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 [Separate No. 149] Xt 
 
 The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 By Frank Hey wood Hodder, Ph. M. 
 
 Professor of History in the University of Kansas 
 
 [From the Proceedings of the State Histoj^al Society of Wisconsin for 
 191 2, pages 69-86] 
 
 Madison 
 
 Published for the Society 
 
 1913 
 
[Separate No. 149] 
 
 The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 By Frank Heywood Hodder, Ph. M. 
 
 Professor of History in the University of Kansas 
 
 [From the Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for 
 191 2, pages 69-86] 
 
 Madison 
 Published for the Society 
 
 1913 
 
£r *roo 
 
 Gift 
 Carnesic Institution 
 •f Waskincton 
 1913 
 
 'y- ■■V'- 
 
 ■'<f 
 
Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 By Frank Heywood Hodder 
 
 Current events portend a new era of American political his- 
 tory. The division in the Republican party suggests the dis- 
 ruption of the Democratic party in 1860 and the earlier origin 
 of the Republican party itself. The Republican party resulted 
 directly from the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the 
 Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. It is still generally believed that 
 this measure was proposed by Stephen A. Douglas in further- 
 ance of his selfish ambition for the presidency. This is the 
 view of the standard histories of Schouler and Rhodes, of Pro- 
 fessor Smith's volume in Hart's "American Nation" series and 
 of a recent popular life of Douglas by Henry Parker Willis. 
 Stephen Arnold Douglas, with the accent on the Arnold, has 
 been the cry of all. ever since von Hoist gave currency to the 
 phrase. Before entering on a new era of party history it may 
 not be amiss to inquire wiiether we have correctly appraised 
 the event that ushered in the present one. 
 
 The Kansas-Nebraska act was the resultant of four distinct 
 elements. Of these the first and most important was the agita- 
 tion for a transcontinental railroad which was begun by Asa 
 Whitney in 1845. While Whitney's specific plan was event- 
 ually rejected, it was he who aroused public interest and con- 
 vinced the American people of the necessity of a Pacific rail- 
 road. Action M'as, however, long delayed by rivalry between 
 the various candidates for the eastern terminus of the road.^ 
 
 ' For contest over eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad, see John P. 
 Davis, Union Pacific Railway (Chicago, 1894), chap. iii. Other con- 
 siderations delayed the building of the road, such as controversy over 
 the power of the federal government and the mode of construction. 
 
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Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 Eastern interests, controlling navigation upon the Great Lakes 
 and the Erie canal, and owning the railways centering in Chi- 
 cago, wanted a road west from Chicago through Iowa and by 
 way of South Pass to the Pacific. Somewhat later, with the 
 development of ^linnesota aiul Oregon, a project emerged for 
 a road much farther north connecting Lake Superior and the 
 Columbia. St. Louis wanted the road west through ^Missouri 
 and thence across the mountains. The principal southern 
 routes contemplated an outlet on the Atlantic at Charleston. 
 ]\Iemphis, expecting to connect with Charleston by roads pro- 
 jected and in part under construction, wanted a road to Albu- 
 querque and thence, either by "Walker's pass or the Gila, to 
 California. Vicksburg, also expecting through connection with 
 Charleston, Avanted a road west through Shreveport to El Paso 
 and thence by the Gila route to San Diego. Southern 
 Louisiana and Texas were both unwilling to have the 
 Pacific trade carried north of them by rail to Charleston 
 and wanted an outlet on the Gulf. Thus the situation was 
 inextricably confused. Not only was there sectional division 
 between the North and West on the one hand and the South on 
 the other, but Northern interests were divided between three 
 distinct routes and Southern interests between as many more. 
 The rivaliy was all the keener because it was supposed at that 
 time that not more than one Pacific railway would ever be needed 
 and that the first one constructed would remain the permanent 
 highway across the continent. 
 
 Besides rivalry for the eastern terminal, two other influences 
 blocked Pacific railway legislation. The Pacific Steamship Com- 
 pany, owned by NeAv York capital, operated a line of steamships 
 to Panama, and in 1849 incorporated a company for the con- 
 struction of a railway across the Isthmus of Panama. At the 
 same time New Orleans capital was promoting a railway across 
 the Isthmus of Tehuantepee. Thus steamship and isthmus rail- 
 way interests both in New' York and New Orleans were opposed 
 to any transcontinental railway at all. 
 
 At the beginning. Pacific railway projects necessarily favored 
 a northern route, as that was the only one then within the ter- 
 ritory of the United States; but with the acquisition of New 
 Mexico and California the tables were turned. The Mexican 
 
 [70] 
 
Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 War was fought quite as much in the interest of the expansion of 
 Scuthem trade as in the interest of the extension of slave territory. 
 The South wanted California and the trade wdth the Orient. 
 Tris't's instructions called for the cession of Southern California 
 and a boundarj^ along the line of the thirty-second parallel. He 
 failed to get Southern California and had to content himself with 
 the Gila River as a boundary ; coupled, however, with the provi- 
 sion that if upon examination it should prove more advantageous 
 to build a railroad on the south bank of the river, Mexico would 
 make an agreement allowing its construction. 
 
