tration, but it was so distasteful to Spain as to seemingly aggravate her cruel dealings with the insurgents, and to require something stronger on the part of President Grant, for, in 1876, his Secretary of State was forced to write that unless the insurrection in Cuba was speedily suppressed the United States would be compelled to intervene. The overwhelmning vote of sympathy, in both houses of the Fifty-fourth Congress, in favor of the Cuban i)atriots, brought about a strong contrast with the course of Presi- dent Cleveland. It was alleged that his attitude v/as not one of indifference toward the contestants but of actual favoritism toward Spain, in that he had gone beyond his duty of preserving neutrality. Though it had been decided in our highest judicial tribunals, that vessels carrying war munitions and unarmed men werenot illegiti- mately engaged, the President ordered the seizure of several such, only to find that they were released by the courts. His undertaking to police the seas beyond the three mile limit and to arrest vessels suspected of violat- ing the neutrality laws, was equally repudiated by the judicial tribunals. Only in a single instance was his course sustained, and that was where the arms and soldiers were found aboard together, the former actually OUR CUBAN RELATION'S, 413 ill the latter's hands, and where the evidence was that such union had been phmned on tlie soil of the United States. Among the pecuniary or material reasons for change in our Cuban relations, may well be mentioned the ruin of American propert}^ of immense value in Cuba, the de- struction of a large commerce with the island, the shut- ting out of American enterprise from a wide and desirable field. Add to these the importance of removing a con- tinuous threat upon our commercial and political well being contained in the possession of an island lying so near our coasts by a foreign and monarchical government, and one may fiiid good reason for the opinion of Charles Sumner in 1869 : " For myself I cannot doubt that in the interest of both parties, Cuba and Spain, and in the interest of humanity also, the contest should be closed. This is my judgment on the facts, so far as known to me. Cuba must be saved from its bloody delirium, or little will be left for the final conquerer. Nor can the enlightened mind fail to see that tlie Spanish power on this island is an anachronism. The day of European colonies has passed — at least in this hem- isphere, where the rights of man were first proclaimed and self-government first established." j But what really makes a change in our Cuban relations necessarily rests on that high ground taken by Mr. Lodge in the Forum : "Such a war as is now being waged in Cuba — unre- strained by any of the laws of civilized warfare and marked by massacre and ferocious reprisals at ever step — is a disgrace to civilization. It is as useless as it is brutal. Spain is in truth "an anachronism " in the Western Hemis- phere. It is impossible that she should long retain even tills last foothold. Spanish-American Governments have 414 OUR CUBAN RELxVTlONS. no doubt fallen far short of the standards of the English speaking race, but they have been an immense improvement in the stupid and cruel mis- government of Spain. It is no argument to sa}^ that, tlie Spanish- American Governments are not up to our standard, the Cubans should be compelled to remain crushed beneath the misgovernment of Spain, — especially when we remember that, although there are many negroes and mulattoes in Cuba, the whites are whites of pure race and not mixed with Indian blood as on the continent. ''This is a world of comparative progress, and freedom from Spain Avould be to Cuba a long step in advance on the highroad of advancing civilization. The interests of liumanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficient interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence. No great nation can escape its responsi- bilities. We freely charge England with responsibility for the hideovis atrocities in Armenia. But it is the merest cant to do this if we shirk our own duty. We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba. We cannot evade it and, if we seek to do so, sooner or later we shall pay the penalty. But the American people, whose sympathies are strongly with the Cubans fighting for their liberties, will no longer suffer this indifference toward them to continue. If one administration declines to meet our national respon- sibilities as they should be met, there will be put in power another administration which will neither neglect nor shun its plain duty to the United States and to the cause of freedom and humanity." A Second View. It must not be supposed that those who favor strict John W. Daniel. Born at Lynchburg, Sept. 5,1842; educated at Lyncliburg College and Harrison University; served in Confederate Army; Adjutant of Early's Staff; studied law at University of Va. ; member of House of Delegates, 1869-70, 1871-72; member of Senate, 187r)-81 ; Tilden Elector, 1876; member of Dem. Nat. Con., 1880, 1888; defeated for Governor in 1881; member of 49ih Congress; elected to U. S. Senate and took seat Marcli 4, 1887; re-elected Dec, 1891; member of Com- mittees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Judiciary, Public Buildings and Grounds, and Revision of Laws. Hon. David B. Culberson. Born in Troup co., Ga., September 29, 1830 ; educated at Brown- wood ; studied law and moved to Texas, 1856; elected to State Legis- lature, 1859: served in Confederate army throughout war; elected to State Legislature, 1864; elected, as a Democrat, to 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st and 52d Congresses, to represent Fourth Texas District, composed of eleven counties ; an earnest and popular member, admired by a large constituency; active on the floor as debater and parliamentarian ; Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 417 neutrality as to Spain and indifference on the part of the United States, are any the less impressed witli the impor- tance of the situation, whether regarded in a political or commercial light. They do not necessarily lack sympathy with the efforts of the patriots to secure the blessing of free institutions for themselves, nor do they close their eyes to the righteousness of a struggle occasioned by long }ears of harsh taxation, treacherous dealings and cruel oppression. They see with all others the three great causes that have contributed to make the Cuban Cjuestion one of pi\juliar interest to the United States, to wit: Sympathy with the idea of Cuban independence, the tyranny of Spanish rule, desire of annexation to the United States. lUit thej^ see also, and make it conspicuous, the supreme duty of the United States to sedulously maintain its neutrality laws, and to take no risks by a change of its relations with a friendly governmento Tliese have studied faithfully the histories of Cuban struggles, and their judgments cannot be ignored in nuiking up the national verdict respecting the attitude to be assumed by the United States. They sustain the President in his proclamation of June 12, 1895, calling attention to the prohibition of our neu- trality laws, and warning all persons against breaking tliem. They find sup[)ort for tlieir views in the statement in the President's annual message of December 2, 1895, to the effect that : "The traditional sympathy of our countrymen as in- dividuals with a people who seem to be struggling for a larger autonomy and gi'eater freedom, deepened as such S3^mpathy naturally must be in behalf of our neighbors, yot the plain duty of their Government is to observe in 24 41S OUIl CUBAN RELATIONS. good faith tlie lecoguizea obligiitioiis of international re- lationship." When the Congress passed its resolution expressing the opinion that the Cubans should bo granted belligerent rights, with sucli great unanimity, it was seen that such action, if not directly, at least by implication, was equiva- lent to saying to the public that tlie judgment of tlie President was erroneous and should be reversed. Tliis opened inquiry as to the power of the President in the premises. It was conceded, after but little discussion, that the question of belligerency was one wliuUy in the hands of the President, as the person chaiged b}^ tlie Constitution with the conduct of our foreign relations. It was equally agreed that belligerency, like independ- ence, was one of fact, in the determination of which neutral governments do not necessarily consider tlie ques- tion of right between the contending parties. This rule was announced to the Texas envoy in 1837, and was found to have been repeated before and since. The actual state of hostilities and not the merits of a controversy is the guide for neutrals in eiiteiing on the path of inter- vention. Assuming that the President and the Congress luul ac- cess to the same sources of information respecting hostili- ties in Cuba, or had equally reliable information, the whole question became one of relying upon or construing such information. And here what may be called an his- toric view of the Cuban cause assumed shades to suit the friends and opponents of belligerency. We have, in former pages, traced this history from the standpoint of those who found in it sufficient t-o warrant a change in our Cuban relations. We must also trace it from the stand- point of those Vvlio opposed a change of such relations. OVn CUBAN RELATIONS. 419 Accoreliiig to these latter, the Cuban uprising, begiu- iiiiig in February, 1895, in the provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas, embraced oi\]y the banditti element of tlie mountains, and included none of the political parties \\])ich represented the planting, industrial, com- mercial and professional interests of the island. It was an uprising of the laboring classes, chiefly plantation negroes, who had been goaded to desperation by low and uncertain wages, due to depression in the prices of sugar and tobacco, to excessive cost of provisions and clothing, and to the grinding modes of Spanish taxation. The hope was that, like oilier and similar uprisings, this one would soon exhaust itself, and that peace would be re- stored. But it was found that there was more bach of it than was at first suspected. Gomez proved abler than former leaders, and he found valuable assistants in the two Maceos, Antonio and Jose, who, being mulattoes, easily persuaded the negroes to leave the cane fields and tobacco l)]antations and swell the raid^^s of the insurgents. The spirit of revolt soon spread among the whites, who were encouraged by tlie show of systematic effort on the part of leaders. Organizations ripened, and a plan of cam- paign was agreed upon admirably calcidated to inflame insurrection and augment the insurgent forces. Battles with Spanish forces were avoided, but a series of brilliant marches was entered npon, wdiere the track was marked by the destruction of plantations, crops, railroads, and all resources vital to the existing government. Thus, by s.weeping from east to west, throughout the length of the island, the insurrection was given geographic extent, and became an object which