f.^ THE VicKSBURG Campaign, BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA I'NDEi; THE CO:M>rAXD OF GEISTERAL U. S. GRANT, IN 1862-63; AN HISTORICAL REVIEW. BY SAM? ROCKWELL REED. Dkiiic.vtkd to the Patriotic American Yoluxteers, the Best Soldiers in the World, whose Herok- Valor, Intelugence, and High Spirit, WrrHorx Reward and Without the Aid of Great Gexerai^hip, Fought the Great War THitoruii TO the Triumph of the Nation. X CIXCIXXATI: Robert Clarke &: Co., 6t, 6;^ Sc 65 W. Fenditure without adequate results, with very little to feed luitional glory, and witliout any jmsitive progress toward ending the war. This seemed continually expanding, and the task of i)utting down the rebellion more; dis- couraging. Yet the people never flinched. Still, volunteers continued to rise up in a continuous tide, rushing with eagerness to the slaughter under a coni))ination of civil and military incompetency of leadership. Injus- tice" would be done to the patriotism and pluck of a great people by pretending that all was then cajiable, suc(.'essful, and glorious. It was an awful waste of brave and intelligent volunteers, and of colossal resources, and ex- j)enditure, by incapacity, and it was a long time of great discouragement. Yet tiic great peo])le never weakened in their resolve to jireserve the Union. It is time for the truth, and the truth is most glorious to the jKMipJe. After the slaughter at Pittsburg Landing, in which an army of as brave men as ever ti'ud the soldier's brogans was sacrificed by sheer neglect in its Commanding General of all that belongs to the practice of a soldier, the national army rested. With Buell's troops it was strong enough to have followed the enemy at once to (.'orinth, but it was in liKA.Ni's (IcpaiMincnt. ami uidcr IIali.eck'.s general command, and it waited forPlALLECK. After a battle our army always had a season of inactivity, rather the more after a victory than a defeat. The battle ended on the 7th of April, liS()2. Hallkck ordered Poi-E'sarmy of 25, (100 from Mi-ssouri to Pittsburg. He kept BuELi/s army. He laid open the entire West to gather troops to put into a .state of sus- pended animatiou. Q'he destroyed equipment of Graxt's army was replaced. Halleck left St. Louis, April 19, to come and take com- mand of an army raisctl to more than 100,000, to begin his famous siege approaches to Corinth, iifteen miles away, lield by not half his number, and these recently repulsed witii great slaughter. Halleck put Guam- into disgrace ; on the other hand, he dispatched the AVar Depart- ment tliat it was tlie opinion of the army that Gen. Sherman saved the day, and he rec- ommended his promotion to be Major Gen- eral. This was done. It is an exam])lc of the way war re])utations are made. Grant was still nominfllly in command of the District of West Tennessee, but his army, which was now divided between right wing and reserve, was under the immediate command of Thomas and McClernand, to whom Halleck .sent orders direct, ignoring Grant. Halleck now moved on Corinth by siege approaches, intrenching in every part at each move, and moving at the average rate of liUlf a mile a day. It was like McClellan's approach to- ward Kichmonfl. He was in constant aj)pre- hension of attack, and he made the evacua- tion of Corinth by the enemy his whole ob- jective. There was no attempt to flank Cor- inth or cut ofl' the enen^y's retreat. Hai.- lei'k's only thought was of being attacked. 4 — He was only too glad to have the enemy go away. His strategy was upon the advice of the Messina Magistrate to the watclr. Dogberry— You are to bid any man stand in the prince's name. Watch— How if he will not stand? Dog.— Why then take no note of him, »ut let him go; and presently call the watch together, and thank God you are rid of a knave. Wlien he had cautiously reached Corinth lie found that the Confederatearniyliad with- drawn at leisure. To cover up this impotent conclusion he dispatched Washington that he was making vigorous pursuit of the demoral- ized enemy, and that Gen. Pope report- ed the capture of 10,000 prisoners and 15,000 stand of arms. Pope had report- ed none and captured none, and there was no chance for this pursuit. But this achievement with the longbow got Halleck present and lasting glory, and because of that he was presently, after McClellan's retreat, called to Washington and made General in Chief to direct all things from Washington, and to be President Lincoln's military ad- viser. Thus was the nation organized for victory. This is another example of the way that the war made great military reputations and high ranks. And now that great army, which had been organized and disciplined by all this daily marching, bivouacking, intrench- ing, outpost duty, and constant vigilance in the face of the enemy, and which Sherman in the Jlemoirs says could have gone anywhere-, was broken up and placed for the defensive. In this as in all the war, in nearly all the commanders as in the administration, the paralyzing error was in the idea that the Union was to be restored by recovering terri- tory and places, instead of destroying the Confederate armies. Halleck had no need of BuELL for Corinth, even if with a capable commander he had at Pittsburg Landing. BuELL would have gone on from Nashville to Chattanooga or through Alabama. And now Halleck ordered Buell to move into East Tennessee. 'This was Lincoln's pet desire, and Halleck supported it. Lincoln fancied a great Union population there which, if pro- tected, would restore Tennessee to the Union, and this political idea overruled military con- ditions. Halleck insisted, against Buell's judgment, that he should make the Memphis A Charleston Railroad, running through Cor- inth, Northern Alabama, and Chattanooga, his line of communications and of movement. For a distance of luore than eighty miles this line was along the enemy's front. To protect this railroad was an impossibility. But all of Halleck's movements were as if afraid that the war would end too soon. Buell proceeded to obey orders by repairing this road, and fortifying its stations and bridges. It was a great work, and at this time he asked the War Department for au- thority to feed and clothe the escaped slaves for this intrenching labor, but was informed that Congress had not appropriated for it. This, we think, was the first systematic proposal for the employment of the escaped slaves in a straightforward manner. Buell, while obeying Halleck's order to repair the Mem- phis tt Charleston road for his base line, pro- ceeded also to provide one for practical use by giving orders for the repair of the roads from Nashville through Tennessee. While our army was thus scattering, and wasting its energies, part on the defensive and part on., impossible undertakings, the Confederate armies in the great Interior, as in the East, were concentrating for a grand advance. Tiiat of Bragg, assisted by the co-operative columns of Kirby Smith on the east, and of Van Dorn on the west, was to carry forward the line of tiie Confederacy to the Ohio River, reinstate the rebel State government in Ten- nessee, set up a rebel' State government in Kentucky, and make these States the great field for recruits and supplies, and the mili- tary base the Ohio. It was a brave undertak- ing, and the imbecility on our side made its opportunity. Buell had brought from Corinth little over 2-1,000 men ; about 10,000 more were distributed through Middle Ten- nessee and Northern Alabama, holding places which he had taken before he went to Pitts- burg Landing. While he was repairing and fortifying railroads for his flank march in the enemy's front to East Tennessee, BnAciCi's grand advance began with 00,000 veteran trooT"is, his movements veiled by a clund of cavalry, and his lines of advance talcing him into the friendly inhabitants of Kentucky. This coiupelled Buell to desist from his vain labors, and to gather up his troops from a wide region and take the field in the ott'en- sive defensive against Bragg's combined forces. Leaving a garrison to hold Nashville, he marched eastward to meet JiKAuo, wliere — 5 — he might be expected to debouch- from the Cumberland ridge. Keeping his well disci- plined troops completely in hand, protecting all his trains, his men never demoralized by this return march, nor by BRAGii's superior numbers, but, confident and high spirited, BuELL moved lirst to offer battle to Bragg, but upon his own ground; then, Bragg avoiding this, Buell moved in a parallel line, always ready for battle, but with the condition that it must be upon his own ground, always threatening BRAiio while moving toward his own re-enforcements. The result of this skillful generalship was that when Bragg got within about twenty-tive miles of Louisville he found that he wanted to face about. Buell, now re-enforced, as promptly faced about to march with him and attack him. For this stroke of genei'alsliip, which against such heavy chances saved his army, saved Kentucky and l\Iiddle Tennessee, and .'^aved the North, and whose skill alid com- plete success has not been surpassed in any war, Buell was summarily removed from command. This is another example of the way war makes reputations and dispenses re- wards. The splendid success was marred by a reverse t<5 a part of one wing of the army at Berrysville, where the disregard of instruc- tions by the commander of tliat wing spoiled well laid plan for a general battle. But ail army of iJU.UOU or .S0,000 men spreads over a wide region, and the non-co-operation of its several commanders can defeat any Com- manding General. Such disregard of instruc- tions by tlie commander of a corjis, in this in- stance, unknown to Buell, defeated a plan of general battle, which would have made de- feat destruction to Bragg. It enabled him to have a nominal success in a dash at a few of our brigades, to carry back with his Ken- tucky State Government and great plan to plant the boundary of the Confederary on the Ohio. Meanwhile, in July, Halleck had been ordered to Wasliington. On leaving he restored Grant to command of his former troops, with headquarters at Corinth. T^ie defensive policy and the holding of territory were pursued. A combined operation against Price, who had seized luka, failed by the neglect of that division which was with Grant to attack, waiting while Pkhe drew away from its front and marched on the double quick three miles and fell with his whole force on Rosecrans. Rosecrans, as was his wont, spoke his nnnd on this. Sub- sequently Rosecrans, with abottt half the number of the enemy, gave Van Dorn a slaughtering repulse at Corinth. Altliougli this was in the defensive line, yet it disabled Van Dorn for his part in the grand plan of invasion. After this Rosecran.s, much to Grant's relief, Badeau says, was ordered to the command of Buell's army. Rosecrans' victory at Corintli was on the 4th of October. Badeau says that on tiie '2'n\\ Grant "assumed comniand of the Depart- ment of the Tennessee, which included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Missis- sippi, and the portions of Kentucky and Ten- nessee west of the Tennessee River." Thus it appears that at tliis time Grant was fully re- instated and his conunand enlarged in bounds, and that it followed Rosecrans' victory at Corinth, for which the latter w'as promoted Major General. In the same month Grant was largely re-enforced from the Northwestern States, and now he ]>roposed to Halleck, October 26, 18G3, a concentration for an ad- vance. He said: "I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksbnrg." Badeau says, with due sense of the im- portance of this germ of the idea of the Vicksliurg campaign: "This was the first mention, in the correspondence of the two commanders, of the place destined afterward to become so renowned." This was the initiative of the Vicksbnrg cam^^aign, wliich was to occupy a great army and a great steamboat fleet and gunboat .squadron for more than eight months, and which was now to begin after eight months, in which great forces and enormous expenditure were con- sumed in merely defensive operations, or in futile attempts, all of Avhich had made no progress except to expand the war, and call continually for more men and n)oney. In following articles we shall see how sped this great offensive campaign, which after long waiting, and immense consumption of men and means, at last brought rejoicing to a patriotic nation. — 6 CHAPTER II. THK CAMPAKiN ON THE INTERIOR UXE — ITS ENER- OETIC START, ITS PAUSE, IRRESOLUTION, BACK- ING, AND FILLING, UNTIL RELIEVED BY VAN DORN's destruction of its SUPPLIES. den. Grant, now in command of ii depart- nient embracing the Mississippi River, and of a large army, wrote Gen. Halleck, then in cliief command at Wasliington, November '2C>, proposing an advance down the Missis- si i>pi Central Raih'oad, his objective being Vicksburg. Still the Jiotion disabled all our military plans, that the recovery of places, not the destruction of armies, was the way to restore the Union. But Grant's line of operations was better than his main ob- jective, for it was toward the enemy's main army. This was under Pemberton, who had ))een placed over Van Dorn, and was holding the line of the Tallahatchie which cro.sses tiie Central forty miles soutli of Grand Junc- tion. This is on the same road, where crossed by the road from Memphis ihrough Corinth, and is about midway between Corinth and Memphis, and was a central point for Grant's concentration of his divided forces. And yet, although Grant's forces were on three sides of Grand Junction, he had not occupied that place, and that road to Memphis was closed to him, and he had to communicate there- with by way of Columbus, Ky. Grant announced to Halleck November '2: "1 have commenced a movement on Grand Junction with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here to- morrow and take command in person. Tf found practicable I will go to Holly Springs, and may be Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as I go." Holly Springs is on the Central road, twenty-tive miles south of Grand Junction, and about half way to the Tallahatchie. Grenada is about sixty miles further south, and is where tlie Yallabusha crosses the railroad. Halleck replied: "I ar)prove of ycjur plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are stnjng enough for that purpose." This was permission enough, properly leaving him discretion as to sufficiency of force and line of operation. Grant had force enough. His good fortune in all this operation was that he was sup- IK.rted by abundance of men, and supplies jind niii>()intiii(Mits of every sort. November 4 he had moved to Grand Junction, He Jiad ordered Sherman to co-operate by moving two divisions from Memphis, but on the Sth of November he informed Sherman that he estimated Pemberton's force at oUjtKiO, and that he felt "strong enough to handle that number without gloves." Tiierefore he coun- termanded the march from Memphis. Unfortunately Grant's advance, which be- gan so energetically, halted. A disturl)ing element had now come in. Badeau relates it with charming simplicity. McClernanu was one of those whom Sherman and Badeau call political Generals. He had proved him- self a good soldier, but this only aggravated his fault. McClernand had obtained from Lincoln a special order to raise troops for an expedition to open the ^lissi-ssippi River. Halleck disa])proved, but tiiis was one of those peculiar military operations which Lincoln took in hand. Grant heard of Mc- Clernand's expedition through the news- papers, and it diverted his energies from Pemberton. He saw that such an expedi- tion would gather up or at least subordinate Sherman, and would reap the glory of occtii- pying Vicksburg if his operations caused its evacuation. For, not to destroy the enemy's army, but to occupy the evacuated Vicksburg, was Grant's objective with his great army. He also suspected that this telegram from Halleck. November 5, pointed to the diversion of troops from his conunand at ^Iemv>his to Mc- Clernand: "Had not troops sent to re-enforcc you better go to Memphis hereafter? I hope to give 20,000 additional men in a few days." Grant, on the 9th, sent this feeler: "Re-en- forcements are arriving very slowly. If tlicy do not come in more rapidly I will attack as I am." In fact Grant had only the day be- fore countermarched Sherman's two divisions back to Memphis, because, he said, he had force enoiigh to handle Pemberton without them. Badeau narrates that next day, grow- ing more uneasy about McClernand, Grant telegraphed: "Ami to understand that I lie here still while an expedition is fitted out for Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman subject to my orders, or is he and his force re- served for some special service?" No one had caused (Jkant to lie there still. Heliad Halleck's consent to his going, and he had turned back forces to Memphis, .saying he had enougli. Halleck answered promptly : — 7 — "Yon have coniinaiid of all troops sent to your department, and liave permission to ti^ht the enemy when you please." Badeau relates that thereupon Grant on tlie 14tli informed Sherman: "I have now complete control of my department," and accordingly ordered him to "move with two divisions of twelve full regiments each, and if possihle, with three divisions, to Oxford, or the Talla- hatchie, as soon as possible. I am now ready to n\ove from here (La Grange) any day, and only await your movements." Thus were his plans backing and filling be- cause of McClernand. And now he had changed his mind again, and had ordered Smickman to join him with all his movable force for the march on Pkmberton. This at hist was a rational plan, but it was naught without cxcctition, and the delay had already given tlie enemy time to recover. But so earnest was Grant now in this plan that he telegraphed Sherman November 15 to meet him at ("olumbus, Ky., where he gave Sher- iiiaa full iiistrtictions as to co-operation by moving three divisions so as to join Grant at tiic Tallahatchie. Sherman marched promptly November 24. Hali.eck ordered the forces at Helena to co-operate by crossing the Mississippi and cutting the Central Railroad in 1'emberton's rear. And now all seemed resolved and promising. But again McClernand's shadow loomed across Gkant'.s horizon. Badeau says: "On the 23d Halleck again broached the subject of the river expedition, doubtless urged on by the President. * '■■ ■•■ He incittired how many men Grant liad in his department, and wliat force could be sent down the river to Vicksburg. Grant replied tliat he had in all 72,000-nien, of whom 18,000 were at Mempliis, and 16,000 of these could l)c spared for the river expedition." He also announced next day that he had given orders for the advance of his entire force, including Sherman; had written to Steele in Arkansas to threaten Grenada, and had asked Admiral I'oRTER to send boats to co-operate at the moutii of the Yazoo. He asked: "Shall I countermand tlie orders for this move?" But Halleck had not asked Grant to tarry, nor to let any of his troops go in the river ex- pedition tmless he could spare tliem, and ( ji RANT liad said he could spare 16,000. Hal- leck answered no. Badeau says Grant's cavalrv crossed the Tallahatchie on the 29th, and his headquarters were at Holly Springs, being an advance of twenty-five miles in twenty-three days, since the 4th; also, that "Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the Tallahatchie at Wyatt," which is six miles west of the railroad crossing, and that on the same day Grant telegraphed Halleck: "Our troops will be in Abbeville (just south of the Tallahatchie) to-morrow, or a battle will be fought." But the main body would not be at Abbeville for several days, and there was no enemy near for a battle. Sherman says in his Memoirs: We reached Wyatt on the 2d day of December, and there learned that Pombertou's whole army ' had fallen back to the Yallabusha, near Grenada, caused, in great measure, by alarm at the demon- stration on their rear from Helena. " '■'■'■ '■■ Wh had to build a l)ridge at V\ yatt, which consumed a couple of days, and on the 5th of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten mile.s from Oxford, whence I reported to Gen. Grant at Oxford. Oxford is ten miles south of the Talla- hatchie, and twenty-five from Holly Springs. Halting as Grant's movement had been, the campaign was full of promise to a resolute General, and Grant had dottble Pemberto.n's force. But Badeau shows that the shadow of McClernand, with an independent command, coming down the Mississippi, weakened Grant. At this point, where he had all in his hands for a campaign against Pember- ton's army, he wanted to turn back. He asked Halleck from Abbeville: "How far South would you like me to go?" He hud lost Ills object and his resolution. He now wanted another change of plan. December 5 he suggested this to Halleck: "If the Helena troops were at my command I think it wotild be practicable to send Sher- . man to take them and the Memphis forces south of the Yazoo River, and thus secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi." This was to turn his back on the Confederate Army to recover places b.V avoiding it. Hal- leck's answer gave Grant the asked for addition to his command, and now Grant countermarched Sher.man again back to Mem- phis to command a river expedition to attack Vicksburg from the river, Grant to await hi.s operation and to "co-operate." But how to co-operate when, even with all his forces, he had decided it not safe to go further, is what Grant could not tell. He ordered Sherman to "proceed to reduce Vicksburg, assisted by 8 — the gunboats," and he said, with a vagueness befitting such co-operation : "I will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary." BAnEAti tells the objective of all this re- version of the plan of the campaign. He says : Grant was still anxious lest McClernand should obtain the command of the river expedition, and therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis on the very day that he secured the authority, so that if possible the latter might start before McClernand could arrive. Halleek, too, sent the permission without that deliberation which he sometimes dis- played. If Bapeau may be believed, Grant's cam- paign had turned from Pemberton toward McClernand, and Halleck was co-operating. Bat they had not yet circumvented Lincoln. Says Badeau : On the 18th came at last the unwelcome word from Washinuton: "It is the wish of the President that Gen. McClornand's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command, under your direction." This would put McClernand in command of that which Grant's altered plan had de- signed to be the winning side of the "co- operation ;" then the subsecjuent proceedings would interest Grant no more. His strategy was beaten. But there was one turn left: If Grant slmuld return and take command of the river expedition, McClernand would be subordi- nated. And now did Grant's proverbial luck come to his relief in the shape of Van Dorn's cavalry,' which, December 20. made a de- scent on Holly Springs, and destroyed the stores of Grant's army. With the same trust in luck as at rittsl)urg Landing, he had taken little care to fortify ins supply depot. The rebels estimated the destruction at $4,000,- 000; but this, perhaps, was at Confederacy prices. Whatever the figure, it was enough for Grant, who now decided that a river for a base, and gunboats to hold it, was the only j)racticable way of war in this countrj'. So he decided to countermarch, and to join Shkkman, and subordinate McClernand, and, leaving Pemberton free to go to defend Vicksl)urg, to liimself undert;ike to reduce that place from the river. Tims ended the lii'st stage of tiie Vicksburg campaign. All this tended to nuike the final viclorv the more a cause for rejoicing. This, howevef, does not include Sherman's "co-operating" part; further along we shall see how that sped. CHAPTER ril. the change of base — retreat from the in- terior LINE — how SHERMAN WAS MARCHED UP AND DOWN — THE MANY REASONS WHY. Gen. Grant's movement down the line of the Mississippi Central Railroad, in the best time of year, when the roads were good, had ad- vanced his headquarters from Grand Junction, November 4, to Oxford, December 5, forty- five miles in thirty-one days. Here he tarried till Van Dorn's visit at Holly Springs on the 20th, when he decided to go no further in a country of such impolite practices. This was not such a constant pressure as keeps an enemy busy in defense and retreat. And there is a being always at hand to find mis- chief still for the idle to do, as was exempli- fied by Van Dorn and Forrest behind Grant's back. Gen. Sherman, Grant's energetic coadjutor, marched three divisions from Memphis, which is straight west of Grand Junction, November 24, by three roads, stopped two days at the Tallahatchie to make a bridge, and reached a point on Grant's flank with his whole command December 5. All this was to find that he must march back again as fast, while Grant waited for the new oper- ation. ^Scraps which Badeau prints from Halleck's dispatches make appear that he was as irresolute as Grant; but they show that he gave Grant full discretion and sup- port, and that when the enemy fell back from the Tallahatchie Halleck became sanguine as to the interior line, and gave Grant plenary authority, including the command of the Arkansas army. In conclusion he said: "Telegraph what are your present plans." Ba- deau prints only this clause. GRANT'sanswer told the change of plan to a river expedition, he to co-operate on the interior line. Grant wrote Sherman December 8 inclos- ing Halleck's dispatch, and asking Sherman to come to Oxford and confer on a plan, say- My notion is to send two divisions back to Mem- phis and fix upon a day when they should effect a landing, and press from here with this command at 9 the proper time to co-operate. If I do not do this I will move our present force to Grenada, ineluding Steele's. '•' '■' When a good ready is had to move innnediately on Jackson, Miss., cutting loose from the road. Of tho?p two plans 1 look more favorably on the former. [ii the former itlaii he \v:is distinctly to itieet Sherman at Yicksbiirg in a eoiirerted attack. In the latter plan he would h;ive only about as far to march from Grenada to .Jackson, as he marched to the same place from Bruinsburg, after consuming a great army and navy and transport fleet for near six months. And the country was much bet- ter for the march. Gen. Sherman had marched from Memphis with two divisions to join Grant; had coun- termarched; had marched from Memphis again with three divisions, and by energetic movement had joined Grant .south of the Tallahatchie. And now he was to go back. Badeau aoes not state what argunumt con- vinced Sherman of the projjriety of tliis new back action; but Sherman started back im- uiediately. As Baueau lets out that this was to snatch the river expedition from McCler- NAND, we might suppose that Grant took Sherman into his contidence, if it were not that Sherman, who is a very George Wash- ington for inability to prevaricate, says that the idea of McClernand's coming did not en- ter into his dreams at that moment. But after Grant had sent back Sherman to head off McClernand, came Halleck's an- nouncement that McClernand was to com- mand the river expedition. This seemed an irreparable blow; but then Van Dorn came tr> Grant's relief by destroying his stores, and this supplied a reason for his going back to get command of the river e.xpcdition: Says Badeait: "Since Sherman was not to com- mand it, he was anxious to do so himself." But to show to Halleck that it was not a retreat, but a"'change of base," he telegraphed : "The enemy are falling back from Grenada." If so they were giviiig up the Yallabusha, the only obstacle to Grant's march directly to .Jackson or Vicksburg. Bareau says the destruction of supplies was but a "temporary iiu>onvenience," Jjut Grant wanted to go back. Thus in the .shifting of plana to cir- cumvent McClernand, Sherman was left to the sacrifice. Although Badeau finds so many reasons for Grant's turning back at the first im- pediment as to make Van Dokn's visit a friendlj' service, yet he pauses to tell what might have been: Grant has told me that had he known thou what he soon afterward learned— the possibility of sub- sisting an armv of 30,000 men without supplies other than drawn from an enemy's country — he could at that time have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in captur- ing the place. Very likelj'I btit McClernand might have been the first to get in. Badeau says: "Grant was now ionvin(;ed of tlie impossibility which lie had foretold, of maintaining so longaline of supplies through liustile territory." He had undertaken a cam- paign to demonstrate his foretold impossi- bility. The Irish pilot was engaged by the skipper upon his solemn affirmation that he knew every rock in tlie channel; and when the ship struck, he exclaimed: "That's one of thcnil" When Generals set out on cam- paigns which thev^ have foretold to be impos- sible, they generally succeed in proving their foretelling. * And when Grant had found, received orders direct from the War Department, and followed about a week after, which left Sher- man time for his assault on V'icksl>urg. Thus did Grant do what he could to prevent the errors at Washington. The last words which Gen. .Shek.man re- ceived from Grant, December 14, defined Grant's line of co-operation in the great con- cert of movements; The eoemy are yet ou ttio ValUbusLa. i txui pushinff down on tlieiu slowly, but so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. - - My lieadquiirters will probably be in Coft'eeville [ten miles aVjove the Vallabushal one week hence. '■= " ''■'■ It would be well ii you iwuld have two or three . * small boats suitable for unvigatiut; the Yuzoo. It may be necessary for me to look to lL;i,t base of sup- plies before we get through. Gen. Sherman, in his Memoiiv, writing of the failure of Grant's column to attack in concert with Rosecrans at luka, remarks: "In my experience these concerted move- ments generally fail, itnless with the very best troo])S, and iben in a country on whose roads some reliance can I)e placed, whicii is not the (^ase in Xorthern Mississijjpi." Perhaps there has not l)een in all the wars of ancient and modern Generals a plan of such farfctching and uncommunicable concerted movements as this, in which the concert of one army in the interior of Mississippi and another by a river expedition from Memphis, not hearing from one another for two weeks, was to be so exactly timed that their guns would ttnite on a given day in the fanfare finale at Vicksburg. This is only one of the examples of the su- periority of military genius in this fresh young country. Even through the tone of , distinguished consideration which these emi- nent Generals preserve toward each other, Grant in Badeau, Sherman in his Memoirs, Sherman maintains that Grant's orders re- quired him to assault at Vicksburg, and gave him to expect to hear simultaneously the sound of Gr.\nt's guns; while Baoeau plants Grant impregnably on that clause of his first order which said: "I will iiold the forces in readiness to co-ojierate wifh you in such man- ner as the movements of the enenty may make necessary;" and he maintains that Grant did this literally in his retreat. And if the enemy's movements made that retreat necessary, who can deny the literal co-opera- tion! Thus were both these distinguished commanders right, and each did alike distin- guish his military genius. Some notion of ihc imnicnsc resources called ou,t by the goscrn incut, may be foruKul from the narration that whereas Sherman, who had jitst bent all his energies to march three divisions froui Memphis to Oxford to join Grant for a campaign, left that place December 8th, to march back, his expedi- tion froxu Memphis started on the lyth, the 11 — flay before Van DoHN ralleil on Oka.nt at Hol- ly Springs. The grand anipliibious armada, was composed of 42,000 men with ail the equip- ment and supplies of an army, fifty-eight steamboats, andCommodoi'o Poktkk's gunboat Heet of sixty vessels of all classes, carrying , 280 guns and soi) men. (Jen. Sherman. says: The preparations were nece.ssarily hasty iu the extreme, but this was the essence of the whole (ihm— viz.. to reach Vicksburg. as il were, by sur- prise, while Gen. (Jrant held in check Pemberton's army about Grenada, leaving me to contend with tile smaller garrison at Vieksbiirg, and its well known strong batteries and defenses. To gather such an expedition, and j'each Vicksburg by surpri.se, was like those social surprise parties which .send notice. And Van DoKN had done the .surprising thing to Gr.\kt a week before Sherman reached the place of attack. Tiie sight of this armada, as '•maneuvering by division.s" it descended the Mississippi, Gen. Sherman describes as grand and inspir- ing. It was also grandly dear to the country ; for the necessities of our Generals, East and West, to have fleets to move their armies for inland operations, and to protect their bases, burned the candle at both ends. The ar- mada reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, on the Arkansas side, De- cendier 24. J^eaving here a division which sent a brigade to break up the railroad lead- ing from Vicksburg west toward Shreveport, La., the rest i>roceeded on the 2Gth to John- son's plantation, just below the mouth of the Yazoo, and there debarked. The other di- vision arrived and debarked tlie next night. And now Sherman's part in this great milita- ry >ym])iipny whs to be ivlaycd. cll.M'TKi; V. <;e.\. shekma.n"s assault on the chukasaw UU'JFS. (Jen. Sherman developed great talent for finding difficult ])laces to assault, but even he could hardly have found one more difficult than this which he had turned back from a [iromising interior campaign to reach. He liad landed his army on an island of live to six miles, between the Ya/.oo River and the line of bluffs nmning northeast from Vicks- bn(g (in the ea.st side of the Yazoo. This island is formed by the Yazoo, the Mississippi, and bayous, and lies opposi'.e that part of the VJck.sburg Bluffs next to the town, which is called Ghickasaw Elufls or Walnut Hills. Furtiier up the range is called Haines' Biuff, which the Yazoo runs near to in two places. twelve and twenty miles above Vickslnirg, and thus Haines" BluH' effectually closed the Yazoo to our gunboats. The island has on the north the crooked Yazoo, on the northeast a deep bayou, the Chickasaw, which runs from the Yazoo to- ward Chickasaw Bluffs to a broad, shallow, forked bayou called Old River, which comes down from above along the line of bluffs, and runs between the island and the bluffs to the ili.'^si.ssippi, just above Vicksburg, The big bayous have little bayous, cutting into the island, and it is dotted with lagoons and swamps. It is ten feet below high water, and, save on the Yazoo side, and .some old cotton fields along Chicka- saw Bayou, was heavily wooded. Shkr.man's reconnaissance found that the only part from which an assault seemed practicable was that which for about two miles below Chickasaw Bayou fronted (["hickasaw Bluffs. To uuike the assault from there. Old liivcr must first be crossed by two narrow causeways, eacit under a concentrated lire. On the Walnut Hills side Old Biver had a levee to keep the Hood from the stri]) of bot- tom between that and the hills. As Sherman states water nuirks ten feet high on the trees of the islaiul, this levee must have been at least as high as that. This levee was tlie enemy's first line; it made a regular para}>et, and was held by infantry. Between this levee and the line of hills was a road that ran along thi^ bottom up to Yazoo City. The levee was a complete cover to this road, so that the enemy's forces could be moved along it, under cover, to meet Sherman's crossing at any point. At the foot of the bluffs, at places to command these two narrow causeways, were batteries to enfilade them. These were supported by infantry in rifle pits and - ment: 12 — Immediately in our front was a bayou, passable at only two points, on a narrow levee or sandbar, which was perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of beach or table land, on which were constructed a series of rifle pits and batteries, and behind that a high abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle trenches, and the crowns of the principal hills presented heavy bat- teries. The country road loading from Vicksburf? to Yazoo City runs along the foot of these hills, aud answered an admirable puipose to the enemy as a covered way, along which he moved his artillery and infantry promptly to meet us at any point at which we attempted to pass this difficult bayou. Nevertheless that bayou, with its levee parapets, backed by the line of rifle pits, batteries, and frowning hills, had to be passed before we could reach terra firma, aud meet our enemy on anything like fair terms. All these conditions made as nice a slaugh- ter x>en as the greatest strategist could find to .-iend an army to. For this nad he counter- marched from a very promising interior cam- paign, and formed a grand armada. Gen. Sherman's report vindicates his failure by showing that success was impossible; but there is this indomitable quality in the soldiering of Sherman and Grant, that the absolute impossibility of an assault, and the certainty of vain slaughter of men, was no reason for not sending them into it. Volun- teers were food for powder, and there was an air of greatness in great slaughter. The very exuberance with- wiiich our young nien vol- unteered made some of the regular officers ^travagant in consuming them. And they had good fortune in this, for they who con- sumed most came to the top, and the few who achieved results with economy in men were thought little of. A brigade of Gen. G. W. Morgan's division was to carry the hills, supported by Frank Bi,air's brigade of Steele's division at the other crossing, a mile or more away. Gen. Sher- man recites his jjlan, which was precise in its several stages, and complete; but in execu- tion it stuck at the first stage. He tells the action in fewer words: The assault was made and a lodgment eft'ected on the hard table land near the county road, and the heads of the diflferent assault- ing columns reached different points of the enemy's works, but tnere met so withering; a fire from the rifle pits and cross fire of ;;rape and canister from the batteries that the col- umns faltej-ed, and finally fell back to the pomt of starting, leaving many dead, wounded, and prison- ers in the hands of the enemy. Say 2,000 brave volunteers done tor in that job. Gen. Sher.man's report pays a hui\d.sonie tribute to the valor of the 6th ^lissouri Regiment, which was sent from A. J. Smith's division to make a diversion from Morgan. He says "the circumstances called for all the individual courage for which that regiment is justly celebrated." He continues: The 6th Missouri crossed over rapidly by com- panies, and lay under the bank of the bayou, with the enemy's sharpshooters over their heads, within a few feet; so near that their sharpshooters held out their muskets, and fired down vertically upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and make a road up it, but it was found impossi- ble; and after the repulse of Morgan's assault I or- dered Gen. A. J. Smith to retire this regnnuni un- der cover of darkness. Tn thf ^femoirs he says lliesc men scooped out holes in the bank with their hands for shelter against the fire from aljove, and that they had to he recalled one at a time after dark. To iross a narrow sand spit, de- ploy against a steep parapet held by a line of the enemy, tmdermine a road througli it, to carry an assatilt beyond up a steep hill thoroughly fortified, or to make a diversion while De Courcey's brigade did pretty mncit the .same, seems like a forlorn hope. Gen. Sherman states the result: When the night of the '2'M\ closed in, we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a re- Ijulse. The effort was necessary to a successful ac- complishment of my orders, and the combication was the best possible under the circumstances. Sherman meant to make another assault next day, and embarked Steele's division to go up the Yazoo to Haines' Bluflt' "and mal;e a dash at the hills;" but fortunately a heavy fog next day prevented the boats from mov- ing. During the night the sound of trains was heard bringing in Pemberton's troojw, A heavy rain set in, and, warned by the water marks on the trees, Sherman re-en\ barked liis army. Sherman's othcial report was chival- rously just. He said : I assume all the responsibility, and attach fault to no one, and am generally, satisfied with the high spirit manifested by all. '- * - I attribute our failure to the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial, and not to lii.- siiptrioi' fiKhi ing. Indeed the enemy had no opportunity to show great fighting qualities. But when Gen. Shekman came to write his Memoirs, twelve years after, his view had changed. As with Badkau's Grant, after he had risen to greatness of superstructure, he seen\ed to think it necessary to strengthen his hase by reconstructing history toshow that he had been infallible from the beginning. He now wrote: "The attack failed, and I have al- ways felt that its failure was due to the fail- ure of Gen. GEORCiE W. Moruan to obey his orders, or to fulfill his promise made in per- son." That promise was to scale those hills. It can not be denied that Morgan did not do it. Sherman says in these afterthoughts: "One brigade (DeCourcey's) of Morgan's troops crossed the bayou safely, but took cover behind the bank,and could not be moved forward." But this is the same cover which the 6th Missouri took, whose courage Sher- man so commended in his report. Let us, like the two dutiful sons of Noah, with averted faces, drop the mantle of charity over this ex- posure of military and moral weakness of a great General. r'HAITIOi; VI. THE QUESTION BETWEEN (iRANT ANH SHERMAN OF grant's failure to co-oi'erate in the ATTACK ON VICKSBURG. Badeau makes an argument to refute the common supposition of the time "that Sher- man's reverse was the consequence of a fail- ure on Grant's part to move south from Grenada and appear in the rear of Vicksburg at the time of tlie assault."' He makes iliese .strong points: 1. Grant "meant, if he could, to hold 1'em- bekton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman U) enter Vicksburg without any material op- ])osition." 2. But if he liad so heltl 1'embkuton it would have made no ditl'erence to Sherman; for "the strength of the works at Vicksburg was hot fully appreciated when this arrange- ment was matha Gen. Grant viai/ en- counter the 'irmy of Gen. FeniJK'rton, the same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified, l)ut as he (Pemberton) M-ill hardly have time to fortify the YalJabusha. and in that event (ien. Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying between the Big Black and the Yazoo, and will expect to meet us on^ the YurMo." The quotations in this number seem to show Sherman's expectation of (Jrant's co-operation; but Badeau quotes them as testimony to the contrary. 1>. This -same romantic letter of general in- telligence, by Gen. Sherman to the several otificei's, issued while the grand armada was descending the Mississippi, showed that he contemplated, among other things, landing- above Vick.sburg and marching into the in- terior to attack Vicksburg from the east on the line of the railroad from that place to .Tack- son, thus: "I purpose to land our whole force on tl)e Mississippi side, and then to reach the l)oint where the Vicksburg and .lackson Rail- road crosses the Big Black, after which to attack Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats assail it by water." This would offer to Grant a fine opportunity to join him. 10. Sherman himself absolves Grant from blame for lack of "tactical co-operation" in this a8.sault, in his general absolution, in his report, when li'e says: "The effort was neces- sary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combinations were the best jiossible under the circumstances. I assume all the responsibility, and attach the l)lanie to no one.'' IJmu: \i: thus j)r()Ves in liis cnlirc s.'itisl'ac- lioii. by these italicized citations from Gen. Siii:i::m\n's re])nrt. and from his previous let- ter dl' roiiui II tic anticipations, that he could not have expected any tactical co-operation from Grant in the attack on Vicksburg, and did not expect it, and that Grant's inability to give the moral co-operatioji, which was all that he meant, by holding Picmberton on the Yallabusha, made no difference to Sherman, because the defenses of Vicksburg were so strong, by his own showing, and so strongly defended, without Pemisertox, that Sherman would have been repulsed all the same. Therefore, what Grant did was a matter of no consequence to Sherman, who thus, by the grand plan of movements in concert, was sent to slaughter his army in a solo. Therefore does Badeau conclude: "Of course those who think or have said tl)at(icn. (Jra.nt was to meet Sherman at Vicksburg, or to co- operate witli him in the assault, never can have seeii these papers." But lie justifies Sherman by this left handed stroke: "Sher- man deserves all praise for his determination to attempt the assault, when he knew not only that Grant never intended to suj)i)0rt him in its tactical execution, bul that he was probably imable to render even the strategical support to the movement which had been originally planned." And he appliesa poultice to Sherman to soothe his sole responsi- bility for his failure by this: "Indeed, when Grant threw both bis armies on the Missis- sippi, success still tied before him as coyly as in the interior." On the other side. Siii:iiMA\. in his Memoirs, ]irints (iiiANT'f; letter, caliint;- him to confer at Oxford on the new ])hiii, (iRant saying; "^ly notion is to send two tlivisions liack to Meiii- ]ihis, and fix tipon a day when they should effect a landing, and ])ress from here with this command at the jiroper time to co-operate." He also thought that the following in Grant's letter of instructious meant practical co-o]ier- ation: "Inform me of the earliest j>racticable day when you will embark, and siicli [)lans as may tiien be matured. 1 will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you iii such manner as tbc movements of the enemy may make necessary." Also a letter from Grant, dated December 14. rc('eived by Sherman at ^lemphis, wliich he says "completes all instriictions received by me governing the first movement against Vicksbm-g," had this as to co-operation: "The enemy are as yet on the Vallal)usba. 1 am pu.shing them down sbiwly, but so as to keep — 15 — up tlu- iiu{>iesi\i\\\ and understanding of concert of action with (riiANT that required him to make the assault immediately at Vicksburg, as "neces- sary to the sut^cessful acconiplislnnent of my orders," without regard to the impossibility of successful as.sault. He says: "Up to that jnoment I iiad not heard a word from Gen. < i KANT since leaving Memphis; and most as- suredly I had listened for days for the sound of his guns in the direction of Yazoo City." In that belief he had intended an otlier as- sault tiie next day, when the providential fog. ])reventing the boats from moving up to Haines' Biulf, saved the sacrifice of another 2,000 volunteers — perhaps twice as many. Tims c taken unprepared, lint had been foi-tilicd a year before; and in the previous .Inly had withstood a protracted bombard- ment by the united fleets of FAitRA(;uT and Por.TKi;. To ad was at the mouth of the Yazoo. Sherman left his armv there, anent to commaml the expeditionary force on the Mis- sissipiji River." He reported to McCleknani> what iiad l)een done, and that troops were pouring into Vicksburg, which must be Pemberton's army, "and that Gen, Grant must be near at hand." But McCleenand l(j — .surprised him by the information "that Gen. Gk.vnt was not coming at all; that his depot at Holly Spring.s had been captured by Van DoRX, and that he had drawn back from Cofteeville and Oxford to Holly Springs and Lagrange; and, further, that (juimby's di- vision of Grant's army was actually at Mem- pliis for stores when he passed down." Sherman thought that this explained "iiow Yicksburg was being re-enforced;" also, that ii made any attempt on the place from the Yazoo hopeless; tlierefore, "all came out of the Yazoo, and on the 3d of January ren- dezvoused at Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above." McClernanp's order assuming t'ommand divided the "Army of the Missis- sippi" into two corps, of two divisions each, the first, his own, commandedby Gen. Geo.W. Morgan, the .second bj' Gen. Sherman. Grant was still in the interior. A steamboat and her tow of barges,with Sherman's ammunition, had been captured by a rebel boat, which came out of Arkansas River, and taken up that river forty miles, to FortHindman. Gen. Sherman says tliat he perceived that this lia- bility in the rear would be unpleasant in operations at Vick.sburg; therefore, he pro- posed to McClernand to let him go up the Arkansas and take the fort. Porter to send gunboats. The conclusion was that Porter and Mc- Clernand went along, taking three ironclads and the whole army, which had not yet de- barked, reaching the Arkansas on the 9th, the troops landing three miles below the fort next day. The enemy had a strong line of in trenchments below the fort, running from river to interior swamp. The front of this was a dead level much obstructed. The troops lay on their arms without fires or cov- ering that January night, to be ready for as- sault in concert with the boats next day. This a.ssault had to be made over a slaughter- ous place, but the volunteers went at it vin- ttinchingly. Meanwhile the gunboats ran their bows into the bank in front of the fort, and, it being but little above the river, they poured their tire into tlie embrasures, i)utting the gunners to flight, they commnnifating their panic to the rest. Outside the fort, at the strong line from river to swamp, the enemy made a more reso- lute defense, and our brave volunteers had to advance against a seeming impregnable line, under great exposure. In this operation they lost 077 killed and wounded. AVliilc this was going on, several otticers in the fort hung out white flags; Commodore Porter landed in the fort, and received the surren- der. There was quarreling among Confed- erate officers over this alacrity with the wliite flag, but the surrender could not be re- called. Our forces dismantled the fort, car- ried off its small arms and .stores, .sent 4,791 prisoners North; re-embarked on the i;^>th; came down the Arkansas IJiver in a snow storm, and stopped at Hcli'na. at the mouth of that river. Here McClernand got a letter from (iRAXT, written before the result, sharply reprimand- ing him for making this .side issue expedi- tion. McClernand replied, assuming the re- sponsibility and defending;- the enterpri.se. Badeau says that Grant supposed that Mc- Clernand planned the expedition, and he had no confidence in his military judgment, and therefore "he expressed his dissatisfac- tion both to McClernand and Halleck" But such a victory could not be repaired, and Grant, finding that Sherman conceived the expedition, took a different view, and gave the credit to Sherman. Sherman says that McClernand's report did not give proper credit to the navy. This increased Porter's distrust of McClernand's military judgment, which he communicated to Washington. It is evident that if the expedition had not gained a victory — an article long a stranger to that army — it would have disposed of GexL McClernand. As it was, it made Gen. Grant stiil more unreconciled to him. Grant vis- ited the army afloat at Napoleon, and, as Gen. Sherman narrates: "On the 18th day of January ordered McClernand with his own and my corps, to return to Vicksburg to dis- embark on the west bank, and to resume work on a canal across a peninsula, which had been begun 'bj' Gen. Tho.mas Willea.ms the summer before, the object being to turn the Mississippi River at that point." Gen. Grant at this time was greatly em- barrassed by his anomalous relation to this expedition. He was in command of the de- partment, but McClernand had an order giv- ing him command of the river e.xpedition. He was Grant's subordinate by all regular military, conditions, but yet he seemed in a degree independent. This is an instance of ihe way Lincoln had of dispensing plums in the way of separate commands. 17 — Orant liari abandoned liis interior cam- paign, and left Sherman in the breach to go back and take tlie command of the river ex- pedition away from McClernand, but lie found his plans blocked by that special order. His position was enougli to perplex a Bona- parte. Indeed he could see no way to real military results but to dispose of McCler- nand. One luan must not be allowed to stop the way of such mighty forces as were now gathering at Vicksburg. Happily, Grant's patriotism was equal to the necessity. Grant had allowed no feeling of jealousy to cause him to withhold his counsel and orders from McClernand. When he had first gotten back to Memphis January 10, he had written him vigorous words: "This expedition must not fail." His order at Helena to McCler- nand to put his army at work to turn the Mississippi gave him opportunity for a great achievement. He repeated on the 22d: "I hope the work of changing the channel of the Mississippi is begun." But while thus gener- ously planning, and giving McClernand the chance for the glory. Grant was not content. Badeau says lie had no confidence in Mc- Clernand's military at)i!ity; he must have known still less of his ability to turn the Mississippi River. Thus was McClernand an obstacle to Grant, and it was a niilitiiry necessity that he should be disposed of. After Grant had visited the expedition at Napoleon, just from the tine but irregular vic- tory of Fort Hindman, he wrote Hallkck, January 20: "1 regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confi- dence in Gen. McClernand as a commander, either by the army or navj', to insure him a success." Bade.au states in addition that McClernand was captious and insubordinate, insisting on "matters of military etiquette and law;" "raising objections to the orders of his commanding officer;" "making sugges- tions contrary to all the principles of military science," and so on. He cites an extreme case: McClernand went so far as to object to Grant's receiving comjjlaints from officers of his command, made not through him, and to Grant'.s practice of issuing orders to McCler- nand's subordinates, not through him, as creating confusion and insubordination. He added : One thing is certain: two Generals can not eom- mund this army, issuing independent and direct orders to subordinate officers, and the public serv- ice be promoted. In this McClernand, a mere volunteer, was taking on rules, order and discipline as if he were a regular army officer, with all which that implies; whereas, there being regular • officers under him, it was quite the regular thing for Grant to send orders to them igno- ring him. Besides, "suggestions contrary to the principles of military science" could not be tolerated. All this undermining operation was pro- moting the discipline of the army in a sort that tended toward the great end, and it re- sulted in Grant's receiving permission from Halleck to take command, which he as- stimed in person January 29, McClernand thereby being set back to the command of his corps. And now at last was Grant ready to begin his great campaign against the Mis- sissippi River, three months after he had started on the interior line. CHAPTER VIII. the wonderful river — the more wonderful MILITARY GENIUS — THE TRUE SOLDIER's LIFE — THE SEESAW MILITARY POLICY'. The Mississippi River is creation's wonder. At no part are its elements more wonderfully combined than in the Vicksburg region ; nor could there be found in its whole length more difficulties for a military operation from the river than that to which the force of circum- stances had now brought Gen. Grant. An idea of the region is requisite to an apprecia- tion of the military achievement, and is in- teresting in itself. Badeau draws from the memoir of Gen. J. H. Wilson, of the en- gineers, and this paper borrows from Badeau: All the way from Cairo to New Orleans the Mississippi meanders througti a vast alluvial region, the whole of which is annually overflowed, except where levees have afforded a partial barrier. This great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and ex- tends on the east to the upland plains of "feniiessee and Mississippi, while on the west it is bounded by the lesser elevations of drift alone. The blurts that form the escarpment of the eastern plains are usually quite steep, and thickly overgrown wiih timber, underbrush, and vines. At various points in its course the river touches one extremity or the other of the bottom land, washing the base of the — 18 bluB's, nnd oi'leii rutting deep into llie soft strata, l-'olmnlius, Furl Pillow, Meuiphis, Helena, Vieks- biirs, Grand iiulf, and Port Hudson are points of this kind, and rise from eighty lo 'JtJO feet above the freshets. The alluvial region, througnout its entire ex- tent, is higher near the banks of the river, and falls oil' gradually, till it reaches the line of thebluttV; the drainage is therefore toward the hills, and is the source of the intricate network of bayous for which the basin is remarkable. The Coldwater, the Talla- hatchie, the Yazoo, the Washita, the Ked, and Ati'hafalaya rivers, besides numerous other and smaller streams, are accordingly nothing more than huge side drains. During freshets, the water that breaks over the Mississippi banks or through the crevasses, flows through cypress swamps and a lahyiinth of bayous, till it reaches the blutl's, and is again forced back into the paient stream. iicsides the bayous, crescent shaped lakes, the sole remains of the ancient meauderings of the river, abound on both sides, often at considerable' dis- tance from the present channel. The forests of the alluvial region are extremely luxuriant and dense: couonwood, tulip, sweet gum, magnolia, syca- more, and ash are found, with an almost impene- trable jungle of ('ane and vine. The cypress swamps that occupy the lower portions of the bottom are nearly always under water; and this, with the slimy character of the soil, and the treacherous beds, and slippery steep banks of the bayous, ren- ders the country almost impassable in summer, and entiiely so, excent by boats, in win'.er. Into tills domain of lialf creation had Gen. Grant ))roiiylit his line army. Here in this very Slongh of Despond wa.'s it to wrestle with tlie dense forests, the jungle of cane and vine, the deep hayoiis and lagoons, obstructed by sunken and overhanging trees, the cypress swamps, the slimy soil, and the treacherous i>()ttom, for the next three months, in the most malarious conditions, with immense labors, all of which B.iDEAi' says were destined to prove abortive, save to prove Gen. Grant's fertility in resource; and all of which, in the con- suming of men by disease, made the destruc- tion of a campaign of battles in an open cotin- try a light matter. The eastern line of bluffs coming down in a southwest course on the east side of tlie Yazoo, and called Haines' Bluti'and Walnut Hills, meets the Mississippi at Vicksburg. Below "that place the river runs near the blutf for several miles; then diverges a little and a swamp intervenes; then comes to the lilutT again at Warrenton, eight miles below ^'il•ksbl^•g, and so continues for three miles; thfcn diverges widely in great crooks, and, with a turn to the northeast, strikes the bluff' again at Grand Gulf, just below the mouth of Big Black River. Here it turns sharply to the southwest again, in the general course of the bluffs, but diverging, till at Bruinsburg, ten miles below Grand Gulf, and just below the mouth of Bayou Pierre, it is two miles from the bluff's. At Vicksburg the bluflFs were regarded as unassailable. They were of the same charac- ter below that place, and had heavy guns at different points. Warrenton was fortilied. Grand Gulf was a little Vicksburg in its sit\i- ation as to bluff's and rivers, and its easy de- fensibility. Where the river left the bluffs the swamps were a defense. At Bruinsburg, thirty-hve miles below Vicksburg by land and twice as far by the river, was the tirst place wliere there was a landing not crowned by bluff. From here there was a road into tlie interior, and the line of bluff is two miles inland. Bruinsburg was easily defensible, but there was a limit to the enemy's exten- sion of forces or to his vigilance. All along the west side of the river was a labyrinth of bayous, lakes, lagoons, and swamps, and of great crooks in the river. Gjsant had for his camj)s and field of oiierations the great bot- tomless region west of the river, drawing all his supplies from the North. 'J'lie Confed- erates had for their field the high land on the east side, drawing their supplies from the rich interior region of Xortfiern Mississij>pi, now given up to them. BADEAti, who is always exem])t from the error of overstating Gen. Grant's forces, states that the whole number now in his command was l.SO.OOO, all engaged in the Vicksburg operation, either immediat(^ly or in supjiort. Fifty thoiLsand were j)laced in camps at Young's Point, eight miles above Vicksburg, andat Millikin's Bend,twelvemiles further up. McPherson's corps was at Lake Providence, forty miles above, to work at a bayou and swamp route of 400 to 600 miles to Red River. The base of supplies aiui re- enforc<-meiits was at Memphis. Says Badeai': "They were i>iit in camps along the west bank of the river, on the low swamp land. overHowed this year to an unusual extent." He continues: ''The camj)s were frequently submerged, and the dis(!a.ses con.scqucnt to this exi>osure jirevailed among the troops; dysentery and fevers jiiade sad havoc, and even tlie smallpox was introduced." "The levees furni.shed the only dry land deep 19 pnougli fur graves, and for miles along the river bank tins narrow strij) was all that ap- [)eared above the water, furrowed its whole length with graves. The troops were thus hemmed in by the burial places of their com- ralan. This plan comes under the third head — viz.: plans to get away from Vicksburg, and go somewhere. Lake Providence is a crescent shapeil lake, perhaps part of the former bed of the river, six miles long, a mile west of the river, forty miles above Vicksburg by an air line, and twice or thrice as far by the river. The plan was to cut a canal from the river to this lake. P>om the lake there was a partly defined cliannel called Bayou Baxter, running through a cypress swamp to Bayou Macon, one of a labyrinth of bayous. In its souther- ly course Bayou Macon, opposite Vicksburg, is forty miles from the river; about forty miles further south — or three or four times as far as by the course of the bayou — it joins the Tensas Bayou or river. All these bayous are rivers, and all the rivers bayous, flitferingouly in size. The Tensas reaches the Washita about west of Natchez, and the Washita the Red River, and thus the Lake Providence route in a wonderfully tortuous course of 400 to 600 miles would reach the Mississippi about 200 miles below Vicksburg. The object of this circumnavigation is stated by Badeau: "Through these various channels it was thought possible to open a route by which transports of light draught might reach the Mississippi again below, and thus enable Grant to re-enforce Banks (then either on the Red River or the Atchafalaya) and to co-operate with him against Port Hud- .son." This was to give up Vicksburg till a more convenient season. This idea came alone from Grant's active mind. There was no desire at Washington that he should abandon Vicksburg to go and re-enforce Banks, "then on either the Red River or the Atchafalaya" or somewhere. And if Banks was to be re-enforced it would be more natural to do it by way of the gulf than by this tortuous route and by abandoning the Vicksburg enterprise. This route would be, by the course of the bayous, from 400 to 600 miles througii tlie enemy's country, and through the greater mirt these bayous could be quickly shut in by felling across them the gigantic trees that grew along theirbanks. To this route for a line of supplies had Grant come to avoid tlie difficulty of guarding aline on the Mississippi Central Railroad; and the objective was to go in search of Gen. Banks, who was somewhere. But here again Grant's proverbial hick inter- posed and .saved from involving troops or supplies ii; this net. The nature of the under- taking, and the result, its great objectin keep- ing the volunteers employed and working oH' their excessive spirit, and its demonstrating Grant's fertility in military resouVce, are so well narrated by Badeau that to comment on it would be to paint the lily: The levee was cut. and a canal opened between the river and the lake, through which the water passed rapidly; but peculiar dilKcullies were en- countered in clearing Bayou Baxler of the over- hanging forests and fallen timber with which it was obstructed. The lancl from Lake Providence and also from Bavou Macon recedes until the lowest Interval between the two widens out into a cypress swamp, where Bayou Baxter is lost. This flat was filled with water to the depth of several feet; and tlie work of removing tlie timber thai choked the baym for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles was in consequence exceedingly ditlifult and slow; but, if this could have heen accomplished, the channel, in high water, would have been cun- tinuous, although intricate and circuitous to a remarkable degree. So McPherson's corps was engaged in the under- taking for many weeks. The impossibility of ob- taining the requi.site number of liaht draught steamers, however, would have rendered this route useless, even had it been thoroughly opened. But no steamer ever passed through the tortuoiJis chnn nel, which served only to employ the superfluuus troops, and to aemonstrate the fertility and variety of devices developed during this anomalous cam- paign. Thus the impossibility of using tlie route if it could have heen opened reconciled Grant to the impossibility of oponin;^ it, and otn:\i alike ilistingiiislied tluit fertility in resources whieli made this campaign "anomalous." Besides, "the project excited attention and speculation," and many thought that it would divert the Mississippi to this route, and then by way of the Atchafalaya into the uulf, leaving Yicksburg and ail the lower river towns. But Badeau says that Grant did not enter into this expectation, "He be- lieved that Vicksburg was only to be won by hard tighting," and meanwhile he was "simply affording occupation for his men." !So this route was given up, after all the practicable occupation for the men had been got out of it, "at about the same time that all hope of effecting anything by the canal was abandoned." But during this time Grant's remarkable fertility in resource had been directing another undertaking, by way of Ya^coo Pass. This plan comes under the second head, viz.: plans to get into the interior east of Vicks- burg. Yazoo Pass is six miles below Helena, Ai-k., on tlie east side of the Mississippi, 160 miles above Vicksburg in a direct line, and twice or thrice as far by the river. It was a narrow and tortuous bayou that once ran from the river to Moon Lake — a crescent shaped lake, perliaps once the river bed — thence eastward to ('oldwater River or bayou, thence southward to the Tallahatchie, which in a crooked ('ourse of about 100 miles unites with the Yallabusha at Greenwood to torm the Yazoo — an exceedingly tortuous river or bayou. Greenwood is near 100 miles above N'icksburg in a line, and more than 200 by the course of the Yazoo. Yazoo Pass had long been closed at the Mississippi by a levee. In all the Yazoo operations the enemy had an immense advantage in the free naviga- tion of the Yazoo River above Haines' Bluff, and in a large fleet of steamboats which had taken refuge there. With these they could carry troops up the Yazoo, Tallahatchie, and ('oldwater to place obstructions against (S rant's expedition. The levee was cut on the 2d of February, and tiie rush of water made an opening for steamboats into Moon Lake. But the impenitent "rebels had be- gun to make obstructions lower down by fell- ing huge trees into the i)ass." "A single one of these barricades was a mile and a quarter in length, and composed of no fewer than eighty trees reaching completely across the stream." Worse than this, of the various trees, nearly all were of wood that would not Hoat. Consequently "the removal was a tedious task. Many of the trees, weighing at the least twenty tons, had to be hauled out upon the shore by strong cables." This served the great object of "occupation for the superflu- ous men." Besides, the crevasse "submerged the entire country, exce])t a very narrow strip of land near the sliore. The men, in parties of 500, were thus obliged to work in the water, as well as during almost incessant rains." But by this kind of labor the barriers were at last removed, "and a heavy growth of overhanging timber cut away, and the dis- tance from Moon Lake to the Coldwater was finally cleared." Bitt while thus occupied above, "the enemy had gained time to se- curely fortify below." On the 15th of February the way to the Tallaliatchie was declared practicable, and Gen. Ross, with 4,500 men, was ordered to move in. "He embarked in twenty-two light transports, preceded by two ironclad gunboats, and a mosquito fleet, as the liglit armored craft suitable for this navigation were called." There was some delay in get- ting light transports, but the expedition en- tered the pass February 24, and reached the Coldwater, twenty-five miles from the Mis- sissippi, March 2. The Coldwater is of the same bayou character, and runs through a dense wilderness; the Tallahatchie is a simi- lar stream, but larger. The exjiedition ])ro- ceeding cautiously, through an almost un- broken forest, reached the Lower Tallahatchie March 10. And now, saj's Badeau: "Grant deter- mined to prosecute liis entire camj)aign, if possible, irt this direction. The idea was to reach the Yazoo, above Haines' Bluff, with liis whole army. The distance from Milli- ken's Bend would have been nearly 900 miles." And half of this would be bj' nar- row, tortuous bayous, and rivers, through an enemy\s country, susceptible to all sorts of obstructions and defenses. Quinby's division was ordered in to support Ross; then Mc- Pherson's whole corps, and a ilivision from IVfemphis, as fast as transjiortation could be procured. And now again did Grant's proverbial luck interpose to save liim from sending his wJiole army into this trap. Great difficulty was found in getting liglit draught and short — 24 — steamboats for these narrow and crooked streams, and the great bulk of the troops was detained at Helena. Meanwhile Ross' flotilla had reached the junction of the Tallahatchie vvitli the Yallabusha, wliich forms the Yazoo at (jreenwood. Here the Confederates had made a battery called Fort Pemberton. which the gunboats e^igaged on the 11th of March, and again on the 13th, aided by a battery on .shore, without success. The country was all under water, save narrow strips along the rivers; the troops had no way to flank the battery; therefore all depended on the ability of the gunboats to silence the battery, and thus the expedition came to a standstill. As the site of the fort was little above the water, an effort was made to drown it by cut- ting the levee of the Mississippi, 300 miles away, at Austin, eighteen miles above Hele- na; but this did not work right. The enemy were now sending troops up to Greenwood by tlieir free navigation of the Yazoo. Batteries would be as obstructive in the rear of our ex- pedition as in "front. Says Badeau: "In order to relieve Ross, who was , now in immi- nent danger of being surrounded, isolated as he was, away off in this tangled network of forest and bayou, Grant devised still another scheme." Thus, like a chapter of a serial novel, this chapter ends, leaving the Yazoo Pass expedi- tion in a crisis on the Tallahatcliie, and keep- ing the reader in suspense until the next chapter. Grant, in order to relieve this expe- dition, shall devise another, which in its turn shall need rescue. CHAPTER XT. TUK Steele's bayou plan — the relieving ex- pedition RELIEVED. Gen. Grant's next plan comes also under the second head — viz., plans to get by way of the Yazoo into the fnierior to operate on the rear of Yicksburg. It liad also the present ob- ject of making a diversion to relieve the Yazoo Pass expedition, now in danger of being surrounded on the Tallahatchie. The plan was to go to the Yazoo "Along anotlier of those labyrinthine routes that leaves the Yazoo River below Haines' Bluff, and after innumerable windings re-enters the same stream sixty miles above that point." Porter, with five ironclads and fouj" moi'- tar boats, and Sherman with his division, composed the expedition. This preparation indicates the high expectation. Steele's Bayou, running south, enters the Yazoo five miles from its mouth. The route was up the Yazoo to Steele's Bayou, up that to Black Bayou, east by that across to Deer Creek Bayou, up that to Rolling Fork Bayou, which diverges to a soutlicast direction and runs across to Big Sunflower Bayou, down the Big Sunflower to its confluence with the Yazoo, the route being about 150 miles. As McPherson had' failed to get transports for his corps for tlie Yazoo Pass expedition. Grant now ordered him down to be ready to follow Sherman. "The drift timber soon began to obstruct the channel, and the gunboats got entangled, but nevertheless forced their way through. The turns were so short that the Admiral was obliged to heave his vessels around the bends, not having a foot to spare. It took him twenty-four hours to advance four miles." Sherman's division was to land at necessary points to clear out the obstructions, and the gunboats got far ahead. Porter had passed through Black Bayou with much diffi- culty, and liad requested Sherman to clear it out, he working his way on in Deer Creek. During the 19th of March Sherman, at Hill's plantation, on Black Bavou, heard frequent guns of the navy, and that night a negro In'ought him a message from Porter, written on tissue paper, which the man had hid in a piece of tobacco, saj'ing that Porter had met infantrj' and artillery, which shot his men when they expo.sed themselves outside the armor to shove off the bows of the boats, on which he could not get steerage way. He be- sought Sherman to come to the rescue. This is from Sherman's graphic narrative. He had with him at Hill's plantation Giles A. Smith and 8U0 men. He ordered these to start up Deer Creek nextmorning. At the same time he went down Black Bayou in a canoe till he came luckily to the steamboat Silver Wave, just come up full of men. Taking some of the working parties into a coal barge, towed by a navy tug, he i^roceeded, followed by the Silver Wave. The night was dark, and they went "crashing through trees, carrying away pilot house, smokestacks, and everything above deck." but could only make two and a half of the four miles. We then disembarked 25 — iuul inarclictl through thecaiiebrake, carrying lighted candles in oiir hands, till we got into the open fields at Hill's plantation, where we lay down for a few hours' rest." Hhkkm.vn's narrative so well illustrates this "anomalous campaign" that it is continued verbatim: On Sunday ninrning, March 21,iissoon as day- light appeared, "we started, following the same route which Giles A. Smith had taken the day be- fore, the battalion of the 13th United States Regu- lars in the lead. We could hear Porter's guns, and knew that moments were precious. Being on foot myself, no man could complain, and we generally went at the double quick, with occasional rests. The road lay along Deer Creek, passing several plantations, and occasionally, at the bends, it crossea the swamps, where the water came above my hips. The smaller drummer boys had to carry their drums on their heads, and most of the men slung their cartridge boxes around their necks. The soldiers generally were glad to have their general and field oflicers afoot, but we gave them a fair specimen of marching, accomplishing about twenty miles by noon. Of course our speed was ac- celerated by the sounds of the navy gunSj which became more and more distinct, though we could see nothing. At a plantation near some Indian mounds we met a detachment of the Sth Missouri, that had been up to the fleet, and had been sent down as a picket to prevent any obstruct'ions Delow. This picket reported that Admiral Porter had found Deer- Creek badly obstructed, and turned back: that there was a rebel force beyf>.nd the fleet, with some six pounders, and nothing between us and the fleet. So I sat down on the doorsill of a cabin to rest, but had not been seated ten minutes when in the woods just ahead, not 300 yards oft", 1 heard quicK and rapid firing of musketry. Jumping up I ran up the road, and found Lieut. Col. Rice, who saia that the head of his column had struck a small force of rebels with a working gang of negroes, who on the first fire had broken and run back into the swamp. I ordered Rice to deploy his brigade, his left on the road, and extending as far into the swamp as the ground would permit, and then to sweep forward until he uncovered the gunboats. The movement was rapid and well executed, and we soon came to some large cotton fields, and couid see our gunboats in Deer Creek, occasionally firing a heavy eight inch gun across the cotton field into the swamp beyond. About that time a Major Reiley, of the Sth Mis- souri, galloped down the road on a horse he had picked up the night before, and met me. He ex- plained the situation of affairs, and offered me his horse. I got on, bareback, and rode up the levee, the sailors coming out of their ironclads and cheer- ing most vociferously as I rode by, nnd as our men swept forward across the cotton field in full view. I soon found Admiral Porter, who was on the deck of one of his ironclads, with a shield made of a sec- tion of smokestack, and I doubt if he was ever more glad to meet a friend than he was to see me. He explained that he had almost reached the Roll- ing Fork when the woods became full of sharp- shooters, who, taking advantage of trees, stumps, and the levee, would shoot down every man that poked his nose outside the protection of their armor; so that he could not liandle his clumsy boats in the narrow channel. The rebels had evidently dispatched a force from Haines' Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling Fork;. had anticipated the movement of Admiral Porter's fleet, and had completely obstructed the channel of the upper part of Deer Creek Ijy felling trees into it, so that further progress in that direc- tion was simply impossible. It also happened that at the instant of my arrival a party of about 400 rebels, armed and supplied with axes, had passed around the fleet and got below it, intending in like manner to block up the channel by the felling of trees, so as to cut oft" retreat. " '■'■' I inquired of Admiral Porter what he proposed to do, and he said he wanted to get out of that scrape as quickly as possible. * * " He informed me that at one time things looked so critical that he had made up his mind to blow up tiie gunboats and escape with his men through the swamp to the Mississippi River. ■•■ '■= " It took three days to back out of Deer Creek in Black Bayou, at Hill's plantation. '■'■ I reported the facts to Gen. Grant, who was sadly disapjjointed at the failure of the fleet to get through to the Yazoo above Haines' Bluft', and ordered us all to resume our camps at Young's Point. The Confederates made poor use of their opportunity. The felling of half a dozen trees ahead was enongli to detain Porter's squadron for their further operations. If instead of amusing themselves for twenty- four hours in popping with sharp-shooters behind trees and the levee at the heads of Porter's men whenever one was thrust out, they had first taken a score of negroes to the rear, and felled a dozen trees, they would have had that squadron trapped. And here the few families on the plantalions were a shield to Gen. Sherm.