LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, t 
 
 I 
 
 
 r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. | 
 
 . 
 
 o 
 
THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 
 
 AND ITS PROBABLE 
 
 fym^wmm to t\u lUutat M\ti#< 
 
 BY FRANCIS J. GKUND. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA : 
 CHILDS & PETERSON, PUBLISHERS, 
 
 NO. 602, ARCH STREET. 
 
 1860. 
 
.J) l6i 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by 
 
 CHILDS & PETERSON, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Eastern District of 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 DEACON & PETERSON, Printers, 132 South Third Street. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The following pages are not intended for the American stu- 
 dent of history, but for the general reader. History is a branch 
 of knowledge so extensive, that but few can find time to explore 
 it; though an acquaintance with leading facts is indispensable 
 even to a proper understanding of the present situation. Events 
 have, of late, followed each other in such rapid succession, that 
 it may truly be said, history was made faster than it could be 
 written. The Press — seldom impartial and independent in its 
 views — in chronicling these events, colors them for its own pur- 
 pose 5 so that the thousands who, for political information, are 
 almost entirely dependent on newspapers, are as often perplexed 
 as instructed by their contents. In addition to this, our people, 
 divided into sections and parties, are disposed to receive garbled 
 statements, and to treasure up opinions and conclusions corres- 
 ponding with their own predilections. Where such a disposition 
 exists writers are always ready to cater for the public taste ; pre- 
 ferring success which, to a certain extent at least, insures reputa- 
 tion, to the more arduous task of establishing historical truth. 
 No such attempt is made in this brief sketch of events which pre- 
 ceded and, as we believe, are likely to follow the present Euro- 
 pean crisis. The desire to place before the reader the facts from 
 which he himself may judge, together with the reasons which led 
 to the author's own conclusions, is all that induced its publi- 
 cation. 
 
iy PREFACE. 
 
 One remark only must be made in advance, to prevent mis- 
 apprehensions. If it shall appear in the following pages that 
 the present Monarch of France has really surpassed the expec- 
 tations of his contemporaries — if it shall be found that he has 
 given France a controlling influence on the destinies of Europe — 
 that he has undertaken the regeneration, perhaps the political 
 re-division of that continent, and that, to accomplish this, he has 
 already conducted two great wars to a successful issue, the con- 
 clusion is inevitable that he has wielded power to some pur- 
 pose ; and we may, without justifying the means by which he 
 obtained it, but starting from it as an accomplished fact, do 
 justice to his commanding talents, the wonderful productiveness 
 of his genius, and the perseverance and energy which mark his 
 present career. We must judge of the emperor's motives from 
 the French stand-point, not from our own; and of his plans, 
 as they affect France. Any other process of reasoning would 
 necessarily lead to wrong conclusions as to the future, and 
 rather serve to mystify, than to explain, the present political 
 situation. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 The present Crisis, and the things which led to it, 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 The Revolutions in Germany and Austria, and the causes which 
 
 produced them, 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Divisions of Italy from the Peace of Utrecht to the Congress 
 
 of Vienna, 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 The Division of Italy by the Congress of Vienna, 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Antagonism of Austria and Sardinia, 42 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 The Reaction in Italy, and the Neapolitan and Piedmontese Revo 
 
 lutions of 1820— 21, 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 The French Revolution of 1830, and its consequences on Italy, . 57 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 The Succession of Charles Albert to the Throne of Sardinia, . . 66 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Pope Pius IX. and the Roman Revolution, 72 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 The Second French Republic. The Sardinian Campaigns. How 
 
 the Italian Cause was ruined in 1848 and 1849, ... 79 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 The Policy of Prince Metternich continued in Italy. Victor 
 Emanuel II. Downfall of the French Republic. The Crimean 
 
 War and its consequences, 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 Preparations for War— Diplomatic Negotiations of France, Aus- 
 tria, Russia, and England— Political attitude of the Five Great 
 Powers, 
 
 45 
 
 90 
 
 104 
 
^ 
 
 11 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 The Situation of Germany During the War. The Army of the 
 Confederation is put on the War footing. Inducements to Peace, 114 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 The Battle of Solferino — Conclusion of Peace. What has Italy 
 
 gained by it ? 129 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 Naples and Sicily. Will the Dynasty of the Sicilian Bourbons 
 be continued ? What changes are likely to follow the Peace of 
 Villafranca — the Muratists — the Importance of the Island of 
 
 Sicily, 152 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 Effects of the Peace of Villafranca on Prussia, Austria and the 
 
 Germanic Confederation, 164 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 The effects of the Peace of Villafranca on Russia — the Mission of 
 
 Russia in Asia, 182 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 The Relations of England and France — the Oriental Question — 
 
 England's Position as a World Power, 192 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 The Manner in which the Political changes in Europe may affect 
 the United States — our Prospects and Hopes, . . . 225 
 
THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS, ETC, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE PRESENT CRISIS, AND THE THINGS WHICH LED TO IT. 
 
 The present European crisis is miscalled an Italian or a French 
 crisis. A question which affects twenty-five millions of Italians, 
 thirty-six millions of Frenchmen, to say nothing of the Austrian 
 conglomeration with its thirty-eight or, as some claim, forty mil- 
 lions of souls, is necessarily an European one : and as the con- 
 dition of Europe influences our own relations, it must be consid- 
 ered as a world-crisis which, in all probability, will introduce a 
 new historical period. Neither is it artfully prepared and evoked 
 by the Emperor Napoleon alone. Great historical events are sel- 
 dom, if ever, the result of the efforts of a single man, however 
 gifted. Single men can only give birth to that which is struggling 
 for existence ; they act as executors of the laws which govern the 
 rise and progress of nations. Centuries were required for the 
 advent of Alexander, Csesar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon I. 
 These men were political necessities of the periods in which they 
 flourished, and succeeded in proportion as they comprehended and 
 acted in the spirit of their times. The propagation of Christianity 
 itself was prepared by the degeneration into externals of the Mo- 
 saic faith, by the sectarian spirit of its followers, and by the moral 
 and political decline of Rome, the then mistress of the world, to- 
 ward which Christianity itself afterwards powerfully contributed. 
 1 * 
 
6 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Had Christianity (principally through St. Paul) not reached Rome, 
 and had Rome not then been mistress of the world, ourselves might 
 at this time, not be Christians. 
 
 The present Emperor Napoleon — in common with all men and 
 especially with all rulers — may have selfish instincts, and be 
 guided by projects of aggrandizement ; but it cannot be denied 
 that he has succeeded in rendering the leading ideas of the age 
 tributary to his views, and that he was right when, with true his- 
 toric instinct, he charged the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria 
 with " not comprehending his epoch. " That the Emperor of the 
 French understands his own people, is proved by the fact that he 
 s their ruler : that the second French Republic had no mission to 
 fulfil, is demonstrated by the fact that it perished. The Revo- 
 lution of 1848, in France, was the mise en scene of an old play 
 without a single great actor — the abortive attempt to harmonize 
 the abstract ideas of political ethics with the actual condition of 
 men resulting from the progress of ages. There was no organiz- 
 ing spirit in the French National Assembly, no practical man 
 who distinguished between ideal justice and that absolute political 
 right which derives its final sanction from the possession of the 
 adequate power to enforce its decrees. The Second Republic was 
 still-born ; it died, like the Constitutional Monarchy of July, 
 from too great anxiety to keep at peace with all its enemies. Its 
 panegyrists called it " the honest Republic" (la Republique hon- 
 ette) ; but this nursery epithet in French politics did not prolong 
 its existence. It lacked character, energy, decision. There were 
 but two men of action in it : — Cavaignac and his rival for supreme 
 power, clothed with the prestige of the name of Napoleon. 
 
 We are not disposed to approve of the steps by which the Emperor 
 Louis Napoleon arrived at supreme power, or to justify the means 
 by which he executed his designs. This much, however, we venture 
 to assert in his favor — that he aimed at supreme power not merely 
 for the possession of it, and that he employed that power with 
 great skill and judgment for the advancement of France. His 
 movements against the party he destroyed were not dictated by a 
 spirit of resentment ; and, though his proceedings were summary 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 7 
 
 and terrific, he employed, perhaps, no more coercive means than 
 were actually required to attain his object. As to the republic, 
 all European statesmen are now agreed that it was doomed with- 
 out him ; and if a restoration must follow, was a return to the Em- 
 pire more criminal than the return to the younger or elder branch 
 of the Bourbons 1 With much apparent truth say the old legiti- 
 mists of Louis Philippe that he knocked the crown from the lawful 
 head that wore it, to put it on his own ; while Louis Napoleon found 
 it in the streets, abandoned by the royal race, the chance reward 
 of any bold adventurer that had the courage and good fortune to 
 seize it. 
 
 We, in this country, find it difficult to reconcile the conduct of 
 Louis Napoleon with our ideas of political justice. We have a 
 right to the severity of our judgment ; but have other potentates 
 acted with greater deference for the opinion of those subject to 
 their rule? Let those among them that are pure cast the first 
 stone at him ! And was there no attempt made by the Kings of 
 England, from the Plantagenets and Stuarts down to George III. 
 of the House of Brunswick, to subvert the liberties wrung from 
 them by the people 1 And were these attempts made from any 
 other motive than that of personal ambition ? He that stretches 
 out his hand for the crown of France, covets a very uncertain pos- 
 session ; for Monarchies there are scarcely more stable than Re- 
 publics. The crown, in France, is the reward of each day's ex- 
 ertion ; he who wears it must rise earlier and go to bed later than 
 the people ; wo to him if he once oversleeps himself ! As to dy- 
 nasties in a country which has abolished all substantial hereditary 
 distinctions and privileges, they have become mere myths.* 
 
 * The dukes and princes created by the First and Third Napoleons only serve 
 as illustrations of the military history of France. In common with the streets 
 and public places in Paris named after battles, they remind you of great events ; 
 but neither their offsprings, nor the people living in those streets, are objects of 
 particular veneration. The essence of nobility consists in hereditaiy fortunes, 
 secured by entailed estates. The even distribution of the nobleman's fortune 
 among his children soon reduces them to the common standard of citizenship, 
 and makes nobility, as is the case in most countries on the Continent of Europe, 
 an incumbrance rather than an advantage to him who enjoys the distinction 
 
8 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Where no other standard of excellence prevails but that of per- 
 sonal merit, it would be absurd to talk of loyalty in the sense of 
 a British subject. Loyalty is the result of tradition and edu- 
 cation, not of thought ; as obedience, with the people of Europe, is 
 from habit rather than reflection or an abstract regard for the 
 law. The French, since their great social revolution of 1789, 
 yield to nothing but power, wielded by the man who, to use one 
 of their own idioms, "has come up," (Phomme qui est arrive,) 
 and who, by his very presence, furnishes the best proof of his 
 superiority. Submission to him, means hopelessness of resistance. 
 With all this, the French, especially the middle classes (the 
 Bourgeoisie), like to be governed. They think they have a right 
 to demand a government in return for being taxed ; but the gov- 
 ernment they desire must be visible — it must display power. 
 The whole French nation is carried away by power ; and their 
 facility for military organization sufficiently determines the nature 
 of the one to which they most readily submit. France has no 
 more national institution than the army, which is constantly re- 
 cruited from the whole people ; he, therefore, who has the suf- 
 frages of the army, may be certain to have ultimately the suffrages 
 of France. An exception to this rule may exist in Paris, the seat 
 of nine-tenths of the intelligence of France ; but even there the 
 superior attainments of the officers in certain branches of the ser- 
 vice connect them with the Academy and the men of letters. 
 
 The French army, besides being national, is democratic in its 
 essence, and so is the French nation. The men of 1793 did their 
 work so completely as not only practically to exterminate the 
 aristocracy, but the very idea of it in the minds of the people. 
 
 •without a difference. The titles of nobility conferred on the victorious generals 
 of the French army merely serve to commemorate their deeds, and to stimulate 
 emulation. They partake of the nature of orders and decorations with which 
 it is usual to connect some pension for life. The times when principalities and 
 kingdoms were distributed among the victorious generals of France are not 
 likely to return ; but it is certainly better to make princes and dukes out of 
 great generals, than generals out of great princes and dukes, as the French 
 marshals have repeatedly demonstrated to the incredulous Austrians. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 9 
 
 The word "Seigneur" (Lord), except as applied to the Deity, or 
 synonymous with proprietor, disappeared even from the Diction- 
 ary.* The terms " grand-monde" and " demi-monde" rather refer 
 to position and wealth, than to any inherent or hereditary quality 
 of men or women. An army recruited from such a people, not by 
 enlistment but by conscription, from which none but the aged and 
 infirm are exempt, with no other rule of advancement but know- 
 ledge, length of service, or individual merit, is an armed propa- 
 ganda ; and such all French armies have proved themselves since 
 the First Revolution. In whatever cause French troops were en- 
 gaged, their organization and discipline always furnished a demo- 
 cratic example to their adversaries, more powerful and lasting in 
 its consequences than all the reasoning of philosophers and states- 
 men. It is the French armies which have carried the germ of 
 modern political institutions into Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, 
 and latterly also into Russia. Their commanders, risen from the 
 ranks, defeated the men of historical renown and illustrious de- 
 scent ; while the men, prompted by their social instincts, readily 
 fraternized with the people. The sociable nature of the French 
 made friends for them wherever they went ; their organization — 
 the type of modern French society — did the rest. 
 
 That the French democratic army should cherish the remem- 
 brance of the first emperor, is natural ; that they should transfer 
 their affection to his nephew, proves that they thought him capable 
 and disposed to do great things. The sentiment of loyalty had 
 nothing to do with it ; though a certain spite against the National 
 Guards, the embodiment of the bourgeoisie under Louis Philippe, 
 was manifested by the troops of the line on more than one occa- 
 sion previous to the formation of the Second Republic. The army 
 under the Citizen King — the officers called him the King of the 
 Shopkeepers (roi des Boutiquiers) — was occupied in Africa ; but it 
 had no chance of signal distinction, and its rewards were scanty 
 
 * The Petit Dictionnaire de I' 'Academie Francaise, adopted by the Council of 
 Public Instruction in France, page 612, defines Seigneur as follows : — "Master, 
 proprietor of a country, of a state, or of land." And then in brackets, as obso- 
 lete, ["a title formerly bestowed on certain persons of distinction."] 
 
10 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 by the side of the splendid retribution of industry. The Republic 
 which followed did not ipjprove its condition ; while it proposed to 
 protect and, in a measure at least, to support the laboring classes 
 at the expense of the State. This last step, which was construed 
 into a war upon property, left to the Eepublic no other supporters 
 but the operatives of the large towns. The peasantry, the large 
 and small proprietors, the clergy with whom the Republic was 
 never on very good terms, and the army were ready for a change 
 of government. There might have been a diversity of opinion in 
 Paris ; but the great mass of population throughout France was 
 undoubtedly in favor of the Empire, and proved it subsequently 
 by its votes. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 11 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE REVOLUTIONS IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, AND THE CAUSES 
 WHICH PRODUCED THEM. 
 
 The revolution of 1848 took a different direction in Germany. 
 There, the leading idea which pervaded all minds and all classes 
 of society was union — the re establishment of a German Empire. 
 It was only after the total failure to realize this national concep- 
 tion that a small party in Germany declared for a Republic. 
 Germany had never been revolutionized after the French fashion 
 of 1793; the different classes of society had not yet assumed 
 towards each other that deadly hostility which existed in France 
 previous to the year 1789, and the fourth estate — that of the 
 laboring classes — was not yet ready to combine against the Bour- 
 geoisie. The relation between master-workmen and journeymen 
 partook, as it still does, of a patriarchical character. The journey- 
 men boarded for the most part with the master's family, and 
 marriages between journeymen and master's daughters and widows, 
 were among the most ordinary occurrences. Neither had the pro- 
 gress of manufactures, except in a few provinces, such as Silesia, 
 Saxony and Westphalia, created that houseless and homeless class 
 of society called " operatives." The nobility, with few individual 
 exceptions, had become impoverished by successive wars, the pro- 
 perty of the clergy had been confiscated or swept away during the 
 wars of the Reformation ; while the smaller princes themselves, 
 shorn of all substantial power and influence, had scarcely an in- 
 ducement to govern otherwise than economically to save their own 
 and their children's patrimony. Some of them, as far as their 
 scanty means permitted, became patrons of the arts and sciences ; 
 most of them guarded, at least externally, the rules of propriety 
 in private life. No striking antagonism existed anywhere, and 
 consequently no conspiracy to threaten the immediate subversion 
 
12 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of the government. With great justice could Henry Heine, the 
 German Aristophanes, say of his country : 
 
 " Where Oaks and Linden trees abound, 
 No Roman Brutus will be found. 
 And if a Brutus rose to-day, 
 No Ca?sar he -would find to slay."® 
 
 The leading idea of Germany, in 1848, was Union, and union 
 is still the leading idea of the Germans. Under what form of 
 government that union is to be accomplished was then, and is still, 
 an open question. Should the thought ever he realized, it will 
 probably be in the form of a confederacy, under one central head, 
 be he President, King or Emperor. Considering the conservative 
 instincts of all the Teutonic races, the strength and endurance of 
 their personal attachments, the magnitude and variety of interests 
 seeking protection, and the habit of obedience contracted by the 
 people through the progress of ages, the form first adopted will, in 
 all probability, be that of Constitutional Monarchy. For this form 
 of government the Germans are undoubtedly prepared, and it is 
 that which, if we believe their historians and eminent public writers,f 
 could hardly fail to insure to them the greatest amount of indi- 
 vidual freedom consistent with safety from foreign intrusion. The 
 establishment, in Germany, of a confederate Republic, would pro- 
 bably lead to an immediate conflict with her powerful neighbors, 
 and it would perpetuate the preponderance of the larger states over 
 the smaller ones which, thus far, has been the principal source of 
 all the political misfortunes which have befallen that unhappy 
 country. The Constitutional party in Germany is, at this moment, 
 far more numerous than the Republican ; because the transition 
 from the present state to a federal monarchy seems to be con- 
 nected with fewer dangers and difficulties, than that to a confede- 
 
 * " Im Land der Eiclicn und dcr Linden, 
 Wird niemals sick ehi Brutus fin den. 
 Und wenn avch ein Brutus unter tins wQr, 
 Den Csesar fdnd er nimmermehr." 
 ■f Schlosser and Gervinus. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 13 
 
 rate republic. Germany, it must be remembered, is a country 
 burdened with two thousand years' history, already densely popu- 
 lated, with no other outlet but emigration, and requiring for its 
 defence, at all times, a large standing army. The practical ques- 
 tion is not what form of government is the most rational, the most 
 just to all ; but simply what sort of government has Germany the 
 power, at this time, to establish and to maintain ? 
 
 The revolutions which, in 1848, took place in Vienna, Berlin, 
 Dresden, Cassel, Darmstadt, &c, after a sharp conflict with the 
 military, ended all in the establishment or enlargement of repre- 
 sentative forms of government. In none of the States was the 
 person of the sovereign exposed to indignities or driven from the 
 throne ; and this in spite of the example of the flight of Louis 
 Philippe and the establishment of the French Republic. But with- 
 out any previous concert, the people of all the States, in addition 
 to their local representative forms of governments, called for a 
 National Parliament in which the people, not the princes, were to 
 be represented, and elections were accordingly held for that pur- 
 pose. The Parliament met at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the place 
 where the former Emperors of Germany were crowned, and where 
 the Diet, composed exclusively of representatives of the ruling 
 princes, was wont to hold its sessions. The members of this latter 
 Diet voluntarily surrendered their power into the hands of the 
 Representatives of the People, and a new order of things seemed to 
 be at once peaceably inaugurated. 
 
 To understand what followed, it is necessary to cast a glance at 
 the history of Germany, since the peace of Westphalia (1648), and 
 to allude briefly to the condition in which the country was left by 
 the Congress of Vienna (1815.) Previous to that period, Germany 
 was an elective Empire, with hereditary princely electors ; a 
 circumstance which sufficiently accounts for the little power ever 
 exercised by the Emperors thus elected by their merely nominal 
 vassals. The peace of Westphalia, which followed the long religious 
 war of the Reformation, destroyed even this shadow of sovereignty, 
 by conceding to some three hundred princes and nobles of the em- 
 pire the right of making treaties among themselves and with foreign 
 2 
 
14 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Powers. France and Sweden guarantied the conditions of this 
 treaty : the former receiving Alsace, the latter a part of Pome- 
 rania, Bremen, Verden and Wismar, for this pernicious service. 
 Nothing was secured to the people except the right of worship of 
 the different confessions^ in return for which the central power of 
 Germany was hopelessly weakened, its influence on the councils of 
 Europe proportionally diminished, and its western frontier exposed 
 to military incursions from France. From that day, Germany 
 became the battlt-field of Europe — the peace of Westphalia, the 
 basis of all European treaties until the time of the French Revo- 
 lution. 
 
 The immediate consequences of this new arrangement was the 
 attempt, on the part of the greater and more influential German 
 States, to establish themselves as independent European Powers, 
 by the creation of courts, the appointment cf ministers and other 
 diplomatic agents to foreign countries, and the assertion, as far as 
 circumstances permitted, of sovereign rights. The two German 
 States which took the lead in this felonious process against their 
 common country, were Prussia and Bavaria- the former leaning 
 toward an alliance with Russia, the latter generally fighting on the 
 side of France. The death of Charles VI., which terminated the 
 male line of the House of Habsburg, finally opened to the genius 
 of Frederic the Great, the road to the hereditary possessions of the 
 German Emperors, while it favored the pretensions of the Elector 
 of Bavaria to the German crown. The wars which followed were 
 civil wars, which wasted the substance of Germany while they 
 brought French and Russian armies into the country, and destroyed 
 the last remnant of central power. By the cession of the Austrian 
 Principalities of Silesia and Glatz to Prussia, the latter became an 
 European Military Kingdom ; the husband of Maria Therese, 
 Francis Stephen, of the House of Lorraine, received nothing but 
 the shadow of the German throne. Prussia, since the peace of 
 "Westphalia the head and front of the Protestant States of Ger- 
 many, became now the declared rival of Austria ; the other German 
 States embracing the cause of one or the other as their limited 
 views and scopeless statesmanship seemed to suggest 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 15 
 
 The war between England and France (1755) for the possession 
 of their North American Colonies, led to a fresh rupture between 
 Austria and Prussia ; the former having, through Madame Pompa- 
 dour, succeeded in establishing an alliance with France, and 
 Frederic the Great having, on the 16th January, 1756, entered 
 into a treaty with George II., by which the two monarchs guar- 
 antied to each other their respective possessions, and bound them- 
 selves to prevent France from marching troops into Germany. The 
 Seven Years' war which followed, by engaging France in Europe, 
 facilitated the British conquest of Canada, and insured the success 
 of British arms in India ; but it led to so complete a prostration of 
 Austria and Prussia, that in the peace of Hubertusburg (1763) 
 both parties were obliged to recognize each other's possessions as 
 they were before the commencement of the war. The war, though 
 conducted on a scale much inferior to the present rate of destruc- 
 tion, had nevertheless consumed a million of men. Prussia alone 
 lost, in twenty-six battles, some 200 generals and superior officers, 
 140,000 men in killed and wounded, and 350 cannon. The losses 
 of Austria were even greater, and her finances have ever since been 
 in a shattered condition. These, then, were the consequences of 
 disunion : — a ruined and divided country, with a northern and a 
 southern power struggling for predominance. What a lesson this 
 to France, who has profited by it, and we may add, to the United 
 States ! — 
 
 The first French Revolution found Germany under the govern- 
 ment of three hundred masters, who themselves depended for pro- 
 tection either on Austria or Prussia, or on their alliances with 
 foreign Powers. For a time the common danger effected a union 
 among them ; but in the war that ensued, Prussia, conceiving the 
 integrity of her provinces threatened by Austria, signed a separate 
 treaty of peace with France (Basel, 5th April, 1795) which ceded 
 the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic. Austria, thus 
 left to herself, was afterwards compelled to conclude the peace of 
 Campo-formio (1797), and revenged herself on Prussia by not only 
 confirming, in the secret articles of that treaty, the cession of the 
 left bank of the Rhine with the fortress of Mentz, to France, but 
 
16 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 also obtaining stipulations from that Power against the future ex- 
 pansion of Prussia. Napoleon I., in 1803, seems to have carried 
 out these secret stipulations by seizing on Hanover, which the 
 Prussians had occupied in 1801, in return for which Prussia 
 refused to enter the coalition of 1805, between England, Austria, 
 Sweden and Russia, and demanded, in 1806, that France should 
 give up Hanover and annex it to Prussia. The consequences of 
 this new division were that Austria was separately beaten at Aus- 
 terlitz, and Prussia at Jena, while Hanover was divided, and a 
 part of it incorporated into the newly formed kingdom of West- 
 phalia. Hanover has since, by the Congress of Vienna, been 
 erected into an independent kingdom ; but the mutual hatred be- 
 tween Prussia and Hanover, arising from these transactions, has 
 continued and has had much to do with the conduct of the Regent 
 op Prussia during the war which has just terminated for an un- 
 certain period. 
 
 The example of Prussia was quickly followed by other German 
 States. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and Saxony united with the 
 elder Napoleon in his wars against Austria, and received provinces 
 and titles in reward for their German defection. In this manner, 
 Germany received four new kingdoms out of the spoils of her unfor- 
 tunate wars ; while her territorial limits disappeared, even as a geo- 
 graphical division, from the map of Europe. The greatest German 
 historian, marks this " period of lowest degration" by stating that 
 ministers of the smaller powers of Germany might be seen in Paris 
 courting the mistresses of French Generals, in order, through their 
 influence, to obtain for their masters the privilege of robbing their 
 German subjects and neighbors. Then followed the establishment of 
 the confederation of the Rhine, of which the Emperor Napoleon was 
 the Protector, and, as a necessary consequence of it, the abdication 
 of Francis II. (6th August, 1806) as Emperor of Germany, and 
 his assumption of the imperial crown of Austria, as Francis I. 
 
 Once more (in 1809) Austria made an effort to regain her lost 
 position ; nearly all the States of Germany assisted the Emperor 
 Napoleon in putting her down again. When the great French 
 army was destroyed in Russia, it was not the German Cabinets, 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 17 
 
 but the People, who raised the national standard. To what extent 
 the German princes had forgotten their duty toward their country, 
 was exhibited in the long hesitation of Austria to join the coali- 
 tion,* in the reluctant movements of the kings of Bavaria and 
 Wurtemberg, who deserted Napoleon only after the fortunes of 
 war had decided against him, and in the conduct of the King of 
 Saxony, who remained his faithful ally to the last. The invasion 
 of France led to the peace of Paris (1814) and to the Congress of 
 Vienna. At that Congress nothing was done for the substan- 
 tial union of Germany : while both Austria and Prussia tried to 
 establish themselves as great European Powers ; the former by 
 extending her possessions and influence in Italy, the latter by add- 
 ing to her possessions and influence in Germany. The mutual 
 jealousy of Austria and Prussia was as much manifested during 
 the Congress as it had been during the previous wars. Austria 
 had a faithful coadjutor in England ; Prussia leaned toward Rus- 
 sia. It was by this unfortunate dualism which destroyed the 
 influence of Germany, that Talleyrand, the representative of 
 France, succeeded in establishing the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 
 and securing its crown to a Spanish Bourbon. The reestablishment 
 of the kingdom of Poland, though advocated by Russia, was 
 abandoned, and in its stead the Duchy of Warsaw only erected 
 into a kingdom of that name, with a separate constitution, under 
 Russian supremacy. Cracovia, as an independent Republic, was 
 placed under the protection of the high contracting Powers. Prus- 
 sia, which claimed the whole of Saxony, was defeated in that de- 
 mand and received, in its stead, about a third of the territory of 
 that kingdom and the Provinces of the Rhine, with a part of West- 
 phalia. The Palatinate was given to Bavaria ; Luxemburg, a 
 German province, was given to Holland, Slesvigh-Holstein re- 
 mained with Denmark, which claimed even the Hanseatic Towns 
 of Hamburg and Bremen, (a proposition which, for a time, was 
 seriously entertained by Austria,) and such a disposition made 
 
 * Metternich, for a long time, leaned toward France, and it was only the de- 
 mand of Napoleon that Austria should join him with her whole available force, 
 which induced him to espouse the cause of the Allies. 
 
 2* 
 
18 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of the other states and provinces of Germany, that the politi- 
 cal geography of that country has ever since been a puzzle to 
 diplomatists. We will not here allude to the charge of bribery 
 that has been preferred against some of the Plenipotentiaries of the 
 Great Powers, which thus laid the foundation to the new public 
 law of Europe. It suffices, for our present purpose, to state that 
 Austria, which presided over the deliberations of the Congress, did 
 not propose a single measure tending toward the union of Germany, 
 and that the Germanic Confederation, the miserable substitute for 
 it, met with the most violent opposition on the part of the German 
 princes, and was finally only acceded to, when the return of Napo- 
 leon from Elba imposed peremptory measures for their common 
 defence. 
 
 The Germanic Confederation was from the beginning, and is to 
 this day, nothing but an institution for the military defence of 
 Germany. It is utterly incapable of any aggressive movement, and 
 possesses, on that account, but little political power. It is an 
 association of princes for their mutual protection and safety, 
 nothing more. In it the different princes have nearly the same 
 rights ;. but on all questions of moment, Austria and Prussia, when 
 united, lead the Diet as European Powers, or condemn it, when 
 divided, to hopeless inactivity. As Austria and Prussia, of late 
 years, have been constantly divided, the Confederation has done 
 nothing ; its previous acts refer only to the limitation of the liberty 
 of the press, and the interference with other liberal institutions 
 proposed or introduced by some of the smaller States. It enjoyed 
 at no time the confidence or respect of the people, and scarcely 
 that of its own members. 
 
 To perpetuate the dualism of Austria and Prussia, the former 
 entered the Germanic Confederation only with twelve millions of 
 her subjects, out of the thirty-seven or eight which she actually 
 possessed previous to the recent war : while Prussia, to balance the 
 account, was only permitted to come in with a like number ; 
 although the Austrian provinces excluded were Hungarian, Scla- 
 vonic, and Italian provinces, while East and West Prussia, which 
 were not admitted into the Confederation, are essentially German 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 19 
 
 and, as such, entitled to representation at the Diet.* Holland, 
 by virtue of the Duchy of Luxemburg, and Denmark, by vir- 
 tue of Slesvigh-Holstein, became members of the Diet ; while, 
 to render its composition as heterogeneous as possible, the smaller 
 States were permitted to establish representative forms of govern- 
 ment at home, to bring them either in direct conflict with Austria 
 and Prussia, or, as the case might be, to oblige them to seek the 
 protection of these Powers against their own subjects. The four 
 free cities, Hamburg, Bremen, Lubec, and Frankfort, which en- 
 tered the Confederacy, were erected into independent Republics, 
 in order, as Metternich sarcastically remarked, by their example 
 " to convince the Germans of their incapacity for self-government." 
 Metternich's aim in establishing the Germanic Confederation, 
 was to use the German States as a bulwark against France, and, 
 at the same time, to confine Prussia to her present territorial limits. 
 By this means, and by pressing on Germany, at all convenient 
 times, as an independent power, Austria attained the same 
 supremacy on the Rhine and Danube which she sought, and 
 secured, in Italy by separate treaties with the smaller States, and 
 by the right to maintain garrisons in some of the principal fortresses 
 of Central Italy. Prussia, when it suited Austria, could be the 
 executor of her will, and thereby lose popularity and influence 
 with the smaller States ; but independently she could do nothing 
 without exciting suspicion and alarm. Metternich took care to con- 
 vince the smaller princes of Germany that the mission of Austria 
 was the extension of German power into Italy and on the Danube ; 
 while Prussia, too small by herself to maintain her position as a 
 Great European Power, must seek enlargement at the expense of 
 
 * The provinces of Austria represented in the Diet, are the Arch Duchy of 
 Austria, the Duchy of Styria, the Kingdom of Illyria, the County of Tyrol, the 
 Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, with Austrian Silesia, and 
 the Duchies of Auschwitz and Zator, in Gallicia. Prussia has entered the Con- 
 federation only for the provinces of Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, Saxony, 
 Westphalia and Rhenish Prussia. Austria has twelve out of thirty-seven mil- 
 lions, Prussia, twelve out of seventeen millions of her subjects represented in 
 the Diet. 
 
20 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 her German neighbors. Thus was the disunion of Germany, which 
 had caused her ruin during the progress of two entire centuries, 
 not only perpetuated, but actually reorganized by the Congress of 
 Vienna. The number of masters, to be sure, was reduced to thirty- 
 eight ; but these were jealous and distrustful of each other, and 
 not bound together even by material interests. Each State ha<> 
 its separate commercial laws, its own tariff of duties, its custom- 
 houses, and its own financial policy. The stipulations of the Con- 
 gress in regard to the free navigation of German rivers are to this 
 day wholly disregarded, with no power anywhere to enforce them 
 for the benefit of the entire country. 
 
 One good result only was obtained from this division of Germany 
 among many masters ; but it is an important and lasting one. It 
 has created a great many small residences, seats of education and 
 learning, of the arts and of civilization generally. Many of the 
 smaller princes, too weak to aim at conquest or aggrandizement, 
 sought lasting fame in the establishment of academies and univer- 
 sities, in the endowments of libraries, and in the protection of 
 artists and men of letters. While Paris, London, Milau, and 
 Naples envied each other the possession of a prima donna or a 
 prima ballerina, Berlin, Munich, Weimar, and Heidelberg en- 
 deavored to capture from each other some celebrated professor of 
 chemistry or geology. Each small capital of Germany has become 
 a seat of superior education and refinement, of study and taste. 
 The capitals of France, England, and Russia may present greater 
 concentration of intellect and genius, but there is certainly no 
 country in Europe where civilization, learning, the fine arts, and 
 true humanity in thought and feeling, are so generally diffused as 
 in Germany. The diffusion of knowledge and the habit of thought 
 act even as checks on the arbitrary power of princes, and this in 
 spite of a shackled press and imperfect political institutions. There 
 seems to be a moral standard by which princes and people, nobility 
 and clergy, fear to be condemned. 
 
 The long peace which followed the Congress of Vienna had a 
 most favorable effect on the development of German industry, and, 
 with a people so eminently active and frugal, soon led to the accu- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 21 
 
 mutation of wealth. Most of the States introduced order and regu- 
 larity into their finances, promoted internal improvements, and 
 facilitated commerce. To do this more effectually, the Customs 
 or Tariff league (Zollverein) was formed by Prussia, in conjunction 
 with nearly all the smaller German States, for the purpose of 
 equally taxing the products of foreign industry on the frontier, 
 and leaving the internal commerce of the country free from the 
 vexations and exactions of collectors and inspectors. This was 
 undoubtedly the best thing ever proposed by Prussia to Germany. 
 It was at least an approach to national assimilation and union ; and 
 as Prussia justly claimed to represent the League in all commer- 
 cial treaties with foreign Powers, she acquired by it no small 
 amount of additional prestige in Europe. Austria, at first, opposed 
 the League and refused to join it ; but she has, within the last few 
 years, made desperate efforts and submitted to many pecuniary 
 sacrifices, to be admitted as one of its members. But neither 
 states nor individuals have the power to do things at their conve- 
 nience. They must act at the proper time, or lose the opportunity 
 forever. Bankrupt Austria will now find it difficult to form a 
 commercial league with the solvent States of Germany. 
 
 The revolution of 1830, which led to a change of dynasty in 
 France, and to the separation of Belgium from Holland, agitated 
 many of the smaller States of Germany ; but as the princes seemed 
 to yield, it led to nothing deserving the name of revolution. The 
 agitation was confined to individual States, the people in their sim- 
 plicity, actually believing that liberal institutions could be intro- 
 duced and secured in any one of them without the consent and 
 active cooperation of all the others. The Resolutions of the Diet 
 of 1833, to which some of the smaller princes themselves unwill- 
 ingly assented, put an end to this delusion, and proved the ab- 
 surdity of the idea of reform independent of Prussia and Austria. 
 The insurrection in Poland, the most serious consequence of the 
 French revolution of 1830, found a strong echo in the German 
 heart ; but when Poland had fallen, and the reactionary movement 
 had commenced in France, the hopelessness of all further struggle 
 produced once more that deceptive state of quiescence which 
 
22 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 monarchs, to their cost, have repeatedly mistaken for submission. 
 Then came the French revolution of 1848, which, as if by an 
 electric spark, convulsed all Germany, including Prussia and 
 Austria themselves. 
 
 Up to 1848, Germany looked upon France as the political motor 
 of Europe ; but the experience of 1830 had taught the Germans 
 not to rely too much on the stability of their French neighbors. It 
 had convinced them that, as their history and condition differed 
 essentially from that of France, institutions of a different character 
 were required for their progress and welfare. They aimed at 
 liberty; but conceived it to be something more than political 
 equality, and thought it indispensable to their safety first to estab- 
 lish union among themselves. The first French Republic had 
 devoloped a fearful military momentum ; might not the second 
 follow in its footsteps % And what if Russia, armed to the teeth, 
 threatened to intervene ? The whole past history of Germany was 
 a series of calamities arising from the want of union ; union, there- 
 fore, was to be the first offspring of revolution. In regard to this 
 one idea, all Germans were agreed ; but how to realize it was the 
 question, for the solution of which no organizing genius appeared 
 in the Parliament of Frankfort. The deputies from the smaller 
 States found they could do nothing, those of Prussia and Austria 
 were mutually jealous of each other. The dualism of Prussia and 
 Austria, which prevented the union of the Princes, was equally 
 manifested by the representatives of the People. The German 
 Empire was to be reestablished on a Constitutional basis, the Ger- 
 man Confederation was to be re-constructed of representatives of 
 the People ; but who was to be at the head of this Confederacy ? 
 A small prince with no power was out of the question : it must there- 
 fore be an Austrian or a Prussian Prince. But might not a ruling 
 Prince, with an army at his command, use his power and influence 
 to subvert the liberties of the people ! Was the Emperor of Aus- 
 tria willing to submit to Prussia ? Would the King of Prussia 
 consent to become a subject of the Emperor of Austria? To avoid 
 these complications and difficulties (the thought of employing force, 
 to compel submission, never entered the loyal German mind,) 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 23 
 
 Arch Duke John of Austria, uncle to the Emperor Ferdinand, was 
 elected Vicar of the Empire — a step which has since been bitterly 
 regretted, and which only afforded time for the development and 
 success of the reactionary movement. There are those who believe 
 that the Prince, now the Regent of Prussia, aspired to that dig- 
 nity, and there are many who wish that he had been elected ; but 
 the historical reminiscences connected with the House of Habsburg 
 prevailed in the Parliament, and the small faction which saw no 
 other remedy for all evils but the establishment of a German Con- 
 federate Republic, was voted down. 
 
 Arch Duke John was more of an Austrian statesman than his most 
 ardent friends had given him credit for ; his achievements consist- 
 ing chiefly in delay and procrastination. With great skill did he 
 prevent immediate action on the vexed question as to who should 
 finally be ruler in Germany ; affording, in the mean time, scope for 
 the discussion of minor topics, such as the disposal of the Duchies 
 of Slesvigh-Holstein, the creation of a German navy, perhaps the 
 reannexation of the former German provinces of Alsace and Lor- 
 raine. During all this time the Vicar and his Parliament remained 
 without an army and without a treasury ; all real power remained 
 with the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the sove- 
 reigns of the smaller states* When the crown was at last offered 
 to the King of Prussia, the reaction had already been successful? 
 and he declined to accept it. The Parliament at Frankfort, shorn 
 of its power and influence, finally broke up : its republican rump 
 assembling at Stuttgart, where they finally quietly dispersed. As 
 a last resort, an attempt was made to establish a Republic in the 
 Duchy of Baden, with the hope, no doubt, of inducing other Ger- 
 man States to follow the example. The military joined the move- 
 ment in a body, and an armed intervention on the part of Prussia 
 was the consequence. Some thirty, according to others, sixty 
 thousand men, under the immediate command of the Prince of 
 Prussia himself, invaded the Duchy, which defended itself with 
 considerable valor. At the battle of Waghausel, the Prussians 
 were beaten back with great slaughter ; but a regiment of Baden 
 Dragoons refusing to pursue the retreating enemy, the prestige of 
 
24 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 victory was lost, and with it the confidence of success. The 
 Duchy was subdued, the fugitive Grand Duke reinstated in his 
 possessions, and the popular movement in Germany checked for an 
 indefinite period. 
 
 During all this time Austria went through a fearful crisis. 
 Hungary, which for four centuries had enjoyed a separate consti- 
 tutional government, (the emperors of Austria were only kings 
 of Hungary) and which had succeeded in obtaining a separate minis- 
 try, located in her own capital (Buda), began to distrust the sincerity 
 of the Emperor, and, after many remonstrances, undertook to estab- 
 lish her entire national independence. This movement was the more 
 destructive to Austria, as Hungary has always been considered the 
 most considerable, and at the same time the most warlike, part of 
 her empire, and because the whole Hungarian army at once joined 
 the insurrection. Hungary was lost to Austria, and had to be 
 reconquered. Twice had the Hungarians heroically beaten back 
 the whole Austrian host, and if they were at last defeated, it was 
 only through treason* and by the intervention of Russia. The 
 Italian Provinces of Austria had previously risen and displayed 
 the standard of independence ; the King of Sardinia, Charles 
 Albert, having entered Lombardy at the head of 40,000 men. 
 Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States had also joined the na- 
 tional insurrection; but the battles of Rivoli (July, 1848) and 
 Novara, (March, 1849) after many partial successes of the Pied- 
 montese, finally decided against the nationals, and reestablished 
 Austrian domination in Upper Italy. Charles Albert, with his 
 characteristic chivalry, sought death on the field of battle ; but 
 not finding it there, abdicated the throne in favor of his son Victor 
 Emanuel II., the present king. He died a few weeks afterwards, 
 far from his country, in Portugal ; leaving no other bequest, to 
 his loyal and generous people, than a liberal constitution, which 
 his son has since faithfully maintained. Venice, now isolated, con- 
 
 * All doubts about the conduct of Gebrgey are now at an end; for he lives on 
 an Austrian pension at Klagenfurt, and his name, at the commencement of the 
 late war, was even suggested in high court circles for Commander-in-Chief of 
 the Austrian army. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 25 
 
 tinued a hopeless struggle against Austria, even after the French 
 had entered Rome (3d July, 1849) ; and had the honor of being 
 the last Italian city which (24th August, 1849,) sheathed the 
 sword drawn for national independence. 
 
 But the Italian struggle for liberty and national independence, 
 is not an isolated fact — an incident called forth by the revolution 
 of 1848. It commenced with the close of the last century, and 
 continued, with innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure, up to 
 the present time. However meanly superficial observers and read- 
 ers may affect to think of the modern Italians and their achieve- 
 ments, no other people of Europe has, in modern times, shown such 
 a constant devotion to an elevated idea, such power of endurance 
 under tragic misfortunes, and such an unbroken spirit under cir- 
 cumstances which would have driven every other nation to frantic 
 despair.* 
 
 * Many of our modern Italian tourists, judging of Italy only by the cheating 
 landlords, the rascally porters and coachmen, the lying picture dealers, selling 
 you smoked modern daubs for valuable originals of the masters of the sixteenth 
 century, and the cunning Jews swearing "by the Redeemer" to the genuine 
 antiquity of cameos, may entertain different notions of the modern Italians. 
 With these gentlemen, who look upon Europe from the window of a railway 
 car, or from the top of a stage coach, we cannot enter into a discussion, and 
 must necessarily leave them to the enjoyment of their own opinions. 
 
26 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DIVISIONS OF ITALY FROM THE PEACE OF UTRECHT TO THE 
 CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 
 
 The present dynasties of Italy, with the only exception of that 
 of Piedmont, owe their origin to the wars of the Spanish succession 
 and the peace of Utrecht (1713.) The House of Savoy, alone, dates 
 back to the year 1000. Its ancestors were probably Burgundian 
 nobles^ the present Prince Royal (born 1814) being named after 
 Humbert, who died in 1050. German historians believe the House 
 of Savoy to be of Saxon origin ; deriving it even from Wittekind, 
 the great opponent of Charlemagne: though the Piedmontese them- 
 selves, that is, the people on the south of Mont Cenis and St. Ber- 
 nard were of Celtic origin, and at all times distinguished as a 
 heroic race. The people of the plains are descendants of the Etru- 
 rians, Romans and Lombards. At the beginning of the war for 
 the Spanish succession, Louis XIV. conferred upon his ally, Ama- 
 deus II. Duke of Savoy, the rank of French Generalissimo in Italy j 
 but the Duke foreseeing his ruin if the King of France became 
 master of Lombardy, which then extended to within a few miles of 
 Genoa, formed an alliance with Austria, and obtained, in return 
 for this service, first, by the treaty of Montferrat, Alessandria, the 
 valley of the Sesia, and the Lomellina, (near Mortara;) and 
 secondly, by the treaty of Utrecht, (1713,) the Island of Sicily. 
 Savoy proper was also restored to him, with the Alps as its frontier 
 against France. Austria received the diminished Duchy of Milan, 
 Naples and the Island of Sardinia. (The Island of Corsica, had, 
 some forty-five years previous, by the Republic of Genoa, been 
 sold to France.) Philippe V., of Spain, or rather his wife, Eliza- 
 beth of Parma, reconquered Sicily in 1717 ; but was forced after- 
 wards to cede it to Austria who, in exchange, gave the worthless 
 Island of Sardinia to Piedmont. In the war for the Polish suc- 
 cession, (1733,) Spain conquered both Naples and Sicily, and re- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 27 
 
 tained both conquests in the treaty of Vienna (1735) for the Infant 
 Don Carlos, who, after his accession to the throne of Spain, left the 
 kingdom of the Two Sicilies to his third son Ferdinand, with the con- 
 dition that it should never again be united to Spain. Piedmont, 
 which had aided Spain and France in the last war, and which had 
 been promised the whole of Lombardy, had to be satisfied with 
 No vara and Tortona, to which were subsequently, at the peace of 
 Aix la Chapelle (1748,) added pieces of Pavia and No vara. Tus- 
 cany, after the death of the last Medici, (1737,) was given to 
 Francis Stephen of Lorraine, husband of Marie Theresa, of Aus- 
 tria, as a secundo-geniture of Austria, that is, with the condition 
 that the Grand Duchy, in the absence of other heirs, should fall to 
 the Arch Duke of Austria next to him who inherits the throne of 
 the Empire. Parma was, by Austria, surrendered to the infant 
 Philippe, of Spain, to which Sardinia also surrendered Piacenza ; 
 both Austria and Sardinia claiming to this day, in the absence of 
 other heirs, the succession in that Duchy.* By these divisions and 
 subdivisions, all hereditary Italian thrones, with the only excep- 
 tion of Modena, were occupied by foreigners; Milan, Tuscany and 
 Mantua by Germans (Habsburgers ;) Naples, Sicily and Parma by 
 Spanish Bourbons, Piedmont and Sardinia by the House of Savoy ; 
 the Republics of Venice, Genoa and Lucca, and the Papal throne 
 alone, had remained Italian. Finally a son of Maria Therese mar- 
 ried, in 1769, Maria Beatrice of Este, hereditary Princess of 
 Modena, by which that last Italian House of Princes was also re- 
 placed by an Austrian. Such was the condition of Italy previous 
 to the French Revolution — the result not of her guilt, but of the 
 wars between England, France, Austria and Spain, for European 
 supremacy. j Yet Italy was happier in those days than she has 
 since been by the consciousness of her degradation, and the con- 
 stant efforts of her people to escape from it. Remarkable, for 
 that period, is the attempt made by Cardinal Orsini, under Pope 
 
 * These claims are now probably settled forever. 
 
 f England acquired, in the peace of Utrecht, Gibraltar, Newfoundland, Hud- 
 son's Bay and the Island of St. Christopher, while France agreed to demolish 
 the fortifications of Dunkirk. 
 
28 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Pius VI., to unite all the Italian States in a Confederacy, under 
 the Presidency of the Father of the Church — an idea analogous to 
 that now again suggested by the Emperor Napoleon, and about to 
 be realized. 
 
 The French Eevolution, and the Empire which followed, pro- 
 duced in no other country more important changes than in Italy. 
 In the first place, the French created a number of small Republics, 
 modeled after the standard of France, then they united these Re- 
 publics again into larger ones, which in turn were transformed 
 into kingdoms with governments more or less national, yet de- 
 pendent on France. The Republics of Venice, Lucca and Genoa, 
 disappeared with the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, &c. 
 The King of Naples was driven to the Island of Sicily, where he 
 maintained himself partly by Russian, but chiefly by British pro- 
 tection ; while the King of Piedmont, after an honorable resistance, 
 which challenged even the admiration of General Bonaparte, with- 
 drew to the Island of Sardinia. Piedmont and Savoy were lost by 
 the refusal of the King of Sardinia to sign the separate treaty of 
 Basel. Venice disappeared without a blow, and was, by the treaty 
 of Campo-formio, first given to Austria, but afterwards united to 
 the Kingdom of Italy. Parma fell with the driving of the Bour- 
 bons from Spain ; the Papal States, after various vicissitudes, were 
 united to France. A. few small Principalities were given away as 
 presents to French Marshals and Diplomatists.* 
 
 Before Napoleon marched into Russia, Italy was divided as fol- 
 lows : — Two and a half millions of Piedmont ese, half a million of 
 Genoese, half a million of Parmese and Modenese, three and a half 
 millions of Tuscans and Romans, two hundred thousand Corsicans, 
 four hundred thousand Savoyards, and the County of Nizza, with 
 two hundred thousand inhabitants, were annexed to France : seven 
 millions of Lombards, Venetians, Romagnoles, Modenese, Istrians, 
 South Tyrolians and inhabitants of the Legations, were united into 
 the Kingdom of Italy, under Eugene Beauharnais, adopted son of 
 Napoleon ; the Kingdom of Naples, with five millions more, was 
 
 * Ponte Corvo to Marshal Bernadotte; Benevent, to Talleyrand. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 29 
 
 presided over by Joachim Murat, who had married Napoleon's 
 youngest sister. One of the three principal islands — Sicily — was 
 still retained by the offsprings of the Spanish Bourbons ; the other, 
 Sardinia, by the King of Sardinia ; while Malta had been taken 
 possession of by the British. The expulsion of the Austrians from 
 Italy had been accompanied by no special act of tyranny or cruelty ; 
 it was simply the consequence of Napoleon's victories. The King 
 of Sardinia had been driven from Piedmont with the regret of his 
 subjects ; but in Naples, after the momentary victories of Suwaroff 
 scenes were enacted under King Ferdinand and Queen Caroline,* 
 which filled all Europe with horror, and laid the first foundation 
 to that series of sanguinary tragedies by which the Spanish Bour- 
 bons have since soiled the pages of history. f When the Papal 
 States were to be disposed of, the Duchess of Parma, afterwards 
 Queen of Etruria, a Spanish Bourbon, proposed nothing less than 
 to seize upon the whole patrimony of St. Peter ; reserving to his 
 Holiness the Island of Sardinia, the last refuge of the chivalrous 
 House of Savoy. England, to protect the king, proposed to garri- 
 son the Island with British troops ; but Charles Emanuel IV., 
 declined the offer by fiercely demanding iC whether the British 
 ministry was mistaking him for a Hindoostanic Nabob ?" 
 
 It was during this period of misfortune for Austria and Pied- 
 mont, that the foundation was laid to that fierce and uncompro- 
 mising rivalry which has since marked the progress of the Houses 
 of Habsburg and Savoy in Italy. As early as 1796 did each of 
 these Houses aim at the total expulsion of the other from Italy. 
 Austria triumphed first. When Suwaroff, in May 1799, after en- 
 tering the City of Turin, wished to reestablish the Kingdom of 
 Piedmont under its legitimate ruler, Austria not only opposed it, 
 but forbade the reassembling of a Piedmontese army under its 
 
 * Not to be confounded with Queen Caroline, the wife of Murat, above men- 
 tioned. 
 
 f The King of Naples refused to ratify the capitulation of 23d June, 1799, 
 which allowed the Neapolitan Republicans to depart without molestation, for 
 Marseilles, and ten thousand (!!) of them, among them the flower of the nobility 
 of birth and mind, were slaughtered. 
 
 3* 
 
30 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 former colors, and threatened with the withdrawal of her troops. 
 Instead of restoring the King of Sardinia, Eastern Piedmont and 
 Genoa were added to Austrian Italy. At first, England sustained 
 the claims of Sardinia : but when Russia withdrew from the coali- 
 tion, she yielded to the demands of Austria on condition that the 
 latter should attack Toulon. Meanwhile Napoleon returned from 
 Egypt, and, on the battle-field of Marengo, destroyed the plans 
 of both England and Austria. 
 
 What, it has often been asked, have the Italians gained, during 
 the French domination, by a change of masters 1 Their own his- 
 torians have answered it. They were roused from their state of 
 torpor, and made to participate in the great struggle for worldly 
 power. They shared the activity, the success, the glory of their 
 conqueror, who was himself in name and origin an Italian. The 
 feudal tenures were abolished. They obtained laws adapted to 
 modern society, equal and comparatively cheap administration of 
 justice, public roads, security from robbers and bandits, and a 
 well-appointed and disciplined army, alike available for offensive 
 and defensive purposes.* From such an improved condition there 
 was but one step toward national elevation and independence. 
 
 As early as 1809, Arch Duke John of Austria — the same who 
 aftei wards figured as Yicar of the German Empire in Frankfort — 
 called upon the Italians to rise in defence of " national liberty" 
 His Proclamation was addressed " to the Italian people." He 
 promised them a Constitution based "upon the nature of things," 
 and asked them to follow the example of the Tyrolese and Span- 
 iards. " Will you," said he, " become Italians ? The word of 
 that prince (the Emperor Francis of Austria) is as sacred and im- 
 mutable as it is pure. It is Heaven itself which speaks to you 
 through his mouth. We come not as inquisitors to punish, but to 
 
 * All European officers have borne testimony to the bravery and fortitude of 
 the Italian troops in the various campaigns of the first Emperor Napoleon. 
 They fell one by one, without a murmur, by the side of the French Imperial 
 Guards on the icy plains of Russia. The few who returned (about a thousand 
 out of 30,000) have ever since remained faithful to the national cause, and were 
 on that account the special objects of surveillance of the Austrian police. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 31 
 
 liberate you."* Per contra, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beau- 
 harnais, addressed the Senate of the Kingdom of Italy, April 1st, 
 1809, as follows: — "Thanks to the arms of the Emperor there 
 are no longer any small Duchies, Legations, or Republics in Italy, 
 without power at home or influence abroad, separated from each 
 other in language almost as much as in interest. There are, in 
 reality, no Lombards, Venetians, Bolognese : but, at last, one na- 
 tion — an Italian nation. The same Italian domain, so recently 
 divided and torn, is to-day united by the same spirit, under one 
 sceptre, under the same laws, embracing six millions of people." 
 The Patriarch of A r enice saluted Napoleon with these words : — 
 "You have saved France ; but you have created Italy!" 
 
 After the destruction of the great French army in Russia, Aus- 
 tria and the other former Princes of Italy again appealed to the 
 love of " liberty and independence" of the Italians to shake off 
 the "foreign yoke." They and their representatives issued pro- 
 clamations "to the Italian people," and "to the Italian nation." 
 Lord Bentinck, the British Commander and Plenipotentiary, vied 
 with these effusions in patriotic fervor ;j though when the allied 
 troops had entered Paris, he was instructed by Lord Castlereagh 
 to make no further appeals to the People, because the British Cab- 
 inet found it more expedient to join the absolute rather than the 
 liberal governments of Europe. 
 
 One of these Proclamations, issued in the name of General 
 Count Nugent, Commander of the Austrian-British forces, to the 
 " Peoples of Italy," was dated Ravenna, 10th December, 1813, 
 and headed Regno d' Italia independente (Independent Kingdom 
 of Italy). In it, the "courageous and renowned Italians" were 
 reminded that they had it in their power to reestablish, by force 
 
 "•*■" " Ora volete voi de nuovo direnire Italian* ? La parola di quel principe 6 
 sacra ed immutahih comme ella e pura ; etyli e cielo che vi parla, per bocca di 
 hti. Xoi nan veniamo ne per investigare, ni per punire ; noi veniamo per rend- 
 ervi liberi," are the identical words of the Proclamation. 
 
 f He promised the Genoese the reestablishinent of their Republic; but the 
 Tory Ministry of England declared he had no power to make such promises, 
 and advocated its union with Piedmont. In a similar manner did England 
 abandon the Liberals of Spain and Sicily. 
 
32 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of arms, the freedom, power, and happiness of their county. 
 " Rise, Italians !" says the proclamation; " and if your arms are 
 not sufficient to free you from foreign oppression our powerful 
 arms are ready to assist you. Up, Italians ! the day of liberty 
 has come ! You must become a united, independent Italy. Unite 
 all your strength for the public good ; and, if you confide in those 
 who love you, and who, with such great exertion, devote them- 
 selves to your welfare, you will soon be great and happy. In a 
 short time your lot will be envied ; those who belong to you will 
 be admired." 
 
 On the 25th of February, 1814, Field-Marshal Nugent again 
 called upon the people and soldiers of Italy to cooperate in the 
 1 tattle for liberty and independence, assuring them that they will 
 not change one foreign master for another. " No, Italians ! that 
 is not the aim of the Allied Powers. Among the many just causes 
 for the present war is the demand for your independence — your 
 political and social existence so blended with the rights of the 
 legitimate Princes of Italy, that you shall form but a single body ; 
 a single nation worthy the respect of your neighbors, free from 
 any foreign influence." * ~* * * « Without union, without armies, 
 you have no country, no civil liberty, no rights. Instead of them 
 a nation can only expect slavery from the despotism of foreigners. 
 Italians ! you show but too much the terrible result of these 
 truths. The many deep wounds of your country, which can only 
 be healed by peace, suffice to give birth to the universal wish to 
 be united under one banner — the banner of honor, of happiness, 
 of the regeneration of Italy." 
 
 There is no need of multiplying these extracts to show how the 
 Allied Powers, but especially Austria and England, excited, stim- 
 ulated and explored, for their own use, the national sentiments of 
 the Italians kindled by the French — how they surpassed each 
 other in promises to the Italian people, which their respective gov- 
 ernments, with Metternich and Castlereagh at their heads, never 
 meant to fulfil. The exiled Italian Princes remained not behind 
 these " statesmanlike" efforts at systematic deception, while some 
 of them even went so far as to join various secret societies for the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 33 
 
 subversion of the then existing governments. The King of Naples, 
 for instance, from his British-guarded Island of Sicily, conspired 
 with the Carbonari of Naples for the destruction of Murat and the 
 establishment of a Constitution, while in Sicily he was constantly 
 opposed to liberal institutions. There is no promise a king can 
 make, which he did not lavish on his " beloved Neapolitans." 
 
 But the Sicilian Bourbons had sunk too low in public estimation 
 to make any considerable number of proselytes, except among the 
 Lazzaroni — the Janissaries of Naples. Murat, when he saw Na- 
 poleon's star declining, aimed himself at independence. He first 
 offered to divide Italy with Eugene Beauharnais ; but when he 
 found Napoleon's adopted son unshaken in his loyalty to his sov- 
 ereign, he conceived the daring project of making himself master 
 of the whole Peninsula, which afterwards cost him his life. 
 Changeable, however, as he was in his mind, he could not resist 
 Austrian temptation ; and, on the 27th of July, 1813, actually 
 entered into a secret treaty with that Power and England, the 
 principal stipulations of which were, that the Emperor of Austria 
 was to take possession of the whole kingdom of Italy, including 
 Milan, Venice, Modena, the Papal Legations and Ancona, while 
 the Arch Dukes were to divide among themselves the remaining 
 States of Upper and Middle Italy, with the exception of Piedmont. 
 In return, Murat was to remain in possession of Naples : the 
 Bourbon King was to retain Sicily. Murat, nevertheless, afforded 
 the Allies but little assistance ; while Eugene Beauharnais valiantly 
 defended the kingdom of Italy. Finally, on the 11th of January, 
 1814, Murat concluded a formal treaty of alliance with Austria, 
 which promised to recognize him as King of Naples, and to give 
 him 400,000 of the Pope's subjects as an indemnity for Sicily, if he 
 would advance with his army to the Po. But even then nothing was 
 effected against Beauharnais ; while Murat, deceived by the successes 
 of Napoleon in February following, halted in his movements. At 
 last, the Allied troops (31st of March, 1814,) entered Paris, and 
 Napoleon abdicated on the 11th of April following. It was only 
 on the 16th of April, and after the French Senate had already 
 previously pronounced against Napoleon, that Eugene Beauhar- 
 
34 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 nais entered into an armistice with the Allies, and dismissed a 
 portion of his army. Had Napoleon remained master of France, 
 the Allies would not have been able to re-conquer Italy. 
 
 The presence of Napoleon at Elba, the place of his retirement 
 suggested by the Emperor of Russia, filled England and Austria 
 with fresh apprehensions. He might land in Italy, and carry out 
 the idea of Italian nationality which British and Austrian agents 
 had so recently taken pains to instil into the minds of the people ; 
 and having made himself master of Italy, he might regain the 
 throne of France. Austria, therefore, did not yet break with 
 Murat, but only entered (January, 1815) into a secret treaty 
 with England and France (against Russia) for his dethronement. 
 This she did when she had reason to fear that the Congress* of 
 Vienna would break up with a war among the Allies, and after 
 Murat's intrigues with the secret societies had seriously alarmed 
 the Emperor Francis. It was then that Metternich, with his 
 usual fertility in diplomatic expedients — perhaps with a view of 
 testifying his gratitude to England — suggested to Murat to con- 
 tent himself, in lieu of all his claims upon Naples, with the Ionian 
 Islands ! 
 
 Meanwhile the news had reached Italy that the Emperor Alex- 
 ander of Russia had pronounced in favor of Eugene Beauharnais, 
 provided the people of the kingdom of Italy indicated a desire to 
 retain him as their sovereign. This was the sisnal for the most 
 violent strife of parties, accompanied by popular tumult and blood- 
 shed. Austrian emissaries were lavish in their promises, and in- 
 ventive in calumnies against the existing government. But when 
 Austrian troops in the midst of the anarchy and confusion which 
 ensued, had taken possession of the whole kingdom in the name 
 of the Allied Powers, and a deputation, representing all parties, 
 waited on the Emperor of Austria, in Paris, for the purpose of 
 obtaining a Constitution for the kingdom, the laconic reply was, 
 that he was himself an Italian, and that he would send his com- 
 mands to Milan. 
 
