* . ' A^^■ .^'^. ^ IkV- "^. v>^ ^ "^^-. v^' ^ '^.. r- y o, * -/- c- 'e<. ^'^/. \^ 3 -^ »^ ■^o^\ ^^^ '^-- .^^J'^ V ■A^^ ^-^^-^ ' v*^ i**\ \ xO<^<. ^0 r-. >o- 'O, ^_^ .-,' ',1 '/- '/ c> /• 'P^ ''^ .-* .^0' ^^^ -^^^ •< ' ,- -^ ' "r .^ .'A .0' c ^^ 'OO^ %. V es not alter the case, for the operations of reason are as clearly intuitive as those of simple perception. The intellect in advancing from the intuitions of sense t-o the processes of reason, does not lay aside its original mode of acquisition in favor of one more intelligible to us ; it acts always in the same manner, whatever may be tlie re- * Essay on the Understanding, Book 4, Ch. xvii., Sec. 14. t Book 4, Ch. s>ii., Sec. 4. so SELF EDUCATION. »ult of its action, like tlie eye which has orJj one method of seeing, though there is an infinite variety in the objects of vision. These observations acqiure great force if we regard the human rjiud, not as a collection of independent faculties, but as a rational agent capable of diversified ac- tion. Mental phenomena are then traceable to a common cause, and must necessarily be alike incomprehensible. 2. The operations of the mind are intuitive. Intuition implies the spontaneous exercise of natural powers. We think as naturally, -and I may add, as necessarily as we breathe, and the miad no more learns to think than the body learns to respire. Hence, M'hatever modification of thought may be put fforth, whether it be memory or imagin- ation, perception or reason, it is the effect of unoriginated capacity, and involved in the constitution of an intelligent natui'e. Some metaphysicians have very carelessly ranked i:ituition as a distinct faculty of the mind, vfhereas it is in no sense a faculty, but merely denotes the manner of all tlie faculties.* Of this process we know nothing except its occasional dependence upon certain physical conditions, as, for instance, in perception, where the mind is mechanic- ally assisted by the organs of vision. But as we can not perceive how the mind operates upon tliese instrumentali- ties, nor comprehend any of its essential powers, we are forced to admit that it acts by intuition — that is, in a way which we do not understand, but which requires neither previous time nor previous preparation. 3. It is further to be observed, that these acts of the mind are natiu-ally perfect. In this respect the strictly in- tellectual faculties bear a striking analogy to the corporeal * " From feeling arise the activities of the mind in the following order: intuition, conception, recollection, imagination, memory, thonght." — Biblical Repository, Jan., 1845, (Stowc's Teutonic Met- 9phjfi"B.) This is given as Kant's doctrine on the subject. CONSTITUTION OF TUB MIND. 21 sonsos, and to the involuntary functions of the physical system generally, none of which become more perfect by the lapse of time or admit of essential improvement by means of cultivation. The eye is as perfect, the precision of instinct as groat, and the self-regulated movements of animal mechanism as harmonious and efficient, in infancy as in manhood. And so far as the operations of intellect c^au bo traced at that fecblo period, they indicate the same measure of inr.atc and constitutional perfection. " I am aware," says Dr. Brown, " that the apphcation to an in- fant, of a process of reasoning, expressed in grave and formal philosophic nomenclature, has some chance of ap- pcarir.g ridiculous. But the reasoning itself is very diiier- ent from the terms employed to express it, and is truly as sini{)le and natural as the terms, which our language obliges us to employ in expressing it, are abstract and artificial. The infant, however, in his feeling of similarity of antece- dents and consequents, and of the necessity, therefore, of a new antecedent, where the consequent is different, haa the reasoning, but not the terms. lie does not form the proposition as universal, and appiical)le to cases that have not yet existed : but he feels it iu every particular ease as it occurs. That he does truly reason, M"ith at least as much subtlety as is involved in the process now supposed, can not be doubted by those who attend to the manifeet results of his little inductions, in those acquisitions of knowledge which show themselves in his actions, and, I may say, almost in the very looks of the little rcasoncr, — at a period long before that to which his o'U'n remembrance; is afterwaitls to extend, when, in the maturer progress cf* his intellectual powers, the darkness of eternity will meet bis eye alike, whether he attempt to gaze on the past, cr ©a the future ; and the wish to know the events with which he is afterwards to be occupied and interested, will not be 22 SEII EDUCATION. more nnavailing tBan the ■wish to retrace events that were the occupation and interest of the most important years of his existence." " Even then, many a process of ratiocin- ation is going on which might have served as an example of strict logic to Aristotle himself, and which affords re- sults far more valuable to the individual reasoner than all the contents of all the folios of the crowd of that great logician's scholastic commentators."* Not only are the faculties of the infant mind perfect, but they possess all the peculiarities which are to distin- guish them in subsequent life. A remark to this effect occurs in one of Dr. Johnson's biographical pieces. " That the strength of Sydenham's understanding, the accuracy of his discernment, and ardor of his curiosity, might have been remarked from his infancy by a diligent observer, there is no reason to doubt. For there is no instance of any man whose history has been minutely related, that did not in every part of life discover the same proportion of intellectual vigor."t If we allow that the acts of the mind are intuitive, their perfection follows as a necessary consequence, because intuition places them beyond tlie reach of cultivation. They are the result of a process independent of himian sagacity or control, and originate in this manner, that man might under all circumstances bo competent to act the part of a rational creature. But for this precaution of nature, rationaUty would have been a contingent blessing, confined entirely to the precincts of education. -1. Mind acts necessarily, but is capable of voluntary direction. Locke observes that, " our knowledge, as in * Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Thomas Brown, M. D., Vol. 1. Lee. 23. The process here alluded to is that by which an nfant acquires its first knowledge of tangible qualities. t Life of Sydenham. CONSTITUTION 07 THE MIND, 2S Other things, so ia this, has a great conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly vol- untary."* Action appears to be as natural and as indis- pensable to the intellectual as to the material part of th^e human system. Whether the intelligent principle ever intermits its activity, is another question, and one, which, however it may be decided, can not determine the mode of its operation in our conscious moments. The eye sees ia all ordinary cases, by constitutional necessity, and yet ita action may be suspended either by sleep or the will of the individual. It is not optional then, with the intellect, ■whether it thinks or not, nor is it altogether able to deter- mine the objects about which its constant activities shall be employed. That it has the power of self- direction, to some extent, is certain, although its course is liable to a thousand interruptions. It is however to this capacity for voluntary direction that tlic mind is chiefly indebted for its scientific acquisitions. Still its method is unchanged, and the knowledge which is acquired by voluntary apphca- tion is gained in the same manner as that which is forced upon us by nature. All the facts which are requisite for man to know do not naturally present themselves to his observation, and he has the power therefore of bringing art and industry to increase the stock of his knowledge. But as the eye has only one method of %ision for all ob- jects, whether natural or artificial, so the intellect scans the creations of its own industry and the spontaneous productions of providence, with the same intuitive glance. Some things we must know, others we may know, but contingency neither precludes intuition nor enables us to dispense with it. The various sciences are so many in- stances of truth elaborated by a voluntary application of * Book 4. Chap. 13. Sec. 1. 2-1 SBLJ EDTTCATIOI?. intuitive powers. Human nature is therefore invested with faculties which, if they do not admit of material im- provement, are nevertheless capable of useful direction. 5. Our intellectual faculties are so constituted that the improvement of which they are susceptible, consists chie3y in the acquisition of knowledge, and not in the in- crease of organic power. The common impression on this subject seems to be that the mental faculties exist only ia an incipient state, or as bare susceptibilities. We are ac- customed therefore to look upon these powers as genus which must be expanded in order to form an iuteEectual cliaracter. It is considered the appropriate work of edu- cation to bring them to maturity by actual expansion. The following remarks of Dr. Reid contain a fair expres- sion of the popular view of this subject. " Of the various powers and faculties we possess, there are some which na- ture seems both to have planted and reared, so as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which arc necessary to the preservation of the individual, or the con- tinuance of the kind. There are other powers, of which nature hath only planted the seeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture. It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements ia intellectuals, in taste, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature ; while on the other hand, the neglect or perversion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption."* I am well persuaded that the sentiment here exhibited is erroneous, and that the human intellect is capable of no such advancement as it supposes. Peopk have seen that the mind is capable of improvement, and have carelessly imputed to an acquired perfection of its * Ififjulry into the Hunaan Tdlind, Chap. 1, Sec. 2. CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND. ZO faculties, ^vllat can only be properly ascribed to a judicious use of those faculties. Improvement is something very diiferont from an augmentation of constitutional ability ; the former may be effected by industry, the latter must l)o the result of creative energy ; the one requires only the proper use of our powers as they now are, — the other demands their re- construction on a larger scale. But in no department of nature is organic development entrusted to human supervision. Providence has made arrange- ments for the complete endowment of its ci*eaturcs without the need of their concurrence. The seeds have not been planted to await the culturing hand of man; whatever exists in our nature in a rudimental state is attended by influences that ensure its spontaneous development and maturity in due time for every practical purpose. It is however from facts connected with the history of the mind that this notion derives its cfieetual refutation. Educa- tion has never been known to add any thing to the intrinsic ability of the human intellect. In every age of the world uneducated mind has proved itself ecjual to the hio-liest efforts of genius ; and when brought into comparison with the most approved specimens of cultured intellect, the latter is found to have acquired nothing essential by the process through which it has passed. In this respect knowledge is like wealth — it adds nothing to the talents cf its possessor; a man may amass property, but his physical and intellectual faculties will remain the same as before. Were it the case that our minds could be thus expanded, the results of education would be greatly modified, and every weak understanding would find a sovereign remedy in the invigorating power of science. Such a pleasing consequence of industry might bo grati- fying, but has never yet occurred, and never can, until the laws of nature arc changed. Man now brings to the stJudj -Q SBLS' EDUCATlOJf. of truth, powers which gain nothing by his researches, or at least nothing more than the eye gains by seeing, or the body by exercise. Their first and their last exhibitions are equal. No great character that has apjjeared in any department of human enterprise, has ever been less acute or less efficient in his first than in his subsequent efforts. 