\n's troops; for, but for them, the reprehensible Confederates would have cut the levee, which would have let from six to eight feet of water upon them. But there was a blind goddess, called Fortune, watching over Grant in all these perilous undertakings. Thus did the liberating expedition narrowly liberate itself. Meanwhile Ross and Quimby liad gotten out of Yazoo Pass, and the army was restored to its former amphibious camps. Yet there was a large slice of satisfaction — 26 in this failure, for it illustrated what might have been had Grant involved his whole army in the laliyrinth of the Yazoo Pass route, or in the Lake Providence route, in which was as much as 200 miles of this nar- row, tortuous, and easily trapped navigation. Tims did the narrow escapes of Grant's army from his own various plans exemplify his provcrhial luck. CHAPTER XII. THE PROCESS OF II.\RI>ENIN<; THE SOLItllCRS — THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST — THE SWAMP ANGELS — THE PL\X TO (JET AWAY FROM VICKSBURG. This historical review follows chiefly B.\- HEAx's Military Life of Gen. Grant. This is not so much for the reason that it is accurate, truthful, or complete; nor that it does not withhold facts that enlighten, and suggest things that darken; but because it is sufticient for a view of the campaign; because it gives Gen. Grant's inward thoughts and back- reaching afterthoughts; because Bapeau sees so fervently Grant's great military genius, that he discerns in present failures the work- ing of ultimate success; because even the line of argument which, runs through his book involuntarily gives away information; finally, because the book is authentic, in that it was revised by Gen. Grant, and is the same as his own. In our much quoting from Badeau it may be received that when signs of quotation are used, the text is from Badeau unless otherwise signified. Badeau st.ys, with admirable cai;dor, that all of Grant's plans and expeditions had thus far been abortive in direct results, but he y)oints out how these failures proved Grant's variety of resources, and prepared for ulti- mate success; and he says: These various attempts and expeditions on both sides of the Mississipj^i, although unsuccessful in their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial resuHs. The national forces, so constantly em- ployed, became hardened by exposure, and of course improved in spirits and health ; they obtained also a thorougli knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of the country in which they were operating, and were thus better able to encotniter those ditticulties. The volunteers were from all sni;ts of occu- pations — mechanics, skilled artisans, profes- sional men, students, clerks, railroad men, journalists, farmers' sons, and so on. Most of them, although accustomed to active lives, and standing pluckily the soldier's marching, bivouacking, fighting, and other work of the soldier, had not been trained in the heav- iest labor. Comparatively few of the class which does the heavy unskilled laborenlisted. Consequently the most of the volunteers needed to be "hardened by the exposure'' of working in the water in the' swamps and bayous to pull out sunken trees by main strength, and of digging canals in the swampy ground, and otlier like serious labors, besides living in camp in swampy and sometimes siibmerged ground. Through this they be- came "of course improved in spirits," in the same manner as Mark Tapley was in joUitj' by the circumstances of the American Eden, And the "thorough knowledge which the}' obtained of the peculiar difficulties of the country in which the}' were operating," led their minds from its bottomless depths uj)- ward to revere the great military genius which had brought them to that region, and rejoiced them to get away. Nature's great law of elevation by the sur- vival of* the fittest was working the jtrejiara- tion of that army for its futuje triumphs. The individual who goes down among 'the unfit is unable to see the benignity of tliis law, which . all know to be wise in gen- eral. The volunteers who passed through that beneficial ordeal had gratifying testim'ony in the multitude of graves of their former comrades rising around them — now a great host of swamp angels — that they who still lived were of nature's elect. Said Gen. Wm. E. Strong, himself of that army — the Army of the Tennessee — in paying a tribute to its elect qualities, in his address at the dedica- tion of the statue to Gen. McPherson at Clyde, July 22, 18S1: It was composed of meu whose bodies were so inured to hanlships thai di.-i ase could make no im- pression upon thuni. Kach num represented tive others who haplies by this bayou route from Milliken's Bend until Port Hudson had been taken,, after which the army was to be supplied from New Orleans. And then "Banks' entire army might be combined with Grant's, and moving up from below, a co-operative attack be made on Vicksburg." This was not that Grant had not more men than he could use; and not that Banks had any to spare, or could come up and join him on Vicksburg; for Banks could not do thisj without losing Louisiana. The great objective was to get out of the Vicksburg predicament without revealing to the country the failure. The bayou route for this operation could be as easily obstructed as the Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou routes liad been. And the road, such as it was, crooked around fifty or sixty miles in a hostile country, where the difficul- ty of guarding it would make mere play of the guarding a line of supplies by the Missis- sippi Central Pailroad, which Grant had given up as impossible. The whole plan depended on getting transports through his canal, and as it happened, none ever got through. Badeau says: In order to accomplish tliis movement it was nec- essary for Grant to throw his whole force siuiul- taueonsly south of Vicucsbupj;, as a siny;le corps woiiKl be exposed to the risU of attack from the gar- rison, as well as fron» the rebel army in the in- terior. Therefore the forces were concentrated at Milliken's Bend. "Hurlbut (at Memphis) was stripped of every nuin that could be spared from the rear. Yawls and flatboats were collected from St. Louis and Chicago." Had this plan been carried forward the military situation wou^ld have been complete, as follows: 20,000 of Grant's army sent 400 miles below to Port Hudson, on the chances of a siege of that place; the rest of the mova- ble army isolated at Grand Gulf, awaiting the result and return from Port Hudson, and hemmed in by the enemy from Vicksburg and the interior, its supplies depending on this circuitous route of fifty to eighty miles in a country affording every facility for hostile incursions and obstructions; Milliken's Bend held by a small force exposed to attacks from Vicksburg and the West; the river above Vicksburg exposed to the lodgments of Con- federate forces from the interior, now wholly given up to them. And even before this. Grant's transports had to be convoyed from Memphis. When Grant disclosed this remarkable plan to his general officers, if caused, as Ba- ueau represents, a sort of emeute: When the idea became known to those In his in- timacy, to his staff', and to his corps commanders, it seemed to them full of danger. To move his army below Vick.sbnrg was to separate it from the North, and from all Us supplies; to throw what^ fseemed an insurmountable obstacle between him- self and his own base; to cut hiscoramnnications, and place his army exactly where it is the whole object and aim of wa* to get the enemy. Says Badeau:, "Shi.:rman, McPiierson, Lo- gan, Wilson, all opposed— all, of course, within the limits of soldierly subordination — but with all energy," and "strove to divert their chief from what they considered this fatal error:" Even after the orders for the movement had boon issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's headquartors, and proposed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, that the only way to take Vicffsburg was from the north, selecting some high ground on the Missis- sippi for a» base. Grant replied that such a plan would require him to go back to Memphis. "Ex- actly so," said Sherman; "that is what I mem.". The earnest Sherman went back to his head- quarters, and April 8 wrote a letter to Raw- lins, Grant's Chief of Staff, setting forth his plan. In short, it was to take the main army back to Memphis, or other practicable high ground, and to the line down the Mississippi Central, which he and Grant had abandoned on the 8th of December. Gen. Sherman was not a man who learned nothing and forgot nothing; he had learned more in that swamp in three moiiths than had not been taught him in four years at West Point. Badeau says that Grant read Sherman's letter in silence, and made no comment; and — 30 — he adds as an example of Grant's magnan- imity to Sherman, "The letter has never since been mentioned between the two com- manders." But Grant persisted in the Port Hudson plan because "he believed that a retrograde movement, even if temporary, would be disastrous to the country, which was in no temper to endure another reverse; he was determined to take no step backward, and so declared." He means that the coun- try "was in no temper to eiulure" another retrograde by Grant, and that it would be disastrous to him. The continuance of Gen. Grant's career of usefulness to his country depended on his seeming to go forward, what- ever the fate of his army. Thus did the fire in the rear keep him from going back to the line which Sherman advised, and tluis did it force him into a plan so strange that it alarmed all his Generals: There was some excuse for these Generals for their lack of confidence in a plan which, BADEAUsays, went counter to all "established principles of military science." Grant had not till that time developed his great military genius. His affair at Belmont was called a l)lundering slaughter witliout any military olijcct. His urgency for the Fort Henrj' march, suggested by Gen. C. F. Smith, who had reconnoitered the place, Avas very credit- al)le to his enterprise, but the navy took the fort, while Grant's delay to invest it with his IS, 000 men allowed the enemy's 2,000 infantry to retreat to Fort Donelson. Grant waited at Fovt Henry a week before moving to Fort D inclson, twelve miles. At Fort Donelson he waited for the navy to batter down the fort, and, that failing, he reported to Halleck his purpose to intrench, antici- jKiting "a protracted siege," for he said, "I fear the result of an attempt to carry the ])lace by storm with new troops." He was next day unaccountably absent for six hours while a furious battle raged. And then the fort was taken by Gen. C. F. Smith, leading " in person a stornnng column of those "new troops," for which not Smith but Grant was promoted. At the surrender of Fort Donelson, Grant had over 30,000 men, and the Confederate ])ower was broken before him. He left his command without notice to Halleck, and went off on a convivial time up the Cumber- land for a week, on a government chartered steamer, during which Hallkck could get nothing from him. Halleck reported him to Wasiiington, and was authorized to arrest him. His explanation was that Grant liad returned to his "old habits." He indnced Halleck to plead for him, but Halleck sus- pended him from command. While thus in disgrace Grant was promoted to be Major General. Halleck "restored him to com- mand just as Smith had ordered Sherman to take position at Pittsburs; Landing. Grant lost his army at Pittsburg Landing. Hal- leck had kept hiiu suspended during the Corinth campaign. He had failed in his part of tiie concerted movements Avith Rose- cran.s on luka. The only victory during his command in that department, as Badeau says, was this of luka, and that of Corinth, which was won by Rosecrans. He had failed in the Holly Springs campaign, and had now occupied a great army and navy for three months in abortive schemes in the swamps and bayous. He had been kept up thus far by the support of some i|Very influential politicians. This was the property which distinguished Grant and Sherman from those they called "political Generals," as well as from the regular officers of the army. Therefore, it could not be ex- pected that these subordinate Generals would receive a plan which set at naught all mili- tary science — as Badeai^ proudly claims — with that complete submission of military judg- ment which his commands carried after his military genius had developed. There would be little encouragement to military heroes to write their own histories if they nuiy not take some privileges therein. Badeau ingeniously laps the energetic re- monstrances of Grant's Generals against his Port Hudson scheme, over to the operations in the rear of Vicksburg, into which he drifted after he had landed at Bruinsburg. In this way he carries forward their protests against a plan which Grant abandoned, and lodges them upon his subsequent successful opera- tion, which was quite the reverse of the otiier. Thus does he put all of (Grant's lieutenants in tlife category of remonstrants against his suc- cess. This, however, is only a moderate use of the privilege of the historian of his own e.xploits. No one knew better than Bonaparte the ad- vantage of writing his own war bulletins. He taught his ]\Larsl/ials that his part was to take all the glory of victories; theirs to be content -31 — to shii'?fe by reflecting his beams. For all these Generals to be silent, while placed in tlieir coniander's history as protesting against his successful plan, wlien the\' had only pro- tested against one so eccentric that lie aban- doned it. was only due subordination. Gen. iSuEU.MAN, who.se temper has been greatly mis- understood as iiiipulsive and fierj% whereas he is a very Moses for meekness, quietly as- sents to this representation of his letter. He even corroborates it by a plea that all he wi'ote it for was to get Grant to call for the opinions of the rest of his corps commanders, and thereby expose McCleknand, of whom Sherman says he does not believe that he had any plan at all. He further corroborates by an unqualified indorsement of Badeau's his- tory of the Vicksburg campaign, in all of which, as in the rest of Badeau's, work, SuKKMAN is patronized as a good subordinate to Grant, but as needing Grant's directing mind. CHAPTER XIV. a prize offerep for a victory — excuses for THE nation's impatience — GLANCE AT OTHER rOMMANDEKS — THE FEARFl'L EXPENSES — HIS- TORY REPEATS ITSELF. During the period of Gen. Grant's Greco- Ronum wrestling with the Mississippi swamps aiul bayous, Gen. Halleck devised the original scheme of breaking the spell of ill fortune, which seemed to have settled upon our military operations everywhere, by pro- claiming an offer of the vacant Major General- ship in the regular army to the General in the field who first won a victory. There could hardly be a more delicate rec- ognition of the motives which govern the reguhir army man, and of the distinction which Gen. Sherman, in liis Mem- oirs, has beautitully defined be- tween the professional General as one who "looked to personal fame and glory" alone, while the volunteers — the political Generals^look to these as "auxiliary and secondary to their political aml)ition." Of the commanders in the fiehl, only Gen. RosECRANS made response to this liolding up of a Major Generalship as a bone to a lot of dogs to jump for. But Rosecrans' long civil life had spoiled his regular army manners, and he was prone' to speak out in a way that — speaking idiomatically— cooked his goose. He sent tiie following: Mi'itFREESBORO, Marcli C, 1803. General: Your.s of tlie 1st instant, announcing the offer of a vacant Major Generalship in the regu- lar army to the General in the field who first wins an important and decisive victory, is received. As an officer and a citizen, I feel degraded at such auctioneering of honors. Have we a General who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and his country? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable Generals on an equal- ity as to chances? If not, it in unjust to those who probably deserve most. W. S. Rosecrans, Major General. Major General H. W, Halleck, Gommanderin Chief, Washington, D. C. Of course the vacant ^lajor Generalcy was not for Rosecrans, and his getting out of comnuind was only a question of time and opportunity'. Althotigh Gen. Grant's historian describes the impatience of the people and tlie govern- ment as so imminent that Grant was com- pelled to set forth the Port Hudson plan, to get awaj' from Vicksburg, in order to prevent his removal from command, and relates that "Senators and Governors went to Vicksburg and then to Washington to ask for his re- moval," and that "McClernand and Hunter and Fremont and McClellan were spoken of as his successors," and that "McClernand's machinations at this time came very near succeeding," yet he generously makes ex- cuse for this impatience. He says: Indeed, it is not surprising that the government should have urged him on. No substantial victory had cheered^the flagging spirits of the North since Grant's own successes at Corinth and Inka, of the preccaiiig autumn. Banks had achieved no mill tary results with his mammoth ex])edition; Burn- snle, in December, had suHered the repulse of Fred- ericksburg: Rosecrans had not got further tluTU Murfreesboro, and the great force of 00,000 or 70,000 men at Grant's disposal had accomy lished absolutely nothing during six long, weary mouths of elfort and delay. Thus, in apologizing for the popular im- patience, does he ingeniously set forth tliat no other commander had done any better. To say that it luid accomplished absolutely notiiing during six months, does not giv^it justice. The peculiar property of this line of operation was that it placed that great army, and all its attachments, where it was as com- -^2 pletely sequestered from all intiuence on other military operations; from co-operation with any; from holding or defending any part of the Confederacy or the North, as if it liad been sunk to the bottom of that morass. The operations of the Army of the Potomac, tiiose of RosECRANS in Middle Tennessee: the expedition to East Tennessee; the campaign of Banks against an enterprising commander in West Louisiana, and all other operations from the Potomac to the Indian Territory, and round the coast, had not the smallest material moral or strategical aid from this great army which was digging its graves in the swamps west of the Mississippi. Banks' ''mammoth expedition" of about 30,000 men had to hold a large region jigainst an active enemy, and the details of garrisons reduced his movable force to less than 14,000, and with this he had to take the field in an acti%'e campaign to defend Louisiana. Rose- CRANS, with 43,400 men, had fought a very bloody pitched battle with Bragg's army of about equal nvimbers. ami was the victor. "The great force of 60,000 or 70,000 men at Grant's disposal" was stated by Badeaii as 130,000 a short time previous. This, with the gunboat fleet, and the steamboat fleet of transports, kept constantly in attendance, made this by far the most "mammoth expedi- tion" of the time. * And the place to which Grant had brought this great expedition, in order to meet, as Badeau says, and destroy Pemberton's army, was so strong that when Grant wrote Hal- LECK, March 27, that he had learned that there were "not to exceed 10,000 in the city (Vicksburg) to-day," he added: "The batteries are the same, however, and would cause the same difiiculty in landing that would be ex- perienced by a heavy force." Thus he granted that 10,000 men, with the defenses of the place, could keep at bay his great land and naval forces. Some hints may be found, even in Baheai's history, of the degree to which other armies were crippled to feetl this swamp maelstrom. For example, RosECRANs had to enter on a winter campaign in the great interior, with nothing on tlie west to prevent concentration against him, with but 43,400 fighting men. ^everal of Halleck's letters to Grant give urgent orders not to detain the steamboats, "on account of the great entanglement it causes the Quartermaster's Department in su]i{)lying our AVestern armies." In particu- lar the need to have them to transport sup- plies to RosECRANS was urged. One of Grant'.s answers to this urgency, dated March 29, ex- plains that before he came he ordered ISIc- Clernand to send back the steamboats, but "on my arrival here I found the river rising so rapidly that there was no telling at what moment all hands might be driven to the boats." Thus was the great fleet of chartered steamboats kept for ark.s to rescue the army if the levees should break. As an instance of Mc'Clehnani>'s insubordi- nation, Badeau gives two extracts from letters of McClernand, at Vicksburg, to Grant, at Memphis, adding: "These letters, it will be remembered, are addressed by a subordinate to his commanding officer." The tirst is the following, and the other is of the same urgent tenor: Great prudence needs to be exercised in detach- ing transports from this fleet to return to Meniphi.s, as the Mississippi is rising rapidly, and may dehige our trooyis at any time. You will at onee perceive the great importance of this caution, as it involves the very existence of the army here. The isolation of Grant's great forces from any influence on the war is in part illustrated by his letter to Halleck April 4, which has this: From information from the South, by way of Coriuth, I learn that the enemy in front of Kose- crans have been re-enforced from Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicksburg. They have also collected a large cavalry force of 20,000 men. All the bridges eastward from Savanna (Tenn.) and north from Florence are be- ing rapidly repaired. Chalmers is put in com- mand of North Mississippi, and is collecting all the partisan rangers and loose independent companies of cavalry that have been operating in this depart- ment. He is now occupying ttie line of the Talla- hatchie. This portends preparations to attack Rose- crans, and to be able to follow up any success with rapidity. Also, to make a simultaneous raid into West Tennessee, both from North Mississippi and by crossing the Tennessee River. The naming of Savanna and Flomice as Confederate lines of operations recalls the be- ginning of the Halleck-GraJit campaign up the Tennessee a year previous. These, to- gether with the withdrawal from Northern Mississippi and Alabama, in order to open the Mississippi River, give some measure of Qur progress in recovering territory, which we had made our objective. Meanwhile the rapid rise of the premfum on gold, which reached 72 while Grant was exploring the ISIississippi bayous, marked the fall of the faith of the money market in the prog- ress of restoring the nation, and showed at what a discount the government was sell- ing its bonds to pay these double expenses of a great army and navy aimlessly tied up in a morass. The observation is profoundly made that historj' repeats itself. . Badeau makes it in likening Grant's Vicksburg campaign to the first Italian campaign of Bonaparte; tlie crossing of the Mississippi River under the protection of the navy in this being an his- torical repetition of Bonaparte's cro.s.sing the Apennines, and the movements and victories which followed being an equally striking par- allel. Hai^leck thought it bore a striking parallel to Bonaparte's campaign about Ulm. Badeau accepts this, so far as it goes, but thinks the addition of the other requisite to fulness. They who enjoy the projecting of these re- peating histories maj'^find in Grant's Vicks- burg campaign in 1862-3 a remarkable repeat- ing of the history of Gen. McClellan's Pe- ninsular campaign in 1861-2. Each com- mander found that a navigable line for sup- plies, the navy to guard it, and a fleet of transports to carry the troops, were essential to his operations. Each withdrew his army from an interior line, leading into the heart of the Confederacy, and took it by water to an exterior line, which opened the interior and the North to the enemy, and wholly neu- tralized the army as to any influence on other operations. Each took his army into a morass, and set it at enormous labors which came to nothing. Each retreated from practicable lines of operations in a healthy up-country and took it to the most unhealthy region and imprac- ticable line attainable, which consumed more by sickness than by battles. Each chose a line which would give to the Confed- erates their best fortified place, and the se- cure possession of their territorial resources and lines of supply. Each claimed that his was the vital operation, and that interior armies should be drawn from to strengthen him. After consuming immense' resources for months, each retreated from a hopeless operation, by a "change of base," to a new plan, whose success was as improbable. In each the volunteers, after all these discourage- ments, fought like veterans and heroes, as soon as tliey got a chance, enduring extraor- dinary hardshij>and privation, and marching by night and fighting by day, without mur- muring, and eager to be led like soldiers to fight the enemy. But here the historic parallel diverges, and one part turns toward success. CHAPTER XV. THE PORT HUDSON PLAN — THE PROCRESS IN "throwing THE WHOLE ARMY AT ONCE" INTO GRAND GULF — THE NAVIGABLE ROUTE DROPS OUT — THE ARMY STUCK IN THE MUD — A NEW PLAN. Orders were issued "in the last week in March" for concentrating all the forces at ^lilliken's Bend, for the Port Hudson plan. "Hurlbut" (at Memphis) "was stripped of every man that could be spared from the rear; yawls and flatboats were collected from St. Louis and Chicago, and on the 29th of March, McClernand was sent by the circuitous roa this necessary caution against going on from Gfand Gulf: It is not ilesirable that you shonkl move in any di- rection from Grand Gtilf, but remain under the pro- tection of the gunboats. The present plan, if not changed by the movement of the enemy. \\i\] l)r to hold Grand Gnlt. ^leanwhilc the difficulty of sui>plyiiig tlie army by that single route, which it was base flattery to call a road, had become serious, even while the greater part of the army had not started. The operation did not realize the briglit anticipation "to throw his whole force simultaneously south of Vickshurg." At this time Gkant, at Milliken's Bend. was in labor with a grave dilemma, which he set forth to Halleck in a letter dated April 12, fourteen days after McClernand had started. The Duckport Canal, which was to let the transports into the bayous for the sup- )ily of this great movement, was not opened wlien McClernand started. Flatboats and tugs were gathering for using it. But now a (juestion i)resented itself. The road by which the army was plodding was only twenty inches above the water in the swamps. The river was near live feet higher tlian tlie land. To cut the levee and let the river into the canal might drown McClernand's corps, and cut ofl" all communication by the road. On the other hand, not to open the canal was to take away the main means which the plan had dependeci upon for supplying the army. Says Grant to Halleck: There is nothing now'in tlie way of my throwing troops into Grand Gulf, and then sending them on to Port Hndson to co-operate with Gen. Banks in the reduction of that place, but the danger of over- llowing the road from here to New Carthage, when the water is let into the new canal, connecting the river there witli the bayou coming out at New Car- tilage. One division of troops is now at New Car- thage, and another on the way. •■' ■■= '■' The wagon road (this road must now be nearly completed), by tilling the lowest ground, will be about twenty inches ahove the water in the swamps. The river, wiiere it is to be let into the canal, is four and eight- tenths feet above the land. This gives the situation of the road build- ing at that time, and'of the progress of the movement, which Badeau strategically makes diiiL But the canal cjuestion was peculiar. "Nothing now in the way of throwing troops into Grand Gulf," excepting that if the river were let into the canal it might sweep away McClernand's corps, and "throw" it into the bayous and cypress swamps. That of itself might not be objectionable, for Mc- ( 'lernand is the bete noire in the history of all the Yicksburg operations, but it might also make the road imnassable without opening any water route. Well might Grant say in this letter: "The embarrassment I have had to contend against on account of extreme high water can not be appreciated by any one not present to witness it." But here again did Grant's proverbial luck turn up to rescue hiiu from the fatality of his plan. The embarrassing question was settled by tlie river's subsiding and leaving the Duckport Canal above water. Badeau says one steamer got through, but says not what became of her; but "afterward tiie depth of water was .insufficient to allow transports (this means barges and flatboats) of even the smallest draught to make their way, and all siipplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled over the miserable muddy roads." Badeau leaves judiciously dim tlie time when the opening of the levee was made to let the river into the canal, but it appears by the result that it was when the river was falling fast, so that one steamer only caught it on the run. But Gen. Grant, in a dispatch from Milliken's Bend to Halleck, April 19, twenty-one days after McClernand had started, states that the promise of the canal and bayou route was then all that his fancy had painted, thus: By clearing out the bayous from timber there will be good navigation from here to New Carthage for lugs and barges, also small stern wheel steamers. The navigation can be kept good, I think, by using our dredges constantly, until there is twenty feet fall. On this subject, however, I have not taken the opinion of an engineer oBicer, nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant me in speaking positively. Grant was his own engineer in all the bayou, canal, and road undertakings. Ba- deau says he attended to all details, even to the duties of wagonmaster of the several corps. But at this time the need to encour- age the administration and the countrv with news of the success of this remarkable under- taking caused an optimism in the dispatches, wliich was laudable for that purpose, but which somewhat impairs historical accuracy. Thus had the water route, which was the main dependence for the supply of the army in the I'ort Hudson operation, vanished. The bottom had dropped out of the plan. Mc- Clernand had one division at New Carthage, twenty-live miles above Grand Gulf by the river; another division bridging and building its way to Mrs. Perkins' plantation on the river, sixteen miles below New Carthage by the Bayou Vidal route, and the others still floundering in the slough and rebuilding the road between Smith's plantation and Milliken's Bend, from which the rest of the army had not yet started. To move the army — 36 — and its supplies by that road was impractica- ble. To Ripply even McClernand's corps by it would be difficult; to do this while the rest of the army was moving on it, still more dif- ficult. The Port Hudson expedition was at a deadlock, and some new means of supply- ing the army must be found, or it must with- draw its advance. The means invented to relieve the expedition from this dilemma, "demonstrate'' — as Badeau remarked of tlie Lake Providence plan — "the fertility and va- riety of devices developed during this anom- alous campaign." CHAPTER XVI. GEN. grant's splendid GENERALS — THEIR ZEAL- OUS WORKS WITHOUT FAITH-^THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF THE VOLUNTEERS — RUNNING THE VICKSBURG GUNS — THE RESULTS. Much praise is given by Gen. Grant's his- torian to his Generals for their zealous co-op- eration in his Port Hudson plan, when tiicy found that "Grant was firmly determined to inake the movement, and the disapproval ol , his ablest Generals had no eflTect to deter him." He continues: Sherman, thinking the plan almost certain of de- feat, for that reason felt the greater need of making thegreater effort to insure its success. He did not fail, nor did any of those officers whose faith in tlie en- terprise was least, to do their utmost to falsify their own opinions. Indeed, had Grant's subordinates been less thor- oughly subordinate, had they done less than their best to attain a result which they believed almost, if not quite, iniattainable, no determination, nor daring, nor energy in their commanaer could have availed. But not a word of dissatisfaction or crit- icism escaped from these true soldiers after it once became evident that Grant was immovable. This is a beautiful tribute. But, although Badeau takes the remonstrances which Sher- man and others made against the plan of di- viding the army, and sending part to Port Hudson on a campaign of indefinite length, holding the rest at Grand Gulf, trusting all to the supplies by this precarious route, and by a stroke of the pen extends them to Grant's operations in the rear of Vicksburg, which Grant took up after he had abandoned the Port Hudson plan, yet he is conscious of a chasm between these two, whicli lie liridges in this admirable manner: At this time, however, he had not himself deter- mined to do all that he afterward attemjjted. His plans, indeed, were always ripened into their full fruition by the emergencies and opportunities of a battle or campaign; his judgment was always sharpened by events: his faculties were always brighter at a crisis; his decisions were most un- erring when compelled to be most sudden ana irrevocable. Tlius the march out to Jackson, to take Vicksburg. was the full fruition of the plan to abandon Vicksburg and go to Port Hud- son. But although his brightened faculties abandoned his plan, and took anotlier which was contrary, the objections pf his Generals to the Port Hudson plan are extended by his veracious mouthpiece to the .Tackson and Vicksburg plan, to show that he did it against all of them. After thus bridging the chasm for Grant. and destroying the bridge for his Generals, Badeau thus repeats his present plan: "His design now was to move his army to some point below Vicksburg, where he might be able to supply himself by the roads and ijayous in Louisiana, and thence send a corps to co-operate with Banks in the reduction, of Port Hudson." (Banks was then in West Louisiana in an active campaign). "After that place should have fallen, Bank.x, with his whole armj', and the corps from Grant, was to march up and unite in the campaign against Vicksburg." (Banks could notmarch up with his wholearmy, nor half of it, without losing Louisiana). *«* "In order to accom- plish this movement it was necessary for Grant to throw his whole force simulta- neously south, as'a single corps would be ex- posed to the risk of attack from the garrison, as well as from the rebel army in the inte- rior." In this throwing of his whole ariiij' siinul- taneou.sly he had got one corps strung out along this tortuous and miry defile of a road between Milliken's Bend and Perkins', forty miles, and the base of his plan — the naviga- ble line of supplies — had dropped out, and the rest of the'army was at Milliken's Bend, unable to move, because tlie (jiiestion of sup- plying even the advanced corps had yet to be solved. And now it had become imperatively necessary to invent some new means to sup- " ply the expedition, or it would have to back out, and another cry of failure would go up in the rear. T'nilci' tlii.-i pressure the desperate resort of sending the frail river steamboats 37 laden Tilth supplies past the Vicksburg bat- teries was resolved upon. The result of previous experiments had not been encouraging. Some of the mailed ves- sels had gone by, but no ordinary river steam- er. And the Vicksburg batteries had im- proved their gunnery. At the request of Ad- miral Farragi't, who wanted some vessels of light draught to operate against the enemy's ironclads in Red River, two of Col. Ellett's rams ran past Vicksburg April 25; one was knocked to pieces, the other much damaged. This appears to be the last experiment made i>efore the one now to be tried, on which de- pended the fate of the expedition. For now it was not only a question of supplies, but boats must be sent down to ferry McCler- nand's corps over the Mississippi to attack Grand Gulf. Three steamboats and ten barges laden with supplies, escorted by one wooden and six ironclad gunboats, composed the experi- mental expedition, which had to pass by "twenty eight heavy guns that commanded the river for fifteen miles." The steamboats were partly protected by bales of cotton and wet hay. They took the barges in tow. The gunboats engaged the batteries. The descrip- tion of this passage is highly dramatic. The gunboats were considerably battered, but not disabled. One of the steamboats, the Henry Clay, was disabled by a shot, and while adrift was set on fire by a shell, and burned. An- other, the Forest Queen, was hulled by a shot, and then disabled by another through the steam drum, but she drifted down below, and was taken up by a gunboat and landed. The third steamboat was unhurt. They cast off the barges when they got under fire. As an example of the kind of men that composed our volunteer armies, the following is cited from Baueau: Only two of the steamboat masters were willing to encounter the danger; the crew of one transport [barge] also remained aboard, but all others shrank. When, however, it became known in the army tliat volunteers were wanted for the danger- ous task, men enough to man a hundred steamers pressed themselves upon the commanders; pilots, masters, engineers, and men, all vvere found in the ranks and among the otiicers on shore, and from these crews were speedily improvisud for the trans- port fleet. The fate of the barges is left obscure. Baueau says they were "materially damaged," and that "some of them went sweeping down the current even below New Carthage," which means that they went into the enemy's hands. In narrating an anecdote of the exultation of "an old rebel" at New Carthage, at whose house McClernand had made his headquar- ters, at what he fancied was the destruction of the whole flotilla, Badeau mentions this: "By daylight, however, the wrecks had all passed by, and after aWhile a gunboat ap- peared below the bend, and then a transport; then, one after another, the whole fleet of iron- clads and' army steamers hove in sight from their perilous passage." Baueau calls the barges transports, and he here mentions one, and the steamers and gunboats after "tlie wrecks had all passed by." Through this mist it appears that the passage went hard with the transports and steamers. Gen. Grant went to Smith's Plantation the day after this passage. After his return he wrote Halleck, April 19, of the barge?; "Whilst under the guns of the enemy's bat- teries they were cut loose, and I fear that some of them have been permitted to run past New Carthage undiscovered. They were relied upon to aid in the transportation of troops to take Grand Gulf." Of course Gen. Grant then knew whether the barges had gone by, but he wished to spare the country's feelings by breaking the news gently. The three steamboats that were tow- ing the ten barges cast them loose as soon as under fire; one of the three was burned, an- other disabled, and herself had to be taken in tow. This left but one steamboat to pick up and land the ten barges after they had passed the fifteen miles of the Vicksburg guns, and then the Warrenton batteries, which left only about sixteen miles to New Carthage, and this in a river running five ^or six miles an hour, and on which, in high water, landings are very difficult, except at places prepared. One steamboat could not do much in fuck- ing up and landing ten loaded barges in such conditions. As for the gunboats they were engaging the batteries and holding back against the current. Gen. Grant says in the same letter: "Our vessels went down even slower than the current, using their wheels principally for backing." But the barges were speeding on with the current. It ap- pears, therefore, that the most of the barges were lost. But the dramatic scone of this heroic running of the batteries clectrilied the 38 — country, and Gen. Grant, in pursuance of the military necessitj'^ to send encouraging ac- counts, wrote Halleck: "Our experiment of running the batteries at Viclisburg, I think, has demonstrated the entire practicability of doing so witli but little risk." CHAPTER XVII. grant's IMPASSIVE>'ESS I'NDER FAILfRES — m'cLERNAND delays ATTACKING GRAND GULF TILL HE CAN GET THERE — THE TIME WHEN THE NAVIGABLE BASE FAILED — SPARING HALLECK's FEELINGS — MORE BOATS RUN PAST VICKSBURG — HALF ARE SUNK — CHANGE OF BASE TO HARD TIMES. During all these operations Gen. (4rant had experienced many failures, which would seem to be severe disappointments, but he bore them all with stoicism, and indeed with seeming unconsciousness. In several of them Badeau regards the failure in the end as ap- proving Grant's forecast in the beginning. The Duckport Canal and bayou route was the base of his Port Hudson plan. The dropping out of this navigable base must have been a severe disappointment; but it is not easy to lind when this happened. Badeau grows judiciously miscellaneous at times. The order of events in which he places it would make it much earlier than is shown by Grant's dis- l)atches to Halleck, and these did not inform Halleck that it had ever failed. Grant's letter of April 12 to Halleck shows that he had then full faith in the navigable route, and that there were only two reasons why he did not then cut the levee and open the canal. First, that he liad then but three tugs and fifteen barges "suitable for this nav- igation;" second, that the cutting of the levee might drown the road and McClernand's corps. Therefore, he said it was necesssary to build the road to use until he got water craft enough, and until the river conditions got right for opening the canal. When he returned from Smith's Plantation he wrote Halleck April 19 this favorable view of the navigable route: "By clearing out the bay- ous from timber there will be good naviga- tion from here to New Cartilage for tugs and barges, also small sternwheel steamers. The navigation can be kept good, 1 think, by using our dredges constantly until there is twenty feet fall " Twenty feet fall is a pretty good margin for a dug way. He adds the condition, "by clearing out the bayous from timber," wliich, in Walnut Bayou, would have occupied Mc- Clernand's corjis all suiumer. He also guards bis statement with the following, which illustrates the trust in luck with which Grant embarked in expeditions involving the fate of a campaign and an army: "On this sul^ect, however, I have not taken tlie opin- ion of an engineer officer, nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant me in speaking positively." Not having con- sulted an engineer as to the practicability of a navigation on wiiich his plan depended, and not having looked into it himself, he was in a situation to rest in a confiding trust in luck. When Grant went forward to Smith's Plan- tation the second time he wrote Gen. Sher- man, April 24, before any attempt had been made to use the water route: "The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly; out of all j>roportion to the fall in the river, so that it is exceedingly doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purposes of navigation." This was only five days after he had written Halleck that the navigable route was even more than his fancy had painted, and that with the dredges going it would be good, though the river fell twenty feet. Yet three days later than this he wrote Halleck of the difficulty and "tedious operation" of mov- ing troops from Smith's Plantation to the Mississippi, because of the flood and cross currents through the breaks in the levees of Bayou Vidal. Thus did Grant's navigable route, which was the base of his Port Hudson plan, fade away while yet the river was so high as seriously to obstruct his operation. But he gave no sign of this to Halleck. He spared Halleck's feelings. And now the failure of this main dependence of the plan was eclipsed by the dramatic spectacle of run- ning the Vicksburg guns. In following out the fate of the navigable base this paper has gone both back and ahead of events. Badeau states, with emphatic reflection on Gen. McClernanu, that Grant wrote him on the 12th: "It is my desire that you should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest practicable moment." At that time McCler- nand's corps was strung along the route from — .59 — Miiliken's Bend to Smith's Plantation, build- ing the road; and the means of getting over tiie fiood and swift currents between Smith's and New Carthage had yet to be found. Again, on the 13th, Grant cautioned him: "It is not desirable that you should move in any direction from Grand Gulf, but remain under protection of the gunboats." Again, on the 18th: "I would still repeat former in- structions, that possession be got of Grand (iult'atthe earliest practicable moment. * * * I will be over here again in a few days, and hope it will be mj' good fortune to tlnd j'ou in safe possession of Grand Gulf." The last was written from Smith's Planta- tion, to which Grant had come becau.se of a message sent him from Porter through Sher- :\r.\N, that he could not harmonize with Mc- Clerxanh. Says Badeai': "Grant was suffer- ing from boils at the time, but the day after receiving this request he rode forty miles, from Miiliken's Bend to Perkins' Landing, and there gave McClernand further instruc- tions." But Grant's letter toHALLECK, April lit, shows that his ride was only to Smith's Plantation. Badeau's quotations show also that Grant wrote from Smith's to McCler- NANU,' who was then at New Carthage. But although this 'ride was only half so long as Badeau thought, yet this and the boils to- gether seem to have quickened Gen. Grant's military faculties to such a degree that he jierceived that something more than desire was required to take Grand Gulf. His letter to Halleck states that "the whole of his (McClernard's) corps is between Itichniond and New Carthage." Richmond is back on Bayou Vidal only nine miles from Miiliken's Bend. What McClernand's troops were doing is told by Grant's letter to Hal- leck, April 12: "The wagon road (this work must now be nearlj' completed), by filling up the lowest ground, will be about twenty inches above the water in the swamps." Mc- < 'i,erxani)'s corps was building a road for the army. Grant also found at Smith's Planta- tion that there was great difficulty in getting troops from there to New Carthage. He also found that most of the barges he had sent down had gone to parts unknown, and, hence, that three things were requisite to an attack on Grand Gulf: First, to get the army to a place on the river where it could em- bark; second, boats to ferry it over; third, supplies. So much was developed by the quickening of military sense by a horseback ride of twenty miles with boils. Thus did those boils do good service to their country. Ba- deau says that bj'- this ride "Grant became convinced that nothing would be accom- plished until he took command in person and remained with the advance," and that "he returned, therefore, to Miiliken's Bend to hasten the transportation of McPherson's corps." The word transportation here means the wagons that belonged to McPherson's corps. And Badeau explains this remarka- ble turn of Grant' to the rear from a convic- tion that his presence was vital at the front, by an admiring ascription that Grant at- tended to all the details of every part of tlie transportation, movement, and supply of the army, directing the Quartermasters, commis- saries, teamsters, and issuing orders not only to division, but to regimental commanders. This representation that Grant turned back to these minute details, from the capture of Grand Gult, which he then held vital to his plan, and which he was convinced would not be done until he took command in person, is a remarkable tribute to the minuteness of Gen. Grant's mind; but it appears by what Grant did that he discovered the three essen- tials above noted, and w^nt back to provide means to supply his advanced corps by send- ing on more wagons, and to provide both means of supply and means to ferry his army over the river by sending more boats to run the batteries. Going back a little this fine anticipation of present performance, and a valuable promise of present aid to Gen. Banks are found in a dispatch iroui Grant to Banks, dated Miili- ken's Bend, April 14: "I am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf. Will send an army corps to Bayou Sara by the '25th, to co-operate with \'ou on Port Hudson." Fortunately the active enemy kept Banks so busy that he did did not wait for this co-operating corps, which, at the tinre when it was promised at Bayou Sara, was still floundering in the slough of Bayou Yidal. But the information and the promise to Gen. Banks illustrate the high intelligence and accurate plan whicii governed all the Vicksburg operations. Gen. Grant dispatched to Halleck, April 23: Six boats and a number of l>arges ran tl'.e Vicks- burg batteries last niglit. All the boats got bv — 40 — more or less damaged. The Tigress sank at 3 a. m., and Is a total loss— crew all saved. The Moderator was much damaged. I think all the barges went through safely. * * * Casualties, so far as re- ported, two men mortally wounded, and several (numbei not known) more or less severely wounded. About 500 shots were fired. I look upon this as a great success. Bapeau narrates the affair more succinctly, save that in this plaeehe calls the steamboats transports: On the 2fith of April six*Dther transports [steam- boats] attempted to run by the yicksburg batteries: five of them succeeded, although in a damaged con- dition; one was sunk by being struck in the hull by a solid shot. The crews of alt the transports [steam- boats], like those of their predecessors, were com- posed of volunteers for the purpose from the army. Twelve barges, laden with forage and rations, were sent in tow of the last six steamers, and half of them got safely by. Six of the twelve barges, laden with sup- plies, went down to form the Mississippi delta. Likewise one steamboat, which carried the hospital stores, preparatory to the Grand Gulf action. This was a dear way of supply- ing a great army, and this was to be the way until the Port Hudson expedition was over. But Uncle Sam was rich, and Grant said it was a great success. And none of these steam- ers or barges could return for another load. A shipyard was set up for repairs. In this again we have a hint at the quality of these volunteers: Mechanics were found in the army to do the work ; for it was a striliing feature of the volunteer service throughout the war, that no mechanical or professional need arose when accomplished adepts could not be found in almost any regiment to per- form the duty required. The following shows that there is no mis- take as to the amount of destruction, and also the next move: The army craft was soon in*a condition to be of use in moving troops: but the destruction of two transports and six barges reduced the number so that it was found necessary to march tlie men from Perkins' Pbmtation to Hard Times, twenty-two miles further, and a distance of seventy miles from Milliken's Bend. The last extract anticipates events l)y a few days in this very important stage of the Port Hudson movement. CHAPTER XVIIi. GEN. GKANT moves TO THE FRONT — GRAND GULF TO BE CARRIED BY STORM — THE 1.3tH CORPS DESTINED FOR THE SACRIFICE — CHANGE OF BASE TO HARD TIMES — VAST WORK IN ROAD BflLDIMi BY THAT CORPS. Gen. Grant's historian relates that on the 18th of April, at Smith's Plantation, he con- cluded that Grand Gulf would not be taken until he took command in person, "there- fore"' he returned to Milliken's Bend to at- tend to" McPherson's wagon train. On tlie 21st he dispatched Halleck, still from Milli- ken's Bend: "I move my headquarters to New Carthage to-morrow. Every effort will be made to got speedy possession of Grand Gulf, and from that point to open the Missis- sippi." A dispatch to Halleck, 23d, wasstdl dated at Milliken's Bend, but a letter of the 24th to Sherman showed that he had reached Smith's Plantation. Till now his orders to McClernand had been to embark at New Carthage on barges and steamers, drop down to Grand Gulf, twent\^-two miles, and carry it by assault. It was about the same as a similar attempt from Milliken's Bend on the Vicksburg bluff. But when Grant had reached Smith's Plan- tation now the second time, and had to direct operations, he found, as he wrote Sherman April 24: "The difficulties of getting from here to the river are great." Yet so far back as the 18th he had written Gen. McClernanj) from there that he would be over there again in a few days, and expected to find him in possession of Grand Gulf. But now he wrote Sherman: "I foresee great difficulties in our present position ;" and he suggested that possibly Sherman might find a chance to pitch in at Vicksburg or Haines' Bluff and relieve the situation. But Grant had now found that to take the army to New Carthage was im- practicable; also that, after so much destruc- tion of boats by running past Vicksburg, he had not means of river transportation for so long a distance as to Grand Gulf. McClernand had found it impracticable to take his corps to New Carthage because of the flood and strong currents from the breaks in tiie levees of Baj'ou Vidal, and had built a road from Smith's Plantation by a circuit on the west side of Bayou Vidal to where it again fetches to the river at Perkins' Plan]|;^ation, twelve miles below, where were either two or 41 three of his four divisions. And now Grant, in the progress of his knowledge of the situa- tion, found that because of the destruction of boats in running Vicksburg, his means of transporting his army to the assault were too small, and that the passage was long. There- fore McClernan'D marched by another in- terior half circle, following the course of Bayou St. Joseph, which fetches to the river again at Hard Times, by which Grant's route of supply was attenuated to seventy miles from Milliken's Bend. Says Badeau: "The new road lay along the west bank of Lake St. .Joseph. and across three large bayous, over which bridges were built by the troops, the materials being taken from plantation houses near by. The whole route was in a miserable condition, and after the march once began the roads became intolerable. But on the 29th of April the entire 13th Corps had arrived at Hard Times, 10,000 men having moved from Perkins' Plantation on trans- ports." Hard Times is four miles above Grand Gulf. Grant's reconnaissances, Badeau says, had found that between Warrenton and Grand Gulf, a distance of forty miles by the river, "there was but one point where a good road existed from the river to the blutfs, the whole still being overflowed on the left bank of the river. This dry point was at a place called Congo Island, and was so strongly protected by natural defenses that it was not judged advisable to attempt a landing there." These natural defenses are thus alleged : "The road led to Cox's farm on the Big Black River, and to use the landing would have ne- cessitated crossing Big Black in the face of the enemy." To avoid the necessity, after the landing, of crossing a narrow river against probable opposition, Gran'!" decided to storm the intrenchments of Grand Gulf, by landing in front of them from crowded barges towed by trail steamers. Grand Gulf is a little Vicksburg in situation and defensibility. The river runs a little north of east for five miles till it strikes the biutf, then turns a short cor- ner and runs southwest, in the general line of the blutf. Its impact against the clay of the bluft" has made a shape at this tuui which gives the name of gulf. And thus the line of blulf is nigh the river bank. Big Black River, connecting with the Missis- sippi at the upper end of Grand Gulf and the flooded bottoni above, *protected the place from approach in that quarter. On the south side of Big Black is a bold spur in the bluff, j^ltting out, and rising higher than thegeneral range of the bluff. In a description made by Admiral Porter, after Grand Gulf fell into our hands, he calls this elevation Point of Rocks. His description is as follows [Boynton's His- tory of the Navy] : "Grand Gulf is the strongest place on the Mississippi. •■■ * * One fort on Point of Rocks, seventy-five feet high, calculated for six or seven guns, mounting two seven inch rifles and one eight inch and one Parrott gun, on wheels (carried off). On the left of this work is a triangular work, calculated to mount one heavy gun. These works are con- nected with another fort by a covered way and double rifle pits, extending three-quarters of a mile, constructed with much labor, and showing great skill on the part of the con- structor. The third fort commands the river in all directions; it mounted one splendid Blakely 100 pounder, and one eight.inch; two thirtj'-two pounders were lying bursted and broken on tlie ground." That whicli Porter calls a covered way and double rifle jjits was along the foot of the bluff, and within short musket range of the bank of the river. The river was nearly on a level with the bank, and boats presented a fair mark. The lower fort was where a road as- cended the hill to the interior. The forts had bonibpronf magazines. This rifle trench, near!}' on the level of the narrow belt of plateau between the bluff and the river, and within what one of the navy officers calls pistol-shot of the river, was the most formidable part of the work to a force landing to carry the place by storm. The greater number might escape the shot from the batteries, pro- vided these did not happen to sink the trans- ports, but infantry in this secure trench could mow them down as fast as they could land. The line of rifle trench was held by a brigade, the greater part of the force being in reserve behind the top of the blurt". The current of the river at Grand Gulf is swift, and strikes the shore. As many of Mc- Clernand's corps as could be crowded into the barges and towing steamers, say 10,000, were to be held in readiness just out of range of the upper battery, and, when the gunboats had silenced the heavy guns, were to be towed down, packed in clumsy barges like sheep for the slaughter house, to make a landing under 42 — this fire, in the way that towed barges must in a rapid river. While those troops stand thus bound fft the sacrifice by the order of one impassive in- dividual, let this paper pause to remark the immense work which they had done in the last thirty days. This review has too pro- found respect for the army profession to. give praise to the commander of that fated corps, whom Grant and Sherman describe as a "po- litical General." Besides, in all the Vicks- burg operation Gen. McClernand gives so much trouble to Grant and Badeau as to ex- cite sympathy for ihem. But in that corps, now destined to the sacrifice, were 20,000 vol- unteers from the Northwestern States — or so many of the 20,000 as had survived Grant's swampordeal — who were serving theircountry for the love of it, and who had done a vast work in building roads and bridges for the army on a route of march and supplies, now drawn out to seventy miles. They had started from Milliken's Bend without tents or baggage, with ten days' rations, and few cooking utensils. Through that wonderful military route of .soft allu- vium and swamp they had built up a road, which, now that the fiction of a navigable route had faded, was the sole road for the ^march and supply of an army of 50,000 men. Even the reticent allusions whici) Grant and Badeau make give ground for the belief that Gen. McClernand did not exaggerate the work of his corps when he said in his ad- dress: "Vour march through Louisiana, from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage and Perkins' Plantation, on the Mississippi River, Is one of the most remark- able on record. Bayous and uiiry roads, threatened with momentary inundation, obst'-ucled your prog- ress. All these were overcome by unceasing labor and uutiaggiii!; energy. The two thousand feet of bridging which was improvised hastily out of materials created on the spot, and over which you passed, must long remain a marvel. Gen. McClellan's whole army did greater laijor than this on the Peninsula, and while astride the Chickahominy ; but this work in the Mississippi swamps was all done by the soldiers of McClernand's corps. And it was after they had been worked three months in digging canals and pulling sunken trees out of bayous and swamps, in undertakings which their intelligence told them liad no chance of success. Yet when these volunteers at last were permitted to set foot on firm ground, they marched by night and fought by day, on scanty rations, with a gallantry that was irresistible. What real military enterprise could be called doubtful with such troops, directed by military intelligence? Badeau says that Grant, "in order to ap- pease the unappeasable ambition and conceit of his subordinate, had given him command of the advance." Thus had he assigned to McClernand's corps the honor of making a road for tiie army through that wonderful route. Also that he had "charged him with an operation which, if successful, would have rendered McClernand famous at once." That operation was now to be performed, and McClernand's devoted corps stood ready, for the sacrifice. It was to be done in the per- fection of the military art, as practiced by Grant and Sherman, which held that the first step of a reconnaissance of a fortified place is a general assault, and that the art of war has no way of judging whether an under- taking is in a military sense impossible, save by sacrificing an army in the attempt. CHAPTER XIX. learning the art of war by general as- saults — takino volunteers at their word — BOiMBARDMENT of grand gulf — SHIPS AND FORTS — ARMY RESIGNATION TO INFERIORITY — BOTTOM tiONE FROM THE PORT HUDSON PLAN — A NEW MOVEMENT. In the history of the wars of the great Gen- erals of Europe, it appears tluit the costly metbod of taking, fortified places by storm is reserved for fortresses of great strategical con- sequence, under imperative circumstances, wliich nuike the object adecjuate to the in- evitable sacrifice of soldiers. And these as- saults are regarded by military men as so much beyond wliat a General uiay properly command men to do, that it is the practice to call for volunteers for the leading column, to receive the first fire, to whom special honoris awarded. And the military man can in gen- eral calculate whether the conditions in which the assault is to be made are such as to give reasonable promise of success to what brave men may be e;c;pected to do. But in this fresh young country, where all — 43. things are infused by tlie spirit of its geo- graphical greatness, a commander forms a plan to escape from his second aborted cam- paign to another so remote and va;ay, and honors is in propt)rtion to their con- sumption of these, the life of a volunteer be- comes very cheap. In the "effete" military powers, where men have to be forced into the ranks, or dearly enlisted by bounties, the tac- f-ics are naturally less consuming. The Port Hudson plan made the taking of Grand Gulf by storm an essential part, as it did the navi- gable route by a canal and unknown bayous. And the projector was as wise as to the possi- bility of one as of the other. "The plan," .says Badeau, to take Grand Gulf, "was for the naval force to bombard and silence the batteries, and immediately afterward the troops were to land at the foot of the bluff and carry the works by storm. Accordingly 10,000 troops of the 1.3th Corps were crowded aboard the transports and barges, and moved down the stream to the front of Grand Gulf, at a point just out of range." This was on the 29th of April. "At 8 o'clock Porter began tlie bombardment with all his ironclads, seven in number, and one ordinary gunboat. For five hours and twenty minutes he kept up a vigorous fire without intermission, running his vessels at times almost within pistol shot of the bat- teries. At twenty minutes past 1 o'clock the Admiral withdrew, the utter futility of his ef- fort having been amply demonstrated." Ba- deau .says: "It would have been madness to attempt a landing under unsilenced guns like these." But there was that all along the front which would have been a thousand times worse to a landing force than those two batteries of thirteen heavy guns. Mr. Henri CoppEE, author of "Grant's Campaigns" — who.se book is Badeau to a considerable ex- tent, but not .so much .so as Badeau — inti- mates that it was fortunate that the navy did not succeed in silencing the great guns. Thus does it appear from one biographer that Grant's proverbial luck did again inter- pose to save him from the fatality of his plan. The gunboats suffered, much more in this bombardment than in running the Vicksburg batteries. They were badly battered, and several of them required extensive repairs to fit them for service. On three of tliem eighteen men were killed and fifty-seven wounded. This was probably greater than the enemy's loss, although the heavy guns of the navy must have been more than thrice as many as in tlie batteries on shore. As many as 3,000 rounds were fired by the navy. This action was an illustration of tlie feebleness of the idea which had taken deep hold in our regular army — that ships can take forts. There must have been a decrepitude in a pro- fessional army class who could so readily ac-« — 44 — cept a theory of the imbecility of their own profession. The theory that ships can take forts was the base upon which Scott had constructed his "anaconda plan," the main part of which was a gunboat fleet to go down the Mississippi. He had instilled this delusion deeply into Lincoln. McClellan imbibed it. Halleck believed it, or professed to. It is an example of the wonderful intelligence which directed the war from Washington, that Halleck, the General in Chief, thought that an expedition to open the Mississippi River was the most important expedition in the war. So he said to Grant while he was fighting the swamps and bayous west of the Mississippi. And while Banks had to take the field in West Louisiana to prevent the losing of the State, river and all, Halleck was continually order- ing him to go and help Geant open the Missis- sippi River, as if to get one passage through would open the Mississippi, while the Con- federate armies were unbroken in all the country on both sides of it. He ordered Banks, and Grant urged him, to drop all, and come up and help Grant open the Mis- sissippi; which, if Banks had done, would have given up both Louisiana and the Missis- si jipi River. This feeble idea of the army that it could not resist ships, nor even such light shells as the river gunboats, pervaded all our military operations in the first two years of the war, and some of the most important of them to the end. It took McClellan away from an interior line, and isolated him in a malarious peninsula; for he pleads that he expected the navy to silence the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and that because they could not his surprise movement began with a month's siege. At Fort Donelson, Grant, with double the force of the enemy, waited for Commodore Foote with four mailed giin- boats to take the fort, and came near losing his army by his unguarded waiting. It was upon this delusion in Lincoln's mind that gunboats could clear out forts, that McCler- nand got a special commission to raise and command an expedition to open the Missis- sippi. Grant and Sherman, both educated at West Point, thought this commission to McCler- nand to open the Mississippi by means of a fleet, so great an opportunity to him that it demoralized them, and one of them hastened back from a true military line to snatch the river expedition from him, while the other feebly waited to be driven back by the loss of his supplies. It would be unreasonable to impeach the military sense of Lincoln or Mc- Clernand, when Scott — the Great Captain — Halleck, McClellan, Grant, Sherman, and a lot of others of that class which assumes to know all military knowledge, maintained the same noti«n of the superioritj"^ of navies to armies, yet the remark must be made that McCler- NAND was not a regular army General; he had not been trained in a school in which each follows the preceding, in a routine like pack mules in a string, and he ought to have known better than to have promoted a river opening expedition upon such an idea. The probability is that Grant unwittingly took a bad job off' his hands when he assumed com- mand of the river opener. Grant's Port Hudson plan had assumed that the storming of Grand Gulf was as easily done as said. After all was over Badeau put into his history, and Grant confirmed, his faultfinding with McClernand because he had not taken Grand Gulf before he got to the river, or got any means to cross the river. The taking of Grand Gulf bj-^ storm was the key of the Port Hudson plan, as the bayou navigable route was its base. And now this was found to be "madness," and the navi- gable base had dropped out. Yet something must be done, and done quickly; for the line of supplies by a pre- carious road, through a hostile country, was now attenuated to seventy miles. At the best that army could not be supplied by it; and if the Confederates should turn their attention to it, the greater part of the army would be needed to keep it open. The next move — as Badeau said of the failure of the Lake Provi- dence plan — will serve '"to demonstrate the fertility and variety of resources develo[)ed during this anomalous campaign." After the bombardment had failed, the transports were brought back to Hard Times, the troo{>s landed, and in the night they marched down the river five miles below Grand Gulf to De Shroon's The transports ran past Grand Gulf in the night, the gunboats engaging the bat- teries again to cover them. And now on the next day a new movement was to be made, which, through the interposition of Grant's proverbial luck, got turned around from a re- treat into that whicli was indeed a movement, — 45 — CHAPTER XX. THE DELIVERANCE — SUCCESSFUL CROSSING OF THE MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON. On the 29th of April, says Adam Badeau, the failure of the naval cannonade of Grand Gulf having developed the idea that "it would have been madness to attempt a landing," and tlie gunboats and transports having passed down below. Grant wrote to Halleck: "I teel now that the battle is more than half over." Thus was the failure to take Grand Gulf by storm the more than half achievement of the battle. On the 30th as many of the troops of Mc- C'lernand's corps as with their artillery could be placed on the transports at a time were embarked at De Shroon's, and set out to find a landing on the east side of the river. The destination was as free as the familiar one of trading vessels — "For Cowes and a market." Grant, says Badeau, "had hardly hoped to get a footing anywhere north of Eodney," which is eighteen miles below Grand Gulf; and of the praeticabilitj- of getting a footing there he Had the same abiding trust in the unknown as in his bayou route of naviga- tion, and in the taking of Grand Gulf by storm. Here came to the rescue the nation's ever faithful friend, the slave. "That ni>;ht in- formation was procured [received] from a negro that a good road led from Bruinsburg, six miles below Grand Gulf to Port Gibson, twelve miles in the interior, and on high ground. When th« embarkation began, it was with a view to steam down the river until land should be found; but this infor- mation being relied on, the first transports went direct to Bruinsburg, and found the negro's story correct." Such a deliverer of a great military plan from a drifting into the unknown ought to be mentioned more reverently. Behold now the great Mississippi River opening expedition, which started in with 130,000 men and a great navy, now with its head brigade, like the nucleus of a comet, embarked on flat- boats, and drifting down the Mississippi on a voyage of discovery, to find a lodgment from which Gen. Grant might send 20,000 troops to Port Hudson to operate on the bowels of the river there; the rest of the great expedition stretching behind, like the comet's spreading tail, through De Shroon's, Hard Times, Richmond, Young's Point, Mil- liken's Bend, Helena. Memphis, to the active recruiting stations in the