 Murat was now the only representative of the Napoleonic sys- 
 tem in Italy. With the deadly hatred of the French and Sicilian 
 
ON THE PRFSENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 35 
 
 Bourbons against him, the enmity of Wellington, Castlereagh, 
 and Liverpool, the secret treaty of Austria and England, above 
 alluded to, concluded for his destruction, his only reliance was 
 upon Russia. In this situation he became reconciled to Napo- 
 leon, and on the return of the latter from Elba, (1st March, 1815,) 
 once more entrusted his fate to the fortunes of war. Austria no 
 sooner saw herself menaced by this new turn of events, than she 
 declared, by public proclamation, that the emperor, firm in his 
 predilection for his Italian States, has determined upon the erec- 
 tion of a Lombardo-Venitian kingdom, as a separate domain of his 
 crown. " By this means," says the proclamation, " the nationality 
 of his Italian subjects, which they justly prize so high, shall be 
 protected and secured." Even a species of Constitution was 
 granted to his " Italian subjects." Thus secured against the 
 people, the Austrian army, in overpowering numbers, turned 
 against Murat who, after various unfortunate engagements at 
 last ordered two of his generals to sign a capitulation at Naples, 
 in which he reserved nothing for himself and family, but secured 
 the creditors of the State, and the purchasers of state and church 
 property. A general pardon was promised to the officers who had 
 served in his army. A few of these followed him first to France, 
 then to Corsica, and at last to the coast of Calabria where he 
 was taken, imprisoned, and shot, by order of the King of Naples. 
 Thus were the territorial changes introduced into Italy by the 
 French Revolution finally disposed of; but the profound agita- 
 tion in the minds of the people — the hopes which had been awak- 
 ened — the desire for liberal institutions and for nationality which 
 had been kindled, continued, and involved the wdiole Peninsula in 
 a series of national calamities. 
 
36 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE DIVISION OF ITALY BY THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. 
 
 The Congress of Vienna assembled to divide Europe and its 
 colonies. It was a mere council of princes and their plenipoten- 
 tiaries, assembled for the avowed purpose of sustaining legitimacy 
 and putting down resistance to the divine authority of kings all 
 over Europe. The promises which had been made to the people — 
 Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese — and by which 
 these had been induced to take up arms in defence of " liberty 
 and national independence," were wholly disregarded, and in their 
 stead the foundation laid to that league of the great absolutist 
 Powers which, under the name of the " Holy Alliance," was, in 
 fact, a conspiracy of princes, not only against all political progress 
 of their own subjects, but also against the liberties and independ- 
 ence of every other people, whose example might be judged dan- 
 gerous to the. then established order of things.* In the treaty of 
 
 * Had the United States then been at a more convenient distance from En- 
 rope, and had the different European Powers been less divided by mutual 
 jealousies and dread of each other, the Congress of Vienna might have enter- 
 tained even propositions for reestablishing monarchical institutions in Amer- 
 ica. True, the right of intervention in the affairs of other States, subsequently 
 claimed at Laibach, was, in a circular note of Lord Castlereagh, dated 19th 
 January, 1821, in general terms not concurred in; but England, which dis- 
 avowed the right did nothing to prevent its execution by the other powers. At the 
 Congress of Verona, the Duke of "Wellington, as the representative of England, 
 again dissented from the doctrines laid down by the Continental powers; but 
 England again contented herself with a strict neutrality, and allowed the con- 
 stitutional Bourbons of France to come to the assistance of the absolute Bour- 
 bons of Spain. And yet, at that time, George Canning had already succeeded 
 the Marquis of Londonderry. Nothing but the prospects of an increased com- 
 merce — perhaps the fear of having the anti-revolutionary theories of the Great 
 Continental Powers applied against herself— induced, in 1825, the recognition 
 by Great Britain of the South American Republics. " If the principle of Legiti- 
 macy preached by the Holy Alliance," said James Mcintosh, in the British 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 37 
 
 Paris, (30th May, 1814,) France had received the limits of 1792 ; 
 nearly thirty-two millions of subjects, which the Republic and the 
 Empire had added, were to be redistributed among the sovereigns 
 of the coalition. The territories of the Republics of Venice, 
 Lucca, Ragusa, and Genoa were included in this enormous booty 5 
 the restoration of these Republics being wholly incompatible with 
 the objects of the Congress. 
 
 To prevent mistakes on that subject, Austria had already occu- 
 pied Venice, Lucca, and Ragusa with her troops ; while the British 
 government had disavowed the political acts of Lord Bentinck, 
 who had promised the restoration of the Republic of Genoa. In 
 return for this favor, Austria consented to Malta becoming a 
 British possession, and with a self-denial yet unexplained, allowed 
 the fleet which, with the kingdom of Italy had fallen into her 
 hands, consisting of seven ships of the line, and a number of 
 frigates and smaller vessels, valued at fifty millions of francs, to 
 rot in her docks. Austria had a care not to excite the commer- 
 cial jealousy of her old British ally in the Levant. 
 
 Though all the sovereigns who had taken part in the coalition 
 against Napoleon, were invited to join the Congress of princes, 
 the four great Allied Powers, Austria, England, Russia and Prus- 
 sia, claimed the exclusive right of preparing the work of territo- 
 rial distribution, in a select committee of Four. Talleyrand, the 
 representative of France, showed " the want of logic and con- 
 sistency," in this arrangement, by insisting that the term " allies" 
 could no longer be applied to powers at peace with France. It 
 was a war term, no longer applicable to the relations of peace, 
 
 House of Commons, " is correct, then our King William was a robber of the 
 crown, our predecessors who placed him on the throne were bandits, and our 
 ancestors, who forced from King. John without Land the Magna Charta, con- 
 spirators. All our institutions crumble into dust, this House loses its privileges, 
 and His Majesty's occupation of the throne is but a prolonged usurpation !" 
 Canning, in two letters, of the 28th February and 31st March, 1823, quoted by 
 Wheaton, declared the alliance formed against Napoleon, " no union for domi- 
 neering the entire world, or for the superior direction of the internal relations 
 of foreign States" — a proof that England dreaded such an interpretation of it, 
 and endeavored to prevent it. 
 
 4 
 
38 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and, with its abandonment* France must be allowed a seat in the 
 predisposing committee* This reasoning prevailed, because the 
 four powers were divided in regard to Poland and Saxony ; Eng- 
 land siding with Austria, to which she was tied by the convention 
 of Prague, previous to the last war, and Prussia and Russia ap- 
 pearing to have similar interests in Northern and Central Europe. 
 The fifth power, France, therefore was admitted ; but not to give 
 France the casting vote, or too great an influence on the commit- 
 tee, the three smaller Powers, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, were 
 admitted at the same time. The Italian States alone were wholly 
 excluded, and the fate of the Peninsula once more left to the deci- 
 sion of those foreign Powers which, for centuries past, had disputed 
 to each other the possession of her soil. The formation of a Ger- 
 manic Confederation had been agreed upon in the treaty of Paris, 
 and a German special committee, over which Metternich presided, 
 was therefore not opposed at the Congress; but when Spain, 
 through its minister, the Chevalier Labrador (whose role was 
 probably prompted by Talleyrand) proposed a special committee 
 on Italian affairs, Metternich disposed of this " incidental remark," 
 as hp was pleased to call it, with masterly dissimulation, by observ- 
 ing that " Germany was a ' body of States,' while Italy, from the Po 
 down, contained nothing but independent States, comprised un- 
 der the same geographical division." Metternich, who was 
 chairman of the special German committee, could hardly expect 
 to be made also chairman of the committee on Italian affairs. He 
 dreaded the influence of the French, Spanish, and Sicilian Bour- 
 bons, and preferred to treat the Italian territorial questions sepa- 
 rately, from State to State. Austria, in these negotiations, had, 
 besides, the advantage of already occupying Upper Italy and the 
 Papal Legations, which, in spite of the pathetic appeals of Cardi- 
 nal Gonsalvi, and his support by the Protestant Powers of Eng- 
 land and Prussia, she only restored to his Holiness after the re- 
 turn of Napoleon from Elba ; retaining, however, certain portions 
 on the left bank of the Po, the Polesina, and the right to maintain 
 garrisons in Ferrara and Commachio, against which the Pope in 
 vain entered his solemn protest. Murat, threatened as he was by 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 39 
 
 France and England, had to surrender Bologna ; but France re- 
 tained Avignon, and Naples, Benevent, without any difficulty. 
 Tuscany and Modena were again bestowed on the Austrian Arch 
 Dukes ; while Parma, which was claimed by the Bourbons for 
 the Spanish Infanta, was retained for Napoleon's son, the Duke 
 of Reichstadt, and administered in the name of Maria Louisa, 
 wife of the Emperor Napoleon. But Emperor Francis of Austria, 
 fearing that the Italian patriots might concentrate their hopes on 
 this new dynasty, resigned the succession of his grandson in Par- 
 ma, for the right of garrisoning Piacenza, a fortress of no small 
 importance to the ulterior plans of Austria, after she had induced 
 the King of Sardinia, under the fear of a French invasion, to con- 
 sent to the demolition of the fortifications of Alessandria.* When 
 the Bourbons claimed the former kingdom of Etruria, (Tuscany,) 
 for the Spanish Infanta, in lieu of Parma, Metternich simply re- 
 plied that this was a question of war, not of negotiation. The 
 temporary possession of Lucca was all that could be obtained for 
 that princess, till, after the death of Maria Louisa of Austria, she 
 was again to be reinstated in Parma. How little the Pope's rights 
 were considered in all these transactions, is also proved by the 
 attempt of Prussia to quarter the King of Saxony on the Papal 
 Legations ! England, however, stood firm by Austria ; in return 
 for which, Austria assented to the British Protectorate over the 
 Ionian Islands, and supported all her other claims to the European 
 colonies she had seized during the long war. Russia, though the 
 firm supporter of Piedmont in her conflicting claims with Austria, 
 did not wish so far to diminish the territorial claims of the latter 
 in Italy, as to induce her to seek compensation on the Danube.f 
 
 * Napoleon always considered Alessandria, Mentz, and Antwerp, as the three 
 strongholds of his empire. The correspondence of Austrian general officers on 
 the subject of Alessandria, shows that the great object of Austria was to make 
 Piedmont strategetically so weak, that in case of a war with France, the latter 
 could either be overrun by Austrian troops, or frightened into an alliance with 
 her. 
 
 | Metternich had already, in a long letter to Lord Castlereagh, complained 
 of the small portion of Italy which had fallen to his share, reminding his lord- 
 ship of the promise of England, made at Prague, to consent to any territorial 
 acquisition of Austria in Italy. 
 
40 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 But she aided Piedmont in extending her frontier toward Lom- 
 bardy, to the shores of the Lake of Como, induced the early 
 evacuation of the Piedmontese fortresses by the Austrian troops, 
 and, in conjunction with France, frustrated Metternich's design to 
 change the hereditary succession in Sardinia. That Metternich 
 cherished such a plan, and expected to execute it, with the assist- 
 ance of the Queen of Sardinia, herself a native Austrian Arch 
 Duchess of Modena, has since been well substantiated •* and it 
 was for this reason that the Salic law of succession, which secured 
 the crown to Charles Albert, of the younger branch of Savoy- 
 Carignan, was especially affirmed at the Congress. The first traces 
 of Metternich's designs were discovered in London ; the first steps 
 to counteract it, were taken in St. Petersburg. The King of Sar- 
 dinia owed the restoration of Piedmont and part of Savoy to the 
 first peace of Paris, (1814.) The Congress of Vienna added 
 the territory of the former Republic of Genoa, while the second 
 peace of Paris (1815) secured to him the remaining part of Savoy, 
 and forty millions of francs, in return for his part in the second 
 coalition. A small portion only of his former territory he had to 
 surrender to Switzerland, the more effectually to secure the neu- 
 trality of that Republic against France. 
 
 The inconsiderate conduct of Murat caused Austria, in April, 
 1815, to enter into a treaty with the Bourbon Ferdinand of Sicily, 
 in virtue of which the latter was at the Congress of Vienna rein- 
 stated in Naples, as King of the Two Sicilies. So disgracefully 
 unpopular was that sovereign with his people, that he stipulated 
 for retaining, till 1817, 16,000 Austrian troops in his newly ac- 
 quired kingdom of Naples; paying for them 4,944,000 ducati, 
 (a ducato is about four francs and a quarter,) besides 6,000,000 
 ducati for the cost of the Austrian campaign against Murat, a pen- 
 
 * The plan was to bestow the crown on Beatrice, daughter of Victor Emanuel 
 of Sardinia, and wife of the Austrian Arch Duke Francis of Modena, and it 
 was pursued by Austria till 1828, when the French Minister, De la Ferronays, 
 assured Metternich, through Baron Lebzeltern, that the exclusion of the Prince 
 of Carignan would produce a profound commotion in Italy — " at the sight of a 
 French army which would then appear on the summit of the Alps." 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 
 
 41 
 
 sion of 60,000 francs a year to Metternich, another pension of the 
 same amount to Talleyrand, and various other largesses to different 
 Austrian generals. Some nine millions of francs were expended 
 by him in diplomatic douceurs at Vienna.* It was impossible for 
 the King of Naples to commence his reign under more unfavor- 
 able auspices. 
 
 By these dispositions of the Congress of Vienna, Italy, before 
 the beginning of the last war (1859) was divided as follows : 
 
 States. 
 
 1. Austrian Italy, 
 
 Lombardy, 
 Venice, 
 
 o e j* • ( Piedmont and Savoy, 
 ( Sardinia, (the Island, 
 
 3. Parma, .... 
 
 4. Modena, .... 
 
 5. Tuscany, 
 
 6. Republic of San Marino, 
 
 7. Roman States, 
 ( Naples, 
 ( Sicily, 
 
 9. Corsica, (French,) 
 10. Malta, (English,) 
 
 Together, 
 
 8. The Two Sicili 
 
 Inhabitants. 
 
 2,750,000 
 
 2,280,000 
 
 4.800,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 500,000 
 
 600,000 
 
 1,800,000 
 
 8,000 
 
 3,130,000 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 2,250,000 
 
 236,000 
 
 130,000 
 
 25,984,000 
 
 * Schlosser, in his "History of the Eighteenth Century, etc.," speaks of the 
 Congress of Vienna, which formed the basis of the new public law in Europe, as 
 an " assembly of diplomatists, who divided lands and peoples as it pleased their 
 respective courts, and as their dearly paid for intrigues, cabals, and tricks were 
 more or less crowned with success.'' 
 
42 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 
 THE ANTAGONISM OF AUSTRIA AND SARDINIA. 
 
 Of the different princes but one, he of Savoy, is by long (eight 
 hundred years') adoption an Italian, and he possessed, until within 
 a few weeks, but one-fifth of the whole country. Between this 
 prince and Austria there is an hereditary feud — an instinct which 
 tells them that one or the other must relinquish his grasp upon 
 Italy. Austria, from the day. she occupied Lombardy and Venice, 
 felt that she must hold them and the rest of Italy, by military 
 power ; Piedmont was bound to gather strength from the national 
 sympathies of the Italians. The antagonism was complete, and 
 accepted as such by the rulers of both countries. Metternich 
 himself, in his diplomatic cynicism, admitted that Italy would 
 never remain quiet under foreign domination ; " but," added he, 
 " she has been struggling for a thousand years against it, and — 
 in vain." 
 
 Metternich was not satisfied with the military position of Aus- 
 tria in Italy, and endeavored to strengthen it by alliances with 
 other Italian States. The Austrian military dictatorship was to 
 be extended to Naples, Tuscany, and Modena ; in short, to 
 wherever the rekindling of liberal ideas threatened to diminish 
 Austrian influence and power. He judged shrewdly, if not wisely, 
 that unless all Italy were equally subjected to absolutism, Lom- 
 bardy and Venice could not continue that form of government. 
 Hence his attempt, as early as 1815, and while the Congress of 
 Vienna was yet in session, to lay the foundation of an Italian 
 Confederacy under the presidency and protectorate of Austria. 
 The plan was as yet kept secret from the princes and representa- 
 tives of the other Great Powers, in order to prevent their influ- 
 ence on its organization ; but the King of Naples, as early as 
 April, 1815, at the treaty of Vienna, which secured to him his 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 43 
 
 kingdom, and as an inducement to that treaty, promised Austria 
 to introduce no form of government differing from her own ; that 
 is, to introduce no such constitution as he had promised, and was 
 at the time still promising, to his people. On the 12th June fol- 
 lowing, he embodied that promise in a formal treaty of alliance 
 with Austria, " for their mutual protection, and for maintaining 
 tranquillity in Italy." Naples was to furnish 25,000 troops ; (in 
 1819 their number was to be reduced to 12,000,) which, together 
 with the garrisons of the fortresses, were to be placed under Aus- 
 trian commanders ; while Austria herself was, in time of war, to 
 furnish an army of not less than 80,000 men, for the common 
 defence. It was further agreed, that the high contracting parties 
 should give each other notice of " internal dangers." A similar 
 treaty had been entered into with Tuscany, (June 2d, 1815,) 
 which promised to place 6,000 men at the disposal of Austria ; 
 but the proposition to join an Italian Confederacy was negatived, 
 though Metternich himself had gone to Florence to urge it. In 
 like manner did the proposed postal treaty fail ; because the Tus- 
 can Premier, from political reasons, found it " inconvenient to 
 confide his mail-bags to Austrian officials." Treaties for mutual 
 defence, however, and for the passage of troops, &c, were made 
 with the Duchies of Modena and Parma, and thereby their de- 
 pendence on Austria, if not their subjection to it, secured. 
 
 The King of Sardinia refused Austria every thing. He could 
 not prevent the demolition of the fortifications of Alessandria, which 
 was executed by the Austrians themselves, (1815,) who still held 
 military possession of the country ; but he refused to open to the 
 Austrians the other fortresses of his kingdom, and to place his troops 
 under their command. As to joining an Italian Confederacy un- 
 der Austrian Protectorate, he not only declined it on his own 
 behalf, but exerted the utmost diplomatic activity to prevent other 
 Italian States from falling into the snare. Count Barbaroux, 
 under some other specious pretext, was especially dispatched to 
 Rome to warn the Pope, and was so completely successful that 
 Cardinal Gonsalvi declined the Austrian proposal for two distinct 
 reasons : — 1st. Because the government of his Holiness, being 
 
44 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 one of peace, must be on good terms with all, and cannot expect 
 to maintain itself by force of arms. 2d. Because the Head of the 
 Church must not be placed in a situation which would oblige him 
 to take part in conflicts with one or the other Power, without 
 knowing the justice of the cause, and the motives which might 
 govern the confederacy and its head. 
 
 When Metternich had ascertained the disposition of the King of 
 Sardinia, he tried to deter him from his course by remonstrances 
 addressed to him by England as an intermediary, and when these 
 also had proved ineffectual, he renewed, through his minister 
 Prince Stahremberg, at Turin, the old Austrian claims to the 
 valleys of the Simplon, (the upper part of Novarese, with the 
 towns of Domo-Dossola and Arona,) though these had, by the 
 Congress of Vienna, been formally ceded to Piedmont. In this 
 new dilemma, the king appealed, through his minister at St. 
 Petersburg, to the Emperor of Russia, " as an Italian Prince, and 
 a member of the European family of sovereigns — as a defender of 
 justice and the faith of treaties." " Without the Emperor of 
 Russia," argued the Sardinian minister, " there is no longer any 
 political equilibrium in Europe. Italy disappears ; the princes of 
 Italy will become Austrian vassals, and finally cease to exist." 
 Emperor Alexander wrote an autograph letter to Victor Emanuel 
 I., and advised him against the Italian Confederation. He also 
 promised to take the proper steps at Vienna to induce Austria to 
 give up her pretensions, and to respect the faith of treaties. Alex- 
 ander seems to have kept his word : — the Austrian pretension to 
 the above-mentioned valleys were never renewed. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 45 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE REACTION IN ITALY, AND THE NEAPOLITAN AND PIEDMONTESE 
 REVOLUTIONS OF 1820 21. 
 
 No sooner did the old Princes return to Italy, than the most 
 absurd reactionary spirit was let loose over the whole Peninsula. 
 Everything wholesome, introduced by Eugene Beauharnais or 
 Murat was abolished ; the abuses in Church and State which had 
 accumulated before the revolution were reestablished ; the Napo- 
 leon Code, which was an undoubted improvement on the hundreds 
 of volumes of useless, obscure and obsolete former law, was, with 
 the exception of Naples and Parma, wholly superseded in every 
 State, and even the substantial, material improvements introduced 
 during the last ten years, set aside to obliterate the very memory 
 of French rule. In some instances, lawsuits, which had been de- 
 cided under the Napoleon Code, were reopened, and the decision 
 of the judges set aside ; property which had been lawfully acquired 
 and passed into third hands, was outlawed, and the very deeds 
 taken from the archives and scattered to the wind. Commerce, 
 which had been facilitated by splendid roads built across the Alps, 
 was forced back again into its old channels ; schools which had 
 been established were closed, the accountability of financial officers, 
 which, under the French administrative system had been secured, 
 diminished or destroyed by the reestablishment of the old methods 
 of collecting revenue, in short, nothing left unturned to put the 
 seal of condemnation on whatever had been done either in imita- 
 tion of the French Republic or under the direct auspices of the 
 French Empire. Even the magnificent bridge across the Po, at 
 Turin, was to be broken up because it was built " during the 
 French occupation." Nothing but a church, standing on one of its 
 sides, saved it. The lamps in the streets of Rome were extinguished 
 because the French had introduced them, and inoculation was 
 
46 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 abandoned because it had been ordered by the French Emperor. 
 Even the excavations at Pompeii were discontinued because they 
 had been carried on with great zeal by the ex-king Murat. The 
 immediate consequence of all these retrograde movements, by which 
 the memory of the French Revolution was to be extinguished, was 
 the reappearance of the old plagues of Italy — street-beggary, theft 
 and highway robbery. Bands of robbers organized in the Roman 
 and Neapolitan States, under regularly elected leaders, who, in 
 turn, issued commissions to inferior officers, and laid whole towns 
 and villages under contribution. These bands could only be sub- 
 dued by stratagem, by the promise of offices of emolument, and by 
 regularly organized campaigns against them. Many of the mur- 
 derers and robbers were, nevertheless, pardoned " on account of 
 their correct political opinions," and their " attachment to their legi- 
 timate sovereigns." Many men of property, who found themselves 
 wholly unprotected by the law and the mode of its execution, 
 joined the robbers in self-defence, and the police itself was, in 
 many cases, in open league with them.* To all these calamities 
 were added the famine of 1816 and 1817, which the absurd anti- 
 commercial laws, enacted for its alleviation, only served to increase, 
 and the breaking out of the oriental plague at Noya, in the Nea- 
 politan province of Bari. 
 
 In the most fertile province of Italy, Lombardy, Austria was 
 only able to establish a provisional government. Nothing seemed 
 to be definite, nothing stable, except the purpose of making the 
 Lombards forget their old, advanced civilization, the glorious re- 
 collections of their former history — the monuments of arts and 
 sciences to which they could proudly refer. Every thing was to 
 be controlled and supervised at Vienna ; even projects of irrigation, 
 the necessary construction of dikes, and other local matters which 
 
 * Prince Canosa, minister of Police in Naples, (1816,) was in league with the 
 Calderari, (tinkers,) a set of robbers and tbieves from the lowest dregs of the 
 mob, and actually planned with them another Sicilian vesper, accompanied by- 
 universal pillage. He was only at the intercession of the Austrian and Prussian 
 ministers at Naples dismissed by the King — with a large pension and all the 
 marks of high royal favor. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 47 
 
 tbe Milanese and Lombards understood far better tban tbe Aus- 
 trian officials at Vienna, bad to be submitted to tbem, accompanied 
 by reports of experts, in tbe Italian language, which were neither 
 read nor understood. To prevent the rekindling of national sym- 
 pathies, the administration of Venice was kept distinct from that of 
 Milan, with such local advantages in favor of the former city, as 
 were calculated to excite the envy and jealousy of the other. When 
 the Emperor Francis I. towards the close of the year 1815, visited 
 Venice, the people had made great preparations for his reception, 
 with the hope of inducing him to make Venice a free port, and to 
 grant a general amnesty to all political offenders: but they were 
 disappointed in both. A " voluntary present" of 60,000 florins was 
 exacted from the Milanese ; but its acceptance coupled with the 
 condition that the people must ask no other imperial favor! Em- 
 peror Francis, himself an Italian by birth, and the son of a 
 Spanish Bourbon Princess, hated the Milanese for their revo- 
 lutionary tendencies and predilections in favor of France, and 
 treated them on all occasions as rebellious subjects rather than 
 a people to be reconciled and attached to him by a just and 
 wise government. His principal reliance was on the secret police, 
 the trials of political offenders by inquisition, and the prisons of 
 the Spielberg. It must be admitted on the other hand, however, 
 that he did something for public instruction — that he established 
 elementary schools ; but the higher philosophical branches of learn- 
 ing, with the mathematical sciences, were wholly neglected. The 
 only tolerable governments of Italy, in those days, were those of 
 Maria Louisa (wife of the Emperor Napoleon) and that of the then 
 liberally inclined Bourbon prince of Lucca. The ex-Empress ; 
 though an Austrian Princess by birth, did not persecute the men 
 who had borne a distinguished part under Napoleon, and his code, 
 with trifling amendments, was continued in the Duchy. Count 
 Neipperg, who shared her government and her bed, was an en- 
 lightened nobleman, and evinced even some public spirit ; but after 
 his death the reaction made more rapid progress, and the fact that 
 the administration of Maria Louisa was only temporary, prevented 
 any substantial reform. Emperor Francis continued deaf to her 
 
48 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 prayer to allow the Duke of Reichstadt, her son, to reside in her 
 capital. The Duke of Lucca was an amiable, at times liberally 
 inclined yet weak young man, whose government was equally palsied 
 by its temporary nature, and who afterwards became firmly at- 
 tached to the Austrian policy. 
 
 The most absurd reaction had taken place at Naples, where the 
 king himself (but recently a member of the secret society of the 
 Carbonari) had been the very head and front of the conspirators 
 against Murat. As Murat, previous to his leaving Naples, had 
 given the people a constitution, and as similar promises had been 
 made by King Ferdinand himself, while yet confined to the island 
 of Sicily, he had, in conformity with the condition of his separate 
 treaty with Austria, previously alluded to, nothing more sincerely 
 at heart than to govern his newly-acquired country as an absolute 
 despot. He trusted nobody ; and none of his subjects trusted him. 
 The officers of Murat's army were constantly in dread of being 
 either dismissed or imprisoned ; while the lives and property of all 
 his subjects were constantly in danger. Various political " sects" 
 in the shape of secret societies, were making a species of civil war 
 on each other, but there was no understanding on public questions, 
 and consequently no possibility of intelligent public action. The 
 people felt that their political condition had become worse than it 
 had been before ; but there was no agreement, even among the 
 better informed classes, on the measures of reform to be introduced 
 with public safety. The officers of the army who, from a glorious 
 career under Murat, were now condemned to hopeless inactivity, 
 were most dissatisfied, and their feelings were soon shared by the 
 whole army. When, therefore, in 1820, the Constitution of 1812 
 had been proclaimed by Spanish generals in Madrid, nothing was 
 more natural than that a similar attempt at revolution should 
 be made by the army in Naples. The movement commenced on 
 the 2d of July, at Nola, and on the 6th the King was already in- 
 duced to promise the desired Constitution. On the same day, the 
 king deposed his power into the hands of the Prince Royal, who 
 was made Vicar-general of the Empire. The kind of Constitution 
 to be given, had not been agreed upon ; but the troops deciding in 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 49 
 
 favor of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, (of which not even a 
 printed copy was then to be found in Naples,)* the latter was ac- 
 cordingly adopted. On the 13th July, the King, as Ferdinand I. 
 of the Two Sicilies, pledged his oath to support that Constitution, 
 adding to the formula which had been furnished him, of his own 
 accord, these memorable words : " Almighty God ! who with unerr- 
 ing eye readest the souls of men and the future, hurl at this mo- 
 ment, the thunderbolts of thy vengeance on my head, if I lie or 
 break my oath," and he turned with apparent satisfaction to General 
 Pepe, and added : " this time I have really sworn with a good 
 heart." 
 
 Sicily did not follow the popular movement of Naples, but de- 
 sired to be governed by a separate Constitution after the model of 
 that of England. The civil war which ensued in consequence 
 of this schism, did much toward weakening the common cause, and 
 robbed Naples of a part of its force. The greatest difficulty how- 
 ever was presented by the secret societies — who had entered the 
 army and destroyed its discipline. 
 
 The revolution in Naples led, in October, 1820, to the Congress 
 of Troppau, assembled, as was announced by the Holy Alliance, 
 to " preserve Christian civilization, public order, and the sacred 
 principles of legitimacy." The Emperor Alexander of Russia, 
 and Francis of Austria were present in person, and on the 19th 
 November signed a Protocol which authorized the military occu- 
 pation of the revolted Neapolitan provinces. France adhered, 
 through its minister, to this monstrous resolution, which submitted 
 the fate of the smaller States of Europe to the decision of the 
 Great Powers ; England dissented, but did nothing to oppose the 
 movement. The Congress now adjourned to Laibach to be nearer 
 to the seat of war, and the King of Naples and the other Italian 
 sovereigns were invited to witness its proceedings. The Neapolitan 
 Parliament at first refused to let the King leave the country j but 
 when the latter promised to act as mediator between his people and 
 
 * The Spanish Constitution of 1812 is similar to the French Constitution of 
 1792. One house — the King with a limited veto; and a Committee (provisional 
 Junta) during the recess of the Assembly. 
 
 5 
 
50 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 the allied Powers, and offered to invest his son with the Regency 
 during his absence, the consent of the Representatives was finally 
 obtained. The first steps of the Regent, who again pledged his 
 oath to support the Constitution, was to induce the Parliament to 
 adjourn, and the new minister of war, to stop the preparations for 
 the military defence of the country. The Prince had evidently 
 had his father for a tutor. The King embarked at Naples with 
 the same Captain Maitland who had carried Napoleon to St. Helena, 
 and shortly after his arrival at Laibach informed his Parliament, 
 in writing, that there was no chance for the Constitution ; to his 
 army he conveyed the information that there was no hope of resist- 
 ance. The troops were especially enjoined not to oppose the ad- 
 vance of the Austrians. It was now too late for the Parliament 
 to assemble, and make provisions for resisting an army of 50,000 
 men under General Ficquelmont. There were volunteers, but no 
 arms, and no money in the treasury. Forced loans brought little 
 money, while the quarrels of the officers among themselves de- 
 stroyed the availability of the troops. A guerrilla war was at last 
 resolved upon ; but the people did not join the movement in suffi- 
 cient numbers, and in March following the Austrians already en- 
 tered Naples. 
 
 While these events were taking place in Naples, a military revo- 
 lution had broken out in Turin, where, after much hesitation and 
 delay, the Spanish Constitution of 1812 was also finally proclaimed. 
 The Republican writers of Italy, especially Mazzini, accuse Charles 
 Albert, Prince of Carignan, (father of the present King Victor 
 Emanuel II.,) of having been the instigator of this revolution and 
 of having betrayed it afterwards ; but the historical facts warrant 
 no such conclusion. The Prince was undoubtedly on terms of in- 
 timacy with some of the conservative noblemen who corresponded 
 with the heads of the conspirators in Milan, Modena and Parma; 
 but he hesitated in regard to the part assigned to himself, and he 
 certainly had no idea of establishing a Republic in Piedmont. The 
 plan, in Milan and Turin, was to reestablish the Kingdom of Italy, 
 " and to extend it over the whole nation," by attacking the rear of 
 the Austrians after these should have marched upon Naples, and 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 51 
 
 then to revolutionize Milan and the Duchies. After the Nea- 
 politans had been beaten, this plan had to be given up, and with 
 it the hope of success. Matters had, nevertheless, proceeded too far 
 to prevent an outbreak. The Lombards promised arms and a 
 general rising as soon as the Piedmontese flag should be unfurled 
 before Milan ; but the small Piedmontese army on its march thither 
 was, at Novara, greeted by Austrian cannon. 
 
 The King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel I., at the first sign of 
 revolt, abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, then at 
 Modena, and until his return appointed the Prince of Carignan 
 Regent of the kingdom. As such the latter, to avoid bloodshed, 
 proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812, and pledged his oath 
 to support it : but did not exact either the troops or the civil func- 
 tionaries of the government to take that oath. On the contrary, 
 he wrote to Charles Felix to tender hiin his entire submission, and 
 at the same time to ask for instructions. Charles Felix, in reply, 
 annulled all that had been done, ordered the Prince to place him- 
 self at the head of the troops who had remained faithful to the 
 king, and threatened the Constitutionalists with the intervention 
 of the Holy Alliance. Upon the receipt of these instructions, the 
 Prince resigned the regency, and with a regiment of horse and 
 some artillery started for Novara where, by order of the king, he 
 resigned his command into the hands of Count della Torre. The 
 Constitutional army, about six thousand strong, arrived almost at 
 the same time, in hopes of influencing the loyalits by its example. 
 But Novara was already occupied, and the Austrians had taken 
 possession of all important passes on the frontier. With the return 
 of the Constitutionalists to Alessandria, the revolution was virtu- 
 ally at an end. 
 
 Two things deserve to be remembered in connection with this 
 unfortunate attempt at revolution, on account of their bearing on 
 the present position of the country. First — That no attempt was 
 made at establishing a Republic; and, Second, that the revolution 
 was almost entirely confined to the military. The king, who had 
 abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, remained all the 
 time at Nizza, unmolested by the people. To limit the absolute 
 
52 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 power of the sovereign was undoubtedly the wish of the educated 
 among the people ; to abolish royalty was no part of their pro- 
 gramme. The king, with his chivalrous notions of honor, had ab- 
 dicated, because " the people, by resisting his authority, had offered 
 him a deliberate personal insult ;" and refused to re-assume his 
 crown, though urged by his brother to do so, after the revolution 
 was crushed. It is also worthy of notice that the Emperor of 
 Russia, through his Minister at Turin, attempted to prevent the 
 Austrian occupation of Piedmont by mediation ; proposing to 
 the Liberals that they should tender their entire submission to the 
 Icing on condition of a general amnesty, and " some institution 
 securing the public interest." Prince Carignan, who was tho- 
 roughly opposed to Metternich, and who preferred a Russian to 
 an Austrian occupation, advised the acceptance of these terms ; 
 but only a portion of the Junta could be prevailed upon to accede 
 to them, and while the negotiations were pending, the blow was 
 struck by the Austrians. 
 
 Metternich, as we have already stated, had as early as 1814 
 conceived the plan of excluding the Prince of Carignan from the 
 succession, and to unite, if possible, Piedmont to Modena, or to 
 Austria herself. Piedmont was the greatest obstacle to Austrian 
 domination in Italy. The geographical position of that kingdom, 
 the warlike disposition of its people, the personal character of its 
 sovereigns, all were opposed to Metternich's ultimate designs. 
 jNow, perhaps, was the favorable moment when he could accom- 
 plish his object. If the Emperor of Russia could be prejudiced 
 against the Prince of Carignan, he might give his consent : the 
 resistance of France might be overcome. All sorts of calumnies 
 were now circulated at the expense of the Prince ; he was sur- 
 rounded by spies ; but the charge of treason against the king 
 could not be established. At the Congress of Yerona, both France 
 and Russia united in his protection. The French Minister had 
 received special instructions from his government to insist not only 
 on the speedy evacuation of Piedmont by the Austrians, but also 
 on the speedy return of the Prince, who had been ordered (ban- 
 ished) to Florence. France argued that the successor to the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 53 
 
 throne of Piedmont should be on the spot, " lest his return to his 
 country might be coupled with conditions unfavorable to the bal- 
 ance of power." This sort of reasoning was equally intelligible 
 to Russia. The gravitation of States frequently overcomes the 
 personal predilections of sovereigns ; and the policy of the Bour- 
 bons was, in this respect, hardly different from that of the French 
 Emperors. 
 
 The reaction which followed the military revolutions of 1820 — 21 
 was a fearful one. Secret tribunals were established in all the 
 larger towns of Italy, to try political offenders ; death or long 
 imprisonment in chains were the usual sentences passed upon 
 them. Those who had fled were hung in effigy, and their estates 
 confiscated. In Milan, where the revolution had not broken out, 
 but where the plans of the conspirators had been discovered by 
 the government, some of the most prominent nobles (among whom 
 Count Confalioneri) were either condemned to death, or to impris- 
 onment for life in irons.* The nobles had been the principal insti- 
 gators of the revolution, as they were those who most cherished 
 the idea of Italian nationality : on them, therefore, did the Impe- 
 rial vengeance most heavily descend. Duke Francis of Modena 
 proceeded only against men of mark — professors, doctors and old 
 officers ; while the King of Naples, forgetting all honor and shame, 
 revoked all previous pardons and amnesties granted by him, for the 
 purpose of punishing the crimes committed against Majesty since 
 1793 ! ! The Convention of Casalanza, concluded with the Murat- 
 ists in 1815, and guarantied by the Emperor of Austria himself, 
 was considered no longer binding. Criminal proceedings were in- 
 stituted against several thousand persons ; eight hundred of whom 
 were actually executed — the rest had either fled or were impris- 
 oned for a term of from 25 to 30 years. In the midst of these 
 horrors, Austria declared that she had no knowledge of the in- 
 fringement on the terms of the capitulation which she herself had 
 
 * What these prisons were, Silvio Pellico has sufficiently described. "Out 
 of sixty who were there confined, all lost their health or their lives — but one, his 
 honor." — Silvio Pellico, " I mei priyioni." 
 
 5* 
 
54 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 guarantied ; but the Neapolitan hangmen averred that they were 
 only doing the behests of the Austrian Minister. Even the tor- 
 ture was re-introduced to extort confessions. Books and pam- 
 phlets of a revolutionary character, among which the Italian clas- 
 sics themselves were numbered, on account of their liberal ten- 
 dencies, were burnt in public ; while the owners of libraries con- 
 signed them voluntarily to the flames to avoid being prosecuted. 
 This reactionary rage, as might be supposed, rendered the pres- 
 ence of the Austrian troops necessary to public tranquillity ; so 
 that at the end of three years, when the occupation was to cease, 
 a new one had to be agreed upon, which in 1825 had again to be 
 extended for two years. The whole cost of this Austrian occupa- 
 tion, from 1821 till 1827, has been estimated at 157,000,000 
 ducati, or about $125,000,000 ! The Austrian commander-in- 
 chief, General Frimont, received for himself alone a gratification 
 of 220,000 ducats!* 
 
 The punishment of the conspirators in Parma consisted chiefly 
 in imprisonment which, by the mercy of Maria Louisa, was 
 soon changed into exile. In Tuscany the mildness of the Grand 
 Duke, Ferdinand III., saw no causes for criminal prosecutions. 
 He died in 1824, regretted by his people. 
 
 The successor of King Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies, Fran- 
 cis I., was even more cruel and blood-thirsty than his predecessor. 
 He ordered whole villages, where the rebels or conspirators had 
 taken refuge, to be leveled to the ground and, on their ruins, 
 
 * The chief instigator of all these enormities was the king's minister, Prince 
 Canosa — the founder of the political sect of the Tinkers, whom the king had 
 met at Florence on his return from the Congress of Laibach. It was this mon- 
 ster who first advised the king to revoke the amnesty of Casalanza, guarantied 
 by the Emperor Francis himself; and his reactionary rage was only arrested by 
 a ruse of M. Rothschild the banker. Naples, to pay the troops of Austria, 
 wanted to make a "loan;" but Rothschild, who had already advanced some 
 sixty-four millions of francs, refused to lend another penny unless Medici, who 
 had been disgraced, were made Minister of Finance. Medici, in turn, refused to 
 accept the office unless Canosa was dismissed, which was accordingly done. Me- 
 dici, grateful for this service of the banker, concluded the first loan at fifty-six, 
 the second loan at seventy-one per cent. Never was humanity discounted at so 
 high a rate ! 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 55 
 
 public monuments of disgrace to be erected by the hangman. 
 Every species of vice disgraced his court; justice, honors, 
 and dignities were for sale ; nothing so much disregarded as law.* 
 " It is but too true," said the conservative Chateaubriand, then 
 French Minister in Rome, in one of his dispatches to his govern- 
 ment, " that the Neapolitan government has fallen to the lowest 
 depth of public contempt. "f What there was left of an army was 
 so vile and decrepit, that Neapolitan sentinels are reported to 
 have asked alms from strangers. 
 
 In Rome, Leo XII. had succeeded to the mild Pius VII. Un- 
 der him feudal institutions were revived, and some five hundred 
 Carbonari excommunicated and sentenced to imprisonment. No 
 capital punishment, however, was inflicted. Conspiracy was in 
 future to be punished by death ; concealing arms, with twenty 
 years' hard labor ; and whoever suspected another of belonging to 
 a (political) "sect" without denouncing him to the government, 
 was to be sent for seven years to the hulks. The national men, 
 nevertheless, praised Leo XII. for resisting Austrian influence, 
 and this the more so as, under his successor Pius VIII. and his Sec- 
 cretary of State, Cardinal Albani, that influence began again to 
 show itself in the lawless conduct of the "sects" and in the exer- 
 cise of arbitrary power. 
 
 It is remarkable that Austria, with all the additional prepond- 
 erance she had acquired from the unsuccessful revolutions of 1820 
 and 1821, was nevertheless unable to induce the Princes of Italy, 
 including the Pope, to enter into a confederacy under her Protec- 
 torate. The only union she effected was the hatred of all Italians 
 of her detested rule, and the universal execration of the monstrous 
 doctrines of intervention, by which every liberal progress was not 
 
 * It was believed in Naples, and is mentioned by the historian Colletta, that 
 Carobreso bought the place of Minister of Finance for 30,000 ducati of the 
 king's valet. This wretch enjoyed the king's confidence — because he could 
 neither read nor write. The ladies of the queen's bed-chamber carried on a simi- 
 lar traffic in offices. 
 
 f Another remarkable dispatch of Chateaubriand's on the state of Italy may 
 be found in his Mcmoire* d" outre-tombe, which we recommend to the reader. 
 
56 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 only crushed in Italy, but throughout Europe. The Congresses 
 of Laibach and Verona, and the armed interventions in Naples 
 and Piedmont, carried their moral into Germany, and there too, 
 in spite of the Constitutions given by some of the smaller Princes, 
 destroyed the hope of political regeneration. To crown her tro- 
 phies in Italy, Austria concluded in 1822 a treaty with Parma, 
 by which she acquired the right to garrison Piacenza. The 
 strength of the garrison was to be determined by Austria. Parma 
 was to furnish the buildings necessary for their accommodation ; 
 military stores and provisions were duty free. If Ducal troops 
 were in the place, they were to be commanded by Austrian offi- 
 cers. When the Austrian commander declared the fortress in a 
 state of siege, the Duke's officers had no jurisdiction except in 
 civil suits. Austrian engineers alone had to dispose of the forti- 
 fications. 
 
 This is one of the treaties which have justly given umbrage to 
 Piedmont and France, and which is now practically abrogated by 
 the Peace of Yillafranca. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 57 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 ON ITALY. 
 
 W e have now arrived at the period of the French Revolution 
 of July, 1830, which terminated the reign of the restored elder 
 Bourbons in France and promised all Europe a new and more lib- 
 eral order of things. As the events which have since marked the 
 history of Europe are yet fresh in the minds of most of our read- 
 ers, a cursory review of them will suffice to comprehend the situ- 
 ation. Louis Philippe, who was called to the throne as the " Citi- 
 zen King" of the French, and who has since by his friends and 
 the men who served under him been called the " martyr of consti- 
 tutional freedom," was a man of undoubted capacity, great shrewd- 
 ness, great knowledge of men ; but with very little faith in them and, 
 from a long school of adversity, rather disposed to turn their weak- 
 nesses to good account than to trust them. He had put himself in 
 correspondence with the British Ministry from the time Napoleon 
 met with his first reverses in Russia, and it is not improbable that 
 even at that early period he conceived the plan of making himself 
 master of France. He knew the virtues and vices of the French 
 people ; he studied the art — so easy for a man in position — to 
 make himself popular, and he had a thorough appreciation of the 
 errors and crimes of European Cabinets. A calm observer of 
 events, sagaciously discriminating between motives and men, and 
 attaching the latter by ministering to their ruling passions, he had 
 without exciting suspicion, and without as yet committing himself 
 to their cause, won the confidence and good will of the leading 
 men of the liberal party. His loquacity, the apparent freedom of 
 his manners and the little restraint which marked his intercourse 
 with all classes of society, gave the court as little concern as they 
 
58 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 did the watchful eyes of diplomacy, and he found himself at the 
 summit of his wishes, before he seemed to have made an effort to 
 attain them. For he added to his many substantial qualities the 
 rare genius of patience. He saw the car of the elder Bourbons 
 safely placed on the inclined plane, and he had the wisdom not to 
 interfere till it had, by its own weight, descended from its elevated 
 position. When, by the confiding weakness of General Lafayette, 
 perhaps by the financial apprehensions of Lafitte the banker, he 
 was finally invited to step into it, he at once seized the reins 
 and, with the grace of a legitimate monarch, bid his friends to 
 take their places behind him. No one could simulate surprise 
 better than himself; no one appeared to be more at home in his 
 new situation. The latter was sufficiently accounted for by his 
 royal extraction ; the former was shared by all Europe. 
 
 Louis Philippe was no sooner placed on the throne, than he 
 employed the most energetic means of preserving it to himself and 
 to his heirs. The power which had raised him was not that to 
 which he could safely trust his preservation. His mind was too 
 logical to believe in a republican throne ; his knowledge of the 
 French people too intimate, to believe that such a throne could 
 satisfy them. He held, for a moment, an immense power; he 
 could wield it to the destruction of all the old political institutions 
 of Europe ; but could he do this without destroying himself? It 
 was the instinct of self-preservation, which a perhaps pardonable 
 sophism identified with the preservation of France, which compelled 
 him to disappoint his friends, even if he had no inclination to de- 
 ceive them. If he would preserve his government, the personal 
 conservatism of the King must triumph over the public radicalism 
 of the citizen. After sacrificing to the idols of popular enthusiasm, 
 with the sincerity and decency of a devotee, he sent the champion 
 of Legitimacy at the Congress of Vienna, Mons. de Talleyrand, to 
 London to secure, by all means, the friendship of that Power which 
 alone could then organize a coalition against him ; while, at the 
 same time, his paternal solicitude was already turned towards a 
 family alliance with some of the northern sovereigns. Some wit 
 observed, at that time, that Louis Philippe made Talleyrand his 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 59 
 
 minister to London, because he felt uneasy in his presence. The 
 Paris stage was not large enough for two actors of such consummate 
 skill. There was, besides, the danger of extemporizing ;. memory, 
 especially of favors, being usually weak in old men. 
 
 As soon as Louis Philippe had hastily barricaded his throne with 
 the recognition of himself by England, Austria and Prussia (Russia 
 and Modena (!) were hesitating in regard to it) he commenced for- 
 tifying his position. This he did very skilfully by encouraging 
 reforms abroad, and by impeding their progress at home. He sug- 
 gested liberal institutions and promised support to the Italians, 
 the Germans, the Poles and the Belgians ; but as in Belgium alone 
 there was a chance of providing for his family, the liberals of that 
 country were the only ones who received his actual support. This 
 conduct, while it embarrassed the sovereigns of Austria, Russia 
 and Prussia, by bringing them in actual conflict with their own 
 people, induced them to preserve relations with France ; while on 
 the other hand, the citizen king's good understanding with all the 
 European powers, acted as a check upon the liberal ardor of his 
 own people. It was now in vain for the Republicans to organize 
 in the streets. The soldiery and the police did their duty, and the 
 leaders of the movement excited no popular enthusiasm. The au- 
 thorities were prepared, and the people had already learned to 
 distinguish between an cmeute and a revolution. 
 
 Neither was the piteous cry of "treason," now uttered by a por- 
 tion of the French press until it was gagged, justifiable. Louis 
 Philippe had been received without a pledge, except that of enlarg- 
 ing the franchise, which he kept ; and he had promised nothing 
 except that the charter should be a truth, which was to be demon- 
 strated. It was not his fault or crime, if the accidents of his birth 
 and training did not correspond with the beau ideal of Citizen 
 Royalty as it existed, after a three days' fight, in the minds of a 
 heroic people. There was no dignity in the public despair of La- 
 fayette and his friends. Why did not the amiable old marquis 
 study Macchiavelli's " Prince," instead of adding one to the num- 
 ber? The distance of Louis Philippe from legitimacy did not 
 diminish that which separated him from the people ; and he could 
 
60 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 not make war upon a principle which, however invaded, was the 
 only substantial claim to the position he now occupied. 
 
 Louis Philippe saw, not without a certain degree of apprehen- 
 sion, the rising of Belgium, Poland, a portion of Germany and the 
 provinces of Parma and Modena with nearly four-fifths of the popu- 
 lation of the Ptoman States. He was, no doubt, in favor of limited 
 Constitutional governments every where ; but concerned lest the 
 reforms about to be introduced abroad might create a taste for 
 others, and in the end affect France. To prevent this, he sought 
 to restrain rather than to encourage the popular impulse which the 
 people of those countries had received by the French Revolution. 
 He held out hopes, but delayed action ; he freely volunteered his 
 advice ; but never supported it with the power of the State. This 
 course, which was condemned by public opinion in France, involved 
 his government in logical contradictions, and unavoidably lent it the 
 color of reaction. It was now difficult for him to preserve the re- 
 putation of political honesty • while his government, no longer the 
 exponent of popular sentiments in France, lost its momentum also 
 in the councils' of Europe. 
 
 As a means of favoring the liberal cause, and of restraining the 
 action of the absolute Powers of Europe, the doctrine of Non-inter- 
 vention was now not only preached by all the diplomatic agents of 
 the new French government, but openly proclaimed in a speech of 
 the citizen king's minister of foreign affairs in the French Chamber 
 of Deputies. But Metternich who, in the mean time, had read 
 Louis Philippe, was not the man to be deterred from his purpose 
 by a mere abstraction. The practical value of a principle of 
 government depends entirely on the disposition and means to en- 
 force it. So reasoned Prince Metternich; so, unfortunately, 
 did not reason the Italian liberals. They rose in the Duchies, 
 and in the Legations of the Papal States, while an Austrian 
 army was already being collected to invade them. As a matter of 
 form — perhaps to convince Louis Philippe that he was not deficient 
 in diplomatic etiquette — Metternich had inquired, through the 
 Austrian minister at Paris, what consequences might ensue if 
 Austrian Imperial troops interfered in Italy ? To which, imitating 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 61 
 
 the language of the Delphic oracle, the Citizen King replied : " If 
 the Austrians occupy Modena, war is possible, if they enter the 
 Papal States war is probable ; but if they enter Piedmont, war is 
 cejiaiji." Without waiting for this answer, however, the Austrian 
 army commenced its march. — The situation of Europe had not 
 changed. Public law was still enacted by violence, and only sub- 
 sequently squeezed into legal forms. Louis Philippe became the 
 66 Napoleon of Peace." 
 
 The rising in the Papal States began with the interregnum which 
 followed the death of Pope Pius VIII., and assumed the form of 
 revolution under his successor Gregory XVI. In Bologna, the in- 
 surgents had actually formed a provisional government, when 
 Austrian troops compelled them to withdraw, and to surrender 
 their power (on condition of a general amnesty) into the hands of 
 the Cardinal Legate. Then, and not till then, France protested 
 against the Austrian invasion. Upon this protest, the Austrians 
 evacuated Ancona ; but the Legations remained occupied, while 
 the French government practised the Christian virtue of charity, 
 by affording a scanty relief to some 1500 Italian fugitives. Re- 
 forms were now again proposed to the Pope, and conferences held 
 for that purpose by the ministers of France, Austria, Russia, 
 Prussia and Piedmont. England had sent a Commissioner. It 
 was by such proposals Louis Philippe fought the Austrians in Italy ; 
 as to the doctrine of non-intervention, he merely applied it against 
 himself. The result of the conferences, was a memorandum signed by 
 all the ministers and presented to the Papal Government on the 
 21st May, 1831, in which the Plenipotentiaries recommended in 
 substance the admissibility of laymen to civil and judicial offices 
 of the government, municipal reform in the capital and in the pro- 
 vinces ; and regulation of the finances of the State. But the Pope 
 considered this an interference with his temporal power, and granted 
 nothing but a general amnesty.* When the French minister in- 
 sisted on the evacuation by the Austrians of the Papal Legations, 
 
 * Thirty-eight of the ringleaders of the revolution only were excluded from 
 this amnesty. No confiscation of property took place. 
 
 6 
 
62 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 his demand was only acceded to on condition that the Austrians 
 should be called back again if new troubles ensued. Even to 
 this humiliating condition France assented for the sake of peace. 
 No sooner, however, had the Austrian troops left the Legations, 
 than fresh troubles, as might have been expected, did ensue, and 
 the Austrians did come back to reestablish order. But their pre- 
 sence gave the Holy Father some uneasiness ; as they were a check 
 on the Papal partisan soldiers as well as on the insurgents, and 
 as he had reason to believe Metternich was entertaining the 
 project of dividing the Legations and the Marks with Naples and 
 Tuscany. 
 
 Louis Philippe, unable to prevent the military occupation of the 
 Legations by the Austrians, and fearing the meeting of the French 
 liberal chambers, now resolved to occupy Ancona as a " guarantee 
 against Austria." He had, however, the prudence to communicate 
 his resolution to Cardinal Bernetti who, with Christian resignation, 
 made the following written reply : — " The Holy Father will not con- 
 sent to it ; but the Fathers of the Church have often been obliged to 
 yield with resignation to superior force. The Pope has become 
 used to the exercise of that virtue. No opposition will be made to 
 an accomplished fact." This note, evidently dictated by the Papal 
 fears of Austrian designs, and containing rather an invitation 
 than a protest in regard to the proposed action of France, was 
 confidentially communicated by Louis Philippe to Prince Metter- 
 nich, and was the cause of Cardinal Bernetti being afterwards re- 
 placed by Cardinal Larabruschini. Being thus secured against all 
 warlike complications, a French fleet with 1500 soldiers was dis- 
 patched against Ancona. After it had been long enough in sight 
 to warn the commander of the place, the troops landed on the night 
 of the 22d March, entered through an unguarded gate of the town, 
 and actually succeeded in capturing the commander, who was fast 
 asleep in his bed. The " Napoleon of Peace" had achieved a vic- 
 tory ! The achievement was communicated in due form to the 
 French Chambers, and received by them as an earnest, on the part 
 of the king, to insist on liberal reforms in the Papal States. The 
 country was satisfied. Both Austria and France had, in the mean 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 63 
 
 time, assured the Pope that " the integrity and independence 
 of the Papal States, were the objects of their deepest solicitude." 
 
 The presence of the French troops at Ancona, and the declara- 
 tion of the French minister in the Chambers, inspired the Italians 
 with fresh delusive hopes, and gave rise to new outbreaks, all over 
 Italy. In Ancona itself, the free corps attacked the Papal gens 
 df armes and killed the Gonfalioneri, so that the French them- 
 selves were obliged to drive the liberals out of the city. Similar 
 risings were put down by Swiss troops, and the prisons were again 
 filled with political victims. The French occupation lasted several 
 years ; but it did nothing for Italy, except that it involved thous- 
 ands of credulous men in conspiracies and ruin, without adding a 
 particle to the lustre' of French arms. Simultaneous with the 
 revolution in the Papal States, those of Mpdena and Parma were 
 put down by military force. Hundreds were executed ; yet from 
 that period, to the commencement of the last war, conspiracies and 
 public manifestations continued. The prison and the scaffold had 
 lost their terror to an agonized people in despair. 
 
 As in the Papal States, so was the policy of Louis Philippe in 
 regard to Naples only calculated to bring discredit on French in- 
 fluence. As the uncle of the new King Ferdinand II., who had 
 succeeded to the crown of the Two Sicilies in 1830, Louis Philippe 
 undertook to advise him to establish a Constitutional Government 
 after the French model. Metternich made a different proposition 
 with better effect. The following is. the answer which Ferdinand 
 II. returned to the Napoleon of Peace. It is very striking, and 
 deserves to be remembered : 
 
 " Monsieur mon frere, cousin and very dear Uncle ! Willingly 
 would I approach the France of your majesty, which can only be 
 moderate and loyal ; but I am tied by former treaties and alliances, 
 to which I must remain faithful, and this the more so, as it is they, 
 which came to my aid in the dark days of my family. To ap- 
 proach the France of your Majesty, if it can ever become a prin- 
 ciple, it would be necessary to upset the organic law which forms 
 the basis of our government, and plunge into the abyss of the 
 politics of the Jacobins, for the sake of which my people has more 
 
64 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 than once proved faithless to the House of its Kings. The revo- 
 lutionary spirit has always been fatal to the family of the Bourbons, 
 and I, for my part, am resolved to avoid, at all hazards, the fate 
 of Louis XVI. and Charles X. With God's aid, I hope to pro- 
 mote the welfare of my people, and to administer the government 
 honestly. But I shall be King. I shall be alone, and always 
 King. 
 
 " His Majesty the Emperor of Austria had some flattering words 
 for me, together with some propositions as an Italian Prince for 
 the maintenance and consolidation of the political system, and 
 concerning the territorial limitation of the Peninsula. Not 
 having the ambition to increase my State, I shall not suffer that 
 others overstep the limits prescribed by treaties. I shall listen 
 to everything that it. may please the Prince Metternich to 
 communicate to me ; but I shall always act according to the dic- 
 tates of my heart, and in the interest of my Kingdom. 
 
 " In the mean time, I confess to your Majesty, with all sincerity, 
 that in everything which concerns the peace and loyalty of the 
 political system of Italy, I incline to the ideas which long experi- 
 ence has shown to Prince Metternich to be salutary and efficient. 
 I have inherited much anger, many senseless desires, all manner 
 of faults and weaknesses from the past ; I must begin the work of 
 restoration, and this I can only do by approaching Austria, without 
 subjecting myself to her will. The Bourbons are old, and if they 
 were to remodel themselves after the fashion of the new dynasties, 
 they would become ridiculous. We will do as the Habsburgers. 
 If fortune betray us, we will, at least, not betray ourselves." 
 
 The Citizen King seeing that his advice was disregarded, had 
 recourse to menace — through a third person. He sent the King, 
 through his minister in Naples, a memorandum written by William 
 Pepe, in which the latter threatened Naples with a dreadful revo- 
 lution, but offers to prevent it if the King would grant a Constitu- 
 tion. The King, in reply, assured the French minister of his 
 readiness to put the revolution down, and to ask the aid of the 
 Austrians only in the last extremity. To prevent the necessity of 
 Austrian aid, Louis Philippe had William Pepe arrested at Mar- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 65 
 
 seilles, just as the latter was proceeding to Ancona to organize a 
 corps for the insurrection of Calabria. Louis Philippe preferred 
 to support the Italian Refugees in France, rather than allow them 
 to expose their lives in dangerous attempts at revolution in their 
 own country.* A few isolated attempts at assassination, and a 
 " storm petition" of the Notables in Naples, including the name of 
 the Minister of Police, Intonti, was all that followed ; but France 
 being quiet, all was crushed, and the petitioning minister Intonti 
 himself packed off to Vienna. 
 
 * He practiced the same liberality toward the Polish Ptefugees of 1830, and 
 offered pious vows for the national independence of Poland in his annual speech 
 from the throne. 
 
6G THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE SUCCESSION OP CHARLES ALBERT TO THE THRONE OF 
 SARDINIA. 
 
