E 416 .n979 Copy 1 SPEECH HON. H. C. MURPHY, OF NEW YORK, SLAVERY IN THE TJERMTOMES. / OELITERBD IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 17, 1848. ^ ^^>" U. S. A. WASHINGTON: l»RINTED At THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBlS OFFICE. 1848. E 416 .n979 Copy 1 SPEECH HON. H. C. MURPHY, OF NEW YORK, SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, / -v a DELITEREDi m THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 17, 1848. WASttlNGTON; l»RtNTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOB^ OFFICE. 1848. SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES, The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of tlie Union, and having under consideration the Navy Pen- sion Bill — Mr. MURPHY rose for the purpose of express- ing his views respecting the power of Congress to legislate over the Territories. He knew that this discussion was inopportune in some respects, and that the remarks v/hicli he proposed to make were not altogether in order; but following the example which had been set by the learned gentlemen from Virginia and South Carolina, [Mr. Bayly and Mr. Woodward,] he should venture to present to the House the views which he entertained-, es- pecially as. they differed from those of both the gentlemen to whom he had referred. He held that Congress has the power to legis- late for the Territories; and having that power, it had power over the question of slavery there. But, in his view, the great difficulty under which the gentlemen had been laboring arose from a confu- sion of idtas respecting the Territories of the Uni- ted States. They had not drawn the distinction between Territories acquired before and those ac- quired after the adoption of the Federal Constitu- tion. While expressing these views, he would here take occasion, at the outset, to say that he was no advocate of the Wilmot proviso. He did not stand here to defend it; at the same time he would not, with his views of the Constitution, and of the power of Congress, assent to the principle laid down by either the gentleman from Virginia or the gentleman from South Carolina. It ap- peared to him that those gentlemen had both pre- sented to this House heresies on this question, which had been pronounced such by the action of Congress over and over again, and which he should endeavor to establish as such before he had done. He held that Territories that were now free — Territories in which slavery did not exist — if an- nexed to this Union, remained free until Congress positively established it there; and for that reason he was opposed to the Wilmot proviso. He held that the Wilmot proviso was wholly unnecessary. It was worse, for it served only to create dissen- sions. But he did not, as some gentlemen ap- peared to, in view of that proposition, see dark clouds hovering over the country. He saw in the Constitution and the laws of the land principles which would carry them through in safety, and preserve for their children and their children's children their glorious Constitution and Confed- «racy. In the next place, then, he laid down the prop- osition that Congress possesses the power to legislate for the Territories acquired since the adoption of the Constitution as an incident to the power to acquire, ex necessitate rei; and is re- strained only by the conditions upon which the territory was ceded, and by the prohibitions and limitations of the Constitution. He also main- tained that the ordinance of 1787 was expressly adopted and continued in force by the Constitu- tion, and no further adoption by Congress was necessary; and that Congress was er.ipowered to make all laws which should be proper to carry the ordinance into effect. Mr. C. J. INGERSOLL. What was the opin- ion of Mr. Madison? Mr. MURPHY said he would answer the gen- tleman presently. In the discussion of these prop- ositions he would reverse the order in which he had stated them. Now, what was the territory of the United States? There was the territory that was ceded by the different States forming the confed- eracy before the adoption of the Constitution — the territory northwest of the Ohio. There were like- wise the cession by deed of Georgia in 1802, com- prising the present States of Alabama and Missis- sippi; the cession by treaty by France in 1803 of the territory which now comprised the State of Louisiana; and the cession by Spain by the treaty of 1819 of that which is now the State of Florida. And what else? The land which we acquired by discovery. Such was the Oregon territory. He deemed it unnecessary to do more than merely to advert to the opinions of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Buchanan on tliis point. The principal ground on which they claimed a title to Oregon was that of discovery. To this fact he wished now to direct the attention of the committee, for purposes which would appear in the course of his argument. The ordinance of 1787, then, became of importance only in reference to the territory northwest of the Ohio. That ordinance and the action under it did not ap- ply to any othe^- territory than that northwest of the Ohio, and we have to look for other principles to govern us in regard to the other territory. He would now proceed to the consideration of the ordinance of 1787, for the purpose of showing the distinction between that and the