8ir Isaac Newton made his two most important discoveries, .li'luxions and Gravitation, before his tAventy-fifth year. A long life, with all the advantages of constant study, did not enable him to display greater skill in scientific researches . Had his faculties been capable of such an expansion as in commonly supposed, the latter period of his life must have been marked by a corresponding brilliancy over the earlier part of his intellectual career. Another objection to this view of the subject is, that an increase of organic power is wholly unnecessary. We do not need a development of new powers,^ but simply an application of those which we already possess. The mind has unemployed strength sufficient for all its wants. It is now competent to know every useful trixth, and any addition to its ability would be as superfluous as it is impracticable, Now altiiough the idea of ehciting the powers of the mind, and thereby giving them a perfection not otherwise attainable, and which they did not previously possess, is obviously unphilosophical, as well as contradictory of facts, yet it remains an established truth that intellectual im- provement is both practicable and necessary. While the acquisition of knowledge has no organic efi^ect, it still subserves, all the important uses for which it was intended- Knowledge is a species of treasure accumulated to be applied as the wants of life require. It is a power which the mind has learned to employ for its own advantage. Mechanieal powers add nothing to the strength of man, and yet hj their meang he U able to accomplish undertak- CONSTITUTION OP THE MIND. 27 ings inconceivably beyond his unaided capacity. In liko manner art and science contribute nothing to the mine!, though through their instrumentality it can eifect the most gigantic achievements. We behold Archimedes baffling the power of armies, Columbus terrifying the inhabitants of the West India Islands into submission, and La PlacR quieting the fears of mankind as to the " wreck of matter and the crush of worlds" from orbicular derangement; but in neither instance did these great men rely upon their unaided faculties, or wield any other power than that whieli science supplies to every diligent student. By nearly all that civilization exceeds a savage state, are we indebted to the transforming influence of science— an influence not restricted to superior abilities, but as universally available as any thing can be v/hich depends upon the industrious a])pUcation of commoviw sense. The savage has powers abundantly suSicifiiit if he would apply them ; the attri- butes of his loiind need only a proper direction to make him the peer of civilized man. His faculties need no improve- ment but that which is derived from the possession of Jcno-wlcdgo, nor does his condition require any but tlsat ■vvJuch arises from the use of his faculties, It is said that the Indians, when they first saw letters tised to convey information, supposed that the paper spoke ; and a similar want of philosoplucal observation has led to the very general opinion that the mind is itself litorislly expanded by the acquisition of knowledge — that it is cultivated, in short, much as we would cultivate a plant, and undergoes a similar enlargement. From its increased power, it is supposed that this must be the efl^ect. But this kind of analogy is inadmissible when applied to things BO very diffierent in their natures. I do not mean their essences, for in that respect we know nothing of either, but simply the laws which govern them as organized, or, at 28 SELF EDUCATIOi\, least, as inclei^endent existences. And if it be true that the miad acquires its growth by degrees like the body, it would even then develop itself spontaneously in the same }nauuer as the physical system now does. We have seen^ however, that human nature is endowed with certain instincts and involuntary movements as perfect at first as they ever can be in the present state of being, and it is to this category that the intelligent principle belongs. The attempt, therefore, to cultivate in the sense of organic expansion would be as absurd as to aim at promoting the growth of the body after it had arrived at maturity. Besides, such analogies overlook the character of knowl- edge ; its immense power is thrown into the shade hj this fancied modification of mind. Education imparts a knowl- edge of facts which enable their possessor to do what to the uninitiated seems entirely superhuman. Hence very naturally arose the story that the first printer was a magician. A mind thus fui'nished with knowledge, hj means of which it can apply itself with such extensive at:d surprising effect, may be considered improved in the only sense in which that term is applicable to its nature. This subject appears not to have attracted the notice of metaphysicians ; and the only authority which I am able to adduce from any source in sup'port of the position here assumed, is the following. " Self-knowledge, indeed, does not enlarge or increase our natural capacities, but it guides and regulates them ; leads us to the right use and apphea- tion of them, and removes a great many things which obstruct their due exercise; as pride, prejudice, and passion, fyc, which oftentimes so miserably pervert the rational powers."* 'I** * Mason on Self-knowledge, Part 2, Chap. 6. Although this is affirmed of only one kind of knowledge, the author evidently designed it as a general proposition. CONSTITUTIOX OF THE MIND. ^y C. The acquisitions of the iniad depend upon its own exertions. It has been shown that talents cannot Lc orig- inated; that the intellectual powers do not derive their capacity for improvement from a process of cultivation; that external means only facilitate acquisition by enabling the student to employ his powers to greater advantage ; and, that mental cultivation involves no other responsibility or benefit than simply furnishing materials which the mind may employ in its future operations. It has also been shown that the mind admits of voluntary application over and above all its necessary acts. The object now is to .show that knowledge is the result of exercise. I shall not inquire how the first idea makes its way into the mind, nor whether such idea is innate or not ; such an inquiry appears to me both useless and absurd. We might as well inquire when the first sound fell upon the ear, or the first pulsation dilated the heart. Mind began to think when it Jxgan to exist, and its thoughts, which we term ideas, can ?>e traced to no origin but the instinctive activity of its cwa nature. Man thinks because he is made a rational creature, and he will continue to think while this attribute of his constitution remains, however assisted by the sug- gestions of sense, or embarrassed by the want of innate ability. Rejecting speculations of this kind as too intri- cate to be successful, and too profitless to deserve attention, we fix upon the far more important question which relates to its subsequent advancement. It is not necessary to rcr-iark liere by what modification of thought, knowledge is luc'st likely to be gained, as that subject must necessarily C'.mc up in an other part of this work. Aside from that knowledge Avhich is inseparable from a rational being, there arc A'ast collections of scientific truth to which the mind has only a contingent relation ; they are not among its ^cccssary, but its possible attainments. That the contin- 30 SELF EDUCATIOIf. gcncy involved ia these acquisitiona is notliing but mental exercise, is a proposition Jtlmost too plain for argument, and jet it lias been overlooked in practice and in theory, until many imagine that knowledge is acquired by some myste- rious and unassignable process over which industry has no control. The difference in the attainments of different individuals may, in part, bo ascribed to a diversity of intellectual endowments, and, in some degree, likewise, to the character of their opportunities; but the prevailing circumstance by which the knowledge of each is determined will be found to consist in the extent and judiciousness of personal appHcation. Genius and facilities ensui-e an easier performance ; and in this case the labor of acquisition is abridged but without the least variation of manner. What one accomplishes may be wholly beyond the reach of as other, although he pursues the same course of intellectual accumulation, and would have arrived, uiader other circum- Btaneea, at equal knowledge in equal time. But genius and mediocrity are thus reduced to a common level ; they are equally thrown upon industry for success, and made to rely, like the ancient athletes, upon the vigorous use of their own powers. The history of the human mind u remarkably uniform in this particular. We have not a sinofle instance where science has not demanded labor of those who attained it, however strong may have been their' predispositions, or brilliant their endowments-. In thisr respect there is no difference between the mind and the body, the law of acquisition being the same to both, and neither having any clandestine methods of effecting its object. No position will make us rich, independent of economy and industry, nor can the mind acquire truth aside from that constant and careful toil so invariably requisite to the successful pursuit of wealth. Forgetful of these obvious facts, and impatient of the CONSTITUTION OF THB MIND. ,'>1 slow process by which wc are conscious our own improYC- ment has been made, we arc led to impute the extraordinary attainments of genius to chance, or to some raj'sterious and unknown law of mental acquisition. Rather than admit its accelerated progress over the same ground, we choose to conceive of it as having arrived at its position in some other way and by some supernatural means. This is to imagine a miracle where nothing was wanting but industry. Such as have been able to retrace their steps from the highest cmincnccg of science, and describe to us the method of their ascent, have uniformly said with Newtou, that if they had accomplished any thing peculiar it must he ascribed solely to -diligence. 