 In 1849 Benton introduced his first bill in the Senate for a 
 great central national highway from St. Louis to San Fran- 
 cisco, between the parallels of thirty-eight and thirty-nine, and 
 in 1850 made his famous speech in favor of what he called ' ' the 
 buffalo trail. ' ' In both years conventions were held in different 
 parts of the country in the interest of the various terminals. 
 Stephen A. Douglas presided over the convention held at St. 
 Louis in 1849. While the convention declared for a St. Louis 
 terminal, a resolution in favor of Benton's buffalo trail was de- 
 feated, and one in favor of the South Pass route substituted, a 
 route that logically required an Iowa and Chicago terminal. 
 
 Above all other things Douglas was interested in the rail- 
 road development of the West. More than any other man he 
 contributed to the upbuilding of the city of Chicago by mak- 
 ing it the railroad centre of the Middle West. In 1850 he 
 carried through the land grant for the Illinois Central, by 
 which he boimd together the northern and southern sections 
 of his own state and eventually joined the Great Lakes and 
 the Gulf. With respect to the Pacific railway question. Doug- 
 las was in a difficult position. His private interests and those 
 of the people of northern Illinois were bound up in the devel- 
 opment of Chicago, where he lived. Southern Illinois on the 
 other hand was tributary to St. Louis, and the interests of 
 that section demanded a St. Louis terminal. If Douglas fa- 
 vored a Chicago terminal, he sacrificed the interests of the 
 people of southern Illinois and laid himself open to the charge 
 of favoring his private interests. If he favored a St. Louis 
 terminal, he sacrificed his own interests and those of his 
 Northern constituents. It is somewhat significant that the St. 
 
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Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 Louis convention, over which he presided, while declaring for 
 a St. Louis terminal, nevertheless adopted a route that logi- 
 cally required a Chicago terminal. 
 
 The organisation of New Mexico in 1850 gave supporters of 
 the southern route a great advantage. It was indispensably 
 necessary that the territory through which the road was to be 
 built, be organized, in order to provide means for building it 
 by the sale of land and in order to provide both protection 
 and business after the road should be built. Unless the north- 
 ern territory could also be organized, the chance of securing 
 a northern route was lost. 
 
 The second element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was 
 the difficulty in the way of organizing this region, presented 
 by the controversy respecting its status as to slavery. The 
 Missouri Compromise provided that slavery in this region 
 should forever be prohibited, but the question whether "for- 
 ever" meant forever or was limited to the territorial period 
 was left open at the time; and each side, as is usual in such 
 cases, put its own interpretation upon the term. When Texas 
 was annexed in 1845, Douglas tried to apply the principle to 
 which, nine years later, he gave the name of popular sover- 
 eignty, by moving that states admitted from Texas be slave 
 or free as their people should desire; but it Avas decided to 
 restrict this provision to states formed south of the Missouri 
 Compromise line, and Douglas himself moved the clause which 
 declared that states formed north of this line should forever 
 be free. Thus Douglas and the majority in Congress at that 
 time accepted the Northern interpretation, that "forever" 
 meant forever. 
 
 The question of the status of slavery in the territories was 
 revived by the discussion of the organization of Oregon and 
 of the territory to be acquired from Mexico. In this discus- 
 sion two opinions developed with respect to the power of Con- 
 gress: one that Congress had plenai-y power and might either 
 prohibit slavery altogether or divide the territory by a com- 
 promise line ; and the other, formulated by Calhoun, that slav- 
 ery was guaranteed by the Constitution and that Congress 
 could neither prohibit it in the territory nor allow the people 
 to do so. The Democrats divided on this issue in the cam- 
 paign of 1848 and a part of them organized the Free Soil 
 
 [72] 
 
Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 party. Cass undertook in his famous Nicholson letter to evade 
 the issue by taking the ground that slavery was a local ques- 
 tion to be decided by the. people of each state, subject however 
 to the Constitution.- In other Vv'ords the question of slavery 
 was to be left to the people of each state— if the Constitu- 
 tion would admit, but not if the Constitution would not. This 
 was a resort to the familiar expedient of a plank that could 
 be construed one way in one section and the opposite way in 
 the other, Cass's object being not only to secure the nomina- 
 tion for the presidency, but also to preserve the integrity of 
 his party. 
 