sources of the power which we are to exercise over other territo- ries, and he had numerous authorities on this sub- ject at hand. He would simply direct the atten- tion of the committee to the ordinance of 1787, for it was unnecessary to read it, as every gentleman was doubtless familiar with its provisions. In the first place, that ordinance was declared to be a compact; and the articles thus agreed to and ar- ranged between the people of the United States and the people who were to form those territories were to continue forever in force, subject, however, to 4 certain restrictions. The language of the ordinance was: "It is hereby ordained and declared, by the authority aforesaid, that the following artieles shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the peo- ple and Stales in the said territory, and forever remain un- alterable unless by common consent." Again, in article 4Lh, are these words: " The said Territory, and the States wliich may be form- ed therein, shall forever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States of America, subject to the Articles of Confederation and to such alterations therein as shall be constitutionally made, and to all the acts and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled conformable there- to." When this ordinance was passed, it thus appears from its own provisions that a new constitution was contemplated, and the people of the new ter- ritories and the territories themselves were to be subjected generally to the legislation of this new government under the terms of the compact. And now he would ansv/er the inquiry put to him by the gentleman froin Pennsylvania, who asked him if he knew what Mr. Madison said on tliis subject. Mr. Madison, it was true, said that the ordinance was passed with doubtful authority, but he went on afterwards to justify the passage of that ordinance. Mr. Madison said: "I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible that they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits." He thus approved the measure, as did Mr. Jef- ferson, who was the author of the ordinance of 1784, in this principle the same as that of 1787, and who would hardly have advocated it if it were unconstitutional. But he cared not whether that act was constitu- tionally made or not at the time; he said, and that was his position, that the Constitution of 1787 confirmed that ordinance, and made it valid. Now, he had not seen, in the course of the debate on this question, the clause of the Constitution of the United States referred to, to which he should di- rect the attention of the House. He did not put the power of Congress to legislate over the Terri- tories, upon the clause authorizing Congress to make " all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States;" for he thought with the gentleman from Virginia, that the word " other" qualified the word " territory," and showed that it was spoken of here only as ^^ property" — giving Congress thS power to make all needful rules and regulations re- specting the territory as property of the United States. He fell in, therefore, with the view of the gen- tleman from Virginia on this point; but it was not necessary to rely upon the clause in question. For, to his mind, we had abundant confirmation of this ordinance in the Constitution itself. Would it not have been remarkable, indeed, if the Con- vention which framed the Constitution, sitting at the same time and place with that Congress which adopted this ordinance, had not made some provis- ion in regard to it.' When we regarded the fact, that the provision in reference to slavery in both instruments was adopted on the same day — the provision in the Constitutioji providing for the three-fifths representation of slaves, and the pro- hibition in the ordinance of slavery in the North- west Territory, and that after there had been the utmost contrariety of opinion in both bodies — could it be considered an accidental coincidence.' No, it was the result of conference; of consulta- tion with each other for the good of the country; of consultation in such a spirit as should be ever shown by us here. They compromised, so that while they allowed to the slave States the represent- ation of three-fifths of the slaves, they prohibited slavery in the Northwest Territory. But after the new Constitution was adopted, which Constitution itself recognized this ordinance, as he would presently show, a law was passed in addition, to carry into further eflect the ordinance of 1787. He would ask gentlemen to tell him how this law came to be passed, if they did not con- sider the ordinance in existence and valid.' He read an extract of the law, the preamble of which recited, that in order that the ordinance of 1787 " may continue to have full effect," it is requisite^ &c. Mr. GAYLE. Is that an act of Congress .' Mr. MURPHY replied that it was. This oj'di- nance, then, was a compact, an engagement — a' contract between the people of the United States, in their collective capacity, and the people who should inhabit this new territory; and this express acknowledgment of this compact by Congress^ after the adoption of the new Constitution, as well as the recognition of it by the Constitution, made it binding, ratified it, and cured it of any unconsti- tionality under the Confederation which it might previously