7. The acts of the mind are uniform in manner and perfect in nature, but greatly diversified in the character of their objects. From this variety of direction, there naturally arise the various descriptions of mental character to which we give the name of genius, and which arc gen- erally supposed to imply some constitutional superioritj-. Intellectual parity finds few advocates, though there are sufficient reasons for believing that all minds arc endowed by nature with about the same degree of strength. This conclusion is justified by the actual attainments of every rational individual. Here I must again refer to Dr. Brovrn. who never, in his searching analysis, loses sight of man's original capacities. "If ail human science were to be divided, as Rosseau says, into two portions, the one comprehending what is common to all mankind, and the ether only that stock of truths which is peculiar to tlie V, ise and learned, he can scarcely be regarded as deliverinir a very extravagant paradox, in asserting that this latter portion, which is the subject of so much pride, would seem very trifling in comparison of the other. But of thi,- greater portion, we do not thir-k, as he triJy savs, parti v S2 SELF EDUCATION, because the kao'wiedge \Yliicli it compreliencls is acquired so very early, that we scarcely remember the acquisition of it, and still more, perhaps, boeau-se since knowledge becomes remarkable only by its differences, the elements that are common in all, like the common quantities in algebraic equations, are counted as nothing. If we know nothing more of the mind of man, than its capacity of becoming acquainted with the powers of so vast and so complicated an instrument as that of speech, and of acquiring this knowledge in circumstances the most unfavorable to the acquisition, without any of the aids, which lessen so greatly our labor in acquiring any other language far less perfectly in after life ; and amid the con- tinual distractions of pains and pleasures, that seem to render any fixed effort absolutely impossible. We might, indeed, find cause to wonder at a capacity so admirable. But when we think of all the other knowledge which is acquired at the same time, even by this mind, which we have selected as one of the humblest, — what observations of phenomena, what inductions, w^hat reasonings down- ward, from the results of general observation to particular cases that are analagous, must have occurred, and been formed, almost unconsciously, into a system of physics, of which the reason er himself perhaps, does not think as a system, but on which he founds his practical conclusions, exactly in the same way as the philosopher applies his general principles to the complicated contrivances of mechanics, or the different arts. When wo think of all this, and know that all this, or at least a great part of all this, must have been done, before it could be safe for the little reasoner to be trusted, for a single moment, at the slightest distance from the parental eye, how astonishing does the whole process appear ; and if we had not oppor- tunities of observation, and in some measure, too, the con- CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND. 33 6ciou3nos3 of our own mcmorv, in our later acquisitions to toll us liow all this has been clone, what a variety of means must we conceive nature to have employed, for producing so rapidly and so efficaciously, this astonishing result l""*" The acquisitions which arc thus unconsciously made by every ordinary understanding, arc no less remarkable for their character than for their extent, as they comprehend facts of every order, from the highest to the lowest that can be addressed to the human mind. No greater intellect- ual power is requisite than has already been exercised by every individual, for there are no harder tasks than have already been performed. But, notwithstanding, while under the tuition of nature, all minds seem to possess equal ability, wo find when left to themselves a m^arkcd disparity — or what appears to many as a disparity. Genius is regarded as indicating superiority of mind, rather than peculiarity of direction. It woTild be idle to deny tliat some minds have a peculiar aptitude for particular acqui- sitions, but it is no less absurd to suppose that such minds are correspondingly great in all other departments of intel- lectual effort. This aptitude is by no means the result of any uncommon endowment ; for the fact that every mind has sufficient capacity while its education is directed solely bv nature, shows that the difference in question can not be ascribed to a want of constitutional ability. Even the weakest mind actually learns enough to demonstrate its capacity for tlio highest attaiinncuts. For this reason some have denied the existence of genius, and affirmed it to be a relic of heathen superstition. True, we arc indebted to paganism for the term, but like many others which wo li^ve borrowed from the same soiux-e, it no longer retains its original meaning. If genius once signified a good or *• Piiiljconliy of the Ilunian Mind. Vol. 2. p. 170. Si SSLJ EDUCATIOK. Cril spirit set over each person to direct his life, it now signifies only " that aptitude which a man naturally pos- sesses to perform well and easily that which others can do but indifferently, and with a great deal of pain." Taken in this sense, the word is as weU authorized aa any which can be applied to the mijid. The difference thus seen and acknowledged, may be accounted for without the aid of organic inferiority or fabulous genii. It is a difference amounting only to varietj' — or, in other words, the difference is not one of proportion, but of kind. Equal powers arc directed to various objects. This is obvious not only from the well-known fact that every person has a genius for something, but also from the §till more irresistible truth th^t men of genius have no universal ability. It is in but one or a few things that they excel others ; in every thing else they sink to the common level. How this diversity of direction occurs, we are not able, in every instance to say, nor is it necessary. Every reader must see tho.t R'amercus c?.':.:cs coiiltine their influence here, and it will oftea be difficult to determine how far individual habits, or hereditary predispositions, or casual circumstances, may have contributed to these peculiarities. This view of genius is sanctioned by Dr. Johnson, in a passage which occurs in his life of Cowley ; only it must be remarked that he makes these determining causes consist wholly of accidental occur- rences, YY'hereas we think they are much more extensive, including corstitutional and hereditary peculiarities, not loss than external circumstances. " In the window of his mother's apartment lay Sponger's Fairy Queen, in which he very early took delight to read, till, by feeling the charms of verse, he became, as he relates, irrecoverably a poet. Such are the accidents which, sometimes remem- bered, and perhaps Boraetimes forgotten, produce that particular designation of mind, and propensity for some CONSTITUTIOK 0¥ THE MIKD. 3S certain science or emploj'ment, which is commonlj caUcd genius. The true gcniuB is a mind of large general power?, accidentally determined to some particular direction. Sir Josliua Reynolds, the great painter of the present age, had tlie first fondness for his art excited by the perusal of Iliohardson's Treatise." Some authors, among whom is Dr. Good, have made genius a distinct faculty of the mind. " Genius is that faculty which calls forth and combines ideas with great rapidity and vivacity, and with an intuitive perception of their congruity or incongruity."* But this distinction is unnecessary, and partakes too much of the antiquated notion of a teutclary divinity. We have seen that all persona, while under the tuition of nature, learn with equal rapidit}', and hence, notwithstanding the diflbrenccs disco- Torable in adult life, we conclude that all possess about the same amount of intellectual power, bnf; variously modified. Taking this view of the subject we can not regard genius as a separate faculty, bccjiusc it denotes only an increased activity of all the faculties whenever directed to soroo particular object. Genius, tl^en, iqiplies no peculiar or extraordinary powers, nor any distinct faculty of the mind. but simply some peculiarity of direction by which the intellect is enabled to exert itself more successfully iii a given pursuit. * Book of Nature, 3 Scrie?, Lcc. 1-5. CHAPTER n. Education. Tlie supremacy of hiinvan nature is one of mind. Man with uo more knowledge than a brute would be as power- less. His constitution as a rational being, gives liim au iaevitable superiority over the lower orders of animal existence; but he is also capable of diversified and exten- sive attainments which can only result from a voluntary application of his faculties. This application and its rcs'jits wc are accustomed to denominate cducaiicu. The term is derived from a Latin word educo, which siguiucs "to nourish," "to bring up," "to draw out," "to teach or instruct." These definitions obviously include the two- fold idea of organic development and scientific acquisition. Eut it is one thing to determine the etymological import of a word, and an other to fix precisely the character of the facts of which it is made the representative ; for it is well known that words are not always used with strict regard to their original meaning, nor applied alone to things which a4"0 clearly understood. In the present instance there can bo no dispute as to the different meanings which the oiiginal word vrill boar, but it may well be questioned wlictlier these are all equally applicable to tlic subject of mental impruvcment. Education is gcnerallj' imdcrstoid to aim no less at invigorating the intellectual faculties, than at imparting useful knowledge ; both objects are consid- ered legitimate, if not necessary results of the process. But if these faculties neither need nor admit of anv direct EDUCATION. 37 cultivation, as I have stated in the previous chapter, it follows that the prevalent o[,)iinon is uiifouvidecl and ought to give })Irtce to a mure philosophical csthnato of the human intellect. The notion of organic improvement carries -with it a discouraging tendency inasmuch as it represents the mind to he nothing, or next to nothing, . until it has Lecn expanded and strengthened by education — an idea mere absurd than would be the supposition that vre had no eyes until they were elicited and brought to maturity by the action of light and the process of vision. In the latter case GUI' eyes would still be provided for by an arrarge- inent of nature, though somewhat delayed; but ia the former case, mind, overlooked by providence, becomes s.;lely the creature of education — that is to say the noblest attribute of man is not original, but acquired. It is remarkable that the prevailing system of education affords no countenance to this absurdity. Every science taught in our schools, has been introduced for the ostensible reason that it relates to useful facts. No object is formally pur- sued but the acquisition of science. Accordingly the progress of the student is usually facilitated regardless of the effect which his attainments may have upon his mind ; ho studies to know things, and knowing them, nothing more either is or ought to be required. Some sciences, it i.? true, have been thought to exert a more powerful influ- ence than others in disciplining the mind ; but this discipline is never formally attempted because the practical philosophy of mankind repels thcii* speculative errors. The difference of effect is owing to the nature of the several truths themselves, or to the method in which thoy are acquired, and not to any organic power which they aitj able to impart to the mind. Perhaps no class of men ever studied more profoundly than the ancient schoolmen ; and yot the trifling character of their inquiries rendered 38 SELJ? SDUOATICN. them powerless in their own and ridiculous in everj succeeding age. Had their minds been wisely directed, had the facts about which they employed such endless industry, possessed any real importance, the Reformation might have dated back three centuries, and names now little less than infamous have shown resplendent in the annals of science. Truth is powerful because it enables the mind to do what ignorance had made impossible. What we impute to discipline belongs only to knowledge ; it is the same intellect acting with greater advantages — the same agent employed under more favorable circumstances. The mode of studying some sciences — a mode rendered necessary by their abstract nature, doubtless requires greater attention as well as more careful observation, and thus by employing the mind more fully, adds corresponding advantage, without any increase of essential power. I am obliged, therefore, to conclude that knowledge is the principal object of education. Science is to be culti- vated, and not the mind. In the invention and acquisition of science, there is an ample field for tlp.e best rjbilitics of human nature, and a field where each is competent to act without the aid of previous preparation. He who is furnished with knowledge acquired by his own industry, is to be considered as educated, and his education is valuable or vforthless just in proportion to the character of the facts which be has learned. Mere assistance docs not vary the case ; science may be improved and the labor of acquisition abridged ; but the nature of the practical effort, and of iU attendant effects, is unchanged. The manner, as well as; the matter of otir scientific pursuits must be estimated solely by its tendency to enrich the mind with useful' knowledge. Education includes the means no less than the end — thft application of the mind no less than tho knowledge bj EDTJCATIOH. 