attracted thousands to it. Con- tributions were levied on planters, and towns, fields, build- 420 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. iijo-s and machinery were destrt»ved; laborers were enlisted or, upon refusal, shot. Said Mr. Williams, our Consul- General at Havana : *' Besides the burning of cane fields, the newspapers re- port cases of damage to laiiroads by displacing rails, the blowing up of culverts, burning of bridges and stations; also, the pilhiging of country stores, the carrying off of horses, saddles, and bridles from farms on their line of march for the mounting of men, and the slaughter of cattle for food. . . . The insurgents appear, while carrying on their work of destruction of private property, to have been able, thus far, to elude all encounter with the government troops." From this state of affairs, it was argued tliat even if there was a Cuban war in progress, as the friends of Cuban freedom claimed, it could not be dignified by the name of reguLar warfare, but possessed only the character- istics of guerrilla warfare, and tlierefore presented none of the conditions which would warrant a grant of bellig- erent rights by a nation which professed to follow strictly neutral lines. Wars vary in kind and degree, and do not become public wars merely by the exclusion of right authority from a portion of its domain, nor by the setting up of a rebellious government inside of said domain. A fine line was drawn between a ^'public war" and ''civil war," and before the latter could become the former, the insurgents must have risen to the dignity of a political power, with cohering principles, a certain degree of in- . dependence, definite geographic limits, and some com- munity of population, interest and destiny. Till the latter became the former there could be no proper grant of bellig- erent rights, for only a "public war" warranted such a ''•rant. OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 421 This piiijciple of law, the resolution passed by tlie Con- gress seemingly conceded, for the language of the resolu- tion was, ''in the opinion of Congress, a public trar exists between tlie Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba." But there was a stout denial by op})oncntsof belligerency that, as facts stood, the insurgents were in any sense "the people of Cuba,"or that they were " maintaining a Government." Again it was argued that there was no emergency, either actual or imminent, in connection with the Cuban question which made it incumbent on neutral powers to define their relation to the conflict. As to the necessity of such emergency in such cases the principle of international law Avas invoked, that " so long as a Government is strug- gling with insurgents isolated in the midst of loyal prov- inces and consequently removed from contact with foreign States, the interests of the latter are rarely touched, and probably are never touched in such a way that they can be served by rejognition. In case of maritime war the as- sumption of propriety lies in the opposite direction. To the legal concession of belligerency two conditions are es- sential ; first, the struggle shall have attained the dimen- sions of war in the international sense ; second, there must be a necessity for the recognition. A recognition by a foreign State of full belligerent rights, if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion, and of censure upon the parent Govern- ment." The Government of the United States had adhered to these principles during the. insurrections in the Spanish- American colonies in 1810-15, aiid only departed from them in the latter year, by a grant of belligerent rights, 422 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. after the appearance of vessels bearing the flags of the in- surrectionary governments appeared in our ports. During the Cuban insurrection of 18G8-T8, President Grant, in his message of June 13, 1870, gave the following reason for his refusal to recognize the Cuban insurgents as bellig- erents, and these reasons were the more quoted and urged by opponents of belligerency in 1896, because, in 18G9, Cespedes, the then President of the Cuban Republic, had declared in an address to President Grant, that he had an army of 10,000 men, which occupied three-fourths of the island and that a navy was in process of construction. It would seem also as if the new government were actually further on in 1869 than in 1896, fur it had been recognized as independent by Peru, and as a belligerent by Chile, Bolivia and ^Mexico. It had also sent a duly accredited minister to the United States, and had oiganized a govern- ment at a stated capital, had passed laws, issued mone}^ and done what regular governments are authorized to do. President Grant evidently regarded the above state- ments respecting the Cuban situation as exaggerated, for in his message he said : " The question of belligerency is one of fact, not to be decided b}' sympathies with or prejudices against either party. The relations between the p'aient state and the in- surgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of in- ternational law. Fighting, though fierce and prutracted, does not alone constitute war; there must be military forces acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war — flags of Iruce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc., — and to justify a recognition of belligerency there must be, above all, a de facto political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among nations capable of discharging the OUR CUIJAN DELATIONS. 42^ duties of a State, and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in the discharge of its national duties. '^Applying the best information which I have been en- abled to gather, whether from official or unofficial sources, including the very exaggerated statements which each party gives of all that may prejudice the opposite or give credit to its own side of the question, I am unable to see, in the present condition of the contest in Cuba, those ele- ments which are requisite to constitute war in the sense of international law. "The insurgents hold no town or city; have no estab- lished seat of government ; they have no prize courts; no organization for the receiving and collecting of revenue; no seaport to which a prize may be carried, or through which access can be had by a foreign power to the limited in- terior territory and mountain fastnesses which they occupy. The existence of a legislature representing any popular constituency is more than doubtful. "In the uncertainty that hangs around the entire insur- rection there is no palpable evidence of an election, of any delegated authorit}^ or of any government outside the limits of the camps occupied from da}^ to day b}^ the rov- ing companies of insurgent troops. There is no commerce; no trade, either internal or foreign ; no manufactures." Again in his message of December 7, 1875, he declared that the United States should carefully avoid the " false lights which might lead it into mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule which has been its guide of doing only tliat which is right and honest and of good report "; and, ad- verting to the fact that the conflict still continued to be on land, and that the insurrection had no seaport whence 424 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. it might send forth its flag, "nor any means of communi- cation with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries," he pointed out that no apprehen- sion of any of the sudden and difQcult coni[)lications which a war upon the ocean was apt to precipitate called for a definition by foreign powers of their relation to the conflict. As is well known, there was much excitement in this country over tlie attitude assumed by President Grant, and in a sudden outburst of sympathy for the Cuban pa- triots Mr. Sherman introduced a resolution in the Senate in favor of recognizing the belligerency of Cuba, sustain- ing it with an able speech. The excitement gradually died out, and the Piesident's course was seen to be right, in view of the fact that an old treaty of 1795 between this country and Spain was found to be in existence, which in case of belligerency wOuld have given Spain an undoubted right to search suspected American vessels, a measure sure to provoke international complications and lead to war. The argument drawn from the fact that Spain had rec- ognized the belligerency of the Confederate States with- in sixty days from the firing on Fort Sumter, and with- out other knowledge of the real status of the rebellion, was met by the statement that long preceding that event, South Carolina had adopted an ordinance of secession, that by May, 1861, ten other States had followed, the Constitution for the Confederate States was formed in February 1861, officers elected, and steps taken toward forming an army, that custom houses, forts, arsenals, and ports had been seized, that Sumter had been fired upon April 12, 1861 ; that President Lincoln had issued a proc- lamation for troops, that in April a blockade of the ports of the seceded States had been declared. The reasoning OUR CUBAN KELATIONS. 425 from this state of facts was, that a large portion of the people of the United States were actually maintaining a government, collecting customs at seaports, and exercising dominion over a vast extent of territory. That the Fed- eral Government in calling out troops and declaring the blockade recognized the condition to be one of '• public war." That this condition was so accepted by the nations which granted belligerent 'rights to the Confederates. In this connection they quoted the opinion of Judge Grier, of the United States Supreme Court, in the Prize Cases: '' This greatest of civil wars was not gradually devel- oped by popular commotion, tumultuous assembles, or local unorganized insurrections. . However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprang forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war. . <> . The proclamation of blockade is it- self official and conclusive evidence that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case .... In organizing this rebellion, they have acted as States claiming to be sovereign over all persons and prop- erty within their respective limits, and asserting a right to absolve their citizens from their allegiance to the Federal Government. . . . Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of battle. The ports and terri- tory of each of these States are held in hostility' to the [General Government. It is no loose, unorganized insur- rection, having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force,— south of this line is enemies' territory, because it is claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent power. " The final argument of the opponents of Cuban belliger- 426 OUR CUDAX RELATIONS. eiicy was that it could be no possible benefit to the strug- gling patriots. It could in no wise alter their relations to Spain, who could still regard them as rebels worthy of death or banislnnent if she saw fit. On the contrary it might prove of great detriment to the Cuban cause, for if Spain chose to exercise her rights of search under tlie treaty of 1795, that would put an end to the transporta- tion of munitions of war for the insurgents. In the discussion in Congress upon the passage of the resolution advising the grant of belligerenc}^ quite a sentiment cropped out in favor of direct intervention by the United States under certain conditions. One of the strongest exponents of this sentiment was Senator Mills, who proposed in his speech tliat if the Government of Spain should deny a request of the United States upon lier to grant to Cubans the power of local self-government, then the United States should take possession of the island and hold it until its inhabitants can institute such government as they may wish, and organize and arm such forces as may be necessary to support it. As to the other means of dealing with the Cuban ques- tion — the purchase of the island outright by the United States, and its annexation as a State of the Union, it liad never entered so fully into public discussion nor taken so serious a hold on public sentiment as in 1854, during a period "of violent agitation in favor of annexatiun. Dur- ing that exciting period Mr. Buchanan, our ]\Iinister at London, Mr. INIason, Minister at Paris, and Mr. Soule, Minister at Madrid, met at Ostend to consider the ques- tion of Cuban annexation. The result was a report to Wm. L. Marcy, then Secretary of State, which became know as the " Ostend Manifesto. " It contained this ex- traordinarily bold and defiant language : OUR CUBAN HALATIONS. 427 " If Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interests, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to tlie United States, " the time would then have come for the United States to consider whether Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endang- ered ' our internal peace and the existence of our cher- islied Union ' ; that, if this question should be answered in the affirmative, ^ then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power'; and that we should be 'recreant to our duty — be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and to become a second St. Domingo. ' " This doctrime was as boldly repudiated, in the follow- ing year, by Secretary Marcy. He said in reply to the report : "lam entirely opposed to getting up a war for the pur- pose of seizing Cuba ; but if tlie conduct of Spain should be such as to justify a w^ar, I should not hesitate to meet that state of things. The authorities of Cuba act unwisely, but not so much so as is represented. They are more alarmed than they need to be in regard to dangers from this country, though it cannot be said that the filibuster spirit' and movements do not furnish just grounds of a] 'pre- hension. They have a clear right to take measures for defence, but what those measures may be, it is not easy to define. In exercising their own rights they are bound to respect the rights of other nations. This tlie}^ have not done in all cases. That they have deliberately in- tended to commit wrong ngainst the United States I do not believe ; but that they have done so I do not deny. The conduct of Spain and the Cuban authorities has been ex- aggerated and even misrepresented in some of our leading 428 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. journals. I am not much surprised at the opinion for war, right or wrong: but I venture to assure you that such is not the policy of the Administration. It does not want war, would avoid it, but would not shiiiik from it, if it becomes necessary in the defence of our just riglits. "The robber doctrine, I abhor. If carried out it would degrade us in our own estimation and disgrace us in the eyes of the civilized world. Should the Administration commit the fatal folly of acting upon it, it could not hope to be sustained by the country, and would leave a tar- nished name to all future times. '^ Cuba would be a very desirable possession, if it came to us in the right wa}^ but we cannot afford to get it by robbery or theft. I am for getting the island, if it can be acquired fairly and honestly, not otherwise. I do not believe the robber doctrine when calmly considered will be popular or that a party can sustain itself upon it. '* Germs of War. Looking at the Cuban question from the standpoint of popular sentiment in Spain, it is an incendiary question which, without the greatest caution on the part or Span- ish rulers, is liable to break out into consuming flame. When word reached Spain of the action of the American Congress, that country manifested the most violent indig- nation. The masses in populous towns rallied to war cries against the United States, and necessitated the use of armed troops to protect the person and [)roperty of American representatives and citizens. All orders of citi- zens, outside of those directly responsible for peace, threw themselves into a war frenzy, and ridiculous threats were made of an immediate invasion and conquest of the United States. OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 429 While this blood tliirsty iiRligiiation was slowly spending itself, the action of the Spanish authorities in Cuba served to kindle indignant fires in the United States. A vessel, called the Competitor, was siezcd while engaged in trying to land war munitions for the insuigents. Her crew were summarily tried by court-martial and sentenced to pay the death penalty. The trial was a sheer mockery, in that the accused wei-e denied time for preparation and counsel of their own choosing. Among them was an American- citizen, who was not a partofthe crew,butwlio was seeking to enter the island as a newspaper correspondent. This action of the authorites was so hasty and in such accord with the charges of cruelty to which they had already thrown themselves open, that word of it incensed our people and spurred our Government to the point of inter- vention. Fortunately the finding of the court-martial had to be certified to the home government for approval before it could be executed. It was met there by an American protest, whose form was not made public. That one made twenty-three years before in the celebrated Virginuis affair, by Secretary Fish, at the instance of President Grant, read thus: - In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation witlnn twelve days from this date, you will, at the expiration of that time close your legation, and will, together with your secretary, leave madrid, bringing with you the archives of the legation. You may leave the printed documents constituting the library in chai^ge of the legation of some friendly power which you may select, who will take charge of them." At any rate it served to call Spain to her senses, and to postpone the approval of what would have been the mur- 430 OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. del" of an American citizen. It traiii^pirecl, amid discussion of the meiits of the case, that condemnation of the men on the cliarge of piracy and treason, and by so savage a court as a court-martial, was clearly illegal. None of the elements o/ piracy were found in the case of the Con]- petitor. She was engaged in filibusteriug, or in a military ex[)edition, which is not piracy. Piracy is a crime com- mitted on the high seas. Its object is plunder by attack upon vessels that come in its way. A pirate is an enemy of the human race. International law so adjudges her. But nut so an insurgent vessel, carrying arUiS to friends, with no intent to depredate in the open seas, and without puwer to do so. Nor was the crime treason, for that is the crime of a subject against his sovereign. The crew of the Con^peti- tor were not Spanish subjects. One was an American. In the case of Aaron Burr, charged with treason, against our Government, Justice Marshall held that treason was not proven, although Burr had planned a rebellion, organ- ized men, or was about to, and had actually purchased arms and ammunitiou as well as a ship fur his enterprise. Nor did he sink his ship and destroy the arms until he learned that he was to be arrested on the charge of trea- son. Of course it would be impossible fur an American to commit an act of treason against Spain or any other for- eign power. It further transpired that tlie American on board the Com[)etitor was wrongly tried by court-martial, it being stipulated b}' the Gushing Treaty of 1821 between Spain and the United States that " No citizen of the United States in Spain, her adjacent islands, or her ultramarine possessions, charged with acts of sedition, treason or conspiracy against the institutions, the public security, the integrity of the OUR CUBAN RELATIONS. 431 lenilui}', or against the Supreme Government, or any otiier crime whatsoever, shall be subject to trial by excep- tional tribunal, but exclusively by the orclinaryjurisdiction, except in the case of being captured with arms in hand." Now, the purpose of treaties is to define clearly and definitely matters between certain nations. Treaties out- rank international law. The latter is strictly a general agreement on general matters between tlie principal na- tions of the world. A treaty, however, is made that the understanding between the parties to it may be explicit. Therefore, in the case of the Gushing Treaty there is but one construction to be placed upon the phrase, " captured with arms in hand." The prisoners must have been in actual possession of arms — have had arms in their hands — to come under the provision of the treaty, which per- mits them to be tried by court-martial. The third section of the treaty says that "those who may be taken with arms in hand," and \vho are therefore comprehended in the exception of the first article, shall be tried by ordinary council of war in conformity with the second article of the hereinbefore mentioned law; but even in this case tlie accused should enjoy for their defense the guarantees in the aforesaid law of April 17, 1821. Pending the solution of this delicate case of the Gom- petitor, a solution which involved the higher question of peace or war between the two anxious and excited coun- tries, the Guban problem worked its way largely into the politics of the national campaign of 1896. Ifc brought the Gongress nearly to the verge of passing a joint resolu- tion in favor of belligerency, in order t@ compel President Gleveland to show where he stood by signing or vetoing it. Mau}^ State Gonventions of both parties passed reso- lutions of sympathy with the struggling Gubans, and as 432 OUR CUP.AN RELATIONS. time progressed it became almost certain that neither tlie Republican nor Democratic parties could refuse to insert a plank in their national platforms in favor of Cuban belli"-erency. The time seemed to be already at hand, or within near arrival, when tension grew full of threatening if nt)t lamentable incidents ; when it would be necessary to inform Spain that indefinite riot and rapine could not be permitted to continue in Cuba, and that if she could not restore peace in the fertile island this country must. Should she resent this attitude, there would be no distinc- tion of political party in this country, and no difference of opinion in the universal determination