Northwestern Stales, all co-operating in the river opening operation ! Gen. McClernand's report divests the expe- dition of some of this romance by narrating that he and a party hadreconnoitered down to opposite Bruinsburg, and had observed this landing. That report tells also of much scouting and reconnoitering all the way from Milliken's Bend to Smith's Plantation, New Carthage. Perkins', and so on down to Hard Times, De Shroon's, some of which were strange voyages of discovery; also of skirmishing dashes with parties of Confederates all along the route from Milliken's Bend, and of the necessity of incessant vigilance against their desire to im- merse them by cutting the levees of the bay- ous. But this review prefers Badeau and the more romantic account, with the negro as the savior of the army from the General's di- lemma. Happily the nucleus of the great comet found a dry landing at Bruinsburg unde- fended. And now, indeed, the battle for Grand Gulf, and likewise for Vicksburg, was "half over." For, once established on the east side of the river. Grant was master of the situation, and, if he could not beat the enemy, he had no business to come. The topograph- ical conditions were singularly favorable. Just below Grand Gulf the river diverges from the bluff line, leaving an interval of bottom, which widens to three miles. Down to where Bayou Pierre joins the river at Bruinsburg, this bottom had so recently emerged from the river flood that it was impracticable for even skirmishers. This information the writer got from a Confederate officer who tried it. From Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, thirteen miles, the road is a little north of east. Bruinsburg, Port Gib.son, and Grand Gulf make three points of a triangle. The road from Grand Gulf is seven miles. On this road Bowen's forces from Grand Gulf, which is northwest of Port Gibson, were coming; also from Vicksburg, by way of Hankinson's Ferry over the Big Black River, which fetched them by roads north-northeast of Port Gib- son. The fortunate conjunction of the wet bottom along the river above Bruinsburg prevented direct interference from Grand — 46 — Gulf with the landing of troops, and Boaven decided that at Port Gibson was the place to make the stand, for tliat would cover the roads both to Vicksburg and Jackson. Tlie length of the ferriage from De Shroon's was six miles, and the embarking and land- ing of troops and artillery is not a quick operation by such means; but by 4 p. m. Mc- Clernand's column movea for the bluffs about three miles in the interior, reaching the upland before sunset, and pushing on in tlie night to reach Port Gibson. in time to pre- vent the enemy from destroying the bridges at that place over Bayou Pierre. At 1 o'clock a. m. the head ot* the column, nine miles from Bruinsbnrg, and four miles west of Port Gibson, struck a line of infantry and artillery: the head brigade dejiloyed, returned and silenced the fire, and then rested till morn- ing. Bowen's report shows that this was Gen. Green's force of about a thousand men, which had been sentforward into position the day be- fore, and which thereby was enabled to choose its ground. The rest of Bowen's forces were coming up during the night and next day. The Confederate line was on a range of hills running across two diverging and converging roads which parted about half a mile in front, and came together in the rear at Port Gibson, and were about two miles apart at the Confederate line. BowEN stated his number in a lumping way as 5,500. Grant, two days after tlie battle, wrote Halleck that it was 11,000. Tlie mat- ter is mixed by troops on the way from "Vicks- burg, and the absence of clear statement how many got into the engagement. Badeau quotes Grant's estimate, but does not give his own. The real number was probably be- tween the two. The only rational object BowEN could have in advancing to the fight was to hold Grant until force enough could be brought up to beat or drive him back to his boats. In any other view his fighting was folly, and, to a very great General, with such an overwhelming number on the ground and coming up. exposed his small force to be cut off and captured. As the battle was fought, however, its tactical object was only to drive Bowen from the ground. McCleknand's report states that his move- ment to the attack was along tiie two diverg- ing roads that led to the enemy's right and left, his reserves being where these two roads parted; that the first brigade of Oster- HAUs' division, at 5:30 a. m., encountered the enemy's right, and after an obstinate re- sistance drove them, when they fell back to cover and to a new and strong position. His second brigade came ud and he attacked the new position, but found insurmountable ob- stacles in the nature of the ground, and de- cided that a front attack at that point was impracticable. It was now 2 p. m., and about this time J. E. Smith's brigade of Gen. Lo- GAN'sdivisioncame up,and attempted the same position with the same result; thus, he says, "attesting the correctness of Gen. Osterhaus' admonition on that point." OsTERUAUs now demonstrated on the ene- my's right center, and at the .same time moved a strong force to his extreme right, and "personally leading a brilliant charge against it, routed the enemy, taking three pieces of cannon. A detachment of Smith's brigade" (J. E. Smith, Logan's division) "joined in the pursuit of the enemy to a point within a half a mile of Port Gibson." Gen. McClernand now takes up the opera- tions on his right. "At 6:15 a. m., when suffi- cient time had elapsed to allow Osterhats' attack to work a diversion in favor of my right, I ordered Gen. Carr to attack the ene- my's left. Gen. Benton's brigade promptly moved forward to the right of the main roail to Port Gibson. His way lay through woods, ravines, and a light canebrake; yethe pressed on until he found the enemy drawn up be- hind the crest of a range of hills intersected by the road. * * •■' The hostile lines im- mediately opened on each other, and an oli- stinate struggle ensued. Stone's brigade moved forward on the left of the. road into an open field and opened on the enemy's left center. "The action was now general, except at the center, where a continuation of fields, extending to the front of my line for more than a mile, separated the antagonists. The enemy had not dared to show himself in these fields, but continued to press my extreme right, with the hope, as I subsequently learned, of crushing it, and closing his concave line around me." Bowen's report shows that he made such an effort, and claims considerable progress in it. "Gen. HuVEY came up at an opportune moment, and reported his division to be on the ground." By the time Hovey had formed his division near the fork of the two roads, Smith's di^ <^ 47 — vision came up, and Hovey moved forward to the support of Care's on the right. In the execution of this order Gen. McGinnis' brigade moved to the riglit front, in support of Benton's, encountering the same obstacles that, had been overcome by the latter. Col. Slack's brigade moved by the flank near the main road, and with- out much ditticulty gained its proper position to the left of McGinnis. During the struggle between Benton's brigade and the enemy, the former had moved to the right to secure its flank, and left a considerable gap between it and Stone's, The gap was ininiediately closed up by a portion of Gen. Hovey's division upon its arrival upon the ground assigned to it. The enemy's artillery was only 150 yards in front, and was supported by a strong line of infantry, which, it was reported, had just been re-enforced, and was the occasion of the shout of the enemy distinctly heard about this time. To teruiiuate the sanguinary contest which had continued for several hours. Gen. Hovey oraered a charge, which was most gallantly executed, and re- sulted in the capture of 100 prisoners, two stands of colors, two twelve pounder howitzers, three cannon, and a considerable quanity of ammunition. A por- tion of Gen. Carr's division joined in this charge. Tlien conies this pleasant incidentr "About this time I heard that Maj. Gen. Grant had come up from Bruitisburg, and soon after had the pleasure of meeting him on the field." Without doubt the pleasure was mutual. There is said to be no brotherhood so warm as that of brothers in arms. By tiiis expression of pleasurable emotion does Gen. McCler- KAND ingeniously state the stage of the battle at the time when he first had the pleasure of the sight of Gen. Graxt. He continues: Determined to press my advantages, I oraered (iciis. Carr and Hovey to push the enemy with all vigor and celerity. This tliey did, beating him liack more tlian a mile, and frustrating all his en- deavors to make an immediate stand. ■'■'■ ••■ Re- turning to bring up the narrative of other opera- tions. Gen. Smith's division came up to Shaefler's about 7 a. m., aud just before Gen. Hovey moved to the support of Gen. Carr. The four divisions of my corns were now on the field, three of them actu- ally engaged, and the fourth eager to be. The last immediately moved forward into the fields in front of Shaetfer's house, aud together with a portion of Gen. Osterhaus' division, held the center, and at the same time formed a reserve. Tlie second position taken up by the enemy on my right front was stronger than tlie first. ■■'■ Having advanced until they had gained a bold ridge overlooking the bottom, Gens. Hovey's and Carr's divisions again encountered the enemy's fire. A hot engagement ensued, in the course ot which, discovering that the enemy was massing a formida- ble force on my right flank, I ordered Gen. Smith to send forward a brigade to support that flank. Burbridge's brigade moved rapidly forward for that purpose; meanwhile Gen. Hovey moved his artil- lery on the right, aud opened a partially enfilading and destructive fire on the enemy. The effect ot these combined movements was to force the enemy back upon his center with considerable loss. Here, with a large concentration of forces, he re- newed the attack, directing it against litiy right cen- ter. Gen. Carr met aud retaliated it with both in- fantry and artillery with great vigor. At the same time Landram's brigade of Gen. Smith's division, re-enforced by a detachment from Gen. Hovey's di- vision, forced its way through cane and underbrush and joined in Carr's attack. The battle was now transferred from the enemy's left to his center, and after an obstinate struggle he was again beaten back upon the high ridge on the opposite side of the bottom, and within a mile of Port Gibson. Gen. Stevenson's t)rigade of Logan's division came up iu time to assist in consummating this final result. The shades of night soon closed upon the stricken field, which the valor of our men had won and held, and upon which they found the first repose since they had left De Shroon's Landing twenty-four hours before. So much for Gen. McClernand. In his view he commanded, and his four divisions fought the battle, aided at the close by tv.'o brigades of Logan's division, one of which, J. A. Smith's, tried to carry a position on the left, against Osterhaus' admonition, and failed, and a detachment of which "joined in the pursuit of the enemy," when Osterhaus nuide his final successful charge on the left; the other, Gen. Stevenson's, "came up in time to assist in consummating the final re- sult on the right." Badeau narrates that "the artillery fire was heard at the landing, eight miles off", and CrRANT started at once for the front, arriving in tlie field at 10 a. m. on a borrowed horse [borrowed, a military term] and with no es- cort but his staff [also on borrowed horses]. He immediately assumed direct command." He narrates that "McClernand was pressing the rebels vigorously on the right with the bulk of his force, but Osterhaus' division on the left had not been so successful -■■ * * until two brigades of Logan's division in McPherson's corps appeared. * * * Mc- Pherson coming on the ground in person * * this was about noon. Grant at once directed him to throw John E. Smith's brigade to the support of Osterhaus, with instructions to advance on the left, and, if pos- sible, outrtank the enemy." -48 — "Grant and McPherson accompanied this brigade;'' therelore "'the movement was per- fectly successful." Logan seems to disappear in the presence of so many commanders "in person." Thus was Gen. Grant in command of the whole, and at the same time leading a brigade in a flank movement. "As soon as the position of the enemy could be definitely ascertained, and the ground sufficiently re- connoitered, a charge was made across the avine and on the rebel flank, simultaneously with a direct attack by Osterhaus in front. This combined effort soon drove the rebels from their position on Grant's left, and sent them in precipitate retreat toward Port Gib- son." And now it was before sunset. "Be- fore sunset their right was completely broken and swept awav." The principal difference between McCler- nand and Baueau in this is that Badeau has Grant and McPherson, "in person," with a brigade, take the affair out of the hands of Osterhaus and his division, and make the de- cisive operation; while McClernand has Osterhaus plan and carry out the finishing movement, assisted by a detachment from J. A. Smith's brigade. Badeau does not recog- nize Logan. He narrates that "McClernand, mean- while, notwithstanding the determined gal- lantry and steady progress of Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith, was sending repeated mes- sages to Grant for re-enforcements on the right, but his wishes were only partly grati- fied." Grant knew better than McClernand whether he needed re-enforcements. Grant's official report has this statement, and that McClernand, even before Logan had arrived with his two brigades, wanted both Logan's and Quinby's whole divisions. But he says he had been over there, and "could not see how they could be used there to advantage." However, when the two bri- gades of Logan's division arrived he sent one (Stevenson's) to McClernand; but Badeau says that before this "appeared on the right, the rebels had begun to withdraw, and the sight of fresh national troops added to their demoralization, although not to their discom- fiture, as Stevenson did not really become engaged." This gives to Stevenson's brigade even less weight in the final consummation than McClernand gives. But it supports Grant's judgment that he knew better than McClernand whether he needed re-enforce- ments, particularly when he had none to give him. The battle was fought bj' McClernand's corps of about 16,000, and two of Logan's di- visions, making about 19,000, according to Badeau. Except the difference made in the flanking movement on the left by one of Lo- gan's brigades, by Gen. Grant accompanying it in person— McPherson, Logan, and J. E. Smith being also present in person— the most material difference in the accounts is that McClernand fancied he was in tonimand, and he reports all the dispositions aiid move- ments as if he were the god of the machine; whereas Badeau says that at 10 a. m. Grant assumed direct command, and then led in person a brigade in a flanking movement. The probability is that the most essential presence in person was that of the volunteers of the ranks, and their immediate officers, the Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, Colonels, and Brigadiers, especially the men in the ranks. CHAPTER XXI. the day .\fter the battle — bridge build- ing — BOWEN'S ME.IT — KILLED AND WOUNDED — THE WAY THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT IN THE REPORTS — EMANCIPATION OF THE SOLDIERS FROM THE SLOUGH. The "last order" of Gen. Grant to Gen. McClernand at night after the battle shows an expectation of a renewal next day, and of a possible night attack from the enemy. Badeau quotes for admiration : Push the enemy with skirmishers well thrown out until it gets too dark to see him. Then phice your command on eligible ground wherever night ttiids you. Park yourartillery so as to command the surrounding country, and renew the attack at early dawn. If possible, push the enemy from the field or capture him. No camp fires should be allowed, unless in deep ravines aud to the rear of troops. Camp fires would reveal their presence to the enemy. Such energj' of orders, after a retreating foe, is more than half the battle. Says Badeau: Early on the morning of the 2d AlcCleriiand's troops, flushed with the success of the day before, and elated at the idea of tieiiig at last on dry land, with plenty of open country for operations, pushed into the town, finding no enemy but the wounded. This elation of the troops at getting out of 49 — the swamps strangely forgets the hardening and inspiriting elTect whicli he liad before ascribed to the swamp labors. Grant immediately detached one brigade of Lo- gan's division to tlie left, to engage the attention of the rebels there, while a heavy detail of McCler- nand's troops was set to work rebuilding the bridge across the South Fork. The break was more than 120 feet long, but was repaired with extraordinary rapidity, ollicers and men working up to their waists in water, and the houses in the neighborhood being torn down for limber. No further pursuit was made till afternoon, when another division of McPherson's corps (Crocker's) had come up from the river, and this corps now came to the front, McCler- nand's resting and falling to the rear. Mc- Pherson's report says of the above movement of one brigade to engage the enemy's atten- tion on tlie left: While waiting the construction of a bridge. Gen. Stevenson's brigade was moved down near the crossing of Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, to engage the attention of the enemy, who were strongly posted on the hills on the northern side. This position of the enemy, while they wanted only to retreat, is explained by Gen. Bowen's report, thus: The enemy attempted no pursuit, and all crossed in safety to this side of Bayou Pierre, destroying the bridges behind us. Gen. Baldwin, misled by the burning of the railroad bridge, and by rumors that it was the suspension bridge, took the road due north through Port Gibson, instead of the Grand Gulf road, and unfortunately destroyed the bridge over the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, cutting me oft' from most of the meat, which had oeen sent be- tween the two forks for safety. I had sent a train around to bring it all here, and some of the wagons were cut off. They are coming in, however, and I expect none will be lost. 1 am endeavoring to get it over a ferry on North Fork, and if I do not succeed, shajl at all events try to de- stroy it. I ordered all the commissary stores left in town (mainly corn) to be burned. Thus was Bowen holding a bold rear to get away his meat, while Gr.\nt was engaging his attention to cover the building of the bridge. Bade,\u says: "While this was doing two brigades of Logan's division forded the bayou and marched on." McPherson, however, shows that the two brigades made a detour to southeast three miles, to find a ford across South Fork, which gave them nine miles of marching to get to a point three miles advanced beyond Port Gib- son. This was good marching, btit through the several circumstances the pursuit did not begin till after 4 p. m., at which hour the bridge was ready. The South Fork, running northwest, crosses, a mile northeast of the town, the road which runs northeast from Port Gibson, and keeps on the same course two miles further, to junc- tion with North Fork, which running west southwest, crosses the same road five and a half miles northeast of Port Gibson. While the pursuit pauses is a time to sum up tiie results of the battle. Bowen had made an orderly retreat from all but Badeau. He stated his losses at 448 killed and wounded, and 384 missing. His wounded fell into Grant's hands. The temptation to count these once as wounded, and again as prisoners, was so strong in this campaign as to make it pardonable to the historian. Grant's reports never descended to such a detail as the casual- ties. Badeau says they were 848 killed and woiinded. McClernand's report states the losses of his four divisions in detail, making an aggregate of 803, and leaving 45 to Logan's two brigades. McClernand says two guns were taken; Grant wrote Halleck four; Badeau says six; these above two were counted from the field guns disabled and left at Grand Gulf. Badeau gives all the credit to the gallantry of McClernand's division commanders. This is an instance of the radical difference between a real General and a mere volunteer Gen- eral, who has taken it up by instinct. For in all of Gen. Grant's battles, as narrated by Badeau, Grant directs and carries out every movement in every part, division, brigade, and regiment, and his genius so pervades all parts that every detail of success is his own; while, on the other hand, ill fortune in any part is because of incompetency in subordi- nates. But although McClernand imagined that he had commanded in a successful bat- tle, yet, being a mere volunteer, or political General, the success was gained in spite of him, by the gallantry of his Generals of divisions. All the accounts show the splen- did gallantry of the soldiers of the ranks, and of their immediate officers. It was a stand up fight against brave troops, aided by a strong position, and the victory was won by valor, and not by tactics. Whether, with at least twice the enemy's nnmber, and with more arriving as fast as 50 they could be fcrrieil. to lose at the least as many killed and wounded — probably twice as many — as the enemy, who would have been forced to a precipitate retreat if his posi- tion had been turned, was as well as general- ship could do, is not for this review to pro- nounce upon; for this review is simply his- torical, and has not the high ambition of mili- tary criticism. It was a question for Gen. Grant, but it does not appear that the ques- tion how to use superior numbers to save his own troops entered much into Gen. Grant's tactics. It came to be thought in our war that victories were great in proportion to the killed and wounded of our own men. Gen. McClernand's i-eport gave this ojiiinion: This, the battle of Port Gibson, on Bayou Pierre, was one of the most admirably and successfully fought battles in which it lias been my lot to partic- ipate since the present unhappy war commenced. If not a decisive battle, it was determinate of the brilliant series of successes that followed. As Gen. McClernand claims to have ar- ranged and directed the fighting of the battle, he may be accepted as the most competent judge; and he gives conspicuous credit to his subordinate Generals — a matter of detail which Baueau habitually omits. Gen. Grant, however, gave to the whole of McClernand's report of this campaign the following indorsement: Respectfully forwarded. This report contains so many inaccuracies that to correct it, to make a fair report to be handed down as historical, would require the rewriting of most of it. It is preten- tious and egoti.-tical, as is sufficiently shown by my own and all other reports accompanying. That Gen. Grant has a severely critical judgment of what a fair report should be, to be handed down as historical, from which all egotism is eliminated, no reader of his ma- tured conclusions in Badeau's history can cjiiestion. For Gen. McClernand, who narrates that he planned the battle, to set down in a public record that it "was one of the most admirably and successfully fought in which it has been my lot to participate," does carry the sound of egotism to the ear. Yet when it is consid- ered that, besides Arkansas Post, which was his own, the only battles in which he had ever participated were those of Grant, and that at Belmont Grant had to excuse the afifair by the very unfortunate plea of the lack of discipline of the troops he had long trained; that at Donelson McClernand's di- vision was doubled back, and Wallace's with it, while Grant was unaccountably absent, and that the only other battle was at Pitts- burg Landing, it is found that his compara- tive ascription is exceedingly moderate. But in spite of the killing and wounding of 848 brave men, the battle gave new life to the soldiers. Save to the survivors from Donel- son, it was their first victory under Grant. After their dreadful experience in the Slough of Despond it was emancipation. True, it was only a soldier's life still, in a campaign of great hardship, but it was their first taste of a soldier's life for at least six months — and such dreadful months! And the footing which they had now gained opened the way to suc- cess bj' the work of a soldier which every vol- unteer could'see. And none of them doubted the result if led straight on to Vicksburg. No one but their Commanding General was in doubt, and that doubt was now to cause him a severe mental conflict. CHAPTER XXII. retreat of the enemy across the big black river — the pursuit — enemy leave grand GULF — grant's mental STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE PORT HUDSON PLAN AND A FORWARD MOVE- MENT. In the afternoon of the 2d Crocker's di- vision, of McPherson's corps, had come up, and the bridge was done, and says Badeau: '"Grant now ordered McPherson to 'push across the bayou and attack the enemy in tlank, in full retreat through Willow Springs, demoralized, and out of ammunition.' " The way that Grant's military intuitions could tell McPherson in what state to find the en- emy is shown further along. He had found telegrams from Bowen to Pemberton stating that "'he had been compelled to fall back, his ammunition having become exhausted." McPherson "started at once, and before night his two divisions had crossed the South Fork and marched to the North Fork, eight miles further on" (five and a half miles from Port Gibson). "They found the bridge at Grindstone Ford still burning, but the fire was extinguished and the bridge repaired in the night, the troops passing over as soon as the — 51 — last plank was laid. This was at 5 a. m. on tlie 3d. Before one brigade had finished cross- ing, the enemy opened on the head of the column with artillery, but tlie command was at once deploj^ed and the rebels soon fell back." And thus it continued all the way to Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black River, tliirteen miles from Port Gibson, over which BowEN had crossed with all his troops and trains, including those from Grand Gulf. BowKN had saved his bacon, and had made an orderly retreat from all but the "demoral- izing" Biideau. At Willow Springs a road ran west to Grand Gulf, and Logan diverged on this road; but, after marching five miles, he heard that Grand Gulf was abandoned, and he then fetciied a turn back into the road of jiursuit north. The advance of the pursuit reached the bridge at Hankinson's Ferry at night, in time to save the bridge from the enemy's last men, who were then trying to destroy it. The conversion of this ferry to a bridge had been recent. The manner was told the writer hereof by a Confederate officer, in charge of a company of sharpshooters, who was far in the rear of the retreating column as a sort of rear guard, in the nature of skirmish- ers. The two flatboats of the ferry had been placed end to end, and at that stage of tlie river they just spanned it. Bowen had found this bridge good enough for his artillery and wagons. By suljsidence of the river the boats had become jammed between banks. The rear party could not move them, and they would not burn. To scuttle them was vain, as they would not sink, and could be easily patched up. The men cut levers from the woods and were trying to pry the end off. Tlieir guns were stacked in the road, and part were working to dislocate the bridge, and otliers were washing their feet in the river or otherwise taking things easy, all unconscious of the approach of a party of "Federal" cav- alry along the farms on the left bank of tlie river further down. Tlie river at the ferry makes a short bend round to northwest. Trees along the nar- row bottom on the other side had veiled the coming of the cavalry, and when they emerged from this cover they were in a posi- tion to rake the rear of the bridge party, across a river so narrow that two flatboats spanned it. They quickly dismounted be- hind the trees, came forward, and opened fire. The bridge party abridged the order of their going, and went at once. A causeway on the north side led from the ferry through a quarter or half a mile of bottom to the up- land. This wooded bottom, from recent over- flow, was a swamp. Into this cover the Con- federates made a precipitate flank movement. From behind trees they returned the fire. Soon another "Federal" party came up the road with two guns, which were whirled about and let drive. This made their cover insuf- ficient. Wlien they emerged from the swamp, out of range, their Confederate gray was converted to the more in- digenous butternut. Bowkn meanwhile had bivouacked for the night, two miles ahead. Thus did Grant, the child of luck, come in possession of a bridge over the only obstacle on the direct road to Vicksburg. McPhekson's troops rested for the night and following days, from Hankinson's Ferry back to Willow Springs. Badeau relates that by this time Grant perceived that the Con- federate "movements since the battle had all been made to cover the escape of the gar- rison" of Grand Gulf. "Accordingly, on the morning of the 3d Grant started from Wil- low Springs in person with one brigade of Logan's division, and a cavalry escort of twenty men, for the town." This start, how- ever, was not till after McPherson's "gaining the crossroads" from the retreating enemy, which must have been late in the forenoon, and after T>ogan had taken that road. "On the way he learned that the rebels had aban- doned all the country between the Big Black River and the Bayou Pierre," therefore he kept on with only the cavalry escort. He "found the naval force in possession " The "cannon had been buried or spiked, while the garrison had begun its retreat at 8 o'clock the evening before." Badeau gives Grant's energetic and minute orders for the dispositions of his army for that night and following. McPherson was to hold the line from Hankinson's back to Willow Springs and beyond. McClernand was to "guard the roads in the rear," to "watch the enemy's movements far down the Bayou Pierre," and to "make a reconnaissance in that direction with one division." This employment of tlie larger part in guarding and far reconnoiter- ing in the rear, after Grant had "learned that the rebels had already abandoned all the country between Big Black River and Bayou — 52 — Pierre," proves that the Holly Springs lesson had not been thrown away on Grant. Grant's tactics were still on the Port Hud- son plan. Says Badeau: Grant's intention was to collect all his forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of pro- visions and ordnance stores, and in ihe meantime to detach a corps to co-operate with Banks against Port Hudson, and so effect a junction of their forces. The change of this plan from a retreat to an advance was to cost Grant a severe men- tal conflict, which was even now shadowing him. The issue was the crisis of that cam- paign and of his military life. He had gained the long desired secondary base for the withdrawal to Port Hudson; shall he con- tinue on that reverse movement or turn and go forward to victory? He had uttered the Port Hudson plan to Halleck and Lincoln as from the ripened experience of his defeated swamp under- takings. He had reiterated the promise that, once at Grand Gulf, he would turn all his mind to "opening the Mississippi River," and would do it by sending a corps to Banks. He liad promised Banks 20,000 men with such precision of time- as would make him plan upon this his operations in his great depart- ment. The Port Hudson plan had played a strategical part to stop a gap — that is to say, a yawp of people in the rear. Shall he now abandon all his promises? And what if, having so abandoned, he should fail in the new plan! On the other hand was tlie terrible tempta- tion of a retreating enemy. Tlie universal instinct is to pursue the flying. Badeau says that Grant's great tactical rule was to let his "movements be governed by those of the enemy." The spirit of his soldiers had re- bounded from the Slough of Despond, and they were eager to go forward. Great gen- erals have said that the high spirit of troops inspires the commander. The indomitable spirit of these volunteers, which not all their dreadful swamp experience could crush, was enough to lift any commander above himself. l^ADEAU says that Grant himself "felt the in- spiration of success." The novel taste of victory had given him an awakening; like as the pet tiger, brought up from a kitten in the household, unconscious of his nature, ex- periences an illumination at the accidental taste of living blood. But while this conflict raged, the forward movement waited from the night of the 3d till the 11th, during which the only move- ments were for convenience in "living otF the country." and as Badeau says with mysteri- ous strategy, "were in the nature of develop- ments." Meanwhile the Confederacy shook with desire, vastly transcending its ability of performance, to gather forces to crush the in- vader. Fortunately, living off the country was good; for the impossibility of feeding the army by supplies battled from Milliken's Bend was already found. Grant said: "We picked up all the teams in the country, and free Africans to drive them. Forage and meat were found in abundance through the country." To Sherman, who, following in the gleaned part, was concerned for the future. Grant wrote: "You are in a country where the troops have already lived off the people for some days, and may find provisions more scarce; but as we get upon new soil they are more abundant, particularly in corn and cattle." The way of running supply boats past the Vicksburg guns had also been found to have too large a discount. The last that is told of this is that on the 30th "orders were issued to the Chief Commissary and Quarternuister of the command to prepare two more tugs to run the blockade, each with two barges in tow, and to load them to their full capacitj' with rations." Badeau tells not what became of them. Peimberton's report states that his guns sank two of them. Perhaps the fate of all by the time they had run Warrenton and Grand Gulf was too sad for utterance. Grant, at Grand Gulf, issued vigorous orders for the forwarding of supplies from Milli ken's Bend. The base was changed from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf, thus shortening the wagon route on the west side to sixty miles. He also wrote Halleck, without any mention of future movement. After writing dispatches till midnight, Badeau says, dramatically: "At midnight of the 3d he turned his back on the Mississippi River, and started for HankinsOn's Ferry," — 53 — CHAPTER XXIII. GEN. grant's battle BULLETINS — GENIUS OF BO- NAPARTE — ARRIVAL OF THE BIOGRAPHER — LIxM- ITATIONS of the LAY REVIEWER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. From Grand Gulf Gen. Grant wrote Gen. Halleck a report of his operations since the 29th of April, giving this view of the battle: On the following: day the whole force with me wns transferred to Bruinsbur.s, * "•' * and the inarch immediately commenced for Port Gibson. Gen. McClernand was in the advance with the 13th Army Corps. About 2 a. m. on the 1st of May, when about four miles from Port Gibson, he met the enemy. Some little skirmishing tools place, but not to any great extent. The 13lh Corps was followed by Logan's di- vision of McPherson's corps, which reached the scene of action as soon as the last of the 13th Corps was out of the road. The fighting continued all day and until dark, over the most broken coun- try I ever saw. " - It was impossible to en- gage any considerable portion of our force at any one time. The enemy were driven from point to point toward Port Gibson, until night closed in, under which it was evident to me they intended to retreat. The pursuit was continued after dark until the enemy was met again by Logan's division, about two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the country is sucli that further pursuit in the dark was not deemed practicable or desirable. On the 2d our troops moved into town without finding any enemy but the wounded. . Gen. Grant in this does not seem aware that the battle was more tlian a heavy and protracted skirmish. He puts Logan's whole division into a prominent place, although Badeau says that only two of Logan's four brigades came up, and only one of these got engaged. In the matter of giving honor Grant had this generous conclusion: "Where all have done so well it would be out of place to make invidious distinction." After he had written this letter he wrote a telegram giving an enlarged view, making the battle general and decided, routing the enemy, and leaving out the circumstance of McClernand's being in the advance. This would be that account which would go to the country: We landed at Bniinsburg April 30, moved imme- diately on Port Gibson, met the enemy ll.OOOstrong four milos south of Port Gibson at 2 a. m., and en- gaged him all day, entirely routing him, with the loss of many killed, and about 500 prisoners beside the wounded. Our loss about 100 killed and 500 wounded. The enemy retreated toward Vicksburg, destroy- ing the bridges over the two torks of Bayou Pierre. Tiiese were rebuilt and the pursuit continued till the present time. Besides the heavy artillery at this place, four field pieces were captured certain, some stores, and the enemy driven to destroy much more. The country is the most nroken and diffi- cult to operate in I ever saw. Our victory has been most complete, and the enemy thoroughly demor- alized. By this ingenious arrangement the great and decisive battle and brilliant victory would go to the country, with the glory of it appropriated by a "We," while the modified battle and undecided result, with McCler- nand in the advance, would go to Halleck to fix T^IcClernand's status. The war bulletin is a standing simile fu» truthfulness. Cesar's "Veni, vidi, vici" is the classic model upon which the finest war bulletins are only an expansion. That master of the art of war, Bonaparte, was master of the art of war bulletins. Possession of the latter genius is presumptive evidence of pos- session of Bonaparte's genius in the other. In the appendix Gen. Grant's military historian says he gives copies of all dispatches between Grant and Halleck during the en- tire Vicksburg campaign. This care for the completeness of the record enables the reader to perceive that the information given by the dispatches was of the same high order as that which invented the several plans of this "anomalous campaign." This- care for historical completeness brings next in the order of the record,. following Grant's improved account of the battle of Port Gibson, the following, which, although of but two lines, is greatest in consequences: "Gen. Grant to Gen. L. Thomas, Hankin- son's Ferry, Miss., May 5, 1863. I have the honor to request that Capt. Adam Badeau, A. A. D. C, be ordered to report to me for duty .on my staff." A divine jioet has enipliasized the slenderness of the thread on which future events are suspended. From this dispatch of two lines came the historj% in three volumes, which is the authority of this admiring his- torical review. From this, Capt. Adam Ba- deau grew to be Gen. Badeau. From a line of soft places in the army he evolved to the post of Con.sul General at London, which is held to be the softest place abroad in the gift of the government. — 54 — This soft seat, in the course of twelve years, enabled him to finish in elegant leisure his second and third volumes, and to have tliem duly revised by tlieir illustrious hero. From thence he was transferred to the light and genteel occupation of Minister to Copen- hagen. Thus does the great republic give the lie to the tradition of the old world despot- isms, that an autocratic government, with pensions in its unlimited hands, is essential to the encouragement of literature. Capt. Adam Badeau, A. A. D. C, was not a West Pointer — to use the military idiom — but his constant perception of the immeasur- able difference between a volunteer and a West Pointer makes him almost one. Besides, his confidential relation to Gen. Grant, on his staff, enrich- ing his mind to write his military life, sharing, as it were, his bed and board — ]:)oard, a dry metaphor — hearing from his own Ups the maxims of the art of war, must have been a better military education than the mere rudiments taught at West Point. The tradition holds that Adam Badeau had served a term in the noble profession of iour- nalisra, and that he acquired his facility in that elevated and impartial style which treats alike the most commonplace doings and the brightest achievements of his hero with the same siiperlative ascription, from practice in a rural journal, in the composition of de- scriptionsof interesting natural and abnormal productions — mammoth squashes, cabbage heads of uncommon development, dreadful accidents, multitudinous births, misbegotten monsters,, testimonial gifts of garden sauce (pro. sass) to the editor, fat lambs, majestic rams, prize bulls, swine who have carried to the ultimate the self-culture which is only the working of Nature's great law of the sur- vival of the fittest, which develops alike the best pork of commerce and the greatest Gen- erals. The same tradition holds tiiat his reverse style of stricture toward all of Gen. Grant's subaltern Generals came also from the jour- nalistic habit of critical animadversion upon the negative virtues of the contemporary ed- itor over the way. Whether this tradition was fetched through the method of the sci- entific and theological people, to reason from effect back to cause, or whether it is strictly biographical, can not be material, as the re- sult is the same; and this result is a work of great service to the student of the art of war in its highest reaches. The military art hath the peculiar property that it is most abstruse and technical in the elementary parts, as the school of the soldier, the section, platoon, company, and so on, and grows more simple — or rather more in the line of general knowledge and general aptitude — in the higher branches of grand tactics and strategy. Thus one may be scholar, scientist, statesman, or editor of a daily jour- nal, and yet not know how to do or command the facings, the manual of arms, the loading by twelve commands; how to give the com- mands to form line into column and column into line; how to give the orders or do the genuflections of that most abstruse part of a military training, the dress parade. But the practice of the higher branches, the tactics by which battles are fought, or the strategy which plans campaigns, embracing the whole theater of war, is set forth by generals and historians to the understanding of the common mind. This draws the line between the military things, which the "lay" reader or commentator may understand, and the military things which are understood only by those technically educated. Even Adam Badeau, who keeps to the view the impassable gulf between officers who were educated at the institute, and officers who were not, recognizes that tlie popular mind can comprehend the doings of stupend- ous strategy and grand tactics which he re- counts of Gen. Grant. When the military biographer himself sets forth exercises of the highest parts of military science for the ad- miration of the common people, it can not be presumptuous in the common mind to ap- preciate them. Thus doth the reviewer mod- estly, but firmly, assert his otlice. CHAPTER XXIV. GRANT, AFTER A LONG MENTAL STRUCitiT.K, DETER- MINES TO ABANDON HIS PORT HUDSON PLAN AND TURN AGAINST VICKSBURG — THE DEBATE — BRACING TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY STAN- TON — PRIVATIONS OF THE COMMANDING GEN- ERAL. With Grand Gulf in Gen. Grant's posses- sion, the way now lay open before him to carry out his Port Hudson plan. Tlie im- — 55 — pregnable rearintrenclinients which he fountl would enable him to hold against the enemy from Vicksburg, while waiting with part of his army besieged, for the Port Hudson part to go, view, conquer, and return, fetching the deliverer Banks with it. Nothing was now needed to put this plan on the high road to success but the invention of some means of supplying the army, the finding of some means to get the 20,000 men to Port Hudson, and to get them back again, and a few other details. For there were not means to transport them by the river, and if 20,000 men were to start to march that dis- tance in the enemy's country, they would liardl}^ get there, and it was as unlikely that Banks could fetch his troops up to Vicksburg. This clear way, and Gen. Grant's long attach- ment to the Port Hudson plan, which was the cherished child of his own brains, made him very loth to give it up. Besides, one more new plan might be the last feather to break the back of the long suf- fering confidence of Halleck, Lincoln, and Stanton. A fortunate decision seems to make much argument unnecessary; but Badeau, out of his abundance, gives much argument against the Port Hiidson plan. Most of the reasons are of the impracticability of the plan, which were as obvious at Mil- liken's Bend as now, but which he represents Grant as unaware of till he reached Grand Gulf by the rear. In this it is likely that Badeau does Grant but scant justice; for the military necessity to get away from Vicks- burg by some way that should seem for the time to go forward, could not allow Grant to consider any impossible things that were sev- eral weeks off. Badeau classes the reasons against the Port Hudson plan as the negative, the reasons for going toward Vicksburg as the positive, and he has such a wealth of negative reasons that he omits the small ones, to wit: that Grant had not means to feed his army; nor to keep the part left at Grand Gulf from being cut off from its supplies, nor to get 20,000 men to Port Hudson without capture, or to get them back again. Among his negative rea.sons he gives the following two as especially decisive in efi'ect: First, "Grant was now fifteen miles [in fact ten] on the road from Grand Gulf eitl^r to Jackson, Black River bridge, or Vicksburg. He could not afford to delay, much less to re- trace his steps." Grant had not yet learned patience by de- lay; yet no one asked him to delay the march on Port Hudson. But Nature's strict econo- my ceases to nourish those parts which are disused. After Gen. Grant had constantly exercised his army in the movements of the Holly Springs campaign, the Lake Provi- dence, Chickasaw Bayou, and Steele's Bayou operations, and in a march of seventy miles to get away from Vicksburg — ever, like poor Joe in Bleak House, moving on — it had lost the use of the step retracing muscles. Second, he had at this "crisis" (mental) received a letter from Banks, stating that he could not be at Port Hudson before the 10th. Grant answered this letter on the 10th, .showing that he could not have received it earlier than the 9th. Inasmuch as Grant could not get 20,000 men to Port Hudson in less than a fortnight, if at all, it appears quite re- markable that in Badeau's subsequent view, indorsed by Grant, it was Banks' inability to be there before the 10th that made Grant re- solve to turn his back on Banks. This also helps to find the time when this mental conflict determined. Grant wrote Banks, May 10, the following apology, in which, however, he said nothing of Banks' being behind time: It was my intention on gaining a foothold at Grand (julf to have sent a sufficient eforce to Port Hudson to have insured tJie fall of that place, with your eo-operatioi!, or rather to have co-operated with you to secure that end. Meeting the enemy as I did, however, I followed him to the Big Black, and could not afford to re- trace my steps. I also learned, and believe the in- formation to be reliable, that Port Hudson is almost entirely evacuated. This may not be true, but it is the concurrent testimony of deserters and contra- bands. Many days can not elapse before the battle will begin which is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, but it is impossible to predict how Ions it may last. I would urgenll*- request, therefore, that you jom me, or send all the force you can spare, lo co-operate in the great struggle for opening the Mississippi Kiver. The great playwright has given touching expression to Sir John Falfstafi's knightly cha- grin when he had sent Bardolph to the mercer for a new sitit of satin bravei-y, with his own and Bardolph's names, and the mercenary dealer had sent back a request for better se- curity : — 56 — I had as lief they would put ratsbane in my mouth as offer to stop it with security. I looked a' should have sent me two and twenty yards of satin, as I am a true knisht, and he sends me security! Alike rueful must have beeu the feelings of Gen. Banks, who, for more than six weeks, liad been imminently promised 20,000 men by Gen. Grant, when in answer to a letter announcing his readiness for the co-operation lie received this request to drop Louisiana and the Mississippi and fetcli all his forces to Grant, "to co-operate in the great struggle for opening the Mississippi River." During the time in which Grant had been engaged in his Port Hudson plan, and had been promising 20,000 men im- mediately to Gen. Banks, he had been enjoying an active experience. His force was 30,000 men when he took command, December 11, 18G2, and he was assured of the co-operation of Grant at Vicksburg. The Confederates thought Louisiana our weak spot, and were active in West Louisiana and Texas, favored by a country which was al- most inaccessible. To hold New Orleans, with its many protecting forts and ap- proaches, required the larger part of his corps, so that his movable force was less than 14,000 men, while the Confederate force at Port Hud- son was 18,000. Leaving the fort to the future, he had taken the field in the Atcha- falaya country with considerable success. But he was recalled by an urgent call from Ad- miral FarAagut to send a force to co-operate in recovering command of the river above Port Hudson. This had been lost by the activity of some rebel gunboats, which sallied out from branch rivers and bayous, and which had captured the ram Queen of the West, and the gunboat De Soto, from Grant's navy. The Admiral declared it necessary to run the Port Hudson batteries, now very formidable, and Banks sent his troops to the rear to co-operate. The naval operation was costly.* The frigates Hartford, Mississippi, Richmond, and Monon- gahela, and the seagoing gunboats Albatross, Genesee, Kiueo, Essex, and Sachem made tlie attempt. The Mississippi, the largest ship, was lost. Tlie Hartford and Albatross got by. Tlie rest dropped back variously hurt. And now Banks took the field again in West Louisiana, in co-operation with the navy, for which he was blamed by Halleck in his annual report, who thought that with his 14,000 men he should have besieged the fort-^ ascertained positively, afterward, to have had 16,000 men. Aided by some light draught gunboats, which had now come from Porter's fleet, he followed Gen. Dick Taylor to the Atchafa- laya, opened up that to the Red River, cap- tured Alexandria and Fort De Russy. seized two rebel steamers, and destroyed eight, and three gunboats. These operations were ac- complished by May 9, and now Gen. Banks was ready to co-operate with the 20,000 men promised by Grant to capture Port Hudson and open the Mississippi River. And now. May 12, he received Grant's letter of the 10th that, having succeeded at Grand Gulf, he could not setid him the long promised army corps; but applying an emollient to his dis- appointment by asking him to come with all his force and join him in the great operation to open the Mississippi River. In the military operations that are read of, when the two armies join issue, it is expected that the verdict will soon come. But Gen. Grant informs Banks that "many days can not elapse before the battle will begin which is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, but it is impossible to predict how long it may last;" as if it might be like freedom's battle, which, once begun, is bequeathed from bleeding sire to son. To make the way entirely clear to Banks, Grant gave him the valuable information that Port Hudson was evacuated. Subse- quently Banks found it sufficiently defended to resist an assault. Had Banks started on this chase he would have given up Louisiana and the Lower Mississippi to the Confederates. He had no means to transport his troops by the river, and the march by land would have been a march into captivity. So much for the negative reasons. But Badeau says "the positive ones were of greater force, as they always were with this commander." He "had won a victory" — an unwonted sensation; "had gained a foothold on the high land and on the east bank that he had been five months striving to obtain;" "his troops were encouraged, and the enemy demoralized;" he "felt the inspiration of success;" "it was his nature in war always to prefer the immediate aggressive;" so "he de- termined that night to detach no force a^j^iinst Banks, but to begin operations against Vicksburg." He wrote this to Banks, dated — 67 the 10th. And now Badeau says the matter was determined; but even after this tlie movements seemed tentative. Badeau says they ''were in the nature of developments." Having finally cast off his Port Hudson plan, according to Badeau, as the snake eman- cipates liimself from his own skin, and de- termined to begin operations against Vicks- burg, the next thing was to plan the opera- tions. In this does Badeau take the reader into the highest reachesof strategy, wliich will come in the next chapter. But before passing too far the order of events, the record shouUl be brought up by giving the following dis- patch, which honors Secretary Stanton's head and heart and other viscera, and which proves that the Assistant Secretary of War's im- pressions at Grant's luxurious headquarters on one of the largest steamers of the chartered fleet, illuminated by the generous hospitalities of liis staff and circle of Generals, had been duly transmitted to his cliief : Hon. E. M. Stanton to C. A. Dana, Esq.— (Cipher Telegram.) Washington, D. C, May 6, 1863. Gen. Grant has full and absolute authority to en- force his own commands, and to remove any per- son wno by ignorance in action or any cause inter- feres with or delays his operations. He has tlie full contideuceof the government, is expected to en- force his authority, and will be firmly and heartily supported, but he will be responsible for any fail- ure to exert his powers. You may communicate this to him. The authority was plenary, but the time inopportune; for the removal of McClernand would reach the people on the heels of news of a victory in whicli he thought he com- manded. But this was now only a question of opportunity, and the Port Gib.son victory made it imperative. Personal incidents in the lives of great men are those whicii oftenest remind us that we may make our lives sublime. Badeau gives only its due prominence to an instance of Gen. Grant's submission to privation in this •'anomalous campaign." He narrates that "while lying af Hankin- son's Ferry the horses and personal luggage [he means baggage] of Gen. Grant and his staff arrived at headquarters. Up to this time he and his officers had messed with any General near whose camp they happened to halt, riding borrowed horses [borrowed, |a military term], and sleeping in the porches of the houses on the road. When he left Hard Times Grant took no baggage [he means lug- gage] with him but a toothbrush." This picture of Grant's privation has eli- cited much admiration. A commanding General with no luggage (or baggage) but a toothbrush, and messing arotind on other offi- cers! To avoid unwholesome thinking, B.\- DEAU mentions the important fact that he borrowed a shirt of the navy at Grand Gulf. Yet each common soldier had his knapsack with all his Inggage and baggage, which, like the immortal John Brown, he carried strapped upon his back as he went marching on; also his faithful companions, the musket, bayonet, and cartridge box with forty plump cartridges; likewise his haversack with three days' rations, which he was "ordered to make last five;" and although the weather was hot, yet so luxuriously were they provided that each carried on his shoulder an army blanket. They had all this baggage and luggage with them wherever they went, in their marching by night and fighting by day, and when they slept, which was not cramped by the "'galler- ies" of planters' houses, btit was under heaven's broad canopy. So luxuriously were the common volunteer soldiers cared for, while their Commanding General, who had left luxury's lap to serve his country on the , l)ay of a mere Major General, took n.o baggage (or Inggage) with him but a '■toothbrush," and liad no place to lay his head save in the houses borrowed of the planters by the way- side. CHAPTER XXV. % THE CAMPAIGiN ARRIVES AT THE STAGE OF BRILL- IANT STRATEGICAL OPERATIONS — THE DIRECT LINE TO VICKSBURG AND THE STRATEGICAL LINE — REASONS FOR THE LATTER — THE STRAT- EGICAL MARCH AWAY FROM THE ENEMY. This history has now reached that stage of the Vicksburg campaign in which the strat- egy and operations raised Gen. Grant's mili- tary fame to its zenith, and made him thence- forward the sun of our great army, round which all other Generals must revolve, and, in effect, tlie military dictator for the rest of the war. Up to this point a degree of monotony was unavoidable iu this history. Achievement is — 58 — essential to make the story of a campaign in- teresting. Adam Badeau remarl' had got the start of him, aiid was moving west to beat him by crossing the Big Black River and joining Pemberton, whom Grant still supposed to be west of the Big Black, he ordered McClernand to gather up his scattered divisions by forced marches to Bolton. They had just made very severe marches northeast, southeast, and south to divide, and now they had to countermarch by forced marches from the several points of the compass to concentrate at Bolton. Thus went the operation which was governed by "tlip emergencies that were always sure to arise." OsTERHAi's' division of McClernand's corps, moving from Raymond, reached Bolton first at 'J:30 on the 15th. Hovey's division came up from Clinton soon after. At this time Grant's race with Johnston appears to have paused. McClernand's report says of the further operations of this day: Both divisions were disposed to meet any attack that might come from the enemy known to be in front. During the flay an active reconnaissance was pushed by Col. Mudd, Chief of Cavalry of my corps, up to the enemy's picicet lines, and at some points beyond. •■' ••■ * Every effort was made '■■■ •:= to acquire familiar knowledge of the ground and roads for seven miles west of Edward's Station. It was found, three roads led from the Raymond and Bjlton road to Edward's Station, ■■:■■ designated the northern, middle, and southern roads to Edward's Station, and united within some two miles of that point. Night found Gens. Hovey, Osterliaus'. and Carr's divisions, in the order stated, at the entrance to these several roads, prepared to receive a threatened attack, or to move forward upon converging lines against Edward's Station, (ien. Smith's division came up during the night, and bivouacked north of Kaymond near Gun. Carr's. Gen. Blair's division of Gun. 8Iicnaan'« corps bivouacked at Raymond. This disposition of my coips but anticipated events. Gen. McClernand, in the above, speaks of dispositions to meet attack from an enemy known to be in front, but Gen. Grant did not know of any enemy in front, nor order any dispositions to that end; for, according to Bade.vu, he was thinking only of a race with JoHN.STON, and he supposed Pemberton still west of the Big Black River. But the lucky outcome of all Grant's blind stumbling, and of McClernand's vigilance, was that on the night of the 15th McCler- nand's four divisions rested on or near to three roads, which, about two miles apart, ran ^-est to Edward's Station, passing by and over Champion's Hill. Consequently, when Grant, at Clinton, got out of bed at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, to receive infor- mation from the two railroad laborers that Pemberton had crossed Big Black River, reached Edward's Station, and was "still ad- vancing," intending to "attack his rear," Mc- Clernand's four divisions, and Blair's di- vision added, happened to be situated on the right roads for meeting Pemberton, either by waiting or advancing, Badeau prefers to have Grant receive by the extraordinary accident of the well informed railroad laborers, foTir days after the event, his first information that Pemberton's armj' had crossed the Big Black; and Badeau is con- firmed by Grant. But Gen. McClernand's report infringes on the romantic accident by this: During the evening of the Iptli I received a dis- patch from Maj. Gen. Grant advising me that the entire force of the enemy at Vicksburg had proba- bly crossed the Big Black, and taken position at Edward's Station, and ordering me to feel the ene- my without bringing on a general engagement, and to notify Gen. Blair what to do. But this still leaves to "the railroad laborers the communication to Grant that Pemberton was advancing on the south to attack his rear — a piece of information which, as will be seen, governed his tactics of the battle. McPherson had come up behind Hovey fronr Clinton. Sherman was coming by tlie .sameroad from Jackson. Thus, by a wonderful stroke of luck, the forced marching to all points of the compass, and the forced counter- marcluiig toward Bolton for a race with •Johnston, when stopped by Grant's new in- formation, found the army well situated to — 78 meet the emergency that had arisen. The only drawback to Grant's good luck was that his stratagem in maneuvering :NrrCLERNANi) to the rear had fetched him to the front. On this day was fought the bloody battle of Champion's Hill. CHAPTER XXXir. FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND STRATEGY. The progress of events in this history has more fully developed the strategy of the cam- paign, and has laid bare the object of the march away alike from Grant's base of .sup- plies, from the Confederate army, and from Vicksburg. That the plan was adapted to the object is well shown by Badeau. The situa- tion was especially favorable. Grant's plan was "to ling the Black River as closely as possible, with :^[cCLERNAND and Sherman's corps," while working his way up to destroy the railroad between Big Black River and Jackson. By this demonstration with his left he expected to divert Pember- ton's attention to the guarding of the Big Black crossings all the way up from Hankin- son's to the railroad cro.*ing at Bovina Sta- tion, while he reached forward with his right to destroy the road. Then, still having Pemherton west of Big Black River, Grant could return and regain the river at Grand Gulf. Badeau says vaguely, "regain some point on the Mississippi;" but there was no practicable point on the river, above Vicksburg, short of IMeniphis. save at Walnut Hills, close by Vicksburg, where he might connect with the fleet by way of the Yazoo. But is it likely that Grant, having marched away from Pemberton's army and Vicksburg and his pwn supplies, when all were witliin his reach by two easy marclies, would expect to make for Walnut Hills on his return, where he Avould have to expect to light Pempekton's army in its strongest posi- tion, while his owm, after all the consuming of the march, would be witliout supplies, and if repulsed would certainly l)e captured? 8uch a| supposition would suppose Grant ilestitute of military or other sense. But below Vicksburg, if cut oil' from Grand Gulf, he would "have a chance at Bruinsburg, and further below, When Grant thought John- ston moving north of him. "evidently to cross the Big Black, and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers," he had cause for his alarm; for with such sup- port at hand, Pemberton could turn the ad- vantages of the line of the Big Black against Grant all the way down to Hankinson's. and would have the inner line by which to cut him oft" from Grand Gulf. The strategy had its designed effect on Pem- berton up to the 12th. He divided his army, guarding the crossings of the Big Black, and keeping a vigilant guard over Vicksburg. At length, lie thought that 'Grant was aiming at the railroad at Edward's Station, and be moved to that place, issuing his orders for it on tlie 12th, but still guarding further down the crossings of the Big Black. His letter to Johnston, May 12, from Vicksburg, defines the plan he M'as pursuing: The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force toward Edward's Depot, on Southern Railroad With my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. That will be the battlefield if 1 can carry for- ward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to se- cure the .safety of this place. Re-enforcements are arriving very slowly, only 1,500 having arrived as yet. I urgently ask that moi-e be sent; also Uiat 3,000 cavalry be at once sent to operate on this line. I urge this as a positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumber me, and I am obliged to hold a large force at the ferries on Big Black, lest he cross and take this place. I am also compelled to keep considerable force on either tlank of Vicksburg, out of supporting distance. Pemberton's report charges his inability t»o cut off Grant from the Mississippi soon after his landing at Bruinsburg, to the condition that he had ijcen stripped of caval- ry to send to Bragg against Rosecrans. How- ever this may be, it is another instance that the attitude of Rosecrans was giving impor- tant aid to Grant. Pemberton narrates his advance to Edward's Station, and says: "On the evening of the 12th I moved my head- quarters to Bovina to be near the scene of active operations. The command arrived at Edward's Depot on the 13th, and was placed in position, covering all the a[>proaches from the south and east." Grant's reconstructed strategy, in Bapeau's history, sets forward the movement of .the Confederate army to Edward's Station to the 8th or 9th. In the narrative of the events of the time, however, Grant did not find- it out till the 16th, when the two railroad laborers brouj^lit him the intelligence. A Bonaparte maxim holds that a General who understaTids his trade will know the enemy's force, posi- tions, and intentions; but tliis is not essential in a plan which expects to be governed by "the emergencies which are always sure to arise." Tlie chartge in Gen. Graxt's plan by the emergency that the two railroad laborers letched him may be seen bj"^ referring back to Badeau's statement, jiages 239, 240, of what that plan was: The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the rebels to Jaek.son, conflrracd Grant in the idea that a strong hostile force was on his right tiank, and he at once determined to move his entire army in that direction, deflecting McClernand and Sherman from the course he had previously ordered them to pur- sue. ■■■ " •■■ Sherman's orders were changed at the samehour: "After the severe fight of to-day at Ray- mond, and repulse of the enemy toward Clinton and .Jackson, I have determined to move on the lat- ter place by way ot Clinton, and take the Capital of the State, and work from there westward." The intended "work" is shown by that which was done as soon as McPheksox struck the railroad, which was at Clinton on the 13th, when, instead of pushing forward to the enemy, he "at once set about tearing up the railroad track and ties, bending the iron, burning bridges, and destroying culverts and telegraph poles and wires," in pursuance of the grand object of this operation, which Badeau says was to leave "Vicksburg with its garrison isolated from the would be Confed- eracy." Next to tlie present risk of tluit "immediate aggressive" course, which Badeau says was Grant's nature always, the great considera- tion which influenced him to leave a very promising opportunity to make a real cam- jiaign by hrst destroying Pemberton's army, and, on the contrary, to make a mere raid to destroy a raiload, was the intelligence which reached Grant while in a vacilliating frame of mind at Hankinson's Ferry, of the consternation caused in the South by Grier- son's cavalry raid from Memphis through Mississi])pi to Port Hudson. Says Badeal': At this time Giant learned the success of Grierson's raid, and the timely eftect it was pro- ducins on the Southern people. The rebel news- papers werS tilled with accounts of the damage done, and this really daring exploit, unexampled at that pi'iiOLi of tlie war, was magnified iuto pro- portions and importance greatly superior even to that which Grant had hoped. That GnANT "had ho})ed" much more from this tuan a temporary cutting of connnuni- catitftis, affecting impending military opera- tions, and that he had formed in his mind an idea that raids were great moral and material effects to end the war, is .set forth by Badeat, page 188, in narrating Grant's suggestion of this raid to Hurlbut at Memphis, Feb- ruary 13: This movement was also intended to act as a di- version to Grunt's new campaign [at that time the Yazoo Pass campaign], as well as to test the idea he entertained that the fortunes of the re- bellion were waning, its armies becoming exhaust- ed, and its supplies rapidly decreasing; that, iu fact, men and stores were alike drawn to the out- side, and the so called Confederacy itself was only a "hollow shell." He adds that this raid had "a moral effect upon tiie population altogether unprecedent- ed." Thus it appears that in Grant's mind raids were greater military operations than campaigns and victories. Thus does Badeau show the processes which, after Grant had gained the footing that had cost him six months of rapid consuming of a great army, made him turn away from his opportunity, and set out upon a raid. Thus was he going to march away from the Con- federate army, to prove that the Confederacy was a "hollow shell." Thus by feeding his own army in the Confederacy was he going to prove that its "stores were drawn to the outside." And so the Confederacy was to be brought to terms, not by overthrowing its armies, but by evading them, and making raids to demonstrate that its armies were in the front and not in the roar, and, therefore, it was a hollow shell. Tins raiding strategy makes clear Badeau's statement .that: "The utmost celerity of movement * •■■" * was indispensable not only to his success, but to his salvation," and therefore he cut loose from his base; for if Grant's plan had been to hght, first an army on the east, and then to turn on the one on the west, his line of operation would completely protect a line of supply, as in fact it did. This raiding idea explains Badeau's state- ment that: "Believing that he would not be allowed to make the campaign if he an- nounced his plan beforehand, Grant did not -^0- how inform the General in Chief of what he contemplated." Also that it was fortunate that there was no telegraph nearer than Cairo, for: "Had the General in Cliiei been able to reach his subordinate, the Viclvsburg . cam- paign would never have been fought;" that is to say, the raid would not have been made ; it had to be as clandestine in its start as it was in its military character. That Grant and Badeau subsequently thought that a raid on a railroad, and even on Jackson, was not the highest improvement of Grant's opportunity is shown by their pos- terior construction of a plan to take in the battle with Pemberton's army. Tliis necessity is that which has given to this part of Ba- OEAU's narrative its complex character. But this relieves Gen. Grant from the alternative supposition, which would be utterly incom- patible with his great genius, namely: that he made an exhausting march of his troops away from his own base and from Pember- ton's army when the way was open and near to both, expecting to attack him on his re- turn, at a time when Pemberton miglit be expected to hold the "formidable obstacle" of the line of the Big Black, and when Grant's rear would be in air, exposed to the gatiiering Confederate forces. Thus does the ac:ual strategy, which was a raid, relieve Grant from the alternative sup- position of a serious campaign on a plan which would be about as plain a plan to shun a victory, and lead an army to destruction, as ingenuity could well devise. The strategy of the raid worked successfully for a limited time. If followed up with celerity, it would prob- ably liave kept Pemherton west of the Big Black until Grant had returned to Grand Gulf. It was fora time hesitating in execution. Then the affair on the road to Raymond drew Grant away from his original plan. Then Pember- ton crossed the Big Black, and took a position which compromised Grant's return. Grant, still ignorant of this, had started on a race with Johnston. In the very act he was acci- dentally informed that Pemberton was march- ing to attack him in such a line as to cut off liis regaining the Mississippi. Thus by a wonderful stroke of luck, which at tlie time seemed to him a catastrophe, he was forced into a fight which redeemed his operation from the character of a raid, and converted it into a real campaign, in which, of course, his troops were victorious, as tliey would liaVt? been if led directly upon the enemy. This stroke of luck again delivered Grant from the fatality of his plan, and enabled Badeau to construct a strategy which from the begin- ning embraced all these events. CHAPTER XXXIII. situation of champion's hill — the surprises which brought pemberton and grant to issue THERE — THE HARD MARCHES OF THE EX- PEDITION — SPLENDID QUALITIES OF THE VOL- LTNTEERS — THE PART THAT OFFICERS PLAY IN BATTLE. A road running direct from Raymond west- northwest twelve miles to Edward's Station, for this operation is called the southern road. Champion's Hill is four miles east-northeast of Edward's Station. A road, called the mid- dle road, forks from tlie southern road a mile and a half from Raymond, running more to the northwest, till it has diverged about two miles, when it runs nearly parallel with the southern road across the ridge, then converg- ing to Edward's Station. From the middle road, four miles from Raymond, a road forks and runs nearly north to Bolton Station, where it comes to the road which runs west from Clinton to Edward's Station, which is called the northern road. This road runs nearly west from Bolton to the north end of the ridge called Champion's Hill, when it makes a turn to south, running up and along the ridge for a mile, then turns west, down tiie ridge, to a junction with the middle road from Raymond to Edward's Station. Baker's Creek has its rise east of Champion Hill, between the middle and northern roads, runs northwest across the nortiiern road and the railroad two miles east of Champion's Hill, fetches a circuit north of the hill to a southwest course west of the hills, and across the roads that run to Edward's Station. Confederate historians call the battle that of Baker's Creek. Pemberton, on the afternoon of the ISth, moved his whole force from Edward's Station, southeast by the Raymond road, to attack Grant's rear, to cut him off ffom Grand Gulf, supposing him to be still advancing on Jackson. Previous freshets had carried off — 81 — the bridge on the direct Raymond road, two miles east of Edward's Station, and a present rain had made tlie ford impassible. Pember- TON marched by the middle road till he had passed the creek on a bridge, and then he turned to the right, so as to striice the south- ern or Raymond road three and a half miles from Edward's Station. Here he rested for tlie night. Pemberton said that the divisions of Bowen and Stevenson had been on the march till past midnight, and the men . were fatigued, and as he desired to receive reports of recon- noissances in front, he did not issue orders to continue the movement early the next morning. At 6:30 o'clock he received a posi- tive order from Johnston as follows: Banton Road. Ten Miles From Jackson, May IS, 186:5, 8:30 o'clock A. M.— Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The oiuy mode by which we can unite is by your mov- ing directly to Clinton, and informing me, that we may move to that point with about 6,000. I have no means of estimating enemy's force at Jackson, 'i'he principal oftii'ers here differ very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him. Let me hear from you immediately, * " '■■ But McPherson had reached Clinton on the 13th, and Hovey's division of McClernand's corps on the 1-ltb. On the 15th Hovey had moved west from Clinton to Bolton, and Mc- Pherson back from Jackson through Clinton to Bolton, in pursuance of Grant's per- emptory orders to McPherson and McCler- nand to concentrate at Bolton to head otF Johnston in a race for the Mississippi. Thus Johnston, in ordering Pemberton to move to Clinton to effect a junction, was in the same blissful ignorance of Grant's positions, move- ments or designs, that Grant was of John- ston's and Pemberton's. This part of tlie campaign was as if all the gods of war were playing at blind man's buft'. No mercy has been shown to Pemberton by either side; but to use Grant's expression, adapted to the situation, "Where all have done so well it would be out of place to nuilce invidious dis- tinction." Upon receiving this order, Pumberton says: "I irumediately directed a countermarch, or rather a retrograde movement, by reversing the column as it then stood, for the purpose of returning toward Edward's Depot to take the Brownsville road, and then to proceed to- ward Cliututi bv a route north of the rail- road." Nortii of the railroad he could keep clear of Grant's coluiuns, and this was now the only way by which he could join John- ston. But just as this reverse movement was beginning, the advance of A. J. Smith's divis- ion of McClernand's corps, moving west, by the southern road from Raymond, came upon the head of Pemberton's column, drove in its cavalry pickets, and opened with artillery, and a brisk artillery duel took the place. Pemberton tried to continue his retrograde movement, but the pressure of the divisions of Smith on the southern road and of Oster- haus on the middle road, compelled to form line of battle. The situation happened to *be fjivorable for forming his line, since he must. Behind him a road ran north from the south- ern to the middle road and to a junction with the road dver the ridge called Champion's Plill. A broken and wooded country in front of his center and right was a cover while making liis formation. Champion's Hill, and the road over it made a natural fortress for his left, its north end jutting out bold and steep. Loring's division was on the right, Bowen's the center, aud Stephenson's the left, holding the ridge. As lias been told. Grant's dividing, forced marching and forced countermarching of Mc- Clernand's corps, in strange ignorance that Pemberton had moved east of the Big Black, and his starting tlie several divisions, together with Blair's, on a wild chase for Johnston, had tlic (.'xtraordinary luck to bring these five divisions upon the three roads that run west to Edward's Station, passing around and over Champion's Hill, su that his surprise when the railroad laborers told liim that Pemberton was east of *he Big Black, and was advancing to his left and rear, found McClernand's corps in as fine positions as Grant could have devised if he had known what was going on. Hovey's division was on the northern road; Carr and Osterhaus took the middle road; A. J. Smith took the southern or Raymond road, on which also was Gen. Frank Blair's division, now, in Grant's strait, attached to McClernand's command. No delay seems to have been made by these several divisions in turning from a chase north to a march west to battle, and they were now in positions to Hank and envelop Champion's Hill, and cap- ture Pemberton's army, as Badeau shows fur- ther along. There must have been excellent marching fjualities and facility of maneuver — 82 in all the troops of Grant's army, to have been moved with such flexibility and celerity to the phases of his changing mind. Not all of Grant's movements in this expe- dition had been made with celerity. There had been waiting enough near Hankinson's to give the Confederates time to re-enforce Pemberton from Bragg' s army, if Roskc'RANs' attitude had not prevented. Badeau calls the round march from Bruinsburg to Vicks- burg 200 miles. The main body of the array was about Willow Springs, and between that and Rocky Springs and Hankinson's, during the waiting, making the previous march not over twenty -five miles, and that after the new start 175 miles. As the distance by the roads is not more than 100 miles, this allows sev- entj'-five miles for the zigzag marching upon the changing plans. But .some of the march- ing was very hard. By singular fortune, most of the hardest marching was in move- ments which developing information showed to be unnecessary. Such was that of jSIcCler- nand's diverging divisions to support Sher- man and McPherson against .Tackson, which McClernand's report says was the hardest march of the campaign. Such was the forced marching of two corps to concentrate at Bol- ton. And Sherman on the 16th marched his corps twenty miles, yet to no use in the battle. The hardship of this marching was greatly increa.sed by the lack of the regular rations and the absence of all shelter; and its labor was increased by having to make expeditions to gather food. Yet there was no flinching; ]5nt there was great hardship. Besides, the malaria of a life of six months in the swamps was not soon eliminated from the bones, if ever. This march had its continuous sinking of brave men to the sick list. A notable fact is that Bowen's report states that the men of Tracey's brigade, which reached the field of Port Gibson during the battle, "were completely jaded and broken down with continuovis marching;" that Gen. Baldwin's "troops were so utterly exhausted that he could not get up in time;" that Pem- herton's report states that after the march toward Dillon's the troops of two of the di- visions were so fatigued that he did not order the march resumed early next morning; that Johnston says, in his report of the time, when he was at Calhoun Station — which was a very crisis to Pemkerton — "The Brigadier Generals representing that their troops re- quired rest after the fatigue they had under- gone in the skirmishes and marches preceding the retreat from Jackson, •■■ * * I did not move on Saturday;" that thus all the Confed- erate troops were fagged by the marches, and yet there is no sound of flinching in our vol- unteers, nor sound of anj'^ allowance bj' Gen. Grant for their fatigue. Something more than a single directing brain is required to organize troops to such facility of movement, and such ability to stand hard marching on short rations, in carrying out the phases of genius, as evolved by the rising emergencies. Something more than one man's mind — great as it niay appear in these operations — is required to create tlie qualities of troops who can .stand such marches on insufficient food, with undiniinished spirit for the battle. There must in the flrst place be a foundation in the character, spirit, intel- ligence, and pluck of the soldiers; in the second place, officers of the same qualities, in whom the soldiers have confidence, all the way from Lieutenants to Brigadiers, and i)ar- ticulariy those officers who ai'e present with the men on the march and in the battle. A jjopular idea is that victories are made by a Commanding General, on a prancing horse, uttering, in the nick of time, an heroic sen- tence to the army, or else leading them at his horse's running speed into the eneniy's ranks. Battle pictures carry this idea. Battle sloi'ies keep it up. The way that honors for success- ful war are concentrated is upon this idea. Badeau's history is upon the same notion, va- rying only in form and detail. The Command- ing General can not carry out the details of organization and discipline; but when he is skillful and thorough in these general parts of tlie organization of an army which he and no one else can supervise, his spirit will infuse all the details of organization and discipline. On the other hand, when the general parts are neglected by the Commanding General, the slackness pervades all the branches. A striking instance of this neglect of the general formation of an army was seen at Pittsburg Landing, where the organization of the new regiments and brigades, under vol- unteer officers, was far better tliiin tiie gen- eral army organization, and, indeed, had to be made in the face of the neglect of all that part of organization and preparation which belongs to the Commanding General. Gen. Shkrman himself bore testimony to an ex- ample of the other sort, in his report, in M'hich he told that after waiting till about noon on the second day, while Buell's army on the left had begun the battle at daylight: "Here I saw for tli^p first time the well ordered and compact columns of Gen. Buell's Ken- tucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined men." Gen. Sherman had to plead lack of disci- pline to excuse the disaster of the first day; yet in Grant's army on that field had been a number of troops as large as Buell's, who were not newer, and had seen as much service. The American volunteer took on discipline with aptitude, as soon as field operations showed him the bearing of it, and as soon as he came under a general organiza- tion which carried it out; and this without losing his intelligence, self-reliance, or spirit. War history has not another exhibition of so great a combination of these qualities of discipline and individual spirit and spontane- ous action as that when the Army of the Cumberland, ordered out of the line of in- trenchraents to make a demonstration to ascertain if Bragg was withdrawing from Mission Ridge, formed its lines in what the gazing Confederates thought a parade, and then, in the same manner of a parade, moved forward and swept the astonished enemy from the strong fortification of Orchard Knob, and from the whole intrenched line to right and left, acquiring a new base, and essentially changing the conditions of the battle which came two days after. Also when the same army, two days after, in perfect order but yet without orders, by a spontaneous movement, stormed Mission Hidge, and thus by an assault upon a place so difficult that a commander would not be justified in ordering it — an assault so incredi- ble to the Confederate Generals that they we^e taken by surprise, and whose very spon- taneousness made it irresistible, rescued the battle from Gen. Grant's plan, which, fatally mistaking the Confederate position, had ex- pended tlie greater force of his combined army in that which lie meant to be the decisive attack but which had entirely failed. These are examples of the high qualities of discipline and individual spirit and self-reli- ance which distinguished the American vol- unteers, and made them the best soldiers in the world. A veteran officer of the regular army, who liad served in two wars, testifying before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said that in battle the only officers who can be any support to the soldiers are theofli- cers who are with them, first the company officers; that if the soldiers have confidence in the firm discipline of these, it is a strong sup- porting influence, but that, after all, the men of the ranks do the fighting, from their own qualities. Yet military biography will con- tinue to l)e written, as Adam Badeau has done it, and yet the honors of successful war will continue to be conferred, upon the idea of the battle pictures. This history has now reached the bloody Iiattle of Champion's Hill. CHAPTER XXXIV. THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION's HILL. Gen. Pkmberton's dispatch to Gen. John- ston stated that his movement from Edward's Station was with 17,000 men. Through Adam Badeau's misty figures it appears that Gen. Grant had now concentrating upon Pember- TON from 40,000 to 45,000 men. McClernand's corps was in the advance, with Blair added to A. J. Smith on the southern, Osterhaus and Carr being on the middle, and Hovey on the northern road, the roads being abftut two miles apart, thus making a front of four miles, the several divisions being connected across a difficult country by lines of skir- mishers. Gen. Grant was at Clinton. Smith's divis- ion came first upon the enemy at 7:30 a. m., following up his skirmishers for half a mile, when an artillery exchange took place. This was with what had been the advance of Pem- berton, who was now reversing his movement; but this affair, which, to Gen. Smith's mind, showed that the enemy was falling back, helped to keep in Gen. Grant's mind the im- pression that the Confederate tactics were to turn his left to get into his rear. Osterhaus' report says that, hearing this firing at 7:30, and his cavalry patrols reporting that "Gen. Smith had engaged the enemy on the Ray- mond road, in order to co-operate with him, I advanced rapidly to a point where the road leaves the open fields and enters a** very broken section of timbered land, bejiinci 84 — which the enemy was formed apparently in very strong numbers." This earl3' engagement on Grant's left and center had an important influence on his im- agination and conduct of the battle. Hovey's division, on the northern road, was in a less difficult counti-y. McPheeson's corps was following HoyEY. At 9:45 McClernand got a dispatch from Hovey that he had found the enemy strongly posted in front, that Mc- Pherson's corps was behind him, and asking whether lie should bring on the battle. Mc- Clernand informed Grant of the situation. Badeau states that Grant's previoiis instruc- tions to McClernand were that "When these dispositions were made he was to feel the enemj' with a heavy line of skirmishers, but not to bring on a general engagement unless certain of success.'' Of course McClernand, in an u-nknown country, before an enemy whose movement had surprised Grant, could be certain of suc- cess before he began. Pemberton had stopped to fight, in order to get away. He expected, as his report sliows, to retreat that night. Champion's Hill was nothing to him but a place for the day's defense, and was nothing to Grant. Sher- man was coming by a more northern road. To the north of Champion's Hill was an open country to the road in the rear of Pemberton's position. Also the southern road, on which were two divisions, ran to the rear of the ridge. The middle road ran through the Con- federate center. About 45,000 men were marching on 17,000 by a way in which they could turn and en- velop the position, and either force the enemy to precipitate flight or to surrender. The situation was favorable in an extraordinary degree for achieving a great victory without slaughter. The sequel will show how it was improved. Badeau relates: "Hovey sent back word to McPherson that he had met the enemy in force, strongly posted on the northern or Bolton road." Whereupon "McPherson dis- patched to Grant: '1 think it advisable for you to come to the front as soon as you can.' " A foot note explains that "McPherson saw that a battle was imminent, and McCler- nand was the ranking oflftcer at the front," under whom he did not want to go into ac- tion. Therefore, he sent this urgent call to Grant, who hastened to the front. And now the situation changed, and there was exhib- ited the important part whicli a Command- ing General may play in a battle. McPherson's corps now moved up. Says Badeau: "Grant found Hovey's skirmishers near the enemy's picket^ The troops were rapidly getting into line, and Hovey could have brought an an engagement at any mo- ment." He gives this description of Cham- pion's Hill, and the Confederate line: The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on a high wooded ridge called Champion's Hill, over which the road to Edward's Station runs, making a sharp tutn to the south as it strikes the hills. This ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surround- ing country, and is the highest land for many miles around. The topmost point is bald, and gave the rebels a commanding jiosition for their artillery, but the remainder of the crest, as well as a pre- cepitous hillside to the east of the road, is covered by a dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred with deep ravines, tbrotiuh whose entanglements troops could jiass only witli extreme ditliculty. This describes a natural fortress. Further along he narrates that the deep cut road run- ning along tlie crest of the ridge, then turn- ing and running across and down to the west, made an intrenchment for the Con- federates when driven to and along the top. 'To the north the timber extends a short distance down the .hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope toward Baker's Creek, al- most a mile away. The rebel line ran southward along the crest, its center covering the middle road from Raymond, while the extreme right was on the direct or southern road. The wliole line was about four miles long. Upon this description of this peculiar ridge, standing up like a promontory above the surrounding country, with open fields arouiul it on the north to the road to Edward's Sta- tion, and with the Raymond road turning it , on the south, making a strong natural fort- ress, which could easily be turned and sur- rounded, Badeau concludes: "Champion's Hill, on the rebel left, was evidently the key to the wliole position;" therefore was the place to be attacked. This is upon the rule of the art of war that if the enemy has taken position for battle, you must find at what point he is best fortified, and attack thete; for that is "the key to the whole position." Hovey's division was disposed for the attack on the Bolton road (on both sides of it), and reached 85 to the hillside and into the wooded ravine; two brigades of Logan's division were thrown to the right of the road, and almost to the rear of the enemy, while Crocker was still coming np in column on the road. But Grant would not permit the attack to begin until he could hear from Mc- C'lernaud. Grant liad licapd from McClernaxd, and had given him instructions. Says Badeau, of McClernand: . "Staff officers were sent to him at once to piish for- ward with all rapidity; but by the nearest practicable route of communication he was at least fko and a half miles off." The kind of orders "to push forward with all rapidity" is told: "At fifteen minutes past 10, Grant sent him written orders: 'Fr^om all informa- tion gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's di- vision. McPherson is now up with Hovey and can support him at any point. Close np all your forces as expeditiously as jjossible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be al- lowed to get to our rear. If you can com- municate with Blair and Ransom, do so, and direct them to come up to your supiDort by the most expeditious route.' " This proves that Grant ^was still acting upon the information given him that morn- ing by the two reliable railroad laborers, and that he thought that Pemberton's main force was moving ujion his left flank and rear bj^ the southern road. Upon this theory he in- formed McClernand, as above, that the mass of the enemy was south of Hovey, that is to say, in frontof McClernand's other divisions; that Hovey was well enough supported by McPher.son, and that McClernand, having the mass of the enemy on his hands, must move very cautiously, and .see that the eneiuy did not get around his left to his rear. The weight which this theory had on Grant's imagination is further shown by his orders to Ransom's brigade of Arthur's division of McPherson's corps, now coming up from Grand Gulf. Says Badeau: "Grant therefore directed Ransom to move his com- mand so as to join the forces north of him, by the first road leading northward. 'Enemy are reported as having sent a column to our left and rear; avoid being cut oil'.'" All of Grant's conduct of this battle was under this delusion as to the situation. The orders to McClernand were of a tenor calculated to put him on the defensive, or at the best to make him very cautious, And to tuun his attention to his left, to extend that, to prevent being outflanked, instead of pushing boldly for- ward, or extending northward to support HnvEY'. This wholly reversed a plan which McCler- nand had formed; for he says in his report that he rode to Grant's headquarters early that morning to ask that McPherson support Hovey: Urging, among other things, that if his corps should not be needed a.s a support, it might, in the event that I should beat the enemy, fall upon his flank and rear and cut him ofl'. Assurances alto- gether satisfactory were given by the General, and I felt confident of our superiority on the right. I went forward with the center, formed by Osterhaus and Carr. Thus did Grant order the battlcdcfensively, under the belief that he was in danger of be- ing taken in the rear, and cut oflf from return to Grand Gulf; and thus his attack on the Confederate left at Champion's Hill was to make a diversion from that danger. Badeau now begins the battle against the fortress of Ciiampion's Hill: Continuous firing had been Icept up all themorn- ing between Hovey's sKirmishcrs alid the rebel ad- vance, and by 11 o'clock this grew into a battle. At this time Hovey's divi.sion was deployed to move westward against the hill, the two brigades of Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the open field, facing the northern side of tlie ridge, .ind only about -100 yards from the enemy: Logan's front and the main front of Hovey's division being nearly at right angles with each other. As Hovey advanced his line conformed to the shape of the hill, and became crescent like, the con- cave toward the hill. McPherson [Logan] now posted two batteries on his extreme right, and well in advance: these poured a destructive enfilading fire upon the enemy, under cover of which the national line began to mount the hill. [No enfilad- ing fire could cover the movement of Hovey's crescent line up the end of the ridge.J The enemy at once replied with a murderous discharge of musketry ,"and the battle soon ragea hotly all along the line, from Hovey's extreme left to ihe right of Logan; but Hovey pushed steadily on, and drove the rebels back (JOO yards, till eleven guns and 300 prisoners were captured; and ihe brow of the height was gained. When a division has stormed such a natural fortress, and has taken "the key to the whole position" by that which was equivalent to carrying strong intreuchments by assault, it — 86 — might naturally be expected that the Com- manding General, who was observing this, would have support at hand to carry this forward and make this "key" turn the whole position. Bat it was otherwise: The road here formed a natural fortification, which the rebels made haste to use. It was cut through the crest of the ridge at the steepest part, the Vjank on the upper side commanding all bejow, so that even when the national troops had appar- ently gained the road, the rebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered from every fire, and masters of the whole declivity. Finding himself, however, m spite of this advantage, losing ground on a point so vitally important, the enemy now pushed re-enforcements rapidly; and when these arrived, rallied under cover of the woods, and poured down the road in great numbers on the position occupied by Hovey. For awhile Hovey bore the whole brunt of the battle, and after a desperate resistance was com- pelled to fall back, though slowly and stubbornly, losing several of the guns he had taken an hour be- fore. But Grant was watching the tight on the first spur of the hill undrrjiir, and seeing that the enemy was getting too strong for Hovey he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division, which had just ar- rived. Hovey's report relates the .same incident thus: Brigadier General Quinby"s division, commanded by (ien. Crocker, was near at hand, and had not yet been under fire. I sent to them for support, but, being unknown to the officers of that command, considerable delay ensued, and 1 was compelled to resort to Gen. Grant to procure the order for their aid. Col. Boomer, commanding 3rt Brigade of Quinby's division, on receiving the command from Gen. Grant,came gallantly up the hill ; Col. Holmes, with two small regiments— 10th Missouri and 17th Iowa— soon followed. The entire force sent amounted to about 2,000 men. Badeau continues: -'These fresh troops gave Hovey confidence, and the height that had been gained with fearful loss was still retained. The preponderance, however, was even yet in favor of the enemy." But Hovey's lack was more of battalions than of confidence, and he says: My division, in the meantime, had been com- pelled to yield ground before overwhelming num- bers. Slowly and stubbornly they fell back, contest- ing with death every inch of the lield they had won. Col. Boomer and 'Vil. Holmes gallantly and heroic- ally rushed with their commands into the con- flict, but the enemy had massed his forces, and slowly pressed our whole line with re-enforce- pients, backward to a point near the hiovf of the bill, Here a stubboui stand was made. To resume now Badeau's narrative at the point where Grant sent the re-enforcement: Meanwhile the rebels had made a desperate at- tempt on their left to capture the battery in Mc- pherson's corps which was doing them so much damage; they were, however, promptly repelled by Smith's brigade of Logan's division, which drove them back with great slaughter, capturing many prisoners. Discovering now tliat his own left was nearly turned, the enemy made a determined effort to turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that com- mander all his available force; and while JjOgan was carrying everything before him, the closely pressed and nearly exhausted troops of Havey were again compelled to retire. They had been fighting nearly three hours, and were fatigued and out of ammunition ; but fell back doggedly, and not far. Outnumbered, fatigued, and out of ammu- nition, too, is reason enough. Continues Badeau: The tide of battle at this point seemed turning against the national forces, and Hovey sent back repeatedly to Grant for support. Grant, however, was momentarily expecting the advance of Mc- Clernaud's four divisions, and never doubled the result. Still, more battalions to Hovey, outnum- bered andoutof ammunition, might be as use- ful at the moment as Grant's never doubting the result. But was Grant momentarily expecting this? Badeau continues: At thirty minutes past 12 he had again dispatched to McClernand: "As soon as your command is all in hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force, if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and McPhcrson, and will see that they co-operate." So he was promising Mc(7lernand that he would see that Hovey co-operated; likewise McPhekson. And McClernand, after he had got his men well in hand — which they had been since daylight — was to throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and "if an opportunity occurred," to attack him in force. He was to wait for his opportunity. Considering what was going on where Grant was, "under fire," his orders to Mc- Clernand seem almost too energetic and peremptory, indicating an undueexcitenicnt, or the glow of battle. Badeau says: "That commander, however, did not arrive." But as Grant, in answer to McClernand's inquiry whether McPherson would support Hovey and whetlier he shoulcl bring on the battle si — had sent the above order, following another, telling him that the mass of the enemy was in his (McClernand's) front, aiming to turn- his left, Grant could hardly expect him "to arrive." And now, Badeau continues: Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, now directed MePherson to move what troops he could by a left flank around to the enemy's right front on the crest of the ridge. The prolongation of Logan to the right had left a gap between him and Hovey, and into this the two remaining bri- urades of Crocker were thrown. The movement was promptly executed; Boomer's brigade went at and into the fight, and checked the rebel advance till Holmes' brigade came up, wnen a dash- ing charge wa.s made, and Hovey and Crocker were engaged for forty minutes, Hovey re- capturing five of the guns he had already taken and lost. Badeau by this has made two affairs of the .sending of Boomer and Holmes to Hovey's aid, of which Hovey makes but one. The muddle is explaiped by Crocker's report, which says that two regiments of Col. Sak- korn's Ijrigade were taken from the right to support Col. Boo.mer, and that Col. Holmes came after. Crocker continues: "At this critical moment Col. Holmes arrived in the lield with two regiments * » « and pro- ceeded * * * to the front, relieving Col. Bijomer, who by this time was out of ammu- nition." This situation on the left of Hovey, and nearest to Grant, was that which im- pressed him that "the position was in dan- ger;" that is to say, that his right wing was in danger of being turned by its left and cut off". Baheau continues: But the enemy had massed his forces on this point, and the irregularity of the ground prevented the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though baf- fled and enraged, he still fought with courage and obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national line was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the po- .sition was in danger. Tills seems a remarkable achievement of generalship, with 45,000 men at hand, against 17,000, desiring only to retreat. And now comes another stroke of generalship. Badeat goes on : At this crisis Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division was moved forward at a double quick into a piece of wood on the extreme right of the com- mand, the brigade moved parallel with Logan's general line of taltle, charged across the ravines up the hill and through an open field, driving the enemy from an important position, where he was about to establish his batteries, capturing seven guns and several hundred prisoners. The main Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, to the point of intersection with the middle^ or Raymond road, turns almost to the west again, running down the hill and across the valley where Lo^au was now operating in the rear of the enemy. At length the battle, after slaughtering men for hours in assaulting a steep and broken nill, naturally so strong a position that prac- tically it tripled the enemy's force, had stum- bled upon a clear way around the head of the ridge by which Pemberton could be turned and captured. Continues Badeau: Unconscious of the immense aavantage, Logan swept directly across the road, and absolutely cut off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's Station, without being aware of it. But at this juncture, the essential part play- ed by the Commanding General in this battle is agaiti to be exemplitied: At this very juncture. Grant, finding that there was no prospect of McClernand's reaching the field [McC. was following Grant's iustructious], and that the scales were still balanced at tlie critical point, thought liimself obliged, in order to still further re-enforce Hove_j' and Crocker in front, to recall Logan from the right, where he was overlapping and outflanking the rebel left. Had the national commander been acquainted with the country, he would, of course, have ordered Logan to push on in the rear of the enemy, and thus secure the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army. But ihe entire region was new to the national troops [to Grant], and this great opportunity unknown. And now conies a singular incident, revers- ing the usual efi'ect. When Logan withdrew from this road, to march by a Iong*circuit to Hovey's left, then the Confederates became alarmed for the road, and gave up the tigtit. 8ays Badeau : As it was, however, the moment Logan left the road, the enemy, alarmed lor his line of retreat, finding it, indeed, not only threatenea, but almost gone, at once abandoned his position in front. But there was a coincidence at the front: .\t this crisis a national battery [Badeau is too delicate to say of Hovey's division— in fact three batteries] opened from the right a well directed fire, aud the victorious troops of Hovev and Crocker 88 pressing on, the enemy once more gave way; the rebel line was rolled back for the third time, and the battle decided. But before this consummation an episode had come oit', which liad an important effect: Before the result of the final charge was known, Logan rode eagerly up to Grant, declaring that if one more aash could be made in front, he would advance in the rear and complete the capture of the rebel army. Grant at once rode forward in per- son, and found the troops that had been so gal- lantly engaged for hours withdrawn from their most advanced positions, and retilling their cart- ridge boxes. Explaining to them the position of Logan's forces, he directed them to use all dispatch and push forward as rapidly as possible. By this it appears that Grant was going to send LouAN back to the road from which he liad withdrawn him to re-enforce Hovey's left, and that he passed by commanding ofifi- cers, and mingled with the soldiers, and ex- plained the situation to them, and directed them to use all dispatch, and make another dash at the enemy. Badeau relates that then : He proceeded himself in haste to what had been Pemberton's line, exnectiiig every moment to come up with the enemy, but found the rebels had al- ready broken and fled from the field. Logan's at- tack had precipitated the rout, and the battle of Champion's Hill was won. This was between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The attentive reader of this interesting bat- tle narrative must here wonder what made the Confederates "break and fly from the field." Badeau's narrative makes, out that Grant had withdrawn Logan from his attack on their left and rear, and that Hovey's troops had withdrawn from their most advanced position, and, as appears, were not engaged at the time, as they were "refilling their cartridge boxes," and that Grant went among them and explained Logan's position, and directed them to mtike one more assault, and then himself rode in haste toward Pember- ton's line. Such a suspension of the attack, and such a retiring movement, does not usually cause tlie strongly placed adversary to break and run. The only explanation suggested of the cause of the sudden turn of the battle to victory at tliis juncture is Grant's riding in haste at Pemberton's line. This would make at least one instance in which the victory was won, according to the battle pictures, by a careering Commanding General riding furi- ously at the enemy's ranks. Perhaps, how- ever, by going back to the next preceding citation, and adding thereto^ Hovey's and Crocker's reports, and the fact that Logan continued to attack, an idea may be had of the cause of Pemberton's giving up the battle. By referring back to Hovey's account of what followed when he had been reenforced from Crocker's division, it will he seen that before the re-enforcement arrived his divis- ion had been forced to give ground, and that this continued thereafter till all had been driven back to the brow of tlie hill, where a stubborn stand was made. At tliis point Hovey relates that which was tlie turning point in this "key of the position:" The irregularity of our line had previously pre- vented me from using artillery in enfilading the enemy's line, but as our forces were compelled to fall slowly back, the lines became marked and dis- tinct, and about 'J::50 p. m. I could easily perceive, by the sound of firearms through the woods, the position of the respective armies. I at once ordered the ]st Missouri Battery, com- manded by Capt. Schofield. and the IGth Ohio Bat- tery under First Lieut. Murdock, to take a position in an open field, beyond a slight mound on my right, in advance of, and with parallel ranges of their guns with, my lines. About the same time Capt. Dillon'^Wisconsin Battery was put in posi- tion; two sections of the IGih Ohio Battery on the left, the Wisconsin Battery in the center, and Capt. Schofield's on the right. Through the rebel ranks these batteries hailed an incessant shower of shot and shell, entirely enfiladine the rebel columns. The fire was terrific for several minutes, and the cheers from our men on the brow of the hill told of success. The enemy gave back, and our forces under Gen. McGinnis, Col. Slack, Col. Boomer, and Col. Holmes drove them again over the ground which had been hotly contested for the third time during the day, five more of the eleven guns not taken down the hill falling a second time into our posses- sion. •■■ * * Thus ended the battle of Champion's Hill at about 3 p. m. But while this gives a reason for the retreat of the enemy which the common mind can understand, Adam Badeau's account of Grant's action at this crisis can be reconciled with it by taking in Crocker's report, which states that Col. Holmes' arrival at the front "relieved Col. Boomer, who by this time was entirely out of ammunition." It is probable, therefore, that it was to Boomer's men, while refilling their cartridge boxes, that Gen. Grant was explaining Logan's situation, while the rest of the line was dealing the fin- ishing stroke to the enemy's line. '— 89 — This explanation allows also for any etfect in the tinal scene, which niiglft have been wrought by , Gen. Grant's riding at Pkmber- TON'sline, if it liad still been there. The length to which this chapter has been drawn, rather than make a Dreak in the midst of the battle, constrains to defer to another the summing up of the character and results 'of this terribly slaughterous conflict, the theory and tactics which distinguished it, and the part of the rest of the line therein, together with a glance at the conduct of the Confederate side. CHAPTER XXXV. THE INVETRED CONCEPTION UPON WHICH GRANT ORDERED THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL — FIGHTINti A BATTLE DEFENSIVELY AGAINST A RETREATING ENEMY — THE OTHER PARTS OF THE BATTLE — THE MURDEROUS NATURE OF THE ASSAULT ON THE RIDGE — HEROISM OF THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS OF THE LINE — THE DREADFUL LIST OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED. AdamBadeau's narrative ignores the action in all that part of the line of four miles which was south of the point of the assault on the north end of the ridge, and he charges great delinquency on Gen. McClernand for not pressing the enemy and destroying his right. He says : A vigorous effort on the part of McClernand would have accomplished the defeat by noon. ■■' * * Or, later in the fii;lu, Logan could have beea kept in their rear, if McClernand haa come up in time, and with all their retreat cut off, the enemy might have been forced to surrender in mass. But Badeau's narration shows that when Grant reached the front at the north end of the ridge, he took charge of the battle and made a reverse change in McClernand's dis- positions; that his conduct of the battle was upon his idea that Fkmberton's main force was moving to McClernand's left and rear — whereas it was trying to get away in the op- posite direction ; that at 10:ir> he sent to Mc- Clernand this alarming order: "Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible; the enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear;" to Blair a similar order, to Ransom this: "Pinemy are reported as having sent a column to our left and rear; avoid being cut oflt';" that even so late as 12:;i5, when Hovky was storming the ridge, he sent McClernand a dubious, vague, cautionary order, calculated to keep him on the defensive, and his chief at- tention to his extreme left and rear; and that at the beginning he had separated Hovey'm division from McClernand's command, and had countermanded his order to keej) in con- nection. While thus issuing alarming orders to his center and left, calculated to keep all that part of the line on the defensive toward the extreme left and rear. Grant promised tiii.H support: "I am with Hovey and McPherson, and will see that they co-operate." Thus was he seeing that, by assaulting the ridge, tliej' co- operated with McClernand in preventing the enemy's main force from getting l)y the left to Grant's rear. This is the only theory tliat is given to explain the assault on the ridge. By this strange misconception, it fell out that while Pemberton was fighting defen- sively to get a chance to retreat, Grant was ordering the battle defensively to prevent Pemberton getting around his left to his rear, and that he thought necessary to order the desperate assault on the north end of the ridge, to '"co-operate" with McClernand in preventing his left from being turned. And so, after Hovey's division had been engaged since 11 o'clock, in the dreadful slaughter which it suffered in storming the north end of the ridge, Grant at 12:30sent McClernand, two miles away, this vague, doubtful, timid, cautionary order, which McClernand's re- port says was in reply to a message he sent, describing the position of things, and asking if he should "bring on a general engage- ment:" As soon as your command is all in hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and at- tack him ill force if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and McPher.son, and will see that they co-operate. And lie was seeing tliat they co-operated. Hovey's and Logan's divisions had been co- operating for an hour in storming tiiat deadly ridge, and a thousand brave men had fallen in co-operating with Grant's fears that four miles to the south he was being taken by the rear. Fortunately, the country has Ada.m Badeau's account of this, approved by Gen. Grant, else it would not in' l)elieved. 90 — McClernand's report narrates further that Gen. A. J. Smith, on the Southern road, sent an aid to tell him that the enemy was not moving to the left or rear, and that he com- municated this information to Grant, where- upon he received an order to attack. The precious time consumed by all this, when Gen. Smith was four miles from Grant, and a part of the country between was very diffi- cult, may be estimated. At length this infor- mation got Grant out of the alarmed de- fensive policy for his center and left, with which he was co-operating by consuming Hovey's and Logan's divisions in storming an almost impregnable hill. Grant's orders were enough to have neu- tralized McClernand's three remaining di- visions and Blair's; but all this time brisk skirmishing was going on, and artillery ex- changes and advances, along a front of four miles in a very difficult country, especially that on the middle road, and between that and Grant's position. Osterhaus and Carr were on this road, Carr in the reserve. Os- terhaus' report gives this description of the ground, mentioning also the force of his di- vision : With this force of 2,704 men, I entered upon one of the most difficult terrains [grounds] tor the pas- sage of trooDS which can be imagined. A chaos of ravines and narrow bills, sloping very abruptly into sink hole like valleys, diverge in all directions. All is covered densely by trees and brush, except the public road, which winds its track in bizarre curves, and follows the hills and valleys without permitting at any point an open view of more than fifty or 100 yards. This was a country in which a small force could retard the advance of an army. It was a country for the exercise of skill in pushing on, or for pushing men into such a bush- whacking slaughter as Grant's in the thicket of the Wilderness. Osterhaus' report shows that the affair was managed with skill, and the Confederate line pressed back without heavy loss on the national side, the loss of Osterhaus' division being 110 killed, wounded, and missing. The fact that there was not a butchery is instanced by Badeau as proof that there was no action. Badeau says that "15,000 men thus lingered under his (McClernand's) command, in the vicinity of the field, though moving on roads con- verging to the front. The force opposed to him was probably not greater than 0,000 or 7,000." Badeau conjures numbers on either side up and down to suit the occasion, un- mindful of the other relations. When he comes to dispute Pemberton's report of his force at this battle, he makes it great enough to have outnumbered the scattered forces all along the line. And Badeau ignores the rul- ing part that Grant had magnified this force to Mc'Clernand, and had put him on the de- fensive. In narrating Grant's riding alone at Pem- berton's line, Badeau tells an incident which shows that McClernand's central divisions were pushing on : Arriving now at the Raymond road, Grant saw on his left, and along the next ridge, a column of troops approaching, which proved to be Carr's division. McClernand was with it in person. To the left of Carr Osterhaus soon afterward appeared, with his skirmishers well in advance. This was timely in meeting Loring's divis- ion, which, at length, moving by a rear road, had come up to help Stevenson on the ridge, but, being too late, was trying to protect the retreat. The battle on Champion's Hill, on the Confederate side, was fought first by Steven- son's division, then re-enforced by one brigade from Bov/en's division, and then by the other brigade. Pemberton called on Loring for help, but Loring said he was hard pressed; when he did come it was too late. Gen. J. E. Johnston gives the opinion that Loring was sufficiently engaged in resisting McClernand. A loss in Stevenson's and Bowen's divisions of 355 killed, 1,07-1 wounded, of which twenty- nine officers were killed and 105 wounded, at- tests the stubbornness of the resistance, as well as the heroic valor of the men who fought this resistance and all the advantages of that strong position. Badeau, ignoring the rest of the line, says: "The battle was fought with McPherson's command and Hovey's division of the 13th Corps." Lest this might go to the credit of Hovey or McClernand, he adds: "Grant di- recting all ofHovEY's movements himself in the absence of McClebnand." He continues: "This hardest fought battle of the campaign cost him (Grant) 426 men killed, 1,842 wounded, and 189 missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200 men, one-third of his command. Mc- PHER.SON lost about 1,000 men." Perhaps none but a soldier can apprehend the nature 91—- of the fighting, the effect on the mind, and the destruction of military organization by the loss of one-third of a division in a battle. Gen. Hovey's report expresses becoming feeling, and does justice to the soldiers and officers of this murderous assault: I can not think of this bloody hill without sadness and pride; sadness for the great loss of my true and gallant men ; pride for the heroic bravery they displayed. ■■'■ ■■'■ It was after the conflict literal- ly the hill of death; men, horses, cannon, and the debris of an army lay pattered in wild confusion. Hundreds of the gallani Twelfth Division were cold in death, or writhing in pain, and with large num- bers of Quinby's gallant boys lay dead, dying, or wounded, intermingled with our fallen foe. I never saw fighting like this. The loss of my division on this field was nearly one-ihird of my forces engaged. Gen. Hovey's report, alone, gives a list of the regiments and their commanders. In a nation where soldierly heroism is appreciated — where gratitude is not all expended on one, man, the naraesof alltheregirnentsengaged in the assault on Champion's Hill would be household words. Hovey mentions those of his division as if the volunteers and their im- mediate volunteer officers did the fighting which Badeau appropriates to Grant by the statement that "Grant directed all of Hovey's movements himself.' Both Hovey's report and Badeau's account show that Grant's directing did not extend to the duty of sup- porting him by ordering up assistance. Hovey's mention of his troops is here given in his own words: Of the 29tli Wisconsin, 24th and 28th Iowa, in what words of prai.se shall I speak? Not more than six months in the service, their record will com- pare with the oldest and best tried regiments in the field. All honor is due to their gallant oflicers and men, and Colonels Gill, Bryan, and Connell have my thanks for the skill with which they handled their respective commands, and for the fortitude, endurance, and bravery displayed by their gallant men. It is useiens to speak in praise of the 11th, 21th, 34th, 46th,'and 47th Indiana, and 5Gth Ohio; they have won laurels on many fields, and not only their country will praise, but posterity will be proud to claim kindred with the privates in tbeir ranks. They have a history that Col. Macauley*, Col. Spicely, Col. Cameron, Col. Bringhurst, Lieut. Col. McLaughlin, and Col. Rayner, and their children will be proud to read. His report, in narrating tlie progress of the battle, tells also of the service of the 1st Mis- souri Battery, Capt. Schofield; the 16th Ohio Battery, Lieut. Murdock, and Capt. Dillon's Wisconsin Battery in the crisis of the battle. Also this of the brigade commanders: My brigades could not have been managed with more consummate skill then they were by Brigadier General McGinnis and Col. James R. Slack. Their services deserve the highest reward that a soldier can claim. " =•" ■' The division lost in killed and wounded fifty-fonr ofllcers, twenty-nine in the 1st Brigade, twenty-five in the 2d. The effective force of the division was 4,180; the losses 211 killed, 872 wounded, 119 miss- ing; total 1,202, in less than four hours. Logan's report, while not giving a list of regiments and officers, gives the same honor to the men of the ranksand their line officers. The loss of his division was 374 killed and wounded, thirty-nine missing; in Crocker's (Quinby's) division 662 killed and wounded. The aggregate loss in this assault of the ridge was 2,262. Badeau says: The losses were thus heavy frorn the nature of the ground. Grant was compelled to mass his men in order to charge, and in the ascent of the hill the fire from the rebel infantry into the serried ranks of the assailants was murderous. Inasmuch as this was the great battle which redeemed Grant's raid, and turned it into a campaign which raised his military fame to its zenith, and as such a battle should be an example for teaching the art of war, it is proper to examine the inquiry why Grant, with more than double the enemy's force, sacrificed 2,262 soldiers in a.ssaulting an al- most impregnable point, which had roads and an open country running around it, and from which the enemy wanted only to get away. CHAPTER XXXVL judgment on the battle of champion's hill, AS established by the matured conclusions SET forth by gen. GRANT AND HIS AUTHORIZED biographer. The battle of Champion's Hill was the first battle which Gen. Grant had commanded in person from its beginning, having all the or- dering of the army, and the choice of time and place, since his battle of Belmont. It — 92 gives, the measure of progress of two years of the work of the practical education of a Com- manding General. The circumstances, conditions, and ideas of this battle are so well revealed by Apam Baiif:au's narrative, that a simple summing np of these constitutes a complete judgment on the generalship. By taking this the re- viewer can avoid all disputing criticism, and can let the whole question rest on the author- ity of the Commanding General and his au- thorized biographer. Their history sets forth the following facts and conclusions: 1. Gen. Grant, up to the morning of the 16th, was ignorant that Pemberton's army had cros.sed the Big Black River, while in fact it had advanced to Edward's Station on the 13th; therefore all his railroad destroying and other diffusive operations were in the be- lief that Pemberton was west of Big Black River, keeping guard over Vicksburg. 2. Gen. Grant, at 5 o'clock in the morning of the 16th, was surprised by the intelligence from two railroad laborers that Pemberton, with a force which these wonderfully in- formed persons estimated at 25,000, was at Edward's Station and advancing, with the "design to attack his rear," around his left. 3. Gen. Grant was greatly alarmed by this intelligence, as was shown by the alarming orders he issued to Sherman, McPherson, Mc- Clernand, Blair, and Ransom. 4. Gen. Grant's order and conduct of the battle, after he had come to the front, was upon hi.s idea that Pemberton's main force was moving southeast into his rear, while in fact Pemberton was trj'ing to retreat to the north. In this persistent delusion Grant ordered the battle to be defensive, with ex- treme caution, on the center and left, em- bracing, Badeau says. 15,000 men, and he ordered the assault on the head of Cham- pion's Hill as a co-operation in the defense of his extreme left and rear. 5. Through open fields around the head of Champion's Hill was a clear way to a road in the rear of the ridge, which was the road of retreat from the hill, which, had Grant known, he need not have assaulted the hill, but could have "thus secured the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army." 6. Gen. Grant, having reached the front about 10 a. m., stillholdingtohisdelusion that Pemberton's main force was on the offensive to his (Grant's) left and rear, sent orders to McClernand to make his dispositions accord- ingly, and then he, without reconnoitering the open country around the north end of the ridge, in ignorance that it could easily be turned, without waiting for Sherman's corps, without waiting even till all of McPherson's had come up, ordered Hovey's division, sup- ported by Logan's, to assault the most diffi- cult point of the ridge. These conclusions are all set forth by Gen. Grant's authorized biographer, and are con- firmed by Gen. Grant's revision. The con- clusions of Gen. Grant and of his inspired biographer leave no room for dispute. They establish the judgment that the assault on Champion's Hill was unnecessary; that with- out any necessity of tne situation save the fancied one of Gen. Grant's delusion as to the enemy's movement, he sent the right wing of the army massed to an assault which must inevitably be to a great slaughter, and made a needless sacrifice of 2,262 brave volunteers, and a waste of the heroism of all, in conse- quence of a false conception of the situation, which was exactly the reverse of the true. A striking example is given of the stuff of which military heroes are made, when all the glory of the heroism of 15,000 soldiers, sent to the slaughter, and of 2,262 volunteers slain or mutilated, is placed upon the head of the Commanding General whose strange mistake ordered this needless sacrifice. To this point the reviewer, and the conclusions of the hero and his biographer travel together, and thus the unpleasantness of disputing judgment is avoided. But it must be remarked that this mistake as to the enemy's design does not give any rational meaning to the assault on the ridgi\ If the enemy had been on the offensive, as Gen. Grant thought, advancing upon his left to get to his rear, the consuming of liis right wing in assaulting the natural fortress of the north end of the ridge would be the most effective co-operation whic:h Grant could give to the enemy's purpose. If they had actually been flanking his left, he, being, as Badeai? represents, free from all incumbrance of a base or of communications, was in complete condition to turn their left liy the open coun- try around the head of the ridgp, called Cham- 93 — pion's Hill. What he did would appear to be a co-operation with tlie enemy's purpose to turn his left, by himself destroying his right. Gen. Grant's apprehension of danger of be- ing taken in the rear was his controlling idea in ordering this action. It was persisted in, al- though when Gen. A. .7. Smith in the morning carae in collision "with the enemy they were falling back. The only explanation given by Badeau is that the two railroad laborers told Grant that Pemberton was moving to attack his rear. He narrates as a great blunder on the part of Pemherton, that he "proposed to fall on the communications of his antagonist, supposing these would be cut at Dillon's;" for he says: "What communications Grant now had were with Jackson, and his face was turned toward Yicksburg, when Pemberton set out to attack his rear at Dillon's;" but in this he forgets his account of the alarming changes which Grant made, and the alarmed orders which he gave, when, as he was hurry- ing all toward Bolton, he was told by the tramps that Pe.mbertox was moving toward Dillon's to attack his rear. Gen. J. E. Johnston makes the same point against Pemberton, calling his movement on Grant's communications absuid in plan, be- cause Grant had cut loose from communica- tions. But it is seen that when Grant heard tliat Pemberton was so moving, it gave him such alarm for the safety of his army as to control all his action, and cause him to sub; ject it to that which Badeau describes as al- most a defeat, and which did make a terrible sacrifice. Reflection will show tliat there was a more positive cause for this alarm than the word of the accidental railroad laborers, in Grant's situation, and in that state of the mind which is embraced by the military term morale. The^alarm was iiievitable from the nature of the raid, whicli had abandoned the base of su})plies and tlie line of retreat, and had trusted to getting back by avoiding any serious battle, when surprised by the fact that tiie- army wbicli it had avoided was advanc- ing to cut off its return. To be cut off was destruction. Even a di'uvvn Ijuttle would be danger of surrender. Bafjeau, in describing the plan, said it risked tlie loss of the whole army. No other reason can be given for (trant's marching away from both his base and from Pemberton's army, than that he did not feel able to attack it; and now, when far away from his base, he heard that that army was advancing across the line of his re- turn. If he thought, when on his base, he had reason for moving away from that army, how much greater reason had he for alarm when he thought that army was advancing to attack him by a line upon which defeat would make sure the destruction of his army. The situa- tion was enough to account for the loss of a self-possession which was not at any time founded upon an intelligent comprehension of the whole situation, but was rather from a slow apprehension. The shock must necessa- rily be very great when Grant, with his mind bent on concentration to the north to pursue Johnston, thinking Pemberton west of Big Black Pdver, suddenly heard that Pem- berton's whole army had crossed the Big Black, had reached Edward's Station, and was still advancing upon a line to cut off his return. Gen. Grant's order to McClernand, dated at 12:35 p. m., shows that the part which he was ordering Hovey and McPherson to take was to co-operate with McClernand in re- pelling Pe.mberton's imagined movement to Grant's left and rear. This is all the reason given for the Champion's Hill slaughter. In the same description he says: "To the north the timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope toward Baker's Creek, almost a mile away." This creek fetched a circuit and ran west of the hill to the south. He says further, the road which ran up the hill "turned almost to the west again, running down the hill and across the valley," and that when Grant recalled Logan he had "swept directly across the road, and absolute- ly cut off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's Station." He says further that if the opportunity of- fered by this road had been known to Grant, and embraced, he could have "thus secured the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army." The only excuse which he gives is this: "But the entire region was new to the national troops, and this great oppor- tunity unknown." Thus, while the glory and reward of the victories of the national troops centered on Grant's head, the responsi- bility for his ignorance of the situation, which sent them to butchery, is diffused over "the national troops." — 94 Troops under command have no means to acquire knowledge of the region they are op- erating in ; that is the part of the Command- ing General. He must he eyes and brains to the army. If he understands even the rudi- ments of his profession, he has an organization that acquires knowledge of the country which is the field of operations. The most ele- mentary teachings of the art of war are that a reconnaissance to ascertain the enemy's situ- ation, and the best line for operations, should precede an attack. It is the more vital when the enemy is found in a position which ap- pears at the first glance to be naturally very strong. The enemy was waiting in front of Grakt on an eminence that stood up above the sur- rounding country, and around which was an open country to a road at the rear, which was their way of retreat. Gkant could choose and did choose his time to attack. He acted as if he had ail the knowledge of the situation that he wanted. Badeau's account shows that if any sort of reconnaissance for infor- mation had been made it would have found that the hill could be easily turned. Conse- quently he shows that Gen. Grant neglected the simplest rudiments of the part of a Com- manding General when he sent this army of heroes to the unnecessary slaughter. As it it were fated by Gen. Grant's pro- verbial luck that he should leave nothing un- done that the mistakes of a Commanding General could do to destroy his army. Badeau relates that Grant, in the very crisis of the battle on the ridge, sent an order re- calling Logan from the right, where he had advanced across the enemy's road of retreat, to fetch him around to add to Hovey's left — an order which, if carried out, would have left the battle to be begun anew, under the influence of a repulse all along the line. By this omission of the simplest duties of a General, Gen. Grant not only made this sac- rifice of his own soldiers, but he permitted the bulk of Pemberton's army to escape, to subject the volunteers to the consuming work of a siege, and the further repeated slaughter of assaulting the recuperated ene- my in fortifications. Such was the costly course of the practical education of a General. But while thus costly to his soldiers, it had the remarkable fortune to him that his hon- ors were increased in proportion to tiie un- necessary sacrifice of his heroic men. CHAPTER XXXVII. the losses and gains of the battle — tactics of the pursuit — giving the enemy free passage to vicksburg — heroic charge of the volunteers at big black bridge. Among the other brilliancies of general- ship of the battle of Champion's Hill, Badeau states this: Only the celerity of the movements which have been described prevented the jmiction of the rebel armies; for as has been seen, Pemberton was actu- ally moving to join Johnston when Grant came up and attacked liim. And the way that Grant's celerity came to prevent it, was that he thought Pemberton was moving southeast to his rear, in an oppo- site direction from Johnston. Gen. Pemberton's report says: Had the movement in support of my left been promptly made when first ordered, it is not improb- able that I might liave maintained my position, and it is possible that the enemy might have been driven back, though his vastly superior and con- stantly increasing numbers would have rendered it necessary to withdraw during the night to save my communicatibn with Vicksburg. This confirms the judgment summed up from Badeau's statements — namely, that the assault was an unnecessary sacrifice, and that Pemberton's army might then and there have been captured, and all the consuming of men by the siege have l)een saved. Gen. Pemberton's re])ort states that Steven- son and BowEN had both told him they could not hold their positions, and "large num- bers of men were abandoning the field on Stevenson's left" before he ordered the re- treat, which was to the Raymond road, over Baker's Creek; and that "although a large number of men had sh'atnefuUy abandoned their commands, and were making tlieir way to the rear, the main body of the troops re- tired in good order." His report states his loss as 1,429 killed and wounded, 2,195 missing. Badeau, with a pen more deadly than musketry, says "the enemy's loss was estimated at between 3,000 and 4,000 in killed and wounded." In the enemy's advantage of position their loss shows the stubborn character of the fighting. HovEY reported 300 prisoners taken under fire, and 400 after the battle, and eleven guns under fire; Logan, eleven guns under — 95 — fire and 1,300 prisoners. Hovey's Division, and one brigade of McPherson's corps, remained on the place, which the soldiers christened "The Hill of Deatli," to care for the dead and wounded, and were none too many for that dreadful duty; the rest started in tlie pursuit, but were too tired to go far that night. McCleknand's other divisions came to the front in the pursuit, but the retreating army, as was always the case, was able to go as fast as the pursuing. At the crossing of Baker's Creek, Loring chose to part company with the rest of Pembeeton's army without a for- mal farewell. He made a detour to the south- west, and after much straggling reported at Jackson with 5,778 men. Gen. Stevenson says he arrived about sunset at tlie ford on Baker's Creek, and found there Bowen's di- vision, and they held the ford, although the enemy was crossing further up the creek, waiting for Loring to come; but not only did become not, but .one of his brigades, which was near, moved of. He abandoned twelve guns. Bowen and Stevenson resumed their re- treat, crossing the railroad bridge (now planked) at Big Black after midnight. Pem- BERTON says '"the entire train of the army was crossed without loss." Badeau, as usual, says "the rout of the rebels was complete." The divisions of Carr and Osterhaus reached Edward's Station about 8 p. m., and at 3:30 in the morning of the 17th resumed the pur- suit. In six miles they came upon 4,000 Con- federates strongly posted at the east end of the bridge over Big Black River. The posi- tion was strongly intrenched. Pemberton says the object in holding it was to enable the still looked for Loring to cross. The river at this place makes a bend like a horseshoe, the open part to tlie east. Across this open part ran a bayou, which formed a natural ditch to the rifle parapet a mile long. Trees and brush growing in the bed of the bayou had been felled to obstruct the way. It was defended by eighteen guns and 4,000 men, as many as could be used at the parapet. Along the front were cleared fields from 400 to 600 yards in width, across which open and level space an assaulting column would have to move. Carr's division, with Lawler's brigade ou its right, invested tiie place on the right, O.STERHAUS' division on the left. Gen. Smith's division came up and joined the left. They found it a difficult jjlace. Osterhaus was wounded early, and had to transfer the command to Gen. A. E. Lee. Gen. Sherman had left Jackson on the 16th, marching twenty miles to Bolton that day and night, and starting again at 4:30 next morning for Bridgeport, two and a half miles north of Edward's Station. Blair, after the battle of Champion's Hill, had been ordered to join him by way of Edward's Station. Says Badeau: "This arrangement brought Sher- man's whole corps together at the most favor- able position for crossing the Big Black River, and turning the enemy's left flank." But Gen. Grant seems not to have thought of any movement for turning the enemy, so long as they held a fortified place to be assaulted; or of cutting off their retreat to Vicksburg; for his tactical aim seemed to be to give them a free passage into Vicksburg. Pemberton says: "So strong was the posi- tion that my greatest, almost only, apprehen- sion was a flank movement by Bridgeport or Baldwin's Perry, which would have endan- gered my communications with Vicksburg." Further along he says: "The enemy by flank movement on my left by Bridgeport, or on my right by Baldwin's or other ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost simultaneously with myself, or perhaps interpose a heavy force be- tween me and tliat city." Thus did he show what an opportunity was opened to Grant by Pemberton's attempting to hold a position on the Big Black. Badeau quotes this as evidence that "the rapidity and strangeness of Grant's maneu- vers had evidently affected the imagination of his antagonist," as if, after Pemberton had witnessed Grant's assault on Champion's Hill, his imagination must be affected in- deed if he thought that Grant would under- take any flanking or cutting off movement, so long as in his front there was a fortification for assault. Thus were the troops of Care's and Osterhaus' divisions left to attack this strong fortification. There was no lack of alacrity on their j)art. A brisk interchange of artillery and mus- Ketry was kept up during most of the fore- noon, with but little change of the situation- save that Gen. Lawler, on the right, had moved these regiments and a battery inte a copse of underwood north of the ra'ilroad, about 300 yards in front of the parapet, ex- tending from tlie road to the river. At length it became evident that other tactics must be — &6 — used, and an assault was resolved on. As this was made by Lawyer's bi-igade, the account is taken from his report. The heroic character of this charge, and its exhibition of the quali- ties of the volunteers and of volunteer officers calls for a more particular and iust narration than Badeau gives: Durine; the greater part of the forenoon a heavy but ineffectual musketry tiring was kept up by the enemy upon my men, briskly responaed to by our sharpshooters. Late in the forenoon, finding it Im- possible to press fuither forward along the river bank toward the enemy, as I had intended, Col. Kinsman, 23d Iowa Volunteers, proposed to charge at once the enemy's works, and drive them out at the point of the bayonet, and asked my consent to the same. Foreseeing that a charge by a single regiment, unsustained by the whole line, against fortifications as formidable as those in his front could hardly be successful, ■■' '■■ '■■ -i determined that there should be a simultaneous movement on the part of my whole command. Accordingly, the 2lst Iowa Volunteers, Col. Mer- rill, was ordered to charge with the 23d, the 11th Wis- consin Volunteers following close upon them as a support, and the22d Iowa, Col. William M. Stone— which had in the meantime cros.sed the field and taken position on the river bank on the right of the 11th Wisconsin— was ordered to move out into the field and act as a reserve force. Two guns of the Peoria Battery, and one 20 pounder Parrott, be- longing to the 1st Wisconsin Battery, were in po- sition in the field actively at work upon the enemy and doing good service. In addition orders had been sent to the 49th and 69th Indiana Volunteers— two regiments which had been sent from Osterhaus' division to my support early in the forenoon — to send forward at once two companies of skirmishers to attract the attention of the enemy from the movement on the right, and as soon as the charge should be commenced, to move pron^.ptly forward to its support. Orders were fur- ther given that the men should reserve their fire until upon the rebel works. Finally the regiments that were to leaa the charge were formea, with bayonets fixed, in the edge of the woods on the river bank. All things being in readiness, the command for- ward was given by Col. Kinsman, and at once his noble regiment sprang forward to the works. The 21st, led on by Col. Merrill, moved at the same in- stant, the llth Wisconsin closely following. Through a terrible fire of musketry from the enemy in front and a galling fire from his sharpshooters on the right these men dashed bravely on. Kinsman fell dangerously wounded before half the distance was accomplished. Struggling to his teet he staggered a lew paces to the front, cheered his men forward, and fell again, ihis time to rise uo more, pierced through by a second ball. Col. Merrill, the brave commander of the 21st Iowa, fell wounded early in the charge, while gal- lantly leading his regiment against the enemy. Im- mediately Lieut. Col. Glasgow placed himself at the head of the 23d, and Maj. Van Anda led on the 21st. Undismayed by the loss of their Colonels * ■' * the men of the 23d and 21st Iowa, and the 1th Wisconsin Vohmteers pressed onward nearer and nearer to the rebel works, over the open field, 500 yards, under a wasting fire, and up to the edge of the bayou. Halting there only long enough to pour into the enemy a deadly volley, they dashed forward through the bayou filled with water, fallen timber and brush, on to the rebel works with the shout of victors, driving the enemy in with con- fusion irom their breastworks and riflepits, and entering in triumph the rebel strongliold. Hurrying forward the 49th and C9th Indiana and 22d Iowa Volunteers, I sent the two Indiana regi- ments to the support of my left, and ordered the Iowa regiment to move against the extreme left of the enemy's works, where they, several hundred strong, still held out, while the llth Wisconsin Vol- unteers was directed to occupy the ground between the enemy and the bridge, and thus cut off their retreat. The movement was successful. The rebels broke and fled before the 22d Iowa, and fell an easy prey to the llth Wisconsin Volunteers. Those of the rebels who were lot captured hastened to make good their retreat over the bridge. As the result of this successful charge we may with justice claim that it gave our army entire po.s- session of the enemy's extended line of works, and with them their field artillery, eighteen pieces iu ell; a large quantity of ammunition, thousands of small arms, and 3,000 prisoners. * •" * But this brilliant success was not accomplished without considerable loss; fourteen killed, and 185 wounded in the space of three minutes, the time occupied in reaching the enemy's works, attest the severity of the fire to which my men were subjected. The total loss in this battle was twenty-nine killed, 242 wounded. Gen. Lawler niakes special mention of regi- mental and company officers, and closes with this handsome tribute to the men of the ranks: Finally I can not close my report without ex- pressing my admiration for the brave men of the ranks, to whose steadiness and determinea courage is in a great measure due the glory of the brilliant and decisive victory of Big Black River Bridge. To them I return my warmest thanks. Lest this affair should reflect any credit on the general commander, McClernand, Badeau minutely remarks: "Lawler had re- ceived no orders to make his gallant charge. He and his men deserve all the credit of its success." Grant was too far away to ap- propriate it. Tlie charge routed the Confederates. Pem- ^97 BKRTo.N saj^s "it soon became a matter of sauve qui peut." There was, besides the railroad bridge, which the enemy set on fire, a bridge made of a dismantled steamboat turned athwart the stream.^ Many of the fugitives were unable to gain either bridge, and rushed into the river, in which some were drowned. Many surrendered; This was the last stand made, and the unlucky Pemberton and his troops, now pretty thoroughly "demoralized," wended tl^eir way, with much straggling, but unmolested, to Vicksburg. CHAPTER XXXVIII. PKMBERTON RETREATS INTO VICKSBURG — DE- MORALIZATION OF HIS TROOPS— SHERMAN'S FRESH CORPS ARRIVES IN FRONT OF VICKSBURG NEXT MORNING — SHERMAN HALTS — THE OB- JECTIVE A SIEGE — GRANT AND BONAPARTE — THE STRONGHOLD OF VICKSBURG. Gen. Pemberton's report states that after the rout at the battle of Big Black River Bridge the condition of his army was sucli, besides tbe liability to be .flanked and cut off from Vicksburg, that nothing remained but to retire tlie army within the defenses of Vicksburg, *'to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops." The retreat was not harassed. Mc- Pherson and McClernand were detained building bridges. Sherman had reached Bridgeport by noun of the 17th, where Blair had already arrived. Blair had the only pontoons, and was laying tliem. Two divis- ions passed over that night. Pemberton's forces readied Vicksburg on the night of the 17th. Badeau gives a de- scription of their condition, referring to "a rebel narrative of the siege by H. S. Abrams:" Late on a Sunday night tli£ main body of the vanquished forces began pourinz into the town. Neither order nor discipline luid been maintained onthenuirch: tlie man were scailered for miles nlong the road, declarinK their rt-adiness to desert rather than ^erve a^ain under Pemberton. Tlie planters and populalion of the country, fleeing from the presence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and the contusion; and the inhab- itants of the city awoke in terror to find their streets thronged with fugitives — one vast uproarious mass, in which, with shrinking citizens and timid women and children, were mingled the remnants of Pem- berton's dismayed and disorganized army. .