39 which it is sure to be rewarded. Aa in all other instancc3, •so in this, we find a consf ant connection between cause and effect. The common theory which ascribes our attain- ments, in part, to an increased constitutional ability, docs indeed assign a cause, but one that is wholly imaginary. la the true spirit of conjectural philosophy, it overlook.? the real and simple cause to fix upon one more imposing in a fiction of its own creation. Mental activity is an invariable condition of knowledge. Mind must think in order to know, and probably must know whenever it thinks. Thus a ])rocess of thought becomes an indispensable part of education, and the mind by a voluntary observation of truth, is seen to collect those treasures of science so essen- tial to its dignity and usefulness. Dilligence here often displays itself iii favor of mediocrity of talents, while genius, regardless of the law of improvement, and uncon- eciaus of its relative superiurity, or vainly relying upon its powers, falls behind through idleness. Wc must not, however, suppose that cduc'^tion i.^ intended to teach tha mind how to think. Such assistance n^ust be superfluous, as natui'c furnished the requisite skill for eveiy intellectual process, when it formed the ipind a cogitative being. Then the power of thought was placed beyond the reach cf contingency, and to education was assigned the luimbler office of directing, in some measure, the application of ovs faculties. From these observations it is evident that education begins with the first and ends only with the last attempt 4o learn. Buf we usually employ the term to express those acquisitions of kiiowledge which are the result of a moro special application of the intpUectual powers. Such efforts are made at school, and hence we properly speak of acqui- ring education at places of this kind; not that we can acquire it no where else, for that would be to suppose 40 SELF EDUCATIOIJ. eitlier that we had no minds excopt at school, or that they were useless in every other place. An attempt to confine the nsc of the word to such acquisitions as are made at school, can only have the effect to destroy its meaning. With many education has now become altogether an ambiguous term in consequence of its being so frequently misapplied. According to present usage the dunce who passes a few years in some literary institution is considered educated; while the talented and faithful, but secluded student, may spend his whole life in intellectual pursuits, and yet die uneducated. Judged by this rule, such men as Franklin, Bunyan, Baxter and Shakspeare, had no education ; they are believed to have been persons of great mind and great industry, but cannot be allowed a place among educated men. And the sapient critic, as he points to some defect in the character of these mighty dead, dees not fail to suggest as an extenuating circumstance, their peculiar disadvantages in never having received an adequate education. Such distinctions, if not invidious, are ex- tremely puerile ; they offend no less against common sense than against common courtesy. This studied perversion Vy'iil correct itself, as it can liave no other effect than to dismiss the word altogether from among the important terms of our language, and leave it as the representative of those inferior considerations to v>'hich carelessness or caprice would evidently consign it. From the same source and with only a trifling abate- ment of iliiberality comes the use of the epithets, regular and irregular, as applied to education. How education can be otherwise than regular is incumbent upon them to show who persist in such a mode of speaking. Mental application may be unsteady, and the knowledge obtained may be deficient or worthless ; but both the application and the knowledge — the labor and its proceeds, so fai- as EDUCATION. 41 tlieyexteiicl, are iticvitably as regular in this instance as ia any other. There is an obvious impropriety in all such expressions because they assume that the ordinary course of education is the standard; thus making the sanction of the schools essential to knowledge, and destroy- ing at once the independence and competence of our faculties. We are not disposed to call in question the excellence of the present system ; it is only its exclusivenci s that vc oppose. The fact that science may be learned at school does by no means prove that it can not be learned elsewhere, and learned too with equal advantage. If these remarks are true, the popular system of educa- tion, hoAvever excellent, must be in a great measure incidental; and such vre have reason to believe it is considered to be by those who are best acquainted %vith it. It is but one among many possible systems of equal and perhaps superior excellence, though based upon the same practical principles. The acquisition of knowledge is the great object, and whatever conduces to this, whether it is literature or the want of literature, the presence or absence of any assignable advantage or disadvantage, is a means of education, and valuable j ust in proportion to its efSciency in accomplishing the desired result. All that the prevalent system of instruction can claim, is that it aids to seme extent in this work ; it pretends to no sovereign efficiency, nor can it boast of any triumph over constitutional imped- iments. Its aim is to be a servant of mind, and aid it in gathering the treasures of science by means of those faculties, which without some foreign assistance, are too apt to lie concealed even from their possessor and useless both to him and the world. c CHAPTER nr. Self Fdiicatioii. We liave slio-R-n in wliat education consists ; but that particular form of it now under consideration, as the sub- ject of this volume, requires still further notice. The common opinion seems to be that self- education is distin- guished by nothing but the manner of its acquisition. It is thought to denote simply acquirements made without a teacher, or at all events without oral instruction — advan- tages always comprehended in the ordinary course of education. But this merely negative circumstance, how- ever important, falls far short of giving a full view of the subject; it is only one of several particulars equally characteristic of self-education as contrasted with the popular system. Besides the absence of many, or of all the usual facilities for learning, there are at least three things peculiar to this enterprise, namely : the longer time required, the wider range of studies, and the higher char- acter of its objects. Our schools claim only a few years; they graduate students after a comparatively limited time, and never again exact lessons from them. It is not so with the Alma Mater of the self-educated ; she claims life as the term of study and gives instruction to the last. The eoui-se of study in our best Uterary institutions is far from including all that might profit the student. Re- ference is always had to the brevity of the period to which his acquisitions must be confined; and as a consequence SELy EDUCATION. 43 luany branches of science, which under other circum- stances would have had a place in the list of studies, arc necessarily excluded. Self-education, by bringing into requisition the whole of our available time, provides for an enlargement of the course of study. Its plan is commen- surate with human ability, and exceeds the popular .standard by all that the mind is capable of acquiring beyond the tasks imposed upon it at school. In the schools, as at present constituted, all acquisitions are confined to pre-established science. No effort is made to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge, nor is there any ambition to do more than fairly understand what othere have written. This is an unavoidable trait of such insti- tutions ; it is impossible to infuse into them a spirit of iavention and discovery without weakening too much that reverence for authority, on wliich their dignity depends. Schools are organized solely for the diffusion of knowledge, not for its improvement. Their highest object is to tread undcviatingly in the beaten path of science, without once entertaining those perplexing questions which address themselves to such as are engaged in original enquiries. But the lijnits of self- education are far from being thus restricted. In addition to cultivating an acquaintance with the attainments of former scholars, the student is exp^ected to extend his researches to new departments of knowledge. The known and the unknown are equally legitimate objects of pursuit ; they are both embraced in the same comprehensive design, and thus united constitute a task worthy of the intellectual faculties. Now although all these co-ordinate points of distLiction are necessary to a complete survey of this subject, yet we do not wish to be understood that the question is not one of much consequence, even when considered as involving nothing but the mode of attainment. Let the schools be •ii SELF EDUCATION. taken as the standard, and it becomes desirable to know Tyhetlier the knowledge which they dispense can be obtained by other means. If it can not, then we are obliged to admit as a principal in mental philosophy, that the powers of the mind are measurably dependent upon these institu- tions. This being the case, those who are shut out from such advantages must of necessity acquiesce in an inferior scholarship. Considered in this light alone the question is one of more than ordinary interest. It is however only by advancing to the other peculiarities which have been mentioned, that we can perceive the true dignity of self- education. Its means, its plans, its objects, to be fully appreciated, must be compared with the more circumscribed scheme of popular education. Regarded in this connection it no longer appears doubtful and imperfect — a questionable substitute for scholastic facilities; but it assumes an eleva- tion which the artificial system can at best but feebly approximate. It becomes the great method — the exclusive method of improving science ; and it opens to the mind the only field sumcientlY extensive for the exertion of its abiUties. Certainly in this riew, the correctness of which can not be disputed, we may justly say with a late writer, that "The subject is one of immense importance. If language contains one word that should be familiar— one subject we should wish to understand— one end on which we should be bent — one blessing we should resolve to make our own— that word, that subject, that end, that blessing should be in the broadest sense of the expression, self- improvement. This is alike the instinct of nature, the dictate of reason, the demand of religion. It is inwoven with aU to which it is possible, either to aspire or to rise. It appeals to us as men— caUs us to the highest and nobles* end of man— reminding us that God's image is upon us, and that as men we may be grea^ in every possible position SELF EDUCATION. 45 of life. It tells us that tlie grandeur of our nature, if we will but improve it, turns to insignificance all outward distiuctions ; that our powers of knowing and feeling and lovbig — of perceiving the beautiful, the true, the right, the good — of knowing God, of acting on ourselves and on external nature, and on our follow beings — that these are glorious prerogatives, and that in them all there is no assignable limit to our progress."* Such is self- education. • Rev. Trj-on Edwards, American Bib. Repos., Jan. 1841. CHAPTEK IV. Fraeticabiiity of Self Ediicatioii. That self- education ia practicable, must appear from rarious sources. So evident indeed ia this fact, that the purpose of this chapter is illustration rather than argument. According to the view just exhibited, it assumes the character of a self-evident truth, and as such demands investigation but not proof. The following are the prin- cipal sources relied upon for supporting the position here taken. 1. The nature of education. Education is the eiFoet of mental industry du'ectcd to the acquisition of science. Now we must admit that self-education is practicable, or deny that the mind is capable of thinking without the aid of a teacher. 