Class £~yyc 3 Book < 77Z (jzZ z^ OPENING ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITED STAT1-S IN REBUTTAL IN THE CASE OF FITZ-JOOT PORTER, BEFORE THE ADVISORY BOARD OF OFFICERS. GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y., OCTOBER 2, 1878, ASA BIRD GARDNER, ■• COUNSEL FOB THE GOVERNMENT." m~7 uniKi or Gen'l Winfield S, Hancock. OPENING ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES IN REBUTTAL IN* THE CASE OF FITZ-JOOT PORTER, BEFORE THE ADVISORY BOARD OF OFFICERS, GOVERNOR'S ISLASD, X. Y.. OCTOBER 2, 1878, ASA BIRD GARDNER. COUNSEL FOE THE G-OVERNMK.-V I V /*< 1SJ > vt a«r ft 3D CO OPENING ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES IINT REBUTTAL IN THE CASE OF FITZ-JOHN POETEE. By ASA BIED GAKDFER " Counsel for the Government? Gentlemen of the Board : We are and have been for some time engaged in one of the most remarkable investigations that has ever taken place in the American or in any foreign army. It is to be regretted that this Board is not invested with any judicial functions; that it has no power in law to administer an oath or take depositions or compel the attendance of witnesses ; and that willful and malicious false swearing before it to a material point of iuquiry will not come under the statutory definition of perjury. In the duly which has been put upon me by the Board to act "as counsel for the government," and which I entered upon reluctantly, I have felt that as the petitioner or accused had come here, after many years' preparation, with the assistance of able and learned counsel, to present a case, claiming that he had been "improperly convicted and removed from the United States Army" at the prosecution of the United States under its criminal laws, the full measure of my responsibility would not be complete unless I made every effort, iu the time given, to ascertain the truth, the, actual facts. While the representative of the government in any investigation should never forget that justice only is what he should keep in view, it does not follow that he is to sit supinely and accept without question an accused's or defendant's statement to the merits. I presume the Board is aware that 1 knew nothing ot this case until after the petitioner had made his opening statement. That this Board may sit with what may properly be termed judicial impartiality, I have felt it incumbent on me earnestly to search for material evidence to the issue, fully knowing that this was what was expected of me. JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL. From the opening argument of counsel for the petitioner and from the testimony adduced by him (I use the word testimony in its colloquial sense), we are called upon to review the proeeed.ngs of a general court- martial in the Armv of the United States, a court which, according to the decisions of the highest courts of record of the United btates, was as valid a judicial tribunal for cases within its competency as any otuei in the land. . , . , , , , , , . __ The case of the petitioner was within its acknowledged statutory iurisdictiou, provided it was properly appointed. J On his trial the accused, before pleading to the merits, raised the point whether the court, which had been appointed by Maj. Gen. U. W. 1 G 2 Halleck, U. S. A., tbeu General-in-Chief, should not have been appointed by the President of the, United States under the act of May 29, 1830, for the reason that Brio-. Gen. B. S. Roberts, IT. S. Volunteers, (now deceased ), who had been inspector-general of Maj. Gen. John Pope's army, the " Army of Virginia,'" bad preferred the charges, and that these might therefore be assumed to have been preferred by the latter, or by his order, so as to make the presentation of them his act. It further appeared that there had been a previous military commis- sion ordered to try the accused, but which was dissolved without action, and relative to which the accused alleged that (p. 9, Court-Martial Record) "the subject-matter of its investigation was charges preferred against" him "by Maj. Gen. John Pope." In reply, the Judge-Advocate of the court said, referring to the previous military commission, that, "in point of fact, no charges were ever pre- ferred" by Major General Pope; that commission was dissolved and the general court-martial appointed, as first stated ; that there was no reference in the order appointing the court martial to General Pope at all: and further, that he wished to state distinctly that Major-General Pope was not the prosecutor in the case, nor had he preferred the charges, nor did he. the Judge- Advocate, present them as being preferred by him. As the accused did not pursue the matter further, the court was cleared for deliberation, and very properly overruled the objection. 1 say very properly, because the act of 1830 was passed for a very dif- ferent purpose, viz, to prevent a commanding general from appointing a general court-martial and at the same time preferring the charges and acting on the proceedings, as had happened shortly before the act was pissed iii the ease of a geueral-in chief who had acted in such manner w th reference to the then Adjutant-General of the Army. Major-General Pope was not at the time the general court-martial was appointed | November 25, 1802) the commanding officer of the accused _ His command of the "Army of Virginia" had terminated about the lib ol .September. 1862 : that army had been dissolved ; he had gone to another sphere of duty, and on the 16th of that month had assumed command of the geographical Military Department of the Northwest, with Ins headquarters at Saint Paul, Minn. The accused was not, therefore, in any way subject to his orders. He could not appoint a court to try him on charges preferred from auv quarter as the latter was not within his military department, neither could he act on the proceedings of any such court. In short, the then accused was not under his command, which was necessarv in order to make the before-described limitation of the act of 1830 applicable. As the petitioner has on several occasions heretofore seemed to con- Biuer tue point as one of moment, and as we have the original record before as as part of this case, 1 allude to it orelimiuarilv to auv dis- cu88,on ot the case, and have further to remark that when General" Pope was jnmmoiied to Washington as a witness on the trial he testified '»"'••; 86.4 p 23, , General Court-Martial Record) that he did ojhisown knowledge know who preferred the charges-that he had hi" li h , H,; "fV~;»"*t.tl'<> accused; he had, however, set ibrth J ,' M,U1 ,r the latt ?^ ^rations as he did those of everybody < lfi« concerned m the campaign of August, 1862. iusl !'e "Im uV' , 1 "r^ bU \ n S dl l ty " lt V ossM S hr ™^ the accused to been ',c , I ■ n''"'!" ' V T bad given his evidence and the case had |,i ' 1m; Pres ldeIlt , lt ended hig offi(jial connectiou with •\ "iv -, , i /° the •\ Al ; my 0f V ^ginia," an army which had 1 ' , x " ' ,- ' Qave • s;ml - dissolved. Hadtheaccueed (or his counsel), on the trial, have desired to know Low, or why, or when Brigadier-General Roberts bad come to prefer tbe charges against him, he could have undoubtedly ascertained when General Roberts was called and sworn as a wituess, by asking him the questions. General Roberts's connection with tbe "Army of Virginia," in which he had witnessed the events on which he had formulated and preferred charges agaiust the accused, had been as acting inspector-general to that army; but, from the fact that he held such a staff office by mi re detail, it did not by any means follow that if he preferred charges against an officer in it, they were necessarily the act of the general officer who, for the time being, commanded that army. He had as much right under the military laws to prefer charges by reason of his own commission in the Army as any other officer, for he was a general officer himself and held a line commission. When the accused raised his point as to jurisdiction, he said it was " not with tbe slightest purpose of taking any exception to any mem- ber of tbe court" (p. 10, General Court-Martial Record). He bad already previously formally declared of record that he had no objection to any member of the court (p. 5, General Court-Martial Record). COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL. Now, who composed that court .' The members of this Board possibly know ; but, in view of the fact that the petitioner has deliberately asserted here that they li could not sit with that calm necessary for a judicial deliberation," that his sentence was "undeserved," and that he was "improperly convicted? a brief allusion to the character aud position of the members of that court seems peculiarly appropriate. Nine general officers sat in the trial of tbe petitioner, not as we are sitting, under the ordinary obligation or oath which we took on accepting our commissions, but under the additional obligation of a special oath, prescribed by statute, to, among other things, " well and truly try and determine, according to evidence, and to duly ad- minister justice." There bad not been a court in the American Army of officers ol such high rank since General Washington appointed the tribunal (September 29, 17S0) which tried Maj. John Andre, adjutant-general of the British Army. Most of the members were old friends aud acquaintances of the ac- cused, and his relations with the President of that court were of so intimate a character that the latter was reluctant to sit. and only did so, I have been credibly informed, because the former wished it. These nine general officers were — 1. Maj. Gen. David Hunter, United States Volunteers, of tbe Dis- trict of Columbia. Graduated at United States Military Academy. L822; colonel and brevet major-general, United States Army; now on retired list. 2. Maj: Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, of Vermont. Graduated I uited States Military Academy L817 : now deceased. 3. Brig. Gen. Rufus King, United States Volunteers, of New York. Graduated United States Military Academy LS33; subsequently resident minister to Rome ; now deceased. 4. Brig. Gen. Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss, United States Volun of Virginia; subsequently appointed major-general of volunteers, to date November 29, 18G2. [Eulogized by Hon. Keverdy Johnson id (printed pamphlet, p. 11) for "skillful defense of Helena. Ark."J 5. Brig. Geu. James Brewerton Rioketts, Uuited States Volunteers, of New York. Graduated at Uuited States Military Academy 1839 ; brevet major-general, United States Army ; uow major-general, Uuited States Army ; on retired list. 6. Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, United States Volunteers, of Rhode Island. Graduated at United States Military Academy 1826; subsequently ap- pointed major-general of United States Volunteers, to date May 31 1862, in acknowledgment of service in battle of "Fair Oaks"; brevet major-general, United States Army, and now on retired list. 7. Brig. Gen. James Abram Garfield, United States Volunteers, of Ohio, formerly chief of staff to Major General Rosecraus ; afterward major-general Uuited States Volunteers for gallant and meritorious services in the battle of Chickamauga. Representative in Congress from Ohio since 1862. 8. Brig. Geu. Napoleon B. Buford, United States Volunteers, of Ken- tucky. Graduated at Uuited States Military Academy 1827 ; brevet major-general, United States Volunteers; subsequently "special United States commissioner for Indian affairs. 9. Brig. Gen. John P. Hough, Uuited States Volunteers; afterward chief justice Territory of New Mexico; now deceased. The Judge- Advocate was the Hon. Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate-Gen- eral, who had been Secretary of War under President Buchanan, and is now a brigadier-general on the retired list of the Army. These comprised the court, the judicial body, which convicted the accused of grave crimes, and I assert confidently that they were as respectable a body of officers as have ever been assembled in the Army of the United States to administer justice under its criminal laws The accused iu his defense, on his trial, said, in addressiuo- that court (p. 256, G. C. M. Rec.) : & Yourselves, most if not all of you, have known uie well. Your eminent official law S^ftft?* 8 J, ^ e - Ad ™ c ate-General Holt), who has conducted this prosecution calm y and fairly so far as on him depended, hut with the vigilance and energy which his duty demanded, hunse f,in the recent past, when numerous events hmgid on the IS *in Tw^e betrayed. g ^ ^ ^ h " trU8ted me ' aDd haS felt tht " bis tr " s * To his carefully prepared written defense on the merits, the Judge- Ad- vocate of the court made no reply whatever ; but, iu alluding to the length ot the investigation, said (p. 227, G. C. M. Rec): I will simply remark that this case has been thoroughly and most patiently investi- ri t; I 1 ;:;;'-'';" '" ^forty-five days sufficiently attests this/ Indeed, contested Jin h l touching the more important and the more severely cont( sted points has, bj re-exami nation and cross-examination, been again and aeain < omprehended and appreciated by you in all its bearings. <,C ll/, l !i' V VVi "r" 1 '','"' l ° accura , cies of iuterpretation of testimony, and whatever 1 ^ a ,1,, ,„.,,,„ fro,,, lt „ Lave foand a lace . n h elaborate defense of SMS Mj^?3 SftSf * "^ l6 " f ° r tbdr J ™«™ t0 the recoil , ?! af t« the court had adjourned sine die President Lincoln, by an ;: ;; , ,;::;;;, l, n r" h ^°i j ^^y u,im t directed judge. aJvo. :'" General Ho t, in bus quality as head of the Bureau of Military Jus- "•''••"Hi m usual course n, such cases under the law, "to revise the pro- r::;:.,^,;: ,: ;;;'' , : i ; , 1 i n irt,al v r case «r M^Ue^ as^Ei rortei, and to lepor fully any legal questions that may have arisen iu and Ts^eittcS rrll ° f the ****">** ilJ Terence to Ute cha ge^ .m.l s|m , , ll( atious exhibited against the accused, and upon which he was we J |'ave , s 1 i'n V i 1 U 1 ,,, ;' h ^ e ^^vocate-General made under the law, *< l-.'M seen here has been made the subject of animadversion by the In his address here the petitioner has asserted that many of his wit- nesses actively engaged in the American Army were unattainable : but the record of his trial does not show it. On the contrary, he specifically stated he was ready to go on with his case (p. 118, G.C. M. Rec), and from then until its close there is nothing whatever to show lie did nor have summoned and in attendance every witness he asked for. When all bis evidence was in, the court gave him all the time he de- sired to prepare his written address, (p. '225, G. C. M. Reel I feel constrained to allude to these matters, as this is the fust time the government has through any recognized representative, in long years in which there have been many misrepresentations, stated the case. The accused, it must be also borne in mind, was defended by able counsel, viz, the late Hon. Eeverdy Johnson and Charles Barnes, esq. As soon as possible after the verdict and decision of the President was announced, his senior counsel, in July, 1863, published an attack upon the court, which the petitioner forwarded in an appeal to President Grant, dated June 10, 1800, and spoke of the " unparalleled injustice " with which he had himself been treated. That attack I do not hesitate to say was unprecedented and unwar- ranted. In it the writer was pleased to declare as to three, of the mem- bers that they were "most estimable gentlemen " (p. 21, printed pamph- let), and yet he used language as to them which was libelous. In these years the members of the court who still survive, bound by their oaths not to disclose or discover the vote or opinion of any partic- ular member, have remained silent, but as these papers to winch 1 have alluded have, by act of the petitioner, become part of the public history of this case, "on tile in the War Department," I believe that, on careful investigation, it will be found that the court which tried the accused not only did so conscientiously, but on the evidence adduced had no recourse but to convict him. In rebuttal, evidence will be introduced tending to show that that conviction was just and proper, and the peti- tioner guilty of the offenses on which he was tried. NATURE OE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONER. He has come here and asked this Board to examine into the merits of his case in the light of needy-discovered evidence. His conviction by a judicial tribunal is an accomplished fact. Con- gress has never provided for any writ of error or appeal from the final approval of the proceedings by the President of the United Si airs, nor even for a revision, as it did lately in Ex-Surgeon-General Hammond's case, which this Board has in charge. As I have observed on a previous occasion, an innocent person may sometimes be convicted of an offense under the forms of law. This is due to the fact that the wisdom of man is but finite. It is iuevitable in the administration of justice. In the jurisprudence of this country we do not fiud that new trials are granted because the accused wants to bring more evidence of the same kind to the same point, in the belief that if he had done so at first the verdict would have been different. To admit such a principle would utterly subvert and destroy the orderlv administration of the criminal laws. No case would be likely ever to be ended, unless the accused was poor or mentally helpless' to induce counsel to aid him. Wisely, therefore, does the law in this country limit, for the purpose of proving innocency of crime, after conviction, an appeal to cases where newly-discovered evidence can be presented. This is, of course, differ- ent from jury trials, where the court may order in certain cases a new trial on the ground of preponderance 7 of evidence contrary to the verdict of guilty. By " newly discovered evidence," we are to understand is meant that evidence to a material point at issue which was not known, or with due d igeuce ascertained on the original trial, but which has been discovered since ; and not evideuce of the same kiud and to the same effect as that introduced. In this case, however, we have seen witness after witness brought here who were examined on the original trial, to be asked questions after the lapse of sixteen years which they could then have been asked, aud other witnesses (cumulative evidence) brought to testify to the same state of facts as testified to by certain of accused's witnesses on the original trial. ►Still others, as well as some of his original witnesses, have been brought to testify as to the accused's conduct on the 30th of August, L862, in the battle of that day, in order to show what his animus was towards his commanding general in the events of the previous day, when he was charged with the commission of certain military crimes, there being no charge against him for like conduct on the 30th" In the original trial the court ruled out and refused admission, after argument aud protest, to the very testimony which the accused has here presented as to his conduct on the 30th. (pp. 118, 133, 252, and 280 G. C. M. Eec.) Relative to that testimony, for the reasons which I originally gave, I do not propose to offer any testimony as to his conduct on the 30th, or any subsequent action. In an appeal to President Johnson, of 16th October, 1867, which that Executive did not choose to grant, the petitioner (p. 45) proposed to materially add to the recorded testimony of his trial, if afforded the opportunity to do so. This he has done to the same kind and effect, but, as I shall try to show, without changing the status of his case. He has also introduced testimony of those who were unfortunately, at the tune, belligerents, as to the .strength of the force opposed to him," and heralded it as the newly discovered testimony on which he demands a reversal of the judgment of a competent court ; vet in a published reply to a Senator of the United States, dated March, 1870, he said, "All just men will agree that it will not do to use aud laud ; rebel testimony' against me" (him), referring to certain reports, while other evideuce of the same character, but contrary effect, was discarded. This particular testimony as to the strength aud position of the oppos- ing force is, I venture to observe, not newly discovered evidence of the kind that would be entitled to consideration in a court of justice having appellate authority, for the reason that we have got to exclude from con- sideration whal we maj or may not know now, and, going back to 1862. endeavor, it it is at all pertinent, to ascertain what the petitioner himself tueu believed or knew to be the actual force opposed to him, after it Has neen shown what he actually did in connection with the order under which he was acting and his duty in the premises. 1 1"' prospect ol a "repulse" in an attack, made under lawful orders, would he no excuse for failing to make it. Confederate testimony, therefore, as to the strength and position of ueneral Longstreet s command, at any time on the 29th August, 1862, is DU1 secondary evidence, coming in, if at all, merely in corroboration of what should first have been shown to have been the kuowledge or belief of petitioner relative thereto. If, however, he did not kuow and cannot show that he knew the strength and position of the contending force to be what he claims, and made no vigorous efforts to develop and ascertain it (which it is very apparent he did not), testimony from Confederate sources on these points, although given by those for whom we have the highest respect, will be of no pertinency iu determining whether the accused did his duty or not. Abstract of charges on which tried. The petitioner was convicted of two charges, viz. disobedience of orders, under the old 9th Article of War, and violation of the old 52d Article of War, involving separate transactions on two different days, viz, on the 27th August and 2Uth August, 1S62. Under the first charge of disobedience of orders there were three specifications of which he was fouud guilty, which, stripped of all verbi- age, were briefly and substantially these, viz : FIRST SPECIFICATION (FIRST CHARGE). That he received at Warreutou Junction, Va., in the evening of 27th August, 1862, an order from General Pope, dated at C.30 p. m., from Bristoe Station, announcing a severe fight therebetween Hooker's divi- sion (of Heintzelmau's corps) and the enemy (Jackson's forces, Ewelfs division), and directing him to start at one o'clock at night, and come for- toard with his ichole corps, or such part of it as was with him, so as to be at Bristoe Station at daylight the next morning, as it was necessary on all accounts that he should be there by daylight. That if Morell's division (of accused's own corps) had not joined him (accused) yet at Warreutou, to send word to him to push forward immediately, and to send word to General Banks to hurry forward with his (Banks' corps) at all speed to take accused's place at Warreutou. Further, that he, General Pope, sent an officer with this dispatch to conduct him to the place (Bristoe). SECOND SPECIFICATION (FIRST CHARGE). That the accused, being in front of the euemy at Manassas, Va., on the morning of the 29th August, 1S62, received from General Pope a joint order addressed to Generals McDowell and Porter to move forward with their joint commauds toward Gainesville, the accused having received written orders to the same effect an hour and a half before (see both orders hereafter set forth), and commuuicaticn to be established between the two wings of the army. THIRD SPECIFICATION (FIRST CHARGE). That the accused, beiug in front of the euemy during the battle of Manassas on Friday the 29th August, 1S62, did receive the lollowiug lawful order: HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, August SJ9— 4.3U i». in. Major-General Porter: Your Hue of march brings you iu on the enemy's right ank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy s flank. and rear, so as to keep you in close couiuiimicatiou with the right win*. ^ ^ Major-General Commanding. Which he did disobey, and fail to push forward his forces into action 8 either ou the enemy's flank or rear, and did in all other respects fail to obey said order. Under the charge of violation of the 52d Article of War, were three specifications of which accused was convicted, viz : FIRST SPECIFICATION (SECOND CHARGE). That daring the battle of Manassas, on Friday, 29th August, 1862, while within sight <>t' the field, and in full hearing of its artillery, accused received from' Major-General Pope the 4.30 order (see above Spec. No. 3), which he did then and there shamefully disobey without any attempt to' engage the enemy or aid the troops, who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying ou the flank attack to secure a de- cisive victory and to capture the enemy's army; a result which must have followed from said flank attack, had it been made in compliance with the order which accused so shamefully disobeyed. SECOND SPECIFICATION (SECOND CHARGE). That the accused, being with his army corps, on Friday, 20th August, L862, between Manassas Station and the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within sound of its guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence was being fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on the held, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without know- ing the forces from which he shamefully retreated. THIRD SPECIFICATION (SECOND CHARGE). That the accused, being with his army corps near the field of battle of Manassas, on the 20th August, 1S02, while a severe action was being ton-lit by the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and being in the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the held, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and geueral, and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his army, and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army; and did fail, by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. CONDUCT OF PETITIONER JUST PRIOR TO FIRST SPECIFICATION (FIRST CHARGE). [See his opening statement, pp. 1-20 inclusive.] Before proceeding to the consideration of the charges and specifica- tions, seriatim, permit me to make brief allusion to the condition of affairs as thej stood just prior to the first act charged, and what the petitioner then did, as it will, I think, aid the Board in understanding some of the material points in the government case in rebuttal. Kail.\ in duly, L862, the gallant Army of the Potomac found itself, after a series of battles, finally at Harrison's Landing, on the James River. Dhe campaign against Richmond had failed, why or wherefore it is not necessary to discuss; but on August 3d, an order was issued from Washington lor that army to move from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek, for a new campaign. The petitioner, in his opening statement, pages 5-13, to which I invite your atteutiou, admits that he was informed by the then com- manding general of the Army of the Potomac, that the new campaign was to be couductecl by hiin. That commander ranked Major General Pope. He, the commanding general. Army of the Potomac, remonstrated against the order of withdrawal. What the military grounds were 1 do not sufficiently know. 1 assume they were good, but thev did not pre- vail, and on the 4th of August the orders were repeated* for the with- drawal, for reasons which, no doubt, were deemed satisfactory by the proper superior authority. The petitioner in his statement (p. 7), ad- mits that he was personally opposed to the withdrawal Horn the Peninsula. On the 9th of August, the general in-chief ordered the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac to "send reinforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory, you must move with all possible despatch." Again on the loth, from the same source came the notice : The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements. The petitioner would have it appear in his statement that his own movements from the Peninsula were made by him in the most energetic manner, solely from his own voluntary desire to aid General Pope; these impelling reasons are therefore suppressed. The rapidity with which he did move, in his march to Fort Monroe, when he finally received his orders on the 14th of August, ami the obstacles he asserts he surmounted, are a sad commentary on his conduct in subsequent instances yet to be noticed, when he received orders from another commander even more urgent. He seems, when he recounts what he did in order to embark by mid- night of the 20th August, quite to have forgotten that he did it not so much for eagerness to join Pope, as he would have us believe, as because he received from his immediate commander at 11 that morning this order, viz : Please push off your troops without one moment's delay. The necessity is very pressing; a matter of life and death. What progress is made and when will you be through i See me before you sail. (P. 2-Vo, G. C. M. Rec.) It should not be forgotten that the case here presented by the peti- tioner is the result of a careful preparation of sixteen years, with the professional advice of some of the best lawyers in the country. He admits having received the legal opinions of such eminent counsel as Win. D. Shipman, Daniel Lord, Charles O'Connor, Sidney Bartlett, Benj. E. Curtis, and J. G. Abbott. To these should be added the late Wm. B. Reed, and the three gentle- men who now so ably assist him. In this •• opening statement "of the petitioner, all the dispatches which he cites up to 26th August, 1SG2, show that he evidently considered General Pope's army as yet a separate command, with which be was merely to co-operate' until his own chief arrived. On the 25th, when be began to get near that army, he began to be troubled with doubts, and in his dispatch to Major-General A. E. Burnside (marked No. 8), says, "Does General McClellan approve.'" And again on same day to Gen- eral Burnside, who was his immediate commander, he asks , No. 10), '■Are mv arrangements satisfactory ?" When', on the 26tb, he found no forces of the enemy in fironl «»t him, below on the Rappahannock, but his own corps in close proximity to General Pope's, he wrote to the latter to know where his command would be most useful. That uight he received his first order from Major-General Pope. He asserts (on page 19) that he "had used extraordinary exertions to 10 join General Pope," but this pretense of zeal fails in the light shed on this transaction by his own witness. General Burnside, when the latter swore on the trial (p. 185, G. C. M., Rec.) that the accused "used no energy or dispatch in joining the command of General Pope, and in his military movements in that direction, beyond those which his duty as an officer required him to use." We now arrive at the point when he has received his first order from ( General Pope, and is told by the latter that he, Pope, "does not see how a general engagement can be postponed more than a day or two" (No. Hi), and orders him to hurry vp one of his divisions as rapidly as possible, and to put the other where he can "easily move to the front." This is not what the petitioner apparently expected. He had uo de- sire or intention to fight the new campaign under any but his old com- mander for reasons which I shall afterwards explain. He shows he is troubled at what he has already done, for he sends a dispatch to Major- General Burnside in which he says: Have just received orders from General Pope * * * I shall move up as ordered. * * * inform McClellau, that I may kno-v I am doing right . What, I submit, had the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac to do with deciding this point if the accused was iu General Pope's command ? On the other hand, if that commander's opinion was asked iu order to ascertain whether he had been rightfully ordered by General Pope, how much could he have considered himself as a subordinate previously? The truth of it is the petitioner, as was testified to by General McClel- lau (on p. 197, G. C. M. Pec), joined General Pope's command because he received orders direct from Major General Halleck, geueral-iu chief, so to do. General McClellan further swore that "when the accused was making his efforts to leave the Peninsula, he did not know that he was to be placed under the immediate command of General Pope." Thus are the petitioner's pleas as to the voluntary character of his efforts brushed away. His argument to the 20th page of his printed opening statement may therefore, 1 submit, be no longer considered. As yet he does not know he is to be under General Pope's immediate and direct orders, whose first communication had been signed by himself instead of his chief of staff", and was couched iu the language rather of request than peremptory mandate, as General Pope began it by requesting him to "phase move forward? He dare not disobey, because, as we have seen, he has the general-in- chiet's direct order from Washington on this subject iu his pocket; still he is not disposed to do anything which may not meet the wishes of the commander of the Potomac Army, as is evidenced by the telegram ask- ing to know of him if he is " doing right." About «.» o'clock the next morning (No, 17) he received an order through General Pope's chief of staff, dated 4 a. m., 27th August, at Warrenton Junction, which changed the direction of approach of his corps from Warrenton, whit her it was going, to the latter place. He was desired to march as rapidly as possible, and informed that he, Porter, with the test of General Pope's army, would probably move the next day to attack the i nemy, This change of tin- direction of the accused's corps from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction appears to have beeu iu consequence of some circumstances stated by himself, which, however, are of no importance in this case. He was now fully apprised that he was expected to fight a battle, not 11 uuder his late chief, who be had expected would have come up to assume command, and under the 62d article of war. directed all the operations. He therefore telegraphed at 4 o'clock p. m. that day to General Burn- side (No. 20) a most disrespectful dispatch, and near its close said 4 ' most of this is private, but if you can get me away, please do so." If the commanding general of the Army of Virginia should be suc- cessful in his expected battle with General Jackson, it was plain that the country would make comparisons. The petitioner presumes to say before this Board (p. 20, Statement) that be at that time thought General Pope was making mistakes from which fatal results would be likely to ensue. Here is a key and partial guide to his subsequent conduct, which, if kept carefully in view, will, I submit, lead to the inevitable conclusion that his conviction was just, according to the evidence adduced, but his sentence merciful. CONDITION OF AFFAIRS PRIOR TO FIRST SPECIFICATION (FIRST CHARGE). Having now arrived at the point where and when the petitioner had come uuder the orders of General Pope, let us turn back a little and see what the condition of affairs was at this juncture. To do so I will have briefly to sketch his campaign to that date. Maj. Gen. John Pope had been called in from the West to take com- mand of the several small independent corps which were covering Wash- ington, known during thiscampaigu as Banks's, McDowell's, ami Sigel's. While considering the movements which he should make under the cir- cumstances, and believing concert or unity of action was indispensable, be asked to be relieved of his difficult duty, which would have possibly placed his army under the commanding general of the