 The Compromise of 1850 admitted California as a free state 
 and organized the territories of Utah and New Mexico with 
 the proviso that, when admitted as states, they should be 
 received with or without slavery as their constitutions should 
 prescribe at the time of their admission. The territorial bills 
 were drafted by Douglas and finally passed in the exact form 
 in which he originally reported them. In the admission of 
 California the North gained an extra state and it was therefore 
 the turn for the admission of a slave state. The South would 
 not organize a free territory in the trans-Missouri region, which 
 would certainly become another free state, and the North would 
 not open this region to slavery by the repeal of the Missouri Com- 
 promise; but, unless it could be organized, there was no hope 
 for a northern route "for the Pacific railroad. 
 
 The third element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was tKe 
 local demand that developed in Missouri and Iowa for the or- 
 ganization of Nebraska for the express purpose of furnishing 
 a route for the Pacific railway. The development of the move- 
 ment in Missouri has been admirably traced by Professor 
 Ray.' Opposition to Benton's continuance in the Senate had 
 
 ^ There is an excellent study by M. M. Quaife, The doctrine of non- 
 intervention with slavery in the territories (Chicago 1910) which by 
 reason of having been privately printed as a doctor's thesis, is less 
 known than it deserves to be. 
 
 »P. 0. Ray, Repeal of the Missouri Compromise (Cleveland, 1909). 
 Unfortunately Professor Ray has made the presentation of this subject 
 a basis for the untenable theory that the Kansas-Nebraska act was the 
 work of Atchison. The force of Atchison's drunken speech is broken 
 by his later utterances. It was Dixon who forced direct repeal. Atchi- 
 
 [73] 
 
Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 been long gathering in Missouri, and the validity of the Mis- 
 souri prohibition was made the issue between his supporters 
 and opponents. In 1847 the Bentonites carried a resolution 
 in the state legislature, affirming the validity of the Missouri 
 Compromise; but by 1849 Claigorne F. Jackson's counter-reso- 
 lutions Avere carried, denoimcing the IMissouri prohibition, 
 affirming that the right to prohibit slavery in a territory be- 
 longed to the people of the territory and instructing their 
 senators to act accordingly. Benton made these instructions 
 the issue of his campaign for reelection, and w^as defeated by 
 a coalition of the Anti-Bentonites and Whigs. He was imme- 
 diately sent to the House by the St. Louis district, and in 
 1853 began a campaign for election to the Senate to succeed 
 Atchison upon the platform of a i^.Iissouri terminal for the 
 Pacific railway and the immediate opening of Nebraska to 
 settlement in order to secure it. The organization of Ne- 
 braska Avas not needed by the Westward movement, as there 
 were still in IMissouri thousands of acres of unoccupied land, 
 but it was indispensable to a jMissouri terminus for the Pacific 
 railroad. Under Benton's inspiration, numerous meetings 
 were held in western Missouri, which sent memorials to Con- 
 gress asking the immediate organization of Nebraska. 
 
 The development of a similar movement in Iowa has not yet 
 been traced in detail; but between 1850 and 1853, under the 
 leadership of Senators Dodge and Jones, numerous public meet- 
 ings were held in the western part of the state, requesting the 
 immediate organization of Nebraska. Hadley D. Johnson says 
 that he removed from Indiana to Council Bluiifs in 1850 with 
 the expectation that it would be the eastern terminus of the 
 transcontinental railroad; and that, with this end in view, he 
 supported in the Iowa senate in 1852 the petition for land grants 
 for three Iowa railroads converging there.* Thus it appears 
 that the validity of the Missouri Compromise had for some time 
 
 son was allied with the Calhoun wing of the Democrats, and would not 
 have fathered a bill which assumed to establish popular sovereignty. 
 As will appear later, Dodge of Iowa was the associate of Douglas in the 
 passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act. 
 
 • Hadley D. Johnson, "How the Kansas-Nebraska boundary line was 
 established", in Nebraska State Hist. Soc. Transactions, ii, pp. 80-92. 
 Council Bluffs was then called Kanesville. 
 
 [74] 
 
Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 been an issue in Missouri and that there had developed in both 
 Missouri and Iowa a considerable demand for the organization 
 of Nebraska, and that this was desired in each state for the 
 purpose of securing the eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad. 
 The fourth element in the Kansas-Nebraska situation was the 
 result of the movement in IMissouri and Iowa. This was the de- 
 mand for organization, in the territory itself, by the emigrant 
 Indian tribes under the leadership of the Wyandots.^ The 
 Wyandots removed from Ohio in 1843 and settled on the west 
 bank of the Missouri at the mouth of the Kansas. They were 
 intelligent people with an organized government, and, while 
 nominally Indian, were predominantly white in blood. 
 They realized that the dissolution of their tribal relations 
 was only a question of time, and wanted to secure the 
 eastern terminus of the Pacific railroad and the opening of 
 the territory to settlement in order to sell their lands at the 
 highest possible price. In the fall of 1852 they sent Abelard 
 Guthrie as a delegate to Congress to urge organization. In 
 the summer of 1853 a convention of the emigrant tribes and 
 of the white men in the territory v/as held at Wyandot, which 
 passed elaborate resolutions ^ declaring for Benton's central 
 route for the Pacific railway, asking for the organization of 
 Nebraska Territory, establishing a provisional government, and 
 providing for the election of a territorial delegate to Congress. 
 At the ensuing election for territorial delegate the Eev. Thos. 
 