2. Faculties of the mind. These are natural endow- ments, brought to perfection, like our physical powers, without the aid of human culture, and operating intuitively with unimprovable esactness. Such faculties place educa- tion within the reach of all, and make the customary facilities for learning, matters of mere convenience, which may safely bo dispensed with whenever circumstances require. Powers of this instinctive and pro-existent character cannot consist with mental vassalage except upon the condition of voluntary acquiescence on the part of their possessor, 3. Condition under which all original scientific piirsuits I>RACTICAniLITr. 47 arc prosecuted. I speak not now of acquisitions made at school, for in these institutions neither students nor teach- ers often aim at originality. But there are other if not higher iutcllcctual researches constantly developed upon the mind under circumstances which do not admit of the aids of supervision. Not to mention that we arc ushered into a world where much of onr success even in common affairs depends upon our own unaided powers of observa- tion, it is obvious that ©very scientific improvement nrjst. be the effect of self-directed energy. That which is net known can not be taught ; therefore if we have any thing new in science, it will be the result of original and indepen- dent efforts. Could all be satisfied with things as they now are, and yield themselves to one unvarying course of instruction, then the mind might always be guided by authority, and the schools would become the chief dispen- sers of knowledge. But this can not be. Science rau&t advance beyond its present position, and every step of its progress will be the triumph of individual genius over tho didactic art. Our schools do not originate science, and the different branches taught in them are contributions from the intellectual wealth of the sohtary student. In- Btruction is confined to principles already established, and pupilage ceases where invention begins. Hence it follow? that self-education is as practicable as tho search of truth, and every science is a monument of its success. 4. Incompetency of schools to furnish the rcquisito knowledge. That literary and scientific institutions can teach what they profess to teach, we have no doubt; that much of what they teach is profound and useful, it would be folly to deny. Still there arc departments of knowledge in which tliey are obviously unable to afford instruction, because the attainments of those who would be pupils aro far in advance of these who must be teachers. V/hat 4B ^ELF EDUCATION!. college or university could have instructed Copernicus m astronomy, ' Galileo in optics, Columbus in navigation, Sliakspeare in |)oetry, Locke in meteplijsics, or Newton in matliematics ? We are aware that some of these men had been educated at college, but the exalted acquirements which have handed their names down to posterity were not the fruits of college life. In every thing peculiar to them, or in any way affecting their greatness, Locke or Newton ■'S'-ere as really "self-educated as Columbus and Shakspeare. These men aspired to what was unknown in their times ; their researches extended beyond the supposed boundaries of science. No institution could either aid their inquiries or determine the propriety of their course. From this it is evident that the highest and moat successful efforts of the miud are necessarily independent of tuition. And if the noblest achievements of which the intellect is capable, cAn be accomplished without a teacher, may not every inferior task be easily, performed in the same manner ? In a word, if able to originate science, may net the mind readily acquire that which others have originated ? 5. Incidental character of the assistance afforded by schools. The diligent student, although pursuing his gtudics at school, will in fact be self-educated, for his teachers have nothing to do but hear him recite. He repeats in their hearing what he had learned alone, and as much alone, as if such an institution had never existed. It is not, therefore, too much to assert that a thorough student is necessarily his own instructor. His industry renders assistance superfluous,* and pushes him forward • An early tutor of Sir Walter Scott notes this particular in the education of that extraordinary man. "Though, like the reet of UiC children, i^laced under my tuition, the conducting of his educa- lion comparatively cost me but Utile trouble, being, by the quickness of his intellect, tenacity of memory, and dilligcnt application to rUACTIOAIJTLtTY. 49 faster than the current of instruction could carry Lira, or than will allow liim to profit by ita favoring tendencies. But even the dullest and most dependent scholar receives oidy an incidental and unimportant advantage from the office of instruction. His time, his attention, bis memory and his judgment must be in constant requisition in order to gain the knowledge which he is supposed passively to imbibe. And yet these requisites comprise every thing essential to self- education. They have given us all the sciences which we now possess, and must give us all that wo are hereafter to possess. The dependence which is created by leaning upon a teacher, seems to include nothing more than the difference in facility of com- prehension between written and oral directions. That is, the advantage of the one is as much greater than that of the other, as a man can teach better than a book ; it is the simple dili'ereiice between writing and speaking. This, to be sure, is conceding the fact that every book is a teacher, and tliat those who have access to books are never without a competent instructor ; yet the use of books has become 80 common that they have ceased to be looked upon in this light, and are regarded merely as pre-re([uisitcs to instruc- tion. Ilencc they arc employed in schools as much as iQ private, and the sphere of the living teacher is reduced to bearing recitatir)ns, or, in more general terms, to secuiing on tbc part of tlic student a thorough acquaintance with such standard works as are embraced in his course. If an author can bo uuderitood without additional assistance, gtiidics, rrcncrally cqna', of himself, to the acrjiiisilion of tb.ose tasks I or otiicrs prcgcribed to him. So that Mas'cr Walter might be regarded not so much as a pupil of niino, but as a friend and » companion, and I may add, as an assistant also." Lockhart's Lifo of Sir Walter Scolt, Vol. 1, p. SG, 50 SELF EDUCATION, then the labors of an other teacher are not noce^ary, and may be dispensed with whenever convenience requires. Of the possibility of dispensing even with books, wo shall Bpeak in an other place. 6. History of literature. Education has never flourish- ed in proportion to the multiplicity of schools. Its foun- dation lies deeper in hxxman character than can be reached by such a cause. Literature and science are rarely pur- sued because they can be ; a higher motive is requisite ; a motive, the inspiration of which will render assistance useless, and set difficulties at defiance. The origin of literature 13 l?nried ia the de^p shades of antiquity, a,nd we shall forever remain ignorant of the exact circumstan- ces under which it arose ; but this is the less to be regretted since its progress, with which we are familiar, must involve the very same principles which originally gave esistence to the art of writing. Under certain circumstances individ- uals and nations have always devoted themselves assidu- ously to the cultivation of letters. This event has occurred cither when superior talents have discovered the need of learning, or when popular energy has by degrees mellowed communities from barbarism into refinement. Literature is one of the results of activity— of that general activity on which all improvement depends. It is remarked by Mr. Kcightley, that many of the best works have been produced in times of great excitement. " Though we can not conclude that literary genius is the creation of political circumstances, yet we may observe that it usually appears synchronously with great political events. It was during the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, that the ever- lasting monuments of the Grecian muse were produced ; end it was while the fierce wars escited by religion agitated modern Europe, that the most noble works of poetio genius appeared in Italy, Spain and England. So also the PRACTICABILITY, 51 first band of Roman poets were co-csistcnt with the Punic wars, and the second and more glorious, though perhaps less vigorous dis]»lay of Italian genius, rose amid tho calamities of the civil wars."* Arabic literature flourished during the Saracenic conquests, but has ever since declined ; and Cbinosc literature, together with that of most Eastern nations, is evidently a legacy handed down from moro enterprising times — its present possessors not being able to make any improvements, nor even to maintain tho original trust unimpaired. Learning is a commodity which tho ignorant and tho idle do not want, and whatever may be the facilities for itg attainment, such persons can not be successfully persuaded to seek it; they have other and more congenial pursuits, rcquhing less of tho mind, and answering better the pur- pcsos of immediate gratification. Schools have rendered literature more accessible, but they have added nothing to the force of those convictions on which enterprise depend?, and hence are to bo reckoned only as an arrangement of secondary character — as a dictate of invincible purpose. It is from this purpose which can alwajs command tho means for its own accomplisliment, that literature eman- ates, and not from our halls of learning. A cause wliich thus produces at once both science and its facilities, is surely equal to self-education. 7. Successful examples of sclf-oducatcd men. Had it been ever so impossible in theory to trace the caiisc of education to any other source than that of scholastic insti- tutions, stUl the numberless examples of self- education would have effectually contradicted such a conclusion. Both in ancient and modern times a very largo proportion of distinguished names are found to have risen to emincnco • Kfightlcy'a History of the Roman Empire, Part 1, Chap. 1, 'J^ SEL? EDUCATION, by their own unaided exertions, and often in spite of yet greater disadvantages from positive opposition. It can not be expected that from a list so extensive, we slionld Belect more than a few instances on the present occasion, and these will be taken from the moderns, as their history is best known. Shakspeare, who stands confessedly at the head of dramatic literature, and who is one of the boldest, most profound, and most correct writers of any age, was alto- gether his own instructor. It is true that the events of bis early life are not well known, but enough is known to. render it certain that the elevated conceptions and iuimi- table style which have immortalized his writings, were no6 the gift of academic shades, nor of pedagogic toil. Pope ranks high in the first class of original poets, and is justly acknowledged to be first among the translators of poetry. But he assumed from choice, not necessity, the responsibility of edacating himself — a task well executed if enduring fame may be taken as the measure of success. Dr. Johnson thus alludes to the subject : " Pope, finding little advantage from external help, resolved thenceforward to direct himself, and at twelve formed a plan of study which he completed with little other incitement than the desire of excellence."* Thomas Simpson, one of the ablest mathematicians that E-urope has produced, and the author of several valuable treatises, was entirely self-taught. Defoe, whose name is familiar to most readers by his tjnrivalled tale of Robinson Crusoe, was an extensive and elegant writer, but independent of scholastic training. Sir William Herschel contributed more than any other modern astronomer to that department of science, * Lifu of Pope. PRACTICABILITY. 