\nd these were the troops that were now the reliance of Vicksburg. According to Pemberton's report this pic- ture is much overdrawn, bat it gives Grant's idea of the conditioii of the forces when thoy reached Vicksburg. Upon the heels of this demoralized army came Gen. Sherman with a fresh corps that Had not been in any of the fighting: Starting at break of day on the 18th, Sherman pushed rapidly on, and by half past 9 o'clock the head of his column had struck the Benton road, three and a half miles from Viclcsbnrg. He thus commanded the Yazoo River, interposing a superi- or force between the rebels in the town and their forts on the Yazoo. His advance now rested un- til the whole command should close up. The Confederates had already abandoned the batteries on the Yazoo bluiTs. Here came off this interesting scene: Grant was with Sherman wheu his Column struck the Walnut Hills. As they rode together up the the furthest height, where it looks down on the Yazoo River, and stood upon the very bluffs from which Sherman had been repulsed six uionths be- fore, the two soldiers gazed for a moment on the long wislied for goal of the campaign -the high; dry ground on the north of Vicksburg, and the base of their supplies. Sherman at last turned abruptly round and exclaimed to Grant: "Until this mo- ment I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end rleariy until now. But this is a campaign : this is a success, if we never take tlie town." "This is a campaign!" A stroke of that which seemed alarming adverse fortune liad lifted the expedition from a raid away from the enemy to a campaign upon tlie enemy; and now it was a campaign, even if tliey never took the town, but merelj'^ reached the supplies. Badeau is magnanimously com- miserating to Sherman, as a zealous subordi- nate, but as aiwaj's apprehensive, and as needing Grant's directing mind and confi- dence. He excuses Sherman by the plea that he "had seen the dangers of this venturesome campaign so vividly that his vision was dimmed for beholding success." In a foot note, page 282, he furtlier pleads that "Sher- man had not been present at any of the vic- tories of this campaign except Jackson [where lie said Sherman did none of the fighting], he therefore had not felt that splen- did confidence svhicli only those who engage in successful battle know." On no rule of Gen. Grant's tactics did he place so niucii stress as that, wlieii the enemy 98 were beaten and retreating, Was the time to throw in the utmost energy, to pursue and destroy them. He complained bitterly of RosECRAKS for that, after his hard fought re- pulse of Van Dorn at Corinth he did not desti-oy him in the pursuit. He told Halleck and Stanton to hold on and not promote Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, after tlie battle of Nash- ville, until he saw whether Thomas was ener- getic in the pursuit. Badeau reflects on Thomas for not in person following the pur- suit from Mission Eidge. Where the line of retreat is open, the re- treating army can march faster than the pur- suing, and in such a country as ours, where pursuit is confined to roads, in most cases through woods, a small rear guard can ob- struct the pursuing army. Nothing ever came of these pursuits that compensated for the fatigue and loss of soldiers, already ex- hausted by the battle and its preceding labors and nervous strain. Grant's pursuit had not harassed Pemberton's troops. But liei-e the "remnants of Pemberton's dismayed and dis- organized army" had retreated into a town where thej'' could retreat no further; and here was a corps of fresh soldiers, and Grant and Sherman "in person." Now, if ever, would seem to be the time to push into Vicksburg, while the troops were dismayed and disorganized, and the whole town was in a panic. But at this crisis these great Generals indulged in a mutual admira- tion scene, and pronounced this a real cam- paign, even if they never took the town. And so this corps waited all the rest of the day, while the disorganized and dismayed Con- federates were recovering their organization, courage, and confidence, and were strengthen- ing their intrenchments and placing their guns. At this point Gen. Grant's biographer, as if the campaign had gloriously terminated in getting the Confederate army into a place whose fortifications quadrupled its force, and restored its morale, pauses in the history to sound a pean to the brilliancy of the strategy, and the splendor of the results, and to com- pare this with two of Bonaparte's brightest campaigns, rather to Bonaparte's disparage- ment. In a foot note he remarks how the history of Bonaparte was repeating itself in Grant. In the text he notes that the repeat- ing was with several improvements, original to Grant: The following extracts from Napoleon's procla- mation to his soldiers after his first great Italian campaign illustrates how curiously history repeats itself: "Soldiers! in a fortnight you have gainea six victories, taken tw*nty-one pairs of colors, fifty- five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and con- quered the richest part of Piedmont; you nave made 15,000 prisoners, and killed or wounded more than 10,000 men. " '- » Destitute of everything, you have supplied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, biv- ouacked without brandy, and often without bread. The republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have endured. >:-• .:= >:•. The two armies wliich so lately attacked you boldly are fleeing affrighted before you; the perverse men who laughed at your distress, and re- joiced in thought at the triumphs of your euemiea, are confounded and trembling." Badeau says that in this operation Grant "separated forces twice as numerous as his own," thus proving that in the hands of the truly great the pen is mightier than the sword. Not content with showing that Grant's strat- egy was unparalleled, he goes on to make out that the "rebel movements" were so blunder- ing that no skill in strategy or tactics was needed by tlie national commander to beat them. He repeats his tale of Grant's great strata- gem in deceiving ' Pembkrton at Edward's Station on the 10th, by turning away toward Raymond, forgetting that he has told that Pemberton did not move to Edward's Station till the 13th, and that Grant was surprised by intelligence of it on the 16th. But this strange operation of going away from the enemy and from his supplies upon a raid, and all the hardships of the forced marching, with short rations, a distance which Badeau makes out to be 175 miles, all the fighting in the unmeaning operations at Raymond and Jackson, and the unnecessary sacrifice at Champion's Hill, had restilted in giving the enemy an impregnable place to protract the resistance, and to subject our troops to the dreadful laburs of a siege in the hot season in that unhealthy region, and to further sacrifice by vain assaults, ordered upon the calculation that volunteers were cheap, and that generalship was enhanced by their lavish consumption. The time l)ad not; yet come for glorification of the generalship. The general mind has no conception of the severity of the labors imposed on a besieging army, and of the incessant dangers of a serv- 99 ice which has none of the inspiration or hon- ors of a battle. The siege of Vicksburg was against an intrenched line of eight miles, along ridges fronted by ravines with steep de- clivities. The besieging line of intrench- ments was ten miles. Justice to the troops engaged in this siege, and largely consumed in it, requires a description of the ground, which will give an idea of the difficulties to wliich Grant had brought his army, as if this was a triumph of strategy. Badeau takes it from the report of the engineers: The Kround upon which Vicksburg stands is sud- posed by some to have been originally a plateau, four or five miles long and about two miles wide, and 200 or 300 feet above the Mississippi River. This plateau has been gradually washed away by rains and streams, until it is transformed intoa labyrinth of sharp ridge-! and deep irregular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut vertically by the action of the water, remains in a perpendicular position for years, and the smaller and newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is difficuU to a foot- man. The sid( s of the declivities are thickly wooded, and the bottoms of the ravines never level, except when the streams that formed them have been unusually large. At Vicksburg the Mississippi runs a little west of south, and all the streams that enter it from the east rnn southwest. One of these empties into the river five miles below the city, and the dividing ridce that pentir-ites two of its branches was that in whicli the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. On the northern side of the town the- line also ran along a dividing ridcre between two small streams that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg; these ridges are generally higher than any ground in their immediate vicinity. Leaving the Mississippi on the 'northern side of Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the river, the line stretched back two miles into the interior. crossed the valleys of two small streams, and reached the river again below at a point where the bluff falls bade from the Mississippi nearly a mile. Tlere the works followed the bluff up the riA'er for a mile Or more, so as to give fire toward the south on any troops that might attempt an attack from that diicction by moving along the bottom land be- tween the bluff and the Mississippi. The whole line was between seven and eight miles. =■' ■■' « It consisted of a series of detached works on prominent and commanding point.-i, con- necttd by a eontinuous line of trencli or rifle pit. * * '■• They were pl.-iced at distances Of frorn sev- enty-five to 600 yards from each other. * '■' '" The ravines were the only ditches, but'no others were needed, trees being felled in front of the whole line, and forming, in many places, entanglements which, under fire, wore absohitely impassable. * * * The difficuU nature of the ground * * * rendered rapidity of movement and unity of effort in an assault impossible. North of the railroad the hills are higher, the wood denser, and the line iiaturally stronger, but south of that road, although the ridges were lower and the country cleared, "the ground was still rough and entirely un- fitted tor any united tactical movement," and the artificial works were stronger. The whole aspect of the rugged fastness, bristling with bayonets, and crowned with artillery that swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was calculated to inspire new courage in those who came •■' =■" * from their succession of disasters in the open field. Here, too, were at least 8,000 fresh, troops who, as yet, had suffered none of the demor- alization of defeat. Yet, to have maneuvered Pemberton's demoralized troops into this impregnable place, and into this re-enforcement of near 8,000 men, is to Badeau a great achievement of Grant's generalship, setting him above Bonaparte. For this had he marched away from the enemy, when a march fifteen miles to the front would have restored him to his base of supplies, and have forced Pemberton to join issue with him in the open field. And this issue the volunteers of Grant's army would have met with alacrity and entire con- fidence. CHAPTER XXXIX. THE FIRST ASSAULT — THE REPULSE — THE ART OF STORMING INTRENCHMENTS. Gen. Grant, on the 19th, ordered a general assault on the works of Vicksburg. Reordered the corps commanders to "push forward care- fully and gain positions as close as possible to the enemy's works, until 2 o'clock p. m.: at that hour they will fire three volleys of artil- lery from all the pieces in position. This will be the signal for a general charge along the whole line." This method of assaulting forti- fications has the merit of giving due notice to the defenders, and of taking no advantage of them by unexpected movement. An interval of thirty-six hours behind strong works, spent in restoring discipline, placing guns and strengthening works, may radically change the condition and spirit of a beaten army That which Badeatt describes as a horde of stragglers as they poured into 100 — Vic'ksburg at niidnif^ht of the 17th was in a very different condition when Grant, with Sherman's corps, had paused in the vicinity of the worlvs from the morning of tlie 18th till the afternoon of the 19th. Baueau says: "When Sherman's troops rushed up, thinking to march easily into Vicksburg, they found not only the ramparts were difficult, but the de- fenders had got new spirit, and were once more the men wlio liad fought at Donelson, and Shiloh. and at Chami)ion's Hill." Badeau deems necessary to find excuses for the assault, and to claim that, although it was repulsed, it got compensation for the sac- rifice of men in the gain of knowledge of the situation. He says: "The troops were buoy- ant with success and eager for an assault, and their commander believed himself justified in an attempt to carry the works by storm." The troops were as buoyant and eager on the morning of the ISth, when it may reasonably be supposed that Pemberton's troops had not recovered from such a state of dismay and disorganization as Badeau describes; and the eagerjiess of troops to assault neither excuses the loss of the favorable time by the Com- manding General nor relieves him from the responsibility of ordering it without intelli- gence. Badeau pleads furtlier that Gen. Grant thought the enemy completely demoralized. From this it appears that he was unconscious tJiat the morale of troops may be quickly re- stored by the protection of strong fortifica- tions, before whicla a following army hesi- tates. Also that "he underestimated Pember- ton's numbers, supposing them to be about 12.000 or 15,000 effective men." If so, he baited Sherman's fresh corps, which must have been as much as 12,000, before about an equal number of beaten troops. But Grant estimatetl Pemberton's ntimber when it was advancing on him at 25,000, and he would liardly reckon that Pemberton had left Vicksburg without a garrison. The compensating gains in knowledge by the assault were these: Butalthou;;b unsuccessful, the operations ot this day were important to Grant. The nature of the fciiemy's works and their approaches, the character of tlie ground, and the unusual obstacles by which It was eucuinbered, together with the policy of the defense, all bficame known; while the national lines were advanced, positions for artillery selected, and the relations of the various parts of the aruiy were fully established and nnderhtood. It wa.s clearly seen, from the knowledge thus obtained, that to carry the works of Vicksliur^: by storm was a more serious uiidertaRing than had been at first supposed. So much progress gained in the work of the practical education of a Commanding Gen- eral, at a cost of only some 600 or 1,000 volun- teers, seems beggarly cheap. By sending a line of brave men upon a line of intrench- ments. to be shot down under conditions where they could not get tnore men into the assaulting jinp than the enemy had behind the works to oppose them. Gen. Grant had acquired that knowledge of the situation which a previous reconnaissance could have found. He had also learned "the policy of the defense," and that it was to defend. He had also learned by this cheap lesson "that to carry the works of Vicksburg by storm was a more serious tmdertaking than had been at first supposed." Further along will appear that tlie same lesson in the same conditions had to be repeated at a larger cost of volunteers. Badeau describes the conditions and the assault- There was slight skirmishing on various parts of the line from early morning, and everywhere the troops were deployed and put into position. * '■■' * At the appointed hour Blair advanced in line, but the ground on both sides of the road was so im- practicable, cut up in deep chasms, and filled with standing and fallen timber, thai it was impossible for the assaulting parties to reach the trenches in anything like an organized conditon. The IStli United Slates Infantry was the first to strike the works, and plan led its colors on the ex- terior slope; its commander, Capt. \\ashinston, was mortally wounded, and seventy-seven men out of 250 were either killed or wounded. Two volunteer regiment.s reached the same position nearly as soon, and held their ground, tiring unon every head that presented itself above the parapet, but failed to effect a lodgment or even penetrate the line. Other troops also gained positions on the right and left, close to the parapet, but got no further than the counterscarp (the outer slope of ihe bank). Steele's division, on Sherman's extreme right, was not close enough to attack the main line, but carried a num- ber of outworks, and captured a few prisoners. Thus was begun atid ended the assault. Parts of the line clung for some time to the outer slope of the parapet, in a mere murder- ous exchange, with no other possible result. or fell back to rear cover, keeping up a scat- tering fire until night covered their with- — 101 — drawal. The nature of tlie ground was such that it was impossible to bring troops upon the works in any solid formation. There could be no massing of a column for assault, nor for its support. In the least difficult places it was an assault in line, and in most a much broken line, and this against a line of at least equal number, covered by intrench- ments. All the conditions which make an assault of works possible were absent; ali that make it imiiossible were conspicuously present, and could be as well known before as after the assault. The assault was to be general, but McPher- sok's corps did not arrive in front of Vicks- burgtill after nightfall of the 18th, and it had to move forward and find positions along the ravines and ridges on the 19th. Badeau says of tliis corps: The roughne.«s of the country prevented any de- cided advance, except by Ransom's brigade, wliich made a brief but unsuccessful aUeinpt to carry llie works in its front. MeCler;iand, having more ground to march over than either of the others, was still at early dawn four miles from Vicksburg: but liis troops were deployed at, once, batteries were put in position, and opened on the rebel line, and by 2 o'clock the whole corps was advanced us close to the enemy's works as the irreiiular ground woula allow. Thus doth it appear that Gen. Grant or- dered a general assault of the Vicksburg forti- fications wlien only one of his three corps had got near enough to reconnoiter them; when McPherson's corps had yet to approach and explore for positions in very difficult ground, and when the other corps was four miles away. Meanwhile Gen. Grant was giving the enemy due warning by his demonstra- tions for half a day of what was coming. Badeau states the result with innocent un- consciousness of its obvious reflection: The extreme steepness of the acclivities, the strength of the works, and the vigorous resistance everywhere made, all rendered necessfiry to move with circumspection ; so l hat without anyfaul t or hes- itation on tlie part of eiilier troops or commanders, nli;ht had overtaken the national forces before tliey were really in a condition lo obey the order of firant, except at the i.oinl wOt-re Shereman had reached the works, but failed lo make any serious impression. Such is the power which a Commanding General possesses over the lives of his soldiers! Such tiie supremacy which military organiza- tion gives to the mind of one man, over the better minds of hundreds of other officers! Adam Badeau's account is sufficient to show that the assault was ordered in a situation which made it certain to be a vain slatighter. And Adam Badeau's account is approved by Gen. Grant. The part of McCuernand's Corps, however, was not so insignificant as Badeau represents. McClernand's report states that his command was in readiness at 4 a. m., and by 6.30 had reached a long hill, between which and the enemy's line of works was a creek and a series of deep hollows, and many ridges run- ning out from the enemy's works to the nar- row valley of the creek. From this hill he opened artillery fire, engaged the Confederate skirmishers, and moved forward across the creek to the hills on the other side. "By 2 o'clock, with great difficulty my line had gained half a mile, and was within 800 yards of the enemy's works. The grotmd in front was une.x- plored, and commanded by the enemy's works, yet at the appointed signal my infantry went forward under such cover as my artillery could oflfer, and bravely continued a wasting conflict until they had approached within 5U0 yards of the enemy's lines, and exiiaustion and lateness of the evening intermit- ted it. An advance had been made by all the corps, and the ground gained firmly held, but the enemy's works were not carried. A number of brave officers and men fell, killed or wounded, and among the latter Gen. Lee, who had signalized his brief com- mand witb equal activity, intelligence and gal- lantry." Gen. Grant made no report of this opera- tion at the time. He vaguely mentions it in his general narrative dated .July 6. Badeau simply says: "No report was made to Grant of the losses of this assault. They were esti- mated by him at fewer than 500." Gen. Grant's reports rarely mentioned his losses. He had a munificent spirit in his expenditure of men which did not stoop to such reckon- ing. An affair which demanded that troops should march into certain destruction, and which killed and wounded, according to Grant's belittling estimate, 500 volunteers, seems to have been thought unworthy of any report. Sherman tells very briefly the assault in his report of May 24 to Grant. Gen. Blaik lumps his losses in this with those of the as- sault of May 22. According to Gen. Grant's authorized his- torian, to have found out the several things of the situation, which he itemizes, which in- — 102 — telligent reconnaissance and scouting could have found out as well, and -which it is the business of a Commanding General to find out before ordei'ing an assault, was worth tlie sacrifice of 500 volunteers; wortli all the dis- couragement to the troops whicli is inevitable from an heroic assault repulsed. And with this was the greater discouragement of intelli- gent soldiers and their officers, in the conscious- ness that they had been blindly sent to the massacre by an order to do that which ordinary military sense would have known to be impossible. The art of war is not so poor that it has no means of finding out whether an assault is pr,acticable save by a vain slaughter. The conditions which make an assault of works practicable are well underslood. Nobody ex- pects a line to carry in trench men ts held by an equal line. The Commanding General who orders this, orders a sacriiife of his own men. The rule is accepted that a line of breastworks triples or quadruples the defensive force of the line of soldiers; a higher parapet still more. To make an assault practicable, the assaulting column must be massed so as to overcome by sheer numbers this advantage. It must be so supported that no losses which the defenders can inflict while it is passing over the iiitervenin;; space can reduce it be- low the required preponderance of numbers. It is expected that an assaulting column ■will lose heavily in a short time. It must be so massed and supported that it can stt-nd this loss, and by its impetus can come quickly to a hand to hand issue. And as it pours over the works it must be supported by a larger column to meet any gatiiering resistance. Thus when assaults are ordered on military rules, although a severe loss in the head of the column is inevitable, yet in general the casualties in a successful assault are not great in number. But an assault of strong intrenchments which can be approached only through very difficult ground, which requires- the assault- ing troor>s to file into line, ifnd to assault in line, and even in a much broken line, is a sheer sending of soldiers to the sacrifice, and this is known as well before. as after. This blind assault was the beginning of that course of generalship which sent a veteran, disci- plined, and heroic army against intrench- ments to be slaughtered in one dull succes- sion, without strategit or tactical skill, until the number thus butchered without a single success made the most appalling list that modern war has known, save in the retreat from Moscow. CHAPTER XL. THE SECOND ASSAULT — FURTHER PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION BY THE SLAUGH- TER OF BRAVE VOLUNTEERS — A GRAVE DISPUTE BETWEEN GENERALS. Gen Grant's biographer states that the suf- ficient compensation for the sacrifice of men in the assault of the 19th was the knowledge gained of "the nature of the enemy's works and their approaches, the character of the ground, and the unusual obstacles by which it was encumbered, together with the policy of the defense." Gen. Grant proceeded to improve this acquirement of icnowledge by ordering another assault on the 22d, under the same conditions, save that McPherson's and McClernand's corps got into their posi- tions before it began. During the 20th and 21st the army was getting into places, opening communications between the several corps and with the river for supplies, securing and distributing rations and other necessaries, of which it had become destitute, bringing up means of shelter, which it had not seen since leaving Milliken's Bend in INIarcii, and getting such other supplies as were required by its greatest necessities. The hosi)ital and stores at Grand Gulf were moved up to Warrenton, which was convenient to the base at Milliken's Bend; Warrenton, which Grant could have reached by a day's march from Hankinson's Ferry, was now made the base of supplies for the left wing of the army, and so continued tlirough the siege. Skirmishing was going on with the enemy's outposts during these two days, but without any near approae^h to the fortifications. Vicksburg was not yet invested. The length of its circuit of works is stated by Badkau as eight miles. When invested he says the in- vesting line of wc>rks was twelve miles. The three corps, at the time of the assault of the 22d, had a front of not more than four miles. There was an Of)en space of four miles between McClernard's left and the river below Vicks- burg; also a gap between McPherson's and McClernard's corps. The army was without any covering works. Grant was giving Plm- — lOS — BEKTO!^ the same opportunity that he gave the Confederates at Donelson, when he extended his line around that place, without cover, for two days, exposing it to a sortie by an equal force. Gen. Grant ordered a simultaneous attack to'begin at 10 a. m. Admiral Porter brought down his mortar boats and gunboats and kept up a bombardment and cannonade from noon of the 20th, through the 21st, day and night, till the assault began. It had no perceptible effect on the defenses, bat it drove the citi- zens to dig caves in the hills lor shelter. Skirmishers and artillery began all aloijg the line of the army at an earlj"- hour. Vicksburg was encircled with a storm of fire, but it does not appear to have hurt the fortifications or their defenders. All of the army artillery was of field guns, save six thirty-pounder Parrotts in McClernand's corps. It was not near the works, and, except these Parrott guns, it made no perceptible breach. Badeau gives a })articular account of the attack by Sherman's corps, adopting Sher- man's narrative in his report. He gives this as an example of the rest, and it briefly shows what the soldiers were required to do. Sher- man's main attack was by the Graveyard road, which ran along an inferior ridge across great ravines toward the line of intrenchments; but as it approached the works it turned to the left, running parallel with them for some dis- tance, closely swept by musketry from the parapet. Says Badeau: Its general direction was perpfjndicular to the rebelline; but as it approached the worUs it bent to the left, passing alon;? tlie ed^e of the ditch of the enemy's bastion, and enterius at the slioulder of the bastion. The limber on the sides of the ridgo and in the ravine liad been felled so that an assault at any other point in front oi the 15th Corps was al- most impossible. The rebel line, rifle trench as well as small works for artillery, was higher than the ground occupied by the national troops,and no- where between the Jackson road and the Mississippi on the north could it be reached without crossing a ravine a hundred and twenty feet beiow the gen- eral level of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity whose natural slope was ' everywliere made more difficult by fallen trees and entaaglemenlsof stakes and vines. Such was the situation for an assault. A ravine 120 feet deep, with steep sides, tangled with felled trees, and stakes, and vines, to be crossed to reach the enemy's parapet, which crowned the higher bunk. This ravine, crossed by a single road, on an inferior cross ridge; this road, enfiladed by the guns of the bastion, and as it neared the works turning. so as to be swept broadside by musketry at short range. No other way bj' which to approach the works to make other attacks, or to support an at- tack by this road, than by crossing this great ravine, and climbing the acclivity, through the entanglement of fallen timber, to scale the parapet in the face of a line of infantry behind it, as strong as the storming line could be under sucii conditions. To send brave men to the assault, under such conditions, was to send them to certain failure and certain death. Military sense could know this as well before as after. But volunteers were cheap. A volunteer "storm ing paj-ty" of 150 men carried boards and poles to cross the ditch, followed at a small interval by Swing's brigade; this by Giles Smith's and then Kilby Smith's, making Blair's division. At the minute the storm- ing party dashed forward on a run, followed by the 30th Ohio in ttie lead of Ewixg's brigade, the artillery meanwhile playing on the bastion which commanded this road. At the rig'it point a double rank of the enemy rose up behind the parapet in every part that commanded the road, and poured a concentric fire on the head of the column which con- sumed it. Says Gen. Sherman in his report: It halted, wavered, and sought cover. The rear pressed on, but the fire was so terrific that very- soon all sought cover. The head of the column crossed the ditch of the left lace of the bastion and climbed upon the exterior slope, where the colors were planted, and the men burrowed in tlie earth to shield themselves from the flank fire. The lead- ing brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that point, the next brigade of Giles Smith was turned down a ravine, and by a circuit to the left found cover, formed line, and tlireatened the parapet about 300 yards to the left of the bastion; and the brigade of Kilby Smith deployed on the off slope of one of tiie.spurs, where, "ilh Ewing's brigade, they kepi up a conslant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet. Thus the leading brigade had sought near cover from this concentric fire which con- sumed the head of the column, and the other two had turned off into the ravine for cover, from which the only way to renew the at- tempt to storm the works was by climbing the acclivity through the obstructions, and then scaling the parapet behind which its ^104 — doable rank of defenders was secure. Enough had been done to demonstrate the impossi- bility of the attempt; enough to vindicate the valor of the soldiers; enough of sacrifice of brave men for naught. But the murderous contest was not to stop here. Gen. Shee- man's report continues: About 2 p. m. Gen. Blair reported to me that none of his brijjades couhl pass the point of the road swept by the terrific Are encountered by Ewing's, bill that Giles Smith had got a position to the left, in connection with Gen. Ransom, of McPhersou's corps, and was ready to assault. I ordered a con- stant fire of artillery to be kept up to occudv the attention of the enemy in our front. Under these circumstances Ransom's and Giles Smith's brigades charged up against the parapet, but also met a stagijering fire, before which they recoiled under cover of tlie iiiUside. B.\DKAu .says of tnis second attack: The ground over which they passed is the moat difficult about Viclcsburg. Three ravines cover the entire distance between the Graveyard and Jackson roads, and opening into one still larger, rendered this portion of the line unapproachable, except for individuals. Nownere between these points could a company march by a flank in anything like order, 80 broken is the ground, and so mucli was it ob- structed by the slashing which had been made by felling forest timber and the luxurious vines along the sides of the ravines * * * The troops pushed on, and in the blazing sun sought to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the column of Ewing, they became hopelessly broken up into small parties, and only a few, more . daring than the rest, succeeded in getting close enough to give the rebels any serious cause for alarm. But these were met by a staggering fire, and recoiled under cover of the hillside. Many a brave man fell after ne had passed through the difficulties of the approacn and reached the rebel line. The foremost were soon compelled to crawi behind the logs and under the brows of the hills, where they waited for single opportunities to bring down the enemy as he showed himself along the parapet or in the rifle trench. Gen. Steele's brigade, which was Sher- man's right, had a less difficult country to cross, but a cleared valley instead of the pre- cipitous ravines, exposed his troops "for three- quarters of a mile to a plunging fire from eveij-^ point of the adjacent rebel line. The distance to pass under fire was not less than 400 yards, and though the. obstacles to over- come were less, the exposure to fire being greater, made the result here the same as the assault on Sherman's left. By 2 o'clock it was evident that the national forces could not reach the rebel fortifications at any point in Sherman's front in numbers or order suf- ficient to carry the line, and all further operations were suspended." The line of works in front of McPherson's corps followed the line of the high ridge nearly north and south; "they were strongly constructed, and well arranged to sweep the approaches in each direction." The only road to them "was completely swept at many points by direct and cross fires." In Logan's division Leggett's brigade was on the road, supported by John E. Smith's brigade; Steven- son's brigade in the ravines and on the slopes to tiie south. At the appointed time all moved forward. Badeau tells the result: Their order of battle, however, was weak from the nature of the ground— columns of regiments not greater than a platoon front, battalions by the flank, in columns of fours, or regiments in a single line of battle, supported by troops iu position, and covered by skirmishers. Notwitstandins; the bravery of the troops, they be- came broken and disorganized by the difficult na- ture of the ground, and the Are of the enemy from trench and parapet; and they, too, were compelled to seek cover under the brows of the hills alons which they had advanced. John E. Smith was thus checked by the crossfire of artillery command- ing the road. '■' * * Stevenson was somewhat protected by the uneven nature of the ground. * '•= '•• His advance was bold, and had nearly reached the top of the slope in his front, but being only in line, and, therefore, without any great weight, unsupported by columns or heavy bodies to give it confidence or momentum, it also failed. Quinby's division was McPherson's left. Badeau says: "Quinby's troops moved out, but the enemy's line in their front being a strong re-entrant [turning by an angle in- ward] no great effort was made by them. At this time they were simply useful from the menacing attitude they held." Neither Mc- Pherson nor any of his Generals made any report of this assault; at least none was for- warded to the War Department. The reason will appear further along. McClernand's corps held the left of the line — first A. J. Smith's division, then Carr's, then Hovey's. Badeau's description makes the ground of the same difficult character, deeply cut up by ravines, but less encumbered with timber, save in Hovey's front. McCler- nand's report says: Five minutes before 10 o'clock the bugle soundea the charge, and at 10 o'clock my columns of attack — 105 — moved forward, and within fifteen minutes Law- ler's and Landrura's brigades had carried the ditch, slope, and bastion of a fort. Some of their men * >;< i< rushed into the fort, finding a piece of ar- tillery, and in time to see the men who had been serving and supporting it escape behind another defense commanding the interior of the former. All of this daring and heroic party were shot down except one, who, recovering from the stunning ef- fect of a shot, seized his muslcet and captured and brought away thirteen rebels, who had returned and fired their guns. This captor was Sergeant Jos. Griffith, 22d lo^a. who for this was proiiioted by Gen. Grant to be First Lieutenant. The colors of the 130th Illinois were planted upon the counterscarp of the ditch, while those of the 48th Ohio and 77th Illinois waved over the bastion. Within fifteen minutes after Lawler's and Laud- rum's success, Benton's and Burbridge's brigades * =;• •:• carried the ditch and slope of another heavy earthwork, and planted their colors upon the latter. '■■ '■' •'• Capt. Wnite, of the Chicago Mer- cantile Battery, carried forward one of his pieces by hand quite to the ditch, and, double shotting it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun in it ready to be discharged, and scattering death among the rebel cannoneers. A curtain connected the works forming these two points of attack. Here, he says, "for more tlian eight long hoars they maintained their ground with deathlike tenacity." Osterhaus' and Ho- vey's troops, forming the column of assault on the left, had more difficult ground to pass over, and a longer march under fire. They "pushed forward under a withering fire upon a more extended line until an enfilading fire from a strong redoubt on their left front and physical exhaustion compelled them to take shelter behind a ridge. "•■■ ■■• * Their skirmishers, however, kept up the conflict." The enemy now massed troops to drive the four brigades from the points tRey had gained in the works, and McClernand sent to Gen. Arthur, who was coming up from Warrenton, asking for help, also to Gon. Grant, advising him of the situation. As this part of the affiiir runs into an uri- happy dispute, in which it is alleged by Gen. McClernand that because of Grant's tardi- ness in supporting him he lost the ground in the enemy's works from which Vicksburg might then have been taken ; and on the other hand it is alleged by Gen. Grant that Gen. McClernand claimed to have carried [On page 100, for "outer slope of the bank," read "outer side of the ditch."] . important points in the enemy's works, which in fact were not important, and that thereby he caused the principal part of the sacrifice of men, the controversy is too great to be taken up in this chapter. CHAPTER XLI. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE SECOND ASSAULT ON VICKSBURG — VOLUNTEERS CONSUMED BY JEAL- OUSIES OF GENERALS. After the assault by Sherman's and Mc- Pherson's corps had failed, and while thatof McClernand's corps was persisting, an un- happy controversy was made by Gen. Grant, which he alleges doubled the sacrifice of men, without any chance of gain. Inasmuch as the sacrifice in this affair is admitted by Badeau to be 3,000, and was, in fact, nearer 4,000, a blunder which caused one-half so many is worth} of historical examination. Gen. McClernand's report states that within fifteen minutes of the time when the troops moved forward at the signal, Lawler's and Landman's brigades had carried the ditch, slope, and bastion of a fort; that some of the men rushed in to the fort, the occupants taking flight, but returning and shooting down all but Sergeant Griffith, who brought away thir- teen of the enemy, surrendered to him. Ba- deau states that sixteen surrendered to Grif- fith, to escape the fire from both sides, the Confederates in the rear, the Nationals on the outer parapet, and that four of the sur- rendered were shot by the enemy as they were following Griffith to the Union lines. McClernard's report states further that simultaneously "Benton's and Burbridge's brigades rushed forward and carried the ditch and slope of another heavy earthwork, and planted their colors upon the latter,'" and that Capt. White, of the Chicago Mercantile Bat- ter j'^, "carried forward one of his pieces by hand quite to the ditch, and double shotting it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun in it ready to be discharged, and scattering death among the rebel cannoneers," and that "a curtain connected the works forming these two points of attack." Badeau's history, indorsed by Gen. Grant, states a >carrying of a part of the intrench- ments substantially as is stated by Gen. Mc- Clernand, but savs it availed nothing; because — 106 — these were coiuinanded by other works in the rear. The Confederate official reports refute the supposition of commanding works in the rear, and show that they regarded their line as dangerously broken. Gen. Grant, on that night, wrote Gen. Halleck, "We have posses- sion of two of the enemy's forts." In his letter two days later he accuses McCi.ernand of misleading him as to the facts. Gen. Grant's testimony, therefore, may be set aside as neutralizing itself. This was a possession of two forts or re- dans in the line of fortifications, and of a rifle parapet connecting them, which now turned them against the enemy. It was such an entrance as makes an assault of fortifica- tions successful if properly supported. That it could not be properly supported by heavy following columns was because of Gen. Grant's plan for the operation, which ordered simultaneous assaults all along the line, and the line was attenuated by being drawn out as much as four miles. Stonuing a place lield by an array of 18,500 men, none of these storming lines could have been supported if it had entered the place. McClernand's corps had lost heavilj^ in bat- tles since crossing the river. With this, and sickness and detachments, including the most of Hovey's division left behind at Champion's Hill, the number now before the works was not above 10,000. It had to extend beyond the point of safety to guard against flanking on the left, between which and the river was a space of four miles. Gen. Grant's order was to assault simultaneously all along the line. It was made in this attenuated manner by McPher- son's corps, behind wliich Grant stood, and by Sherman's corps. McClerxand's corps fol- lowed the same fatal order, and was all engaged. McClernand's position during the attack was at the Parrott six gun battery, which had breached the line which his troops carried. He sent to Gen. Grant this note, dated 11 a. m.: I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is massing on me from right and left. A vigorous blow by McPherson would make a diversiou in my favor. Gen. Grant's report says he received this at 12, and that he responded in this remarkable manner: "I directed hira to re-enforce the points liard pressed from such troops as lies had that were not engaged." This was the same as to direct him that if he wanted re-enforce- ments he might re-enforce himself. But Mc- Clernand had not directly asked re-en- forcements, but had suggested that a vigorous blow by McPherson would prevent the ene- my's massing on him from right and left, McPherson's and Sherman's attacks having ceased. Gen. Grant narrates that as soon as he had sent this remarkable answer, he made this remarkable movement: "I then rode around to Sherman." The reply which McClernand received -was this, dated 11:50: "If your advance is weak, strengthen it from your reserves or other parts of the line." This is interesting as an exam- ple ot the great mind which a Commanding General can bring into the conduct of a bat- tle, but it had little relevancy to McCler- nand's need or suggestion. Gen. Grant's re- port states that: "The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of tlie 13th Army Corps than I believed it possible for tlie commander to have." If so it seems strange that he should leave so sightly a place upon receiving such a call from McClernand. Grant's position was a mile and a quarter from this action; McClernand^ at a battery which had breached these works; but if Grant had the superior view which he alleges, then, while this conflict was going on, while the na- tional flag was on the parapets of two forts in the line, and the attack from McPherson's and Sherman's corps had ceased, or was only keeping up a skirmishing fire, when he re- ceived this appeal from McClernand he an- swered it with a rebuff, and then rode away in an opposite direction, as if to put himself as far as he could from McClernand's call. Gen. Sherman, in his Memoirs, relates: After our men had been fairly beaten back from oil' the parapet, and had got cover behind the spurs of ground close up to the rebel works. Gen. Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left his horse some distance to the rear. I pointed out to him the rebel works, admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the result with McPherson aud McClernand was about the same. He could speak advisedly for McPherson, but having left his view of McClernand's ac- tion when the national flag was flying on the enemy's works, which was the sure sign of a — 107 — desperate conflict raging, and when McCler- NAND had appealed to him for support, he could not say advisedly that the assanlt of McClernand's corps liad failed; he could only state his own determination in the matter. Gen. Grant's report states that just as he had reached Sherman: I received a second disvmtch from McClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then wavea over them, and asking me to have Sherman and Mc- Pherson make a diversion in his favor. Gen. Sherman says in his Memoirs, the writing was "to tlie effect that 'his troops had captured the rebel parapet in his front.' that 'the flag of the CTnion waved over the strong- hold of Vicksburg,' and asking him (Gen. Grant) to give renewed orders to McPherson and Sherman to press their attacks on their respective fronts, lest the enemy should con- centrate on him (McClernand)." By these quotation marks Gen. Sherman assumes to give McClernanhj's words. Sher- man's report told it in this manner, increasing the captured forts to tliree: Gen, McClernand's report to Gen. Grant read that he had taken three of the enemy's forts, and that his flags floated on the slronghold of Vicksburg. Gen. McClernand's real dispatcii, as at- tested, was as follows: We have gained the enemy's inlrenchmunts at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command at this point? P. S. I have re- ceived yonr dispatch. My troops are all engaged, and I can not withdraw any to re-enforce others. Then followed this: We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts, and the starH and stripes are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all along the line. Tliis seems difterent from "stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of two of the forts," as Gen. Grant's report says, or that he had "taken three of the enemy's forts, and that his Hags waved on the stronghold of Vicksburg," as Gen. Sher- .man's report says. And Gen. McClernand's statement that he had "part possession of two forts," and the further decorative state- ment that "the stars and stripes are floating over them, "is abundantly supported by the reports of the officers engaged in the assaults, and is substantially admitted by Badeau's narrative. Grant's report makes the remarkable argu- ment that this partial possession of the works "could give us no practical advantage unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time;" which is to say that in storming fortihcations, to carry one part is of no consequence unless all are car- ried at the same time. This, like all the or- dering of this affair, is an original theory in the art of storming fortifications. Gen. IGrant's report goes on to state that from where he had been he could not see Mc- Clernand's "possession of the forts, nor ne- cessity for re-enforcements, as represented in his dispatches, and I expressed doubts of their correctness." But, he continues: I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and, that uo possi- ble opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division '■■ '■' to report to McClernand. ••■ * * I showed his dispatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part, to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages. Gen. Sherman narrates in his Memoirs: Gen. Grant said, "I don't believe a worn of it," but I reasoned with him that this note was official, and must be credited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with new troops. He said he would instantly ride down to McClernand's front, and if I did not receive orders to the contrary by 3 o'clock p. m.. I might try it again. Mower's fresh brigade was brought up under cover, und some changes were made in Giles Smith's brigade, and punctually at 3 o'clock p. m., hearing heavy firing down along the line to my left, I ordered the second assault. It "A'as a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful and bloody. The same thing occurred with McPherson, who lost in this second assault some most valuable officers and men without adequate result. Meanwliile what had become of Gen. Grant, who had started for McClernand's position to prove his dispatches false? It appears that he did not go there, but returned to his posi — 108 — tion at McPherson's center, for he relates that he showed McClernand's dispatch to McPherson, and his subsequent dispatches to McClernand are dated "Field Signal Sta- tion." Gen. McClernand, in a letter to Gen. Halleck reviewing Grant's report, gives the following dispatches which he received from Grant after the events narrated above: From Field Signal Station. To Gen. McClernand : McArthur advanced from Warrenlon last night. He is on your left. Couceutrate with him, and use his forces to the best advantage. From Field Signal Station'. To Gen. McClernand: Sherman and McPherson are pressing the enemy. If one portion of your troops are pressed re-enforce them from another. Sherman has gained some suc- cesses. This instruction that "if one portion of your troops are pressed," the comraander should re-enforce them from another portion that is not pressed, shows the fineness to which the art of war has been brought by a government military institute; also tlie im- portant part which a Commanding General may perform in communicating great mili- tary instruction to his corps commanders in the crisis of battle Grant's next dispatch was the following: May 22— 2: 30 p. M. General: I have sent a dispatch to yon saying that McArthur left Warrenton last night: was about half way to the city this morning at 1 a. m. Communicate with him, and use his forces to the best advantage. McPherson is directed to send Quinby's division to you if he can notefTect a lodg- ment where he is. Quinby is next to your right, and you will be aided as mnch by his penetrating into the enemy's lines as by having him to support the columns you have already got. Sherman is getting on well. Gen. McClernand had not asked for re- enforcements from any save McArthdr's diyision, then coming up from Warrenton. Grant's dispatch, next above, shows that he proposed to first send Quinby's division to the assault, and, if that failed, to send it to sup- port McClernand. Yet in making his case against McClernand he alleges that the attempts had all failed, and had shown that it was impossible to storm the Confederate works. But it appears that he changed his mind, and did not order QriNBY' to the as- sault, but sent him to support McClernand. This remarkable conduct of Grant in rid- ing away from McClernand's call, and in vacillating between riding back to McCler- nand's position to prove his dispatches false, or ordering a renewal of the assault without that, had consumed time which would have made his re-enforcements to McClernand of no avail in any possible event. Gen Grant next received the following answer from McClernand, dated at 3:15 p. m. : I have r,eceived your dispatch in regard to Gen. Quinby's division and Gen. McArthur's. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possi- ble dispatch, and doubt not that I will force my way through. I have lost no ground: My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are com- manded by rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed. But time was flying during this discordancy. Quinby's division did not reach McClernand's position till near night; McArthur's not till next day. Says McClernand's report: Col. Boomer's and Siinborn's brigades of Gen. Quinby's division, much exhausted, came up, but before either of them could be fully applied— in- deed before one of them was entirely formed— night set in, and terminated the struggle. Col. Boomer early fell while leading his men forward, lamented by all. Meanwhile the enemy, seeing Quinby's division moving in the direction of my position^ hastened to concentrate additional forces in front of it, and made a sortie, which was repelled. About 8 p. m., after ten hours' continuous fighting, my men withdrew to the nearest shelter and rested for the night, holding by a strong picket most of the ground they had gained. But a history of this assault would be in- complete without a glance at the Confederate reports. These give some light on the subject of this controversy. CHAPTER XLII. ORCiANIZED SLAUGHTER OF HEROIC VOLUNTEERS — ATTEMI'f TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY — CRIMINATION TO COVER THE REAL AFFAIR. The Confederate officers had views of the importance of the lodgment of a part of Mc- Clernand's corps in their line of fortifica- 109 — tions. Gen. Pemberton's report says: It was of vital importance to drive them out. Gen. Stephenson's report ht^s this: The work was constntcled in such a manner that the dilch was commanded by no nart of the line, and the onlj' means by which they conld be dis- lodged was to retake the angle by a desperate charge. '■■ '■'■ ■■'■ A more firalUnt feat than this charge has not illustrated onr arms during the war. Brigadier General Lee was in the immediate command of that part of the line, but died •without making a report. Col, Dockery, commanding a brigade of the reserve, says: "While on the way to Gen. Moore's lines, a courier from Brigadier General Lee to Gen. Green reported that Gen. Lee's line had been broken by the enemy." Col. Waul, of the Texas Legion, who organized the foree which retook the works, saj's: Alive to the importance of the position, Gen. Lee Issued and reiterated orders to Col. Shelley, commanding the 23(1 Alabama, and Lieut. Col. Pettus, commanding the Jfitn Alabama, who occu- pied the fort, to retake it at all hazards, offering the flags to the commands capturing them. After sev- eral vain attempts they refused to volunteer, nor could the most strenuous efforts of their chlvalric commander urge or incite them to the assault. Gen. Lee then directed the Colonel of the legion to have the fort taken. He immediately went there, taking with him one battalion of the legion to aid or support the assailants, if necessary, in- forming Capt. Bradley and I^ieut. Hagan, who re- spectively commanded the companies that had pre- viously been sent as a support to the garrison. These gallant officers not only willingly agreed, but solicited the honor of leading those companies to the assault. * * * Three of Col. Shelley's regi- ment also volunteered. - This feat, consid- ered with the accompanying circumstances, the occupation by the enemy, the narrow pass through which the party had to enter, the enfilading fire of musketry and artillery they had to encounter in the approach, the unwillinsness of the garrison, consisting of two regiments, to volunteer, and per- mitting the flags to float for three hours over the parapet, the coolness, conrase, and intrepidity manifested, deserve highest praise for every officer and man engaged in the hazardous enterprise. Gen. Grant's accusation admits that if Mc- Clernand's troops had gained such a lodg- ment in'the fortifications as he reported, then it was Grant's dut\''to order the attack re- newed by tlie other two corps, although he knew that it would only repeat their sacrifice against impregnable works. To the "lay- man" the thought is suggested whether this is the art of war. If McClernand's troops had taken this part of the intrenchments, then Gen. Grant takes to himself the re- sponsibility for ordering a repetition, of an assault which he then knew would be a slaughter without carrying any works at that part of the line. This Confederate testimony supports McClernand in all that he reported, and more. Gen. Grant's accusation of McClernand caused him to bring the testimony of the of- ficers that led the attack, and of their imme- diate commanders, to prove that all thfe pos- .session of the intrenchments that he claimed was gained. The testimony is from officers of many battles and gallant charges. It is abundant to prove that Gen. McClernand re- ceived official dispatches of this progress from the officers engaged, besides being in a posi- tion from which he could see the operation; that all the possession that he reported to Grant was gained, and more, and that the officers who led the assault which carried these works thought the way open to A''icks- burg, if they had been supported in force. This historical review need not give this testimony. The statement that it is conclu- sive is entitled to acceptance, when it is fully confirmed by the 'Confederate official reports, unbiased by this dispute, which show that a part of the line of fortifications which had been held by two regiments was in possession of the national troops for more than tliree hours; that the Confederate regiments which had been driven from this part of the fortifications could not be rallied to retake them, as Col. Waul says, "Permitting the (Xational) flags to float for three hours over the parapet." The official reports of Confederate officei-s, and the testimony of the National officers actually engaged, show that McClernand's report to Grant was within the reality of Ids occupation of the intrenchments. Gen. Grant concedes that if McClernand's troops had such a lodgment as he reported, then it w-as his (Grant's) duty to sijpport it by a re- newal of the assault by Sherman and Mc- Pherson, which he says doubled the losses for the day, and/ in another way of stating it, makes the cause of most of the loss. As the situation is proved to be just as McClernanu reported to Grant, does not Grant's admission that this new assault would be necessary in such a situation, take to himself the respoiisi- — no — bility for ordering it, or at least share it with McClernand? To the attentive reader it is obvious tliat this crimination is to cover up the real mat- ter. What meaning was there in this assault of a strongly fortified line, if when any part was carried and the way opened, it could not be supported by masses so as to enter? Could it be supposed that this simultaneous attack along a line of at least four miles would simultaneously walk over the works, and that then the Confederate army would throw down its arms? Upon no other expectation could Gen. Grant assume that the storming of a fortified place by simultaneous attacks from a line stretched out more than four miles, in a very rough country, and utterly unable to strengthen one part from another, could be successful. Did Gen. Grant think now as Badeau rep- resents that he did in the first assault, of which he says: "When Sherman's troops rushed up, thinking to march easily intoVicksburg, they found not only the ramparts were difficult, but the defenders had got new spirit, and were once more the men who had fought at Donelson. and Shiloh, and at Champion's Hill" For "Sherman's troops" read Gen. Grant; for the troops knew better; but Gen, Grant had tried this "walkover" once. In assaulting a fortified place, it is thought that the great part is to effect an entrance, and that when this is gained success is in hand; but it appears that in Gen. Grant's method of storming, to gain an entrance on one side is nothing, for his line is too thin to adequately support it anywhere. Did the possession of the enemy's line, which McClernand reported to Grant, make further success practicable by such support as McClernand called for, or by the renewed assaults which Grant ordered? Conceding that McClernand held ali that he reported, did that make possible a further success by his corps, which justified Grant in ordering the other corps to repeat an assault on impreg- nable works, and repeat the sacrifice of men, merely to make a diversion to support Mc- Clernand? Gen. Grant assumes that it did. Gen. Sherman takes the same sanguinaiy view. These two great soldiers appear to think the chance of technically making Mc- Clernand responsible, suflScient for the send- iTig of these fated volunteers to the slaughter. Both these great soldiers concede that what McClernand called for and more, and the as- saults which they ordered, knowing they would double the bloody business, were right, if McClernand held what he reported. That he did hold it is proved beyond honest dis- pute. This makes Gen. Grant responsible for the operation which he ordered as a diversion to support McCi«ernand. It makes him at least as responsible as McClernand; for he knew the situation. It makes him responsible in chief for doubling the sacrifice of men, after he knew that the works in front of Sherman and McClernand could not be car- ried; for McClernand could not have known this, nor could he fairly be held to require, for diversion, an attack so real as to double the sacrifice of men. Is the art of war so poor as this work of dogged butchery? Is there any theory of war, as taught at the military institute, which re- quired two-thirds of the army to be sent again to the sacrifice before impregnable fortifica- tions, to make a diversion for the other third, because it had effected a lodgment in a part of the works which it could not support by a force sufficient to enter the place? Gen. Grant, if he may be accredited with a mind up to the ordinary level, knew the whole situation. He knew that from a line so extended as his army was, no column of attack could be sup- ported with force adequate to enter the place when it had opened the way. He knew that McArthur was not near, and that McClernand could get no additional force adequate to enter the place at the time when he ordered the assault repeated. He knew that several hours would be spent while (^uiNBY was moving to McClernand's posi- tion. He knew that Vicksburg was held by an army which from the center could re- enforce any part of its line, or could mass for a battle inside the fortifications, and that if any further success had been possible by prompt support of strong force where the as- sault had opened the way, or by other opera- tions for diversion, it had been made impossi- ble by the waste of hours, during which the Confederate array had abundant time to con- centrate to recover their broken line, while he was riding away from the sounti of the battle. Vicksburg was not simply a fort, held by a limited garrison, enveloped by overwhelming numbers, its strength consisting chiefly in its walls, and lost as soon as these were entered; — Ill— it was an army intrenched with a circuit of strong fortifications along its front of eight miles, having the advantage of a sliort inner line, by which its reserves could be massed for any point, while Grant's army was ex- tended oil a great circuit, from which con- centration and mutual support were imprac- ticable. Upon the testimonj^ of Confederate and National officers it may be said that if the successful storming of the works by parts of Lawlee's and Landrum's brigades could have been promptly supported by a heavy force, it could have entered the place, and that this, following up the panic stricken regiments that had been driyen from the works — the at- tack being at the same time pressed on the other parts of the line — would have been very dangerous to Pemberton's army. Its com- plete success may be said to be as probable as military undertakings can generally be, when the chance is regarded as sufficient to justify the attempt; but it must also be said that in the dispositions which had been made of the army previous to this attack, and in the way that Grant ordered it to be made, it was im- possible to support any successful column adequately to enter the place, after it had opened the way. On the other hand, there is as much cer- taintyascan visually be foregathered in in- telligent military undertakings, that when' the momentum of this attack had been ex- pended by reaching the works, and McCler- NAND was unable to presently support it by a heavy force, the time had gone by when the success could be carried further by anything which it was practicable to do. Still more inevitable was this failure when hours had passed, and the attack by the other two corps had long ceased, leaving the Confederate General free to direct his reserves to this quarter. Lieut. Col. Stone, commanding the 22d Iowa, which entered the works, says: "Had we been re-enforced at any time before 12 m. by a fresh brigade, I have no doubt that the whole army could have gone into Vicksburg." As he received a wound at that time, he was unable to say further. This, however, means that the way was open for the whole army to go into Vicksburg. But the army was not there to enter, and its dispositions were such that no adequate force could be massed to enter anywhere. The ordering of the assault sup})Osed that the whole line of four miles would march over tlie line of works. Tlie conduct of Gen. Grant is the strangest part of this atTair. While the battle was going on in the enemy's intrenchments, which he says he could see, and when he had been informed byMcCLERNAND of the situation, he rode away, leaving the action suspended where he was, and going to Sherman, where it was also suspended. If McClernand's fur- ther success had been otherwise possible, this conduct of the Commanding General made it impossible. If lie had not determined the event, he could soon have judged for himself what should be done l)y riding to McCler- nand. The distance to that part of the line where tlie battle was raging was no greater than to Sherman's part, where it had ceased. But the Commanding General, as if refusing to know McClernand's situation, as if he had determined the event in his own mind, rode away from the battle, leaving these troops to be sacrificed, as if for succeeding in a desperate assault when Sherman and Mc- Pherson, in his own presence, had failed. Is it possible that any one having such knowledge of the general situation as lay be- fore the Commanding General's eye could believe that another attack of the fortifica- tions by Sherman's and McPherson's corps, after 3 o'clock p. m., could enable McCler- nand's troops to enter Vicksburg? Whatever chance there was of success was determined by Gen. Grant's riding away from McCler- nand's call while his troops were in the Con- federate works, and keeping the rest of the army inactive for several hours. His order of another assault upon the fortifications after that was the sending of a gallant army to the slaughter, to no intelligent purpose, and with no possibility of gain. This crimination is only a diversion from the real affair of the organized fatality of this assault. If a successful assault of those forti- fications had been possible, it was made im- possible by the disijositions of the army to in- vest so great a line, for which its numbers were inadequate, and by the order to assault from such an extended line a fortified army. This made it impossible to adequately support any column which should enter the fortifica- tions. Grant and Badeau admit that the storming of the works was impossible, but Badeau pleads that Grant could not know this till he had tried the second time — could — 112 — not know the strength of the works, the diffi- culties of the approach, nor that the Con- federate soldiers would fight so well. This seems a plea of niilitary incorapetencv for the Conunanding General. CHAPTER XLIII. THE COMMANDING GENERAL CONCEDES THAT THE VOLUNTEERS DID ALL THAT HEROISM COULD DO, BUT SAYS THE UNDERTAKING WAS AN IMPOSSI- BILITY— HIS EXCUSES FOR HIS FATAL ORDER — INFALLIBILITY OF MILITARY SCIENCE. Gen. Grant's formal report of the opera- tions of the Vicksburg campaign, dated July 6, gave credit to' the soldiers for the gallantry of the attack, and stated that the failure was because the strength of the fortifications, the difficulties of the ground, precluding any ap- proach in strong columns, and the number of the defenders, made a successful assault im- possible, and that the result would have been the same if his own army had been ever so much greater. He wrote: "The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both natu- rally and artificially, to be taken in that way." This does justice to the valor of the troops, and exonerates them from responsibility for this sacrifice of the army for nothing. He continues: "At every point assaulted, and all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works would cover." Thus the defenders could show a stronger line behind the rifie parapet and batteries than the assaulting army could bring up to them, through the difficult approaches. He also argued by the following that greater numbers on his side could not have changed the result: "Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened be- tween them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie." Forasmuch as they did not break through the enemy's line, he regards it of no consequence that more men were not there to avail. This seems to show a sagacity in the ordering of the assault which had foreseen that it would nowhere enter the line of fortifications, and, theretore, had wasted no energy in providing force to follow it up. Gen. McClernand's report, which was made earlier, stated that two of his assaulting col- umns did break through the enemy's works, and that he had not adequate force to make this entrance avail. But Gen. Grant's report was made to refute that. It showed also that the ordering of the assault, and the disposi- tions of the army were upon the conclusion that the enemy would make no sortie, and therefore men v.'ould not be required to meet that. Fortunately the enemy did not, save that the force which had been gathered to re- take the works in McClernand's front, and the further force which he says was concen- trated because of Quinby's movement, did make a sortie which caused considerable loss. The average citizen has profound venera- tion for the military art. He is taught to be- lieve it a system of absolute theoretical prin- ciples, which are taught at the military in- stitute, by which the graduate can forecast military operations with an approximation to the exactness of science, and without which education no amount of experience in war can make a soldier other than an empir- ical bungler, whose success, if he ever makes any, is a matter of chance. To shake popu- lar beliefs is always evil ; for not alone is the particular tradition shaken, but this tends to weaken popular faiths in all things. But the average citizen, reading Gen. Grant's award to the gallantry of the sol- diers in this assault of his ordering, and his unqualified declaration that the natural and artificial strength of these fortifications was such that a successful assault was im- possible, and that tlie result could not be otherwise if he had had ever so many^ more men, is constrained to inquire whether mili- tary science has no other means of finding out that fortifications are impregnable to assault save by sending an army upon tliem to be de- stroyed. Such fortifications are not hidden. This was a line of eight miles, along the highest projections. In a great part of the way they crowned the steep banks of deep ravines, which enabled the constructors to dis- pense witli the outer ditch. They were further strengthened by redans, lunettes, and redoubts at the angles, and at places to com- mand any ground that was practicable for an approach in formation. This line of fortifications was the most conspicuous feature in that region. Under cover of parallel — 113^ ridges and of the thickets in tlie ravines, scouts and reconnoitering officers conld ob- serve the works. Could not military science judge wliether it was practicable to carry these fortifications by storm? Could the military art do no better than to sacrifice near 4,000 heroic vol- unteers, to find out what could be told by an intelligent reconnaissance"'' Was it necessarj'^ to order assaults all along the line of four miles, to try the strength of the works? If this be so, is the art of war, as taught at the in- stitute, the infallible science that is popu- larly^believed? If this be the only way to find that fortifications are impregnable to assault, is there such an unassailable height as is assumed between the officer of the special schooling and the officer of general educa- tion, general capacitj', and of as much ex- ])erience in war? Badeau says that "Grant had in his varioiis columns about 30,000 men engaged." Gen, Pemberton's report states that at the begin- ning of the siege he had 18,500 effectives. ["To man the entire line I was able to bring into the trenches about 18,500 muskets."] Grant's army was extended as much as four miles. This extension, and the nature of the country, made it impracticable for one army corps to support, another. The reports show also that neither of the three corps was so con- centrated tliat in case of any part entering the works, it could be adequately supported to advance. The previous disposition of the army for the attack, and the ordering of it from a line so extended, against a line of fortifications which covered an army, was upon the plan that the assaulting lines were to march over them simultaneously. After Gen. Grant had tri«d this, he amply declared that they were impregnable. Had generalship no other way to find out this? Can it be said, upon his own account, that even by this terrible sacrifice he had proved that the enemy's line could not be broken by assaults in the manner that fortified places are usually assaulted, by massing at one or two points, and masking these by other demonstrations? Reports of both Confederate and national officers show that the enemy's line was broken in "MoClernand's front. The pre- vious dispositions of the army and Gen. Grant's order of the assault show that it was impossible to support this adequately to enter the place. Gen. Grant said tliis posses- sion of the Confederate works was of no use unless others to right and left were carried. This still further shows that the ordering of the assault all along the line was upon tlie theory that the whole line was to simulta- neously march over tlie fortificatious. after a cannonading fanfare, which made no im- pression save to give notice of what was com- ing. Gen. Grant's biograplier makes a formida- ble array of excuses for the ordering of tliis a.ssault. 1. He felt that a resolute assault from the ad- vanced positioiLS obtained on the 19th would suc- ceed, if made with proper visor and co-operation. Previously, in stating the compensations got for the sacrifice by the assault of the 19th, the principal item was this: "The nature of the enemy's works, the character of the ground, and the unusual obstacles by' which it was encumbered, together with the policy of the defense, all became known." That knowledge was obtained by the sacrifice of something less than 1,000 men; but now something less than 4,000 had to be sacrificed to obtain the same knowledge. 