 •This subject was developed in 1899 by William E. Connelley In his 
 "Provisional Government of Nebraska Territory", issued as Id, iii. The 
 material is repeated in Kansas State Hist. Soc. Transactions, vi, pp. 
 97-110. With the enthusiasm of a discoverer, Mr. Connelley exagger- 
 ates the importance of the movement. Hadley Johnson's article (see 
 ante, note 4) and Connelley's book (p. 31) are the earliest suggestions 
 that I have found of the influence of the Pacific railroad route upon the 
 organization of Kansas and Nebraska. 
 
 •This meeting was promoted and the resolution drawn by Maj. Wil- 
 liam Gilpin, a supporter of Benton and afterward first territorial gov- 
 ernor of Colorado. Gilpin had secured the adoption of similar resolu- 
 tions at Independence, Mo., in 1849. See appendix to his Central Gold 
 Region (Philadelphia, 1860). Mr. Connelley writes me that he was 
 mistaken in supposing that the resolutions were in the handwriting of 
 W. T. Dyer, chairman of the committee on resolutions. 
 
 6 [ 75 ] 
 
Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 Jolinson, Methodist missionary to the Shawnees at Westport, was 
 chosen. Hearing that an election for territorial delegate had been 
 called and fearing that their railroad interests would suffer at 
 the hands of a delegate chosen by the inhabitants of the south- 
 ern part of the territory, the people of Council Bluffs crossed 
 the river on the appointed day and elected Hadley D. Johnson 
 delegate. Both Johnsons proceeded to Washington, and, while 
 their influence was probably slight, nevertheless the presence 
 of two representatives from the territory urging its organiza- 
 tion could not have been wholly without effect. This summary 
 of the elements that entered into the passage of the Kansas- 
 Nebraska act discloses the fact that at every point the pur- 
 pose was to secure a northern route for the Pacific railway. 
 
 The events in the struggle over the location of this railroad 
 indicate that the organization of Nebraska was a part of the 
 larger controversy. Douglas served in the House from 1843 to 
 1847, and in the Senate from 1847 until his death in 1861 . As 
 early as 1845 he proposed a grant of land to the states of Ohio, 
 Indiana, lUinois, and Iowa, for a railroad from Lake Erie by 
 way of Chicago and Rock Island to the Missouri River, and 
 prepared a bill for the organization of the territories of Neb- 
 raska and Oregon and a land grant to them for a railway from 
 the Missouri River to the Pacific.^ Nothing came of the pro- 
 posals, as the title to Oregon was still in dispute and Califor- 
 nia had not yet been acquired. They are significant only as 
 showing that these two purposes were coupled in Douglas's 
 mind from the beginning of his national career, and at a time 
 when serious agitation for a Pacific railway had hardly begun. 
 In December, 1845, he was made chairman of the House com- 
 mittee on territories. When he was elected to the Senate' in 
 1847, he transferred the House chairmanship to his friend and 
 political lieutenant William A. Richardson, just elected to Con- 
 gress for the first time, and w^as himself elected to the chair- 
 manship of the corresponding Senate committee and continued 
 in that position for over ten years. The organization of the 
 
 ' J. Madison Cutts, Brief treatise upon constitutional and party queS' 
 tions (New York, 1866), p. 218. 
 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 territories thus became the principal business of his political 
 life.« 
 
 In 1848, during both sessions of the Thirtieth Congress, Doug- 
 las introduced bills for the organization of Nebraska, but with- 
 out result. The stream of emigration that poured over the Oregon 
 trail after the discovery of gold in California, demonstrated 
 the necessity of organization, but the struggle over the Com- 
 promise of 1850 postponed the subject for the time being. The 
 whole history of the subsequent discussion of Pacific railway 
 projects indicates the co-operation of Douglas and of Dodge 
 of Iowa, both working for a Chicago and Iowa terminal for 
 the road. Dui-ing the first session of the Thirty-second Con- 
 gress, the Senate passed (March 17, 1852) a bill introduced by 
 Senator Jones of Iowa and amended by Senator Dodge, pro- 
 viding for the grant of land to Iowa for the construction of 
 two railroads — one, north and south, from Dubuque to Keo- 
 kuk, and the other, east and west, from Davenport to the Mis- 
 souri River.^ A month later (April 22) Douglas introduced a 
 bill for the protection of the emigrant route and for a tele- 
 graph line and overland mail from the Missouri River to Cali- 
 fornia and Oregon. At the beginning of the second session of 
 the Thirty-second Congress the Douglas bill was referred to 
 a special committee, which, February 1, 1853, reported a 
 substitute bill for the construction of a Pacific railway, leaving 
 to the president the designation of the route and terminus. 
 The bill was buried by adjournment on February 22, Douglas 
 insisting upon putting every senator on record by calling 
 for the yeas and nays. The next day the Senate voted an ap- 
 propriation for the survey of the several routes under the di- 
 rection of the secretary of war, coupled with the requirement 
 