53 although he was from first to last his own teacher, and the maker of all his toloscopcs. Sir Himiphrcy Davy not only mastered the soicJJcc of chemistry without assistance, but extended his researches until important additions were made to that department of knowledge. Dr. Franklin's eminence as a statesman and a philosopher is a3 little questionable as the fact of his being entirely self-educated. Dr. John Mason Good was a scholar of the highest order in almost every department of science ; iu medicine, in natural science, in classical and in oriental Uterature, An other of similar acquirements, except, perhaps, in medicine, and the last to which I shall now refer, v.as the late Dr. Adam Clarke. This eminent man was no lesa distinguished for oriental than for classical literature. Hia proficiency in almost every science was too well known to leave a doubt of his being one of the maturest scholars of the age. But these, like the rest of the individuals hero mentioned, received no assistance from colleges or uni- versities. These examples are quite sufficient to show that education is within the reach of determined industry, whatever may be the paucity of external advantages. There is however another class of learned men who properly belong to this category ; I mean those who for various reasons left the University without finishirg their studies, or who were eminent before entering there. Among the former are Lord Bacon, Gibbon the historian, and Sir "Walter Scott; the first two having left the University through disgust, and the last, that he might ajiply himself more particularly to his legal studies. That this designa- tion does no injustice to Sir Walter, we have the very decided testimony of Mr. Lockhart. " As may be said, I believe, with perfect truth of every really great man, \ 51 SELF EDUCATION. Scott was self-educated in every branch of knowledge which he ever turned to account in the works of his geuius."* Among the latter are Grotius, Johnson, Jlur- ray, and Gifford. One of the works of Grotius, written prior to his entering the University, is said to be equal to any which he afterwards published. Dr. Johnson gives us the following statement of his early attainments. " It is a sad reflection, but a true one, that I knew almost as much at eighteen as I do now. My judgment, to be sure, was not so good ; but I had all the faets."t Dr. Alexander Blui-ray and William Gilford, both gained for themselves places, the one in a Scotch, and the other in an Enghsh University, solely by the merit of their unquestionable and unaided scholarship, 8. The nature of science. "We have shown that the faculties of the mind have a pecuhar competency for the reception of truth — an aptitude which neither adm.it s material improvement, nor needs it-. This fact naturally teaches us to look for a corresponding adaptation of science to these faculties, and the slightest observation is sufficient to show that the character of this relation is reciprocal Knowledge is the food which satiates our intellectual appetency and gives strength to the mind — not indeed organic capacity, but supphes the means by which organic capacity becomes efficient. Hence the pleasures of science, or the attractive influences of truth, have ever been considered one of the principal inducements to study. Milton's elegant description of these dehghts is familiar to all. " We shall conduct you to a hill side, laborious, indeed, at the first ascent ; but else so smooth, so green, * Life of Scott, Vol. 1, p. 104. + Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. 2, p. 44. Johnson entered at Oxford ia his nineteenth year. PKACTICABlLITr. 55 SO full of goodly prospects, and melodious sounds on every side, that the harp of Orpheus was not more charming."* It is further to be remarked that the truths of science are level to all observers. Education gives no new facul- ties, nor does it essentially invigorate those which nature has given us. The elements of knowledge, the facts which make up every science, are intuitively obvious to the diligent mind. All may perceive them who will take the pains, as labor alone is the price of their acquaintance. They are like a favorite view which can be had only from the summit of some lofty mountain, but which is ccpally within the reach of all whose industry surmounts the rugged ascent. Capacity for such acquisitions is mani- festly co-extensive with common sense. There is no fact in science either above the comprehension or beyond the reach of an ordinary intellect. Religion presents us with truths more profound and more important than human research has ever gleaned from the study of nature ; and yet the mind of man — of man through all the grades of intellectual character, down to where responsibility is lost in mental weakness — is competent not only to understand, but to carry into successful practice the highest principles of revelation. This shows us that things are not difficult of apprehension in proportion to their importance. It requu'es no more strength of mind to understand the highest than the lowest truth ; we comprehend truths without reference to their intrinsic character. The idea that great truths can only be known to great minds, would forever exclude the knowledge of God from all but a fraction of our race. Such a conclusion is no less subver- sive of philosophy than revolting to religion. There is therefore, nothing impracticable in the nature of science ; • • Tractate on Education. 5G SELP EDUCAXlOJSf. it can neither Toe monopolized by the learned, nor lost tot want of prc-recpisites on the part of the student. 'Did truth disclose itself only to minds previously developed according to the popular notion, then education would he the formation of capacities, and industry could avail nothing for want of constitutional povrer. But, except as one fact may help to know an other, the learned have no pre-eminence abore what nature has conferred. The nat- ural er^uality of human understandings is not disturbed by the aC'.|nisitions of diligence, and hence we very frequently see those who have little of what is called learning, malcing important discoveries, while the more learned vrasto their time in fi-uitless speculations. This could not be if science- was accessible only in one direction, or if the usual prelim- inaries were of more than incidental importance. 9. Analogy. In every other pursuit mankind are necessarily self- directed; and it is singular indeed if the acquisition of knowledge violates the analogy which every where else obtains in active life. Is man less able to direct his mental than his physical energies ? or, rather, is he less able to direct the energies of his mind when applied to the acquisition of science, than when applied to the acquisition of physical objects ? Vf e must either suppose that some fatality attends the use of his faculties in the one instance from which they are free in the other, or admit that he is- equally competent whether the objects of his action are physical or intellectual. The only school for gi'eat achieve- ments is the common theatre of hnman enterprise, where every man is a master, and all are learners. The agricul- turist, the mechanic, the statesman, and the warrior are thrown upon their own resources, and compelled to act, not only without direction, but frequently in opposition to the maturest counsel. In the highest department of science — ■ that of invention, the same necessity prevails. Nothing PRACTICABILITY. 57 can be done until the mind acts for itself independent of all authority. Even where much less than this is aimed at, science obliges all her votaries to an independent course. If they would throw themselves forward to future ages, it can only be by attaining such indisputable excellence as will suffer no depreciation from the lapse of time — bv e.Kceeding the standard of their own to meet the anti- cipated progress of future generations — by successful competition with the past; the present, and the future. That is, instead of following authorities, one must himself become an authority in order to secure a lasting refu- tation. Such exertions as are required by an enterprise like this, can not be the subject of tuition. They demand an energy and a knowledge as incommunicable as gen- ius itself. Thus we have seen that in all physical pur- suits, and in those intellectual operations, which from their greatness are removed from the sphere of scholastic supervision, the mind is quite equal to the task of self- direction, and can not by any possibility, be subjected tu pupilage. Under these circumstances, can we conceive it to be impracticable for any ordinary intellect to direct its own efforts successfully in the pursuit of knowledge, aTid especially that kind of knowledge which is usually taught in our schools? In concluding tin's chapter, I have only to say that if these remarks have the appearance of claiming too much for self-education, the result was unavoidable. Facta admit of no compromise. If the human nilad is iucom- petent to this task, it is capable of no other. d CHAPTER V. Tlie Means of Self Education. Section I. Literature. Language is the veliicle of thouglit. It is more : it is the repository of the knowledge of a people, as well as a means of intellectual conveyance. An accurate acquaint- ance, therefore, with the structure of language, and espe- cially with the specific import of its various terms, is an important part of education. The meaning of words is, to some extent, the key of knowledge, and thus far taken as a separate study, it is more profitable, if not mor& interesting, than any other pursued. A written language is but a collection of artificial signs, the arrangement of which, according to certain prescribed forms, amounts to nothing, if their true signification be not understood. Literary education has its numerous gradations ; begin- ning with a single alphabet, it knows no limit but the ca- pacity of man. But those who think, because it is possi- ble to spend a whole life in making acquisitions of this sort, that it is, therefore, necessary to eminence, have manifestly mistaken the process of preparation for tbe splendor of action. Language is, indeed, subservient to the formation of thought, as well as to its clear expression ; it is a system of signs by which we both receive and transmit opinions ; and it is true, in a certain sense, that tho more language we have, the more we have of truth. UEANS. 69 and if it were as easy to determine the nature of things by means of language, as it is to obtain a knowledge of their existence, the value of letters would be inconceivably enhanced. This, however, is not the case, for we read what is false as well as what is true; nor will reading alone, like the reiterated use of mathematical terms, infal- libly secure the necessary correction. Words are the representatives of ideas, and if the ideas are wrong, their siirns can never be right, that is, the words in this connec- tion become the visible exhibitions of falsehood. Written language has often been compared to algebraical char- acters, but the comparison is without foundation ; for the signs in the one case are expressive of the unchangeable relations of c^uantity or number, while in the other they represent thought, which is not only changeable, but often imperfect and contradictory. The remark of Coudillac,* that "the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged," must be received with great limitation, if indeed, it be true in any respect. Sound arguments may undoubtedly be expressed in verbal language, but no argu- ment can be stronger than the mind which forms it, nor any language better arranged than to convey the ideas of the speaker. Reason depends upon language for nothing but the means of expression, and expression arises not from the nature of terms, but from the use we make of them — the meaning which they are employed to convey. As literature is only of conditional and limited import- ance to the reasoning process, we may justly infer that the other acts of the mind are equally independent of its advantages. What has been considered the standard of desirable attainments in one age, has been regarded in the next as the merest illiteracy. But the practical and • Quoted by Stewart, Elem. PLil. Vol 1., p. 3'3. 