 Charles Albert Prince of Carignan succeeded, in April, 1831, 
 to the throne of Sardinia. It is difficult to describe the charac- 
 ter and actions of this prince, in regard to whom the Italian his- 
 torians themselves so widely differ. The Radicals, the partisans 
 of a red Italian Republic one and indivisible, with Joseph Maz- 
 zini at their head, represent him as a hypocrite and a traitor, who 
 first promoted and then betrayed their cause, or give him at best 
 credit only for favoring the nationality of Italy to increase his 
 own territorial possessions. The German historians,* who treat 
 the matter more philosophically, the Piedmontese historian Count 
 Balbo, Farini and others equally entitled to credit, have come to 
 a different conclusion. That his acts, as Prince of Carignan, and 
 afterwards as King of Sardinia, were contradictory, appears on 
 record ; but to judge of them correctly, the political position of 
 Piedmont and its king must be taken into consideration. For 
 years, as we have seen, Metternich sought to exclude the prince 
 from the throne, then an attempt was made, and only frustrated 
 by Louis XVIII., to exile him for a number of years from his own 
 country. After that he was surrounded by Austrian spies, and 
 he knew that these were among the highest classes of society, 
 and among the very ministers of state and of his own household. 
 The pompous letter of Mazzini, addressed to him at the time of 
 his succession, as from an equal to his fellow, and the many 
 public manifestations of sympathy, on the part of the people, with 
 the principles proclaimed at the French Revolution, were not apt 
 
 * Especially the German historian Reuchlin, who is even hy the Austrian 
 champions quoted as the most impartial of all, and whom the author has 
 largely consulted. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 67 
 
 to strengthen his confidence in the moderation of the popular 
 party and its leaders ; while Metternich's positive declaration, 
 through his minister at Turin, that Austria would never suffer 
 the return of the exiles of 1820 — 21, or the granting of a Consti- 
 tution, necessarily arrested his plans in that direction. He had 
 no army to resist an Austrian invasion, no finances so regulated 
 as to create one, and his diplomatic relations with the other Great 
 Powers of Europe had not improved since 1820. At that time, 
 France and Russia earnestly espoused his cause ; while the revo- 
 lution of 1830 had again united Austria and Russia, and while 
 his open espousal of the Salic law of succession in Spain and Por- 
 tugal — the law by which himself had succeeded to the throne — 
 threatened even a rupture with England. Under these circum- 
 stances, Charles Albert could not but hesitate with the exe- 
 cution of his plans of reform. He stood between invasion and 
 revolution, between a reactionary and a republican party ; or, as 
 himself wrote, between the poison of one sect and the poignard of 
 another. In the mean time conspiracies, real or manufactured, 
 were discovered by the police, (the head of which, La-Scarena, 
 was suspected of being an Austrian agent,) and its objects revealed 
 to the king, as a warning against liberal concessions ; whilst Maz- 
 zini publicly announced that he had money and men enough to 
 invade Savoy. Mazzini actually arrived with a few hundred men 
 and a Polish general in Switzerland, from which he issued his 
 "Proclamation to the Italian Nation." But Mazzini, on this 
 occasion, and later at Rome, proved that he was not intended by 
 Providence either for a captain or a soldier, and that a man may 
 be very sincerely and honestly devoted to a great cause, without 
 being qualified for a leader. The insurrection turned out to be 
 nothing but a conspiracy, and proved a miserable failure. The 
 fact is proved, beyond all controversy, that some of the men in 
 Mazzini's camp, and apparently the most zealous among them, 
 were actually Austrian spies in disguise, who betrayed his plans 
 long before they were executed. Mazzini's movements served to 
 embarrass the King of Sardinia, and contributed in no small de- 
 gree to further, unknown to himself, the designs of Prince Met- 
 
68 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ternich. The only result attained by this ardent and confiding 
 devotee to Republican freedom, was the ruin of some hundred 
 families by execution, imprisonment or exile, in order, to use one 
 of the misguided patriot's own phrases, " that despair might 
 seize upon many, and thereby prepare a general resistance to the 
 government." How the substantial Austrian army was to be got 
 rid of, how a force capable of resisting it was to be organized and 
 maintained, was beyond the plan of the conspirators. They were 
 persevering and, to a certain extent, successful agitators ; but never 
 effected more than a partial rising in one or the other province. 
 " Young Italy," no more than " Young Germany," appreciated, at 
 its just value, the power to overcome, or the means required to 
 accomplish such an end ; neither do they seem to have understood 
 the employment, ad interim, of antagonistic forces to obtain ap- 
 proximate results. They were in hot pursuit of a political beau 
 ideal, no matter at what cost, or with what chance of success. The 
 teachings of statesmanship were excluded from their councils : 
 for " Young Italy" admitted no man as a member who had passed 
 the age of forty. They were all Spartans, without Spartan respect 
 for age and experience. Placed between the antagonistic influences 
 we have described, the King of Sardinia, Charles Albert, did all 
 that could reasonably have been expected of him. He introduced 
 the strictest economy in his finances, and he created an army 
 capable, if necessary, to defend the independence of his States. 
 After the warning Metternich had given him, he knew that to 
 make liberal concessions to his people was to declare war against 
 Austria, and he had sense enough to know that war against Aus- 
 tria could not be waged with undisciplined troops and an empty 
 treasury. Metternich at once guessed the meaning of these prepa- 
 rations, and, through his agents in Turin, did all in his power to 
 divert the king from his purpose. But Charles Albert persevered, 
 and such was the order, regularity and economy introduced into 
 the public treasury that in 1834, just one year after Gioberti and 
 had attempted to revolutionize his country, and while 
 
 * Both were, in 1833, exiled for conspiracy. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 69 
 
 Mazzini was threatening with the invasion of Savoy by the Repub- 
 licans, he was able to obtain at home a loan at V2h per cent, pre- 
 mium; while Rothschild, in 1838, offered for another loan a premium 
 of eighteen per cent. ! The condition of his army in 1840 was 
 already such that when Austria, which, on account of the Egyp- 
 tian question, had assumed a hostile attitude toward France, sought 
 a union with Piedmont against that Power, the king could threaten 
 with calling out the reserves, and with maintaining an armed neu- 
 trality. This, at all events, was acting with more decision than 
 Louis Philippe, with a single exception, had ever exhibited in his 
 mode of treating Italian questions.* On another occasion, when 
 Austria urged him under threats to some unjust concession, Charles 
 Albert declared " he would sooner be flayed alive than dishonor 
 his crown," and on still another occasion, after he had refused to 
 receive a dispatch couched in improper terms, he avowed " that, 
 in the worst case, he and his two sons would mount on horseback 
 and play the part of Schamyl, rather than yield to Austria." 
 
 While the King of Sardinia was thus gradually preparing for a 
 mortal conflict with that Power, which up to that period had shown 
 itself able and determined to crush, by military force, every attempt 
 to establish liberal institutions in Italy, Mazzini and his organs de- 
 nounced him as a " tyrant" and " traitor" whose only object was 
 to increase his own power. The only element of national defence 
 against Austria was the army and military spirit of the King of 
 Piedmont ; yet both were systematically discredited by " Young 
 Italy." While yet groaning under the tramp of the Austrian sol- 
 diery, they already feared to be subjugated by the King of Sar- 
 dinia ! 
 
 We have seen how Austria defended herself against the best 
 army in the world united to that of Piedmont, and with all the 
 
 * The exception here alluded to consists in the declaration of the French 
 minister, the Duke de Broglie, to the three monarchs of Russia, Austria and 
 Prussia assembled at Munchen-Gratz in Bohemia, that his master would not 
 suffer an armed intervention in Belgium, Switzerland or Piedmont, and that an 
 Austrian army would meet a French one in the last named country. 
 
70 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 people of Northern and Central Italy arrayed against her almost 
 to a man ; and yet Mazzini hoped to overthrow the Austrian host 
 in Italy by a simple insurrectionary movement ! His motto is — 
 V Italia fara da se (Italy will do for herself). He wants to re- 
 construct Italy on the principles of " Liberty, Equality, Independ- 
 ence, Humanity, and Unity," without reference to her former his- 
 tory. In a more general sense, Unity, Republicanism, and De- 
 mocracy form his political Trinity. He unites the mysticism of 
 the Germans, with the glowing imagination of his Southern nature, 
 and he possesses the essential qualities of all prophets — he believes 
 in himself and in his mission. He is, nevertheless, a product of the 
 unfortunate situation of modern Italy, not the man who is des- 
 tined to change it. He is, in spite of his fiery composition, an 
 amiable though not a harmless German dreamer. Let the gov- 
 ernments of Italy be established on a more liberal basis — let them 
 approach that union which is the hope, the thought, the faith of 
 every political heart in Italy, and Mazzini's abstract theories will 
 soon vanish into thin air. Himself will be obliged to become 
 practical, and to assist in rebuilding and remodeling, instead of de- 
 stroying the political institutions of his country.* 
 
 In 1835 the cholera appeared in Italy, and committed dreadful 
 ravages ; but it neither diminished the conspiracies nor the number 
 of their victims. In Sicily the rebellion was crushed by military 
 force and the government of the island definitely united to that of 
 Naples. The Austrians had evacuated the Papal States ; but in 
 1841 conspiracies were again rife in the Legations. Bands of 
 armed insurgents had beaten the Papal troops, but the expected 
 
 * The last letter addressed by Mazzini to the present King of Sardinia, since 
 the conclusion of the late war, in which he offers him the support of the Repub- 
 lican party on certain conditions, is an approach to returning common sense; 
 but the conditions imposed are as impracticable and extravagant as ever, "Why 
 docs not Mazzini take a lesson from Garibaldi ? The Mazzinists did their best 
 to ruin the cause of Charles Albert in 1S-I8 — 49 ; and their movements in Lom- 
 bardy and Naples at that period only helped the cause of despotism by divid- 
 ing the forces of the liberals. lias the experience of the past no warning for 
 them? When will Mazzini (born in 1S08) be of the age which, by the statutes 
 of the society, excludes him from the association of Young Italy ? 
 
ON THE TRESENT TOSITION OF EUROPE. 71 
 
 simultaneous rising in Naples did not take place, and all ended 
 again in useless bloodshed. No more fortunate was the attempt 
 of the brothers Bandiera to revolutionize Calabria. Republican 
 virtue increased the number of its victims j the state of Italy re- 
 mained as desperate as before. 
 
THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 POPE PIUS IX. AND THE ROMAN REVOLUTION. 
 
 The most important epoch in the modern history of Italy com- 
 mences with the election of Pope Pius IX. on the 16th of June, 
 1846. His election had been brought about against Austrian in- 
 fluence, and his inclinations were evidently toward France. One 
 month precisely after his election he published a general amnesty, 
 embracing all political offenders — a measure of benevolence which 
 extended to more than two thousand unfortunate persons till then 
 either in exile or in prison. The scene which followed is inde- 
 scribable. The people surrounded the Quirinal and on their knees 
 asked the Holy Father's blessing. " It was," says Reuchlin, " as 
 if the angels in chorus saluted Christmas morning ; to those who 
 left their dungeons, it was Easter and they left their tombs." On 
 that day many new converts were made to the Catholic faith, 
 many sceptics cured of their scepticism. 
 
 The Pope evidently meditated reform. He commenced by di- 
 minishing the rigor of censorship of the Press ; he allowed the 
 people peaceably to assemble and express their wishes, and he 
 struck patriotism and Italian sentiments from the list of political 
 crimes. Austria, or rather Metternich, as yet unwilling to oppose 
 these measures openly — perhaps afraid lest such an open opposition 
 might cause a general rising in the Austrian provinces of Italy — 
 resolved to defeat the liberal movement by pushing it to extremes. 
 In league with all the reactionary factions, his agents sought to 
 persuade the people and their leaders that instead of petitioning 
 for reforms they must boldly demand them, and by exhibiting 
 power, cut off the chance of a refusal. Metternich shrewdly cal- 
 culated that the Pope possessed no military force to oppose a vio- 
 lent popular movement, and that in case of an outbreak, no troops 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 73 
 
 could be relied upon but those of Austria. Pius IX. had not been 
 on the Papal throne one year, before Mettemich offered the Pope's 
 Nuncio at Vienna the intervention of Austrian troops. When that 
 offer was declined, and while the popular enthusiasm for the Pope 
 was at its height, Austrian troops, seven hundred strong, with three 
 pieces of artillery, entered the Papal City of Perrara. Though the 
 special Treaties of Vienna, already quoted on several occasions, 
 gave Austria the right to garrison the place (which term, in French, 
 may apply either to the citadel or the town), nobody could for a 
 moment doubt that the occupation was intended as a political de- 
 monstration with a view of intimidating the Pope and the liberal 
 Cardinals. To the British Minister in Vienna Metternich openly 
 declared, in justification of this act of violence, that the Emperor 
 of Austria had no idea of giving up Lombardy. The same decla- 
 ration was made in a circular note of the Austrian Premier to the 
 four Powers — England, France, Russia, and Prussia. The note 
 reiterated the declaration made at the Congress of Vienna, that 
 Italy is nothing but "a body of Independent States, comprised 
 under the same geographical denomination." 
 
 Metternich, it is now conceded, labored, on this occasion, un- 
 der an optical delusion. He really believed the Pope had 
 ulterior views — he expected nothing else than a federal na- 
 tional Italian league with the Holy Father at its head ; and feel- 
 ing that Austria, with the system of government established in the 
 kingdom of Lombardy and Venice, could not enter that league, he 
 was determined to oppose it. In this manner he almost prompted 
 the cry of "away with the Austrians!" which was now raised in 
 every part of the Peninsula. His conscience actually conjured up 
 the spirit of revenge which he dreaded — the phantom of Nemesis 
 seemed to demand its victim. 
 
 And what did France — we mean the government of Louis Phi- 
 lippe — do to sustain the Pope 1 Absolutely nothing. The Citizen 
 King was anxious to remain on good terms with the Holy Father who 
 was the spiritual head of the church of his subjects ; but he took care 
 not to urge him to farther reforms, or to give him substantial assur- 
 ances of his support. Louis Philippe advised reforms when they were 
 7 
 
74 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 opposed ; when lie found the Pope predisposed in favor of them, he 
 dreaded their sudden introduction. His fleet, sufficiently strong 
 to overawe Austria, remained at Naples (why was it not sent to 
 the Adriatic — to Ancona ?), while his Minister in Rome, who was 
 at the end of his diplomatic resources, wrote long reports to Paris, 
 and demanded further instructions. That Austria intimidated the 
 Pope — that she was in league with the reactionary minister Mar- 
 gherita in Turin, Abercromby's dispatches to the British govern- 
 ment express in so many words ;* while Metternich's own letter to 
 Cardinal Ferretti, the Pope's new Secretary of State, plainly avows 
 his disposition to look w 7 ith favor on the correction of abuses, but 
 not on the " introduction of new ideas which are worse than the 
 abuses themselves." The new idea here referred to was the 
 Italian nationality. As to France, the Roman statesmen perceived 
 soon enough that Louis Philippe, with his designs on Spain (as 
 evinced by the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier his son with 
 the Spanish infanta Louisa) could not afford to pick a quarrel with 
 Austria ; while England, on the contrary, whose alliance with 
 France had been considerably weakened by this marriage, had 
 an additional interest in furthering the independence of Italy. 
 Hearing of the friendly disposition of that country, the liberal 
 Cardinal Secretary of State is reported to have exclaimed : " All 
 hail, England ! We have now both Providence and England on 
 our side !" 
 
 The liberal sentiments of Pope Pius IX. gave Metternich more 
 concern than all the Secret Societies, and all the Committees of 
 Young Italy, Young Poland, and Young Germany put together. By 
 the process of intimidation, by agents in the very Cabinet of Charles 
 Albert, and by fomenting difficulties between the Sovereigns of 
 Modena, Tuscany, and Parma, he had succeeded in preventing 
 Constitutional government from being introduced into any of 
 these States ; but when the head of the Catholic Church himself 
 had become the champion of reform, when his praise was reecho- 
 ing, not only in every part of England, but in Protestant Germany 
 
 * They quote the language employed by the Sardinian Minister, and leave 
 no doubt ae to the truth of Abercromby's statement. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 75 
 
 and in Mahometan Turkey,* nothing short of an armed interven- 
 tion seemed to be able to arrest the progress of liberal ideas. 
 The power of the spiritual sovereign of Rome, when wielded for 
 the temporal benefit of Italy, became irresistible ; religious differ- 
 ences themselves seemed to melt before it, and the glorious idea 
 of reuniting the Church dawned once more upon the minds of the 
 faithful. Father Ventura, afterwards chaplain to the Emperor 
 Napoleon, at the funeral sermon, preached in the church of St. 
 Andrea della Valle in Rome, over the dead body of Daniel O'Con- 
 nell, who had gone to Italy to receive the blessing of the Pope, 
 but who died at Genoa on the 15th of May, 1847, used these fiery 
 words : — " Despotism is a Heathen element : liberty is the Chris- 
 tian one. If the Sovereigns of Europe, those successors of old 
 barbaric chieftains, persevere in their irreligious despotism, then 
 the Church will turn towards Democracy ; it will consecrate the 
 lowly maiden and say : Rule ! — and Democracy shall rule." 
 Had there been statesmen, then, to guide and restrain the passions 
 of the Roman people, as there were agitators and agents of Maz- 
 zini who filled them with distrust against the Pope — had the de- 
 mands for reform been always couched in terms not to alarm the 
 sense of security of the sovereign — had the Roman Patriots been 
 content with instalments, and not pressed forward for payment in 
 full of a long outstanding debt, the probability is the Papal States 
 would now enjoy a better temporal government. The Pope had 
 already adopted the great — the capital measure of introducing 
 laymen into his civil government ; he had instituted the Council 
 of State, with the exclusive privilege of reporting directly on all 
 financial measures (the essence of every state not governed by ab- 
 solutism), and his whole conduct had given proofs of his sincerity 
 in promoting the welfare not only of his own people, but that of 
 the people of the whole Peninsula. The force of his example was 
 irresistible. It had given rise to peaceable reforms in Modena, in 
 Parma, in Tuscany, and in Piedmont ; the resistance of the King 
 
 * The Sultan had sent an Ambassador to Ptome, to assure the Pope of the 
 protection, by the Sultan, of the Catholics in his dominions. 
 
76 OUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of Naples alone led to open rebellion. During all this time the 
 first Catholic power, France, did nothing to sustain the Pope ; 
 England promised more than,, she intended or was able to fulfil ; 
 while the very fact that the liberal reforms in the Papal States 
 were supported and encouraged by England — a Protestant power 
 — was taken advantage of by the Austrian reactionary party, to 
 impeach the sincerity of the head of the Catholic church. His 
 orthodoxy was now questioned, and hints thrown out that he 
 aimed at exchanging his spiritual power for a worldly one. A 
 Vienna paper went even so far as to express the hope that he had 
 not been " tempted by Satan in being shown the kingdoms of this 
 world." In this manner the Pope was made to doubt the correct- 
 ness of his own course; his conscience was troubled, and the mo- 
 ment precipitated when he believed he had to choose between Re- 
 ligion and Reform. Instead of avoiding, at that critical moment, 
 whatever could alarm or excite the suspicion of the spiritual sov- 
 ereign of Rome, Mazzini, in a letter dated Paris, 25th of Novem- 
 ber, 1847, called upon the Pope "to place himself at the head of 
 the national movement, which would otherwise turn from the cross 
 and go its own way." While Mazzini thus threatened to forsake 
 the Pope altogether, Austria and Naples intimated to him that his 
 course, if persisted in, must necessarily lead to a schism in the 
 church, as they had no idea of following in his footsteps.* 
 
 As early as January, 1847, Count Lutzow, Austrian Minister at 
 Rome, inquired of Cardinal Ferretti, whether the Holy Father w T ould 
 permit the passage of Austrian troops through his States for the 
 protection of the King of Naples. The worthy Cardinal refused in 
 the most positive manner ; adding that, if Austria were to attempt 
 to force such a passage, he himself would go to the frontier and 
 defend it to the last drop of blood. The ambassador, not satisfied 
 with this answer, wanted to see the Pope who, though in a milder 
 
 * This may explain why the Emperor Napoleon, at this moment, lays such 
 stress on Austria recommending reforms in the Papal States, and why this 
 recommendation on the part of Austria, was made an article of peace at Villa- 
 franca and Zurich. The Emperor of the French insists that the Pope shall no 
 longer be threatened with a schism in his church. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 77 
 
 form, made the same reply. It is to be remarked that Metternich 
 had previously promised the English Minister, Lord Ponsonby, at 
 Vienna, that Austria would not interefere with the Italian States, 
 whose sovereigns were inclined to introduce reforms. The King 
 of Naples, being opposed to them all, constituted, no doubt, the 
 mental reservation of the Austrian Chancellor of State. Tuscany 
 was in constant dread of an Austrian invasion ; the King of Sar- 
 dinia alone offered to send an army for the protection of the 
 Pope. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that the inhabitants of the Papal 
 towns began to arm themselves for the purpose of " repelling the 
 Austrians" — that the necessity of union and armed resistance to 
 Austria was felt throughout Italy — that the issues which were 
 afterwards distinctly presented on the battle-field of Lombardy 
 in 1848, were, in advance, accepted by the Italian mind. In 
 December, 1847, Austria concluded with Francis V., Duke of 
 Modena, and Louis II., Duke of Parma, an offensive and defen- 
 sive alliance, by the terms of which these two Duchies " entered 
 into the line of defence of the Austrian Provinces" and allowed 
 Austria to occupy any important military point within them. By 
 this treaty, Genoa itself was threatened. The King of Sardinia 
 protested against it ; but instead of giving any explanation, Austria 
 increased her army in Lombardy. 
 
 The display of armed force, the muster of the National Guards, 
 the division of the male population of Rome into sections, led by 
 Heads of the People, (capi-popolo,) on one side, and the pressure 
 of the reactionary party, together with the doubts of perhaps the 
 majority of Cardinals in the interest of Austria, produced, at last, 
 that degree of apprehension in the mind of Pius IX. which the 
 leaders of faction were but too apt to construe into fear or a dis- 
 position, on his part, to betray the popular cause. On the evening 
 of the 1st of January, 1848, as the people of Rome were preparing 
 for a torch-light procession, to salute the Pope on the advent of a 
 New Year, the news was suddenly circulated that the Quirinal was 
 surrounded by soldiers. The Pope, as it afterwards appeared from 
 the correspondence of Lord Minto, believed himself betrayed and 
 7 * 
 
78 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS. 
 
 his life in danger ; but Prince Corsini, then eighty years of age, 
 interceded with the Holy Father, who promised to show himself 
 the next day to the people. He drove past the civic guards, sur- 
 rounded by an enthusiastic crowd ; while the popular coachman, 
 Ciceruacchio, so baptized by the humor of the Romans, jumped up 
 behind, and held a flag over his head, with the inscription, "Holy 
 Father, confide in your people." Then it was that the cries, 
 " Long live Pius IX. — alone /" were first heard in the city of Rome. 
 The Italian historians relate that, on that day, the Pope's face was 
 pale, and that he trembled. The power of the State now gravi- 
 tated toward the masses — the reforms, toward revolution. A few 
 weeks from that period, the Italian tri-colored flag was planted by 
 the people, amid the roar of cannon, on the Island of Sicily. The 
 King of Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the King of Sar- 
 dinia were obliged to grant constitutions to their people. In Feb- 
 ruary, 1848, Louis Philippe himself was driven from Paris, and 
 the kingdom of France changed into a Republic. At this last 
 event, all Europe stood aghast ; but the Holy Father observed 
 with great calmness : " Perhaps the French Republic will be less 
 opposed to religion than Louis Philippe, who, at heart, was always 
 an infidel." 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 79 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC. THE SARDINIAN CAMPAIGNS. 
 HOW THE ITALIAN CAUSE WAS RUINED IN 1848 AND 1849. 
 
 "With the French Revolution of 1848, a new era seemed to dawn 
 on the whole European Continent ; but it is a mistake to suppose 
 that France, in this instance, gave the first impulse. That im- 
 pulse, no matter how the radical party in Europe may endeavor to 
 disguise it, was given by the Pope more than a year previous, and 
 had produced its effect on every Italian State. Before there were 
 any symptoms of revolt in Paris, Naples, Turin, Milan or Flo- 
 rence, the Holy Father had granted a general amnesty, instituted 
 his Council of State, his Ministerial and Municipal Councils, and 
 awakened the idea of Italian nationality. But he was not, and 
 could not, from the sacredness of his calling, be a conqueror 
 through the instruments of war, and it was a gross mistake in the 
 radical party to assign to him such a part. His example, never- 
 theless, had elevated the hopes of the People and produced the 
 emulation of Princes. Naples, Tuscany and Piedmont had already 
 liberal constitutions when Louis Philippe was driven from Paris. 
 The Italian Republicans are wrong in stating that these revolu- 
 tions would have been effected without the Pope — without the in- 
 fluence which the head of the Church of Rome necessarily exer- 
 cised on the rulers and people of the other Italian States. It was 
 in his name that the people assembled — it was in his name, and 
 after his example, that reforms were asked for in those States, and 
 it was by his name that the demands for reform were sanctified. 
 Instead of conspirators, there were now patriots avowing their senti- 
 ments ; instead of secret tribunals, there was a public opinion to 
 approve or condemn men's political actions. Then came the time 
 of trial — the time when statesmen were required to give force and 
 direction to public opinion, and to enjoin that moderation on all 
 
80 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 which, in view of the limited means possessed by the people of 
 Italy, and the magnitude of the object in view, were indispensable 
 to success. 
 
 The Italians had risen to drive the Austrians from their soil. 
 They knew that as long as Austria was powerful, they would be 
 treated as subjects, their princes as vassals of that Power. They 
 knew also that she was unrelenting, that she was opposed to con- 
 stitutional progress in any form, and that, above all things, she 
 was the uncompromising foe of Italian nationality. As long as 
 Austria exercised power in Italy, there was no hope for liberty or 
 national independence. She was now threatened in her own strong- 
 holds ; the people in her oldest and most loyal provinces had risen 
 to demand reforms, a feeble monarch had been compelled to grant 
 them, and the demand for national institutions threatened the dis- 
 solution of her empire. One strong, combined, organized effort 
 might now force her to relinquish her grasp on the Italian Penin- 
 sula. The only organized force in all Italy disposable for a move- 
 ment of that kind was the army of the King of Piedmont, and the 
 king was resolved to employ it for that purpose. But here he was 
 again met by the two opposite factions which, from his accession to 
 the throne, had thwarted his plans, and impeded the progress of 
 reforms. Both the reactionary and the republican party impeached 
 his motives, and represented him to the people merely as a military 
 chieftain thirsting after conquest and territory. Mazzini stigma- 
 tized the king's partisans " as the Royal Sardinian party," which 
 was no more to be trusted than the Austrian reactionary party 
 itself. 
 
 These aspersions and calumnies had their effect on the people. 
 They dampened their ardor, filled them with distrust and suspicion, 
 and prevented that unity of action which was indispensable to suc- 
 cess. When Charles Albert marched his troops into Lombardy, 
 the rural populations did but partially espouse his cause. They 
 neither flocked in overwhelming numbers to his standard, nor were 
 they willing to make the necessary provision for his army which, 
 in consequence, was but indifferently fed and cared for during the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 81 
 
 whole campaign of 1848.* In addition to all this, the Piedmon- 
 tese army was chiefly composed of new levies ; while the Austrians, 
 under Radetzky and Hess, had experienced troops under oil gene- 
 rals of established reputation and acknowledged military genius. 
 The odds, assuredly, were largely against the Italians, if the Aus- 
 trians could hold the fortresses till they were reinforced. The 
 whole number of Italian volunteers in that first campaign against 
 Austria, did certainly not exceed twenty-five thousand, and was 
 probably below that estimate. The King of Naples had sent 
 15,000 regular troops, the Papal States 10,000 (partly Swiss), 
 the other central Italian States perhaps as many more, to reinforce 
 the King of Sardinia. The Austrians under Radetzky may have 
 been, at the commencement, some forty-five or fifty thousand strong ; 
 but they were subsequently considerably strengthened by the 
 troops sent to their relief. The principal difficulty in the way of 
 success, however, consisted in the little reliance which the King 
 of Sardinia could place upon his allies. The Dukes of Tuscany 
 and Modena, though yielding to the popular pressure of the mo- 
 ment, were at heart Austrians, and the instructions given to their 
 commanders partook no doubt of that dubious character, which 
 corresponded to the situation, and was least of all calculated to 
 stimulate their military ardor. Parma, as we have already related, 
 had, by the treaty of December, 1847, been as good as sold 
 to Austria : while the solemn Encyclia of the Pope, declaring 
 that the mission of the Vicar of Christ was one of conciliation and 
 peace, and not of war, was nearly, if not quite, equal to an injunc- 
 tion on his army. But the most disastrous blow inflicted on the 
 Italian cause was the counter-revolution in Naples (15th May, 
 1848), effected by the king's troops the very day on which Parlia- 
 
 * The Austrians expected the same lethargy on the part of the rural popula- 
 tion of Lombardy during the last war ; but they were mistaken. The people 
 of Central Italy had profited by the lessons of 1848 and 1849; they knew that 
 they could never rise under more favorable auspices. The Republican commit- 
 tees and leaders in foreign countries had lost their influence upon them, and 
 the example of Garibaldi inspired every one with hope and confidence in the 
 sincerity of the King and his new powerful ally. 
 
82 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ment met, and the consequent dispersion of that Parliament. 
 Absolutism being thus reestablished in Naples, the Neapolitan 
 troops stationed in Lombardy were recalled, and Radetzky re- 
 lieved of their presence. Thus forsaken by the sovereigns of 
 Italy, Charles Albert had nothing but his own gallant army 
 and the Italian volunteers to rely upon, who, from distrust of 
 the king, and instigated by republican leaders, obstinately re- 
 fused to enlist in the regular army, and, in their undisciplined 
 state, were no match for the Austrian troops of the line. 
 
 The Austrian quadrilateral having, since the peace of Villa- 
 franca, acquired fresh notoriety and importance from its bearing 
 on the Italian question, a short sketch of the campaign of 1848 
 may, perhaps, serve to illustrate its strength and the advantages 
 resulting from it to an army using it as the basis of its defensive 
 or offensive operations. We quote from a military authority 
 which will hardly be questioned.* 
 
 After the revolution of Milan, the defection of the Italian regi- 
 ments in the Austrian service, and the passage of the Piedmontese 
 across the Ticino, Radetzkv marched his army, 45,000 strong, to 
 Verona. Having garrisoned this strong place with 15,000 men, 
 he had still a force of 30,000 at his disposal. Opposed to him, be- 
 tween the Mincio and the Adda, stood 60,000 men — Piedmontese, 
 Tuscans, Modenese and Parmese. In his rear stood the army 
 of Durando, 45,000 men — Neapolitans, Romagnese and volun- 
 teers, principally from the province of Venetia. Nothing remained 
 in his possession but the communication with the Tyrol, and even 
 that was (though feebly) threatened by the free corps from Lom- 
 bardy. Radetzky, nevertheless, maintained his position. The 
 observation of the two fortresses Peschiera and Mantua, required 
 so many Piedmontese troops that on the 6th of May, in their 
 attack on the position of Verona (battle of Santa Lucia) they 
 could only dispose of four divisions — from 40,000 to 45,000 men. 
 Radetzky, with a part of # the garrison of Verona, may have had 
 
 * A complete military description of the Austrian quadrilateral was furnished 
 by J. I. Bande, and published in Paris, 1859. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 83 
 
 3G,000. The respective forces of the belligerents, therefore, con- 
 sidering the strategical advantages of the position of the Aus- 
 trians, were already equalized, and the Piedmontese were beaten. 
 The counter revolution in Naples (above alluded to) freed Ra- 
 detzky from the presence of 15,000 opposing Neapolitans, and 
 reduced the army opposed to him in Venetia to 30,000, composed 
 of 5,0(30 Papal Swiss, 5,000 Papal troops of the line, and some 
 20,000 Italian volunteers. The Austrian army of reserve, which 
 had been formed in April, under Nugent, on the Isonzo, easily 
 broke through these troops and, on the '25th May, 20,000 strong, 
 effected its junction with Iladetzky at Verona, Iladetzky, thus 
 reinforced, achieved his celebrated flank march to Mantua, (27th 
 March,) debouched (May 29th) on the right bank of the Mincio, 
 stormed the enemy's line at Curtatone, and advanced (30th May) 
 to Goito, in the rear and flank of the Italians. At Goito he was 
 beaten ; but the Piedmontese derived but little advantage from 
 this victory though, on the same day, they took the fortress of 
 Peschiera. The weather becoming unfavorable, and not feeling 
 strong enough to risk a decisive battle, lladetzky marched his 
 army back again (4th June) through Mantua to the Adda, sent 
 the corps of reserve to Verona, and went, with the balance of his 
 troops, over Legnano to Vicenza, which was occupied and fortified 
 by Durando with 17,000 men. On the 10th he attacked Vicenza 
 with 30,000 men, and on the 11th May, Durando capitulated after 
 a brave defence. The second corps </' armte took Padua and ren- 
 dered itself master of the valley of the Brenta and of Venetia 
 generally, after which it followed the first corps to Verona. A 
 second Austrian corps de reserve, under General Welden, now 
 came from the Isonzo. In the mean time, the Piedmontese be- 
 stowed great attention to llivoli, which had played an important 
 part in Napoleon's campaign in Italy, and at the same time laid 
 siege to JSIanlua. Eadetzky now conceived the plan of breaking 
 through the Italian centre. On the 22d July, he ordered Rivoli 
 to be attacked, w T hich was evacuated by the Piedmontese on the 
 23d, and on the same day marched with 40,000 men from Verona 
 to Sona and Soma Campagna, where, the Piedmontese being but 
 
84 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 14,000 strong, lie broke through their whole line of operation. 
 The left Piedmontese wing was, on the 24th July, entirely thrown 
 across the Mincio, while their right wing which had, in the mean 
 time, advanced towards the Austrians, was beaten as Custozza. 
 On the 26th July the whole Austrian army crossed the Mincio, 
 and defeated the Piedmontese once more at Volta. Thus ended 
 the campaign. The Piedmontese evacuated Lombardy *and re- 
 treated across the Ticino. Through the mediation of France and 
 England an armistice was now concluded, by the terms of which 
 Sardinia surrendered all Northern Italy to the Ticino, including 
 the Duchies which, with Venice, had united themselves to Sar- 
 dinia. But Venice did not accept these terms, and under the dic- 
 tatorship of Manin continued its resistance to Austria. 
 
 Meanwhile the affairs of Austria proper had taken a pernicious 
 turn, and the progress of the Hungarian rebellion again en- 
 couraged the hopes of the King of Sardinia. Both parties prepared 
 for another — a last struggle. Hostilities were resumed on the 
 16th March, 1849; but the campaign lasted but seven days. At 
 Novara (23d March) the fortunes of war again decided against 
 Charles Albert, who was this time fighting without an ally, and 
 the Powers whose mediation had produced the first armistice felt 
 again called upon to arrest, by diplomacy, the progress of the vic- 
 tors. They effected another armistice for ten years (equivalent to 
 a peace) to which Austria the more readily assented, as she her- 
 self had hardly any hope of subduing the Hungarians without the 
 assistance of a third Power. 
 
 Thus ended the campaigns for Italian independence in 1848 and 
 1849 ; but the risings of cities continued, though they were all 
 crushed in turn, and only served, by their many heroic victims, to 
 write in blood the It lian protest against Austrian rule. We have 
 given this short sketch of the military operations of that period, 
 to show what strength Austria still possessed at the time of her 
 greatest embarrassment, and how vain the hopes of the Republican 
 party must have been, to dislodge that Power, without preconcerted 
 action, by the mere effect of popular insurrections ! " The Pied- 
 montese," continues our military authority, " had to detach so many 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 85 
 
 troops before the quadrilateral of fortresses, that their strength, for 
 offensive purposes, as was proved by the battle of Santa Lucia, was 
 already broken ; while Radetzky, the moment he had received his 
 first reinforcements, could already move with perfect ease between 
 the four fortresses ; now taking Mantua, now Verona, for the basis 
 of his operations : to-day alarming the rear of the enemy on the right 
 bank of the Mincio, and to-morrow taking Yicenza, and command- 
 ing, in all these movements, the initiative. The Piedmontese, it is 
 true, committed many faults ; but it is precisely the strength of a 
 position which embarrasses an enemy and obliges him to commit 
 blunders. To observe the fortresses, and to lay siege to one of them, 
 compels the enemy to divide his forces, and to weaken his offensive 
 power ; the rivers oblige him to repeat this division of forces, and 
 render it impossible for the corps, thus detached, mutually to assist 
 each other. What force is not required to lay siege to Mantua, 
 as long as the Austrians have an army in the field capable of de- 
 bouching from the detached forts of Verona !" We beg the 
 reader to take note of this argument, as it had undoubtedly its 
 weight on the wise determination of the Emperor Napoleon, to 
 offer the Emperor of Austria the terms of peace agreed upon at 
 Villafranca. The strength of the four fortresses, as long as Aus- 
 tria is permitted to hold them, can only be counterbalanced by an 
 Italian army in the field, or at least ready to take the field, (the 
 manoeuvres of an army in the field being the only defence against 
 an army ensconced behind fortifications) and by the alliance of 
 France. 
 
 While the military operations of the King of Sardinia were thus 
 brought to a disastrous conclusion, while the Austrians were in- 
 creasing their army in Lombardy, and the King of Naples was 
 fortifying his newly acquired despotic power by new enlistments and 
 additional numbers of foreign mercenaries, a new detached revolu- 
 tion broke out in the Papal States. The people of Rome, on the 
 16th November, 1848, demanded of the Pope an Italian Constit- 
 uent Assembly, a declaration of war against Austria, and a minis- 
 try ready to carry out both these measures. The Pope, in con- 
 ceding these demands, yielded but to physical force. He had no 
 
8G THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 longer the means to refuse anything, and it is but natural to sup- 
 pose that the majority of the Cardinals, who had already protested 
 against the surrender of the power of the Church, should not have 
 considered the Pope bound by promises extorted from him under 
 such circumstances. Besides, how could the Holy Father make 
 war upon Austria after the allied Princes of Italy, with the King 
 of Sardinia at their head, had been so signally discomfited 1 What 
 were his resources, with a handful of troops, an empty treasury 
 and a government of which he was now only the nominal head ? 
 In this dilemma, the man of peace fled to Naples. With his flight, 
 the Republicans had everything their own way ; but it must have 
 been plain to the humblest capacity, that the Republic of Rome 
 could not act in concert with the King of Sardinia, and that its 
 antagonism to Austria and Naples must soon involve it in war 
 with either or both these Powers. The pious vows of the Pope 
 for one party or the other, could not change the military aspect of 
 things, and the men who divested him of all substantial power, can 
 hardly make him responsible for seeking the protection of those 
 who professed to be his friends. The Pope has no hereditary suc- 
 cessor; he is not governed by the ordinary motives of ruling 
 Princes, and he cannot, without ceasing to be Pope, become a 
 Prince by virtue of a constitutional compact with his people. Jt 
 was, therefore, the essence of logic, though ungrateful to the ears 
 of his subjects, when he declined the title of Constitutional Prince 
 which the latter wished to bestow on him. The Pope, in his 
 spiritual capacity, was no more qualified to perform the part which 
 the Republicans had assigned to him, than the King of Sardinia 
 was able to solve the military problem reluctantly entrusted to his 
 hands. 
 
 The King of Sardinia, when marching into Lombardy to take 
 the lead in the Italian national movement, had a right to count 
 on the support of the other Italian Princes : but the Republicans, 
 who wished the movement to proceed directly from the People, not 
 only prevented the rising of the masses, but also hinted to the 
 Dukes of Central Italy, and to the King of Naples, that if Charles 
 Albert were successful, they would be mediatized, or at best 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE 87 
 
 become his vassals. The King of Naples, as we have seen, 
 took the hint at an early date, and acted accordingly; the 
 others went as far as was safe, considering the circumstances in 
 which they were placed. The Piedmontese officers relate, and 
 Republican writers confirm it, that treason existed even in the 
 quartermaster's department of their own army, and that in the 
 bread which was distributed to the troops the day before the battle 
 of Novara, slips of paper were found with the words printed or 
 written upon them : " Piedmontese soldiers ! what are you fighting 
 for? You and your king are betrayed!" That Charles Albert 
 was surrounded by conspirators and traitors at his own court — 
 that he had spies and Austrian agents in his own Cabinet — has been 
 clearly established ;* that there were men in his army who, enter- 
 taining different political views, only obeyed him from " fealty to 
 the king," can hardly be doubted. But the fact that such con- 
 spirators and traitors existed in the immediate vicinity of the king, 
 among his own confidential advisers, proves that those who knew 
 him best were most convinced of the sincerity of his devotion, and 
 feared his success. That he hesitated for a long time before he 
 granted a constitution to his people, is true ; but we have also 
 stated the reasons which were well calculated to make him pause 
 before he took that important step. To grant a constitution was 
 to declare war against Austria, and the melancholy events which 
 followed that act sufficiently justified his apprehensions. f Charles 
 Albert was indeed an unfortunate sovereign. While yet Prince 
 of Carignan he was, by the intrigues of Prince Metternich, threat- 
 ened with being excluded from the succession. Then — perhaps 
 from his very hatred of Austria — he was induced to join the pop- 
 
 * We have already alluded to the reactionary Count Margherita; also refered 
 to in Abercromby's dispatch to the British government. 
 
 f A great point was made by the Republicans of the fact that the King of 
 Naples granted a Constitution ten days sooner than the King of Sardinia. But 
 the Constitution of Ferdinand II. was a ruse, and that of Charles Albert, a truth, 
 tantamount to a declaration of war against Austria. Charles Albert, as events 
 have shown, was alone too weak to measure swords with Austria and felt only 
 sure of the assistance of Naples when the King had granted a Constitution. He 
 was nevertheless deceived by him, and by all his other allies. 
 
88 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ular cause. After that he was exiled by Charles Felix, and only 
 permitted to return by the intercession of France and Russia. 
 When, at last, he succeeded to the throne, he was again threatened 
 by Austria and by contending factions in his own country. A 
 number of attempts were made on his life ; others were reported 
 and exaggerated for the purpose of intimidating him ; and he was, 
 besides, the special aim of the poisoned shafts of Mazzini who, 
 as a native Genoese, shared the dislike of his countrymen for the 
 monarchical rule of Piedmont. The memory of the glorious days 
 of the Republic yet lives in the minds of the people of Genoa, 
 but the present King Victor Emanuel II. has appeased their hatred 
 of Piedmont and its dynasty. 
 
 In extenuation of the faults of Charles Albert, we may yet plead 
 that he considered himself bound by his word — a virtue which he 
 inherited from his ancestors — and that, therefore, he naturally 
 hesitated before he made promises to. his people. None of the 
 Piedmontese kings, from the time the French Republic had driven 
 them from the continent to the Island of Sardinia, sought popu- 
 larity with his subjects by promising them liberal reforms ; none, 
 therefore, could be accused of having broken his pledges. This 
 cannot be said of any other Italian sovereign, and least of all of 
 the kings of Naples.* Neither was Charles Albert in league with 
 any reactionary faction in Italy. His natural hatred of Austria, 
 as well as his national Italian sentiments, clear him of all such 
 humiliating suspicions. Only once in his life — perhaps from grati- 
 tude for the protection which Louis XVIII. had afforded him 
 against Metternich — he drew the sword against liberty ; but it was 
 in Spain, not in Italy. He joined the French army which, under 
 the Duke of Angouleme, in 1823, invaded that country for the 
 
 * Circelli, one of the ministers of Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, when 
 the latter on the night of the 5th July, 1820, was pressed by the people to grant 
 a Constitution, conjured the King to yield to an unavoidable necessity : " I love 
 your Majesty,'' said he, "as a father loves his son. Listen and follow the counsel 
 which comes from faithful lips. Grant immediately a Constitution and thus 
 avoid the danger of the moment. May God afterwards aid the most pious and 
 innocent King to recover the rights of the crown from a guilty people !" The 
 King followed the advice of his minister to the letter. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 89 
 
 purpose of reinstating Ferdinand VII., and was present at the 
 storming of the Trocadero. This feat of arms was, perhaps, neces- 
 sary to facilitate his return to his native country. The French 
 and the Spanish Bourbons could now intercede in his behalf, and 
 he could claim the alliance of Russia. Without the intercession 
 of these Powers, thus sought and obtained, it is highly probable 
 that the Dukes of Modcna, that is to say, Arch Dukes of Austria, 
 would now securely occupy the throne of Sardinia — and that Aus- 
 trian domination would extend over the whole Italian Peninsula. 
 
90 
 
 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE POLICY OE PRINCE METTERNICH CONTINUED IN ITALY. 
 VICTOR EMANUEL II. DOWNFALL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC . 
 THE CRIMEAN WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
 
 Having thus far sketched the leading events which produced 
 the situation of Italy previous to the last war, it remains for us 
 only to state that we have honestly labored to perform our task 
 without prejudice or partiality. We have consulted Italian, French 
 and German authorities, and among the latter especially Reuchlin, 
 who, as the historian most favorable to Austrian views, has been 
 especially commended and quoted by the papers and periodicals 
 in the interest of that Power. But we have not been able to 
 arrive at that author's conclusions. On the contrary, the facts 
 which he relates, and the authorities he cites with the usual honesty 
 and disinterestedness of a German writer, only serve to confirm 
 us in the opposite opinion. It is an error to suppose that the mis- 
 government of Italy, of Germany and of Austria proper, is merely 
 the result of Metternich's policy, and it is a romantic delusion to 
 imagine that that policy was buried with the Austrian Chancellor. 
 The Austrian policy is of Spanish origin — it is a system inherited 
 from Charles V., which will endure as long as a Habsburger oc- 
 cupies a throne in Europe. Metternich was nothing but its able 
 exponent during a long period of years, which identified him, in 
 the eyes of his contemporaries, with the principles on which he 
 acted. His predecessors and successors have pursued the same 
 policy ; though none but Prince Kaunitz, under Maria Theresa, has 
 enjoyed a similar opportunity of arriving at signal distinction. 
 Austria is the living embodiment of the reactionary principle in 
 politics, and all her statesmen must act in that sense. Progress, 
 except in a material direction — which is perfectly compatible with 
 moral decline — national elevation, liberty are her natural enemies, 
 which she is compelled to oppose, to preserve the territorial integ- 
 rity of her Provinces. When the conquests of the first Napoleon 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 91 
 
 drove all Europe into a reactionary coalition, the representative of 
 reaction — the Prime Minister of the reactionary Power par excel- 
 ence — was, for a time, invested with the diplomatic dictatorship ; 
 but even that was only in appearance. England exercised the 
 real power behind the scene. As long as Metternich followed in 
 the wake of British statesmen, he was successful ; when he separated 
 from them, or rather when England, under the influence of more 
 liberal statesmen, pursued a different policy, better adapted to the 
 spirit of the age, Metternich committed nothing but blunders. 
 That he possessed no political forecast, is proved by the fact that 
 he was surprised by every revolution, until he was at last shaken 
 by the thunder of the insurgents in his own palace. He never had 
 the skill or tact to prevent an outbreak, and he had but one mode 
 of crushing it : — military force. In his negotiations from State to 
 State, he was artful and cunning ; but in the execution of his 
 designs seldom employed other than temporary expedients. Napo- 
 leon I. characterized him well, when he said : " Monsieur de Met- 
 ier nick croit faire de la politique, quand il fait de V intrigue." 
 (Prince Metternich thinks he is a great diplomatist when he resorts 
 to intrigue.) To compare him to Macchiavelli,* would be doing a 
 monstrous wrong to that preeminent Florentine historian and states- 
 man. Macchiavelli was endowed with the wonderful faculty of deci- 
 phering the hieroglyphics of the past, while his divinatory power 
 actually approached to prophetic vision. He was painfully con- 
 scious of the calamities which had befallen Italy, and devoting all 
 the energies of his mighty mind to the discovery of the means to 
 unite and save her ; while Metternich himself furnished the most 
 damning comment on his statesmanship, by the vulgar motto : "After 
 me, the Deluge. "f 
 
 * It need hardly be observed in this place, that history has long since cleared 
 the memory of Macchiavelli of the reproaches some of his contemporaries have 
 heaped upon him. No well-read man now doubts his patriotism or his love of 
 liberty. His " Prince/' in which, with a masterly hand, he traces the portrait 
 of royalty, has always been at the head of the list of prohibited books in Aus- 
 trian Italy. 
 
 f We are too seriously inclined to jest, much less to pun ; but if tho Deluge is 
 to come after Metternich, were not he and his policy necessarily— antediluvian? 
 
92 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 The Austrian system of government in Italy underwent no 
 change by the retirement of Metternich from power : its severity 
 was hardly tempered by the high personal quality of the Arch 
 Duke Maximilian. The Italians must cease to be Italians, before 
 they can become loyal Austrian subjects. Austria must abandon 
 the Peninsula, before she can be just to the Italians. It is sheer 
 nonsense to talk of Italy being obliged to acknowledge either 
 French or Austrian supremacy, and that an Italian revolution can 
 only produce a " change of masters." As well might it be said of 
 Germany, that she must either acknowledge French or Russian 
 supremacy, and that a revolution whose object is union, would only 
 end in a change of masters. No country in Europe, except Eng- 
 land, has such natural geographical limits, corresponding so exactly 
 with the limitation of the language of its people, as Italy ; and the 
 Italian population exceeds that of Great Britain, and very nearly 
 equals that of the United Kingdoms. If Prussia, with her sixteen 
 or seventeen millions of people, and the most exposed frontier of 
 any State in Europe, can maintain the relations of a Great Power; 
 why should not twenty-six millions of Italians, united under a 
 strong government, be able to preserve their independence? That 
 the Italians look to France as their natural ally, is unavoidable as 
 long as Austria has a foothold in the Peninsula ; and the French 
 Republic of 1848 committed a terrible blunder when it did not 
 come to the assistance of Lombardy. It might, then, have accom- 
 plished, almost without bloodshed, what has since been the fruit of 
 a most sanguinary war, and it might, by such a step, have prolonged 
 its own existence. But the Italian policy of Monsieur de Lamartine 
 and General Cavaignac chd not differ much from that of the 
 Bourbons, and merely aimed at a counterpoise to Austrian influ- 
 ence in the Peninsula. For that purpose Rome was occupied, 
 after a most skilful and heroic defence, as an offset to the Aus- 
 trian successes in Central Italy, and with a view, no doubt, of not 
 being eclipsed by Louis Philippe, who had once rendered the Pope 
 a similar service by the occupation of Ancona. But when the 
 French Republic intervened in Rome, Italy was already prostrate; 
 the battles for national independence at Rivoli and Novara were 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 93 
 
 lost, and it was but a few disjected members that continued the 
 struggle, after life had fled from the body. France entered to dis- 
 pute the spoils to the victors. Austria was not to have it all her 
 own way in Italy ; in Vienna, not in Rome, was the French inva- 
 sion to be felt. If the French had not gone to Rome, the Aus- 
 trians would have gone there, and the result would have been 
 worse — the future hopeless. The double invasion by France and 
 Austria was a terrible infliction on the Papal States ; but the anta- 
 gonism between these two Powers was the last hope of Italy. 
 
 Charles Albert, as we have already related, abdicated the throne* 
 after the unfortunate battle of Novara (23d March, 1849,) and his 
 successor, the present King Victor Emanuel II. succeeded him, after 
 the truce concluded through the mediation of France and England. 
 This chivalrous Prince, now scarcely turned forty, and still in the 
 full vigor of manhood, was not bowed down with the calamities which 
 had befallen his House ; but resolved to continue the struggle for 
 the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke. As his success at 
 Groito — where, the year previous, the Piedmontese had achieved a 
 splendid victory, and where he himself had received several 
 wounds — had not elated him, so did the crushing defeat at Novara, 
 which placed his country at the mercy of the conquerors, not de- 
 press his spirits. With unaltered resolution, and stroking his huge 
 moustache, he stood firm and erect, a prince and a soldier, before 
 the year-stricken form of the Austrian Field Marshal Radetzky, at 
 the interview which took place between them after the battle, in 
 an old farm-house ; and the Austrian officers assert that in behold- 
 ing the two men, it was difficult to say which of them was the 
 victor — which, the vanquished. 
 
 The first care of the new king, after he felt secure on his throne, 
 was to reaffirm the Constitution, and to surround himself with men 
 
 * The Kings of Piedmont seem, at all times, to have heen willing to abdicate 
 when the interest of the State, or their personal honor, demanded such a sacrifice 
 at their hands. It is difficult, in the history of European Dynasties, to find a 
 line of sovereigns more imbued with the sentiment of responsibility to the State 
 and of personal honor, than the Princes of the House of Savoy. They may 
 indeed be called the Plantagenets of Italy. 
 
94 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of decision and experience, earnestly devoted to the liberal cause. 
 No Italian comprehended the situation of Italy and of Europe better 
 than Count Cavour, the eminent Sardinian statesman whom Victor 
 Emanuel II. soon selected as his Prime Minister and Counsellor. 
 Austrian pens have been employed to revile him — to represent him 
 as a speculator, an adventurer, a political gambler, a madman ; while 
 the Republican exiles have been equally lavish in their abuse of his 
 grasping monarchical predilections. But he heeded one party as little 
 as the other, and pursued his object — the creation of an opportunity 
 to renew the conflict with Austria under more favorable auspices — 
 with a steady hand.* His first object was to continue the political 
 antagonism between Sardinia and Austria, by imparting as much 
 progress and political vitality to the constitutional government of 
 Turin, as there was reaction and political death in Milan. The 
 Constitution must be a truth, the liberties granted must be honestly 
 maintained, in order not only to satisfy every reasonable aspira- 
 tion of the People and to afford the widest scope for the develop- 
 ment of all national resources, but also, by contrast with the other 
 governments of Italy, to stimulate the general desire for liberal and 
 national institutions. The greater the freedom in Piedmont, the 
 more intolerable were the despotisms of Milan and Naples, and the 
 means employed to maintain them. Austria, whose logic of State 
 
 * Count Cavour is probably tbe first living statesman of Europe. He not only 
 understands and appreciates, at their just value, the political, moral and military 
 elements of Italy: but, with a single exception to which we need not point, sur- 
 passes his contemporaries also in intimate knowledge of the secret springs of 
 action of the public men of other countries. He is descended from one of the 
 oldest noble families of Piedmont, and numbers St. Francis of Salis among his 
 ancestors. In spite of this high, conservative descent — we say this in all humility 
 and piety — Count Cavour evinced from his early youth an unconquerable pre- 
 dilection in favor of liberal principles, and an ardent devotion to the cause of 
 Italian independence. An eloquent speaker and a persuasive public writer, he 
 soon became a popular leader; though thore were many who, from the fact that 
 his father belonged to a different school of politics, questioned the sincerity of 
 his motives. But ten years' constant devotion and labor in the cause of Italy, 
 during which he was the body and soul, not only of the foreign diplomacy of 
 Piedmont, but also of every measure of public interest and improvement at 
 home, have at last identified his name with the cause of Italian freedom, and he 
 enjoys at this hour, the undivided affection and admiration of his countrymen. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 95 
 
 consists in artillery, added new fortifications to Peschiera and 
 Verona ; Sardinia rebuilt and enlarged the fortress of Alessandria. 
 Austria strengthened her garrisons ; Sardinia nearly doubled her 
 army. Austria complained of Sardianian provocations; Sardinia 
 replied with the fable of the wolf and the lamb, and looked, im- 
 ploringly, for protection to other Powers. But the Sardinian 
 Secretary of Foreign Affairs was a statesman, not a conspirator, 
 and as such knew how to bide his time. He knew that Victor 
 Emanuel II. had not a single ally among the Princes of Italy, and 
 that the People, whose blood had so recently drenched the battle 
 fields of the Peninsula, required repose to gather strength for a re- 
 newed effort. He also knew that Piedmont alone was no match 
 for Austria, and that political Italy — something more than a mere 
 geographical division — had as yet to be created. Italy was a beau 
 ideal ; the political problem was to introduce her corporeally into 
 time and space. 
 
 The new Republic of France — " la Republique honnette" — was in 
 the mean time approaching a metamorphosis. It had lost the 
 Democratic sympathies of the people by its weak, temporizing, 
 heartless foreign policy,* and it could not make its peace with the 
 adherents of the system which it had displaced. It played no im- 
 portant part in the tragic scenes which riveted the attention of the 
 
 * The French Republic of 1848 evinced as little sympathy for the national 
 cause of the Germans, as it did. for that of the Italians. The German minister, 
 Baron Von Raumer, sent to Paris by the provisional government at Frankfort, 
 was not even officially received by the acting President of the French Republic. 
 He was introduced by the Prussian minister, and General Cavaignac received 
 him with an unceremonious " How do you do, my dear Baron ; I'm delighted to 
 see you." The literary reputation of the German ambassador, no doubt, entitled 
 him to this charming familiarity on the part of the " Conqueror of the Barricades." 
 Perhaps, too, Cavaignac was a sceptic, who did not believe in the visible ambas- 
 sador of the invisible German Empire. Koelle, in his "Diplomatic Aphorisms" 
 advises young Diplo7nates, when embarrassed, to utter some monstrous absurdity, 
 which generally so disconcerts the other party, as to afford the speaker time to 
 collect his thoughts. "A German diplomate" continues Koelle, "need never be 
 at a loss for such a thing. He need only speak of the union of Germany." 
 Unfortunately for the German cause, the German literary ambassador to tbo 
 French Republic did not even dare to profit by so sensible an advice. 
 
96 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 world, and it emitted no new ideas capable of rallying the nation 
 in its support. The National Assembly was without a Mountain 
 or a Plain — it possessed neither the men to dare, nor those to resist 
 a great movement ; while the Socialist principles, which it attempted 
 to enact, struck at the root of all political organization. A catas- 
 trophe was unavoidable, and the Empire of 1852 was inaugurated 
 without a desperate struggle either in Paris or the Provinces. 
 The real Democracy of France had become indifferent to the fate 
 of the Republic ; the Orleanists were disgusted with it, and the 
 army, with its historical reminiscences of the Empire, decided in 
 favor of Louis Napoleon. Even the laborers of Paris, expected 
 better things from a Democratic Caesar, than from the humani- 
 tarians, philanthropists and poets of the Republic. To suppose 
 that the immense majority which Napoleon III. received at the 
 popular elections, could be obtained by mere intimidation and in- 
 trigue, is to betray a very limited knowledge of the French people, 
 and the means possessed by any government of France to prevent 
 the manifestation of public opinion. The army of France is not a 
 separate institution. It is itself a large and most influential part 
 of the people ; representing always its youth, its vigor and its 
 actuality. The Zouaves and the Chasseurs de Vincennes, as mar- 
 tial as they look, and as brave as they are, are after all but French 
 peasants and artisans in red trowsers, and never cease to frater- 
 nize with the plow and the workshop.* 
 
 The new Imperial government of France adopted at once a firm 
 and decided policy ; one of its early acts being the formation of 
 an alliance with England, for the purpose of checking the threatened 
 aggressive movement of Russia against Turkey. The entente cor- 
 diale which, from that day, has subsisted between the two great 
 Western Powers of Europe was, at first, the object of considerable 
 
 * What contributed in no ordinary decree to the downfall of the second 
 French Republic, was the want of security which began to be felt by nearly all 
 classes of society. " Thank Heaven !" exclaimed a sarcastic Parisian lady, at a 
 morning visit from the writer, shortly after the 2d of December. " Thank 
 Heaven, our government is no longer in the street ; we have at last found a place 
 to put it in." 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 97 
 
 anxiety to the United States ;* but Italy and Germany and the 
 Scandinavian Powers of Europe felt reassured by its announcement. 
 The entente cordiale between Orleanistic France and England was 
 a mere diplomatic arrangement ; but that between Imperial France 
 and England was an historical event which promised action and 
 corresponding changes in the future. The circumstances under 
 which it was concluded (on the eve of warlike complications) 
 showed that both governments were in earnest — that Great Britain 
 had overcome her inertia, and that France was about to give vent 
 to her actuality. Had the Emperor Nicholas of Russia appreciated 
 the spirit and vigor of the new government inaugurated in Pari& 
 as correctly as he understood the decline and decrepitude of the 
 sick man in Constantinople, and had he, at the same time, put a 
 proper estimate on the recuperative power of Austria, so often illus- 
 trated during the progress of the last and present century, it is more 
 than probable he would have pursued a different policy from that 
 which has led to the Crimean war. He would have nursed two sick 
 men instead of one, and on the ruin of Austria and Turkey, and in 
 conjunction with France, attempted the solution of the Oriental 
 question. But the Emperor Nicholas, since the Polish insurrec- 
 tion in 1830, was the enemy of all national aspirations, and mis- 
 trusted the expansiveness of Democracy even in a monarchical 
 form. If he counted upon the gratitude of Austria, he must 
 have read history to very little purpose. 
 
 The Russian war allowed Sardinia to give the world the first 
 manifestation of renewed political vitality. The King may have 
 felt grateful to France and England for the mediation which 
 assured his throne ; but his joining the allies was undoubtedly dic- 
 tated by reasons of State, and by a more intimate knowledge of 
 the character and designs of the French Emperor. It was the 
 first step toward the re elevation of his kingdom, and to his own re- 
 introduction into the family of ruling European sovereigns. The 
 Piedmontese troops, standing their ground against the acknow- 
 
 * The alarm of the United States, on that occasion, seems to have been un- 
 reasonable; no alliance having ever outlived the purpose for which it was formed, 
 
 9 
 
98 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ledged valor of the Russians, regained their lost prestige ; the 
 people, their courage. Italy was once more associated with the 
 great events of Europe : she was represented in the council of the 
 Great Powers, and might, in a future struggle, secure an ally to 
 her cause. 
 
 But there were yet other considerations that might have influ- 
 enced the course of Victor Emanuel II. and his minister Count 
 Cavour. Up to the period of the Crimean war, Russia was the 
 dominant Power of Europe. The dread of the Cossack palsied the 
 resolution of the liberals not only in France and Italy, but through- 
 out the continent of Europe. It was the fear of the Cossack which, 
 more than the ghost of 1793, terrified the French Republicans, 
 confounded the German Parliament at Frankfort, and kept Poland 
 from manifesting her sympathy for Hungary. The Czar had put 
 down the Hungarian insurrection in 1849, and it was Russia which, 
 in 1820 — 1821, assembled a hundred thousand men to assist Aus- 
 tria in crushing the rebellion in Naples and Sardinia. There was 
 no hope for the liberal cause anywhere on the European continent, 
 if Russia remained what she was — a semi-barbarous, yet eminently 
 warlike Power, subject to the will of an energetic autocrat. Sar- 
 dinia, in joining France and England to prevent the further en- 
 croachments of that Power, sacrificed blood and treasure not only 
 for herself, but (as was at that time distinctly admitted even in 
 Germany) for all Europe. That the King of Sardinia and his 
 ministers should, in this new situation, be found the quasi allies of 
 Austria, not only attests their consummate statesmanship, but 
 also proves that they possessed that absolute and supreme control 
 over their personal feelings, which could postpone the gratification 
 of revenge to a period when it could be indulged in with less danger 
 and greater profit to the State. 
 
 The Emperor of the French, too, whatever may have been his 
 personal motives, advanced the cause of civilization by his war 
 against Russia. He had the tact to perceive that France, under 
 whatever form of government, was not safe from invasion as long 
 as the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia remained in 
 full force. The doctrine of intervention, which that association 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 99 
 
 of Sovereigns bad proclaimed, and on which it had acted for 
 more than a generation, had at one time (under the restored Bour- 
 bons) received the assent of France; while England, though hon- 
 orably dissenting from it, contented herself with a mere feeble 
 protest against it. The Holy Alliance, therefore, had to be sev- 
 ered, and it was severed by the Crimean campaign. The war, 
 while it evinced the great endurance and defensive strength of 
 Russia, also proved to Europe her little aggressive power, and the 
 extreme difficulty with which (in the present imperfect state of her 
 railways and river navigation) she can concentrate a considerable 
 military force on a given point. Russia, by the Peace of Paris, 
 lost the absolute control over the Danubian Principalities (which 
 are now placed under the protection of the Five Great Powers), 
 the formidable navy which she had collected in the Black Sea, and 
 the command of the mouths of the Danube. These things were 
 sufficient to diminish her prestige in Europe, and to allow Austria 
 to assume, for a time (till the commencement of the last war), the 
 special protectorship of Turkey. Practically, Russia lost nothing 
 that she will not regain in a little time, especially as the ally of 
 France : but, for that purpose, she must introduce great political 
 reforms into her government and develop her internal resources, 
 which she is now doing under the auspices of an enlightened and 
 humane sovereign. Russia, after changing the serfs of the nobles 
 into crown peasants,* and after completing the system of railways 
 
 * Among the many plans for emancipating the serfs, the following appears, 
 perhaps, to be the most feasible and just. Let the lands which the serfs occupy, and 
 the income which the nobles derive from them in the shape of rents and labor, 
 be appraised, and let the government issue to the nobles an amount of stock 
 which, at the rate of three per cent, per annum, will indemnify them for the loss 
 of that income. To enable the government to pay that interest, let the serfs be 
 assessed, to a corresponding amount, in the shape of direct taxes, secured by the 
 real estate of which the serfs will, by this process, become holders in/ee sinqAe. 
 By such an operation, provided the appraisers are sensible and honest men, 
 neither the State nor the nobles would be subject to loss; while the serfs would 
 hereafter enjoy the benefit of the improved lands. To the nobles it would be a 
 convenience, because it would enable them to realize, at once, their annual income, 
 or to dispose of it altogether, with the property itself, by the sale and transfer 
 of the stock ; while the possession of the lands would stimulate the industry of 
 
100 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 now projected or in progress of construction, -will be twice as pow- 
 erful as she was before the Crimean war, with natural facilities 
 not shared by any other nation except the United States. But for 
 the present, Russia is occupied at home, and obliged to regain her 
 lost influence by diplomacy rather than by force of arms. 
 