 'An excellent study is Allen Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas (New 
 York, 1908). Professor Johnson, however, represents the Pacific rail- 
 road as "crossing the path" of the Kansas-Nebraska Act rather than as 
 its mainspring (see pp. 222 and 238), and he does not develop the ex- 
 tent of Douglas's activity in behalf of a Pacific railroad and the Iowa 
 route. 
 
 * Louis Pelzer, Augustus Cwsar Dodge (State Hist. Soc. of Iowa Bio- 
 graphical Series), chap, xiii; chap, xii treats of the Pacific railroad. 
 The natural order of these chapters is reversed. 
 
 77] 
 
Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 that reports of the surveys be laid before Congress on the first 
 Monday in February, 1854. 
 
 While the Senate was debating the Pacific railroad bill, the 
 House passed a bill for the organization of Nebraska. De- 
 cember 13, 1852, Hall of Missouri reported a bill for the organ- 
 ization of the Territory of the Platte, which was referred to 
 the committee on territories. February 2, 1853, Richardson 
 reported from this committee a substitute bill for the organizS/- 
 tion of Nebraska, without mention of slavery, and the bill 
 passed February 10 by a vote of 98 to 43. Nearly all the 
 votes against tlie bill came from the South, and both Hall and 
 Richardson ^" charged in the debate that they were based upon 
 opposition to a northern route for the Pacific railway. Reply- 
 ing to Howard of Texas, Mr. Hall said: "He wishes to treat 
 with those Indians, to go through that slow process and in the 
 meantime all the great objects of the bill will be lost and the 
 emigration to the Pacific will be driven to another portion of 
 the Union from the route that it now foUow^s." Elsewhere in 
 the speech he exclaimed: "Everybody is talking about a raii- 
 road to the Pacific. In the name of God, how is a railroad to 
 be made, if you will never let people live on the lands through 
 which it passes ?"^^ Douglas made repeated efforts to get the 
 House bill before the Senate. On the last day of the session 
 (March 3, 1853) it was laid on the table by a vote cf 27 to 17. 
 Of those voting, every Southern senator voted against the bill, 
 except the two from Missouri,^- and every Northern senator 
 for it, except five from the Northeast. Opposition in both houses 
 was ostensibly based on the fact that the Indian title had not 
 been extinguished, although the bill provided that it should not 
 take effect until this had been done. The only progress that was 
 made toward organization was the passage of an appropriation 
 for the extinction of this title. 
 
 Professor Ray argues upon two grounds, that the votes on the 
 Richardson bill do not indicate that the opposition was 
 
 " Richardson's speech is quoted by Ray, p. 241. Ray erroneously says 
 that it is the only reference to the subject in the debate. 
 » 32 Cong., 2 sess., Congressional Globe, pp. 560, 562, 563. 
 " 32 Cong., 2 sess., Senate Journal, p. 322. 
 
 [78] 
 
Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 connected with the rivalry over the Pacific railway route: first, 
 that in the Senate twenty-two members did not vote at all; and 
 second, that in the House two members from Louisiana and a 
 considerable part of the New York delegation voted for the 
 bill and only one of the Texas members against it.^^ In regard 
 to the Senate vote, it may be said that it equalled the average 
 vote of the session and that it w^as taken on the last day, after 
 many members had gone home. In regard to the House vote, 
 it will be remembered that the South was itself divided on the 
 subject of the Pacific railroad. Louisiana and southern Texas 
 were opposed to a road with au outlet at Charleston, and Louis- 
 iana was interested in the proposed Tehuantepec railroad. 
 The two Louisiana votes for Nebraska may have been intended 
 to offset the Southern project, and the failure of one of the 
 two Texas members to vote is not surprising.^* New York in- 
 terests were divided between the Pacifie Steamship and Panama 
 Raihvay companies on the one hand and the Erie canal on the 
 other. Erie canal interests required a northern route for the 
 Pacific railway, and a division of the vote in that quarter was 
 therefore to be expected. The vote does not therefore militate 
 against the theory that Pacific railway considerations influen- 
 ced the attitude of the House toward the organization of Neb- 
 raska. The situation was, however, too complex to render it 
 possible to interpret the vote from any single point of view. 
 
 During the summer of 1853, Jefferson Davis dispatched the 
 exploring expeditions ordered by Congress to examine the sev- 
 eral routes under discussion for the proposed transcontinental 
 railway, and their reports w^ere expected early in the following 
 year. Preliminary surveys of the Gila route had indicated that 
 a railroad in that quarter could best be built south of the river, 
 and it had come to be realized that it was not practicable to 
 
 " Ray, pp. 239-241. 
 