Army of the Po- tomac. His request was not complied with. On the 29th of July, 18(32, he left Washington with the design to cover, as far as possible, the front of Washington, and make secure the valley of the "Shenandoah, aud so operate upou the enemy's lines of communi- cation to the west aud northwest as to force him to make heavy detach- ments from his main force at Richmond, aud thus enable the Aim\ of the Potomac, without molestation, to withdraw from its position at liar risou's Landing, aud take transports for Aquia Creek or Alexandria. ■ During these movemeuts the battle of Cedar Creek was fought 0th August. On the 16th he became apprised by an intercepted dispatch thai Gen- eral R. E. Lee, with the main portion of the Confederate army, intended to overwhelm him before the Army of the Potomac could come to Ins assistance. The fate of the country depended ou his ability to hold his ground until re-enforced by that army, for if the capital had fallen it is highly probable the Confederate Government would have been recog- nized bv foreign powers. On the 14th August the Confederate Major Gen. T. J. Jackson had begun his march from Gordonsville. He had obtained permission from General Lee to make one of his characteristieallv bold and decisive moves in advance, and on the knowledge of this fact many subsequent events will become plain. The permission was incautiously given ; soon, I have reason to believe, repented of. Even General Lougstreet hirosell admits having remonstrated when he heard of it. The movements of General Pope's army during these tryiug days are worth studying. m , . , .. . T . .. , Hampered, as he was, bv orders from ^ ashington, he did. I belie\ e, all that a courageous aud able geueral could do: and. as I have hereto- fore, from want of knowledge, eutertaiued contrary opinions as to tne 12 conduct of that campaign, I am happy uow, after studying it, to give him the benefit of this acknowledgment. As late as the 20th, he was ordered by the general-in-chief to hold the line of the Kappabanuock, and on the 2lst " to dispute every inch of ground, aud fight like the devil until we can re-enforce you." Meanwhile Jackson, covered by the Bull Bun Mountain Eange, was marching rapidly to Salem and Thoroughfare Gap, positively outflank- ing Pope, who, confined by his imperative instructions, could do but little. Jackson was now about three days ahead of the maiu body of the Confederate army. General Pope's army had been re-enforced from the Array of the Potomac bv the Array Corps of M y or General Heintzelmin and much ot' Burnside's Xiuth Corps, under Reno, and by the division of Maj. <1 n. John F. Reynolds of Pennsylvania Reserves. O a the 2 Jth August, Jackson m irched from White Plains through Thoroughfare Gap, by Hayinarket and Gainesville, reached Bristoe Station at sunset, and the saraa night sent a detachment to seize .Manassas Junction. ()u the 25th General Pope's headquarters had been at Warrenton, and on the 26th they were at Warrenton Junction. Od the morning of the 27th General Pope, having relinquished his former line of operations, which he had held later than his judgment dictated, under the orders he had, began his movement against Jackson, and on the evening of that day General Hooker's division of Heintzel- raan's corps having moved along the railroad from Warrenton Junction toward Manassas Junction, and meeting Ewell's division of Jackson's forces at Bristoe Station in the afternoon, after a sharp tight drove him out in the direction of Manassas Junction. General Pope made his headquarters with this division. In his rear, at Warrenton Junction, was the petitioner's command, the gallant Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Geueral McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps, and Reynolds' division, were at Gainesville, interposed between Jackson and' Thor- oughfare Cap, while Reno, with his corps and Kearney's division of Beintzelrnau's corps, was at and near Greenwich, within supporting- distance of McDowell. Jackson's main force was concentrated at Ma- nassas Junction — a point, by the way, he would possibly never have reached if the promised re-enforcements had been sent from Alexandria tit hat point. Two courses now remained open for Jackson, seeing that his line of it through Gainesville and Hayinarket to Thoroughfare Gap was ; by McDowell, viz, to retire through Ceutreville, which would carry him still further from the main body of Geueral Lee's army, or to mass his force and assault Hooker at Bristoe Station and turn his right. If this last move should be made, davbreak was the time when it wmihl be most likely to be carried into effect. At this juncture General Hooker reported his ammunition nearlv ex uiusted, and that he had bat about five rounds per man left. FIRST CHARGE, FIRST SPECIFICATION CONSIDERED. Wc now come to the first specification of the first charge, viz, of dis- obedience of orders, on which the petitioner was tried. I'h. it order was as follows : ... _ Headquarters Army of Virginia, Ma J- ,M "- ' • •'■ 1 '" l: " ;: - August 27, 1862, 6.30 p. m.. Bristoe Station. N in i, hi,, i, Junction : , neral com nanding directs that von start at 1 o'clock to- night and come forward with your w iole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as 13 to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has bad a very severe action with flip enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. Tbe enemv has leen driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manas- sad and clear the country between that place aud Gaiuesville, where McDowell is II Morell has not joined you, send him word to push forward immediately also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take v.mr place at Warrenton Junc- tion. It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here bv daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Payetteville, probably in the direction of Bealtou Bay to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad-train to this side of Ced 11 Run. If he is not with you. write him to that effect. By command of General Pope. GEO. D. RUGGLES Colonel and Chief of stuff. P. S.— If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of irfantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you imme- diately upon his doing so. If Bauks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run. and post a regiment aud a section of artillery with it. By command of General Pope. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff. General Pope, in his examination on the original trial, explained to tbe court tbe reasons for tbe urgency of tbe order (p. 12, G. C. M. Record). It appears tbat under this order, instead of arriving at day- ligbt, as directed, tbe petitioner did not arrive until between ten and eleven o'clock in tbe morning at Bristoe Station. I submit tbat it would he quite impossible to put an order in language more imperative than tbe one I bave quoted. Tbat order sbows on its face tbat it was dated in tbe evening; it contemplated tbe possibility tbat Morell's division bad not yet reacbed Warrenton Junction. As a matter of fact, we know tbat it did not all arrive there until about sunset (p. 143, G. C. M. Record). Tbat the petitioner should be informed of the state of affairs, the order quite minutely placed before bim the circumstances as they were then seen by the commanding general. The order positively and peremptorily directed that he should leave Warrenton Junction ;it one o'clock in the morning; no discretion was allowed ; and the command- ing general, in order that there should be no mistake as to the execution of this order, sent an officer of his staff to conduct the accused to IWis- toe, although tbe road appears to have been straight and plain. As a reason why be should start at one o'clock at night, tbis strong language is used : It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here by daylight. There is no question tbat the order was a lawful order. The peti- tioner has at various times made excuse why he did not obey it, that his command was tired and worn out with marching : that the night was dark; that tbe road was blocked with wagons. All this subject was thoroughly and fully investigated on the original trial. There has not been a particle of "newly-discovered evidence" produced on tbis hearing under tbis specification. The petitionei in his opening statement (p. 22) says that at tbe tunc tins order was received, which he has undertaken to put at ten o'clock at night, but which Captain DeKay, of General Pope's staff (the officer who car- ried the dispatch), said was between nine and half past nine p. m. (p. 43, G. C. M. Record), bis command were busily engaged in securing ra- tions and preparing their supper. P>y this statement the petitioner would have us believe that all his command had arrived thereat or after dark. If the men were then getting their supper at tbe hour be fixed, at ten o'clock, thev could not have arrived there much before nine. It is needless to say that all the evidence on tbe original trial was eon- 14 trary to this statement. A few men, stragglers of Morell's division, may have been getting their suppers at the time the petitioner states ; but Morell himself, whom I have just quoted, swore that his command got in there near sunset; and as to General SyTces* command, that division had been in camp at Warrenton Junction from not later than half past ten in the morning. They were consequently fresh, and would, at the time wheu the order required them to move, have been over thirteen hours in camp. It must be remembered that the order to move at one o'clock had reference to the movement of this very division of regulars of General Sykes. Now what did the petitioner do when he got this order ? Did he direct his assistant adjutant-general to issue immediate orders for a strict com- pliance ? Did he personally exhibit that energy which he exhibited at Fort Monroe under the urgent orders of his then commander? On tbe contrary, he seems immediately to have taken counsel not so much how he could obey the order, but how he could avoid it. Without his presence an engagement was not possible. If the commanding general intended to attack, every hour's delay made the prospect of a change of commanders, in the light he then had, more probable. He says, "lite- ral execution was physically impossible"; and that the order authorized him to exercise his judgment. On the contrary, I say that literal execu- tion was not impossible, and I propose to introduce evidence tending to substantiate this allegation. There is not a word in the whole order which shows that he was left to the exercise of any discretion whatever as to the end to be obtained, namely, "on all accounts to be in Bristoe at daylight." Fortunately for the country, the occasion for his presence at daylight on the morning of the 28th at Bristoe had at that time passed away ; but of that the petitioner was ignorant. Jackson, taking the alternative which I have heretofore mentioned, made a night march on Oentreville with all his forces, and this despite the darkness which the petitioner declares was so intense. If he could move his corps that night over roads as rough, if not rougher than the one over which the petitioner was directed to move, certainly the petitioner could have marched his men, if uo other element came into consideration, a distance of nine miles. Jackson's troops were not the only troops that moved that night, as I shall show that McDowell's and Reno's corps and other parts of our army made night marches that same uight, despite the alleged impenetrable darkness. Whether General Pope knew or did not know at the time that Hooker was out of ammu- nition, or nearly so, is not a question which at all affects the petitioner's case. As commander of that army, General Pope was not bound to give any reasons to a subordinate why he required him to perform a lawful order. It was more than sufficient, and was not necessary, under the rules governing the military service in such cases, that he should even have said to the petitioner that it was necessary "on all accounts" that lie should do a certain thing. The petitioner says now as he did wheu tried, that the roads were blocked with wagon-trains belonging to the sev- eral corps. Let us look into this matter a little. Lieutenant Colonel Myer (p. 108, G. 0. M. Record), chief quartermaster in charge of those trains, swore that he put his trains all in park by order of General Pope on that Dight, because General Hooker was in action ; and that the road was in excellent condition. When Captain DeKay arrived at head- hunt- rs of the petitioner, he told him that he had passed the last wagon a little beyond Catlett's Station going to Warrenton Juuctiou ; and that the road was in good condition, though there were wagons on the road. As Porter was ordered to move at one o'clock at uight, the Board will see that he was ordered to move at the very time when all the wagons 15 would be in park. If, as the petitioner says, or if he assumes to assert that the wagons were moving all night, then men could have moved! But in point of fact they were mostly in park ; possibly there were some on the road. The terms of the order were such that he was left no discre- tion iu setting about a literal compliance. Had he arrived the next morning iu Bristoe Station, with but ten men, after making due efforts to keep well closed up, and all reasonable exertions, he would not have been held responsible. Now did he obey the order? Did he loyally and energetically, the moment it was received, proceed to carry it out ? Did he send out a detachment of meu first to stop any wagons that might be coming along through Warreuton Junction 1 on that road ? And, second, to proceed along the road and compel all the wagons that might be found in it to withdraw into the fields aud go into park if they were not already there ? It must be borne iu mind that under his own showing as to the time of the receipt of the order, he had fully three hours in which to accomplish this before a regiment should start at all on the march. Did he do it ? It is almost needless to say that he did not. < >n the contrary, as was stated by Captain DeKay, when he read the dispatch he handed it to one of his generals, saying as he did so, "Gentlemen, there is something for you to sleep upon" (p. 43, G. 0. M. Record). That expression has been uncontradicted. General Sykes testified for the accused (p. 176, G. C. M. Kecord) that he moved out from camp as soou as he could distinguish the road, his division leading ; and that two miles from camp he ran upon a train of wagons. On page ITS, he says that he was not made acquainted with the urgent language of the order stating that by all means General Porter must be at Bristoe Sta- tion by daylight the next morning, and that he was satisfied that if the urgency had been made known to him, they would have moved at the hour prescribed. He subsequently undertook to qualify his testimony, but the qualification has not made it less significant. It was under- taken to be shown in the testimony of another witness for the accused. Brigadier-General Butterfield (p. LSo, G. C. M. Record), that the ac- cused stated rather decidedly, "There was the order; it must be obeyed ; that those who gave the order knew whether the necessities of the case would warrant the exertion that had to be made to comply with it." The whole allegation of disobedience of orders in this specifi- cation finds the true principle of obedience enunciated by Porter at the time. He canuot plead, therefore, that he did not know what the responsibilities were that attached to him when he undertook to vary from it, and instead of being at Bristoe at daylight not to leave his camp until daylight. Those were perilous and critical times lor the government, requiring great and unusual exertions on the part of thai army. So necessary did the commanding general seem to think it was that the Fifth Corp3 should be speedily at Bristoe, that, as was shown ou the original trial, he sent messengers to Porter while the latter was ou the march, in order to hasten his arrival. Now, what were the exertions which Porter made after he got the order, and between nine aud ten o'clock at night to move promptly at one? It would seem that he stepped out from the light of his tent to look around, aud concluded it was dark, and then send an aid or two to do the same thing. When Lieut. Col. Joseph P. Brinton, of the Second Pennsylvania Cavalry, went (p. 'A>5, G. C. M. Record) at 10 o'clock at night from Catlett's Station to Warrentou Junction on this v. ry road thai Porter was to march over, and saw Porter himself at midnight, Porter asked him if he would not send out some meu when he got back to have the road cleared. He, says that he sent out some men to get the wagons 16 out of the way, bat don't know the result. This it will be observe! «- ao afte, rnnlnight Already had the accused in his possesst^ th border upwards o two hours when he made this request of an accidental v^tor Lieutenant BrooKs of the Sixth Wisconsin (n 114 G 'm p ! h traveled that same road between the hours of i^en and n^ne p! ^2 Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, and found the road good- and on H cross-examination by the accused said (p. 115, G. CM Record^ t ha? tlu-re were wagons upon it, while he was passing over it fmn \v^ renton Junction to Bristoe Station, but they were* goTng nto part at cu ed^n &Wm* eW ' ™T y ° f ^-^nce, ca^/b" the accused (p. 1J, G. C. M. Kecord), said that the wagons stretched alon^ for three or tour miles; he found them on the way from Warren ton Junction to Bristoe, between Warrenton and Kettle E^- That there was a jam between Warrenton Junctiou and Kettle S ST™ questioned by the court, he stated the case aa foUows: ' Examination by the Court naS «M^Co%a t B^r d ' anSWeied ° n Cr ° SS eXami * hi&t" SoCvhTch^?:^ " ° SIT* G ^ ral /^ ter ' » fter ^ ««e ipt of the road entirely of wagon bToneor two ollt^ ? e - a l th ° f A "^ 1 ^, have cleared not Lave been much impeded ' two o clock that night, so that his march would *£ IE seS^advVncTo S ^sTjj^t^ the ^ ht - bad a suffici -t the time I passed over it extended on it SJ J Wi ^t ,° h ° Se ob 8truction 8 , which at road it was between 2 and 3 o?cloek n? *£ 1U ' les ' I S 1 . nk ' Wheu * P a ^ed over the previous to that time I am unable to «4 "^ Wh,lt the obstru °tions had been £-°™^ ft* »^t and the state of been taken. L & T * Steps " hlub X hii ™ previously stated ought to have JJ.. Were or were not the first three or four miles of the road from Warrenton unob- A. I hey were, as I passed over them O^^^^^^^^^^ ^en aide-de-camps, Lieut. Station-tbi 8 • ! yToad- " IfH 11 ? a,TeUt ? 1J J ™*» toCatlett's sunset, (p. !•_•,;, <;' c M IV •> n , £ f0I ? er 1)lace L:,lt '»» "our before others nVuvu.u ; d.i, «;/ ; u u :! , i, !ln,, /T lm s °r wa ^ ons st °pp ed *»* coming awar! of the order who "V> ^1 ^ though "^oubtedJy be- •eport as to the wagons i HPhJir ° rte I bad ^ived, he made no wioh . * h ere nnder| r e''iou7oiders P?,^ red t0 find a road t0 Green- dia ""' consider it of sufficient ?™ orter?s corps was destined; yet he ons being on the ,„;!," f' 00 to alIude to tbe fa<* of wag- whe » he must daylight, taking aS h ,, , I ed fl f ht 'X th . e side of the ™ad after ""'- beyond Warrenton , ' 7 ,? f ° rth ' k^ 11 *' a8 is ^en, several "ton, d< gan to pull out into the road, and move in 17 the same direction as Porter's troops. Of course, when his advance catne up with them he found the road quite full. Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, another witness for the accused, swore that Porter had a report of the condition of the road from Warrenton Junctiou to Br is toe at about 8 p. m. (p. 139, G. 0. M. Record). It has been testided to by Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, his assistant adjutant-general, whom be called, that Porter made great personal exertions to clear the way after day- light, aud that his staff assisted, and that at Catlett's Station "he got a detachment of the First Maine Pegimeut assigned to him. (p. 131. G C. M. P.cord.) This witness stated what was undoubtedly the more prudent course, in answer to the following question by the court: Question. Upon a report of bad roads, would it be a reason for commencing the march before or alter the time fixed iu the order, if the time ought to be varied from at all 1 Auswer. If the time were to be varied from, it would be better to have it prior to the time fixed than after. The fact that when Porter got to Bristoe Station the occasion for his presence had passed, had nothing to do with it. One of the statement." of the petitioner in this matter (page 23 of the statement) is, I am inclined to think, not substantiated. I refer to that which is collateral, entirely to the question of his obedience or his disobedience, where he says that General Pope did not know for an hour after sendiug him the order that Hooker was out of ammunition. Not only did General Pope swear that he did know it (p. 12, G. C. M. Record), but General Heintzel- man, Hooker's corps commander, also has sworn (p. SO, G. C. M. Rec- ord) that he himself made known that fact to General Pope late in the afternoon of August 27th, so that General Pope had that information both from General Hooker and General Heiutzelman. As the peti- tioner has undoubtedly prepared his statement with the greatest care, he cannot plead inadvertence when he makes such a statement as this. I now leave this specification, which is the only one as to the events of the 27th August, submitting that even on the evidence as it stands to-day the petitioner was properly convicted of a disobedience of orders, which, if Jackson had not taken the alternative course which he did take, might have resulted in disaster to the cause of the Union. His excuses seem to be very well answered by the rule laid down by General Washington in general orders which he published on the 10th of Octo- ber, 1777, from Army headquarters at Toamensing. Said he : It is not for every officer to know the principles upon which every order is issued, and to judge howthey may or may not be dispensed with or suspended, but their duty to carry them into execution with the utmost punctuality and exactness. They are to consider that military movements are like the working of a clock, and they will go quickly, regularly, anil easily if every officer does his duty ; but without it he as easily disordered, because neglect from anyone, like the stopping of a wheel, disorders the whole. The General, therefore, expects that every officer will duh consider the im- portance of the observation, their own reputation, and the duty they owe to their •ountry. He claims it of them and earnestly calls upon them to do it. FIRST CHARGE— SECOND SPECIFICATION. We now come to the second specification under the fust charge ol lisobedience of orders. That specification was based upon the follow- ing order: [General Order No. 5.] Headquarters, Army of Virginia, Uentreviile, Aure received. petitioner's statements at different times considered. Since his defense before his court in 1802, General Porter has made several statements of his case: 1st. Under oath before the court of inquiry, instituted on the applica- tion of General McDowell in January, 18G3. I'd. In June, 1869, ou " an appeal to the President of the United States for a re-examination of the proceedings of the general court-martial in his case." 3d. In March, 1870, in replv to Hon. Z. Chandler's speech in the U. S. Senate, Feb. 21, 1870. ■1th. In his statement made before this Board at West Point last June. These only will be referred to for the opiuions of General Porter. The account given by General Porter, in these several statements, of what passed between himself and General McDowell at the first meet- ing at .Manassas, states what General McDowell said to him, but says Httle or nothing of what he said to General McDowell; and the tone and character of what he alleges General McDowell said, and some of •lir statements he ^ives as having been made by him, are not at all ad- mitted as correct ; but whether they are so or not, the main facts which have any beating on the question are not affected, namely, that their commands were together, not by any design of either of them, or by 21 thatoftbeir common superior; and tbat these commands pursued the same road under the orders given by that superior. Tbe statements of Geueral McDowell aud General Porter as to what was said at their second meeting that day at the head of General Tor- ter's corps, and during- their ride to the right, and when General Mc- Dowell left him, are wholly irreconcilable. MAJOR GENERAL M'DOWELL's EVIDENCE. General McDowell's statement, as taken from his testimony before General Porter's court, is as follows: Question. Will you state fully what occurred in that conference? [The one above referred to.] Answer. On passing the head of General Porter's column, which was on the road I have before mentioned, General Porter was in advance of tbe head of his column— I tbink on a slight eminence, some of bis staff near him. I rode up to him, and saw- that he had the same order as myself— the joint order. Soon after my attention was directed to some skirmishing — I think some dropping shots in front of" us. The coun- try, in front of tbe position where General Porter was when I joined him, was open for several hundred yards, and was. as I supposed, by seeing the dust coming up above the trees, [near] the Warrenton turnpike, which was covered from view by woods. How deep those woods were I do not know. It did not seem at that time to be a great distance to that road — the Warrenton turnpike. I bad an impression at the time that these skirmishers were engaged with some of the enemy near that road. "I rode with General Porter from the position he occupied eastward to the right. That is, the column being somewhat west of north, and I going east, made an angle with the line of troops on the road. The joint order of General Pope was discussed between us; the point to be held in view, of not going so far tbat we should not 1"' able to get beyond Bull Run tbat night : that was one poiut. The road being blocked with General Porter's troops from where tbe head of his column was back to Bethlehem Church; the sound of battle, which seemed to be at its height on our [thr-] road to Groveton ; tbe note of General Buford indicating the force tbat had passed through Gaiuesville, and, as be said, was moving towards Groveton, where the battle was go- ing on, tbe dust ascending above the trees seeming to indicate that force to be not a great distance from the head of General Porter's column. I am speaking now of tbat force ot tbe enemy referred to by Geueral Buford as passing down tbe Warrenton turn- pike towards Groveton, I understand this note of General Buford to refer to a loir.' of the enemy. The question with me was how, soonest, within the limit fixed by General Pope, this force of ours could be applied against the enemy. General Porter mail.' a remark to me which showed me that he bad no question but that the enemy was in bis imme- diate front. I said to him: " Yon put your force in here, and 1 will take mine up to tkt Sttdley Springs road, on the left of the troops engaged at that point with thr enemy," or words to that effect. I left General Porter with the belief aud understanding that be would put his force in at that point. petitioner's testimony before general m'dowell's COUKT OF INQUIRY. ******* Question by Court. What order did General McDowell give, or what auth >rity did he exercise over you, and in virtue of whose order ? State fully and particularly. Answer. General McDowell exercised authority over me in obedience to an order of General Pope's addressed jointly to General McDowell and me and which I presume is in possession of the court. I 'have no copy of it. Oiir commands being united he necessarily came into the commaud under the Articles of War. ******* * * * General McDowell on arriving showed me the joint order a ropy of which I acknowledged having in my possession. An expression of opinion then giv. n by him to the effect that that was no place to fight a battle and that I was boo far out, which, taken iu connection with the conversation, I considered an order and stopped futher progress towards Gainesville for a short time. General McDowell and I went to the right, which was rather to the north, with the view of seeing the character ol the country, and with the idea of connecting, as tbat joint order required, with the troops on my right. But very few words passed between us, and I suggested, from the charac- ter of the country, that he should take King's division with him aud form connection on the right of the timber, which was then on the left of Reynolds or presumed to be 22 Reynolds. He loft me suddenly, not replying to a call from me to the effect, " What should I do ?" and with no understanding on my part how I should be governed, I im- mediately returned to my command. On the way back, seeing the enemy gathering in my front, I sent au officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, my chief of staff, to King's division, directing it to remain where it was for the present, and commenced moving my command toward Gainesville and one division to the right, or north of the road. I received an answer from General McDowell to remain where I was ; he was going to the right and would take King with him. He did go, taking King's division, as I pre- sumed, to take position on the left of Reynolds. I remained where I was. When Gen- eral McDowell left me I did not know where he had gone. No troops were in sight, and I knew of the position of Reynolds and Sigel, who were on our right, merely by the sound of Sigel's cannon, and from information that day that Reynolds was in the vicinity of Groveton. The head of my corps was on the first stream after leaving Ma- nassas Junction on the road to Gainesville, one division in the line of battle, or the most of it. Question. Did you consider the expression of General McDowell, as stated by you, that you were too far to the front, and that this was no place to fight a battle, in the light of an order not to advance, but; to resume your original position? Answer. I did when King's division was taken from me, and as countermanding the first order of General Pope, under the authority giveu him by that joint order. # * * # * * * Question by Court. State, as far as you know, what followed, so far as the move- ments of General McDowell's troops and your own were concerned, and what orders you subsequently received from General McDowell. Answer. General McDowell took King off to the right. I knew nothing further of his movements. I remained where I was until three o'clock nest morning. A portion of the command left at daybreak. I received no orders whatever from General Mc- Dowell. # * * # * # * Question by General McDowell. What did you understand to be the effect of Gen- eral McDowell's conversation ? Was it that you were to go no further in the direction of Gainesville than you then were .' Answer. The conversation was in connection with moving over to the right, which necessarily would prevent an advance. # * # # * # # Question by General McDowell. Witness speaks of the effect of General McDowell's message (as Drought by Colonel Locke) to have beeu 10 cause htm Co remain in posi- tion at til* place where General McDowell first saw him. How long did witness' troops continue in this position ". Answer. A portion of the command remained there till daybreak the following morning, and some till after daybreak. The most of Morell's division was on or near that ground all day. Question by General McDowell. Did witness conceive himself prohibited from march- ing or attempting to make any movement to the front, or to the right, or to the front and right .' Answer. By that direction or order taken in connection with the joint order I con- sidered myself checkfd in advancing, especially taken in connection with the removal of King's division. I did not consider that I could move to the right, and I considered that General McDowell took King's division to form a connection on the right or to go to the right and form such a connection as was possible. I add further that I con- sidered it impracticable to go to the right. Question by General McDowell. Did witness attempt to make any movement in either oi the directions above named ? Answer. Not directlv to the right. I did to the right and front, and when I re- ceived the last message from General McDowell to remain where I was 1 recalled it. Question bj General McDowell. Did you make no attempt to go to the frout or to the righl and front after that message? Answer. I made no attempt with any body of troops. I sent messengers through there to go to General Pope and to get information from the troops on the right. Question by General McDowell. Alter General McDowell left the wituess, did the witness not know he was expected by General McDowell to move to the right or to the righl and limit ! Answer. 1 did not. Question by General McDowell. Witness speaks of having reported to General Tope. When did witness conceive himself as no longer under General McDowell ? Answer. M.\ messages were addressed to General McDowell, I think, all of them. The messengers were directed to deliver them to General Pope if they saw or met him. 1 considered myself as limited in my operations under General McDowell's orders until 1 should receive directions from General Pope. 23 Question by General McDowell. How long was witness and General McDowell to- gether before they moved to the right with a view of seeing the character of the country ? Answer. I do not think that we were together more than four or five minutes ; though I have no distinct recollection. Question by General McDowell. How long were they together after moving to the right ? Answer. It may have been ten or twelve minutes, perhaps longer. Question by General McDowell. Witness refers to some conversation between him- self and General McDowell wheu they first met, which taken in connection with an expression of opinion by General McDowell, witness considered an order. Can the witness state what that conversation was? Answer. I only recollect the impression left upon my mind at the time, aud merely a reference to the artillery contest going on far to our right. Question by General McDowell. Was not the joint order referred to in that conver- sation ? Answer. I have no recollection of it. It may have been referred to because we went to the right, my belief is, to look at the country ; but I do not recollect anything at all of the order being referred to. Question by General McDowell. Were not the remarks witness here states to have been made by General McDowell made with reference to the point iu the joint order which required the troops not to go to a point from which they could not get behind Bull Run that night? Answer. I think I have replied to the question by stating I do not recollect. Question by General McDowell. Does not the witness recollect asking General McDowell if he knew of any roads leading to the right or right and front of the head of witness' column ? Answer. 