2. He believed * * - he could reach the rebel works in suflicient oKder and with weight enough to break through before any serious loss could be inflicted by the enemy. This is the way he improved the knowl- edge gained by the first assault. But he fouijd that he conld not reach the works with any heavy columns, nor, as Baijeau says, make "any tactical movement." % 3. In addition to these tactical considerations, it was known that Johnston was at Canton, witli the troops that had escaped from Jackson, re-enforced by others from the East and South : that acces.sions were daily reaching him, and that every soldier the rebel government could gather up in all its terri- tory would doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's support. In a short time he might be strong enough to aUack Grant in tlie rear, and possibly, in con- junction with the garrison, raise the siege. The alleged grand strategy of Gen. Grant's march away from Pemberton's army at Vicks- burg, and from his base of supplies, both of which could be reached from Hankinson's Ferry by a march of fifteen miles, was that in this way he could scatter all forces that could be gathered on the east, seize Jackson, — 114 — destroy the railrouils that center tliere, and thus, said Badeau: "Troops as well as stores would be cut oft', and Vickshurg with its gar- rison isolated from the rest of the would he Confederacy." This movement away from the enemy and the objective ulace, to first make impossible any aid from the east, so as to pen up Pkm- BERTON in Vickshurg and have his own. way with him, was the whole of the grand strategy, as reconstructed after the event. It was upon this that Bakeau, approved by Grant, de- clared that this movement equaled a combi- nation of Bonaparte's first Italian campaign, and of his 'campaign about Ulm. Yet now only three days after his rapid march had reached Vickshurg, he determined that this desperate assault of impregnable fortifications was necessary because Jonxsrox might shooters commanded the ground, and Grant would not ask permission to succor the wounded and bury the dead. .Something near 4,000 killed and wounded, yet this bulletin told the country that "our loss was not severe." The greatest (juality of this great soldier wa.s his imperturbability in the slaughter of his own soldiers. What thought the intelligent volunteers of the severity of the loss, whose comrades were thickly stre%vn, dead and wounded, l.)efore the enemy's intrenchments, the dead unburied, the wounded abandoned, "crying for water which none could bring them, and writhing in pain that might not be relieved?" Were they so imbruted that they had no feeling, when they knew that this sacrifice was a blunder of generalship? This bitlletin was the othcial rcjioi-t that would first go tut (ien. Pe.Mt — 117 — berton's permission, and to ask this would •disclose to the country a situation quite dif- ferent from that in his bulletin. At length, on the 2'nh, Gen.- Pkmberton sent this note: Two days liaviiif; elapsed since your dead and wounded have been lyins? in our front, and as yet no disposition on your part of a desire to remove ihera being exhibited, in the name of humanity, 1 have tlie honor to propose a cessation of hostilities for two ana a half hours tliat you may be enabled to remove your dead and dying men. If you can not do this, on notification from you that hostilities will be suspended on your part for the time speci- ) lied, 1 will endeavor to have the dead buried, and the wounded cared for. To this Gen. Grant replied at y:.SO p. m. ai)pointin*j> (i p. m. as the time for the cessa- tion of hostilities. Badk.\u, in a foot note, defends Grant against Pembkrton's imputa- tion of inhumanity, for he say.s the impossi- bility of relieving tho.se wounded "was oc- ]H'd under cover of night. But the wounded could not be brought away nor the dead buried withoiit the ene- tny's permission. To Gen, Pemberton it was a matter of war etiquette that the side which needed such permission .should ask it. To Gen. Grant, to ask it would admit to the na- tion in his rear that the Confederates held the battleground, and would reveal a situation very different from that represented by his bulletins. Thus this abandonment was his military necessity, and humanity to his own heroic volunteers had to give way to his own jiecessity in order that the history of the Vick.sburg campaign might be rightly written in the jmblic mind. CHAPTER XLV. THE SIEGE — IMMEDIATE FEAR OF .IOHNSTON IN THE BEAR — SACRIFICING OTHER OPERATIONS TO RE-ENFORCE GRANT — THE DREADFUL LABORS OK THE SIEGE. Two bloody assaults having satislied (ien. Grant that the fortihcations of Vicksbutg could not be stormed, he put his army to tlie work of investing the place, and of approach- ing it by trenches, saps, and mines, and tlie other engineering works of a siege. The Confederate line of works, Badeau says, was eight miles long, and the national intrenclied line twelve miles, and he says Grant had now about 40,000 men. The present force was inadequate to the in- vestment. There was still a space of four miles between Grant's left and the river, — 118 — through which Gen. rEMBERTOX might have escaped, or have debouched upon Graft's left, while the army, yet unintrenched, was 80 extended in a rough region that mutual support of its several corps was impracticable. But Gen. Pemberton's experience had sub- dued his spirit. Besides, from the beginning he had resolved on a defensive course. His movement to attack Grant's rear at Dillon's, was b'ecause of Johnsto^j's urgency, and against his own views. And now, when Johnston took the military ground that the place was of little consequence, and that he should let that go and save the army, Pem- herton took the opposite view that the place was the essential thing. In this he coincided with the ideas of Grant, Halleck, Lincoln, and Stanton. The army was poorly eiiuipped for a siege of such immense labor. It was much worn by the hardships and privations of the march, and had suffered heavily by battles and sick- ness, liarge re-enforcements were needed to invest the place, and to fortify their own lines against sorties. Generals Hurlbut and Pren- tiss were ordered to strip Grant's department to send forward '"every available man that could possibly be spared." And now Gen. (Jrant, whose great strategy in marching away from Vicksburg and Pemberton's army to Jackson was to finally extinguish all inter- ference from the east, began to sound the alarm that Johnston was threatening him in the rear, which he kept up to the end of the siege. Admiral Porter sent "a brigade of am- phibious and useful troops at his disposal, known as the Marine Brigade, to deliark at Haine's Bluflf, and hold the place until re- lieved by other forces." A division from Hurlbut, under Brig. (4en. Kimball arrived June 3. On the 8th Brig. Gen. SooY Smith arriyed witli a division, and was i>laccd at Haine's BluH'. Says Badkait: Herron's division [from the ",\rmy of the Frontier"], the strouge.st in the combined army, arrived from Schofield's command on the Uth of June; and by the wise prevision of the General in Chief two divisions of the ;)th Corps, under Major General Parke, were diverted from tlieir march to East Tennessee [from Biiruside's command], and iir- rived before Vicksoiirg on llic 14tii ul Uie same month. Tints, responsive to Grant's unceasing alarms, did Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln strip other departments, and cripple more important operations to increase Grant's army for the siege which had been his own tactical objective. Thus was the long wanted movement into East Tennessee — whose occupation now m co- operation with Rosecrans' Chattanooga cam- paign, -was of much greater military impor- tance than Vicksburg, suspended at a time when it was essential to the true military movement down the center of the Confed- eracy. And while thus contracting Grant's lines in the northern part of the Confederacy, and giving up important places to the enemy* possession, and suspending a co-operating movement which was essential to Rose- crans' campaign, in order to carry out a siege of a single place, Stanton treated all of Rosecrans' calls for troops and arms and cav- alry as excuses for delay, and at length de- clared that he would not give him another man, and ordered him peremptorily to march. So far was carried this policy of giving up all to make sure the taking of this place, that Gen. Banks was ordered to drop all and come to the help of Grant, which, had he done, would have lost the lower river and Louis- iana — a military possession of tenfold more importance than Vicksljurg. Gen. Lanman's division arrived on the 24tli of May, and was placed defensively' on the Hall's Ferry and Warrenton roads, south of the place. Herron's division arrived on the Uth of June, and took possession on the left. Then Lanman moved up, and to the right, connecting with McClerxand's left, "and for the first time the investment became com- plete." The plan of the siege was to w'ork up to the fortitications by meansof trenches and under- ground ajiproaches. into near positions, for another general assault; this from a line which Badeau says was twelve miles, and against a line of eight miles. Like the assaults, tlie besieging approaches were along the whole line, and the object of them another assault along the whole line. The mind can have but a faint conception of the immensity of the work of siege approaches against a line of fortifications of eight miles, in a region of singular diiriculties to the be- siegers, of which Gen. Grant wrote to Hal- leck: "The position is as strong by nature as can possibly be conceived of, aiul is strongly fortilied." 119 — The l)esieging army is also heaieged. Ex- tended in a circuit to invest a place wnich is held by an array, it is exposed to sorties from tlie center; therefore it must be intrenched all along its line, and must be ever vigilant. Thus the besieging army has double labor, intrenching itself and trenching upon the ]>laoe. The trench approaches have mostly to bo done by night. In general the conditions of such works are unhealthy, and the hard- ships great, but these were unexceptionally so in the ravines about Vicksburg, where the tiery heat of the sun by day, the damp- ness of the nights, the scarcity of water, and .the most irksome labor, told heavily on the health and spiritsof the Xorthern volunteers. They did not realize so vividly as Bai)e.\u the grandness of the strategy whose objective was Ii siege, and had made an exhaustive march on a circuit to achieve this consum- mation. Adam Bakeau airs a vocabulary of siege terms in describing the manner of the work, as if he hadJately learned them. The details (^f the work are not necessary to this historical review, which concedes all the mag- nitude of the labor which Badeau asserts, and also its uselessness, and, in a great degree, aindessness, save as a preparation for another general slaughter, which, hai)pily, was saved by the shortening of Pembekton's supplies, and by his idea that he could get lietter terms by giving to Grant the theatrical coup of a surrender on the 4th of July. In these siege appi'oaches all along the line, the whole army was encamped in the near I'uvines, so as to be "as close to the enemy's works as shelter could be found; most of the camps were within 600 yards of the rebel parapet." This proximity made the fire of l)ickets and sharpshooters incessant. Roads had to be opened in the rear for supplying the several parts of the army, and inner roads and covered ways to connect the sev- eral camps. Timber had to lie cleared away for digging the approaches. In the list of mighty labors Badeatt mentions eighty-nine I latteries, not all in the first line, but ad- vanced frf)m time to time. He describes the conslructionof these as complete in detail, with all the technical terms thereunto be- longing. These batteries were connected by a line of riHe trench, which was advanced with them. These were constantly occupied by sharp- sliooters duringihe daylight, and by guards and advanced pickets during the night. Also, wherever an advanced cover for a man could be found a sharpshooter was placed. Alike for the style of the works and the style of tlie biographer, these specimens are quoted: The style of the work in the batteries was varied, depending on tlie maleriiil tliat coulrl be obtained at the time. In .some cases the lines were neatly revetted with gaoioiis and fascines, and finished with snbstantial plank platforms; while in others a revetting of rough boards or cotton bales^ was u.sed, and the pbitforms were made of timber from the nearest Kin house. The embrasures were sometimes revetted with cane, and sometimes lined with hides taken from beef cattle. ••■ ••■ ••' In all close batteries the gun- ners soon found the necessity of keeping the em- brasures closed against rifle balls by plank shut- ters, sometimes swinging from a limber across the top of the euibrasure, sometimes merely placed in the embrasure, and removed in tiling. In close ap- proaches the sap was generally revetted with gabions, empty barrels or cotton bales, but some- times left entirely unrevetted, for when the enemy's fire was heavy, it became difficult to prevent the working parties from sinking the sap as deep as five or even six feet, when, of course, revetting became unnecessary. Material for gabions was abundant, grapevines benig chiefly used, though ttiis made the gabions inconveniently lieavy, the vines being too large! Cane was also used for wattling, the joints being crushed with Wooden mallets, and the rest of the cane split and interwoven between the stakes of the gabion. The caue made excellent fascines, and was frequently used in this way. At first some difficulty was found in making saprollers which should be impervious to minie balls, and yet not too heavy to use on the rougli ground over which the sap must run. Two barrels, however, were placed head to head, and the saproller was then built of cane fascines, wound around this hollow core. . This extract from nnich. of the same sort shall suffice to show the elaborate details of the siege works, and the author's aptitude with the terms. Tlicse were the lighter parts; the main work was the digging. Thus did all these labors and the daily game of single kill- ing go on along this line of twelve miles. At first the Confederates opposed the works witli ar- tillery; butsoon they ceased, partly to husband their ammunition, and partly because famil- iarity gave them an idea that there was no present danger from the approaches. After a time the opposition by musketry tire slack- ened, the besieged having a short supply of percussion caps. Says Baoeai": 120 The aim of the rebels seemed to be to await an- other assault, losing in the meantime as few men as possible. This indi (Terence to Grant's approach became, at some points, almost ludicrous. The be- siegers were accustomed to cover the front of their night working parties by a line of picliels, or by a covering party, and while these were not closer than a hundred yards, the enemy would throw out his picliets in front. At one point the rebel pickets entered into a regular agreement with those of the besiegers not to Hre on each other at night, and as most of the work in a siege is done at night, this arrangement was eminently satisfactory to the working parties. •*. On one occasion the picket officer was directed to crowd his pickets on the enemy's, ;0 as to allow the working party to push on another parallel. In doing this the two lines of pickets became inter- mixed, and, after some discussion, the opposing officers arranged their lines by mutual corapromise, the pickets in places not being ten yards apart, and in full view of each other. This gives the Confederate soldiers' idea of tlie danger of Grant's siege approaches. Nor is there anything to show that tliey under- rated it, or had any reason to fear the result ol another general assault from these nearer lines. Thus was the army expended in this dread- ful work along a line of twelve miles, in a burning sun by day and in the damps of the ravines by night, in the most uphealthy con- ditions, and in the most dispiriting labors that can be imposed on gallant soldiers; all , of which, save the intrenching of themselves, were to be useless, and all of which were for an ultimate aim which would be another vain .slaughter. Save that the besieged army may he short of provisions, its hardships are less than of the besiegers. Its intrenching is mostly done. Its line of fortifications occu- pies the high ground ; and its holding of them is in a less unhealthy situation than that of the besiegers. The following description of the condition of the besieged, .save the nuitter of food, and save that the labor of the besiegers was vastly greater, needs but little modification to de- scribe that of the devoted volunteers of GR.VNx'sarmy : The privations and exposures of the men were telling on their health and spirits. The miasmatic e.xhalations of the swamps, rising through the hot atmosphere of June, envelopea and penetrated their weary frames, exhausted by the long series of disastrous marches and ince.ssant bivouacs. '•' '•'' '' Their numbers were reduced by casualties, but far more by disease. Thousands were tossing and groaning in the hospitals, with none of the deli- cacies and little of the attention that the sick re- quire [The women of Vicksburg did not neglect the sick soldiers]; while those in the trenches were hardly better otf. Scorched by the sun, drenched by the rain, be- grimed with dirt, for water was far off, and time more precious still, " '■' * those weary, but heroic, rebels defended the citadel whose fall they believed would be tne fall of the Confederacy. Those vvho fought them the hardest could not, .tnd did not, fail to recognize their splendid gallantry and thorough devotion to an unrighteous cause. That this description is alike applicable to Grant' .s better fed, but more severely worked and more unhealthily situated army, is oh-, vious from the inevitable couditions, and is further shown by Gen. Grant's statement to Gen. Halleck, even after the army had been inspirited by the capture of Yicksburg, ' that it was now greatly exhausted, and "entirely unhtfor any duty requiringmucii marching.'' CHAPTER XLVI. oen. grant's alarm for his rear — to give t'P LOUISIANA FOR VICKSBURG — THE MIGHTY WORKS OF PICKAX AND SPADE — GEN. .IOHNSTON'S IN- ability — immobility of his subordinates — grant's objective strictly local. Gen. Grant's strategic march away from Yicksl)urg and the Confederate army, to scatter any gathering forces on the east, so that he might have Pemberton's army '"iso- lated from the would be Confecieracy," had entirely failed in its purpose, as has been seen; for according to Badeau not only did the fear of Johnston in his rear constrain him to sacrifice his army in a vain assault ou the Yicksburg intrenchnients, but he was in con- tinual apprehension of this, and was not at any time re-enforced enoitgh to quiet his un- easiness. On the 25th he wrote Gen. Rank.s, asking hira to come and help take Yicksburg. On the 31st he wrote Halleck this alarming statement: It is now certain that .Tohnston has already col- lected a force from 20,000 to 25,000 strong at Jack- son anle: War Is an awful game, and demands death and liesiruclion. A certain amount of fighting-— of kill- ins— had to be done, and the banks of the Rapidan and Mattapony were as good a place for it as those of the James and Appomattox. But if war is only a matter of unskilled Imtchery, why have a military institute to teach it? And if this be all of war, is there an impassable gulf between the professional and the volunteer? Can we expect to always have such conditions in our wars that we can afford to sacrifice three of our soldiers to do for one of the enemy, and therefore can af- ford to contemn all the art of war. Having failed to make the mine practica- l)le for anything but "the death hole," another mine was begun, which was exploded on the 1st of July. This appears not to have had any aim save to kill any Confederate soldiers that happened to be near at the explosion. The Confederate report says a ton of powder was fired in this. Badeau says: The result was the demolition of an entire redan, leaving only an immense chasm where the rebel work had stood. The greater portion of the earth was thrown toward the national forces, the line of least resistance being in that direction. The rebel inierior line, however, was much injured, and many of those manning tlie works were killed or wounded. But no serious attempt to charge was made, ihe result of the assaulis on the 2oth having been so inconsiderable. Gen. Benjamin F. But/jcr might find some satisfaction for the ridicule which educated officers heaped upon his Fort Fisher powder ship, in this mining by Gen. Grant's direc- tion, whose first great performance was to make a "death hole" where the safe enemy could butcher Grant's soldiers, and the next was to see the earth fly. But this appears to have been thought the art of war in a siege, or Badeau continues: From this time forward the engineers were kept constantly and busily employed mining and coun- termining on different portions of the line. Gen. Grant reported to Halleck on the 27th that Johnston expected 10,000 re- enforcements from BragCi. This was a mis- take. Johnston was inactive correspondence with the Richmond government, which was urging him to act, while he was protesting that he had not more than half the force necessary, and that to make the attempt on Grant's army with such a force would be de- struction. And he said: "The defeat of this little army would at once open Mississippi and Alabama to Grant." Johnston could not believe that Vicksburg was the sole ob- jective of all of Grant's mighty campaign; he supposed that he wanted that for a base from which to occupy Mississippi. Gen. Pemberton sent to Johnston that he ought not to attempt anything with less than ' 40,000 men : this in co-operation with Pem- berton' s forces. It was, in fact, impractica- ble to arrange such co-operation, for it re- quired correspondence in time, and corre- spondence was slow, difficult, and uncertain. Johnston's whole force was about 26,000 men, but it was lacking in equipment and trans- portation. When he came, all the military materials were at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. "Artillery had to be brought from the East, horses for it, and field transportation pro- cured in an exhausted country; much from Georgia, brought over wretched railroads." Thus he said: "I have not the means of moving." Gen. Johnston had written Gen. Pember- ton on the 14th of June that all he could at- tempt would be to save the garrison, and that to do this exact co-operation was indis- pensable; that "by fighting the enemy sim- ultaneously at the sanie'point of his line you may be extricated;" that his own communi- cations could best be preserved by operating north of the railroad, and asking him to state what point would be best for him. Gen. Pem- berton answered this on the 21st, proposing that, with due notice, Johnston should move by the north of the railroad, drive in the — 130 — enemy's pickets at night, and at daylight next morning engage mm heavily with skirmishers, occupying him during the entire day, and that on that night he, Pembertox, would move by the Warrenton road to Hau- kinson's Ferry. He further required Johnstox to send to Hankinson's a brigade of cavalry, with two field batteries', to build a bridge there and hold that ferry; also to hold Hall's and Baldwin's ferries to cover his crossing at Hankinson's. By this Johnstox was to attack on the north, where were the intrenchments of Haine's Bluff, and to the Big Black River, while Pemberton moved out to the south. And this required j^retty strong detachments from Johnston's forces to keep Pemberton' s way clear over the Big Black River. Gen. Johnston answered this on the 22d, stating that Gen. Richard Taylor had sent Gen. E. K. Smith to co-operate with Pemberton on the west side of the Mississippi, to throw in supplies, and to cross with his forces, if ex- pedient and practicable. He added: I will have the means of moving toward the enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a di- version in your favor; and if possible, communi- cate witli you, though I fear my force is too small to effect the latter. * <= * If 1 can do nothing, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment, if you and Gen. Taylor can communicate. Gen. Pemberton's report relates that about the 30th of May the meat ration was reduced one-half, but that of sugar, rice, and beans was largely increased, and chewing tobacco was impressed and issued to the troops. "This had a very beneficial influence." By the 12th of June, says Gen. Pemberton: .\bout this time our provisions, particularly of meat, having become nearly exhausted, Gen. Stone- man was instructed to impress all the cattle iu the city, and the chief commissary directed to sell only one ration per diem to any officer. He was also iustructea to issue for bread equal portions of rice and flour, four ounces of eacii. By this the reduction of the bread ration one-half came on top of the reduction of tlie meat ration. On the 15th he wrote Johnston: "Our men have no relief, and are becoming much fatigued, but are still in pretty good spirits. I think your movement should he made as soon as possible. * * * We are living on greatly reduced rations, but I think sufficient for twenty days yet." To the mortar bom- bardment were now added several very heavy guns, in position on the peninsula, the fire of which, Pemberton says, was very destructive. On the 19th he wrote: "I hope you will ad- vance with the least possible delay. My men have been thirty-four days and nights in trenches without relief. * * * We are living on greatlj^ reduced rations. What aid am I to expect from you?" Under date of June 22, his report says: About this time, our stock of bacon having been almost exhausted, the experiment of using mule meat as a substitute was tried, '■' '■'■' * and I am gratified to say it was found by both officers and men not only nutritious, but very palatable, and in every way preferable to poor beef. By the latter part of June, says Baoeait, taking from a Southern narrative of the siege : I Flour was S5 a pound, or Sl.OOO a barrel, rebel money; meal, $140 a bushel; molasses, jflO and $12 a gallon; and beef (very often oxen killed by the national shells and picked up by the butchers), was sold at $2 and $2 50 by the pound. Mule meat, sold 'at $1 per pound, was in great demand. Many fami- lies of wealth had eaten the last mouthful, and the poorer class of non-combatants was on the verge of starvation. There was scarcely a building that had not been struck by shells, and many were entirely demol- ished. A number of women and children had been killed or wounaed by mortar shells, or balls, and all who did not remain in the damp caves or hillsides were in danger. The hospitals, which were now a large feature, had to take their chances with the other liouses in the unceasing bombardment. Starvation was swiftly bringing the surrender of a place which was impregnable to all of Grant's ill ordered assaults, saps, mines, and batteries. Gen. Pemberton, on the 22d, wrote Johnston suggesting that he should propose terms to Geriv Grant for the surrender of tlie place, but not of the troops. He added that his men were much fatigued by being con- stantly in the trenches, and were living on very reduced rations, but still, if there was hope of ultimate relief, they would hold out for fifteen days longer. The difficulty of communication may be seen in the date of Johnston's answer to this — the 27th. He said: — 131 Gen. E. K. Smith's troops have been mismanagerl, and have fallen back to Delhi. I have sent a special messenger urging him to assume direct command. The determined spirit you manifest, and his expect- ed co-operation, encourage me to hope something may yet be done to save Vicksbnrg, and to postpone both the modQs of extricating the garrison. Xe20- tiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make them, they may be considered as made under my authority. The bearer of this dispatch was captured. Forasmuch as Gen. Johnston had now no expectation of an increase of his own force, this encouragement that Vicksburg might at last be saved depended on Gren. Richard T.\ylor's sending a force to break the invest- ment west of the river, and throw in sup- plies. It is reasonable to suppoee that with these the defense might have been prolonged indefinitely, and a very large diversion of Grant's forces to the west side made necessary. But Gen. Banks had Port Hud- son now' in the same strait as Grant Vicks- burg, and Gen. Taylor was trying to relieve that place. Thus divided between the two, he relieved neither. This gives a further illustration of the strange military idea of Grant, Halleck, Stanton, and Lincoln, that Banks should abandon the Lower Mississippi, and come and help Grant besiege Vicksburg. Had he done so, not only would Louisiana and the Lower Mississippi have been lost, but it is unlikely that Vicksburg would have been taken. Gen. GR.A.NT, in his letter to Halleck, ex- plaining why he could not protect the leased plantations west of the Mississippi, stated: Beside.s the gun boats, negro troops, and six regi- ments of white troops, left west of the Mississippi fiiver in consequence of these plantations being there, I sent an additional brigade from the invest- ing army, and that at a time when government was straining every nerve to send me troops to in- sure the sucsrss of the enterprise against Vicksburg. All this has not been availing. But it appears that the colored troops, chiefly, repulsed an attack on his base of sup- plies at Milliken's Bend, and that this force, which he calls detaclied because of the leased plantations, defeated a promising ex- pedition in the niok of time, for throwing .supplies into Vicksburg. Gen. .ToHNsTON states that on the 'iMth, hav- ing procured the necessary supplies and field transportation and artillery equipment, and a serviceable floating bridge, the army was ordered to march next morning toward Big Black River. He says "the effective force was a little above 20,000 infantry and artil- lery, and 2,000 cavalry." Reconnaissances, "to which the 2d, 3d, and 4th of July were devoted," convinced him that no attack was practicable north of the railroad; he therefore "determined to move on the morning of the 5th by Edward's depot to the south of that road." On the 3d a courier from Gen. Pemberton ar- rived, having left Vicksburg on the 28th of June, He had been so near capture as to think necessary to destroy his dispatches. Johnston sent back by him to Pemberton the following, dated the 3d: Your dispatches of 28th were destroyed by mes- senger. He states that Gen, Smith's troops were driven back to Monroe. This statement and your account of your condition make me think it necessary to create a diversion, and thus enable you to cut your way out, if the time has arrived for vou to do this. Of that time I can not judge — you must, as it depends upon your condition. I hope to at- tack the enemy in your front on the 7th, and your co-operation will be necessary. The manner and the proper point for you to bring the garrison out, must be determined by you, from your superior knowledge of the ground anddis\ribution of the enemy's forces. Our firing will show you where we are engaged. If Vicksburg can not be saved, the garrison must. An operation, requiring such exact and prearranged co-operation, between forces widely separated by the opposing army, and whose interchanges of intelligence were so slow and uncertain, was impracticable. The bearci; of this dispatch was captured. Mean- while that was going on between Grant and Pemberton which made Johnston's move- ment unnecessary just as he had gotten ready to begin. CHAPTER XLIX. preparing for another assault — the capit- tfl-\tion — the play of unconditional sur- render — marring a great event by small personal motives — the petty dispute — the terms of capitulation — .strategem to de- MORALIZE PEMBEKTON's TROOPS. By the 1st of July the trenching had reached such a stage that Badeau says "little — 132 — farther progres« could be made by digging alone, and Grant accordingly determined to make the final assault on the morning of the 6th of July." Not that the "siege approaches" had reduced, or expected to reduce, any part of the fortifications, but that the trenches would enable "columns of fours" to debouch at points near to the enemy's works. As before, the assault was not to be by mass- ing troops on particular points, but was to be a general line attack on the fortifications, or as much of a line as could be made by de- bouching from the trenches in columns of fours. Badeac narrates communications be- tween the pickets which showed that the Confederate soldiers expected this assault with confidence. Whether this was to be the final assault was problematical. But assum- ing it to be certain, Badeau includes among the terrors now hanging over Vicksburg the ancient custom of giving license to mercenary troops ujjon the disarmed soldiers and the in- habitants of a town taken by assault. He goes on : To crown all, after a few more contractions of the coil, another mighty assault would bring the enemy immediately beneath the walls, when, covered by their works, and more numerous than the besieged, the assailants, in every human probability, would storm the town, and all the unutterable horrors to which fallen cities are exposed might come udou the devoted fortress. But although Baueah was revised by Gen. Grant, this must be taken as a flight of rhetoric; for it is not likely that he had any thought of making the rapine, slaughter, and ravishment of the inhabitants of Vicksburg, nor even the slaughter of the garrison, the prize of the soldiers in a successful assault; and even if he had, the volunteers would not have accepted such a reward. In the middle ages the mercenary troops were given unbridled license in a town taken by assault, after a formal demand for sur- render had been refused. The British still practice this in their wars in Asia. But it is no part of civilized warfare, and is a shame to England. The imagination must be truculent which can suppose that the volunteers would have given rage to the passions of killing, pill- age, and '■the unutterable horrors" on the de- fenseless inhabitants, or on the overpowered soldiers of Vicksburg, if that place had iseen taken by storm. Gen. Pemberton, having about 18,000 soldiers in the lines, and the fortifica- tions unbroken, had good ground to believe that he could repulse an assault as before, atid to decline a summons to surrender. Under the circumstances such a refusal would be no reason for savage measures, if Grant had car- ried the place by storm. But no- mention is made that Grant intended even the formality of a summons to surrender. Gen. Pemberton's report narrates: "By the 1st of July I became satisfied that the time had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city and cut my way otit, or to capitulate upon the best attainable terms." He therefore addressed a communication to each of the division Generals, Stevenson, Forney, Smith, and Bowen, reanesting them to inform him as to the condition of their troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo, the fatigues necessary to accom- plish a successful evacuation. The substance of the answers was that the troops were not in condition for such marching, and for the fighting which might be expected, and that the attempt would result in the destruction of a large part of the troops that made it. Thereupon. July 3. Gen. Pemberton ad- dressed to Gen. Grant the following: General: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice of hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to yon, 1 will appoint three com- missioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to avoid the effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indeliuite period. This communication will be nanded you under a flag of truce Dv Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen. To this, in the course of two huurs, was sent the following answer: General: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours fortiie pur- pose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointea, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by tliis course can be ended at any time you choose by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have sliown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicl;sburg will always chal- lenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to pris- oners of war. I do not favor the proposition of ap- pointing commissioners to arrange terms of capit- ulation, because I have no terms oi;lier thau those indicated above. 133 — The greatness and dignity of this affair was now belittled by motives of personal vanity and popular clap-trap, which caused a trucu- lent demand that was not in earnest, a piti- ful dispute in the small ettbn to put upon Gen. Pembkrton the liumiliation of asking a reopening of negotiations after this refusal of all terms save unconditional surrender. The incitement to this may be seen by a reference to a previous surrender. When Gen. Gk.vnt returned from Commo- dore Foote's gunboat, and found that for half a day a furious battle had been raging by a sortie of the army of Fort Donelson, and that more than lialf of his army had Deen driven back, he sent this word to Commodore FooTE. whose boats had all been disabled in attacking the fort the day before: A terrible foiifiici ensiR'd iii luy .ab-seiice, wiiicli lias demoralized a portion of my commana, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats do not appear it will reas.surc the enemy, and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a cliarge to save appearances. 1 do not expect the gunboats to go into aciiou. Before his army had l>een hurt he had dis- l>alched Gen. Hai.leck that he would have to intrench, for he said: "I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops." Feeling this way before the disaster, the sit- ' nation now looked badly. But Gen. C. F. S.MiTJi formed a storming force of Gen. L.\u- man's brigade, resolved on something more than to save appearances. He led it in per- son, iinimating the "new troops" by his ex- ample, and tiiey carried by storm a part of the f(jrt wliich was the key to the position. Here tliey ancl their gallant veteran commander lay on the frozen ground without slielter, tire, or overcoats through the long night. In the morning Gen. Bi^ckxer hoisted the white ilag, and sent a messenger to Gen. Gkant, proposing an armistice till 12 o'clock and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation. To refuse tliis per- emptorily was j)roper; fur (trant could not know that the time would not be used as a ruse in. order to mass troops to drive out the assaulting force. He now rose with the occtision, and sent back this answer: No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move im- mediately upon your works. Gen. Buckler's situation — his two supe- riors having fled with all the troops that could get away in the night — was such that he was compelled to surrender uncondition- ally. In the great rejoicing over this great victory. Gen. 3r.vnt's answer to Buckner was celebrated as if it, and not Gen. SMiTii'i lead- ing and Gen. Lauman's brigade, had made the capture. That the surrender was uncon- ditional was tliought to be more than the vic- tory. The initials of Gen. Grant's name be- came popularly interpreted as Unconditional Surrender Graxt. Secretary Staxton, then wrestling with the much preparing Gen. Mc- CleliiAN, wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Tribune, in a strain of great re- ligious exaltation, conveying that the whole art of war was contained in Grant's answer to BtJCKNEit, saying: We iflay well rejoice at the recent victories, for they teach us that battles are to be won now, and by us, in the same and only manner that they were ever won by any people, or in any age since Joshua, by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be the true organization of victory and military com- bination to end this war, was declared in a few words by Gen. Grant's message to Gen. Buckner : "1 propose to move immediately on your wor'ivS." Therefore did the vanity of playing a part up to the popular name of Unconditional Surrender Grant lead him to make this per- emptory refusal to negotiate for the capitula- tion of a place which he had twice assaulted, with great slaughter of his soldiers; whose fortifications were intact, and which had 18,000 men to defend them, and while he thought that the threatening situation on both sides of tlie Mississippi compelled him to assault again, with the certainty of repeat- ing the slaughter of the 22d of June, and with no certainity of any other result. The nature of this refusal of terms can be appreciated by reflecting on the probable consequences if Gen. Pemberton had taken Gen. Grant at his word, and he had sent his troops to death in another as- sault. Does not Badeau's history place Grant in the situation of choosing the further sacri- fice of his own soldiers, in ordar to play up to his popular sobriquet? Then followed an un- seemly dispute over the unseemly question who it was that made the proffer of further negotiation, or of a mediation to get Gen. 134 Grant to relent his implacable temper. Ba- DEAu's version is this: Bowen was received by Gen. .\, J. Smith, and ex- pressed a strong desire to conversu with Grant: this, however, was not allowed; he then suggested that it would be well if Grant and Pemberton could meet. Grant, therefore, sent a verbal message that if Pemberton wished to see him, an interview could be had between the lines, in Mcpherson's, at 3 o'clock that afternoon. He sent this verbal' message with the above written answer. Thus was tlie demand for unconditional surrender coupled with the written promise of generous treatment, and with a consent to see Pkmberton to talk over the matter. Badeau's narrative of the interview fetches this great affair down to a play of bluff. .Grant went to the place of meeting, between the lines, with Gens. Ord, McPhee.son, Logan, and A. J. Smith, and several of his staff; Pemberton with Gen. Bowen and Capt. 'Mont- gomery. Badeau narrates: The two Generals shook hands, and Pemberton inquired what terms of capitulation would be allowed him. Grant replied: "Those that had been expressed in his letter of this morning;" where- upon Pemberton haughtily declared: "If this were all, the conference might terminate, and hostilities be resumed immediately." "Very well," said Grant, and turned away. According to Badeau's narrative Gen. Grant thus chose to send his army to another assault upon these fortifications rather than grant any terms of capitulation, and he, b^- his peremptory manner, cut off all further negotiations. Gen. Pembekton's version is different; but Gen. Grant, who revised Badeau's narrative, is ejititled to his version, whatever the reflection. Badeau goes on : But Gen. Bowen then proposed that two of the snborainates present should retire for consultation and sugge.-!t such terms as tliey might thinly proper for the consideration of their chief.s. Grant had no . objection to this, but would not cou.sider himself bound by any agreement of his .subordinates. He, himself, must decide what terms were to be al- lowed. Smith and Bowen accordingly went a little way apart, while Grant and Pemberton walked up and down between the parapets conversing. Even by Badeau's account it thus appears that Gen. Graft's refusal to consider any terms but unconditional surrender had now limbered down to a consent to let commis- sioners consult about conditions. Gen. Pemberton's report narrates that he understood from Bowen that Grant desired a personal conference, but upon arriving on the ground : I soon learned that there was a mutual misun- derstanding in regard to the desire for this inter- view, and therefore informed Gen. Grant that if he had no terms to propose other than were contained in his letter, the conference could terminate, and hostilities be resumed immediately. After some further conversation, he (Grant) proposed that Gen. Bowen and Cajjt. Montgomery, ana two of his staff officers, Maj. Gens. McPherson a"fid Smith, should retire, consult, and suggest such terms as they thought proper for our cotisideration. After some conversation between these officers, we parted, with the understanding that Gen. Grant would communicate with me by 10 o'clock, and about that hour the following letter was received. Here is a flat difference as to who proposed the personal interview, and who proposed the commissioners of conference, and Gen. Pemberton's statement has the corroboration of the result, which is wholly contradictory to the ground which Badeau says that Grant took. Gen. Pemberton, in 1875, wrote a letter to Col. John P. Nicholson, of Philadelphia, giving his version of the interview. This states that the misunderstanding as to Grant's having expressed a desire for an interview was his, and was satisfactorily explained: that after Grant had repeated that he had no other terms but his first, and Pemberton had declared that the fighting would go on, it was « Grant that proposed a conference, and that they parted, Grant consenting that as he had rejected Pemberton's proposition, it was his part to make one, and agreeing to send one that night. Badeau's further narrative seems to corrob- orate PexMBERTon in tliis. He says: After .some discussion it was agreed that Grant should send his terms to Pemberlon before 10 o'clock that night. '■■ " '■■' Grant returned to his quarters', and, for the only time in his life, held what might be called a council of war. He sent for all his corps and division Generals on the city front, and received their opinions as to the terms which should be allowed to Pemberton. It would not accord with Badkvu's measure of Grant's great mind if l)e did not in tliis take a view greatly higher than his subordi- nates. It pleases Badeau, approved by Grant, to represent Gen. Grant in this as im- placal)le toward the Vicksburg army, and as- demanding severer terms of surrender than — 135 other men could rise to. Accordingly, he says : With one exception (Gen. Steele), they suggested terms that Grant was unwilling to sanction, and their judgment was not accepted. The following letter was written instead, ;ind forwarded to Pem- bertou. But Grant's letter was so different from his original demand as to make that appear a de- feated attempt to play the bully. It offered these liberal terms: 1. To march in one division as a guard. 2. All officers and men to be paroled, and to march out, all to have their clothing, officers their side arms, field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. 3. Any required amount of rations and cook- ing utensils to be taken from their own stores, and thirty wagons for transportation. Tiiese terms were generous, but not too gen- erous under the circumstances. But to start in insolently with the refusal to talk of any terms but unconditional siirrender, and then to come down to this proposition, was to thrust into a great military event the tactics of the Cheap John auctioneer. Pemberton received this at 10 o'clock p. m. of July 3, and in the same nightseiitan answer, accept- ing the terms in the main, but asking these amendments: 1. The garrison to march out at 10 o'clock on the 4th, and surrender by stacking arms in front of the works, then Grant to take possession. 2. Officers to retain personal property. 3. Rights and property of private citizens to be respected. The manner in which Pemberton proposed to make the surrender was much more spec- tacular than that of Grant's propositions. It was as if he thought a scene of laying down arms would make it n\ore imposing. Grant accepted this, but declined any enlargement of the private property allowed to officers, or to bind himself as to the private property of citizens. Gen. Pemberton gave as his reason for proposing to surrender on the 4th of July that he thought "the vanity of our foes" would lead them to give better terms for a capture which would be such a celebration. It appears that both sides were expediting the negotiations all night to this spectacular end, and by 8 o'clock a. m. of the 4th, Pemberton's formal acceptance was received by Grant, the surrender to be made at 10 o'clock. But Badeau narrates that during the live- long night Unconditional Surrender Grant was not limiting himself to a negotiation of conditions with Gen. Pemberton, but was at the same time carrying on a negotiation through the Confederate pickets to corrupt Pemberton's troops. He says: During that n,ight Grant sent instructions to Ord and McPiierson to put discreet men on picket, and allow them to communicate to the enemy's pickets the fact thnt in case of surrender both officers and men would be paroled and allowed to return to their homes. Not only paroled by him, but discharged from Confederate authority. CHAPTER L. the surrender — GRAND ENTRY OF THE NATION- \AL TROOPS — THE GENERAL's BULLETIN — THE TROPHIES — THE NOT VALID PAROLE — THE NUM- BER PAROLED — HOW IT WAS SWELLED — THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THE CAPTURE OF THE PLACE. At 10 o'clock on the 4th of July, 18G3, a ceremony took jilace which, to the volunteers who had survived this dreadful campaign, must have seemed the reward of their hard- ships, which, to the chiefs, brought glory and promotion, and whose announcement caused extravagant joy throughout the country. The defenders of Vicksburg marched outside of their lines and stacked their arms, while the national volunteers stood on their para* pets in silence, ob.serving the ceremony. This triumph had cost the national volun- teers dearly, and in the course of the whole campaign, sickness, wounds, and death had deprived of the view of this closing scene a larger number than the surrendered. The ca- pitulation was a severe mortification to the Southern troops, but no dishonor. They had yielded to starvation that which superior force had tried in vain to take, and they had received honorable terms. The place which had been the object of all the hardships, sac- rifices, and heroism of a great army for nearly a year was now gained. Gen. Logan's division then entered the town. Badeau says it was entitled to this honor of being first, because it "was one of those which had approached nearest to the rebel works," and "had been heavily engaged in both assaults." The column marched to 136 the Court House, upon which the 48tQ Illinois placed its flacj. Gen. Grant and staff rode at the head of the column. "He went direct to one of the rebel headquarters,'" and entered, and, Badeau says, was coldly received. He had an interview with Pemberton. Badeau says that Pemberton now requested Grant to supply the garrison with rations, and when Grant asked him how many would be needed, Pemberton replied: "I have 32,000 men." Grant then rode to the landing to exchange "congratulations with Admiral Porter on the flagship, but returned to his old camp at dark." His quarters were not removed to Vicksburg till the 0th. That night he an- jiounced the capitulation to the government in these words: "Theenemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their pa- role. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this juncture. It saves probably several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service." Grant had now become convinced that the conditional was better than the unconditional surrender, A week was taken in making the paroles and other arrangements, and then the garri- son, except the sick, marched out into the Confederacy. Gen. Halle<'k sent to Grant the following, July 8: I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg vvithouc actual delivery to a proper agent, as re- quired by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and th.at these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you vvill retain ihem until further orders. Before this was received, Badeau says, the prisoners had left Vicksburg. Upon this point Badeau makes a plea that Grant was "obliged to parole and discharge his prison- ers" by the terms of the cartel, and he quotes these terms as if proving it; but they prove that paroles were not to be held valid by either side unless the prisoners were reduced to actual possession, and were then formally delivered up to the other, at stated places, and to the authorized agent. One of these places was Vicksburg; but as Grant had captured that, there was no Confederate au- thority there to which to deliver his prison- ers. Unquestionably Gen. Halleck's statement of the conditions of the cartel was correct. and his view that if the Confederate authori- ties should hold strictly to the terms, tbey could place these paroled men in the ranks without exchange. The common report of the time was that this was done, and that among the forces gathered to resist the march of Gen. RosECRANs were many of the paroled Vicksburg array. This is a matter which is not easy to find out at this time. It could not be expected to be found in Confederate reports, and Badeau's treatment of this parole question is a plea of defense, and the defense is the false plea that "Grant was therefore obliged to parole and discharge his prisoners" by the cartel. The number of men surrendered is stated bj-^ Badeau as 31,600, but he says "the num- ber actually paroled was 28,892;" that "709 re- fused to be paroled, and were sent North as prisoners." To make up the rest he estimates that "many hundreds died in the hospitals be- fore the paroling could be completed, and over 1,000 escaped, or concealed themselves, or, disguised as citizens, avoided being pa- roled." But the number actually paroled was 28,892, and the conditions were such as to make a parole desirable, instead of a thing to avoid. Badeau states the captures as 105 field guns and sixty-seven garrison guns. The history written by Charles A. Dana and Grant's Chief Engineer, Wilson, says: "The rebels surrendered 21,000 efTective men. and 6,000 wounded in hospital, besides over 120 guns of all calibers." Captured guns are cherished trophies, but more when captured on the field of battle than when surrendered by starvation, The difference between the surrender of men paroled and the number j stated by Gen. Pemberton in his report as his effective force at the beginning of the siege, namely, 18,500. and in his dispatch to Gen. J. E. Johnston after the two assaults, namely, 18,000, needs remark. Badeau takes the number which he says Pemberton stated to Grant as requiring rations, and from that he calculates back that Pemberton pursued a course of understating liis force at Edwards' Station and Champion's Hill. A lumping statement of numbers, how- ever, made for rations to the hungry, may have been a liberal one. Badeau has to guess at the unknown to make out 31,600, after he has stated all that were paroled. To suppose that Pemberton would make a false report of his force to Gen, Johnston, when he was 137 anxious for Johnston to co-operate for his re- lief, would be unreasonable; also, a false re- port of his force would be swiftly challenged by Johnston and the War Department. At the beginning he stated his effective force as about 18,500. Subsequently he stated 'his losses during the siege as about 1,000. But it will be supposed, as a matter of course, that all the citizens and sojourners in the town who were able to bear arms were made to help the defense. Badeau, taking from "a rebel narrative of the siege," describing the retreat of Pember- ton's army into Vicksburg after the rout at Black River Bridge, says: "The planters and population of the country, fleeing from the presence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and the confusion." Every man in the Confederacy, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, was under conscrip- tion, and if permitted to be at home to work his farm or attend to other business, he was detailed to this. The men over this age were enrolled as "State troops." With all this Pemberton could place in the trenches every man in Vicksburg able to bear arms. In the answers of Pemberton's Generals to his questions whether their troops were in a condition to make the attempt to fight the way out of Vicksburg, Maj. Gen. M. L. Smith wrote: "There are al)out 3,000 men in my division, including State troops." In another part of the letter he mentions the regulars as 2,000. He said: "Out of the 3,000 only about 2,000 are considered reliable in case we are strongly opposed and much harassed." With the enrollment of all the men in Vicksbufrg who were able to bear arms, it is reasonable to suppose that Pemberton could increase his number of 18,500 effectives to 21,000 nominally in arms wlien he sur- rendered. Besides, the service of the Confederate troops, since the national army had emerged from the swamps, had been severe, their losses in battle large, and they endured the hard- ships of campaigning with less stamina than the Northern volunteers. Such a list of sick and wounded aa might reasonably be calcula- ted would account for the number stated by Dana's history, as "21,000 effective men," in- cluding "State troops," and "over 6,000 in hospital," thus leaving the correctness of Pembketon's report that he had 18,500 effect- ive men when first besieged in Vickaburg. These 18,500 regular troops who were effect- ive when Grant began the siege, deducting their losses during the siege, were the effective regular force lost to the Confederacy by this siege and capture. Besides this was the large number of sick and wounded of the regular force, of whom the number stated by Dana as 6,000 was probably no exaggeration, making between 2-f,000 and 25,000 of the regular Con- federate soldiers. The capture of the sick and wounded did not diminish the present Confederate strength, and they were a burden to us; but as many as survived would count in exchange. Pollard, the Southern historian, whose general candor is conceded by Greeley's his- tory, says: "The numbers which surrendered at Vicksburg were 27,000 men, with three Major Generals and nine Brigadiers, upward of ninety pieces of artillery, and about 40,- 000 small arms. Weakness from fatigue, short rations, and heat, had left thousands of the troops decrepit. Six thousand of them were in hospitals, and many of them were crawling about in wjiat should be convales- cent camps." Citizen.?, armed for the defense, and State troops, made up the rest to tlie number stated by Dana and Wilson as 27,000, or to the num- ber stated by Badeau as actually paroled, namely, 28.892. It was Gen. Pkmberton's duty to return for parole all that liad borne arms in the defense, and the parole was sought for. Such of the planters and business men as were under the conscription, but were de- tailed lo attend to their business, were glad to be paroled, because it was an indefinite furlough to them. The citizens and State troops desired it for the same reason. The Confederate soldiers wanted it because it relieved them from the terrible duty in the field, and seemed a promise of visiting their homes. These conditions, aided by the present des- titution and government rations, combined to enlarge the paroled list to a number greatly beyond the effective force surren- dered, and to make the captures on the national side far greater than the loss of effective forces on the Confederate side. Tiie authorities at Washington seemed to judge military results by the inventory of the sur- rendered, and to think a capture of a town by the work of starvation, after a campaign of two seasonS; a greater military result than 138 a victory in a pitched battle, such as that of Gettysburg, which effectually disabled Lee's hitherto invincible army as an offensive force, while the Confederate army in the West had yet to be encountered in the field. The importance of the capture of a place, however, is not to be measured by its tro- phies in guns and flags, nor even by the num- ber of soldiers surrendered. They who con- sider the object of war will hardly say that the capture of these men and guns was a suf- ficient military object for the occupation of all the force of Grant's department for two campaigning seasons, and all the consuming of men and means thereby. No military power could afford to make war upon such terms. The importance of the taking of Vicksburg was not in the number of men or guns surrendered, but in its military position, as a commanding place lost by the adversary, or as a commanding place gained by us for further operations. If the capture of Vicksburg had neither of these military consequences; if its loss did not lay open the Confederacy to a further campaign from this point of vantage; if it was not to us a base for a line of operations to the heart of the Confederate power in the western zone of the war, then the Vicksburg campaign would have no military meaning, and the capture not only would not be worth a tithe of the immense cost in men and other resources, but it would not redeem the course of disaster which had abandoned an interior campaign on a true military line, to bury an army in the Mississippi swamps. Further along we shall see the military consequences of this capture of a place which was thought ' to have fatally dismembered the Confederacy. CHAPTER LI. THE SURRENDER OF PORT HUDSON — A VICTORY IN SPITE OF ORDERS — SHERMAN'S MARCH ON JACK- son — vicksburg the finality of the cam- paign — the way kept open for johnston to retreat — devastation — the isolation of grant's army at vicksburg. Gen. Banks had been prosecuting the siege of Port Hudson with great energy, and the garrison had been reduced to extremit_v. Hearing of the surrender of Vicksburg, and finding no promise of relief from either Gen. J. E. Johnston on the east, or Gen. Richard Taylor on the west, Gen. Gardner surren- dered on the 8th of July. And now, says Badeau: "The attempted Confederacy was cut in twain, and, in the forcible language of Lincoln, 'The father of waters rolled un- vexed to the sea.' " The capture of Port Hudson was the com- pletion of an intelligent and successful operation west of the Mississippi, which was vital to the possession of Louisiana and of all the lower river. It had been carried out with a comparatively small force. Banks had but about 10,000 men to besiege Port Hudson, held by over 7,000, and he was more imminently threatened by Gen. Richard Tay- lor than Grant was by Gen. J. E. Johnston. The possession of Port Hudson was as im- portant to the "cutting of the Confederacy in twain," and the unvexed flow of the father of waters, as Vicksburg. The siege had been pushed with the utmost energy and by two assaults, and the garrison was nearly ex- hausted. Gen. Gardner surrendered 6,408 men, of whom 455 were officers. In the brief campaign west of the Mississippi, and in ihfs conclusion at Port Hudson, Gen. Banks' troops had cap- tured 10,584 men, 73 guns, 6,000 small arms, three gunboats, eight other steamboats, be- sides cotton, cattle, and other supplies. And now this strong fort was taken, which com- manded the navigation of the Mississippi as much as Vicksburg did. Instead of having now to begin the work of taking Port Hud- son, which would have been the case if Grant and the Washington authorities had had their way in calling Banks off to help Grant tak^ Vicksburg, with probably the work of re- covering Louisiana to begin anew, Louis- iana was firmly in our possession, the last Con- federate stronghold on the Mississippi cap- tured; the Confederacy had suffered a heavy loss of men and munitions and supi)lies; the "Confederacy was cut in twain, and tlie father of waters rolled unvexed to the sea, and Banks was ready for an operation which the administration was now very anxious to enter upon in Texas. All this had given es- sential cooperation to Grant's taking of Vicksburg. Yet all this success was slighted by the Washington authorities, and Badeau treats it as a consequence of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, — 139 Before Pemberton had proposed negotia- tions, Sherman had been placed in command of the army of the rear, formed to resist John- 6TON. On the night of the 4th, Grant ordered Ord and Steele to join Sherman, making about 40.000 men, and ordered him: ''Drive Johnston from the Mississippi Central Rail- road; destroy the bridges as far north as Grenada with your cavalry, and do the enemy all the harm possible." In another order he said: "I want you to drive Johnston out in your own way, and inflict on the enemy all the punishment you can. I will support you to the last man that can be spared." These orders gave Gen. Grant's view of the objective of the Vicksburg campaign, and of the military value of the capture of that place. They showed that it had not been sought as a commanding base for further operations, but that the mere occupation of Vicksburg was the ultimate object of the whole campaign, which contemplated noth- ing further in that quarter save devastating raids. All of Gen. J. E. Johnston's course proves that his limited mind could not rise to the height of Grant's generalship; for he thought that Grant wanted Vicksburg as a base for operations to possess the State of Mississippi. He was incapable of believing that Grant could spend such a force merely to /capture a town. Believing that he intended this as a base for an interior movement into the very heart of the Confederacy, and the navigation of the river having before been lost, through Fabragut's fleet and the running of the Vicksburg guns, he held that the place was of little military importance to the Confederacy, and that the great necessity was. to save the army to protect the interior from the invasion which he supposed would follow the capture of this place. Thus did these two greatest military men of their respective sections — the one regarded as the greatest strategist and tactician of the Confederacy, the other as the greatest General of the nation, and rated by his authorized biographer as greater than Bonaparte— take opposite views of the objective and opportu- nities of Grant's campaign ; Johnston tliink ing that the great operation was to follow the capture of Vicksburg; Grant making that his final objective. Johnston fell back to Jackson, before which place Shermax arrived on the 9th. Johnston's narrative says of the fortifications, which had been made under Pemberton's orders: These works, consisting of a very light line of rifle pits, with low embankments at intervals to cover field pieces, extended from a point nortli of the town, and a little east of the Canton road, to one son th of it within a short distance of Pearl River, and covered the approaches to tlie place west (^ the river. These intrenchments were very badly located and constrncied, and offered very slight obstacle to a vigorous assault.; Reports of Johnston's olTicers led him to believe that the want of water would compel Sherman to make an immediate assault, and he disposed of his troops to meet that. But he says: "Instead of attacking as soon as it came up. as we had been hoping, the Federal army intrenched and began to construct bat- teries." He continues: Hills within easy cannon range, commanding and encircling the town, ofifered very favorable sites for Federal batteries. A crossfire of shot and shell reached all parts of the town, showing that the position would be untenable under the fire of a powerful artillery. Such, as it was ascertained, was soon to be brought to bear upon it. On the 11th Johnston telegraphed President Davis that it was impossible to 'hold the place against a siege, and that unless the enemy attacked he must, or else abandon the place, and that to attack would expose the army to destruction. Gen. Sherman narrates in the memoirs: We closed our lines about Jaclsson; my corps (15th) held the center, extending from Clinton to the Raymond road; Ord's (13th) on the right, reach- ina Pearl River below the town, and Parke's (9th) the left, above the town. On the 11th we pressed close in. and shelled the town from every direc- tion. One of Ord's brigades (Lauman's) got too close, and was very roughly handled, and driven back in disorder. Gen. Ord accused the commander (Gen. Lauman) of having disregarded his orders, and attributed to him personally the disaster and heavy loss or men. He requested his relief, which I granted, and Gen. Lauman went to the rear, and never regained his brigade. He died after the war, in Iowa,' much respected, as 'before that time he had been universally esteemed a most crallant and excellent officer. Gen. Johnston's narrative tells this affair as on the 12th. The "memoirs" paid little heed to accuracy in dates or other facts. John.ston says: On the 12th, besides the usual skirmifihing, there — 140 — was increased fire with artillery, especially by bat- teries near the Canton road, and those immediately to the south of that to Clinton. The missiles fell in all parts of the town. An assault, though not a yigorous one, was made in Breckinridge's front. It was quickly repulsed, however, by the well directed fire of Slocomb's and Cobb's batteries, and a flank attack by the skirmishers of the 1st, 3d, and 4th Florida, and 47th Georgia regiments. The enemy lost about 200 prisoners, the same number killed, many wounded, and the colors of the 28th, 41st, and 53d Illinois regiments. The at- tacking troops did not advance far enough to be ex- posed to the fire of Breckinridge's line. On the 13th the Federal lines had been so ex- tended that both flanks rested upon Pearl River. Col. A. C. Fuller of Lieut. Gen. Pemberton's staff, arrived from Vicksburg, and informed us of the terms of the capitulation. » ■> * He stated also tliat at the time of the surrender about 18,000 men were reported fit for duty in the trenches, and about COOO sick and wounded in the hospitals. And the estimates for rations to be furnished to the troop? of the garrison by the United Slates Com- mis ary Department were based on a total of 31,030 men. Johnston learned from his scoxits on the 14tli that a large ammunition train had left Vicksburg by the Jackson road. On the 15th he telegraphed President Davis that the enemy had begun a siege, which he could not resist. A cavalry attempt to intercept the train failed. The state of the batteries indi- cated that all \vould open oh tiie town on the 17th; tlierefore .Tohnston evacuated the place on the night of the 16th. He says: All public property, and the sick and wounded, except a few not in condition to bear removal, Jiad been carried to the rear, to Brandon, and be- yond. The army marched to Brandon by two roads, destroying behind it the bridges by which it crossed Pearl River. Johnston gives his loss in Jackson as seventy-one killed, 504 wounded, twenty-five miissing. Belated soldiers wlio left the town at 7 or 8 o'clock informed him that appar- ently the enemy had not then discovered its evacuation. Sherman continues his narrative thus: The weather was fearfully hot. but we con- tinued to press the siege day and night, using our artillery pretty freely, and on the morn- in? of Jti'.y 17 the place was found evacuated. Gen. Steele's division was sent in pursuit as far as Brandon (fourteen miles), but Gen. Johnston had carried his army safely off, and pursuit in that hot yreather would have been fatal to my commaad- Johnston's narrative tells this: Two divisions of Federal infantry and a body of cavalry drove our cavalry rearguard through Bran- don on tlie 19th, and returned to Jackson on ttie 20th. The object of the expedition seemed to be the de- struction of the railroad bridges and depot, to which the outrage of setting fire to the little town, and burning the greater part of it, was added. Gen. Sherman, with a force which, effect- ively, was more than twice as great as John- ston's, and with all of Grant's army to draw from, had found Johnston facing him at Jackson. He had consumed seven days in intrenching and in an aimless, tentative kind of "close pressing," which exposed his troops to a sortie; had gotten considerably hurt by the flanking of one of his divisions; he was gathering ammunition for shelling the town, when at last Johnston marched out by the east where all was open. The whole operation by this superior force was as if the place were the objective, and the tactics to have Johnston leave it. Mean- while Sherman was literally carrying out Grant's order: "I want you to drive John- ston out in your own way, and inflict on the enemy all the punisiiinent you can." In stead of disposing of his army to capture Johnston's, or to bring it to battle in the field by marching upon its communications, he was encouraging it to depart, and was de- voting his chief energies to the work of de- stroying property. Says Badeau: The work of railroad destruction went on vigor- ously, while regular parapets of eartti and cotion were constructed in front of the lines. * "•' * Meanwhile Stierinan sent out expeditions to the right and left, destroying the railroads in every direction— cars, locomotives, turntables, and shops, as well as tracks and bridges. '^" '^' * Some of his troops traversed as far as sixty miles, marking their whole route with devastation. Of the evacuation he tells: All night Sherman heard the sound of wagons, but nothing that indicated evacuation, for the picks and shovels were at work till midnight; butat dawn of nay it became evident that the en- emy had withdrawn across Pearl River. All the material of war had beeu removed in advance of retreat, by means of the railroad running east. Of the work of Sherman" at Jackson. John- ston narrates: The Federal army remained only five or six days at Jaukson, but in that short time.it destroyed al^ — 141 of the town so closely built that fire could com- municate from house to house; its rear guard left the place for Vicksburg on the 23d. Badeau says with more comprehensiveness: "He remained two or tliree days completing the work of destruction." Summing up the grand results, Bapeau says: They drove Johnston f-ftv miles, and left him in full retreat; they destroyed the great arteries of travel, which alone could enable him to reassemble troops and molest Grant's possession of the Missis- sippi, and they so exhausted the country through which they passed that no army could exist there again, during that season, without hauling its sup- plies. The campaign was a fitting supplement to the conquest of the Mississippi, and, indeed, was necessary to perfect the achievements of Grant. Sherman's whole loss was less than 1,000 men. Sherman's tactics had kept open the way of Jotnston's retreat, with all the material of his army. He had made his grand object- ive the destruction of a railroad center whose occupation by our army, Gen. Johnston said, would have brought the fall of the State of Mississippi. He had destroyed a place antl material which a rational and comprehen- sive military plan would have converted to our means. All of his destruction was, in fact, of resources available to us. He had de- vastated a fruitful country, leaving it deti- tute, as if it were not our own, and we were not carrying on war to restore the Union, but were a horde of Tartars invading civilization. All this was in pursuance of a plan which made tlie possession of Vicksburg the finali- ty; all this devastation to make the Confed- erates unable to fetch troops to molest Grant in Vicksburg. Having facilitated Johnston's withdrawal with his army and material; having made a desert, and called it war. Gen. Sherman says he returned, reaching camp on the 27th near the Big Black River, "with the prospect of a period of rest for the remainder of the summer." Thus was Grant's arm}', after it had achieved its objective, as com- pletely isolated from all other armies, and as completely neutralized as to any co-opera- tion or influence on other operations as when it was involved in the swamps west of the Mississiv>pi. In respect to all interior cam- paigns, it had simply changed places with Pembeeton's army. CHAPTER LII. a gallant officer elected scapegoat — THB VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN ARRIVED AT ITS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE — CUTS ITSELF OFF FROM ALL SE- QUENCE — THE CONFEDERACY CUT IN TWO AND ITS BACKBONE BROKEN— GRANT SITS DOWN TO WAIT FOR IT TO DIE. The last previous chapter mentions the per- emptory dismissal of Gen. Lauman, of Iowa, from the command of his brigade, by Gen. Sherman, at the demand of Gen. Ord, who charged him with the blame for the loss suf- fered by his brigade by a flank attack of the enemy, while the whole line was pressing upon the intrenchments of J.