60 SELF EDUCATION. beneficial results of tliis species of learning bear no pro- portion to its extent or to the facilities for its attainment. The greatest advantages have not iinfrequentlj effected nothing but a life of fruitless speculation, or it may be, fabricated a succession of puerile fictions, which, aiming to be more true to nature than nature is to herself, have, of course, accomplished nothing but distortion, while necessity has awakened the slumbering energies of the poor and the unfortunate to achievements to which more refined inducements have seldom been equal. The facts which confirm these remarks may be found in the copious literary remains of antiquity, as well as among the teem- ing productions of our own age. Anciently the means of acquiring literature were so universally imperfect, com- pared with what is now deemed essential to such pursuits, that nearly every writer of eminence ranks as a prodigy ; nor is there any method of bringing their talents to a level with the moderns, but by observations like those which we have now made. Let us turn for a moment to particular instances. What were the qualifications of David for the poetic office ? An intimate acquaintance with the best models of the poetic art; a knowledge of foreign languages, together with a very critical mastery of his vernacular tongue, and a large amount of general sci- ence, would seem to be indispensable to the man whose business it was to clothe the noblest sentiments in the finest dress. But had the bard of Israel gone through with this regular training ? What ancient poet did he study, or what foreign language could he write ? In what school did he study even his own language ? No one who has a knowledge of the bearings of the subject ■vvill sug- gest that David was inspired, and therefore wrote with eloquence and correctness. He would have written with the ?ame sublimity and purity, had he been only a piou« MEANS. 61 man. I spoak now of the stylo of his composition, and not of the character of its sentiments. He ^vas simply a Bhophord boy, until he exchanged his rural occupation for the court and the camp, places by no means favorable to literary researches. Indeed there is little probability that .his attainments embraced more than a tolerable acquaint- ance with a single language. The epithet of illiterate would sound very harsh if applied to him ; and yet if the notions of modern literati arc just, he was a mere sciolist. His ju'ctcnsions to the hai'p were the height of imperti- nent dabling, and a dism-ace to men of education. He should have repressed the vehement fires of poetic thought until his genius had become improved by scholastic lore. Others are chargeable with a hke folly. Moses and Miriam, and Deborah, Job and Solomon, and above all, Isaiah, have left specimens of their taste and ability for cooipositions of this sort. The next example of course must be Homer, at once the oldest and the greatest of heathen poets. Of his personal history we have no certain information ; but this fact only adds to our astonishment, as it shows us that his immortal works must have been written while literature was yet too imperfectly diffused, or too miserably deficient to preserve even the humblest record of so distinguished a genius.* From whom then could Homer have learned * Some Iiave maintained that his works were composed before the art of writing was invented. " It has been doubted whether Homer could write or read ; and the arguments adduced for the negative, in Mr. Wood's Essay on the Original Genius of Homer, seem scarcely controvertible." Mitford's History of Greece, Vol. 1, p, 126. In every thing but his poems. Homer is as much a mythological personage as any of the heroes whom he celebrates. Herodolus, the oldest of the Greek historians, gives us nothing but conjecture; he says (Book 2, chap, 53.) "Homer, I believe, lived four hundred years, and not more, before myself." His works G2 SELF EDUCATION. the art of poetry, and wliat beyond tlie simplest know- ledge of his own language could have been his attainments ? What literary institution had any share in his education? What classic author contributed to purify his taste, to direct his judgment, or to control his imagination ? And yet without any aid from any source, he advanced his art to such perfection as succeeding ages, with all their accu- mulated improvements, have rarely equalled, and never surpassed. Still the author of the Hiad and the Odessy belongs not to the class of educated men. If the popular jargon be correct, he holds a very illegal authority in the learned world. Many others of the heathen poets flour- ished under circumstances equally forbidding; some of them are &o bare of historical incident that their authors seem scarcely to have been acquainted with social life. Yet with their productions the world is eminently pleased. Even Christian sages of the greatest erudition have ex- tolled them as priceless. It is suflScient for our present purpose that the public has given its sanction to the general excellence of these works. In doing this it has tacitly said the ancients were competent, be their literature as it might. It is not, it is surely not without some reason that the refined scholars of this age so universally admire such writings. But what is the circumstance that gives them all their value, if it be not that they are true to nature ? Nature is the standard and the greatest originality is but faithfully copying from her. A glowing theme naturally seeks a corresponding expression ; and if the language Ave use is not adequate to our wants, nature has a convenient resource in the use of figures. The admiration which these works have gained, prove that he existed, but this uncertainty shows that it was before the age of authentic history. MEANS. 63 is derived from the splendor of genius and the force of truth ; not from peculiarity of dialect or felicity of gram- matical construction. Such writings are valuable as conservators of ancient wisdom, and not as models of polished composition. Both Grecian and Roman literature, wliich have so largely, if not disproportionately occupied the attention of mankind, were cultivated under the same disadvantages as the Hebrew. The writers of these nations lacked, in general, schools and libraries, and, what was worse tlian all, science itself. But possessing minds accustomed to powerful thought, and using language only as a means of communication, they were quite equal to what they as- pired — a clear and elegant expression of truth. It may be thought their knowledge of grammar, rhetoric, and other sciences relating to the composition of language must have been considerable, and acquired by studying authors of great eminence on these subjects. But this I am persuaded is a mistake. "The grammatical forms which constitute the organization of a language, are not the work of civilization, but of nature. It is not writers, nor arbitrary conventions, that give laws to language : the forms of grammar, the power of combinations, the possi- bility of inversions, spring from within us, and are a con- sequence of our own organization."* Grammar may be styled the fashion of truth. Established usage makes almost any form of expression grammatical, for whatsoever is established, is also understood, which is what is princi- pally intended by grammar. There are various anomalies in every language, that can be explained on no other principle. In Greek a plural verb frequently has a singu- lar nominative, and double negatives only make the « Bancroft's History of American colonization, Vol. 3. p. 2G9 6i SELF EDUCATION. negation stronger, while in our own language they are used as an affirmative. Our awkward substitution of the plural pronoun you, for thee and thou, may show how easily the most palpable violation of analogy becomes grammatical when once it has the sanction of common usage. Where there is precision of thought there will not often be a want of grammar or rhetoric, and if there is a violation of existing rules, the usual redress of the science is to add a new rule that shall legalize the infrac- tion. Thus rhetorical canons become the sport of genius, and the ever-varying construction of a living language sets at defiance the power of criticism. But there is a more formidable objection to over-refine- ment of style than even its want of utility. By attempt- ing to give laws to genius, it reverses the order of nature, and blights what it meant to improve. No writer who allows himself to be trammeled either in language or sentiment, by the thoughts of other men, can ever rise above mediocrity. The mind which is entrusted with an important truth, will feel the consequence of that truth too much to ask for any thing more than the means of explicit communication. It has been said that "In no polished nation, after criticism has been much studied, and the rules of writing estabhshed, has any very extraordinary book ever appeared."* Although this observation is not .strictly correct, yet it is sufficiently so to evince the absur- dity of relying upon an adherence to the rules of criticism for the advancement of knowledge. If such rules are not an effectual barrier to eminence, it is at least certain that the want of them has never impeded the progress of truth, * Quoted by Dr. Johnson from '< An Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope." He says, "The remark deserves great at« tcntion," MEANS. 65 Genius is a law unto itself, and its iniiuitable productions are never dependent upon the state of the arts and sci- ences. Therefore whenever a language requires too mixcli obsequiousness, it must be left to those who are conscious of no higher calling, and minds of loftier purpose will pro- vide a medium of expression that shall offer no restraint to the peculiarity of their powers. On the utility of studying the ancient classics, different views have prevailed, and for very justifiable reasons. By many a knowledge of the dead languages has been consid- ered indispensable to education ; while others have regarded such attainments as of doubtful importance. This is a complicated subject, and one which, in the preseiit state of literature, deserves even more attention than it has yet received. To the mere philologist these languages must ever be of great consequence ; but to the man of science, whether poet or philosopher, they are valuable only for the knowledge which they contain. When G-reek and Latin were employed for the transaction of business, or the composition of books, they had all the claims which it is possible for language to possess. But they are now employed for neither of these jDurposes, and as the most valuable deposits which they contain have either been transferred to our language or rendered un- necessary by original acquisitions,* their claims are so * " All tliat remains of Greece and Pome, which is really worthy of being known, has been published cither in English or French. There is no storehouse there to be unlocked."— Dr. A. Clarke. (Life, Vol. 2, p. 225) Should the correctness of this opinion be called in question, wo have only to say that a necessity for further translations cannot devolve upon comnuinity at large an obligation to learn those an, cient languages. We might with the same propriety require every nun who needs a watch, to learn the art of watch-making merely C6 SELF lilDUCATION, reduced as to make them a matter of little importance to any but the literary antiquary or the professional student who is unfortunate enough to be more concerned with words than with. facts. The strongest argument which can be adduced in favor of cultivating these languages, ia the fact that they still furnish the best means of inter- course with those ancient nations ; yet this argument is far from being conclusive, since to converse with the an- cients is not the great business of human life. Education is designed to make us what they were, and not barely to make us acquainted with their greatness. They were great without us ; we may be great without them. Trans- lations, though acknowledged to fall below the originals, will answer aU the ends of emulation ; they will give us truth, and we need no more. It has been urged that the study of the classics exerts a beneficial influence by way of disciplining the mind. This advantage is altogether imaginary. Mind needs no such discipline. Still the diifieult task of acquiring a dead language is not without advantages. Such studies, bc- for the purpope of making his own time piece. That modern au. thors have, in a, great degree, superseded the necessity of ancient literature, is well known. "The great productions of Athenian and Roman genius are indeed still what they were. But though their positive value is unchangedj their relative value, when compared with the whole mass of mental wealth possessed by mankind, has been constantly falling. They were the intellectual all of our ancestors. They are but a part of our treasures." — Macauly. (Review of Bacon's Works.) '■'With respect lo the sura of knowledge which the works of aiuiqully convey, as compared with that which is conveyed by modern literature, the disproportion is great in the extreme. To say that the modern is a hundred times greater than the ancient, is to keep far from the language of exaggeration." — Dyraond's Essays, p. 192. MEANS. 