1 do not. Early in the day General McDowell loaned me a map aud may have given more explanation with it. This is all the information I recollect of receiv- ing, or having in my possession, of the country. Question by General McDowell. Does not the witness recollect of being made ac- quainted by General McDowell, with information received by him from General Bu- ford, as to the force of the enemy which had passed through Gainesville? Answer. I do. Question by General McDowell. When the witness and General McDowell moved to the right, " with a view of seeing the character of the couutry," what were the few words which witness states passed between them ? Answer. I have given some of the words already; that was, my suggestion to take King's division to the right. I have no recollection of any conversation or any words being used by me or him, except when reaching the railroad, remarking that the rail- road was an obstacle — we having some little difficulty in gettiug over it with our horses. Question by General McDowell. Does the witness recollect nothing of what was said by General McDowell on that occasion, and of his telling the witness to take his t mops across to the Warrenton road, and of General McDowell's intention to go back to take his troops up the Sudley Springs road? Answer. To the best of my recollection nothing of the kind was conveyed to my mind. From the foregoing extracts it will be seen that petitioner then claimed : 1. That General McDowell exercised authority over him in obedience to an order of General Pope's addressed jointly to General McDowell and himself; and further, that " our commands being united, he neces- sarily came into the command under the Articles of War." 2. That he considered himself limited in his operations under Gen- eral McDowell's orders until he should receive directions from General Tope. 3. That General McDowell gave him no orders to take his troops over to the Warrenton road— none to move to the front or right, or the right aud front— but that he was checked by General McDowell in his inten- tion to advance. 4. He, therefore, claims to have been reduced to a state Ot inaction, so far as any order, direction, or instruction of General McDowell was concerned; and that this condition of enforced inaction continued till he snould receive directions from General 1'ope. 24 petitioner's REPLY TO HON. z. chandler's speech. In this he said : I have asserted, and ever shall assert, that General McDowell's order to me was to remain where I then was, while he would place King's division on my right and form the connection enjoined in the joint order." He further says in that reply ; * * * An immediate examination by us of the country towards Groveton showed the impracticability of doing direothj what he desired, " placing King on my right and thus forming connection with the troops near Groveton ;" and Gen- eral McDowell left me without further instructions, but with the understanding that he would, by going around behind the woods separating us from Groveton, take King and Ricketts with him to join his command (Reynolds and Sigel), then at Groveton. As General McDowell's order to me at that time alone prevented an immediate en- gagement of my troops, and resulted in prolonging the " inaction" which you condemn in me, I deem it proper to state these facts fully. * I have shown that my "inaction "up to the afternoon of the 29 th was in strict obedience to orders. I now meet your charge of inaction up to a later hour in that day. After General McDowell left me (early afternoon 29th), and up to the time of Gen- eral Pope's positive order of 4.30 p. m. (29th), reaching me 6.30 p. m., I was certainly as free to exercise my "discretion" under Pope's "joint order" as McDowell was. Under the "joint order" he elected to divide our forces and march to another field where it seems he arrived too late for his troops to be successfully used. Under ir I elected to hold my position, neutralize double my force, and, in the enemy's opinion. saved by my action both Pope and McDowell from capture or total rout. * * He further adds : To show that my views are in no wise changed, and that I now raise no new issue, I quote from my defense before the court : it is well that this alleged order, " put your troops in there," to me by General McDowell, does not so appear changed as specified, for now I will demonstrate that he did not then give me, and cannot believed to have given me, any such order. * * * It would have been proclaimed forthwith at the headquarters of General Pope; it would have been blazoned among the charges and specifications, side by side with the order itself, and. if true, it ought to have made the words of exculpation which General Pope uttered to me at Fairfax Court-House on the 2d September, four days afterwards, choke him as he spoke. But it is not true that Geueral McDowell then, or at any time iu that day. gave me any such orders, "to put my troops in there," or to do anything of the kind : ami fortunate is it for General McDowell that it is not true, for if he had given me any such mandate to thrust my corps in one, that broken ground between Jackson's right and the separate enemy massing in my front, the danger and disaster of such a move- ment would have been then and now upon his bauds. I am glad that I can say that General McDowell is utterly in error upon this point, and is no way chargeable with such military blander. This narrative covers the period of time between noon of the 29th aud the hour of Pope's order of 4.30 p. in. * * * * In the petitioner's appeal to the President in 1SG9 he undertook to answer a statement which had been made to the express effect that he " did not even try to pass over the ground between him and the enemy OD the 29th Augustj which he claimed as impassable, and also occupied by the right wing of the enemy." Said he: I Bhall show that the movement to pass over that ground was thwarted by General McDowell 8 orders to me, and fortunately it was so. And also : Thai even an effort to communicate by messengers failed from the nature of the countrj and the occupation of it by the enemy. 25 These statements of petitioner, it will be perceived, are diametrically opposed to each other, for in one he' says substantially that after McDow- ell left him and up to receipt of the 4.30 p. m. order he was certainly as free to exercise his discretion under Pope's joint order as McDowell was, and that he did do so; in the other he says that a movement to the right was thwarted by General McDowell's orders ; and yet it appears he felt it incumbent on him during that day to report to McDowell that he had undertaken to do the very thing he says McDowell thwarted. (See dispatches Nos. 28 and 29, in petitioner's opening statement.) petitioner's statement before this board. Again, before this board, he has said (p. 31 statement) : The three objects to be accomplished under the joint order were : 1. To remove to- wards Gainesville. 2. To establish communication with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno. 3. When this communication was established to halt. But the troops should occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run by night or the next morning. There was nothing in this order that contemplated a battle. On the contrary, the command being to halt when communications were established, implied the contrary. The joint order had been fulfilled as far as it could be complied with, when Gen- eral McDowell rendered it impossible to move any farther towards Gainesville with our joint forces by taking King's divisiou with him. After he left me, I was not only authorized but bound to exercise the discretion authorized in the joint order, holding in view " that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run tonight or by morning." The corps had already marched ten miles, and was then about eight miles from Bull Run. ******* While returning to my command, I saw the enemy's infantry coming to the rail- road, and artillery moving to a slight elevation north of it. Impressed as I was with the strength of the force in my front, I yet determined to make the effort to move towards Gainesville if it was at all feasible to do so. Believing that then, if ever, before the enemy formed in too great strength so close to us, was the time to strike with our united forces, I determined, General McDowell having left ru*, to take the responsibility, and directing Morell to continue the deploy- ment for an advance, sent my chief of staff, Colonel Locke, to instruct King not I away. Sykes was coming up as rapidly as MorelFs deployment permitted. Colonel Locke soon returned and gave me the following message from General Mc- Dowell, whom be had found with King's division : " Give my compliments to General Porter, and say I am going to the right, and shall take King with me. lie had better remain where he is, but, if necessary to fall back, he can do so on my left." (Record, p. 135.) , .. This message decided my course. Not that I regarded it as an order obligatory upon me— for i wa8 now independent of General McDowell— but, in face oi what we had the best reason to believe was a largely superior force to mine, General McDowell moving away with King's force beyond all possible assistance tome, left me no alternative hut to conform to the course he had adopted, because I was too weak to make an effective attack. RELATIONS OF THE PETITIONER TO M'DOWELL AS TO COMMAND ON THE 29TH AUGUST. Before taking up the main question, it will be of interest to note pe- titioner's several statements touching the relations as to commaud, and as to his responsibility, in connection with General McDowell. It will be seen that in his first statement, made before the court ol inquiry within a few weeks after the occurrences in question, being asked : When did he conceive himself no longer under General McDowell ' 26 Said My messages were addressed to General McDowell, I think all of them. The mes- sengers were directed to deliver them to General Pope, if they saw or met him. I con- sidered myself as limited in my operations under General McDowell's orders until I should receive directions from General Pope. Seven years after, in bis appeal to the President, he speaks of having recalled Morell's division to its former position under McDowell's " re- iterated order" — an order he claims to have received after MvDoivell had left him. A year later, his view of his relations to General McDowell were that — After General McDowell left me (early afternoon, 29th), and up to the time of Gen- eral Pope's positive order of 4.30 p. m. (29th), reaching me 6.30 p. m., I was certainly as free to exercise my "discretion" under Pope's "joint order" as McDowell was. UDder the "joint order " he elected to divide our forces and march to another field. Under it I elected to hold my position. (Yet, with strange inconsistency, he speaks of receiving a message from McDowell, after the latter had left him, as one not to be disre- garded, and which he claims to have obeyed.) And (after the lapse of another eight years) in his late statement before this Board, he states, in reference to the message he says he received, that McDowell was going to the right with King: This message decided my course. Not that I regarded it as an order obligatory on me for I was now independent of General McDowell. So it appears that in 1862-G3, he prefers that it should be held that the acts and omissions of the 29th were due to McDowell's orders to him. But in 1870 and 1878, having in the mean time seen that this posi- tion was not tenable — not tenable from the fact that it had been shown he had, during the day, given abundant proof he did not feel himself forced to a state of inaction — he shifts his ground. He no longer claims that it was General McDowell's orders to him, for after McDowell left him he had been free to act — was independent of him. He now holds that it was McDowell's act in taking King to the right which restrained him. This act having prevented his doing what he claimed he desired to do — engage the enemy iu the direction of Gainesville ; or do, even had the ground permitted it, as McDowell claims he had directed him to do, engage the enemy in the direction of Grovetou, viz, to the right and front of that place. But this very act, which petitioner alleges as the cause of paralysis on his part, and which he and his defenders have condemned as unwise, is one he states in 18fJ2-'63 to have been done at his own suggestion. It will be seen from his testimony before the court of inquiry that, in recounting what passed between McDowell and himself, after the second meeting at the head of his column, petitioner testified as follows : I reneral McDowell and I went to the right, which was rather to the north, with the % !rw ni seeing the character of the country, aud with the idea of connecting, as that joint order required, with the troops on my right. But very few words passed between us. and 7 suggested, from the character of the country, that lie should take King's division with him and form connection on the right of the timber, which was then on the lelt oi Reynolds, or presumed to be Reynolds. And iii his reply to Hon. Zachariah Chandler, he says: And General McDowell left me without farther instructions, but with the understanding that he would, by going around behind the woods separating us from Grovetou, take King and Ricketts with him tojoiu his command (Reynolds aud Sigel) at Groveton. 27 In couuection with this march of King's division, and in view of peti- tioner's claim, that while McDowell was with him he was subject to his orders, and after he left him he was independent of him, it is unaccount- able that— after McDowell had left him with, as petitioner says, the understanding that he was to take King and Eicketts around behind the woods to join the troops at Groveton — Porter should almost imme- diately have sent direct to a division, under McDowell's immediate com- mand, orders in contravention of those he admits he knew McDowell himself was to give it ! GENERAL M'DOWELL'S ORDER TO THE PETITIONER. If there is one thing more than another which the petitioner here claims with constant and unvarying pertinacity and vehemence, it is that when General McDowell left him he had given him no orders to go into action with his troops, and thereafter that he gave him none. He was asked, when a witness, among other questions to the same end : If he did attempt to make any movement in either of the directions named? [" To the front or right, or to the front and right."] He said : Not directly to the right; I did to the right and front, and whon I received the 1 i-t message from General AlcDowell to remain wnere I was, I recalled it. He was then asked : Did you make no attempt to go to the front, or to the right and front, after that message ? And said : I made no attempt with any body of troops. He was further asked : After General McDowell left the witness did the witness not know he was expected by General McDowell to move to the right, or right and front .' And said: I did not. In his defense before his own court-martial he is still more emphatic, and in speaking of the period of time from noon on the 2!)th to the hour of Pope's order of 4.30 p. m., says : But it is not true that General McDowell then, or at any time diiringthat .lay ga\ fortunate iy corps ve meanysuch orders " to put my troops in there " or to do any thing oi the kind; and rtunate is it for General McDowell that it is not true, for it he had given ine an.\ o..ch mandate to thrust my corps in over that broken ground, between Jackson 8 ngnl and the separateenemy massing in my front, the danger and disaster ot aach amovemenl would have been then" and now upon his hands. I am glad that General McDowell la utterly in error upon this point, and is in no way chargeable with such tatal militai.v upon this poi blunder. But in his statement before this Board, General Porter publishes two of his dispatches of the 29th (p. 35), numbered Nos. 28 and 29. In tin- first he orders General Morell (commanding the advanced divisions ol his corps) to — Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. In the second, addressed to Generals McDowell and King, he sa\ a I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. Communication we must recollect was by the joint order directed to be established bv Pope between Generals Portera.nl McDowell and tin left of the main army, where Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds was. 28 NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. General McDowell swore be ordered General Porter "to put his troops in there." The latter denied it, but these dispatches just cited show, even in petitioner's own statement to this Board, that he knew it was expected of him by McDowell ; and now we come to newly-discovered dispatches, on the same subject, of great importance, viz, one addressed to General McDowell dated 29th August, 6 p. m., which says : Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering abont the woods for time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened on ns. Another, addressed to Generals McDowell or King, says: 1 have been wandering over the woxls and failed to get a communication to yon . * * * # * * In the third, addressed to General McDowell, he says : The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance and have/ailed to get over to you except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. It will be seen from some of the foregoing extracts, taken in connec- tion with the " sketch of 2d Manassas, August 29, 18G2," published as a frontispiece in General Porter's statement betore this Board, that General Porter, after receiving McDowell's last message, deliberately reported that he had made an attempt, or attempts, of some kind or other, to move some of his troops over the country to the CTuited States forces at or near Groveton ; though, when especially interrogated with respect thereto by General McDowell, while on the witness stand, he denied having done so. They show, as before stated, that he did not feel himself held to a state of inaction by any order General McDowell gave him ; and they also show that what he says he attempted was in the exact direction of what McDowell states he ordered him to do, to wit : To put his troops iu there. [In the direction of the Warreutou pike.] In view of petitioner's claim, that as this attempt to move Morell over to the Warrenton pike, "to aid Sigel," or "over to McDowell,'' was made after the latter had left him, he had then become independent of .McDowell, "free to exercise his own discretion," and, in view of peti- tioner's most emphatic declaration, made iu his defense before his court in 1863, and repeated as emphatically in 1870, that any such movement would, in his judgment, have been a "fatal military blunder," involving disaster, it is not only an obvious inference but an inevitable conclusion, that lie must hare been acting under the constraint of some superior authority ; that he would not merely of his own motion have inv dved his troops in the consequences of as he states it, "a fatal military blunder: 1 And as, during this time, there was no authority acting upon him but that of Pope, and McDowell, dming the time the latter was with him, ami as he received no orders from Pope, he must hare acted, in the particular in question, under the order McDowell (jure him before they par- ted and while he was still subject to his control ! Therefore, in the assertion by General McDowell, that before he left petitioner tor the last time on the 29th August, he did order him to put his troops in /hire [in the direction of Warrenton pike], and in the denial by petitioner that McDowell gave him any such order, it, is petitioner's memory and not McDowell's that is in fault. 29 NATURE AND EXTENT OF PETITIONER'S OPERATIONS AFTER GENERAL M'DOWELL LEFT HIM. Holding that petitioner received an order from General McDowell modifying the ioint order given by General Pope when McDowell was with him, and clothed with the necessary authority to give him a valid order, it is further claimed that this order did not lose its force and validity after they parted, but was one which impose I duties on peti- tioner, for the due discharge of which he is to be held responsible till he can show it was either countermanded by superior authority, or that its execution was, or became, impossible. As to the nature and extent of what was done by General Porter after McDowell left him, it is significant of how feeble and inconsequent it must have been, that, within a very short time afterward, even the memory had passed away from his mind, and he could not recollect under oath : (1.) That he had ordered his leading division commander to push on to the aid of Sigel ; (2 ) That he had informed McDowell, at 6 p. m., that he had "failed in getting Morell over " to him ; (3.) That he had (at six o'clock) ordered Morell "to push up two regiment*, supported by two others, preceded by skirntisKers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yard's, and attack the party with the section of artillery opposed to you {him)." For, wheu a witness on the court of inquiry being asked if, after the alleged return of Colonel Locke, he attempted even to make any move- ment " to the front or to the right, or to the trout and right," he denied having done so; and, according to his version of the case in lS'J.'J, he simply continued in a state of inaction after McDowell left him. To judge from his most recent statement, his principal object was nor to make any attack on the enemy at all, but to conceal himself from him — to put everything out of sight — for he says to Morell (dispatch 30) : Come the same game over them they do over ns, aud get your men out of sight. So it appears that it was more a game of hide and seek than one of attack that was contemplated or that was carried out. Porter had estab- lished himself personally near Bethlehem Church, which is — according to the map made up from the survey of last June — two miles aud a half behind the place where he was when joined by McDowell the second time, and where he had commenced deploying his leading division, with alleged thick woods between him and the head of his column or his partly de- ployed line. And it was from this place, so retired from the possible field of action, and from any chance of his kuowins: anything from his own observation, that he received Morell's reports aud sent to him and to McDowell the dispatches heretofore referred to. STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ENEMY OPPOSING GENERAL PORTEH ON THE 29TH, AS KNOWiX AND ESTIMATED AT THAT TIME. The petitioner has asserted he knew Longstreet's force was in front of him all of the 29th August. Certainly General Buford's dispatch,* which McDjwell showed Por- *Arefereuce to this report, which is below, will show that Buford did not state Longstreet's arrival, but merely mentioned that a certain force had passed Gainesville, without saying who commanded it or to whom it belonged. "Headquarters C.w.w.ky Brigade— 9.30 a.m. i' General Ricketts: Seventeen regiments, one battery, 550 cavalry, passed through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Ceutreville road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged, at once. "JOHN BUFORD •• Brig. '<< neral. •" Please forward this.'' 30 ter at Dawkins' Branch, did not indicate whose forces had been seen goiDg down, not the Gainesville and Manassas Junction road, but the Gainesville, Groveton, and Centreville turnpike. But if General Porter knew then all he claims to know now as to this force, it is certain that he did not communicate his knowledge to General McDowell ; and his dispatches to and from his officers, to which he refers as being some of the sources of his information, do not warrant the claim he has made that he then knew of this large force being on Jackson's right, or whose it was. From his skirmish or picket line was certainly the quarter from whence such information in this case had to be obtained, yet those who were out there gave no evidence of it. See Morell's dispatch Xo. 30, where he says : GEXERaL: Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the •woods on our right, towards the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. It this is so it will he hot here in the morning. See Colonel Marshall's report to General Morell (No. 34), where he says: General Morell: The enemy must be in a much larger force than I can see. From the commands of the officers I should judge a brigade. They are eiuFavoriug to come in on our left, and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on ttie left as the movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close. In these there is nothing to indicate the knowledge it is claimed was then possessed of this large force of Longstreet; two batteries and two regiments in one instance, and at least a brigade in another. And General Porter did not give evidence of such knowledge when, late in the afternoon, he gave his order to push up " two regiments sup- porting two others to attack." (See No. 37.) THE EFFECT OF FETITIONER'S COURSE. General Porter claims that by his course he held in check at least double that of the enemy, and thus saved Pope from total defeat. But in the reports of their operations on the 29th, Generals Stuart and Longstreet both concur in stating that, after they had taken preliminary measures to resist Porter's advance, he, alter firiug a few shots, retired — one said to Manassas — and thereafter they were not materially influ- enced by him. This will be substantiated by oral evidence. They were however in error as to Porter's having gone to Manassas; he had only been successful in "putting everything out of their sight"; and, it will be seen, so far as his force was concerned, out of their minds as well. Fart of his troops did go back there. 1 have already said that in my judgment Longstreet's testimony as to having about 25,000 men more or less on the ground or near it, most of the 29tb, was not an important element in this case. The question is solely what General Porter knew was in front of him. His Dim exhibits are conclusive against him. In dispatch No. 3d, Major-General Morell stated two batteries and two regiments to have come down on their right, and then hazards the remark, based on this report, "If this be so,it will be hot here in the morning," showing conclusively that at that time Longstreet was not thought to he in force in his front. It was sufficient, however, for the accused, and immediately the gal- lant Fifth Corps was put out of sight, and part ordered to fail back to Manassas .Junction, several miles distant. 31 In this connection it seems pertiDent to ask why No. 33 was sent, viz : General Morell : Hold on if you can to your present place. What is passing ? This does not betray much confidence iu his defensive position, nor that he himself was in a place where he could know what was going on nor his corps ready to resist assault. ORDER OF 4.30 P. M. CONSIDERED. Let us now consider the order of 4.30 p. in. The petitioner has mentioned an order hegave(No.37) about six o'clock for two regiments supported by two others to attack the party opposed to them. If he meant to develop the enemy's strength, why did he not do it at 11.30 a, m.! He calls it a reconnaissance, but the order shows it to have been an attack. If Longstreet had been where it is sought to put him, this detachment would have beeu destroyed. Petitioner denies he received General Pope's 4.30 order at o or even 5.30 p. m. He has brought witnesses here to " guess" that the A. 1). 0. who carried it must have taken a roundabout road. At 4 p. m. the accused's A. D. O. had been sent to General Pope, and reached the latter's headquarters about 5 p. m. (G. 0. M. Rec, p. L29.) Therefore, at that time, the distance was not over an hour, and possibly not that much. When the petitioner states that the order directed him " to attack Jackson's right flank," he says what is not contained in the order itself (p. 40, Statement). How did or could be know that General Pope did not know that Long- street was there. He was directed to attack the enemy's right flank, which was, according to some statements, in front of him. Jackson's name was not mentioned. General Pope afterward expressed his opinion on the subject in his evidence, but at the time of the order there was nothing to show that Pope did not understand what Porter pretends to say he himself knew teas the case. The battle ou the right continued for some time after dark : General Lee said until 9 p. m. This is no doubt true. Porter alleged, on his trial, he did not receive the 4.30 order at or about 5 or 5.30 p. in., and has brought witnesses to testify as to the road tiny guess the messengers took. It must not be forgotten that General McDowell in his evidence (pp. 80, 89, and 218, G. C. M. Rec.) swore that he met the staff-officer earn ing it on or near the Sudley Springs road, between Bethlehem Church an. I Henry House hill. That he himself got on the battle field about live o'clock, some time before sundown, and after meeting the officer. He says he arrived at Henry House hill at least an hour before sun- Captain Pope, the staff officer, also swore he met General McDowell (p. GO, G. C. M., Rec). The court convicted of the charge. I shall submit some rebutting testimony on this point. Let us look, however, at the facts as already developed in evidence : If General Porter was so very well prepared for even defense— it he really had any intention or desire to assist his compauionsiu-arins on the right— why should it have taken him an hour or more to get ready to move into action ? 32 All day long- on the 29th lie is, according to his theory, either ready or getting ready, but never doing anything, while the sound of battle came from the right. Let me observe that the road on which his corps rested in column that day was no easier to travel than the country bordering it on the lett, over which he could have moved up in division front as if on parade, had he so desired. The country is called by the inhabitants Manassas Plains. "WAS THERE A BATTLE ON THE 29TH ? One of the most astonishing things in the petitioner's case is the effort he has made to prove no battle on the 29th August, and to do this he has brought distinguished and gallant officers like, say, Sykes and Buttertield, to testify to what they did not hear. It is necessary for General Porter to establish this, because, as the Count de Paris said, in a letter dated 8th October, 187G: Under his first instructions his duty would have heen to attack the large and well- posted forces of the enemy which he unexpectedly met near the railroad, only in two Cases: 1. If he had received from a superior the positive orders to do so. •2. If he had been aware that a great battle was raging near enough for him to take a direct or indirect part in it. In this case it will be perceived the court assumes a large force in presence of Porter. Was there a battle raging that day '? Let the official reports, Union and Confederate, which form part of the evidence now on file in the War Department, attest the fact. The theory of the petitioner on this head is the theory of civilians without military experience — one like his 27th August theory, that the night was too dark, &c, for him to even undertake to begin earnestly to obey a peremptory order. This petitioner was as much convicted by the evidence he himself brought on Jils original trial as by that of government. Take the 4.30 p. m. order. Where was he when he got it ? He was '2\ miles from his front, lying down on his back, at Bethlehem Church. Beside him was that good soldier Sykes, his next in command. Did he spring to his feet and say, "Sykes, here is an order to go at once into action. Deploy to the lett of this road" (where, by the way, there was plenty of room). Did he say this? No. Did he ask Sykes for his opinion as to what had best be done ? No. On the contrary, he gave some order of which Sykes knew nothing. He put the 4.30 p. m. order in his pocket aud went on talking, and left his second in command in ignorance of its character. (Sykes' division comprised three regular batteries and about 4,500 men; in all, about 4,750, pp. 177, 178, and 179, G. C. M. Kec.) From that time forward General Sykes swore he continued with Porter all night. Let ns see now what Col. Benjamin F. Smith says, who had an oppor- tunity given him to take a good look at the position of the supposed enem\ . Col. Benjamin F. Smith, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volun- teers, called for government: ( laptain Bixth Infantry, in Colonel Chapman's brigade, General Sykes' division. Page 112, G. C. M. Record : Ordered to retrace our steps and march hack in the direction we bad come. We then marched hack to near Manassas Junction, and camped in the woods alongsidi thebranch railroad. Saw no infantry supports to the rebel batteries. 33 Next came Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin's testimony : Page 161 G. C. M. Record: The halt at Manassas Junction was for half au hour Page 162: Left Manassas at 9. The skirmishers, Sixty-second Pennsylvania com- menced tiring with the enemy's pickets possibly tire miles from Manassas.' Porter rode up and column halted. The other eight companies Sixty-second Bent oat Portei then read Pope's communication (the one jointly to Porter and McDowell to himself Morell, aud Buttertield, all dismounted. We theu went back to the rear on a hill say three hundred yards. A battery, I believe, was placed iu position there. We were there some time when McDowell rode up. Pickets of the Sixty-second were recalled by Griffin by order. P. 162: I received an order almost directly alter General McDowell had left, to recall my pickets and orders to m >ve my command to the right I attempted to go to the right aud moved probably 6U0 yards until with the head of my column I crossed arailroad said to run to Gainesville. ' Here we met with obstruc- tions which we could not get through. It was reported by somebody, I cannot -n who, "You can't get through there." We then faced about and moved back to the hill. My brigade was then placed in position. It was a very position to repel an attack. P. 165: They ran into some little, thick, pine bushes; halted until ordered to move back again ; made no reconnaissauce whatever. 1'. 169 : Merely obeyed orders. P. 162 : During the day large clouds of dust were g our front and to our left from a point stated to us then to be passing through Thor- oughfare Gap. There were large clouds of dust all that afternoon, in fact nearly all day, as I can recollect, coining from a poiut said tons to be Thoroughfare Gap. 1 should say it was three or four miles from where I was ; fully that. I except, of course, these batteries that opened on us about 10 o'clock ; they were nearer. They were within 1,200 or 1,500 yards. We saw scattering groups of horsemen or of infantry. In fact, there i» not a doubt, if that point was Thoroughfare Gap, that the enemy was coming through there all day. P. 16.5 : When Morell got his orders near sundown to '• we had started back toward Manassas Junction." Lastly, comes that of Col. E. G. Marshall, United States Army, retired, a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, called by the accused, and since recalled before this board, and his prior statements accepted without question by petitioner: (p. 190, G. C. M. Rec.) Question. State the position and force of the enemy in the immediate vicinity ol General Porter's command as far as y/ou know it. Answer. Immediately after going there my skirmishers were fired on by a body of dragoons, aud shortly afterward there was a section of artillery which opened fire upon General Porter's command. Soon after that, perhaps about two o'clock, the head of a large column came to my front. They deployed their skirmishers and nut mine. and about three o'clock drove my skirmishers iuto theedge of the timber. We were all nil the left of the Manassas Railroad, going toward Gainesville. Their force continued to come down all day : iu fact, until one o'clock at night. It was a very large force, and they were drawn up in Hue of battle as they came down. I reported at different intervals to General Morell, my immediate commander, the position of the enemy ; but at oue time I deemed it so important that I did no to trust orderlies or others with messages, aud I went myself up to linn to conf ceruing the enemy. This was about dusk. Geueral Morell told me that he had jasr received orders from Geueral Porter to attack the enemy — to commence the I with four regiments, lie seemed to be very much troubled concerning the ordei asked my atfvice, my opinion. I told him by all means not to attack : thai ii v tain destruction to us to do so; that I, for oue, did not wish to go into the timber and attack the enemv. Their position was a strong one, and they were certainly in force at that time— twice as large as our force — all of Geueral Porter's corps. He had ex- pert to me the teuor of General Porter's order. I also deemed that we had ej same with reference to the other part of the army— General Tope's army— by I his large body iu force, and better than we would by attacking them, beca is ad attacked them. I felt that it was certain destruction, as we would have had t., 3 our line of battle across this ravine into this timber, and then perhaps our line treat would have beeu entirelv cut off from Geueral Pope's army. aay say that this army that came down in our front was a separate ai army of theenemy from that which we saw General Pope's army fighting with. About the same time— before I weut in to General Morell— I could hear and of the result of the fighting betweeu the force of the enemy and General Pope 8 army. I could see General Pope's left aud the enemy's right during the greater part ol the dav, about two miles off, perhaps more, diagonally to our trout and to the right. I he enemy set up their cheering, and appeared to be charging and dnvn . 