 This, then, is what France gained by the Russian war : — She 
 has destroyed the Holy Alliance, created permanent jealousies 
 and causes of mutual distrust and resentment between Russia and 
 Austria, and destroyed all chances of another European coalition 
 against her government and people. But she has gained even 
 more than this. She has positively made an ally of Russia, by 
 siding with her in all matters bearing on the Oriental (Turkish) 
 question, including, as is charged by Austria, some of the very 
 points which led to the Crimean war. She secured the friendship 
 of Russia by her conduct during and after the war, by the manner 
 in which she concluded peace, by the time at which that peace was 
 concluded, and by the conditions of it, which, though apparently 
 hard, yet left Russia in possession of all the essential elements of 
 her former power. In this Crimean war, England seems to have 
 shared the fate of Sardinia ; for the war was not continued a day 
 longer than was " compatible with the interests of France." What 
 
 the serfs. The Bonds of the State, with coupons attached to them, would have a 
 r jady sale on every Stock Exchange in Europe, and the sums thus realized might 
 he invested in commercial and manufacturing enterprises, for which the Rus- 
 sians have a great natural aptitude. Politically, the State would not be a sufferer, 
 because the Russian serf is of the same race, and belongs to the same human 
 variety, as his master. He possesses the same qualities, physical and moral, and 
 is in many respects, even now, a successful competitor with him in every species 
 of human industry, in the tine arts and in science. There are serfs in Russia 
 who are merchants, traders, artisans, and ingenious mechanics. Female serfs 
 are actresses and prime donne, engaged at the principal theatres; and one of the 
 best writers— the Homer of Russia — is said to be a serf. The men who are now 
 serfs, some centuries back, were as free as their present masters on the same soil; 
 the law which forbade their migrating from one place to another, leading, by its 
 abuse, to the present state of servitude, never contemplated by the Czar who 
 gave it. To draw a parallel between the serfs of Russia and the Africans held to 
 labor in the United States, would be preposterous and absurd. In Russia there is 
 but one race ; in America there are two — of which one is physically, morally, 
 and intellectually inferior to the other. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 101 
 
 was accomplished, was not so much for the lasting benefit of Eng- 
 land, as essential to the extension of European civilization into 
 Asia and Africa. Russia and Austria, with France for an umpire, 
 may now at any time settle the Oriental question their own way ; 
 England, with all the navies of the world combined, could not re- 
 sist its settlement. Russia and France seem to be already agreed 
 as to their future policy in the East : will Austria hereafter sup- 
 port the British policy in the East, without reciprocal British pro- 
 tection against French or Russian encroachments 1 
 
 We must yet consider the last Russian war in another light. 
 Russia menaced Europe, because her policy was distinct from that 
 of every other European nation. The Russians were looked upon 
 as a semi-Asiatic people, from whom another exodus was con- 
 stantly dreaded. With the emancipation of the serfs — which has 
 been induced by the late war — the latter will become property- 
 holders, attached to their homes, and thereby disposed to cultivate 
 domestic manners and habits. Civilized Russia will weigh heavily 
 in the Council of States ; but her name will no longer be a terror 
 to other civilized nations. As to Italy, the Russian war has bene- 
 fited her to the extent that hereafter she will only have one foreign 
 Power to contend against instead of three, and that in all reason- 
 able questions which she may bring before the forum of European 
 Cabinets, she will have a friend, instead of an enemy, in Russia. 
 The attitude of Russia, ever since 1856, has been such as to en- 
 courage Sardinia in her resistance to Austrian dictation, as it had 
 no doubt its weight in predisposing the Emperor Francis Joseph 
 to accept the recent overtures of peace. There is, as Russia well 
 knows, a close connection between Greece and Italy, dating from 
 times almost immemorial : and as the Turkish question draws near 
 its solution, the cognate one of Italy, affecting the whole political 
 status of Europe, waxes in importance and influence. To carry out 
 her designs upon Turkey, Russia must have friends in the Medi- 
 terranean ; it is there rather, than in the British Channel, that the 
 future battles for naval supremacy will be fought. 
 
 We are disposed, then, to look upon the Russian campaign as 
 an introduction to that of Italy ; for we certainly find, from the 
 9* 
 
102 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 day of the Paris conferences, a growing understanding between 
 Russia and France in all matters appertaining to the Danubian 
 Principalities and the navigation of the Danube, and a constant 
 resistance, on the part of Austria, to all the propositions jointly ad- 
 vocated by the diplomatic agents of those Powers. The double 
 election of Couza for Moldavia and Wallachia, the election of 
 Milosh as Prince of Servia, were opposed by Austria to the last 
 moment ; while Prince Danilo (the Montenegrin) found his 
 strongest and most kindly-disposed protector in the Emperor Na- 
 poleon. In 1857, a French fleet sailed with sealed orders for the 
 Adriatic, and from that moment up to the 1st of January, 1858, 
 the relations between Austria and France were of the most un- 
 satisfactory nature. Men in the immediate vicinity of the Em- 
 peror Napoleon spoke of a war with Austria as among the most 
 probable occurrences ; while, at Vienna, measures were taken to 
 secure the alliance of England in such an event. The Austrian 
 army was placed on a footing capable of resisting, if need be, 
 France and Russia ; while every effort was made to enlist the 
 sympathies of Germany in the impending struggle. 
 
 It was this position of things, of which Count Cavour, the able 
 Sardinian Minister of State, took advantage, to further the cause 
 of Italy. He showed to the Emperor Napoleon that Austria was 
 not merely a Sclavonic-German, but also an Italian Power, and 
 that she might as well be attacked in Lombardy, as on the coast of 
 Dalmatia ; — that in fighting Austria in Italy, the national aspira- 
 tions of the Italians, their deadly hatred of Austria, public senti- 
 ment in England and in a portion of Germany at least, would be 
 on the side of Napoleon, and that France, in paralyzing Austrian 
 influence in Italy, would diminish that influence to a still greater 
 oxtent in Europe, and in the same ratio add to her own. These were 
 rational, tangible arguments, and they must have had their weight 
 with the French Emperor. Piedmont was openly arming for the con- 
 flict. France was merely introducing " improvements in her artil- 
 lery, and in other branches of her military service." Her peace 
 establishment being on such an enormous scale, the facilities of 
 increasing her army by the system of conscription so great, and 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 103 
 
 the means of transporting troops by railway to any point of the 
 empire so abundant, that no extraordinary preparations were 
 needed to render from one hundred and fifty to two hundred 
 thousand of the best troops immediately available for any warlike 
 purpose. When matters had proceeded thus far, Baron Hubner, 
 the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, was snubbed on New Year's 
 Day. 
 
104 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTEK XII. 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF FRANCE, 
 
 AUSTRIA, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND — POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE 
 FIVE GREAT POWERS. 
 
 The effect of the French Emperor's morning salutation to Baron 
 Hiibner was terrific throughout Europe. The Emperor Francis 
 Joseph, aware of the unfriendly feelings which had subsisted be- 
 tween him and the Emperor Napoleon, and of the causes which 
 had produced it, at once prepared for war. He answered the un- 
 gracious treatment of his minister in Paris by sending a whole 
 corps cf armee (some 30,000 men) with corresponding artillery to 
 increase his army in Lombardy, which was done in less than three 
 days. A second corps of the same strength soon followed, and a 
 third, fourth, fifth, and sixth corps took the same direction. All 
 the fortresses which Austria occupied in the Papal States and in 
 Parma received additional garrisons, while fresh fortifications were 
 thrown up on the Venitian and Dalmatian coasts of the Adriatic. 
 The public funds in Europe declined to the amount of several 
 thousand millions of francs in a few weeks. The Emperor Na- 
 poleon still declared that he was not arming — that he was for 
 peace ; but that he insisted on a revision of the Treaties of 1815, 
 and especially those which Austria then and subsequently con- 
 cluded with the miner Italian States. For this purpose, he in- 
 vited Austria to another European Congress. This course of the 
 emperor seemed to be so reasonable that it met at once with the 
 support of Prussia, Russia, and England. Austria was now iso- 
 lated : — the head and front of the former Holy Alliance was in a 
 minority of one in the Council of the Five Great Powers of Eu- 
 rope. Sardinia completed the fortifications of Alessandria and 
 Cassale, raised her army to 100,000 men, and commissioned Gari- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 105 
 
 baldi as General of the " Hunters of the Alps." England pre- 
 pared to send Lord Cowley on a special mission to Vienna. 
 
 All European diplomatists now agree that a European Con- 
 gress, if it had met, would have decided against Austria ; and it 
 is also probable that with the withdrawal of the Austrian garrisons 
 from Ancona, Ferrara, Piacenza, and Pavia, and with the abroga- 
 tion of the Austrian treaties with the Duchies and with Naples, 
 peace, for a time, would have been preserved. Piedmont alone 
 could not have gone to war ; she could not, under any circum- 
 stances, act otherwise than on the defensive. Neither would she 
 have had a just cause for war. Her chief complaint against Aus- 
 tria was that the military attitude of that Power was constantly 
 threatening the smaller States of Italy — that there was no safety 
 anywhere in Italy as long as the Austrian garrisons, in the numer- 
 ous fortified places she occupied, were alone sufficient to overpower 
 the standing armies of all the other Italian sovereigns. Those garri- 
 sons amounted, in the aggregate, to more than a hundred thousand 
 men ; and the peace-establishments of all the other Italian States, 
 taken together, were no match for such a host. Austria, very 
 naturally, was satisfied with things as they were. She held 
 the fate of the Peninsula in the palm of her hand, and she knew 
 that any change of position, attempted by the Italian States alone, 
 was worse than useless. Austrian statesmen and generals alike 
 ridiculed the pretensions of Piedmont ; the other Italian States 
 were either vassals or allies of Austria. If Austria submit the 
 situation of Italy to an European Congress, she admitted that there 
 was something wrong in it which required to be made right — and 
 who could have committed that wrong, who could be made an- 
 swerable for it, but Austria, who had directly or indirectly gov- 
 erned Italy for the last forty-four years ? Austria foresaw that the 
 Congress would recommend the abrogation of the special "treaties 
 she had concluded with the smaller States ; that it might recom- 
 mend other reforms if urged by France, and that, if she refused, 
 she exposed herself to a coalition. The Emperor Francis Joseph 
 therefore, in the most positive manner, declined the proposition of 
 
10G THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 a Congress made by France, and still further increased bis army 
 in Italy. 
 
 Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna, it was soon ascertained, was 
 a failure. Austria, relying on the strength of her army in Lom- 
 bardy and Venetia, would not listen to any proposition from Eng- 
 land unless it was accompanied by a guarantee that, if accepted, it 
 would be maintained by the aid of British Power. Lord Cowley 
 had no instructions to commit his government thus far, and while 
 negotiations were pending, Russia renewed the proposition to sub- 
 mit the Italian question to an European Congress. This new pro- 
 position, coming from Russia, was far more embarrassing to Austria 
 than that of France. It was now evident that she must submit to 
 a Congress, or go to war without an ally, and with public opinion 
 enlisted in favor of Italy. Why she did not at once march her 
 troops into Sardinia, is still an unexplained mystery. To make the 
 matter worse, it was now ascertained that there was a disposition 
 on the part of Russia — perhaps also of Prussia — to propose an 
 European Congress without Austria. The intimation came un- 
 doubtedly first from St. Petersburg, and it was a service rendered 
 to France and Italy which will not easily be forgotten. It was 
 now very plain that Austria had no alternative but the sword, and 
 she was resolved to draw it. 
 
 The Emperor Napoleon had long since foreseen that his adver- 
 sary would prefer war to negotiation, without a reliable ally on 
 his side. He knew that the Emperor Francis Joseph was a young 
 man, proud and chivalrous in his bearing, absolute and uncontrol- 
 able in his temper as all the Princes of the House of Habsburg, 
 brave and daring as the young army he and Feldzeugmeister Hess 
 had raised at an expense of nearly a thousand millions of florins, 
 and strong in his conceit that that army was invincible. He also 
 knew that Prince Metternich, who had built up the Austro-Italian 
 policy during the long period of forty-five years, though retired 
 from public life, was still all-powerful, not only with the Emperor, 
 but with the whole Austrian court, and as much the prompter of 
 Count Buol Schauenstein, the then minister of foreign affairs, as 
 in 1845, when the latter, as minister to Turin, was acting under his 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 107 
 
 instructions. The Emperor of Austria could not send a Plenipo- 
 tentiary to the proposed Congress, and allow England, Russia, 
 France and Prussia to sit in judgment on his acts and those of his 
 predecessors, without surrendering his power and ceasing to be the 
 umpire of Italy. And the Austrian " officious" and semi-official press 
 farther proclaimed that the Emperor would never submit the rights 
 he had acquired by treaties, to the arbitration of the Five Powers ; 
 and that he could still less descend to have his Plenipotentiary occupy 
 a seat by the side of the minister from Sardinia, whose King, after 
 the battle of Novara, held his crown only by his forbearance and 
 generosity. Austria, in a Congress, might have had some hope of 
 England ; but the mission of Lord Cowley had not increased her 
 confidence in that Power, and she expected nothing from the rivalry 
 of Prussia, or the ill-disguised enmity of Russia. The proposition 
 to admit the smaller Italian States was equally ohjectionable ; be- 
 cause they could only be summoned as witnesses, not as voters on 
 the questions submitted to the Congress. 
 
 While these negotiations for a Congress were going on, without 
 either party knowing its precise object, or the Powers that were to 
 be represented at its deliberations, the winter drew to its close and, 
 with it, the chances of surprising Piedmont. Austria had two hun- 
 dred thousand troops in Italy, France as yet not one man, and the 
 fortifications of Alessandria and Cassale — the only ones that could 
 shelter the Piedmontese army till assistance arrived from France — 
 were still requiring improvements to withstand a siege. The mili- 
 tary position of Austria was too tempting, the diplomatic prospects 
 almost hopeless. At this crisis, the war party at Vienna triumphed : 
 Piedmont was summoned to disarm within three days, or take the 
 consequences of a refusal.* To comply with this summons was 
 physically impossible : Had Victor Emanuel II. been a Neapolitan 
 diplomatist, he might have issued the required order to his army, 
 with a secret injunction to the commanding General, not to execute 
 it ;. but such a diplomatic subterfuge never entered the mind of the 
 
 * Austria previously proposed that Piedmont should disarm on condition of 
 being represented at the Congress; but the proposition was rejected as unfair; 
 Piedmont being the smaller Power and, from her weakness, naturally exposed 
 to invasion. 
 
108 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 royal soldier ; if it had, he would have lost all the prestige his name 
 had acquired in Italy. With the spirit which pervaded the army, 
 the volunteers and the people of Piedmont, it is highly probable 
 that submission to Austria, at that period, would have lost him his 
 throne, if not his life. Piedmont, therefore, instead of obeying the 
 summons, called upon France for assistance. 
 
 Thus far, the immediate provocations to a war seemed to have 
 come from Piedmont ; but by the last unfortunate move of Aus- 
 tria, the latter appeared to act as the aggressor, and, by declin- 
 ing the propositions of the other Powers, to forfeit all claims to 
 their support. England, in her over zeal for peace (a zeal which 
 had ruined the cause of Italy in 1848 and 1849,) Prussia, in the 
 hope of avoiding all responsibility, protested against these proceed- 
 ings ; while Russia, not without visible satisfaction, considered her- 
 self absolved from all further obligation toward an ungrateful 
 former ally. England now tried what she could do by herself. She 
 sent a special messenger, with fresh propositions of peace, into 
 the Austrian camp ; but effected nothing but an otherwise unac- 
 countable delay in the advance of the Austrian army. This last 
 act of England, undoubtedly well intended, exasperated the Aus- 
 trians. As a diplomatic move, it was hopeless ; in a military point 
 of view, its effect was disastrous to the result of the campaign. 
 It prevented the Austrians from reaching Turin, before the French 
 were in position to oppose them. The Piedmontese hardly ex- 
 pected to save their capital ; and had already began to remove the 
 archives and other public property to Genoa. In less than three 
 days, however, after the Austrian summons to Piedmont had been 
 telegraphed to Paris, the French Liberating Army was crossing the 
 Alps ; General Niel, one of the best military engineers of France, 
 had previously been dispatched to Alessandria, to inspect and 
 strengthen that important fortress. The war had commenced, and 
 Austria was waging it — alone. 
 
 The great object of the Emperor Napoleon had been to isolate 
 Austria, and in that he was completely successful. Neither Eng- 
 land nor Prussia had now any other object than to confine the war 
 to Italy ; the smaller German States, though partly sympathizing 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 109 
 
 with Austria, had no means of making themselves felt as European 
 Powers. The war was regarded as a match between two great 
 military nations (France and Austria) and it was expected that 
 both would be punished in the contest, without establishing the 
 preponderance of either. Austria held the strategical position of 
 Upper Italy with all the principal fortresses ;. France had the best 
 appointed army, with the most dashing spirit of chivalry ; no one 
 supposed that the people of Italy, crushed as they had been by the 
 tragic termination of so many previous revolutions, would take a 
 very active part in the struggle. The assistance derived from the 
 Free Corps, under Garibaldi and other popular leaders, were, 
 neither by the Austrians nor by the French, set down for aught in 
 the contest. We know what Wellington thought of the Spanish 
 guerrillas and their leaders during the Peninsular war ; but the 
 French ought to have judged Garibaldi differently. They might 
 have known that, when defending Rome, after having conquered 
 16,000 Neapolitans led by their own King, he compelled 20,000 
 Frenchmen under General Oudinot to lay siege to a simple walled 
 town, and that he had driven them out of bastion No. 8 of that 
 town, after they had taken it at the point of the bayonet. We 
 say these things not to the discredit of the French, whose chival- 
 rous bearing and martial spirit are matters of history ; but simply 
 in honor of Garibaldi, whose military genius and bravery were 
 as conspicuous then, as they have been since the commencement 
 of the last war ; though they were far less admired and rewarded. 
 
 While Europe was quietly looking on the progress of the belli- 
 gerents, every pen which Austria could command was put in 
 requisition, to describe the act of the Emperor Napoleon as a 
 wanton outrage against the peace of the world. The Derby min- 
 istry of England, whose sincere desire to preserve peace, cannot 
 for a moment be doubted, was accused of siding with Austria ; 
 while public opinion in Englandj though sympathizing with Italy, 
 pronounced in favor of strict neutrality.* Yet England was appre- 
 
 * The German journalists and pamphleteers in the Austrian interest, abounded 
 in vulgar abuse and grotesque nonsense with regard to the conduct of England. 
 Nothing would satisfy them but a British declaration of war against France, and 
 
 10 
 
110 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 hensive and arming. She bad increased her Channel fleet, strength- 
 ened the garrisons and fortifications of Gibraltar, Malta and Corfu, 
 and increased her squadron in the Mediterranean. What did all 
 this mean ? Surely not to advance the cause of Italy. Surely not to 
 intimidate Austria or to protect Turkey. The attitude of Great Bri- 
 tain was a demonstration against France ! It was an injunction on 
 French victory, should the arms of France be carried beyond a cer- 
 tain point. To that extent the British government, in spite of the 
 Italian sympathies of the people of England, opposed the cause of 
 Italy. England, as far as Austria was concerned, acted as her 
 second in a German student's duel ; allowing her to be wounded, 
 but not to be mortally hurt. " Austria," said the old Tory states- 
 men of England, " is necessary to the balance of power in Europe, 
 and as a check upon Russia." 
 
 The attitude of Prussia was peculiar, and can only be explained 
 by her rivalry with Austria, and the attempt of the smaller Ger- 
 man States in the interest of the latter Power, to resist Prussian 
 hegemony. Austria, from the time her minister, Baron Hubner, 
 
 a great naval fight ending in the destruction of the French fleet in the Mediterra- 
 nean. England, which seems to have grown tired of hiring or subsidizing German 
 troops and Princes, was represented as the "Spice-Island," the " Cotton-Cobden 
 England," the " shopkeeper's country, which will not fight except for some 
 American cotton bags, or a sack of pepper dropped into the Adriatic." The 
 spirit of William III., of Chatham and Pitt had fled from Albion ; nothing~was 
 left but the spirit of the Pelhams, Addingtons and Aberdeens, and the agitator 
 Palmerston ! By such eloquent appeals did the Austrian press attempt to change 
 the resolution of the British statesmen of the present day. Not improperly could 
 the London Post refer to the Diet of Frankfort as the "toyshop of the infant 
 political mind of Germany." The insulting language applied to the Emperor 
 Napoleon, was even more ridiculous and absurd, on the part of journals par- 
 taking more or less of an official character, and which, but a few years previous, 
 had hailed Napoleon III. as a special Providence to whom the world was in- 
 debted as the " Savior of European Society." Even the United States, though 
 at a considerable distance from the scenes about to be enacted, were raked by the 
 terrible fire of this literary artillery. § It was the "Star-spangled Banner — 
 the historical symbol of revolution — which set the example of low, commercial 
 egotism, and was now corrupting the once high-minded and far-sighted states- 
 manship of Great Britain. The lofty character of the British Parliament was 
 running a degrading race with the selfish vulgarity of the American Congress." 
 Sic! 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. Ill 
 
 had been snubbed in Paris, was using all the arts of her experienced 
 Diplomacy to secure the cooperation of the smaller States of Ger- 
 many, in the approaching contest with France. She represented, 
 through her press and through some of the leading journals of 
 Germany, among which the Jlugsburg Gazette figured most 
 conspicuously, that nothing less than the conquest of the left bank 
 of the Rhine was the immediate object of the French Emperor — 
 that she, as a German Power (Austria always is a German Power 
 when she is attacked by France), was defending the shores of the 
 Rhine on the Po, and that she had, consequently, a right to ex- 
 pect that the Germans would defend the Po on the Rhine. She 
 was now glittering in arms to defend German honor and the in- 
 tegrity of the Germanic Confederation, against the Power she 
 had fought (by the aid of British subsidies) for nearly a quarter 
 of a century, with such varied success ! And she was this time 
 entering the arena without a penny from England (ungrateful Al- 
 bion !) and a bankrupt treasury of her own. If she were defeated, 
 then the bulwarks of Germany against France, the veteran army 
 of Austria, would be destroyed, and no other standard bearer left 
 in Germany but feeble Prussia, whose fate in 1806, after Austria 
 had been defeated in 1805, should be a warning to all Germany. 
 If Austria lost another Austerlitz, Prussia was sure to lose an- 
 other Jena, and the result would be the humiliation of the common 
 Fatherland. 
 
 This argument was specious and plausible, and had an immense 
 effect on the German mind. It was the text of ten thousand 
 political sermons, preached in the press and the pulpit, (perhaps 
 the confessional,) and its effect was irresistible. Never, since 
 1813, had there been such a national uprising in Germany. The 
 dreamiest and drowsiest of the Teutons now became suddenly con- 
 vulsed with the desire of immediate action. Artisans left their work- 
 shops, learned men their professions, students the universities, to 
 enlist in the army. " Germany must be defended against the 
 ambitious designs of the French Emperor." — " She must not be 
 degraded as she was from 1805 till 1814" — " not an acre of Ger- 
 man territory must be surrendered ; nay, more, Alsace and Lor- 
 
112 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 raine must be given up by France, because she ought not to have 
 retained them in 1814, when Germany had a right to claim what 
 had once been her own." Such was the language of the German 
 Princes and the people. But there were three parties to this 
 public manifestation of revived national sentiment. One party 
 was that of the princes and nobles in the interest of Austria ; the 
 other, that of the partisans of constitutional liberty, comprising 
 principally the commercial and industrial classes attached to 
 Prussia, and there were yet the utopists of Germany who, like 
 their brethren in France and Italy, cherished the idea of the " one 
 and indivisible Republic." This latter class of enthusiasts, though 
 extremely small and without an organ to speak its sentiments, gave 
 the smaller princes of Germany the most concern. It showed the 
 danger of agitation to their own persons ; for while, if the Aus- 
 trian or Prussian party succeeded, they were threatened with ab- 
 sorption by the larger States, they were, if the Republicans tri- 
 umphed, altogether expelled and exiled from their hereditary posses- 
 sions. The smaller princes of Germany, therefore, took ground 
 either for Prussia or Austria ; all of them comprehending the im- 
 possibility, in case of a war with France, to pursue any other 
 policy than that of submitting to one or the other of these Powers. 
 Thus, the mere prospect of a war with France did that for 
 Germany, which the German Parliament of 1848 in vain en- 
 deavored to accomplish : — it wholly united the people of all the 
 States as against any foreign country, and it produced the con- 
 viction in the minds of the German princes, that it was impossible 
 for them hereafter to exercise separate sovereign power in a na- 
 tional struggle. The only question which remained was this : — 
 Shall Germany be sunk into Austria, or into Prussia ; or, which is 
 the same thing, shall the future ruler of Germany be a Habs- 
 burger or a Hohenzollern ? The Germans had taken an immense 
 step toward national organization, and they had taken it without 
 any previous concert among themselves. It was the energetic ex- 
 pression of the resolution of a whole people, including every class 
 of society, to maintain its nationality, as the only means of de- 
 fence against invasion and foreign conquest. France, in preparing 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 113 
 
 for war in Italy, had roused the national sentiment of twenty-six 
 millions of Italians in her favor ; but she had, at the same time, 
 united forty-five millions of Germans, with an organized army of 
 half a million of men. This was an element of opposition which 
 the Emperor Napoleon had to take into account, lest the war 
 might " assume proportions incommensurate with the interests of 
 France." 
 
 The Prussian party in Germany, from its aversion to the abso- 
 lutist principles of the House of Habsburg — perhaps from a de- 
 sire to see Austria humbled, was not altogether displeased with 
 the war in Italy : and it is quite certain that this feeling was 
 shared by at least some of the members of the Cabinet of Berlin. 
 There were Germans who would not have regretted to see Austria 
 lose every foot of ground in Italy, and Hungary to boot ; because, 
 with such a diminution of her territory, and the loss of Austrian 
 prestige which must have followed it, the dualism of Germany 
 would disappear, and the supremacy of Prussia established, with- 
 out a contest, as the natural result of political gravitation. A 
 Germanic Empire, with the King of Prussia at its head, was then 
 possible, and the suppression or mediatization of the smaller princes 
 an unavoidable conclusion. To that extent, but no further, did 
 the Prussian party sympathize with Italy. If Napoleon III. went 
 a step further — if, after driving the Austrians out of Italy, or as 
 a means of accomplishing that end, he attacked any of the German 
 provinces of Austria, the case was reversed. Then Prussia, with 
 all the smaller German States, must have taken the field to pro- 
 tect the territorial integrity of the Germanic Confederation against 
 insult or conquest. The attitude of Prussia, therefore, like that 
 of England, though not absolutely hostile to France, and not 
 improving the position of the Austrians in Italy, was, neverthe- 
 less, an injunction on French conquest. 
 10* 
 
114 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE SITUATION OF GERMANY DURING THE WAR. THE ARMY OF 
 THE CONFEDERATION IS PUT ON THE WAR FOOTING. INDUCE- 
 MENTS TO PEACE. 
 
 At the commencement of the war, and even as early as January, 
 1859, the Emperor Napoleon, through his ministers at the differ- 
 ent German courts, and through the columns of the Moniteur, 
 gave the Germans the most earnest assurances of his peaceable 
 intentions in regard to them ; but these assurances were received 
 with great distrust, and were purposely discredited by Austria 
 and her agents. The Emperor of the French took every possible 
 care not to rouse the warlike enthusiasm of the Germans ; but all 
 his endeavors in that direction proved fruitless. " If," said the 
 presses in the Austrian interest, " the Emperor Napoleon is really 
 disinterested in Italy, as he says in his proclamation, it is because 
 he intends to make Germany pay the expenses of the war. If he 
 wants no Italian province to be annexed to France, it is because 
 he prefers the left bank of the Rhine, with the fortress of Mentz, 
 which the elder Napoleon considered as one of the keys to his 
 empire. If he succeeds, the line of military defence on our fron- 
 tier is changed, the Germanic Confederation dismembered." 
 These arguments were substantially the same which had been 
 employed in 1840, when Alphonse Thiers (on the occasion of the 
 bombardment of St. Jean d? Acre) declared that " France must 
 seek to regain on the Rhine the influence she lost in the East," 
 only that being in this case employed against a real Napoleon, 
 they produced an incredibly greater effect, than when used against 
 the poetical fiction of the " Napoleon of Peace." 
 
 Neither was the progress of the war calculated to appease Ger- 
 many. After the Austrians had failed to take Turin, all military 
 men of note predicted an unfortunate campaign for Austria ; but 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 115 
 
 when the Austrians were beaten on the banks of the Sesia — when 
 Garibaldi, followed by the corps of General Cialdini, had turned 
 the right wing of the Austrians — -when the Lomelina was evacu- 
 ated, and the battle of Magenta won by the French, a perfect 
 panic seemed to seize upon the Germans. The cry now was, 
 " Austria is beaten too fast. The victories of his army, which 
 follow each other in rapid succession, will embolden Napoleon ; and 
 if he ever coveted the left bank of the Rhine, his success in Italy 
 will encourage him to attempt this new conquest." Some of the 
 German Princes considered themselves already conquered, others 
 conceived themselves threatened with revolution : all of them 
 dreaded, alternately, the Gallic Caesar and their own people. Then 
 it was that the different States of Germany, after contracting heavy 
 loans, which were cheerfully voted by the Chambers, put their 
 respective armies on the war footing. The little kingdom of Ba- 
 varia alone furnished 115,000 men, Wurtemberg some 36,000, 
 Baden 20,000, Hanover 30,000, Nassau 6,000, &c, Prussia mob- 
 ilized six entire corps gP armze, something like 240,000 men, to 
 which were subsequently added three more corps, amounting to 
 an additional force of 100,000 men. The federal army could, 
 no doubt, have been made to exceed largely half a million of 
 men. Nothing was wanting but the money to pay and support 
 them in their own country. 
 
 But the army of the Germanic Confederation was not united in 
 spirit, and the different States which had contributed to its forma- 
 tion, were not on the best terms with each other. The Kings of 
 Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg and Hanover were in close league 
 with Austria ; the other Northern Protestant States of Germany 
 generally sided with Prussia, and, satisfied with Prussian protec- 
 tion, exhibited less of a warlike temper. Prussia, it is believed, 
 armed as much to preserve her position in Germany, as to repel a 
 French invasion. It is indeed very doubtful whether the new 
 ministry, which the Prince Regent of Prussia had summoned to 
 his aid, really apprehended a French invasion at all ; but a large 
 number of Germans believed in it, and the Austrian press would 
 not be satisfied with anything short of the actual march of the 
 
116 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 federal army on Paris. The pressure of public opinion, not in 
 Prussia, but in the smaller German States, and especially in 33a- 
 varia and AVurtemberg, at last induced the Cabinet of Berlin to 
 declare officially, that she was arming to defend, with her whole 
 power, the entire Germanic Confederation, in which the German 
 provinces of Austria, the Tyrol, and Illyria with the port 
 of Trieste, were necessarily included.* On this point, however, 
 Prussia had no choice, if she considered the act of confederation 
 (which included these provinces) as binding upon her. By the 
 terms of that act, the Confederation was obliged to declare war if 
 any of those provinces were attacked by a foreign enemy ; and 
 Prussia, therefore, only reiterated what she had already solemnly 
 promised in 1814. The act of confederation also stipulates that 
 after war is once declared by the Confederation, none of its mem- 
 bers shall have the right to conclude peace except with the unan- 
 imous assent and simultaneous act (of peace) of all the others. 
 But the Confederation, as such, had already once been broken up 
 in 1848, and although subsequently reestablished, was only looked 
 upon as a loose, temporary arrangement. The official declaration 
 of the Cabinet of Berlin, therefore, was necessary to prove that 
 Prussia still adhered to the federal compact ; but it did not satisfy 
 the court of Vienna. An advancing French or Russian army 
 might compel a separate peace, and a special treaty with a foreign 
 Power might secure impunity to a recusant member. Austria had 
 no faith in treaties, except between a greater and a smaller Power, 
 where the former had the means of enforcing compliance with its 
 terms. What the Emperor of Austria wanted from Prussia was 
 simultaneous action — a war on the Rhine, while he was fighting 
 on the Ticino, the Po, and the Mincio — not promises what Prussia 
 would do in a certain contingency which might never arise. On the 
 other hand, M. von Schleinitz, the Prussian Secretary of State 
 (successor to Baron Manteuffel) insisted that the question of 
 Italy did not concern Germany, and could not legitimately be 
 brought before the Federal Diet. Italy concerned Austria as a 
 
 * See note to page 19. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 117 
 
 European Power, not as a member of the Confederacy ; and Prus- 
 sia must, in regard to it, also act as an European Power. Her 
 proper course was to have a friendly understanding with England, 
 and avoid being isolated, as Austria was. When Prussia, in spite 
 of the special mission of the Arch Duke Albert to Berlin, could not 
 be moved from her position, Austria applied to Bavaria, Wurtem- 
 berg, Hanover and Saxony, to take the initiative and to compel 
 Prussia either to follow the popular movement, or, by remaining 
 inactive, to lose her prestige in Germany. This last move of the 
 diplomacy of Vienna had its effect. Prussia armed as if for a 
 general war, and pointed with pride to the completeness of her 
 army ; while some of the smaller States, which had been loudest 
 in the cry for war, had not even completed the clothing of their 
 troops ! 
 
 The army of Prussia gave a fearful momentum to the popular 
 enthusiasm in Germany, and excited the military emulation of the 
 other States. The year 1813 seemed to have come back with all 
 its terrible historical recollections, which the repeated blows, struck 
 by the French army in Italy, only served to render more glaring 
 and effective. The different political parties tried to excel each 
 other in their denunciation of the French Emperor and his " thirst 
 for conquest." The reactionary party hoped everything from the 
 success of Austria ; the liberal party relied on the embarrassment 
 of the Princes, which they hoped to turn to good account. What- 
 ever part the latter may have had in stimulating the enthusiasm 
 of their subjects, it was now quite plain that they could no longer 
 control it : — they scarcely seemed to have another choice than be- 
 tween an aggressive movement against France, or a revolution. Be- 
 sides, how were half a million of soldiers, of whom more than one 
 half were Landwehr* taken away from their agricultural and indu- 
 strial pursuits and quartered upon the people, to maintain discipline 
 without military occupation 1 The thing was impossible ; the at- 
 tempt, involving an expenditure far exceeding the financial resources 
 
 * Soldiers who have served their time in the regular army ; hut who are still 
 liahle to be called out in time of war. They constitute the great corps de 
 renerre of the Prussian army. 
 
118 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of Germany. " The army must be led into France," cried the ora- 
 tors in the German Chambers ; " lead us into France !" echoed the 
 troops in the barracks and encampments. The Emperor Napoleon 
 had done nothing to provoke this feeling in Germany. Though 
 compelled to organize an army of observation, to watch the move- 
 ments of Prussia and the other German States, he had removed 
 the head-quarters of that army to Chalons in Champagne — at a 
 considerable distance from the Rhine, while the fortresses of 
 Strasbourg and Metz, between which and the German frontier 
 cities the transit was never interrupted, were almost entirely un- 
 garnished of troops. Napoleon knew too well that two great 
 armies, filled with hostile sentiments against each other, could not, 
 for any length of time, be in sight of each other, without creating 
 the occasion for war, and he was determined not to provoke it. 
 
 The situation had now become extremely difficult, and war, if 
 the campaign in Italy continued, was inevitable. Was the German 
 confederate army to be idle on the Rhine, and exhaust the re- 
 sources of the country, till Austria was completely prostrate — till 
 she was driven from her strongholds in Lombardy and Venetia — 
 till Verona and Mantua received French and Piedmontese garri- 
 sons, till the army of Francis Joseph was retreating through the 
 Tyrol to defend the Austrian capital 1 Were half a million of 
 Germans to ground arms till the victorious French army, led by 
 the Emperor Napoleon himself, recrossed the Alps, or were they 
 to strike while the best French troops were yet engaged in the 
 plains of Italy? Were they to wait for the destruction of the 
 Austrian army, or save that army by an aggressive movement 
 which would oblige the French Emperor to divide his forces ? 
 There was but one answer to these questions, and no one antici- 
 pated it more shrewdly and correctly than Napoleon himself. He 
 spoke the naked truth, from the fulness of his heart and mind, 
 when he assured his army that the war threatened " to assume 
 proportions, no longer commensurate with the interests of France." 
 
 About that time, there appeared, in Germany, an anonymous 
 pamphlet " Po and Rhine," evidently written by a superior officer, 
 which treated the question of war in a purely military, passionless 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 119 
 
 way, and for that very reason produced a most profound impres- 
 sion. It was, in a measure, refuting the proposition that the Po 
 must be defended on the Rhine, and vice versa; but the argument 
 on that point was not conclusive ; because it merely proved that if 
 the Po were lost, Bavaria would still be a sufficient bulwark against 
 an army that might attempt to attack the Southern frontier of 
 Germany, and that the Rhine could be defended without occupy- 
 ing a position in Italy. But it showed that the left bank of the 
 Rhine was indispensable to the military security of France, whose 
 frontier, by the loss of Mayence became indented, and that France, 
 therefore, must naturally covet its possession. The Northern and 
 North Eastern frontiers of France, the author argued, offer no 
 military line of defence ; because the triple line of French fortresses 
 on the Belgian frontier, built by Vauban, do not occupy positions 
 which could not now be easily turned ; they do not support each 
 other and, in their present condition, are incapable of resisting the 
 effect of modern siege artillery. France recognized that weakness 
 at an early day, and, for the purpose of remedying it, turned her 
 capital into an immense fortress, behind which, with all the avail- 
 able resources of her rich Southern provinces, she may bid defiance 
 to a foreign invader. The French, says our author, have done 
 right in fortifying Paris — a place which can neither be enclosed 
 nor turned by the largest army Europe has as yet marshaled in 
 the field, and before which there may be fought a dozen battles, 
 any one of which, if unfortunate to the assailants, might involve 
 their destruction. It would not be so with a retreating French 
 army, which would always find quarters, protection and reinforce- 
 ments under the guns of the capital. The French army, moving 
 in a smaller circle round the capital, and aided in this respect by 
 three concentric railways, could always select its point of attack, 
 and meet the enemy when at a greater distance from his supports ; 
 while an attack on a particular position of the French, would 
 always be resisted by combined forces, and, if need be, by the whole 
 population of Paris. These arguments, however, only proved that 
 France was already strong in a war of defence against Germany, 
 and the conclusion was irresistible that she must not be allowed to 
 
120 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 increase her aggressive power by acquiring a fortress on the Rhine, 
 where she was now weak. Instead of dampening the warlike ardor 
 of the Germans, it only served to increase it. As the troops of 
 "Wurteniberg and Baden were being drilled and inspected, symp- 
 toms of insubordination began to manifest themselves, and it is a 
 fact, though it did not appear in print, that the troops demanded 
 to be led against France, instead of making " a show on parade, 
 while their Austrian brethren were slain and sacrificed on the plains 
 of Lombardy." The question of war absorbed every other thought 
 in Germany. Sensible men expected that the new German levies 
 would be beaten by the French ; but they relied, as in 1813, on the 
 recuperativeness of their countrymen. That the Prince Regent of 
 Prussia, up to the battle of Solferino, was able to maintain not only 
 perfect discipline in his army, but also the entire confidence of the 
 people, though the nobility, without reserve or stint, openly es- 
 poused the cause of Austria, showed the strength his government 
 had acquired in the few short months of his reign, during which 
 the Constitution was faithfully observed, and the laws honestly 
 executed, in the spirit in which they were enacted. But would he 
 have been able to remain master of the situation if the war had 
 continued much longer ? Could he have restrained u his people in 
 arms"* if Yerona and Mantua had fallen ? And what, if the 
 French, after laying siege to Verona and Mantua, met with a re- 
 verse 1 ? Would not a victory achieved by Austria have brought 
 things in Germany to a crisis, and carried armies and Princes irre- 
 sistibly along with her ? As the war approached those Austrian 
 provinces which make part of the Germanic Confederation, the 
 danger of a struggle in which all Germany must be engaged be- 
 came imminent. The people of Southern Tyrol, from Bolzano and 
 Trent down, are Italian. They sympathized now, as in 1848 — 49, 
 with Italy. They are, moreover, as the inhabitants of the Veltlin, 
 which was once a part of Switzerland, a brave and warlike people, 
 who, in a national cause, cannot easily be restrained. The Veltlin 
 had risen against the Austrians, and the South Tyrolians were on 
 
 * This is the expression which the King of Prussia used iu referring to his 
 subjects. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 121 
 
 the point of rising. How could the Emperor Napoleon have pre- 
 vented one or the other of the Italian Free Corps from coming to 
 the rescue of the insurgents ? And would not this have consti- 
 tuted a case of war, according to the text of the Germanic Confede- 
 ration which we have just quoted ? And could Prussia then pause 
 without incurring the charge of treason against the Confederation % 
 
 The position which the Emperor Napoleon occupied before 
 Verona resolved itself to this : — That fortress, or rather for- 
 tified camp, which can shelter an army of from 50,000 to 100,000 
 men, and from whose many gates 25,000 troops may debouch in half 
 an hour, is so situated at the foot of the mountains that it may re- 
 ceive constant reinforcements and supplies by the fortified military 
 roads of Tyrol ; while the fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera and Leg- 
 nano which mutually support each other, would give to an army 
 in the field the faculty of resisting double the number of the enemy ; 
 taking either Verona or Mantua for the basis of its operation ; and 
 acting either on the defensive or offensively in the direction of 
 Venice or Milan.* Even if Peschiera and Mantua had fallen, an 
 Austrian army in Verona was safe as long as it maintained its con- 
 nection with the Tyrol, which the French and Piedmontese must 
 not attack, on pain of having half a million of Federal German 
 troops cross the Rhine. All the passes of the Tyrol, by which an 
 army might debouch into Lombardy and turn the French and 
 Piedmontese flank, were in the hands of the Austrians; but the 
 French must be content with waiting for them as they descend into 
 the plains, lest the combined resources of the Germanic Confedera- 
 tion are employed against them in the direction of Paris. What 
 general, under such circumstances and with such restraints on his 
 military operations, would have undertaken the siege of four such 
 fortresses as Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and Legnano ? And was 
 it not military foresight, in the Emperor Napoleon, when he told his 
 troops that the further prosecution of the war involved " propor- 
 tions incommensurate with the immediate interests of France ?" 
 
 Nor was this all, an inuendo was thrown out, first in diplomatic 
 
 * Compare the Sardinian campaign of 1848, page 82. 
 11 
 
122 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and court circles, but soon repeated in ordinary conversations, and 
 at last circulated by the press, that a secret understanding existed 
 between the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Emperor Napoleon, 
 by which it was agreed that Prussia should not come to the assist- 
 ance of Austria during the Italian war } in return for which Prussia 
 was to take possession of Hanover, which she always coveted, and 
 of Saxony, which she demanded at the Congress of Vienna ; and 
 these possessions should be guarantied to her by France. There 
 was even a talk of further Prussian acquisitions, with the river Main 
 as the future frontier of that country. By these means, Prussia was to 
 be made the preponderating Power in Germany, in the same manner 
 that Piedmont w T as to be made the preponderating Power in Italy. 
 Of course, these insinuations were thrown out with great caution, 
 and always accompanied by the reservation that they were mere 
 rumors wdiich nobody believed : the character of the Prince of 
 Prussia being the best guarantee that such an act of " treachery to 
 the Confederation" was not only never contemplated by him ; but 
 that his patriotic heart would indignantly reject such overtures if 
 they were ever made, or contemplated to be made, by the French 
 Emperor. The Austrian press, and even the affiliated Augsburg 
 Gazette, stoutly asserted that there was nothing in the conduct of 
 Prussia " as yet" to give the least color of truth to the report ; 
 much less any ground for suspecting the sincerity of the Regent. 
 Yet these very defences of Prussia helped to spread the report, and 
 excited suspicion in the minds of those Princes whose States were 
 to be so unceremoniously disposed of; while their subjects were, 
 perhaps, less inclined to disbelieve it because they wished it to be 
 true. The new government of Prussia had revived the consti- 
 tutional system and given it the form, if not the substance, of a 
 liberal government. The example of the Prince Regent struck 
 terror into the small Princes, who had either infringed on the terms 
 of the Constitutions of their States, or suspended their lawful opera- 
 tion altogether, as was the case in Hanover and Hesse Cassel. 
 He was now stigmatized as an agitator — another Victor Emanuel, 
 whose sole object in professing liberal principles was the increase 
 of his power at the expense of his neighbors, and the humiliation 
 
ON TITE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 1*23 
 
 of Austria, as a means of establishing the supremacy of Prussia in 
 Germany. 
 
 It required much tact, much character, and a good deal of for- 
 bearance, on the part of the Regent of Prussia, to give a practical 
 and yet unspoken denial to these charges by his acts. Prussia, 
 true to the policy of the great Frederic, and to her indisputable 
 mission, must undoubtedly endeavor to acquire the basis of a great 
 Power, if she would continue to discharge the obligations of one; 
 and it is equally true that the foundation of a great Power does 
 not merely consist in moral elements and their skilful combination, 
 but also in the necessary extent of territory, and in material means. 
 How delicate, then, was the position of Prussia — how difficult the 
 task of maintaining her ascendency among such conflicting interests, 
 and almost in sight of the enemy's camp ! As a Frenchman, the 
 Emperor Napoleon could not regret the growing alienation be- 
 tween the Prussian and Austrian parties in Germany : as a states- 
 man he must have rather nourished than counteracted them. But 
 what more effectual means could be employed to force them to be- 
 come friends, than to continue the war against Austria 1 Peace, in 
 Italy, was certain to continue the feud in Germany ; for as matters 
 then stood, it was only on a common battle-field, in view of a com- 
 mon danger, from a common enemy, that the Emperor of Austria 
 could have been cordially reconciled to the Regent of Prussia. Was 
 it then not wise in the Emperor Napoleon, not to allow the war 
 to assume "proportions no longer compatible with the interests of 
 France ?" 
 
 Again, suppose the French, after an immense sacrifice of blood, 
 had succeeded in forcing the celebrated quadrangle — suppose they 
 had taken Venice and the whole province of Yenetia, and that the 
 Austrian army had, in tolerably good order, (as they have always 
 done) retreated into the Tyrol; would the war then have ended? 
 Assuredly not. Could not the Emperor of Austria, from his for- 
 tresses in the Tyrol, have invited the French to follow him; know- 
 ing that the first French footprint on Tyrolese soil would bring 
 500,000 Germans to his aid 1 And was the possession of Lom- 
 bardy and Venice, by the French and Piedmontese, secure as long 
 
124 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 as there was an Austrian army in the Tyrol, and a Bavarian one 
 ready to cooperate with it, ready at any time, to descend, through 
 the mountain passes, upon Brescia, Milan and Verona % Was it 
 not more prudent, then, and in the end more beneficial to Italy her- 
 self, that the German army on the Rhine should be disbanded (as it 
 now is) than that further conquests should be attempted which, if 
 successful could not be maintained except by a general war, and if 
 frustrated, might involve all that had previously been gained 1 ? 
 
 We now come to another important consideration, and that is, 
 how would the continuation of the war have affected Russia ? We 
 have seen that Russia, ever since the Crimean war, has been on 
 excellent terms with France ; though this seems rather to be the 
 result of position, than of any personal predilection of either of the 
 two Emperors for the other. There is a natural gravitation of 
 Russia and France toward each other, based on material interests, 
 and on the maritime position of the two countries in the Black Sea 
 and Mediterranean respectively. In a territorial point of view, 
 they have also many sympathies in common, as well as a very 
 natural aversion to influences alike hostile to both of them. There 
 is a basis large enough for an alliance, or at least a good under- 
 standing, between Russia and France for tens of years, perhaps 
 generations to come. The First Napoleon's march to Moscow and 
 the Crimean war, had disturbed these relations ; but when the 
 perturbing causes ceased, the natural attraction between the 
 tAVO Empires reassumed its sway. Russia performed some good 
 offices for France. In the first place, she avoided everything that 
 could produce the impression that she was reconciled to Austria, 
 and then she went a little further, by giving publicity to her 
 determination not to be reconciled. The regularly accredited 
 Austrian minister at St. Petersburg might furnish some inter- 
 esting illustrations^ of this fact; the extraordinary minister 
 to St. Petersburg, whom the Emperor of Austria appointed as 
 the Italian question became entangled, never left for his place of 
 destination. Meanwhile there was something quite positive in the 
 declaration of Prince GortchakofFthat, should war actually ensue be- 
 tween France and Austria, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 125 
 
 would pursue the same line of conduct towards Austria, which the 
 Emperor of Austria, with so much apparent success, had pursued 
 in regard to Russia, during the Crimean war. There was no actual 
 treaty of reciprocity between the two Powers ; but the principles 
 on which they acted was understood and practically enforced. 
 Another kind office, which Russia performed in the interest of 
 France, consisted, as we have already observed, in the proposition 
 to submit the Italian question to an European Congress, when a 
 similar proposition made by France, and supported by England and 
 Prussia, had been virtually declined by Austria. This generous act 
 of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, was also one of kindness to 
 the Derby ministry ; because it prevented the public announcement 
 of the failure of Lord Cowly's mission to Vienna, and protected the 
 British government from the charge of showing too great partiality 
 for Austria. But when, in the prosecution of the war, it was 
 deemed expedient to threaten the Emperor of Austria with a new 
 insurrection in Hungary, Russia, it may safely be presumed, was 
 not quite so ready to cooperate with France in the execution of 
 that design. The Hungarians, crushed as they are by an angry 
 sovereign, might, as between Russia and Austria, prefer the present 
 enlightened autocratic rule of Emperor Alexander II. to that of the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph ; but with the prospect of entire independ- 
 ence, that partiality would have ceased, to make room for more na- 
 tional sentiments. In case of an Hungarian rebellion, the old sym- 
 pathies between Poland and Hungary might have been rekindled 
 which, based on parallel interests, could only have been counteracted 
 by a display of force. The Sclavonic population of Hungary, to 
 whom promises were made during the last Hungarian revolution, 
 which the Emperor Francis Joseph has since forgotten to fulfil, is 
 now less favorably disposed towards Austria than the Hungarians 
 themselves, and might join Hungary in a rise. In such an event 
 it would be difficult to manage, not only Gallicia, but also Russia, 
 Poland and the Duchy of Posen. Here, then, a point of departure 
 was presented to the respective policies of France and Russia — a 
 positive danger to the silent workings of that affection which, as 
 yet, had found no language to express its warmth. The attitude 
 11* 
 
126 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of Russia in regard to Austria and her German allies, the deter- 
 mination of the Emperor Alexander to place an army of observa- 
 tion on his Western frontier, undoubtedly favored France and 
 Italy ; but if Russia were alienated, and the pressure of that Power 
 on Austria and Germany removed, might not the war assume 
 proportions altogether " incommensurate with the interests of 
 France ?" 
 
 When Russia charged Austria with the magnitude of her in- 
 gratitude, the statesmen of Vienna replied, that Austria had no 
 need of acknowledging obligations for services rendered purely 
 in the well-understood interest of Russia herself. Russia, in aid- 
 ing to suppress the Hungarian insurrection, only prevented Po- 
 land from joining the rebellion ; while the marked civility, nay 
 distinction, with which the leaders of the Hungarian rebellion 
 were treated by the superior Russian officers,* were anything but 
 gratifying to the Austrians, who had only thought them fit company 
 for the executioner. Austria and Russia have, on more than one 
 occasion, bandied these charges of ingratitude with each other ; 
 and the probability is, they will have occasion to repeat them 
 hereafter, as their respective policies will lead to fresh complica- 
 tions and conflicts. Russia charged Austria with ingratitude dur- 
 ing her war with Turkey (1828). Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian 
 Minister, wrote from Paris, November 28th, 1828 : — " Italy was 
 at the Congress of Vienna entirely abandoned to Austria ; partly 
 by real territorial concessions, and partly by allowing her to con- 
 trol everything not immediately subject to her domination. When 
 the Neapolitan revolution threatened Austrian supremacy through- 
 out the whole country, from the Alps to Sicily, it was again Alex- 
 ander who, by his intercession, dissipated the storm." And yet, in 
 return for all these services, Austria would not cooperate with 
 Russia in her designs upon Turkey ! There is as little gratitude 
 among sovereigns and statesmen, as among politicians. It is the 
 nature of their calling, which deprives them of that noble virtue ; 
 
 * Hungarian officers, it will be remembered, were even invited to dine with 
 the commanding Russian Generals, and allowed to pledge the health of the 
 Czar. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 127 
 
 and this holds not only of individuals, but of parties which con- 
 trol them. 
 
 To sum up, Russia had an old score against Austria, which 
 had been largely increased by the attitude of the latter dur- 
 ing the Crimean war ; but she was unwilling to have it paid at her 
 own expense. A Hungarian insurrection, which might involve 
 Poland, never entered into the combinations of Prince Gortcha- 
 koff ; especially at this period, when the emancipation of the serfs 
 already sufficiently agitated the whole Russian empire. If, then, 
 the Emperor Napoleon, to prosecute the Italian war, must tolerate 
 the organization of a " Hungarian Legion," and avail himself of 
 the services of the late Governor Kossuth to induce the people of 
 Hungary to rise in arms, it is, at least, questionable whether the 
 ardor of his new allies would not have checked the resolution of 
 his old ones, and whether such an exchange would have inured to 
 his immediate benefit. The Emperor of the French could hardly 
 afford to become the leader of revolutionary bands, or the insti- 
 gator of revolutions ; for who could say that these revolutions would 
 not extend to France if he met with a check from Austria ? Napo- 
 leon aided Italy for the avowed purpose of making her his friend 5 
 but he could not, as the established sovereign of France, sacrifice 
 himself, or the cause he had espoused, to an indefinite future. Be- 
 tween Garibaldi and Kossuth there was a wide difference. Gari- 
 baldi, as a native of Nice, was born a Piedmontese subject. He 
 had conspired against his sovereign and was exiled, but afterwards 
 pardoned. He had then again entered the service of his sovereign, 
 and was regularly commissioned by him as a General in the Pied- 
 montese army. He was, if taken by the Austrians, entitled to be 
 treated as a prisoner of war ; not so Kossuth or Klapka, who, if 
 the fortunes of war delivered them into the hands of the Aus- 
 trians, would most unquestionably have died by the hangman. 
 With the enthusiasm of patriots, they might have staked their 
 lives in such a cause ; but their deaths would have led to repri- 
 sals, which must have added to the cruelties of war, and stained 
 the reputation of the sovereigns engaged in it. If the war could 
 be honorably ended without such a calamity, it was a saving of 
 
128 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 lives, in the interest of humanity, at which we cannot but rejoice. 
 The Hungarians may feel disappointed ; but the Emperor Napo- 
 leon never promised to liberate Hungary. If Hungary had risen, 
 and peace had been concluded afterwards, without a stipulation for 
 a general amnesty, the Austrian prisons would have again been 
 crowded, and the executioner employed to overwhelm a country 
 already sufficiently drenched with blood ; while the very amnesty 
 which France would have been bound in honor to insist upon, as 
 one of the conditions of peace, might have proved an insurmount- 
 able obstacle to its conclusion. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 129 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO — CONCLUSION OF PEACE. WHAT 
 HAS ITALY GAINED BY IT? 
 
 It was in this situation of things, and while all Europe was arm- 
 ing for a general war, that the Battle of Solferino was fought — 
 honorable to both armies, but ending in the complete triumph of the 
 French and Piedmontese arms. An armistice followed, and to the real 
 or affected surprise of all Europe, peace was concluded in the space 
 of a few days. What could have been the motives of the Emperor 
 Napoleon, that prompted him to this act % asks the one. Why 
 did the Emperor of Austria submit to such terms % demands the 
 other. That the Emperor Napoleon had good reasons for con- 
 cluding peace ; and that he spoke the truth when, in his Proclama- 
 tion to the army, he said that the war had " assumed proportions 
 no longer commensurate with the interests of France," we have 
 endeavored to show in the preceding pages. The further prose- 
 cution of the war, on his part, menaced him with a European coa- 
 lition, required another loan of at least a thousand or fifteen hun- 
 dred millions of francs, and threatened to give to the revolutionary 
 tendencies of Europe such an impetus, as to endanger the political 
 status, not only of Italy and Germany, but also of France. His 
 military successes in Italy, had already been discounted by public 
 opinion in Paris ; and he must have pushed them to the very capi- 
 tal of the Austrian empire, if he would reconcile the French peo- 
 ple to new sacrifices of blood and treasure. The peace with Aus- 
 tria which France wanted, could only be dictated at Vienna ; at 
 any place short of the Austrian capital, it was only to be obtained 
 by mutual concessions. On the part of Austria, the principal 
 reason for concluding peace was undoubtedly the deranged state 
 of her finances, and the impossibility of raising money except by 
 
130 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 forced loans. The Austrian army, though discomfited in four 
 large battles, had not suffered more than the French ; it had lost no- 
 thing of its ancient prestige ; and though its leaders had made many 
 blunders, it came out of the contest without loss of reputation or 
 military honor. But the Emperor of Austria, if he continued the 
 war, must have ungarnished the discontented provinces of Hun- 
 gary, Transylvania, and the Military Frontier* of troops, and 
 thereby completely abandoned Turkey and the Danubian Principali- 
 ties to the influence of Russia. There has always been a party in 
 Vienna, that wished the emperor to abandon his Italian Provinces 
 altogether, if he could add Servia, Moldavia, and Wallachia to his 
 empire. In those provinces, Austria might have a mission of civil- 
 ization ; in Italy, she has none. To rule any portion of Italy — 
 Venetia for instance — in the Italian sense, will prove an unprofit- 
 able and hopeless task, and will weaken Austria where she will soon 
 have use for all her strength. To rule Yenetia, hereafter, in the 
 Austrian sense, is impossible, and would require the presence, in 
 that province alone, of at least a hundred thousand troops, inclu- 
 sive of the garrisons of the fortresses. Austria, in spite of the 
 immense contributions of war which she imposed on Lombardy, Ye- 
 netia, and Piedmont, in 1848 — 49, and the heavy war taxes she has 
 levied on her unfortunate Italian subjects for the last ten years, in 
 spite of confiscations and forced loans, has found her Italian pro- 
 vinces a drain upon her treasury ; and Yenetia, exhausted as she 
 now is, will afford no relief to her finances. 
 
 Austria made peace, by sacrificing a province which she only 
 held at the point of the bayonet : and she would have given up 
 Yenetia to boot, but for the quadrangle of fortresses which she 
 deems indispensable to the defence of her south-western frontier. 
 There existed, therefore, good reasons on both sides for making 
 peace. Piedmont alone had an interest to prolong the war so 
 auspiciously begun, and the Italians generally thought and felt 
 with the King of Sardinia. 
 
 It would undoubtedly have been better for the security and in- 
 
 * That Province of Austria which borders on Turkey. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 131 
 
 dependence of Italy, if Austria had entirely withdrawn from Italian 
 soil ; but if this could not be effected without weakening France, 
 or exposing her to new great dangers, then Italy cannot complain 
 of " treachery." Such a charge has indeed no foundation in fact. 
 The Emperor of the French had promised assistance to an ally, 
 and has kept his word to the extent of bestowing on that ally the 
 richest and most fertile province of Italy. If he could not add 
 Venetia to his gift, it was, as himself expressed it, a source of re- 
 gret to him ; for which, at some future period, he may, perhaps, make 
 suitable amends. But it must be recollected that the assistance 
 rendered, on the part of the emperor, was without a consideration ; 
 while, at the same time, it exposed him to a coalition that might 
 prove fatal to France. If France were beaten on the Rhine, or if, 
 by dividing her forces and withdrawing a portion of her troops 
 from the Peninsula to defend her own soil, the army in Italy suf- 
 fered a severe check, to whose lasting discomfiture would it have 
 inured, but to that of the Italians ? No obligations, however sol- 
 emnly contracted, can bind a state to do that which is to her own 
 ruin ; and no enlightened government, whatever may have been 
 its nature, has ever committed such an act of political suicide. 
 Inability to perform, is a good plea under the law of nations ; 
 though, from pride, few nations have resorted to it. They gene- 
 rally tax their ingenuity with discovering some other reasons for 
 not complying with their engagements.* 
 
 Frederic the Great, in the preface to his work, " The History of 
 my Time" (1746), denies even the obligation of Treaties between 
 
 * Portugal, in the case of the brig Armstrong, might have pleaded inability, 
 at that period, to perform the duty of a neutral power ; but her pride would not 
 allow her to do so. King John VI. of Portugal was, at that time, little more 
 than a British pensioner. A British fleet had carried him to Rio Janeiro, and 
 protected him there; British troops fought for his crown in Portugal, and Brit- 
 ish power alone could prevent the loss of all his colonies. In what condition 
 was he to protect an American privateer against an act of violence committed 
 under that flag, which alone maintained his existence as a king, and the inte- 
 grity of his territory ? Yet Portugal never pleaded inability to do her duty as 
 a neutral Power, and was therefore justly held responsible for the damage. 
 
