o o .0 -. .•■J>1,- ""-^ ,•0'" '•■4°-. °, ** I- ^ M4 v\ '\ ^ -O . A - .1 V t.-o^ '■^.A'- JAMl/A'o ^^^<^v A O. O > POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS BY FRANK PRESTON STEARNS THE author's club, LONDON Author of "The Mid-Summer of Italian Art," "The Life and Genius of Nathaniel Hawthorne," "The Real and Ideal in Literature," "The Life of Tintoretto," Etc. BOSTON: RICHARD G. BADGER Toronto: The Copp Clark Co., Limited Copyright 1915, by Richard G Badger All rights reserved The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. JUL 2 1915 ©GI,A401604 INSCRIBED TO HENRY CABOT LODGE A WORTHY SUCCESSOR TO Sumner and Wilson HEROISM Ruby wine is drunk by knaves. Sugar spends to fatten slaves. Rose and vine-leaf deck bufoons. Thunder clouds are Jove's festoons. Drooping oft in wreaths of dread. Lightning -knotted round his head. The hero is not fed on sweets Daily his own heart he eats; Chambers of the great are jails And head-winds right for royal sails. Emerson. PREFACE If there is a science of politics, it must be developed as other sciences have been, by an examination and com- parison of historical data with a view to the discovery of the causes which underlie important political phenomena, — and not, as is too often done, by judging of such phe- nomena according to purely empirical rules. It is equally fallacious to justify political action by its results, or to condemn it on a priori grounds; and it is only by the application of the inductive method that revolutionary periods, like those of Machiavelli and Napoleon, can be properly understood. CONTENTS Politics The Man of Destiny, 11 Napoleonic Mem<:>ries. 52 The Poetic Napoleon 68 Napoleon's Marshals 77 The Waterloo Campaign 87 The Politics of "The Divina Commedia" 101 Machiavelli's "Prince" 110 ' The Ides of March 143 Goethe's Position in Practical Politics 147 Lynch Law 158 Dante's Political Allegory -164' ^'"V Metaphysics Mind and Brain 167 Space and Time 169 Pragmatism 182 POLITICS POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS THE MAN OF DESTINY THE French Revolution raged like an awful conflagration, in which human beings, not buildings, were consumed; and when it had burned to ashes, there stood Napoleon, like a compressed little god of war, the most perfectly developed man of action in modern times. Lord Bacon says, "Augustus Csesar was endowed, if ever man was, with a greatness of mind, calm, serene, and well ordered; witness the exceeding great actions which he conducted in his early youth. " This estimate of Bacon's applies even better to Napoleon than to Augustus ; for the latter, though he showed remark- able judgment and self-command at the time of his uncle's death, was not the general who won the battle of Philippi. It was Mark Anthony who carried the popular party safely through that crisis, and historians have not yet given him sufficient credit for this. The well-known bust of the young Augustus, which is in the Capitoline Museum, bears a resemblance to Napoleon, which all observers notice; but at a later time his head did not develop to such full, 11 12 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS well-rounded capacity. If in addition to the qualities men- tioned by Bacon we make a list of other virtues, such as diligence, punctuality, determination, readiness, versa- tility, correct observation, mental composure, firmness, and courage. Napoleon is one of the few historical char- acters who possessed them all. Then if we add a vivid imagination, a rare inventive faculty, and a ready appre- ciation of fine and beautiful things, we may turn him about and look at him, on every side, without finding a flaw anywhere in him. He seems to be a complete man. If not scrupulously veracious, he had at least a veracious nature; the nature of a man who loves good work in him- self and others. No doubt he was ambitious, but of what sort was his ambition? The quality of ambition, like the quality of love, depends upon the individual. It may lead to the loftiest virtue or the most contemptible vice. Ambition is a plant which requires the sunshine of opportunity. The more rapidly we succeed, the more ambitious we become. In every college class there are men apparently as ambitious as Napoleon was at his military school. Some of them die of it. A cheap ambition for superiority did not belong to him; his was of a more sohd kind. To attempt to penetrate Napoleon's motives by a preconceived opinion of him as an exceptional man, is a vicious method. If we judge him at all, we must suppose him to be actuated by the same motives which actuate other men under like conditions. The early death of his father left him with the responsibihty of providing for four brothers, of whom Lucien alone possessed sufficient talent to make his own way in life. His family, never affluent, were obliged to be exceedingly economical. Under these circumstances a virtuous boy, as Napoleon THE MAN OF DESTINY 13 certainly was, will feel that his first duty is to obtain a foothold in the great world, from which he can hold out a hand to the others. We hear that Napoleon was solemn and taciturn, "prematurely grave," in his youth, and this weight of responsibility is sufficient to account for the fact, without seeking an explanation deduced from the surprising events of his after life. It has even been supposed that he stunted his figure by hard study and exercise at the military school; but at the same time it is certain that he did not injure his health. From the time of his first military success Napoleon's personal ambition is so interwoven with the necessities of his time and of his country that it is impossible to separate one from the other. Perhaps the most remarkable trait in his character is revealed in the fact that his confidence does not appear to have been ever misplaced. He surrounded himself with the most honest men in France, and though he also made use of tricky and unprincipled persons, like Talley- rand and Fouche, he always knew just how far they were to be trusted. When during the hundred days Fouche was playing a double part for his own safety. Napoleon perceived it at once, and let him know that he understood his position, and for that reason was not afraid of him. How are we to account for this clear insight except by a pure love of veracity. It is only that which guides the historian, the philosopher, or the statesman through his work. Penetration is also necessary, but penetration is like a telescope which needs a human will behind it to make it of service. Voltaire had also a penetrating mind, but by no means a profound one. Napoleon was, after all, the one solid entity among the Latin races. For the same reason he was universally trusted. The French 14 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS people clung to him as iron filings are attracted to a magnet. Napoleon's penetrating look has become historical, — ^like that of Alexander of Macedon before him. That it became a habit with him, so that he applied it to both men and women in a manner which often seemed uncivil is not to be denied; but in the confused condition of French affairs after the Revolution, having to deal continually with strange faces, it was the only way in which he could judge of his customer. The objection may be raised that we are describing an ideal man and not the real Napoleon. This is quite true, but without such an ideal there would never have been any real Napoleon as we know him. The real is the ideal Napoleon as conditioned by external events. It was the ideality in him which gave the supernal beauty to his face and illuminates the history that he made; for otherwise he would have been merely a French oflScer, as Bliicher was a Prussian officer, and never a genius and a world hero. Veracity of fact is always superior to veracity of form. It is not uncommon for people to have, and at the same time disregard, such evidence and testimony as are indis- pensable for sound judgment and right action. On the other hand, it is impossible to deal with men on a large scale, particularly in politics, without some faculty of dissimulation, — enough at least to enable us to conceal our thoughts; and Napoleon developed this faculty to such perfection that the ablest diplomats in Europe were not more than a match for this son of Mars, whose only education had been in the art of war. There are men and women whose inclinations follow so closely the lines of the universal laws that ordinarily they are not obliged to exercise much self-control. Napo- THE MAN OF DESTINY 15 leon was one of these: he did everything he undertook in the very best manner, not as a matter of principle, but as Raphael and Titian painted their pictures. He was not only a great soldier, but a great artist; and this perfect freedom of action endowed him with extraordinary power. He could throw all the energy of his nature, without reservation, into each particular act. This separated him by a wide chasm from the ablest men about him, and caused them to look upon him almost as a supernatural personage. In the end, however, it exaggerated his self- confidence almost to the extent of a religious superstition. It was much to Napoleon's advantage — as it was to Hamilton's — that he was born on an island, and of a different race from the one with which he was afterwards identified. He had thus an opportunity in the years of formative intelligence of looking at France from an exter- nal standpoint, and could see the French people more exactly as they were, and are. Metternich remarked that none of the sovereigns of France had understood the French character, or had known how to deal with it so well as Bonaparte. Louis XIV. might say, " I am France ;" but Napoleon, in 1809, could have said, "France, I own it. " He became more and more of a Frenchman as he advanced in life; but was altogether more like an ancient Roman dropped into the nineteenth century. He was particularly fond as a boy of reading Plutarch's Lives; and it can hardly be doubted that he derived his code of morality from that source, although in the most atheistic stage of the French Revolution he remained a stanch Catholic and celebrated mass privately in his chamber when it was dangerous to do so. One of Madame Bona- parte's friends is reported to have spoken of her taciturn son as "one of Plutarch's men." 16 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS No man can escape altogether from the influence of early surroundings. Modern ItaHans are well known to be rather tricky and Corsica has also been noted for its smugglers and even pirates. We sometimes trace the germ of this moral dereliction in Napoleon's method of dealing. He had not more of the lion in his composition than he had of the fox. He won his most decisive battles by tactical tricks which no one had ever thought of before; and his practice of carrying off valuable works of art from conquered cities, in order to give lustre to his administra- tion, reminds one of those plundering Roman generals, whom even the ancients could not justify. Occasionally we perceive an element in him as if the pure brightness of his intellect was momentarily shut out by a cloud. The larger the diamond the more liable it is to some im- perfection. It is necessary to distinguish, however, between the virtues of a retired life, in which there is always leisure to reflect upon the consequences of our conduct, and the life of those who act under continual pressure, and are obliged to decide almost instantaneously on matters of the highest importance. To judge Napoleon by the same standard as Wordsworth, or Emerson, would be an absurdity of logic. It would be hardly just to compare him with Wellington or General Sherman. We should always remember the element into which he was plunged — so young and inexperienced. France in the time of Henry IV. was the centre of civilization; but it had become a civilization rotten at the core. Its condition during the eighteenth century has become pro- verbial, but Spain, Italy, and Portugal were even more demorahzed. In all the Latin races vice was rampant and virtue persecuted; but the vigorous struggle in France THE MAN OF DESTINY 17 between Huguenots and Catholics had helped to preserve the intellectual energy of the French race. Although Protestantism had been crushed out as a popular creed, intellectual freedom continued to survive in the skepticism of Voltaire and the encyclopaedists, while political indiffer- ence tolerated theories of government of the most revolu- tionary character. There were high-minded men in both Spain and Italy, but they lived only to suffer. They were isolated instances, and in neither country was there sufficient vitality left to enact a revolution. When religion becomes separated from morality — and it was just this condition which Martin Luther rebelled against — civiliza- tion has to decline and will continue to do so, until some great physical shock brings the world to its senses, and causes it to realize its true condition. At that time it may fairly be stated that Prussia and some other portions of Germany, with Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Scotland, and the eastern coast of North Ameri- ca were the only nations in a healthy moral condition, — the only countries where the commandments of Moses were respected, and obeyed to any considerable degree. England was in a midway condition between Scotland and France. The body politic of Europe evidently re- quired a surgeon, and Nature, not wishing her favorite race to go to ruin, provided one at the right moment. We read of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, without realizing that a similar course of events has taken place in recent times. There is now a united Italy, and Spain has again obtained a constitutional government, but the Italy of Michel Angelo and the Spain of Cervantes exist no longer. Those nations have gone down as Rome went down before them, and their present influence on the course of civilization is little or 18 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS nothing. France, Germany, and Great Britain are full of intellectual energy, and each has had its complement of great men during the present century. Italy has had two or three, and Spain even less. Italian soldiers fought bravely under Garibaldi, but were everywhere defeated by the Austrians in 1866, from a lack of competent com- manders; and the same incompetency was conspicuously apparent in the late contest between Spain and the United States. Men of superior character and nobility are to a nation what lighthouses are to the seacoast. It is a saddening investigation to trace the degradation of Italian art and architecture from the pure, refined taste of the fifteenth century, and the noble magnificence of the sixteenth, through various transitions of demoraliza- tion and reaction, until the series finally ends in the middle of the eighteenth century with what might be called a stony grin of horror. In the immediate vicinity of the ducal palace at Venice, there is a head carved on the base of a tower dedicated to St. Mary the Beautiful, which Ruskin thus describes: "A head, — huge, inhuman, and monstrous, — leering in bestial degradation, too foul to be either pictured or described, or to be gazed at for more than an instant: yet let it be endured for that instant; for in that head is embodied the type of the evil spirit to which Venice was abandoned in the fourth period of her decline. " Similar monstrosities are to be met with in Rome and other Italian cities, and the funereal monuments in the churches, of that period; and if not so indecent are equally frivolous and distasteful. What more fitting prognostic could there be of a great social upheaval. The concluding lines of Byron's tragedy of "Marino Faliero" repeat the same evidence, — a picture of social conditions which we THE MAN OF DESTINY 19 shudder to contemplate. When Napoleon arrived before Venice with his army, a feeble revolution took place in his favor within the city; so feeble that it might be compared to the impotent struggles of a paralytic, but it served to indicate the popular impulse of the time. Napoleon made an end of the decrepit old republic, and almost immedi- ately its inhabitants doubled in number. It was like a surgeon lancing an ulcer. His disposing of the city after- wards to the Austrians as a make-weight in the negotiations for peace is not so creditable to him, but it is not likely that he would have done this if it had been avoidable. It has been supposed that Spanish dominion was the ruin of Italy; but cities like Milan and Florence that were under foreign government were more flourishing, and preserved a better morale than Venice and Rome. After the revolution came the virtuous, weak sentimentality of Canova and the Italian opera, and in France the mild, negative conservatism of Chateaubriand. The world had begun to realize its wickedness, and was making a laudable but not very earnest effort to behave itself again. Previous to Napoleon, the whole continent of Europe was covered with an iron network of institutions derived from the feudal system, which were as unsuitable to modern modes and customs as the armor of the Black Prince would have been for General Grant. The human race was not only spiritually miserable, but its limbs were fettered. Society in the feudal system was like an army in winter cantonments. Warfare, though not so deadly nor carried on so extensively as at present, was almost perpetual, so that subordination and military discipline prevailed every- where. Now, an officer in an army can strike a soldier, and, if he does it without sufficient cause, the latter has a 20 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS chance of redress by applying to his superior officer; but if a private soldier strikes an officer, the latter has a right to shoot him. This is necessary for military subordina- tion; but apply it to civil affairs and what a condition of things you will have. Voltaire was beaten by a French lord as any slave might have been; but when he attempted to obtain redress he was imprisoned for several months to cure his insolence. Even in England a hundred years ago there was no law which could compel a nobleman to pay debts contracted to merchants or professional men. The revolutions of the seventeenth century had mitigated the evil largely in Great Britain; as did the law reforms of Frederick in Prussia, and the reforms of Joseph II. in Austria. It was accordingly these three nations which formed the barrier against the extension of French influence under Napoleon. Heroes do not always appear when they are needed, nor do they fit exactly the places which are assigned to them. There are periods in history in which human affairs seem to be given over to the sport of circumstances, and a blind, deaf fate mocks all efforts to discover a rational sequence of events. There are other periods which seem to be in the care of a supernatural guidance; when events take place as if according to a prearranged plan, and great men appear unexpectedly to play their parts in them, as actors come out from behind the scenery of a theatre. Of the former sort, the Italian leagues of the fifteenth century and the thirty years' war in Grer- many are conspicuous examples: of the latter are the struggle of the American colonies for independence, and the consulate and empire in France. Napoleon's mission in life was to knock the feudal system in the head. Julius Csesar is the only famous man with whom we can compare him. They are the two greatest soldiers in THE MAN OF DESTINY 21 history, and at the same time great lawgivers, writers, and revolutionists. Wendell Phillips said, " Caesar crossed the Rubicon borne in the arms of a people trodden into the dust by a cruel and rapacious oligarchy;" and the world is generally coming to that opinion. It was exactly the same spirit which animated the soldiers of Napoleon in his two Italian campaigns; but the difference was that in his case the oligarchy was without France instead of within it. All the kings of Europe were banded together in support of hereditary privilege, and this "little cor- poral" stood forth as the champion of character and virtue. It was Thor again fighting the giants. Carlyle calls him "the champion of democracy," but that is not likely. As an army officer he would naturally have more confidence in subordination as a political principle than in equal rights. He was, however, the champion of justice, and of equality for all classes before the law. Wherever he went with his battalions he ap- peared as a political reformer, — a reorganizer in the inter- est of public morality; and this accounts partly for the marvelous success of his early campaigns. The rank and file of the enemy looked upon him as a liberator, and actually wished for his success. The French fought for a cause, but the Austrians fought because they had no alternative. Napoleon was a hero in Vienna itself, and Beethoven had already dedicated a symphony to him when the news came that he had crowned himself at Fon- tainebleau. If Napoleon had died before that event, would he not have been considered one of the noblest heroes of all time? A government that will endure the storms of history must be rooted like the oak. It must have its beginning far back in the records of the nation, and be endeared to the hearts of the people. It must grow underground, as 22 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS it were, before it comes to the surface. The federal Con- stitution of the United States was a natural outcome from the colonial governments which preceded it; and these were derived, with some simple modifications, from the municipal and constitutional governments of England. Such was not the case with the French Directory. It had no historical basis, but was merely a temporary structure raised upon the ruins of the old French monarchy. The people of France were not accustomed to it. It was not suited to their character and they distrusted it. It was vicious and ineffective. Our foreign ambassadors soon discovered what unprincipled men were elected to the Directory. " Mirabeau, " said Napoleon, "was a rascal, but a very smart one. There were as great rascals as he on the Directory with me, but they were not half so smart." The mercantile class distrusted the Directory from a lack of faith in its continued existence: the poorer classes dis- trusted it on account of its impersonal character. A fre- quent change of rulers has its advantages, but it greatly lessens executive responsibility. A reaction against the Directory was inevitable, and it would have taken place much sooner but for the bad diplomacy of Pitt and the Austrian minister, Thugut. The wars that resulted from this diplomacy in fact prevented just what the Austrian and English governments wished to accomplish. But for the brilliant campaigns of Moreau and Napoleon it is highly probable that the Bourbon family would have been reseated on the throne of France before the close of the century. The course of history sometimes depends on a single will. About the year 1800 two counter-revolutions