to meet all the responsibilities of such a situation, created uot^-by the United States but by Spain. LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY. Birth and Education. The McKiDley family, to which our illustrious subject belongs, was originally from the west of Scotland, but eventually found its way to the north of Ireland, as part of that important migration which afterwards became so conspicuously known both in Europe and this country as Scotch-Irish. Two branches of the McKinley family migrated to America about the beginning of the last century. One branch settled in the South, and became founder of a long line of prominent and influential citizens. The other branch settled in the North, and presumably in Yoi'k county. Pa.; at least one James McKinley, who was but twelve years old when his father came to this country, was a resident of York in 1755, where a son was born to him, whom he named David McKinley. This David McKinley served as a private in the Revo- lutionary war, and was engaged in several important battles. After the war he moved to Westmoreland county. Pa., then to Mercer county. Pa., then to Colum- biana county, Ohio, and finally to Crawford county, where he died. He married twice, the first time in 1780 to Sarah Gray, and the second' to Eleanor McCk-an. He had no children by his second wife, but by his first he had (435) iSQ LIFE OF VViLLlAJVI McKlNLEY. four sons and several daugliteis, all of whom were born in Pennsylvania, in Westmoreland or Mercer counties. He died, August 8, 1840, in Crawford county, Ohio. His second son, James McKinley, and great-grand- father of our subject, was born September 19, 1783, and resided in Mercer county, Pa., where he married Mary Rose, who was of English extraction. Her father was an iron founder, and he, too, was a soldier in the Revolution- ary war. James McKinley moved to New Lisbon, Ohio, in 1809, taking along with him his son, William McKinley, then but a year and a-half old, and born November 15, 1807. There were born to James McKinley, thirteen children, eleven of whom were born in New Lisbon. The oldest son was the above mentioned William McKinley, father of our subject. He early became associated with the iron business, and erected, both for himself and in association with others, several foundries and furnaces in Ohio, moving in pursuit of his business from New Lisbon to Niles, thence to Po- land, and thence to Canton, where he died in 1892. He married Nancy Campbell Allison, in 1827. She was a descendant of an English family, that had first settled in Virginia, then moved to Greene county, Pa., and finally to New Lisbon. From this union sprang William McKinley, the subject of our biography, distinguished alike for his high place in American political history, and as the recipient of an homage accorded to but few statesmen. He was born at Niles, Trumbull county, Ohio, January 29, 1848. His father was then a resident of Niles, and manager of an iron furnace there. Whil5 the younger William and liis sisters were mere children, the father and mother moved to Poland, in Mahoning county, a village in the centre of LIFP: of WILLIAM I\Ii KIN !j:y. 4S7 a flourishing agricultural and mining section. This move was made both for business and educational reasons, the place being somewhat noted for its academy. In this busy but unostentatious village, the younger McKinley began his school career. It was at Ihst the usual tame submission to the routine of the public schools, and then a loftier and pleasanter walk in the portals of the academy. The pupil was ever obedient and progressive. He laboied hard during the school ses- sions to improve his opportunities, and durhig vacations he did not hesitate to follow the custom of the times by earning pocket and book money on his own account. As he progressed witli his studies, he filled in his leisure with odd clerical jobs, and taught a term of public school in a district contiguous to Poland, thus contributing mater- ially to the expense of his academic education, as well as to the development of his intellectual organization and powers of self-control. As a boy and pupil, young McKinley gave evidence of many of those qualities which in their maturity character- ized his public life. His industry and perseverance were earnests of that assiduity and persistency Avhich after- wards enabled him to meet and conquer the hard prob- lems of legislation and statescraft. His youthful love of fun, exercise and athletics gave assurance of sturdy phys- ical power, equal to the hardest strains of the battlefield or the severest exactions of the political campaign or com- mittee room. In his youthful candor and generosity of spirit, were the germs of that social elegance and pleasing political address admired as much by those who opposed as those who favored his views. In his boyish democ- racy were the seeds of that philanthropy which would bring the beneficences of economic legislation down to 438 LIFE OF WILLIAM ISK KINLEY. the looms and tlie furnace hearths, and into the domestic lives of the toiling masses. In the brightne.ss and ac- quisitiveness of his youthful intellect, we see that future mastery of our inJustrial status, and that successful appli- cation of remedial laws which have borne such relishable fruits and have left him without a peer in popular affec- tion. In that young faithfulness to family, in obedience, in all that reflected a noble mother's assiduous training, have been found that exalted moral life, noble integrity of purpose, severe adherence to the codes of honor that regulate our business and political estates. In short, the boyish and educational estate of William McKinley presaged the coming man with far greater accuracy than is common, even with those who have the greatest reason to a2)preciate the stern lessons of early years. He left the Academy at Poland when seventeen years of age, and entered Allegheny College. But his career here was brief, owing to sick'ness. On his return to Po- land he again taught public school for a time, and also Bible class in his Sunday school, he being then a member of the Methodist Episcopal church. Army Career. A youth of McKinley 's patriotism could not, of course,' resist the liigli call to duty wdiich came with the breaking out of tliC Civil war. Burning with desire to aid the cause of the Union, forgetting his unripe 3'ears and the sacrifices that one so young would have to make, he joined the band of companions that went out from Po- land early in the war — June 11, 1861 — and that after- wards became Company E, of the 23d Ohio Volunteers. He bore no commission, was honored b}^ no title, but LIFE OF WILLIAM M-' KIN LEV. 430 marched as private ia the ranks, impelled only by the sacredness of his cause and that inward devotion to prin- ciple which actuated his entire military career. He was but a stripling of eighteen years, but as un- daunted as the volunteer of stronger mould and more mature years, in whose hands the musket was less un- wieldy, on whose back the knapsack was less a burden, wliose limbs were stronger for fatiguing march, whose vitality was hardier against camp exposure. Hardly had he found his way to headquarters before he attracted the attention of his superiors, as one possessed of more than the usual qualities of a private soldier. He was ever attentive to duty, promptly in his place at every com- mand, fearless of danger and exposure, an inspiration to his fellow soldiers, and withal, gave evidence of an ability to originate and execute which bade fair to be of ines- timable value to those over him. His Colonel was W. S. Rosecrans who, being a West Pointer, proved to be a severe disciplinarian. If Mc- Kinley and his comrades found their school of the regi- ment at first a hard one, it was none the less useful, and the time would prove to be near when the advantages of discipline would become apparent. Stanley Mattliews was the first Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment, and Ruther- ford B. Hayes, afterward, Pi-esident Hayes, was its first major. Here was certainly distinguished company, and to win the favor of such men by rigid adherence to dut}', and by show of superior ability was a matter of more than ordinary moment. The rendezvous of the regiment was Camp Chase, Columbus, Ohio. It had enlisted for the three montlis' serv- ice. On its arrival at camp, the State quota for tiii'ee months' men was found to be full. But orders for three 440 LIFE OF WILLIAM M KINLEY. years' men had already been issued from Washington, and the 23d Ohio was asked to change the term of its en- listment. A great majority of them, including McKinley did so, and thus the regiment which had been third to en- list of the three months' men, became the first to enlist of the three years' men. The regiment continued to drill at Camp Chase during July, 1861. Owing to the promotion of General Rose- crans, E. P. Scammon became its Colonel. It was now ripe for the field, and was waiting at Clarksburg, W. Va., a mountainous, remote, difficult section infested by guerrillas. Here the regiment was not likely to meet an enemy in pitched battle, but a secret foe, who kept it on al- most a continuous march by night and day, over steep mountains, through dangerous defiles, drenched with rain to-day, shelterless and foodless to-morrow, routing, chas- ing and scattering an adroit, swift and heartless enemy. The mountain incursion may not have called forth the liighest fighting qualities of the regiment, but it was cer- tainly a severe test of its powers of endurance, and an excellent foretaste of the real hardships of campaigning. The only engagement fought by the legiment that reached the magnitude of battle was that at Carnifex Ferry on September 10, 1861. This was a series of active skirmishes throughout the day, followed by the stealing away of the enemy at night. These 0[)erations ended by a difficult march of the regi- ment to Camp Ewing on New river, which proved to be a very unhealthy spot, and where tlie ranks were greatly decimated by an outbreak of disease, owing to exposure and lack of proper food. In May, 1862, the regiment, now fully recruited and in good condition, left its camp, under the lead of Lieutenant Colonel Hayes, and LIFE OF WILLIAM McltlNLEY. 