3 G 34 a man of my command but what was certain that General Pope's army was being driven from the field. In the different battles I have been, I have learned that there is no mistaking the enemy's yell when they are successful. It is different from that of our owu men, our men giving three successive cheers, and in coucert, but theirs is a cheering without any reference to regularity of form — a continual yelling. Does this evidence show there was no fighting on General Porter's right on the 29th, or that it was unknown to his command! Colonel Marshall's evidence substantiates the fact that Reynolds' Pennsylvania Reserves were at and near " Meadowville," and iSchenek's division in occupancy of Gibbon's Field Hospital. TVbeu the petitioner and McDowell rode to the right at Dawkius' Brand), the latter, in his subsequent evidence, said (p. 85, G. C. M. Rec.) that " tbe sound of battle seemed to be at its height on our right." We have seen that petitioner did not always communicate what he did know of what was going on to even his second in command. How, therefore, was it or is it to be expected that the officers and men of the Fifth Corps should know all that was transpiring? It is to tbis ignorance on tbe part of officers and individuals of certain events known to the petitioner himself, and it is to the fact that on the original trial seriously inaccurate accounts of the government case went to the public press, that this case has not been more generally under- stood (p. 31, G. C. M. Rec). Did General Porter believe there was no battle going on '? Why, at Manassas Junction when he was there, between S and 9 a. in., the firing was incessant, and the thunder of cannon shook even the windows in Washington, many miles distant. Major-General Franz Sigel had been ordered to attack with his corps at daylight, and did so. In bis opening statement [p. 28) the petitioner speaks of his (petition- er's) interview in the morning, at Manassas Junction, with McDowell, seeking information from him, while at that very time he himself had an order in his own pocket from Pope, notifying him that " a severe engagement was likely to take place, and his presence was necessary." McDowell, on the other hand, had not theu heard from Pope owing to bis own movements. Tbe unqualified statement of petitioner that there was no battle on the 29th is positively disproven by two of his own dispatches of that day, found in bis own opening statement before tbis Board, viz: First. (No. 28, to General Morrell.)To push over aDd aid Sigel * * See if you cannot help Sigel. If you find him retiiiug, move back toward Manassas. Second. (No. 29.) The enemy appear to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced and ours retired. I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. This last named dispatch was to Generals McDowell and King, sent, as petitioner's own witness fixed it, at 4 o'clock p. m. (G. C. M. Rec, p. 129). lie says he (petitioner) went to the head of the column, and found he had been misinformed, and no action was therefore taken by him to carry out the determination expressed so positively in that dispatch. These dispatches arc fatal to petitioner's theory, even if Marshall's evidence alone was not. I shall show that he undertook, even earlier in the day, to carry out the. same determination to retire, based on the same belief as to our repulse. If he was misinformed at that second time (four o'clock) as he alleges in bis opening statement, when . in. I Again, in another dispatch to General McDowell or Kiug, G p. m.: I have been wandering over the woods and failed to get a communication to you. Again, in another to General McDowell : Have failed to get over to you except by the route takeu by King. As to these I have only to say that the evidence of accused's witness, Lieutenant Stevenson, on the original trial shows how the latter crossed the country from the left of General Pope's army with the mail lor his regiment (Thirteenth New York Volunteers), which held General Porter's advance (p. 200, G. C. M. Pec.) The evidence, I believe, all shows he made no effort to get over to unite to SigeFs left, and also that he had six or eight batteries with him. That there was a battle which began at daylight on the 29tu, and ended on the evening, our reports and the Confederate reports all show. I will now quote from some of the principal ones that which seems to me desirable, premising however that all the corps and division com- manders in the National army did not, for some unexplained reason, make reports, aud that the Confederate reports are much more numerous. 36 UNION REPORTS OF THE OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29, 1S62. RErORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL S. P. HEINTZELMAN. Arlington, Virginia. October 21, 1862. * * * * » * * At 10 a. m. I reached the field of battle, a mile from Stone Bridge, on the Warrenton turnpike. General Kearney's division had proceeded to the right and front. I learned that General Sigel was in command of the troops then engaged. At 11 a. m. the head of Hooker's division arrived; General Reno an hour later. At the recjuest of General Sigel I ordered General Hooker to place one of his brigades at General Sigel's disposal to re-enforce a portion of his line then hard pressed. General Grover reported, and before long became engaged, and was afterward supported by the whole division. General Pope arrived between 1 and 2 p. m. The enemy were driven back a short distance toward Sudley's Church, where they made another stand, and again pressed a portion of our line back. All this time General Kearney's division held its position on our extreme right. Several orders were sent to him to advance, but he did not move till after the troops on his left had been forced back, which was near 6 p. m. He now advanced and reported that he was driving the enemy. This was not, however, until after the renewed heavy musketry tire on our center had driven General Hooker's troops and those he was sent to support back. They were greatly outnum- bered and behaved with exceeding gallantry. It was on this occasion that General Grover's brigade made the most gallant and de- termined bayonet charge of the war. He broke two of the enemy's lines, but was finally repulsed by the overwhelming numbers in the rebel third line. It was a hand- to-hand conflict, using the bayonet and the butt of the musket. In this tierce en- counter, of not over twenty minutes' duration, the 2nd New Hampshire, Colonel Mars- ton, suffered the most. The 1st, 11th, and 1,6th Massachusetts, and 26th Pennsylvania were engaged. The loss of this brigade, numbering less than 2,000, was a total of 484, nearly all killed and wounded. I refer you to Geueral Grover's accompanying report. Had. General Kearney pushed the enemy earlier it might have enabled us to have held our center and have saved some of this heavy loss. Kearney on the right, with General Stevens and our artillery, drove the enemy out of the woods they had tempo- rarily occupied. The firing continued some time after dark, and when it ceased we re- mained in possession of the battle-field. RETORT OK BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS, DIVISION ATTACHED TO M'DOWELL'S CORPS. Headquarters Reynolds' Division, Camp Near Mun*oit'x Hill. Va., September 5, 1862. General McDowell joined the command at daylight, and directed my co-operation with General Sigel. The right of the enemy's position could be discerned upon the heights above Grove- ten, on the right of tin- pike. The division advanced over the ground to the heights above Groveton, crossed the pike, and Cooper's battery came gallantly into action on the same ridge on which the enemy's right was, supported by Meade's brigade. Y>*hile pressing forward our extreme left across the pike, re-enforcements were sent forbyGen- cial Sigel lor tin- right of his line under General Milroy, now hardly pressed by the enemy, and a brigade was taken from Schenek's command on my right. The whole lire of the enemy was now concentrated on the extreme right of my division, and unsupported there, the battery was obliged to retire with considerable loss, in both men and horses, and the division fell back to connect with Schenck. Later in the day General Pope, arriving on the right from Centreville, renewed the attack on the enemy and drove him some distance. My division was directed to threaten the enemy's right and rear, which it proceeded to do under a heavy tire of artillery from the ridge to the left of the pike. Generals Seymour and Jackson led their brigades in advance : but, notwithstanding all the steadiness and courage shown by the men. they were compelled to fall back before the heavy fire of artillery and mus- ketry which met them both on the front and left flank, and the division resumed its original position. King's division engaged the enemy along the pike on our right, and the action was continued with it until dark by Meade's brigade. 37 List of brigades, regiments, and batteries in Reynolds' division as per his report of killed wounded, and missing. First Brigade (Meade). SSiKnt M ?2- i" , Seyenth Gantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Ihircl Infautry, Colonel Sickles. Henderson Fourth Infantry, Colonel Magillon. Eighth Infantry, Captain Lemon. Second Brigade (Seymour). First Iufantry, Colonel Roberts. Fifth Infantry, Major Fentmvcr Second Iufantry, Colonel McCandless. Sixth Infantry, Colonel Sinclair. Third Brigade (Jackson). Ninth Infantry, Colonel Anderson. I Eleventh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel leuth Infantry, Colonel kirk. Jackson. Twelfth Infantry, Colonel Hardin. Artillery. Battery C. Fifth Artillery, Captain Ran- Battery B, First Pennsylvania Artillery. aom - Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery. Battery A, First Pennsylvania Artillery. supplemental report of brigadier-gexeral john f. reyxoi Headquarters First Army Corps, October 9, L862 General: I observe in the report by General Schenck's actiug assistant adjutant- general, published in the Philadelphia Inquirer of to-day, of the operations of that general's division when General Sigel advanced to attack the enemy on the morning of the 29th of August last (you will yourself observe the error in the dates), several misstate- ments, unintentional no doubt, when referring to the movements of my division. My division maneuvered ou his left from early in the morning uutil he gained the position alluded to ou the pike near Gibbon's battle-ground of the evening previous. It was here that General Schenck asked me for a battery. Cooper's battery, with Meade's brigade as a support, was immediately placed in position on the ridge to the right of the pike and on the left of the woods where Gibbon's brigade had been in action by General Meade and myself. In returning from this position, to bring up the other bat- tery and Seymour's brigade, I passed through Schenck's troops, drawn up on the right of the woods before alluded to, in which Gibbon had been engaged. But, in bringing up Ransom's battery and Seymour's brigade along the pike, I noticed that Schenck's troops had disappeared from this position and were nowhere in sight. I understood that Schenck had detached a brigade to the right to the support of Milroy, and that I was therefore left alone as far as I knew. I immediately arrested Seymour's move- ment, and directed the division to occupy the position across the pike from which it had moved, in doing which McLeau's brigade was discovered occupying a piece of woods just ou the left of the pike, and as soon as could be this movement was arrested and made to correspond with his position. It was subsequently ascertained that In- was disconnected from the rest of Sigel's troops, and the position was again changed to make them correct. I sent no word to General Schenck of the kind indicated in this paper of the move- ment of the enemy at the time this change of position was made, nor at any time. There was a report came later in the evening thai the enemy were moving over tin- pike, but I am not aware that I communicated it to General Schenck, as at that time I had no connection with him. I am, Ac JOHN F. REYNOLDS, .,/ Volunteers, Comnum Major-General McDowell, Washington, I>. C. I make this correction to you, and without any desin into a conl the paper on official matters. 1 l .1. 1\ R. 38 report of brigadier-general john c. robinson, of kearney's division, iieintzel- man's corps. Headquarters Robinson's Brigade, Centreville, Va., August 31, 1862. Ou Friday morning I was ordered to "support Colonel Poe's brigade and to develop Lis line of battle to the right." After crossing Bull Run I moved forward in two lines, the first composed of the 63d Pennsylvania and five companies of tbe 30tb Obio, wbich ■were temporarily attached to my command. Arriving on the ground assigned me, I remained for a considerable time exposed to a heavy artillery fire, after which I took up my position on high ground farther to the right. I was soon after directed, by Major-General Kearney, commanding division, to move to the support of Poe's left, ■when I formed the 63rd and 105th Pennsylvania in line of battle on the Leesburg road, holding the 20th Indiana and Ohio battalion in reserve. At this time there was a heavy musketry fire to our left and front, and I was directed to move forward through the woods to turn the enemy and cut off his retreat through the railroad cut. On arriving on the ground with the 63d and 105th Pennsylvania, 20th Indiana, and 3d Michigan, I found the railroad already occupied by our own troops, and the cornfield in front filled with the enemy. I then deployed the 63d and 105th Pennsylvania along the railroad to the right of tbe troops in position, directing the 3d Michigan to protect my right flank, placing the 20th Indiana in reserve, and throwing skirmishers to the front. Soon after taking this position the regiments ou my left gave way and. passed rapidly to the rear out of the woods, leaving my left flank entirely exposed. As rap- idly as possible I moved my command to the left to occupy the deserted ground, but before my troops could get fairly into position I was fiercely attacked by a superior force that had succeeded in crossing the road. I then threw forward my right wing, forming my line of battle at right angles to the origiual position, and checked the progress of the enemy. At this time General Birney brought up and turned over to me his 4th Maine. He afterward sent me his 1st, 40th, and 101st New York Regiments. These troops were deployed to the right and left of the railroad, and pushed forward to the support of my regiments in front, which were suffering severely from a terrific fire of musketry and the enemy's artillery posted on a hill to our right and rear. Our men now gained steadily on the enemy, and were driving him before them until he brought up fresh masses of troops (supposed to be two brigades), when, with ammunition nearly expended, we withdrew to our second position. Our loss in this action was severe, embracing some of our best officers. It was here that my 20th Indiana lost their brave colonel, William L. Brown, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment. The loss of this gallant officer and true patriot is irreparable. With him fell other brave officers and men who will ever be remembered as among our country's heroes and martyrs. Tbe enemy's loss must have been very great. report of brigadier-general c. grover, of heintzelman s corps. Headquarters First Brigade, Hooker's Division, September 26, 1662. On the following day we continued our march for the plains of Manassas by the way of Centreville, and arrived upon the battle-field about 9 a.m. The battle had already commenced, and as my column moved to the front the shells fell with remark- able precision along the Hue of the road, but fortunately did no damage. My brigade was temporarily placed under the orders of Major-General Sigel, whose troops were then engaging the enemy in the center. Under instructions received from him, I threw forward the 1st Massachusetts Volunteers to support, his line, while my remaining tour regiments were drawn up in two lines, sheltered from the enemy's i i i < ■ by a roll of the field in front. This position was occupied until about 2.30 p. m. In the mean lime I rode over the field in front as far as the position of the enemy would admit. After rising the bill uuder which my command lay au open field was cnii red, and from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley, through which ran a railroad embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest continued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by tin- enemy in force, supported by artillery. At :; p. m. I received an order to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embankment, enter the edgeof the woods beyond, and hold it. Dispositions for carry- ing out such orders were immediately made; pieces were loaded, bayonets fixed, and instrnctions given for the line to move slowly upon the enemy until it felt itsfire, then close upon him rapidly, fire one well-directed volley, and rely upon the bayonet to se- cure the posil ion on the other side. 39 • We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a Bhorfc, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks, others struck down with the bntts of pit its, and onward pressed our line. In a tew yards more it met a terrible tire from a second Hue, which in its tiru broke. The enemy's third line now bore down upon oar thinned ranks in close order and swept back the right center and a portion of our left. With the gallant 16fch Massachusetts on our left I tried to turn his flank, but the break- ing of our right and center and the weight of the enemy's lines caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to onr colors. In this fierce encounter, of not more than twenty minu'es' duration, or loss was as follows : First Massachusetts Volunteers Second New Hampshire Volunteers Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers .... Sixteenth Massachusetts Volunteers Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers. Total Killed. Wou uled. Missing. TotaL 5 66 7 ".- lfi 87 30 133 10 77 25 112 4 64 4-2 110 6 33 14 53 Though forced to retire from the field by the immensely superior numbers of the enemy, supported by artillery and by the natural strength of his position, men never fought more gallantly or efficiently. I must make special mention of my personal observation of the 2d New Hampshire, and 11th and 16th Massachusetts Regiments, that, under every trial, have won new distinctions. The well known 1st Massachusetts, though not under my personal obser- vation, was as usual in the van. The 26th Pennsylvania, which supported the left, did not have that opportunity of showing its metal that I could have desired, owiDg to the nature of the ground. Striking examples of personal gallantry were unusually numerous. The gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Tileston, of the 11th Massachusetts; Captains Littlefield, of the 2d New Hampshire, and Stone, ot the 11th ; Lieutenant Roberts, of the 1st Massa- chusetts ; Lieutenants Rogers and Moore, of the 2d New Hampshire: Lieutenant Por- ter, of the 11th ; and Lieutenant Banks, of the 16th, were either killed upon the field or died from the effects of wounds soou after the battle. Amoug those that in the short duration of the engagement I especially noticed were Captains McDonald, of the 11th; O'Hara, of the 16th (wounded) ; Lieutenant Merriam and Lieutenant Banks (killed). I had not the opportunity to observe but few cases of signal daring; but, with few exceptions, all officers and men there engaged can look back w ith just pride to their conduct ou that day. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL P. KEARNEY (BY BRIGADIEK-GENERAL D. B. KIKMY . ol-' HEISJTZELMAN'S COUPS. Centrevii.i.e, Va., August 31, 1862. ****** On the 29th on mv arrival, I was assigned to the hoi, ling of the right wing, my lefi on Leesburg road. I posted Colonel Poe, with Berry's brigade, in first line; General Robinson, first brigade, on his right, partly in line and partly m support; and kept Birney's most disciplined regiments reserved and ready for emergencies. Towards noon 1 was obliged to occupy a quarter of a mile additional on Left ol said road, from Schurz's troops being taken elsewhere. During the first hours of combat General Biruey. on tired regiments in the centre falling back, of his own accord rapidly pushed across to give them a hand to raise themselves to a renewed fight. . In early afternoon General Pope's order to General Roberts was to send a prettj strong force diagonally to the front to relieve the centre ... woods from pressnre Ac- cordingly I detached ou that purpose Genera Robinson, with his brigade, the frl Pennsylvania Volunteers, Colonel Hays, the ^.Pennsylvania Volunteers, Captain Craig,"the 20th Indiana, Colonel Brown, and, additionally, the 3rd Mud,, g.n Marksmen, under Colonel Champlin. General Robinson drove forward for several hundred . • • but the centre of the main battle being shortly alter driven back and ou of the woods, mv detachment thus exposed so considerably in front ol all others, both Banks in air, 40 was obliged to oease to advance, and confine themselves to holding their own. At 5 o'clock, thinking — though at the risk of exposing nay fighting line to being enfiladed — that I might drive the enemy, by an unexpected attack, through the woods, I brought, up additionally the most of Birney's regiments, the 4th Maine, Colonel Walker and Lieutenant-Colonel Carver, the 40th New York, Colonel Egan, 1st New York, Major Burt, and 101st New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Gesuer, and changed front to the left, to sweep with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The enemy rolled up on his own right. It presaged a victory for us all; still, our force •was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further prog- ress was impeded. General Stevens came up gallantly in action to support us, but did not have the numbers. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL. Near Fort De Kalb, Virginia, Sept. 16, 1862. II. — Battle of Grovtlon near Bull Run, on Friday, August 29, 1862. On Thursday night, August 28, when the First Corps was encamped on the heights south of Young's Branch, near Bull Ruu, I received orders from General Pope to "at- tack the enemy vigorously " the next morning. I accordingly made the necessary preparations at night and formed in order of battle at daybreak, having ascertained that the enemy was in considerable force beyond Young's Branch, in sight of the hills ■we occupied. His left wing rested on Catbarpin Creek, front towards Centreville; with his centre he occupied a long stretch of woods parallel with the Sudley Springs (New Market) road, and his right was posted on the hills on both sides of the Centre- ville-Gainesville road. I therefore directed General Schnrz to deploy his division on the right of the Gainesville road, and, by a change of direction to the left, to come into position parallel with the Sudley Springs road. General Milroy, with his brigade and one battery, was directed to form the ceutre, and to take possession of an elevation in front of the so-called " Stoue house," at the junction of the Gainesville and Sudley Springs roads. General Schenck, with his division forming our left, was ordered to advance quickly to an adjoining range of hills, and to plant his batteries on these hills at an excellent range from the enemy's position. In this order our whole line advanced from point to point, taking advantage of the ground before us, until our whole line was involved in a most vehement artillery and infantry contest. In the course of about four hours, from half past six to half past ten o'clock in the morning, our whole infantry force and nearly all our batteries were en- gaged with the enemy, Generals Milroy and Schurz advaucing one mile, and General Schenck two miles, from their original positions. At this time (10.30 o'clock) the en- emy threw forward large masses of infantry against our right, but was resisted firmly and driven back three times by the troops of Generals Milroy and Schnrz. To assist those troops so hard pressed by overpowering numbers, exhausted by fatigue and weak- ened by losses, I ordered oue battery of reserve to take position on their left, and posted two pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant Blum, of Schirmer's battery, supported by the 41st New York Volunteer Infantry, beyond their line and opposite the right Hank of the enemy, who was advancing in the woods. These pieces opened fire with can- ister most effectually, and checked the enemy's advance on that point. I now directed General Schenck to draw his lines nearer to us, and to attack the enemy's right flank and rear by a change of front to the right, thereby assisting our troops in the centre. This movement could not be executed by General Schenck with his whole division, as he became briskly engaged with the enemy, who tried to turn our extreme left. At this critical moment, when the enemy had almost outflanked us on both wings and was preparing a new attack against our centre, Major-General Kearney arrived on the field of battle and deployed by the Sudley Springs road on our right, while General Reno's troops came to our support by the Gainesville turnpike. With the consent of General Reno, I directed two regiments and one battery, under Brigadier- General Stevens, to take position on the right of General Schenck— the battery on an eminence in front and centre of our line, where it did excellent work during the rest of the day, and where it relieved Captain Dilger's battery, which had held this position the whole morning. Three regiments were posted between General Milroy and Gen- eral Schenck, and two others, with two mountain howitzers, were sent to the assist- ance of General Schnrz. Scarcely were these troops in position, when the contest began with renewed vigor and vehemence, the enemy attacking furiously along our whole line from the extreme righl to the extreme left. The infantry brigade of Gen- eral Steinwehr, commanded by Colonel Koltes, was then sent forward to the assistance of Generals Schenck ami Schurz, and one regiment was detailed for the protection of 41 t-^&rS? 1 I n i re f«^ e 1 near °» r ^ntre. The troops of Brigadier Reynolds bad meanwhlef 12 o'clock) taken posit.on on our left. Iu order to defend our right I sent a letter to General Kearney, saying that Longstreet was not able to bring his troops in line of battle that day, and requesting him (Kearney) to change his front to the left and to advance, if possible, against the enemy's left dank. To assist him in this movement, I ordered two long-ranged rifled gnus to report to him, as his own battery had remained in reserve behind his lines. At two o'clock in the afternoon General Hookers troops arrived on the field of battle and were immediately ordered forward by their noble commander to participate in the battle. One brigade, nndet Colonel Carr, received orders, by my request, to relieve the regiments of General Schnrz s division, which had maintained their ground agaiust repeated attacks but were now worn ont and nearly without ammunition. Other regiments were sent for ward to relieve Brigadier-General Milroy, whose brigade had valiantly disputed the ground against greatly superior numbers for eight hours. To check the enemy if he should attempt to advance, or for the purpose of preparing and supports an attack from our side, I placed four batteries, of different commands, on a ran°-e of hills on our centre and behind the woods, which had been the most hotly contested part of the battle-field during the day. I had previously received a letter from Major-General Pope, saying that Fitz-John Porter's corps and Brigadier-General King's division numbering twenty thousand men, would come in on our left. I did, therefore, not think it prudent to give the enemy time to make new arrangements, aud ordered all the batteries to continue their fire and to direct it principally against the enemy's position in the woods before our front. Some of our troops placed in front were retiring from the woods, but as the enemy, held in check by the artillery in the pontic, did not venture to follow, and as at this moment new regiments of General Hooker's coramaud arrived and were ordered forward, we maintained our position, which Generals Milroy and Schurz had occupied in the morning. During two hours, from four to sis o'clock p. m. strong cannonading and mus continued on our centre and right, where General Kearney made a successful effort against the extreme left of the enemy's lines. At a quarter past six o'clock, Brigadier-General King's division of Major General Mc- Dowell's corps, arrived behind our front, and advanced on the Gainesville turnpike. I do uot know the real result of this movement, but from the weakness of the enemj 's cannonade, and the gradually decreasing musketry in the direction of General K< attack, I received the impression that the enemy's resistance was broken, and that victory was on our side ; and so it was. We had Von the rield of battle and our army rested near the dead aud wounded who had so gloriously defended tl. tnse of this country. p.epoht of brigadier-general r. ii. milroy. Headquarters Independent Brigade, ISear Fort Ethan Allen, Virginia, September 12. 1 362 * # * * - * * On the following morning (the 29th) at daylight I was ordered to proceed in search of the rebels, and had not proceeded more than 500 yards when we were greeted by a few strangling shots from the woods in front. We were now at the creek, and I had just sent forward my skirmishers when I received orders to halt and let my men have breakfast. While they were cooking, myself, accompanied by General Scbenck, rode up to the top of an eminence some 500 yards to the front to reconnoitre. Wo had no - reached the top than we were greeted by a shower of musket balls from t b<* woods oil our right. I immediately ordered up my battery and gave the bushwhackers a few shot and shell which soon cleared the woods. Soon after I discovered the enemy in great force about three-qn j rters of a mile in front of us, upon our right of the pike leading from Gainesville to Alexandria. I brought up my two batteries and opened upon them causing them to fall back. I then moved forward my brigade, with skirmishers de- ployed, and continued to advance my regiments, the enemy falling back. General Schenck's division was off to my left, and that of General Schnrz to my right. After passing a piece of woods I turned to the right, where the rebels had a battery that gave us a good deal of trouble. I brought forward one of my batteries To reply to it, and soon after heard a tremendous lire of small-arms, and knew that General Schnrz was hotly engaged to my right in an extensive forest. I sen! two of my regiments, the 82d Ohio, Colonel Cant well, ami the 5th Virginia, Colonel Zeigler, to General Schurz's assistance. They were to attack the enemy's right Hank, ami 1 held my other two regiments in reserve for a time. The two •■ 'it to Schurz were soon hotly engaged, t he enemy being behind a railroad embankment, which afforded them an excellent breastwork. The railroad had to be approached 42 from a cleaved ground on our side through a strip of thick timher from 100 to 500 yards in width. I bad intended, with the two regiments held in reserve, the 2d and 3d Virginia Regiments, to charge the rebel battery, which was but a short distance from us over the top of a hill on our left, but while making my arrangements to do this, I observed that my two regiments engaged were being driven back out of the woods by the terrible tire of the rebels. I then saw the brave Colonels Cantwell and Zeigler struggling to rally their broken regiments on the rear of the forest out of which they had been driven, and sent two of my aids to assist them and assure them of immediate support. They soon lallied their men and charged again and again, but were driven back each time with great loss. I then sent the 2nd Virginia to their support, directing it to approach the rail- road at the point on the left of my other regiments, where the woods ended, but they were met by such a destructive lire from a large rebel force that they were soon thrown into contusion, and fell back in disorder. The enemy now came on in overwhelming numbers. General Carl Schurz had been obliged to retire with his two brigades an hour before. And then the wbole rebel force was turned against my brigade, and my brave lads were dashed back before the storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest. I then ordered my reserve battery into position a short distance in the rear, and when five guns had got into position one of the wheel-horses was shot dead, but I or- dered it to uulimber where they were and the sis guns mowed the rebels with grape and canister with fine effect. My reserve regiment, the 3d Virginia, now opened with telling effect. Colonel Cantwell, of the 82nd Ohio, was shot through the brain and instantly killed while trying to rally h s regiment during the thickest of the fight. While the storm was raging the fiercest, General Stahel came to me and reported that he had been sent by General Scheuck to support me, and inquired where he should place his brigade. 