 " It should be said that Howard, who opposed the bill, was from San 
 Antonio, and that Scurry, who did not vote, came from Clarkesville in 
 northern Texas. Scurry, whose failure to vote impresses Professor 
 Ray, appears, despite his name, not to have been a very active member 
 of Congress. He is referred to but three times in the index to the 
 Globe, for this session: the first time he arrived nearly a month late; 
 the second time he moved to adjourn; and the third time he announced 
 that he had paired. 
 
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Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 build a road in Mexican territory as contemplated by the 
 treaty of Guadaloupe. Accordingly, President Pierce sent to 
 Mexico General Gadsden, president of the Charleston road 
 with which the proposed Pacific road was to connect, with in- 
 structions to purchase the necessary territory south of the Gila, 
 and by December 30 he had done so.^'^ Colonel Manypenny, 
 commissioner of Indian affairs, was sent by the secretary of the 
 interior to the Indian tribes of the Northwest with instructions 
 to make a preliminary survey and to negotiate treaties at his 
 discretion. Manypenny consorted with Southern men while in 
 the territory and returned without negotiating any treaties, 
 reporting that it was confidently believed that the necessary 
 treaties could be secured in the following spring, at which time 
 it was expected that the southern Pacific road would be defi- 
 nitely located. If anything were to be done to prevent it, it 
 must be done quickly. 
 
 Douglas spent the summer of 1853 in Europe and returned a 
 month before the opening of Congress. Soon after his return 
 he wrote a confidential letter ^^ indicating that the subjects up- 
 permost in his mind were the disposition of the surplus, the 
 river anH harbor question, and the Pacific railroad. Referring 
 to his own chances for the presidency, he said: "The party is 
 in distracted condition and it requires all our wisdom, pru- 
 dence, and energy to consolidate its powers and perpetuate its 
 principles. Let us leave the presidency out of view for at least 
 two years to come." 
 
 The first session of the Thirty-third Congress convened on 
 December 5, 1853. On the first day of the session Dodge of 
 Iowa, as chairman of the committee on public lands, gave no- 
 tice of his intention to introduce a bill for the organization of 
 Nebraska, and on the 14th introduced a bill identical in form 
 with the Eichardson bill of the preceding session. The bill was 
 referred to the committee on territories and returned by Doug- 
 las January 4, 1854 with amendments, accompanied by his 
 
 " Gadsden was not nominated minister to Mexico until February 2, 
 1854, was confirmed February 13, and the treaty was not ratified until 
 April 28; see Senate Executive Journal. The treaty included other sub- 
 jects than the boundary. 
 
 "Letter to Lanphier and Walker, Nov. 11, 1853; Johnson, pp. 226- 
 228; Ray, pp. 185, 186. 
 
 [80] 
 
Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 famous report. The amendments consisted of the insertion in 
 the bill of two clauses taken verbatim from the Utah and New 
 Mexico acts, which Douglas had himself drawn and which both 
 parties professed to accept as a final settlement of the slavery- 
 controversy. The first clause provided that "when admitted 
 as a state or states, the said territory * * * shall be re- 
 ceived into the Union with or without slavery, as their consti- 
 tutions may prescribe at the time of their admission". The 
 second clause provided that questions involving title to slaves 
 should be determinable in the local courts, subject to appeal to 
 the supreme court of the United States. The report explained 
 that the committee did not assume either to atfirm or deny the 
 Missouri Compromise, but that they considered that its eft'ect 
 was limited to the territorial period and that the question of 
 its validity during that period was a judicial one. 
 
 Douglas saw that he could not secure the organization of 
 Nebraska and thus pave the way for a northern route for the 
 Pacific railway without some concession to the South. In the 
 original bill this concession consisted in limiting the force of 
 the Missouri Compromise to the territorial period. The pro- 
 vision that the question of the validity of the prohibition dur- 
 ing the territorial period should go to the courts, was a conces- 
 sion only in appearance, since it belonged and would have 
 gone to the courts in any event. Six days later (January 10), 
 Douglas made a second concession by adding a section to the 
 bill which was evidently intended to apply the principle of 
 popular sovereignty to the territory. His hand was further 
 forced by Dixon's motion for direct repeal of the Missouri 
 Compromise, and January 24 he brought in a second bill which 
 declared the Compromise inoperative on the ground that it was 
 superseded by the principles of the Compromise of 1850. This 
 was verbal jugglery intended to cover his defeat. February 
 7 he made another amendment, forced upon him by the Demo- 
 cratic caucus, which applied popular sovereignty, in Cass's 
 phrase, * 'subject to the Constitution". Douglas did not orig- 
 inally intend to repeal the Missouri Compromise, but having 
 made one concession he made a second and then was forced 
 to make a third and a fourth. His object was clearly to secure 
 the organization of the territory at any cost. He may be blamed 
 for yielding to pressure, but the facts disprove the charge that 
 