441 marched upon Princeton, W. Va. The enemy first evacuated the town, but afterwards returned. A sharp engagement followed, May 15, 1862, resulting in the de- feat of the Union forces. They retreated, however, in good order, but were afterward subjected to great hard- ship by the cutting off of their supplies. While in camp at Flat Rock, orders were received to march to Green Meadows and thence to Camp Piatt on the Great Kanawha, on the way eastward to reinforce McClellan's army, then about to confront the forces of Lee in Maryland. In three days, the regiment covered the very difficult distance of one hundred and four miles from Green Meadows to Camp Piatt. The embarcation for Washington was speedy, and the arrival in Washington timely, for after a rest of a day or two, the regiment was on the march with McClellan toward Frederick City, Md., to head off Lee's threat upon Washington and Balti- more. But now McKinley was no longer a private in the ranks. In recognition of those very executive qualities Colonel Hayes had discovered in him while at Camp Chase, he liad secured his promotion to the important post of commissary sergeant, April 15, 1862, ere they left the wilderness of West Virginia. This brought him into a staff relation with his colonel, and they not only became friends, but their intimacy proved to be deep and lasting. The preliminary battle of dreadful Antietam had now to be fought, September 14, 1862. McKinley 's regiment, still commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hayes, was at- tached to Cox's division, which was the division in the advance of McClellan's army. The battle opened by an attack of this advance upon the enemy, strongly entrenched up the mountain side. A murderous fire at short range 442 LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. wa§ opened on the leading Federal brigade, and in a few moments one-third of their number was stretched upon the field, Lieutenant Colonel Hayes receiving a bad wound in the arm. On the arrival of reinfurcements, the brigade charged up the hill and drove the enemy from his strong entrenchments at the point of the bayonet. During the balance of the day the regiment fought with its division, under the immediate command of General Cox, and in all made three severe bayonet charges with success. The regimental losses for the day were nearly two hundred, one-fourth of whom were killed outright. Severe as this battle of South Mountain was, it was but^ a prelude to that of Antietam, for which both sides were now making the utmost preparation. This great battle was fought, September 17, 1862. It has passed into history as the bloodiest single day of war during the re- bellion. McKinley's regiment fought at the right of the First Brigade of the Kanaw^ha Division. It w^as called into battle before daylight and without breakfast. The entire division soon found its left and rear exposed to a terrific attack of the enemy from a corn field. Its colors of the 23d went down, to be hoisted again by Major Comly, on a new line facing the enemy, to which the entire regiment quickly conformed, and by a decisive fire forced the enemy to retire. The regiment, not re- ceiving the orders of the division to withdraw^, held its po- sition till the arrival of a special order for it to fall to the rear. Notwithstanding the arduous and bloody duties oi the day, the regiment spent the night in support of a battery, and found final relief only on the next afternoon. All through the angry fight of the 17th, Sergeant McKin^ ley spared no exertion to relieve the men of his regiment of the pangs of hunger and thirst. He was in the midst LIFE OF WILLIAM M KINLEY. 443 of the fires of conflict from iiioniing t(j liight, serving witli his own hands the food and drink which the men had been deprived of by the early morning outburst of battle. It was this occasion of bravery and self-sacrifice under fire, and this incident of devotion and administrative ability, that earned for him the applause of his officers and companions. Word of it reached the Governor of his State, and recognition came back in the shape of a promo- tion to the Second Lieutenancy of Company D, September 23, 1862. Tlie relief which came to a dangerous military situation through the battle of Antietam, enabled McClellan to send McKinley's regiment once more to West Virginia, where its presence was much needed. It made a hasty journey westward and went into winter quarters on the Great Kanawha, after a march of six hundred miles during the year, a campaign of severe mountain service, and partic- ipation in two of the bloodiest episodes of the war. McKinley was promoted to be First Lieutenant of Com- pany E February 7th, 1863. During 1863, the regiment was engaged in the scouting duty incident to the occupation of West Virginia, but once it was called upon to participate in the movement which brought Morgan's raid to termination by the en- gagement at Buffington's island, Ohio. During the winter of 1863-64, it was in winter quarters at Charleston, West Virginia. In the spring of 1864, it marched to Brownstown on the Kanawha, where it became a part of the force of General Crook, who was then preparing for his celebrated raid on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. This expe- dition differed but little in its dangers and hardships from the everyday West Virginia experience. It embraced 444 LIFE OP WILLIAM Mc KINLEY. toilful mountain marches, the threading of deep and dan- gerous ravines, exposure to frequent rainfalls, precarious supplies of food, rej^eated encounters with guerrillas, till on May 9, 1804, patience and effort culminated in the spirited battle of Cloyd's mountain. In this engagement the 23d Ohio occupied the right of the First Brigade which was face to face with an enem}^ strongly posted on the wooded steeps of the mountain, with an open meadow in front. A charge was ordered on the enemy's lines, amid a terrific fire of musketry and artiller3^ It was bravely made across the open space and up over the first line of entrenchments, the enemy retreat- ing to a second fortified line further up the mountain. A second charge up the steeps dislodged him from this line. Reinforced, a third stand was made, but nothing cou'd now check the ardor of the Union troops. They rushed in hand to hand encounter upon the enemy's guns, and after an heroic struggle succeeded in capturing them, and thus accomplishing an important aim of the raid. This victory was followed by a series of active operations, in- volving the artillery duel at New Bridge, and the destruc- tion of the bridge ; the continuous battle march to Black- burgh, and the embarrassing crossing of Salt Pond moun- tains, owing to incessant rains, the wretched condition of the roads, and the flocking of "contrabands," whom pity could not leave to starvation, or perhaps a worse death. Crook's force was now within reach of that of Hunter, who had been ordered on a similar raid up the James river. It was therefore ordered to join with Hunter, which it did at Lexington, Virginia. March was taken for Lynchburg, with the intent of attacking. Lee had sent heavy reinforcements from Richmond, and when the encounter came, the Union forces met with severe repulse. LIFE OB^ WILLIAM McKINLEY. 445 At the time of the junction of Crook's forces with Hunter, they were in no condition for battle. They liad been on ahnost incessant night and day marches for a long time, had scaled mountains and forded streams, had passed through repeated encounters, some of which rose to the dignity of battles, and had never had a sure supply of food. The fortunes of the 23d Ohio now for a time became tliose of Hunter to the north of Richmond and in the Shenandoah Valley. Or to speak more accurately, its fortune remained that of General Crook, for all of Hunter's infantry command had not yet arrived from the Kanawha valley. And this fortune was by no means a hapi)y one, for the enemy followed up his advantage at Lynchburg, and attacked the Union forces at Liberty, where a brisk battle occurred, resulting in a further Union retreat. On June 20, 18G4, the rear of the Union forces, con- sisting of Hayes' brigade, with Crook present, hehl Buford Gap against the enemy's advance, and then made a hasty niglit retreat for the van, supposed to be at Salem. But Hunter was not found at Salem. The enemy had attacked and cut off his trains, and had forced him beyond the place. Crook's rear guard was in a manner surrounded, and it was only by rare strategy and brave fighting that he extricated his command from this dilemma. This retreat before a superior force was kept up without opportunity for rest and with an insufficient supply of food and ammunition till June 27th, when a safe spot was reached on Big Sewell Mountain. It liad been a continu- ous figlit and march for nearly 180 miles. It need not be recited here how General Early's successes in the Shenandoah Valley at this time emboldened him to carry his invasion to the very front of Washington, and to 446 LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY. challenge a figlit for the National Capital. It was all toe plain that the Union forces under command of Hunter in the valley were unable to cope with the augmented forces of Earl}-, So Grant sent two corps from Rich- mond for the rescue of the Capital. Before these Early beat a retreat southward, carrying along a rich supply of stores and booty gleaned from the valley. He was pursued for a time by Hunter's command, and had gotten as far as Strasburg in his retreat. Here lie halted, and learning that he was no longer pursued, re- solved to return and fall upon Hunter's in detail. It had become the opinion of all that Lee had recalled to Richmond the reinforcements previously sent to Early. Hence Hunter felt comparatively secure, after seeing his enemy so far south as Strasburg. He had not only called off pursuit, but had posted his all too meagre forces at various strategic points in the valley. These were driven, somewhat in surprise, from their positions, by Early's returnfiig forces, and forced northward, in a line through Winchester, which General Crook held, with his real" guard of Hunter's army. Crook's command contained Hayes' brigade, in which was the Ohio, 23d Regiment. On July 24, 1864, Crook's command heard firing to the south of Wincliester. He promptly marched his forces, numbering some 6,000 men, out some four miles in the di- rection of the firing, and to the village of Kernstown. Here he formed a line of battle with Flayes' brigade, numbering 1,700 men, on his left. Here it soon became manifest that Early was present in force, and that a severe struggle impended. Early pushed the attack with his greatl}' superior force. It was an attack by centre and both fianks, and was suc- cessful on the centre. But Hayes' brigade kept the left LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. 