took place, of opposite tendencies; one in France and the other in the United States. Let us suppose that Napoleon was ambi- tious to become dictator. The fact makes little diflference. THE MAN OF DESTINY 23 It was inevitable that he should become dictator whether he wished it or not. The Romans were the most practical people of antiquity, and none more jealous of absolute power; and they knew well enough what they were doing when in times of public danger they vested the supreme authority in a single person. On Napoleon's return from Egypt he found the government of his country equally bankrupt in money and reputation; commerce was ruined; and the armies of the republic defeated and demoralized. There was hardly more than one opinion: that he was the only man who could save the state in this emergency. The result justified the measure: for no sooner had Na- poleon been placed at the head of affairs than his electric energy penetrated to the most distant provinces and into every department of public activity. With incredible quickness the treasury was filled, trade revived, fresh armies equipped, and the right man was everywhere found in his proper place. After the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, Na- poleon was confronted by even greater difficulties. There was a political organization in France, but otherwise the social fabric was everywhere disordered. The early re- formers of the Revolution, especially the Girondists, might be compared to the alchemist in Hawthorne's fable who killed his wife in attempting to remove her birthmark. They desired to abolish a debased govern- ment, a superannuated religion, intolerable class distinc- tions, and social disabilities; and for the time being they quite destroyed government, religion, and good society. Alison, a historian more just to Napoleon than some later ones, says of France in 1801, "Not only had the throne been overturned, the nobility exiled, and the landed estates confiscated; but the institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education were almost annihilated. Even 24 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS the establishments of charity had shared in the general wreck; the monastery no longer dispensed its munificence to the poor, and the doors of the hospitals were closed against the indigent sick and wounded." Napoleon per- ceived that before he could govern France he must obtain the co-operation of church and school. There is nothing that a statesman dreads like interfering in questions of religion; and many who have done so have lost their lives in consequence. Napoleon, however, re- stored Catholicism, which was the only practical course to pursue, at a single stroke. The skepticism of Voltaire had culminated in the nihilism of Paine and the atheism of Robespierre, and a strong reaction had set in. If Napoleon had attempted to introduce Protestantism as a national faith, the French people would have become divided into hostile camps, and would have fallen an easy prey to their enemies. As it happened, there was strong opposition in high places to Napoleon's course. Moreau, who was the Pompey of his time, set himseK against it, and ungraciously refused to attend the first mass which was celebrated by the new government in Notre Dame. He may have been more enlightened than Napoleon, but he was not so wise — not so patriotic. The true patriot knows by a sense of tact and instinct what is best to be done in such cases. Napoleon next restored the time-honored names of the months and days of the week, for which revolutionary epithets had been substituted. This he accomplished by a single edict, and thereby won much credit for himself from all parts of the world. He next recalled a hundred and fifty thousand exiles who had been hving in England and Germany since 1793, many of them in great destitu- tion. He could not restore their confiscated estates to them, though it cannot be doubted that they deserved a THE MAN OF DESTINY 25 partial indemnity; but he conciliated them as much as possible in other ways. He restored good society by recognizing those informal but sensible distinctions of classes such as we respect in America; and, if his state receptions were not so brilliant as those of Louis XIV., they had at least a superior moral tone. Napoleon's own conversation was delightful; the plain sense and simple grandeur of his ideas captivated everybody; though his methods of preserving decorum in the drawing-room, and in his own household, were sometimes too much like those of the camp. When his face grew dark, everybody shivered, not knowing where the lightning would strike; but his reprimands were always well deserved, and on the whole salutary. It was his way of keeping order. His brothers enjoyed a larger share of this than others, yet they do not appear to have been much afraid of him. We cannot but admire the clearness of judgment, resolution, and decision, by which he effected these radical changes. During the First Consulate, the French govern- ment securities nearly trebled in value; and the only question asked was, "How could this prosperity be main- tained and made continuous. " Napoleon was only thirty- two, and his fame was like that of Alexander. It is stated that when Beethoven heard that Napoleon had obtained for himself the office of life-consul, with power of nominat- ing a successor, he cast the score of his heroic symphony on the floor and allowed it to remain there for some days. Napoleon's usurpation, as it has been called by his enemies, has always been considered by republicans a severe blow to liberal institutions; but if we compare it with Cromwell's treatment of the British Parliament, we find similar under- lying causes in both instances. There was the same division of opinion and uncertainty in the councils of the republican leaders in France as that which embarrassed 26 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS Cromwell so much in managing the affairs of the Puritan party. In both cases there was a strong military pressure behind the usurper; and a strong external need of concen- tration. Subsequent events proved that Cromwell's life could only be safe by pursuing the course he adopted, and we may suspect as much in regard to Napoleon. The repetition of such events in history would seem to indicate that they were unavoidable. No man could have suc- ceeded in elevating himself to Napoleon's position through personal ambition alone. As in Caesar's case, it was necessary to have a strong political party behind him; and to this end it was essential that he should assimilate himself to the aims and purposes of his party. Not only the French army wished for the life-consulship, but a large majority of the French people wished it, — as was proved by the vote that was taken in ratification of the change of government. Napoleon must have been gratified by this expression of public confidence, but, like every great con- structor, he naturally desired to see the work he had be- gun carried to its completion; and this was even of more importance to him than honor. If at the close of two years Napoleon had resigned the consulship, which was really a dictatorship,* and the Direc- tory had again come into power, what would have been the consequences? What condition would France have been in to withstand the next coaUtion of England, Austria, and Russia? Every aristocrat in Europe was determined to crush out the dangerous French innovation. It is not likely that Napoleon would have found a place in the Directory. He had proved his superiority to all of the Frenchmen in public life; such superiority as is more dangerous to the possessor than to others. He might *I have since found that Napoleon gave the same explanation to Count Las Cases. THE MAN OF DESTINY 27 have been exiled or even put to death. If the sole con- sulship survived, Moreau would probably have been elected in Napoleon's place. In 1800 Napoleon placed Moreau in command of the best army that France possessed, and went to the Marengo campaign with a greatly inferior force. Is it likely that Moreau, who was afterward implicated in the conspiracy of Cadoadal, would have treated Napoleon with equal magnanimity? It is more probable that Moreau would have stood in the way of Napoleon's employment in any position where he might have a chance to distinguish himself. The best evidence of this is, that he afterwards fought against his own country, in the army of the Tsar of Russia, which can only be accounted for on the ground of a deep-seated animosity toward Napoleon.* Perhaps the best excuse for Napoleon's course at that time was the codification of French law in the interest of equality and universal justice. He felt especial interest in this work, which has survived his battles, and embodied the best fruits of the French Revolution. The codifica- tion was almost too hastily accomplished, — for it was a work of years, — and could only have been performed under the supervision of a single mind. After the Code Napoleon had been adopted, it was still necessary that it should be sustained in practice until the legal profession should become accustomed to it. Otherwise, a sudden revolution of the most fickle people in Europe might have overturned the whole structure of revolutionary jurisprudence and left it sticking in the mire of reform. The change from life-consul to emperor was little more than a nominal one. Napoleon's power remained the *Napoleon twice treated Moreau with exceptional magnanimity; and Moreau was killed at Dresden in consequence of an order given by Na- poleon himself. 28 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS same, but it was surrounded by more formality and court etiquette. He was virtually emperor already, and it was better on many accounts that he should be recognized by the proper title. He was not a man to care for names but for realities. Before he returned from Egypt he wrote to his brother, "At twenty-nine, I am already tired of glory. " It is certain that the etiquette of court life was distasteful to him. He repeated this several times, adding that elaborate ceremonies were not becoming to a soldier. The enlightened government of the future should be a rational republicanism; a republicanism foimded not so much on the rights of the individual as on duties to the state ; and it would have been well if Napoleon could have resigned his dictatorship, and assisted with his wise head in framing a constitutional government which would have united the best qualities of the Roman, the English, and the American. Such an effort of his genius would be more pleasant to contemplate than the long list of his battles now carved on the Arc de Triomphe. This, how- ever, was not to be; educated in the army instead of in the law, his inclination undoubtedly favored a more military form of government. If such a plan crossed his mind, we may suppose that he dismissed it. There is always a tendency to imperialism in democracy, and of this he was ready enough to take advantage. It is only in the high tides, or rather in the smooth waters of civilization, that republican governments have proved to be possible; usual- ly in communities favored by their geographical position. Whether such could have succeeded in France at the beginning of the nineteenth century is problematic and could only be proved by experiment. We can thank our isolated position in America for what was accomplished here in 1787; accomphshed by the mighty exertions of men THE MAN OF DESTINY 29 trained and educated in English constitutional history. It is safe to conclude that a slight external pressure at that time would have prevented the adoption of our con- stitution; and, indeed, such adoption was seriously threat- ened by consideration of the slaveholder's interest. There were in Napoleon's day not less than five political parties in France, and of these the one which corresponded most nearly to our Federalists counted the smallest number of votes. To the confusion of the revolutionary period there had s\icceeded a confusion of opinions. In the public mind there is always uncertainty and indecision; and the general public naturally turned for help to the man who had a mind of his own, and was never found vacillating. The problem of the hour was whether or no poor human nature was to be crushed again beneath the juggernaut of aristocratic privilege. Napoleon foresaw that this was to be fought out in a long and bloody conflict, and he pre- pared himseK for the coming struggle. According to the Peace of Amiens, which followed the French victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, Napoleon was to withdraw his forces from Switzerland and Italy; and the British government on its part promised to restore Cape Colony in Africa to Holland and the island of Malta to the Knights of St. John, from whom it had been treach- erously pirated. Malta, however, was an important strategic position for the British cruisers, and possession of the Cape of Good Hope secured the maritime highway to India; so that public opinion in England was strongly averse to having the conditions of the treaty carried into effect; although Fox and the Liberals were anxious for peace, and considered that the pledges of the treaty ought to be kept. Having waited a reasonable time, therefore, and finding that the British cabinet had no intention of 30 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS acting in good faith with him, Napoleon marched his troops back into Switzerland and Piedmont and took possession again. This action was made an excuse at Westminster for the renewal of hostilities; and it was at this time that Napoleon used that celebrated phrase to the English ambassador, "France may be destroyed, but she cannot be intimidated." The true cause of the war lay much deeper. Ever since the time of the Tudors it had been a tradition of English foreign politics that the possession of the Low Countries by a strong power would be dangerous to English independence. Napoleon also recognized this when he said, " Antwerp is a sword pointed at the throat of England;" that is, at the mouth of the Thames. It is true that Napoleon was in no wise responsible for the annexation of Belgium or the French protectorate in Holland, but he would have considered it cowardly, as the great mass of the French people would, to have surrendered those conquests. It would have been considered a base desertion of the Dutch and Belgian democrats. The same was true of northern Italy. Even if Napoleon had been willing to return to the ancient boundaries of France for the sake of peace and the balance of power, it is not likely that this would have availed much. In the temper of the French people at that time, excited as they were with a rose-colored enthusiasm of reforming the whole world, it could only have resulted in Napoleon's overthrow, and transferring the reins of government to less capable or less practical hands. Even Napoleon's life would not have been safe imder such conditions. He had to go on in the course which destiny had prescribed for him, and was actually safer on the battlefield than he would have been in Paris, if he had pursued the policy which so many historians have since prescribed as the THE MAN OF DESTINY 31 proper course for him. He recognized this himself, and frequently alluded to it; but few of those about him, and still fewer afterwards were able to comprehend what he meant. He was like a man between two fires, and this situation explains the apparent recklessness with which he often acted.* In the coming struggle the French people were not only obliged to contend against the fossilized principles of mediaeval Europe, but against the living and highly active principle of the balance of power, and the still more im- portant principle of national independence. Did Napoleon realize the task that was before him? Did he realize that his enemies could not conclude a lasting peace so long as Holland and western Germany were practically united to France? No word ever escaped him from which we can infer that he understood this supreme law of modern international politics. Great actors in the world's drama do not look too far ahead or consider too curiously. The practical statesman turns from one object to another, seizing always the one that is most prominent and im- portant. Great events in those times pressed upon one another so rapidly that men acted as it were from instinct, and had hardly time to exercise forethought. The German view of Napoleon is that he was an instrument in the hands of fate, and like Michel Angelo (whose Christ in the Last Judgment resembles him) built better "than he knew." Napoleon's motives may not have been philan- thropic; he may have desired the extension of French interests more than the cause of equal rights, and his per- sonal or family interests may have often obscured higher objects in his mind. All we can say is that he pursued a *Yet the French are the yeast of Europe and their heroic actions rival those of the Greeks and Romans. 32 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS well-defined course in a consistent manner, and should receive credit for doing so.* When a military genius is bom on a throne, or like Cromwell obtains possession of one, the rest of the world may well look out for itseK. If Napoleon had been ham- pered by an Aulic council like that at Vienna, or had been tied to a modem English ministry by submarine cables, he might not have accomplished so very much. It was certainly fortunate for the fame of Nelson and Wellington that they were able to act in as independent a manner as Napoleon himself. He often profited by the mistakes of his adversaries, but it was more frequently the simple grandeur of his ideas that defeated them. He calculated his plans so exactly and carried them out to such minute perfection that if it had not been for the disasters of his Russian expedition, it is difficult to see how he could ever have been overcome; but it might have happened in some other manner, a stray bullet, or perhaps a fall from his horse. The man who ruined him was the unknown person who planned the burning of Moscow. That was a catas- trophe which he had never thought of, and from that hour his fall was certain. His military movements have been criticised of late even by his admirers; but too much, I think, according to the methods of our own time. Napoleon does not appear to me like a gambler in war, as M. Thiers and Mr. Ropes are pleased to call him. Those who have suggested *This and the foregoing statements concerning Napoleon's interference in German affairs are fully supported by the best German historians. Menzel's is, I believe, the only one yet translated into English, and it is not first-rate, but his evidence is the more valuable because he belongs to that class of German writers who have strong anti-Gallic sentiments. He fumes over the French occupation of western Germany, but he admits that Napoleon's government was just, and his reforms highly beneficial. THE MAN OF DESTINY 33 that in the campaign of 1805 he hazarded his communica- tions to an attack in the rear from the Prussians, are not so well informed as Napoleon was as to the condition of the Prussian army. A year later Napoleon writes to his brother, "The preparations that Prussia is making for war are ridiculous." In 1805 Prussia was in no condition to interfere with Napoleon. It is true that he would have been defeated at Marengo but for the fortunate arrival of Desaix, and Kellermann's brilliant charge; but it was Napoleon who secreted Keller- mann in the vineyard, and he evidently detached Desaix to march on a parallel road so that he might fall on the enemy's flank as soon as he heard the sound of the cannon. It was an agreement like that between Blucher and Wel- lington at Waterloo, and equally successful. He took too large risks, perhaps, in his last German campaign, but the result could hardly have been other than it was, and the habit of playing a bold game had become fixed upon him. During his captivity Napoleon often talked the matter over with his_ companions, but never could see how the campaign might have ended successfully. Whatever special talent his adversaries possessed, that Napoleon had also. He was in himself equal to all the other generals in Europe. Wellington may have matched him in handling troops on the battlefield; but Wellington added nothing to the art of war, and as a strategist was not even equal to Marmont. He had rare foresight and In regard to the war of 1809, he flatly contradicts the statements of English historians who allege that it was forced by Napoleon. He states that it originated in an attempt by the Austrian government to excite an uprising against Napoleon in central Germany, but this only resulted in a few isolated outbreaks. He considers Napoleon the greatest hero of modern times. See the American edition, pp. 1459, 1471, 1472, 1482, 1492, 1511, 1515. 34 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS made a brave defense in Portugal; but he was afraid to face Massena in the open field, and accomplished little in Spain until Napoleon had withdrawn all the forces that could be spared from the peninsula. Bliicher was as bold and swift as Wellington was slow and cautious; but in other respects the two were much alike. He defeated Napoleon at Laon in 1814, — it is true with a superior army, — and he saved the battle of Leipsic for the allies, as he did afterward at Waterloo. Next to Napoleon, the model soldier of the time was the Archduke Charles of Austria. His campaign of 1809 was on both sides the most brilliant and bravely fought of the present century. The series of actions from Eck- muhl to Ratisbon, extending over a space of ten miles, was such as only two commanders could perform who perfectly understood each other. The Archduke, though defeated, is admitted to have displayed great military skill; and in the battle of Essling, which followed soon after, he had much the best of the game, although the sudden rising of the Danube prevented reinforcements from reaching the French army. Wagram was one of the most equal conflicts ever fought. There were ninety thousand men on either side, and the level plain of the Mayfield gave no advantage of position to one party or the other. Napoleon was victorious by means of an invention which had never before been thought of, and which I believe has not been used since. He advanced his cannon against the enemy's centre almost like a charge of cavalry, — a movement which could only have succeeded on perfectly level ground. It is a mistake to suppose that Napoleon was lavish of the lives of his soldiers. On the contrary, he was as careful of them as possible. He overran both Austria and Prussia with a loss of something like ten thousand THE MAN OF DESTINY 35 men. The desperate struggles of 1809, 1813, and 1815 caused a frightful loss of life to both sides; but there was no help for it, and strange as it may seem, nobody was to blame for this. The Italian nationalists who supported Victor Emman- uel and Garibaldi have admitted that Italy was never so well governed before as under Napoleon's viceroy; though particular cities like Florence and Venice had been better governed. The numerous uprisings in Spain and Italy during the Restoration between 1820 and 1848 all had for their object constitutional government and a return to the Code Napoleon. The enlightened princes of south- western Germany, as well as the Duke of Weimar, adopted the same platform of their own accord. The same in- fluences prevailed even in Portugal after many turns of fortune and an obstinate struggle with the nobles and clergy. Napoleon's conquests were so beneficial that they were even of advantage to countries which he treated most severely. There is no evidence that he wished to make war against Prussia. It was not for his interest to do so. He could fight England, Austria, and Russia together, but he foresaw if Prussia were added to these three powers the struggle might be too much for him. The Prussians, however, were in a vainglorious state of mind, such as the French were in 1870. The passage of Napoleon's army across an outlying piece of their territory was not a sufficient offense of which to make a casus belli. The truth appears to have been that they were jealous of French victories and wished for a trial of skill with the great conqueror. Napoleon certainly treated Prussia with great severity, but the chastisement was not without favorable results. It enabled Chancellor Stein to enact the liberation of the serfs, and to settle the land question in a manner greatly to the advantage of the 36 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS common people. It is supposed that Frederick the Great wished also to make these changes, but was deterred from doing so on account of the opposition of his army officers, who mostly belonged to the nobility. The present vigor- ous and healthy condition of Prussia is owing in no small measure to the catastrophe of Jena.