1 told him on my left, and help support my battery. He then re- turned to his brigade, and soon after being attacked from another quarter, I did not again see him during the day. I was then left wholly unsupported, except by a por- tion of a Pennsylvania regiment, which I found on the field, and stood by me bravely during the next hour or two. I then rallied my reserved regiment and broken frag- ments iu the woods near my battery, and sent out a strong party of skirmishers to keep the enemy at bay, while another party went forward without arms to get off as many of our dead and wounded as possible. I maintained my ground skirmishing and oc- casionally firing by battalion during the greater part of the afternoon. Toward evening General Grover c ime up with his New Eng and brigade. I saw him forming a line to attack the rebel stronghold in the same place I had been all day, and advised him to form line more to the left and charge bayonets ou arriving at the rail- road track, which his brigade executed with such telling effect as to drive the rebels in clouds before their bayonets. Meanwhile I had gathered the remnant of my brigade, ready to take advantage of any opportunity to assist him. I soon discovered a large number of rebels fleeing before the left flank of Grover's brigade. They passed over an open space, sime five hundred yards in width, in front of my reserved regiment, which I ordered to fire on them, which they did, accelerating their speed and discom- fiture so much that I ordered a charge. My regiment immediately dashed out of the woods we were in, down across the meadows iu front of us, after the retreating foe ; but before their arriving at the other side of the meadow the retreating column re- ceived a heavy support from the railroad below them, and, soon rallying, came surging back, driving before their immense columns Grover's brigade and my handful of men. An hour before the charge I had sent one of my aides back after a fresh battery, the ammunition of both my batteries having given out, which arriving as our boys w r ere being driven back, I immediately ordered them into position, and commenced pouring a steady fire of grape and canister into the advancing columns of the enemy. The first d'scharge discomposed them a little, but the immense surging mass behind pressed them on. I held ou until they were within a hundred yards of us, and having but a handful of men to support the battery, ordered it to retire, which was executed with the loss of one gun. 1 then rallied the shattered remnant of my brigade, which had been rallied by my aides and Us officers, and encamped some three- quarters of a milt! to the rear. REPORT <>i BRIGADIER-GEXERAL J. STAHEL, (IK SIGEL'S CORPS. Headquarters FiRsf Division ok Fikst Army Cohps of Virginia, Near Centreville, September 1. 1862. With bieak ot day. mi the 29f.b, I followed the 2d brigade, 1st division, marching to Dogau's farm, and took position behind the farm. I remained here but a short time 43 when I received the order to aavance on Warreuton turnpike beyond Groveton Try- ing advanced about one mile, 1 received the order to take pSn , f, f ?£ road resting with my right wing of the brigade on the road, and with my left winVoS the 2d brigade. Here I found a number of dead and wounded soldiers filmMcDoSeWs corps from the preceding evening, and I had all the possible n,,,Hcal a i"' ;1 i - stowed upon them. Having remained here half an hour, a heavy skirmish took place to our right, and General Milroy sent to Brigadier-General Schenck, conimana°nc 1st division, for support. In order to support General Milroy, I left said p , s , a d followed the coarse shown to me by General Milroy's orderly. Arriving S Yonntfs Branch with my brigade I reported myself to General Milroy, and took my brigade to Wn i r ° y8 ' a i°, ng Y °, nngS BraDcb ' where 1 cou'Ul prevent the enemy from breakn g our lines and be ready at any time to render assistance to General Milroy Here I had but little cover for my troops, and was very much exposed to the cross-fire of the enenivs artillery, in consequence whereof I sustained a loss of several dead and wounded. During these proceedings one of General Stevens' batteries and two regi- ments were placed behind Groveton's farm to operate against the enemy's batteries As soon as the battery commenced firing, thereby fully governing all the open ground on the right of the turnpike, and. with the assistance of the two regiments, makine it impossible tor the enemy to breakthrough at this point, I received orders from Gen- eral Schenck to take my brigade through a small defile to the left of the turnpike, on the leit of Groveton s farm, taking position on the borders of the woods, resting mv right wing on the turnpike, and the 2nd brigade joining on the left, placing the 8th and 2/th regiments in front, the 45th aud 41st regiments in reserve, and two pieces of the .mountain howitzer battery on the left wing of my brigade, the skirmishers in front ot the brigade on a small hill and in Groveton's farm. The enemy kept up a lively artillery tire upon General Stevens' battery, planted ou our right wing about 200 paces to the rear, and also upon the woods occupied by us, while the enemy's skirmishers, trying to advance on the road, were warmly received by ours, and as they threw them- selves in stronger force against the skirmishers of the 8th regimeut, they were received on top of the hill by a volley of the 8th regiment; whereupon they fell back ami ceased firing. As the right wing seemed to have retreated, the brigade received the order at about 4 o'clock to move back slowly on the left of the road, and to take posi- tion ou the chain of hills to the left of Dogan's farm. Having been here but a short time, I received further orders to encamp behind Dogan's farm ; in consequence thereof I marched there, crossing Young's Branch and the turn-pike, took camp behind the 2nd brigade, where we remained over night. REPORT OF COLONEL X. C. M'LE VX, COMMANDING SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST (SCHEXCK'8) DIVISION, SIGEL'S CORPS. Camp at Ufton Hill, September 17, 1862. On the next day, 29th August, we were at an early hour marched forward in line of battle, on the extreme left, towards the enemy, with whom we were only engaged by our skirmishers. During the whole day we were in line of battle, and often exposed to fire from the artillery of the enemy, but otherwise we were not actively engaged ; our position was frequently changed ; sometimes advancing and sometimes retiring and expecting momentarily an attack. At onetime the division of General Reynolds look possession on my left and advanced a little beyond my front line ; but in a short time General Meade informed me that he had placed a battery which be had been compelled to withdraw on account of the superior force, in artillery which had been brought against it. and that the enemy were marching around on our left in such heavy force that he had decided to fall back immediately, aud he then marched the troops whicb had been a little in advance on my left to some point in my rear. I reported the facts to General Schenck and he then ordered me to fall back a short distance to another position, which was accordingly done. We remained here until near night, when we were placed in the position we occupied until the afternoon of the 30th. REPORT OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE B. HASKIXS, in, si ollli) ARTILLERY, M LEAN 8 BRIG WT. SCIIEXCK'S DIVISION, sigel's COUPS. Headquarters Bati ery K. Buffalo Fort. Virginia, September 17. 1862. Fighting resumed uext morning, Angusl 29, and engaged the enemy until about II a. m., when we ran out of ammunition, and, not being able to get more, were ordered to the rear, where we remained that and the following day, August 30Dh, until al t 5 p. m. 44 REPORT OF COLONEL ORLAND SMITH, COMMANDING SEVENTY-THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEERS, OF M'LEANS BRIGADE, schknck's DIVISION, sigel's CORPS. Langley, Virginia, Sept. 5, 1862. # * * * * # # On the 29th, although not actively engaged with the enemy, the regiment was con- stantly in the held, and in several instances under severe artillery fire, resulting in the wounding of seven persons of my command. The actual fighting service of the regiment during that day was confined to some slight skirmishing between Companies A and B and the enemy's sharpshooters. Never- theless, the frequent changes of position and preparations for action, continuing till a late hour at night, were fatiguing and harassing, taxing not only the patience and en- durance of the men, but very frequently their courage. report of brigadier-general carl schurz. Headquarters Third Division, Sigel's Corps, Camp near Minor's Hill, September 15, 1862. On the evening of the 28th of August my division was encamped south of the turn- pike leading from Centreville to Gainesville, near Mrs. Henry's farm. On the 29th, a little after 5 o'clock a. m., you ordered me to cross the turnpike, to deploy my division north of it, and to attack the forces of the enemy supposed to be concealed iu the woods immediately in my front, my division forming the right wing of your army corps. In obedience to your order I formed my division left in front, and, after having forded Young's Branch, deployed the 1st brigade, under Colonel Schimmelfenning, on the right, and the 2d brigade, under Colonel Krzyzanowski, on the left. There was a little farm-house in front of Colonel Schimmelfenuing's bri- gade, which he was ordered to take as a point of direction, and, after having passed it, to bring his right wing a little forward so as to execute a converging movement towards the 2nd brigade, and upon the enemy's left flank. The battery of the 2d bri- gade, Captain Rohmes, I ordered to follow the left wing of the brigade and to take a position on a rise of ground immediately on the left of a little grove, through which Colonel Krzyzanowski was to pass. The battery attached to Colonel Schimmelfen- ning's brigade was held iu reserve. As soon as the two (2) brigades, consisting of three (3) regiments each, had formed four (4) regiments in column by company iu the first Hue, and two (2) in column doubled iu the centre in reserve behind the intervals, the skirmishers advanced rapidly a considerable distance without finding the enemy. Arrived upon open ground behind the little patches of timber the division had passed through, I received from you the order to connect my line of skirmishers with General Milroy's on my left. I pushed my left wing rapidly forward into the long stretch of woods before me and found myself obliged to extend my line considerably in order to establish the connection with. General Milroy, which, however, was soon effected. Hardly had this been done when the fire commenced near the point where General Mil- roy's right touched my left. I placed the battery of the 2d brigade upon an elevation of ground about six hundred (600) or seven hundred (700) yards behind the point where that brigade had entered the woods a little to the left, so as to protect the re- treat of the regiments composing the left wing iu case they should be forced to fall back. The battery of the 1st brigade remained for the same purpo-e on high ground behind the woods in which Colonel Schimmelfenning was engaged, covering my right. When the fire of the skirmishers had been going on a little while two (2) prisouers were brought to me, sent by Colonel Schimmelfenning, who stated that there was a very large force of the enemy, Ewell's and Jackson's divisions, immediately in my front, and about the same time one of Colonel Schimmelfeuning's aides informed me tli.it heavy columns of troops were seen moving on my right flank, and that it could not be distinguished whether they were Union troops or rebels. I I hen withdrew the reserve regiment of the 2d brigade, the 54th New York, from the woods, so as to have it at my disposal in an emergency, and ordered Colonel Schim- melfenning to form one of his regiments front towards the right, and to send out skir- mishers in that direction, so as to ascertain the true condition of things there. Mean- while the fire in front had extended along the whole line and become very lively, my regiments pushing the enemy vigorously before them about one-half mile. The dis- charges of musketry increased in rapidity and volume as we advanced, and it soon be- came evident thai the enemy were throwing heavy masses against us. About that time General Steinwehr brought the 29th New York, under Colonel Soest, to my sup- port, and formed it in line ot battle on the edge of the roads behind a feuce. I then 45 without making any tLJg&tJTSl ^ SKST*^^^ coining up ,n my rear. Thus reassured about the safety of n.v J . f ,, ' IT more serious busiuess in tbe centre I sent the 54th w ■ V' right, and expecting order to fill up the gap to*0^*ttS^£*£S b^ffLSE? "^ *• diately afterward the enemy began to^i„3X ■p 8 ™ ' m ™' we soon rallied it again aid & er a SSJSSS^ S^ZS? "reuKrevTo^v taken from the enemy. It was about lOo'clock a. m. when an officer anSSSSJKeSS General Kearney had arrived on the battle-field and desired tosee i. e v . r ney requested me to shorten my front and condense my KJbfdSX J^SSSS^ to the left, bo as to make room for him on the right. I gave my fiSL fo cJSSl fecb.mmelienning accordingly, A short time afterward I discovered I .- wo smal regiments sent to my support had slipped in between my two brigaded and were v , pying par of my line in the woods. General Kearney was jnst moving m, his troons on my right when the enemy made another furious charge upon my centre The two regiments above mentioned as well as the 54th New York, broke and werethrown on of ': fW %£»£' v" T°? adva ™ D * ™P"Uy ^d in great force to th" i of the finest. Ihe 29 th New York poured several volleys into them, check in s tfie pursuit of the enemy «nly for a moment, and then fell back in good or der. The mo- ment was .cntica While endeavoring to rally my men again, I sent orders to the battery of the 2d brigade, whieh I had placed in position in the rear of my left wine to open hre upon the enemy who threatened to come out of the woods. This was done with very good effect, and the enemy was brought, to a stand almost instantaneously Meanwhile I succeeded ,n forming the 54th New York again, whose commander, Lieu- tenant-Colonel Ashby displayed much courage and determination and placed it en echelon behind the 29th New York, which advanced in splendid style upon the enemy in our centre. My extreme right, under Colonel Schimmelfenning, had stood firm, with the exception of the 8th Virginia, while the extreme left, under Colonel Krzyzanowski had contended every inch of ground against the heavy pressure of a greatly superior force. The conduct of the 75th Pennsylvania, which displayed the greatest firmn. - and preserved perfect order on that occasion, deploying and firing with tbe uf. regularity, deserves special praise. The 29th New York and the 54th New York had just re-entered the woods, when one of your aids presented to me for perusal a letter which you had addressed to General Kearney, requesting him to attack at once with his whole force, as the rebel General Longstreet, who was expected 'to reinforce the enemv during the day, had not vet arrived upon the battle-field, and we might hope to gain decisive advantages before his arrival. I then ordered a general advance of mv whole line, which was executed with great gallantry, the enemy yielding evervwhere before us. In this charge the 29th New York distinguished itself bv its firmness and in- trepidity. Its commander, Colonel Soest, while setting a noble example to his men, was wounded and compelled to leave the field. On my right, however, where General Kearney had taken position, all remained quiet, and it became clear to me thai be had not followed your request to attack simultaneously with me. I am persuaded it' Gen- eral Kearney had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the aftern that is to say, if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's lefl flank, envelop the latter by a change of direction to the left, we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing, and thus gained decisive results before General Long ■ ar- rival. As it was, I advanced and attacked alone. The light cam > to a stand on my left, at an old railroad embankment, running through the woods in a direction aim parallel to our front. From behind this cover the enemy poured a rapid and destruc- tive fire into our infantry, who returned volley for volley. Colonel Sohimmelfonii brigade on my right gained possession of this embankment, and advanced even be- yond it. but found itself obliged, by a very severe artillery and infantry fire, back. But the embankment remained in its possession. "While this was going on, the battery of the 1st brigade, under Captain I Ian was ordered to march along the outer edge of the woods in which Col. Schimmel- fening was engaged, and to take position there, in order to protect and facilitate the advance of my right; but the cross-fire of two of the enemy's batteries was that Captain Hampton's battery failed in two successive attempts to establish itsi until I sent Captain Rohmer's battery to its support, the place of the Latter being Idled by a battery brought from the reserve by General Steinwehr. At this juncture you put two pieces of the mountain-howitzer battery at my ■ posal. I ordered Major Koenig, of the 68th New York (temporarily attached to my staff), to bring them forward, and he succeeded in placing them into the lim skirmishers of Colonel Krzyzauowski's brigade, in so advantageous a position thai B few discharges sufficed to cause a backward movement of the enemy in front of my left. Now the whole line advanced with great alacrity, and we succeeded in drh 4G the enemy away from his strong position behind the embankment, when they fell into our hands on my let' t also. While this was going on I heard, from time to time, very heavy tiring on my left, where General Milroy stood. The sound of the musketry was swaying backward and forward, indicating that the right was carried on with alternate success. The con- nexion of my left with General Milroy's right was lost, and I found my left uncovered. However, we succeeded in holding the position of the railroad embankment along my whole front against the repeated attacks of the enemy, until about two (2) o'clock p. m., when my troops, who had started at five (5) o'clock in the morning, mostly with- out breakfast, had been under fire for eight (8) hours, had been decimated by enormous losses, and had exhausted nearly all their ammunition, were relieved by a number of regiments kindly sent by General for that purpose. These re-enforcements ar- rived in my front between one and two o'clock. According to your order I withdrew my regiments, one after another, as their places were filled by those of General Hooker. Thus the possession of that portion of the woods, which my division had taken and held, was in good order delivered to the troops that relieved me. I rallied my two brigades behind the hill on which the battery of the 2nd brigade had been in posi- tion. Hera the men took a new supply of ammunition, and for the first time on that day they received something to eat. From there you ordered me to take the position in the woods on the right of the open ground, where we encamped for the night. The two mountain-howitzers which had done such excellent service in the contest in the woods, I had left in position to co-operate with the troops who relieved me, and I am sorry to report that one of them was lost when these troops were temporarily driven back from the ground, the possession of which we had delivered to them. Exhausted and worn down as my men were, my division was unable to take part in the action after two (2) o'clock p. m., nor was I called upon to do so. REPORT OF LIEUT. COLONEL G. A. MUHLECK, SEVENTY-THIRD PENNSYLVANIA, COM- MANDING FIRST BRIGADE, SCHURZ'S DIVISION, SIGEL'S CORPS. In the night, from Friday to Saturday, the above brigade bivouacked in the corner of a woods in the rear and south of those woods where Gen. Carl Schurz's division on the day before (Friday) had had a terrible encounter with the enemy, who were at- tacked and thrown by him, and driven at the point of the bayonet clear through the woods, over the railroad embankment. We formed on that morning the extreme left wing of the 2nd divisiou, to which this brigade had been attached in the course of the preceding day, while the whole division was drawn up as a reserve to those troops of ours which held the battle-field overnight. REPORT OP COLONEL KRZYZANOWSKI, COMMANDING SECOND BRIGADE, SCHUKZ S DIVIS- ION, SIGEL'S CORPS. Near Arlington Heights, September 3, 1862. At about half past five o'clock a. m., on the 29th of August, I received orders from General Schurz to advance with my brigade. It was done in the following order : Two regiments in company column, left in front, and one regiment, the 54th New York Volunteers, as reserve. On the right of me was Colonel Schimelpfenuig with his brigade, and on the left General Milroy's brigade. A line of skirmishers having been established we advanced towards the woods, through which the Manassas Gap Railroad runs. As soon as we entered the woods I dispatched my adjutant to ascertain whether the line of skirmishers was kept up on both wings, and finding such was not the case and that I had advanced a little faster than General Milroy's and Colonel Schimel- pfennig's column, I halted my skirmishers to wait until the liue was re-established. However, being informed that General Milroy was advancing, I seut the 54th Regiment to take position on my right wing and try to find the lines of Colonel Schimelpfeunig's skirmishers, and then I advanced together with the former. Scarcely had the skir- mishers passed over two hundred yards when they became engaged with the enemy. For some time the firing was kept up, but our skirmishers had to yield at last to the enemy's advancing column. At this time I ordered my regiments up and a general engagement ensued. However, I soon noticed that the 54th and 58tn Regiments had to fall back, owing to the furious lire of the enemy, who had evidently thrown his furees t selusively upon those : two regiments. The 75th Regiment Pennsylvania Volun- teers, which, up to this time, had not taken part in this engagement, was (at the time the 58th and 54th retired) now nobly led on by L eutenant-Colonel Mahler, upon the right flank of the enemy, and kept him busy until I had brought the 58th at a double quick up to its previous position, when those two regiments successfully drove the enemy before them, thereby gaining the position of the Manassas Gap Railroad. 47 The 54th had meanwhile heen ordered by General Schurz to take position with the 29th Regiment New York State Volunteers in the interval of uiy brigade and that of Colonel Schimelplening. At this time I observed on my right the brigade of General Roberts, to whom I explained my position, after which we advanced together a short distance : but he soon withdrew his forces, ascertaining that he got his brigade in between the column of onr division. We had occupied the above-named position only a short time when the enemy again tried to force us back, but the noble conduct of my troops did not allo\< him to carry out bis design, and he did not gain one inch of ground. We were thus enabled to secure our wounded and some of our dead, and also some of the enemy's wounded belonging to the 10th South Carolina Regiment. We held this position until two p. m., wheu we were relieved by a brigade of General Kearney's division, and retired about one-fourth of a mile toward our rear, where we also encamped for the night. Most nobly did the troops behave. AmoDgst the officers I must mention the names of LieuteDaut-Colonel Mahler, 75th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers: Lieuten- ant Gehrke, of the same regiment, who was in command of the skirmishers; and Lieutenant W. Bowen, who was, on that day, acting adjutant of that regiment, of the officers of the 58th Regiment New York State Volunteers, I have to make par- ticular mention of the gallant conduct of Major William Henkel, who was wounded, but who remained for three hours longer on the battle-field until his pains became too violent; also of the adjutant, Lieutenant Stoldt, of that regiment, who did valu- able service with the skirmishers. Of the 54th Regiment New York State Volun- teers, Lieutenant-Colouel Ashby and Adjutant Brandt deserve great credit. The dif- ferent members of my staff executed my orders promptly; Captain Theune being severely wounded whilst performing his duty, acd Lieutenant Schmidt most gallantly cheered the men and conducted the line of skirmishers to my greatest satisfaction. Captain Maluski and Captain Weide did valuable service on that day. report of colonel joseph b. carr, commanding brigade of brigadier- general joseph hooker's division, neintzelman's corps. Headquarters Third Brigade, Hooker's Division, Camp near Fort Lyox. Virginia, September (J, 1862, * * * * * * At two (2) o'clock Friday morning, August 29, I received orders to march at three a. m. and support General Kearney who was in pursuit of the enemy. A march oi ten miles brought us to the Bull Ruu battle-field. About eleven (11) a. in. was ordered in position to support a battery in front of the woods, where the enemy with General Sigel's troops was engaged. Remaining about one hour in that position, was ordered to°send into the woods and relieve two regiments of General Sigel's corps. I sent in the 6th and 7th New Jersey Volunteers. Afterwards received orders to take the balance of the brigade in the woods, which I did at about two (2) p. m. I lei. 1 at once engaged the enemy, and fought him for a space of two hours, holding my position until our ammunition was all expended. About four (4) o'clock we were relieved by General Reno and Colonel Tavlor, but did not reach the skirt of the woods before a retreat was made and the woods occupied by the enemy. W hen I arrived out ot the woods I was ordered to march about half a mile to the rear and bivouac tor the nijjht. REPORT OF COLONFL J. W. REVERE, SEVENTH NEW JERSEY VOLUNTE1 RS, CARR'S BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION, heintzelman's CORPS. In the Field, near Centreviixe, Virginia, August 30, Sin: I have the honor to report that this regiment, being ordered into the woods with the Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, proceeding [proceeded] to occupy them, reliev- ing a New York regiment of General Steinwehr's division, on the 29th instant at 11 a. m., on the extreme right of the position of our part of the army. Advancing about fifty yards we encountered the enemy's pickets and a .sp rited engagement ensued with varying success ; and having been relieved bj .1 . t, > ad vanceof the Sixth Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers, we drove the enemj from his position, but, having been strongly reinforced, he regained it about 1 p. m. 48 The battle then recommenced, aud we held our ground, as ordered to do so, nntil 2.30 p. m., when our ammunition beginning to fail we were regularly relieved by the troops in reserve. Oar soldiers went into the action greatly fatigued from the hot pursuit of the enemy in the forenoon and the previous day, but fought with great courage and determina- tion, and held their ground until relieved against three reliefs of the enemy iu front successivelv. All did well; but I particularly desire to mention a piece of notable gallantry ou the part of Corporal Frederick Kock. Sergeant Onslow, our color-bearer, having been struck down, the colors fell, and Cor- poral Kock seized the colors, and, elevating them aloft, stuck the staff into his belt- roll, still tiring his musket on the advancing enemy. 1 have recommended him to a second lieutenancy for his bravery aud example to the rest. I am deeply pained to report that Captain Jos. Abbott, Company E, died nobly at his post while bravely discharging his duty in the coolest manner. He is a great loss to his country aud the service. # » - * s * report of lieutenant-colonel w. j. sewei.i.. commanding fifth new jersey volunteers, (.mill's brigade, hooker's division, heintzelman's corps. Headquarters Fifth New Jersey Volunteers, Near Alexandria, September 5, 1862. Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the regi- ment under my command at the battle of Bull Run, August 29th, 1862 : I received orders to deploy my right wing as skirmishers in front of the brigade, in an open wood. As soon as the line advanced to where the line of another division had previously been, tiring commenced on both sides, continuing up to the time the brigade was relieved. I was soon obliged to relieve my right wing with my left wing, the former having emptied their cartridge-boxes, containing sixty rounds. The men thus relieved I posted in the rear of the line of battle to prevent stragglers from leaving the fight. The brigade having been relieved by General Reno's brigade, as I was forming the regiment this last brigade fell back in disorder. I endeavored to stop them, but rind- ing that the enemy were almost up to my line, deployed in the rear; aud now beiug formed, having divided their cartridges equally, I saw that it was time for me to take care of my command. A part of the 8th New Jersey, with their colors, formed ou my left. The enemy having turned the left flank of the line of battle, came out on the open field on my left, and immediately after I received their fire from the front, which I returned, driving them from our immediate vicinity, and then marched to join the brigade. The following is a list of the casualties, which are large in proportion to the number of men in the regiment. 1 entered the tight with 350 men. repor1 of i ieutenan1 colonel s. j. m'gkoartz, commanding sixty-first ohio volunteers, of first brigade, schurz's division, sigel's corps. Camp Carl Sciiurz, Minor's Hill, September 13, 1 - On the uext morning when we advanced the 61st was posted in a wood on th right in reserve. A few moments afterwards our skirmishers became engaged ; the: one and two companies, then five, then the whole regiment advanced, the ?4th bain, on our right. We advanced about a mile and a half, pushing the enemy before us an- driving them over the railroad, over which we followed them through a ravine aud u to a corn-field where we, iu turn, were driven back, but rallied at the railroad whicu we held until relieved at 2J p. m. The severe firing here was very effective. At that time we understood that we were surrounded, and being ordered to make a bayonet charge relieved ourselves from our position. We were then relieved. About one hour and a half afterwards our men were repulsed aud fell back through the woods. We were again called up to form in line of battle and advance. We thereupon moved into the woods and remained all night. 49 REPORT OF MAJOR F. BLESSING, COMMANDING SEVENTY-FOURTH PENNSYLVANIA VOL- UNTEERS, OF FIRST BRIGADE, SCHDRZ'S DIVISION, SIGEL'S CORPS. * * * * * # » At 5 o'clock a.m.. \ngnst the 29tb, we left this place, meeting our brigade com- manded by Colonel A. Schiinmelfennig, at 6 o'clock. Alter a rest of abont fifteen min- utes the regiment was ordered to take its position on the extreme righl of the army corps then advancing. Under cover of skirmishers in the front and right flank we advanced in quick time over an open Held until we arrived at the centre of the woods, where in an opening we halted. The skirmishers met the skirmishing line of the enemy, opened tire, and drove them into the woods. Forced by the heavy artilery fire of the enemy, we changed several times our positions. From the right flank came the report that a strong column was advancing, but that it was impossible to recognize whether friend or foe. It was afterward ascertained to b~ General Kearney's corps for onrrelief. The regiment was then ordered to the left, where it took its position in the general battle-line, after advancing about 400yards under the heavy fire of the enemy, driving the latter back and out of his positions, but by the withdrawing of a regime t st 'turned on the left of the 74th, the enemy took advantage, and, outflanking us, we were forced back about 100 yards. Forming again in column for attack, the regiment advanced in quirk time fcowa"d the enemy, who gave way until he arrived at the other side of the railroad dam. Here, again flanked by the enemy and under a galling tire of grape shot and canister, the regiment had to leave its position, which it did by mak- ing a flank movement to the left, forcing the enemy to withdraw from the woods. We advai cod over our former position, capturing an ambulance with two wounded officers, to the seam of the woods. At this point, a heavy shower oi grape-shot and canister pouring into us, we withdrew to the railroad dam. After resting here for ab.i ,g thirty minutes, we were ordered by General Schnrz to support a battery on the ex- treme right, keeping in that position till the battery left. We then again joined our brigade. Wearied and exhausted, we camped for the night ou the same ground tiie enemy held the night previous. report of major steven kovacs, fifty- fouhth new york volunteers, second brigade, schurz's division, sigel's coups. Camp near Arlington Heights, September 12, 1862. Sir : T have the honor to report that on the 29th of August, 1862, the 54th regiment, New York State Volunteers, was drawn up in line of battle at 6 o'clock a. ai., at Manassas, and ordered for reserve by General Schnrz ; at 8 o'clock, by h s orders, was sent to iln- w Is to drive ont the enemy, and found them in large force. The regiment instantly became engaged, and it held the woods in spite of the superior numbers until 1 o'cl ck, when u was relieved by another regiment. In this engagement theofficers and men behaved themselves bravely, especially the 2d color bearer, William Rausch- muller, who, seeing his comrade (the, 1st color-bearer) fall, instantly seized the flag ai d at the same time he cared for his wounded comrade, took him to the rear, and immed-- ately returned again to his proper place. After this the regiment was ordered to fall back to another wood about half a mile distant, with the ord r to be in coll i by division, to be ready for any emergency, and the regiment remained under anus all night. REPORT OF CAPTAIN F. BRAUM, COMMANDING FIFTY-EIGHTH NEW YORK VOL1 Nl SECOND BRIGADE, SCHURZ'S DIVISION, SIGEL'S CORPS. Camp near Arlington Heights, September 12, 1862. and missin REPORT OF CAPTAIN M. WEIDRICK, COMMANDING BATTERY I, FIRST REGIMENT NEW YORK ARTILLERY, SCHURZ'S DIVISION, SIG EL S CORPS. Four De Kalb, September L3, l-' ; '-'- * * * * Went, into action on the 29th at about 10 o'clock a. ..... when we ™«fl^*£ ward by Captain Schirmer, chief of artillery. Alter advancing a short distan 4 G 50 •were met by Major-General Sigel, who ordered me to take a position on the right of the road to support the infantry in ease they should be driven back. A ter remaining in this position about half an hour Major-General Sigel eame to me and ordered me ahead with the four parrot gnus to support Captain Dilger's battery, which order was executed as promptly as possible by taking a position ou which the enemy bad the range with one of his batteries; but in about fifteen minutes after we opened fire on it. if was silenced. We kept our position until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when our ammunition gave out, and we were obliged to retire to get a new supply. Alter getting the ammunition we started 'again to take our foi mer position, but find- ing that Captain Diekman was there with his battery, I returned to where I had left my two howitzers iu the forenoon. Soou after coming in action there, Lieutenant Scbenkelberger had his 1- g shattered by a shell; also Private William Moller, the arm; both of which had to be amputated. After using up the remainder of our ammunition, I retired with my battery to uear Major-General Sigel's headquarters, where I remained during the nigbt. On this day we had one piece dismoun ed, and on another the axle shor through ; but I am happy to say that we brought all of the pieces out of the reach of the euemy. Report of captain h. dilger, commanding battkry i, first ohio volunteers, schurz's division, sigel's corps. Camp