132 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 States, when they no longer answer the public good. We quote 
 the passage : — 
 
 " You will see, in this work, Treaties made and broken ; and I 
 am bound to tell you that, in regard to this matter, we are bound 
 by our means and faculties. When our interests change, we must 
 change with them. Our business is to watch over the happiness 
 of our people. As soon, then, as we find danger or hazard to 
 them from an alliance, it becomes our duty to break it off, rather 
 than to expose our people. In this, the sovereign sacrifices him- 
 self for the good of his subjects. All the Annals of History fur- 
 nish examples of this sort ; and it is, in truth, difficult to con- 
 ceive how men should act differently. Those who so loudly 
 condemn this conduct, are people who look upon a given word as 
 a sacred thing. They are right, and I agree with them, as far as 
 the rule applies to private matters ; for a man who pledges his 
 word to another, though he may have inconsiderately promised a 
 thing which may turn to his greatest disadvantage, ought to keep 
 it, since honor is above interest. But a Prince, who pledges his 
 word, commits not only himself (which would render the matter a 
 private one), but also exposes great states and great provinces to 
 a thousand calamities. It is therefore better, rather than that the 
 people should suffer, that the sovereign break his Treaty. What 
 would be said of a surgeon, who, foolishly scrupulous, would not 
 cut off the gangrened limb of a man ; because cutting off a limb 
 is a bad act? Is it not worse to let a citizen perish, whose life he 
 might have saved? I hold that it is the circumstances under 
 which an act is committed, everything that accompanies and 
 everything that follows it, which must be considered in order to 
 determine whether an act is good or bad ; but how few persons 
 judge thus, with a proper knowledge of the case ! Men are like 
 sheep. They follow blindly their leader. Let a man of mind 
 say a good thing, and it will suffice for a thousand fools to re- 
 peat it." 
 
 Far be it from us to endorse these sentiments, though they are 
 those of the Great Frederic — the model monarch of modern times. 
 We have quoted them merely for the purpose of showing that the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 133 
 
 charges now preferred against Napoleon III. belong to a class which 
 apply to all sovereigns, and more especially to those who have dis- 
 tinguished themselves in history. Frederic, in the above quotation, 
 evidently justified himself and his motives, in a manner much more 
 positive and direct, than the Emperor of the French in his late pro- 
 clamation. The Emperor excused himself to the people of Italy, for 
 not fulfilling all he had promised. Frederic would have justified the 
 act, if he had stipulated for it, as one required by the public interest 
 of his country ; and he would, by his own confession, have considered 
 it a duty to do so, regardless of all consequences. The Emperor 
 Napoleon certainly never made a Treaty with the King of Sardinia, 
 to conquer all Upper Italy for him. He could only promise to do 
 what he believed he was able to perform ; no more. And of that 
 ability, France being the greater Power, the Emperor alone must 
 be the judge. Neither was he bound, in faith or honor, to fulfil 
 all at once, if it was possible for him to do more hereafter at less 
 cost. The safety of France, and of his throne, must necessarily be 
 paramount to every other consideration ; or he would be unworthy 
 to be the ruler of France ! The late war in Italy was not a war 
 against Austria, waged by a coalition for a common purpose. There 
 was nothing to be divided between France and Piedmont after the 
 victory. The sacrifice was necessarily greater on the part of 
 France — the greater Power ; the gain was all to Piedmont — the 
 smaller one. Events, thus far, have proved the disinterestedness 
 of the Emperor Napoleon ; though, at the beginning of the cam- 
 paign, the whole world charged him with having provoked a war 
 of conquest for his own aggrandizement ! This, nevertheless, is 
 the second war he has waged with success, and without adding an 
 acre of land to the territory of France ; though thousands upon 
 thousands of Frenchmen have perished in them, and millions upon 
 millions have been expended to attach victory to his Eagles. For 
 more than a thousand years have the Italian States been the 
 theatre of war, and the spoils of foreign conquerors. England, 
 France, Spain and Germany have divided her as their booty ; the 
 last war was the only one which was waged for her benefit 5 the 
 victor surrendering his spoils. 
 12 
 
134 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 What has France heretofore — beginning with Louis XII. and 
 his pretensions to Milan — done for Italy 1 What has Spain done 
 for her, after holding one of the finest parts of her, in actual pos- 
 session, for more than two centuries ? What have the German 
 Emperors effected by their descents into the plains of Lombardy 1 
 England, after abandoning all Italy to Austria, in return for her 
 joining the coalition against the First Napoleon, contented herself 
 with Malta as her share of the plunder. In vain did the Sicilians 
 ask her intercession to preserve the constitution which, during the 
 war, had been established under British guarantees — in vain did the 
 Genoese insist on the promises made to them by Lord William Ben- 
 tinck — useless was the dissent of Great Britain from the Resolu- 
 tions taken by the Holy Alliance at Laibach and Verona, without 
 an arm raised to oppose their execution — without result, the ap- 
 pointment of a British Commissioner to the Pope, in 1831 — and 
 pernicious, the roving mission of Lord Minto to Turin, Florence, 
 Rome, Naples and Palermo. England only encouraged the Pied- 
 montese, the Tuscans, the Romans, the Neapolitans, and, alas ! 
 the poor Sicilians, to risk their lives and their fortunes in the 
 attempt at establishing liberal institutions, without being aided by 
 a British ship, or a British soldier ! The fine speech of Lord 
 Napier, from the balcony of the British embassy at Naples (Feb. 
 15th, 1848) did not save the Constitution, which even then was a 
 dead letter and a farce 5 the powerful fleet under Admiral Parker 
 did not prevent the massacres at Messina and Palermo (though the 
 British government was very prompt in demanding compensation 
 for the damage done to her ships in those harbors), and the sus- 
 pension of her diplomatic intercourse with Naples had no effect 
 on the resolution of the King, to govern his country despoti- 
 cally, by the aid of foreign mercenaries. The fine writings of the 
 British consul in Sicily, the dispatches of Mr. Abercromby and 
 of Lord Minto, and the classic memorandum of Mr. Petre to Lord 
 Clarendon (July 26th, 1856), produced no result favorable to the 
 Italians ; because England was known to be unwilling to take an 
 active part in any of the revolutions which agitated Italy from 
 1820 to 1849. She did much to provoke and encourage them ; 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 135 
 
 but when pressed, by the popular leaders, to come to their aid, de- 
 clared with great composure that she had no idea of interposing 
 between the sovereigns of Italy and their subjects. The truth is, 
 England deceived the Italians ; though it may not have been her 
 intention to do so. She advocated, indeed, the introduction of 
 reforms, and the formation of liberal governments in the separate 
 Italian States ; but she had no idea of promoting their union into 
 an Italian Power. When the decisive moment had arrived — 
 when the King of Sardinia had declared war against Austria, and 
 Milan, Venice, Tuscany and Home had sent troops to assist the 
 Piedmontese arms ; did the British government not exert itself to 
 prevent the King of Naples who, in the meantime, had given a 
 constitution to his people, from joining Charles Albert with any 
 considerable force ?* A simple naval demonstration in the Adriatic, 
 at that critical period, might have induced Austria to yield up Lom- 
 bardy and Venice, (the former she was at one time willing to cede to 
 Piedmont ;) but England had no intention to weaken Austria, and 
 thereby give the least advantage either to France or Russia. As 
 to the Italian policy of Louis Philippe, we have already charac- 
 terized it in its proper place. The " Napoleon of Peace" looked 
 upon a war between Rome and Austria as " the ruin of the Catho- 
 lic religion ;" while Guizot, in the midst of the liberal movement 
 in Italy, (1847 — 1848) and almost on the very day that the King 
 of Naples granted a constitution, declared, in the French Cham- 
 bers, that " Italy could not possibly acquire representative govern- 
 ments under twenty years." 
 
 Such was the aid which " Free Albion," under a liberal administra- 
 tion, and Constitutional France, under her Citizen King, rendered 
 to the cause of Italian liberty and independence. No statesmen 
 in either country had the most distant thought of assisting the 
 
 * " But England/' says Horner, (History of the Kingdom of Naples, 1734 — 
 1825, hy Pietro Colletta, translated from the Italian by S. Horner, with a 
 Supplementary Chapter, 1825 — 1856) who was in the anomalous position of 
 being at once the friend of liberty, and the friend and ally of despotic Austria, 
 (to whom she was fast bound by her aristocratic tendencies, as well as by her 
 commercial dread of war), " England now threw every difficulty in the way of 
 sending aid to tho Sardinian King." 
 
136 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Italians in the driving the Austrians out of Italy ; and yet they 
 must have known that without ridding Italy of the supremacy of 
 Austria, it was impossible to introduce lasting reforms. The 
 French Republic desired only to counterbalance Austrian influ- 
 ence in the Papal States ; the Emperor Napoleon, alone, struck a 
 decisive blow for the independence of Italy ! 
 
 JSfor is England now willing to intervene, in the affairs of Italy, 
 otherwise than by advice and council. The pressure of the 
 material interests of the country is so great, the practical turn 
 of British statesmen so thoroughly opposed to war, and the 
 feeling of the nation so exclusively English, that the hope that 
 England will ever sacrifice her interests to an abstract idea — 
 and that too, a foreign one — must necessarily prove delusive. 
 On the other hand, we are bound to admit that England has 
 seldom, if ever, made professions of that sort ; and that a British 
 minister would but ill recommend his policy to the nation, if he 
 were to represent it as " disinterested" and " magnanimous" to 
 other countries. The English people are not carried away by glory. 
 Glory is no marketable article. It will not pass current from 
 hand to hand, and the tradespeople of England do not receive it 
 in payment of their dues. Even George Canning, when advocating 
 the recognition of the Independence of the South American Re- 
 publics, had to assure the British people, that he had no other but 
 British interests at heart. We do not find fault with this policy, 
 which is, perhaps, the only one which a statesman of a great 
 country may adopt with safety ; but we object to Englishmen 
 and English journals charging the statesmen of other nations with 
 selfish motives, which they justify in themselves. England, at the 
 commencement of the last war, was as much an ally of Piedmont 
 as France ; yet England armed and offered her good offices to 
 Austria ; because it is not her interest to see the power of Austria 
 diminished. She keeps her eye constantly on the Oriental ques- 
 tion — the question which must now soon be settled, and which will 
 eventually decide the fate of her Empire in India. By the side of 
 the magnitude of that interest, the fate of Italy dwindles into in- 
 significance. England may have kind words, the British people 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. Lot 
 
 may have generous sympathies for the Italians, and Great Britain 
 may endeavor, by Diplomacy, to meliorate the condition of Italy ; 
 but to suppose that, from a pure sense of right and justice, she will 
 ever sacrifice a regiment, or incur any considerable national ex- 
 pense for Italy, is to betray a lamentable ignorance of British his- 
 tory, and the character of British statesmen. 
 
 Italy, in the war of 1859, had no other reliable ally but France ; 
 while France, in espousing her cause, had, with the exception of 
 Russia, the whole of Europe against her. 
 
 The Emperor of the French had every imaginable motive ascribed 
 to him. The Germans accused him of designs on the left bank of 
 the Rhine ; the Belgians feared for their safety, and wanted to 
 fortify Antwerp ; the Austrians accused him of coveting a portion 
 of Italy for himself, and a kingdom for his cousin. All denounced 
 him for his love of conquest, inherited from his uncle, inherent in, 
 and inseparable from, the Empire. The greater the successes of 
 Napoleon's campaign in Italy, the greater were the apprehensions 
 of the neutrals that their turn will come next ;* the more immi- 
 nent, therefore, were the dangers of a coalition against France. 
 
 This is the proper stand-point from which to consider the peace 
 of Villafranca. What would the Italians have gained if France 
 had been attacked and overpowered by a coalition ? Would an- 
 
 * As an illustration of those fears, we cannot refrain from describing a cari- 
 cature which, shortly after the battle of Magenta, was published in a humoristic 
 journal of Berlin, called " Kladdcradatsch" — a name not easily pronounced by 
 American lips. It represented a barber's shop, with the Emperor Napoleon as bar- 
 ber, and Count Cavour, as his apprentice, engaged in preparing the lather. The 
 Emperor of Austria occupied the chair, already well lathered by Cavour, and 
 ready to be shaved. The Emperor Napoleon was represented as about to per- 
 form that operation in person. In the back ground were two customers already 
 served; the first, washing his face and looking rather wry, was the King of 
 Portugal; the other, better pleased with the operation performed upon him, 
 and already washed, was adjusting his cravat before the glass. This was the 
 Emperor of Russia. Other potentates, such as the King of Prussia, the King 
 of the Belgians, the King of Naples (the delicacy of the German artist in omit- 
 ting the Queen of England was remarkable !) were crowding upon the French 
 Emperor; but Count Cavour (the apprentice) assured them, with a gracious 
 move of his arm, that they need not be impatient, because each of them shall 
 hare his turn J 
 
 12 * 
 
138 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 other Treaty of Paris, or another Congress of Vienna, have treated 
 them with more consideration than in 1814, when Prince Metter- 
 nich discovered that Italy was only a geographical division ? Can 
 it be doubted that Austria, if again master of Italy, would have 
 swept Piedmont from the Peninsula, and confined the dominion of 
 her King once more to the Island of Sardinia ? And what would 
 have become of the hopes of Italy, if the chivalrous King of Pied- 
 mont, and his gallant army were no longer at the head of the 
 Italian movement % Mazzini and his Red Republican friends 
 will probably answer : " The King of Piedmont is of the House 
 of Chambery ; he is a Frenchman, not an Italian ; and Italy, to be 
 free, must get rid of him and the Austrians both." We do not 
 deem it necessary to refute such an argument. With the fall of 
 Piedmont, Italy would for centuries be plunged back again into 
 the old despotic system of government ; and as to foreign domina- 
 tion and its melancholy consequences, we must not forget that the 
 Italians have fretted, and agitated, and fought against it, for cen- 
 turies, without being able to get rid of it. Was not, then, an im- 
 mediate substantial payment on account, preferable to a renewal 
 of the long deferred hope of being payed in full ? To suppose 
 that Italy, after centuries of foreign and domestic misrule, can, by 
 one single campaign, be made free and happy, is simply absurd. 
 We read of lovers who, after many sad and vexatious disappoint- 
 ments, are finally united, to be separated no more ; but the God- 
 dess of Liberty delights in constant courtship, and will only bestow 
 her favors on those who, in return for her affection, are unremit- 
 ting in their attention. The Italians must make up their minds to 
 continue the struggle a little longer. Their efforts in their 
 country's cause must not be allowed to flag, nor their readiness 
 for self-sacrifice to abate ; and the very means which they will be 
 obliged to employ to acquire freedom, will, after its acquisition, 
 serve to preserve it. 
 
 Let us now ask, what has Italy gained by the late war and the 
 peace of Villafranca ? This is our answer : 
 
 1st. The French delivered Piedmont, which had been invaded, 
 from its foreign enemy. They thereby helped the constitutional 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 139 
 
 cause ; for Piedmont was the only constitutional Power of Italy, 
 and the very cause of the Austrian invasion was the liberal go- 
 vernment established at Turin. 
 
 2d. Austria, which has been the arbiter of the fate of Italy for 
 nearly half a century, has resigned her paramount influence on Ita- 
 lian affairs, and expressed her willingness to become merely a 
 member of the projected Italian Confederation. 
 
 3d. The Emperor of Austria is to join that Italian Confederacy, 
 not as an European Sovereign, but only as an Italian Prince, and 
 with a voice only corresponding to the Province of Venetia. 
 
 4th. The separate treaties which Austria, since 1815, has con- 
 cluded with Naples, Tuscany, Parma and Modena, and which gave 
 Austria the right of intervening in the international affairs of the 
 smaller States, are abolished, and the people of those States left to 
 establish their own form of government without dread of foreign 
 invasion.* 
 
 5th. The Emperor of Austria, though retaining the fortresses of 
 Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Legnano, surrendered the fortresses 
 of Piacenza, Brescello, Pizzighettone, Rocca d'Anfo, Ferrara and 
 Ancona, with that portion of the Venetian Territory which extends 
 towards Volta on the right bank of the Mincio. 
 
 6th. Austria gives up Lombardy, the richest of all her former 
 possessions, and that fertile and best cultivated " division of Italy" 
 is united to the Kingdom of Piedmont. 
 
 7th. Austria, by the events of the war, and the diplomatic 
 transactions which preceded and followed it, is now completely 
 isolated in her Italian policy — too weak, by her own acknowledg- 
 
 * This point is not invalidated by the terms of the treaty agreed upon at the 
 Zurich Conferences; for though the Arch Dukes reserve their rights to the Ducal 
 crowns of Modena and Tuscany, the ^>ossess ion may remain in abeyance for 
 generations to come. The Emperors of Austria have not yet surrendered their 
 claims to the Kingdom of Jerusalem ; though Baron Rothschild in Frankfort-on- 
 the-Main, can show a better title to the estate. The reservation of the rights of 
 the Arch Dukes may save their honor; but the treaty says nothing about their 
 reinstatement. Their right, unless they have the power to enforce it, is no better 
 than that of the Wasa family to the throne of Sweden, now occupied by one of 
 the offsprings Af Napoleon's generals. 
 
140 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ment, to enforce it herself; and without an ally, even in German y, 
 to sympathize with her in her political solitude. We consider this 
 the most important result obtained by the late peace of Villafranca ; 
 because all the delay which now occurs between this preliminary 
 arrangement and the final settlement of the Italian question by an 
 European Congress, is in favor of Italy who is in possession, and 
 against Austria who is kept out of Lombardy and the Duchies. 
 The new Congress may meet or it may not meet, it may settle the 
 Italian question or it may not settle it ; the Congress may last as 
 long as the Council of Trent, or it may be as short as the Queen's 
 visit to Cherbourg ; it can only inure to the benefit of the Italians. 
 The very fact that there is an Italian question on which the great 
 Powers of Europe are called to decide, and that Austria is willing 
 to submit that question to an European iEropagus, justifies the war 
 which France and Piedmont have waged against her, and involves 
 her in logical contradictions. Austria will be as isolated in the 
 Congress as she was in the war, and far more powerless than she 
 was on the evening of the battle of Solferino. 
 
 The objection which has been made to the peace, rests on two 
 distinct grounds — a military and a political one. The military 
 objection is to the famous quadrangle of fortresses, Peschiera, 
 Verona, Mantua and Legnano, which remains in the possession of 
 Austria ; but this objection loses much of its force when it is con- 
 sidered that Austria, in surrendering Lombardy, proclaimed to the 
 world that she considered herself vanquished, while she had yet a 
 powerful army in and behind those fortresses ; and when it is further 
 considered that her finances are wholly exhausted, and that the 
 loss of her finest province cannot add to her national resources. 
 The people of Austria, during the war and under the mortification 
 of defeat, might have made voluntary loans to the government ; the 
 convents might have made donations of money and jewels, and the 
 creditors of the State might have made further advances to make 
 good their previous ones ; but neither of these things will now be 
 done to enable Austria to plunge into a second war. While the game 
 is playing, the loser, under the influence of extraordinary excite- 
 ment, may double the stakes ; but none but a professional gambler 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE 141 
 
 will try to win to-morrow, what he has lost to-day — after he has 
 slept over his loss. Austria, if she had been attacked in her strong- 
 holds, might have overcome the aversion of Prussia : but the peace 
 of Villafranca has caused the Prussian army and the contingents 
 of the smaller German States to be disbanded ; so that, if circum- 
 stances were to compel the Emperor Francis Joseph once more to 
 measure swords with France, he would open the campaign under 
 far greater disadvantages than the loss of Peschiera and Mantua 
 would have entailed upon him in the first encounter. 
 
 Again, the Emperor Francis Joseph, previous and during the 
 last war, held out sundry promises of internal reform, which were 
 to be introduced into Austria proper, after the conclusion of the 
 peace. These promises stimulated the ardor of his German sub- 
 jects, and disposed them for large sacrifices to sustain the honor of 
 their sovereign. It remains now to be seen whether the Emperor 
 is as good as his word. If the Emperor Francis Joseph disappoint 
 the expectations of his people — and this will in all probability be 
 the case — then it would perhaps have been better for him to lose 
 the celebrated quadrangle, than the confidence of his most faithful 
 subjects. Austria must improve her present respite to regulate, as 
 far as this may be within the range of possibility, her finances, her 
 system of taxation, and her uncontrolled expenditures. This is 
 expected of her by those of her subjects who have most contributed 
 to the expenses of the war, independent of municipal reforms, com- 
 mercial regulations adapted to the spirit of the age, and equal rights 
 for five millions of Protestants. If Austria disappoint thes'e just and 
 reasonable expectations — and it is difficult to see how she can manage 
 not to disappoint them — then the consequences may be worse to her 
 future position in Europe, than if she had at once treated for the 
 surrender of her Italian fortresses for a round sum of money, and 
 made herself strong at home. If Austria retains Venetia and en- 
 deavors to govern her as heretofore, her wealthy subjects will 
 emigrate, and she will draw but little revenue in return for the 
 expense of maintaining fortresses and military roads ; while any 
 concession which Austria may feel disposed to make to Venetia, 
 will instantly be demanded also by the other Provinces, which have 
 
142 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 remained loyal to her House. Provincial governments, unless 
 they partake of the representative form, would not satisfy either 
 the Venetians, the Hungarians or the Sclavonians, much less the 
 Germans ; and Provincial Parliaments would be equivalent to the 
 dismemberment of the Empire. Austria, therefore, will be com- 
 pelled to continue the system of centralization introduced by Prince 
 Schwarzenberg in 1849, and Yenetia will enter against it an un- 
 ceasing protest, which will constantly present the alternative of war 
 or revolution. Against the insecurity of such a position, the posses- 
 sion of Mantua and Verona is no adequate offset ; and Austria will 
 soon find herself obliged, either to make a last desperate effort to 
 reconquer all she has lost, or cede what was left to her for a con- 
 sideration in money or territory. The probability is, she will de- 
 mand both ; and as Italy can only furnish one, fall back for the 
 other on some of her South Eastern neighbors. Austria has some 
 experience in that species of trade ; having for more than a century 
 not only frequently exchanged or sold her own hereditary Pro- 
 vinces, but also those which belonged to the Germanic Empire. 
 Her first acquisition of Venice (at the peace of Campo-Formio) was 
 secured by such a traffic ; for Austria, it must be remembered, re- 
 ceived Venice out of the hands of the first Napoleon (who obtained 
 for it the left bank of the Rhine, which did not belong to Austria ; ) 
 and it would be but a historical retribution, if Austria were now 
 obliged to surrender it again — for a slice of Turkey. Turkey is the 
 " Indian Reserve" of Europe, in the partition of which those sove- 
 reigns, who feel aggrieved by the "new political map," must seek 
 their permanent redress. It is for this reason, that we believe the 
 settlement of the Italian question will accelerate that of the Oriental 
 one. Austria will be glad to surrender the four fortresses, if she can 
 take a step or two in the eastern direction of her Empire.* 
 
 As regards the political work which it is charged the Emperor 
 
 * If Russia, previous to the last Crimean war, was favoring Austria domina- 
 tion in Italy, it was to prevent Austria from taking an active part in the affairs 
 of Constantinople. Pozzo di Bokgo, has already said so in so many words. 
 Since the Crimean war. however, Russia has lost all confidence in Austria, and 
 expects moi-e from her necessities than from her gratitude. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OE EUROPE. 143 
 
 Napoleon has left undone, the answer is already contained in the 
 preceding pages. We only wish to refer once more to the fact, 
 not yet sufficiently appreciated, that Austrian influence in Italy is 
 crushed ; and that she can now neither uphold despotism in Naples, 
 nor force it on the Central Italian States. That she considered 
 this her mission in Italy, up to the latest hour, was confessed by 
 Metternich himself, in a dispatch which Count Buol Schauenstein, 
 the late Austrian Premier, then (in 1845) Austrian minister to 
 Turin, handed to King Charles Albert, father of the present 
 King of Sardinia. In that dispatch, to which we have already once 
 cursorily alluded, and which the King of Sardinia, to his honor be 
 it said, refused to receive, Metternich warns the Princes of Italy 
 against making concessions to the people, and reminded them of 
 the fact that " the Italian (despotic) governments have, for the last 
 ten years, existed only by the assistance of Austria."* Well then, 
 this assistance to despotism, which Austria afforded to the former 
 Italian governments, exists no more ; and if Metternich spoke the 
 truth, these governments must fall without it. The proposition 
 could not be more clearly laid down, nor more satisfactorily demon- 
 strated. If the Italians, in their improved present condition, are 
 unable to work out their own salvation, we must conclude that 
 they are, as yet, unfit for liberty. For the first time, for many 
 centuries, are the people of Central Italy permitted to exercise the 
 sovereign right of choosing their rulers and establishing their own 
 governments. If Southern Italy is not moved by this example, it 
 is because other influences prevail, which can only be removed in 
 the course of time. It is assuredly not pretended by any reason- 
 able man, that the Emperor Napoleon is bound to dethrone the 
 King of the Two Sicilies, or establish a constitutional government 
 in Naples by means of rifle-cannon. This would only be imitating 
 the policy of Austria, though applying it in another sense. Let 
 the Republic of Switzerland put an end to the enlistment of her 
 people in the service of foreign Princes, let the agents and recruit- 
 
 * The dispatch was originally addressed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany ; but 
 was also intended as a lesson to King Charles Albert, and, for that reason, the 
 Austrian minister was instructed to hand him a copy of it. 
 
144 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ing officers of foreign governments, if caught on her soil, be sen- 
 tenced to the work-house or the penitentiary, and let the men who 
 enlist be dishonored, instead of having monuments erected to their 
 fidelity, and a great step will be gained in the emancipation of the 
 Two Sicilies from despotic rule. The Marquis de Turgot, the 
 present French minister at Bern, is, perhaps, instructed by the 
 Emperor to press these considerations on the Swiss government. 
 If so, we feel assured that public opinion in Switzerland will be 
 with him, and that this last remnant of the condottieri practice of 
 past ages will soon cease to disgrace Europe.* 
 
 But the Papal States, we are told, are still suffering from tem- 
 poral misgovernment. This is undoubtedly true : but who contends 
 that no Reforms are to be introduced into those States ? Certainly 
 not the Emperor Napoleon, who is pressing them all the time on 
 the Holy Father, without losing either patience or courage. That 
 the question of political Reform in the Papal States is surrounded 
 with difficulties and dangers, need not be urged on the Emperor 
 Napoleon either by the English or German press ; the French 
 Catholic journals being sufficiently remindful of that fact. It may 
 indeed be questioned whether the advice, given by the public 
 writers of England and Germany, is altogether disinterested. The 
 Protestant Powers of Europe are quite ready to abolish the tem- 
 poral power of the Pope altogether, and "be done with it;" but it 
 is one of the characteristics of the present Emperor of the French, 
 that he not only emulates the achievements, but also avoids the 
 mistakes, of his great uncle. The Papal States may be governed 
 without a British Constitution, and yet satisfy the reasonable aspi- 
 rations of the Roman people. Reforms in the Papal States have 
 been advised over and over again, by Catholic and Protestant 
 Powers,t and the time is close at hand when they must be intro- 
 
 * It is but justice to Switzerland to state that the so-called "Swiss troops," 
 employed in foreign service, are only in part composed of Swiss soldiers, and 
 that perhaps the majority of them are adventurers from all parts of Europe. 
 But for this very reason, the Swiss government ought to cooperate with other 
 powers to put down the practice. 
 
 f See page 61. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 145 
 
 duced to prevent revolution. With liberal governments estab- 
 lished in Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Lucca and Piedmont, it is 
 physically and morally impossible for Rome to retain the temporal 
 government which Austrian bayonets have forced upon her. The 
 Pope himself, though the experience of 1848 and 1849 may have 
 rendered him cautious and timid, will, when no longer under the 
 influences of interested advisers, yield to the reasonable demands 
 of his subjects, and complete the work which he has so gloriously 
 inaugurated in 1846. We have the testimony of Gioberti* who f 
 in 1848, was Charles Albert's minister, that Pope Pius IX. before 
 bis flight from Rome, promised him that, in case the King of Sar- 
 dinia were successful, he would crown him King of Italy, and when, 
 after his flight to G-aeta, the Holy Father, at last, decided to throw 
 himself for protection on Austria, he remarked, with some bitter- 
 ness, "they willed it so;" referring evidently to those who had 
 forced him into a position so little congenial to his heart. The 
 Pope has since been surrounded by Cardinals in the Austrian in- 
 terest ; and Von Bach, the Austrian ex-minister of the Interior, 
 now Austrian envoy at Rome, is not the man to advise and counsel 
 the Holy Father in his present extremity. f 
 
 The role which the Republican Unionists assigned to the Pope 
 in 1848, was that of a belligerent Prince, engaged in an unequal 
 contest with a vastly superior military Power, and he declined it. 
 The part now assigned him, by the peaee of Villafranca is more 
 consonant with his spiritual calling. After his antecedents, he 
 
 * Author of the Primato morale e civile degV Italiani, published in 1843, and 
 dedicated to Silvio Pellico — a political work, with strong Catholic tendencies, 
 which exercised an immence influence on the minds of the Italians. 
 
 f Mr. Yon Bach was, at the beginning of the Austrian revolution in 1848, an 
 obscure lawyer in Vienna, who harangued and led the students in the Aula. No 
 paper, published in Austria or the German States, was then sufficiently liberal 
 for his democratic zeal. But he was soon converted to a different faith, accepted 
 ■office, and was, through the medium of the Arch Duchess Sophia, promoted t© 
 the rank of a cabinet minister. In that capacity, he systematized the reaction- 
 ary movement under various disguises ; and was mainly instrumental in the con- 
 clusion of the concordat which may safely be considered as his work. Neither 
 Count Buol Schauenstein, ex-minister of foreign affairs, nor Baron Bruck, the able 
 minister of finance, enjoyed, in the same degree, the confidence of the Emperor* 
 
 13 
 
146 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 may, at first, find it embarrassing ; but as soon as laymen shall be 
 introduced into the civil government of the Papal States, and the 
 line of demarcation drawn between that government and the 
 supremacy of the Pope in all things belonging exclusively to the 
 Roman Church, (in sacra) the principal difficulty in the way of 
 reform will be removed. We must not, of course, expect these 
 things to be done over night — " Rome," says the proverb, " was not 
 built in a day" — nor believe that these reforms will be introduced 
 without serious opposition from the reactionary party ; but good 
 sense will ultimately prevail, if moderation continues to characterize 
 the proceedings of the liberals. 
 
 But in order that the reforms about to be introduced may be 
 lasting, and serve as a basis for the national development of Italy, 
 the Pope must not appear to be coerced, or to yield his previous 
 convictions merely to a combination of circumstances beyond his 
 control. The Pope cannot be considered merely in the light of a 
 sovereign Prince. As such, he has the control over some three 
 millions of subjects : but as the head of the Catholic Church, he 
 has the spiritual control (circa sacra) over one hundred and fifty 
 millions of Europeans. Whatever shall lessen his spiritual au- 
 thority, or appear as an indignity offered to the Head of the Church, 
 might be accompanied by sad consequences in France and other 
 Catholic countries, without benefiting Italy. If the Pope appear 
 coerced, there will be a reactionary party in Italy and throughout 
 Catholic Europe, to oppose whatever has not received his sanction ; 
 while, if the Pope himself can be induced to separate his temporal 
 from his spiritual power, and to administer the former on liberal 
 principles, his example on all other Catholic sovereigns will be 
 irresistible. Liberty, then, will be received as an article of faith, 
 sanctified by the solemnities of religion. Such a state of things 
 may be brought about by forbearance and prudence, by gradually 
 extending the power and influence of the liberal members of the 
 Sacred College,* and by convincing the Holy Father that reforms 
 
 * Since writing the above, news has reached our shores that Cardinal Anto- 
 nelli, the chief of the Austrian party in the College of Cardinals, has resigned 
 the Presidency of the Pope's Council, though he still retains the office of Secre- 
 tary of State. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 147 
 
 in his temporal government, in spite of the threats of the sovereigns 
 of Austria and Naples, will not lead to a schism in the Church. 
 They will, on the contrary, increase his power by the harmony they 
 will introduce between his temporal and spiritual calling, and pro- 
 mote the welfare, not only of his subjects and of the Italians gener- 
 ally, but of the whole Catholic world. Pius IX. is not called 
 upon, by the Emperor Napoleon, to make war upon Austria or any 
 other Catholic Power ; his aid is invoked to make peace, and to 
 bless the birth-day of the Italian nation. 
 
 Those who imagine that Italy can only be saved by abolishing 
 Popery, and substituting Protestantism for Catholicism, take a very 
 narrow view of the history of human progress. A new Protestant 
 faith could not now be introduced in any part of Europe, except by 
 dividing the sects already in existence ; and there is no established 
 Protestant faith, in any part of Europe, which would satisfy the 
 heart and the genius of the people of Southern Europe. Religion, 
 to become the leading principle of action in all people of Roman 
 or Greek origin, must not merely appeal to the understanding, but 
 also to the senses ; — it must not merely consist in solemn ratioci- 
 nation, but be felt as something that has impressed itself on the 
 heart. To deprive the Church of its authority, in such communi- 
 ties, is not to reform the Catholic religion, it is simply to destroy 
 it without putting anything in its place. It would be equal to the 
 introduction of a moral and religious anarchy, such as we have 
 witnessed in France during the Reign of Terror. The Reforma- 
 tion which, in Germany, led to the separation of the churches, not 
 to the reform of the Catholic church, was followed by thirty years' 
 war, and ended in the division of the Germanic empire — a histo- 
 rical lesson which, under all circumstances, but especially at this 
 moment, when the national sentiment prevails over all others, is 
 not very inviting to the Italians. To this moment, the antagonism 
 between Protestant and Catholic Germany exists ; and yet the 
 Teutonic mind, which is naturally inclined to scepticism and rati- 
 ocination, is incomparably more considerate and calm than that of 
 the people of Italy. If the political union of Germany is now the 
 absorbing aim and desire of the whole German race, it is not be- 
 
148 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 cause the Catholics and Protestants, there, have concluded an eter- 
 nal peace; but because they have arrived at that point of religious 
 indifference, -where they can no longer find any serious matter for 
 dispute. It is exceedingly questionable whether the imaginative 
 mind of the Italians, surrounded as it is by works of art, to the 
 creation of which faith has essentially contributed, will ever arrive 
 at the German point of indifference ; and it is a matter for the 
 gravest consideration of statesmen, whether that point of indiffer- 
 ence in regard to religious matters, if it could be attained in Italy, 
 would be an element of political strength, at this or any other 
 period.* 
 
 We must, then, come to the conclusion that the introduction of 
 a religious schism in Italy, would be no means of achieving that 
 union which is indispensable to her safety : and that, whatever re- 
 forms may be necessary in the Papal States, must relate exclu- 
 sively to their civil government. That these reforms will be 
 brought about, that it will be impossible to reestablish the system 
 which prevailed previous to the late war, is confirmed by the atti- 
 tude of the people in the Roman Marks and Legations ; by the 
 organization which has there been effected, and by the armistice 
 which seems to have been tacitly agreed upon between the reform- 
 ers and the partisans of the present government. 
 
 The idea of an Italian Confederation, with the Pope for its no- 
 
 * It is a great mistake to suppose that the Catholic clergy, in a body, are op- 
 posed to liberal reforms either in Rome, or in any other part of Itaty. On the 
 contrary, the Priests in Lombardy, in Naples, in Piedmont, and in the Papal 
 States, have generally sided with the people ; and many of them have suffered 
 imprisonment and death for their heroic devotion to the cause of liberty. On 
 this subject, the historians, and the reports of the diplomatic and consular agents 
 of England and France (Protestants and Catholics) furnish the most ample and 
 conclusive testimony. That a portion of the Catholic Hierarchy, in their ultra- 
 conservative zeal, should oppose popular reforms, is, perhaps, inseparable from 
 their elevated position, which is productive of the same feeling in Churchmen 
 and Laymen, in Lords and Bishops. Ferdinand Cortez was certainly a good 
 Catholic, who ascribed his escape from Mexico, after the failure of his first at- 
 tack, simply to the intercession of St. Peter; but his faith did not prevent him 
 to implore Charles V. rather to send him Priests and Monks, than Bishops, to 
 convert the American Indiana. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 149 
 
 niinal President, needs no apology. The political union of the 
 free Italian States is indispensable to their national independence, 
 and consolidates what has been acquired at so terrible an expense. 
 The Italian Confederation now proposed, is the exact counterpart 
 of that League of Princes which, ever since the Congress of Vi- 
 enna, Metternich aimed at, as a means of extending Austrian in- 
 fluence and despotic rule over the whole Peninsula. That very 
 league, which the Austrian statesman partially established by sep- 
 arate treaties with the smaller Italian Princes, and which the 
 sovereigns of Sardinia at all times so stoutly opposed, is now prac- 
 tically dissolved by the elimination of these Princes, and the pro- 
 position of a confederation of liberal governments, against the 
 reactionary tendencies of Austria. Metternich's Italian states- 
 manship is now turned against himself; the means which he em- 
 ployed to crush Italy, are used to save her from Austrian domina- 
 tion. For though Austria is invited to become a member of the 
 Italian Confederacy, the Emperor of Austria will exercise no more 
 influence over it, than if he were simply Duke of Venetia. Doomed 
 to an unavoidable minority in council, he will have no influence on 
 its deliberation ; and an attempt to control it by force, will bring 
 him in conflict with all the Great Powers of Europe. The Italian 
 Confederacy, if it does not at once introduce " Italy one and indi- 
 visible" into the family of nations, will, nevertheless, be able to 
 effect many objects indispensable to the safety and welfare of the 
 country. It will devise means for common defence ; it will facili- 
 tate the building of railways and canals ; it will abolish the vex- 
 atious line of custom-houses between the several States, by the 
 establishment of tariff-leagues after the example of G-ermany ; and 
 it will bring the people of the different States and towns, who have 
 been divided by centuries of civil war, in friendly communion with 
 each other. It is by such means, Italy must be regenerated j not 
 by some absolute, abstract rule of action ; confounding all con- 
 ditions, and obliterating all historical recollections. 
 
 And if an Italian Confederacy is formed, who better than the 
 p pe_ w ho but the Pope can be its President ? Shall vanquished 
 Austria preside over its deliberations i None but a madman would 
 13* 
 
150 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 propose it. Shall Piedmont preside, with whom Austria has been 
 so recently at war ? National comity forbids it. Shall Naples 
 preside — she who is still an absolutist Power, and a stranger to 
 the whole arrangement ? None of the remaining sovereigns of 
 Italy can properly claim precedence oyer his peers , but they are 
 all Catholics, and can, as such, defer to the Head of the Church. 
 The Presidency of the Pope, so far from being unnatural, seems 
 to us the only means by which an Italian Confederacy can be suc- 
 cessfully organized, so as to command, from the start, the respect 
 of the world. 
 
 There is yet the matter of garrisoning the fortresses of the cele- 
 brated quadrangle. This, if not now, will hereafter lead to serious 
 complications. In the first place, we may ask, is Austria willing 
 to make federal fortresses of all or any of the four fortresses com- 
 posing that quadrangle? and, if so, how shall the federal fortresses 
 be garrisoned'? The federal fortresses of Germany have mixed 
 garrisons, and their commanders are alternately Austrians and 
 Prussians ; yet, even with such an understanding, questions have 
 arisen, not at all conducive to harmony ; how, then, shall we ex- 
 pect an agreement on this subject among the different States of 
 Italy % Shall the fortresses of Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, and 
 Legnano receive mixed garrisons, to which all the larger States of 
 Italy are to furnish their quota, or shall these fortresses be exclu- 
 sively garrisoned by Austrians ? If garrisoned exclusively by 
 Austrians, the troops will not consist of Italians ; but of Germans, 
 Hungarians, Croats, etc. ; for Austria, without Lombardy, will 
 not have enough Italian troops in her service to properly garrison 
 Verona and Mantua, much less the other places we have named. 
 The Lombard regiments which, during the war, were sent to Gal- 
 licia, Bohemia, and the German federal fortress of Kadstadt, can- 
 not be retained in the Austrian service after Lombardy itself is 
 surrendered ; and the Province of Venetia, be it dukedom or king- 
 dom, cannot furnish more than thirty or forty thousand men with 
 the system of conscription now in use in that Province. If the 
 Emperor of Austria, therefore, as an Italian Prince, honestly con- 
 sents to an Italian Confederation, he must also consent to the Ita- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 151 
 
 lian fortresses receiving Italian garrisons, which he cannot furnish 
 without the aid of his confederates. These points, we think, will 
 be the most difficult to settle ; and hence the formation of an Ita- 
 lian Confederacy was only, in general terms, agreed upon between 
 the two emperors. They will open a wide field for discussion and 
 future disagreement, which will be periodically renewed till Aus- 
 tria retires to the eastern shore of the Adriatic. But whether 
 Austria alone, or conjointly with her Italian confederates, occu- 
 pies these fortresses, if their garrisons are to be formed exclusively 
 of Italian troops, Austria might as well have surrendered them as 
 retained them in such custody. And yet, on no other terms can 
 she expect to be at peace either with her own Italian subjects, or 
 with the distrustful members of the new Italian Confederacy. 
 To sum up, the condition of Italy has never been more promis- 
 ing than now ; and it would be folly and ingratitude in her not to 
 acknowledge the vast advantages secured to her by the Peace of 
 Villafranca. If all she desired has not been accomplished, all that 
 she could reasonably hope for is still within her reach. The pre- 
 sent political constellation is more propitious to Italy, than any 
 that thirty generations have seen, in that beautiful land. If the 
 Italians have the tact, prudence, moderation, and fortitude for 
 which we are willing to give them credit, and which they have so 
 strikingly exhibited in their late conduct, the day of their final 
 deliverance is already dawning upon them. 
 
152 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 NAPLES AND SICILY. WILL THE DYNASTY OF THE SICILIAN 
 BOURBONS BE CONTINUED? WHAT CHANGES ARE LIKELY TO 
 FOLLOW THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA — THE MURATISTS — THE 
 IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLAND OF SICILY. 
 
 Of all the States of Italy, none have been so long and so tho- 
 roughly misgoverned as Naples and Sicily. Though the Sicilians, 
 whose nobility claim the honor of Norman descent, had fought 
 bravely for a separate constitution and government, and were pro- 
 mised both, by Ferdinand I. and his English protectors, during the 
 wars with France, the Congress of Vienna decided (and Metternich 
 and Talleyrand received pensions for aiding in this decision) that 
 the island shall be joined to Naples, and that Ferdinand I. should 
 be recognized as King of the Two Sicilies. The Neapolitan yoke 
 was a terrible infliction on the Sicilians 5 but their many heroic and 
 sanguinary struggles to throw it off, only ended in their entire sub- 
 jugation. The revolution of 1820, in Naples, only revived the 
 hopes of the islanders to establish a separate government of their 
 own, and aided the coercive movement of the Austrians, by divid- 
 ing the forces of the Liberals. After the Austrians had entered 
 Naples, they also occupied Sicily ; but the foreigners were hardly 
 as much detested as the Neapolitans. What the Sicilians wanted, 
 was a Constitution after the British model, with a House of Peers 
 and a House of Commons. Republican tendencies existed in no 
 part of the island ; and Mazzini and his emissaries never succeeded 
 in making the least impression on its inhabitants. 
 
 In 1818, the Sicilians again rose, and having driven out the 
 Neapolitan troops, succeeded in establishing a government of their 
 own, which was favorably received, though not officially recog- 
 nized, by. England and France. These powers were unwilling to 
 recognize a Republic; but when, on the 11th of July, 1848, the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 153 
 
 Puke of Genoa (second son of Charles Albert and brother of the 
 present King of Sardinia) was declared King of Sicily, under the 
 name of Albert Amadeus I., the French and English Admirals 
 saluted the Sicilian flag, and an English steam-vessel carried the 
 Envoy, with the offer of the crown, to Genoa. 
 
 Charles Albert, who in the meantime, had been driven out of 
 Lombardy, was not in a condition to accept the crown of Sicily for 
 his son ; but rather sought to conciliate the King of Naples, whose 
 assistance he now required for a second campaign against Austria. 
 The King of Naples, however, not only refused to send troops to 
 his aid, but preferred employing them against Sicily. Filangieri 
 with 16,000 troops was dispatched against that unhappy island, 
 which was now, by France and England, abandoned to its fate. 
 Messina, which had been shelled from the citadel for eight long 
 months — and which, in return for this favor, had bestowed on the 
 King of Naples the title of il Re Bomba* — was now, for the fourth 
 time, bombarded, and only taken after a four days' hand-to-hand 
 fight, and after the batteries of the town had been silenced from 
 want of ammunition. A truce was now agreed upon, and Eng- 
 land and France again interceded between the king and his Sici- 
 lian subjects ; but in vain. The campaign reopened, and the in- 
 surgents were again beaten. After Catania had fallen, Palermo, 
 advised by the French Admiral Baudin, surrendered on condition 
 of a general amnesty. Filangieri entered with his Neapolitan sol- 
 diers ; but no amnesty was granted, and the leaders, as hereto- 
 fore, handed over to the executioner. 
 
 The fate of the Neapolitan constitution was even more melan- 
 choly. The King, a crafty hypocrite, like his two predecessors, 
 never intended that it should go into force ; and, from the first mo- 
 ment of its granting, and for months previous, negotiated with 
 Austria for military assistance. But Austria, at that time, re- 
 quired all her troops at home, and the King of Naples was obliged 
 (10th February, 1848,) to proclaim a constitution. Five days 
 later, on the occasion of a procession to solemnize the event, Lord 
 Napier delivered, from the balcony of the British Embassy, the 
 
 * The King of the Bomb-shells. 
 
154 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 following remarkable speech : " Happy are these clays, when Ita- 
 lian liberty and independence are forever secured. Italian nation- 
 ality is no longer an affair of sentiment and desire, but a reality. 
 Let all rally round their institutions, to secure the triumph against 
 the stranger. Long live the independence of Italy ! Long live 
 Ferdinand II. !" We do not, for a moment, doubt the sincerity of 
 his Lordship ; but between the love of Italian independence, as 
 expressed by the British Minister on that occasion, and the subse- 
 quent advice of the British government to the King of Naples, 
 " not to engage in a war with Austria, to promote the interests of 
 the King of Sardinia," there is such a palpable contradiction, that 
 none but the British Premier himself can explain it. More intel- 
 ligible was the previous offer of Admiral Parker, to protect the 
 King of Naples with his fleet. 
 
 The opening of the Neapolitan Chamber w T as fixed on the 1st 
 May ; but owing to some imperfections in the electoral college, 
 Parliament was prorogued to the 15th. On that day, however, 
 the city was filled with troops ; and a quarrel between the people 
 and the soldiers having been artfully provoked, the artillery from 
 the forts was ordered to fire upon the town, and a general massa- 
 cre ensued, which only ended at night. In the midst of the car- 
 nage, and while the houses of the liberals were being burnt and 
 sacked, the King sent a message to the Parliament, ordering it to 
 disperse, as he should otherwise employ force. Resistance was, of 
 course, hopeless, and the members left, under protest. Some of the 
 ministers, imploring the King to put a stop to the slaughter, were 
 told that " the time for clemency was past, and that the people 
 must now render up an account for their actions. " The following 
 day the National Guards were disbanded, and the city placed under 
 martial law. Thus ended the first act of the Neapolitan Constitu- 
 tional drama. 
 
 Italy, however, was not yet pacified • and though the Nea- 
 politan troops were withdrawn from Lombardy, the Piedmontese 
 had obtained a victory at Goito. The King of Naples, there- 
 fore, gave a new electoral law, and convoked Parliament for 
 the 1st of July. Though the electoral law was changed, and every 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 155 
 
 species of intimidation used, nearly the same Deputies were re- 
 turned. Parliament actually opened on the clay appointed ; but 
 there was no reliance on the King, either on the part of the Depu- 
 ties or the people ; and this want of confidence was soon justified 
 by the King's acts. Scarcely had the Peers and Commons (each 
 separately) voted the address, before the King, even without re- 
 ceiving it, signed the decree for the prorogation of Parliament. A 
 bloody riot accompanied the adjournment. The royal treachery is 
 explained by the fact that, on the 25th and 26th of July, (nearly 
 a month after the opening of the Neapolitan Chambers,) the Sardi- 
 nian army was beaten in Lombardy, and Radetzky had again 
 crossed the Mincio. 
 
 But the Hungarian Revolution was now making considerable pro- 
 gress, and Charles Albert was again arming to retrieve his political 
 fortune. The King of Naples, therefore, convoked another Par- 
 liament, for the 30th November ; but on the 24th November ad- 
 journed it until the 1st February, 1849. What enlightened Ita- 
 lians thought of this new convocation, is emphatically expressed 
 by a single line of Carlo Poerio, in a letter to General Pepe, dated 
 Naples, 4th Dec. 1848 : " Another Bartholomew threatens all who 
 will not sell body and soul." The new Parliament, whose liberal 
 composition was similar to that of its predecessors, was hardly 
 recognized by the King's ministers, and on the 13th March it was 
 formally dissolved. 
 
 Thus closed the Neapolitan Parliamentary play, with its cruel, 
 sanguinary episodes ; but the end was not yet. The loss of the 
 battle of Novara by the Piedmontese, and the victory of Radetzky, 
 furnished Ferdinand II., of the Two Sicilies, matter for an epilogue. 
 Feeling, at last, secure against all chances of success of the liberal 
 party in Italy, he ordered criminal proceedings to be instituted 
 against all who had borne a prominent part in the late patriotic 
 movements. The worthiest men in the land were now either ex- 
 ecuted, banished or thrown into prison. Mr. Gladstone has de- 
 scribed the sufferings of some of these patriots ; and the Neapolitan 
 dungeons have since become as famous, through the eloquent pen 
 
156 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 of the British translator of the Iliad, as those of the Spielberg by 
 the graphic pencil of Silvio Pellico. 
 
 Ferdinand II., after having thus carried out his purpose " to be 
 King — alone, and always King," as expressed, in his remarkable 
 letter to his uncle, Louis Philippe, referred to in another chapter,* 
 locked himself up — not in a convent, but in a fortress — the only place 
 in his kingdom where he thought himself safe from the vengeance of 
 his subjects. He there died, of a frightful lingering disease, which 
 made him an object of loathing to his own family ; cursed by the 
 thousands he had betrayed, and seeing his throne again surrounded 
 by dangers from the rekindled patriotism of the Italian people, 
 and the victorious progress of their arms. His son by his first 
 w T ife, Marina Christina, of Savoy, (youngest daughter of Victor 
 Emanuel I.,) born on the 16th of January, 1836, succeeded him, 
 as Francis II. of the Two Sicilies, without any of those manifesta- 
 tions of hope or joy which usually greet a young sovereign on his 
 accession to the throne. The Neapolitans and Sicilians have ceased 
 to hope for the introduction of political reforms, except through 
 revolution and bloodshed. There is nothing the King might pro- 
 mise that could, for a moment, inspire the people with confidence — 
 nothing that he could do, which would not instantly be construed into 
 a new artifice of deceit and dissimulation. No other government in 
 Europe is, in a moral point of view, so completely bankrupt as the 
 Neapolitan ; no other line of sovereigns so thoroughly hated and 
 detested by the people. f It is the loyalty of the Piedmontese 
 people, their entire confidence in the sacredness of the King's 
 word, their conviction of his honesty, which have sustained Victor 
 Emanuel II. in the darkest hour of his life. Had his ancestors left 
 such a historical record as the First and Second Ferdinand of Na- 
 ples, he might now be an exile in England, or a citizen of the 
 United States. How easy it would have been for the present 
 King of Sardinia, to make his peace with Austria, by revoking 
 the constitution and crushing the liberty of the people ! And how 
 
 * See page 64. 
 
 f The only popularity the late King Ferdinand enjoyed was among the Laz- 
 zaroni — the nobility and gentry, the learned and educated, -were equally opposed 
 to his rule. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 157 
 
 difficult and beset with dangers is the path he is now treading, 
 unless he feels that he is supported and loved by a whole people ! 
 
 The want of confidence in their King, which the Neapolitan people 
 have transferred from Ferdinand II. to his son, and which is strength- 
 ened bj the still lively recollections of the enormities committed 
 by Ferdinand I. and Queen Caroline of Austria, is an insuperable 
 obstacle to any beneficial changes which the present sovereign may 
 intend to introduce in his kingdom. If he granted a new consti- 
 tution to-morrow, few would believe that it is his purpose to sup- 
 port it ; and the members of the new Parliament would not venture 
 to take their seats, without first ascertaining that their voices are 
 not likely to be drowned by the roar of the King's artillery. 
 Neither can the King, after the record left by his father, confide 
 in his subjects. It is so natural for a southern people to love or to 
 hate — how much more then must this hold of the people at the foot 
 of Mount Vesuvius and Mount iEtna ! And yet, without mutual 
 confidence between the sovereign and his subjects, a constitutional 
 government is practically impossible, and far more demoralizing 
 than an absolute despotism. But it will be urged that there is a 
 constitution in Naples, which, though fallen into desuetude, has 
 never been revoked. Will any one assert that elections, under that 
 constitution, could now be held with a satisfactory result'? The 
 present King, if he wants to establish a liberal government, must 
 use none of the blood-stained lumber of the old political machine 
 of his father ; he must strike out a new path, and consign the old 
 one, if possible, to oblivion. But will he do this ? " The Bour- 
 bon's are old," said his father, in his letter to Louis Philippe, 
 " and if they wished to remodel themselves, after the fashion of the 
 new dynasties, they would render themselves ridiculous." We 
 doubt much if Francis II. has the least disposition to render him- 
 self ridiculous ; the education he received being a sufficient gua- 
 rantee against all such unworthy suspicions. 
 
 But of what use can constitutions be in Naples or Sicily, as long 
 
 as the available and best part of the Neapolitan army consists 
 
 of mercenaries? As early as July, 1821, did Ferdinand I. 
 
 disband his former army, which had been raised by conscription, 
 
 14 
 
158 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and which, in fact, had made the revolution of 1820 ; only the Guards 
 and the gens d'armes were retained. The new army was entirely 
 formed by enlistments ; and, from that time, it has been a wilful and 
 ready instrument in the hands of the King. It was the army, and 
 especially the Swiss regiments, who, on the 15th of May, 1848, 
 established anarchy and despotism on the ruins of a constitutional 
 government, and who, since that period, have been the main sup- 
 port of the Neapolitan throne.* 
 
 The transition from an absolute military despotism, to a liberal 
 representative government, is, under all circumstances, fraught 
 with difficulties and dangers ; but with the antecedents of the Ne- 
 apolitan government, it would be doubly so in Naples and Sicily. 
 The Neapolitan army, unlike that of every other Italian State, is 
 exclusively devoted to the King ; and an object of detestation to 
 the people, with whom it has not a single sentiment in common. 
 The army, therefore, would have to be disbanded and another one 
 formed, or newly officered, to inspire public confidence. The 
 Swiss regiments could not be continued a day after the establish- 
 ment of a liberal government, and the same holds of the present 
 organization of the police. Without these radical changes, there 
 would be no safety for the constitution ; no protection either to the 
 members of Parliament, or to those who sympathize with them. 
 But would the King and the royal family consider themselves safe 
 under such a new arrangement ? Would not the old party feuds, 
 stimulated by the spirit of revenge, break forth with fresh viru- 
 lence, and menace both the King and his Parliament ? 
 
 Another difficulty consists in the unquenchable desire of the 
 Sicilians for a separate government. Sicily, in that respect, bears 
 the same relation to Naples, which Norway does to Sweden. They 
 want a Parliament of their own, and a separate administration. 
 Norway made the same demand on Sweden in 1815, and King Ber- 
 naclotte had the good sense to grant it, rather than invade Norway, 
 
 ;:: Francis I., grandfather of the present kiug, had no great appreciation of the 
 Neapolitan soldiers; but a high regard for the Swiss. When his Guards de- 
 manded to be dressed in red, after the fashion of the " brave English,*' the King 
 replied, " Dress them in blue or in red ; they are sure to run." 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 159 
 
 and enforce obedience through military force. Yet Bernadotte 
 was a general. The Sicilian Bourbons, who were no soldiers at 
 all, acted differently ; and Messina, Palermo and Catania have be- 
 come historical monuments of their cruelty and folly. Yet the 
 hatred of the Sicilians of Neapolitan rule, and the desire for inde- 
 pendence, are, at this moment, as strong as ever. At the Congress 
 of Verona, Metternich, who was aware that the Sicilians hated the 
 Germans less than the Neapolitans, proposed the separation of the 
 two governments ; but France opposed it, and England protested 
 against it ; and the proposition was dropped. But in 1848, Lord 
 Minto, in his dispatch to Lord Palmerston, admitted the justice of 
 the demand of Sicily, " who had as good a cause for revolution as 
 England had in 1688." England mediated, but effected nothing ; 
 and when the King of Naples felt strong enough to throw off all 
 diplomatic restraint, he plainly told the British minister that he 
 would govern Sicily as he thought proper, and that England had 
 no right to interfere with his sovereign pleasure. Diplomatic re- 
 lations between England and Naples were afterwards entirely sus- 
 pended, and remained so till the death of Ferdinand. 
 
 The question now is, wdiat shall become of the Kingdom of the 
 Two Sicilies, in the present condition of Italy? Can the present 
 absolute rule of Francis II. continue for any length of time, with 
 Piedmont and Central Italy in arms, determined to establish and 
 uphold representative governments ? Can Italian freedom be 
 secured, with more than a third of the whole population of Italy 
 still subject to military despotism ? The King of Naples, himself, 
 does not seem to think so, as he is evidently preparing for a crisis. 
 Whether he intends to invade the Papal States, or simply to defend 
 himself against possible encroachments of the liberal army of Cen- 
 tral Italy, certain it is that the concentration of Neapolitan troops, 
 on the frontier of the Boman States, does not argue favorably for 
 the Italian cause. If he intended to grant a constitution, such as 
 is likely to satisfy his people, he would not put his army on the 
 war footing ; and thereby ruin his finances, which, in spite of his 
 despotism, his father left in a tolerably satisfactory condition. 
 Francis II., then, is resolved to resist the popular movement which 
 
160 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 sweeps over Italy, and to assume all the responsibility attending 
 that revolution. He may, like his father, have no disposition to share 
 the fate of Charles X. or Louis Philippe ; but will he be able to avoid 
 it % If the King of Naples were to follow his inclination, and inter- 
 vene in the affairs of Rome, a casus belli would at once be presented, 
 the result of which, if Austria is kept at bay by France, would be 
 overwhelming. Francis II. is a young, inexperienced prince ; and 
 his queen, a Bavarian princess, sister of the Empress of Austria, 
 may be ambitious. Both are, moreover, animated by a religious 
 zeal, artfully stimulated by the leaders of the reactionary parties 
 in Vienna and Rome. Thus circumstanced, and surrounded by 
 indiscreet advisers, emboldened by former successes, they may be 
 betrayed into a rash act, and realize, in their own case, the truth 
 of Pitt's remark, that " there is nothing so short-lived as a military 
 despotism." 
 
 The present strength and organization of the Neapolitan army 
 are, undoubtedly, sufficient to enable the King, if left free to attend 
 to his domestic affairs, to resist any demand of the people for 
 popular reform. Whether he will be able to do so for a consider- 
 able length of time, is doubtful ; but as long as the affairs of Cen- 
 tral Italy remain unsettled, as long as constitutionalism is not 
 definitely organized in the Duchies, and modified in the Papal 
 States, the King of Naples will not change his form of government. 
 Once entirely isolated from all the other States of Italy, he will 
 be obliged to yield ; but it may then be " too late." If the King 
 be once obliged to yield, he has no longer the power to prescribe 
 limits to the demands of the people. 
 
 But the King, relying on his army, seems to be disposed to take 
 the initiative, and we can imagine a combination of circumstances 
 which may lead him to believe that he can do so with advantage. 
 A move of that sort, however, unless all Italy is crushed, and 
 Austria again reinstated in Lombardy, is sure to cost him his 
 crown. There can be no more compromise between him and his 
 subjects — between Francis II., of the Two Sicilies, and Italy. 
 And he had better have a care, too, not to involve himself, even 
 diplomatically, with the King of Sardinia and his allies ; lest cause 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 161 
 
 be found to invade Lis own country. In his present situation, lie 
 cannot afford to lose a battle. His troops, once beaten, would be 
 treated as intruders ; the Piedmontese, as the liberators of the 
 country. 
 
 And, in this connection, we may as well ask what would become of 
 Naples and Sicily, if the royal family were exiles in England or Aus- 
 tria 1 Republican elements there are but few, either in Naples or 
 Sicily ; and it is doubtful whether these could be combined into a 
 government sufficiently powerful to protect life and property at 
 home, and sufficiently conservative to maintain friendly relations 
 with the other States of Europe. The revolution of 1820 was en- 
 tirely achieved by the military ; though the people afterwards joined 
 it (as was lately the case in Florence) and the Parliament, convoked 
 in that year, was as loyal to the sovereign as could have been 
 desired by a king of Great Britain. In the Parliaments which 
 met at Naples in May and July, 1848, and in February, 1849, 
 there were but few Republicans. The charge of Republicanism, 
 preferred against many members, was trumped up for the purpose 
 of charging them with treason against the crown.* The majority 
 in each Parliament was in favor of an Italian Union ; nothing else. 
 A Neapolitan or Sicilian Republic was not even in the programme 
 of Mazzini; much less in that of the Neapolitan or Sicilian liberals. 
 Besides, it must be clear to the humblest political capacity, that a 
 Republic often millions of people, or even of seven millions, (Naples 
 alone) would not, in the present situation of Europe, be recog- 
 nized by any of the five Great Powers. But if either the Nea- 
 politans, or the Sicilians, chose a King, the case would be different. 
 We have seen that the Sicilians, in 1848, did choose a King, and 
 that the choice fell on the Duke of Genoa, brother of Victor 
 Emanuel II. The French and English admirals, in Palermo, 
 
 * To give the reader an idea of the manner in which political trials were eon- 
 ducted in Naples and Sicily under the late king, we need only mention the case 
 of six poor political criminals who, in January 1850, were handed over to a 
 court martial, with this injunction to the judges: "These prisoners are to be 
 found guilty and must be executed to-day." Judges which found the accused 
 guilty were rewarded, those who voted for their acquittal were punished. 
 