* Napoleon was also the liberator of Poland, and, in spite of his severe military exactions, his all too brief dominion there was looked upon as an oasis in the long dreary desert of Russian absolutism. His government was not despotic, for everything was done according to law, and the capable Poles who took service under him found their merits appreciated as quickly as if they had been born Frenchmen. The burning of Moscow was a greater misfortime to Poland than the burning of Warsaw would have been. It appears to have been during the Prussian campaign of 1806 that Napoleon first conceived the idea of obtaining peace by universal dominion. This, however, would have been a positive misfortune to mankind, and it brought him into conflict with two political principles, which he could bend with his superhuman strength, but could not break; so that they finally recoiled against him and cast him from his throne. These were nationality, and the balance of power. To quote Hegel again, — and no one is better worth quoting, — "It was against the rock of German nationality that Napoleon shattered himself. " He might have added also English and Spanish nationality. It has become a fixed idea in the minds of a majority of men that a people speaking the same language, of a common origin, and common customs, have a right to a government of their *See Professor Seeley's biography of Von Stein. THE MAN OF DESTINY 37 own. It is a principle which has been centuries in develop- ing, but has acquired great power. The heart of humanity is in sympathy with it. Consider what it has accom- plished since 1820. Belgium has become independent, and so have Servia and Bulgaria. Schleswig and Holstein have been united with Germany, and Germany has become united in itself. The Hungarians have obtained all the independence they require, and Italy has become inde- pendent and united. It was more this feeling that caused the independence of the American colonies than any decided misgovernment on the part of England. The only exception to it has been the separation from France of Alsace and Lorraine, whose inhabitants were originally German, but had become Gallic through a long period of French government. There were two causes which may have prevented Napo- leon from recognizing the right of nationality. In the first place, he was without a country of his own. He had adopted France and become identified with it; but his father emigrated to Corsica at a time when there was a bitter feeling on the island against the French, and Corsica was not enough of itself to make a fatherland. In the second place, from his early youth until middle life the classes in all adjacent nations were so divided against one another as for the time being almost to sup- press the feeling for nationality. As these disputes, how- ever, became finally adjusted, the love of one's own country rose superior to the admiration for French liberalism, and introduced into the affairs of Europe a new element on which the great magician had not sufficiently counted. Napoleon's enemies have always enumerated among his imaginary crimes the removal of the king of Spain in favor of his brother Joseph. Now, in reality to put an end to such an effeminate, mendacious, and altogether 38 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS disgraceful race as the line of Spanish sovereigns, from Philip II. downward, was an act of beneficent manliness, for which not only Spain, but all other nations ought to have been thankful. Professor Seeley says : " The adminis- tration of Spain had long been in the contemptible hands of Manuel Godoy, supposed to be the queen's lover, yet at the same time high in the favor of King Charles IV. Ferdinand, the heir apparent, headed an opposition; but in character he was not better than the trio he opposed, and he had lately been put under arrest on suspicion of designs upon his father's life." A precious family this, truly, and one better suited to a house of correction than a palace. The overthrow of Nero was not more perfectly deserved, but Napoleon's peremptory method offended the national pride of the Spanish people. They felt that their rights as an independent state had been trampled on; and the classes that would have been chiefly benefited by the change were the foremost to revolt and showed the most bitter opposition to it. Insurrections broke out all over the country, and this lack of savoir faire gave Napoleon more trouble and cost him more lives than ten years of warfare with England. The explanation of his severe treatment of Prussia is simple enough. He said he* had "no ill-will against Prussia; but if he could not remain at peace with her it was necessary to crush her." He reduced the Prussian army to twenty thousand men, ruined the commerce of the country, and joined its eastern provinces to the king- dom of Westphalia. He had not counted, however, on Prussian nationality. In 1813 the people rose to a man, and the nobles pawned their jewels for a war contribution. They fought with the same desperation as the French did in '95, and with even more stubbornness. Wherever Napoleon was not present in person his troops were THE MAN OF DESTINY 39 defeated, and for the first time he discovered the differ- ence between a heterogeneous empire and a substantial nationahty. No less important a principle is the balance of power. Without this no country would feel safe from the attacks of its neighbors. It is difficult enough to keep the peace at any time between two or more rival nations, each with its national prejudices, jealousies, and material interest; but without the balance of power peace would be almost impossible. Witness the hundred years of warfare between England and France in the time of the Plantagenet kings. Such purposeless, indiscriminate fighting would not be permitted at the present day. The chief distinction be- tween the politics of modern Europe and those of the Grseco-Roman world consists in this principle. Universal domination means political stagnation, the decline of civilization, and barbarian conquest. The supremacy of France in Europe, even of a French republic, or the supremacy of any single nation, would be an international misfortune. Among a family of nations, though there may be contention and ill feeling, there is also that inde- pendence of character and interchange of ideas which give moral good health. We need the Englishman for his manliness, the German for his sincerity and depth of feeling, and the Frenchman for his social virtues. It has been the very capstone of Bismarck's diplomacy that, after having seriously disturbed the balance of power in Europe, he was able to reconstruct it again on a firmer and more rational basis than before. It is far from pleasant to have to take sides against such a magnificent man as Napoleon; but in the end we are obliged to do this. He carried matters to such an extreme that the minds of all men were in a state of tension, so that they felt they could endure it no longer. Like 40 POLITICS A^D METAPHYSICS many another statesman, he was right in the beginning, but wrong at the close of his career. Even his partisans in France felt this. It seemed as if the iron network of feudalism, which Napoleon had shattered, had been forged again into a massive chain, which was twisted about the whole of Europe, and was crushing out all freedom of action and cheerful human activity. Carlyle, then a student at Edinburgh, felt it with his keen, artistic sensi- bility, and described in his old age how people woke up at the fall of Napoleon as if from a hideous nightmare. Na- poleon never perceived it himself; he had become too much of a partisan; and perhaps could hardly distinguish his own interests from those of his country. With all his breadth of mind and clear penetration, he never could place himself in the position of his adversaries. I do not suppose any man could do it. He continued to the end fighting the Russians and Prussians and Austrians in his own mind. The Russian campaign of 1812 was Napoleon's first aggressive movement — if we except his occupation of Spain — and the only one for which he can fairly be blamed. Dr. Ropes brings forward evidence to prove that the Tsar Alexander was meditating war and acting in a manner hostile to his agreement with Napoleon, but it does not seem likely that Alexander would have gone to war of his own accord until he could have obtained the support of Austria and perhaps of Prussia also.* Napoleon's ostensi- ble complaint was that the Russian government permitted the importation of English merchandise contrary to Na- poleon's embargo. This is probable enough, but it was much for Napoleon's interest that it should have been *Menzel states, however, that the Russian campaign was caused by Alexander's demand for the duchy of Warsaw, and his accumulation of heavy forces on the PoUsh frontier. THE MAN OF DESTINY 41 permitted. Although there had not been since 1805 any- direct commercial relations between England and France, an immense smuggling traffic had been carried on by way of Belgium, because Frenchmen wanted their coffee and other tropical products, and Englishmen were equally anxious for a supply of silks and brandy. The traffic that was carried on through Russia between 1810 and 1812 was of a similar character and served to content people on the continent of Europe with the existing political order. Green and other English historians have vainly imagined that Napoleon's object was to humiliate their country; but Napoleon's mind was too practical and his nature too magnanimous for such idle folly. Metternich spoke of it as the va hanque of a gambler whose head has been turned by unlimited successes. At the same time, when consulted by the Emperor Francis in regard to the probable issue of the campaign, he expressed no doubt that Napoleon would accomplish his object whatever that might be; and it is well that those who look upon it now as a foolhardy enterprise should remember this. I do not know that Napoleon at any time gave an explanation of his reasons for it, but we may gather them from casual observations made at St. Helena. He told Dr. O'Meara, in a discourse on Poniatowski, that he intended to have made him king of Poland. This casts light on the subject at once. If Poland could be reorganized under French protection, perhaps with boundaries more extended than ever before, and with the Code Napoleon and a land reform to satisfy the cravings of the Polish people, it would form a strong- hold in the east of Europe, on which the French emperor could always rely for diplomatic support in peace and military assistance in war. It would be a breakwater against Russian aggression, and a military post in the rear of Austria and Prussia. Such a government would prob- 42 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS ably have satisfied the aspirations of the Poles for inde- pendence, and would have been a very great advantage to them. This evidently was Napoleon's plan, and if he had succeeded in realizing it, it is difficult to imagine how his enemies could ever have gotten the better of him.* That Napoleon did not anticipate the burning of Moscow is certain. He confessed that he never thought of it; and it was perhaps the only large city in Europe that could have been destroyed in that manner. It was composed chiefly of wooden houses, and the weather of northern Russia is subject to severe northwest winds which blow from three to four days at a time. Such a conflagration could not have happened in Paris or London. The fire engines were of a primitive description, and had all been cut so that even Napoleon's army was unable to stop the conflagration. He described it as the grandest and most terri|ble sight that he had ever witnessed. The burning of Moscow was the last desperate resort of the Russian government to drive Napoleon from the country. In this it succeeded, but in the natural order of events it would not have caused serious injury to the French army, nor would it have prevented Napoleon from opening a vigorous campaign on the Polish frontier the following spring; and considering the immense destruction of property, it was doubtful if the Russian cause would on the whole have been improved by it. It was the pre- mature and unprecedented cold during the French retreat which so nearly destroyed the grande armee. The French soldiers left their ranks, and wandered into farmhouses, where they were easily captured by the Russians. "In one night, " says Napoleon, " I lost forty thousand horses. " *Menzel gives important evidence on this score, but his own reflec- tions are neither judicious nor impartial. Pp. 1563-1565. THE MAN OF DESTINY 43 After this the cannon had to be left to the enemy, the cavalry was dismounted, and the rear of Napoleon's army was left unprotected. Multitudes were frozen to death, and the wonder is that any escaped to tell the tale. Yet when they reached the Beresina, one of the broadest rivers of Europe, Napoleon was equal to the occasion, and so manoeuvred as to deceive the Russian generals, and effect a passage. He still remained equal to himself, but fate was against him. Fortune, which had always favored him thus far, even in the chances of escaping death on so many battlefields, now smiled on him no longer. It was as if the hand of destiny had set a mark beyond which he could not go; and although this included the suffering of millions, perhaps it was best that it should be so. The pendulum of reform and revolution had swung too far, and th,irty years of conservatism were needed to counter- balance it. Napoleon had no chance after 1812, but the Russians also suffered so severely that during the follow- ing campaign they were able to accomplish little, and but for the assistance of the Prussians must have been driven out of Germany. In 1813 Napoleon won his first three battles, with raw levies scarce twenty years of age. His downfall was a most terribly magnificent spectacle. Though he appears so hard-hearted, he really loved his men, and the loss of his army in Russia was like a perpetual bereavement. Still more keenly did he feel the immola- tion of his old veterans at Waterloo. No wonder he said to Fouche, on his last return to Paris, "Do not tell me to dare; I have dared too much already." What could be more tragical than his last look at France (as we may fancy it), from the deck of the Northumberland! What more pathetic than his memoirs ! A voice from St. Helena warning Europe to beware of its two great dangers; the "red cotton night-cap, " and the monstrous semi-barbarous 44 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS power of Russia — two great avalanches ready to descend on civilization. This supreme man of action wasting away on a sultry tropical island! Certainly Csesar was more fortunate to fall at the base of Pompey's statue. For a time it seemed as if, after filling the world with confusion for twenty years, he had disappeared and left no result behind him. Europe needed rest in which to recup- erate from her wounds, and this could only come through a strong conservative reaction. The despotism of Met- ternich and the Holy Alliance was more intolerable than the severity of Napoleon, with his sumptuary laws and constant military training; but it was inevitable and had to be endured. It seemed for the time being as if the whole continent would be Russianized; but the spirit of equal rights was irrepressible. First came the revolution at Naples; then in Piedmont, Spain, Portugal, and Greece; and these were suppressed for the most part by Metternich and the sentimental Chateaubriand, and many patriots suffered martyrdom; yet a deep fermentation went on in society, and at length the July revolution in Paris changed the whole aspect of affairs in western Europe. When a ship loaded with cotton happens to take fire it will sometimes burn for days before this is discovered, and for days afterwards, while all attempts to quench the conflagration fail. When the deck begins to smoke and becomes too hot for the sailors to stand on, they take to their boats and escape as they best can. Such was the political situation in Europe between 1820 and 1848; and Metternich was the captain of the vessel. He strove man- fully to quench the flames, but at length even conservative Vienna became too hot for him, and he was obliged to retire to the cool shadows of his castle on the Rhine. He was a good man in himself and not without statesmanlike ability, but much too superficial. To his mental vision THE MAN OF DESTINY 45 constitutional government must lead to republicanism, and republicanism to socialism; just as our prohibitionists suppose that drinking wine and beer leads to delirium tremens. After many vibrations of the political pendulum all Europe except Russia has now adopted the constitutional form, and the Code Napoleon is dominant from Munich to Cadiz, and between Sicily and the Straits of Dover. Napoleon is reported to have said that his laws would be remembered after his victories were forgotten; but they really belonged to one another, and the same principles underlie them both. He was not a scrupulous man, and, if he had been, would never have accomplished the work he was given to do. Like all great natures, he troubled himself little as to what his contemporaries thought of him. He cared more to en- act justice in this world than to have justice done him in the next. It is true he was severe, but the times were such as required severity; and I believe there is no instance in which he refused to listen to a suggestion in behalf of a revision of judgment. Metternich says that as a man he was neither moral nor immoral; and this coming from so vigorous an opponent has a good deal of value. Those who have the cares of empires resting on them find little leisure to be good according to the usual methods of human- ity. He has suffered somewhat from the stories that Madame Junot and other ladies of his court record of him; and it is better to believe these, and give Napoleon the full benefit of them, than to attempt any excuse for them. They are not charges of a serious nature. I was long troubled by hearing of Napoleon's crimes until I found an opportunity to examine them; whereupon they all became dissipated like morning mist. They are crimes only from the standpoint of hereditary privilege. 46 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS His removal of the incapable king of Spain, which was already been commented on, is a typical instance of this. It is true that the negro general Toussaint died in a French prison, but we should be cautious about accepting Miss Martineau's statement that his death was caused by ill treatment. There was no reason why he should have been treated differently from other political prisoners, and Miss Martineau's writings are rarely exempt from the influence of the various philanthropies of which she was the champion. When a writer's sense of right and wrong becomes so far perverted as to treat the protection of national industries as a question of morality, there is no reason why we should pay him or her serious consideration. Napoleon's transportation of the Jacobin leaders to Guiana was a relief to French politics, and a tardy act of justice for the horrors of the Revolution, which could not have been obtained in any other manner. The perfection of government would only seem to be attained when there is a power above the law to rectify and amend its deficien- cies. Madame De Stael was banished for her impertinence; if it be not called downright impudence. A woman is never so intolerable as when she imagines herself to be an important political factor. Madame De Stael permitted herself to become a puppet for Napoleon's enemies, and no matter how powerful a chief magistrate may be he cannot afford to have men or women treat him with dis- respect. There was great rejoicing among sensible people in Paris at her departure; as there was also in the duchy of Weimar when she returned to her villa on the lake of Ge- neva. Her exile was no great hardship, and but for its long continuance might even be esteemed a blessing. The French people as a rule know too little about other coimtries, and her travels in Germany, Italy, and Eng- THE MAN OF DESTINY 47 land broadened her mind and improved the quaKty of her writing. Napoleon's nearest approach to crime, and the most futile of his undertakings, was his divorce from Josephine. That, at least, was an offense against society. Yet it was not a crime, for many other men have done the same with- out being regarded as criminals. On his return from Egypt there was some trouble between them, but they were reconciled by the mediation of Hortense and Eugene. Again, when he became emperor he is reported to have had a severe struggle over the right of succession; for Josephine wished to have her own son take precedence of Napoleon's brothers. This statement does not come from very good authority, and may be incorrect. If the truth were known, it would probably appear that the divorce originated more from Napoleon's desire to have children of his own than from a wish to become allied to the house of Austria. There are many husbands who can sympathize with such a feeling. The cardinal sin of Napoleon's life, however, the one his enemies lay the severest stress on, was the supposed murder of the Due d'Enghien. There never was a much clearer case of accessory before the act than is found in the conduct of the duke. At the same time that Captain Wright landed Cadoudal and his accomplices on the French coast, the Due d'Enghien went to the duchy of Baden and stationed himself close to the French border. The duke was a fool to suppose he could make such a move on the chessboard without attracting Napoleon's attention. Its coincidence with the arrival of a number of mysterious persons in Paris was also noticed. Spies were at once set upon the duke's movements, and it was discovered that he made nocturnal excursions into French territory. He might have been arrested and condemned for this; 48 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS but Napoleon waited until all the fish had been gathered into his net. It is not certainly known that the duke corresponded with Pichegru and Cadoudal; but no sane person doubts that he was acquainted with their movements. The British government might profess in- difference as to the methods by which the conspirators intended to overthrow Napoleon's government; but the same excuse will not answer for the Due d'Enghien. If an honest man is caught among thieves he suffers the penalty of his folly. It was the duke's business to have known the plans of the conspirators. He was court-martialed and executed as the associates of Wilkes Booth were court- martialed and executed for the murder of Lincoln. The assassination of a chief magistrate is the most hideous of all crimes, and the slightest effort towards it ought to be punished with death.