near Miner's Hill, September 16, 1862. # » * # ** * * On Friday, the 29 h of August, the battery was ordered, under the protection of Col- onel Kolte's brigade, to the support of General Schenck's division upon the left flank of the 1st corps. I advanced to the left of the road and took position upon the outer- most elevation in our front, just opposite a large battery of the enemy, which, mount- ing about ten guns, was posted upon the hill enclosing the valley. After two hours' incessant tiring, the enemy's guns were sileuced for a while, in con- sequence, no doubt, of the successive explosu n of two of their caissons. During this pause, which was improved to prepare the battery for the continuance of the contest for the important position, opportunity was also afforded me to support the infantry on our tight, that had been compelled to fall back across the railroad track, with two pieces of artillery posted on the right of my battery. The enemy's battery, however, was not long in making its appearance again. I engaged it until Wiedrich's battery and two pieces of Diekman's battery were sent, by my request, through order of Gen- eral Sigel, to my assistance, and after I had exhausted all my ammunition, of which there was not an oversnpply, to my relief; by this time the fire of the euen.y slack- ened its concentration upon this position. The loss 1 sustained during this engagement, which lasted four hours, was twenty- two horses and four men slightly wounded. The damage to the guus was slight, so that they could be repaired iu the evening. REPORT OF MAJOR CIIARLES M'LEAN KNOX, COMMANDING REGIMENT, SCHENCK'S DIVIS- ION, SIGEL'S CORPS. Movements of 9th Neiv York Cavalry daring the month's campaign ending Sep. 12, 1862. * * # * * ■ * Aug. 21), 1862. — We lay all day in rear of our forces, as a reserve during the battle. REPORT OF BRIGADIER R. C. SCHENCK (BY COLONEL WM. H. CHESEBROUGH, A. D. C. AND A. A. A. G., SCHENCK'S DIVISION, SIEGEL's CORPS). Washington, D. C, September 17, 1862. * * * * # # * On Thursday, 29th ultimo, we left Buckland's Mills, passing through Gainesville, and proceeded on the Manassas Junction pike to within some four miles of that place, and then turned eastwardly, marching toward " Hull Run." The scouts iu advance reported a force of the enemy, consisting of infantry and cavalry iu front. We were 51 hurried forward and formed line of battle with onr right toward Centreville. Some few s: ell were thrown into a clump of w oda in front where tin- enemy w< re lasl se< n. but without eliciting any response. Some two hours elapsed when heavy firing was heard on our left, which we concluded was from McDowell'* coi ps, ami t» u enemy who had worked around from our front in that direction. We were immediately put in motion and marched on the Warrentqn road and took position fur the ni<*ht on a hill east of the -'stone honse," our right resting on the pike. On Friday morning early the engagement was commenced by General Milroy on onr right, in which we soon after took par .ami a rapid artillery lire ensued from both sides. For some time h avy c Inmns of the enemy could be seen filing out of a wood in front and gradually tailing back. They were within range of onr guns, which we e turned on them, and must have done some execution. An hour after, we received the order to move one brigade by the flank to the left and advance, which was done. We here obti iued a good posi- tion for artillery, and stationed I_)e Beck's 1st Ohio Battery, which d d excellenl serv- ice, dismounting one of (he enemy's guns, blowing up a caisson and silencing the bat- tery. Unfortunately, however, they were poorlj supplied with ammunition, and soon compelled to withdraw. Onr two brigades were n pushed on across the open space in front and took position in the woods beyond. We here dis- covered thai we were on the battle-ground of the uight before, and found the ho-pi al of Gibbon's brigade who hail engaged the enemy. The battery of the enemy still con- tinued. We had no artillery. D< Beck's and Schirmer's ammunition having giveu out, an I Ihiell's battery which had reported, after a hot contest with the enemy (who had every advantage in position and range), was compelled to retire. It was now determined t" think the battery and capture ii, and for this purpose General Schenck ordrred one of his aids to reconnoiter the position. Before be returned, however, we were n quested b\ General Milroy to assist him, as he was very heavily pressed. General Stahel was immediately ordered to proceed with his biigade to Milroy's support. It was aboal this time, 01 e or two o'clock, that a line of skirmishers were observed approaching i s from the rear ; they prov« d tobeoi Geueral Reynolds. We communicated with General Kc\ m.lds at once, who took his position on our left, a il at (Ie ieral Seheuck's si tio'n he sent a battery to our right in the woods for thepurposeof Hanking theei emy. They secured a p sition and were engaged with him about ;m hour, hut with what result we were not informed. General Reynolds now sent us word that he had dis- covered the enemy bearing down upon his left in heavy columns, and t hat he intended to fall back to the Hist wo nd that after- ward, when Geueral Reynolds was bringing up Ransom's battery anil Seymour's brigade, they were gone, which accounts for his impression that "he was lett alone." He soon discovered his error, however, as he states in his letter, "in doi, g which McLean's brigade was discovered." Colom l McLean still held his position, and was immediately moved so that his right would rest on the pike, and General Reynolds made his movement to coirespond. li was about this time that our position was el .a ged, but not because we had ascer- tained Hint we were disconnected with the rest of Sigel's troops. We had been and were well aware of our position. It is true we had advanced further than was intended, b'ing constantly urged by Gei eial Sigel to advance, and pressed towaids the right, he evidently not understand- ing onr true position. We fell back, however, on account of the informal ion received from General Reynolds that the enemy were bearing down on his left. General Rey- noldsdid uol communicate directly w iili General Schenck, as i< would ap ear from my report, but tie information was received through Colonel McLean, who told General Schcuck that Genera] Reynolds bad informed him " that the cue my were bearing down, &c, and that he (Reynolds) intended to fall back, and has actually commenced the movement.'' Colonel McLean wished to know if he should act accordingly. General Scl enck directi v |y across the open space to and within the woods and halted. Gen- era; Sialic! rejoined us here, and General Stevens also reported w itli two regiments of infantry and a battery. General Stevens' force was thrown to the right of the pike, 53 General Stahel on the left of the pike, and Colonel McLean to the left of Stahel I hen- state m my report that General Schenck, on receiving these re-en forceuients "de- termined to advance again, and communicated his intention to General Reynolds I earned tins message myself, and after some, difficulty found General Reynolds and requested him to halt and form on the left of McLean. He had fallen hark however some distance to the rear of McLean's line of battle, so ranch so that the enemy's skirmishers had actually Hanked us. and in returning to the division I had a narrow escape from being captured. 1 also asked General Reynolds to ride forward to meet General Schenck, who had dir.-cted me to sav that he would lie at the extreme hit of our line lor that purpose. General Reynolds neither gave me any positive answer as to whether he would meet General Schenck or any information as to what he intended to do. 1 do not know if lie complied with the request to make his connection on nnr 1 ft. as, on my return to General Schenck, 1 was immediately sent to General Si«*el to represent our position ; and when returning again with the'order to General Schenck to retire slowly, I met the command executing the movement. My report was intended merely as a sketch of our movements for General Sigel's information, and 1 endeavored throughout to be as concise as possible, and confine my- self solely to the operations and movements of our division. 1 now submit the ah >ve statement, trus iug that the explanations will be satisfactory to General Reyuolds. REPORT OF COLONEL WILLIAM BLAISDKLL, ELEVENTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS, GKOVEU'S B1UGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION, HEINTZKLMAN'S CORPS. Camp near Alexandria. Va., September 11. I*i62. After supporting several batteries the regiment was ordered to move forward and en- gag the enemy. At. about '■'< p. m., advancing ahout one mile to the edge of a heavy wood, then deploying and moving forward in line of battle until within range of the enemy's pickets, the line was halted, bayonets fixed. Aguu moving forward, driving the enemy's pickets before if, the regiment came upon anil engaged a heavy line of the enemy's infantry, which was driven back and over a lino of railroad, where tin 1- bed was ten feet high, behind which was posted a -other heavy line of infantry, wh ch opened a terrific fire upon the regiment as it emerged from the woods. The llth Reg- iment being the battalion of direction, wis the first to reach the railroad, and of course received the heaviest of the tire. This staggered the men a little, but recovering in an instant, they gave a wild hurrah and over they went, inouuting the embankment, driving everything before them ac the point of the bayonet. Here, for two or three minutes, the struggle wis very severe, the combatants exchanging shots, their mus- kets almost muzzle to muzzle, and engaging hand to hand in deadly encounter. Pri- vate John Sawler, of C pany D, stove in the skull of one rebel with the butt of his nuisket and killed another with his bayonet. The enemy broke in confusion and ran, numbers throwing down their muskets, some fully cocked, and the owners too much t'r ghtened to tire them, the regiment pursuing them some eighty yards into the wo. ids, where it was met by an overwhelming force in front, at the same time receivi ig an artillery tire, which enfiladed our left and forced it to retire, having the dead ami many of the wounded wheie they fell. It was near the railroad einba il< ut t lal t ln- brave Tileston, Stone, and Port r, and other gallant men, received their mortal wounds. Being thus over owered by numerical odds, after breaking through and scat ering two lines of the enemy, and compelled to evacuate the woods and enter int.. tl p in fields beyond, the eneniy pursuing us hotly to the edge of the woods, I was greatly amazed to find that the regiment had been sent to engage a force o( more than live tin numbers, strongly posted in thick woods and behind heavy embankments, and nol a soldier to support it in case of disaster. After collecting the reginieni together and moving back io our original position, we encamped for the night. The officer* and men of the regiment fought with the most desperate bravery; not a man flinched, ami the losses were proportion itelv severe. Out of two hundred and eighty-three officers and men who participated in the fight, three officers and seven enlisted me i were killed, three officers and seventy-four enlisted men were wounded, and twenty-hve missing, making an aggregate of ten killed, seventy-seven wounded, and twenty five missing, all in the space of fifteen or twenty minutes. The regiment bivouacked on the field. 54 REPORT OF LIEUTENANT- COLONEL R. THOMPSON, COMMANDING ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA VOLUNTEERS, CAKli'S BRIGADE, HOOKER'S DIVISION, HK1NT- ZELMAN'S CORPS. Camp near Alexandria, Sej). 6, 1862. ******* In the action of tlie 29th ultimo, at Bull Rim, moved into the woods with brigade, taking position assigned by commandant of the brigade, my right Hank connecting with the left of the Seventh New Jersey, my left flank connecting with the right of the Sixth New Jersey. After I had taken my first position, which was about twenty yards in rear of the road in front of the woods, by permission of the commandant I moved my command forward to the road to support the Seventh New Jersey and gain a position in which I could deliver a more eff-ctive tire upon the enemy. During the engagement my command charged across the road up to the ravine behind which the enemy were concealed. Owing to the strength of the position and weight of lire from an immense body of the enemy, were obliged to fall back to their original position, which, I am proud to record, they maintained during the engagement, until relieved. During this charge I sustained a heavy loss, the am tint of which it is impossible to ascertain. Many of those returned as missing met their death in this charge. Alter being relieved I moved to my original position, where I encamped for the night. report of lieutenant-colonel g. c. burling, commanding sixth new jersey volunteers, caril's brigade, hooker's division, heintzklman's coups. Camp near Fort Lyon, Alexandria, Virginia, September 4, 1862. * * # * * * * Friday, August 29, left camp at 3 a. m., pursuing them through Centreville, down the Warrenton road, crossing Bull Run at 10 a. in. At 11 a. m. we formed a line of battle ami advanced into the woods to relieve one of General Sigel's regiments, where we, round t ie enemy in force behind the embankment of an old railroad ; after deliver- ing and receiving several volleys we charged and drove the enemy from his position, when he received re-enforcements and we were compelled to full back nearly fifty yards, which position we held until we were relieved by the 2d Maryland Regiment. (Dining this engagement Colonel G. M >tt and Major S. R. Gilkyson, while gallantly encouraging their men, were wounded.) We encamped in the open held for the night. report oe captain george hoffman, commanding regiment, carr's brigade, iiook- eli's division* hmn'izelman's corps. Camp Eighth Regiment. New Jersey Volunteers, Near Alexandria, Va., September 10, 1862. * * * * * * * The march was resumed very early in the morning, the 29th halting at Ceutre- Aille lor a time, and arriving at Bull Run battle-field at meridian, when we were immediately ordered to the front, and stacked arms in a ravine, near a dense wood, lor a short rest. After a rest of an hour we advanced in line of battle into the wood, under a heavy and rapid lire from the enemy, whose exact position we were unable ai a moment to discover. After a short time a huge force of the enemy, consisting of a brigade, was observed passing round our left Hank, when the regiment was or- dered l>y Acting Major Fuite to retire, Colonel Ward having in the mean time been severely wounded. The enemy in passing to the left poured into the regiment a most galling and destructive lire, throwing it lor the moment into confusion : ii was, how- ever, rallied by its few remaining officers (Acting Major Fuite being killed by a shot in the head) on the edge of ihe wood, hi no of bat t le was immediately formed, our right rest ug on the left of tlie Fifth. We at once became engaged, and for twenty minutes poured into Ihe ranks of the enemy so destructive a lire as to cause him to si auger. lie, however, rallied, but was again met by the same sharp lire, and the ai tillery, for- tunately opening at this time, swept him from the Hank, and the attempt to outflank us on the hit was not again repeated. Our ammunition being entirely expended, we retired by the right Hank for a supply, the ammunition train being to the right and rear some t wo hundred v aids. Alter receiving a supply of ammunition, under orders we retired to rear of the artillery, and bivouacked for the night. The command, during the latter part of the day, devolved upon Captain Hoffman, and he being in- 55 jnred from a fall, still later, the command devolved upon Captain Johnson. Tin- loss in this day's engagement was .severely felt, Acting Major Fnite being killed, and Lien- tenant-Colouel William Ward being severely wounded; there were also thirty- three non-commissioned officers and privates killed and wounded— eight killed, twenty-live wounded. report of brigadper-general georlle svkes, commanding second division, fitz- joiin pouter's coups. Camp at Vanderwenker's, Virginia, September (i, 1862. Sir: T have the honor to submit the following report: On the 27th ultimo, General F. J. Porter's army corps, of which my division forms a part, effected a junction with the army of Virginia, under General Pope. The day following we marched to Brislow Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad ; thence on the "29th to Manassas, and westwardly towards Gainesville, mak- ing a demonstration against the enemy and exchanging a few cannon-shot with him in the evening. We bivouacked for the night near Bethlehem Church, on the Gaines- ville road. CONFEDERATE REPORTS OF THE OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29, 1862. The following comprise *"he principal reports of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under General liobert B. L^e, relative to the action of Friday, 29th of August, 1862, at Manassas Plains, by which it will he seen that, according to General Lee, "the battle raged with great fury' 1 ; that in one part of the field there were "several hours of severe fighting"; that the contest was "close and obstinate," and that the attacks were made by the Union forces, and that "the battle continued until !) p. in.." thus confirming t e Union reports as to the character of that d.i\'s con- test.— ( Vide 2 vols. Official Reports Army Northern Ya. Richmond, 1804. U. S. Mil. Acad. Library.) REPORT OF GENERAL R. E. LEE, OF THE FIRST DAY, SECOND BULL RUN, AUGUST 29, 1862. [" Rebellion Record," Frank Moore, sometimes cited as " Putnam's Rebellion Record," vol. '■', page 277, lelt-uaud column, seventh line from top.] The next morning, the twenty-ninth, the enemy had taken a position to interpose his army between General Jackso and Alexandria, and about 10 a. m. opened with artillery upon the right of Jackson's line. The troops of the latter were disposed in renr of Groveton, along the line of the unfinished branch of the Manassas Gap Kailroad, and extended from a point a short distance west of the turnpike toward Smiley Mill. Jackson's division, under Brigadier-General Starke, being or. the right : Ewells, under General Lawt. n, in the center, and A. P. Hill on the left, The Federal Army was evi- dently concentrating upon Jackson, with the design of overwhelming him beloie the arrival of Lougstreet. The latter officer leit his position, 0] site Warrenton Springs, on the 26th, being relieved by General K. H. Anderson's division, and marched to ioin Jackson. He crossed at Kinson's (Hiuson's) Mill in the afternoon and encamped near Orleans that night. The next .lay he reached the White Plaius.hiS ma, eh being retarded by the want of cavalry to ascertain the meaning of certain movements ol the enemy from the direction of Warrenton, who seemed to menace the i ight ol hiscolumii. On the 28th, arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, h- found the enemy prepared to dispute his progress. General D. R. Jones" division being ordered to for. 6 the passaged the mountain, quickly dislodged the enemy's sharp-sh. oters from the trees and rockB and advanced into the gorge. The enemy held the eastern extremity ol the pass in large force, and directed a heavy fire of artillery upon the road hading through i wdnwj the sides of the mountain. The ground occupied by Jones afforded no "I'j"' ""' the employment of artillery. Hood, with two brigades, and \\ ilcoz , w th tbre ord, red to turn the enemy's right-the former moving oyer the mountain by * . narroj path to the left of the pass, and the latter farther to the north, by H°V™f ™«J Before these troops reached their destination the enemy advanced and attacked Jones left, under Brigadier-General G. T. Anderson. Being vigorously repulsed, with drew to his position at the eastern end of the gap, from which he kept np .... aotiV< 56 file of artillery uutil dark, and then retreated. Generals Jones and Wilcox bivouacked that night east, of the mountain, and ou the morniug of the "29t'i the whole com- mand resumed the march, the sound of cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had already opened with artillery upon Jackson's right, as pre- viously described. He immediately placed some of his batteries in position, but before be could complete his dispositions to attack, the e eniy withdrew, not, however, with- out loss from our artillery. Longstreet took possession (position '?) on the rigbt of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turn- pike, and at light angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brig- ades under General Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under General Kemper. D. R. Jones' divis on formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right being under General Stuart in person. After the arrival of Longstreet, the enemy changed bis position, and began to concentrate opposite J ckson's left , opening a brisk artillery fire, which was responded to with effect by some of General A. P. Hill's batteries. Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position between Generals Jackson and Longstreet, by order of the lat'er, and engaged the enemy vig- orously for several hours. Soon afterwards General Stuart reported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoe Station, threatening Lougstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox were sent to re-enfofce General Jones, but no serious attack was made, and after firing a few shots the enemy withdrew. While this dem- onstration was being made ou our right, a large force advanced to assail the left of J .ckson's position, occupied by the divisiou of General A. P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops with their accustomed steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. The enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but. again pressed ou tin- attack with tiesh troops. Once he succeeded in penetrating an interval between General Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, and that of General Thomas, but was quickly driven back, with great slaughter, by the 14th South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, and the 49h Georgia, of Thomas' brigade. The contest was close and obstinate; the combatants sometimes delivered their fire at ten paces. General Gregg, who was most expos, d, was re-enforced by Hays' brigade, under General Foruo, and suc- cessfnlly and gallanth resisted the attack of the enemy until, the ammunition of his brigade being exhausted and all it field-officers but, two killed or wounded, it was relieved, after several houis of severe fighting, by Early's brigade aud the 8th Lou- isiana Regiment. General Early drove the enemy back with heavy loss, and pursued about two hun- dred yards beyond the 1 ne of battle, when he was recalled to the position on the rail- road, where Thomas, Pender, and Archer had firmly held their ground against every attack. While the battle was raging on Jackson's left, General Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but liefore the order could be obeyed Hood was himself ai lacked, and his command at once became warmly engaged. General Wilcox was re- called from the right and ordered to advance on Hood's left, and one of Kemper's brig- ades, under Colonel Hnuton, moved forward on his right. The enemy was repulsed by Hood after a severe contest, and fell back, closely followed by our troops. The battle continued until 9 p. in., the enemy letreating until he had reached a strong p si- tion, which he held with a large force. The darkness of the night put a stop to the engugen ent, and our troops remained in their advanced position until early next morning, when they were withdrawn to their first line. One piece of artillery, several stands of colors, and a number of prisoners woe captured. Our loss was severe in 1 his engagement. Brigadier-Generals Field and Trimble and Colonel Foruo, command- ing Hays' brigade, were severely wounded, aud several oth-r valuable officers killed or disabled, whose names are mentioned in the accompanying reports. report of lieutenant-general j. longstreet. Headquarters near Winchester, Va., October lOlh, 1862. Early on the 29th (August) the columns were united, and the advance to joiu Gen- eral Jackson was resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gaines- ville. The inarch was quickened to the extent of our capacity. The excitement of bat- tle seemed fco give new life and strength to our jaded men, and the head of my column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank and within easy cai non-shot. i approaching the field some of Brigadier-General Hood's batteries were ordered into position, and his division was deployed ou the right aud left of the turnpike, at .57 right angles with it, and supported by Brigadier-General Evans' brigade. Before these batteries could open, the enemy di>covered our movements and withdrew bis left. An- other battery (Captain Stri hi tag's) was placed upon a commanding position to my right, wbicb played upon the rear of the enemy's left and drove hi n entir Iv from that part of The field. He changed his front rapidly, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans. Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown forward to the support of the left, and three others, under General Kemper, to the support of the right of tbesecom- niands. General D. R. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas Gap Railroad to the right and in echelon with regard to the three last brigades. Colonel Walton placed bis batteries in a commanding position between my line and that of General Jackson, and engaged the enemy tor several hours in a severe and successful artillery dael. At a late hour in the day Major-General Stuart reported the approach of tin emy in heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, with histhree brigades, from the left, and placed his command in position to support. Jones in case of an attack against my right. After some few shots the enemy withdrew his forces, moving them around towards his front, and about four o'clock in the afternoon began to press forward against General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades were moved back to their former position, and Hood's two brigades, su ported by Evans, were quickly pressed forward to the attack. At the same time Wilcox's three brigades niade a like advance, as also Hnnton's brigade, of Kemper's command. These movements were executed with commendable zeal and ability. Hood, sup- ported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driving the euemy back till nine o'clock at night. One piece of artillery, several regimental standards, and a number of prison- ers were taken. The enemy's entire force was found to be massed directly in my front, and in so strong a position that it was not deemed advisable to move on against his immediate front; so the troops were quietly withdrawn at one o'clock the following morning. The wheels of the captured piece were cut down, and it was 1 t't on the ground. The enemy seized that opportunity to claim a victory, and the Federal com- mander was so impudent as to dispatch his government, by telegraph, tidings to that effect. After withdrawing from the attack, my troops were placed in the line first occupied, and in the original order. Daring the day Colonel S.D.Lee, with his reserve artillery, placed in the position occupied the day previous by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy in a very severe artillery combat. The result was, as the day previous a success. At half past three o'elo k in the afternoon I rode to the front for the purpose of completing arrangements for making a diversion in favor of a flank movement then under contemplation. Just after teaching my front line 1 received a message for reinforcements for General Jack son, who was said to be severely pressed. From an eminence near by, one portion of the enemy's masses attacking General Jackson were immediately within my view and in easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I had not expected to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the pur- pose and one placed in position immediately and op ned. Just as this re bega i 1 re- ceived a message from the commanding general, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As if was evident that the attack against General Jacksou could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made n > move- ment with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diver- sion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprang to their work, and moved forwaid with all the steadiness and firmness that characterize war-worn veterans. The batteries continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the work of this portion oftheenemy's line, and my attack was, therefore, made against the forces in my front. The order for the advance bad scarcely been given when I received a message from the commanding general, antici- pating some such emergency, and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The commanding general soon joined me, and a few moments after Major-General Anderson. arrived with bis division. The attack was led by Hood's brigade, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from the rear. Kemper's three brigades, and I). R. Jones' division 'from the right and Wilcox's I rigade from the left. The brig- ades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Pryor became detached and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily for- ward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as be took them. My batteties were thrown forward from p int to point, following the movements of the general line. These, however, were .somewhat detained by an enfilade fire from a bat- tery on my left. This threw more thau its proper share of fighting upon the infantry, reta ded our rapid progress, and enabled the enemy to escape with many ol In- batte- ries, which should have fallen into our hands. The battle continued unti teu o clocK at night, when utter darkness put a stop to our progress. The enemy made hi- 58 across Bull Ran before daylight. Three batte-ies, a large number of prisoners, many stands of regimental colors, and 12,000 stands of arms, besides soma wagons, ambulauces, &c, were taken." REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL T. J. .JACKSON (AS PREPARED BY LIEUTENANT- COLONEL C. J. FAULKNER AND FOUND AMONG JACKSON'S PAPERS). Headquarters Second Corps, A. N. V., April 27, 18G3. *. * * - * * * Pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, I left Jeffersonton on the morning of the 25th (August) to throw my command between Washington City and the army of General Pop* , and to break no his railroad communication with the Federal Capital. * * * On the next day (26th) the march was continned ; diverging to the right at Salem, crossing the Bull Run Mountain through Thoroughfare Gap, and, p; ss- iug Gainesville, we reached Bristoe Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, after snnsec. General Talliaferro moved his division that night across to the Warrenton and Alex- andria turnpike, pursuing the road to Smiley Mill, and crossing the turnpike in the vicinity of Groveton, halted near the battle-field on the 2lst of July, 18(11 (?) Ewell's and Hill's divisions joined Jackson's on the 28th. My command had hardl.v concen- trated north of the turnpike before the enemy's advance reached the vicinity of Grove- ton from the direct on of Warrenton. My troops on this day (29th) were distributed along and in the vicinity of the cut of an unfinished railroad (intended as a part of the track to connect the Manassass road directly with Alexandria) stretching trom the Warrenton turnpike in the direction of Sudley Mill. It was mainly along the excavation of this unfinished road that my line of battle was formed on the 29th [August], Jackson's division, under Brigadier- Gei.eral Starke, on the li^bt, Ewell's division, under Brigadier-General Lawton, in the center, and Hill's division ou ihe left. In the morning, about 10 o'clock, the Federal artillery opened with spirit and animation upon our right, which was soon replied to by the batteries of Poague, Carpenter, Dement, Brokenbrongb, and Latimer, under Major Shnmaker. This lasted for some time, whi n the enemy moved around more to our left to another point of attack. His next effort was directed against our left. This was vigorously repulsed by the batteries of Braxton, Crenshaw, and Pegfam. About "2 o'clock p. in. the Federal infantry , in huge force, advanced to the attack of our left, occupiedby the division of General Hill. It pressed forward in defiance of our fatal and destructive fire with grear, determination, a portion of it crossing a deep cut in the railroad track, and penetrating in heavy force an interval of near a hundred and seventy-five yards, which separated the right of Gregg's from the left of Thomas' brigade. For a short time Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, was isolated from the main body of the command. But the Fourteenth South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, with the. Forty-ninth Georgia, left of Col. Thomas, attacked the exultant enemy with vigor and drove them hack across the railroad track with great slaughter. Gen. McGowan reports that the opposing forces at one time delivered their volleys into ea h olher at the distance of ten paces. Assault after assault was made on the left, exhibiting on the part of the enemy great pertinacity and determination, but every advance was most successfully and gallantly driven back. General Hill reports that six separate Mid distinct assaults were thus met and repulsed by his division, as- sisted by Hays' brigade, Colonel Forno commanding. By this time the brigade of Geuer 1 Gregg, which, from its position on the extreme left, was most -exposed to the enemy's attack, had nearly expended its ammunition. It had suffered severely in its men, and all its field officers except two were killed or wounded. About four o'clock it had been assisted- by Hays' brigade (Colonel Forno). It was now retired to the rear to take some r- pose after seven hours of severe service, and General Early's brigade, of Ewell's division, with tin- Eighth Louisiana Regiment, took its place. <>u reaching his position, General Earl} found that the enemy bad obtained possession of the railroad and a piece of wood in front, there being at this point a deep cut, which furnished a strong defence. Moving through a field he advanced upon the enemy, drove them from the wood and railroad-cut with great slaughter, and followed in pur- suit 8 e two hundred yards. The Thirteenth Georgia at the same time advanced to the railroad and crossed with Early's brigade. As it was no, desirable to bring on a general engagement that evening. General Early was recalled to the railroad where Thomas, Pender, and Archer bad firmly maintained their positions during the day. Early kept his position there until the following morning. Brigadier-General Field 59 and Colonel Forno (commanding Hays' brigade) were severely wounded. Brigadier- General Trimble was also seriously wounded. During the day a force of tbe enemy penetrated the wood in my rear, endangering the safety of my ambulances and train. Upon being advised of this by General Stuart I sent a body of infantry to drive them from the wood. But in the meau time tbe vigilant Pelham had uulimbered bis battery and dispersed that portion of them which bad reached the wood. At a later period Major Patrick, of the cavalry, who was by General Stuart intrusted Avith guarding the train, was attacked, and, although it was promptly and effectually repulsed, it was not without the loss of that intrepid officer, who fell in the attack while setting, an example of gallantry to his men well worthy of imitation. Duriug the day tbe commanding general arrived, and also General Longstreet with his com- mand. repoitt of major- general a. p. hill. Headquarters Light Division, Camp Gregg, Ftbraary'Zo, L863. Lt. Colonel C. J. Faulkner, A. A. G., Second Army Corps: Colonel: I have the, honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division from the crossing of the Rapidan, August 2(Jth, to the repulse of the enemy at Cattleman's Ferry, November 5th, inclusive. The march was without incident of importance until arriving at the ford opposite Warrenton Springs. The morning after arriving (Sunday, the 21th; I was direcced to occupy the hills crowning the ford. * * * Wednesday morning (August 27th), at Manassas Junction, Branch's brigade had a sharp encounter with a battery supported by the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry. They were soon dispersed. * * * That night, about twelve o'clock the depot buildings, with an immense amount of commissary stores, and about two miles of Loaded freig it- cars, were burned, and at one o'clock 1 moved my div sion to Centreville ; at teii a. in. (Thursday) moved upon the Warrenton pike, towards the stone bridge, whi n I recen etl an order from General Jackson, dated battle-field of Manassas, eighl a. m., thai "the enemy were in full retreat, and to move down to tbe fords and intercept him." But, having just seen two intercepted dispatches from Pope to McDowell, ordering the formation of his Hue of battle for the next day on Manassas plains, I deemed M best to push on and join General Jackson. That evening (Thursday) there was a little artillery practice by some of my batteries on the enemy's infantry. Friday morning, in accordance with orders from General Jackson, 1 occupied the line of the unfinished railroad, my extreme left resting near Sndley's Ford, my right near the point wbere the road strikes the open field, Gregg, Field, and Thomas in the front line, Gregg on the left and HMeld on the right, with Branch, Pender, and Archer as supports. * * * The evident intention of the enemy this day was to turn our left and overwhelm Jackson's corps before Longstreet came up, and, to accomplish this, the most persistent and furious onsets were made by column after column of infantry, accompanied by numerous batteries of artillery. " Soon my reserves were all in, and np I o six o'clock my division, assisted by the Louisiana brigade of General Hays, commanded by Col- onel Forno, with au heroic courage and obstinacy almost beyond parallel, had not and repulsed six distinct and separate assaults, a portion of the time the majority ol the men being without a cartridge. The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried masse,, over- whelming superiority of numbers, and bold hearing, made the chance ol victory to tremble in the balance; my own division exhausted by s ven hours' unremitted light- ing, hardly one round per man remaining, and weakened in all tin gs Bave its nucon- querahle spirit. Casting about for help, fortunately it was here reported to me thai the brigades of Gene als La wton and Early were near by, aud, sending for them, they promptly moved to my front at the most opportune moment, and tins I, si cliurge mel the same disastrous fate that had befallen those preceding. Having received an order from General Jackson to endeavor to avoid a general engagement, 1113 commanders 01 brigades contented themselves with repulsing the enemy and billowing them Up Dili a few hundred yards. 