have been obnoxious to. The clause of the Constitution to which he referred was in these words: "All debts contracted and engage- ' mcnts entered into before the adoption of this Con- ' stitution shall be as valid against the United States ♦ under this Constitution as under the Confedera- ' tion." A gentleman near him said this had reference to a compact; true, and this ordinance is in terms declared to be a compact, an agreement, an engage- ment entered into on the part of the United States; and here was an express provision to ratify all "en- gagements." If it were no compact, no agreement between the United States and the people of the new territory, then he admitted this clause of the Constitution did not touch it. But this was no new doctrine on his part. Look into the debate on the Missouri compromise, and we had the authority of a distinguished Southern gentleman, the father of the honorable gentleman from Maryland, (the Hon. Louis McLane,) con- firming the view which he had taken. That dis- tinguished gentleman said, if it were a compact, it , was confirmed by the Constitution. These are his words; "This ordinance was considered doubtful until the adop- tion of the present Constitution, hy the first clause of thfr the sixth article of which it was supposed to be confirmed. But this confirmation shows it to be in the nature of a com- pact, and not of a law — a compact voluntarily entered into by all the parties connected with it — not incorporated in the present Constitution as a grant of power, or explanatory of its principles; but merely sanctioned by a single clause, pro- viding for the validity of contracts. It was a contract made by the party ceding the territory; it did not propose to affect the rights of persons residing there; it was to operate as a contract upon those who should subsequently remove thither; such persons, therefore, went under this ordinance; they voluntarily became parties to it;' and such only settled there as were willing to live without slaves, and subject to the terms of the compact." 5 Mr. HILLIARD interposed with the remark tliat Congress did not recognize the constitutional authority of the ordinance of 1787. They simply authorized the people of the Territory to organize and maintain a government; but none of the pro- visions of the act related to slavery. Mr. MURPHY said his argument was, that the ordinance of 1787 was confirmed by the Constitu- tion. He had alluded to the law to show that the first Congress thereafter, cognizant as its members must have been of the views of the framers of the Constitution, thought the Constitution had con- firmed the ordinance, and they passed this law for the purpose of giving it more full effect. That was the view in which he had used it. Mr. BAYLY (in his seat) was understood to inquire if the people of the Territory were con- sulted in this "compact.'" Mr. MUBPHY replied in the negative; they were not there. But this was a contract binding essentially upon the people of the United States, because it was voluntarily entered into by them inviting settlers to go there. It was, therefore, to be taken in the strongest manner against the United States. The gentleman from Virginia had addressed to the House the argument, that in none of the laws establishing territorial governments had this inhibition of slavery been contained, except in the case of Wisconsin, and in that case he had under- taken to explain it away. Now, if his (Mr. M.'s) view was correct, that this contract was binding on the United States, there was no necessity of introducing it; it was the law of the land; and, more, it was the supreme law, as it was ratified and confirmed by the Constitution. He came now to his second proposition: That Congress possesses the power to legislate for terri- tories acquired since the adoption of the Constitu- tion, as an incident to the power to acquire, ex necessitate; restrained only by the conditions of the cession, and by the prohibitions and limitations of the Constitution. Tiiis covered the territory which was really the subject of their discussion. As re- garded the territory northwest of the Ohio, there was no question raised in this House or in the country. It was in view of the new territory to be acquired in Mexico, comprising New Mexico and California, that this question assumed its great importance; and it was in regard to that territory that he deemed this his proposition to apply. Now, he held that the Constitution did not contemplate the acquisition of new territory. He found no power expressed in the Constitution to acquire new territory. He admitted, that where an express power was granted, it carried with it all the powers necessary to give it full force and effect. But there was no express power conferred by the Constitu- tion to acquire territory; if there was, he called on the gentleman from Virginia or any other gen- tleman to point it out. Mr. BAYLY (in his seat) was understood to refer the gentleman to the power to declare war. Mr. MURPHY. Is that a power to acquire ter- ritory? Mr. BAYLY. Certainly. Mr. MURPHY inquired of the gentleman if it was not incidental to that power, and also to the treaty power? It was a mere incident. How did we acquire territory? By treaty and by conquest. Was there any other power in the Constitution authorizing the acquisition of territory? Mr. BAYLY. None. Mr. MURPHY asked the gentleman, then, how the United States acquired the territory composing the States of Alabama and Mississippi? And how the territory of Oregon? They acquired the terri- tory of Alabama and Mississippi by the cession of Georgia, and the territory of Oregon by the dis- covery of Gray. Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Buchanan, as he had already observed, had, as Secretaries of State, taken the position that that was the primary ground and right of the United States to Oregon. Spain had no rights there: she had never followed up her discovery by settlement. It was contended at the time, and might be now, that we had full right to that territory by the discovery of Gray, and subsequent colonization and settlement. Now, we had the power to acquire territory not by an original, express grant in the Constitution, but first as incidental to the expressed powers; and also ^s an incident to sovereignty. He told the gentleman from Virginia he did not deny the right to acquire territory, but he said the right by which we acquired Alabama, Mississippi, and Oregon, was an incident of nationality. Mr. McLANE (the floor being yielded) ex- plained, that in the speech referred to by the gen- tleman from New York, [Mr. Murphy,] Mr. McLane, of Delaware, denied that the ordinance of 1787 gave Congress any power to prohibit slavery in the Northwestern Territory. Mr. Mc- Lane argued that this ordinance was good for nothing, except so far as it was supposed by some to be a compact; and as a compact would have acted directly on the people going into said terri- tory. But Mr. McLane himself did not admit it to be a compact, ratifiied by competent parlies to make a contract. Mr. MURPHY stated that he had taken the position that the ordinance was a compact, and that that compact was ratified and confirmed by the Constitution. He had referred to the ordi- nance of 1787 to show that it was a compact, and had then gone on to say, that, according to the argument of Mr. McLane, of Delaware, if a com- pact, it was ratified and confirmed by the Consti- tution. Mr. McL. said it was confirmed as a compact, not as a law. Mr. McLANE said, he never admitted it was a compact, then or now. Mr. MURPHY said it was declared by the ordinance itself to be a compact; but he was going on, before this interruption, to consider the ques- tion relative to the territory which was now the subject of their discussion. He had asserted that the provisions of the ordinance of 1787 did not apply to that territory; he had gone on further to say, that there were certain national powers, not derived from the constitntional grant — powers incident to this Government as a sovereign, in common with all other civilized nation.s — which we could exercise, and that among them was the right to acquire territory; and if we had not those powers, we had no right to the cession from Geor- gia of those two southern States which he had mentioned, and had no claim to Oregon on the ground of discovery. Now, if we had this power to acquire, he held that this other power to govern followed as an in- cident; and this was no new doctrine. It was laid down by Story, and by all the writers on the Con- stitution, and was affirmed by decisions of the Supreme Court. Before proceedino; to the authorities, however, let him ask, if this Government had the right to ■ acquire territory, how it was to be governed? It was not sovereign. He agreed wiih the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. Woodward,] that it was a dependency, a province; the sovereignty was in Congress. The territory had not a single attribute of sovereignty; it was not recognized as such by the sister States or by the world at large; it was dependent on the power which had the right to acquire and did acquire it; that was the power which had the right- to govern it under certam limitations, to which he would presently refer. If this was not the case, who was to govern this territory? Would gentlemen tell him that that power was reserved to the people of the States inde- pendent of the Congress; or was it to be exercised by the State governments? If the territories were not to be governed by the people in it, or by the people of the States, or by the State governments, /lo-ic, let him ask, were they to be governed? The right to govern the territories atquired must neces- sarily exist in the government which had the title, which had the right to acquire. He had said that this principle had been settled. It was well known that the Supreme Court of the United States had again and again admitted the right of Congress to legislate for the Territories under the clause of the Constitution which autho- rized them to make " all needful rules and regula- tions," &c. He did not coincide with that view. But they had gone further; they had recognized the principle which he now asserted. Sustained by such authority, he thought he might assume this position with confidence. Chief Justice Marshall declared, in the case of the American Insurance Company et al. vs. Canter, that — " Perliap^ tlie power of governing a feiritnrv belonging to the United States, which has not, by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessa- rily, from the facts that it io not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is witliin the power and jurisdic- tion