* The massacre of his Turkish prisoners by Napoleon, in Syria, was atrocious enough, but the act was decided upon by a council of war, which Kleber, Junot, and other generals of high character attended. They had no provisions wherewith to feed the prisoners, and, if released, they would have rejoined the forces of the enemy. Christian prisoners might have been paroled, but for Turks that would have been a useless and ridiculous ceremony. They were treated as if their parole had already been broken; but it was a bad situation of affairs. The only act which appears to have caused him remorse was breaking the ice at Austerlitz. The cries of the drowning Russians haunted him. It was hardly worse *Every one should read Napoleon's own account of this conspiracy, (veracious on the very face of it) in the Voice from St. Helena, vol. i., p. 290, which I did not see myself until after this statement was written. The English also consider the execution of Major Andre a crime of the same sort. THE MAN OF DESTINY 49 than exploding the powder magazine of a frigate with hot shot would have been. There is no other instance like it in the history of warfare on land. Frederick or Marlborough might have done the same. Napoleon's civil administration is fairly exemplified by his treatment of the Jews. When questioned at St. Helena as to his reason for this liberality, he replied, "I wanted to make them leave off usury and become like other men. There were a great many Jews in the countries I reigned over; by removing their disabilities, and by putting them on an equality with Catholics, Protestants, and others, I hoped to make them become good citizens, and conduct themselves like others of the community. I believe that I should have succeeded in the end. My reasoning with them was — as their rabbins explained to them — that they ought not to practice usury to their own tribes, but were allowed to do so with Christians and others; that, there- fore, as I had restored them to all their privileges, and made them equal to my other subjects, they must consider me to be the head of their nation, like Solomon or Herod, and my subjects like brethren of a tribe similar to theirs; that, consequently, they were not permitted to practice usury with me or them, but to treat us as if we were of the tribe of Judah; that having similar privileges to my other subjects, they were in like manner to pay taxes and sub- mit to the laws of conscription and others. By this I gained many soldiers. Besides, I should have drawn great wealth to France, as the Jews are very numerous and would have flocked to a country where they enjoyed such superior privileges. Moreover, I wanted to establish a universal liberty of conscience. My system was to have no pre- dominant religion, but to allow perfect liberty of conscience and of thought, to make all men equal, whether Protest- ants, Catholics, Mahometans, Deists, or others; so that 50 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS their religion should have no influence in getting them employment under government." It will be remembered that Julius Caesar also wished to alleviate the condition of the Jews. What a man is this! What lofty thought and noble statesmanship, expressed in sentences as chaste and fra- grant as rose petals! It is the doctrine of Christ trans- ferred into practical politics. There is nothing like it in Bacon or Locke or Macaulay. Just an hour before read- ing it I was perusing the Phsedo of Plato, and it was not easy to believe that I had changed from one writer to another. The powder-scorched man, with the marble temperament, had a most beautiful human soul within him. Such a man must either be an autocrat or noth- ing; for where could he find others whom he might take counsel with on equal terms. If he had not risen to power his whole life would have been an exile. Napoleon's bulletins are not so exaggerated as his enemies would have you believe; and yet they do not represent him fairly. They were written to suit the taste of the French people, who, in spite of their realistic art and literature, had so long been separated from reality that the simple truth, would no longer satisfy them. He must have smiled as he wrote them. In his letters to Joseph and in his conversations at St. Helena we come close to the man himself. The clearness of his thought and force of his ideas are emphasized by the unpretending directness of his style. It is like taking Manitou iron water to read him. He infuses energy into every nerve. If he had devoted himself to literature he would have been the greatest of French writers as he is now one of the best. He never composed any plays, but he knew human nature better than Moliere, and his sentiment was purer than Voltaire's or Racine's. He liked Eugene Beauhamais THE MAN OF DESTINY 51 as a youth, because he wept at the sight of his father's sword. Napoleon discipHned the whole of Europe, and filled it with heroes. He aroused people from their slovenly, mechanical ways, and instructed them to a.ct with energy and precision; he woke them up from their drowsy, self- complacent lucubrations and set them to thinking in earnest. Wherever he went all idlers, parasites, vicious and dissipated persons were sent about their business. He disliked the monks because they lived in idleness, which he considered the root of all evil. We are indebted to Napoleon, not only for such grand characters as Ney, Victor, Murat, Junot, and Soult, but Wellington, Blucher, Canning, and Von Stein owe their places in history to him. Nor can it be doubted that he exercised an influence on great artists. It has been noticed that the best poetry of Schiller, Goethe, Byron, and Wordsworth was written between 1795 and 1810. Beethoven also intended at first to dedicate his heroic symphony to Napoleon. When we admire them we admire Napoleon also. A man, however, who tries to change, remodel, and transform everything must in the end set all the world against him. What comprehensive wisdom in his last directions to the child whom he had not seen for so many years: "My son shall reign a mighty monarch. He shall do good works and not attempt to avenge my death. To win great battles would be but to ape me." This did not come true of his son, but of his nephew; and if Napoleon III. had paid more strict attention to it he might not have died an exile in England. NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS I MEMOIRS are not the most trustworthy of historical documents. They are commonly written in old age, long after the events referred to have taken place, and it is one of the peculiarities of our later years that the events of our boyhood or girlhood reappear much more distinctly to us "than those of mature life. Our imaginations also play strange tricks with us at times. I have myseK some- times supposed that I remembered an extract from a cer- tain author with perfect distinctness, but, on looking it up, I found the wording of it wholly different from what I supposed. Memoirs are also more likely to be prejudiced than any other form of composition, on account of the nearness of the author to his or her subject. The remem- brance of past favors, as well as grievances, trifling affairs in themselves, which otherwise he would not think of mentioning, enter into his mind and more or less influence his judgment. Recently published American memoirs like Conway's and White's are transparent enough with the predilections of the writer — Conway's partiality for his own section of the country, and White's feeling of obligation to those to whom he owed his foreign appoint- ments. A mischievous slander, played by a designing person or an intentionally sincere one; like the horrid calumny of Theodora, which was accepted by Gibbon, may impose upon the public for centuries. A review of the various memoirs concerning Napoleon 52 NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 53 would constitute a large volume by itself. In fact, Rose- bery's recent work on Napoleon is little more than a dis- cussion of the records preserved by Napoleon's friends who shared his imprisonment at St. Helena. It is a fair and candid work for an Englishman, and a marked con- trast to the misrepresentations of Macaulay, Green, and Seeley; but it has limitations of its own which are worth a passing notice. Of these, the two most important are what he considers Napoleon's lack of judgment in his choice of men, and the peculiarity of his religious opinions. In regard to the first, I think it might almost be said that no other man has recognized merit so quickly and rewarded it so well as Napoleon did. It was largely to this that he owed his earlier successes. It would be diffi- cult to prove or disprove Rosebery's assertion. No one can tell what there may be in the ocean; but what have we ever heard of Wellington's or Blucher's subordinates? Murat, Ney, Soult, Lannes, Massena, and Victor are celebrated names in the history of those times ; and if they did not always accomplish what Napoleon hoped of them when they were fighting against the odds of two or three to one, the fact is not surprising. Massena was the only one of Napoleon's marshals, how- ever, to whom military critics have given the credit of being a great commander; and when we examine Napo- leon's campaigns, we find that it was always to Massena that he intrusted the most difficult commissions. He was already an invalid in his Spanish campaign, but Massena in his prime was probably a match for either Blucher or Wellington. His defeat of Swanoff at Zurich was a masterpiece of military skill. In regard to Napoleon's religion or philosophy, Rose- bery goes a long way off. He believes him to have been a Mohammedan and a materialist. The terms are contra- 54 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS dictory. Mohammedanism is a sensual religion, but sensu- ality and materialism are not convertible terms, and for absolute faith in the divine will there are none like the followers of Islam. Materialism in philosophy invariably leads to skepticism, and a skeptical Mohammedan is as rare as a white blackbird. On the other side, sensuality was hateful to Napoleon, as everything was which tended to mental or physical weakness. His creed wa^ the gospel of strength. He courted the favor of the Sheiks in Egypt as Alexander did that of the Persian Magi, in order to obtain political, as well as military, control of the country; but there is no trustworthy evidence that he went so far in this as to compromise himself as a Christian. What we gather from the various comments on religious subjects which have been reported of Napoleon, is that he had no very definite religious creed, though a decided religious faith. He makes some such statement of himself some- where, and it is a very fine one. Such was the mental attitude of Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, and many others, and it testifies to the depth and sincerity of Napoleon's moral nature. As Goethe states it in Faust: "Who can say I know Him, who can say I know Him not? " He was too much of an idealist to be called a materialist; too practical, perhaps, to be called an idealist. You might call him an idealist-atihtarian. His mind always preserved an equitable balance between theory and prac- tice. He read little philosophy and had a particular horror of what he called idealogues — doctrines such as Fourier and John Stuart Mill. Lord Rosebery , however, admits what Metternich denies that Napoleon was a true statesman; that ths earlier period of his government might be termed ideal; that he was by nature of a kindly disposition and wished to do what was right; that he preserved the fruits of the French Re volution NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS m to posterity; that he was the greatest of generals, and one of the greatest of law givers; that his wars were mainly forced upon him; and that he had only one fair opportuni- ty of making peace (in the summer of 1806), which "either his suspicion or his madness" prevented him from seizing. It is generally supposed that the death of Charles James Fox prevented Napoleon from making peace with Eng- land in 1806, and Napoleon intimates this in a letter to his brother, Joseph, written at the time; but it is not probable that an enduring peace could have been con- summated, so long as Holland, Belgium, and France re- mained under the same government. In regard to the numerous records of Napoleon's mourn- ful life at St. Helena — ^the fifth act of the tragedy — ^Rose- bery considers General Gourgand's diary to be the most veracious and trustworthy, on the ground that it was evidently not intended for publication. This, like the others, cannot be proved, though he assigns plausible reasons which have their value; but it seems like a nar- row basis on which to form a judgment. In such cases the character of the individual should always be taken into account. General Gourgand was one of the bravest and most devoted of Napoleon's personal adherents, but his portrait, as well as his diary, indicates a man of not more than mediocre intellect. He served the Emperor as a sort of staff detective. He discovered the mines which were intended to blow up Napoleon at Moscow, and killed a dragoon who was attacking Napoleon at the battle of Brienne. Once, when the Emperor's party were out walking at St. Helena, they were threatened by a drunken or insane British soldier, who leveled his musket and ordered them to halt. Napoleon merely said: "General Gourgand, take charge of that fellow. " Gourgand made 56 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS a sort of flank movement, then suddenly darted on the soldier and wrested his weapon from him in a twinkling. This, however, would seem to have been the limit of his capacity. Napoleon surely would not have approved of the statement which Gourgand published concerning the battle of Waterloo, that so offended the British ministry. He was a forcible man, but narrow and unimaginative. Napoleon could not have conversed with him on large and important subjects as he did with Montholon and Las Cases, and we consequently find that Gourgand's reports are meager and not particularly interesting. The most conspicuous fact in his diary is Napoleon's continual effort to cheer and encourage the spirit of his companions. Gourgand was still in the prime of life, and when other methods failed. Napoleon held forth to him the prospect of a favorable matrimonial alliance — ^which came to pass some ten years later by Gourgand's marriage to a French countess. Lord Rosebery has examined the evidence in Surgeon O'Meara's case against Sir Hudson Lowe and finds much of it quite untrustworthy. This need not, however, make any serious difference to us. The civilized world has long ago condemned Sir Hudson Lowe, nor has he ever found an apologist for his absurdly spiteful behavior, and nobody cares to hear any further discussion in regard to him. Rosebery himself admits that the general mass of evidence is decidedly against Sir Hudson. What still makes the "voice from St. Helena" interesting are Napo- leon's commentaries on his battles and other important matters which it contains. O'Meara could not have in- vented these, and they agree remarkably well with the statements made afterwards by Montholon and Las Cases. O'Meara has this advantage over the others, that being imacquainted with the history of those times, he could NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 57 ask Napoleon more direct and pertinent questions than they very well could, from fear of inquiring about matters which they might be supposed to know already. The best of the Napoleonic memoirs are those by Las Cases and Savary, both men of superior character and intelligence. Savary, the Duke of Rovigo, was a brave soldier, and brave men are much more likely to be truth- ful than those whose courage has never been tested; witness Grant and Sherman. Savary did not prove an able commander, but Napoleon made use of him to dis- cover the movements of the Russians at Friedland, and to open communication with Davout at Eckmuhl — at the risk of a dozen lives. His accoimts of the battle of Auster- litz, Friedland, and Eckmiihl, although incomplete, have the vitality of an eye-witness. After Fouche's retirement Napoleon made Savary superintendent of pohce. He followed the Emperor to England, but he was proscribed by Louis XVIII. and the British government imprisoned him at Gibraltar, when he afterwards escaped to Asia Minor and returned to France after twelve years of exile. His life was one of the most adventurous and interesting of that stirring period. He was a man of astute intelligence and his writing has much of the frankness, directness, and perspicacity of Napoleon's own. If he appears somewhat too favorable to Napoleon, it is not in what he says, but in what he leaves unsaid. His points are well taken, and his remarks on the condemnation and execution of the Due d'Enghien are the most judicious of any among his contemporaries. Count Las Cases belonged to the old French nobility, and his writing has the tone of high cultivation. He fled to England at the outset of the Reign of Terror and sup- ported himseK there by the publication of what he called an atlas, but which would seem to have been an epitome 58 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS of the history of nations.* He returned to France by favor of Napoleon's amnesty, and soon became so con- vinced of the good intentions of the Emperor that he ac- cepted a position in the government. Napoleon, however, saw or knew little of him, until after the battle of Waterloo he was surprised by Las Cases 's determination to accom- pany him in exile. Las Cases was sent away from St. Helena by Sir Hudson for secret though perfectly honorable communication with Napoleon's friends in Europe. Sir Hudson made a mistake, and attempted to rectify it by having Las Cases detained at the Cape of Good Hope for some six months, during which time he suffered severely from the vindictiveness of the British officials there. He was not permitted to land in England for fear of the in- formation he might circulate concerning the ill-treatment of Napoleon, but he was hustled over to Rhenish Prussia where he suffered similar grievances to those at the Cape. His book bears every mark of an honorable man and a conscientious writer. *He afterwards republished this in Paris under a nom de plume, but the French Academy frowned upon it. Las Cases reports that one of the Academicians told him that " they did not believe in literary work which emanated from the nobility." This was the way in which they afterwards treated Dr. Morton, the discoverer of etherization. NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS II BOURIENNE'S memoirs, mifortmiately, are not to be trusted at all. Even if they were not written, as Savary states, by an unknown person and signed by Bourienne after he became de- mented, the character of the man is very much against them. He was discharged from Napoleon's service for complicity in a shameful stock-jobbing operation; and though Napoleon afterwards relented and sent him as consul to Hamburg, he never permitted Bourienne to be near him after that time. His story in regard to Napo- leon's amour with the wife of a captain of infantry lacks confirmation. His talk is too much like that of a dis- charged servant. Romancing comes naturally to a French woman. Both Madame Junot and Madame de Remusat had grievances of their own against the Emperor. It is well known that the father of Madame de Remusat attached himself to Talleyrand, and went out of office with him in 1810. Madame Junot's grievance was of a more subtle kind. Her husband was one of the Emperor's favorite com- manders and yet he never was created a marshal of France. A lack of dignified character may have been a sufficient reason for this, but his wife, of course, could not under- stand it, and unquestionably felt it as a slight. In her earlier household reminiscences of Napoleon she appears in quite an amiable light, but she did not sustain this character in after life, and the Emperor spoke of her as 59 60 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS rather a flashy sort of person. The society she moved in certainly was not high-toned^ — witness the remark she recounts, made in company, about Pauline Bonaparte's ears — and her small animosities are sometimes very amus- ing. One of the results of Madame de Remusat's memoirs has been the republication of Las Cases's, O'Meara's, and other memoirs more favorable to Napoleon. It is impossible to determine what is fact and what may be fiction in these feminine memoirs. It is remarkable what a strong Creole element pervaded Parisian society during the second empire. Madame de Montholon was a Creole, and an English lady who resided some time at St. Helena, considered her a very tyrannical wife. Josephine could not very well be that; but all accounts agree that she was one of the most extravagant women ever known to the historical pen. Napoleon, after praising her natural grace of manner, and the pleasantness of her disposition to O'Meara, concluded with the blunt remark that she rolled up mountains of debt and then told lies about them. She probably prevaricated from embarrassment, but all accounts agree that while Napoleon was in Egypt she contracted a mass of debts equal to several times the amount of his salary and if he