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Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 he set out to repeal the Missouri Compromise in order to win 
 support for the presidency. He yielded to pressure to save the 
 party. The Whig party had been destroyed by the Compro- 
 mise of 1850, and the Democratic party was "in distracted 
 condition". Northern Democrats refused to extend slave ter- 
 ritory, and Southern Democrats demanded a guarantee of 
 slavery in all territory. Douglas hoped to save the party by 
 accepting Cass's expedient of relegating the ciuestion of slav- 
 ery to the people of the territories, "subject to the Constitu- 
 tion." He failed to save the party but he did succeed in post- 
 poning its disruption until 1860. 
 
 The amended Nebraska bill substituted two territories, Kan- 
 sas and Nebraska, for a single one. It is a part of the Douglas 
 tradition that two territories v/ere created in order that one 
 might be slave. Douglas at the time clearly stated the reason 
 for two territories." The two Johnsons, and, what was far 
 more important, the representatives of both Iowa and Missouri, 
 demanded two territories. Dodge's speech on this point re- 
 veals the extent to which the question of the route for the Pa- 
 cific railway was the controlling one. "Originally", said 
 Dodge, "I favored the organization of one territory, but repre- 
 sentations from our constituents, and a more critical examina- 
 tion of the subject — having an eye to the systems of internal 
 improvement, which must be adopted by the people of Neb- 
 raska and Kansas to develop their resources — satisfied my col- 
 league, who was a member of the committee who reported this 
 bill, and myself that the great interests of the whole country 
 and especially of our state demand tv/o territories, otherwise 
 the seat of government and leading thoroughfares must have 
 fallen south of Towa".^^ As Professor Johnson puts it: "One 
 territory meant aid to the central route; two territories meant 
 an equal chance for both northern and central routes. As the 
 representative of Chicago interests, Douglas was not blind to 
 these considerations." 
 
 This session of Congress was too much engrossed by the 
 Kansas-Nebraska controversy to consider seriously the Pacific 
 railroad question. A select committee on the subject was ap- 
 
 " Johnson, pp. 238, 239. 
 
 " 33 Cong., 1 sess., Congressional Globe, App., p. 382. 
 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 pointed in each house. Gwin of California was chairman of 
 the Senate committee, but Douglas appears to have been its 
 moving spirit. March 13, 1854, a joint bill providing for two 
 roads, one at the south and the other west from j\Iinnesota, was 
 introduced in both houses but w\as not considered in the Sen- 
 ate and was laid on the table in the House. Douglas did not 
 intend that it should be passed, but wa,s playing for time until 
 Nebraska should be organized. Having organized Nebraska he 
 w^as ready for the fray. 
 
 At the second session of this Congress, January 9, 1855, 
 Douglas reported his railroad bill in the Senate and it was re- 
 ferred to the select committee and reported back on the 15th. 
 The bill provided for three roads: one vrest from Texas, 
 another west from Missouri or Iowa, and a third west from 
 Minnesota. Within the limits designated, the bill left the loca- 
 tion of th,e roads to the contractors.^^ The day after the bill 
 was reported back to the Senate, Dunbar of Louisiana moved 
 to substitute it for the bill pending in the House. Two days 
 later, John G. Davis of Indiana moved to amend by substitut- 
 ing a single road west from Iowa or Missouri, and in this form 
 the bill was passed ; but some question arising as to pairs, Ben- 
 ton rallied the opposition and it was lost upon reconsideration 
 by a single vote. In the Senate, Guyer of Missouri opposed 
 the bill on the groimd that the Eastern interests would choose 
 the Iowa terminal, since they would furnish the capital and al- 
 ready owned the Chicago and Iowa roads. Douglas, neverthe- 
 less, carried it through the Senate (February 19) but it was 
 not again taken up in the House. 
 
 February 27, Jefferson Davis made his final report on the. 
 Pacific railway surveys, in which he recommended the adop- 
 tion of the Gila route. Douglas had a weakness for sharp par- 
 liamentary practice. The substitution of his bill in the House 
 and the restriction to a single central road look very much 
 like a prearranged plan.^° Had the bill passed the House there 
 
 " See Id, 32 Cong., 2 sess., p. 749, for text of the bill. 
 
 " Notice that the member who moved substitution in the House was 
 from Louisiana. John G. Davis made a speech at the preceding session 
 in favor of a single central road: 33 Cong., 1 s^ss., Congressional Olobe, 
 App., p. 961. It would be interesting to know the relations between 
 Douglas and Davis. 
 
 [83] 
 
Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 is little doubt that he could have carried it through the Senate 
 before Davis's report was received. Douglas thus missed by a 
 single vote in the House accomplishing the purpose for which 
 he had organized Nebraska. 
 