 14* 
 
162 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 saluted his flag in token of recognition ; and had Charles Albert 
 not been defeated by the Austrians, Albert Amadous I. would 
 have remained King of Sicily. Sicily, it may safely be presumed, 
 will attempt another revolution ; and if Francis II. be otherwise 
 engaged, it may succeed and end in another choice of royalty.* 
 
 If there is to be an Italian Confederation, with the kings of 
 Sardinia and Venetia as members, there can be no good objection 
 to a King of Sicily, and another one of Naples. The separation 
 of these two kingdoms would satisfy the people, and there would 
 be no Bourbon interest in France to oppose it. But would Eng- 
 land consent to it ? We imagine that her assent to such a propo- 
 sition would depend on the choice of the King. Piedmont, being 
 already enlarged by the acquisition of Lombardy, and the probable 
 annexation of Parma and Modena — perhaps Tuscany, could hardly 
 claim Sicily, even as a secunclo-geniture, unless she were disposed 
 to cede the Island of Sardinia — perhaps Savoy, whose inhabitants 
 are French — to France. This might displease England ; but would 
 she go to war for it ? We hardly think so. Certainly not while 
 French and English troops fight side by side in China ; and, while a 
 disturbance of those happy relations, might find a French fleet 
 and French troops in the Indian ocean. Again, supposing a Sar- 
 dinian Prince out of the question, might not the choice of the Sici- 
 lians fall on another member of the King of Sardinia's family ? 
 What, if the choice fell on Prince Napoleon, son-in-law of the King 
 of Sardinia ? Such a choice is quite possible, and would hardly be 
 seriously objected to, unless a descendant of Joachim Murat be, at 
 the same time, called to the throne of Naples. That the Muratists 
 in Naples, in case of a revolution, would enlist a powerful party in 
 favor of such a change of dynasty, is quite probable j but the 
 
 * The separation of Sicily from Naples presents a parallel case to the separa- 
 tion of Belgium from Holland, effected by revolution, approved by the London 
 Conferences, and finally assured by French arms, under Marshal Gerard ,• only 
 that in the case of Sicily — an island — the separation has been effected by nature, 
 •while Belgium which is contiguous to Holland, was separated by an act of vio- 
 lence, only subsequently legalized by treaty. Violence, in the case of Sicily, 
 effected and maintained its junction with Naples, unless the treaties of Vienna 
 are invoked to justify it. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 163 
 
 Emperor Napoleon has practiced wisdom and moderation too long, 
 to accede to such a double proposition. France is too great and 
 powerful, to seek territorial aggrandizement in Italy ; but Sicily 
 would be a maritime acquisition, for which the French Emperor 
 might consent to let an Austrian Arch Duke mount the throne of 
 Naples — provided Austria gave up Yenetia. In this manner, the 
 balance of power might be still preserved on the continent of 
 Europe. Let us consult figures : — 
 
 Inhabitants. 
 
 Austria has lost Lombardy with . . . 2,750,000 
 Add to this the possible loss of Tuscany, (Aus- 
 trian Secundo-Greniture) 
 
 1,800,000 
 
 And Modena, 600,000 
 
 Total loss of Emperor and Arch Dukes, . 5,150,000 
 
 If an Austrian Secundo-Geniture were created 
 in Naples, there would revert to the House of 
 
 Habsburg 7,000,000 
 
 Or two millions more than she lost, for which, and a consideration 
 in money, she might give up Yenetia with 2,750,000 inhabitants. 
 The Emperor of Austria might, besides, receive a suitable com- 
 pensation on the Danube, where the Sultan possesses now nothing 
 but a nominal suzerainty, which, in his present financial embarrass- 
 ments, and the still unchecked extravagance of the Seraglio, he 
 would willingly exchange for a sum of money, or a loan at a 
 nominal rate of interest. The only serious obstacle to this arrange- 
 ment might be Russia ; but there are other means, to which we may 
 refer hereafter, of procuring the assent of the great Northern 
 Power. 
 
164 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 EFFECTS OF THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA ON PRUSSIA, AUSTRIA 
 AND THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION. 
 
 Germany has been profoundly agitated since tbe reactionary 
 movement of 1849 ; though the failure of the revolution of 1848, 
 the fear and general distrust which have followed it, the revival of 
 the petty jealousies between the smaller Princes, and the more 
 serious antagonism between Austria and Prussia, prevented any 
 public manifestation of popular sentiment. Every one felt that 
 the situation was intolerable, every body hoped that it would soon 
 be changed ; none had the courage to propose a remedy. During 
 the Crimean war, Germany had played a part so utterly insignifi- 
 cant, that she was hardly considered a political Power; while 
 Austria, by her ambiguous conduct, irritated Russia without satis- 
 fying the allies. The government of Prussia had relapsed into a 
 state of torpor — that of Austria signalized at least some vigor in 
 organizing a formidable army, enlarging and reconstructing her 
 navy, and in making earnest preparations for the resumption of 
 specie-payments. All these efforts suffered a terrible check by the 
 late war ; and arrested, at least for a decade, the development of 
 her vast material resources.* Germany proper was in a better 
 
 * It was charged upon the Emperor Napoleon that his new year's salutation 
 to the Austrian minister in Paris, forced the National Bank of Austria to stop 
 specie payments, which she had just then partially resumed. Since the com- 
 mencement of the war, she has even taxed the interest and coupons of her public 
 debt; and it is now charged, though the Austrian papers stoutly deny it, that 
 being unable to contract a new loan, even at ruinous rates, she emitted spurious 
 bonds of former loans, and disposed of them at current rates, at the various stock 
 exchanges of Europe. This, is seems, was done about the same time that steps 
 were proposed to be taken in Frankfort, either to shame the delinquent American 
 Railway Companies into propriety, or to take legal steps to foreclose on their 
 mortgage bonds. Every bankrupt in Europe was then pleading "losses by the 
 American crisis;" but Austria is not entitled to the benefit of such a plea; be- 
 cause she has never trusted the Republic. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 165 
 
 condition. The long continued peace, joined to the industrious 
 and frugal habits of the people, had stimulated commerce and 
 manufactures ; while successive good harvests had vastly improved 
 the condition of the peasantry. Compared to former times, Ger- 
 many was rich, capital abundant, and labor adequately rewarded. 
 This condition of things had produced a superficial calm ; but the 
 greater material comfort of the industrious classes only increased 
 their desire to have a share in the government, and their political 
 discontent. What little of political life was left in some of the 
 States, was in constant conflict with the government ; indicating a 
 disposition, on the part of the people, to exhaust every legal means 
 to procure relief, and a determination not to yield except to su- 
 perior force. The moderation of the more or less absolute Princes, 
 practiced under these circumstances, furnished the best practical 
 proof of the insecurity of their position. The general condition of 
 the people was, perhaps, tolerable ; but from its nature, transitory. 
 With undefined political rights, and no guarantee for maintaining 
 even these, neither the people nor the princes felt assured of the 
 future. They knew that a change must come ; but not knowing 
 in which direction, they had no means of preparing for it. One 
 idea only was prominent in every man's mind — that Germany, 
 to weigh in the balance of European Powers, must act as a unit, 
 and that, to accomplish this great end, reforms must be introduced, 
 not only in the local governments of the different States, but also 
 in the organization of the Germanic Confederation. German 
 nationality, from being the dream of the poets and songsters, had 
 become the leading theme of public discussion ; and was adroitly 
 put forward even by those who least believed in it, as an element 
 of political power. The statesmen of Austria and Prussia made 
 all sails to catch the popular breeze, and men who, but a few 
 years previous, would have been persecuted as demagogues or 
 conspirators, were now applauded for their patriotic sentiments, 
 and became the objects of royal or imperial favor.* 
 
 * There was a time in Austria, when the popular song, "Was is des Deittschen 
 Vaterland ? (What is the Fatherland of the Germans?)" was prohibited under 
 pain of imprisonment, lest an Austrian might mistake Germany for his native 
 country. 
 
166 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 While the Germans were thus permitted to discuss the necessity 
 of German union, the men of mind among them were not forgetful 
 of the lessons of 1848, and not disposed, without a reasonable 
 chance of success, to risk a popular movement. The Liberals of 
 Germany, compromising nearly all the educated and wealthy 
 classes, and a considerable portion of the nobility, had become 
 circumspect • the reactionary party, conciliatory, because reduced 
 to a small minority. The Republicans, especially the leaders, 
 were mostly in exile, scattered over the whole globe : and their 
 cause — from the extravagance of some of their doctrines, and the 
 extreme measures by which, it is believed, they intended to carry 
 them into execution — was discredited at home. No substantial 
 man in Germany is now in favor of a Red Republic ; and it was a 
 great blunder, on the part of the Republicans of 1848, to avow, 
 that no other republic could maintain itself against its adversa- 
 ries. The horrors of the French Republic of 1793 held out but 
 few attractions to the philosophic, contemplative mind of the Ger- 
 mans ; and but indifferently encouraged the expectations of a re- 
 viving industry. The declaration of the Republicans was a con- 
 fession of their weakness — for no coercive measures of a violent 
 character are necessary, where a clearly ascertained majority is at 
 liberty to exercise power — and an open avowal that a republic, if 
 it were established, could only last for a short time, through an 
 intolerable despotism. 
 
 From republicanism thus weakened by the apprehension of ter- 
 rorism, and still further reduced by the menacing attitude of so- 
 cialism, the German Liberals gradually returned to more moderate 
 political views. Upon reflection, they found that there were many 
 things which they had an interest to preserve, and that the re- 
 forms which they desired to introduce, might be sought by legiti- 
 mate means more immediately within their reach. In this manner 
 Constitutionalism was, with a very large party, substituted for 
 Republicanism — a Limited Monarchy, with Representative Cham- 
 bers, for a prospective Reign of Terror. 
 
 There still remained, however, the old physical obstacle to the 
 union of Germany, and the formation of a strong central govern- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 167 
 
 ment — the fatal dualism of Austria and Prussia. Austria is the 
 historical power of Germany ; Prussia, the revolutionary one. 
 Prussia has fed and grown on the debris of Austria : Austria 
 looks on Prussia as a parasitical plant, which saps her vitals. A 
 lasting reconciliation between these two Powers is impossible ; be- 
 cause it is their nature to oppose each other ; since, what makes the 
 one great, diminishes the power of the other. But this antagon- 
 ism, strong as it naturally was, has, during the last ten years, 
 assumed a far more threatening aspect than at any time since the 
 Seven Years' War between Frederic the Great and the Empress 
 Maria Therese — it approached the nature of a conflict. 
 
 Austria, since the Italian and Hungarian revolutions of 1848 
 and 1819, has abandoned her system of isolation (which did not 
 secure her against conspiracies and revolts) and returned to her 
 former relation as a German Power. " I speak as a German 
 Prince, to my confederates," were the words of the Emperor Fran- 
 cis Joseph, when, in addressing himself to the Diet, he in vain 
 sought to identify his Italian cause with that of Germany. He 
 felt that, by abolishing the separate local governments which, 
 under the auspices of the Imperial crown, existed in Hungary, 
 Gallicia, Bohemia, etc., and substituting for them a great central 
 power in Vienna, he musfc make one nationality prevail over all 
 the others ; and he naturally selected the German one, which was 
 the most loyal of them all, and the most devoted to the fortunes 
 of his family. The ancestors of the Emperor Francis Joseph of 
 Austria had, for generations, been Emperors of Germany; the 
 historical recollections of the Germans pleaded in his favor; and 
 there was some hope of not only Germanizing the foreign elements 
 in the Austrian empire, but also of rekindling, in Germany, the 
 affection for the old Imperial House. But there was Prussia, 
 created by the energy and genius of its Princes, with her seats of 
 learning, her advanced civilization, her superior administration of 
 justice, her well-regulated system of finance and her military 
 organization, which has raised her to the rank of a Great Power ! 
 Prussia was too far advanced ; Austria had started too late in the 
 race to overtake her. The great body of the German people, the 
 
168 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 intelligent, industrious classes, who- bad become wealthy by the 
 long peace and the fostering of material interests, did not look to 
 Austria for salutary reforms : her commercial laws were consid- 
 ered a century behind the age; and the Concordat which she 
 concluded with the Pope, and with which she intended to prop up 
 her government in Italy, was loudly condemned even by the Ca- 
 tholics. They accused the Emperor Francis Joseph of having 
 made concessions to the Holy See, which the latter did not ask 
 for ; and which, had they been demanded by a Pope before the 
 introduction of Protestantism, would have been refused by every 
 Emperor of the Houses of Swabia or Saxony. " The Hohenstauf- 
 fens," they added, " would have answered such a demand by a 
 campaign in Italy ; and every Christian in Germany would have 
 followed them, in those days." So reasoned the majority of the 
 German Catholics — all who did not absolutely belong to the ultra- 
 montaine party; and the Catholic clergy, for the most part, joined 
 them. Not even the clergy of the German Catholic Provinces of 
 Austria could be united in the support of the Concordat. No one 
 believed that it emanated from the emperor's piety, or that other 
 than political objects prompted its conclusion. It was looked 
 upon as an abdication of power, unworthy the sovereign. While 
 the Pope could not well refuse what was offered, the emperor was 
 charged with the design of establishing additional police regula- 
 tions in matters of conscience, the more easily to govern and con- 
 trol his subjects. It was the political, not the religious, merit of 
 the Concordat which was discussed in Germany, and condemned. 
 From the stand-point of German religious indifference, which is 
 far better understood and appreciated in Pvome than at Vienna, no 
 other view could be taken of it, and no other conclusions arrived 
 at. It was the greatest political mistake made by Austria, since 
 1814, and it may prove a fatal one. It has availed her nothing 
 in Italy ; and it has excited a storm of indignation, even among 
 her most ardent partisans, in Germany. 
 
 Prussia, since 1848 and '49, after suffering various humiliations 
 from Austria, which indicated a disposition to humble her even 
 with the assistance of Russia, reduced her antagonism to Austria 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 169 
 
 to a system. Whatever Austria demanded, Prussia opposed — 
 either at the reestablished Diet at Frankfort, or in her negotia- 
 tions from State to State. She felt, to use an American phrase, 
 that Austria was " crowding " her — -that she and Austria were 
 pursuing the same object ; and that the success of one, must 
 necessarily involve the disappointment and discomfiture of the 
 other. Hence, the attitude of Prussia during the Crimean war ; 
 her elose alliance with Russia, and her present unwillingness to 
 uphold Austrian power in Italy. On this subject, Prussia used 
 no disguise. Her sentiments were known in Paris, St. Peters- 
 burg, and London, as well as in Vienna. Prussia, during the 
 last Italian war, was willing to arm for Germany — she would de- 
 fend German interests against any assailing Power, be it France or 
 Russia — she would defend every village and hamlet belonging to 
 the Germanic Confederation ; but she stoutly denied that the in- 
 terests of Germany were parallel to those of Austria, or that it 
 was incumbent on Prussia and the States of the Germanic Con- 
 federation, to uphold Austria in the possession of her non-German 
 provinces. Prussian, and other liberal partisans, went even far- 
 ther. They boldly asserted that it would be better for Germany 
 if Austria were stripped of all her Italian possessions, and of 
 Hungary and Transylvania to boot ; because, then, she would be 
 compelled to foster German interests, instead of sacrificing these 
 to her policy in Hungary and Sclavonia, Transylvania and Gal- 
 licia. If Austria were reduced to her German States, then Prus- 
 sia would have the ascendancy in Germany ; and that union, which 
 it is in vain to hope for as long as Austria and Prussia retain their 
 present limits, would at once be spontaneously established. That 
 this is a part of the Prussian creed, and that a large body of Ger- 
 man liberals is of the same persuasion, is now an incontestible 
 fact. A number of pamphlets, which have gone through many 
 editions, have been published on this subject, and the Daily Press 
 itself has entertained its readers with similar speculations. 
 
 It is the peculiar misfortune of Austria that, in addition 
 to her political misrule, she finds, in the heterogeneous charac- 
 15 
 
170 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS^ 
 
 ter of her subjects, a potent auxiliary to despotism. Under 
 Metternicli's system, and before him, Germans were em- 
 ployed to check or put down Hungarians ; Hungarians, to put 
 down or overawe Germans ; Croats, to coerce the Italians ; Ita- 
 lians, to coerce Poles and Sclavonians. When Austria appeals 
 to the national sentiments of her subjects, she forgets that she is 
 not only a complex of different nationalities, but that, unfortu- 
 nately, she possesses only fragments of nations, the greater por- 
 tions of which are incorporated into other States. Thus, Austria 
 has nearly eight millions of pure Germans ; but there are some 
 thirty-four millions of Germans, partaking of a more advanced 
 civilization, beyond her. She has nearly seventeen millions of 
 subjects of Slavic origin ; but Russia embodies more than sixty 
 millions of that race, united under a strong government, and in- 
 spired with fierce national sentiments, which exercise a perturbing 
 influence on the kindred populations of Austria. Finally, she has 
 a little more than five (now only about three) millions of Italians, 
 who, with the twenty (now twenty-three) millions of Italians sub- 
 ject to other princes, are always ready to conspire against her 
 rule. The only nationality entirely under her sceptre is the Hun- 
 garian ; and with this she had to .contend in a deadly struggle for 
 existence, without conquering its pride or its antipathy. That 
 Austria, under these circumstances, should have been able to de- 
 velop all the substantial elements of a Great Power, shows the in- 
 contestable talent of her statesmen, and the immense advantage 
 of military discipline over unorganized masses. But States, thus 
 composed, cannot have an indefinite growth. There is a natural 
 limit to their cohesion, even if not menaced by foreign Powers. — 
 Austria, in 1848 and '49, had no foreign enemy to contend against, 
 and was yet, by the revolt of the different nationalities subject to 
 her rule ; brought to the brink of destruction. The events of these 
 years made an indelible impression on the mind of the emperor, 
 and induced him to adopt a system of government better calcu- 
 lated to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Prince Schwar- 
 zenberg, Metternich's successor, a bold, enterprising, energetic 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 171 
 
 soldier, believed that the monarchy could only be preserved by a 
 strong, absolute, central government, supported by a powerful 
 standing army. Since that period, in spite of the progress of her 
 industry, her manufactures, her internal navigation, and her vastly 
 increased trade to the Levant, the government of Austria has been 
 nothing but a military despotism. If Austria, through her able 
 Minister of Finance, Baron Bruck,* has augmented her material 
 prosperity, compared to the hopeless condition of revolutionary 
 times, the army — the great antagonist of every minister of 
 finance — has deprived the country of the fruits of that improve- 
 ment ; while it has sown the seed of discontent broadcast through 
 all the provinces. 
 
 When the statesmen of Austria had resolved to give up the sys- 
 tem of Provincialism by which they had heretofore governed, and 
 to adopt, in its stead, the centralism we have just described, the 
 Press, inspired by the Cabinet, and one of the leading members 
 of the imperial family itself, published to the world, that Austria 
 was rejuvenated — that she had risen, like Phoenix, from the fire 
 and smoke of revolution, and was now, strong in her right and in 
 
 * Baron Brack, the most practical man in the whole Austrian Cabinet, is a 
 Prussian by birth and education, and a Protestant who, on that account, is not 
 very popular in the court-circles of Vienna ; though his talents are appreciated 
 by the emperor. He commenced his remarkable career by being an officer in 
 the Prussian army. lie resigned his commission and went to Trieste, where he 
 engaged in commercial pursuits, and became the founder of the Austrian Lloyds — 
 the Steamship Company which trades from that place to all the principal ports of 
 the Mediterranean, and which has done more for Austrian commerce than either 
 her diplomacy or her military fame. Baron Bruck is also the projector of the 
 great Austrian Southern Railway, from A^ienna to Trieste, and the father of 
 that expansive commercial policy, whose object it was to join Austria to the 
 German Zollverein (Tariff-league) — a policy which would have given Austria 
 a preponderating influence on the material interests of Germany ; and which 
 has been cruelly thwarted by the events of the last war. Baron Brack's ad- 
 versaries in Vienna (his nobility is of a recent date) say, that he is a better 
 Minister of Commerce than of Finance; which is easily accounted for by the 
 fact, that the Austrian Minister of Finance is not permitted to regulate the ex- 
 penditures by the income of the State, but by its military requirements, which 
 change with the situation; while, in matters of commerce, he is furnished 
 with data on which he can implicitly rely. 
 
172 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 the returned sense of duty of her subjects, entering upon a new 
 historical period. "Rejuvenated Austria" [das verjilngte Oest- 
 reich) all at once had a mission ; Providence had destined her to 
 Germanize Hungary, Transylvania, Gallicia, in short, all the nation- 
 alities subject to her sceptre ; with the probable addition of Servia, 
 Wallachia, Moldavia and Bosnia, whose people, from their geo- 
 graphical position, naturally gravitate toward Austria. When these 
 provinces shall once be made to enjoy the blessings of a strong central 
 government, located at Vienna, Austria will be so strengthened by 
 the process of assimilation, that she will be able to instill new life 
 and vigor into some of the antiquated German States, and event- 
 ually succeed in rejuvenating all Germany. The new Germanic 
 Empire, under the Emperors of the old House of Habsburg (which 
 will be the result of this blessing of renewed youth all round) will 
 then be the "great Central Power of Europe" and extend from 
 the North Sea and the Baltic, to the Alps and the Adriatic, and 
 from the Rhine to the Euxine ; including the best part, if not the 
 whole, of Italy. It will be an easy matter, then, to call France to 
 an account for her robbery of Alsace and Lorraine ; while Holland 
 and Belgium will be but too glad to be placed under the pro- 
 tection of the rejuvenated Germanic Empire. All this will be 
 done in the interest of civilization ; for the semi-barbarous nations 
 on the Danube will be made to partake of a higher civilisation than 
 they now enjoy ; and the Italians, sunk from their high estate by 
 indolence and corruption, will be rejuvenated, by having new Teu- 
 tonic blood infused into their veins, and thereby saved from entire 
 destruction. This is, indeed, a splendid historical mission (der 
 welt hist orische Beruf) of " Young Austria" — well calculated to 
 strike the imagination, and kindle the enthusiasm, of so romantic and 
 speculative a people as the Germans ; and we must not be surprised, 
 therefore, to learn that there are thousands of educated men, in 
 the land of poetry and song, who firmly believe in the proxi- 
 mate realization of this dream, and who will probably die bequeath- 
 ing their faith to their children. We cannot refrain here from 
 quoting another of the satirical verses of Henry Heine : 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 173 
 
 The French and the Russians have taken the land, 
 
 John Bull took the ocean it seems ; 
 But the Germans, more mighty, supremely command 
 
 The Realms most expansive of — ireama /■* 
 
 There is one man, however, who does not believe in this mission 
 of rejuvenated Austria, and that is no less a personage than the 
 Prince of Prussia. His scepticism, moreover, is publicly avowed ; 
 and he is daily adding to the number of converts to his political 
 infidelity. 
 
 About two years before the breaking out of the late war, an event 
 occurred in Prussia which, in no small degree, added to the acerbity 
 of feeling already existing between that Power and Austria. The 
 King of Prussia betrayed symptoms of alienation of mind ; and it 
 became necessary to appoint a Regent who, under the constitu- 
 tion, must be the next heir to the throne. The state of the King's 
 health, however, was kept a secret, and he appointed his brother, 
 only " to act in his stead, till himself should again be able to re- 
 sume the government." The Prince of Prussia, who was thus 
 made Regent by appointment, accepted the office so bestowed only 
 temporarily ; and, in exercising its functions, had a special care to 
 abstain from any act that could be construed into an assumption 
 of sovereign power. This conduct, though praiseworthy and as 
 much dictated by loyalty and respect for his elder brother, as by 
 prudential motives, suggested by the peculiar circumstances by 
 which the Prince was surrounded, neither pleased "the Court, nor 
 did it satisfy the People. It was, therefore, resolved, in case the 
 King's health did not improve, to vest the Regency absolutely in 
 his successor, in accordance with the terms of the constitution. 
 The Prince, nevertheless, felt some delicacy to let the Chambers 
 vote directly on the " incapacity of the King ;" especially as the 
 date of his insanity could not be exactly fixed by his physicians ;f 
 
 * Franzoseji ami Russen geltdrt das Land 
 
 Das Meer gelart den Briten ; 
 Wir aber besitzen im Lvftreich des Traums 
 Die Herrschaft unbestritten. 
 f The members of his Cabinet seem to have been entirely ignorant of the 
 catastrophe. 
 
 15* 
 
174 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and because such a vote might hereafter be used as a dangerous 
 precedent against any sovereign who, for some cause or other, 
 might be judged by his subjects as bereft of reason. The Prince, 
 on that account, waited patiently for the King's voluntary abdica- 
 tion ; but when he found there was an intrigue on foot, to establish 
 a Regency of which the Queen was to be a member, he at once 
 resolved to terminate the interregnum, by either withdrawing from 
 public affairs altogether, or managing them hereafter as he thought 
 fit. The result was the entire resignation of the King's power 
 into the hands of the Prince, as the Constitutional Regent of the 
 kingdom, and the suppression of every other influence on public 
 affairs. Now, Austria stands charged with having been at the 
 bottom of this intrigue ; and with having sought the extension of 
 the Queen's influence beyond the limits of the constitution. 
 What gave color to this suspicion, is the circumstance that the 
 Queen of Prussia is a Bavarian princess, and a near relative to the 
 Empress of Austria. She was, moreover, educated in the Catholic 
 faith ; and, though converted to Protestantism, to remedy her legal 
 disability, still supposed, by many, to be at heart attached to 
 the faith of her ancestors. What other motives Austria may 
 have had in endeavoring to invest the Queen with a portion of the 
 power of the State, will probably remain forever a secret ; but the 
 attempt, if really made, has utterly failed ; and has only served to 
 widen the gulf which separates the constitutional regime of Prussia 
 from the absolute despotism of Austria. 
 
 One of the first acts of the Prince Regent of Prussia, in his sove- 
 reign capacity, was to dismiss the King's ministers, (the ministry 
 Manteuflel,) and to construct a liberal Cabinet of his own. This 
 he did before the general elections ; anticipating thereby the popular 
 will, and calling on his subjects afterwards, to approve of his 
 choice. This anti-constitutional proceeding, on the part of the 
 Regent, which, had it l^een applied in the opposite sense, might 
 have crushed the hopes of the people, was received, not only in 
 Prussia, but throughout Germany, with tokens of unfeigned admi- 
 ration ; but it was not, of itself, sufficient to secure the return of 
 a liberal majority to Parliament. The power of the crown, there- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 175 
 
 fore, again interceded in the cause of the people ; which was most 
 effectually done by the removal from office of those persons who had 
 borne a distinguished part in the former elections, on the opposite 
 (reactionary) side of the question, and by withdrawing the subsi- 
 dies from those presses and public writers, who had formerly ex- 
 hibited the most zeal in supporting the King's government. These 
 sovereign remedies for popular weakness, operated like a charm ; 
 and the result was an immense Parliamentary majority in favor of 
 the new ministry. The People of Prussia, who had thus become 
 free, as if by letters patent, and with scarcely a serious effort of 
 their own, were, nevertheless, quite able to appreciate the boon 
 bestowed upon them ; and exhibited their loyalty and gratitude in 
 a manner which could not but touch the heart of the Regent. Cities 
 were illuminated, addresses of thanks poured in upon him, com- 
 mittees begged to express their devotion to his person, and the 
 students " rubbed salamanders" — that is, consumed oceans of wine 
 and beer in drinking the Regent's health. But the most remark- 
 able phenomenon was the abnegation, practiced by some of the 
 ultra liberals, compromised during the revolution of 1848, in with- 
 drawing their names from the list of candidates for the Lower 
 Chamber, " lest their election might embarrass the new constitu- 
 tional government ;" and the total absence of opposition in the Par- 
 liament itself, to reward the Prince's liberality with a correspond- 
 ing mark of confidence in his administration. German loyalty 
 partakes of the nature of filial piety ; and requires but very little 
 nursing, on the part of the Princes, to become hereditary. The 
 security of the constitution of Prussia depends, at this moment, far 
 more on the firmness of the Regent, on his plighted word, and on 
 his individual sense of honor, than on the love of liberty or the 
 spirit of independence of the Prussian people.* 
 
 * Another event which served to increase the popularity of the Prince Regent, 
 was the marriage between his eldest son (the heir presumptive to the throne) 
 and the Princess Royal of England. The good people actually thought that, 
 with the British Princess, the British constitution would come to Prussia ; and 
 that the influence of a Princess, brought up under the wholesome restraint of 
 constitutional law, would exercise a beneficial influence on the military Court 
 of Berlin. The marriage was also regarded as an alliance with Great Britain, 
 
176 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 The entire confidence of the Prussian Parliament and the people 
 in the honor and rectitude of the Prince, exercised an important in- 
 fluence on the attitude of Prussia, in regard to Austria and France, 
 during the last war. In vain did the Wurtembergian, Bavarian and 
 Hanoverian Chambers, instigated by Austria, urge an immediate de- 
 claration of war against France ; the Prussian government thought 
 there existed, as yet, no casus belli justifying such an act. In vain 
 did the press of the other States of Germany, and the ultra abso- 
 lutist opposition papers, call upon the Prussian Parliament to 
 speak out ; it only uttered the conviction of the vast majority 
 that the Prince will do no wrong — that " he who had so*generously 
 acted toward the people, would not betray his country." 
 
 The example of the Kegent of Prussia could not but exercise 
 an important influence on the other constitutional governments of 
 Germany. The King of Bavaria found it consistent with his 
 principles of action, to dismiss his ministers, who had continued in 
 office for ten consecutive years against popular majorities in the 
 Chambers. The Kings of Hanover and Saxony, and the Dukes of 
 Hesse Cassel and Nassau, who had been constantly at war with 
 the majority of their miniature Parliaments, found that their situ- 
 ation had not improved by the example set them in Berlin : and 
 there was a general cry among the old nobles that the Prince of 
 Prussia himself had become the instigator of revolution, and the 
 chief of the radical party in politics and religion.* Austria, ever 
 on the alert and opposed to innovations, and considering herself 
 now threatened by the progress of liberal ideas both in Germany 
 and Italy, renewed her insinuation that Prussia sought an exten- 
 
 and as weakening the ties of friendship whieb, during a long period of years, 
 has subsisted between England and Austria. When the Princess E,oyal gave 
 birth to a son, a spontaneous thanksgiving burst from the lips of the whole peo- 
 ple; and it was certainly a mark of refined attention to a British-born Princess, 
 for the civil authorities and the municipal corporations of the kingdom, to be 
 theirs* to offer their homage on this joyful occasion. 
 
 * The ultra orthodox (Hengstenberg) party, in Prussia, has lost position and 
 influence j and the most enlarged tolerance of all religious differences of opinion 
 and worship, is now officially enjoined. " Protestant Jesuitism" seems to have 
 suddenly dwindled down to a mere aristocratic coterie. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE 177 
 
 sion of power and territory by encroaching upon her German 
 neighbors-^-that her constitutional zeal was the means of preparing 
 the people for such a change of Government, and that the Prince 
 of Prussia harbored the same ambitious designs in regard to Ger- 
 many, which Victor Emanuel cherished in regard to Italy ; and 
 which Austria was now resolved to repress with all the power of 
 the State. 
 
 As the war in Italy proceeded, and the popular Italian leaders 
 called the people to arms to rid the country of the " detested Aus- 
 trians," the smaller German Princes, and among them espe- 
 cially those who had most sinned against constitutional liberty, 
 instigated their people to come to the assistance of Austria. The 
 more they were inclined to absolutism, the more ardent was their 
 Teutonic patriotism, and their contempt for the Latin races. The 
 Prince of Prussia and his dumb Parliament, which had, in ad- 
 vance, sanctioned his policy, were the only drawbacks to a decla- 
 ration of war against France. If Napoleon III., a few years pre- 
 vious, had been called the " Saviour of European Society," the 
 Prince of Prussia was now "the invader of its historical privi- 
 leges," and the conspirator against the established systems of go- 
 vernment. Had Austria not been engaged in Italy, it is highly 
 probable she would have remonstrated with Prussia ; but the situ- 
 ation did not admit of any overt act which might lead to a diplo- 
 matic rupture. The attitude of the smaller Princes, backed by 
 Austria, nevertheless, amounted to a demonstration against Prus- 
 sia ; and it was easy to perceive that, if Austrian arms were suc- 
 cessful in Italy, the Prince of Prussia must give up his liberal 
 innovations. Under these circumstances, the peace of Villafranca 
 came most opportunely for the Prince and the liberal cause of 
 Germany. Austria was humbled, her aggressive power diminished, 
 and her attention imperatively called to her own half-revolted 
 provinces. 
 
 There is no doubt that the alarming condition of his own Hun- 
 garian and Sclavonic provinces, the dissatisfaction of the Croats, 
 and the menacing attitude of the people of the Military Frontier, 
 exercised an enervating influence on the Emperor Joseph, which, 
 
178 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 ■with the other motives for peace, induced him to accept the terms 
 proposed to him at Villafranea. The Emperor Napoleon and 
 Count Cavour, who held the threads of all the secret movements 
 and conspiracies in their hand, were far better informed of what 
 was going on and preparing in the interior of the Austrian Em- 
 pire, than the Emperor himself. At the interview which took place 
 between the two Emperors, the mirror which reflected the position 
 of Francis Joseph at home, was held before him, and he accepted 
 without hesitation — a thing unknown in the former diplomatic his- 
 tory of Austria — the moderate and reasonable conditions, imposed by 
 the victor. The defeat of Austria was threefold. She was beaten, 
 in the field, in diplomacy, and in the nature and disposition of her 
 internal policy. No wonder, then, that the Emperor Francis Joseph 
 looked pale, after his interview with the " Gallic Caesar." 
 
 Scarcely had the news of the conclusion of peace reached Ger- 
 many, before the Prince Regent of Prussia, without consulting the 
 Diet at Frankfort, dismissed his extraordinary levies and reduced 
 his army to the peace establishment. The other Princes of Ger- 
 many followed his example. Economy, no doubt, prompted this 
 act ; but it furnished, at the same time, the most complete refuta- 
 tion of the charge, trumped up during the progress of the war, 
 that the Emperor Napoleon intended to seize upon the left bank 
 of the Rhine. If such a fear existed in Germany, it must have 
 increased, not diminished, by the conclusion of peace, which left 
 France free to turn her arms against Germany. Besides, only 
 preliminaries of peace were signed at Villafranea ; the treaty of 
 peace was to follow the conferences at Zurich. And suppose the 
 treaty of peace was not definitely signed at Zurich, and the war 
 renewed, where was the federal army to protect either the German 
 provinces of Austria, or Germany proper ? If the position of 
 Francis Joseph was bad at Villafranea, it was certainly worse at 
 Zurich, and will be painfully uncertain until a general European 
 Congress assures to him the quiet possession of his hereditary 
 States. In a Congress held before the war, France and Austria 
 might have held equal positions ; but this is no longer possible in 
 the Congress now about to be held. In a Congress held after a war, 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 179 
 
 the beaten party has lost its prestige, and must submit to what it 
 can no longer resist by the sword. In this condition of things, we 
 do not think it improbable that Austria will seek the alliance of 
 France ; hoping better things from the generosity of the conqueror, 
 than from the dubious or unwilling support of her former friends 
 and confederates. Thus, then, has the sagacious policy of the 
 Emperor Napoleon succeeded, a second time, in transforming an 
 enemy into an ally. 
 
 The Congress about to be held will be a long one, and all man- 
 ner of questions, besides those now mooted, will be brought be- 
 fore it. The very fact that it will convene, and for the avowed 
 purpose of remodeling the Public Law of Europe laid down at 
 the Congress of Vienna — that it will redivide at least one half the 
 spoils of the coalition campaigns of 1814 and 1815 — is an immense 
 achievement of the French Emperor, for which the people can 
 never be sufficiently grateful, and which the French press itself 
 has not yet appreciated at its full value. The respective roles of 
 France and Austria will be reversed. France, which was humbled 
 in 1814, sought, at the Congress of Vienna, as a last resort, the 
 alliance of Austria, and obtained it ; now Austria is the humbled 
 Power, seeking, and perhaps obtaining, on terms not inconsistent 
 with her honor, the mediation of Imperial France. And the new 
 Congress may yet resemble that of Vienna in another respect. 
 It may be interrupted by the cry, "to arms!" and reverse the 
 fortunes of Waterloo. 
 
 As regards Austria and Prussia, the peace of Villafranca affords 
 them abundant opportunities of creating fresh issues between them, 
 and of cherishing the mutual resentments to which each considers 
 herself entitled by the conduct of the other during the war. Aus- 
 tria and Prussia will not act together for at least a decade to come, 
 and then only in extreme cases. The smaller States of Germany, 
 now secured against foreign invasion, will group themselves round 
 these rival Powers, as their interests or their political predilections 
 will prompt them. The dualism of Germany has found a new ex- 
 pression and a new cause ; and it is, perhaps, easier at this moment 
 
180 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 to foment a war between Austria and Prussia, than to make theni 
 pursue the same policy in regard to France. 
 
 The liberal party in Germany which, during the war, was 
 accused of anti-national sentiments, because it did not sympathize 
 with Austria in Italy, is now free to adopt what course it pleases 
 in regard to the Austrian policy in Germany. It can now openly 
 oppose the Austrian reactionary influence on the Germanic Diet, 
 and it may, without incurring the charge of treason, sympathize 
 with constitutional liberty in any part of the world. The Austrian 
 party in Germany can now no longer appeal to a false Teutonic 
 enthusiasm, by exaggerating the dangers with which the common 
 German Fatherland is threatened by a" ruthless foreign conqueror." 
 The Rhine is no longer to be " defended on the Po :" but in the 
 worst case, on the 3Iincio. The necessity of defending the common 
 soil has disappeared ; and the eyes of the Germans are once more 
 turned from Italy to the condition of their own country, to which 
 that of Italy bears such a striking resemblance. Reforms are now 
 called for in Germany as loudly as they were in Italy before the 
 war. If the Italians have succeeded in making some progress 
 toward union, would it not be a disgrace for Germany to remain 
 divided ? Here Austria meets again the phantom of Nemesis. 
 " What has she done for Germany V ask, simultaneously, a thou- 
 sand voices, " since the reestablishment of her power at Vienna V 
 and a thousand voices answer : " She was the constant, unrelenting 
 enemy of liberal institutions, whether these emanated from the 
 Princes or from the People ; and the ready defender of every falsi- 
 fied promise and broken pledge on the part of the rulers." To 
 introduce reforms into the German governments, is equivalent to 
 excluding Austrian influence : to be free, means to be independent 
 of Austria. One more step, and the cry, " Away with the Aus- 
 trians !" will be heard on the Rhine, as it was on the Po. 
 
 With the aversion of the liberal party in Germany to the des- 
 potic rule of Austria, and the antagonism which exists between 
 that absolute Power and constitutional Prussia, it is impossible 
 that the present organization of the Germanic confederation can 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 181 
 
 long survive. The confederation, as we have shown, was the 
 hasty work of the Congress of Vienna, conceived in a spirit which 
 Germany has long since outgrown and abandoned. With its two 
 leading members moving in different directions, it possesses neither 
 influence nor power ; and hence the Prince of Prussia has already 
 announced his determination to conclude separate treaties with the 
 Northern German States, for the protection of their common sea 
 coast. If Prussia succeeds in this, she will probably form another 
 League, to insure independent action in all matters concerning her 
 internal policy ; and thus the antagonism to Austria will be con- 
 tinued, till one or the other of these Powers is exhausted in the 
 struggle. 
 
 16 
 
182 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XYII. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA ON RUSSIA — THE 
 MISSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA. 
 
 Russia, as we Lave seen, sympathized with Victor Emanuel and 
 the Italians, before and during the war. There was a time (to 
 which we have also alluded) when Alexander L, uncle to the pre- 
 sent Emperor, was willing to abandon the whole Peninsula to 
 Austrian domination : hoping that, in return for this favor, Austria 
 would not interfere with his designs upon Turkey. Russia, how- 
 ever, as early as 1829, complained of " Austrian ingratitude," to 
 which she ascribed the unsatisfactory peace of Adrianople; and 
 her experience in 1854, after having, in 1819, saved Austria from 
 total dismemberment, made an indelible impression on the Czar 
 and his seventy millions of subjects. If the Russians understand 
 any political question, it is that of nationality ; and if Austria is 
 threatened with dangers arising from the peculiar complex of 
 nationalities, constituting her Empire, it is chiefly from the fact that 
 nearly one half of her entire population is of Slavic origin, look- 
 ing to Russia, not to Austria, for the realization of its national 
 aspirations. In addition to this, we must yet consider that a con- 
 siderable portion of the South Eastern, non-German, population of 
 Austria belongs to the Greek Church, of which the Emperor of Rus- 
 sia is the head ; and that when these people pray for their sovereign, 
 they mean the Czar, not the Emperor of Austria. For many years 
 past, this part of the population of Austria has been propitiated by 
 various gifts and largesses from St. Petersburg ; either to help poor 
 communities, who had nothing to hope for in Vienna, to build 
 Greek churches ; or to endow schools and churches and provide 
 otherwise for their spiritual comfort. The Austrian populations are 
 not as ungrateful as the Austrian government ; and it is therefore 
 but reasonable to suppose that the government of Russia has estab- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 183 
 
 lished relations with those populations which promise a rich return 
 in the future. It is the advantage of a growing Power, like that of 
 Russia, that she need not look to an immediate reward of her 
 works of love ; and that her charities do not appear in the nature 
 of a loan which is to be repaid with interest at a specified period. 
 Russia is not only an adept in diplomacy between courts ; but main- 
 tains friendly relations also with the populations adjacent to 
 her Empire. The Lomelina and the plains of Lombardy have ex- 
 hibited the advantages derived by an army from the approving 
 sympathies of a people ; and Russia is not too old to profit by such 
 valuable lessons in history.* Russia, by the homogeneity of her 
 
 * At the time of the Hungarian rebellion, the Sclavonic and Croatian popula- 
 tions of Hungary were, from the commencement, and even before the breaking 
 out of actual hostilities, encouraged to take up arms against the Magyars. While 
 the Emperor of Austria was nattering the Hungarians with the belief that he 
 would have the Croats, Servians and Sclavonians treated as rebels, he was in 
 close communication with Jellachich, the Ban of Croatia, who was collecting an 
 arrny to resist Hungary. When hostilities commenced, the Ban took off the 
 mask, and appeared as the Imperial leader. Many promises were made to him 
 and his followers; but few, if any, were fulfilled. Even the money which was 
 appropriated for the payment of spies, some 92,000 florins (about $46,000) was 
 withheld, though the treacherous service was rendered to the Austrian govern- 
 ment. The Sclavonians, as an inducement to their rising in a body, were pro- 
 mised various ameliorations, and a government of their own. The military cen- 
 tralism afterwards established, and maintained to this day, put an end to their 
 hopes, and reduced the Sclavonian population of Hungary to a level with the 
 Magyars. They had helped to despoil the Magyars of their historical rights and 
 privileges, and lost their own. Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, has since died; but 
 we have not learned that the Emperor has appointed a successor to that dignity. 
 This imperial ingratitude has reconciled the Sclavonians with the Magyars, as 
 it has convinced them of the folly of allowing their national jealousies to interfere 
 with the maintenance of their rights. The malcontents on both sides are now 
 confident that, in another struggle with the Austrian government, Russia will 
 not interfere, nor assist in hemming them in and preventing them from procur- 
 ing ammunition and arms. In the Military Frontier of Austria, the same discon- 
 tent exists. The Province was heretofore considered a Military Colony, and the 
 troops, a sort of native militia, were permitted to marry and cultivate farms. 
 They were only, in extraordinary cases, to be employed against any other foreign 
 enemy but the Turks. The Emperor, however, ordered nearly the whole mili- 
 tary force of that province to Italy, where their wild, martial bearing, and their 
 swarthy countenances, became objects of terror to the rural populations. Before 
 
184 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 people, lias an immense advantage over her Austrian neighbor ; for 
 though there are some sixty-eight languages and dialects spoken 
 in the Empire, the Moscovite element preponderates largely over 
 all the others, and, being the representative of civilization and 
 power, must eventually absorb all the others. The different races 
 over which the Czar rules as autocrat, are, moreover, kindred races, 
 whose natural affinities for each other may be increased by a wise 
 and just government, and whose antipathies may be overcome by 
 national concessions to local prejudices. Eussia is a Sclavonic 
 Power, and the idea of uniting all the Sclavonic races under her 
 sceptre, has grown into a religious faith, not only with the nobles 
 who surround the person of the Czar, but also with the people of 
 the different Sclavonic tribes, whether these be subject to Russia 
 or to other Powers. The plea of nationality, which threatens the 
 dismemberment of Austria, promises large accessions to the Rus- 
 sian Empire ; and is encouraged as the great moral basis of the 
 "manifest destiny" of the Northern colossus. Russia "has the 
 mission" to carry civilization into Asia — to reconquer the beau- 
 tiful provinces which, in the classic ages, were the seat of the highest 
 intellectual culture, from Mahometanism, and to plant the symbol 
 of the faith of the Christian once more on the Church of St. Sophia. 
 Here, then, are a religious and a political mission united in one — 
 a sort of seraphic harmony, introduced between the diplomatist, the 
 bishop and the soldier, well calculated, at some future period, (not 
 far distant) to astonish the world with its achievements. The 
 
 the breaking out of the last war, in which these troops were again employed in 
 large numbers, there were, as the writer was creditably informed by a superior 
 officer, between sixteen and twenty thousand widows of soldiers in the province; 
 and the last war must have largely added to their number. The women must 
 now work the fields to support their fatherless children. This harsh treatment 
 of these loyal subjects, contrasts singularly with the benevolent exemption from 
 conscription, which the present Emperor of Russia has granted to Poland for the 
 space of three years — not to deprive mothers of their sons, and to foster the in- 
 crease of the male population of that unfortunate kingdom. The Poles had, by 
 the revolution of 1830, and by subsequent attempts at revolution, incurred the 
 extreme displeasure of their sovereign; the people of the military frontier of 
 Austria, on the contrary, have always been distinguished for their loyalty and 
 devotion to the Imperial House of Austria. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 185 
 
 geographical position of Austria is more favorable to a military 
 advance upon Turkey, if she could act with the momentum of a 
 well-assured central Power ; but Austria has always been too con- 
 servative or reactionary for such a mission. She opposed the inde- 
 pendence of Greece, which the Emperor Alexander favored, as she 
 has recently opposed the liberal and national movements of the 
 people of the Danubian Principalities. She sees danger and 
 destruction in every popular movement ; while Russian diplomacy 
 does not disdain to receive aid and comfort even from professional 
 agitators and religious fanatics. If the Emperors of Austria had 
 studied the map of Southern Europe, they could hardly have failed 
 to perceive that they, too, must advance in a southern direction. 
 But they halted, not to afford Russia a pretext for a similar move- 
 ment ; and Metternich felt assured when England, instead of 
 Russia, was, at the Congress of Vienna, finally entrusted with 
 the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands. Russia, argued the Aus- 
 trian statesman, must not, on any account, be permitted to take 
 position in the Mediterranean, and thereby threaten the Adri- 
 atic, which he was disposed to consider as an Austrian sea ; but 
 Russia has taken a position at Yillafranca, in the shape of a modest 
 Coal Station ; her influence now rules in the Morea, and inspires 
 the hopes of the Ionians. Austria cannot bid the world to stand 
 still ; and the Emperor Francis Joseph must profit by the lesson 
 taught him by the Emperor Napoleon, and try to " comprehend 
 his epoch." 
 
 The Christians in European and Asiatic Turkey, belong, in the 
 main, either to the Greek or Catholic (Latin) Church ; the calm, re- 
 flective ratiocination of Protestantism having, as yet, made but little 
 progress among the imaginative populations of southern climes. 
 The former (the Greeks) look to Russia for deliverance ; the Latin 
 Christians, from the time of the Crusaders, considered France as 
 their protector.* Between these two nations, the sympathies of 
 the Christians in the East are divided ; hence the importance of 
 the question of the Holy Sepulchre, and the determination of the 
 
 * The term "Franks" by which all Europeans in Turkey are designated, is 
 derived from ''France" or the " French." 
 
 16* 
 
186 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Emperor Napoleon to preserve the prestige of France in the East. 
 Russia considers herself the heir of Byzantium ; France, that of 
 Rome. Austria is a lost position between them, important only 
 in a political and military point of view ; from its proximity to the 
 future scene of action. The old House of Habsburg has been as 
 unsuccessful in its religious propagandism, as in its attempts at 
 centralization. 
 
 We have already, in a preceding chapter, spoken of the conse- 
 quences to Russia of the Crimean war. The enterprise of the 
 Emperor Nicholas was evidently ill-timed, and Russia has thereby 
 lost some of her outposts ; but she has since, by her skilful diplo- 
 macy, and by the blunders of her adversaries, more than recovered 
 her former influence on European and Asiatic affairs. Overhang- 
 ing the whole Asiatic continent, from the Pacific to the Ural Moun- 
 tains, the line of her diplomatic agents, educated and trained for 
 their calling, extends from Pekin to London, and is, at all times, 
 assisted by another body of diplomatists, permanently residing 
 among, or selected from the prominent natives of foreign countries. 
 Through them, the minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg is 
 not only informed of the views and projects officially entertained 
 by each government ; but also of the character of the men likely 
 to influence or control the decision of public questions. The duty 
 of the corps of attaches, composed of young men physically and 
 intellectually gifted, consists not merely in making themselves 
 agreeable and useful at soirtes and routs ; but in reporting, directly 
 to St. Petersburg, what they have seen, heard and observed ; * 
 describing the peculiar mental faculties, the character, virtues and 
 vices of distinguished individuals, the persons by whom they are 
 
 • ;; The faculty of observation seems to be enjoyed in an eminent degree by all 
 Russians; diplomatists have merely to practice the art of observing without 
 being observed. "When a minister of a Great Power," says Kolle in his hints 
 to Young Diplomates, "takes you familiarly by the hand and draws you in a 
 friendly manner into the recess of a window, to learn your opinion on some tri- 
 fling cpaestion relative to your own country, playing all the time with your but- 
 tonhole or the chain of your watch, do not be flattered into the belief that he 
 remembers one word of what you say to him. He is observing somebody else, 
 and is merely making use of you — as a screen,'' 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 187 
 
 surrounded, and the men and women who are likely to have a con- 
 trolling influence on their acts. There are few prominent public 
 men, in any country, whose portraits, thus ably drawn, may not be 
 found at St. Petersburg ; and many an author of " Lives of Eminent 
 Men" would have given a different color to some of his heroes, had 
 he been permitted to search the archives of the Russian Foreign 
 Office.* Marriages between its diplomatic agents and natives of 
 the country to which they are accredited, are always looked upon 
 with favor, and encouraged by the government of St. Petersburg ; 
 the intimate relations thus created, and the sense of security 
 accompanying them, being much preferred to evanescent conquests 
 with their concomitant excitement, impatience, suspense and alarm, 
 which are oftener the means of betraying diplomatic secrets, than 
 of discovering them. By this thoroughly organized system of 
 diplomacy, and the talent for acquiring foreign languages which 
 the Russians possess in the most eminent degree, the Cabinet of 
 St. Petersburg is better informed of what is going on in every 
 quarter of the globe, than any other government in Europe. The 
 fruits of this system of diplomacy, joined to the development of the 
 vast internal resources of Russia which furnish the substantial 
 elements of power, are fast -maturing in Asia, where Russia is un- 
 doubtedly called upon to play a first part in the historical drama 
 of the world. 
 
 Another immense advantage of Russia, over all other European 
 nations, consists in the absence of powerful neighbors to, impede or 
 check her progress. Turkey is crumbling to pieces. Austria must 
 conquer her separate nationalities. China cannot withstand the re- 
 peated shocks she receives from England and France, and India 
 is shaken and impoverished by mutiny and rebellion. Catharine II. 
 used to say of Poland, that it was " a country where one need only 
 stoop to pick up something," and she got the best slice of it ; but 
 
 * During the excitement and troubLs of the years 1848 and 1849, the portraits 
 of most of the foreign ministers to the Germanic Confederation, drawn by a 
 Russian diplomute, fell into hands for which they were not intended, and were 
 subsequently published. They were delicately drawn, and truth-like; but lacked 
 what the Italian painters call the tocca fli maestro (the touch of the master.) 
 
188 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 now half the world seems to be a political placer for the Czar. 
 What Russia has now most at heart is to compete with British 
 commerce in Central Asia. This she cannot do without extending 
 her railways, and introducing steam navigation in the Caspian — a 
 sea whose shores, now that Circassia is subdued, will soon be en- 
 tirely subject to Russian domination and influence. The people 
 south of the Caspian have long since been operated on by Russian 
 emissaries; while men versed in Oriental diplomacy, have met 
 British agents at Khiva. When the railway from Moscow to 
 Saratof, now in process of construction, shall be completed (Russia 
 can employ soldiers in the construction of her roads) and the 
 rivers Amoor and Syr Daria be made navigable to a greater ex- 
 tent than they now are, it is difficult to see how the extension of 
 Russian commerce, and with it, of Russian domination, shall be 
 checked in Asia. Russia will certainly fortify every important 
 point between the Caspian and the Aral ; and with the vast advan- 
 tage she possesses in the species of troops best adapted to frontier 
 service and to the steppes, domineer all the smaller States which 
 lie between her Asiatic possessions and British India. England 
 has heretofore employed commercial agents to extend her influence 
 in Asia; the Russian pioneer is the* Cossack, who at heart is a 
 good natured fellow, wonderfully frugal, inured to every species of 
 hardship, and, himself a semi- Asiatic, disposed to fraternize with 
 the native populations. He is armed and mounted at almost no 
 expense, .and, from his otherwise rural habits, the very best ma- 
 terial for the establishment of military colonies. Since the Crimean 
 war, the Russian diplomatic agents in Europe have become exceed- 
 ingly reserved and modest. They assure everybody that Russia 
 seeks no extension of power by military force — that she is engaged 
 with reforms and improvements in the interior, which will occupy 
 her at least for a period of twenty years, and that the Emperor 
 Alexander is, par excellence, a man of peace. Russia seems to 
 be entirely willing that France should take the initiative in all 
 European affairs ; and it was purely in the interest of peace that 
 she concentrated an army of observation on the Pruth, and another 
 in Poland, to prevent the war in Italy from assuming European 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 189 
 
 proportions. As to the special treaty between her and France, how- 
 ever, to which allusion was made during the last war, its formal 
 existence has been stoutly denied ; and we have the assurance of a 
 British minister, given to a British Parliament, that the " friendly 
 understanding" subsisting between Russia and France, touches no 
 point which especially concerns England. The British government 
 seems to have been so assured by this frank avowal, that Lord 
 John Russell was, for a while, unwilling to have England repre- 
 sented at the next European Congress ; but, upon reflection, that 
 eminent British statesman has altered his mind ; a Congress with- 
 out England bearing too close a resemblance to isolation in the 
 settlement of European affairs. 
 
 In spite of the peaceful inclination of the Emperor Alexander of 
 Russia, we have seen him take a very active part in the negotia- 
 tions which preceded and accompanied the last war, and the result 
 has not been favorable to Austria. The Emperor himself, from 
 his well-known forgiving disposition (so very handsomely illustrated 
 in his treatment of the Poles) cherishes, in all probability, but 
 little resentment ; but the old Moscovite party, which is an here- 
 ditary one, will transmit its hatred of Austria to succeeding gene- 
 rations.* Prince Gortchakoff, the present Prime Minister of 
 Russia, belongs, as his name indicates, to the old Moscovite party ; 
 and his Anti- Austrian predilections have, on more than one occa- 
 sion, manifested themselves in a striking manner. There is no 
 ambiguity or reserve in regard to them, either in his dispatches or 
 in his ordinary diplomatic intercourse. The Russians, -undoubtedly, 
 wish to see Austria entirely driven from Italy, and her influence 
 
 * It has been jocosely observed that the two leading parties in Russia — the 
 Moscovite and the German, mutually relieve each other at the court of St. Peters- 
 burg. When the German party is in favor at court, the chiefs of the Moscovite 
 party travel to Siberia: and when the Moscovites are in the ascendancy at the 
 capital, the Germans travel in that direction. Under the Emperor Nicholas, the 
 Germans occupied prominent positions in St. Petersburg; now the Moscovites 
 are most appreciated; but with the known humane disposition of the Emperor 
 Alexander II., it is doubtful whether Siberia will receive any access of popula- 
 tion, except from men condemned for ordinary crimes, and from voluntary emi- 
 grants. 
 
190 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 destroyed in Germany; for this would make Russia the arbiter of 
 Central Europe. Experience has shown her that Austria and 
 England united may very materially interfere with her plans 
 in the East, and thwart her diplomacy in Constantinople. The 
 relations between Austria and Turkey had become very inti- 
 mate since the Crimean war: but the events of the last Italian 
 campaign, and the peace of Villafranca, have proved to the Sultan 
 that he is leaning on a broken reed : and since then Russia, whose 
 Eastern policy is parallel to that of France, has resumed her for- 
 mer influence. Thus Austria, in a few short months, has been 
 stripped of the prestige she momentarily acquired by her dubious 
 policy in 1854, and by the necessity which existed for France and 
 England, at that time, to express themselves satisfied with it. 
 
 While the peace of Villafranca has thus changed the relative 
 position of Russia and Austria in regard to Turkey, and while 
 France has naturally different interests to protect in the East 
 from those of England, the Oriental question must necessarily as- 
 sume a different aspect. Austria, forsaken by England, dimin- 
 ished in Italy, and threatened by Prussia in Germany, has now 
 nothing to hope from adhering any longer to the fortunes of Turkey. 
 She is unable, by her detached efforts, to arrest the fate of that 
 semi-barbarous Empire ; and, having done all in her power to pre- 
 vent its division, will find it not incompatible with her conservative 
 statesmanship, to* consent to it, on condition of receiving a proper 
 share of the spoils. When Catharine II. first proposed to the 
 Empress Maria Therese, of Austria, to divide Poland, the proposi- 
 tion was indignantly rejected, for nearly the same reason which has 
 since prevailed on the statesmen of Vienna to oppose the division 
 of Turkey. " I shall always be happy," said Maria Therese, " to 
 have the Empress Katherine for a friend, but not for a next 
 door neighbor." When, however, her minister, Prince Kaunitz, 
 represented to her that Austria had lost Silesia to Prussia, who 
 had grown powerful, while she had suffered a diminution in her own 
 dominions, this dyspeptic though virtuous abstinence, was suddenly 
 changed into a healthy though criminal appetite, and she accepted 
 Gallicia and Lodomeria, as the price of her consent to the parti- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 191 
 
 tion. Austria has now lost a province in Italy, and she may be 
 compelled, either by persuasion or force, or by prudential motives 
 of the highest order, to surrender another ; and the desire to be 
 even with Prussia, may again induce her not to refuse a large slice 
 of territory, as the price of her consent to the spoliation of a neigh- 
 bor. Thus Austria, after long and nobly repelling the advances 
 of her northern seducer, and being worried and fatigued with the 
 effort of resisting his arts of persuasion, will at last, half willingly, 
 half forced, rush into his arms. Will Russia be faithful to Aus- 
 tria '? In the last Will and Testament of Peter the Great, when 
 speaking of the necessity of dividing Turkey, there occurs this 
 remarkable passage : " Austria must receive her share of the divi- 
 sion, which must be taken from her afterwards (qu > on lux enlevera 
 plus tard") The will has never been proved in a court of Pro- 
 bate ; but the administrators of the estate have, thus far, acted as 
 its faithful executors. 
 
192 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE— THE ORIENTAL QUES- 
 TION — England's position as a world-power. 
 
 We have, in the preceding chapters, treated of the different re- 
 lations of the States of the Continent of Europe, and the manner 
 in which they have been affected by the late war and the sudden 
 conclusion of peace at Villafranca. Let us now consider the ques- 
 tion which is most important to us, as Americans ; namely — how 
 does that peace, the embroiled condition of Europe, and the ap- 
 proaching solution of the Oriental question, affect the relative po- 
 sition of England and France ?■ 
 
 All reasonable men will agree that the entente cordiale, 
 which, at one time, gave our own statesmen some unnecessary 
 concern, is now, if not virtually terminated, at least reduced to 
 the ordinary friendly relations between two neighboring States. 
 The entente cordiale has answered its purpose, and is now growing 
 cold and dying out, unless fresh causes spring up to warm it into 
 life again. It was, indeed, never more than a well-intended gov- 
 ernmental affection — a passion which sprung up from a sudden 
 opportunity, and which was never cordially shared by the people 
 of either country. If the national antipathy between France and 
 England was hushed for a while, to conduct the Crimean war to a 
 successful issue, it only shows the prodigious influence which the 
 Emperor Napoleon exercises over the public mind of France, and 
 the extreme skill with which he wields that influence for the bene- 
 fit of the State. The entente cordiale, though not yet changed 
 into the opposite sentiment, is, as such, nevertheless, an obsolete 
 idea. A cordial understanding can only exist between two na- 
 tions who have the fullest confidence in each other's intentions, 
 strengthened by a parallelism of interests which leaves no room 
 for suspicion. This does not exist between France and England ; 
 as the statesmen of both countries know, and as their separate 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 193 
 
 acts have but too clearly demonstrated since the conclusion of the 
 Crimean war. Up to a certain point, France and England had 
 the same interest in Prussia ; but, when that point was reached, 
 cordiality made room for suspicion ; in spite of the consoling assur- 
 ances, on both sides, that their affections had undergone no change. 
 France built Cherbourg, merely to assure herself of England's fidel- 
 ity ; England reestablished her Channel-fleet, and increased her 
 navy, merely to prevent France from loving any one better than 
 herself. Yet, notwithstanding these strong measures for perpetu- 
 ating each other's love, reflection has weakened the sentiment. 
 " Plus qu > on raisonne, moins qu? on ai?ne" * said Jean Jacques 
 Rousseau^ and the maxim applies equally to the affections between 
 States. England bears now no other relation to France, than that 
 of any other European Power. When the interests of the two 
 countries are the same, or parallel to each other, they will move 
 in similar directions ; whenever their interests clash, each will 
 pursue its own policy ; and it will depend on the particular view 
 one or the other may take of a leading question, and the manner 
 it may affect its paramount interests, whether the difference thus 
 created shall lead to a rupture. In the mean time, we may rest 
 assured, that a war with England will always be popular in 
 France ; that it will rouse the whole nation in support of it ; and 
 that, in such a war, the voice of party would be completely 
 drowned in the ardor of the national sentiment. No man in 
 France, of whatever party, rank, or condition, could oppose it and 
 live : no woman could call herself French, and receive the atten- 
 tion of such a man. The Emperor Napoleon, who, better than any 
 previous ruler of France, knows how to give tone and direction to 
 public sentiment, holds, in this respect, a fearful weapon in his 
 hands. May he never use it to the terror of the civilized world ! 
 What a catalogue of British offences against France, from the 
 burning of the Maid of Orleans as a witch, to the counterfeiting 
 of the Assignats and the infamous Jail of St. Helena, could he not 
 unfold to the exasperated French people ? What a balance-sheet 
 
 * The more you reason, the less you love. 
 