of the United States. The richl to govern may ho the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory." The principle was laid down by all our element- ary writers — Story, Rawle, and others — that the power to govern did not rest either in the people who inhabit the territories or in the several States in their separate capacities, or in the people of the States; for, if this was the case, it would not be exercised at all ; but that it was a necessary incident to the right to acquire in the United States to be exercised by Congress. He now came to his third proposition — that, until Congress passes new laws over acquired ter- ritory, the old municipal laws of the former govern- ments remain in force, subject only to the condi- tions annexed to the cession and the limitations of the Constitution; and every person settling there is sul ject to the local laws. He made this point in reference to New Mexico and California. They were settled countries, subject to civil laws. It was asserted that the Government of Mexico, having the right over those territories, had prohibited slavery in New Mexico and California. But, whether this was so or not, he was discussing the principle, whether a free territory could be made a slave territory except by the positive authority of Congress. He supposed, however, that slavery had been abolished by the Government of Mexico in these territories. Now, if there were no laws made by Congress, he asked how were the people of these acquired territories to be governed in the mean time, after the cession or conquest and until Congress did make laws for them ? Were they not, from the necessity of the case, to be governed by the laws which existed there before they were acquired by us? What were the precedents? What were the laws in Florida and Louisiana until Con- gress prescribed laws for them? Why, the old laws which prevailed before their cession. And this principle was recognized by all writers on public law. It would be found laid down in Blackstone. He begged to refer the committee, however, to the opinion of Lord Mansfield, in the case of Campbell vs. Hall; Cowper's Reports, vol. 1, p. 208, from which he would read the following extract: " A great deal has been said and many authorities cited relative to propositions, in which both sides seem to be per- fectly agreed, and which, indeed, are too clear to be contro- verted. I will slate the propositions at large, and the first is this : " A country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the King in the right of bis crown, and, tliere- fore, nece>sarily subject to the legislature— the Parliament ol Great Britain. "The second is, tbat the conquered inhabitants, once nceived under the King's protection, become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or aliens. "The third, that the articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered, and the articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable, according to their true intent and meaning. "The fourth, that the law and legislative government of every dominion equally affects all persons and all property within the limits thereof, and is the rule of decision for all questions which arise there. Whoever purchases, lives, or dies there, puts himself under the law of the place. An Englishman in Ireland, Minorca, the Isle of Man, or the Plantations, has no privilege distinct from the natives. "The fifth, that the laws of a coiKjuered country continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror." According to these propositions, the territories of California and New Mexico will be free terri- tories if slavery does not now exist there; and slavery could not be introduced there except by the act of the sovereign power exercised over the territories which exists in the Congress of the United States. Slavery could not exist, either by the common law, or by the civil law of Spain, ex- cept by positive enacttuent. He would refer to the case of the negro Soiuerset, in 1772, in Eng- land, decided by Lord Mansfield, for the com- mon law doctrine, and to the Institutes of the Civil Law, for the rule of that law. Slavery is contra naiuram; it must be established by law, and is not to be presumed. It appeared, therefore, to him, that it was much luore important for the South to establish the power of Congress over the subject, than for the North. But he did not in- vite the question here: he deprecated it for the the .sake of the Union. But he felt bound to say to the gentlemen from the South, " beware.^' If this subject came into these Halls, it must be brought "here by gentlemen from the South seek- ing to establish slavery in the new territory, and he would, in a spirit of frankness, admonish them to beware how they came in collision with the free sentiment of the North. When it should be brought here properly, it would be met by repre- sentatives upon their responsibility to their constit- uents and the Constitution. Having but a very limited time, he should hurry along to make some general observations on this subject. He had no -wish to discuss the question of slavery in its moral, social, and^poiitical aspects, except so far as was necessary to make himself understood in discussing the question of power which had been brought into controversy. But it was proper at this time, when there was so much