447 steady, and only retreated to Winchester, after the rest of the lines had been driven back in confusion. In the fierce contention for his position throughout the day, he had lost nearly a fourth of his command, a proportionate share of which fell to the Ohio Twenty-third. In the annals of this fierce encounter of Hunter's rear guard, an encounter which, though it brought not victory, yet answered the purpose of checking for the time the career of an invadnig foe of superior numbers, occur-ed one of the many episodes in young McKinley's army the v\areer, which served to show his heroism amid danger. At Winchester, General Hayes learned that one of his regiments had not been informed of the retreat of the brigade, and had been left in a position where it could hardly escape capture, being already nearly surrounded by the enemy. He ordered McKinley, then acting as his aide, to ride out and bring it in. It was seemingly a ride to the death, but, nothing daunted, the brave young officer executed the order, brought the regi- ment safely in, and received the congratulations of all for his perilous feat. After this battle of Kernstown, or as is more frequently written in the war histories, of Winchester, there was a confused period of evacuation by Crook's command and a hasty following up, as rear guard, of Hunter's forces to- ward Martinsburg. Many incidents of this retreat reflected great credit on young McKinley's military career. He was brave, sagacious, thoughtful, spirited, when all was perilous, confused and despondent, and more than once the saving of men and guns from capture was due to his advice and personal heroism. Lieutenant McKinley wascommissioned Captain of Com- pany G. of his regiment, on July 25, 1864, the day after the Kernstown battle. Sheridan now came to the com- 448 LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY. iiiaiid in the Shenandoah Valley. His forces embraced the two corps Grant had sent from Richmond, the two in- fantry divisions of Crook, and Averill's cavalry. These had been concentrated at Halltown in the valley. Early was forced to call together his scattered columns. Sheri- dan moved against him on August 10th, and pursued him toStrasburg, where he found him so strongly entrenched and greatly reinforced that he dare not attack. On the contrary, Early now began an offensive movement, deter- mined to crush Sheridan at Cedar Creek. But the latter was on the alert and retired to Berryville, leaving Early to concentrate at Winchester, now no longer the centre of a land of plenty. Now occurred a period of manoeuvering for position. At length Sheridan determined to attack Early in his po- sition on the Opequan, covering Winchester. He formed his line of battle with the Sixth and Nineteenth 'di-my corps in front, and Crook's divisions in reserve. The at- tack began on September 19, 1864. Sheridan's onset was fierce but was rolled back. It was followed by a counter- charge which broke Sheridan's centre. The broken lines were quickly reestablished. As the battle progressed it was found that the enemy's left was strongest. Crook was ordered to find the extreme of this left, strike its flank and rear and break it up, while Sheridan swung his own left in a half wheel to support him. Crook made his advance with great spirit, and the enemy was forced step by step from his position. Torbert's cavalry came to the aid of Crook and his gallant men, and soon Early's stubborn and strong left was in confusion. Sheridan was driving the centre hard with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps. Wilson was ordered to push his cavalry to the left and gain the roads leading south from Winchester. He dashed to the LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. 449 light where Ciouk and Torbert were iiiakiug such telliug inroads on the enemy's ranks, and ordered a charge with all the troops that could he brought into position. In- fantry and cavalry now bore irresistibly on the enemy's wavering columns. Early trembled for the fate of his army, pressed as it was in front and by flank. His forces could stand the strain no longer. They broke and fled over the spaces between the Opequan and Winchester and through the latter place. Night alone saved his forces from complete destruction. He lost 4,500 men, of whom 2,500 were prisoners, and several guns. Sheridan lost 4,500 men ; 500 killed, 3,500 wounded and 500 missing. Never was battle more decisive. It had beeen fought with the precision of clockwork, and was the first in which in- fantry, artillery and cavalry had been used concurrently. The victory brought great honor to every participant, and electrified the country. Sheridan pushed his beaten foe vigorously, first to New- town, then to Fisher's Hill, then to Strasburg. Here Sheridan sent Crook's command to work its way secretly, under cover of the night, to Early's left. Torbert was sent on a similar mission to the left. On September 22, Sheridan attacked with his Sixth and Nineteenth corps. Suddenly Crook debouched from his hiding place on the enemy's flank and rear, and doubled up his lines within his breastworks. Sheridan charged in front. The enemy fled in panic, leaving sixteen guns and 1,100 prisoners in Sheridan's hands. Again Sheridan pursued the routed enemy and drove him out of the valley. But the valley forces had not long to rest. Early was strongly reinforced from Richmond, by October 5th, and on the 6th, attacked Sheridan's advance at Harrisonburg, diiving it back. Sheridan called together his forces at 450 LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY. Cedar Creek, for be liad learned that Longstreet had been sent from Richmond to Early's aid. At Cedar Creek Sheridan left his forces in apparent safety to go to Wash- ington at the command of the President. Crook's com- mand here occupied a position to the left of the cavalry, which formed the extreme right. While Sheridan was ab- sent Early attacked in a roundabout and highly strate- gical way on October 19th. That portion of his attack, headed by Kershaw, fell on the Union left, where Ciook was situated. The battle raged furiousl}^ here, but the force of the enemy's blow could not be resisted. Crook's lilies were driven in, after a contest in which many on both sides lost their lives. General Hayes had his horse shot under him and narrowly escaped with his life. Cedar Creek was thus far a surprise for the Uriion forces. Except upon the left, it hardly reached the im- portance of a battle, for the right, finding its position un- tenable, and snuffing disaster if a general engagement en- sued, found its highest mission in securinglines forasafe re- treat. Yet the result was disastrous enough in loss of life, guns and munitions, to render the enemy jubilant and en- courage him to fresh attack. On the night of the 18th Sheridan slept at Winchester, on his return from Washington. On the morning of the 19th the firing of heavy guns twenty miles away told him of battle at Cedar Creek. Then began his famous twenty miles ride with all its exciting incidents — its repeated shouts to "Face the other way boys!" "We are going back!" "We'll lick them yet!" " Back to duty boys!" as he met his retreating soldiers. Soon he is with his generals — Crook and all the rest — now in momentary conference, now issuing liasty orders, inspiring all by his presence, bringing order out of dii-e confusion. Sheridan found that Getty's division of the 6th corps, LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. 453 supported by Custer's and Merritt's Cavalry, occupied a position between the rapidly advancing enemy and his other corps. His quick topographic eye selected this line as his line of battle, for he saw that battle must be ioined at once in order to retrieve the disaster of the morning. He quietly closed his corps on that line, and not a mo- ment too soon, for already the attack was on, upon the 19tli corps. It was bravely resisted, and Early thought to fortify and merely hold his own lines. At three P. M. Sheri- dan took the offensive, and attacked with his entire line, by a left flank movement, his cavalry ably supported him. For a time the battle went stubborn and bloody. Early was trying Sheridan's manoeuvre with his own left. It was charglid upon by a force led by Sheridan in person, and partly detatched from the main column. The charge grew more persistent and bloody. The Confederate left wav- ered and gave way. Early acklowledged the day lost by ordering a retreat. Then the confusion. of the mornmg was transferred to the enemy's ranks. They were rolled backward to the position of the morning on Cedar Creek. At this point, Early lost control of his men, and retreat became a rout. Prisoners, guns, ammunition fell readily into the victor's hands. Koads were blocked with dis- carded booty and army paraphernalia. At Fisher's Hill, Early hoped to make a stand, but he found nothing there except the Union prisoners of the morning. Night alone saved his fleeing remnants fi^om annihilation, and dark- ness found Early at New Market twenty miles away from Cedar Creek. Sheridan had not only brilliantly re-Won the battle of Cedar Creek, but had recaptured all the guns taken in the morning and had added to them twenty-four of the enemy's pieces, 1,600 prisoners and three hundred wagons. 26 4bi LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. The momentous battle of Cedar Creek ended the cam- paign in the Shenandoah Valley. Early was recalled to Richmond. The President honored Sheridan with a jMajor-General's commission, "For the personal gallantry, military skill and just confidence in the courage and gallantry of your troops." The Congress complimented him and his soldiers for tlieir " series of victories in the Shenandoah Valley, and especially for their services at Cedar Creek ". In Sheridan's disposition of the forces left in the Vallej^ on his return to Richmond, tlie command to which the Twenty-third Ohio was attacked was ordered to Martins- burg. Their march thither was enlivened by casting the army vote for President in 1864. Tlie McKinley '^boy soldier" had earned his manhood in the field along with other honors, and cast his first vote in that election, along with the older veterans. The battle of Cedar Creek tlierefore virtually ended the active military career of Captain McKinley, though he found much future service on staffs of both Generals Crook and Carroll. On JNIarch 13, 1865, lie w^as brevetted major. In the spring of 1865 the Twenty-third Ohio was ordered to Camp Cumberland, where it was mustered out of service, July 26, 1865, closing a four year career of war with honor, leaving a host of brave comrades beneath the turf of the battlefields, returning home to receive the con- gratulations of loyal friends and to enter once more the occupations of peace. The soldier boy of eighteen years was now a man of twenty-two. The private of 1861 was now a major. The education and aspirations of youth, had been supplemented by such an experience in the cause of country as few could claim at his age, and such as would meet the most exalted purposes of after life. LIFE OF WILLIAM McKlNLEY\ 455 In Private Life. On bis return from the army in July, 1865, and at the age of twenty-two years, Major McKinley settled at Poland/ The problem before him was the choice of a civic career. Both qualification and inclination pointed to a course of law. Pie accordingly entered the law office of Judge Glidden of Mahoning County, Ohio, where he grounded himself in the principles of law, and afterwards completed his course at the Albany Law School, in New York. He proved to be an apt and diligent student. Though liampered at times by paucity of means, he courageously fought his way toward the bar, and was admitted to that of Canton County in the early part of 1867. At this date he left his Poland home, and entered on his professional career at Canton, the county seat, then a town of some 6,000 inhabitants, mostly sturdy migrants from Pennsyl- Yania, or their descendants. lie began his career auspiciously, in that his industry and energy happily seconded an excellent preparation and a naturally forceful and persuasive style of speech. He was painstaking in preparing a cause and eloquent in presenting it. To these necessary attributes of the suc- cessful practitioner, he added a charming personal address. With this equipment and these qualities his success at the bar was marked. He not only won speedy recognition among his fellow members but among the people. Before two years had transpired he was honored with the Re- publican nomination for District Attorney of his county. Though the county was largely Democratic, he at once took the stump and conducted so vigorous a campaign that, to the surprise of friend and foe, he was elected. 