67 Bides awakening the mind to a knowledge of its own capacities, and enlarging its acquaintance with the philos- ophy of language, never fail to introduce new ideas of things, and to excite an interest in the subject of intellect- ual hiiprovemcnt. This however only proves that these acquisitions are not useless ; other evidence, and such as can not be had, is wanting to prove that they are essential to modern education. If these languages were needed as depositories of science, or as means of intellectual com- merce, we might insist upon their cultivation. But why cultivate languages tliat are not to be used? With their use, their necessity ceases. As relics of the past, they may be curious and instructive ; but not . serving as lan- guages, at least in their original capacity, they are of no importance to practical life, and should be remitted to the cabinet of antiquities. The knowledge which they have preserved can be transferred to living languages, and will not be the less valuable for its new depository. Shall we worship the casket for the sake of the gem which it once contained? Facts will still be facts in spite of a modern alphabet, and those ancient tongues, disburdened of the treasure M'hichthey were expected to convey to later gen- erations, may be allowed to perish with the nations tliat used them. I need not remark that these principles are applicable to the study of aU foreign languages ; they can be useful only when demanded for actual intercourse, or for opening soui'ces of information not otherwise accessible. Language is not sentiment, nor literature the sum of knowledge. And abstractly considered, skill in these compares with the system of knowledge about as does the doctrine of colors with the whole compass of physical science. Indeed their intrinsic importance is so small tliat they seem to have no positive existence. The language of a community is a/ac simile of its intelligence. An igno- 68 SELF EDUCATION. rant and barbarous people never wi'itc or speak a refined and elegant language, nor has it ever been known that an elegant and refined people used a rude and barbarous dialect. A system which thus exists only as a consequence of knowledge, can not be considered of much intrinsic value. In accordance with this were the views of Mil- ton, " Language is but the instrument conveying to us things useful to be known. And though a linguist should pride himself to have all the tongues that Babel cleft the world into, yet if he have not studied the solid things in them as well as the words and lexicons, he were nothing so much to be esteemed a learned man, as any yeoman or tradesman competently wise in his mother dialect only."* It is therefore to the relative importance of literature that we must ascribe the necessity for its cultivation. In this respect it is not unlike the mariner's compass which is of small consequence in itself, but when applied to navigation, becomes of inconceivable advantage. Literature considered merely as an ornament of social life, or as a branch of natural philosophy, will perhaps pay the expense of cultivation, but it is chiefly valuable as the medium of mental commimicatiou, and the ud decaying record of science. Its utility in these respects is so well expressed by Dr. Grood, that I shall close this section with his remarks. After detailing in a variety of interesting observations, the origin of wi'iting, or at least its origin so far as we have any authentic information on the sub- ject, he proceeds : " Such is a brief history of the noblest art that has ever been invented by the unassisted efforts of human xmderstanding ; an art that gives stability to thought, forms a cabinet for our ideas, and presents, in * Tractate on Education. (Prose works, London, 1S39, p. 98.) MEANS. 60 inipcrishablc colors, a speaking portraiture of tbc soul. Without tliis, hard indeed would be tlie separation of friends ; and tlie traveller would become an exile from his native home — vainly languishing for the consolatory information that hig wife, his children, his kinsmen, liis country, were in a state of health and prosperity, and him.?elf still embalmed in their affections. Without this, what to us would be the wisdom of past ages, or the history of former states ? The chain of nature would be broken through all its links, and every generation become an isolated and individual world, equally cut off, as by an irremediable abyss, from its ancestors and from its poster- ity. While the language of the lips is fleety as the breath itself, and confined to a single spot as well as a single moment, the language of the pen enjoys, in many instan- ces, an adamantine existence, and will only peii^h amid the ruins of the globe. Before its mighty touch time and space become annihilated; it joins epoch to epoch, and pole to pole ; it gives unity to the works of crea- tion and Providence, and enables us to trace from the beginning of things to the end. It is the great sun of the moral world, that warms, and stimuJates, and vivi- fies, and irradiates, and develops, and matures the best virtues of the he'art, and the best faculties of the intel- lect. But for this, every thing would be doubt, and darkness, and death-shade ; all knowledge would bo traditionary, and all experience local; civilized life ■would relapse into barbarism, and man would have to run through his little, and comparatively insignificant round of existence, the perpetual sport of ignorance and error, uninstructed by science, unregulated by Iaws, and unconsoled by revelation,"* • Book of Nature, Lect. 10., Eccond series. TO BELP EDUOATIOlf, Section II. Science. It is for the sake of science that literature exists. But for science the art of wiiting would be as useless as the power of speech where nothing was to be spoken. It would be as a house which was to have no inhabitant, or a conveyance in which nothing could be conveyed. Science and literature are not identical, as one stands to the other in the relation of means to an end. Science is the end, and literature is, in part, our way to that end. Knowledge is to the mind what light is to the eye, an indispensable pre-recjuisite to the performance of its func- tions. Light may exist without vision, and knowledge without understanding, because in both cases it is abstractly possible not to employ the faculties on which these acta depend ; but in neither instance can the faculty accom- plish any thing apart from its constitutional medium or element. Lord Bacon therefore deserves great credit for having called the attention of mankind to the fact that, " Knowledge and human power are synonymous."* A truth which, however much neglected, probably never was quite forgotten. Knowledge is power, because mind is nob available without knowledge. Hence a great part of human knowledge is necessary, and does not at all depend upon a voluntary application of the mental faculties. The mind that does not know is as useless as a mirror which fails to reflect the objects placed before it. In conformity to this idea, the same author has elsewhere said " A man is but what he knoweth:"t — that is, knowledge is the « Nov. Org. Apb. 3, Book 1. t Praise of Knowledge. MBANS. 71 condition of intellectual activity and efficiency. But knowledge not only displays the capacity of the human mind by bringing its powers into exercise : it also predom- inates over them so fully that Bacon does not hesitate to affirm that, " The mind itself is but an accident to know- ledge."* Tliis is indeed to reach the extreme of specu- lative boldness; but he has repeated his views on this subject and in a passage which I shall quote from the Advancement of Learning, they are expressed more at length and in much less exceptionable phraseology, " But the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will, for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself; for there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of state in the spirits or souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. "f That science lies at the foun- dation of human enterprise, is a truth which, however little knowT-i two centuries ago, now needs neither amplifi- cation nor defence. While Europe was in its transition state, passing by slow degrees from barbarism into refine- ment, the utterance of such a sentiment was in advance of the age, and justly entitled the author to a high reputa- tion. Then science was mistaken for chance, and art for magic ; ignorance was considered the mother of devotion, and knowledge the enemy of religion. Those who could read and write, following the practice of a still darker age, too generally wasted their time and talents upon merely verbal distinctions that only tended to " darken counsel by words without knowledge," while before them lay the ♦ Praise of Knowledge, t Book 1. 72 SELF EDUCATION. whole domain of science as a barren -wilderness. To an- nounce at such a time that knowledge is power, and to treat with merited contempt the metaphysical subtleties then universally in vogue, was no ordinary achievement. But those times are gone, and with them — happUy for mankind — has gone the scholastic logic. The course of education is changed. Literature is no longer employed as an instrument of investigation, but merely as a means of expression, and knowledge is admitted to be the legiti- mate object of the student. Bacon's celebrated observa- tion is now a truism. Even the humblest individual knows as well as did the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain in the days of James the first, that knowledge is equivalent to power. It does not fall Avithin the plan of this work to discuss minutely the advantages arising from the study of any particular branch of science ; but as some sciences appear to have been neglected, and others to have been cultivated, from mistaken views of their essential importance, it is necessary to take up the subject so far as these errors lie in the way of mental improvement. In reality all know- ledge is valuable only in proportion to its subserviency to human wants, and the object is to determine what a par- ticular class of truths can contribute to this purpose. As no satisfactory division of the sciences has ever been made, we cannot be expected to follow any esfablished order, nor to do more than notice such particulars as have forced themselves upon public observation. Natural Philosophy was for a long time undervalued, and perhaps even at the present time does not hold its proper place in our higher institutions of learning. It is taught there, we admit, and there is no cause to complain that tho instruction is deficient ; but it seems to be tolerated from nec^^ity rather than weltfbmed from choice. Institutioiui MEANS. 73 of a merely literary cliaracter can not exist, and thereforo phyi-ical scicnco has to bo included in the co]l(>ge course. The exclusion of such studies has the sanctioii of many very einiiicat scholars, among whom is Dr. Johnson. This great man, whose passion for literature led him to neglect, if not to despise other kinds of knowledge, has given his opinion at length in combatting what he thought to be an error of Milton. " The purpose of Milton, as it seeni--, was to teach s.-mcthing more solid than the common liter- ature of the schooitJ, by reading those authors that treat of physical subjects, such as the Georgia and astronomiea! treatises of the ancients. This was a scheme of impro\o- ment which seems to have busied many hterature pro- jectors of that age. Cowley, who had more means than Milton of knowing what was wanting to the cmbellisli- ments of life, form