60 KKPOKT OF MAJOR-GENERAI STUART. Headquarters Cav.ukv Division. A K Fti Memoranda of S - < or * . " - - . 5* at Manassas (a - a the aimy staited for the Stone bi u?iie. a j» ri ifii going by the way of Centrevi le, the cavalry i - _ - - - s to rover this movement, Colonel Rosier forming the rear* gmul to General A P. Hill's division. - - — On the morning of this day (the army facing towards Groveton, Colonel K &serV cavalry being on our left flank and front] a \ oit on v( I he cavalry sta- tioned en our right flank. - - kept watch of the • neniy's movements, wit ho: to repoit to General Jack>on. Gc 8 :t, with portions of Robertson's and F. Let- gades - Haymarket. keeping a s nth sidrofBr.ll Kun (crossing sometimes) by a by-way; but before reaching I General Stuart found a force of the enemy, which he skirmished with for some time, - tttack on them at Haymarket being iutei s* re in favor of General _ _ . with the enemy at Thoroughfare Gap. General Stuart ed Haymarket at :< |>. in., ami returned about dark, in time to take pa t in the ft er t be infant) y and artillery ceased reneral Stuait spent the night of Thu - _ - .- al Jackson, Sndley Mills 4s General Stuart rede forward towards Groveton, about ten a. m.. he found t. - • - - trated the v - _ ug towards the ' to cut them off. He at once directed Captain (now ".lam. of the S - v bo was near by, to shell the woods and gatbernpallt es srglere und the train and drive back the euemy, notifyiug Gen- eral Jackson, in tbe mean time, of what t - si ting. He also ordered the quarter- the train towards Aldie. and sent au order to Major Patrick to keep his bat airy hetw«en the enemy and the baggage-train, a duty which he faith- lulh - ... receiving » mortal wouud just as he gallantly and successfully repulsed rce of the eiiem\ that was attempting to cross the run. so sent I lonel Ba\ lor, who was near the railroad embankment in comma - _. » him to come forward aud drive back the n y, but be . - -•. .1 here i< r a purpose, and have positive orders to stay here, which I must obey." Having ordered Captain Pelham to report to General Jaeks ral Stuart went towards Haymarket to establish communication with - Lee aud Lougstreet, accompauied by lbi>;adier-General Robertson, with a portion oi his and a portion oi General F. Lee's cavalry. Stuart met G e aid Lougstreet on the road between Haymarket Gaii esvil e. aid iuforu ed thin of wl at had happened, and the situation of Gen- se of the enemy. General Lee inquired for some way to 5 r. ad. General Stuart showed him thai the b.st route for them was by the turnpike, which they took, and General Stuart moved to General LoLgstreet's t _ flank. tachment of cavalry under General F. Lee, that had been to Burke's Station, returned in the afternoon oi this day to the vicinity of General Jackson at Sndley. Ike night of Frit ay, J ssession last, year, 1861-'62, we were I'm d upon by musketry and artilley with canister. The order was immediately 63 given to charge the place, which we did, receiving several volleys of canisti r before we reached it. The enemy left the r guns, which we took, and the regiment was employed for sever 1 hours after in gathering up prisoaers aud searching through the various buildings of the place. This was about half past one o'clock a. ru. The cavalry did not enter the place until some two hours after, by which time we had secured a large number of prisoners besides many negroes. Our regiment was kept in the place all night; several companies were detailed to guard the prisoners and perform pickei duty. REPORT OF OFFICERS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST GEORGIA REGIMENT UPON THE CAPTURE OF MANASSAS. Camp Twenty-First Georgia Regiment, April in. 18(53. After a fatiguing march, arrived at Bristoe Station about night, and then recom- menced the march to Manassas Junction with the Twenty-First North Carolina Regi- ment, commanded by Brigadier-General Trimble. We attacked at d captured Manassas Junction about twelve o'clock, this regiment charging and capturing a batter; of artillery, four pieces, and about seventy prisoners, including a lieutenant colonel and several commissioned officers. REPORT of brigadier-general J. A. early, commanding swell's DIVISION, <>l OPER- ations from august lb' to september 27, 1862. Headquarters Ewell's Division, January 12, 1863. # * * # * * # Early on the morning of the 25th, the division moved, under orders from Gener 1 Jackson, to Hi n son's Mill, above Waterloo bridge, where it crossed the Rappahannock, and then proceeded, by Oi lean, and camped at night near Salem, in Fauquier County. Very early next morning it marched by Salem and through Thor ughfare Gap, in the direction of Gainesville, at which latter place it took the road to Bristoe Station, ou the Change aud Alexandria Railroad. Hay's brigade reached the station a short time before sunset, just as several trains were approaching from the direction of Warrenou Junction. There be'ing no force at this place except a small detachment of cavalry, which was soon dispersed, Colonel Forno succeeded in arresting and capturing two trains of empty cars, the firsl which approached making good its escape by forcing its way over the obstructions placed on the r ad towards Manassas Junction. General Trimble, as soon as he arrived, was detached with two regiments of his brigade to Manassas Junction, and the nthei brigades, as they arrived, and Hay's brigade were placed in position by Major-Gtmeral Ewell so as to prevent surprise and any approach on the rai road * *** * * * * In the afternoon indications were seen of the approach of heavy columns of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton Junction, and all the baggage-wagons were ordered to move toward Manassas Junction. Shortly after dusk, under orders from General Ewell, I moved to Manass-as .Junc- tion. * * * As soon as the troops were supplied with provisions at Manassas, of which they stood in great need, they were moved in the direction of Ceu reville, toward Bull \inn, and the several brigades bivouacked separately between Manassas and Bull Run. * * * * * * Early next morning (August 29) the division, then under command of Brigad i eral Law ton, was formed on a ridge perpendicularly to the railroad-track, with the right resting on the Warrenton turnpike and facing toward Grov«ton. In n short time thereafter I received an order from G n ral .Jackson to move, with my own and Hay a brigade, to a ridge west of the turnpike and the railroad-track, so as to prevent the em my from flanking our forces on the right, a moveimn: from the direct! n ol .Ma- nassas indicating that purpose having been observed. In making this movent n of my regiments, the Thirteenth and Thirty-first i-irginia, were detached uj Ueuerai 64 Jackson and placed in a piece of woods, on the east, of the turnpike, to observe the movement of a bo 1y of the enemy that was moving toward our right. I formed my own and Hay's brigade in line on the ridge indicated, placing them under cover in the, woods, and advanced skirmishers to the railroad-track, and posted a detachment on my right flank, so as to ptevmt any surprise from that direction. Johnson's battery was also placed in position so as to command my front. In the mean time our whole line of liattle had been so modified us to place it along the railroad-track, and Law- ton's and Trimble's brigades were moved so as to conform to this new disposition. My own and Hay's brigades thus constituted the extreme right, being thrown back a little in rear of the direction of the main line. The Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Walker, and the Thirty-first, under Colonel Hoffman, by skirmishing, kept the body of the enemy's infantry, w ich has been mentioned, in check until the head of General Longstreet's corps made its appearance ou the Warrenton turn- pike from the diiection of Gainesville. When this corps had advanced sufBcien ly far to render it unnecessary for me to remain longer in my posit on, or for thi Thir- teenth and Thirty firs 1 Regiments to remain where they weie, I recalled them and moved to the left for the purpose of rejoining the rest of the division. I found General Lawton, with his brigade, in the woods, not far from the position at which I had been the evening before, but formed in line so as to be parallel 10 the lailroad, Trimble's brigade being pos ed on the railroad cut, on the right of our line as thus contracted. I was ordered by General Lawton to form my brigade in line in rear of his brigade, and Colonel Forno was direc ed to form on my right. Shortly after this the enemy began his attempts to drive our troops from the line of the railroad, and about half past three p. 111. Colonel Forno was ordered to advance, to the front by General Jackson to the support of one of General A. P. Hill's brigades, and he advanced to the railroad and drove the enemy from it. and took position on it with his brigade. Alter this affair Colonel Forno was wounded by one of the enemy's sharp- shooters so serinusly as to require his removal from the, field. Subsequent to this advance by Colonel Forno, a messenger came to me from General A. P. Hill, stating that the enemy weie pressing one, of his brigades on the railroad, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, and requesting me to advance to its support. I iinm diately did so, and as I passed General Lawton 's brigade I found him preparing to send forward the Thirteenth Georgia Regiment. I continued to advance to the front, accompanied by the Eighth Louisiana Regiment, under Major Lewis, which had not been with its own brigad", having been sent off to replenish its ammunition the day before, and having returned just in time to join my brigade. On reaching the railroad, I found the enemy had possessiou of it and a piece of wocg' in root, there being at this point a deep cut, which furnished a strong defence. Gt. eral Gregg's and Colonel Thomas' brigades, of A. P. Hill's division, having nearly e. hausted their ammunition, had fallen back a short distance, but were still presenting front to the enemy. My brigade ai d the Eighth Louisiana Regiment advanced upon the euetny through a field and drove him from the woods and out of the railroad outcross- ing the hitter and following in pursuit several hundred yards beyond. In this charge, which was made with great gallantry, heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy with com- parative ly slight loss to my own brigade, though among others two valuable officers, Colonel Smith and .Major Higginbotham, of the Twenty-fifth Virginia Regiment, «ere s-veielv wounded. The Thirteenth Georgia Regiment also advan ed to the railroad and crossed it to my right. The messenger from General Hill had stated that it was not desirable that I should go beyond the railroad, and as soon as I could arrest the advance of my brigade, I moved it back to the railroad and occupied it. This was the last attempt made by the enemy on the afternoon of Friday, the 29th, to get posse siou of the line of the railroad. On 'the afternoon of this day, General Trimble was wounded by a sho f om one of the enemy's sharpshooters, though I believe his brigade was not engaged during the day. REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. 1$. TALIAFERRO, COMMANDING DIVISION. JACKSON'S COMMAND. Richmond, September lfi, l-Cfi. * « # * * * * On the morning of the 27th ( Vngnst) I was ordered to send before daybreak a brigade across Muddy Run by the county road to Manassas Junction. I accordingly si-ni forward on t his service the lirst brigade, "Colonel Baylor, and followed with the rest of the division as soon as General Hill's division permitted me to move. At night Major-General E well, who had been lighting during the evening at Bris- fcoe Station, having crossed Muddy Run by direction of Major-General Jackson, I 65 moved my division wih the entire train across the Warrentoi and i'exandria turn REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. B. HOOD OK OPERATIONS OF HIS DIVISION LOVG STREE1 S COMMAND, FROM FREF.MANS FORD. Division Headquarters, September 27, 1862 ]>ass on t the gap. The next morning, at daylight, the march was again resnmedf with thh division in the advance. Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of the Fifth Texas, in commando? a party oi select Texan riflemen, constituting the advance guard Coming up with the rear guard of the enemy before sunrise, this gallant and distin- guished officer drove them before him so rapidly that halts would have to he made for the troops in rear to rest. Early in the day we came up with the main bo.lv of the enemy on the plains of Manassas, engaging General Jackson's forces. Disposition of the troops being made, the Texas brigade advanced in line of battle down and on the immediate right of the pike leading to the stone bridge, and Colonel Law's brigade on the left. Arriving on a line with the line of battle establishe I by General Jackson the division was halted by order of the general commanding. About four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy made a tierce attack upon General Jackson, his noble troops holding their ground with their usual gallantry. At sunset an order came to me from the commanding general to move forward and attack the enemy. Before, however, this division could come to attention they were attacked, and I instantly ordered the two brigades to move forward and charge the enemy, which they did most gallantly, driving them in confusion in front of them. Colonel Law's brigade, being engaged with a very heavy force of the enemy, captured one piece of artillery, three stand of colors, and one hundred prisoners, and the Texas brigade three stand of colors. It soon became so verv dark that it was impossible ti pursue the enemy any farther. At 12 o'clock at night orders came to retake our posi tiou on the right of General Jackson. REPORT in MAJOR-GENERAL I>. R. JONES, DIVISION OF LONGSTREET'S COMMAND, OF -1 0- OND BATThE OF MANASSAS. Richmond, Va., December 8, ISQ2 After the repulse of his efforts at flanking, the enemy withdrew his artillery to the plateau on which he had first appearedand kept up a very heavy fire till dark. when. appearances indicating his retreat, I advanced my command and bivouacked beyond the gap nn molested by the enemy. The intense darkness and ignorance of thi over the creek in my front prevented pursuit. My entire loss in this engagement was not more than twenty-live. The number of the enemy engaged amounted to over 11,000, under the command of General Eicketts, as appeared from Northern papers. My division of three brigades was alone engaged ou our side. Early ou the morning of the 20th I took up the line of march in the direction of the old battle-ground of Manassas, whence heavy tiring was heard. Arriving on the ground about noon, my command was stationed on the extreme right of our whole line, and during the balance of the day was subjected toshelling, resulting in but few casual;:. - REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. M. WILCOX, COM MAX HI NO DIVISION LONGST] COMMAND, AS TO NIGHT-MAKCH. Headquarters Anderson's Division, October 11, 1862. The division crossed the Rapidan at Racoon iTord on the 20th August, ami, continuing its march, bivouacked for the night about tive miles from Kelly's Ford, on the H bannock. Early next morning the march was resumed, the three brigades under inf 5 a 06 command leading the ad vaDce. The march was continued on the road to Stephensburg till we came to a road that bore off to the right to Kelly's Ford. My command was directed to take this road. Advancing about one and a half miles we crossed a small stream, Mountain Run (my brigade did not cross this run), this run being about two miles from the ford. The major-general commanding now directed me to withdraw my force back across Mountain Run, leaving a picket force on the far side. My command was now — near sundown — put in march in rear of the column for Stephensburg. Just at this time the enemy reappeared on the ground where his cavalry had been twice repulsed by our artillery. This time he came with four pieces of rilled artillery, and began to fire upon us as we were moving off. It was now quite late, and as we were soon out of sight and danger I did not conceive it necessary to return this tire, as my orders were to follow the remainder of the division, which was now in motion. Pursuing our march, we bivouacked at Stephensburg at 1 o'clock at night. rkport of brigadier-general c. m. wilcox of second battle of manassas. Headquarters Anderson's Division, October 11, 1862. The conimaud of General Longstreet bivouacked on the night of the 27th August at White Plains. On the following day the march was resumed, following the road lead- ing through Thoroughfare Gap. Arriving near this gap it was found to be occupied by the enemy, supposed to be in btrong force. The three biigades under my com- mand — my own, General Featberston's, and Pryor's — were, together with two bat- teries of artillery, mostly rifled pieces, detached from the main command and moved off to the left over a rough and hilly road in the direction of Hopewell Gap, with orders to force our way through it should the enemy be found to hold it. After a tedious, fatiguing, and rather difficult march the gap was reached at 10 o'clock p. m. Halting the column, a regiment was detached, preceded by a compauy, both under the direction of Brigadier-General Pryor, with instructions to approach the pass cautiously with a view of ascertaining if it was held by the enemy, and, if so, his probable strength. In half or three quarters of an hour General Pryor reported that he had threaded his way through the pass as far as Antioch Church, near one mile be- yond. The troops were then moved forward through the pass, and, after posting pickets on the various roads and mountain paths that diverged from the gap, the com- mand at 12 o'clock bivouacked for the night. Hopewell Gap is about three miles from Thoroughfare Gap, being connected with the latter on the east side by two roads, one of which is impracticable for wagons. The enemy had been at this pass during the day, but retired before night, thus giving us a free passage. Early the following morning our march was resumed, and the com- mand rejoined at half-past nine a. m. the remainder of the division at the intersection of the two roads leading from the gaps above mentioned. Pursuing our line of march, together with the division, we passed by Gainesville, and advancing some three miles beyond, my three brigades were formed iu line of battle on the left and at right angles to the turnpike. Having advanced near three- quarters of a mile, we were then halted. The enemy was in our frout and not far distant. Several of our batteries were placed in position on a commanding eminence to the left of the turnpike. A cannonading ensued and continued for an hour or two, to which the enemy's artillery replied. At half past four or five p. m. the three brigades were moved across to the right of the turnpike, a mile or more, to the Manassas Gap Railroad. While here musketry was heard to our left, on the turnpike. This firing continued, with more or less vivacity, until sundown. Now the command was ordered back to the turnpike, and forward on this to the support of General Hood, who had become engaged with the euemy, and had driven him back some distance, inflicting severe loss upon him, being checked in his successes by the darkness of the night. After reaching General Hood's position but little musketry was heard. All soon be- came quiet. Our pickets were thrown out to the front. The enemy's camp-fires soon became t isible, extending far off I ) our left, front, and right. Remaining in this posi- tion until twelve o'clock at night, the troops were withdrawn three-quarters of a mile to the rear and bivouacked, pickets being left to guard our front. 67 REPORT OF COLONEL B. T. JOHNS >N, OF SF.COM) VIRGINIA BRIGADE, TALIAFERRO'S DIVISION, JACKSON'S COMMAND. Captain Taliaferro, J.J. G., Taliaferro's Division, Army of the Valley: Captain : I have the honor to report that on Wednesday, August 27tb, l-i'.-i. my com- mand, the second brigade of this division, consisting of the Twenty-first, Forty second, and Forty-eighth Virginia and First Virginia Battalion, with two batteries, marched from Manassas Junctiou about dark. The Forty-eighth and Forty-second Virginia had been, during the day. on picket on the Blackburn's Ford and Union Mill road. March- ing by the Sudley road and passing the Chinn house. 1 reached Warrenton road after midnight. I was then ordered by Brigadier-General Taliaferro, commanding division. to proceed with my command down the Warrenton road towards Gainesville, and picket and hold it and a road, cutting it at Groveton atright angles, and \\ Inch led from the Junction also to Sudley Ford. I did so, holding Groveton as my reserve, throwing out pickets towards Manassas and down the turnpike, and pushing Captain George 1^ Gaither's troop. First Virginia Cavalry, which I found on picket before I reached the position, some half a mile in front of me, with videttes still further before him. Shortly after daylight he reported to me a cavalry force advancing from Gainesville, and soou after himself brought in a courier, captured by him, hearing a despatch from Major-General McDowell to Major-General Sigel. * # * * * # • I ordered Major John Seddon, First Virginia Battalion, with his command and the Forty-eighth Virginia, to take position on the road from Groveton toward Manassas to guard against any flank movement on me from thence. * *■ * # * * Riding forward I got ou a high hill, to the right of the road, and discovered the enemy in force, their skirmishers pushing rapidly on me. I instantly brought up the rifled pieces and Forty-eighth, and after a race beat the enemy to the hill and opened on them, driving in their cavalry and skirmishers; but linding them place several guns in position, which they served with rapidity and accuracy, and pressing their infantry on me, I called in Major Seddon, and with his reinforcement determined to hold the hill, which was the key of the surrounding country. This I did, and drove off the advance down the Warrenton road, but after some time discovered them on my extreme left toward Manassas. That night, by General Jackson's order, I held the crossing of the Sudley road over the old railroad, and at daylight, being so ordered, rejoined the division, then commanded by Brigadier-General Starke, Brigadier-General Taliaferro haviug been wounded the previous evening. By him I was ordered to clear the woods we had just left, but into which the enemy's skirmishers had lodged. I directed Lieutenant Dabney, with the Forty-eighth, to do so, and then sent Captain Witcher, with the Twenty-first, to support him. They did their work at once and well. Our line of bat- tle was then formed, facing the east, parallel to the Warrenton road, fronting it and to the left of it, Ewell's division being on my left and Starke's brigade mi ray right. This place was not attacked until the afternoon. Our line was <»n the -rest oi a ridge covered with timber, and in front of the wood in the open ground was the embankment in one place and the cut iu another, according as the ground lay. oj an unfinished railroad. It the afternoon the enemy carried the embankment tomyleft, and while I was trying to rally some men, not of my command, came close on in.' and between my command and the railroad cut. The men were lyingdownat the time in ranks concealed, and unexpected I ordered a charge, and with a yell the second brigade went through them, shattering, breaking, and routing them. The struggle was brief, but not a man faltered, and with closed ranks their rush was irre- sistible They drove the enemy into the railroad cut and out ol it. Jusl then Brigadier-General Starke came gallantly heading the fourth brigade, and together we went after the flying foe. In a skirt of woods in front a Lattery was attempt- in" to cover their rally, but Maj ir Seddon and the Irish battalion wrested a three- inch rifle-gun from them and bore it oil'. The fourth brigade secured another. he Fortv-secoml is entitled to the credit of capturing the colors ot the attacking Un- made, which was "Sickles Excelsior," having run over then alter the enemy. 1 he flag was taken up by the fourth brigade, and I do not claim U for the lorty- second. Returning to the first position, we held it that night. REPORT or BRIGADIER-GENERAL TRIMBLE of CAPTURE OF MANASSAS (I N v ( HON. Chabloi i KS^ nil . Janua 6, 1863. Lieutenant-General T, J. Jackson : General: In compliance with your request I report the operations o my ■*"«** in the execution of your order to me on the evening oi the 26th ol August las) to capture Manassas Junction. 68 Your order was received about nine o'clock that night, after a long and fatiguing march of the army from Salem to Bristoe Station. I immediately put two regiments in motion, the Twenty-first North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, and the Twenty-first Georgia, commanded hy Major Glover, in all about five hundred men (my third regiment was left at Bristoe), and proceeded with them to within one mile and a half of Manassas, where we halted iu consequence of the brisk discharge of fire-arms in our front, caused by an encounter of a part of General Stuart's cavalry with a party of the enemy's pickets. I informed General Stuart of my intention to attack Manassas Junction, and requested his aid with the cavalry which he had thtn with him. ******* I then disposed of one regiment on the north side of the railroad and the other on the south side. * * These dispositions being made, I gave orders to advance rapidly, skirmishers being well iu front, until we had approached within one hundred yards of the batteries, which continued their fire one on the north and the other on the south of the railroad. Here I halted and issued watch-words and responses, that our men might recognize each other in case of a mingled encounter with the enemy. The posi- tion of the batteries on either side of the railroad having been ascertained, the word was given, " Charge!" when both regiments advanced rapidly and firmly, and in five minutes both batteries were carried at the point of the bayonet. * * In this successful issue of the night's work I had no assistance from artillery or from any part of General Stuart's cavalry, a regiment of which arrived some time after the attack was made, and commenced an indiscriminate plunder of horses. General Stuart him- self did not arrive until seven or eight o'clock in the morning. * * ' Reporting our success at General Jackson's headquarters at Bristoe, I asked that reinforcements should be sent to me without delay ; these arrived soon after daybreak, and were disposed so as to repel any attack of the enemy.. REPOET OF COLONEL FORNO OF IIAV's BRIGADE, EWELL'S HI VISION. JACKSON'S COM- MAND. Headquarters Fifth Louisiana Volunteers, Cam}) near Port Royal, Va., January 2, 1863. General : Hay's brigade, under my command, arrived at Bristoe Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, at six o'clock p. m. August 2G, 1862, and was ordered to attack and destroy the railroad trains, then approaching the station, they being supposed to contain troops. The duty was promptly performed, and the brigade laid on their arms until daylight on the 27th, at which time I made a reconnoisance to the front in force, when finding the enemy embarking their troops attacked them with artillery. ' * After twelve o'clock at night of the 27th the brigade was put in motion, with orders to follow General Early, but owing to the darkness I was unable to find him. At daylight on the morning of the 28th I crossed Bull Run bridge and joiued the division. Afterwards was ordered to report to General Early, and, with his brigade, sup- port General Taliaferro, but did not engage. On the morning of the 29th, still under command of General Early, occupied the right of our line until the arrival of General Longstreet, when we rejoined our division in the centre. At half past three p. m., 29th, was ordered to advance my brigade by General Jackson, and soon after engaged the enemy, and, after driving them with great slaughter, retained the ground pre- viously occupied by them. At about six o'clock p. m. I was wounded and taken from the field, and turned over the command to Colonel Strong, Sixth Louisiana. refor'i of colonel edward l. thomas, commanding second brigade, a. p. hill 8 division, jackson's command. Headquarters Third Brigade, Light Division, October 26, 1862. » ***** On Thursday, August 28th, near Sudley Ford, this brigade was heldiu reserve by order of General Hill ; was under fire but took no active part, and after the enemy gave way, moved forward and bivouacked for the night on the field. Early on Friday, Au- gust 29th, the march was resumed with directions to be prepared for an attack near the railroad. General Gregg's brigade meeting the enemy there, this brigade advanced to his right, the regiments being thrown in successively until all became engaged. 