 17 
 
194 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 he could spread before the nation, to call for a final settlement ! 
 England herself seems to feel the heaviness of her indebtedness j 
 hence her little faith in the continuance of peace, which she has 
 so much at heart, and for the maintenance of which she has so 
 often, since 1814, sacrificed her friends and allies. England is, 
 no doubt, sincere in her late professions. She desires no war} 
 and her attitude, though strong in defensive preparations, is en- 
 tirely quiescent. All the aggressive power seems to be lodged in 
 France, and she is continually increasing it. The continental na- 
 tions admit that she is master of the battle-field, and that the 
 question of peace or war is decided in the Tuileries. No Eng- 
 lishman now dreams of invading France ; no Frenchman, when 
 speaking of the chances of war with Great Britain, thinks of any- 
 thing else than an invasion of England. How the times have 
 changed since Henry V. ! How the virtus militaris of Rome has 
 gained on the statesmanship of Carthage ! 
 
 It would seem as if England had abandoned the initiative in 
 European affairs. She has become so ultra-conservative in her 
 foreign policy, and so progressive in regard to internal reforms, 
 that any positive policy, adopted by one party or the other, is 
 almost certain to lead to its defeat. The circle of the governing 
 classes of England has become greatly enlarged ; but it has lost 
 in intensity and power. No one man, now, can lead a British 
 Parliament ; and no measure can be carried, unless it is popular. 
 England has begun to count the cost of her renown, and her hu- 
 manity has wonderfully increased with the expense of her national 
 glory. Her ambition being satisfied, she is now willing to look on 
 while other nations propose great political problems ; reserving to 
 herself simply the right of assisting at their solution, or approving 
 of what has been done. This position naturally renders her the 
 most conservative Power in the world ; — a position to which she can 
 the more readily resign herself, as she has already accomplished 
 great things, and would now, like a man who has grown rich by 
 toil, gladly retire on her fortune. The world is divided, and Eng- 
 land is satisfied with her share of it. But the world is ever young, 
 though individuals and nations grow old in it ; and her gifts are 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 195 
 
 constantly redistributed, to give birth to new life and to repro- 
 duce, with a new cast, the old drama, which we call history. Old 
 personages leave the stage, new ones appear ; but the play is never 
 ended. 
 
 England owes much of her greatness, not only to the many 
 eminent qualities of her people, but also to her geographical po- 
 sition, which admitted of the undisturbed development of her in- 
 stitutions from that period in the history of Europe, when national 
 progress and civil liberty emerged from the barbarism of the feu- 
 dal ages. She enjoyed the rare good fortune neither to be unduly 
 stimulated, nor retarded in her progress, by circumstances beyond 
 her control. Nothing was done out of time ; no change was intro- 
 duced unless it was found necessary ; and no innovation destroyed 
 the respect for the memory of the past. Yet, for this very reason, 
 the present political institution, though in regard to public libertjr 
 far in advance of those on the Continent of Europe, cannot serve 
 as models for imitation to other countries. They present "an anta- 
 gonism to the civilization and progress of other nations who, 
 though not politically free as she is, have far surpassed her in 
 social freedom, and in the emancipation of the individual from the 
 prejudices and injustice of castes. The British system of govern- 
 ment is a happy compromise between the historical growth and the 
 intellectual progress of the nation ; admirably suited to the temper 
 and habits of the people of England, but to none other. Every- 
 thing which has grown up in England during the progress of ages, 
 is cherished and preserved with religious reverence ; while the im- 
 provements, which time has rendered necessary, have taken their 
 places quietly by the side of the historical debris of past centuries. 
 The British edifice of state is not a uniform building, in which you 
 can trace the one, presiding idea of the architect ; it is an old Grothic 
 castle, with its high arched windows, its battlements, and its draw- 
 bridges, to which at various periods extensive and magnificent wings 
 have been added, provided with all the conveniences and comforts of 
 modern times. There lives the noble, the merchant, the manufac- 
 turer, the artisan, each occupying the part most suited to his habits 
 and tastes, without intruding on one another, and with scarcely the 
 
196 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 desire of intrusion. Every successive age has left its imprints oa 
 that remarkable edifice ; nothing has been radically changed, no- 
 thing removed — the improvements consist merely in the valuable 
 additions. To the external beholder it appears cumbrous, clumsy, 
 out of proportion, and in wretched taste ; yet, when you behold 
 its interior arrangements, you are struck with its wonderful adap- 
 tation to the wants of the occupants. It is not the product of a 
 moment j it is the result of the undisturbed workmanship of ages. 
 No modern architect will now imitate that edifice ; no sensible one 
 attempt it. The building materials of which its ancient parts are 
 composed, are no longer in existence ; the workmen are used to 
 other tools. If that edifice were now destroyed, England herself 
 could not raise such another ; how, then, can France, Germany, 
 Italy, or Spain be expected to build on such a plan 1 Suppose the 
 crown or the nobility were swept away ; could the loyalty of the 
 British people be secured to another dynasty ? Could the defer- 
 ence to the nobility, which is part of an Englishman's loyalty to 
 the crown, be transferred to a new set of men, strangers to the 
 people, whose achievements date from yesterday ? The nature of 
 an Englishman forbids it. It is time which has sanctified the in- 
 stitutions of England ; the education and habits of the people 
 have confirmed them. And, we may add, that the wisdom of the 
 privileged classes in making, at proper times, adequate concessions 
 to the people, has also contributed to their preservation. There 
 has always been found sufficient space for valuable additions to 
 the edifice of state, without intruding on the Gothic part of it. 
 The modern extensions have saved the old Gothic structure from 
 demolition. 
 
 On the Continent of Europe men do not move in concentric 
 circles. Liberty there, especially with the Latin races, is synony- 
 mous with equality 5 and it is astonishing to see to what extent 
 the latter may be cherished, even under an absolute monarchy. 
 Where men are of a social disposition, inequality can less be borne 
 than injustice : where education and learning are generally dif- 
 fused, inequality of consideration, not based on superior personal 
 merit, is tantamount to barbarism. The people on the Continent 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 197 
 
 of Europe are much more disposed to submit to an enlightened 
 absolutism, than to the supremacy of privileged classes ; and hence 
 the British system of government, whatever advantages it may 
 possess in a political point of view, has no attraction for them. 
 Englishmen, who are generally but the representatives of classes, 
 (a Frenchman, whether cook or general, barber or statesman, 
 always represents his nation,) so far from being able to act as pro- 
 pagandists, (if they ever thought of a thing so foreign to their 
 nature,) are more apt to produce a certain aversion to their politi- 
 cal and social system. Englishmen themselves are sufficiently 
 aware of this fact ; but, until lately, it has given them but little 
 concern. As the people on the Continent of Europe have, thus 
 far, had but little to say in governmental matters, no one thought 
 it worth while to conciliate their good opinion. England, up to 
 the latest period, has exercised a commanding influence on the 
 political affairs of the European Continent ; but this was by gov- 
 ernmental action, not by popular sympathy, and not unfrequently 
 in spite of the latter. This influence, however, since 1815, has 
 visibly declined, and seems to be still further diminishing. An 
 impression prevails, that England will not easily go to war — that 
 the growing importance of her industrial classes is opposed to 
 that foreign policy, which sacrificed the wealth of the nation to the 
 maintenance of supremacy abroad ; and that taxation has, at last, 
 reached that point, where it cannot be increased without enhanc- 
 ing prices, and encouraging foreign competition with British pro- 
 ducts in the markets of the world. If this were so, England 
 would really have reached the climax of her power ; but there are 
 yet other causes which operate to her disadvantage. 
 
 Nations do not always rise or decline by their own merit ; but 
 by the circumstances which surround them, and which it is impos- 
 sible for them to control. The most terrible blows inflicted on the 
 llepublic of Venice, were the discovery of America and the cir- 
 cumnavigation of the Capes ; the circumstances most contributing 
 to the growth of Russia, were the internal divisions of Germany 
 and Poland. Some States decline by moving slowly ; while other 
 nations, with whom they are in contact, outrun them in the race. 
 17* 
 
198 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 Holland, for instance, which, some two hundred years ago, was 
 one of the most influential and warlike Powers of Europe, hag 
 quietly dwindled down into a Power of the second rank : not by 
 any fault of her own, or the debasement of her people ; but simply 
 by the natural growth of England, France, Prussia, and Russia ; 
 which she had not the power to arrest, and which she even as- 
 sisted with her accumulated capital ; her own industry and com- 
 merce being insufficient to aiFord scope for its investment.* Eng- 
 land is now in a somewhat similar condition. Stupendous as her 
 industry is, British capital still seeks foreign, more remunerative 
 investments. It builds railways in America, in France, in Bel- 
 gium, in Italy, in Egypt, and, by this means, develops the re- 
 sources of other countries ; and the same holds of other industrial 
 pursuits. In like manner does English capital sustain the credit 
 of other States, and helps to sustain them in periods of difficulty 
 and trouble. England thus becomes the creditor of the world ; 
 but it is very questionable whether this is an advantage to her as 
 a nation. 
 
 The population of the British empire, which, for support, de- 
 pends on the labor and industry of the country, has reached a 
 point which cannot be surpassed without increasing pauperism in 
 almost the same ratio. In Russia, the population may triple, in 
 the United States it may quintuple, without visibly diminishing 
 the means of support of the laboring classes. If Holland lacked 
 the material basis for a Power equal to that of England, so Eng- 
 land lacks the physical means of rivaling hereafter the industrial, 
 commercial, and military development of the United States. Her 
 empire and her maritime power are scattered over the globe. 
 They are imposing, but efficient only as long as they arc not 
 threatened on different points at the same time. British states- 
 men have heretofore succeeded in forming coalitions against any 
 
 * See " Reclierches sur le commerce de la Holhmde" Amsterdam, 1828; and 
 especially the answer of the Dutch merchants to the. queries addressed to them 
 by the Stadtholder William IV : — "Why the trade of Holland has been rapidly 
 declining, and by what means It teas to be reestablished and placed on its ancient 
 footing f" 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 199 
 
 Power that threatened the commercial supremacy of England ; 
 will t^ey be able to do so in future ? And what if a coalition — 
 we mean a voluntary one, not one coerced by military power, like 
 that formed by the first Napoleon — were now organized against 
 her ? With the French navy nearly, if not quite, equal to the 
 British ; with the French army, at least, equally efficient, and 
 vastly superior in numbers ; with Russia, becoming daily more 
 formidable in the East ; with France, straining every nerve and 
 exhausting her inventive genius to become the great maritime 
 power of the Mediterranean ; and the United States in majestic, 
 natural growth, and a continent of their own, unavoidably con- 
 tending for the empire of the ocean, it is difficult to perceive by 
 what means England will be able to secure, in the future, that 
 influence on the politics of the world, which she has hitherto main- 
 tained by her wealth, her valor, and the wisdom of her statesmen. 
 England is, no doubt, peaceably inclined ; but the times are trou- 
 bled, and the nations disposed for war. England will not draw 
 the sword, unless she is threatened by a foreign Power. Her 
 future course will not be aggressive ; and she has, we will believe 
 her, no further idea of conquest. The wars in which England will 
 henceforth engage, will not be for new acquisitions, but for the 
 preservation of her present power. England, as we have above 
 remarked, is satisfied with the world's partition ; provided no new 
 division is attempted, to enlarge other Powers beyond their present 
 proportion. And how is she to arrest the natural growth of the 
 United States and of Russia? How can she prevent the revival 
 of the Latin nationalities under the am pices of France, and their 
 probable future concert of action 1 
 
 England is a continental power in Asia ; nowhere else. She 
 possesses colonies in America and in Africa, and important islands 
 in Europe and elsewhere ; but the time has passed when colonies 
 were profitable, and England's power in Asia can henceforth be 
 maintained only by an European army. Colonies which cannot be 
 made to assimilate with the mother country, can only be retained 
 by military force ; colonies which in origin, language and thought 
 are assimilated to the mother countrv, demand similar institutions 
 
200 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 or entire independence. The colonies of Great Britain may, 
 henceforth, afford scope to her commerce and increase her wealth ; 
 but, in a military point of view, they constitute elements of weak- 
 ness, not of strength ; because, in time of war, they require aid. 
 instead of furnishing assistance to the mother country. England 
 holds Gibraltar, Malta and the Ionian Islands, merely by military 
 power ; her dominion in India does not extend beyond the reach 
 of her guns; her West India Islands produce no revenue, and her 
 possessions on the continent of America are only secure in time of 
 peace. The power of England is neither homogeneous nor com- 
 pact, and does not compare, in these respects, with that of France, 
 Russia or the United States. Nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine 
 hundredths, of all the aggressive means of England are still con- 
 fined to the two Islands constituting the united kingdoms of Great 
 Britain and Ireland ; and in computing the available military force 
 of the British Empire in time of war, reference must be had, almost 
 exclusively, to those islands. England cannot now enlist troops 
 on the continent of Europe ; and her course, since the Congress of 
 Vienna, has been such that she will not easily succeed in forming 
 lasting alliances with any European Power. 
 
 England once threatened the reactionary sovereigns with " let- 
 ting Democracy loose upon Europe ;" but England has not the 
 power to do that. England cannot conjure up a spirit with which 
 she does not s} r mpathize, and between which and herself there has 
 heretofore existed such a deadly antagonism. England has pro- 
 duced a poet who espoused the cause of popular liberty from true 
 devotion to it ; but the statesmen of England have never been 
 guilty of a similar indiscretion. They invoked liberty to foment 
 civil wars ; and formed coalitions against democratic France, to re- 
 store the rule of despotism. If, within the last ten years, Eng- 
 land has been found on the popular side of public questions in 
 Europe, it is because her governing classes have lost power, and 
 are obliged to account for their acts. England, to let Democracy 
 loose upon Europe, must herself become Democratic ; or she will in 
 vain try to drum up recruits for such a service. With her past 
 history, the aristocratic cast of her government, and the specific 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 201 
 
 loyalty of her people, it is easier for the Emperor Alexander, of 
 Russia, to " let Democracy loose on Europe," ilian for any nation 
 on the continent to believe in the sincerity of such a move pro- 
 ceeding from England. The Czar, the Emperor of the French, 
 the Regent of Prussia, Victor Emanuel, the Pope, may let Demo- 
 cracy loose on Europe ; but an aristocracy cannot do so without 
 destroying itself. If England wants to let Democracy loose upon 
 Europe, she must employ the French army. 
 
 Another cause which has served to diminish British supremacy, 
 is the invention of steam and its application to industrial pursuits, 
 to railwaj's and to ocean navigation. As far as industrial pursuits 
 are concerned, it is clear that steam, as a substitute for hands, 
 equalizes whatever advantage experience may have given to the 
 British artisan or manufacturing laborer ; and that the advantages 
 of concentrated capital in England, are quite, if not more than 
 compensated, by lighter taxation, cheaper living and lower wages 
 elsewhere, or by the greater proximity of the raw materials em- 
 ployed in manufactures. The latter advantage is especially enjoyed 
 by the United States in regard to the world staple cotton and to 
 dye stuffs ; while France surpasses England in the manufacture of 
 all articles of taste, which are past the competition of steam. 
 France, being by the common consent of all nations, allowed to 
 set the fashions of the world, fears no competition with her fash- 
 ionable goods, for which she furnishes the only standard of com- 
 parison. This privilege is worth incalculable sums of money an- 
 nualty. Wherever, throughout the whole range of the civilized 
 world, a man rises to the condition of ease and comfort, he be- 
 comes tributary to the industry and taste of France. There are 
 numberless and nameless articles of taste and fashion — articles 
 de veriu, of luxury, of elegance, manufactr" ." '-• Paris, compara- 
 tively out of nothing, and exceeding in value many hundred mil- 
 lions of francs. The ratio of the cost of the raw material to the 
 price of the manufactured articles, is as one to four, and exceeds 
 often that of one to fifty 5 while, in most articles of British manu- 
 facture, it is the near approach of the price of the manufactured 
 article to the cost of the raw' material, which commands the market, 
 
202 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 by diminishing or excluding competition. The privilege of setting 
 the fashions is the only monopoly which requires no protection, 
 and does not act injuriously on every other species of industry. 
 It commands the highest price, and insures the best markets. It 
 is a tax levied on the prejudices and vanity, perhaps on the dis- 
 cernment, of men and women, and is, on that account, cheerfully 
 submitted to in every quarter of the globe. Finally, it creates 
 artificial wants, far beyond the computation of the political econo- 
 mist, and supplies them, not unfrequently, to the exclusion of the 
 necessaries of life. 
 
 The long peace enjoyed in Europe since 1815, while it un- 
 doubtedly developed the industry of England, has, in a still greater 
 ratio, stimulated that of other countries. The long wars of the 
 French revolution made Germany, Spain and Italy almost entirely 
 dependent on English manufactures ; while France herself, en- 
 gaged in warlike pursuits, but imperfectly supplied her own wants. 
 England, since Harry VII. , free from foreign invasion,* quietly and 
 steadily cultivated the arts of peace ; while the industrial devel- 
 opment of the States of Continental Europe, though much older 
 than that of England, had not only suffered from hostile legislation — 
 as, for instance, in the case of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
 which expelled certain industrial classes altogether — but also 
 from continued wars, which rendered all species of property inse- 
 cure, and quartered large bodies of troops upon the peaceful 
 inhabitants of rising cities. The civil wars of France and Ger- 
 many commenced during an industrial period ; those of England 
 preceded it. During the twenty-five years' war of the French 
 
 * It is doubtful whether even the landing of Henry YII., with his English 
 followers, in their own country, can be called an invasion of England, especially 
 as it only served to put an end to the civil wars of the Roses. The short in- 
 glorious attempt of Charles II. to recover the throne of his father, during the 
 life of Cromwell, certainly does not deserve that name; nor can the landing of 
 the Pretender's son, Charles Edward, in Scotland, in 1745, be magnified into an 
 invasion. Finally, the Stadtholder William of Orange, landed, in November, 
 1688, by invitation on the shores of England; and his almost bloodless success 
 was a triumph and a delivery of England, rather than an invasion. He raised 
 the power of England, instead of diminishing it; so did Henry YII. before him. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 203 
 
 Revolution, England not only enjoyed the monopoly of manufac- 
 tures, but also complete supremacy on the ocean. She sup- 
 plied the principal markets of the world, and extracted large 
 sums even from France and her allies. The burning of English 
 manufactured goods, wherever they were seized by Napoleon I.'s 
 agents, on the Continent of Europe, only enhanced the price of 
 them, without diminishing the demand ; so that, in a commercial and 
 industrial point of view, the war, which diminished the resources of 
 every State on the Continent of Europe, largely added to those of 
 England, and enabled her to subsidize the armies of her allies. 
 Since the second peace of Paris (1815) France, Germany, Belgium, 
 and even Russia, have entered the industrial arena ; not only ex- 
 cluding, to a great extent, British manufactured goods from their 
 own markets, but also competing with them successfully in the 
 markets of the world. And America, with inexhaustible stores of 
 coal and iron, has joined these States in the competition with Brit- 
 ish industry ; claiming a large part of her own best market for her 
 domestic goods, and diminishing both the extent and the ratio of 
 the profits of English labor. These diminished profits are the most 
 effective means of driving British capital and manufacturing labor 
 out of England, and investing or employing them more remunera- 
 tively in other countries. 
 
 The application of steam to propulsion on railways is of far 
 greater benefit to other countries than to England. British territory 
 is so limited in extent, and the public roads are in such excellent 
 condition, that, even before the introduction of railways, no import- 
 ant point of the island was more than some twenty-four hours distant 
 from another. These distances have undoubtedly been shortened j 
 but the effect of it does not compare in importance with the advantages 
 resulting from railways in the United States, or on the Continent 
 of Europe. Here products are brought to market which otherwise 
 would be entirely excluded from it ; and at a cost so low as not mate- 
 rially to affect prices. States with a comparatively thin population, 
 like Russia and the United States, are made to enjoy the advan- 
 tages of thickly settled communities ; while large, continuous and 
 populous countries, like Germany and France, have been furnished 
 
204 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 the means of concentrating vast power at convenient points. Had 
 Russia, during the Crimean war, had a continuous system of rail- 
 ways from St. Petersburg to Sebastopol, or any other point on the 
 Black Sea, her fleet in that sea might yet hover over Constanti- 
 nople. Unless England derive great commercial advantages from 
 her railways in India, propulsion by steam will do more for the 
 development of the power of her rivals than for herself. Large 
 Powers have heretofore found it difficult to act from a common 
 centre ; this is now accomplished by railways, without difficulty 
 and with very little loss of time. The action of the whole Conti- 
 nent may thus be assimilated, in point of speed, to that of an 
 island ; but it acts with a greater mass, and therefore with a 
 greater momentum. When the Russian railways shall extend 
 from Petersburg and Moscow to Central Asia, and when a con- 
 tinuous railway communication shall be opened between New York 
 and San Francisco, the commerce of the world will be changed by 
 the adoption of new routes, which will benefit other countries more 
 than England, and, in the same ratio, diminish her political 
 prestige. 
 
 The most serious change, however, in the relative position of 
 England and her great Continental rivals, was effected by the appli- 
 cation of steam to the propulsion of ships. Before the introduc- 
 tion of steam navigation, that Power which had the greatest 
 number of experienced seamen — in other words, that Power which 
 furnished the greatest employment to seamen by her fisheries and 
 her trade — commanded the ocean ; and if that country was an 
 island, it was invulnerable, because free from foreign attacks. It 
 then possessed the greatest aggressive power, and, at the same 
 time, the most effective means of defence. Thus England was 
 
 " That precious stone set in the silver sea, 
 Which serves it in the office of a wall, 
 Or as a moat defensive to a house 
 Against the envy of less happier lands !" 
 
 But the sea serves it in that office no longer. Steam has done for 
 seamanship, what gunpowder has done for chivalry. It has more 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 205 
 
 nearly assimilated the conditions of people living on different shores 
 of the same water ; and it has left that to the operation of me- 
 chanical engines, which was formerly achieved by the combined 
 efforts of officers and crew. Sails on board a steam vessel are but 
 an auxiliary force ; it is the engine and the engineer, and her 
 tonnage, that give character to the ship. Now, as steam ships, in 
 moderate weather, can take any direction they please, or change 
 their course as it may suit the purpose of their commanders, it is 
 evident that fleets now-a-days cannot lay waiting for each other, 
 as in former times. Fleets will henceforth be manoeuvred with 
 nearly the same facility as armies on land, and it is the quality and 
 quantity of the metal which will decide naval contests. Neither 
 the physical superiority of the men, nor their superior skill as 
 sailors, would outweigh any positive advantage that might be pos- 
 sessed by the enemy's artillery, in the superiority of his guns and 
 the mode of serving them. The success of future naval battles 
 will mainly depend on the superior engines of destruction pos- 
 sessed, at the time, by this or that power ; and this superiority will 
 far more depend on the successful application of the mathematical 
 and physical sciences to the purposes of war, than on long expe- 
 rience and practice on the water. In the present state of the 
 French army and navy, it is not likely an English force will be 
 landed on the coast of France ; but there are fears in England 
 that a French army may be landed somewhere either in Ireland 
 or Great Britain. What the French lack at this moment, is a 
 sufficient fleet of transports ; they have ships of the line and fri- 
 gates enough to act as convoys. France does not require her 
 present immense navy to protect either her maritime possessions 
 or her commerce. One fourth of her present naval force would 
 be amply sufficient for either or both these purposes. But if she 
 intends to do great things in the Mediterranean ; if Turkey is to 
 be partitioned, if Egypt is to be Europeanized, and Morocco 
 taught a lesson of civilization, then we can easily understand why 
 the Emperor Napoleon bestows such unremitting attentions to the 
 defence of the French sea coast and to the increase and improve- 
 ment of his already formidable navy. In a war with England, 
 18 
 
20G THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 France might lose all her distant colonies, -without serious diminu- 
 tion of her power or prestige in Europe ; or she might dispose of 
 these colonies as she once did of Louisiana, to have her hands 
 free in the Channel and in the Mediterranean. If France were to 
 attempt the invasion of England — a thing which probably lies 
 further from the thoughts of the Emperor Napoleon than the most 
 patriotic Englishman believes or desires — she could afford to lose 
 half her entire fleet, if she succeeded in landing a sufficient number 
 of troops on the British shore. The mission of her whole navy, in 
 the last resort, would be to convoy a fleet of transports safely on 
 a voyage of a few short hours. We leave it to naval men to de- 
 termine whether the present navy of France is equal to such a 
 task.* 
 
 But whether the Emperor Napoleon alone, or in conjunction 
 with Russia, meditate any offensive movement against his British 
 ally, it is quite evident that England mistrusts his friendships, and, 
 in anticipation of untoward events, multiplies her military and 
 naval forces. And from her recent attitude in regard to the 
 Italian question, it would seem as if England also apprehended a 
 concert of action between France and Austria — her last and most 
 steadfast ally on the continent of Europe, up to the period of the 
 last war and the peace of Villafranca. 
 
 The political changes in Italy have, since 1849, occupied but a 
 small share of the attention of British statesmen. The old Tory 
 ministers were quite willing to abandon the whole Peninsula to Aus- 
 trian domination, and actually stipulated for it at the Congress of 
 
 * It is now believed, by many seafaring men, that the navy of France is at 
 this day superior to that of England, if not in the number of ships, at least in 
 caliber and weight of metal. Rifle guns are already introduced into the whole 
 French navy; and her artillery men, which, on land, excel any other troops in 
 the world, may, at some future day, if not noAV, claim the same superiority on 
 the water. Add to this, that the same Democratic spirit which pervades the 
 French army, and excites the greatest amount of military emulation, exists also 
 in the navy 5 and it will be difficult to comprehend why it should not there pro- 
 duce similar results. With such a national, democratic navy, the Emperor 
 Napoleon may attempt much — and succeed. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 207 
 
 Prague, in 1813.* Holding Gibraltar and Malta, and receiving at 
 the Congress of Vienna, the Protectorate over the Ionian Islands, 
 England thought herself sufficiently strong in the Mediterranean, 
 not only against France, but against any combination of Powers 
 which might interfere with her supremacy in that sea. From 
 Austria she could hardly anticipate any considerable naval demon- 
 stration ; and besides, Austria, as we have already related, had 
 allowed the whole naval establishment of the kingdom of Italy, 
 which, with the retirement of Eugene Beauharnais, had fallen into 
 her hands, to decay, and the vessels of war (several line of battle 
 ships and frigates) to rot in her ports. Austria, Prussia, and the 
 German States generally, took it for granted that, in case they 
 w T ent to war with one or more of the Continental maritime Powers, 
 England would protect their sea coast ; hence no effort was made 
 by either of them, till 1848, to establish a military navy. Even 
 the miniature fleet, which the Germans in 1848 and '49 had col- 
 lected to oppose the pretensions of Denmark, was, chiefly through 
 Austrian jealousy of Prussia, brought to the hammer. England 
 never favored the development of any, the smallest naval force of 
 a continental Power ; for, apart from the possibility of a coalition, 
 the involuntary reliance of Germany and Austria, and the smaller 
 continental States, on England, was a British check on an inde- 
 pendent continental policy. England, up to the last moment, 
 was looked upon as the " natural ally" of Austria and Prussia — 
 (the Queen of England is officially addressed as the " Protectress 
 of the Hanseatic Towns,") — and, in return, England had a right 
 to consider them as her natural allies on the Continent. This 
 mutual relation of England and Germany has been totally changed 
 by the events of the last war. England abandoned Austria to her 
 fate. Austria looked in vain for a British fleet to protect Venice, 
 
 * Metternich, on 26th May, 1814, (after the peace of Paris,) addressed a long 
 Protest to Lord Castlereagh, complaining that England had not redeemed the 
 pledges she had made to Austria at Prague, in 1813. He claimed, by the secret 
 treaty with England of that year, the Duchy of Parma and a portion of the 
 Papal States. The Spanish Bourbons were to be compensated for the loss of 
 Parma — in Germany ! ! 
 
208 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 or the ports of the Adriatic ; while British statesmen, conjointly 
 with the British press, declared that Prussia and the German 
 States, in case of a war between them and France, must not count 
 on British assistance or protection. A British fleet did appear in 
 the Adriatic ; but it did not interfere with the blockade of the 
 Venetian coast. No British fleet appeared in the North Sea or 
 the Baltic. Austria, in preparing for war with France, fortified 
 her sea coast. Prussia, since the peace of Villafranca, has 
 already declared that she will do the same thing, conjointly with 
 her German allies bordering on the North Sea and the Baltic. 
 Looking no longer to Great Britain for the protection of their 
 commerce in time of war, their policy will, henceforth, be less 
 liable to be influenced by Great Britain; unless England (which is 
 not likely) considers the family alliance between the British and 
 Prussian sovereigns as a sufficient cause for entering into treaty 
 stipulations with the States of Northern Germany. 
 
 In regard to Piedmont, the policy of England was strictly con- 
 servative ; no more. England had an interest not to see Piedmont 
 dwindle clown into a province of Austria or France. She wanted an 
 independent kingdom in that important strategical position, placed 
 between these two rival Powers : and a port (Genoa) where, in case 
 of need, she might land an army. Beyond this, no British minister, 
 it is but fair to presume, ever extended his vision. "What assist- 
 ance England will now give to Sardinia, in her conflicting claims 
 on the Duchies, and to what extent she will advocate the estab- 
 lishment of an Italian Power, capable of resisting further Austrian 
 encroachments, remains to be seen, The greatest counterpoise to 
 Austrian domination would have been a firm league between Pied- 
 mont and Naples ; but this, as we have related, England opposed 
 and helped to prevent, in 1848 and 1849 ; the expulsion of the 
 Austrians from Italy having never before entered the programme of 
 a British minister. From 1846 till 1850, the weight of British in- 
 fluence in Italy was undoubtedly thrown in favor of political re- 
 forms ; but not in favor of Italian nationality , or against Austria; 
 though any reforms introduced into the governments of Italy, 
 without, at the same time, diminishing Austrian power and influence 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 209 
 
 in the Peninsula, were worse than useless. Neither did England 
 wish to plunge Italy into revolutions, which might have endan- 
 gered any of the Dynasties ; and Lord Minto took a special occa- 
 sion to assure the Neapolitan minister in Rome, that " the encour- 
 agement of popular insurrections formed no part of the hearty 
 support she (England) was disposed to give to the progress of liberal 
 reforms in Italy." England, to improve the condition of Italy, 
 expected to employ no other than moral means, which were not 
 likely to interfere with her exchequer ; when the Franco-Italian 
 alliance was formed, she maintained an armed neutrality. 
 
 During the Italian war, which has just been brought to a close, 
 England was actuated by two important considerations : — First, she 
 did not wish her " old, faithful ally," Austria, driven to the wall ; 
 and secondly, she was apprehensive that the French Emperor was 
 about to establish a Napoleonic Dynasty somewhere in the Penin- 
 sula — perhaps in Naples or Sicily. How could we otherwise 
 account for the large reinforcements sent to Malta, Gibraltar and 
 the Ionian Islands, or for the increase of her fleet in the Tyrrhenian 
 and Adriatic seas? The Emperor of the French could hardly 
 misconstrue these movements, and he is not the man to forget 
 them. England could not for a moment suppose that the Emperor 
 Napoleon wanted Parma, Modena, or even the Grand Duchy of 
 Tuscany for his cousin, the Prince. Such an ambition is assuredly 
 below the imperial mark. No such miniature principality or king- 
 dom was consistent with good faith to Victor Emanuel, and it is 
 quite certain the Emperor never gave it a thought. If France 
 were to purchase Savoy, neither England nor an} r other Power of 
 Europe could raise an objection to it. The Savoyards are French- 
 men, speak the French language, and their separation from Pied- 
 mont would neither be a hardship for them, nor infringe on the 
 doctrine of nationality laid clown by the French Emperor. But 
 Naples and Sicily are differently situated, especially the latter. 
 There is a Bourbon Dynasty to be displaced, which, for more than 
 half a century, has disgraced royalty by acts of the lowest and 
 bloodiest treachery, and by almost every vice which can disgrace 
 18* 
 
210 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 humanity. The only intermission between the tyranny of the two 
 Ferdinands, was the reign of Joachim Murat (that of King Joseph 
 Bonaparte did not last long enough to create a permanent impres- 
 sion on the people), and every act of his successors has, by the con- 
 trast it afforded — endeared his memory. Here are natural causes 
 operating to excite the inquietude of England ; for if France, Pied- 
 mont and Naples are once agreed on the policy of Italy, Austria's 
 occupation in the Peninsula is gone, and she will readily consent 
 to a compensation on the Danube. 
 
 The Italian Islands of Sardinia and Corsica, though compara- 
 tively large, are, as maritime possessions, of little consequence to 
 Piedmont and France respectively ; but the case is different in 
 regard to the Island of Sicily. The geographical position of that 
 Island, its incredible fertility, (even the Sugar-cane succeeds on its 
 soil) and the many magnificent and safe harbors, with which it is 
 blessed, constitute vast elements of power which, under a liberal 
 and energetic government, might change the political aspect of the 
 Mediterranean. Sicily, in the hands of a maritime Power, might 
 command the opposite shore of Egypt, and exercise a prepon- 
 derating influence in the Greek Archipelago. Malta itself might 
 be threatened ; while the Ionian Islands, whose population will 
 never be reconciled to British rule, no matter what concessions 
 their British Protectors may make to them, would require the 
 presence of a strong naval and military force, not to give vent to 
 their national sentiments. England, therefore, in case dynastic 
 changes are about to be introduced in Italy, will keep a watchful 
 eye on Naples and Sicily ; and if unable to guard both, at least 
 take Sicily under her protecting wing. The population of Naples 
 is more than twice as large as that of Sicily ; but, in a maritime 
 and commercial point of view, the Island possesses infinitely greater 
 advantages. Under Neapolitan dominion, it will always be com- 
 paratively neglected ; first, on account of the national jealousies be- 
 tween the Neapolitans and Sicilians; and secondly, because with 
 the undying desire of the Sicilians for a government independent 
 of Naples, and their repeated attempts at revolution, the island has, 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 211 
 
 for many years, been treated merely as a conquered province. The 
 Sicilian nobles, -who claim the honor of Norman descent,* consider 
 themselves related to those of England, and have, in their struggles 
 for independence, emulated many British virtues. They have always 
 shown themselves ready to make great personal sacrifices for the 
 public good ; and to surrender the privileges of their caste where 
 they interfered with the liberal aspirations of the people. Of all 
 the States of Italy, none gave the national party more concern 
 than the Kingdom of Sicily. The Sicilians dreaded the unbridled 
 liberties proclaimed, from time to time, by their countrymen in 
 other parts of Italy, and actually resisted the Spanish Consti- 
 tution of 1812, which the Neapolitans established in 1820. The 
 historical antecedents of Sicily, the spirit of its inhabitants, and its 
 geographical position, plead for its independence of Naples ; and it 
 would, perhaps, be easier for the island to become an independent 
 member of the proposed Italian League, than to join that League 
 merely as an appendix to Naples. Military men have laid down 
 the rule that he who commands Upper Italy, commands the whole 
 Peninsula ; but this does not include Sicily. Napoleon I., and his 
 Generals, did possess all Italy ; but a British fleet protected the 
 Island. With the present improvements in the French navy, 
 events may happen which were not foreseen even by the genius of 
 the " Great Monarch." 
 
 In connection with these considerations, we must yet refer to 
 the Isthmus of Suez. The proposed ship canal, or a ship railway 
 accross that Isthmus, is part of the Italian question, and of im- 
 mense consequence to the trade of the Mediterranean. We all 
 remember the fierce quarrel between the French and English 
 Engineers, Lesseps and Stephenson, on that subject, and how the 
 Chevalier Negrelli, the Austrian Engineer, took the part of Mons. 
 Lesseps, in showing the feasibility of the canal. It was very- 
 evident, however, that England did not want a canal across^the 
 Isthmus ; and it became equally manifest that France and Austria, 
 and all the States of Italy desired it, as essential to a new route to 
 
 * The Normans having conquered the Island. 
 
212 TIIOtTGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 India for their commercial marine. If a ship canal were built 
 across the Isthmus of Suez, the whole trade from Marseilles, 
 Trieste or Leghorn to India, would be coastwise ; adding immea- 
 surably to the prosperity of these important seaports, and damag- 
 ing, in the same ratio, the British East India trade round the 
 Capes. The Chevalier Negrelli agreed on that point, and on 
 many others, entirely with Mons. Lesseps ; but when the French 
 Chambers of Commerce of Paris, Marseilles, Nantes, &c. sub- 
 scribed largely to Lesseps' enterprise, and when it was believed 
 that the French subscriptions alone were sufficient to commence 
 and finish the work, Austria grew jealous of her French rival, 
 considered Trieste outdone by Marseilles, and withheld not only her 
 own support of the enterprise, but damaged it also in public opinion, 
 through the aid of the journals devoted to her interests. A more 
 natural explanation of this conduct is, perhaps, found in the reflec- 
 tion that Austria, foreseeing a rupture with France, either on the 
 Italian or Turkish question, sought, in advance, to conciliate Eng- 
 land ; although in doing so, she opposed the best commercial in- 
 terests of her own subjects. Mons. Lesseps evidently put that 
 construction on her conduct ; and, in return for her kindly offices, 
 sent some three hundred Italian Refugees, on board of a steamer, 
 chartered by himself, back to their native land, to aid in the war 
 against Austria. The canal project has since met with varied suc- 
 cess. Sometimes the Vice Roy of Egypt seemed to favor it, some- 
 times his opposition to it amounted almost to an injunction. Whether 
 the work will be finished under the present auspices, seems to be 
 doubtful ; and to depend mainly on the preponderance of British 
 or French influence at Cairo. It is difficult, however, to believe 
 that France, after having subscribed some two hundred millions of 
 francs, and after having obtained the necessary concessions, will 
 now suffer the work to be suspended or abandoned. Neither the 
 Vice Roy of Egypt, nor the Sublime Port, can with impunity throw 
 obstacles in the way of civilization and progress ; or attempt to 
 confine commerce to its present limits. The Isthmus of Suez is, 
 at this moment, quite as important, in a commercial point of view, 
 as Constantinople ; and its possession is coveted by more than one 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 213 
 
 Power that looks forward to the division of Turkey. There is, to 
 use one of Mr. Calhoun's celebrated phrases, " a mysterious con- 
 nection" between France and Egypt, illustrated by many historical 
 incidents, from the battle of the Pyramids, to the bombardment of 
 St. Jean d' Acre. The romantic expedition of General Bonaparte 
 yet lives in the memory of the veterans of the French army, and 
 must have occurred more than once to the comprehensive mind of 
 the Emperor Napoleon III.* 
 
 The whole foreign policy of the Emperor Napoleon seems in- 
 deed, to have been directed to the solution of the Oriental ques- 
 tion ; which involves not only the future configuration of the 
 Powers of Europe, but also that of Asia, to the borders of the 
 Pacific. It is the problem of our century ; involving the regenera- 
 tion and civilization of the Eastern Continents, and affecting, in its 
 ultimate consequences, the material prosperity of the whole civ- 
 ilized world. When the Emperor Nicholas attempted to solve 
 this question, without regard to the wishes of the other European 
 Powers, Napoleon III. entered his protest, and conjointly with 
 England waged the Crimean war. After the peace of Paris, Aus- 
 tria, supported in a measure by England, endeavored to exercise 
 that predominating influence at Constantinople which Russia had 
 lost by the war ; but here, she too, was met by France, who, from 
 that day, only sought a fit opportunity of lowering her pretensions. 
 The Italian question w r as cognate to the Oriental one ; but the 
 Emperor Napoleon had no idea of fighting two mortal duels on the 
 Po and on the Rhine, as mere preliminary steps to the accomplish- 
 ment of his original design. The interests of France were not 
 commensurate with such a sacrifice. With a powerful army, flushed 
 w r ith victory, and a magnificent navy longing for an opportunity to 
 
 * After the canal across the Isthmus shall he built, the possession of Constan- 
 tinople by Russia, though it would give her immense prestige in Asia, and be a 
 powerful means of stimulating the religious enthusiasm of her people, will, in a 
 commercial point of view, be of loss consequence than Alexandria. The domina- 
 tion of the Black sea would advance other projects; but these need not neces- 
 sarily excite the jealousy of any continental Power of Europe. The further 
 Russia goes East, the less momentum does she acquire on her western frontier. 
 
214 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 live in fame, other things may be accomplished than restoring 
 Venice to the Winged Lion.* The liberation of Italy was a means 
 of humbling Austria ; it was a beautiful incident, not the sole cause 
 and object of the war. That liberation, nevertheless, is about to 
 be substantially accomplished, and an Italian Confederation, in 
 some shape or other, will undoubtedly follow. But as long as the 
 Oriental question remains unsettled, that of Italy will necessarily 
 be involved in doubt. Austria is now as much in a state of transi- 
 tion as Italy herself. The mode in which Turkey shall be divided, 
 will determine whether Austria shall again gravitate toward Italy, 
 or become definitely, what some of her most reflecting statesmen 
 already call her — " the Danueian Empire." When Couza was 
 chosen Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia, he declared to the world 
 that he should look upon the power, thus conferred upon him, merely 
 as temporary ; and that he was ready, at any time, to abdicate in 
 favor of a foreign Prince. Here, then, there is a vacancy which 
 the Emperor of Austria or some other Prince, according to cir- 
 cumstances, may be called upon to fill ; other vacancies may be 
 created. 
 
 If the peace, concluded between France and Austria, is a sincere 
 one (and this appears to be the case) there is some probability that 
 these two Powers will come to an understanding on the Oriental 
 question. France, Russia and Austria have sufficient power to 
 settle it, and if agreed among themselves, would dispose of Turkey 
 without much difficulty. England, isolated as she now is, from 
 the continent of Europe, might protest against it ; but would hardly 
 wage war in a fruitless attempt to prevent it. Her land force 
 would be insignificant compared with that of either of the opposing 
 Powers ; and Turkey herself is utterly unable to offer any serious 
 resistance. Thus England might be obliged to ratify, by her ac- 
 quiescence, an arrangement to which she has not been a party, and 
 thereby suffer a fatal diminution of her prestige. She cannot be 
 excluded from the councils of the continental Powers, without suf- 
 fering in the estimation of the world, and diminishing the influence 
 
 * The ancient arms of the Republic of Venice. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 215 
 
 of her diplomacy in other quarters. This seems to be the true 
 danger to which England is exposed by the foreign policy of Im- 
 perial France, and it is difficult to overrate it. An island within 
 a few hours' sail from the continent, cannot avoid being affected 
 by its fate. Neither can England remain an indifferent spectator 
 to a continental arrangement which, by its ulterior consequences, 
 may involve the security of her Indian Empire. India is not as 
 easily defended now, as it was half a century ago, when England 
 could threaten to bring her Seapoys to Egypt — when a native army, 
 larger than any that a European Power could have dispatched to 
 India, was ready to repel an invasion. 
 
 The possessions of England are scattered over the whole globe. 
 It is of her, not of Spain, that it may be said, " the sun never sets 
 in her dominions." But the extent of these possessions also in- 
 volves responsibilities and cares proportionate to their importance. 
 No political or commercial changes can take place anywhere with- 
 out affecting British interests. England is obliged to take a part 
 in every question of power, wherever it may arise ; but as the greater 
 part of her dominions lies in Asia, anything affecting that conti- 
 nent, necessarily strikes at her supremacy. England is the most 
 considerable Power in Asia ; and her influence, for some time past, 
 has ruled that continent. But if Europe advances into Asia, and 
 that old continent becomes the seat of European Power, revolu- 
 tions must follow, the result of which must change the relations of 
 every nation on earth. The British people are now taxed for 
 the support of. the government of India; would they be willing to 
 be taxed for another Indian war ? And if that war involved the 
 integrity of British soil — if a French fleet were assembled at Cher- 
 bourg, and an army ready to embark — if England, deserted by all 
 her old allies, and, " the dread and envy of them all," were prepar- 
 ing, alone, for the great world duel with an European coalition, 
 where, in the wide world, could she look for sympathizing hearts, 
 except to her own kindred in America ? 
 
 And why should there not be growing sympathies between Eng- 
 land and the United States ? England, to be sure, has, until a very 
 late period, scarcely treated us with the comity due from one great 
 
216 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 nation to another. She has sought to thwart our policy in many 
 things, of vital importance to us, and of little moment to herself. 
 She has periodically revived her pretensions to the odious Right of 
 Search, in some form or other, with a full knowledge of the mortal 
 offence the agitation of this vexed question must always give to the 
 United States. She tried to overreach us in the Clayton-Bulwer 
 Treaty, by construing it in a manner which would bind us against 
 ourselves without a consideration ; and she has, on various occasions, 
 in the most offensive manner, attempted to read us homilies on the 
 subject of slavery, which are unjust, scarcely regarded as sincere, 
 and can serve no practical purpose except that of sowing discord and 
 exciting prejudices between different sections of our common countiy. 
 English statesmen and writers have repeatedly attempted to sit in 
 judgment on us ; forgetting that they have no longer any jurisdic- 
 tion in our case ; and that there is a public opinion on this side of the 
 water, too, which it would be wise and proper in them to conciliate. 
 England must cease to play the arrogant, aggressive part of arbiter 
 of the world ; she must resign the ungrateful office of censor of 
 public morals, and she must allow other nations to judge for them- 
 selves as to the best mode of promoting their own welfare and 
 happiness. If she will do that, and use her free press and the 
 great power she still possesses, for the promotion of constitu- 
 tional liberty from a stand-point higher than mere commercial 
 interest, then she will not only regain much that she appears to 
 have lost, but attach new allies to her cause. 
 
 It cannot have escaped observation that, of late, the British 
 Press has taken a different tone, indicating a change of public 
 sentiment, in regard to the United States. We are heartily re- 
 joiced at this ; and feel assured that there is every disposition in 
 this country, to reciprocate whatever kindly feelings Great Britain 
 may have in store for us. The British Press has labored long 
 enough, and perseveringly enough, to depreciate our institutions 
 and laws, and to throw ridicule on what it was pleased to call our 
 "American idiosyncracies." These taunts and sneers could never 
 serve any reasonable purpose ; and could only alienate the sympa- 
 thies which we naturally feel for a kindred people. It seemed 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 217 
 
 really, for a time, as if the similarity of our institutions, instead 
 of being favorably considered in England, constituted an addi- 
 tional grievance, on account of their approximation to the funda- 
 mental principles of British liberty. English statesmen and pub- 
 lic writers were in a habit of treating us as political heretics ; for 
 whom those who consider themselves orthodox seem to have less 
 consideration, than for downright infidels. The nearer we came to 
 their own standard, the more intolerable seemed to be the differ- 
 ence. Let England henceforth practice a little more tolerance, 
 and she will have no cause to regret it. Let us be united, hence- 
 forth, not only by mutual interest, which may change every day with 
 the circumstances in which we are placed ; but by that deep and last- 
 ing anxiety for each other's welfare, which characterizes members 
 of the same family. One of our great statesmen, in a speech de- 
 livered in England, some years ago, called Great Britain the 
 " Breakwater of Liberty." We are disposed to consider her as 
 such, should the nations of the Continent of Europe relapse into 
 despotism ; and it would be both a source of pride and satisfaction 
 for us to watch and do what may be in our power, to prevent that 
 breakwater from being swept away. If the Emperor Napoleon, 
 in a late proclamation, could justly say, that " wherever there is 
 civilization, there is France ;" we may, with equal truth, proclaim, 
 that wherever there is Constitutional Liberty, there are the sym- 
 pathies of the Great Republic of the United States ! 
 
 France has never been more prosperous, or more powerful than 
 at the present day. Never before was her industry in a more 
 flourishing condition, her commerce less trammeled, and her agri- 
 cultural labor more certain of its reward. Never have so many 
 improvements been going on, at the same time, in so many differ- 
 ent parts of the country. The wealth of France has astonished 
 Europe ; her enterprise keeps pace with her immense material de- 
 velopment, and the gradual approach to free trade. If these 
 have been the results of the wise and liberal domestic policy of 
 the French Emperor, in harmony with the spirit of the age, and 
 adapted to the peculiar genius of the French people, his foreign 
 policy— the sole creation of his own mind — has even been more 
 19 
 
218 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 successful, and has made France the leading Power in Europe. 
 The process by which this was accomplished, was natural; yet 
 highly elaborate. The Emperor Napoleon did not create new 
 elements of power ; but he bestowed the mighty energies of his 
 fertile mind on the development and improvements already in 
 existence, and he combined them in a manner to produce the most 
 striking effect. Without territorial conquest, without absorbing 
 other nations, without the aid of allies to swell their -numbers, his 
 armies have become the terror of Europe ; his fleets, the cause of 
 alarm and anxiety to his neighbors. Frederic the Great used to say, 
 that if he were King of France, no cannon in Europe should be fired 
 without his consent : — the Emperor Napoleon reduced this hypo- 
 thetical proposition to a verity. If, in the Crimean war, he low- 
 ered the pretensions of Russia, he also diminished the warlike 
 prestige of his British allies by comparison with the efficiency and 
 brilliant effect of his own military appointments ; and like results 
 may attend the joint military expedition of England and France 
 against China. 
 
 These achievements have elated France much more than the 
 Emperor who, after each victory, astonished his enemies as much 
 by his moderation, as by the terrible energy he displayed before 
 and during the battle. It is no disparagement to say of Napoleon 
 III., that he does not possess the matchless military genius of his 
 great uncle (since nobody on earth possesses it now, and perhaps 
 but one — Hannibal — possessed it before him) ; but it may also be 
 no flattery to say, that he excels him in wisdom and prudence. 
 Whatever hope the reactionary party may cherish, no coalition 
 will ever be formed, or, if established, succeed, against the nephew 
 of the "Great Monarch;" for his allies are not coerced, and he 
 makes it their interest to be true to him. He knows their aspira- 
 tions and wants, and, by affording them scope, renders them tribu- 
 tary to his own views and prospects. 
 
 The foreign policy of the Emperor Napoleon takes the world by 
 surprise. He baffles the combinations of the old-fashioned, con- 
 servative statesmen of Europe by his restless activity and celerity 
 of motion, which secure to him the initiative in every important 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 219 
 
 question. He is at work, when they are asleep ; he plans, when 
 they are reposing from their toils ; and he is ready to execute, 
 when they arc ready to take matters into grave consideration. 
 Even his rest is only a feigned slumber, to allow his opponents 
 the privilege of closing their eyes. His productiveness seems to 
 be unlimited : his endurance only equal to the quickness of his 
 perceptions. To all this he joins an indomitable will, unsurpassed 
 personal courage, and a firm belief in his destiny. His knowledge 
 of the world extends to all classes of society, from the throne down 
 to the day-laborer ; and he possesses the wonderful faculty of read- 
 ing men, as ordinary mortals read books. To those admitted into 
 his presence, his attitude is calm and reserved : to his friends, he 
 unbends with cordiality ; but even those nearest to his person 
 know as little of his resolutions, until they are ripe for action, as 
 those whom they are intended to benefit or overwhelm. That the 
 Emperor Napoleon is a statesman who reads alike the future and 
 the past, and that, better than any man living, he comprehends 
 "his epoch," will yet be demonstrated to eyes most unwilling to 
 see, and to minds least prepared to receive a new truth. No 
 country in Europe, or in the world, is more difficult to govern than 
 France ; because in none other has social emancipation proceeded 
 so far ; yet how eminently successful has the Emperor been in the 
 performance of that painful and perilous task ! Supported by the 
 democratic sympathies of the people, which he has rekindled by 
 the war in Italy ; strengthened by the adhesion of the industrial 
 and commercial interests of the country, to which he has extended 
 his fostering care ; at peace with the nobility, to whom, in the ab- 
 sence of everything else, he has restored their titles ; and cheered 
 by the enthusiasm of a victorious army, whose dauntless chivalry, 
 led by himself, has gathered new laurels on ancient battle-fields, 
 he is now not only the dictator of France, but the arbiter of the 
 fate of Europe. 
 
 But one question remains to be answered : — Will Napoleon III. 
 be able to perpetuate his dynasty % Will he be able to secure 
 the throne of his uncle, which he has reconquered, to his son ? 
 Dynasties, in France, are neither easily established, nor revived, 
 
220 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and cannot now be perpetuated without the adhesion of the people. 
 France cannot, under any government, be content to play a second- 
 ary part in history. She must lead, or admit that her mission is 
 ended. The traditions of Charlemagne, whom the French call their 
 own,* the souvenirs of the first French Empire, and the prestige ac- 
 quired by the second, plead strongly in favor of Imperialism ; but 
 the Bourbon Pretender, too, has a small party in France ; and his 
 cause is favored by the reactionary Courts of Europe. Legiti- 
 macy, in support of which the Treaties of 1815 were concluded 
 at Vienna, and the armed interventions of Austria and France in 
 Italy and Spain sanctioned by the Congresses of Laibach and 
 Verona, though repeatedly defeated, is still plotting to regain 
 its lost ascendency ; and watching every step of the emperor to 
 take advantage of a hoped-for turn of fortune. Will the em- 
 peror give his foreign and domestic adversaries a chance 1 We be- 
 lieve not. 
 
 As far as the Legitimists are concerned, the fusion between the 
 partisans of the Duke of Chambord (Henry V.) and the Count of 
 Paris (grandson of Louis Philippe) seems to be complete. The 
 Count of Chambord will certainly die without issue; and the 
 Count of Paris will then be the legitimist successor to the throne 
 of royal France. The education of this Prince, the principles in- 
 stilled into his mind by his most excellent mother (wife of the un- 
 fortunate Puke of Orleans), and the fact that he is looked upon 
 with apparent favor by the party which professes to adhere to the 
 Constitutional Government established in 1830, may render him, 
 if favored by circumstances, a dangerous, if not a powerful, pre- 
 tender to the throne of his ancestors. His friends reason thus : — 
 " The Emperor Napoleon, while he has undoubtedly succeeded in 
 attaching to himself the army, the agricultural and industrial 
 population, and a large portion of the clergy (who were never sin- 
 cerely attached either to the Citizen King or to the Republic), has 
 not, as yet, been able to satisfy the haute Bourgeoisie (comprising 
 the Bankers, Brokers, and the gentlemen engaged in the higher 
 
 * So, at least, the boys, in France, are taught at school, in spite of the rival 
 claims set up by the Germans. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 221 
 
 branches of manufactures and commerce*), and he has not yet 
 reconciled the men of Letters. The great body of the literary 
 men of France are national, and will support the national cause 
 under any government ; but the emperor will never be able to 
 overcome their aversion to the censorship. But few among them 
 are Republicans : and between the anarchy, toward which the late 
 French Republic was gravitating, and the Empire, they resigned 
 themselves to the latter as the least of two evils. Their adhesion, 
 however, is involuntary, and their hopes and expectations lie in a 
 different direction." These arguments the emperor must meet 
 practically, by making such reasonable and timely concessions, as 
 circumstances and the increased security of the State will permit. 
 The intelligence of France is proud of the position the country 
 now occupies in Europe — it is, with the mass of the people and 
 the army, rejoiced at the triumph of French arms, which has blot- 
 ted out the stain of the invasions of 1814 and 1815 ; and it is flat- 
 tered with the thought that France is once more dictating law to 
 Europe. But all this and much more — the astonishing develop- 
 ment of French commerce and industry, the improvements in navi- 
 gation, the creation of a powerful navy, and the impregnable for- 
 tresses erected on the French coast, does not compensate it for the 
 absence of a representative government. It is as natural for men 
 who have once enjoyed constitutional freedom, to covet its posses- 
 sion, as for a hungry man to long after bread ; and no administra- 
 tion, however brilliant, no success, it matters not how substantial, 
 can wholly eradicate that desire. As long as it exists (and it will 
 exist as long as civilization exists in France), no government which 
 withholds its gratification, can be considered entirely secure ; no 
 pretender, with " liberty " inscribed on his banners, as insignifi- 
 cant. 
 
 As long as the Emperor Napoleon retains the use of his facul- 
 ties — as long as his foreign and domestic policies increase the 
 number of his admirers and diminishes that of his opponents, his 
 government will be strong enough to crush any attempt at revo- 
 
 * The "upper-tendom" of Paris; principally established in the quarter known 
 as Lhe Quartier de Finance. 
 
 19* 
 
222 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 lution ; whether its object be the establishment of a republic, or 
 the reinstatement of the banished royal family. But the enduring 
 strength of a government is not measured merely by the means it 
 possesses, to overcome resistance ; but also by that disposition of 
 the governed, which renders the employment of these means unne- 
 cessary, and thus enables the government to turn its whole avail- 
 able force against a foreign enemy. " The consent of the gov- 
 erned " is not only morally, but physically an element of power. 
 In this respect, the late general amnesty, granted by the emperor 
 to all political offenders without distinction, is a greater proof of 
 his growing power and security, than the victories he achieved at 
 Palestro, Magenta, and Solferino.* 
 
 As long as the emperor lives, no pretender to the French 
 throne will cause him any serious uneasiness ; but, in case of his 
 death, the regency during the minority of the Infant of F?a?ice, 
 or the Imperial successor himself, might not enjoy the same im- 
 munity from intrusion. One thing only is sure to act permanently 
 in favor of the Napoleonic succession. The glorious recollections 
 which attach to the first French empire, and which have inspired 
 the emulation of Napoleon III., will forever contrast with the re- 
 turn of the Bourbons, who, escorted as they were by foreign bay- 
 onets, will constantly recall to mind the period of the humiliation 
 of France, and the triumph of her foreign enemies. This contrast 
 between the two dynasties constitutes the real strength of the em- 
 pire, and the permanent weakness of all Bourbon pretenders. 
 The empire is progressive. It produces and accomplishes great 
 things. It lives by its productiveness, and is sustained by the 
 national plaudits. This is the key to all the emperor's plans and 
 combinations, and the best explanation of his " mysterious foreign 
 policy." The memory of the first Napoleon is constantly refreshed 
 by analogous achievements, which exhibit the interval of the Bour- 
 
 * The emperor, more than two years ago, desired to grant this amnesty ; but 
 the men who surrounded him advised against it. They thought the moment 
 had not yet arrived, when the emperor could, with safety to the State, gratify 
 the promptings of his heart. In the projection of all liberal measures, he is 
 known to Lave always been far in advance of all the members of his cabinet. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 223 
 
 bons from 1815 till 1848, as a mere calamitous interruption of a 
 long brilliant period in French history. 
 
 But the return of the Bourbons is not the only thing that 
 threatens, however faintly, the permanent Napoleonic succession 
 to the throne of France. There is also a party, located prin- 
 cipally in the large cities, which desires the return of the Republic. 
 What, if this party, moderating its impracticable views of imme- 
 diate and direct self-government — least suited to an imaginative 
 and excitable people — were to make common cause with the 
 friends of constitutional freedom, after the example of the Italian 
 Republicans, who have now, almost in a body, joined the consti- 
 tutional party of the King of Piedmont? Against such a combi- 
 nation, the emperor will undoubtedly provide by a gradual exten- 
 sion of the representative system ; provided no new perturbing 
 causes interfere with his present resolution. But the French Na- 
 tional Assembly must learn to confine itself to its parliamentary 
 duties ; and not look upon itself continually as a constituent assem- 
 bly, whose business it is to establish a government, or to change it 
 at its pleasure. It must restrict its opposition to measures, and 
 not extend it to the dynasty ; so as to create two conflicting pow- 
 ers in the State, which must necessarily terminate in the suppres- 
 sion of one or the other. It can hardly be supposed that the Em- 
 peror Napoleon favors the cause of constitutional freedom in Italy, 
 without meditating its introduction, in a new form, into France ; 
 and it is difficult to conceive how he could wish to condemn so 
 enlightened a people as the French, who, in some form or other, 
 have enjoyed a National Parliament for more than half a century, 
 to permanent political inactivity. France, being surrounded by 
 representative governments in England, Belgium, Prussia, and 
 Italy, cannot, without admitting her inferior political capacity, or 
 her deterioration in public morals (against either of which impu- 
 tations the French people will, at all times, enter their solemn 
 protest), cannot but desire that political form of government which 
 marks the progress of civilization of our age, and most conforms to 
 the abstract idea of public justice. The French people may have 
 faults which disqualify them for institutions similar to our own, 
 
224 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 and their historical antecedents may render the introduction of such 
 institutions dangerous and impracticable ; but they are too inge- 
 nious, too brave, and too public-spirited not to be able to live 
 under some form of government more nearly approaching the 
 representative system. At the time of Aristotle, several hundred 
 political governments existed, all laying claims to the appellation 
 of popular, and yet all differing from each other in their mode of 
 distributing power. Why should the Emperor of the French not 
 be able to devise a government for France, essentially liberal in 
 substance and form ; yet adapted to the peculiar temper and habits 
 of the French people 1 Such a government, carrying with it the 
 prestige of success, of glory, and of progress, would secure Europe 
 against all future chances of reaction — imperial France herself, 
 against revolution and anarchy. The late acts of the Emperor 
 Napoleon indicate a disposition to pursue this course. May he 
 adhere to it ; and may his quiet progress not be arrested by cir- 
 cumstances which call again for the display of force. France, with 
 her civilization, her power, and her historical renown permanently 
 introduced into the family of free nations, would turn the scale in 
 favor of liberty throughout the world. Such a mission is, indeed, 
 enviable ; its fulfilment sure to receive the gratitude of the latest 
 posterity. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 225 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE MANNER IN WHICH THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE MAY 
 AFFECT THE UNITED STATES — OUR PROSPECTS AND HOPES. 
 