agitation throughout the country on this subject, that, in order that he might not be misun- derstood in the views which he had taken, he should express succinctly what his opinions were. He regarded slavery as the gentleman from South Carolina did — not as an institution. It was a per- version of terms to call it an institution, much less a republican institution. He regarded it as a con- dition of life which has been recognized by all laws, human and divine, from the foundation of the world in all countries to a late period; and is still in a large portion of the world. It existed by virtue of the principle of early international law that the conqueror has the right to dispose of the conquered. It was so recognized under the Mosaic dispensation. And hence, finding slavery existing in a large portion of this country, into which it was intro- duced without our efforts, and brought there witli- out our legislation, he was disposed to pay it that respect which every other kind of property, of whatever nature, was entitled to. And palsied be the hand that should interfere with the rights of the States to control slavery within their own lim- its ! When the question comes here, and comes legitimately, he hoped every man, whether from the' North or South, would be ready to meet it and to give a vote that will be consistent with the prin- ciples of the Constitution, and,subordinately there- to, reflective of the views of the constituents whom he represents; and if it comes here improperly, let every hand be sternly raised to put it hence. He lived in a free State, as it was called — a State in which there were free negroes, and he would assert from his own personal observation, that it was im- possible for the two races to live together on terms either of a social or political equality. The people of the State in which he lived had recently been called upon to vote on this question, and, by a majority of one hundred and forty thou- sand, they had refused to extend to the free blacks the right of sufiVage as enjoyed by the whiles. Why was that? Because it was repugnant to the feelings of the white population. We were taught by our mothers to avoid all communication with them; and the theorists and Utopians never would be able to bring about an amalgamation. There can be no commingling of the blood of the races; and yet that had been said to be the only way in which the barrier could be broken down. Wliile, then, the negroes remained this inferior race, they were doing them injustice by giving to them their freedom. When he heard, the other day, of the incident which occurred in this Dis- trict — he alluded to the carrying ofTof several slaves down the river — hefeltgreatpity,not fortheowner of the vessel, nor for the owners of the slaves, but for the slaves themselves. He knew that the mo- ment they left their comparatively happy homes, and were landed in a free State, they would be the objects of contumely and scorn, and would soon become adepts in vice and crime. Let him ask gentlemen who wished to carry slaves to the North, what would have become of them if they had been transferred there? It was a well-established fact, that the number of free negroes was rapidly decreasing in many of the New England States, and simply because the free negroes are forced to be vicious. They are not allowed to associate with the whites. They are driven from the employment of the whites. The women become degraded, and the men thievish. They cannot live in the free States and be perpet- uated; and he appealed to the friends of hurnanity to let them remain where they are, unless they can be emancipated entirely and sent to Africa. He could not believe that this black race had been di- minished by amalgamation. He knew, however, that there was hi^h authority recommending that course for the extinction of the blacks in the free States. . One of the greatest men of New England sug- gested, fifty years ago, that this process would go on. He held in his hand a sermon by the dis- tinguished Jonathan Edwards, in which he said: " It is not to be doulited but tliat the negroes in the north- ern Suites also will in time mix with the common mass of the people. But we have this consolation, that, as they are so small a proportion of the inhabitants, when mixed with the rest they will not produce any very sensible diversity of color." If that was to be the consequence, he would say, keep your slaves in the South, and he would go for enacting laws of a most penal character against any who shall bring the wretched beings to our free States, there to taint the blood of the whites, or to destroy their own race by vicious courses. Perhaps it might be doubted that such was the fact, that the numbers of the free negroes so sensi- bly decreased in the New England Stales. But he held in his hand a copy of the report of the com- mittee of the city council appointed to obtain the census of Boston for the year 1845, by Lemuel Shattuck, which gave some important information on this subject. The colored population of Bos- ton, in 1830, appears in that report to have been 1,875; in 1845 it was 1,842. While the white pop- ulation has been increasing in that city, the blacks have been decreasing. It appears from the same table, that in 1742 the blacks were to the -whites as eight to ninety-two. In 1845, it was as one and sixty- one