69 The enemy were in strong position on the railroad. We at once advanced and drove them from it. This position we were ordered to hold, and, if possible, to avoid brim when General Pender's brigade advanced promptly and in fine order to the assistance of the third, most of which joined General Pender, and together they drove back the enemy some distance beyond our previous position, which was held until night the brigade bivouacking on the field. REPOP.T OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. L. ARCHER, OF A. P. HILL'S DIVISION, JACKSON'fl COMMAND. Headquarters Archer's Division. Camp Gregg, near Fredericksburg, la., Alareh 1, 1863. ***** The 2rfth Angusi, after marching through Centreville up the Warrenton turnpike and across Bull iiau, my brigade was formed in line on the right of and fronting a by-road, the direction of which was nearly parallel with the railroad cut. * * *° The next morning my brigade with Braxton's battery was posted on a hill on the extreme left of the division, with skirmishers thrown out to the front and on the left Hank. In this position it was not actively engaged, although it was somewhat annoyed by shell from batteries in front but not in sight. About three o'clock p. m. I moved, by order of General Hill, to the right, until my right rested on a road which cusses the railroad at right angles, and remained there within supporting distance of other brigades of the division which had been engagi d during the day. About four o'clock p. m., during an interval of the assaults of the enemy, General Pender sent his aid-de-camp requesting me to relieve him, and. with the consent of General Hill, who was near me at the time, I immediately marched down and (iled to the right into the railroad cut. As my leading files entered the railroad cut I perceived the enemy advancing up it from the left into the wood. Uu willing to commence the light until my troops were in position, I did not call their attention to the enemy until half of my last regimeut (Colonel Turney's First Tennessee) had entered the cut. 1 then pointed out the enemy on the left and ordered that regiment to fire, which it did with great effect. The first fire of this regiment was instantly answered by a furiou- assault upon my whole frout. At this time my own brigade was the only one in sight along the whole line, but for twenty minutes or more it firmly and gallantly resisted the attack, and maintained its position until the troops came up on my right and left in time to save me from being flanked. Soon after the arrival of these fresh troops we charged and drove the enemy back several hundred yards, and then quietly returned to our position. In a few minutes fresh forces of the enemy arrived and attacked us as vigorously as the first ; they were as firmly resisted and as gallantly repelled by another charge. At this second charge many of my meu were out of ammunition and charged with empty rifles. I did not average over two cartridges to the man. A third assault was met and repulsed in the same manner, my brigade charging upon the enemy w ith loud cheers and driving them back with their empty rifles. It was after sunset when we resumed our position, and we lay upon our arms that night, with a strong picket in front to prevent surprise; replenished our ammunition during the night, and next morning changed places with Early's brigade, which had come in on our left the even- ing before, and in frout of which a heavy skirmishing fire had been kept up all the morning. RF.rOKT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. D. PENDER, A. P. IllLI.'s DIVISION, JACK80N 3 I 0M- MAND. Camp near Bunkersville, Va., October 14/*, ldC2. * * * * On Friday morning, August 29th, my brigade was placed in supporting dints Colonel Thomas, with orders to support him, where it remained until the afternoon. opposite sule ana uevonu tueir uaiienes in mm: > „ . i.. L^ - - . - - _ - - - - T • - - - r.c*»l charge. Driv- ing the enemybefore us, we again fell back to our position, remaining in it during the night. report of colonel j. 15. walton, ok longstr1 et s command, of second battle of manassas. Headquarters Battalion Washington Artillery, November Wilt, 1*62. ■:r * * * # * * On tbe 29th August, 1862, the four batteries composing the battalion were assigned and served as follows: The fourth company, consisting of two six-pcund bronze guns and two twelve-pound howitzers, under Captain D. F. Eshleman, Lieuts. Norcom, Battles, and Apps, with Pickett's brigade; the second company, with two six-pound bronze guns and two twelve-pound howitzers, under Captain Richardson, Lieutenants Hawes, DeRussey, and Britton, with Toombs' brigade; tbe first, company, with three three-inch rifle-guns, under Captain C. W. Squiers, Lieutenants E. Owens, Galbraith, and Brown, and the third company, with four light twelve-pound gnus (Napoleon), under Captain M. B. Miller, Lieutenants McElroy and Hero, in reserve. About noon on the 29th, the two batteries in reserve having halted near the village of Gainesville, on the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, were ordered forward by Gen- eral Longstreet, to engage the enemy then in our front, and near the village of Groveton. Captains Miller and Squiers at once proceeded to the position indicated by tbe Gen- eral and opened tire upon the enemy's batteries. Immediately in Captain Miller's front he discovered a battery of the enemy, distant about twelve hundred yards. Beyond this battery, and on a more elevated position, were posted the enemy's rifle batteries. He opened upon the battery nearest him, and, after a spirited engagement of three- quarters of an hour, completely silenced it and compelled it to leave tbe field. He then turned his attention to the enemy's rifle batteries, and engaged them until, having exhausted his ammunition, he retired from the field. Captain Squiers, on reaching bis position on the left of Captain Miller's battery, at once opened, with his usual accuracy, upon the enemy's batteries. Unfortunately, after the first fire, one of his guns, having became disabled by the blowing out of the bushing of the vent, was sent from the field. Captain Squires then placed the renaaiuiug section of his battery under command of Lieutenant Owen, and rode to the left to place additional guns (that had been sent forward to his assistance) in position. At this time the enemy's infantry were en- gaged with the forces on the left of tbe position occupied by our batteries, and while the enemy retreated in confusion before the charge of our veterans, the section under Lieutenant Owen poured a destructive fire into their art righted ranks. Scores were seen to fall, until finally the once beautiful line melted confusedly into the woods. The enemy's artillery having withdrawn beyond our range, the section was ordered from the field. Both batteries, the first and third, in this action, fully maintained their well earned reputation for skilful practice and gallant behavior. With this duel ended tbe operations on the left of our line for the day. report of coloxel s. crutchfield, chief of artillery of jackson 8 command, of second rattle of manassas Headquarters Artillery Second Corps, March 14, 1^03. Early on Friday, the 29th, the enemy renewed the attack over nearly the same ground, while our troops occupied pretty generally the same position. His infantry being re- pulsed by ours, artillery was thrown out in front of our right to complete it. Tin- bat- teries of Captains Poague, Carpenter, Dement, Brockenbrough, and Latimer, under Major Shumaker, were so engaged, facing obliquely towards Groveton, while the bat- tery of Captain Braxton was placed further to our right, bearing on the road from Groveton to Warrenton, in case the enemy should advance from that direction, rather in rear of the other batteries. 75 This did not, however, happen, and so Captain Braxton's battery was no1 engage'! then. The other batteries did not all come into action at once. The enemy endeavored to cover his repulse by batteries thrown into position to play on the first of ours that opened on his retiring infantry. These were answered by fresh batteries of ours, and thus began a very fierce artillery duel, which Listed till about ten o'clock a. m., our batteries being gradually withdrawn, and the enemy mov- ing around more to our left, to select another point of attack. His next effort, later in the day, was directed against Brigadier-Genera] Gregg's bri- gade, which, forming the right of Major-General A. P. Hill's division, joined the Second Virginia brigade, which formed the left of Jackson's division. This being in the woods, no artillery was placed there; but, as the enemy was repulsed, a section of Captain Pegram's battery was brought up and fired a few shots. The enemy's next attack was still further to the left. At this time General A. P. Hill's brigades were posted from right to left in this order: Gregg's, Fields', Thomas', Branch's. Pender's, and Archer's. On the left (of the line) was Captain Broxton's battery of six guns ; to the right of General Archer's brigade was Captain Crenshaw's battery of four guns; and to its right, to the left and rear of General Branch's brigade, was Captain La- tham's battery of four guns, commanded by Lieutenant Potts. About two o'clock p. m. the enemy made an assault upon the front of Generals Thomas, Branch, and Field, which, of course (as was the case in his former and subse- quent attacks), was preceded and accompanied by a heavy shelling of the adjacent woods. * * * The attack was of short, duration, and they were again repulsed, and this time fol- lowed up by General Branch's brigade. In a short time after entering the woods, the latter was driven out and followed by the enemy, who were checked at the edge of the woods by the fire of these batteries, and again quickly repulsed by fresh infant i \ eral Lawton's division, I believe), and General Branch's brigade was reformed. The fight then shifted more to the right, as General Hill ordered an advance of his line i the enemy having fallen back obliquely towards our right). As Brigadier-General Ten- der's brigade advanced directly to the front, Captain Crenshaw's battery was moved forward and shelled the woods in front, while Captain Braxton's battery was moved around to the right of General Hill's line, and opened fire ou the retiring enemy there, until General Hood's brigade drove the enemy from their position on the heights op- posite Groveton. retoi.t of stephen d. lee, commanding reserve artillery, army of northern virginia. Headquarters Battalion Light Artillery, Camp near Winchester, Uvtobir -2. 1862. The battalion received orders on the evening of the 29th, near Thoroughfare Gap, to march to the front during the night, and after a tedious march encamped, about dawn on the morning of the 30th, on the pike leading from Gainesville to Stone Bridge, and about two miles from Gainesville. Soon after daylight I found that our bivouac was on the battle-field of the previous evening, and near our advanced divis ,.n on picket. Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Chilton. Adjutant-General Army of Northern Virginia. REPORT of major r. w. frobel, chief of artillery of hood's division, long- street's command, of second Haiti. i: OF MAitySSAS. Camp near Frederick, Maryland, September 9, i - # * * • \t eleven a m on Friday I was ordered by General Hood to prooeed to the right of the turnpike i and report to General Stuart. This I did with Captain Bachman battervReillv being already in position on the left, and Garden having no ^ng-mnje pfecesf'S road. The battery was brought up, and immediate y opened - ' ; ;< „",,,',: column of the enemy moving to the right, which a once cl . . 1 .■ J ' rapidly to the left. Fifteen rounds were fired, when the 1- ?g> < at creased, 1 ordered Captain Bachman to cease firing. At om >"• •>! 76 Eeilly was ordered to the left of the turnpike, and to take position with other hatteries on a hill commanding the hills near Groveton house, where the enemy had several bat- teries strongly posted. Immediately afterwards I proceeded with Captain Bachman's battery to the same position (Captain Garden's being considered of too short range to be effective there). The position assigm d to us was on the extreme left, both batterie passing through a heavy fire in reaching it. After being hotly engaged for two hours and a half, and firing about one hundred rounds, the enemy ceased firing and with- drew his guns. We were then ordered to return to the road, for the purpose of replen- ishing our ammunition. REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. L. WALKER. Headquarters Artillery Battalion, March 1, 1863. ^ ***** * My batteries were imparked at early dawn on Monday morning, August 2.">th, and after a most fatiguing march, arrived at Bristoe Station about nine o'clock Tuesday night, where we camped for the night. Wednesday morning I was ordered to follow my division to Manassas. As we approached the junction we were fired upon by two of the enemy's rifled guns. Captain Peg ram being in front, his battery was carried forward and placed in position in an old redoubt. Captain Braxton's battery was posted on the east side of the railroad, and the batteries of Captains Mcintosh and Crenshaw occupied the intermediate ground. The enemy's battery was soon silenced, and a New Jersey brigade was, after some very pretty practice on the part of Captains Pegram, Crenshaw, Mcintosh, and Braxton, broken and put to flight. We moved with the intention of following them up, but the character of the country was such as to render successful pursuit impossible, and the idea was abandoned. There was no loss on our side, but it is believed that the loss of the enemy was considerable. Wednesday night, at twelve o'clock, we took up line of march to Centreville, and from thence we'marched to the battle-field of Manassas, where wo arrived Thursday even- ing, the 26th of August. The artillery took no part in the engagement of that after- noon. On Friday, the 29th of August, the batteries were placed in position on the ridge in rear and to the left of General A. P. Hill's division. Captain Braxton's bat- tery was engaged early in the forenoon on the extreme left, with the loss of some of his'horses. Upon the cessation of the enemy's fire ours ceased also. In the afternoon a section of Captain Pegram's battery hotly engaged the enemy on the right. His position was in rear of General Field's and Gregg's brigades. The loss of this section was very heavy, and, the fire continuing with unremitted severity, it was withdrawn. Captain* Braxton was then ordered to the position, and, with five guns, held it, with loss, under a terrific fire, until night closed in upou the field. Captain Crenshaw's battery was also engaged during the day from a point in rear of General Pender's brigade. report of major s. ii. hairston, division quartermaster, stuarts cavalry division. Gainesville, August 29, 1862—8 p. m. To Colonel Chilton, A. A. G. : In obedience to General Lee's order I started this morning at eight o'clock with one hundred and fifty cavalry to go to Warrentou, " to fiud out if any of the enemy's forces were still in the vicinity of that place." I went from Thoroughfare to the right on a by-road, which took me into the Winchester road two miles below Warrentou, and came up to the rear of the town. I inquired of the citizens and persons I met on the way, but could not hear that any of their forces were in the vicinity of that place. They informed me that the last left yesterday in the direction of Gainesville and War- renton Junction. We picked up on the way forty-six prisoners, thirty muskets and rifles, one deserter from the Stuart horse artillery, and one sutler, with his wagon and driver. I also paroled two lieutenants in Warrentou, who were too sick to travel. What shall I do with the prisoners? Respectfully, your obedient servant, SAMUEL H. HAIRSTON, Major Commanding, by order of General Lee. Note. — This was made of men from every regiment in your command, w T ith one entire company, beaded by the captain, that General Lee had handled at Thoroughfare and turned over to me when he ordered me to go on the expedition. s. ii. H. 77 ANIMUS OF PETITIONER TOWARD EIS COMMANDING GENERAL. Let us now consider what was the animus of the petitioner toward his commanding general. In bis dispatch to Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside (p. 09, G. 0. M. rec), dated Warrenton Junction, 27th August, 1862, 4 p. m., he said : I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as the present. * * * * * Everything has moved up north. I find a vast difference hetween these troopa and ours, but I suppose they were new, as to-day they burnt their clothes, &c, when there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoralized, and needed some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. We are marching now to gel be- hind Pull Run, and I presume will be there in a few days if strategy does not i ise ns up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I would like some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, and to push toward Hanover, or with a larger force to strike at Orange Court-House. I wish Sumner was at Washington and up near the Monocacy, with good batteries : 1 do not doubt the enemy have large amounts of supplies provided for them, and I be- lieve they have a contempt for this Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with our old Army of the Potomac, an army that could take the best care of Pope says we long since wanted to go behind the Occoqnan. ' * * # # » * # Most of this is private, but if you can get me away please do so. Make what use of this you choose, so it does good. On the very morning he received General Pope's order to move on Ceutreville (20th August), stating that it was very important that he should be there at an early hour in the morning, that a severe engage- ment was likely to take place and his presence necessary, he sat down half an hour later aud sent this dispatch to General Bnrnside (p. 103, G. C. M. rec.) : Bristoe, 6 «. »>.. 29 To General Burnside : I shall be off in half an hour. The messenger who brought this says the enemy had been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night. Sigel had severe tight last night; took many prisoners. Banks is at Warrenton Junction; McDowell near Gainesville; Heintzelman and Reno at Centreville, where they marched yesterday, and Pope went to Ceutreville with the last two as a body- guard, at the time not knowing where was the enemy, ami where Sigel was fighting within 8 miles of him and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not having been watered fo] fifty hours; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night; your train of forty wagons cannot be found. I hope Mac's at work, and we shall soon get ordered out of this. It would seem from proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose, but I i pect they kuow what they are doing, which is more than anyone here or anywhen knows. Comment on this almost seems needless, but it explains possibly why he did not give Pope a hearty support in that day's action. He pretended to have no confidence in Pope; and in his appeal to the President of 10th October, 1807, p. 53, he went on to say that if his dispatches to Burnside — Manifested confidence in General McClellan and a distrust of General Pope's ability to conduct the campaign (as claimed by the prosecution), they but expressed the opin- ion pervading our Eastern armies. General Burnside, a witness for the accused, in his testimony (p. L81, G. C. M. rec), said he— Saw in Porter's telegrams exactly what he heard expressed by a large portion of the officers with whom he happened to be in communication at the time— a very greal lack of confidence Tin the management of the campaign- It was not confined to General Porter. 78 The petitioner's late counsel, Reverdy Johnson, in the pamphlet to which 1 have referred, in undertaking to excuse or explain his (Porter's) telegrams to General Burnside, said (p. 31) : Not only was the honor of rhe flag involved, but the very safety of the capital. Porter saw that both ivere in danger by what he believed to be the incompetency of Pope. Here, I submit, is the true secret of the accused's fatal inaction on the 29th August, 1862. Not that he was a traitor to his country. Heaven forbid that any graduate of so meritorious an institution as the United States Military Academy should ever be found in that position, wearing the uniform and holding the commission of his country. He did, however, either really or apparently distrust his then com- mander and did trust another, whom he was hourly looking to see come forward, for he said that very morning he hoped they would make con- nection soon (p. 119, G. C. M. rec), and he did not propose to help Pope in any of his serious movemeuts where he could possibly avoid it. That thousands of lives were sacrificed by this inaction is a factor that I do not think for a moment was considered by the accused. Had it been, he would have pushed in to assist the Army of Virginia. Just here let me refer to a matter in which his dispatches are abso- lutely contradictory. In that to Burnside of G a. m., 29th August, he avers he would not be out of provisions until the night of the 30th (p. 104, G. C. M. rec). By previous dispatch of 9.30 a. m., dated Bristoe, 28th August, 1862, he said there were " More supplies on hand than he supposed had been brought up." Yet, on page 38 of his opening statement to this board, he says the troops were without food at this time, and so continued throughout the next day, except a small supply of hard-tack ; and in the newly-discovered dispatch to General McDowell he said to the latter that, "If left to himself, he would have to retire for food and water." SUPPORTING FORCES. It is proper here to note that during nearly all the day of the 29th there were within easy supporting distance of General Porter's corps, including Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's division, the following troops, viz : Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps of at least seven thousand men (see petitioner's opening statement, p. 62), and Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks's corps of over eight thousand men at Bristoe. These facts have not received notice from the petitioner because they tend to show that he failed in his duty, as alleged in the second and third specifications of the second charge, in not going into action to aid our forces on the right when he was aware that a severe action of great consequence was being fought, and was within sight of the con- tending forces, and could even hear their cheers and yells. General Longstreet has stated in his official report that at a late hour in the day he withdrew Wilcox's three brigades from his left and placed them in position toassistMaj. Gen. D.R. Joues'sdivision of three brigades on the right, whose right regiment, according to General R. E. Lee's report, rested on the Manassas Gap Railroad, not beyond it. The petitioner has, I think, erroneously supposed that this movement was due to some of his own singular movements during that day, and would have us believe that his inchoate preparations to attack what he says he knew from the first was Longstreet in force, viz, to attack with two regiments, supported by tico others, was the occasion of a whole divis- ion being sent down near his front. The fact is that a brigade of observation was sent out by Major-Gen- 79 eral Banks from Bristoe ou the direct road to Gainesville, which road closely approaches the one on which General Porter's troops were im- patiently King, near the head of bis column. It was this brigade of Banks' corps which attracted notice, and as it went forward not for the purpose of attack, but merely observation, it of course withdrew on finding itself in presence of an enemy. General Wilcox was then withdrawn with his division of three brigades and sent to assist Hood's division of three brigades of Longstreet's com- mand in resisting the advance of King's division of McDowell's corps on the Warrenton turnpike, toward Gainesville. Now certainly was a time when petitioner could have thrown himself on the "enemy's flank,'' as the force opposed, even according to his own present allegations, being then but about a third of Longstreet's alleged 25,000 men, was less than his own present under arms and containing very nearly all of the theu regular army in Sykes' splendid division, and aggregating under his immediate command over 14,000 men. Even this opportunity was permitted to pass without effort. Indeed, what effort could be expected of a commander of an army corps who spent most of his time that day several miles to the rear, where, by reason of thicker interposing woods, the souud of battle on the right was less distinct. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. From careful study of the Confederate reports it would seem that the centre of Longstreet's operations during the entire day of the 29th was Gainesville. It was of vital importance to the Confederate army of .Northern \ n- giuia that this point should be held : First. To prevent a flank movement from any portion of the Army of the Potomac via Warrenton Junction. Second. To maintain communication with Thoroughfare Gap. General Lee did not and could not properly know what peculiar influ- ences were operating to retard the arrival of additional assistance from the Army of the Potomac, an army to which I am glad to say 1 had the honor once of belonging. Therefore we find from the official Confederate reports that at 8 a. in., on the morning of that day, while still at Thoroughfare Gap, he dispatched Mai. Samuel H. Eairston, as I have said, with a cavalry detachment to Warrenton to see whether any of our army was in the vicinity ol that place, and it was not until 8 p. m. of the same day that General Lee was informed bv Major Eairston that there were no Union troops on taa flank or rear in that direction. (Confederate reports, p. 42.», published in Richmond, Va., 1864. U. S. Mil. Acad. Library.) . : The Confederate general-in-chief maybe said to have been fighting what General Pope termed a "defensive" battle, because he had not all his forces available, viz, the large divisions, of Maj. Gen. D. tL Mill, consisting of five brigades, with artillery; Maj. Gen. L. McLaws, ot four brigades, and Maj. Gen. R. H. Anderson s division o J-W^J" special command. At that time there were no regular « corps organi- zations in the Confederate army, and only divisions and armies. General Lee had pushed forward as fast as possible, test /acksDU, who had gotten three days ahead, should be destroyed before he could avert it His first thought had been to overwhelm Pope before re ent.-i j me^coukl^ach him^rom the peninsula, but he ^Sstoro^and movements, and Pope received llemtzelman s and Ported corps and Reynolds' and Reno's divisions. 80 Jackson never would have reached Manassas Junction had the re-en- forcements, promised General Pope by the authorities in Washington, arrived on time, re enforcements other than those here mentioned, and which should have come from Alexandria. The bold but incautious act of Jackson put his own army iu peril, and General Pope instantly seizing the advantage interposed a sufficient force between him and his, Jackson's, supports which were coming up by forced marches to Thoroughfare Gap. The halt made at that place, and the fact that the reserve artillery were, for tbe 20tb, left there, indicate that the position of the Union forces was not well understood. If, therefore, General Lee did at any time on the 29th wish Longs treet to make any offensive movement, it may be considered as having been suggested rather with a view to develop the strength of the opposing force than for serious action. TBIE WHEN ENEMY'S SUPPORTS ARRIVED. The question as to when the enemy's supports arrived in considerable force and took up position is one of but secondary importance, deriving no value in any consideration of this case unless the petitioner at the time knew they were there iu force. Where diaries were not kept, uor the hours noted down from a time- piece, the sequence of events will usually be the best guide in determin- ing how long it was before a certain movement took place. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's official report furnishes a good illustration : "About 10 a. m." he found a small portion of our forces had penetrated to General Jackson's left rear, near the baggage trains; which caused some dismay. He placed Captain Pelham's horse-artillery battery in position near Sud- ley Church, and then moved towards the road between Uaymarket and Gainesville. The troops which thus got towards Jackson's rear were most probably Col. O. M. Poe's brigade. After General Stuart met General Longstreet's advance, he passed his cavalry through to the south of the turnpike in order to watch the roads there. In doing this he came to the high commanding ridge, which is not indicated on the contour map used in tins case, but which is specially marked on "Beauregard's map "' in the War Department. Prom that elevated position ho could see Ceutreville, Manassas Junction, Hopeville Gap, Thoroughfare Gap, in fact the entire country. He saw General Porter's corps coming on a road from the southeast, and to retard them until he could get infantry up, set troopers to dragging brush to raise a cloud of dust on the road, and then sent for Capt. Win, K. Bachman's battery South Carolina Artillery, of Hood's division, under Maj. B. \V. Probel. It went into position on this hill, and fired a few shots toward and into General Porter's advance brigade, but as he quickly withdrew it, there was nothing left to fire at. That very ridge is to this day known by the people who live there as "Stuart's Hill," where the battery was placed, and if General Porter had moved forward, as he should have done, he would have taken that ridge and been in a position between Jackson's right and Longstreet's advance. Prom that ridge the artillery, later in the day, fired in the direction of Cunliff's, and enfilading the Pennsylvania reserves, under Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds, forced them to fall back from the furthest position gained by them westwardly near Cunliff's and the pike on that day. The opportunity here presented to an enterprising and vigorous officer was lost, for instead of pushing into action so as to communicate with the left of General Pope's army, the petitioner retired without any effort to carry out the specific orders for his march, under which he was to halt only when he should have established communication with the forces 'on his right (Pennsylvania reserves), which, as he Jcnew, were ordered also to march toward Gainesville. As, however, from the sounds of battle, it was evident that they had met the enemy, communication could not of course be had by continu- ing in tbe direction of Gainesville on one side of the triangle. Gainesville forming the apex, but by pushing across to the other side on a more northerly road, parallel to the base of the assumed triangle. While he was still at his furthest point of advance, with a portion of his troops, near Dawkin's Branch, General Reynolds was crossing the "U'arrenton turnpike and attacking Jackson's right. There were two brigade fronts between Reynolds' division and Grove- ton, viz, Stand's and McLean's, ofSigel's corps, and this shows how far his force must have extended on the general line of the turnpike toward Gainesville. In his official report, Geueral Reynolds says, as we have seen, that " Cooper's battery, with Meade's brigade as a support, was immediately placed in position on the right of the pike and on the left of the woods where Gibbon's brigade had bi en in action " (p. 72, official printed report). In his evidence on the general court-martial, General Reynolds said " he supposes this to have been as late as one o'clock? In Brig. Gen. R. C. Schenck's official report (p. 140, ibid.), it is stated that it was about one or two o'clock when General Reynolds' division was seen coming up on the left of McLean's brigade of Schenck's divis- ion. It was the " left rear " of the force of General Reynolds (thus offered at an angle with our main line) that the Confederate reports speak of as attained by their artillery in their advance from Gainesville. From this we may consider what would have been the effect had General Porter moved up to establish communication with our left (Reynolds'), since the ground between them was necessarily entirely unoccupied by the enemy, and since the enemy's check to Reynolds' attack of Jackson's right would have been counterchcked by General Porter's advance. All these troops south of the Warrenton turnpike were rendered of comparatively little use, by reason of the accused's inaction. As, according to Geueral Schenck's report, Cooper's battery, alter go- ing into position (left of Gibbon's battle-ground) between one and two o'clock, was in action "about an hour" (p. 140, ibid.), it follows that the enemy could not have attacked and flanked Reynolds with artillery, even so as to have compelled his falling back, until about three o'clock. When, therefore, it is sought by petitioner's counsel to place the < 'on- federate line of Hood's division in the neighborhood of Gibbon's hat tie- ground and field hospital some time before noon, we can only believe it bv saving that what gallant John F. Reynolds swore to, and Schenck by his aide-de-camp) officially reported in September and October. L862, was a lie, or else you must come to the conclusion that tbe Confederate sources of information were mistaken. The field-hospital of our dead and wounded men of Gibbon's brigade has been too well fixed in evidence and too indelibly impressed on the minds of those who passed over the ground on the 29th August, 1 862, and who have been witnesses, not to leave its impress. Nearly three hours is a great discrepancy, but as Reynolds' and Schenck's reports and 6 G 82 the former's evidence were made and given when the subject was fresh in their recollection, such sources of information are entitled to great respect. If the Confederates were anywhere near the position it is sought to place them, Reynolds would have been destroyed. I shall produce further evidence from distinguished officers in the reserves to confirm Reynolds' evidence. Leaving out of view the question of success or non- success of an attack on the enemy's right, and whether Jackson or Long- street was there, it will not be questioned that an attack should be made as ordered, because even if it fails it may so employ troops of the enemy as to insure elsewhere against their line such success as to lead to vic- tory. The battle we are considering affords a striking illustration of this. When Hood's advance (of Longstreet's command) had, towards the middle of the afternoon, rendered the stay of the two brigades in Jack- son's right front in observation of Reynolds no longer a necessity, they were withdrawn and became a reserve greatly needed for Jackson's nearly-exhausted lines. When General Kearney, at about six o'clock, rolled up the enemy's left upon his center, and Stevens, joining with Kearney, endeavored to sweep their line still further and make the success decisive, it was Jubal Early's Confederate brigade, with the Eighth Louisiana of Hay's bri- gade, coming to the aid of A. P. Hill's exhausted troops, who had already, says Hill in his report, suffered "six distinct and separate assaults," that checked our advance and drove Stevens back. Kearney's report says his own division "changed front to the left to sweep with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The enemy rolled up on his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. Still our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further progress was impeded. General Stevens came up gal- lantly in action to support us, but did not have the numbers." These were the last reserves Jackson had upon the field. The other regiments of Hay's brigade had been put in some time previously on a similar necessity. It must not be forgotten in the examination of these details that the strength of the evidence against the accused lay much in the con- sideration that it presented a series of acts having throughout a charac- ter in common and bearing on their face a common motive ; that they began upon his being placed under the command of a particular officer; that they continued so long as he remained uuder that officer ; that they exhibited a half-compliance, non-compliance, or positive disobedience to both the letter and the spirit of successive orders received from that offi- cer ; and that his hostility to that officer was clearly proven, both in his dispatches and utterances. Again, what maybe called the method of his defection looked to a retirement of the army in which he found himself to a point in rear of the field of operations, where, by the fact of this retirement, and the assumed failure of the general under whom he was serving, he might come under another command; and his own private dispatches confirmed this aspect of the case since they showed this to have been his ruling thought and desire. It was, in short, the consistency of these acts with each other, their contrast with the previous conduct of the same officer, and the key to their purpose furnished by his own words, that trebly indicated his ac- countability, and bore the minds of the court to his conviction. Of the less flagrant of these acts, perhaps of every one except his 83 turning his back upon the field cm the afternoon of the 29th aud failure to push in, it may be said that this or that, had it stood alone, might have been covered up or explained away so as to have left him the ben- efit of a doubt. It was more difficult to do this with several taken to- gether. It was impossible to do it with all. I have taken considerable time in this statement, feeling constrained to make it preliminary to the introduction of evidence in rebuttal. The task imposed upon me under the ruling of the Board is, and has been, far from agreeable. My sympathies have leaned considerably toward the petitioner, but I have endeavored to perform my duty irre- spective of personal considerations, and have striven to state the case for the government as I understand it and as I expect to be able to prove it. I think in some quarters my position has been misunderstood, and as the duty imposed on ma has been to me a source of regret I shall look with satisfaction to the time when I can say that on you, not me, rests further responsibility in this case. tz^^u LEAg'12