 The traditional policy of the United States consists in maintain- 
 ing friendly relations with all the Powers of the earth, in recog- 
 nizing every de facto government, and in keeping aloof from all 
 " entangling alliances." We may have sympathies for this or that 
 people ; but sound reasons of State forbid that we should become 
 a party to its conflicts with its own government, or with any other 
 nation. This holds especially of our relations with the Powers 
 of Europe, all of which we wish to treat with becoming interna- 
 tional comity and respect. We have nothing to do, either with 
 their revolutionary movements, or with their so-called " Balance 
 of Power ;" so long as that phrase is applied merely to their Euro- 
 pean possessions. Whether France acquire the Rhenish Provinces 
 and Belgium j whether Prussia, practising hegemony, absorb the 
 smaller States of Germany ; whether the Italians succeed in driv- 
 ing the Austrians from their soil, and the people of the Two Sici- 
 lies in changing their dynasty, is, in a national point of view, of 
 but little consequence to our development and progress. But if it 
 be contended that we must remain absolutely indifferent to the 
 affairs of Europe — that the changes wrought in the institutions 
 and mutual relations of European governments do not merit our 
 consideration and challenge our watchfulness, then, assuredly, our 
 neutrality doctrine would amount to an injunction on ourselves, 
 and condemn us, in our foreign relations, to absolute political inac- 
 tion. It would insure all other nations against harm from our 
 growing energy and power ; while it would not protect us from 
 their intermeddling with our affairs. European alliances have 
 been formed against us, as in the case of the Quintuple Treaty, 
 
226 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 for the exercise of the Eight of Search, so strenuously and suc- 
 cessfully opposed by General Cass, then our Minister to France ; 
 European statesmen, like Mr. Guizot, have talked of the " neces- 
 sity of confining the power- of the United States within limits no 
 longer threatening the world-equilibrium of nations ;" Lord Cla- 
 rendon threw out hints in regard to the late Anglo-French alli- 
 ance, neither complimentary nor assuring to our country ; and the 
 complication of our Central- American relations shows, most con- 
 clusively, that even on this continent we may come in contact, if 
 not in conflict, with European diplomacy. As early as 1822 and 
 ? 23, the Powers represented at the Congresses of Laibach and 
 Verona contemplated an armed intervention in Mexico and South 
 America; thereby giving rise to the proclamation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine; and we have no guarantee whatever that similar 
 attempts will not again be made, if circumstances favor so 
 monstrous a scheme.* The question now is, shall we patiently 
 wait till such plans are matured ; or shall we meet them at the 
 threshhold, and confound their concocters ? A nation which, with- 
 out regard to the circumstances in which it may be placed, should 
 declare its intention to adhere, in all future time, to the principle 
 of absolute neutrality, would deprive itself of half its influence ; 
 for power consists not only in the ability of a nation to defend it- 
 self, if attacked ; but also in the aggressive means which it pos- 
 sesses to prevent or punish provocation. Let no European Power 
 hold an assurance policy against the United States, which gives it 
 the unpunishable initiative in every question of public law ; and 
 let no European government flatter itself that we are still in the 
 humble position of shaping our policy merely in reference to self- 
 preservation. AVe may be the youngest member in the fraternity 
 of nations ; but we have signalized our childhood like Hercules, 
 by strangling a monster in our cradle. 
 
 We have, in less than a century of national existence, risen to 
 the rank and consideration of a great Power, and we cannot, if we 
 
 * The correspondence of the Hon. Mr. Rush, then our Minister to England, 
 contains valuable information on this subject, and refers pointedly to the noble 
 part which Mr. Canning took in relation to it. 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 227 
 
 would, rid ourselves of the responsibility and the influence which 
 we exercise on other nations. The example of our institutions, 
 the prosperity which we enjoy under them, our staples which sup- 
 ply the wants of the world, our widely extended commerce, are all 
 so many elements of power; exciting sympathies on the one hand, 
 and jealousies on the other, which we have no means to counteract 
 either by our foreign or domestic policy. We cannot help being 
 loved or feared, as our progress may favor or conflict with the pro- 
 gress of other nations ; and we must expect to become the theme 
 of European political writers, and the aim of European statesman- 
 ship. We furnish the world staple of clothing, (Cotton) we export 
 the largest quantity of bread-stuffs,* and the manufacturing indus- 
 try of all civilized nations competes for success in our markets. 
 What elements of power are these — what means of reaching every 
 interest and every class of society in Europe ! Every American 
 ship is a propagandist, every bale of cotton an eloquent defender 
 of the Monroe doctrine ; and this not only on the defensive prin- 
 ciple ; but as a representative of our aggressive power. f 
 
 How intimately our material prosperity is now interwoven with 
 that of Europe, has been illustrated by our late money crisis. 
 Though the fortunes of Europe have accumulated during the pro- 
 gress of centuries, and rest, on that account, on a more substantial 
 
 * Chicago exports more grain than Odessa. 
 
 -f- One of the most effective means of exercising a steadily increasing influ- 
 ence on the people of Europe, consists in the success of our Democratic institu- 
 tions. The fact that we maintain all the relations of "a Great Power, -without 
 the luxury of kings and nohles ; that we excel in every species of enterprise, and 
 successfully compete with Europe in all the departments of knowledge, and 
 latterly, also, of the fine arts ; and that we do this without hereditary families 
 acting as protectors and patrons, naturally excites curiosity and a desire to 
 imitate our cheap institutions. The achievements of our industry and com- 
 merce are considered as Democratic achievements ; and classified with the vic- 
 tories of the French army, l'ecruited and officered from the People. It is our 
 social development, even more than our political one, (though one is necessa- 
 rily dependant upon the other,) which dazzles the populations of Europe; as it 
 is the social organization of France — the result of the great revolution of 1789 — 
 which, far more than any political doctrine France has emitted since that period, 
 has planted the seed of revolution in every State of the European Continent. 
 
228 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 basis than our own — though the capital of Europe exceeds by many 
 thousand millions that of the United States, a scarcity of money 
 in New York is sure instantly to react on the money market of 
 every important commercial town in Europe ; while an appreciable 
 diminution in our imports, produces greater distress among the 
 laboring classes there, than a foreign war would inflict on our own. 
 Wages, in Europe, are reduced to the minimum of what is neces- 
 sary to sustain human life ; and a farther diminution of them, or a 
 momentary suspension of work, is sure of sending hundreds and 
 thousands of industrious men and their families hungry to bed, or 
 to the grave. Considering the political transition state of many, 
 if not all European governments, such catastrophes may involve 
 the security of kingdoms ; while, with us, a temporary suspension 
 of business is merely complained of on the score of " hard times," 
 which cannot last long, and are sure to be succeeded by better ones. 
 A commercial distress in Europe undoubtedly reacts also on the 
 United States ; but not to the same extent, and unaccompanied by 
 such fearful consequences. Europe, whether rich or poor, must 
 have our staples ; we may dispense with European luxuries. Our 
 influence on Europe, therefore, is greater in proportion to our 
 means, than that of Europe upon us : in other words, we have 
 gained the start on Europe. 
 
 Another immense advantage we possess over every Power in 
 Europe, except Russia, consists in our geographical position. 
 Spanning the whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
 ocean, bordering to the North on friendly colonies whose inhabi- 
 tants are assimilated to us in origin, language and habits, and lat- 
 terly, also, by reciprocal free trade ; and advancing southward by 
 superior energy, and the unavoidable influence of our institutions, 
 we are almost beyond the reach of those casualties which usually 
 accompany the rise and progress of nations ; and able, with a unity 
 of purpose entirely depending on ourselves, to shape our own 
 destiny. No people of antiquity, or of modern times, has been so 
 favorably circumstanced : none has been allowed such a sponta- 
 neous, uninterrupted, rapid growth. And, in addition to this, we 
 draw population from all other quarters of the globe, and enrich 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 229 
 
 our magnificent domain by the labor, wealth and enterprise of 
 every other civilized country. Well may we thus excite the envy 
 and jealousy of other governments ; but a wise and firm policy on 
 our part, will render these harmless. The human tide which flows 
 from Europe to the United States, cannot be arrested by any 
 sovereign power ; though it may succeed in throwing innumerable 
 obstacles in its way ; the expansion of our people, in the absence of 
 geographical barriers, cannot be stopped by paper leagues and 
 diplomatic subtilties. Against these, if we remain united, we shall 
 always have the power to defend ourselves ; but for that purpose 
 we may as well employ our influence and standing in Europe, as 
 our arms and our patriotism on this continent. 
 
 There is no reason why our opinions — the opinion of thirty mil- 
 lions — should not have its influence on Europe, as the opinions 
 of Europe have heretofore influenced us ; and there is no reason 
 why we should not have a diplomacy in Europe, as well as a 
 power in America; provided that diplomacy be directed to avert- 
 ing dangers, instead of courting and provoking them. We have 
 reached that period in our history, and that eminent position 
 among the nations of the world, which renders our good will 
 and friendly offices valuable objects to be secured by other 
 governments ; why, then, should we not discriminate in regard 
 to those on whom we bestow them, and thus make some return 
 for favors shown to ourselves ? Such a policy would give no just 
 cause of offence to any nation. It would only convey a proper idea 
 of our self-respect, and of our just appreciation of the conduct of 
 others. To this point of positiveness our foreign diplomacy must 
 certainly advance, if we would counteract foreign influences on our 
 own affairs, and if our envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipo- 
 tentiary to foreign courts, shall enjoy a higher consideration than 
 mere special agents. If our people and government object to the 
 direction of our diplomacy to some preconceived, determined pur- 
 pose, reducible to a system, and which mutatis mutandis shall be- 
 come the rule of action for all our diplomatists, then why continue 
 our diplomatic agents at all 1 The special things entrusted to their 
 care, may as well be entrusted to our consuls and consuls general, 
 20 
 
230 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 or to special agents, as to our ministers. The country would have 
 the same service at a cheaper rate ; and a consul entrusted with 
 diplomatic functions, would, as a republican officer, be received 
 with the same distinction as a full minister. 
 
 The practice adopted in Europe is, for each government to send 
 to all its ministers and diplomatic agents, copies of the instructions 
 forwarded to any one of them. The British minister to St. Peters- 
 burg, for instance, knows what the British minister in Paris is 
 doing, and vice versa. The same holds of every other diplomatic 
 agent of Great Britain ; and precisely the same system prevails in 
 France and elsewhere. Thus, when an important question is 
 started, by either of these governments, all the diplomatic agents 
 of that government are at once advocating it directly or indirectly 
 at all the courts of Europe, each in his own way ; and by putting 
 forth reasons suitable to the views and the situation of the govern- 
 ment to which he is accredited. Thus a unity of action is pro- 
 duced, and a power brought to bear on the question, equal to the 
 sum of all the relations of that government with foreign nations. 
 The great object is to procure the cooperation of several govern- 
 ments to the same end, or, at least, to neutralize their action where 
 it is likely to be unfavorable to the object in view. To isolate a 
 government, that is, to prevent any other government from espous- 
 ing its cause, is to achieve a diplomatic triumph over it. That 
 this system has its advantages, no one can deny ; that it may, at 
 any time, be employed with great force against ourselves, is also 
 apparent. It was very nearly successful in the case of the Quin- 
 tuple Treaty for the exercise of the Right of Search, and it failed, 
 at the Congress of Verona, principally by the withdrawal of Eng- 
 land from the coalition. We have, no doubt, our own American 
 views on subjects connected with this continent, and are entitled 
 to them ; and we have, or ought to have, a fixed American polity. 
 Why should not this be urged by all our ministers abroad, not 
 only in their intercourse with the sovereign or the minister of 
 foreign affairs of the government to which each is accredited ; but 
 on all suitable occasions, officially and unofficially, with all persons 
 who may possess influence with that government. In this manner 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 231 
 
 our European diplomacy might be made a unit ; while all European 
 governments would be made to appreciate our position, and the 
 particular interest of each to keep on terms with us. During 
 the short period of the administration of the State Department by 
 the Hon. John C. Calhoun, when the annexation of Texas was 
 substantially if not formally opposed by England and France, a 
 similar system was adopted, and it was admirably successful. The 
 present situation of Europe is one which requires the greatest 
 watchfulness on our part ; while, at the same time, it may present 
 points of interest which will not escape the attention of our states- 
 men. As long as the States of Europe have colonies in America, 
 anything affecting their mutual relations will command our atten- 
 tion, and receive the consideration of our government. 
 
 But while watching the political events of Europe, and the 
 changes to which they may lead in all the established relations, 
 and even in the forms of their governments, we ought to have a 
 care not to bind ourselves rashly by Treaties. We cannot have 
 too few of these ; for we are a growing nation, and what is refused 
 to us to-day will hardly be denied to us to-morrow, if our demand 
 is at all reasonable and compatible with the honor of others. 
 Neither can we, like Frederic the Great, Peter the Great, or other 
 great monarchs of Europe, disregard treaty stipulations when they 
 no longer answer our purpose. But acknowledging, as we do, the 
 binding force of treaties, our diplomatic agents ought not easily to 
 be tempted to make one ; though their abstinence, in this respect, 
 may deprive them of immortality — in the archives of the State 
 Department. There is no achievement for any of our diplomatic 
 agents in making a Treaty. The whole world wants to treat with 
 us ; because we are not only getting stronger every day, but also 
 richer. Our domain enlarges, our productions increase, and we 
 afford every year larger markets to the manufacturing industry of 
 other nations. To secure the American market, is the commercial 
 policy of every nation in Europe ; for their welfare, their prosperity, 
 their safety depends on securing this market. While our policy 
 is to trade with all the world, we have a right to stipulate for 
 reciprocity ; and when, from various causes, this is denied to us, 
 
232 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 we ought, if at all regulating our intercourse with such countries 
 by treaties, make these for as short a period as possible ; in order 
 to enable us hereafter to affix conditions to the renewal of them. 
 Neither ought we, while advancing with a giant's step, bind our- 
 selves to any particular polity, in regard to foreign nations, without 
 securing a great object. We ought to reserve to ourselves the 
 greatest freedom of action, and thus oblige other nations constantly 
 to cultivate our friendly sympathies. The parting injunction of 
 Talleyrand to all young diplomates was, " No zeal gentlemen ! 
 above all things, no zeal." France, with Napoleon at her head, 
 could afford to bide her time ; our immense national resources, and 
 the progressive spirit of our people, afford us the same diplomatic 
 privilege. We may, therefore, repeat the injunction " no zeal," 
 and add to it " no haste !" 
 
 Another measure of prudence may consist in not crowding our 
 diplomatic agents with too many specific instructions. Instead of 
 that, our agents abroad ought to be obliged constantly to report 
 on the state of things, and the changes wrought in the respective 
 positions of the different governments of Europe ; from which, 
 afterwards, instructions may be prepared, modifying the general 
 rule of conduct prescribed to our functionaries abroad. In this 
 manner all our diplomatic agents, accredited to foreign governments, 
 would be kept usefully employed ; and the Department in Washing- 
 ton would, at all times, be furnished with a political map of Europe, 
 which could be studied to advantage, and applied to the solution 
 of our own American problems. Even court gossip, when properly 
 grouped, so as to illustrate events, or the thoughts and opinions of 
 prominent individuals, may be reported with advantage, and used 
 in unraveling diplomatic mysteries. A proper knowledge of the 
 character of the men with whom we may have to treat, or with 
 whom we ought not to treat, is often more essential to success, than 
 the most familiar acquaintance with all the details of business. 
 
 To sum up. In the present condition of Europe, we ought to 
 have an especial care not to contract, unnecessarily, obligations to 
 foreign Powers. We ought to be on the qui vive ; but abstain from 
 all inconsiderate action. We can afford to let events take their 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE 233 
 
 course ; but we ought to be prepared for them. If the map of 
 Europe is to be changed — if Turkey is to be divided, and the na- 
 tions of Europe are to extend their power and influence into Asia, 
 we may consider how far this great historical movement of the 
 people of the old world may affect the conditions of the new 5 and 
 what steps it may be prudent for us to take, to balance the account. 
 If Europe divides Asia, we ought to lose no time in taking a pro- 
 per position on the Pacific ; our power, our progress, our security, 
 may depend on that step. In that event, San Francisco must be- 
 come the Gibraltar of our Western coast ; it must be fortified so 
 as to be able to resist the modern instruments of destruction intro- 
 duced into the navies of England and France ; and it must be con- 
 nected by railway with the Mississippi valley, the basis of its sup- 
 port. Whether this shall be done by federal authority, by char- 
 ters from the States, or by individual enterprise, is a matter which 
 we have no disposition to discuss, and which would be irrelevant 
 to our purpose. But that its accomplishment, at whatever sacri- 
 fice of money, is of the utmost importance to our own success and 
 progress as a nation, must be apparent even to the humblest polit- 
 ical capacity. If European influence prevail on one side of the 
 Pacific, American power must be established on the other. But 
 by power we mean not merely the display of military force ; and 
 by progress, not merely the tramp of soldiers. We are neither 
 Frenchmen nor Spaniards ; but a plain, sensible, commercial peo- 
 ple, with whom military power merely exists for the protection of 
 the civil one. We require fortresses and soldiers merely for 
 purposes of defence — to secure to us the undisturbed reward of 
 our industry ; nothing more. Our Pacific coast must not be ex- 
 posed to the casualties of war ; it must not invite foreign inva- 
 sion. If placed in a proper state of defence, the invader will not 
 be tempted. 
 
 We have, in another place, alluded to the Isthmus of Suez, and 
 to the consequences which a ship canal across that Isthmus would 
 entail on the coastwise trade to India of France and Italy. We 
 must now allude to the consequences which would result from that 
 canal to ourselves. We now receive a good part of our India 
 20* 
 
234 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 goods from the assorted markets of London and Liverpool ; but if 
 the Emperor Napoleon were to introduce the British warehouseing 
 system into Marseilles, we would, after the piercing of the Isthmus 
 of Suez, receive those goods from the Mediterranean. Instead of 
 shipping them a distance of eighteen hundred miles, to London, in 
 latitude 51, to be thence reshipped to the southern latitude of 
 New York, they would be shipped directly from Marseilles; 
 saving time and freight and, in some instances, the deterioration of 
 the goods. France would then be better situated for the East 
 India trade than England ; but with a railway to the Pacific, and 
 a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama, the position of the 
 United States would be more advantageous than either, and secure 
 to us, ultimately, the greatest portion of that trade. So far as 
 the Isthmus of Suez is concerned, our interests are parallel to those 
 of France ; a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama would be- 
 nefit France and England in other respects ; but it would shorten 
 our own commercial route to the wealth of India and China. 
 
 "VVe should not consider our task completed, were we not to say 
 a word about Cuba. There may be many conflicting opinions in 
 regard to that Island, and the value of its acquisition to the United 
 States ; but this fact stands uncontroverted, that it gravitates 
 toward us, and that its destiny is necessarily connected with our 
 own. If England, with all her wealth and power, her colonies, 
 and the martial qualities of her people, cannot separate her des- 
 tiny from that of the continent of Europe, how shall Cuba, a mere 
 colony, under the auspices of a distant country no longer exer- 
 cising any very appreciable influence on the affairs of the world, 
 be able to maintain its present position in the West Indian Archi- 
 pelago ? The idea is preposterous, and cannot be entertained by 
 any statesman of discernment or forecast. The material interests 
 of Cuba would, most unquestionably, be promoted by its annexa- 
 tion to the United States ; while the United States would, by its 
 acquisition, undoubtedly increase their wealth and productiveness, 
 if not their military and maritime power. It would add immensely 
 to our material prosperity ; but it would, in the same ratio, increase 
 that of the Island, and of the other commercial Powers of the 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 235 
 
 world. It would increase our exports ; but these would, in turn, 
 stimulate importations from Europe. The manufacturers of Eng- 
 land, France and Germany would find new and rich markets for 
 their goods ; whilst the operatives they employ would see the colo- 
 nial articles, and especially sugar, which is now to many of them 
 merely an article of luxury, brought within their reach ; adding, 
 thereby to their health and comfort. Viewed in this light, the ac- 
 quisition of Cuba by the United States is not only a question of 
 political economy to Europe and America, but also one of philan- 
 thropy. Under the present government of Cuba, the productive- 
 ness is stinted, its revenue goes to enrich a few favorite officers of 
 the crown, or is spent in the maintenance of a large military 
 force, altogether disproportionate to the population and resources 
 of the island. 
 
 The point of honor which Spain seems to make in regard to the 
 alienation of the Island, is only fit to be answered by Cervantes. 
 Has Spain never lost any territory % Did she not, at one time, 
 possess Holland and the rich provinces of Flanders and Brabant ? 
 Has she not lost Southern and Central America and Mexico ? Did 
 she not once possess Hispaniola — the present Island of St. Do- 
 mingo ? Did she not hold the Floridas ? Whence, then, this 
 maiden pride and bashfulness ? Suppose the Cubans were to re- 
 volt, and to succeed in overpowering the garrisons ; would Spain 
 be able to reduce them to submission % Would we be justified in 
 allowing her to attempt such a task % Spain has now entered a 
 new era of her history. She is developing her internal resources, 
 which have once constituted a large portion of the wealth of Car- 
 thage and Rome ; she is building railways and public roads ; she 
 is working her mines, encouraging her manufactures, and culti- 
 vating fields which had become deserted by foreign invasion or 
 civil wars. How much better, then, would it be for her if, at this 
 period, she were to increase her revenue from Cuba without incur- 
 ring the expense of collection — if she were to dispose of the 
 Island for a sum of money, the interest of which would far exceed 
 her present income from it % Her merchants and shippers would 
 lose nothing by the transfer. They would trade to Cuba as before, 
 
236 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 only with increased advantages and without any of the annoyances 
 to trade incidental to the prohibitory system now established in 
 the island. Spain would derive greater advantages from Cuba if 
 it were part of the United States, than she can ever hope to 
 realize from her colony ; and would be better able to develop the 
 resources of her Philippine Islands, which, under a wise administra- 
 tion, might be made as productive as the Dutch East Indies. It 
 is absurd and wicked in the statesmen of Spain to interpose such an 
 obstacle to the development of her varied resources : and to con- 
 sider her pedigree invaded by making a reasonable and profitable 
 concession to a powerful though " upstart" neighbor. We do not 
 want Cuba for a monopoly ; we want to open her ports to the trade 
 of all nations, that her products may enrich the whole commercial 
 world. Spain knows that she cannot keep it forever ; and that if 
 she lose it by conquest or revolt, her treasury will not receive a 
 dollar by way of compensation. Spain may, at some future time, 
 read us a homily on our " political turpitude ;" but had she not 
 better study the history of her own conquests of the Continent 
 and Islands of America, to convince herself of the weakness of her 
 title, and the terrible retribution which her own barbarities have 
 brought upon her head % 
 
 But if the pride of Spain does not allow her to sell the 
 Island of Cuba to a foreign country, and especially to the 
 " upstart Yankees," why not dispose of it to her own subjects ? 
 Why not propose to the inhabitants of Cuba to acknowledge 
 their independence of Spain, in consideration of a round sum 
 of money, to be paid in coupon bonds, bearing five per cent, 
 interest, to be secured by the revenue of the Island — perhaps 
 guarantied by the United States, on certain conditions speci- 
 fied in a separate treaty. If the Cubans desire it, or if Spain 
 insist upon it, the Island might be placed under the joint pro- 
 tection of England, France and the United States, till its people 
 think fit to form another more natural connection, or until events, 
 over which the Island has no control, induce its inhabitants to 
 unite their destiny permanently with our own. Such a plan might 
 remove the conscientious scruples of the government of Spain, 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 237 
 
 save the pride of the countrymen of el Cid campeador, and meet 
 with fewer objections on the part of France and England. If Spain 
 understands her own interest, and wishes to raise the necessary 
 funds to extend her chivalrous conquest of the Moors to Morocco, 
 she will lose no time to make the proposition, or cause the propo- 
 sition to be made to her. 
 
 France and England can only desire that we should possess 
 Cuba. It would, as we have already observed, add but little to 
 our military power, either for aggressive or defensive purposes ; 
 but it would greatly increase the exchange of products between 
 Europe and America. The holders of Spanish bonds, too, might 
 find their condition improved ; while the vast sums which would 
 become afloat in the principal money markets of Europe, would 
 not a little contribute to advance the prices of all other public 
 securities. The British government and the British commercial 
 community, we feel assured, understand their interests too well to 
 advise Spain to persist in her present course ; and the Emperor of 
 the French, with his usual masterly discrimination, need only be- 
 stow his attention on the subject, to come to the same conclusion. 
 The times in which distant colonies were a source of wealth and 
 power to the mother country, are past, and, with them, the oppor- 
 tunity of profitable investment of capital. The principal profits of 
 colonies were derived from the monopoly of their products — a 
 system now universally condemned, as contrary to the spirit of the 
 age, and opposed to all sound principles of political economy. 
 What would be the commerce of England with this country, if 
 we were still British colonies, instead of independent States 1 Let 
 Europe ponder on this proposition, and apply it to the case of 
 Cuba. We look upon the acquisition of Cuba as a foregone con- 
 clusion, which it is impossible for Spain to prevent, and which does 
 not, in the slightest degree, involve her national honor. Its an- 
 nexation to the United States is as natural as the annexation of 
 Calais was to France ; though, from its imagined importance to Eng- 
 land, it nearly broke the heart of Queen Elizabeth. The part of 
 a statesman is not to oppose events which are inevitable: but 
 rather to turn them to good account. There are, as we might ex- 
 
238 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 pect, parties in the United States who, for various reasons, object 
 to the acquisition of Cuba ; but their opposition will probably yield 
 to a closer examination of the subject. If the Island be once 
 incorporated into our federal Union, all parties and sections will 
 sanction the acquisition, as has been the case with all previous 
 annexations. 
 
 " And what shall become of Mexico ?" will be asked by some of 
 our readers. It is now in vain to regret the omissions in the 
 treaty of Peace which followed our first victorious campaign ; the 
 question now is, how are these omissions to be supplied % We 
 have certainly treated Mexico with a degree of forbearance and 
 moderation to which there is no parallel in history ; but our gene- 
 rosity has not benefited our vanquished foe, and has only served 
 to consign Mexico, whose people, during our occupation of the 
 best part of the country, had, for the first time since their national 
 independence, enjoyed the benefit of equal laws and justice, to 
 hopeless anarchy and ruin. Mexico, as a confederate Republic, 
 may be said to exist no longer. It is already practically dismem- 
 bered, and divided into a number of small military despotisms, 
 without a shadow of law or order to entitle them to the respect and 
 consideration of the world. Juarez, undoubtedly the best man in 
 the country, may or may not succeed in overthrowing the nominal 
 government established at the capital ; the fact that he has to 
 operate through generals, and that these are nearly all independent 
 of one another, will strongly militate against the establishment of 
 a strong central government, capable of maintaining itself, for 
 any length of time, against the ambitious and rapacious leaders of 
 faction and their military supporters. To all these evils must yet 
 be joined the antipathy of races, which has always existed where 
 two of them were thrown together under the same government. 
 The descendants of pure Castilian blood have so diminished in 
 number, that it is doubtful whether they will not, in time, be en- 
 tirely extinguished or subdued by the indigenous and mixed popula- 
 tions ; and whether the more civilized among the latter will not, 
 in turn, succumb to the savages. 
 
 The future of Mexico is, indeed, gloomy ; and our government 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 239 
 
 may yet be obliged to intervene to protect our own border popu- 
 lation from robbery and slaughter. It is certain that Mexico, in 
 her present condition, would fall an easy prey to any European 
 Power disposed to make its conquest ; and it is equally certain 
 that it is only the fear of becoming embroiled with the United 
 States, which prevents the attempt. On the other hand, France 
 and England, and the other Powers of Europe, would hardly ob- 
 ject to our seizing the whole of Mexico, provided we succeeded in 
 establishing a government of law and order, capable of protecting 
 industry and commerce, and secured the creditors of the State. 
 On this subject there hardly seems to be a dissenting voice in 
 England ; and, with proper explanations, none need be apprehended 
 in France. France does not now export five per cent, of the 
 amount of her staple articles and manufactures which, under a go- 
 vernment of law and the principles of free trade, would find a 
 ready market in Mexico ; and the Emperor Napoleon is too wise a 
 monarch not to appreciate whatever tends to increase the pros- 
 perity of the French people. The civilized world must, indeed, 
 hold us responsible for the continued anarchy in Mexico, if we 
 have the means of arresting its progress, either by diplomatic or 
 military arrangements, or both. This is not so much a part of our 
 " manifest destiny ;" but, manifestly, a duty which we owe to 
 ourselves and the people of a neighboring State, who have copied 
 our institutions, before education and experience had rendered them 
 fit to enjoy them. They are like minors, requiring a guardian to 
 protect themselves and others from mischief. Meanwhile, Mexico 
 will make no exception to the historical law which governs the rise 
 and fall of all nations ; — she will not stop declining, and will not 
 be regenerated, till a new race, more powerful than any which 
 inhabits that country now, shall establish a new order of things. 
 
 As regards the Central American complications, they are about 
 to be settled, in a manner satisfactory to all parties concerned. 
 Mr. Buchanan, while Minister to London, laid the foundation to 
 their settlement, by convincing the government of Great Britain, 
 in the Protocol conducted between him and Lord Clarendon, that 
 the American construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty is the only 
 
240 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 one which, being reasonable and just to all parties, can be honorably- 
 submitted to by the government of the United States. Her Ma- 
 jesty's ministers seem to have arrived at the same conclusion ; 
 hence the recall of Sir William Gore Ousely, who, in attempting 
 to drive a bargain, evidently exceeded his instructions. The 
 attempt to overreach, in such a petty transaction, a neighbor, re- 
 lative and friend, is utterly unworthy a great Power, like Eng- 
 land, and was very justly and wisely abandoned. The United 
 States have no idea of establishing an exclusive transit across the 
 Isthmus; and that declaration, which has satisfied the Emperor of 
 the French, and extinguished Mr. Belly's heroic conceptions, 
 might be equally reassuring to her Majesty's government. The 
 railway or canal which, sometime or other, will be constructed 
 across the Isthmus, will be open to all nations ; but, as we have 
 the greatest interest in protecting the Isthmus, and as we are 
 nearest to it, it is but natural that, in case such protection be 
 needed, we should be the first to render it. 
 
 As to the Central American States themselves, who seem to be 
 so pugnacious in regard to their national independence, we would 
 respectfully remind them that their country — we mean the five 
 small States, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and 
 St. Salvador — in spite of the fertility of its soil, receives its polit- 
 ical importance only from the fact that a great, enterprising, com- 
 mercial nation requires the right of way across the Isthmus, to 
 reach a portion of her own dominions ; and that, without the United 
 States, the Central American States might have been recolonized 
 by almost any European Power. The Central American States 
 never fought for their independence. Spain, being unable to re- 
 conquer Mexico and South America, simply abandoned Central 
 America to its own fate, and thus obliged the people of the 
 former Spanish Presidencies to establish a government to fill a 
 vacuum. The true interest of the Central American States now, 
 consists in establishing the most cordial relations with the United 
 States, who are their natural protectors. Their prosperity depends 
 entirely on our success, and on the commercial relations which 
 they may be enabled to establish with our people. Of this they 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 241 
 
 seem to be convinced at last, and there is some hope, therefore, 
 that the friendly relations now subsisting between ourselves and 
 those States will be preserved, for their ultimate benefit. 
 
 The best government on earth cannot always avoid war, after it 
 has made every honorable effort to avert it. We may find our- 
 selves in the same predicament ; and the question naturally arises, 
 what means do the United States possess to resist an attack from 
 a foreign enemy % Neither England nor America raises troops by 
 conscription ; and an army formed by voluntary enlistments, through 
 bounties paid to the soldiers, is always an expensive establishment. 
 As far as standing armies are concerned, France, in the facility of 
 raising troops and the cheapness of their support, possesses vast 
 advantages over both England and America j but we have another 
 institution, which more than supplies the want of conscription, and 
 which, by a single signal, transforms the whole country into a vast 
 camp of soldiers. This is our volunteer and militia system. The 
 number of our enrolled militia exceeds five millions, and events 
 have shown that our volunteer force can be made to exceed any 
 army which can possibly be sent against us across the ocean by 
 one or more European Powers. Neither are our volunteer soldiers 
 deficient in quality. They are composed of the fighting men of 
 the country — of men familiar from childhood with the use of fire- 
 arms, who take both pleasure and pride in the duties they may be 
 called upon to perform. An American regiment of volunteers 
 may not make the same military appearance as a body of regular 
 European troops ; but in martial spirit, in ardent devotion to a 
 cause voluntarily espoused and understood, and in general intelli- 
 gence, a comparison between it and a regiment of ordinary soldiers, 
 would be an insult to the American people. Our militia, in the 
 rural districts, is composed of farmers, (in the Western States of 
 hunters,) while in the towns it is principally made up of mechanics, 
 capable of doing any kind of work that may be required for the 
 movement of an army or the materials of war. An American mi- 
 litia regiment on the march, may be compared to a moving com- 
 munity ; it possesses all the elements of civilization and labor, it 
 21 
 
242 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 can supply all its wants, and it can, from its familiarity with 
 the mechanic arts, throw infinite obstacles in the way of an ad- 
 vancing enemy. Compare this to the sluggish disposition of the 
 rural districts of England, and it requires no profound knowledge 
 of military science, to decide between the warlike qualities of our 
 race, and the poetical simplicity of the old Arcadian shepherds. 
 The English plough-boy becomes a fine soldier after a long drill — 
 the French peasant is a soldier from impulse and love of country ; 
 but the American husbandman is a soldier from duty and reflec- 
 tion. He is armed for the defence of the institutions of his 
 country ; and as his early life, especially in the new States, is 
 spent in a constant struggle with the elements of nature, he is 
 inured to every species of privation and danger. Such men are 
 not easily beaten, if fighting for their own fire-sides ; and, if de- 
 feated, would, again and again, rally, till the invader were driven 
 from the soil. 
 
 Our regular army, to be sure, is not large ; but its organization 
 and appointments are excellent, and it is so well officered, that it 
 may, at a moment's notice, be doubled and tripled in number. 
 What our army, small as it is, has already done, lives in history ; 
 what is still left for it to accomplish, is concealed in the womb of 
 time. One consideration only may be urged on our general offi- 
 cers, and on the government. We are a commercial people ; and, 
 as such, it is natural for us to store up wealth in our seaports. 
 To the defence of these, the energies and valor of our regular 
 army must be directed in time of war — the country will always 
 be sufficiently protected by our volunteers. In the last Russian 
 war, two points only, Cronstadt and Sebastopol, the two principal 
 Russian ports, were threatened ; and their defence almost ex- 
 hausted the resources of the empire. The two corresponding 
 ports of our country, offering strategical and maritime positions of 
 great importance, with great accumulation of wealth, are New 
 York and San Francisco ; both which ought to be fortified against 
 all contingencies. No European Power will be so mad as to at- 
 tempt the conquest of any portion of our vast territory ; but it 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE. 243 
 
 may try and surprise one of our great seaports, and, if success- 
 ful, make itself paid for the expenses of the war. Here vigilance 
 and forecast are indispensable. For the defences of harbors re- 
 quire time — they cannot be improvised after a declaration of war. 
 To them, more than to any other engine of war, applies the old 
 adage : — " In time of peace, prepare for war." 
 
 On the composition of our navy, little need be said. Young as 
 it is, as a national institution, it has a historical record which is 
 part of the fame of our country. Our ships are models of con- 
 struction, our sailors not inferior to any upon earth ; and we can 
 command the best men from the crews of all seafaring nations. 
 An American " seaman's protection " is the best passport of a 
 sailor in any port of the world, and the last thing he parts with 
 should he be ever so much distressed. He feels that it is a priv- 
 ilege to belong to our navy ; and he is proud of it. Our own popu- 
 lation has a most peculiar adaptation to maritime pursuits. Life 
 on the water is as familiar and natural to our people, as life in the 
 woods to our backwoodsmen : and this not only on the seacoast, 
 but on our Mediterranean of Lakes, and on our mighty rivers. 
 Our sea-coast is accessible the whole year round ; and its extent, 
 according to the official Report of the American Coast Survey, in- 
 cluding bays, indentations, and islands, exceeds thirty- three thou- 
 sand miles ! Our navigable rivers and lakes render our inland 
 population as familiar with steam navigation as the people on the 
 sea-coast ; while the trade on those waters, in 1846, according to 
 official statistics, had already exceeded the prodigious sum of Five 
 hundred millions of dollars.* The Mississippi, from the Balize to 
 the Falls of the Missouri, presents a continued river navigation of 
 4,500 miles ! What other people, not even excepting the British, 
 can boast of such natural facilities for becoming a maritime nation ; 
 what other people could have improved them to the same extent? 
 We have, indeed, acquired a character, by our amphibious nature, 
 bordering on the romantic ; and the tales of our " half-horse and 
 
 * Compare the Hon. Robert J. Walker's official Report, as Secretary of the 
 Treasury. 
 
244 
 
 THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 
 
 half-alligator" race are read with pleasure, even by European 
 spinsters. 
 
 But it is not so much the number of vessels of war which a 
 nation can arm and render fit for service, as the character of the 
 people from which the ships are to be manned, which determines 
 its maritime power. It is the adaptation of our people to sea-far- 
 ing life, their familiarity with the elements, their skill and daring 
 on the water, which have astonished the world ; while they have 
 swelled our tonnage and made our commercial marine larger than 
 that of England ! Should Congress, at any time, resolve to in- 
 crease the number of our ships of war, we have the materials and 
 the skilful workmen to do it, and the men to man the ships. But 
 we require no extensive fleets to fight regular naval battles (though 
 we have fought these with admirable success on our lakes) ; we 
 want but to defend our sea-coast and harbors. Our navy corres- 
 ponds to our army : — it is small, but capable of indefinite expan- 
 sion. We have besides, in our Privateers, a sort of naval militia, 
 whose efficiency has been tested, and whose achievements are yet 
 fresh in the memory of all sea-faring men. A joint proposition 
 has recently been made to us by France and England, to abandon 
 this branch of our voluntary service ; but our government has 
 wisely rejected it. There was no reciprocity in the proposition ; 
 for if the making of prizes is confined to vessels of wa?-, the largest 
 navy will have the best chance, and, if the war be prolonged, suc- 
 ceed in driving the ships of the other nation from the ocean. The 
 system of privateering, so admirably adapted to the enterprise and 
 daring of our people, makes us a match for any enemy on the 
 ocean ; and enables us to inflict the severest blows on the com- 
 merce from which his military navy is recruited and supplied. To 
 do away with privateering, is to tie one of our arms while the en- 
 emy has the use of two ; and we are, as yet, too young to give 
 such odds in a fight. The Powers of Europe need not be alarmed 
 by our adhering to the practice. We are (we cannot sufficiently 
 repeat it) a commercial, conservative people. Our mission is one 
 of peace — not of war. We desire no conquests ; we want to sub- 
 
ON THE PRESENT POSITION OP EUROPE. 245 
 
 due nothing that we cannot assimilate. Our Constitution contains 
 no such words as " province " or " subject." We do not govern 
 by Consuls and Proconsuls. Equality is at the basis of our insti- 
 tutions — the highest punishment (to use a hyperbole) inflicted on 
 a vanquished foe, is the bestowal on him of all the rights and pri- 
 vileges of American Citizenship ! We battle, not to destroy ; we 
 conquer but to save. But whatever fate may have in store for 
 us — whatever vicissitudes may befal us as a nation, we shall never 
 forget that we are the children of England (consequently her 
 heirs at law), and that France was our first ally. 
 
 THE END. 
 
To the Literature of the Language what a Dictionary of Words is to the Language itself. 
 
 Allibone's Dictionary of Authors, 
 
 INDISPENSABLY NECESSARY TO 
 
 AJLLi WS1© REA3>, AM, WHO WRITE, 
 
 ALL CLERGYMEN, ALL PHYSICIANS, ALL LAWYERS, 
 
 Scientific and Literary Men, Merchants and Farmers, 
 Manufacturers and Mechanics. 
 
 IT IS ^. HOUSEHOLD COIIVEDP^nNriOIINr. 
 
 The importance of this greti.t work to every one will be understood by referring 
 to highly commendatory letters received from the following 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE LITERARY MEN. 
 
 ALLISON, SIR ARCHIBALD, the Historian. 
 
 BANCROFT, HON. GEORGE, the Historian. 
 
 BARNARD, DR. HENRY, the eminent writer on Education, and Editor of Ber- 
 nard's American Journal of Education, &c. 
 
 BEECHER, REV. HENRY WARD, of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn 
 
 BETHUNE. GEO. W., D.D., of the Dutch Reformed Church, Brooklyn 
 
 BREWSTER, SIR DAVID, LL.D. and K.H. 
 
 BRYANT, WM. C, the Poet. 
 
 CARPENTER, DR. WILLIAM B., the eminent Medical writer. 
 
 CHANNING WALTER, M.D. 
 
 CHEEVER, GEORGE B., D.D., Pastor of the Church of the Puritans New 
 York. 
 
 CLEVELAND, PROP. CHARLES D., Author of Compendium of English Lite- 
 rature, <fcc, 
 
 COGSWELL, DR. JOS. G., Librarian of the Astor Library. 
 
 GUMMING, REV. DR., of London, the eminent Divine and Author. 
 
 DALLAS, HON, GEORGE M., LL.D, the eminent Statesman, Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary to England, &q. 
 
 DANA, RICHARD HENRY, the Poet, 
 
 DARLING, JAMES, the eminent Bibliographer, Author of Cyclopaedia Biblio- 
 graphica, &c. 
 
 DUNGLISON, ROBLEY, M.D, LL.D., for more than twenty years Professor 
 of the Institute of Medicine, &c, in the Jefferson Medical College, Phila- 
 delphia, Author of Dunglison's Dictionary. 
 
 DURBIN, JOHN P., D.D., of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Author of Tra- 
 vels in Europe, the East, &c. 
 
 EVERETT, HON. EDWARD, late President of Harvard University, &c. 
 
 FELTON, PROF. C. C, of Harvard University. 
 
 FORSTER, JOHN, the eminent Reviewer, Editor of the London Examiner, and 
 Author of the Statesmen of the Commonwealth of England, Life of Gold- 
 smith, &c. 
 
 FRANCIS, JOHN W., M.D., LL.D., President of the New York Medical So- 
 ciety, <fcc. 
 
2 TESTIMONIALS TO 
 
 GILPIN, HON. HENRY D., late Attorney General of the United States. 
 GOODRICH, CHAUNCEY A., D.D., Prof, of the Pastoral Charge, Yale College, 
 
 Editor of Webster's Quarto Dictionary, Ac. 
 HALL, JUDGE JAMES, of Cincinnati, Author of Legends of the West, Ac 
 HALLECK, FITZ-GREENE, the Poet, 
 HAWKS, FRANCIS L., LL.D., D.D., Ac. 
 HEDGE, FREDERIC H., D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Harvard 
 
 University. Editor of the Christian Examiner. 
 HILLARD, GEORGE S., in the Boston Courier, Jan. 13, 1859, and Littell's 
 
 Living Age. Feb. 5, 1859. 
 HODGE, DR. CHARLES, Professor of Biblical -Literature, Ac, Presbyterian 
 
 Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. 
 HOLLAND, SIR HENRY, Physician to Queen Victoria, the eminent Author, 
 
 and son-in-law of the famous Sydney Smith. 
 HOLMES, OLIVER WENDELL, M.D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy and 
 Physiology, Harvard University, Author of the Autocrat of the Breakfast- 
 Table, Ac 
 HORNE, REV. THOMAS HARTWELL, D.D., Assistant Librarian of the 
 British Museum, Author of the Introduction to the Study of the Scriptures, 
 Introduction to the Study of Bibliography, Ac. 
 HOWITT, MARY, the popular Writer. 
 IRVING, WASHINGTON. 
 KENNEDY, HON. JOHN P., late Secretary of the Navy, Author of Horse-Shoe 
 
 Robinson, Ac. 
 KENRICK, RT. REV. FRANCIS PATRICK, Archbishop of Baltimore. 
 KING, CHARLES. LL.D., President of Columbia College, New York. 
 LIEBER, DR. FRANCIS, Editor of the Encyclopaedia Americana, Ac. 
 LOSSING, BENSON J., Author of Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution, Ac 
 MACAULAY, LORD, the Historian. 
 
 MACKENZIE, R. SHELTON, D.C.L., Editor of Noctes Ambrosiana?. 
 MANN, HON. HORACE, LL.D., President of Antioch College. 
 MAURY, LIEUT. M. F., LL.D., Director of the U. S. National Observatory, 
 
 Author of the Geography of the Sea, Ac. 
 NAPIER, LORD. 
 
 OWEN, RICHARD, D.C.L., Ac, the eminent Naturalist. 
 PARSONS, THEOPHILUS, LL.D., Prof, of Law in Harvard University. 
 PEABODY, REV. A. P., D.D., Editor of the N. American Review. 
 PRESCOTT. W. H.. the Historian. 
 
 PRIME, S. IREN^US. D.D., Editor New York Observer. 
 RIPLEY, GEORGE, Esq., Editor of the New American Cyclopaedia. 
 ROBINSON, EDWARD, D.D., President Union Theological Seminary, Author 
 
 of Biblical Researches in Palestine, Ac. 
 SIMMS, W. GILMORE, of South Carolina, Author of Yemassee; Guy Rivers,; 
 
 The Partisan, Ac. 
 SPARKS, JARED, LL.D., late President of Harvard University. 
 SPRAGUE, Dr. W. B., Author of the Annals of the American Pulpit. 
 STRICKLAND, AGNES, Author of the Queens of England. 
 TANEY, HON. ROGER B., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
 
 States. 
 TAYLOR, BAYARD. 
 TENNYSON, ALFRED, the Poet. 
 
 THOMPSON, JOHN R., Editor of the Southern Literary Messenger. 
 TICKNOR, GEORGE, Author of History of Spanish Literature. 
 TRENCH, REV. DR., the Philologist, Dean of Westminster. 
 TUCKERMAN, HENRY T., the Essayist. 
 VERPLANCK, GULIAN C, LL.D., Regent of the University of the State of 
 
 New York, Editor of the Illustrated Shakspeare, Ac. 
 WALKER, JAMES, LL.D. President of Harvard University. 
 
allibone's dictionary of authors. 3 
 
 WAYLAND, FRANCIS, D.D., late President of Brown University, Author of 
 
 Wayland's Moral Science, &c. 
 WHITT IER, JOHN G., the Poet. 
 WILLIS, N. P. 
 
 WINTHROP, ROBERT C, of Boston. 
 WISEMAN, CARDINAL. 
 WHIPPLE. E. P., the Reviewer. 
 WOOLSEY, THEODORE D., DD., LL.D, President of Yale College. 
 
 Volume I., super-royal octavo, 1005 pages, elegantly printed, on fine paper. 
 Price, $5.00 in muslin binding; $6.00 in fine sheep binding, or $7.50 in library 
 style, half Turkey morocco antique. 
 
 Forwarded to any portion of the United States, free of expense, on receipt of 
 the above prices. 
 
 Address 
 
 CHILDS & PETERSON, 
 
 602, Arch Street, Philadelphia. 
 
 ALLIBONE'S DICTIONARY OF AUTHORS: 
 
 A Critical Dictionary of English Literature and British and 
 American Authors, living and deceased : from the Earliest 
 Accounts to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century. Containing 
 Thirty Thousand Biographies and Literary Notices : with Forty 
 Indexes of Subjects. " The chief glory of every people arises 
 from its Authors. 77 By S. Austin Allibone : 1859, imp, Svo. 
 Childs 8f Peterson, Philadelphia. Trubner Sc Co., London. 
 Price, $5.00. 
 
 The first volume of this work is just published in Philadelphia and London. 
 It contains the letters from A to J, both inclusive, 1005 pages, imperial double 
 column, minion and nonpareil type, about 200 lines on each page on an average, 
 the volume containing upwards of two millions of words. In bulk of typo- 
 graphical matter it is equal to thirteen volumes (470 pages each) of Putnam's 
 edition of Irving's Works, or about fourteen volumes of Prescott's, Bancroft's, or 
 Hallam's Histories, Svo. The number of Authors whose works are noticed 
 in the first volume is above 17,100,- making in the forty indexes (at end of vol. 
 ii.) about 24,100 names, viz: — 
 
 Authors. 
 
 1. Agriculture - 320 
 
 2. Antiquities: Archeology, Mythology, and Numismatics 510 
 
 3. Architecture 106 
 
 4. Astronomy and Astrology 203 
 
 5. Bibliography: Bookbinding, Catalogues, and Printing 120 
 
 6. Biography and Correspondence 1170 
 
 7. Botany : Arboriculture, Flowers, Fruit, Horticulture, Vegetables 257 
 
 8. Chemistry . 191 
 
 9. Divinity 5668 
 
 10. Domestic Economy 55 
 
 11. Dramatic Literature 527 
 
4 TESTIMONIALS TO 
 
 12. Education ^\ 
 
 13. Essayists: Encyclopaedias, Periodical Literature 617 
 
 14. Fiction: Facetia\ Novels, Romances, Tales 620 
 
 15. Games and Sports l^O 
 
 16. Geography: Atlases and Charts 159 
 
 17. Geology, Mineralogy 89 
 
 18. Heraldry and Genealogy 140 
 
 19. History, Chronicles, Chronolosv 1111 
 
 20. Juvenile Works : Tales, Ac 1*5 
 
 21. Law, Jurisprudence 1272 
 
 22. Literary History 227 
 
 23. Mathematics: Arithmetic. Geometry, Trigonometry, &c 353 
 
 24. Mechanics. Engineering, Railways 141 
 
 25. Medical Sciences 1714 
 
 26. Moral and Mental Philosophy 487 
 
 27. Morals 309 
 
 28. Music ISO 
 
 29. Natural History 305 
 
 30. Natural Philosophy 346 
 
 31. Naval and Military 510 
 
 32. Painting and Sculpture 256 
 
 33. Philology 511 
 
 34. Poetry and Poetical Criticism 1838 
 
 35. Politics: Government, Legislation, Documents and Reports 850 
 
 36. Political Economy : general subject and special topics 527 
 
 37. Topography '. 270 
 
 38. Trade and Commerce 280 
 
 39. Travels 892 
 
 40. Voyages 235 
 
 Total number of names in the forty Indexes from A to J, inclusive, 
 
 Vol. 1 24.110 
 
 From K to Z, inclusive, Vol. 2, about 26,000 
 
 Total number of names in the Indexes of the two volumes, about 50,116 
 
 As each of the forty indexes runs through the alphabet from A to Z, this de- 
 partment of the work will probably consist of nearly one thousand divisions, 
 enrolling about 50,000 names. It will be interesting to see at a glance the 
 number of authors of names of common occurrence in the body of the work in 
 vol. i., A to J. 
 
 Brown and Browne 175 I Hill 67 
 
 Clark and Clarke 153 Holmes 24 
 
 Green and Greene 83 Howard 53 
 
 Davies 68 Irving 17 
 
 Davis 48 : Jackson 81 
 
 Ellis 47 > James 48 
 
 Gibson 42 j Johnson 110 
 
 Grant 47 Johnston 35 
 
 Hall 92 Johnstone 17 
 
 Hamilton 86 | Jones 189 
 
 Harris 52 
 
 Harrison 52' Authors in 21 names 1586 
 
 The number of works recorded, and in very many cases criticised, both favor- 
 ably and unfavorably, would, perhaps, in the whole work amount to between 
 one and two hundred thousand; but this is a mere surmise, as they have never 
 been numbered. 
 
allibone's dictionary of authors. 5 
 
 The best, because the briefest, description which can be given of the Critical 
 Dictionary, is, that it is intended to be to the literature of the language 
 
 WHAT A DICTIONARY OF WORDS IS TO THE LANGUAGE ITSELF. 
 
 The second volume, which will complete the work, is now more than one-half 
 stereotyped. 
 
 From Wm. H. Prescott, Esq., the Historian. 
 
 Boston, Aug. 14, 1855. 
 Gentlemen : — I should sooner have replied to your note requesting my opinion 
 of Allibone's Dictionary of Literature. I have rarely seen so large an amount 
 of matter condensed into so small a compass. The work is conducted on what 
 to me is an entirely novel principle, and presents the reader not simply with the 
 opinions of the author, but with those of the best critics on every writer whose 
 character he discusses. This is opening the best sources of information, while 
 the original contributions of the editor, which connect the extracts together, are 
 of a piquant kind that gives vivacity to the discussion. 
 
 The index of subjects will form a sort of catalogue raisonnee, that cannot fail 
 to make the book as useful in a bibliographical as in a biographical view. If 
 the rest of the work is as ably executed as that embraced under the first three 
 letters of the alphabet, — all I have seen, — it cannot fail to be an important con- 
 tribution to English Literature. 
 
 I remain, gentlemen, your ob't servant, 
 
 W. H. PRESCOTT. 
 Childs & Peterson. 
 
 Boston, Dec. 27, 1 858. 
 
 My dear Sir : — I am truly obliged to you for so welcome a present as the first 
 volume of your great work. I have read the whole of it with the same care 
 which I bestowed on the earlier portion ; and I may truly say that I find no 
 occasion to modify the opinions I have before expressed in regard to the book. 
 I find everywhere occasion to commend the excellence of the plan and the con- 
 scientious and able manner in which it has been carried into execution. Indeed, 
 the work may be said to combine in itself a whole library of criticism ; and the 
 reader, who sees the scattered rays of opinion concentrated into one focus, carries 
 with him what may be regarded as an expression of the public sentiment on the 
 topic under review. 
 
 With my best wishes for the successful completion of your difficult task, 
 I remain, dear sir, very sincerely yours, 
 
 W. H. PRESCOTT. 
 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
 From Cardinal Wiseman. 
 
 London, Feb. 18, 1859. 
 
 Bear Sir : — I thank you very sincerely for the first volume of your Dictionary 
 of Authors. I have tested its value in two different ways, — first by looking at 
 the accounts of comparatively unknown or obscure authors hardly to be found 
 in ordinary biographical works, and then by glancing over the history of cele- 
 brated ones, whose lives have occupied volumes. Your work stands both tests 
 admirably. I have found more about the first class of writers than I have ever 
 seen elsewhere, and than I could have anticipated in so comprehensive a work ; 
 while the interesting points in the literary lives of those belonging to the second 
 are brought out in sufficient detail and treated with sufficient accuracy to render 
 further reference or inquiry unnecessary. 
 
 I congratulate you on the success of your herculean undertaking, and am 
 Yours, very faithfully, 
 
 N. CARD. WISEMAN. 
 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
6 TESTIMONIALS TO 
 
 From Washington Irving, Esq. 
 
 Sminyside, Aug. 23, 1855. 
 Gentlemen : — Accept my thanks for the specimen you have sent me of Mr. 
 Allibone's Critical Dictionary of English Literature. The undertaking does 
 honor to that gentleman's enterprise; and the manner in which, from the speci- 
 men before me, (464 pages,) he appears to execute it, does honor to his intelli- 
 gence, perspicuity, wide and accurate research, impartiality, and good taste. 
 When completed, the work cannot fail to be a valuable library companion and 
 family book of reference. The beautiful manner in which the work is got up is 
 highly creditable to American typography. 
 
 Very respectfully, gentlemen, your obliged and ob't servant, 
 
 WASHINGTON IRVING. 
 
 Childs & Peterson. 
 
 Sunnijside, Jan. 12, 1859. 
 My dear Sir: — I have to thank you for a copy of the first volume of your 
 Dictionary of Authors, which you have had the kindness to send me. It fully 
 comes up to the high anticipations I had formed from the specimen submitted 
 to my inspection in 1S55. 
 
 Thus far you have fulfilled admirably the stupendous task undertaken by 
 you; and your work, when completed, will remain a monument of unsparing- 
 industry, indefatigable research, sound and impartial judgment, and critical 
 acumen. 
 
 It merits, and cannot fail to have, a wide circulation, and to find a place in 
 every library. With great regard, yours, very truly, 
 
 WASHINGTON IRVING. 
 
 S. Austin Allibone. Esq. 
 
 From the Hon. Edward Everett, late President of Harvard University, &c. 
 
 Boston, Sept. 20, 1855. 
 Gentlemen: — I have received the volume you were good enough to send me, 
 containing the first three letters of Mr. Allibone's " Critical Dictionary of Eng- 
 lish Literature, and British and American Authors, Living and Deceased." The 
 plan of the work is extremely comprehensive, and requires laborious research in 
 the collection of the materials, and great care and discrimination in putting 
 them together. As far as I have been able to examine the specimen contained 
 in the volume sent me, Mr. Allibone is performing his task with great fidelity 
 and success. In giving, in the words of the author, the judgments which he 
 cites from approved sources, he has made a great improvement over former bio- 
 graphical dictionaries, which are, for the most part, unacknowledged compila- 
 tions. Mr. Allibone's work appears to be, to a very unusual degree, the result of 
 original investigation, and, if completed as begun, will, I am confident, be found 
 a most useful work of reference, and an important addition to the literary appa- 
 ratus of our language. I am, gentlemen, respectfully yours, 
 
 EDWARD EVERETT, 
 
 Childs & Peterson. 
 
 From Hon. George Bancroft, the Historian. 
 
 New York, Nov. 17. 1855. 
 Gentlemen : — The examination of articles under the letter A, in Mr. Allibone's 
 Critical Dictionary of British and American Authors, has led me to form a high 
 estimate of the comprehensiveness and the utility of his design, as well as of 
 the fearless and indefatigable industry, the candor, and the general ability with 
 which he is executing it. His work bids fair to take a very high rank in its own 
 peculiar department. His plan has moreover a special attraction, for it not only 
 presents appropriate information respecting each author, but also a general pic- 
 ture of the impression which he may have made on the public and on his critics. 
 I wish the deserved success to this great undertaking, and 
 Remain, very respectfully yours, 
 
 * GEORGE BANCROFT. 
 Childs & Peterson. 
 
allibone's dictionary op authors. 7 
 
 From Lord Macaulay, the Historian. 
 
 Holly Lodge, Kensington, April 19, 1859. 
 Sir : — Since I wrote to you last, I have bad frequent occasion to consult your 
 Dictionary, and I have scarcely ever failed to find what I sought. I have no 
 hesitation in saying that it is far superior to any other work of the kind in our 
 language. I heartily wish you success proportioned to the labor and cost of 
 your undertaking. 
 
 I have the honor to be, sir, your faithful servant, 
 
 MACAULAY. 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
 From Thomas Hartwell Home, D.D., Librarian of the British Museum, &c. 
 
 British Museum, August 27, 1859. 
 
 My dear Sir: — I lose no time in transcribing the following notice, from Vol. 
 I. No. 1, page 8, of "The Literary Record," a new Journal published April 30, 
 1859, which is now before me : — 
 
 '•Mr. Allibone has based this dictionary on the Bibliographical works of Watt, 
 Lowndes, Chalmers, &c. Notices are given of seventeen thousand different 
 authors : for which, we learn from the Introduction, the materials have been 
 drawn from some hundreds of books, of which a list has been given. The lives 
 of recent and living writers, are treated with special amplitude; and considering 
 the difficulties to be overcome before such a book can be produced, we think the 
 undertaking reflects credit on the author, and deserves encouragement." 
 
 That " encouragement" I do fervently hope you are receiving in the United 
 States. I hear but one opinion about the value of your Magnum Opus. I find 
 it very useful, here, in ascertaining the Christian names of authors, and in find- 
 ing out American Anonymes and Pseudonymes. 
 
 As my own copy, here, is never to be removed from my table, the junior assist- 
 ant librarians frequently come to consult your work. I have not been able to 
 collect any new information for you, but I hope to hear that you are advancing 
 towards the close of your arduous labors : on the completion of which, if spared, 
 I shall rejoice to congratulate you and your spirited publishers. 
 I remain, my dear sir, very sincerely yours, 
 
 THOS. HARTWELL HORNB. 
 
 S. A. Allibone, Esq. 
 
 From Dr. Smith, the Author of The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography ; Anti- 
 quities; Geography, &c. 
 
 London, July 22, 1859. 
 My dear Sir: — I owe you many apologies for having so long neglected to 
 thank you for your very valuable present of the first volume of your " Dictionary 
 of English Literature." 
 
 Having had, myself, some experience in drawing up dictionaries, I may, per- 
 haps, be "permitted to express to you my high admiration of the way in which 
 you have executed the work. I have frequently consulted it, and have always 
 found what I wanted. The information is given in that clear style and con- 
 densed form, which are so important in a Dictionary; and you have shown your 
 skill in what you have omitted as well as in what you have inserted. You must 
 have bestowed immense labor upon the book, but you have the satisfaction of 
 having made a most valuable contribution to our literature. 
 
 I remain, my dear sir, yours faithfully, ---_—- 
 
 WM. SMITH. 
 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
8 TESTIMONIALS TO ALLIBONE'S DICTIONARY OF AUTHORS. 
 
 From Henry G. Bohn, the eminent London Publisher. 
 
 London, Sept. 2, 1859. 
 
 JJy dear Sir : — I very much regret that a succession of circumstances has 
 prevented my earlier acknowledgment of your flattering and agreeable present. 
 I was absent when it arrived, and since my return have constantly kept your 
 volume before me with the intention of giving it a critical examination, before 
 pronouncing an excathedra opinion, but have hitherto found this impossible. I 
 have now great pleasure in saying that I know of no bibliographical work of 
 modern times more successfully pains-taking, or more indispensable to the lover 
 of literature. Being fully alive to all the difficulties you have had to encounter, 
 I cannot but marvel at the patience, perseverance and industry, which have 
 enabled you. to accomplish so much and so well. I wish I had you as a coad- 
 jutor in my Lowndes. 
 
 As regards your article on myself, you have picked up some matters which I 
 had all but forgotten, and have guessed my age pretty nearly. Curiously enough, 
 just as your sketch of me came to hand, another appeared in Mackenzie's Bio- 
 graphical Dictionary, so different that the two would amalgamate with very 
 little excision. Yours, my dear sir, very sincerely, 
 
 HENRY G. BOHN. 
 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
 From Charles Dickens, the Novelist. 
 Office of All the Year Round, No. 11 Wellington street, | 
 North Strand, London, Tuesday, August 26, 1859. j 
 Dear Sir: — The impression that I duly acknowledged the receipt of the book 
 you had the kindness to send me, is so very strong upon my mind, that I think 
 a letter I addressed to you must have miscarried. I am pained to find, from 
 your letter dated the 27th of last month, that in any case you do not know how 
 highly I esteem the first volume of your excellent Dictionary, and with what 
 pleasure I received that mark of your remembrance. Pray receive the assurance 
 from me now, that I consider your book a very important and valuable one, and 
 that I send you many thanks. 
 
 Dear sir, faithfully yours, 
 
 CHARLES DICKENS. 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
 'From William and Robert Chambers, the eminent Publishers and Authors. 
 
 Edinburgh, July 22, 1859. 
 Sir : — We are favored with yours of the 27th ult, and have to apologize for 
 having neglected to acknowledge the receipt of Vol. I. of your Dictionary. We 
 should have done so at once, but the matter was not brought sufficiently before 
 our notice at the time of the arrival of the book, hence we overlooked the source 
 from whence it came. Permit us now, however, to express our best thanks, and 
 to offer our humble mite of praise, for so extraordinary an undertaking as your 
 Dictionary certainly is. We are as much pleased with the care and mechanical 
 skill bestowed upon the book, as surprised that so much research could be 
 brought to bear upon a subject demanding the treatment, not of one, but of 
 every author of importance ! 
 
 Your labors, collossal as they must have been, and must still continue to be, 
 will, we trust, meet with due reward in time ; and none will hail your final suc- 
 cess more gladly than 
 
 Your obliged obedient servants, 
 
 W. & R. CHAMBERS. 
 S. Austin Allibone, Esq. 
 
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