had not risen to autocratic power he never could have liquidated them. False pride is the besetting sin of womankind. Josephine considered herself above paying for the articles that she purchased, or even inquiring their price. She wished to please everybody, which is the same as pleasing nobody; and she purchased almost every article that was offered her. Las Cases states that she bought thirty-eight hats in one month. Such a woman could have little depth either of character or of affection. There was nothing Napoleon hated so much as foolishness; and it is probable NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 61 that he contemplated separating from Josephine a long time before he did so. Marie Louise having been born to the purple, acted very differently. She only purchased what she really wished to have, and paid for it at the time. She showed true dignity of character during the trying scenes of 1814, and her only fault would seem to have been a lack of modesty — natural enough considering the family she came from. Napoleon did not often compare men to animals, but when he did there was a reason for it. He thought Sir Hudson Lowe looked like a tiger cat; and that is just what he did look like according to the steel portrait in the last edition of Las Cases's memoirs. A long lean neck, a shal- low pate, and sharp angular features bespeak a most un- amiable disposition. His face is a bad one, and the only talent he seems to have possessed was that of tormenting those who were under his authority. His detention of a portrait of Napoleon's son, which was sent from Vienna was typical of all his proceedings. Napoleon informed him In their third and last interview that he and Lord Bathurst would only be remembered by posterity for their inhuman treatment of him. It was safe enough to predict that. The British government spent between two and three hundred thousand dollars a year to keep Napoleon at St. Helena, and yet the rooms he occupied there were like those of an American tenement-house; nor was his table much better served. He certainly was not treated like a gentleman; and who was ultimately responsible for this so much as the Duke of Wellington? After O'Meara's return to England the facts concerning Napoleon's confine- ment became widely known, and it is not a supposable case that Wellington should have been ignorant of them. He was the autocrat of Great Britain for the time being, and the thought of Napoleon must have been of daily occur- 62 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS rence to him. As Rosebery says, Wellington was not a generous adversary and Wellington was the real govern- ment. One other remark of Rosebery deserves a momentary consideration. He speaks of Napoleon as not having a good seat in the saddle. I suppose some Englishmen would think more of this than they would of losing a battle. A man with a figure like Napoleon's could hardly make a fine-looking horseman; but he rode over more battlefields than any commander before or since Julius Csesar, and we do not hear that he was thrown except at Arcole, where his horse was mortally wounded. At Arsis -Sur-Aube he rode onto a bursting bombshell probably with the intention of ending his life in that manner. His horse was disabled by the explosion, and yet Napoleon kept his seat. He depended largely on rapid riding to escape capture or assassination. In this way he once arrived in Paris before his ministers were cognizant that he had left Spain. Thiers's "Consulate and Empire" derives great advan- tage from the fact that the incidents of those times were still fresh in the memories of the actors. Thiers could obtain information from Napoleon's marshals, generals, colonels, and even from the soldiers of the old guard. This has given his account a freshness and pictorial liveli- ness such as later writers will have to struggle for in vain, unless they possess the genius of Tacitus or Carlyle. Karl Lemeke, in his "Aesthetics" takes notice that Thiers knew how to poetize; but the poetry was not in the man, but in his subject- — the chivalrous crusade of a whole nation fighting against mighty odds to liberalize Europe and break the shackles of fossilized institutions. Thiers is by no means a classic. He is a diffuse, watery writer, and appears to have taken small pains with his sentences. His worst fault, however, is the constant harping on Napoleon's NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 63 "inordinate ambition," which finally becomes as weari- some as the sound of the Alpine horn to travellers over the Wengern Alps. Thiers understood politics too well to believe this him- self, and the reason for it was obviously to obtain publica- tion for his book, under a Bourbon king. Louis Philippe was a liberal, but we could not expect him to be so liberal as to permit the French people to understand that the Bonapartes were right, and the Bourbons were wrong. Thiers, therefore, compromised to suit the situation — no doubt reluctantly enough. There are few histories which do not suffer from similar perversions of the truth. In spite of this we may fairly suppose that it was the "Consulate and Empire" which upset Louis Philippe, and made a final end of the Bourbons. Its publication was of great assistance to Louis Napoleon's designs and this may have been more than Thiers expected or wished for. No man, since the world began, has ever been so lied about as Napoleon. It is one measure of his importance. The British officers on the Northumberland were never tired of questioning Bertrand, Las Cases and the rest, concerning the emperor's character, habits of living, etc., and expressed much surprise at the replies they received. They admitted that he had been grossly misrepresented. This was the work of dishonest journalism, of which I have noticed the effect, even to the present day — improbable scandals, and stories of his cruelty and cowardice. Five hundred people will read the newspapers while one will read a dignified history; and of this five hundred nine-tenths will believe what they read as if it were the Gospel of St. Matthew, During the peace of Amiens Napoleon complained to the British Ministry of the atro- cious calumnies concerning him that were published in English newspapers, but the ministry replied that they 64 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS had no legal right to interfere with the liberty of the press and his only remedy would be to enter a suit for libel in an English court. This was true enough, but it is not sur- prising that Napoleon should never afterwards have ap- proved of that form of liberty. Such calumnies would have been dangerous in Germany as the death of the book-seller, Koch, afterward exemplified ; but the Prussians circulated wood-cuts of the infant Bonaparte coddled in the arms of a demon, and other pictures of dark and dubious insinuation. Such black- guardism always happens in time of war, but it has never been so virulent or enduring as in Napoleon's case, and this for most excellent reasons. The hereditary sover- eigns and the titled aristocracy could only justify their repeated attempts to suppress this champion of struggling humanity and incite their subjects and serfs to fight against him by the most shameless falsification. The same mis- representation is now taking place in American history. Slavery is dead, but the pro-slavery spirit still lives, and sits in the professor's chair. They acted like the villain in Moliere's play, who screened himself by bringing accusa- tions against the persons he had injured. They had however, this kind of justification, in fact, that even if the peace of Amiens had been kept through Napoleon's life- time, such a ruler would have made the French nation so powerful that under a less judicious successor it would have been dangerous to its neighbors. O'Meara reports that Sir Hudson Lowe once remarked to him that Napoleon's death "would be of little conse- quence, compared with the mischief that might ensue if he escaped — not so much of himself as in the revolutions that would be excited in various parts of Europe. " This would seem to indicate that even subordinate officers in the British army understood the character of the conflict NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 65 they were engaged in better than they pretended. Na- poleon only escaped in death; but the revolutions took place, nevertheless, and continued to take place until France, Spain, Italy, and even Prussia, were liberated from the despotism of Metternich and the so-called Holy Alliance. The Tory leader in Parliament even declared at that time (1816) that the Anglo-Saxon race was the only one fit for a constitutional government. In Las Cases's memoirs there are statements made by Napoleon himself, which strongly support the view I have taken of him in the preceding lecture. He speaks of the autocratic period of his government as a kind of dictator- ship, like those of Sulla and Csesar, "which would have come to an end when peace was firmly established." " He was necessary for the defense of France, and to pre- serve the principles of the Revolution. The coalition always existed either openly or secretly." It was not the crowned heads of Europe that hated him, "so nluch as the aristocracy, which is always cold, implacable, and vindictive." They want everything for themselves. If he did dream of universal empire, it was his enemies that led him into it. He did not like the ceremonial of court life; and he had an idea if he lived long enough to abdicate in favor of his son, and to spend the evening of his life travelling from one capital to another examining into public affairs, giving advice, and establishing new institu- tions for the benefit of the people. Savary alleges that Napoleon undertook his Egyptian expedition, for one reason, because he considered the sword-points of the enemy less dangerous than the jealousy of his fellow directors; and that the overthrow of the Directory on his return was a question of self preservation for himself and his friends. Thiers was of opinion that it prevented the 66 POIJTICS AND METAPHYSICS establishment of a pretorian government by the army, — like that of the Roman Empire. Better than Savary, and perhaps the best of all memoirs are Napoleon's own. They are said to be inaccurate, but I, who have been over the whole subject seven or eight times, have not noticed this. There are inaccuracies in all histories, for three-fourths of history is written from memory — either the writer's or some other person's. Napoleon himself has pointed out mistakes in Heroditus, which no Greek scholar would seem to have noticed; but Napoleon's signal merit is that he understood human nature. His account of the Marengo campaign is a match for Thucydides's description of the Syracusean expedition. John Ropes says that what happened at the battle of Marengo will probably never be known, but Napoleon gives such a clear and comprehensive account that we cannot only see the man fighting — the rout of Victor's divisions, and the charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers — but we can perceive the working of Napoleon's mind and understand the plans of his adversary. There is no ambiguity in the tactics of this battle. Napoleon in his anxiety for Suchet, who was on the other side of the enemy pushed his right wing forward to Marengo, where it was attacked the next morning by the whole Austrian army, and was driven out in great confusion. The enemy next fell upon Lannes, who commanded the centre, but Lannes retreated in good order, always, as Napoleon says, refusing his left wing; and the effect of this movement was to draw the Austrians round in the arc of a circle; so that they finally exposed their right fiank to the attack of Desaix and Kellermann, who were not slow to take advantage of this. Victor's division was reformed, and in less than an hour the Austrian army had become a fiying mob. It is a very rare book now, and ought to be republished with NAPOLEONIC MEMOIRS 67 notes and corrections. It would be a pleasant contrast to the tame academic histories of the present day. After Napoleon's death, Sir Hudson Lowe, wandered about the earth ignored by his former employers, and generally avoided almost like a discharged convict. Napoleon was in all respects an exceptional man and has to be viewed exceptionally. His powers of endurance exceeded that of any other individual of whom there is even a tradition. He worked with his secretaries until they fell asleep from exhaustion; and at Arcole for four nights he never took off his boots. Before he was twenty- eight years old he had won seventeen battles. His features were refined and classic, but his earlier coins represent him with an uncommonly thick neck, and it may have been in some exceptional structure of the spinal column that his powers of endurance are to be accounted for. THE POETIC NAPOLEON NO great man is complete without the poetic element. It is to be found in Lincoln's Gettys- burg address, and in Sumner's solemn affir- mation before the Senate: "Thank God for Massachusetts ! " It was in the poetic element that Demos- thenes surpassed Cicero, and perhaps Webster. Victor Hugo wrote to Garibaldi in his highflown manner, "There was a lyre in the tent of Achilles." ^Eschylus fought at Salamis and Dante at Campaldino. Frederick the Great sent his verses to Voltaire, "Heroes or Poets." There was not much poetry in Frederick, although he was fond of scribbling verses, and Bismarck was also a rather matter of fact character; but Napoleon was charged with it; although he may never have composed a couplet. His ambitions and successes were poetic, and so were his failures; even his misdeeds (or mistakes) have that appear- ance. His whole life was like the rising and setting of the sun. His actions were poetic; he talked poetry; he was continually meeting with poetic adventures; his whole life was an epic, and some hundreds of years from now it might become the subject of as grand an epic as Dante's "Inferno" or Milton's "Paradise Lost." The early incidents which Madam Junot relates of him have a poetic character, — ^the Puss in Boots story, and his mercifulness to Sallicetti because he had taken refuge in the house of Napoleon's friends. Then what a picture we have of this young artillery officer, with the big head and 68 THE POETIC NAPOLEON 69 tapering figure, giving the word of command^ — only one word — ^which puts an end to the Reign of Terror in France. Again we see him in Italy, like Thor fighting the giants, driving armies before him, two or three times the number of his own. We see him leading his men across the bridge of Lodi, and rescued by his devoted followers from the swamps of Arcole. Homer represents Achilles as fighting in impenetrable armor, which is his way of saying that the hero was protected by divine intervention, and it seems as if nothing less could have saved Napoleon in his eighteen Italian battles. His Egyptian expedition was like the voyage of Ulysses. He eluded the Polyphemus Nelson, who proposed to shut him up in an iron cage like Bajazet, and looking up at the stars he said to the atheistic scientists about him, "You may talk, gentlemen, but tell me who made all that," — memorable words. When his regiments were drawn up for the battle of the Pyramids, he said to them: "Soldiers, forty centuries look down upon you." Like Moses of old, he led them across the Red Sea, and saved them from drowning by the miracle of his marvelous brain. He gives up his horse to a womided soldier, and walks through the desert with his infantry. He learns from an English newspaper of the defeat of Moreau in Italy and the perilous condition of France, and he flies to the rescue of his country like a lover to his sweetheart. He overturns the incapable Directory, establishes a sound government, and scatters the enemies of France to the winds. Five times he does this, in the space of fourteen years. Crossing over the Alps he stops to listen to the tolling of a monastery bell. "How sweetly that bell sounds," he says, "in this desolate region." Savary found him in the midst of the defeat at Marengo, before the final victory lying on the ground and quietly studying a map of Italy. 70 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS He replies to the envoys of the Venetians, "Your govern- ment is superannuated. I will have no more Senate, no more inquisitors. I will be an Attila to the Venetian state, " — including the history of Venice in a single Shakes- pearian sentence. Soon after he had disposed of their superannuated government the population of Venice doubled its numbers. One of the finest of the Napoleonic anecdotes, and the most significant in its character, is one that he told Las Cases of himself at St. Helena. He was going on a jour- ney to Italy, when walking beside the carriage up the slope of Mount Talare, he overtook an old woman, hobbling with a crutch, and said to her, "My good woman what are you doing here, in this wild place?" "I have come, " she replied, "in the hope of seeing the Emperor Napoleon when he passes by." "What do you care for him?" said the Emperor again. "You have only exchanged one tyrant for another. It was formerly tyrant Louis, and now it is Napoleon." "No!" responded the old woman. "There is a great difference. Napoleon is the Emperor of the people." Here he breaks off and leaves us in the dark as to whether the old dame discovered the identity of her chance acquain- tance, but we may presume that she finally did, and that she raised her apron to her face to conceal the tears of joy. It was Napoleon's practice (and I have never heard of another commander who did the same) to ride over his battlefields after a victory to see that the wounded men were properly cared for. This, of course, greatly endeared him to his soldiers, but it would be thinking evil to con- sider that he did it on that account. He was riding over the bloody field of Wagram in this manner, when he came upon the dead body of a colonel who had done him an ill THE POETIC NAPOLEON 71 turn in earlier years. "Poor fellow," said Napoleon, "there he lies; and I wish he knew that I had long since forgiven him." A little farther he found a grenadier lying on his back with a bullet hole in his forehead, and the lower part of his face covered with dirt from the explosion of a shell. The Emperor alighted from his horse and wiped the dirt from the man's mouth and nose with his handkerchief. The soldier opened his eyes, recognized Napoleon, and wept. What a sight that must have been to him — his last on this earth. On another battlefield he came upon a dog mourning over the body of his dead master, an Austrian officer, and Napoleon, speaking of it afterward, said, "I was almost ashamed to think that the devotion of that poor dog affected me more deeply than anything else there. " Yet many others would have felt as he did; and it is a poetic picture that we have here — Napoleon stopping his horse to reflect on the attachment and unhappiness of a poor dog. Then, the burning of Moscow! None but the French army and its commander, who called it the grandest, most terrible sight ever beheld by man, witnessed this. It was a presage of their coming misfortunes. Sixteen years of uninterrupted success had reached its climax, and now the change of fortunes was to be sharp and sudden. Na- poleon's plans continued to be good, but some accident always interfered to prevent their realization. Armies alone could not defeat this man. The first battle that he really lost, although he had rather the worst of it at Essling, was the battle of Leipsic, the most terrible battle of modern times. Napoleon was heavily outnum- bered, but it was the desertion of the Saxon contingent of fifteen thousand men who went over to the enemy with sixty cannon that did the mischief. The transfer of such a force to the opposite side was of less consequence than 72 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS the disarrangement of Napoleon's plans, and its disheart- ening effect upon the French. Yet the first day he gained some slight success and held possession of his ground. On the second day both armies rested from exhaustion and, in order to bury the dead. Napoleon and his marshals rode over the field. It was a terrible sight. Every face was dark, and Napoleon was the first to say, "We shall have to retreat. " On the third day he drew up his army* in the concave order, and waited for the allies to attack him. His position was not a strong one, but all the nations of northern and eastern Europe were hurled against it in vain. At nightfall his line was nowhere broken. The battle was lost, but Napoleon was not defeated. That evening he said to Murat, "I foresee that you will desert me — ^but I forgive you." At day- break he commenced his retreat, but the premature blow- ing up of a bridge left one-third of his army at the mercy of the enemy. Murat deserted him with nearly twenty thousand men, and the Bavarian general. Von Werder, with more than that number. The king of Bavaria even contemplated a hideous pro- ceeding. In order to curry favor with his former enemies he ordered his army to the Rhine to intercept Napoleon and make him a prisoner; but the French soldiers were so enraged at being debarred from their own country that they flung themselves upon the Bavarians like tigers, slaughtered thousands of them and severely wounded their commander. Von Werder. Murat, who tried a similar game, was also defeated in Italy by Prince Eugene, the magnanimous son of Josephine Beauharnais. It should always be remembered that Napoleon made overtures for peace, after the second day's battle at Leipsic but this customary right of the vanquished was refused *Nov. 4, 1813. THE POETIC NAPOLEON 73 him. Neither should we forget the names of his marshals who remained constant to their duty in these dark days of fortune. They were chiefly Davout, Soult, Ney, Bestrand, Berthier, McDonald, Victor, Grouchy, Van- damme, and Gerard. Massena's heart was true, but he was now an invalid and retired from active service. Read Thiers's account of the campaign of 1814, all the more poetic from the prosaic nature of the politician, who has here given us the plain, unvarnished facts that speak so eloquently of themselves. That little army of heroes contending against five times their own number, fighting ten battles in six weeks, never fairly defeated, and several times victorious, but losing strength even by their victories — when has history seen the like of it? Under similar conditions the army of Murat melted away like spring snow, but we do not hear of any desertions from Napoleon's ranks, hopeless as his soldiers may have considered the cause, for which they spent their blood. At Montmirail Napoleon captured one-fourth of the Prusso-Russian army, and with an adequate force would have utterly destroyed it. At Montreux he defeated the Austrians, and drove them back to the boundaries of France; but his army dwindled from fifty to forty thousand, and from forty to thirty -three thousand. All this time he was endeavoring to make peace, ready to accept any terms that would be honorable to France; but as often as he agreed to the offers of the allies, they raised fresh objections, until it became evident that their peace congress at Soissons was only intended to throw dust in the eyes of the people. Napoleon must have felt at this time like a man who is hunted by bloodhounds and the ineffectual dose of laudanum at Fontainebleau was the natural outcome of it. Again we behold him on the island of Elba. The allies 74 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS have not kept their faith with him. They have taken his wife and child from him ; they have confiscated his proper- ty; they have not paid the stipend which they agreed for his support. He has escaped the Count d'Artois's assassin by a trifling accident. Welhngton has proposed to the Congress of Vienna to have him removed to the Azores and to have Murat removed from the kingdom of Naples, • — a most shameful breach of trust and good faith, without which the battle of Waterloo might not have taken place. What is Napoleon to do? Shall he submit tamely, and await the fate before him, or shall he make one last desper- ate plunge for independence? If he can regain his throne even for a short period, he will be able to provide for his brothers and their families.