 The excitement over the struggle in Kansas and the pending 
 presidential election was so great that it was impossible to se- 
 cui-e any Pacific railway legislation during the Thirty-fourth 
 Congress ; but in 1856 both parties declared in their platforms 
 for a transcontinental road. The Gwin bill, introduced in the 
 Senate during the first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress, 
 provided for a road between San Francisco and some point on 
 the Missouri River between the mouths of the Big Sioux and 
 the Kansas, and Douglas made a speech in its support. As it 
 finally passed the Senate at the following session, it provided 
 for three roads, which was equivalent to making no provision 
 at all for a road, as everyone knew that only one could be 
 built at a time. Sectional feeling had been so intensified that 
 the chance had passed of securing agreement on any one 
 route. 
 
 "When the Kansas-Nebraska act is considered in connection 
 with the discussion of the Pacific railroad routes which pre- 
 ceded and followed it, the conclusion is irresistible that it was 
 passed chiefly in furtherance of the project for the Chicago 
 and Iowa route. If, however, that purpose had been alleged 
 at the time, it would have prevented its passage. The ex- 
 citement over the Missouri Compromise obscured the real is- 
 sue and carried the bill. While Douglas failed by the nar- 
 rowest possible margin of accomplishing his ulterior object, 
 he nevertheless blocked the building of the southern road 
 which in 1853 was upon the eve of accomplishment. He in- 
 cidentally blocked the project for the absorption of all 
 Mexico, which Jefferson Davis intended should follow the 
 building of the southern road,^^ and he very possibly saved 
 California to the Union, since a southern road, built before 
 the war, might easily have carried that state into the Confed- 
 eracy. 
 
 Professor Ray argues that Douglas was not controlled by 
 Pacific railway considerations in proposing the Kansas- 
 
 "W. E. Dodd, Jefferson Davis (Philadelphia, 1907), p. 161. 
 
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Kansas-Nebraska Act 
 
 Nebraska act, for the reason that he never alleged that 
 ground, when hard-pressed, as he afterwards was, to defend 
 his course."- The difficulty of Douglas's position in his own 
 state has already been noted. He could not openly favor 
 either a Chicago or a St. Louis terminal without losing sup- 
 port in one section of it or the other. His position was sim- 
 ilar in the Union. He remained a presidential candidate un- 
 til his final nomination and defeat. If at any time he had 
 explained that the act generally accepted as a concession to 
 the South was in reality intended to sacrifice Southern to 
 Northern railway interests, he would instantly have lost all 
 Southern support. 
 
 Professor Johnson has pointed out that the vote in the 
 Democratic convention of 1852 indicates that Douglas was un- 
 der no necessity of currying favor in the South, but that he 
 was weakest in the Middle States.-^ If Douglas had his pres- 
 idential aspirations in mind in proposing the organization of 
 Nebraska, it is more reasonable to suppose that he expected that 
 a Chicago terminal for the Pacific railroad would strengthen 
 him with the Eastern interests and win support where he most 
 needed it. The South did not desert him until popular sov- 
 ereignty failed to make Kansas a slave state. 
 
 Douglas was an opportunist in politics. He had neither 
 the insight nor the foresight of a great statesman. He failed 
 utterly to realize the force of the rising anti-slavery sentiment 
 in the North. He did not foresee the length to which he 
 would have to go in order to organize Nebraska, nor the op- 
 position that it would arouse. He anticipated neither the 
 struggle that popular sovereignty precipitated in Kansas nor 
 the fact that it would be undermined by the supreme court. 
 When that court decided against it, he was compelled to fall 
 back upon the doctrine of unfriendly legislation, promulgated 
 at Freeport. This enabled Lincoln to say that Judge Douglas 
 claims that "a thing may be lawfully driven away from where 
 it has a lawful right to be." 
 
 Nevertheless Douglas was the dominant force in American 
 politics during the decade from 1850 to 1860. Lincoln was 
 
 " Ray, p. 242. 
 
 » Johnson, p. 206. 
 
 [85] 
 
Wisconsin Historical Society 
 
 exceptional, Douglas was typical. In highest degree he typi- 
 fied the new West, its vigor, its optimism, and its crudity. 
 The parallel is a striking one between Webster's seventh-of- 
 March speech and Douglas's organization of Kansas and Ne- 
 braska. Both men were accused of bidding for Southern sup- 
 port for the presidency. It is now admitted that Webster_[s_ 
 course was dictated by devotion to the Union. It ought to be 
 equally clear that Douglas's was controlled by devotion to the 
 development of the West. But when the supreme test came, 
 Douglas knew neither North nor South, East nor West, but 
 threw all his strength into the fight for the Union. The minor 
 faults of his political career were more than atoned for in its 
 close. "Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it." 
 
 86] 
 
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