\ckson. Gen. Lauman's high services, although only a vol- unteer General, warrant the reviewer in no- ticing this arbitrary execution, which termi- nated a distinguished military career in dis- grace, at the hour ot triumph. It was Gen. Lauman's brigade that re- deemed Grant's disaster at Fort Donelson, and got him promotion by an assault which carried one part of the fort, and made the other untenable. This was after Grant had waited with his army for the gunboats to take the fort, and they had all been disabled in the attempt; after he had dispatched Gen. Halleck that he should have to intrench and enter upon a "protracted siege;'' for, says he: '•I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops." And he was intending to wait for the fleet to go back and repair and return. Also, this storming of the fort was carried by Lauman's brigade after the Confederate armyjiad made a sortie, which had driven back the entire right wing of Grant's army, and then Wallace's division, in a fierce battle which raged from dawn till noon, while Grant was absent on Commodore Foote's gunboat. It was made after Grant had sent word to Commodore Foote that a fierce conflict bad demoralized a portion of his command, and that if the gunboats did not appear, it would "reassure the enemy, and still further demoralize our troops," and that "I must order a change to save appear- ances." Under all these "demoralizing" and dis- astrous conditions did Lauman's brigade make the assault, which not only saved ap- pearances, but redeemed the disaster, saved — 142 — the Commanding General, and set him afloat on the flood tide to fortune. It is unnecessary to say that such soldierly work is not done without that previous organizing and train- ing which give to soldiers confidence in them- selves, in each otlier, and in their officers. Such work is not done by "raw troops," and this brigade had been ripened by discipline and service If Gen. Grant, who, before his army was hurt, distrusted its ability to carry the tort by storm, and who, after his army had been badly hurt, ordered the attack only to save appearances, was glorified tcf the skies, be- cause the assault succeeded, what should be the measure of merit to Gen. Lauman, who trained the troops that stormed the fort, and who, with Gen. C. F. Smith, led them into the enemy's works? The soldierly qualities of this brigade, which enabled it to do this work of veteran troops, had not been ac- quired without a good soldier for a com- mander, nor without much service. This service had continued through all the discouragements and hardships of the Vicks- burg campaign, and now in the hour of triumph this gallant officer was sent to the rear in disgrace. What was the special fault of Gen. Lauman in an operation which, with twice Johnston's force, had permitted him to retire at his leisure, after having inflicted a sharp punishment? Gen. Sherman had stretched his army from the river above Jack- son to the river below, and was "pressing in," whatever that may be. He narrates in his memoirs: On the 11th we pressed close in, and shelled the town from every direction. One of Ord's brigades (Lauman's) got too close, and was very roughly handled and driven back in disorder. Gen. Ord accused the commander, Gen. Lauman, of having disregarded his orders, and attributed to him per- sonally the disaster and heavy loss of men. He re- quested his relief, which I granted, and Gen. Lau- man went to the rear and never regained his bri- gade. He died, after the war, in Iowa, much re- spected, as before that time he had been universally esteemed a most gallant and excellent officer. Gen. J. E. Johnston's narrative, which is given in the previous chapter, tells this affair as on the 12th, which was the third day after Sherman had arrived in front of the Jackson lines, and shows that Lauman's brigade(|was struck in flank by four regiments. As there is on file no report of Ord or Sherman of the Jackson operation, this is the sum of the information given to the public on this case of summary execution upon a distinguished volunteer officer. Gen. Lauman died unheard, and nobody but Gen. Ord knows what were the orders which Gen. Lauman disregarded.- The dangerous operation of spreading an army around a fortified place held by an army is not a new thing in war, although our commanders appear to have had to learn it by dear experiment. Gen. Grant experi- enced it at Fort Donelson, in a disaster which Lauman's brigade turned into a crowning victory to Grant. Gen. Sherman experienced it at Atlanta, where his loose tactics exposed successively two wings of his army to attack by superior force where he could not sitpport them, and where it was only by heroic fighting against sup)erior numbers that his array was saved from destruction. He was engaged in a like dangerous operation at JacksoUj with tactics equally loose, and whose object is not made clear by his narra- tive, and was probably as vague in the orders. The fact that Lau-man's brigade was struck in flank and rear, so that about 200 of his men were forced to surrender, serves to show that Sherman's pressing line was not continuous. In the previous operation against Jackson, by McPherson's and Sherman's corps, when the riglit and left were extended to the same points south and north of the town, Badeau states that there was a gap of two miles be- tween the two corps. The extent of this line must have been as much as five miles. It is not easy to understand how Lauman's bri- gade could be taken in flank and rear in such force, and that too before it had reached the enenay's line — which Johnston's narrative shows to be the case — if there had not been a great gap in Sherman's pressing line. He says on the 11th we pressed close in and shelled the town from every direction; again: "We continued to press the siege, using our artillery pretty freely." and so on till the 17th, when they found that Johnston had de- parted. What was the object in pressing close in along this extended line? Was it not tentative to see if there was a weak spot where an assault might make a lodgment, or if a pressure all along the line would not ex- pedite Johnston's departure? The place wa.'* not besieged, for it was not invested. All on the east was open, and Sherman was pressing 143 — oa the west to induce Johnston to go. Mean- while Sherman had sent back for heavier artillery and ammunition for shelling the town. In this pressing close in by a line of four or five miles, which probably had e:reat gaps, which did not intend a serious attacK, it may have been difficult for a subordinate General to know just how strong a pressure he was to make, and Gen. Ord's orders may have partaken of the vague and tentative quality of this operation. Naturally Gen. Laum.\n, In case of doubt, would take the most enter- prising course, although that would be the opposite of the way that Ord solved doubt at luka. But this extended pressing-in opera- tion was a very dangerous one, and exposed the superior army to be fatally struck by a sortie from the fortified place. The loss to Lauman's brigade was a small matter for that army, compared to what it was exposed to by such a way of operating against an army in a fortified camp. The arbitrary dismissal of Lauman looks like the appointment of a scapegoat, which might not be confirmed by inquiry. The confounding of all the properties of merit and justice in our war. by the infallibility and absolute power allowed to a certain class, and the irre- mediable disabilities kept upon all the rest of the army, has an exemplification in this summary disgrace of so distinguished an of- ficer as Gen. Lauman, at the demand of Gen. Ord, for alleged disregard of orders which in the indefinite nature of the operation could not be made definite, and because his brigade happened to be the one hurt by the enemy in a dangerous operation which exposed the army to such sorties as at Donelson and At- lanta. But suppose Gen. Lauman did err, was it a thing unheard of in Gen. Grant's campaigns? If lie erred, it was forward, not backward, aa Grant and Ord at luka, and, therefore, his error ought to be the more pardonable. Was it military propriety to dismiss such an officer unheard at the demand of Ord"^ Was it for Gens. Grant and Sherman to pronounce such a sentence on a distinguished soldier, after their experience of the danger of spread- ing out an army before a fortified place at Donelson, and before their experience of the same at Atlanta, at Petersburg, and Rich- mond? Was this charge of pressing too far forward, in an operation whose generalship exposed the army (o destruction, so fatal a fault that Gen. Grant could not pardon it in the officer whose brigade had rescued him from disaster, and set him on the high road to all his fortunes? With the surrender of Vicksburg, the driv- ing of Johnston's army beyond Jackson, the destruction of that place and of the railroads in all directions, and the devastation of the country, to the end of making it a desert in which an army could not find subsistence in operating against Grant at Vicksburg, the campaign of Grant's army ended. The pos- session of the river, which was declared to be acquired by the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, was the ultimate mili- tary objective. The destruction of Jackson •and of the railroads, and the devastating of the country, was Grant's decision against making Vicksburg and Jackson a base for a campaign to the interior, and it voluntarily destroyed the means for such a campaign. Gen. Sherman returned and encamped be- tween Big Black River and the Mississippi, and a Confederate cavalry division followed to the east bank of Big Black River, and re- mained in observation. The capture of Vicksburg had no military sequence. Sher- man says in the memoirs: "Grant's army had seemingly completed its share of the work of war, and lay, as it were, idle for a time." The military powers of all the earth must wonder at the magnitude of the war re- sources of a nation which could thus afford to have one great army rest at Vicksburg, as if its share of the work of the war were done, while in the interior of the West another army, lesser in number, and having to pro- tect a long railroad line of supplies, was mak- ing a campaign from Murfreesboro to Chatta- nooga, and the Confederate forces east and west were thus left free to concentrate against it. But there were military figures of speech which were potent in the war. One of these was the backbone of the rebellion, which we kept on breaking; which was de- clared broken at Donelson, and again at Cor- inth, and which was now pronounced finally broken by the surrender of Vicksburg. An- other was that by getting possession of the Mississippi we had cut the Confederacy in two. It was held that the Confederate mili- tary body could no more live than the animal body, when cut in halves. At any rate, the — 144 campaign had reached its ultimate, and had no sequence, and if the Confederacy refused to die when its back was broken and it was cut in two, it was a contumacy so contrary to nature that military tactics could not be ex- pected to provide against it. Gen. J. E. Johnston, however, argued to his government that when our armed ships passed Port Hudson the Confederacy lost control of the navigation ot the Mississippi ; still more when our gunboats ran tne bat- teries of Vicksburg, and that that place had thus ceased to have any great military im- portance. Thus had the Confederacy in fact been cut in twain long before. The extent of the river and its multitude of branches made the preventing of the crossing of troops and supplies impossible. Thus in Hood's cam- paign against Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, in De- cember. 1864, do we read of Gen. Grant's ap- prehension that the trans-Mississippi Con- federate forces would join Gen. Hood, as one of the reasons for his order to supersede Gen. Thomas for delay. And now, forasmuch as in one part of the severed Confederacy Price and Marmaduke continued in vitality in Arkansas, so that Grant had to send 5,000 men to re-enforce Gen. ScHOFiELD on that line, and Gen. Rich- ard Taylor in West Louisiana, became very active, in the face of Gen. Banks, re-enforced by the 13th Corps (late McClernand's), and was able to hold West Louisiana and Texas till the end of the war, against two formidable expeditions; and, in the other severed part, Bragg gathered a superior force against RosECRANs' advance, while Grant's army was reposing on its completed work, it ap- pears that the Confederacy unconscionably refused to recognize the moral results of the tactics of the campaign, but continued to show the same vitality when cut in twain, and with its back broken, and that it was on our side that the energy and strategy of this great army had been so completely expended that the campaign had no sequence. CHAPTER LHL THE FINISHED CAMPAIGN — DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY — ITS ISOLATION FROM THE THEATER OF THE WAR — GRANT WANTS TO MOVE ON MOBILE — SINGULAR NOTION OF CONCENTRATION ON VITAL POINTS GRANT ORDERED TO RE-ENFORCE BOSECRANS, AND THEN TO TAKE COMMAND — BEGINS WITH A GRACEFUL ACT. As soon as Gen. Grant had pronounced the Vicksburg campaign finished, he proceeded to divide up his army, and to send a part to Gen. Banks, 5,000 men to Missouri, to send back the 9th Corps to Burnside, in East Ten- nessee, and to dispose of the rest for garrison- ing the river, and for rest from its hard labors. In this dispersing, which usually is a sad finale to a General, he showed an alacrity as if this were the sealing of the completion of the campaign, or as if apprehensive that his worn out army might be ordered to another. Such apprehension might be reasonable, for the military propriety of Grant's army's co- operating with RosECRANS by a movement from Vicksburg and Jackson, or of part of it being; sent to re-enforce Rosecrans, then seeking to bring Gen. Bragg to action, was so evident as to suggest itself to the whole coun- try. Gen. Grant, before the capture of Vicks- burg, had been generous in promises to Gen. Banks to send him troops as soon as he had taken that place. A few days after the sur- render, although Port Hudson iiad also sur- rendered, and Gen. Banks' present strait was over, Gen. Grant, says Badeau, "offered to send him 'an army corps of as good troops as ever trod American soil; no better are found in any other.' " Badeau states that immediately after the capture of Jackson, Grant sent to Banks Herron's division, whose number he now gives as 4,000. When it reached Vicksburg to complete the investment, he said it was the largest division in the combined army. Subsequently he sent Ord's corps, the 13th, lately McClernand's. Sherman's narrative says: "Ord's corps (13th) was sent down to Natchez and gradually drifted to New Or- leans and Texas." As to the disposition of his own corps Sherman says: "It being mid- summer we did not expect any change till the autumn months, and accordingly made ourselves as comfortable as possible." On the 18th of July Grant announced to 145 — ITai.i.ix'ic I lie capture of Jack.sou and tho completion of tbe Vicksburg campaign, and .suggested this: "It seems to me now that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from some point on Lake Ponchar- train. There is much sickness in my com- mand now, from long and excessive marching and labor." II-alleck answered: "Before attempting Mobile, I thiiik it will bo best to clean up a little. Johxstox should be dis- l)osed of, also Trice and ^NIakmaulke, so as to hold line of Arkan.sas River.'' Sherman had reported to Grakt, and Grant to Halleck, that Jounston had been disposed of; tliat "He is now in full retreat east. Sherman says most of his army must l)erish from the heat, lack of water, and gen- ci-al discouragement;'" but Halleck did not understand this easy method of destroying armies by bulletin, and lie assumed that .Ii>iiNSTu>''s army was still to be disposed of. .Viul although the capture of Vicksburg and L'oit Hudson was said to have possessed tlie .Mississipi>i, and thus to have cut the Confed- eracy in two, Halleck assumed that no mil- itary consequences were to follow, bnt that .loHXSTON in one-half, and Trice and Mar- MADUDE in the other, had yet to be disposed of in the usual wa}'. Halleck continued, as quoted t)y l>AnEAi": Tills will enable us to withdraw troops from Missouri. Vicksburg and Port Hudson stiould bo repaired so as to be tenable by small garrisons; also, assist Banks in clearing out Western Loui.si- ana. When these things are accomplished there will he a large available force to operate either on Mobile or Te.-cas. Navy is not ready for co-opera- tion: should Sumter fall, then ironclads can be seiu to assist at Mobile. rpiiu tills, T> uiRvr niakc:^ ihc rcinns-k-alilc cuimiicntary : Tuis .strategy w.-is in iiccorc.ancc witli lliillcck's lial)it of scattering liis forces an(i energies upon comparatively unimportani objects, leaving the great and decisive aims to ue accomplished last. He .seemed to be unable to appreciate the fact that if the main objects of the war are gained, the lesser ones were sure to follow; or even the purely mili- tiiry maxim that strategic points of the highest confsequence should be first secured. ^ Thus it doth appear that to withdraw Grant's army from the interior, and devote it for nearly a year to the capture of Vicks- burg, which had no tactical or strategical sequence, and then to take it around by sea to capture ^Mobile, separating it as widely as possible from the great interior campaign then on foot, was concentration upon tlic main objects and great strategic points. To the reviewer these great Generals appear to be able rivals in the tactics of avoiding co- operation of the armies, scattering forces, and devoting energies t.i comparatively unim- portant places. Badeau states that "on the L'-tth of July Grant renewed his suggestion : 'It seems to mo that jNIobilc is the point deserving the most immediate attention,' and on the 1st of August he telegrapiied to H.vlleck: 'Mobile can be taken from the Gulf Department with only one or two gunboats to protect the de- barkation. I can send the necessary force. With your leave I would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the movement against New Orleans is aulliorized.' " The permis- sion was not granted, nor tiie movement authorized; but trRANT soon after went to New Orleans, ostensibly to confer with Gen. Banks about the Ued River expedition, and Badeau states that from there he renewed his solicitation for the movement on ilobile. As the campaign of Roseceans progressed. Gen. Grant seemed to grow more urgent to talco his army to a remote point. The authori- ties at Washington, however, had resolved I that Gen. Rosecrans .shoirld be left to his j chances with such force as he had, and were not intending nor dcsirinir to re-enforce him, although his forward movement was attenu- ating his forces to guard his lengthening line of supplies. As to Gen. Banks, they were de- sirous that he should move -with a strong force into Texas, lest the French Emperor should lue tempted to add that to the empire lie was founding in Mexico. While Grant v. as urging Halleck to per- mit an expedition to Mobile, he was also stating that his army was too much worn out for any other movement. Thus says Badeau, quoting Grant's dispatch to Halleck: The troops which had been engaged in the vari- ous operations of the campaign and siege of Viclcs- burgwere now greatly exhausted, and "entirely un- fit forany duty requiringmuch marching," but" by selecting any duty of immediate and prerssing im- portance," said Grant, "it could be done." Thus their e.xhaustion was .so peculiar that it unfitted them for any marching campaign in the interior, but did not unfit them tor an -14U-. expedition further into a tropical climate in midsummer, with the probability of another siege. True, the 13th Corps, which had borne as much of the hardship and sickness of the Mis- sissippi swamp operations, and of the fight- ing, the labors, and dangers of all the cam- paign and the siege as anv other, was sent off on a very severe marching campaign at mid- summer in the malarial lowlands of West Louisiana, which was about as hard an ordeal as troops exhausted by previous hardship and labor could be subjected to; but it is probable that a penance was still owing by them for the sins of their late commander. Badeau states that at New Orleans Grant renewed his solicitation on the 25th of Sep- tember, and again a complaining solicitation on the 30th, and that Halleck answered him again on the 13th of October, stating that '•there were certain reasons which I can not now explain, which prevented such an at- tempt." Yet Badeau states also that on the 22d of September. Grant, who had then re- turned to Vicksburg, received Hallkck's dis- patch of the 15th, ordering this: "All the troops that can be spared in West Tennessee and on the Mississippi River should be sent without delay, to assist Gen. Eosecraxs on the Tennessee River. * * * Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to re-enforce Bragg :" also that on the 28th he wrote Halleck: "I am now ready for the field, or any duty I may be called on to perform." At last the Washington authorities had awakened to the situation, which had been inevitable to the common sense, which was that the brunt of the war was left to fall on Gen. RosECRANs; that east of the mountains no operation was going on to prevent the re- enforcement of Gen. Bragg from Lee's army by the short inner line; that in the west Gen. Grant's great army had been taken out of the theater of the war, and was wielding no co- operative aid or influence, and was too remote to bring succor before the crisis of the cam- paign ; while all Middle and W^est Tennessee and Kentucky, save where occupied by Rose- cRANs' forces, was open to Confederate raids up to the Ohio River. The authorities at Washington awoke to that which was before evident, but awoke too late. Nor was the sending of Longstrekt's corps from Lee to Bragg the first reason why they should not have permitted an army to lie isolated and idle at Vicksburg, while RosECRANS was making the campaign from Murfreesboro into the heart of the South, where all knew that the Confederates would use every ettbrt to concentrate forces to de- feat him. Halleck's first telegram was September 13. So shadowy had become the military possession in Grant's department, north to the Ohio, that there was no telegraph nearer than Cairo. The dispatch was brought thence by steamer, and Badeau tells this strange incident: "The messenger to whom this package was intrusted failed to deliver it promptly." This dispatch was: "All of Major General Grant's available force should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corintli and Tuscumbia. to co-operate with Gen. Rosecrans." Strange that the messenger to whom this package was intrusted neglected to deliver it till the 25th. Badeau says it was delayed ten days between Cairo and Memphis. As related above, Hal- leck telegraphed again on the 15th, and Badeau says this was received at Vicksburg on the 22d. The first troops embarked on the 27th. The battle of Chickamaiiga was fought on the 19th and 20th. On the 3d of October Grant received a request from Secre- tary Stanton to come to Cairo and report from there by telegraph. Conscious of what was in the wind, Grant departed immediately with all his staff and headquarters. At Cairo fie received a telegram from Stanton to proceed with staff, etc., for immediate operations in tlie field, to the Gait House at Louisville, Ky., where he would meet an officer of the War Department with instructions. At Indian- apolis he met Secretary Stanton with an order creating a new military division, em- bracing all between the AUeghanies and the Mississippi, except such as was occupied by Gkn. Banks, and placins Grant in command, subordinating the Department of the Cum- berland, commanded by Rosecrans, and the Department of the Oliio, commanded by BuRxsiDE. The history of Grant by Dana and Wilson states that his request, on being appointed to this command, was that Rose- crans should be removed from command of the Army of the Cumberland, and Gen. George H. Thomas put in his place. There came a time when he was even more desirous to put Gen. Thomas out of the way. 147 — CHAPTER LIY. the great expectations of the trade that followed the flag — the way it fed the exemy — the fathek of waters becomes a channel of supply to the confederacy — the fond vision of reconstruction — gen. Sherman's statesmanship — a sudden awak- ening. In the popular rejoicing over the capture of VicltsburK, and the generous magnifying of that military achievement, there was a larfje ingredient of thrift, in tiie expectation that it would open the way to trade in the South. INIuch cotton had been kei)t in tlie South by the obstructions to its export; the war had greatly raised the price of cotton, and the Xorth liaa an abundance of goods and of products which the people of ihe South greatly needed. The trade was very profitable; the more so because the nece.ssity for iiaving military pro- tection, and the assistance of army trans- l^orts and teams, made it in the nature of a privilege to the favored. Always were a suthcient number of persons whose com- mercial character rose above the prejudices of the war. to go between the belligerent parties in carrying on this trade, and it found means of softening military commanders to it, and of procuring favors in the way of protection :iik1 transportation. By December, 1802, the ureenbaek price of cottou had risen to sixty- eight cents a pound: by Decen\ber, 1863, to eighty-four cents; in 1805 it reached $1 20. The j)rice of tobacco rose enormously. These .•irticles being inconvertible within the Con- federate lines, and being converted to such value by reaching the national lines, there were fortunes to be quickly made by those who could get favors from theTreasurj- agents and from military commanders, ;ind large nicans for corrupting these. 'J'here was a popular sentiment of the time, in the form of words that "trade follows the tlag." which had a noble, national, and patri- otic sound, nuiking trade the sealing of the restoration of States to ihe Union, Secretary Chase emphasized this line sentiment; the agents of the Trcasuiy Department were in^ siructed to advance it, and were not loth; and so a horde of traders followed the flag, and it came about that with the establish^ ment of the army at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, s^tucl >.'atchez, flicro was a, lar^e influx ol' tm* ders, desirous to complete the work of re- storing that region to the Union. That enter- prising and cosmopolitan people, the Israel- ites, found themselves the chosen race in this, as always, alike by their commercial genius, their exemption from national preju- dices, anil their domicile on both sides, hav- ing equally the confidence of both parties. Badeau says that Gen. Grant was from the first opposed to this trade, and that he demonstrated to the administration that it furnished supplies to the enemy, and enabled them to continue the war. He argued that whereas more than lialf the cotton was the property of the Confederacy, as soon as we permitted our traders to buy, tiiis Confeder- ate cotton would become nominally the property of whatever jiersons were allowed to trade in it, and thus it would bring sup- plies directlj' to the Confederate Government. But Badeau says that Grant was overruled, and that trade was opened, first within cer- tain lines, and sub.sequently without any military limits, the trader giving a bond and receiving a uermit. Grant said: li tiaile IS o>>eiie(t uiidfr any tjeiienil rule, all sorts 01 dishonest luen will engaije in it. taking any oath or obligation necessary to sccnre the privilege. Smnggling will at once commence, as it did at Memphis, Helena, and every other place where trade lia.s lieen allowed within llie disloyal .States, and the armed enemy will be enabled to procure from Nonhern msuUeis every Hrilcle they require. BAiiiiAi. says that it .sk came about; trade was 0{)ened, "and the consequences ))i'edicted by GiiANT followed rapidly." Thus was the singular consequence that the capture of Viclv.-sbur.ir and the recovery of the Misissippi Iliver, which had cost so many lives and so much treasure, became a source of supplj' to the enemy. Gen. Grant could I'efer wilji emphasis to his previous observation of the corrupting influence of this trading with the enemy, for in the first Vicksburg campaign, called the Holly Springs campaign, when he was at Ox- ford, Miss., he found a necessity to issue the following general orders: lA.j Headqc AivriiRs ;:^Tii .\.hmy Corps, ) Drpaut-vent of the Te.vnessee. OxFQRp, Miss,, I»ec, 17, IS-ii, ) General Order No. 12. 1, TUe Jcwis, as » C'1r=s vJolMlng erwy fsgulrtUwM 148 — of trade established by the Treasury Department, are hereby expelled from the department. 2. Within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order by post commanders, tliey will see that nil this class of people are furnished with passes, and required to leave; and any one returning after such notification, will be arrested and held in close confinement until an opportunity occurs of sending them out as prisoners, unless furnished with per- mits from these headquarters. By order of Maj. Gen. U. S. Gkant. (Ofticial.) John C. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant General. [B.] Headquarters, Holly Springs, Dec. IS, 1802. General Order No. 8. By theorder of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, all Jews are hereby expelled from the Department of the Ten- nessee. The Provost JNIarshal will at once give this notice to all Jews of this post, and see that they are provided with passes to leave the department; and all found here after the lapse of twenty-four hours will be arrested and placed in close confinement. No passes will be given to these people to visit, head- quarters of the Army of the Tennessee for the pur- pose of making personal application for trade per- mits. By order. R. c. Munrity, Col. sth Wis. Vol. In., Com'g Post. Capt. N. G. Lane will see to the faithful execu- tion of the above order. The President resciiided tliis order, Ijccause of its invidious particularity; but tlie order and Gen. Grant'.s remonstrances expressed the result of his observations of the working of this trade, under Treasury permits, and of the special genius wliicli that enterprising people have for inii)roving- such opportunities. Indeed, the records of the Superior Court of Cincinnati show tliat one of that favored race, a leading mereluint of Cincinnati, sought to ingratiate hi m.sclf into special favor of the very Commanding General, for this trade, by mak- ing a partner of a very near relative — a part- nership made public by a suit to recover tlie equal share in the venture, whiclt was agreed to be set ofTfor influence. Gen. Grant wrote from liis lieadqiuirters at Viclcsburg, July lil, 18(;;;; My experience in West Tennessee is that any trade whatever with the rebellious States is weaken- ing to us to at least SS per cent, of our force. Ko matter what the restrictions thrown around trade, if any whatever is allowed it will be made the means of supplynig to the enemy what they want. Restrictions, it lived up to, make trade unprofit- able, and hence none but dishonest men go into it. 1 venture to say that no honest raau his made money in West Tennessee In the last year ; yet many fortunes have been made during that time. Mr. Shuckers, in his life of Mr. Chase, says : It is probably no exaggerated estimate that from the beginning to the end of the war, the surrepti- tious traffic thus carried on reached, at the least, an aggregate of two hundred millions of dollars. This is of the trade besides that authorized ])y regular permits. Gen. Canby, writing from New Orleans in 18G4, said that the Confeder- ate armies both east and west of the Missis- sippi, during the preceding twelve months, had been largely supported by this ttnlawful traffic, and that its inevitable result must be to give strength and efSciency to the Confed- erate army equal to an addition of .'lO.OOO men. He said tliere were ten tliousand men within our lines wIk) were stimulated into active op- positi(jn to the successful prosecution of the war by the cotton trade, and that in order to save the cotton in the Confederate lines they gave the enemy earning of our military ex- peditions. This conti'aband trade created many of tlie forttmes which were made in the war. wliieli establi.shed tlie demoralizing tradition that the war was prohtable to the Xorthei-n people. Our Commaiiding Generals testified against it, but between the arguments on the othe^ side, and the sentiment that trade fol- lows the flag, and the constructive regulation of it by bonds and permits, the trade went on in large proportions, and thus was pre- scntetl tJie paradox that the acquirement of that river whicii was thought an irretrievable disaster to tlie Confederacy, became a valua- ble channel of Confederate supplies. Gen. Grant made his strong protest, and then rested tlie case, saj'ing that no views of his own sliould prevent his executing orders from t liosc in autliority. It was an abominable traffic, in its supplying means to resist our armies, and in that its profits went chiefly to the di.sloyal and dislionest; but there was no way of preventing this but by total prohibi- tion.'and by arresting every person found with- in the lines without military business. Our government was not equal to that, and tlie affair was furtluu- embarrassed liy the circum- stance that the expectation of trade had greatly magnihed tlic importance of recover- ing the Mississippi. 149 There was alsu a fond buliet' that the tuk ing o£ Vicksburg would cause the South- weste^rn States to recognize that the Confeder- ate cause was lost, and would lead to a move- ment for their restoration to the Union. iSiiERMAN's report of the desperate state into Avhich he had driven JoHNSTOx'.sarmy beyond Jackson, and Gt.ant's rejiort of thedisband- nient of Pemberton's paroled troops, giving up the Confederate cause, and carrying dis- affection to their homes, nourished this no- tion. As if the fighting were done, and the work of pacification were now in order. Gen. Grant, in giving instructions to Sherman to issue supplies to the inhabitants who had been left destitute by our devastation, said: It shoukl be our policy now to make as favor- able au impression upon the people of thi.s State as jiossible. Impress upon the men the importance of goinz through the State in au orderly manner, re- fraining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while traveling. They should try to create as favorable an impres- sion as possible upon the people, and advise them, if it will do any good, to make efforts to have law and order established within the Union. Thus, after our army had been ordered to destroy everything that could subsist man or beast between Jackson and the Mississippi, it was transformed from ravening wolves to po- litical doves, to preach the gospel of the Union. Adam Badeau, in telling of tlie fatal blow given to the Confederacy by the taking of Vicksburg, says: The country in the rear of Vicksburg was full of paroled soldiers, swearing they would not take up arms again if they were exchanged. Pemberton was reported to have but -l.OOO men left together. The army that was paroled, said one, was virtually discharged from the rebel service. Thonsands crossed the Mississippi and went West; many begged a passage to the North, and quite a number expressed a strong anxiety to enter ilie niuional service; but this, of course, was not allowed. Johnston's army also was greatly demoruUzcd. and the men deserted by thousands. Even a poiiiical movement was started by citizens, we.-st of Pearl River, to bring Mississippi back inlo thu Uniun. In the same mood of glorious fruitiuii. Gen. Halleck, August 29, wrote •Qeii. Sherman, stating that the question of the reconstruc- tion of Louisiana, Missi.ssippi, and Aricansas, was now to come up, and that not only the length of the war, but our ultimate and com- plete success, will depend on his solution." He desired to have the opinions of the Gen- erals to lay before the President to iireclude those of "gassy politicians in Congress." He had written Banks, who had answered fully. He had also written Gen. Grant, who had not answered. He desired Sherman to con- sult Grant and McPherson, and write him unofircially, so tlrat it need not go on file, but that he could use it with the President, Such an appeal for a comprehensive opin- ion on affairs of statesman^sliip could not be made in vain to Gen. Sherman. The letter, dated September 17, occupies six and a half fine print pages in the memoirs. Its breadth of comprehension, and the keynote of its polic}', may be judged by this in the fore part: That part of North America known as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas is, in my judgment, the key to the whole interior. The valley of the Mis- sissippi is America, and, although railroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet the water channels still mark the lines of fertile land, and afford cheap carriage to the heavy prod- ucts of it. The inhabitants of the country on the Mononga- hela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage are as directly concerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those who dwell on its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the na- tion has recovered its possession, this generation of men will make a fearful mistake if they again com- mit its charge to a people liable to misuse their po- sition, and assert, as was recently done, that be- cause they dwell on the banks of this mighty stream they had a right to control its navigation. 1 would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, to institute in this quarter any civil govern- ment in which the local people have much to say. Tiic, latter went on to describe truly tlic social and political conditions of tlieSoutlicni people, which made free government an absurdity, and to argue the necessity of keep- ing them in a state of pupilage, under military authority, until all traces of war were effaced, and the conditions made suitable for the restoration of local government, administeretl by the local people. It was a letter of wise statesmanship, whose wisdom has been con- firmed by our sorry experiment of recon- struction. President Lincoln paid it t!ie compliment of reading it carefully and of asking Haw.eck to telegraph Suermax for permission to pul:)lish, which SMi:u:\tA\ re- fused. President Lincoln also paid it the compliment of acting directly opposite to thti — 150 advice of the letter, in his policy of recon- struction. But wliile the military authorities at Wash- ington, and the Generals on the Mississippi, had laid aside the sword, and put on the robe of the statesman, and were gathering in the political fruits of tiie campaign which had cut the Confederacy in two,' and broken its backbone again, they were awakened from their fond dreams of the political reconstruc- tion of a broken up confederacy by intelli- gence tiiat Gen. Bragg, with an army re- cruited from the dispirited and demoralized West, and re-enforCed by Longstreet's corps from the East, confronted Kosecrans south of tlie Tennessee, and tliat a great battle was at hand, and the army of the Department of the Tennessee was far away, and exercising no influence whatever in the war. CHAPTER LV. WHAT IT (OST I.\ TIME, MKX, A>;D MOXEV — ITS th of October Hal- leck's general order made some rearrange- ment of the departments, and, Badeau says, enlarged Grant's command. In the same month he received large re-enforcements from the Northwestern States, and on the 20th he proposed to Hallicck a concentration for an advance, saying: "I think I would be able to move down the ^Mississippi Central road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." From the month of October, at the latest, the occu- pation of the Army of the Tennessee in the Vicksburg operation may be dated, even if all the previous time of organizing and pre- paring be left out of the account, It was at the ia>t of Septeujbcr, 1S76, wiien a part of loi tliat aviny left V'icksburg to go to the rt^licl' oi RosECKANs' army at Chattanooga. The Confederate force which Gen. Gka>"t had to encounter in the field and in the siege of Vicksburg has been given in its order in this review. That Gen. Pemberton would understate his force to Gen. J. E. Johnstox, or JoiiNSTox to Pemberto.v, is improbable. He was not able to bring to the field at any time a force greater than half of that which Grant had in the raid to Jackson. His force in all the Department of Mississippi and East Louisi- ana, reaching to the gulf, and including Gen. Gardner's division at Port Pludson, which March 31, 1S63, had a total present and absent of 22,827, was little more than half as great as Badeau mentions as in the Department of the Tennessee when Grant began tlie Vicksburg operation in October, 1SG2. The Confederate official report of March 31, 1863, of the troons of Pemberton' s depart- ment, including, as above. Gardner's troops at Port Hudson, and the 1st Military District under Brig. Gen. Euggles, the 4th Military District under Brig. Gen. Adams, and the 5th Military District under Brig. Gen. Chalmers, and 2,337 Mississippi State troops, present and absent, gives the following grand total: Pres- ent for duty, officers and men, 48,759; aggre- gate present, 61,485; aggregate present and absent, 82,308. Gen. Sherman, in his memoirs, states that Gen. Grant had abundant force for the inte- rior campaign. Badeau states the force in Grant's department as 130,000 men. Grant, November 8, informed Sherman that he was strong enough to handle Pemkerton's force "without gloves," and without Sher- man's aid. To this great army was subse- qnently added a gunboat fleet, and a great fleet of steamboat transports, most of which were kept in constant attendance on the ariny~ during its swamp operations. During the siege of Vicksburg, the 9th Corps — a fresh corps, organized for the expedition to P^ast Tennessee — was added to Grant's army; also Herron's division from the Department of the Missouri, which Badeau mentions as the strongest division in the combined army. Whether recruits were added in detail during the campaign does not appear from the records, but aside from these, the Vicks- burg operation absorbed a great army, and was enormously costly in the naval part, in which part there was also much destruction of vessels and stores, and an enormous con- sumption of large ammunition. The cost of the stores destroyed by Van Dorn at Holly Springs was estimated by hin\ at four millions; by Badeau it is belittled to the bagatelle of a million. The true value was probably between the two figures, either of which shows great preparation of stores for the interior campaign. Gen. Grant wrote to Gen. Halleck, after the surrender of Vicksburg, that the army was so used up by hardship as to be unfit for any operation requiring much marching. The number of men consumed in the campaign can not be found without going through all the sur- geons' returns, and these are not complete. The 'officers' reports of casualties give only those of battles. Gen. Grant's reports rarely descended to such detail as the loss of men, and when they did, it was only to a part of the actual loss. The number of soldiers con- sumed by disease in all the Vicksburg opei-a- tion will never be known. To lose more by disease than by battles is not uncommon in campaigns; what, then, may be estimated of a campaign which, after the Holly Sprino-s failure, began by sinking the army for three months in the flooded Mississippi bottoms, where the soldiers had to lay logs to support their beds above water, and by working them in the water in the most unhealthy and dis- spiriting labors. Contemporary reports of the dying of the soldiers in that swamp habitation, and in those swamp labors, caused a popular de- mand for Gen. Grant's removal. The num- ber of men which Badeau states as all that Grant could bring to the siege of Vicksburg, by stripping his department, shows that a large number had disappeared, Badeau mentions tlie levee for miles "furrowed its whole length with graves," and that "the troops were thus hemmed in by the burial placesof their comrades." Gen. McClernand mentions the heavy reduction of his corps by sickness from the swamp labors. In various ways there are materials for a rational esti- mate that the number of soldiers consumed in the whole operation was much greater than the number killed, wounded, and cap- tured of the enemy. Other campaigns which have been at the last successful may have consumed more of the offensive arrnj' than of the enemy, al- — 1-V2 thduuli. ;i« the oilensive isalwaj's .supposed lo !>(• I lie superior force, such a loss does not .sliDw brilliant generalship; but it is not usual for a General to begin an oflTensive cam- paign Ijy sticking liis armj' helplessly in a malarious swamp, and making its chief losses in that way. Xor did convalescence restore to sound health such of the sick as survived. Not only they, but the most of those who did not succumb, got the poison of that malaria planted in their bodies for tlic rest of their lives. But when the conditions oblige a General to consume his army heavily in attacks in an offensive campaign, his plan exiiects to gain thereby successes and strategic positions which shall either be decisive of the war or :iu advantageous base for further operations; l)ut the finality of the Vicksburg campaign placed the army out of the field of war. It i.siolated that army from all other operations, leaving the Con federate armies free to concen- trate against the army in the parallel depart- ment. And, as regards all the tlieater of the war, it left (^rajjt's army — to use his own phrase— "bottled up." Graxt knew not which way to turn to give his campaign some se- quence. In any rational military jilan his army should be co-operating or joined with that of RosKCR.VNs, on which the whole weight of the war was now left to fall. Grant evi- dently feared that this would be ordered, and therefore he urgently solicited leave from Halleck to divert his forces to another ex- terior operation on Moliile, at the same time hedging against the military use of his army )iy saying that it was so used up as to be unfit for any service requiring much marching. The Confederate Government thought Vicksburg a place of great militavy impor- tance, and its loss a heavy disaster. The national government thought the same, and glorified its capture accordingly, overlooking all its dreadful cost. Gen. J. E. .Toiinston thought the place of but little military im- portance, since both it and Port Hudson had failed to keep control of the river. Even when in our hands, with all our gunboats, we could not prevent the Confederates from crossing forces and] supplies— so little significance had this much vaunted cutting of the Confederacy in two. The statements of Qen. Grant, Gen. Canby, and of Secretary Chase's biographer show that our recovery of the Mississipi)i, and our practice of the hue sentiuient ihai ti'ade follows the Hag, made the river a groat channel for supplies to the Confederate army. Gen. Canby estimated the aid thus given to the Confederate army as equivalent to 50,000 men. Thus the loss of Vicksburg had a large com- pensation to the Confederacy by enabling it to convert its cotton into supplies for its armies, while it had no military sequence to Grant's armj-, and left it where it exercised no material or moral influence on the war, while the real campaign, on a true military line, was going forward under Gen. Rose- CRANS, and by a wonderful combination of scattering policies the Confederate armies east and west were left free to concentrate against it. The success in making one of our armies pull away from another armj', and in diverting armies from co-operation in move- ments on the vital part, was so complete as to indicate the work of brilliant genius. But iu all the war there was not so complete a per- formance of this off-pulling, isolating policy as when Gen. Grant lialted in his marclmear the Yallal)usha, and by his irresolution lost his great accumulation of stores, retreated, abandoned the interior of his great depart- ment, and took his army by the river to the Ijottoms west of the Mississippi, with Vick- burg its sole and final objective, and a man- ner of attacking it which not only had no possibility of success, but in its several bayou and canal attempts was so destitute of mili- tary sense and of common sense as to be in- dignantly scoffed at by the intelligent volun- teers. Having no military sequence; having done nothing to end the war nor to gain a position or line for further operations; liaving opened a line of supplies for the Confederacy; having isolated Grant's army while the real military operation was culminating, the militaiy re- sults of the Vicksburg campaign are reduced to a calculation of the comparative butchery and the comparative consumption of men and means. In this the excess of the con- sumption of the men and means ot the na- tion was greater than our superiority to the Confederacy in these resources. The war never could have been brought to a success- ful termination by successes got at such cost as that at Vicksburg. And that diversion of the army from the interior, completely neu- tralizing it as to all true military operations, prepared the conditions of disaster to the 15S — Army of the Cumberland as thoroughly as if it had been artfully planned. Instead of the drawn battle of Chickaniauga being an occa- sion for blame, it is a cause for amazement that, with Grant's army bottled up in the West, and the Army of the Potomac paralyzed in the East, and by the still mure wonderful management from Washington, the army un- der Gen. Burnside, in East Tennessee, sepa- rated and neutralized, the Confederacy was not able to seize such an opportunity to destroy that army; and that the invincible Army of the Cumberland, now bearing the biunt of all the war, was able to end the bat- tle by a clear repulse of the enemy, and to gain its territorial objective. CHAPTER LVI. THE MATURED OPINIONS OF GENS. GRANT AND SHERMAN ON THE VICKSBUKG CAMPAIGN— THE REVIEWER HUMIiLY ACCEPTS THE JUDGMENT OF THESE GREAT GENERALS. The military results of the Vicksburg cam- paign were so completed by the surrender of the place, that, as Gen. Sherman remarks in his memoirs: "Grant's army had seemingly completed itsshare of the work of war," and it was now at rest where it had no influence on the great campaign now going forwai'd in the interior of the Western zone, not even to the holding of any of the Confederate forces to the defensive against it in Mississippi, or detaining the troops recently under Gen. J. E. Johnston from joining Gen. Bragg in the concentration against Gen. EosEcaAMS and the Army of the Cumberland." Says Gen. Sherman: Our success at Vicksbun; produced other results not so favorable to our cause— a geaeral relaxation of effort, and desire lo escape the liard drudgery of tlie Camp; officers sought leave of absence to visit their homes, and soldiers obtained furloua^hs and discharges on the most slender pretexts; even the general government seeniei to relax its efforts to replenish ourranUs witix new men, or toenforce the draft, and the politicians were pressing their schemes to reorganize or patch up some form of civil government, as fast as the armies gained par- tial possession of the States. The "politicians" were simply acting upon the simple military idea of the time, that the capture of Vicksljtirg was a fatal blow to t!ie Confederacy, and was ai least equivalent to the occupation of the State of Mississippi, and this idea is set forth by Badeau in his glorification of Grant's achievement. When a military operation has nothing further to do, and has left the army where it is neutralized as to the war, and its Com- manding General departs on a hunt for an- other peripheral expedition, is a time for re- laxation and furloughs, and for discharges of such as had become enfeebled by hardships in a malarious region, of whom there were thousands that had gone through the cam- paign, but were now too broken in health to be fit for another. But the war was yet to be fought, and now, while Grant's army was lying idle out of the theater of the war, the Confederate chiefs were straining ettbrt to gather a force under Gen. Bragg to fall upon the army of Gen. Rosecrans, now pushing into the heart of the Confederacy. Van Horne's History of the Army of the Cumberland narrates that on the 30th of August, at the time wlien the Army of the Cumberland was crossing the Tennessee River, a loyal citizen, escaped from Chattanooga, brought Gen. Rosecrans intelligence that 15,- 000 men were on the waj"^ from Mississippi to join Gen. BracTg. Further along he states that Bragg had been joined by two divisions from Mississippi. Also, in his general re- marks on the battle of Chickamauga, he men- tions as among the Confederate troops men paroled at Vicksburg. The strategy of a campaign which thus enda by taking an army to a place where it has no influence on other operations, as if its part in the war" were done, wliile the war is still in- creasing in magnitude and its greatest actions are yet to be, is a subject for the study of the military profession, and should have a promi- nent place in the text books at the military institute. In going back from the immediate and fin- ished results to make a brief review of the grand tactics of the campaign, the reviewer has the satisfaction of following the matured conclusions of the Commanding General as given by his supervised historian, and also of liis greatest Captain, as given in his memoirs. Thus he has that confidence which the "lay- man" feels when he follows the judgment of men of the military profession, particularly of those who themselves, in their written — 154 — memoirs, were the grejitest part of the great events. Says Gen. Sherman in his memoirs, after having recited the several failures in tlie bayou and canal cutting attempts: I had always contended that the best way to take Vicksburg was to lesurae the movement which had been so well begun the previous November, viz. : For the main army to march by land down the country inland of the Mississippi River, while the guttboat fleet and a minor land force should threat- en \ icksburg in its river front. I reasoned that with the large force then subject to Gen. Grant's orders — viz., four army corps — he could easily re- sume the movement from Memphis by way of Ox- ford and Grenada to Jackson, Miss., or down the ridge between the Yazoo and the Big Black. Gen. Sherman also confirms the exhibit made by this history, that Gen. Grant's at- tempt to go to join Gen. Banks, by way of his Duckport canal. Willow Bayou, and Bayou Vidal, to New Carthage, was tor the purpose of getting away from his hopeless situation at Vicksburg, without seeming to go back', which, as he says, was "for other than mili- tary reasons," meaning that it was to quiet the country by seeming to go forward, when, in truth, he was abandoning the expedition. For Gen. Sherman goes on : But Gen. Grant would not, for reasons other than military, take any course which looked like taking a step backward, and he himself concluded on the river movement below Vicksburg, so as to appear like connecting with Gen. Banks, v/ho at the same time was besieging Port Hudson from the direction of New Orleans. Gen. Sherman narrates that his onlnion of the interior line, as that by which the catii- paign would achieve great results, to which the fall of Vicksburg would be a conse- quence, was concurred in by Gen. Grant after all was over. He says: He has told me since the war that had we pos- sessed in December, 1862, the experience of march- ing and maintaining armies witliout a regular base, which we afterward acquired, he would have gone on from Oxford, us first contemplated, and would not have turned Ijaok because of the de- struction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van Worn. Tliis is a candid statement by Gen. Grant that he abandoned the true tactical line, be- cause he had yet to learn how to move and subsist an army in a country of abundance, when his immediate depot of stores had bcei^ lost. No lesson of the war was so strongly im- pressed on the public mind, and on the minds of the volunteer soldiers, as that the education at the military institute turned out officers knowing the whole art of war; and that on the other hand, without this passing through the institute, no degree of general education and no natural aptitude, genius, or " experience, or achievement could make any- thing but a mere pretense of a soldier — a fiction, whose successes or failures were alike blunders. Upon this admirable rule were promotions and commands assigned and military operation? jndged. Yet the moving and subsisting of armies in tlie enemy's coun- try is an elementary part of the art of war. But Gen. Sherman here states a simple con- fession by Gen. Grant that after all the service he had seen in the war he aban- doned a promising campaign and retreated ignominiouHly,and thereby finally abandoned the true tactical line, because he had not yet learned the rudimentary part of war, that an army may be subsisted in a country of abun- dant supplies for a few days, when by sheer neglect of another rudiment of war it has lost its immediate depot of supplies. The younger part of this generation may get an idea of the way the war was made to last four years, and to cost .seven thousand millions, and to call out more than a million of men, when our greatest General, now in command of a great department, and of 130,- 000 men, as good soldiers as the world ever saw, was yet serving an apprenticeship, and learning the very elementary parts of war, at the expense of sacrificing campaigns, and of flying from the tactical line to an impossible one. Gen. Sherman goes on: The distance from Oxford to the rear of Vicks- burg is little greater than by the circuitous route we afterward followed from Bruinsburg to .Jackson and Vicksburg, during which we iiad neither depot nor train of supplies. In other words, after ail the cost of getting to Bruinsbnrg, the army was far worse situ- ated for marching to Jackson then when, in November, six months before, it was at Ox- ford, and Pf;Mr>ERTON had fallen baqft to the south of the Yallabusha. Upon this Gen. Sherman remark.s— not as a criticism, but simply remarks: 155 — I have never criticised Gen. Grant's strategy on this or any other occasion, but I tnought then that he had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us nix months of extra hard work; for we misht have captured Vickshurg from tlie direction of Oxford in January, quite as easily as was afterward done in July, iSOS. These reiuarks'by Gen. Shermvx, wliich are not a criticism, relieve the reviewer from the disagreeable work of criticism. This, and Gen. Grant's concurrence tlierein, saves the lay reviewer from the presumption of differ- ing from these great soldiers, and leaves to liim the more pleasant work of agreeing en- tirely with their conclusion. The mutual admiration and confidence of these great Captains give great interest to their judg- ment of the radical blunder of the whole campaign. But Gen. Shekmak, who states that it was for "'other than military reasons" that Gen. Grant practiced the imposture on the country of pretending to go to Port Hud- son because of his dead failure on Vicksburg, omits to state that it was also for other than military reasons that Gen. Grant left the in- terior line at Oxford, after he had arranged a co-operation with Sheeman, and had sent him back to Memphis, and that it was the vision of Gen. McClernand, with Lincoln's commission in his pocket, coming to com- mand a river expedition, that caused Gen. Grant to falter, to weakly inquire of Wash- ington, "How far do you want me to go?" to halt, to leave the enemy, relieved from the pressure of his advance, free to operate in his rear, and then to make the loss of his com- munications a pretense for going back to liead off McCiernand, leaving Sherman to take his men to blind slaughter at Chickasaw Bluffs. Gen. Sherman's statement of Gen. Grant's afterthought is further corroborated by Ba- DEAU, who, in narrating Grant's success in subsisting his army in the retreat from Ox- ford, after Van Dorn had destroyed his stores at Holly Springs, says: Gen. Grant has told me, when discussing this campaign, that had he known then what he soon afterward learned— the possibility of subsisting an army of liO.OOO men without supplies other than those drawn from the country— he could at that time have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in capturing the place. f This statement is the more interesting from being made upon Grant's discovery then, a Oxford, that an army in a campaign can draw supplies from the country, for, says Badeau: For over a week he had no communication with the North, and for two weeks no supplies. But the country was found to be abundantly stocked. Everything for the subr.istence of man or beast, for fifteen miles east and west of the railroad, from Coff'eeville to La Grange, was appropriated to the use of the army. The families of tlie farmers .suf- fered, but the soldier.-i were fed ; and the lesson was taught which Grant afterward applied in the rear of Vicksburg, and which Sherman, having seen the application, practiced on a still larger scale in the marches through Georgia and the Carolinas— the lesson that an army may live, ihouiih its communi- cations are destroyed. Thus does Badeau, approved by Grant, corroborate Sherman's statement of Grant's admission, that if he had then known how to subsist an army for a short time in a country of abundance, as he afterward learned, he could then have gone on from Oxford to Jackson. And Badeau makes the admission more interesting by stating that it was after Grant had learned, on the Holly Springs and Oxford line, the simple lesson that he could subsist an army on the country, that he left that true tactical line and went to an impos- able one, becjyise his line of supply liad been temporarily broken. Badeau, revised by Grant, has to explain Grant's present disregard of the lesson which he had learned, and hedoesitshrewdly by this: Although the soldiers found all that was neces- sary, Grant was anxious until he discovered the success of the experiment. It was one hitherto un- tried, and, while uncertain of its results, he moved his army back to La Grange, abandoning the cam paign, which had been pressed to a distance of fifty or sixty miles. Thus was the rudimentary educational ac- quirement by this costly lesson laid on the shelf, and Grant went to plant his army in the swamps west of the Mississippi, to learn further elementary lessons in the art of war. This gives an idea of what it cost to edu- cate one General. If Grant had gone on from Oxford to Jack- son, and established himself strongly there, Vicksburg would be untenable to the Con- federates, and would have fallen of itself. Gen. J. E. Johnston said that our possession of Jackson would eventuate in the loss of the State of Mississippi to the Confederacy. But reaching — i56r. it by a raid from Grand Gulf, we could only raid it. By the interior line the army would have possessed and covered the country of the Departmentof the Tennessee, and thestrategic places which had been the objective of a pre- vious great campaign of an army of 100,000, but which were now abandoned to the enemy. Its progress down Northern Mississippi would have converted the resources of a rich country to the national use, which this strange aban- donment left to supply the Contederate armies. It would have given support and co-opera- tion to the Army of the Cumberland, from which this strange departure isolated it as completely as if it had been taken out of the world. From the Department of the Cum- berland to the Mississippi River, the Depart- ment of the Tennessee was laid open to the enemy, north to the Ohio River; and all that region, open to Confederate incursions, flanked Roskcrans' army in the Stone River and Chattanooga campaigns. Happily the lay reviewer can avoid the presumption of drawing this conclusion on a purely military affair, and can escape the displeasure of dif- fering with military men on their own achievements, when these great Captains con- cur in the judgment that the abandonment of the interior campaign was a blunder, and was because Gen. Grant had yet to learn this elementary part of the art of war. CHAPTER LVII. GEN. GEANT AWARDED THE SOLE HONOR AND RE- SPONSIBILITY OF THE SEVERAL PLANS OF THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN — THE REASON WHY HE ABANDONED THE INTERIOR CAMPAIGN — HIS GREAT OPPORTUNITY. Gen. Grant's authorized historian afJirms that all of tiie operations against Vicksburg were of Grant's sole planning, and that not only did he unapproachably transcend all his Generals, but in the very turning point of the campaign, when it emerged from the swamp disasters and entered the triangular road to victory, he went contrary to the opin- ions of all his subordinate officers. Gen. Sherman generously awards the same exclusive honor to Grant. He says: "The eampaign of Vicksburg, in its 'conception and execution, belonged exclusively to Gen. Grant." He corroborates this by saying that when Gen. Grant retreated from the in- terior campaign, "I thought then that he had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us six months' extra hard work; for we might have captured Vicksburg from the direction of Oxford in .January quite as easily as was afterward done in July, 1863." No one has contested Gen. Grant's sole credit for all the planning of the several operations which have been embraced in the general term as the Vicksburg Campaign, comprising a variety of campaigns and expeditions. And both Sherman and Badeau quote Grant as admitting that his retreat from the campaign by the line of the Mississippi Central Rail- road was a mistake. This admission of the military blunder of retreating from a promising campaign, on the true military line, where he had abundant force, great preparation of supplies, and had only to go forward to accept' the success which was at hand, carries with it an admis- sion of Gen. Grant's sole responsibility for all the consequences of this error. The re- viewer may avoid the sin of presumptuous criticism by accepting the matured judgment of the sole author and finisher of those operations, and of his great Captain, and he- may plant himself impregnably on the base of their judgment in reviewing the direct consequences of this confessed blunder. And no operation in all the war had greater con- sequences, in the consuming of the volun- teers and resources of the nation. Both Gen. Sherman and Adam Badeau quote Gen. Grant as excusing his abandon- ment of the Yallabusha campaign by his in- experience in war, in the elementary part of subsisting an army in the enemy's conn- try; but this is an instance of mode.sty doing itself injustice. Badeau's narrative of that retreat shows plain I3' that Grant's object was to keep McClernand from the command of tlie river e.xpedition, and he narrates this as a sufficient reason. Gen. Sherman had just made an extraordinary march from jMemphis, with three divisions, to join Grant's arnu' south of the Tall^ahatchie, and thus all was ready for a decisive advance, when Grant heard that Lincoln was favoring McCler- nand's project of a river expedition. He thought to head off McClernanp by hurryiug Sherman back to Memphis to or- -^157 ganize endi- ture, so strained and protracted the discour- agement by (Jrant's operations, that this cap- ture of a starved garrison by four times its number, after more than its whole number, sick and well, had been consumed in tne va- rious undertakings against Vicksburg, was hailed as a prodigious victory. And now the victory which the Commandins General's plans had so long shunned, and which had cost such vast consumption and sacrifice of intelligent volunteers, was glorified as an achievement of his genius, and it was stretched back to make his failure in the Mis- sissip})i Central campaign, andall his failures in his bayou and canal undertakings, and in his marching his army away from victory after he had reached solid ground, parts of iu- — 163 — telligent strategy, all leading up to the crown - iiig victory. (JHAPTER LVJII. TIIK AKT i)F PROTRACTING THE WAK — TlIK DIS- JorXTEl) AM) DIVKRGINC. SYSTEM — SEESAW GEXKRALSnir — TO PREVENT OTHERS FROM SUC- CEEDING THE FIRST OBJECTIVE — THE PATRIOTIC VOLI'NTEERS. If the object had heen to protract the war for the interest of an army faction, and therefor to consume the resources of a great nation and the most spirited and intelligent soldiers the world has ever seen, without de- cisive results, strategic genius could not con- trive a more effective plan than by dividing the field of operations into difFerent parallel departments, each under a separate com- mander, directed in his separate line from Washington. Yet disjointed and bad as this system of separate and independent commands was, it had a theory that the several commanders of departments and of offensive campaigns would support and co-operate with each other. It supposed that these Generals would use their great discretion in loyalty to each other and to the country, and it had no thought that any one of them would have his mind divided between achieving success for his own advancement, and keeping a I'omraander in a parallel department from succeeding; that any one placed in command of an army of citizens would care more for beating a rival than for beating the enemy. If the object had been to so constitute de- partments and commanders, and so to order armies that one should give no support to an- other, or that the commander of one depart- ment should prevent the coiAnander of the adjoining department from succeeding, strat- egy could not better contrive it than by Gen. Grant's withdrawing his great army — the principal army in the West — from the interior campaign, and from all the territory of his department, save a few ports on the Missis- si{)pi River, isolating his army, and laying open all that country to C on federate occupa- tion, while the Army of the Cumberland was ordered on a campaign down the interior to Chattanooga. The region which Grant abandoned, to isolate his army in the Mississippi swamps included the strategic places which, in the previous season, had been the objective of a great campaign of an army of 100,000 men, and whose achievement had in its time been declared the breaking of the rebellion's back- bone. W^est Tennessee anil North Mississippi and Alabama were thus given up to supply the Confederate armies, and all these dearly gained strategic places were left to the enemy, on the right of Gen. Rosecrans' array, while it had to go forward into the heart of the Confederacy, stretching out its line of sup- plies, with the enemy in full possession of the country on its Hank. The strateg}- was so perfected that even if Grant had found the taking of Vicksburg practicable from the river, all the same it would have isolated his army so that it could give neither material nor moral support to the campaign of Gen. Rosecrans, nor hold any Confederate troops from joining the army which was opposing him. If the object had been to destroy one army after another, by subjecting each in its turn, unsui^ported by the others, to the combined armies of the Confederacy, it is hard to conceive how it could be better planned than was done. And of all the segregating and isolating of our armies by separate and diverging operations, that of Vicksburg was the chief, for surpass- ing in the bottling up property even Gen. McClellan's taking his army from Northern Virginia and the interior to the peninsula. Looking forward we behold the same won- derful management so ordering the Army of the Ohio in East Tennessee as to take it from co-operation with Gen. Rosecrans, and to provide that all the Confederate forces be- tween Virginia and the Mississippi should be concentrated against Rosecrans, and even strengthened by Longstreet's corps from Virginia, while our forces between the mountains and the Mississippi were divided into three isolated and non-co-operating parts. Further along in the war we shall find that Corinth, which was the threat strategic objective of Gen. Halleck's campaign with 100,000 men, in the spring of 1862, was the base of supplies for Huon's army in his cam- paign against Gen. George H. Thomas' army in December, 1864. The declaration of Gens. Grant and Sher- man that the true line of operations was that down the Mississippi Central Railroad, which Grant abandoned, and that all the results — 164 — which came after wasting of tlie army and the season in the swamp operations, might liave been gained in the fall of 18(32, by sim- ply keeping on in the line upon which he had started, admits much more than the wasting of that arim' by a palpable blunder, which ignored all principles of the art of war; admits the withdrawal of the support which this line and this territorial possession would have given to the Army of the Cum- berland in its Chattanooga campaign. Is it unreasonable to suppose that such support and co-operation in these depart- ments might have changed materially the history of the war? Is it too much to say that good generalship, operating on these parallel lines, with such armies, might have swept all before them, and ended the war in the great central zone in 1863? All this is happily free from the temerity of a dispute of the judgment of professional armj' men by a mere layman; for this is only a direct conclusion trom the after judgment ex- pressed by these great Generals. The severest military critic could not argue a greater military blunder than is thus con- fessed by the actors thereof: confessed with a plea of an alleged reason which confesses ig- norance of the very elementary parts of the military profession. But in fact this aban- donment of the interior campaign was done "for other than military reasons." Can we regard the long holding out of the Confeder- ates in a war so conducted as proof of great generalship? On the other hand, can we set too high an estimate on the martial qualities of the Northern volunteers and their volun- teer officers, whose invincible valor, heroic endurance of hardship, and hard lighting under all the disadvantage and discourage- ment ot such leading generalship, fought the war through to the triumph of the nation? Upon the surrender of Vicksburg, Gen. Grant was promoted, and, \ipon his recom- mendation, Sherman and McPhekson. Ac- cording to Badeau, this was the extent of his generosity to subordinates. The volun- teers who had been consumed by his dreadful methods M'cre considered as simply to have done the duty which every man owes his country. The volunteer officers, who, with the men of the ranks, had saved Grant from his blunders, and had brought the succession of destructive operations out at last to vic- tory, by sheer hard fighting, were regarded by Grant and his approved historian as ex- cessively honored by being permitted to serve as officers under a West Point commander, and to lead the volunteers into undertakings and sacrifices which their intelligence told them were ordered without military knowl- edge or good sense. The more the war is studied tfie more does it insi)ire admiration for the soldierly quali- ties of the American volunteer, and the more does it raise pride in a country whose mass of citizens possess such martial superi- ority. The conscientious historian is obliged to say that the war did not evolve any Bona- parte to a leading command; but it did evolve a patriotic valor, and a military capac- ity in the mass of citizens above what any had believed. The citizen volunteers fought out the war to triumph in spite of blunder- ing generalship in the highest commands. These splendid martial qualities and heroic patriotism in the universal citizen are im- measurably higher elements of national glory and pride than if all had been achieved by the genius of one or two Generals, with soldiers who were unthinking machines. The honor and glory of saving the nation be- long not to any individual, but to the Amer- ican patriotic volunteers. From Vicksburg Gen. Grant went to take comniaiul at Chattanooga. The Chattanooga campaign of the Army of the Cumberland under Gen. Rosecuans, and the operations of Gen. Grant on the river, were maierially rel- ative; not by co-operation, but by the de- parture of one from the line of co-operation, upon which a regard for militaiy principles and a desire to end the war should have kept him. Because.of this essential relation, and forasmuch as the battle of Chattanooga terminated cure the supi>lies of your army. Should Gen. Sherman be assigned by Gen. Grant to the command, you will furnish him with this and all other orders." Time all important, and the repair of the railroad, which would consume the all im- portant time. It is true that a dispatch of the 14th from Halleck to Sherman, received on the 16th, had this modification of the rail- road order: "When Eastport can be reached by boats, the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time it must be guarded as far as used." Sherman narrates that at luka on the 20th he heard that two gunboats sent to his aid had arrived at Eastport, only ten miles off. Yet he kept on repairing the railroad, and was at luka on the 27th. The same dis- patch eoncludes with the following moderate expectation from Sherman's expedition: Should the enemy be so strong as to prevent your going to Athens, or connecting with Gen. Rose- crans. you will, nevertheless, have assisted him greatly by drawing away a part of the enemy's forces. This soars into the realms of grand strategy, but all this was the way not to assist the Army of the Cumberland. Such expedition as Sherman made with three divisions from Memphis to join Grant at Oxford, and made again in his countermarch, would have brought him to Chattanooga in a fortnight from Memphis. But this was the way to re- — 168 — live RosECRANS* army, and enable that to se- cure its victory. At length, on the 27th of October, Sherman, still at luka, got intelligence that Grant was ajipointed to supreme command from Vir- ginia to the Mississippi, with power to remove E.OSECRANS, and other plenary powers, includ- ing that of placing him (Sherman) in com- mand of the Army of the Tennessee, in wliich it appears that Hurlbut was the rank- ing officer, but he was only a volunteer. With this exhilarating intelligence he re- ceived from Grant an order to "drop all Wjork on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennessee, and hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport till you meet further orders from me." No more delay of an urgent relieving ex- pedition to rebuild a railroad which was not to be used, and was left in the enemy's hands! No longer was the railroad from the north overtaxed to supply Rosecrans' army, for Grant was now in the command. It was now thirty-three days since Halleck's urgent order of the 15th reached Vicksburg, and twenty-five days since Sherman's first division reached Corinth, and in that twenty-five days his advance had reached Tuscumbia, about fifiy miles from Corinth. That was the way Grant's army relieved Rosecrans. Gen. Halleck's letter to Gen. Grant, sup- plementing Secretary Stanton's assignment of Grant to the command of the three depart- ments, gave liis version of the operations toward East Tennessee, of the general failure of co-operation, and of Rosecrans' operations in the Chattanooga campaign, sparing not the longbow in his own excuse. He also gave this piece of intelligence which rounds out, completes, and gilt edges the Vicksburg cam- paign : Itis now ascertahied that the greater part of the prisoners paroled by you at Vicksburg, and by Gen. Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally and im- properly declared exchanged and forced into the ranks to swell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. Gen. HALLECKsaidat the time that Grant's parole was not according to the cartel, and was not valid. But this is an exemplification of the nature of the co-operation which Grant gave to other operations, and it considerably diminislies Baueau's inventory of the results of the capture of Vicksburg. Fortunately the relief ordered from tlie East was more expeditious than that from Grant's army, and its commanders were eager to help their brother soldiers in the West. Fortunately, by the aid of these the plan formed by Gen. Rosecrans for opening the communication to Bridgeport, and left by him in the hands of Gen. George H. Thomas, was ready to be put in operation before Gen. Grant arrived, and was not opposed by him. Thereby the Army of the Cumberland was re- lieved by the reopening of its supplies without any assistance from Grant and Sherman. Had it depended on them, it is safe to say that at the least the soldiers would have been re- duced to very great straits. The operation which reopened the line of supplies was the first of the battles about Chattanooga, to which this preliminary chapter has now brought this review. CHAPTER LX. the soft delusion at WASHINGTON — THE AWAKENING — PROMPT MOVEMENT OF TROOPS FROM THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC TO THE RESCUE — DESTRUCTION OF STORES AND TEAMS — rosecrans' PLAN TO REOPEN THE LINE OF SUPPLIES — ROSECRANS REMOVED — GRANT AR- RIVES — rosecrans' PLAN EXECUTED UNDER GEN. THOMAS — BRILLIANT OPERATION AND BATTLE — THE LINE OF SUPPLIES OPENED AND THE ARMY TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE, At Washington the intelligence that Long- street had joined Bragg was a sudden awaking from the soft delusion that Bragg had ried, and was dividing his army to send to Lee, and that the way for Rosecrans was now open to Georgia and Alabama. Even as late as the 11th of September Halleck thought that Bragg was re-enforcing Lee, and on the 15th, in reply to a telegram from Rosecrans, Halleck telegraphed that no troops had gone from Lee to Bragg. Gen. Rosecrans. in his testimony to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, stated that "Longstreet's movement to support Bragg was known to Gen. Peck as early as the Gth. and that ^ol. Jacques, 73d Illinois, endeavored to communicate the fact that Longstreet's corps was going to Bragg, to the authorities at Washington, so long before the battle that he was able — 169 to wait in vain in Baltimore for a liearing, and then to reach us and take part in the battle of Cliickaniauga." Gen. Hal- LECK tries to show that he issued energetic or- ders for the aid of Rosecrans; but a previous management which had deprived him of the support of the army on the Mississippi on his right, and of the army in East Tennessee on his left, and had conceived and clung to the strange delusion that Bragg was scattering his army, could not retrieve all this after Bragg had received his re-en f or ce^ients from east and west, and was advancing with intent to attack Rosecrans before his widely divided columns could debouch from the mountain pa.^ses. The authorities at Washington decided promptly to transfer 20,000 men from the Army of the Potomac, then inactive on the Rapidan, to re-enforce the Army of the Cum- berland at Chattanooga, and through the energies' of the Quartermaster General and Government Superintendent of Railroads, and the officers of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 20,000 men, comprising the 11th Corps of Gen. Howard, and the 12th of Gen. Slocum, under the command of Gen. Hooker, with their artillery, marching from the Rapidan to Washington to embark, were debarked at Nashville within eight days. The officers of the Eastern army responded with loyal spirit to the need to relieve the beleaguered Western army. In the soldiers there was never anj'' lack of this loyal spirit, either East or West. Thus it came about that troops fi-om the army on the Rapidan were moved to the communications of Rosecrans' army, co-operating with him, and eventually assisting the Army of the Cumberland to open the line of supplies, before any assist- ance had arrived from Grant's army. Yet the remark must be made that this transfer of troops from the Army of the Potomac to re- lieve a situation caused by the transfer of Confederate troops from Lee's army and from the Mississippi, when concert of action in our Eastern and Mississippi armies would have given the Confederates enough to do on their several lines, was a most wasteful way of carrying on war, and that this and the con- cert of action now ordered in the Western armies was only an effort to retrieve a suc- cession of blunders. Gen. Hooker's troops were moved without their transi.>ortation teams. The lack of these greatly restricted tlieir co-operation with an armj"^ whose railroad line of supplies was cut off, and which had now lost a large part of its wagon equipment throtigh the Confederate cavalry expeditions. Wheeler's cavalry had, on the 30th of September, captured and burned in the Sequatchie Valley a train of from 700 to 1,000 wagons laden with supplies, and then a train of wagons and of cars at McMinnville, in the heart of Tennessee, and had kept on lo Murfreesboro, which being resolutely de- fended, he did not wait to attack, as he was pursued by Gen. Crook with the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland. Wheeler moved upon other places on the railroad, burning bridges, stores, and trains, and although he was eventually driven from Tennessee with severe losses of men, and the destruction of his effective force for a time, he had inflicted heavy damage on the Army of the Cumberland by the destruction of its stores and transpor- tation. Hooker's arrival secured the railroad from Nashville to Bridgeport; but he had not the means of transporting supplies to join the army at Chattanooga, which was now on greatly reduced rations, and the geographical and military situation waS such that the operation to open the line of supplies had to be made in tlie first instance from Chatta- nooga. The Confederate historian, Pollard, says of Chattanooga: Chickamauga liad conferred a brillirait glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held tbe prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our niter beds were in that region, find a large portion of the coal which supplied our foundries. It abounded in the nec- essaries of life. It was one of the strongest coun- tries in the world, bo full of lofty mountains that it had been called, not inaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany, and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Geoitsia, and Alabama. Chattanooga is situated in a valley on tha left bank of the Tennessee River, surrounded by lofty mountains and intervening valleys. Tliese mountains, in a range from north to south, are cut by the Tennessee River in a serpentine southwest course till it strikes the north end of Lookout Mountain, about three 170 miles below Chattanoofja, wlien it turns shortly to the northwest, the loop making a tongue of land tliree miles long called Mocca- sin Point, from tlie fancied resemblance of its outline to a mofcasin. The river keeping a northwest course for live miles, turns again abruptly to the south, making another nar- row tongue of land, and then to southwest. Down the river twenty-six miles by railroad from Chattanooga is Bridgeport, and eleven miles further to the sonthwest is Steven- son, Ala., where the railroad from Chattanoo- ga to Nashville turns to the north. Tnis rail- road, from Stevenson to Chattanooga crosses the Tennessee at Bridgeport and runs south of the river through a gap in Raccoon Mountains to Lookout Valley, through which valley it enters Chattanooga around the north base of Lookout Mountain. This valley, together with Lookout Mount- ain, was held by Gen. Buagg's forces, where- by our army's line of supplies by both railroad and river was cut off. And now the only way in whicli supplies could reach the army at Chattanooga from Bridgeport was by a cir- cuitous route up the Sequatchie Valley, and over the mountains north of the river, a dis- tance of sixty miles, and by a road which the fall rains soon made a slough. The number of wagons had been greatlj' reduced by the cavalry expeditions; the quantity whicli the teams could haul was fast diminishing by the nature of the road and the lack of forage; the animals of the army had to be left unsup- plied, and the rations for the men were get- ting very short. The possession of Lookout Vallev on the river would open to our army the navigation of tUe river up to the heel of Moccasin Point, and a road of less than a mile across this point would reach the river opposite Chatta- nooga, avoiding the guns of Lookout Mount- ain. Besides, a road from Brown's Ferry, at the heel of Moccasin Point, south and west through Lookout Valley, at the eastern base of Raccoon Mountains, to Kelly's Ferry, would open a practicable short road of sup- plies across a loop of the river to Kelly's Fer- ry, and thence by boat to Bridgeport. To get possession of Lookout Valley, between Look- out Mountain on the east, and Raccoon Mountains on the west, was, therefore, the object to which Gen. Rosecrajs's addressed liim.self as soon as he had made his position at Chattanooga secure by intrenchments so that he could safely detach a force for that object, in the face of Bragg's circumvallating army. Gen. Halleck, in his letter to Gen. Grant giving his version of previous operations to excuse himself and accuse Rosecrans, wrote: If you reoccupy the pns.ses in Lookout Mountain, which should never have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river from Bridge- port to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and should receive your early attentiou. This has gone into history as a jiroper cen- sure on Roseckans for giving up these passes as unnecessary and a military blunder. Badeau's history, revised by Grant, repeats this censure. But generalship at Washington was much easier than in the field of opera- tions, and was not limited by knowledge of the geographical situation. Lookout Mouiitain, twenty-eight hundred feet above tlie sea, and fourteen hundred and sixty feet above the Tennessee River, is a hundred and fifty miles long. One of its passes is forty-two miles south of Chattanooga, the next nearest twenty-six miles, and the nearest at the northern end of the mountain. Did Halleck mean all these, or which of them? To hold Lookout Mountain, and to cover the line of supplies below Chattanooga, required the holding of a line across Chatta- nooga Creek Valley, three miles to Lookout Mountain, and then the holding of Lookout Valley, making a line of not less than ten miles, overlooked at Chattanooga by the natural fortress of Mission Ridge. Tliis, to a badly hurt and retreating army, followed up by a victorious army, was equivalent to say- ing that it should restore the line of battle of Chickamauga, and that that "ought never to have been given up." In Lookout Valley the Confederates might concentrate any re- quired force, to fall on that detached wing. What was done was to intrench at Chatta- nooga, so that in the first instance our army could resist the expected immediate attack. Gen. Bragg gave as his plea for not following up his victory by an attack at Chattanooga, that he had lost two-fifths of his troops in the battle; and, second, that having cut off the line of supplies of the national army, he was confident that starvation would comjiel it to surrender. President Davis came to Lookout Mountain to anticipate the victory, This con- 171 fidence resulted in Bra(;g's ill fortune. Gen. RosFXRANS, having made his army secure by intrenchments which a part could hold, planned a movement for the other part to get possession of Lookout Valley. RosECRANs had previously ordered the con- struction of small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport, and two steamboats were now well advanced, and he was urging their comple- tion. He directed Gen. Hooker to concen- trate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised him that as soon as enough of his train should arrive to subsist his troops, ten or twelve miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley. He also ordered pontoons built at Chattanooga for a bridge at Brown's Ferry to connect with Hooker's army, and preparations to build storehouses on Williams' Island, just beyond the narrowest part of Moccasin Point, with a view to making the island a cover for a steam- boat landing. All of this meant that the army was at Chattanooga to stay. The original plan was tljat tlie pontoons should be carried across Moccasin Point, and then floated to Brown's Ferry, where they were to form a bridge by which the expedi- tion was to cross to Lookout Valley, and there intrench until it was supported by Hooker's troops, who were at the same time to move up from Bridgeport. The plan v?as far advanced in preparation when, October 19, Gen. Rosecrans received an order to turn over the command to. Gen. Thomas. Gen. Grant, on the same day, telegraphed Gen. Thomas: "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as jwssible. Please inform me how long your present supplies will last, and the prospect for keeping them up." Tills was energetic, but as early as the 23d of September Gen. Rosecran.s' dispatches had shown that Chattanooga would be held against attack, and tliat its continued holding would be secured by prompt re-enforcements to open its line of supplies. Neither Rosecrans, nor Thomas, nor the soldiers had had any thought of giving it up. But now nearly a month had passed since Grant liad received orders of urgency to send aid to Rosecrans, and none from that army had arrived, or was itear enoiigh to assure aid before starvation. Therefore this order did not render the deci- sive service to the holding of Chattanooga which Badeav seems to ascribe to it. Gen. Thomas answered: "Two hundredand four thousand and sixty-two rations in store- house; ninety-six thousand to arrive to-mor- row, and all trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th. We will hold ttie town till we starve." On the same day Thomas directed Hooker to hasten his concentration and his preparation to move as Rosecrans had ordered. Gen. Grant reached Chattanooga in the evening of the 23d. and the plan for opening the line of supplies was laid before him. The next day, in company with Gen. Thomas and Gen. W. F. Smith, Chief of Engineers to Rose- crans, he rode out to a view on thenorthsideof the river, and approved the plan. Gen. Smith was charged with the enterprise, which was now almost ready for action, and Gen. Thomas immediately issued the necessary orders to Gen. Hooker, who replied that he would move on the 27th. Gen. Smith now decided that the risk would be less if he floated the pontoons down from Chattanooga, carrying part of the troops, and made a landing on the enemy's side, to cover the crossing of the rest. The operation was avery delicate one. The boats had to float for seven miles along a line of Confederate pickets, and the landing to be made in the face of their lire. Fifteen hun- dred picked men, under Gen. Hazen, era- barked, while Gen. Turchin, with his brigade, the rest of Hazen' s, and three batteries of artillery under Major Mendenhau., moved across and took position in the woods on the north bank, to cover the landing of the rest on the opposite bank, and to join them as soon as practicable. The boats moved from Chattanooga at 3 a. ra. on the 27th of October, directed by Col. T. R. Stanley. A slight fog favored their con- cealment. They hugged the right shore, rounded Moccasin Point, and reached the place of landing unperceived. As the lead- ing section of the boats landed, the pickets fired and fled. The other sections arrived in quick succession; the men leaped ashore and ascended a near hill to meet a small force which had hurried forward at the alarm of the pickets, which was driven back by a short engagement. The boats were busy in bringing over the rest of the troops, while those before landed were busy in taking positions. Hazen took position on a hill east of the railroad ga}>. — 172 — and TuRCHiN on one west of this gorge. Skirmishers were thrown forward, and then detachments with axes felled trees for barri- cades and abatis, and in two hours the de- fenses were such as to make the hold secure. Then the pontoon bridge was laid under the supervision of Capt. Fox, 1st Michigan En- gineers. The enemy cannonaded from the foot of Lookout Mountain, but the loss of men in all this brilliant operation was but six killed, twenty-three wounded, and nine missing. The loss of the enemy was about tiie same. While Gen. Bragg was wasting ammuni- tion cannonading the floating bridge. Hooker was moving up from Bridgeport. He started early on the 27th, crossing on a pontoon bridge, turned through a gap in Eaccoon Mountains into Lookout Valley, and at 3 p. m. the head of his column had reached Wauhatchie, three miles from the river. His road passed through hills, where resistance was expected, but no resolute opposition was made. As Gen. Bragg's position on Lookout commanded a view of all the country, and as he must have perceived that a force coming down that valley to join the one which had crossed the river meant the opening of the line of supplies to the army he was expecting to starve, it w'as to be expected that he would make a strong attempt to oppose Hooker's march, but he did not. There was a feeble resistance to the march beyond Wauhatchie, but after firing a volley the enemv withdrew, burning the bridge over Lookout Creek. There was also on the march some loss of men from the batteries on top of Lookout Mountain. At 5 p. m. Hooker's troops halted for the night about a mile from Brown's Ferry. Gen. Geary's division of the 12th Corps remained at Wauhatchie to hold the road leading back to Kelly's Ferry. In the night the enemy attempted to take advantage of tliis separation of tlie troops. About mid- night a regiment which had advanced toward Lookout got into a skirmish; soon after the sound of battle was heard from Geary's divis- ion, which was attacked by part of Long- street's corps. Hooker ordered Howard to send Schurz's division double quick to Geary's aid. This division met resistance from the enemy on ijear hills. Stei>'\vehk's division came to the support, and an action was fought in the night, in which the enemy were successively driven from two strong positions, by charges with the bayonet. Through this the aid failed to reach GKARY^ who had to fight it out with his own division. After a resistance to " superior numbers for three hours, he took tlie oifensive, broke Longstkeet's line, and drove him from the field. In these actions the loss of Hooker's army was 416. This night attack showed that the Confed- erate General had at lentrth realized the meaning of our lodgment in Lookout Valley, but his attempt to retrieve the loss was not made with sufficient force to overcome the splendid fighting of our troops. Two brigades were now moved, one from Chattanooga, to strengthen the hold on the valley, and the enemy's chance of recovering it was gone. The relative situations of the national and Confederate armies were now changed. The question of supplies to our army was settled. .The steamboat, which had now been repaired at Chattanooga, passed the batteries of Look- out on the night of the 28th, and one at Bridgeport was soon underway laden with rations. A road was made from Chattanooga to Browii's Ferry, thence to Kelly's, and work was begun to repair the railroad from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. And now, in- stead of Gen. Bragg's question how long tlie national army could hold out against surren- der from starvation, the question was how soon could it get ready to attack Bragg's army. This relief had been achieved through the plan formed by Gen. Rosecrans, and the aid brought bjf Gen. Hooker from the Eastern army, without any assistance from the two Western armies, one on the oast and the other on the West, from which, in any rational military plan, co-operation was to be ex- pected from tlic beginning, and from one of which, namely, that of Gen. Grant, the first relief was rationally to be expected. This was the first of the battles about Chattanooga after Gen. Grant took command. Although he had no part in the operation, the credit of the success redounded to his glory in Badeau's history. And, considering tlje genius he had before exhibited, great credit is unquestionably due him for not preventing the execution of this well laid plan. — 173 — CHAPTER LXr. THE MKillTY PREPARATION — ARMIES ANJl ADMIN- IfiTRATION WORKING IN HARMONY FOR THE FIRST TIME — LONGSTREET DEPARTS TO ATTACK BURNSIDE — GRANT OPvDERS AN IMPOSSIBILITY — SHERMAN AT LENGTH BEGINS TO MOVE WITH ENERGY — THE PLAN OF OPERATION'S AGAINST MISSION KIDGE — GRANT's MISCONCEPTION OF THE SITUATION — THOMAS ORDERS TROOPS TO FEEL THE ENEMY — THEIR SPIRIT CONVERTS A PEMONSTRATION TO AN ADVANCE AND THE GAIN OF AN ADVANTAGE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FINAL EVENT. Tlie firm hold on the left bank of the Ten lu'ssee River, in the valley between Lookout and Raccoon mountains, whicli had been made strong by the 27th of October, opened the way for supplies, which soon began to come by small steamboat-!, and thus the siege of Chattanooga was in effect broken, and now preparations began for driving the Confed- erate army from its positions. In this preparation there was none of that dividing and diverting of resources which had given the chief of them to Grant's army in Mississippi, while thatof the Cumberland had to prepare for a greater campaign, nor of that stinting which had positively refused any ad- ditional force to Gen. Rosecrans, when he was ordered on the most difficult campaign of the war; but now all the resources of the three departments which had been placed under Grant's command were concentrated for the Chattanooga operation, with the aid of the two corps from the Army of the Potomac; and now tlie Wasliington authorities were boun- teous in furnishing every sort of equipment and sui)ply. At length three parallel depart- ments and armies were placed under one com- mander, and the military administration at Washington was supporting. This was rare harmony in the great war. Gen. Sherman was coining with the loth Corps, comprising four divisions, to which, by an order issued frdui luka. he addeda select force of 8,000 from the 17th (Mc- Pherson's) Corps, under command of Gen. Dodge. And now Gen. Grant ordered forward another division from McPherson's corps. All the troops of both armies holding posts in the rear were ordered forward, so far as they could be spared, especially cavalry and ar- tillery. Great energies and means were called out from the North to repair and equip the railroads, to increase the lines of supply. At Chattanooga Gen. Brannan. Thomas' Chief of Artillery, was instructed to prepare the fortifications for heavier guns, and to make re(juisitions for these and for all ammunition tliat might be wanted. Two additional pon- toon bridges were ordered to be laid to facili- tate tlie movement of troops. 'J'his sound of mighty preparation might have warned Gen. Bragg that something more than the mere defense of Chattanooga was in the wind, but he supposed that his position on Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain was im))regnab]e, and now, in the faice of this gathering power, he sent off Longstreet witii 15,000 men to attack Burnsidk in East Ten- nessee, having some grand project of ulterior opei'ations after overwlielming Burnside and recovering East Tennessee. Thus by a strange fortune, while forces from east, north, and west were gathering to Grant, in his front Bragg was dividing bis army. Pollard, who has a severe mind toward President Davis, charges this dividing expe- dition to him, but it was resolved upon by a council of war after Davis had left, and after Thomas' occupation of Lookout Valley had changed the situation. Bragg and his Gen- erals might reasonably reckon that his posi- tion was impregnable. If impregnable, .so that part of his army could securely hold it. and hold Grant's army in its front, he might reckon on recovering East Tennessee and threatening Grant's rear by Longstreet's op- eration. It did throw the Wa.shington au- thorities into panic, and if Grant had given way to them he would have sent part of his army to help Burnside, and thus the opera- tions •would have neutralized each other. But some military man has written that in real war the event depends on the question which side will commit the greatest blunders. There is a sort of satisfaction in the thought that blundering generalship was not all on the national side. Gen. Grant, having ascertained on the 7th of November that Longstreet was moving to- ward East Tennessee, became very anxious for Burnside, but he saw no way of relieving him, save by attacking Bragg on Mission Ridge. He sent another urgent message to Sherman, and on the same day ordered Gen. Thomas to attack and carry the north end of Mission Ridge on the next morning. The order said : — 174 — The news ■•■■ •'■ '^ is of such a nature that it be- comes an imperative duty to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. I deem the best movement to attack tlie enemy to be an attack on the northern end of Mission Ridge with all the force you can bring to bear against it; and when this is carried, to threaten and even at- tack, if possible, the enemy's line of communica- tion between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Mission Ridge is in our posses- sion ; rations to be curried in haversacks. * * * The movement should not be made a moment later than to-morrow morning. To issue such an (u-dcr is e;isy wIkmi the conimander is utterly nnconsciolis of physic- al possibilities. This was to attack at a point which subsetjuently Gen. Sherman, with six divisions, and more offered hini, found im- pregnable. The operation which had seized Lookout Valley while the rations were at the shortest, had shown the indomitable spirit of Gen. Thomas' soldiers. They had had no thought of surrender or retreat, and whatever faintness they suflered from hunger was quicklj'^ cured by a full meal. But in the strait for food men were preferred befon Gen. Grant's head. To say that Gen. Grant, with an army twice as great as Gen. Bragg's, could tind in all that region no way to operate against him, save by a front attack against Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, is to slander his military capacity. Justice to him demands that it be said that he did not plan such an operation, but that his plan depended wholly on Sherman's finding the north end of Mission Ridge unfortified, and thereby an open way to Bragg's depot of supplies, and that nothing fell out as Grant had planned. Yet Adam Badeau admirably remarks: Few battles have ever been won so strictly ac- cording to the plan laid down; certainly no battle during the war of the rebellion was carried out so completely according to the programme, (irant's Instructions in advance would almost serve as a history of the contest. He then reconstructs the plan to fit the event losing sight of the whole foundation — namely, that Sherman was to find the depot of supplies unguarded, and bringing in Hooker "to draw attention to the right," and converting Sherman's attack into a dem- onstration "to still further distract the enemy; and then, when re-enforcements and attention should be drawn to both the rebel flanks, the center was to be assaulted by the main body of Grant's force under Thomas." But as it happened, two divisions were sent fi"om our center to aid Sherman, giving him seven divisions to "distract" with, and leav- — 192 — ing to Thomas only three 'divisions for the real assanlt. And when one of these returned, still Thomas' command at the center was far from being "the main body of Grant's force." Badeau winds up his effort with this: "Every- thing happened exactly as had been fore- seen." Gen. Sherman also disparages the brilve fighting of his troops by the after assertion that it was only a feint at one end, while Hooker was to feint at the other. He says in the memoirs: The object of Gen. Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanks of Bragg's position was to dis- turb him to such an extent that he would naturally detach from his center as against us, so that Thomas' army could break through his center. The whole plan succeeded admirably. Gen. Sherman forgot that only two pages previous to this he had narrated how Grant told him that "he believed that the northern portion of Mission Ridge was not fortified at all," and how elaborately his plan of a con- cealed march was formed upon this belief. In Flanders our army was remarkable for profanity; in the great secession war our greatest Generals were distinguished for ve- racity. In fact, Gen. BEAGodid not strip his center, although Sherman "disturbed" his right with six divisions, and another in sight; his force in the center was enough, if the troops had fought with their usual valor; but the en- thusiasm of our soldiers threw them into panic — a thing which could not be looked for, much less made a dependence in the plan of a great battle. From the blind plan and indecisive orders of the Commanding General, the clear orders of Gen. Thomas stand out admirably in relief. They show that he knew just what he wanted to do, and that his orders were all the time in advance of the mind of the Commanding General, comprehending the whole situation, and gaining successes in advance of orders, which were not in Grant's plan, and which so changed the situation that the heroic spirit of the soldiers was able to snatch victory from the jaws of a planned failure. In all this he was brilliantly seconded by Hooker's untiring energy and military skill. And this splendid achievement of the Army of the Cumberland was the fruit of a thorough training which began with Gen. Buell and Gen. Thomas, and had made it invincible. The civil war extended the breadth of a continent; yet it was less than the solar sys- tem, which, vast as it is, allows but one sun, round which all the other planets must re- volve, shining only by reflecting sunbeams. Even a continental army system can not be expected to be exempt fronr the conditions which govern the solar system.* Glancing forward to Gen. Grant's historian's third vol- ume, the reader observes that Gen. Grant was much dissatisfied with Gen. Thomas' slowness at Chattanooga; that this was one of the alleged reasons for Grant's order to re- move Thomas from command while the battle of Nashville was imminent— an order which, fortunately for the country, failed of connec- tion ; that after that completest victory of the war, which destroyed the offensive power of the Confederate army of the interior. Gen. Grant determined to strip Gen. Thomas of troops, and allow him no more a command in any active operations. All of this is more fully set down in Grant's letters to Sherman, printed in his memoirs. Another instance of the operation of the same solar law was seen in the Atlanta cam- paign of the following year, after Gen. Mc- Pherson was killed, in that Gen. Sherman ad- vanced to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, over Gen. Hooker's head, Gen. Howard, Hooker's subordinate, whose neg- lect of Hooker's orders at Chancellorsville, and of all rational military precautions, upon his shallow conceit that Lee was retreating, subjected his corps to a surprise, and sacri- ficed the campaign. The victory in the battles about Chattanoo- ga was gained by the volunteers of the ranks. The more one studies the history of the great war, the more is he impressed with admira- tion for tlie qualities of the American citizen volunteer soldier, and with the fervent belief that they were the best soldiers in the world. The greatness of a whole people is a better cause for national pride than the eminence of an individual. These splendid martial •qualities and this grand patriotism, in the volunteers of the ranks, are infinitely a higher national glory than the single genius of a Bonaparte, even if our war had devel- oped a Bonaparte. But war has a terrible sarcasm in its tradi- ditions, which heap all the glory of the patri- otism, heroic valor, heroic death, and dear victories of the volunteers of the ranks, upon — 193 the head of a Commanding General who may even have been an incumbrance. The battles about Chattanooga raised Gen. Grant's mili- tary fame to its zenith, and resulted in his call to the East to the command of all the national armies. His history atfords an in- structive lesson in the possibilities of com- manding generalship and in the nature of military fame. CHAPTER LXVII. REVIEW OF THE EFFECT OF THE VICKSBURG CAM- PAIGN ON THE ARMY OF THE OHIO AND BURN- SIDE's EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. As goon as Knoxville had been relieved, Gen. BuRNsiDE, who had asked to be relieved from the command because of ill health, as soon as he had gained East Tennessee, but had continued at Lincoln's special request, now asked to be relieved, and he left on the 7th of December. Gen. Foster soon arrived to take command, the active command de- volving on Gen. Parke, Burxside's Chief of Staff. Gen. Halleck had now rewarded Gen. BuRNsiDE for the brilliant campaign which had seized the long coveted East Tennessee, and had held it by numerous engagements against superior numbers, by promoting him to the responsible ofSce of scapegoat — a very essential office in all wars, and transcend- ently so in that romantic style of war whose remote campaigns are directed by dispatches from Washington, dictated by a General in Chief whose theory of war was so untram- meled by real conditions as Gen. Halleck's telegraphic campaign orders. The conduct of tlie Army of the Ohio after Gen. BuRNsiDE took command had so impor- tant a relation to the Vicksburg campaign, the Chattanooga campaign of the Army of the Cumberland, and the subsequent opera- tions under the command of Gen. Grant, that a review of these would be incomplete which did not touch upon this part. When Gen. BuRNSiDE was appointed to the command of the Department of the Ohio, in the last of March, 1863, he called for more force, and in April two divisions of the 9th Corps arrived in Kentucky. The Confederate expeditions into Kentucky were very active at this time, aim- ing at the communications of Rosecrans' army. On the 27th of April Gen. Burnside organ* ized the other troops in Kentucky into the 23d Army Corps. The intention was to move into East Tennessee, which from the be- ginning had been the cherislied object of the government, and which was now to be under- taken by Burnside with the two divisions of the 9th Corps and the hastily organized 23d Corps, under Gen. Hartsuff. Says Wood- bury's history: Gen. Burnside submitted to Gen. Rosecrans a plan for a co-operative movement upon East Tennes- see. With the advice of Gen. Thomas it was ac- cepted, and preparations were accordingly made by the two commanders. The troops were properly concentrated for the movement, and on the 2d of June Gen. Burnside left his headquarters at Cincinnati and proceeded to Lexington to take command. The time was ripe for the operation, and officers and men were eager for the service. The 9lh Corps, strengthened by a division under Gen. Carter, was to march directly into East Tennessee by way of Monticello. Gen. Hartsufr was to follow ia support. Gen. Rosecrans was to advance upon Chattanooga. Tliis plan gives a glimpse of real war— of war lifted out from raids and disjointed^ cen- trifugal, seesaw campaigns, and placed upon a connected and mutually supporting plan. But it was not to be. Gen. Grant's abandon- ment of the Mississippi Central movement, and his diffusive expedition /to' isolate his great army at Vicksburg, had withdrawn the grand right wing of this operation, and now his situation was to withdraw the left wing just as the Army of the Cumberland in the center was about to start. If war is so near an art that rational calculations can be made upon positive conditions of forces and plans, is it too much to say that if these armies had been in the interior, co-operating, their march could not have been successfully opposed anywhere? Upon the same premises is it too much to say that when Halleck withdrew the 9th Corps from Burnside at this time to send to Grant at Vicksburg, he dealt the cam- paign of Rosecrans a fatal blow? This sacri- fice was a part of the cost of the Vicksburg campaign. And upon the same premises is it presumptuous to say that if a great genius had been directing our armies with intent to thwart them, he could not have done it more effectually? Gen. Burnside, on the eve of starting for the field, received an ominous inquiry from Washington, if any troops could be spared — 194 from the Department of the Ohio to assist Gen. Grant. Soon an order reached Burn- side, at Lexington, to send 8,000 men to Grant. The 9th Corps, except one regi- ment, whose term of service was nearly out, was promptly disjiatched upon this order of urgency. This enforced the suspension of the East Tennessee co-operation. And while the military authorities were stripping Rosecrans of co-operation, and laying open his flanks west and east, and were devoting the great means of every sort to the supply and in- crease of Grant's army, and were denying to liosECRANS any further aid, they were per- emptorily ordering him to adyance, unsup- ported, more than a hundred miles further into the heart of the South, 'against the prin- cipal Confederate army, and upon tlic strongest Confederate position. The 9th Corps went to Vicksburg. After the surrender, instead of being sent back to the East Tennessee operation, it was marched in Sherman's useless raid to .Jackson. Wood- bury's description of the condition of the yth Corps when it embarked to return from Vicksburg, in August, gives an idea of that terrible part of tlie cost of taking Vicksburg which is not set down by Gen. Grant's his- torian, and is not given in the Commanding General's bulletins or reports. He says: The campaign in Mississippi was especially se- vere in the effects upon the ofliceis and men of the 9th Corps. The excessive heat, the malaria that settled like a pall of death around the camps upon the Yazoo River, the scarcity of water and Its bad quality, the forced marches, and the crowded con- dition of the transports, told fearfully upon the troops. All the accounts of the movement agree in their statements respecting the amount of disease and mortality which accompanied it. The hardships which all were obliged to endure vvere excessive. Water which the horses refused to drinii the men were obliged to use in making their coffee. Fevers, congestive chills, diarrhea, and other diseases attacked the troops. Many sank down by the road- side and died from sunstroke and sheer exhaustion. Tlie sickness that prevailed upon the transports upon the return voyage was terrible and almost universal. Nearly every night, as the boats lay up on account of low waier and the consequent danger of navigation, the twinkling liglu of the lanterns on shore betokened the movements of the burial parties as they consigned the remains of some uu- i'ortunate comrade to the earth. When the troops reached Cairo the men were scarcely able to murcn through the streets. They dropped in the ranks; and even at the market house, where the good citizens had provided an abundant ana comfortable meal for the wornout soldiers, they fell beside the tables, and were car- ried away to the hospitals. More than half the command were rendered unfit for duty. There were notable men enough belonging to the batteries to water and groom the horses. From the diseases contracted in that cam- paign, few ever recovered entirely. Yet these troops had not had the previous dreadful ex- perience of four months in the hardships of the swamp operations, and of the .first forced marches away to Jackson and back. This accountof the condition of a corps which had come fresh from the North only two months before, gives some idea of the way in which the Vicksburg operation consumed a great army. Gen. Grant, as quoted by his historian, and Gen. Sherman in his memoirs, admit that they might have gone on from Oxford in the fall of 1862, and have taken Vicksburg from the interior. In this they confess that the Vicksburg operation by the river was in itself a blunder, and that this blunder caused the enormous expense of the river expedition, the consuming of the army in the swamp operations tor four months, and the loss of at least six months of time. This confesses a blunder of great magnitude; but all this was but the lesser part. Vastly greater was the cost of the Vicksburg campaign in its sacrifice of other greater campaigns. In all this it was equivalent to a year's prolongation of the great war. Meanwhile, in July, Gen. Burnside had to direct the forces to pursue Gen. .John Mor- gan's great raid into Kentucky, Indiana, and Oiiio, which he did with great success, and his directions were supported by wonderful energy, and Morgan's force was captured after a ptirsuit of nearly a month, which, for near twenty days, was in Indiana and Ohio. This raid again delayed preparations for East Tennessee. When the 9th Corps arrived the troops were unfit to join the expedition, and were sent to places in Kentucky for rest and recovery. Tlie East Tennessee expedition was now organized of troops of the 23d Coi'ps, some fresh levies in Kentucky, some from East Tennessee, and some from the North. The troops of the 9th Corps were to be disposed for following re-enforcements. — 105 — CHAPTER LXVIII. (iEN. BURNSIDE OCCUPIES EAST TENJS'ESSEE — A BRILLIANT OPERATION — HALLECK'S DISTRACT- ING ORDERS — OPERA BOUFFE WAR — THE ACTIVE CAMPAIGN IN EAST TENNESSEE AFTER CIIICKA- MAUGA — THAT POSITION SAVED BY BURNSIDE IN SPITE OF HALLECK's ORDERS — BURNSIDE PRO- MOTED TO THE PLACE OF SCAPEGOAT — LONG- STREET IN EAST TENNESSEE A STANDING MENACE. The Confederate positions in East Tennes- see were so strong, and could be so quickly re-enforced both from Virginia and from Bragg's army, that it was only by strategy that such a force as that of Burnside could expect to succeed. Burnside moved from (!rab Orchard August IG, the infantry in two columns, the cavalry in another. Demon- strating toward Cumberland Gap, he moved to the mountains by more westerly gaps and more unfrequented roads, hitherto deemed impassable by a large army, his troops in light marching order, and after fourteen days of hard marching, the troops aiding the animals to haul the guns and wagons up the acclivities, they surmounted the sumiuits, and Gen. Buckner was surprised by the ap- pearance of an army approaching on ditfer- ents roads, as if it had dropped from the clouds. By this extraordinary march of 250 miles, over great mountains by difficult passes. Gen. Burnside gained East Tennessee, which, with due notice of his coming and line of march, might be called impregnable. His army consisted of about 18,000 men. On the 1st of September Col. Foster's cavalry en- tered Kingston, and on the 2d Burnside entered Knoxville. On the 9th Cumberland Gap was surrendered to Burnside, with 2,500 prisoners, eleven guns, small arms, and much ammunition. The recovery of East Tennessee was at last achieved, and it was done by an operation as bold, skillful, and brilliant as any in the war. On the 10th Burnside received from Gen. Gordon Granger a dispatch stating his occu- pation of Chattanooga, and giving a highly colored view of the results, as if that opera- tion were completed. Burnside was suflFer- ing from disease, and he now asked to be relieved; but Lincoln, with warm thanks for what he had done, besought him to stay. On the 11th he received tliis remarkable order from Halleck: I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with Gen. Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. Gen. Rosecrans will occupy Dalton. or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes in tlie west. This being done, it will be determined whether the movable force shall advance into Georgia and Alabama or into the valley of Virginia and North Carolina. The Grand Duchess of Gerolstein's council of war ceases to be burlesque in the contem- plation of these and tollowing orders issued by Gen. Halleck to Burnside. To hold the gaps of the North Carolina Mountains to pre- vent access from Virginia, to hold the line of the Holston, and connect with RosecransI Only an affair of 200 miles or so, besides the necessity of holding Cumberland Gap and other widely separated points in Tennessee. And meanwhile Rosecrans. instead of dream- ing of Dalton and boundless marches into Georgia and Alabama, or into the valley of Virginia and North Carolina, was giving all his energies to getting his separated columns through the mountains west of Chattanooga, to concentrate them, before Bragg's re-enforced army could fall upon them in detail. Burnside did what he could to make dis- positions to carry out tliese diffusive orders, and had to do it against an active enemy, who had no intention of resigning East Ten- nessee. The utmost vigor and vigilance were required to repel the ever vigilant enemy, on a line now extended to 176 miles. On top of all this cam*) to Burnside from Halleck the following distracting order dated Septem- ber 13: Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may hold the passes of the mountains to cover Atlanta, and move his main army through North- ern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River, ana turn Rosecrans' right and cut ofT his supplies. In this case iiosecrans will turn Chattanooga over to you and move to intercept Bragg. To hold East Tennessee, the passes of the Nortli Carolina Mountains, and move with his infantry to Chattanooga! Corporal Gen- era< Fritz is without doubt an historical char- acter. On the morning of the 17th Bl'RNSide started to overtake the troops whom he had — 196 sent up the valley on Halleck's first order, to march them back and down toward Chat- tanooga on his second order. Then came this from Halleck on the 14th: There are several reasons why you should re-en- force Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed tnat the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him. Gen. BuRNSiDE got this order at Morris- town, forty miles northeast of Knoxville, late on the 17th, and next day he ordered all troops in that quarter back to Knoxville and London. Thus was Burnside from Washing- ton ordered to hold the North Carolina Mountains against troops from Virginia, to hold the line of the Holston against Gen. Jones' army and re enforcements from the south, and to join Rosecrans with his main army, besides liolding passes in the Cumber- land Mountains on his own account. That wliich Halleck's orders required was like the traditional spread of the bird of freedom. When Rosecrans had fallen back to Chatta- nooga Gen. Burnside submitted to Halleck three different plans of movement to aid him, declaring his preference for the one to move on Bragg's right and rear, and send the cav- alry to destroy the machine works and powder mills at Rome. This would be a bold move- ment, but, if made immediately, who can say that it might not succeed? But Halleck was still at cross purposes, and he disapproved, and gave this by way of censure for the past and direction for the future: The purport of all your instructions has been that you should hold some point near the upper end of the valley, and with all your available force move to the assistance of Rosecrans. And the purport and effect of all of Hal- leck's orders was to give up East Tennessee, if they had been followed. A history would be required to give a full view of the absurd muddling of these and Halleck's other orders to Burnside, whicii continued as long as Burnside remained there. Of course a scapegoat was a military necessity, and the General who had made one of the most brilliant and important achieve- ments of the war, and had done it with small means, and maintained it against great ef- forts of the enemy, was selected for this office. Halleck still seemed unconscious of the ridiculous impossibilities of his orders, when he^aftervvard'cited them to show how vigor- ous he had been in ordering Burnside to co-operate with Rosecrans, and how delin- quent Burnside. Then Longstreet was sent up in a deter- mined campaign to recover East Tennessee. Longstreet could be re-enforced to any desired extent from Virginia. Burnside, with his troops greatly extended, had to op- pose this superior force, led by one of the most enterprising of the Confederate Gen- erals. The peril of his army and of East Tennessee was very great, but Burnside, though suffering from disease, was a sanguine and bold General, and he had brave troops. Longstreet planned his movements with good strategy to cut off and capture Burnside, but he was met at eacli point, and was repulsed in all the important engagements of this very active campaign, as Burnside retired skill- fully upon Knoxville, where an assault and bloody repulse had expended Longstreet's present resources, and had made his cam- paign a failure in its great objective, by the time that Sherman's relieving march began. The brilliancy of the operation by which East Tennessee was gained was surpassed by the energy, skill, and hard fighting by which it was held. Fortunately Halleck's orders of impossibilities were but little heeded, the Commanding General having constantly to hold against an active enemy. Halleck's fault finding was an attempt to cover his own blunders by disparaging one of the most im- l^ortant, spirited, and successful campaigns of the war. Halleck would have sacrificed East Tennessee; Burnside saved it in spite of his orders. Yet Halleck pretended that Burnside was weakly going to give up Ten- nessee. Although Burnside's falling back before Longstreet to Knoxville was in accord with Grant's views, who at that time thought it well to draw Loniistreet further away, Halleck took it as a purpose to give up East Tennessee, and on the 14tlj of November he sent to Grant this mean and supremely ig- norant telegram: Advices from East Tennessee indicate that Burn- side intends to abandon the defense of Little Ten- nessee River, and full back before Longstreet to- ward Cumberland Gap and the upper valley. Long- street is said to be near the Little Tennessee with from twenty to forty thousand men. Burnside has about thirty thousand in all, and can hold his posi- tion ; he ought not to retreat. I fear further delay may result in Burnside's. abandonment of East Ten- nessee. — 197 Again Halleck telegraphed Grant on the KJtli : 1 fear he will not tight, although strongly urged to do so. Unless you can give him uumediate assistance, he will surrender his position to the enemy. This was from the hero of the fifteen miles of siege approaclies ot Corinth m thirty days, with a veteran army of a hundred thousand men; and it was concerning a General who had carried out one of the boldest camjiaigns of the war. Gen. Burnsidk's reward was his promotion by Halleck to the high office of scapegoat. He left Knoxville on the 7th of December. Gen, Parke moved a coltinm from Knox- ville after Longstreet on the 7th of Decem- ber to Blain's Cross Roads, thirteen miles east ot Knoxville. His cavalry was strung out sixteen mile.s beyond, where a force of Wheeler's cavalry fell upon a detachment far from support, and captured a wagon train laden with supplies. Parke's advance then fell back to Blain's Cross Roads. ' The winter was severe, and the troops in no condition for a campaign. Rosecrans' army had crossed the Tennessee in light marching order for a campaign in warm weather. Burnside's troops had crossed tiie mountains in light marching trim. Howard's corps had stripped at Bridgeport for Chatta- nooga. The movement of Sherman's army to Knoxville was one of great hardship from insutiicient clothing and food and hard marching. Burnside's troops were destitute, in rags, shoeless, and on semi-starvation ra- tions. Not till spring were communications restored so that the troops at Knoxville could be properly supplied. During that winter the hardships of the troops in East Tennessee, on a much larger scale, surpassed the historical sufferings of Washington's troops at Valley Forge. Yet in the midst ot their privations these hungry, ragged, and shoeless volunteers re-enlisted by regiments for three years. Yet our war traditions, following that hero wor- ship which, in the evolution of tradition, creates the gods of mythology, hold that the National Union was saved by the military genius of an individual. Longstreet abode all winter in East Ten- nessee. His attitude was a standing threat to our occupation, and eyen to Grant's rear. Grant's uneasiness was increased by reports that Longstreet was receiving more troops from Virginia, portending an offensive move- ment. Badeait says that Grant went to Knoxville about Christmas, to take steps to drive out Longstreet, but he found the troops so destitute, the weather so severe, and tlie difficulties of supplying the command so i)ro- digious, that a campaign was impossible. He says: The weather was extremely iiielemeut, and many of the troops stood in line with only a blanket to cover their nakedness. The difficulties of supplying the demand were so prodigious that great sufTering ensued. No railroad could be built under two months, at soonest; the fall in the rivers frequently interfered with the transportation of supplies; and now that the roads had become well nigh Impassable by reason of snow and ice, to send re-eniorcements would only be to put the men on more insufficient rations. Longstreet's attitude was a standing menace. Re-enforcements could reach him from both Dalton and Virginia, and his plan of aggression might recover the mountain fortresses and passes of East Tennessee, and compromise Grant's communications. Not- withstanding the destitution of the troops, a movement in force was made in January. Gen. Wood's advance on the 15th drove the Confederate cavalry from Dandridge, twenty- eight miles directly east of Knoxville. Long- street showed tight, and on the 17th and 18lh there was skirmishing, and late on the 18th a brisk cavalry fight, which McCook, with three Ohio cavalry regiments, closed by a charge that cleared the field and covered the retreat, which a council of corps and division Generals had decided to be better than to risk a general engagement. They fell back to Strawberry Plains, and subsequently to Maysville, followed by Longstreet. After this Granger's corps returned toward Chattanooga, and, Badeau says, remained all winter stretched out between Cleveland and Knoxville. Not till some time in the spring were communications restored so that the army in East Tennessee could be fully sup- plied. But Longstreet seemed to Grant to have the strategic advantage in East Tennes- see, and, from his position, to be able to com- pel the course of the next campaign. He had heard also that Longstreet had received heavy re-enforcements. He therefore ordered Gen. Foster to prepare to take the offensive to drive out Longstreet, and Gen. Thomas to 198 — jtrepare for an advance to Knoxville, with such forces as could be spared from the pro- tection of Chattanooga and its communica- tions, to assist Gen. Foster to drive Long- street from East Tennessee. Gen. Foster wanted at least 10,000 men. Gen. Thomas' array was now greatly re- duced by furloughs to regiments of re-enlisted veterans, and the waste of his artillerj' horses and train animals in the siege had not yet been supplied. He advised a postponement till the railroad could be put in runningorder to Loudon, thirty miles from Knoxville, where the bridge over the Tennessee was destroyed. Gen. ScHOFiELD had now arrived, and assumed command at Knoxville, Gen. Foster, on ac- count of ill health, having been relieved. Grant had a conversation with Foster, which, with Schofield's dispatches, led him to countermand the order. Again there was an alarm about Longstreet early in March, but it did not cause any lartie change of dis- positions. CHAPTEE, LXIX. the inFFusivE dispositions after the great • victory — peripheral strategy again — A RAID, with an alternative — A SCAPEGOAT — MILITARY RAIDING GENIUS — GRANT's FAME AND PRESTIGE AT THE ZENITH — GRANT LIEU- TENANT GENER.\L .\ND MILIT.\RY AUTOCRAT — TAKES COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO- MAC — A GRAND ARMY READY TO BE CONSUMED — GRANT EMBRACES HIS OPPORTUNITY — THE END, The victory of Mission Ridge was followed by a long period of diffusion, such as that which followed the operation on Corinth in the spring of 1862. From the beginning of the war much stress had been laid on the sti'ategic importance of Chattanooga, but now no advance was made from it till in the fol- lowing May. And that, after a vastly greater expenditure of troops, means, and time, was made abortive by its failure to disable the Confederate army, and by Gen. Hood's march north into Middle Tennesse, where he made his base at Corinth, which had been the great objective of Halleck with an army of 100,000, in the spring of 1862. Thus the dis- jointed strategy in the West had the fortune that it was successively lighting back and forth over the same ground. Great energies and means were applied to the rebuilding of bridges and roads, and to the gathering of munitions and supplies for the holding of Chattanooga, and for ulterior operations, whose nature was not yet decided upon. The region in the rear of the national advanced line was greatly in- fested by guerrilla parties, and raided by Confederate cavalry expeditions, against which were many national cavalry expedi- tions which were generally successful. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston succeeded Gen. Bragg, and made his base at Dalton, his dispositions covering all tiie country south of the na- tional lines, and securing its supplies to the Confederate army. Gen. Grant, on the 7th of December, an- nounced to Gen. Halleck that "it may now safely be assured that the enemy are driven from the front, or, at least, that they n o longer threaten it in formidable numbers;" he therefore reverted to his former peripheral strategy, of an expedition from New Orleans against Mobile. He said the country south of Chattanooga was mountainous, afibrdiyg little for the supply of an army, the roads bad at all times, and a winter campaign there impossible; therefore, he said: "I propose, with the concurrence of higher authority, to moye by way of New Orleans and Pascagoula, or Mobile. I would hope to secure that place, or its investment, by the last of January." The higher authority did .not concur, and Badeau says "Grant himself ceased to urate it when he discovered that Longstreet was likely to winter in Tennessee." With Long- street in East Tennessee and Johnston's army still in front of Chattanooga, and the defensive attitude improved by the Confed- erate cavalry raids on his lines of supply, the sending of an army round the circumference to Mobile would be in the same order of dif- fusive strategy as that w hich retreated from Oxford to take the army to the Mississippi swamps, and would be likely to permit the Confederates to recover East Tennessee and to march into Kentucky. Gen. Grant on the 11th of December con- ceived a more ambitious expedition. He wrote to McPherson at Vicksburg: "I shall start -a cavalry force through Mississippi in about two weeks, to clean out the State en- tirely of rebels." That would be an exten- sive cleaning out. Says Badeau: "This was the germ of what has been known as th. — 199 — Meridian raid." Tiiis contemplated raid grew in time and preparation to the force for a campaign. More than a month hiter, January 15, Grant wrote to Halleck : Sherman has gone down the Mississippi to collect at Vicksburg all the force that can be spared for a separate movement from the Mississippi. He will probably have by the 24th of this month a force of 20,000 men. I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian with his spare force, the cavalry goin^ from Corinth; destroy the roads and bridges south of there so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebel- lion. He will then return, unless an opportunity of going to Mobile with the force he has appears per- fectly plain. Further along the letter has this sign of strategy: "I do not look upon any points, except Mobile in the South, and the Tennessee River in the North, i^s presenting practicable starting points from which to operate against Atlanta and Montgomery." It thus appears that the plan had the same alternative con- venience as that of the movement from Hankinson's Ferry away from Vicksburg — namely, that it was to be a campaign if it succeeded in getting to Mobile, and a raid if it failed. Gen. Sherman says in his memoirs: "I never had the remotest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given out that idea to tlie people of the country, so as to de- ceive the enemy and divert their attention." That tliis stratagem would be likely to divert ihe attention from his movement is easy to be seen. But Gen. Grant wrote to Gen. Thomas of this plan : He (Sherman) will proceed eastward as far as Me- ridian at least, and will thoroughly destroy the roads east and south of there, and, if possible, will throw troops as far east as Selma; or, if he linds Mobile unguarded so as to make his force sufficient for the enterprise, will go there. Toco-operate with this movement you want to keep up an appearance of preparation of an advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary to move a column even as far as Lafayette. This was by the Commanding General who planned the expedition. Badeati, wliose strategic mind ranges as widely as the poet's frenzied rolling eye, has also this as one of the objects of the plan: "To relieve East Ten- nessee, as well as to secure the safety of the contemplated movement into Georgia during the ensuing spring." Gen. Sherman, Feb- ruary 3, moved from Vicksburg four divisions on this alternative. Gen. William Sooy Smith was to move with 7,000 cavalry from Memphis, at the .same time, or thereabout, to join Gen. Sherman at Meridian, a route of over 250 miles, into the heart of the enemy's country. It was about this time that Gen. Grant ordered Gen. Thomas to move to Knoxville — Johnston then confronting Chattanooga. When he recalled that order, he issued an- other on the 19th to Gen. Thomas, \vhich was as remarkable — namely, to move in force to- ward Dalton. and if possible occupy that place and repair the railroad to it. This was to make a movement wliich Sherman re- quired the three combined armies for in the following May. It was to attack Johnston behind Rocky Face Ridge, which Sherman with the three armies found unassailable. Grant's object in this was to prevent John- ston's sending troops against Sherman. But the diverting movement would be a much greater thing than Sherman's naovement. Two days after Grant had issued this order he learned that Johnston had at Dalton six divisions, and had sent away but one brigade; yet he did not recall his order, although he now knew that it was to attack superior numbers in an unassailable position. Thomas moved on the 2'2d. On that evening Gen. Palmer advised Grant that he had received intelligence that Johnston had sent Cheat- ham's and Cleburne's divisions to re-enforce Polk, who was falling back before Sherman, and now all the available troops were moved up to attack Johnston. The movements and dispositions were carried forward on the 2?)(1 and 24th, developing the enemy's positions, skirmishing, and driving him from the outer lines. Next day a resolute attack was made, which charged up the hill, and there met an overwhelming force. Skirmishing and cannonading were contin- ued till night, when our troops were with- drawn. Next morning Col. Harrison was driven from a gap six miles south of Buzzard Roost, nearly opposite Dalton, by Cleburne's division, one of the two which Grant thought had been sent away. Gen. Thomas had proved that not only had Johnston an unassailable position, but more tljan his own force, and that to attempt to stay in front of John- ston was to expose his army, besides the im- practicability of supplying it. Grant urged — 200 — him to stay and threaten Johnston and make him believe that he was making an advance into the South, until the result of Sherman's campaign should be known. But Thomas decided this to be impracticable, and gave orders to withdraw, his means of supply be- ing inadequate. Sherman had before this started to return. This operation cost more than 300 men. It effected nothing that Grant had designed. But Van Horne's History states that upon the intelligence gained by this movement, Thomas was impressed with the feasibility of a plan to turn Johnston's position by a move- ment through Snake Creek Gap, and requested Dermission from Grant to make preparation for it. But that Thomas should do this was not in Grant's ideas. In the following May this movement was made by Gen. Sherman, with the three armies combined, but made in such a manner as to leave the way open for Johnston to retreat. Gen. Sherman's march, bordered by Con- federate cavalry, reached Meridian, 150 miles from Vicksburg, on the 14th of February. Here he set his infantry at work destroying the Mobile & Ohio Railroad south and north, and the Jackson & Selma Railroad east and west. The rolling stock of these roads had been removed. Meanwhile Admiral Parra- GUT, at Sherman's request, made a co-operative demonstration against the forts in Mobile har- bor. Whatever indecision Sherman may have had hitherto, whether his movement was a raid, or a campaign to Mobile, was solved at Meridian, where he decided that it was a raid. He issued a s^^ecial order at Meridian on the 18th, beginning: Having fulfilled, and well, all the objects of the expedition, the troops will return to the Mississippi to embark in another equally important movement. This order gave directions for the return march, to begin on the 20th. It appears that after his return he began to doubt that his ex- pedition had fulfilled all its objects, and he charged a default on Gen. Smith for not mov- ing at the appointed time, and for failing to join him at Meridian. But his communica- tion to Gen. Grant, including Gen. Smith's report, expressed only a mild dissatisfaction, and closed with this satisfaction : "Neverthe- less, on the whole, we accomplished all I un- dertook." His dissatisfaction, however, grew with years, and in his memoirs he gave a stronger version of Gen. Smith's conduct, and said: Gen. Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though I still regard him as a most accom- plished gentleman and a skillful engineer. .Since the close of the war he has appealed to me to re- lieve him of that censure, but I could not do it, be- cause it would falsify history. Let the truth of history stand, thougli military heads fall! But Gen. Boynton's very accurate criticism of Gen. Sherman's memoirs, which he treats of as a raid upon history, reviews this affair from the records, and proves that Sherman's order to Smith did not fix February 1, nor any exact time, for his start, but that he was to wait for a certain cavalrj' force, of which an entire brigade and a battery were to come from the North; that this brigade marched 250 miles, over a coun- try covered with snow and ice, crossing dif- ficult rivers, to reach Memphis on the Sth, after which Smith gave them only three days to refit before he started. Besides, Gen, Smith's movement was op- posed by Forrest's cavalry, estimated at 6,000, which was in no way diverted from him by Sherman's movement. To order a cavalry force of only 7,000 on an isolated inarch of 250 miles into the heart of a hos- tile country, opposed by a cavalry force so nearly equal, seems a wild operation. To go 140 miles of this way, and then return in safety, argues very good troops and a good General. Sherman says in the memoirs that Smith suffered a defeat at West Point, but he simply found Forrest, with about an equal force, in a very strong position to resist his crossing of a river, and that was his turning point from the wild expedition. The damage which Smith inflicted on the enemy seems about equal to Sherman's. He went further, and besides his great destruction of railroads, cotton, and corn, he brought in 3,000 horses and mules, and 1,.500 negroes — these last in pursuance of orders. Besides, from the unavoidable delay in starting, it was now impossible for him to join Sherman at Meridian on the day he had appointed to be there— namely, the 10th— even if it had ever been possible. Sherman did not get there till the 14th, and eight days after that he told his troops that they had done all they came to do. And Sherman was already going back when Gen. Smith — 201 — turned. Only in history did Sherman be- come implacable to Smith; for when Sher- man succeeded Grant in the Western com- mand he retained Smith, who had been Grant's Chief of Cavalry, as his own Chief of Staff', and intrusted him with the organization of the cavalry for the Atlanta campaign. Furthermore, Gen. Sherman assured Gen. Smith that his own movements on Meridian and the contemplated operations there did not of necessity depend on a junction with the cavalry from Memphis. If it had been otherwise, and if movements from these re- mote points, on such long and widely separat- ed routes into the unknown, had been planned by Gen. Sherman to depend on so exact a junction, it is hard to see how Gen. Smith could ever have regained any confidence in Sherman as a soldier or as a man of .sound mind. If theexiteclition was only a raid to destroy railroads, what was the need of Gen. Smith's joining Sherman at Meridian, when he was separately doing the same devastation? And if only a raid to Meridian, to destroy railroads. Gen. Grant ordered a very costly co-opera- tion when he ordered Gen. Thomas to attack Johnston at Kocky Face Ridge, to divert the enemy from Sherman, thereby to sacrifice his own veterans to help Sherman destroy rail- roads. This affair, like that of the previous spring in moving away fromVicksburg,showed the tendency of the minds of Grant and Sherman to tentative raids, rather than con- nected and comprehensive campaigns. This had exercise on a still greater scale in the following autumn, when Sherman, with a great army, turned his back on the still un- broken Confederate army, and marched ofT to raid the undefended country, abandoning all the objectives ot the enormously dear cam- paign, and leaving the real war to be sus- tained by Gen. Thomas, with the lesser num- ber of troops, widely divided in holding his lines of supply. The winter thus wore away without ap- parently evolving' any comi)rehensive plan of operations on either side. In anticipation of some campaign further into the South, Gen. Thomas made active preparations to sup- ply the army and to guard the lines of sup- ply, by constructing block houses at the rail- road bridges and depots. Early in March Gen. Grant became apprehensive that John- ston was to resume the oflTensive, but no im- portant movement was made. The victory in the battles about Chatta- nooga, like the Vicksburg campaign, was ascribed to Gen. Grant's military genius. His fame was now raised to the zenith, and his prestige was irresistible to the executive administration and to the politicians of Con- gress. A bill was introduced into the House of Representatives by Hon. E. B. Washburne — he whom Badeau tells of as falling away from Grant when the army was stuck in the Mississippi mud, and advising Lincoln to re- move him — to create the rank of Lieutenant General, "to command the armies of the United States." It became a law on the 2(Jth of February. The President on the 1st of March nominated Grant to this exalted rank, and he was immediatelj' confirmed. On the 3d of March Grant was summoned to Washington, which he reached on the 8th. He returned to the West to close up his affairs, and on the 23d arrived in Washingtcm to enter upon his great command. He was now military autocrat. The President and Secretary of War assured him of their inten- tion to give him the absolute control of all military movements. Upon his requirement Sherman was placed in connnand of the mili- tary division of the Mississip])!, over the head of Gen. Thomas, his senior, and McPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, over the head of Hurlbut. Gen. Grant, in the East, found a great, thoroughly disciplined, high spirited, veteran army; seasoned by many battles, in which it had always shown fighting qualities of the highest order; officered by his seiiiors in serv- ice; ready to be taken in hand by him and consumed, and he did not come short of his great opportunity. ERROR. On page 105, for Landman road Landrum.