456 LIFE OF WILLIAM INI' KiNLEY. lie was renominated for the ^i'.me ( ffice, but his political enemies were on the alert, and he was defeated, not, how- ever, without putting up a battle tliat proved him to be one of the ablest and most indefatigable of campaigners. In these, his preliminary contests, he laid the ground work of that fame which has ever since been his portion as one of the most captivating and convincing public speakers in the land. On January 25, 1871, he married Miss Ida Saxton, the accomplished daughter of James A. Saxton, a banker of Canton, and began housekeeping in the neat and com fortable home that has since become historic. They had two daughters, both of whom died young. The blow gi-eatly affected Mr. McKinley's general health for a time, and they went to live with Mr. McKinley's mother, till the time came for him to move to Wt^shington as a mem- ber of Congress. In Congress. In 1876, Major INIcKinley entered the race for Congress in the Eighteenth Ohio District. There were several dis- tinguished competitors for the nomination in his party, some of wliom were distinguished politicians and veteran campaigners. But the young man of thirty-three years carried off the lionors of the nominating convention, and, after^ one of his characteristic campaigns, he was elected to the Forty -fifth Congress by a liandsome majority. He continued to be reelected to each succeeding Congress up to 1800. Though the Democrats, in 1878, tried to defeat him by a gerrymander of his district, making it Demo- cratic by 1,800 majority, he carried it by 1,300 majority. In 1884, a similar gerrymander was tried, but McKinley still held Ids district by some 1,500 majority. It was only after LIFE OF WILLIAM McKINLEY. 457 a third and more desperate attempt, in 1890, to gerry- mander liim out of his district, that his political enemies succeeded in their nefarious object. His home county, Stark was thrown in with three overwhelmiugly Demo- cratic' counties, so as to make a sure Democratic majority of 8 000 in the district. Yet such was iMcKiuley s hold on the affections of the people, and such the strength ot his campaign, that he was beaten only by the beggaidly majority of 363 votes, having polled 2,500 move votes in his' district than had been cast for Harrison in 1888. In Congress, Major McKinley was to do far more than repeat his brilliant success at the bar. He was in a field more to his liking and one fuller of opportunity for the development and application of endowments leading to the highest plains of statesmanship. He entered public life with the ardor of a youthful, ambitious nature, witli a larcre fund of information, especially upon economic prob- lems, with painstaking industry, with unswerving fidelity to political conviction, with commanding address, with ar more than usual parliamentary and diplomatic tact, with a demeanor and philosophy tliat attracted instant notice and rendered his counsels pleasing and desirable. It was but natural that one thus equipped for public lile should soon begin to make his mark. He grew daily in popularity among the members, and in respect and strength among his party associates. His assignment to various im- portant committees, all of which were of the working kind, tested thoroughly the appreciation of his abilityaiid sup- plied opportunities for the exercise of that useluluess he exemplified from the very beginning of his public career. At first his growth in favor was rather through the chan- nels of committee work, with its arduous details, than through those of open debate. But this was all the better 45S LIFE OF WILLIAM Mt KINLEY. as a ground work for solid reputation, and as a preparation for that higher statesmanship in whose midst he was soon to stand so conspicuousl}' forth. It must not be thought, however, that he neglected fo- rensic opportunity. Indeed his reputation as a keen, clear and powerful debater preceded his entry to Congress, and the distinction that awaited him, in this respect, came naturally and expectedly. His interest in public ques- tions, his wonderful power in the marshalling of facts, his forceful, impressive logic, his fascinating rhetoric, his fair- ness to opponents, his freedom from excitement and bitter- ness, his readiness and keenness in repartee, very soon, and of their own momentum, carried him to a front place in the rank of skilled debaters. He never rose to s})eak with- out an occasion, nor did he ever speak idly nor without full knowledge of his subject. What he touched upon he both ornamented and exhausted. His earnestness be- spoke depth and honesty of conviction. His warmth in- spired enthusiasm. He charmed by lucidity of thought and clear cut expression. His political foes heard with the same interest and delight as his friends. McKinley found a place on the Committee of Ways and Means, on entering Congress. This was to be the avenue to that high pedestal of protection he would soon occupy. *' Pig Iron " Kell}^ was his sponsor in these early days of his career. Afterwards Garfield was chairman, an eco- nomic tutor as brilliant, if less sturdy, than his predeces- sor. McKiidey came to the exalted honors and grave re- sponsibilities of the chairmanship under a tutelage whose ability was everywhere recognized, and by virtue of deserved promotion He had served thirteen years upon the com- mittee, had passed through all its labors and throes, and was at length crowned with its leadership, to crown, in LIFE OB^ WILLIAM Mc KlNLEY. 459 turn, his party and country with its greatest and best pro- tective safeguard. In his early Congressional career, the questions of great- est moment related to the currency and to the resumption of specie payments in 1879. In these he took a keen in- terest, and stood shoulder to shoulder with the Republican leaders who had resolved that the country's promises to pay should be redeemed in gold, and that the national credit should be at par in all the world. Time and again the subject of pension for Union soldiers come up, and each time it found in Major McKinley one of its most resolute and elective champions. No subject touched him more nearly, and over none did he ever giow more fervent and forceful. What may be called his maiden speech upon the doc- trine of protection was made in 1878 when the Wood tariff bill was under discussion. This speech ranked as ono of the ablest delivered during those debates, and in it McKniley took the high and noble stand he was to occupy in all subsequent discussions of the same momentous sub- ject. It stamped him more as leader, than follower, of the economic thoughts which were to dominate future tariff legislation. It prepared the way for his powerful advo- cacy of that measure which came up in 1882, and which looked to the appointment of a Tariff Commission, duly authorized by Congress, whose duty should be a friendly revision of the tariff. This commission prepared and presented the tariff bill of 1883. In advocacy of its passage Major McKinley stood shoulder to shoulder with such veteran protectionists as Kelley and others and evenly divided with them the honors of debate. It was at this juncture that Judge Kelley said of him, " he has distanced all his colleagues in 460 LIFE OF WlLLIAiM MCKINLEY. mastering the details of the tariff." And this was the oc- casion when McKiiiley made the protective idea a para- mount doctrine of the Republican party by carrying it farther down to the masses and into the workshops and homes, than any previous exponent had done. He proved to be tlje greatest orator of this memorable occasion, and a prophet as well, for the revelations of 1894 repeated in disaster and want and tears and groans his visions of 1883, By 1884 McKinley had deservedly and honorably won the title of ''Champion of American Protection." Or, if not yet, the title could no longer be withheld, for he was about to add another imposing chapter to his career in the celebrated debates on the Morrison horizontal tariff' bill. In his opposition to this bill he was learned, exhaustive, merciless, and such a master of the situation as to make those who favored the bill appear ridiculous, and the bill itself an economic farce. In 1888, Mr. Mills sprung his remarkable attack on American industries upon the Congress, by a bill which became known as the '' Mills Tariff Bill." This bill was an insult to the minority of the Ways and Means Committee, for it had been prepared and presented without consult- ing with them. The insult w^as resented and the bill op- posed by the minority, headed by Mr. McKinley, in a report, which for minute detail, exhaustive presentation of facts, and invincible argument, must ever stand as a monument to his patient industry and perfect mastery of his subject. It was regarded as one of the ablest papers on the subject of tariff ever presented to Congress, and when it was fol- lowed in a short time by the speech of its author in the House, he clinched the impression already existing as to the report, that none could approach him in fearless, logi- cal and convincing championsliip of the doctrine of protec- LIFE OF WILLIAM M< KINLEV. 461 tion. This report and this speech went to the country in the campaign of 1888, and served as potent agencies in the election of President Harrison, with a Republican House of Representatives. Major McKinley now reached the grandest opportunity of his brilliant career, thus far. By virtue of his position as chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means in the Fifty -first Congfess he was to incorporate the policy of party and the verdict of the country into its commercial economy, to put into the form of statute the doctrine of protection that been so ably and fully presented in the preceding campaign, and so em[)hatically passed upon- He entered upon this work fully equipped by experience, and with all the enthusiasm of his ardent nature. Deter- mined to avoid the errors into which the Democrats had previously fallen, he invited all the interests concerned in tariff revision to a hearing, and a bill was framed which was to constitute the Tariff Actof 1890, and be popularly known as the '' McKinley Bill." It involved the exper- ience of all former tariff legislation and the best features of all former acts. It imposed protective rates in the in- terest of American labor, on home manufactures whose existence was threatened by foreign competition. It im- posed higher rates on manufactures which we ought to produce but did not. It largely reduced the duties on necessaries of life, or made them (such as sugar) free. It 'greatly enlarged the free list by placing on it all raw nuiterials whose importation did not complete with the home growth of the same. It introduced the policy of reciprocity. No previous tariff bill had ever been so fully matured, or had so satisfied in advance