* In this hard dilemma he consulted his mother, perhaps for the first time in his life, and she said to him, " Go, my son, and may God be with thee." Every one knows the story of that wonderful return — ^the most marvelous of his exploits. How he wound his way like a hare through the dangers that surrounded him, — how the army that was sent to capture him went over to him, and his soldiers wept when they saw him again; how the Bourbons and Talleyrand fled like frightened deer at his approach! The army was with him and the people were with him, but the shrewder sort of men feared only too correctly that his triumph would be of short duration. There was no one to receive him at the Tuilleries; and as he entered those great silent halls, he felt a chill come over him, and he said, "This is a fine escapade I have made." Yet it was a triumph in its kind. After Waterloo, when Napoleon was leaving Paris for the last time, a crowd of mechanics and laborers gathered *In his last letter to Joseph, in 1814, Napoleon admonished his brothers to observe the strictest economy. THE POETIC NAPOLEON 75 abotit his carriage and cheered him as it drove away. "Poor creatures," he said, "what do they owe to me? I found them poor and I have left them poor." Nothing else brings us so near to the heart of Napoleon as this statement — his sympathy for those who labor and are heavy laden, that a large proportion of mankind are destined to this, and that it is impossible to prevent it. The life of a soldier is much to be preferred, even with its risk of death or mutilation, to that of the coal miner, the marble worker, or the thread-lace maker. The German soldiers who had been promised constitu- tional government if they would conquer Napoleon, were greatly disheartened on' their return home to find that the old order of politics was everywhere to be restored. Old Bliicher talked about "those rascals," and Goethe's son openly declared that the Germans had driven out their greatest benefactor. It is more than probable that the king of Prussia would have kept his word to the Prussian people if he had not been intimidated by Metternich and Lord Castlereagh. The Uberal reforms instituted by the king of Wiirtemburg and the duke of Weimar were im- mediately suppressed by the Holy Alliance, There are many, even among Napoleon's admirers who have failed to realize the true nature and makeup of the man. Dr. Ropes, whose excellent work on Napoleon always deserves consideration, once said to me: " I do not consider Napoleon personally interesting, and I doubt if he was an agreeable companion. I have friends whom I believe to be much more interesting than Napoleon was. He was a sort of great, rough Silas Lapham. " Nothing could be farther from the mark. It is doubtful if any Frenchman would much resemble Howell's ideal Western- er; as for Napoleon, his native gentleness, kindliness, and amiabihty were almost feminine. Besides this, he was a 76 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS man of superior refinement. Josephine once thought to entertain him by introducing a diminutive dwarf into his room. The dwarf was brought in in a covered basket but Napoleon was not pleased at the sight of this abortion of nature. "Take him away!" he said, " It is horrible." What an improvement since the time when a dwarf and a jester were considered essential to a royal household. His manner became more dictatorial in course of time but his numerous campaigns did not roughen him up, as they did Frederick the Great. He disliked Rabelais and all indecent conversation. He was remarkably patient for a man who had such a heavy burden on his shoulders — or rather on his brain. That he sometimes lost patience is not surprising, but his well-known bursts of anger were more often assumed than real. It was the readiest way by which he could produce the impression he desired. He once slapped a soldier in the face and then pardoned him for striking an officer. The fellow had been court-martialed and condemned to be shot. Readers of the "Voice from St. Helena" will remember that on one occasion Surgeon O'Meara having a fit of indigestion, bled himself for it, according to the absurd medical practice of the time, the consequence of which was, that when he went to pay a visit to Napoleon he fainted and fell flat on the floor. On coming to his senses he saw the Emperor bending over him with an expression of anxious solicitude which he never forgot. As soon as he was in a condition to return to his quarters. Napoleon ordered one of his attaches to accompany him for fear he might have another fainting spell on the way. Napoleon was kind to thousands; but the remarkable part of it is that a man could be so kind and yet see men dying about him on a battlefield without visible effect upon his nerves. NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS IT may not be out of order at this time to say some- thing of Napoleon's marshals; and they certainly deserve it. Massena was the best of them; so it is easy to see, from the use that Napoleon made of him. He may fairly be termed a great general. His victory over Swaroff at Zurich saved France from invasion and was fully equal to some of Napoleon's best. The Austrians' plan in 1805 was to retard Napoleon in Southern Germany, while the Archduke Charles re-conquered Italy. Massena spoiled the latter part of this program, by a hard-fought, indecisive battle, from which both commanders derived much credit. In 1809, he saved the French army, on the terrible field of Essling, by his indomitable courage and good judgment. In 1810 he drove Wellington out of Spain, but was obliged to retire from active service the following year. Napoleon said of him: "Massena is covetous,* but he has qualities as a soldier, before which we all should bow the head. " Davout comes next to Massena. With twelve thousand men he defeated the Duke of Brunswick at Auerstadt with sixty thousand. There has been no other such battle in modern tim6s; and it is difficult to understand it for the Prussians were completely routed. In 1809 he held the whole Austrian army at bay for two days, until Napoleon could come to his assistance; for which service *He robbed a church in Italy but Napoleon compelled him to make restitution. 77 78 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS he was created prince of Auerstadt and Eckmuhl, a two- fold honor, not accorded to any other general of the empire. It is thought that if Napoleon had employed him in the Waterloo campaign, the result might have been different. He was a severe disciplinarian, but a modest, unpretending patriot. When the allies invaded France in 1815 Davout, wanted to fight them and promised a victory, if he was not killed in the first two hours. The more cautious Soult, however, advised against it. Lannes was a rough and ready soldier, but out of place anywhere except in camp, He won the battle of Mon- tibello from the Austrians, and completely dispersed the Spanish army at Tudela. It was said of him that he never would learn prudence, and yet it was by an act of prudence that he lost his life. He was struck by a cannon- ball while leading his horse across an exposed and danger- ous position. Murat is the most famous of cavalry leaders; though perhaps not better than Ziethen or Seidlitz. Napoleon said: "I would tell Murat to destroy four or five regiments for me, and it was done on the instant. It is a wonder that he was not killed, for he was a very conspicuous object." What may have saved him was his constant activity; wheeling about, and directing the movements of his squadrons. His white plume is well known, but he also dressed in a green coat and buff trousers. He would seem to have been invincible in single combat. At Aboukir he wounded and captured the commander of the Turkish army; and on the retreat from Moscow he killed a number of Cossacks with his own sabre. It is sad to think that such a man should have disgraced himself by treachery, at the termination of his life. He not only deserted his great benefactor after the battle of Leipsic, but issued a shameful proclamation against him. He NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS 79 did this in the vain hope of saving the crown which Napo- leon had bestowed on him from the general wreck; but by this double dealing, he lost both his kingdom and his life. If he had been present at Montmirail with his thirty thousand Italians, there would have been a favorable chance of capturing the whole Prussian army. All that Napoleon needed in 1814 was fifty thousand additional troops to have given the allies a complete overthrow. Murat was not killed by the hand of a peasant, as Byron has it in his verses, but in compliance to a royal mandate. Such false reports were freely circulated under the Restora- tion. Bessieres is but slightly known to fame, but he was a worthy successor to Murat, and as a cavalry oflScer, fully equal to Bliicher. On the first day at Essling, Lannes sent him an order to charge, and to charge home. Bessieres replied to the aide-de-camp, "Tell the Marshal that I always charge home;" and so he did. During the battle of Wagram, a cannon-ball shattered the pistol which he held in his hand, and then ran down his leg, without, however, doing him any serious injury. Thiers says that he was killed at Boro- dino, but this is a mistake. Bessieres returned in safety from the Russian campaign to lose his life in a paltry skirmish, the following year. Soult, according to Savary, distinguished himseK above all others at Austerlitz, and he has received commenda- tion from German historians for his campaign against Wellington in 1813, with a force greatly inferior in number to the English. But Napoleon said that he was a much better general to plan a battle, than to fight one. Bernadotte was not so much of a Judas as Murat, but more so than Marmont is supposed to have been. He 80 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS must have possessed good ability to judge by the com- mands with which Napoleon intrusted him, but there remains a suspicion of treachery connected with his move- ments in the campaign of 1807, and in 1809, when his proclamation after the battle of Wagram savored of insubordination. He was the only officer in the army who considered that he knew more than the Emperor; and as for Napoleon's nomination of him for King of Sweden, one can plainly call that a mistake. There was no necessity for Bernardotte's joining in the crusade against France in 1813. It was sacrificing the interests of Sweden for the benefit of Russia and Prussia. If he had joined Napoleon in 1812, he might have recovered Finland, besides helping to break up that pow:erful, semi- civilized and dangerous empire. Marmont was the best strategist among the marshals but was unfortunate in his battles. He out-manoeuvered Wellington at Salamanca, so that the latter was obliged, either to win a victory or to surrender; but one of the first cannon-balls from the English wounded Marmont in the shoulder, so that he had to be carried off the field — • a piece of unexampled good fortune for his antagonist. Napoleon however blamed him for offering battle before he had been joined by Soult. At Laon in 1814, after an indecisive engagement Marmont was driven from his position by a night attack of the Prussians, so that the whole army was obliged to retreat. He is spoken of in the Century life of Napoleon, as "the traitorous Marmont;" but his treachery may have been patriotic enough. After the allies had occupied Paris, he may have concluded that further resistance would be merely a waste of human life; but it was not for Marmont to decide this alone. It is a poetic picture that we have of him fighting the battle of NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS 81 Paris against overwhelming odds with his back against the wall of the city.* Ney was the hero of the retreat from Moscow. He won the title of Prince, by his bravery at Borodino, where Napoleon lost twenty -eight generals, and the Russians their commander, Bagration, with thirty thousand men. At the passage of the Beresina, Ney was the last man to cross the bridge in the face of the whole Russian army. He is said to have had five horses killed under him at Waterloo; but he was not an able commander. Napoleon would seem to have been suspicious of this, for he did not give Ney an independent command, until 1813, and then Ney made a bad failure of it. His tragical fate has en- deared him to the memory of mankind. Why should he have been put to death, rather than Soult, Gerard, and others who took part in the Waterloo campaign? The Peter C. Ney of South Carolina, about whom there has been so much written, would seem to have been a French imposter, who assumed that name in order to give himself distinction. It is possible that he may have been a Ney of some other family; but if the man had been Marshal Ney, there would have been nothing to prevent his return to France after the Revolution of 1830. We may believe that the good-hearted Louis Philippe would have been proud to pardon him. Marshal Victor is best known by his heroic reply to the Emperor after the battle of Montreux. Victor had failed to capture a bridge, whose possession by the French * • would have ruined the Austrian army, which was already in retreat. It was a severe trial for Napoleon's nerves, for his last hope of success depended upon that bridge; and when Victor presented himself at the evening con- ference the Emperor said: "Marshal Victor, you may *At least, Thiers says so. 82 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS leave the army." "No," replied Victor, "I will remain and shoulder a musket, and die with my old comrades in the Guard. " Nevertheless he did not support Napoleon in the emergency of the hundred days. Berthier was an excellent chief of staff, who carried out Napoleon's directions with great exactness, and may have made some suggestions of his own, but he was a hero worshipper, and a woman worshipper, which is the same as saying that he was not much of a hero himself. In- stead of following Napoleon on the Waterloo campaign, where he was greatly needed, he fled to Germany, and after the campaign was over, filled with remorse, he com- mitted suicide. Duroc was grand marshal of the palace, and a most efficient one. He was killed by a cannon-ball in 1813 when he was more than a mile from the enemy. There was no one whose loss could have been more deeply regretted by the Emperor. Bertrand was his worthy successor. He accompanied Napoleon to St. Helena, and never left him until he laid him in the grave. Three of Napoleon's marshals were killed by cannon- balls. Desaix was killed by a bullet at Marengo. Murat and Ney were sentenced to be shot by court martial. Berthier committed suicide at the time of the Waterloo campaign; but Soult, Victor, Macdonald and the rest, survived all the battles and political changes of their time, and lived to a prosperous old age. Soult was Minister of War in the reign of Louis Philippe. Napoleon sometimes made use of men of whose character he did not approve, simply because he could not find others who were suitable. Such were Fouche and Talleyrand. The latter would seem to have made a practice of extort- ing money from foreign governments upon the pretext of serving their interests at court. He began this practice during the Directory, with the envoys of the United NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS 83 States, — ^the well-known x, y and z correspondence. According to Napoleon he lost most of the money made in that way in stock speciilations. He was exactly the opposite of Napoleon, of whom Meneval says that the expression of his face changed with every word he spoke; that is, he acted out the thought of the moment, — and there could be no better proof of his deeply rooted sincerity. When he had anything to conceal he was absolutely impenetrable. Talleyrand, on the contrary never had but one expression to his face, much like that of a cat watching for mice. It was a strange face he had, to judge from the portraits; with neither manliness nor kindliness apparent in it. Next to Metternich, who looked like a veritable Mephistopheles, Talleyrand was the ablest diplomat of his time, but he never had any policy of his own; he suited himself to circumstances, and followed the lead of others. The trite proverb, "set a thief to catch a thief, " applies remarkably well to Fouche. Lie was one of the regicides of Louis XVI. Nobody liked him; and he died in exile at Trieste. Napoleon was a sore trial to his brothers, for he wished to give them positions for which they were not qualified by nature. He perceived this himseK after the mischief was done, but there was no remedy. Lucien was the only one of them who possessed the capacity for a public life, and he was of essential service to Napoleon in upsetting the Directory; but after that time they never could agree. Lucien opposed his brother's attempt to separate him from his wife in a good manly spirit. Napoleon said of Joseph, "He looks like me, but is handsomer. His virtues are those of private life, and it is for such he was intended." This describes the whole man; but Savary gives him credit for inaugurating those 84 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS salutary reforms in the kingdom of Naples, which were afterwards carried out by Murat. Louis and Jerome Bonaparte do not appear to have had much character of any kind. Metternich speaks of Louis in a favorable manner; but he finally ran away from his kingdom of Holland, while Jerome commanded a division at Waterloo, and did good service there. Louis Bonaparte's eldest son was probably poisoned by the direction of Metternich, — as Napoleon predicted in regard to his own son. The latter, however, could not very well have been disposed of tn that manner, and if he was led astray by evil companions, he could not have been much like his father who went unscathed through the orgies of the Revolution. He looked like his father as a boy, but not at all after he had grown to manhood. In spite of all that Metternich and Alexander could do, the Bonapartes finally regained their importance, and they first attained to it through the medium of a demo- cratic revolution. It were idle to discuss the question of Louis Napoleon's legitimacy as a Bonaparte, for if his keen-eyed uncle had not considered him so, he would not have permitted him to be christened with his own name. The great mass of the French people, both educated and common believed him to be a genuine Bonaparte, and Machiavelli \vould have said that Louis Napoleon's enthusiastic Bonapartism was also much in his favor. His ambition was certainly not that of a vulgar adven- turer. His reign was, in certain respects remarkably like that of the great Napoleon. The first ten years was a brilliant success. He obtained the support of the English tories by a favorable commercial treaty. He regulated the internal affairs of France as they never had been regulated. He made Paris the finest city in the world. He encouraged NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS 85 the arts and sciences by magnificent and fairly judicious patronage. French art owes its present ascendency chief- ly to the impulse given it by Napoleon III.; and the archi- tecture of his time has extended itself to Brussels, Turin, Milan and Vienna. He humiliated Russia in the Crimean war, and Austria in the Italian campaign. He avenged his uncle in the death of the Czar Nicholas the son of the first Napoleon's greatest enemy. His Mexican expedition, however, shows that he had not learned from previous experience to let the Spanish race alone; and according to Bismarck he missed a rare opportunity in not taking possession of Belgium during the war between Prussia and Austria. Belgium naturally forms a portion of France, and the union of the two countries would be of great advantage to both. Instead of doing this he at- tempted to detach Victor Emmanuel from his alliance with Prussia by a gross fabrication, which was quickly discovered, and which set the whole Italian nation against him.* This was the first step towards his downfall. Too much good was said of him in England, and too much evil in America, especially by the New York Tribune. To quote Bismarck again, "He never forgot a man who had done him a service, " but on the whole his was not such a character as one can cordially admire. His usurpation of the government had not the excuse of public necessity like that of the great Napoleon; although it was largely approved by the French people. Many of Napoleon's old soldiers and officers like Gourgand, lived to witness the restoration of the Bonapartes, and one cannot help sym- pathizing with them. On the whole, France did not come off so badly from the Napoleonic wars. The French won more than fifty vic- tories; their opponents less than twenty; they had the *See my life of Bismarck. 86 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS satisfaction of knowing that it required all the other nations of Europe to put them down; which was much glory for them, and little enough for their enemies. They were almost free from debt, while the English National debt amounted to nearly three hundred millions sterling; and the rebuilding of Moscow, alone, must have cost several hundred millions of dollars. They retained the boundaries of 1789, and the loss of life was quickly repaired by nature's kindly method; for in a crowded country like France, every man that dies makes room for another to be born. In 1811 nearly one-fourth of the population of Great Britain were paupers, and had to be supported by government. This shows how closely the plans of Napo- leon missed success; but he remained twelve days too long at Moscow. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN HUNDREDS of writers have treated this sub- ject heretofore, and yet something always remains to be said of it. It still continues fresh and interesting. If nothing more, I can at least expose some of the errors and misstatements of my predecessors. This is not an enviable task, but it is a useful one. The Waterloo campaign is the most interesting one of modern times, for its problematic character, the fearful loss of life occasioned by it, and a certain dramatic quality, like the fifth act of a tragedy, which reached its climax in the consignment of Napoleon to St. Helena. The political importance of the campaign has often been estimated too highly. It was the battle of Leipsic in 1813 that broke the power of Napoleon; and after that he had nothing more than a ghost of a chance so long as Austria, Prussia, and Russia remained united against him. That they would have remained so is proved by the fact that their alliance continued for more than thirty years longer without any other object apparently than to pre- serve the peace and prevent democratic revolutions. Those who, like Byron, look upon Napoleon as a homicide and butcher of mankind cannot be aware that after his return from Elba he offered the allies peace during his own and son's lifetime, and that they were even disposed to consider these terms. Nothing but the terror of Napo- leon's genius can excuse the great powers for declining his 87 88 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS proposals; and it seems a shame that the man who proved himseK foremost in the art of war should not have been permitted to show what he could also do in the arts of peace. But it is only on grand occasions that history ac- complishes the best results ; and the lives of forty thousand men were sacrificed within three days, in order to main- tain the principle of hereditary right in politics. No one knew better than Napoleon the desperate errand on which he went'. Even if he had succeeded in driving Wellington into the sea and pushing Bliicher across the Rhine, there was little chance that he could sustain him- self against the forces that would afterward have been brought against him. Only a continuation of miraculous successes could have saved him, and his fate was prac- tically decided before the battle of Waterloo was half finished. It has been said that his army in this campaign was one of the best he ever commanded; but this is hardly a fair statement. The rank and file of his troops was largely composed of veterans, but his best generals, with the ex- ception of Ney and Soult, were gone. Massena was an invalid, Junot and Lannes were dead, Murat was in Italy, and Victor declined to serve. Dr. Ropes thinks Napoleon made a mistake in stationing Davout at Paris, but it was essential to have a reliable man in command at the seat of government, and we should be cautious in judging such matters in the light of subsequent events. To have re- placed Grouchy with Massena and D'Erlon with Victor might have made a great difference in the result of the campaign. In addition to this, an American student who was residing in Paris during the hundred days, and in his old age wrote an account of it for "The Atlantic Monthly, " noticed that the French cavalry were not well mounted. This followed as a matter of course from the THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 89 immense destruction of horses during the retreat from Moscow, and gave the Enghsh cavalry, charging down the slope of Mont St. Jean, an easy superiority. The Duke of Wellington was of opinion that Napoleon would have succeeded better if he had invaded Belgium by other lines than those of the Meuse and Sambre; and he certainly could not have succeeded worse unless he and his whole army had been captured. If it does not appear that his chances might have been much improved by pursuing a different course, if he had followed the line of the Scheldt and attacked Wellington on the extreme right, he might have cut the English from their base of supplies, but at the same time would have been outflanked strate- gically by Bliicher, a general who would not have been slow to take advantage of the situation. If, on the con- trary, Napoleon had marched against Bliicher's left wing, he would thus have thrown the allies together, and have been obliged to fight very much such a battle as General Beauregard did at Shiloh. Prince Bliicher's biographer blamed Wellington for declining to prearrange a point of junction in case of Napoleon's advance; and Wellington replied to this that such an attempt would probably have led to a false position, than which nothing could be more unfortunate for the allied cause. It would be interesting to hear this question discussed by an impartial expert in military affairs. A statement by Napoleon's surgeon at St. Helena may have misled some writers in regard to his plan of this campaign. He is reported to have said that if his subordi- nates had acted with as much energy as they did some- times, Wellington's army would have been captured in cantonments before he had a chance to strike a blow. This, however, throws more light on Napoleon's manner of talking than on the subject before us. Napoleon no 90 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS doubt felt pretty sore over this defeat. For Marshal Ney, with forty thousand men, to capture the Duke of Welling- ton with twice that number of troops at his disposal, was such a dream as no sane person would imagine. Napoleon's plan was one which he had invented himself in his first Italian campaign. It was very well known, and Bliicher evidently expected from first to last that Napoleon would act exactly as he did. Wellington, on the other hand, seems to have looked for some new inven- tion. Napoleon directed his first attack against Bliicher, because the Prussian army was stationed nearer to the French frontier than Wellington's, and because he knew that Bliicher was always ready for a fight. He directed Ney to press forward on the road to Brussels and hold Wellington in check, while he dealt with Bliicher himself. Having defeated Bliicher, he would transfer the bulk of his army to unite with Ney and fight Wellington. Marshal Ney performed his part of the programme in a satisfactory manner. It is thought that if he had at- tacked Wellington at once at Quatre Bras he might have defeated him; but what could Ney have gained by this? If he had defeated the small force opposed to him and pursued it, he would have run the risk of being overpowered by a superior force coming to its support, while he would be widening the distance between himseK and his own reinforcements. That the whole body of Ney's troops was not present at the battle was owing to a request which Napoleon sent to him for assistance, which was delivered to one of his subordinates. Wellington remained on the defensive until the close of the day, when, having been heavily reinforced, he ordered a forward movement, and Ney's army retired from the field in good order. Welling- THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 91 ton, with a force numerically superior to his adversary, gained no advantage except the possession of the ground. Meanwhile, "Old Forwards" was carrying on with Napoleon one of the toughest struggles of the times. General Hambley avers that Napoleon directed his first attack against Blticher because the French were accus- tomed to defeating the Prussians. Such an opinion by a writer on military affairs! The plain fact is that the French have never defeated the Prussians except when commanded by Napoleon, and at Davout's battle at Auerstadt. Bliicher defeated them repeatedly in 1813, and in 1814 he defeated Napoleon himself at Laon, though it is true with some advantages on his side. The Prussian army consisted of soldiers of two years' service, and only three years' training. Bliicher's cavalry may have been superior to Napoleon's, but he had no body of trained veterans like the Old Guard or Wellington's Highlanders. He was obliged to concentrate at or near Ligny on the best ground he could find, and the position was not a strong one. Otherwise he must have retreated on the road to Liege and have been hopelessly separated from Wellington. Bliicher's Prussian biographer com- plained that Wellington did not come to the assistance of the Prussians, but it is doubtful if Bliicher ever complained of it. His army was larger than any force that Napoleon would be able to bring against him, and why should he require assistance?* The battle of Ligny in its general character resembled Wagram. Bliicher, like the Archduke Charles, attempted to turn Napoleon's left wing; but at the very moment when *Tlie story that Wellington examined Bliicher's ground and disap- proved of it, contradicts itself, for it represents Wellington speaking as if he had seen Blucher's army in position, which it was quite impossible for him to have done. 92 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS he seemed likely to succeed, Napoleon, by a sudden attack of the Guards, captured the village of Ligny and compelled him to retreat. Gustavus Adolphus gained the battle of Britenfeld by similar tactics. If Blucher had merely stood on the defensive, which it was all that was necessary to do to block Napoleon's game, this might not have hap- pened. Every nation has its style in war; and there are no soldiers like the French for fighting in a street or storm- ing a fortified position. Blucher does not appear to have realized this. He charged at the captured position at the head of his cavalry, but his horse was killed by the frag- ment of a bombshell and the attack was repulsed. The Prussians retreated in good order, and Napoleon appears to have captured few guns and not many prisoners except those who were wounded. The loss of the French was about twelve thousand killed and wounded; that of the Prussians from twelve to fifteen thousand.* An incident occurred during this battle which proves how narrow the line often is between success and failure. Napoleon sent a request to Marshal Ney for a body of eight or ten thousand men (if he could possibly spare them) to attack the Prussians on the right wing. If this request could have been complied with, Ligny would have been a Waterloo for Blucher; a large portion of his left wing must inevitably have been captured and his army compelled to evacuate Belgium altogether. The request was delivered to a general of division who was on the road to Quatre Bras, and who undertook to fulfill it on his own responsi- bility. He and his forces were already within sight of the Prussians when the contrary order reached him to retrace *Dr. Ropes places the Prussian loss on French authority at eighteen or twenty thousand. German writers are much more trustworthy on such points, however, than the French: witness the report of the Prussian staff for the war of 1870 and 1871. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 93 his step^s. Marshal d'Erlon is credited with having pre- vented this stroke of genius, which otherwise might have changed the current of French history. The next forenoon Grouchy was sent in pursuit of the Prussians with about thirty thousand men. According to Thiers, Grouchy was a poHtical appointment, — ^the sort that has often occasioned mischief in mihtary affairs. He belonged to the old noblesse whom Napoleon was desir- ous to conciliate; was a brave soldier and formerly com- manded the Old Guard. Napoleon, however, was obliged to choose between Grouchy, Vandamme, and Gerard. The position was one of great delicacy and required a skillful and experienced general. In 1809, after the battle of Eckmuhl, Napoleon dispatched Massena in pursuit of the Austrians, while he himself took the road to Vienna. Grouchy did not at all like the commission that was given him. He was no doubt very much afraid of Blucher and with good reason. Blucher had an available force of forty thousand more than he himself commanded, and his own troops had suffered but little less than the Prussians on the preceding day. What was there to prevent Blucher from turning on him and overpowering him; Blucher was originally a cavalry general, and possessed all the dash and rapidity of action which belongs to that branch of the service. The fact that on the afternoon of June 18 Grouchy was obliged to fight a battle with General Teile- mann shows that if Blucher had not gone to Wellington's assistance Grouchy would have been obliged at that time to encoimter the whole Prussian force; and the destruction of Grouchy's command would have been almost as severe a blow to Napoleon as Waterloo itself. In the vindication of his conduct, which he published on his return from exile, Marshal Grouchy says of his last interview with the Emperor: — 94 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS I replied to him, that the Prussians had commenced their retreat at ten o'clock the evening before; that much time must elapse before my troops, who were scattered over the plain, were cleaning their guns and making their soup, and were not expecting to be called upon to march that day, could be put in movement; that the enemy had seventeen or eighteen hours' start of the troops sent in pursuit; that although the reports of the cavalry gave no definite information as to the direction of the retreat of the mass of the Prussian army, it was apparently on Na- mur that they were retiring; and that thus, in following them, I should find myself isolated, separated from him, and out of range of his movements. "These observations," Marshal Grouchy states, "were not well received; the emperor repeated his orders, adding that it was for me to discover the route taken by Marshal Bliicher."* Grouchy's objections are valid enough, but unfortunate- ly there was nothing else to be done. The wonder is that Napoleon, finding that Grouchy did not like the business, should not have superseded him at once. Vandamme was an experienced officer, and might have understood the situation better. Soult in such an undertaking might have won great renown, but Napoleon retained Soult not only for his knowledge of Wellington's tactics, but as the best person to take command of the army in case of acci- dent to himself. At Gembloux, seven or eight miles from Ligny, the highway divides going north and east. Grouchy ap- parently spent the 17th of June in discovering which direction Blucher had taken. Now any one who examines the positions of the four armies on the morning of June 18 will perceive that Napoleon was in a trap. Blucher was *The Campaign at Waterloo, J. C. Ropes, p. 207. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 95 at Wavre, which is about fourteen miles from the field of Waterloo; whereas Grouchy was fully eighteen miles from Wavre, and twenty miles distant from Napoleon, who probably delayed opening the battle on that account. At half past eleven Grouchy had reached Walheim, only six miles north of Gembloux, where he was greeted with the sound of Napoleon's cannon at Mont St. Jean, and as is well known was urged by Vandamme and Gerard to go to his support. If Grouchy did not know where he was and what he was doing, this was clearly his best line of action, though Bliicher still had the inside track and could have reached the field of battle nearly an hour before Grouchy could. Yet in this case we ought to consider not only what actually happened but what might have happened. If Wellington's army had been defeated by three o'clock in the afternoon, Grouchy 's assistance would not have been required, and he would have found himself awkwardly situated with regard to Bliicher. He would seem to have been more culpable for the slowness of his movements than for erroneous judgment. Why Bliicher delayed so long to reinforce Wellington has not yet been explained. One Prussian army corps arrived on the field about five p. m., and seriously embarrassed Napoleon's movements; but it was more than two hours later when the main force of the Prussians attacked the right wing of the French army. The material of Wellington's force was not nearly so good as Bliicher's. Only two-fifths of the troops drawn up to oppose Napoleon at Mont St. Jean were British soldiers, of which nearly a third were volunteers; one-fifth was made up of Hanoverians and Brunswick Prussians; and the remainder were Dutch and Belgians.* Welling- *Tliis is General Hambley; but Mr. J. C. Ropes says about twenty- four thousand British, twenty thousand Germans, and twenty-three 96 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS ton's Highlanders, however, may be counted equal to Napoleon's Old Guard, and he had also a very effective cavalry force. Napoleon, of course, was aware of the constitution of his opponent's army and probably expected to defeat it quite easily. The emperor alleges in his memoirs that he sent an order to Grouchy on the evening of the seventeenth requesting him to come to his assistance on the following day if he could possibly do so without Bliicher's knowing it. The truth of this has been doubted, and Grouchy has denied ever receiving such a dispatch. It is possible that Napo- leon intended to send such an order, that he neglected to send it, and afterwards supposed that he had sent it; but it is quite as possible that being sent to Wavre it fell into the hands of the Prussians, or that Grouchy being at Gembloux, Napoleon's orderly did not succeed in finding him until late in the following afternoon. Thiers states that a Polish ofiicer was intrusted with this dispatch, and that he never afterwards was heard from. Marshal Marmont, in his report on the battle of Sala- manca, notices that Wellington had a faculty for selecting strong positions, and his position at Mont St. Jean was no doubt the strongest he ever occupied.* The farm of Hougomont and the village of La Haye Sainte were like two castles in front of his line, which protected it from any immediate attack on the right and centre, while his second line was posted in comparative security behind the crest of the ridge. Yet Wellington did not anticipate Napoleon's attack on his left wing, and stationed his weakest troops there. thousand Dutch and Belgian troops. English battles have always been fought largely by soldiers of other nations. *It was at Mont St. Jean the battle took place. Waterloo is more than a mile on the road to Brussels. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 97 He thus came very near being defeated at the outset. According to the statement of his biographer. Rev. George Robert Gleig, the Dutch and Belgian troops all ran away, leaving only three or four thousand English soldiers to contend with a column of twelve or fifteen thousand French. General Pictou, who was in command, gave the order to advance, and was instantly killed by a musket ball. If this had happened before the order was given, it seems likely that in the confusion that ensues at the death of a commanding officer, the French attack would have succeeded. Marshal d'Erlon has been censured by all Napoleon's sympathizers for the formation of the column with which he made this attack. There can be no doubt that it was not properly supported by cavalry; but why did not Napoleon superintend such an important movement him- self .f* A Prussian corjps d'armee had already been observed on the heights of St. Lambert before the order for attack was given. Napoleon ought to have realized the deadly peril in which he and his army were placed. If Junot or Victor had organized the movement, who can doubt but that it would have succeeded? Why did not Napoleon support it with Kellermann's cavalry division and six or seven battalions of the middle guard? He might have concentrated tv/o-fifths of his force on that single point without danger to the rest of his hne, or if he had ad- vanced his right wing in line for a determined conflict, who can doubt that numbers and discipline combined would have carried the day? Napoleon's capture of La Haye Sainte two hours later was a decided advantage, and gave him a second oppor- tunity to win the battle. This, however, was neutralized by the attack of the Prussian corps shortly afterward on the right flank of the French. From this time forward 98 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS Wellington had the advantage of numbers, and Napoleon's army was in such a position that nothing but the blunders of his opponents could save it from defeat. Napoleon was obliged to withdraw troops from his centre to protect his right wing, and thus weakened it too much for a vigorous offensive movement. There were now more German than English troops on the battlefield. The failure of Ney's cavalry charges points directly to the statements already made in regard to the weakness of Napoleon's cavalry. Not a single square of the enemy was broken by them, whereas in 1870 the Berlin Guards rode down the French ranks at Gravelotte in spite of the rapid firing of the infantry. The Dutch regiments on Wellington's centre suffered most severely, but succeeded in preserving their formation. Dr. Ropes is the first writer in English who has given a clear and satisfactory account of the close of the battle. According to Thiers, the Guards made their attack in column about the time of the arrival of Bliicher, when the French line broke behind them and they were left at the mercy of Wellington's cannon, and refusing to surren- der were immolated on the field. This is melodramatic enough, but in order to believe it we must suppose that Napoleon delayed a final attack until the Prussian regi- ments had begun to deploy on his right; which is the same as supposing that Napoleon had suddenly lost his senses. Dr. Ropes 's account is supported by the statement of a Captain Powell, who fought against Napoleon's Guard in the Highlanders. It was not the Old Guard but the Middle Guard which was defeated, and Captain Powell attributes it to the sudden apparition of the Highlanders (who had been lying on the ground) and the deadly volley that they poured into the advancing column. This unex- THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN 99 pected collision was caused by the volume of smoke which rolled between the two armies, and as the Highlanders, had orders to fire while the Guard had orders to reserve their fire, the latter were taken at a disadvantage from which they did not recover. Captain Powell's testimony is valuable here. He states that the Highlanders pursued the Middle Guard for nearly a quarter of a mile, until finding themselves outflanked by the advance of Napoleon's Old Guard they retired again to their former position. The Old Guard was itself outflanked in turn by a British division coming up from Hougomont, and finding itself caught in a trap wisely withdrew without serious loss. Wellington's cavalry charge, by which he had recovered La Haye Sainte, appears to have been contemporary with Bliicher's attack on the French right. I believe no authentic statement of the English loss at Waterloo has ever been made public. Thiers places Napoleon's loss at about thirty thousand killed and wound- ed; the English at about the same; and the Prussians at eight or ten thousand. This is nothing but