hundredths to ninety-eight. And this was the most favorable location to make the comparison, for it was in cities that the blacks congregated. If we look at some of the New England States, we find the decrease most marked. Thus, in New flamp- shire, the number in 1820 was 77G; in 1830, 604; and in 1840, 537. In Rhode Island, the number decreased from 3,560 in 1820 to 3,280 in 1840; in Vermont, from 903 to 730 in the same time; and in Connecticut The falling of the Chairman's hai-nmer, announ- cing the expiration of his allotted hour, prevented the completion of the sentence, and the honorable gentleman resumed his seat. Note. — Mr. Murphy was going on to say, when the hour expired, that in Connecticut, the number of blacks had follen off, between 1820 and 1840, from 8,044 to 7,195. But, however prejudicial a state of freedom among the white population 8 might be to the perpetuation of the negro race, or however beneficial in a while community slavery was to the negro, he was no advocate of slavery. He took the condition of the negro as he found it existing in our Confederacy, and wished to speak of it as he found it. To his mind, slavery was a greater curse to the master than to the slave. It made him indolent. It involved him in the employ- ment of the dearest kind of labor; though, perhaps, in some few cases where the climate was unhealthy for the white man, it might be different. It kept back enterprise, invention, and improvement; be- cause it devolved the labor, by which all those pro- gressed, upon the black slave who was brought up in ignorance. Note 2. — The following are the provisions of the constitutive acts and the decrees of the Mexi- can Federation, relating to the abolition of slavery in Mexico, referred to by Mr. Murphy: Constitutive Acts, adopted the 31st January, 1834. Article 30. It is the duty of the nation to protect, by wise and just laws, the rijjhts of man and of the citizens. — See IVhile's New Rccopilacion, vol. 1, p. 379. Decree. — ProhihUion of the commerce and traffic in Slaves. Freedom to those leho tread the Mexican territory. Penal- ties on those who introduce them. Period at which these penalties shall take effect. The Sovereign General Constituent Congress of the Me.xi- can United States has thouijht proper to decree as follows: 1. The commerce and traffic in slaves, from whatsoever Power and under whatsoever flag they may come, is and shall be forever prohibited in tlie territory of the Mexican United States. 2. Slaves introduced contrary to the tenor of the prece- ding article are free, from tlie fact alone of their treading the Mexican territory. 3. Every vessel, whether national or foreign, in which slaves are transported and introduced into the Mexican ter- ritory, shall be irremissibly confiscated, with the remainder of her cargo; and the owner, tlie purchaser, the captain, the master, and the pilot, shall suffer the punishment of im- prisonment for ten years. 4. This law shall go into effect from the very day of its publication ; but with regard to the penalties prescribed in the preceding article, it shall not go into effect until six months later, in consideration for the colonists who may land slaves with the object of introducing them into the Mexican territory in virtue of the law of the fourteenth of October last, respecting the colonization of the Isthmus of Guazacualco. Let it be published, &c. Mexico, July 13, 1824. Translated from the ori^nal "Coleccion de los Decretos y Ordenes del Soberano Congreso Constituyente Mexi- cano," (Mexico, 1825,) in the Library of the Department of State. Decree, September 15, 1829, by President Guerrero. — Abo- lition of Slavery. The President of the United Mexican States to the inhabitants of the Republic : Be it known : That in the year 1829, being desirous of signalizing the anniversary of our independence by an act of national justice and beneficence, which may continue to the strength and support of such inestimable welfare, as to secure more and more the public tranquillity, and reinstate an unfortunate portion of our inhabitants in the sacred rights granted them by nature, and maybe protected by the nation, under wise and just laws, according to the provision in arti- cle 30 of the constitutive act: availing myself of the extraor- dinary faculties granted me, I have thought proper to de- cree— 1. Thai sl.avery be exterminated in the Republic. 2. Cpnsequently, those are free who, up to this day, have been looked upon as slaves. 3. Whenever the circumstances of the public treasury will allow it, the owners of slaves shall be indemnified in the manner which the laws shall provide. JOSE MARIA DE BOCANEGRA. See "Moody^s Facts for the People," p. 62. As additional evidence of the abolition of slavery in Mexico, the declaration of Mc-de Bocanegra, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, in his cor- respondence with Mr. Green, the charge d'affaires of the United States in 1844, may be cited. The Mexican Minister then said, slavery was a "relic of barbarous ages, proscribed by philosophy, and by the intelligence of the epoch"* — language which he would not have used in official correspondence if his own country had been liable to the censure which his remark implies. ' See Vol. 1, Ex. Doc, 2d session 98th Congress, p. 54. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 011 932 894 9