the various interests con- sulted in its preparation. Certainly none ever passed that 462 LIFE OF WILLIAM Mc KIN LEY. was more ably cliampioiied or persisteiitlj^ opposed. Its passage occupied the entire time of the first session of the Fifty first Congress, and during all that time Mr. McKinley stood at the head of his party, directing the fortunes of his bill, and vigilant day and night over its fate. Its pas- sage was a signal triumph of his patience, endurance and legislative ability. His name went forth with the tide of prosperity that followed the bill, and was heard amid the rejoicings in every hamlet, workshop and home of the land. He came to stand for the beneficence of his meas- ure in the eyes and hearts of the toiling millions. At a later date, 1894, when the ^McKinley Act was about to be repealed by the Wilson Act which President Cleveland designated as a product of ''perfidy and dis- honor " and permitted to become a law without his signa- ture, ]Mr. McKinley spoke thus of the operation of the act which bore his name : *' The law of 1890 was enacted for the American people and the American h(;me. Whatever mistakes were made in it were all made in favor of the occupations and the firesides of the American people. It didn't take away a single day's work from a solitary American workingman. It gave work and wages to all, such as they had never had before. It did it by establishing new and great in- dustries in this country, which increased the demand for the skill and handiwork of our laborers everywhere. It had no friends in Europe. It gave their industries no stimulus. It gave no employment to their labor at the expense of our own. " During more than two years of the administration of President Harrison, and down to its end, it raised all the revenue necessary to pay the vast expenditures of the Government, includijig the interest on the public debt and LIFE OF WILLIAM McKlNLEV. 463 tlje pensions. It never encroached upon the gold reserve, wliich in the past had always been sacredlj^ preserved for the redemption of outstanding paper obligations of the Government. '' During all its operations, down to the cliange and re- versal of its policy by the election of 1892, no man can assert tliat in the industries affected by it wages were too high, althougli they were higher than ever before in this or an}' other country. If any such can be found, I beg that they be named. I challenge the enemies of the law of 1890 to name a single industry of that kind. Further, I assert that in the industries affected b}- that law, which that law fostered no American consumer suffered by the increased cost of any home products that he bought. lie never bought them so low before, nor did he ever enjoy tlio benefit of so much open, free home competition. Neither producer nor consumer, employer or employee, suffered by that law. As Governor. The attack made on the McKinley Act b}^ its free trade enemies, fall of 1890, and before any of its beneficent re- sults could be tabulated and officiallj^ shown, was the most ferocious illogical and deceptive attack in the annals of campaigning. It passions and falsehoods carried down many of the active advocates of the bill. McKinley 's de- feat for the Fifty-second Congress was brought about by a Democratic gerrynumder of his district, which was now made hopelessly Democratic. Yet he lost it by only a paltry majority, though the Democrats centred in its sjjeakers and resources from various States. But what was an irreparable loss to the party and the country proved to be a gain to his State and himself. Sentiment 464 LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. ill Lis State began iniiiiediately to settle on liiin as a can- didate for Governor. Ho would not enter a contest for the honor, but would accept if it came spontaneously. The State Convention was held in June, 1891, There was really but one candidate put in nomination, and that was McKinle}'. His nomination was unanimously made. It was received with applause throughout the State, and the campaign was active and aggressive from the first, on the lines of protection and reciprocity. Mr. McKinley made it a typical "campaign of education," visiting in person eighty-six out of eighty eight counties in the State, and speaking one hundred and thirty times. The Democrats contested every inch of the ground stubbornly, but the people turned to McKinley as to the apostle of the true dispensation, and women and children said he had made protection and tariff plain to them. In that campaign, the first general campaign Mr. McKinley had ever made, he was pronounced the best vote-getter ever seen on the stump in Ohio. He won the admiration of Democrats, as lie won the devotion of Ke])ublicans, and his election by a handsome majority was gratifying to one party, without being a source of bitterness to the rank and file of the other party. As his first term in the Governor's chair drew toward its close he was renomi- nated by acclamation, and after another spirited campaign he was reelected by a majority of more than 80,000, at that time the largest but one in the history of the State. As Governor, Mr. McKinley never forgot that he was the Chief Magistrate, not merely of the party which had elected him, but of the whole State, and he was untiring in his efforts to secure for the whole State a wise, economi- cal and he)norable administration. He tciok great interest in the management of the public institutions ot the State, LIFE OF WILLIAM mckinlp:y. 465 making a special study of ineans for their betterment, and securing many impoi-tant and nuicli-needed reforms. He urged tlie 2)reserving jind improving of the canal system, and ^vas an earnest promoter of the movement for good roads. To the question of tax reform he paid mucli atten- tion, and repeatedly urged its importance upon tlie Legis- lature. Many questions relating to the welfare of work- iiigmen became acute during his administration, and were dealt with by him in a spirit of intelligent sympathy. He had already long been known as an advocate of the eight- Iiour system, and of arbitration as a means of settling dis- putes between employers and employees. It was due to his initiative that the State Board of Arbitration was established in Ohio, and to its successful operation he gave for nearly four years his close personal attention. He made various wise recommendations for legislation for the better protection of life and lind) in industrial pur- suits, and as a result several salutary laws to such effect were put upon the statute book. When destitution and distress prevailed among the miners of the Hocking Valley, he acted with characteristic promptness and de- cision. News that many families were in danger of starv- ing reached him at midnight. Before sunrise he had a carload of provisions on the way to their relief. Many times during his administration the peace of the State was disturbed by unseemly outbreaks i-equiring the a[)plication of the restraining power of the Government. This power Mr. McKiidey exercised with signal firmness and discretion. Fifteen times it was necessary to call out the State troops for the maintenance or restoration of order, but on no occasion was the use of them in any respect oppressive. During the summer of 1894 strikes and other disturbances prevailed, especially on the chief 466 LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. railroad lines, and for three weeks the regiments were on duty, acquitting themselves most creditably for the pro- tection of property and enforcement of the law, without any unnecessar}' harshness toward either j arty to the dis- putes. On two noteworthy occasions desperate efforts were made by ill advised mobs to commit the crime of lynching. Governor JNIcKiule}' promptly used the mili- tary forces of the State to prevent such violence of law and dislionor to the Commonwealth, and showed himself a thorough master of the trying situation. A distinctive feature of the McKinley administration was the absence of red tape and needless formality. In his method of transacting business the Governor was con- cise and direct, and in his intercourse with the people, though dignified, he was always approachable and genial. Access was readily had to him at all reasonable times, and no matter of actual interest ever failed to receive his courteous, prompt and painstaking attention. Personal Appearance and Home Life. ]\Ir. McKinley is five feet, seven inches in height, straight as an arrow, and of full, rotund fignre. Hia mouth is grave and dignified, his lower jaw heavy and firm, his forehead high, broad and full. His eyes are dark and look out keenly from under ample bi'ows. The general cast of his face is pleasant, and it lights up into animated expressiveness when lie smiles, or under the glow of excitement. J lis favorite suit for dress purposes is a double-breasted frock coat and a tall silk hat. His tastes are modest and habits quiet. He enjoys a cigar, but raiely touches strong drinks. He loves the countiy, and enjoys the sight of fine cattle and horses. Before his financial reverses he owned a farm in Colum- LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY. 467 biana County on which he spent part of his leisure time, lie is a charming man to meet at home, on the street, and in a business or political way. His presence is prepossessing, tliough his conversation is not striking nor scintilhiting. lie talks to the p. Logan, Chairman. John F. St. John, Vice Cliairman. I). J. 'lYiOMAS, SecretarN'. A. ^\. Todd, Treasurer. IIelkn M. Gougak. John Lloyd Thomas. R, S. Thompson. National Executive Committee. July 4. 1896. 21 Hon. Mattiip:\v S. Quay. Born at Dillsburg, York co., Pa., September 30, 1833; graduated at /efferson College, 1850; admitted to bar, 1854; elected Trothonotary of Beaver co., 1856 and 1859 ; served in Union army as Colonel of 134th Pennsylvania Volunteers, and as Military State Agent at Washington, Assistant Commissary-General and Chief of Transportation; Military Secretary to Governor of Fenns)lvania, 1861-65; member of Legisla- ture, 1865-67; Secretary of Commonwealth, 1872-78; Chairman of Republican State Committee, 1878-79; Secretary of Commonwealth, 1879- 82 ; elected State Treasurer. 1885 ; elected United States Senator, as Republican, 1886, and again in 1893; Chairman of Republican National Committee during campaign of 1888 ; Chairman of Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, and member of Committees on Appro- priations, Commerce and Epidemic Diseases ; prominent candidate for Presidential nominee in 1896. Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge. Born in Boston, Mass., May 12, 1850; graduated at Harvard, 1871 ; graduated from Harvard Law School, 1875 ; admitted to Sufifolk bar, 1876, but preferred literary pursuits ; served two terms in State Legisla- ture ; elected, as a Republican, to 50th, 51st, 52d and 53d Congresses, to lepresent Sixth Mas-^achusetts District ; elected to U. S. Senate, January 17, 1893, to succeed Hon. Henry L. Dawes; resigned his seat in House and took that in Senate, March 4, 1893; chairman of Committee on Immigration, and member of other important Committees. LB S 20