national vanity. The British loss is generally admitted to have been over twenty thousand, but that it should be equal to that of the French in such a conflict is incredible. The Prussian loss may have been between three and five thou- sand, but certainly not more. Wellington's management of the battle after Napoleon's first attack has never been found fault with. His subordi- nates also were everywhere equal to the occasion. As a defensive action, however, it was not so remarkable as Napoleon's second day at Leipsic, when with an army composed largely of French boys he preserved an unbroken line against a force nearly twice as large as his own. What Napoleon evidently did not reckon on in this 100 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS campaign was the strategy of Bliicher. He supposed after the battle of Ligny that Blticher would retreat on Namur or Liege, and he misled Grouchy somewhat by suggesting this. If he had foreseen Bliicher's action, he would certainly have taken greater precautions against it. We could admire Wellington more perfectly if he had never pointed to the playground at Eton and said, "There Waterloo was won." Napoleon would not have plumed himself on such a victory. He does not appear to have plumed himself on any of his exploits. The fame of forty victories was no comfort to him at St. Helena. The man was too great for that. THE POLITICS OF THE DIVINA COM MEDIA WE are not accustomed to think of T. W. Parsons as one of the foremost American poets, and yet in his translation from Dante, he has done the world a literary service second to none of them. There have been many translations hitherto of the great Italian epic, in English prose and verse, but Parsons's is the only one that combines the essential qualities of the original; its ease and grace of movement, its earnest tone and delicacy of expression . Before reading Parsons's translation I had given up hope of enjoying any translation of Dante, except, perhaps, John Carlyle's prose-poetic version of the Inferno. Carey made the fatal mistake of attempting to render him into English blank verse ; and Longfellow had already acquired a style too far removed from that of the Divina Commedia. The lack of any very definite style as a poet may have been to Mr. Parsons's advantage as a translator. No other modern language possesses equal advantages with the Italian for the formation of smooth-flowing verse; and the secret of Dante's graceful measure resides chiefly in the cadence of his feminine rhymes, which fall over from one line to another like the spray of a fountain. This effect might have been reproduced in Spenser's time, but doubtfully, in the present contracted state of the Eng- lish language. Parsons very wisely did not attempt to reproduce it, — though he has done so in places under favorable conditions; but he has preserved the alternate 101 102 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS rhymes of Dante's verse, which continue without a break to the end of each canto. He has thus secured a sense of movement, which, if it does not possess the noiseless ghding of Dante's spirits, nevertheless carries the reader along in a pleasant and unconstrained manner. In this we recognize its advantage over English blank verse, which is much better suited to the argument of the stage. Al- though Parsons's lines are commonly a syllable shorter than Dante's, he has rendered the first thirty-five verses of the Inferno into twenty -eight English verses. Considering the diflSculty of the work, the translation is remarkably smooth and well sustained. That it should be always equal to itself is more than we have the right to expect. Parsons's account of the revenge of Ugolino is one of his most fortunate passages, while he has treated the pure and simple story of Francesca's love with a circum- locution that requires too much for the imagination. That the Purgaiorio remains unfinished is more to be re- gretted than that Parsons should not have attempted more than a few detached passages of the Paradiso. In his exile Dante was no longer equal to a description of true happiness. This rare book, however, needs to be published with explanatory notes. Dante appears to have had glimpses of his own literary immortality, and yet no other poet has written so distinctly and determinedly for his own time and people. He is perhaps so much the better for this; but whether he is a better poet for his extensive scholarship may be considered doubtful. What the true poet needs, is not scholarship but a manifold experience, and it must be admitted that the scholarly character of Dante's work makes it more difficult for us to com- prehend. To realize the full meaning and intention of the Divina POLITICS OF THE DIVINA COMMEDIA 103 Commedia, it is necessary to acquire some familiarity with the tenets of mediaeval Christianity, to possess a college graduate's knowledge of Greek mythology, and to be ac- quainted with the course of Italian politics during the thirteenth century. There is as little true philosophy in his epic as in Homer's Iliad. It indicates an author of wide observation and profound experience, but the scholas- tic metaphysics with which he has impeded the movement of his Purgatorio and Paradiso may well be left to the initiated. Dante was not a thinker like Abelard, but a poet par excellence. Of these requisites the last has been the least understood, even by Dante's most ardent admirers. His interference in politics has been looked upon as the great mistake of his life. It has been said that he placed his enemies in hell and his friends in purgatory. It has been looked upon as a natural piece of vindictiveness that he should have placed his arch-enemy, Boniface VIII., in the third circle of Malebolge. Without entering too far into this branch of the sub- ject, we may quote the following sentence from one of the latest of his commentators: — "It is, however, not easy to decide what the principle is upon which he made his selection: some have thought that it was personal, and that he allowed himself to be guided throughout by motives of personal liking or hatred."* Suspicion is the child of ignorance and bad judgment. Sound minds recognize one another; and if there had not been a deep abiding sense of justice in Dante, he would never have become a world poet. All human beings are swayed more or less by personal feeling, but a close ex- amination of Dante's judgments proves that he was neither *Scartazzmi's Companion to Dante, trans, p. 429. 104 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS partial to his friends, nor unfairly invidious to his enemies and political opponents. The principle he evidently acted upon was that a person who had committed one cardinal sin, like the simony of Clement V. or Jason's desertion of Hypsipyle, ought to be condemned to hell, no matter how virtuous he might be otherwise. He has placed a number of Ghibelines in the Inferno, with his instructor Brunetto Latini and his friend Jacopo Rusticucci. Manfred is placed in purgatory, to show that in spite of excommuni- cation he is on the way to paradise. Guelph and Ghibeline are still ominous words. They represent the struggle between church and state in the middle ages, which raged so fiercely in Germany and Italy that other European nations were comparatively neg- lected by the priesthood; and the reason for this was that it was a struggle also for national independence against national unity. Italy could have no central authority of its own, so long as the pope held possession of Rome. He could not be pope and king also; and this fact created a demand for some supreme authority from the outside, which might constitute a final court of appeal for the diflfi- culties arising between the different states; and although the papal government disliked this, it was considered pref- erable to an Italian monarchy. The pope and the emperor were like a married couple who can neither live together nor live apart. A nation without a central government can only main- tain its independence so long as external circumstances favor this. Pope Adrian I. was obliged to call in Charle- magne to protect him against the Lombards; and John XII. offered the imperial dignity to Otho I. on condition that he would depose the usurper Berengarius. The attacks of the Saracens on southern Italy, which once placed Rome itself in serious danger, were a perpetual POLITICS OF THE DIVINA COMMEDIA 105 annoyance, and both Germans and Normans were called upon to suppress them. The Italian people were perfectly capable of defending themselves, but they lacked military organization, and it was not for the interest of the papal government that they should acquire this; and the grati- tude of the popes to their deliverers gradually cooled after the danger was over. The terms Guelph and Ghibeline only originated when the masterly Waiblingen family came to the German throne, but the same parties existed before their time and long afterward. The Guelphs were the patriotic party who wished Italy to become independent; and the Ghibe- lines were the party of law and order, who preferred pay- ing a foreign tax to having continual rows with their neighbors. As a matter of course the large cities like Milan, Genoa, Florence, and Bologna were Guelphic; and the smaller states, such as Verona, Padua, Arezzo, Cre- mona, and Pisa, who were greatly afraid of their more powerful neighbors, were Ghibeline. Naturally, in the more powerful cities the opposition was Ghibeline, and in the smaller ones it was Guelph. In Florence the Neri were Guelph and the Bianchi Ghibeline, or allied with them. In Florence the Ghibeline party acquired the ascendency in 1260; for which event one of its streets was named the Via Ghiabellina. There is always a conflict external or internal in the nation, the city, or the individual; but the manner in which we conduct ourselves in the struggle is more im- portant than the object or occasion of it. The occasion is a variable, but our conduct is a function of our lives. There was much useless bloodshed in the Guelph and Ghibeline wars, as there was in other countries during the middle ages, but in spite of this Italy prospered, improved, and became wealthy. There were varying successors on 106 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS both sides ; but the three powerful Hohenstaufen monarchs, Frederick I., Henry VI., and Frederick II., coming in suc- cession gave a preponderating advantage to the Ghibeline cause, and reduced the temporal authority of the pope almost to a nutshell. This was particularly the case during the reign of Fred- erick II., a ruler who united in himself the talents of Louis XIV. and Frederick the Great, without the weak- nesses of either, — one of the most complete men of whom there is any record. At the age of eighteen he crossed the Alps in disguise (for the Swiss were hostile to him) in order to take possession of an empire which not only in- cluded modern Germany, but Austria proper, Bohemia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Lombardy, and the king- dom of Naples. For thirty-eight years he governed this vast domain as if by magic. He was terrible in war, but too wise to attempt conquests which he did not believe could be retained. He carried the sword in his left hand and the olive-branch in his right. He suppressed a rebel- lion of the Lombards with Napoleon-like rapidity and thoroughness; but when obliged to go on a crusade in order to nullify the excommunication of the pope, he made peace with Carmel the Great, the successor of Saladin, and obtained from him larger concessions for the city of Jerusalem than previous crusaders had won by hard fight- ing. He founded a university, chartered free cities, and enacted laws to ameliorate the condition of the peasantry. Dr. Francis Lieber speaks of him as a man centuries in advance of his own age; and Menzel says that the" lustre of his seven crowns was far surpassed by his intellectual gifts and graces. " Against such a sovereign the pope had no weapons, spiritual or temporal, that were of any avail, — Frederick's son once captured the whole college of cardinals on their POLITICS OF THE DIVINA COMMEDIA 107 way from Avignon to Rome, — so the conclave of the Vati- can came to the wicked determination to assassinate the whole Hohenstaufen family.* Frederick's favorite son Enzio, was captured by the Guelphs at Bologna and put to death contrary to knightly customs and the right of bel- ligerents. Frederick himself narrowly escaped poisoning, and died soon afterward in his fifty-seventh year. His son Conrad IV., and Conrad's brother Henry, were both poisoned by the priests. His last son, Manfred, was killed in battle, fighting against the Duke of Anjou, whom the pope had called into Italy for the purpose, f His beauti- ful wife died in prison, and his young children, brought up in ignorance, became beggars in the streets. Three years later Conrad V., who came to avenge Manfred's death, was beheaded at Naples. So ended the Hohen- staufens; and in the history of the Church of Rome there is not a more hideous crime. When base methods are resorted to it commonly indi- cates a desperate condition of affairs. After the destruc- tion of the noble Waiblingen family, the pope and his cardinals found they had only changed a German for a French master; for the evil was inherent in the political situation. The execution of Conrad was avenged, as Carlyle says, by "Sicilian Vespers," in which the French were massacred, not only to a man, but to a woman. Pope Celestine was "induced to resign," by Charles of Anjou; and his successor, the infamous Boniface, was so maltreated by Philip the Fair that he died in the fourth year of Dante's exile. Such a course of events could only serve to strengthen the Ghibelines in Italy. Many im- *We regret to find a strict moralist like John Stuart Mill defending this course on the groimd of necessity. The same reasoning would exculpate the murderers of Cavendish and Burke. fin 1265, the same year that Dante was bom. 108 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS portant Guelphs went over to them from the fear of a sacerdotal despotism, and among these was the poet Dante. The succeeding pope, Clement V., favored the Ghibelines. Such was the background upon which the Divina Corn- media was written. In his youth, Dante was a soldier, and had fought against the Ghibelines at Campaldino. He next became a politician, but his poetic sense of justice and devoted patriotism brought him into conflict with greater forces than those which he could wield. If it had not been for his exile we might never have read his poetry. It must be confessed that his scheme of morals is rather academic. According to modern standards, it would have been more just to have represented Frederick II. in pur- gatory, and Boniface VIII. in the lowest hell; for in cold- blooded villainy Boniface was never surpassed by any other pope, unless it were Alexander Borgia. We find Frederick assigned to the circle of arch-heretics — which was simply taking his enemies' accusations for truth. It is evident that he was excommunicated for purely political reasons, and that his severe edicts against heresy were intended to counteract this. Dante may have known less about him than the historian Hallam did. The real heretic is he who refuses to believe the truth when it is placed before his eyes; and Frederick was too enlightened to feel implicit faith in the superstitious dogmas of his time. Why Dante should have placed his friends, Teghiaio Aldobrandi and Jacopo Rusticucci, in the Inferno is not so clear; it was probably for reasons known only to con- temporaries : so also of his preceptor Brunetto, — ^but they were evidently excellent men or Dante would not have foimd pleasure in recognizing them. A still more pedantic instance of injustice is that of Pietro della Vigne, in canto xiii, 55, who is incarcerated in the trunk of a tree for having committed suicide. He POLITICS OF THE DIVINA COMMEDIA 109 had been minister of state to Frederick II., but was blinded and imprisoned on suspicion of having attempted to poison his master. Dante considered him innocent of this accusation, but nevertheless consigned him to hell for taking his own life in prison. Contrariwise he excul- pates Cato, who was the most pedantic of suicides. Dante's essay in praise of monarchy is readily explained. He recognized the need of a national government for Italy, and monarchy was the only form of centralization that he could understand. The time for federalism had not yet arrived. He was not the greatest of poets. He may have ex- celled Milton; but he is surpassed by Homer, Shakespeare, and Goethe, — perhaps also by Sophocles and ^Eschylus. Yet, we return to him continually, and we are not depressed by the terrible scenes which he conjures up for us; for they appear in an atmosphere of the tenderest pity, and the light which illumines them comes from the life eternal. The Divina Commedia is one of the watch-towers which mark the progress of civilization, and, like Homer's Iliad, it may still hold its place after the lingua Toscana has ceased to be spoken. MACHIAVELLI'S "PRINCE" MACHIAVELLI is one of the puzzles of me- diaeval history. When some notable person who has always appeared immaculate to the public eye, one who has been long distin- guished for the performance of pious works and the utter- ance of patriotic sentiments, is discovered conniving at fraud, or caught in the perpetration of some criminal act himself, we are greatly shocked, it is true, but not alto- gether surprised; for we know that such instances have not been uncommon before, that self-interest is an ever ready instructor of hypocrisy, and, if we are sufficiently honest with ourselves, we realize how near at times the tempter has been to each one of us. When, however, we read of a man upon whose personal character there was never a stain, and who devoted his life to the service of his native city, who endured torture without complaint, and died in poverty without reproach; and yet one who in his writings advocated the most cruel, cold-blooded, and atrocious principles, — of such a one what judgment are we to make? What are we to think of a statesman who advises us that "men must be either flattered or crushed; for they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but for heavy ones they cannot?" Such a piece of truculent cynicism leaves Diogenes and his tub centuries behind. "The Prince" differs in this respect from the "History of Florence." The latter work may, in the portion of it which comes closely to the author's own life, represent 110 MACHIAVELLI'S "PRINCE" 111 partisan and prejudiced views, but this can only be proved by a painstaking investigation of the subject. Otherwise the spirit that animates it would seem to be that pure love of exposition, which George Eliot has noticed as one of Machiavelli's distinctive traits. After a recent perusal I do not recollect a single passage in it which might be called cynical or even sarcastic, and the satire which we may occasionally meet with in it is of a most amiable and refreshing kind. Nowhere does he descend in manner or material from the dignity which belongs to historical com- position, except in the fifth chapter of the eighth book, where he evidently makes game of Roberto da Rimini. He is always the friend of municipal independence, the only form of civil liberty possible in Italy during the Middle Ages, and always the admirer of healthy, vigor- ous political action, whether by princes or popular govern- ments. In the conduct of affairs he considers sagacity the highest virtue and incapability the worst of evils. This it is not difficult to perceive, though his usual style is one of judicial indifference. He never palliates the crimes of princes, nor excuses the sloth, negligence, and presumption which have often accompanied the inheritance of titles and high offices. Visionary schemes of restoring an ideal past are to such a practical mind as Machiavelli's of all things the most abhorrent. Yet he speaks kindly of Stef ano Poreari, who attempted to revolu- tionize Rome, after the fashion of Garibaldi and Mazzini, but was betrayed and put to death by the pope in 1452. "Though some may applaud his intentions," Machiavelli says, "yet he is accountable for a deficiency of imder- standing; for such attempts, although they may appear glorious, are almost sure to be attended with ruin." In the same narrative he refers to the dissolute manners of the priesthood and the mischief which they occasioned 112 POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS among both nobles and commons. If he favors one form of government more than another, it is that spontaneous Periclean authority, conferred upon the Medici by the citizens of Florence from the time of Cosmo the Great to the unworthy son of Lorenzo, with whom it came un- happily to an end.* It is a marvelous thing when a whole people with one accord intrust the best man among them with sole charge of their public affairs. It is something better than either democracy or monarchy, for it is the harmonious union of both. When the life of Lorenzo de' Medici was in danger from the conspiracy of Sixtus Fourth and the Pazzi, every Florentine citizen of any importance whatever, says Machiavelli, waited upon him with the offer of their life and property in his defense. The interests of Florence and of the Medici would seem to have been identical. Macaulay, to whom much speaking gave readiness, but writing not much exactness, states as a "notorious" fact "that Machiavelli was, through life, a zealous republi- can;" but this is saying a great deal too much. The only support I can find for it is the internal evidence of the History, and the fact that he was imprisoned and tortured by the Medici in 1513 on suspicion of being concerned in a conspiracy against them. The truth of this accusation will never be known, for no confession could be extorted from him; but the fact that the conspiracy was formed only within a year after the dedication of his book to Lorenzo the younger, would, to those who place any faith in human nature, make it appear improbable. Nor is it likely that Machiavelli would give a decided opinion in favor of the republican form of government. He was a trained diplomat, nursed in the school of the Borgias, and ready to serve the state, whichever party happened to be *This was also Aristotle's opinion. Politics, iii.y 13. MACHIAVELLI'S "PRINCE" 113 in power. As a diplomat, he would certainly be prudent enough to preserve silence on so dangerous a subject. In truth, this appears to have been a pretty bold guess on Macaulay's part; for in his commentaries on Livy, Machia- velli, after discussing the nature and special advantages in each case of the monarchical, aristocratic, and demo- cratic forms of government, and explaining in the clearest manner how each has a peculiar weakness inherent in itself which has always led finally to its corruption and debase- ment, concludes at length that the most stable, efficient, and just government will ultimately prove to be that which